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Cudahy Packing Co Ltd Vs Holland - Citation 97365 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. Vs. Holland - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97365CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-02-1942Case Number315 U.S. 357AppellantCudahy Packing Co., Ltd.RespondentHollandExcerpt:
cudahy packing co., ltd. v. holland - 315 u.s. 357 (1942)
1. the fair labor standards act does not confer upon the administrator of the wage and hour division, department of labor, authority to delegate the power to sign and issue subpoenas
pp. 358, 367.
2. the act gives to the administrator all the powers with respect to subpoenas which are conferred upon the federal trade commission, and no more. p.
315 u. s. 360
3. section 4(c)..... Judgment:
means only that the Administrator and his representatives may exercise either within or without the District of Columbia such powers as they respectively possess, and this construction is fully supported by the legislative history. P.
4. An unlimited authority in an administrative officer, charged with the duty of gathering data and of making investigations, to delegate the exercise of the subpoena power is not lightly to be inferred, in view of the oppressive use which may be made of it when indiscriminately delegated and when the subpoenas are not returnable before a judicial officer. P.
5. It is fair to infer that in granting authority to delegate the power of inspection, and in omitting to grant authority to delegate the subpoena power, the Act shows a legislative intention to withhold the latter. P.
315 U. S. 364
6. The entire history of the legislation controlling the use of subpoenas by administrative officers, and particularly the legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act, indicates a Congressional purpose not to authorize by implication the delegation of the subpoena power. P.
power to delegate the signing and issuance of subpoenas to persons undesignated by the statute, a power not granted to or exercised by the Commission or its members. P.
315 U. S. 366
Of the several questions raised by this record only one requires our attention: whether, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201,
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has authority to delegate his statutory power to sign and issue a subpoena
On application of respondent, pursuant to § 9 of the Act, the District Court for Eastern Louisiana ordered petitioner to show cause why it should not be compelled to obey a subpoena
The subpoena, issued by a regional director of the Wage and Hour Division,
The District Court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction, and ordered it to produce the demanded books, papers, and records relating to wages and hours, but left undecided, until again presented to the court in the course of investigation, the further question whether the books and records relating to purchases and shipments specified in the subpoena should be produced. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Fleming,
119 F.2d 209, specifically ruling that the subpoena was validly issued and that the court had jurisdiction to enforce it. We granted certiorari, 314 U.S. 592,, on a petition which presented as a ground for reversal the want of authority in the regional director to issue the subpoena and, as a reason for allowing the writ, the conflict on this point of the decision below with that of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Lowell Sun Co. v. Fleming,
120 F.2d 213,
314 U.S. 599.
duties of the Administrator, the Chief of the Children's Bureau, [
] and the industry committees, [
] the subpoena provisions of §§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 49 and 50. The Administrator is thus given all the powers with respect to subpoenas which are conferred upon the Federal Trade Commission, and no more. Under § 9 of the Trade Commission Act, the Commission may require the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and production of documents by subpoena, and any members of the Commission may sign the subpoenas. The Commission may apply to any district court within whose jurisdiction an investigation is carried on for an order compelling compliance with a subpoena.
plain that its only function is to provide that the Administrator and his representatives may exercise either within or without the District of Columbia such powers as each possesses. This construction is fully supported by the legislative history of § 4(c). [
The entire history of the legislation controlling the use of subpoenas by administrative officers indicates a Congressional purpose not to authorize by implication the delegation of the subpoena power. The Interstate Commerce Act, [
] the National Labor Relations Act, [
] and the Federal Trade Commission Act, [
] whose subpoena provisions were adopted by the present Act and by the Packers
and Stockyards Act, [
] all fail to grant authority to delegate the issuance of subpoenas. It appears that none of the agencies administering these acts has construed the authority of its head to include the power to delegate the signing and issuance of subpoenas. [
] On the other hand, Congress, in numerous cases, has specifically authorized delegation of the subpoena power. [
] In others, it has granted the power to particularly designated subordinate officers or agents, thus negativing any implied power in the head to delegate generally to subordinates. [
All this is persuasive of a Congressional purpose that the subpoena power shall be delegable only when an authority to delegate is expressly granted. That purpose has been emphasized here not only by the authority expressly given to delegate the power to conduct investigations, and in the adoption by reference of the subpoena provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which contain no authority to delegate, but by the legislative history of the present Act, which shows that the authority to delegate the subpoena power was eliminated by the Conference Committee from the bills which each House had adopted. [
] Such authority expressly granted in the bill which passed the Senate, was rejected by the Conference Committee. It also discarded the provisions of the House bill which committed the administration of the Act to the Secretary of Labor, who has a general power of delegation under Rev.Stat. § 161, 5 U.S.C. § 22, and placed in his stead the Administrator, who was given only the subpoena powers of the Federal Trade Commission incorporated in the House bill.
