Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/594/742/601/
Timestamp: 2020-02-20 18:18:21
Document Index: 94982119

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 401']

Libby Rod and Gun Club et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. John Poteat et al., Defendants-appellants, 594 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1979 › Libby Rod and Gun Club et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. John Poteat et al., Defendants-appellants
Libby Rod and Gun Club et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. John Poteat et al., Defendants-appellants, 594 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 594 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979) March 15, 1979
The project was authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1950 (the Act), Pub. L. 516, 64 Stat. 170 (May 17, 1950). Construction began on the main dam in 1966, and was completed in 1973. The Act authorized ten generators for the Libby Dam. Four were installed originally in the dam, and the Corps of Engineers (the Corps) intends to add four more as part of the LAURD project.
The section has been interpreted to apply to federal dam construction projects. United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 183-84, 55 S. Ct. 666, 79 L. Ed. 1371 (1935); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 616 (D.D.C. 1974), Vacated 431 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1977).2
Congress has on a number of occasions appropriated funds specifically for the construction of the reregulating dam.4 The Corps contends that such appropriations are equivalent to authorization of the second dam. The Rod and Gun Club conversely argues, and the district court agreed, that the recent Supreme Court ruling in T. V. A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1978), holds directly that the appropriation of funds should not be construed to represent authorization of a project.
The Rod and Gun Club further buttresses this argument by referring this court to a number of cases where congressional funding of a project has not been viewed as representing implicit authorization of that project. See e. g. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 505, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959); D. C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Airis, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 128-29, 391 F.2d 478, 481-82 (1968).
We are not convinced that these cases address issues that are necessarily analogous to those presented by this appeal, nor that they mandate the conclusion that courts can never construe appropriations as congressional authorization. However, we do conclude that T. V. A. v. Hill, although clearly distinguishable on the facts, nonetheless creates serious questions as to the Corps' claim that the appropriation of funds for a project should generally be regarded as project authorization. Id. 437 U.S. at 190-92, 98 S. Ct. 2279.5
We are hesitant, as was the Supreme Court in T. V. A. v. Hill, to interpret isolated remarks in committee hearings or reports as expressions of the intent or knowledge of Congress. T. V. A. v. Hill, supra, 437 U.S. at 191-92, 98 S. Ct. 2279; See S. E. C. v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121, 98 S. Ct. 1702, 56 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1978).
Because the reregulating dam has not been authorized by Congress as required by § 401, this court need not look further at the equities employed by the district court to support the injunction. United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30-31, 60 S. Ct. 749, 84 L. Ed. 1050 (1940). Our conclusion that the reregulating dam was not authorized bars its continued construction.
At the outset, it should be understood that the language of 33 U.S.C. § 401 assists us in resolving certain preliminary matters, but it does not answer the ultimate question we face. It is relevant, though not especially helpful, in determining whether or not the plaintiffs have a private right of action to challenge these expenditures as unauthorized.1 The language is relevant also to indicate that agencies of the federal government, as well as states and private entities, must obtain consent from Congress prior to constructing a dam in a navigable river. See United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 55 S. Ct. 666, 79 L. Ed. 1371 (1935). Thus the Corps of Engineers may not, and it does not, rely for its authority to proceed upon some general authorization from Congress not addressed to this specific project. Beyond these questions, however, the statute provides little assistance in resolving the principal issue confronting us, which is whether Congress has in fact approved the expenditures in question. The majority deems the word "consent" in the statute to mean "authorization," and I have little objection to this translation except to note that it simply restates the question without answering it. The problem then is whether or not Congress has authorized the Corps to spend funds for construction of this project. Based on the legislative history before us, I conclude it did.
NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLEI find little support for the majority's conclusion that appropriations for specific aspects of reregulating dam construction does not constitute consent for the expenditures. The majority suggests that Congress may have been laboring under a mistake in voting on the appropriation, since the Corps stated before various congressional committees that the reregulating dam was authorized by the 1950 Flood Control Act.4 Isuppose the majority's reasoning is that if Congress had been alerted to the ambiguous nature of the asserted prior authorization, it would not have passed the appropriation measure in question here. There is no evidence supporting that conclusion. Even assuming that there was a procedural flaw because Congress did not follow the normal course of making a separate declaration to authorize the project before appropriating money for its construction, the majority gives no reason at all for departing from the general rule that the courts may not inquire into whether or not the internal procedures of Congress were correctly followed, precedent to the enactment of a law. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 676-77, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 29 (1892). The enactment of a statute is conclusive in the courts on the issue of regularity in legislative proceedings.
Operation of 33 U.S.C. § 401 was addressed in United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 55 S. Ct. 666, 79 L. Ed. 1371 (1935). At issue was the construction of Parker Dam, a project Congress had not authorized by the appropriation of monies or in any other manner. The dam was to be financed entirely by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. The United States brought suit to enjoin the State of Arizona from interfering with the project. The court concluded there was no congressional approval for the project and dismissed the Government's suit. In a discussion with implications for this case, the court referred to Laguna Dam, a completed project cited by the Government to support the proposition that the Parker Dam was also authorized. The court agreed that independent authorization of the Laguna project was doubtful, but stated, "Congress has made appropriations for the benefit of the project of which it is a part, and so recognized and approved the building of the dam. Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379, 386, 24 L. Ed. 668." This is an explicit recognition that appropriation of funds may constitute requisite congressional consent for construction of a dam, as is the Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379, 383-86, 24 L. Ed. 668 (1877).
The majority's opinion here appears to rest in large part on a misperception of the relevance of TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1978). There is no question that Tellico Dam, the project at issue in the case, was expressly authorized and funded by appropriations, and it was unnecessary to consider 33 U.S.C. § 401. The Court held that Congress, by its express authorizations and appropriation of funds for the project, did not intend to repeal by implication the clear substantive provisions of other statutes. The case deals with the relationship of project authorization to the mandates of other federal statutes, not with the manner in which Congress declares consent under section 401. In the case before us, no one argues that a finding of consent under section 401 would by implication repeal provisions of the Endangered Species Act or the National Environmental Policy Act. For similar reasons, Hill 's discussion of the role of committee hearings and reports in interpreting congressional intent, See 437 U.S. at 189-92, 98 S. Ct. 2279, has no bearing on this case.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959), which is the second featured precedent of the majority opinion, is not relevant either. At issue was the validity of a security clearance program implemented by the Defense Department. The court simply held that various peripheral statutes and general congressional appropriations for security programs did not imply approval of the specific procedures, which were of doubtful constitutionality. The court noted that the procedures were not before congressional committees which considered the appropriations question. Id. at 505, 79 S. Ct. 1400. D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Airis, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 391 F.2d 478 (1968), is also inapposite. That opinion held only that a congressional lump sum appropriation for street and highway construction in the District of Columbia did not authorize the district to disregard its own procedural requirements for planning and construction, requirements entirely consistent with the appropriations measure. Similar considerations distinguish other cases such as National Audubon Society v. Andrus, 442 F. Supp. 42 (D.D.C. 1977) (appropriations bill does not ratify an otherwise insufficient environmental impact statement).
The authority most closely in point to support the rationale of the court is Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 431 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1977). While it might be possible to distinguish Callaway on narrow grounds, broad language in the opinion does conflict with my view of section 401. The reasons set forth above, including the controlling law of this circuit, point rather conclusively against the result reached by the majority, and I would not follow the decision of the district court in the Callaway case.
Judge Kennedy suggests in his dissent that this court should not inquire into whether "internal procedures of Congress were correctly followed, precedent to the enactment of a law. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 676-77, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892)." We make no such inquiry in this case. Rather, we are confronted with a duly enacted statute that requires Congress as a whole to authorize dam projects, including federally funded projects. It is the duty of the courts, when they must, to inquire whether Congress has satisfied the mandate of 33 U.S.C. § 401. See United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 55 S. Ct. 666, 79 L. Ed. 1371 (1935). We therefore do not view § 401 as merely an "internal procedure of Congress."
Similarly, neither United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 55 S. Ct. 666, 79 L. Ed. 1371 (1935), nor Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379, 24 L. Ed. 668 (1877), is factually analogous to this case. Neither decision holds explicitly that appropriations constitute congressional authorization for dam construction.
In T. V. A. v. Hill, the Supreme Court was confronted with a record showing that various congressional committees had specifically opined that continued construction of the Tellico Dam was proper notwithstanding the Endangered Species Act. 437 U.S. at 170-71, 98 S. Ct. 2279. The Court nonetheless held that such statements were not persuasive evidence that Congress as a whole intended to repeal that Act. Id. at 191, 98 S. Ct. 2279. In this case, the Corps has offered no evidence that the various appropriations committees ever considered the authorization issue. Thus, we find even less direct evidence than existed in T. V. A. v. Hill that Congress intended appropriations to be equated with authorization
This difficult question is not addressed by the majority. I do not discuss it in detail because I find plaintiffs' challenge without merit on other grounds. See Red Star Towing and Transportation Co. v. Department of Transportation, 423 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1970) (no private right of action under 33 U.S.C. § 401). See also Hooper v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (D. Conn. 1971). Cf. Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140, 1148 (N.D. Ala. 1971), Aff'd 456 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946, 93 S. Ct. 1352, 35 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1973). See generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975). But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 622-25 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), Aff'd on other grounds, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), is not directly in point but is nevertheless relevant. One of the plaintiff's claims was that although a dam project had been originally authorized, the Corps was proceeding in excess of, and in violation of, that authorization. See id. at 754. In dismissing plaintiff's complaint as to this count, the court stated: