Source: https://m.openjurist.org/415/us/709/lubin-v-panish
Timestamp: 2020-03-31 11:16:58
Document Index: 146659433

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 18603', '§ 48', '§ 18603', 'Art. 13', '§ 18600', '§ 18600', '§ 2']

415 US 709 Lubin v. Panish | OpenJurist
415 U.S. 709 - Lubin v. Panish
Donald Paul LUBIN, etc., Petitioner,
Leonard PANISH, Registrar-Recorder, County of Los Angeles.
'It has been established in recent years that the Equal Protection Clause confers the substantive right to participate on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an electoral process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274.' San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 n. 2, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1310, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
'(l)egislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1382 (1964) (Warren, C.J.).
In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972),4 we recognized that the State's interest in keeping its ballots within manageable, understandable limits is of the highest order. Id., at 144—145, 92 S.Ct. at 849, 856. The role of the primary election process in California is underscored by its importance as a component of the total electoral process and its special function to assure that fragmentation of voter choice is minimized. That function is served, not frustrated, by a procedure that tends to regulate the filing of frivolous candidates. A procedure inviting or permitting every citizen to present himself to the voters on the ballot without some means of measuring the seriousness of the candidate's desire and motivation would make rational voter choices more difficult because of the size of the ballot and hence would tend to impede the electoral process. That no device can be conjured to eliminate every frivolous candidacy does not undermine the state's effort to eliminate as many such as possible.
That 'laundry list' ballots discourage voter participation and confuse and frustrate those who do participate is too obvious to call for extended discussion. The means of testing the seriousness of a given candidacy may be open to debate; the fundamental importance of ballots of reasonable size limited to serious candidates with some prospects of public support is not. Rational results within the framework of our system are not likely to be reached if the ballot for a single office must list a dozen or more aspirants who are relatively unknown or have no prospects of success.
'(T)he right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot.' Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 11, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).
This must also mean that the right to vote is 'heavily burdened' if that vote may be cast only for one of two candidates in a primary election at a time when other candidates are clamoring for a place on the ballot. It is to be expected that a voter hopes to find on the ballot a candidate who comes near to reflecting his policy preferences on contemporary issues. This does not mean every voter can be assured that a candidate to his liking will be on the ballot, but the process of qualifying candidates for a place on the ballot may not constitutionally be measured solely in dollars.
In Bullock, supra, we expressly rejected the validity of filing fees as the sole means of determining a candidate's 'seriousness':
'To say that the filing fee requirement tends to limit the ballot to the more serious candidates is not enough. There may well be some rational relationship between a candidate's willingness to pay a filing fee and the seriousness with which he takes his candidacy, but the candidates in this case affirmatively alleged that they were unable, not simply unwilling, to pay the assessed fees, and there was no contrary evidence. It is uncontested that the filing fees excluded legitimate as well as frivolous candidates. . . . If the Texas fee requirement is intended to regulate the ballot by weeding out spurious candidates, it is extraordinarily ill-fitted to that goal; other means to protect those valid interests are available.' 405 U.S., at 145—146, 92 S.Ct. at 857. (Emphasis in original.) (Footnotes omitted.)
Filing fees, however large, do not, in and of themselves, test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the voter support of an aspirant for public office. A large filing fee may serve the legitimate function of keeping ballots manageable but, standing alone, it is not a certain test of whether the candidacy is serious or spurious. A wealthy candidate with not the remotest chance of election may secure a place on the ballot by writing a check. Merchants and other entrepreneurs have been known to run for public office simply to make their names known to the public. We have also noted that prohibitive filing fees, such as those in Bullock, can effectively exclude serious candidates. Conversely, if the filing fee is more moderate, as here, impecunious but serious candidates may be prevented from running. Even in this day of high-budget political campaigns some candidates have demonstrated that direct contact with thousands of voters by 'walking tours' is a route to success. Whatever may be the political mood at any given time, our tradition has been one of hospitality toward all candidates without regard to their economic status.
In so holding, we note that there are obvious and well-known means of testing the 'seriousness' of a candidacy which do not measure the probability of attracting significant voter support solely by the neutral fact of payment of a filing fee. States may, for example, impose on minor political parties the precondition of demonstrating the existence of some reasonable quantum of voter support by requiring such parties to file petitions for a place on the ballot signed by a percentage of those who voted in a prior election. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 39 L.Ed.2d 744. Similarly, a candidate who establishes that he cannot pay the filing fee required for a place on the primary ballot may be required to demonstrate the 'seriousness' of his candidacy by persuading a substantial number of voters to sign a petition in his behalf.5 The point, of course, is that ballot access must be genuinely open to all, subject to reasonable requirements. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1974, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). California's present system has not met this standard.
While I join the Court's opinion I wish to add a few words, since in my view this case is clearly controlled by prior decisions applying the Equal Protection Clause to wealth discriminations. Since classifications based on wealth are 'traditionally disfavored,' Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1082, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966), the State's inability to show a compelling interest in conditioning the right to run for office on payment of fees cannot stand. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972).
The Court first began looking closely at discrimination against the poor in the criminal area. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), we found that de facto denial of appeal rights by an Illinois statute requiring purchase of a transcript denied equal protection to indigent defendants since there 'can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.' Id., at 19, 76 S.Ct. at 591. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), we found that the State had drawn 'an unconstitutional line . . . between rich and poor' when it allowed an appellate court to decide an indigent's case on the merits although no counsel has been appointed to argue his case before the appellate court. Just recently we found that the State could not extend the prison term of an indigent for his failure to pay an assessed fine, since the length of confinement could not under the Equal Protection Clause be made to turn on one's ability to pay. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, i6 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); see Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971). But criminal procedure has not defined the boundaries within which wealth discriminations have been struck down. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), the majority found that the filing fee which denied the poor access to the courts for divorce was a denial of due process; Mr. Justice Brennan and I in concurrence preferred to rest the result on equal protection. And it was the Equal Protection Clause the majority relied on in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 79, 92 S.Ct. 862, 877, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972), in finding that Oregon's double-bond requirement for appealing forcible entry and detainer actions discriminated against the poor: 'For them, as a practical matter, appeal is foreclosed, no matter how meritorious their case may be.'
Indeed, the Court has scrutinized wealth discrimination in a wide variety of areas. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1330, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), we found that deterring indigents from migrating into the State was not a constitutionally permissible state objective. Closer to the case before us here was Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362—364, 90 S.Ct. 532, 542, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970), in which the Court found that Georgia could not constitutionally require ownership of land as a qualification for membership on a county board of education. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969). In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra, we found a state poll tax violative of equal protection because of the burden it placed on the poor's exercise of the franchise. And in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972), we invalidated a Texas filing fee system virtually indistinguishable from that presented here.
What we do today thus involves no new principle, nor any novel application. '(A) man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States.' Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184, 62 S.Ct. 164, 172, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). Voting is clearly a fundamental right.* Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra, at 667, 86 S.Ct. at 1079; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561—562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). But the right to vote would be empty if the State could arbitrarily deny the right to stand for election. California does not satisfy the Equal Protection Clause when it allows the poor to vote but effecitvely prevents them from voting for one of their own economic class. Such an election would be a sham, and we have held that the State must show a compelling interest before they can keep political minorities off the ballot. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). The poor may be treated no differently.
In addition to a proper petitioning process suggested by the Court in its opinion, ante, at 718, I would regard a write-in procedure, free of fee, as an acceptable alternative. Prior to 1968, California allowed this, and write-in votes were counted, although no prior fee had been paid. But the prior fee requirement for the write-in candidate was incorporated into the State's Elections Code in that year, Laws 1968, c. 79, § 3, and is now § 18603(b) of the Code. It is that addition, by amendment, that serves to deny the petitioner the equal protection guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 18603(b) appears to be severable. See Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 525—526, 49 S.Ct. 235, 239, 73 L.Ed. 483 (1929); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 341—342, 42 S.Ct. 124, 133, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921). The Code itself provides for severability. Cal.Elections Code § 48. That, however, is an issue for the California courts to deicde.
I would hold that the California election statutes are unconstitutional insofar as they presently deny access to the ballot. If § 18603(b) were to be stricken, the Code, as before, would permit write-in access with no prior fee. The presence of that alternative, although not perfect, surely provides the indigent would-be candidate with as much ease of access to the ballot as the alternative of obtaining a large number of petition signatures in a relatively short time. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, at 738—746, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1283—1287, 39 L.Ed.2d 714. The Court seemingly would reject a write-in alternative while accepting many petition alternatives. In my view, a write-in procedure, such as California's before 1968, satisfies the demands of the Equal Protection Clause as well as most petitioning procedures. I, therefore, join the Court in reversing the order of the Supreme Court of California denying petitioner's petition for writ of mandate and in remanding the case for further proceedings.
See Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political Candidates, 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. 109 (1971), for a detailed description of each State's filing-fee requirements.
Bullock, of course, does not completely resolve the present attack upon the California election statutes because it involved filing fees that were so patently exclusionary as to violate traditional equal protection concepts. Cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 1249, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966). Under attack in Bullock was a Texas statute that required candidates to pay a flat fee of $50 plus their pro rata share of the costs of the election in order to get on the primary ballot. Tex.Election Code, Art. 13.07a (Supp.1974). The assessment of costs involved sums as high as $8,900.
It is suggested that a write-in procedure, under § 18600 et seq., without a filing fee would be an adequate alternative to California's present filing-fee requirement. The realities of the electoral process, however, strongly suggest that 'access' via write-in votes falls far short of access in terms of having the name of the candidate on the ballot. It would allow an affluent candidate to put his name before the voters on the ballot by paying a filing fee while the indigent, relegated to the write-in provision, would be forced to rest his chances solely upon those voters who would remember his name and take the affirmative step of writing it on the ballot. That disparity would, itself, give rise to constitutional questions and, although we need not decide the issue, the intimation that a write-in provision without the filing fee required by § 18600 et seq. would constitute 'an acceptable alternative' appears dubious at best.
'No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.' Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964).
Wesberry involved a federal election. Article I, § 2, of the Federal Constitution declares that Members of the House should be 'chosen every second Year by the People of the several States'; and the Seventeenth Amendment says that Senators shall be 'elected by the people.' But the right to vote in state elections is one of the rights historically 'retained by the people' by virtue of the Ninth Amendment as well as included in the penumbra of First Amendment rights. As Mr. Justice Brennan stated in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, at 756, 94 S.Ct. 1274, at 1291, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, 'The right to vote derives from the right of association that is at the core of the First Amendment, protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.' (Dissenting opinion.)