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Timestamp: 2016-12-10 14:44:04
Document Index: 319703509

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 30', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 30', '§ 30', '§ 5186', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 30', '§ 1', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 1', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 30', '§ 3', '§ 3']

| In re Estate of Hogen
In re Estate of Hogen
In the Matter of the Estate of Arline H. Hogen, Deceased;v.Rodney Hogen, Respondent and Appellant and Cross-Appellee Steven C. Hogen, Petitioner and Appellee and Cross-Appellant
Jonathan T. Garaas, Fargo, N.D., for respondent and appellant and cross-appellee.
Michael D. Nelson, West Fargo, N.D., for petitioner and appellee and cross-appellant.
Carol Ronning Kapsner, Lisa Fair McEvers, Daniel J. Crothers, Dale V. Sandstrom. Opinion of the Court by Kapsner, Justice. I concur in the result. Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.
[¶2] Curtiss and Arline Hogen were husband and wife, and they jointly owned about 737 acres of farmland in Barnes and Cass Counties. In the late 1960s, Rodney Hogen began farming the land with his father, Curtiss Hogen. When Curtiss Hogen died in 1993, his will distributed his undivided half interest in the farmland into the Curtiss Hogen Trust B, with Arline Hogen designated as the recipient of the net income from the Trust. Curtiss Hogen's will appointed his sons, Steven and Rodney Hogen, as co-trustees of the Trust and authorized the Trust to continue the farming operation. Rodney Hogen continued farming the land under a cash rent and crop-share rental arrangement with the Trust and with Arline Hogen, the owner of the other undivided half interest in the farmland. An inventory of Arline Hogen's estate reflected the Barnes County land consisted of about 308 tillable acres and 14 non-tillable acres and the Cass County land consisted of about 393 tillable acres and about 22 non-tillable acres. Rodney Hogen initially cash rented the Barnes County land for $30 per acre and farmed the Cass County land as a crop-share tenant. According to Rodney Hogen, under the terms of the crop-share agreement for the Cass County land, he received two-thirds of the crop-share proceeds and was responsible for two-thirds of the input costs and Arline Hogen and the Trust each received one-sixth of the crop-share proceeds and were each responsible for one-sixth of the input costs. Rodney Hogen claimed he made yearly reconciliations of the cash rent and crop-share Page 881
proceeds due to Arline Hogen against the input costs she owed for the Cass County land.
[¶6] Rodney Hogen answered the petition, asserting any debt he owed the estate was a contingent indebtedness under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-20-03. He denied " the estate [was] in a condition to be closed," and claimed he was not indebted to the estate for any unpaid rents and expenses. Rodney Hogen thereafter moved for summary judgment on the personal representative's claim for a retainer, asserting any debts he owed the estate were barred by statutes of limitations in N.D.C.C. § § 28-01-26 or 30.1-19-03. He also claimed he and Steven Hogen were co-owners of the cash rent and crop-share proceeds immediately after Arline Hogen's death and those funds were not needed for administration of her estate. The district court ruled the personal representative's claims for cash rent and crop-share proceeds before March 19, 2004, were barred by the six-year statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16 and granted Rodney Hogen summary judgment dismissing the estate's claim for a retainer for the 2003 crop year. The court denied the remainder of Rodney Hogen's motion for summary judgment.
[¶7] After further proceedings, the personal representative filed an amended petition for approval of a final accounting and formal settlement of the estate in February 2013, seeking a retainer against Rodney Hogen's share of the estate for cash rent, crop-share proceeds, and conservation reserve program payments for crop years 2004 through 2012. After a protracted bench trial, the district court determined that the estate was not entitled to an offset against Rodney Hogen's share of the estate for cash rent or crop-share proceeds before Arline Hogen's death in March 2007, but that Rodney Hogen owed the estate $95,544.44 for cash rent and Page 882
crop-share proceeds for crop years 2007 through 2013. The court further determined Rodney Hogen owed the estate for a share of conservation reserve program payments and also awarded the estate interest, which resulted in a determination that Rodney Hogen owed the estate a total of $123,387.44 to be offset against his interest in the estate. The court also approved Steven Hogen's request for the estate to pay $27,500 in personal representative fees and $333,272.23 in attorney fees, costs, and expert witness fees.
[¶8] Rodney Hogen argues the district court erred in authorizing the personal representative to pursue a retainer in this probate proceeding against his devised real property for claimed post-death cash rent and crop-share proceeds under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-20-03. He claims his share of Arline Hogen's real property vested in him immediately upon her death under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-12-01 and the common law rule stated in Stanton v. Stanton, 134 Neb. 660, 279 N.W. 336 (Neb. 1938). He asserts " North Dakota's present statutory scheme seems to follow the general common law rule . . . as to devised real property" to the effect that when a decedent dies testate, a debt owed the decedent, who failed to mention the debt in the will, is not subject to the right of retainer and the debt must be collected in a separate legal action.
[¶10] In Stenson v. H.S. Halvorson Co., 28 N.D. 151, 156, 147 N.W. 800, 801 (1913) (citing 1905 R.C. § 5186), a case involving a decedent without a will, this Court considered the effect of a statutory provision stating that both real and personal property of an intestate decedent Page 883
passed to the decedent's heirs subject to administration. This Court sustained a right of retainer against an heir of the intestate decedent and held the heir's indebtedness constituted part of the estate's assets for which the heir should account before receiving anything out of the estate's other assets. 28 N.D. at 159-62, 147 N.W. at 802-04.
[¶11] Both Stanton and Stenson recognize the common law rule for devolution of property may be altered by statute, and Rodney Hogen's arguments require examination of relevant parts of the Uniform Probate Code (" U.P.C." ), adopted in North Dakota in 1973. See 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 257, § 1. See also N.D.C.C. § 1-01-06 (" [i]n this state there is no common law in any case in which the law is declared by the code" ).
[¶12] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Estate of Elken, 2007 ND 107, ¶ 7, 735 N.W.2d 842. The primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the legislation. Id. The intent of legislation must be sought initially from the statutory language. Olson v. Job Serv. N.D., 2013 ND 24, ¶ 5, 826 N.W.2d 36. Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. Statutes are construed as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07. We construe statutes to give effect to all of their provisions, so that no part of a statute is rendered inoperative or superfluous. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38(2) and (4). Statutory provisions that are part of a uniform statute must be construed to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states enacting them. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-13. In construing the U.P.C., we may also look to the Editorial Board Comment for guidance. In re Estate of Conley, 2008 ND 148, ¶ 15, 753 N.W.2d 384.
[¶14] Under the U.P.C., " '[s]uccessors' means persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to property of a decedent under the decedent's will or . . . [by intestate succession under N.D.C.C.] title [30.1]," and " '[p]roperty' includes both real and personal property." N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(43) and (53) (U.P.C. § 1-201(38) and (49)). The language of the retainer statute applies to the " amount of a noncontingent indebtedness . . . if due, or its present value if not due," but the U.P.C. does not define a " noncontingent indebtedness." [¶15] One source defines " contingent" as " [p]ossible; uncertain; unpredictable," or " [d]ependent on something that might or might not happen in the future; conditional." Black's Law Dictionary 387 (10th ed. 2014). Another source defines contingent as " likely but not certain to happen: possible" ; " in happening by chance or unforeseen causes." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 270 (11th ed. 2005). Juxtaposing those definitions with the ordinary definition of " non" as the " reverse, absence of, or lacking the usual esp. positive characteristics of the thing specified" in Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 841, results in ascribing a meaning Page 884
to noncontingent as something that is certain to happen or is not conditioned on something that might or might not happen in the future. These sources also define " indebtedness" to mean the condition of owing money or being indebted, or something such as an amount of money that is owed. Black's Law Dictionary at 885; Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 632.
[¶16] We conclude a " noncontingent indebtedness" means an amount owed that is certain to occur and is not subject to some future uncertain event which may or may not happen. See Graber v. Bontrager, 69 N.D. 300, 305-06, 285 N.W. 865, 868-69 (1939) (defining contingent claim as a claim for which the liability depends upon some future event which may or may not happen and which makes it uncertain whether it will ever be a liability). We further conclude cash rent and crop-share obligations a devisee owes a decedent or the estate are debts or obligations that are certain to happen and are not conditioned on something that might or might not happen in the future. We therefore conclude a devisee's cash rent and crop-share obligations to a decedent are a noncontingent indebtedness under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-20-03 (U.P.C. § 3-903).
