Source: http://www.copswiki.org/Common/M1295
Timestamp: 2017-10-18 08:57:31
Document Index: 686634595

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 50', '§ 50', '§ 50', '§ 50', '§ 50', '§ 50', 'ART09']

M1295 < Common < Copswiki
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Review of SONGS License Amendment Request by COPS; Petition to Intervene and Request for a Hearing
Citizens Oversight (2012-08-29) Ray Lutz
This Page: http://www.copswiki.org/Common/M1295
See main subproject here: San Onofre License Amendment Intervention
A petition to intervene and request a hearing has been submitted as of Oct 17, 2012 by COPS. Read the full petition here:
Petition to Intervene by COPS
News Release on Petition to Intervene
2012-10-19_NRC_Memo_referring_request.pdf: NRC Memo which confirms reception and refers the request to Administrative Judge E. Roy Hawkins
People who are on the contact list for this submission
Bessette Paul M. pbessette@morganlewis.com Morgan Lewis Company Bio Mr. Bessette represents nuclear utility clients in a variety of licensing, regulatory, adjudicatory, and litigation matters.
Burdick Stephen sburdick@morganlewis.com Morgain Lewis Company Bio Mr. Burdick represents electric utilities and other clients in the nuclear industry on a variety of regulatory and litigation matters before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), other state and federal agencies, and the federal courts.
Frantz Steven P. sfrantz@morganlewis.com Morgan Lewis Company Bio Mr. Frantz represents and counsels electric utilities, manufacturers of reactors and materials licensees on the regulation and licensing of nuclear power plants, as well as other facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE).
Freeze Mary mfreeze@morganlewis.com Morgan Lewis Company N/A N/A
Hawkens Roy roy.hawkens@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
Hearing Docket hearingdocket@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
Kanatas Catherine catherine.kanatas@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
Martin Circe ogcmailcenter@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
OCAAMAIL OCAAMAIL@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
Roth David david.roth@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
Smith Maxwell maxwell.smith@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
Sutton Kathryn M. ksutton@morganlewis.com Morgan Lewis Company Bio Kathryn M. Sutton is a partner in and the practice group leader of Morgan Lewis's Energy Practice. Ms. Sutton represents nuclear utility clients in licensing, regulatory and adjudicatory matters.
Walker Antoinette awalker@morganlewis.com Morgan Lewis Company N/A N/A
Weisman Robert robert.weisman@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
Williamson Edward edward.williamson@nrc.org NRC N/A N/A
The licensee ( Southern California Edison Company) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for SONGS, Units 2 and 3, dated July 29, 2011, requesting approval to convert the Current Technical Specifications (CTS) to be consistent with the most recently approved version of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for Combustion Engineering Plants, NUREG-1432.
This review was conducted by Citizens' Oversight Projects; Reviewing Engineer was Ray Lutz.
After review, it is apparent that the primary change to the documents is to adopt a new "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies" instead of the fixed frequencies specified in the Technical Specifications. The Surveillance Test Intervals (STIs) are then tracked by operator-controlled documents using a procedure designated by the NRC:
"Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies" http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0713/ML071360456.pdf
Thus moving a spec to another document does not change it right away, but over time, the process of the SFCP (Surveillance Frequency Control Program) will be to gradually reduce surveillance rates. There does not seem to be a method to increase surveillance rates above the original rate, even if there is an unusual event tied to the system of interest.
These comments will be submitted to the review process. Submitted to Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0192.
COMMENT 1 -- Your Comment Tracking Number: 8111ad8e
The primary change to the license is to move surveillance frequencies from the license document to a document under the control of the operator. This change would only be entertained if it were the desire of the operator to decrease the frequency of surveillance to save money. The license has no upper limit on the frequency of surveillance... the operator can check these parameter MORE frequently without any concern, and no violation of the license as it stands. COPS objects to these changes for the following reasons.
We see two categories of surveillances:
Measurements of critical operational parameters to allow the reactor to continue to operate.
Tests of backup and safety equipment that is not necessary for the normal operation of the plant but are standing ready in case an emergency might unfold.
