Source: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2014-10-31 13:25:54
Document Index: 404472766

Matched Legal Cases: ['§13', '§13', '§13', '§207', '§207', '§ 13', '§13', '§1', '§502', '§ 502', '§502', '§502', '§1', '§14']

New York Public Personnel Law: April 2011
Source: Administrative Law Professor Blog. Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2011, All rights reserved http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adminlaw/ "In his New York Public Personnel Law blog, Harvey Randall reviews a case involving one kind of administrative law issue that often darkens an attorney's door: The government has given your client something by mistake and now intends to take it back. But your client, ignorant of the error, has spent the money or made plans or persuaded investors or otherwise reasonably relied on the erroneous decision and doesn't want to pay it back, change plans, return investments, or otherwise reverse course. In the case discussed by Mr. Randall in "Doctrine of Estoppel not available to bar an administrative action to correct an error notwithstanding its adverse impact on the individual", a retired city government lawyer finds out seven years after retirement that she has been overpaid almost $1000 per month, and the New York City Employees' Retirement System is going to deduct 25% of her (reduced) pension until it is repaid. She has spent the money and made all sorts of plans that depend on the original monthly payment. Sounds like a job for Equitable Estoppel!
"Should any change or error in records result in any member or beneficiary receiving from the retirement system more or less than he or she would have been entitled to receive otherwise, on the discovery of any such error such Board shall correct such error, and as far as practicable, shall adjust the payments in such a manner that the actuarial equivalent of the benefit to which he or she was entitled shall be paid."New York City Administrative Code §13-182 (emphasis added). "According to Mr. Randall: "Accordingly, in the event an overpayment is made, the agency has authority to recoup the overpayment by withholding or reducing the current pension benefits to which the retiree would otherwise be entitled. As to applying the doctrine of estoppel in this case, Judge Mendez ruled that the doctrine could only be applied against a governmental entity if failure to apply the doctrine would defeat a right legally and rightfully obtained.
"I'm sorry but your client is, ummmm, going to be disappointed." EMM
Court finds Pension Board's failure discontinue the payment of disability retirement benefits obviates the “suspension” of the retiree’s benefits
Matter of Seiferheld v Kelly, 2011 NY Slip Op 03309, Court of Appeals
New York City police officer James J. Seiferheld retired for alleged disability in 2004 and was awarded accident disability benefits. Seiferheld had applied for disability retirement benefits claiming that he suffered from constant pain in his right shoulder and neck, loss of range of motion in his neck and shoulder, and pain radiating into his arm as the result of a line-of-duty accident. This injury, he contended, prevented him from performing police duty. His application was granted, and he was awarded accident disability retirement on May 12, 2004.
Subsequently the police department received information that Seiferheld was working. It instituted an investigation that ultimately reported that Seiferheld was "performing construction work on a daily basis," which work included “picking up siding, passing it to others, lifting it over his head and nailing materials above his head with both arms extended for some time — all tasks performed without apparent difficulty.” A number of these activities were recorded on videotape.
The police department notified the Police Pension Fund that Seiferheld "may no longer be disabled" and the Pension Fund subsequently reexamined him. During his interview with the Pension Fund’s Medical Board Seiferheld said that he "cannot lift any heavy objects . . . cannot work overhead . . . has no outside work and his major occupation is babysitting his two children."
The Pension Fund's Medical Board concluded that Seiferheld’s condition "has improved dramatically," and recommended disapproval of his retirement application. Ultimately the Pension Fund board of trustees voted, over the dissent of several trustees, to invoke New York City Administrative Code §13-254** entitled "Safeguards on disability retirement," under which a disability pensioner found to be able to work may be returned to city service. Seiferheld was placed on a list of candidates eligible to become police officers, but subsequently he was informed that he was "medically disqualified" for that position "due to the presence of an unauthorized substance, cocaine, in your hair sample."* When the Pension Fund's Director of Pension Payroll advised Seiferheld "that your pension benefit will be suspended beginning with the July 2007 payroll," Seiferheld filed an Article 78 petition seeking to annul the determination to suspend his pension benefits.
Supreme Court denied the application; the Appellate Division reversed, annulling the suspension of benefits; the Court of Appeals “reluctantly” affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.
Characterizing New York City Administrative Code §13-254 as “complicated,” the Court of Appeals explained, in a “simplified summary,” that a “disability pensioner found to be able to work is put on a civil service list, and his or her pension is reduced based on outside earnings and the amount ‘earned . . . or earnable’ in any City job that is offered.”
Noting that the application of the statute to this case presents something of a puzzle, because although Seiferheld was put on a civil service list, he was not, and evidently could not be, offered a job because of his cocaine us, the court commented that “if the statute is mechanically applied, [Seiferheld] might actually benefit from using cocaine, because he presumably does not want to be offered a City job; he wants to remain retired and receive his pension.
Supreme Court, in a thoughtful opinion, correctly concluded that this anomaly could not have been intended by the statute's authors.
The Appellate Division, however, reversed Supreme Court's order, without discussing Supreme Court's analysis of the statute, because the suspension of Seiferheld's benefits "was not directed by the Board of Trustees" of the Pension Fund.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Appellate Division was correct as it is “clear from a reading of the safeguards statute that action under that statute must be taken by the board.” The court explained that “However well justified a reduction or termination of benefits may be … the board of trustees has to do it.”
The majority*** of the Court of Appeals, at the conclusion of its opinion, wrote:
“Though [Seiferheld] is entitled to prevail here, the case as a whole is very troubling. It seems from the record that [Seiferheld] either has received or is in a position to claim accident disability benefits for the last seven years, and counting. Yet any reader of this record must have serious doubt that he was ever really disabled. Whether any of the benefits paid to him may be recouped is a subject on which we express no opinion. But we do express the hope that the Pension Fund's board of trustees will generally act to protect the Fund and the public with more efficiency than it has displayed in this case.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_03309.htm * General Municipal Law §207-a5 provides “The appropriate municipal or fire district officials may transfer such a fireman to a position in the same or another agency or department where they are able to do so pursuant to applicable civil service requirements and provided the fireman shall consent thereto.” while General Municipal Law §207-c4 provides “The appropriate municipal officials may transfer such a policeman to a position in another agency or department where they are able to do so pursuant to applicable civil service requirements and provided the policeman shall consent thereto.” ** The "safeguards" statute, New York City Administrative Code § 13-254, under which the Pension Fund tried to bring Seiferheld back to work, provides, in relevant part: "Once each year the board [of trustees of the Police Pension Fund] may . . . require any disability pensioner, under the minimum age or period for service retirement elected by him or her, to undergo medical examination. . . . Upon the completion of such examination the medical board shall report and certify to the board whether such beneficiary is or is not totally or partially incapacitated physically or mentally and whether he or she is or is not engaged in or able to engage in a gainful occupation. If the board concurs in a report by the medical board that such beneficiary is able to engage in a gainful occupation, he or she [sic] shall certify the name of such beneficiary to the appropriate civil service commission . . . and such commission shall place his or her name as a preferred eligible on such appropriate lists of candidates as are prepared for appointment to positions for which he or she is stated to be qualified. Should such beneficiary be engaged in a gainful occupation, or should he or she be offered city-service as a result of the placing of his or her name on a civil service list, such board shall reduce the amount of his or her disability pension . . . if any, to an amount which, when added to that then earned by him or her, or earnable by him or her in city-service so offered him or her, shall not exceed the current maximum salary for the title next higher than that held by him or her when he or she was retired." *** Justice Pigott, in his dissent, said: “In my view, the Appellate Division erred in finding that the Board of Trustees had not considered what action should be taken with respect to revocation of the Accident Disability Retirement benefits. This error, which the majority of this Court repeats, rests on an assumption that the Board's final determination had merely been that Seiferheld should be returned to work as a police officer. This leaves out a crucial part of the Board's ruling. The Board's final determination was that Seiferheld was not disabled, should not receive disability benefits, and should be returned to work” and would “reverse, deny the petition and dismiss the article 78 proceeding.” Posted by
The decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_02994.htm
Proof of filing a timely application for disability benefits criticalJarek v McCall, 268 A.D.2d 654
Had Jarek used certified or registered mail -- or delivered his application in person and obtained a receipt -- he would have had a better chance of prevailing even if ERS had lost his application after receiving it. * Sections 62 and 63 of the Retirement and Social Security Law require a member to file his or her application for ordinary disability retirement benefits within 90 days of his or her last day of service. Accordingly, Jarek had to file his application within 90 days of March 4, 1993.
Considering the employee's personnel record in setting a disciplinary penalty
Considering the employee's personnel record in setting a disciplinary penaltyThomas v Mt. Vernon, 267 AD2d 241
The Thomas ruling points out the elements that must be observed if the appointing officer wishes to consider an employee’s personnel record in setting a disciplinary penalty.
Robin Thomas was employed by the Mount Vernon Department of Public Safety. She was terminated from her position after being found guilty of habitual lateness. Thomas appealed the Commissioner of Public Safety’s determination.
Although the Appellate Division sustained the commissioner’s decision finding her guilty of the charges filed against her, it remanded the matter to him “for a new determination as to the penalty to be imposed” (Thomas v City of Mount Vernon, 249 AD2d 483).
When the original penalty - dismissal - was again imposed, Thomas again appealed. She contended that her “prior disciplinary record” was considered in setting the penalty.
Thomas argued that although the commissioner considered her prior disciplinary record, he failed to comply with the procedures set out by the Court of Appeals in Bigelow v Village of Gouverneur (63 NY2d 470) in such situations.
The Appellate Division observed that an employee’s prior disciplinary history could be considered in setting a disciplinary penalty if:
1. The individual is advised that his or her prior disciplinary record would be considered in setting the penalty to be imposed; and 2. The employee is given an opportunity to submit a written response to any adverse material contained in the record or offer “mitigating circumstances.”
The court said that there was nothing in the record to support Thomas’ claim that she was denied an opportunity to review her personnel record or to submit her objections in writing prior to the commissioner making his determination as to the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Accordingly, it ruled that the commissioner had complied with the standards set out by the Court of Appeals in Bigelow.
As to the penalty imposed - dismissal - the Appellate Division said that it was persuaded that the penalty met the Pell standard as it was not “so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness” [Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222].
Commenting that Thomas’ conduct that resulted in this disciplinary action, together with her conduct underlying a previous suspension, “established a pattern of excessive absences and a failure to correct this behavior after her suspension,” the Appellate Division sustained her termination and dismissed her appeal.
Termination for violating the employee’s “last chance agreement” disqualifies individual for unemployment insurance benefitsMatter of Brown v Lincoln Ctr. for The Performing Arts, Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 02982, Appellate Division, Third Department
The decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_02982.htm
Doctrine of Estoppel not available to bar an administrative action to correct an error notwithstanding its adverse impact on the individual Matter of Olick v D'Alessandro, 2011 NY Slip Op 50718(U), Supreme Court, New York County, Judge Manuel J. Mendez [Not selected for publications in the Official Reports] Alice D. Olick filed petitions pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules in an effort to annul and the determination by the New York Teachers’ Retirement and the New York City Employees’ Retirement Systems that reduced the amount of her retirement allowance and barring deductions from future retirement allowance payments for alleged “overpayments” made to her during the past seven years since her retirement. For more than seven (7) years since her retirement Olick had been receiving an annual retirement allowance of $62,381. On March 16, 2009 she was advised that she would receive a "revised benefits letter" with a larger Annual Retirement Allowance. In addition in conversations had with NYCERS employees she was advised that she would receive a bulk payment for each of the seven years since her retirement. In December 2009, however, Olick was advised that her retirement allowance informing her that her pension was not being increased, instead it was being decreased and she was responsible for the return of excess payments in the amount of $32,879.82 made to her over the past seven years.* The Retirement System attributed the original mistaken pension calculation to "a programming error….” Olick appealed NYCERS' reduction of her pension, contending, among other things, that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. She also argued that [1] NYCERS failed take into account that in reliance on the original calculation she and her husband had planned and budgeted for their retirement, making life altering decisions relying on the certainty that her pension would be $62,381, plus Social Security and that [2] she paid taxes on this amount and that she received the Annual Pension Allowance for seven years before any alleged error was detected. In its defense the Retirement System said that Estoppel is not available against a governmental agency seeking to recoup overpayment of a benefit. Judge Mendez said that the applicable statute, New York City Administrative Code §13-182 Retirement and Pensions, provides, in pertinent part: "Should any change or error in records result in any member or beneficiary receiving from the retirement system more or less than he or she would have been entitled to receive otherwise, on the discovery of any such error such Board shall correct such error, and as far as practicable, shall adjust the payments in such a manner that the actuarial equivalent of the benefit to which he or she was entitled shall be paid." Accordingly, in the event an overpayment is made, the agency has authority to recoup the overpayment by withholding or reducing the current pension benefits to which the retiree would otherwise be entitled. As to applying the doctrine of estoppel in this case, Judge Mendez ruled that the doctrine could only be applied against a governmental entity if failure to apply the doctrine would defeat a right legally and rightfully obtained.Citing Freda v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 224 AD2d 360, Judge Mendez said the statement of an employee of the agency later found to be incorrect, even if relied upon by the employee does not bar the agency from correcting an error later discovered and recouping any overpayment made to the retiree. The bottom line: as Olick received a greater annual retirement allowance than she was entitled to receive, once the error was discovered, under the statute, NYCERS is entitled to recover the amount paid in excess of what Olick was entitled to receive. Further, the overpayment can be recovered by withholding or reducing the current pension benefit Olick is receiving. In an Article 78 proceeding such as this one, the court's function is limited to a determination whether the administrative determination is arbitrary and capricious in that it is "without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts" and unless the decision is arbitrary, the court cannot substitute its judgment, even if it would have reached a different result if presented with the issue in the first instance. Applying this standard, Judge Mendez denied Olick’s petition.
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_50718.htm
* Olick’s monthly gross retirement allowance was reduced by almost $1,000 from $5,264.44 to $4,333.12. POSTSCRIPT: In his blog, Administrative Law Professor [ http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adminlaw/ ], Edward M. McClure comments: In his New York Public Personnel Law blog, Harvey Randall reviews a case involving one kind of administrative law issue that often darkens an attorney's door: The government has given your client something by mistake and now intends to take it back. But your client, ignorant of the error, has spent the money or made plans or persuaded investors or otherwise reasonably relied on the erroneous decision and doesn't want to pay it back, change plans, return investments, or otherwise reverse course. In the case discussed by Mr. Randall in "Doctrine of Estoppel not available to bar an administrative action to correct an error notwithstanding its adverse impact on the individual", a retired city government lawyer finds out seven years after retirement that she has been overpaid almost $1000 per month, and the New York City Employees' Retirement System is going to deduct 25% of her (reduced) pension until it is repaid. She has spent the money and made all sorts of plans that depend on the original monthly payment. Sounds like a job for Equitable Estoppel!
===================The Discipline Book, - a concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State is a 1272 page e-book available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/ for additional information concerning this electronic reference manual. =======================
Appointing authority may reject a proposed disciplinary settlement
Appointing authority may reject a proposed disciplinary settlementTetro v Safir, App. Div., First Dept
It is not uncommon for an employee to offer to, or to agree to, “settle” disciplinary charges that have been filed against him or her.
Is the appointing officer bound to accept the “negotiated settlement?” Not necessarily, as the Tetro decision by the Appellate Division demonstrates.
In Tetro, the Appellate Division affirmed the appointing authority’s rejection of the terms of the settlement of a disciplinary action previously agreed to by the employee and impose a harsher penalty -- termination -- upon the individual.
Anthony Tetro, a New York City police officer, was dismissed from his position after he was found guilty of giving “false testimony at the criminal trial of a former police officer.”
Tetro testified that his partner discovered a gun in their patrol car while he was removing a prisoner from the vehicle.
The evidence showed that Tetro and his partner failed to check underneath the back seat of the patrol car and that other police officers later found the weapon.
Tetro had “negotiated a plea agreement” in order to settle the disciplinary charges filed against him but the Commissioner rejected it and decided that the appropriate penalty to impose was dismissal from the department.
The Appellate Division ruled that Tetro’s “contract rights were not violated” when the Commissioner declined to accept the settlement agreement and imposed a different penalty. The court cited Silverman v McGuire, 51 NY2d 228, in support of its ruling.
Elected official removed from public office for failing to be a domiciliary of the jurisdiction as required by lawBoard of Trustees of the Vil. of Sodus, N.Y. v Allen, 2011 NY Slip Op 31035(U), Supreme Court, Wayne County, Docket Number: 71473/2010, Judge Dennis M. Kehoe [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
In rebuttal, Allen said that he maintained a residence in an apartment on the second floor of a building located within the Village at 29 West Main Street. The building is owned by Allen’s wife, Tracey L. Fox, Esq., who has maintained her law office at that address for some eleven years.* Judge Kehoe, noting that the Village Law does not define the term "resident", said that under Election Law §1-104(22) the term refers to "that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home, and to which he, whenever temporarily located elsewhere, intends to return"** of his or her domicile.
The Johnson decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05447.htm The Allen decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2011/2011_31035.pdf
The ability of an “in-network” health care provider to sue an ERISA health benefit plan for breach of contract in state court depends on the nature of its claim
The ability of an “in-network” health care provider to sue an ERISA health benefit plan for breach of contract in state court depends on the nature of its claimMontefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272, 10-1451-cv, USCA 2nd Circuit
The question presented in this appeal: May a healthcare provider’s breach of contract and quasi-contract claims against an ERISA health benefit plan were completely preempted by federal law under the two-prong test for preemption established in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200?
The Davila two-prong test to determine whether a claim falls “within the scope” of §502(a)(1)(B). provides that claims are completely preempted by ERISA if they are brought:
a. by “an individual [who] at some point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),”; and
b. under circumstances in which “there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s actions.”
The Circuit Court noted that the test is conjunctive; i.e., a state-law cause of action is preempted only if both prongs of the test are satisfied.
The Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that:
1. An “in-network” health care provider may receive a valid assignment of rights from an ERISA plan beneficiary pursuant to ERISA §502(a)(1)(B)*;
2. Where a provider’s claim involves the right to payment and not simply theamount or execution of payment, i.e., where the claim principally implicates coverage and benefit determinations as set forth by the terms of the ERISA benefit plan, and not simply the contractually correct payment amount or the proper execution of the monetary transfer—that claim constitutes a colorable claim for benefits pursuant to ERISA §502(a)(1)(B).
In this instance, said the court, at least some of Montefiore's claims for reimbursement are completely preempted by federal law. However, the Circuit Court noted, the remaining state-law claims are properly subject to the exercise of the District Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/638f47ad-5866-4fe6-b0b7-de8642e536f7/1/doc/10-1451Complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/638f47ad-5866-4fe6-b0b7-de8642e536f7/1/hilite/
* 1 Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides, in relevant part: A civil action may be brought -- (1) by a participant or beneficiary -- (B) to recover benefits due to him [or her] under the terms of his [or her] plan, to enforce his [or her] rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his [or her] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.
Creating and abolishing a temporary positionWilson v Madison-Oneida BOCES, 268 AD2d 625
Frequently a public employer will establish a temporary position to handle a particular need that is expected to be resolved in a relatively short period. The Wilson case addresses the creation and abolishment of temporary positions and the rights of individuals appointed to such temporary positions. The Madison-Oneida BOCES appointed Dana Wilson as “temporary clerk of the works” to perform construction oversight services for the Cazenovia Central School District and the Stockbridge Valley Central School District. The item was established as a temporary position in the civil service.*
Wilson sued, contending that BOCES violated its “employment agreement” to employ him through June 30, 1997 and, in addition, urged that it had terminated him without just cause. The Supreme Court, treating this as an “Article 78” proceeding rather than as an action for “breach of contract,” dismissed his petition, finding that it was untimely. Wilson appealed.
In an effort to avoid this result, Wilson tried to convince the court that this was a “breach of contract” case and thus his petition was timely as it was subject to a longer Statute of Limitations provision. The Appellate Division rejected Wilson argument, holding that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a formal employment contract between Wilson and BOCES or the school districts. It said that the “employment notices” he relied do not establish the existence of such an agreement.
Thus, said the court, Wilson’s claims involve the abolition of the position of temporary clerk of the works, a matter that may be properly challenged only via an Article 78 proceeding. According to the ruling, Wilson’s position was officially abolished effective January 17, 1997 at a meeting of BOCES held on February 13, 1997. The Appellate Division concluded that regardless of whether the four-month Statute of Limitations is measured from the date of the BOCES meeting or the effective date of abolition of the position, Wilson’s commencement of the action in January 1998 was untimely.
* The decision refers to Wilson’s temporary position as being in the “civil service” when it would be more accurate to describe it as being in the “classified service.” In New York, the civil service consists of the classified service and the unclassified service. Educators, typically serving in positions in the unclassified service, are also in the civil service. Posted by
Disqualifying misconduct for the purposes of Unemployment Insurance benefitsMatter of Jacquelyn M. Cody v Commissioner of Labor, 37 AD3d 920
The decision is posted on the Internet at:http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2007/02/disqualifying-misconduct-for-purposes.html
Lastly, Grovesteen contended that due to her disability and exercise of her rights under the Human Rights Law, the Federation retaliated against her by, among other things, closing the Region 7 office and contesting her claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Appellate Division found that notwithstanding the fact that Grovesteen was a woman and thus a member of a protected class, the evidence she presented was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of sexual discrimination or harassment.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_03168.htm
Unfair labor practices - protected activitiesCSEA Local 1000 v PERB, 267 AD2d 935
Transfer of functionsMetacarpa v Johnston, App. Div., Third Dept., 268 AD2d 938[decided with Terrusa v Wing, 268 AD2d 938]
Addressing the objections raised by the Metacarpa and Terrusa plaintiffs with respect to their inclusion on the list of employees to be transferred to OCFS or OTDA and their exclusion from the DOH list, the Appellate Division found that: 1. DSS employees who worked in defined program units within DSS (2,285 out of the total 4,450 DSS employees) followed those units when entire program units were transferred; and
2. The Metacarpa and Terrusa plaintiffs were determined not to work in a particular program unit because they carried out functions and duties, which supported a variety of programs and thus held “generic administrative support positions.” The court took special note of the fact that the Manual stated that “.... interdepartmental titles which primarily provide support of a variety of functions ... shall not generally be considered to be substantially engaged in the function being transferred.”
Untenured employee must demonstrate his or her termination was made bad faith or for an unlawful reason in order to successfully challenge his or her dismissalShih v Waterfront Commn. of N.Y., 2011 NY Slip Op 03190, Appellate Division, First Department
As Conrad Shih’s status as an auditor with the New York City Waterfront Commission was not within the Commission’s definition of a "permanent employee" Supreme Court ruled that Shih was not entitled to the due process protections of a “permanent employee” i.e. a pretermination hearing. The Appellate Division agreed with the lower court determination that the Commission’s terminating Shih without such a hearing was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
As a nontenured employee, said the court, Shih was not entitled to a full adversarial hearing concerning the reasons for his termination. Further, the Appellate Division said that Shih “failed to show that his termination was for an improper reason or in bad faith,” citing Beneky v Waterfront Commn. of N.Y. Harbor, 42 NY2d 920, Certiorari denied 434 US 940. Applying the “Pell Doctrine,”* the court ruled that “Given [Shih’s] attempt to steal a DVD from a music store and failure to report his arrest on related charges, we cannot say that the penalty imposed was so disproportionate to the offense as to shock one's sense of fairness.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_03190.htm
Vacating a disciplinary arbitration awardRoemer v NYC Bd. of Ed., 268 AD2d 479, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 94 NY2d 763
Accidental disability retirement benefits application based on a training-related injuryGeraci v Hevesi, 37 AD3d 941
Joseph Geraci, a police officer, injured his left knee while participating in training course. Geraci said that his injury occurred when his left foot sank into an exercise mat and his sneaker gripped the mat, thereby causing his left leg to twist as he attempted to move to his right.
Claiming that the injury resulted from an accident, Geraci applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. The Retirement System’s hearing officer found that Geraci failed to establish that the incident resulting in his injury constituted an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law. The State Comptroller accepted the Hearing Officer's findings and conclusions, and disapproved Geraci ’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits.
The Appellate Division confirmed the Comptroller’s determination. The court said that based on its review of the record, “we cannot characterize the subject incident as a “'sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact'“ that would support a finding that Geraci’s injury resulted from an accident.
Rather, said the court, Geraci ’s injury “was the result of a training program constituting an ordinary part of petitioner's job duties and the normal risks arising therefrom,” citing Matter of Felix v New York State Comptroller, 28 AD3d 993, and other rulings.*
For the full text of the opinion, go to:http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2007/2007_01046.htm
* The Appellate Division also commented that “regarding [Geraci’s argument concerning] the inappropriateness of his footwear, even if accepted, would not transform the incident into an accidental event.”
Payment of unreimbursed medical expenses permitted by the Internal Revenue Code via a “Health Reimbursement Arrangement Plan” held not the same as health insurance premiumsKathleen Rockwell et al v Broadalbin-Perth Central School District, Supreme Court, Fulton County, Judge Joseph M. Sise, Decision [RJI #27-1-2009-05091. Motion #13, April 18, 2011]
* Chapter 30 of the Law of 2009 temporarily** extended the provisions of §1 of Chapter 566 of the Laws of 1967, which Chapter, in pertinent part, provided that BOCES and school districts could not diminish the health insurance benefits and employer contributions for such benefits provided to retirees “unless a corresponding diminution of benefits or contributions is effected from the present level … from the corresponding group of [active] employees….” ** N.B. Part B of §14 of Chapter 504 of the Laws of 2009 made this provision "permanent."