Source: http://openjurist.org/715/f2d/1248
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 06:52:04
Document Index: 385048303

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4332', '§ 1371', '§ 4332', '§ 2857', '§ 1371', '§ 2860']

715 F2d 1248 Simons v. M Gorsuch Usa | OpenJurist
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715 F2d 1248 Simons v. M Gorsuch Usa 715 F.2d 1248
20 ERC 2132, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,998
Edward E. SIMONS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.Anne M. GORSUCH, Administrator of Environmental ProtectionAgency of the U.S.A., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 82-2634, 83-1072.
Argued May 11, 1983.Decided Aug. 30, 1983.
Subsequently, the appellants moved to vacate the judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., upon the grounds that the defendants had misrepresented to the court that an adequate environmental assessment had been performed, that the defendants would take all steps necessary for the protection of the environment and that the new treatment plant was operating properly. The district court dismissed that motion for lack of jurisdiction, but also, in the alternative, denied the motion on the merits because plaintiffs' arguments did not address the grounds upon which the case had been decided.
Thus, the key to determining the need for an EIS is whether the proposed undertaking is a "major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). In this connection, section 511 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act addresses the question of which waste water management actions are to be deemed "major Federal action[s]." 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c). That statute provides, in pertinent part:
In addressing this contention, we note that ordinarily under NEPA, an agency's determination that "an environmental impact statement need not be filed must stand unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law." Assure Competitive Transportation, Inc. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir.1980). We must therefore determine whether section 1371 eliminates this discretion and requires preparation of an EIS in certain described cases.4
We know of no case which supports the statutory interpretation espoused by the appellants. Kilroy v. Quarles, 614 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.1980), which the plaintiffs cite, states that, although some permits are exempt from the "usual EIS requirement, ... grants of federal funds by the EPA to help finance projects made necessary by permits are not." Id. at 227. This language, however, merely says that projects using federal funds are not exempt from the EIS requirement. It does not provide that all federally funded facilities require an EIS. See also Pacific Legal Foundation v. Quarles, 440 F.Supp. 316 (D.C.Cal.1977) (involving the same waste treatment project as Kilroy; both Quarles and Kilroy involve a class of federal action which is specifically exempted by section 1371(c) from the EIS requirements of NEPA). Similarly, Burch v. Costle, 452 F.Supp. 1154 (D.D.C.1978) provides only that projects funded by grants are subject to NEPA. Id. at 1159-60. This interpretation merely arms the agency with discretion to determine whether federally funded projects are major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
Appellants argue first that a factual dispute exists, based on Edward Simons' statement in an affidavit that his land "adjoin[ed]" the City's land, and that summary judgment was thus inappropriate. But Simons' statement is simply not sufficient to create any factual dispute. The map produced by the Sawyer County Surveyor is both clear and uncontested. The map demonstrates that, at the closest point between the appellants' property and the City's property, the distance is either 332.30 feet or 348.80 feet.5
Finally, we turn to the Simonses' motion to vacate the judgment below for fraud and misrepresentation, as provided in Rule 60(b)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P. We first note that the district court denied the appellants' motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction pending direct appeal from the judgment, and alternatively, on the merits. The district court was incorrect as to its jurisdiction to consider the Rule 60(b) motion. We have held that a district court has jurisdiction to consider and deny Rule 60(b) motions during the pendency of an appeal, Textile Banking Co., Inc. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844 (7th Cir.1981). A remand is unnecessary, however, because the district court also addressed the merits of the motion.
The plaintiffs' motion was based upon materials which purportedly demonstrated that the appellees had misrepresented to the district court that their environmental assessment had been adequate, that they had taken all necessary steps for the protection of the environment and the public health and that the new treatment plant was operating properly. The district court denied the motion on the alternative ground that "nothing in [the] allegations of wrongdoing goes to the grounds upon which the case was decided." Our role in reviewing the denial of the 60(b) motion is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavating, 627 F.2d 792, 795-96 (7th Cir.1980); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2857 (West 1973). Abuse of discretion in this context "is established only where no reasonable man could agree with the district court; if reasonable men could disagree as to the propriety of the court's action, no abuse of discretion has been shown." Smith, at 795-96.
The district court was within its discretion in finding that the appellants did not make the showing required by Rule 60(b) to set aside a judgment. The materials presented in support of the motion are essentially irrelevant to the legal issues upon which the case turned. The appellants argued that an EIS was required as a matter of law, not that the factfinding procedure followed by the appellees had in some way been inadequate. Thus, the materials presented in no way affect the legal conclusion that an EIS was not required as a matter of law under 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c). Further, even if we were to interpret appellants' 60(b) motion as being based upon a theory that the appellees' behavior was so fraudulent that equity requires the judgment to be set aside, we do not think that the district court abused its discretion. The burden of establishing fraud or misrepresentation is upon the moving party and must be established by clear and convincing evidence. DiVito v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 361 F.2d 936, 939 (7th Cir.1966); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2860 (West 1973). Our review of the record does not reveal such clear and convincing evidence. We therefore approve the action of the district court in denying the motion.
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