It is our observation that surveillance frequencies of critical operational parameters (1 above) are far too low (infrequent) to allow operators to -- through those surveillances -- catch an ongoing failure of the plant. For example, checking leakage from the steam generators only once every 72 hours is ridiculously low. A leak can progress quickly within only a matter of hours during a SGTR, and if the operator waits for 72 hours to detect that failure, the plant will certainly be experiencing a full Loss of cooling Accident (LOCA).
On the other hand, systems in category 2 above can be reasonably placed in a secondary document since it is only necessary to check that these systems have not deteriorated due to time, corrosion, lack of maintenance, etc. and are not involved in the critical normal operation of the plant.
Transferring these surveillance frequencies completely to the document under the control of the operator gives them too much free reign, akin to writing a purchase order to a vendor with no limit on price. A responsible way to handle this would be to include limits to the surveillance frequencies to insure that they are inspected at least more frequently than X (analogous to a Not To Exceed limit).
> Classify all surveillances according to whether they are in class 1 or 2.
> Increase substantially the surveillance frequencies in Class 1 to reflect the need to detect rapid deterioration in a SGTR, for example. These should not be moved to the Surveillance Frequency program.
> Include minimum frequencies (or maximal time intervals between inspections) in the license document to insure that the licensee adheres to a reasonable limits for inspections of parameters in CLASS 2.
COMMENT 2 -- Comment Tracking Number: 8111ad90
Attachment 1 Vol 7 (Chapter 3.4 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)) - ML11251 A100
Page 99, the proposed change is to reduce SG level from 25% to 20%. this significantly reduces the level for reactor trip. Proposal under consideration is to change 25% to 20% in two places here. This is the reverse of most changes that go from 25% to 50%, and may be a mistake. Perhaps 20% should be 50%.
Each OPERABLE loop consists of two RCPs providing forced flow for heat transport to an SG that is OPERABLE. SG, and hence RCS loop, OPERABILITY with regard to SG water level is ensured by the Reactor Protection System (RPS) in MODES 1 and 2. A reactor trip places the plant in MODE 3 if any SG level is ≤ [25]% as sensed by the RPS. The minimum water level to declare the SG OPERABLE is [25]%.
> This proposed change is a reduction of the level of water in the steam generator to allow the reactor to run. COPS objects to this loosening of licensee requirement and puts the plant in severe danger.
COMMENT 3 -- Comment Tracking Number: 8111ad92
COPS is concerned that that the surveillance frequency is too infrequent for checking the status of critical operational measurements to account for the rapid response needed in a real failure event.
Page 351 - CTS SR 3.4.13.2 requires verifying that primary to secondary LEAKAGE is ≤ 150 gallons per day through any one SG every 72 hours. ITS SRs 3.4.13.1 and 3.4.13.2 require similar surveillances and specify the periodic Frequencies as "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program." This changes the CTS by moving the specified Frequency for the SR and the Bases for the Frequency to the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
> We assert that this spec (operator much check leakage rate every 72 hours) is far too lax because the leakage can progress from a small leak to a major SGTR in only an hour or two. The SONGS steam generator leak started at a 75 gpd rate and within one hour had increased to 104 gpd. Waiting 72 hours would allow this to progress to a full SGTR and perhaps LOCA.
> Waiting for this leak to progress to 150 gal/day rate is far too lax to detect a dangerous operating condition in the plant.
COMMENT 4 -- Comment Tracking Number: 8111ad94
The operational license has a severe internal inconsistency. On one hand, it says there can be no pressure boundary leakage at all, due to material degradation.
From Technical Specification:
No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material deterioration. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.
Definition from 10CFR 50.2 (definitions)
But then, it allows significant leakage to occur, up to 150 gallons per day through any one SG, and they have to check for this.
> The definition of pressure boundary or the technical specification regarding leakage must be revised to achieve internal consistency. Now, the document is inconsistent because it first says no leakage is allowed, and then it allow leakage of up to 150 gal/day which is then released into the environment.
COMMENT 5 -- Comment Tracking Number: 8111add6
Attachment 1 Vol 10 (Chapter 3.7 Plant Systems) - ML11251 A103
Page 99 - ADV - Atmospheric Dump Valve - The ISTS LCO 3.7.4 is being changed from "Two ADV lines shall be OPERABLE" to "One ADV line per required steam generator shall be OPERABLE." The ISTS is written such that there are two ADV lines per SG. SONGS has just one ADV line per SG and in MODE 4 SONGS could have one SG being utilized for heat removal. If the LCO required two ADV lines to be OPERABLE, SONGS would be in an ACTION unnecessarily. Therefore, the LCO was changed to require one ADV line per required steam generator. Also, due to SONGS just having one ADV line per steam generator, the Completion Time for ACTION A was changed from 7 days to 72 hours. These changes are also consistent with the SONGS Units 2 and 3 CTS.
