Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/7/957/479245/
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 13:57:19
Document Index: 597870738

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 1', '§ 5', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 922', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 3742', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 5', '§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 3553', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 3742']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Benjamin Thomas Tisdale, Iii, Defendant-appellant, 7 F.3d 957 (10th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1993 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Benjamin Thomas Tisdale, Iii, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Benjamin Thomas Tisdale, Iii, Defendant-appellant, 7 F.3d 957 (10th Cir. 1993)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 7 F.3d 957 (10th Cir. 1993)
This case is before us a third time to review the sentence imposed upon Benjamin Tisdale following his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).1 By virtue of that conviction and his prior criminal record, Tisdale is classified as an armed career criminal, subject by statute to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1).2 The district court initially sentenced Tisdale to 30 years. We remanded for resentencing because the court's stated reasons for the sentence were insufficient for appellate review. United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 1990).
The underlying facts of this case are set forth in our prior opinion and are repeated here only as relevant. Mr. Tisdale committed the instant offense on December 4, 1987. He was initially sentenced on August 23, 1988, to a 30-year term of imprisonment followed by a two-year term of supervised release. He was fined $1.00 and ordered to pay the $50.00 mandatory special assessment. The district court reconvened the sentencing hearing on October 20, 1988, in order to change the terms of the fine imposed. At the reconvened sentencing hearing the district court sentenced Mr. Tisdale again to a term of 30 years in prison, followed by a two-year term of supervised release, but changed the fine imposed to $25,000. Mr. Tisdale was also ordered to pay the $50.00 mandatory special assessment. We consolidated Tisdale's appeals of his conviction, sentence, and resentence, and affirmed the district court on all issues with the exception of the sentence itself. We vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing in accordance with the steps outlined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 and § 5G1.1(b), along with the court's reasons for its upward departure, if any, upon resentencing. We also directed the district court to reconsider the $25,000 fine in light of the statutory language that the fine imposed under § 924(e) (1) shall not be more than $25,000. Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1100-01.
On remand from this court, the district court directed the preparation of a revised presentence report. In preparing the presentence report, the probation officer concluded that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 ("Armed Career Criminal") was not applicable because it was an amendment to the guidelines, effective November 1, 1990, subsequent to the date of Tisdale's offense of conviction. The probation officer determined the base offense level by applying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) (2), relating to offenses committed under § 922(g) (1). The base offense level under that guideline was nine. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 the probation officer fixed Tisdale's criminal history category at V based upon a calculation of 11 points from Tisdale's prior criminal record. The resulting guideline range was 18 to 24 months, substantially below the statutory minimum sentence of 15 years. Accordingly, the presentence report fixed Tisdale's guideline sentence at 180 months, or 15 years, as prescribed by U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (Nov. 1987), which provided that " [i]f application of the guidelines results in a sentence below the minimum sentence required by statute, the statutory minimum shall be the guideline sentence."
We review a sentencing court's upward departure in three steps. United States v. Flinn, 987 F.2d 1497, 1500 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. St. Julian, 966 F.2d 564, 567 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 348, 121 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1992); United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 277 (10th Cir. 1990). First, we determine whether the circumstances cited by the district court warrant a departure from the guidelines as a matter of law. White, 893 F.2d at 277. Second, we review the court's factual determinations underlying the asserted justification for departure to determine if they are supported by the record. Id. at 278. Third, we determine whether the degree of departure is reasonable. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3). Because Tisdale makes no challenge to the underlying factual determinations, we consider only the first and third elements--whether a departure was warranted and whether the degree of departure was reasonable.4
We consider first whether a departure is warranted. A sentencing court may depart from the guideline sentence only if it " 'finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.' " White, 893 F.2d at 277-78 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). Where departure is based on factors that are considered by the guidelines, the sentencing court cannot depart unless it finds that consideration to be inadequate in light of unusual circumstances. United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1454 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 225, 116 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1991); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0). We review de novo whether the district court justified its decision to depart by citing appropriate circumstances. United States v. Thornton, 922 F.2d 1490, 1493 (10th Cir. 1991).
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (4) directs that the district court, when imposing sentence, shall consider "the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant " as set forth in the guidelines (emphasis added). Section 3553(b) requires the district court to impose sentence within the range referred to in § 3553(a) (4), unless the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines did not adequately consider a circumstance which should result in a sentence outside that range.
Prior to the promulgation of § 4B1.4, the guidelines did not implement the Armed Career Criminal Act, § 924(e), and, therefore, did not provide a sentencing range for defendants falling in that category. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, comment. (backg'd.) ("this section implements 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)"). Certainly the statutory minimum sentence of 180 months, converted to the "guideline sentence" under the general provisions of § 5G1.1(b) did not constitute a guideline range. See United States v. Simmons, 924 F.2d 187, 189-91 (11th Cir. 1991).
Thus, in the exercise of our review under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) (1), we hold that the district court's departure from the guidelines did not violate the law or incorrectly apply the guidelines.5
We turn, therefore, to the question of whether the degree of departure was reasonable. Flinn, 987 F.2d at 1501; United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc); White, 893 F.2d at 278. In answering that question, we consider the following:
Jackson, 921 F.2d at 989 (quoting White, 893 F.2d at 278) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). We have recognized that ordinarily, a district court must "premise its departure on the guidelines' deficiency in assigning a defendant a particular offense level, criminal history category, or both, [and] also must explain a departure sentence in these terms." Jackson, 921 F.2d at 990.
As indicated, in dealing with an omitted category of offenders (ACCA violators), as here, to whom a mandatory statutory minimum applies, a sentencing court may explain its upward departure in terms of the most appropriate guideline range for the omitted category. The only imperative in adopting that range is the statutory minimum of 180 months, or 15 years.6 Thus, when the Commission promulgated § 4B1.4, it adopted, as the lowest acceptable range, level 33, History Category IV: 188-235 months. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b) (3) (B) and (c) (3). This approach was described in the guidelines prior to the promulgation of § 4B1.4. In the commentary to § 2D1.1, the Commission stated: "The base offense levels at levels 26 and 32 establish guideline ranges with a lower limit as close to the statutory minimum as possible." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (backg'd.). Both levels were above the statutory minimum. Such an approach is obviously the most appropriate way to fit the statutory minimum into the existing sentencing table without structurally compromising either. That is in fact what the district court did in this case.
A number of cases have upheld as reasonable for ACCA violations sentences comparable to and even in excess of the 262-month sentence imposed here. See, e.g., United States v. Doucette, 979 F.2d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir. 1992) (departure upward to 25 years reasonable); United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 745 (5th Cir.) (departure upward to 230 months reasonable), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 355, 121 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992); United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 710 (11th Cir.) (30-year sentence reasonable), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 370, 116 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1991); Simmons, 924 F.2d at 192 (departure upward to 50 years reasonable); United States v. Fields, 923 F.2d 358, 362 (5th Cir.) (departure upward to 204 months reasonable), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 2066, 114 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1991); United States v. Lebon, 800 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (D. Mass. 1992) (departure upward to 240 months reasonable).
In Williams, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the appellate review of sentences permitted by the Sentencing Reform Act is limited and does not "alter a court of appeals' traditional deference to a district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion." Williams, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S. Ct. at 1121. The Court went on to say:
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n. 16, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010 n. 16, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)).
There is no justification in this case for us to interfere with the district court's sentencing discretion. In the exercise of our appellate review under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) (2), we hold that the sentence imposed by the district court is not unreasonable.8
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of a law which " 'must apply to events occurring before its enactment.' " Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981) (emphasis added)). This court has also held that the Clause "prohibits retroactive application of a changed guideline if the change disadvantages the defendant." United States v. Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); Smith, 930 F.2d at 1452 n. 3.
As these excerpts show, the district court almost exhausted the possibilities of the English language in declaring its state of mind: "external benchmark," "benchmark," "reasonableness determination," "analog."9 Considering the presentence report and the dialogue at the sentencing hearing, the only thing the court could have done to make its mental process more clear would have been the addition of: "and I really mean it," after each of these expressions. This is a state of mind inquiry, and the argument ends when the district judge declares his or her mind. Cf. Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1171 (10th Cir. 1991) ("We will not look behind a district court's express statement that it engaged in a de novo review of the record."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 1213, 117 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1992).
Courts are not bound to close their eyes to reasonableness determinations made by other bodies, whether courts, the Commission, or otherwise, when those determinations are available for consideration at the time of discretionary sentencing. So long as the court makes clear its understanding that a subsequently enacted guideline does not govern, it is per se reasonable for the court to consider it. See United States v. Willey, 985 F.2d 1342, 1350 (7th Cir. 1993) (no ex post facto violation where court "applied the 1989 guidelines and, based on sound reasons for departure, used the 1990 amendment as its model for sentencing upward."); United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1046 (1st Cir. 1990) (no ex post facto violation where "there is nothing in the court's sentencing statement to make us think that it treated the amended guidelines as controlling."); Lebon, 800 F. Supp. at 1018 ("The amended guideline, by analogy, substantiates the reasonableness of the 240-month sentence imposed here.").
Section 922(g) (1) provides in pertinent part:
The district court granted the two-week continuance of the sentencing proceeding to satisfy the requirement that the defendant be given notice of a proposed upward departure "on a ground not identified as a ground for upward departure either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission by the Government." Burns v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2185, 115 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1991). Tisdale argues for the first time in his reply brief that he was not given notice of the additional ground of the omission of the category of ACCA offenders: "when the district court gave notice of the bases on which it intended to depart, the Sentencing Commission's so-called 'failure' to promulgate a guideline specifically addressing the Armed Career Criminal Act was not mentioned." Appellant's Reply Brief at 2. To the extent Tisdale is arguing that he was never given notice of this proposed basis for departing upward from 15 years, we point out that he never objected, on lack of notice grounds, to the district court's evident reliance on that factor at sentencing, nor did he seek a second continuance on that basis, nor did he raise it as an issue on appeal or in his opening brief. Moreover, no one argues that anyone involved in this case was unaware of the fact of the omission of the category of ACCA offenders from the guidelines applicable to Tisdale; thus, no prejudice has been shown. Furthermore, we are not obliged to address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Reliance Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 1991)
The Supreme Court has recently formulated a two-step departure analysis in Williams v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1120, 117 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1992):
First, was the sentence imposed either in violation of law or as a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines? If so, a remand is required under § 3742(f) (1). If the court concludes that the departure is not the result of an error in interpreting the Guidelines, it should proceed to the second step: is the resulting sentence an unreasonably high or low departure from the relevant guideline range? If so, a remand is required under § 3742(f) (2).
A sentencing court's use of an invalid departure ground is an incorrect application of the guidelines. Williams, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S. Ct. at 1119. However, such an incorrect application of the guidelines requires a remand only if the sentence was imposed "as a result of" the incorrect application. Id. at ----, 112 S. Ct. at 1120. We need not remand if we find that the district court still would have imposed the same sentence in the absence of the invalid factors, unless we find that the degree of departure is unreasonable. See id. at ----, 112 S. Ct. at 1120; United States v. O'Dell, 965 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1992). Thus, even if the district court cited an invalid factor for departure in this case, we still would not remand since the history of this case and the record before us convince us that the district court would impose the same sentence without regard to any such factor
Even if, arguendo, the district court was not perfect in its reasoning or explanation at various points, our responsibility is still clear. In United States v. O'Dell, 965 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1992), we observed that: