Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/36/240/563689/
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 21:23:43
Document Index: 800235866

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 1324', '§ 371', '§ 1324', '§ 371', '§ 3553', '§ 371', '§ 1201', '§ 1621']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Ho-hsin Fan, Defendant,william Chen and George Huang, Defendants-appellants, 36 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1994 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Ho-hsin Fan, Defendant,william Chen and George Huang, Defenda...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Ho-hsin Fan, Defendant,william Chen and George Huang, Defendants-appellants, 36 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1994)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 36 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1994)
Argued July 22, 1994. Decided Sept. 16, 1994
A jury convicted defendants William Chen and George Huang under 18 U.S.C. § 371 of conspiracy to bring 150 aliens into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1) (A), (1) (D), and (2) (B) (ii). They appeal from a sentence imposed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert P. Patterson, Jr., Judge) under the Sentencing Guidelines. Both defendants claim that the district court impermissibly based an upward departure on speculation about the fate that awaited the aliens in the United States. In addition, Huang challenges a four-level adjustment for his leadership role in the offense and a two-level adjustment for perjury. Chen also contests the validity of his own decision to be represented by the same counsel as Huang.
Chen, Huang and Ho-Hsin Fan, the captain of the vessel, were indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to bring the 150 aliens to the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1) (A), (1) (D), and (2) (B) (ii). Captain Fan pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and a $500 fine. (We affirmed his sentence in an unpublished order. See United States v. Fan, Dkt. No. 93-1268 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1993)). Chen and Huang, however, chose to go to trial.
The district judge sentenced Huang first, calculating a base offense level of 9 under Sec. 2L1.1(a) (2) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Four levels were added under Sec. 3B1.1(a) for Huang's leadership role in an offense involving five or more participants, and two levels were added under Sec. 3C1.1 for perjurious testimony.
These calculations yielded a total offense level of 27, with a corresponding sentencing range of 70-87 months. The district court sentenced Huang to 60 months' imprisonment, which is the maximum sentence permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the statute Huang violated). Huang was also ordered to pay $11,258.60 in restitution to the Coast Guard, and a $9,000 fine.
A court may depart from the Sentencing Guidelines if it determines "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). See also United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 2933, 124 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1993); U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.0.
It requires no quantum leap in logic to infer from these established facts that these huge debts would be paid through years of labor under circumstances fairly characterized as involuntary servitude. Certainly, the district judge was permitted to draw such a conclusion from the record. "There comes a point where the court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 1349, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.). Accordingly, the district judge properly considered this sad reality as one aggravating circumstance supporting an upward departure.
Huang also argues that the district judge departed from the Guidelines because he decided that Huang violated other criminal statutes carrying stiffer penalties than those in 18 U.S.C. § 371. The record does not support this contention. The district court did mention the offense level for another crime, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (the federal kidnapping statute), in deciding how far to depart, not whether to depart. Reference to an analogous statute is a well-established method to determine the magnitude of an upward departure. See United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1991). Given the captain's use of a stun gun and his brandishing of a conventional gun (both of which were supplied by Huang) during the Chin Wing's voyage, we find ample support for the district court's consideration of Sec. 1201 in measuring the magnitude of the departure.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level increase in the offense level " [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution or sentencing of the instant offense." U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1. The Guidelines specify that perjury is a "type [ ] of conduct to which this enhancement applies." Id., comment. (n.3). For Guidelines purposes, perjury is defined as "false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory." United States v. Dunnigan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S. Ct. 1111, 1116, 122 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1993) (relying on the definition of perjury set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1621).
While a court may not automatically impose the two-level adjustment solely because the defendant testified at trial and was subsequently convicted, Dunnigan, at ---- - ----, 113 S. Ct. at 1116-17, the adjustment is not limited to those instances where the jury's verdict necessarily reflects disbelief of the defendant's testimony. United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 436, 121 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1992). Instead, where a finding of perjury does not necessarily follow from the jury's verdict, the court must base its decision to impose the two-level adjustment on the evidence adduced at trial. Dunnigan, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S. Ct. at 1117; Johnson, 968 F.2d at 216. Although separate findings of fact regarding the alleged perjury are encouraged, "a general finding of obstruction that tracks those factual predicates necessary to support a finding of perjury will suffice." United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1993).
Chen and Huang both retained the same attorney, Stephen Flamhaft, to represent them. Because of the potential conflict of interest that could arise from joint representation, the district court conducted a hearing pursuant to United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Curcio hearing"). The hearing occurred in two stages. Since Huang does not contest the validity of his Curcio hearing, the proceedings involving him are omitted. Chen was assisted by an interpreter at both stages of his hearing.
Joint representation brings two constitutional rights into potential conflict: "the right of a criminal defendant to be represented by counsel of his own choice and the right of such a defendant to counsel whose effectiveness is unimpaired by divided loyalty." United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1982). A criminal defendant is free to prefer the right to counsel of his choosing over the right to counsel of undivided loyalty, provided that the choice is "knowing and intelligent," a matter which depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1883-84, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981).
United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888-90 (2d Cir. 1982)). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) (requiring district court to advise jointly-represented defendants of the potential for conflicts of interest).