Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102965/aberdeen-rockfish-r-co-vs-scrap
Timestamp: 2017-12-16 05:32:06
Document Index: 591541119

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 6', '§ 15', '§ 4332', '§ 15', '§ 316', '§ 907', '§ 1006', '§ 204', '§ 824', '§ 717', '§ 1482']

Aberdeen and Rockfish R Co Vs Scrap - Citation 102965 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Aberdeen and Rockfish R. Co. Vs. Scrap - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/102965
Case Number 409 U.S. 1207
Appellant Aberdeen and Rockfish R. Co.
Respondent Scrap
.....carrier-made rates to take effect without suspension." ibid. the commission had found the surcharge rates just and reasonable, and it had authored a detailed set of conditions on approval of the rates without suspension. the district court concluded that "[a] suspension decision which page 409 u. s. 1214 effectively blackmails the carriers into submitting agency-authored rates is functionally indistinguishable from an agency order setting those rates . . . [s]uch orders are, of course, judicially reviewable." id. at 197. yet the district court found it unnecessary to decide the degree of commission involvement in effectuating the 2.5% surcharge. the court held that "nepa implicitly confers authority on the federal courts to enjoin any federal action.....
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP - 409 U.S. 1207 (1972)
U.S. Supreme Court Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207 (1972)
No. A-72 Decided July 19, 1972 *
These applications request me, as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit, to stay a preliminary injunction entered by a three-judge United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The applicants are the Interstate Commerce Commission and a long list of railroad companies composing most of the rail transport in the Nation. Opposing the applications are the plaintiffs below, Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, who describe themselves as "SCRAP," [ Footnote 1 ] and a coalition of organizations dedicated to the protection of environmental resources. The applicants say that they intend to seek prompt review in this Court on the merits of the preliminary injunction entered below.
The Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., permits increases in railroad freight rates to become effective without prior approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. A carrier may file a proposed tariff and, after 30 days unless the Commission shortens the period, the new rate becomes effective as a carrier-made rate. 49 U.S.C. § 6(3). The Commission may, however, choose to suspend the effectiveness of newly filed rates for as much as seven months, in order to investigate the lawfulness of the rates. 49 U.S.C. § 15(7). At the end of seven months, the carrier-proposed rates go into effect by operation of law unless the Commission has completed its investigation and affirmatively disapproved the new rates. Ibid. Prior decisions of this Court confirm the Commission's broad discretion in the exercise of its power of suspension; judicial review of suspension action or inaction is most severely limited, if not foreclosed. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658 (1963); Board of Railroad Comm'rs v. Great Northern R. Co., 281 U. S. 412 , 281 U. S. 429 (1930).
Against this legal background and prodded by an increasingly precarious financial condition, the railroads, on December 13, 1971, asked the Commission for leave to file on short notice a 2.5% surcharge on nearly
On January 5, 1972, the railroads filed tariffs to put the 2.5% surcharge into effect on February 5. SCRAP and other environmental groups asked the Commission to suspend the surcharge for the statutory seven-month period. They opposed the across-the-board surcharge on the ground that the present railroad rate structure discourages the movement of "recyclable" [ Footnote 2 ] goods in commerce, and that every across-the-board increase would
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). [ Footnote 3 ]
The Commission's order of February 1 further provided that the Commission would not resume the investigation begun by its December 21 order until the railroads asked to file the promised selective 4.1% rate increase. After that tariff was filed, on April 24, the Commission suspended the 4.1% selective increase for the statutory seven-month period until November 30, 1972. Since the original June 5 expiration date for the surcharge had assumed that selective increases would become effective
SCRAP filed suit on May 12, 1972, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking, among other relief requested, a preliminary injunction to require the Commission to prevent the railroads from further collecting the 2.5% surcharge. [ Footnote 4 ] Other environmental groups and the railroads were allowed to intervene as a matter of right. The primary thrust of SCRAP's suit was that the Commission's orders, permitting and then extending the 2.5% surcharge, constituted "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." The plaintiffs argued that the Commission's action was unlawful because the Commission had not issued an environmental impact statement as required by NEPA. On July 10, 1972, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the railroads from collecting the 2.5% surcharge on shipments originating after July 15, 1972, "insofar as that surcharge relates to goods being transported for purposes of recycling, pending further order of this court." In its opinion, the District Court rejected the Government's contention that SCRAP and its fellow plaintiffs lacked standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972).
