Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/664/356/198530/
Timestamp: 2019-12-09 23:08:38
Document Index: 686465150

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 146', '§ 146', '§ 10', '§ 102', '§ 10', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 1385', '§ 146', '§ 102']

Standard Oil Company (indiana) v. Montedison, S.p.a., a Corporation of Italy, Phillipspetroleum Company, Acorporation of Delaware, Ande.i. Du Pont De Nemours and Company, Acorporationof Delaware.appeal of Standard Oil Company (indiana).appeal of E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company.appeal of Montedison, S.p.a, 664 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981) :: Justia
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Standard Oil Company (indiana) v. Montedison, S.p.a., a Corporation of Italy, Phillipspetroleum Company, Acorporation of Delaware, Ande.i. Du Pont De Nemours and Company, Acorporationof Delaware.appeal of Standard Oil Company (indiana).appeal of E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company.appeal of Montedison, S.p.a, 664 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 664 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981) Argued April 23, 1981. Decided Oct. 14, 1981
Before HUNTER, SLOVITER, Circuit Judges and MEANOR, District Judge* .
Each of the unsuccessful parties to the interference proceeding in the Patent Office filed civil actions in January 1972, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 146, challenging the Board's decision.4 The actions, which were eventually consolidated for all purposes, were assigned to Judge Caleb M. Wright.5 They were then stayed pending resolution of earlier-filed patent infringement suits before the same judge arising out of a different patent owned by Montedison which covered a form of crystalline polypropylene not at issue here. That litigation was settled in March 1975. Thereafter, plaintiffs in this action sought to amend their complaints to make additional allegations against Montedison including charges of fraudulent activities in the Patent Office in the prosecution of the Natta group's patent application. The denial of permission to amend was reversed by this court which held that in appropriate circumstances the district court may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, hear issues of fraud affecting the Board's decision on priority although such issues were not raised in the interference proceeding. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 540 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976). On remand, the district court permitted the amendment of the complaints to add claims that Montedison committed fraud on the Patent Office affecting the Board's decision on priority. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 431 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Del. 1977). The consolidated cases then advanced to trial of the issues.
During the course of the 85-day trial conducted between September 19, 1977 and May 17, 1978, the district court received, in addition to the voluminous record compiled in the Patent Office, considerable new evidence including several thousand exhibits and the testimony of a number of experts in the area of physical and polymer chemistry. On January 11, 1980, the district court issued a detailed opinion which it supplemented on February 28, 1980 when it entered the order which is the subject of this appeal. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370 (D. Del. 1980).
The district court also determined that Phillips had proved that Montedison fraudulently withheld information from Patent Office examiners, and that this fraud was detrimental to Phillips' case for priority of invention in the Patent Office. It held therefore that Phillips' burden of proof, which would ordinarily require it to adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the Board's findings regarding the priority date, was reduced to a preponderance of evidence standard. 494 F. Supp. at 375-76. The court concluded, nonetheless, that Phillips had in fact proven its case by clear and convincing evidence. 494 F. Supp. at 435. Finally, the district court sua sponte reached the issue of the patentability of Phillips' product and found that the crystalline polypropylene of the interference count was useful, novel and non-obvious, and therefore patentable to Phillips. 494 F. Supp. at 454-456, reaffirmed at 456-61. The court's judgment, entered February 28, 1980, authorized the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to issue letters patent to Hogan et al. and their assignee, Phillips.
An action brought under 35 U.S.C. § 146 is a trial de novo; the statute provides that the Patent Office record shall be admitted in the district court proceeding "without prejudice to the right of the parties to take further testimony." See Frilette v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 980, 95 S. Ct. 1983, 44 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1975); Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Carborundum Co., 155 F.2d 746, 748 (3d Cir. 1946). Nevertheless, a section 146 proceeding is governed by the strict rule that the Board's decision on priority, a "question of fact," is not to be disturbed "unless the contrary is established by testimony which in character and amount carries thorough conviction." Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 125, 14 S. Ct. 772, 773, 38 L. Ed. 657 (1894); Stamicarbon, N. V. v. Chemical Construction Corp., 544 F.2d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1976).
As to our review of the district court, it is plenary with respect to legal issues but subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) on factual matters. Stamicarbon, N. V. v. Chemical Construction Corp., 544 F.2d at 648. In this case, as one would expect, the appellants contend that this court should exercise plenary review of the decision of the district court. Phillips, on the other hand, argues that the trial court's findings should be reviewed in the same manner as in any other kind of law suit. While the proper construction of a patent application ultimately presents a legal issue, Methode Electronics, Inc. v. Elco Corp., 385 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1967); Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Carborundum Co., 155 F.2d at 749, where the district court's decision on the adequacy of the disclosures of a patent application is based on an evaluation of expert testimony, it has been held that the decision presents a mixed question of law and fact. Hinde v. Hot Sulphur Springs, Colorado, 482 F.2d 829, 835 (10th Cir. 1973); see Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 547 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929, 93 S. Ct. 2753, 37 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1973). The "clearly erroneous" standard of review under Rule 52(a) has been found to be particularly appropriate in cases, such as this, involving complex chemical patents. See Ludlow Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chemical Co., 636 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609-10, 70 S. Ct. 854, 856-57, 94 L. Ed. 1097 (1950).
Generally, in determining entitlement to a patent when there are contending inventors, priority is awarded to the party who first reduced to practice a conception of the invention if all other conditions of patentability are satisfied. See Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 477 F.2d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1973); Grefco, Inc. v. Kewanee Industries, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 844, 848 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd, No. 80-2753 (3d Cir. Aug. 3, 1981); 3 Chisum, Patents § 10.01 (1981).6 Reduction to practice may be established by a party either by reliance on the filing date of its application, which constitutes constructive reduction to practice, or by proof of actual reduction to practice on an earlier date. See Kardulas v. Florida Machine Products Co., 438 F.2d 1118, 1120-22 (5th Cir. 1971); 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); 3 Chisum, Patents § 10.02.
Section 112 expressly provides that the specification of an application shall contain: a description of the invention, sufficient information to enable one skilled in the art to make and use the invention, and the best mode known to the applicant of carrying out the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112. In addition, section 101 has been construed to impose the requirement of a practical utility disclosure. Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d at 886; see Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 16 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1966).
Turning first to the challenges made to the adequacy of Phillips' disclosure of the count invention, it is undisputed that Phillips' 1953 application does not contain either the language "consisting essentially of recurring propylene units," or the language "having a substantial crystalline polypropylene content." However, to satisfy the disclosure requirements of section 112, the description of the invention need not repeat the language of the count in haec verba but may be in any manner which adequately but necessarily communicates the invention of the count to persons of ordinary skill in the art reading the application at the time of its filing. Stamicarbon, N. V. v. Chemical Construction Corp., 544 F.2d at 652; In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (Cust. & Pat.App.1976); see Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Oklahoma, Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 896 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018, 100 S. Ct. 672, 62 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1980). The language of the application is deemed the legal equivalent of the language of the count if the necessary and only reasonable construction which can be given it is the same as the construction given the language of the count. See Wagoner v. Barger, 463 F.2d 1377, 1380 (Cust. & Pat.App.1972). The party who asserts inherent disclosure has the heavy burden of proving it. Id.
After examination of the application, consideration of the expert testimony produced by Phillips and consideration of the evidence that six independent research groups produced a product complying with Phillips disclosures that always and inevitably conformed to the three limitations of the Count, the district court concluded "that Phillips's 1953 application disclosed crystalline polypropylene." 494 F. Supp. at 430.
The object of polymerization9 is to break the double bond joining the atomic groups constituting the molecular structure of the starting monomer, here, propylene, so that in the resulting polymer those groups are joined by a single bond and the released bond serves to form additional molecular units. Thus, a polymer contains a greater number of molecular units than its corresponding monomer. The district court graphically described and illustrated the polymerization process with respect to the monomer, propylene, in its opinion at 494 F. Supp. at 376.
494 F. Supp. at 376-77 (Footnotes omitted). Since the count requires only that qualifying polypropylene consist of "essentially" recurring propylene units, it permits small variations from a predominant structure of recurring head-to-tail propylene units.
It is, however, evident that the claim does not indicate the presence of major or "appreciable" unsaturation. Rather, the phrase is: "the major portion of the unsaturation ..." As the district court pointed out, the application expressly disclosed that the unsaturation of Phillips' polypropylene is no more than 2.4 double bonds per molecule. The court stated, "Fox testified that since the total number of recurring units in the molecules was greater than 400, it is justifiable to conclude that a skilled polymer chemist would have known that Phillips' scientists were discussing a 'minor feature' of the structure in their polymers." 494 F. Supp. at 432 (footnote omitted). Since the unsaturation was a negligible amount, it was not inconsistent with the limitation of the count that the product consist "essentially" of recurring propylene units.13
The count requires that the polypropylene have "a substantial crystalline polypropylene content." The appellants stress the conceded fact that the word "crystalline" does not appear in the Phillips 1953 application. Nonetheless, if the product was disclosed to be, in fact, crystalline in conformity with the count, the inventors' failure to appreciate the product's crystallinity, as such, does not detract from the adequacy of the disclosure. See Miller v. Watson, 129 F. Supp. 241, 242 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 229 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1955). As we previously indicated, an acceptable disclosure need not be in any precise language. See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 436, 31 S. Ct. 444, 447, 55 L. Ed. 527 (1911).
In concluding that the 1953 application inherently disclosed substantial crystalline polypropylene the district court relied on the testimony of Dr. Fox and another Phillips expert, Dr. Bailey, as well as the repetition experiments conducted by six independent research groups. Standard and Montedison raise both general and specific challenges to this evidence. Standard argues that Fox's testimony runs counter to "what was the appreciation at Phillips in 1952." Standard's Brief, p. 40. The appropriate inquiry, however, is the understanding and appreciation of knowledgeable polymer chemists at that time, rather than only the appreciation of Phillips. Moreover, subsequent testimony is admissible to show what interpretation would have been placed on a description of an invention in an application at the time of the filing of the application. In re Lange, 644 F.2d 856, 863 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
Standard argues, further, that the district court should not have accepted the melting point, density and intrinsic viscosity ranges set forth in the application because these ranges "were mere best guesses" by Hogan, the inventor. Hogan testified that far from being "guesses", those ranges were his estimates based on actual data, "evaluations and characterizations", made on these polypropylene products "reported back to (him)." Joint Appendix Vol. XIX, pp. E48-49. Standard does not refer us to any authority for its contention that an application which utilizes estimated ranges is defective. The precedent points to a contrary result. Krantz v. Olin, 356 F.2d 1016, 1019 (Cust. & Pat.App.1966) (citing Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 535-36, 8 S. Ct. 778, 782-783, 31 L. Ed. 863 (1888)), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982, 87 S. Ct. 1286, 18 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1967). Since Standard does not contend that Hogan's estimates were wrong, arbitrary or unreasonable, its attack on this ground must fail.
With respect to the property of insolubility stated in the 1953 application, Fox testified that the skilled polymer chemist who in 1953 read that Phillips' solid polypropylene was "insoluble in pentane at room temperature" would have understood: (1) that pentane was a chemically suitable solvent for dissolving polypropylene, (2) that the asserted insolubility of the polypropylene indicated that it was either cross-linked or crystalline and (3) that "insoluble ... at room temperature" meant that the product was soluble at some higher temperature and that therefore it was crystalline rather than cross-linked since cross-linked polymers were known to be insoluble at any temperature. Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B290-92, B296, B368, B374-75; Joint Appendix Vol. VII, pp. B2116-18. The district court made an express finding as to (1) above, 494 F. Supp. at 415, and Dr. Fox's other two conclusions are supported by contemporaneous publications, including an article by Montedison's expert, Bawn.14
However, there was convincing testimony in the district court that when "melting point" was used improperly in various publications, the amorphous nature of the material in question was made otherwise evident so that no confusion as to structure resulted from the misuse of the term. See Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B452-55; Joint Appendix Vol. VI, pp. B1870-71, B1874-81, B1885-87. In addition, Dr. Bailey, a Phillips' expert upon whose testimony the district court expressly relied, testified that where the expression "melting point" was used in the literature without other qualification, it necessarily indicated, and so indicated in 1952, a crystalline transition, i. e., a transition from a crystal to an amorphous form. 494 F. Supp. at 421, 431; Joint Appendix Vol. VII, p. B2226. Dr. Fox also testified that as used in the 1953 application with respect to Phillips' polypropylene, the term necessarily indicated a crystalline content. Joint Appendix Vol. III, p. B342.16
Furthermore, Dr. Fox's unrebutted testimony was that a melting point determined on the basis of a temperature-time cooling curve "clearly indicated that you have a crystalline polymer." Joint Appendix Vol. III, p. B374; see also Joint Appendix Vol. VI, pp. B1952-53. The cooling curve technique is used to discover the freezing point of a crystalline material, the point at which a molten, liquid material freezes being approximately the same as the point at which the solid material melts. Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B308-309, B322. A curve plotted on the basis of a series of points in time and the corresponding temperature readings at each point of the pre-heated and now cooling material shows an initial fast cooling until a plateau, a period of slow cooling which is the freezing point, is reached. Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B312-21. This plateau in turn is followed by rapid cooling again. With respect to an amorphous material, there is no freezing, no phase change from liquid to solid, a cooling curve shows no plateau, and the cooling curve technique, therefore, has no application. Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B324-28; see 494 F. Supp. at 414-15.
