Source: https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2015/12/index.html
Timestamp: 2020-02-17 18:59:03
Document Index: 125915443

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 224', '§ 205', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§91', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 46', '§ 91', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§205', '§ 205', '§ 15', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 1983', '§ 1441', '§ 1983']

inversecondemnation.com: December 2015 posts
Arkansas: City Missed Appeal Of Just Comp Verdict By Not Paying The Court Reporter In Time
One for the appellate practitioners in the audience.
In City of Little Rock v. Hermitage Dev. Corp., No. CV-15-842 (Ark. Dec. 3, 2015), the Arkansas Supreme Court granted the property owners' motion to dismiss an appeal filed by the city from a jury verdict awarding just compensation. The court agreed that the City missed its deadlines to get the record on appeal lodged even though the trial court granted an extension of time to allow the court reporter preparing trial transcripts to get those done (and get paid).
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court should not have granted the request for an extension, because the rules require strict compliance, the rules are jurisdictional, and the city had not made the proper financial arrangements with the court reporter to get her paid. The rules require that this means the reporter is actually paid, "not merely making promises to pay or even diligent efforts to pay." Memo. at 5.
In other words, for the failure to pay $1500 to the reporter, the city lost the chance to appeal. Ouch.
Posted on December 31, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation | Permalink
La App: Trial Court's Ruling On Value "A Pure Credibility Call"
Another one in our year-end opinion rush.
In Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University v. Villavaso, No. 2014-CA-1277 (Dec. 23, 2015), the Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's view of just compensation after a bench trial, in a case about LSU's taking of property being used for a parking lot in New Orleans. The court concluded that the verdict was a choice between the property owner's appraiser and LSU's, which was "a pure credibility call." Slip op. at 9. And you know what that means when an appellate court says such things: affirmed.
The court also upheld the verdict regarding business losses, and the lower court's ruling that the owner was entitled to compensation both for the taking of the land, as well as the value of the parking business. Same result on LSU's claim that the trial judge erroneously prohibited one of LSU's appraisers from testifying.
But the court of appeals concluded that the $50,000 award for mental anguish -- a remedy allowable under Louisiana law in eminent domain actions -- was too much, and $15,000 was "appropriate." Why, the court does not explain.
Finally, the court upheld the $165,000 attorneys' fees award.
Overall, a satisfying property owner victory, so congratulations to our Owners' Counsel of America colleague Randy Smith for this one.
Posted on December 31, 2015 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Just Compensation | Appraisal | Permalink | 0 Comments
Oregon: Cutting Off Direct Highway Access Is OK, Provided Property Isn't Totally Landlocked
Here's one in which we've been waiting for the ball to drop, since we filed an amicus brief in the case. Unfortunately, the result in State of Oregon v. Alderwoods (Oregon), Ltd., No. SC062766 (Dec. 31, 2015) wasn't as hoped for, but looking for silver linings, was a lot less bad than it could have been.
Bottom line is that the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that a property owner does not have a right of direct access to a highway, only a right of reasonable access. Thus, when a project to improve Highway 99 cut off Alderwoods' driveways on Highway 99, it was not a taking of access because Alderwoods still had access to Highway 99 via a driveway on Warner Avenue:
The above cases demonstrate three governing principles regarding the common-law right of access of a property owner to an abutting public road. First, it is well established that a common-law right of access by property owners attaches to property as an interest in land. Specifically, an abutting property owner holds an easement of access, appurtenant to the abutting land, for the limited purpose of providing a means of ingress and egress to and from the owner’s property by means of the abutting public road. Second, the right of access to an abutting road is limited in scope. An abutting property owner does not have an absolute right to access an abutting road at the most direct or convenient location. Rather, the owner has a qualified right that is subject to the government’s interest in regulating the safe use of public thoroughfares. Third, the owner’s right of access ensures only reasonable access to and from the owner’s property by means of the abutting road. Those three principles, in combination, reduce to this central proposition: When governmental action interferes with an abutting landowner’s right of access for the purpose of ensuring the safe use of a public road, and the abutting landowner retains reasonable access to its property, no compensable taking of the property owner’s right of access occurs.
Slip op. at 517.
A photo of the "after" condition of the property here.
While this was not the result which our amicus brief advocated, at least the court did not adopt the reasoning of Court of Appeals Judge Armstrong, whose opinion argued that the state's ability to regulate access to the highway was enough to keep Alderwoods from having a property interest. See State v. Alderwoods (Oregon), Inc., 336 P.3d 1047 (Or. App. 2014) (Armstrong, J., concurring) (In summary, the state condemned defendant's access rights in the context of a project that would--and did--result in a regulatory denial of access to Highway 99W to promote the safe and efficient use of the highway as a highway. Whatever the measure of damages could be in those circumstances, it is not the diminished value of the land resulting from the loss of access to Highway 99W because, as a result of the regulatory elimination of the curb cuts and driveways, the property has no lawful access to Highway 99W irrespective of the condemnation of the access to the highway.").
As we noted above, silver linings.
There's more, of course, and if there is anything that you should be aware of that strikes us after we read the opinion in detail, we'll post it.
Posted on December 31, 2015 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Just Compensation | Appraisal, ▪ Land use law | Permalink | 0 Comments
Another short one that's been in the hopper for a while, Sorrells v. City of Macomb, No. 3-13-0763 (Ill. App. Oct. 23, 2015), involving a claim for inverse condemnation that was a result of flooding.
The inundation of the plaintiffs' property came from a street that was developed privately, but later dedicated to the city. The court of appeals concluded that this was not sufficient to state a claim for inverse condemnation:
In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the streets were constructed by DK Linde and "dedicated" to the City. According to plaintiffs' allegations, the City had taken the plaintiffs' property in the form of a "drainage easement" for the drainage of its streets. "It is well established that the government may not take an easement without just compensation." Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947), and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)). However, plaintiffs alleged that the private development as a whole caused the alleged unreasonable amount of surface water to drain onto their land from the detention and drainage basins.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged, "the water from the development, including from the streets, is being channeled and directed by said streets and is and will be unreasonably discharged from two Storm Water Detentions Basins onto Plaintiffs [property]." At most, the allegations, taken as true, indicate that the increased drainage onto the plaintiffs' land was for the benefit of both the private development and the public streets. Although temporary or permanent government-induced flooding can constitute a taking of property by flooding, the flooding as alleged in this case was induced by the private developers, not government action. Plaintiffs' complaint makes clear that the water allegedly invading the plaintiffs' property was drainage from two storm water detention basins or other drainage basins.
Thus, the allegations of count IV of the third-amended complaint are insufficient to support plaintiffs' claim of a taking for public use where the alleged increased water drainage was coming from the entire development, including streets, through detention or drainage basins. The development was not a public property and the acceptance of the dedication of the streets inside the development does not give rise to a taking where the drainage was from the basins. In addition, plaintiffs failed to allege that the water draining from the development onto their land, in an unreasonable amount and unnatural channels, was the intended or foreseeable result, in whole or part, of the City's actions rather than that of the development. See Bay Bottoms Drainage District v. Cache River Drainage District, 295 Ill. 301 (1920); Arkansas Game & Fish, 568 U.S. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 522 (property loss is compensable as a "taking" only when the government intended to invade a protected property interest or the invasion was the direct, natural, or probable result of authorized activity as opposed to a resulting incidental or consequential injury) (citing Ridge Line, Inc., 346 F.3d at 1355-56).
Besides, "traditionally" inverse condemnation claims are those in which the government alone is alleged to be responsible for the flooding, not just one of the causes.
Posted on December 30, 2015 in ▪ Inverse condemnation | Permalink | 0 Comments
Counting Down To The ALI-CLE Eminent Domain Conference (Austin, Jan 28-30, 2016)
We're exactly one month away from the 2016 Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation / Condemnation 101 Conference, which runs from January 28-30, 2016, in Austin, Texas.
Together with our friends and colleagues Joe Waldo, Jack Sperber, and Andrew Brigham, we think we're put together a pretty good program that covers a lot of ground. This is the first time the conference has been to Austin, and we're hoping for a good turnout.
Here's the full agenda for the program.
If you have not already signed up, there is more than enough room, and there's still time.
If you haven't yet pulled the trigger, we'd like to convince you to come. So over the next few days, we're going to be posting highlights from the agenda, featuring our stellar faculty.
We'll start off with a talk welcoming us to the city by Austin Mayor Steve Adler, who in his former life was an eminent domain lawyer.
Posted on December 28, 2015 in ▪ Administrative law, ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Court of Federal Claims | Federal Circuit, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Just Compensation | Appraisal, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Public Use | Kelo, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Seminars | Permalink | 0 Comments
Tenn App And The Churchill Principle: On Further Review, We Goofed
More from our end-of-year clearing of the opinion hopper.
Winston Churchill reportedly said, "Never give in--never, never, never, never, in nothing great or small, large or petty, never give in except to convictions of honor and good sense. Never yield to force; never yield to the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy."
Well, the case of City of Memphis v. Tandy J. Gilliland Family LLC, No. W2014-02472-COA-R3-CV (Dec. 16, 2015) might prove the point.
The opinion was the second time the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered issues regarding the taking of the Gilliland Family's land by the Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division (nice use of the Oxford comma there, MLGW) for utility poles. The first time up, the question involved public use. The court concluded the taking was for public use, even though MLGW allowed the poles to be shared by private telecommunications and cable providers. In the course of resolving this issue, the court concluded that a federal law, the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224, mandated that "utilities" allow "co-location." The court remanded for valuation.
The trial court dutifully applied the court of appeals' conclusion and rebuffed the property owner's attempts to keep arguing the point that the Pole Attachment Act didn't require sharing, and thus co-location rights could not be part of the taking. Law of the case and all that. Undaunted, the owners appealed again, arguing that the first court of appeals' decision was wrong insofar as it concluded that co-location rights could be taken by MLGW, because the definition of "utility" in the Act excludes entities owned by state and local governments, and MLGW is a subdivision of the City of Memphis. The city protested: it's too late to reargue this because this point of law was settled the first time around.
Mea culpa, held the court, the owner is right: we goofed. But the court didn't overrule its prior ruling that the taking was for public use, only the issue of whether MLGW was required by the Pole Attachment Act to allow co-location. The court allowed the condemnation to go forward, but vacated the co-location rights granted.
Posted on December 28, 2015 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Public Use | Kelo | Permalink | 0 Comments
Ind App: Statute Of Limitations On "Continuous" Inverse Condemnation Claim Renews With Each Injury
We have quite a few court decisions in the hopper, and as 2015 draws down we're going to post them with only minimal analysis, hoping to clear the queue before January.
Here's the first, a recent opinion from the Indiana Court of Appeals, in which Mr. Kerr objected after noxious odors from a city owned and maintained sewage line entered his house. He brought claims for both tort (for injuries to his health), and for inverse condemnation (the gases eventually forced him to leave the home).
The court of appeals concluded that his tort claim would have been viable, except that he had not instituted it within the time allowed by the statute of limitations. Kerr admitted he knew of his potential health problems as early as 2005, but didn't bring the claim for more than 7 years.
However, the court allowed at least part of the inverse condemnation claim -- a claim for compensation for loss of the use and enjoyment of property -- to go forward, because the harm in that case was "continual," and, "as such, trigger new limitations periods each time they damage or interfere with the use and enjoyment of his property." Slip op. at 12.
One potential problem: the court concluded (assumed?) that inverse condemnation claims are tort claims, subject to Indiana's requirement that bars tort claims unless notice is given to a municipality within 180 days. Consequently, Kerr's inverse damages were limited to those which he incurred 180 days before he filed notice. The court did not cite any authority for applying the tort notice requirement to inverse condemnation claims, so we're wondering whether there is authority for the proposition that inverse condemnation are tort claims under Indiana law, or maybe there isn't.
Any Indiana practitioners out there who know the answer on this one?
Kerr v. City of South Bend, No. 71A03-1502-CT-49 (Ind. App. Dec. 23, 2015)
Posted on December 28, 2015 in ▪ Inverse condemnation | Permalink | 0 Comments
Barista's note: last week, the Hawaii Supreme Court issued a 4-1 ruling in Friends of Makakilo v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, LLC, No. SCAP-13-0002266, holding that the State Land Use Commission was not prohibited from adopting a boundary amendment (akin to a rezoning under Hawaii's state-heavy land classification scheme) while the process for designating Important Agricultural Lands plays out.
Earlier this year, on June 25, 2015, court heard oral arguments, and our colleague Paul Schwind, who has guest posted before on this and other important cases, kindly attended the arguments, and had the the following report, which we're posting while we digest the majority and dissenting opinions.
In this case, Appellants Sierra Club and Clayton Hee appeal from the Decision and Order of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which dismissed their appeal from the Land Use Commission’s (“LUC”) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, which approved Appellee D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes’ Petition for District Boundary Amendment (as amended). The LUC reclassified approximately 1525.516 acres of Appellee’s land from the state agricultural land use district to the state urban land use district. The land is slated for development of the Ho`opili project.
Appellants also argue that the reclassification violated Act 183, HRS § 205-41 through -52, which are the statutory provisions implementing Article XI, Section 3’s mandate, and which govern land use on important agricultural lands (“IALs”). They contend that the LUC should not reclassify lands that could potentially qualify as IALs until the City and County of Honolulu has completed the formal process of identifying Oahu’s IALs.
Lastly, Appellants argue that the reclassification violated Hawai`i Administrative Rules (“HAR”) § 15-15-77, which requires conformance to the Hawai`i State Plan. They also contend that the reclassification violated HAR § 15-15-77(6), which requires the LUC to consider whether taking land in “intensive agricultural use for two years prior to the date of a filing of a petition [for a district boundary amendment] or lands with a high capacity for intensive agricultural use” out of the agricultural district “[w]ill not substantially impair actual or potential agricultural production in the vicinity of the subject property or in the county of State; or . . . [i]s reasonably necessary for urban growth. . . .”
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/courts/oral_arguments/archive/oasc13_2266.html (or here: https://archive.org/details/SCOA062515132266)
Hawaii Supreme Court Oral Argument on Land Use Commission's Hoopili Approval
When we last visited this case on November 30, 2012, Circuit Court Judge Rhonda Nishimura had granted motions to dismiss an attempt by Friends of Makakilo to cross-appeal, in the agency appeal by the Sierra Club Hawaii Chapter and [now former] Senator Clayton Hee, from the Land Use Commission’s (LUC’s) order granting a district boundary amendment effecting the reclassification of land from the “agricultural” district to the “urban” district for D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes' proposed Ho`opili development. The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the “cross-appeal” as untimely; see Friends of Makakilo v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, LLC et al., slip op., No. SCAP-13-0002408 (Haw. Oct. 30, 2014).
Subsequent to the November 2012 preliminary skirmish, on May 8, 2013, Judge Nishimura heard oral argument on the Sierra Club’s and Senator Hee’s appeal-in-chief. She dismissed that appeal and affirmed the LUC’s decision. The court’s written decision and order and final judgment were filed on June 27, 2013, and were promptly appealed by the Sierra Club and Senator Hee. After having originally been filed in the Intermediate Court of Appeals, the appeal was transferred to the Hawaii Supreme Court and is now designated The Sierra Club et al. v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, LLC et al., No. SCAP-13-0002266 (Haw. May 1, 2014).
The Supreme Court heard oral argument on this appeal on June 25, 2015. Sitting in on this case were Supreme Court Chief Justice Mark E. Recktenwald, Associate Justices Paula A. Nakayama, Sabrina S. McKenna, and Richard W. Pollack, with Circuit Court Judge Gary W. B. Chang assigned in place of Justice Simeon R. Acoba, recused [and since retired].
Eric A. Seitz, Esq., began by arguing for Appellants Sierra Club and Senator Hee that the subject property of the reclassification is the “best and most productive” agricultural land in Hawaii and perhaps in the entire United States. The property represents 32 percent of the most productive land on the island of Oahu, and 13 percent of such land statewide. Chief Justice Recktenwald immediately asked (evidently referring to the record on appeal), what about alternative agricultural lands said to be available? Mr. Seitz responded that the lands referred to have no infrastructure [such as farm roadways and irrigation systems], and are not a substitute for the subject property. The contrary findings of fact in the record (such as “no significant impact” to agriculture) are therefore “100 percent wrong”, and it would be “inconceivable” – a violation of law and the constitutional mandate to conserve and protect important agricultural lands (Article XI, Section 3 of the Hawaii State Constitution) – to take these lands.
Mr. Seitz asserted that the appellants do not dispute the need for housing. But the statutory mandate to the LUC is to achieve “balance” in its decision-making, and it did not do that, in “utter disregard” to the policies in the law. There are already 40,000 new housing units permitted for development in the Ewa region. The subject property is not needed for housing, and the LUC made no finding that a need for housing there outweighed the need to preserve agricultural land. Unlike in the Koa Ridge [reported here on June 1, 2015], the developers here have consistently misrepresented and lied about their case. The alternative agricultural land they proposed was in small plots and gulches and other unproductive land. They gave no indication of the jobs that would be created, except in food service. And most of the homes to be developed will be “overpriced”.
In response to a series of questions from the Justices, Mr. Seitz stated that the appellants challenge all of the LUC’s findings of fact, and appeal the entire process for violation of law and the standards of review in Haw. Rev. Stat. §91-14. They are no longer arguing whether Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City and County of Honolulu, 102 Haw. 465, 78 P.3d 1 (2003) (until legislative standards and criteria are adopted, the constitutional section is legally inoperative and does not act as a barrier to reclassification) is applicable. The LUC reclassification action did not meet the tests required under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205-4(h) (the proposed boundary must be “reasonable, not violative of section 205‑2 [standards for districting and classification of lands] and part III of [chapter 205 (§§ 205‑41 through 205-52 relating to important agricultural lands)], and consistent with the policies and criteria established pursuant to sections 205‑16 [conformance to the provisions of the Hawaii State Plan] and 205-17 [LUC decision-making criteria]”). Mr. Seitz conceded that the subject property is within the City and County of Honolulu’s urban growth boundary, but he contended that the LUC nevertheless has a binding obligation to “stay its hand” pending the City’s mapping of important agricultural lands. He further conceded that the Hawaii State Plan does not favor agriculture over other land uses, but added that former Board of Agriculture Chairman Russell Kokubun’s testimony in this case acknowledged that there is no substitute for the agricultural lands in the subject property. He concluded that pursuant to City Council Resolution 12-23 CD1, FD1 (Feb. 15, 2012), the agricultural productivity of the subject property should be considered, even though it is within the urban growth boundary.
Gregory W. Kugle, Esq., then argued for Appellee D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes by beginning that this case is about planning: “he who fails to prepare, prepares to fail”. The City and County of Honolulu’s adopted General Plan and Ewa Development Plan have long since determined that the region of the subject property is intended for urban development. In Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Co. v. City and County of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 480, 483, 486, 777 P.2d 244, 246, 248 (1989), the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the statutory requirement in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-4(a) that “[z]oning in all counties shall be accomplished within the framework of a long range, comprehensive general plan prepared or being prepared to guide the overall future development of the county”, and there has been no change in legislative intent since this language of the Zoning Enabling Act was first enacted in 1957. Here, the LUC is implementing City plans in place since the 1970’s. Today, the Court has heard nothing about long-range planning. Under the standard of review for appeals (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-14), the LUC’s decision and order has the presumption of validity. The appellants must specifically identify findings of fact that are “clearly erroneous”, but they have not done so, and the Court cannot otherwise re-weigh the facts. The site of the proposed Ho`opili project is surrounded on the north by the H-1 freeway, to the east and south by existing urban development, and to the west by the University of Hawaii West Oahu Campus.
In response to questions from Chief Justice Recktenwald, Mr. Kugle continued that the City’s urban growth boundary was drawn to protect 3,000 acres of important agricultural lands in Ewa outside that boundary. There are 30,000 acres of such prime land that are not being farmed on Oahu. Horton-Schuler’s consultant testified that the City is making improvements to the Lake Wilson irrigation system, and wells are also being developed on the north shore which can service alternative agricultural sites. The reclassification to urban met the tests required under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205-4(h) by virtue of the fact that important agricultural lands (IAL) have not yet been formally identified by the City and designated by the LUC pursuant to the criteria set forth in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205-42(a); therefore the subject property cannot be treated as IAL. Further, as land within the City’s urban growth boundary, the subject property is specifically excluded from such consideration by Haw. Rev. Stat. §205‑47(a) (Counties required to map IAL within their jurisdictions) and § 205‑46(e) (incentives for IAL apply only to lands so designated).
In response to questions from Justice Pollack, Mr. Kugle added that the LUC findings of fact support the conclusion that the reclassification has met the “not substantially impair” [agricultural production] and “reasonably necessary” [to meet the need for housing] standards of HAR § 15-15-77(6) (supra). Since the 1970’s, it has been a conscious policy decision of the City to direct growth to Ewa, and “keep the country country” elsewhere on Oahu. The Ho`opili project meets the need for primary residences, unlike some previously committed projects that will develop second homes and vacation units. The reclassification to urban also meets the standard of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205-2 for urban districts by providing a sufficient reserve area of suitable lands for foreseeable urban growth on an incrementally phased basis. By so doing at this location, the reclassification serves to give the “greatest possible protection” to other agricultural lands elsewhere that are arguably better, based on historical crop yields.
Don S. Kitaoka, Esq., argued next for Appellee City and County of Honolulu, Department of Planning and Permitting. There is “a time and place for everything” in the land use process, he said, within which the City’s General Plan and Development Plans must be given deference. The General Plan directs growth to the Ewa plain, which inevitably requires that agricultural land within the urban growth boundary be used for housing. Yet 3,000 acres of agricultural land is protected in Ewa, together with 30,000 acres of prime land in the rural Sustainable Community Plan areas. The most recent Ewa Development Plan is the result of a deliberative process and full public comment. Accordingly, the Court should not give “short shrift” to the City’s plans.
Finally, Bryan C. Yee, Esq., argued for Appellee State Office of Planning that the planning process must allow adequate land for development. In this case, the LUC made findings of fact that agricultural lands are available for farm tenants in the Kunia Agricultural Park and in the “Galbraith lands” purchased by the State in Central Oahu. The standard in the law does not require a quid pro quo substitution of acreage or quality of agricultural land to replace the area reclassified to urban. In response to a question from Justice Pollack, Mr. Yee added that the standards and criteria for reclassification or rezoning of important agricultural lands in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205‑50 (as linked through § 205-17) do not apply to every LUC reclassification action. Nevertheless, prime agricultural land does get consideration even if it has not been formally designated as IAL. Where conflict arises, that is where planning comes in. In conclusion, he asked the Court to consider that the LUC is a group of volunteers who donate their time to consider the dockets before them.
In rebuttal, Mr. Seitz contended that the reference in the LUC findings of fact to 30,000 acres of prime agricultural land with water was entirely hypothetical. He reiterated that City Council Resolution 12-23 CD1, FD1 (Feb. 15, 2012), as amended on January 19, 2012, specifically requires “that the [City’s] process of identification and mapping of important agricultural lands also consider agriculturally productive lands within urban growth boundaries that are classified as prime agricultural lands, provided adequate water supply is available”, and this applies to both the Ho`opili and Koa Ridge properties. He added that there was testimony from a former Campbell Estate employee that agricultural lands within the Ewa plain should be preserved. He concluded that this Court has required a high degree of scrutiny when reviewing agency decisions affecting the environment.
Watch this space for further reportage.
Posted on December 27, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Zoning & Planning | Permalink
Here's one that combines two of our practice areas, election and admin law. Land users should also pay attention because admin law issues frequently arise there, also.
In Green Party of Hawaii v. Nago, No. CAAP-14-0001313 (Dec. 18, 2015), the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals concluded that certain practices by the State Office of Elections were not "rules," and thus need not have been adopted via the rulemaking procedures in the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act.
The procedures complained of were reactions to the shortage of printed ballots and other well-known difficulties the Elections Office had during the 2012 General Election. The ICA acknowledged "[i]t is undisputed that mistakes were made." Slip op. at 2. See also slip op. at 24 ("In sum, mistakes were made in conjunction with the 2012 General Election.").
