Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/355/141/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-06-25 02:05:15
Document Index: 423864302

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 213', '§ 206', '§ 5', '§ 207', '§ 5', '§ 207', '§ 213', '§ 5', '§ 207', '§ 5', '§ 207', '§ 5', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207']

American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States (full text) :: 355 U.S. 141 (1957) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center Log In
American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States 355 U.S. 141 (1957)
U.S. Supreme CourtAmerican Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 141 (1957)American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United StatesNo. 6Argued October 23, 1957Decided December 9, 1957*355 U.S. 141APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
(f) The underlying policy of § 5(2)(b) must not be divorced from proceedings for new certificates under § 207, and the Commission must take "cognizance" of the National Transportation Policy and apply the Act "as a whole"; but the Commission does Page 355 U. S. 142 not act beyond its statutory authority when, in the public interest, it occasionally departs from the auxiliary and supplementary limitations in a § 207 proceeding. Pp. 355 U. S. 151-152.
144 F.Supp. 365 affirmed. Page 355 U. S. 143
These appeals involve, among subsidiary issues, the basic question of whether the Interstate Commerce Commission, in a proceeding under § 207(a) [Footnote 1] of the Interstate Commerce Act wherein a railroad subsidiary seeks a certificate permitting it to provide ordinary motor carrier service at or near the parent railroad's line, is required by § 5(2)(b) [Footnote 2] of the Act, and the National Transportation Page 355 U. S. 144 Policy to restrict such motor carrier service to that which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, the parent railroad's services. A three-judge District Court sitting in the District of Columbia upheld the action of the Commission in issuing a certificate without such restrictions. 144 F.Supp. 365. We agree with the conclusion of the District Court that, under the circumstances of this case, the action of the Commission was well founded.
In 1938, the Commission authorized Rock Island Motor Transit, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad, to purchase the property and operating rights of the White Line Motor Freight Company, between Silvis, Illinois, and Omaha, Nebraska. 5 M.C.C. 451. The operating certificate, issued in 1941, restricted Motor Transit to service to or from points on Page 355 U. S. 145 the Rock Island Railroad, subject to any further restrictions the Commission might impose "to insure that the service shall be auxiliary or supplementary to the train service. . . ." No. MC-29130. Three years later, the Commission allowed Motor Transit to purchase property and operating rights of the Frederickson Lines, covering routes between Atlantic, Iowa, and Omaha. 39 M.C.C. 824. Prior to issuing an operating certificate for the Frederickson routes, however, the Commission reopened both proceedings and imposed five conditions on Motor Transit's operation over the combined routes. [Footnote 5]
Although Motor Transit succeeded in its efforts to have this order set aside by a three-judge District Court, 90 F.Supp. 516, we upheld, on appeal, the power of the Commission to impose the conditions, and reversed the order of the District Court. United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 340 U. S. 419 (1951). Pursuant to Page 355 U. S. 146 our holding, a certificate was issued in September, 1951, containing the restrictions as originally ordered. [Footnote 6]
The order was attacked in the District Court by American Trucking Associations, Inc., its Regular Common Carrier Conference, and nine motor carriers -- all appellants in No. 6. The Railway Labor Executives' Association Page 355 U. S. 147 and two organizations which since have become members thereof -- all of whom are appellants in No. 8 -- intervened in opposition to the order. Answers were filed by the United States and the Commission. Intervenors in support of the order included Motor Transit, a committee of its employees, the Iowa State Commerce Commission, and numerous Chambers of Commerce and shipper organizations. These appeals were taken from the order of the District Court upholding the certificate as granted.
By § 5(2)(b), which was formerly § 213(a)(1) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 555, the Congress authorized consolidation, merger, acquisition, or lease of carriers if found by the Commission to be "consistent with the public interest." However, in transactions involving a motor carrier where a railroad or its affiliate is an applicant, the Congress directed the Commission "not [to] enter such an order unless it finds that the transaction proposed" not only is in the public interest, but "will enable such [railroad] carrier to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations and will not unduly restrain competition." The Commission has Page 355 U. S. 148 interpreted this mandate of the Congress to confine acquisition of a motor carrier by a railroad or its affiliate to "operations . . . which are auxiliary or supplementary to train service." [Footnote 8] We specifically approved this long administrative practice in United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., supra. It will be remembered that the acquisitions of the White Line and Frederickson routes by Motor Transit, wherein "auxiliary or supplemental" restrictions were imposed, were pursuant to this section of the Act.
The present proceedings, however, were instituted under § 206 et seq. of the Act, which involve applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity. Motor Transit had been carrying on scheduled peddle operations over the entire White Line and Frederickson routes regardless of the volume of traffic available. By this application, it sought to secure a certificate covering the same general routes without the restrictions imposed in the § 5(2)(b) proceedings. Such a certificate would enable it to haul, inter alia, the more profitable truckload traffic, thus supplementing the expensive peddle service. [Footnote 9] Page 355 U. S. 149
In interpreting § 207, the Commission has accepted the policy of § 5(2)(b) as a guiding light, not as a rigid limitation. While it has applied auxiliary and supplementary restrictions in many § 207 proceedings, the Commission has occasionally issued certificates to railroad subsidiaries without the restrictions where "special circumstances" prevail -- namely, where unrestricted operations by the rail-owned carrier are found on specific facts Page 355 U. S. 150 and circumstances to be in the public interest. [Footnote 10] At least three of these cases had been decided when the Congress extensively revised the Interstate Commerce Act by enactment of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, in which § 213 of the Motor Carrier Act was substantially reenacted into § 5(2)(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, while § 207(a) was left unchanged.
We conclude, therefore, that the Congress did not intend the rigid requirement of § 5(2)(b) to be considered as a limitation on certificates issued under § 207. Page 355 U. S. 151
We repeat, as was said in those cases, that the underlying policy of § 5(2)(b) must not be divorced from proceedings for new certificates under § 207. Indeed, the Page 355 U. S. 152 Commission must take "cognizance" of the National Transportation Policy and apply the Act "as a whole." But, for reasons we have stated, we do not believe that the Commission acts beyond its statutory authority when, in the public interest, it occasionally departs from the auxiliary and supplementary limitations in a § 207 proceeding.
Appellants' last contention relates to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Commission's finding of Page 355 U. S. 153 public convenience and necessity. Appellants concede that public need may be found for peddle traffic between the smaller points along the routes, but contest the findings of public need for unrestricted service between such major points as Davenport, Cedar Rapids, Des Moines, and Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebraska.
This evidence leaves us unwilling to suggest that public convenience and necessity could only be advanced by confining Motor Transit to service of the smaller communities, while leaving the more profitable business to others. Public need for Motor Transit's operation in truckload traffic to some extent can be grounded on the Page 355 U. S. 154 need for its operation in peddle traffic, since economic justification for carrying on a costly peddle operation depends on combining it with a more lucrative truckload operation. While it is true that railroads were not allowed to enter the motor trucking industry primarily to build an independently profitable trucking operation, there is no foundation in the Interstate Commerce Act for so construing § 207 as to require that any railroad operation in the motor trucking field be unprofitable. Observance of economic realities in ascertaining public need is no less due a rail-owned motor carrier than an independent motor carrier.
"* * * *" "The findings hereinafter made . . . do not establish a precedent. Each case of this character must be determined upon the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence."