Source: http://dc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20160518_0000604.DDC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-07-23 02:22:53
Document Index: 700224698

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1400', '§ 1412', '§ 1412', '§ 38', '§ 1412', 'art, 131', '§ 1411', '§ 1412', '§ 1431', '§ 1432', '§ 1411']

Given that this lawsuit was initiated in 2005, the Court has had ample opportunity to acknowledge the importance of the early intervention programs at stake in this litigation. Indeed, when executed properly, the early intervention mandated by the IDEA and at the core of plaintiffs’ complaint “can work a miracle,” allowing an estimated 75–80% of disabled children to enter “kindergarten alongside every other ordinary five-year-old-without needing further supplemental special education.” DL v. District of Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2011). These positive outcomes substantially advance the IDEA’s primary goal: “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
In order to achieve its aim, the IDEA provides federal funding to states, including the District of Columbia, on the condition that they “establish policies and procedures to ensure . . . that free appropriate public education [FAPE] . . . is available to disabled children.” Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). More specifically, the IDEA imposes an affirmative obligation on school systems to “ensure that all children with disabilities residing in the State . . . regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and who are in need of special education and related services, are identified, located, and evaluated.” Reid, 401 F.3d at 519–20 (internal quotations omitted); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A). The District’s laws implementing the IDEA require that once a potential candidate for special education services is identified, the District must conduct an initial evaluation and make an eligibility determination within 120 days. D.C. Code § 38-2561.02(a)(1). The duties to identify, locate, and evaluate disabled children are collectively known as the “Child Find” obligation. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
DL v. District of Columbia, 237 F.R.D. 319, 324 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Mem. Order 3–4, ECF No. 389.
With this group of children serving as the original plaintiff class, in 2010, the Court found that the District’s policies were inadequate to meet its obligations under the IDEA and that they violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in programs receiving federal funding. See Mem. Op. 4–5, ECF No. 389 (citing DL v. District of Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10–17 (D.D.C. 2011)). First, on August 10, 2010, the Court partially ruled for plaintiffs on summary judgment and found that, at least through 2007, the District violated the IDEA and District law by denying a FAPE to numerous preschool-age children with disabilities. DL v. District of Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 84, 95 (D.D.C. 2010). The Court in 2010 also found that, at least through 2007, the District violated the Rehabilitation Act by demonstrating “bad faith or gross misjudgment” in failing to bring itself into compliance with the IDEA, even though it “knew that [its] actions were legally insufficient.” See Mem. Op. 4–5, ECF No. 389.
Following this summary judgment ruling, the Court held a two-day bench trial on the 6th and 7th of April 2011 regarding the District’s liability and plaintiffs’ remaining claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for the period from January 1, 2008, through the trial. After hearing the evidence at trial, the Court found that the District’s prior liability extended to April 6, 2011. To remedy these violations, the Court then issued a structural injunction, which included programmatic requirements and numerical goals that would remain in effect until the District demonstrated sustained compliance. Mem. Op. & Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 138–76.
After the trial but before this Court issued its final decision, the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), which clarified the proper interpretation of the commonality requirement for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) (“FRCP 23(a)(2)”). Wal-Mart essentially found that to establish commonality under FRCP 23(a)(2), a class must present a common question that is “capable of classwide resolution- which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 2551.
Immediately following Wal-Mart, the defendants in this case sought to decertify the consolidated plaintiff class, arguing that it was too broadly defined to satisfy FRCP 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. Essentially, the defendants argued that the single and undivided class could not satisfy FRCP 23(a)(2) because it “bundled together multiple different allegations of a variety of different provisions of the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and local District of Columbia law” and “amalgamat[ed] . . . a variety of provisions of a single statutory scheme.” DL v. District of Columbia, 277 F.R.D. 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2011). This Court rejected that argument, ruling that the plaintiff class satisfied FRCP 23’s commonality requirement because it presented the common question of whether or not each class member received a FAPE. The Court then ruled that the class members’ “differing allegations only represent the differing ways in which defendants have caused class members’ common injury,” that is, the “denial of their statutory right to a free appropriate public education.” Id. at 45.
After Wal-Mart it is clear that defining the class by reference to the District’s pattern and practice of failing to provide FAPEs speaks too broadly because it constitutes only an allegation that the class members “have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” which the Supreme Court has now instructed is insufficient to establish commonality given that the same provision of law “can be violated in many different ways.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. In the absence of identification of a policy or practice that affects all members of the class in the manner Wal-Mart requires, the district court's analysis is not faithful to the Court’s interpretation of Rule 23(a) commonality.
On remand from the D.C. Circuit, this Court was to reconsider whether a “class, classes, or subclasses may be certified,” id. at 129, and ultimately did so, certifying the following four plaintiff subclasses in 2013:
After these subclasses were certified, plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint, alleging violations of the IDEA, Rehabilitation Act, and DC law specific to each subclass. Following another round of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in 2014. The Court partially granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the District was liable for violating the IDEA and District law for the period up to April 6, 2011. Specifically, these claims corresponded to the four subclasses and related to the District’s failure to (1) identify substantial numbers of children who are in need of special education and related services, (2) timely to evaluate children for special education and related services, (3) timely to issue eligibility determinations for special education and related services, and (4) provide smooth and effective transitions for children from Part C to Part B services. Mem. Op. 9–14, 16–20, ECF No. 444. The Court did not grant plaintiffs summary judgment on their Rehabilitation Act claims for that same period, concluding that based on the record, it could not determine “whether the District’s actions reached ‘bad faith or gross misjudgment’ as to each subclass.” Id. at 15, 20.
In addition to partially ruling for plaintiffs, the Court also partially ruled for defendants on summary judgment. Specifically, the Court ruled for defendants on (1) plaintiffs’ IDEA and District law claims related to the failure timely to evaluate children for special education and related services for the period from April 6, 2011 to the present, and (2) all of plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claims for the period from March 22, 2010 to the present. Id. at 36–37, 39–42; see also Order, ECF No. 491.
7. Dr. Dunst has received a number of awards from professional organizations for his research and practice. Id. ¶ 6. He has an extensive list of publications about Child Find-related policies and practices. Curriculum Vitae of Carl J. Dunst, Pls.’ Ex. 268, at 22–100.
8. During trial and in post-trial filings, the District attacked the credibility of Dr. Dunst on the basis that he had never logged into or received relevant training on the District’s database, called Special Education Database System, or “SEDS.” See Trial Tr., Nov. 12, 2015, 102:20–25, 108:7–13; Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ¶ 12, ECF No. 513. The Court has previously considered and rejected this argument, finding that Dr. Dunst is qualified to analyze the District’s Child Find-related obligations and assess its compliance. See Mem. Op. 26 n.1, ECF No. 444 (“[I]t is not clear why Dr. Dunst needed to understand how the database operates in order to analyze the data pulled from it.”).
12. Dr. Cupingood is currently a Director of BLDS, LLC, a position in which he develops and applies statistical models and analyses for a wide variety of settings and industries. Id. at ¶ 2. He has extensive experience conducting statistical analysis in a variety of litigation matters, including employment discrimination cases and audits of insurance companies regarding claims processing. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3. He has provided deposition and trial testimony as a database expert and as a statistician. Id. at ¶¶ 9–10.
14. For these reasons, following the previous trial, the Court found that Dr. Cupingood is a qualified expert in statistics. Mem. Op. & Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 14, ECF No. 294. The Court also found that Dr. Cupingood provided credible and compelling testimony during trial regarding the District’s Child Find-related obligations, including the timeliness of the District in determining the eligibility for special education and related services of children ages three through five, and the number of preschool-age children who were referred each year for special education services Id. at ¶¶ 14–15.
19. Dr. Cupingood has substantial additional experience in computer programming and statistics. Cupingood Supplemental Direct Test., Nov. 2, 2015, ECF No. 489-1. Similar to Dr. Dunst, at trial and in post-trial filings, the District attacked Dr. Cupingood’s credibility because he had never logged into SEDS or received training on the database. Trial Tr., Nov. 12, 2015, 30:20– 31:9, 44:25–45:3; Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law ¶ 4, ECF No. 513. The Court previously rejected these arguments and will do the same today. Mem. Op. 30, ECF No. 444 (“Dr. Cupingood does not need to have any particular understanding of special education policies or databases to assess the data provided to him. Furthermore, it is entirely unclear to the Court why Dr. Cupingood needed to access the database himself rather than rely on the data provided by the District.”).
20. Based on findings paragraphs 11–19, the Court again finds that Dr. Cupingood is a qualified expert in statistics, and also finds that he is an expert in computer programming and databases. The Court also finds that Dr. Cupingood provided credible and compelling testimony during trial regarding the District’s data related to the number of preschool-age children who are enrolled, the number of preschool-age children who timely received an initial eligibility determination for special education and related services, the number of children who received a smooth and effective transition from Part C to Part B services, and the District’s special education databases.
22. The District offered the testimony of 13 fact witnesses, 12 of whom are District of Columbia’s Office of the State Superintendent of Education (“OSSE”) or District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) employees. Those witnesses testified regarding positive improvements in the District’s policies, procedures, and practices. These witnesses did not directly rebut or discuss the statistical conclusions of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses regarding the effectiveness of the District’s policies, procedures, and practices, nor did any of the District’s witnesses challenge the findings of plaintiffs’ Factual Summary.
34. Dr. Freund has authored extensive publications and presentations in the special education and early childhood education fields. Defs.’ Ex. 55, at 5–12. As an Associate Dean of the George Washington University, she also directs doctoral candidates’ dissertations on special education and early childhood education and has developed a specific focus on the special education eligibility determination process for preschool-age children. Id.
35. Based on paragraphs 32–34, the Court concludes that Dr. Freund is qualified as an expert to analyze the District’s Child Find obligations as they relate to preschool children. The Court also finds that Dr. Freund testified credibly, demonstrated specific knowledge of the relevant literature, and explained clearly how her conclusions were based on her research, personal experience in the field, and in depth examination of the District’s preschool Child Find system.
37. Part B of IDEA concerns special education and related services for three-to-five-year-old children. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411–1419 (“Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities”); § 1412(a)(1)(a) (requiring states to have “in effect policies and procedures to ensure that . . . [a] free appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive”).
39. If a parent, teacher, or any other person with knowledge of a child in the District has a concern that a child requires special education services, they can contact Early Stages. See Compagnucci Dep. 6:19–7:13, June 2, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 15 (“Compagnucci Dep.”); Early Stages Family Care Manual, Feb. 8, 2011, Pls.’ Ex. 72, at DL2014 177 (“Family Care Manual”). Early Stages is required to screen the children, which it does through a questionnaire. See Compagnucci Direct ¶ 24; Compagnucci Dep. 8:11–9:9. Early Stages then assesses the child to determine the child’s needs. Compagnucci Direct ¶ 27.
40. Once those assessments are performed (together referred to as the evaluation), see Compagnucci Dep. 26:10–13, Early Stages determines whether the child is eligible for special education and related services. See Compagnucci Direct ¶ 29. The District must complete the evaluation and provide an eligibility determination within 120 days of the child’s referral. See infra paras. 254–57, 262. If the child is eligible, then Early Stages must prepare an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) and identify a location (i.e., a school) where the services will be provided. Compagnucci Direct ¶ 29; Compagnucci Dep. 13:7–14:4.
43. Part C refers to the part of IDEA that relates to special education services for children younger than three years old. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1431–1444 (“Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities”); § 1432(5) (defining “infant or toddler with a disability”). Children in Part C receive an Individual Family Service Plan (“IFSP”), rather than an IEP. See Family Care Manual, Pls.’ Ex. 72, at DL2014 194. Part C services are the responsibility of a District program called Strong Start, not Early Stages. Direct Examination of Kerda Dehaan ¶ 1.
47. The District Office of the State Superintendent of Education (“OSSE”) is the State Education Agency (“SEA”) for the District “serves as the lead and local agency for Part C,” and “fulfills state-level obligations for Part B and Part C of IDEA.” Direct Test. of Amy Maisterra ¶ 3, Mar. 16, 2011, ECF No. 210-3 (“2011 Maisterra Direct”). “OSSE is responsible for monitoring the performance of the District’s Local Education Agencies (‘LEAs’), of which [DCPS] is the largest.” Id; see also Direct Examination of Amy Maisterra ¶ 5, Oct. 22, 2015, ECF No. 477-1 (“2015 Maisterra Direct”). OSSE assumed these roles from DCPS after OSSE was created in 2007. 2009 Freund Report 4.
49. Dr. Amy Maisterra is OSSE’s Assistant Superintendent of Elementary, Secondary, and Specialized Education. 2015 Maisterra Direct ¶ 1. She was previously OSSE’s Assistant Superintendent for the Division of Specialized Education. Maisterra Dep. 6:11–14, June 2, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 14. OSSE’s Division of Specialized Education “is responsible for overseeing the development and promulgation of state policy governing special education; monitoring LEAs for compliance with IDEA as well as other federal and local regulations and court-ordered consent decrees; allocation and administration of IDEA grant funds to LEAs and other public agencies; provision of training and technical assistance to LEAs; and investigation and resolution of state complaints relating to special education.” OSSE website, Pls.’ Ex. 58.
50. DCPS keeps documents and data related to children who receive referrals to Early Stages in the Early Stages database, part of which is then uploaded into a different database, called the SEDS. Compagnucci Dep. 20:14–21:2, 21:17–22:11, 32:13–33:2, 43:3–6, 43:15–44:16, 45:9– 48:10, Aug. 12, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 21. OSSE requires documents and data related to children who receive referrals to be uploaded into SEDS. 2011 Maisterra Direct ¶ 7; Maisterra Dep. 336:18– 337:3, July 2, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 18.
51. OSSE uses SEDS to prepare statistics for this case and for reporting to OSEP. Direct Examination of Anupama Proddutur ¶ 2, ECF No. 477-12 (“Proddutur Direct”); Proddutur Dep., July 2, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 18; Maisterra Dep. 336:18–337:3, July 2, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 18. These statistics include data such as the number of children who have IEPs at a given point in time, the percentage of children who receive an eligibility determination within 120 days over a given period of time, and the percentage of children who receive a smooth and effective transition from Part C to Part B services over a given period of time. See Proddutur Direct ¶ 2. To calculate the percentage of children who receive a smooth and effective transition from Part C to Part B services, in addition to SEDS, OSSE uses data from the Early Stages database and the Part C database (a separate database that tracks data related to children receiving Part C services). See Proddutur Dep. 164:17–165:11, July 2, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 18; Trial Tr., DeHaan Test., Nov. 13, 2015, 17:21–18:8.
In other words, the District fails to challenge plaintiffs’ evidence on its own terms. As the defendants point out, the plaintiffs litigation strategy has shifted from the 2011 trial to the more recent trial conducted in November 2015. See, e.g., Trail Tr., Nov. 12, 2015, 19:8–10 (District’s counsel: “[T]he statistics that plaintiffs offer today are not the statistics that the Court credited in 2011. It’s not apples to apples.”). Indeed, the plaintiffs’ arguments and evidence have evolved to focus on the outcomes and effectiveness of the District’s policies and the accuracy of its statistical conclusions in addition to the design of the polices themselves. See, e.g., id. at 20:6–8 (District’s counsel: “This time, unlike in 2011, plaintiffs will not critique any major or substantive aspect of the District’s preschool Part B program.”).
But as plaintiffs’ arguments have developed, the defendants for the most part presented evidence as though plaintiffs’ litigation strategy has remained constant since 2011. The District claims its statistics show its policies are effective and are implemented a way that complies with the IDEA’s requirements. In presenting this evidence, however, the District does very little to counter the plaintiffs’ core theory and substantial testimony that the District’s self-reported data significantly inflate the District’s actual rates of compliance. Even assuming the District “has always been clear with OSEP on how the District selects data points, collects data, and calculates statistics,” Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 65 (quoting 2015 Maisterra Direct ¶ 15), it does not follow that the District’s assumptions are well founded and that its reporting is accurate.