Appellants contend that substantial polypropylene crystallinity was not shown by the melting point and cooling curve disclosures and that the district court made no finding reversing the Board's negative finding in this respect. However, the district court specifically addressed this question and found that substantial crystallinity was disclosed based on Fox's testimony that a freezing point plateau which did not indicate a substantial amount of crystallinity would not be reported. 494 F. Supp. at 431; Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B412-13.
The district court concluded that the evidence of the significance of solubility, viscosity, density and melting point determination contributed to the ultimate finding of inherency. 494 F. Supp. at 431. Our examination of the record leads us to the same conclusion.
Judge Wright distinguished Stamicarbon from this case on the ground that Stamicarbon involved a process patent, where the application must disclose a functioning process which "must work every time", whereas this case involves a product patent where "the only claim is that when the disclosed process produces a product with certain specified characteristics, that product invariably falls within the Count." 494 F. Supp. at 384. Montedison and Standard argue that the district court committed a fundamental error of law, Standard terming the court's distinction between product and process "pure sophistry." Standard's Brief, p. 34.
494 F. Supp. at 430. We believe there is ample support for this finding in the record. We therefore affirm the district court's finding of inherent disclosure.
The patent law authorizes the grant of a patent only for a new and "useful" process or product. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Any consideration of the requirement that a patent application must show utility should begin with the decision of the Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 16 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1966). In applying that requirement to a chemical process, the Court rejected the view that a sufficient showing of utility can be made merely because the chemical process produces the intended product or the compound yielded belongs to a class of compounds which are the subject of serious scientific investigation. Instead, the Court reasoned that the statutory grant of a patent monopoly is given only for "the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility." Id. at 534, 86 S. Ct. at 1042. The Court continued,
Id. at 534-35, 86 S. Ct. at 1042. The Court also accepted the Patent Office's rejection of the contention that there was a sufficient showing of utility because a related compound had demonstrated utility, since there was no showing that the compound yielded by the process at issue would have characteristics and effects similar to the other compound.
Montedison and Du Pont, however, contend that the Phillips statement of utility is too vague to be an adequate disclosure of substantial utility and rely on the holdings in Anderson v. Natta, 480 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973), and Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson, 247 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 955, 78 S. Ct. 540, 2 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1958). These cases are distinguishable. The Phillips application has an affirmative statement of utility, unlike the product description, "plastic-like", relied on as a disclosure of utility in Anderson v. Natta. Similarly, in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson, the patent application was for a process producing polymers forming films but the application failed to disclose the use for such films. 247 F.2d at 801; but see Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger's dissenting opinion. Id. at 802. That application also stated that the polymers were useful because of their thermal stability and resistance to various fluids but failed to disclose how those properties might contribute to the polymers' utility. Id. at 801. Thus the court held the disclosed characteristics of the polymers did not constitute a utility disclosure. In contrast, the Phillips application contained both a statement of utility and disclosure of the properties of solid polypropylene.