[¶17] Moreover, the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-20-03 (U.P.C. § 3-903) authorizes an offset against a " successor's interest" and permits a successor to raise any defense to a noncontingent indebtedness which would be available to the successor in a " direct proceeding" for recovery of the indebtedness. The U.P.C. defines a " proceeding" to include an " action at law and suit in equity." N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(42) (U.P.C. § 1-201(37)). We construe the phrases " successor's interest" and " direct proceeding" in N.D.C.C. § 30.1-20-03 (U.P.C. § 3-903) to give meaning to each phrase and to authorize the personal representative to allege " offsets against the successor's interest" in the context of the probate of an estate instead of requiring the personal representative to bring a separate lawsuit or direct proceeding to collect the debt. We therefore reject Rodney Hogen's argument the personal representative was required to bring a separate lawsuit to offset Rodney Hogen's indebtedness, if any, to Arline Hogen or to the estate against his successor's interest in the estate.
The power of a person to leave property by will, and the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to the person's property, are subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this title to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. Upon the death of a person, the decedent's real and personal property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by the decedent's last will . . . or in the absence Page 885
of testamentary disposition, to the decedent's heirs . . . subject to . . . administration.
Until termination of the personal representative's appointment, a personal representative has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court.
The Editorial Board Comment to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-11 (U.P.C. § 3-711), states:
The personal representative is given the broadest possible " power over title" . He receives a " power", rather than title, because the power concept eases the succession of assets which are not possessed by the personal representative. Thus, if the power is unexercised prior to its termination, its lapse clears the title of devisees and heirs. . . . The power over title of an absolute owner is conceived to embrace all possible transactions which might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a change of rights of possession. The relationship of the personal representative to the estate is that of a trustee.
A noted practice manual for the U.P.C. explains the personal representative's broad power, subject to administration, over a decedent's property under U.P.C. § 3-711:
In general, the power[s] of a personal representative [PR] are said to be those that an absolute owner would have, subject only to the trust to exercise the power for the benefit of creditors and others interested in the estate. This general power and any power specifically conferred upon him may be exercised without notice, hearing, or court order. Since the PR has a " power over the title" rather than " title", no gap in title will result if the PR does not exercise his power during the administration. The title of the heir or devisee, however, is " subject to administration" ; hence, it remains encumbered so long as the estate is in administration or is subject to further administration.
1 Richard V. Wellman, Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual 317-18 (2d ed. 1977).
Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every personal representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent's property, except that any real property or tangible personal property may be left with or surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto unless or until, in the judgment of the personal representative, possession of the property by the personal representative will be necessary for purposes of administration. The request by a personal representative for delivery of any property possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive evidence, in any action against the heir or devisee for possession thereof, Page 886
that the possession of the property by the personal representative is necessary for purposes of administration. The personal representative shall pay taxes on, and take all steps reasonably necessary for the management, protection, and preservation of, the estate in the personal representative's possession. The personal representative may maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine the title thereto.
The Editorial Board Comment to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-09 (U.P.C. § 3-709), explains the relationship of the devolution of title on death and a personal representative's authority to take possession or control of a decedent's property and states:
Section 30.1-12-01 provides for the devolution of title on death. Section 30.1-18-[11] defines the status of the personal representative with reference to " title" and " power" in a way that should make it unnecessary to discuss the " title" to decedent's assets which his personal representative acquires. This section deals with the personal representative's duty and right to possess assets. It proceeds from the assumption that it is desirable whenever possible to avoid disruption of possession of the decedent's assets by his devisees or heirs. But, if the personal representative decides that possession of an asset is necessary or desirable for purposes of administration, his judgment is made conclusive in any action for possession that he may need to institute against an heir or devisee. It may be possible for an heir or devisee to question the judgment of the personal representative in later action for surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty, but this possibility should not interfere with the personal representative's administrative authority as it relates to possession of the estate.
As Professor Wellman explains:
The Code provides in [U.P.C.] Section 3-101 for devolution of title upon death to the successors. This devolution is expressly stated to be " subject to . . . administration" and the right to possession and control of the decedent's property in administered estates is vested in the PR [personal representative] by Section 3-709. Thus, " title" and " power to possess and control" are to be distinguished. The PR is required to possess and to protect all money and intangible assets of the estate. He has the right, in relation to land and tangible personal property, to surrender possession to the persons presumptively entitled to the asset when in his judgment it is in the best interest of the estate. He also has the power at any time to take or retake possession of these assets for the estate, and his request for delivery of any property in the hands of an heir or devisee is conclusive evidence in any action that he may bring to show that possession is necessary for the purposes of administration. . . .
Two other points should be made. The first is that in the full context of Section 3-709, the term " surrender" should not be given the meaning of finality in a common law surrender. This appears from the " unless or until" and the language that follows in the same sentence.
Secondly, the turn-over of possession of land or an item of tangible personal property by the PR to the person presumptively entitled thereto should not be construed as a " distribution." Section 3-709 is obviously concerned with possession for the present time; no finality should attend the PR's decision under this section not to disturb possession Page 887
of an estate asset by one presumptively entitled to the asset, or his decision to hand over the possession of an estate asset to such a person for the present. A " distribution" in kind is to be made as provided in Section 3-907; it enables the distributee to pass good title to a good faith purchaser. (Section 3-910). A " distribution" is appropriate only if the PR does not think that the asset will be needed for administration. It reflects the PR's determination that the " distributee" is the correct person to receive the asset. A " distribution" should end the assumption that the PR still has control of the asset, even though Section 3-909 gives rights to recover assets improperly distributed to an estate representative who can assert the right to have distributions " returned." See the official Comment, Section 3-907 infra.
1 Wellman, supra, at 316-17.
If distribution in kind is made, the personal representative shall execute an instrument or deed of distribution assigning, transferring, or releasing the assets to the distributee as evidence of the distributee's title to the property.
The Editorial Board Comment to that section explains:
This and sections following should be read with section 30.1-18-09 which permits the personal representative to leave certain assets of a decedent's estate in the possession of the person presumptively entitled thereto. The " release" contemplated by this section would be used as evidence that the personal representative had determined that he would not need to disturb the possession of an heir or devisee for purposes of administration.
Under section 30.1-18-11, a personal representative's relationship to assets of the estate is described as the " same power over the title to property of the estate as an absolute owner would have." A personal representative may, however, acquire a full title to estate assets, as in the case where particular items are conveyed to the personal representative by sellers, transfer agents, or others. The language of section 30.1-20-07 is designed to cover instances where the instrument of distribution operates as a transfer, as well as those in which its operation is more like a release.
Under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-20-08 (U.P.C. § 3-908), proof that a distributee has received an instrument or deed of distribution of assets in kind from a personal representative is conclusive evidence that the distributee has succeeded to the interest of the estate in the distributed assets.
The instrument of distribution does not, in the purest sense of the words, cause the vesting in interest of the title of the devisee or heir; rather, it transforms the beneficiary's beneficial interest in the estate, as acquired by him at death by the operation of Section 3-101, from an equitable right to receive his due interest in the estate to regular ownership Page 888
of the asset distributed. The ownership as distributed is not necessarily the distributee's only right since the distributee may have additional claims on the PR for further distributions or for money to make him whole on account of breaches of duty by the PR. Rather, it is evidence that, as between the PR and the distributee, since the former has discharged his responsibility for administering the distributed asset, the latter is now entitled to hold himself out to the world as its full owner. Distribution is a release of the PR's primary right to possess the asset for administration purposes, although it does not follow that the same or a successor PR may not later be entitled to a return of the distributed asset if that is found necessary in order to correct a defective distribution. . . .
The distributive acts of a PR, whether consisting of payments by check or in cash, physical delivery of possession, or execution and delivery of an instrument or distribution, are quite important. These acts reflect the PR's determination of heirs in intestacy, his interpretation of the will in a testate case, and his conclusion regarding the identity of the taker and the propriety of the distribution in the light of all of his duties as estate fiduciary. These and other determinations by the PR are given importance by the Code and are considered administrative determinations that are assumed to be correct. Errors can be corrected, of course, but the Code seeks to give these administrative acts of the PR considerable stability and stature. Sections 3-908, 3-909, and 3-910 of the Code supply many details regrading the consequences of distributions.
Wellman, supra, at 384-85.
[¶24] This Court has recognized a devisee's right to a decedent's property is subject to administration by a personal representative. Feickert v. Frounfelter, 468 N.W.2d 131, 132 (N.D. 1991). We have also said a personal representative has power over title to property during the administration of an estate. Green v. Gustafson, 482 N.W.2d 842, 846 n.3 (N.D. 1992). In Matter of Estate of Johnson, 2015 ND 110, ¶ 19, 863 N.W.2d 215, we recently construed several of the preceding statutory provisions about a devisee's title to property during the administration of an estate, to pass title to a decedent's property to devisees at death, subject to a personal representative's broad power over title for administration purposes. We held a personal representative had statutory authority under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-15 (U.P.C. § 3-715) to retain and lease farmland in an estate for administration purposes for the benefit of interested persons. Estate of Johnson, at ¶ 19. We recognized states with statutes similar to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-15 had reviewed whether a personal representative's sale or lease of an estate's land was reasonable. Estate of Johnson, at ¶ 18 (citing Matter of Estate of Booth, 202 Neb. 6, 272 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Neb. 1978) and In re Estate of Corbin, 637 So.2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)). In Estate of Johnson, at ¶ 19, we held a personal representative could lease farmland for a term within or extending beyond the period of administration if the personal representative acted reasonably for the benefit of interested persons.
[¶25] Under the U.P.C. statutory scheme, a devisee's right to a decedent's property is subject to administration by a personal representative, which may continue until termination of the personal representative's appointment or execution of an instrument or deed of distribution, and nothing in the statutory scheme for title to a decedent's land requires a personal representative to take actual possession of the Page 889
property to effectuate an offset. Rather, N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-09 (U.P.C. § 3-709) contemplates the personal representative may take " possession or control" of property except that any real property may be left with the person presumptively entitled thereto unless or until possession or control is necessary for purposes of administration. The personal representative's power or control over the decedent's property or estate during administration may be exercised without notice, hearing, or an order and may continue until termination of the personal representative's appointment, or execution of an instrument or deed of distribution transferring the assets to the distributee. See N.D.C.C. § § 30.1-18-11 (U.P.C. § 3-711), 30.1-20-07 (U.P.C. § 3-907) and 30.1-20-08 (U.P.C. § 3-908).
[¶27] Steven Hogen was the duly authorized personal representative of Arline Hogen's estate engaged in administration of the estate, and he executed no instrument or deed of distribution transferring or releasing the property to Rodney Hogen. See N.D.C.C. § § 30.1-20-07 (U.P.C. § 3-907) and 30.1-20-08 (U.P.C. § 3-908). Rather, the record reflects the estate leased the land to Rodney Hogen while the estate was being administered. See Estate of Johnson, 2015 ND 110, ¶ 19, 863 N.W.2d 215. We reject Rodney Hogen's claims that as the personal representative of the estate, Steven Hogen may not pursue a retainer claim against Rodney Hogen for post-death crops and farm rentals because the estate made no demand, had no administrative need, and did not have possession of the lands, or because the personal representative did not have possession of the land and Rodney Hogen exercised his rights as a tenant-in-common owner. We also conclude the statutory scheme for a personal representative's powers during administration of the estate does not preclude the personal representative from seeking a retainer for conservation reserve program payments attributable to the estate's Cass County land for the 2010 through 2013 crop years. We conclude the district court did not err in determining the devolution of real property to Rodney Hogen was subject to the personal representative's power during administration of the estate to offset any noncontingent indebtedness he owed to Arline Hogen or her estate.
a. A claim based on a contract with the personal representative, within four Page 890
months after performance by the personal representative is due.
[¶30] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03(2) (U.P.C. § 3-803) applies to " claims against a decedent's estate" and does not apply to claims an estate may have against devisees for a retainer. We conclude the personal representative's claim for a retainer is not barred by the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03(2) (U.P.C. § 3-803).
[¶32] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-21-06 (U.P.C. § 3-1006), applies to time limits to " recover property improperly distributed . . . from any distributee." A personal representative's claim for a retainer against a devisee is not a claim to " recover property improperly distributed," and we conclude the personal representative's claim for a retainer is not barred by the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-21-06 (U.P.C. § 3-1006).
[¶34] To the extent Rodney Hogen argues the district court erred in admitting evidence under the cited rules of evidence, he has not marshaled any argument with supporting authority on the evidentiary issues, and we decline to consider those issues on appeal. See Hale v. State, 2012 ND 148, ¶ 12, 818 N.W.2d 684 (" we are not ferrets and we 'will not consider an argument that is not adequately articulated, supported, and briefed'" ).
