Source: https://openjurist.org/480/us/421/immigration-and-naturalization-service-v-cardoza-fonseca
Timestamp: 2018-08-20 15:02:39
Document Index: 672165797

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 208', '§ 101', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 243', '§ 1253', '§ 1158', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 208', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 1158', '§ 1101', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 203', '§ 243', '§ 101', '§ 1157', '§ 1158', '§ 203', '§ 1153', '§ 203', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 203', '§ 243', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 207', '§ 203', '§ 42', '§ 37', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 243', '§ 208', '§ 1158', '§ 243', '§ 1253', '§ 5', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 1253', '§ 1158', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 208', '§ 1158', '§ 108', '§ 242', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 243', '§ 203', '§ 1153', '§ 1159', '§ 243', '§ 1253', '§ 209', '§ 1159', '§ 203', '§ 243', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 207', '§ 208', '§ 101', '§ 203', '§ 101', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 243', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 243', '§ 208']

480 US 421 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca | OpenJurist
480 U.S. 421 - Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca
480 US 421 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca
107 S.Ct. 1207
94 L.Ed.2d 434
Luz Marina CARDOZA-FONSECA.
Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) requires that the Attorney General withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his "life or freedom would be threatened" thereby on account of specified factors. The above-quoted phrase requires a showing that "it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution" in the country to which he would be returned. In contrast, § 208(a) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to a "refugee," who, under § 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, is unable or unwilling to return to his home country because of persecution or "a well founded fear" thereof on account of particular factors. At respondent illegal alien's deportation hearing, the Immigration Judge applied the § 243(h) "more likely than not" proof standard to her § 208(a) asylum claim, holding that she had not established "a clear probability of persecution" and therefore was not entitled to relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 208(a)'s "well-founded fear" standard is more generous than the § 243(h) standard in that it only requires asylum applicants to show either past persecution or "good reason" to fear future persecution. Accordingly, the asylum claim was remanded so that BIA could evaluate it under the proper legal standard.
Since 1980, the Immigration and Nationality Act has provided two methods through which an otherwise deportable alien who claims that he will be persecuted if deported can seek relief. Section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his "life or freedom would be threatened" on account of one of the listed factors if he is deported. In INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984), we held that to qualify for this entitlement to withholding of deportation, an alien must demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution" in the country to which he would be returned. Id., at 429-430, 104 S.Ct., at 2501. The Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 102, also established a second type of broader relief. Section 208(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
In Stevic, we rejected an alien's contention that the § 208(a) "well-founded fear" standard governs applications for withholding of deportation under § 243(h).1 Similarly, today we reject the Government's contention that the § 243(h) standard, which requires an alien to show that he is more likely than not to be subject to persecution, governs applications for asylum under § 208(a). Congress used different, broader language to define the term "refugee" as used in § 208(a) than it used to describe the class of aliens who have a right to withholding of deportation under § 243(h). The Act's establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to the country where they are in danger, mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. In addition, the legislative history of the 1980 Act makes it perfectly clear that Congress did not intend the class of aliens who qualify as refugees to be coextensive with the class who qualify for § 243(h) relief.
In the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respondent did not challenge the BIA's decision that she was not entitled to withholding of deportation under § 243(h), but argued that she was eligible for consideration for asylum under § 208(a), and contended that the Immigration Judge and BIA erred in applying the "more likely than not" standard of proof from § 243(h) to her § 208(a) asylum claim. Instead, she asserted, they should have applied the "well-founded fear" standard, which she considered to be more generous. The court agreed. Relying on both the text and the structure of the Act, the court held that the "well-founded fear" standard which governs asylum proceedings is different, and in fact more generous, than the "clear probability" standard which governs withholding of deportation proceedings. 767 F.2d 1448, 1452-1453 (CA9 1985). Agreeing with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court interpreted the standard to require asylum applicants to present " 'specific facts' through objective evidence to prove either past persecution or 'good reason' to fear future persecution." Id., at 1453 (citing Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (CA7 1984)). The court remanded respondent's asylum claim to the BIA to evaluate under the proper legal standard. We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict on this important question.2 475 U.S. 1009, 106 S.Ct. 1181, 89 L.Ed.2d 298 (1986).3
The Refugee Act of 1980 established a new statutory procedure for granting asylum to refugees.4 The 1980 Act added a new § 208(a) to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, reading as follows:
"The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title." 94 Stat. 105, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
"The term 'refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. . . ." 94 Stat. 102, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Thus, the "persecution or well-founded fear of persecution" standard governs the Attorney General's determination whether an alien is eligible for asylum.5
In addition to establishing a statutory asylum process, the 1980 Act amended the withholding of deportation provision,6 § 243(h). See Stevic, 467 U.S., at 421, n. 15, 104 S.Ct., at 2496, n. 15. Prior to 1968, the Attorney General had discretion whether to grant withholding of deportation to aliens under § 243(h). In 1968, however, the United States agreed to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6259-6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968); see generally Stevic, supra, at 416-417, 104 S.Ct., at 2494. Article 33.1 of the Convention, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954), reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, which is the counterpart of § 243(h) of our statute, imposed a mandatory duty on contracting States not to return an alien to a country where his "life or freedom would be threatened" on account of one of the enumerated reasons.7 See infra, at 411. Thus, although § 243(h) itself did not constrain the Attorney General's discretion after 1968, presumably he honored the dictates of the United Nations Convention.8 In any event, the 1980 Act removed the Attorney General's discretion in § 243(h) proceedings.9
To begin with, the language Congress used to describe the two standards conveys very different meanings. The "would be threatened" language of § 243(h) has no subjective component, but instead requires the alien to establish by objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he or she will be subject to persecution upon deportation.10 See Stevic, supra. In contrast, the reference to "fear" in the § 208(a) standard obviously makes the eligibility determination turn to some extent on the subjective mental state of the alien.11 "The linguistic difference between the words 'well-founded fear' and 'clear probability' may be as striking as that between a subjective and an objective frame of reference. . . . We simply cannot conclude that the standards are identical." Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1250 (CA5 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-388; see also Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 64 (CA2 1986); 767 F.2d, at 1452 (case below).
The different emphasis of the two standards which is so clear on the face of the statute is significantly highlighted by the fact that the same Congress simultaneously drafted § 208(a) and amended § 243(h). In doing so, Congress chose to maintain the old standard in § 243(h), but to incorporate a different standard in § 208(a). " '[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' " Russello v. United States, supra, 464 U.S., at 23, 104 S.Ct., at 300 (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). The contrast between the language used in the two standards, and the fact that Congress used a new standard to define the term "refugee," certainly indicate that Congress intended the two standards to differ.
The message conveyed by the plain language of the Act is confirmed by an examination of its history.12 Three aspects of that history are particularly compelling: The pre-1980 experience under § 203(a)(7), the only prior statute dealing with asylum; the abundant evidence of an intent to conform the definition of "refugee" and our asylum law to the United Nation's Protocol to which the United States has been bound since 1968; and the fact that Congress declined to enact the Senate version of the bill that would have made a refugee ineligible for asylum unless "his deportation or return would be prohibited by § 243(h)."
The statutory definition of the term "refugee" contained in § 101(a)(42) applies to two asylum provisions within the Immigration and Nationality Act.13 Section 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157, governs the admission of refugees who seek admission from foreign countries. Section 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, sets out the process by which refugees currently in the United States may be granted asylum. Prior to the 1980 amendments there was no statutory basis for granting asylum to aliens who applied from within the United States.14 Asylum for aliens applying for admission from foreign countries had, however, been the subject of a previous statutory provision, and Congress' intent with respect to the changes that it sought to create in that statute are instructive in discerning the meaning of the term "well-founded fear."
Section § 203(a)(7) of the pre-1980 statute authorized the Attorney General to permit "conditional entry" to a certain number of refugees fleeing from Communist-dominated areas or the Middle East "because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." 79 Stat. 913, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976 ed.). The standard that was applied to aliens seeking admission pursuant to § 203(a)(7) was unquestionably more lenient than the "clear probability" standard applied in § 243(h) proceedings. In Matter of Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 569-570 (1967), for example, the BIA "found no support" for the argument that "an alien deportee is required to do no more than meet the standards applied under section 203(a)(7) of the Act when seeking relief under section 243(h)." Similarly, in Matter of Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 201, 202 (1967), the Board held that an alien's inability to satisfy § 243(h) was not determinative of her eligibility under the "substantially broader" standards of § 203(a)(7). One of the differences the Board highlighted between the statutes was that § 243(h) requires a showing that the applicant "would be" subject to persecution, while § 203(a)(7) only required a showing that the applicant was unwilling to return "because of persecution or fear of persecution." 12 I. & N., at 202 (emphasis in original). In sum, it was repeatedly recognized that the standards were significantly different.15
At first glance one might conclude that this wide practice under the old § 203(a)(7), which spoke of "fear of persecution," is not probative of the meaning of the term "well-founded fear of persecution" which Congress adopted in 1980. Analysis of the legislative history, however, demonstrates that Congress added the "well-founded" language only because that was the language incorporated by the United Nations Protocol to which Congress sought to conform. See infra, at 436-437. Congress was told that the extant asylum procedure for refugees outside of the United States was acceptable under the Protocol, except for the fact that it made various unacceptable geographic and political distinctions.16 The legislative history indicates that Congress in no way wished to modify the standard that had been used under § 203(a)(7).17 Adoption of the INS's argument that the term "well-founded fear" requires a showing of clear probability of persecution would clearly do violence to Congress' intent that the standard for admission under § 207 be no different than the one previously applied under § 203(a)(7).18
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of "refugee," and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the United States acceded in 1968.19 Indeed, the definition of "refugee" that Congress adopted, see supra, at 428, is virtually identical to the one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Convention which defines a "refugee" as an individual who
The origin of the Protocol's definition of "refugee" is found in the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO). See 62 Stat. 3037. The IRO defined a "refugee" as a person who had a "valid objection" to returning to his country of nationality, and specified that "fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or political opinions . . ." constituted a valid objection. See IRO Constitution, Annex 1, Pt. 1, § C1(a)(i). The term was then incorporated in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,20 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (July 28, 1951). The Committee that drafted the provision explained that "[t]he expression 'well-founded fear of being the victim of persecution . . .' means that a person has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why he fears persecution." U.N.Rep., at 39. The 1967 Protocol incorporated the "well-founded fear" test, without modification. The standard, as it has been consistently understood by those who drafted it, as well as those drafting the documents that adopted it, certainly does not require an alien to show that it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted in order to be classified as a "refugee."21
In interpreting the Protocol's definition of "refugee" we are further guided by the analysis set forth in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979).22 The Handbook explains that "[i]n general, the applicant's fear should be considered well founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there." Id., at Ch. II B(2)(a) § 42; see also id., §§ 37-41.
The High Commissioner's analysis of the United Nations' standard is consistent with our own examination of the origins of the Protocol's definition,23 as well as the conclusions of many scholars who have studied the matter.24 There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no "well-founded fear" of the event happening. See supra, at 431. As we pointed out in Stevic, a moderate interpretation of the "well-founded fear" standard would indicate "that so long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility." 467 U.S., at 424-425, 104 S.Ct., at 2498.
In Stevic, we dealt with the issue of withholding of deportation, or nonrefoulement, under § 243(h). This provision corresponds to Article 33.1 of the Convention.25 Significantly though, Article 33.1 does not extend this right to everyone who meets the definition of "refugee." Rather, it provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group or political opinion." 19 U.S.T., at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S., at 176 (emphasis added). Thus, Article 33.1 requires that an applicant satisfy two burdens: first, that he or she be a "refugee," i.e., prove at least a "wellfounded fear of persecution"; second, that the "refugee" show that his or her life or freedom "would be threatened" if deported. Section 243(h)'s imposition of a "would be threatened" requirement is entirely consistent with the United States' obligations under the Protocol.
Both the House bill, H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), and the Senate bill, S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), provided that an alien must be a "refugee" within the meaning of the Act in order to be eligible for asylum. The two bills differed, however, in that the House bill authorized the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to any refugee, whereas the Senate bill imposed the additional requirement that a refugee could not obtain asylum unless "his deportation or return would be prohibited under section 243(h)."26 S.Rep., at 26. Although this restriction, if adopted, would have curtailed the Attorney General's discretion to grant asylum to refugees pursuant to § 208(a), it would not have affected the standard used to determine whether an alien is a "refugee." Thus, the inclusion of this prohibition in the Senate bill indicates that the Senate recognized that there is a difference between the "well-founded fear" standard and the clear probability standard.27 The enactment of the House bill rather than the Senate bill in turn demonstrates that Congress eventually refused to restrict eligibility for asylum only to aliens meeting the stricter standard. "Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language." Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359, 392-393, 100 S.Ct. 1723, 1741-1742, 64 L.Ed.2d 354 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200, 95 S.Ct. 392, 401, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S., at 23, 104 S.Ct., at 300.
First, the INS repeatedly argues that the structure of the Act dictates a decision in its favor, since it is anomalous for § 208(a), which affords greater benefits than § 243(h), see n. 6, supra, to have a less stringent standard of eligibility. This argument sorely fails because it does not take into account the fact that an alien who satisfies the applicable standard under § 208(a) does not have a right to remain in the United States; he or she is simply eligible for asylum, if the Attorney General, in his discretion, chooses to grant it. An alien satisfying § 243(h)'s stricter standard, in contrast, is automatically entitled to withholding of deportation.28 In Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (1982), for example, the Board held that the alien was eligible for both asylum and withholding of deportation, but granted him the more limited remedy only, exercising its discretion to deny him asylum. See also Walai v. INS, 552 F.Supp. 998 (SDNY 1982); Mat of Shirdel, Interim Decision No. 2958 (BIA Feb. 21, 1984). We do not consider it at all anomalous that out of the entire class of "refugees," those who can show a clear probability of persecution are entitled to mandatory suspension of deportation and eligible for discretionary asylum, while those who can only show a well-founded fear of persecution are not entitled to anything, but are eligible for the discretionary relief of asylum.
The INS's second principal argument in support of the proposition that the "well founded fear" and "clear probability" standard are equivalent is that the BIA so construes the two standards. The INS argues that the BIA's construction of the Refugee Act of 1980 is entitled to substantial deference, even if we conclude that the Court of Appeals' reading of the statutes is more in keeping with Congress' intent.29 This argument is unpersuasive.
The question whether Congress intended the two standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide. Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we have concluded that Congress did not intend the two standards to be identical.30 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), we explained:
"The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. [Citing cases.] If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect." Id., at 843, n. 9, 104 S.Ct., at 2782, n. 9 (citations omitted).
The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the same is, of course, quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply either or both standards to a particular set of facts. There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like "well-founded fear" which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling " 'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,' " the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program. See Chevron, supra, at 843, 104 S.Ct., at 2781-2782, quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1072, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). But our task today is much narrower, and is well within the province of the judiciary. We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the "well-founded fear" test should be applied.31 Instead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the two standards are identical.32
I join the Court's opinion and judgment. Thus, I accept its "narrow" conclusion that "the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the [standards for withholding of deportation and granting asylum] are identical." Ante, at 448. In accordance with this holding, the Court eschews any attempt to give substance to the term "well-founded fear" and leaves that task to the "process of case-by-case adjudication" by the INS, the agency in charge of administering the immigration laws. Ante, at 1221. I write separately and briefly to emphasize my understanding that, in its opinion, the Court has directed the INS to the appropriate sources from which the agency should derive the meaning of the "well-founded fear" standard, a meaning that will be refined in later adjudication. This emphasis, I believe, is particularly needed where, as here, an agency's previous interpretation of the statutory term is so strikingly contrary to plain language and legislative history.
Thus, as the Court observes, ante, at 430-431, the very language of the term "well-founded fear" demands a particular type of analysis—an examination of the subjective feelings of an applicant for asylum coupled with an inquiry into the objective nature of the articulated reasons for the fear. Moreover, in describing how, in the 1980 Act, Congress was attempting to bring this country's refugee laws into conformity with the United Nations Protocol, the Court notes that the Act's definition of refugee, wherein the "well-founded fear" term appears, ante, at 427, tracks the language of the Protocol. See ante, at 436-437. Such language has a rich history of interpretation in international law and scholarly commentaries. See ante, at 437-440, and nn. 20, 24. While the INS need not ignore other sources of guidance, the above directions by the Court should be significant in the agency's formulation of the "well-founded fear" standard.
