Source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Harisiades_v._Shaughnessy_&_Mascitti/Opinion_of_the_Court
Timestamp: 2020-02-24 16:10:19
Document Index: 618752919

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 12', '§ 1011', '§ 1011', '§ 732', '§ 732', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 738', '§ 738', '§ 2', '§ 202', '§ 202', '§ 3', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 4', '§ 454', '§ 454', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 210', '§ 210', '§ 155', '§ 155', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 4', '§ 137']

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Harisiades v. Shaughnessy & Mascitti/Opinion of the Court
< Harisiades v. Shaughnessy & Mascitti
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy & Mascitti
907305Harisiades v. Shaughnessy & Mascitti — Opinion of the Court
Argued: Dec. 5, 1951. --- Decided: March 10, 1952
The ultimate question in these three cases is whether the United States constitutionally may deport a legally resident alien because of membership in the Communist Party which terminated before enactment of the Alien Registration Act, 1940. [1]
Harisiades, a Greek national, accompanied his father to the United States in 1916, when thirteen years of age, and has resided here since. He has taken a wife and sired two children, all citizens. He joined the Communist Party in 1925, when it was known as the Workers Party, and served as an organizer, Branch Executive Committeman, secretary of its Greek Bureau, and editor of its paper 'Empros.' The party discontinued his membership, along with that of other aliens, in 1939, but he has continued association with members. He was familiar with the principles and philosophy of the Communist Party and says he still believes in them. He disclaims personal belief in use of force and violence and asserts that the party favored their use only in defense. A warrant for his deportation because of his membership was issued in 1930 but was not served until 1946. The delay was due to inability to locate him because of his use of a number of aliases. After hearings, he was ordered deported on the grounds that after entry he had been a member of an organization which advocates overthrow of the Government by force and violence and distributes printed matter so advocating. He sought release by habeas corpus, which was denied by the District Court. [2] The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. [3]
Validity of the hearing procedures is questioned for noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, which we think is here inapplicable. [4] Admittedly, each of these deportations is authorized and required by the letter, spirit and intention of the statute. But the Act is assailed on three grounds: (1) that it deprives the aliens of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (2) that it abridges their freedoms of speech and assembly in contravention of the First Amendment; and (3) that it is an ex post facto law which Congress is forbidden to pass by Art. I, § 9, cl. 3 of the Constitution.
For over thirty years each of these aliens has enjoyed such advantages as accrue from residence here without renouncing his foreign allegiance or formally acknowledging adherence to the Constitution he now invokes. Each was admitted to the United States, upon passing formidable exclusionary hurdles, in the hope that, after what may be called a probationary period, he would desire and be found desirable for citizenship. Each has been offered naturalization, with all of the rights and privileges of citizenship, conditioned only upon open and honest assumption of undivided allegiance to our government. [5] But acceptance was and is not compulsory. Each has been permitted to prolong his original nationality indefinitely.
So long as one thus perpetuates a dual status as an American inhabitant but foreign citizen, he may derive advantages from two sources of law-American and international. He may claim protection against our Government unavailable to the citizen. As an alien he retains a claim upon the state of his citizenship to diplomatic intervention on his behalf, a patronage often of considerable value. The state of origin of each of these aliens could presently enter diplomatic remonstrance against these deportations if they were inconsistent with international law, the prevailing custom among nations or their own practices.
The alien retains immunities from burdens which the citizen must shoulder. By withholding his allegiance from the United States, he leaves outstanding a foreign call on his loyalties which international law not only permits our Government to recognize but commands it to respect. In deference to it certain dispensations from conscription for any military service have been granted foreign nationals. [6] They cannot, consistently with our international commitments, be compelled 'to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country.' [7] In addition to such general immunities they may enjoy particular treaty privileges. [8]
Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal footing with citizens, [9] but in others has never been conceded legal parity with the citizen. [10] Most importantly, to protract this ambiguous status within the country is not his right but is a matter of permission and tolerance. The Government's power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court since the question first arose. [11]
War, of course, is the most usual occasion for extensive resort to the power. Though the resident alien may be personally loyal to the United States, if his nation becomes our enemy his allegiance prevails over his personal preference and makes him also our enemy, liable to expulsion or internment, [12] and his property becomes subject to seizure and perhaps confiscation. [13] But it does not require war to bring the power of deportation into existence or to authorize its exercise. Congressional apprehension of foreign or internal dangers short of war may lead to its use. So long as the alien elects to continue the ambiguity of his allegiance his domicile here is held by a precarious tenure.
