Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/501/252/
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 20:26:20
Document Index: 710225595

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2456', '§ 7', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', '§ 3', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2456', '§ 2456', 'Art. 13', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 6', '§ 2456', '§ 2456']

METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON AIRPORTS AUTHORITY, et al., Petitioners v. CITIZENS FOR THE ABATEMENT OF AIRCRAFT NOISE, INC., et al. | LII / Legal Information Institute
501 U.S. 252 (111 S.Ct. 2298, 115 L.Ed.2d 236)
Argued: April 19, 1991.
Decided: June 17, 1991.
dissent, WHITE, MARSHALL [HTML]
1. Respondents have standing. Accepting as true their claims that the Master Plan will result in increased noise, pollution, and accidents, they have alleged "personal injury" to themselves that is "fairly traceable" to the Board's veto power. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556. This is because knowledge that the Plan was subject to that power undoubtedly influenced MWAA's directors when they drew up the Plan. Moreover, because invalidation of the veto power will prevent enactment of the Plan, the relief respondents have requested is "likely to . . . redress" their alleged injury. Ibid. Furthermore, the harm they allege is not confined to the consequences of a possible increase in National activity, since the Board and the Master Plan injure CAAN by making it more difficult for it to fulfill its goal of reducing that activity. Pp. 264-265.
An Act of Congress authorizing the transfer of operating control of two major airports from the Federal Government to the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (MWAA) conditioned the transfer on the creation by MWAA of a unique "Board of Review" composed of nine Members of Congress and vested with veto power over decisions made by MWAA's Board of Directors. 1 The principal question presented is whether this unusual statutory condition violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers, as interpreted in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986), and Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928). We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that the condition is unconstitutional.
National and Dulles are the only two major commercial airports owned by the Federal Government. A third airport, Baltimore Washington International (BWI), which is owned by the State of Maryland, also serves the Washington metropolitan area. Like Dulles, it is larger than National and located in a rural area many miles from the Capitol. Because of its location, National is by far the busiest and most profitable of the three. 2 Although proposals for the joint operating control of all three airports have been considered, the plan that gave rise to this litigation involves only National and Dulles, both of which are located in Virginia. Maryland's interest in the overall problem explains its representation on the Board of Directors of MWAA. See 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(e)(3)(C).
Despite the FAA's history of profitable operation of National and excellent management of both airports, the Secretary of Transportation concluded that necessary capital improvements could not be financed for either National or Dulles unless control of the airports was transferred to a regional authority with power to raise money by selling tax-exempt bonds. 3 In 1984, she therefore appointed an advisory commission to develop a plan for the creation of such a regional authority. Id., at 6.
Substitute bills were therefore drafted to provide for the establishment of a review board with veto power over major actions of MWAA's Board of Directors. Under two of the proposals, the board of review would clearly have acted as an agent of the Congress. After Congress received an opinion from the Department of Justice that a veto of MWAA action by such a board of review "would plainly be legislative action that must conform to the requirements of Article 1, § 7 of the Constitution," 4 the Senate adopted a version of the review board that required Members of Congress to serve in their individual capacities as representatives of users of the airports. See 132 Cong.Rec. 28372-28375, 28504, 28521-28525 (1986). The provision was further amended in the House, id., at 32127-32144, and the Senate concurred, id., at 32483. Ultimately, § 2456(f) of the Transfer Act as enacted defined the composition and powers of the Board of Review in much greater detail than the Board of Directors. Compare 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(f) with § 2456(e).
Subparagraph (1) of § 2456(f) specifies that the Board of Review "shall consist" of nine Members of the Congress, eight of whom serve on committees with jurisdiction over transportation issues and none of whom may be a Member from Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia. 5 Subparagraph 4(B) details the actions that must be submitted to the Board of Review for approval, which include adoption of a budget, authorization of bonds, promulgation of regulations, endorsement of a master plan, and appointment of the chief executive officer of the Authority. 6 Subparagraph 4(D) explains that disapproval by the Board will prevent submitted actions from taking effect. 7 Other significant provisions of the Act include paragraph 5, which authorizes the Board of Review to require Authority directors to consider any action relating to the airports; 8 subsection (g), which requires that any action changing the hours of operation at either National or Dulles be taken by regulation and therefore be subject to veto by the Board of Review; 9 and subsection (h), which contains a provision disabling MWAA's Board of Directors from performing any action subject to the veto power if a court should hold that the Board of Review provisions of the Act are invalid. 10
The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 718 F.Supp. 974 (DC 1989). As a preliminary matter, however, the court held that plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action for two reasons: 11 first, because the master plan will facilitate increased activity at National that is harmful to plaintiffs, and second, because the composition of the Board of Review diminishes the influence of CAAN on airport user issues since local congressmen and senators are ineligible for service on the Board. Id., at 980-982. On the merits, the District Court concluded that there was no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers because the members of the Board of Review acted in their individual capacities as representatives of airport users, and therefore the Board was not an agent of Congress. Id., at 985. Moreover, the Board's powers were derived from the legislation enacted by Virginia and the District, as implemented by MWAA's bylaws, rather than from the Transfer Act. Id., at 986. "In short, because Congress exercises no federal power under the Act, it cannot overstep its constitutionally-designated bounds." Ibid.
Because of the importance of the constitutional question, we granted MWAA's petition for certiorari. 498 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 750, 112 L.Ed.2d 770 (1991). Although the United States intervened in the Court of Appeals to support the constitutionality of the Transfer Act, see 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), the United States did not join in MWAA's petition for certiorari. As a respondent in this Court pursuant to this Court's Rule 12.4, the United States has again taken the position that the Transfer Act is constitutional. 12
Respondents alleged that the master plan allows increased air traffic at National and a consequent increase in accident risks, noise, and pollution. App. 10. "For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). If we accept that the master plan's provisions will result in increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents, this "personal injury" to respondents is "fairly traceable" to the Board of Review's veto power because knowledge that the master plan was subject to the veto power undoubtedly influenced MWAA's Board of Directors when it drew up the plan. Because invalidation of the veto power will prevent the enactment of the master plan, see 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(h), the relief respondents have requested is likely to redress their alleged injury. Moreover, the harm respondents have alleged is not confined to the consequences of a possible increase in the level of activity at National. The harm also includes the creation of an impediment to a reduction in that activity. See App. 8. The Board of Review was created by Congress as a mechanism to preserve operations at National at their present level, or at a higher level if possible. See supra, at 258. The Board of Review and the Master Plan, which even petitioners acknowledge is at a minimum "noise neutral," Brief for Petitioners 37-38, therefore injure CAAN by making it more difficult for CAAN to reduce noise and activity at National. 13
Control over National and Dulles was originally in federal hands, and was transferred to MWAA only subject to the condition that the States create the Board of Review. Congress placed such significance on the Board that it required that the Board's invalidation prevent the Airports Authority from taking any action that would have been subject to Board oversight. See 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(h). Moreover, the Federal Government has a strong and continuing interest in the efficient operation of the airports, which are vital to the smooth conduct of Government business, especially to the work of Congress, whose Members must maintain offices in both Washington and the districts that they represent and must shuttle back and forth according to the dictates of busy and often unpredictable schedules. This federal interest was identified in the preamble to the Transfer Act, 14 justified a Presidential appointee on the Board of Directors, and motivated the creation of the Board of Review, the structure and the powers of which Congress mandated in detail, see § 2456(f). Most significant, membership on the Board of Review is limited to federal officials, specifically members of congressional committees charged with authority over air transportation.
Although the legislative history is not necessary to our conclusion that the Board members act in their official congressional capacities, the floor debates in the House confirm our view. See, e.g., 132 Cong.Rec. 32135 (1986) (The bill "also provides for continuing congressional review over the major decisions of the new airport authority. A Congressional Board will still have veto power over the new airport authority's: annual budget; issuance of bonds; regulations; master plan; and the naming of the Chief Executive Officer") (Rep. Lehman); id., at 32136 ("In addition, the motion provides continued congressional control over both airports. Congress would retain oversight through a Board of Review made up of nine Members of Congress. This Board would have the right to overturn major decisions of the airport authority") (Rep. Coughlin); id., at 32137 ("Under this plan, Congress retains enough control of the airports to deal with any unseen pitfalls resulting from this transfer of authority. . . . We are getting our cake and eating it too. . . . The beauty of the deal is that Congress retains its control without spending a dime") (Rep. Smith); id., at 32141 ("There is, however, a congressional board which is established by this. . . . That board has been established to make sure that the Nation's interest, the congressional interest was attended to in the consideration of how these two airports are operated") (Rep. Hoyer); id., at 32142 (The bill does "not give up congressional control and oversight—that remains in a Congressional Board of review") (Rep. Conte); id., at 32143 ("I understand that one concern of Members is that by leasing these airports to a local authority, we would be losing control over them. But, in fact, under this bill exactly the opposite is true. We will have more control than before") (Rep. Hammerschmidt).
Congress as a body also exercises substantial power over the appointment and removal of the particular Members of Congress who serve on the Board. The Transfer Act provides that the Board "shall consist" of "two members of the Public Works and Transportation Committee and two members of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives from a list provided by the Speaker of the House," "two members of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and two members of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate from a list provided by the President pro tempore of the Senate," and "one member chosen alternately . . . from a list provided by the Speaker of the House or the President pro tempore of the Senate, respectively." 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(f)(1). Significantly, appointments must be made from the lists, and there is no requirement that the lists contain more recommendations than the number of Board openings. Cf. 28 U.S.C. 991(a) (Sentencing Reform Act upheld in Mistretta required only that the President "consider" the recommendations of the Judicial Conference); 31 U.S.C. 703(a) (Congressional Commission only "recommends" individuals for selection as Comptroller General). The list system, combined with congressional authority over committee assignments, guarantees Congress effective control over appointments. Control over committee assignments also gives Congress effective removal power over Board members because depriving a Board member of membership in the relevant committees deprives the member of authority to sit on the Board. See 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(f)(1) (Board "shall consist" of relevant committee members). 15
We thus confront an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the powers of which Congress has delineated, the purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal interest, and membership in which is restricted to congressional officials. Such an entity necessarily exercises sufficient federal power as an agent of Congress to mandate separation-of-powers scrutiny. Any other conclusion would permit Congress to evade the "carefully crafted" constraints of the Constitution, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2788, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), simply by delegating primary responsibility for execution of national policy to the States, subject to the veto power of Members of Congress acting "in their individual capacities." Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 755, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3202, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). 16
Petitioners contend that the Board of Review should nevertheless be immune from scrutiny for constitutional defects because it was created in the course of Congress' exercise of its power to dispose of federal property. See U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 17 In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987), we held that a grant of highway funds to a State conditioned on the State's prohibition of the possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under the age of 21 was a lawful exercise of Congress' power to spend money for the general welfare. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Even assuming that "Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly," we held that this indirect "encouragement to state action" was a valid use of the spending power. Id., at 212, 107 S.Ct. at 2798. We thus concluded that Congress could endeavor to accomplish the federal objective of regulating the national drinking age by the indirect use of the spending power even though that regulatory authority would otherwise be a matter within state control pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment. 18
"Time and again we have reaffirmed the importance in our constitutional scheme of the separation of governmental powers into the three coordinate branches. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 725 106 S.Ct., at 3187 (citing Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. 602, at 629-630 55 S.Ct. 869, 874, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935) ). As we stated in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the system of separated powers and checks and balances established in the Constitution was regarded by the Framers as 'self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.' Id., at 122 96 S.Ct., at 684. We have not hesitated to invalidate provisions of law which violate this principle. See id., at 123 96 S.Ct., at 684." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2620, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988).
"The founders of our republics . . . seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations; which by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations. . . . It is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.
To forestall the danger of encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on the Congress. It may not "invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power." J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928). And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified in Article I. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). 19
The second constraint is illustrated by our decision in Chadha. That case involved the validity of a statute that authorized either House of Congress by resolution to invalidate a decision by the Attorney General to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States. Congress had the power to achieve that result through legislation, but the statute was nevertheless invalid because Congress cannot exercise its legislative power to enact laws without following the bicameral and presentment procedures specified in Article I. For the same reason, an attempt to characterize the budgetary action of the Comptroller General in Bowsher as legislative action would not have saved its constitutionality because Congress may not delegate the power to legislate to its own agents or to its own Members. 20
Respondents rely on both of these constraints in their challenge to the Board of Review. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to discuss the second constraint because the court was satisfied that the power exercised by the Board of Review over "key operational decisions is quintessentially executive." 286 U.S.App.D.C., at 342, 917 F.2d, at 56. We need not agree or disagree with this characterization by the Court of Appeals to conclude that the Board of Review's power is constitutionally impermissible. If the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7. In short, when Congress "takes action that has the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch," it must take that action by the procedures authorized in the Constitution. See Chadha, 462 U.S., at 952-955, 103 S.Ct., at 2784-2786. 21
One might argue that the provision for a Board of Review is the kind of practical accommodation between the Legislature and the Executive that should be permitted in a "workable government." 22 Admittedly, Congress imposed its will on the regional authority created by the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia by means that are unique and that might prove to be innocuous. However, the statutory scheme challenged today provides a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitutionally-confined role. Given the scope of the federal power to dispense benefits to the States in a variety of forms and subject to a host of statutory conditions, Congress could, if this Board of Review were valid, use similar expedients to enable its Members or its agents to retain control, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of national policy. As James Madison presciently observed, the legislature "can with greater facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments." The Federalist No. 48, at 334. Heeding his warning that legislative "power is of an encroaching nature," we conclude that the Board of Review is an impermissible encroachment. 23
Today the Court strikes down yet another innovative and otherwise lawful governmental experiment in the name of separation of powers. To reach this result, the majority must strain to bring state enactments within the ambit of a doctrine hitherto applicable only to the Federal Government and strain again to extend the doctrine even though both Congress and the Executive argue for the constitutionality of the arrangement which the Court invalidates. These efforts are untenable because they violate the " 'cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of a statute is fairly possible by which the constitutional question may be avoided.' " Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932)). They are also untenable because the Court's separation-of-powers cases in no way compel the decision the majority reaches.
Both the Airports Authority (Authority) and the Board are clearly creatures of state law. The Authority came into being exclusively by virtue of acts passed by the Commonwealth of Virginia, 1985 Va. Acts, ch. 598, § 2, and the District of Columbia, 1985 D.C.Law 6-67, § 3. 1 These enactments expressly declared that the Authority would be a "public body corporate and politic . . . independent of all other bodies" with such powers as "conferred upon it by the legislative authorities of both the Commonwealth of Virginia and the District." 1985 Va. Acts, ch. 598, § 2; 1985 D.C.Law 6-67, § 3. The Transfer Act acknowledged that the authority was to have only "the powers and jurisdiction as are conferred upon it jointly by the legislative authority of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia," § 2456(a), and was to be "independent of the . . . Federal Government," 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(b)(1). Under the Transfer Act, the Secretary of Transportation and the Authority negotiated a lease that defined the powers and composition of the Board to be established. Lease, Art. 13, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 175a-176a. Even then, the Board could not come into existence until the state-created Authority adopted bylaws establishing it. Bylaws, Art. IV, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 151a-154a. To allay any doubt about the Board's provenance, both Virginia and the District amended their enabling legislation to make explicit the Authority's power to establish the Board under state law. See 1987 Va. Acts, ch. 665, § 5, subd. A, par. 5; 1987 D.C.Law 7-18, § 3(c)(2).
As the Court has emphasized, "going behind the plain language of a statute in search of a possibly contrary . . . intent is 'a step to be taken cautiously' even under the best of circumstances." American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1540, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26, 97 S.Ct. 926, 941, 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977)). Nowhere should this caution be greater than where the Court flirts with embracing "serious constitutional problems" at the expense of "construing a statute to avoid such problems." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988); see Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.). The majority nonetheless offers three reasons for taking just these steps. First, control over the airports "was originally in federal hands," and was transferred "only subject to the condition that the States create the Board." Ante, at 266. Second, "the Federal Government has a strong and continuing interest in the efficient operation of the airports." Ante, at 266. Finally, "and most significant, membership on the Board of Review is limited to federal officials." Ibid. In other words, Congress, in effect, created a body that, in effect, discharges an ongoing interest of the Federal Government through federal officials who, in effect, serve as congressional agents.
Likewise, nothing charges the Board with oversight of any strong and continuing interest of the Federal Government, much less with conducting such oversight as an agent of Congress. Despite disclaimers, the majority is quick to point to portions of the legislative history in which various Members of Congress state their belief that the Board would insure congressional control over the airports. Ante, at 267-268. But that is not all the legislative history contains. Other statements support the declaration in all the relevant enactments that Members of Congress are to sit on a state-created body in their individual capacities to safeguard the interests of frequent, nationwide users. On this point Members of the House, the Senate, and the Executive agreed. Representative Hammerschmidt, for example, stated that the purpose of a "board of review composed of Congressmen is . . . to protect the interests of all users of the two airports." 132 Cong.Rec. 32143 (1986). Senator Kassebaum contended that members of Congress could further this purpose since, "most Members are intensely interested in the amount of service to and from certain cities, from both National and Dulles." Id., at 6069. Secretary of the Treasury Dole echoed these sentiments, testifying that "Members of Congress are heavy users of the air transportation system." Hearing on H.R. 2337, H.R. 5040, and S. 1017 before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 (1986).
"The 'independent constitutional bar' limitation on the spending power is not . . . a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly. Instead, we think that the language in our earlier opinions stands for the unexceptional proposition that the spending power may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional. Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of the Congress' broad spending power. . . . Were South Dakota to succumb to the blandishments offered by Congress and raise its drinking age to 21, the State's action in so doing would not violate the constitutional rights of anyone." 483 U.S., at 210-211, 107 S.Ct., at 2798 (emphasis added).
There is no question that Dole, when faithfully read, places the Board outside the scope of separation-of-powers scrutiny. As noted, no one suggests that Virginia and the District of Columbia could not have created a board of review to which nonfederal officers would appoint Members of Congress had Congress not offered any inducement to do so. The Airports Act, therefore, did not induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional. Nor is there any assertion that this case involves the rare circumstance in which "the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion' " Dole, supra, 483 U.S., at 211, 107 S.Ct., at 2798 (quoting Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S., at 590, 57 S.Ct., at 892). In Dole, Congress authorized the Secretary of Transportation to withdraw funding should the States fail to comply with certain conditions. Here, Congress merely indicated that federal control over National and Dulles would continue given a failure to comply with certain conditions. Virginia and the District may sorely have wanted control over the airports for themselves. Placing conditions on a desire, however, does not amount to compulsion. Dole therefore requires precisely what the majority denies—the rejection of separation-of-powers doctrine as an "independent bar" against Congress conditioning the lease of federal property in this case. 2
Even assuming that separation-of-powers principles apply, the Court can hold the Board to be unconstitutional only by extending those principles in an unwarranted fashion. The majority contends otherwise, reasoning that the Constitution requires today's result whether the Board exercises executive or legislative power. Ante, at 274-276. Yet never before has the Court struck down a body on separation-of-powers grounds that neither Congress nor the Executive oppose. It is absurd to suggest that the Board's power represents the type of "legislative usurpation . . . which, by assembling all power in the same hands . . . must lead to the same tyranny," that concerned the Framers. The Federalist No. 48, supra, at 309-310 (J. Madison). More to the point, it is clear that the Board does not offend separation-of-powers principles either under our cases dealing with executive power or our decisions concerning legislative authority. 3
Based on its faulty premise that the Board is exercising federal power, the Court first reasons that "if the Board's power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it." Ante, at 276. The majority does not, however, rely on the constitutional provisions most directly on point. Under the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses, Members of Congress may not serve in another office that is under the authority of the United States. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 2. If the Board did exercise executive authority that is federal in nature, the Court would have no need to say anything other than that congressional membership on the Board violated these express constitutional limitations. The majority's failure is either unaccountable or suggests that it harbors a certain discomfort with its own position that the Board in fact exercises significant federal power. Whichever is the case, the Court instead relies on expanding nontextual principles as articulated in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). Bowsher, echoing Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928), held that the Constitution prevented legislative agents from exercising executive authority. Bowsher, supra, 478 U.S., at 726, 106 S.Ct., at 3187. The Court asserts that the Board, again in effect, is controlled by Congress. The analysis the Court has hitherto employed to recognize congressional control, however, show this not to be the case.
