Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/356247/constabr
Timestamp: 2020-07-02 23:37:02
Document Index: 88551628

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 35', '§ 84', '§ 35', '§ 84', '§ 12131', '§ 794', 'art, 156', '§ 1983']

Plaintiffs,: United States’ Response As Amicus Curiae To Defendant’S Motion For Summary Judgment | Complaint | Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs,: United States’ Response As Amicus Curiae To Defendant’S Motion For Summary Judgment
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Chicago Park District, The v. Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc., The et al - Document No. 12
Malik v. Clarke et al - Document No. 6
1:09-cv-10309 #49
NORTHEN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NAVELLA CONSTANCE AND
VERNAL CONSTANCE,
98-CV-1440
(FJS)(GJD)
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE AS AMICUS CURIAE TO
DANIEL J. FRENCH BILL LANN LEE
Northern District of Civil Rights Division
WILLIAM H. PEASE Chief
Chief, Civil Division RENEE M. WOHLENHAUS
Bar Roll No. 102338 Deputy Chief
Syracuse, NY 13261-7198 PHILIP L. BREEN
December 1, 2000 Trial Attorney
Bar Roll # 502617
Background........................................................................................................................................2
I. FREYDEL V. NEW YORK HOSPITAL IS DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THIS CASE.............................................................................................................3
II. THE RECORD CONTAINS EVIDENCE THAT SUNY WILL NOT
ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE CONSTANCES' RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION.................................................................................................4
III. THE RECORD CONTAINS EVIDENCE OF SUNY'S DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE TO THE CONSTANCES' FEDERALLY
PROTECTED RIGHTS...................................................................................................................5
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................7
The United States, as amicus curiae, respectfully submit this brief, in support of plaintiffs
Navella and Vernal Constance's memorandum of law in opposition to defendant State University
of New York Health Science Center's motion for summary judgment.
Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on January 13, 1999. In support
of this motion, Defendant argued, inter alia, that the Constances lacked standing for injunctive
relief because they could not show an “injury in fact”; and Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead
discriminatory intent to justify an award of damages. The court denied Defendant's motion to
dismiss. (Judge's Decision and Order, dated 6/28/99).
The court also dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief, but granted Plaintiffs' leave
to amend their complaint. (Judge's Decision and Order, dated 6/28/99). Plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint on July 9, 1999. The amended complaint contains several new allegations,
including that 1) SUNY is one of the few hospitals located within a reasonable driving distance
of the Constance's home; 2) SUNY is the only Level One Trauma Center in the region; 3)
Navella Constance had developed a serious medical condition (cervical cancer) since 1996 that
required hospitalization and ongoing care; 4) given its proximity, it is reasonably possible that
Navella will seek services from SUNY; and 5) it is reasonably possible that Vernal will
accompany Navella if she uses SUNY's services. (Amended Complaint).
Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment1 on October 25, 2000, based solely
upon arguments made in its earlier motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendant alleged
that: 1) the Constances lack standing because they cannot prove an “injury in fact;” and 2)
plaintiffs fail to prove discriminatory intent. The only new information or argument in support of
1 On October 25, 2000, the Attorney General of the State of New York filed a memorandum in support
of a motion for summary judgment. (This memorandum is cited herein as “Def. Mem. __.”)
the motion is a recent federal district court decision in Freydel v. New York Hospital, 2000 WL
10264 (S.D.N.Y.).
As explained below, reliance upon Freydel is misplaced because the facts are plainly
distinguishable from the present facts, and because the district court decision, which is currently
on appeal to the Second Circuit, is not controlling on this Court.2 There are genuine issues of
material fact on Plaintiffs' standing to seek injunctive relief and on Defendant's discriminatory
intent, so as to deny Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Regulations implementing Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“Title II”),4 and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504")5 require public entities and recipients of
federal financial assistance to ensure “effective communication” with persons who are deaf or
hard of hearing by providing appropriate auxiliary aids and services, 28 C.F.R. § 35.160; 45
C.F.R. § 84.52(c)-(d), including qualified interpreters, 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.52(d)(3).6
“Effective communication” is critical in virtually all medical contexts. Without it, a care
giver cannot obtain complete medical histories; assess symptoms; provide for patient rights,
2 At most, the Court should consider staying this action until the Second Circuit rules in Freydel rather
than rely upon the case to decide summary judgment in the face of contested facts.
3 For a summary statement of the case, the United States respectfully refers the Court to plaintiffs’ statement
of the case contained in plaintiffs' memorandum of law in opposition to defendant's motion for summary
judgment, which are adopted herein by reference. (This memorandum is cited herein as “Pls.' Mem. ___.”)
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34.
5 29 U.S.C. § 794.
6 For information on the practical necessity of providing interpreters in health care settings, see
Elizabeth Ellen Chilton, Note, Ensuring Effective Communication: The Duty of Health Care Providers to
Supply Sign Language Interpreters for Deaf Patients, 47 Hastings L.J. 871, 873 & n.12 (1996)(citing
including informed consent; develop accurate diagnoses and prognoses; develop, explain and
administer procedures, medication and treatment generally; provide counseling; or otherwise
ensure that patients' needs are appropriately met. Failure to ensure that deaf and hard of hearing
patients can effectively communicate threatens the quality of care and, even when treatment
ultimately is successful, violates legally protected rights. Moreover, depriving patients and
companions such as Navella and Vernal Constance of the means to communicate can cause
needless panic, fear and worry.
FROM THIS CASE
Defendant heavily relies on Freydel v. New York Hospital, 2000 WL 10264 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), to argue that plaintiffs lack standing.7 Such reliance is misplaced as the case is plainly
distinguishable from the present facts.
The Freydel court ruled that a patient who was denied a Russian sign language interpreter
during the first week of her stay at the hospital was not entitled to injunctive relief, after noting
the changes in the circumstances which led Mrs. Freydel to be sent to New York Hospital: 1) she
was transferred to New York Hospital only because her primary care physician was at that time a
member of the hospital's cardiac catheterization laboratory; and 2) subsequently, her primary
care physician left New York Hospital, thus severing Mrs. Freydel's previous link with the
institution. 2000 WL 10264 at *3. The court also found that the relationship between her
community hospital and defendant hospital was “too weak” to form a basis to establish a real or
imminent need for her to utilize defendant hospital in the future, and that one visit to a hospital
was insufficient to establish that Mrs. Freydel was likely to again find herself seeking treatment
7 Defendant fails to note that Freydel is on appeal to the Second Circuit and was scheduled for
argument before the court November 29th. One of the issues argued is whether a deaf patient who was
denied interpreter services on a single visit to a hospital and continues to have medical need, which may
require her to return to the hospital, have standing for injunctive relief.
at the hospital. Based on these facts, the court concluded that Mrs. Freydel has failed to provide
evidence of a likely future encounter between herself and defendant hospital.
The present record shows that Constances have a far stronger link with SUNY. Mrs.
Constance's recurring health condition, as well as her cervical cancer, is likely to require future
care.8 She is likely to require that care at SUNY for her conditions.9 A trier of fact could
reasonably conclude that if Mrs. Constance suffers again from the condition for which she was
originally sent to SUNY in 1996, she is likely to be sent to SUNY's emergency department.
Also, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that if her current course of treatment fails, she
will likely choose to go to SUNY, one of Upstate New York's most advanced cancer treatment
centers.10 Thus, it is extremely likely that Mrs. Constance will require future care for her
conditions at SUNY.11
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION12
Defendant claims that its hospital policies and procedures for interpreting services make
recurrence of alleged violations less likely (Def. Memo, p. 17). In the present case, there is,
however, evidence that SUNY has not corrected serious programmatic deficiencies in the policy
regarding whether or when interpreters should be obtained. The New York State Department of
8 See Pls.' Mem., p. 2; Depo., Vernal Constance, pp. 24-25; Pls.' Mem., p. 8-9; Dep., Navella
Constance, p. 39; Navella Constance Aff., ¶ 11; Pls.' Mem., p. 9, Navella Constance, p. 39; Navella
Constance Aff., ¶ 11.
9 See Pls. Mem., p. 9; Navella Constance Aff., ¶ 12.
10 See Pls.' Mem., p. 9; SUNY website, http://www.unversityhospital.org/cancer; Navella Constance Aff.¶ 12.
11 Because it is likely that Navella will return to SUNY, it is also likely that Vernal will return with
her. Therefore, he too has standing for purposes of an injunction against SUNY.
12 Regarding the correct requirements for establishing standing injunctive relief under Title II and
Section 504, the Department respectfully refers this court to the Department of Justice's Memorandum of
Law As Intervenor and Amicus Curiae in Response to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
at pp. 12-16.
Health specifically found that SUNY's policy, as it existed in 1996, was deficient,13 and there is
evidence that SUNY has not changed the policy substantively in response to the DOH findings.14
Moreover, the record shows that SUNY has continued its failure to provide interpreter
services in similar incidents. First, the New York State Department of Health cited deficiencies
in SUNY’s interpreter services not only in this case, but also in two prior cases in 1994.15
Second, even after being cited for these deficiencies, SUNY still continued its failure to provide
interpreter services more than two years after plaintiffs’ experiences when SUNY failed to
provide interpreters for another deaf patient, Joan Emerick, who repeatedly requested services
during her four-day hospitalization in August 1998.16 As stated above, evidence shows that there
was a lack of clarity in the SUNY policy and that SUNY failed to correct the policy after ordered
to do so by the State.
INDIFFERENCE TO THE CONSTANCES' FEDERALLY PROTECTED
The Second Circuit concluded in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners that
a plaintiff may obtain monetary damages for intentional violations of Title II and Section 504 by
establishing “deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that a violation of federally
protected rights will result from the implementation of the [challenged] policy . . . [or] custom”.
156 F.3d at 331 (brackets in original)(citations omitted). In this context, unlawful discrimination
“does not require animosity or ill will”. Id. Indeed, as the district court noted in Bartlett,
liability can attach even where “defendants may have had the best intentions.” Bartlett v. New
York State Board of Law Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in relevant
13 See Pls.' Mem., p. 4; Ex.1 - DOH Report.
14 See Pls.' Mem., p. 9; Ex. 2 & 5 - HR Policy
15 See Attachment 1 to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
16 See Attachment 3 to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
part, vacated in part, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds and remanded, __
U.S. __, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999). This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's conclusion
in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), that “much of the conduct Congress sought to alter
in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act
construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by discriminatory intent.” Id. at 296-97.
Defendant argued that Plaintiffs have no cause of action because they cannot prove
discriminatory intent. Contrary to the defendant's arguments, the record contains evidence of
SUNY's “deliberate indifference” to the Constances' federally protected rights that is sufficient to
defeat summary judgment. That evidence includes SUNY's ongoing failure to meet requests for
interpreters,17 its failure to train18 or supervise its staff regarding hospital policy and the rights of
deaf and hard of hearing persons generally,19 and the complete disregard of the Constances'
requirements for effective communication by hospital staff and officials who had both
knowledge of those requirements and the ability to address them.20
A trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the
deliberate indifference standard that this Court recently concluded governs the availability of
compensatory damages under Title II and Section 504, see Bartlett v. New York State Board of
Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds and remanded, __
U.S. __, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999), and to withstand SUNY's summary judgment motion on
plaintiffs' damage claim, cf. Wyant v. Okst, 101 F.2d 845, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1994) (summary
17 See Pls. Mem., pp. 1-2; Vernal Constance Depo. p. 5; Pls. Mem., p. 4; Ex. 1- DOH Report.
18 See Pls. Mem., p. 5; Maxine Thompson Depo, p. 38.
19 See Pls. Mem., p. 4; Ex. 2 - Policy H2; D. Pipas Depo, pp. 27-28; Maxine Thompson Aff., p 8.
20 See Pls. Mem., pp. 1-2; Vernal Constance Depo. p. 5.
judgment inappropriate when a reasonable juror could conclude that defendants in § 1983 action
were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's needs).21
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be denied
Chief, Civil Division JOHN L. WODATCH
Assistant U.S. Attorney Chief
Bar Roll No. 102338 PHILIP L. BREEN
100 South Clinton Street Special Legal Counsel
Syracuse, NY 13261-7198 RENEE M. WOHLENHAUS
(315) 448-0672 Deputy Chief
21 In Weyant, the Second Circuit observed that factual questions about the sate of knowledge
necessary to establish deliberate indifference are ordinarily determined after trial because, in most cases,
there will be genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. 101 F.3d at 856-57.
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