Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/18520290/24-First-Supplemental-Complaint
Timestamp: 2017-12-12 00:14:41
Document Index: 34261726

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1278', '§ 1102', '§ 12945', '§ 7297', '§ 2601', '§ 12945', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§ 45', '§ 1983', '§201', '§ 825', '§ 72970', '§ 825', '§3294', '§3294', '§ 1278', '§ 1278', '§ 1278', '§ 1102', '§ 1102', 'art: 24', '§ 1102', '§ 12945', '§ 12945', '§ 7297', '§ 7297', '§ 72972', '§ 7297', '§ 2601', '§\n1', '§\n2611', '§ 2615', '§ 12945', '§ 12945', '§ 7297', '§ 15', '§ 825', '§ 7297', '§ 7297', '§ 12945', '§ 7297', '§ 7297', '§ 72972', '§ 7297', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§7293', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§ 7293', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 45', '§ 45', '§ 541', '§ 541', '§ 2617', '§ 1988', '§ 12940', '§ 12945', '§3294', '§3291']

24 First Supplemental Complaint | Pathology | Complaint
Case No. 1:07-cv-26 FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. Retaliation [Health & Safety Code § 1278.5]; II. Retaliation [Lab. Code § 1102.5]; III. Retaliation [Gov’t Code §§ 12945.1, et seq; 2 C.C.R. § 7297.7(a)]; IV. Interference with FMLA Rights [29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.]; V. Violation of CFRA Rights. [Gov’t Code §§ 12945.1, et seq.]; VI. Disability Discrimination [Gov’t. Code § 12940(a)]; VII. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation [Gov’t Code § 12940(m)]; VIII. Failure to Engage in Good Faith In An Interactive Process [Gov’t Code § 12940(n)]; IX. Defamation [Civ. Code §§ 45- 47]; and X. Procedural Due Process Violation [14th Amendment of U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1983]. XI. Violation of FLSA [29 U.S.C. §201 et seq.] JURY TRIAL DEMANDED I.
1 NATURE OF THE ACTION 2 This is an individual action brought by Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O., a whistleblowing 3 physician with disabilities, against his employer, (i) the County of Kern (“Defendant County” or 4 “the County”); ) (ii) individual Defendants Peter Bryan (“Bryan”), Chief Executive Officer of 5 Kern Medical Center (“KMC”); Eugene Kercher, M.D., President of Medical Staff at KMC 6 (“Kercher”); Jennifer Abraham, M.D., Immediate Past President of Medical Staff at KMC 7 (“Abraham”); Scott Ragland, M.D., President-Elect of Medical Staff at KMC (“Ragland”); and 8 Toni Smith, Chief Nurse Executive of KMC, (“Smith”), both personally and in their official 9 capacities; and (iii) individual Defendants Irwin Harris, M.D., Chief Medical Officer of KMC 10 (“Harris”); William Roy, M.D., Chief of the Division of Gynecologic Oncology at KMC 11 (“Roy”); and DOES 1 through 10. 12 Plaintiff’s claims against his employer, Defendant County, allege violations of section 13 1278.5 of the Health & Safety Code 1 which prohibits retaliation against a health care provider 14 who reports suspected unsafe care and conditions of patients in a health care facility; section 15 1102.5 of the Labor Code which prohibits retaliation against an employee for reporting or 16 refusing to participate in suspected violations of the law; the California Family Rights Act 17 (sections 12945.1, et seq., of the Government Code) (“CFRA”) and the Family and Medical 18 Leave Act (sections 2601, et seq. of the United States Code) (“FMLA”) which prohibit 19 interference with an employee’s right to medical leave and retaliation for an employee’s exercise 20 of the right to medical leave; and the Fair Employment and Housing Act [subdivisions (a), (m) & 21 (n) of section 12940 of the Government Code] (“FEHA”) which prohibits discrimination against 22 23
classified employee, or have any rights or protections under the County's Civil Service Ordinance, rules or regulation. 33. Article II.3(B)(1) of the Second Contract guarantees that Plaintiff’s base salary
I was quite surprised to receive your letter of June 5th. The "discrepancies" should be well known to you as I have brought them to your attention many times, both in the presence of Dr. Perez, and in a letter to you a couple of months ago, as well as multiple phone conversations. The inaccuracies, delays and refusals to refer specimens for outside review continue. The matter has been appropriately reported to the administration for a quality assurance review, as I have had no success in my pleadings to you directly. 53. Roy’s statements of fact regarding the existence of “discrepancies” and the
to Harris. The Roy Letter stated in relevant part: With respect, Dr. Jadwin is a small rural community hospital pathologist, with very limited experience and no specialty training in regard to Gynecologic Oncologic Pathology…. Dr. Jadwin is not a clinician, and has neither the fund of knowledge nor the experience to make any recommendations regarding the treatment of patients, much less criticize the care provided by those, such as myself, whose training and experience were attained at some of the highest seats of learning in the U.S and abroad. Additionally, as you are aware, it is not infrequent that Dr. Jadwin's diagnoses are in err when reviewed by outside specialists, as in this particular case. The management of the patient would have been inappropriate if we accepted Dr. Jadwin's report, which as you know, was different from two other pathologists in his own department (three different opinions). I have no confidence in Dr. Jadwin and I am actively pursuing the possibility of having all specimens from the Gynecologic Oncology service evaluated outside, as is currently done for the Neurosurgery service…. I have discussed these issues with Dr. Perez, Chairman of the Department of Obstectrics and Gynecology, and he assures me of his full support. 60. The Roy Letter contained the following false statements of fact: (i) Plaintiff is a
in relevant part: I received a copy of your letter to Dr. Roy dated February 10, 2006 and I must say that I am disappointed in your decision to send it… I know that you felt justified in sending the letter. You feel that Dr. Roy besmirched your reputation and challenged your professional competency. Furthermore, you feel that there is no evidence to support his characterizations of you and you are demanding that he recant his comments and apologize. All of these things may or may not be as you say. However, your decision to confront the issues this way is not a good one…. It is not your message that people react to but rather how you deliver it…. Dr. Roy's letter was correspondence submitted through the medical staff structure, and the staff officers and Chief Medical Officer have the obligation to decide what to do with that input. They can either ignore that correspondence because of a lack of supporting evidence, call for a review of the quality of your work, or cause a meeting to happen between you and Dr. Roy and Dr. Perez to further clarify the basis of Dr. Roy's concerns. 70. As an officer of KMC, Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede
leave under FMLA and CFRA pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 and 2 C.C.R. § 72970(e), respectively, in that he had been regularly employed by Defendant County for 1,250 hours in the twelve months immediately prior to the start of his leave and had not taken any medical or family leave during that time. 75. An eligible employee’s rights under CFRA and FMLA include a “reduced work
schedule” pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 825.203 that is “medically necessary” pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 825.117. 76. On or about December 16, 2005, Plaintiff submitted to KMC a copy of his
protesting the Paycut. The email stated: Mr. Bryan stated in his letter to me that his decision to strip me of my chairmanship was based on the sick leaves I was taking. KMC's proposed reduction of my base salary seems to have the purpose of punishing me further. I wish to return to work at KMC, but I believe the proposed drastic reduction in my
base salary as benchmarked against Dr. Dutt's is utterly unfair on numerous levels. I am left feeling that this is simply another retaliatory effort on the part of KMC. 96. On or about September 20, 2006, Culberson sent a letter addressed to Plaintiff
not been informed that KMC had finally hired a locum tenens pathologist. The email stated: I don't know of Dr. Bhargava and didn't know that a contract with Dr. Bhargava was signed. Had I known, I would have placed him on the call schedule for the
Plaintiff, willfully and intentionally creating a hostile work environment, subjecting him to acts of defamation and ratification thereof, demotion and excessive reduction in pay, disparate treatment, unwarranted criticism and reprimands, threats, requests for his resignation, interference with and denial of his right to medical leave, refusing to engage in good faith in an interactive process and denying him reasonable accommodation and procedural due process because of his protected characteristics and/or activities alleged herein. I. DAMAGES AND CAUSATION 136. As a result of Defendants' acts and omissions alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered
pecuniary losses, such as loss of wages and benefits, and has been required to incur medical and legal expenses and to hire attorneys in order (i) to enforce Plaintiff's rights, (ii) to enforce provisions of the law protecting whistleblowers, employees who exercise their right to medical leave under CFRA and FMLA, and employees with disabilities that need reasonable accommodation, and (iii) to take such action both in his own interest and in order to enforce important rights affecting the public interest. 137. After Plaintiff’s returned from leave on October 4, 2006, Defendants and each of
are a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's harm. 142. The acts and omissions of Defendants Bryan, Harris, and Roy alleged herein are
despicable, oppressive and were done in conscious disregard of the rights of individuals and whistleblowers, such as Plaintiff, and of the safety of public patients, and have evidenced actual or implied malicious intent toward Plaintiff, thereby entitling him to an award of punitive damages against Defendants Bryan, Harris and Roy pursuant to §3294 Civil Code in an amount sufficient to make an example of Defendants Bryan, Harris, and Roy and discourage others from conscious disregard for the rights of individuals and whistleblowers and for the safe care and condition of public patients. Plaintiff does not know the financial worth of Defendants Bryan, Harris, or Roy or the amount of punitive damages sufficient to accomplish the public purposes of §3294 Civil Code and will seek leave to amend this complaint when such facts are known or proceed according to proof at trial. 143. Plaintiff has mitigated his damages by seeking and maintaining medical and
