Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/870/858/312072/
Timestamp: 2019-08-19 12:01:00
Document Index: 206241052

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 158', '§ 160', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 158']

Wpix, Inc., Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent,andradio and Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212,i.b.e.w., Afl-cio, Intervenor, 870 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1989) :: Justia
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Wpix, Inc., Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent,andradio and Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212,i.b.e.w., Afl-cio, Intervenor, 870 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1989)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 870 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1989)
Argued Oct. 11, 1988. Decided March 21, 1989
Petitioner WPIX, Inc. ("WPIX") petitions for review of a decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") which dismissed the Board's complaint on behalf of WPIX against Local 1212 of the Radio and Television Broadcast Engineers Union, I.B.E.W., AFL-CIO (the "Union"). The complaint charged the Union with violating section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2)1 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) and (2) (1982), by (1) maintaining a provision of the collective bargaining agreement between WPIX and the Union that provides Union officials a longer leave of absence than is afforded to other employees, and prohibits only employees not on Union business from seeking or accepting other employment while on leave of absence; (2) demanding reinstatement of a Union official pursuant to that provision; and (3) filing for arbitration when WPIX rejected that demand. We have jurisdiction pursuant to NLRA Sec. 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
By letter dated May 25, 1984, the Union notified WPIX that Tomaselli's leave of absence would be extended an additional two years. WPIX later denied receiving this letter. In an arbitration described infra, however, the arbitrator concluded that the Union had notified WPIX concerning Tomaselli's extension and WPIX had acquiesced therein, based upon (1) a presumption that the Union's letter had been mailed and delivered, (2) the fact that WPIX continued to deal with Tomaselli as the Union's business representative during the extension period, and (3) the continued recognition of Tomaselli's leave status by continued payment of insurance premiums (subsequently, as theretofore, reimbursed by the Union). The administrative law judge "assumed without deciding" that an extension was effected, and the Board so found. In its reply brief on appeal, WPIX states that " [t]he propriety of the Arbitrator's award extending Tomaselli's leave of absence from two to three years is now before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ... and is not at issue in this proceeding."
On August 2, 1985, WPIX filed a charge with the Board alleging that the Union's demand that Tomaselli be reinstated violated sections 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the NLRA because, in making that demand,
the Union is attempting to cause the Employer to violate Section 8(a) (3) of the Act in that it is attempting to cause the Employer to encourage membership in and loyalty to the Union by providing a job-related benefit to employees who participate in Union business that is not provided to employees who refrain from participating in Union business.
On February 24, 1986, the General Counsel of the Board granted WPIX's appeal from the Regional Director's refusal to issue a complaint and directed issuance of a complaint. A hearing was then held before Administrative Law Judge Steven B. Fish (the "ALJ") on June 18, 1986. The ALJ issued a decision on January 16, 1987 which determined that the Union violated section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the NLRA by maintaining and enforcing section 3.09(a) of the Agreement. The ALJ recommended an order directing the Union to cease and desist from maintaining and enforcing Section 3.09(a) of the Agreement, and to withdraw the grievance filed on behalf of Tomaselli.
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied primarily upon two Board precedents: Dairylea Coop. Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976); and Mead Packaging, 273 N.L.R.B. 1451 (1985).
Mead Packaging involved an alleged violation of NLRA Sec. 8(a) (1) and (5)3 by employers for unilaterally ceasing to provide contractual increases in pension benefit multipliers, and group insurance coverage, to union officers (not shop stewards) on union-related leaves of absence. The pertinent collective bargaining agreement provided employees the right to take leaves of absence for up to four years in order to accept employment as officers of the union. Mead Packaging, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1452. Other than for union employment as elected or appointed union officials, the employers in question never allowed any employee a leave of absence to take another job. Id. at 1454. The Board found that the employers in question provided benefits to the union officers which did not " 'further the effective administration of bargaining agreements on the plant level by encouraging the continued presence of the steward on the job.' " Id. at 1452 (quoting Dairylea, 219 N.L.R.B. at 658). The Board therefore concluded that the employers did not violate NLRA Sec. 8(a) (1) and (5) by declining to continue the benefits without bargaining with the union, and stated in dictum that were the issue before it, it would find the underlying contractual provisions violative of NLRA Sec. 8(a) (3) and (b) (2). Id.
The Board distinguished Dairylea and a similar case on the ground that the agreements in those cases provided superseniority, thus "encourag [ing] employees to become union officers because they gained seniority they could not have possessed had they not done so." Id. at 10. The Board instead followed IATSE, observing that section 3.09(a) of the Agreement restored the returning Union official to "no better position than if he had never left, rather than [providing] a preference or benefit." Id. The Board added that "to the extent that the foregoing analysis is inconsistent with Mead Packaging, ... we overrule that case." Id.
[W]e find that section 3.09 of the parties [sic] contract does not accord an unlawful preference to employees serving as union officials. Therefore, the Respondent's actions in seeking to have Tomaselli reinstated to his job at WPIX did not violate Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act.
We begin by considering the proper standard for our review, which is provided by Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 99 S. Ct. 1842, 60 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1979), in the following terms:
Of course, the judgment of the Board is subject to judicial review; but if its construction of the [NLRA] is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 [98 S. Ct. 651, 660, 54 L. Ed. 2d 586] (1978). In the past we have refused enforcement of Board orders where they had "no reasonable basis in law," either because the proper legal standard was not applied or because the Board applied the correct standard but failed to give the plain language of the standard its ordinary meaning. Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166 [92 S. Ct. 383, 390, 30 L. Ed. 2d 341] (1971). We have also parted company with the Board's interpretation where it was "fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the [NLRA]" and an attempt to usurp "major policy decisions properly made by Congress." American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 [85 S. Ct. 955, 967, 13 L. Ed. 2d 855] (1965). Similarly, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 499 [80 S. Ct. 419, at 432, 4 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1960) ], we could not accept the Board's application of the [NLRA] where we were convinced that the Board was moving "into a new area of regulation which Congress had not committed to it."
Id. at 497, 99 S. Ct. at 1849; accord, NLRB v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 746 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
WPIX argues that the second prong of the Board's three-part test--whether the distinction in benefits between union officials and other employees tends to encourage the union status or activity in question--"radically departs from the two-step disparate benefit analysis initially set forth in [Dairylea ] and refined in Gulton Electro-Voice, 266 N.R.L.B. 406 (1983), enf'd sub nom. Electrical Workers U.E. Local 900 v. N.L.R.B., 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984)." WPIX contends that the Board's prior jurisprudence established a two-step analysis that was basically identical to the first and third steps--disparate treatment and policy justification--of the analysis employed here. We conclude, however, that no radical departure has occurred, finding the standard here employed to be consistent with the Board's prior decisions, the language of the NLRA, and authoritative court interpretations of that statute.
As stated earlier, NLRA Sec. 8(a) (3) prohibits an employer from "discriminat [ing against an employee] in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization," and NLRA Sec. 8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violations of [Sec. 8(a) (3) ]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) and (b) (2) (1982) (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute, therefore, establishes encouragement or discouragement of union membership as the centerpiece of a section 8(a) (3) or (b) (2) violation. See NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1166 (2d Cir. 1976) ("under Secs. 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2), encouragement of membership is a sine qua non of a violation"), enforcing Dairylea Coop. Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975).
The Supreme Court authoritatively interpreted section 8(a) (3) to this effect in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 74 S. Ct. 323, 98 L. Ed. 455 (1954), stating:
The language of Sec. 8(a) (3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice is for an employer to encourage or discourage membership by means of discrimination. Thus this section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in employment as such; only such discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization is proscribed.
Id. at 42-43, 74 S. Ct. at 336-37 (emphasis added); see NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32, 87 S. Ct. 1792, 1796, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1027 (1967) ("Sec. 8(a) (3) ... requires specifically that the Board find a discrimination and a resulting discouragement of union membership").
the phrase "encourage membership", as used in Sec. 8(a) (3), encompasses not only discrimination which induces workers to join a union, but also conduct which encourages employees to be "good" union members, to support and assist the union, or to participate in union activities. Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 39-42, 74 S. Ct. 323, 335-337, 98 L. Ed. 455, 476-478 (1954).
Against this background, even if the Board decision herein departed radically from prior Board precedents in articulating the encouragement of union status or activity as necessary to a section 8(a) (3) violation, it could hardly constitute an inappropriate or invalid interpretation of the NLRA. We believe, however, that WPIX misreads the Board's precedents. The cases cited by WPIX deal for the most part with superseniority provisions in collective bargaining agreements. We addressed the Board's jurisprudence in this area, with specific reference to the "encouragement" issue, in NLRB v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 746 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1984), a case in which we enforced a Board order directing an employer and a union to cease enforcement of a superseniority provision. We there said:
The Union contends that even if [Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 406 (1983), enforced sub nom. Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ] states the appropriate rule, the Board failed to prove that the superseniority clause here "encourage [s] membership" within the meaning of section 8(a) (3) of the Act. It is true that the Board's decision in this case does not directly address the question of encouragement. Nevertheless, all of the superseniority cases --from Dairylea to [United Elec. Workers Local 623, 230 N.L.R.B. 406 (1977), petition for review denied, D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978) ] to Gulton--proceed from the premise that superseniority encourages workers to be good union members so that they might increase their chances of being selected for positions afforded superseniority. See, e.g., Dairylea, supra, 219 N.L.R.B. at 657-58; Gulton, supra, 266 N.L.R.B. at 409.
In sum, we view the Board's articulation, in the decision here under review, of a three-part test for the analysis of alleged section 8(a) (3) violations as a natural evolution from its prior precedents, well rooted both in the language of that section and authoritative case law interpretations of that language. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the Board overruled Mead Packaging to the extent that case was inconsistent with its analysis in the decision here under review. For, as the Supreme Court stated in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 95 S. Ct. 959, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1975):To hold that the Board's earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking. " 'Cumulative experience' begets understanding and insight by which judgments ... are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judicial process."
Id. at 265-66, 95 S. Ct. at 967-68 (quoting NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349, 73 S. Ct. 287, 290, 97 L. Ed. 377 (1953)).
Again, we disagree. The distinction is both meaningful and essential to a principled application of section 8(a) (3), which prohibits discrimination which either encourages or discourages union activity. The Board was therefore fully justified in following IATSE, and reasonably applied the rule thus formulated to the facts of this case.
Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353, 362 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting NLRB v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 746 F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 1984)).
First, WPIX concedes that this case is not one of first impression. Second, as indicated earlier, we view the rule announced by the Board herein as in a line of evolution from its prior decisions. Or, as we put it in NLRB v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, " [r]ather than abruptly changing well-settled law, the Board ... fashioned a clear-cut rule that resolved the uncertainty created by its earlier decisions." 746 F.2d at 151. Third, nothing in the record suggests that WPIX relied upon Board precedents in refusing to reinstate Tomaselli. In fact, the ALJ's decision herein, although favorable to WPIX, specifically states: "Murch admitted that had Tomaselli requested reinstatement prior to the two years [the period of the initially agreed leave of absence] having expired, WPIX would have complied with the contract and given him back his job." Fourth, although WPIX may well have to reinstate Tomaselli and provide him with back pay as a result of the pending litigation, no significant hardship would result from holding WPIX to contractual provisions in which it has voluntarily acquiesced since 1971, especially when contrasted with the hardship that would be imposed upon Tomaselli if, contrary to his legitimate expectations, he were not reinstated. Fifth, there is a statutory interest in applying the new rule retroactively. The Board's decision in this case noted that seventy-six percent of a recent sample of union contracts contained union-related leave of absence provisions, and that "tremendous instability in labor relations ... would result if we deemed all union-related leave of absence provisions unlawful." Radio and Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union Local 1212, 288 N.L.R.B. No. 49 at 10 n. 15 (Apr. 1, 1988).
NLRA Sec. 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) reads in relevant part:
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) and (2) (1982).
NLRA Sec. 8(a) (3), to which section 8(b) (2) refers, reads in relevant part:
N.L.R.A. Sec. 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1982), is set forth in note 1 supra. N.L.R.A. Sec. 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1982), provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees."
Although the emphasis in this case is upon the encouragement of union status or activity, we note that section 8(a) (3) prohibits discrimination "to encourage or discourage" it. Accordingly, formulations which focus only upon encouragement (or discouragement) are to be read in the context of the cases in which they occur