Source: https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2015_06_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2017-04-27 07:09:59
Document Index: 370153314

Matched Legal Cases: ['§600', '§ 1003', '§1002', '§ 1056', '§1002', '§25', '§115', '§115', '§212', '§115', '§7', '§212', '§ 212', '§212', '§212', '§212', '§212', '§89', '§3020', '§3020']

New York Public Personnel Law: June 2015
Type in a key word or two concerning the subject or issue in which you are interested in the box at the upper left and tap enter to access any relevant material posted. Tuesday, June 30, 2015
An employer may be required to provide an individual with a name clearing hearing if it has publicly disclosed stigmatizing material concerning the individual An employer may be required to provide an
individual with a name clearing hearing if it has publicly disclosed stigmatizing
material concerning the individual 2015 NY Slip Op 04890,
After a probationary teacher
[Probationer] was terminated from her employment by the School District she commenced
an action against a number of school administrators and board members
[Defendants] alleging that Defendants had maliciously published defamatory
statements about her and that her due process rights were violated by Defendants'
failure to provide her with a name-clearing hearing. Supreme Court granted Probationer's
application to annul the School Board's determination denying her a
name-clearing hearing and ordered such hearing to be provided. Addressing Probationer’s due
process claim, the Appellate Division said that Supreme Court erred in
annulling the Board's determination and granting plaintiff a name-clearing
hearing. The court explained that where "a government employee is
dismissed for stigmatizing reasons that seriously imperil the opportunity to
acquire future employment, the employee is entitled to an opportunity to refute
the charge [or charges]" at a name-clearing hearing if the employer
publicly disclosed the stigmatizing reasons or if there is a likelihood of
future dissemination of such reasons.” Probationer had requested a
name-clearing hearing “to specifically defend against and address the assertions”
by school officials concerning her termination or her relations with students
that had been made part of her personnel file. However, said the court,
Probationer’s allegations as to the stigmatizing content of such material did not
include any further allegations that Defendants and the Board had publicly
disclosed those letters or their contents. Further, said the Appellate
Division, Probationer’s assertion that she was seeking relief in the form of
removal of the statement of reasons letter from her personnel file was
sufficient to apprise the Board of an allegation that there was a likelihood
that such a letter or its content might disseminated. Members of the Board,
however, said that, before deciding to deny Probationer’s request for a
name-clearing hearing the Board determined that the statement of reasons set
out in the letter had been and would remain confidential. Thus, the court concluded, “given
that [Probationer] did not allege that Defendants and the Board had publicly
disseminated any stigmatizing materials and considering the evidence supporting
the conclusion that [Probationer’s] allegation that the statement of reasons
letter was in [Probationer's] personnel
file was factually incorrect, there is no basis to disturb the Board's denial
of a name-clearing hearing.
Turning to Probationer's action
alleging statements made by certain school officials had subjected her to "ostracism
and rejection" in the community, the Appellate Division, after explaining
the relevant law, held that “Given that defendants do not challenge the jury's
determinations that [certain school officials] made the respective statements
and that they were defamatory” and remanded the case for a new trial to determine damages, if any, “based upon proof of harms limited to those that can
be linked by proximate cause to the two slanderous statements.”
NYS Employees’ Retirement System benefits are based on the member’s job title at the time of his or her retirement
NYS Employees’ Retirement
System benefits are based on the member’s job title at the time of his or
2015 NY Slip Op
04555, Appellate Division, Third Department
New York State Correction Officer [Officer] retired from his position and began
collecting service retirement benefits pursuant to Retirement and Social
Security Law Article 14. Some four years later Officer requested that he be
granted service retirement benefits pursuant to Retirement and Social Security
Law Article 15, contending that “other correction officers … had been granted
service retirement under Article 15.” After an administrative hearing, the
Hearing Officer concluded that Officer was not eligible for Article 15 service
retirement benefits and the Comptroller adopted the Hearing Officer’s decision,
in which he included a supplemental conclusion of law, and denied the Officer’s
request for Article 15 retirement benefits. Officer appealed the Comptroller’s
The Appellate Division confirmed
the Comptroller’s determination, noting that “The Comptroller has exclusive
authority to determine all applications for retirement benefits and the
determination must be upheld if the interpretation of [the] controlling
retirement statute is reasonable and the underlying factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence." Retirement and Social Security
Law §600 (a) (2) (a) provides that "[m]embers in the uniformed personnel
in institutions under the jurisdiction of the [D]epartment of [C]orrections and
[C]ommunity [S]upervision of New York [S]tate" are excluded from Retirement
and Social Security Law Article 15 benefits.” A representative from the New
and Local Employees' Retirement System testified that retirement benefits are
based upon an applicant's job title at the time of the individual’s retirement,
and Officer admittedly retired from service from the position of correction
officer. While Officer argued that the
denial of his request for Article 15 service retirement benefits was irrational
based upon the fact that other correction officers were granted such benefits,
the Appellate Division said the record reflects that those officers had “transferred
to civilian job titles prior to retirement.”
The court’s conclusion: The
Comptroller's determination that Officer was ineligible for Article 15 service
retirement benefits is consistent with the applicable statutory provision and
supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed.
