Source: http://openjurist.org/536/f2d/886
Timestamp: 2016-05-30 14:58:39
Document Index: 333593644

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1111', '§ 3005', '§ 707', '§ 50321', '§ 707', '§ 707']

536 F2d 886 United States v. Martinez | OpenJurist
536 F. 2d 886 - United States v. Martinez HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 536 F.2d.
536 F2d 886 United States v. Martinez 536 F.2d 886
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Phillip MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Michael OLMO, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 75-2913, 75-2912.
Following arraignment upon the indictment, Martinez and Olmo requested that they each be granted 20 peremptory jury challenges pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(b), that an additional attorney be provided and a witness and a venireman list. The District Court granted the requests for one additional attorney and for witness and venireman lists, but denied the request for 20 peremptory challenges.
Martinez and Olmo challenge Romero's statements as dying declarations because Romero did not know that death was near and certain and had not lost all hope of recovery, as required under the test of Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933). Additionally they assert that because several of the statements were shown to be untrue, they undercut the reliability foundation of the dying declaration exception. Further, they argue the statements would not qualify as spontaneous statements because they were shown to be partially untrue showing the victim had the chance to reflect and fabricate and they were made in response to Sauer's questions.
We are mindful that the District Court's discretionary admission in evidence of a decedent's statements and descriptions of his assailant as a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule should be reversed only if determined to be clearly erroneous. United States v. Glenn, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 61, 473 F.2d 191 (1972). However, we do not reach that issue as we are satisfied that even if the admission of Romero's descriptions of the assailants was error, such was harmless and not prejudicial to either Martinez or Olmo. The independent evidence of Martinez' and Olmo's guilt was manifest and overwhelming. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); and United States v. Mobley, 421 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1970).Issue 2 :
Martinez and Olmo contend that the death penalty was a potential sentence under § 1111 at the time of their trial, and accordingly under the authority of Amsler v. United States, 381 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967), it was plain error for the District Court to deny each of them 20 peremptory jury challenges pursuant to Rule 24(b). Their reliance upon the rational of Amsler is misplaced since they were not facing the possibility of a death penalty sentence in their jury trial. We are satisfied that the rationale of Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867, 89 S.Ct. 151, 21 L.Ed.2d 135 (1968), dictates rejection of the contention. Loux distinguishes Amsler on the thesis that Amsler had no actual existing agreement on the part of the Government which foreclosed the Government from seeking a death penalty. In Loux, the Government agreed on the record not to seek the death penalty and the District Court made it clear on the record that the case was not a capital case. This court held that under such circumstances, a death penalty was impossible and concluded:
The granting by the District Court of the request for two attorneys pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3005 under the rationale of United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973), is not inconsistent with the denial of the request for 20 peremptory jury challenges under Rule 24(b). United States v. Freeman, 380 F.Supp. 1004 (D.N.D.1974).
Martinez and Olmo contend that the State Juvenile Court § 707 "transfer hearing" during which evidence was heard regarding the facts of the crime and the arrest, qualifies as a "proceeding (that) has reached the stage that evidence has begun to be taken with respect to a crime." Therefore, they assert that § 50321 was violated when they were tried by the federal government, and they were subjected to double jeopardy because the statute has abolished the dual sovereignty doctrine in juvenile cases. Furthermore, they contend that the State Juvenile Court § 707 hearing constituted double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment as determined by the Supreme Court in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).
We are satisfied that the § 707 "transfer hearing" procedure followed by the State Juvenile Court in this case is sanctioned by Breed, 421 U.S. at pages 535-40, 95 S.Ct. 1779, and did not impose jeopardy.