Source: http://openjurist.org/538/f2d/1166
Timestamp: 2014-09-02 02:45:24
Document Index: 286966627

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2281', '§ 1253', '§ 1291', '§ 50', '§ 1253', '§ 1253', '§ 1253', '§ 1253', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 6', '§ 8', '§ 37', '§ 37', 'Art. 8', '§ 213', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 37']

538 F2d 1166 Jagnandan v. L Giles | OpenJurist
538 F. 2d 1166 - Jagnandan v. L Giles	Home538 f2d 1166 jagnandan v. l giles
538 F2d 1166 Jagnandan v. L Giles 538 F.2d 1166
Edward R. JAGNANDAN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.William L. GILES, President, Mississippi State University,et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 74-3467.
Mark Shenfield, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Ed Davis Noble, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff Reverend W. L. Jagnandan, on behalf of himself and his two sons, brought a class action to challenge the constitutionality of a Mississippi statute which classified all alien students, even Mississippi residents, as nonresidents for tuition and fee purposes at state institutions of higher learning. A three-judge district court denied the class action request, declared the statute unconstitutional as being in contravention of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and granted injunctive relief. The court refused, however, to award plaintiffs reimbursement for the $3,495.00 in tuition and fees they had paid in excess of the amounts required of resident students, holding that such relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Jagnandan v. Giles, 379 F.Supp. 1178 (N.D.Miss.1974). Plaintiffs appeal the denial of reimbursement for the excess tuition and fees paid pursuant to the unconstitutional statute. Plaintiffs do not appeal the denial of their class action request, nor do the defendants appeal from the grant of declaratory and injunctive relief as to the statute's unconstitutionality.
This appeal presents important questions involving (1) the scope of our jurisdiction to review decisions of three-judge district courts, and (2) the scope of the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition against reimbursement of overpayments collected under an unconstitutional statute. As to the first question, we conclude that we do have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. On the merits, we hold that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court to recover excess tuition paid pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, and affirm the three-judge district court.
The Jagnandans were citizens of the Republic of Guyana (formerly British Guiana in South America) lawfully admitted into this country as aliens with permanent resident classifications.1 Since September 1969 they have lived in West Point, Mississippi, where Reverend Jagnandan is a minister of a local church. Reverend Jagnandan pays Mississippi income taxes and owns an automobile registered in Mississippi. All three plaintiffs hold Mississippi driver's licenses. Each testified without reservation or qualification that he had no present intention of leaving the state, his purpose being to reside indefinitely in Mississippi.
The two sons, Edward R. Jagnandan and Leonard Susil Jagnandan, enrolled as full time students at Mississippi State University in the fall of 1970. Reverend Jagnandan himself enrolled at the University in the spring of 1972 as a candidate for a master's degree. The three were required to pay nonresident tuition and fees pursuant to a Mississippi statute classifying all aliens as nonresidents for tuition and fee purposes at state institutions of higher learning.2
In September 1970, contemporaneous with his sons' matriculations at Mississippi State, Reverend Jagnandan sought to establish with University officials his family's eligibility as state residents for tuition and fee purposes. Plaintiffs fully exhausted their opportunity for administrative relief and, upon being notified that they were ineligible for resident tuition rates, instituted this federal action.
Congress has provided that suits seeking injunctive relief against the enforcement of state statutes by state officers must be heard and determined in the first instance by a specifically constituted district court of three judges, at least one of whom must be a circuit judge. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281. Appeals lie directly to the Supreme Court from orders of three-judge courts "granting or denying, . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction . . . ." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253.3 Courts of appeals have jurisdiction over all appeals excepting those where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291 and 1292(a)(1).
Although this statutory scheme is simple enough to describe, it has proved to be far from simple in its operation and has "given rise to bewildering problems in the area of appellate review." 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice P 110.03(3), at 70 (2d ed. 1975). Professor Wright has observed that the appellate rules relating to three-judge courts "are so complex as to be virtually beyond belief." C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 50, at 193 (2d ed. 1970). The Supreme Court itself has recognized that "(t) hese procedural statutes are very awkwardly drafted, and in struggling to make workable sense of them, the Court has not infrequently been induced to retrace its steps." Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 95, 95 S.Ct. 289, 293, 42 L.Ed.2d 249 (1974) (footnotes omitted). This Court also has commented on the problems which arise when working in this area, noting that "the jurisdiction of three-judge courts and appellate jurisdiction arising from their decisions is a treacherous and fluid area of our jurisprudence." Wernick v. Mathews, 524 F.2d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1975).
Last term the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the law in this confused area. In two cases, Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, supra, 419 U.S. 90, 95 S.Ct. 289, 42 L.Ed.2d 249 (1974), and MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 95 S.Ct. 1278, 43 L.Ed.2d 636 (1975), the Court restricted the scope of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253 to situations involving denial of injunctions.
In Gonzalez, the Court unanimously held that jurisdiction over an appeal from an order of a three-judge court dismissing a complaint for lack of standing was vested in the courts of appeals. Although the Court explored the question of whether an order of a three-judge court "denies" an injunction, for purposes of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253, where there is no adverse resolution of the constitutional claims presented, it reserved determination of that issue and rested its decision on a different ground. The decision was based, at least partially, on the reasoning that a three-judge court is not required and should not be convened when the district court lacked jurisdiction of the complaint or when the claim is not justifiably in the federal court. 419 U.S. at 100, 95 S.Ct. 289 citing Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31, 54 S.Ct. 3, 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933). The Court noted that if a single judge had in fact issued the order of dismissal for lack of standing, no direct appeal to the Supreme Court would have been allowed.4 Thus, it was "mere convenience or happenstance" that a three-judge court had ruled on the standing issue, and to avoid a fortuitous direct appeal, the Court held
that when a three-judge court denies a plaintiff injunctive relief on grounds which, if sound, would have justified dissolution of the court as to that plaintiff, or a refusal to request the convention of a three-judge court ab initio, review of the denial is available only in the court of appeals.
Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, supra, 419 U.S. at 101, 95 S.Ct. at 296.
Three months later, in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, supra, 420 U.S. 799, 95 S.Ct. 1278, 43 L.Ed.2d 636 (1975), the Court again considered the reach of its jurisdiction under § 1253. Directly addressing the question it reserved in Gonzalez, the Court, with Justice White concurring only in the result and Justice Douglas dissenting, held that direct appeal lies from a three-judge court order denying injunctive relief only when the order is based on the merits of the constitutional attack against the statute. Therefore, since in MTM, Inc. the three-judge court had dismissed the suit under the comity doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and did not reach the merits of the case, the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the direct appeal.
Although in each case the Supreme Court's decision was meant to limit its review under § 1253, the practical effect of the two cases may differ in particular situations.
Under Gonzalez, the question of Supreme Court appealability turns on the power possessed by a single district judge. If a three-judge court denies an injunction on a ground within the decisional province of a single judge, review of the three-judge denial must be in the court of appeals. By contrast, MTM focuses on whether the three-judge court's denial of an injunction was grounded in a decision on the constitutional merits.
The Supreme Court: 1974 Term, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 187 (1975). These differing approaches raise the question of whether MTM, Inc. supplements Gonzalez, or subsumes it.
These two decisions undoubtedly will serve in most cases to make more certain the proper forum in which an appeal of an order of a three-judge court should be taken. In this particular case, however, we are unsure as to whether jurisdiction of the appeal lies in this Court or in the Supreme Court. Under the Gonzalez standard it would appear that we properly have jurisdiction of the case, since the appealed order denying reimbursement does not involve a question of injunctive relief and thus is not one which had to be made by a three-judge court. It can be argued, however, that the question of reimbursement was so integrally related to the question of constitutionality which confronted the three-judge court, that its appealability must be considered as from an issue "within the decisional province" of a three-judge court.
Applying the MTM, Inc. test presents similar difficulties. It is clear that the order denying reimbursement was not based on a resolution of the merits of the constitutional claim for which injunctive relief was sought. Again, however, a plausible argument can be made that in this case the reimbursement issue is so closely related to the question of the constitutionality of the statute that the appeal of the order denying reimbursement should be heard by the same forum that would hear an appeal involving the constitutionality of the statute.
Moreover, had the state officials appealed the three-judge court's grant of injunctive relief, we would confront even greater conceptual problems. Such a situation would present the hypothetical suggested by Justice Douglas in his dissent in MTM, Inc., whereby under a strict reading of the new standards, a case could be fragmented or split into pieces for purposes of appeal. 420 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 1278. The order granting the injunction would be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, while the same order denying reimbursement for excess past tuition and fees paid pursuant to the unconstitutional statute would be appealed to this Court.
The absence of an appeal from the injunctive relief eliminates that hypothetical from surfacing here. Our reading of both Gonzalez and MTM, Inc. leads us to believe that in this case the proper forum for appeal is in this Court, regardless of where appellate jurisdiction may lie in a case where the grant or denial of injunctive relief has also been appealed. By holding that we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we are supporting "the historic congressional policy of minimizing the mandatory docket of . . . (the Supreme Court) in the interest of sound judicial administration." MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, supra, 420 U.S. at 804, 95 S.Ct. at 1281.5 Furthermore, by hearing this appeal we are giving the Supreme Court our opinion on the proper determination of the merits of the case, views which would not be available to that Court if only a direct appeal were available. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, supra, 419 U.S. at 99, 95 S.Ct. 289.
In short, based upon the recent Supreme Court decisions in Gonzalez and MTM, Inc., and in the interest of sound judicial administration, we hold that jurisdiction over this appeal properly lies in this Court.6
The Mississippi statute requiring resident aliens residing in Mississippi to pay out-of-state tuition was ruled unconstitutional by the three-judge district court. Jagnandan v. Giles, 379 F.Supp. 1178 (N.D.Miss.1974). No appeal was taken from that holding. The court held, however, that the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs' recovery of excess tuition payments made under the unconstitutional statute. In denying reimbursement the court relied on Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), and on Edelman 's precursor, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945).7 This denial of relief is challenged on appeal.
In presenting their case for reversal plaintiffs assert five arguments: (1) defendants are personally liable for the excess tuition payments; (2) the State of Mississippi is not a party to this suit for Eleventh Amendment purposes; (3) Mississippi waived its immunity; (4) Edelman v. Jordan does not preclude the type of relief here sought; and (5) the Eleventh Amendment cannot be used to protect Fourteenth Amendment violations. Answering these points seriatim in the negative, we affirm the district court's denial of tuition refunds.
During the ratification process of the United States Constitution, and subsequent thereto, the sovereign states of this fledgling nation were concerned with the prospect that federal constitutional authority might be construed to allow suits against the states in federal courts when brought by a citizen of another state or foreign country.8 These fears were soon realized in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793). Chisholm held that under the language of the Constitution and of the Judiciary Act of 1789 a state could be sued by a citizen of another state or foreign country. Reaction was swift and immediate. Barely five years later, in 1798, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified by the states.9 Unaltered since its ratification, the amendment provides simply:
The amendment has been judicially construed to bar federal jurisdiction over suits brought against a state by its own citizens, despite the absence of language to that effect.10 It also has been construed to encompass a suit brought by a foreign state.11 This bar, however, does not preclude a suit against the state when brought by the United States.12 Thus, when speaking of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court really talks in terms of the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain suits and to grant relief against a state.13
At the outset we hold that the defendant University officials are not personally liable for the excess tuition payments tendered by plaintiffs. Thus, if plaintiffs are to recover, payment must come from defendants in their official capacity.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendants acted unreasonably or in a manner outside of their official capacity.14 Defendants were merely complying with the clear state mandate in collecting out-of-state tuition from these resident aliens. Defendants were not on notice of the statute's unconstitutionality prior to payment and acceptance of the money. They were acting in complete good faith.15
Suit Against the State?
Plaintiffs next urge that for Eleventh Amendment purposes the defendants are not state entities and therefore the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable. The initial defendants were the President of Mississippi State University and the Assistant to the Vice President for Business Affairs at the University. The district court, on its own motion, joined the Board of Trustees as a party defendant. 379 F.Supp. at 1180. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). We cannot agree with plaintiffs' contention, because on our reading of the case law we are convinced that, effectively, the state is the true defendant to this suit.
By its own language the Eleventh Amendment indicates that a state must be sued before the bar to suit in federal court applies. The state must be a real or, at least, a nominal defendant.16 It is not necessary for the state to be actually named in the suit. It is enough that, in effect, the suit is against the state and any recovery will come from the state.17
To make this determination, the Court must decide whether the suit is for all practical purposes against the state.18 In Hander v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 522 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1975), this Court affirmed the district court's award of back pay for a wrongfully discharged teacher. The Court recognized that a back pay award was the type of retroactive relief prohibited by Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974).19 Nonetheless, an Eleventh Amendment challenge was bypassed in the suit against the governing junior college districts on the ground that under the peculiar Texas statutory and decisional law, the suit was not against the state.20 The junior college districts in San Jacinto were "primarily local institutions, created by local authority and supported largely by local revenues." 519 F.2d at 278. Thus, under the established law that local governmental institutions may not stand in the same light as the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, there was no bar to the suit.21 What preserved jurisdiction in San Jacinto will not, however, assist the plaintiffs here. Under the instant facts, it is clear from statutory and decisional law that the State of Mississippi is the real party defendant.22 The district court implicitly recognized this when it stated,
Nor is there any question but that the refunds, if ordered, would not be paid by the defendants from personal funds, but would necessarily be a charge upon the state treasury, or at least that portion of the fisc dedicated to higher education.
379 F.Supp. at 1188.
The genesis of Mississippi State University (M.S.U.) is found in Chapter XIX of the Laws of the State of Mississippi, approved February 28, 1878. The school was first known as the Agricultural and Mechanical College of the State of Mississippi. Laws of Mississippi, ch. XIX, § 2.23 Overseeing the school was a Board of Trustees appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the state senate. Id. § 3. The Board was declared to be a body politic and corporate, capable of suing and being sued. Id. § 5. The Governor was the ex officio president. Id. § 6. The State Treasurer was the ex officio treasurer, empowered to keep and disburse all moneys of the school according to the orders of the Board. Id. § 8. Later, Mississippi's universities were placed under the control of the Board of Trustees of state institutions of higher learning.24 The Agricultural and Mechanical College of Mississippi logo was changed to Mississippi State University by statute, although the school retained "all its property and the franchises, rights, powers, and privileges heretofore conferred on it by law (1878 Act) . . . ." Miss.Code Ann. § 37-113-3 (1972).
Under state law Mississippi is inextricably involved in all facets of the Board's operation of the University, as well as the operation of other schools comprising the state's higher institutions of education. See Miss.Code Ann. § 37-101-1 (1972). The Board's structure is detailed in the Mississippi Constitution. In part, the provision provides:
Such Board shall have the power and authority to elect the heads of the various institutions of higher learning, and contract with all deans, professors and other members of the teaching staff, and all administrative employees of said institutions for a term not exceeding four years; but said Board shall have the power and authority to terminate any such contract at any time for malfeasance, inefficiency or contumacious conduct, but never for political reasons.
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit or take away the power of the Legislature had and possessed, if any, at the time of the adoption of this amendment, to consolidate or abolish any of the above named institutions.
Miss.Const. Art. 8, § 213-A. The general powers and duties of the Board are prescribed in § 37-101-15 of the Mississippi statutes. The Board exercises control, distribution and disbursement "of all funds, appropriations and taxes, . . . levied and collected, received, or appropriated . . . ." Miss.Code Ann. § 37-101-15(a) (1972). It also has the power to authorize employees to sign vouchers for the disbursement of funds. According to documentations provided in a post argument memorandum submitted by defendants' counsel, M.S.U. is classified as a Group I university. This means that the University is allowed to request up to 72% of its total budget from state appropriations. Requests for such funds are made through the Board as the clearing house for legislative appropriations. The Board disburses the funds to the state university system by an allocation-of-funds formula. Thus, it appears that all appropriations must first be funnelled through the Board. The Board's supervision over the University's budget is complemented by the state's control over the Board's supervision.
Section 37-101-15(d) provides that the Board shall maintain a uniform system of recording and accounting. This system must be approved by the state Department of Audit. It prepares an annual report submitted to the legislature that details "the disbursements of all moneys appropriated to the respective institutions." Id. § 37-101-15(e). The report must also show a summary of gross receipts and disbursements. This necessarily covers not only the funds appropriated by the legislature, but would also include self-generating funds. These funds include all student fees collected, grants, sponsored research, income from endowment interest that may accrue to an institution, and the like. Important to note is a provision that illustrates both the Board's control over M.S.U.'s fiscal policy and the ultimate supervision of the Board by the state legislature.
The board shall keep the annual expenditures of each institution herein mentioned within the income derived from legislative appropriations and other sources, but in case of emergency arising from acts of providence, epidemics, fire or storm with the written approval of the governor and by written consent of a majority of the senators and of the representatives it may exceed the income.
Id. § 37-101-15(e) (emphasis added).
Related to this is another statutory provision detailing the procedure by which the Board submits the budget of each institution to the state's Commission of Budget and Accounting. Section 27-103-29(g) directs the Board to submit the annual budget prior to the beginning of each fiscal year. The Commission approves the budget if sufficient funds will be available to meet the requests. If not, requests must be justified to the Commission or some sort of compromise worked out. Only then is the budget approved. "The total amount approved for each institution shall constitute the maximum funds which may be expended during the fiscal year." Miss.Code Ann. § 27-103-29(g).
This statutory scheme clearly demonstrates the State of Mississippi's control over the fiscal policies established by the Board, and a fortiori over the finances of M.S.U. There has not been cited and we have not discovered any state statute providing refund procedures for overpayment of out-of-state tuition fees. Cf. Miss.Code Ann. § 27-73-1 et seq. (tax refund statutes).
Thus, there are no facts in this case that would allow application of the San Jacinto rationale. Mississippi statutes do provide that counties meeting certain qualifications are authorized to contribute funds toward the construction and equipping of M.S.U. educational facilities within that county. Miss.Code Ann. § 37-113-43 (1972). These funds, however, do not give the county any rights to the facilities, id. § 37-113-49, and the funds are deposited into a special fund in the state treasury. Id. § 37-113-47.
State decisional law confirms that the Board and the University are part and parcel of the state. Coleman v. Whipple, 191 Miss. 287, 2 So.2d 566 (1941), involved a suit to construe a will and cancel certain bequests to three Mississippi universities. In determining whether the state fell within the statute prohibiting charitable bequests, the court had to inquire whethe