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Timestamp: 2016-10-24 00:20:07
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Matched Legal Cases: ['art 2', 'art 3', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 15', 'art 15', 'ARTY 01037']

⭐Security Target for Cisco Secure PIX Firewall 515, 520, 525 Version 5.2(3)
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1 Security Target for Cisco Secure PIX Firewall 515, 520, 525 Version 5.2(3) Reference: ST January 2001 Version: 1.6 Europe: USA: CISCO Systems Ltd CISCO Systems Inc. 3 The Square 170 West Tasman Drive Stockley Park San Jose Uxbridge CA Middlesex. UB11 1BN USA United Kingdom2 DOCUMENT AUTHORISATION Document Title Security Target for Cisco Secure PIX Firewall 515, 520, 525 Version 5.2(3) Reference Version Date Description ST 1.0 DRAFT a 22 October 1999 Draft issue for discussion with CISCO ST 1.0 DRAFT b 1 November 1999 Updated to reflect IT environment audit collection functionality ST 1.0 DRAFT c 14 December 1999 Updated following discussions with Cisco USA. ST 1.0 DRAFT d 26 January 2000 Updated following discussion with Certifier and CISCO. ST 1.0 DRAFT e 22 May 2000 Updated following comments raised in EORs ST July 2000 Updated following discussions with Cisco USA. ST August 2000 Updated following comments raised in EORs ST 1.2 September 2000 Updated to include platform 525 ST 1.3 October 2000 Updated following discussions ST 1.4 November 2000 Updated following discussions to remove Solaris. ST 1.5 December 2000 Updated following discussions regarding testing platform. ST 1.6 January 2001 Updated following Evaluator Testing. Page 2 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 20013 CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY TARGET Security Target Identification Security Target Overview CC Conformance Claim TOE DESCRIPTION Overview of the Cisco Secure PIX Firewall System Scope and Boundaries of the Evaluated Configuration Application Context SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Introduction Threats Threats countered by the TOE Threats countered by the Operating Environment Organisational Security Policies Assumptions SECURITY OBJECTIVES TOE Security Objectives IT Security Objectives Non-IT Security Objectives Environment Security Objectives IT Security Objectives Non-IT Security Objectives IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS TOE Security Functional Requirements Security Management Security Audit User Data Protection Protection of the TOE Security Functions Security requirements for the IT Environment Security Audit TOE Security Assurance Requirements Strength of Function Claim TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION TOE Security Functions Security Management Function Audit Function Information Flow Control Function...27 Issue 1.6 Page 3 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST4 6.1.4 Protection Function Clock Function Identification and Strength of Function Claim for IT security Functions Assurance Measures PROTECTION PROFILES CLAIMS RATIONALE Introduction Security Objectives for the TOE Rationale T.INTERN T.EXTERN T.SPOOF TE.AUDATT TE.AUDFUL TE.SELPRO TE.VIOLATE A.PHYSICAL A.HOSTILE A.AUDIT A.AUDFUL Security Requirements Rationale Requirements are appropriate Security Requirement dependencies are satisfied Security Requirements are mutually supportive ST complies with the referenced PPs IT security functions satisfy SFRs IT security functions mutually supportive Strength of Function claims are appropriate Justification of Assurance Requirements Assurance measures satisfy assurance requirements...43 Page 4 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 20015 REFERENCES [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1, August 1999 (aligned with ISO 15408). Issue 1.6 Page 5 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST6 GLOSSARY AND TERMS Authorised User CC FTP Human User IP IT MAC NAT PP SFP SOF ST TCP TOE TSAP TSC TSF TSP User User data A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation. Common Criteria File Transfer Protocol Any person who interacts with the TOE Internet Protocol Information Technology Media Access Control Network Address Translation Protection Profile Security Function Policy Strength of Function Security Target Transmission Control Protocol Target of Evaluation Transport Service Application Protocol TSF Scope of Control TOE Security Functions TOE Security Policy Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE. Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF. Page 6 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 20017 1 Introduction to the Security Target 1.1 Security Target Identification Title: Security Target for Cisco Secure PIX Firewall 515, 520, 525 Version Assurance Level: EAL4, augmented with ALC_FLR Security Target Overview The Cisco Secure PIX Firewall is a stateful packet filtering firewall. A stateful packet filtering firewall controls the flow of IP traffic by matching information contained in the headers of connection-oriented or connectionless IP packets against a set of rules specified by the firewall's authorised user. This header information includes source and destination host (IP) addresses, source and destination port numbers, and the transport service application protocol (TSAP) held within the data field of the IP packet. For connection-oriented transport services, the firewall either permits connections and subsequent packets for the connection or denies the connection and subsequent packets associated with the connection. Depending upon the rule and the results of the match, the firewall either passes or drops the packet. In addition to IP header information, CISCO Secure PIX firewalls use other information, such as the direction (incoming or outgoing) of the packet on any given firewall network interface. 