Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19841213-1074184
Timestamp: 2016-12-06 18:11:22+00:00
Document Index: 91471936

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 1", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 27", "l'article 1", "l'article 1", "l'article 1", "l'article 5", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10741/84Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1984-12-13;10741.84 Analyses : (Art. 41) PREJUDICE MORALParties : Demandeurs : S.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 10741/84 S . v/the UNITED KINGDO M S . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 13 December 1984 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 dÃ©cembre 1984 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
A rticle 26 of the Convention : An appeal limited to questions of lawfulness is not effective where complaint is twde concenting facts or the law itself. A rticle I of the First Protocol : A property right limited to the benefit of a restrictive covenant and receipt of an annual rent is a "possession " . A law pennining the coun to extinguish a restrictive covenant wâ¢hich is obsolete constitutes a control of the use of possessions . 7he Commission's examination of the necessit}â¢ for a control of the use of possessions is very limited .
Article 26 of the Convention : Un recours limitÃ© Ã la lÃ©galitÃ© nest pas effficace lorsque l'intÃ©ressÃ© conteste les faits ou la loi elle-mÃªme . Article 1 du Protocole additionnel : Un droit sur un immeuble . qui se limite au bÃ©nÃ©ftce d'une serritude et Ã la perception d'une retite annaelle, est un biet . Utie loi permettant au juge de prottoncer l'extinction d'une senâ¢itnde fonciÃ¨re excessive et tombÃ©e en dÃ©suÃ©mde constitue une rÃ©glementation de l'usage des biens. S'agissant de la nÃ©cessitÃ© d'une rÃ©glementation de l'usage des biens, la Commission ne dispose que d'un pouvoir d'examen trÃ¨s limitÃ© .
(franÃ§ais : voir p. 234)
The facts as they have been submitted on behalf of the applicant, a citizen of the United Kingdom born in 1959 and living in Belfast, by her representatives, Messrs Cleaver . Fulton and Rankin, solicitors of Belfast, may be summarised as fol lows : The applicant complains that she has been deprived of part of her interest in certain land in Belfast and alleges violations of Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article I of Protocol No . I . The subject land ("the land"), consisting of approximately 3 .5 acres, is in Belfast . On 23 October 1953 the land was granted under an indenture of fee farm by various parties to the Cliftonville Football and Athletic Club Limited at an annual rent of Â£100 ; this indenture imposed various restrictions on the possible use of the land . The Belfast Education and Library Board ("the Board") acquired the grantee's interest in the fee farm grant by a conveyance dated 6 December 1977 . The applicant is the successor in title to one of the initial grantors . Her interest in the land is that she is entitled to collect the rent of Â£I00 . The Board obtained planning permission to build a nursery school on part of the land in 1973 . Work on the school began in 1974 and was completed in 1975 . The school was built in breach of two restrictive covenants contained in the fee farm grant . These convenants state that the grantee :
"(2) and will during the continuance of this demise keep in good and substantial repair any buildings that are erected in connection with the sporting, recreational and social activities of the club but shall not build without the written consent of the grantors any other form of premises either dwelling houses or business or commercial premises during the terni hereby granted ." "(4) and will use the hereditaments and premises for sporting, recreational and social activities only and not use or permit the same to be used for any purpose whatsoever which ntay grow to be an injury, nuisance or annoyance to the grantors or their lessees or the owners or occupiers of adjoining premises ." It would appear that the covenants were overlooked by all the parties in th e course of the planning and construction of the nursery school . At no tinte did the applicant object to the construction of the nursery school, and the documents submitted suggest that she was not aware of the restrictive convenants . However, once the Board became aware of the existence of the restrictive covenants they informed the applicant and from 6 July 1979 onwards the Board sought a waiver of both covenants from the applicant . Negotiations took place but no agreement was reached . The applicant did however continue to collect the rent charge after the breach had been brought to her attention .
In 1981 the Board made an application for an order that the two restrictive covenants be extinguished or modified pursuant to Article 5 of the Property (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 ("the 1978 Order") . This Article provides that : "(1) The Lands Tribunal, on the application of any person interested in land affected by an impediment, may make an order modifying, or wholly or partially extinguishing, the impediment on being satisfied that the impediment unreasonably impedes the enjoyment of the land, or if not modified or extinguished, would do so . " The application was heard on 18 March 1983 by the Lands Tribunal fo r Northem Ireland . The decision of the Tribunal was handed down on 29 April 1983 but a decision on costs was reserved on that occasion . A copy of the final decision of the Tribunal containing the award of costs was forwarded to the applicant's solicitors by the Registrar of the Lands Tribunal by letter dated I I August 1983 which was received by them on'15 August 1983 . The Lands Tribunal found that the Board had satisfied the burden placed upo n them under the 1978 Order to show that the impediment (that is the restrictive covenants) unreasonably impeded the enjoyment of the land . On the evidence before it the Tribunal was satisfied that the use of the land for private recreation had lapsed through lack of demand and that there had been no demand in recent years from local residents or from any other source for outdoor recreational use of the land and that there had been no planning pressure or interest to develop the land for commercial purposes . The Tribunal had seen no evidence to support the view that the proposed use for commercialor recreational purposes was other than "a mere possibility or hope .,, . . However, the Lands Tribunal found that the proposed use for a new school (in addition to the nursery school completed in 1975) was afeality and with planning consents already given for such use as part of the area development programme the future of the land for that purpose seemed assured . The Tribunal, having heard such evidence, was of the opinion that "there is no longer any relevance in perpetuating a sterilisation of the land by means of the restrictive convenants and the landlord, as a collector of ground rents in the vicinity, no longer has an interest which would justify their perpetuation ." . . . "The only relevant question under that legislation [i .e . the 1978 Order] is whether the applicant [i .e . the Board] has proved that the restrictions have become obsolete . In the opinion of the Tribunal it has so proved and the relief sought will be granted and the covenants extinguished . " On the question of the correct basis of compensation the Tribunal held tha t under Article 5 para . 6(b) (i) of the 1978 Order there could be no loss to the landlor d
because the evidence showed that the interest was not that of an owner occupier but rather that of a collector of neighbouring ground rents . The applicant's representatives argued that the compensation should rellect the amount which would have been agreed between the panies for waiver of the covenants in similar circumstances prior to the passing of the 1978 Order . They calculated this on the basis of the difference between the restricted and unrestricted value of the land and estimated this latter value according to the prices paid for housing development . The Tribunal found as a matter of fact that the small possibility which existed of the land being used for a housing development would not have affected the ntarket value . The Tribunal's judgment does not specifically state that it considered the applicant's proposed method of calculating compensation to be inappropriate, but the tone of its decision suggests that this was the case . The Tribunal in fact followed the calculation proposed on behalf of the Board . It accepted the uncontested evidence offered by the Board that at the time of the fee farm grant in 1953 the value without restriction was the same as the value of the land restricted . It was also shown that the fee farm rent was a full rent . The Tribunal was however of the opinion that the market would in fact have paid a premium for the land if it were unrestricted . Since the actual rent reserved was shown to be a full fee farm rent the amount of such a premium would have been comparatively small . The Tribunal assessed it at Â£350 and awarded that sum to the applicant by way of compensation . The applicant sought an opinion from Counsel concerning an appeal . Counsel was strongly of the opinion that there was little likelihood of any appeal being successful . He advised that the Tribunal had ample evidence upon which to reach its conclusion that the impediments were unreasonable . On the question of quantunt of compensation he considered that the method of computation proposed to the Tribunal by the applicant was without any basis in the 1978 Order since the whole purpose of the 1978 Order was to avoid such sunts being demanded by landlords as a price for releasing impediments . He was in complete agreement with the Lands Tribunal in their decision that the applicant could not show that she had suffered any " loss or disadvantage" as a consequence of the extinguishment of the impedinient . In his view, the compensation awarded pursuant to Anicle 5 para . 6(b) (i) was, if anything, generous to the applicant .
No appeal was lodged by the applicant against the decision of the Lands Tribunal .
COMPLAINT S Article I of Protocol No . I The applicant complains that the decision of the Lands Tribunal extinguishing the restrictive convenants of which she had the benefit was a deprivation of th e
peaceful enjoyment of her possessions . . She argues that such deprivation was not in the public interest, nor was it subject to the conditions provided for by law in .that it constituted an ex post facto legitimisation of previous breaches of the restrictive convenants . She further claims that the deprivation did not accord with the general principles of international law in that prompt, adequate and effective compensation was not paid . The applicant furt her complains that the 1978 Order effectively removed he r right either to seek the forfeiture of the grant on the ground of the breach of the restrictive covenants or to negotiate with the Board for payment in consideration of waiving the covenants, which payment might have amounted to one half of the develÃ´pment value of the land . She submits that this is a wrongful deprivation of an interest in property without compensation, and thus a violation of Article I of Protocol No . 1 .
THE LAW (Extract) 1. The Commission is required pursuant to Article 26 to consider, inter alia, whether in the circumstances of the present case thÃ© applicant has exhausted all her domestic remedies before making the present application . She did not seek to lodge an appeal against the decision of the Lands Tribunal extinguishing the restrictive covenants although an appeal procedure was available to her had she chosen to avail herself of it . The Commission recalls its previous decision that in order to comply with the requirements of Article 26 an applicant is obliged to make "normal use" of remedies "likely to be effective and adequate" to remedy the matters of which he complains . (See e .g . Donnelly and others v . the United Kingdom, Nos . 5577-5583 1 72, Dec . 15 .12 .75, D .R . p . 4 at p . 64) . In addition, the Commission has consistently held that the mere existence of doubts as to the prospects of success does not absolve an applicant from exhausting a given remedy (ibid'at p . 72) . At the same time, the Coun has held in the Vagrancy cases Eur . Court H .R ., De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no . 12, p . 34 at para . 62) that applicants are not obliged to make use of remedies which, according to "settled legal opinion" existing at the relevant time, do not provide redress for their complaints . . In the present case an appeal was available to the applicant from the decision of the Lands Tribunal on a question of law . However, the applicant does not dispute the lawfulness of the Lands Tribunal's decision, Counsel having strongly advised that the Tribunal had correctly applied the law and that its decision was as favourable to the applicant as could be expected . The applicant's complaint is rather that in all the circumstances of the case the restrictive covenants should not have been extinguished, i .e . that the facts did not merit the particular decision, rather than tha t
the decision was taken after an incorrect application of the law to the facts . The applicant also argues that the power to abolish covenants as obsolete impediments which is contained in the 1978 Order should not exist . The applicant's complaints amount to a challenge of the decision of the Lands Tribunal on a question of fact and a challenge of the legislation itself . The Commission accepts that the available appeal from the Lands Tribunal is not an effective and adequate remedy for such complaints and that the applicant has therefore satisfied the requirements of Article 26 as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies . Her application was lodged within six months of the completion and service of the final decision of the Lands Tribunal about which she complains . It follows that the application cannot be rejected under Article 27 para . 3 of the Convention . The applicant complains that the extinction of the restrictive covenants of which .2 she enjoyed the benefit, and the removal of the right to negotiate a payment for waiver of the covenants or seek forfeiture of the grant by reason of their breach (both of which she claims are the practical effects of the 1978 Order), were contrary to Article I of Protocol No . I which provides : "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions . No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law . The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties . " In its judgment in the case of Sporrong and Ldnnroth the Court observed that Article I of Protocol No . I comprises "three distinct rules" . The first rule was "of a general nature" and enounced the principle of "peaceful enjoyment of possessions" . The second rule "covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions" . The third mie is concerned with the control of the use of property . (Eur . Court H .R ., Sporrong and Ldnnroth judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no . 52, para . 61) . The nature of these three rules has been further examined by the Commission in its Report adopted on 7 March 1984 on the Nationalisation cases, Sir William Lithgow and others v . the United Kingdom where it observed : "that the threerules referred to by the Coun are not entirely separate or watenight . The first 'general' rule contains a general guarantee of the right of property . This general guarantee is then qualified or limited by the second and third rules . The second and third rules must be interpreted in their context and in the light of the general guarantees contained in the first sentence" (Eur . Court H .R ., Series A no . 102, p . 89, para. 351) .
The applicant enjoys an interest in the land in question which is limited to the benefit of the restrictive covenants contained in the fee farm grant and an entitlement to collect the annual rent charge fromthe Board as grantee . The first sentence of Article I of Protocol No . I entitles the applicant to the peaceful enjoyment of this limited interest in the land, which is a possession . The decision of the Lands Tribunal complained of extinguished two restrictive covenants, thereby depriving the applicarit of the benefit of them . To this extÃ©nt her right to peaceful enjoyment of her interest in the land has been interfered with, and this interference falls to be considered in thÃ© light of Article I of Protocol No . 1 . In so far as the decision of the Lands Tribunal extinguished the two restrictiv e convenants it reduced the applicant's interest in the land . However, the Commission notes that the remainder of the applicant's interest remains unaffected by the decision . She is still entitled to collect the rent charge, the value of which has not been altered by the extinction of the restrictive covenants, and she still has the benefit of the remaining unextinguished restrictive covenants . For this reason the Commission does not consider that the applicant has been deprived of her possessions under the first paragraph of Article I of Protocol No . I . However, the Lands Tribunal's decision to extinguish the restrictive covenant s adjusted the degree of control exercisable by the applicant ovÃ©r the'land and must therefore be examined under the second paragraph of Article I of Protocol No . 1 . Under this provision the Commission's review of the necessity for a contro l measure is limited, although real . Its principle review, however, consists in examining the proportionality of a particular control measure to the end result sought . Hence a control measure which is grossly disproportionate will fail to satisfy the requirement of respect for possessions which is contained in the first sentence of the Article and which underlies the interpretation of the whole provision . The purpose of Article 5 of the 1978 Order is to avoid the continuing encumbrance of land by obsolete impediments, such as the restrictive covenants in the present case .To enable it to achieve this aim, the Lands Tribunal is empowered by the 1978 Order to extinguish or modify any such impediment on the application of any person interested in the land affected . The Tribunal may so decide if it is .satisfied that such impediment "unreasonably impedes the enjoyment of the land, or if not modified or extinguished- would do so" . The Commission finds that this power enables the Lands Tribunal to free land in certain circumstances from unreasonable impediments and thus enable it to be used constructively where this is desirable . Such a power is accordingly in "the general interest" within the meaning of Article I of Protocol No . I . ' â¢ . As regards the proportionality of the decision of the Lands Tribunal in the pursuit of this legitimate aim, the Commission notes the findings of fact of the Lands Tribunal- which have not been challenged by the applicant . It was found that there
was no longer any interest in using the land for 'sporting, recreational or social activities' as required by the restrictive covenants . Nor was the development of the land for commercial purposes "other than a mere possibility or hope" (Decision of the Lands Tribunal dated 29 April 1983 at page 5) . In contrast, the proposed use for a new school was a reality and since planning consents for that purpose had already been given the future use of the land for that purpose seemed assured . The Commission notes in this respect that the procedure for a planning application and the requirement for planning permission has in practice superseded the relevance of restrictive covenants such as those at issue in the present case . Given these facts the Lands Tribunal found that the restrictive covenants were obsolete and ordered their extinction . Having heard the parties the Tribunal considered that at the time of the original grant the market would have paid a small premium for land which was unrestricted . Hence the applicant could be said to have suffered financial loss equal to the amount of this sntall premiuni . The Tribunal therefore awarded the applicant E350 conipensation for the loss of the benefit of the restrictive covenants . It is clear therefore that the Lands Tribunal's task was to balance the conflicting interests of the panies, and the Comniission finds that the control of the property exercised by the Lands Tribunal was 'in accordance with the general interest', and that the extinction of the restrictive covenants upon payment of compensation was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim of ensuring the most efficient use of land for the benefit of the community . The applicant funher claims that by enabling the Board unilaterally to apply for the extinction of the restrictive covenants the 1978 Order effectively removed her right to negotiate payment of a premium for their waiver or alternatively to seek the forfeiture of the grant on the ground of their breach . She argues that she could have received a premium amounting to half of any increased developnient value of the land, and that the deprivation of this expectation is contrary to Article I of Protocol No . I . The Comntission recognises that the 1978 Order removed the negotiating position of the beneficiary of an obsolete impedintent to land, which was the position of the applicant . This was, however, the declared purpose of the legislation - to prevent landlords from securing large sums in return for a waiver of obsolete restrictions . However, the jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal, a tribunal prima facie in conformity with Article 6, to adjudicate on disputes concerning the applicability of this general power under the 1978 Order to a panicular set of circumstances, means that the legislation has not simply rentoved the power to negotiate . lnstead, it has provided a means of resolving disputes which, in default of negotiation-'threaten, contrary to the public interest, to delay the development of land . It further appears that the applicant failed to seek the forfeiture of the grant following the initial development of the land by the Board and that she continued t o
receive payment of the rent . In these circumstances it appears that the right to seek forfeiture of the grant may have been waived by the applicant prior to the application by the Board under the 1978 Order . ln view of this fact and the fact that the applicant was able to claim, and was granted, compensation, it follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention .
EN FAI T Les faits, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s au nom de la requÃ©rante, resso rt issante du Royaume-Uni nÃ©e en 1959 et habitant Belfast, par ses reprÃ©sentants MM . Cleaver . Fulton et Rankin, solicitors Ã Belfast - peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : La requÃ©rante se plaint d'avoir Ã©tÃ© dÃ©possÃ©dÃ©e d'une partie de ses droits sur un terrain sis Ã Belfast et allÃ¨gue des violations des articles 13 et 14 de la Convention et de l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel . Le terrain en question (Â« le lerrain Â» ), d'environ 1,5 ha, est situÃ© Ã Belfast . Le 23 octobre 1953, il fut concÃ©dÃ© pour un loyer de 100 livres par an selon un contrat de ferrnage Ã pa rt ies multiples, au club de football et d'athlÃ©tisme de Clifionville ; ce contrat comportait diverses servitudes res treignant l'utilisation Ã©ventuelle du terrain . Le conseil de bibliothÃ©que et d'enseignement de Belfast (Â« le conseil .) acquit, par un acte du 6 dÃ©cembre 1977, le droit du concessionnaire sur la concession Ã ferme . La requÃ©rante est le successeur de l'un des concÃ©dants initiaux . Son droit de propriÃ©tÃ© sur le terrain consiste Ã encaisser le loyer de 100 livres . Le conseil obtint en 1973 le permis de construire une Ã©cole mÃ¢temelle sur une partie du terrain . Les travaux commencÃ¨rent en 1974 et s'achevÃ¨rent en 1975 . L'Ã©cole fut construite en violation de deux clauses accessoires restrictives figurant dans l'acte de concession Ã ferme . Ces clauses prÃ©cisaient que le concessionnaire : - (2) pendant la durÃ©e de cette cession Ã bail, maintiendra en bon Ã©tat les bÃ timents construits en liaison avec les activitÃ©s sportives, rÃ©crÃ©atives et sociales du club et ne construira sans le consentement Ã© crit des concÃ©dants aucun autre type de locaux, qu'ils soient Ã usage d'habitation ou Ã usage industriel ou commercial â¢ 234
-(4) et n'utilisera les terres, biens et locaux que pour des activitÃ©s sportives, rÃ©crÃ©atives et sociales, sans en permettre aucun autre usage pouvant entrainer dommage, nuisance ou ennui dans le chef des concÃ©dants ou de leurs concessionnaires ou celui des propriÃ©taires ou occupants des locaux adjacents . Il semblerait que ces clauses aient Ã©tÃ© mÃ©connues par toutes I es parties lorsque fut construite et amÃ©nagÃ©e l'Ã©cole maternelle . A aucun moment la requÃ©rante n'a objectÃ© Ã la construction de l'Ã©cole et les documents produits montrent qu'elle n'avait pas connaissance des servitudes en question . Cependant, lorsque le conseil eut connaissance de l'existence de ces deux clauses, il en informa la requÃ©rante et chercha Ã partir du 6 juillet 1979 Ã l'amener Ã y renoncer . Des nÃ©gociations eurent lieu mais sans aboutir Ã un accord . La requÃ©rante continua cependant Ã encaisser les loyers aprÃ¨s que la violation eut Ã©tÃ© portÃ©e Ã son attention . En 1981, le conseil sollicita une ordonnance du juge pour annuler ou modifier les deux clauses restrictives conforrnÃ©ment Ã l'article 5 de l'ordonnance de 1978 sur les biens en Irlande du Nord (â¢ l'ordonnance de 1978-) . Cet article est ainsi libellÃ© : - (I) Le tribunal foncier peut, sur demande de toute personne ayant un droit sur un terrain grevÃ© d'une servitude- dÃ©livrer une injonction modifiant ou annulant en tout ou en partie la clause y affÃ©rente, s'il est convaincu que ladite servitude entrave de maniÃ©re dÃ©raisonnable la jouissance du terrain ou le ferait si elle n'Ã©tait pas modifiÃ©e ou levÃ©e . â¢ Le tribunal foncier pour l'Irlande du Nord examina la demande le 18 mars 1983 . 11 signifia sa dÃ©cision le 29 avril 1983 mais rÃ©serva la question des frais et dÃ©pens . Copie de la dÃ©cision finale du tribunal contenant la distraction des dÃ©pens fut adressÃ©e aux solicitors de la requÃ©rante par le greffe du tribunal foncier (lettre du 11 aoÃ»t 1983 reÃ§ue le 15 aoÃ»t 1983) .