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04555.htm
Guidelines for the promulgating of rules and regulations by an administrative agency
Guidelines for the promulgating of rules and regulations by an
Greater N.Y. Taxi
Assn. v New
York City Taxi & Limousine Commn., Court of Appeals, 2015 NY Slip Op 05514
In this case the Court of Appeals addresses the
separation of powers doctrine in cases where a legislative body delegates to an
administrative agency the power to “fill in the details” of the legislation by adopting rules and,
or, regulations. The basic standard: the rules or regulations adopted by an administrative agency to implement a statute may not be inconsistent with the statutory language nor inconsistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislation authorizing the promulgation of such
rules or regulation.
The genesis of the case was the New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission’s
[TLC] efforts to replace the Checker cab -- "the iconic taxi of
yesteryear "– with “an iconic Taxi of Tomorrow” [ToT] by adopting certain rules
setting new standards for such vehicles.
An association of medallion owners and an individual owner
of a taxi fleet commenced a combined CPLR Article 78 proceeding and declaratory
judgment action, seeking to invalidate the ToT rules and obtain a related
declaration. The complaint alleged, among other things, that the TLC lacked
authority to enact the ToT rules and violated the separation of powers doctrine
in doing so. Supreme Court held that the TLC had exceeded its authority under
the City Charter and had violated the separation of powers by intruding in the City
Council's domain. The court then declared that the ToT rules were invalid [42 Misc 3d 324].
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision [see 121 AD3d 21].
Citing Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling. The court said that the issues of delegation of power and
separation of powers overlap and are often considered together, noting that “if
an [administrative] agency was not delegated the authority to enact certain
rules, then it would usurp the authority of the legislative branch by enacting
those rules,” explaining that “[t]he constitutional principle of separation of
powers . . . requires that the [l]egislature make the critical policy
decisions, while the executive branch's responsibility is to implement those
policies." Further, said the court, “as long as the legislature makes the
basic policy choices, the legislation need not be detailed or precise as to the
agency's role.”
In Boreali, the Court of Appeals set out
four "coalescing circumstances" that are non-mandatory,
somewhat-intertwined factors for courts to consider when determining whether an
administrative agency has crossed the hazy "line between administrative
rule-making and legislative policy-making:"
1. Did the agency do more than "balanc[e]
costs and benefits according to preexisting guidelines," but instead made
"value judgments entail[ing] difficult and complex choices between broad
policy goals" to resolve social problems?”
2. Did the agency merely fill in details of a broad
policy or "wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set
of rules without benefit of legislative guidance?"
3. Was the legislature unsuccessfully in reaching reach
agreement on the issue, which would indicate that the matter is a policy
consideration for the elected body to resolve?
4. Whether the agency must use its special expertise or
competence in the field to develop the challenged rules or regulations.
In this case the Court of Appeals concluded that “[g]iven
the broad statutory powers granted to the TLC to set policy as guided by
enumerated safeguards and guidelines, the New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission
did not exceed its authority or intrude on the City Council's domain in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine by enacting the ToT rules.”
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05514.htm
Termination as "a final agency action” is effected when the letter of dismissal is delivered to the officer or employee
Termination as "a
final agency action” is effected when the letter of dismissal is delivered to
the officer or employee 2015 NY Slip Op 04892, Appellate Division, Third Department
An internal investigation by the Division of State Police concerning missing evidence
resulted in misconduct charges being filed against a State Trooper [Trooper]
for allegedly failing to obey a lawful order to truthfully answer questions and
knowingly making a false entry in official records. The Division of State
Police Hearing Board found Trooper guilty of the two charges and recommended a
penalty consisting of a 60-day suspension without pay, a one-year disciplinary
probation period and a letter of censure.
Trooper, however, was shown a determination already signed by the Superintendent
of State Police imposing the penalty of termination from his employment and was
told that he had 10 minutes in which to resign or he would be terminated. Trooper resigned but subsequently commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding
seeking to be reinstated. Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate
Division for review of the question of “substantial evidence” supporting the findings of the Hearing Board with respect to Trooper's being found guilty of the charges filed against him.
Initially the Appellate Division considered the question of the Trooper’s
resignation, commenting that a resignation "would ordinarily be beyond [its]
review,” but noting “exceptions exist where . . . the resignation was allegedly
ineffective and involuntary,"* citing Melber v NYS Education Department, 71
AD3d 1216. As it was undisputed that the Superintendent had signed a written
decision terminating Trooper’s employment, which document was shown to him and
Trooper was told that he had 10 minutes to accept an "option" of
resigning, the Appellate Division ruled that “under the narrow circumstances”
of this case Trooper was effectively terminated by a final agency action when
he was handed the signed termination document.
Turning to the merits of the issue of “substantial evidence,” the court sustained
the hearing panel’s determination as to Trooper’s guilt with respect to the
charges filed against him, explaining that “credibility determinations are for
the administrative factfinder when conflicting proof is presented.”
Although Trooper offered explanations “for some of the many discrepancies”
in his testimony, the Appellate Division said that “this created a credibility
question which was resolved against him” and substantial evidence supports the
administrative determination.
