Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/409/1239/120917/
Timestamp: 2020-01-17 18:45:31
Document Index: 702257060

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 19', '§ 4', '§ 15', '§ 23', '§ 15']

State of Iowa et al., Plaintiffs, v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., et al., Defendants.in Re Application for Attorney Fees Verne Lawyer and Lex Hawkins, Applicants-appellees, v. State of Iowa, Appellant, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969) :: Justia
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State of Iowa et al., Plaintiffs, v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., et al., Defendants.in Re Application for Attorney Fees Verne Lawyer and Lex Hawkins, Applicants-appellees, v. State of Iowa, Appellant, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969) April 2, 1969
This is an appeal by the state of Iowa from the judgment of the district court awarding Verne Lawyer and Lex Hawkins attorney fees for services rendered appellant and other political subdivisions of that state in connection with antitrust litigation against Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc. and 20 other defendants.
The primary question for determination is whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the application for allowance of fees. The court, after a plenary hearing on the merits of the claim, concluded it was vested with authority, determined the value of the services rendered and entered the judgment from which this appeal is prosecuted. The court filed a memorandum opinion which is reported sub nom Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (D.Iowa 1968). We affirm.
On January 5, 1967, for the first time, Turner requested appellees to resign. They refused to do so. The attorney general persisted in his demand that appellees withdraw from the case. They complied and on January 9 delivered their files to the attorney general's office. On January 10 they filed application in the district court for an order permitting them to withdraw their appearance in behalf of the plaintiffs. On the same day the district court granted the motion and entered an order providing that for good cause shown appellees were permitted to withdraw their appearance. The order in part recites: " [T]he Court does hereby state that Verne Lawyer and Lex Hawkins have fully and completely discharged their legal duties and responsibilities to the plaintiffs and as officers of the Court to date. * *"
It is evident that Turner questioned the legality of appellees' employment by the state on the ground that the provisions of § 13.7, 1966 Iowa Code1 were not complied with when appellees were initially retained. Turner conveyed his views to the Executive Council of Iowa on January 10, 1966.2
* * * " [I]n my opinion they [attorney general and state] would have an obligation to pay you on the quantum meruit for the value of services you have rendered to date."
Subsequent to the hearing on January 24, the Executive Council on February 7 requested an opinion from the attorney general concerning the legality of paying appellees for their services, specifically, whether the Council under § 19.10 of the Iowa Code was authorized to pay appellees.3
"I believe the State has a moral obligation to compensate these lawyers on a quantum meruit basis for the fair and reasonable value of their services to the State and the benefit of any of which the State accepts, but such compensation can only be authorized by the legislature." (Emphasis supplied.) Thereafter, on February 27, the secretary of the Executive Council, acting pursuant to directions from the Council, forwarded a "complete file consisting of itemized statements received from Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Lawyer and the Attorney General's opinion" to the chairman of the Iowa State Senate Judiciary Committee for determination by the Committee.
On November 6, while the matter was under consideration by the court, appellees filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 (b), F.R.Civ.P., requesting the court to amend its order of January 10, 1967, to provide that appellees be permitted to condition their withdrawal upon the payment of reasonable attorney fees. This motion was apparently designed to bring the case within the teachings of this court in First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1957), where the district court conditioned its order of substitution of counsel upon a grant of attorney fees.
We observe preliminarily that the district court was vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the antitrust suit filed on December 6, 1966, out of which this controversy arose. Clayton Act § 4 (15 U.S.C. § 15). The question which initially concerned Judge Hanson related to the court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the fee controversy between appellees and their former client. The court engaged in an exhaustive review of the doctrine of federal ancillary jurisdiction, and documented its discussion with authorities which it deemed analogous in principle. 281 F. Supp. at 396. In view of the comprehensive exposition of the law by the district court we shall confine our discussion to the primary purpose of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 23 (Rules ed. 1960), often cited by the court, states:
"The termination of relations between a party in litigation in a federal court and his attorney is a matter relating to the protection of the court's own officers and is not subject to the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188." Id.
See also First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., supra.
In our view, this argument must rest upon the premise that the motion of appellees for allowance of fees constituted an independent action against the state of Iowa within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. Our holding that the claim in issue was incident to the primary action and therefore within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court is dispositive of the Eleventh Amendment argument. Beyond doubt the district court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties plaintiff and defendant in the antitrust case. 15 U.S.C. § 15. Having voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court the state must submit to any valid order or judgment within the authority of the court to enter.4
Chapter 19 of the Iowa Code Ann. is the statutory authority for the creation of the Executive Council and the duties and authority conferred upon it. Section 19.1 provides that the Council shall consist of the Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of State, Treasurer of State, Secretary of Agriculture
People of Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U.S. 627, 34 S. Ct. 461, 58 L. Ed. 763 (1914); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 2 S. Ct. 878, 27 L. Ed. 780 (1883); Rank v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 1, 67 (S.D. Cal. 1956), stand for the proposition that when a state voluntarily comes into a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter, it waives its sovereign immunity and submits itself to the court's jurisdiction