Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/997/1076/382116/
Timestamp: 2020-05-29 05:15:21
Document Index: 550422617

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5313', '§ 1956', '§ 1956', '§ 1956', '§ 1956', '§ 1956', '§ 1956', '§ 5322', '§ 371', '§ 5322', '§ 1956', '§ 371', '§ 5322', '§ 371', '§ 1956', '§ 1956', '§ 1961']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Roosevelt Winfield, A/k/a Jihad A. Muhammed, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Luvenia H. Winfield, Defendant-appellant, 997 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1993 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Roosevelt Winfield, A/k/a Jihad A. Muhammed, Defend...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Roosevelt Winfield, A/k/a Jihad A. Muhammed, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Luvenia H. Winfield, Defendant-appellant, 997 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 997 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1993) Argued March 4, 1993. Decided June 29, 1993
John Blanton Farmer, Thompson & McMullan, P.C., Richmond, VA, argued, for appellant Roosevelt Winfield.
* Luvenia Winfield, Roosevelt Winfield, and most of their immediate family were heavily involved in selling illegal drugs in Petersburg, Virginia. Their sales generated large amounts of cash. For example, the Winfield family reported taxable income of $46,904 between 1987 and 1989, while Luvenia was officially unemployed. During that same period they spent approximately $408,673. Much of this money, according to the government's evidence, was laundered by purchasing real estate through intermediaries in financial transactions structured to avoid the CTR requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a).1
Garland Harrison, Mary McDaniel, and James Bruce Winfield pleaded guilty, and Roscoe Eubanks was acquitted. The court denied Luvenia's and Roosevelt's motions for judgment of acquittal. Thereafter, the jury convicted Luvenia of all charges against her and convicted Roosevelt on the Count One conspiracy charge. On appeal, Roosevelt and Luvenia challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on their conspiracy convictions under Count One. Luvenia also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on her money laundering convictions under Counts Eight, Nine, Fifteen, and Sixteen. We affirm Luvenia's convictions on all counts and reverse Roosevelt's conviction on Count One.II
We first review Luvenia's sufficiency challenges to her convictions on Counts Eight, Nine, Fifteen, and Sixteen for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956,2 and, of course, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
Counts Eight and Nine alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 in connection with the purchase of 1409 Farmer Street. Count Eight charged that Luvenia, along with James Bruce Winfield and Roscoe Eubanks, purchased that property with proceeds from drug sales and with the intent to promote an illegal activity (drug distribution), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). Count Nine charged that the purchase was designed to conceal the illegal drug proceeds in violation of § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i).3
Luvenia concedes that the prosecution proved by overwhelming evidence that she sold illegal drugs and derived substantial income from these sales.4 She contends, however, that she cannot be convicted of money laundering in relation to 1409 Farmer Street because the evidence showed that she was not involved in the purchase of that property.
Luvenia also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts Fifteen and Sixteen for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) and 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) by the purchase of the house at 1361/63 Rome Street. She likewise attacks these convictions on grounds that the evidence did not connect her to the transaction.
(Luvenia and Roosevelt)
Count One alleged that the defendants conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1) (B) (i), 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), and 1957, relating to laundering money; and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 and 5324, relating to the reporting requirements. Entitled "18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Defraud,"5 it accused the defendants (including Luvenia and Roosevelt) of conspiring
with each other to commit an offense against the United States, that is, [they] ... conspir [ed] ... to conduct and attempt to conduct financial transactions, well knowing that the property involved in the said financial transactions represented the proceeds of unlawful activity ...
A. which financial transactions involved proceeds of the specified unlawful activity knowing that the transactions were designed in whole and in part to conceal and disguise the nature, source, ownership, location, and control of the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a) (1) (B) (i),
B. to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate commerce, which financial transactions involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, with the intent to promote the carrying on of an unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i),C. to engage in monetary transactions affecting interstate commerce in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000, the currency being the proceeds from a specified unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957, [and]
It went on to instruct that the defendants were charged with conspiring to interfere with the IRS's gathering of "data and reports concerning currency transactions at banks in excess of ten thousand dollars" in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 and 5324. Absent were jury instructions concerning a conspiracy to violate the involved money laundering statutes--18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1) (B) (i), 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), and 1957.6 The court's only discussion of money laundering was a passing reference to the money laundering theory in its instruction on the burdens of proof and in its preface to the instructions on the substantive counts.7 Even read as a whole, the instructions do not inform the jury of the elements of conspiracy to violate the laundering statutes in sufficient detail for the jury to understand the requirement for convictions. See Wells v. Murray, 831 F.2d 468, 477 (4th Cir. 1987).
In view of this and because convictions based on theories not submitted to the jury cannot stand, McCormick v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 8, 111 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 n. 8, 114 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1991), the only issue we review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the defendants' convictions on the theory that they conspired to defraud the United States by conspiring to obstruct the filing of CTR's in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 and 5324.8 See United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir. 1988) (appellate court can affirm a conviction only if it can say "with a high degree of probability that the jury did not rely on the legally incorrect theory") (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906, 109 S. Ct. 3190, 105 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1989); United States v. Conover, 845 F.2d 266, 268 (11th Cir. 1988) (declining to decide the sufficiency of the evidence on a theory in the indictment on which the jury had not been instructed).
The elements of the crime of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 are: (1) the existence of an agreement, (2) an overt act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the objectives, and (3) intent to agree to defraud the United States. United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1446 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 938, 107 S. Ct. 1585, 94 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1987). In addition, to be convicted of conspiring to structure transactions to avoid the CTR requirements, a party must have "knowledge of the reporting requirements and act [ ] to avoid them." United States v. Wollman, 945 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 108 S. Ct. 357, 98 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1987). Knowledge may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. See United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232, 238 (4th Cir. 1992).
The evidence, viewed most favorably to the government, certainly established that Roosevelt and Luvenia were involved in a conspiracy to sell drugs--but they were not indicted for this offense. The evidence offered to prove a conspiracy by Roosevelt and Luvenia to violate the CTR requirements presents a closer question and, in our view, compels differing results. We think the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support Luvenia's conspiracy conviction but insufficient to sustain Roosevelt's conviction.
The prosecution's evidence of a conspiracy to obstruct the CTR requirements revolves around real estate transactions in Petersburg, Virginia. Garland Harrison, an indicted co-conspirator who pleaded guilty to one count of money laundering, testified that he received money from Luvenia to purchase several different properties in Petersburg. To buy property at 2215 Ferndale Street, she gave Harrison $42,000 in several payments. He placed the property in his name and set up a fictitious lease to her. Luvenia's initial payment to Harrison of $13,000 caused the issuance of a CTR when Harrison deposited the money into his account. Thereafter, Luvenia gave Harrison cash payments of $10,000 or less, Harrison funneled the payments through his nephew's "produce center" (a grocery enterprise then exempt from CTR requirements), and no CTR's issued.9 From these circumstances alone, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Harrison and Luvenia had knowledge of the CTR requirements, agreed to avoid them, and acted to avoid them.
Other real estate transactions, conducted in the same fashion, are corroborative. For property located at 103/105 Indiana Lane, Harrison testified that he received a total of $58,500 in incremental cash payments from Luvenia. Among those payments was $15,000 cash received on September 1, 1987, of which Harrison exchanged $9,000 for a produce center check on September 3, 1987. Harrison also converted $10,500 cash into a produce center check and deposited it into his account.10 As he had done with the property at 2215 Ferndale Street, Harrison titled the property at 103/105 Indiana Lane in his name and set up a fictitious lease from himself to Luvenia. Harrison further testified that he received $60,000 in payments from Luvenia to purchase a convenience store at 1102/04 Farmer Street. Some of these cash payments he converted into produce center checks. For instance, the government's evidence showed that Harrison received $14,400 cash and converted it into two produce center checks for $7,400 and $7,000. Valarie Randall, who sold the property, testified that Luvenia took over the convenience store operation on the day of the closing. Finally, Harrison's testimony connected Luvenia to the purchase of property at 1409 Farmer Street. As part of that transaction, her son, James Bruce Winfield, gave Roscoe Eubanks $10,000, broken down into two checks for $5,000.
The relevant regulation, 31 CFR 103.22(a) (1), provides:
Both of these provisions require the government to prove the defendant's knowledge that the funds involved in the transaction were proceeds of illegal activity. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 1991). In addition, to obtain a money laundering conviction under § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), the government must prove that the defendant intended to promote the carrying on of "specified unlawful activity," which includes drug distribution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7) (A) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (D)). Section 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) requires proof "that the transaction was designed to conceal the nature of the proceeds" from the illegal activity. United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1331, 122 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1993). Luvenia does not appear to contest these elements of proof on appeal. Rather, she contests her alleged connection to the 1409 Farmer Street transaction
Much evidence (including her own testimony) showed that Luvenia obtained money from the drug distribution. In addition to testimony that she was in charge of a drug sales business, the evidence showed her dominance over her family and control of drug acquisition and distribution
In instructing the jury, the court primarily adopted the government's proposed instructions
Later, while instructing on the substantive counts, the court explained the money laundering violations. It prefaced its instructions on the substantive counts by stating, "Now, counts--let's get to the laundering transaction, because it is all wound up into the laundering of money."
(a) A person willfully violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter ... shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(b) A person willfully violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter ... while violating another law of the United States or as part of a pattern of any illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period, shall be fined not more than $500,000, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both....
$4,000--February 24, 1987
$10,000--February 28, 1987
$4,000--March 5, 1987
$6,000--March 25, 1987
$1,000--April 1, 1987
$1,000--April 10, 1987
$1,000--April 22, 1987
$2,000--April 30, 1987.
Harrison's records showed that Luvenia made cash payments to him for 103/105 Indiana Lane in amounts of $10,000, $4,000, $5,000, $15,000, $10,000, $5,000, $4,000, $2,000, $500, and $3,000