Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/317/341/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-07-26 10:18:50
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 266', '§ 380', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 301', '§ 1', '§ 41', '§ 601', '§ 8', '§ 22', '§ 8', '§ 2', '§ 10', '§ 302', '§ 1302', '§ 8']

U.S. Supreme CourtParker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)Parker v. BrownNo. 46Argued May 5, 1942 (No. 1040, 1941 Term)Reargued October 12, 13, 1942Decided January 4, 1943317 U.S. 341APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Appellee, a producer and packer of raisins in California, brought this suit in the district court to enjoin appellants -- the State Director of Agriculture, Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, the members of the State Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission and of the Program Committee for Zone No. 1, and others charged by the statute with the administration of the Prorate Act -- from enforcing, as to appellee, a program for marketing the 1940 crop of raisins produced in "Raisin Proration Zone No. 1." After a trial upon oral testimony, a stipulation of facts and certain exhibits, the district court held that the 1940 raisin marketing program was an illegal interference with and undue burden upon interstate commerce, and gave judgment for appellee granting the injunction prayed for. 39 F.Supp. 895. The case was tried by a district court of three judges, Page 317 U. S. 345 and comes here on appeal under §§ 266 and 238 of the Judicial Code as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 380, 345.
The packers sell their raisins through agents, brokers, jobbers and other middlemen, principally located in other states or foreign countries. Until he is ready to ship the raisins, the packer stores them in the form in which they have been received from producers. The length of time that the raisins remain at the packing plants before processing and shipping varies from a few days up to two years, depending upon the packer's current supply of raisins and the market demand. The packers frequently place orders with producers for fall delivery, before the Page 317 U. S. 346 crop is harvested, and at the same time enter into contracts for the sale of raisins to their customers. In recent years, most packers have had a substantial "carry over" of stored raisins at the end of each crop season, which are usually marketed before the raisins of the next year's crop are marketed.
Upon the petition of ten producers for the establishment of a prorate marketing plan for any commodity within a defined production zone (§ 8), and after a public hearing (§ 9), and after making prescribed economic findings (§ 10) showing that the institution of a program for the proposed zone will prevent agricultural waste and conserve agricultural wealth of the state without permitting unreasonable profits to producers, the Commission is authorized to grant the petition. The Director, with the approval of the Commission, is then required to select a program committee from among nominees chosen by the qualified producers within the zone, to which he may add not more than two handlers or packers who receive the regulated commodity from producers for marketing. §§ 11, 14, 15. Page 317 U. S. 347
The seasonal proration marketing program for raisins with which we are now concerned became effective on September 7, 1940. This provided that the program committee should classify raisins as "standard," "substandard," and "inferior"; "inferior" raisins are those which are unfit for human consumption, as defined in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. The committee is required to establish receiving stations within the zone to which every producer must deliver all raisins which he desires to market. The raisins are graded at these stations. All inferior raisins are to be placed in the Page 317 U. S. 348 "inferior raisin pool," to be disposed of by the committee "only for assured by-product and other diversion purposes." All substandard raisins, and at least 20 percent of the total standard and substandard raisins produced, must be placed in a "surplus pool." Raisins in this pool may also be disposed of only for "assured byproduct and other diversion purposes," except that, under certain circumstances, the program committee may transfer standard raisins from the surplus pool to the stabilization pool. Fifty percent of the crop must be placed in a "stabilization pool."
Appellee's bill of complaint challenges the validity of the proration program as in violation of the Commerce Page 317 U. S. 349 Clause and the Sherman Act; in support of the decree of the district court, he also urges that it conflicts with and is superseded by the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. The complaint alleges that he is engaged within the marketing zone both in producing and in purchasing and packing raisins for sale and shipment interstate; that, before the adoption of the program, he had entered into contracts for the sale of 1940 crop raisins; that, unless enjoined, appellants will enforce the program against appellee by criminal prosecutions, and will prevent him from marketing his 1940 crop, from fulfilling his sales contracts, and from purchasing for sale and selling in interstate commerce raisins of that crop.
