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Timestamp: 2019-08-24 03:18:21
Document Index: 23876533

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1251', '§ 1345', '§ 2', '§ 1253', '§ 1254', '§ 1257', '§ 1258', '§ 2', 'arty 1', 'arty 2', '§ 631', '§ 1983']

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Course: Federal Courts
Year: Spring 2005
Professor: Judith Resnik
Text: Federal Courts and the Federal System, 5th ed.
Text Authors: Richard H. Fallon, Henry Melvin Hart, Herbert Wechsler, Daniel J. Meltzer, David L. Shapiro
This outline is © copyright 2007 by Maximilian Ventures, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. This outline, in whole or in part, may not be reproduced or redistributed without the written permission of the copyright holder. A limited license for personal academic use is permitted, as described below. This outline may not be posted on any other web site without permission. ILRG reserves the exclusive right to distribute this outline.
Congress has power to ordain and establish inferior courts or not
clause has been taken to mean that Congress has the power to create lower courts vested with less than the maximum jurisdiction that the Constitution allows
Judges serve during good behavior
judicial compensation should not be diminished
cl 1 – power extends to cases arising under constitution, ambassadors, admiralty; controversies where US is party, 2 or more states, b/w citizen of state, between state and citizens and foreign states, citizens or subjects
original jurisdiction in cases involving ambassadors, other public ministers or where state is party and appellate juris over “all other cases”
exceptions as the Congress shall make
president nominates and Senate confirms SC justices and other officers
SC original jurisdiction
28 USC § 1251
a – original and exclusive between states
b – original but not exclusive over ambassadors, between US and state, actions by State against citizens of another state or against aliens (State must be real party in interest
falls short of Congressional grant
doesn’t include private suits against state or suits between state and private nation
§ 1345 – district courts have OJ over all suits commenced by US
BUT original juris from Art III § 2 does not require enabling action by Congress (exists by force of Constitution)
discretionary - SC can choose among cases in original juris (Ohio v. Wyandotte)
case involved nuisance and court said onerous fact-finding
SO presumption against original juris even when you’re a state
SC may decline when (1) won’t disserve principal policies underlying Article III; (2) discretion legitimated by other responsibilities
have to ask permission to file
SC rarely hears original jurisdiction cases
Congress cannot add to SC original jurisdiction (Marbury v. Madison)
So Article III is a ceiling
when SC hears original juris cases have special masters for fact-finding
28 USC § 1253 – three-judge courts
statute provides for appeal to SC so court must take case
very limited – redistricting cases
28 USC § 1254 – courts of appeals; certified questions
28 USC § 1257 – state courts
28 USC § 1258 – Puerto Rico
Functions of SC review
authoritative voice on meaning of US Constitution
enforce supremacy of federal law (Cooper v. Aaron (1958))
uniformity – resolve conflicting interps of fed law among fed and state cts
BUT state courts are ultimate interpreters of state law absent federal issue
Federal courts – limited jurisdiction
Compare state courts - general jurisdiction – and concurrent juris
can only hear cases if they have both constitutional and statutory authority
presumption against federal jurisdiction – person seeking to invoke has burden of proof
fed cts can challenge sua sponte
Congressional control over federal jurisdiction
Congress can’t go beyond Article III (See Tidewater – DC cases)
SO Article III is ceiling
But in Tidewater itself SC allowed juris w/ no majority opinion (2 judges said it makes sense to treat DC citizens as “citizens of a state”
Congress can contract (See Sheldon v. Sill) but uncertain to what extent
Congress has never vested full Art III juris in lower courts
can Congress revoke all fed appellate juris?
Art. III § 2 – exceptions clause – Congress can make exceptions to appellate juris
framer intent to allow Congressional control – 1789 Judiciary Act only gives authority to review state SC decisions fed constitutional decision
ExParte McCardle (1869) – Congress expressly has in Constitution the power to limit appellate jurisdiction (upheld statute revoking SC jurisdiction to hear circuit court habeas appeals)
can’t acquire into legis’s motives
3 interps
1) broader – Congress has plenary power over app juris so can abolish completely
2) narrower – can only do this because other way to hear case (see Yerger)
Congress can take away something but not everything
3) narrowest – only applies to particular statute
need clear statement that removing juris (Graham-Levin debate)
exceptions modifies factual review
Can’t take away all jurisdiction from SC (Yerger)
McCardle distinguishable b/c statute did not completely preclude SC review; only eliminated one of 2 bases for juris
Yerger said 1868 act only repeals appellate jurisdiction of 1867 so still have previous habeas juris
Felker v. Turpin (upheld AEDPA as constitutional) stands for the proposition that any continuing basis for SC review, no matter how unlikely is sufficient to make a restriction on juris constitutional
AEDPA precluded appellate review but still had possibility of original habeas
irrelevant that SC has not granted original habeas petition since 1915
See also INS v. St. Cyr – interpreted statute not to eliminate habeas relief since it precludes appellate review of deportation
can cut off one channel
Klein – Congress can’t restrict SC review to reach substantive results
BUT Congress always does this
if no state or fed court could hear would probably have due process problem
subject to external restraints – can’t restrict jurisdiction in way that runs afoul of due process clause, equal protection clause or suspension clause
EP clause would preclude stripping jurisdiction from blacks, but might not have same problem with subject specific distinctions
under Article III don’t have to create lower courts at all
Congress has power to establish lower fed courts and define juris (less than Art III)
Sheldon v. Sill upheld Congress’ ability to contract juris
limits on diversity juris
Lockerty (fed dist ct. lacked juris to hear challenges to price controls promulgated under Emergency Price Control Act)
“The Congressional Power to ordain and establish inferior fed cts includes the power of investing them with juris either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good”
Yakus: SC precluded D from challenging constitutionality of price controls as D b/c forfeited opp to challenge in admin procs
Lockerty established power of Congress to restrict juris of fed cts and establish Emergency Court of Appeals as only forum
NOTE: both Lockerty and Yakus just precluded one federal court from hearing issue; some jurisdiction
likewise, Lauf just limited ability to award particularly remedy – did not foreclose all review
Justice Story’s view that all Art III juris must be vested in some Art III court (in original or appellate form) is not congruent with doctrine or Article III but modifications have some sway
need lower cts for some claims
1) where SC doesn’t have original jurisdiction and state court can’t hear (e.g., fed habeas)
2) where SC can’t hear
Sager – Con requires orig or app juris over constitutional claims
Amar – Art III establishes two “tiers” of fed juris – mandatory in “all cases” but not in controversies
BUT Meltzer said no support for variation of importance b/w cases and controversies
Portal-to-Portal Act (1947) – no fed juris to hear FLSA “unpaid overtime” suits
taking away juris v. remedies
maybe eliminating juris better than remedies b/c saying how to decide cases (See Klein)
SC upheld barring of injunctive relief (under Norris-Laguardia Act) for labor disputes in Lauf v. EG Shinner & Co (1938)
Congress can’t assign extrajudicial functions (Hayburn’s case – pension petitions)
Court doesn’t issue advisory opinions
Congress can’t prescribe rule of decision in pending case (US v. Klein – said presidential pardon can’t be admit as evidence of loyalty)
BUT any change of law will affect cts in some way; looks like intent even though McArdle said intent doesn’t matter
special things about Klein: (1) arguably unconstitutional as infringement on exec’s pardon power; (2) deprived property w/o due process
problem is not just saying Congress can’t speak but saying how it should speak
relates to 11th Amendment and commandeering concerns (SOC)
SC puppet rather than independent speaker of law
Congress can’t direct courts to reopen final judgments in decided cases (Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm – lengthened SOL beyond that inferred by SC in dismissing cases)
nature of harm – violation of integrity of lower courts; Hayburn’s case – need finality; no advisory opinions; interest in moving along cases
looks like prescribing rule of decision (Klein)
when retroactive legislation requires in its own application in a case already decided, that’s the same as Congress reversing the judgment
no Plaut problem with PLRA (Miller v. French - upheld PLRA provision granting automatic stay on injunctive relief)
Congress didn’t impermissibly reverse a “final” judgment b/c it altered the underlying law on which an injunction was valid
Souter Dissent - ? of whether Congress usurped judicial function if give court too little time
JR – this could be okay under an agency theory of courts – first Congress sent me a muddy signal and now they’re sending me a clear signal so I can’t do their bidding
NOTE: Courts cannot enlarge their own jurisdiction over suits in equity – that’s Congress’s job (Grupo Mexicano de Desarallo (1990)
-basically stands for proposition that fed cts can’t create new remedies
-in this case ct granted preliminary injunction preventing transfer of assets where no lien or equitable interest
-according to outline, equitable remedies generally not favored
President’s power over Judicial Review
Ex Parte Milligan – MT cannot try US citizen on US soil when courts are open
Ex Parte Quirin – MT can try belligerents in US
distinguishes Milligan as not a belligerent
Eisentrager – foreign citizens on foreign soil have no constitutional rights
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld – DP demands that a citizen held in the US as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that decision before a neutral DMer
Rasul v. Bush – we have no jurisdiction over Gitmo b/c juris over custodian
JR: comes back to the ? of soil, presence and physical boundaries of the nation-state
Congressional Control over State Court Juris
Presumption of concurrent jurisdiction (See Tafflin v. Levitt (1990) – RICO juris not divested)
only divested when 1) explicit statutory directive; 2) unmistakable implication from legis hist; 3) clear incompatibility b/w state and fed court juris (non-uniformity not enough)
BUT originally – Priggs v. PA (1842) – both states and SC agreed Congress could not compel them to take concurrent juris
state courts can’t refuse to enforce fed law or discriminate against fed claims (Testa v. Katt – state didn’t want to enforce treble damages under Emergency Price Control Act, just normal damages)
So state judges are enforcers of supremacy clause
can’t decline of grounds contra to policy (See Mondou) b/c fed law is policy of each state as if had emanated from its own legislature
non-discrimination principle assumes fed law becomes state law
JR – but then not fed law at all?
if you (states) part of us (feds), makes anti-commandeering arg (see Printz) seem like add on
NOTE: state can refuse to enforce fed law that violates constitution/fed law
Congress possesses power under Commerce Clause to make admissibility rules for state and fed courts (Pierce County v. Guillen (2003) – fed statute barring discovery of evidence in connection w/ highway safety programs w/in Congress’s power)
BUT didn’t address whether statute violated dual sovereignty embodied in Tenth Amendment b/c states can’t exercise sovereign power to establish discovery and admissibility rules
State actors / regulation
US v. Morrison (2000) – Congress can’t subject private and state actors under commerce clause and 14th Amendment to money damages under VAWA
“Constitution requires a distinction b/w what is truly nat’l and what is truly local”
inadequate evidence of discrimination so overbroad restriction on potentially rational state legis
Reno v. Condon (2000) – Drivers’ privacy protection act (restricts ability of states to disclose personal info.) is constitutional
Gonzales v. Raich (2005) – Congress has power under Commerce Clause to prohibit local cultivation and use of marijuana
substantial effect on supply and demand on nat’l market
broader regulatory scheme
Test – rational basis for believing that failing to regulate intrastate possession and manufacture would leave gaping hole
Scalia concurrence – just need nat’l interest or substantial effect
non-Art III courts (aka legislative or Art I courts) - tribunals created by Congress in administrative agencies or as adjuncts to Article III courts
no protections of Art III judges
nomination by president and Senatorial confirmation
justifications for creating non-Art III courts
efficiency, specialization of subject matter
Congress might prefer judges who are less independent (perhaps policy uniformity)
keep the fed judiciary small and prestigious
threatens separation of powers between Congress and federal courts
fear that Congress will determine outcomes of cases by channeling them into non-Art III courts where judges less insulated from pressure
BUT JR notes that judges are influenced in ways beyond life tenure and salaries (e.g., fear of impeachment, desire for appointment, socialization)
permissible in four areas although law is uncertain and confusing
territories and possessions of US
public rights matters
private law and criminal matters
SEE SHORT OUTLINE FOR DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Can Congress put case – based on subject matter - in Article I court?
Congress has subject matter authority (e.g., commerce)
Art I gives Congress power to create tribunals
Congress could give juris to state courts to decide so can create alternative fed forum
Canter is pillar for proposition that Congress can create non-art III courts (you can create territorial courts so ergo can create these)
balancing - Crowell & Schor; White’s dissent in Northern Pipeline
no rights in state of nature so Congress gives you right and decides where adjudicated
Article III exclusivity
easy textual argument that Constitution says judicial power shall vest in these ways SO article III or state
only have historical exceptions; Article III is norm (plurality in Northern Pipeline)
judges dependent on executive so violates sep of powers
more troubling w/ private rights
Crowell v. Benson (1932) held that in private law matters, At III court exercises de novo review of law, juris facts and con facts
BUT no longer followed
agency adjudication fine for public rights (e.g., claims against US for money; immigration)
BUT need independent judicial DMing for private rights (e.g., money liability of party 1 to party 2)
rationale – essential feature of fed. judicial power
should be unclear what’s okay and what’s not
can’t give juris over private rights to non-Art III courts w/o right to review (Northern Pipeline plurality)
SO BR act unconstitutional b/c it gives BR judges juris over state claims
rights not created by Congress
all “essential attributes of judicial power are vested in bankruptcy courts
should be adjunct to Article III court
hold the line at current 3 instances for non-Art III courts
White dissent – balancing of Article III v. competing values (utility, expediency, etc.)
now the law in CFTC v. Schor
only time SC said Congress went too far in creating non-Art III courts
CFTC v. Schor (1986) – p. 387 – balancing test for examining agency adjudication
SC held CFTC could hear state law claims b/c limited power and does not intrude on province of judiciary (appellate review; particularized area of law)
also waiver so no infringement on rights
purposes of Art III: 1) protecting role of indep judiciary; 2) safeguarding litigants right to have case decided before indep judges
cost; efficiency
why did it (further fed regulatory scheme v. sapping courts)
fairness to litigants (i.e., personal Article III)
due process (notice; opp to be heard)
no problem if consent of litigants as here
structural article III
most important is appellate review
best if in Art III court
builds on Crowell v. Benson – idea is that searching appellate review by Art III court legitimates initial agency adjud.
sep of powers – does putting Art III business in non-Art III court impermissibly threaten the institutional integrity of the Judicial branch? (breadth and depth of juris)
extent to which “essential attributes” of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts
best if particularized area of review
origins and importance of right to be adjudicated
concerns that drove Congress to depart from Article III in the first place
SI extends to agency adjudication (Federal Maritime Comm’n v. SC Ports Auth. (2002))
agencies similar to Art III courts - ALJ has similar role to Art III judge; looks like civil litigation (use adaptation of FRCP); have discovery
state has to defend self
Breyer dissent says different b/c executive power – just investigation into whether someone violated law
SUMMARY – assess con. of provisions for adjudication in non-Art III court
1) Does provision fall into exceptional categories IDed in Northern Pipeline (territorial courts, military courts, public rights)?
If yes, passes muster
2) Is non-Art III adjudication justified under Schor-like (case by case) balancing test?
3) If non-Art III tribunal permissible, is jury trial required?
Grandfinanciera says jury trial must be provided if relief is legal + private rights
1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 authorizes jury trials in bankruptcy courts w/ consent of parties and approval of dist ct but unclear what happens w/ other courts
can Art III court rely on admin agency’s determination in imposing criminal punishment?
Answer is partially yes
Falbo – registrant being prosecuted for draft evasion couldn’t defend on ground he was wrongly classified
Estep – opposite result; could say board beyond juris
explained Falbo on ground that petitioner failed to exhaust admin remedies
US v. Mendoza-Lopez (1987) – alien deported now being charged for crime of remedy can challenge validity of underlying deportation order
referenced Yakus for principle that at a minimum result of admin proceeding can’t be conclusive element of criminal offense when JR denied
bankruptcy courts (28 USC 151-52, 57-58)
bankruptcy system originally found unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline (1978)
Congress fixed with statute in 1984
judges have 14 year terms and appointed by COA
“unit” of the district court (28 USC 151)
have bankruptcy appellate panels and eventually COA review possibility
1994 bankruptcy reform act – bankruptcy courts have authority to conduct jury trials with approval of district court and consent of parties
Grandfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg found right to jury trial where legal relief + private rights (fraudulent conveyance claim)
magistrate judges – 28 USC § 631et seq.
w/in Art III framework
can conduct pretrial and post-trial hearings; evidentiary hearings; full trial w/ parties consent; select juries even in felony trials (Peretz)
some dissents say 636(c) (consent provision) is unconstitutional
Roell v. Withdrow (2003) – consent of parties to MJ trials can be implied from conduct
8 year terms for full-timers; 4 years with part-timers
appointed by DJs (so culture of hierarchy)
dist judges make de novo finding of fact
BUT doesn’t need to have de novo review of evidence (US v. Raddatz)
APA has merit selection for ALJs
AJs (including IJs) aren’t protected by APA
what about dignity concerns?
Confusion on whether tribes had preexisting power– therefore Congress must take away (See Santa Clara Pueblo) – or lack power – therefore Congress must delegate (Oliphant; Duro; Lara)
Santa Clara Pueblo (1978) – no implied cause of action in fed court under the IRCA (Indian Civil Rights Act)
Marshall – Indian tribes are “separate sovereigns”; Congress can diminish tribal sovereignty but must act through clear statement not implication
where Congress provides explicit remedy, it’s exclusive
good case for relationship among court systems
? of whether to defer to tribes – they determined necessity of rule through tribal representation
preexisting sovereignty – subject to defeasement – and Congress can’t take it away unless they say so
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) – tribal courts lack jurisdiction to try non-Indians
no affirmative delegation by Congress – SO only have power Congress gives
Duro v. Reina (1990) – tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians
again (as in Oliphant) not given power by Congress
distinguished civil context where tribes had jurisdiction
US v. Lara (2004) – constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians
SO here Congress acted – gave back power
But seems like reversal of Oliphant b/c didn’t have power there toward defeasement (ala Santa Clara)
doesn’t violate double jeopardy clause b/c separate sovereigns
BUT if delegated by feds, then sounds like double jeopardy b/c feds prosecuting twice (Souter dissent)
No implicit for concurrent juris for tribal courts (unlike state courts)
See Nevada v. Hicks – tribal court doesn’t have juris to hear § 1983 claims
juris only extends as far as legis authority
SO can’t get what Marshall wanted in Santa Clara– litigation in tribal courts to look like nat’l norms
Eleventh Amendment: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
Response to Chisolm (1793) (fed juris to hear claims against states)
Gibbons argues more about federal treaty power (most concerned about citizens of foreign states suing individual states in US courts) than overturning Chisolm
“construed to” sounds like Congress speaking directly to courts
SO maybe legis could still bring into effect
Two views of 11th Amendment
prevailing view – restriction of subject matter jurisdiction
minority view – only restricted fed diversity juris (citizens of other state v. state)
Brennan dissent in Atascadero – repeated by Stevens in Seminole Tribe and Fed. Maritime Comm’n - BUT never caught on
SO can’t sue US w/o consent but can sue fed officers (US v. Lee)
b/c officers obliged to obey law
11th Amendment bars suits against states by own citizens (Hans v. Louisiana (1890))
would fall outside Amendment based on strict textual reading
big debate about whether statement of constitutional immunity or FCL
extends to arm of state
foreign state can’t sue state (Monaco v. Mississippi)
SI doesn’t extend to state compacts (Port Auth – so incentives against states coming together) or cities/counties/etc. (Northern Ins. Co. v. Chatham County, GA (2006) (9-0))
11th Amendment also bars private Ps from suing states in state courts w/o their consent (Alden v. Maine - FLSA)
NO possibility of abrogation
why can’t Congress tell state courts to enforce fed rights against states like against private parties (Testa v. Katt & Tafflin)?