Election law types know that courts are generally pretty reluctant to intervene when the plaintiff can't show that the complained-about actions made a difference in an election. Here, no different. The use of the passive-voice cliche tells you where this one was going (the Elections Office really goofed, but no-harm, no-foul), and indeed, "none of the races that could have been impacted by the ballot mix-up were close enough to have been affected," even if the Elections Office's "execution of the 2012 General Election fell short of the electorate's reasonable expectations." Slip op. at 2.
Admin law types should really read the opinion in detail, because it details the tests for when an agency procedure must be adopted by rulemaking. We won't spell the details out here, because the opinion does a good job of it, in our view. Short version: the procedures and methodogies employed by the Elections Office were not statements of general applicability or future effect that interpreted law. Consequently, they were not "rules," as defined by the Admin Procedures Act, and it was not error for the Elections Office to not have adopted them by the usual rulemaking process.
Only time -- and the next election -- will tell whether "mistakes [will continue to be] made."
Green Party of Hawaii v. Nago, No. CAAP-14-0001313 (Haw. App. Dec. 18, 2015)
Posted on December 26, 2015 in ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Yule Log: Darth Vader Edition
An inversecondemnation.com holiday tradition, the Yule Log, updated for current events.
Pa Supreme Court Loves The Smell Of Biosolids In The Morning: "Normal Agricultural Operation" Under Right To Farm Act For Judge, Not Jury
Lawprofs and other academics will tell you that nuisance law is about "negative externalities" and the like, but to us, it has always been about the smell.
Especially when it comes to nuisance claims about farms and ranches. Excessive noise, dust, weird hours. No question, those can be disturbing to neighbors and the public, but man, the smell. As one Indiana court put it about a pig farm, "so long as the human race consumes pork, someone must tolerate the smell." Shatto v. McNulty, 509 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. App. 1987).
Deciding who has to tolerate the smells is of the main driving forces behind "right to farm" acts, adopted by many states. These laws generally restrict the ability to bring nuisance lawsuits, or even prohibit them, against farmers and ranchers for the usual "negative externalities" which result from normal farming operations. Hawaii has a right to farm act, and a pretty strong one. Like many states, Hawaii has elevated agriculture to a constitutional imperative, and a muscular right to farm act is one byproduct of that.
Back to the smells. It sounds like when a Pennsylvania farm applied "biosolids" (a fancy way of saying treated human sewage) as a fertilizer, the neighbors were assaulted by the smell, even a neighbor who testified, "I enjoy the smell of manure. I think it is the most down-to-earth country smell that you could smell. I go outside and take a big whiff. I enjoy it." Here are how other neighbors reacted:
Appellees contended that as soon as the biosolids were applied, extremely offensive odors emanated; many of the appellees were long-time farm residents and were thus accustomed to the smell of animal manure, and characterized the biosolids’ odor as unusually noxious, so bad that they could not leave their homes on many occasions. Appellees described the odor and its impact as: “smells like a dead horse[,]” “the most horrendous smell I ever smelled[,]” Cleo Fockler Deposition, 1/17/12, at 40, 41; “smelled like dead animals[,]” Beverly Cox Deposition, 1/19/12, at 65; “typically smelling like a herd of dead, rotting deer[,]” Gilbert, at 40 (quoting Amended Complaint, 7/23/10, ¶ 86), “I can tell you the difference between manure — this doesn’t even go on the same scale as that ... It smelled like death[,]” Scott Eckert Deposition, 1/30/12, at 37; “[t]hat smell changed the way we lived[,]” “made your kids stay in P [m]ade you close your windows when you didn’t want to ... [m]ade you tell people not to come visit you, or people that came visit you said they aren’t staying[,]” Terrence Fancher Deposition, 2/24/12, at 36; “like rotting flesh P [n]auseating, repulsive stench[,]” Susan Fox Deposition, 4/4/12, at 112; “was a lot stronger odor [than animal manure], and it stayed constantly[,]” Rickey McSherry Deposition, 2/3/12, at 29; and “like a dead, rotting flesh type of situation[,]” Joseph Jasinski Deposition, 4/12/12, at 56. During the period the biosolids were applied, appellees described suffering from physical symptoms such as burning eyes, sore throats, coughing, headaches, and nausea. See, e.g., Melda Bittorf Deposition, 1/18/12, at 28-29; Wendy Fodel Deposition, 3/6/12, at 119; William Strine Deposition, 1/18/12, at 140-41; Terrence Fancher Deposition, 2/24/12, at 144-45; Susan Fox Deposition, 4/4/12, at 94, 170; Kathryn Jasinski Deposition, 4/12/12, at 114, 128-29; Jeffrey Van Voorhis Deposition, 3/20/12, at 144, 271-72.
Holy cow. Not surprisingly, they sued.
But the Pennsylvania right to farm act -- which limits nuisance actions for "normal agricultural operations" if the "agricultural operation" has been in operation more than one year before the lawsuit, and the "normal agricultural operation" has continued "substantially unchanged" -- stood in their way. The question arose about whether spreading biosolids is a "normal agricultural operation," and, more importantly, whether a judge or a jury makes that call. Is the use of biosolids as a normal farming practice something determined on a case-by-case basis, or broadly?
In Gilbert v. Synagro Central, LLC, No. J-32-3015 (Dec. 21, 2015), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said it is a legal question, for the judge to decide. No need for evidence, no need for a jury. The first issue the court resolved was whether the statute was a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. It is the latter, the court concluded, because it immunizes farmers from any nuisance lawsuits one year after they start, and not from the injury like a statute of limitations. Statutes of repose are generally legal questions for judges, and the legislature did not mean for juries to make "an idiosyncratic determination of a farming practice's 'normality[.]'" Slip op. at 28.
Having determined the question was one of law, the court resolved the substantive issue, and concluded that spreading biosolids as fertilizer is a "normal agricultural operation," and reading the statute that way "protects farms now and in the future," as the legislature intended. See slip op. at 36 ("Thus, a review of related authority concerning biosolids land use leads to the conclusion this is and has been an accepted farming practice in Pennsylvania."). There was no real dispute that the farm had been spreading biosolids more than one year prior to the lawsuit, by the way.
Summary judgment for the farm, nuisance claim dismissed.
All in all, a very strong reading of a right to farm law.
Posted on December 24, 2015 in ▪ Agriculture, ▪ Land use law | Permalink | 0 Comments
Posted on December 23, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Equal Protection, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink | 0 Comments
HAWSCT: Land Use Comm'n Need Not Impose Moratorium Until After "Important Ag Lands" Process Is Complete
Here's one in a land use case we've been following, both because it is a huge issue and because our partners Greg Kugle and Matt Evans represent the prevailing land owner.
All Hawaii land users need to read this, a 4-1 decision (Justice McKenna writing for the majority, with Justice Pollack in in dissent) that involves the LUC, the "Important Agricultural Lands" process, and reclassification. We haven't yet read it in detail, but here's the holding:
This appeal involves a long-standing issue in this state: balancing agricultural and urban land uses.
Pursuant to Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City & County of Honolulu, 102 Hawaii 465, 476, 78 P.3d 1, 12 (2003), Article XI, Section 3, standing alone, is not self-executing; rather, its mandate is carried out through the provisions of Part III. Therefore, the plain language of Article XI, Section 3 does not require the LUC to stay reclassification of agricultural land while the formal county-initiated IAL designation process runs its course. Pursuant to the policies underlying Part III, state and county government should consider the “compelling state interest in conserving the State’s agricultural land resource base assuring the long term availability of agricultural lands for agricultural use,” see HRS § 205-41 (Supp. 2005); however, the plain language of Part III contains no provision requiring a stay. Further, the constitutional history of Article XI, Section 3, as well as the legislative history of Part III, does not reveal an intent to require the LUC to delay reclassifying agricultural land pending formal designation of IALs. Second, reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the LUC’s finding that the reclassification of the land at issue in this case was consistent with the Hawaii State Plan, would not substantially impair agricultural production, and was necessary for urban growth. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s decision and order, which affirmed the LUC’s D&O.
More to come, once we digest this. In the meantime, congratulations to our colleagues Greg and Matt.
Posted on December 22, 2015 in ▪ Agriculture, ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Zoning & Planning | Permalink | 0 Comments
Back to the Hawaiian-only election. Here's an interview from ThinkTech Hawaii which asks "Is Nai Aupuni Sponsored by the State Government?"
The interview is conducted by the plaintiff in the Akina v. Hawaii case, and the interviewees are one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs, Michael Lilly, and the other is U. Hawaii lawprof Williamson Chang. Each has their viewpoint of course (Professor Chang has argued that Hawaiians should be independent, and not relegated to tribal status, while Dr. Akina and Mr. Lilly are challenging the election), but whatever your view of this thing is, the program is a very good 1/2 hour education on the principles at stake.
The quote in this post's title is from Professor Chang, whose answer to the question posed by the video's title is clearly "yes." If Hawaiians want independence, then those efforts should not be funded by the very sovereign they are attempting to separate from, according to Professor Chang.
Meanwhile, we're still waiting for more action in the Ninth Circuit.
Posted on December 22, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Equal Protection, ▪ Williamson County | Ripeness | Permalink | 0 Comments
When we hear the word "trona," we think of Trona, California, a hardscrabble San Bernardino County town near Death Valley.
We just thought we'd get that out of the way, because today's case from the Federal Circuit, Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-5028 (Oct. 9, 2015), doesn't involve the town, but it does involve trona mining (in Wyoming).
It seems that the federal government preferred trona mining to oil and gas development. The Bureau of Land Management "indefinitely suspended" oil and gas leases on federal public lands in one part of Wyoming, because oil and gas development posed risks to trona mining. Barlow had 26 oil and gas leases with BLM, and it sued for a taking, and for breach of the leases.
After trial, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the breach of contract claim failed on the merits, and that the takings claim was not ripe. We won't go into the details of the CFC's conclusion about why suspension of the leases was not a breach, except to say that the suspension actually didn't foreclose all possibility of Barlow drilling in the area, because "BLM repeatedly stated that it would recognize valid existing rights."
The CFC dismissed the takings claim as not ripe because Barlow had not sought an "APD," which is "a permit to drill" in bureaucratese. But seeking an APD would have been futile, Barlow argued, to no avail. The same reason that supported the failure of the breach of contract claim -- BLM's statements that it would recognize existing rights, whatever that meant -- also meant that an APD might work.
The Federal Circuit affirmed. No "final decision" from BLM meant that the takings claim was not ripe under Williamson County. "BLM had discretion to permit or deny the APD." Slip op. at 14. Even in light of the "suspension," held the court: "[i]n particular, the testimony indicated that the BLM could still consider an APD even if the leases were currently suspended. Id. The BLM’s resource management plans also reflect this discretion." Slip op. at 14.
Seems a little odd to us that an "indefinite suspension" wasn't really a suspension (if BLM would "recognize existing rights," then exactly what was it "suspending?"). But that's the kind of rationale that Williamson County allows.
Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-5028 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2015)
Posted on December 21, 2015 in ▪ Court of Federal Claims | Federal Circuit, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Williamson County | Ripeness | Permalink | 0 Comments
Posted on December 20, 2015 in ▪ Equal Protection, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Posted on December 18, 2015 in ▪ Articles and publications, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Public Use | Kelo, ▪ Seminars | Permalink | 0 Comments
Posted on December 18, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Equal Protection, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink | 0 Comments
New Cert Petition: Federal Circuit Expanded § 1500's Jurisdictional Bar
One for all you Court of Federal Claims mavens: a new cert petition, filed On Wednesday, that once again puts front and center 28 U.S.C. § 1500, the statute which bars the CFC from hearing claims that are "pending in any other court" against the United States.
The statute was last interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307 (2011), a case in which the Nation alleged in a District Court lawsuit that the federal government had breached trust duties it owed. Almost immediately thereafter, the Nation filed a claim in the CFC for money damages based on the same theory. The CFC's limited jurisdiction does not allow it to hear claims for declaratory relief, and District Courts are without power to make the federal government pay significant money damages. Meaning that claims like the Nation's (and takings claims where the property owner also challenges the validity of the government action) must be split between the CFC and a District Court. But the CFC dismissed under § 1500, because both lawsuits arose out of the same set of facts, despite each seeking separate (and exclusive) relief.
We filed an amicus brief in that case pointing out to the Supreme Court the "jurisdictional ambush" which § 1500 sets for takings claimants caused by the claim splitting requirement, arguing that this would "force private property owners into a quandary: either they must forfeit their ability to challenge the validity of the regulation, or they must risk losing their rights to seek just compensation." We also argued that takings claims were different, since they are self-executing, and thus there must be a federal judicial forum which can hear these claims and award just compensation.
But the Court failed to address the issue, because it adopted a test for § 1500 which did not go past the trust claim in the case, which requires the CFC to dismiss if there is any claim pending in another court that arise from the same "operative fact." The Court affirmed the CFC's dismissal, because at the time of its filing, the District Court lawsuit had already been filed.
The takings problem we noted in our amicus brief has been presented to the Court in at least two cases since Tohono, with the latest case being being denied review only recently. And now the issue is back again, with the latest petition seeking review of a recent Federal Circuit opinion (which we detailed here).
Section 1500 of Title 28 bars the Court of Federal Claims from asserting jurisdiction over “any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States.” In United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 317 (2011), this Court held that, for the purposes of § 1500, “[t]wo suits are for or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in the [Court of Federal Claims], if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit.”
1. Whether the Federal Circuit impermissibly broadened the scope of § 1500’s jurisdictional bar and deviated from settled precedent when it construed this Court’s straightforward “substantially the same operative facts” standard to mean “arising out of the same transaction.”
2. Whether, in the absence of clear congressional intent to bar constitutional claims, § 1500 should be construed to preclude Fifth Amendment takings claims and, if so, whether such an interpretation would be unconstitutional.
In our view, until the Court resolves the question left open by Tohono, property owners are going to get unfairly caught up in this jurisdictional trap, and will risk being deprived of constitutional remedies to which they are entitled.
More posted, when there is more.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Resource Inv., Inc. v. United States, No. ___ (Dec. 16, 2015)
inversecondemnation.com: Cert Petition: Overrule Williamson County!
Posted on December 18, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Court of Federal Claims | Federal Circuit, ▪ Regulatory takings | Permalink | 0 Comments
The "Oprah Theory Of Elections" - Everyone Wins! Hawaiians-Only Election "Terminated," All Candidates Invited To Participate
You win the election, and you win the election! and ...
We can't take credit for the pithy headline because we cribbed it from elections law guru, lawprof Rick Hasen ("Hawaii Election Subject to #SCOTUS Stay Cancelled") ("(It’s the Oprah rule: You get elected! You get elected! Every-body-gets-elected!)").
Coming up with lines like this is why Professor Hasen earns the big bucks.
We appropriated it because it accurately captures the end result of the announcement this morning by Nai Aupuni, the NGO set up to conduct the election -- funded with millions of dollars of taxpayer money -- of delegates to a convention whose purpose it will be to settle on a way forward for Hawaiians to have some sort of sovereignty (or maybe not, since all options are professed to be open). Nai Aupuni announced this morning that the election was "terminated," and that the outfit actually doing the ballot counting has been instructed to stop taking ballots, and never, never, never to count those that it has already received.
And here's the Oprah part: Nai Aupuni also announced that the "aha," the quasi-constitutional convention for which the now-terminated election was choosing delegates, is going to happen in February 2016 anyway, and every candidate who was in the race -- all 196 of them -- is invited to be a delegate.
In other words, in effect they all got elected.
After Thanksgiving, the U.S. Supreme Court had enjoined the counting of ballots and certification of the election pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit in the appeal from the District Court's denial of an injunction. The central issue is whether the "election," was a private affair, and thus insulated from the requirements of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, or whether the public funding and questions involved meant that this could not be a race-restricted election. On the challengers' motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court upheld the private nature of the election, and the Ninth Circuit refused to issue a stay on appeal.
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, as Circuit Justice, issued a stay pending review by the entire Court, and when the rest of the justices got a look, they split 5-4 and prohibited the counting of ballots and the certification of the election. In response, Nai Aupuni announced that the closing date of the election would be extended for three additional weeks, which resulted in a lot of cringing in the peanut gallery since that's the sort of thing that is supposed to happen only in a banana republic.
