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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1394', '§ 1404', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1404', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 6', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1391', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 6', '§ 12', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 6']

EX PARTE COLLETT, 337 U. S. 55 - Volume 337 - 1949 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 337 > EX PARTE COLLETT, 337 U. S. 55 (1949) > Full Text
EX PARTE COLLETT, 337 U. S. 55 (1949)
No. 206, Misc.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRITS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a Federal District Court in which an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act had been brought transferred it to a District Court in another District, on the ground that this would serve the convenience of parties and witnesses and be in the interest of justice. Petitioner moved in this Court for leave to file a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. The case was assigned for hearing on the notion. 335 U.S. 897. Motion denied, p. 337 U. S. 72.
Page 337 U. S. 56
The court below found that all 35 witnesses and the petitioner himself live in Irvine, Kentucky, which also was the scene of the accident; that Irvine is 420 miles, "approximately twenty-four hours . . . by public transportation," from East St. Louis, where the court below sits, but only 26 miles from Richmond and 48 from Lexington, in which two cities the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky sits. Furthermore, the court below determined that jury schedules at both Richmond and Lexington made early trial possible. Thus, concluding that the transfer would serve the convenience of parties and witnesses, and would be in the interest of
Page 337 U. S. 57
justice, the District Court granted the Railroad's motion. Petitioner then filed directly in this Court a
This is § 1404(a). The reviser's notes, which accompany
Page 337 U. S. 58
each section of the Code, here read as follows:
The only suggestion petitioner offers in this regard is that "any civil action" embraces only those actions for which special venue requirements are prescribed in §§ 1394-1403 of Revised Title 28, [Footnote 7] since these sections
Page 337 U. S. 59
immediately precede § 1404(a), and all are within the Venue Chapter, §§ 1391-1406, inclusive, of the Code. To accept this contention, we would be required completely to disregard the Congressional admonition that "No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28 . . . in which any section is placed. . . ." [Footnote 8] Furthermore, petitioner's argument proves too much: §§ 1391-1393, which also are in the Venue Chapter and also refer to "any civil action," would be read as applying only to actions for which special venue requirements are established in neighboring sections of the Code, although they were obviously intended by Congress to be the general venue sections applicable to ordinary actions. It seems more reasonable to hold that § 1404(a) in terms applies generally, i.e., to "any civil action."
Second. Although petitioner wishes to restrict the literal meaning of "any civil action," he would expand the sense of "may transfer . . . to any other district or division where it might have been brought" beyond the exact scope of those words. Obviously, the express language gives no clue as to where the action "might have been brought." Yet the essence of petitioner's position is that the order below, transferring his suit, effects a repeal of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which granted him the right to sue in any district "in which the defendant
Page 337 U. S. 60
shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action." [Footnote 9]
The Code therefore does not repeal § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We agree with petitioner that Congress had no such intention, as demonstrated by its failure to list the section in the meticulously prepared schedule of statutes repealed. [Footnote 11] We cannot agree that the order before us effectuates an implied repeal. The inapplicability of forum non conveniens to Liability Act
Page 337 U. S. 61
suits derives from the Kepner decision. And there, this Court expressly stated that, "[i]f it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative. . . ." 314 U.S. at 314 U. S. 54. That opinion discusses § 6 of the Liability Act, to be sure, but this Court did not and could not suggest that the legislative answer had necessarily to be addressed to that section. Since the words selected by Congress for § 6 denote nothing one way or the other respecting forum non conveniens, there was no occasion to repeal that section, expressly or impliedly; Congress chose to remove its judicial gloss via another statute. Discussion of the law of implied repeals is therefore irrelevant.
Nevertheless, we need not rest our decision on it solely. For the legislative history does not support petitioner's position. Petitioner's argument is based on these twin premises: Congress intended no "controversial change" to be incorporated in the Code, and § 1404(a) is such a change.
Page 337 U. S. 62
Petitioner does not offer any definition of "controversial," but he does point to one concrete example of what he regards as a "controversial" measure. This is the
Page 337 U. S. 63
Jennings Bill, [Footnote 15] which was under consideration in the House in the spring of 1947, as was the Code revision. [Footnote 16] The Jennings Bill and § 1404(a) of the Code meet the same problem, the alleged abuses in the selection of
Page 337 U. S. 64
forums for Liability Act suits. [Footnote 17] But the Jennings Bill was far more drastic than § 1404(a). The Jennings Bill would in large part have repealed § 6 of the Liability Act. It would have delimited the available forum for actions brought in state, as well as federal, courts. [Footnote 18] It would have eliminated the right to sue in any district in which the railroad did business. Initially, this applied only to Federal Employers' Liability Act plaintiffs, but, in final draft, the Jennings Bill generally restricted all, including passengers, who might sue railroads for personal injuries. Inasmuch as none of these changes in the law was contained in the Code, it is evident that § 1404(a) might well be considered, "noncontroversial" by the same Congress which would regard the Jennings Bill as "controversial." [Footnote 19]
Page 337 U. S. 65
This was scarcely hasty, ill considered legislation. To the contrary, it received close and prolonged study. Five years of Congressional attention supports the Code. [Footnote 20] And, from the start, Congress obtained the most eminent expert assistance available. The spadework was entrusted to two law book publishing firms, the staffs of which had unique experience in statutory codification and revision. [Footnote 21]
Page 337 U. S. 66
They formed an advisory committee, including distinguished judges and members of the bar, and obtained the services of special consultants. [Footnote 22] Furthermore, an advisory committee was appointed by the Judicial Conference. [Footnote 23] And, to assist with matters relating to the jurisdiction of this Court, Chief Justice Stone appointed an advisory committee, consisting of himself and JUSTICES FRANKFURTER and DOUGLAS. [Footnote 24]
That these experts assisted in drafting the Code does not mean that Congress blindly approved what outsiders did. This is demonstrated, for example, by the statement of Representative Robsion, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee at the hearing conducted by his
Page 337 U. S. 67
Subcommittee in 1947.
"The committee on revision of the laws in the preparation of those preliminary
Page 337 U. S. 68
drafts sought to give them the widest possible circulation. We made certain that every member of the legislature got one; we made certain that they were sent to every United States attorney; that they were sent to every member of the Federal judiciary; that they were sent to the appropriate committees of the leading State and local bar associations; that they were sent to everyone who ever evidenced any interest in the work at all. [Footnote 27]"
"Subsection (a) is new. It was drafted in accordance with a memorandum of Mar. 7, 1945, from the author of Moore's Federal Practice, stating that recognition should be given the doctrine
Page 337 U. S. 69
of forum non conveniens. . . . [Footnote 29]"
In the Eightieth Congress, under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, [Footnote 31] the Code revision passed to
Page 337 U. S. 70
the jurisdiction of the House Judiciary Committee and was assigned to a Subcommittee of which Representative Robsion of Kentucky was Chairman. At the hearing before this Subcommittee, Professor James William Moore of Yale University, special consultant to the revisers, in summarizing the Code proposals, testified that there were "changes of importance" in the law of venue and specifically mentioned § 1404. [Footnote 32] In April, 1947, the House Judiciary Committee reported the bill with a unanimous recommendation that it be passed. [Footnote 33] This Report again fully reprinted the reviser's notes. In this Report, the section entitled "Examples of Changes in Law," which had appeared in the Report on the revision in the preceding Session of Congress, expressly referred to the reviser's notes for §§ 1391-1406. [Footnote 34]
After this painstaking consideration, with its references to § 1404(a), the House initially passed the bill on July 7, 1947. [Footnote 35] At that time and in the subsequent consideration in the Senate, the Tax Court provisions occasioned the most discussion; but other specific sections did not pass unnoticed. Attention was directly called to § 1404(a) by one witness at the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Judiciary Subcommittee, although his interest was not in the Federal Employers' Liability Act issue. [Footnote 36] No change in § 1404(a) was included in the Senate amendments, and the revision of Title 28 was enacted by the Congress in June, 1948. [Footnote 37]
Page 337 U. S. 71
Fourth. Petitioner suggests that his action may not be transferred because, it was instituted prior to the effective date of the Code. Clearly, § 1404(a) is a remedial provision applicable to pending actions. And "[n]o one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure. . . ." Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 258 U. S. 147 (1922). [Footnote 38]
Page 337 U. S. 72
One is that, in my view, § 1404(a), taken broadly to include "any civil action," does effect a partial repeal of
Page 337 U. S. 73
§ 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act and of the other statutes mentioned by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, including the venue provisions, § 12, of the Clayton Act, involved in our decision in United States v. National City Lines, 334 U. S. 573.
In the second place, those changes, although entirely within Congress' power to make, were neither insubstantial nor noncontroversial, in view of the legislative history of the original provisions, for example, the venue provisions of the Clayton Act. Nor do I think the legislative history of § 1404(a) demonstrates either the insubstantial or the noncontroversial nature of the changes in § 1404(a), although they seem to have been so treated by those in charge of the bill. [Footnote 2/2] It is to be noted, moreover, that
Page 337 U. S. 74
specific attention was drawn to the effect of § 1404(a) upon § 6 of the Employers' Liability Act through reference to the Kepner and Miles decisions, but no like specific reference was made to the venue provisions of the Clayton Act and the National City Lines decision.
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