1.3 CC Conformance Claim This TOE has been developed to include components as defined in the Common Criteria version 2.1 [CC] part 2 extended by a bespoke audit generation component. The TOE has been developed to conform to the EAL4 assurance level, augmented with ALC_FLR.1 as identified in part 3 of [CC]. This augmentation has been included, as it is intended to maintain the assurance of the TOE under an assurance maintenance scheme. Issue 1.6 Page 7 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST8 2 TOE Description 2.1 Overview of the Cisco Secure PIX Firewall System This section presents an overview of the Cisco Secure PIX Firewall Version to assist potential users in determining whether it meets their needs. The Cisco Secure PIX Firewall controls the flow of Internet Protocol (IP) traffic (datagrams) between network interfaces. The Cisco Secure PIX Firewall is provided on a number of platforms. The platforms included within the scope of this evaluation are 515, 520 and 525. From hereon these platforms will referred to as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The Cisco Secure PIX Firewall (the TOE) is a purpose built hardware device that uses an Intel Pentium processor and runs the Cisco Secure PIX Firewall image (version 5.2.3). It provides a single point of defence as well as controlled and audited access to services between networks by permitting or denying the flow of information traversing the firewall. Router Internet PIX Firewall INSIDE OUTSIDE Router Protected Servers Protected Clients Server 1 Server 2 Internal Accessible Server 2.2 Scope and Boundaries of the Evaluated Configuration The TOE configuration consists of: One Cisco Secure PIX Firewall, which controls the flow of IP traffic between network interfaces. The TOE s physical boundary includes this single component, although the TOE relies on functionality provided by components beyond the scope of this evaluation. The Page 8 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 20019 physical scope of the TOE includes the hardware and software elements identified in Table 1. Hardware PIX 515 consisting of a single Pentium processor with three network cards, or PIX520 consisting of a single Pentium II processor with three network cards installed, or PIX525 consisting of a single Pentium III processor with 3 network cards installed. Software Cisco Secure PIX Firewall image (version 5.2.3) Table 1 - TOE Component Identification The TOE interacts with an NT Server 4.0 machine for the purpose of storing the audit data generated by the TOE. The requirements for the component of the IT environment providing storage for the audit trail of the TOE is identified in one of the following platforms and associated software: Operating System NT Server 4.0 Software and Hardware requirements Pentium II-based PC running the Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 operating system with Service Pack 4 Table 2 Requirements of the machine storing audit data generated by the PIX firewall Functionality provided by the component collecting audit data is beyond the scope of the evaluation. However, it is recommended that a Certified version of NT Server 4.0 be used for the machine holding the audit records. Software and hardware features outside the scope of the defined TOE Security Functions (TSF) and thus not evaluated are: Cut-Through Proxies; Failover; NAT; Issue 1.6 Page 9 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST10 RIP; Remote Management; SNMP; DHCP Server; Virtual Private Networks (Ravlin IPSec Encryption Card); The TOE is also designed to operate with an AAA server to provide Identification and Authentication of both authorised users and communication sessions set-up through the TOE. This functionality is also outside of the scope of the evaluation. 2.3 Application Context The Cisco Secure PIX firewall (the TOE) provides interconnections between two or more networks depending on the number of interface cards installed within the product. For the evaluation 3 network cards will be installed in the PIX 515, PIX 520 and PIX 525. With the Cisco Secure PIX firewall it is possible to identify each network interface as either internal or external. If an interface is identified as external then the network to which it attaches is classed as being outside of the firewall. If an interface is identified as an internal interface that the network to which it attaches is classed as being inside (or behind) the firewall. All networks inside (or behind) the firewall are protected by the Cisco Secure PIX firewall against those outside of the firewall. The Cisco Secure PIX firewall can provide protection between networks connecting to the different internal network interfaces of the TOE. All traffic between each network attached to the TOE must flow through the CISCO Secure PIX Firewall to maintain security. The connections through the TOE that are within the scope of the evaluation are Ethernet, ARP, DNS, Echo, Finger, IP, ICMP, TCP, UDP, FTP, HTTP, POP3, Telnet and SMTP. The Cisco Secure PIX Firewall also interacts with an NT Server 4.0 machine for the purpose of storing the audit data generated by the TOE. The NT Server 4.0 platform will be used for gathering test evidence for the evaluation. Page 10 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 200111 3 Security Environment 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Threats This section provides the statement of the TOE security environment, which identifies and explains all: 1. known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment; 2. organisational security policies the TOE must comply with; 3. assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and connectivity aspects. This section identifies the threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by the security environment Threats countered by the TOE The IT assets requiring protection are the services provided by, and data accessible via, hosts on the internal network (or networks if there are multiple network interfaces on the TOE configured as being behind the firewall). The