Source: http://openjurist.org/520/us/641/edwards-v-b-balisok
Timestamp: 2013-12-08 22:11:46
Document Index: 518287559

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983']

520 US 641 Edwards v. B Balisok | OpenJurist
520 U.S. 641 - Edwards v. B Balisok	Home520 us 641 edwards v. b balisok
520 US 641 Edwards v. B Balisok 520 U.S. 641117 S.Ct. 1584137 L.Ed.2d 906
Gary EDWARDS and Tana Wood, Petitioners,v.Jerry B. BALISOK.
Respondent, an inmate of a Washington state prison, was found guilty of prison rule infractions and sentenced to, inter alia, the loss of 30 days' good-time credit he had previously earned toward his release. Alleging that the procedures used in his disciplinary proceeding violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, he filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for a declaration that those procedures were unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. Although he expressly reserved the right to seek restoration of the lost good-time credits in an appropriate forum, he refrained from requesting that relief in light of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841-1842, 36 L.Ed.2d 439, under which the sole remedy in federal court for a prisoner seeking such restoration is habeas corpus. The District Court applied Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372-2373, 129 L.Ed.2d 383, which held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under §1983 if a judgment for him would "necessarily imply'' the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated. Although holding that a judgment for respondent would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary hearing and the resulting sanctions, the court did not dismiss the suit, but stayed it pending filing and resolution of a state-court action for restoration of the good-time credits. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a claim challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing is always cognizable under §1983.
2.Although a prayer for prospective injunctive relief ordinarily will not "necessarily imply'' the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time credits, and so may properly be brought under §1983, respondent's claim for such relief must be remanded because it was not considered by either lower court, and its validity was neither briefed nor argued here. P. 1589.
3.The District Court erred in staying this §1983 action. That court was mistaken in its view that once respondent had exhausted his state remedies, the action could proceed. Section 1983 contains no judicially imposed exhaustion requirement, Heck, supra, at 481, 483, 114 S.Ct., at 2369, 2370-2371; absent some other bar to the suit, a claim either is cognizable under §1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed. P. 1589.
70 F.3d 1277 (C.A.9 1995), reversed and remanded.
Kathleen D. Mix, Olympia, WA, for petitioners.
Thomas H. Speedy Rice, San Diego, CA, for respondent.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372-73, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), this Court held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,'' unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated. This case presents the question whether a claim for damages and declaratory relief brought by a state prisoner challenging the validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits is cognizable under §1983.
On January 26, 1994, respondent filed the present §1983 action alleging that the procedures used in his disciplinary proceeding violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. His amended complaint requested a declaration that the procedures employed by state officials violated due process, compensatory and punitive damages for use of the unconstitutional procedures, an injunction to prevent future violations, and any other relief the court deems just and equitable. Taking account of our opinion in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), which held that the sole remedy in federal court for a prisoner seeking restoration of good-time