Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US20020026583?dq=7,752,326
Timestamp: 2017-03-29 23:03:59
Document Index: 649383840

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 100', 'art 100', 'art 120', 'art 120', 'art 120', 'art 120', 'art 120']

Patent US20020026583 - Document transmission techniques IV - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inPatentsA method of determining the authenticity of a digital document sent by an unknown sender. The method comprises receiving a digital document and an encrypted digest of the document created by the sender using a hash algorithm. The digest is encrypted using a first token, such as a private key, of the...http://www.google.com/patents/US20020026583?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US20020026583 - Document transmission techniques IVAdvanced Patent SearchTry the new Google Patents, with machine-classified Google Scholar results, and Japanese and South Korean patents.Publication numberUS20020026583 A1Publication typeApplicationApplication numberUS 09/918,062Publication dateFeb 28, 2002Filing dateJul 30, 2001Priority dateAug 25, 2000Publication number09918062, 918062, US 2002/0026583 A1, US 2002/026583 A1, US 20020026583 A1, US 20020026583A1, US 2002026583 A1, US 2002026583A1, US-A1-20020026583, US-A1-2002026583, US2002/0026583A1, US2002/026583A1, US20020026583 A1, US20020026583A1, US2002026583 A1, US2002026583A1InventorsKeith Harrison, Richard BrownOriginal AssigneeHarrison Keith Alexander, Richard BrownExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (14), Referenced by (43), Classifications (6), Legal Events (2) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetDocument transmission techniques IV
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENTLY PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS [0073] Referring now to FIG. 1 there is shown a fax system 10 according to a first embodiment of the present invention for implementing a new fax protocol which insures that a fax of a document 12 reaches its intended recipient. The fax system 10 comprises a sending fax machine 14 and a receiving fax machine 16. Both machines are able to function as normal fax machines but, in addition to this, are configured to take advantage of a more secure overlay protocol as will be described below. [0074] The secure protocol relies on the use of digital certificates 18 which each contain a copy of a corresponding individual's public key 20. The digital certificates 18 comply with the well known X.509 standard. Public keys 20 of an individual are normally readily accessible within the electronic environment and are well known in the field of public/private key encryption techniques. Accordingly, no further detailed explanation of how these keys operate or of the certificate standard is provided herein. [0075] In the present embodiment, the fax system 10 accesses a central database 22 of individuals' certificates which uses LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol). The LDAP database 22 is well known and is configured to enable details regarding any registered user to be obtained and provided for use in transmission of the fax to the receiving fax machine 16. In particular, an encrypted fax version 24 of the document 12 (encrypted using a session key 25) is transmitted together with the intended recipient's digital certificate 18, containing the intended recipient's public key 20 and their contact details, and the session key 25 (encrypted using the intended recipient's public key 20). [0076] For each public key 20 stored in the LDAP database 22, there is a corresponding single private key 26 which is owned by the individual themselves. This private key 26 is provided on an intelligent portable store such as a smart card 28, which the individual keeps personal possession of. The smart card 28 not only contains the private key 26, but also an algorithm for encoding or decoding data using the private key 26. The private key 26 enables the intended recipient to uniquely identify themselves to the receiving fax machine 16 in order to received the fax document 24, as will be described in detail later. [0077] The receiving fax machine 16 includes a store 30 which retains each of the received certificates 18 and transmitted fax documents 24 until such time as the intended recipient accesses its transmitted fax document 24. The receiving fax machine 16 also has a smart card reader 32 provided in its housing such that an individual's smart card 28 can be inserted and certain information can be read into the receiving fax machine 16. It is to be appreciated, that the individual's private key 26 is never transmitted to the receiving fax machine 16 as this would compromise the security of the data and the system 10. The details of the interaction between the individual's private key 26 and received fax is also described in detail later. [0078] In the present embodiment, the receiving fax machine 16 is configured to receive an encrypted fax document 24, to store the fax document 24 electronically and to print it out as a paper document 34 only when an intended recipient of the fax document 24 has proved their identity by use of their private key 26. The entire process of transmitting a document to an unknown actual recipient (namely the fax machine of an unknown person or authority) for the attention of a specific known person is now described with reference to FIGS. 2a and 2 b. [0079] Referring now to FIG. 2a, the process commences with the original document 12 being scanned at 40 into the sending fax machine 14. At this stage, the sender has also to specify the identity of the intended recipient as well as the telephone number of the receiving fax machine 16. Once the identity of the intended recipient has been entered into the sending fax machine 14, the intended recipient's certificate 18 is requested and obtained at 42 from the LDAP database 22. [0080] In order to provide secure communications, resistant to someone tapping into or diverting the fax transmission to access the document, the fax document 24 is encrypted. This is carried out in this embodiment by the use of enveloping encryption techniques. These involve the sending fax machine encrypting the document to be sent using a lightweight encryption algorithm which is computationally inexpensive. DES, Triple DES, RC2 and Skipjack are examples of such lightweight encryption algorithms. An encryption key for the lightweight encryption algorithm is then encrypted using a standard computationally heavyweight encryption algorithm, such as RSA, which uses the intended recipient's public key. The heavily encrypted algorithm key can be decrypted with the intended recipient's private key 26 at the receiving fax machine and used to decode the lightweight coded document. [0081] More specifically, in the present embodiment, the session key 25 which is a coding algorithm key that is unique to the current communication event, is used. The process comprises selecting at 44 a session key 25 for use with the communication with the intended recipient. Then the scanned in document is encrypted at 46 using a relatively lightweight symmetric cryptographic encryption algorithm such as DES for example under the unique selected session key 25. [0082] As the session key 25 also needs to be sent with the encrypted document 24 in order to be able to decode it, the session key 25 is encrypted at 48 using the public key 20 of the intended recipient and the computationally heavy encryption algorithm, e.g. RSA. The public key 20 of the intended recipient is incidentally also found in the intended recipient's Certificate 18. The encoding of the session key 25 ensures that it will only be decodable by the owner of the intended recipient's private key 26. [0083] Once the sending fax machine 14 has created the encrypted version 24 of the scanned-in document 12 and has obtained the digital certificate 18 of the intended recipient, then can be sent to the receiving fax machine 16 together with the encrypted session key 25. However, prior to sending the information, the sending fax machine 14 implements a modified interconnect fax protocol to establish the link between the two machines. The modification over the standard interconnect fax protocol is that the sending fax machine 14 inquires as to whether the receiving fax machine 16 is of the type which can be used according to the present embodiment, namely one which has the capability to stop the faxed document from being printed out until the intended recipient has proved their identity. If the receiving fax machine 16 is a standard machine, this is determined at this stage and the sending fax machine 14 can either not send the fax document 24 or send it as a normal non-encrypted fax, namely without the certificate 18 and session key 25, which will be printed out conventionally. However, if the receiving fax machine 16 is capable of implementing the present invention, then the next stage is to send at 50 the encrypted fax document 24, the intended recipient's certificate 18 and the encrypted session key 25 to the receiving fax machine 16. [0084] Referring now to FIG. 2b, the process of receiving the fax document 24 and providing it to the intended recipient is now described. The receiving fax machine 16 receives at 52 the encrypted fax document 24, the intended recipient's certificate 18 and the encrypted session key 25, and places these in the store 30. The receiving fax machine 16 then requests at 54 the intended recipient to input their smart card 28 (containing their private key 26) into the smart card reader 32. More specifically, this is carried out by the certificate 18, which contains the name of the intended recipient, being extracted from the received information and the name being displayed on the receiving fax machine 16. However, it is to be appreciated there are various different viable ways in which the intended recipient could be notified that there is a fax for them. [0085] In response to the request, the intended recipient inputs their smart card 28 into the card reader 32 of the receiving fax machine 16. The encrypted session key 25 is then passed at 54 from the store 30 to the smart card 28. The decryption algorithm running on the processor of the smart card 28 decrypts at 56 the session key 25 using the private key 26. The decrypted session key 25 is then passed back at 58 to the receiving fax machine 16 and is used to decrypt at 58 the encrypted fax document 24. [0086] By virtue of being able to decode the session key 25 correctly, the intended recipient user has gone a large way to proving their identity to the receiving fax machine 16 and can be permitted to access the fax document 24. However, the use of digital certificates 18 enables an extra level of security to be achieved as is now described. [0087] The process continues with a determination at 60 of whether a verification of the intended user's certificate is required? If the answer is no, then the decrypted fax document 24 is simply printed out at 62 for the intended recipient. However, if verification of the certificate 18 is required at 60, the receiving fax machine 16 carries out an on-line authentication check at 64 of the intended recipient's certificate 18. This on-line check may actually involve authentication of a string of certificates until a trusted authority's certificate such as that of Verisign's, for example, has been received. Alternatively, this task could be designated to an authority such as Verisign to carry out and report back on or an on-line connection to the LDAP database 22 could be used to validate the certificates. [0088] If the result of the authentication check at 64 is positive (certificates valid), the decrypted fax document 24 is released to the intended recipient by being printed out at 62. Otherwise, the release of the document 24 is prevented at 68 and an appropriate message signifying the failure of the authentication check is presented at 69 to the person trying to access it at the receiving fax machine 16. [0089] In this embodiment, it is also possible to configure the receiving fax machine 16 to ensure that a document is sent to a group of people and that all of the group are present before the fax document 24 is printed out. This group facility is enabled carrying out the following steps. [0090] Firstly a session key 25 is chosen for the communication event. Then the scanned in fax document 24 to be sent is encrypted using the session key 25. The digital certificates 18 of each member of the group are obtained from the LDAP database 22 (each certificate 18 containing the members public encryption key 20). Then the session key 25 is encrypted using the public key 20 of the first member of the group. The encrypted result of this is then encrypted using the public key 20 of the second member of the group. Then the encrypted result of this is encrypted using the public key of the third member of the group and so on. This process is repeated until all of the group members' public keys 20 have been used to encode the session key 25 in this manner. The multiple encrypted session key, the encrypted fax document and the members' certificates are all sent to the receiving fax machine 16. [0091] The receiving fax machine 16 is programmed to store each of the received certificates 18 and to request each of the intended recipients of the group to prove their identity to the receiving fax machine 16 by presentation of their respective smart cards 28 possibly within a given time period. More specifically, each of the members of the group is asked in turn to present their smart keys 28 to the receiving fax machine 16 to decrypt the multiple encrypted session key 25. The decryption is carried out on the smart card 28 itself as described previously. The order in which the members need to present their smart cards 28 to the receiving fax machine 16 is the reverse of the order for encoding the session key 25, namely starting with the last member of the group and finishing with the first. Also the decrypted result received from one member's smart card 28 is provided as the input to the next member's smart card 28 until such time as the multiple layers of encryption of the session key 25 has all been decrypted. At the end of this process, the session key 25 is decrypted correctly and can then be used to decrypt and the received fax document 24 for printing out. Accordingly, all of the intended recipients (members of the group) have to be present to enable the fax document 34 to be accessed. [0092] As encryption techniques are used in the present embodiment, the new protocol is highly transparent. Any faxes being intercepted by an unscrupulous person or which are sent to the wrong receiving fax machine 16, would be in a secure form and would not be readily understandable by the unintended receiver. Another feature of such a protocol is that, as the documents are encoded it is not necessary to send the public key 20 of the intended recipient. Rather, the received document can be presented to anyone wishing to access the document but would only be correctly decodable by the intended recipient by use of their private key 26. As mentioned above, in order to maintain a very high level of security, all of the decoding of the received session key 25 is carried out on the smart card 28 itself. This prevents the private key 26 of the intended recipient being transferred onto the receiving machine 16 which could compromise security. Smart cards 28 can be programmed in Java to run the decryption algorithm with input/output rates up to 1 Mbit/sec. [0093] Referring now to FIG. 3, a second embodiment of the present invention is now described. The second embodiment is similar to the first and so only the differences are explained below. In this embodiment, the fax document 24 is sent to the receiving fax machine 16 in a non-encrypted format and so no session key 25 is required. On receipt of document 24, the receiving fax machine 16 prints out the received fax immediately. However, non intended recipients are prevented from reading the printed out documents 34 by virtue of them being printed out into locked compartments 36 of the receiving fax machine 16. In order to open a particular locked compartment 36, the intended recipient has once again to prove their identity by use of the smart card 28 containing their private key 26. [0094] The way in which the intended recipient's identity can be proved is for the receiving fax machine 16 to send to the intended recipients smart card 28 some identifier data (for example a random integer or even the intended recipient's certificate itself) that has been encrypted by the public key 20 of the intended recipient (the public key 20 can be obtained from the received certificate 18 of the intended recipient). Then only the true intended recipient's private key 28, if present on the smart card 28, will be able to correctly decode the identifier data and provide it back