he had filed a complaint and initiated this action in US district court, alleging interference with Plaintiff’s right to family and medical leave under FMLA. No right-to-sue notice has issued as Plaintiff has a free-standing private right of action under FMLA. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FIRST CLAIM (Retaliation in Violation of Health & Safety Code § 1278.5) (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10) 152. Plaintiff alleges this first and separate claim for Retaliation in violation of Health
& Safety Code § 1278.5 against Defendant County.
through 141, inclusive, above. 154. At all material times herein, Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 provided protection
regarding suspected unsafe care and conditions of patients at KMC. 156. Defendants and each of them have violated Section 1278.5 of the Health & Safety
Code by engaging in a continuous and ongoing pattern and practice of discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff because he engaged in whistleblowing activity protected by Section 1278.5 of the Health & Safety Code. 157. A motivating factor for the acts and omissions of Defendants and each of them
described herein was Plaintiff’s reports to his employer, Barmann, and Authorities regarding what he reasonably believed to be unsafe patient care and conditions. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. SECOND CLAIM: (Retaliation In Violation Of Lab. Code § 1102.5) (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10) 158. Plaintiff alleges this second and separate claim for Retaliation in violation of
19 Labor Code § 1102.5 against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive 20 159. 21 1 through 141 above, inclusive. 22 160. 23 pertinent part: 24 At all material times herein, Labor Code § 1102.5 was in effect, and provides in Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
practice of discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff because he engaged in activity protected by Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code. 164. Plaintiff's activity protected by Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code was a
contributing factor in the continuous pattern and practice of discrimination and retaliation of Defendants, and each of them, against Plaintiff described in this complaint. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. THIRD CLAIM [Retaliation (CFRA - Gov’t Code §§ 12945.1, et seq.)] (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.) 165. Plaintiff alleges this third and separate claim for violations of Government Code
22 §§ 12945.1, et seq., against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 23 166. 24 Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
C.C.R. § 7297.7(a) prohibit any person from discriminating, discharging, or retaliating against an employee for exercising his right to medical leave. 168. Pursuant to 2 C.C.R. § 7297.2(a), CFRA requires that upon granting of leave, an
employer shall guarantee to reinstate an employee to the same or comparable position, and must do so unless refusal to reinstate is “justified” by the defenses stated in 2 C.C.R. § 72972(c). 169. At all material times herein, the County lacked “justification” pursuant to 2
C.C.R. § 7297.7(c) for refusing to reinstate Plaintiff to the same or comparable position on his return from medical leave. 170. Defendants, and each of them, retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his right
to medical leave, including denying him a medically necessary reduced work schedule; unjustified notice of Defendants’ intent not to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; Defendant’s unjustified refusal to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; demoting him; and excessively reducing his salary and chance to earn professional fees, bonuses and promotion. 171. Plaintiff's exercise of his right to medical leave was a motivating reason for
Defendants’ adverse treatment Plaintiff. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. FOURTH CLAIM [Interference With FMLA Rights in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.] (Against Defendants County, Bryan, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.) 172. Plaintiff alleges this fourth and separate claim for violations of 29 U.S.C. §§
1 through 141 above, inclusive. 174. At all material times herein, FMLA was in effect and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) imposed liability on covered employers and “any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer to any of the employees of such employer” for interfering, restraining, or denying the exercise of, or attempt to exercise, any right provided under FMLA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). 175. Defendants, and each of them, interfered, restrained, or denied the exercise of, or
exercise Plaintiff’s rights under FMLA included interference with and denial of Plaintiff’s right to a medically necessary reduced work schedule; requiring Plaintiff to take full-time medical leave when he was ready, willing, and able to work part-time, exhausting his medical leave more rapidly than permitted; unjustified notice of Defendants’ intent not to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; Defendant’s unjustified refusal to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; Defendants’ excessive reduction in Plaintiff’s salary. 177. Plaintiff's exercise of his rights under FMLA was a motivating reason for
Defendants’ adverse treatment of Plaintiff. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. FIFTH CLAIM [Violation of CFRA Rights in violation of Gov’t Code §§ 12945.1, et seq.] (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.)
1 178. 2 §§ 12945.1, et seq., against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of 3 them. 4 179. 5 1 through 141 above, inclusive. 6 180. 7 employment practice for an employer to violate an employee’s rights under the CFRA pursuant 8 to section 12945.2(a) of the Government Code. 9 181. 10 employers who discriminated against an employee for exercising his right to leave or otherwise 11 interfered with an eligible employee’s CFRA rights pursuant to 2 C.C.R. § 7297.1 and Section 12 1615(a)(2) of the United States Code. 13 182. 14 implementing regulations for FMLA that are not inconsistent with CFRA. 29 C.F.R. 825 § 15 825.700(a) provides that “[i]f an employee takes paid or unpaid leave and the employer does not 16 designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee’s FMLA 17 entitlement.” 18 183. 19 leave within 10 days of notice of the employee’s need for leave; but the greater protections of 29 20 C.F.R. § 825.208 which require an employer to do so “within two days absent extenuating 21 circumstances” should apply. 22 184. 23 construed 29 C.F.R. Sec. 825.200(e) and held that where an employer does not designate the 24 In Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001), the court Pursuant to 2 C.C.R. § 7297.4(6), an employer must designate leave as CFRA Pursuant to 2 C.C.R.§ 7297.10, CFRA expressly incorporates federal At all material times herein, the CFRA imposed strict liability on covered At all material times herein, the CFRA was in effect and made it an unlawful Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs Plaintiff alleges this fifth and separate claim for violations of Government Code
method used in calculating employees’ entitlement to leave, “the option that provides the most beneficial outcome for the employee will be used.” 185. Pursuant to Government Code § 12945.2(a) and 2 C.C.R. § 7297.2(A), medical
leave requested is not be deemed to have been granted unless the employer provides the employee, upon granting the leave request, a written guarantee of employment in the same or a comparable position upon the termination of the leave. 186. Pursuant to 2 C.C.R. § 7297.2(a), CFRA requires that upon granting of leave, an
employer shall guarantee to reinstate an employee to the same or comparable position, and must do so unless refusal to reinstate is “justified” by the defenses stated in 2 C.C.R. § 72972(c). 187. At all material times herein, the County lacked “justification” pursuant to 2
C.C.R.C § 7297.7(c) for refusing to reinstate Plaintiff to the same or comparable position on his return from medical leave. 188. Defendants, and each of them, discriminated against Plaintiff and otherwise
rights by informing him that his medical leave was exhausted as of June 16, 2005, while Plaintiff may have been entitled to medical leave even as of October 4, 2006 when he returned to work. 190. Plaintiff's exercise of, or attempt to exercise, his CFRA rights was a motivating
reason for Defendants’ adverse treatment of him. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. SIXTH CLAIM [Disability Discrimination in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940(a)] (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive) 191. Plaintiff alleges this sixth and separate claim for Disability Discrimination in violation of Government Code § 12940(a) against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 192. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
benefit of employment, in whole or in part, because he is an individual with known disabilities in violation of Government Code 12940(a) and 2 C.C.R. §7293.7. 195. In addition to the adverse actions alleged above, Defendants, and each of them,
discriminated against Plaintiff, denied him reasonable accommodation, and refused to engage in good faith in an interactive process because of his known disabilities. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. SEVENTH CLAIM (Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940(m)) (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive)
1 196. 2 Accommodation in violation of Government Code § 12940(m) against Defendant County and 3 DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 4 197. 5 1 through 141 above, inclusive. 6 198. 7 Plaintiff's known disabilities in violation of Section 12904(m) of the Government Code and 2 8 C.C.R. § 7293.9. 9 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. 10 EIGHTH CLAIM 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 (Failure to Engage In Interactive Consultation In Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940(n)) (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive) 199. Plaintiff alleges this Eighth and separate claim for Failure to Engage in Good Defendants, and each of them, failed to provide reasonable accommodation of Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs Plaintiff alleges this seventh and separate claim for Failure to Provide Reasonable
