Source: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/06/10/sam-fowles-can-the-prime-minister-prorogue-parliament-to-deliver-a-no-deal-brexit/?replytocom=119909
Timestamp: 2020-07-14 16:17:19
Document Index: 80278083

Matched Legal Cases: ['CJEU ', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Art 50', 'Art 50', 'Art 50', 'art\n5']

Sam Fowles: Can the Prime Minister Prorogue Parliament to Deliver a No Deal Brexit? – UK Constitutional Law Association
Constitutional Law Group June 10, 2019 Europe, European Union, Judicial review, UK government, UK Parliament
While several Conservative leadership candidates have disavowed this course of action, Dominic Raab, one of the front runners, appears to have declined the opportunity to do so. It further appears that Andrea Leadsom, whilst Leader of the Commons, explored the implications of taking a similar course of action. The Speaker, John Bercow, has stated that he will not permit Parliament to be prorogued in such a way. Prorogation, however, is within the gift of the Monarch, not the Speaker. It is not clear what would happen if the Queen prorogued Parliament and the Speaker refused to be prorogued but it is certain that it would create a constitutional crisis.
(Suggested citation: S. Fowles, ‘Can the Prime Minister Prorogue Parliament to Deliver a No Deal Brexit?’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (10th Jun. 2019) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/))
Posted in Europe, European Union, Judicial review, UK government, UK Parliament and tagged Bancoult, Brexit, Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, Fire Brigades Union, Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011, GCHQ case, Jackson, Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, prerogative powers, prorogation, Royal Prerogative. Bookmark the permalink.
Brexit Highlights 3 – 9 June 2019 | Middle Temple Library Blog	 on June 10, 2019 at 3:08 pm
[…] – A new post was published on the UK Constitutional Law Association blog – Sam Fowles: Can the Prime Minister Prorogue Parliament to Deliver a No Deal Brexit? […]
Michael	 on June 10, 2019 at 5:34 pm
I am wondering about the the Prorogation Act 1867. Is this still good law? If so could the power to prorogue Parliament flow from this Act rather than the prerogative (in light of De Keyser’s Royal Hotel)? Would that change the assessment of the PM’s powers?
Roger	 on June 10, 2019 at 5:49 pm
It’s not denying the will of Parliament to allow the notice in Article 50 to take effect when Parliament itself voted so heavily to do so. In fact it seems to me that it is Parliament that is out of step here.
It is extraordinary that such steps are even having to be talked about because of the behaviour of MPs, who are failing to keep to the undertakings they made.
It is MPs that are seriously st fault.
Tony	 on June 11, 2019 at 6:17 pm
Parliament didn’t legislate to require the Article 50 notice to be served in the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 – it merely granted the Prime Minister the discretionary power to do this. In addition, because the Article 50 notification can be revoked, it’s not the case that Parliament has mandated EU withdrawal to take place. Parliament is free to reverse any of the legislation it passes. Mandates and “undertakings” don’t apply to Parliament – that’s what Parliamentary Sovereignty means.
Roger	 on June 12, 2019 at 11:55 am
I accept your technical points.
It remains the case that MPs are failing to meet their undertakings to an extent that proroguing Parliament has been raised as a serious proposition.
JohnAllman.UK	 on June 10, 2019 at 5:53 pm
It would appear that in EU law, the UK will leave the EU at the end of the final extension to the Article 50 notice period (which I will call EU Brexit), unless Article 50 notice is revoked beforehand in compliance with any British constitutional requirements, which I will refer to as “cancelling EU Brexit”.
In UK law, the UK leaves the EU on the statutory “exit day” defined in section 20 of the Act, as amended, which I will call UK Brexit. UK Brexit and EU Brexit both used to be 29th March 2019.
It is important that EU Brexit and UK Brexit should be synchronised so that they happen simultaneously, if they happen at all.
Both Houses of Parliament could theoretically pass primary legislation to repeal the present primary legislation provision whereby the UK Brexit occurs on exit day. This I call “cancelling UK Brexit”.
