Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/777/433/117590/
Timestamp: 2017-11-22 01:40:18
Document Index: 21015822

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1744', '§ 1291', '§ 1701', '§ 1744', '§ 1744', '§ 1291', '§ 1744', '§ 1744', '§ 1744', '§ 28']

Nl Industries, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Secretary of the Interior of the United States of America, Defendant,andall Minerals Corporation, a Nevada Corporation, Defendant Inintervention- Appellant, 777 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1985 › Nl Industries, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Secretary of the Interior of t...
Nl Industries, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Secretary of the Interior of the United States of America, Defendant,andall Minerals Corporation, a Nevada Corporation, Defendant Inintervention- Appellant, 777 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1985)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 777 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1985)
Argued March 15, 1985. Submitted May 29, 1985. Decided July 25, 1985. As Amended on Denial of Rehearingand Rehearing En BancDec. 4, 1985
All Minerals Corporation (AMC) appeals from the district court's order reversing a decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (Board) which held that an unpatented mining claim filed by NL Industries (NL) had been forfeited for failure to comply with the filing requirements of section 314(a) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the district court and reinstate the Board's decision.
On October 21, 1976, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (the Act), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782, became effective. Section 314(a), codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a), mandates the initial recording of unpatented mining claims with the federal government and the annual filing of affidavits of assessment work. NL initially recorded its claim involved in this case on December 7, 1977, and filed evidence of assessment work on December 14, 1977. NL failed to file evidence of assessment work or a notice of intention to hold the claim during 1978. NL did, however, file such evidence for the year 1979 on September 20, 1979. During the pendency of NL's state court suit against AMC, the Nevada office of the Bureau of Land Management (Bureau) issued two decisions invalidating both the NL and the AMC claims for failure to comply with the Act's filing provisions. The Bureau deemed both the NL and AMC claims conclusively abandoned pursuant to section 314(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c). NL and AMC each appealed to the Board.
NL also lost its appeal to the Board, which affirmed that NL's claims were abandoned and void for noncompliance with the filing provisions of the Act. NL appealed that decision to the district court of Nevada. AMC was again allowed to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) because of its interest in NL's disputed mining claims. If the district court had affirmed the Board decision, AMC could have argued that it was the prevailing claimant to the NL claims invalidated by the Board.
AMC asserted an interest in the specific claims of NL that were being adjudicated in the district court. Moreover, AMC's interest in the property was significantly different from the Secretary's interest in these claims. Thus, the Secretary could not adequately represent AMC. AMC therefore clearly met the test of a proper intervenor under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
In determining whether an intervenor may subsequently appeal from a decision not being appealed by one of the parties in the district court, the test is whether the intervenor's interests have been adversely affected by the judgment. See Shaff v. United States, 695 F.2d 1138, 1140 n. 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S. Ct. 85, 78 L. Ed. 2d 94 (1983); Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1980) ("the general rule [is] that an intervenor may appeal from any order adversely affecting the interest that served as a basis for intervention") (footnote omitted). In this case, the district court's decision to restore NL's claims undermined AMC's argument that it possessed a claim to the property based on its 1979 relocations. Thus, AMC is entitled to bring this appeal because its interests have been adversely affected. See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68, 100 S. Ct. 2232, 2240-41, 65 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1980) (government's failure to appeal does not deprive intervenor of ability to appeal adverse judgment) (Bryant).
NL relies on In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1977), a case in which ten appeals regarding properties sold or leased by a trustee in bankruptcy to third parties were declared moot. In that case, we observed that, as to several of the properties, a reversal of the district court's order would be ineffective to unwind the already concluded transactions. We pointed out that in order for the appellant to obtain relief "he would be required to bring a new action" to set aside the transactions "and join the buyers and lessees as parties." Id. at 189.
AMC has done all that it could to preserve its clear right to appeal the district court's decision, see Bryant, 447 U.S. at 366-68, 100 S. Ct. at 2240-41 (government's failure to appeal adverse judgment does not deprive intervenor of right to bring appeal), when it sought stays both in the district court and here. When AMC's notice of appeal was filed, we inherited jurisdiction over the entire case and controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Should we find the district court in error, we can order it to direct the Secretary to reinstate the Bureau decision. There is no need to assert jurisdiction over third parties who have not been involved in this litigation, as in Combined Metals, nor is there any property involved that is beyond the jurisdiction of the district court.
We agree with AMC that a finding of mootness under these circumstances "would be to make the appellate process meaningless to any defendant whose fellow defendant did not seek reversal of an adverse judgment." Simply because the Secretary is not a party to this appeal does not mean that the Secretary was not a party to the proceedings over which the district court had jurisdiction. The Secretary's failure to appeal only means that he cannot raise any objections in this court; it cannot act as a unilateral termination of an appeal by another party to the proceedings. See Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 485 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1974) (compliance with judgment by one defendant that moots its ability to appeal "in no way jeopardizes" the ability of other parties to appeal). "Nothing has transpired that has deprived this Court of the power to affect the rights of the litigants in this case." Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (distinguishing Combined Metals because "all parties to the transactions are before the Court"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S. Ct. 1481, 67 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1981). We therefore hold that this appeal is not moot.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1983). In reviewing the Board's decision, however, " [o]ur review is limited to an examination of whether the decision of the Board was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence, or not in accordance with the law." Melluzzo v. Watt, 674 F.2d 819, 820 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
This case turns upon the interpretation of the word "thereafter" in section 314(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a). That section requires that:
43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (emphasis added). The statute clearly provides a grace period for the filing of an initial claim for the first three years following the effective date of the Act: between 1977 and 1979. The question before us, however, is whether the subsequent annual reports must be filed in the year following any initial recordation prior to 1979, or whether such annual reports are only required beginning in 1980, regardless of the year in which the claim was initially recorded provided that it was recorded before the end of 1979.
43 C.F.R. Sec. 3833.2-1(a) (1) (1977) (emphasis added) (current version at 43 C.F.R. Sec. 3833.2-1(b) (1) (1984)).
In Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031, 102 S. Ct. 567, 70 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1981), we found that certain Department requirements for the filing of unpatented mining claims were not arbitrary and unreasonable. In a footnote we suggested in dictum that annual filings might be necessary only after October 21, 1979:
43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) requires owners of unpatented mining claims to file either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim, an affidavit of assessment work, or a detailed report provided in 30 U.S.C. § 28-1, in the office where the location notice or certificate is recorded. This section also requires that a copy of such instrument be filed in the office of Bureau of Land Management, designated by the Secretary with a description of the location of the mining claim. For claims located before the effective date of the Act, October 21, 1976, these instruments were required to be filed by October 21, 1979, and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter.
643 F.2d at 627 n. 13. See Oregon Portland Cement Co. v. United States Department of the Interior, 590 F. Supp. 52, 58 (D. Alaska 1984) (" 'thereafter' [modifies] the phrase 'within the three year period' ").
Since Oregon Portland Cement and after oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Locke, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 85 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1985). Locke addressed several issues regarding the Act, including: (1) whether section 314(a) of the Act required forfeiture of a claim when an annual filing was made only one day beyond the statutory deadline of December 30th, and (2) whether the Act's notice provisions were inadequate, thereby resulting in a deprivation of a property interest without due process. The Court upheld both the Secretary's interpretation of the statute to require forfeiture upon late filings, id. 105 S. Ct. at 1791-94, and the Act's constitutionality with regard to notice. Id. at 1799-1801.
105 S. Ct. at 1789 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court characterized the Act as a forfeiture statute, see id. at 1794-96, that is sufficiently clear as to bar judicial "attempt [s] to soften the clear import of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes those words lead to a harsh result." Id. at 1793. The Court pointed out that the Act serves two distinct purposes: (1) removal of stale claims, which is implemented by the initial recording requirement, and (2) establishment of a self-executing recording system to provide a continuing inventory of claims, which is implemented by the annual filing requirement. Id. at 1795, 1798. The Court held that there was no basis for any distinction with regard to the applicability of the forfeiture provision between failures to comply with either the initial or the annual filing requirements. Id. at 1795. As a result, strict compliance with the annual reporting deadlines was mandated, rather than merely "substantial compliance." Id. at 1796.
We requested that the parties file supplemental briefs with regard to Locke' § impact on this case. NL apparently considers Locke' § discussion as dictum with regard to this appeal because different facts were involved. Nevertheless, NL does concede that the Court undertook to interpret section 314(a). NL continues to argue that the statute did not provide adequate notice to permit forfeiture on the facts of this case, and that the Secretary's construction of the Act does not merely choose between one of two reasonable alternatives but rather imposes an additional requirement beyond the statute's clear language. NL also relies on Justice Stevens's dissent in Locke as further evidence that no annual filings were required until after the three year grace period ending in 1979. In that dissent, Justice Stevens states that "1980 was generally the first year that claimants ... had to comply with the annual filing requirements." 105 S. Ct. at 1810 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Moreover, NL continues to assert that there was an absence of clarifying regulations prior to 1979.
The Court's discussion in Locke of section 314(a)'s mechanics in its due process analysis necessarily required an interpretation of when annual filings were required. In that discussion, the Court clearly indicates that the annual filing requirement is "triggered" by the initial filing of a claim, and that the grace period relates solely to the initial filing. See 105 S. Ct. at 1800. Once a claimant files an initial claim, he is put on notice that more is required of him thereafter. The Court observed that this annual requirement imposes only "the most minimal of burdens on claimants" who have a "powerful motivation to comply" with the Act. Id. at 1798-99.
We disagree with NL's assertion that the Secretary has imposed an "extra requirement" beyond the statute's provisions. Rather, the Secretary interpreted a somewhat ambiguous statute, and provided regulations that are not ambiguous as to the requirements to file annual reports after the initial recording of a claim. See 43 C.F.R. Sec. 3833.2-1(a) (1) (1977).
In light of the deferential standard we must apply when reviewing the Secretary's interpretation of a statute which it is required to enforce, see Locke, 105 S. Ct. at 1793, and the Supreme Court's interpretation in Locke that closely parallels the Secretary's interpretation, we cannot say that the Secretary's action was arbitrary and capricious. We therefore must reverse the district court and reinstate the Bureau's decision.