405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 735 .
Having thus dealt with our decision in Sierra Club, the District Court focused on Arrow Transportation, supra, and related cases [ Footnote 5 ] drastically curtailing the jurisdiction of the federal courts to review the suspension power of the Interstate Commerce Commission. "The thrust of the doctrine," reasoned the District Court, "seems to be that judicial review is available only when the rates in question are Commission-made, rather than carrier-made." 346 F.Supp. at 196. The District Court noted that the present case was not one "where the Commission merely stands silently by and allows carrier-made rates to take effect without suspension." Ibid. The Commission had found the surcharge rates just and reasonable, and it had authored a detailed set of conditions on approval of the rates without suspension. The District Court concluded that
Turning to the merits, the court held that the Commission's decision not to suspend was a "major federal action" within the meaning of NEPA. An impact statement would be required whenever an action " arguably will have an adverse environmental impact." Id. at 201. (Emphasis in original.) The Commission could not escape preparation of a statement by "so transparent a ruse" as its "single sentence" affirmation that the 2.5% surcharge would have no significant adverse environmental effect. This finding is "no more than glorified boilerplate," id. at 201 n. 17, and the Commission has failed to prove its truth.
Finally, the District Court concluded that the balance of equities in this case tipped in favor of preliminary
It is likely that the questions to be presented by this appeal "are of such significance and difficulty that there is a substantial prospect that they will command four votes for review" when the full Court reconvenes for the October, 1972, Term. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 80 S.Ct. 33, 35, 4 L.Ed.2d 34, 37 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., in chambers). The decision below may present a serious question of standing to sue for the protection of environmental interests. Sierra Club. v. Morton, supra. The decision may be read as undermining our Arrow decision, and, in that respect, may conflict with the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Port of New York Authority v. United States, 451 F.2d 783 (CA2 1971 ). Most important, the decision may have the practical effect of requiring the Commission to file an impact statement whenever it exercises its statutory suspension powers. This requirement is significant because it would likely apply to each of the cluster of federal agencies presently exercising suspension powers comparable to that of the Interstate Commerce Commission. [ Footnote 6 ]
On the other hand, the District Court was convinced that harm to the environment might result from allowing the railroads to collect the 2.5% surcharge on recyclable goods pending disposition of their appeal in this Court. The District Court concluded that any such harm would likely be irreparable, since, as the court explained, "once
raw materials are unnecessarily extracted from the ground and used, they cannot be returned from whence they came." [ Footnote 7 ] 346 F.Supp. at 201. This eventuality is premised on the following projected chain of events:
Our society and its governmental instrumentalities, having been less than alert to the needs of our environment for generations, have now taken protective steps. These developments, however praiseworthy, should not lead courts to exercise equitable powers loosely or casually whenever a claim of "environmental damage" is asserted.
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 278 U. S. 322 , 278 U. S. 326 (1929); Railway Express Agency v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 466, 7 L.Ed.2d 432 (1962) (Harlan, J., in chambers). I cannot say the District Court's action can be equated with an abuse of discretion because it decided that there was danger to the environment outweighing the loss of income and consequent financial threat to the railroads. Notwithstanding my doubts of the correctness of the action of the three-judge District Court, as Circuit Justice, acting alone, I incline toward deferring to their collective evaluation and balancing of the equities.
Id. at 3. See infra at 409 U. S. 1216 .
Among suspension provisions enacted by Congress since 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) are 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(g), 318(c) (Motor Carrier Act, 1935); 49 U.S.C. §§ 907(g), (i) (Water Carriers Act); 49 U.S.C. § 1006 (e) (Freight Forwarders Act); 47 U.S.C. § 204 (Federal Communications Act of 1934); 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (Federal Power Act); 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (Natural Gas Act); and 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (Federal Aviation Act of 1958). See Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658 , 372 U. S. 666 n. 13 (1963).