Source: https://casetext.com/case/flagler-v-trainor
Timestamp: 2020-02-18 01:58:38
Document Index: 169579841

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 700', '§ 250', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

Flagler v. Trainor, 663 F.3d 543 | Casetext
(Dkt. No. 32.) Upon review, the Second Circuit affirmed so much of the dismissal as "found Trainor absolutely…
Harvey v. Town of Greenwich
The Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 "may provide a remedy for [a plaintiff] insofar as [the…
Full title:Stephanie FLAGLER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Matthew E. TRAINOR, Assistant…
Date published: Nov 21, 2011
663 F.3d 543 (2d Cir. 2011)
holding that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from the plaintiff's allegations that he made false statements within his function as an advocate and distinguishing cases denying absolute prosecutorial immunity for wrongdoing in connection with administrative or investigatory tasks
Summary of this case from McClenic v. Shmettan
Appeal from an order and judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McCurn, J. ), which granted Defendants–Appellees' motion to dismiss Plaintiff–Appellant's complaint in its entirety based on absolute prosecutorial immunity.Defendants–Appellees moved the district court to dismiss Plaintiff–Appellant's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Defendant–Appellee Matthew Trainor, a Fulton County Assistant District Attorney, was absolutely immune from Plaintiff–Appellant's claims. 1 We conclude that the district court correctly found Trainor absolutely immune from liability for making alleged false statements in support of a material witness order and warrant.We also conclude, however, that the district court erred by finding Trainor absolutely immune from Plaintiff–Appellant's other claims. Because absolute immunity only extends to conduct related to prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with initiating or presenting the State's case, it does not immunize prosecutors from liability for: (1) making defamatory statements to the press; (2) accessing a person's voicemail without consent; or (3) persuading a party to a conversation to record its contents. We also vacate and remand for the district court to consider in the first instance whether immunity extends to Trainor's decision to “preserve” evidence after the criminal prosecution has run its course.We express no view as to the substantive viability of these claims. We simply conclude that absolute immunity does not shield this conduct.AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part.Bradford Benson, the Golden Law Firm, Utica, NY, for Plaintiff–Appellant. Thomas Higgs, Murphy, Burns, Barber & Murphy, LLP, Albany, NY, for Defendants–Appellees.
Appeal from an order and judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McCurn, J.), which granted Defendants–Appellees' motion to dismiss Plaintiff–Appellant's complaint in its entirety based on absolute prosecutorial immunity.Defendants–Appellees moved the district court to dismiss Plaintiff–Appellant's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Defendant–Appellee Matthew Trainor, a Fulton County Assistant District Attorney, was absolutely immune from Plaintiff–Appellant's claims. We conclude that the district court correctly found Trainor absolutely immune from liability for making alleged false statements in support of a material witness order and warrant.We also conclude, however, that the district court erred by finding Trainor absolutely immune from Plaintiff–Appellant's other claims. Because absolute immunity only extends to conduct related to prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with initiating or presenting the State's case, it does not immunize prosecutors from liability for: (1) making defamatory statements to the press; (2) accessing a person's voicemail without consent; or (3) persuading a party to a conversation to record its contents. We also vacate and remand for the district court to consider in the first instance whether immunity extends to Trainor's decision to “preserve” evidence after the criminal prosecution has run its course.We express no view as to the substantive viability of these claims. We simply conclude that absolute immunity does not shield this conduct.AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part.Bradford Benson, the Golden Law Firm, Utica, NY, for Plaintiff–Appellant. Thomas Higgs, Murphy, Burns, Barber & Murphy, LLP, Albany, NY, for Defendants–Appellees.
Flagler sued Fulton County, but has abandoned those claims. See Flagler v. Trainor, No. 08–cv–138, 2010 WL 3724015, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2010). In addition, Flagler has clarified that she only sued Trainor in his individual capacity; she does not sue him in his official capacity.
A. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity.
In this case, the standard of review is well known and not at issue. “We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 685 (2d Cir.2001). We will “affirm only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
3. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991).
4. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).
6. Burns, 500 U.S. at 492–96, 111 S.Ct. 1934.
7. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276–78, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993).
8. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129–31, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997).
The criteria for accumulating strikes under § 1915(g) track only two of the three grounds for dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). They do not include immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Nonetheless, we have held that under certain circumstances, a district court making the “three-strikes” determination under § 1915(g) may deem a prior dismissal on account of immunity as frivolous. Collazo, 656 F.3d at 134, Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir.2011).
Prosecutors are generally immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct in furtherance of prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with initiating or presenting the State's case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Section 1983 immunity is grounded in the prosecutor's common law tort immunity. That immunity arises from the “concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust.” Id. at 423, 96 S.Ct. 984. “[I]f the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time [an aggrieved defendant] charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.” Id. at 425, 96 S.Ct. 984. Immunity protects the proper functioning of the prosecutor's office by insulating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997).
To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest. It would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. 424 U.S. at 427–28, 96 S.Ct. 984; see also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949). Thus, while absolute prosecutorial immunity may leave an injured party without a remedy, society has found more benefit in insulating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
That being said, the Supreme Court has clarified that immunity is not a function of the prosecutor's title. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125, 127, 118 S.Ct. 502. Rather, it attaches to prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with initiating or presenting the State's case. Id. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit only when acting as advocates and when their conduct involves the exercise of discretion. Id. at 127, 118 S.Ct. 502. Thus, the Supreme Court has found prosecutors absolutely immune from suit for alleged misconduct during a probable cause hearing, in initiating a prosecution, and in presenting the State's case. On the other hand, the Court has withheld absolute immunity for conduct unrelated to advocacy, such as giving legal advice, holding a press conference, or acting as a complaining witness.
Flagler contends that by making sworn factual statements in support of the order, Trainor was acting as a complaining witness rather than as an advocate. In Kalina v. Fletcher, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor was not absolutely immune from liability for making false statements in support of an arrest warrant. There, the prosecutor provided a “Certification for Determination of Probable Cause” that summarized the evidence supporting the arrest warrant. 522 U.S. at 121, 118 S.Ct. 502. Rather than attaching to the motion an affidavit from a witness with personal knowledge of facts, the prosecutor “personally vouched for the truth of the facts set forth in the certification.” Id.
The certification included two inaccurate factual statements, id.; the charges against the defendant were eventually dismissed, id. at 122, 118 S.Ct. 502. The former defendant sued the prosecutor under Section 1983 “based on [the prosecutor's] alleged violation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Id. The prosecutor moved for summary judgment based on absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court denied immunity and both the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 122–23, 118 S.Ct. 502.
After surveying the history of prosecutorial immunity, the Supreme Court recognized immunity's two important functions: (1) “protecting the prosecutor from harassing litigation that would divert [the prosecutor's] time and attention from his official duties”; and (2) “the interest in enabling [the prosecutor] to exercise independent judgment when deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court.” Id. at 125, 118 S.Ct. 502 (internal quotation omitted). The Court recognized that the second function—insulating the prosecutor's discretion when acting as advocate—was of “primary importance.” Id. But sworn statements in support of an arrest warrant were not intimately associated with a prosecutor's duty to advocate. Rather, offering sworn statements was an “act that any competent witness might have performed.” Id. at 129–30, 118 S.Ct. 502. The prosecutor was acting as a complaining witness, not as an advocate; “[t]estifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer.” Id. at 130, 118 S.Ct. 502. The Court also noted that “neither federal nor state law made it necessary for the prosecutor to make [the factual assertion].” Id. at 129, 118 S.Ct. 502.
The Court held that preparing and drafting of the certification was protected by absolute immunity because it was intimately associated with a prosecutors's advocacy. It was only the act of “personally attesting to the truth of the averments” that went beyond the prosecutor's duty to advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129, 118 S.Ct. 502.
Seeking a material witness order is within the prosecutor's “function” as an advocate. A prosecutor employs prosecutorial discretion when determining whether to seek such an order. See Betts v. Richard, 726 F.2d 79, 79 (2d Cir.1984) ; Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 69 (7th Cir.1978). It is an act “intimately associated” with presenting the State's case. The material witness order ensures the attendance of a “material” witness at trial, which often makes or breaks the prosecutor's case.
In Betts v. Richard, 726 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.1984), we held that a prosecutor who had obtained a writ of capias (essentially the Connecticut equivalent of a material witness warrant) to ensure the presence of the complaining witness at a criminal trial was immune from liability under § 1983. It is arguable that Betts is controlling authority in this circuit, subject only to whether Kalina abrogates its precedential force. Because we believe that absolute immunity applies even on the analysis set forth in Kalina, and would reach the same result even if Betts had never been decided, we do not need to decide whether Kalina sets forth a sufficiently novel analysis to require us to rethink the Betts precedent. See Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. INS, 336 F.3d 200, 210 (2d Cir.2003) (setting forth the standard for when we may disregard circuit authority in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent). It follows from our analysis that while the Betts court did not have the benefit of Kalina, and applied a somewhat different framework derived from earlier cases, its result would survive any rethinking that Kalina might require.
FN11. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 213, 215–16 (3d Cir.2008). In Odd, the Third Circuit held that keeping the court informed about the status of a criminal proceeding (which could affect a material witness's continued detention) was an administrative task. The court recognized, however, that securing a material witness's attendance at trial was shielded by absolute immunity. Id. at 212. That is the case before us; Flagler challenges Trainor's conduct that was intimately associated with his securing her attendance at trial as a material witness.
Nevertheless, Flagler argues that the Third and Ninth Circuits have denied absolute prosecutorial immunity for wrongdoing in connection with prosecutorial functions. Flagler, however, fails to recognize that the wrongdoing in those cases was either administrative in nature or akin to the function of law enforcement officers in protecting the public safety by making a complaint of wrongdoing. Therefore, notwithstanding Flagler's arguments to the contrary, we find Trainor absolutely immune for making alleged false statements in support of a material witness order and warrant.
In Cruz v. Kauai County, the Ninth Circuit denied absolute immunity because the prosecutor's conduct—swearing to facts in support of a bail revocation—was akin to conduct of a complaining witness, even though Hawaii law restricted authority to seek bail revocation to a prosecutor. 279 F.3d 1064, 1067–68 (9th Cir.2002). We recognize that our holding may be in tension with Cruz. In Cruz, however, the district court granted only qualified immunity, so the Ninth Circuit's discussion about absolute immunity is largely dicta. And, we believe that in seeking a material witness warrant, despite signing an affidavit, the prosecutor is intimately involved in advocacy—assembling and presenting the State's case.
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Supreme Court held that “statements to the media are not entitled to absolute immunity.” 509 U.S. 259, 277, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). The Court explained that while absolute immunity shields statements made during a judicial proceeding, it does not shield statements made outside court. Id. The Court reasoned: “The conduct of a press conference does not involve the initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the State's case in court, or actions preparatory for these functions.” Id. at 278, 113 S.Ct. 2606. The Court recognized that while statements to the press may be an “integral part” of the prosecutor's job, the duty is no different than that for other executives who deal with the press and enjoy only qualified immunity. Id. Because absolute immunity does not shield statements made to the press, the district court erred by dismissing Flagler's defamation claim on account of absolute immunity.
We have no trouble concluding that Trainor is not absolutely immune from allegedly accessing, or ordering someone to access, Flagler's voicemail without her consent, or from persuading Becker's ex-wife to record telephone calls with Flagler. The alleged misconduct is akin to investigatory acts, and absolute immunity does not shield investigatory acts. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). As a result, the district court erred by dismissing Flagler's claims on this ground.
We take no position on whether these acts occurred or whether they would constitute actionable misconduct if they did. In general, so long as one party to a conversation consents to its recording, the recording is lawful under both New York and federal law. See N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 700.05; N.Y. Penal Law § 250.00; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971).
In Collazo, we held that claims dismissed on the ground of absolute prosecutorial immunity are considered “frivolous” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the “three-strikes” provision.1 Id. at 134. We expressly limited our holding to cases in the “readily distinguishable heartland of immune prosecutorial conduct that [is] ... ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Id. n. 2 (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991)). We also excluded “cases in which the complaint is not dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id.
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