Finally, in my view, the well-reasoned opinions of the Courts of Appeals, that almost uniformly have rejected the INS's misreading of statutory language and legislative history, provide an admirable example of the very "case-by-case adjudication" needed for the development of the standard. Although the Court refers to a conflict among these courts, see ante, at 426, n. 2, with one exception, see ibid., all the Courts of Appeals that have addressed this question have concluded that the standards for withholding of deportation and granting asylum are not the same. Rather, differences in opinion have arisen as to the precise formulation of the "well-founded fear" standard.* Such differences can arise only when courts or agencies seriously grapple with the problems of developing a standard, whose form is at first given by the statutory language and the intimations of the legislative history, but whose final contours are shaped by the application of the standard to the facts of specific cases. The efforts of these courts stand in stark contrast to—but, it is sad to say, alone cannot make up for—the years of seemingly purposeful blindness by the INS, which only now begins its task of developing the standard entrusted to its care.
I agree with the Court that the plain meaning of "well-founded fear" and the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) clearly demonstrate that the "well-founded fear" standard and the "clear probability" standard are not equivalent. I concur in the judgment rather than join the Court's opinion, however, for two reasons. First, despite having reached the above conclusion, the Court undertakes an exhaustive investigation of the legislative history of the Act. Ante, at 432-443. It attempts to justify this inquiry by relying upon the doctrine that if the legislative history of an enactment reveals a " 'clearly expressed legislative intention' contrary to [the enactment's] language," the Court is required to "question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses." Ante, at 1213, n. 12. Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval of this doctrine, that is to my mind an ill-advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect—at least in the absence of a patent absurdity. See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 18 L.Ed. 830 (1868); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 34, 15 S.Ct. 508, 515, 39 L.Ed. 601 (1895) (opinion of Harlan, J.); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492, 67 S.Ct. 789, 793, 91 L.Ed. 1040 (1947) (opinion of Jackson, J.); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 693, 68 S.Ct. 331, 334, 92 L.Ed. 297 (1948) (opinion of Black, J.); Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 64, 73 S.Ct. 580, 583, 97 L.Ed. 821 (1953) (opinion of Douglas, J.). Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.
I am far more troubled, however, by the Court's discussion of the question whether the INS's interpretation of "well-founded fear" is entitled to deference. Since the Court quite rightly concludes that the INS's interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of that phrase and the structure of the Act, see ante, at 431-432, 449 and n. 12, there is simply no need and thus no justification for a discussion of whether the interpretation is entitled to deference. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress" (footnote omitted)). Even more unjustifiable, however, is the Court's use of this superfluous discussion as the occasion to express controversial, and I believe erroneous, views on the meaning of this Court's decision in Chevron. Chevron stated that where there is no "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," id., at 843, 104 S.Ct., at 2781-2782, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency," id., at 844, 104 S.Ct., at 2782. This Court has consistently interpreted Chevron—which has been an extremely important and frequently cited opinion, not only in this Court but in the Courts of Appeals—as holding that courts must give effect to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional intent. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 233-234, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2867-2868, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986); United States v. Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 666-667, 106 S.Ct. 1422, 1427-1428, 89 L.Ed.2d 661 (1986); Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375-2376, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125, 126, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1107, 1108, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985). The Court's discussion is flatly inconsistent with this well-established interpretation. The Court first implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever, "[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction," they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute. Ante, at 446. But this approach would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron.
The Court also implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever they face "a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide," ante, at 446, rather than a "question of interpretation [in which] the agency is required to apply [a legal standard] to a particular set of facts," ante, at 448. No support is adduced for this proposition, which is contradicted by the case the Court purports to be interpreting, since in Chevron the Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's abstract interpretation of the phrase "stationary source."
Many people come to our country because they fear persecution in their homeland. Congress has provided two forms of relief for such people: asylum, see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 208(a), as added by 94 Stat. 105, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); and withholding of deportation, see 66 Stat. 212, § 243(h), as amended, 94 Stat. 107, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has concluded that there is no practical distinction between the objective proofs an alien must submit to be eligible for these two forms of relief. The Court rejects this conclusion. Because I believe the BIA's interpretation of the statute is reasonable, I dissent.
The BIA's interpretation of the statutory term "well-founded fear" appears in Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986 (Mar. 1, 1985).1 Under the BIA's analysis, an immigration judge evaluating an asylum application should begin by determining the underlying historical facts. The burden of persuasion rests on the applicant, who must establish the truth of these facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See id., at 7 (citing, inter alia, 1A C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 5.10b, p. 5-121 (rev. ed. 1986)).
Once the immigration judge has decided what historical facts the applicant has demonstrated, he then decides whether those facts meet the definition of "refugee" set forth in § 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The major point of contention in this case concerns that section's requirement that the fear be "well-founded."2 In Acosta, the BIA adhered to the interpretation of that language it had developed in Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973):
" '[T]he requirement that the fear be "well-founded" rules out an apprehension which is purely subjective. . . . Some sort of showing must be made and this can ordinarily be done only by objective evidence. The claimant's own testimony as to the facts will sometimes be all that is available; but the crucial question is whether the testimony, if accepted as true, makes out a realistic likelihood that he will be persecuted.' " Acosta, supra, at 18-19 (quoting Dunar, supra, at 319) (emphasis added by Acosta Board).
"By use of such words [as 'realistic likelihood'] we do not mean that 'a well-founded fear of persecution' requires an alien to establish to a particular degree of certainty, such as a 'probability' as opposed to a 'possibility,' that he will become a victim of persecution. Rather as a practical matter, what we mean can best be described as follows: the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien." Acosta, supra, at 22.
In Part II of its opinion, the Court examines the language of the Act. Section 243(h) provides that the Attorney General shall grant withholding of deportation to any country where "such alien's life or freedom would be threatened." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). Section 208(a) provides that the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum "if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee." § 1158(a). The crucial language of § 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, as added by 94 Stat. 102, defines a refugee as a person who has "a well-founded fear of persecution." § 1101(a)(42)(A). In the Court's view, this language all but disposes of the case. Ante, at 427-432.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court gives short shrift to the words "well-founded," that clearly require some objective basis for the alien's fear. The critical question presented by this case is whether the objective basis required for a fear of persecution to be "well-founded" differs in practice from the objective basis required for there to be a "clear probability" of persecution. Because both standards necessarily contemplate some objective basis, I cannot agree with the Court's implicit conclusion that the statute resolves this question on its face. In my view, the character of evidence sufficient to meet these two standards is a question best answered by an entity familiar with the types of evidence and issues that arise in such cases. Congress limited eligibility for asylum to those persons whom "the Attorney General determines" to be refugees. See § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). The Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for making these determinations to the BIA. That Board has examined more of these cases than any court ever has or ever can. It has made a considered judgment that the difference between the "well-founded" and the "clear probability" standards is of no practical import: that is, the evidence presented in asylum and withholding of deportation cases rarely, if ever, will meet one of these standards without meeting both. This is just the type of expert judgment—formed by the entity to whom Congress has committed the question—to which we should defer.
Common sense and human experience support the BIA's conclusion. Governments rarely persecute people by the numbers. It is highly unlikely that the evidence presented at an asylum or withholding of deportation hearing will demonstrate the mathematically specific risk of persecution posited by the Court's hypothetical. Taking account of the types of evidence normally available in asylum cases, the BIA has chosen to make a qualitative evaluation of "realistic likelihoods." As I read the Acosta opinion, an individual who fled his country to avoid mass executions might be eligible for both withholding of deportation and asylum, whether or not he presented evidence of the numerical reach of the persecution. See Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986, at 18-25.3 Nowhere does the Court consider whether the BIA's four-element interpretation of "well-founded" is unreasonable. Nor does the Court consider the BIA's view of the types of evidentiary presentations aliens generally make in asylum cases.
In sum, the words Congress has chosen—"well-founded" fear—are ambiguous. They contemplate some objective basis without specifying a particular evidentiary threshold. There is no reason to suppose this formulation is inconsistent with the analysis set forth in Acosta. The BIA has concluded that a fear is not "well-founded" unless the fear has an objective basis indicating that there is a "realistic likelihood" that persecution would occur. Based on the text of the Act alone, I cannot conclude that this conclusion is unreasonable.
In contrast, the United States argues that Congress chose the words "well-founded fear" to preserve the Attorney General's regulations governing applications for asylum by aliens in the United States.4 These regulations were substantially in accord with the BIA's view, namely that there is no significant difference between the "well-founded fear" and "clear probability" standards. Compare 8 CFR §§ 108.3(a) and 236.3(a)(2) (1980) (asylum) with 8 CFR § 242.17(c) (1980) (withholding of deportation). Common sense suggests that the United States has the better of this argument. It is more natural to speak of "preserving" an interpretation that had governed the same form of relief than one that had applied to a different form of relief.
