Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=528
Timestamp: 2020-02-20 23:23:49
Document Index: 118086787

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.\n14', 'Art.\n19', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 14', 'Art.\t19', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 19']

SHRI KISHAN SINGH & ORS versus THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS
1955 AIR 795	1955 SCR (2) 531
SHRI KISHAN SINGH & ORS V. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS [1955] RD-SC 44 (27 September 1955)
27/09/1955 AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
CITATION: 1955 AIR 795	1955 SCR (2) 531
Fundamental Rights, Infringement of-Act settling fair	and equitable rent restricted to a part of the State-Settlement of rent of different localities on	different dates on decennial average-Possibility of variation in rates of rent- If amount to denial of equality before	law-Deprivation of landlord's right to realise	rents freely and without hindrance, if invasion of right to property-Retrospective enforcement of	rates of rent, if amounts to violation of right to property and acquisition without compensation-Such power	conferred on Settlement Officer, if	arbitrary- Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(f), 31(2)-Marwar Land Revenue Act (XL of 1949), ss. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86.
The petitioners, who are jagirdars of Marwar, sought to impugn	the constitutional validity of ss. 81 to 86 of	the Marwar	Land Revenue Act which embody a scheme	for fixing fair and equitable rents payable by cultivating tenants on the ground that they infringed their	fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.
Their contentions were that after the merger of Marwar in the State of Rajasthan the Act had become discriminatory as it applied only to the jagirdars of Marwar and not to	the entire	body of jagirdars of the State of Rajasthan,	that settlement of rents made with reference to different areas on different dates on the basis of previous	ten years' average	of collections might result in different rates of rent and lead to inequality such as is prohibited by	Art.
14, that the Act deprived the landlords of their right to realise rents from the tenants freely and without hindrance and invaded their right to hold property guaranteed by	Art.
19(1)(f) of the Constitution, that the power conferred on the Settlement Officer by s. 86 of the Act to	enforce	the rates of rent retrospectively is an invasion of their right to hold property and amounts to acquisition	of property without	compensation and that it confers absolute	and uncontrolled discretion on the Settlement Officer and is an encroachment on the right to hold property.
Held,	repelling these contentions, that Art. 14	only prohibits unequal treatment of persons	similarly situated and a classification might properly be made on	territorial basis, if that was germane to the purposes of the enactment and no	tenancy legislation can be held to contravene	the article	solely on the ground that it does not apply to	the entire State. Before the petitioners could succeed it was 532 incumbent on them to show that conditions obtaining in other parts of the State were similar to those in Marwar and	this they had failed to do.
Bowman v. Lewis [1879] 101 U.S. 22: 25 Law. Ed.	989, referred to.
That the provision in the Act for assessment of rents	with reference to a portion of the area to which the Act applies is not a contravention of Art. 14. To hold otherwise would be to	make it impossible for any State to carry on	its settlement operation.
Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and others, [1964] S.C.R.	842, and Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, applied.
That the fundamental right to hold property in the case of a, landlord in respect of his tenanted lands is no more than the right to receive reasonable rents and no	legislation which has for	its object the settlement of fair	and equitable rents can contravene Art.	19 (1)(f) of	the Constitution even though it may give	such rents retros- pective operation.
That	the provision in s. 86 of the	Act empowering	the Settlement Officer to give retrospective operation to	the rates of rent	does not contravene	Art. 19(1)(f)	and, therefore, no question as to whether such a provision is not of a regulatory character and as such prohibited by	Art.
19(5) can at all arise.
That	it is well settled that a law which regulates	the relation of a landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within the meaning of Art. 31(2) even though it has	the effect of reducing his rights. Consequently, there is no contravention of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, [1943] 6 F.L.J. 55: A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 29 and Thakur Jagannath Buksh v.
United Provinces, L.R. 73 I.A. 123, relied on.
That s. 86 of the Act does not confer an absolute and uncon- trolled discretion on the Settlement Officer and such power as it gives does not constitute an encroachment on the right to hold property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of	the Constitution.
Thakur Baghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer and another, [1953] S.C.R. 1049, explained and distinguished.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 621, 655 and 678 of 1955.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution for the en- forcement of fundamental rights.
N.C. Chatterjee (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him)	for the petitioners.
533 M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Kan Singh and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondent No. 1.
K.R. Chowdhury, for Goma, Ghisa and Rama, respondents in Petition No. 655 and Dhira, respondent in petition No.678.
1955. September 27. The judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These are applications under article 32 of the	Constitution by certain jagir dars	of Marwar, challenging the constitutionality of sections 81 to 86 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act No. XL of 1949	(hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that they infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners	under	article	14, article	19(1)	(f) and article 31(2) of the Constitution.
These sections provide for fixing fair and equitable	rent payable	by the tenants and prescribe the procedure to be followed therefor. Section 81 of the Act provides that when any local area has been brought under settlement operations by a notification under section 64, the Settlement Officer or an	Assistant Settlement Officer shall inspect every village	in the local area, divide it into soil-classes	and assessment circles, select rentrates	for the area	and publish	them in such manner as may	be prescribed.	If objections to	these proposals are received,	he has to consider them,	and submit his report to the Board of Revenue. The Board has the power to sanction the proposals with or without any modifications, and it has also the power to direct further enquiry into the matters. With a view to arriving at fair and equitable rates, the Settlement Officer is required under section 82 to have regard to	the collection of rent and cesses in the nature of rent during the ten years preceding the settlement excluding such years as the	Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be abnormal the average of the prices of agricultural produce during the same period, the nature of the crops grown and the quantity of the produce and their value.	Section 82(2) provides that the rent rates shall not 534 exceed one-third of, the value of the produce of unirrigated lands and one-fourth	of the	value	of the	produce of irrigated lands. Under section 84, the Settlement Officer shall	determine rents whether by way of	abatement, enhancement or commutation payable for all holdings in	the occupation of tenants on the basis of the rates sanctioned by the Board of Revenue. Section 86 enacts that any	rent fixed by order of the Settlement Officer shall	be payable from the first day of July next following the date of	such order,	"unless	the Settlement Officer thinks fit for	any reasons to direct that it shall be payable from some earlier date".
Acting under section 81 of the Act, the Settlement Officer formulated certain proposals with reference to the	rent rates in the	villages comprised in	the jagirs of	the petitioners, and they were published in the Gazette on	12th December 1953.	Objections to those rates were filed by	the petitioners on the 12th January, 1954.	On 13th October 1954 the Additional Settlement Commissioner submitted his final proposals to the Settlement Officer, who forwarded the	same to the Board of Revenue for sanction. After making further enquiry, the Board passed an order on 4-12-1954	determining the rent rates payable. Subsequent to this, an order	was also passed under section 86 of the Act bringing	the sanctioned rate into operation from 1-7-1954. This order is not itself the subject of attack in these proceedings,	and it cannot be, seeing that Petition No. 621 of 1954 was filed on 24th November 1954 before that order was	passed,	and Petitions Nos. 655 and 678 of 1954 merely repeat verbatim the allegations in Petition No. 621 of 1954. Before us, the petitioners conceded that they were	not impugning	the correctness of the order passed under section 86 in so	far as it gave operation to the rates of rent from 1st July, on its merits, but that they were attacking the section as	bad only as a step in establishing that the scheme of the	Act, of which section 86 is an integral part is,	taken as a whole, an infringement of their fundamental rights under articles 14, 19 and 31(2). We have now to consider 535 whether sections 81 to 86 of the -Act are bad as infringing the above provisions of the Constitution.
The contention that sections 81 to 86 of the Act are	void as being repugnant to article 14 is sought to be made out on two grounds. It is stated firstly that the Act applies' only to what was prior to its merger the State	of Marwar, that the present State of Rajasthan comprises Marwar and 17 other States which have merged in it, and that as the	Act, as it stands, is directed against the jagirdars in one	area of the	State	and not the whole of	it, it	has become discriminatory	and void. This contention is clearly untenable. What article 14	prohibits is the unequal treatment of persons	similarly situated, and therefore before	the petitioners can claim the	protection of	that article, it is incumbent on them to	establish that	the conditions which prevail in other areas in the State of Rajasthan are similar to those which obtain in Marwar.	But of this, there has been neither allegation nor	proof.	On the contrary, it is stated by the respondents in para 10 of their statement that the tenants in the jagirs of Marwar were paying much more by way of rent and cesses than those in the Khalsa area of the State, that with a view to remove the inequality between the two classes of tenants within the State, a law was passed in 1943 providing for settlement of rent, and that again on 10-1-1947 another law	was passed abolishing all cesses (lags) and fixing the maximum share of rent payable in kind. These special features, it is argued, form sufficient justification for a separate legislation for this area, It is also stated that the other States had their own rent laws suited to their conditions. There are no materials on which we could hold that the impugned Act is discriminatory	in character, and we cannot strike it	down merely on the ground that it does not apply to the whole of the State of Rajasthan.
A similar question arose for decision in	Bowman	v.
Lewis(1). There, some of the areas in the State of Missouri were governed by a judicial procedure diff- (1) [1879] 101 U.S. 22: 25 Law. Ed 989.
68 536 erent from that which prevailed in others. Repelling	the contention that this differentiation	offended the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court observed:
"Each State has the right to make political subdivisions, of its	territory for municipal purposes, and	to regulate their local government. As respects the administration of justice, it may establish one system of courts	for cities and another for rural districts; one system for one portion of its	territory and another system for another portion.
Convenience, if not necessity, often requires this to be done, and it would seriously interfere with the power of a State to regulate its internal affairs to deny to it	this right If a	Mexican State should be acquired by a	treaty	and added to an adjoining State or part of a State in the United States,	and the two should be erected into a new State, it cannot	be doubted that such new State might allow	the Mexican laws and judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion and the common law and its corresponding judicature in the	other portion.	Such an arrangement would not be prohibited in any fair construction of the Fourteenth Amend- ment.	It would not be based on any respect of	persons or classes, but on municipal considerations alone and a regard to the	welfare of all classes within the	particular territory or jurisdiction".
This	Court has also repeatedly held	that classification might properly	be made on territorial basis if that	was germane to the purposes of the enactment. Having regard to the fact that the conditions of tenants vary from locality to locality, we have no hesitation in holding that a tenancy legislation restricted	to a portion of a State cannot be held on this ground alone to contravene article 14.
The second ground urged in support of the contention	that article	14 has been infringed is that discrimination -must result from the settlement of rent being taken up only	with reference to portions of the 537 area to which the Act applies and not to the whole of	it, because	the rent rate is to be fixed on the basis of	the average	of the ten years preceding the settlement; and if the proceedings are started for different areas on different dates, that might result in different rates being fixed, and that would make for inequality such as is prohibited by article	14. We are unable to agree with this,.contention.
Settlement operations can be conducted only by a specialised staff	having	technical knowledge	and administrative experience, and it might be beyond the capacity of the State to undertake them for the whole area at one and the	same time. To accede to the contention of the petitioners would, in effect, be	to prevent the States from	carrying on settlement operations.	It was held	by this Court in Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and other8(1) and in Thakur	Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan(2) that a provision authorising	the taking over of	estates	on different dates was not repugnant to article 14, and	the principle of those decisions would apply to the present case as well. The contention that the impugned provisions are in contravention of article 14 must, therefore, be rejected.
It is	then contended that the provisions in question	are repugnant to article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution, because they deprive landlords of their right to realise rents	from the tenants freely and without hindrance,	and are an encroahment on their right to hold property. The provision in section 82	that the Settlement	Officer	should, in determining the average collection for the previous	ten years,exclude from consideration abnormal years as notified by the Government was particularly attacked as a..device to reduce	the rent payable to the landlord and an invasion of his rights to the property. We are unable to	agree with this contention. The fundamental right which a citizen	has to hold and enjoy property imports only a right to recover reasonable rent when the lands are cultivated by a tenant, and therefore a legislation whose object is to fix fair	and equitable (1) [1954] S.C.R. 842, 845.
(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, 538 rent cannot be said to invade that right. The contention that the provision in section 82(1) (a) that abnormal years as notified in the Gazette should be excluded in determining average collections is calculated to reduce the rent, and is therefore unreasonable is unfounded, because a	declaration that a	year is abnormal is made not only when there are bumper	crops but also when the yield is very low, and	the provision is intended equally for the benefit of the tenant and of the landlord. A provision of this kind is usual in all tenancy legislation, and there is nothing	unreasonable or unfair about it.
It was next contended-and this was the contention	most pressed	on us-that section 86 is bad as it confers on	the Settlement Officer a power to bring the rent	rates	into operation from a date earlier than' the succeeding year	and even retrospectively from a date prior to the	settlement, and that such a power was repugnant to both article 19(1)(f) and article 31(2). The argument with reference to Article 19(1)(f) is that section 86 is an encroachment on the rights of a person to hold property, and can be valid only if it falls within article 19(5), that it is only a	law of 'a regulatory character that is protected by article 19	(5), that there could be regulation only with reference to rights to be	exercised in	future,. and that a	law giving retrospective operation is consequently outside article 19(5).	This contention rests on an assumption for which there is no basis. The question whether a law is valid under.	Article 19 (5) can arise only when	there is a violation of the fundamental right declared in	article 19 (1) (f), and if the right to hold property imports, as we have held it does, only a fight to recover reasonable	rent from cultivating tenants, that right cannot be held to	have been invaded by a law fixing reasonable rent, even when it is retrospective in operation. If	the rent fixed is reasonable with reference to a period	subsequent to	the settlement, it must be reasonable for the period prior to it as well, and if the settlement is not an encroachment on the rights	of the	holder as regards the	future-and that is conceded-it cannot be an encroachment as regards 539 the past. A	consideration, therefore, of the question whether a law under article 19(5) should be regulatory'	and whether a law with retrospective operation could be said to be regulatory would be wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present controversy.
The argument in support of the contention that section 86 is repugnant to article 31(2) is that to the extent that it gives retrospective operation, it deprives the landlord of the right to rent which had accrued prior to the settlement, and that is taking property without payment of compensation.
But it	is well settled that a law which regulates	the relation of landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within article 31(2), even though it has the effect of reducing his rights.	In Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v.
United Provinces(1), the question arose for decision whether the provisions -of Act XVII of 1939, United Provinces, under which the rent payable to a landlord became diminished	were obnoxious to section 299(2) of the Government of India	Act, 1935. It was held by the Federal Court that they were	not, and in affirming this decision on appeal, the Privy Council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v.	United	Provinces(2) observed:
"The appellant relies on certain express provisions of the Government of India Act. Thus he relies on section 299 of the Act, which provides that no person, shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law,	and that neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to	make any law	authorising the compulsory acquisition of 'land for public purposes save on the basis of providing for the payment of compensation.	But in	the present	case	there	is no	question of	confiscatory legislation. To regulate the relations of landlord	and tenant	and thereby diminish rights, hitherto exercised by the landlord in connection with his land, is different	from compulsory acquisition of the land".
It was finally urged that section 86 in so far as it (1) [1948] 6 F.L..J. 55; A.I.R. 1948 F.C. 29.
(2) [1946] L.R. 73 I.A. 123.
540 conferred authority on the Settlement Officer to	give retrospective operation to the rent rates was bad, because the exercise of that authority was left to his arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion, that the Act laid down no rules and prescribed no conditions under which the discretion had to be exercised, and that the power conferred in	those terms must be held to be unconstitutional. The decision in Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer and another(1)	was relied	on, in	support of this contention.	There,	the question was as to the validity of a power conferred on	the Court of Wards to take over the management of an estate	"if a landlord habitually infringes the right of	a. tenant".
Under the Act, the decision whether the condition aforesaid was satisfied depended on the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Commissioner., and that -was final and not liable to be questioned	in civil courts. It was held that a power which could be exercised at the absolute discretion of	the authority was an encroachment on the rights of a citizen to hold property under article 19(1)(f), and that it was	not saved by article 19(5). But, in the present case, section 86 of	the Act expressly lays down that if a Settlement Officer	decides to bring rates into operation from a	date earlier	than the following 1st of July, it must be	for reasons. There is no force in the contention that section 86 does not lay down under what circumstances such an order could be passed, because the very nature of the thing requires that	a large discretion should be left to	the authority. Discretion	which is wide	is not	necessarily arbitrary. It was said that under section 233 of the	Act the civil courts are debarred from	enquiring into	the reasonableness	of the order; but that is because matters concerning revenue and settlement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts, and under section 62 of	the Act, the Board of Revenue has revisional jurisdiction	over all orders passed in connection with settlement. We think that the power conferred on the Settlement Officer to fix an earlier	date for giving operation to	the rent rate is reasonable and valid, (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049.
541 and that it invades no fundamental rights of the landlord.
For the reasons given above, we must hold that	the scheme embodied in sections 81 to 86 of the Act does not transgress any of the Constitutional limitations, and is valid.
In the	result, the petitions are dismissed	but in	the circumstances, without costs.