Source: http://va.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190730_0000677.EVA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-09-21 19:20:28
Document Index: 629930207

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

WARREN HAROLD BROWN, Petitioner.
Warren Harold Brown, a federal inmate proceeding with counsel, filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion ("§ 2255 Motion," ECF No. 221) arguing that his firearm convictions are invalid under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015).[1] The Government initially filed a Motion to Dismiss the § 2255 Motion contending that it is barred by the relevant statute of limitations. (ECF No. 219.) Thereafter, the Court ordered further briefing. In its most recent response, the Government concedes that in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) and United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2019), Brown's firearm conviction in Count Two should be vacated. Nevertheless, the Government maintains that Brown's challenge to his firearm conviction in Count Four lacks merit and should be dismissed. Brown agrees that Count Two should be vacated, but has filed a Motion to Stay "pending decisions from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Ali, 4th Cir. No. 15-433 and United States v. Mathis, 4th Cir. No. 16-4663(L), which will decide whether Hobbs Act robberies meet the force clause definition of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)." (ECF No. 251, at 2.) For the reasons set forth below, Brown's § 2255 Motion will be granted with respect to Count Two and denied with respect to Count Four. Brown's Motion to Stay will be denied.
On July 12, 2011, the Government charged Brown by Superseding Indictment with: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count One); using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (2), to wit, the Hobbs Act conspiracy as charged in Count One (Count Two); attempting to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count Three); using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (2), to wit, the attempted Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count Three (Count Four). (ECF No. 62, at 1-6.) On September 14, 2011, a jury found Brown guilty of the above charges. (ECF No. 101, at 1.) On January 19, 2012, the Court sentenced Brown to 612 months of imprisonment on the above charges. (ECF No. 136, at 2.)
In his § 2255 Motion, Brown asserted that after Johnson, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery could no longer qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), and thus, his conviction for Counts Two and Four must be vacated. Although Brown was not sentenced pursuant to ACCA, he asserted that the residual clause of § 924(c) is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA residual clause (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)) that the Supreme Court in Johnson struck down as unconstitutionally vague. As explained below, Brown's challenge to Count Four lacks merit, but recent decisions from the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit support Brown's challenge to Count Two where his firearm conviction was predicated upon conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery.
A. Brown's Challenge to Count Four Lacks Merit
At the time of Brown's conviction, the United States could demonstrate that an underlying offense constitutes a crime of violence if it established that the offense is a felony and satisfies one of two requirements. Namely, the statute defined a crime of violence as any felony: