Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1484581.html
Timestamp: 2019-05-23 04:27:04
Document Index: 485883646

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u2002636', '§\u2002636', '§\u2002636', '§\u2002636', '§\u2002636', '§\u2002636', '§\u2002636']

Before D.W. NELSON and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, *Senior District Judge. Eric S. Multhaup, Mill Valley, CA, for the petitioner-appellant. Richard B. Cullather, Deputy Attorney General, for the respondents-appellees.
On November 22, 1999, the magistrate judge issued a document styled “Memorandum and Order Re Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.” He found that of the seventy-one claims presented in the First Amended Petition, twenty-seven were fully exhausted, five were partially exhausted, thirty-six were unexhausted, and three did not state a federal claim. He concluded that “unless Petitioner elects to move for leave to file a Second Amended Petition containing only exhausted claims, this Court will be required to dismiss the entire action without prejudice.” The magistrate judge further advised that “Petitioner risks forfeiture of the unexhausted claims ․ if he elects to file a Second Amended Petition containing only exhausted claims and later attempts to file a second federal habeas action after exhausting his state remedies.” Rather than issuing a report and recommendation for district court review, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the magistrate judge issued an order granting time to file a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Petition containing only exhausted claims or, alternatively, a request for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. He warned that failure to timely file a motion for leave to file such a petition “shall be construed as either his consent to dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute or disobedience with a Court Order warranting the dismissal of the action with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).”
On December 8, 1999, Hunt filed an application directed to the district judge, for an order extending the time within which to file a Second Amended Petition pending resolution of his objections to the magistrate judge's order filed concurrently. Hunt objected to the November 22 order on the grounds that “the Magistrate wrongfully found nonexhaustion as to several issues.”
On July 31, 2000, Hunt again directed objections to the district judge, reasserting his objections to the November 22 order as well as to the July 20 order. He argued that if he were to file a Second Amended Petition before the court ruled on his objections it might moot his objections because the claims would no longer be pending before the court. The district judge did not rule on the objections, but on August 11, the magistrate judge issued an order extending until October 2, 2000, Hunt's time to file a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Petition along with a petition “complying with the magistrate judge's November 22, 1999, Memorandum and Order and July 20, 2000, Order Re Petitioner's Objections,” and denying the application for clarification of the July 20 order.
Meanwhile, on February 23, 2000, Hunt had filed another state habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court to obtain confirmation that all his federal claims had previously been presented to that court and thus had been exhausted. On August 9, 2000, the California Supreme Court denied Hunt's habeas petition by order stating: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001; In re Miller (1941) 17 Cal.2d 734, 735, 112 P.2d 10; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729).”
Following receipt of the Supreme Court's order, Hunt, on September 8, 2000, filed an application directed to the district judge and the magistrate judge to vacate the magistrate judge's earlier nonexhaustion findings in light of the Supreme Court's August 9 order. Hunt argued that the citations to In re Waltreus and In re Miller are “an explicit determination by the California Supreme Court that they view the sum total of what Petitioner presented to them as a relitigation of claims Petitioner has previously presented to them.” The court's rejection of his petition, Hunt argued, confirmed that his claims were exhausted prior to his first federal filing.
On December 19, the district judge denied Hunt's request to vacate the magistrate judge's September 14 order, ruling that “Petitioner ․ cannot rely on a later-filed state habeas petition to exhaust claims that were not exhausted at the time his federal petition was filed.” The order gave Hunt until January 16, 2001, to file a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Petition.
On January 18, 2001, Hunt lodged a proposed Second Amended Petition, including all but one of the claims previously found to be unexhausted plus a number of new claims, contending that the Supreme Court's order confirmed that they had all been exhausted. Hunt simultaneously lodged a Third Amended Petition, which he contended contained only exhausted claims, and requested it be held in abeyance pending adjudication of the Second Amended Petition. On January 31, 2001, the magistrate judge, declining to follow this court's recent decision in Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568(9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941, 121 S.Ct. 2576, 150 L.Ed.2d 739 (2001), denied leave to amend on the ground that under earlier Ninth Circuit decisions exhaustion must be established “before coming to federal district court.” The magistrate judge gave Hunt until February 20, 2001, to move for leave to file a Third Amended Petition containing only exhausted claims or, alternatively, to stand on his First Amended Petition containing unexhausted claims, which would lead to a recommendation to dismiss. Failure to pursue either course, the magistrate judge advised, would be construed as either consent to dismissal for failure to prosecute or disobedience of the court's order warranting dismissal with prejudice. The magistrate judge did not inform Hunt of the stay and abey procedure.
