Source: http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=26621
Timestamp: 2015-01-28 06:35:21
Document Index: 297846823

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 28', '§\n32', '§ 90', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 3', 'art 3', '§\n28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 38', '§ 28', '§ 11', '§ 28', '§ 28']

26621 - Kiriakides v. School District of Greenville County
Kiriakides, III, Mary Ann Kiriakides, and Michael Kiriakides, as Personal
Representatives of the Estate of Alex Kiriakides, Jr., Appellants/Respondents,
District of Greenville County, South Carolina, a Political Subdivision, Respondent/Appellant.
Opinion No. 26621
Heard December 3, 2008 - Filed March 30,
2009 AFFIRMED
Lloyd Thomas, of Moore, Taylor & Thomas, of Greenville, and S. Jahue Moore,
of Moore, Taylor & Thomas, of West Columbia, for Appellants-Respondents.
W. Traxler and Travis V. Olmert, both of Carter, Smith, Merriam, Rogers &
Traxler, of Greenville, for Respondent-Appellant.
JUSTICE BEATTY: Alex
Kiriakides, Jr. (Kiriakides) sued the School District of Greenville County (the
School District) to prevent it from condemning his property. He also sought
damages for inverse condemnation for the School District’s alleged delay in
this matter, as well as attorneys’ fees. The master-in-equity found in favor
of the School District on the condemnation claims, but awarded attorneys’ fees
to Kiriakides. Kiriakides and the School District filed cross appeals.[1] We affirm.
Kiriakides owned
property in Greenville County that was formerly the site of the Bijou Theater,
an eight-theater multiplex. During the first half of 2001, the property was
under a monthly lease to United Artists. United Artists was in bankruptcy
proceedings during this time. In
February 2001, a real estate agent working for the School District, Henry
Garrison, advised Kiriakides that the School District was interested in
purchasing the property. The Kiriakides property adjoined Wade Hampton High School, and the School District wanted to renovate and expand the school. Kiriakides initially informed Garrison that he did not want to sell the
property, but that he would lease it. In June 2001,
United Artists stopped paying rent and moved out of the theater. Kiriakides
and the School District continued their negotiations for a voluntary sale until
approximately April 2002, but when the negotiations proved unsuccessful, the School District began the process to acquire the property by eminent domain. The School District retained an appraiser as part of the preliminary preparation for a
condemnation proceeding, but Kiriakides refused to allow entry on his
property. On April 30, 2002, the School District filed a complaint seeking an
order of entry. On May 1, 2002, the circuit court issued an “Order for Entry
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-70 (1991)” allowing the School District to
enter upon the property to make a survey, to determine the location of proposed
improvements, and to prepare an appraisal. Due to the workload
of the appraiser, the appraisal was first given to the School District in late
July 2002. On or about August 12, 2002, the School District served Kiriakides
with a “Condemnation Notice and Tender of Payment” pursuant to the South
Carolina Eminent Domain Procedure Act.[2] The
School District never filed the condemnation action with the court, however,
because on August 23, 2002, Kiriakides instituted the current action
challenging the right of the School District to condemn his property. In his
pleadings, Kiriakides additionally sought damages for inverse condemnation and
attorneys’ fees, alleging “[t]he stigmatization of [his] property as well as
the unreasonable delay in commencing condemnation [proceedings] has amounted to
an inverse condemnation of [his] property.” In May
2003, because of the urgency of the school construction project and the
existence of this litigation challenging the right to proceed with
condemnation, the School District notified Kiriakides that it had abandoned its
efforts to condemn the property. The School District ultimately purchased a
different piece of property located nearby. Thereafter,
in December 2005, the master held a bench trial regarding Kiriakides’s
complaint. By order filed May 4, 2006, the master ruled in favor of the School
District, finding as follows: (1) Kiriakides’s challenge to the School
District’s right to condemn his property was moot because the School District
had abandoned its condemnation efforts; (2) any challenge to the delay in the
condemnation proceedings was likewise moot and there was no evidence of delay,
in any event; and (3) Kiriakides had not established his inverse condemnation
claim and was not entitled to damages. After
a post-trial motion and hearing, the master awarded Kiriakides $6,500 in
attorneys’ fees pursuant to a provision in the South Carolina Eminent Domain Procedure
Act based on his finding that the School District had “abandoned its
condemnation efforts.” This cross appeal followed. II. LAW/ANALYSIS
appeal, Kiriakides challenges the master’s ruling in favor of the School
District on his claim for inverse condemnation, and the School District challenges
the master’s award of attorneys’ fees to Kiriakides.
A. KIRIAKIDES’S APPEAL
Kiriakides contends
the master erred in denying his claim for inverse condemnation. We disagree.
concept of inverse condemnation was originally conceived as a remedy for the
physical taking of private property without following eminent domain
procedures.” 11A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §
32.132.20 (3d ed. 2000) (citing, inter alia, Woods v. State,
314 S.C. 501, 431 S.E.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1993)). “Inverse condemnation is,
therefore, a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the
value of property which has been taken in fact by a governmental entity
although not through eminent domain procedures.” Id.
“One basic difference between condemnation and inverse condemnation is that in condemnation proceedings, the governmental
entity is the moving party, whereas, in inverse condemnation, the property owner is the
moving party.” South Carolina
State Highway Dep’t v. Moody, 267 S.C. 130, 136, 226 S.E.2d 423,
425 (1976). A
landowner has the burden of proving damages for the taking of the landowner’s
property, whether through condemnation proceedings or by inverse condemnation. Brenco v. South Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 377 S.C. 124, 128, 659 S.E.2d
167, 169 (2008) (citing Owens v. South Carolina State Highway Dep’t, 239
S.C. 44, 54, 121 S.E.2d 240, 245 (1961)).
damages that are suffered by a private property owner at the hands of the
governmental agency are compensable. Woods v. State, 314 S.C. 501, 504,
431 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ct. App. 1993). The property itself must suffer some
diminution in substance, or it must be rendered intrinsically less valuable. Id. “[I]n
an inverse condemnation case, the trial judge will determine whether a claim
has been established; the issue of compensation may then be submitted to a jury
at either party’s request.” Cobb v. South Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 365
S.C. 360, 365, 618 S.E.2d 299, 301 (2005).
condemnation claims can result from two instances: “An inverse condemnation
may result from the government’s physical appropriation of private property, or
it may result from government-imposed limitations on the use of private
property.” Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 S.C. 650, 656, 620 S.E.2d 76,
79 (2005).
the second instance, where there is a regulatory inverse condemnation, there
are two elements that must be shown: (1) affirmative conduct, and (2) a
taking. Id. at 657, 620 S.E.2d at 80. The analysis of whether a taking
has occurred is governed by the case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) when the claim stems from an
allegation of a temporary denial of less than all economically viable use of
the property. Id. at 658, 620 S.E.2d at 80. “In the context of a
regulatory delay, the Penn Central inquiry is whether the delay ever
became unreasonable.” Id. at 81, 620 S.E.2d at 660. “Until regulatory
delay becomes unreasonable, there is no taking.” Id. As enumerated
in Byrd, two circumstances are particularly important: (1) the economic
impact on the claimant, especially the extent to which the governmental entity
has interfered with the claimant’s investment-backed expectations, and (2) the
character of the governmental action. Id. at 659, 620 S.E.2d at 80
(citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). In
the case now before us, the parties conceded, and the master specifically
found, that there was never any physical occupation or appropriation of
Kiriakides’s property, the first type of taking under Byrd. Rather,
Kiriakides asserted the stigmatization of his property by the threat of
condemnation amounted to a regulatory inverse condemnation under the
second prong of Byrd. In
rejecting this assertion of a regulatory inverse condemnation, the master found
there was no act and no taking by the School District that would come within
the parameters of an inverse condemnation claim. The master noted: “The
parties agree that the School District never imposed any regulations or
restrictions on the property of Mr. Kiriakides. The School District’s
pre-condemnation activities and the service of the Condemnation Notice and
Tender of Payment to Mr. Kiriakides certainly did not give rise to a taking,
regulatory or otherwise.” The
master stated that “[a] regulatory taking by its very nature
necessitates the existence of some regulation, statute, ordinance, zoning law,
or similar rule of law that impacts a landowner’s use of his property. In
other words, regulatory takings exist only in conjunction with affirmative
governmental restrictions on the use of land.” The master further stated: “Such
was the essence of the Byrd case, where Mr. Byrd’s property was
restricted by zoning regulations, and in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)[,] where land use restrictions constituted a
regulatory taking. That does not exist in this case.” The
master additionally observed his conclusion was supported by public policy, namely,
the construction of public projects would be severely impeded if the government
incurred liability for inverse condemnation as a result of merely announcing
plans to condemn, citing National By-Products, Inc. v. City of Little Rock,
916 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Ark. 1996) (“Construction of public-works projects would
be severely impeded if the government could incur inverse condemnation
liability merely by announcing plans to condemn property in the future.”); Santini
v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, 739 A.2d 680, 691 (Conn.
