Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/cafc/c751602/ethicon-inc-and-inbae-yoon-md-v-united-states-surgical-corporation
Timestamp: 2020-07-14 20:44:28
Document Index: 258622727

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 256', '§ 116', '§ 116', '§ 116', '§ 116', '§ 262', '§ 261']

Ethicon, Inc. And Inbae Yoon, M.D. v. United States Surgical Corporation and Young Jae Choi, Federal Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
Ethicon, Inc. And Inbae Yoon, M.D. v. United States Surgical Corporation and Young Jae Choi , 135 F.3d 1456 ( 1998 )
135 F.3d 1456
ETHICON, INC. and InBae Yoon, M.D., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNITED STATES SURGICAL CORPORATION and Young Jae Choi,
Declined April 1, 1998.
In this patent infringement action, Dr. InBae Yoon (Yoon) and his exclusive licensee, Ethicon, Inc. (Ethicon), appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. In 1989, Yoon and Ethicon sued United States Surgical Corporation (U.S. Surgical) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,535,773 (the '773 patent). In 1993, the parties stipulated to the intervention of Mr. Young Jae Choi (Choi) as defendant-intervenor. Choi claimed to be an omitted co-inventor of the '773 patent and to have granted U.S. Surgical a retroactive license under that patent. On U.S. Surgical's motion to correct inventorship of the '773 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 256, the district court ruled that Choi was an omitted co-inventor of two claims, see 937 F. Supp. 1015 (D.Conn.1996), and subsequently granted U.S. Surgical's motion to dismiss the infringement complaint, see 954 F. Supp. 51 (D.Conn.1997). Because the district court's determination of co-inventorship was correct, and because Choi is a joint owner of the '773 patent who has not consented to suit against U.S. Surgical, this court affirms.
Patent issuance creates a presumption that the named inventors are the true and only inventors. See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980, 41 USPQ2d 1782, 1785-86 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 2459, 138 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1997). Inventorship is a question of law, which this court reviews without deference. See Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415, 30 USPQ2d 1356, 1358 (Fed.Cir.1994). However, this court reviews the underlying findings of fact which uphold a district court's inventorship determination for clear error. See Hess, 106 F.3d at 980.
A patented invention may be the work of two or more joint inventors. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994). Because "[c]onception is the touchstone of inventorship," each joint inventor must generally contribute to the conception of the invention. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28, 32 USPQ2d 1915, 1919 (Fed.Cir.1994). "Conception is the 'formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.' " Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 87 (Fed.Cir.1986) (quoting 1 Robinson on Patents 532 (1890)). An idea is sufficiently "definite and permanent" when "only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation." Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228.
The conceived invention must include every feature of the subject matter claimed in the patent. See Sewall, 21 F.3d at 415. Nevertheless, for the conception of a joint invention, each of the joint inventors need not "make the same type or amount of contribution" to the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 116. Rather, each needs to perform only a part of the task which produces the invention. On the other hand, one does not qualify as a joint inventor by merely assisting the actual inventor after conception of the claimed invention. See Sewall, 21 F.3d at 416-17; Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 641 (Fed.Cir.1985) ("An inventor 'may use the services, ideas and aid of others in the process of perfecting his invention without losing his right to a patent.' " (quoting Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 451 F.2d 849, 864, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 713, 724 (5th Cir.1971))). One who simply provides the inventor with well-known principles or explains the state of the art without ever having "a firm and definite idea" of the claimed combination as a whole does not qualify as a joint inventor. See Hess, 106 F.3d at 981 (citing O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 111, 14 L. Ed. 601 (1853)). Moreover, depending on the scope of a patent's claims, one of ordinary skill in the art who simply reduced the inventor's idea to practice is not necessarily a joint inventor, even if the specification discloses that embodiment to satisfy the best mode requirement. See Sewall, 21 F.3d at 416.
Corroborating evidence may take many forms. Often contemporaneous documents prepared by a putative inventor serve to corroborate an inventor's testimony. See id. at 1195-96. Circumstantial evidence about the inventive process may also corroborate. See Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d 1368, 1373, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (CCPA 1982) ("[S]ufficient circumstantial evidence of an independent nature can satisfy the corroboration rule."). Additionally, oral testimony of someone other than the alleged inventor may corroborate. See Price, 988 F.2d at 1195-96.
Questions of patent ownership are distinct from questions of inventorship. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248, 26 USPQ2d 1572, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1993). In accordance with this principle, this court has nonetheless noted that "an invention presumptively belongs to its creator." Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 406, 38 USPQ2d 1695, 1697 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 513, 136 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1996).
One more settled principle governs this case, however. An action for infringement must join as plaintiffs all co-owners. See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255, 11 S. Ct. 334, 335, 34 L. Ed. 923 (1891) ("The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign, grant, and convey, either (1) the whole patent ...; or (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United States. A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers. In the second case, jointly with the assignor. In the first and third cases, in the name of the assignee alone." (emphasis added)); Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 515, 520, 19 L. Ed. 37 (1868) ("[W]here [an] assignment is of an undivided part of the patent, the action should be brought for every infringement committed subsequent to the assignment, in the joint names of the patentee and assignee, as representing the entire interest.").
This freedom to exploit the patent without a duty to account to other co-owners also allows co-owners to freely license others to exploit the patent without the consent of other co-owners. Schering, 104 F.3d at 344 ("Each co-owner's ownership rights carry with them the right to license others, a right that also does not require the consent of any other co-owner."). Thus, the congressional policy expressed by section 262 is that patent co-owners are "at the mercy of each other." Willingham v. Lawton, 555 F.2d 1340, 1344, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249, 252 (6th Cir.1977).
The district court found that Mr. Choi made a contribution to two claims of the '773 patent. Although precedent would as readily place Mr. Choi's work in the category whereby "an inventor 'may use the services, ideas and aid of others in the process of perfecting his invention without losing his right to a patent,' " Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 641 (Fed.Cir.1985) (quoting Hobbs v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 451 F.2d 849, 864, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 713, 724 (5th Cir.1971)), the district court's finding as to the two claims is not clearly in error. That conclusion is not my primary concern. My primary concern is with the failure of the court to recognize, in deciding ownership rights, the effect on these rights of the 1984 amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 116, which markedly changed the law of naming inventors on patents, and authorized the "joint invention" here adjudicated.
Those assistants who worked on an invention at the behest of the originator of the idea did not achieve the legal status of "joint inventor." Having no legal status as an inventor, such assistants acquired no property right in the invention by virtue of their contributions. See Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530, 563-64, 23 L. Ed. 128 (1874) (ancillary discoveries of assistant belong to person who conceived original principle unless they "constitute the whole substance of the improvement"); Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602-4, 19 L. Ed. 177 (1868) (same). In Agawam the Court explained that one less than a true joint inventor was forbidden from "appropriat[ing] to himself the entire result of the ingenuity and toil of the originator, or put[ing] it in the power of any subsequent infringer to defeat the patent." 74 U.S. at 604.
Before 1984 precedent did not permit naming as an inventor a person who did not share in the conception of the invention and who did not contribute to all of the claims of the patent. See In re Sarett, 51 C.C.P.A. 1180, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010 n. 7, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 474, 479 n. 7 (CCPA 1964) ("It should be clear that the patent could not legally contain a claim to Sarett's sole invention under existing law because it would not have been the invention of the joint patentees." (emphases in original)); In re Hamilton, 17 C.C.P.A. 833, 37 F.2d 758, 759, op. den. reh'g, 17 C.C.P.A. 914, 38 F.2d 889, 890 (CCPA 1930) (joint patent could not issue on portion of invention made by single inventor). If different persons made an inventive contribution to various parts of an invention or to different claims of a patent, the legalistic problems that arose were not readily soluble, even by the complex, expensive, and often confusing expedient of filing separate patent applications on separate claims.