As to the penalty imposed by the Superintendent, the court said “we have
observed that ‘a State Trooper holds a position of great sensitivity and trust
and a higher standard of fitness and character pertains to police officers than
to ordinary civil servants," citing Bassett v Fenton, 68 AD3d at 1387-1388.
The court said that the penalty imposed, termination, did not shock its sense
of fairness in view of findings of Trooper’s “repeated false statements where
the underlying matter implicated missing evidence, together with [Trooper’s]
failure to accept responsibility even when confronted with contrary documentary
* Concerning the issue obtaining an "involuntary resignation," in Rychlick v Coughlin, 63 NY2d 643, the
Court of Appeals pointed out that
threatening to do what the appointing authority had a right to do -- in this instance filing
disciplinary charges against the employee if the employee did not submit his resignation from his position -- did not constitute coercion so as to make the
resignation involuntary.
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04892.htm
The 2015 edition of The Discipline Book, a concise guide to disciplinary actions involving
public officers and employees in New York State, is now available in two formats - as a paperback
print edition and in an electronic [e-book] edition. For
more information click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com
The 2015 edition of this concise guide to disciplinary actions involving
public officers and employees in New York State is now available in an electronic [e-book] edition. For
more information click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending June
Click on text highlighted
in color to access the full report
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Attorney General Eric T.
Schneiderman announced the unsealing of a one-count indictment charging
Richard L. Cook III, 57, a
resident of Atlanta, Ga.,
with the crime of Grand Larceny in the Second Degree, a class C felony, in
Albany County Court. Cook is charged with stealing over $200,000 in pension
payments from the New York State
and Local Employees Retirement System paid to his deceased mother, Yvonne
Powell, a New York State
pensioner who died in 2009.
Former clerk-treasurer convicted of
stealing $50,000 of the village’s funds
Former Village of Riverside clerk-treasurer
Kristina Johnson was sentenced to jail time for repeatedly stealing village
funds to cover her household expenses. State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli
announced Johnson was sentenced to 60 days in jail, five years
probation and ordered to pay full restitution of $50,000 to the village.
ERISA provisions do
not apply to government retirement plans insofar as its prohibition against “assignment
and alienation” of benefits is concerned
04949, Appellate Division, First Department
The husband [Son] and his former spouse [Daughter-in-Law] stipulated in a settlement,
incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the judgment of divorce, whereby Daughter-in-Law waived her rights to receive payments as the designated beneficiary of
her former mother-in-law's New York City Employees' Retirement System [NYCERS]
Supreme Court granted Son’s motion to, among other things, direct Daughter-in-Law
“to disgorge payments she received as the beneficiary of Son’s mother’s NYCERS
pension plan. Daughter-in-Law appealed but the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed
the lower court’s ruling.
The Appellate Division explained that Daughter-in-Law’s reliance on her argument
that the waiver violated the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act's
(ERISA) anti-alienation provision* was misplaced
as 29 USC § 1003[b][1] provides that “The provisions of this subchapter shall
not apply to any employee benefit plan if ,,, (1) such plan
is a governmental plan” as defined in 42 USC §1002(32).**
As NYCERS is a government plan of a political subdivision of a State, the
provisions of ERISA cited by Daughter-in-Law in support of her claim did not apply.
Thus, said the Appellate Division, Supreme Court “correctly applied standard
principles of contract interpretation to the stipulation, as it [was] a settlement
agreement in a divorce action.”
The provision in question, titled "Retirement Funds," said the
court, evinced an intent to waive the parties' rights to each other's
retirement funds. Further, noted the Appellate Division, the clause in which Daughter-in-Law
waived her right to such benefits included her waiver of "any and all
pension funds set up during the marriage in [Daughter-in-Law’s] name by . . . a member
of [Son’s] family." This language, said the court, evinced a related
intent by Daughter-in-Law to waive her rights to Son's relatives' retirement funds,
including her rights to her former mother-in-law's NYCERS pension benefits.
* 29 USC § 1056[d][1] provides that “Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated.”
** 42 USC §1002, Subdivision 32, provides that
the term “governmental plan” means a plan established
or maintained for its employees “by the Government of the United States, by the
government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or
instrumentality of any of the foregoing.”
Employee must exhaust
available administrative remedies unless he or she can demonstrate that such
action would be futile
05402, Appellate Division, First Department
A member of the College’s faculty [Petitioner] was not reappointed
as an assistant professor by the College. Petitioner filed an Article 78 petition seeking a
court order annulling the College’s decision not to continue her employment. Supreme
Court dismissed Petitioner’s action.
Petitioner appealed but the
Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling, explaining that the
relevant collective bargaining agreement governing an employee’s employment with
the College provided for a three-step grievance and arbitration procedure. As Petitioner did not to avail herself of this procedure, the Appellate Division explained that she was precluded from seeking relief under Article 78 of the CPLR as she had not exhausted her administrative remedies.
