Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104773/lewis-vs-bt-investment-managers-inc
Timestamp: 2017-08-24 08:48:44
Document Index: 415960128

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 659', '§ 660', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 660', '§ 660', '§ 3', '§ 2281', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', '§ 1253', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 1846', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 660', '§ 2281', '§ 659', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 1842', '§ 1846', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 659', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 660', '§ 660', '§ 3', '§ 712', '§ 712', '§ 659', '§ 660', '§ 659', '§ 1253']

Lewis Vs Bt Investment Managers Inc - Citation 104773 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Lewis Vs. Bt Investment Managers, Inc. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104773
Case Number 447 U.S. 27
Respondent Bt Investment Managers, Inc.
lewis v. bt investment managers, inc. - 447 u.s. 27 (1980) u.s. supreme court lewis v. bt investment managers, inc., 447 u.s. 27 (1980) lewis v. bt investment managers, inc. no. 79-45 argued january 15, 1980 decided june 9, 1980 447 u.s. 27 appeal from the united states district court for the northern district of florida syllabus a florida statute (§ 659.141(1)) prohibits out-of-state banks, bank holding companies, and trust companies from owning or controlling a business within the state that sells investment advisory services. another statute (§ 660.10) prohibits all corporations except state-chartered banks and trust companies and national banks located in florida from performing certain trust and fiduciary.....
Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc. - 447 U.S. 27 (1980)
U.S. Supreme Court Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980)
1. Section 659.141(1) directly burdens interstate commerce in a manner that contravenes the Commerce Clause's implicit limitation on state power. Pp. 447 U. S. 37 -49.
(a) While banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern, it does not follow that these same activities lack important interstate attributes that establish Congress' power to regulate commerce and that also support constitutional limitations on the powers of the States. Such limitations clearly apply in this case. Pp. 447 U. S. 38 -39.
(b) The District Court properly concluded that § 659.141(1) is "parochial" in the sense that it overtly prevents foreign enterprises from competing in local markets. Under that section, discrimination against affected business organizations is not evenhanded, because only banks, bank holding companies, and trust companies with principal operations outside Florida are prohibited from operating investment subsidiaries or giving investment advice within the State. It follows that § 659.141(1) discriminates among affected business entities according to the extent of their contacts with the local economy. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117 , distinguished. And the disparate treatment of out-of-state bank holding companies cannot be justified as an incidental burden necessitated by legitimate local concerns, such as discouraging economic concentration or protecting the citizenry against fraud, or by an asserted interest in promoting local control over financial institutions. Pp. 447 U. S. 39 -44.
(c) Neither § 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act -- which prohibits bank holding companies from acquiring banking subsidiaries in other States without local authorization -- nor § 7 of that Act -- which reserves to the States a general power to enact regulations applicable to bank holding companies -- authorizes a State to prohibit out-of-state holding companies from acquiring local investment subsidiaries. The only authority § 3(d) grants to the States is the authority to permit expansion of banking across state lines where it would be otherwise federally prohibited. Moreover, the Act's structure reveals that § 3(d) applies only to holding company acquisitions of banks. Section 7 was intended to preserve existing state regulations of bank holding companies and to define the extent of the Act's preemptive effect on state law, and there is nothing in § 7's language or legislative history to indicate that it was also intended to extend to the States new powers to regulate banking that they would not have possessed absent federal legislation. Section 7 applies only to state legislation that operates within the boundaries marked by the Commerce Clause. Pp. 447 U. S. 44 -49.
2. Since the constitutionality of § 660.10 was neither fully placed in issue nor fully determined by the District Court's decision, the validity of that section's limitation on the types of corporations that may perform trust responsibilities is not properly before this Court at this stage of the proceedings; hence, the District Court's judgment with respect to § 660.10 is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Moreover, the amendment, in the interim, of § 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act so as apparently to prohibit appellee bank holding company from establishing a Florida trust subsidiary raises new jurisdictional
and substantive questions that should be addressed in the first instance by the District Court. Pp. 447 U. S. 50 -53.
This case concerns the constitutionality of two Florida statutes regulating the conduct of investment advisory and trust services within that State. A three-judge United States District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), [ Footnote 1 ] held that the statutes violate the Commerce Clause, U.S.Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, because, in combination, they discriminate against bank holding companies that operate principally outside Florida. It also held that such discrimination is not authorized by federal legislation regulating the interstate operations of bank holding companies. The case was brought here on direct appeal, see 28 U.S. . § 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction to resolve the substantial constitutional and statutory issues presented. 444 U.S. 822 (1979).
In 1972, the management of Bankers Trust decided to seek the Board's approval for an investment management subsidiary to operate in Florida. On October 3 of that year, Bankers Trust filed a formal proposal for such a subsidiary, which it planned to operate from offices in Palm Beach. Appellee BT Investment Managers, Inc. (BTIM), was Bankers Trust's intended vehicle for entry into the Florida market. It was incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware as a wholly owned subsidiary on November 24, 1972. Three days later, it qualified to do business in Florida. The application to the Board proposed that BTIM would provide "portfolio investment advice," as well as "general economic information and advice, general economic statistical forecasting services and industry studies" to persons other than banks. See Complaint Ś 7, App. 9-10, and appellant's Answer Ś 7, App. 19.
The reaction of the Florida financial community to Bankers Trust's proposed investment subsidiary was decidedly negative. The State Comptroller, the Florida Bankers Association, and the Palm Beach County Bankers Association, Inc., all filed comments with the Board objecting to the Bankers Trust proposal. More importantly for present purposes, the state legislature was persuaded to take action. On November 30, 1972, shortly after BTIM had qualified to do business in the State, a special session of the legislature amended Fla.Stat. § 659.141(1). That statute, which had been on the books only since March 28 of that year, was expanded to prohibit an out-of-state bank holding company from owning or controlling a business within the State that sells investment advisory services to any customer, rather than just to "trust companies or banks" in Florida, as the statute theretofore had
read. [ Footnote 2 ] This amendment took effect, without the Governor's approval, on December 21, 1972. There is evidence that the amendment was a direct response to Bankers lust's pending application, and that it had the strong backing of the local financial community.
On April 26, 1973, the Board rejected Bankers Trust's proposal on the ground that it would conflict with state law. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 59 Fed.Res.Bull. 364. The Board observed that the proposal contemplated de novo entry into the Florida investment management market, rather than acquisition of an existing concern, and it noted that de novo entry ordinarily has a desirable procompetitive impact. Absent evidence of a contrary effect in this case, the Board intimated that it would have been favorably inclined toward the proposal. But it found that the December amendment to Fla.Stat. § 659.141(1) "was intended to, and does, prohibit the performance of investment advisory services in Florida by non-Florida bank holding companies." 59 Fed.Res.Bull. at 365. In view of its obligation to respect the dictates of state law, the Board found itself constrained to reject the proposal. See 12 U.S.C. § 1846; Whitney Nat. Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411 , 379 U. S. 424 -425 (1965).
Within six months of the Board's decision, the two appellees
filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. [ Footnote 3 ] Count I of their complaint alleged that Fla.Stat. § 659.141(1)
Complaint Ś 11, App. 11. The complaint alleged violations of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as violation of the Commerce Clause. Count II alleged similar constitutional defects as the result of the joint operation of §§ 659.141(1) and 660.10. Appellees alleged that, "[b]ut for the existence of the challenged statutes," Bankers Trust would seek authority from the Board to establish "a subsidiary trust company having a national bank charter or a Florida state charter" that would engage exclusively in one or more of the functions regulated by § 660.10. Complaint Ś 21, App. 14-15. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), and the case was submitted for summary judgment on a stipulated set of facts.
On remand, the District Court held that the challenged portions of the two statutes violate the Commerce Clause. 461 F.Supp. 1187 (1978). Without reaching appellees' due process and equal protection arguments, it found that the
The court issued an order granting declaratory relief against both statutes but enjoining the enforcement of only § 659.141(1) against appellees. [ Footnote 4 ]
This appeal presents two distinct but related questions with respect to the validity of the challenge Florida statutes. [ Footnote 5 ] The first is whether the statutes, viewed independently of federal legislation regulating the banking industry, burden interstate commerce in a manner contrary to the Commerce Clause. The second is whether Congress, by its own legislation in this area, has created an area in which the States may regulate free from Commerce Clause restraints. Since there is no contention that federal legislation preempts the state laws in question, federal law becomes important only if it appears that the Florida statutes cannot survive without federal authorization. Thus, the second question becomes pertinent only if we reach an affirmative answer to the first.
These questions arise against a backdrop of familiar principles. The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." U.S.Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Although the Clause thus speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the Court long has recognized that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 , 441 U. S. 326 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 , 437 U. S. 623 (1978); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525 , 336 U. S. 534 -538 (1949); Cooley v. Board of
Page 447 U. S. 36
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852). This limitation upon state power, of course, is by no means absolute. In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, the States retain authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of "legitimate local concern," even though interstate commerce may be affected. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U. S. 429 , 434 U. S. 440 (1978); Great A&P; Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366 , 424 U. S. 371 (1976). Where such legitimate local interests are implicated, defining the appropriate scope for state regulation is often a matter of "delicate adjustment." Ibid., quoting H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 336 U. S. 553 (Black, J., dissenting). Yet even in regulating to protect local interests, the States generally must act in a manner consistent with the "ultimate . . . principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 , 294 U. S. 527 (1935). However important the state interest at hand,
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 626 -627.
Over the years, the Court has used a variety of formulations for the Commerce Clause limitation upon the States, but it consistently has distinguished between outright protectionism and more indirect burdens on the free flow of trade. The Court has observed that, "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected." Id. at 437 U. S. 624 . In contrast, legislation that visits its effects equally upon both interstate and local business may survive constitutional scrutiny if it is narrowly drawn. The Court stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970):
Id. at 397 U. S. 142 . See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 336 ; Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333 , 432 U. S. 353 (1977); Great A&P; Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 371 -372; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 , 362 U. S. 443 (1960). The principal focus of inquiry must be the practical operation of the statute, since the validity of state laws must be judged chiefly in terms of their probable effects. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 336 ; Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 , 311 U. S. 455 -456 (1940).
Appellant and the amici supporting his position argue that the District Court's analysis of § 659.141(1) is flawed in three respects: first, the statute assertedly affects only matters of local character that have insufficient interstate attributes to bring federal constitutional limitations into play. [ Footnote 6 ] Second,
the District Court erroneously labeled the statute protectionist legislation, and thus incorrectly relied upon the " per se rule of invalidity" identified in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 624 . Appellant argues that the statute should be treated as neutral legislation subject to the less stringent standards of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra, and he argues that it meets this test. Third, the District Court failed to accord proper significance, in appellant's view, to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Appellant argues that the Act grants authority to the States to prohibit out-of-state bank holding companies from owning local subsidiaries that provide bank-related services.
Nonetheless, it does not follow that these same activities lack important interstate attributes. An impressive array of federal statutes regulating not only the provision of banking services but also the formation of banking organizations, the rendering of investment advice, and the conduct of national investment markets, is substantial evidence to the contrary. [ Footnote 7 ]
We do not understand appellant to dispute the validity of these enactments, all of which rest primarily on Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, appellant's arguments under the Bank Holding Company Act assume the validity of federal regulation in this sphere. This Court has observed that the same interstate attributes that establish Congress' power to regulate commerce also support constitutional limitations on the powers of the States. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 622 -623. For present purposes, it is clear that those limitations apply.
Appellant argues, however, that the statute ought not to be
The statute involved in Exxon flatly prohibited producers and refiners of petroleum products from opening or operating retail services within Maryland under a variety of corporate or contractual arrangements. Id. at 437 U. S. 120 , n. 1. It was enacted in response to perceived inequities in the allocation of petroleum products to retail outlets during the fuel shortage of 1973. Various oil companies, all of which engaged in production and refining as well as in sale of petroleum products, challenged the statute on a number of grounds. Among other arguments, they claimed that the statute violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against producers and refiners, all of which were interstate concerns, in favor of independent retailers, most of which were local businesses.
The Court rejected this contention. After holding that the statute served the legitimate state purpose of "controlling the gasoline retail market," id. at 437 U. S. 125 , the Court separately analyzed its effect on interstate commerce in the producing-refining and retailing ends of the petroleum industry. The Court concluded that the statute could not discriminate
against interstate petroleum producers and refiners in favor of locally based competitors because, as a matter of fact, there were no such local producers or refiners to be favored. Ibid. For the same reason, it concluded that the flow of petroleum products in interstate commerce would not be reduced. Id. at 437 U. S. 127 . It also rejected a claim of discrimination at the retail level because the statute placed "no barriers whatsoever" on competition in local markets by "interstate independent dealers" that did not own production or refining facilities. Id. at 437 U. S. 126 . Despite the fact that the number of stations operated by independent dealers was small relative to the number operated by producer-refiners, the Court concluded that neither the placing of a disparate burden on some interstate competitors nor the shifting of business from one part of the interstate market to another was enough, under the circumstances, to establish a Commerce Clause violation. Id. at 437 U. S. 126 -127.
There are some points of similarity between Exxon and the present case. In the former, the statute in issue discriminated against vertical organization in the petroleum industry. Section 659.141(1) similarly discriminates against a particular kind of conglomerate organization in the investment and financial industries. And the Maryland statute permitted some kinds of interstate competitors free entry into the local market, as does the Florida statute at issue here. [ Footnote 8 ]
We disagree, however, with the suggestion that Exxon should be treated as controlling precedent for this case. Section 659.141(1) engages in an additional form of discrimination that is highly significant for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis. Under the Florida statute, discrimination against affected business organizations is not evenhanded, because only banks, bank holding companies, and trust companies with principal operations outside Florida are prohibited from operating investment subsidiaries or giving investment advice within the State. It follows that § 659.141(1) discriminates among affected business entities according to the extent of their contacts with the local economy. The absence of a similar discrimination between interstate and local producer-refiners was a most critical factor in Exxon. Both on its face and in actual effect, § 659.141(1) thus displays a local favoritism or protectionism that significantly alters its Commerce Clause status. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 626 -627; Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. at 294 U. S. 527 . [ Footnote 9 ]
We need not decide whether this difference is sufficient to render the Florida legislation per se invalid, for we are convinced that the disparate treatment of out-of-state bank holding companies cannot be justified as an incidental burden necessitated by legitimate local concerns. In the District Court and, to some extent, on this appeal, appellant and supporting amici have argued that the Florida legislation advances several important state policies. Among those that
Discouraging economic concentration and protecting the citizenry against fraud are undoubtedly legitimate state interests. But we are not persuaded that these interests justify the heavily disproportionate burden this statute places on bank holding companies that operate principally outside the State. Appellant has demonstrated no basis for an inference that all out-of-state bank holding companies are likely to possess the evils of monopoly power, that they are more likely to do so than their homegrown counterparts, or that they are any more inclined to engage in sharp practices than bank holding companies that are locally based. [ Footnote 10 ] Nor is there any reason to conclude that outright prohibition of entry, rather than some intermediate form of regulation, is the only effective method of protecting against the presumed evils, particularly when other out-of-state businesses that may be just as large or far-flung are permitted to compete in the local market. We conclude that these asserted state interests simply do not suffice to eliminate § 659.141(1)'s apparent constitutional defect. Cf. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 353 -354; Great A&P; Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 375 -376.
With regard to the asserted interest in promoting local control over financial institutions, we doubt that the interest itself is entirely clear of any tinge of local parochialism. In almost any Commerce Clause case, it would be possible for a State to argue that it has an interest in bolstering local ownership, or
wealth, or control of business enterprise. Yet these arguments are at odds with the general principle that the Commerce Clause prohibits a State from using its regulatory power to protect its own citizens from outside competition. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 336 U. S. 538 ; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 , 267 U. S. 315 -316 (1925); cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 , 334 U. S. 403 -404 (1948). In any event, the interest is not well served by the present legislation. The statute, for example, does not restrict out-of-state ownership of local bank holding companies. Nor, as appellant concedes, does it prevent entry by out-of-state entities other than those having the prohibited organizational forms. There is thus no reason to believe that the State's interest in local control, to the extent it legitimately exists, has been significantly or evenhandedly advanced by the statutory means that have been employed.
Ordinarily, at this point we would have reached the end of our inquiry. But in this instance appellant has another string to his bow: the contention that, by Act of Congress, the State has been given additional authority to regulate entry by bank holding companies into the local investment advisory market. Congress, of course, has power to regulate the flow of interstate commerce in ways that the States, acting independently, may not. And Congress, if it chooses, may exercise this power indirectly by conferring upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 336 U. S. 542 -543; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 , 328 U. S. 423 -424 (1946); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 , 326 U. S. 315 (1945). It is appellant's view
This argument rests on two provisions in the federal legislation. Section 3(d) of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d), prohibits the Board from approving an application by a bank holding company to acquire "any additional bank" located outside the State in which the holding company has its principal operations, unless that acquisition is specifically authorized by the statutory law of the State in which the proposed acquisition is located. [ Footnote 11 ] Section 7 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1846, reserves to the States a continuing role in the regulation of bank holding companies. [ Footnote 12 ] Appellant argues that
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was enacted to accomplish two primary objectives. First, it was designed to prevent the concentration of banking resources in the hands of a few financial giants. Second, it was intended to implement a congressional policy against control of banking and nonbanking enterprises by a single business entity. See S.Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955); Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U. S. 234 , 439 U. S. 242 -243 (1978). Underlying both objectives was a desire to prevent anticompetitive tendencies in national credit markets. See S.Rep. No. 91-1084, pp. 2-3 (1970).
When this legislation was first proposed to the Senate, neither § 3 nor § 4 contained explicit limitations on interstate
We conclude that § 3(d) offers scant support for the portions of § 659.141(1) subject to challenge in this proceeding. Preliminarily, it is doubtful that § 3(d) authorizes state restrictions of any nature on bank holding company activities. The language of the statute establishes a general federal prohibition on the acquisition or expansion of banking subsidiaries across state lines. The only authority granted to the States is the authority to create exceptions to this general prohibition, that is, to permit expansion of banking across state lines where it otherwise would be federally prohibited. Furthermore, the structure of the Act reveals that § 3(d) applies only to holding company acquisitions of banks. Nonbanking activities are regulated separately in § 4, which does not contain a parallel provision. Even if § 3(d) could be interpreted to authorize additional state regulation, ordinary canons of interpretation thus would lead to the inference that restraints so authorized could apply only to a holding company's banking activities. [ Footnote 13 ]
In contrast to § 3(d), § 7 of the Act does reserve to the States a general power to enact regulations applicable to bank holding companies. This section was intended to preserve
On this appeal, the argument over the constitutionality of § 660.10 has focused not on the concatenation of the two statutes, but on the power of a State under the Commerce Clause to require local incorporation as a condition of doing business
One further consideration counsels against our attempting to evaluate the validity of § 660.10 at this juncture. Since we noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal, Congress has
amended § 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act to extend its restrictions on interstate expansion to fiduciary organizations of the kind Bankers Trust has stipulated it would attempt to organize in Florida. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, § 712(b), Pub.L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 189 (Mar. 31, 1980). [ Footnote 14 ] It thus appears that Bankers Trust is presently prohibited by federal law from establishing a Florida trust subsidiary. This amendment is "repealed" by its own terms, § 712(c), as of October 1, 1981, and there are indications in the legislative history that it was intended as a temporary moratorium on approval of trust company applications, rather than as a prelude to more permanent restrictions. Nevertheless, we must review the judgment below in the light of both state and federal law as it now stands. See Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U. S. 412 , 404 U. S. 414 (1972). This enactment raises new questions,
In summary, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it declares unconstitutional the challenged portions of § 659.141(1) and enjoins their enforcement. We vacate that portion of the judgment that relates to the constitutionality of § 660.10, and we remand the case for such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with this opinion. [ Footnote 15 ]
Because the District Court granted injunctive relief with respect to § 659.141(1), we have jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, over the appeal. See White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 , 412 U. S. 761 (1973). See, however, 447 U. S. infra.
Appellant also argues that the present statute, like the one in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 125 , has no discernible impact on the flow of goods in interstate commerce. Locally owned investment businesses are as free to channel their clients' investments into interstate markets as their interstate competitors. The validity of this argument cannot be determined on this record. In the Exxon case, as we have noted, all petroleum products sold in the State were produced and refined elsewhere. In contrast, investments may be directed into local, as well as interstate, markets. Since it is at least conceivable that an investment subsidiary owned by a locally operating bank holding company would be more likely to recommend investments in local businesses, we decline to assign any weight to this argument in the absence of proof concerning the actual effect of the Florida statute.