Source: https://casetext.com/case/lines-v-larkins
Timestamp: 2020-02-19 02:29:24
Document Index: 355087405

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 9501', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 1291', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', 'art, 980', '§ 9545', '§ 9543', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 9541', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153 | Casetext
Mathis v. Attorney Gen. of N.J.
To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must "fairly present" the claim by presenting its…
Courts use the term "futile" or "futility" in referring to these exceptions to exhaustion. See, e.g., Lines…
Full title:LAWRENCE LINES, Appellant v. DAVID LARKINS, WARDEN; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY…
208 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2000)
holding that federal courts should dismiss a habeas petition with unexhausted claims without prejudice, but should dismiss a petition with procedurally defaulted claims with prejudice
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-01500 District Judge: Hon. Donald W. VanArtsdalen.
Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Esq. (Argued), Schnader, Harrison, Segal Lewis Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for Appellant.
Stephen B. Harris, Esq. (Argued), Heather A. Castellino, Esq., Office of District Attorney, Doylestown, PA, Attorneys for Appellees.
BEFORE: McKee, and Rendell, Circuit Judges, and Debevoise, District Judge.
We are asked to review the District Court's dismissal of Lawrence Lines' petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court held that Lines had not exhausted his state court remedies, and dismissed the petition without prejudice based upon that court's conclusion that Lines could return to state court to properly present his claims there. We agree that Lines has not exhausted his state court remedies. However, we conclude that returning to state court would be futile and that his claims are all procedurally defaulted. We also conclude that Lines can not establish cause and prejudice for the default and that failing to reach the merits of his petition would not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. We therefore hold that his petition must be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, we will affirm, but modify, the order of the District Court dismissing Lines petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The procedural history of this appeal illustrates just how serpentine the path to federal habeas review has become and the unexploded mines awaiting even seasoned practitioners who attempt to navigate under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Lines was tried for murder in state court in 1986. However, he escaped from custody on October 10, 1986, while the jury was deliberating. The jury convicted Lines in absentia, and his trial attorney filed post-verdict motions on his behalf, and in his absence. Lines was apprehended on December 21, 1986, while those post-verdict motions were pending. Thereafter, he retained new counsel who filed additional post-verdict motions on his behalf. The Commonwealth moved to quash the post-verdict motions, arguing that Lines was no longer entitled to seek post-verdict relief because he had absconded during his trial. However, the trial court never ruled on the Commonwealth's motion. Instead, the court held numerous evidentiary hearings on the merits of Lines' claims and, by order dated May 23, 1991, the trial court denied the post-verdict motions on the merits. On July 19, 1991, Lines was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction.
Brief of Appellant at 2. The Commonwealth responded by asking the Superior Court to dismiss Lines' appeal based upon his flight. The Commonwealth argued that the trial court had erred in not quashing Lines' post-verdict motions because he had been a fugitive when his post-trial motions were filed.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 536, 541, 610 A.2d 439, 441 (1992). In its opinion, the court listed Lines' substantive claims but did not address them.
I am unable to glean any support for the proposition that an appellate court cannot review an appeal where the defendant was a fugitive prior to appeal where the trial court did not dismiss posttrial motions. . . . The cases relied on by the Majority fail to support either that a trial court must dismiss a defendant's post-trial motions if the defendant becomes a fugitive, or that this court has no power to hear an appeal from a judgment of sentence rendered against a defendant who was a fugitive prior to appeal where the trial court has not dismissed his post-trial motions.
Commonwealth v. Lines, 415 Pa. Super. at 447-448, 609 A.2d at 836-837 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Despite his disagreement with the majority, Judge Johnson would still have denied Lines relief, because he concluded Lines' claims were meritless.
On March 31, 1993, Lines filed a petition for collateral relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9501 et seq. He raised the following issues in that petition:
On February 28, 1997, Lines filed the instant habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising the following claims:
1. Lines' Due Process Rights were violated (1) when the prosecutor refused, despite demand, to disclose that John Gabriele had been immunized and (2) when the prosecutor permitted John Gabriele to perjure himself throughout his assertions of noninvolvement in drug activity.
The Commonwealth asked the District Court to dismiss the petition based upon Lines' purported failure to exhaust remedies in state court. The Commonwealth argued that Lines was precluded from obtaining any relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because he had not presented any of his federal habeas claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Commonwealth relied in part upon Fiegley v. Fulcomer, 833 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1987), to argue that Lines was procedurally barred from federal habeas review because the Superior Court had quashed his appeal, and he could not establish the cause and prejudice that was a condition precedent to obtaining federal habeas relief on his defaulted claims.
(Brief at 8.).
Lines cites Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975), and Paull v. Paull, 384 Pa. 2, 119 A.2d 93 (1958). However, these cases merely stand for the proposition — irrelevant here — that courts should not decide sua sponte issues not raised, briefed and argued by the parties.