In addition, the Appellate Division noted that Petitioner
failed to establish that arbitration, which could result in referral to a
three-member committee of faculty members drawn from a panel jointly chosen by
the Chancellor and the union pursuant to terms and conditions set out in the collective bargaining agreement, would be futile. Finally, the Appellate Division rejected
Petitioner’s contention that the Chancellor's academic judgment as to her scholarly
record and the College’s failure to secure meaningful funding does not
constitute an "agency policy" that would render her resorting to her administrative remedies
Public employees cannot be required to surrender their legal right to
their continued receipt of retirement benefits otherwise provided by law
2015 NY Slip Op 05243, Appellate Division, Third Department
Upon reaching the age of 70 the New York State Constitution, Article VI, §25(b) and
Judiciary Law §115 requires Supreme Court justices to apply for certification
to continue their services on the Supreme Court bench. In October 2013, the Administrative Board of the Courts of New York
State [Board] adopted a new policy that "no judge henceforth certificated
for service as a Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Judiciary Law §115
may receive, concurrent with receipt of a salary for such service, a retirement
allowance for prior judicial service within the Unified Court System." In
December 2013, Justice Gerald E. Loehr and certain of sitting Justices [Justice Loehr]
were informed of their need to comply with the new policy and that approval for
certification would therefore be conditioned on such compliance. Justice Loehr filed an Article 78 petition and an action for declaratory judgment
seeking, among other things, a declaration that the Board’s policy that
certificated justices not receive such pension benefits during such employment
was illegal, a ruling annulling approval of Justice Loehr's recertification being
contingent upon suspension of such pensions during such employment and a
declaration that Justice Loehr is not subject to such policy. Supreme Court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss Justice Loehr's complaints,
declared the policy to be neither illegal nor unconstitutional and Justice Loehr
The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court’s ruling and held that the Board’s
policy violated Retirement and Social Security Law §212, Judiciary Law §115 (3)
and NY Constitution, Article V, §7. The Appellate Division explained that as
relevant in this action Retirement and Social Security Law §212(1) provides that "there
shall be no earning limitations under the provisions of [Retirement and Social
Security Law § 212] on or after the calendar year in which any retired person
attains age [65]." The court said that the language of Retirement and Social Security Law §212
explicitly allows New York public employees — including justices of the Supreme
Court — to retire in place and continue to work while collecting their state
pension, rejecting the Board’s argument that §212(1) implicitly permits state
employers, including the Board, to require employees to bargain away their legal
right to the continued receipt of retirement benefits is unpersuasive. Indeed,
noted the Appellate Division, “the plain language of §212(1) grants this right
to public employees without mention of employers or an employer's discretion to
condition recertification upon suspension of a statutory right.
Noting that the history of Retirement and Social Security Law §212
supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to give certain pension
rights to public employees and those rights are not subject to their
employer's preferences, the Appellate Division said that it “cannot discern a rational
argument for the proposition that a Supreme Court justice's pension-taking
falls under the category of necessity when determining a justice's eligibility
for certification” and declared that the Board's policy was "illegal and contrary to
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05243.htm
Some issues to be mindful of when filing and prosecuting an appeal before the Commissioner of Education Some issues to be mindful of when filing and prosecuting an appeal before the Commissioner of Education Appeal of Guilaine
Leger-Vargas, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,771
Guilaine Leger-Vargus, a disappointed candidate in the 2012 annual
election to a school board, alleged that certain school officials had engaged
in conduct prior to the election that interfered with her campaign and the
Among the remedies Ms. Leger-Vargas sought by in her appeal to the
Commissioner of Education was the removal of certain members of the school
board and the school superintendent and the “reprimand and fine of [certain] district
officials and employees.” The Commissioner said that the appeal must be dismissed and the
application denied, noting, among others, the following procedural
1. Ms. Leger-Vargas submitted
newspaper articles as exhibits to her petition. The Commissioner said
that “It is well settled that newspaper articles do not constitute evidence of
the truth of the statements contained therein” and such articles will not be considered
“for the veracity of their content.”
2. Ms. Leger-Vargas’ reply to the school district’s answer may respond
to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in the answer and is not
meant to buttress allegations in the petition or to belatedly add assertions
that should have been in the petition. The Commissioner said that those
portions of a reply containing new allegations or exhibits that are not responsive to new
material or affirmative defenses set forth in the answer will not be
considered. 3. To the extent that a reply also addresses other appeals pending
before the Commissioner, the Commissioner said that “such submission is
improper and those portions will not be considered….”
4. Regarding Ms. Leger-Vargas’ memorandum of law, the
Commissioner said that a memorandum of law should consist of arguments of law and
may not be used to add belated assertions or exhibits that are not part of the
5. As to the relief sought by Ms. Leger-Vargas, the Commissioner said
that, to the extent that she seeks to have the Commissioner reprimand and fine district employees, there is no provision in the Education Law
authorizing the imposition of a reprimand or the imposition of a fine of a board member, a school officer or a member of the school district
staff's by the Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner observed that the
board of education has the sole authority and responsibility to determine if
disciplinary action against a district employee is warranted, not the
Turning to the merits of Ms. Leger-Vargas' appeal, the Commissioner explained that to invalidate the
results of a school district election, the petitioner seeking have such results declared invlid must establish not only
that irregularities occurred, but also a probability that any such irregularities
actually affected the outcome of the election. However, noted the Commissioner, “It is well settled that mere
speculation as to the possible existence of irregularities provides an
insufficient basis on which to annul election results.
Additionally, in an appeal to the Commissioner, the petitioner has the burden of
demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of
establishing the facts upon which the petitioner seeks relief. On this record, said the Commissioner, Ms. Leger-Vargas
“has not established that an irregularity occurred or that the outcome of the
election was affected by the alleged actions of [school officials].” Addressing a number of other issues raised by Ms. Leger-Vargas in her appeal, the
Commissioner pointed out that:
To the extent that Ms. Leger-Vargas raises claims in her appeal that do
not arise under the Education Law, such as acts of alleged defamation and
slander, the Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction over such claims and,
therefore, need not address them.
To the extent that Ms. Leger-Vargas seeks “an apology” from a school board member, an officer or employee
of the school district, the Commissioner lacks authority to order a member board
of a education, a school officer or school district employee to do so.
To the extent that Ms. Leger-Vargas raised claimed violations of the
Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), §89 of the Public Officers Law vests
exclusive jurisdiction over complaints alleging FOIL violations in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York and alleged violations thereof may not be
adjudicated in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education.
The Commissioner, noting that Ms. Leger-Vargas’ appeal must be
dismissed and her application for removal of certain school officers and
officials denied, said “the parties are reminded that public officials and
employees can and should avoid unnecessary contention, particularly by ensuring
that their actions cannot be interpreted as offensive to any specific
individual or group.”
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume54/d16771
probationary employee has the burden of showing that the decision leading to his
or her termination was made in bad faith
A probationary correction officer [Probationer] challenged his employer’s
decision to terminate him from his position. Supreme Court dismissed
Probationer’s Article 78 petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower
The Appellate Division explained that Probationer’s “unsupported
assertions” that his employer, the New York City Department of Correction,
improperly terminated his probationary employment are insufficient to satisfy
his burden of establishing that his dismissal was made in bad faith.
The court said that “[m]ere conclusory allegations of bad faith based on
speculation are not sufficient.”
Service Rule Making Activities
The following “ERRATUM” was published in the New York State
Register dated June 24, 2015
A Notice of Adoption, I.D. No.
CVS-20-14-00003-A, pertaining to Jurisdictional Classification, published in
the June 3, 2015 issue of
the State Register inadvertently failed to include an assessment of written comments
received on the proposed rule. The Department of Civil Service
apologizes for any inconvenience this may have caused. The Assessment of Public
Comment is published below in its entirety:
At a public meeting held on April 8, 2014, the New York State
Civil Service Commission amended Appendix 2 to 4 NYCCR by approving the placement
of 230 positions of Empire Fellow in the non-competitive jurisdictional class.
Following publication of the Notice of Proposed Rule Making, a public comment
in opposition to the proposed rule amendment, dated June 30, 2014, was received from the New York
State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO, (PEF).
Article V, section 6 of the State
Constitution requires that appointments in the classified service of the State
shall be “made according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained, as far as
practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be
competitive...” The Legislature has defined a number of exceptions where
competitive examination in not practicable, such as contained in Civil Service
Law section 42, which authorizes the filling of positions in the non-competitive
jurisdictional class. Non-competitive class positions typically require
candidates to meet minimum qualifications consisting of academic credentials or
training and/or relevant work experience.
Empire Fellow positions are
two-year term-limited appointments for highly skilled professionals who possess
a bachelor’s degree or higher with three years of professional work experience
and who demonstrate leadership capacity and a desire to make a significant
contribution to enhancing New York State government operations. The Empire
Fellows undertake special projects as assigned and report directly to State
agency executive management or serve in the Office of Governor. Empire Fellows
may be cycled through several different assignments during their fellowships
and take part in a structured graduate-style training program focusing on areas
of public administration/management including human resources, budgeting and
community engagement/press relations.
PEF asserts that Fellows perform
duties analogous to promotion-level competitive class positions such as
Environmental Analyst 3 and Program Operations Specialist 5. PEF also claims,
that based upon unverified anecdotal evidence, two Fellows had performed the
same duties as competitive Senior Attorneys.
After review of the public
comment, the State Civil Service Commission has determined to adopt the
amendment as originally proposed. Commission decisions in such matters are
based upon iinformation provided by the appointing authority (here, the State
Office of General Services), as well as comments from professional staff of the
Department of Civil Service Divisions of Classification and Compensation and
Staffing Services. Department staff advised the Commission that Fellows will
work on highly sensitive and cross-functional matters for agency heads and the
Executive Chamber. The variety and nature of these
projects are not amenable to competitive examinations, which may be limited to
specific career-oriented test rubrics.
The promotion-level competitive
class titles cited in PEF’s comment reference certain analytical and policy
development duties in narrow fields, but these titles remain fundamentally
distinct from the role of the Fellows program, which is intended to introduce
and cultivate future generalist managers and leaders from outside of State
service. As such, Fellows must enter State government at a relatively high level,
rather than progressing through a competitive career ladder of successive
promotion examinations. Further, the Fellows serve two-year term appointments
and do not expect and cannot obtain tenure that ordinarily accompanies a permanent
appointment from an eligible list established after a competitive examination.
