Source: https://casetext.com/case/griglione-v-martin
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 02:45:36
Document Index: 145415845

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 286', '§ 285', '§ 668', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Griglione v. Martin, 525 N.W.2d 810 | Casetext
525 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1994)
Griglionev.Martin
Supreme Court of IowaDec 21, 1994
Winger v. CM Holdings, L. L.C.
That is the position espoused in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965) and followed by this court in…
Winger v. CM Holdings, L.L.C.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. A divided court of appeals affirmed on both appeals with…
holding even if the district court erred in not submitting a claim against one defendant, we will not remand the case for new trial if a factual finding against another defendant would preclude the dismissed party from establishing an essential element of the dismissed claim
Summary of this case from Linn v. Montgomery
holding statement of uncontroverted facts by moving party does not constitute part of the record from which genuine issues of material fact may be determined
Summary of this case from Adams v. McIntosh
stating parties must establish the undisputed facts compelling a particular outcome under controlling law
Summary of this case from Thompson v. Kaczinski
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT FOR HENRY COUNTY, D.B. HENDRICKSON, J.
David S. Wiggins of Wiggins Anderson, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
David A. Elderkin of Elderkin Pirnie, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Officer Martin testified that Rodney began running toward him. At some point, officer Martin drew his pistol and fired at Rodney three times, fatally wounding him. There was evidence indicating that officer Martin failed to identify himself as a police officer during the events that accompanied the fatal shooting. Other facts bearing on the issues will be considered in our discussion of the points of law urged by the parties.
Plaintiff urges that the jury should have been instructed that a violation of the police operating procedures would constitute negligence per se rather than only being some evidence of negligence. We disagree with that contention for two reasons. First, our prior cases direct that, in order for the violation of rules of conduct to constitute negligence per se, those rules must establish specific standards that are to be followed unwaveringly in all instances. Jorgensen v. Horton, 206 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Iowa 1973); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 cmt. b (1965). Whether this is the case is to be determined in light of the purpose of the particular rule. Porter v. Iowa Power Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221, 237 (Iowa 1974).
The City took the deposition of an expert witness retained by the plaintiff. In that deposition, this witness testified that a video entitled "Surviving Edged Weapons," shown to officer Martin by the Mt. Pleasant Police Department, was inadequate training for handling situations involving edged weapons. The witness then opined that, if this were the only training Martin received on combating assailants armed with edged weapons, he would have been ill-trained for such encounters.
To obtain a grant of summary judgment on some issue in an action, the moving party must affirmatively establish the existence of undisputed facts entitling that party to a particular result under controlling law. Goodwin v. City of Bloomfield, 203 N.W.2d 582, 588 (Iowa 1973). This may be attempted by both the party seeking relief in the action (Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(a)) and the party defending against the claim (Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(b)). To affirmatively establish uncontroverted facts that are legally controlling as to the outcome of the case the moving party may rely on admissions in the pleadings, see Fisher Controls Int'l v. Marrone, 524 N.W.2d 148, 149 (Iowa 1994), affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c).
The City urges that this issue should be determined under a stricter standard for resisting motions for summary judgment, which it refers to as the "new federal standard." It asserts that this new federal standard, approved in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 274 (1986), allows the grant of summary judgment when, after adequate time for discovery, a party is unable to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. The City contends that we approved this standard in Behr v. Meredith Corp., 414 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1987).
The matters to which the City refers involve the establishing of a right to summary judgment by means of showing the limits of the proof available to the party seeking relief. The City is correct in assuming that this means of obtaining summary judgment has been approved by this court. See, e.g., Cox v. Jones, 470 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1991) (statutory requirement for timely designation of expert witness invoked by defendant to preclude required expert testimony at trial). To obtain summary judgment by this means, it is essential that the moving party demonstrate that the proof available to the claimant at trial will be limited to evidence that will not be sufficient to sustain a right to relief. The mere filing of a summary judgment motion, however, does not serve to limit the extent of the resisting party's potential proof at trial. Such limits must be established through procedural devices separate and apart from the summary judgment motion, such as statutory limitations on designating expert witnesses, see Iowa Code § 668.11 (1993), concessions on proof in answers to interrogatories filed by the resisting party, or pretrial orders limiting proof at trial to that evidence disclosed through discovery and closing the discovery process at a fixed time. The record on the motion for summary judgment at issue here does not show that plaintiff's potential proof at trial had yet been limited to that which was contained in a single deposition taken by plaintiff's opponent.
The showing that we last referred to is required not because the City's liability under § 1983 is vicarious. It is required because an act by Martin denying Rodney Griglione's civil rights is an essential element of causation in plaintiff's case against the City. This requirement was clearly stated in Revene v. Charles County Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1989):
[W]hile municipalities . . . may be liable under § 1983 for inadequate police training policies that directly cause constitutional deprivations by individual police officers, the test of municipal liability is a most stringent one. To establish municipal liability on this basis, a claimant must allege and prove that a municipal governing body (or its authorized policymakers) has followed a policy of inadequate training for its police in respect of particular tasks for which "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need, and that the inadequate training actually caused a claimed [constitutional] injury."
Id. at 874 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Iowa Court of Appeals has also recognized that a municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when its acting employee has in fact caused a violation of civil rights as a result of a municipal custom or policy. Allen v. Anderson, 490 N.W.2d 848, 854-55 (Iowa App. 1992).