Source: http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/03
Timestamp: 2014-03-09 10:46:22
Document Index: 466507993

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 112', '§1404', '§1391', '§1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1292', '§ 101', '§ 271', '§ 271']

March | 2008 | Patently-O
CAFC Overturns Jury Verdict of Non-Obviousness Because Combination Yields Predictable Results
March 31, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Agrizap v. Woodstream Corp (Fed. Cir. 2008)
Agrizap holds a patent covering a method of electrocuting rats and gophers. The product is sold under the trade name “Rat Zapper.” Woodstream (maker of the Victor rat trap) first licensed the product then began manufacturing its own version. The jury found the patent nonobvious and held Woodstream liable for both infringement (and for fraud based on its actions during the license.) In a post-verdict decision, the district court granted JMOL of non-infringement.
On appeal, the CAFC (Judge Moore) zeroed-in on the question of obviousness: “[A]s the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a question of law, it remains our duty as the appellate court to ensure that the law has been correctly applied to the facts. . . . In other words, we review de novo the conclusion on obviousness . . . [keeping in mind] that ‘[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.’” (Quoting KSR v. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007)).
Here, the CAFC found, as a matter of law, that Agrizap’s own commercial product (the “Gopher Zapper”) rendered the claimed invention obvious. The only difference between the two was the type of trigger mechanism, and the Rat Zapper’s claimed electrical switch was already well known in the cattle-prod art.
Secondary Considerations: When faced with a mere combination of familiar elements, even strong secondary evidence of nonobvious will not save the application. Here, Judge Moore took as true “the commercial success of the Rat Zapper, copying by Woodstream, and a long felt need in the market for electronic rat traps.” However, that evidence is “insufficient to overcome the overwhelming strength of Woodstream’s prima facie case of obviousness.”
Notes: Judges Bryson, Moore, and Wolle (S.D.Iowa). This case should be contrasted with Ortho-Mcneil v. Mylan , also decided this week. (Judges Michel, Rader, and Linn). Perhaps a strategic misstep by Agrizap?: During prosecution, the PTO made the identical argument as that made by Judge Moore. The only difference was that the PTO examiner rejected the Rat Zapper patent application based on the “Gopher Zapper” patent instead of the commercial product. Instead of arguing around the asserted reference, Agrizap amended inventorship and filed a terminal disclaimer. This left the Examiner’s rejection glaringly un rebutted when it turned out that the commercial embodiment (102(b) prior art) could not be swept away so easily. [See Patently-O discussion of whether to file a 131 declaration or argue over a reference.]
March 31, 2008Indefinite, Means Plus Function, PatentDennis Crouch	Aristocrat Technologies Australia (ATA) v. International Gaming Technology (IGT) (2007-1419) (Fed. Cir. 2008)
ATA and IGT have two parallel cases pending before the CAFC. This appeal focuses on whether ATA’s asserted claims are invalid as indefinite. (U.S. Pat. No. 6,093,102). The other pending case questions whether the PTO properly revived ATA’s unintentionally abandoned national stage application. (U.S. Pat. Nos. 7,056,215 and 7,108,603) [See Patently-O discussion of revival case]. This case focuses on a patent covering an electronic slot machine patent that allows players to pre-select which combination of symbol locations will be used to determine a winner. Claims Indefinite: The district court held the claims invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. Its opinion focused on the claimed means-plus-function element “game control means” — finding the term indefinite because the specification did not provide “structure” to perform the claimed functions. The specification did include the statement that the control means could be a microprocessor-based gaming machine with “appropriate programming.” However, the lower court focused on the absence of any “specific algorithm” or “step-by-step process for performing the claimed functions.”
On appeal, the CAFC affirmed, holding that computer implemented means-plus-function claims must include “more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor.” The purpose of the requirement, according to Judge Bryson’s opinion, is to avoid overbroad “pure functional” claims. Because of the ubiquity of general purpose computers, a bare microprocessor cannot be considered a sufficiently specific structural disclosure: For a patentee to claim a means for performing a particular function and then to disclose only a general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform that function amounts to pure functional claiming. Within PHOSITA’s Ability: The algorithm missing from ATA’s disclosure is almost certainly within the ability of an ordinary game programmer. In fact, I believe that it would only take me (a law professor) only a few hours to create a rough algorithm showing how the ATA software program could operate. Judge Bryson shot-down that argument: Structure for a means-plus-function element must be provided in the specification regardless of whether the structure is already well known in the art.
Notes: Biomedino v. Waters Technology (Fed. Cir. 2007)
March 30, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Last week, I wrote about whether an infringement lawsuit can properly be filed at 12:01 am on the date that the patent is scheduled to issue. A plaintiff only has standing to sue once a patent is issued, and it is not clear to me that patent has actually issued by that point (even if the patentee holds exclusive rights for the entire day once the patent has issued).*
Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 26
March 28, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	BusinessWeek: Michael Orey has written another interesting Troll Tracker article: Busting a Rogue Blogger.
A recent comment raised an interesting question: Why do the pharmaceutical companies rarely (if ever) file their patent infringement suits in the Eastern District of Texas? In a tight economy, is there a tendency file more patents (to secure some assets as insurance against business failure) or fewer patents (to tighten the outflow of cash)? Ex Parte Bilski: Once Again Rethinking the Scope of Patentable Subject Matter
March 28, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	We can expect over one dozen friendly briefs in the pending en banc case captioned Ex Parte Bilski by the amicus deadline of April 7. The Bilski case involves questions of whether an invention can fit within the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 101 if the invention does not specifically require the use of “technology.” 35 U.S.C. 101: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
I was part of the team that drafted and submitted IPO’s 2006 brief to the Supreme Court in the Metabolite case. There, we argued on policy grounds that the court should not set arbitrary limits on the types of innovations that should be patentable. Instead, we asked the court to “support the expectation that innovations in yet unknown areas of technology will be eligible for patent protection.” There will be at least one Bilski brief arguing along the same lines. It will, of course, be interesting to see whether the IPO and AIPLA have altered their positions in the past two years. If the court chooses to narrow subject matter, the 2007 Comiskey decision will quickly become an elephant in the room. In that opinion, the Federal Circuit implicitly held that a patent applicant cannot rely on nonpatentable subject matter portions of an invention to prove nonobviousness. Comiskey’s arguably unique inventive contribution was a method of arbitration. By itself, that method was considered an unpatentable mental process. And, Comiskey’s attempt to tie the process to a microprocessor were also unsuccessful: “The routine addition of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness. Moreover, there is no pertinent evidence of secondary considerations because the only evidence offered is of long-felt need for the unpatentable mental process itself, not long-felt need for the combination of the mental process and a modern communication device or computer.” The implicit holdings here: (1) during nonobviousness analysis, any portion of an invention that constitutes nonstatutory subject matter will be considered de facto obvious; and (2) evidence of secondary considerations do not apply to portions of an invention that are not considered “patentable subject matter.”
Depending upon how it is interpreted, the Comiskey decision may greatly influence the impact of a rule narrowing patentable subject matter. For that reason, I hope that at least one brief will focus its effort on this important issue. Patently-O Bits and Bytes No. 25
March 27, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Japanese Patents: Fordham’s new IPLJ blog wrestles with my question: “Why are relatively few non-Japanese applications filed in Japan?” [IPLJ][Patently-O]
E.D. Texas Venue Case Goes En Banc; AIPLA Amicus Brief
March 27, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	The AIPLA believes that the Eastern District of Texas is hearing too many patent cases. Legally, the organization has decided that E.D. Texas judges are “misapplying federal transfer rules by giving too much weight to plaintiffs’ choice of venue.”