Therefore, the unique and varied
duties, high-level reporting relationships of the positions, along with the
personal characteristics required of successful candidates and the limited
nature of the appointments, render competitive examination impracticable for
Empire Fellow positions. Candidates’ merit and fitness can be properly assessed
through a non-competitive evaluation, which includes established minimum
qualifications and a rigorous selection process featuring individualized resume
reviews. Accordingly, the Commission continues to find that the Empire Fellow
positions belong in the non-competitive jurisdictional class and the subject
amendment to Appendix 2 of 4 NYCRR has been approved for final adoption.
Distinguishing between a covered employee and an independent contractor for the purposes of eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits Distinguishing between
a covered employee and an independent contractor for the purposes of
eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits 2015 NY Slip Op
04550, Appellate Division, Third Department A law firm [Firm] appealed a decision of the
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board [Board] which assessed Firm for additional
unemployment insurance contributions after ruling that a claimant [Lawyer] for
unemployment insurance benefits for eligible for such benefits. Lawyer had been retained as a "contract
attorney" by the Firm to perform document review services in conjunction
with the litigation of a class action lawsuit. After his assignment ended, Lawyer
applied for unemployment insurance benefits and . The Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Board ruled that Lawyer was the Firm’s employee and assessed it for
additional unemployment insurance contributions as a result. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s
decision explaining that "Whether an employer-employee relationship exists
is a factual determination for the Board, and its decision will be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence." Citing Matter of LaValley, 120 AD2d
1498, the court said that "in cases where the rendering of professional
services is involved, an employment relationship can be found where there is
substantial evidence of control over important aspects of the services
performed other than results or means."
The decision indicates that Lawyer:
1. was paid an agreed-upon hourly rate and required
to work at least 45 hours a week, but not more than 50 hours per week;
2. was given specified hours each day to report to
his assigned work station; 3. was required to take a daily unpaid 30 minute
lunch break and was occasionally required to report to work on weekends;
4. was allowed to take unpaid days off, provided
that he requested the time off in advance;
5. received daily assignments from an associate
attorney employed by the Firm and who supervised Lawyer’s work; and
6. assisted in the
litigation by providing written memoranda summarizing deposition testimony,
work that included Lawyer's attendance at meetings with attorneys from other
firms involved in the litigation. These elements,
said the Appellate Division, constituted “substantial evidence” supporting the
Board's decision that the Firm retained sufficient overall control of Lawyers services
to establish an employment relationship, despite evidence in the record that
could support a contrary conclusion.
court commented that “The fact that [Lawyer] signed a written agreement
designating him as an independent contractor does not compel a different result,
citing Matter of Joyce, 116 AD3d 1132.
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04550.htm
Employer has the burden of proving that the disciplinary charges filed against the employee were timely served
Employer has the
burden of proving that the disciplinary charges filed against the employee were
timely served
04940, Appellate Division, First Department The disciplinary hearing officer found that the tenured teacher [Teacher]
was guilty of two of three sets of charges and imposed the penalty of
termination from his position. Teacher appealed and Supreme Court granted his petition to vacate a
hearing officer's award to the extent of annulling the portion of the award
that sustained a third set of charges against Teacher and imposed the penalty
of termination. The court remanded the matter to Teacher’s employer, the New
York City Department of Education (DOE) for the imposition of an appropriate
lesser penalty.
On appeal, the Appellate Division “unanimously affirmed” the Supreme
Court’s action.
The Appellate Division said that there was nothing in the record to
support Teacher’s claim that his due process rights were violated as the
result of his having been provided with the third set of charges after having been served the first two sets of charges. The court
explained that Teacher had more than 10 days before he offered testimony with
respect to those charges, and he did not object to DOE's request for
consolidation of all of the charges against him. In addition, observed the Appellate Division, “[e]ven though DOE did not
specify the precise sections of the Penal Law allegedly violated, the
allegations in the three specifications fairly apprised” Teacher of the basis the
alleged misconduct underlying the charges filed against him. As the Court of
Appeals held in Matter of Block v Ambach, 73 NY2d 323, "in
the administrative forum, the charges need only be reasonably specific, in
light of all the relevant circumstances, to apprise the party whose rights are
being determined of the charges against him and to allow for the preparation of
an adequate defense." Notwithstanding this, the Appellate Division said that Supreme Court did
not exceed its authority in finding that the third set of charges against Teacher
was time-barred.* Although DOE had requested that hearing
officer to take judicial notice of two sections of the Penal Law and repeatedly
characterized Teacher's conduct as "criminal," the hearing officer did
not find that Teacher’s conduct as alleged in the third set of charges constituted
a crime. Thus there was no basis triggering the three year exception regarding
timeliness set out in Education Law §3020-a(1)
and DOE had the burden of establishing that the charges served on Teacher were
As the DOE essentially conceded at the disciplinary hearing that the
first and second set of charges against Teacher do not support the penalty of
terminating Teacher's employment with DOE, The Appellate Division concluded
that Supreme Court correctly remanded the matter to DOE for the imposition of
an appropriate lesser penalty.
