Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/486/98/287365/
Timestamp: 2019-08-24 13:29:56
Document Index: 208532122

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 655', '§ 655', '§ 4332', '§ 651', '§ 655', '§ 551', '§ 655', '§ 655', '§ 655', '§ 655', '§ 1857', '§ 655', '§ 655', '§ 4321', '§ 4332', '§ 651', '§ 655', '§ 655']

Dry Color Manufacturers' Association, Inc., et al., Petitioners, v. Department of Labor et al., Respondents.oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Andhealth Research Group, Petitioners, v. Peter Brennan, Secretary United States Department of Laborand John Stender, Assistant Secretary,occupational Safety and Healthadministration, United Statesdepartment of Labor,respondents.aerojet-general Corporation, an Ohio Corporation, Petitioner, v. Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, and John H. Stender,assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupationalsafety and Health, Respondents, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1973 › Dry Color Manufacturers' Association, Inc., et al., Petitioners, v. Department of Labor et al., Resp...
Dry Color Manufacturers' Association, Inc., et al., Petitioners, v. Department of Labor et al., Respondents.oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Andhealth Research Group, Petitioners, v. Peter Brennan, Secretary United States Department of Laborand John Stender, Assistant Secretary,occupational Safety and Healthadministration, United Statesdepartment of Labor,respondents.aerojet-general Corporation, an Ohio Corporation, Petitioner, v. Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, and John H. Stender,assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupationalsafety and Health, Respondents, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973)
Argued Sept. 10, 1973. Decided Oct. 4, 1973
These cases are before the court upon petitions (filed in May and June 1973) to review an order of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, published on May 3, 1973, 38 Fed.Reg. 10929, issuing an Emergency Temporary Standard on Certain Carcinogens, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.93c. The temporary standard prescribes plant operating procedures and equipment, work practices and procedures for preventing exposure to 14 chemicals said to be carcinogens. This court has jurisdiction to review and set aside the standard pursuant to section 6(f) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
In No. 73-1361, petitioners are Dry Color Manufacturers' Association, Inc., Sun Chemical Corporation, Inmont Corporation, H. Kohnstamm & Co., Inc., Allied Chemical Corporation, Chemetron Corporation, The Upjohn Company, Lakeway Chemicals, Inc. and Hercules, Incorporated (hereinafter "Dry Color"). Each is a manufacturer, user, or an association of users of 3,3'-dichlorobenzedine (DCB), one of the 14 chemicals. Petitioner in No. 73-1638, Aerojet-General Corporation (hereinafter "Aerojet") is a user of ethyleneimine (EI), another of the 14 chemicals subject to the Emergency Temporary Standard. The petitioners in these two cases (hereinafter "industry petitioners") raise as objections to the Emergency Temporary Standard that: (1) there is not substantial evidence in the record to show that the use of DCB and EI, respectively, satisfies the provisions of subsection 6(c) (1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1), as to the conditions necessary to justify the promulgation of an emergency temporary standard; (2) the findings of fact and statement of reasons for the standard contained in the standard's preamble are inadequate; and (3) the Assistant Secretary violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C), by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to issuance of the standard. In addition, the industry petitioners have challenged the Department of Labor's Certification of Record, charging that a substantial portion of the documents contained therein were never actually considered by the Department in its decision to issue the Emergency Standard and, therefore, should not be included in the record.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., (hereinafter "the Act") provides for the issuance of both permanent and emergency temporary standards.1 Under subsection 6(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b), the Secretary may promulgate permanent standards by following rulemaking procedures similar to those prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., with the added assistance of a statutorily authorized Advisory Committee if deemed necessary. Under subsection 6(c), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c), on the other hand, emergency temporary standards become effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register; the hearing, public comment, and other provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act do not apply. After issuing an emergency temporary standard, the Secretary must begin a permanent rulemaking process and complete that process by issuing a permanent standard within six months of the publication of the emergency temporary standard.
Subsection 6(c) (1) of the Act commands the Secretary to issue an emergency temporary standard "if he determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger," 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1). Subsection 6(e) provides that " [w]henever the Secretary promulgates any standard, . . . he shall include a statement of his reasons for such action," 29 U.S.C. § 655(e), and subsection 6(f) directs courts reviewing a standard that " [t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole," 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
The standard goes on to prescribe plant operating procedures and equipment, work practices and procedures for preventing exposure of employees to the 14 chemicals found to cause cancer, together with a timetable of effective dates.2 In promulgating the standard, OSHA stated that as soon as possible a draft environmental impact statement would be filed with the Council on Environmental Quality and that a copy of the proposed rules would be sent to the Environmental Protection Agency for its comments under section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. A draft environmental impact statement prepared by OSHA was received by the Council on Environmental Quality on May 21, 1973.
The Emergency Temporary Standard in question here was appropriately issued if there is substantial evidence in the record to support OSHA's determination (A) that the 14 chemicals listed in the standard are carcinogenic and, therefore, that exposure of employees to them presents a "grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful," and (B) that the emergency standard "is necessary to protect employees from such danger," 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1) and (f).3
For its part, the Department of Labor has argued that the industrial experience is not conclusive because of the small size of the statistical sample and the relatively short time span of the studies relied on by industry petitioners. The Department also has pointed out that while it has not yet been demonstrated that dogs or humans produce harmful metabolites of DCB, neither has it been shown that they do not. The Department admits, however, that there is no reliable data on the carcinogenicity of DCB or EI in humans. Thus, its entire case depends on an extrapolation from the data gathered in rodent experiments, and to justify that extrapolation the Department relies heavily on the April 22, 1970, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Evaluation of Low Levels of Environmental Chemical Carcinogens to the Surgeon General.5 That Report recommends that " [a]ny substance which is shown conclusively to cause tumors in animals should be considered carcinogenic and therefore a potential cancer hazard for man."6 Although this recommendation does not command unanimous agreement,7 it does appear to constitute substantial evidence in support of the Department's position. The problem, however, is that the Report is not part of the record, and there is no evidence in the published notice of May 3, 1973, that this Report was relied on.8
Based on this summary of the evidence, we conclude that the most that can be said is that DCB and EI pose a "potential" cancer hazard to man. Although the danger of cancer is surely "grave," subsection 6(c) (1) of the Act requires a grave danger of exposure to substances "determined to be toxic or physically harmful." The amount and quality of the evidence necessary to provide "substantial" support for such a finding will necessarily vary depending on the facts of each case. OSHA need not wait until workers have actually been harmed to issue an emergency temporary standard. Extrapolation from animal experiments may in appropriate cases be used to establish a sufficient probability of harm to man.9 However, while the Act does not require an absolute certainty as to the deleterious effect of a substance on man, an emergency temporary standard must be supported by evidence that shows more than some possibility that a substance may cause cancer in man.9a On this record, the evidence supplies no more than some possibility that DCB and EI may cause cancer in man.
Subsection 6(e) of the Act specifically mandates that " [w]henever the Secretary promulgates any standard, . . . he shall include a statement of the reasons for such action, which shall be published in the Federal Register." 29 U.S.C. § 655(e).10 This requirement is designed to serve several general functions: it provides an internal check on arbitrary agency action by insuring that prior to taking action an agency can clearly articulate the reasons for its decision; it makes possible informed public criticism of a decision by making known its underlying rationale; and it facilitates judicial review of agency action by providing an important part of the record of the decision. Furthermore, the statement-of-reasons requirement of subsection 6(e) complements the requirement of subsection 6(c) (1) that certain factual findings be made by the Secretary of Labor prior to promulgation of an emergency temporary standard. Congress contemplated that emergency temporary standards would be developed and issued without the benefit of ordinary standard-setting procedures involving public comment and open hearings in the interest of permitting rapid action to meet emergencies. But, by the language of subsection 6(e), it clearly refused to eliminate the general requirement of articulation of the reasons for such action as an essential safeguard to emergency temporary standard-setting.
The only statement of reasons offered by OSHA and contained in the preamble to the Emergency Temporary Standard consists of the finding that the 14 chemicals listed in the standard are carcinogens and the conclusion, reciting the language of subsection 6(c) (1) of the Act, that the conditions necessary for the issuance of an emergency temporary standard have been met. We find this statement of reasons inadequate. In the context of a voluminous factual record, such a conclusory statement of reasons places too great a burden on interested persons to determine and challenge the basis for the standard, and makes possible in any subsequent judicial review the use of posthoc rationalizations that do not necessarily reflect the reasoning of the agency at the time the standard was issued.
The remaining issues raised in this case may be dealt with briefly. Industry petitioners contend that OSHA violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to the promulgation of the standard. Paragraph 102(2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C), and the Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality on the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 36 Fed.Reg. 7724 (April 23, 1971), require all federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement in connection with major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and to complete that statement before action is taken. We see no reason to create a general exemption for OSHA from this requirement. The decision in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 158 U.S.App.D.C. -, 486 F.2d 375 (1973), was a carefully limited one, creating a narrow exemption from the requirements of NEPA for the environmentally protective regulatory activities of the Environmental Protective Agency under a statute-the Clean Air Act-which provides effective procedures to accomplish NEPA's purposes. Nevertheless, while the NEPA requirement of an environmental impact statement applies to ordinary standards promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, an exception should be made for the Emergency Temporary Standard involved in this case.14 The process by which NEPA statements are produced and circulated is a lengthy one. To require its completion before the promulgation of an emergency temporary standard would impair the purpose of subsection 6(c) to provide speedy protection from grave dangers to the health of employees. No doubt any exemption of emergency temporary standards under this Act from the requirement of an environmental impact statement involves some sacrifice of the policy behind NEPA. However, that sacrifice is mitigated somewhat by the fact that an emergency temporary standard must be replaced within six months by a permanent standard, for which a completed impact statement is required, and it is, in any case, justified by the need to accommodate the provisions of NEPA with those of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. We therefore have concluded that where, as here, OSHA begins the process contemplated by NEPA by issuing a draft environmental impact statement within a reasonable time after issuing an emergency temporary standard, the requirements of NEPA are sufficiently satisfied.15
On May 3, 1973, pursuant to the congressional mandate set forth in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (the Act), the Secretary of Labor promulgated an Emergency Temporary Standard regulating employee exposure to fourteen (14) substances which the Secretary determined to be carcinogenic (cancer-causing). Several manufacturers and users of two (2) of these substances, dichlorobenzedine (DCB) and ethyleneimine (EI), petitioned this court to vacate the Emergency Temporary Standard in so far as it applied to these substances.
These petitioners contend that there was no substantial evidence in the Secretary's findings to show that employees are subjected to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful as required by 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1) and that the Secretary's reasons for issuing the Emergency Temporary Standard were inadequate. The majority opinion agrees with these propositions and thereby vacates the Emergency Temporary Standard's provisions relative to DCB and EI. I must respectfully dissent.
The record before us contains the results of various scientific experiments which stand for the proposition that ingestion of DCB and EI may cause cancerous tumors to develop in the anatomical structures of mice and rats. These findings led the Secretary to conclude that DCB and EI could possibly produce similar results in the human anatomy and he therefore issued the Emergency Temporary Standard. The Act requires that, upon judicial review of any standard promulgated pursuant to its provisions, "determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." 29 U.S.C. § 655(f). Stated another way, there must be substantial evidence in the record to justify setting aside the Standard. Here, the Secretary has taken affirmative action to protect and preserve human life. Petitioners have asked this court to invalidate that action. Obviously the petitioners must bear the burden of proof, i. e. they must be able to show by substantial evidence that their conduct does not jeopardize the health of their workers. They, however, merely assert that since there is inconclusive scientific data proving DCB and EI to be carcinogenic in man, the Standard should be set aside. Those assertions cannot be reasonably accepted as substantial evidence and clearly the Standard should remain.
Subsection (c) (1) (A) of Section 655 of the Act provides that "The Secretary shall provide * * * for an emergency temporary standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register if he determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful * * *." The majority takes the position that the phrase "determined to be toxic or physically harmful" requires the Secretary to establish, by substantial evidence, that a substance is potentially harmful and that a showing of some possibility of harm would not justify the issuance of an Emergency Temporary Standard. To decide whether Congress empowered the Secretary to regulate a substance or agent because it is possibly harmful, probably harmful, or actually harmful is to engage in a futile exercise in semantics. My reading of the Act and its legislative history makes one thing abundantly clear: Congress intended to protect the health and safety of the American worker. Therefore, I would hold that even a scintilla of evidence which tends to prove a substance carcinogenic in man or animal justifies the issuance of an Emergency Temporary Standard.
Industry petitioners argue that there must also be substantial evidence to support OSHA's determination that employees are in fact being exposed to those harmful substances. Although subsection 6(c) (1) readily lends itself to such a reading, that interpretation would render ineffective the provision for emergency temporary standards. The purpose of subsection 6(c) (1) is to provide immediate protection in cases where there is a grave danger of harm to employees. This necessarily requires rather sweeping regulation. OSHA cannot be expected to conduct on-the-spot investigations of every user to determine if exposure is occurring. In cases where OSHA determines that a substance is sufficiently harmful that a grave danger would be created by exposure, OSHA must be allowed to issue necessary regulations. In other words exposure can be assumed to be occurring at any place where there is a substance that has been determined to be sufficiently harmful to pose a grave danger and where the regulations that have been determined to be necessary to meet that danger are not in effect. This interpretation of subsection 6(c) (1) is supported by the existence of subsection 6(d), which provides that any affected employer may obtain a variance from any standard if he can show that "the conditions, practices, means, methods, operations, or processes used or proposed to be used by an employer will provide employment and places of employment to his employees which are as safe and healthful as those which would prevail if he complied with the standard."
It has long been settled that in reviewing an agency action and the adequacy of an agency's articulation of its action, including findings of fact and reasoning processes, courts must look to the record that was considered by the agency and to the factual findings and reasoning of the agency-not to post hoc rationalizations of counsel or even agency members and not to evidentiary materials that were not considered by the agency. See, e.g., Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971); N.L.R.B. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443-444, 85 S. Ct. 1061, 13 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1965); Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-169, 83 S. Ct. 239, 9 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1962). Furthermore, where, as here, the statute authorizing the agency action specifically requires that such action be supported "by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole" [emphasis added], it is clear that OSHA may not go beyond the record in promulgating a standard or in supporting a standard in any subsequent judicial review. Cf. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel, 406 U.S. 742, 756-757, 92 S. Ct. 1941, 32 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1972)
The court in Kennecott Copper found that the regulation there satisfied the provision in Sec. 4 of the APA for a "concise general statement" of the basis and purpose of a regulation, but nevertheless remanded " [i]n the interest of justice, . . . and in aid of the judicial function." This distinction does not in any way diminish the force of the court's decision to remand for a clarification of the factual basis of the regulation. In addition, the case before us is not governed by Sec. 4 of the APA but by subsection 6(e) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which we read as imposing a more stringent requirement for a statement of reasons. The opinion of the court in Kennecott Copper also stresses the need to avoid imposing cumbersome and time-consuming procedures that would hinder a new agency in the discharge of its novel and sensitive tasks. We fully agree, but like the court in Kennecott Copper hold that the need for expedition cannot excuse the lack of an adequate statement of reasons