Source: https://openjurist.org/990/f2d/472
Timestamp: 2018-02-18 20:19:16
Document Index: 104804535

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 845', '§ 1291', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841']

990 F2d 472 United States v. Gutierrez | OpenJurist
990 F. 2d 472 - United States v. Gutierrez
990 F2d 472 United States v. Gutierrez
990 F.2d 472
Felipe GUTIERREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 90-50204.
Submitted Nov. 2, 1992*.
Felipe Gutierrez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute approximately 243 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 860 (formerly § 845a). Gutierrez appeals the district court's failure to grant his motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, and its failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
To establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution, a defendant must show both (1) that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted, and (2) that the prosecution is based on an impermissible motive, i.e. discriminatory purpose or intent. United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 938 (9th Cir.1992). These are essentially factual showings. See United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503 n. 2 (9th Cir.1981) (selective prosecution is essentially a factual inquiry); see also Services Employees Int'l. v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n., 955 F.2d 1312, 1317 n. 7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3056, 120 L.Ed.2d 922 (1992) (whether a law discriminates is a factual question); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984) (state of mind is essentially a factual inquiry). In United States v. McConney we held that when a legal standard provides for a strictly factual test, the standard of review should be clear error. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1203-04. Thus, under McConney, the standard of review over the establishment of a prima facie case of selective prosecution is clear error. This holding is well supported in our cases. See, e.g., United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1418 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 960, 103 S.Ct. 2436, 77 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1983); United States v. Taylor, 693 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503 n. 2 (9th Cir.1981).
Our holding in United States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.1986), amended, 791 F.2d 707 (9th Cir.1986) is not to the contrary. The court in Moody refused to decide whether the failure to establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution should be reviewed for clear error or abuse of discretion since the defendant could not meet either standard. Despite this noncommittal holding, Moody is consistent with our opinion here. The court in Moody first observed that "several decisions" have applied an abuse of discretion standard, citing United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863, 101 S.Ct. 167, 66 L.Ed.2d 80 (1980), and United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827, 98 S.Ct. 105, 54 L.Ed.2d 85 (1977). Moody, 778 F.2d at 1385. Both of these cases, however, involved the entirely different claim of vindictive prosecution.1 The cases cited by Moody which used a clearly erroneous standard of review, on the other hand, involved selective prosecution claims. See United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.1983) (district court's finding of selective prosecution was clearly erroneous), aff'd., 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985); United States v. Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d 1307, 1310-11 (9th Cir.1977).2 Thus, Moody supports the conclusion that selective prosecution claims should be reviewed for clear error. Cf. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 937 ("[t]he decisions the Moody opinion cites as utilizing a clearly erroneous standard ... involve determinations on the merits of the defendants' [selective prosecution] claims").
As mentioned above, to successfully bring a claim, a defendant bears the burden of showing both (1) that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted, and (2) that the prosecution is based on an impermissible motive. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d at 938. With respect to (1), the court should isolate the factor allegedly subject to the impermissible discrimination so that the similarly situated class is analogous to the defendant without the one impermissible factor. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 707 (9th Cir.1989) (large organized smugglers of illegal aliens operating for profit similarly situated to defendant which was large organized "sanctuary movement").
The second factor, improper motive, is essentially the requirement of a showing of discriminatory purpose or intent. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531. Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as awareness of consequences. Id., 470 U.S. at 610, 105 S.Ct. at 1532. It implies that the decisionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Id. The identifiable group is typically a race, religion, or group of persons exercising a constitutional right. Id., 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531.
Gutierrez argues that the district court failed by not finding that he had established a prima facie case of selective prosecution. With regard to the first requirement Gutierrez claims that blacks and Hispanics are singled out for prosecution under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 860, and that similarly situated Caucasians are not prosecuted. Gutierrez supports this argument by citing statistics which ostensibly show that only 4 non-minority suspects were arrested within 1000 feet of a schoolyard and none were prosecuted in federal court.
This showing is insufficient to establish the first prong of the selective prosecution requirement. Gutierrez argues that the similarly situated class should be all drug traffickers who violate 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. Even if this were the appropriate class, Gutierrez offers no evidence that, over a reasonable period of time, the government is declining to prosecute similarly situated Caucasian drug offenders. His evidence indicates only that there are more blacks and Hispanics being prosecuted than Caucasians. Statistics showing a high percentage of certain groups being prosecuted, alone, are insufficient to establish that similarly situated persons are not being prosecuted. See United States v. Huff, 959 F.2d 731, 735 (8th Cir.1992) (statistics showing 87% of people arrested are African-Americans would be insufficient to establish prima facie case). Gutierrez does not point to a policy which allows that similarly situated Caucasians not be prosecuted. See United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1972) (policy of prosecuting only those who protest census shows that similarly situated class not asserting first amendment rights are not prosecuted). Thus, Gutierrez cannot establish the first prong of the selective prosecution inquiry.
Gutierrez also argues that the schoolyard statute should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Gutierrez is correct that under equal protection standards, racial and ethnic classifications should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). However, prior to applying strict scrutiny, a court must determine that a distinction has been made on race or ethnic origin. Gutierrez has failed to establish a racial or ethnic classification.
We review the failure to allow jury instructions on lesser included offense for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pedroni, 958 F.2d 262, 267-68 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 217 (9th Cir.1989). Discretion with formulating jury instructions lies with the district court. United States v. Pace, 833 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 1742, 100 L.Ed.2d 205 (1988). So long as the instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, the judge's formulation of those instructions is a matter of discretion. Id.
Gutierrez correctly notes that possession is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 860; United States v. Garcia-Duarte, 718 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir.1983). However, Gutierrez fails to identify a factual basis for this instruction. When there is a large quantity of a drug and other evidence tending to establish distribution, courts have declined to require a possession instruction because in those circumstances, once a jury found possession, it could only rationally conclude that the possession was for distribution. United States v. Powell, 932 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 256, 116 L.Ed.2d 210 (1991) (over five kilograms of cocaine). Gutierrez was carrying the equivalent of 6,000 doses of cocaine.
The cases Gutierrez cites in support of the lesser included offense instruction all involve either small amounts of cocaine and/or evidence that the defendant was going to use the cocaine himself. See United States v. Garcia-Duarte, 718 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.1983) (.23 grams of cocaine); United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954, 101 S.Ct. 361, 66 L.Ed.2d 219 (1980) (evidence that defendant possessed cocaine for own use); United States v. Brischetto, 538 F.2d 208, 210 (8th Cir.1976) (evidence for possession stronger than for distribution). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the instruction.
Vindictive prosecution claims challenge an increase in charges by a prosecutor after the defendant has asserted some sort of procedural right, see, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), whereas selective prosecution claims challenge the prosecution of one person in light of the failure to prosecute other similarly situated people
The defendant in Thurnhuber brought a vindictive prosecution claim, but the appellate court refused to consider it since there was no link between the exercise of a procedural right and the "penalty." Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d at 1310. The court therefore concluded that the defendant's allegations "must rest on an improper motive other than retaliation," id. at 1311, and cited several selective prosecution cases, such as United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955, 96 S.Ct. 1431, 47 L.Ed.2d 361 (1976). Thus, the court in Thurnhuber considered the defendant's vindictive prosecution claim as a selective prosecution claim and applied a clearly erroneous standard