> We object to this design deficiency in the SONGS plant. This points out a design deficiency of SONGS compared with other plants.
Page 101: This part was deleted: "Two ADV lines per steam generator are required to meet single failure assumptions following an event rendering one steam generator unavailable for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) heat removal."
Page 102: "The design must accommodate the single failure of one ADV to open on demand; (following deleted:) thus, each steam generator must have at least two ADVs. (end delete)
> Since the design must accommodate the single failure of one ADV, how is this accomplished if there is only one ADV per SG??
> We object to this change to the license which incorrectly allows a single ADV.
COMMENT 6 -- Comment Tracking Number: 8111add8
Page 361 of 554, "The USFAR (ref. 3) analysis for SGTR assumes the contaminated secondary fluid reaching each SG is released via the safety valves, and by the atmospheric dump valve used to perform the plant cooldown to shutdown cooling entry. The 0.5 gpm primary to secondary LEAKAGE safety analysis assumption is relatively inconsequential. The SLB (steam line break) is more limiting for site radiation releases. The safety analysis for the SLB accident assumes 0.5 gpm primary to secondary LEAKAGE to each steam generator as an initial condition. The dose consequences resulting from the SLB accident are well within the limits defined in 10 CFR 50.67"
10 CFR 50.67 (excerpt)
(i) An individual located at any point on the boundary of the exclusion area for any 2-hour period following the onset of the postulated fission product release, would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 0.25 Sv (25 rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE).
10 CFR 50.02 (excerpt)
> The exclusion zone at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station includes a freeway and an accessible beach. There are no signs warning people that ingress to the area may subject them to higher than specified radiation in the event of a rapid emergency situation.
> Contrary to the definition of an exclusion zone, there is no means to stop traffic on the freeway in the event of a SGTR or LOCA, events that can progress within minutes and may require the complete shutdown of the freeway. Licensee should be required to install gates and turn-arounds to allow that traffic be completely stopped on the freeway and rerouted to other roads.
See this document which shows the exclusion zone on a satellite view of the facility.
SanOnofreExclusionZone.pdf: San Onofre Exclusion Zone Analysis
The changes are analyzed one by one and are classified into one of five categories.
Administrative changes (A) - Editorial (reformatting, renumbering, and rewording) Changes to the CTS that do not result in new requirements or change operational restrictions or flexibility. These changes are supported in aggregate by a single generic no significant hazards consideration (NSHC)
These are probably not a concern to review by COPS
More restrictive changes (M)—Changes to the CTS that result in added restrictions or reduced flexibility. These changes include additional requirements that decrease allowed outage times, increase the Frequency of Surveillances, impose additional Surveillances, increase the scope of Specifications to include additional plant equipment, increase the Applicability of Specifications, or provide additional actions. These changes are generally made to conform to NUREG-1432 and have been evaluated to not be detrimental to plant safety.
These may be of interest to review to see what they are.
Relocated specifications (R)—Changes to the CTS that relocate CTS LCOs to licensee-controlled documents. (specifications that do not meet the selection criteria of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.36(c)(2)(ii)). The affected structures, systems, components or variables are not assumed to be initiators of analyzed events and are not assumed to mitigate accident or transient events.
May be a concern to COPS
Removed detail changes (LA)—Changes to the CTS that eliminate detail and relocate the detail to a licensee-controlled document. Typically, this involves details of system design and function, or procedural detail on methods of conducting a Surveillance Requirement (SR). Some of the proposed changes involve moving details out of the CTS and into the TS Bases, the UFSAR, the Containment Leakage Rate Testing (CLRT) Program, the LCS, or other documents under regulatory control, such as the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), the Quality Assurance Program (QAP), the Inservice Testing (IST) Program, the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program, and the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP). The removal of this information is considered to be less restrictive because it is no longer controlled by the TS change process.
These should be reviewed and may be a concern since they are moving control of an issue to the licensee. * Less restrictive changes (L)—Changes to the CTS that result in reduced restrictions or added flexibility. These changes are supported either in aggregate by a generic NSHC that addresses a particular category of less restrictive change, or by a specific NSHC if the change does not fall into one of the eight categories of less restrictive changes. The eight categories of less restrictive changes are designated as:
Category 1 - Relaxation of LCO Requirements
Category 2—Relaxation of Applicability
Category 3—Relaxation of Completion Time
Category 4—Relaxation of Required Action
Category 5—Deletion of Surveillance Requirement
Category 6—Relaxation of Surveillance Requirement Acceptance Criteria
Category 7—Relaxation of Surveillance Frequency
Category 8—Deletion of Reporting Requirements
Best way to get these is through ADAMS, with Document Content = "San Onofre" and Document Date = 07/29/2011. Some of the links provided here do not work for some reason. Or, search for the document number by each one.
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/08/16/2012-20114/southern-california-edison-san-onofre-nuclear-generating-station-units-2-and-3-application-and
CFR 50.36 on Technical Specifications: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title10-vol1/xml/CFR-2011-title10-vol1-sec50-36.xml
Main application for LAR: ML11251A113
Attachment 1 Vol 1 (Chapter 1.0 Use and Application) - ML11251A094
Attachment 1 Vol 2 (Chapter 2.0 Safety Limits (SLs)) - ML11251A095
Attachment 1 Vol 3 (Chapter 3.0 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Applicability and Surveillance Requirement (SR) Applicability) - ML11251A096
Attachment 1 Vol 4 (Chapter 3.1 Reactivity Control Systems) - ML11251A108
Attachment 1 Vol 5 (Chapter 3.2 Power Distribution Limits) - ML11251A098
Attachment 1 Vol 6 (Chapter 3.3 Instrumentation) - ML11251A099
Attachment 1 Vol 7 (Chapter 3.4 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)) - ML11251A100
Page 99, reduce SG level from 25% to 20%. this seems like a significant change. Proposal is to change 25% to 20% in two places here. This is the reverse of most changes that go from 25% to 50%, and may be a mistake. Perhaps 20% should be 50%.
page 124,128,155,162,190,196,198,200 - More stringent requirement for >= 50% instead of 25%, but sometimes add "(wide range)" and I'm not sure what that means.
Page 138,143,179 - delete "wide range"
Page 190,192 says > 50% instead of >= 50%
The relocation of the specified Surveillance Frequencies to licensee control is the primary change in this License Amendment Request. The surveillance rates may be the same now, but if they are under licensee control, we can expect them to gut the surveillance rates.
The relocation of the specified Surveillance Frequencies to licensee control is consistent with Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Regulatory Guide 1.177 provides guidance for changing Surveillance Frequencies and Completion Times. However, for allowable risk changes associated with Surveillance Frequency extensions, it refers to Regulatory Guide 1.174, which provides quantitative risk acceptance guidelines for changes to core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF). Regulatory Guide 1.174 provides additional guidelines that have been adapted in the risk-informed methodology for controlling changes to Surveillance Frequencies.
COPS: This spec (operator much check leakage rate every 72 hours) is far too lax because the leakage can progress from a small leak to a major SGTR in only an hour or two. The SONGS steam generator leak started at a 75 gpd rate and within an hour had increased to 104 gpd. Waiting 72 hours would allow this to progress to a full SGTR and perhaps LOCA.
See "Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies" http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0713/ML071360456.pdf
move surveillance times to separate document -- makes it harder to find the times?
Spec changed from "Average Temp of RCS is >= 520 F" to "Cold leg is >= 522 F"
SR 3.4.5.2 Verify secondary side water level in each steam generator was 25% change to 50%. Frequently, it uses the wording like this: "This SR requires verification (per surveillance plan) that the secondary side water level in each SG is >= 50% (wide range). An adequate SG water level is required in order to have a heat sink for removal of the core decay heat from the reactor coolant"
(Type 3 – Removing Procedural Details for Meeting TS Requirements or Reporting Requirements) CTS SR 3.4.6.2 requires verifying that secondary side water level in each steam generator ≥ 50% (wide range). ITS SR 3.4.6.2 requires verifying that secondary side water level in each steam generator ≥ 50%. This changes the CTS by deleting the parenthetical statement, "(wide range)," from the Surveillance Requirement to verify secondary side water level is ≥ 50%.
The removal of the parenthetical statement, "(wide range)," from CTS SR 3.4.6.2 is acceptable because this type of information is not necessary to be included in the Technical Specifications to provide adequate protection of public health and safety. The ITS Bases for SR 3.4.6.2 contains the information that the steam generator level indication is ≥ 50% wide range. Also, this change is acceptable because these types of procedural details will be adequately controlled in the ITS Bases. Changes to the Bases are controlled by the Technical Specification Bases Control Program in Chapter 5. This program provides for the evaluation of changes to ensure the Bases are properly controlled. This change is designated as a less restrictive removal of detail change because procedural details that require level indication to be wide range is being moved from the Technical Specifications to the ITS Bases.
Page 364 - (FYI) "Steam Generator Tube Integrity," should be evaluated. The 150 gallons per day limit is measured at room temperature as described in Reference 5. The operational LEAKAGE rate limit applies to LEAKAGE through any one SG. If it is not practical to assign the LEAKAGE to an individual SG, all the primary to secondary LEAKAGE should be conservatively assumed to be from one SG.
3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) tube integrity -- See pages 499+
Change "plug or repaired" to just "plug"
A SG tube has tube integrity when it satisfies the SG performance criteria. The SG performance criteria are defined in Specification 5.5.9, "Steam Generator Program," and describe acceptable SG tube performance
Page 510 - Describes the SGTR accident. Specs are to avoid a SGTR.
Page 510 - This paragraph doesn't make much sense. Why would any tube that satisfies the repair criteria not be plugged. Plus "Repair Criteria" should be "Plug Criteria"
During an SG inspection, any inspected tube that satisfies the Steam Generator Program repair criteria is removed from service by plugging. If a tube was determined to satisfy the repair criteria but was not plugged, the tube may still have tube integrity.
Attachment 1 Vol 8 (Chapter 3.5 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)) - ML11251A101
Attachment 1 Vol 9 (Chapter 3.6 Containment Systems) - ML11251A102
Attachment 1 Vol 10 (Chapter 3.7 Plant Systems) - ML11251A103
Page 5 - Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) - change action condition from two to seven inoperable to one or more inoperable.. (Better).
COPS: This points out a design deficiency of SONGS compared with other plants, apparently.
COPS: Since the design must accommodate the single failure of one ADV, how is this accomplished if there is only one ADV per SG??
Attachment 1 Vol 11 (Chapter 3.8 Electrical Power Systems) - ML11251A105
Attachment 1 Vol 12 (Chapter 3.9 Refueling Operations) - ML11251A106
Attachment 1 Vol 13 (Chapter 4.0 Design Features) - ML11251A107
Attachment 1 Vol 14 (Chapter 5.0 Administrative Controls) - ML11251A108
Attachment 1 Vol 15 (Generic NSHCs) - ML11251A109
As usual, obfuscation starts with a whole new language, and a plethora of acronyms.
LAR = license amendment request
RAI = requests for additional information - NRC staff issued or will issue its requests for additional information (RAIs) and the licensee addressed or will address the RAIs through the ITS Conversion Web page.
DOCs = discussion of changes
NSHC = no significant hazards consideration -- this is a document or section of a document that argues that a change can be made without any hazard or safety concerns.
LCO = Limiting Conditions for Operation -- defined in the CFR regarding Technical Specifications
AFW = AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
CCW = Component Cooling Water system
MSSVs = Main Steam Safety Valves
RCS = Reactor Cooling System -- An OPERABLE RCS loop consists of at least one OPERABLE RCP and an SG that is OPERABLE and has the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.6.2. [(50%)??]
SDC train = Shutdown Cooling Train -- an OPERABLE SDC train is composed of the OPERABLE SDC pump(s) capable of providing forced flow to the SDC heat exchanger(s). RCPs and SDC pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required.
SLB = steam line break -- The SLB radiological analysis assumes that offsite power is lost at the same time as the pipe break occurs outside containment. The affected SG blows down completely and steam is vented directly to the atmosphere. The unaffected SG removes core decay heat by venting steam to the atmosphere until the cooldown ends and the SDC system is placed in service.