That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign state. [14] Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien and we leave the law on the subject as we find it.
This brings us to the alternative defense under the Due Process Clause-that, granting the power, it is so unreasonably and harshly exercised by this enactment that it should be held unconstitutional.
In historical context the Act before us stands out as an extreme application of the expulsion power. There is no denying that as world convulsions have driven us toward a closed society the expulsion power has been exercised with increasing severity, manifest in multiplication of grounds for deportation, in expanding the subject classes from illegal entrants to legal residents, and in greatly lengthening the period of residence after which one may be expelled. [15] This is said to have reached a point where it is the duty of this Court to call a halt upon the political branches of the Government.
It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. [16]
We are urged, because the policy inflicts severe and undoubted hardship on affected individuals, to find a restraint in the Due Process Clause. But the Due Process Clause does not shield the citizen from conscription and the consequent calamity of being separated from family, friends, home and business while he is transported to foreign lands to stem the tide of Communism. If Communist aggression creates such hardships for loyal citizens, it is hard to find justification for holding that the Constitution requires that its hardships must be spared the Communist alien. When citizens raised the Constitution as a shield against expulsion from their homes and places of business, the Court refused to find hardship a cause for judicial intervention. [17]
Our Constitution sought to leave no excuse for violent attack on the status quo by providing a legal alternative-attack by ballot. To arm all men for orderly change, the Constitution put in their hands a right to influence the electorate by press, speech and assembly. This means freedom to advocate or promote Communism by means of the ballot box, but it does not include the practice or incitement of violence. [18]
True, it often is difficult to determine whether ambiguous speech is advocacy of political methods or subtly shades into a methodical but prudent incitement to violence. Communist Governments avoid the inquiry by suppressing everything distasteful. Some would have us avoid the difficulty by going to the opposite extreme of permitting incitement to violent overthrow at least unless it seems certain to succeed immediately. We apprehend that the Constitution enjoins upon us the duty, however difficult, of distinguishing between the two. Different formulae have been applied in different situations and the test applicable to the Communist Party has been stated too recently to make further discussion at this time profitable. [19] We think the First Amendment does not prevent the deportation of these aliens.
In 1939, this Court decided Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 59 S.Ct. 694, 83 L.Ed. 1082, in which it was held that Congress, in the statute as it then stood, had not clearly expressed an intent that Communist Party membership remained cause for deportation after it ceased. [20] The Court concluded that in the absence of such expression only contemporaneous membership would authorize deportation.
However, even if the Act were found to be retroactive, to strike it down would require us to overrule the construction of the ex post facto provision which has been followed by this Court from earliest times. It always has been considered that that which it forbids is penal legislation which imposes or increases criminal punishment for conduct lawful previous to its enactment. [21] Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure. [22] Both of these doctrines as original proposals might be debatable, but both have been considered closed for many years and a body of statute and decisional law has been built upon them. In Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978, Mr. Justice Holmes, for the Court, said: 'It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. The determination by facts that might constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of the local penal law with the policy of Congress is an accident. * * * The prohibition of ex post facto laws in article 1, § 9, has no application * * * and with regard to the petitioner, it is not necessary to construe the statute as having any retrospective effect.' Later, the Court said, 'It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment. * * * The inhibition against the passage of an ex post facto law by Congress in section 9 of article 1 of the Constitution applies only to criminal laws * * * and not to a deportation act like this * * *.' Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39, 44 S.Ct. 283, 286, 68 L.Ed. 549.
^1 54 Stat. 670, 8 U.S.C. § 137, 8 U.S.C.A. § 137.
^2 90 F.Supp. 397.
^3 187 F.2d 137.
^4 Petitioner Harisiades and appellant Coleman contend that the proceedings against them must be nullified for failure to conform to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. However, § 12 of the Act, 60 Stat. 244, 5 U.S.C. § 1011, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1011, provides that '* * * no procedural requirement shall be mandatory as to any agency proceeding initiated prior to the effective date of such requirement.' The proceedings against Harisiades and Coleman were instituted before the effective date of the Act. Harisiades also contends that, the Administrative Procedure Act aside, he was denied procedural due process in that in his 1946-1947 hearings the same individual acted both as presiding officer and examining officer. However, it appears that the officer here performed both functions with Harisiades' consent. He, therefore, has no standing to raise the objection now.
^5 40 Stat. 548, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 732(a)(13), (16), (17), (18), (19), 8 U.S.C.A. § 732(a)(13, 16-19); 61 Stat. 122, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 735, 8 U.S.C.A. § 735. But a certificate of naturalization is subject to revocation on the ground of fraud or other illegality in the procurement. 54 Stat. 1158, 8 U.S.C. § 738, 8 U.S.C.A. § 738; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 66 S.Ct. 1304, 90 L.Ed. 1500.
^6 § 2 of the Selective Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 202, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 202; § 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 303, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 303; § 4(a) of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 454(a), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 454(a). Cf. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 71 S.Ct. 553, 95 L.Ed. 729.
^7 Article 23, 1907 Hague Convention, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2301-2302.
^8 Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 64.
^9 This Court has held that the Constitution assures him a large measure of equal economic opportunity, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131; he may invoke the writ of habeas corpus to protect his personal liberty, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 S.Ct. 336, 338, 35 L.Ed. 1146; in criminal proceedings against him he must be accorded the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140; and, unless he is an enemy alien, his property cannot be taken without just compensation. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 51 S.Ct. 229, 75 L.Ed. 473.
^10 He cannot stand for election to many public offices. For instance, Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3, of the Constitution respectively require that candidates for election to the House of Representatives and Senate be citizens. See Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 63. The states, to whom is entrusted the authority to set qualifications of voters, for most purposes require citizenship as a condition precedent to the voting franchise. The alien's right to travel temporarily outside the United States is subject to restrictions not applicable to citizens. 43 Stat. 158, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 210, 8 U.S.C.A. § 210. If he is arrested on a charge of entering the country illegally, the burden is his to prove 'his right to enter or remain'-no presumptions accrue in his favor by his presence here. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 155(a).
^11 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 711 714, 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1019, 1021-1022, 1028, 37 L.Ed. 905; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 545-546, 15 S.Ct. 967, 969-970, 39 L.Ed. 1082; Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486, 494-495, 21 S.Ct. 449, 452, 453, 45 L.Ed. 634; Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302, 22 S.Ct. 686, 688, 46 L.Ed. 917; Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 97, 23 S.Ct. 611, 613, 47 L.Ed. 721; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 261, 25 S.Ct. 644, 645, 49 L.Ed. 1040; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275, 33 S.Ct. 31, 32, 57 L.Ed. 218; Chuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 556-557, 33 S.Ct. 585, 586, 57 L.Ed. 960; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591. 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978.
^12 40 Stat. 531, 50 U.S.C. § 21, 50 U.S.C.A. § 21.
^13 40 Stat. 411, 50 U.S.C.App. § 2(c), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 2(c); 40 Stat. 415, 50 U.S.C.App. § 6, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 6; 62 Stat. 1246, 50 U.S.C.App. § 39, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 39; Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 72 S.Ct. 338.
^14 '* * * (I)n strict law, a State can expel even domiciled aliens without so much as giving the reasons, the refusal of the expelling State to supply the reasons for expulsion to the home State of the expelled alien does not constitute an illegal, but only a very unfriendly act.' 1 Oppenheim, International Law (3d ed., Roxburgh, 1920), 498-502, at 499. But cf. 1 Oppenheim, International Law (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948), 630-634, at 631. See also 4 Moore, International Law Digest, 67-96, citing examples; Wheaton's International Law (6th ed., Keith, 1929) 210 211; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905.
^15 An open door to the immigrant was the early federal policy. It began to close in 1884 when Orientals were excluded. 23 Stat. 115. Thereafter, Congress has intermittently added to the excluded classes, and as rejections at the border multiplied illegal entries increased. To combat these, recourse was had to deportation in the Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1086. However, that Act could be applied to an illegal entrant only within one year after his entry. Although that time limitation was subsequently extended, 32 Stat. 1218; 34 Stat. 904-905, until after the turn of the century expulsion was used only as an auxiliary remedy to enforce exclusion.
^16 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-322, 57 S.Ct. 216, 220-222, 81 L.Ed. 255; Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568; U.S.Const. Art. IV, § 4; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42, 12 L.Ed. 581; Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State of Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 32 S.Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 34 S.Ct. 92, 58 L.Ed. 206. In respect to the war power over even citizens, see Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1381, 87 L.Ed. 1774; Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-218, 65 S.Ct. 193, 194, 89 L.Ed. 194. That English courts also refuse to review grounds for deportation orders appears from Rex v. Home Secretary; Ex parte Bressler, 27 Cox Crim. Cases 655.
^17 Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774; Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194.
^18 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137.
^20 40 Stat. 1012, 8 U.S.C.A. § 137.
^21 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242, 32 S.Ct. 613, 617, 56 L.Ed. 1066.
^22 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1028, 37 L.Ed. 905; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154, 44 S.Ct. 54, 56, 68 L.Ed. 221.
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