Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19900208_0000064.SNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-21 08:58:12
Document Index: 748414758

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2720', '§ 1300', '§ 1300', '§ 1303', '§ 1304', '§\n1304']

| DEI DOGI CALZATURE v. SUMMA TRADING CORP.
DEI DOGI CALZATURE v. SUMMA TRADING CORP.
DEI DOGI CALZATURE S.P.A., PLAINTIFF,v.SUMMA TRADING CORPORATION, CAST (1983) LTD., M/V CAST CARIBOU, HER ENGINES, BOILERS, ETC., ATLANTIC CONBULK MARITIME CORPORATION, ATLANTIC MARITIME CORPORATION, AND JOHN DOE SHIPPING COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANTS. CAST (1983) LTD., AND ATLANTIC CONBULK MARITIME CORP., THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS, V. ANDREA SARTI, BRUZZONE SHIPPING, INC., GARFIELD TRANSPORT, INC. AND FRANCOIS ROBERT, THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiff Dei Dogi Calzature S.P.A., an Italian importer,
brings this suit to recover the losses it has suffered due to
the receipt of a container holding 8,086 kilograms of water
instead of the expected $433,607 worth of leather jackets and
shoes. Defendant Cast (1983) Ltd. (Cast) is the owner and
operator of the ship which transported the container containing
the water. The role of Cast is limited to arranging for the
transportation of the container from New Jersey to Montreal,
loading the container at Montreal and then issuing an "on
board" bill of lading. See Cast 3(g) at 2-4, ¶¶ 3, 8a.
On January 30, 1989, Cast moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and "for an Order
vacating security arranged in favor of plaintiff pursuant to
Rule E, Supplemental Rules for certain Admiralty and Maritime
On August 29, 1989, the Court placed the matter on the
suspense calendar pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules for the
Division of Business Among District Judges. On September 14,
1989, Cast moved for reargument of its motion for summary
judgment and the Court's decision to place the case on the
suspense calendar. Then, by letter dated January 5, 1990,
plaintiff informed the Court that its settlement negotiations
with Cast had failed and that it "would also like to see the
legal entanglements in which it has been cast . . . resolved as
soon as possible." In addition, plaintiff's letter urged the
Court to decide the summary judgment motion in its favor,
despite the absence of a formal cross-motion. Cast has
responded to said letter and the Court will treat it as a
cross-motion for summary judgment. See Local 33 v. Mason
Tenders, 291 F.2d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1961); 10A Wright, Miller &
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2720, at
29-35. The Court removes the case from the suspense calendar
and addresses the outstanding motions submitted by Cast and
Cast argues that the Court should dismiss the complaint
without even addressing the issue of liability, because
plaintiff has not suffered any damages. A brief review of
plaintiff's legal maneuvers is necessary to understand Cast's
argument. Upon receipt of Cast's bill of lading, the Banca
Popolare di Milano (the Bank) branch in New York deducted
$433,607 from plaintiff's account and paid the shipper, Summa
Trading Corp. (Summa), pursuant to the terms of a letter of
credit. After the container of water arrived in Switzerland,
plaintiff instituted two lawsuits: this action and a separate
action in Italy against the Bank. The latter action alleged
that the Bank had been negligent in honoring the bill of
lading. According to plaintiff, "on September 4, 1989 the
Italian Court issued something similar to a temporary
restraining order against the bank[, preventing the Bank from
continuing its deduction of the $433,607 from plaintiff's
account]. However it is not known when the [Italian] Court will
make a final determination." DeOrchis Aff. at ¶ 12, Ex. 9. Cast
contends that this "Italian TRO" means that plaintiff has yet
to sustain any damages and that the complaint must therefore be
The pending Italian suit does not cause plaintiff's claims to
become unripe for adjudication. Cast does not dispute that the
risk of loss passed to plaintiff when the bill of lading was
issued and that the ownership of the missing cargo passed to
plaintiff when its bank paid the shipper. The acts which
plaintiff alleges render Cast liable for the loss of
plaintiff's cargo are neither hypothetical nor abstract. Since
the "allegedly injurious events," Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143, 95 S.Ct. 335, 358, 42 L.Ed.2d 320
(1974), have already transpired, the issue of
liability presents a ripe case or controversy and the Court
proceeds to rule on the merits of the motion. See Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
82, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2635, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (case is ripe
because waiting would not "significantly advance our ability to
deal with the legal issues presented nor aid us in their
resolution").
Cast contends that this suit should be governed by the
Canadian Carriage of Goods by Water Act rather than by the
United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C.
App. § 1300, et seq. Nevertheless, Cast concedes, "This
[Canadian] Act is in all material respects identical to the
U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act." See Cast Br. at 6 (Jan. 30,
1989). Indeed, Cast only cites U.S. COGSA cases in its papers
despite its supposed reliance on Canadian law.
The Court applies United States law because the terms of
United States COGSA dictate that that statute govern this bill
BILLS OF LADING SUBJECT TO CHAPTER
Every bill of lading or similar document of title
which is evidence of a contract for the carriage
of goods by sea to or from ports of the United
States, in foreign trade, shall have effect
46 U.S.C. App. § 1300.*fn1 Although the actual voyage was from
Montreal, Canada to New York, New York to Chiasso, Switzerland,
the parties contracted for a voyage from New York to
Switzerland. See Cast Ex. A, Pl.Ex. 2 at 2. Accordingly, the
contract was for the carriage of goods by sea from a United
States port and the Court applies United States COGSA law in
COGSA provides that a bill of lading is prima facie evidence
of the carrier's receipt of the goods described in the bill of
lading. 46 U.S.C. App. § 1303(4). There is no dispute that
water is all that arrived in Switzerland. Thus, plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case against the carrier. Once a prima
facie showing has been made, the burden usually shifts to the
carrier to show either that the loss was not due to the
carrier's negligence or that the carrier qualifies for one of
the "excepted" clauses in 46 U.S.C. App. § 1304. Among the
exceptions to carrier responsibility are 46 U.S.C. App. §§
1304(2)(i) (loss arising from acts or omission of the shipper
or his agent), 1304(2)(q) (cause arising without the actual
fault and privity of the carrier) and 1304(5) ("in connection
with the transportation of the goods if the nature or value
thereof has been knowingly and fraudulently misstated by the
shipper in the bill of lading"). Cast attempts to rebut
plaintiff's prima facie case by pointing to the uncontested
admissions of Andrea Sarti, the head of Summa, that he and his
agents deceptively filled the container with water. Cast 3(g)
at 3-4, ¶ 8.
Plaintiff responds that the "excepted" clauses do not apply
in this case, because the allegations are "not based on theft
of the [cargo] . . . or on . . . [the carrier's] negligence,
but on the carrier's false representation that it loaded" the
cargo specified in the bill of lading on to the ship. See
Berisford Metals Corp. v. S/S Salvador, 779 F.2d ...