Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/473-f-3d-824-597018994
Timestamp: 2020-02-27 21:33:51
Document Index: 7299784

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 107', '§ 9607', '§ 113', '§ 9613', '§ 107', '§ 113', '§ 107', '§ 113', '§ 9613', '§ 107']

473 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007), 05-3299, Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc. - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 597018994
473 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007), 05-3299, Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc.
Docket Nº: 05-3299.
Citation: 473 F.3d 824
Party Name: METROPOLITAN WATER RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTH AMERICAN GALVANIZING & COATINGS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant.
Case Date: January 17, 2007
Argued January 20, 2006
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, No. 03 C 754—James B. Zagel, Judge.
In February 2003, Metropolitan Water filed this action against Lake River to recoup its costs in remedying the contamination. The original complaint asserted a claim under CERCLA § 107(a), see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), an alternative claim for contribution under CERCLA § 113(f), see
id. § 9613(f), and state law claims for nuisance and breach of contract. Lake River failed to answer the complaint, resulting in a default judgment that ordered Lake River to pay approximately $1.8 million in damages to Metropolitan Water, in addition to future response costs. Metropolitan Water then amended the complaint to add Lake River's parent, North American, as a defendant; the amended complaint realleged the CERCLA counts and state law claims. North American then moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
In ruling on North American's motion, the district court began by distinguishing the two CERCLA claims being asserted. The court first described § 107(a)'s liability provisions as providing an implied cause of action for cost recovery in cases "where a party is seeking direct recovery of costs incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site." R.23 at 3. Section 113(f) claims for contribution, by contrast, are asserted by "potentially responsible parties," or "PRPs," seeking to apportion damages among themselves. The court recognized that Metropolitan Water, because it owned the property during the period of contamination, must be considered a PRP under CERCLA's strict liability framework. Normally, the court noted, PRPs are limited to claims for contribution under § 113(f) and cannot recoup the full cost of remediation under the joint and several recovery of § 107(a). The court then observed that the Supreme Court had held recently in Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 125 S.Ct. 577, 160 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004), that parties like Metropolitan Water who have commenced cleanup voluntarily, rather than being compelled to do so by a civil suit, have no right to contribution under the plain wording of § 113(f). See 42 U.S.C.§ 9613(f)(1) (allowing contribution only "during or following any civil action"). The district court held that, for this subset of PRPs who voluntarily undertake cleanup, an implied right to contribution under § 107(a) remains available, notwithstanding their status as strictly liable parties under the statute. A contrary outcome, the court reasoned, "would seem to lie contrary to the general purposes of CERCLA to promote prompt and proper cleanup of contaminated properties." R.23 at 7.
After hearing oral argument from the parties, we invited the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to submit its views as amicus curiae. The EPA accepted our invitation, 1 and, with the permission of the court, Lockheed Martin Corporation also has submitted an amicus curiae brief. Both Metropolitan Water and North American now have filed supplemental briefs in response.
In the 1970s and 80s, a number of high-profile environmental disasters, including the "Love Canal" dumping at Niagara Falls, New York, drew the public's attention to the environmental risks and health hazards posed by improper hazardous waste disposal.2 In response to rising public concern and the view that "existing law [was] clearly inadequate to deal with
this massive problem," H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 6119, 6120, Congress enacted the CERCLA. The law's purpose was twofold. It was intended, for one, to "establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, at 1. Second, CERCLA was meant to shift the costs of cleanup to the parties responsible for the contamination. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483, 116 S.Ct. 1251, 134 L.Ed.2d 121 (1996).
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