Source: https://casetext.com/case/porter-v-sturm
Timestamp: 2020-04-02 10:16:53
Document Index: 215779206

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997']

Porter v. Sturm, 781 F.3d 448 | Casetext Search + Citator
MEMORANDUM AND ORDERThis matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (#51),…
Prisoners need not plead compliance with the exhaustion requirement; "[n]onexhaustion is an affirmative…
Full title:Andre Porter Plaintiff - Appellant v. Matt Sturm, MDOC Div Director of…
781 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2015)
holding "[d]ismissal without prejudice is mandatory" where the plaintiff did not exhaust his institution's grievance procedures
Summary of this case from Elston v. Pollard
William P. Nacy , Hanrahan & Nacy, P.C., Jefferson City, MO, argued, for appellant. Andre Porter, Pacific, MO, pro se. John M. Reeves , Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued ( Chris Koster , Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellees Dave Dormire, David Webster, and Edward Ruppel.
William P. Nacy, Hanrahan & Nacy, P.C., Jefferson City, MO, argued, for appellant. Andre Porter, Pacific, MO, pro se.
John M. Reeves, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued (Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellees Dave Dormire, David Webster, and Edward Ruppel.
On August 25, still in segregation, Porter submitted a timely grievance. Porter claimed that the warden violated his due process rights in retaliation for his unrelated § 1983 case. According to the Manual: “The superintendent/designee should respond to offender grievances within 40 calendar days of receipt.” Id. at III.L.9.e.
On October 19, over 40 days after the response was due, Porter requested an appeal form. The next day, he received a letter from the MDOC notifying him that the “investigation regarding this matter is complete, and evidence was not found to implicate you in this matter. You were not issued a conduct violation either.” The letter also stated, “While I am unsure why you are pursuing appeal of this matter, which has been resolved in your favor, I do note your grievance ... is pending final response at the grievance level. Please remain patient as that review is completed.” Porter received the appeal form on October 29, ten days after requesting it. On November 4, still in segregation, Porter appealed the MDOC's lack of a “final response” to his grievance. Porter was not released from segregation until he served the five-month punishment for the violation.
The November 2010 appeal should have been resolved within 100 days, but Porter's officer never filed the appeal. See id. at III.M.6 (“An appeal response should be provided as soon as practical, but within 100 calendar days of receipt.”). On April 6, 2011, after learning that his appeal was never filed, Porter wrote the MDOC to notify them of the appeal, stressing that his violation had not yet been resolved or expunged. On October 5, he sent a similar letter to the Governor (which was referred to the MDOC).
An inmate must exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007); Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir.2014). Available remedies are “capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose: immediately utilizable [and] accessible.” Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (finding exhaustion does not require use of “ all ” remedies). An inmate satisfies § 1997e(a) by pursuing “the prison grievance process to its final stage” to “an adverse decision on the merits.” Burns, 752 F.3d at 1141. It does not matter that the inmate “subjectively believed that there was no point in his pursuing administrative remedies.” Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc). Nonexhaustion is an affirmative defense, and defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211–12, 127 S.Ct. 910.
Porter seems to claim he is excused from exhausting remedies because prison officials withheld grievance procedures. Inmates are excused from exhausting remedies “when officials have prevented prisoners from utilizing the procedures, or when officials themselves have failed to comply with the grievance procedures.” Gibson v. Weber, 431 F.3d 339, 341 (8th Cir.2005). “[A] remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from ‘utiliz [ing]’ is not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)....” Miller, 247 F.3d at 740 (second alteration in original) (finding remedies not “available” where prison officials failed to respond to inmate's requests for grievance forms). See also Sergent v. Norris, 330 F.3d 1084, 1085–86 (8th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (finding prison official's failure to timely respond to grievance could show inmate had exhausted “available” remedies); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697–98 (8th Cir.2001) (finding inmate may have exhausted remedies when MDOC prison officials refused to respond to IRR).
Porter did not exhaust his remedies in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Dismissal without prejudice is mandatory. Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (affirming, in part, dismissal without prejudice for § 1997e(a) failure to exhaust); Washington v. Uner, 273 Fed.Appx. 575, 577 (8th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (modifying district court's dismissal to clarify that § 1997e(a) failure to exhaust is dismissed without prejudice); Maddix v. Crawford, 216 Fed.Appx. 605, 606 (8th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (same).
This court need not review Porter's case on the merits or opine on the summary judgment. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 211, 127 S.Ct. 910 (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”); Lyon, 305 F.3d at 809 (holding an inmate “must first have exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the grievance procedure of the prison before his civil rights complaint could proceed”); Barbee v. Corr. Med. Servs., 394 Fed.Appx. 337, 337 (8th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal without prejudicebut vacating grant of summary judgment).
After oral arguments on appeal, Porter filed a pro se motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In light of this opinion, his motion is denied.
holding that, when exhaustion has not occurred, "[d]ismissal without prejudice is mandatory"
Summary of this case from Hemingway v. Shelton
holding that improper exhaustion is "excused" if prison officials "prevented prisoners from utilizing" the grievance procedure
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finding incomplete exhaustion when a prisoner failed to "pursue the ... grievance process to its final stage"
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finding inmate had not exhausted administrative remedies where inmate explicitly accepted warden's adverse grievance response
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recognizing the steps in Missouri Department of Correction's administrative procedure process and the time periods involved in each step
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recognizing the steps in Missouri Department of Correction's administrative procedure process
stating exhaustion is not required where officials have failed to adhere to their own grievance procedures or have prevented prisoners from using those procedures
Summary of this case from Muhammad v. Mayfield
noting that delays in responding to prisoner's grievance did not prevent him from continuing the grievance process, for example by attempting to appeal