Source: http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Laborlaw/Nogler-1996/nogler.htm
Timestamp: 2017-11-23 03:31:59
Document Index: 681321543

Matched Legal Cases: ['§3', '§ 3', '§ 4', 'art. 165', '§ 3', '§ 3']

IN MEMORY OF HUGO SINZHEIMER (1875- 1945): REMARKS ON THE METHODENSTREIT IN LABOUR LAW
Luca Nogler1
1. Sinzheimer's period of exile in Holland
Fifty years ago, on 16th September 1945, in Overveen, near Haarlem in Holland, Hugo Sinzheimer, by then in his seventies, died2. His period of exile had begun in 1933, marked by his escape from Frankfurt3 on the evening before the Gestapo broke into his house to take him away, and it had become increasingly hazardous - taking him to breaking point - after the Nazi invasion of 1940. In August 1942 he was arrested, together with his wife Paula and some other Jews, to be sent to a concentration camp. Luckily, as his youngest daughter Ursula has subsequently recounted,4 the president of the Jewish community in Amsterdam was allowed to choose ten people who would not have to go on this tragic journey, and among these were the Sinzheimers.
Forced to go underground, to 'disappear',5 and to search for an 'exile in exile' 6 - to live, in short, in particularly 'insidious' conditions for a person who, like him, was characterised by an 'unmistakeable profile and an enormous nose',7 he was, when finally free to leave his hideout in May 1945, incapable of doing so.8 Death carried him away the evening before his final lesson at the University of Amsterdam, and before the news could reach him that his four children (Gertrud, Hans, Eva and Ursula) had all survived the terrible experience of the camps.
Having begun her legal studies during the family's period in Holland, and having managed to survive the Bergen-Belsen and Bilberach concentration camps, Gertrud - Sinzheimer's eldest daughter and 'spiritual heir' - emigrated to the United States with her husband ('a young Jewish lawyer from her father's practice').9 Once there, she took up where she had left off: both she and her husband enrolled in the legal faculty, and subsequently she became a judge, holding several courses at New York University on 'women's law'.
Sinzheimer, for his part, began work at the University of Amsterdam in 1933 as a temporary professor in 'the sociology of law' - the first time that such a tenure had been instituted in a Dutch university.10 For his first lecture,11 on 6th November 1933, he chose a theme which would nowadays form part of the area of legal anthropology: man and labour law. The lecture was based on work which he had begun to develop during the final Weimar years;12 in it he examined the different ways in which the law perceives man, distinguishing different phases of private law, and centred on the abstract concept of the free individual. He also worked on labour law which, according to a concept taken from real existence, views man as an individual who is dependent, not free. Finally, he worked on economic law, which treats man as a product of society and places him in the economic context. For the private law concept, 'dependence' is a rudiment of pure 'fact'; for the social law concept, underlying labour law, it is a 'concrete case'; in the socialist concept, the ultimate intention is to get rid of it. To this end, its aim is to cut away at its very roots, which is to say, at the private property belonging to the means of production.
Two years after his arrival in Amsterdam Sinzheimer published a monograph on the 'task of the sociology of law';13 this was translated into German in 1976 when the collection of essays by Sinzheimer, edited by Otto Kahn-Freund and Thilo Ramm, was published. The monograph helped to establish Sinzheimer as one of the 'most important representatives of the sociology of law'.14 In the monograph, ideas which had already been included in a paper presented to the Juristische Gesellschaft in Vienna in 1909,15 and which he had entitled Die Soziologische Methode der Privatrechtswissenschaft,16 were developed and finetuned. However, all the legal questions treated - and Sinzheimer went to great pains to underline this - were dealt with in relation to the questions of method which underlay them.
In 1936 Sinzheimer was also appointed temporary professor of sociology of law17 at the University of Leiden, and he was elected to the position of vice-president of the Institut International de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique.18
A year later he completed one of the works of which he was latterly to feel fondest, and which he came to consider as his favourite.19 This study was dedicated to 'classic Jewish works on German legal thought' 20 and comprised twelve fascinating portraits (of Stahl, Goldschmidt, Dernburg, Unger, Lenel, Wilda, Glaser, Laband, Georg Jellnik, Ehrlich, Lotmar, and von Simson). The first time that this (provocative) idea had come to him was during a conference of the Reichsgruppe Hochschullehrer, held in Berlin on 3rd and 4th October 1936 by 'the National Socialist Association for the Protection of Law'.21
The conference was dedicated to the theme Das Judentum in der Rechtswissenschaft,22 and was opened by Frank, who was both a minister in the Reich and president of the Akademie für deutsches Recht; he underlined his belief that the time had come to 'draw a line to the development in Germany of a Jewish legal literature in German'. The works were opened, and subsequently closed, by Carl Schmitt, who did all he could23 to theorise the necessity 'of freeing the German spirit from all the Jewish distortions'. As his numerous writings of the period show (and they have been analysed in great detail in the recent important and widely quoted study by Bernd Rüthers), this well-known constitutionalist was at the forefront of the Nazi regime's worst propaganda, and not only in a way that can be said to be theoretical. It is therefore striking, to say the least, to find that even today it is felt that Schmitt 'absolutely' cannot 'be collocated in the new legal science created by the Nazis', in accordance with a view which began to gain ground immediately after the war.24
Be that as it may, although this particular bit of writing remained substantially unread until the second edition of 1953, Sinzheimer unmasked the Nazi propaganda, showing that 'the spirit of the Jewish classics in German legal ideas is merely scientific spirit'.25 In the last years of his life Sinzheimer became increasingly sensitive to the issue of his Jewish identity; this led him to plan a collective work which would highlight the specific contribution which Jewish scholars had made to various sectors of science.26
These were the years in which various of the Sinzheimer students who had emigrated to the United States27 made attempts to entice their maestro across the ocean.28 However, 'he did not want to begin from scratch again, given that he had to some extent reconciled himself' 29 to exile in Amsterdam.
2. 'Law' and 'society' in the ideas and activity of Hugo Sinzheimer
As is well-known, Hugo Sinzheimer's labour law experience during the Weimar30 and imperial periods was characterised by his teaching activity in the university, by his very successful practice,31 and by his ability to 'unite theory and practice with singular success'.32 In his work as a lawyer, he had amongst other things taken part in the action of his category against the exclusion of representation and had defended it in the first stage of the labour lawsuit (which was basically unsuccessful). He also took part as public prosecutor33 in the decisive proceedings of the 'constitutional commission', which in 1919 drew up arts.159 and 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of Weimar. After a period as parliamentary representative for the SPD, he was appointed technical advisor for several important legislative decisions.34
In reality, Sinzheimer's theoretical position was characterised over a long period35 by a tendency to overevaluate the role played by 'law' in the evolution of 'society'. This was due in part, if not entirely, to his support for Rudolf Stammler's theory36 according to which 'law' represented the 'moulding force' of social life: 'society does not exist in a preconstituted form', but 'is "guaranteed" by law'.37 Society is subsequently defined as a unit of 'people who are legally bound', and the law is recognised as having a constituent function in this.38 Sinzheimer - while rejecting the radical view which supported the idea of the constituent force of law39 - maintained this latter position for many years: it had been developed to overcome historical materialism,40 based on the neo-Kantian presupposition of a radical distinction between 'form' and 'substance', as well as the definition of law as a science of ends as opposed to that of natural science, concerned instead with natural phenomena.
All 'social life', wrote Sinzheimer in the above- mentioned article of 1909, making direct reference to Stammler, is 'determined in its particularity by rules which have been developed by man. (...) These rules need not form part of either the written order, or of unwritten law, but they must be rules of law in action (...) and they need not even be rules of law, since they can also be merely conventional rules of custom (...).' 41
It was in defending precisely this aspect of Stammler's doctrine that in 1916 Sinzheimer called the 'new' juristischen Methodenlehre introduced by Kelsen and Radbruch directly into question, placing the ideal of the application of law on a par with that of the effectiveness of the law. On this view, it was the jurist himself who was forced to investigate which legal methods were necessary to reach certain objectives, in order 'to construct new social forms'.42
Thus, two of the fundamental lines of thought which underscored most of Sinzheimer's scientific work began to emerge - a faith in the ability of law to affect the development of society, and the necessity, from a methodological point of view, for legal science to go beyond the construction of an a priori system of norms. As well as this, legal science should also attempt to answer the question whether such law corrisponds or not to the social needs for which it has been developed.43
However, the call to thoroughly analyse the social function of legal institutions was the distinguishing characteristic of all Sinzheimer's work (see infra §3); in his last writings he also paid tribute to the fact that Stammler had demonstrated that 'law is one of the elements which contributes to the formation of social life'.44 As time passed, he would in reality come to re-evaluate his faith in the capacity of 'law' to have an effective influence on social 'reality' - a view inherited from legal socialism as well as from Stammler, as the Sinzheimer project revealed itself to be 'merely an idea aspiring to accomplishment'.45
The last article which Sinzheimer published in Germany, in 1933,46 therefore dealt with the 'crisis in labour law', and in it he was forced to admit that the subject presupposed a certain 'economic' system which 'no longer works'. 'Labour law', claimed Sinzheimer provocatively, 'has not prevented a collapse in the economy'.47 In the crisis 'of the basic vision which has guided labour law to date', its renewal was no longer possible without a renewal of the economic order.48 Thus Max Weber was right when he criticised Stammler, stating that 'the legal rule considered from an empirical point of view certainly does not represent a form of social being'; it was 'a component of empirical reality' and could contribute from time to time with greater or lesser effectiveness to determine the latter causally.49 The same criticism was made by Sinzheimer when, at the death of eighty-four year old Stammler, he commemorated both the scholar and his work;50 it also formed the basis of the works written by his student Otto Kahn-Freund in the years following the second world war.51
Forced into 'a purely contemplative life',52 Sinzheimer renounced all his previous positions and began to focus on what had by then been established as the theoretical conditions necessary for jurisprudence to have an effective influence on the social fabric, principally in the form of 'law'.53 This gave rise to a purely theoretical work on legislative activity,54 now considered to be one of the precursors to the modern Gesetzgebungstheorie.55 His last monograph, written in conditions of constant danger56 and in fact unfinished, was in fact devoted to a 'theory of legislation'.57
Sinzheimer's view in regard to the relations between 'law' and 'society', and the 'State' and 'society' (the latter overlapping only in part, he believed) was undoubtedly neo- Kantian, and therefore led to a radical contrast of the two elements;58 this outlook altered after only having read Herman Heller's Staatslehre.59 In the regrettably unfinished work by his great and longstanding adversary Carl Schmitt, the State - far from representing a transcending entity - was in fact conceived as part of the social reality. To be more precise, it fulfilled the social function of 'organising and autonomously activating the ordinary actions of a society' in a particular territory.60
Hugo Sinzheimer's numerous works - the result of his multifarious activity as politician,61 sociologist, philospher, and jurist - became prohibited reading from 1937 on, the year in which his titles as a man of learning were also rescinded.62 Only his methodological writings will be treated (briefly) here (in the following sections (§§ 3.1; 3.2; 3.3)), since it was on account of this work that he became the protagonist of a series of controversies that anticipated those which would follow the second world war (see infra § 4). For many years Sinzheimer's work as a specialist on 'collective bargaining' (in which role seventy-year old Otto von Gierke63 attributes him the highest level of expertise)64 obscured the latter area of activity, and rightly so for many reasons. His work on method did also, however, make a firm contribution, in a by no means secondary way, to his reputation as the father of the science of labour law.65 In effect, what stands out in Sinzheimer's work, and what is particularly striking even today,66 was his constant sensitivity to the fact that behind each single legal dispute there is, more often than not, a methodological dispute.
3. Walter Kaskel and Hans Carl Nipperday versus Hugo Sinzheimer
3.1 Sinzheimer's Grundzüge des Arbeitsrecht
Two years after having been appointed, on 4th November 1919, to the post of 'honorary professor' at the Faculty of Law in Frankfurt, where he would teach labour law,67 Sinzheimer - while reworking the entry Arbeitsrecht for the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften 68 - published what was destined to become one of the most important 'textbooks' on labour law during the Weimar period.69 In that year too, the Akademie der Arbeit was founded.70
In his book Sinzheimer decided to break with tradition and to divide the second part of the 'basics', treating the 'development and contents of labour law', into three sections: the 'labour contract' (Arbeitsvertrag), 'association of labour' (Arbeitsverband), which at that time consisted in 'a range of workers and units under a unified management serving one employer', and the 'profession of labour' (Arbeitsberuf), the regulations of which concerned the personality of the worker as such, and namely not in relation to the employer.71 This last feature therefore also included protective regulations for the worker, the right of alliance, and the right of representation based on art. 165 of the Weimar Constitution, of which Sinzheimer was both the theoretical and the practical father.