As Bowsher made clear, a "critical factor" in determining whether an official is "subservient to Congress" is the degree to which Congress maintains the power of removal. Bowsher, supra, at 727, 106 S.Ct., at 3188. Congress cannot "draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of" the removal of a federal executive officer. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161, 47 S.Ct. 21, 40, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926). Here Congress exercises no such power. Unlike the statutes struck down in Bowsher and Myers, the Transfer Act contains no provision authorizing Congress to discharge anyone from the Board. Instead, the only express mention of removal authority over Board members in any enactment occurs in resolutions passed by the Board of Directors under the bylaws. These resolutions provide that members of the Board shall sit for fixed terms, but may be removed by the Board of Directors for cause. See Resolution No. 87-12 (June 3, 1987), App. 47-48; Resolution No. 87-27 (Sept. 2, 1987), App. 60. This arrangement is consistent with the settled principle that "the power of removal results by a natural implication from the power of appointing." 1 Annals of Cong. 496 (1789) (statement of Rep. Madison). See Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 99, 109 S.Ct. 407, 411, 102 L.Ed.2d 395 (1988); Myers, supra, 272 U.S., at 119, 47 S.Ct., at 26.
The majority counters that Congress maintains "effective removal power over Board members because depriving a Board member of membership in certain congressional committees deprives the member of authority to sit on the Board." Ante, at 269. This conclusion rests on the faulty premise that the Airports Act requires the removal of a Board member once he or she leaves a particular committee. But the Act does not say this. Rather, it merely states that members of the Board "shall consist" of Members of Congress who sit in certain specified committees. 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(f)(1). Moreover, the Act elsewhere provides that the standard term of service on the Board is six years. § 2456(f)(2). This term, which spans three Congresses, suggests that a Board member's tenure need not turn on continuing committee or even congressional status. Nor, to date, has any member of the Board been removed for having lost a committee post. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. Once again, the Court seizes upon a less plausible interpretation to reach a constitutional infirmity despite " 'the elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.' " DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S., at 575, 108 S.Ct., at 1397 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 211, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895)); see Ashwander, 297 U.S., at 348, 56 S.Ct., at 483.
The majority claims not to retreat from our settled rule that " 'when this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President, . . . it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons.' " Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 384, 109 S.Ct., at 661, (quoting Bowsher, supra, 478 U.S., at 736, 106 S.Ct., at 3193 (STEVENS, J.)). This rule should apply with even greater force when the arrangement under challenge has also been approved by what are functionally two state legislatures and two state executives.
Since the "compelling constitutional reasons" on which we have relied in our past separation-of-powers decisions are insufficient to strike down the Board, the Court has had to inflate those reasons needlessly to defend today's decision. I cannot follow along this course. The Board violates none of the principles set forth in our cases. Still less does it provide a "blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitutionally-confined role." Ante, at 277. This view utterly ignores the Executive's ability to protect itself through, among other things, the ample power of the veto. Should Congress ever undertake such improbable projects as transferring national parklands to the States on the condition that its agents control their oversight, see Brief for Respondents 39, there is little doubt that the President would be equal to the task of safeguarding his or her interests. Least of all, finally, can it be said that the Board reflects "the propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments," that the Framers feared. The Federalist No. 73, at p. 442 (A. Hamilton). Accordingly, I dissent.