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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1404', '§ 6', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1394', '§ 1404', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1404', '§ 6', '§ 1404', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 6', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1391', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 56', '§ 182', 'art 1', 'art 2', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 65', '§ 1406', '§ 81', '§ 1404', '§ 6', '§ 12', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 6']

Ex Parte Collett - Citation 98358 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Ex Parte Collett - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98358CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMay-31-1949Case Number337 U.S. 55AppellantEx Parte CollettExcerpt:
is made applicable to actions under the federal employers' liability act. pp.
337 u. s. 56
1. this conclusion is required by the clear and unambiguous language of § 1404(a), which applies generally to "any civil action." pp.
2. it involves no implied repeal of §..... Judgment:
2. It involves no implied repeal of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, since that deals with the places where actions may be brought originally, whereas 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) deals with the right to transfer an action properly brought. Pp.
337 U. S. 59
3. The legislative history of the revision of the Judicial Code requires the same conclusion. Pp.
4. As thus construed, § 1404(a) is applicable to actions instituted before its effective date but not brought to trial prior to its effective date. P.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a Federal District Court in which an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act had been brought transferred it to a District Court in another District, on the ground that this would serve the convenience of parties and witnesses and be in the interest of justice. Petitioner moved in this Court for leave to file a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. The case was assigned for hearing on the notion. 335 U.S. 897.
337 U. S. 72
In this case, we must decide whether the venue provisions of the Judicial Code [
] render applicable the doctrine of
to actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. [
] Petitioner instituted such an action against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in October, 1947, in the court below, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois. No trial was had before September 1, 1948, the effective date of the present Judicial Code. [
] Thereafter, the Railroad filed a motion to transfer the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
Petitioner makes no allegation that the court below abused its discretion; his sole contention is that the order of transfer exceeded the District Court's authority. Since that issue seemed of importance in the administration of justice, [
] we assigned the case for hearing on the motion. 335 U.S. 897 (1948).
Prior to the current revision of Title 28 of the United States Code,
was not available in Federal Employers' Liability Act suits.
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U. S. 505
(1947). The new Code, however, provides that,
permitting transfer to a more convenient forum even though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision,
, which was prosecuted under the Federal Employer's Liability Act in New York, although the accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so. [
The court below relied on the language of § 1404(a),
which it regarded as "unambiguous, direct, clear." We agree. The reach of "any civil action" [
] is unmistakable. The phrase is used without qualification, without hint that some should be excluded. From the statutory text alone, it is impossible to read the section as excising this case from "any civil action."
The only suggestion petitioner offers in this regard is that "any civil action" embraces only those actions for which special venue requirements are prescribed in §§ 1394-1403 of Revised Title 28, [
] since these sections
immediately precede § 1404(a), and all are within the Venue Chapter, §§ 1391-1406, inclusive, of the Code. To accept this contention, we would be required completely to disregard the Congressional admonition that "No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28 . . . in which any section is placed. . . ." [
] Furthermore, petitioner's argument proves too much: §§ 1391-1393, which also are in the Venue Chapter and also refer to "any civil action," would be read as applying only to actions for which special venue requirements are established in neighboring sections of the Code, although they were obviously intended by Congress to be the general venue sections applicable to ordinary actions. It seems more reasonable to hold that § 1404(a) in terms applies generally,
to "any civil action."
Although petitioner wishes to restrict the literal meaning of "any civil action," he would expand the sense of "may transfer . . . to any other district or division where it might have been brought" beyond the exact scope of those words. Obviously, the express language gives no clue as to where the action "might have been brought." Yet the essence of petitioner's position is that the order below, transferring his suit, effects a repeal of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which granted him the right to sue in any district "in which the defendant
shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action." [
Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper forum; § 1404(a) of the Code deals with the right to transfer an action properly brought. The two sections deal with two separate and distinct problems. [
] Section 1404(a) does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been brought previously.
The Code therefore does not repeal § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We agree with petitioner that Congress had no such intention, as demonstrated by its failure to list the section in the meticulously prepared schedule of statutes repealed. [
] We cannot agree that the order before us effectuates an implied repeal. The inapplicability of
to Liability Act
suits derives from the
decision. And there, this Court expressly stated that, "[i]f it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative. . . ." 314 U.S. at
314 U. S. 54
. That opinion discusses § 6 of the Liability Act, to be sure, but this Court did not and could not suggest that the legislative answer had necessarily to be addressed to that section. Since the words selected by Congress for § 6 denote nothing one way or the other respecting
there was no occasion to repeal that section, expressly or impliedly; Congress chose to remove its judicial gloss via another statute. Discussion of the law of implied repeals is therefore irrelevant.
Petitioner's chief argument proceeds not from one side or the other of the literal boundaries of § 1404(a), but from its legislative history. The short answer is that there is no need to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear.
Gemsco v. Walling,
324 U. S. 260
(1945). This canon of construction has received consistent adherence in our decisions. [
"The policy that we adopted . . . was to avoid wherever possible and whenever possible the adoption in our revision of what might be described as substantive changes of law. [
". . . the purpose of this Bill is primarily to revise and codify and to enact into positive law with such corrections as were deemed by the committee to be of substantial and noncontroversial nature. [
Jennings Bill, [
] which was under consideration in the House in the spring of 1947, as was the Code revision. [
] The Jennings Bill and § 1404(a) of the Code meet the same problem, the alleged abuses in the selection of
forums for Liability Act suits. [
] But the Jennings Bill was far more drastic than § 1404(a). The Jennings Bill would in large part have repealed § 6 of the Liability Act. It would have delimited the available forum for actions brought in state, as well as federal, courts. [
] It would have eliminated the right to sue in any district in which the railroad did business. Initially, this applied only to Federal Employers' Liability Act plaintiffs, but, in final draft, the Jennings Bill generally restricted all, including passengers, who might sue railroads for personal injuries. Inasmuch as none of these changes in the law was contained in the Code, it is evident that § 1404(a) might well be considered, "noncontroversial" by the same Congress which would regard the Jennings Bill as "controversial." [
Moreover, even if we could distill from the legislative history of the Jennings Bill a usable concept of "controversial change," its application would destroy petitioner's case. For petitioner concedes that, in fact, § 1404(a) did not arouse controversy; he submits the Jennings Bill as contrast. His argument is obviously based not on the actual legislative history of § 1404(a), but on necessarily vague speculation as to what Congress might have done had it fully realized that
was henceforth to be applicable in Federal Employers' Liability Act suits. The requisite assumption, that Congress did not appreciate the significance of its action when it ratified the Code and § 1404(a) therein, is contrary to the facts shown by the legislative history which is of record. The lack of controversy reflected aware agreement, and not the inertia of ignorance.
This was scarcely hasty, ill considered legislation. To the contrary, it received close and prolonged study. Five years of Congressional attention supports the Code. [
] And, from the start, Congress obtained the most eminent expert assistance available. The spadework was entrusted to two law book publishing firms, the staffs of which had unique experience in statutory codification and revision. [
They formed an advisory committee, including distinguished judges and members of the bar, and obtained the services of special consultants. [
] Furthermore, an advisory committee was appointed by the Judicial Conference. [
] And, to assist with matters relating to the jurisdiction of this Court, Chief Justice Stone appointed an advisory committee, consisting of himself and JUSTICES FRANKFURTER and DOUGLAS. [
"We shall do the same as we did last year . . . , just read them line by line and have you and other expert codifiers and other persons go over the bill with us. [
Petitioner almost seems to imply that this very careful Committee consideration vitiates the legislation. But the Committee system is integral in typical legislative procedure; Congress could not function without it. [
] A canon of construction which would discount statutory words
the greater the expertise or the more meticulous the Committee consideration devoted thereto or the longer and more complex the legislation, would be absurd, not least because it would make mockery of the techniques of statutory interpretation which have heretofore been used by the courts.
drafts sought to give them the widest possible circulation. We made certain that every member of the legislature got one; we made certain that they were sent to every United States attorney; that they were sent to every member of the Federal judiciary; that they were sent to the appropriate committees of the leading State and local bar associations; that they were sent to everyone who ever evidenced any interest in the work at all. [
Indicative of the success in publicizing the provisions of the Code is the fact that there was specific treatment of § 1404(a) and its applicability to Federal Employers' Liability Act suits in a number of legal periodicals. [
The balance of that note was substantially the same as the present reviser's note; it expressly cited the
case, an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as demonstrating the need for § 1404(a). And the reviser's notes were before the Congress at every subsequent legislative step.
July 24, 1946, the House ordered to be printed the Report submitted by Representative Keogh of New York, Chairman of the House Committee on Revision of the Laws, on the codification of Title 28. [
] This Report consisted of a preliminary statement and a full printing of the reviser's notes. Section 1404(a) appears in that Report, together with its note. There was no further action on the Code in the Seventy-Ninth Congress.
In the Eightieth Congress, under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, [
] the Code revision passed to
the jurisdiction of the House Judiciary Committee and was assigned to a Subcommittee of which Representative Robsion of Kentucky was Chairman. At the hearing before this Subcommittee, Professor James William Moore of Yale University, special consultant to the revisers, in summarizing the Code proposals, testified that there were "changes of importance" in the law of venue and specifically mentioned § 1404. [
] In April, 1947, the House Judiciary Committee reported the bill with a unanimous recommendation that it be passed. [
] This Report again fully reprinted the reviser's notes. In this Report, the section entitled "Examples of Changes in Law," which had appeared in the Report on the revision in the preceding Session of Congress, expressly referred to the reviser's notes for §§ 1391-1406. [
After this painstaking consideration, with its references to § 1404(a), the House initially passed the bill on July 7, 1947. [
] At that time and in the subsequent consideration in the Senate, the Tax Court provisions occasioned the most discussion; but other specific sections did not pass unnoticed. Attention was directly called to § 1404(a) by one witness at the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Judiciary Subcommittee, although his interest was not in the Federal Employers' Liability Act issue. [
] No change in § 1404(a) was included in the Senate amendments, and the revision of Title 28 was enacted by the Congress in June, 1948. [
Thus, at almost every stage of the legislative procedure, attention was directed to the fact of change, and, in most instances, specific mention was made of § 1404(a). At no stage subsequent to the first formal printing did § 1404(a) and its accompanying reviser's note fail to appear. From the start, § 1404(a) remained the same, and the reference in the note to a Federal Employers' Liability Act case as showing the need for permitting the application of
remained unchanged. Now to hold that Congress did not appreciate what it was enacting in that section would defy the legislative history. We must flatly reject petitioner's thesis that this section was so obscured that its enactment is meaningless. We cannot blind ourselves to the hearings, to the experts, to the Committee reports, to the reviser's notes and their incorporation in the Committee reports -- to a history of the most meticulous Congressional consideration.
Petitioner suggests that his action may not be transferred because, it was instituted prior to the effective date of the Code. Clearly, § 1404(a) is a remedial provision applicable to pending actions. And "[n]o one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure. . . ."
Crane v. Hahlo,
258 U. S. 142
258 U. S. 147
Since the petition for mandamus and prohibition must be denied because of the view we must take as to the meaning of § 1404(a) and its applicability to this case, we need not decide whether denial might be placed on other grounds also.
-260 (1947). [
United States v. National City Lines, post,
Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869: "An Act To revise, codify, and enact into law title 28 of the United States Code entitled
Judicial Code and Judiciary.'"
At least five district court decisions dealing with the relationship of § 1404(a) to FELA suits have been reported. Four have held that the section is applicable.
Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co.
(and seven other cases), 79 F.Supp. 821 (1948);
80 F.Supp. 411 (1948);
Nunn v. Chicago, St. P. & P. R. Co.,
80 F.Supp. 745 (1948;
Scott v. New York Central R. Co.,
81 F.Supp. 815 (1948);
cf. Brainard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co.,
81 F.Supp. 211 (1948;
Perry v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co.,
82 F.Supp. 912 (1948) (in both, motion to transfer denied, in exercise of "discretionary powers");
Chaffin v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co.,
80 F.Supp. 957 (1948);
Richer v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co.,
80 F.Supp. 971 (1948). One reported decision has held that the Code section is inapplicable to such suits.
Pascarella v. New York Central R. Co.,
81 F.Supp. 95 (1948).
The reviser's notes make clear that the phrase was substituted for "suit," formerly used in various venue statutes, in the light of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2: "There shall be one form of action to be known as
civil action.'"
45 U.S.C. § 56. For a brief historical sketch,
see Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner,
314 U. S. 49
-50 (1941).
In almost every state, the requirements for venue and for transfer are treated in different statutory sections. Brief for New York, C. & St.L.R. Co. as
pp. 11-2,
Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., post,
N.Y. Civil Practice Act, §§ 182, 187.
E.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Labor Board,
United States v. American Trucking Associations,
(1940), and cases there cited.
The rule as to statutory revisions is the same.
Continental Casualty Co. v. United States,
And, in response to the Chairman's question, "And this bill does not include controversial matters?" Rep. Keogh replied that "We have sought to avoid as far as possible . . . any substantive changes that did not meet with unanimity of opinion."
Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-12, 17-22, 31-8 (1947); H.R.Rep. No.613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (part 1), 1-2, 4 (part 2) (1947).
Doubt was expressed that Congress had constitutional power so to affect state courts.
letter of Acting the Assistant to the Attorney General, Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1567 and H.R. 1639 (Jennings Bill), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1948).
Furthermore, petitioner's argument suggests, at most, that § 1404(a) was as "controversial" as the Jennings Bill, as of July, 1947. Thereafter, however, both the Code and the Jennings Bill were referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which held hearings on both. The same three Senators composed the Subcommittee holding these hearings: Sen. E. H. Moore, Chairman at the hearings on the Jennings Bill in January, 1948; Sen. Donnell, Chairman at the hearings on the Code in April and June, 1948, and Sen. McGrath. The relationship between the two proposals was expressly called to their attention.
Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1567 and H.R. 1639 (Jennings Bill), 80th Cong., 2d.Sess. 111-2 (1948). The Committee reported the Code favorably, albeit with amendments; but the Jennings Bill was not reported.
It is clear that only the Tax Court provisions were regarded by the Senate Committee as sufficiently "controversial" to be deleted.
Sen.Rep. No.1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948); 94 Cong.Rec. 7927 (1948).
H.R.Rep. No.308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1947).
H.R.Rep. No.308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947).
Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 12-4, 17-8, 24-6 (1947).
Circuit Judge Maris was Chairman, and District Judges Galston and W. F. Smith also served on the committee.
Loc. cit. supra,
1944 Report of the Judicial Conference 24; 1945
17-18; 1948
Galloway, Congress at the Crossroads 53 (1946).
Bryce, The American Commonwealth c. XV (New Ed.1931); Chamberlain, Legislative Processes, cc. V-VI (1936); Kefauver and Levin, A Twentieth-Century Congress 114-53 (1947); Luce, Legislative Procedure, cc. IV-VIII (1922); Walker, The Legislative Process, c. 11 (1948).
Expressly reciting the reference to the
case in the reviser's notes: Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv.L.Rev. 908, 933 (July, 1947); Note, New Limitations on Choice of Federal Forum, 15 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 332, 341, n. 54 (Winter (March), 1948); Comment,
A New Federal Doctrine, 56 Yale L.J. 1234, 1249, n. 115 (Aug., 1947).
Barrett, The Doctrine of
35 Calif.L.Rev. 380, 421 (Sept., 1947); Note, 32 Minn.L.Rev. 633, 636, n. 29 (May, 1948).
Note 23 Ind.L.J. 82, 87, n. 26 (Oct., 1947) (quoting § 1404(a), but not referring to the reviser's notes).
Of course, the fact that the Judicial Code was being revised was publicized in discussions not directly bearing on the instant issue;
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp.Prob. 216 (1948); Zinn, Revision of Federal Judicial Code, 48 Law Notes, Nos. 3-4, 11 (1944) (earliest reference); Note, The Proposed Revision of the Federal Judicial Code, 60 Harv.L.Rev. 424 (1947).
There is no doubt as to the meaning of § 1404(a) in the mind of the author of the memorandum.
3 Moore's Federal Practice 2141 (2d ed.1948), stating that the Code "provides for the transfer . . . of
action to a proper and more convenient forum" (italics in original), with a footnote (107) citing § 1404(a) and declaring that
articles by a member of the advisory committee appointed by the Judicial Conference, and by the Chief Reviser: Galston, An Introduction to the New Federal Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 201, 206 (1948); Barron, The Judicial Code 1948, Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 442 (1949).
While it lacks relevance to our holding as to Congressional intention and expression in June, 1948, the presentation of an up-to-date report of Congressional consideration of the Code revision requires noting that over 60 additional amendments to Title 28 have already become law. Pub.L.No.72, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 65-127, May 24, 1949.
95 Cong.Rec. 3892-9 (April 4, 1949), 5929-30 (May 6, 1949), 6396-7 (May 16, 1949); H.R.Rep. No.352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11-20, 38-51 (1949); Sen.Rep. No.303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). While § 1406 is amended by adding "shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice" before "shall transfer," § 81 of the Law, no change whatever was suggested or made in § 1404(a).
184 U. S. 669
National Exchange Bank of Baltimore v. Peters,
99 U. S. 569
Ex parte Mars, Inc.,
320 U.S. 710 (1943);
(1943), and cases there cited.
(1945), and cases there cited.
§ 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act and of the other statutes mentioned by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, including the venue provisions, § 12, of the Clayton Act, involved in our decision in
334 U. S. 573
The legislative history, for example, of the Clayton Act venue provisions demonstrates that the change § 1404(a) is said to have made was more than the mere removal of a judicial gloss. I think we should not now impugn the validity of our decisions in
National City Lines, supra,
] by characterizing each as a mere "judicial gloss" upon the pertinent statute. Those decisions, in my opinion, were true reflections of congressional intent as stated in the respective statutes, and, accordingly, the changes made in them by § 1404(a) were in the nature of repeals, to the extent that the plaintiffs were deprived of their rights under the preexisting statutes to have their causes of action tried in the forums where they were properly brought.
In the second place, those changes, although entirely within Congress' power to make, were neither insubstantial nor noncontroversial, in view of the legislative history of the original provisions, for example, the venue provisions of the Clayton Act. Nor do I think the legislative history of § 1404(a) demonstrates either the insubstantial or the noncontroversial nature of the changes in § 1404(a), although they seem to have been so treated by those in charge of the bill. [
] It is to be noted, moreover, that
specific attention was drawn to the effect of § 1404(a) upon § 6 of the Employers' Liability Act through reference to the
decisions, but no like specific reference was made to the venue provisions of the Clayton Act and the
94 Cong.Rec. 7928. For similar expressions by members of the House of Representatives,
Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 11. A member of the House Judiciary Committee told the House that the only "controversial aspects" of the 1947 draft of the code were certain subsequently deleted provisions concerning the Tax Court. 93 Cong.Rec. 8390.
the legislative history of the contemporaneously pending Jennings Bill, citations to which are made in the Court's opinion.