Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/19881234702FSupp532_11114/KOLBECK%20v.%20GENERAL%20MOTORS%20CORP.
Timestamp: 2017-02-25 00:37:05
Document Index: 420753595

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1391', '§ 1392', '§ 1397', '§ 1392', 'art, 681', '§ 1365', '§ 1410']

KOLBECK v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. | 702 F.Supp. 532 (1988) | Leagle.com
702 F.Supp.
702 F.Supp. 532 (1988)
KOLBECK v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
Civ. A. No. 88-0714.
Michael J. KOLBECK
As Amended February 13, 1989.
Larry E. Coben, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Edward A. Gray, Philadelphia, Pa., Stephen J. Brogan, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
Donald Camhi, Philadelphia, Pa., for Tait Design and Machine and Charles N. Tait.
FootNotes 1. Numerous federal courts have addressed this issue. Some courts find the Safety Act and FMVSS 208 do not preclude state common law suits for failing to include passive restraint systems. See, e.g., Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.N.M.1988); Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407 (D.Md.1987); Murphy v, Nissan Motor Corp In U.S.A., 650 F.Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y.1987); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F.Supp. 1108 (D.Mass.1987). Murphy, however, was based in part on a theory that the automobile's seat belt system did not operate properly when a seat was fully reclined. Murphy, 650 F.Supp. at 927.
Finally, some courts reason that under the relevant state law, the failure to include airbags could not be the basis for finding the duty necessary to support a defective design claim, and, therefore, do not reach the preemption issue. See, e.g., Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F.Supp. 76 (D.Conn.1987); Higgs v. General Motors Corp., 655 F.Supp. 22 (E.D.Tenn.1985). At oral argument, counsel for GM stated that GM is not challenging plaintiff's claim on this ground. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 7 [hereinafter, Transcript].
2. The Secretary has authority to establish safety standards pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391(10), 1392(a).
3. In full, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
4. Section 1397(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982), provides "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from liability under common law."
5. The citation is to the standard in effect when the Pontiac was manufactured in 1980. FMVSS 208 has not substantially changed since then.
6. The Safety Act clearly was not designed to occupy the entire field of automotive safety standards. See Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319, 325 (1st Cir.1969).
7. Dawson is consistent with the seminal automobile crashworthiness case of Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir.1968), where the court stated:
It is apparent that the [Safety Act] is intended to be supplementary of and in addition to the common law of negligence and product liability. The common law is not sterile or rigid and serves the best interests of society by adapting standards of conduct and responsibility that fairly meet the emerging and developing need of our time. The common law standard of a duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances can at least serve the needs of our society until the legislature imposes higher standards or the courts expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort. The Act is a salutary step in this direction and not an exemption from common law liability.
8. Other courts which find no express preemption of passive restraint claims generally agree with this reasoning. They reason that Congress surely knows how to expressly bar claims when they want to, and that § 1392(d) does not do so. See Richart, 681 F.Supp. at 1466; Schick, 675 F.Supp. at 1184-85; Wood, 673 F.Supp. at 1114; Murphy, 650 F.Supp. at 927; Baird, 654 F.Supp. at 30-31.
9. Negligent compliance would occur when the restraint system the manufacturer provides fails to operate properly.
10. Section 505(e) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) states:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ... may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief....
11. This regulatory policy was stated in the announcement of the Final Rule for Standard 208 as "provid[ing] sufficient latitude for industry to develop the most effective systems" rather than "mandating the specific use of one device such as airbags...." 49 Fed.Reg. 28,962, 28,997 (July 17, 1984).
This amendment to the Safety Act also authorized the Secretary of Transportation to develop occupant safety standard restraint standards. 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(b)(3)(A).
12. The Supreme Court expressed the issue in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47, 79 S.Ct. 773, 780-81, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).
Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventative relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method governing conduct and controlling policy.
13. I am mindful that other courts disagree with this conclusion. I believe, however, that Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462, 1468-69 (D.N.M.1988), Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407 (D.Md.1987), and Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F.Supp. 1108 (D.Mass.1987), misapprehend the regulatory effect of common law damages awards and the effect of section 1397(c) in light of Ouellette, Palmer, and Cipollone.