* See Education Law §3020-a(1). Disciplinary
charges against a teacher must be brought within three years from the date of
the alleged misconduct, unless the alleged misconduct constituted a crime when
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04940.htm
Ohio v Clark,
No. 13-1352, Decided June 18, 2015
As the Court of Appeals observed
in Matter of Gray v Adduci, 73 N.Y.2d 741, hearsay evidence can be the basis
of an administrative determination,
In Willis v New York State Liquor
Authority, 118 AD3d 1013, the Appellate Division noted that:
[1] “The strict
rules of evidence do not apply to administrative proceedings and hearsay
evidence is admissible” and [2] “Hearsay evidence may constitute substantial
evidence if sufficiently relevant and probative and may, under appropriate
circumstances, form the sole basis for an agency's determination, unless it is
seriously controverted.” Indeed, in Doctor v New York
State Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Services, 112 A.D.3d 1020, the court said that hearsay evidence
alone may constitute substantial evidence in an administrative hearing.
In contrast, hearsay testimony is typically barred in a criminal
trial. Paul Rothstein, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, addressed the use of hearsay in a criminal
trial in his review of Ohio v Clark,* a decision
recently handed down by the United States Supreme Court. His analysis is posted
on the Internet at https://casetext.com/posts/a-comment-on-the-supreme-courts-decision-in-ohio-v-clark.
In response to an inquiry, “Does
not Ohio v Clark
suggest a weakening, if not the eventual demise, of the prohibition against the
use of “hearsay” in criminal actions?”, Professor Rothstein explained:
"The hearsay rule and its
exceptions still apply as an additional filter, but the states are free to make
exceptions to the hearsay rule. As long as the exceptions are not used to let
in "testimonial" hearsay (i.e. statements made/obtained at the time
with a primary purpose to make/get evidence for prosecution) against a criminal
defendant, which would violate the confrontation clause, the evidence would be
admissible. "In many situations, the new
approach to the confrontation clause (beginning with Crawford in 2004) lets
LESS hearsay in. The previous approach (a case called Roberts) allowed hearsay
in, if it was within a traditional hearsay exception, even if it was
testimonial. Evidence even if within a traditional hearsay exception is now
inadmissible under the confrontation clause if it is testimonial" * In Ohio v
Clark, addressing an appeal from a
criminal conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “In light of these
circumstances, the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit the State from introducing
L. P.’s statements at trial.” At the time the statements at issue were made
L.P. was a three-year old child.
Administrative decision adversely affecting employee that considered allegations not set out in the charges vacated
decision adversely affecting employee that considered allegations not set out
in the charges vacated
2015 NY Slip Op 04764, Appellate Division, First Department
Supreme Court’s denial of a probationary teacher’s [Probationer] the
petition to [1] annul the Board of Education’s [BOE] determination sustaining the
Probationer’s an unsatisfactory rating (U-rating) as a teacher for the
2006-2007 school year, and [2] dismissing the proceeding, was unanimously
reversed, on the law, by the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division then vacated
Probationer’s U-rating for the 2006-2007 school year and remanded the matter to
the BOE for “further proceedings consistent” with its ruling.
After discussing the events leading to Probationer’s U-rating, the court
1. Probationer was informed that her file would be reviewed for a
determination of whether her services as a probationary teacher would be
discontinued and whether her teaching license would be terminated as of the
close of business on July 15, 2007 “.based on professional attitude and
professional growth; attention to records and reports; unsatisfactory classroom
performance; poor planning and preparation; skill in adapting instruction to
the individual needs of the students; evidence of pupil growth in knowledge and
skills;" and
2. This letter constituted the charging document that was the basis of
the ensuing hearing. In particular the Appellate Division noted “missing from the charging
document was any mention of excessive absences.”
An “officially designated” committee, composed of three members,
conducted a review of [1] the decisions to issue Probationer’s U-rating for the
2006-2007 school year; to discontinue her probationary service; and [2] to
revoke her New York City teaching certificate. The majority of the committee concurred as to the recommendation to
discontinue Probationer’s probationary service. However, said the Appellate
Division, "[r]ecognizing that [Probationer] is young and inexperienced and
that she had to take over a new class, which may have been more of a challenge
than she could handle," the committee "reached unanimous
non-concurrence on the recommendation to terminate all
license(s)/certificate(s) held by [Probationer]."
Ultimately Probationer was advised that a "reviewed the report of [the
committee] concerning the recommendation that all your teaching
certificate(s)/licenses be terminated . . . and that your probationary service
as a Teacher of Common Branches be discontinued," and the recommendation
had been sustained. The Appellate Division noted that this determination was
made “notwithstanding the unanimous view” of the committee that the
recommendation to terminate all [Probationer’s] licenses/certificates … should
not be adopted.”
One of the elements referred to in this “ultimate” ruling was the
Probationer’s alleged “excessive absence” not withstanding, as the Appellate
Division pointed out, no mention of alleged excessive absences were setout in the
“charging document.”
Probationer sought judicial relief in a prior proceeding which resulted
in a Supreme Court concluding that the petition to review the termination of Probationer's
probationary employment was time-barred. However the court granted Probationer’s
petition to the extent of annulling the unsatisfactory rating and the revocation
of Probationer’s teaching license. The court then remanded the matter for a new
hearing on Probationer’s unsatisfactory rating and the imposition of a penalty.*
Supreme Court, in this earlier proceeding, also ruled the Probationer
had not been provided with adequate notice that absenteeism was a basis for BOE’s
taking adverse action against her and thus that its reliance on Probationer’s attendance
record in making a final determination violated due process. Nevertheless, on remand, BOE again relied on “evidence of absenteeism,”
as did Supreme Court in upholding Probationer’s U-rating in the proceeding
giving rise to this appeal.
