Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca5/c15342/winters-v-diamond-chemical
Timestamp: 2019-12-15 15:58:18
Document Index: 610963686

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 1442', '§ 1442', '§ 1442', '§ 1442', '§ 1442', '§ 1442']

Winters v. Diamond Chemical, Fifth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
* The seminal case setting out the parameters of the offensive use of collateral estoppel is Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979). Before addressing Parklane, however, let us make a few observations generally about the use of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. Four conditions must be met before collateral estoppel may be applied to bar relitigation of an issue previously decided by a court of competent jurisdiction:
"The general rule should be that in cases ... where, either for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel." Id. at 331, 99 S. Ct. 645 (emphasis added). The Court specifically noted, however, that a district court has broad discretion to determine whether collateral estoppel is appropriately employed offensively to preclude issue relitigation. Id. at 331, 99 S. Ct. 645; Copeland, 47 F.3d at 1423 (also noting "broad discretion" of district court, particularly with respect to use of offensive collateral estoppel). We thus review the district court's refusal to offensively apply collateral estoppel only for abuse of the broad discretion afforded it. Copeland, 47 F.3d at 1423.
We thus see that the availability of review is of paramount importance to the issue of preclusion. In Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir.1986), we discussed whether preclusive effect should be given to an order granting partial summary judgment. We noted that the order was nonfinal and thus could be revised by the district court, but we premised our decision refusing to grant preclusive effect to the partial summary judgment order on the basis that it was unappealable. Avondale, 786 F.2d at 1270. We noted that we were unaware of "any federal appellate decision which has applied preclusion to a prior nonfinal ruling as to which appellate review was unavailable...." Id. & 1271 n. 8 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, comment a). Other circuits have also stressed the importance of appellate review. See, e.g., Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1)); Johnson v. Watkins, 101 F.3d 792, 795 (2d Cir.1996); J.R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chemical Co., 93 F.3d 176, 179 (5th Cir.1996); In re DES Litig., 7 F.3d 20, 24 (2d Cir.1993); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir.1987); Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 750 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir.1984); see Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 & n. 18, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 2007 & n. 18, 64 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1980) (noting confidence that initial litigation was substantially correct is often unwarranted in absence of appellate review).
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions explained the purposes behind § 1442(a)(1). See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405-07, 89 S. Ct. 1813, 23 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1969), for the historical background of the Federal Officer Removal Statute. It consistently has been iterated as a principle of federalism and supremacy that the federal government
Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406, 89 S. Ct. 1813 (quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263, 25 L. Ed. 648 (1879)); see also Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 126, 109 S. Ct. 959, 103 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1989) (quoting Davis ); Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 241 n. 16, 101 S. Ct. 1657, 68 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1981) (same).
In the light of that established precept, the Supreme Court has noted that one of the most important functions of this right of removal is to allow a federal court to determine the validity of an asserted official immunity defense. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407, 89 S. Ct. 1813; see also Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 242, 101 S. Ct. 1657 (noting right of removal is "absolute for conduct performed under color of federal office"); State of La. v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226, 232 (5th Cir.1992) (noting chief purpose is to "prevent federal officers who simply comply with a federal duty from being punished by a state court for doing so"). Removal pursuant to § 1442(a)(1) is thus meant to "ensure a federal forum in any case where a federal official is entitled to raise a defense arising out of his official duties." Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 241, 451 U.S. 232; Murray v. Murray, 621 F.2d 103, 106 (5th Cir.1980) (noting removal statute is "incident of federal supremacy"). Furthermore, this right is not to be frustrated by a grudgingly narrow interpretation of the removal statute. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407, 89 S. Ct. 1813; Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 242, 101 S. Ct. 1657 (quoting Willingham ); Sparks, 978 F.2d at 232 (noting Supreme Court requirement of liberal interpretation for over two decades).
The second factor necessary for § 1442 removal is a finding that the defendants acted pursuant to a federal officer's directions and that a causal nexus exists between the defendants' actions under color of federal office and the plaintiff's claims. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S. Ct. 1813 (citing Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 33, 46 S. Ct. 185, 70 L. Ed. 449 (1926)). We have previously noted the Supreme Court's admonishment that the statute's "color of federal office" requirement is neither "limited" nor "narrow," but should be afforded a broad reading so as not to frustrate the statute's underlying rationale. Murray, 621 F.2d at 107. On the other hand, the Court has clarified that the right to removal is not unbounded, and only arises when "a federal interest in the matter" exists. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406, 89 S. Ct. 1813; Mesa, 489 U.S. at 139, 109 S. Ct. 959. The question we must determine is whether the government specified the composition of Agent Orange so as to supply the causal nexus between the federal officer's directions and the plaintiff's claims.
The third and final factor necessary for removal pursuant to § 1442 is the assertion of a "colorable federal defense." Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406-07, 89 S. Ct. 1813; Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 241, 101 S. Ct. 1657 ("[R]emoval under § 1442(a)(1) and its predecessor statutes was meant to ensure a federal forum in any case where a federal official is entitled to raise a defense arising out of his official duties."); Mesa, 489 U.S. at 129, 133-34, 109 S. Ct. 959 ("[A]n unbroken line of this Court's decisions extending back nearly a century and a quarter have understood all the various incarnations of the federal officer removal statute to require the averment of a federal defense."). It is important to note that the defendants need not prove the asserted defense, but need only articulate its "colorable" applicability to the plaintiff's claims. "One of the primary purposes of the removal statute--as its history clearly demonstrates--was to have such defenses litigated in the federal courts.... In fact, one of the most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tried in a federal court. The officer need not win his case before he can have it removed." Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407, 89 S. Ct. 1813 (emphasis added). In this case, the defendants have proposed two defenses that they contend meet the removal statute's requirement: (1) the government contract defense, and (2) the immunity afforded them under the Defense Production Act.
The Supreme Court set out the test for immunity under the government contractor defense in Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 101 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1988). The Court wrote that
Id. The Court explained that the government's immunity inured to the benefit of the contractor because it was derivative of the government's own immunity from suit "where the performance of a discretionary function is at issue." In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 81 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511, 108 S. Ct. 2510). The Court further noted that "the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function." Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511, 108 S. Ct. 2510. Thus, the decisions regarding the specific formulation, packaging, delivery, and use of Agent Orange in Vietnam constitute governmental exercise of a discretionary function.
781 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y.1992)
The Supreme Court decided in 1894 that unavailability of appellate review alone could not preclude the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Johnson Steel Street Rail Co. v. Wharton, Jr. & Co., 152 U.S. 252, 261, 14 S. Ct. 608, 38 L. Ed. 429 (1894). The Court held that the "existence or nonexistence of a right, in either party, to have the judgment in the prior suit re-examined, upon appeal or writ of error, cannot in any case, control [the inquiry into the application of the doctrine or res judicata]." Id. See also Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 635-37 (5th Cir.1974) (discussing estoppel by judgment and noting that "[a]s between the two federal district courts, the inability to appeal from the order of remand does not permit the issue actually litigated and determined in the federal court in Arkansas to be relitigated in the second action"); Frith v. Blazon-Flexible Flyer, Inc., 512 F.2d 899, 901 (5th Cir.1975); cf. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 & n. 18, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 64 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1980) (noting that the lack of appellate review "strongly militates against giving an acquittal preclusive effect," but also noting that Court was not suggesting "that the availability of appellate review is always an essential predicate of estoppel")
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (West Supp.1998) (as amended 1996). The 1996 amendment overruled the Supreme Court's ruling in 1991 that a federal officer, but not a federal agency, could effect removal pursuant to the statute. See International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 111 S. Ct. 1700, 114 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1991).
DocketNumber： 97-40113
Citation Numbers： 149 F.3d 387
Filed Date： 8/18/1998
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