But now that doesn't appear to matter, as the election has been called off, and according to the press release, we should expect a motion by the defendants to dismiss the appeal as moot.
Posted on December 15, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Equal Protection, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink | 0 Comments
Posted on December 14, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Williamson County | Ripeness | Permalink | 0 Comments
Here's one more amici brief supporting the the cert petition in Arrigoni Ent., LLC v. Town of Durham, No. 15-631 (cert. petition filed Nov. 10, 2015). (Here is the first amicus brief filed today, and here's the second.)
This one -- on behalf of the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, and lawprof Ilya Somin -- we assisted on, with the heavy lifting being undertaken by NFIB's Luke Wake. Our brief takes a slightly different approach than the others, although we too call for the Court to revisit Williamson County:
Thirty years ago, in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), this Court pronounced a new and unfounded rule that a property owner must sue in state court in order to ripen a federal takings claim. This marked a radical departure from the historic practice. There was never, previously, any requirement that property owners had to resort to litigation in order to ripen their takings claims. For that matter, courts played no role in the ripening of takings claims prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and there is no basis for assuming that, through ratification, the Reconstruction Congress imposed any sort of litigation requirement on property owners seeking to ripen claims against state actors.
To be sure, Williamson County’s requirement to litigate in state court is anathematic to the very reforms that Congress sought to effect with the Reconstruction Amendments, and enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure federal rights—especially the guarantee against uncompensated takings—for citizens of the United States, against the various states. The Amendment was necessary to curb pervasive abuse by state governments at the time. And, to further that noble goal, the Reconstruction Congress enacted Section 1983 in order to ensure that citizens would have a federal forum to vindicate their federal rights—precisely because, there was great skepticism as to whether state courts could be trusted to adequately enforce the federal constitution against the coordinate branches of state government.
Not only does Williamson County’s requirement to litigate in state court defeat the Reconstruction Congress’ goal of opening the federal court house doors to citizens alleging violation of federal rights, but it denies the right to litigate in federal court without any truly principled basis. Property owners are simply shut out from federal court without any firm doctrinal justification. Worse—in a total miscarriage of justice—some courts apply Williamson County to deny access to both federal and state courts. For all of these reasons, the time has come to reconsider Williamson County.
Well, that looks like it for amicus briefs at this point (although if more come in that we were not aware of, we'll post them). Now, we wait for the response.
Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of National Federation of Independent...
Here's the second amicus curiae brief supporting the the cert petition in Arrigoni Ent., LLC v. Town of Durham, No. 15-631 (cert. petition filed Nov. 10, 2015). (Here's the first.)
This brief was filed by the Institute for Justice, and authored by Supreme Court takings maven Michael Berger:
1. It is time for the Court to reconsider Williamson County’s state court litigation prong, which requires state court confirmation that there is no state remedy for a governmental taking of property. Only then will a 5th Amendment claim be “ripe” for federal court litigation. The premise of that rule goes beyond the plain language and meaning of the 5th Amendment. A municipality’s taking of private property without just compensation is complete when property is taken and compensation is not paid by the government. It does not require a judicial determination to complete, or ripen, the taking. And, if it did, there is no reason why such a determination must take place in state court.
2. This Court’s cases since Williamson County have shown the need to disapprove the state court litigation requirement. First, in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997) this Court authorized a municipal defendant sued for a taking in state court to remove the case to federal court, even though removal is proper only if the plaintiff could have brought suit in federal court in the first place (28 U.S.C. § 1441[a]) – something Williamson County forbids. Second, in San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), the Court held that, once a case is brought and tried in state court – as commanded by Williamson County – issue preclusion would prevent prosecuting such a case in federal court. Four concurring Justices urged reconsideration of Williamson County. Third, in Horne v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062, n. 6 (2013), the Court concluded that, once there has been a taking without payment, a proper constitutional claim has been presented, without the need for further “ripening.”
3. No other constitutionally protected right is subjected to state court “ripening” as a condition precedent to suit in federal court. If the 5th Amendment’s protection of property is truly no “poor relation” to the rest, as this Court proclaimed in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994), then it is entitled to equal access to federal courts.
4. Both Williamson County and this case were brought under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such cases are probably the worst cases in which to inject a state court litigation requirement. As this Court has held, the point of this legislation was to “interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights.” (Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 [1972].)
Yes, there are more briefs, so stay tuned.
Motion for Leave to File and Amicus Curiae Brief of Institute for Justice Supporting Petitioner, Arrigoni E...
Here's the first in a series of posts we're going to put up, with the cert petition and the supporting amici briefs (ours included) in Arrigoni, Ent., LLC v. Town of Durham, No. 150631 (petition filed Nov. 10, 2015).
In that case, the Second Circuit in a two-sentence ruling, summarily affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Arrigoni's regulatory takings claim under the "state procedures" prong of Williamson County, because the property owner "failed to 'seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.'" Slip op. at 2.
1. Whether the Court should reconsider, and then overrule or modify, the portion of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985), barring property owners from filing a federal takings claim in federal court until they exhaust state court remedies, when this rule results in numerous jurisdictional “anomalies” and has a “dramatic” negative impact on takings law, San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 351- 52 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)?
2. Alternatively, whether federal courts can and should waive Williamson County’s state litigation requirement for prudential reasons when a federal takings claim is factually concrete without state procedures, as some circuit courts hold, or apply the requirement as a rigid jurisdictional barrier, as other circuits hold?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Arrigoni Ent., LLC v. Town of Durham, No. 15-631 (Nov. 10, 2015)
Happiness Is Not A Perfect Puppy In The First Circuit: Removed Takings Claim Remanded As Unripe
We are on the road today, so were not going to post. But when the case title is Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. City of East Providence, No.15-1553 (Dec. 8, 2015), who could resist?
Reading through the court of appeals' passive-aggressive sniping at the plaintiff -- a pet shop challenging the City's ban on pet shops -- it boils down to this: plaintiffs did the right thing and filed their due process and equal protection claims in state court, after which the complaint was removed to federal court by the City. In federal court, Perfect Puppy amended its complaint to allege a facial and as-applied regulatory takings claim. After which the District Court dismissed the facial takings claim and all of the other constitutional claims, except the as-applied takings challenge, which it remanded to state court under -- you guessed it -- Williamson County.
The First Circuit affirmed both the dismissal of the facial takings challenge, concluding that the plaintiff had not properly raised the claim in District Court, and the Williamson County remand, an action over which the court of appeals asserted it had no jurisdiction. By virtue of a federal statute, you can't appeal a remand order.
This made for "an unhappy Perfect Puppy." Slip op. a 2.
No doubt, Your Honors, no doubt.
Posted on December 9, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Williamson County | Ripeness | Permalink | 0 Comments
Op-Ed: In SCOTUS One-Person, One-Vote Case, Hawaii Might Finally Be Forced To Include Military Among ‘We The People’
Today, the Honolulu Star-Advertiser published an op-ed by me, Col. David Brostrom (U.S. Army, retired), Rep. Mark Takai, who represents Hawaii's First Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives, and Andrew Walden, editor and publisher of Hawaii Free Press, about the case, argued this morning in the U.S. Supreme Court about who gets counted when state legislatures get reapportioned:
Hawaii might finally be forced to include military among ‘We the People’
By David P. Brostrom, Mark Takai and Andrew Walden
The familiar opening of the U.S. Constitution, announcing our most cherished principles.
Big words, for sure.
But just who are “We the People?”
The U.S. Supreme Court is now considering that question in a Texas case in which Hawaii’s decades-long exclusion of active-duty military and families from the body politic is front and center.
In Evenwel v. Abbott, the court will determine who gets counted when drawing district lines for state legislatures, a process known as reapportionment.
Reapportionment is based on population. In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled that state legislatures must be reapportioned based on “one-person, one-vote,” meaning that under the Equal Protection Clause, each district must contain a roughly equal number of people.
But the court avoided explaining what “population” must be counted. All persons? U.S. citizens? Voters?
Two years later, in Burns v. Richardson, a case from Hawaii, the court held that states need not count everyone, but may measure alternate “populations” — either all Census-counted residents, U.S. citizens, or state citizens.
It also noted, “aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime” can be excluded, because “one-person, one-vote” is not meant literally, but protects two competing principles.
“Voting equality” protects voters’ equal opportunity to elect representatives, while “representational equality” protects every person’s right — regardless of their voting eligibility — to access those officials.
After all, officials represent everyone in their districts, not just voters.
Last year, a diverse coalition of civilian and military Hawaii residents challenged the exclusion of service members and families from Hawaii’s reapportionment.
This skewed districts, and violated one-person, one-vote’s representational equality principle.
The federal court disagreed, because the Burns ruling allows Hawaii to count state citizens. Military and their families are not Hawaii citizens because they elect to pay taxes in another state.
But Hawaii never asked anyone else where — or even if — they pay taxes. This means non-U.S. citizens are treated as “Hawaii citizens,” while military residents and families are not.
Despite this surreal outcome, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
In Evenwel, the court is revisiting that ruling. (Arguments will be heard today before the high court.) Texas draws legislative districts to equalize its Census population, which includes undocumented immigrants.
Voters argue that Texas should also consider whether districts contain an equal number of voters. The court will decide whether states must count everyone (including non-citizens, non-voters and military), only those eligible to vote, or some other population.
The question posed by the case is straightforward: What “population” must be counted, and if less than everyone is included, what one-person, one-vote principle must states follow when determining whom to eliminate?
A ruling requiring counting everyone would bring Hawaii’s reapportionment practice in line with 48 other states and with congressional apportionment, which, like Texas, is based on the Census count of all persons, regardless of their citizenship, taxpaying, or voting status. It wasn’t always so, and prior to adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, African-Americans counted as three-fifths of a person in congressional reapportionment. It took a civil war and amendments to our Constitution to exorcise the demon of not counting every- one equally.
While the situation here is much less dramatic, the stakes are no less important, and excluding service members and their families is no less repugnant. Under federal law, they are counted by the Census only as Hawaii residents, and only in Hawaii’s Legislature.
Excluding them here means they are not represented anywhere.
Evenwel is vitally important because the Supreme Court may finally force Hawaii to stop excluding our military and their families from “We the People.”
David P. Brostrom is a retired U.S. Army officer and Hawaii resident; Mark Takai represents Hawaii’s 1st District in the U.S. House; and Andrew Walden is editor/publisher of Hawaii Free Press. They were among the plaintiffs in the 2014 case that challenged Hawaii’s reapportionment for excluding military personnel and their families. This piece was co-signed by Robert H. Thomas, their lawyer in the case, who is with Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert in Honolulu.
Posted on December 8, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Equal Protection, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink | 0 Comments
Tomorrow, the Supreme Court is hearing oral arguments in two election law cases, Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940, and Harris v. Arizona Ind. Redistricting Comm'n, No. 14-232. We've covered the issues presented by these cases several times, so please forgive the continuing detour from takings law that we take whenever we get into our other favorite area, election law.
Evenwel is the sleeper case of the Term, and may finally answer a question the Supreme Court has dodged for over fifty years, involving the seemingly mundane issue of who can states count when they reapportion their legislatures: all residents? U.S. citizens? Those eligible to vote? And who must they count? Think back to your Con Law I class, and the "one-person, one-vote" rule from Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the case which first announced that rule, and the resultant Equal Protection requirement that both houses of state legislatures be apportioned according to population. That decision totally rewrote American politics (some states had set up one house of their legislature to mirror the U.S. Senate, with at least on representative for each county), and moved the locus of power to urban population centers.
That decision was followed closely by Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), a case originating in Hawaii, in which the Court reaffirmed that rough equality of "population" is the measure of constitutionality, but again refused to define which "population" it meant. There, the Court upheld Hawaii's count of registered voters, concluding that it was a rough proxy for both total population and state citizens because Hawaii's voter registration numbers were so high. Because there was no proof the the resultant reapportionment drew districts that were different from districts drawn using total population or state citizens, the count of voters was upheld.
In the intervening 50 years, the Court has not clarified that decision, nor specified which "population" it requires be counted, if any, despite several cases squarely presenting the issue (including ours, from 2014). Most states (48) count everyone.
Now comes Evenwel, a case which challenges Texas' use of total population. That population, you see, includes those not eligible to vote (such as aliens), and their inclusion in the reapportionment population results in district lines that dilute the power of registered voters, or those citizens of voting age population. Citizens whose voting power was diluted by virtue of them being put into overpopulated districts sued, asserting that reapportionment could not be accomplished using total population, when doing so would impact the power of voters. "One-person, one-vote" is the mantra, after all, and the focus of many of the Court's decisions citing this rule are on preserving voting equality.
And that is the issue before the Court tomorrow. Will it say that state's must count everyone? Must only count registered voters, or some other similar metric? Or will the Court conclude, like we argued in our amici brief, that states can choose any population metric, provided they meet certain criteria?
"One-person, one-vote" has become a kind of a mantra, but one without a lot of specific meaning. The plaintiffs are asking the Court to uphold the plain meaning, and if it really meant what it said about the "vote" part. The arguments on the other side, by contrast, are more focused on "sky will fall" claims, and arguing that a ruling against Texas will result in Hispanics and children being "disenfranchised," and the like. They also claim it is impossible to accurately count the citizen voting age population. And here's where our experiences as takings lawyers may come in, because these competing claims remind us of two threads in regulatory takings doctrine:
Lesson #1: From 1980 to 2005, we all operated under the assumption that the Court meant what it said in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255 (1980), when it held that a regulation may work a taking when it either (1) deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use, or (2) fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest. And for years, taking the Court at its word, we all tried to apply the "substantially advance" in takings cases, repeating the Agins two-part test as a mantra, much like "one-person, one-vote." Until 2005, when the Court in Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) issued a huge mea culpa, and held that the language in Agins about substantially advance was just inartful writing, and that wasn't a takings test at all. So be wary of relying too much on the Court's mantras. What the Justices sayeth, they can later disclaim.
Lesson #2: The Court doesn't always pay heed to "Chicken Little" arguments like the Evenwel appellees are relying on. We takings lawyers have heard for decades how the sky was going to fall, the whole planning system was going to collapse, and that courts would become zoning boards of appeals, if regulatory takings arguments were accepted. And, like clockwork, this argument reappears in every takings-related case presented to the Court. But recently, the Court has grown weary of these arguments, noting in Brandt and Koontz that the sky would not fall.
And what about the other case, Harris v. AIRC? That one asks whether, in addition to "traditional redistricting principles" which allow a deviation from absolute population equality (such as geography, traditional political boundaries, communities of interest), whether reapportionment can also consider political motives and a desire to obtain DOJ pre-clearance under the Voting Rights Act. That case will be argued just prior to Evenwel.
We're in town to attend the arguments, and will have a report following.
Posted on December 7, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink | 0 Comments
The View Of The Nai Aupuni Election From Washington, D.C.
Hawaii is either 5 or 6 hours behind Eastern Time, depending on the time of year (we don't adhere to Daylight Savings Time), so we're a quarter-day behind the part of the country where a lot -- if not most -- of the important things legal, financial, and political occur. Scheduling conference calls can be a chore, too. But we're used to it, and sometimes, being outside the national attention range can work to our advantage, and we can get away with things which -- were they occurring elsewhere -- would attract more scrutiny, and a more skeptical eye.
At least that is the way it appears once you step outside the Hawaii bubble, and find out how others view things that we do.
We're way outside the bubble this week in Washington, D.C. (a different sort of bubble altogether), doing some election law things -- we'll have some thoughts on the two big SCOTUS cases that are being argued on Tuesday in a separate post -- so naturally, the topic of the Nai Aupuni "Hawaiians only" election poll has come up when talking shop with our election law colleagues. These lawyers, many of them national experts in election, constitutional, and appellate law, come from both sides of the political spectrum. Nai Aupuni is our shorthand for a vote, limited to those with native Hawaiian ancestry, now being conducted by a non-profit organization, Nai Aupuni, which asks the voters to select delegates to a kind of constitutional convention to determine the steps to be taken to recognize Hawaiian sovereignty, in whatever form that might take.
The U.S. District Court of Hawaii in an oral ruling which has yet to be reduced to writing, refused to enjoin the election, concluding that the delegates chosen were not actual government officials, and the election was not going to make law or official government policy, and thus it was not an unconstitutional race-restricted election, but more like a private poll. See this post for more ("Tips From An Election Lawyer For Setting Up Private Racially-Exclusive Elections...er 'Opinion Polls'"). The court also held that the fact that the Nai Aupuni nonprofit was conducting the election -- despite being funded with taxpayer money by the State Office of Hawaiian Affairs -- meant that it was sufficiently removed from public funding to not be considered a public election. The Ninth Circuit refused to stay pending appeal, and the plaintiffs took their case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
As we noted here, Justice Kennedy issued an order putting a stop to the ballot counting and certification of the election, but otherwise didn't enjoin it. When the full court got a look after Thanksgiving, five Justices enjoined the election on similar terms pending resolution by the Ninth Circuit (with four Justices "dissenting"). That Justice Kennedy would stop it, and that a majority of the Court agreed, raised the profile of the case to a "red alert" level among election lawyers and Court followers, particularly here in Washington.
The universal query they have for us about the Nai Aupuni vote is "what the heck [or stronger] are you doing out there?"
When we explain about the arguments that this is an election beyond the reach of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, their reaction is skeptical, to say the least. Follow the money, they suggest. Not an election to choose officials or make law? How can that be, when the election was designed to craft the relationship between a Hawaiian nation (in whatever form that might take) and the rest of us, meaning this is an election that we all have a stake in. Kind of like that statehood vote back in 1959, only the other way around.
Richard Borecca has a column in today's Star-Advertiser ("Nai Aupuni's Hawaiian election unraveling at seam") which picks up some of the problems, and also picks up what we think is the major problem here:
The big issue that has the U.S. Supreme Court interested, however, is the whole idea of holding an election that limits voting to those who claim Hawaiian heritage.
Honolulu attorney Robert Thomas writes in his legal blog, Inversecondemnation.com, that holding an election that is paid for with public money runs into the Supreme Court prohibition from the 2000 Rice v. Cayetano decision.
Thomas says Na‘i Aupuni’s attempt to move the $2 million in OHA money for the election through a nongovernment group will not work.
“Yes, the money was washed through a nonprofit, set up for the purpose of supporting the argument that this is not a publicly funded election. But come on, the Court would have to be blind to not see the pretense,” Thomas writes.
Lawyers love to toy with the “The law is blind” metaphor, but in this case, it might not be blind at all.
In our view, that's what has happened in the past when those outside our Hawaii bubble are made to realize what is going on here. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 405 (2000), see Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 1623 (2009), for example.
We're not saying which side we think is eventually going to prevail, either in the Ninth Circuit, or the Supreme Court (to which the case is surely returning should the plaintiffs not prevail in the court of appeals), but we do know that the issues presented are going to get looked at with more than the accommodating review that they are used to locally.
Posted on December 6, 2015 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Due process, ▪ Equal Protection, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Space. The final frontier. These are the voyages of the telescope Thirty Meter. Its five year continuing mission: to explore strange new worlds. To seek out a Conservation District Use Permit from the Board of Land and Natural Resources, and navigate the treacherous waters of Hawaii administrative law. To boldly go where twelve other telescopes have gone before!
Which leaves this question: since Justice McKenna joined both opinions, what does this mean about the roles of agencies? On one hand, she joined the opinion which views agencies like neutral judges; but she also joined the opinion which viewed agencies in an entirely different role, as advocates and prosecutors. We're not sure what this means, except that in a future case on this issue, we know which Justice we're pitching our arguments to.
Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land and Natural Resources, No. SCAP-14-0000873 (Haw. Dec. 2, 2015)
Posted on December 4, 2015 in ▪ Administrative law, ▪ Agriculture, ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Due process, ▪ Environmental law, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Water rights | Public trust | Permalink | 0 Comments
Posted on December 2, 2015 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Public Use | Kelo | Permalink | 0 Comments
One for all you civil procedure and jurisdiction wonks. The background facts are a bit detailed, so please bear with us.
Normandy Apartments in Tulsa, Oklahoma made a series of agreements with the federal government: in return for Normandy agreeing to rent to low-income Section 8 tenants and maintain the premises, the Department of Housing and Urban Development would pay the difference between the tenant's contribution and the rent. The last of these agreements was not with HUD, but with the Oklahoma Housing Finance Authority, although the terms were essentially the same. Normandy also agreed with HUD that in return for renting to low-income tenants, Normandy could prepay its HUD-backed mortgage. Like the Section 8 contract, this agreement obligated Normandy to maintain the premises, a standard enforced by HUD inspections.
Normandy failed several inspections, and after some back-and-forth about whether Normandy was entitled to correct the alleged failings, HUD informed it that Normandy had defaulted under the Section 8 agreement. HUD told Normandy that it should stop taking in new low-income tenants because the rent subsidies were stopping, even though it was obligated to continue honoring the below-market rents of existing tenants. Normandy tried to sell the building, but after HUD withheld its consent, the deal fell through.
Normandy sued in U.S. District Court, and sought an injunction ordering HUD to keep making the rent subsidy payments. The District Court punted, concluding that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction because this was, in essence, a Tucker Act claim for damages. The Tenth Circuit partly agreed, holding that at least Normandy's request for nonmonetary relief was proper under the Administrative Procedures Act.
But Normandy apparently didn't pursue this, and instead filed a claims for breach of contract and for a Penn Central taking in the CFC. The CFC dismissed the contract claim because the agreement which Normandy claimed was breached was not with HUD, but was with a state agency, the Oklahoma Housing Finance Authority, and the court thus lacked jurisdiction. As for the takings claim, the CFC granted the feds summary judgment, concluding that HUD did not effect a taking because it was exercising its regulatory authority when it stopped subsidy payments.
In a 2-1 decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the jurisdictional dismissal of the contract claim, and summary judgment on the takings claims. The majority rejected Normandy's claim that it had an investment-backed expectation to collect minimum rents under its HUD agreements, and pointed out that "[t]hough Normandy broadly addresses the first and second Penn Central factors, it does so without specificity[,]" and "Normandy fails to at all address the third Penn Central factor, the character of the government regulation." Slip op. at 16. The right to receive rent subsidies was based on the HUD-Normandy contracts, and was totally voluntary. HUD's ceasing the payments was a part-and-parcel of its regulatory authority, which Normandy had agreed to.
One judge dissented on the contract claim, asserting that the government blew hot and cold jurisdictionally. It obtained dismissal in the District Court by arguing that the case belonged in the CFC, but then once in the CFC, it changed its tune and argued that the case belonged in the District Court:
Thus the United States obtained dismissal of the contract claims by the Oklahoma district court and the Tenth Circuit on the argument that the contracts are with the United States and can be litigated only in the Court of Federal Claims. The United States then obtained dismissal of the contract claims by the Court of Federal Claims on the argument that the contracts are not with the United States, but with the Oklahoma Contract Administrator. Normandy has exhausted the supply of courts in which it can seek resolution of its claim for breach of contract. In its shifting positions, the government avoided judicial determination of the merits for eight years.
Dissent at 3. The dissenting judge passed on a ruling on the merits of the contract claim, but would have remanded for a determination: "This is not the process envisioned by President Lincoln, his words carved at the entrance to this courthouse: 'It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between private individuals.'" Dissent at 9. Although the dissent did not take issue with the majority's takings analysis, there are lessons here for you takings mavens, because even though the dissent does not use the words "Tucker Act shuffle," those of you familiar with this process know exactly what the judge is writing about.
The majority rejected the dissent's view, concluding that the judge misread the government's position, which was always consistent. See slip op. at 17.
An interesting sidebar: the judge who joined the majority (but did not author the main opinion) filed a separate opinion, which was joined by the judge who wrote the majority opinion, to "explain why our opinion raises troubling concerns." He was concerned that HUD has insulated itself from liability in these type of cases, because the property owner's contract was not with HUD, but with a state agency, which effectively barred Normandy from any recovery. Although "justice is hard to find in this case," the majority shrugged its shoulders, and told the owners that their remedy are with "another branch of government." Yeah, that'll work.
Posted on December 1, 2015 in ▪ Court of Federal Claims | Federal Circuit, ▪ Penn Central | Permalink | 0 Comments