Le tribunal estima que le conseil s'Ã©tait acquittÃ© de sa tÃ¢che conformÃ©ment Ã l'ordonnance de 1978 et avait prouvÃ© que la servitude (c'est-Ã -dire les clauses restrictives) entravait de maniÃ¨re dÃ©raisonnable la jouissance du terrain . Au vu des Ã©lÃ©ments produits, le tribunal a eu la conviction que l'utilisation du terrain Ã des fins de loisirs privÃ©s Ã©tait tombÃ©e en dÃ©suÃ©tude faute de demande et que, dans les annÃ©es rÃ©centes, aucun riverain ni personne n'avait demandÃ© d'utiliser le terrain pour des activitÃ©s rÃ©crÃ©atives de plein air ni cherchÃ© Ã amÃ©nager le terrain Ã des fins comnterciales . Le tribunal n'avait rien trouvÃ© pour Ã©tayer l'idÃ©e que l'usage envisagÃ© Ã des fins commerciales ou rÃ©crÃ©atives fÃ»t autre chose Â«qu'une simple Ã©ventualitÃ© ou espÃ©rance+ . Par contre, le tribunal estima que l'usage envisagÃ© pour une nouvelle Ã©cole (outre l'Ã©cole maternelle achevÃ©e en 1975) Ã©tait une rÃ©alitÃ© et qu'avec les autorisations d'urbanisme dÃ©jÃ donnÃ©es en ce sens dans le cadre du programme de lotissement du secteur, l'affectation du terrain paraissait assurÃ©e .
Ayant pris connaissance de ces Ã©lÃ©ments, le tribunal formula l'avis qu'Â« il n'y avait plus lieu de perpÃ©tuer la stÃ©rilisation du terrain par lesdites servitudes et que le propriÃ©taire, en tant que receveur des loyers alentour, n'avait plus d'intÃ©rÃ©t propre Ã justifier leur maintien . - . . . -La seule question qui se posait au regard de cette lÃ©gislation (l'ordonnance de 1978) Ã©tait celle de savoir si le requÃ©rant (c'est-Ã -dire le conseil) avait Ã©tabli que les servitudes Ã©taienl tombÃ©es en dÃ©suÃ©tude . Le tribunal estima que le conseil en avait apportÃ© la preuve et dÃ©cida de faire droit Ã la demande et de lever les servitudes . Sur la question d'une Ã©valuation correcte de l'indemnitÃ©, le tribunal dÃ©clara qu'en vertu de l'article 5 par . 6 (b) (i) de l'ordonnance de 1978, il ne pouvait pas y avoir de perte pour le propriÃ©taire puisque . selon les Ã©lÃ©ments produits, il ne s'agissait pas du droit d'un propriÃ©taire occupam mais de celui d'un receveur de loyers . Les reprÃ©sentants de la requÃ©rame firent valoir que l'indemnisation devait reflÃ©ter la somme dont les parties seraient convenues pour renoncer aux servitudes dans des circonstances analogues et avant le vote de l'ordonnance de 1978 . Ils calculÃ¨rent ce chiffre Ã panir de la diffÃ©rence entre les valeurs du terrain grevÃ© et du terrain libre de servitudes et estimÃ¨rent cette derniÃ¨re valeur en fonction des prix des lotissements . Le tribunal estima qu'en rÃ©alitÃ©, la faible possibilitÃ© de voir le terrain utilisÃ© pour un lotissement n'en affectait pas la valeur marchande . Dans son jugement, il ne dit pas expressÃ©ment que la mÃ©thode de calcul de l'indemnisation proposÃ©e par la requÃ©rante est inappropriÃ©e mais le ton qu'il emploie le donne Ã penser . EnrÃ©alitÃ©, le tribunal suivit le mode de calcul proposÃ© par le conseil . 11 accepta les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve nori controversÃ©s offens par le conseil selon lesquels, Ã l'Ã©po- . que de l'octroi du bail Ã ferme en 1953, la valeur du terrain libre Ã©tait la mÃ©me que celle du terrain grevÃ© de servitudes . 11 fut Ã©galement Ã©tabli que le loyer du fermage Ã©tait un loyer complet . Le tribunal estima cependant que le prix du marchÃ© aurait en rÃ©alitÃ© contponÃ© une plus-value si le terrain n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© grevÃ© de telles servitudes . Mais comme il avait Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli que le loyer rÃ©el rÃ©servÃ© Ã©tait un loyer de plein fermage, le montant de cette plus-value aurait Ã©tÃ© relativement faible . Le tribunal l'Ã©valua Ã 350 livres el dÃ©cida d'accorder cette somme Ã la requÃ©rante Ã titre d'indemnisation . La requÃ©rante demanda conseil Ã un avocat sur un Ã©ventuel appel . L'avocat estima qu'un appel n'avait guÃ¨re de chance de rÃ©ussir car le tribunal disposait de nombreux Ã©lÃ©ments lui permettant de conclure que les servitudes Ã©taient dÃ©raisonnables . Sur la question du montant de l'indemnisation, l'avocat estima que la mÃ©thode de calcul proposÃ©e-au tribunal par la requÃ©rante ne pouvait pas trouver fondement dans l'ordonnance de 1978 dont l'unique objectif Ã©tait d'Ã©viter que les propriÃ©taires exigent de pareilles sommes pour lever les servitudes . Il Ã©tait entiÃ¨rement d'accord avec le tribunal foncier qui dÃ©clarait dans sa dÃ©cision que la requÃ©rante ne pouvai t 236
pas prouver avoir subi une â¢perte ou un handicapâ¢ suite Ã la levÃ©e de la servitude . A son avis, l'indemnisation accordÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 5 par . 6 (b) (i) Ã©tait tout simplement gÃ©nÃ©reuse pour la requÃ©rante . La requÃ©rante n'introduisit pas d'appel contre la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier .
GRIEFS Article 1 du Protocole additionne l La requÃ©rante se plaint de ce que la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier portant levÃ©e des servitudesjouant Ã son profit a constituÃ© une atteinte au respect de ses biens . Elle fait valoir que cette dÃ©possession n'Ã©tait pas d'utilitÃ© publique et n'a pas eu lieu dans les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi puisqu'elle Ã©tait une lÃ©gitimation a posteriori des violations des clauses de servitude . Elle prÃ©tend en outre que la dÃ©possession n'Ã©tait pas conforme aux principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international puisqu'une indentnisation rapide, adÃ©quate et effective ne lui a pas Ã©tÃ© versÃ©e . La requÃ©rante se plaint en outre de ce que l'ordonnance de 1978 lui a effectivement Ã´tÃ© le droit soit de chercher Ã faire lever l'octroi de servitudes pour violation des clauses y affÃ©rentes, soit de nÃ©gocier avec le conseil une indemnisation pour sa renonciation aux clauses, indemnisation qui aurait pu atteindre la nioitiÃ© de la valeur de lotissement du terrain . Selon elle, il s'agit lÃ d'une privation abusive de son droit de propriÃ©iÃ© sans indemnisation, d'oÃ¹ une violation de l'article I du Protocole additionnel .
EN DROIT (Extrait ) I . Aux ternies de l'article 26, la Commission est tenue d'examiner si, dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce, la requÃ©rante a Ã©puisÃ© toutes les voies de recours internes avant d'introduire sa requ@te . En effet, l'intÃ©ressÃ©e ne s'est pas pourvue en appel contre la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier annulant les clauses de servitude alors qu'une procÃ©dure d'appel lui Ã©tait offerte si elle avait choisi de s'en prÃ©valoir . La Comntission rappelle sa dÃ©cision antÃ©rieure selon laquelle- pour se conformer aux exigences de l'article 26, un requÃ©rant est tenu de faire un Â« usage normal Â» des recours â¢vraisentblablement efficaces et suffisantsâ¢ pour porter remÃ¨de Ã ces griefs (Voir par exemple Donnelly et autres c/Royaume-Uni, Nos 5577-5583/72, dÃ©c . 15 .12 .75, D .R . 4 p . 4 Ã la page 151) . De plus, la Commission a toujours considÃ©rÃ© qu'un simple doute sur les chances de succÃ¨s d'un recours donnÃ© ne constitue point une circonstance particuliÃ¨re dispensant un requÃ©rant de l'exercer (ibid . p . 159) . La Cour a Ã©galemenl dÃ©clarÃ© dans les affaires de vagabondage (Cour Eur . D .H ., arrÃ¨t De Wilde, Ooms et Versyp du 18 juin 1979, sÃ©rie A nÂ° 13, p . 13, par . 62) que les requÃ©rants ne sont pas tenus de faire usage de recours qui, Â« selon l'opinio communis â¢ existant Ã l'Ã©poque ne sont pas de nature Ã parer Ã leurs griefs .
En l'espÃ¨ce, la requÃ©rante pouvait se pourvoir contre la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier en ce qui concerne sa lÃ©galitÃ© . Elle n'a cependant pas contestÃ© la rÃ©gularitÃ© de la dÃ©cision, son avocat lui ayant nettement dit que le tribunal avait correctement appliquÃ© la loi et que la dÃ©cision Ã©tait aussi favorable que possible . La requÃ©rante se plaint en fait de ce que, vu les circonstances, les clauses de servitudes n'auraient pas dÃ» Ã©tre annulÃ©es, autrement dit que les faits ne justifiaient pas la dÃ©cision rendue . Elle ne dit pas que cette dÃ©cision a Ã©tÃ© prise suite Ã une mauvaise application de la loi aux faits . La requÃ©rante fait valoir Ã©galement que le pouvoir, prÃ©vu par l'ordonnance de 1978, de supprimer les clauses parce que concernant des servitudes dÃ©suÃ¨tes ne devrait pas exister . Les griefs formulÃ©s par la requÃ©rante reviennent Ã contester d'une pari la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier sur une question de fait et, d'autre part, la lÃ©gislation ellemÃªme . La Commission reconnaÃ®t que la possibilitÃ© de faire appel de la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier n'est pas un recours efficace et adÃ©quat pour ce genre de grief et que la requÃ©rante avait dÃ¨s lors satisfait aux exigences de l'article 26 sur l'Ã©puisement des recours intemes . Sa requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e dans les six mois suivant la dÃ©cision finale du tribunal foncier dont elle se plaint . Il s'ensuit que la requÃ©te ne saurait Ãªtre rejetÃ©e au sens de l'article 27 par . 3 de la Convention . 2 . La requÃ©rante se plaint de ce que la suppression des clauses de servitude qui jouaient en sa faveur et la suppression du droit de nÃ©gocier une indemnitÃ© de renonciation aux clauses ou de rÃ©clamer la levÃ©e de leur octroi en raison de leur violation (toutes deux, selon elle, consÃ©quences pratiques de l'ordonnance de 1978) Ã©taient contraires Ã l'article I du Protocole additionnel, ainsi libellÃ© : Â«Toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens . Nul ne peut Ã©tre privÃ© de sa propriÃ©tÃ© que pour cause d'utilitÃ© publique et dans les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi et les principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international . Les dispositions prÃ©cÃ©dentes ne portent pas atteinte au droit que possÃ¨dent les Etats de mettre en vigueur les lois qu'ils jugent nÃ©cessaires pour rÃ©glementer l'usage des biens conformÃ©ment Ã l'intÃ©rÃªt gÃ©nÃ©ral ou pour assurer le paiement des . impÃ´ts ou d'autres contributions ou des amendes . â¢ Dans l'arrÃ©t qu'elle a rendu dans l'affaire Sporrong et Ltinnroth, la Cour a fait remarquer que l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel contient Â«trois normes distinctes â¢ . La premiÃ¨re est â¢ d'ordre gÃ©nÃ©ral . et Ã©nonce le principe du â¢ respect de la propriÃ©tÃ© . . La deuxiÃ¨me .vise la privation de propriÃ©tÃ© et la soumet Ã certaines conditionsÂ» . La troisiÃ¨me conceme le pouvoir de rÃ©glementer l'usage des biens (Cour Eur . D .H ., arrÃ©t Sporrong et Ldnnroth du 23 septembre 1982, sÃ©rie A, nÂ° 52, par . 61) .
La nature de ces trois rÃ¨gles a Ã©tÃ© de nouveau examinÃ©e par la Commission dans le rapport qu'elle a adoptÃ© le 7 mars 1984 sur les affaires de nationalisation, Sir William Lithgow et autres contre Royaume-Uni, oÃ¹ elle observait : â¢que les trois normes visÃ©es par la Cour ne sont pas totalement distinctes ou Ã©tanches . La premiÃ¨re norme 'gÃ©nÃ©rale' contient une garantie gÃ©nÃ©rale du droit de propriÃ©tÃ© . Celle-ci est ensuite qualifiÃ©e ou limitÃ©e par les deuxiÃ¨me et troisiÃ¨me normes . Il faut interprÃ©ter ces derniÃ¨res dans leur contexte Ã la lumiÃ¨re de la garantie gÃ©nÃ©rale contenue dans la premiÃ¨re phraseÂ» (Cour Eur . D .H ., sÃ©rie A nÂ° 102, p . 89, par . 351) . La requÃ©rantejouit sur le terrain en question d'un droit qui se limite au bÃ©nÃ©fice des clauses de servitude figurant dans la concession Ã ferme transmissible et du droit d'en encaisser le loyer annuel auprÃ¨s du conseil en sa qualitÃ© de concessionnaire . La premiÃ¨re phrase de l'article I du Protocole additionnel garantit Ã la requÃ©rante le droit au respect de ce droit limitÃ© qu'elle a sur le terrain et qui est un bien . La dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier dont elle se plaint a supprimÃ© deux clauses de servitude, privant ainsi la requÃ©rante de leur bÃ©nÃ©fice . Dans cette mesure, il y a bien eu atteinte au droit au respect de son droit sur le terrain et cette atteinte doit Ãªtre examinÃ©e Ã la lumi8re de l'article I du Protocole additionnel . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier a supprimÃ© les deux clauses de servitude, elle a diminuÃ© d'autant le droit de la requÃ©rante sur le terrain . La Commission relÃ¨ve cependant que la dÃ©cision n'a pas touchÃ© au reste des droits de la requÃ©rante . Celle-ci a toujours le droit d'encaisser un loyer dont la valeur n'a pas Ã©tÃ© modifiÃ©e par la suppression des clauses de servitude, et elle bÃ©nÃ©ficie toujours des autres clauses restrictives non supprimÃ©es . La Commission estime dÃ¨s lors que la requÃ©rante n'a pas Ã©tÃ© privÃ©e de ses biens au sens du premier alinÃ©a de l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel .
Cependant, la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier de supprimer les clauses de servitude a modifiÃ© le droit de regard que peut exercer la requÃ©rante sur le terrain . Il faut dÃ©s lors l'examiner au regard du deuxiÃ¨me alinÃ©a de l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel . Aux termes de cette disposition, le contrÃ´le par la Commision de la nÃ©cessitÃ© d'une mesure de rÃ©glementation est limitÃ© mais rÃ©el . Ce contrÃ´le de principe consiste Ã examiner le caractÃ¨re proportionnÃ© d'une certaine mesure de rÃ©glemenation par rapport au but visÃ© . C'est ainsi qu'une mesure de rÃ©glementation tout Ã fait disproportionnÃ©e ne remplira pas la condition de respect des biens Ã©noncÃ©e Ã la premiÃ¨re phrase de cet article et qui sous-tend l'interprÃ©tation de l'ensemble de la disposition . Le but de l'article 5 de l'ordonnance de 1978 est d'Ã©viter d'obÃ©rer en perrnanence un terrain par des servitudes dÃ©suÃ¨tes, telles que l'Ã©taient les clauses restrictives en l'espÃ¨ce . Pour atteindre ce but, le tribunal foncier est habilitÃ© par l'ordonnance de 1978 Ã annuler ou modifier toute servitude de ce genre, sur demande de toute personne ayant un droit sur le terrain en question . Le tribunal peut ainsi en dÃ©cider s'il est convaincu que cette servitude Â«entrave de maniÃ¨re dÃ©raisonnable l a
jouissance du terrain ou le ferait si elle n'est pas modifiÃ©e ou levÃ©e . . La Commission . estime que ce pouvoir permet au tribunal foncier de lever dans certains cas les servitudes dÃ©raisonnables pesant sur un terrain et de permeure, ainsi son utilisation constructive lorsque cela est souhaitable . DÃ¨s lors, ce pouvoir est conforme Ã - l'intÃ©rÃ¨t gÃ©nÃ©ral- au sens de l'article I du Protocole additionnel . Quant au caractÃ¨re proportionnÃ© dÃ© la dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier par rapport Ã cet objectif lÃ©gitime, la Commission relÃ¨ve que la requÃ©rante n'a pas contestÃ© la constatation des faits par le tribunal