Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/508/200/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-12-07 11:53:48
Document Index: 220696354

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1500', '§ 133', '§ 902', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 133', '§ 902', '§ 1500', '§ 154', '§ 1500', '§ 1', '§ 1406', '§ 301', '§ 1631', '§ 1500', '§ 1500', '§ 1503', '§ 1500', '§ 1500']

KEENE CORP. v. UNITED STATES 508 U.S. 200 - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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KEENE CORP. v. UNITED STATES 508 U.S. 200
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(b) For the purposes of a possible dismissal under § 1500, claims must be compared to determine whether the plaintiff has a suit pending incralaw
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alaska by Charles E. Cole, Attorney General, and Ronald G. Birch; for the State of Hawaii by Robert A. Marks, Attorney General, and Steven S. Michaels, Deputy Attorney General; for the Chamber of Commercecralaw
1 Keene actually filed its complaints in the old Court of Claims. Soon thereafter, Congress transferred the trial functions of the Court of Claims to a newly created "United States Claims Court." Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 133, 96 Stat. 39-41. The Claims Court has just been renamed the "United States Court of Federal Claims." See Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, § 902, 106 Stat. 4516. To avoid confusion, we will refer to the trial court in this case by its latest name.cralaw
In the meantime, in December 1979, with the Miller thirdparty action still pending, Keene filed the first of its two complaints in issue here, seeking damages from the United States in the Court of Federal Claims "for any amounts which have been, or which may be recovered from Keene by the claimants, by settlement or judgment." Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 579-79C (Keene I), App. to Pet. for Cert. H15. The "claimants" are defined as the plaintiffs in the more than 2,500 lawsuits filed against Keene "by persons alleging personal injury or death from inhalation of asbestos fibers contained in thermal insulation products" manufactured or sold by Keene or its subsidiaries. Id., at H3. Keene alleges conformance with Government specifications in the inclusion of asbestos within the thermal insulation products Keene supplied to Government shipyards and other projects funded or controlled by the Government, and Keene further claims that the Government even sold it some of the asbestos fiber used in its products. Keene's theory of recovery is breach by the United States of implied warran-cralaw
Only five days before the Southern District's dismissal of that omnibus action, Keene returned to the Court of Federal Claims with the second of the complaints in issue here. Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 585-81C (Keene II). Although this one, too, repeats many of the factual allegations of Keene I, it adopts one of the theories raised in the Southern District case, seeking payment for "the amounts of money that [the United States] has recouped" under FECA from asbestos claimants paid by Keene. App. to Pet. forcralaw
2 When Keene filed its complaints, § 1500 referred to the "Court of Claims" rather than the "United States Court of Federal Claims." See 28 U. S. C. § 1500 (1976 ed.). Section 1500 has since been amended twice, first to substitute "United States Claims Court" for "Court of Claims," Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 133(e)(1), 96 Stat. 40, and then to substitute "Court of Federal Claims" for "Claims Court," Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, § 902(a), 106 Stat. 4516. See also n. 1, supra.cralaw
Congress has the constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, see Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545, 548 (1989), and, once the lines are drawn, "limits upon federal jurisdiction ... must be neither disregarded nor evaded," Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365, 374 (1978). In § 1500, Congress has employed its power to provide that the Court of Federal Claims "shall not have jurisdiction" over a claim, "for or in respect to which" the plaintiff "has [a suit or process] pending" in any other court. In applying the jurisdictional bar here by looking to the facts existing when Keene filed each of its complaints, the Court of Federal Claims followed the longstanding principle that "the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought." Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.); see Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, 69 (1987) (opinion of SCALIA, J.); St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 289-290 (1938); Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 270 U. S. 580, 586 (1926).
While acknowledging what it calls this "general rule" that subject-matter jurisdiction turns on the facts upon filing,cralaw
3 On this score, Keene cites Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826 (1989), for the proposition that the Court can rely on practical considerations to create exceptions to the time-of-filing rule. Brief for Petitioner 35-36. We need not decide whether Keene's reading is accurate, for Keene has not shown that we should, even if we could. We do note, however, that Newman-Green reiterated the principle that "[t]he existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed." 490 U. S., at 830.cralaw
4 We do not decide whether the statute also continues to bar a plaintiff from prosecuting a claim in the Court of Federal Claims while he has pending a later-filed suit in another court "for or in respect to" the same claim. Cf. Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 389, 343 F.2d 943 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 976 (1966). As the dissenting judge noted below, this case does not raise that issue. UNR Industries,cralaw
Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1030, n. 5 (CA Fed. 1992) (Plager, J., dissenting).cralaw
5We have had one other encounter with this statute, in Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 352 (1932), where we relied on the plain words of § 154 to hold that the statute did not apply where the Court of Claims plaintiff had brought suit in another court against the United States, rather than against an agent of the United States, for the same claim. When Congress reenacted the statute in 1948, it added the phrase "against the United States" to close this loophole. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 942; Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F. 2d 1556, 1566-1567, and n. 15 (CA Fed. 1988).cralaw
6 Because the issue is not presented on the facts of this case, we need not decide whether two actions based on the same operative facts, but seeking completely different relief, would implicate § 1500. Cf. Casman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956); Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, FSB v. United States, 864 F.2d 137 (CA Fed. 1988).cralaw
7 Keene argued in its petition for certiorari that the claim it raised in its third-party action in Miller was not based on the same facts as its complaint in Keene I. Keene did not press this argument after we granted the writ, and, in any event, we see no reason to disturb the rulings to the contrary by both courts below. See 962 F. 2d, at 1024 ("[W]e have no quarrel with the [Court of Federal Claims] determination that the underlying facts in Miller and Keene I are the same").cralaw
9Keene claims that its view represents "well-established law," citing Allied Materials & Equipment Co. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 714 (1976) (per curiam), and Casman v. United States, supra. Brief for Petitioner 15. In Casman, however, the plaintiff was seeking completely different relief in the Court of Claims and the District Court, and later cases have read Casman as limited to that situation. See Johns-Manville Corp., 855 F. 2d, at 1566-1567; Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, FSB v. United States, 864 F. 2d, at 139. Although it is not clear whether the plaintiff in Allied Materials was seeking completely different relief in the District Court, the Court of Claims simply applied Casman without much explanation. Neither Casman nor Allied Materials discussed, much less purported to overrule, British American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 438 (1939), a case that undoubtedly is well established. See, e. g.,cralaw
10 The questions on which we granted certiorari contain no direct mention of prospectivity, see Pet. for Cert. i, although Keene did argue in its petition that Tecon Engineers should be overruled only prospectively, see Pet. for Cert. 13, and the Court of Appeals did consider, and reject, the argument that its ruling should only be prospectively applied, see 962 F. 2d, at 1025.cralaw
11 We note that both the Brown and Hossein courts failed to consider the possibility that the District Court, in such a situation, could transfer the case to the Court of Federal Claims under a statute first adopted in 1960. See Act of Sept. 13, 1960, § 1, 74 Stat. 912 (codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1406(c) (1964 ed.)); Act of Apr. 2, 1982, § 301(a), 96 Stat. 55 (codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1631).cralaw
14 A recent attempt to repeal § 1500 failed in Congress. See S. 2521, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., § W(c) (1992); 138 Congo Rec. S4830-84832 (Apr. 2, 1992).cralaw
"'The object of this amendment is to put to their election that large class of persons having cotton claims particularly, who have sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the other agents of the Government in more than a hundred suits that are now pending, scattered over the country here and there, and who are here at the same time endeavoring to prosecute their claims, and have filed them in the Court of Claims, so that after they put the Government to the expense of beating them once in a court of law they can turn around and try the whole question in the Court of Claims. The object is to put that class of persons to their election either to leave the Court of Claims or to leave the other courts. I am sure everybody will agree to that.''' UNR Industries, Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1018 (CA Fed. 1992) (quoting 81 Congo Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 2769 (1868).cralaw
2 Sections immediately following § 1500 use similar language with respect to other types of claims. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1503, 1508.cralaw
4 As Justice Holmes pointed out, in a similar context, "no one would say that the words of the Mississippi statute of frauds, 'An action shall not be brought whereby to charge a defendant,' go to the jurisdiction of the court. Of course it could be argued that logically they had that scope, but common sense would revolt." Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 235 (1908) (internal citation omitted).cralaw
In my judgment, the Court of Claims properly construed § 1500 in 1966 when it held that the provision merely requires claimants to choose between alternative pending claims before proceeding to trial. See Brown, 175 Ct. Cl., at 348, 358 F. 2d, at 1004. The statute limits the power of the Court of Federal Claims to render judgments, and thus the ability of a plaintiff to prosecute simultaneous actions against the Government, but it does not prevent the Court of Federal Claims from allowing a case to remain on its docket until the claimant has made the required election. Even if I did not agree with this interpretation of § 1500, however, I would nevertheless endorse it here, as litigants have a right to rely on a longstanding and reasoned judicial construction of an important statute that Congress has not seen fit to alter. See McNally v. United States, 483 U. S.cralaw