Source: https://www.lipcon.com/cruise-line-law-reporter/january-2002-issue/
Timestamp: 2019-06-20 03:20:28
Document Index: 394683202

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10313', '§ 10313', '§ 213', '§ 784', '§ 10601', '§ 10602', '§ 10601', '§ 688', '§ 941', '§ 688', '§ 688', '§ 905', '§ 688', '§ 688']

January 2002 Issue - LMAW, PA
VESSEL OWNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS SEAMAN’S WAGE PENALTY CLAIM DENIED EVEN WHERE VESSEL OWNER BAREBOAT CHARTERED VESSEL TO ANOTHER COMPANY
TERRY J. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, -against- WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY, Defendant.
01 Civ. 7590 (AJP)
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 816
January 22, 2002, Decided
Wilmington’s motion to dismiss DENIED.
Plaintiff seaman sued defendant, the ultimate owner of the vessel on which he had been employed as a seaman, for statutory wage penalties pursuant to 46 U.S.C.S. § 10313(g). The vessel owner moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The vessel owner asserted that it was not the “owner” of the vessel within the meaning of the statute, because its bareboat charter to another company relieved it of the obligations of ownership. In interpreting § 10313(g), the court noted that absent a “clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,” the wage penalty clearly applied to the vessel owner. As there was no such clearly expressed intention to the contrary, the vessel owner was liable. The court further noted that when the statute was revamped in 1983, Congress left intact the words that the owner or master was liable for the wages due. There were no exceptions for, explanations of, or references to non-employing owners and no distinctions were made.
Vessel owner’s motion to dismiss was denied.
SEAMANS’ WAGE CLAIMS HELD EXEMPT FROM FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND SIX-MONTH LIMITATION PERIOD FOR IN REM ACTIONS PLACED IN SEAMAN’S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HELD VOID WHERE SHIPS’ MASTERS’ DID NOT SIGN THE CONTRACT
BORA DO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OCEAN PEACE INC, inpersonam; OCEAN PEACE F/T, official no 677399, her engine, machinery, appurtenances and cargo, in rem, Defendants-Appellees. TINH PHAM,Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OCEAN PEACE INC, in personam; UNITED STATES SEAFOODS LP,in personam; SEAFREEZE ALASKA F/T, official no 517242, her engines, machinery, apurtenances, and cargo, in rem, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 01-35177, No. 01-35179
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1200
December 5, 2001, Argued and Submitted, Seattle, Washington
January 29, 2002, Filed
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. D.C. No. CV-00-00315-TSZ D.C. No. CV-00-00321-TSZ. Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding.
Boro Do v. Ocean Peace, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19810 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
Plaintiff employees sued defendants, employer and vessels, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking wages owed them for work performed aboard the employer’s fishing trawlers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on (1) claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and (2) the employees’ remaining wage claims. The employees appealed.
The employees worked on different vessels for the employer. One worked as a fish processor, the other as a housekeeper. They each signed an employment contract with the employer, but the ships’ masters did not sign them. The court of appeals found that the employees’ duties were exempt from the FLSA, under the “first processing” exemption of 29 U.S.C.S. § 213(a)(5). Though the statute was ambiguous, the regulations under it, including 29 C.F.R. § 784.133, squarely addressed the issue of the definition of “first processing.” That definition included the employees’ duties, even though one of them was not actually engaged in fishing. The parties’ contracts were entered into pursuant to 46 U.S.C.S. § 10601, and included a six-month limitation period for in rem actions that was also provided in 46 U.S.C.S. § 10602. However, the contracts’ failure to include the ships’ masters’ signatures rendered them void, and the six-month limitations periods did not apply.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in part, as to FLSA claims, and denied it in part, as to in rem wage claims.
NOTE: Another case holding that the master must sign a written contract with each crew member before a voyage pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 10601 decided this month is: HARPER v. UNITED STATES SEA FOODS LP, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1201 (9th Cir. 2002)
SEAMAN FOUND 50% COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT FOR LIFTING AND CARRYING A VALVE WHILE ON LIGHT DUTY
CARROLL P. BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (US Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration); BAY SHIP MANAGEMENT INC, Defendants-Appellees. CARROLL P. BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee
No. 00-30705, No. 00-31358
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 615
January 15, 2002, Decided
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 97-CV-1592-C. Helen Ginger Berrigan, US District Judge.
Boudreaux v. Unites States, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2000)
District court’s attribution of 50% comparative negligence to Boudreaux and the court’s finding that the OSPREY was not unseaworthy, affirmed. District court’s allocation of an additional 20% negligence to Boudreaux for lifting the valve despite his prior back injury reversed. On remand, the court should restore to Boudreaux $59,941.17 representing the 20% of actual tort damages.
Plaintiff seaman filed suit against defendants the United States and ship management company for injuries he sustained on the ship. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana found that the seaman was comparatively negligent, and reduced his damages. The seaman filed a motion to alter or amend, which was denied in part, and filed a suit for maintenance and cure, which was dismissed. The seaman appealed.
The seaman had injured his back while working on another ship, and was limited to light industrial work. The seaman was injured again at work when he and a pumpman had to carry a valve that weighed about 300 pounds. The seaman filed suit against the government and the ship management company under general maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. app. § 688. The district court found that the government was negligent, but that the seaman was comparatively negligent to the extent of 70 percent, and reduced the seaman’s actual damages accordingly. The seaman filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was partially granted and denied. The seaman filed a new lawsuit and sought maintenance and cure. The suit was dismissed. The two appeals were consolidated. The court found that the government failed to identify any record evidence that the seaman’s decision to lift the object despite his back condition in any way caused his injuries, so the finding of an additional 20 percent negligence was clearly erroneous. There was no showing that the ship was not reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was used. The seaman had not reached maximum medical cure.
The judgment of the district court was affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.
COURT AFFIRMS JURY VERDICT FOR SHIPOWNER ON UNSEAWORTHINESS WHERE AN ENGINE SURGE CAUSED THE CAPTAIN OF THE VESSEL TO FALL OUT OF THE VESSEL AND SUFFER INJURIES AND, AT TRIAL, THE COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE RELEVANT TIME OF UNSEAWORTHINESS TO CONSIDER WAS THE TIME SURROUNDING THE ACCIDENT AND LEADING UP TO THE CAPTAIN BEING HURT
ROBERT F. GIFFORD, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. AMERICAN CANADIAN CARIBBEAN LINE, INC., Defendant, Appellee.
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 584
January 10, 2002, Decided
Plaintiff captain of a cruise ship sued defendant ship owner, alleging inter alia that the unseaworthiness of the ship’s rescue boat caused the captain to fall out of the boat and suffer injuries. The captain appealed the judgment in favor of the owner, entered on a jury verdict in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, contending that the jury was improperly instructed.
The captain asserted that engine problems caused the rescue boat to operate intermittently, and that an engine surge caused the captain to fall out of the boat, after which he suffered severe injuries from the boat’s propeller. During deliberations, the jury requested clarification concerning the time at which they were to determine the seaworthiness of the boat. The district court responded that the relevant time was the time surrounding the accident and leading up to the captain being hurt, but then directed the jury to focus on the time when the captain was hurt. The appellate court held that the jury was properly and repeatedly instructed that they were to determine whether the unseaworthiness of the boat was a substantial direct cause of the captain’s injuries, and the isolated reference to the time when the injury occurred was insufficient to lead the jury to believe that unseaworthiness at the time of the fall was insufficient to establish causation. The one remark, taken in the context of the instructions as a whole, thus did not have a tendency to confuse or mislead the jury.
The judgment in favor of the owner was affirmed.
VESSEL OWNER SANCTIONED FOR REFUSING TO ALLOW OSHA TO BOARD VESSEL TO INSPECT WORK AREAS OF SHIPYARD EMPLOYEES – COAST GUARD AUTHORITY OVER REGULATING SAFETY OF SEAMAN’S WORK PLACE DID NOT DISPLACE OSHA AUTHORITY TO INSPECT AREAS OF VESSEL WHERE SHIPYARD EMPLOYEES WORK
ELAINE CHAO, SECRETARY OF LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, VERSUS TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE, INC., Defendant-Appellant
No. 00-60535
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 292
January 9, 2002, Decided
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Mississippi. 1:99-CV-157-GR. Walter J Gex, III, US District Judge.
Defendant vessel owner appealed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against it for civil contempt and the award of attorneys fees and costs to the Secretary of Labor (secretary) in the secretary’s action for civil contempt.
The secretary filed an action against the vessel owner for civil contempt arising from the vessel owner’s refusal to honor a warrant obtained by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to inspect the work areas of a shipyard’s employees, who were working aboard the vessel owner’s vessel. The court entered a judgment of civil contempt against the vessel owner and was in the process of determining an award of attorneys fees and costs when the vessel owner appealed the judgment. The court remanded the case for the determination of fees and sanctions. After the award of fees and costs, the vessel owner appealed. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment. The court held that OSHA had jurisdiction to board the vessel for inspection, pursuant to the warrant, because the workplace of the shipyard employees, not the workplace of the seamen, was being inspected, and OSHA had the authority to adopt safety regulations for such employees pursuant to 33 U.S.C.S. § 941. OSHA’s regulatory power was not displaced by the fact that if it were the seamen’s workplace that was being inspected, the Coast Guard would have such authority. Good faith was not a defense to civil contempt.
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court against the vessel owner for civil contempt and the award of attorneys fees and costs in favor of the secretary.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SHIPOWNER AND AGAINST SEAMAN ON JONES ACT NEGLIGENCE AND UNSEAWORTHINESS AFFIRMED WHERE SEAMAN WHO WAS INJURED WHEN HANDLING A STEEL CABLE COULD NOT SHOW ANY EVIDENCE OF SHIPOWNER’S NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO TRAIN SEAMAN OR ANY NOTICE OF A RISK
GENE A. RUTHERFORD, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKE MICHIGAN CONTRACTORS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 00-1850
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 441
January 7, 2002, Filed
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. 98-00769. Miles. 07-18-00.
Rutherford v. Lake Mich. Contrs., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 592, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1631 (W.D. Mich. 2000)
Plaintiff injured worker appealed the decision from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, which entered summary judgment in favor of defendant tugboat owner in the injured worker’s suit for negligence under 46 U.S.C.S. § 688 of the Jones Act and under the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The tugboat owner alleged a lack of negligence.
The injured worker hurt his back when he was handling a steel cable. The appellate court affirmed. Under the Jones Act, there was a reduced standard of causation. After negligence was proven, a plaintiff only needed to show that a shipowner’s negligence was the cause in whole or in part of the injuries. Even under the reduced standard, there was no evidence of the tugboat owner’s negligence. There was no evidence that handling the steel cable was a foreseeable risk nor was there evidence of notice of any risk, if one existed. The appellate court rejected the lack of training argument since there was no evidence of the negligent failure to train. Any evidence on the weight of the cable or unfamiliarity with pulling techniques went to causation, not breach. The injured worker did not identify whether proper safety equipment was used, and the appellate court was not required to search the entire record for this information. Under the seaworthiness doctrine, a shipowner was not required to furnish an accident-free ship. Based on many of the same facts, there was no evidence of defective cables, equipment, or and insufficient number of workers.
Summary judgment in favor of the tugboat owner was affirmed. Under either the Jones Act claim or the unseaworthiness claim there was insufficient evidence of the tugboat owner’s negligence.
SEAMAN’S PETITION TO COMPEL HIS EMPLOYER TO PAY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL COUNSELING AS PART OF THEIR CURE OBLIGATION WAS DENIED WHERE SEAMAN FAILED TO PROVIDE MEDICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUCH COUNSELING OR EVIDENCE THAT THE CONDITION FOR WHICH HE NEEDS COUNSELING IS RELATED TO THE PHYSICAL INJURY HE SUSTAINED WHILE IN THE SERVICE OF THE VESSEL
IN RE GULF SOUTH MARINE TRANSPORTATION, INC., OWNER AND OPERATOR OF THE M/V MR. T
CIVIL ACTION NO.01-1755 SECTION: “R” (4)
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1312
January 16, 2002, Decided
January 17, 2002, Filed, Entered
Claimant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of his entitlement to cure for psychological treatment was denied.
Seaman field petition for cure against his employer/owner/operator of the vessel for psychological counseling.
Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to cure because his anxiety about being unable to pay his child support payments resulted from the physical injury he sustained that left him unable to work. He asserts that before the accident he did not suffer from anxiety because he was able to work and pay his child support obligations. However, the record reflects that plaintiff had a long history of being derelict in child support, which predates his injury. The only medical evidence in the record is a progress note written by claimant’s treating physician, an orthopedic surgeon, in which the doctor merely restates claimant’s claim that he is “fairly stressed” about his failure to pay child support. The physician, however, does not state anywhere in the referral form that the anxiety accompanied injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered on the ship or indeed arose as a result of anything that happened on the ship. Nor is the statement a diagnosis of anxiety. Plaintiff does not submit medical records or physician testimony.
The Seaman’s petition to compel his employer to pay for psychological counseling as part of their cure obligation was denied.
SHIPOWNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS SEAMAN’S INJURY ACTION AND CLAIM FOR MAINTENANCE AND CURE GRANTED WHERE SHIPOWNER DID NOT HAVE CONTINUOUS AND SYSTEMATIC CONTACTS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT GENERAL JURISDICTION AND SEAMAN COULD NOT SHOW THAT SHIPOWNER EXERCISED SIGNIFICANT CONTROL OVER LOCAL UNION WHICH CREWED SHIPOWNER’S VESSEL
CHARLES FRISELLA VERSUS TRANSOCEANIC CABLE SHIP COMPANY,ET AL
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-1855 SECTION “F”
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 943
January 11, 2002, Filed
Defendant TCSC’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction GRANTED.
Plaintiff seaman filed an action against defendant shipping company, seeking damages for his injury and for maintenance and cure. Defendant moved to dismiss, contending that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Louisiana to support the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over it.
The seaman was hired by the company pursuant to an agreement between the company and his seafarer’s union. The seaman’s complaint alleged that the company did business in Louisiana and failed to provide an adequate crew. The court held that the company did not have the type of continuous and systematic contacts with Louisiana necessary to support general jurisdiction. The court then examined the seaman’s claims of specific jurisdiction that: (1) the seafarer’s union acted as the company’s agent, and so its activities should have been imputed to the company and (2) the union hired an “inadequate” crew inasmuch as the crew members’ intentional actions caused his injuries. The court found that there was no evidence that the company exercised significant control over the union’s activities in Louisiana. Instead, it was more accurate (and more factual) to say that the union acted as an agent for the seaman and the other union members who paid the union for its services. Furthermore, the court found that the connection between the seaman’s injury and the union’s hiring practices was tenuous at best.
The shipping company’s motion to dismiss was granted.
TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CHARGE JURY THAT A BARGE WORKER’S NEGLIGENCE AND UNSEAWORTHINESS CLAIMS WERE NOT DEPENDENT ON HER STATUS AS A “SEAMAN” UNDER THE JONES ACT REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL
MARY FREEZE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOST ISLE PARTNERS, Defendant and Appellant.
A093146 /A093390
2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 281
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 997994.
After jury determined barge worker was not a “seaman” under the Jones Act, barge worker appealed alleging the trial court erred in not properly charging the jury with regard to the barge worker’s claims under the general maritime law.
Plaintiff Mary Freeze was injured while she moored a barge owned by her employer, defendant Lost Isle Partners (Lost Isle). In her amended complaint, she sought relief under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. App. § 688(a)) and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) (33 U.S.C. § 905(b)). Additionally, Freeze alleged claims of negligence and unseaworthiness of a vessel under general maritime law. During the trial, Freeze abandoned her LHWCA claim because she was excluded from coverage under that Act. She requested the court to instruct the jury on her other causes of action, in the alternative, contending that the negligence and unseaworthiness claims were not dependent on her entitlement to relief under the Jones Act. The trial court refused to charge the jury as requested by Freeze. Instead, the jury was directed not to consider the general maritime causes of action if they found Freeze was not a “seaman” under the Jones Act. The jury found in favor of Lost Isle on the Jones Act claim, determining that Freeze was not a “seaman.” After a judgment in favor of Lost Isle was filed on September 7, 2000, Freeze filed a timely notice of appeal. By a subsequent order filed November 8, 2000, the trial court granted Freeze’s motion to strike Lost Isle’s bill of costs after judgment. Lost Isle filed a timely notice of appeal from the November 8, 2000 order. On appeal from the judgment, Freeze correctly argues that the trial court’s instruction to the jury limiting their consideration of her general maritime claims was prejudicial error.
WIDOW AND MINOR CHILDREN OF DECEASED SEAMAN AWARDED PRE-DEATH PAIN AND SUFFERING, FUTURE LOSS OF EARNINGS, HOUSEHOLD SERVICES, AND LOSS OF GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT WHERE SHIPOWNER FAILED TO PROVIDE PROMPT, PROPER, AND ADEQUATE MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR BACTERIAL MENINGITIS
REBECCA J. LABAT, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, MEGAN SCOTT AND TIFFANY SCOTT, AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT LABAT VERSUS MALLARD BAY DRILLING COMPANY, INC.
NO. 2000-CA-2098
2000-2098 (La.App. 4 Cir, 01/16/02); 2002 La. App. LEXIS 82
APPEAL FROM PLAQUEMINES 25TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. NO. 41-375, DIVISION “A”. Honorable Anthony Ragusa, Judge.
Appellant widow, individually and on behalf of her minor children, sued appellee employer in a wrongful death and survival action. The district court found that the employer was not responsible for causing or worsening deceased’s condition and that employer did not unfairly or improperly withhold or fail to provide proper maintenance and cure to the decedent. The widow appealed.
The decedent worked for the employer and was on board a vessel on a well on a lake. The decedent became ill. He was taken by boat to shore, but when it was discovered his wife could not immediately come for him, he was returned to the vessel to rest and was left in isolation. When his fellow workers came to get the decedent they found him to be very ill. He was taken to shore and then a hospital. He died days later from bacterial meningitis. On appeal, the court found that the employer owed the decedent the duty of maintenance and cure as an employee aboard its vessel, whether injured or ill. Further, the failure of the employer to reasonably assess the decedent’s condition and to allow his condition to manifest while under its care and control gave rise to the employer’s responsibility to the decedent’s survivors. Finally, the record supported awards for pre-death pain and suffering, loss of future income, household services, and loss of guidance and support.
The judgment was reversed and the appellate court rendered an award in favor of the widow for pre-death pain and suffering, future loss of earnings, household services, and loss of guidance and support.
JUDGMENT NOTHWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF TUGBOAT OPERATOR WHERE SHIPOWNER NOT FOUND NEGLIGENT BUT SHIP FOUND UNSEAWORTHY FOR HAVING AN ICY DECK – COURT FINDS THE HAZARDS OF SNOW, SLEET, AND ICE ON VESSELS’ DECKS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENDER A VESSEL UNSEAWORTHY BECAUSE THEY ARE UNAVOIDABLE INCIDENTS OF SHIPBOARD LIFE
ROBERT C. FOSTER AND ANN I, FOSTER, his wife, Appellees v. MARITRANS, INC., MARITRANS GP, INC. AND MARITRANS OPERATING PARTNERS, L.P.,Appellants
No. 240 EDA 2001
2002 PA Super 4; 2002 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3
June 26, 2001, Argued
Appeal from the Judgment entered December 11, 2000. In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Civil No. 001070 – February Term, 1998. Before DEMBE, J.
Reversed in part, and remanded. Affirmed in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Defendant tugboat operator appealed from that portion of a judgment that awarded plaintiff injured seaman and his wife damages for injuries resulting from the tugboat’s alleged unseaworthiness under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688 et seq.
A seaman was injured when he slipped on the icy deck of the tugboat. In a lawsuit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688 et seq., he sought damages for negligence, as well as the traditional maritime remedies of maintenance and cure, as to which the tugboat operator did not question its liability. The appeals court held that after the jury found the tugboat operator not negligent but that the tugboat was still unseaworthy, the trial court should have granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the operator. The hazards of snow, sleet, and ice on vessels’ decks did not automatically render a vessel unseaworthy, given that they were unavoidable incidents of shipboard life. So long as the deck was not unreasonably slippery, the operator should not have been held liable.
The court reversed the judgement to the extent appealed from and remanded with directions to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the tugboat operator, and affirmed the remainder of the judgment.