[¶35] To the extent Rodney Hogen argues the district court erred in failing to subtract about 81 acres of conservation reserve program land in Barnes County in determining cash rent due for the Barnes County land and in determining the average per acre cost of production for crop-share calculations for the Cass County land, we agree with him that the record reflects the court failed to account for the conservation reserve program land in those calculations. During oral argument, counsel for the personal representative conceded minor adjustments to the retainer may be necessary. We decline to make those adjustments on the record before us, and we reverse the district court's determination of the retainer to that limited extent and direct the court to recalculate the retainer after considering the effect Page 891
of the Barnes County conservation reserve program land on the cash rent for the Barnes County land and on the average per acre cost of production for the Cass County land.
[¶41] Steven Hogen also argues the district court clearly erred in determining Arline Hogen waived pre-death cash rent and crop-share proceeds owed by Rodney Hogen to her. Steven Hogen argues Arline Hogen was confined to an Alzheimer's unit in a nursing home in Page 892
2002, Rodney Hogen never talked with Arline Hogen about reconciling payments for the cash rent and crop-share proceeds against her input costs, the shortages were not discovered until after her death, and she could not have voluntarily and intentionally waived any payment deficiencies for crop years 2004 through 2006.
Rodney testified that he reconciled his cash rent obligations, his crop-share obligations and his mother's crop-share expenses every year. Rodney's " reconciliation" certainly wasn't done with any type of accounting standard in place. It is evident that the expenses that Rodney paid on behalf of the landlord for the Cass County crop share were less than the cash rent owed on the Barnes County land. The Court, more importantly, finds that Rodney's farming relationship with his mother was not defined by exact standards. The so-called contract was more or less a loose guideline. What Rodney may have deemed reconciled was, in fact, Arline agreeing that what was received was good enough. This is based on Rodney's history of farming the property, the past course of conduct of the parties and the estate planning documents executed by Arline and Curtis Hogen indicating a specific desire to maintain the farming operation. Any alleged shortfalls for Arline for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006 are deemed to have been waived and Rodney's contractual obligations to Arline were satisfied.
[¶44] Rodney Hogen argues the district court abused its discretion in not removing Page 893
Steven Hogen as the personal representative of the estate and in awarding Steven Hogen personal representative fees and attorney fees, costs, and expert witness fees from the estate.
[¶45] Under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-17-11 (U.P.C. § 3-611), a person interested in an estate may petition for removal of a personal representative for cause, which exists when removal would be in the best interest of the estate, or the personal representative has mismanaged the estate or failed to perform a duty pertaining to the office. A district court has discretion to remove a personal representative, and the court's decision will not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Estate of Shubert, 2013 ND 215, ¶ 27, 839 N.W.2d 811. A court abuses its discretion " when it acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, when it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination." Id.
[¶50] Section 30.1-18-20, N.D.C.C. (U.P.C. § 3-720), authorizes a district court to award a personal representative necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney fees, from an estate for prosecuting estate proceedings in good faith, whether successful or not. A personal representative's Page 894
actions must be in good faith and for the benefit of the estate. Matter of Estate of Peterson, 1997 ND 48, ¶ 25, 561 N.W.2d 618; Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d at 518. A benefit to the estate includes a personal representative's good faith attempt to effectuate a testator's testamentary intent or to increase the assets in the estate. Peterson, at ¶ 26; Flaherty, at 518. We review an award of attorney fees under the abuse of discretion standard. Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d at 519.
[¶51] Although the amount of awarded attorney fees in this case is large, the district court provided a reasoned explanation for the award, including consideration of the " lodestar" rate, and the fact the case involved " tough litigation" and was " hard going." This proceeding involved lengthy evidentiary hearings and issues related to reconstructing financial records and tracing crop-share proceeds and cash rent over several years for farmland in contentious litigation. Rodney Hogen vigorously litigated the retainer issue, which required Steven Hogen to expend additional resources to resolve the issue. We have recognized a party " 'cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent' overcoming its vigorous defense." Duchscherer v. W.W. Wallwork, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 13, 19 (N.D. 1995) (quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986)). The district court determined Steven Hogen acted in good faith and pursued funds owed to the estate. Steven Hogen's duty to effectuate an equal distribution of Arline Hogen's estate by collecting all assets belonging to the estate, including offsetting Rodney Hogen's debts to the estate, applies regardless of whether Steven Hogen was also a beneficiary under the will. On this record, we conclude the district court's award of attorney fees was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the personal representative attorney fees and expert witness fees from the estate.
[¶53] Carol Ronning Kapsner, Lisa Fair McEvers, Daniel J. Crothers, Dale V. Sandstrom,