Appellee's allegations of irreparable injury are in general terms, but it appears from the evidence that he had produced 200 tons of 1940 crop raisins; that he had contracted to sell 762 1/2 tons of the 1940 crop; that he had dealt in 2,000 tons of raisins of the 1939 crop, and expected to sell, if the challenged program were not in force, 3,000 tons of the 1940 crop at $60 a ton; that the pre-season price to growers of raisins of the 1940 crop, before the program became effective, was $45 per ton, and that immediately afterward it rose to $55 per ton or higher. It also appears that, the district court having awarded the final injunction prayed, appellee has proceeded with the marketing of his 1940 crop and has disposed of all except twelve tons, which remain on hand. Although the district court found that the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000, we are of opinion that as the complaint assails the validity of the program under the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-33, the suit is one "arising under" a "law regulating commerce", and allegation and proof of the jurisdictional amount are not required. 28 U.S.C. §§ 41(1), (8); Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, 316 U. S. 350. The majority of the Court is also of opinion that the suit is within the equity jurisdiction of the court, since the complaint Page 317 U. S. 350 alleges, and the evidence shows, threatened irreparable injury to respondent's business and threatened prosecutions by reason of his having marketed his crop under the protection of the district court's decree.
But it is plain that the prorate program here was never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or combination. It derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state, and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command. We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its Page 317 U. S. 351 legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
True, a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful, Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 193 U. S. 332, 193 U. S. 344-47, and we have no question of the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination Page 317 U. S. 352 by others for restraint of trade, cf. Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450. Here, the state command to the Commission and to the program committee of the California Prorate Act is not rendered unlawful by the Sherman Act, since, in view of the latter's words and history, it must be taken to be a prohibition of individual, and not state, action. It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate program. Although the organization of a prorate zone is proposed by producers, and a prorate program, approved by the Commission, must also be approved by referendum of producers, it is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and which enforces it with penal sanctions in the execution of a governmental policy. The prerequisite approval of the program upon referendum by a prescribed number of producers is not the imposition by them of their will upon the minority by force of agreement or combination which the Sherman Act prohibits. The state itself exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application. The required vote on the referendum is one of these conditions. Compare Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 306 U. S. 16; Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 276 U. S. 407; Wickard v. Filburn, ante p. 317 U. S. 111.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., authorizes the Secretary Page 317 U. S. 353 of Agriculture to issue orders limiting the quantity of specified agricultural products, including fruits, which may be marketed "in the current of . . . or so as directly to burden, obstruct, or affect interstate or foreign commerce." Such orders may allot the amounts which handlers may purchase from any producer by means which equalize the amount marketed among producers; may provide for the control and elimination of surpluses and for the establishment of reserve pools of the regulated produce. § 8c(6). The federal statute differs from the California Prorate Act in that its sanction falls upon handlers alone, while the state act (§ 22.5(3)) applies to growers and extends also to handlers so far as they may unlawfully receive or have in their possession within the state any commodity subject to a prorate program.
We may assume that the powers conferred upon the Secretary would extend to the control of surpluses in the raisin industry through a pooling arrangement such as was promulgated under the California Prorate Act in the present case. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533; Currin v. Wallace, supra. We may assume also that a stabilization program adopted under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act would supersede the state act. But the federal act becomes effective only if a program is ordered by the Secretary. Section 8c(3) provides that, whenever the Secretary of Agriculture "has reason to believe" that the issuance of an order will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the Act with respect to any commodity, he shall give due notice of an opportunity for a hearing upon a proposed order, and § 8c(4) provides that, after the hearing, he shall issue an order if he finds and sets forth in the order that its issuance will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the Act with respect to the commodity in question. Since the Secretary has not given notice of hearing and has not proposed or promulgated any order regulating raisins, it must be Page 317 U. S. 354 taken that he has no reason to believe that issuance of an order will tend to effectuate the policy of the Act.
It is evident, therefore, that the Marketing Act contemplates the existence of state programs at least until such time as the Secretary shall establish a federal marketing program, unless the state program in some way conflicts with the policy of the federal act. The Act contemplates that each sovereign shall operate "in its own sphere, but can exert its authority in conformity, rather than in conflict, with that of the other." H.Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. pp. 22-23; S.Rep. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 15. [Footnote 2] The only suggested possibility of conflict is between the declared purposes of the two acts. The object of the federal statute is stated to be the establishment, by exercise Page 317 U. S. 355 of the power conferred on the Secretary, of "orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce" such as will tend to establish "parity prices" for farm products, [Footnote 3] but with the further purpose that, in the interest of consumers, current consumptive demand is to be considered and that no action shall be taken for the purpose of maintaining prices above the parity level. § 2.
The declared objective of the California Act is to prevent excessive supplies of agricultural commodities from "adversely affecting" the market, and although the statute speaks in terms of "economic stability" and "agricultural waste", rather than of price, the evident purpose and effect of the regulation is to "conserve agricultural wealth of the state" by raising and maintaining prices, but "without permitting unreasonable profits to producers." § 10. The only possibility of conflict would seem to be if a state program were to raise prices beyond the parity price prescribed by the federal act, a condition which has not occurred. [Footnote 4] Page 317 U. S. 356
That the Secretary has reason to believe that the state act will tend to effectuate the policies of the federal act so as not to require the issuance of an order under the latter is evidenced by the approval given by the Department of Agriculture to the state program by the loan agreement between the state and the Commodity Credit Corporation. [Footnote 5] By § 302 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 43, 7 U.S.C. § 1302(a), the Commodity Credit Corporation is authorized "upon the recommendation of the Secretary and with the approval of the President, to make available loans on agricultural commodities. . . ." The "amount, terms, and conditions" of such loans are to be "fixed by the Secretary, subject to the approval of the Corporation and the President." Under this authority, the Commodity Credit Corporation made loans of $5,146,000 to Zone No. 1, secured by a Page 317 U. S. 357 pledge of 109,000 tons of 1940 crop raisins in the surplus and stabilization pools. These loans were ultimately liquidated by sales of 76,000 tons to packers and 33,000 tons to the Federal Surplus Marketing Administration, an agency of the Department of Agriculture, [Footnote 6] for relief distribution and for export under the Lend-Lease program. [Footnote 7] The loans were conditional upon the adoption by the state of the present seasonal marketing program. We are informed by the Government, which at our request filed a brief amicus curiae, that, under the loan agreement, prices and sales policies as to the pledged raisins were to be controlled by a committee appointed by the Secretary, and that officials of the Department of Agriculture collaborated in drafting the 1940 state raisin program. Page 317 U. S. 358
We have no occasion to decide whether the same conclusion would follow if the state program had not been adopted with the collaboration of officials of the Department of Agriculture and aided by loans from the Commodity Page 317 U. S. 359 Credit Corporation recommended by the Secretary of Agriculture.
The governments of the states are sovereign within their territory save only as they are subject to the prohibitions of the Constitution or as their action in some measure conflicts with powers delegated to the National Government, Page 317 U. S. 360 or with Congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of those powers. This Court has repeatedly held that the grant of power to Congress by the Commerce Clause did not wholly withdraw from the states the authority to regulate the commerce with respect to matters of local concern, on which Congress has not spoken. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 230 U. S. 399-400; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 303 U. S. 187, et seq.; California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 313 U. S. 113-114 and cases cited; Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390. A fortiori, there are many subjects and transactions of local concern, not themselves interstate commerce or a part of its operations, which are within the regulatory and taxing power of the states, so long as state action serves local ends and does not discriminate against the commerce, even though the exercise of those powers may materially affect it. Whether we resort to the mechanical test sometimes applied by this Court in determining when interstate commerce begins with respect to a commodity grown or manufactured within a state and then sold and shipped out of it -- or whether we consider only the power of the state in the absence of Congressional action to regulate matters of local concern, even though the regulation affects or in some measure restricts the commerce -- we think the present regulation is within state power.
In applying the mechanical test to determine when interstate commerce begins and ends (see Federal Compress Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17, 291 U. S. 21 and cases cited; Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 and cases cited) this Court has frequently held that, for purposes of local taxation or regulation, "manufacture" is not interstate commerce even though the manufacturing process is of slight extent. Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165; Hope Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245; Champlin Refining Page 317 U. S. 361 Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210; Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422. And such regulations of manufacture have been sustained where, aimed at matters of local concern, they had the effect of preventing commerce in the regulated article. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, supra; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52; see Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 183 U. S. 245; Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U. S. 55, 300 U. S. 77; cf. Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, supra. A state is also free to license and tax intrastate buying where the purchaser expects in the usual course of business to resell in interstate commerce. Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U. S. 584. And no case has gone so far as to hold that a state could not license or otherwise regulate the sale of articles within the state because the buyer, after processing and packing them, will, in the normal course of business, sell and ship them in interstate commerce.
It is for this reason that the present case is to be distinguished from Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50, and Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, on which appellee relies. There, the state regulation held invalid was of the business of those who purchased grain within the state for immediate shipment out of it. The Court was of opinion that the purchase of the wheat for shipment out of the state without resale or processing was a Page 317 U. S. 362 part of the interstate commerce. Compare Chassaniol v. Greenwood, supra.
