Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/720/610/425514/
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 158', '§ 160', '§ 160', 'art, 464', '§ 160', '§ 160', '§ 158']

Airport Parking Management, Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent.national Labor Relations Board, Cross-petitioner, v. Airport Parking Management, Cross-respondent, 720 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
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Airport Parking Management, Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent.national Labor Relations Board, Cross-petitioner, v. Airport Parking Management, Cross-respondent, 720 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1983)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 720 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1983)
Argued and Submitted Aug. 8, 1983. Decided Nov. 8, 1983
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) entered an order against Airport Parking Management (the employer) for violations of subsections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) and (3). The Board found that the employer violated subsection 8(a) (1) by threatening to discharge employees for strike participation and by inquiring among employees about their support for the strike. The Board also concluded that the employer violated subsections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) by firing employee Allen because of his union activities and by refusing to reinstate immediately the striking employees, who struck in part because of Allen's dismissal, after they made unconditional offers to return to work. The Board ordered the employer to cease and desist from its violations, reinstate Allen and the unfair labor practice strikers with back pay, post appropriate notices, and expunge from the records of Allen and the strikers all references to their discharge or failure to be reinstated. 264 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1983). The employer filed a petition for review under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). The Board cross-applied for enforcement of its order under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). We deny the petition and enforce the order.I
At the next union meetings, held five days after Allen's firing, the members discussed both economic issues and their shop steward's discharge. A resounding majority voted at the end of the meetings to reject the employer's contract offer, to go out on strike, and to demand Allen's reinstatement. Three days later, in an attempt to avert a strike, the union and the employer met with a federal mediator. The union requested a dollar-per-hour wage increase and the reinstatement of Allen. The effort at conciliation failed, and a strike began the next day. On September 29, the union filed charges against the employer alleging that Allen's discharge violated subsections 8(a) (1) and (3). The Board issued a complaint for this charge on Christmas Eve of 1980.
In accord with the settlement, the union requested withdrawal of the unfair labor practice charges. On March 19, three days after the settlement, the union also instituted a new unfair labor practice charge alleging violations of subsections 8(a) (1) and (3) for the employer's refusal to reinstate the strikers upon their unconditional offers to return to work.
The Board refused to allow the withdrawal of the union's first charge concerning Allen's discharge. Instead, that charge and the newest charge were consolidated. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the employer had violated subsections 8(a) (1) and (3) both in firing Allen and in refusing to reinstate the strikers. The ALJ also refused to defer to the strike settlement agreement. The Board affirmed the findings and conclusions of the ALJ and essentially adopted his recommended order.
We must enforce the decision reached by the Board if the Board correctly applied the law and if substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Board's findings of fact. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 464, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951); Royal Development Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1983).
The employer properly points out that in Royal Development Co. we questioned the Board's burden shifting rule in "mixed-motive" unfair labor practice claims established in Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989, 102 S. Ct. 1612, 71 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1982). See Royal Development Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d at 367-70. The Board applies Wright Line when an employee claims to have been discriminated against by his employer--for example, by having been fired--because of union activity or other protected conduct under section 7 of the Act, but the employer claims to have acted for a lawful business reason. To prove an unfair labor practice in such situations, the Board requires:
251 N.L.R.B. at 1089 (footnote omitted). The question of the application of this rule, however, is no longer open because the Supreme Court has approved the Wright Line burden shifting procedure. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 2469, 76 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1983). See Humes Electric, Inc. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983). The ALJ properly applied this procedure.
The employer next argues that the Board lacked substantial evidence to support its finding that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike because the strike was for economic demands as well as for the firing of Allen. We held in NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1953), that a strike was "an unfair labor practice strike, even though other reasons were also present, since one of the reasons for it was to protest an unfair labor practice." Id. at 907 (citations omitted). See also Larand Leisurelies, Inc. v. NLRB, 523 F.2d 814, 820 (6th Cir. 1975) ("If an unfair labor practice is a 'contributing cause' of a strike, then, as a matter of law, the strike must be considered an unfair labor practice strike"); NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898, 907 (6th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 342, 78 S. Ct. 718, 2 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1958); NLRB v. Stilley Plywood Co., 199 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 933, 73 S. Ct. 504, 97 L. Ed. 718 (1953); NLRB v. A. Sartorius & Co., 140 F.2d 203, 206 (2d Cir. 1944); Juniata Packing Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 934, 935 (1970), enforced in pertinent part, 464 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1972) (employer's unlawful pre-strike conduct "played a part in the decision to go out on strike"; the Board found the strike was an unfair labor practice strike).
Finally, the employer argues the Board should have deferred to the "voluntary strike settlement agreement" (the agreement) rather than entertain NLRB proceedings for remedy of the unfair labor practices claimed by the union. Both the employer and the Board agree the Board has no statutory obligation to defer to private settlement agreements, see Sec. 10(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), but may defer in its discretion. Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271, 84 S. Ct. 401, 408, 11 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1964); id. at 272, 84 S. Ct. at 409 ("The superior authority of the Board may be invoked at any time"); cf. Sec. 10(k) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (the Board must hear an unfair labor practice charge involving a jurisdictional strike under section 8(b) (4) (ii) (D) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (D), unless the parties within ten days of notice of the filing of the charge show they have settled or agreed on a method of resolution).
