Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20120626_0008581.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-22 03:58:09
Document Index: 402025486

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 2254', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

| Thomas Paul Wynn v. Cate
Thomas Paul Wynn v. Cate
THOMAS PAUL WYNN, PLAINTIFF,v.CATE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The remaining defendant, Casillas, moves for summary judgment arguing that he is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law. Dckt. No. 21. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the motion be denied.
This action proceeds on the complaint filed March 8, 2010, which alleges that defendant used excessive force against plaintiff on December 16, 2008. Dckt. No. 1. The underlying facts are mostly irrelevant to the instant motion, which turns not on those facts but rather on a legal issue (whether the action is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)), but are provided here for context. As the parties dispute most of the facts, each party's version is provided here.
According to plaintiff, on December 16, 2008, correctional officers in the building at Mule Creek State Prison ("MCSP") where he was housed abruptly shut off the dayroom televisions, causing all the inmates to loudly protest. Dckt. No. 29, Pl.'s P. & A. ISO Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.*fn1 Defendant Casillas approached plaintiff, who was sitting on a bucket in his bed area. Id. While still 20 feet from plaintiff, defendant Casillas pulled out his pepper spray and rushed up on plaintiff, who was still sitting. Id. Defendant Casillas shouted expletives at plaintiff and ordered him to "shut-up, stand-up, cuff-up." Id. Plaintiff did not use expletives or lunge at or approach defendant Casillas or other staff. Id. Rather, plaintiff complied with defendant Casillas's orders, putting his hands on the wall to be cuffed. Id. at 5. Defendant Casillas then sprayed plaintiff with pepper spray "for a long time as Plaintiff passively stood with his hands on the wall . . . until Plaintiff's cloths [sic] were soaked with pepper spray." Id.
According to defendant Casillas, on December 16, 2008, he was conducting a count in plaintiff's building at MCSP when he heard plaintiff yelling obscenities at other officers who were also doing the count. Dckt. No. 21-1, Def.'s P. & A. ISO Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.") at 2. Defendant Casillas finished his count and then approached plaintiff, asking what was wrong. Id. Plaintiff yelled obscenities at defendant Casillas. Id. Defendant Casillas asked plaintiff several times to calm down, but plaintiff refused. Id. Defendant Casillas ordered plaintiff to cuff up, but plaintiff refused. Id. Then plaintiff got up from his bunk suddenly and approached defendant Casillas with his hands extended out and yelling obscenities. Id. Defendant Casillas sprayed plaintiff with pepper spray. Id. Plaintiff then consented to cuff up. Id.
The parties do not dispute that plaintiff was issued a "Rules Violation Report" ("RVR") in connection with the incident, charging him with "Behavior Which Could Lead to Violence."
Dckt. No. 21-5, Decl. of C. Cassidy ISO Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B. At the hearing on the RVR on February 6, 2009, plaintiff pleaded not guilty and stated that the RVR was false and that "C/O Casillas did not have to spray me. I was never a threat to him in any way. All I was asking why the TV was shut off [sic], when it never is when the C/Os count. I guess C/O Casillas didn't like me questioning the TV being shut off." Id. Plaintiff was found guilty and assessed a loss of 30 days behavioral credit, among other things. Id. The credits loss advanced his minimum eligible parole date ("MEPD") from June 6, 1998 to July 5, 1998 (both dates over ten years past at the time of the hearing). Id. Plaintiff is serving a term of 15-years-to-life for a second-degree murder conviction. Id.
On November 30, 2010, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dckt. No. 9; see Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).
Defendant argues that plaintiff's suit is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), because his claims conflict with the disciplinary finding which included a revocation of time credits. Plaintiff counters that the revocation of credits could not affect the duration of his sentence and thus Heck and Balisok do not bar the case. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned agrees with plaintiff.
Heck is one in a line of cases generally regarded as beginning with Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), in which the U.S. Supreme Court determined that state prisoners seeking an injunction restoring good-time credits revoked in disciplinary proceedings must proceed under the federal habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. § 2254) rather than via § 1983. The court noted the historic role of the writ of habeas corpus as the vehicle for a confined individual to attack the legality of her custody and obtain release and concluded that, because the habeas statute dealt specifically with such a situation, it must be utilized rather than the more general § 1983 where a prisoner attacks (1) the fact of confinement or (2) the duration of confinement.
Id. at 484-500.
In Heck, the Court further clarified what suits may not be brought under § 1983 but must instead be pursued via petition for writ of habeas corpus. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). There, the court held that a state prisoner may not bring a damages claim under § 1983 attacking the constitutionality of his criminal conviction unless and until the underlying conviction is invalidated via habeas corpus or similar proceeding, because success in the § 1983 damages action would necessarily establish the invalidity of the conviction and attendant confinement. Id. at 478, 486-87. The Court emphasized that this rule, sometimes referred to as the "favorable termination rule," applies only where success in the civil rights suit would necessarily imply that the conviction or sentence were invalid. Id. at 486-87 and n. 6-7.
The Court took up the interplay between federal civil rights actions and writs of habeas corpus again in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). In that case, the Court clarified that the favorable termination rule applies to a state inmate who challenges a disciplinary action for which he was assessed a credit loss, even where the inmate seeks no injunction restoring the lost credits, if success in a civil rights action would necessarily imply that the credits should not have been revoked. Id. at 643-44, 646-47.
Conversely, in Muhammad v. Close, 544 U.S. 749 (2004), an inmate could challenge his pre-disciplinary hearing detention under § 1983 without first invalidating the discipline imposed, because success in the action would not show his underlying criminal conviction to be invalid nor shorten the duration of his sentence by requiring the restoration of revoked credits. The Court clarified that Heck's favorable termination rule does not apply categorically to all suits challenging prison disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 754. Prison disciplinary proceedings do not implicate the validity of the "fact of confinement" (see Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500) because "these administrative determinations do not as such raise any implication about the validity of the underlying conviction[.]" Muhammad, 544 U.S. at 754. Such proceedings may implicate the "duration of confinement" (see Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500), if credits were revoked. Muhammad, 544 U.S. at 754. Because the plaintiff in Muhammad lost no credits as a result of the discipline imposed, and because prison disciplinary hearings by their nature do not address the underlying conviction, the plaintiff's § 1983 action could not be "construed as seeking a judgment at odds with his conviction or with the State's calculation of time to be served in accordance with the underlying sentence." Id. at 754-55.
In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Court surveyed the line of cases beginning with Preiser in determining that inmates challenging state parole procedures could proceed under § 1983. While the prisoners' ultimate goal was arguably to obtain speedier release under more favorable parole procedures, their success in obtaining such procedures in their § 1983 suit would not necessarily mean speedier release -- parole was not guaranteed under the different procedures. Id. at 82. The Court emphasized that the favorable termination rule is limited to situations in which success in the § 1983 action would necessarily invalidate confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82; see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004) (noting that the Court has "stress[ed] the importance of the term 'necessarily.'").
The Court reiterated the availability of § 1983 where success in the suit would not necessarily invalidate the prisoner's underlying conviction nor shorten his sentence in Skinner v. Switzer, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298-99 (2011). There, it held that a state prisoner seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence could assert his claim under § 1983, even though his ultimate aim was to use the evidence to support a claim of innocence. Id. at 1293. Success in the § 1983 suit would only provide the inmate with access to the DNA evidence, which could prove to be inculpatory, exculpatory, or neither. Id. The Court noted that none of its cases "has recognized habeas as the sole remedy, or even an available one, where the relief sought would neither terminate custody, accelerate the future date of release from custody, nor reduce the level of custody." Id. at 1299 (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 86, Scalia, J., concurring, internal quotation marks omitted) & 1299 n.13.
Returning to the facts of this case, the disciplinary finding does not
affect the validity of plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction and
thus does not implicate the "fact of confinement." Muhammad, 544 U.S.
at 754. While defendant argues that the disciplinary finding
implicates the "duration of confinement" because the credits loss"
push[ed] off" plaintiff's MEPD, success in this action (and any
consequent restoration of the revoked credits) would not necessarily
result in plaintiff's earlier release. Plaintiff's MEPD, or minimum
eligible parole date, was long past at the time the credits were
revoked. At the time of the revocation, the duration of plaintiff's
custody was in the discretion of the parole board and defendant
provides no argument or evidence that the board's determination of
when to release plaintiff is affected by the credits loss.*fn2
See Vandervall v. Feltner, No. CIV S-09-1576 DAD P, U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72059, at *15-18 & n.3 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2010), report &
recommendations adopted by 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88704 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
25, 2010) (finding that revocation of credits to a life prisoner does
not necessarily affect the duration of confinement because the MEPD
does not determine a date of release but merely the date on which the
parole board will consider, in its discretion, whether to grant
parole). As success in this action would not impact the validity of
plaintiff's criminal conviction nor necessarily shorten the duration
of plaintiff's confinement, the Heck bar does not apply, and summary
judgment in favor of defendant Casillas on that ground is not
Accordingly, it ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court randomly assign a United States District Judge to this case.
Further, it is RECOMMENDED that defendant's October 24, 2011 motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 21) be denied.