Source: http://stepstoatrademark.com/groundsforoppositionofatrademark.html
Timestamp: 2018-01-17 19:46:38
Document Index: 269869813

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§1052', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052']

﻿ Grounds for Opposition or Cancellation
(2) Trademark Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e): For example, that defendant’s mark, when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the defendant, is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them,
See Trademark Act § 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(1). See also, e.g.,The Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 57 USPQ2d 1720, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (deceptive misdescriptiveness) and Callaway Vineyard & Winery v. Endsley Capital Group, Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1919, 1922-23 (TTAB 2002) (mere descriptiveness). Regarding claims under Trademark Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. §1052(f), see Cold War Museum Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 92 USPQ2d 1626, 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (in cancellation proceeding, presumption of validity of registration under Trademark Act § 2(f) includes presumption of acquired distinctiveness, and party seeking cancellation must overcome this presumption by preponderance of evidence; “burden” to prove that mark has acquired distinctiveness shifts to registrant only after plaintiff establishes prima facie case that mark has not acquired distinctiveness); Yamaha International Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 6 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (in opposing a claim under Trademark Act § 2(f), opposer has initial burden of challenging or rebutting applicant’s evidence of distinctiveness) Alcatraz Media, Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1764-1767 (TTAB 2013) (burden on petitioner to rebut presumption that mark registered under Section 2(f) has acquired distinctiveness), aff’d unpub’d, No. 2014-1031 (Fed. Cir. 2014); ; Target Brands Inc. v. Hughes, 85 USPQ2d 1676, 1680 (TTAB 2007) (ultimate burden of persuasion under Trademark Act § 2(f) rests with applicant); Kellogg Co. v. General Mills Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1766, 1768 (TTAB 2007) (mere descriptiveness; whether claim under Trademark Act § 2(f) is sufficient).
See Trademark Act § 2(c),15 U.S.C. § 1052(c). See also Chester L. Krause v. Krause Publications, Inc., 76 USPQ2d 1904, 1909 (TTAB 2005), aff’d slip. op. 2007-1364 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 7, 2007); Ross v. Analytical Technology, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1269 (TTAB 1999) (plaintiff must establish that the “name,” as used on the goods or services, points uniquely to plaintiff as a “particular living individual”); Ceccato v. Manifattura Lane Gaetano Marzotto & Figli S.p.A., 32 USPQ2d 1192, 1195 (TTAB 1994) (party asserting Trademark Act § 2(c),15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) ground must have cognizable or proprietary right in the name).
Cf. Societe Civile Des Domaines Dourthe Freres v. S.A. Consortium Vinicole De Bordeaux Et De La Gironde, 6 USPQ2d 1205, 1209 (TTAB 1988)(Trademark Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) does not apply to family surnames).