The employer asks us to reverse the Board, however, for abusing its discretion in not deferring to the agreement. The general policies of the Act and of labor law favor the private, amicable resolution of labor disputes whenever possible. We encourage voluntary settlements. They often minimize economic dislocations that may result from a more prolonged dispute. Settled disputes do not add to an already overcrowded docket made up of parties who cannot or will not agree on a resolution. However, because the Board must act in the public interest to enforce public rights, National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364-65, 60 S. Ct. 569, 577, 84 L. Ed. 799 (1940), we have hesitated to hold that the Board abused its discretion in deferral decisions when unfair labor practices are involved. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sebastopol Apple Growers Union, 269 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1959).
The employer argues that the Board failed to follow its own criteria for deferral to a voluntary settlement. We agree that the Board must, to avoid abuse of its discretion, either adhere to or explain its departure from earlier clearly articulated criteria constituting self-imposed limits on its discretion. See Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1979); Hawaiian Hauling Service, Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965, 97 S. Ct. 2921, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1061 (1977). The record shows that the Board neither failed to follow its own criteria nor otherwise abused its discretion. We need not decide whether the findings of fact underlying the Board's exercise of discretion require support by substantial evidence or only some evidence, because substantial evidence appears on the record here. See generally Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415, 424 n. 17 (4th Cir. 1981) ("substantial evidence" standard for factual support in deferral decision).
The ALJ's first reason for refusing to defer was both proper and well-supported. The employer successfully elicited testimony from Jones, the union's chief negotiator, that she did not know about the unfair labor practice stemming from the unconditional offer to return to work until after the settlement. The record shows little or no other evidence that the unfair labor practice nature of the strike and its relation to reinstatement was in the minds of the negotiators, much less discussed, during the settlement negotiations. The record similarly lacks evidence that the unfair labor practice nature of Allen's firing was ever discussed or became part of the agreement. Thus, the Board followed its own general guideline that an unfair labor practice issue must clearly be presented and acted on before deferral is proper. See, e.g., Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 146-47 (1980); Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 928 (1972); Airco Industrial Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 676-77 (1972); see also Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1977).
The employer relies on Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1981), in which the Fourth Circuit also recognized "that deferral ... will not be appropriate if the merits of the claim which are the subject matter of the settlement and of the Labor Board proceedings were never discussed or considered in the settlement negotiations." 647 F.2d at 424 (citations and footnotes omitted). The court in Roadway Express reversed the Board's decision not to defer in a case of an unfair discharge settled by immediate reinstatement with no loss of seniority, but without back pay. It observed that the record provided evidence of a full hearing on the issue of the propriety of the discharge before an arbitration panel. Id. at 425. The employee settled after the arbitration panel split four to four on the grievance. Id. at 418. The union fully acquiesced in the agreement, the employee returned to work, and more than four months later filed a complaint with the Board. Id. In contrast, the record before us, including the settlement agreement itself, does not include evidence of a full hearing, a discussion, or consideration of the propriety of Allen's discharge, or any consideration of the refusal to reinstate immediately the unfair labor practice strikers after their unconditional offer to return to work. See Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. at 928 (because the record did not indicate whether the issue of the employer's wrongful motivation in a discharge had been considered, deferral was improper); Airco Industrial Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. at 676-77 (where the arbitration proceedings touched only "tangentially" on the issue of discrimination in an employee's discharge, deferral was improper); see also United States Steel Corp., 250 N.L.R.B. 387, 390 (1980); cf. Central Cartage Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 337, 338 (1973) (agreement clearly reached the statutory issues under sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act, stating the employee "was not laid off for union activity" and that the settlement was a "full, final, and complete settlement of the ... matter").
The second reason for not deferring given by the ALJ was that "the settlement does not include anything like the usual Board remedy for the serious violations involved" and that " [t]he Agreement is simply not a reasonable compromise of the disputed claims." Although there may be some doubt whether the Board should refuse to defer merely because in hindsight it does not consider the compromise reasonable, the Board should insure that the strict statutory commands of the Act are not bypassed without reason. To this extent, therefore, it was not inappropriate for the Board to consider this factor. The contractual imposition of a remedy substantially less favorable to one party than the remedy usually ordered by the Board may indicate the statutory basis of the usual remedy received no consideration. It may also indicate a violation of the broader policy underlying the usual remedy.
The employer claims the agreement embodies a fair, not a repugnant, compromise and cites several cases for comparison. Each is distinguishable from the facts of this dispute. For example, in United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part on other grounds, 534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825, 97 S. Ct. 79, 50 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1976), a private settlement ended a violent economic strike by granting the strikers some reinstatement rights greater than applicable Board decisions would have required at the time, id. at 387-88, plus apparently requiring some compromises in the new collective bargaining contract. The settlement did not purport to resolve any unfair labor practice claim. See American Cyanimid Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 440, 441 (1978), citing United Aircraft Corp. The Board has also expressly refused to extend its reasoning for deferral in United Aircraft Corp. to cases involving unfair labor practice strikes. 192 N.L.R.B. at 387-88 n. 31. As the case before us involves an unfair labor practice strike, United Aircraft Corp. is not in point.
We do not reach the employer's argument that the Board attempted improperly to shift the burden of proof on the unfair labor practice strike issue from the General Counsel to the company. In his conclusions, the ALJ did not indicate that the employer bore any burden of proof on those issues inconsistent with the law of this circuit. See NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1953)