This division was based on the assumption according to which 'labour law regulates workers' relations. These relations can hold between workers and employers, as well as being simply general, and it is distinctive that in this case they concern only those persons who practise the trade of worker. Relations with an employer cover the worker as a single entity or as one of a group of workers together in a firm, which can be defined as an Arbeitsverband .' 72
Starting from the way that its contents were systematized, 'the Grundzüge were an attempt to give an interpretation of labour law which was not pure and dogmatic, but to clarify instead the processes going towards its making, starting with the structures and functioning of rival social forces.'73 In so doing, as mentioned above, Sinzheimer's outlook took as its constant reference the working man, who came in this way to represent the true gravitational centre of his system. In his introduction to Sinzheimer's writings published in 1976, Kahn-Freund stated, without exaggerating, that 'mankind's liberty and freedom' represented 'the alpha and omega of his political and spiritual life.'74
As Sinzheimer himself later had occasion to recognise during another famous Methodenstreit - in which he expressed his opposition to the views of Erwin Jacobi with regard to the private law, or rather, public law nature of collective agreements - the distinction between 'public', and 'private' 'draws on the view that human beings are individual entities who rely entirely upon themselves and who are bound to units only by means of the state'.75 In an outlook of this kind, which finds its roots in the work of Hegel,76 'no ulterior ties exist'. All the same, if greater attention is focused on the issue it can be seen that, on the contrary, such ties do exist, and that they are constituted by what is normally called 'society', which represents 'the a priori of all ties', 'independently of the will of the individual'. The law discovers 'a new subject, taking the form of the social tie. It accomplishes its duty towards the latter by providing a set of informed regulations which give rise to informed interventions aiming to order the environment and the power of the life of the individual according to its own set of criteria, in the otherwise routine progress of social life'.77
Viewed in this light, labour law, and its institutions, are in reality, according to the famous designation which finds its roots in Sinzheimer's work, 'social law'. Thus 'private labour law and public labour law do not exist. Only one kind of labour law exists' since 'in the shift to a new social period' such an opposition 'loses significance'.78
3.2 Kaskel and Nipperdey: harsh criticism
Sinzheimer's short textbook, which was lengthened in the second edition to the size of a proper textbook (approximately 300 pages), was brutally 'panned'79 by 'the brilliant and dogmatic labour law expert' 80 Walter Kaskey, who held the first81 ever German temporary chair in labour law, in the University of Berlin.82 It was also attacked by Nipperdey.
The initial point that Kaskel made about Sinzheimer's work - the first edition of the Grundzüge - was that it 'is very far removed from the kind of legal dogmatic approach which has for about ten years now begun to upgrade labour law into an autonomous discipline, and it represents a step backwards to a kind of sociological feuilleton; this should be viewed as having been surpassed by jurists specialising in labour law. The positive contents of the work are for this reason very limited, and those wanting to discover something will find themselves virtually empty-handed. It cannot be considered as didactic material for students, and the practitioner would not know how to use it'.83 In line with this judgement, in the paragraph dedicated to bibliographical indications in his textbook on labour law published in 1925, Kaskel included Sinzheimer's textbook under 'works treating the politics of law'.84
Kaskel's and Sinzheimer's views could not have been further apart. In 1921, Kaskel had founded the Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 85 together with Dersch, Stitzler and Syrup, and this, as can be read in the Zum Geleit of the first issue, promised - in contrast to the until then 'usual' politico-legal treatments - 'to treat the legal aspect of the new normative material which had come into existence in depth'. The 'new' journal wanted, in short, to 'mark a decisive change against the Arbeitsrecht', the alternative and prestigious journal run by Potthoff and Sinzheimer.86
One of the things Kaskel did, for example, was to publish a long article of his, Die Lehre vom Tarifbruch, in the Neue Zeitscrift für Arbeitsrecht, subsequently republished separately.87 In this he treated the topic of collective agreements, basing his arguments on the 'logical necessity' (Begriffsnotwendigkeit) of the consequences which had been asserted from time to time. On this view collective agreements were necessarily composed of two 'parts', and not, as Sinzheimer maintained, of three 'functions'; the duty of trade union peace was also necessarily contained in every collective agreement.88 In other words, he tackled the topic of the collective agreement, establishing a view - destined to dominate Germany for many decades to come - which was aprioristic, ie. which was divorced from any real content. Sinzheimer was fiercely critical of this article. In his view, it 'did not contain any new points compared to those presented in the existing literature, only part of which was taken into consideration'.89
Leaving this to one side, the second objection which Kaskel raised about the Grundzüge was based on the way in which the text was actually systematized, which he defined as 'untenable'. He particularly stressed that 'in labour law for many years now there has been a solid systematization which has subdivided the whole area into several components (together with industrial insurance, labour contracts, labour protection, labour constitution (Arbeitsverfassung ), the public authorities with regard to work and trade disputes, as well as the "search" for work (Arbeitsbeschaffung) and help for the unemployed). This division is followed not only in the most well-known systematic treatments and by academic lectures, but also by the most important journals (Reichsarbeitsblatt and Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht), as well as by the classification of the labour minister and the commission for the labour code'.90
