Source: https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=FEDERAL_REGISTER&p_id=17514&p_text_version=FALSE
Timestamp: 2015-03-29 21:10:37
Document Index: 763607453

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1915', 'art 1910', 'art 1910', 'art 1915', 'art 1910', '§ 1915', 'art 1910', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', 'art 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1910', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment; Proposed Rule - 67:76213-76253
67:76213-76253
1910; 1915.508
Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment; Proposed Rule
[Docket S-051]
SUMMARY: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is proposing fire protection standards for shipyard employment that were developed through a negotiated rulemaking process. This proposed standard is based on the recommendations of the Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee and is a comprehensive standard for the protection of shipyard employment workers from the hazards of fire on land side and on board vessels. The proposed standard reflects new technologies and current national consensus standards. The proposal collects all fire-related safety practices into a single subpart, which will make them more accessible and more easily understood by employers and employees. The standard will provide increased protection of shipyard employment workers from fire hazards.
Hard Copy: Your comments must be submitted (postmarked or sent) by March 11, 2003.
Facsimile and electronic transmission: Your comments must be sent by March 11, 2003. (Please see the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION provided below for additional information on submitting comments.)
ADDRESSES: Regular mail, express delivery, hand-delivery, and messenger service: You must submit three copies of your comments and attachments to the OSHA Docket Office, Docket No. S-051, Room N-2625, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC, 20210. OSHA Docket Office and Department of Labor hours of operation are 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., e.s.t.
Facsimile: If your comments, including any attachments, are 10 pages or fewer, you may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at (202) 693-1648. You must include the docket number of this notice, Docket No. S-051, in your comments.
[Note: In the printed copy of the Federal Register the docket number was incorrectly identified as H-011G. The correct Docket number is S-051.]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information and press inquiries, contact Ms. Bonnie Friedman, OSHA, Office of Information and Consumer Affairs, N-3647, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999. For additional copies of this Federal Register notice, contact OSHA, Office of Publications, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-3101, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC, 20210; telephone (202) 693-1888. Electronic copies of this Federal Register notice, as well as news releases and other relevant documents, are available at OSHA's web page on the Internet at http://www.osha.gov.
You may submit comments in response to this notice by (1) hard copy, or (2) FAX transmission (facsimile), or (3) electronically through the OSHA Webpage. Please note that you cannot attach materials, such as studies or journal articles, to electronic comments. If you have additional materials, you must submit three copies of them to the OSHA Docket Office at the address above. The additional materials must clearly identify your electronic comments by name, date, subject and docket number so we can attach them to your comments. Because of security-related problems there may be a significant delay in the receipt of comments by regular mail. Please contact the OSHA Docket Office at (202)-693-2350 for information about security procedures concerning the delivery of materials by express delivery, hand delivery and messenger service. All comments and submissions will be available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office at the address above. Comments and submissions posted on OSHA's Webpage are available at http://www.osha.gov. OSHA cautions you about submitting personal information such as social security numbers and birth dates. Contact the OSHA Docket Office at (202)-693-2350 for information about materials not available through the OSHA Webpage and for assistance in using the Webpage to locate docket submissions.
This Preamble to the proposed standard is organized into the following sections:
II. The Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee
III. Pertinent Legal Authority
IV. Summary and Explanation of Proposal
V. Summary of the Preliminary Economic and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Screening Analyses
VIII State Plan Standards
Employees in shipyard employment are subject to a high risk of injury and death from fires and explosions during ship repair, shipbuilding, shipbreaking, and related work activities as well as firefighting activities. Many of the basic tasks involved in shipyard employment (also referred to as just "shipyards" hereafter), such as welding, grinding, and cutting metal with torches, provide an ignition source for fires. There are also many combustible sources on vessels and in shipyards, including flammable fuels and cargo on vessels, wood structures, building materials, and litter. When cutting torches are used in enclosed or confined spaces, accidental oxygen-enriched atmospheres can cause normally fire resistant-materials to readily burn. When fires do occur, employees are often working in confined or enclosed spaces that may make escape difficult or impossible, and result in atmospheres of combustible gases, toxic fumes, or oxygen-depleted air.
Shipyard employees are therefore at risk from fires that can result in burns, death, explosions, toxic gases and fumes, and asphyxiation from a lack of oxygen. Based on data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there is an annual average of one fatality, 110 lost-workday "heat/burn" injuries, and more than three times that many total injuries (Ex. 15).
In addition, employees are also at special risk when fighting fires in shipyards. Fighting fires at shoreside facilities in shipyards can be similar to structural firefighting at typical industrial manufacturing facilities. The usual firefighting hazards encountered include compressed gas cylinders, flammable liquid processes and storage, high-voltage electric switches and transformers, and high-density combustible materials storage.
Structures at shipyards can range from single-story office buildings to warehouses to massive fabrication shops. Fires can also be encountered in tunnel sections, rail cars, vessel components, and similar units under construction, repair, or demolition at the shipyard site.
However, firefighting on board vessels can be considerably different from structural firefighting. When traditional structural firefighting techniques are used on vessel fires, the result can be catastrophic. The potential is much greater for serious injury to firefighting personnel when tactics do not reflect the unique nature of ship firefighting. For example, there may be little or no ability to ventilate the heat, smoke, and gases produced by a fire. Typically, in structural firefighting, immediate steps are taken to open up the structure, vertically and horizontally, to remove smoke and heat. Hose lines are then used to attack the fire. When fighting a ship fire, one of the first steps that may be taken is to shut down ventilation systems to close off the fire's progression and starve it of oxygen. Hose lines are used to cool down surrounding metal decks and bulkheads. A defensive fire-fighting option for large or intense structural fires is to "surround and drown'; that is, position hose lines outside the structure and apply voluminous amounts of water until the fire goes out. Strategic options for vessel fires are very limited and nearly always require an aggressive interior attack. Small shipyards have outside fire responders. These municipal or other fire departments may not have much experience in fighting fires in shipyards or, especially, on vessels. Proper coordination, familiarization, and training is necessary to ensure the safety of outside firefighters who respond to shipyard fires.
Vessel fires are also more complicated because, in most cases, outside firefighters seldom have the opportunity to learn the layout of the vessel. Vessels under construction or modification have constantly changing structures. Firefighters, operating under adverse conditions caused by heat and smoke, can easily become disoriented or confused. Access to the vessel may be restricted by its location, such as within a dry dock, meaning that firefighters boarding the ship will have to converge on one or two access locations. This can lead to congestion of personnel and delays in locating and extinguishing the fire. Access can also be restricted by equipment, tools, vessel components, and structures. Staging platforms, scaffolding or rigging, cranes, and even mooring lines can hamper deploying hose lines and positioning apparatus, again causing delays and confusion. Even with unrestricted access to the vessel, deploying hose lines can be time-consuming and labor intensive. To attack a fire deep within a ship, firefighting hoses may have to be stretched hundreds of feet, a task that requires time and a lot of people.
Maintaining an adequate supply of air is another tactical problem for firefighting operations on ships. Firefighters will usually be equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) that optimally provide a 30-minute supply, after which the compressed air bottle will have to be refilled or replaced. Ship fire-fighting operations can last many hours; firefighters have to be rotated frequently to resupply their SCBA and counteract fatigue.
Ships' fires also present a problem firefighters do not often have to think about -- introducing a large amount of water into the vessel, so much so that the vessel can become unstable and possibly capsize or sink. This potential problem requires consultation with experts (such as naval architects or U.S. Coast Guard engineers) to assure vessel stability.
Radio communication is another complicating factor common to fighting ship fires. Steel bulkheads and many compartments in ships effectively block and limit radio signal transmissions. To compensate, firefighters have to relay messages from within the ship by stationing personnel with radios close enough that transmissions can be sent and received. Other alternatives include using runners or deploying hard-wire communications systems. All possible solutions to this problem involve additional personnel, delays in establishing command and control, and increase the potential for mishaps.
Fires in shipyard employment present significant, serious hazards to those who work to control them. These hazards can be found in shipbuilding, as well as in shipbreaking and ship repair. Because firefighters must function on both land side and on board vessels, they need a single set of standards and training to do so safely. Likewise, other shipyard employees move from ship to shore frequently and need a single standard and training on alarms, evacuation, and the many other response actions.
OSHA's general industry standards for fire protection are in subpart L, CFR 1910.155 through 1910.165. The application of subpart L, CFR 1910.155(b), exempts maritime employments from coverage. Subpart L addresses typical land-side fire prevention and firefighting conditions (fire extinguishers, fixed extinguishing systems, etc.). OSHA compliance policy, set out in OSHA Instruction STD.2 addresses typical land-side fire hazards in shipyards. Since the Agency has no specific standards that address the risks of fire on board vessels and vessel sections, OSHA has used the General Duty Clause section 5 (a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to cite fire safety hazards on both land-side facilities and on board vessels and vessel sections (also referred to as just "vessels" hereafter). To enforce the General Duty Clause, OSHA must show the existence of a hazard, that the hazard is recognized, that the hazard is causing, or is likely to cause serious physical harm to employees, and that a feasible means exists to abate the hazard. To demonstrate industry recognition and feasible abatement measures, OSHA has relied upon standards published by the Coast Guard and other branches of the Federal Government to identify hazards and abatement steps as well as guidelines developed by professional associations such as the National Fire Protection Association and the Marine Chemists Association.
The lack of a clear OSHA standard for fire protection on vessels, and the multiplicity of guidelines and standards from other sources that potentially apply to shipyards can result in uncertainty about, and gaps in, the safety requirements for employers in the shipyard industry. The Agency has preliminarily concluded that codifying relevant issues for fire protection in shipyards into a single subpart in CFR part 1915 will substantially clarify an employer's responsibilities in protecting shipyard employees from fire hazards. The Agency believes that this, in turn, will lead to better protection for these employees.
Simply extending application of the current general industry standards to shipyards would not be appropriate. First, most of the provisions in the general industry standards have been in effect since 1980. They would need revision to take into account technological advances that could improve fire protection in shipyard employment. These advances are recognized in the proposed new subpart P. Secondly, shipyard employment encompasses many tasks and worksites that are unique to the maritime industry. Employers, labor representatives and professional and trade associations have repeatedly asked OSHA to allow all shipyard employment to be covered by a single set of standards. They point out that the work situations found within shipyard employment have more in common with each other than with those in general industry, and that the hazards and methods of controlling the hazards are similar throughout the shipyard. Finally, they point out that the work on land and aboard the vessels is located within the same area and performed by the same workforce. Fire protection services are usually provided by the same in-yard plant or out-of-yard fire crews to all areas of shipyard employment. OSHA's Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee for subpart P (hereafter "the Committee") concluded that when fire response crews find shipyard employment sites following the same standard, the crews are more effective in their fire response activities. OSHA agrees and has preliminarily concluded that a single new standard addressing fire hazards for all shipyard employment, on land and on board vessels, is reasonably necessary and appropriate to protect shipyard employees.
The Agency has also preliminarily concluded that there is a significant risk to employees of material impairment from fires, explosions, and fire-related accidents causing death, burns, and injuries related to fire and fighting fires. OSHA further concludes that the proposal's requirements for inspections before beginning hot work, fire watches, fire planning, training, and other provisions will help save lives and prevent injuries. Proposed subpart P will substantially reduce this risk of fire by recognizing and, in some cases, requiring new technology.
OSHA established the Shipyard Employment Standards Advisory Committee (SESAC) in 1990. SESAC was formed to guide OSHA in revising, consolidating, and modernizing the varying sets of rules that were being applied in the shipyard employment industry into what would ultimately become a single comprehensive set of standards for all shipyard employment. The new shipyard employment standards would apply to all shipyard employment, regardless of geographic location. In 1991 SESAC began work on standards on fire protection for all shipyard employment. The SESAC Subcommittee on Fire Protection, after reviewing pertinent federal regulations and guidelines issued by professional associations, drafted a shipyard employment fire protection standard (SESAC, Ex. 9). However, not all of its provisions were written in regulatory language and the provisions did not address all of the issues that need to be considered in an OSHA rulemaking.
The shipyard employment workgroup of the Maritime Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health (MACOSH) briefly discussed fire protection and negotiated rulemaking at its September 1995 meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana. Members urged OSHA to proceed with a fire protection standard, although some members suggested the MACOSH shipyard employment workgroup take up the fire protection issues if OSHA was unable to do a fire protection negotiated rulemaking.
On June 6, 1996, OSHA announced its intent to establish a Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA)(61 FR 28824). The Committee would negotiate issues associated with developing a notice of proposed rulemaking to regulate fire hazards in shipyard employment. The Committee would be made up of representatives of the parties interested in, or affected by, the outcome of the proposed rule. OSHA asked interested parties to submit their nominations for membership or request representation on the Committee. The Agency planned public meetings for the Committee along the United States coastlines in an effort to provide small employers with the access they needed to participate in this rulemaking effort.
Negotiated rulemaking is a process by which a proposed rule is developed through negotiation among a committee composed of representatives of all the interests that will be significantly affected by the rule. Negotiation allows interested parties to discuss possible approaches to various issues and arrive at jointly agreed or acceptable provisions for a standard. The negotiation process involves a mutual education of the parties on the reasons for different positions on the issues as well as on the concerns about the practical impact of various approaches.
The process is started by the Agency's identification of all interests potentially affected by the rulemaking under consideration. To help in this identification process, the Agency publishes a notice in the Federal Register, called "an intent to negotiate," which identifies a preliminary list of interests and requests public comment. Also included in this notice is a statement that the Agency intends to negotiate and develop a proposed rule; a description of the subject and scope of the rule to be developed and the issues to be considered; a proposed agenda and schedule for completing the work of the committee; and even a possible list of persons who may be nominated.
After receiving comment, the Agency chooses an advisory committee of those nominated to represent these various interests. Representation on the committee may be direct, that is, each member represents a specific interest, or indirect, through coalitions of parties formed for this purpose. An Agency representative is a member of the committee, representing the Federal government's own set of interests. The negotiated rulemaking advisory committee is chaired by a mediator, who facilitates the negotiation process.
Once a negotiated rulemaking committee reaches consensus on the provisions of a proposed rule, the Agency, consistent with its legal obligations, uses this as the basis of its proposed standard, which is published in the Federal Register. This provides the required public notice and allows for a public comment period. Other participants and other interested parties retain their rights to comment, participate in an informal hearing (if requested), and Seek judicial review. OSHA anticipates, however, that the pre-proposal consensus reached by the Committee will effectively narrow the number of controversial issues in the subsequent rulemaking.
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (5 U.S.C. 561 et seq.) (NRA) allows OSHA to establish a negotiated rulemaking committee if it is determined that using the negotiated rulemaking procedure is in the public interest. As noted above, OSHA has made this determination for this rulemaking activity. Each committee member participates in resolving the interests and concerns of other members instead of leaving it up to OSHA to bridge different points of view. A key principle of negotiated rulemaking is that agreement is reached by consensus of all the interests. The NRA defines consensus as unanimous concurrence among the interests represented on a negotiated rulemaking committee, unless the committee itself unanimously agrees to use a different definition of consensus.
The Agency determined that the selection criteria listed in the NRA were met, and that there was a need to issue fire protection requirements that would apply to all shipyard employment. Finally, parties representing significant interests requested that OSHA use the negotiated rulemaking process on subpart P and acknowledged the need for a new standard.
The members of the Committee are: Chris Myskowski, U.S. Coast Guard; Paul Jensen, NIOSH; Joseph V. Daddura, Office of Maritime Standards, Occupational Safety and Health Administration; G. F. Hurley, Norfolk Naval Shipyard; Richard Duffy, International Association of Firefighters (AFL-CIO, CLC); E.P. Kaiser , South Tidewater Association of Ship Repairs, Inc.; Guy Colonna, National Fire Protection Association; Russ Sill, Portland Fire Bureau; Alton Glass, United Steel Workers of America (AFL-CIO, CLC), who was later replaced by John Molovich; George Broussard, Bollinger's Shipbuilding and Ship Repair, who was later replaced by Mark Duley, Walker Boat Yard, Inc.; Glenn Harris, Ingalls Shipbuilding; Donald Mozick, Atlantic Marine, who was later replaced by Terry Guidry, Bollinger's Shipbuilding and Ship Repair; Michael Buchet, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, who was later replaced by Joseph Durst; J.D. Paulson, National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., Peter Schmidt, Office of Specialty Compliance Programs, Washington State Department of Labor and Industry.
The first meeting of the Committee was held in Portland, Oregon, on October 15, 16, and 17, 1996, and was open to the public, as were all subsequent meetings. (All minutes and documents from the Committee meetings can be found in Exs. 5-1 through 5-. Minutes were recorded by OSHA staff for the Committee.) During this organizational meeting, the members were charged with their duties and procedural matters were addressed. The members adopted ground rules for the Committee and set forth substantive issues that needed to be resolved. The rulemaking process was explained in depth to the Committee members, so that they would understand their role in the process. SESAC's proposal on fire protection in shipyards was given to the Committee.
Several examples of firefighting were given by members of the Committee and discussions were held after each example, including how small businesses contact outside fire departments for assistance with firefighting. Workgroups were established for the following areas: Fire Watch, Safe Work Practices, Fire Response, and Fire Protection. These workgroups were charged with producing a draft regulatory text and rationale for their parts of the safety standard. These drafts were to include definitions and several options in areas where the members of the workgroup did not agree. The Committee agreed to include sea trials in the scope of this regulation. Also at this meeting, an overview and history of the SESAC Draft Proposed Standard for Fire Protection was presented by a member of SESAC's workgroup. The draft, text, and rationale of SESAC's recommendations were reviewed. As was to become routine at meetings, the Committee and other participants toured nearby shipyards. They were MarCom Inc., Vancouver, Washington (small shipyard); Diversified Marine Incorporated, Portland, Oregon (small shipyard); and Cascade General, Portland, Oregon (large shipyard).
The second Committee meeting was held in Jacksonville, Florida on February 4, 5, and 6, 1997. The Committee discussed several key issues: Should subpart P -- Fire Protection for Shipyard Employment -- apply to all shipyard employment? How will the standard affect out-of-yard/plant firefighters such as those employed by a municipal fire department? What controls and work practices will provide adequate protection for workers? Should OSHA require hot work permits? Should OSHA require training for all firefighters? Should OSHA incorporate U.S. Coast Guard regulations in this standard? Is there any difference in controls and work practices on land-side verses on board vessels and vessel sections? Should OSHA require the employer to secure (deactivate) all firefighting systems on board vessels when they arrive in the yard? Should OSHA require each shipyard to have an in-yard/plant fire brigade? Should OSHA require written fire plans for land side and on board vessels? If so, what provisions need to be included in the plans? Should OSHA include a requirement for de-watering (removal of firefighting water from the vessel) of vessels when fighting a fire on board a vessel? What advances in fire technology have occurred since OSHA's general industry standards were published that should be incorporated into the shipyard employment standard? Should OSHA include technical information in an appendix or appendices? If so, should appendices be mandatory?
The Committee had a lengthy discussion about OSHA's jurisdiction. OSHA has no jurisdiction over municipal firefighters, but states and territories with OSHA-approved State Plans are required to have standards for state, county, and local government entities that are at least as protective as Federal OSHA's.
Small employer representatives included: T.L. James & Company, Houma, Louisiana; Halter Marine, New Orleans, Louisiana; and Alabama Shipyard/Atlantic Marine, Mobile Alabama. A Chicago municipal firefighter also attended. Committee members and the public participants at this meeting took a tour of Atlantic Marine (small shipyard).
A Fire Watch section workgroup met at Charleston, South Carolina, on March 18, 1997. The workgroup was tasked with developing proposals to be presented to the full Committee. Discussions included the Navy's NAVSEA 00907 Fire Prevention and Housekeeping standard of September 13, 1996. The workgroup agreed that NAVSEA 00907 was not applicable to the safety of workers because its focus was on the protection of property. The workgroup also agreed on two proposals to present to the full Committee: That an employee performing hot work should never be his or her own fire watch, and that training requirements should be performance oriented. For example, for training employers could use stand-up tool-box safety meetings or written training documents as a basis for appropriate training sessions. Suggestions for identifying a fire watch included: Stickers on hats, arm bands, and vests. The topic of live-fire training was raised as an issue for the full Committee to consider.
The third public meeting of the Committee was held in Lockport, Louisiana, on April 8, 9, and 10, 1997 (Ex. 5-3). The Committee's workgroups continued working on the issues of scope and application, controls and work practices, fire brigades, written fire plans, technological advances in fire protection, costs of fire protection, and appendices. There were discussions about small employer difficulties and on Coast Guard jurisdiction over vessels during sea trials. Preliminary drafts of proposed changes and preamble language were circulated among committee members for review and comment. At this meeting the Committee decided that issues upon which general agreement could not be reached would be raised for public comment in the proposal's preamble. By doing so, an issue, such as live fire training, would be considered by the public and OSHA and could become part of a final rule. Small employer representatives in attendance were: Walker Boat Yard; Halter Marine; Leevac Shipyard; Boland Marine; and Bollinger Shipyard. The Committee members and other participants toured the Bollinger Lockport facility and two other Bollinger facilities in the area (small shipyards).
The fourth public meeting of the Committee was held in Baltimore, Maryland on July 15, 16, and 17, 1997 (Ex. 5-6). During this meeting the Committee broke out into its workgroups and continued to develop proposed preamble and regulatory text on the issues that were identified in previous meetings. OSHA staff explained the economic feasibility issues that are brought into rulemaking and gave a briefing on "plain language." Carryover discussion items from the previous meeting were OSHA's lack of jurisdiction over civilian guests on board vessels during sea trials, municipal fire departments, and volunteers. The discussions produced several examples of current practices from members of the Committee.
There was a discussion about the hazards of fixed extinguishing systems and members gave examples of current practices. A large West Coast shipyard disconnects the vessel's system because they do not want it to be accidentally activated. A representative from small shipyard on the inland waterways noted that he prefers not to deactivate a vessel's fixed extinguishing system, especially for a short-term repair job. For this type of short-term repair job, the Committee agreed that there are two options: Disconnect the entire system or train employees. Some members indicated that on some manned Navy vessels, deactivating the fixed extinguishing system is not an option. It was also noted that, on U.S. flag vessels the U.S. Coast Guard requires a time delay on fixed systems to allow employees to evacuate before the extinguishing agent is released or automatic locking doors are activated. There was an incident in Spain where a small fire on board a vessel was under control locally when another employee pulled the fixed fire system, causing fatalities. A presentation was given on a fire aboard the Melvin H. Baker II, which occurred during a hot work operation and caused a fatality.
There was also a discussion of how a fire watch can alert others before he or she exits the dangerous areas, which fire watch duties should be included in safe work practices, and the important role of the fire watch in preventing fires and loss of life. A workgroup was established to work on the definitions section of the standard. Small employers were represented by: Bollingers Shipyard, Lockport, Louisiana, and the National Shipbuilders Association, Arlington, Virginia.
The fifth meeting of the Committee was held in Paducah, Kentucky, on October 7, 8, and 9, 1997 (Ex. 5-4). At the request of the Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA), OSHA staff held a preliminary meeting on October 6. This meeting was open to the public and SCA invited small employers to be present. OSHA staff made presentations on the negotiated rulemaking process, OSHA's standards writing process, and the intent of the proposed Fire Protection standard. The OSHA Project Attorney reviewed the ground rules for negotiated rulemaking procedures, and answered more specific questions that the Committee had raised, such as regulating small businesses. Some workgroups presented their draft documents for discussion and approval by the full Committee. Those documents that were approved by the Committee were delivered to OSHA for further action. Some of the other topics of discussion were: Sliding/rolling fire doors, inadvertent activation of a ship's CO2 system, and live fire training. Small employer representatives in attendance were: Bollinger's Shipyard, Lockport, Louisiana; James Marine, Inc., Paducah, Kentucky; Cascade General, Inc., Portland, Oregon; Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Houston, Texas; Missouri Dry Dock, Cape Girardeau, Missouri; Mid South Towing, Metropolis, Illinois; Sea River Maritime; and American Commercial Marine Service Co. Unions representatives were present from Firefighter Local 168, Paducah, Kentucky and IBEW Local 733, Pascagoula, Mississippi. Committee members and the public participants toured two small shipyards, Walker Boatyard and James Marine, Inc., Paducah, Kentucky.
The sixth public meeting of the Committee was held in San Diego, California, on February 24, 25, and 26, 1998 (Ex. 5-5). Discussions at this meeting included the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), the general industry (29 CFR part 1910) regulations that apply to landside operations, and live fire training for fire watches. During this meeting, the Committee approved the regulatory text on hot work. Small employer representatives at this meeting included: Bollinger's Shipyard, Louisiana; Walker Boat Yard, Kentucky; Sea River Maritime; and South Tidewater Association of Ship Repairers (STASR), Hampton Roads, Virginia. The Committee member representing STASR noted that the negotiated rulemaking issues and products are shared by the member with 121 STASR members, who are mostly small employers. Committee members and the public participants at this meeting took a tour of the NASSCO and the NAVAL shipyards.
The seventh meeting of the Committee was held in Linthicum, Maryland on June 15, 16, and 17, 1998 (Ex. 5-9). The Committee decided that since MACOSH has supported the Committee and intends to review its products, the Committee's recommendation for a proposed standard will be made available to them. A lengthy discussion was held on shipboard fixed fire protection systems, during which the Committee members learned that only CO2 systems have caused fatalities. This led to further discussion about whether or not an employer would rely on a vessel's fixed system as the primary source of fire protection., and prompted a page-by-page review of the fire response section. Topics discussed included the term "qualified instructor," personal protective equipment, hose testing, and how long records must be kept.
During the second day of this meeting, the Acting Director of OSHA's Office of Regulatory Analysis presented an overview of what requirements OSHA's economic analysis must meet. A representative from the Small Business Administration (SBA), Office of Advocacy also answered questions from the Committee and public on issues related to small businesses. After a review, the Committee voted to accept the preamble of shipboard fixed systems. The Committee further agreed to not bring sections of 29 CFR part 1910 over into 29 CFR part 1915 for land-side fixed systems, because members prefer that fire extinguishers, stand pipes, or sprinklers conform to NFPA 10, Standard for Portable fire Extinguishers, 1998 Edition (Ex. 20-1) rather than the older OSHA general industry standards for this type of equipment.
The issue of records retention was reviewed. It was agreed that the proposal will state that records must be kept and made available for one year; however, an issue will be raised on one year versus three years retention. Large shipyards typically keep their records indefinitely, but in the opinion of several of their representatives, they would rather not be told how long records must be kept.
Small employer representatives at this meeting included: Bollinger's Shipyard, Louisiana; Walker Boat Yard, Kentucky; and South Tidewater Association of Ship Repairers, Hampton Roads, Virginia. A representative from National Shipbuilders Association, Arlington, Virginia, also attended.
The eighth meeting of the Committee was held in Biloxi, Mississippi, on September 9, 10, and 11, 1998 (Ex. 5-7). Topics of discussion included the progress that the definitions workgroup was making and the outreach programs previously completed. The public was polled about their expectations from this negotiated rulemaking on fire protection. Other discussions were held on what to do with burning torches, what the extent of the standard was, where fire watches are not needed, and how to ensure that the 29 CFR part 1910 requirements are updated and that they cover the same work as subpart P.
The following list of issues was distributed and discussed by the Committee: Can a fire response count as a drill? Is the inspection required in the proposal's section 504(a) and (b) already covered in 1915.14, or does the proposal mandate that all areas -- other than those that require a Marine Chemist or Shipyard Competent Person's inspection -- be inspected before hot work? In section 505, Fire Response, should OSHA require proximity firefighting protective clothing for all yards and fire departments? Should an employee have the right to stop work if the employee felt he or she was placed in a dangerous situation? Does the committee want to require the employer to instruct on-site contractors on their fire plans? What is an "authorized area?" Is a welding shop, sheet metal shop, fabricating shop, or subassembly area to be considered an authorized area? If so, does the Committee want the employer to post signs to notify employees? How does the employer determine the authorized area? Is it the Committee's understanding that the employer is to survey his shipyard to determine and label all working areas? How is the issue of municipal fire departments' response to shipyard fires to be explained in the preamble? How can the Committee ensure that the public understands that this standard does not apply to state, county, or municipal fire departments?
Other issues discussed included: Proximity suits; a model training program for fire watches; employee participation; fire watch training; the requirements of subpart B, Confined and Enclosed Spaces and Other Dangerous Atmospheres in Shipyard Employment, that could apply in the hot work section; training requirements for all shipyard employees versus training only fire watches; liaisons between shipyards and outside fire responders; and the proposed requirement that all fire hoses used by the employer being labeled, tested, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 1962-1998 Standard for the Care, Use, and Service Testing of Fire Hose Including Couplings and Nozzles, 1998 Edition (Ex. 20-2). The Committee agreed on the regulatory text of proposed § § 1915.505 and 1915.506.
A small shipyard representative requested that OSHA have an extended compliance date for employers with 250 or fewer employees. Shipyards with more than 250 employees typically have a full-time designated safety and health professional, based on the experience of the National Shipbuilders Association. A labor representative opposed the request for a delay in implementation for small employers. It was suggested that OSHA review the issue for its proposal.
Small employers were represented at this meeting by Bollinger Machine Shop & Shipyard, Inc., Louisiana; Walker Boat Yard, Kentucky, South Tidewater Association of Ship Repairers, Hampton Roads, Virginia; National Shipbuilders Association, Arlington, Virginia; First Wave Marine, Houston, Texas; Bender Shipbuilding, Mobile, AL; and Omega Shipyard, Moss Point, Mississippi.
The ninth meeting of the Committee was held in Houston, Texas, on February 5-7, 2002 (Ex. 5-8 ). OSHA staff incorporated the agreed upon changes made during this meeting into the Committee's working document. A motion was made for a full Committee vote on the document. The Committee unanimously approved, agreeing on all the issues and topics. A reworked package of the regulatory text including section number changes with training in its own section was mailed to the Committee March 2002.
Small employers were represented at this meeting by Bollinger Machine Shop & Shipyard, Inc., Louisiana and Texas; Walker Boat Yard, Kentucky; South Tidewater Association of Ship Repairers, Hampton Roads, Virginia; National Shipbuilders Council, Washington, D.C.; First Wave Marine, Houston, Texas; Trinity Marine Products; Moon Engineering, Co., Portsmouth, Virginia; and Atlantic Marine/Alabama Shipyard.
Informal meeting minutes were provided by OSHA staff for all meetings. These minutes were approved by the Committee and included in OSHA's Docket S-051 (Ex. 5). The Agency has taken the Committee's recommendations for a proposal for fire protection in shipyard employment and editorially revised them into the proposed standard that follows this preamble.
The purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq. ("the Act") is to "assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources' (29 U.S.C. 651(b)). To achieve this goal, Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to issue and enforce occupational safety and health standards. (See 29 U.S.C. 655(a) (authorizing summary adoption of existing consensus and federal standards within two years of the Act's enactment), 655(b) (authorizing promulgation of standards pursuant to notice and comment), 654(b) (requiring employers to comply with OSHA standards).) A safety or health standard is a standard "which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment or places of employment." 29 U.S.C. 652(8).
A standard is reasonably necessary or appropriate within the meaning of section 652(8) if it substantially reduces or eliminates significant risk; is economically feasible; technologically feasible; cost effective; is consistent with prior Agency action or is a justified departure; is supported by substantial evidence; and is better able to effectuate the Act's purposes than any national consensus standard it supersedes. See 58 FR 16612-16616 (March 30, 1993).
A standard is technologically feasible if the protective measures it requires already exist, can be brought into existence with available technology, or can be created with technology that can reasonably be expected to be developed. American Textile Mfrs. Institute v. OSHA 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) ("ATMI"), American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir 1991) ("AISI").
A standard is economically feasible if industry can absorb or pass on the cost of compliance without threatening its long term profitability or competitive structure. See ATMI, 452 U.S. at 530 n. 55; AISI, 939 F.2d at 980. A standard is cost effective if the protective measures it requires are the least costly of the available alternatives that achieve the same level of protection. ATMI, 453 U.S. at 514 n. 32; International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("LOTO II").
Section 6(b)(7) authorizes OSHA to include among a standard's requirements labeling, monitoring, medical testing and other information gathering and transmittal provisions. 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(7).
All standards must be highly protective. See 58 FR 16614-16615; LOTO II, 37 F.3d at 668. Finally, whenever practical, standards shall "be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired." Id.
IV. Summary and Explanation of Proposal Rule
Section 1915.501 General Provisions
In paragraph (a), OSHA states that the purpose of this standard is to require employers to protect all employees from fire hazards in shipyard employment, including employees engaged in fire response activities.
Paragraph (b) describes the scope of the proposal, which is all shipyard employment work, including work on vessels and vessel sections and land-side operations, regardless of geographic location. The scope of this subpart is consistent with that in the maritime standards' subpart B Confined and Enclosed Spaces and Other Dangerous Atmospheres in Shipyard Employment and subpart I Personal Protective Equipment for Shipyard Employment. Fire response provided by the employer's workers, whether they be part of a fire brigade, shipyard fire department, or simply designated by the employer, is within the scope of this standard. There are several reasons for including all shipyard employment in the scope of this standard: (1) The requirements are tailored to the unique risks in shipyard employment; (2) subpart P will provide a single source of standards for fire protection that will be easier for training and to understand than multiple sources or sets of rules; (3) a comprehensive standard, referencing part 1910 where necessary, will be applicable throughout shipyard employment addressing hazards associated with fire watch situations, ship fire suppression systems, fire response procedures and landside fire operations.
OSHA has preliminarily concluded, and the Committee agrees, that a comprehensive standard applying to all shipyard employment operations will be highly protective of shipyard employment workers working on vessels, vessel sections, or landside operations and offer the best protection against fire hazards.
Shipyard employment can consist of shipbuilding, ship conversion, ship repairing or shipbreaking, and related employments. Shipyards may be dedicated to one type of work, such as new ship construction, or a shipyard may perform any or all types of shipyard work. The construction of a new vessel may be a single project or may involve separate fabrication of key components which are then joined together. Vessel sections may be fabricated on land within the shipyard, or may be built in specialty facilities inland of the shipyard and then transported to the yard. The scope must have broad coverage because shipyard employers increasingly engage in non-traditional shipyard employment such as steel fabrication of products not directly related to ships. This could include work such as construction of railroad cars, bridges, tunnel sections, smoke stacks, and boilers. It could also include operations performed during the final outfitting of vessels under construction or repair. Examples of such operations include technical support from the providers of shipboard electronic equipment as well as suppliers of internal furnishings. It does not include shoreside support services, such as those provided by vending equipment and mail delivery companies. The Agency is also proposing that any fire brigade, shipyard fire department, contracted outside fire response organization, or federal fire response organization be covered by this subpart if the responder is located at or responds to shipyard employment facilities. OSHA recognizes that a number of small employers perform vessel repair in non-traditional shipyards and intends to cover them.
Ship repair work could involve replacing damaged hull sections, outdated systems or components, or modifying a vessel to increase its capacity or change its designed purpose.
Shipbreaking could consist of the partial removal of vessel components or it could be the complete dismantling of a vessel (also known as "scrapping") for the salvage value of its parts.
Shipyard employment can also consist of support operations necessary for vessel construction and repair. Metal fabrication, machine shops, electrical and paint shops are typical facilities that can be found within a shipyard. Many vessel sections and vessel components are built in these shops more easily than they can be built on board a vessel. The materials are the same and often the hazards encountered are similar.
Shipyard employment also occurs on vessels and vessel sections within the navigable waters of the United States. The provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq., only applied to shipyards. Under the OSH Act, jurisdiction was extended to include workers wherever they were working.(1)
OSHA has included the phrase "regardless of geographic location" in the scope so that protection is afforded employees wherever they work: On vessels, vessel sections, land side, or any other location they are sent to by their employers. This has been Agency policy on shipyard employment and is in the scope of both subparts B and I.
The Committee also urged OSHA to cover work in the traditional shipyard and dock as well as on vessels during sea trials or at anchor. At the Portland, Oregon, meeting, the Committee noted that most ships on sea trials are still under construction with shipyard workers on board. At the Baltimore, Maryland, meeting, Committee members reviewed OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20, "OSHA/U.S. Coast Guard Authority Over Vessels," dated November 8, 1996. Particular attention was given to paragraph I which delineated geographical considerations for enforcement over all vessels. The CPL states that "OSHA only has authority over vessels when they are operating within the limits of State territorial waters." It goes on to define those waters as extending three nautical miles seaward from the coast line of coastal States, "except for the Gulf Coast of Florida, Texas and Puerto Rico where the territorial waters extend for 3 marine leagues (approximately 9 nautical miles)."
The Committee concluded that the fire hazard exposure to workers is significant, whether a vessel or part is being constructed, repaired, or broken up and whether it is in the shipyard or dockside, at anchor, or underway for testing. Therefore, the requirements proposed in this subpart would apply broadly, including vessels underway within OSHA's jurisdictional boundaries, or at anchor, dockside, in dry dock, or on land.
In paragraph (c) of § 1915.501, OSHA seeks to encourage employee participation in shipyard safety and health program activities. OSHA proposes that the employer must provide ways for employees and employee representatives to participate in developing and periodically reviewing programs and policies adopted to comply with this standard. At the September 10, 1998, meeting held in Biloxi, Mississippi, the Committee recommended regulatory text regarding employee participation and involvement. The Committee saw this as a crucial component of the proposed standard and OSHA agrees. This proposal is consistent with the Department of Labor's policy to involve employees in decision-making processes affecting safety and health at their worksites.
Paragraph (d) of the proposed fire protection rule sets minimum requirements for exchanging information and coordinating responsibilities for fire protection among host and contract employers. These requirements are fundamental to any effective fire safety program on a multi-employer worksite.
A multi-employer workplace is defined for the purposes of this rule as a workplace where there is a host employer and at least one contract employer. This proposed requirement is necessary because the existence of additional employers and their employees at a workplace makes addressing safety and health conditions at the workplace more complex. For example, at a multi-employer worksite, one employer may introduce hazards into the workplace that employees of other employers may not know about. All employers need information about hazards present at the worksite to enable them to fulfill their obligations to protect workers. For these reasons, communication and coordination among employers are essential.
Failure to communicate about hazards between employers and their employees can be tragic. For example, the 1989 explosion at a Phillips 66 chemical complex in Houston, which killed 23 people and injured more than 100 workers, resulted largely from the failure to coordinate safety and health activities on a multi-employer worksite. A Department of Labor/OSHA 1990 report to the President concerning this catastrophe concluded:
The catastrophe at the Phillips Complex not only emphasized the need for effective implementation of good safety management systems in the petrochemical industry but also raised questions about diffused responsibility for employee safety at worksites where one or more contractors are engaged in work for a company. OSHA had addressed this issue at construction sites, but not at petrochemical plants like the Phillips Complex, where a contractor was regularly employed to perform key maintenance operations and was directly involved in the October 1989 disaster (Ex. 10-5).
Events like the Phillips explosion and the increased reliance on using contractors throughout the shipyard industry have led OSHA to conclude that responsibility for fire safety must be specifically assigned to all employers, who must then be held accountable for discharging those responsibilities.
The need for and benefits of coordinating activities and exchanging information on multi-employer worksites are widely recognized, and requirements such as those being proposed here have been implemented in many workplaces throughout general industry, construction, and maritime industries. For example, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (now the American Chemistry Council) and the American Petroleum Institute state that improved occupational safety and health performance is one benefit that occurs when owners and contractors work together to enhance the management of contractor-related safety and health programs. Similarly, the National Safety Council has observed that "a strong partnership between [host and contract employers] can reduce or eliminate risks, injury, and illnesses; help control health and insurance costs; and improve employee production and morale." In the shipyard industry it is common practice to hire contractors for nonroutine or specialized work situations. For example, painters, joiners, carpenters and scaffolding contractors are routinely used in shipyard employment.
The requirement for host and contract employer coordination and for the exchange of information about safety and health conditions on multi-employer worksites is consistent with Congress' desire that employees be informed of the hazards to which they are exposed. (Sections 6(b)(7) and 8(c)(1) of the OSH Act.) Employees can only be informed of the hazards to which they are exposed if information about such hazards is communicated among employers on multi-employer worksites. Such an exchange of information is also necessary to make sure that all hazards in the workplace are identified and that the responsibility for controlling them and protecting employees can be appropriately allocated among all employers on the site.
Under the proposal host employers must inform all employers at the work site about the contents of the host's fire safety plan -- including hazards, controls, and emergency procedures -- and assign any appropriate responsibilities for fire safety to other employers. The Committee is in agreement with this approach to multi-employer worksites (Ex. 5-8). The employer representatives on the Committee felt that the shipyard should not be responsible for training contractors.
In § 1915.509 Definitions, the host employer is defined as an employer who is in charge of coordinating work or hiring other employers to perform work at a multi-employer worksite. Proposed § 1915.501(d)(1) establishes the responsibilities of host employers. First, host employers must make sure that information about fire hazards, controls, safety and health rules, and emergency procedures is given to all the contract employers. The information includes whatever a contract employer must have to carry out his or her own duties as an employer under this rule. Contract employers need to inform employees of the fire hazards to which they are exposed at that worksite, the controls in place to reduce or eliminate those fire hazards, the safety and health procedures to be followed, and the steps to be taken in a fire emergency. Second, host employers must ensure appropriate fire safety and health responsibilities are assigned to contract employers at the worksite.
Contract employers must know about other hazards related to fire their employees may encounter at the workplace. Such knowledge allows contract employers to effectively plan and safely carry out their work and understand procedures, such as what to do when a fire alarm is sounded to evacuate a vessel. This information lessens the likelihood that accidents will occur. A host employer's workplace may have fire hazards of many kinds: toxic chemical, flammable or combustible liquids or dusts, electrical hazards, fall hazards, pressurized systems, confined spaces, and many more. Under this standard host employers must inform contract employers of the hazards related to fire they are likely to encounter to enable them, in turn, to protect their employees.
The Committee recognized that in the event of a fire emergency, contract employers must be able to take appropriate actions to protect their employees. Therefore, OSHA requires the host employer to make sure that all appropriate information about fire safety and evacuation procedures is conveyed to all contract employers working in shipyard employment.
OSHA is also requiring in paragraph (d)(1)(ii) that the host employer make sure that fire protection responsibilities are specifically assigned to the various employers working at a multi-employer worksite. The host employer must make sure that fire safety and health responsibilities are assigned as appropriate to other employers at the worksite. Some of these responsibilities include fire hazard abatement, informing employees of fire hazards before exposure, and stopping work because of an imminent danger situation. A host employer might assign a contract employer the responsibility of preventing employees (other than the contract employer's employees) from being exposed to a hazard generated by the contract employer. For example, the host employer might require the contract employer to control the area around a painter to ensure that hot work is not permitted while painting is in progress. More generally, the host employer must, in conjunction with the contract employers, decide who is to train employees and control which hazards. The need to coordinate across organizational lines on a multi-employer worksite makes the clear assignment of responsibilities across those lines essential to achieve the overall goal of reducing employee exposure to potential fire hazards.
The proposed definition of "contract employer" in § 1915.509 Definitions is an employer who performs work under contract for a host employer or to another employer under contract to the host employer at the worksite. This definition specifically excludes employers who provide incidental services that do not influence shipyard employment (such as mail delivery or office supply services). The Agency recognizes that many vendors who work under contract to host employers do not engage in work that exposes their employees to the job-related hazards present at the site and do not themselves introduce new hazards to the site. This definition also makes sure, however, that contract employees engaged in work operations that do place them at risk, such as temporary labor (e.g.. tank cleaners), blasting, and paint contractors are protected by the proposed provisions regarding multi-employer worksites.
As noted in this discussion, OSHA has provided additional definitions of "host employer" and "contractor employer" in order to help clarify multi-employer worksite provisions. In other places, the term "employer," which is already defined in 29 CFR part 1915, is used to describe duties that are generally the host employer's as the employer with control of the overall worksite. We believe the intent of this approach is clear. The host employer has overall responsibility for fire protection at the worksite. However, in order to have effective fire protection, all employees on the site need to be aware of the hazards and the procedures established to deal with fires, regardless of who employs them. And all of the hazards on the site need to be identified and controlled, regardless of which employer has introduced the hazard to the workplace. Thus the provisions of the standard anticipate that an exchange of information will be required to ensure that fire protection is handled in a comprehensive and effective manner, and any necessary coordination of activities will occur. The Agency invites input on these terms and the way they are used in the proposed rule. Is it clear which employer is responsible in all of the proposed provisions? Is there another way to define or clarify which employer has responsibility for implementing the requirements?
The Agency is considering dropping the phrase "safety and health rules," in paragraph (d)(i) that refers to the contents of the fire safety plan and dropping the phrase "safety and health" in reference to contract employers' responsibilities for fire protection activities in paragraph (d)(ii). The Agency has concluded that the reference to "health" or "safety and health" rules or responsibilities is confusing and vague in the fire safety proposal and that the scope of issues should be confined to fire safety.
Paragraph (d)(2) of § 1915.501, sets forth the proposed responsibilities for contract employer's. The contract employer must inform the host employer of any fire hazards that could be created by the work being performed by his or her employees, and what steps the contract employer must take to address those hazards. In addition, OSHA proposes that any hazards that were not identified by the host employer, but were identified by the contract employer, must be shared with the host employer. Proposed paragraph (d)(2)(i) requires contract employers to make sure that the host employer is aware of the fire related hazards presented by the contract employer's work and how the contract employer is addressing them. The work performed by contract employers is commonly beyond the knowledge and expertise of the host employer and typically is not a part of the host employer's routine work. Contract employers are often hired precisely because they have special expertise. They offer a wide range of services, such as equipment repair and maintenance, blasting, painting, atmospheric testing of spaces, tank cleaning, and selected scaffold erection. Consequently, their work can present a set of hazards that are unfamiliar to the host employer. For these reasons, OSHA believes that the proposed rule must include minimum requirements for contract employers on multi-employer workplaces to report fire hazards to host employers. Proposed paragraph (d)(2)(ii) requires that contract employers advise host employers of any fire hazards unidentified by the host employer. In the course of his or her work, the contract employer may create or uncover fire hazards. The host employer must be made aware of all of the hazards, regardless of who created them, to enable him or her to coordinate the management of safety and health at a given multi-employer worksite.
Section 1915.502 Fire Safety Plan
The requirements for fire safety plans contained in this section were developed by the Committee based upon their combined professional experience and current industry practices. OSHA concurs with these recommendations. OSHA does not have any requirements for fire safety plans in its current standards.
The Committee recommended a program that would establish the location, type, and capacity of firefighting equipment such as extinguishers, fire hose and stand pipes, smoke detectors, automatic sprinklers, and other fixed firefighting systems in accordance with applicable fire codes. The plan must provide for the routine inspection, maintenance, and replacement of this equipment and mandate training for new workers and refresher training for all shipyard employment workers. Routine fire prevention inspections would be conducted by knowledgeable personnel with authority to correct deficiencies. The program would establish: Effective fire prevention measures for control of flammable and non-flammable compressed gases; identification and the control of ignition sources; the control of combustible materials; welding and hot work procedures and designated locations covering all operations (in addition to locations where hot work is authorized); and designated emergency evacuation routes and procedures.
The Committee felt that such a plan must be written. A written plan would enable employers and employees to See how the employer intends to protect workers; enable employers to readily exchange information; provide continuity of procedures; and would provide a practical means of communication to fire response organizations. Updating the plan to reflect changing fire control technology or changing the plan to reflect different fire hazards in different work situations is readily accomplished with a written plan. The Committee rejected the notion of verbal exchange as the equivalent of an established written fire safety plan.
In paragraph (a) of § 1915.502, OSHA proposes that the employer develop and implement a written fire safety plan that covers all the actions that employers and employees must take to ensure employee safety in the event of a fire. OSHA is also proposing to include a note to the paragraph referring readers to a model fire safety plan that is included as Appendix A, a non-mandatory appendix to this subpart.
Appendix A contains a suggested outline for a model fire safety plan that employers could follow. Members of the small business community who participated in Committee negotiations strongly recommended that OSHA offer guidance for developing a fire safety plan. The purpose of the proposed appendix is to give guidance to any employers who may not have the expertise available to develop their own plan. If an employer chooses to use the model plan for a specific worksite, following the outline and addressing particular conditions at his or her specific worksite would meet the minimum requirements of this section.
In paragraph (b) of § 1915.502, OSHA sets forth the elements that the employer must include in the fire safety plan. They are: The identification of significant potential fire risks; procedures for recognizing and reporting unsafe conditions; alarm procedures; procedures for notifying employees of a fire emergency; procedures for notifying fire response organizations of a fire emergency; procedures for evacuation; procedures to account for all employees after an evacuation; and the names, job titles, or departments for individuals who can be contacted for further information about the plan. The Committee identified these elements as essential components that every effective plan must have. The Committee was particularly anxious for the alarm procedures to address the distinctive signaling devices and how they will be used to alert employers of fire and evacuation in a particular shipyard. The Committee and OSHA recognized that each shipyard may have its own unique alarm systems (e.g.., steam whistles, intercom, bells).
In paragraph (c) of § 1915.502, OSHA proposes that the employer must review the fire safety plan with each affected employee within 90 days of the effective date of this standard for employees who are currently working; upon initial assignment for new employees; and whenever the actions the employee must take under the plan change because of a change in duties or a change in the plan.
Paragraph (d) of § 1915.502 reflects the recommendations of the Committee. Consistent with that, OSHA proposes that the employer must also keep the plan readily accessible for review by employees, their representatives, and OSHA; review and update the plan whenever necessary but at least annually; certify in writing that each affected employee has been informed of the plan; and give a copy of the plan to any outside fire response organization that the employer expects to respond to fires at a worksite, regardless of geographic location. These requirements are necessary in order for the plan to be effective in protecting employees.
In paragraph (e) of § 1915.502, OSHA proposes as additional responsibilities for contract employers, compliance with the host employer's fire safety program. At any given time, because of the nature of the work, there may be many employers within one particular shipyard. The additional employers and employees cause an increase in safety and health hazards in the worksite. OSHA's intent with this paragraph is that all employers take responsible actions to reduce these hazards when possible, and to alert other employers when hazards exists. Recognition of hazards and response to emergencies in a safe manner requires all employers on the site to follow the host employer's fire safety plan.
Section 1915.503 Precautions for Hot Work
The purpose of this section is to reduce the potential of fire hazards and to reduce the frequency and severity of any fires resulting from hot work. Three elements are normally present for a fire to occur: an ignition source, oxygen, and a fuel source. If one element is removed, then a fire will not occur. The proposed requirements in this paragraph are intended to prevent the combination of these three elements from occurring at the same time.
The Committee's proposal focused on reducing the hazards associated with both the fuel sources as well as the ignition sources for fires. The Committee advocated removing any fuel source from the area where hot work was to be performed. If that is not possible, then isolating the fuels, using protection (shielding), or posting a fire watch can be used to comply with the provision. These requirements reflect current industry practices and the requirements associated with § 1915.14 for flammable and combustible materials within confined and enclosed spaces and other dangerous atmospheres. The Committee also identified other materials that may be present that have properties that may increase the hazards associated with a fire, such as oxidizers and water reactive chemicals. The Committee's proposal would require the employer to perform a hazard assessment as part of the decision-making process in authorizing hot work. The Committee concluded that fires resulting from hot work can be prevented through an authorization procedure and proper inspection of the worksite before hot work. This would involve identifying fire hazards and implementing appropriate control measures that include removing hazards, inerting spaces, shielding combustibles, or posting fire watches. The Committee believed this would be an innovative approach that protects shipyard workers from fire hazards while reflecting the best practices of the industry.
Following the Committee's recommendations, OSHA proposes that the requirements of this standard apply to all hot work operations in shipyard employment except those covered in subpart B of this part. The purpose of OSHA's proposed requirement is to make sure that the employer identifies all fire hazards in a hot work area. This section is also based upon requirements adapted from the existing § 1915.52 Fire Prevention, § 1910.252 Welding, Cutting and Brazing, and from an industry consensus standard, NFPA 51B-1998, Standard for Fire Prevention in Use of Cutting and Welding Processes (Ex. 20-3).
In paragraph (a)(1) of § 1915.503, OSHA is proposing that the employer, in designating areas for hot work, must determine that such areas do not contain potential fire hazards. The Committee recognized that there are areas within the shipyard that may not require an inspection before each hot work operation. These areas may, in fact, be designed for hot work. They include fabricating shops, sub-assembly areas, and welding and burning areas within shops, such as pipe, boiler, and sheet metal shops. These areas are examples of what the Committee considered to be "Designated Areas" along with certain areas on board vessels and vessel sections. In "designated areas" the hot work operations are regular and continuous as opposed to incidental operations occurring throughout the yard. Nonetheless, such areas must be initially inspected to establish them as "designated areas" and then maintained as such, as proposed in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
The requirement for authorization of hot work in nondesignated areas is addressed in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. In paragraph (a)(2)(i) of § 1915.503, OSHA proposes that before authorizing hot work in non-designated area, the employer must visually inspect the area where hot work is to be performed, including adjacent spaces, to identify potential fire hazards, unless a Marine Chemist's certificate or shipyard Competent Person's log is used for the authorization. The Committee recommended that this section include any area not covered by subpart B of this part. As mentioned earlier, OSHA is not addressing hot work in areas covered by subpart B Confined and Enclosed Spaces and Other Dangerous Atmospheres in Shipyard Employment. This subpart already covers the hazards of performing hot work in these areas. Addressing them again in this subpart would be duplicative. OSHA believes that by requiring authorization before hot work in the non-designated areas, the employer will pre-plan the operation and thereby identify and control the hazards associated with hot work.
OSHA notes that although Marine Chemists and Shipyard Competent Persons have specific functions to perform under subpart B, this paragraph recognizes that the employer may also use them to assess and inspect both designated and nondesignated hot-work areas for potential fire hazards.
The Committee considered whether the authorization of hot work issued by the employer should be in a written form or whether a verbal authorization would give equivalent safety. Currently all shipyards handling repair or overhaul-type U.S. Navy contracts have written authorization procedures because Navy work requires authorization (hot work permits) as a standard item. On the other hand, shipyards that do not handle Navy contracts allow employees to perform hot work following either verbal or written authorizations. The Committee decided that shipyard employers should have the flexibility to decide what type of authorization is best suited for their hot-work operations. For example, in many cases associated with new construction, hot work is done with an authorization specifying that no special precautions are required and no written authorization (permit) is issued. The intent here is to enable the employer to perform the steps and to assess the hazard each time before authorizing the hot work, but not necessarily introduce the specification that requires a formal written permit. Therefore, in this paragraph OSHA does not specify what form of authorization must be issued.
In paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of § 1915.503, OSHA proposes that the employer be allowed to authorize employees to do hot work only in areas that have been visually inspected and found to be free of fire hazards or in inspected areas where fire hazards are controlled by physical isolation, fire watches, or other positive means such as inerting.
In developing the proposed language above, the Committee discussed under what circumstances the employer may authorize hot work on board vessels and vessel sections. Everyone on the Committee agreed that decisions about authorizing hot work on board vessels and vessel sections must be based on the inspection. When the inspection shows that there are no uncontrolled combustible or flammable materials in the area, then authorization for hot work is appropriate. The Committee also recognized that most of the mid-to large-size yards pre-outfit ship sections with electrical cables and fixtures, insulation, and other combustible materials requiring the employer to decide for each section what type of fire protection should be provided when hot work is to be done.
The likelihood of the hot work areas containing combustible materials during ship repair is greater than in shipbuilding. During ship repair, as in other work the employer must control the fire hazards prior to authorizing the hot work. Control, as required in paragraph (a)(2)(ii), can be by physical isolation, posting fire watches, or other positive means. For example, an employer can achieve physical isolation of combustibles by simply moving them to an area at least 35 feet away from the hot work (see definition of "physical isolation"). The Committee discussed the 35-foot vertical and horizontal distance and found it to be consistent with current industry practice. Where combustibles can not be moved or otherwise physically isolated, the employer can post a fire watch to control the fire hazard. Additionally, when flammable atmospheres are found adjacent to the hot work area, the employer can control the fire hazard by inerting the adjacent space with a non-reactive substance that will not support combustion. For further information on controlling spaces (flammable atmospheres) adjacent to where hot work is being performed, See subpart B of this part. Members of the public and shipyard representatives on the Committee commented during negotiations that the individual performing the hot work is usually expected to conduct his or her own final visual survey of the hot work area to make sure that conditions are safe for hot work. This is a common practice whether identified on a written permit or as part of the verbal authorization/assignment to the work. If the survey discovers unsafe conditions (e.g.., appreciable combustibles in an area, leaking lines of combustible liquids -- hydraulic fluid, oil), then the worker will not initiate the work and will contact the individual authorizing the work for further instruction. It is also expected that work would not start until the situation was corrected. As explained by a Committee member, the employer is ultimately responsible for making sure that areas are inspected before hot work and that safe conditions are maintained throughout the hot work area. This may be done by requiring frequent inspection, training, or warning signs even when the employer has delegated the responsibilities for the inspections. OSHA has not proposed to require the hot worker to conduct a survey as the Agency believes the employer has the responsibility for determining if the area is safe. An employer may, of course, have such a survey as part of his or her work practices.
While subpart B has a requirement that a record be prepared by the Marine Chemist, Coast Guard Authorized Person, or Shipyard Competent Person allowing the hot work to be authorized as defined by § 1915.14, not all hot work areas need to be certified by a Marine Chemist or inspected by a Coast Guard Authorized Person or Shipyard Competent Person before the employer's authorization for hot work to begin. The employer may assign the authorization responsibility to other individuals who are knowledgeable in the hazards associated with hot work.
In paragraph (b) of § 1915.503, OSHA is proposing that the employer keep all hot work areas free of hazards that may cause or contribute to the spread of fire. This proposed paragraph summarizes the Committee's belief that fires cannot occur if the hazards contributing to them are controlled. This requirement is to prevent the introduction of combustible or flammable materials during the performance of hot work. Often, safe conditions exist at the start of the hot work process; however, over the duration of the work, these materials may be brought to the site thereby creating a fire hazard. For example, one worker may be performing hot work at the same time another worker from another job introduces combustible or flammable materials within 35 feet of the hot work operation. The worker's safety can be further compromised by the fact that the worker doing the hot work is wearing a face shield that obstructs vision, preventing that worker from Seeing the entrance of the second worker. It is the intent of this requirement that hazard assessment be a continual process and not a singular, one-time event. Therefore any measures used by the employer to control fire hazards must be maintained.
Fuel gas and oxygen burning lines and torches are typically used in shipyard employment as follows. A burner (an employee engaged in burning or brazing) is trained and becomes qualified in the safe operation and testing of his equipment; namely the burning torch, gauges, care and use of the fuel gas and oxygen hose lines and proper connection to the supply manifold. Only qualified employees are issued this equipment from the tool room. After being issued his equipment, a burner working on a vessel will proceed to the manifold on the fantail of the vessel. Assigned to work in the lower level of the machinery space (enclosed space) 200 feet from the manifold, he will connect four 50 foot sections of hose together and to his torch. Next, he will connect this assembly to the gauges that he, in turn, attaches to the supply manifold. He then charges the entire burning rig by opening the oxygen and fuel supply lines. He then tests the torch and lines for compression integrity using his gauges first having turned off the supply valves. If the gauges indicate compromised integrity, the burner will then re-tighten all of the connections and test again. Once the integrity of the burning rig is established, he then proceeds to roll out the lines on the deck to his assigned worksite. Upon reaching his worksite, he then returns to the supply manifold, energizes the system, and proceeds to secure his hose lines elevated and out of walkways to eliminate tripping hazards. Finally, he returns to his worksite and begins burning.
In paragraph (b)(2)(i) OSHA proposes that the employer must make sure that no unattended fuel gas and oxygen hose lines or torches are left in confined spaces. The proposed language in this paragraph has been adapted from 29 CFR 1910.252; § 1915.52; and NFPA 312-2000, Standard for Protection of Vessels During Construction, Repair, and Lay-up (Ex. 20-4). The Committee and participants from the public attending the Committee's meetings agreed with the proposed requirement in paragraph (b)(2)(i). This requirement reflects the current practice in the industry.
The potential danger associated with unattended fuel gas and oxygen hoses or torches in confined spaces is apparent and universally accepted. Leaking fuel gas and oxygen from unattended hoses or torches can accumulate rapidly in confined spaces leading to several hazardous conditions such as increased fire hazards, oxygen-enriched atmospheres, explosive atmospheres, and similar conditions. This proposed paragraph seeks to eliminate the hazards associated with unattended fuel gas and oxygen hoses or torches in confined spaces.
In paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of § 1915.503, OSHA is proposing that employers must not allow unattended charged fuel gas and oxygen hose lines or torches in enclosed spaces for more than 15 minutes. The proposed language in this paragraph has also been adapted from 29 CFR 1910.252; § 1915.52; and NFPA 312-2000, Standard for Protection of Vessels During Construction, Repair, and Lay-up (Ex. 20-4). The Committee agreed with this proposed requirement following extensive discussion and analysis. They felt that the potential for fire or explosion caused by unattended charged lines in enclosed spaces far outweighs the burden of pulling to open air or disconnecting.
In paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of § 1915.503, OSHA is proposing that the employer must disconnect all fuel gas and oxygen hoses at the supply manifold at the end of each shift. The fact that paragraph (b)(2)(iii) does not propose a hose removal requirement needs to be further discussed in rulemaking. The Agency seeks comment on this subject. Some shipyard employers indicated that at shift change fuel gas and oxygen hoses are rolled back to the manifold and disconnected at the supply end, while other shipyard employers found this to be impractical. They noted that at a large shipyard work can be done on a vessel as long as 800 feet with as many as seven decks. For this work, employees need to connect burning rigs on the fantail supply manifold and string 700 feet of fuel gas and oxygen hose lines through a number of enclosed spaces to reach a worksite. Adding more lines to this supply manifold with additional manifolds also located on the fantail creates the problem of unstringing and rolling back literally miles of hose lines to disconnect them. The potential for confusion exists when these lines are disconnected and then need to be reconnected. The Committee agreed that the hoses should be removed from the confined spaces, but there remained a question about whether this was necessary for enclosed spaces.
The concern is not necessarily about leaking hoses and their potential for creating a hazardous space. Rather, the bigger concern Seems to be with the possibility of hooking up, at the supply manifold, a different (wrong) hose whose torch end was left hanging in an enclosed space. Because it is the wrong hose, it may now be dispensing gas (oxygen and fuel gas) into an space without anyone knowing, a space that is not involved in the intended work. The contaminated space may not be discovered until much later, thus creating a fire/explosion hazard. Additionally, leaking fuel gas and oxygen may create a flammable or oxygen-enriched atmosphere that may reach an ignition source.
OSHA deals with these hazards in proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(iii)(A) and (B) of § 1915.503. When fuel gas and oxygen lines are to be disconnected, the employer has two options. One is to completely roll the lines back to the supply manifold (open air) and then disconnect the torch. The other is, where a positive means of identification on the fuel gas and oxygen hose lines has been given before rolling out or extending the line, the employee can leave the lines extended, disconnect them at the supply manifold, and then disconnect the torch. This would assure that, not only would the proper extended lines be disconnected, but also that the proper lines will be reconnected, thus eliminating the hazards discussed above. Also, because the torch must be removed from the enclosed space after disconnecting the extended line from the supply manifold, the potential for the build-up of a hazardous atmosphere is greatly reduced.
Selecting the positive means of identification for the fuel gas and oxygen hose lines is left, by this performance type requirement, to the discretion of the employer. Examples of the positive means of identification include stenciling both ends of the line, color coding, stamped brass tags, and so forth. It is clear however, that the lines must be identified at both ends regardless of how many sections are joined, creating the run.
The Committee felt that extended lines could be reconnected safely provided that certain measures were followed: positively identifying hose line ends and maintaining the integrity of the complete burning rig. The former has already been discussed. The Committee recognized that maintaining the integrity of the burning rig can be accomplished in a number of ways. The preferred way is the drop test using gauges which has already been discussed. Another way is the use of a lockout device (Ex. 16b). Still another is testing a pressurized system, using soapy water at all connections. The Committee concluded -- and OSHA agrees -- that using such performance language as an alternative to specifications will help to nurture developing technology in these areas.
Section 1915.504 Fire Watches
The requirements of this section, as recommended by the Committee, apply to fire watch activity designated by the employer in shipyard employment. The requirements are proposed in three parts: (a) the employer's written policy on fire watches, (b) the posting of a fire watch, and (c) fire watch assignments. The existing subpart in § 1915.52 Fire Prevention in Welding, Cutting and Heating is a 35-year-old standard. It was identified by SESAC in 1992 as needing updating and extension of its scope to cover all the situations in shipyard employment regardless of geographic location. The Committee has recommended, and OSHA agrees, that the existing requirements in § 1915 that address fire protection be replaced by the proposed requirements of this subpart.
Paragraph (a) of § 1915.504 requires employers to create and keep current a written policy on fire watches specifying the requirements for the training, duties, equipment, and PPE necessary for fire watches in the workplace. The PPE that fire watches will need is specified in to 29 CFR subpart I Personal Protective Equipment. No specific format is proposed for the written policy. The Committee determined the employer was in the best position to determine how the requirement can be met, and OSHA agreed. OSHA recognizes that the employer needs the discretion to tailor the plan to his or her workplace.
Paragraph (b) of § 1915.504 proposes that the employer must determine the need for and post a fire watch if during hot work: (1) Slag, weld splatter, or sparks might pass through an opening and cause a fire; (2) fire-resistant guards or curtains are not used to prevent ignition of combustible materials during work on or near decks, bulkheads, partitions, or overheads; (3) combustible material closer than 35 ft. (10.7m) horizontally and vertically cannot be removed, protected with flame-proof covers, or otherwise shielded with metal or fire-resistant guards or curtains, so that the material will not be ignited by the hot work; (4) on or near insulation, combustible coatings, or sandwich-type construction on either side cannot be shielded, cut back, or the materials removed. In the latter case, if removal is impracticable, the space affected by the hot work must be inerted; if that cannot be done, then a fire watch must be posted. A fire watch must also be posted when: (5) Combustible materials adjacent to the opposite sides of bulkheads, decks, overheads, metal partitions, or of sandwich-type construction may be ignited by heat conduction or radiation; (6) hot work on pipes or other metal is close enough to cause ignition through heat radiation or conduction if contact is made with insulation, combustible coatings, or combustible decks, bulkheads, partitions, or overheads; (7) hot work is close enough to unprotected combustible pipe or cable runs to cause ignition from exposure to the hot work; or (8) a watch is required by a Marine Chemist, a Coast Guard authorized person, or a shipyard Competent Person. The Committee identified these eight probable cases where a fire watch is needed for any size shipyard employment. OSHA's proposed requirements for this paragraph are based on their recommendations.
Paragraph (b)(1) of § 1915.504 proposes controlling ignition sources for work processes that generate slag, weld splatter, or sparks that might pass through an opening and cause a fire. It has been adapted from NFPA 51B-1999, Standard for Fire Prevention in Use of Cutting and Welding Processes (Ex. 19-3) and 1910.252(a)(2)(iii)(A)(3). During the meetings, the Committee discussed the size of the openings. The Committee considered whether the size needs to be specified. The provision's intent as proposed is to leave the requirement performance oriented. If a spark can get through an opening and cause a fire, then the area should be protected. The Committee preferred to not be specific, but to leave it to the employer to determine which openings need to be protected. Paragraph (b)(2) of § 1915.504 proposes to recognize that ignition sources can be controlled through the use of fire-resistant guards or curtains. Where the combustible materials cannot be protected from a possible ignition source, the employer must post a fire watch. The Committee recognized that combustible materials can be protected through the use of fire-resistant guards or curtains. For example, a sandwich-type bulkhead could be safely protected from ignition of the combustible materials during hot work by using a fire-resistant guard or curtain.
Paragraph (b)(3) of § 1915.504 reflects the 35 ft. requirement (minimum distance of combustible materials from hot work) from the 1910.252(a)(2)(vii), subpart Q Welding, Cutting and Brazing and NFPA 51B-1999, Standard for Fire Prevention in Use of Cutting and Welding Processes (Ex. 19-3). In this paragraph OSHA proposes to require that an employer post a fire watch unless combustible materials are relocated to at least 35 feet beyond the hot work area or are protected by shielding. The Committee discussed the 35-foot distance at length during the course of the meetings and agreed that if the possibility exists that hot work materials could make contact with the combustible material in any way, a fire watch must be posted. No specific reasons or evidence to change the distance was suggested by any of the members or representatives from the public. The Committee's proposal kept the 35-foot distance. The Committee believes that the distance has been in regulatory requirements and national consensus standards for many years and reflects the current industry practice. The Agency concurs that such protection is reasonable and necessary.
Paragraph (b)(4) of § 1915.504 addresses the hazards associated with combustible coatings, sandwich-type construction, or other insulating materials. Besides shielding, cutting back, removing the materials and posting a fire watch, an industry practice for the acoustic foams that are commonly found in inaccessible voids is to inert the areas to make them safe for hot work. Industry practice, in these situation, has been to also provide charged fire hoses or portable extinguishers as fire protection measures for fire watches. Polyurethane and other organic foams are increasingly used on vessels because of their excellent insulating and lightweight properties. When properly installed and protected against fire, organic foams present no more fire hazard than other combustible materials. However, when organic foams (including those described as self-extinguishing, non-burning, fire resistant, flame resistant, and by similar terms) are exposed to fire or heat, they may ignite and burn with rapid flame spread, high temperatures, toxic gases, and voluminous quantities of smoke.
Paragraph (b)(5) of § 1915.504 addresses the potential hazards of adjacent spaces. This paragraph is adapted from § 1915.52(a)(3). It is an important part of the hazard assessment "since direct penetration of sparks or heat transfer may introduce a fire hazard to an adjacent compartment, the same precautions shall be taken on the opposite side as are taken on the side on which the welding is performed." During hot work on or near insulation, combustible coatings, or sandwich-type construction on either side, if the employer cannot cut back or remove the materials or inert the space, a fire watch must also be posted on the opposite side of the hot work. This requirement is intended to address the increased fire hazard potential (noted in the explanation above for paragraph (b)(4)) that results from hot work conducted in areas with or adjacent to polyurethane or other organic foams.
In cases where hot material from hot work could involve more than one level, as in trunks and machinery spaces, a fire watch must be stationed at each affected level unless positive means are available to prevent the spread or fall of hot material. Positive means could be accomplished by placing barriers or by physically isolating an area. The same is true for adjacent spaces; a fire watch must be stationed at each affected work area.
Paragraph (b)(6) of § 1915.504 requires a fire watch during hot work when performed on pipes or other metal in contact with insulation, combustible coatings or combustible materials on or near decks, bulkheads, partitions, or overheads if the work is close enough to cause ignition by radiation or conduction. The fire watch workgroup discussed at length the term "bulkhead and deck." Because the scope of subpart P is for shipyard employment, the subgroup discussed the fact that bulkheads and decks refer to vessels and vessel sections and although these terms could be used for structures and buildings, that is not the norm. Normally on landside structures the terms "walls and floors" are commonly used. Would use of "bulkhead and deck" in this provision cause confusion as to the applicability throughout shipyard employment, both on land side and aboard vessels? The Agency invites comment on this issue.
Paragraph (b)(7) of § 1915.504 requires a fire watch if hot work is conducted close enough to combustible pipe or cable runs to cause ignition (unless the pipe or cable runs are protected from exposure to the hot work). This provision takes into account the large amount of cable runs through vessel compartments. Although these cables must be tested to low flame spread and smoke production rates, they are still combustible and have been responsible for the spread of fire in many cases. Also, the use of combustible piping is increasing, and although required to meet strict flame spread and smoke production criteria, the potential for fire spread through pipe runs is the same as through cable runs and should therefore be safeguarded.
Paragraph (b)(8) of § 1915.504 proposes to add a provision for posting a fire watch when required by a Marine Chemist, a Coast Guard authorized person, or a shipyard Competent Person. These individuals are trained to know when a fire hazard requiring a fire watch exists even in circumstances not set forth in paragraphs (b)(2) through (b)(7) above. In one of the areas of biggest concern-where flammable and combustible liquids are present, for example, in vessel construction -- the regulations already require a competent individual to determine where a fire watch will be required. An employer is already required to designate a shipyard Competent Person in accordance with applicable requirements of 29 CFR 1915.7. These requirements, coupled with the time-tested recommendations of NFPA 51B-1999 and 29 CFR 1915 subpart B, were considered adequate by the Committee.
Paragraph (c) of § 1915.504 outlines the assignment of fire watch duty. Originally, the Committee's Fire Watch Workgroup had recommended language for this paragraph that specifically states that the employer is responsible for a worker's assignment to fire watch duty. However, the Committee felt that this should be understood throughout the regulations that the employer is ultimately responsible for workplace fire safety, and thus it does not need to be repeated. OSHA agrees.
Paragraph (c)(1) of § 1915.504 states that an employee must not be assigned other duties when designated as fire watch by the employer. The Committee wanted to be very clear on this