The function of the industry committees and their relation to the Administrator are discussed in
S. 2475, passed by the Senate on July 31, 1937 (81 Cong.Rec. 7957) and sent to the Conference Committee, provided for a Labor Standards Board, and contained § 3(e), which read: "The principal office of the Board shall be in the District of Columbia, but it may meet or exercise any or all of its powers at any other place." Section 12(b) of this bill also specifically authorized the Board to delegate its subpoena power. The House Committee on Labor, to which the Senate bill was referred, amended it to provide for an Administrator, instead of a Board (
82 Cong.Rec. 1391), but it included a § 3(d) corresponding to § 3(e) of the Senate bill, save for the substitution of the Administrator for the Board. Section 11(b) of the bill sponsored by the House Committee also authorized any employee designated by the Administrator to subpoena witnesses. This bill, however, was recommitted to the Committee by the House on December 17, 1937 (82 Cong.Rec. 1835), and the Committee reported out a new bill on April 21, 1938 (83 Cong.Rec. 5680) which placed the administration in charge of the Secretary of Labor, rather than an Administrator, contained no section comparable to § 3(e) of the Senate bill or § 3(d) of the recommitted House bill, and, in § 7, applied §§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to the powers and duties of the Secretary. The bill with these changes passed the House on May 24, 1938 (83 Cong.Rec. 7449) and went to the Conference Committee.
Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Part 11, Interstate Commerce Commission, Sen.Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 26.
Part 5, National Labor Relations Board, pp. 18-19;
Part 6, Federal Trade Commission, Sen.Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 18; also Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941), Appendix K, pp. 414, 419. Apparently the actual issuance of subpoenas, though not their signing, is delegated to subordinates in some of these agencies. We are not concerned here with the validity of such a practice, since both the signing and issuance of subpoenas is delegated by the Administrator.
subordinates direct a discriminating and sparing use of the subpoena power, [
] a restriction of the scope [
] of subpoenas
and a regard for the convenience of those whose records are sought. [
] Delegation is a matter of degree. An authority need not be delegated completely or not at all. It is sufficient that the administrative officer supervise and direct the execution of his duties. So far as the subpoena power is concerned, it would seem that the Administrator has satisfied all statutory demands in this situation by his selection of the limited group which can issue subpoenas, by formulating the policy to guide them, and by ratifying a subpoena issued by his subordinate.
seeks enforcement of the subpoena and stands behind his subordinate who has issued the subpoena, the subpoena is as much the Administrator's as if he had signed it.
Cf. Norris v. United States,
The reasons for holding that authority to delegate this power is an incident of the office are certainly no less cogent than those underlying the cases which hold that an administrative officer may delegate the function of holding hearings without express statutory authority. As stated by Chief Justice Hughes in
, "Assistants may prosecute inquiries. Evidence may be taken by an examiner." Such a delegation has been approved under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Southern Garment Mfrs. Assn. v. Fleming,
122 F.2d 622. Can it be that the power to hold hearings and take evidence is so unimportant as compared with the power to sign subpoenas that the power to delegate the one, but not the other, can be implied? Can it be that the requirements of "practicable administrative procedure" (
Morgan v. United States, supra,
) are relevant and controlling in the one instance, but not in the other? Both the power to conduct hearings and the power to issue subpoenas are intermediate steps in administrative procedure. The findings of the examiner are advisory only; this kind of subpoena is a command without legal sanction unless supported by a court decree. But the function of the examiner is not simply ministerial. The role which he fills is significant. The very essence of a fair hearing may depend on his conduct. If that function may be delegated without express statutory authority, it should follow
that the lesser subpoena power may also be delegated by reason of the requirements of "practicable administrative procedure."
way influenced by the presence in the latter of an express power of the proposed Board to delegate its subpoena power. The controversy centered on the question as to where administration of the Act should be lodged.
H.Rep. No. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.; S.Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. As a matter of fact, if we are to speculate as to the intent of Congress on this point, we must assume that all delegation of the subpoena power was not precluded. The provisions of §§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act were "made applicable to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the Administrator." § 9. The Federal Trade Commission Act lodges the subpoena power in the Commission. § 9. But it also provides that any member of the Commission may sign subpoenas. § 9. If the Commission has a limited power of delegation, it is hard to see why the Administrator has none. Logical difficulties prevent literal incorporation of the whole of § 9 into the Fair Labor Standards Act. But it certainly is impossible to deduce that a more stringent rule governs the Administrator than the Commission.
"The inspector must limit the demand in the subpoena to those records and those periods of time which are indispensable for his inspection."