The systematization which Sinzheimer had operated was criticised in particular for the fact that it grouped 'under the "profession of job" different topics with no internal links between them, such as labour protection, Arbeitsnachweis, insurance, right of coalition, the responsibilities of the professional associations, the advice of the economy'. In regard to this, Kaskel added a list of fourteen points he felt to be 'inexact', given that space to treat each point individually was insufficient.91
Hans Carl Nipperdey's review,92 also published in 1922,93 was less personal in tone than that of Kaskel, and his observations were of a more genuinely critical nature. Accordingly, he felt that there were three flawed areas in Sinzheimer's 'Introduction': the basic outlook - which was justifiably open to attack; the systematization - which was awkward; thirdly, there was a certain lack of precision in the details. On the first point, Nipperdey observed that it was 'it was to the credit of the new legal science if the law of the Sozialpolitiker had become labour law'.94
Nipperdey had significantly fewer reservations about the second edition of the book, published in 1927, which he defined as 'a new text'.95 The German science of labour law should 'rejoice', he claimed, that 'it could now, together with the excellent textbook by Kaskel, count on the Grundlehren des Arbeitsrechts by Erwin Jacobi and the Grundzüge des Arbeitsrechts by Hugo Sinzheimer. These three books contain the foundations of the science of labour law, its dogmatics, its basic legal concepts, its fundamental principles, and its future hopes'.96
3.3 Sinzheimer's reply : on sociological and dogmatic methods in labour law science
Sinzheimer's reply, placing special emphasis on Kaskel's 'contentious' points, was immediate. In Arbeitsrecht 97 - the journal on labour law which he had founded98 with Potthoff in 1914, and which could boast of such prestigious contributors as Philipp Lotmar and Franz Klein - he replied to what he considered to be, as well as a direct personal attack, an attempt 'to remove the socio-legal method from the science of law and to uphold the absolute dominion of legal dogmatic treatment'.99 'Legal dogmatics', wrote Sinzheimer, is of 'high scientific value. It represents the necessary presupposition for any legal knowledge (...) it offers an unparalleled training for the jurist, and it forms part of our spiritual culture. Anyone inclined to abolish it would be divorcing himselfes from the duty of legal science. It can however be dangerous, for it aspires to having a monopoly'.100
The socio-legal method instead 'starts from the presuppostion that the knowledge of law is obtained not only from its legal provisions, but also from the legal forms of social life. (...) If any sector exists in which the necessity for such a methodology has been demonstrated, it is that of labour law. This was not upgraded to an autonomous discipline by the legal-dogmatic approach, as Kaskel modestly claims, but before this, on account of the more or less explicit breaking of its dominion. The most basic work of the modern science of labour law is to be found in Lotmar's Arbeitsvertrag, the first volume of which was published in 1902. Until that time research activity was only barely discernible - and it was unable to develop because it was excluded from the legal dogmatic approach that was then dominant. (...) The importance of Lotmar's work lies in the fact that he started not only from the content of the laws but also, systematically, from real-life cases. (...) The law was only barely aware of the jobbing contract. Consequently, in an exclusively legal dogmatic perspective, jobbing contracts did not exist'.
The fact that they were included, as a result of Lotmar's work, in legal science was made possible thanks 'to his rejection of the prevailing contemporary approach to legal dogmatic issues, and to the fact that he also analysed - in a way that was commendable - concrete legal facts. He also adopted this approach for the problem of retribution in kind and above all for collective agreements. Prior to Lotmar, legal science did not acknowledge even the existence of these issues, despite the fact that they were at the centre of many trade disputes. This situation was simply taken for granted, and indeed no legal provisions for collective agreements existed. The concrete cases to which they gave rise (Tatbestand) were not formulated anywhere. Even for this issue, scientific development only became possible once the concrete substance of the collective agreement had been analysed and by means of this, within the general legal system, its legal substance deduced. It may well be that in part, for the subjects under discussion, this method of research is no longer absolutely necessary, or at any rate not to the same extent as it was then, particularly since the legislator has at least partially regulated the substance of collective agreements. However, at that time it was a necessary development for these issues, as it always is at the beginning of things, now and in times to come. While new and concrete legal forms of existing labour laws form within the legal system, the content of old legal forms changes or else dies out, even though the law continues to provide for them. If legal science was limited to the foundations on which it was built - to its fundamental characteristic, that of the legal dogmatic method - then all this would be precluded from legal research'.101
However, the legal sociological method is not limited, according to Sinzheimer, 'to the knowledge of concrete legal forms. It aims to go beyond a pure doctrine of social forms. No discipline can be content with knowing that it exists (Dasein); it questions itself above all on its causes. This is why juridical science must ask itself how it is that a particular legal form comes into existence, and about what its contents explain. It must find its moving force in the life of law, if it wants to understand the life of law itself'.102 Kaskel's approach emphasized the finding of legal rules in an aprioristic manner, by means of simple deduction using an argument that to be convincing must be packed with 'logical necessities'; subtle and refined to exactly the same degree was the call by Sinzheimer for an analysis of real content.
4. The Methodenstreit of the post-second world war period
It has already been pointed out that the methodological controversies which characterised Weimar labour law doctrine anticipated to a large extent those of the period following the second world war. Three important areas can be identified, and bibliographical references are supplied for a more indepth treatment than can be given here.
In post-Nazi Germany 'scientific geography changed radically in respect to the Weimar Republic period. After 1945 labour law was deprived of its left wing politics and Jewish scholars; it was a labour law in which the force of the workers' movement was lacking, as was the social issue'.103
In this period the Sinzheimar methodological view began to gain ground in other systems. One of the most striking examples of this was in British common law. Otto Kahn-Freund exported into this system the concept - based on Sinzheimer's works, with its roots in the writings of Ihering104 - of law as 'social technique'. This approach led him to exclude, as is well-known, that 'the application of legal sanctions, damages, injunctions, etc. is an expedient technique to give effect' to collective agreements.105 Kahn-Freund's work made reference to the conferences that Sinzheimer held during the imperial period at the Gesellschaft für soziale Reform, in which he underlined the necessity of 'keeping civil actions as far away as possible from all the legal contoversies relative to collective agreements'.106 From the Genossenschaftslehre of Otto von Gierke, Sinzheimer had learnt that law can play an entirely secondary role in the evolution of law.107 To his pupils, one of whom was Kahn-Freund, the maestro had transmitted his 'conviction that labour law is a social phenomenon' which in turn 'influences society and thus only in starting with this can be seriously understood and applied'.108
Gino Giugni's monograph on the inter-union system (ordinamento intersindacale) 109 marked the beginning of a Methodenstreit in Italy.110 Like every pluralistic hypothesis, Giugni's proposal served above all 'to narrow the distances, which to some might still appear to be unbridgeable, between the phenomenological tendencies of legal investigation, and "pure" or formal categories'.111 The theory under discussion led Italian labour law to consider more attentively the position of so-called concrete cases112 or, in general, that of 'effective reality', thereby causing, as already mentioned, 'a profound methodological revision'.113 According to some, there was even a tendency to exaggerate 'the assertive moment or the preparation of the premises'.114 This risk was frequently underlined by Sinzheimer, for whom 'the analysis of law from a social point of view should not take the place of dogmatics but only integrate with it'.115
At the beginning of the 1970s, the Arbeitsrechtskartell of post-war labour law,116 headed by Nipperdey (who had been singled out as the commentator of Nazi law of the Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit 117 on 20th January 1934, and called to preside over the first labour cassation court in 1954), was strongly attacked by the arbeitsrechtliche Linke.118 This controversy, when viewed through the lenses once used by Thilo Ramm,119 is often presented as a purely ideological contrast.120 Recently Ramm has once again stated, consistent with his previous opinions, that 'little is now left of the 1968 movement'.121 Such a 'postulate', the result of a 'past which does not pass',122 contrasts (moreover) with the role played in the context of today's German labour law by some of the most important exponents of leftwing labour law, who nowadays form the so-called minority group.123 This role has gradually become more important with the increasingly strong imposition of the line of its 'scientific spokesman', Wolfgang Däubler, the 'most famous'124 of the group; it is a line of 'the highest practical impact which, in the conditions given, a science of labour law can reach'.125
The influence of this line on the law in action can be witnessed by the frequent references made, especially by the Bundesarbeitsgericht, to the works to which the duty of 'concrete application' is entrusted. An example of this can be found in the commentary of the law on the corporate constitution,126 which is now considered to be 'indispensable'127 for whoever, including stipendiary judges, intends or is obliged to deal with the subject. Gathered together in the Deutscher Arbeitsgerichtsverband, German labour lawyers today give the impression, in fact, of reproducing a sort of conflictual Partnerschaft which marks a large part of the labour law of the Germany.
In saying this, doubt is not meant to be thrown on the fact that the contrast between the two groups (those of the majority and the minority128) comes about, even today, from a different way of understanding society. What should be underlined, however, is that the minority group's critical attitudes are presented as a rigorous rebuttal of the opposing arguments;129 this comes about more often than not through privileged recourse to the empirical data which accompany the normative complex each time it is analysed.130 In other words, it can be noted that the methodology used is constantly oriented towards the concrete consequences of various juridical choices, following a need that was felt from the very beginning by the arbeitsrechtliche Linke 131 as well as by ... Thilo Ramm.132 Thus it can be effortlessly stated that the Weimar dualism - the Methodenstreit introduced by Hugo Sinzheimer - has made its return mutatis mutandis to govern, more or less consciously, (also) the attitudes of German labour lawyers.
5. A final observation on methods and teaching
All Sinzheimer's intellectual effort was directed towards the modification of things which existed. 'Science', he used to say, 'is not useful for knowledge, but for construction (Gestaltung )';133 and this highlights the clearest characteristic of his 'new way of being a jurist'.134 Incapable of seperating his research activity from that of his teaching,135 he frequently upheld, together with Gustav Radbruch, the need for a reform of the legal training system, in the sense of avoiding any ulterior increase in the focus of teaching on 'legal technique', and instead of opening up the approach to the areas of science, politics and sociology.136
As has been stated by the pupil to whom Sinzheimer entrusted the task of updating his textbook, with this kind of work Sinzheimer 'wanted to show that his method, so unacceptable to traditional doctrine, was absolutely capable of satisfying (...) both practical and teaching requirements in a more satisfying manner than normal textbooks and university texts were able to do with their oppressive dogmatic outlook'.137
A few years after the publication of the much criticised Grundzüge, Sinzheimer published a short pamphlet of sixteen pages138 which, inspired by the idea that it was necessary 'more than to know, to understand law', attempted to answer the question: Wie studiere ich Arbeitsrecht?
This was in all likelihood a 'tail end' to the controversy discussed in § 3: the full professor (Kaskel) had in fact 'scolded' his 'merely' temporary colleague (Sinzheimer)139 for his mistaken approach to teaching. Kaskel advised his students against Sinzheimer's 'Introduction'.140 Nipperdey instead advised its use, but only 'after they have a complete knowledge of the labour law norms'.141
In contrast, Heinrich Hoeniger, in the final part of his review of Grundzüge, stated that, like Sinzheimer, he had 'advised this work on labour law to his students'. 'I advise it', he continued,' to everyone who is interested in coming into contact the with new legal ideas' in this sector.142
Heoniger and Sinzheimer had obviously adopted as their own the observation by Saint-Exupéry that 'if you want to build a ship, then you shouldn't assemble men to fetch your wood or your tools, to organise the tasks or to ease the work. What you must transmit to them instead is a sense of nostalgia for the infinite width of the sea'.
1 Researcher in labour law at the University of Trento, Italy. The author would like to thank the review "Lavoro e diritto" for having permitted the translation and publication of this work.
2 See C. Citron, "In memoriam. Hugo Sinzheimer", (1946) Die Gegenwart, p.56.
3 The University of Frankfurt (see N. Hammerstein, "Von der hohen Schule des Geistes zur Hochschule der Gleichgeschalteten", (1989) Forschung Frankfurt, p. 22) was literally 'cleaned out' of all its Jewish teaching staff, thanks to Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums of 7th April 1933. As a result, 30.7% (109 out of 355) professors and lecturers were dismissed, with a further 16 being discharged for political reasons (see N. Hammerstein, Die Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität, (Frankfurt 1989)). Together with Sinzheimer (dismissed with a letter dated 13th April 1933, and formally motivated by political activity, rather than for his being Jewish, see H.P. Benöhr, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), in B. Diestelkamp, M. Stollies, Juristen an der Universität Frankfurt am Main, (1989 BadenBaden), p.80), the names of Hermann Heller, Max Horkheimer, Ernst Kantorovicz, Frank Oppenheimer, and Karl Mannheim can be mentioned.
4 See U. Sinzheimer, In memoriam Hugo Sinzheimer, in V. Jacob, A. Van der Voort, Anne Frank war nicht allein, (1988 Berlin- Bonn), p.216.