Moreover, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress was referring to the regulations rather than to § 203(a)(7). The Senate Report states that the bill "improve and§ clarif[ies] the procedures for determining asylum claims filed by aliens who are physically present in the United States. The substantive standard is not changed." S.Rep. No. 96-256, p. 9 (1979), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, p. 149. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 435, n. 17, this statement unquestionably refers to the informal procedures for aliens in the United States, not the statutory procedures under § 203(a)(7).5 Similarly, the House Report states that "the new definition does not create a new and expanded means of entry, but instead regularizes and formalizes the policies and practices that have been followed in recent years." H.R.Rep. No. 96-608, p. 10 (1979) (emphasis added). Congress hardly would have felt a need to "formalize" the statutory procedures under § 203(a)(7). Indeed, the House Report cites the Attorney General's regulations as the extant procedures to which it was referring. H.R.Rep., at 17.
In any event, the materials discussed by the Court shed little or no light on the question presented by this case. None of them states that the burden of proof for nonrefoulement under Article 33.1 of the United Nations Protocol of 1967—a remedy essentially identical to withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the Act—is higher than the burden of proof for asylum under Article 34. The only thing the materials tend to establish is that a mathematical approach to the likelihood of persecution in asylum cases is arguably inconsistent with the sense of the drafters of the Protocol. The BIA has declined to adopt such an approach. See supra, at 457-459. It is simply irrelevant that this approach might be inconsistent with the views of commentators on the Protocol.
Neither the premise of the Court nor its conclusion is justified. The language of the Senate bill does not demonstrate that the Senate recognized a difference between the two standards. The Senate just as easily could have included the language to ensure that the Attorney General held to his position that there was no difference between the standards. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the changes made by the Conference Committee reflected a considered rejection of this portion of the Senate's definition of refugee. Rather, the Conference Committee Report demonstrates that the Conference thought both bills adopted the same general definition of refugee—the U.N. definition. See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 96-781, p. 19 (1980). The differences the Conference saw between the bills related to treatment of refugees still in their homeland, and to refugees who have been "firmly resettled" in another country. See ibid.
In short, I see no reason to believe that the minor differences in wording between the Senate bill and the Act as passed reflect a rejection of the position that there is no significant difference between the two standards.6 Thus, I place no weight on the Conference Committee's choice of the language of the House bill.
Even if I agreed with the Court's conclusion that there is a significant difference between the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and uphold the decision of the BIA in this case.7 A careful reading of the decisions of the BIA and the Immigration Judge demonstrates that the BIA applied the lower asylum standard to this case.
"None of the evidence indicates that the respondent would be persecuted for political beliefs, whatever they may be, or because she belongs to a particular social group. She has not proven that she or any other members of her family, other than her brother, has [sic] been detained, interrogated, arrested and imprisoned, tortured and convicted and sentenced by the regime presently in power in Nicaragua." Ibid.
The absence of such evidence was particularly probative, because many of the other members of respondent's family—her parents, two sisters, her brother's wife, and her brother's two children—were still in Nicaragua and thus presumably subject to the persecution respondent feared.
"has openly admitted that she herself has taken no actions against the Nicaraguan government. She admits that she has never been politically active. She testified that she never assisted her brother in any of his political activities. Moreover, she admits that she has never been singled out for persecution by the present government." App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a.8
"[T]he Board appears to feel that it is exempt from the holding of Marbury v. Madison [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) ] . . . and not constrained by circuit court opinions. . . . [T]he Board applied its own construction of the applicant's burden of proof in an asylum case to the claims of both Cardoza-Fonseca and [her copetitioner]. It held that they were required to demonstrate a clear probability of persecution in order to be declared eligible for asylum." 767 F.2d, at 1454 (citation omitted).
This statement is simply inconsistent with the BIA's opinion. As I have explained, the BIA acknowledged the conflicting decisions of the various Courts of Appeals and explicitly tested the application under three different standards. The least burdensome of these—the "good reason" standard—is identical to the court's statement quoted supra this page. The Court of Appeals completely ignored the words in which the BIA framed its decision. It failed to examine the factual findings on which the decision rested. At least in this case, it appears that the Court of Appeals, and not the BIA, has misunderstood the proper relation between courts and agencies. That court properly could have considered whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that respondent failed to demonstrate a "good reason" to fear persecution, but it should not have assumed that the BIA tested respondent's application by a higher standard than the BIA's own opinion reflects.