The progress of technology exacerbated the inventorship problems. Patents were invalidated simply because all of the named inventors did not contribute to all the claims; and patents were also invalidated when there were contributors to some of the claims who were not named. See Jamesbury Corp. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 516, 518 F.2d 1384, 1395, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 720 (1975) (inclusion of more or less than the true inventors renders patent void and invalid); Amax Fly Ash Corp. v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 756, 514 F.2d 1041, 1050, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 210, 217 (1975) ("Where more or less than the true inventors are named, the patent is void."); Hobbs, 451 F.2d at 864-65, 171 USPQ at 724 (patent on joint invention issued to one inventor is invalid); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 406, 408, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374, 376 (4th Cir.1971) ("the law has been strictly construed to grant patents only to the true inventors"); Pointer v. Six Wheel Corp., 177 F.2d 153, 157-58, 83 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 43, 46-48 (9th Cir.1949) (patent issued to only one of the inventors is void); Shreckhise v. Ritchie, 160 F.2d 593, 595, 73 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 140-41 (4th Cir.1947) (same, citing cases); Thropp & Sons Co. v. De Laski & Thropp Circular Woven Tire Co., 226 F. 941, 947-48 (3d Cir.1915) (joint patent on invention of one is invalid as to all); Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prods. Co., 358 F. Supp. 91, 101, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 432, 439-40 (W.D.Mo.1973) (patent issued to one is invalid for failure to join others); Stewart v. Tenk, 32 F. 665, 666 (C.C.S.D.Ill.1887) (claim to sole invention is invalid in joint patent); Worden v. Fisher, 11 F. 505, 508-9 (C.C.E.D.Mich.1882) (when two persons invent distinct parts of machine they should take out separate patents). Indeed, at the time the '773 patent application was filed in 1982, most practitioners believed that a separate application was required if it was desired to present, for example, the two claims that contain Mr. Choi's contribution. See generally John F. Pearne, Must Each Inventor Named in a Patent Application Have Made an Inventive Contribution to Each of the Claims Thereof?, 58 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 205 (1976) (discussing then-proposed amendments to § 116).
The law of patent ownership has its roots in the common law of property--although a patent has its own peculiar character, for it deals with intangibles. See Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40, 43 S. Ct. 254, 258, 67 L. Ed. 516 (1923) (a patent is a creature of statute); Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494, 13 L. Ed. 504 (1850). Certain incidents of patent ownership have been created or clarified by statute, see 35 U.S.C. § 262, yet the common law provided the basic rules, as manifested in the concepts of tenancy in common and undivided interests that courts have drawn upon in patent ownership disputes.
Most of the disputes concerning patent ownership that reached the Supreme Court dealt not with joint invention, but assignments and other transfers. The oft-cited case of Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 11 S. Ct. 334, 34 L. Ed. 923 (1891) dealt with a dispute among the inventor's spouse and various assignees concerning ownership of the fountain pen patent, not inventorship. Occasionally an issue of ownership of patent property arose based on whether the claimant actually shared fully in the creation of the invention. In such cases, as cited supra, the decision on "joint invention" also decided the issue of ownership, for a person who had fully shared in the creation of the invention was deemed to be a joint owner of the entire patent property. On this premise each joint inventor was deemed to occupy the entirety of the patented subject matter, on a legal theory of tenancy in common. See 7 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property p 602 (1997) ("undivided fractional shares held by tenants in common are usually equal and are presumed equal unless circumstances indicate otherwise"). As patent property became viewed more precisely as personal property, see 35 U.S.C. § 261, the concept of tenancy in common was adjusted to that of an undivided interest, although with no substantial change in legal rights.
The panel majority holds that although Mr. Choi's grant of a license under all fifty-five claims of the '773 patent does not have retroactive effect and thus does not relieve U.S. Surgical of liability for past infringement, Dr. Yoon is powerless to recover for past infringement because Mr. Choi as joint inventor refuses to join in the suit. Precedent and the Federal Rules do not support this ruling. Schering Corp. & Roussel-Uclaf S.A. v. Zeneca, Inc., 104 F.3d 341, 41 USPQ2d 1359 (Fed.Cir.1997), relied on by the panel majority, does not bar Dr. Yoon's suit for past infringement and does not bar the joinder of Mr. Choi as an involuntary party in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 19. Nor do Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. at 255, 11 S.Ct. at 335, Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 515, 520, 19 L. Ed. 37 (1868), or the other cases cited by the majority. There is no barrier to the involuntary joinder of a joint inventor and/or co-owner under Rule 19, if such is needed to bring before the court all persons deemed necessary to the suit. See also Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 574, 576 (E.D.Pa.1988) ("Rule 19 'makes inappropriate any contention that patent co-owners are per se indispensable in infringement suits' "). Further, Mr. Choi is already before the court as a party, having voluntarily intervened, by general appearance.
Two established exceptions exist. First, when any patent owner has granted an exclusive license, he stands in a relationship of trust to his licensee and must permit the licensee to sue in his name. See Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 469, 46 S. Ct. 166, 169-70, 70 L. Ed. 357 (1926). Second, the obligation may arise by contract among co-owners. If, by agreement, a co-owner waives his right to refuse to join suit, his co-owners may subsequently force him to join in a suit against infringers. See Willingham v. Lawton, 555 F.2d 1340, 1344-45, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249, 252 (6th Cir.1977)
DocketNumber： 97-1269
Citation Numbers： 135 F.3d 1456
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