Source: http://de.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191004_0000915.DDE.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 17:46:14
Document Index: 387127663

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3729', '§ 1332', '§ 1915', '§ 3728', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

FindACase™ | Genrette v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.
Genrette v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.
ANDREA GENRETTE, Plaintiff,
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., et al., Defendants.
Andrea Genrette, New Castle, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Plaintiff Andrea Genrette (“Plaintiff), filed this action for “a declaratory judgment, reapplication of debt forgiveness, ” and pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729. (D.I. 2). She appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4). Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction by reason of diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court proceeds to review and screen the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff owns real property in New Castle, Delaware. As alleged, Defendant Bank of New York Mellon Trust, NA. (“Bank of NY Mellon”) is a nationally chartered trust company with offices throughout the United States that is headquartered in Los Angeles, California, operates as a subsidiary of The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, and acts as the Trustee for Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-RS8. (D.I. 2 ¶¶ 4, 5). Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) is a for-profit entity that offers residential mortgage loans and its loan servicing includes customer service, collections, investor accounting, escrow, loss mitigation, foreclosure, and property disposition. (Id. ¶ 6). Ocwen is based in West Palm Beach, Florida, and operates as a subsidiary of Ocwen Financial Corp. (Id.).
Plaintiff purchased the real property at issue in 2004. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff sought, and was granted, a loan modification with previous servicer GMAC, but it was never recorded. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20). Plaintiff alleges that the debt forgiveness was removed by GMAC upon approval of the 2010 loan modification and that GMAC reported the deduction to the IRS in 2010. (Id. ¶ 59).
Plaintiff alleges that when Ocwen obtained servicing rights of the underlying loan in February 2013, it acknowledged the principal debt forgiveness, yet reapplied the $23, 954.82 and, without reason or justification, placed the amount back on Plaintiff's outstanding balance. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 60). When the loan was transferred in 2013, there was no verification or recordation of the balance, terms, and conditions. (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff alleges the amount - distinguishable from the 2010 principal forgiveness amount of $23, 954.82 - was to be removed from Bank of NY Mellon and Ocwen shortly after the transfer from GMAC. (Id. ¶ 22). In 2014, the loan was reinstated through settlement with the Delaware Housing Authority due to a change in Plaintiff's employment and a decrease in annual income. (Id. ¶ 23). In June 2014, settlement funds were paid to Ocwen on behalf of Plaintiff's account. (Id. ¶ 23).
On August 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.[1] (Id. ¶ 27). On October 1, 2015, Bank of NY Mellon prepared, filed, and recorded an assignment of mortgage transferring an interest in the real property at issue to Bank of NY Mellon as trustee. (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff contests the validity of the assignment of mortgage. (Id. ¶ 25). Plaintiff alleges that she tendered payments to Ocwen well before the October 1, 2015 assignment, and it is impossible for Bank of NY Mellon to have standing or an interest in the property as of 2015 if Ocwen had been accepting payments. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33). Plaintiff alleges that Bank of NY Mellon, as trustee, was never properly assigned an interest in the property and that the assignment is void as being in contravention of the terms and conditions delineated in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 38). Plaintiff alleges that an actual controversy exists between Plaintiff and Bank of NY Mellon as to any rights or interests Bank of NY Mellon may have in the subject property. (Id. ¶ 43).
The Complaint alleges that Bank of NY Mellon filed a void assignment of mortgage with the County Recorder's Office and asserted an unlawful interest in the property at issue knowing that it had no legal interest in the property. (Id. ¶¶ 46-48). The Complaint alleges that Bank of NY Mellon knew that the assignment was fraudulent as a matter of law, knew at the time of recordation of the assignment that Plaintiff was under Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection, and attempted to perfect a post-petition title to the property. (Id. ¶¶ 52-55).
Count I, raised against Bank of NY Mellon, seeks declaratory judgment to deem the assignment of mortgage void as a matter of law; Count II, raised against Bank of NY Mellon, alleges violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3728; and Count III, appears to be raised against Ocwen, and seeks reapplication of the loan forgiveness amount.
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and her Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;An action is frivolous if it &ldquo;lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.&rdquo; Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. &sect; 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is &ldquo;based on an indisputably meritless legal theory&rdquo; or a &ldquo;clearly baseless&rdquo; or &ldquo;fantastic or delusional&rdquo; factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 ...