EU Brexit will be on WTO terms unless a withdrawal agreement agreed between the government and the EU subject to ratification by the latter is first ratified in accordance with the UK constitution. UK Brexit will be on WTO terms unless the House of Commons votes beforehand to approve the ratification of any withdrawal agreement.
The date of UK Brexit cannot be amended without secondary legislation in both houses of Parliament.
The date of EU Brexit cannot be amended without the consent of the EU.
Amending the date of EU Brexit without also amending the date of UK Brexit would be undesirable.
I am going to argue, if need be by way of judicial review, that cancelling EU Brexit requires primary legislation, passed by both Houses of Parliament. I hope to win.
Assuming I win, it appears that the only outcome that can be procured without Parliament’s further co-operation with government (e.g. procured whilst Parliament isn’t sitting, or if Parliament hasn’t done beforehand all that is needed before being prorogued) is EU Brexit and UK Brexit on 31st October, on WTO terms.
The new Prime Minister will inherit the situation in which Parliament, which has enacted the present UK law status quo, thus authorising the giving of Article 50 notice that has caused the present EU law status quo, has expressed a non-binding distaste (in the Commons at least) for the UK’s leaving the EU on WTO terms, but has so far been unwilling to enable any of the remaining possible outcomes. If those circumstances continue until Parliament rises for the conference season, I for one don’t want Parliament to sit between the end of the conference season and EU Brexit and UK Brexit, simultaneously on 31st October.
Apart from passing meaningless advisory votes counselling against accepting WTO terms, when no other legal option remains, mainly because Parliament has done none of the various things it could have done to make a different outcome lawfully achievable, what earthly use is Parliament, in the final run-up to 31st October.
Mrs May’s policy u-turn during what was supposed to be the final week before Brexit shocked me. Her further policy u-turn that caused me to attend court on 10th April fearing I needed to battle to save Brexit myself, was even worse. I do not want an impotent Parliament putting on a show, panicking like headless chickens next time we reach that part of the loop. I want an orderly Brexit.
I do not mind at all the government’s ministers being left in peace, for the last three weeks of Brexit planning.
I was in court two days before the interim EU Brexit Day and UK Brexit Day of 12th April, seeking to establish that primary legislation was a constitutional requirement in order to cancel EU Brexit. I fear I may need to resume that task before long. That needs to be tested in court in good time, preferably not on 29th October, because the government has ignored the pre-action correspondence and no law firm has taken on my Miller-in-reverse challenge, allowing history repeat itself.
For more information about my intended judicial review, see:
Tony	 on June 10, 2019 at 8:18 pm
Parliament didn’t actually “sanction” the Article 50 notice to be served in the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 – it merely granted the Prime Minister the discretionary power to do this. In addition, because the Article 50 notification can be revoked, it cannot be said that Parliament has mandated that EU withdrawal take place, let alone that it should occur by a particular date.
Because of this, the principle stated by the majority in the Miller case (i.e. “a major change to UK constitutional arrangements can be achieved by ministers alone”) remains applicable to issues regarding the lawfulness of prorogation.
Jerzy Kolodziej	 on June 11, 2019 at 2:10 pm
Parliament did not “sanction” the Office of the Prime Minister to give notice. The power was a discretionary conferred power that was subject to the usual requirements of any administrative decision and subject to review. Importantly, such a decision is also subject to the provisions of A50(1) that requires notice to be “in accordance with the constitutional requirements” of the country leaving.
There are several obstacles. I would question whether prorogation to avoid Parliamentary scrutiny was compatible with the Bill of Rights 1688[9] and the Supreme Court Ruling in Miller. I would also question whether it fulfilled the purposes and intentions of the EU (Withdrawal) Act itself.
How would the CJEU rule on the legitimacy of A50 notice if they were required to?
I accept the author’s differentiation between the decision of the Prime Minister to advise Her Majesty and the that of the Her Majesty herself. Her Majesty would be bound to act on the advise unless it were quashed by the courts.
In practical terms, there may be difficulty in preventing the illegal prorogation of Parliament without some sort of injunction?! The situation would be highly unusual.
I totally reject that the courts would accept the legitimacy of prorogation for any purpose ulterior to its ordinary usage. The underlying foundation of constitutional order would be undermined if a government could simply avoid Parliament to establish authoritarian control of the law. It would not be acting in good faith. In my view it would be precisely what the Bill of Rights was enacted to avoid:
The purpose and intention is to ensure Parliament is not bound or silenced.
Finally, there is the question of where it would leave us if such a prorogation were to effected. At some point, Parliament would have to enact laws to facilitate the Brexit process, in the circumstances that Parliament had been deliberately frustrated from doing so at the appropriate time. It would be a full scale constitutional crisis on an astonishing scale.
Paul W	 on June 23, 2019 at 10:30 am
“Parliament didn’t actually “sanction” the Article 50 notice to be served in the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017”
On the contrary, the Act did ‘sanction’ i.e. permit the Article 50 notice to be served. No further legislative action was required to satisfy the majority judgement in Miller and thus to satisfy Article 50(1)’s ‘constitutional requirements’.
Of course Parliament can change its mind, and proroguing it to prevent it passing the necessary legislation would seem to be acting in bad faith.
But the Court would not necessarily invoke the Miller principle again. After all, by the Notification Act Parliament has decided that it approves of Brexit. It has had plenty of time since then to change its mind. The Crown would have a tolerable argument that it is now in the national interest to have a period of certainty pending Brexit Day. The closer October 31 approaches, the stronger that argument becomes. The Court may conclude it doesn’t have a dog in this constitutional fight.
The best it might do is stay the PM’s hand so as to give Parliament time to table a vote of No confidence under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act.
Best of the blogs - Legal Cheek	 on June 14, 2019 at 8:40 am
[…] Can the Prime Minister prorogue parliament to deliver a no deal Brexit? [UK Constitutional Law Association Blog] […]
Being a Good Dictator is not so Easy | Verfassungsblog	 on June 15, 2019 at 3:26 pm
[…] SAM FOWLES believes that if the future British Prime Minister wants to push through a no-deal Brexit by means of prorogation of Parliament, the courts might well be able to intervene. […]
Gary Phillips	 on June 27, 2019 at 8:11 am
Sir Edward Leigh’s suggestion that a new Prime Minister could be commissioned who has not demonstrated that he has the confidence of the Commons and who intends to act to prevent the Commons from expressing that confidence or lack of it, can be dismissed as fantasy. It would be a coup.
It seems clear that the Leader of the Opposition intends immediately to test whether a new Prime Minister has the confidence of the Commons.
The more interesting question is what happens if the new Prime Minister wins that initial vote with the support of MPs who indicate that their confidence would be withdrawn if the Prime Minister attempted to produce a No Deal Brexit by prorogation and then the Prime Minister later seeks a prorogation.
The answer seems to be the fundamental implausibility of a “surprise” prorogation given that the Prorogation Act 1867 does not apply to a prorogation at the end of a session. One would end up with a televised version of the Arrest of the Five Members or the Dissolution of the 1681 Oxford Parliament.
The only realistic scenario in which one could see the courts having to adjudicate on a prorogation issue is if a Prime Minister persuades the Commons to acquiesce in a prorogation for a new Session commencing before 31 October, and then implements a prorogation by proclamation of the new Session before it meets to a date after 31 October under section 1 of the Prorogation Act 1867. That statutory prorogation looks more amenable to judicial review and it is difficult to see such a scenario arising except upon a breach of faith by the the Prime Minister to the Commons of the terms on which the Commons allowed the earlier prorogation to proceed.
Roger	 on June 27, 2019 at 11:08 am
The fact that MPs have undermined the people and the government by vociferously setting themselves against a no-deal exit is what I find most appalling.
Both major parties committed to acting on THE people’s vote of 2016 in the 2017 election but did nothing to ensure the people it sanctioned to represent them were committed to that objective.
Both major parties are guilty of complacent mismanagement. They may yet pay the ultimate price. MPs who continue to seek to avoid no-deal are contemptuous imbeciles. Whatever they think, however bad they (mistakenly) think Brexit will be for the country, their first commitment should be to carry out what the people voted for. If they can’t even get us out after more than 3 years, let alone resolve the future relationship, Parliament should be shut down permanently as useless.