SGTR = steam generator tube rupture -- (pg 484) The SGTR analysis assumes the contaminated secondary fluid reaching each SG is released via the safety valves, and by atmospheric dump valve used to perform the plant cooldown to shutdown cooling entry. The unaffected SD removes core decay heat by venting steam until the colldown ends adn the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System is placed in service.
SSC = structures, systems and components
SFCP = Surveillance Frequency Control Program
STIs = surveillance test intervals
PRA = probability Risk Assessment
CDF = core damage frequency - Used in PRA to determine if a system should be tested, i.e. given surveillance.
LERF = large early release frequency - Also used in PRA.
CFR 50.36 Technical specifications. (c)
(2) Limiting conditions for operation.
(i) Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met. When a limiting condition for operation of any process step in the system of a fuel reprocessing plant is not met, the licensee shall shut down that part of the operation or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met. In the case of a nuclear reactor not licensed under § 50.21(b) or § 50.22 of this part or fuel reprocessing plant, the licensee shall notify the Commission, review the matter, and record the results of the review, including the cause of the condition and the basis for corrective action taken to preclude recurrence. The licensee shall retain the record of the results of each review until the Commission terminates the license for the nuclear reactor or the fuel reprocessing plant. In the case of nuclear power reactors licensed under § 50.21(b) or § 50.22, the licensee shall notify the Commission if required by § 50.72 and shall submit a Licensee Event Report to the Commission as required by § 50.73. In this case, licensees shall retain records associated with preparation of a Licensee Event Report for a period of three years following issuance of the report. For events which do not require a Licensee Event Report, the licensee shall retain each record as required by the technical specifications.
Process to request or petition for a hearing
The following excerpt explains this process.
From the "apply-certificates" page:
There are three steps to obtain a Veri Sign Digital ID Certificate from NRC:
Step 1 - Request an NRC Approval Code
To request an NRC Approval Code you must first determine which NRC program meets your needs. Each program area will want basic information from you including your name, email address, phone number, organization, role in the organization and reason for submitting documents to the NRC.
Adjudicatory Proceedings Program participants should call (301) 415-1677 or send an email request to the NRC’s Office of the Secretary staff at: Hearing.Docket@nrc.gov
Step 2 - Enroll for your Digital ID Certificate --
http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/certificate/enroll-certificate.html
VIew and print this document: http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/certificate/nrc-digital-ids-guide.pdf
Pick up your digital ID certificate from the same PC where you enrolled. Only enroll from the PC where you receive email.
You must have an NRC issued digital ID Approval Code prior to electronic enrollment for a certificate.
Step 3 - Install and Use a Digital ID Certificate
Interaction with NRC
From: Ray Lutz [mailto:raylutz@citizensoversight.org]
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 7:33 PM
To: Docket, Hearing
Subject: Request for NRC Approval Code
To: NRC's Office of the Secretary
Re: Request for NRC Approval Code for the Adjudicatory Proceedings Program
I hereby request an NRC Approval Code for the Adjudicatory Proceedings
My Name:         Ray Lutz
Email:                 raylutz@citizensoversight.org
Phone:               619-447-3246 or 619-820-5321 (mobile)
Organization:    Citizens Oversight Projects (COPS) -- (Citizens
Oversight, Inc)
Role:                   Engineer -- Technical Analyst
Reason for submitting documents:
It is our intention to request a hearing and/or petition for leave to
intervene, regarding Docket ID NRC-2012-0192 "Southern California
Edison, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3;
Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination"
On 9/21/2012 6:05 AM, Docket, Hearing wrote:
Good morning.  Please let me know if you are referring to a recent Federal Register Notice and if possible the date that it was published?
(301) 415-1679
Sent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 12:17 AM
Subject: Re: Request for additional information
Yes, it is, here is the link to the notice:
Southern California Edison, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units
2 and 3; Application and Amendment to Facility Operating License
Involving Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination
Good morning.  Thank you for your response.  This is a new proceeding and I will need to establish a new docket for it.  I will send you an email when the docket has been established.
The Office of the Secretary has received your request and is providing you with an approval code to apply online for a new digital ID (Veri Sign Certificate). You will need to apply for your digital certificate through the NRC Electronic Information Exchange (EIE) website. See the instructions at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. Please use the following approval code =ART09RLCI= when completing the online form. After you have completed the enrollment page, you will receive 2 separate emails from the digital ID administrator stating that your request is being processed and again to notify that your digital certificate is ready to be picked up and downloaded.
(NEW LINK) Digital ID Center https://onsite.verisign.com/services/USNuclearregulatoryCommission/digitalidCenter.html
Once you have downloaded your digital certificate it will be necessary to request access to a proceeding and you can do so by using this link https://eieprod.nrc.gov/EIE25
A window will appear and you will need to select your digital certificate and select ok. At the EIE Terms of Service page click on "Accept" to proceed. At El E Portal page under “EIE User Maintenance”, click on "Request Access to a Proceeding." Complete the required information and click on "Submit Request" at the bottom of the page. You will receive an automated email message stating that you have been granted access to the requested proceeding.
Related Links This page contains written guidance and video's designed to assist you in the digital certificate application and download process. http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html
You must be familiar with the document format requirements for submitting an EIE filing. See http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html to obtain submission guidance and view the instructional video:
In order for you to access and view documents submitted via EIE you must download and install the Workplace Forms Viewer. For guidance see: http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/install-viewer.html
If you require assistance with installation of your Certificate or Forms Viewer, with requesting access, or with submission of documents via our electronic filing system, please contact our Help Desk toll-free at 1-866-672-7640 or MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov. They are available Mondays through Fridays, except federal holidays, during the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern time.
Note that a request for a digital certificate must come directly from the individual.
Completed the enrollment form and received this response:
Your Digital Certificate request has been submitted for approval
Once your digital certificate request has been approved, you will receive an email with instructions for installing your digital certificate. If you do not receive it shortly, contact your administrator.
Thank you for requesting a Digital ID. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is processing your request, and will notify you when your Digital ID is ready. The NRC approval process should happen fairly quickly but sometimes takes one or two days.
If you have questions about your application or haven't received a reply from the NRC within 2 business days, please contact the Digital Certificate Administrator at NRC by replying to this email message or by calling the NRC's Digital ID Help Line at (301) 415-0439.
Received 2012-09-27 at 6:00 AM
Good morning. The docket for the San Onofre 50-361 and 50-362-LA has been established. Once you have downloaded your digital certificate it will be necessary to request access to a proceeding and you can do so by using this link https://eieprod.nrc.gov/EIE25
A window will appear and you will need to select your digital certificate and select ok. At the EIE Terms of Service page click on "Accept" to proceed. At El E Portal page under "EIE User Maintenance", click on "Request Access to a Proceeding." Complete the required information and click on "Submit Request" at the bottom of the page. You will receive an automated email message stating that you have been granted access to the requested proceeding.
Received 2012-09-27 at 1:59pm
Your Digital ID has been successfully generated and installed.
Your Digital ID Information.
Organization = U.S. Nuclear regulatory Commission
Title = Engineer & National Coordinator
Common Name = Ray Lutz
Email Address = raylutz@citizensoversight.org
Serial Number = 05a99bb0c115168957b90ffc1230c497
Installation of certificate failed, not sure why. Had to call technical support and had to go through the whole process again, from the beginning.
PIN = 9714547888
Title = Engineer / National Coordinator
Serial Number = 12d0f94dcb712cbe92a765bed5977809
Then, went to this Electronic Information Exchange Portal: https://eieprod.nrc.gov/EIE25/portal.do and requested access to the proceeding that was already set up. Made the request and the contact at the help desk said it will take a couple of days for them to approval it.
Title Review of SONGS License Amendment Request by COPS; Petition to Intervene and Request for a Hearing
Pub Date 2012-08-29
pdf 2012-10-19_NRC_Memo_referring_request.pdf manage 408.9 K 2014-06-26 - 17:22 Raymond Lutz NRC Memo which refers the request to the administrative judge
pdf COPS-petition-to-intervene-San-Onofre-V2.pdf manage 125.1 K 2014-06-26 - 17:22 Raymond Lutz Petition to Intervene by COPS
pdf NewsRelease-COPSPetitionToIntervene-2012-10-19.pdf manage 95.4 K 2014-06-26 - 17:22 Raymond Lutz News Release on Petition to Intervene
pdf SanOnofreExclusionZone.pdf manage 2919.7 K 2014-06-26 - 17:22 Raymond Lutz San Onofre Exclusion Zone Analysis