foncier . Ce dernier a constatÃ© qu'il n'y avait plus aucun intÃ©rÃ©t Ã utiliser le terrain pour Â«des activitÃ©s sportives, rÃ©crÃ©atives ou sociales - comme l'exigeaient les clauses de servitude . L'amÃ©nagement du terrain Ã des fins contmerciales n'Ã©tait rien de plus Â«qu'une simple Ã©ventualitÃ© ou espÃ©ranceÂ» (dÃ©cision du tribunal foncier en date du 29 avril 1983, page 5) . En revanche, l'utilisation envisagÃ©e du terrain pour une nouvelle Ã©cole Ã©tait une rÃ©alitÃ© et les autorisations d'urbanisme ayant Ã©tÃ© donnÃ©es Ã cet effet, l'affectÃ tion future du terrain semblait Ãªtre assurÃ©e en ce sens . La Commission relÃ¨ve Ã cet Ã©gard que la procÃ©dure de demande d'amÃ©nagement et l'exigence d'une autorisation d'urbanisme ont en pratique remplacÃ© l'utilitÃ© de clauses de servitude comme celles qui sont enjeu en l'espÃ¨ce . Cela Ã©tant, le tribunal foncier a estintÃ© que lesdites clauses avaient un caractÃ¨re dÃ©suet et en a ordonnÃ© la suppression . AprÃ¨s avoir entendu les parties . le tribunal a estimÃ© qu'Ã l'Ã©poque de la concession initiale, le prix du marchÃ© aurait comportÃ© une petite plus-value si le terrain avait Ã©tÃ© libre de toute servitude . On peut donc dire que la requÃ©rante avait subi une perte financiÃ¨re Ã©galÃ© au montant de cette petite plus-value . Le tribunal lui a accordÃ© en consÃ©quence une indeninitÃ© de 350 E pour la perte du bÃ©nÃ©fice des clauses d . ' . esrvitud ' Il est clair dÃ¨s lors que le tribunal foncier avait pour tÃ che de mettre en balance les intÃ©rÃªts antagonistes des parties . La Commission estime que la rÃ©glementation pratiquÃ©e par le tribunal foncier Ã©tait â¢conforme Ã l'intÃ©rÃ©t gÃ©nÃ©ralÂ» et que la suppression des clauses de servitude contre paientent d'une indemnisation n'Ã©tait pas disproportionnÃ©e au but lÃ©gitime consistant Ã assurer l'usage le plus efficace du terrain au profit de la collectivitÃ© . La requÃ©rante prÃ©tend en outre qu'en permettant unilatÃ©ralement au conseil d e demander la suppression des clauses de servitude, l'ordonnance de 1978 a effectivement supprimÃ© son droit de nÃ©gocier une indemnitÃ© pour cette renonciation aux clauses ou, Ã titre subsidiaire, de dentander la dÃ©chÃ©ance de la clause en raison de sa violation . Elle a fait valoir qu'elle aurait pu percevoir une indemnitÃ© Ã©gale Ã la moitiÃ© de la valeur de lotissement du terrain et que la privation de cette possibilitÃ© est contraire Ã l'article I du Protocole additionnel . La Commission reconnait que l'ordonnance de 1978 a supprimÃ© pour le bÃ©nÃ©ficiaire d'une servitude fonciÃ¨re dÃ©suÃ¨te la possibilitÃ© de nÃ©gocier qu'avait la requÃ©rante . Tel Ã©tait cependant le but dÃ©clarÃ© de la lÃ©gislation - empÃªcher le s 240
propriÃ©taires de s'assurer des sommes importantes contre renonciation Ã des clauses restrictives dÃ©suÃ¨tes . Cependant, la compÃ©tence du tribunal foncier - tribunal Ã premiÃ¨re vue conforme Ã l'anicle 6 - de trancher les litiges concernant l'applicabilitÃ© de ce pouvoir gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ©vu par l'ordonnance de 1978 Ã un ensemble de circonstances donnÃ©es, signifie que la lÃ©gislation n'a pas fait que supprimer le pouvoir de nÃ©gocier . Elle a, au contraire, fourni le moyen de rÃ©soudre des conflits qui, faute de nÃ©gociation, menaceraient de retarder la mise en valeur du terrain, ce qui serait contraire Ã l'intÃ©r@t gÃ©nÃ©ral . Il semble au surplus que la requÃ©rante n'a pas rÃ©clamÃ© la dÃ©chÃ©ance de la servitude suite au premier amÃ©nagement du terrain par le conseil et qu'elle a continuÃ© a en percevoir le loyer . Dans ces conditions, il semble que la requÃ©rante aurait pu renoncer au droit de rÃ©clamer la dÃ©chÃ©ance de la servitude avant la demande adressÃ©e par le conseil conformÃ©ment Ã l'ordonnance de 1978 . Cela Ã©tant et la requÃ©rante ayant pu rÃ©clamer et se voir accorder une indemnisation, il s'ensuit que la requÃ©te est, sur ce point, manifestement nial fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention .
241Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 13/12/1984Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page