On February 23, 2001, Hunt objected to the magistrate judge's January 31 order disposing of the Second Amended Petition, contending he was entitled to district court review of dispositive orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Further, he applied for an order permitting him to make an election as to how he would proceed after the district judge reviewed his objections to the January 31 order denying leave to file the Second Amended Petition. The district judge never acted on this application.
On the same day, the district judge issued an order, stating that he “has made a de novo determination,” and adopting the magistrate judge's Reports and Recommendations, denying the application for a stay, granting the motion to dismiss the First Amended Petition as mixed, and directing entry of judgment dismissing the action with prejudice.
A district judge may not designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine a motion to involuntarily dismiss an action. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A);1 see Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir.1978); see also Estate of Conners v. O'Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 659 (9th Cir.1993) (“ ‘[I]t was not intended that the magistrate would have the power to hear and determine dispositive motions[; i]t was only intended that a judge could assign a dispositive motion to a magistrate for hearing and submission of proposed findings and recommendation to the judge for ultimate disposition.’ ”) (quoting Taylor, 575 F.2d at 154 (second alteration in original)). A judge may, however, under § 636(b)(1)(B), designate a magistrate judge to hear a motion to dismiss and submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of such a motion.2 Where a party files written objections to the proposed disposition, “[t]he district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir.1991) (“[W]ith respect to dispositive matters, a magistrate is only permitted to make recommendations for final disposition by an Article III judge who reviews his findings and recommendation, if objected to, de novo.”).
These statutory directives were ignored by the district court. Respondents' motion to dismiss the First Amended Petition as mixed was a dispositive matter. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (holding that a mixed petition must be dismissed). Thus, the magistrate judge's November 22 Memorandum and Order determining Respondents' motion to dismiss Hunt's First Amended Petition as mixed exceed his statutory authority. The magistrate judge did not submit proposed findings and recommendations with respect to that motion as required by § 636(b)(1)(B). And although Hunt filed objections to that order the district judge did not review it, much less did he make a de novo determination. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (“The statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”) (en banc). Instead, in his December 19, 2000, order, the district judge merely passed on the procedure by which Hunt had sought to have the Supreme Court confirm that his claims had been exhausted. Ultimately, the district court summarily dismissed the petition as mixed without review of the magistrate judge's determination. That dismissal, moreover, was with prejudice on the basis of the magistrate judge's unreviewed finding that Hunt had failed to prosecute the action and disobeyed the court's orders.
Rather than determining whether the petition contained unexhausted claims, the district court determined that all claims had to have been exhausted at the time the petition was filed. That ruling was in error. As we stated in Kelly v. Small, 300 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.2002), reprinted as amended, 315 F.3d 1063 (2003), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1042, 123 S.Ct. 2094, 155 L.Ed.2d 1077 (2003), “[a] state prisoner is required to exhaust all available state court remedies before a federal court may grant him habeas relief.” 315 F.3d. at 1066 (emphasis added). Our cases contemplate that district courts may stay and abey a mixed petition, permitting petitioner to return to state court and exhaust unexhausted claims. Id. at 1070; James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that district court may in its discretion hold exhausted claims in abeyance until the unexhausted claims are exhausted and then allow petitioner to amend the stayed petition to add the now-exhausted claims); Anthony, 236 F.3d at 575 (“Our precedent unequivocally authorizes district courts to stay fully exhausted federal petitions pending exhaustion of other claims.”); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9th Cir.1998) (same). It would make little sense to give district courts discretion to stay petitions containing exhausted claims pending exhaustion of other claims if post-filing exhaustion could not be recognized.
Because the district court, in dismissing the First Amended Petition, acted on the premise that all claims had to have been exhausted at the time the petition was filed, it did not advise Hunt that he had the option to stay his First Amended Petition after dismissal of unexhausted claims to permit him to exhaust those claims and then add them by amendment to his stayed petition, as it was obliged to do. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d at 1070; see also Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, 883-84 (9th Cir.2002), as amended by 330 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that district judge is obligated to inform pro se litigant of his options with respect to his mixed petition).
Neither the magistrate judge nor the district judge considered the alternative of staying the petition after dismissal of unexhausted claims to permit Hunt to exhaust those claims, nor did they inform Hunt of this option. Had Hunt been so informed, the protracted proceedings in which he sought to protect his ability to proceed on claims he believed to have been exhausted-and which eventually resulted in the dismissal with prejudice-would have been avoided.
We conclude that under the circumstances presented by this record, the failure to advise Hunt of his options with respect to the First Amended Petition renders its dismissal improper.
Medrano v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1508(9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 940, 113 S.Ct. 2415, 124 L.Ed.2d 638 (1993) (quoting United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.1979)). “The first two of these factors are of equal importance, and a finding of one of them would support a remand to a different judge.” United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir.1986).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) provides:(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) provides:(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for posttrial[sic] relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.