general threats to be countered are: attackers on the outside the protection of the TOE may gain inappropriate access to resources within the internal network; users on the internal network may inappropriately expose data or resources to the external network. If the TOE is configured to provide separation between different internal networks then the following general threats will also need to be countered: a user on one of the internal networks may gain inappropriate access to resources on another of the internal networks; a user on one of the internal networks may expose data or resources to users on other internal networks. Issue 1.6 Page 11 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST12 The following specific threats (based on the general threats) are countered: T.INTERN T.EXTERN T.SPOOF A user on the internal network may attempt to connect to unauthorised hosts or access unauthorised services on the external network or other internal networks. A user on the external network may attempt to connect to unauthorised hosts or access unauthorised services on an internal network. A user may cause information to flow through the TOE into a connected network by spoofing the source IP address in the service request Threats countered by the Operating Environment The following are specific threats that must be countered by technical and/or nontechnical measures in the IT environment, or must be accepted as potential security risks. TE.AUDATT TE.AUDFUL TE.SELPRO TE.VIOLATE An attempt by someone to access unauthorised hosts or services through the firewall may go undetected. A user may cause audit records to be lost or prevent future records from being recorded by taking actions to exhaust audit storage capacity. An unauthorised user may read, modify, or destroy TOE internal data. Users may violate the network security policy as a result of careless or wilful negligence actions by the system authorised user, resulting in an attack on the assets protected by the network security policy. 3.3 Organisational Security Policies There are no organisational security policies or rules with which the TOE must comply. 3.4 Assumptions The following conditions are assumed to exist in the operational environment. A.PHYSICAL A.HOSTILE The TOE is physically protected so that only the authorised user of the TOE has physical access. The firewall must only be administered at the console. The firewall is physically protected to prevent hostile Page 12 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 200113 individuals engaging in theft, implantation of devices, or unauthorised alteration of the physical configuration (e.g. bypassing the firewall altogether by connecting the internal and external networks together). A.AUDIT A.AUDFUL The machine used to store the audit data is physically protected so that only those authorised to access the audit data can do so. The machine used to store the audit data has sufficient storage space to store the audit data. Issue 1.6 Page 13 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST14 4 Security Objectives 4.1 TOE Security Objectives IT Security Objectives The principal IT security objective of the Cisco Secure PIX firewall is to reduce the vulnerabilities of an internal network exposed to an external network (or another internal network should there be multiple internal networks) by limiting the hosts and services available. Additionally, the Cisco Secure PIX firewall has the objective of providing the ability to monitor established connections and attempted connections between networks. The specific IT security objectives are as follows: O.VALID O.HOSTILE O.PRIVATE O.ATTEMPT O.SECPROC The Cisco Secure PIX firewall must limit the valid range of addresses expected on each network interface. The Cisco Secure PIX firewall must limit the internal hosts and service ports that can be accessed from the external network (or other internal networks should they exist). The Cisco Secure PIX firewall must limit the external hosts and service ports that can be accessed from the internal network. The Cisco Secure PIX firewall must provide a facility for the generation of audit events of all communication attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, between each network interface. The Cisco Secure PIX firewall must provide separate areas in which to process security functions and service requests. The processing of a security function must be completed prior to invocation of subsequent security functions Non-IT Security Objectives There are no non-it security objectives to be satisfied by the TOE. Page 14 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 200115 4.2 Environment Security Objectives IT Security Objectives The following IT security objectives are satisfied by the IT environment. OE.AUDIT The machine used for the storage of audit data shall provide facilities to securely store audit data Non-IT Security Objectives The following non-it environment security objectives are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures. NOE.AUDIT NOE.DELIV NOE.NETWORK NOE.MANAGE NOE.PHYSICAL Authorised users of the audit facilities must ensure that the audit facilities are used and managed effectively. In particular, audit logs should be inspected on a regular basis, appropriate and timely action should be taken on the detection of breaches of security, or events that are likely to lead to a breach in the future. Also, the audit logs should be archived in a timely manner to ensure that the machine does not run out of audit log data storage space. Those responsible for the Cisco Secure PIX firewall must ensure that it is delivered, installed, managed and operated in a manner that maintains the security policy. The Cisco Secure PIX firewall must be configured as the only network connection between the networks connected to the firewall s network interfaces. A Cisco Secure PIX firewall authorised user is fully trained and assigned with responsibility for day to day management and configuration of the firewall. Authorised users are trusted individuals, who have been appropriately vetted. The Cisco Secure PIX firewall and the audit machine must be physically protected so that only authorised users have access to Cisco Secure PIX and only authorised individuals have access to the audit machine. Issue 1.6 Page 15 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST16 NOE.REVIEW The configuration of the firewall will be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that the configuration continues to meet the organisation's security objectives in the face of: Changes in the Cisco Secure PIX firewall configuration; Changes in the security objectives; Changes in the threats presented by the external network; Changes in the internal hosts and services available to the external network by the internal network. Page 16 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 200117 5 IT Security Requirements 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements The functional security requirements are drawn from [CC] Part 2 with the exception of FAU_AUD.1 which is a bespoke security functional component based on the [CC] Part 2 component FAU_GEN.1. Table 3 below details the functional security requirements drawn from [CC] Part 2, while Table 4 details the functional security requirement not drawn from [CC] Part 2. The functional security requirements for this Security Target are discussed in detail below. It was found to be necessary to include FAU_AUD.1 instead of FAU_GEN.1 as the requirements imposed by FAU_GEN.1 were not appropriate for the TOE. Functional Components drawn from [CC] Part 2 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MTD.1 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_RIP.1 FPT_RVM.1 FPT_SEP.1 FPT_STM.1 Management of security attributes Static Attribute Initialisation Management of TSF data Subset Access Control Access Control Functions Subset Information Flow Control Simple Security Attributes Subset Residual Information Protection Non-Bypassability of the TSP TSF Domain Separation Reliable Time Stamps Table 3: Functional Requirements from [CC] Part 2 Bespoke Functional Components not drawn from [CC] Part 2 Issue 1.6 Page 17 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST18 FAU_AUD.1 Audit Generation Table 4: Functional Requirements not drawn from [CC] Part Security Management This section defines requirements for the management of security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. In the evaluated configuration, physical access is required to the TOE prior to management of the security attributes is possible 1. Once physical access is gained to the TOE the Authorised user needs to provide the enable (privilege mode) password to be able to manage the security attributes. FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1.1 Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to a) [modify] the [time]; to [an authorised user]. FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1.1 Management of security attributes The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [change_default, query, modify, delete, add] the security attributes: a) [the interface on which the request is allowed to arrive; b) the information flow policy rules to [an authorised user]. FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3.1 FMT_MSA.3.2 Static Attribute Initialisation The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP and Information Flow Control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. The TSF shall allow the [authorised user] to specify alternative 1 The TOE provides the facility for remote management. This functionality is outside of the scope of the evaluation. Page 18 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 200119 initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created Security Audit 2 This section involves recognising, recording and storing information related to security relevant activities. FAU_AUD.1 FAU_AUD.1.1 Audit Generation The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and b) [Every inbound and outbound connection]. FAU_AUD.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and Time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [service requested for network connections] User Data Protection This section specifies requirements for TOE security functions and TOE security function policies relating to the protection of user data. This section consists of an Access Control Policy and an Information Flow policy. The Information Flow Policy defines the information flows of packets that are permissible for the types of inbound traffic (external to internal information flows) and outbound traffic (internal to external information flows). These policies are defined using the rules specified below. 2 The Audit Generation component is a bespoke component based on the [CC] Part 2 component FAU_GEN.1. Issue 1.6 Page 19 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST20 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1.1 Subset Access Control The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] on a) [Manipulation of TSF data and security attributes (as specified in FMT_MSA.1) by an authorised user] FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1.1 FDP_ACF.1.2 Access Control Functions The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to objects based on [the user being an authorised user] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [Manipulation of TSF data, and security attributes (as specified in FMT_MSA.1) can only be performed by an authorised user] FDP_ACF.1.3 FDP_ACF.1.4 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [None] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [No additional rules] Subset Information Flow Control The TSF shall enforce the [information flow control SFP] on: a) [external hosts which send and receive information through the TOE; b) internal hosts which send and receive information through the TOE]. Page 20 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 200121 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1.1 Simple Security Attributes The TSF shall enforce the [information flow control SFP] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: a) [the interface on which the request arrives; b) the information flow policy rules which consists of: presumed source IP address of the subject, as appropriate; presumed destination IP address of the subject, as appropriate; service is allowed; FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information, via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: a) [subjects on the internal network can cause information to flow through the TOE if: all information security attribute values are expressly permitted by the information flow control SFP rules; the request arrives on the internal interface; the presumed address of the destination subject translates does not translate to an address on network from which it originated; service is allowed; b) subjects on the external network can cause information to flow through the TOE if: all information security attribute values are expressly permitted by the information flow control SFP rules; the presumed address of the source subject translates to Issue 1.6 Page 21 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST22 an external network address; the presumed address of the destination subject translates to an address assigned to an internal interface of the TOE. service is allowed; FDP_IFF.1.3 FDP_IFF.1.4 FDP_IFF.1.5 FDP_IFF.1.6 The TSF shall enforce the [additional information flow control SFP rules: none] The TSF shall provide the following [additional SFP capabilities: none] The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules [no additional rules to authorise information flow] The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: a) [there is no rule which explicitly allows it; b) if any of the attributes identified in FDP_IFF.1.1 do not match]. FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1.1 Subset Residual Information Protection The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] the following objects [resources that are used to communicate through the TOE] Protection of the TOE Security Functions This section specifies functional requirements that relate to the integrity and management of the mechanisms providing the TSF and the TSF data. FPT_RVM.1 FPT_RVM.1.1 FPT_SEP.1 Non-Bypassability of the TSP The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed. TSF Domain Separation Page 22 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 200123 FPT_SEP.1.1 FPT_SEP.1.2 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC. Reliable Time Stamps The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. Issue 1.6 Page 23 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST24 5.2 Security requirements for the IT Environment This section details the IT security requirements that to be met by the IT environment of the TOE. Table 5 lists the IT security requirements to be provided by the IT environment: Functional Components FAU_STG.1 FAU_SAR.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage Audit Review Table 5: IT Security Requirements of the Environment Security Audit This section involves recognising, recording and storing information related to security relevant activities. FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1.1 FAU_STG.1.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1.1 FAU_SAR.1.2 Protected Audit Trail Storage The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorised deletion. The TSF shall be able to [detect] modifications to the audit records. Audit Review The TSF shall provide [authorised users] with the capability to read [all audit information] from the audit records. The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. 5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements The assurance requirements for this Security Target, taken from Part 3 of the CC, comprise the EAL4 level of assurance, augmented with the Flaw Remediation assurance. The assurance components are summarised in Table 6. Assurance Class Assurance Components ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation Page 24 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 200125 Assurance Class Assurance Components Configuration management ACM_CAP.4 ACM_SCP.2 Generation support and acceptance procedures Problem tracking CM coverage Delivery and operation ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification ADO_IGS.1 ADV_FSP.2 ADV_HLD.2 Installation, generation and start-up procedures Fully defined external interfaces Security enforcing high-level design Development ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_LLD.1 ADV_RCR.1 Descriptive low-level design Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model Guidance documents AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance AGD_USR.1 ALC_DVS.1 User guidance Identification of security measures Life cycle support ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_LCD.1 ALC_TAT.1 Developer defined life-cycle model Well-defined development tools Issue 1.6 Page 25 of 48 January 2001 Ref.: ST26 Assurance Class Assurance Components ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage Tests ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design ATE_FUN.1 ATE_IND.2 AVA_MSU.2 Functional testing Independent testing sample Validation of analysis Vulnerability assessment AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis Table 6: Assurance Requirements: EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 Further information on these assurance components can be found in [CC] Part Strength of Function Claim A Strength of Function (SOF) claim of SOF-medium is made for the TOE. Page 26 of 48 Issue 1.6 Ref.: ST January 2001 View more
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