Source: http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/aviation/Planning/Reminga.htm
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 02:58:21
Document Index: 373688144

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 91', 'art 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 1501', '§ 1501', '§ 1348', '§ 77', '§ 2680', '§ 77', '§ 77']

WSDOT - Reminga v. United States
Reminga v. United States
DECIDED - October 2, 1980
No. 78-1154
GERTRUDE REMINGA, Executrix of the Estate of Thomas H. Reminga, Deceased, and
BARBARA SUE BREEDEN, Executrix of the Estate of James Robert Breeden,
Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees
June 10, 1980, Argued
COUNSEL: James S. Brady, U. S. Atty., Robert C. Greene, Asst. U. S. Atty., Grand Rapids, Mich., Ronald R. Glancz, Frederic D. Cohen, Michael J. Pangia, Asst. Chief Counsel, Litigation Division, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellant.
LIVELY, Circuit Judge
In this Federal Tort Claims Act n1 case the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs upon a finding that acts and omissions of two federal regulatory agencies were negligent. The plaintiffs are the widows and executrices of two passengers in a small private airplane who were killed when the plane struck a guy wire which supported a tall television tower. The district court found negligence and proximate cause in three agency actions and omissions: (1) the government was found negligent for publishing a "sectional chart" which showed the TV tower in the wrong location; (2) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was found negligent in issuing a "no hazard determination" when construction of the tower was proposed; and (3) the FAA and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) were found negligent for failing to require additional lighting or marking "so as to safeguard pilots who are in the area from striking the guy-wires of such a tower, or at least to have inquired into the feasibility of marking the wires." Reminga v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 445, 469 (W.D.Mich.1978).
The decedents were returning to their homes in Michigan from a hunting trip in Wisconsin when the fatal crash occurred. Though both were licensed pilots, the district court found that the plane was being operated by the third occupant whose father's business owned it. This finding is supported by the evidence. The plane took off from the Land O'Lakes Airport near Rhinelander on November 17, 1968 at approximately 2:30p.m. and crashed at approximately 2:52 p. m. some seventeen miles south-southeast of the airport. None of the occupants of the plane was licensed for instrument flying and the flight was to be conducted under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). The "flight minimums" for the trip were that the area be free of clouds and that the pilot have one mile visibility as long as he flew outside of controlled airspace. 14 C.F.R. § 91.105(a). The district court found that though the weather was "marginal," conditions were above the minimums at the time of take off. The plane reported to the airport when it was 12 miles south that it was flying at 600 feet with about 3 miles visibility.
The government also contends that the displacement of the symbol for the TV tower could not have been the proximate cause of the crash. It is contended that sectional charts are intended for use by pilots to determine their "general location by reference to objects on the ground," and that "a pilot cannot rely on any map to visually thread his way through the needles which would be encountered by flying under 500 feet in uncontrolled and unnavigable airspace in bad weather." This argument overlooks the district court's finding that although the plane took off with legal minimums and had three miles visibility when 12 miles from the airport, deteriorating weather (mixed rain and snow) caused the pilot to descend further to be able to fly according to VFR. As he approached the point of collision, the top of the tower was hidden and the pilot was moving in and out of clouds.
In this situation it was essential that the pilot know the correct location of obstructions to navigation. We cannot say the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that the issuance of the map which showed the location of the tower in the wrong place was the proximate cause of the crash.
Though not required by law to do so, n2 when the FAA arranges for the publication of aeronautical navigation charts and engenders reliance on them, it is required to use due care to see that they accurately depict what they purport to show. Failure to show the location of the tower accurately rendered the United States liable for injury to those who relied upon the chart. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69, 76 S. Ct. 122, 126, 100 L. Ed. 48 (1955); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931, 88 S. Ct. 295, 19 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1967).
The government contends vigorously that recovery in this case is precluded by the Michigan rule of contributory negligence. The district court, applying Michigan law, recognized that at the time of the fatal crash contributory negligence was an absolute bar to recovery. The government contends the weather was so unsuitable for VFR flying that it was negligent to begin the trip, and negligent not to turn back when the weather worsened. However, the court found no contributory negligence. Since all three occupants of the plane were licensed pilots and there was evidence that more than one engaged in inquiries about the weather before their departure, the court found that all participated in the decision to take off. Nevertheless, the court stated: "However, the weather is not the primary cause of this crash. The only influence the weather had was to force the decedents' plane to fly at an altitude much lower than they normally would have done, thus forcing them to go around the tower rather than over it; the weather also obscured the guy-wires to an extent that a large and potentially hazardous obstruction was transformed into a fatal hazard." 448 F. Supp. at 465.
The district court recognized that the FAA has limited authority to control the construction of broadcast towers. However, it concluded that if the FAA had determined that the Rhinelander tower would be a hazard to pilots the FCC would have considered this determination in making its decision whether to grant a broadcasting license to the tower's owner. Though the FCC has no power to prohibit the construction of a tower, the district court reasoned that denial of a broadcasting license "on the basis of the FAA hazard determination is in effect a denial of construction of the tower by the FCC." 448 F. Supp. at 455. Thus the court found that the FAA and FCC "acting in concert do have authority to indirectly ban the construction of such towers." Id. at 463.
448 F. Supp. at 455.
448 F. Supp. at 463.
448 F. Supp. at 465.
The other basis for government liability was found in the failure of the FAA and FCC to require lights or markings on the guy wires. The regulations in question, 47 C.F.R., Part 17, Subpart C, contain very specific lighting requirements for towers which reach 200 feet or more above the ground. The specifications for lighting of "antenna structures" between 1650 and 1800 feet in height are found at 47 C.F.R. § 17.35. The regulations provide that "(t)he term antenna structures includes the radiating and/or receiving system, its supporting structures and any appurtenances mounted thereon." 47 C.F.R. § 17.2(a). The plaintiffs contended that these regulations, taken together, explicitly required guy wires to be lighted or marked. The district court held that such a construction strained the meaning of the language of the regulations and that the regulations do not require lights or other markings on guy wires. However, noting the general statutory duty of the FAA to provide for the safety of aircraft, the district court concluded that the FAA was negligent in failing to require some lighting or marking. Apparently the district court believed the FAA should have promulgated such regulations since those of the FCC do not cover guy wires. See 448 F. Supp. at 467.
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
With respect to the FAA's "no hazard" determination, the district court held that the FAA was not making policy but was merely implementing policy that had already been "determined and enunciated." 448 F. Supp. at 464. With respect to the lack of warning markers on the guy wires, the district court found that there was "no agency action at all" and "there must first be evidence of some exercise of discretion" before the discretionary function defense applies. 448 F. Supp. at 467-68.
We begin our discussion of the discretionary function exception by examining the landmark decision in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953), where the Supreme Court dealt with the historical background and legislative history of this exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity from tort liability. In discussing the legislative history, Mr. Justice Reed, writing for the majority, referred to "the governmental regulatory function exception from suits." Id. at 26, 73 S. Ct. at 963 (emphasis supplied). This language appears to assume that regulatory activities involve discretion. The Court also quoted from a statement by an assistant attorney general testifying before the House Judiciary Committee when it was considering legislation which eventually became the Federal Tort Claims Act. This witness testified that the discretionary function exception was included because it was not "intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act, should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort." Id. at 27, 73 S. Ct. at 963.
In analyzing the two exceptions contained in § 2680(a), supra, the Court noted that the second exception applies to "acts of discretion in the performance of governmental functions or duty "whether or not the discretion involved be abused.' " 346 U.S. at 33, 73 S. Ct. at 966. The reference to abuse, the Court found, "connotes both negligence and wrongful acts in the exercise of the discretion ...." Id. The Court further found that "discretionary function" includes more than high level decisions to initiate government programs and activities. "It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations." 346 U.S. at 35-36, 73 S. Ct. at 968. In denying jurisdiction in the particular case before it in Dalehite, the Court noted that the decisions upon which the district court had predicated liability "were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level ...." 346 U.S. at 42, 73 S. Ct. at 971.
Though Dalehite has been limited in other respects, see Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319-20, 77 S. Ct. 374, 376-377, 1 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1957), its conclusions represented by the language quoted herein have not been questioned. However, the application of these principles to specific cases has created problems and some disparity in results.
In Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.1975), this court rejected the government's contention that an action was barred by the discretionary function exception. In that case two hostages in a hijacked airplane were killed when FBI agents attempted to prevent the plane from taking off after being urged by the pilot not to interfere. The court considered the purpose of the exception as disclosed by the language itself, the legislative history and judicial interpretations, and concluded that decisions in handling a particular law enforcement problem do not involve the discretionary function which Congress referred to in the Act. Such decisions have no "policy overtones." 522 F.2d at 997. In reaching this conclusion the court observed, "Congressional reports indicate that the regulatory functions of the FTC and SEC were the types of activity to be exempted by this exception." Id. at 996.
Nor do we find any error in the district court's conclusion that the United States should not be subjected to liability in this case because air safety regulations should have been more strict at the Cincinnati airport. The discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act precludes the imposition of tort liability on the claimed failure to impose a more strict set of air safety regulations. 28 U.S.C. § 2680, Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
Decisions from other courts, while emphasizing various factors in particular cases, appear generally to have followed a course similar to that of this circuit. A number of cases have denied the defense of discretionary function where air traffic controllers have acted negligently in advising pilots. E.g., Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931, 88 S. Ct. 295, 19 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1967). Such cases deny the exemption where the negligent decision is made in an operational setting rather than in a context of official planning or policymaking. See Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir.1976); Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.1975); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. United States, 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1973); Pigott v. United States, 451 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.1971).
As the court pointed out in First National Bank in Albuquerque v. United States, 552 F.2d 370, 375 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835, 98 S. Ct. 122, 54 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1977), it is necessary to focus on the statutes and regulations involved in a particular case in order to determine whether the discretionary function exception applies. The specific statute dealing with structures which may constitute hazards to air commerce is 49 U.S.C. § 1501: § 1501. Hazards to air commerce The (Secretary of Transportation) shall, by rules and regulations, or by order where necessary, require all persons to give adequate public notice, in the form and manner prescribed by the (Secretary of Transportation), of the construction or alteration, or of the proposed construction or alteration, of any structure where notice will promote safety in air commerce.
§ 1348. Airspace control and facilities(a) Use of airspaceThe (Secretary of Transportation) is authorized and directed to develop plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and limitations as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace. He may modify or revoke such assignment when required in the public interest.
Both of these statutes speak in general, not specific terms. The same is true of the regulations related to determination of whether a proposed structure would be a hazard to air navigation. The FAA regulations require consideration of "all facts relevant to the effect of the proposed construction or alteration on the safe and efficient utilization of the navigable airspace." 14 C.F.R. § 77.35(b)(4). These regulations are replete with permissive words in describing the functions of FAA officials. E.g., "This study may include ....." "To the extent considered necessary ....." Id. (a), (b). This language connotes discretion rather than mandatory requirements. Like those considered by the court in First National Bank in Albuquerque, supra, the statutes and regulations upon which governmental action was based in the present case are written in terms of general policy standards rather than specific mandatory directions.
The district court recognized that § 2680(a) precludes a finding of government liability on the basis of an abuse of discretion. n4 Nevertheless, the process by which it reached its conclusion that the government was liable for the FAA's issuance of the "no hazard" determination appears to have involved a determination that the agency did abuse its discretion rather than a determination that the agency exercised no discretion. n5
It is clear to us that the FAA performed a discretionary function in making a "no hazard" determination with respect to the TV tower. Contrary to the finding of the district court, the FAA was permitted to consider matters other than safety of aircraft. To the extent considered necessary, the regional director is authorized by 14 C.F.R. § 77.35 to consider "all facts relevant to the effect of the proposed construction or alteration on the safe and efficient utilization of the navigable airspace." (emphasis added). Further, 14 C.F.R. § 77.31 requires the consideration of "conflicting demands." The comment which the FAA made concerning the importance of television to the Wisconsin north woods country convinced the district court that the agency based its determination on an "irrelevant criterion." 448 F. Supp. at 463. On the contrary, this statement indicates a consideration of competing demands and the exercise of the broad discretion granted to the agency.