Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/681/605/405212/
Timestamp: 2020-07-11 09:02:37
Document Index: 259115036

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 404', '§ 416', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 404']

Kyle Doran, a Minor, by His Next Friend, Doris Clark,plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard S. Schweiker,* Secretary, United Statesdepartment of Health and Human Services,defendant-appellee, 681 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1982 › Kyle Doran, a Minor, by His Next Friend, Doris Clark,plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard S. Schweiker,*...
Kyle Doran, a Minor, by His Next Friend, Doris Clark,plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard S. Schweiker,* Secretary, United Statesdepartment of Health and Human Services,defendant-appellee, 681 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 681 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982) Argued and Submitted Jan. 13, 1982. Decided July 13, 1982
The issue in this case is how much support an impoverished father must contribute to render his illegitimate posthumous child eligible for Social Security Child's insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii).
* Kyle Doran, an illegitimate child, claims entitlement to Social Security Child's insurance benefits. To establish eligibility, he must prove that his father, at death, was "contributing to the applicant's support" under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii).1 He presented the following undisputed evidence through affidavits and testimony at his Social Security Administration hearing.
The first issue is what test this court should adopt to determine whether a father was contributing sufficient support to his unborn illegitimate child to render the child eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii). The statute states that an illegitimate child is eligible for benefits if he can prove his father, at death, was "contributing to the support of the applicant." The statute is silent on the issue of the required amount of support; it contains no language suggesting how much or how often the father must contribute support to render his posthumous child eligible for survivor benefits.
The construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to deference if it has a "reasonable basis in law." Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261, 272, 88 S. Ct. 929, 935, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1968). However, "(r)eviewing courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute." NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S. Ct. 980, 988, 13 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1965).
The Social Security Act is remedial, to be construed liberally. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). The primary purpose of the social security scheme at issue is to provide support for dependents. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634, 94 S. Ct. 2496, 2500, 41 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1974). We find merit in other courts' determinations that the Act's remedial purposes are not served by the Secretary's test. In Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit implied that in cases involving illegitimate posthumous births, the Secretary's test is not rationally related to the Act's remedial goals: "An unborn child is totally dependent upon its mother for its human needs. Thus, a legal requirement that the father's support of the unborn child must be 'regular' and 'continuous' is purposeless." The Sixth Circuit characterized the Secretary's test as "ludicrous," even when not applied to illegitimate posthumous births:
In sum, the Secretary can find no support for a "regular and substantial" test in the remedial goals of the Act. The Secretary nonetheless contends the "regular and substantial" test more effectively promotes administrative convenience, and is thus the more appropriate test under Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1976), which held that administrative convenience is a constitutionally permissible rationale for congressional distinctions on the basis of illegitimacy to determine eligibility for Social Security benefits. Id. at 509, 96 S. Ct. at 2764. The Secretary argues that because the Adams test provides only vague guidelines, its resulting case-by-case adjudication hinders the efficient administration of the Act.
Doran, also relying on Lucas, responds that even if the Secretary's test promotes administrative convenience, this rationale is constitutionally impermissible if it conclusively denies illegitimate children the opportunity to establish their eligibility for benefits. See id. at 512, 96 S. Ct. at 2765; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635-36, 94 S. Ct. 2496, 2501, 41 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1974). The Secretary concedes that the government may not irrebuttably presume that certain illegitimate children are ineligible, but claims the "regular and substantial" test does not deny an illegitimate child the opportunity to demonstrate his father's support. The Secretary contends his test merely requires the child to prove his father's support was regular and substantial.
The Secretary's test does not deny all illegitimate children the opportunity to prove their father's support, but, as the Second Circuit found, it "would prevent almost all posthumous (illegitimate) children from qualifying" for survivor benefits. Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). Indeed, in this case, the mother left the improverished father against his will, undermining both the father's opportunity to support his unborn child and the posthumous child's opportunity to prove his father's support was "regular and substantial." Cf. Mills v. Habluetzel, --- U.S. ----, 102 S. Ct. 1549, 1553, 71 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1982) (one-year state statute of limitations for illegitimate children to prove paternity held unconstitutional because it provides "an opportunity so truncated that few could utilize it effectively"). Because the "regular and substantial" test denies virtually all posthumous illegitimate children the ability to demonstrate their father's support, the Secretary cannot rely on a claim that his test promotes administrative convenience.
We conclude that the Secretary's "regular and substantial" test improperly interprets the statutory mandate and frustrates the goals of the Social Security Act. We therefore refuse to adopt the "regular and substantial" test to determine whether an impoverished father was "contributing to the support" of his illegitimate child under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii). We instead agree with Doran that the Adams test is substantially related to the Act's remedial goals, affording applicants like Doran the opportunity to prove eligibility for benefits. Yet it effectively weeds out spurious claims by placing the burden on the applicant to prove his father's paternity and support, see Lucas, 427 U.S. at 503 n.7, 96 S. Ct. at 2761 n.7. We therefore adopt the Adams test, whether the father's support "was commensurate with the needs of the unborn child at the time of the father's death." 521 F.2d at 660. In keeping with the Act's remedial goals, we also take into account the economic circumstances of the child's father in determining whether, at death, he was "contributing to the applicant's support." See Boyland v. Califano, 633 F.2d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying a test "whether the contributions that were made to the support of his children were important to them given their needs and the wage earner's economic circumstances and ability to support"). See also Parker v. Schweiker, 673 F.2d 160, 163 (6th Cir. 1982) ("the 'support requirement' ... must be evaluated in light of the father and child's actual circumstances").
The next issue is whether the ALJ, in reaching his conclusion that Doran was ineligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii), correctly applied the Adams test, and examined whether the father's support was "commensurate with the needs of the unborn child at the time of the father's death."
The ALJ's finding that Mace, an insured individual, was the natural father of Kyle Doran is undisputed. Doran has thus fulfilled the first requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii).
The ALJ also found that Mace "fail(ed) to make any significant attempt to meet his obligations as a prospective father." To reach that decision, he had to discount Mace's two tangible contributions to Ms. Clark's support, his help in moving her to the ranch and his repairs to her roof, which had cash value. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.366(a) (1) (1981). The ALJ found that "(t)he roof repair ennured (sic) more to the landlord's benefit than to the mother and child because of their relatively short use of the premises." The evidence shows that, as soon as Ms. Clark called, Mace came to fix her cabin in a rainstorm. No evidence was offered to show that the landlord would have repaired the roof. Even if Mace's repairs incidentally benefited the landlord, protecting a mother and her unborn child from the elements certainly constitutes "contributing to the support of the applicant" under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii).
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43, we substitute the name Richard S. Schweiker, successor to the original appellee, Patricia Roberts Harris, as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, formerly Health, Education, and Welfare
To establish eligibility for Social Security Insurance survivor benefits, children born of a legitimate marriage need only show that their deceased parent was fully insured. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d) (1), 402(d) (3), 416(h) (2) (B). To establish eligibility for the same benefits, illegitimate children must additionally demonstrate their dependency upon their deceased father. They may do so by proving that they are covered by a statutory presumption of dependency, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d) (3), 416(h) (1) (B), 416(h) (2) (B), 416(h) (3) (C) (i). Alternatively, they may prove dependency under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) which provides, in pertinent part, that the illegitimate child of a deceased wage earner shall be eligible if the "insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured individual was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died." Id. (emphasis added); see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497-500, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 2758-2760, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1976). Doran contends his father contributed support sufficient to entitle appellant to benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii)
C.F.R. § 404.366(a) (2) (1981). The ALJ first applied a test similar to, although less restrictive than, the one contained in the Secretary's regulation: whether the father was contributing support to his unborn child "in any regular or substantial manner at any time during (the) pregnancy." (emphasis added)