The Appellate Division said that Supreme Court in this second Article 78
proceeding acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious, explaining that
“While the evidence of pedagogical deficiency — apart from the evidence of
absenteeism — might, by itself, be sufficient to warrant the U-rating, that is
for [BOE] to decide.” The Appellate Division ruled that if on remand BOE “declines to sustain
[Probationer’s] unsatisfactory rating, [BOE] is free to reconsider the termination
of her probationary employment.”
However, in the event BOE sustains the unsatisfactory rating, it is
precluded from imposing the penalty of revocation of Probationer’s teaching
license because the judgment in the first Article 78 proceeding directed that
the penalty, if any, should be something less than revocation of Probationer's
license, and BOE did not appeal from that judgment.
Noting that “it is significant that the wrongful admission of evidence
in this case occurred after a specific direction from [Supreme Court] that
evidence of absenteeism was not authorized, based on the charges,” the
Appellate Division again remand the matter to BOE for its reconsideration of Probationer’s
performance rating for the 2006-2007 school year “based solely on the evidence
related to the charges of which [Probationer] received proper notice.”
* The Supreme Court’s decision in that action
is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_22316.htm
The Appellate Division's decision is
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04764.htm
The Discipline Book - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving
public employees in New
York State set out in a 448 page e-book. For more information
click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com
Selected reports and information published
by New York State's
Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending June 19, 2015
Son left father’s body in morgue in order to steal
his father's pension and social security payments On June 14, 2015
State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the pending sentencing of a Queens man for concealing his father’s death so he
could continue to unlawfully collect pension payments electronically deposited
into a checking account in the name of his father. Christopher Bunn is expected
to make restitution full on based upon his guilty plea in October to grand
larceny in the third degree, a Class D felony, and petit larceny. Bunn has
already served six months in federal prison related to his arrest. Bunn’s father was a
designated beneficiary collecting retirement benefits that were not transferable upon
his death. State Comptroller DiNapoli said that “Mr. Bunn left his deceased
father’s body unclaimed at the Nassau County morgue for more than a year so he could
steal his pension and social security payments.”
The Comptroller thanked
District Attorney Brown and the Social Security Inspector General for their
partnership and continued commitment to protecting public funds.” Special Agent in Charge Edward J. Ryan, Office of the Inspector General, Social
Security Administration said that “It is illegal to conceal or fail to report
deaths to continue receiving someone else’s Social Security benefits. I am
gratified by the State Comptroller’s pursuit of justice in this case.” Queens District Attorney Richard A. Brown said that Christopher Bunn’s actions
was “robbing the New York pension system and the federal government of tens of thousands of
dollars in unlawfully obtained benefits. My office will continue to pursue and
prosecute individuals who abuse the system for their own benefit.” This is one of a series of investigations by DiNapoli’s office that have led to
criminal convictions and recovery of unlawful retirement payments. In 2011,
DiNapoli’s investigation of a double-dipping former Rome police officer resulted in the recovery of
almost $90,000. DiNapoli’s 2012 investigation of double-dipping at the Troy
Housing Authority led to two guilty pleas and the recovery of almost $70,000 in
unlawfully paid pension earnings. In 2015, DiNapoli’s work with the Attorney
General’s Office resulted in a two- to six-year prison sentence of a Florida resident for defrauding the system of over
$100,000 and pending indictments of two New Jersey residents for stealing over $100,000 in
pension funds. Most recently, in May 2015, a retired Suffolk County police officer was convicted in Nassau County of defrauding the pension system of more
than $465,000 and ordered to pay full restitution. Since taking office
in 2007, DiNapoli has committed to fighting public corruption and fraud and
encourages the public to help fight fraud and abuse. Allegations of fraud
involving New York taxpayer money by calling the toll-free Fraud Hotline at
1-888-672-4555, by filing a complaint online at investigations@osc.state.ny.us or by mailing a complaint to: Office of the State Comptroller, Division of
Investigations, 14th Floor, 110 State St., Albany, NY 12236. A Ticking Clock for
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli’s “op-ed,” A Ticking Clock for Job Benefits, was
published in The Albany Times Union on June 16, 2015. The Comptroller urges the state Legislature
to act on his proposal to create an optional investment pool to help fund
retire health insurance and other post employment benefits (OPEB).
The text of the Comptroller “op-ed” is posted on the
Internet at: http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-opinion/article/A-ticking-clock-for-job-benefits-6328455.php
his office completed audits at the Village of Brookville
Canajoharie http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/villages/2015/canajoharie.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150621&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=061815release
Fairport Public
Library http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/libraries/2015/fairport.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150621&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=061815release
Revena-Coneymans-Selkirk
Community Library http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/libraries/2015/ravenacoeymansselkirk.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150621&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=061815release
and the Town of Saugerties http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2015/saugertiesjc.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150621&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=061815release
Cheektowaga-Maryvale UFSD http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2015/cheektowagamaryvale.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150621&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=061815arelease
Corinth CSD http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2015/corinth.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150621&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=061815arelease
and the Mount Morris CSD http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2015/mountmorris.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150621&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=061815arelease