Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/349/731/636865/
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 02:29:34
Document Index: 616192579

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1983', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15']

Michael Bailey; Jane Bailey; Billy Bailey, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. D.h. Kennedy; D.b. Whitley; Mike Crisp; City of Hickory, Defendants-appellants.michael Bailey; Jane Bailey; Billy Bailey, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. D.h. Kennedy; D.b. Whitley; Mike Crisp; City of Hickory, Defendants-appellees, 349 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 2003 › Michael Bailey; Jane Bailey; Billy Bailey, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. D.h. Kennedy; D.b. Whitley; Mike...
Michael Bailey; Jane Bailey; Billy Bailey, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. D.h. Kennedy; D.b. Whitley; Mike Crisp; City of Hickory, Defendants-appellants.michael Bailey; Jane Bailey; Billy Bailey, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. D.h. Kennedy; D.b. Whitley; Mike Crisp; City of Hickory, Defendants-appellees, 349 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 349 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003) Argued: September 23, 2003
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED ARGUED: Robert Danny Mason, Jr., WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, P.L.L.C., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellants.
The Baileys cross-appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to the police officers and the City of Hickory on the Baileys' procedural due process claim, and its denial of summary judgment on two of their state law claims. Because we do not have jurisdiction over this interlocutory cross-appeal, see Swint v. Chambers County Comm., 514 U.S. 35, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 131 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995), we grant the motion to dismiss the cross-appeal.
In the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, after telling Defendant Kennedy that the suicide report was "crazy," that the officers "need [ed] to leave," and that he was going to call his lawyer, Michael attempted to close the door and turned and reached towards a cabinet where the telephone base was located. In the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Defendant Kennedy placed his foot in the doorway to prevent the door from closing and grabbed Michael's arm in an attempt to pull him onto the porch. Defendant Kennedy then stepped into the house and began to fight with Michael in an attempt to take him to the floor.
Kennedy then struck Michael in the chin and pushed him back 20 to 30 feet over a bush. Sigmon and Kennedy then sprayed Michael with pepper spray. " [Michael] did not fight with the officers or resist arrest in any way, and it is undisputed that he was handcuffed and placed in the back of Defendant Kennedy's patrol car."4 (J.A. at 85.)
The Baileys filed a timely notice of cross-appeal. In their brief, the Baileys limit their cross-appeal to three issues: the grant of summary judgment to the police officers and the City of Hickory on the procedural due process claim; the denial of summary judgment on the state law claim of false imprisonment associated with the May 27 incident; and the grant of summary judgment to the police officers and the City of Hickory on the state law malicious prosecution claim associated with the September 3 incident. As noted above, we do not have jurisdiction over this interlocutory cross-appeal. Swint v. Chambers County Comm., 514 U.S. 35, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 131 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995).
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of district courts under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). The police officers appeal the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the federal law claims. To the extent that an order of a district court rejecting a government official's qualified immunity defense turns on a question of law, it is a final decision within the meaning of § 1291 under the collateral order doctrine recognized in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949), and is therefore subject to immediate appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1995) (holding that although interlocutory appeal is allowed from the denial of qualified immunity, questions of evidentiary sufficiency are not collaterally appealable). Accordingly, "we possess jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a decision of a district court rejecting a government official's claim of entitlement to qualified immunity to the extent that the official maintains that the official's conduct did not violate clearly established law." Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 529 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). On the other hand, "to the extent that the appealing official seeks to argue the insufficiency of the evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact — for example, that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a conclusion that the official engaged in the particular conduct alleged — we do not possess jurisdiction under § 1291 to consider the claim." Id. at 529-30.
Where, as here, the district court articulates the facts as it viewed them in determining that summary judgment was inappropriate, our task is relatively straightforward. We "must accept those facts and then determine whether, based on those facts, a reasonable person in the defendant's position could have believed that he or she was acting in conformity with the clearly established law at the time." Gray Hopkins v. Prince George's County, Md., 309 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2002); accord Bass, 106 F.3d at 530 (holding that in reviewing the denial of qualified immunity we "accept [] the facts as the district court viewed them").
"We review de novo the district court's denial of qualified immunity, employing our full knowledge of our own and other relevant precedents." Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003). "The burden of proof and persuasion with respect to a claim of qualified immunity is on the defendant official." Id. We also review the denial of public officers' immunity de novo. See Gray-Hopkins, 309 F.3d at 233-34 (reviewing denial of public official immunity de novo).
Determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity is a two-step inquiry. First, we must decide "whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). "Next, assuming that the violation of the right is established, courts must consider whether the right was clearly established at the time such that it would be clear to an objectively reasonable officer that his conduct violated that right." Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002).
Probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical conception" that addresses the "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). It is a "fluid concept" that cannot be "reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id. at 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317. We have previously held that in the case of the law governing seizures for psychological evaluations, there is a "lack of clarity" as far as what constitutes probable cause. Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 968 (4th Cir. 1992). Based on Michael's version of the events giving rise to this case, as accepted by the district court, when Officer Whitley responded to the 911 dispatch, he found Michael intoxicated and sitting at the dining room table eating lunch. Michael denied any thoughts of suicide, and there were no weapons or any other preparations for a suicide attempt evident. When Officer Whitley asked for permission to search the house, Michael told the officer to contact Michael's father, Billy Bailey, the owner of the house, for permission to search. Apparently satisfied, Officer Whitley left the house within five minutes of his arrival. Officer Kennedy arrived as Officer Whitley was leaving the house. Officer Whitley said, at most, "we're going to have to do something." (J.A. at 77.) Michael, who was then on the telephone, opened the door when Officer Kennedy knocked, and again denied any thoughts of suicide, calling the suicide report "crazy." (J.A. at 77.) He told the officers that they needed to leave and that he was going to call his lawyer. Michael attempted to close the door and turned toward a cabinet where the telephone base was located. At this point, Officer Kennedy placed his foot in the doorway to prevent the door from closing and grabbed Michael's arm.
We now must determine whether the right alleged to have been violated was a "clearly established ... right [] of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). A right is "clearly established" if "`the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear'" so that a reasonable officer would have understood, under the circumstances at hand, that his behavior violated the right. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)). The inquiry is an objective one, dependent not on the subjective beliefs of the particular officer at the scene, but instead on what an objectively reasonable officer would have understood in those circumstances. Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888, 122 S. Ct. 199, 151 L. Ed. 2d 141 (2001).
In deciding whether the right alleged to have been violated was clearly established, we must define the right "at a high level of particularity." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1999). We have recognized that "the general right to be free from seizure unless probable cause exists [is] clearly established in the mental health seizure context." Gooden, 954 F.2d at 968. We have also recognized that "an officer must have probable cause to believe that the individual posed a danger to [him]self or others before involuntarily detaining the individual." S.P., 134 F.3d at 266. The test of whether a right is clearly established, however, cannot be applied at this level of generality. Id. Defining the right at issue with the requisite level of particularity, the appropriate question is whether, at the time of Kennedy and Whitley's actions on May 27, 1998, it was clearly established that a police officer may not detain someone for an emergency mental evaluation based only on a 911 report that the person was suicidal, where the officers were able to observe the person alleged to be suicidal and observed nothing indicating that the person might have been a danger to himself.
Next, we consider Jane and Billy Bailey's federal and state constitutional claims8 based on an allegedly unlawful search of their home, as well as their state common law claim of trespass by a public officer. The police officers argue that exigent circumstances made their warrantless entry into the Bailey residence objectively reasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). Because, as discussed above, the officers had no reason to believe that Michael was a danger to himself, no exigent circumstances justified their warrantless entry into the Baileys' home. Also, as discussed above, accepting the facts as the district court viewed them, it was clearly established that no exigent circumstances requiring immediate action to protect human life existed to justify the search. Moreover, a man of reasonable intelligence would not have believed that exigent circumstances existed in this situation. See Grad, 321 S.E.2d at 890 (holding that public officers' immunity is not warranted when official does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know was contrary to his duty). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity and public officers' immunity on these claims as well.
The last three claims associated with the May 27 event are the federal excessive force claim and the two related state law claims: assault and battery and gross negligence. Respecting the federal constitutional claim, as discussed above, qualified immunity is a two-step inquiry, so we turn first to whether, accepting the district court's view of the facts, there was a constitutional violation. "The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable seizures bars police officers from using excessive force to seize a free citizen." Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003). We determine whether an officer has used excessive force to effect a seizure based on a standard of "`objective reasonableness.'" Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)). "We weigh the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. This test requires us to determine the reasonableness of an officer's actions and is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. Instead it requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Id. (quotation marks omitted). Those facts and circumstances include "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). "The extent of the plaintiff's injury is also a relevant consideration." Jones, 325 F.3d at 527.
We consider the Graham factors in turn. Starting with the first factor, the severity of the crime at issue, Michael committed no crime. In fact, as discussed above, the police officers did not even have probable cause to seize Michael. When we considered this factor in Jones, we noted that " [i]n recent years, we have twice confronted situations in which a plaintiff, subjected to police force, had committed no crime; in each, we held that the plaintiff had stated a claim for violation of his constitutional right to be free from excessive police force." Jones, 325 F.3d at 528 (citing Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 545-47 (4th Cir. 2002); Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 848, 853 (4th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, Jones itself was a case in which the plaintiff had committed no crime, and we held that because "Jones committed no crime, this first factor clearly weighs in his favor." Id. Similarly, because it was unquestionable that Michael had not committed any crime, this factor weighs heavily in Michael's favor.
Turning to the third factor, it is clear that after Kennedy started to use force to seize him, Michael resisted arrest. Whitley then joined Kennedy and both administered repeated hand-blows and kicks while trying to handcuff Michael. The officers continued to use force after Michael's hands were bound behind his back,9 his feet were bound, and he was lying face down on the floor. (J.A. at 99 (" [I]n the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, after backup arrived and Michael's hands and feet were secured, and while he was still lying face down, Defendant Kennedy pulled him up by his arms, causing further injury to his shoulders, and Defendant Whitley kicked Michael in the back.").) Accepting the facts as the district court viewed them, Michael was not resisting arrest when he was bound hand and foot and lying face down on the floor. Accordingly, even this factor does not weigh completely against Michael.
Ten years before Deputy Keller's November 1999 use of force against Jones, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor had clearly established that all claims of excessive force in the course of any seizure of a free person must be analyzed under an "objective reasonableness" standard, taking into account the factors discussed above. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-96, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443. Both before and after November 1999, courts have consistently applied the Graham holding and have consistently held that officers using unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force to seize a secured, unarmed citizen, do not act in an objectively reasonable manner and, thus, are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Jones, 325 F.3d at 531-32 (citation omitted). There, we held that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because the officer attacked Jones "even though Jones, although drunk and using foul language, was unarmed, handcuffed, and alone in a secured room in the sheriff's headquarters." Id. In Jones, we cited several cases decided prior to May 1998, in which police officers were denied qualified immunity where the officer's use of force might seem to be more justified than the use of force in this case. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 1994) (denying qualified immunity on excessive force claim where police officer attacked person suspected of taking a $5 bill from the floor that did not belong to him even though Rowland may have resisted after he was attacked); Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1993) (denying qualified immunity on excessive force claim where taking the facts in the light most favorable to Kane, she resisted arrest for driving under the influence and the police officer, after he had secured her, "repeatedly push [ed] her face into the pavement, cracking three of her teeth, cutting her nose, and bruising her face"); see also Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226, 1227-28 (8th Cir. 1997) (denying qualified immunity to an officer who slapped and punched a suspect, in handcuffs and leg restraints, even though the suspect had, prior to being completely restrained, kicked and hit an officer, physically resisted arrest, and shouted and screamed at officers). "Thus, years before [1998], it was clearly established that a police officer was not entitled to use unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force against a handcuffed, secured citizen, who posed no threat to the officer or others and had neither committed, nor was suspected of committing, any crime." Jones, 325 F.3d at 534. Here, Michael was unarmed, and the use of force continued even after he was secured with flex-cuffs around both his hands and his feet, and lying face down on the floor, alone in a room of his parents' house. Kennedy lifted Michael up by his arms while they were bound behind his back, thereby wrenching his shoulder, and Whitley kicked Michael in the back when he cried out in pain. Thus, Kennedy and Whitley violated clearly established law in using force to seize Michael when he had committed no crime and when they had no reason to believe he was a danger to himself or others. It was especially clear that they were not entitled to use force after Michael was secured face down on the floor in handcuffs and leg restraints. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity on the § 1983 excessive force claim.
The only claim appealed by the police officers related to the September 3 event is the state law false arrest claim. Officer Kennedy argues that the arrest of Michael Bailey on September 3 was in accordance with state law. The district court held that the arrest violated state law because Kennedy was not an eyewitness to Michael's misdemeanor offenses. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-401(b) (2) provides, in relevant part:
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-401(b) (2001). Kennedy admits that Michael's offenses were misdemeanors and were committed outside of Kennedy's presence. Kennedy argues that the arrest was nonetheless lawful because N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-401(b) (2) (b) (2) allows an officer to arrest people who commit misdemeanors outside of his presence if that person may cause physical injury to himself or others unless immediately arrested. Kennedy argues that he had probable cause to believe that Michael might cause physical injury to himself or others because of his knowledge of the events of May 27. We held above, however, that Kennedy did not have probable cause on May 27 to believe that Michael was a danger to himself or others. Given that the events of May 27 were insufficient to give the officers probable cause to seize Michael on that date, they are a fortiori insufficient to constitute probable cause to believe that Michael was a danger to himself or others three months later. Moreover, an officer of reasonable intelligence would have known that arresting Michael in such a situation was contrary to his duty. Accordingly, Kennedy is not entitled to public officers' immunity on the state law false arrest claim.
A finding of malice also requires that the officer "intend [] [his act] to be ... injurious to another."Grad, 321 S.E.2d at 890. Because the police officers argue only that a man of reasonable intelligence would not have known that their actions were contrary to their duty, we confine our discussion to the first prong of the malice definition.
We note that the police officers have not argued that the Baileys do not have a direct action for monetary damages for the abridgment of their state constitutional rights. Accordingly, we do not address whether the Baileys' claim of trespass by a public officer constituted an adequate remedy at law See Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276, 293 (1992) (holding that an individual whose state constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct action for monetary damages against a state official in his official capacity, if there is no adequate remedy provided by state law).