Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/451/56/
Timestamp: 2019-12-10 07:40:06
Document Index: 551676295

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 10', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 10', '§ 301']

United Parcel Svc., Inc. v. Mitchell :: 451 U.S. 56 (1981) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 451 › United Parcel Svc., Inc. v. Mitchell
Page 451 U. S. 57
bargaining agreement, the indispensable predicate for the § 301(a) action was not a showing under traditional contract law that the discharge was a breach of the agreement, but instead that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Since the arbitrators' conclusion was, under the collective bargaining agreement, "binding on all parties," respondent was required to show that the union's duty to represent him fairly at the arbitration had been breached before he was entitled to reach the merits of his contract claim. Thus, the suit is more analogous to an action to vacate an arbitration award than to a straight contract action. Pp. 451 U. S. 61-62.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 451 U. S. 64. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 451 U. S. 65. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 451 U. S. 71.
Page 451 U. S. 58
Page 451 U. S. 59
Page 451 U. S. 60
Congress has not enacted a statute of limitations governing actions brought pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA. As this Court pointed out in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 383 U. S. 704-705 (1966), "the timeliness of a § 301 suit . . . is to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations." [Footnote 2] Our present task is to determine which limitations period is "the most appropriate one provided by state law." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 421 U. S. 462 (1975). This depends upon an examination of the nature of the federal
Page 451 U. S. 61
claim and the federal policies involved. See Hoosier Cardinal, supra, at 383 U. S. 706-707.
The Court of Appeals purported to rely on this Court's decision in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., but that decision strongly supports borrowing the limitations period for actions to vacate arbitration awards. As Hines makes clear, an employee may go behind a final and binding award under a collective bargaining agreement and seek relief against his employer and union only when he demonstrates that his union's breach of its duty "seriously undermine[d] the integrity of the arbitral process." 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 567. Hines rejected the suggestion that "erroneous arbitration decisions must stand" in the face of the union's breach of its duty, id. at 424 U. S. 571, suggesting that the suits it sanctioned are aptly characterized as ones to vacate such arbitration decisions. Indeed, the present
Page 451 U. S. 62
writer, though in dissent on the merits in Hines, characterized the action as one to "vacate an . . . arbitration award." Id. at 424 U. S. 575. See also Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 375 U. S. 336 (1964) (issue characterized as whether to enjoin implementation of decision of joint panel).
Hines, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 570-571. Thus, respondent's characterization of his action against the employer as one for "breach of contract" ignores the significance of the fact that it was brought in the District Court pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, and that the indispensable predicate for such an action is not a showing under traditional contract law that the discharge was a breach of the collective bargaining agreement, but instead a demonstration that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. Since the conclusion of the Joint Panel was, under the collective bargaining agreement, "binding on all parties," respondent was required in some way to show that the Union's duty to represent him fairly at the arbitration had been breached before he was entitled to reach the merits of his contract claim. This, in our view, makes the suit more analogous to an action to vacate an arbitration award than to a straight contract action. [Footnote 4]
Page 451 U. S. 63
Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574, 363 U. S. 581 (1960). Although the present case involves a fairly mundane
Page 451 U. S. 64
and discrete wrongful discharge complaint, the grievance and arbitration procedure often processes disputes involving interpretation of critical terms in the collective bargaining agreement affecting the entire relationship between company and union. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, supra (seniority rights of all employees). This system, with its heavy emphasis on grievance, arbitration, and the "law of the shop," could easily become unworkable if a decision which has given "meaning and content" to the terms of an agreement, and even affected subsequent modifications of the agreement, could suddenly be called into question as much as six years later.
I join the Court's opinion because I am persuaded that the Court has made the correct choice between the two state law alternatives presented by the parties. As the Court observes, the applicability of § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), was never pressed by
Page 451 U. S. 65
either party, and was not considered by the Court of Appeals. Although I find much that is persuasive in JUSTICE STEWART's analysis, resolution of the § 10(b) question properly should await the development of a full adversarial record.
"The present suit is essentially an action for damages caused by an alleged breach of an employer's obligation embodied in a collective bargaining agreement. Such an action closely resembles an action for breach of contract cognizable at common law. Whether other § 301 suits different from the present one might call for the application of other rules on timeliness, we are not required
Page 451 U. S. 66
to decide, and we indicate no view whatsoever on that question."
Moreover, unlike Hoosier, where the employee's complaint was rooted solely in § 301 of the LMRA, the respondent employee here has two claims, each with its own discrete jurisdictional base. The contract claim against the employer is based on § 301, but the duty of fair representation is derived from the NLRA. [Footnote 2/2] Yet the two claims are inextricably interdependent.
Page 451 U. S. 67
Thus, the suit in this case, unlike the one in Hoosier, cannot be likened to "an action for breach of contract cognizable at common law." 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 705, n. 7. Instead, it is an amalgam of § 301, which has no limitations period, and the NLRA. And, of course, the latter contains a limitations provision. Although § 10(b) of the NLRA was designed to limit the initiation of unfair labor practice claims [Footnote 2/3] in order
Page 451 U. S. 68
to safeguard the stability of collective bargaining agreements, the policy behind it applies with equal force in this context.
Congress enacted § 10(b) of the NLRA to protect continuing collective bargaining systems from delayed attack. The 6-month bar of § 10(b) [Footnote 2/4] is designed to strengthen and defend the "stability of bargaining relationships." Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U. S. 411, 362 U. S. 425. The time limitation reflects
Page 451 U. S. 69
the balance drawn by Congress, "the expositor of the national interest," id. at 362 U. S. 429, between the interests of employees in redressing grievances and "vindicati[ng] [their] statutory rights," ibid., and the "interest in industrial peace, which it is the overall purpose of the Act to secure.'" Id. at 362 U. S. 428 (quoting NLRB v. Childs Co., 195 F.2d 617, 621-622 (CA2) (L. Hand, concurring)). [Footnote 2/5]
Finally, even if it were appropriate to view the respondent employee's suit in this case as founded solely on § 301, the
Page 451 U. S. 70
Court is not obliged to apply a state statute of limitations. As already noted, Hoosier contemplated that "other § 301 suits different from the present one might call for application of other rules of timeliness." 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 705, n. 7. And the Court has indicated, in a more general context, that state limitations periods will not be applied when their employment would be inconsistent with national policy:
Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 702. Accordingly, "[t]he need for uniformity" among procedures followed for similar claims, ibid., [Footnote 2/7] as well as the clear congressional indication
Page 451 U. S. 71
of the proper balance between the interests at stake, counsels the adoption of § 10(b) of the NLRA as the appropriate limitations period for lawsuits such as this.
In this action, the plaintiff employee seeks a judicial remedy against his former employer for wrongful discharge, and against his union for breach of the duty of fair representation. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants because of the employee's failure to file suit within what that court viewed as the appropriate period of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment as to both claims, and remanded for further proceedings. The employer alone sought further review in this Court. Therefore, at this stage of the litigation, the only question properly presented for our consideration is whether the Court of Appeals chose the most appropriate New York statute of limitations to govern the employee's claim against his former employer for wrongful discharge. [Footnote 3/1] Although I agree, for the most part, with the
Page 451 U. S. 72
Court's resolution of that question, I fear that its failure expressly to limit its reasoning to the narrow question presented in this case may suggest that today's decision also resolves the question whether the same statute of limitations governs the employee's claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. That interpretation, although understandable in light of the broad language of the Court's opinion, would be inconsistent with the procedural posture of this case, and, in addition, would be conceptually unsound.
The employee's claim against his union for breach of the duty of fair representation, however, is of a far different character. Although this claim is closely related to the claim
Page 451 U. S. 73
against the employer, the two claims are nonetheless conceptually distinct. [Footnote 3/2] The claim against the union may not, in my judgment, be characterized as an action to vacate an arbitration award. The arbitration proceeding did not, and indeed, could not, [Footnote 3/3] resolve the employee's claim against the union. Although the union was a party to the arbitration, it acted only as the employee's representative; the Joint Panel did not address or resolve any dispute between the employee and the union. Therefore, with respect to the employee's action against the union, the finality and certainty of arbitration are not threatened by the prospect that the employee might prevail on his judicial claim. Because no arbitrator has decided the primary issue presented by this claim, no arbitration award need be undone, even if the employee ultimately prevails. [Footnote 3/4]
Page 451 U. S. 74
In this case, I agree with the Court that the statute of limitations applicable to respondent's claim against his former employer is the 90-day statute governing actions to vacate or
Page 451 U. S. 75
modify arbitration awards in New York. [Footnote 3/6] It surely does not follow, however, that that statute is applicable to the claim against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation. [Footnote 3/7] Because the union did not seek review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, it is not appropriate to decide what period of limitations should be applied to the employee's claim against it. It is, however, noteworthy that JUSTICE STEWART's proposal that we strain to conclude that Congress intended that § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), [Footnote 3/8] be applied to causes of action that this
Page 451 U. S. 76
Court had not yet divined when § 10(b) was enacted, [Footnote 3/9] cf. Watt v. Alaska, post, p. 451 U. S. 276 (STEWART, J., dissenting), rests on a rationale that might apply to a § 301 claim against the union, but which is wholly inapplicable to the claim against the employer, because the employer is not accused of any unfair labor practice.
"The fact that Mitchell may have a claim against the Union does not affect the determination of which statute of limitations governs his claim against his employer. See Liotta v. National Forge Co., supra, 629 F.2d at 905."