Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/401/387/324160/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 18:07:17
Document Index: 294671869

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2901', '§ 502', '§ 3204', '§ 943', '§ 40', '§ 944']

Clarence Blair, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee.james L. Suggs, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1968 › Clarence Blair, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee.james L. Suggs, Appellant, v. Unite...
Clarence Blair, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee.james L. Suggs, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968) Argued March 7, 1968
Decided May 2, 1968
Petition for Rehearing En Banc in No. 21,033 Denied October 10, 1968
These appeals arise out of the armed robbery of a department store. Appellant Blair was convicted of robbery, 22 D.C.CODE § 2901 (1967), and sentenced to from five to 15 years imprisonment. Appellant Suggs, in addition to being convicted of robbery, was also found guilty on three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, 22 D.C.CODE § 502 (1967), and on one count of carrying a pistol without a license, 22 D.C.CODE § 3204 (1967). He was given consecutive and concurrent sentences totaling 45 years imprisonment. We affirm Blair's conviction, but reverse as to Suggs because his pre-trial statements to the police were admitted in evidence contrary to the teachings of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
"* * * The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely `exculpatory.' If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement. * * *" 384 U.S. at 476-477, 86 S. Ct. at 1629. (Emphasis added.)
3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 943-953 (3d ed. 1940). See also C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 40, at p. 86 (1954). For cases specifically dealing with evidence of police brutality or illegality admitted for purposes of testing credibility,see, e. g., People v. Dickman, 143 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 833, 299 P.2d 30 (Los Angeles County Super.Ct.1956); City of Xenia v. Burton, 70 Ohio Law Abst. 289, 128 N.E.2d 134 (Ohio Ct.App.1953); Churn v. State, 184 Tenn. 646, 202 S.W.2d 345 (1947); Lansdale v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 167, 158 S.W.2d 75 (1942).
3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 944. Cases dealing with police officers include State v. Robinson, 24 Wash. 2d 909, 167 P.2d 986 (1946); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 294 Mass. 379, 2 N.E.2d 477 (1936)
Suggs does raise a serious Mallory point, Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479 (1957), not noted on trial. In view of our disposition, we do not notice it on appeal.
See Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
The fact that the ruling had been well publicized was assigned as a reason for requiring objection by defense trial counsel in United States v. Armetta, 2 Cir., 378 F.2d 658, 661 (1967). We need not consider whether and in what circumstances a Miranda objection may be noticed as plain error on appeal, see Gregory v. United States, 125 U.S.App. D.C. 140, 142 n. 5, 369 F.2d 185, 187 n. 5 (1966). Armetta was a case where the prosecution had a claim that it had met the requirements of Miranda, and the failure of defense counsel to raise the point may have precluded its bringing out the full facts concerning advice given and waiver.
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954). The Government's reliance on People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 221 N.E.2d 541 (1966), is misplaced. The trial in Kulis occurred prior to the decision in Miranda. See Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966).
Walder, of course, involved the use for impeachment purposes of evidence that was not directly related to the offense charged and that was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Subsequent lower court cases, however, have extended its rationale to illegally obtained pretrial statements which were directly related to the offense charged. See, e. g., Inge v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 365 F.2d 345 (1966); Tate v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 283 F.2d 377 (1960). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recently demonstrated its intention to discourage any such whittling away of rights. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S. Ct. 967, 974, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968), wherein the Court held that a defendant's testimony in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds may not be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt.
See State v. Brewton, Or.Sup.Ct., 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943, 87 S. Ct. 2074, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1328 (1967). See also Note, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 939 (1967). No case has been cited and we have found none holding the principle applied in Walder applicable in Miranda situations.