1999) (“[I]f the government were to be considered as having accomplished a
compensable taking as a result of mere planning that, because of its publicity,
harmed the value of property, public planning would be discouraged . . . .”); City
of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 903-04 (N.Y. 1971)
(stating the threat of condemnation generally does not constitute a taking and
any changes in value are incidents of ownership). The master stated that
Kiriakides’s arguments, “if accepted, would have a devastating impact on government
and its citizens.” We agree
with the master’s determination that Kiriakides did not establish a claim for
inverse condemnation. We find no merit to his arguments that the mere threat
of a condemnation suit stigmatized his property and that the School District’s alleged
delay in bringing this action entitled him to damages for an inverse
condemnation. The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the “impairment of the market
value of real property incident to otherwise legitimate government action
ordinarily does not result in a taking.” Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984). In Kirby Forest, the Supreme Court concluded
the landowner “failed to demonstrate that its
interests were impaired in any constitutionally significant way before the
Government tendered payment and acquired title in the usual course.” Id. at 16. The
mere institution of condemnation proceedings does not constitute a taking, as
it is a legitimate exercise of the government’s authority. See generally 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 90 (2007) (stating the mere planning in
anticipation of a public improvement is not an actionable taking of property);
J. R. Kemper, Annotation, Plotting or Planning in Anticipation of
Improvement as Taking or Damaging of Property Affected, 37 A.L.R.3d 127
(1971 & Supp. 2008) (discussing acts performed in preparation for and as
part of condemnation proceedings and the imposition of liability therefor).
evidence shows that the School District and Kiriakides engaged in extensive
negotiations concerning a voluntary sale of the property until at least April
2002. During this time, no public action was taken by the School District that
would “stigmatize” the property as Kiriakides alleges, as the communications
were solely with Kiriakides and there was no public filing of a condemnation
action. The first public communication occurred when Kiriakides refused to
allow an appraiser to enter his property and the School District filed a motion
in April 2002 seeking an order allowing entry. Thereafter,
when negotiations failed, the School District followed the statutory procedures
for an eminent domain action and served a notice of condemnation in August
2002. Kiriakides challenged the School District’s right to condemn within
thirty days of being served with notice by the School District by filing the
current, separate action, as was his right under state law, which stayed the
condemnation proceedings. See S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-470 (2007) (providing
an “action [challenging a condemnor’s right to condemn] must be commenced
within thirty days after service of the Condemnation Notice upon the landowner”
and that “[a]ll proceedings under the Condemnation Notice are automatically
stayed until the disposition of the action, if any, unless the landowner and
the condemnor consent otherwise”).
discern no unreasonable delay or bad faith conduct on the part of the School District in this matter. The School District never tried to obtain possession of
Kiriakides land, and until Kiriakides refused to allow an appraiser on his
property, it had made no public filing in this case. If anything, Kiriakides’s
failure to cooperate with the School District’s efforts to obtain an appraisal
and his challenge to the School District’s right to condemn extended these proceedings. Further, Kiriakides presented no evidence of damages. He offered no proof that
the value of his property was diminished or that he lost any potential sales of
his property due to the proceedings. In fact, Kiriakides admitted that he had
not tried to sell his property during this time. The School District’s actions were part of the statutorily-mandated process for condemnation,
and did not constitute an unreasonable delay in these circumstances that would
establish a compensable claim. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 335 (2002) (“A rule that
required compensation for every delay in the use of property would render
routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty
decision-making.”); Woods, 314 S.C. at 504, 431 S.E.2d at 262 (holding not
all damages suffered by private property owners at the hands of the government
are compensable). The nine-month period between the time the School District
served notice of the condemnation in August 2002 until it notified Kiriakides
in writing in May 2003 that it was abandoning the condemnation proceeding due
to Kiriakides’s opposition and the need to proceed with the project did not
establish a taking. Cf. Byrd, 365 S.C. at 661-63, 620 S.E.2d at 82
(finding an eleven-month delay in evaluating the rezoning of certain property
did not result in a regulatory taking and inverse condemnation). The
master observed that cases from other jurisdictions overwhelmingly hold that
normal activities incident to condemnation do not rise to the level of a
taking. See Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Trust v. Alaska Dep’t of
Transp., 54 P.3d 294, 302 (Alaska 2002) (stating “there is no indication
the state did anything more than make announcements, prepare and publish plans,
and provide publicity concerning the project” and no evidence the state
interfered with the property rights of the landowners); City of Chicago v.
Loitz, 295 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (observing “the weight of
authority in other states and in the Federal courts, is that mere planning by a
governmental body in anticipation of the taking of land for public use and
preliminary steps taken to accomplish this, without the filing of proceedings
and without physically taking or actual invasion of the real estate, is not
actionable by the owner of the land”). To
the extent Kiriakides’s alleges the master improperly considered public policy
in determining no inverse condemnation occurred in this matter, we find no
error. The master merely cited this as additional support for his conclusion
that Kiriakides’s position was untenable because if it was accepted, the
government would be faced with inverse condemnation claims every time it
attempted to survey property and obtain an appraisal, which would preclude the
government from engaging in normal activities incident to a condemnation. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we affirm the master’s determination that
Kiriakides did not establish a claim for inverse condemnation. B. THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S APPEAL
In its cross
appeal, the School District contends the master erred in awarding statutory attorneys’
fees to Kiriakides. We disagree.
the order ruling on Kiriakides’s complaint, the master found that, “because the
School District abandoned its condemnation efforts, that part of the present
litigation challenging its right to condemn has been rendered moot.” Kiriakides filed a post-trial motion seeking a determination whether he was
entitled to attorneys’ fees, stating he had requested attorneys’ fees in his
complaint, but the issue was not addressed in the master’s order.[3] After
a hearing, the master issued an order on December 5, 2006, finding Kiriakides
was entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 28-2-510(C) of the South
Carolina Code, which allows a landowner costs and fees in the event a condemnor
abandons a “condemnation action” as follows:
condemnor abandons or withdraws the condemnation action in the manner
authorized by this chapter, the condemnee is entitled to reasonable attorney
fees, litigation expenses, and costs as determined by the court.
S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510(C)
(2007) (emphasis added). The master
concluded a reasonable fee would be $6,500, which “fairly represents the
portion of the fees in this case that were necessarily related to the issues of
abandonment or withdrawal of the condemnation action by the Defendant.”[4] On appeal, the School District contends this was error.
decision to award or deny attorneys’ fees under a state statute will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Layman v. State, 376
S.C. 434, 444, 658 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by an error of
law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions.” Id. “Similarly,
the specific amount of attorneys’ fees awarded pursuant to a statute
authorizing reasonable attorneys’ fees is left to the discretion of the trial
judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Id.
Applicability of Section 28-2-510(C).
argues the master erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to Kiriakides under section
28-2-510(C) of the South Carolina Eminent Domain Procedure Act because the
statute is inapplicable. The School District asserts that, although it served Kiriakides with a Condemnation Notice and Tender of Payment, it never filed the notice with the circuit court; therefore, the action was never commenced. Consequently,
it is not liable for attorneys’ fees for the abandonment of a “condemnation
this argument, finding “under the unique facts of this case,” a party is
entitled to attorneys’ fees if the condemnor abandons the action after service of the Condemnation Notice. The master reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise
would . . . encourage a governmental entity to serve its Condemnation Notice,
chill the value of the property, negotiate until it determines that the value
sought by the landowner is still too high or that another parcel is more
suitable, and then unilaterally withdraw its Notice with complete impunity
since a condemnation lawsuit was never filed. All to the detriment of the
landowner. This certainly cannot be the result intended by our Legislature.” Under
Rule 3 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a civil action is generally
deemed commenced by filing and serving a summons and complaint. Rule 3(a),
SCRCP. Under this rule, both filing and service are required to institute an
action. See 24 S.C. Juris. Rules of Civil Procedure § 3.2 (1994)
(“Subpart 3(a) requires both the filing and service of a summons and complaint
prior to the commencement of a civil action. The South Carolina courts have
demanded literal compliance with Rule 3(a).”).
