Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/369/367
Timestamp: 2013-12-10 16:36:20
Document Index: 554650206

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 349', '§ 360', '§ 349', '§ 2201', '§ 1009', '§ 1011', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 401', '§ 349', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 2201', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 2201', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 359', '§ 360', '§ 503', '§ 359', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 1481', '§ 1252', '§ 349', '§ 1252', '§ 1253', '§ 2282', '§ 1252', '§ 2282', '§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 1009', '§ 2201', '§ 359', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 503', '§ 360', '§ 2201', '§ 503', '§ 2201', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 360', '§ 1105']

Dean RUSK, Secretary of State, Appellant, v. Joseph Henry CORT. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews Dean RUSK, Secretary of State, Appellant, v. Joseph Henry CORT.
369 U.S. 367 (82 S.Ct. 787, 7 L.Ed.2d 809)
[HTML] dissent, HARLAN, FRANKFURTER, CLARK
[HTML] Oscar H. Davis, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.
'From and after the effective date of this Act a person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by
The appellee, Joseph Cort, is a physician and research physiologist. He was born in Massachusetts in 1927. In May of 1951 he registered with his Selective Service Board under the so-called 'Doctors' Draft Act.'
Cort then instituted the present action against the Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. His complaint alleged that he had not remained abroad to evade his military obligations, and that § 349(a)(10) was in any event unconstitutional. A three-judge court was convened. The Secretary of State moved to dismiss the action upon the ground that § 360(b) and (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provide the exclusive procedure under which Cort could attack the administrative determination that he was not a citizen. The District Court rejucted this contention, holding that it had jurisdiction of the action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction. On motions for summary judgment, the court determined that the appellee had remained abroad to avoid service in the Armed Forces. Relying upon Trop v. Dulles,
the court held, however, that § 349(a)(10) was unconstitutional, and that consequently the appellee's citizenship had not been divested. The court accordingly entered a judgment declaring the appellee to be a citizen of the United States and enjoining the Secretary of State from denying him a passport on the ground that he is not a citizen. Cort v. Herter, D.C., 187 F.Supp. 683. This is a direct appeal from that judgment.
In support of its jurisdiction the District Court relied upon the Declaratory Judgments Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. 187 F.Supp. at 685. The Declaratory Judgments Act, 48 Stat. 955, as amended, 28 U.S.C. 2201, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, provides:
'(b) FORM AND VENUE OF ACTION.The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such review is provided by law.' 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. 1009, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009.
'No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.' 60 Stat. 244, 5 U.S.C. 1011, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1011.
On their face the provisions of these statutes appear clearly to permit an action such as was brought here to review the final administrative determination of the Secretary of State. This view is confirmed by our decisions establishing that an action for a declaratory judgment is available as a remedy to secure a determination of citizenshipdecisions rendered both before and after the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884, 83 L.Ed. 1320; McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 71 S.Ct. 224, 95 L.Ed. 173. Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff is not within the United States has never been thought to bar an action for a declaratory judgment of this nature. Stewart v. Dulles, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 280, 248 F.2d 602; Bauer v. Acheson, D.C., 106 F.Supp. 445; see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435.
It is the appellant's position, however, that despite these broad provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, Cort could not litigate his claim to citizenship in an action such as the one he brought in the District Court, but is confined instead to the procedures set out in subsections (b) and (c) of § 360 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Section 360 establishes procedures for determining claims to American citizenship by those within and without the country. Subsection (a) covers claimants 'within the United States' and authorizes an action for a declaratory judgment against the head of the agency denying the claimant a right or privilege of citizenshipexcept that such an action cannot be instituted if the issue of citizenship arises in connection with an exclusion proceeding.
Subsections (b) and (c) deal with citizenship claimants 'not within the United States.' The former provides with limitations, for the issuance abroad of certificates of identity 'for the purpose of traveling to a port of entry in the United States and applying for admission.' The latter subsection declares that a person issued such a certificate 'may apply for admission to the United States at any port of entry, and shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act relating to the conduct of proceedings involving aliens seeking admission to the United States.' Judicial review of those proceedings is to be by habeas corpus and not otherwise.
The predecessor of § 360 of the 1952 Act was § 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137. That section provided that a claimant whose citizenship was denied by administrative authorities could institute a declaratory judgment suit in the federal courts to determine his right to citizenship, whether he has in the United States or abroad. In addition, the section broadened the venue of such an action by permitting suit to be brought in the 'district in which such person claims a permanent residence.' Finally, the section provided a method by which a claimant could enter the United States and prosecute his claim personally.
The legislative history of § 503 indicates that Congress understood the provision for a declaratory judgment action to be merely a confirmation of existing law, or at most a clarification of it.
What was concededly novel about § 503 was the provision designed to permit a citizenship claimant outside the United States to be admitted to this country upon a certificate of identity in order personally to prosecute his claim to citizenship, subject to the condition of deportation in the event of an adverse decision. At the time of the enactment of this provision some misgivings were expressed that it might be utilized by aliens to gain physical entry into the United States and then to disappear into the general populace.
In the ensuing years the abuses which some had anticipated did, indeed, develop, and the legislative history of § 360 of the 1952 Act shows that the predominate concern of Congress was to limit the easy-entry provision of § 503 of the 1940 Act, under which these abuses had occurred. Thus the report of the Senate Committee which studied immigration and nationality problems for two and a half years found that § 503 'has been used, in a considerable number of cases, to gain entry into the United States where no such right existed.' S.Rep.No.1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 777; see also Joint Hearings before the Submittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 716, H.R. 2379 and H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 108110, 443445. In describing the purpose of the legislation which became § 360 of the 1952 Act the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating that '(t)he bill modifies section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940,' explained that it provides:
While I agree with the reasoning of the Court and join its opinion, I wish to note my view that its interpretation of § 360 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is further supported by serious doubt as to whether the statute as construed and applied by the dissenting opinion would be constitutional. Compare, e.g., United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201202, 77 S.Ct. 779, 783, 784, 1 L.Ed.2d 765.
Necessarily implicit in the administrative denial of a right or privilege of citizenship on the ground that the individual affected has committed an expatriating act enumerated in § 401 of the 1940 Act or § 349 of the 1952 Act, is the assumption that the individual was theretofore a citizen. Accordingly, it follows from the interpretation advanced by the dissent that a person abroad who just prior to the adverse administrative action admittedly had been deemed a citizen, entitled to all the incidents of citizenship including the freedom to re-enter the country, may by unreviewable administrative action be relegated to the status of an alien confronted by all the barriers to alien entry and the limited access to judicial review that an alien enjoys. That Congress may, consistently with the requirements of due process, circumscribe general grants of jurisdiction
so as to deny judicial review of administrative action which peremptorily initiates the treatment as an alien of one who had been a citizen seems at least doubtful enough that we should, if reasonably possible, avoid interpreting any statute to accomplish such a result.
If § 360(b), (c) provided the sole avenue to judicial review for one who while abroad is denied a right of citizenship, the following consequences would result: He would have to apply for a certificate of identity, which would be granted only if an administrative official was satisfied that the application was made in good faith and had a substantial basis. If the certificate were initially denied, an administrative appeal would have to be taken. If that failed, an attempt might be made to secure judicial review. A holding that no such review is available would mean that one who admittedly had been a citizen would have been conclusively converted into an alien without ever having gained access to any court. On the other hand, if review were forthcoming at this stage, and if issuance of a certificate were ordered, the individual would have gained only the right to travel to a United States port of entryif he could afford the passagethere to be 'subject to all the provisions of this chapter relating to the conduct of proceedings involving aliens seeking admission to the United States.' He would, in other words, have to submit to detention as an alien although it is assumed that he was once a citizen and no court had ever determined that he had been expatriated. Should he still encounter an administrative denial of the right to enter, he would finally get into court, but 'in habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise,' with whatever limitations upon the scope of review such language may imply.
The dissent finds shelter in United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 S.Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040, but that case does not resolve the constitutional doubts I have suggested. The precise issue there was the degree of finality to be accorded in habeas corpus proceedings to an administrative refusal of entry based on a finding that the petitioner was not, as he claimed, native-born and so had never been a citizen. Ju Toy was not an expatriation case in which administrative officials purported to withdraw rights of citizenship which admittedly once existed. Even if 'the mere fact that (persons seeking entry) claimed to be citizens would not have entitled them under the Constitution to a judicial hearing,'
it does not follow that rights attaching to admitted citizenship may be forfeited without a judicial hearing. To deny the rights of citizenship to one who previously enjoyed them 'obviously deprives him of liberty * * *. It may result also in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living. Against the danger of such deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due process of law. The difference in security of judicial over administrative action has been adverted to by this court.' Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284285, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed. 938.
This issue depends upon § 360 of the 1952 Act. That section is entitled: 'Proceedings For Declaration of United States Nationality in The Event of (the administrative) Denial of Rights And Privileges as National.' The provisions of the section set out in full in the margin,
(1) If the person whose rights as a national have been administratively denied 'is within the United States,' he may bring a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. 2201, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, to establish his citizenship,
unless that issue was, or is, already involved in an 'exclusion' proceeding. The action must be brought within five years after the final administrative denial, and in the district where such person resides or claims residence. (Subsection '(a).')
As will be shown later, these provisions of the 1952 Act, among other things, departed from the comparable procedural provisions of § 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 11711172, which had expressly made declaratory relief available to all citizenship claimants, whether 'within the United States or abroad,' following an administrative denial of that status.
The purpose and effect of the new provisions are shown by the following extract from the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the bill (S. 2550), § 360 of which, with only a minor addition and deletion,
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 S.Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040 (Holmes, J.). In 1922, however, the Court held that a resident claimant in a deportation proceeding was entitled to a judicial determination of his citizenship status, thus turning the availability of full judicial relief on the geographical location of the claimant. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938 (Brandeis, J.).
In 1934 the Declaratory Judgments Act was passed. 48 Stat. 955956; 28 U.S.C. 2201, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, as since amended. In a case decided in 1939, this Court held that remedy applicable to resident citizenship claimants, see Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884, 83 L.Ed. 1320. However, despite the Elg decision, and no doubt because of the Ju Toy and Ng Fung Ho cases, the continuing prevailing view prior to 1940 seems to have been that relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act was not available to nonresidents seeking a determination of their citizenship claims.
At the same time Congress recognized the possibility of abuse of this liberalized procedure on the part of nonresident claimants who might seek certificates of identity only to achieve entry into this country, without any thought of pressing their citizenship claims; and an attempt was made to guard against such abuse. Accordingly, the section was written to provide that certificates of identity should be furnished only upon 'a sworn application showing that the claim of nationality presented in such (declaratory judgment) action is made in good faith and has a substantial basis'; it also authorized the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Attorney General, to prescribe regulations for the issuance of such certificates.
Commencing soon after the close of World War II, and perhaps in part as a result of the then recent repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act and continuing Communist successes in China, a large number of suits were filed in the federal courts by Chinese citizenship claimants. These carried in their wake consequences which Congress could hardly have fully anticipated when it enacted § 503. Such consequences were principally of three kinds. First, there was an increase in the volume of fraudulent entries into this country; many Chinese who had obtained certificates of identity incident to the institution of a declaratory judgment citizenship action would abandon the suit upon arrival here and disappear into the stream of the population. Second, the courts experienced difficulty in adjudicating 'derivative' citizenship claims without the claimants having been first exposed to normal immigration screening; such claims were often based on the assertion that the claimant was the foreign-born child of an American citizen who had temporarily returned to China, an assertion frequently difficult to disprove. Third, the federal court dockets became cluttered with these suits. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, D.C., 116 F.Supp. 745, 751752, aff'd, 2 Cir., 220 F.2d 537; Mar Gong v. McGranery, D.C., 109 F.Supp. 821, rev'd sub nom. Mar Gong v. Brownell, 9 Cir., 209 F.2d 448. By the end of 1952, 1,288 such cases had been instituted. See Ly Shew v. Acheson, D.C., 110 F.Supp. 50, 5455, vacated and remanded sub nom. Ly Shew v. Dulles, 9 Cir., 219 F.2d 413; Annual Reports of the Attorney General for 1956 (pp. 111113) and 1957 (pp. 121123). This state of affairs contributed in no small degree to the revamping of § 503 by § 360 of the statute now before us, enacted after five years of investigation pursuant to a 1947 Senate Resolution authorizing a general study of the immigration laws. S.Res. No. 137, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
The first step in this direction occurred in 1950 when Senator McCarran introduced S. 3455, § 359 of which, entitled 'Judicial Proceedings for Declaration of United States Nationality in the Event of Denial of Rights and Privileges as a National,'
was the earliest version of what ultimately became § 360 of the 1952 Act. Section 359 provided declaratory relief only for 'any person in the United States.' The Senate Report
accompanying that bill, after observing that § 503 of the 1940 Act permitted persons 'within or without' the United States to file declaratory judgment suits, went on to say of proposed new § 359:
'In spite of the definite restrictions on the use and application of section 503 to bona fide cases (see supra, 369 U.S., pp. 389390, 82 S.Ct., pp. 799800), the subcommittee finds that the section had been subject to broad interpretation, and that it has been used, in a considerable number of cases, to gain entry into the United States where no such right existed. * * * The subcommittee therefore recommends that the provisions of section 503 as set out in the proposed bill be modified to limit the privilege to persons who are in the United States * * *.' (Emphasis added.)
Read in connection with this report it is surely beyond doubt that the § 503 'privilege' which was intended to be changed was not merely the right to a certificate of identity, which, under the existing statute, was an optional, not a necessary, appurtenance of a declaratory judgment suit, but the right of one abroad to maintain such a suit itself. Since a person 'in' the United States had no need for a certificate of identity, the 'privilege' limited by this bill to persons 'in' the United States can only mean the privilege of bringing a declaratory suit. In other words, the new proposal did not view the 'entry' problem as something that could be dealt with independently of the character of the judicial remedy to be afforded those administratively denied citizenship.
a revision of the earlier McCarran bill, and H.R. 2379,
introduced by Representative Walter, both provided for 'citizenship' declaratory relief only as to persons 'within the United States.' The third, H.R. 2816,
introduced by Representative Celler, afforded such relief to 'any person' (making no reference to location), and in other respects was also substantially like existing § 503.
attention became sharply focused on the question of what, if any, judicial relief (other than habeas corpus) should be available to nonresident citizenship claimants. The most revealing points of view are found in the statements submitted on behalf of the Departments of State and Justice.
and the Walter bill, H.R. 2379, was revised as H.R. 5678,
The revised McCarran bill adopted the Department of Justice proposals, in effect limiting the judicial remedy for testing nonresident citizenship claims to that afforded in connection with 'exclusion' cases, that is habeas corpus.
The new Walter bill was in effect a combination of existing § 503 and the suggestions of the State Department.
was reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee as S. 2550 and passed by the Senate. Supra, 369 U.S., pp. 386387, 82 S.Ct. p. 798.
the judicial remedy provisions of which became § 360 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Note 1, supra.
Certainly, the past cases in this Court lend no support to this decision. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884, 83 L.Ed. 1320, holding that a resident, threatened with deportation, could maintain a declaratory judgment action to establish citizenship, was of course quite in line with Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra. Moreover, the case was decided in 1939, before Congress, for the first time, addressed itself to the availability of declaratory relief in nationality cases. Supra, 369 U.S. p. 389, 82 S.Ct., p. 799. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 71 S.Ct. 224, 95 L.Ed. 173, is even more inapposite. The issue there was simply whether, in the circumstances involved, an alien then in this country was eligible for naturalization, so that the Attorney General had power to stay his deportation. The Court noted that § 503 of the 1940 Act was not available to the alien, since his citizenship status was not in issue. Incidentally, the Court did not reach the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, involved a nonresident alien's right to social security benefits, not citizenship.
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868, and Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 77 S.Ct. 252, 1 L.Ed.2d 225, the two cases relied on by the Court as supporting the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act in this instance, were, respectively, simply straightforward deportation and exclusion cases, neither involving a citizenship claim. Unlike the sections in the 1952 Act relating to nationality, those governing deportation and exclusion then had no specific provisions dealing with judicial relief,
and unlike this case, the relief in those cases was sought only after the administrative process had run its full course, and a 'final' determination had been made by the Attorney General.
When it comes to § 360 itself and the legislative history of the section, the Court's analysis is, if anything, even more cursory and unpersuasive. The Court initially finds that the declaratory judgment provision respecting nonresidents, contained in the predecessor of § 360s 503 of the 1940 Actwas understood 'to be merely a confirmation of existing law, or at most a clarification of it.' In this, the Court has overlooked the Ju Toy and Ng Fung Ho cases which of course indicate precisely the contrary. Supra, 369 U.S., p. 388, 82 S.Ct., p. 799, and note 6.
Finally, the Court considers that Congress' 'predominate concern' in enacting subsections (b) and (c) of § 360 was with fraudulent entry, not judicial remedies. It is said that this 'seems obvious' because the phrase 'such person,' contained in the extract quoted by the Court from the Judiciary Committee Report on S. 2550 (ante, 369 U.S., pp. 378379, 82 S.Ct., p. 794), refers grammatically only to those persons who had elected to pursue the certificate of identity procedure in prosecuting their citizenship claims. But this conclusion also will hardly stand up when the full text of the Judiciary Committee Report, especially the clause 'The bill modifies section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940 by limiting the court action exclusively to persons who are within the United States * * *,' is read (supra, 369 U.S., p. 387, 82 S.Ct., p. 798), and the relevant legislative history is considered.
But to sustain the Government's position on this issue it is not necessary to find that Congress, in enacting § 360, subdenly became severe, irrational, or capricious. As a result of the unfavorable experience with § 503 of the 1940 Act, Congress simply restored, with some alleviations, what until 1940 had been the procedure in such casesa procedure whose constitutionality had long since been upheld by this Court with the firm support of such men as Holmes and Brandeis, JJ. And in so doing Congress acted only after the fullest inquiry, debate, and deliberation.
I am unable to grasp how the Court could have reached the conclusion that the present declaratory action is not precluded by § 360, except by making its own wish father to the thought.
66 Stat. 163, 267268, 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(10), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a)(10).
We postponed consideration of the question of our jurisdiction of this appeal until the hearing of the case on the merits. 365 U.S. 808, 81 S.Ct. 691, 5 L.Ed.2d 690. Under 28 U.S.C. 1252, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252, a direct appeal may be taken from a District Court decision holding unconstitutional an Act of Congress in a civil action in which an officer of the United States is a party. Since the District Court held § 349(a)(10) unconstitutional, this appeal is properly before us under § 1252.
An alternative basis for our jurisdiction over this appeal might be found in 28 U.S.C. 1253, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253, providing for direct appeals from the decisions of three-judge courts convened under 28 U.S.C. 2282, 2284, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2282, 2284. But since jurisdiction is clearly authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1252, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252, we need not inquire further into the applicability of 28 U.S.C. 2282, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2282 to this case. In view of the unanimous decision below, the fact that three judges heard the case originally would not affect an otherwise final and reviewable decision of the District Court. See Thompson v. Whittier, 365 U.S. 465, 81 S.Ct. 712, 5 L.Ed.2d 704; compare International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304 U.S. 243, 251252, 58 S.Ct. 875, 880, 82 L.Ed. 1316.
Section 360(a), 66 Stat. 163, 273, 8 U.S.C. 1503(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1503(a):
Section 360(b) and (c), 66 Stat. 163, 273274, 8 U.S.C. 1503(b) and (c), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1503(b, c):
Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 11711172, provided:
'The CHAIRMAN. I should think, gentlemen, that we ought to go a little step further * * * to say that such person may, upon application, be permitted under certain conditions * * * to enter the United States for a short period of time as a temporary person only.' Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 6127, superseded by H.R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 291292.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 1009, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009; Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201.
Section 503, 54 Stat. 11711172, provides:
S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., § 359, pp. 239240 (1950).
S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 776777 (1950).
This was the view of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which in reporting on this bill stated that the new section was designed to 'replace section 503' authorizing a nonresident citizenship claimant 'to come to this country after filing such a suit in order to prosecute it to a conclusion.' See Legislative History, Immigration & Nationality Act, 82d Cong., Vol. 5 (Analysis of S. 3455), pp. 3591 to 3592. (Emphasis added.)
H.R. 2379, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., § 360, pp. 263264 (1951).
H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., § 360, pp. 260261 (1951).
A large number of 'lay' witnesses expressed their views before the Joint Committee. All were highly critical of the McCarran and Walter bills which afforded no declaratory remedy to nonresident citizenship claimants, but most had not heard of the so-called 'Chinese derivative suit' and other problems experienced under § 503. (Supra, 369 U.S., pp. 390391, 82 S.Ct., p. 799.) On the other hand, it is entirely evident from the questioning of all witnesses that the problem which was uppermost in the minds of the committee members on this aspect of the bills was how best to afford adequate judicial relief to nonresidents under tight controls which would minimize the dangers of abuse. Joint Hearings, pp. 106109, 338339, 443444, 522.
S. 2055, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., § 360, pp. 277279 (1951).
H.R. 5678, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., § 360, pp. 150152 (1951). The Celler bill, H.R. 2816, which, like § 503, proposed a judicial remedy for both resident and nonresident citizenship claimants, scarcely figured in the Joint Hearings discussion.
It should be noted that there was added to what in the final result became subsection (a) of § 360, relating to resident claimants, a specific reference to 28 U.S.C. 2201, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, the Declaratory Judgments Act, which had not been in § 503. No reference to 28 U.S.C. 2201, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 was included in what ultimately became subsection (b).
At p. 22 of his brief before this Court the appellee, Cort, quotes extensively from the House Report which accompanied H.R. 5678H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 8788 (1952) to support his contention that present § 360 was not designed to prohibit a suit for a declaratory judgment by a nonresident claimant, but only to limit the use of certificates of identity to gain entry in this country. However true this may be as to § 360 of H.R. 5678, Cort's reliance on that bill is misplaced since the House bill was rejected in conference and the Senate version of § 360 was eventually passed by both Houses and became law.
The conferees modified § 360 of S. 2550 in two minor respects. In subsection (a), a reference to 'deportation proceedings' was deleted, so that the disability to bring declaratory relief for a person 'within the United States' was limited only if the issue of nationality arose in an 'exclusion' proceeding. (Compare note 1 and text accompanying note 2, supra, with S.Rep. No. 1137, supra, 369 U.S., pp. 386387, 82 S.Ct. p. 798.) In subsection (b) 'a person under sixteen years of age who was born abroad of a Unied States citizen parent' was also made eligible for a certificate of identity. (Compare note 1 with S.Rep. No. 1137, supra, 369 U.S., pp. 386387, 82 S.Ct., p. 798.)
It is not without irony that less than a year ago Congress, with the support of the Department of Justice, acted to tighten still further the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Public Law 87301, 75 Stat. 650 (effective October 26, 1961), amending the 1952 Act in various respects, among other things makes habeas corpus the sole judicial remedy in exclusion proceedings, thereby in effect rejecting Brownell v. Tom We Shung, supra, which had held the Administrative Procedure Act also available in such cases. See 8 U.S.C. 1105a (Supp. III 1962), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a; H.R.Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 22 33 (1961), U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News 1961, p. 2950.