Faith in an Interactive Consultation in violation of Government Code § 12940(n) against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 200. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
ongoing, interactive consultation regarding reasonable accommodation of Plaintiff's disabilities in violation of Section 12940(n) of the Government Code. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. NINTH CLAIM (Violation of Due Process Right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Against Defendants Bryan both personally and as former CEO of KMC; Kercher both
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution Right of Procedural Due Process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Bryan both personally and as former CEO of KMC; Kercher both personally and as President of Medical Staff of KMC; Ragland both personally and as President-Elect of Medical Staff of KMC; Abraham both personally and as Immediate Past President of Medical Staff of KMC; and Smith both personally and as Chief Nurse Executive of KMC, in their capacity as members of the JCC of KMC. 203. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. TENTH CLAIM (Defamation in Violation of Civ. Code §§ 45-47) (Against Defendants County, Roy, Harris, DOES 1 through 10, and Each of Them) 214. Plaintiff alleges this Tenth and separate claim for Defamation in violation of Civil
Code §§ 45 to 47 against Defendants Roy, Harris, the County, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them. 215. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
included the Roy Letter in papers stored in Plaintiff's personnel file, where they are continuously republished to anyone who consults his personnel file. 218. 219. The above-alleged defamatory statements have continuously been false. The hearers of the defamatory statements reasonably understood that they were
about Plaintiff and understood them to mean that Plaintiff’s professional credentials, competence and/or integrity were deficient. 220. As a result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered harm to his
Defendants' wrongful conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to
Plaintiff's profession and reputation. 222. statements. 223. At all material times, Defendants, and each of them, either knew that each Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the
1 through 141 above, inclusive. 227. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 541.118(1), an employee will not be considered “on a
salary basis” if deductions from his predetermined compensation are made for absences occasioned by the employer. 228. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 541.118(6), where a deduction not permitted by these
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, as follows: 1. Reinstatement to his former position as Chair of Pathology and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of his employer pursuant to Section 1278.5(g) of the Health & Safety Code and Section 12965 of the Government Code. 2. Recovery of all reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred, pursuant to Section 2699 of the Labor Code for violation of Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code, 1278.5(g) of the Health & Safety Code, Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 12965 of the Government Code, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) [FMLA], and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 3. That Defendant County be enjoined from retaliating against whistleblowers in violation of Section 1278.5 of the Health & Safety Code and Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code. 4. That Defendant County be required to expunge from Plaintiff's personnel records any and all references to Plaintiff’s having "poor relationships" with staff, displaying poor teamwork or other words of similar effect. 5. That Defendant County be required to comply with all of the provisions of the FEHA relating to providing reasonable accommodation and engaging in good faith in an interactive consultation regarding reasonable accommodation [Government Code §§ 12940 (m) & (n)]. 6. That Defendant County be required to provide training to the managerial staff at KMC regarding compliance with Section 1278.5 of the Health & Safety Code, Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code, Sections 12940(m) and (n) of the Government Code, and CFRA
(Government Code §§ 12945.1, et seq.). 7. General and compensatory damages according to proof. 8. Liquidated damages under FMLA/CFRA and FLSA according to proof. 9. Punitive damages against Defendants Roy, Harris, and Bryan pursuant to §3294 Civil Code; 10. Pre-judgment interest pursuant to §3291 of the Civil Code. 11. For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
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