A new seat of government and people’s representatives needs restructuring and locating in purpose built premises in the heart of the country, ie not London, which has shown itself to be detached from the rest of us. Visit Parliament and you’ll see how easy it must be to become lost in the sea of old history and forget you lead a purposeful independent vibrant modern 21st century country. Unless MPs stand beyond a line in the floor, they’re not allowed to speak! The place is a museum.
And at some point grasp the nettle of BBC funding – it no longer justifies unquestioning excessive public finance as its neutral political stance no longer exists.
Julian Cole	 on July 1, 2019 at 2:45 pm
If the Queen forces a “no-deal Brexit” on the 16M who voted against Brexit, and the 13M who did not vote, Her Majesty could become the last Monarch of the United Kingdom. Is this a risk she is willing to take?
Patrick Ostendorf	 on July 7, 2019 at 5:45 pm
I wonder why prorogation would be necessary anyway if a new PM wants to deliver a no Brexit deal given that this is simply the default option. Could Parliament force the government to submit a revocation of the Art. 50 notice to Brussels respectively request a prolongation in accordance with Art. 50 (3) TEU??
Tony	 on July 17, 2019 at 2:11 pm
Yes, Parliament can enact a statute requiring the government to revoke the article 50 notification because it would be imposing an enforceable legal duty on the government.
What’s more interesting is that Parliament could, alternatively, enact a statute that executes the revocation “decision” directly by operation of law (i.e. without requiring action on the part of the government). The same statute could also grant legal authority to any office holder to notify the EU Council of the revocation decision and require that office holder to submit that notification. If the office holder was not a member of the government (e.g. an officer of Parliament) this would have the effect of conclusively revoking article 50 without involving the government at all.
JohnAllman.UK	 on July 18, 2019 at 5:43 am
My question remains unanswered. Can the government revoke Art. 50 notice if Parliament does not enact that it may or must do so? I am seeking a declaration to the effect, no, it cannot. The lack of interest in this test case, here and elsewhere, I find staggering.
Tony	 on July 22, 2019 at 7:24 pm
Yes, the government can revoke Art. 50 notice even if Parliament does not enact a statute stating that it may or must do so. This is because the application of EU treaties to the UK is a matter of international law. A statute is required to dis-apply the domestic effect of EU law in the UK, but this is a separate matter.
JohnAllman.UK	 on July 26, 2019 at 7:59 am
You say, “Yes, the government can revoke Art. 50 notice even if Parliament does not enact a statute stating that it may or must do so. This is because the application of EU treaties to the UK is a matter of international law.”
Roughly speaking, in Miller, the government argued unsuccessfully that the government could give Art. 50 notice even if Parliament didn’t enact a statute stating that it may or must do so. This was because the application of EU treaties to the UK was a matter of international law. Why the asymmetry that you assert, whereby an argument that had failed in one direction, would succeed if applied in the opposite direction?
I have now published my claim form, by the way.
Legal Twitterati sent into overdrive after former PM threatens to take Boris Johnson to court to stop a no-deal Brexit - Legal Cheek	 on July 10, 2019 at 10:20 am
[…] Fowles of Cornerstone Barristers has written on the UK Constitutional Law Blog that a judicial review could be successful in theory, although it’s less obvious what remedy […]
JohnAllman.UK	 on July 13, 2019 at 3:05 am
Yesterday, I served a sealed Judicial Review claim form on the Prime Minister and the Brexit Secretary. I am asking the court for a declaration that the Royal Prerogative alone does not empower the British government to revoke Article 50 notice of the UK’s intention to leave the EU, because the constitutional requirements for such a revocation include the prior enactment of a statute permitting or requiring revocation, nothing less than an Act of Parliament being sufficient.
There has far too much talk of “Parliament” “blocking” a “no deal Brexit”. Parliament, both houses, and the Queen have enacted that there will be a no deal Brexit, unless certain conditions are met. The only way to change that legal position would be another Act to be enacted.
That’s what I say. Unless, on the papers, a judge rules my application totally without merit, there’ll have to be a hearing now.
Parliament (both houses) have enacted Brexit, with or without a deal. The Commons has rejected the only deal on offer, tantamount to voting for no deal. There are only four possible outcomes: no deal Brexit, the Commons voting for a Withdrawal Agreement that is actually on offer, further extensions, and canceling Brexit.
I have decided I can no longer put up with news coverage that moots cancelling Brexit, never mentioning what the constitutional requirements would be for Brexit to be cancelled. I say that an Act is required, not just an adhoc division on a motion in one of the two houses of Parliament saying that the Commons that enacted Brexit has got cold feet and wants to “block” it now. I’ve got no sense out of HMG in 3 months of asking questions, so I’ve resorted to this litigation.
Tony	 on August 28, 2019 at 7:21 pm
@JohnAllman.UK
The “asymmetry” that you mention exists because withdrawing from the EU involves the removal of rights and obligations whereas staying in the EU does not effect those rights and obligations – they are the status quo.
JohnAllman.UK	 on September 2, 2019 at 3:06 pm
I understand that broad-brush argument, in purported refutation of my own even more broad-brush argument. Here are some early thoughts in response.
(1) The present status quo has become the present countdown to a scheduled Brexit in about 8 weeks time. Cancelling Brexit now woul;d be more of a “change” than Brexit would be, because of that momentum.
(2) The decision (in an Act of Parliament) to schedule the update didn’t add or subtract any fundamental human rights, because it doesn’t amend the ECHR or the HRA. Every law of the land is interpreted consistently with those rights. That won’t change.
(3) The decision to leave the EU potentially adds, subtracts, increases and/or reduces, depending upon one’s nationality, rights (that aren’t fundamental Convention rights – because these remain untouched), obligations, privileges, advantages and disadvantages.
(4) The update was scheduled for Exit Day by the authority of an Act of Parliament.
(5) The decision to schedule that update was justiciable. The absence of a decision not to unschedule the update would not be justiciable. A last-minute, legally-flawed, u-turn decision ought to be justiciable, when it is to unschedule an update that millions of sensible people have looked forward to for 3 years and which businesses have invested money planning for, in anticipation of reaping the economic benefits the update promises to confer, potentially causing terrible suffering to millions.
I realise I’ll have to argue far better than this, if my JR claim ever gets a hearing. A hearing will only be necessary though, if a future PM seems to be about to purport to revoke Article 50, without passing a statute giving him or her that power. In April, I thought that might be about to happen. What are the chances of it happening one day, in the new circumstances, as they have come about since I issued my claim in July.
Neil O'Brien	 on July 13, 2019 at 9:39 am
I am not a lawyer, though I read law after retirement from the fire service. Having ploughed (struggling, sometimes!!) through the forgoing arguments proffered by learned and honourable persons as to the validity of the use of the Royal Prerogative in respect of Article 50, nowhere in any of the arguments have I found any reference to the result of that most purest form of democracy: the referendum which told the executive and legislature, in no uncertain terms that the majority of the electorate voted ‘Leave’. There was only one question to answer: remain or leave and whatever reasons each voter had for his or her decisions was immaterial. The outcome of that referendum is democracy in its purest and inviolable state. That members of parliament, since that referendum, have sought and continue to seek to deny the fulfilment of this historically vital ‘Plebiscitum’ is flying in the face of the very concept of democracy and makes a mockery of the so-called ‘Mother of all Parliaments’ upon which many democracies around the world have founded their own. If ever the concept of the Royal Prerogative in its purest form should be decreed without further question, it is NOW!
My apologies for butting in amidst this very high level legal argument but I do enjoy reading them.
Michael J Laidlaw	 on August 17, 2019 at 8:38 pm
Maybe a case that majoritarian democracy is at an end. If it is a vote whether to have tea or coffee and it is 51% for tea then not such an issue. But when it is a major change to the trading practices of a nation and a risk to the welfare and future of the population then surely it requires a larger majority to state they are prepared to accept that. The Scottish independence referendum provided for a 55% remain which was to me not enough to say No to independence but if the other way round would not be enough to say yes. Some believe they have a mandate to leave with 17.4 million people but what about the remaining 50 million plus in the country. Highlights the error in the referendum and the arguments were sold on inaccurate information. However we should be protected by the Bill of Rights from parliament been prorogued and Her Majesty. If the executive chooses this course of action then we enter dangerous territory. Remember whatever happens the politicians never suffer the consequences.
Andy Jones	 on August 28, 2019 at 1:38 pm
Prophetic article. Just one thought, Art 50:
Would unconstitutional actions by an executive to leave the EU mean that the U.K. had not actually fulfilled the requirements of Art 50? And therefor that the U.K. had not actually left the EU as leaving is predicated on the use of Art 50?
Paul McH	 on August 30, 2019 at 9:36 pm
I find the arguments here to be weak.
1. Fowles accepts that the argument that ‘a major change to UK constitutional arrangements can be achieved by ministers alone’ is weaker than in Miller. However, in the case of prorogation, it’s non-existent. The constitutional change is actually due to the Notice given on statutory authority back in 2017. Prorogation doesn’t effect a major constitutional change in itself
2. If the advice and prorogation are separate, what effect will a court declaring that the PM’s advice was somehow ultra vires have on the prorogation itself? None. If the advice and the prorogation can’t be separated-out, then the prorogation can’t be challenged
3. Fowles says:
“As the House of Lords held in R (Fire Brigades Union et al) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1995] 2 A.C. 513 (albeit in the case of a clear statutory steer from parliament), the executive is not permitted to use prerogative powers to frustrate the will of Parliament.”
That isn’t what FBU was decided on the basis of. Let’s have a look at the full reasoning in that case, pler quote, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson:
“My Lords, it would be most surprising if, at the present day,prerogative powers could be validly exercised by the executive so as to frustrate the will of Parliament EXPRESSED IN A STATUTE [my emphasis]…”
That is the basis the case was decided upon, that the prerogative would have frustrated the statute in question. There is no statute here that is frustrated (in terms of being ‘stripped of content’) by prorogation.
To try to apply the reasoning of FBU to a series of indicative votes is a step too far.
4. I find the reasoning based on the quote from Jackson to be unpersuasive. Indeed, you could use it against those MPs who have sought to impede Brexit from the start
5. Fowles contradicts himself. He says both that prorogation is against the will of Parliament and that it will prevent Parliament expressing its will on the matter. Both can’t be true
Lloyd Wade	 on August 31, 2019 at 5:52 pm
You say: ”The core of the issue is the exclusion of Parliament from a matter of historic constitutional importance. The harm at which a review would take aim is not simply the frustration of Parliament’s will, but the fact that Parliament will be prevented from establishing a position at all.”
How so? Parliament is only being suspended for an additional 4/5 days. It would have been suspended in any case in order to allow a new session to start and to facilitate the conference season. Parliament will return on 14th October in time for the new Queen’s speech. The key dates will then be 17 and 18 October when the European Council meets to consider any new Brexit deal. What is the point of Parliament discussing any new Brexit deal (or otherwise) until after that meeting?
I don’t understand how Parliament will be prevented from establishing a position on this matter. Could you please provide more detailed arguments to support that assertion?
Paul W	 on September 2, 2019 at 11:01 am
The ‘only 4/5 days extra’ argument is – to say the least – unpersuasive. Parliament intended to take a recess for the conference season, but that was in its control and was already coming under pressure due to the amount and intensity of and need for Parliamentary debate that is likely in the coming weeks. Prorogation is out of its control and there is no way for it to reassemble in defiance of the prorogation.
This week, when Parliament is still sitting, it should spend its time ‘taking back control’ by passing legislation that prorogation can only occur with the consent of both Houses of Parliament. This is where the power to suspend should lie. The fact that it still lies with the Executive is an historical anomaly, which has not previously been problematic because the Executive has not previously played fast and loose with the constitution