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Timestamp: 2018-09-25 12:41:03
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 944', '§ 944', '§ 944', '§ 944', '§ 944', '§ 944', '§ 944', '§ 944']

WEAVER V. GRAHAM, 450 U. S. 24 - Volume 450 - 1981 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 450 > WEAVER V. GRAHAM, 450 U. S. 24 (1981) > Full Text
Fla.Stat. § 944.275(1) (1979). [Footnote 3]
Petitioner, acting pro se, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Florida on the ground that the new statute, as applied to him, was an ex post facto law prohibited by the United States and the Florida Constitutions. [Footnote 5] He alleged that the reduced accumulation of monthly gain-time credits provided under the new statute would extend his required time in prison by over 2 years, or approximately 14 percent of his original 15-year sentence. [Footnote 6] The State Supreme
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U. S. 325-326 (1867). See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 301 U. S. 401 (1937); Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 196 U. S. 324-325 (1905); In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 134 U. S. 171 (1890); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 3 U. S. 390 (1798). [Footnote 9] Through this prohibition, the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly
changed. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 432 U. S. 298 (1977); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 107 U. S. 229 (1883); Calder v. Bull, supra, at 3 U. S. 387. The ban also restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation. Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180, 237 U. S. 183 (1915); Kring v. Missouri, supra, at 107 U. S. 229; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 10 U. S. 138 (1810); Calder v. Bull, supra, at 3 U. S. 395, 3 U. S. 396 (Paterson, J.); the Federalist No. 44 (J. Madison), No. 84 (A. Hamilton). [Footnote 10]
In accord with these purposes, our decisions prescribe that two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, [Footnote 11] and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. [Footnote 12] Lindsey v. Washington, supra, at 301 U. S. 401; Calder v. Bull, supra, at 3 U. S. 390. Contrary to the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Florida, a law need not impair a "vested right" to violate the ex post facto prohibition. [Footnote 13] Evaluating whether a right has vested
is important for claims under the Contracts or Due Process Clauses, which solely protect preexisting entitlements. See, e.g., Wood v. Lovett, 313 U. S. 362, 313 U. S. 371 (1941); Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U. S. 74, 302 U. S. 78-79 (1937). See also United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 449 U. S. 174 (1980). The presence or absence of an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant, however, to the ex post facto prohibition, which forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred. Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated. Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it violates the Clause if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of
is foreclosed by our precedents. First, we need not determine whether the prospect of the gain time was, in some technical sense, part of the sentence to conclude that it, in fact, is one determinant of petitioner's prison term -- and that his effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. at 301 U. S. 401-402; Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F.Supp. 644 (Mass.1967) (three-judge court), summarily aff'd, 390 U. S. 713 (1968). See also Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170 (CA7 1979) (elimination of parole eligibility held an ex post facto violation). We have previously recognized that a prisoner's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain and the judge's calculation of the sentence to be imposed. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 418 U. S. 557 (1974); Warden v. Marrero, 417 U. S. 653, 417 U. S. 658 (1974). See United States v. De Simone, 468 F.2d 1196 (CA2 1972); Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689, 692 (CA1 1969). Second, we have held that a statute may be retrospective even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence. Thus, we have concluded that a statute requiring solitary confinement prior to execution is ex post facto when applied to someone who committed a capital offense prior to its enactment, but not when applied only prospectively. Compare In re Medley, 134 U. S. 16 (1890), with Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483 (1890). See also Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867). [Footnote 17]
Respondent argues that our inquiry should not end at this point, because Fla.Stat. § 944.275(1) (1979) must be examined in conjunction with other provisions enacted with it. Brief for Respondent 18-26. Respondent claims that the net effect of all these provisions is increased availability of gain-time deductions. [Footnote 18] There can be no doubt that the legislature
intended through these provisions to promote rehabilitation and to create incentives for specified productive conduct. See Fla.Stat. § 944.012 (1979). But none of these provisions for extra gain time compensates for the reduction of gain time available solely for good conduct. The fact remains that an inmate who performs satisfactory work and avoids disciplinary violations could obtain more gain time per month under the repealed provision, § 944.27(1) (1975), than he could for the same conduct under the new provision, § 944.275(1) (1979). To make up the difference, the inmate has to satisfy the extra conditions specified by the discretionary gain-time provisions. [Footnote 19] Even then, the award of the extra gain time is purely discretionary, contingent on both the wishes of the correctional authorities and special behavior by the inmate, such as saving a life or diligent performance in an academic program. Fla.Stat. §§ 944.275(3)(a), (b) (1979). In contrast, under both the new and old statutes, an inmate is automatically entitled to the monthly gain time simply for avoiding disciplinary infractions and performing his assigned tasks. Compare Fla.Stat. § 944.275(1) (1979) with § 944.27(1) (1975). [Footnote 20] Thus, the new provision constricts the inmate's
"The enhancement of a crime or penalty seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty" after the fact. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. at 3 U. S. 397 (Paterson, J.). See also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 10 U. S. 138 (1810) ("An ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed.").
The ex post facto prohibition also upholds the separation of powers by confining the legislature to penal decisions with prospective effect and the judiciary and executive to applications of existing penal law. Cf. 6 U. S. Blackledge, 2 Cranch 272, 6 U. S. 277 (1804).
Cummins v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U. S. 325 (1867).
I find this case a close one. As the Court recently noted: "It is axiomatic that, for a law to be ex post facto, it must be more onerous than the prior law." ,Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 432 U. S. 294 (1977). Petitioner was clearly disadvantaged by the loss of the opportunity to accrue gain time through good conduct pursuant to the 5-10-15 formula when the legislature changed to a 3-6-9 formula. The new statute, however, also afforded petitioner opportunities not available