Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20130315_0003297.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-24 18:28:21
Document Index: 780700815

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 605', '§ 553', '§ 605', '§ 605', '§ 605', '§ 605', '§ 605', 'art, 47', '§ 605', '§ 553', '§ 553', '§ 553', '§ 605', '§ 605', '§ 605', '§ 605', '§ 553']

| Joe Hand Prod., Inc v. Ravinesh Tony Behari
Joe Hand Prod., Inc v. Ravinesh Tony Behari
JOE HAND PROD., INC., PLAINTIFF,v.RAVINESH TONY BEHARI,D/B/A KNOCKOUTS NIGHT CLUB, A/K/A KNOCK OUTS SPORTS BAR & GRILL,DEFENDANT.
Pending before the court is plaintiff's January 15, 2013 motion for default judgment against defendant Ravinesh Tony Behari, d/b/a Knockouts Night Club, a/k/a Knock Outs Sports Bar & Grill, located at 227 C Street, Marysville, California. The court has determined that the matter shall be submitted upon the record and briefs on file and accordingly, the date for hearing of this matter shall be vacated. Local Rule 230. On review of the motion, the documents in support, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
On June 6, 2012, plaintiff, a nationwide distributor of sports programming, filed a complaint against defendant alleging that the latter unlawfully intercepted and exhibited a live broadcast of a program entitled "Ultimate Fighting Championship 131: Dos Santos v. Carwin" ("the Program") in the establishment for commercial advantage without obtaining a sublicense from plaintiff for its use, in violation of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605, the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 553, and state law. The complaint alleges defendant exhibited the Program on June 11, 2011.
The summons and complaint were served on defendant by mail and by substituted service on August 21, 2012 (the documents were left with or in the presence of Reshma Behari, defendant's co-occupant at a residence). See ECF No. 5; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2); Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1985) (default judgment void without personal jurisdiction). Defendant has failed to file an answer or otherwise appear in this action. The clerk entered default against defendant on October 10, 2012.
Request for entry of default and the instant motion for default judgment and supporting papers were served by mail on defendant at defendant's home address. ECF No. 11- 5. Defendant did not file an opposition to the motion for entry of default judgment. Plaintiff seeks an entry of default judgment in the amount of $111,100 ($10,000 for statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II); $100,000 for enhanced damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii); and $1,100 for conversion).*fn1
Plaintiff seeks entry of default judgment on its claim brought pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(a).*fn2 Plaintiff's inability to allege the precise nature of the intercepted transmission in this case, which is largely due to defendant's failure to appear or defend itself in the action, raises a question regarding the scope of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) and the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim under that provision. The Federal Communications Act prohibits, among other things, commercial establishments from intercepting and broadcasting radio communications to its patrons. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). In relevant part, 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) states:
The scope of section 605(a) is less clear with respect to transmissions intercepted from a cable system, which are expressly covered under 47 U.S.C. § 553(a). Section 553(a) states, in relevant part: "No person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law." 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).*fn3
At a minimum, plaintiff's complaint and evidence support a conclusion that defendant intercepted, without authorization, a transmission of the Program and broadcast it to its patrons. Plaintiff essentially concedes that its complaint and the record contain no allegations or evidence substantiating the nature of the transmission that was intercepted by defendant. Plaintiff argues, however, that although it was unable to allege the precise means of transmission in this case (i.e., transmission over a cable system or satellite broadcast), it "should not be prejudiced" given defendant's failure to appear or defend itself in this action. Pl.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Default J. at 8. The undersigned agrees with plaintiff that under the circumstances of this case, where plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the transmission at issue because of defendant's failure to appear or defend itself in this action, plaintiff should not suffer the resulting prejudice. In any event, the split of authority presented above has little practical impact in this case because the undersigned will recommend the entry of a judgment for statutory damages in the amount of $5,000, which is the middle range of the non-enhanced statutory damages available under both 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). Thus, insofar as the merits of plaintiff's statutory claims and the sufficiency of its pleadings under the Eitel factors are concerned, the complaint and record before the undersigned favor entry of default judgment.
3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action Under the fourth factor cited in Eitel, "the court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct." PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Here, plaintiff seeks statutory damages of $110,000 for the willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. This amount represents the maximum amount plaintiff would be permitted to recover under the statute, including enhanced damages. In addition, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for defendant's tortuous conversion of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff notes defendant would have been required to pay only $1,100 to broadcast the Program at the establishment, but plaintiff asserts nominal damages have proven insufficient to combat piracy and that defendant therefore should be required to pay the statutory maximum. Thus, plaintiff seems to concede that amount of damages requested is not proportional to defendant's conduct.
Given the substantial amount of money at stake, this factor could weigh against the entry of default judgment. See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions v. Streshly, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (proposed award amount of $100,975 was "manifestly excessive under existing law"); J & J Sports Productions. v. Cardoze, 2010 WL 2757106, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2010) ("a large sum of money at stake would disfavor default damages," such as damages totaling $114,200); see also Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers v. Vigil, 2007 WL 3239281, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007) ("default judgment is disfavored if there were a large sum of money involved"); but see J & J Sports Productions v. Hernandez, 2010 WL 1980186, at *4 ("the statutes involved contemplate such an award under certain circumstances," and the factor did not weigh against default judgment). As discussed below, however, the court declines to recommend judgment in the amount requested. Consequently, the factor does not weigh against plaintiff.
4. Factor Five: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material
Here, plaintiff seeks a judgment in the amount of $111,100. Plaintiff's application for default judgment and proposed order indicate that this sum consists of $110,000 for a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) and (e)(3)(C)(ii), and $1,100 as compensatory damages arising from defendant's act of conversion.
In this case, plaintiff's investigator provided evidence that the establishment, which has a capacity of 100 patrons, had between 42 and 47 patrons inside on the day in question and that defendant was unlawfully broadcasting the Program on an unspecified number of televisions.*fn5 Affiant Decl., ECF No. 9-3. The court recognizes the following factors that weigh against the imposition of enhanced damages: defendant's establishment is not large, it is unclear how many televisions were displaying the Program, and there is no evidence that the establishment was doing any greater level of business on the night the fight was shown than at any other time.
Despite these factors, the court finds that enhanced damages are appropriate based on the following factors: there is evidence of promotion by defendant that the Program would be shown at the establishment, see Affiant Decl. at 4; there is evidence that a special premium on drinks was being charged at the establishment on the night of the fight, id.; and the establishment was charging a $10.00 entrance fee on the night in question, id. Also, plaintiff's counsel's supplemental declaration identifies another action brought against this same defendant, Ravinesh Tony Behari, d/b/a/ Knockouts Sports Bar, for the same unlawful conduct. See Riley Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 4-6; J&J Sports Prod., Inc. v. Behari, Case No. 2:12-cv-1204-LKK-DAD (plaintiff's November 29, 2012 motion for default judgment remains pending). Assessing plaintiff's history as a repeat offender, the court finds it necessary to award enhanced damages to offset future unlawful conduct. Balancing these facts with the widespread problem of piracy and the need for an award sufficient to deter future piracy, the undersigned will recommend an award of statutory damages in the amount of $5,000, and an award of enhanced damages in the amount of $15,000.
Plaintiff also seeks actual damages for defendant's alleged tortious act of conversion in the amount of $1,100, which consists of the fee that defendant would have had to pay to plaintiff in order to lawfully broadcast the Program through a contractual sublicense.*fn6
The undersigned will not recommend an award of damages with respect to plaintiff's conversion claim. The statutory damages provisions at issue serve not only a deterrent function, see J & J Sports Prods. v. Orellana, 2010 WL 1576447, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2010) (unpublished), but also a compensatory function, which is evidenced by provisions that permit the award of statutory damages or actual damages in a civil action. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(I); 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i). Here, the recommended award of statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 and enhanced damages in the amount of $15,000 sufficiently compensates plaintiff, and this case does not present a set of circumstances where an additional award might be warranted. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff be awarded no damages on its conversion claim.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the April 3, 2013 hearing on plaintiff's motion for default judgment is vacated; and
3. The court award statutory damages in an amount of $5,000.00 and enhanced damages in the amount of $15,000 to plaintiff; and