Source: http://fl.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190828_0002770.MFL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-01-20 02:42:18
Document Index: 642513736

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3729', '§ 3730', '§ 3730', '§ 3730', '§ 3730', '§ 3730', '§ 3730']

FindACase™ | United States ex rel. Higgins v. Healthsouth Corp.
United States ex rel. Higgins v. Healthsouth Corp.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. MELISSA HIGGINS, Plaintiffs,
HEALTHSOUTH CORPORATION, Defendant.
VIRGINIA M . HERNANDEZ COVINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This cause comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant HealthSouth Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 104), filed on July 30, 2019. Plaintiff Melissa Higgins filed a response in opposition (Doc. # 113) on August 13, 2019. HealthSouth filed a reply in support of its Motion (Doc. # 122) on August 23, 2019. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is granted.
In her Amended Complaint, Higgins alleges that her former employer, HealthSouth, defrauded the United States by generating improper fees and fraudulent billings to Medicare, Medicaid, and other public and private health insurers. (Doc. # 88 at ¶¶ 2, 30, 87-164, 194). She alleges that HealthSouth defrauded the government by knowingly admitting and readmitting patients to its inpatient rehabilitation facilities that did not meet certain federal criteria and then billing the government for unnecessary services provided to those patients. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 13-24, 100-64).
According to the Amended Complaint, Higgins formerly worked for HealthSouth as the local and regional Director of Therapy Operations in Arlington, Texas. (Id. at ¶¶ 165-68). When she raised concerns regarding the alleged fraudulent billing practices within the corporation, she was stripped of her responsibilities and then forced to resign in 2011. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-34, 172-86).
In July 2012, Higgins filed the instant qui tam action against HealthSouth, raising several claims on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., and a retaliation claim under the FCA pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). (Doc. # 2 at ¶¶ 161-75).
On April 1, 2019, the United States notified the Court that it would not be intervening in the case at that time. (Doc. # 73). Accordingly, the Court lifted the seal from the Complaint and directed that it be served upon HealthSouth. (Doc. # 74).
On June 24, 2019, the United States notified the Court that it would intervene in this action for the purposes of settlement. (Doc. # 81). Following the parties' filing of a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, this Court dismissed Higgins's federal qui tam claims with prejudice, but it retained jurisdiction to resolve Higgins's claim for retaliation under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), as well as any claims for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). (Doc. # 87).
Higgins thereafter filed her Amended Complaint, in which she raises two claims - a retaliation claim under the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (Count I), and a claim for attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) and (h) (Count II). (Doc. # 88 at ¶¶ 198-207). In addition, Higgins filed a motion for attorneys' fees, seeking attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). (Doc. # 89). That motion is currently pending.
HealthSouth now moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Count I and those portions of Count II that relate to the retaliation claim in Count I. (Doc. # 104 at 1). According to HealthSouth, Higgins's claims are barred by the waiver and release contained in the Severance Agreement she signed in connection with the termination of her employment. HealthSouth appended a copy of the Severance Agreement to its Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. # 104-1). Higgins responded, and HealthSouth replied. (Doc. ## 113, 122). The Motion is now ripe for review.
When considering a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). However, the Supreme Court explains that:
Generally, if matters outside the pleadings are presented as part of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). There is, however, an exception to this rule. “In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.” SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A] document central to the complaint that the defense appends to its motion to dismiss is also properly considered, provided that its contents are not in dispute.”).
Similarly, although the existence of an affirmative defense usually will not support a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court may dismiss a complaint when the complaint's “own allegations indicate the existence of an affirmative defense, so long as the defense clearly appears on the face of the complaint.” Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1984)); see also Banco Popular N. Am. v. M/V Triple Play, No. 12-20188-CIV-GRAHAM, 2012 WL 12885237, at 82 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2012) (explaining that waiver is typically an affirmative defense that may be raised in a motion to dismiss only if it is apparent on the face of the complaint).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As a preliminary matter, the parties do not dispute that the Severance Agreement is central to the plaintiff&#39;s claim and is authentic. See SFM Holdings, 600 F.3d at 1337. Accordingly, the Court will consider ...