Source: https://openjurist.org/535/f2d/516/hart-v-l-mclucas
Timestamp: 2017-08-24 10:46:28
Document Index: 612702387

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 1486', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61']

535 F. 2d 516 - Hart v. L McLucas
535 F2d 516 Hart v. L McLucas
535 F.2d 516
Eldon C. HART, Petitioner,
There has been disagreement throughout this case as to the proper construction of 14 C.F.R. § 61.59(a)(2).2 It has been Hart's position that the terms "fraudulent" and "intentionally false" in § 61.59(a)(2) are synonymous and that, therefore, the finding of the NTSB that Hart did not act "fraudulently" necessarily implies that his statements were not "intentionally false" since the two terms, Hart asserts, mean the same thing.
This contention was rejected by the administrative law judge and by the NTSB, and properly so. On its face, § 61.59(a)(2) prohibits statements which are "fraudulent or intentionally false," thereby indicating that there are two different offenses which the regulation proscribes (emphasis added). See, e. g., Merchants Fire Assurance Corp. v. Lattimore, 263 F.2d 232, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1959); Adolfson v. United States, 159 F.2d 883, 885-86 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 818, 67 S.Ct. 1307, 91 L.Ed. 1836 (1947); Barkdoll v. United States, 147 F.2d 617, 618 (9th Cir. 1945).
The FAA argues that knowledge of falsity is not a required element for intentional false statement under § 61.59(a)(2). While the NTSB agreed with that construction of § 61.59(a)(2), we do not. And, indeed, at oral argument, attorneys for the government disavowed the NTSB's interpretation of § 61.59(a) (2).
The obvious problem with this interpretation is that it effectively construes the term "intentionally" out of the regulation. The use of the word "intentionally," however, must be assumed to impart a mens rea requirement to the regulation. Were this not so, the draftsman of § 61.59(a)(2) could have defined the offense as the making of a false statement without any reference to the mental state of the person who makes the entry. Since, however, § 61.59(a) (2) explicitly includes an intent requirement, it is inconsistent to read the regulation as establishing strict liability.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that scienter requirements, such as that established by § 61.59(a)(2), are not to be read out of administrative regulations when the express language of those regulations uses "the commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, --- U.S. ----, ----, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1391, 47 L.Ed.2d 668, 689, (1976).
We conclude that § 61.59(a)(2) must be construed to require actual knowledge of falsity. It is readily conceded that fraud requires such knowledge. Pence, supra; Kiefer, supra. Since "a word is known by the company it keeps," (noscitur a sociis ) it is unlikely that the draftsman of § 61.59 was establishing both strict and scienter liability with the simple phrase "fraudulent or intentionally false." Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 1582, 6 L.Ed.2d 859, 863 (1961).
It is true, as the FAA asserts, that an administrative interpretation of a statute or regulation is to be accorded deference in judicial deliberations. However, when, as here, the administrative construction is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the regulation, the courts need not defer to it. White v. Bloomberg, 345 F.Supp. 133, 147 (D.Md.1972); Francis v. Davidson, 340 F.Supp. 351, 368 (D.Md.), aff'd,409 U.S. 904, 93 S.Ct. 223, 34 L.Ed.2d 168 (1972).
Judge Moorhead and the NTSB found that Hart had no intention to deceive when he entered incorrect entries into his students' logbooks. That finding is supported by substantial evidence and should not be overturned on appeal. 49 U.S.C. § 1486(e). Hart's character, his unblemished record, his cooperation with the FAA investigation of this incident, his failure to alter his other logbooks to conform to the entries in those of his students, his physical condition at the time of the entries, the time pressure which Hart was under, Hart's demeanor all these circumstances provide substantial evidence for the finding that Hart lacked an intent to defraud.
Prior to January 1, 1974, the provision presently codified as 14 C.F.R. § 61.59 was designated 14 C.F.R. § 61.48. Since 14 C.F.R. § 61.59 is the present designation, we use it throughout this opinion
(a) No person may make or cause to be made