Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/735/1178/211890/
Timestamp: 2018-12-09 21:38:27
Document Index: 368919214

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1400', '§ 701', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1412', '§ 1412', '§ 1412', '§ 1412', '§ 794']

Raymond J. Wilson and Darlinda Wilson, in Their Own Behalfand As Parents and Next Friends of Jessica Wilson,plaintiffs-appellants, v. Marana Unified School District No. 6 of Pima County;raymond Narum, Loren Loftin, C. Roger Fulton, Georgeleaming, and Olive Barry, Members of the Board of Trustees,marana Unified School District No. 6, in Their Officialcapacities, Defendants-appellees, 735 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1984 › Raymond J. Wilson and Darlinda Wilson, in Their Own Behalfand As Parents and Next Friends of Jessica...
Raymond J. Wilson and Darlinda Wilson, in Their Own Behalfand As Parents and Next Friends of Jessica Wilson,plaintiffs-appellants, v. Marana Unified School District No. 6 of Pima County;raymond Narum, Loren Loftin, C. Roger Fulton, Georgeleaming, and Olive Barry, Members of the Board of Trustees,marana Unified School District No. 6, in Their Officialcapacities, Defendants-appellees, 735 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1984)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 735 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1984)
Argued and Submitted Feb. 14, 1984. Decided June 26, 1984
Raymond J. Wilson and Darlinda Wilson filed suit against the Marana Unified School District, et al., on their own behalf and as the parents and next friends of Jessica Wilson. The Wilsons appeal a state administrative decision pursuant to the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The district court granted the appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.
The parents filed a request for a due process hearing before an impartial hearing officer, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) of the EAHCA. The officer reviewed the facts of the case and the applicable state and federal laws before ruling against the school district's proposal. The school district, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c), appealed to a state review officer who affirmed the decision. The parties subsequently agreed, however, to resubmit the issue to a different state review officer who reversed the decision. The parents then brought suit in district court appealing the decision of the second state review officer pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2). The school district moved to dismiss the case claiming that the parents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by not requesting a rehearing after the second state review officer handed down his decision. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the school district's motion to dismiss but granted its motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both parties appeal the denial of their motions.
This matter comes before this court on a stipulated set of facts. Therefore, the issue to be decided is whether the district court correctly interpreted and applied state law. Yazzie v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan, & Tenner, 593 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979). A de novo review is also to be applied to questions of whether a state department of education's proposed individual educational program constituted a "free appropriate education" within the EAHCA. Department of Education, State of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 814 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1983).
Arizona has, in addition to the procedures under the EAHCA, a statute requiring the State Department of Education to permit a rehearing on decisions regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to a handicapped chilD. Ariz. Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 41-1010(B) (supp. pamphlet 1975-1983). Arizona also has a statute providing that when a statute or rule of an administrative agency allows for a rehearing, the decision of the agency is not final until the application for the rehearing is denied or the decision is rendereD. Ariz. Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 12-901(2). Because Jessica's parents did not request a rehearing of the second review officer's decision, the school district argues that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case.
Where administrative procedures cannot afford adequate relief, the remedy need not be exhausted. Monahan v. State of Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 593, 597 (8th Cir. 1981); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2).
The EAHCA is a federal funding program which was designed to assist states in providing for the unique educational needs of handicapped children. If a state is to receive federal funding under the EAHCA, it must have in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a "free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).
The parents maintain that neither Arizona nor federal law supports the school district's contentions. They argue that the EAHCA does not require the states to provide handicapped children with the best education possible. Instead, they contend that the congressional intention is that handicapped children be enabled to achieve a "reasonable degree of self-sufficiency." Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 n. 23, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3048 n. 23, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982). The parents further maintain that the auditory approach, by which Jessica was given reading lessons in the first grade, is adequate to enable her to achieve a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency.
While we do not disagree with the parent's interpretation of legislative intent, we do not consider it to be the controlling issue in this matter. At issue here is a school district's ability, after determining that a handicapped student is not making satisfactory progress, to transfer that student to a school which can provide assistance from an instructor especially qualified to train a student with that particular disability. We find that the school district's proposal does not conflict with state or federal law, but complements it by attempting to provide Jessica with a teacher particularly suited to deal with her learning problems. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S. Ct. at 3051. The school district's proposal, under the facts of this case, is reasonably calculated to furnish Jessica a free, appropriate education and therefore we affirm the decision of the district court. Id. at 207, 102 S. Ct. at 3051. Johnston by Johnston v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 569 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
The parents have drawn the court's attention to the federal and state mandate to "mainstream" handicapped children, assuring that, to the maximum extent possible, handicapped children are educated with children who are not handicapped. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B); 45 C.F.R. Sec. 84.34(a) (1983); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 15-764(A) (3) (spec. pamphlet 1983). We are well aware of the importance of this policy; however, it is a policy which must be balanced with the primary objective of providing handicapped children with an "appropriate" education. See Johnston by Johnston v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 569 F. Supp. 1502, 1508-09 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (transferring child from a regular classroom to a special education classroom does not violate the EAHCA's goal of mainstreaming so long as special education is necessary and appropriate. See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 n. 4, 102 S. Ct. at 3038 n. 4.
The district court and the second state review officer determined that the objective of mainstreaming would not be thwarted by requiring Jessica to be instructed for a period of time by a physical disabilities teacher at another school. We agree. Although the policy of mainstreaming is to be applied "to the maximum extent appropriate," where, as here, "the nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily ...," a handicapped child may be removed from "the regular educational environment." See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (emphasis added) and 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B).
The Wilsons seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. V 1981). Passage of the EAHCA, however, precludes them from recovering attorneys' fees under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In a recent Ninth Circuit opinion denying attorneys' fees under the Rehabilitation Act, the court held that:
Department of Education, State of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1983).
In deciding this case, the court acknowledges that public education has traditionally been a function of the states. They have been given much discretion over the years in formulating educational policies and systems. " [C]ourts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.' " Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208, 102 S. Ct. at 3052 (citations omitted). The courts should not substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review. Id. at 206, 102 S. Ct. at 3051. Therefore, we must grant deference to the sound judgment of the various state educational agencies.