Prior to the amendments, asylum for aliens who were within the United States had been governed by regulations promulgated by the INS, pursuant to the Attorney General's broad parole authority. See n. 14, infra. Asylum for applicants who were not within the United States was generally governed by the now-repealed § 203(a)(7) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976 ed.). See infra, at 433.
"Section 243(h) relief is 'country specific' and accordingly, the applicant here would be presently protected from deportation to Afghanistan pursuant to section 243(h). But that section would not prevent his exclusion and deportation to Pakistan or any other hospitable country under section 237(a) if that country will accept him. In contrast, asylum is a greater form of relief. When granted asylum the alien may be eligible for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to section 209 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159, after residing here one year, subject to numerical limitations and the applicable regulations." Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (1982).
As amended, the new § 243(h) provides: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (emphasis added).
The definition also applies to § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159, which governs the adjustment of status of refugees after they have been granted asylum.
The argument that Congress intended to adhere to the standard used in the informal parole proceedings cannot be squared with Congress' use of an entirely different formulation of the standard for defining "refugee"—one much closer to § 203(a)(7), than to § 243(h) (the statute which was the focus of the standard developed in the 1980 regulations). Moreover, to the extent that Congress was ambiguous as to which practice it sought to incorporate, it is far more reasonable to conclude that it sought to continue the practice under § 203(a)(7), a statutory provision, than to adhere to the informal parole practices of the Attorney General, a matter in which Congress had no involvement.
The Government relies on the following passage from the Senate Report to support its contention that Congress sought to incorporate the standard from the parole proceedings—not from § 203(a)(7):
Justice POWELL's claim that the House Report also sought to incorporate the informal asylum standard is unfounded. Post, at 462-463. As the passage he quotes and the context plainly indicate, the House Report referred to "means of entry"—an issue dealt with under § 203(a)(7), not the asylum regulations. See H.R.Rep., at 10. The Committee's reference to the Attorney General's asylum procedures, seven pages later in the text, in a discussion labeled "Asylum," and not even dealing with the definition of "well-founded fear," see id., at 17, certainly does nothing to support Justice POWELL's conclusion.
Although this evidence concerns application of the term "refugee" to § 207, not § 208, the term is defined in § 101(a)(42), and obviously can have only one meaning. Justice POWELL suggests that the definition of "well-founded fear" be interpreted as incorporating the standard from the asylum regulations, rather than the standard from § 203(a)(7), because "[i]t is more natural to speak of 'preserving' an interpretation that had governed the same form of relief than one that had applied to a different form of relief," post, at 462 (emphasis added). Since the definition in § 101(a)(42) applies to all asylum relief—that corresponding to the old § 203(a)(7) as well as that corresponding to the old Attorney General regulations—it is difficult to understand how Justice POWELL reasons that it is likely that Congress preserved the "same form of relief" (emphasis added). The question is: the "same" as which? Our answer, based on Congress' choice of language and the legislative history, is that Congress sought to incorporate the "same" standard as that used in § 203(a)(7).
The BIA has answered the question of the relationship between the objective § 243(h) standard and the fear-based standard of §§ 203(a)(7), 208, and the United Nations Protocol in at least three different ways. During the period between 1965, when § 203(a)(7) was enacted, and 1972, the BIA expressly recognized that § 203(a)(7) and § 243(h) prescribed different standards. See supra, at 433-434. Moreover, although the BIA decided in 1973 that the two standards were not irreconcilably different, see Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973), as of 1981 the INS was still instructing its officials to apply a "good reason" test to requests for asylum from aliens not within the United States. See Dept. of Justice, INS Operating Instructions Regulations TM 101, § 208.4, p. 766.9 (Nov. 11, 1981) (explaining that "well-founded fear" is satisfied if applicant "can show good reason why he/she fears persecution"). In 1984, when this case was decided by the BIA, it adhered to the view that the INS now espouses—complete identity of the standards. In 1985, however, the BIA decided to reevaluate its position
Justice POWELL argues that the Court of Appeals should be reversed for a different reason—that it misinterpreted the BIA's decision. See post, at 465-468. This issue was not raised in any of the parties' briefs, and was neither "set forth" nor "fairly included" within the question presented in the petition for certiorari. See this Court's Rule 20.1. The question presented asked: