Source: https://uvamentalhealthpolicy.org/case-law/category/US+Supreme+Court
Timestamp: 2019-07-18 22:22:03
Document Index: 721588630

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 921', '§ 19', 'art, 568', 'art, 568', '§ 10801', '§ 15001']

US Supreme Court — Case Law — UVA Mental Health Policy & Practices
In its recently completed term that began October 3, 2005, and ended June 29, 2006, the United States Supreme Court decided sixty-nine cases with a signed opinion. After an unprecedented eleven years without a change in its membership, these opinions were closely watched to see whether the Court's direction would change with the addition of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. For many mental health professionals, the case of greatest interest, Clark v. Arizona, was issued on the final day of the term...
US Supreme Court, NGRI, Mental Health Experts
US Supreme Court Declines to Review Seventh Circuit Decision Authorizing Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services to Sue Indiana to Obtain Peer Review Records
Indiana Family and Social Services Administration v. Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services, 603 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2010) pet. for cert. denied April 25, 2011)
On April 25, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration seeking review of the en banc decision of Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that authorized Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services to sue to obtain peer review records from its mental health agency (Docket No. 10-131). This case set up the conflict between the circuits prompting the Supreme Court to hear VOPA v. Stewart described above.
Other Federal Circuits, US Supreme Court
US Supreme Court Denies Review of Idaho’s Abolition of Insanity Defense; Three Justices Dissent
Idaho v. Delling, 267 P.3d 709 (Ida. 2011), cert. denied, Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. __ (November 26, 2012)
The dissenting opinion is available at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/112612zor_f204.pdf [ at pp. 24-26 ]
Idaho abolished the insanity defense in 1982 enacting new language providing that a defendant’s mental condition shall not be a defense to criminal conduct. In this case, John Joseph Delling was charged with two counts of first degree murder, which were later amended to second degree murder. On motion of his counsel, the court ordered Delling evaluated for competency to stand trial and later committed him for restoration to competency. After nearly a year of commitment, Delling was found competent to proceed. He thereafter entered a “conditional” plea of guilty but asked the trial court to find Idaho’s abrogation of the insanity defense unconstitutional on its face and as applied in his case. He argued that the ability of a defendant to raise the issue of insanity with respect to criminal responsibility is mandated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition, he argued that abolition of the insanity defense violates his rights under the Sixth Amendment to present a defense and under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court denied these arguments and sentenced Delling to two consecutive life sentences.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld his convictions on the grounds that it had previously upheld the State’s abolition of the insanity defense in a long line of cases, and that the United States Supreme Court had declined to review any of those decisions after being presented with an opportunity to do so. Delling argued, however, that those decisions were no longer valid in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Arizona statute that removed the cognitive incapacity element or second prong of the M’Naughten test. In so doing, the Supreme Court stated that it had never held that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense, but it had also never held that the Constitution does not require such a test. It stated that each state has the capacity to define its own crimes and defenses.
On November 26, 2012, the Supreme Court not surprisingly declined to review this case. What was a surprise was three justices dissented. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, noted the absurd result reached under Idaho law that permitted a defendant to argue that because of mental illness he lacked the requisite intent or mens rea to commit the act, but not defend on the basis that he was operating under a delusion when he committed the act. Under amicus curiae briefs filed by the American Psychiatric Association and Criminal Law and Mental Health Law Professors, Justice Breyer wrote that the vast majority of defendants pleading insanity appear to know they are committing the act charged but are operating under a delusion when they are doing so. He would therefore grant a Writ of Certiorari on the grounds that a defendant’s due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment may be implicated.
US Supreme Court, NGRI
US Supreme Court Denies Habeas Relief in Michigan’s Denial of Diminished Capacity Defense
Metrish v. Lancaster, _ U.S. _, 17 133 S.Ct. 1781, 2013 WL 2149793 (No. 12-547, May 20, 2013)
The United States Supreme Court has denied a Michigan prisoner’s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus arguing that Michigan had erroneously prevented him from presenting evidence of his diminished capacity to a charge of first degree murder. At the time this case first came to trial in 1993, the Michigan Court of Appeals had long recognized the defense of diminished capacity to negate the mens rea or specific intent element required to support a first degree murder conviction. Two years after the first trial, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the diminished capacity defense had been abolished following Michigan’s 1975 comprehensive enactment of its statutes related to the admissibility of evidence of mental illness and intellectual disability. Upon his retrial in 2005 and on direct appeal, the Michigan courts refused to allow the defendant to present evidence of diminished capacity rejecting his argument that retroactive application of the state’s Supreme Court decision did not violate his due process rights. The Sixth Circuit granted the petitioner habeas relief. The United States Supreme Court reversed finding that the state court decisions did not result in an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as embodied in Supreme Court decisions. The Opinion is available on the Court’s website at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-547_0pm1.pdf.
In April 1993, Burt Lancaster, a former police officer with a long history of mental illness, shot and killed his girlfriend in a shopping center parking lot. Lancaster was charged with first degree murder and possession of a firearm to commit a felony. At his jury trial in 1994, Lancaster raised the insanity and diminished capacity defenses. At that time, the Michigan Court of Appeals in a line of cases had permitted legally sane defendants to present evidence of mental abnormality to negate the specific intent or mens rea required to commit a crime. Even though he was allowed to present this evidence, the jury convicted him of both charges. Lancaster later obtained federal habeas corpus relief on different grounds because the prosecutor at his first trial had erroneously exercised a race-based preemptory challenge to a potential juror and was awarded a new trial.
Prior to his new trial, however, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the Michigan legislature had enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme in 1975 establishing the requirements for introducing evidence related to a defense based upon mental illness or intellectual disability. People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276 (Mich. 2001). That scheme essentially adopted the M’Naughten rule for asserting an insanity defense. It also required a 30- day notice of intent to use the defense and a court-ordered psychiatric examination. In addition, the legislature created a verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” for defendants who suffered from mental illness but did not satisfy the legal definition of insanity. Such defendants would be provided with treatment but would not be exempt from the sentencing provisions applicable to other criminal defendants. Although the legislation did not specifically address the diminished capacity defense, the Michigan Supreme Court found that by creating such a comprehensive statutory scheme, the diminished capacity defense was superseded by that scheme.
Upon retrial in 2005, the trial court refused to allow Lancaster to assert the diminished capacity defense based upon the decision in Carpenter and he was again found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Michigan appellate courts upheld the conviction and the United States District Court denied him habeas relief. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed holding that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter was unforeseeable because of 1) the Michigan Court of Appeals’ consistent application of the diminished capacity defense, 2) the Michigan Supreme Court’s repeated references in dicta to the defense, and 3) the Michigan State Bar’s use of the defense in pattern jury instructions.
After granting the petition for Writ of Certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg recognized that a state prisoner has a very high standard to meet to obtain habeas corpus relief from a federal court. To obtain such relief, the challenged court ruling must have unreasonably applied federal law clearly established in United States Supreme Court decisions. The Court declined to apply Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), as urged by Lancaster, a case in which the Court had preciously held that due process required state criminal statutes must give fair warning of the conduct they prohibit. In Bouie, African-American petitioners had been convicted of trespass under South Carolina law after they refused to comply with orders to leave a drug store’s restaurant, which was reserved for white customers. Unlike this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court had unexpectedly expanded narrow and precise statutory language that did not cover the defendants’ conduct.
Instead the Court relied upon Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001), a case that upheld the Tennessee Supreme Court’s retroactive abolishment of the year and a day rule, a common law rule that barred a murder conviction unless the victim died within a year and a day of the act. In Rogers, the Court held that the retroactive application of the decision did not violate due process. The Court recognized that the diminished capacity defense is not an outdated relic of the common law as is the year and a day rule. To the contrary, the Court observed that the Model Penal Code sets out a version of the defense whenever evidence may establish a defendant does not have the state of mind that is necessary to establish an element of the offense.
In addition, the American Bar Association approved criminal justice guidelines in 1993 that favor the admissibility of mental health evidence to negate mens rea, and a majority of States, including Virginia, allow such evidence in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, the Court held that it has never found a due process violation where a state supreme court “squarely addressing a particular issued for the first time, rejected a consistent line of lower court decisions based on the supreme court’s reasonable interpretation of the language of a controlling statute.” The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Sixth Circuit decision and denied Lancaster habeas relief.
US Supreme Court, Competence
United States Supreme Court to Review Florida’s Bright-Line IQ Test to Determine Mental Retardation in Capital Cases
Hall v. Florida, No. 12-10882, _S. Ct._, 2013 WL 3153535(mem) (Oct. 21, 2013)
The United States Supreme Court has granted a capital prisoner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to determine whether Florida’s scheme utilizing a bright-line IQ score of 70 for identifying defendants with mental retardation in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the execution of defendants with mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In a per curiam opinion, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the defendant could not meet the first prong of the mental retardation standard establishing a maximum IQ score of 70 and upheld his death sentence. Hall v. Florida, 109 So. Ed 704 (Fla. 2012). Should the Supreme Court overturn Florida’s scheme, the decision could impact mental retardation determinations in the states that still employ the death penalty, especially the twelve states, including Virginia, that have either a statutory or case law bright-line rule that does not apply the standard error measurement.
Freddie Lee Hall was convicted in 1981 for the 1978 murder of a man he kidnapped while robbing a convenience store. Upon fleeing the scene of the robbery, Hall stole a car and kidnapped his victim, and then drove approximately 18 miles to a wooded area where he killed him. Hall appealed his conviction, which was upheld, and filed numerous post-conviction petitions through the years, all of which were eventually denied.
In 1988, Hall again challenged his death sentence, arguing based on a then recently decided United States Supreme Court decision holding that all mitigating factors, and not just statutory mitigation, must be considered by the judge and jury. The Florida Supreme Court granted Hall’s petition in 1989 and remanded his case to the trial court for a new sentencing proceeding. During his resentencing hearing, the trial court found Hall to be mentally retarded as a mitigating factor but gave it “unquantifiable” weight, finding aggravating factors that outweighed the mental retardation factor, and again sentenced him to death. The Florida Supreme Court upheld this decision in 1993. Hall again pursued post-conviction relief which the Florida Supreme Court denied, finding that the trial court did not err in finding him competent to proceed at the resentencing, but writing “while there is no doubt that [Hall] has serious mental difficulties, is probably somewhat retarded, and certainly has learning difficulties and a speech impediment, the Court finds that [Hall] was competent at the resentencing hearings.” Hall v. State, 742 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1999).
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins, holding that imposition of the death penalty for defendants with mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court, however, left it to the States to determine how to measure mental retardation. Following this decision, Hall filed a motion to vacate his sentence, arguing among other things, that the issue of his mental retardation could not be re-litigated because he had already been found mentally retarded at his mitigation resentencing hearing. The trial court denied this motion, and at the 2-day evidentiary hearing in December 2009, testimony was presented concerning Hall’s behavior and functioning as a child, including his problems with reading, writing and caring for himself. One expert testified that Hall’s IQ using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised was 73, and that a prior result given by another psychologist on the same test was 80. Another expert testified that Hall scored a 71 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Third Edition (WAIS-III). Hall also sought to introduce a report completed by a then-deceased expert reflecting a score of 69, which the court refused to admit into evidence. The trial court then refused to vacate Hall’s sentence because he could not meet the first prong of the mental retardation standard – an IQ of 70 or below.
Florida statute § 921.137(1), adopted in 2001 prior to the Atkins decision, but after Hall’s mitigation resentencing hearing, defines mental retardation as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” It defines “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” as “performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.” Two standard deviations of 15 points each from the mean of 100 is an IQ score of 70.
On appeal, Hall argued, among other things, that IQ should be read as a range of scores from 67 to 75 and that Florida’s adoption of a firm cutoff of 70 or below misapplies Atkins and fails to reflect an understanding of IQ testing. He argued that the appropriate standard should also include the standard error measurement (SEM). Relying on its precedent interpreting the statute, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the Florida statute does not use the word “approximate,” nor does it reference the standard error measurement. Based on the plain meaning of the statute, the Court held that the legislature established a bright-line IQ standard of 70 from which it could not deviate. It further found that Atkins did not mandate a specific IQ score or range of scores. Because Hall could not meet the first standard of an IQ of 70 or below, the Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit evidence establishing deficits in Hall’s adaptive behavior that manifested before age 18.
The Court also found the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the report of the deceased psychologist reflecting an IQ of 69 because the underlying data supporting the report were not available and subject to challenge by the State. The Court also rejected Hall’s argument that Florida was precluded from challenging his mental retardation because the trial court had previously found him to be mentally retarded during the previous resentencing hearing on mitigation The Court found that the mitigation hearing occurred prior to the enactment of the Florida statute defining mental retardation and the current definition controlled, and that mental retardation as a mitigating factor and mental retardation under Atkins were discrete legal issues.
Three justices concurred in the per curiam opinion and one justice concurred separately in the result, also finding a strict cutoff IQ of 70 based upon a plain reading of the statute. The concurring justice focused his opinion, however, on the lack of issue preclusion from the mitigation hearing. He stated that even though the trial court at the mitigation hearing found Hall to be mentally retarded, it expressed concerns throughout the hearing that Hall’s experts were exaggerating his inabilities. The justice also noted that Hall’s crime reflected more deliberation and planning than would be expected from a typical defendant with mental retardation.
The majority of the Florida Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of Florida’s statutory scheme. Two dissenting justices did, however. One justice wrote that the trial court had found that Hall had been mentally retarded his entire life but ironically his execution was being permitted solely by the Legislature’s after-enacted and inflexible definition of mental retardation. He noted that Atkins did not prescribe any bright-line cutoff, although it stated that “mild” mental retardation is typically used to describe someone with an IQ level in the range of 50 to 70. Because of the difficulty in determining which offenders are in fact mentally retarded, the Supreme Court left it to the States to develop “appropriate” ways to enforce the constitutional restriction on execution of sentences. This justice would have found therefore that imposition of a bright-line IQ cutoff was not “appropriate” when there was ample evidence of mental retardation from an early age.
The second dissenting justice wrote that imposing the death sentence on a prisoner who had been found mentally retarded even though he could not establish an IQ of below 70 would produce an absurd result. He went on to recite the record evidence reflecting Hall’s mental retardation, including testimony of an IQ of 60, his organic brain damage, chronic psychosis, speech impediment and learning disability. The justice wrote that Hall is functionally illiterate and has the short-term memory of a first grader. He indicated that the evidence also suggested that Hall was suffering from a mental and emotional disturbance, and to some extent may have been unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
The justice also wrote that the record reflected Hall suffered tremendous physical abuse and torture as a child. He was the sixteenth of seventeen children and was tortured by his mother. She tied him in a “croaker” sack, swinging it over a fire and beat him; buried him in the sand up to his neck to strengthen his legs; tied his hands to a rope attached to a ceiling beam and beat him while naked; locked him in a smokehouse for extended periods; and held a gun on him and his siblings while poking them with sticks. The justice went on to write that the Supreme Court articulated in Atkins that those with disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment and control of their impulses do not act with the same level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious criminal conduct and in the interest of justice, he would have vacated the sentence.
The Supreme Court should hear this case during its January term and its decision may provide more guidance to the States in implementation of the death penalty for defendants alleging mental retardation. Florida is not unique in its use of a bright-line IQ score of 70, but there is no clear consensus among the States on this issue. Ten states among those that still impose the death penalty, including Virginia under Va. Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A), have a statutory bright-line rule and do not apply the standard error measurement. Two additional states, Alabama and Kansas, apply a bright-line rule through court decision. Sixteen states apply the standard error measurement, including ten states without a bright-line cutoff. The application of the standard error measurement to IQ scores in the remaining four states is unclear.
US Supreme Court, Intellectual Disability, Death Penalty
Supreme Court Reinstates Death Penalty Holding Prosecution May Introduce Expert Psychological Opinion Rebutting Voluntary Intoxication Defense
Kansas v. Cheever, _ U.S._ , 134 S.Ct. 596, 82 USLW 4032 (No. 12-609 Dec. 11, 2013) available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-609_g314.pdf
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the United States Supreme Court held on December 11, 2013 that when a defense expert testifies that the defendant lacks the mens rea, or requisite mental state to commit a crime, the prosecution may offer evidence from a court-ordered psychological examination for the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s evidence. In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court that introduction of expert testimony from a court-ordered examination to which the defendant had not agreed violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
In January 2005, Scott Cheever shot and killed a county sheriff and shot at other law enforcement officers who were attempting to arrest him on an outstanding warrant. Several hours prior to the shooting, Cheever and his friends had cooked and smoked methamphetamine. One of Cheever’s friends warned him that officers were on the way to arrest him. He attempted to flee in his car but it had a flat tire. He returned inside and hid with a friend in an upstairs bedroom. Hearing footsteps on the stairs, Cheever stepped out and shot the sheriff climbing the stairs. He returned to the bedroom briefly, but went back to the stairs and shot the sheriff again. He also fired at other officers and members of the SWAT team that had arrived.
The State charged Cheever with capital murder, but shortly thereafter, the Kansas Supreme Court found in an unrelated case that the State’s death penalty scheme was unconstitutional. Because the death penalty was no longer available, the state prosecutors dismissed the charges against Cheever and permitted federal prosecutors to indict him under the Federal Death Penalty Act.
Cheever filed a notice in the federal case that he intended to introduce evidence that his intoxication with methamphetamine prevented him from forming the specific intent to commit the crime. The federal district court ordered Cheever to submit to a psychiatric evaluation to assess how methamphetamine had affected him when he committed the crime. The federal court, however, suspended the proceedings during jury selection when defense counsel became unable to proceed, and then dismissed the case without prejudice. In the interim, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court in the unrelated case, holding that the Kansas death penalty scheme was constitutional.
Kansas then refiled the state proceedings against Cheever at which he presented a voluntary intoxication defense, arguing that his methamphetamine use had made him incapable of premeditation. He presented evidence at trial from a psychiatric pharmacologist that long-term methamphetamine use had damaged his brain. The expert testified that Cheever was acutely intoxicated at the time of the shooting. The State then sought to present rebuttal testimony from the forensic psychiatrist who had examined Cheever under the federal court order. Cheever objected on the grounds that he had not voluntarily agreed to the examination and the expert’s testimony would therefore violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court admitted the testimony and the expert testified that Cheever shot the sheriff because of his antisocial personality and not because of his methamphetamine use. The jury convicted Cheever of murder and attempted murder, and recommended the death penalty, which the court imposed.
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court agreed that use of the rebuttal testimony from the expert in the federal proceeding violated Cheever’s Fifth Amendment rights because he had neither initiated the examination nor put his mental capacity in issue at trial. In so deciding, the Kansas Supreme Court relied upon the United Supreme Court decision in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), holding that a court-ordered psychiatric examination violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights when the defendant had not initiated the examination or put his mental capacity in dispute at trial. The Court acknowledged the later-decided case of Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987), which held that where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacks the requisite mental state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. But the Kansas Court found Buchanan did not apply because under Kansas law voluntary intoxication is not a “mental disease or defect.” The State of Kansas then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted.
The Supreme Court reversed distinguishing this case from Estelle, pointing out that the judge in Estelle had ordered a psychiatric examination to determine the defendant’s competency to stand trial. The prosecution then used the defendant’s statements from the examination during the sentencing phase of trial to demonstrate the defendant’s future dangerousness. Instead, the Supreme Court relied on Buchanan, finding that “mental status” is a much broader term than “mental disease or defect.” It held that mental status defenses include those based on expert opinion as to the defendant’s mens rea, that is, his mental capacity to commit the crime or ability to premeditate. The Court reasoned that to allow a defendant to present one-sided and potentially inaccurate evidence to the jury would undermine the adversarial process. On the other hand, permitting the prosecution to present rebuttal testimony harmonizes with the principle that when a defendant chooses to testify in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment does not permit him to refuse to answer related questions on cross-examination.
In this case, Cheever presented expert evidence of his voluntary intoxication to support his defense that he lacked the requisite intent to commit murder. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution may therefore offer evidence from a court-ordered psychological examination for the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s evidence. The Court then reversed the Kansas Supreme Court decision, reinstated the death penalty and remanded the case for further proceedings.
US Supreme Court, Death Penalty, Mental Health Experts
Supreme Court Hears Arguments Whether Protection and Advocacy Agency May Sue State Officials to Access Peer Review Records
June 01, 2010 / Katherine Faris
Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 568 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2009) pet. for cert. granted (U.S. No. 09-529, June 21, 2010)
The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument on December 1, 2010 in Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 568 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2009) pet. for cert. granted (U.S. No. 09-529, June 21, 2010), as to whether one independent state agency, the Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy, may sue other state officials, namely the Commissioner of the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services and the directors of two state facilities, to enforce the requirements of the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act or 1986 (“PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C §§ 10801-10851 and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (“DD Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001-15115. The 4th Circuit had reversed the decision of the federal district court, refusing to allow VOPA to sue the Commissioner and directors of Central State Hospital and Central Virginia Training Center to obtain peer review records related to the deaths of two individuals and the severe injury of a third. The 4th Circuit refused to apply the Ex parte Young doctrine which permits law suits by private parties to enforce federal law and obtain injunctive relief, but not monetary damages, from individual state officials in federal court. The court found that the lawsuit could otherwise be brought in state court.
Indiana is also seeking Supreme Court review in a similar case in which the 7th Circuit en banc held that the Indiana Protection and Advocacy agency could sue. Indiana Family and Social Services Administration v. Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services, 603 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2010) en banc, pet. for cert. filed, (No. 10-131, July 21, 2010). In addition to the Ex parte Young arguments heard in the Virginia case, Indiana is also arguing that PAIMI does not create a private right of action and peer review documents are protected against disclosure under state law.
Should the Supreme Court rule in the DBHDS Commissioner’s favor in VOPA v. Stewart, VOPA would need to file a new lawsuit in state court to seek access to peer review records. If the Supreme Court rules in VOPA’s favor, the case will be remanded back to the United States District Court in Richmond for a determination of the case on the merits. Four other federal circuits have already ruled that the state’s protection and advocacy agency has access to peer review records. Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun, 228 F.3d 423 (3rd Cir. 2000); Center for Legal Advocacy v. Hammons, 323 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2003); Missouri Protection & Advocacy Services v. Missouri Department of Mental Health, 447 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 2006). Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Mental Health and Addiction Services, 448 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2006).
June 01, 2010 / Katherine Faris/
US Supreme Court, Mental Health Providers