5 See C. Citron, op. cit., p.37.
6 See W. Luthardt, 1977 Kritische Justiz, p.447.
7 See U. Sinzheimer, op. cit., p.216.
8 See U. Sinzheimer, op. cit., p.217.
9 See U. Sinzheimer, op. cit., p.213.
10 See J. Valkhoff, "Hugo Sinzheimer Arbeiten in der Emigration", 1967 Recht der Arbeit, p.82.
11 The lecture has been included in H. Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden, II, (Frankfurt-Köln 1976), p.53.
12 See H. Sinzheimer, "Der Mensch im Arbeitsrecht", 1930 Neue Blätter für den Sozialismus, p.241.
13 See H. Sinzheimer, De taak der Rechtssoziologie, (Haarlem 1935); on the text see J. Valkhoff, op.cit. p.85 and J.J.M. Van der Verte, "Zur Aufgabe der Rechtssoziologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Hugo Sinzheimer", 1958 Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, XLIV/2, p.244.
14 See G. Gurvitch, Sociology of Law, (New York 1942).
15 This was the opinion of O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), in H. Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie, cit., I, p.24.
16 München 1909.
17 See J. Valkhoff, op.cit., p.84.
18 See H.P. Benöhr, op.cit., p.82.
19 See F. Mestitz, "Hugo Sinzheimer und das Arbeitsrecht - einst und jetzt", 1993 Zeitschrift für neue Rechtsgeschichte, p. 38.
20 See H. Sinzheimer, Jüdische Klassiker der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, (Frankfurt and Main 1953); this is the reprint of the first edition, first published in 1938.
21 See B. Rüthers, Carl Schmitt im Dritten Reich, (München 1990), p.97.
22 Of the most well-known labour lawyers of the period of the Weimar Republic, Walter Kaskel and Erwin Jacobi were also of Jewish origin (see F. Mestitz, op. cit., pp.36-37.). Georg Flatow and Richard Joachim both died in concentration camps (see L. Wenzel, "75 Jahre deutsche Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit", 1965 Juristen Zeitung, p.697.
23 See B. Rüthers, op.cit., p.100.
24 This was instead the opinon of F. Lanchester, Momenti e figure nel diritto costituzionale in Italia e in Germania, (Milano 1994), p.235.
25 See H. Sinzheimer, Jüdische Klassiker der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, cit., p.244.
26 See F. Mestitz, op.cit., p.38.
27 On the resurge of interest in studies on the emigration of Weimar lawyers to the United States, see U. Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 1994 American Journal of Comparative Law, p.195; however, see also G. Vardaro, Il diritto del lavoro nel "laboratorio Weimar", in E. Fraenkel, O. Kahn- Freund, K. Korsch, F. Neumann, H. Sinzheimer, Laboratorio Weimar, G. Arrigo and G. Vardaro (eds.), (Roma 1982), pp.30-31.
28 See E.C. Stiefel, F. Mecklenburg, Deutsche Juristen im amerikanischen Exil (1933-1950), (Tübingen 1991), p.211 n.3.
29 See U. Sinzheimer, op.cit., p.214.
30 See for a comprehensive treatment: E. Fraenkel, "Hugo Sinzheimer", 1958 Juristen Zeitung, p.457; W. Wildberger, Hugo Sinzheimer Beitrag zur Entwicklung der Rechtsstellung der Gewerkschaften, (Frankfurt am Main 1965); O. Kahn-Freund, op.cit.; R. Erd, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945). Aufruf zur Befreiung des Menschen, in Kritische Justiz (editor) Streitbare Juristen, (Baden-Baden 1988), p.282; F. Mestitz, "Alcuni ricordi di Hugo Sinzheimer", 1989 Lavoro e diritto, p.661; H.P. Benöhr, op.cit..
31 See W. Luthardt, op.cit..
32 See O. Kahn-Freund, op.cit., p.1.
33 See H.P. Benöhr, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945). Mitbegründer des Arbeitsrechts, H. Heinrichs, H. Franzki, K. Schmalz, M. Stolleis (eds.), Deutsche Juristen jüdischer Herkunft, (München 1993), p.625.
34 He was, for example, a member of the committee for the development of the labour law code: see T. Bohle, Einheitliches Arbeitsrecht in der Weimarer Republik, (Tübingen 1990).
35 See H. Sinzheimer, Ein Arbeitstarifgesetz. Die Idee der sozialen Selbstbestimmung im Recht, (Berlin 1916), pp.5-7.
36 It should be remembered that Sinzheimer had been in direct contact with Stammler at the University of Halle during the summer of 1901. In the preface to his doctorate thesis, Sinzheimer thanked him for the 'stimulation' which he had received "even outside the lecture hall" (see H. Sinzheimer, Lohn und Aufrechnung, (Berlin 1902), p.V).
37 See R. Stammler, Wirtschaft und Recht, (Leipzig 1896), p.496.
38 See R. Stammler, op.cit., p.496.
39 See N. Bobbio N., Teoria della scienza giuridica, (Torino 1950), p.141; see also infra § 3.1.
40 This was the opinion of H. Heller, Staatslehre, (Leiden 1934, now Tübingen 1983), p.242.
41 See H. Sinzheimer, Die soziologische Methode in der Privatrechtswissenschaft, cit., p.14.
42 See H. Sinzheimer, Ein Arbeitstarifgesetz, cit., pp.4-7.
43 See H. Sinzheimer, "Zur Kritik des bürgerlichen Rechtes", 1931 Zeitschrift für soziales Recht, p. 94; the reference is to Renner's functional doctrine of law: see K. Renner (J. Karner), "Die soziale Funktion der Rechtsinstitute", 1904 Marx Studien, I, p.63; K. Renner, Die Rechtinstitute des Privatrechts und ihre soziale Funktion, (Tübingen 1929).
44 See H. Sinzheimer, "Formalismus in der Rechtsphilosophie", 1939 Zeitschrift für freie deutsche Forschung, p.30, now in H. Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie, cit., p.238.
45 See G. Vardaro, op.cit., p.24, following in the footsteps of P. Gay, La Cultura di Weimar, (Bari 1978), p.21.
46 "His swan song", as O. Kahn-Freund described it, op. cit., p.22.
47 See H. Sinzheimer, "Die Krisis des Arbeitsrechtes", 1933 Arbeitsrecht, pp.1 and 9.
48 See H. Sinzheimer, "Die Krisis des Arbeitsrechtes", cit., pp.9-10.
49 See M. Weber, R. Stammlers "Ueberwindung" der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, 1907, now in Id., Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 7th ed., (Tübingen 1988), p.349.
50 See H. Sinzheimer, "Formalismus in der Rechtsphilosophie", cit., p.229.
51 See R. Lewis, J. Clark, Introduction, in O. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic, (Oxford 1981), p.56 and above all in O. Kahn-Freund, ivi, p.196, where he recognises the influence of Max Weber.
52 See O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.9.
53 See H. Sinzheimer, "Formalismus in der Rechtsphilosophie", cit., p.240.
54 See H.P. Benöhr, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945). Mitbegründer des Arbeitsrechts, cit., p.628.
55 See A. Kaufmann, Grundprobleme der Rechtsphilosophie, (München 1994), p.17.
56 See O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p. 2; H.P. Benöhr, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.82.
57 See H. Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie, cit., II, p.245.
58 See O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p. 8; Gibt es eine arbeitsrechtliche Methode?, in Festschrift für Marie Luise Hilger und Hermann Stumpf, (München 1983), p.578.
59 See H. Sinzheimer, Eene niewe staatsleer, 1935 De Socialistesche Gids, 20, p.420.
60 See H. Heller, op.cit., p.230.
61 See S. Knorre, Soziale Selbstbestimmung und individuelle Verantwortung. Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945). Eine politische Biographie, (Frankfurt am Main-Berna-New York-Paris 1991).
62 See H.P. Benöhr, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.1.
63 See O. von Gierke O., "Die Zukunft des Tarifvertragsrechts", 1917 Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 42, p.815; thus he received the highest honour possible for a professor without a chair: see E. Fraenkel, op.cit., p.458.
64 See O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.1.
65 See E. Fraenkel, op.cit., p.457; O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit.; O. Kahn-Freund, "Die Väter des deutschen Arbeitsrechts", 1975 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 24.05.1975.
66 See O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.23.
67 See H.P. Benöhr, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.72, where there is information on the courses and seminars taught by Sinzheimer at the Faculty of Law in Frankfurt. In July 1929 the Faculty requested that he also be appointed to teach "sociology of law". This was approved and Sinzheimer took up the appointment in the winter term of 1930.
68 See H. Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht, in Handwörtenbuch der Staatswissenschaften, I, (Jena 1923).
69 See R. Dubischar, "Zur Entstehung der Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft als Scientific Community", 1990 Recht der Arbeit, p.92.
70 See F. Mestitz, "Alcuni ricordi di Hugo Sinzheimer", cit., p. 666; H.P. Benöhr, op.cit., pp.77-79; information and bibliography is also to be found in W. Luthardt, op.cit., p.445.
71 See H. Sinzheimer, Grundzüge des Arbeitsrechts. Eine Einführung, (Jena 1921), pp.31 and 40.
72 See H. Sinzheimer, Grundzüge des Arbeitsrechts. Eine Einführung, cit., p.17.
73 See F. Mestitz, "Alcuni ricordi di Hugo Sinzheimer", cit., p.1.
74 See O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.2.
75 See H. Sinzheimer, Über einige Grundfragen des Arbeitstarifrechtes, in Die Reichsgerichtspraxis im deutschen Rechtsleben, (Berlin-Leipzig 1929), p.14.
76 See H. Sinzheimer, De Taak der Rechtssociologie, cit., p.431.
77 See H. Sinzheimer, Über einige Grundfragen des Arbeitstarifrechtes, cit., p.15.
78 See H. Sinzheimer, Grundzüge des Arbeitsrechts, cit., pp.V-VI.
79 See R. Dubischar, op.cit., p.92.
80 See T. Ramm, Pluralismus ohne Kodifikation. Die Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft nach 1945, in Simon D. (ed), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Republik, (Frankfurt am Main 1994), p.456, n.7.
81 In regard to this, see "Errichtung arbeitsrechtlicher Lehrstühle", 1926 Gewerbe und Kaufmannsgericht, p.293; on the teaching of labour law in university institutions of the period, see also: H. Potthoff, "Lehrstühle für Arbeitsrecht an Hochschulen", 1920 Arbeitsrecht, p.56; H. Potthoff, "Arbeitsrecht an Hochschulen", 1920 Arbeitsrecht, p.134, as well as the editorial notes "Arbeitsrecht als Lehrfach der Hochschulen" and "Sozialpolitik, Arbeitsrecht und Wolfahrtspflege als Lehrfächer auf den deutschen Hochschulen", 1920 Soziale Praxis, p.1040 and p.1167 respectively.
82 The doubt which Roland Dubischar raised several years ago has been resolved in this way, op. cit., p.90, in regard to "when and where the first chair of labour law in German universities was instituted." I would like to take the opportunity here to thank Wolfgang Däubler and Roland Dubischar for the useful suggestions they have given me in my work on labour law during the Weimar Republic.
83 See W. Kaskel, 1992 Recht und Wirtschaft, pp.70- 71, who does not hesitate to define the work as a complete 'failure'.
84 See W. Kaskel, Arbeitsrecht, (Berlin 1925).
85 See T. Blanke, op.cit., p.121. At the onset of Nazism the journal changed its policy, as did many of its contributors. In a column of the nl6 edition of June, 1933, written by all three directors (Dersch, Sitzler, and Syrup - Kaskel had died in 1928) it was stated that the journal "hopes, inasfar as it is competent to do so, that it will be able to contribute to the development of the foundations for the construction of the German national state". The parenthetic clause 'inasfar as it is competent' should be understood as the construction of 'German national labour law'.
86 See R. Dubischar, op.cit., p.92.
87 See W. Kaskel, Zur Lehre vom Tarifbruch, (Mannheim- BerlinLeipzig 1922).
88 See W. Kaskel, Zur Lehre vom Tarifbruch, cit., pp.318- 319.
89 See H. Sinzheimer, "Zur Lehre vom Tarifbruch", 1923 Juristische Wochenschrift, p.218.
90 See W. Kaskel, 1922 Recht und Wirtschaft, pp.71-72.
91 See W. Kaskel 1922 Recht und Wirtschaft, pp.71-72.
92 About which now see H. Stumpf, Hans Carl Nipperdey, in Juristen im Portrait. Verlag und Autoren in 4 Jahrzehnten, (München 1988).
93 Namely, two years after his qualifying examination, and three years before his appointment to the chair of civil, commerical, economic and labour law at the University of Cologne: see R. Dubischar, op. cit., p.90.
94 See H.C. Nipperdey, 1922 Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, p.45.
95 See H.C. Nipperdey, 1927 Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, pp.494-495.
96 See H. C. Nipperdey, 1927 Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, p.495.
97 The journal was forced to close in July, 1933 (by which time Sinzheimer's name had already disappeared from the list of founders and contributors). The reason given was totally 'ludicrous' (see H. Göppinger, Juristen jüdischer Abstammung im "Dritten Reich", (München 1990), p. 377) - since labour law represented a discipline which was of particular importance in the Dritten Reich, all publications had to be united into one journal.
98 See T. Blanke, "Die Entdeckung des Arbeitsrechts durch die Gewerkschaften", 1994 Arbeit und Recht, p.121.
99 See H. Sinzheimer, "Ueber soziologische und dogmatische Methode in der Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft", cit., p.187.
100 See H. Sinzheimer, "Ueber soziologische und dogmatische Methode in der Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft", cit., p.187.
101 See H. Sinzheimer, "Ueber soziologische und dogmatische Methode in der Arbeitrechtswissenschaft", cit., pp.189- 190.
102 See H. Sinzheimer, "Ueber soziologische und dogmatische Methode in der Arbeitrechtswissenschaft", cit., p.190.
103 See T. Ramm, op. cit., p.456.
104 See O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1895-1945), cit., p.24.
105 See O. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, (London 1972), p.134.
106 See H. Sinzheimer, Rechtsfragen des Arbeitstarifvertrages, in Schriften der Gessellschaft für soziale Reform, 45/46, (Jena 1914), p.44.
107 See H. Sinzheimer, "Otto von Gierkes Bedeutung für das Arbeitsrecht", 1922 Arbeitsrecht, p.1; see also E. Fraenkel, op. cit., p.459.
108 See F. Mestitz, "Alcuni ricordi di Hugo Sinzheimer", cit., p.666; on the parallels between Kahn-Freund and Sinzheimer, or rather on the methodology underpinning of their work on collective agreements, see R. Lewis, J. Clark, op. cit., p.55.
109 See G. Giugni, Introduzione allo studio dell'autonomia collettiva, (Milano 1960).
110 See G. Suppiej, Tradizione civilistica e costituzionale nel magistero di Francesco Santoro Passarelli, 1988 Il diritto del lavoro, p.3, which sides with the 'pure legal method'.
111 See R. Flammia, Contributo all'analisi dei sindacati di fatto, (Milano 1963), pp.51-52.
112 See G. Giugni, La funzione giuridica del contratto collettivo di diritto del lavoro, in AIDLASS, Il contratto collettivo di lavoro, (Milano 1968), p.11.
113 See F. Mancini, U. Romagnoli, Il diritto sindacale, (Bologna 1971), p.25.
114 See M. D'Antona, Diritto sindacale in trasformazione, in Id. (ed.), Letture di diritto sindacale, (Napoli 1990), p.219.
115 See H. Sinzheimer, "Zur Kritik des bürgerlichen Rechtes", 1931 Zeitschrift für soziales Recht, p.94, n.1.
116 See R. Wahsner, "Das Arbeitsrechtskartell - Die Restauration des kapitalistischen Arbeitsrechts in Westdeutschland nach 1945", 1974 Kritische Justiz, p.373.
117 See A. Hueck, H.C. Nipperdey, R. Dietz, Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit. Kommentar, (München-Berlin 1937).
118 See M. Pedrazzoli, Introduzione, in W. Däubler, Diritto sindacale e cogestione nella Germania Federale, (Milano 1981), p.19; L. Gaeta, G. Vardaro, "Un passato che non passa": Thilo Ramm e la dottrina tedesca", 1988 Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, p.721.
119 See T. Ramm, Die "Linke" und das Arbeitsrecht, 1978 Juristen Zeitung, p.184.
120 Still in agreement with this view is D. Reuter, op. cit.; for a different analysis, see E. Klausa, Deutsche und amerikanische Rechtslehrer, (Baden-Baden 1981).
121 See T. Ramm, Pluralismus ohne Kodifikation. Die Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft nach 1945, cit., p.494.
122 See L. Gaeta, G. Vardaro, op. cit..
123 See W. Däubler, "Arbeitsrechtliche Forschung in der Bundesrepublik", 1985 WSI Mitteilungen, p.67.
124 See T. Ramm, Pluralismus ohne Kodifikation. Die Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft nach 1945, cit., p.492, n.122.
125 See M. Pedrazzoli, op. cit., p.24.
126 See W. Däubler, M. Kittner, T. Klebe, W. Schneider (eds), BetrVG. Kommentar für die Praxis, (Köln 1994).
127 See 1994 Bundesarbeitsblattes, n.2.
128 In reference to which see W. Däubler, "Arbeitsrechtliche Forschung in der Bundesrepublik", cit.
129 T. Beck, 1994 Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, n.5, p.10.
130 See W. Däubler, "Arbeitsrechtliche Forschung in der Bundesrepublik", cit., p.67.
131 See W. Däubler, Gesellschaftliche Interessen und Arbeitsrecht. Zum Selbstverständnis der Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft, (Köln 1974), p.11; contra D. Reuter, op. cit.
132 See in fact, T. Ramm, Zur Soziologie der Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft, in Festschrift für Otto Rudolf Kissel, (München 1994), p.937.
133 See H. Sinzheimer, "Ueber soziologische und dogmatische Methode in der Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft", cit., p.193.
134 See G. Vardaro, op. cit., p. 13; O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.1.
135 See O. Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.2.
136 See H.P. Benöhr, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.70.
137 See F. Mestitz, "Alcuni ricordi di Hugo Sinzheimer", cit., p.664.
138 See H. Sinzheimer, Wie studiere ich Arbeitsrecht?, (Frankfurt am Main 1924).
139 See F. Mestitz, "Alcuni ricordi di Hugo Sinzheimer", cit., p.663; on this point see also H.P. Benöhr, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), cit., p.76.
140 See W. Kaskel, 1922 Recht und Wirtschaft, p.71.
141 See H.C. Nipperdey, 1922 Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, p. 46.
142 See H. Hoeniger, 1922 Juristische Wochenschrift, p.563.