Indeed, plaintiffs have offered ample evidence that speaks to the substance of the District’s statistics, while the District has responded primarily with conclusory assertions that its statistics are “accurate[e] and valid[] across staff and across reports,” id. at ¶ 64, and with evidence showing it has made noticeable improvements since 2011. In the Court’s view, however, substantial progress and good faith efforts are insufficient to satisfy the IDEA’s affirmative duties. For the District to comply with the IDEA and District law, its policies and procedures must produce the proper results-something that plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates they are currently failing to do.
53. While the District’s policies, procedures, and practices are important, the outcomes of those policies, procedures, and practices are even more critical. The Court made this clear when it adjudicated the motions for summary judgment. Mem. Op. 18–19, ECF No. 444 (“The question . . . is whether the District’s policies were successfully implemented, thus ensuring that the District met the required conditions.”); id. at 27 (“Indeed, evidence that the District is failing to identify, evaluate, determine eligibility for, and transition large numbers of students may necessarily reflect a failure in policies and procedures.”); id. at 34 (“While the District thoroughly details the policies it has enacted since 2010, the Court must also consider the effectiveness of these policies in achieving compliance with IDEA and D.C. law.”); id. at 38 (“[P]laintiffs’ statistics tend to show that the District’s policies-whatever they may be-have failed to ensure that eligibility determinations are timely.”) (emphases in original).
54. The Court also previously found, see Mem. Op. ¶¶ 60–63, ECF No. 294, and finds again, that the District has improved, and that its improvement, including reforms to the District’s Child Find-related policies, procedures, and practices, and the organization of the Early Stages Center, occurred during and because of this lawsuit. See accompanying Mem. Op. issued on this date, at 15–18.
55. Despite the District’s extensive testimony about the strengths of its program, see, e.g., Trial Tr., Maisterra Test., Nov. 13, 2015, 15:9–10, its deficiencies have continued, although to a lesser degree. The plaintiffs have provided evidence that corresponds specifically to the alleged harms suffered by each subclass, evidence which the District has not successfully rebutted. This evidence tends to demonstrate that despite the District’s efforts, it is failing to identify preschool-age disabled children for the purposes of offering them special education and related services, failing to timely determine the eligibility of preschool-age children for special education and related services, and failing to provide a smooth and effective transition from the early intervention program under Part C of the IDEA to preschool special education and related services under Part B by the child’s third birthday.
56. As described below, the District should be providing special education and related services to at least 8.5% of its preschool-age population. See infra paras. 59–82. The District contends that it served between 8.40% and 9.89% of that population monthly since January 2013, when it began producing monthly data. See District of Columbia Monthly Enrollment Reports, Defs.’ Ex. 53, at 5–6 (displaying a high in Mar. 2013 of 9.89%), 45–46 (displaying a low in Nov. 2014 of 8.40%); see also Pls.’ Ex. 285, at 1; Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 101. These numbers, however, are not accurate, in large part because they are calculated using an outdated census figure. See infra paras. 86–95.
57. When calculating its data appropriately (e.g., using an annual population estimate rather than the 2010 census figure), the District served a high of 8.04% of its preschool-age population in March 2013, a figure which fell nearly monthly to a low of 6.27% in November 2014. See infra para. 84. In other words, the District failed to provide special education and related services to between 98 and 515 children, varying monthly, since 2013. Id. The District contends that it is screening over half of its preschool-age population. See Trial Tr., Beers Test., Nov. 13, 2015, 21:13–18; see also Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 77–78 (describing the safeguards and procedures the city has in place to ensure that families are able to “receive developmental screenings”). Despite these efforts, at any given time, hundreds of children are still not receiving needed special education and related services.
58. Moreover, the District reported to OSEP that it provided special education and related services to 1,429 three-to-five-year-old children for 2014-2015, which amounts to only 6.19% of the District’s preschool population. See infra para. 96. That is a decline of approximately 19% since 2011 and is essentially equal to the average percentage of children served nationwide. See supra paras. 97–98. Based on its risk factors, the District should be serving substantially more children than the national average. The District is far from meeting the 8.5% benchmark.
59. OSEP tracks the percentage of children who receive special education and related services in each state and similar jurisdictions. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 44. The District has historically provided special education and related services to the lowest or near the lowest percentage of preschool-age children in the United States. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶¶ 45–46; see infra paras. 191–99; see also Mem. Op. ¶¶ 25–28, ECF No. 294. That is true despite the fact that, based on risk factors in the District, and the fact that it is the only entirely urban jurisdiction, it has the largest percentage of children who may be eligible for special education services. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶¶ 36–43; see also Mem. Op. ¶¶ 29–30, ECF No. 294. Otherwise said, the District has had the highest need for special education services, but has historically provided those services to the fewest children. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 43.
60. In 2011, the Court found that the District violated federal and District law by failing to provide Part B services to a substantial number of three-to-five-year-old children. Mem. Op. ¶¶ 111–13, ECF No. 294. The Court also found that, “on the low end, the District should expect to be serving 8.5% of its preschool-age population with Part B services.” Id. at ¶ 30. Accordingly, the Court ordered the District to “ensure that at least 8.5 percent of children between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive . . . who reside in or are wards of the District of Columbia, are enrolled in special education and related services under Part B of IDEA.” Id. at ¶ 147.
61. At the recent trial, Dr. Dunst again explained why the District should currently be serving at least 8.5% of its preschool-age population with Part B services, a figure that is in line with the Court’s benchmark set in 2011. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶¶ 29–40; Trial Tr., Dunst Test., Nov. 12, 2015, 117:25–119:7, 128:6–19. Dr. Dunst based this figure upon evidence related to risk factors in the District, comparisons to other jurisdictions, and incidences of developmental delays nationwide. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶¶ 29–40; Trial Tr., Dunst Test., Nov. 12, 2015, 117:25–119:7, 128:6–19. He explained that the relevant risk factors in the District are high, meaning that children in the District face higher risks of experiencing developmental disabilities than the national average. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶¶ 41–42. These greater risk factors contribute to the relatively high target 8.5% enrollment rate, which is a few percentage points above the national enrollment figure. Id. And importantly, these risk factors have not materially changed since 2011, when the Court first found that the 8.5% enrollment benchmark was appropriate. Id.; see also U.S. Census Bureau, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimate, Under Age 5 in Poverty, Pls.’ Ex. 193, at 4 (2007, 26.1% in poverty; 2013, 26.8% in poverty); see generally Data Related to Risk Factors, Pls.’ Ex. 287. Looking to the specific risk factors, as of the November 2015 trial, 55% of the number of children in the District live in single parent households, see Pls.’ Ex. 287, at 4126, 15% live in non-English speaking households, id. at 4130, 14% live in households where parents have less than a high school education, id. at 4131, 23% of households receive assistance through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (the highest in the country), id. at 4132, 33% live in concentrated poverty areas, id. at 4134, and 22% of families experience severe housing problems, id. at 4135.
62. Dr. Dunst’s conclusion that the District should be serving 8.5% of its preschool population is also entirely consistent with the District’s documents and Dr. Beers’ testimony at the last trial, although at that time Dr. Beers suggested that the benchmark should be even higher. The Early Stages Family Care Manual states: “Given DC’s risk factors for developmental delays, including low birth weight, poverty, and HIV/AIDS infection, DC’s projected identification rate is about 12%.” See Pls.’ Ex. 72, at DL 204. When asked at his 2011 deposition about how the 12% figure was derived, Dr. Beers testified that it was an estimation based upon the identification rates of other urban jurisdictions, namely Atlanta and Detroit, which “range[d] between 10 to 12 percent, but [the District] picked 12 percent as an aggressive target that [it] wanted people to strive towards.” Beers Dep. 61:12–62:11, Mar. 1, 2011, Pls.’ Ex. 12. At the recent trial, Dr. Beers explained that he initially looked at a range of 10-12%, and then looked at a range of 8-12%:
Trial Tr., Nov. 13, 2015, 20:22–21:6; see also Mem. Op. ¶ 30, ECF No. 294.
63. Whether it is Dr. Dunst talking about 8.5%, or Dr. Beers talking about 10 to 12% (or 8 to 12%), both individuals were addressing the percentage of children who would be served. Dr. Dunst testified that the District “should expect to be serving 8.5 percent of its preschool-age population with Part B services.” 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 40. Although other language in his direct examination made it appear as though he meant this to relate just to children who are found eligible for Part B services, he explained that he meant it as an estimate of “eligibility, enrollment, and provision of services.” Trial Tr., Dunst Test., Nov. 12, 2015, 130:15–16. Indeed, he provided extensive testimony comparing the number of children receiving special education and related services in the District with the 8.5% benchmark. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶¶ 43–88. Dr. Beers similarly explained, at the last trial, that the District’s “identification rate” relates to children receiving services. See Trial Tr., Apr. 6, 2011, Pls.’ Ex. 6, 175:23–176:18.
64. The 8.5% benchmark is also consistent with portions of Dr. Freund’s previous testimony. See Freund Dep. 57:3–7, Oct. 1, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 22 (“[I]t certainly seems to be somewhere in the 8 percent area might be the current appropriate identification of children with disabilities preschool, given the current population.”).
68. The District offers several contrary arguments. First, Dr. Freund believes that the 8.5% benchmark is arbitrary. 2015 Freund Direct ¶ 11. The Court disagrees. The Court made a reasoned conclusion based upon the evidence presented at the last trial, see Mem. Op. ¶¶ 29–30, ECF No. 294, and the findings above, including Dr. Beers and Dr. Freund’s statements, and the District’s own documents.
69. Second, Dr. Freund believes that the District has such a strong Child Find program that a numerical benchmark is unnecessary. 2015 Freund Direct ¶ 11. This argument, however, overlooks how critical it is for any organization to have a benchmark to avoid slippage. A benchmark is not necessary just for the Court to assess compliance; it is necessary for staff to understand what must be accomplished. As described above, Dr. Beers testified that, in 2009, he identified 12% as the goal because he “was asked to set forth an aggressive metric in order to make sure that we could get quick change.” Trial Tr., Nov. 13, 2015, 20:11–14.
70. The results of the District’s program confirm the need for a benchmark. Around the time of the last trial, when the District had a goal of 10 to 12%, it had a rapid rise in its enrollment rate. Trial Tr., Beers Test., Nov. 13, 2015, 20:11–21:1. However, during 2013 and 2014, around which time the District did not have an enrollment benchmark, the District’s enrollment in special education and related services fell by approximately 15%. See id. at 21:24–22:4 (stating the benchmark was abandoned); Compagnucci Dep. 32:18–33:1, June 3, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 16 (stating no enrollment benchmark was used in 2014); Maisterra Dep. 33:21–34:10, June 2, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 14 (same); infra para. 85 (showing a fall in enrollment rate).
Trial Tr., Nov. 13, 2015, 21:19–22:4. Indeed, the District discontinued its use of a benchmark even though there was not a rapid rise in the enrollment percentage, at least recently. In fact, as described below, there was a two-year drop. See infra para. 85. Moreover, the District is not currently in the 8 to 12% range. That conclusion is based on outdated census figures which the District does not use in other similar circumstances. See infra paras. 86–95. The remainder of Dr. Beers’ explanation, that he does not think that his staff would rest on their laurels, does not explain why the District would abandon a benchmark.
72. Third, Dr. Freund contends that “if the Court is inclined to ascribe compliance to a number, . . . it would be better to look for the number of children served (over 1,450 children in each month for nearly two full years) and find that this large number of children served is a sufficient one to serve a numeric proxy for programmatic compliance.” 2015 Freund Direct ¶ 11; see also Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 103 (“[S]ustained delivery of special education services to more than 1,450 children . . . constitutes strong evidence of compliance with the IDEA’s Child Find mandate.”). However, again, the number of preschool-age children with IEPs in the District fell over that two-year period and then began to rise again. See infra para. 85. Based on the District’s own measurement, 264 fewer children were receiving special education and related services in November 2014 than in March 2013, id., while at the same time the population of three-to-five-year-olds in the District was rising. See infra para. 89. This apparent backslide, coupled with the fact that the District’s three-to-five-year-old population is expected to continue to rise, see infra para. 90–91, demonstrates that any benchmark should reflect the rate of enrolled students, not the absolute number of enrolled students.
73. Relatedly, the District cites to Dr. Dunst’s 2010 testimony, where he stated the “District’s goal should be to serve between 600 and 1,100 preschool children in special education.” Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 102 (citing Trial Tr., Nov. 12, 2015, 117:2–5, 119:22–25). The District argues that this statement undercuts Dr. Dunst’s testimony and supports its argument that the current absolute number of children being served shows the District is complying with the IDEA. Id. As plaintiffs point out, this figure of 600 to 1,100 preschool children ties to Dr. Dunst’s 2009 expert report, where he wrote that “[t]he different profiles shown in Exhibit B would indicate that DCPS should be locating and serving at least 6% of the preschool population in special education, or about 1100 children.” ECF No. 358-7, at 13. At the time, six percent was that national average. Id. at 10–11.
74. Fourth, the District argues that the 8.5% is too high because that target number does not properly account for what the District called “protective factors,” that is, conditions or policies that “buffer[] children against their negative effects” of the District’s heightened risk factors, such as poverty and homeless. Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 97. For example, the District asked Dr. Dunst about how the existence of non-profits and other social organizations may reduce the number of children in need of special education and related services, see Trial Tr., Nov. 12, 2015, 123:17–124:9, 125:10–23, and Dr. Travis Wright testified on the District’s behalf that its non-profits contribute to a strong social safety net, see Trial Tr., Nov. 16, 2015, 16:24–17:14. Washington D.C.’s network of non-profits likely does indeed help to alleviate some of the negative developmental effects of risk factors like high homelessness and poverty rates, but child homelessness and poverty still exist in D.C. at staggering levels. See supra para. 61. In the Court’s view, the positive effects of such a non-profit network would materially affect the enrollment analysis if it decreased the incidence of the relevant risk factors. But to the extent that the non-profits do decrease rates of poverty and homelessness, etc., that decrease is already baked into Dr. Dunst’s analysis. In other words, the rates of the relevant risk factors are lower than they otherwise would be if D.C.’s network of non-profits did not exist. Therefore, Dr. Dunst’s analysis, which centers on risk factors, still incorporates much of the positive effects of protective factors.
75. Adding to the protective factors, Dr. Wright testified that the District’s early childhood education programs (not specific to special education) were ranked best in the country. Trial Tr., Nov. 16, 2015, 16:24–17:14. This is of course a positive development, but the District did not analyze the specific impact that those or other programs may have on the percentage of children who should receive special education and related services. See Id. at 20:14–17. Regardless of the aggregate impact of the protective factors, the 8.5% enrollment benchmark is conservative given the prevalence and impact of the District’s risk factors. See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 287, at 4131 (showing that 23% of households in D.C. receive assistance through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program-the highest in the country). Moreover, it is in line with estimates contained in internal District documents, see supra paras. 65–66, and with testimony provided by Dr. Beers in 2011. See supra para. 62. As such, the Court finds that the conservative nature of the benchmark more than accounts for any impact the protective factors may have on the analysis.
76. Fifth, the District contends that, with a benchmark, or with the wrong benchmark, there is a risk of over-identification. Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 100; Trial Tr., Wright Test., Nov. 16, 2015, 18:5–15. Such over-identification could harm children who do not need special education services by placing a label on them that could potentially last “throughout their educational career.” Trial Tr., Beers Test., Nov. 13, 2015, 2:15–24. However, if a child is referred and does not qualify for services, the child should not receive services and the District staff should understand that they should not be finding children eligible for special education services when they do not qualify. That appears to be what Dr. Freund meant when she testified that “if it over-identifies through screening, the evaluation process, [will] take care of that.” Trial Tr., Nov. 16, 2015, 32:22-24.
