Source: http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed114250
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 00:39:09
Document Index: 458346525

Matched Legal Cases: ['UKHL ', '§1', 'UKHL ', '§23', '§85', '§43', '§28']

Family Law Week: Z & Ors v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Ors (Judgment 1) [2013] EWHC 1150 (Fam)
The applicant was the father of five of eight children whose mother was being tried in the Crown Court for serious benefit fraud. The charges arose from claims made by her in relation to supposed multiple complex disabilities and needs of the children.
An order for reporting restrictions made earlier in the criminal proceedings under s.39 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 had been successfully challenged by News Group Newspapers Ltd ("NGN") on the basis that that provision only applied to children concerned in the proceedings as defendants, victims or witnesses. In this case, although the children's medical and other conditions would be the subject of "lengthy and detailed analysis", they were not "caught" by the Act.
Accordingly, the father of the five younger children applied to the High Court for an injunction.
In determining the application, Cobb J noted that the inherent jurisdiction enabled the court to conduct the exercise of balancing the competing ECHR rights under Articles 8 and 10.
He adopted the test articulated by Lord Steyn in Re S [2004] UKHL 47 namely that:
- neither Article has precedence over the other
- where the articles are in conflict, intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights claimed is necessary
- the justification for interference with each right must be taken into account
- the proportionality test must be applied to each.
He also considered s. 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the relevant press code of practice and the applicable case law. He expressly adopted the analysis of Jackson J in A Council v M, F and others [2012] EWHC 2038 (Fam) which set out the need for close attention to be paid to the circumstances of each case; the need to remember that Article 8 rights concern "a few", whereas Article 10 rights are typically of importance to "the many (whose rights should not be eroded by "hard cases of individual misfortune") but that, equally, no hierarchy of rights exist, such that in "highly exceptional" cases there can be "inroads" made into the fundamental right to report criminal proceedings.
In applying these principles to reporting the criminal process, he bore in mind the importance to democratic society of reporting such trials; the need to guard against the "instinctive desire to extend a protective wing to shield the children of parents who are accused of criminal activity"; that press freedom should only be displaced in exceptional circumstances and that the burden of proof lay with the applicant.
NGN advanced a public interest argument and the applicant contended that the circumstances were exceptional and that any identification of the children would cause them serious detriment.
At the particular stage that the trial had reached, Cobb J found that the balance was "exquisitely finely poised" but that, having applied the relevant principles and considered all matters, the applicant had discharged the heavy burden of proof required for the making of the reporting restriction.
He set out four specific reasons for so doing;
- The central role of the children in the case which would involve "constant" references to their private lives and upbringing.
- That the trial was about to focus on detailed examination of the children's medical records which would constitute a serious intrusion into their private lives and was therefore a powerful Article 8 consideration
- That when considering the Article 8 rights of the children the court must have regard to their "unusual stated vulnerabilities"
- That, in terms of proportionality: (i) he recognised that the order would be a considerable interference with Article 10, (ii) that although there was a "hierarchy" amongst the children in respect of the need for protection, it was necessary and proportionate to protect the Article 8 rights of the most vulnerable to preclude the identification of all the family, (iii) that the balancing exercise he had conducted pertained to the particular point reached in the criminal trial.
Cobb J then considered the impact that a conviction might have upon the balancing exercise he had conducted, observing that in such circumstances, there should probably not be "reporting restraint".
Accordingly, whilst making the injunction, he invited the parties to make further representations before him at the point at which the trial judge started summing up, in order that he could make a further decision in time for the verdict.
9. That application was made orally by Miss Claire Kissin on behalf of NGN at the Crown Court on the following morning – Friday 3 May 2013. The application was based on the fact that the subjects of the order were not now (if ever) caught by the provisions of Section 39; the application was successful, and the Crown Court Judge discharged the order.
11. Following the completion of a busy list (and other urgent without notice hearings) the hearing commenced before me at 5.20p.m. on Friday 3 May; I heard full submissions from counsel, and the hearing concluded at 7.40p.m. At that stage, I made a reporting restriction order, expressing it to be effective until I could deliver this judgment. I do so on the first opportunity after the hearing – namely on the morning of 7 May 2013.
18. Perhaps most notably, it is said that three of the children attended a specialist theatre school, became successful child actors/actresses and appeared in amateur and professional productions in regional theatres, and even on the West End stage, including appearances in a number of well-known and successful productions; they appeared on the television. In their theatrical and public roles they were said to be involved in acting, dancing, and singing – "wholly inconsistent" (says the Crown: §1.9) "with the care and mobility needs described by the defendant".