to the receiving fax machine 16. The receiving fax machine 16 can determine the validity of the intended recipient by carrying out a simple comparison of the pre-encryption sent identification data and the received decrypted data. It is to be appreciated that this data is preferably data that has been sent from the sending fax machine 14 to provide greater confidence (at least to the sender) in the security of the system though it is possible that it can be generated at the receiving fax machine 16 itself. If the identifier data is generated at the receiving fax machine 16 it is encoded there using the public key 18 of the intended recipient. This advantageously reduces the amount of data being transmitted but is a less secure protocol than when the identifier data is encrypted and sent by the sending fax machine 14. [0095] For additional security, which can also be applied to the first embodiment, the receiving fax machine 16 requests the PIN (Personal Identification Number) of the smart card holder to establish that the presenter of the card is its actual owner. The PIN is similar to that required for ATMs and is only known to the valid owner of the card. This security feature prevents a stolen card from being used to access the transmitted document 24. Alternatively, other biometrics can be used instead of the PIN, for example, signature comparison or fingerprint matching with that provided on the smart card 28, although this type of check is usually more expensive. [0096] Referring now to FIGS. 4, 5 and 6, a third embodiment of the present invention is now described. This embodiment deals specifically with the issue and problems associated with an unknown sender, namely the integrity of the source of the received fax document. [0097] A fax system 70 for implementing a new protocol for ensuring the integrity of the source of a received fax document, is now described with reference to FIG. 4. The fax system 70 comprises a sending fax machine 72 and a receiving fax machine 74. Both machines are able to function as normal fax machines but, in addition to this, are configured to take advantage of a more secure overlay protocol as is described below. [0098] The sending fax machine 72 includes a smart card reader 76 which is arranged to receive a sender's smart card 78. The smart card 78 has provided on it a private key 80 of the sender which is used to authenticate the identity of the sender as will be described later. The sending fax machine 72 also has a hash algorithm 84, such as SHA1 or MD5, provided in its memory which can be used to provide a fingerprint 86 of any block or file of data provided to it as an input. (A hash algorithm is an algorithm which reduces down a block of data into a fingerprint of about twenty bytes. It is computationally infeasible to find another document with the same fingerprint and it is not possible to derive details of the document from analysis of the fingerprint.) [0099] Although not shown in FIG. 4, the sending fax machine 72 is connectable to a central database 22 of individuals' certificates which uses LDAP in exactly the same manner as in the first embodiment. In this way, the sending fax machine 72 is able to request and obtain the certificate 18 of a sender (rather than an intended recipient) together with their public key 82. Alternatively, the public key 82 of the sender can be obtained directly from the sender's smart card 78 or even their personal website. [0100] The format of the data communication between the sending fax machine 72 and the receiving fax machine 74 is based on three elements, namely an electronic representation 24 of the document 12 which has been scanned into the sending fax machine 72, the certificate 18 of the sender, and an encrypted version of the document digest 86 (fingerprint of the document 12 which has been created by the hash algorithm 84). The way in which this data is used at the receiving machine is described later. [0101] The receiving fax machine 74 has a memory in which a store 88 of documents and a store 90 of certificates is provided. These documents 24 and certificates 18 are those which have been received from the sending fax machine 72 (or other sending fax machines—not shown). The receiving fax machine 74 also has a copy of the hash algorithm 92 which is identical to the hash algorithm 84 found in the sending fax machine 72. A microprocessor (not shown) is provided for implementing the algorithm 92 and making decisions based on the comparison of data as is described in detail later. [0102] Apart from the standard fax machine elements and functions, the receiving fax machine 74 also comprises an audit log 94 which stores information regarding the receipt of each electronic document 24. This information includes the time and date at which the fax document 24 was received, a reference to the certificate 18 which relates to the received document 24, the digest 86 of each document and a unique identifier which can be printed on each printed document 34 which establishes a link to the associated entry in the audit log 94. [0103] The process of transmitting a scanned in document 12 from the sending fax machine 72 (namely the fax machine of an unknown person or authority) to the receiving fax machine 74 is now described with reference to FIGS. 5 and 6. [0104] The process is divided into two distinct parts, the first part 100 (FIG. 5) which occurs at the sending machine 72 and the second part (FIG. 6) which occurs at the receiving machine 74. Taking each of these in turn, the first part 100 commences with the document 12 being scanned at 102 into the sending fax machine 72. The hash algorithm 84 is then used at 104 