Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-%C2%A7-6514/
Timestamp: 2020-01-22 03:53:32
Document Index: 195514741

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6514', '§ 6514', '§ 6514', '§ 6512', '§ 6514', '§ 6514', '§ 6514', '§ 6512']

Category: CPLR § 6514
(b) Discretionary cancellation
The court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as
it may require, may direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of
pendency, if the plaintiff has not commenced or prosecuted the action
Inasmuch as the motion was made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the
court must accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true and
accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704; Smith v Meridian Tech., Inc., 52 AD3d 685,
686). In general, it may be appropriate to impose a constructive trust
in situations " [w]hen property has been acquired in such circumstances
that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain
the beneficial interest'" (Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121, quoting Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co.,
225 NY 380, 386). The necessary elements for the imposition of a
constructive trust are: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship;
(2) a promise; (3) a transfer in reliance on that promise; and (4)
unjust enrichment (see Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d at 121; Pereira v Glicker, 61 AD3d 948; Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d 32,
37). Here, the complaint does not adequately plead a cause of action to
impose a constructive trust on the Bethpage property. While there was a
confidential relationship between the plaintiff and Galindo as 50%
shareholders in Demo, and Galindo and Madia may have been unjustly
enriched by the alleged diversion of Demo's assets, there was no
promise to either the plaintiff or Demo with respect to the Bethpage
property and no transfer of that property in reliance on any promise.
Indeed, there is no allegation that either the plaintiff or Demo had
any preexisting interest or expectation of an interest in the Bethpage
property. The complaint contains the plaintiff's acknowledgment that
Madia borrowed the money using his own credit to pay for the purchase
of the property, and it is not alleged that any assets of Demo or
personal funds of the plaintiff were used in the purchase of the
property (see Gargano v V.C. & J. Constr. Corp., 148 AD2d 417, 418—419).
Inasmuch as the cause of action seeking to impose a constructive
trust on the Bethpage property was the only cause of action in the
complaint that would affect the title to, or the possession, use or
enjoyment of that property, that branch of the defendants' motion which
was to cancel the notice of pendency should have been granted (see CPLR 6514[b]; Shkolnik v Krutoy, 32 AD3d 536, 537; Distinctive Custom Homes Bldg. Corp. v Esteves, 12 AD3d 559).
Author DMGPosted on August 9, 2009 Categories CPLR § 6514, CPLR R. 3211Leave a comment on CPLR § 6514 and Fun With Constructive Trusts
The plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, to
impose a constructive trust in her favor on certain real property
formerly owned by her. She filed a notice of pendency on the property
on April 12, 2007. On or about May 1, 2007, the defendant Harvey Sorid
was served with four copies of the summons and complaint at the
business office of all of the defendants. On May 4, 2007, the plaintiff
mailed two copies of the summons and complaint to the business office,
addressed to each of the defendants Jay Sorid and Susan Sorid
(hereinafter together the appellants). The envelopes were marked
"privileged + confidential."
The appellants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 6514(a) to
cancel the notice of pendency and pursuant to CPLR 6514(c) for an award
of costs, arguing that Harvey Sorid did not have an ownership interest
in the premises and that service was not properly effectuated upon
either of them within the 30-day time limit of CPLR 6512. The
appellants did not challenge personal jurisdiction [*2]as
it was undisputed that service was effectuated upon them in June 2007.
The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that Harvey Sorid had an
equitable interest in the property and therefore service upon him was
sufficient to avoid cancellation of the notice of pendency, and that,
in any event, service had been effectuated on the appellants pursuant
to CPLR 308(2) within the statutory time period. In the order appealed
from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the
appellants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 6514(a) to cancel the
notice of pendency and pursuant to CPLR 6514(c) for an award of costs.
We affirm the order insofar as appealed from.
CPLR 6514(a) provides for mandatory cancellation of a notice of
pendency if service of a summons has not been completed within the time
period set forth in CPLR 6512, which is 30 days after filing of the
notice of pendency. In multi-defendant cases, service is sufficient for
purposes of CPLR 6514(a) if it is timely made on any one defendant with
an ownership interest in the subject property (see Merchants Bank of N.Y. v Rosenberg, 31 AD3d 507; Weiner v MKVII-Westchester, 292 AD2d 597; Rabinowitz v Larkfield Bldg. Corp., 231 AD2d 703; Slutsky v Blooming Grove Inn, 147 AD2d 208, 212).
However, for the purposes of CPLR 6514, service upon the
appellants was timely effectuated pursuant to CPLR 308(2). While the
envelopes mailed to their business office erroneously bore the legend
"privileged + confidential" instead of "personal and confidential,"
under the circumstances of this case, where the defect does not
implicate personal jurisdiction and no prejudice resulted from the
mislabeling, the defect was properly disregarded pursuant to CPLR 2001 (see Patrician Plastic Corp. v Bernadel Realty Corp., 25 NY2d 599, 608; Matter of Perez v Villamil, 19 AD3d 501; Federal Loan Home Mtge. Corp v Torres, 238 AD2d 306, 307).
notice of pendency is effective only if, within thirty days after
filing, a summons is served upon the defendant or first publication of
the summons against the defendant is made pursuant to an order and
publication is subsequently completed. If the defendant dies within
thirty days after filing and before the summons is served upon him or
publication is completed, the notice is effective only if the summons
is served upon his executor or administrator within sixty days after
letters are issued.
Author DMGPosted on November 8, 2008 Categories CPLR § 6512, CPLR § 6514Leave a comment on CPLR § 6514(a); § 6514(c); § 6512