Source: http://ipr-pgr.com/author/matt4iprpgr/
Timestamp: 2017-09-22 04:18:25
Document Index: 298373064

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 42', '§ 318', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315']

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Author: Matt Cutler
Author Matt CutlerPosted on September 14, 2017 September 14, 2017 Categories Federal Circuit Decisions, Supplemental EvidenceLeave a comment on Federal Circuit Reverses PTAB for Refusing to Allow Supplementation of Record to Add Later Inconsistent Deposition Testimony from an Expert
The Federal Circuit (CAFC) held in Consumer Watchdog v. WARF, 753 F.3d 1258, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2014), while one does not need to satisfy Article III standing requirements to prosecute an inter partes re-examination in front of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB), if one does not like the PTAB’s decision and one wants to take an appeal to the CAFC, then one does need to satisfy the Article III requirements for standing. If the appellant does not show a concrete and particular injury from the PTAB’s decision, the court will not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. InConsumer Watchdog, it was the patent challenger (Consumer Watchdog) who had lost in front of the PTAB. Because Consumer Watchdog does not actually make, use, or sell any products or services that might infringe the patent that they were challenging, the CAFC decided that Consumer Watchdog had no standing to appeal the PTAB’s determination that the challenged claims are patentable. The CAFC dismissed Consumer Watchdog’s appeal. The CAFC recently affirmed in Phigenix Inc. v. ImmunoGen Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2017) that the Consumer Watchdog holding applies just as much to inter partes reviews (under the America Invents Act) as it applied to inter partes re-examinations. See also, PPG Indus. Inc. v. Valspar Sourcing Inc., 679 Fed. Appx. 1002, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
All of these cases concerning standing in appeals from the PTAB, however, featured one common fact pattern: it was always the patent challenger who was trying to appeal to the CAFC. That is to say, it was an open question whether—in a case where there was no allegation of infringement or likelihood of infringement between two parties—an appeal could proceed where the patent owner had lost in front of the PTAB. The CAFC definitively answered this question in Personal Audio v. Electronic Frontier Fdn., No. 16-1123 (Fed. Cir., Aug. 7, 2017), holding that the patent owner whose claim has been held unpatentable at the PTAB has suffered the sort of concrete, particularized injury that will support standing in an Article III court.
Author Matt CutlerPosted on August 10, 2017 August 10, 2017 Categories Federal Circuit Decisions, Standing
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Outdry Technologies Corporation, v. Geox S.P.A. discusses some criteria for determining whether or not the explanations provided by the PTAB in an IPR decision are sufficient to support a finding of motivation to combine.
The independent claims of Outdry Technologies Corp.’s US Patent No. 6,855,171 (“the ‘171 patent”) were found to be obvious during IPR proceedings. Outdry’s ‘171 Patent is directed to two claimed processes for waterproofing leather by “directly pressing,” on an internal surface of the leather, a semi-permeable membrane to which a discontinuous pattern of glue dots has been added. One of the claimed leather waterproofing processes of the ‘171 patent requires the glue dots have a particular density. The other requires that the glue dots have a particular size. According to Outdry, directly pressing the glue dot-bearing membrane onto the leather addressed the problem of water pockets forming between the semi-permeable membrane and the leather when only the edges of the semi-permeable membrane are sown or glued to the leather.
In the IPR decision, the PTAB found the claimed leather waterproofing processes of the ‘171 to be obvious in view of US Patents to Thornton and Hayton, and a reference entitled “Chemistry of the Textiles Industry” (“Scott”), each of which discuss using glue dots, or something similar, to adhere a film or waterproof layer to another layer (e.g., a water permeable layer, like leather). The PTAB determined that the petitioners for the IPR proceedings, Geox, S.p.A., had provided a rational underpinning for combining Scott and Hayton, and that the claimed leather waterproofing processes of the ‘171 Patent would have been obvious in view of Thornton, Hayton and Scott.
Outdry appealed the PTAB’s IPR decision, arguing, among other things, that the motivation to combine Thornton, Scott and Hayton relied upon by the PTAB during the IPR proceedings was insufficient.
In particular, Outdry argued that the PTAB failed to make the required findings supporting the conclusion that a motivation to combine Thornton, Scott and Hayton existed because the PTAB merely relied on Geox’s petition to find a motivation to combine without making its own findings. The CAFC disagreed. The CAFC listed a number of example reasons for which the findings of the PTAB have previously been determined by the CAFC to be insufficient to support a decision that motivation to combine exists, including: failing to cite any evidence, either in the asserted prior-art references or elsewhere in the record, with sufficient specificity for us to determine whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been so motivated; merely stating that a combination is “intuitive” or “common sense,” without articulating a rationale; and simply agreeing with arguments in a petitioner’s brief without making any factual findings. However, the CAFC concluded that the PTAB did not make any of the above-referenced errors by articulating, in the IPR decision, Geox’s arguments explaining the motivation to combine the cited references. Further, the CAFC clarified that a PTAB decision that relies on a petitioner’s arguments and includes an explanation supporting the decision to rely on the petitioner’s arguments is acceptable, unlike a PTAB decision that merely adopts a petitioner’s arguments by reference without providing such an explanation.
