Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/1964/36989-1.html
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 00:13:11
Document Index: 794713659

Matched Legal Cases: ['sui generis', '§ 2', '§ 359', '§ 4077', 'Art. 1', '§ 16']

Puget Constr. Co. v. Pierce Cy. :: 1964 :: Washington Supreme Court Decisions :: Washington Case Law :: Washington Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Washington Case Law › Washington Supreme Court Decisions › 1964 › Puget Constr. Co. v. Pierce Cy.
Puget Constr. Co. v. Pierce Cy.
64 Wn.2d 453 (1964)
392 P.2d 227
PUGET CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellant, v. PIERCE COUNTY, Respondent.[*]
No. 36989.
*454 Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester and Lyle L. Iversen, for appellant.
(2) That appellant encountered subsurface riprap conditions unknown to and unanticipated by either party which increased the cost of construction substantially and *455 would, under the contract, entitle appellant the additional costs as compensable extras;
"All such claims for damages must locate and describe the defect which caused the injury, describe the injury, and contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a statement of the actual residence of the claimant at the time of presenting and filing the claim and for a period of six months immediately prior to the time the claim accrued and be sworn to by the claimant: Provided, That *456 if the claimant is incapacitated from verifying and filing his claim for damages within the time prescribed, or if the claimant is a minor, or in case the claim is for damages to real or personal property, and the owner of the property is a nonresident of the county or is absent therefrom during the time within which a claim for damages is required to be filed, the claim may be verified and presented on behalf of the claimant by any relative or attorney or agent representing the injured person or, in case of damages to property, representing the owner thereof."
"... Such funds are `moneys got through imposition,' and the obligation to do justice rests upon all persons, natural or artificial; and, if the county obtains money or property from others without authority of law, [the law] independent of any statute compels restitution or compensation."
And we reach the conclusion that our statement in Corwin Inv. Co. v. White, 166 Wash. 195, 6 P. (2d) 607 (1932), cited by appellant, that an action against a county to recover *457 void taxes arises upon an implied unwritten contract and, therefore, comes within the 3-year statute of limitations, does not affect the statute prescribing the filing of claims for damages. We assume, in the absence of statutory procedure, that suits to recover taxes collected illegally or under a void law are sui generis and that these tax suits give us no rule of decision as to the meaning of the statutes referring to "all claims for damages."
[1] The word damages as employed in the statute means the sum of money which the law imposes or awards as compensation, or recompense, or in satisfaction for an injury done, or a wrong sustained as a consequence, either of a breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious act or omission. 15 Am. Jur., Damages § 2. This meaning makes good sense when considered in connection with the requirements of a claim as prescribed in RCW 36.45.020, because in many instances it is virtually impossible to distinguish between a claim ex contractu and one ex delicto and the information sought is equally important in either case.
By way of illustration, when a county operates a parking lot in connection with a park and charges a fee for its use, it has both a contractual duty to its patrons to maintain the lot and is liable in tort for its failure to keep the *458 premises in a reasonably safe condition. The same contractual obligations, seemingly identical with duties imposed under the law of torts, arise in the operation of county hospitals and sanitariums, or in the sale and distribution of water and electricity. Where a breach of such duty is claimed, the information required to be furnished by a claimant as a prelude to legal action seems as valuable to the county and quite as appropriate to the occasion in contract as in tort.
Although a careful study of the case law in this jurisdiction shows the precedents to be in conflict and to a substantial degree irreconcilable because obiter dicta in one case has been adopted as the rationale of another, we can discern a consistent thread of policy running through the cases. The early case of Hoexter v. Judson, 21 Wash. 646, 59 Pac. 498 (1899), arose from a payment under protest to Pierce County of a tax lien filed upon goods sold to plaintiff. Plaintiff asserted that his vendor had purchased the goods before the time when the taxes for that year could by law become a lien thereon, and that, when the goods became the property of plaintiff through a purchase, he took them free from any valid lien claim by the county. Accordingly, he paid the lien under protest, took possession, and brought action to recover the amount paid the county to lift the tax lien. No claim having been filed with the Board of County Commissioners as then required by statute, judgment of dismissal gave rise to the appeal.
Narrowing the issues, the court said:
"... On the part of the county, the only question presented here is, was it necessary for the appellant to present his claim to the board of county commissioners for *459 allowance or rejection before bringing an action thereon?" Hoexter v. Judson, supra.
Then, considering §§ 359 and 393, Ballinger's Code, in pari materia, the decision says of the statutory language "`all claims, demands and accounts' against the county" that:
"... These terms are broad enough to include every species of liability for which a county can be called upon to respond, whether it be a contractual or tortious liability, and we think the statute did not intend to make a distinction between claims arising in tort and those arising out of contract...."
"... Actions for damages may arise ex contractu as well as ex delicto, and the phrase `all claims for damages' is sufficiently comprehensive to include such claims, whatever their origin...."
Lenhart v. Hoquiam, 86 Wash. 168, 149 Pac. 650 (1915), barred two separate causes of action by reason of plaintiff's failure to file a claim as required in the statute which referred to "all claims for damages" etc. One cause of action arose from a claimed breach of a lease agreement to clean *460 up leased land before restoring it to the owner, and the other cause related to a claim for reasonable rental for holding over beyond the term of the lease. The statute required, as it does in the instant case, that:
"`... All such claims for damages must accurately locate and describe the defect that caused the injury, accurately describe the injury and state the time when the same occurred, give the residence for six months last past of claimant, contain the items of damages claimed and be sworn to by the claimant....'"
In Johnson v. Town of Endicott, 123 Wash. 1, 211 Pac. 717 (1923), we quoted from International Contract Co. v. Seattle, supra, with approval in attempting to distinguish between an action on a contract and an action for a breach of contract on the possible theory that no claim is required in the former but is mandatory in the latter, pointing to the International Contract Co. v. Seattle, supra, case as a guide, and Waldy v. Seattle, 93 Wash. 407, 161 Pac. 65 (1916), in confirmance of the proposition. We did refer to Lenhart v. Hoquiam, supra, as a departure from the view that a distinction exists between actions on a contract and those arising from a breach of contract. But we now find no valid reason why one type of action comes within the claim statute and the other avoids it, if each is an action for damages.
Perkins v. South Bend, 133 Wash. 349, 233 Pac. 655 (1925), another action on local improvement warrants brought against a city for wrongful payment to subsequent holders, cites Lenhart v. Hoquiam, supra, as authority for the proposition that the claims statute applies to actions for damages *461 ex delicto and ex contractu, approves both International Contract Co. v. Seattle, supra, and Johnson v. Town of Endicott, supra, and apparently drops the idea of a distinction between actions on a contract and actions for a breach of contract. Failure to file the claim raised a final barrier to recover upon the warrants.
*462 Appellant now earnestly argues that Shaw Supply Co. v. King County, supra, is no authority in the instant case for there no claim at all was filed, whereas here, it says, its letter from counsel addressed to the county commissioners within 7 months of the acceptance of the bridge did constitute a sufficient filing of a claim. Although appellant urges this with great force, we point out that in the Shaw Supply Company case, supra, we explicitly referred to, and set forth in part, Rem. Comp. Stat., § 4077, the same statute involved in the instant case, and which required that "all claims for damages ... be presented ... and filed ... within sixty days after the time when such claim for damages accrued." This section then goes on to require that "All such claims for damages must locate and describe the defect which caused the injury, describe the injury, and contain the amount of damages ... with a statement of the actual residence of such claimant ... for a period of six months ... and be sworn to by the claimant." We cited Old Nat. Bank v. Lewis Cy., supra, and ignored Byram v. Thurston Cy., supra, decided by this court only 6 years before the Shaw case, supra.
"It has been the uniform holding of this court that all claims against the county, other than those specially excepted, such as cost bills, fees of the official reporter and the expenses of a judge called to hold court in a county other than his election, must be presented to the board of county commissioners for allowance or rejection before an action can be maintained thereon...."
means not some claim, or a demand generally, but, on the contrary, the claim described by and required in RCW 36.45.010 and RCW 36.45.020. We gave renewed approval to the Shaw Supply rationale in Holmquist v. Queen City Constr. Co., 175 Wash. 681, 27 P. (2d) 1066 (1934).
Reverting now to the facts pleaded in the first and second causes of action, we see in them a claim for damages arising out of a written contract to construct a bridge over the Puyallup River. In the first cause of action, plaintiff says *463 that the county wrongfully interfered with the work progress and changed the conditions of performance as prescribed in the plans and specifications by denying plaintiff the right to construct approaches during pier construction. In its second cause of action, plaintiff says that it unexpectedly encountered subsurface physical conditions consisting of buried riprap which, adding to its cost of construction, became a compensable extra under the contract.
Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action seek redress in the alternative for dumping brush in the river at points upstream from the bridge under construction when the county engaged in brush-clearing operations. Plaintiff claims damages because the brush and material coming down river against its falsework carried it out and destroyed it and thereby created either (a) a violation of its contract with plaintiff by causing it additional costs in completing the contract or (b) a taking in eminent domain by destroying plaintiff's personal property without compensation *464 in violation of Art. 1 § 16, Washington State Constitution.
OTT, C.J., ROSELLINI and HUNTER, JJ., and JAMES, J. Pro Tem., concur.
[*] Reported in 392 P. (2d) 227.