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Timestamp: 2019-01-21 09:55:20
Document Index: 37583168

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1623', '§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3143', '§ 3161', '§ 3162', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 1621']

U.S. v. Richardson, 421 F.3d 17 | Casetext
421 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005)
United States Court of Appeals, First CircuitAug 30, 2005
U.S. v. Boskic
…He invokes the doctrines of fundamental ambiguity and literal truth in support of his contention. See United…
…That is, the question itself is excessively vague, making it impossible to know—without guessing—the meaning…
holding that, in the case of a "fundamentally ambiguous" question, "`we cannot allow juries to criminally convict a defendant based on their guess as to what the defendant was thinking at the time the response was made&apos;" (quoting United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097, 1101 (11th Cir. 1991))
holding that a party may "preemptively impeach" its own witness, "even where the defendant agrees to forego impeachment on cross-examination"
Conspiracy - Objects of the Conspiracy
…421 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005) When there are alternate grounds on which a jury can convict a defendant on one…
Robert M. Andalman, with whom Jeremy D. Margolis, Sonnenschein Nath Rosenthal LLP, A. John Pappalardo, Evan Georgopoulos, and Greenberg Traurig LLP were on brief, for appellant.
We set forth the facts "in the light most flattering to the government's theory of the case, consistent with record support." United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 2001). From about 1997 to 2000, Richardson was employed as a Regional Account Manager for TAP Pharmaceuticals Inc. ("TAP"), which manufactures, among other drugs, Lupron, a prescription drug used in the treatment of prostate cancer. Richardson was responsible for maintaining relationships with institutional and managed care customers, including, in 1997, the Lahey Clinic in Burlington, Massachusetts.
On June 25, 2002, Richardson was indicted on one count of making false statements before a grand jury, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (Count One), and one count of obstruction of justice, id. § 1503 (Count Two), based on her grand jury testimony of December 19, 2000. On October 31, 2002, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment amending Count One, re-alleging Count Two, and adding one count each of perjury and obstruction of justice (Counts Three and Four) based on a statement Richardson had made in a sworn declaration submitted to the court on September 24, 2002 in opposition to the government's motion to disqualify her defense counsel.
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) prohibits, among other things, a person from "corruptly . . . endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice. . . ."
discussed with, offered[,] and provided to Lahey Clinic things of value outside the written contract as a way of making Lupron cheaper, . . . to help make up the difference between the price of Lupron and the price of Zoladex, [a competing drug], [and] as an inducement to the Lahey Clinic and some of its employees to . . . renew the contract with TAP and . . . to purchase Lupron for patients being treated in the Clinic's facilities;
and that Richardson had "discussed those arrangements with other employees at TAP." Count One further alleged that "such things of value includ[ed] golf outings, research support, educational grants, free or nominally priced goods, and other items."
The nineteen allegedly false statements charged in Count One of the superseding indictment are reproduced in Appendix A.
Richardson moved to dismiss all four counts in the superseding indictment on March 7, 2003, arguing with respect to Count One that the perjury charges against her were insupportable as a matter of law because her statements before the grand jury were literally true, the indictment took those statements out of context, and her statements were made in response to the prosecutor's fundamentally ambiguous questions during the grand jury colloquy. Judge Stearns heard argument and took the motion under advisement on May 29, 2003.
We identify the four different district court judges involved in this case at various stages solely to prevent confusion over the chronology of the proceedings.
The government timely filed its report, captioned a "Motion to Set a Trial Date of January 19 and for Excludable Delay for the Period Between November 17, 2003 and January 19, 2004," in which it calculated that the STA required Richardson's trial to "commence on or before December 18, 2003." The government nevertheless requested that the court schedule trial for January 19, 2004 and exclude the period of time between November 17, 2003 and January 19, 2004 from the speedy trial clock as a continuance in the interest of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). As grounds for the continuance, the government asserted that: (1) a trial date earlier than January 19, 2004 would "unreasonably deny . . . the Government continuity of counsel" because its chosen trial attorney had been involved since mid-October in another trial that was unlikely to end before December 10, 2003, justifying a continuance for that period of time; (2) the court could "require the parties to file any motions in limine by [November 24, 2003] . . . as a legitimate case management tool," thereby tolling the STA clock where "the defendant is likely to have such motions"; and (3) because it was unlikely that the case could be reassigned to another judge who could schedule the case for trial on or before December 18, 2003, "any transfer to another judge in this district will likely result in a miscarriage of justice because the case will probably have to be dismissed without prejudice due to a violation of the [STA]."
(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by [ 18 U.S.C. § 3161].
Upon the November 19, 2003 request of Judge Lindsay's clerk, Richardson submitted a letter to the court on November 20, 2003 addressing the "impact under the [STA] of the Government's November 18 filing." In the letter, Richardson disputed the government's STA calculation and argued that November 20, 2003 was the last day on which a trial could begin in compliance with the STA. Richardson also asserted that despite its caption, the government's report was not a "motion" whose filing on November 18, 2003 operated to toll the speedy trial clock pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), but was instead a mere status report that "acknowledged that the first date on which the Court could try the case [January 19, 2004] indeed present[s] problems under the [STA], even by the Government's calculation." In Richardson's view, the government's attempt to characterize its filing as a motion was a pretext for avoiding the STA's requirements.
The government filed a reply to Richardson's letter on November 24, 2003 contesting Richardson's STA calculation and reiterating the arguments made in its November 18, 2003 filing. Richardson filed a "Memorandum in Opposition" the next day, November 25, 2003, seeking dismissal of the indictment with prejudice for violation of the STA. Without formally responding to any of the parties' papers filed between November 18 and November 25, 2003, and without determining how many days, if any, remained on the speedy trial clock, Judge Lindsay had the case reassigned to a fourth judge on December 1, 2003.
Judge Lindsay apparently utilized "a new procedure" through which the "case [could] be redrawn from a pool of those judges indicating the matter could be tried on an expedited basis." United States v. Richardson, 324 F.Supp.2d 339, 341 (D.Mass. 2004) (Young, J.).
When the parties appeared before Judge Young that same day, December 1, 2003, Richardson maintained that the time period within which the STA required her trial to begin had expired on November 20, 2003. Judge Young stated that he thought the speedy trial clock had not yet expired, but was about to. Although he offered to empanel a jury on December 8, 2003, he advised the parties that his schedule that week would not permit an uninterrupted trial. In the alternative, Judge Young offered to set a trial date of January 5, 2004 and to exclude the time between December 8, 2003, and January 5, 2004 as a continuance in the interest of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A), without prejudice to Richardson's right to seek dismissal of the indictment under the STA on the theory that the speedy trial clock had expired on November 20, 2003. The parties eventually agreed to set a trial date of January 12, 2004 and to exclude the time between December 8, 2003 and January 12, 2004 as a continuance in the interest of justice.
Appendix B sets forth a timeline of the dates and filings relevant to the STA calculation.
On April 29, 2004, the court sentenced Richardson to six months of imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release (including four months of home confinement), a fine of $3,000, and a special monetary assessment of $100. The court entered a final judgment of conviction on April 30, 2004, and Richardson timely appealed. On May 11, 2004, the court, citing Richardson's STA claim, allowed her motion to stay execution of her sentence pending appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (providing for detention pending appeal except where judicial officer finds that appeal is not for purposes of delay and raises a "substantial question of law . . . likely to result" in a different disposition). On July 13, 2004, the court issued a memorandum explaining its reasons for denying Richardson's motion to dismiss the indictment on STA grounds. See United States v. Richardson, 324 F.Supp.2d 339 (D.Mass. 2004).
The STA provides that the trial of a defendant charged by indictment "shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the . . . indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). This requirement reflects the Act's purpose of protecting both a defendant's private interest and the broader public interest "in the fair — but expeditious — trial of criminal cases." United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir. 1988). If a defendant's trial begins after the seventy-day time period has elapsed, the STA requires the court, "on motion of the defendant," to dismiss the indictment, either with or without prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); see also United States v. Barnes 159 F.3d 4, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing factors to be considered). However, in calculating the seventy-day period within which a trial must commence, the STA "mandates the exclusion of certain periods of delay." United States v. Salimonu, 182 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 1999); see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9). Among the periods of delay that must be excluded is "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
The STA "increases a defendant's speedy trial safeguards beyond the constitutional minima." Hastings, 847 F.2d at 923 n. 4.
The parties' disagreement is therefore confined to the question whether the government's filing of November 18, 2003 was a "motion" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), which operated to toll the speedy trial clock "from the filing of the motion through [its] . . . prompt disposition." Richardson argues that the government's November 18, 2003 filing was nothing more than a status report responding to Judge Lindsay's request for information that did not toll the speedy trial clock, which expired two days later without the commencement of her trial. Alternatively, Richardson argues that even if the government's filing otherwise qualified as a motion, it did not operate to toll the speedy trial clock because it was filed as a pretext to avoid the consequences of an STA violation. To permit tolling under these circumstances, Richardson maintains, would frustrate the purposes of the STA. The government takes the position that it filed a legitimate motion for a continuance in the interest of justice, without pretext, whose filing tolled the clock until the case was reassigned from Judge Lindsay to Judge Young on December 1, 2003. By the government's count, only one additional non-excludable day, December 2, 2003, elapsed on the speedy trial clock before Richardson's trial began on January 12, 2004 with two days to spare.
Richardson does not argue that, if the government's November 18, 2003 filing qualifies as a motion, the court exceeded the permissible period of excludable time for disposing of the motion.
The government filed a motion in limine on December 3, 2003, which overlapped with the filing of other pretrial motions that were decided on January 12, 2004. The parties also agreed on December 1, 2003 to exclude the period of time from December 8, 2003 through January 12, 2004 as a continuance in the interest of justice. See infra Appendix B.
Richardson, 324 F.Supp.2d at 342 (citations omitted). Judge Young thus determined that Judge Lindsay effectively denied the government's legitimately filed motion for a continuance when he had the case reassigned to Judge Young on December 1, 2003. As a result, the filing of the motion tolled the speedy trial clock from November 18, 2003 through December 1, 2003. Accordingly, Judge Young agreed with the government's position that the disputed period of time was excludable from the speedy trial clock and denied Richardson's motion to dismiss the indictment on STA grounds.
Judge Young also noted that "the [STA] separately provides for disciplinary action against attorneys who file frivolous motions for the purpose of delay" under 18 U.S.C. 3162(b). Richardson, 324 F.Supp.2d at 342 n. 3. Because Richardson did not seek sanctions against the government's attorneys, Judge Young declined to comment on "whether the Government's motion qualified for such punishment." Id.
The question whether the government's filing was a "motion" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) is a question of law subject to de novo review. Cf. United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 600 (1st Cir. 1996) (reviewing de novo question whether colloquy qualifies as a "hearing" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F)). We review for clear error the district court's factual findings on the question whether the government's filing was merely a pretext to avoid dismissal of the indictment under the STA. See United States v. Zayas, 876 F.2d 1057, 1058 (1st Cir. 1989) (reviewing factual determination that jury empanelment was not pretextual for clear error).
"[W]e have read the term `pretrial motion' broadly to encompass all manner of motions" for purposes of tolling the speedy trial clock, "ranging from informal requests for laboratory reports to `implied' requests for a new trial date." Barnes, 159 F.3d at 11 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d 344, 348 (3d Cir. 1993) (defendant's letter to court qualifies as motion tolling speedy trial clock where "the government, in good faith, treated the letter as a motion" despite court's refusal to consider the filing until resubmitted in proper form). But see United States v. Brown, 285 F.3d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (document filed by government that "served the function of [regular] status reports required by [a] local rule" but also requested that the court set a trial date does not constitute motion that tolls speedy trial clock). The district court accurately characterized the government's November 18, 2003 filing, which not only reported the government's calculation of the number of days remaining on the speedy trial clock but also sought relief in the form of a continuance in the interest of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A), as a motion that tolled the speedy trial clock pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
The statutory grounds for exclusion of time from the speedy trial clock "are designed to take account of specific and recurring periods of delay which often occur in criminal cases; they are not to be used either to undermine the time limits established by the Act, or to subvert the very purpose the Act was designed to fulfill." Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 333, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). Accordingly, we have repeatedly cautioned that neither counsel nor district courts may employ measures for excluding time from the speedy trial clock that impermissibly frustrate the STA's purpose of protecting the shared interest of criminal defendants and the public in "bringing criminal charges to the bar of justice as promptly as practicable." Hastings, 847 F.2d at 923. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 56 (1st Cir. 2001) (period of delay not excludable where court's retroactive reasons for exclusion "would undermine the purposes of the [STA]"); Staula, 80 F.3d at 602 n. 3 ("[W]e will not permit either the district court or the prosecution to jerry-build a `hearing' in order to thwart the concinnous operation of the Speedy Trial Act."); United States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1165 (1st Cir. 1995) (declining to adopt "broad rule" requiring exclusion of "extended delay attributable solely to the government's unexcused failure to comply with a court-ordered briefing schedule" because of "potential [for] abuse").
The record in this case supports Judge Young's determination that the government's facially valid motion was not filed as a pretext to avoid the consequences of an STA violation, but was filed for the legitimate purpose of seeking a continuance in the interest of justice. In particular, the motion justifiably sought a continuance to prevent the loss of continuity of counsel in the event the case was reassigned to a different judge for an earlier trial date. The government's need for continuity of counsel is a valid statutory ground for granting a continuance in the interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv) (among factors court "shall consider" in determining whether ends of justice outweigh interests favoring speedy trial is whether failure to grant a continuance "would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel"); United States v. Scantleberry-Frank, 158 F.3d 612, 615 (1st Cir. 1998) (excluding time period resulting from "continuance . . . granted to aid defense counsel, and maintain continuity of counsel").
We do not address the other two grounds raised in the government's November 18, 2003 motion in support of a continuance in the interest of justice: (1) that the court could "require the parties to file any motions in limine by [November 24, 2003] . . . as a legitimate case management tool" and (2) that "any transfer to another judge in this district will likely result in a miscarriage of justice because the case will probably have to be dismissed without prejudice due to a violation of the [STA]."
Richardson does not dispute that the government's attorney was in fact unavailable because he was engaged in another trial during much of December. She points out, however, that while continuity of counsel is an express statutory ground for a continuance in the interest of justice, the STA explicitly prohibits a court from granting such a continuance "because of general congestion of the court's calendar." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C). The events in this case, Richardson argues, demonstrate that although the government cited continuity of counsel as a reason to grant a continuance in the interest of justice, the real reason a continuance was necessary was because Judge Lindsay's trial schedule was full.
A different government attorney eventually tried Richardson's case in January.
Richardson argues that the government's motion was pretextual because the court could not grant a continuance in the interest of justice in order to postpone a trial date that had not yet been set and, more importantly, could not be set within the seventy-day period allotted by the STA. However, Richardson cites no authority, and we have found none, for the proposition that a trial date must first be set before a court may grant "a continuance in the proceeding," 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i).
The district court instructed the jury that in order to convict Richardson of perjury on Count One, its members had to agree unanimously that the same false statement or statements amounted to perjury beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Glantz, 847 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1988) (no error in jury "instructions [that] could only be interpreted by the jury to mean that the defendant must be acquitted on the count unless the entire jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of one specific act of perjury alleged in that count"). Because the court submitted the case to the jury for a general verdict instead of a special verdict, it is impossible to know which one or more of the nineteen false statements it found, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, to constitute perjury, and which statements (if any) it determined to fall short of that standard when it found Richardson guilty of perjury on Count One.
Richardson argues that the jury's guilty verdict must be vacated because at least one of the nineteen alternate grounds submitted by the government is legally insupportable, and the jury's verdict may have rested on such an invalid ground. Richardson acknowledges that, ordinarily, "a general jury verdict [is] valid so long as it [is] legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds — even though that [gives] no assurance that a valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actually the basis for the jury's action." Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). However, a guilty verdict may rest on an invalid ground either because it is based on "evidence that no reasonable person could regard as sufficient," id. at 59, 112 S.Ct. 466, or because it advances "a particular theory of conviction . . . [that] is contrary to law," id. While jurors, in a criminal case, are "well equipped to analyze the evidence" in order to avoid resting a guilty verdict on a "factually inadequate" theory, they "are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, where a general verdict may rest on a ground that is invalid because the theory of conviction is contrary to law — as opposed to a ground that is invalid because the evidence supporting it is insufficient as a matter of law — the verdict must be set aside despite the existence of an alternate, legally valid ground of conviction. Id.; see also United States v. Nieves-Burgos, 62 F.3d 431, 434-36 (1st Cir. 1995).
Richardson argues that at least one of the nineteen false statements alleged in Count One of the indictment advances a legally erroneous theory of perjury, requiring us to vacate her conviction. See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 589 (1st Cir. 1996) (general verdict that may have been grounded on legally erroneous theory requires setting aside verdict on all grounds), overruled in part by Pasquantino v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1766, 161 L.Ed.2d 619 (2005); cf. United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 377 (2d Cir. 1986) (remanding for new trial on one count of perjury alleging multiple false statements without determining whether legal defect resulted from insufficiency of evidence or legally erroneous theory of conviction). We review this question of law de novo. United States v. Ferrario-Pozzi, 368 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
In general, "[t]he determination as to the defendant's state of mind — [her] belief in the untruthfulness of [her] statement — is one which a jury is best equipped to perform." United States v. Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, because the falsity of a statement in many circumstances depends on the meaning of the question to which it responds, a jury may be required to examine "the question and answer . . . in the context of the investigation as a whole and the state of the defendant's knowledge." United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998). Richardson nevertheless maintains that her challenges go beyond assailing the sufficiency of the evidence before the jury because several of the government's alternate theories of conviction are contrary to the strict requirements imposed by the law of perjury.
In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973), the Supreme Court set exacting standards for maintaining a perjury prosecution. The Court recognized that "[u]nder the pressures and tensions of interrogation, it is not uncommon for the most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not entirely responsive. Sometimes the witness does not understand the question, or may in an excess of caution or apprehension read too much or too little into it." Id. at 358, 93 S.Ct. 595. Given this practical reality, "[t]he burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to the specific object of the questioner's inquiry." Id. at 360, 93 S.Ct. 595. Accordingly, "[p]recise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury." Id. at 362, 93 S.Ct. 595.
Despite these general pronouncements, the Bronston Court's holding was narrow. The Court decided only that a jury could not be allowed to consider a perjury charge where the allegedly false statement was "literally true but not responsive to the question asked and arguably misleading by negative implication." Id. at 353, 93 S.Ct. 595. The Court reasoned that "[a] jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether `he does not believe [his answer] to be true.'" Id. at 359, 93 S.Ct. 595 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1621; alteration in original). Bronston thus requires dismissal of an indictment "where . . . the government hinges its charge on the false implications of a statement that is not alleged to be false in itself." United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 848 (1st Cir. 1983).
Richardson, relying on Bronston, argues that several of the perjury charges against her are contrary to law because they allege the falsity of statements that are literally true. Bronston, however, is inapplicable to any of the false statements charged against Richardson. The government does not allege that any of Richardson's statements are facially true but "arguably misleading by negative implication," Bronston, 409 U.S. at 353, 93 S.Ct. 595, thereby evincing only her intent to "mislead or divert the examiner," id. at 359, 93 S.Ct. 595. Rather, the government alleges that Richardson knowingly made statements that are in direct conflict with facts the government alleges to be true, by denying that she committed acts the government maintains she in fact committed. See Glantz, 847 F.2d at 6 ( Bronston's "literal truth" defense inapplicable where "no claim is made that [defendant's] statement . . . was true but unresponsive to the question asked before the grand jury"). Whether or not the government's evidence was sufficient to prove the falsity of Richardson's statements, as well as that she knew her statements to be false when she made them, its theory of perjury is not contrary to law.
Richardson also argues that several of the false statements alleged in Count One of the indictment advance theories of conviction that are contrary to the law of perjury because they were made in response to fundamentally ambiguous questions. "A question that is truly ambiguous or which affirmatively misleads the testifier can never provide a basis for a finding of perjury, as it could never be said that one intended to answer such a question untruthfully." DeZarn, 157 F.3d at 1049; see also United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097, 1101 (11th Cir. 1991) ("When the question that led to the allegedly false response is fundamentally ambiguous, we cannot allow juries to criminally convict a defendant based on their guess as to what the defendant was thinking at the time the response was made.").
By contrast, where a question is only arguably ambiguous, "it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant has committed perjury. In such a case there is an actual possibility that the defendant intended to and did in fact give a response that was literally false." Finucan, 708 F.2d at 848 (citations omitted). In determining whether a statement made in response to an ambiguous question could be said to be false, "the context of the question and answer becomes critically important." United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998); see also DeZarn, 157 F.3d at 1049 (jury must be allowed to consider "evidence of the context of the questioning which would establish that the [d]efendant — despite the false premise of the question — knew exactly what the questions meant and exactly what they were referring to").
Both a transcript and an audio recording of the grand jury colloquy were available to the jury during its deliberations.
Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (quoting United States v. Lattimore, 127 F.Supp. 405, 410 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 232 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1955)).
In several of his questions during the grand jury colloquy, the prosecutor explicitly distinguished between the contract price of Lupron and the actual cost of Lupron. For example, in the question preceding statement A1 alleged in the indictment, the prosecutor asked Richardson, "have you ever offered a customer or discussed with a customer giving them an educational grant to give them a lower price in reality but not changing the price in the contract?" (emphases added). In her allegedly false statement A1, Richardson responded, "No, never outside of a contract." Similarly, in the question preceding statement A12, the prosecutor asked,
Throughout this opinion, we refer to the false statements alleged in Count One, according to our own numbering system, as A1-A19, in the order in which they are set forth in the indictment. Only the statements highlighted in boldface are alleged to be false.
Q. As a way of effecting a reduction in price? A13. No that was separate.
Richardson's interpretation of the prosecutor's follow-up question is not plausible. First, the prosecutor had just stated his assumption that Richardson "might not be able to reduce the price" in the contract, so that any additional "support" would necessarily have to be provided "elsewhere." Second, even if the prosecutor did intend to refer to the price as written in the contract in his follow-up question, the context of the exchange suggests a much more reasonable interpretation of the prosecutor's questions than the one Richardson advances. After asking Richardson whether she discussed giving Lahey Clinic "support elsewhere" because she could not "reduce the price" of Lupron that was written in the contract, the prosecutor immediately followed up the question by asking whether the provision of "support elsewhere" was a way of " effecting a reduction in [the] price" written in the contract, that is, as a way of reducing the price in effect without actually changing the written contract price. "[A] witness cannot twist the meaning of a question in his own mind into some totally unrecognizable shape and then hide behind it" by alleging its fundamental ambiguity. Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d at 691.
The indictment alleges three other false statements made by Richardson, A2-A4, in response to questions in which the prosecutor used the word "price" without specifying whether he was referring to the price of Lupron listed in Lahey Clinic's written contract with TAP or to the actual cost of Lupron to Lahey Clinic after taking into account things of value that TAP provided to the clinic free of charge. The context of each exchange reveals that any ambiguity in the questions was not fatal to a perjury charge. Richardson made statement A2 during the following exchange:
Statements A3 and A4 respond to the prosecutor's questions whether Richardson offered or discussed offering Lahey Clinic "educational grants to reduce the price on a contract" (emphasis added). While the prosecutor sought to determine whether Richardson offered or discussed offering Lahey Clinic educational grants instead of reducing the price written in the contract, Richardson points out that the phrase "on a contract" is not generally interpreted to mean "outside a contract." When read in context, however, the prosecutor's questions continue a line of inquiry into whether TAP provided financial support to Lahey Clinic that was not listed in the written contract but was nevertheless part of the parties' agreement regarding the clinic's Lupron purchases.
Richardson argues that her statement in A4 that "we did never do that" is literally true because TAP never did list any additional financial support "in the contract." Richardson's argument goes only to the sufficiency of the evidence that statement A4 was false, an issue we do not reach.
On appeal, Richardson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of the nineteen false statements charged against her (i.e., those that she does not identify as advancing legally erroneous theories of conviction). As a result, she has forfeited any argument that not one of the nineteen charges against her is supported by adequate evidence. See United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 812 (1st Cir. 1996) (defendant forfeited challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting alternate ground of conviction through failure to develop argument). Nonetheless, we have compared the charges in Count One of the indictment against the record evidence, including the transcripts and audio recordings of the grand jury colloquies that were submitted to the jury. Based on our review, we readily conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support not just one, but several, of the perjury charges against Richardson. See Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d at 689-90 (evidence sufficient to support conviction for knowingly made false statement where, "taking into account the totality of the evidence, direct and circumstantial, and giving due weight to the indirect evidence anent appellant's motive to falsify, the proof was adequate to underbrace a guilty verdict"). In particular, a reasonable jury could have inferred, based on the government's strong circumstantial evidence (including Richardson's own contemporaneous internal office memoranda and notes), that Richardson knew at the time she testified before the grand jury that the things of value that she offered or discussed offering to Lahey Clinic, and that she discussed with other TAP employees, were intended to provide the clinic with a hidden discount or incentive to renew its contract for Lupron, contrary to Richardson's statements in A1 and A8-A11. See infra Appendix A.
By limiting our discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence to several of the allegedly false statements, we do not imply that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the other charged grounds. Nor do we suggest that more than one ground was required to be supported by sufficient evidence in order for the guilty verdict to stand. We make the point about evidentiary sufficiency on several of the statements to dispel any notion that Richardson could have argued successfully that the general verdict should be vacated on the basis that there was insufficient evidence for all nineteen statements.
We review preserved challenges to a district court's evidentiary rulings regarding relevance and unfair prejudice for abuse of discretion. United States v. Otero-Mendez, 273 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) ("In reviewing Rule 403 challenges, we are extremely deferential to the district court's determination."); United States v. Newton, 891 F.2d 944, 946 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[R]ulings on relevance and admissibility are reversible only for abuse of discretion."). However, because Richardson failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to the admission of testimonial evidence relating to the free Lupron samples after the denial without prejudice of her motion in limine, we review the court's decision to admit the testimony for plain error only. See United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 496 (1st Cir. 1997) (evidentiary challenge on grounds of unfair prejudice ordinarily must be renewed in trial context in order to be preserved); United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1996) (reviewing unpreserved challenge to relevance of evidence for plain error).
The government also introduced the testimony of another TAP employee, Daniel Steiner, who confirmed that in February 1998 he had emailed a PowerPoint presentation to other TAP employees, including Richardson, explaining the restrictions on distribution of free drug samples to customers. A print-out of the presentation introduced into evidence includes the statement: "If MCO [managed-care organizations]/Hospitals ask for large quantities of samples to achieve a contract price — you must include these in the contract. Of course, this affects the per unit cost. . . ."
As the government argues, however, the evidence relating to the free Lupron samples was relevant to prove that the following statement made by Richardson during her grand jury testimony was false:
Relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 403; see also United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[B]y design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided."). Richardson argues that the jury could have inferred that she was guilty of perjury under "a theory of guilt by association" because Chase, her former supervisor, had pled guilty to a crime. United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 602 (1st Cir. 1989). Moreover, because Chase had pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud, while Richardson was on trial only for the offenses of perjury and obstruction of justice, Richardson argues that the jury could have been confused about whether Richardson was also on trial for health care fraud.
Richardson asks us to take judicial notice of the fact that Chase's guilty plea was vacated months after Richardson's trial had concluded and after she had filed her notice of appeal. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., Inc. v. Cullen, 791 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (federal court may take judicial notice of complaint filed in related case); but see Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 22, n. 8 (1st Cir. 1982) (court of appeals "may not ordinarily consider factual material not presented to the court below"). Richardson suggests that the jury may have found her guilty of perjury on a theory of guilt by association with a person whose own guilt has since been called into question. We need not take notice of the fact that new developments have arisen in Chase's case (much less draw any conclusions regarding Chase's guilt or innocence based on those developments). This is so because unfair prejudice is measured not retrospectively, but as it existed at the time the contested evidence was introduced at trial, that is, at the time of the "district court's on-the-spot judgment." Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988).
Finally, Richardson argues that the government had no need to preemptively impeach its own witness because she offered to forego impeachment of Chase in order to prevent the government from introducing evidence of the guilty plea in its case-in-chief. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit a party to impeach its own witness. See Fed.R.Evid. 607 ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness."); United States v. Frappier, 807 F.2d 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1986). This is so even where the defendant agrees to forego impeachment on cross-examination. See United States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1984) (defendant's statement that he would not impeach government's witness "does not diminish the benefit to the jury of having before it information relevant to its task of judging credibility and weighing testimony"). Nevertheless, we have recognized the "possibility of using . . . impeachment of one's own witness improperly if there is no relevant contribution to be made by the witness's principal testimony on direct examination." Frappier, 807 F.2d at 259. Richardson argues that because Chase's testimony was largely irrelevant to the charges against Richardson, her testimony served the sole purpose of permitting the government to introduce, as impeachment evidence, unduly prejudicial evidence it could not otherwise have introduced.
Having reviewed the record in this case with care, we agree with the government that Chase's testimony about TAP's internal procedures made a "relevant contribution" to its case-in-chief, id., and that the government properly sought to introduce evidence of her guilty plea so that the jury could evaluate her credibility. "Only rarely — and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances — will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the . . . weighing of probative value and unfair effect." Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1340. In this case, the district court, attentive to the possibility of undue prejudice, issued a lengthy jury instruction soon after the government elicited Chase's testimony regarding the circumstances of her guilty plea and her possible self-interest in a reduced sentence in exchange for her testimony against Richardson:
Richardson did not and does not challenge the curative jury instruction.
Here's what I want to caution you on. The fact that [Chase has] pleaded guilty to something in no way affects your judgment about Ms. Richardson. In no way. It doesn't at all. Now, you listen to what she says like with all the other witnesses, . . . if you believe that that may have something to do with the case as between the government and Ms. Richardson. But this business that she has . . . pleaded guilty [to] is only before you so that you can evaluate her testimony. That's the only reason.
The court reiterated its instruction when it submitted the case to the jury. "We have held that within wide margins, the potential for prejudice . . . can be satisfactorily dispelled by appropriate curative instructions. Jurors are presumed to follow such instructions, except in extreme cases." United States v. Freeman, 208 F.3d 332, 345-46 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original) (discussing spillover prejudice). In light of the immediacy and specificity of the district court's curative instruction, we conclude that the court acted within its discretion by admitting evidence of Chase's guilty plea as impeachment evidence.
Count One of the superseding indictment charges the following statements as being false:
The indictment contains several variations from the transcript of Richardson's grand jury testimony and the audio recording of that testimony. Where such variations might materially affect the meaning of the testimony, we have provided the version contained in the transcript and the audio recording in brackets. Ellipses indicate that sections of the grand jury colloquy are omitted from the indictment. As we have noted, the jury had access to both the transcript and the audio recording of the testimony during its deliberations.
A5. No. That we need to give the customer an educational grant?
Q. I thought you testified earlier that it was not your proposal —
APPENDIX B Timeline of Dates and Filings Relevant to Richardson's STA Claim
Richardson's Government's Calculation, Calculation, Date Event Days Remaining Days Remaining
11/17 Parties appear before Judge Lindsay 3 3 11/18 Government files "Motion to Set a Trial 2 3 Date . . . and for Excludable Delay" 11/20 Richardson files response 0 3 11/24 Government files reply 0 3 11/25 Richardson files "Memorandum of Opposition" 0 3 seeking dismissal of indictment on STA grounds 12/1 Case is reassigned by Judge Lindsay, 0 3 parties reappear before Judge Young and agree to exclusion of period from 12/8 until 1/12 in the interest of justice 12/3 Government files motion in limine 0 2 12/5 Richardson files renewed motion to dismiss 0 2 for legal defects in indictment 12/16 Richardson files motion to dismiss indictment 0 2 on STA grounds 12/23 Richardson responds to government's 0 2 motion in limine 12/29 Richardson files motion in limine 0 2 1/12 Richardson's trial begins, Richardson's 0 2 motion to dismiss on STA grounds is denied, Richardson's motion in limine is denied