Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100402/machibroda-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2020-05-26 07:14:11
Document Index: 73621744

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

Machibroda Vs United States - Citation 100402 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Machibroda Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/100402
Case Number 368 U.S. 487
Appellant Machibroda
machibroda v. united states - 368 u.s. 487 (1962) u.s. supreme court machibroda v. united states, 368 u.s. 487 (1962) machibroda v. united states no. 69 argued december 5, 1961 decided february 19, 1962 368 u.s. 487 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit syllabus in a federal district court, petitioner pleaded guilty to two charges of bank robbery. before sentencing, the judge inquired whether counsel desired to make any statement, but he did not direct any similar inquiry to petitioner personally. he sentenced petitioner to imprisonment for 25 years on one charge and 15 years on the other, the sentences to run consecutively. several years later, petitioner filed in the same court a.....
Machibroda v. United States - 368 U.S. 487 (1962)
U.S. Supreme Court Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962)
1. Failure of the Judge specifically to inquire at the time of sentencing whether petitioner personally wished to make a statement in his own behalf is not of itself an error that can be raised by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Rule 35. P. 368 U. S. 489 .
2. The District Court did not proceed in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 2255 when it made findings on controverted issues of fact without notice to petitioner and without a hearing, since this was not a case where "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." Pp. 368 U. S. 489 -496.
For the reasons stated in Hill v. United States, ante, p. 368 U. S. 424 , we hold that the failure of the District Court specifically to inquire at the time of sentencing whether the petitioner personally wished to make a statement in his own behalf is not of itself an error that can be raised by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
United States Attorney had told him that if he "insisted in making a scene," certain unsettled matters concerning two other robberies would be added to the petitioner's difficulties. Finally, the motion and affidavit alleged that the petitioner had written two letters to the sentencing court and two letters to the Attorney General of the United States "relative to the misrepresentations" by the Assistant United States Attorney, to which he had received no reply. [ Footnote 1 ]
There can be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the petitioner's motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated. A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open to collateral attack. See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 ; Shelton v. United States, 356 U. S. 26 , reversing 246 F.2d 571. [ Footnote 2 ]
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220 , 274 U. S. 223 .
We think the District Court did not proceed in conformity with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, when it made findings on controverted issues of fact without notice to the petitioner and without a hearing. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205 , 342 U. S. 220 . The statute requires a District Court to "grant a prompt hearing" when such a motion is filed, and to "determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto" unless "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." [ Footnote 3 ] This was not a case where the issues raised by the motion were conclusively determined either by the motion itself or by the "files and records" in the trial court. The factual allegations contained in the petitioner's motion and affidavit, and put in issue by the affidavit filed with the Government's response, related primarily to purported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 , at 312 U. S. 287 .
What has been said is not to imply that a movant must always be allowed to appear in a district court for a full hearing if the record does not conclusively and expressly belie his claim, no matter how vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible his allegations may be. The language of the statute does not strip the district courts of all discretion to exercise their common sense. Indeed, the statute itself recognizes that there are times when allegations of facts outside the record can be fully investigated without requiring the personal presence of the prisoner. [ Footnote 4 ] Whether the petition in the present case can
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concur in the Court's judgment and opinion except as to Part I, from which they dissent for the reasons set out in their dissent in Hill v. United States, ante, p. 368 U. S. 430 .
that these materials do not conclusively belie petitioner's story, and that it is necessary to go outside the files and records to discover the truth of the matter. With this conclusion I cannot agree. [ Footnote 2/1 ] It represents not only a failure to give due deference to the inferences drawn by the two lower courts, but an unwarranted restriction of the summary disposition provision of § 2255. The opinion is an invitation to prisoners, always seeking a sojourn from their keepers, to swear to "Munchausen" tales when self-interest readily leads to self-deception in § 2255 applications . Once the opinion goes the rounds of our prisons, we will likely be plagued with a rash of such spurious applications. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
years after the prosecutor had reneged on his promise. [ Footnote 2/3 ] To my mind, it is preposterous to think that the prosecutor would make the trade alleged when, before any promises were allegedly made, not only had petitioner waived indictment on the Waterville robbery, which was the more serious of the two charges, but his attorney in his presence had mentioned to the judge in open court the "possibility of another information being filed," and had indicated a clear intention to waive indictment on "both informations" and to plead guilty to at least one. Moreover, experienced criminals such as petitioner know that judges, not prosecutors, control sentences. Petitioner says the Assistant had the "implied" consent of the judge. Certainly this would have not been sufficient for one so experienced as petitioner. The pledge he alleges the Assistant exacted as to silence with reference to his attorney did not include the judge. Despite this, and even though he appeared before the judge on three occasions subsequent to the alleged "deal," he never mentioned the same, nor asked for any conference with the judge in camera. Finally, it is inconceivable that credence could be given to a story of an agreement of leniency told by a hardened criminal who, before the alleged agreement was performed, had testified against the Government and favorable to a codefendant. Prosecutors make deals, if at all, for testimony to support their prosecutions, not to destroy them.
For the Court to say that an application so inconsistent and incredible cannot be dispatched without a hearing leaves the summary dismissal exception of § 2255 meaningless. [ Footnote 2/4 ] As pointed out by the Government, to require a hearing in this case means
I doubt, [ Footnote 2/5 ] then these avenues should be explored before permitting the petitioner to make a trip into town. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Why not ask for a response in this regard, as we often do, before ordering a hearing, with the attendant expense and hazards. The Court implies that a full hearing may not be required in a given case if the allegations are sufficiently "vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible." Although I would not require any hearing under the circumstances of this case, I submit that if, upon remand, it develops that no letters were mailed and that the Assistant United States Attorney did not visit the jail as claimed, then even the rationale of the Court's opinion would not require that petitioner be summoned to tell his story in court. [ Footnote 2/7 ]