Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/514/1323/32734/
Timestamp: 2020-08-03 12:38:55
Document Index: 645737831

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 717', '§ 2000', '§ 717', '§ 717', '§ 717', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000']

Violet Davis Grubbs, Individually and on Behalf of Allpersons Similarly Situated, Appellant, v. Earl L. Butz, Individually and As Secretary of Agriculture, et al, 514 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1975) :: Justia
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Violet Davis Grubbs, Individually and on Behalf of Allpersons Similarly Situated, Appellant, v. Earl L. Butz, Individually and As Secretary of Agriculture, et al, 514 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 514 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1975) Argued Sept. 16, 1974. Decided June 23, 1975
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 19721 (EEOA), which amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 , extends procedural protections to federal employees complaining of employment discrimination. Under § 717(c) of the EEOA3 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16) a federal employee may file a civil action in United States District Court within 30 days of receiving notice that final action has been taken on his discrimination complaint by his agency or by the Civil Service Commission to which he can appeal. The right to file an action arises as well if within 180 days the agency has not taken final action on his complaint or the Civil Service Commission has not taken final action on his appeal.
No appellate court has yet superimposed an exhaustion requirement on the statutory prerequisites to suit as set out in § 717(c). And, recently, our District Court in Williams v. Mumford, 5 FEP Cases 1042 (D.D.C. 1973), held that, regardless of the availability of any further administrative remedy, a federal employee has a right to file a civil action under § 717(c) if final agency action has not been taken within the 180 day period.
Nor does the addition of a further exhaustion requirement to § 717(c) find support in the cases interpreting the analogous part of Title VII dealing with private employees' rights of action in discrimination cases.13 In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), the Supreme Court noted that the prerequisites to suit set out in the statute were the only ones that Congress meant to apply: "We will not engraft on the statute a requirement which may inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimination in the federal courts." Id. at 1822. Even before McDonnell Douglas, Courts of Appeals were unwilling to supplement the statutory scheme with any additional prerequisites that might delay or dilute a private complainant's full access into District Court.14
Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) provides that "it shall be the duty of the trial judge to assign the (discrimination) case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited."15 This explicit Congressional desire for expedition might be thwarted if trial judges were free to impose an exhaustion requirement over and above the 180 day provision for federal employment discrimination cases.16 III
Secondly, while Title VII does not explicitly provide that administrative and judicial processing of either federal or private employee complaints shall proceed concurrently, its text does provide one significant indication that Congress foresaw the possibility of concurrent proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) provides that in a private employment discrimination case, the District Court may stay its proceedings for sixty days pending the termination of either local or state proceedings or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission efforts to conciliate the dispute. If the filing of a civil action automatically terminated all non-judicial jurisdiction over a discrimination dispute, this provision would be meaningless since no occasion could ever arise in which to apply it. Thus the existence of concurrent jurisdiction is apparently implicit in § 2000e-5(f) (1).20
Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 et seq
Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 et seq. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.)
Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (D.D.C. 1973); H.R.Rep.No.92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-26 (1971)
See Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps, 456 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1972); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Sokolowski v. Swift and Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968)
We note that in its provisions regarding civil actions filed by private employees, Title VII does allow the staying of the action after a request has been made and for a limited period of time. "Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending the termination of State or local proceedings . . . or further efforts of the (Equal Employment Opportunity) Commission to obtain voluntary compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1). We need not decide whether that provision is made applicable to civil actions filed by federal employees by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d). See note 13 supra. In the instant case, the trial judge did not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1). Nor was there a request to do so as required by the statute. Finally, the trial judge did not indicate again as required by the statute that the cessation of judicial proceedings would be limited to sixty days
Delaware & Hudson Ry. v. United Transportation Union, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 142, 450 F.2d 603, 619 (1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911, 91 S. Ct. 2209, 29 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1971); District 50, UMW v. International Union, UMW, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 412 F.2d 165 (1969); Wallace v. Lynn, D.C. Cir., 507 F.2d 1186 (decided Dec. 4, 1974)
Section 2000e-5(f) (1) may be made explicitly applicable to the federal employment situation by § 2000e-16(d). See note 13 supra. If so, its relevance to Ms. Grubbs' claim of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal court is of course heightened
Hoffenberg v. Kaminstein, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 396 F.2d 684, 685 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913, 89 S. Ct. 235, 21 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1968)
See, e. g., Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973) (appeal pending); Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 364 F. Supp. 37 (D.Fla.1973); Thompson v. United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 360 F. Supp. 255 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Guilday v. Department of Justice, 385 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Del., decided Oct. 22, 1974)
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (5)