In re Volkswagen is up for an en banc hearing in the 5th circuit court of appeals. The VW case is a product liability case stemming from a VW Golf crash that killed a 7–year old girl. The accident occurred in Dallas (location of the N.D. Tex.), but the case was filed 150 miles away in Marshall. VW argues that the District Court (Judge Ward) abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s §1404 venue transfer motion — arguing that it would be “unduly burdensome” for the multinational to litigate in the Eastern District of Texas rather than the Northern District of Texas. 28 U.S.C. §1391, the venue statute, broadly allows cases to proceed in any venue where a defendant corporation “is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” Even when venue is proper, a court may still transfer the case to a more convenient location. 28 U.S.C. §1404 provides that a district court may transfer a civil action when it is both more convenient for the parties and witnesses and is “in the interest of justice.” In an amicus brief filed in the case, the AIPLA argues that there are many cases sitting in the Eastern District of Texas that should more properly be heard elsewhere, and that the district court has been too slow to transfer venue.
“The routine filing of patent infringement complaints in the Eastern District of Texas that have essentially no connection to that district has been encouraged by the seeming reluctance of courts in that district to transfer cases under § 1404(a).” As a backstop to its arguments, the AIPLA also raised the threat of legislation: “It is also worth noting that legislation on patent reform currently before Congress seeks to narrow drastically venue in patent cases, driven to a great extent by a desire to address the kind of forum shopping that occurs in the Eastern District of Texas.4 Providing the district courts clear guidance on applying the transfer provision will go a long way toward solving the forum shopping problem that is the impetus behind the pending venue legislation.”
The AIPLA Argument: The location of filing should only be a presumptive starting point in the venue analysis. If a defendant shows “good cause” reason to transfer, then the presumption should evaporate. “Proximity of evidence” should be a major factor. This decision is made at a very early stage in the litigation, thus the court should not require a high level of precise evidence to prove convenience. The “public interest” is usually a sham argument. (That the people of E.D. Tex. have an interest in having their courts adjudicate patent cases if the goods are sold there). Read the AIPLA Brief
March 26, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Rambus Wins Hynix Patent Case, Shares Rise 39 Percent Intramurals: The European Patent Divide
March 26, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	European IP Attorney Severin de Wit writes one of the best patent focused blogs on the European continent: IPEG. With his permission, I am reposting his article on European Patent No. 0455 750 B1 owned by the US company Document Security Systems, Inc. (DSS). You are a European institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), and you seek the invalidation of what has been granted as a valid right by another European institution, the European Patent Office (EPO). The last weeks we got a taste of how The Great Patent Divide, the most un-European experience in patent law, has turned into Europe’s Patent Demise.
March 26, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Sr. Patent Agent – Large Corporation – Madison, N.J.
Intellectual Property Attorney – Law Firm – Fort Collins, Colo. Disavowal of Claim Scope: CDS v. Dell
March 25, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Computer Docking Station v. Dell (Fed. Cir. 2008)
Limiting Preamble: CDS’s patent was filed in 1991 and includes the claim preamble: “portable computer.” In interpreting that preamble term, the CAFC found that it must be limiting because statements in the specification and prosecution history emphasize portability, but the portability limitation is not found in the claims. “The written description and applicants’ statements during prosecution emphasize this feature of the invention, yet this limitation does not appear in the body of the claims. As a result, this court finds that the terms “portable computer” and “portable computer microprocessing system” limit the scope of the asserted claims.”
Disavowal of Claim Scope: The CAFC also found that CDS had, through its statements in the specification and during prosecution, disavowed coverage of a laptop computer device that included an attached keyboard and screen. In claim scope disavowal, the court always looks for a linguistic hook in the claims. Here, it relied again on the “portable computer” preamble term — finding that the patentee had disavowed coverage of portable computers that included those features. Attachable features: In several figures, the patentee showed how a keyboard and screen could be coupled with its device. However, the CAFC noted that those attachments were only temporary and did not become part of the portable computer. “Thus, a cable connects the physically separate keyboard to the main housing. The keyboard is neither built-in nor attached.”
LinkedIn describes PTO Employees
March 25, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	The social networking site LinkedIn has created a profile of USPTO employees (Based on LinkedIn members). In their data, the most common career path is from ASRC (a major Gov’t Contractor) to the USPTO; then to Bingham McCutchen. Folks leave Bingham for Perkins Coie and Goodwin Procter. From there, they branch out to Ropes & Gray, Foley Hoag, Microsoft, Amazon, Expedia, Wilson Sonsini, and Google. With all this job-hopping, LinkedIn helps me keep track of patent law folks I have met along the way (even after we change jobs and move across the world). Apparently, a LinkedIn membership is required before viewing the full employee profiles.
Patently-O Facebook Group.
March 24, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Most major companies are still trying to get their heads wrapped around the flat world concepts that Thomas Friedman presented in his 2005 bestseller. The reputational power of the internet is now driving many corporate balance sheets. The business issue: ensuring that the reputation is going right way. Certainly, this management may be a bit like herding cats: In less than five minutes, anyone with an internet connection and skills with a mouse can become an anonymous online publisher to the world without spending a dime. The impact of cheap worldwide distribution is multiplied by a seeming societal shift away from a desire for privacy, away from strong employee loyalty, and away from a respect for intellectual property in favor of free speech and free software. Cisco Systems found itself in the midst of a potential reputation firestorm when the popular anonymous blogger known as the Patent Troll Tracker (PTT) revealed himself as a Cisco IP Director Rick Frenkel. The PTT blog focused on patent enforcement companies — so called patent trolls — that have sued major technology companies such as Cisco, Microsoft, Sprint, and others. Frenkel and Cisco have been accused of defaming two Texas plaintiffs attorneys and have also been accused of a stealth anti-patent lobbying campaign. (Cisco is a major part of the “Coalition for Patent Fairness” — an organization lobbying for weaker patent rights). One way that Cisco can emerge as a publicity winner is to promote and encourage employee publication and free speech. Cisco appears to be taking this road. I discussed the Frenkel case with a Cisco spokesperson today who indicated that Cisco is defending against the lawsuit; that Cisco is “committed to supporting [its] employees and their right to online expression”; and that Frenkel will certainly be allowed to continue blogging while a Cisco employee. The internet’s ease of anonymity is in tension with the prevailing blog notion of transparency. The problem with anonymous corporate blogs is the potential for customer backlash when they discover the true content provider. The other major problem with anonymous publication is the tendency of anonymous authors to become reckless authors. (See, e.g., anonymous Patently-O comments). Cisco’s new employee publishing policy takes these issues into consideration. The policy: No anonymous blogging or comments on issues associated with your Cisco job.
“If you comment on any aspect of the company’s business or any policy issue the company is involved in where you have responsibility for Cisco’s engagement, you must clearly identify yourself as a Cisco employee in your postings or blog site(s) and include a disclaimer that the views are your own and not those of Cisco. In addition, Cisco employees should not circulate postings that they know are written by other employees without informing the recipient that the source was within Cisco.” I disagree with many of Cisco’s patent reform suggestions, but I admire the way the company is handling this issue. Notes:
Interested in a workshop on Corporate Blog Policies? PTT Defamation Lawsuit
March 24, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	A G Design v. Trainman Lantern (Fed. Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential)
AG sued Trainman for infringement of its hand-held RR Lantern patent. (US Pat. No. 7,118,245). The W.D. Washington district court issued a preliminary injunction after hearing an expert report that Trainman’s product was essentially identical to the patented device (except for one claim element). On appeal the CAFC vacated the preliminary injunction — finding that the lower court had committed legal error in finding that the patentee had “a likelihood of success on the merits.”
Legal Standard for Preliminary Relief: The CAFC nominally applies a four factor standard for determining whether preliminary relief is warranted. However, two factors are requisite and typically determinative: (a) Likelihood of success on the merits and (b) irreparable harm associated without preliminary relief. Likelihood of Success: A likelihood of success on the merits requires some proof that the defendant “infringes at least one valid and enforceable claim” of the asserted patent. The likelihood of success may be rebutted by an accused infringer who raises a “substantial question” regarding the patent’s validity, enforceability, or whether the accused device infringes the asserted claims. In a recent case, the a different panel (Judges Rader & Dyk) found the substantial question threshold met by evidence that “cast[s] doubt on the [claim’s] validity.” Erico Int’l v. Vutec & Doc’s Marketing (Fed. Cir. 2008). Lacking a Claim Element: Because the accused device here lacked a claim element (a ‘plurality of ports’ in the reflector), it could not literally infringe. Likewise, the CAFC found that the ‘plurality of ports’ limitation had been added during prosecution to narrow the claims — presumptively foreclosing infringement by equivalents. (Unless AG can show that the “rationale for the amendment is tangential to the equivalent in question.”). Validity Questions: The CAFC also found error in the district court opinion because the court did not specifically analyze whether a disclosed prototype included “all of the limitations of any of the asserted claims.” Instead, for the purposes of the PI, the district court had only noted that the prototype was “different” from the patent claims. Expired Non-Compete: The parties here have a history including a non-compete agreement that expired during the appeal. Because it is now expired, the CAFC found that the non-compete could not serve as a basis for preliminary relief. Notes: This should be a precedential opinion.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1), the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable to the Federal Circuit. See, Dennis Crouch, Using Preliminary Injunction Decisions to Seek Immediate Appeal; Dennis Crouch, De-Stabilizing Preliminary Injunctions through De Novo Review of Claim Construction; Dennis Crouch, No Immediate Appeal of PI Contempt Order; Dennis Crouch, As a Matter of Law, Preliminary Injunction Defeated by Casting Doubt on Patent’s Validity.
Courts Resist Using the Term Patent Troll
March 24, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Despite being used en gross by accused defendants, courts have largely resisted using the term “patent troll” in their decisions. A Westlaw search revealed only seven examples of the pejorative term in court decisions: IP Innovation v. Ecollege.com (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The CAFC noted that the term had been used in the defendant’s argument, but refused to engage in a discussion of its implication). Colida v. Sanyo (Fed. Cir. 2004) (In dissent, Judge Newman argued that attorney fees should not be granted against an accused “patent troll”)
Hynix Semiconductor v. Rambus (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Judge Whyte granting Rambus motion in limine to prohibit use of the term “patent troll” during the trial)
Taurus IP v. DaimlerChrysler (W.D. Wisc. 2007) (Citing Magliocca’s article; piercing the corporate veil of the accused “nonpracticing entities”)
InternetAd Systems v. Opodo ( N.D. Tex. 2007) (Defining a patent troll as a “small company that did not manufacture products or supply services based on patents in question but enforced patent rights against accused infringers in attempt to collect licensing fees”). Overstock.com v. Furnace Brook (D.Utah 2005) (The court indicated a preference for finding that “patent trolls should be subject to more general jurisdiction, perhaps as a way of deterring coercive baseless litigation.” However, the court could not find a legal hook for such a holding.). Black & Decker Mfg. v. Baltimore Truck Tire Service (D.Md. 1928) (Patent was issued to Mr. Fred Troll)
In the eBay decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the status of the patent owner may not operate as a categorical exclusion from the prospect of injunctive relief. Oakley’s Sunglasses and Design Patents
March 23, 2008Design Patent, PatentDennis Crouch	Oakley recently sued Fox, Marvel, and others for infringement of its design sunglasses design patent No. D470,166. According to the complaint, the movie industry has knocked-off Oakley’s design to promote Silver Surfer DVDs. Oakley owns over 100 design patents on its various sunglass designs. Since 2004, the fashion trend-setter has filed over 30 complaints against accused infringers. Apparently, Mardsen wore genuine Oakley in his role as Cyclops. What damages if they had been fakes? Absolute Novelty, First-to-File, and Foreign Bias
Ex Parte Bilski: Briefing Round I
March 21, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	As requested by the CAFC, both the PTO and Bilski’s attorneys (the Webb Firm) simultaneously filed briefs addressing the en banc that probe the scope of patent-eligible subject under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Bilski facts focus on the patentability of a method of managing risk that is not tied to any particular form of technology. More generally, the CAFC appears prepared to reevaluate its decade-old State Street Bank decision. A bevy of amici briefs are expected to be filed in early April.
BILSKI Brief en banc
USPTO Brief en banc Patently-O discussing en banc hearing
March 19, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Using Prosecution Histories: I’m going to do a survey next week on how prosecution history is used in practice, but I would like some reader input to help me create the survey. What are some examples of times when you look at the prosecution history of an application? This survey will span prosecution, litigation, licensing, FTO, patent families and related applications, and will also touch on the cost associated with reviewing a prosecution history. [Comment or e-mail]
Appointing CAFC Judges: For at least the second time in the past two months, a Federal Circuit judge has publicly discussed the fact that eight of the current twelve CAFC judges will be up for “senior status” within the next two years. The Honorable Kimberly Moore discussed this issue at a recent IPO conference in DC. The next President can expect to shape the face of Patent Law through these appointments. In Defiance of Kinik: 271(e)(1) Safeharbor Applies to ITC Action Against Importation of Product Made by Patented Process
March 19, 2008PatentDennis Crouch	Amgen v. ITC and Roche Diagnostics (Fed. Cir. 2008)
Majority Opinion by Judge Newman: In a Section 337 action, the International Trade Commission (ITC) sided with the accused infringer Roche — finding that Roche’s (proposed) importation of recombinant human erythropoietin (EPO) were exempt from charges of infringement under the safeharbor of 35 USC Section 271(e)(1). Amgen had alleged that the importation violated Section 337’s prohibition on importing products made by a patented process. On appeal, Amgen argues that the 271(e)(1) safeharbor does not apply to process patent liability in Section 337 Tariff Act actions. This case relates to Kinik, where the CAFC held that the limitations of 271(g)(1) do not apply to ITC actions. In that case, however, the 271(g)(1) limitations were specifically linked to infringement under 271(g) and not tied to infringement in general. By its terms, 271(e)(1) is not expressly limited to the Patent Act. Amgen argues, however, that the 271(e)(1) exceptions should not apply to excuse importation of a product made by a patented process. Rather, patent holder claims that the statute should only apply to accused infringers who “make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention.” (quoting 271(e)(1)). And, as an extension, the exception does not apply to infringing actions not listed in the exception — here that infringement is importation of a product made by a patented process.
The Federal Circuit Found that the Exception Should Receive an Expansive Reading: In two cases, the Supreme Court has held that the 271(e)(1) exception should be broadly interpreted. In both Merck and Eli Lilly the [Supreme] Court stressed the congressional purpose of removing patent-based barriers to proceeding with federal regulatory approval of medical products. This purpose and its application in precedent weigh heavily against selectively withholding the ’271(e)(1) exemption depending on whether the infringement action is in the district court or the International Trade Commission. We thus affirm the Commission’s ruling that the safe harbor statute applies to process patents in actions under Section 337, when the imported product is used for the exempt purposes of ’271(e)(1). Thus, this case creates an internal split with the authors of Kinik.
In Dissent, Judge Linn stated the situation clearly. Congress likely intended for the safe harbor to include ITC actions, but the safe harbor statute does not – by its terms – actually extend that far. The thrust of the majority’s position is that Congress probably intended § 271(e)(1) to apply in section 337 proceedings the same way it applies in patent infringement litigation under Title 35. While I agree that it would make sense for section 337 to apply that way, the problem remains that if that is what Congress intended, it is not what Congress unambiguously said. . . . Indeed, it is worth noting that there are also potential policy arguments in support of the textual reading of the statute. Congress may not have intended to extend the same benefits of § 271(e)(1) to foreign pharmaceutical companies as it extended to domestic ones, or it may have intended to discourage the importation of pharmaceuticals that have not yet been approved by the FDA. Posts navigation