to create a digest 86 of the scanned in document. The sending fax machine 72 requests the sender to input his smart card 78 and also to confirm the card by entering its associated PIN. The card 78 is entered into the smart card reader 76 and card confirmed at 106. [0105] The private key 80 of the sender is then used at 108 to encrypt the digest 86 of the document 24. This encryption provides the link back to the sender which forms the basis for author authentication security of the present embodiment. The sending fax machine 72 also requires the sender's certificate 18 which includes the sender's public key 82 for sending to the receiving fax machine 74. Accordingly, the process 100 continues with the sending fax machine 72 requesting and obtaining at 110 the sender's certificate 18. As mentioned before, this is obtained either from the sender's smart card 78, the sender's website or from a central database such as the LDAP database 22. Finally, the document 24, the sender's certificate 82 and the encrypted digest 86 of the document are all sent at 112 to the receiving fax machine 74. [0106] Referring now to FIG. 6, the second part 120 of the process which occurs at the receiving fax machine 74 commences with the receiving at 122 of the document 24, the sender's certificate 82 and the encrypted digest 86 of the document. The receiving fax machine 74 extracts at 124 the public key 82 of the sender from the enclosed digital certificate 18 and uses it to decode the encrypted digest 86 of the document. In addition, the received document 24 is redigested at 126 using the same hash algorithm 92 as used to create the original digest 86. The decoded digest created by the sending fax machine hash algorithm 84 and the new digested document created by the receiving machine hash algorithm 92 are then compared at 128. [0107] If these two digests are not equivalent, then the second part 120 of the process ends at 130 with the result that sender of the document and its contents cannot be relied upon. This is caused by either the original and received documents being different or the private/public keys of the supposed sender not matching. [0108] If these two digests are equivalent from the comparison at 128, then the process continues and determines at 132 whether validation of the sender's certificate is required. If no validation is required, then the second part 120 of the process ends at 134 with the result that sender of the document and its contents can both be relied upon. This result is then identified to the recipient by the printing at 136 of a verifying mark (not shown) on the printout 34 of the received document 24. However, if validation is required as determined at 132, then the receiving fax machine 74 takes steps at to check the validity of the certificate 18 or a chain of certificates of which the present certificate forms a part. These checks can be made on-line to higher and higher authorities and may, if necessary, extend all the way to a trusted authority such as Verisign. The process of on-line authentication of a certificate is well understood in the art and does not require further explanation herein. [0109] The result of the verification process determines the validity of the certificate 18 and if it is valid at 140, then the second part 120 of the process ends at 134 with the result that sender of the document and its contents can both be relied upon. Otherwise, the certificate 18 is considered to be invalid at 140, and the second part 120 of the process ends at 130 with the result that sender of the document cannot be relied upon. [0110] It is also to be appreciated that if the receiving fax machine 74 carries out the certificate validation check then it could notify the result (confirmation) in header sheet or other print form or even on screen of the receiving fax machine. Such a confirmation would identify the document, identify the sender, and signify that the relevant sender's certificate or certificates had all been verified. [0111] Received certificates 18 are placed in the store 90 on receipt and a relevant entry is made in the audit log 94. However, as described above, a received certificate 18 is not necessarily checked on-line when a new fax is received; this decision depends on the relationship between the sender and the recipient. If at any time in future doubt should arise as to the identity of the sender of a fax, thus requiring on-line verification of the certificate, then the relevant certificates 18 listed in the audit log 94 associated with that fax can be accessed by use of the unique identifier printed on the paper copy 34 of the fax document 24. Once the relevant certificate 18 has been located, an on-line validity check can be carried out. [0112] The above described audit log 94 advantageously allows later on-line checks to be carried out on received documents 24 and their associated certificates 18. Furthermore, the provision of the audit log 94 permits the potentially time-consuming on-line validation procedure to be carried out at a more convenient time and also to be carried out for batches of received fax documents 24 and their associated certificates 18. If batch on-line validation is carried out, significant time savings can be attainted over individual on-line validations. [0113] As mentioned previously, a copy of the digest for each received fax is also stored in the audit log 94 for additional security. The digest can be used in conjunction with the hash algorithm 92 as described above to verify the equivalence of the received document and a copy of that document at any time in the future. This provides proof that the document has not been tampered with at any time between its receipt and the subsequent moment in time when its authenticity is being considered. [0114] In addition, the audit log 94 provides a history of the faxes received and can at a later time provide confirmation of when a fax was sent/received and who sent it. Each page of a received and printed out fax contains the above mentioned unique validation mark on it. Accordingly, each printed page of a received fax has a page number provided and also the unique identifier which can be associated with an audit log entry so that it is possible at any time to determine from a single page who sent the fax, when it was sent and the authenticity of each page thereof. [0115] Referring now to FIGS. 7 and 8, closed group fax system 150 according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention is described. The closed group fax system 150 comprises a group of authenticated fax machines 152 (in the present embodiment a group of only three fax machines (A, B and C) is shown). These machines make up a virtual private network. [0116] Each fax machine 152 has provided within it a store 154 of group member's certificates 156. These can be provided by any known method for example by either remote programming via the communications network 158 that links the fax machines 152 together, or by individual loading of each member's certificate 156 onto each machine 152. [0117] The fax system 150 operates as a virtual private network by way of an authentication procedure that operates prior to the transmission of any fax document data. The authentication procedure determines whether a given pair of sending and receiving fax machines 152 are both members of the authorised group of fax machines as is now described with reference to FIG. 8 using an example of a desired transmission of a document from fax machine A to fax machine C. [0118] The authentication procedure 160 commences with Machine A (A) sending at 162 its own digital certificate 156 together with a nonce (labeled NonceA) to Machine C (C). NonceA is a random integer that has been generated at A and that is used only once. NonceA is used in a data exchange to stop replay attacks, namely the reuse of a valid authentication for further authentications. [0119] C receives Machine A's request at 164 together with NonceA. The received version of A's Certificate is compared at 166 with the corresponding Certificate 156 held in its store 154. If they are not equivalent, at 166, the procedure has detected an irregularity at 168 and the procedure 160 is stopped at 168. Otherwise, the procedure continues as described below. [0120] The received NonceA is encrypted at 170 using C's private key (only available at C). This can be carried out on a smart card which holds the private key 159 as well as a encoding/decoding algorithm for example. C then generates a new nonce (labeled as NonceC) and sends this at 172 together with the encrypted NonceA and C's digital Certificate to A. [0121] On receipt of the encrypted NonceA, C's digital Certificate and NonceC at 170, A compares at 176 the received version of C's digital Certificate with the corresponding Certificate 156 held in its store 154. If they are not equivalent, at 176, the procedure has detected an irregularity at 168 and the procedure 160 is stopped at 168. Otherwise, the procedure continues as described below. [0122] A then decodes at 178 the encrypted NonceA using C's public key (the Public key is either obtained from C's Certificate or has previously been stored in A's memory. The decrypted version of NonceA is compared at 178 to the previously stored version of NonceA. If both versions are not equivalent at 180, then an irregularity in the authentication procedure has been detected and the subsequent transmission of a fax document between A and C is prevented at 168. Conversely, if both version are equivalent at 180, then A has proved that that the party who has sent the encrypted NonceA is the owner of C's private key, namely C and so commences its response procedure. [0123] The response procedure commences at 182 with A encrypting the received NonceC with its own private key 159. Again the private key 159 may be provided on a smart card as in the previous embodiments. A then sends at 184 the encrypted NonceC to C. On receipt, C decodes at 186 the encrypted NonceC using A's public key (available via A's digital Certificate or previously stored) and compares this at 186 with the previously stored version of NonceC. If at 188 the decrypted version of NonceC is not equivalent to the stored original, then an irregularity in the authentication procedure 160 has been detected and the subsequent transmission of a fax document between A and C is prevented at 168. Otherwise, if both version are equivalent at 188, then C has proved that that the party who has sent the encrypted NonceC is the owner of A's private key 159, namely A. Accordingly, the authentication procedure 160 is now complete and the document can be faxed at 190 between A and C. [0124] The use certificates 156 in the above procedure not only enables a local check to be made as to the membership of the closed group of the fax machine 152 wishing to commence communication but also enables each fax machine 152 to carry out on-line authentication checks to establish as an additional check whether each participating fax machine 152 is who it claims to be. Also this on-line authentication procedure provides an up-to-date validity check on the status of the fax machines' Certificates 156 if required. [0125] It is to be appreciated that the above described encryption techniques can also be used with this embodiment of the present invention if additional security is required. Also prior to the authentication procedure, a person wishing to send a document using one of the authorised fax machines 152 may be required to prove their identity by the use of a personal smart card 28 containing their certificate 156 and their private key 159. This would provide an additional layer of security for the virtual private network. [0126] An example of a typical application of the fourth embodiment of the present invention is a fax machine in a local bank that should only receive faxes from other remote branches of the same bank. Here, the certificates 156 of the fax machines 152 at the remote branches are stored in the local branch fax machine and are used to confirm the identity of the sending/receiving fax machine at the remote branch. [0127] It is to be appreciated that the above described embodiments can all be combined in different ways to provide a system or method with significant advantages. In particular, the first or second embodiments relating to the unknown intended recipient can readily be combined with the third embodiment relating to the unknown sender. Such a combination of embodiments would provide a very secure system of fax transmission and receipt. In addition, the first or second embodiments and the third embodiment can also be combined with the fourth embodiment to provide a virtual private network with secure intended recipient and unknown sender capabilities. Similarly, other valid combinations of embodiments are the third embodiment with the fourth embodiment and also the first or second embodiments with the fourth embodiment. Furthermore, the first and second embodiments could also be combined such that the receiving fax machine could either printout decrypted documents directly or print non-encrypted documents into locked compartments. The configuration options of the receiving fax machine would be set up to determine its mode of operation with the faxes to be received. [0128] It is also to be appreciated that the fax machines 14,16 described in the above embodiments have provided within them a software configurable communications module (not shown) for receiving and transmitting documents and data, and a software configurable controller (not shown) for processing data (encrypting/decrypting data or implementing hash algorithms, for example) as required. [0129] Having described particular preferred embodiments of the present invention, it is to be appreciated that the embodiments in question are exemplary only and that variations and modifications such as will occur to those possessed of the appropriate knowledge and skills may be made without departure from the spirit and scope of the invention as set forth in the appended claims. For example, the present invention is not restricted to fax documents, and could equally be applied to any transmitted document which requires printing out, for example the present invention could also apply to document printing from computers. The issues of secure document reception which require secure document reproduction to prevent any person seeing contents by accident, for example, also occur with shared printers on a network or at a hotel lobby (document transmitted from hotel room to printer in lobby). Patent CitationsCited PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitleUS5222136 *Jul 23, 1992Jun 22, 1993Crest Industries, Inc.Encrypted communication systemUS5448045 *Feb 26, 1993Sep 5, 1995Clark; Paul C.System for protecting computers via intelligent tokens or smart cardsUS5465229 *Nov 28, 1994Nov 7, 1995Sun Microsystems, Inc.Single in-line memory moduleUS5473691 *Nov 5, 1993Dec 5, 1995Microsoft CorporationSystem and method for computer data transmissionUS5555307 *Jan 26, 1994Sep 10, 1996France Telecom Establissement Autonome De Droit PublicDevice and process for rendering secure the transmission of faxes, as well as fax unit which has been made secure and incorporating such a deviceUS5598473 *Aug 17, 1994Jan 28, 1997Ibm CorporationDigital signature generator/verifier/recorder (DS-GVR) for analog transmissionsUS5633932 *Dec 19, 1995May 27, 1997Intel CorporationApparatus and method for preventing disclosure through user-authentication at a printing nodeUS5671285 *Dec 13, 1995Sep 23, 1997Newman; Bruce D.Secure communication systemUS6079018 *Oct 8, 1997Jun 20, 2000Agorics, Inc.System and method for generating unique secure values for digitally signing documentsUS6185683 *Dec 28, 1998Feb 6, 2001Intertrust Technologies Corp.Trusted and secure techniques, systems and methods for item delivery and executionUS6314521 *Nov 26, 1997Nov 6, 2001International Business Machines CorporationSecure configuration of a digital certificate for a printer or other network deviceUS6378070 *Jan 8, 1999Apr 23, 2002Hewlett-Packard CompanySecure printingUS6385728 *Nov 26, 1997May 7, 2002International Business Machines CorporationSystem, method, and program for providing will-call certificates for guaranteeing authorization for a printer to retrieve a file directly from a file server upon request from a client in a network computer system environmentUS6862583 *Oct 4, 1999Mar 1, 2005Canon Kabushiki KaishaAuthenticated secure printing* Cited by examinerReferenced byCiting PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitleUS7472270 *Nov 13, 2002Dec 30, 2008Microsoft CorporationSecure transmission of digital content between a host and a peripheral by way of a digital rights management (DRM) systemUS7502770Apr 10, 2002Mar 10, 2009Metaweb Technologies, Inc.Knowledge webUS7765206Dec 15, 2003Jul 27, 2010Metaweb Technologies, Inc.Meta-WebUS7779249Dec 10, 2008Aug 17, 2010Microsoft CorporationSecure transmission of digital content between a host and a peripheral by way of a digital rights management (DRM) systemUS7844610May 25, 2004Nov 30, 2010Google Inc.Delegated authority evaluation systemUS7849318 *Jun 19, 2007Dec 7, 2010Yahoo! Inc.Method for session securityUS7865720 *Mar 20, 2003Jan 4, 2011Research In Motion LimitedSystem and method for supporting multiple certificate status providers on a mobile communication deviceUS7881467 *Jul 20, 2005Feb 1, 2011Ricoh Company, Ltd.Image forming apparatus and electronizing method for information mentioned in paperUS8012025Dec 11, 2003Sep 6, 2011Applied Minds, LlcVideo game controller hub with control input reduction and combination schemesUS8069175Mar 24, 2010Nov 29, 2011Google Inc.Delegating authority to evaluate contentUS8090950 *Apr 8, 2004Jan 3, 2012NexTenders (India) Pvt. Ltd.System and method for authenticating documentsUS8219817 *Nov 13, 2006Jul 10, 2012Dialogic CorporationSystem and method for authentication of transformed documentsUS8321419Sep 8, 2011Nov 27, 2012Google Inc.Delegated authority to evaluate contentUS8423763 *Nov 26, 2010Apr 16, 2013Research In Motion LimitedSystem and method for supporting multiple certificate status providers on a mobile communication deviceUS8533477Jul 11, 2006Sep 10, 2013Dialogic CorporationFacsimile transmission authenticationUS8782422Dec 22, 2011Jul 15, 2014Nextenders (India) Private, Ltd.System and method for authenticating documentsUS9380050 *Jun 20, 2014Jun 28, 2016Xerox CorporationScan image authenticationUS20030194093 *Nov 13, 2002Oct 16, 2003Microsoft CorporationSecure transmission of digital content between a host and a peripheral by way of a digital rights management (DRM) systemUS20030195834 *Sep 18, 2002Oct 16, 2003Hillis W. DanielAutomated online purchasing systemUS20030196094 *Nov 6, 2002Oct 16, 2003Hillis W. DanielMethod and apparatus for authenticating the content of a distributed databaseUS20040177076 *Mar 8, 2004Sep 9, 2004Yohko OhtaniInformation processing apparatus, image forming apparatus, and information processing methodUS20050086188 *Apr 10, 2002Apr 21, 2005Hillis Daniel W.Knowledge webUS20050131722 *May 25, 2004Jun 16, 2005Hillis W. D.Delegated authority evaluation systemUS20050131918 *May 24, 2004Jun 16, 2005W. Daniel HillisPersonalized profile for evaluating contentUS20050148323 *Mar 20, 2003Jul 7, 2005Research In Motion LimitedSystem and method for supporting multiple certificate status providers on a mobile communication deviceUS20050180574 *Jan 6, 2005Aug 18, 2005Derek RitzMethod and system for document transmissionUS20050182933 *Jan 25, 2005Aug 18, 2005Derek RitzMethod and system for document transmissionUS20060020808 *Jul 20, 2005Jan 26, 2006Masuyoshi YachidaImage forming apparatus and electronizing method for information mentioned in paperUS20080016356 *Jul 11, 2006Jan 17, 2008Cantata Technology, Inc.Facsimile transmission authenticationUS20080016358 *Nov 13, 2006Jan 17, 2008Cantata Technology, Inc.System and method for authentication of transformed documentsUS20080028439 *Apr 8, 2004Jan 31, 2008Ravindra Waman ShevadeSystem and Method for Authenticating DocumentsUS20080301793 *Mar 10, 2008Dec 4, 2008Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Apparatus and method of verifying online certificate for offline deviceUS20080320307 *Jun 19, 2007Dec 25, 2008Yahoo! Inc.Method for Session SecurityUS20090125988 *Dec 10, 2008May 14, 2009Microsoft CorporationSecure transmission of digital content between a host and a peripheral by way of a digital rights management (drm) systemUS20100185626 *Mar 24, 2010Jul 22, 2010Hillis W DanielDelegated authority evaluation systemUS20110072270 *Nov 26, 2010Mar 24, 2011Little Herbert ASystem and method for supporting multiple certificate status providers on a mobile communication deviceUS20130191633 *Mar 11, 2013Jul 25, 2013Research In Motion LimitedSystem and method for supporting multiple certificate status providers on a mobile communication deviceUS20150358298 *Aug 17, 2015Dec 10, 2015International Business Machines CorporationSecure sharing and collaborative editing of documents in cloud based applicationsCN102480353A *Nov 26, 2010May 30, 2012航天信息股份有限公司Method of password authentication and secret key protectionWO2004091135A1 *Apr 8, 2004Oct 21, 2004Nextenders (India) Private LimitedSystem and method for authenticating documentsWO2008008306A2 *Jul 9, 2007Jan 17, 2008Dialogic CorporationFacsimile transmission authenticationWO2008008306A3 *Jul 9, 2007Nov 20, 2008Dialogic CorpFacsimile transmission authenticationWO2013006918A1 *Jul 13, 2012Jan 17, 2013Commonwealth Scientific And Industrial Research OrganisationCryptographic processes* Cited by examinerClassifications U.S. Classification713/172International ClassificationH04L9/32Cooperative ClassificationH04L2209/805, H04L9/3265, H04L9/3236European ClassificationH04L9/32MLegal EventsDateCodeEventDescriptionJul 30, 2001ASAssignmentOwner name: HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, CALIFORNIAFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:HEWLETT-PACKARD LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:012073/0826Effective date: 20010724Sep 30, 2003ASAssignmentOwner name: HEWLETT-PACKARD DEVELOPMENT COMPANY L.P., TEXASFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY;REEL/FRAME:014061/0492Effective date: 20030926Owner name: HEWLETT-PACKARD DEVELOPMENT COMPANY L.P.,TEXASFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY;REEL/FRAME:014061/0492Effective date: 20030926RotateOriginal ImageGoogle Home - Sitemap - USPTO Bulk Downloads - Privacy Policy - Terms of Service - About Google Patents - Send FeedbackData provided by IFI CLAIMS Patent Services