Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/439/743/337278/
Timestamp: 2020-02-24 21:58:51
Document Index: 218160191

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2514', '§ 1826', '§ 2514', '§ 2514', 'art, 113', 'art, 304', '§ 2101', '§ 231', '§ 837', '§ 5861', '§ 5861']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Lee Weinberg, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. David Alfred Scheffler, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Teri Ann Volpin, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Karen Duncan, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Pamela Donaldson, Appellant, 439 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1971 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Lee Weinberg, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Lee Weinberg, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. David Alfred Scheffler, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Teri Ann Volpin, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Karen Duncan, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Pamela Donaldson, Appellant, 439 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 439 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971) January 18, 1971
Richard K. Burke, U. S. Atty., John Wilkes, Asst. U. S. Atty, Tucson, Ariz., for appellee.
In the fall of 1970 a grand jury was convened at Tucson, Arizona to inquire into the matters referred to in the margin.1 The five appellants were subpoenaed by the United States to testify before the grand jury. Each refused to answer most of the questions asked of them before the grand jury. Each was then called before a district judge then sitting in Tucson, granted immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2514, and ordered to "testify and answer the questions asked by the grand jury."
Each of the appellants appealed and we have consolidated the appeals for purposes of briefing and disposition. By order of this court entered on January 5, 1971, we expedited the appeals in order that they may be disposed of within thirty days from the filing of such appeal, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b). Appellants' motion for reconsideration of the order of January 5, 1971, insofar as it expedites the appeal, is denied. Appellants' motion for leave to file a supplement to the opening brief in lieu of a reply brief, is granted, and their supplemental brief has been received and considered.
Under all of the circumstances we hold that appellants were not deprived of due process with regard to these contempt proceedings. See Licata v. United States, 429 F.2d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 400 U.S. 938, 91 S. Ct. 239, 27 L. Ed. 2d 243.4 The same considerations which justify the holding of civil contempt proceedings, absent the safeguards of indictment and jury (Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371, 86 S. Ct. 1531, 16 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1966)), warrant reasonable expedition of such proceedings both in the district court and on appeal.
At these hearings, which preceded the contempt hearings, the Government asked that appellants be granted immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 2514, and that, after such immunity were granted, that they be ordered to answer, before the grand jury, the questions propounded to them. Both requests were granted by the court.
The leading case prescribing the procedure to be followed in proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 2514 for the granting of immunity and the directing of a witness to answer questions before the grand jury, is In re Bart, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 304 F.2d 631 (1962). As there indicated, while such a proceeding is by its nature preliminary and summary, an application by the Government for such relief, and supporting documents, should normally be served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 6(d) provides for five days notice, which was not given here. But Rule 6(d) also provides that a different period may be fixed by the court. In effect, that is what happened here; the district court denied appellants' motion for a continuance and ordered that the section 2514 proceeding be had almost immediately after the respective appellants had refused to testify before the grand jury.
Turning to the first problem we must, at the outset, limit our inquiry to the questions generally similar to those which were propounded, as testified to by the court reporter, when the individual appellants were returned to the district court on the orders to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. This is necessary because the contempt adjudication and commitments were referenced to the refusal to answer questions testified to by the reporter, and generally similar questions. If questions not generally similar to those testified to by the reporter were asked at appellants' last grand jury appearance, we do not know what they were or why appellants refused to answer them, and in any event, appellants have not been penalized for refusing to answer them.
Apart from unusual circumstances, such as those involved in Caldwell, the chilling effect such questions may have upon the future exercise of First Amendment rights, or the asserted deprivation of privacy with regard to past acts and conduct are not, we believe, a recognized ground for lawful refusal to answer questions propounded before a grand jury.
"Without question, the exaction of this duty impinges sometimes, if not always, upon the First Amendment freedoms of the witness. Material sacrifice and the invasion of personal privacy are implicit in its performance. The freedom to choose whether to speak or be silent disappears. But ` [t]he personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public.' Blair v. United States, supra, 250 U.S. [273] at page 281, 39 S. Ct. [468] at page 471 [63 L. Ed. 979]."
Such a procedure would constitute a serious interference with the normal course of grand jury proceedings, and the secrecy thereof. We have noted above the limited scope of proceedings for the granting of immunity and the directing of witnesses to answer questions before the grand jury, as spelled out in In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631, 636-637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
The Fourth Amendment is usually thought of as extending to searches for, and seizures of, tangible items. However, as made clear in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), it extends also to the recording of illegally overheard oral statements. But compelled grand jury testimony is neither a search for, nor seizure of, oral statements in the sense envisioned by the Fourth Amendment. As Judge Zirpoli said in In re Grand Jury Witnesses Sherrie Bursey and Brenda Joyce Presley, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970):
"The grand jury does not need to have probable cause to investigate; rather its function is to determine if probable cause exists. And if probable cause is not required to investigate, it follows that probable cause is not required to make the preliminary showing necessary to call a witness whose testimony may shed light on criminal activity which the grand jury must investigate if the national interest is to be effectively served."
"Only the grand jury can properly decide what may be useful to such an investigation, and if it has any meaningful role to play, this is a function it must have free from undue interference of the Court."
With regard to their Fourth Amendment argument, appellants rely upon Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). But what the Court there said was that a compulsory production of a man's private papers "* * * to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property * * *" is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. That was not the purpose of the questions asked of appellants before the grand jury.
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614 (1946), also relied upon by appellants, likewise involved a subpoena duces tecum to produce records and papers. The Court said that "* * * the Fourth, if applicable, at the most guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be `particularly described' * * *" in the subpoena.
The basic principles may be briefly stated. The federal courts recognize that confidential communications between husband and wife are privileged. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 54 S. Ct. 279, 78 L. Ed. 617 (1934). This privilege may be exercised by a witness called to testify before a grand jury. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333, 71 S. Ct. 301, 95 L. Ed. 306 (1951). As established in Blau, this privilege includes within its protection information obtained by the witness from his or her spouse, providing the information was privately conveyed. Marital communications are presumptively confidential. It is therefore necessary for the party seeking to avoid the privilege to overcome the presumption. Blau, at 333, 71 S. Ct. 301.
The federal courts also bar a husband or wife from testifying against his or her spouse, unless both consent, with exceptions not here relevant. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78-79, 79 S. Ct. 136, 3 L. Ed. 2d 125. This is a rule of exclusion. While Donaldson's "marital privilege" claim was imprecise we believe that, in view of the expedited nature of the contempt proceeding, it should be accepted as sufficiently presenting the question.
Three of the questions asked of Donaldson, quoted in the margin, may have called for answers which would be "against" her husband, within the meaning of this rule of exclusion.9 If they were the only questions which she refused to answer, her civil contempt adjudication and commitment could not stand.10 But the other questions concerning which the reporter testified, summarized in note 8, are not within the ambit of this exclusionary rule. For this reason, the exclusionary rule does not call for reversal.
Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (interstate travel to organize, promote and encourage a riot), 18 U.S.C. § 231(a) (2) (interstate transportation of explosives or firearms), 18 U.S.C. § 837 (interstate transportation of explosives), 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (possession of unregistered destructive devices), and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(j) (interstate transportation of unregistered destructive devices)
Date Specified Judge in Refused Date Duration Tucson to Ordered of Ordering Testify Committed Commitment Commitment Weinberg 12/ 2/70 12/ 2/70 Life of grand jury or until Powell March 31, 1971, whichever date first occurs, or until purged (The grand jury was to expire on December 31, 1970, but was later extended to March 31, 1971.) Scheffler 11/19/70 11/20/70 Life of grand jury (March 31, Goodwin 1971), or until purged Donaldson 12/ 3/70 12/ 3/70 Life of grand jury (March 31, Powell 1971), or until purged Volpin 11/ 3/70 11/ 3/70 Life of grand jury (March 31, Craig 1971), or sixty days, whichever will come about sooner, or until purged Duncan 12/ 3/70 12/ 3/70 Life of grand jury (March 31, Powell 1971), or until purged
We recognize that here, unlike Licata, there were objections to the conduct of the hearings and motions for continuances. But, having in view the issues appropriate for consideration in such proceedings, we do not believe the district court abused its discretion in overruling these objections and denying the motions for continuance.
Scheffler declined to state how long he had lived at 602 Venicia, Venice, California. Volpin refused to state whether she lived at a particular address with any other person. She also refused to state whether she had taken any trips outside the state of California at any time during 1970; whether she was the owner of a 1969 Toyota automobile; whether she participated in any riots or demonstrations in the state of California in February, 1970; and whether she participated in any demonstrations at the University of California at Los Angeles on February, 19, 1970. Duncan declined to tell the grand jury whether she had made the statement that she was going to Cuba to gain experience in building the revolution. Donaldson refused to state where she resides
"Q Will you describe for the Grand Jury all of the riots, demonstrations and disorders in which you have attended or participated during 1970, telling the Grand Jury when and where these took place and what activities you engaged in, and who else was present?"
"Q Mrs. Donaldson, will you describe for the Grand Jury every occasion during 1970, on which you have had in your possession or seen in the possession of any other person any dynamite, fuses, blasting caps, destructive devices, or firearms?"
"Q Will you tell the Grand Jury when and where you saw dynamite, fuses, blasting caps, destructive devices, or firearms, who else was present on those occasions, and what was done with those items?"