provisions of the South Carolina Eminent Domain Procedure Act, however, constitute
the exclusive procedure for condemnation in this state. S.C. Code Ann. §
28-2-210 (2007). Moreover, these provisions control over the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. § 28-2-120 (“In the event of conflict
between this act and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, this act
shall prevail.”).
this case, section 28-2-30(5) specifically states a “‘[c]ondemnation action’
includes all acts incident to the process of condemning property after the
service of a Condemnation Notice.” Id. § 28-2-30(5) (emphasis
Act also makes reference to service in other provisions. For example, section
28-2-470 provides that a separate action to challenge the condemnor’s right to
condemn automatically stays a proceeding for condemnation, and the Act requires
this separate action to be filed within thirty days after service of the
Condemnation Notice. Id. § 28-2-470. In addition, the
Act defines litigation expenses as those incurred from the time of service of
the Condemnation Notice, again referencing service:
“Litigation expenses” means the reasonable fees, charges, disbursements, and
expenses necessarily incurred from and after service of the Condemnation
Notice, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .
Id. § 28-2-30(14) (emphasis added).
the Act are unique and thus the commencement of the condemnation action cannot be
measured in terms of regular civil proceedings:
does not require the issuance of a summons and complaint and the filing of
responsive pleadings. Rather, the procedure begins with service of a
condemnation notice. The condemnation notice may be served in any manner
allowed for serving a summons and complaint in a civil action. 18 S.C. Juris. Eminent
Domain § 38 (1993) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
are references to filing in the Act,[5] we hold service marks the time for commencement of the action as defined in the
Act. Thus, we find section 28-2-510(C) is applicable in this instance. (2)
Contingency Fee Agreement. The School District further argues the master erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to Kiriakides
because he legally owed no fees to his attorneys. One of Kiriakides’s
attorneys testified that he and his co-counsel had no written fee agreement with
Kiriakides, but they did have a contingency fee arrangement with him - their
understanding was they were to be paid if Kiriakides recovered on his claims. The attorney acknowledged that they had not billed Kiriakides for any fees and
that Kiriakides had paid no fees. [R. 44-46] The School District argues that,
because Kiriakides did not prevail on his inverse condemnation claim and he did
not obtain a recovery, no attorneys’ fees were legally due, relying upon the
case of South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Weeks, 201 S.C. 199, 22
S.E.2d 249 (1942).
we considered a statutory provision allowing attorneys’ fees for the
abandonment of eminent domain proceedings that provided as follows:
time prior to the final conclusion of the condemnation proceeding provided for
in this Act and prior to entry into possession by such State Authority, it may
abandon, withdraw or dismiss such condemnation proceedings upon payment by it
to the owner of all costs and expenses incurred by the owner, and the amount of
such costs and expenses shall constitute a lien, for the payment thereof, upon
any award theretofore deposited in said proceeding by said Authority.
Id. at 200-01, 22 S.E.2d at 249.
The parties in Weeks had a contingency fee agreement to compensate the attorneys one-half of the
amount recovered over and above what the condemnor offered, but there was no
recovery obtained as the condemnation proceeding was abandoned. Id. at 202, 22 S.E.2d at 250. Consequently, no fees were owed under the terms of
the agreement. The trial judge allowed attorneys’ fees, however, on the theory
of quantum meruit. Id. Upon review, we noted that, we found this was
error, stating: [T]he
agreement was for a contingent fee, contingent upon recovery and, incidentally,
recovery of more than the amount offered for the land by the condemnor. This
contingency never occurred, the event of recovery did not transpire, because
the condemnation was abandoned, and the right to that course by the condemnor
* * Undoubtedly, generally where an attorney is discharged
without cause by his client after they have entered into a contingent fee
agreement, he is entitled to compensation. . . . The latter, however, is not the case now presented. No
action on the part of the landowners prevented the happening of the
contingency; it failed because of the abandonment of the condemnation by the
appellant. The inevitable result is that the attorneys by force of the terms
of their contract, voluntarily entered into, are entitled to no compensation.
Id. at 202-03, 22 S.E.2d at 250.
The master noted
the holding of the Weeks case, but concluded: “Notwithstanding, I find
that Plaintiff and his attorneys had a reasonable expectation of payment and
that [section 28-2-510(C)] entitles Plaintiff, as the owner of property which
was subject to an abandoned condemnation action, to reasonable attorneys[’]
fees. Further, even though an express contract for legal services was not
entered into, the law in this State is clear that under the facts of a case
such as this, the law will imply one.” Kiriakides
maintains Weeks is distinguishable because the statute there referred to
“all costs and expenses incurred by the owner,” which requires the fees to be
actually incurred, whereas section 28-2-510(C) generally provides for the recovery
of “reasonable” attorneys’ fees, which means the fees need not be actually
incurred. The South Carolina Eminent Domain Procedure Act, however, defines “litigation
expenses” as those “reasonable . . . expenses necessarily incurred from
and after service of the Condemnation Notice, including, but not limited to,
reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-30(14) (emphasis
added). In
the current appeal, Kiriakides’s attorneys had an unwritten agreement to be
paid on a contingency basis - essentially they would recover a percentage of
any award Kiriakides obtained. They included a request for attorneys’ fees in
their pleadings, but the School District subsequently abandoned its
condemnation action. As one treatise has stated:
Some courts have denied recovery for attorneys’ fees
which were wholly contingent upon the payment of an award or judgment in the
condemnation proceeding, when the proceeding was abandoned by the condemnor. [Citing, inter alia, South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Weeks, 201 S.C. 199, 22
S.E.2d 249 (1942).] However, other courts have held or recognized that the
recovery of attorneys’ fees in such a situation is not barred by the existence
of a contingency fee agreement between the property owner and the owner’s
attorney, rejecting the
contention that the contingent nature of the agreement meant that fees were not
“incurred” by the landowner and thus not recoverable.
2 Robert L.
Rossi, Attorneys’ Fees § 11:38 (3d ed. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
with the master’s determination that Kiriakides was entitled to attorneys’ fees
under these circumstances. We hereby overrule Weeks to the extent that
it conflicts with section 28-2-510(C), as the obvious intent of this statute is
to allow a landowner to recover his expenses in the event of abandonment of a
condemnation proceeding. Further, we see no reason to differentiate situations
where a party terminates the attorney and those where the condemnor terminates
the proceeding. Having found the School District abandoned its efforts to
condemn Kiriakides’s property, we hold attorneys’ fees were properly awarded. We
note that on appeal the School District has challenged Kiriakides’s entitlement
to attorneys’ fees, but it has not challenged the reasonableness of the
master’s award. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorneys’ fees to
Kiriakides in the amount of $6,500. III. CONCLUSION
foregoing, we affirm the master’s determination that Kiriakides has not
established his claim for inverse condemnation and that Kiriakides is entitled
to attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 29-2-510(C) of the South Carolina Code for
the School District’s abandonment of its condemnation proceeding.
C.J., WALLER and PLEICONES, JJ., concur. KITTREDGE, J., not participating.
[1] Alex Kiriakides, Jr. passed away before oral
argument was held in this matter. This appeal continues via his personal
representatives. [2] The Act is codified at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-10 to
-510 (2007).
[3] We find the issue is preserved for our review under
[4] Kiriakides submitted an affidavit and statement
seeking attorneys’ fees of $13,775, representing 55.1 hours at $250 per hour. [5] For example: “In all condemnation actions, the date
of valuation is the date of the filing of the Condemnation Notice.” S.C. Code
Ann. § 28-2-440 (2007) (referencing filing). © 2000-2015 South Carolina Judicial Department