Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/286/374/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-05-23 06:58:44
Document Index: 86447702

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 7', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 7', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 7', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 7', '§ 5']

SPROLES V. BINFORD, 286 U. S. 374 (1932) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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5. The Texas statute, supra, exempts "implements of husbandry" from the net load weight limitation. Held that, construed as confined to farm implements and machinery, the movements of which are relatively temporary and infrequent as compared with the ordinary uses of the highways by motor trucks, the exception is consistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 286 U. S. 391. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
56 F.2d 189, affirmed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appeal by the plaintiffs and interveners from a decree of the district court of three judges dismissing a bill to restrain the enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Act of Texas. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court, composed of three judges, entered a final decree dismissing the bill of complaint which sought to restrain the enforcement of the Motor Vehicle chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 2 [Footnote 1] prohibits the operation on any highway of any "vehicle," as defined, exceeding stated limitations of size, or any vehicle not constructed or equipped as required, and also the transportation of any load exceeding the dimensions and weights prescribed. The state highway department may grant permits, for ninety days, for the transportation "of such overweight or oversize or overlength commodities as cannot be reasonably dismantled," or for the operation "of super-heavy and oversize equipment" for the transportation of such commodities, provided that hauls under these permits shall be made "by the shortest practicable route." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 3 [Footnote 2] limits the width of a vehicle including load, to 96 inches, the height to 12 1/2 feet, the length to 35 feet, and the length of a combination of vehicles, coupled together, to 45 feet. It forbids the transportation as a load, or as part of a load, of any commodity in containers having more than 30 cubic feet and weighing more than 500 pounds, where there are more than 14 of such containers carried as a load on "any such vehicle or combination," chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 5 [Footnote 3] prohibits any "commercial motor vehicle" (which the Act defines as one designed or used for the transportation of property), truck-tractor, or trailer from operating outside of an incorporated city or town with a load exceeding 7,000 pounds "on any such vehicle or train or combination of vehicles," and provides further that no motor vehicle (which includes passenger buses) shall operate outside a city or town with a greater weight than 600 pounds "per inch width of tire upon any wheel concentrated upon the surface of the highway." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court made comprehensive findings. These set forth the various interests of the complainant and interveners (common carriers and contract carriers, in intrastate and interstate commerce, and manufacturers and distributors of commodities), their large investments, the extent of their operations in highway transportation, the character and uses of their equipment, and the losses chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
and this finding of the legislature is supported by the preponderance of the evidence before the court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The number of trucks in use in Texas has increased 300 percent in the last six years; official registrations show an increase from 65,536 in 1924 to 206,527 in 1930, not including the large increase in interstate truck traffic, and this increase in "truck density" justifies the dimensional and weight restrictions of the statute in the interest of public safety and convenience and highways protection. In 1930, there were only 900 passenger buses operating over the Texas highways, representing less than .004 of one percent of the total number of vehicles; these passenger buses, while similar in many respects in construction to trucks carrying freight, are specially equipped to haul passengers, operate under regulations of the railroad commission and under conditions wholly different from those of trucks; that the difference between these two types of vehicles and the number of each type, and in their operation, is ample justification for legislative classification. Excessive loads on trucks are damaging the highways and the limitation of the net load to 7,000 pounds will cause a saving to the state in maintenance costs. Heavily loaded trucks cause accidents and reduced loads will result in greater safety. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There are a large number of commodities "such as boilers, transformers, telephone poles, etc., as cannot be reasonably dismantled" and which it is necessary to transport. The State Highway Commission, in the performance of its duty of issuing special permits under § 2, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The intervener W. T. Stevens, who is engaged in hauling uncompressed cotton, specifically complained of § 3, subdivision (f), as creating an arbitrary and unconstitutional discrimination against him, and the district court made separate findings upon this point. The court found that the customary square bale of uncompressed cotton is of a greater size than 30 cubic feet, and that the average "square bale of uncompressed cotton, when compressed to a standard density, is less than 30 cubic feet in size;" and that the average square bale of cotton, whether uncompressed or compressed, weights approximately 500 pounds or more. There is the further finding that there is no commodity commonly transported over the highways of Texas which conforms to the description "contained, boxed, or bound in any container, box, or binding, containing more than 30 cubic feet and weighing more than 500 pounds" other than square bales of uncompressed cotton. The court held that the limitation of the load to "fourteen packages, boxes, barrels or bales" exceeding the dimensions stated in § 3, subdivision (f), was reasonable and valid when construed in connection with the provision of § 5 (which became effective January 1, 1932) limiting loads to 7,000 pounds, and expressed the opinion that 14,000 pounds of uncompressed cotton may be transported under the provisions of § 7 (§ 5(b)). But the court also held that, if § 3, subdivision (f), is construed independently of the provisions of § 5, the former "has no relation to the supposed mischiefs to be remedied and is unreasonable and unlawfully discriminatory" in its application to the intervener Stevens. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In exercising its authority over its highways the state is not limited to the raising of revenue for maintenance and reconstruction, or to regulations as to the manner in which vehicles shall be operated, but the state may also prevent the wear and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles and weight of load. Limitations of size and weight are manifestly subjects within the broad range of legislative discretion. To make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power would be to subject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 281 U. S. 159. When the subject lies within the police power of the state, debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts, but for the legislature, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third. The conclusion that the state had authority to impose the limitation of § 5 for the purpose of protecting its highways meets the contention based on the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Contracts which relate to the use of the highways must be deemed to have been made in contemplation of the regulatory authority of the state. With respect to the power of Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce, this Court has had frequent occasion to observe that it is not fettered by the necessity of maintaining existing arrangements which chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court was of the opinion that the term "implements of husbandry" has reference to such implements as "tractors, plows, trucks, hay presses, etc.," and that the use of the highways for this purpose, as well as for the movement of the described machinery, is but temporary. 56 F.2d 189 at 190. Appellants urge that any implement, truck or vehicle used by a farmer is an "implement of husbandry" and hence, that, under chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Objection is made to § 7 (§ 5(b)) [Footnote 9] permitting an additional length of vehicles and greater loads than 7,000 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If taken to be sufficiently definite, appellants deny that the exception is justified. The District Court found that it relates to hauls that are universally short, averaging chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
from four to eight miles, and that those who come within the exception transport under distinctly different circumstances from other persons using the highways. Appellants contest the latter statement and urge that the former ground is insufficient. But the legislature, in making its classifications, was entitled to consider frequency and character of use and to adapt its regulations to the classes of operations which, by reason of their extensive as well as constant use of the highways, brought about the conditions making the regulations necessary. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, supra. It is said that the exception was designed to favor transportation by railroad as against transportation by motortrucks. If this was the motive of the legislature, it does not follow that the classification as made in this case would be invalid. The state has a vital interest in the appropriate utilization of the railroads which serve its people as well as in the proper maintenance of its highways as safe and convenient facilities. The state provides its highways and pays for their upkeep. Its people make railroad transportation possible by the payment of transportation charges. It cannot be said that the state is powerless to protect its highways from being subjected to excessive burdens when other means of transportation are available. The use of highways for truck transportation has its manifest convenience, but we perceive no constitutional ground for denying to the state the right to foster a fair distribution of traffic to the end that all necessary facilities should be maintained and that the public should not be inconvenienced by inordinate uses of its highways for purposes of gain. This is not a case of a denial of the use of the highways to one class of citizens as opposed to another, or of limitations having no appropriate relation to highway protection. It is not a case of an arbitrary discrimination between the products carried, as in the case of Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 283 U. S. 567. The provision chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Another objection to classification is based on the fact that the limitation of § 5 [Footnote 10] applies to "commercial motor vehicles," which, as defined in the Act, do not include passenger buses. The latter motor vehicles, while subject to the general limitation of "six hundred (600) pounds per inch width of tire upon any wheel concentrated upon the surface of the highway," are not subject to a load limit. The District Court found, as above stated, that there were only 900 passenger buses operating over the Texas highways (representing less than .004 of one percent of the total number of vehicles) and that the difference between the two types of vehicles and number of each type and in the conditions of operations were such as to support the classification. Appellants press the contention that, as admitted by the district court, the damage to the highways is as great from a load of persons as from a load of freight, and that the combined weight of vehicles and load in the case of passenger buses is greater than the combined weight of vehicles and load carrying freight where the net load is limited to 7,000 pounds. These considerations would be controlling if there were no other reasonable basis for classification than the mere matter chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In view of our conclusion that the limitation in § 5, and the exception in § 7 (§ 5(b)), are valid, it is unnecessary to consider the question which has been presented as to the validity of § 3(f), if it were regarded as an independent provision, that is, in case the objections to § 5 were sustained. It appears to be conceded that, under the ruling of the district court as to § 5 and § 7 (§ 5(b)), which we have approved, motor transportation of uncompressed cotton is placed upon an equal basis with other articles of commerce. 56 F.2d 189 at 191, 193. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary