Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19760706-694675
Timestamp: 2017-01-18 22:48:51+00:00
Document Index: 109784519

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', '§ 1', "l'article 6", '§ 1', "l'article 6", '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', "l'article 6", '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2']

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 6946/75Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1976-07-06;6946.75 Analyses : (Art. 10-1) LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION, (Art. 10-2) DEFENSE DE L'ORDRE, (Art. 10-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 10-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 10-2) PREVUE PAR LA LOI, (Art. 11) LIBERTE DE REUNION ET D'ASSOCIATION, (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 17) DESTRUCTION DES DROITS ET LIBERTES, (Art. 18) RESTRICTIONS DANS UN BUT NON PREVU, (Art. 5-1) ARRESTATION OU DETENTION REGULIERE, (Art. 5-1) LIBERTE PHYSIQUE, (Art. 5-1) VOIES LEGALES, (Art. 5-4) INTRODUIRE UN RECOURS, (Art. 6-1) ACCUSATION EN MATIERE PENALE, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVIL, (Art. 6-1) JUGEMENT PUBLIC, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) TRIBUNAL IMPARTIAL, (Art. 6-1) TRIBUNAL INDEPENDANT, (Art. 6-2) PRESOMPTION D'INNOCENCE, (Art. 6-3-b) FACILITES NECESSAIRES, (Art. 6-3-b) TEMPS NECESSAIRE, (Art. 6-3-c) SE DEFENDRE SOI-MEME, (Art. 6-3-d) INTERROGATION DES TEMOINSParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION/REQU6TE NÂ° 6946/7 5 X . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY X . c/REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 6 July 1976 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 6 juillet 1976 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention : Right to be tried within a reasonable time (in criminal mattea ) a . Time begins to run from the moment when the suspicion of the person concerned has important repercussions on his situation (in the present case, the arrest warrant) . b. In determining what is a reasonable time, the criteria developed in the jurisprudenc e do not apply to proceedings concerning war crime committed during the second world war (new jurisprudence) . c . Subsidiary examination in accordance with these criteria : complexity of the case and its conduct by the judicial authorities and the accused . Article 6, paragreph 3, lit. cl, of the Convention : This provision neither guarantees to the accused the right to choose his official lawyer not to be consuked by the court on this subject . Article 6, paregraph 1, de fe Convention : Droit d'Btre jugÃ© dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable (pÃ©nal) . a . Le dÃ©lai commence Ã© courir au moment o0 les soupÃ§ons dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã©tait /'objet ont eu des rÃ©percussions importantes sur sa situation (en l'espÃ©ce, le mandat d'arrÃªt) . b. Pour l'apprÃ©ciation du dÃ©lai raisonnable, les critÃ©res dÃ©gagÃ©s par la jurisprudence ne s'appliquent pas aux procÃ©dures concernant des crimes de guerre commis pendant ta deuxiÃ©me guerre mondiale (nouvelle jurisprudence) . c . Examen subsidiaire selon les critÃ©res : comptexitÃ© de t'affaire et sa conduite par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires et par l'accusÃ© . Article 6, paragraphe 3, fitt, cl, de ta Convention : Ce tte disposition ne garantit Ã t'eccusÃ© ni le droit de choisir son avocat commis d'office ni celui d'Ã©tre consultÃ© par le tribunal Ã ce sujet. Summa ry of facts
(tranÃ§ais : voir p . 117 )
In 1965, investigations were commenced concerning the applicant and he was arrested on suspicion of having been invotved in war crimes of great enormity against the jews during the nazi regime.
The applicant was freed in February 1970 and, after a long prefiminery investigation (163 witnesses from all over the world, 5 experts, etc .), his trial began in November 1971 . It lasted until July 1974 : the applicant was sentenced to eight years in prison for attempted murder in two cases and acquitted on the other counts. He appealed on a point of law (Revision) . In October 1974, the court revoked the authority of one of the two official lawyers acting for the applicant, Mr A . However, in the beginning of 1976 the Federal Court appointed Mr A . again as official lawyer for the end of the appeal proceeding. In April 1976 the Federaf Court quashed the conviction of 1974 and sent the case back for a retrial. Before the Commission the applicant complains of the length of the criminal proceedings against him and also the temporary revocation of the Mr A's euthority, whom he would have prefered to his other official lawyer . THE LA W 1 . As regards the applicant's complaint concerning the length of the criminal proceedings the Commission first notes that the applicant might have had the possibility of lodging a constitutional appeal . However, there are no published decisions in which the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) had to deal with the problem of the length of criminal proceedings and the Commission therefore doubts that a constitutional appeal can be considered as an effective remedy . The question may be left open because even assuming that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies, his complaint is to be rejected for the following reasons :
Article 6 (1) of the Convention guarantees to everyone charged with a criminal offence the right to a fair and public hearing "within a reasonable timÃ©" . According to the case-law of the Commission (see Report on the Neumeister case Part II, Chaper 2, Application No . 2278/64, Yearbook 10 p . 188), the period to be taken into consideration under Article 6 ( 1) begins with the date on which the situation of the applicant was substantially affected as a result of a suspicion against him . This date often corresponds with that on which the applicant is charged (see Eur . Court of Human Rights, Judgments in the Wemhoff case (paragraph 19), in the Neumeister case (paragraph 18), Report of the Commission on the Soltikow case, (paragraph 26) . This period ends when the criminal charges are finally determined by an acquittal or a conviction even if this determination is made on appeal by a court which pronounces upon the merits of the charge (see Eur . Court of Human Rights, Judgment in the Wemhoff case, paragraphs 9 and 18) . In the present case the first charges were levelled against the applicant in the warrant of arrest of . . . April 1965 . The period to be considered consequently begins with this date and has not yet ended as the Federal Court questioned the applicant's conviction and sent the case back for a new trial . So far the proceedings have therefore lasted more than eleven years . This is as such a very long time . However, the exceptional character of criminal proceedings involving war crimes committed during World War II renders, in the Commission's opinion, inapplicable the principles- developed in the case-law of the Commission and the Court of Human Rights in connection with cases involving other criminal offences . In particular the Commission had regard to the fact that the rules of prescription do not apply to wa r
crimes and that the international community requires the competent authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany to investigate and prosecute these crimes despite the difficulties encountered by reason of the long time that has elapsed since the commission of the acts concerned . In this situation the Commission considers that the criteria determining the reasonableness of the length of ordinary criminal proceedings are not applicable to proceedings concerning war crimes, but the lenth of such proceedings must be measured in the light of the above considerations which take into account their exceptional character .
Having regard to these considerations the Commission finds that an axamination of the present case as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 111 of the Convention . Even assuming, however, that the criteria developed in the case-law of the Commission and the Court in relation to the length of ordinary criminal proceedings were to be applied, namely the complexity of the case as a whole, the manner in which it was handled by the prosecuting authorities and courts, and the applicant's own conduct, the Commission's finding would be no different . The complexity of the case against the applicant and his co-accused is manifest, given the original number of very serious charges, the large number of witnesses to be heard and countries in which enquiries had to be made . As regards the manner in which the case was handled by the German judicial authorities until the decision of the trial court was pronounced, the applicant has himself not alleged that any substantial avoidable delaywas caused by the authorities . In view of the material before it, the Commission is of the opinion that the judicial authorities tried to collect as much evidence as possible and to prepare the case with utmost care . The result reached so far (several charges were dropped and in one case the applicant was acquitted despite the evidence given against him by five alleged eyewitnesses) shows that the diligence employed by the German authorities was only beneficial for the applicant's case . The applicant was even granted the assistance of a second official defence counsel in order to avoid delays of the trial . It further has to to be noted, in this context, that the applicant is no longer in detention . On the other hand there are no indications that the applicant by his own conduct caused any delay of the proceedings . The Commission concludes that the special nature of the charges which concerned war crimes committed more than twenty years ago and the complexity of the wse resulting thereof sufficiently explain the length of the proceedings . It follows that the applicant's complaint that reasonable time was exceeded under Article 6 ( 1) is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . 2 . The applicant has further complained that he was not defended by his second official defence counsel, Mr A ., at the beginning of the appeal proceedings . It is true that Article 6 (3) (c) of the Convention guarantees to everyone charged with a criminal offence the right to be defended through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has no sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free of charge when the interests of justice so require . However, according to the Commission's case-law Article 6 (3) (c) does not guarantee the right to choose an official defence counsel who is appointed by th e
court (Dec . on admissibility of Application No . 646/59, Yearbook 3, p . 272 and No . 4338/69, Coll . 36, p . 79), nor does it guarantee a right to be consulted with regard to the choice of an official defence counsel . (Decision on admissibility of Application No . 1251/61, unpublished) . The Commission is of the opinion that once a court has appointed two official defence counsels and then dismisses one of them, issues under Articles 6(3 ) (c) or 6 (1) (fair trial) may arise in certain circumstances . However in the present case the applicant has not, as was also pointed out by the German courts, even alleged to have reason to distrust his first official defence counsel nor has he shown that this cousel was less qualified to represent him in the appeal proceedings . Furthermore, Mr A . was re-appointed in January 1976 . It follows that there is no appearance of a violation of the Convention and in particular of Article 6 (1) or (3) (c) and this complaint is consequently also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBL E RÃ©sumÃ© des faits En 19Ã´5 des poursuites ont Ã©tÃ© engagÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant et celui-ci a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© comme soupÃ§onnÃ© d'avoir participÃ© A des actes criminels de grande envergure dirigÃ© contre des juifs durant le rÃ©gime nazi . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tA remis en /iberrÃ© en fÃ©vrier 1970 et, aprÃ©s une tongue instruction (163 tÃ©moins rÃ©sidant dans le monde entier, 5 expe rts, etc.), son procÃ©s s'ouvrit en novembre 1971 . ll dure jusqu'en juillet 1974 : le requÃ©rant fut condamnÃ© A huit ans de rÃ©clusion pour tentative de meurtre dans deux cas et acquittÃ© des autres chefs d'accusation . Il s'est pourvu en cessation (RÃ©vision) .
En octobre 1974, le tribunal a mis fin au mandat de l'un des deux avocats d'office du requÃ©rant, Me A . Toutefois, au dÃ©but de 1976, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale Ã© nommÃ© B nouveau Me A . comme avocat d'office pour la fin de la procÃ©dure de cassation . En avril 1976, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale a cassÃ© le jugement de 1974 et a renvoyÃ© Yaffaire Ã juger. Devant la Commission, le requÃ©rant se plaint de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale ouverte contre lui, ainsi que de la rÃ©vocation temporaire du mandat de Me A ., qu'il aurait prÃ©fÃ©rÃ© Ã son autre avocat d'office.
(TRADUCTION ) EN DROI T 1 . Pour ce qui est du grief du requÃ©rant relatif Ã la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, la Commission relÃ©ve en premier lieu que le requÃ©rant aurait pu introduire un recours constitutionnel . Cependant, il n'existe pas de dÃ©cision publiÃ©e dans laquelle la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale IBundesverfassungsgerichtl a eu Ã statuer sur le problÃ¨me de la durÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale et la Commission estime donc douteux qu'un recours constitutionnel puisse Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme recours efficace . Cette question peut
rester ouverte Ã©tant donnÃ© que, mÃªme Ã supposer que le requÃ©rant ait Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes, son grief doit Ã©tre rejetÃ© pour les raisons suivantes : L'article 6,Â§ 1 de la Convention garantit Ã toute personne faisant l'objet d'une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale le droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et Â«dans un dÃ©lai raisonnableÂ» . Selon la jurisprudence de la Commission (voir rapport dans l'affaire Neumeister, IlÃ¨me Partie, chapitre 2 ; RequÃªte NÂ° 2278/64, Ann . 10, p . 189), la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration au regard de l'article 6, Â§ 1 commence au moment oÃ¹ les soupÃ§ons dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã©tait l'objet ont eu des rÃ©percussions importantes sur sa situation . Ce moment correspond souvent Ã celui oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant est accusÃ© (voir arrÃ©ts de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Wemhoff (paragraphe 191, dans l'affaire Neumeister (paragraphe 18), Rapport de la Commission sur l'affaire Soltikow (paragraphe 2611 . Cette pÃ©riode se termine lorsqu'il est statuÃ© sur les accusations pÃ©nales par un acquittement ou une condamnation, mÃ©me rendue en degrÃ© d'appel, par un tribunal qui se prononce sur le fond de l'accusation (voir arrÃªt de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Wemhoff, paragraphes 9 et 18) .
En l'espÃ¨ce, les premiÃ¨res accusations ont Ã©te portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant dans le mandat d'arrÃªt du . . . avril 1965 . La pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration commence donc Ã cette date et n'a pas encore pris fin, puisque la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale a remis en question la condamnation du requÃ©rant et a renvoyÃ© l'affaire pour un nouveau jugement . La procÃ©dure a donc durÃ©, Ã ce jour, plus de onze ans . Il s'agit d'une trÃ©s longue durÃ©e . Cependant, la nature exceptionnelle d'une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale qui porte sur des crimes de guerre commis au cours de la Seconde guerre mondiale rend inapplicables, aux yeux de la Commission, les principes dÃ©gagÃ©s par la jurisprudence de la Commission et de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans des affaires ayant trait Ã d'autres infractions . La Commission relÃ©ve en particulier que les rÃ©gles de la prescription ne s'appliquent pas aux crimes de guerre et que la communautÃ© internationale exige que les autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes de la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne enquÃªtent sur ces crimes et les poursuivent malgrÃ© les difficultÃ©s dues au grand laps de temps qui s'est Ã©coulÃ© depuis la perpÃ©tration des actes . Dans ces circonstances, la Commission estime que les critÃ©res dÃ©terminant le caractÃ©re raisonnable de la durÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale ordinaire ne sont pas applicables Ã une procÃ©dure concernant des crimes de guerre, mais que la durÃ©e de cette procÃ©dure doit Ãªtre apprÃ©ciÃ©e Ã la lumiÃ©re des considÃ©rations ci-dessus qui tiennent compte de son caractÃ©re exceptionnel . Eu Ã©gard Ã ces considÃ©rations, la Commission estime qu'un examen de la prÃ©sente affaire, telle qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e, ne rÃ©vÃ¨le aucune apparence de violation de l'article 6, 4 1, de la ConvÃ©ntion . Toutefois, mÃªme Ã supposer que s'appliquent les critÃ©res Ã©noncÃ©s dans la jurisprudence de la Commission et de la Cour quant Ã la durÃ©e des procÃ©dures pÃ©nales ordinaires - Ã savoir la complexitÃ© de l'affaire dans son ensemble, la maniÃ©re dont elle a Ã©tÃ© traitÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s chargÃ©es des poursuites et les tribunaux, et le comportement du requÃ©rant lui-mÃ©me - la conclusion de la Commission ne serait pas diffÃ©rente . La complexitÃ© de la procÃ©dure dirigÃ©e contre le requÃ©rant et ses co-accusÃ©s est manifÃ©ste Ã©tant donnÃ© le nombre initial d'accusations trÃ¨s graves, le nombre important de tÃ©moins Ã entendre et de pays dans lequel il a fallu faire des enquÃ©tes.
Pour ce qui est de la maniÃ©re dont l'affaire a Ã©tÃ© menÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires allemandes jusqu'Ã la dÃ©cision de la juridiction de jugement, le requÃ©rant luimÃ©me ne prÃ©tend pas qu'un retard impo rt ant et Ã©vitable leur soit imputable . Au vu des documents dont elle dispose, la Commission estime que les autoritÃ©s judiciaires se sont efforcÃ©es de rassembler autant de preuves que possible et de prÃ©parer l'affaire avec le plus grand soin . Les rÃ©sultats atteints jusqu'ici (plusieurs accusations ont Ã©tÃ© abandonnÃ©es et pou r
une autre, le requÃ©rant a Ã© tÃ© acquittÃ© malgrÃ© les dÃ©pos rt ions faites contre lui par cinq tÃ©moins prÃ©tendument oculaires) montrent que la conscience dont les autoritÃ©s allemandes ont fait preuve n'a Ã©tÃ© que favorable au requÃ©rant . Il a mÃªme bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© de l'assistance d'un second dÃ©fenseur commis d'office afin que des retards soient Ã©vitÃ©s dans le procÃ©s . Il convient en outre de relever Ã cet Ã©gard que le requÃ©rant n'est plus en dÃ©tention . D'un autre cÃ´tÃ©, rien n'indique que par sa propre conduite le requÃ©rant soit Ã l'origine d'un retard dans la procÃ©dure . La Commission conclut que la nature pa rticuiÃ©re des accusations qui po rtaient sur des crimes de guerre commis il y a plus de vingt ans et la complexitÃ© de l'affaire qui en rÃ©sulte suffisent Ã expliquer la longueur de la procÃ©dure . Il s'ensuit que le grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel le dÃ©lai raisonnable prÃ©vu Ã© l'a rt icle 6, Â§ 1 a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©passÃ©, est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'a rticle 27, Â§ 2, de la Convention .
2 . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint en outre de ne pas avoir Ã©tÃ© dÃ©fendu par le second dÃ©fenseur commis d'office, Me A ., au dÃ©but de la procÃ©dure de cassation . Certes, l'a rt icle 6, Â§ 3 c) de la Convention garantit Ã tout accusÃ© le droit d'avoir l'assistance d'un dÃ©fenseur de son choix et, s'il n'a pas les moyens de rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur, de pouvoir Ãªtre assistÃ© gratuitement par un avocat d'office lorsque les intÃ©rÃ©ts de la justice l'exigent . Toutefois, selon la jurisprudence de la Commission, l'a rt icle 6, Â§ 3 c) ne garantit pas le droit de choisir le dÃ©fenseur qui sera commis par le tribunal ( dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 646/59, Ann . 3 p . 273 et NÂ° 4338/69, Recueil de dÃ©cisions 36, p . 79), pas plus qu'il ne garantit le droit d'Ãªtre consultÃ© Ã propos du choix d'un dÃ©fenseur commis d'office ( dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 1251, non publiÃ©) . La Commission estime que dans le cas ai un tribunal e dÃ©signÃ© deux dÃ©fenseurs puis rÃ©voquÃ© l'un d'eux, des questions dÃ©licates pourraient naÃ®tre, dans ce rt aines circonstances, au regard de l'article 6, Â§ 3 c) ou de l'a rt icle 6, Â§ 1 ( procÃ©s Ã©quitable) . Toutefois, en l'espÃ¨ce, comme l'ont relevÃ© les tribunaux allemands, le requÃ©rant n'a mÃªme pas prÃ©tendu avoir des motifs de refuser sa confiance Ã son premier dÃ©fenseur d'office pas plus qu'il n'a montrÃ© que celui-ci fÃ»t moins qualifiÃ© pour le reprÃ©senter dans la procÃ©dure de cassation . Au surplus, Me A . a Ã©tÃ© commis Ã nouveau en janvier 1976 .
Il s'ensuit qu'il n'y a pas apparence de violation de la Convention, en pa rticulier de ses a rticles 6, Â§ 1 ou 6, 5 3 c) et que ce grief est, lui aussi, manifestement mal fondÃ©,au sens de l'a rt icle 27, Â§ 2 . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REOUÃTEIRRECEVABLE .
119 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 06/07/1976Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page