Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19840517-1041683
Timestamp: 2017-01-19 09:06:34+00:00
Document Index: 203001887

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 5', 'arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 3", "l'article 26", "l'article 27"]

K. c. IRLANDE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche K. c. IRLANDE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 5-4 ; Non-violation de l'art. 5-1 ; Préjudice moral - constat de violation suffisant ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure nationaleNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10416/83Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1984-05-17;10416.83 Analyses : (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 5-3) JUGE OU AUTRE MAGISTRAT EXERCANT DES FONCTIONS JUDICIAIRES, (Art. 5-4) INTRODUIRE UN RECOURS, (Art. 5-4) ORDONNER LA LIBERATIONParties : Demandeurs : K.Défendeurs : IRLANDETexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 10416/8 3
K . v/IRELAN D K . c/IRLAND E DECISION of 17 May 1984 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 17 mai 1984 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ¨t e
Article 26 of the Convention : 77ze Contracting States cannot of their own notion put aside the rule of compliance with the six-months time limit . Examination of the factual circumstances which the applicant claims should be regarded as suspending the running of this time limit . Arlicle 26 de la Convention : Les Etats ne sauraient Ã©carter, de leur propre chef, le jeu de la rÃ¨gle du dÃ©lai de six mois . Examen de circonstances de fait qui, selon le requÃ©rant, devraient Ã©tre consid(rÃ©s comme ayant suspendu le cours du dÃ©lai de six mois.
(franÃ§ais : voir p. 161 )
7he applicant (*) was sentenced, with two accomplices, to a long prison sentence for an armed mail train robbery . He was arrested in April 1976 and detained for 44 hours during the course of which he war interrogated at length by the police and finally nutde certain statements. He was then brought before a coun and remanded in custody. Neither he nor his accomplices complained at the time of ill-treatment by the police . (â¢) The applicant was repmsemed before the Commission by Mr . Garret Sheehan, solicitor . Senator Mery Robinson, senior counsel and Professor K . Boyle, barrister-at-law, all of Dublin .
After having been released on bail, he appeared for trial but absconded to the United States during the proceedings . He was convicted and sentenced in his absence in December 1978. In his written and oral statements before the cou rt , the applicant claimed that he had been mal treated by the police and called several witnesses who confirmed that he had been covered with bruises when remanded in custody . However, the coun considered that the applicant's initial statements had been made voluntarily . In 1980 the applicant returved to Ireland and was arrested . He appealed unsuccessfully against his conviction and his further appeal to the Supreme Court was disntissed on 29 October 1982 .
THE LA W I . The applicant complains that his conviction was based on admissions which had been obtained by beatings at the hands of the police during a forty-four hour period of detention and interrogation . As a consequence he alleges that he did not receive a fair trial in accordance with Article 6(I) of the Convention . He further alleges that conviction and sentence on the basis of admissions which have been so obtained amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention . 2 . The Commission recalls that it is not competent to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention, as Article 26 provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter . . . within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken ." 3 . In the present case the date of the final decision is 29 October 1982 when the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal . Since the application was introduced to the Commission on 6 June 1983 it has been presented more than six months afier the date of the final decision .
4 . The applicant, however, submits that there are special circumstances in his case which ought to be regarded as interrvpting or suspending the running of the six months period . He states, in this respect that he had been receiving psychiatric treatment for prolonged depression, headaches, sleeplessness and disorientation since 1978 and that he received further treatment during his stay in the United States . He claims that between the decision of the Supreme Court on 29 October 1982 and the introduction of his application before the Commission on 6 June 1983 he was suffering from such depression and disorientation that he was unable to consider his situation in a responsible and reasonable way . He has also submitted a statement from a psychiatrist who had examined him in June 1980, Febrvary 1981 and May 1983 stating that during this time he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder which altered his perception and judgment regarding the efficacy of the legal process .
5 . The respondent Government, in response to these claims, reply as follow s "Should Lhe Commission be minded to interpret the Convention as allowing of the dealing with an application after Lhe six months period has expired Lhe respondent Government refrains from contesting Lhe facts alleged in support of the existence of 'special circumstances' . " 6 . The Commission recalls that the six months rule, in reflecting Lhe wish of the High Contracting Parties to prevent past decisions being called into question, after an indefinits lapse of time, serves the interests not only of the respondent Government but also of legal certainty as a value in itself . It marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by Lhe organs of the Convention and signals to both individuals and state authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (See, Application No . 9587/81, X . v . France, D .R . 29, 228 at paras 13-16) . 7 . For these reasons Lhe Commission has held, in view of Lhe important function of the rule in the Convention system, that the Contracting States cannot on their own authority waive compliance with it . (ibid . . It follows, therefore, that the decision)8 of the respondent Government not t o contest the facts alleged in support of the existence of special circumstances cannot operate as a form of waiver or be determinative of the issue and that it falls to the Commission to make its own assessment of the matter in the light of the circumstances of the case . 9 . The Commission has examined the evidence submitted by the applicant conceming his emotional and mental state in Lhe light of the facts of Lhe case . It does not consider that he has substantiated the claim that his mental state rendered him incapable of lodging a complaint within Lhe six months time-limit . In reaching this conclusion it observes that the applicant in fact lodged his application on the 38th day of a hunger strike when it might be expected, if his account was to be accepted, that his mood and depressive state would be even less conducive, as compared to previous months, to contemplating legal proceedings . Furthermore the Commission notes that his state of mind did not appear to hinder in any way Lhe pursuit of numerous appeals before the Irish courts ( . . .) concerning his conviction during the period when, according to psychiatric evidence, he was suffering from post traumatic stress disorder . 10 . Accordingly an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended Lhe running of the six months period . The application has, therefore, been lodged out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 (3) of the Convention . For these reasons the Commission ,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE . - 160 -
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits Le requÃ©rant (*) a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© avec deu .r complices Ã une lourde peine de prison pour hold up contre un train postal. ArrÃ©tÃ© en avril 1976, il avait Ã©tÃ© placÃ© en garde Ã vue durant 44 heures, au cours desquels il fut longuement interrogÃ© par la police et passa finalement aux aveus . Il fut ensuite prÃ©sentÃ© au tribunal et mis en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive. Ni lui ni ses complices ne firent Ã©tat, Ã ce moment, de mauvais traitements par la police . Ayant Ã©tÃ© mis en liberrÃ© sous caution, il comparut libre au procÃ¨s, mais pris la fuite aux Etats-Unis durant celui-ci . 1! fut condmrmÃ© par dÃ©faut en dÃ©cembre 1978. Dans ses dÃ©clarations Ã©crites et verbales utilisÃ©es au procÃ¨s, le requÃ©rant dÃ©clara avoir Ã©tÃ© nmltraitÃ© par la police et fit entendre plusieurs tÃ©moins qui attestÃ¨rent qu'il Ã©tait couvert d'ecchvnwses lorsqu'il fut placÃ© en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . La cour admit toutefois que les aveux du requÃ©rant avaient Ã©lÃ© faits librement . En 1980. le requÃ©rant revinr en Irlande, oÃ¹ il fur arrÃªrÃ©. Il interjeta appel de sa condamnation mais ce recours fut rejetÃ©, comme le fut Ã©galement, le 29 ocrobre 1982, son pou rvoi devant la Cour suprÃªme.
EN DROI T I . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de ce que sa condamnation a Ã©tÃ© fondÃ©e sur des aveux obtenus par â¢passage Ã tabac . lorsqu'il Ã©tait aux mains de la police, pendant une pÃ©riode de 44 heures de dÃ©tention et d'interrogatoire . Il allÃ¨gue par consÃ©quent qu'il n'a pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 6 par . I de la Convention . Il allÃ©gue en outre qu'une condamnation sur la base d'aveux ainsi obtenus Ã©quivaut Ã un traitement inhumain et dÃ©gradant, contraire Ã l'article 3 de la Convention . 2 . La Commission constate qu'elle n'est pas appelÃ©e Ã examiner si les (aits allÃ©guÃ©s par le requÃ©rant prÃ©sentent l'apparence d'une violation de la Convention, car l'article 26 stipule que la Commission . ne peut Ãªtre saisie que . . . dans le dÃ©lai de six mois Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive . . ( â¢) Le requÃ©rant Ã©rait reprÃ©sntÃ© devant la Convnission par Me Garret Shehan, sulicitor Ã Dublin, et par Mes Mary Robinso et K . Buyle, barrister-at-law Ã Dublin .
3 . En l'espÃ¨ce, la date de la dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive Ã©tait le 29 octobre 1982, lorsque la Cour suprÃªme rejeta l'appel du requÃ©rant . La requÃªte ayant Ã©tÃ© introduite auprÃ¨s de la Commission le 6juin 1983, il s'Ã©tait alors Ã©coulÃ© un dÃ©lai supÃ©rieur Ã six mois aprÃ¨s la date de la dÃ©cision finale . 4 . Le requÃ©rant fait cependant observer qu'il existe dans son cas des circonstances spÃ©ciales qui doivent Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©es comme ayant interrompu ou suspendu le cours du dÃ©lai de six mois . II dÃ©clare, Ã cet Ã©gard, qu'il a Ã©tÃ© soumis, depuis 1978, Ã un traitement psychiatrique pour une dÃ©pression prolongÃ©e, des maux de tÃªte, de l'insomnie et de la dÃ©sorientation et qu'il a subi Ã©galement un traitement au cours de son sÃ©jour aux Etats-Unis . Il affirme qu'entre la dÃ©cision de la Cour suprÃªme, le 29 octobre 1982, et l'introduction de sa requÃ©te Ã la Commission, le 6 juin 1983, il Ã©tait atteint d'une telle dÃ©pression et dÃ©sorientation qu'il Ã©tait incapable d'envisager sa situation d'une maniÃ¨re raisonnable et responsable . II a Ã©galement produit une attestation d'un psychiatre qui l'avait examinÃ© en juin 1980, en fÃ©vrier 1981 et en mai 1983, et dÃ©clarÃ© qu'au cours de cette pÃ©riode il souffrait de dÃ©sordres nerveux post-traumatiques qui avaient altÃ©rÃ© sa perception et sa facultÃ© de discernement touchant l'efficacitÃ© du processus lÃ©gal . 5 . Le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur rÃ©pond comme suit Ã ces prÃ©tentions : Â« Pour le cas oÃ¹ la Commission voudrait interprÃ©ter la Convention comme lui permettant d'Ãªtre saisie d'une requÃªte aprÃ¨s expiration du dÃ©lai de six mois, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur s'abstient de contester les faits allÃ©guÃ©s Ã l'appui de l'existence de 'circonstances spÃ©ciales' . Â» 6 . La Commission rappelle que"la rÃ¨gle des six mois, qui reflÃ¨te le dÃ©sir des Hautes Parties Contractantes d'empÃªcher que des dÃ©cisions anciennes ne soient remises en question aprÃ¨s une pÃ©riode de temps indÃ©ftnie, sert les intÃ©rÃªts non seulement du Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur, mais aussi de la certitude du droit en tant que valeur intrinsÃ¨que . Elle marque la limite temporelle de la surveillance exercÃ©e par les organes de la Convention, et signale Ã la fois aux individus et aux autoritÃ©s de l'Etat la pÃ©riode au-delÃ de laquelle cette surveillance n'est plus possible (voir requÃ©te No 9587/81, X . c/France, D .R . 29 p . 228, par . 13-16) . 7 . C'est pour cette raison que la Commission a exp rimÃ© l'avis, en raison de l'importante fonction de la rÃ¨gle dans le syst8me de la Convention, que les Etats contractants ne sauraient l'Ã©carter de leur propre chef ( ibidem) . 8 . Par consÃ©quent, la dÃ©cision du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur de ne pas contester les faits allÃ©guÃ©s Ã l'appui de l'existence de circonstances spÃ©ciales ne peut Ã©quivaloir Ã une sorte de renonciation, ni Ãªtre dÃ©cisive sur ce point, et il appa rt ient Ã la Commission de procÃ©der Ã sa propre apprÃ©ciation de l'affaire en tenant compte des circonstances . - 162 -
9 . La Commission a examinÃ© les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve soumis par le requÃ©rant au sujet de son Ã©tat affectif et mental, Ã la lumiÃ¨re des faits de la cause . Elle n'estime pas qu'il a suffisamment Ã©tayÃ© la prÃ©tention que son Ã©tat mental le rendait incapable de formuler ses griefs dans le dÃ©lai de six mois . Pour parvenir Ã cette conclusion, elle observe que le requÃ©rant a en fait prÃ©sentÃ© sa requ@te le 38Ã¨me jour d'une grÃ¨ve de la faim, alors qu'on pouvait s'attendre - si son rÃ©cit est acceptÃ© - Ã ce que son humeur et son Ã©tat dÃ©pressif fussent encore moins favorables, par comparaison avec les mois prÃ©cÃ©dents, pour envisager une procÃ©dure . La Commission note en outre que son Ã©tat mental ne semble pas l'avoir empÃ¨chÃ© d'interjeter plusieurs recours auprÃ¨s des tribunaux irlandais ( . . .) Ã l'encontre de sa condamnation, au cours de la pÃ©riode oÃ¹, selon l'attestation du psychiatre, il souffrait de dÃ©sordres nerveux posttraumatiques . 10 . Aussi, un examen de l'affaire ne rÃ©vÃ¨le-t-il pas l'existence de-circonstances spÃ©ciales qui pourraient avoir interrompu ou suspendu le cours du dÃ©lai de six mois . La requÃªte est donc tardive et doit Ã©tre rejetÃ©e en vertu de l'article 27 par . 3 de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTEIRRECEVABLE .
- 163 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 17/05/1984Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page