21. It follows from my (necessarily brief and inevitably incomplete) summary of the case above that at the heart of the enquiry in the criminal court is an evaluation of whether, and if so to what extent, some or all of these children have disabilities – physical, intellectual, emotional, and social.
28. Therein lies the inherently unusual aspect of this case – the lives of the dependent children is the focus of the criminal trial, but the children do not attract the ordinary protections of Section 39 Children and Young Persons Act 1933. It is to that statutory provision which I turn first, in evaluating the applicable law.
"no newspaper report of the proceedings shall reveal the name, address or school, or include any particulars calculated to lead to the identification, of any child or young person concerned in the proceedings, either as being the person by or against or in respect of whom the proceedings are taken, or as being a witness therein" – (emphasis added)
33. This is – per Lord Steyn in Re S (A child) (Identification: Restriction of Publication [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593 ("Re S") at §23 – the simple and direct way to approach such cases.
38. Article 8 embraces the concept of "unwanted access to private information and unwanted access to [or intrusion into] one's … personal space": this is what Tugenhadt J in Goodwin v NGN Ltd & VBN [2011] EWHC 1437 (at §85) described as "confidentiality" and "intrusion". I accept the submissions of Miss Lazarus in this case that intrusion into one's personal space includes interference into the life of the family aswell as the private life of the individual.
"The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material), to –
"…what is of interest to the public is not the same as what it is in the public interest to publish. Newspaper editors have the final decision on what is of interest to the public: judges have the final decision what it is in the public interest to publish."
53. In this respect, I recognise the need to guard against an instinctive desire to extend a protective wing to shield the children of parents who are accused of criminal activity and involved in the associated public forensic process. I have much in mind here the comments of Baker J at §43 in of W(B) v M(OS) & others [2011] EWHC 1197 (CoP) :
"judges and practitioners in the Court of Protection – as in the Family Division – must be on their guard to ensure that their naturally protective instincts, developed through years of giving paramount consideration to the welfare of children and the best interests of vulnerable adults, do not lead them to underestimate the importance of article 10 when carrying out the balancing exercise".
"Publicity can have a strong effect on individuals, particularly if they are not used to it, or if, … they are vulnerable to anxiety and to changes in their environment. Any evidence that suggests a real possibility of a detrimental effect from publicity must weigh heavily. On the other hand, there must be some proper factual basis for such concerns" (emphasis by underlining added).
62. Miss Kissin emphasises the need for there to be some "exceptional" reason to justify an order that the reporting should be curtailed; she argues that the Applicant seeks a substantial interference with the right to freedom of speech. She reminds me that this is not a situation (as the Crown Court judge has found) in which Section 39 applies; accordingly, the court should be slow to extend the protection offered to children beyond that provided by statute – this is particularly so given that none of the children are accused of wrongdoing: she submitted that this is not a case where vilification or condemnation will fall on the children through press reporting of their situations.
67. On the other side of the argument is the fragile emotional state of the child E, the explicit warning about the consequences of invasion of her privacy, and – to a lesser extent – the particular concerns raised about the well-being of D, and F in the event of press reporting of the alleged conduct of their mother. There is the further prospect of the public reporting of all of the children's medical histories as the defence case unfolds.
68. In reaching a conclusion on these competing arguments, I have faithfully applied the principles laid down by Lord Steyn in Re S; I have not treated one article of the Convention as having precedence over the other, and in the final analysis, I have applied the "proportionality test … to each carefully", reminding myself that the burden of establishing a case for restriction of press freedom falls upon the Applicant.
71. I would not be faithful to the obligation on me to bring 'intense focus' to the 'comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case' if I were to make slavish comparisons with the facts of previously reported decisions. But unlike the decisions which were analysed in argument, this case is, in my judgment, truly extraordinary. While these children are neither the subject of the alleged crime or the victim of the alleged criminality, they are said by the Crown to be the instruments through which Mrs Z is alleged to have achieved her unlawful gain. Their dependent status has been – according to the Crown – horribly exploited by their mother to make these fraudulent benefit claims. This is a powerful reason for concluding that they should have protection from widespread public knowledge of those alleged activities.
78. These are potent considerations when evaluating a person's right to respect for their private life – the more so where that person is a minor. Quite apart from Mrs Z's contentions about the children's abilities/disabilities, I am entitled to take into account, and do so, the particular emotional and behavioural characteristics of the children as described by the Applicant. These factors weigh heavy in my evaluation of the children's rights.
89. While acknowledging that the rights to freedom of expression "… apply with equal force to the freedom of the press to report criminal trials in progress and after verdict" (Lord Steyn in Re S §28), in my judgment marginally different considerations are likely to apply to the balancing exercise in the event that Mrs Z is convicted.