Outdry also argued that the PTAB’s finding of a motivation to combine was insufficient because the PTAB failed to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the cited references to solve the water pocket problem addressed by Outdry’s ‘171 Patent. The CAFC was not persuaded by this argument either. The CAFC responded to this argument by citing previous CAFC decisions indicating that a motivation to combine cited references identified in support of a conclusion of obviousness does not have to match a motivation provided by the patent at issue or the patentee. The CAFC further explained that the identified motivation does not even have to come from the references, themselves.
Accordingly, in Outdry Technologies, the CAFC confirmed that there are standards the PTAB must satisfy when asserting, in an IPR decision, that a motivation to combine exists. Further, the CAFC also explained that these standards are not quite as strict as the Appellant argued they were.
Author Matt CutlerPosted on June 23, 2017 June 23, 2017 Categories Federal Circuit Decisions, Obviousness, Reason to Combine
On June 12, the Supreme Court took certiorari on probably the biggest IPR case possible: a case challenging the constitutionality of IPRs on separation-of-powers and seventh amendment grounds. This comes just a few weeks after the Supreme Court took certiorari on SAS Inst. v. Lee. The patent owner in Oil States v. Lee has asked the court to consider whether it violates the separation of powers to have an administrative tribunal (the PTAB) making decisions about patent validity—an issue traditionally entrusted to the Article III courts. The patent owner also wants the Court to consider whether a patentee has a right to a jury trial when issues of validity are at stake. The Court has agreed to consider both questions.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) faced these same questions in MCM Portfolio v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The CAFC held that it was not problematic to have an administrative tribunal like the PTAB decide issues that are also decided by courts and juries because patents involve “public rights” created by Congress. The logic is that because Congress created patent rights in the first place, Congress can create an agency to decide validity questions. MCM sought certiorari and was denied. Similarly, the patentee in Cooper v. Square sought certiorari after the CAFC summarily dismissed an appeal without opinion. The Court denied certiorari on that case as well. Finally, Oil States Energy Services proved that the third time really is a charm by making many of the same arguments as MCM and Cooper, but this time certiorari was granted.
Suffice it to say, the outcome in this case could be huge. If the Court reverses the CAFC (and the Court usually reverses the CAFC when it takes certiorari), then the entire IPR system could be dismantled at a stroke. On the other hand, if the CAFC were reversed in this case, then SAS Inst. v. Lee would be rather pointless. If one wants to sift tea leaves, then, the fact that the Court also took certiorari in SAS Inst. might suggest that the Court does not have in mind to disassemble the IPR system totally. In any event, HDP will be following this case closely, and keeping readers of this blog up to date with subsequent developments in both cases.
Duke University owns US 7,056,712 (‘712), which claims methods of treating a metabolic disorder known as Pompe disease. In particular, ‘712 claims methods of treating Pompe disease using a recombinant human acid α-glucosidase (hGAA) that is produced using Chinese hamster ovary (CHO) cells. BioMarin petitioned for IPR of ‘712 on two grounds: (1) anticipation by US 7,351,410 (van Bree); and (2) obviousness over WO 97//5771 (Reuser) in view of van Hove et al. (1997). The PTAB found Claims 1–9, 12, 15, 20, & 21 anticipated, and held Claims 1–9, 11, 12, 15, & 18–21 obvious. Duke appealed and the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part in Duke Univ. v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 2016-1106 (Fed Cir. April 25, 2017).
Regarding anticipation, van Bree teaches administering hGAA to treat Pompe disease, and lists CHO cells as a production system (albeit a disfavored one) for manufacturing the hGAA. Anticipation is a question of fact, and therefore the Federal Circuit (CAFC) only reviews an anticipation finding for substantial evidence. The mention of CHO cells in van Bree—even as a disfavored option—was enough to satisfy the CAFC that anticipation is supported by substantial evidence. The CAFC affirmed the invalidation of Claims 1–8, 12, 15, 20, & 21 for anticipation.
Claim 9, however, was a special case. Claim 9 provides that “the human acid α-glucosidase is a precursor of recombinant human acid α-glucosidase that has been produced in Chinese hamster ovary cell cultures.” The PTAB construed this claim as allowing for mixtures of precursor and full-length hGAA, but the CAFC held that “the human acid α-glucosidase” meant all the hGAA had to be in precursor form. Because van Bree does not mention the precursor form of hGAA, the CAFC reversed the PTAB’s anticipation conclusion for this claim.
For any claim already found anticipated, the CAFC declined to review the PTAB’s obviousness. That meant that the CAFC only had to review the obviousness of Claims 9, 11, 18, & 19. Claims 11 & 18 are dependent claims that had not been argued separately, so in effect the CAFC only had to review obviousness of Claims 9 & 19.
