Source: https://openjurist.org/660/f2d/91/president-and-directors-of-georgetown-college-v-madden
Timestamp: 2017-10-17 10:35:38
Document Index: 70831553

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 5', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 1292', '§ 1292']

660 F2d 91 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden | OpenJurist
660 F. 2d 91 - President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden
660 F2d 91 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden
660 F.2d 91
The PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF GEORGETOWN COLLEGE, Appellant,
Dennis W. MADDEN, John M. Walton, Seymour Auerbach, Victor
R. Beauchamp Associates, Inc., Reliance Insurance
Company, Anchor Associates, Inc., Edward
J. Scullen, Alvin Marchigiani,
The PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF GEORGETOWN COLLEGE, Appellees,
Edward M. CROUGH, as Trustee for Victor R. Beauchamp
Associates, Inc., Appellant,
Dennis W. Madden; John M. Walton; Seymour Auerbach; Reliance
Insurance Company; Anchor Associates, Inc.; Edward
J. Scullen; Alvin Marchigiani, Defendants.
Dennis W. Madden; John M. Walton; Seymour Auerbach; Victor
R. Beauchamp Associates, Inc.; Anchor Associates,
Inc.; Edward J. Scullen; Alvin
Marchigiani, Defendants.
Nos. 80-1798, 80-1891, 80-1892.
D.C.Code Ann. § 12-310(a)(1)(1973). The statute does not apply to "any action based on a contract, express or implied ...." Id. s12-310(b)(1). Although Georgetown filed suit in Maryland, the district court applied § 12-310 because it found that that provision was substantive rather than procedural and would, therefore, have been applied by a Maryland court as the law of the place where the injury occurred in lieu of the relevant Maryland limitations provision, Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 5-108 (1973) (twenty-year limitation period).
We are unpersuaded by these arguments, and hold that the district court did not err in applying § 12-310 to bar Georgetown's tort claims. Georgetown's argument that § 12-310 should be characterized as procedural is refuted by the overwhelming weight of authority holding that statutes similar to that provision are substantive rather than procedural. E. g., Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972); Overland Const. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla.1979). In only one reported case has a court held otherwise, Regents of the University of California v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 21 Cal.2d 624, 147 Cal.Rptr. 486, 581 P.2d 197 (1978). While there is no direct Maryland authority, c. f. Allentown Plaza Associates v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 43 Md.App. 337, 338 n.2, 405 A.2d 326 (1979) (dictum), the many cases in other jurisdictions characterizing statutes similar to § 12-310 as substantive rather than procedural lead us to conclude that a Maryland court would also characterize § 12-310 as substantive.
Reliance moved for summary judgment on Georgetown's claim against it under the performance bond it executed as surety. Acknowledging that the twelve-year statute of limitations for specialties applied to this claim, see Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 5-102(a)(2) (1980), Reliance argues that Georgetown did not file its action within that period because its cause of action accrued when the allegedly defective wall at the Hall was built in 1964, and not in 1966, when the Hall was completed and final payment was made by Georgetown. Reliance also contends that Georgetown's claim was time-barred by a provision of the construction contract which, it contends, altered the twelve-year statute of limitations. That provision stated: "The Contractor shall remedy any defects in the work and pay for any damage to other work resulting therefrom, which shall appear within a period of one year from the date of final acceptance of the work ...."
As well as alleging that Beauchamp was liable to it under the performance bond, Georgetown claimed that Beauchamp had breached the construction contract and, because that contract was under seal, Beauchamp could be sued for that breach even though the normal three-year limitation period for such actions had passed when Georgetown filed its complaint. Compare Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 5-101 (1980) (three-year limitation period for breach of contract actions) with id. § 5-102(a)(1) (twelve-year limitation period for actions on contracts under seal). The district court granted Beauchamp's motion for summary judgment on this claim because it found that the construction contract was not under seal.
A district court's order denying a motion for summary judgment or denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and may be appealed only (a) if the district court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, and (b) if the court of appeals permits such an appeal. While the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), certified an interlocutory appeal of Crough's motion to quash service of process, it made no certification with regard to its denial of Crough's motion for summary judgment or its denial of his motion to dismiss Reliance's cross-claim against Beauchamp. See The President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Dennis W. Madden, et al., 505 F.Supp. 557, at 600 (D.Md.1980). Accordingly, the district court's orders denying Crough's motion for summary judgment as to Georgetown's claims and his motion to dismiss Reliance's cross-claim in No. 80-1891 are not appealable and we must dismiss the purported appeals therefrom as not properly before us.