Alden looks like Testa violation (discrimination) b/c won’t recognize FLSA claims against state actors but will recognize state law claims
rationale: immunity not derived from 11th Amend. but retained by virtue of admission to union; structure of federalism means Congress must treat states as “residuary sovereigns”
BUT feds could bring suit themselves
SI extends to agency adjudication (Fed Maritime Comm’n v. SC Ports Authority (2002))
look like Art III courts and same effect as judicial proceedings
easy for JR b/c looks like jud proc but Breyer says it’s different
concern is not to raise up any proceedings against States that were “anomalous and unheard of when Constitution adopted” (Hans v. Louisiana)
no state regulatory immunity (Garcia – transit authority must comply w/ FLSA)
3 means of circumventing 11th Amendment
Ex Parte Young suit against state officer
But no state law claims (Pennhurst) although some ways around this (see p. 42)
Not available if fed statutes provides comp. enforcement mechanism (Seminole tribe)
state consent (affirmatively agree) and waiver (Seminole Tribe)
anomaly because parties generally lack power to confer SJ on fed courts
popular to do so b/c accountability wins campaigns
selective waiver OK (e.g., just in state courts) (Smith v. Reeves)
no constructive consent (e.g., accept funds; part. in fed programs) (FL Prepaid)
SO extra-litigation conduct is not form of waiver
waive by participating in litigation (Lapides – removal from state ct. to fed ct)
Lapides was state law claim, but seems like would also apply to fed claim
issue of who can waive (can I go to dumb 1st year DA?)
need unequivocal intent and power to do so (See Seminole Tribe)
See also Atascadero - emphasizing clear statement rule
Vermont Agency of Nat Resources (2000) - False Claims Act doesn’t apply to states b/c uses term “person” so no clear intent
Examples: court of fed claims – claims against US govt.; tax court for tax claims; FTCA; admiralty; workers comp; Tucker Act; APA – admin agencies
Congress can abrogate pursuant to 14th Amendment (Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976) – 14th Amendment) BUT need clear statement
need record of violations and congruence and proportionality
unclear whether municipality stuff is OK or need state stuff
abrogation not allowed in Morrison (2000) (VAWA) and Kimel (2000) (ADEA – no pattern of age discrim)
allowed under Hibbs (2004) (FMLA $ damages) and Tennessee v. Lane (2004) (ADA in state courthouses)
hard to square w/ Garrett and Morrison b/c same level of evidence
Congress can abrogate under Article I (Central Auth. v. Katz – bankruptcy)
overruled Seminole Tribe (Congress couldn’t abrogate pursuant to Indian Commerce Clause)
Can abrogate pursuant to bankruptcy clause (Central VA Community College v. Katz (2005))
argument is all about function – can’t distribute assets if we can’t make state put itself in
states agreed to be subject to suits when they signed off on Constitution which authorized creation of uniform bankruptcy system
no need for clear statement rule b/c relevant “abrogation” in Constitution not statute
Thomas dissent – majority conflates authority to regulate & SI against suit
see also Tenn Student Assistance Corp (2005) –fed jur doesn’t affect state sovereignty b/c juris premised on debtor and estate not creditors
Congress can’t abrogate in state courts (Alden v. Maine (1999))
no SI in courts of sister states (Nevada v. Hall)
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