As noted above, the CAFC disagreed with the PTAB’s construction of Claim 9, so the CAFC remanded for reconsideration of obviousness of Claim 9 in view of the new construction. Claim 19 requires that an “immunosuppressant [be] administered prior to any administration of” hGAA. BioMarin had submitted an expert declaration asserting that “[i]f there is a high incidence of patients developing high antibody titers, and immunosuppressant could be administered prophylactically…” (emphasis added). This was the evidence on which the PTAB had relied to show a reasonable expectation of success for Claim 19. The CAFC considered that the fact that the person of ordinary skill could do something is not enough to establish obviousness. Rather, testimony was necessary as to what the person of ordinary skill would do. The CAFC considered that BioMarin’s expert declaration was not substantial evidence necessary to support a reasonable expectation of success. Therefore, the holding of obviousness for Claim 19 was reversed.
The most important take-away from this case is that expert declarations should avoid talking about what the person of ordinary skill “could” do. Instead, declarations should speak of what the person of ordinary skill “would” do, or “did” do.
Author Matt CutlerPosted on May 31, 2017 Categories Uncategorized
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in another inter partes review dispute, this time in SAS Institute v. Lee. The Court will decide whether the PTAB may properly institute partial review (i.e., institute review on less than all claims in a challenged patent). The PTAB’s rules—particularly 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a)—allow the Board to “authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” However, the statute—particularly 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)—requires that, if review is instituted, then the “Board shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner….” The question for the Supreme Court is whether the Board’s partial review option is allowed by this statutory provision.
The Court’s decision will impact the application of IPR estoppel, because estoppel only attaches after review is instituted, and—under the current law—does not apply to claims for which review is not instituted. If the PTAB is required to issue a final written decision for all claims after review is instituted, then estoppel would affect more claims than under the current state of the law.
Author Matt CutlerPosted on May 25, 2017 May 25, 2017 Categories Estoppel, Supreme CourtTags estoppel, partial review, Supreme Court
In Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceedings, the estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) prevents the petitioner from challenging the validity of a patent in an IPR on any “ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised” in an earlier IPR that resulted in a final written decision. When deciding estoppel issues under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and courts analyze whether “a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover” the prior art in question.
Recently, in Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2016-00130, (P.T.A.B., May 8, 2017) (non-precedential), the PTAB considered an estoppel issue involving the petitioner’s own prior art: two of John Manville’s (JM) marketing brochures. The patent owner, Knauf, raised the issue of estoppel because JM did not include the marketing brochures as grounds in an earlier IPR, Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01453, (P.T.A.B., Jan. 11, 2017) (non-precedential), which resulted in a final written decision and involved the same patent.
This case presents an interesting estoppel question because one might expect the PTAB to place more scrutiny on the petitioner when the prior art at issue is from the petitioner instead of a third party; however, the PTAB Panel in IPR2016-00130 did not change the approach for analyzing IPR estoppel just because the prior art was from JM instead of a third party.
Knauf argued that a reasonable search should have found JM’s marketing brochures before filing IPR2015-01453 because thousands of copies of the marketing brochures had been distributed, and one of JM’s employees, Mr. Mota, had hard copies of the marketing brochures before IPR2015-01453 was filed. Also, Knauf argued that a skilled searcher should have interviewed Mr. Mota and researched historic versions of the accused products before IPR2015-01453 was filed.
However, JM’s arguments persuaded the PTAB that a skilled and diligent searcher could not have been expected to discover the marketing brochures before JM filed IPR2015-01453. JM explained the professional searcher it hired to search Internet archives did not find the marketing brochures because the brochures were never posted on-line. Also, Mr. Mota’s possession of the marketing brochures violated JM’s 7-year document retention policy. JM also argued that Mr. Mota’s records were disorganized and in hardcopy binders so a skilled searcher could not reasonably have been expected to locate them.
Additionally, JM persuaded the PTAB that a skilled and diligent search would not necessarily include interviewing Mr. Mota before filing IPR2015-01453. Because Mr. Mota did not work in a division that made the product accused of infringing Knauf’s patent, JM’s counsel argued that it would not have made sense to interview Mr. Mota before filing IPR2015-01453. JM’s explanation for interviewing Mr. Mota after filing IPR2015-01453 was because Mr. Mota by that time had switched to a division that made the allegedly-infringing product.
In the PTAB’s view, Knauf’s arguments would have extended 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) estoppel to all references that JM “reasonably should have known” about, based on imputing the knowledge and document possession of Mr. Mota to the entire JM organization. The PTAB was unwilling to extend the scope of estoppel that far because the PTAB determined the “reasonably could have discovered” language in 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), and legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), suggested a narrower interpretation of IPR estoppel.
Even though the Knauf did not get its way on the estoppel issue, Knauf still prevailed on the bigger issue: the PTAB upheld the validity of Knauf’s patent in IPR2016-00130. This case is useful for showing the approach the PTAB may take when deciding whether IPR estoppel applies to the petitioner’s own documents.
Author Matt CutlerPosted on May 15, 2017 Categories EstoppelTags estoppel