Such regulations by the state are to be sustained not because they are "indirect", rather than "direct," see DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, supra; cf. Wickard v. Filburn, supra, not because they control interstate activities in such a manner as only to affect the commerce, rather than to command its operations. But they are to be upheld because, upon a consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances, it appears that the matter is one which may appropriately be regulated in the interest of the safety, health and wellbeing of local communities, and which, because of its local character, and the practical difficulties involved, may never be adequately dealt with Page 317 U. S. 363 by Congress. Because of its local character also there may be wide scope for local regulation without substantially impairing the national interest in the regulation of commerce by a single authority and without materially obstructing the free flow of commerce, which were the principal objects sought to be secured by the Commerce Clause. See Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, 230 U. S. 398-412; California v. Thompson, supra, 313 U. S. 113. There may also be, as in the present ease, local regulations whose effect upon the national commerce is such as not to conflict, but to coincide, with a policy which Congress has established with respect to it.
Examination of the evidence in this case and of available data of the raisin industry in California, of which we may take judicial notice, leaves no doubt that the evils attending the production and marketing of raisins in that state present a problem local in character and urgently demanding state action for the economic protection of those engaged in one of its important industries. [Footnote 9] Between 1914 and 1920, there was a spectacular rise in price of all types of California grapes, including raisin grapes. The price of raisins reached its peak, $235 per ton, in 1921, and was followed by large increase in acreage, with accompanying reduction in price. The price of raisins in most Page 317 U. S. 364 years since 1922 has ranged from $40 to $60 per ton, but acreage continued to increase until 1926, and production reached its peak, 1,433,000 tons of raisin grapes and 290,000 tons of raisins, in 1938. Since 1920, there has been a substantial carry over of 30 to 50% of each year's crop. The result has been that, at least since 1934, the industry, with a large increase in acreage and the attendant fall in price, has been unable to market its product, and has been compelled to sell at less than parity prices, and in some years at prices regarded by students of the industry as less than the cost of production. [Footnote 10]
The history of the industry, at least since 1929, is a record of a continuous search for expedients which would stabilize the marketing of the raisin crop and maintain a price standard which would bring fair return to the producers. [Footnote 11] It is significant of the relation of the local interest in maintaining this program to the national interest in interstate commerce that, throughout the period from 1929 until the adoption of the prorate program for Page 317 U. S. 365 the 1940 raisin crop, the national government has contributed to these efforts either by its establishment of marketing programs pursuant to Act of Congress or by aiding programs sponsored by the state. Local cooperative market stabilization programs for raisins in 1929 and 1930 were approved by the Federal Farm Board, which supported them with large loans. [Footnote 12] In 1934, a marketing agreement for California raisins was put into effect under § 8(2) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended, 48 Stat. 528, which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture, in order to effectuate the Act's declared policy of achieving parity prices, to enter into marketing agreements with processors, producers and others engaged in handling agricultural commodities "in the current of or in competition with, or so as to burden, obstruct, or in any way affect, interstate or foreign commerce." [Footnote 13] Page 317 U. S. 366
Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 was organized in the latter part of 1937. No proration program was adopted for the 1937 crop, but loans of $1,244,000 were made on raisins of that crop by the Commodity Credit Corporation. [Footnote 14] In aid of a proration program adopted under the California Act for the 1938 crop, a substantial part of that crop was pledged to the Commodity Credit Corporation as security for a loan of $2,688,000, and was ultimately sold to the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation for relief distribution. [Footnote 15] Substantial purchases of raisins of the 1939 crop were also made by Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation, although no proration program was adopted for that year. [Footnote 16] In aid of the 1940 program, as we have already noted, the Commodity Credit Corporation made loans in excess of $5,000,000, and 33,000 tons of the raisins pledged to it were sold to the Federal Surplus Marketing Administration. [Footnote 17] Page 317 U. S. 367
In comparing the relative weights of the conflicting local and national interests involved, it is significant that Congress, by its agricultural legislation, has recognized the distressed condition of much of the agricultural production of the United States, and has authorized marketing procedures, substantially like the California prorate program, for stabilizing the marketing of agricultural products. Acting under this legislation, the Secretary of Agriculture has established a large number of market stabilization programs for agricultural commodities moving in interstate commerce in various parts of the country, including seven affecting California crops. [Footnote 18] All involved attempts Page 317 U. S. 368 in one way or another to prevent overproduction of agricultural products and excessive competition in marketing them, with price stabilization as the ultimate objective. Most if not all had a like effect in restricting shipments and raising or maintaining prices of agricultural commodities moving in interstate commerce.