The requirement that a specific utility must be disclosed is directed to one skilled in the art; that which is obvious to such a skilled person, including obvious specific utility, need not be expressly stated. See Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 886 (Cust. & Pat.App.1973); In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1406 (Cust. & Pat.App.1969). See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d 120, 133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014, 101 S. Ct. 573, 66 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1980); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 461 F.2d 66, 74 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997, 93 S. Ct. 319, 34 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1972). Fox testified that in 1952 the plastics industry was a well-known, fast-growing field in polymer industrial chemistry, and a polymer chemist in 1952 would have understood that a solid polymer which was said to have the usefulness of a solid plastic could be used as existing polymer plastics were then being used, i. e., that it was a moldable material of high Young's modulus20 for which many specific applications were known to exist. Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B256-69; B378-81; Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B2176-78.21 Fox testified that among such applications were "mold(ing) a button, a poker chip, a rod, a sheet" and extruding filaments for insulation for noise and for heat. Joint Appendix Vol. VII, p. B2150. The trial court relied on this testimony in finding the disclosure of a definite practical utility.
Proof of one of the disclosed utilities suffices to meet the statutory utility requirement. Krantz v. Olin, 356 F.2d at 1019. See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980). Therefore, Phillips argues that even if there are uses for solid plastics for which its product was unsuitable, those for which it is suitable are disclosed when its utility statement is considered together with the description of the properties of its product. It is recognized that the required utility disclosure can be met if the disclosed properties of the invention indicate the material is useful for a specific purpose. See Ciric v. Flanigen, 511 F.2d 1182, 1185 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Folkers, 344 F.2d 970, 974 (C.C.P.A. 1965). Fox testified that from the properties described in the Phillips 1953 application obvious specific uses would be inferred:
Joint Appendix Vol. III, pp. B381-82; see also id., B262-63, B383 and B495-96, Joint Appendix Vol. VII, pp. B2144-52, Joint Appendix Vol. VII, p. B2150. The court relied upon Dr. Fox's analysis in rejecting the challenges to Phillips' disclosure of utility. 494 F. Supp. at 435. We agree that the utility disclosure was adequate.22
Montedison and Standard contend that the ex parte experiments of Phillips' Witt and DeLap were erroneously admitted and accorded weight by the district court. Where, as here, the party seeking to discredit ex parte tests is permitted discovery of the persons who performed them and cross-examination at trial of the witness who testifies as to the conditions of the tests and their relevance, such tests have the status of other evidence and the district court did not err in finding them persuasive on the question of inherent disclosure. See Johnson & Johnson v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 704, 719 n.28 (D. Del. 1977); 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1385(3) (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
Having concluded that Phillips' 1953 application disclosed the count invention and upon consideration of the record made in the Patent Office on the patentability of the count invention, the district court determined that Phillips' crystalline polypropylene is patentable to Phillips and authorized the Patent and Trademark Office to issue the patent to Phillips as authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 146. Montedison urges that this was error in that the issue was decided without having been raised or addressed by the parties. However, as the district court pointed out, the question of patentability of an invention to a successful section 146 plaintiff is not an issue which the district court may ignore. Hill v. Wooster, 132 U.S. 693, 698, 10 S. Ct. 228, 230, 33 L. Ed. 502 (1890); see Sanford v. Kepner, 344 U.S. 13, 15, 73 S. Ct. 75, 76, 97 L. Ed. 12 (1952). Moreover, following the announcement of its initial decision in an opinion issued January 11, 1980, and before entry of final judgment on February 28, 1980, the district court accepted briefing and heard argument on the issue and, in an opinion issued February 28, 1980, answered appellants' objections. No objections on the merits of the decision are raised on appeal.
On October 6, 1964, the Board terminated the proceedings as to Vandenberg and his assignee Hercules because they could not allege a date of invention prior to the date on which Zletz filed his application. See Vandenberg v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 242 F. Supp. 188, 189 (D.D.C. 1965). The remaining contending parties engaged in extensive discovery proceedings, necessitating various judicial determinations. See, e. g., Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1969); In re Natta, 410 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969); Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1968); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Natta, 388 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1968), overruled, Frilette v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 980, 95 S. Ct. 1983, 44 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1975); Natta v. Zletz, 379 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1967). The extensive record before the Board was finally completed in April 1970. Over 1,000 exhibits had been submitted and over 100 witnesses deposed in 18,000 pages of testimony. The Board heard oral argument at a final hearing on October 28 and 29, 1970 and issued its decision on November 29, 1971.
The major exception occurs when a party who was later in actual reduction to practice can nevertheless prove that s/he conceived the invention first and exercised reasonable diligence in reducing that invention to practice. See Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34-35, 63 S. Ct. 1393, 1408-10, 87 L. Ed. 1731 (1943). The statute provides, "In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other." 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)