78. Sixth, the District argues that any benchmark should relate to children determined eligible, rather than children served, since that would comport with the identification requirement of the IDEA. See Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 93-94 (“[T]he number of preschool-age children for whom the District fulfilled its Child Find obligation (i.e., to identify, locate, and evaluate) necessarily exceeds enrollment in preschool Part B; conversely, enrollment does not directly approximate identification rates absent evidence to the contrary.”); id. at ¶ 95 (“Plaintiffs offered no reliable basis for determining how enrollment correlates to identification, location, or evaluation for Part B services.”). Moreover, Mr. Compagnucci testified that “enrollment is not a perfect proxy for Child Find because it fails to account for children who were identified but whose parents did not complete the IEP or enrollment processes, which can happen for a variety of reasons.” Compagnucci Direct ¶ 19. Indeed, the District has argued previously, in the context of class certification, that plaintiffs should be measuring identification data, not enrollment data. Defs.’ Mot. to Decertify Subclass 1 4–6, ECF No. 467. However, as described above, the 8.5% benchmark relates to children who should be receiving special education and related services, not just children who should be determined eligible for such services. See supra para. 63.
Mem. Op. 11–12, ECF No. 482.
81. Other District documents demonstrate that the District uses the terms “identification” and “enrollment” interchangeably. See, e.g., Trial Tr., Compagnucci Test., Nov. 13, 2015, 33:20–36:6 (explaining that the District’s enrollment data are generally referred to as identification data); Trial Tr., Proddutur Test., Nov. 13, 2015, 45:9–46:21 (describing the “Business rule for identification,” which relates to the calculation of enrollment data); District of Columbia Monthly Enrollment Reports 53, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, Pls.’ Ex. 189 (showing the District’s monthly data reports identifying children “Receiving Services Under IDEA Part B” and, from that, calculating a “Total Identification” percentage).
84. Based on the parties’ sampling and data agreements,[3] the District’s enrollment totals should be reduced by 2% to account for children who are not receiving special education and related services. See Pls.’ Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Individual Children 5-6, ECF No. 514-2 (showing that two children identified as enrolled in the District’s 100-child sample had not actually received services). Doing so, the District reached, since 2013, a high of 8.04% ((1,742 × 0.98)/21,221, Mar. 2013) and a subsequent low of 6.27% ((1,478 × 0.98)/23,094, Nov. 2014). See Pls.’ Ex. 285, at 1. Based on the requirement of serving 8.5% of children, these figures indicate that, on a monthly basis, the District failed to serve between 98 ((21,221 × 0.085)–(21,221 × 0.0804)) and 515 ((23,094 × 0.085)–(23,094 × 0.0627)) children. See Id. As this Court previously explained, such data “would suggest that the District has in fact failed in its obligation to locate disabled children.” Mem. Op. 35, ECF No. 444.
85. The number of preschool-age children with IEPs, as reported by the District, declined for nearly two years and only recently began to rise again. Pls.’ Ex. 285, at 1–2. In March 2013, the District hit a high of 1,742 children with IEPs. Id. After that time, the number fell by 264 to a low of 1,478 children in November 2014. Id. That is a decline of over 15%. There is no explanation for this decline. Since that low point, the number of children reported by the District as “enrolled” in Part B services has risen by 138 children, or about 9%. Id. at 1.
87. For every period from 2013 to the present, the District has calculated its enrollment percentage using, for the denominator, the population from the 2010 decennial census. Proddutur Direct ¶ 4 (“Divide that number [of children with a current eligibility determination or IEP] by the population of three-to-five year olds in the District according to the decennial census.”); District of Columbia Monthly Enrollment Reports, Pls.’ Ex. 189 (showing that the denominator each month is 17,605, the 2010 census number, from 2013 through 2015).
88. The Census Bureau prepares annual population estimates, which adjust the Bureau’s decennial census to account for birth, death, and migration rates over the intervening year. See, e.g., District of Columbia State Data Center Fact Sheet, 2012 DC Population Estimates, Pls.’ Ex. 197, at 1. It is appropriate to use the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual estimates of the District’s population instead of using the 2010 decennial census figure to calculate the enrollment rate. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶¶ 71–73; Trial Tr., Cupingood Test., Nov. 12, 2015, 45:13–46:1 (stating the 2013 census estimate is more accurate for 2013 than the 2010 decennial census number).
89. The District has artificially inflated its enrollment percentages by relying on the 2010 census figures because the District’s population of three-to-five-year-old children had risen substantially over the last five years: 2010, 17,605 (6,267 three-year-olds, 5,795 four-year-olds, and 5,543 five-year-olds); 2011, 18,905; 2012, 19,799; 2013, 21,221; 2014, 23,094. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 73; U.S. Census Bureau 2014 Population Estimates, District of Columbia, Pls.’ Ex. 196, at 1, 4, 7, 10.
90. These numbers are likely to continue to rise. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 73. In the 2014 census estimate, the number of children ages zero, one, and two total 26,485, which is over 3,000 children more than the three-to-five-year-old estimate. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2014 Population Estimates, District of Columbia, Pls.’ Ex. 196, at 10; 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 73.
91. This substantial growth is mirrored by the District’s projections for enrollment in school, which it uses for budgetary purposes. The projected enrollment rate for children in prekindergarten 3, prekindergarten 4, and kindergarten (or, as described with regard to charter schools, pre-school, pre-kindergarten, and kindergarten) for 2012 (the budget for which issued in 2011) was 16,814 (9,524 for DCPS and 7,290 for charter schools). District of Columbia FY2012 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan, vol. 3, Pls.’ Ex. 190, at D-19, D-52. The corresponding projected enrollment rate for 2016 is 19,549 (10,142 for DCPS and 9,407 for charter schools). District of Columbia FY2016 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan, vol. 3, Pls.’ Ex. 191, at E-1, D-77.
93. Therefore, is not surprising that the Census Bureau’s annual population estimates are required for purposes of grant determinations under the IDEA and are used by OSEP, OSSE, other District agencies and other states, for analysis of data related to these and other issues outside of this litigation. More specifically, the IDEA states that, “[f]or purposes of making grants, the Secretary [of Education] shall use the most recent population data, including data on children living in poverty, that are available and satisfactory to the Secretary.” 20 U.S.C. § 1411(d)(3)(A)(ii). Additionally, the annual population estimate is used by OSEP for its annual Child Count. Department of Education. See 36th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 182, at 6 (“In this report [which catalogs Child Count data], annual resident population estimates for the 50 states and the District of Columbia were used to determine the percentages of the resident population served under IDEA, Part C and Part B, and to develop comparisons and conduct data analyses.”); id. at 98–99 (“Percentage for each state was calculated by dividing the number of children ages 3 through 5 served under IDEA, Part B, by the state in the year by the estimated U.S. resident population ages 3 through 5 in the state for that year, then multiplying the result by 100.”); 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 71.
94. The District uses the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual population estimate to report data related to the percent of children receiving Part C services. The District is required to report to OSEP the “Percent of infants and toddlers birth to 3 with IFSPs compared to national data.” FFY 2013 Part C State Performance Plan (“SPP”)/Annual Performance Report (“APR”), Pls.’ Ex. 241, at DL2015 3695. To calculate that percentage, the District used as its denominator what it referred to as the “U.S. Census Annual State Resident Population Estimates April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013,” which it identified as 26,517 children. Id. That was the Census Bureau’s annual population estimate for children up to age 3 for 2013 as of the time of the District’s publication. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2013 Population Estimates, District of Columbia, Pls.’ Ex. 195, at 7 (totaling 9,111, 8,680, and 8,726 for zero-to-two-year-olds, inclusive).
d. The District’s Child Count percentage is also falling
96. Every year, the District and the states are required to provide OSEP with “Child Count” data, which is the number of children in that jurisdiction receiving special education and related services. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 44; 34 C.F.R. 300.641(a) (“report the number of children with disabilities receiving special education and related services”); 34 C.F.R. 300.644 (“report children with disabilities who are enrolled in a school or program . . . that-(a) Provides them with both special education and related services . . . .”); OSEP EDFacts Submission System ages 3-5, Pls.’ Ex. 183, at 6 (“Include all children with disabilities (IDEA) who are ages 3 through 5 receiving special education and related services according to an individual education program or services plan on the count date.”). Enrollment should be measured in this case too by the receipt of the prescribed special education and related services.
OSEP compares the District’s and states’ Child Count data to the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual population estimates for each jurisdiction to determine the percentage of preschool-age children enrolled in Part B services. This Court relied upon those percentages in prior years when it concluded that the District failed to provide special education and related services to sufficient numbers of children. Mem. Op. & Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 23–32, ECF No. 294. The District’s Child Count percentages for 3-5-year-olds are 7.6% for 2011-2012, 7.9% for 2012-2013, and 6.8% for 2013-2014. OSEP Part B Data Display 2015, Pls.’ Ex. 248, at 1. OSEP has not yet produced its report that identifies the Child Count percentages for the 2014-2015 school year. 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 61. However, for that year, the District reported to OSEP that it provided IEP’s to 1,429 children (237 3-year-olds, 511 4-year-olds, and 681 5-year-olds), which is only 6.19% of the 2014 population of 3-5-year-olds. 2014 Child Count Report, Pls. Ex. 292, at DL2015 5960; 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 61.
97. That is a decline of approximately 19% from 2011 to 2014. The District has claimed that these OSEP data show lower service rates than the rates produced to plaintiffs in this litigation because OSEP does not permit OSSE to include in the count children for whom the District lacks certain information, such as a description of the educational environment in which the child receives services. Maisterra Dep. 348:1–9, 349:17–20, 350:1–4, July 2, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 18. The educational environment is where the child is receiving services. OSSE 2014 Enrollment Audit Manual Supplement: Child Count Guide, Sept. 22, 2014, Pls.’ Ex. 188, at 10; 2015 Dunst Direct, ECF No. ¶ 83. The District would not have this information if the child had not begun receiving services. However, if the child had begun receiving services and the District still lacked that or other required information, that demonstrates a significant problem with the District’s data management. Id.
98. As described above, the Child Count rate is now 6.19%. See supra para. 96. That is essentially equal to the most recent national average for 3-5-year-olds, which is 6.2%. OSEP Data Display: District of Columbia, Identification of Children with Disabilities, 2015, Pls.’ Ex. 248, at 1; see also 2015 Dunst Direct ¶ 88. It should be much higher given the risk factors in the District. See supra para. 61. It also should be rising, not falling. This means that many children are not receiving needed special education and related services.
E. TIMELY ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS