Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/alabama/alsdce/2:2015cv00130/57310/24
Timestamp: 2016-10-28 20:23:41
Document Index: 231069636

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n1381', '§ 405', 'art 404', 'art,\n404', 'art,\n357', '§ 416', 'art, 444', '§ 404']

Order re: 1 Complaint filed by Tamika Williams stating that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for supplemental security income be AFFIRMED for Williams v. Colvin :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Order re: 1 Complaint filed by Tamika Williams stating that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for supplemental security income be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 9/23/2016. Copies to parties. (mpp)
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00130-B
Plaintiff Tamika Williams (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks
income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1381, et seq.
On June 8, 2016, the parties consented to have
the undersigned conduct any and all proceedings in this case.
Thus, the action was referred to the undersigned to
Plaintiff filed her application for benefits on March 1,
Plaintiff alleged that she has been disabled
since February 2012,1 due to diabetes, chronic back pain, bulging
disc, pinched nerve, panic attacks, and depression.
(Id. at 43,
Plaintiff’s application was denied and upon timely request,
Law Judge Bruce MacKenzie (hereinafter “ALJ”) on August 5, 2013.
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff is not
Therefore, the ALJ’s decision dated September 26, 2013, became
the final decision of the Commissioner.
timely filed the present civil action.
waived oral argument on June 8, 2016 (Doc. 20), and agree that
this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly before
this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
1. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the
Plaintiff amended her onset
February 20, 2012. (Tr. 43).
physician, Dr. Judy C. Travis, M.D.?
Whether the ALJ erred in evaluating
Plaintiff’s complaints of pain?
Plaintiff was born on January 2, 1979, and was thirty-four
years of age at the time of her administrative hearing on August
(Tr. 40, 173).
Plaintiff passed her high school exit
(Id. at 47, 177).
Plaintiff’s past work includes
working as a babysitter in 2009, working as a packer at a fish
plant from 2005 to 2008, and working as a packer in a poultry
Plaintiff stopped working in 2008 (except for babysitting) to
(Id. at 177, 240, 251).
At her hearing on August 5, 2013, Plaintiff testified that
she can no longer work because of depression and diabetes.
at 49).
She testified that she takes insulin shots, as well as
medication helps, but it makes her dizzy.
back pain but has not had any physical therapy or surgery to
treat her condition.
She has received steroid
shots for her back, but they did not help. 2
sometimes wears a back brace that she bought over the counter,
Pain medications provide temporary
With respect to her depression, Plaintiff takes medication
and goes to therapy every other month.
(Id. at 52).
testified that she has crying spells every other day and panic
attacks every day, as well as insomnia and occasional thoughts
hospitalizations related to depression or any medical condition.
problems that prevent her from working.
Plaintiff testified that she lives alone in an apartment
with her two children, ages ten and eleven.
sister does all of her cooking, laundry, and grocery shopping,
and her sister and children do all of the housework.
She does not get out of the house, does not go anywhere,
and does not visit with anyone except her sister.
can drive, but her license is suspended because of a ticket.
Plaintiff rated her back pain as a seven or eight on a ten-point
pain scale with medication and a ten without medication.
She declined epidural injections for her back pain
because she was afraid of the procedure. (Id. at 61).
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February
20, 2012, her application date, and that she has the severe
impairments of obesity, diabetes mellitus Type II, degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine, asymmetric right sided disc
bulge at L4-L5 without canal stenosis, adjustment disorder with
disturbance of mood, panic disorder with agoraphobia, depressive
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals any of the listed impairments contained in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.6
The ALJ found Plaintiff’s hypertension to be non-severe.
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has only mild restrictions in
activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in social
functioning and concentration, persistence or pace, and no
episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 22).
light work, except that “she would require a sit/stand option to
relieve pain and discomfort and she can ambulate short distances
of up to 75 yards.
She could frequently use foot controls and
frequently reach overhead.
ladders or scaffolds.
She could never climb ramps, stairs,
She can frequently balance and crouch but
only occasionally stoop and kneel but never crawl.
hazardous processes or unprotected heights.
atmospheric conditions and weather.
She can be occasionally
concentrated dust, fumes, gases or other pulmonary irritants.
She can be exposed to moderate noise levels.
remember short, simple instructions and would be unable to deal
She is able to do simple routine,
repetitive tasks but would be unable to do detailed or complex
She would be limited to simple work-related decisions.
criticism, work in small group settings and be able to accept
changes in the workplace setting if introduced gradually and
She would be unable to work at a production rate
pace but could perform goal-oriented work.
Any time off task by
the claimant could be accommodated by normal breaks.”
The ALJ also determined that while Plaintiff’s medically
The ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable
to perform any of her past relevant work as a packer (unskilled,
medium), hand fish filleter (unskilled, medium), and baby sitter
(semi-skilled, medium).
However, utilizing the
work, as well as her age, education and work experience, there
are jobs existing in the national economy that Plaintiff is able
to perform, such as a “garment folder,” “office helper,” and
“mail clerk/sorter,” all of which are classified as unskilled
Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
record in this case and the issues on appeal.
A. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the
rejecting the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Judy C.
Travis, M.D., set forth in a Medical Source Statement Physical
completed on July 17, 2013.
(Doc. 13 at 4-5).
In the forms,
Dr. Travis opined that, because of Plaintiff’s diabetes, lumbar
disk disease, and anxiety, she has the following limitations:
she can sit for only four hours in an eight-hour work day; she
can stand/walk for less than one hour in an eight-hour work day;
she can lift only five pounds frequently; she would miss work
more than three times in a month; her pain is present to such an
extent as to be distracting to the adequate performance of daily
activities; physical activity would greatly increase her pain to
everyday tasks; and her pain is so severe as to prevent her from
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace for periods of
(Id. at 5; Tr. 330-31).
The Commissioner counters that the medical evidence does
not support Dr. Travis’ opinions set forth in the MSS and CAP
The Commissioner also contends that Dr. Travis’ opinions
were properly discredited by the ALJ.
(Doc. 18 at
assessment is supported by the substantial evidence in the case.
Having carefully reviewed the record in this case,
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.
As part of the disability determination process, the ALJ is
decision, the ALJ must specify the weight given to different
medical opinions and the reasons for doing so.
See Winschel v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011).
The failure to do so is reversible error.
See Williams v.
Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12010, *4, 2009 WL 413541, *1
(M.D. Fla. 2009).
must give the opinions “substantial weight,” unless good
cause exists for not doing so.
Costigan v. Commissioner, Soc.
Sec. Admin., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2827, *10, 2015 WL 795089, *4
(11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing Crawford v. Commissioner of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) and Broughton v.
Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985)).
The opinion of “a
one-time examining physician — or psychologist,” on the other
Petty v. Astrue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24516, *50,
2010 WL 989605, *14 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2010) (citing Crawford,
363 F.3d at 1160).
An ALJ is also “required to consider the
opinions of non-examining state agency medical and psychological
consultants because they ‘are highly qualified physicians and
psychologists who are also experts in Social Security disability
evaluation.’”
Milner v. Barnhart,
404.1527(f)(2)(i)).
examining sources.”
275 Fed. Appx. 947, 948
Id. (citing Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d
580, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Whether considering the opinions of treating, examining, or
unsupported by the evidence of record.
Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Good cause may also
inconsistent with the doctor’s medical records, or unsupported
by objective medical evidence.”
Hogan v. Astrue, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 108512, *8, 2012 WL 3155570, *3 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
The ALJ is “free to reject the opinion of any physician when the
evidence supports a contrary conclusion.”
Sryock v. Heckler,
omitted); Adamo v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 365 Fed. Appx.
opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.).
discrediting 7 Dr. Travis’ opinions that her limitations from her
diabetes, lumbar disk disease, and anxiety preclude her from
working, Plaintiff points to the following evidence which she
alleges establishes her disability:
(1) From 2000 to 2013, Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Edgar
Brown, M.D., for back and neck pain and diabetes, for which Dr.
Brown prescribed medications and administered injections.
Brown also ordered an MRI in 2011 that showed a right-sided disk
bulge at L4-5.
Dr. Brown referred Plaintiff to a specialist,
Plaintiff saw on March 15, 2012.
(Doc. 13 at 1-2, Tr. 220-37,
234-35, 247-49, 256, 272-312, 345-57);
(2) In 2010, Plaintiff was treated on one occasion by Dr.
Bruce Taylor, M.D., for pain, paresthesia, and radiculopathy in
her back, neck, and shoulder.
Dr. Taylor gave Plaintiff a Depo-
Medrol injection and prescribed Flexeril and Ultram.
did not return for further treatment.
(Doc. 13 at 2; Tr. 214-
(3) On February 2, 2012, Plaintiff was
The record shows that the ALJ assigned “some weight” to portions
of Dr. Travis’ opinions contained in her treatment records but
not to those expressed in the MSS and CAP forms. (Tr. 34).
request of the Agency by consultative physician, Dr. Stephen J.
Robidoux, M.D., who diagnosed “diabetes type two NOT on insulin”
and opined that Plaintiff had a
“normal examination for her
(Doc. 13 at 2; Tr. 239-242).
Dr. Robidoux’s physical
examination findings showed normal unaided gait, normal heel and
toe walking, able to squat and raise, and normal neuromuscular
chiropractic care, and no epidural blocks for her alleged of
(Id. at 242).
He noted an abnormal MRI “without
normal physical examination for her age.”
noted that Plaintiff was taking only a low dose of NSAIDs for
Dr. Robidoux assessed no functional limitations
whatsoever, concluding that Plaintiff had “NO limitations for
objects, speaking, listening or travel” (id.);
(4) On March 15, 2012, Plaintiff saw Dr. Wesley L. Spruill,
M.D., at the Spine Care Center.
Spruill’s
(Doc. 13 at 2; Tr. 256-61).
pain with flexion at 60 degrees and tenderness to palpation in
the mid lumbosacral region. Dr. Spruill found no numbness or
weakness in Plaintiff’s legs, but tingling in both legs, which
Plaintiff’s lumber exam was largely “normal,” with the
exception of “tenderness” in the mid lumbosacral region, with no
pain in the cervical or thoracic regions, the sacroiliac joint,
or bilateral facets.
She had no swelling or
atrophy in the upper or lower extremities.
normal range of motion, strength, and sensation in the upper
extremities bilaterally.
She had 4/5 grasp strength in
both hands and 4/5 muscle strength in both legs.
had normal patellar reflex in both knees.
pain in her hips during range of motion.
(Id. at 261).
a positive straight leg raise in the right leg at sixty degrees.
She described her sleep as “fair,” reporting that she
averages seven hours of sleep each night.
persistent pain, and failure of conservative treatment.
He recommended an epidural steroid injection and physical
therapy, both of which Plaintiff declined.
never returned for further treatment;
request of the Agency by consultative psychologist, Dr. Nina E.
affect and thought content; oriented to time, place, person, and
However, Plaintiff was not able to calculate change or perform
backward or serial fours forward; she could not name five famous
people; and she could not spell “world” or “earth” backward.
She demonstrated a “good” fund of information and
Dr. Tocci opined that Plaintiff was functioning
in the low average range of intellectual ability and diagnosed
her with Adjustment Disorder with Disturbance of Mood, finding
that her prognosis was guarded.
Dr. Tocci found that Plaintiff
obtaining her GED and job training.8
(Doc. 13 at 3; Tr. 251-53);
(6) From August 1, 2012, to October 22, 2013, Plaintiff saw
a psychiatrist, Dr. Timothy Baltz, M.D., at Cahaba Mental Health
Center, who diagnosed her with Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia,
Depressive Disorder, and Cluster B Personality features.
Plaintiff reported to Dr. Tocci that the reason that she stopped
working was because of child care issues. (Tr. 251).
lasting about three minutes, suicidal thoughts with no attempts,
and a reluctance to be around people.
(Id. at 264-65, 327).
Dr. Baltz prescribed medication and counseling.
time did Dr. Baltz assign any functional limitations as a result
of Plaintiff’s mental condition.
(Doc. 13 at 3; Tr. 264-68,
326-28, 360-61); and
(7) On three occasions from May 13, 2012, to July 17, 2013,
Plaintiff saw physician, Dr. Judy C. Travis, M.D., who diagnosed
her with diabetes, anxiety, hypertension, displaced lumbar disk,
and joint pain and treated her with medications.
Tr. 330-43).
(Doc. 13 at 4;
On Plaintiff’s first visit on May 13, 2013, Dr.
“symmetrical” musculoskeletal system with “no deformities,” “no
swelling,” “good muscle mass bilaterally,” “full range of motion
joints,”
Plaintiff’s blood glucose level was
medication follow up.
(Id. at 338).
On her third visit on July
17, 2013, Dr. Travis completed MSS and CAP forms, opining that
anxiety prevent her from working.
(Id. at 330-31).
Dr. Travis’
except for notations that Plaintiff had “pain in arms and legs,”
“decreased
“tender[ness]” in her neck. (Id. at 334-35).
above does not support Dr. Travis’ opinions set forth in the MSS
treatment of her conditions with medication, with no physical
therapy, no epidural injections, no chiropractic care, and no
surgeries for her back, as well as no hospitalizations 9 related
to any of her medical conditions.
With respect to Plaintiff’s back,
L4-5;
her 2011 MRI
therapy, choosing only conservative treatment with medication.
Curiously, Dr. Travis’ own examination findings
on the date that she completed the MSS and CAP forms reflect
nothing more than “pain in arms and legs,” “decreased movement
of upper body due to muscle pain” and “tender[ness]” in her
(Id. at 334-35).
Even more curious, on May 13, 2013, Dr.
The record reveals one emergency room visit on March 2, 2013, in
which Plaintiff complained of back pain, which she rated as a
nine on a ten-point pain scale.
the emergency room physician noted that she was in “no acute
distress,” and his findings related to her neck, back, and
extremities were completely normal.
(Tr. 316, 318).
condition. (Id. at 320).
deformities,”
swelling,”
bilaterally,”
“full range of motion of all joints,” “all muscles functioning
well,” and “no atrophy.”
are inconsistent with the severity of the opinions set forth in
the MSS and CAP forms.
In addition to being inconsistent with her own treatment
records, Dr. Travis’ opinions are inconsistent with the opinions
examination findings were largely normal, with the exception of
“tenderness” in the lumbosacral region.
recommended epidural steroid injections and physical therapy,
both of which Plaintiff declined, and he assigned no functional
limitations whatsoever.
examination findings were largely “normal” and who opined that
(Id. at 239-242).
Dr. Travis’ opinions are inconsistent with the opinions of
consultative psychologist, Dr. Tocci, who diagnosed Plaintiff
with Adjustment Disorder with Disturbance of Mood but opined
that she would benefit from obtaining her GED and job training.
(Id. at 251-53).
Dr. Travis’ opinions are inconsistent with the treatment
Disorder, and Cluster B Personality features, but treated her
(Id. at 327).
Because Dr. Travis’ opinions in the MSS and CAP forms are
inconsistent with her own
treatment records, as well as
remaining substantial evidence in this case detailed above, the
ALJ had good cause to discredit those opinions.
the Court finds, based upon the evidence detailed above, that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment for a
range of light work, with the stated restrictions.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim must fail.10
The Court notes that Plaintiff also submitted additional
records from Dr. Baltz, Dr. Travis, Vaughn Regional Medical
Center, and Bryan Whitfield Memorial Hospital to the Appeals
Council after the date of the ALJ’s decision on September 26,
2013, which the Appeals Council reviewed and found did not
warrant remand.
Of particular note in the new
evidence is a lumbar spine bone scan dated January 10, 2014,
which was “normal,” and a lumbar spine MRI dated December 2,
2013, which showed a “dehydrated” disc at L4-5 with a “small”
posterior annular tear associated with a “very small” posterior
protrusion at L5-S1, without spinal stenosis.
(Id. at 394-95,
Although Plaintiff has not alleged any error related to
the Appeals Council’s review of the records, the Court has
nonetheless reviewed the records and finds nothing in the
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to
properly evaluate her complaints of pain pursuant to SSR 96-7p. 11
records to suggest that Plaintiff’s back pain, diabetes,
anxiety, or any other impairment is disabling. To the contrary,
the Court finds that the additional medical records are
cumulative of the treatment records considered by the ALJ and
reflect nothing more than ongoing treatment of the same medical
conditions considered by the ALJ.
For this reason, they would
not have changed the administrative outcome and, thus, do not
warrant a remand for further consideration of the evidence. See
Ingram v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 126162 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a claimant properly presents new
evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider
whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits
erroneous.”); Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F. 2d 872, 877 (llth Cir.
1986) (new evidence is material if it is “relevant and probative
so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change
the administrative outcome.”).
Plaintiff refers to the following language in SSR 96-7p:
Assessment of the credibility of an individual’s
statements about pain or other symptoms and about
the effect the symptoms have on his or her
consideration of all of the evidence in the case
record. This includes, but is not limited to:
Diagnosis, prognosis, and other medical
opinions provided by treating or examining
medical sources; and
Statements and reports from the individual
and from treating or examining physicians or
psychologists and other persons about the
individual’s medical history, treatment and
response, prior work record and efforts to
tenderness to palpation and reduced strength on examination,”
“decreased movement of the upper body due to muscle spasms,”
constitute “medical signs” which satisfy the pain standard and
establish her disability.
The Commissioner counters that the ALJ reasonably evaluated
all of the evidence of record, including Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints of pain, that the ALJ identified valid reasons for
(Doc. 18 at 6).
in this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is without
symptoms) affects the claimant’s daily activities and ability to
20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a).
In a case where a claimant
symptoms and how the symptoms
SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996 WL 374186, *5.
testimony concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, a threepart standard applies.
That standard requires: “(1) evidence of
an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical
evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain [or
other subjective symptoms] arising from that condition or (3)
that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a
severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the
symptoms].”
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 348 Fed. Appx. 551, 554 (11th Cir.
2009) (unpublished) (quoting Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221,
1223 (11th Cir. 1991)).
The Social Security regulations further
[S]tatements
symptoms will not alone establish that you
are disabled; there must be medical signs
and laboratory findings which show that you
have a medical impairment(s) which could
findings),
20 C.F.R. 404.1529(a) (2013).
evidence that satisfies the pain standard is itself sufficient
to support a finding of disability.”
1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995).
Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d
Stated differently, “if a claimant
testifies to disabling pain [or other subjective symptoms] and
Reliford v. Barnhart, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (N.D. Ala.
Therefore, once the determination has been made that a
claimant has satisfied the three-part standard, the ALJ must
then turn to the question of the credibility of the claimant’s
See id., 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 n.1
If a claimant does not meet the standard, no
credibility determination is required.
consider all of the claimant’s statements about his symptoms and
determine the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be
accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence.
404.1528.
within the province of the ALJ.
1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005).
However, if an ALJ decides not to
symptoms, “the ALJ must articulate explicit and adequate reasons
for doing so or the record must be obvious as to the credibility
Strickland v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 516 Fed.
Appx. 829, 832 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (citing Foote, 67
F.3d at 1562); see also Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1255
(11th Cir. 1983) (although no explicit finding as to credibility
is required, the implication must be obvious to the reviewing
testimony related to pain or other subjective symptoms requires,
as a matter of law, that the testimony be accepted as true.
Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the determination of
expected to produce the pain or other subjective symptoms is a
factual question to be made by the Secretary and, therefore,
“subject only to limited review in the courts to ensure that the
finding is supported by substantial evidence.”
Hand v. Heckler,
761 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds
and reinstated sub nom., Hand v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 275 (11th Cir.
A reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated
credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the
See Nye v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 524 Fed. Appx.
538, 543 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
satisfied the threshold three-part pain standard, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of her symptoms was “not entirely credible”
based on the inconsistency between her testimony and the other
The record evidence, detailed
only; that while an MRI has shown that she has a bulging disk at
L4-5, she has declined epidural injections and physical therapy;
chiropractic care, for her back pain; that no medical source has
ever recommended surgery for any of her medical conditions; that
medical conditions; that, other than Dr. Travis (whose opinion
has been discredited), no treating or examining physician has
ever opined that she is unable to work due to a physical or
mental condition or imposed any functional limitations; and that
Plaintiff herself stated that she stopped working because of
(Id. at 26-35).
administrative hearing, Plaintiff showed “no evidence of pain or
discomfort while testifying at the hearing,” that she “walked in
and out with no apparent gait disturbance,” that she “sat down
and arose without issue,” that she “sat for 45 minutes or more
without any distress evident,” and that she “bent over twice
during the hearing to her right to pick papers off the floor and
she did so easily.”
After a careful review of the record, the Court finds that
testimony were sufficiently articulated in the decision.
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)-(4); (Tr. 26-35).
this Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence,
or substitute its judgment but must accept the factual findings
evidence and based upon the proper legal standards.
v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (“the findings and
evidence.”);
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim must fail.