Source: http://openjurist.org/445/f3d/375
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 01:53:26
Document Index: 541069229

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 1326', '§ 3553', '§ 401', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 5']

445 F3d 375 United States v. Montes-Pineda | OpenJurist
445 F. 3d 375 - United States v. Montes-Pineda	Home445 f3d 375 united states v. montes-pineda
445 F3d 375 United States v. Montes-Pineda 445 F.3d 375
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Benigno MONTES-PINEDA, a/k/a No. Benigno Pineda Muntez, a/k/a Benigno Montez-Pineda, a/k/a Benigno Pineda-Montes, Defendant-Appellant.
The Government initially contends that we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Montes-Pineda counters that we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742 (West Supp.2005). That statute provides, inter alia, that defendants may appeal sentences "imposed in violation of law." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a)(1). The Government argues that since Montes-Pineda's sentence is within a properly calculated Guidelines range, it cannot have been "imposed in violation of law." We disagree.
First, the Supreme Court at least implicitly rejected this jurisdictional argument in Booker, explaining that "the [Sentencing Reform] Act continues to provide for appeals from sentencing decisions (irrespective of whether the trial judge sentences within or outside the Guidelines range in the exercise of his discretionary power under § 3553(a))." 543 U.S. at 260, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Breyer, J., opinion for the Court). Unsurprisingly, in light of this language, every court of appeals to consider this question has held that it has jurisdiction to review sentences within a properly calculated Guidelines range. See United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 517 (1st Cir.2006) (en banc); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 328 & n. 5 (3d Cir.2006); United States v. Martinez, 434 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir.2006).
In addition to being foreclosed by precedent, the Government's argument also relies upon a faulty premise: that all sentences within a properly calculated Guidelines range are necessarily lawful. Other courts of appeals have also rejected this premise. See, e.g., United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786-87 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 n. 9 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir.2005). We must do the same, because Congress has directed in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West Supp.2005) that the applicable Guidelines range is only one factor that sentencing courts must consider in imposing a proper sentence. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60, 125 S.Ct. 738. Holding that a sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range is automatically lawful would render superfluous the other § 3553(a) factors and so contravene the statute's mandatory language. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) ("The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . ." (emphasis added)).
A sentence after Booker may be unreasonable for both procedural and substantive reasons. "A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable, for example, if the district court provides an inadequate statement of reasons . . . . A sentence may be substantively unreasonable if the court relies on an improper factor or rejects policies articulated by Congress or the Sentencing Commission." See United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Montes-Pineda challenges his sentence on both substantive and procedural grounds. We reject both arguments.
As we have held repeatedly, a sentence within a properly calculated advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, ___, 2006 WL 893594, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr.7, 2006); Moreland, 437 F.3d at 433; United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.2006). "[A] defendant can only rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors." United States v. Sharp, 436 F.3d 730, 738 (7th Cir.2006). Here, the § 3553(a) factors clearly support the reasonableness of Montes-Pineda's sentence. The reentry of an ex-felon is a serious offense for which Congress has seen fit to impose a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). And Montes-Pineda is a chronic offender for the crime of his conviction: he concedes that he has illegally reentered this country at least three separate times after being deported. The district court's sentence, which is at the low end of the applicable advisory Guidelines range, does not seem unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the need to deter Montes-Pineda in the future.
United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir.2005). Montes-Pineda has convincingly demonstrated that significant sentencing disparities exist between "fast track" and non-"fast track" districts. But he has not shown that, in light of the other § 3553(a) factors, a general allegation of such disparities compelled the district court to impose a below-Guidelines sentence in his particular case. See id. at 1131.
It would be especially inappropriate to impose such a general requirement on district courts in non-"fast track" districts, given that Congress seems to have endorsed at least some degree of disparity by expressly authorizing larger downward departures for defendants in "fast track" districts. Specifically, the PROTECT Act ordered the Sentencing Commission to promulgate "a policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than 4 levels if the Government files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney." Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act ("PROTECT Act") § 401(m)(2)(B), Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).* "[T]o require the district court to vary from the advisory guidelines based solely on the existence of [`fast track'] programs in other districts would conflict with the decision of Congress to limit the availability of such sentence reductions to select geographical areas." United States v. Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir.2006) (emphasis added).
This is not to say that a district court may never consider the disparities between "fast track" and non-"fast track" districts in calculating an appropriate sentence under § 3553(a). Several courts have already held that the need to avoid such sentencing disparities may support below-Guidelines sentences in particular cases. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 406 F.Supp.2d 320, 324-27 (S.D.N.Y.2005); United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F.Supp.2d 943, 947 (N.D.Ill.2005); United States v. Peralta-Espinoza, 383 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1112 (E.D.Wis.2005); United States v. Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F.Supp.2d 728, 732 (E.D.Va.2005); United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F.Supp.2d 958, 963 (E.D.Wis.2005). But see United States v. Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d 22, 30 n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (suggesting but not holding the opposite conclusion); United States v. Perez-Chavez, 422 F.Supp.2d 1255, 2005 WL 3877583, at *1, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9252, at *1-*3 (D.Utah May 16, 2005). We do not pass on the validity of such approaches here. Rather, we hold that merely pointing out the existence of such disparities, with no reference to the characteristics of the particular defendant, does not render a within-Guidelines sentence unreasonable. See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir.2006).
Montes-Pineda further argues that the district court inadequately articulated the reasons for his sentence. District courts are obligated to explain their sentences, whether those sentences are within or beyond the Guidelines range, although they should "especially explain[]" sentences outside this range. See Green, 436 F.3d at 456. See also Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432, 434; cf. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c). Of course, a court need not "robotically tick through § 3553(a)'s every subsection." Johnson, 445 F.3d at ___, 2006 WL 893594, at *5. However, a district court's explanation must be elaborate enough to allow "an appellate court to effectively review the reasonableness of the sentence." United States v. Williams, 432 F.3d 621, 622 (6th Cir.2005). In particular, we believe that a district court's explanation should provide some indication (1) that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors with respect to the particular defendant, see United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 305 (6th Cir.2005); and (2) that it has also considered the potentially meritorious arguments raised by both parties about sentencing, see Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679.
The Sentencing Commission subsequently promulgated U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1 (2004)
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