Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/756/754/162132/
Timestamp: 2020-02-27 21:36:35
Document Index: 580765309

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 706', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20']

Canyoneers, Inc., Etc., Dba Grand Canyon Trail Guides,plaintiff/appellant, v. Donald Hodel,* Secretary, Department of Theinterior, et al., Defendants/appellees, 756 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1985 › Canyoneers, Inc., Etc., Dba Grand Canyon Trail Guides,plaintiff/appellant, v. Donald Hodel,* Secreta...
Canyoneers, Inc., Etc., Dba Grand Canyon Trail Guides,plaintiff/appellant, v. Donald Hodel,* Secretary, Department of Theinterior, et al., Defendants/appellees, 756 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 756 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) Argued and Submitted Feb. 12, 1985. Decided March 29, 1985
Canyoneers, Inc., an Arizona corporation operating in the Grand Canyon National Park, appeals from an adverse ruling by the district court regarding the failure of the National Park Service ("NPS") to renew Canyoneers' concession permit. The district court, 596 F. Supp. 106, held that the statutory preference right afforded Canyoneers as a satisfactory concessioner does not vest Canyoneers with an entitlement to permit renewal on substantially the same terms. Instead, the district court held that the relevant portion of the Concessions Policy Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. § 20d, only entitles satisfactory concessioners the opportunity to meet the terms and conditions of any competing concessioner proposals.
The plaintiff corporation filed this suit in 1983 in district court against the defendant Secretary alleging that it had been wrongfully denied its statutory preference rights when the National Park Service failed to renew its concession permit in 1983 so as to allow the sale of hiking gear. Essentially, the plaintiff company contended that it was arbitrarily denied a permit continuing its prior authorization to sell backpacking and camping gear to tourists at Grand Canyon National Park in derogation of the preference rights articulated in a statute, 16 U.S.C. § 20d, and an implementing regulation, 36 C.F.R. Sec. 51.3(b). On cross-motions for summary judgment the district court entered summary judgment for the defendant Secretary. The district court held that the statutory right of preference for renewal of a concession permit is not an enforceable entitlement to the renewal or award of a concession permit. The plaintiff appeals.
Stated simply, the district court construed 16 U.S.C. § 20d as guaranteeing only a procedural preference to existing concessioners--that is, satisfactory concessioners must be given the right to match competing bids to the renewal or award of future permits. Conversely, the plaintiff, joined by amicus Mountain States Legal Foundation, contends that the statutory preference right entitles an existing concessioner to renewal of their permit on identical terms as long as the concessioner has satisfactorily met the conditions of the current permit and a need remains for these concession services. We agree with the district court's interpretation and, reviewing the administrative record, find that the Secretary's actions were not arbitrary or capricious.
The NPS thereafter issued a Statement of Requirements ("SOR") detailing the minimal services that the successful permit proposal would have to meet. Canyoneers submitted the only proposal. In their response to the SOR, Canyoneers "agreed" to the SOR but noted that they disagreed with several of the SOR terms. Canyoneers' written response indicated that " [f]urther discussion is essential," and complained that the SOR would deprive them of prior permit rights. The Canyoneers' disagreement with the SOR encompassed such basic issues as the amount of the franchise fee and the geographic limitations placed on the plaintiff's Canyon activities.
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1983). The decision of the NPS Director is subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A), requiring this court to determine whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Walker v. Navajo-Hopi Indian Relocation Comm'n, 728 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 298, 83 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1984). The defendant has defended his action on the basis of his interpretation of his authority to grant or renew concession permits. Thus, this court must initially determine whether his decision was based on a reasoned, permissible construction of the relevant statute and regulation. Chevron USA, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984); Villa View Community Hospital, Inc. v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983).PREFERENCE RIGHTS UNDER THE ACT
Under the Concessions Policy Act of 1965, the Secretary of Interior is authorized to issue permits to national park concessioners. 16 U.S.C. § 20 et seq. The Secretary has promulgated regulations regarding the issuance of such permits pursuant to this Act. See 36 C.F.R. Secs. 51-51.7. To encourage private business to undertake and continue the provision of concessions, Congress specified that permit preference be given satisfactory concessioners. This "preference right" is found in 16 U.S.C. § 20d, which reads:
Construed in this manner, the statutory preference right would afford satisfactory concessioners the opportunity to match competing proposals. At the same time, this interpretation would permit the Secretary to take into account the changing needs of our nation's parkland without becoming restricted to the choice of proceeding under the same set of services provided by the same concessioner or not offering these services at all. Moreover, the statutory admonition that the Secretary "shall consider and evaluate all proposals received," 16 U.S.C. § 20d, would be rendered meaningless if existing concessioners were entitled to automatic renewal of their permits based solely on their status as satisfactory concessioners. As the legislative history reveals, see S.Rep. No. 765, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1965, p. 3489. Congress did not view the right of preference as an "absolute" entitlement to renewal. Instead, Congress intended that the Secretary take "all relevant factors" into account in negotiating for concession permits. Id.
A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the determination of the Secretary regarding plaintiff's sale permit was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The defendant Secretary recognized the plaintiff's preference rights in the issuance of the SOR. Plaintiff's response was deemed inconsistent with the terms of the SOR and therefore unacceptable to the Secretary. Pursuant to 36 C.F.R. Sec. 51.4(c), the Secretary then cancelled the SOR. As the plaintiff's preference rights under 16 U.S.C. § 20d did not entitle plaintiff to renewal on substantially the same terms, the defendant did not violate any statutory right of plaintiff by failing to extend Canyoneers' prior permit or by rejecting Canyoneers' submission as unresponsive to the SOR.
Plainly, the defendant was acting within the scope of his statutory authority. The Task Force Report chronicles the detailed manner in which the defendant addressed "the relevant factors," Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S. Ct. 814, 823, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971). Nor can it be said that the administrative record reveals that "there has been a clear error of judgment." Id. Finally, the defendants' recognition of the plaintiff's preference right met the procedural requirements imposed on the Secretary by virtue of 16 U.S.C. § 20d.
Donald Hodel has been substituted for William P. Clark pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c) (1)