Lines filed a timely notice of appeal from the District Court's denial of his habeas petition, and we granted his request for a certificate of appealability to determine whether the District Court correctly dismissed the petition for lack of exhaustion. On appeal, Lines repeats his argument that the District Court should have addressed the merits of his petition because exhaustion must be excused under the circumstances here. Lines contends that since he has already unsuccessfully filed one PCRA petition and a direct appeal, he has no means to exhaust his claims in state court, and the District Court should therefore hear his claims on the merits.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253; our review is plenary, Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d at 678.
All claims that a petitioner in state custody attempts to present to a federal court for habeas corpus review must have been fairly presented to each level of the state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1734 (1999) ("we ask not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those remedies, i.e., whether he has fairly presented his claims to the state courts,"); Doctor, 96 F.3d at 678. Thus, except as we discuss below, and except for petitions which can be denied on the merits, federal courts refrain from addressing the merits of any claim raised by a habeas petitioner that was not properly exhausted in state court, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). "The exhaustion requirement ensures that state courts have the first opportunity to review convictions and preserves the role of state courts in protecting federally guaranteed rights." Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 856 (3d Cir. 1992). The burden of establishing that such claims were fairly presented falls upon the petitioner. Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). Federal courts will dismiss without prejudice claims that have not been properly presented to the state courts, allowing petitioners to exhaust their claims.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), a habeas corpus petition "may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust" available state remedies.
Petitioners who have not fairly presented their claims to the highest state court have failed to exhaust those claims.
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel. If, however, state procedural rules bar a petitioner from seeking further relief in state courts, "the exhaustion requirement is satisfied because there is `an absence of available State corrective process.' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999). Even so, this does not mean that a federal court may, without more, proceed to the merits. Rather, claims deemed exhausted because of a state procedural bar are procedurally defaulted, and federal courts may not consider their merits unless the petitioner "establishes`cause and prejudice' or a `fundamental miscarriage of justice' to excuse the default." Id. See also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731.
In the section of the Petition captioned: "CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE," Lines outlined the circumstances of his flight during jury deliberations, his subsequent apprehension, the Commonwealth's Motion to Quash based upon his fugitive status, and the trial court's decision on the merits of his post-verdict claims. In doing so, he stated that he had "asked the [trial] Court to review" the three substantive grounds set forth above, and he reiterated each of those claims. However, in the seven and one-half pages in which he set forth his "CONCISE STATEMENT OF REASONS RELIED UPON FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL," Lines presented only his challenge to the Superior Court's application of the fugitive forfeiture rule. He did not set forth any of the substantive claims he had relied upon in his brief to the Superior Court, nor did he discuss his underlying claims at any point in his Petition for Allowance of Appeal.
Rule 1115(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure prescribes the proper method for presenting an issue to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It states that a Petition for Allowance of Appeal must contain, inter alia:
(5) A concise statement of the reasons relied on for allowance of an appeal.
(emphasis added). Rule 1115(c) provides:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court strictly adheres to the letter of these rules and will not address claims that are not properly asserted in a Petition for Allowance of Appeal. Commonwealth v. Rush, 522 Pa. 379, 386-387, 562 A.2d 285, 288 (1989), and cases cited therein. The Court has also emphasized that "all claims appellant wishes to raise must be set out in his brief and not merely incorporated by reference." Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 535 Pa. 210, 238 n. 3, 634 A.2d 1078, 1092 n. 3 (1993). See also Rule 2116(a).
As noted above, Lines challenged only the Superior Court's application of the fugitive forfeiture rule in the appropriate section of his Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The trial court's opinion denying Lines' post-trial motions (which include the questions raised in the Superior Court) was appended to the petition, along with Superior Court's opinion. In addition, Lines' "Statement of the Case" in his Petition for Allowance of Appeal listed the questions raised in the Superior Court. However, Lines did not attempt to incorporate the issues discussed by the trial court by reference or otherwise, and the trial court's opinion does not fully state the substance of Lines' legal argument. Furthermore, it is clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not have addressed Lines' substantive claims if he had merely attempted to incorporate them by reference. See Edmiston, 535 Pa. at 238 n. 3 ("Appellant also `incorporates by reference' claims in his post-trial motions as though set forth in his brief at length and requests this court to consider them in terms of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. We refuse to do so in that all claims appellant wishes us to consider must be set out in his brief and not merely incorporated by reference").
Lines concedes that his severance claim was not raised on direct appeal; nor was it presented in his PCRA petition. Lines also presents a Confrontation Clause claim in his habeas petition. Although this claim was not expressly raised on direct appeal to the Superior Court, Lines argues that it is subsumed within the hearsay argument which he presented to the Superior Court. However, even if Lines' hearsay argument sufficiently presented his Confrontation Clause claim, the hearsay argument, like the rest of his claims on direct appeal, was never fairly presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), exhaustion is excused if a return to state court would be futile because of "an absence of available State corrective process[,] or . . . circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." "Futility" exists where: "a state's highest court has ruled unfavorably on a claim involving facts and issues materially identical to those undergirding a federal habeas petition and there is no plausible reason to believe that a replay will persuade the court to reverse its field," Allen v. Attorney General of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 573 (1st Cir. 1996); where the state provides no means of seeking the relief sought, Wallace v. Cody, 951 F.2d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 1991), Dawan v. Lockhart, 980 F.2d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1992); or where the state courts have failed to alleviate obstacles to state review presented by circumstances such as the petitioner's pro se status, poor handwriting and illiteracy, Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1473-1475, 1479 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 S.Ct. 938 (1992).
If an appropriate remedy does not exist or its utilization is frustrated by the state system . . . [t]he deference accorded the state judicial process must give way to the primary role of the federal courts to redress constitutional deprivations. . . . If it appears that the prisoner's rights have become an "empty shell" or that the state process is a "procedural morass" offering no hope of relief, then the federal courts may excuse the prisoner from exhausting state remedies and may directly consider the prisoner's constitutional claims.
Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1986). See also Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 1997) (enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act "which overall is intended to reduce federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings, reenforces" that federal courts ought to be reluctant to conclude that resort to state courts would be futile.). Thus, "[i]n questionable cases it is better that the state courts make the determination of whether a claim is procedurally barred." Id. Accordingly, we must determine if we can conclude with certainty that the courts of Pennsylvania would no longer entertain Lines' substantive claims for relief.
Lines filed his Petition for Allowance of Appeal more than seven years ago. We think it is obvious that he could not successfully amend a petition that has now been denied for seven years and include within it claims that he could have included when he first filed the petition. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, the only avenue that may be available to Lines is a second petition under the PCRA. Thus, we turn to the provisions of the PCRA to see if Lines can file a second collateral attack in the state courts. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) limits the availability of PCRA relief. It states:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim. . . .
Under section 9545(b)(3), a prior petition becomes final for PCRA purposes "at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review." Commonwealth v. Banks, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 726 A.2d 374, 375 (1999). Under Banks, it is now clear that the one year limitation applies to all PCRA petitions including a second petition, no matter when the first was filed.
In Banks, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the time restrictions for seeking relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act are jurisdictional. Prior to Banks there was some doubt as to the proper scope and application of the one year limitations period under the amended PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Thomas, ___ A.2d ___, 1998 WL 648515 (Pa. Super. September 16, 1998), the Superior Court expressly rejected two possible interpretations of this period of limitations: that a second or subsequent PCRA petition is timely if the first PCRA petition was filed by January 16, 1997, one year after the effective date of the 1995 amendments; and that all second or subsequent PCRA petitions are timely so long as the first PCRA petition was filed either one year before or one year after the effective date of the 1995 amendments. The court stated instead, "we hold that it was the intention of the legislature to permit an otherwise untimely first PCRA petition to be filed within one year following the effective date of the 1995 PCRA amendments, but that exception was not intended to apply to subsequent petitions regardless of when a first petition was filed." Id. at *3.
Clearly, more than a year has passed since Lines' judgment of conviction became final and none of the aforementioned exceptions to the limitations period applies to Lines' claims. He does not allege that improper governmental interference or previously unknown facts prevented him from asserting them in state court in a timely manner, nor does he base his claims upon the assertion of a new constitutional right.
Moreover, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) provides that claims raised in a PCRA petition must not have been "previously litigated or waived." Section 9544 defines those terms as follows:
(a) Previous litigation. — For purposes of this subchapter, an issue has been previously litigated if: . . .
(b) Issues waived. — For purposes of th is subchapter, an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.
When Lines filed his first PCRA petition he was represented by counsel other than trial counsel. Therefore, he could have raised the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to move for a severance in his first PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 537 Pa. 447, 454 (1994) (a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel under the PCRA must be raised at the earliest stage in the proceedings after petitioner is no longer represented by allegedly ineffective counsel). Under Pennsylvania law Lines could attempt to challenge the stewardship of PCRA counsel even though he is not guaranteed the right to counsel to collaterally attack his conviction under the United States Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 43 (1999) ("we have never found our power of review, and if necessary, remedy deficiencies of counsel at the post-conviction stage circumscribed by the parameters of the Sixth Amendment."). However, the only vehicle for now doing so is a second P.C.R.A. petition. As we noted above, the period for filing such a petition has long since run, and the courts of Pennsylvania therefore no longer have jurisdiction to entertain a successive P.C.R.A. petition. Banks, 726 A.2d at 376 ("the issue . . . is one of jurisdiction . . ."). Accordingly, we conclude that it would be futile for Lines to return to state court in an effort to attempt to bring a second PCRA proceeding raising the unexhausted claims he has included in his federal habeas petition.
As noted above, it does not necessarily follow, however, that Lines is entitled to an adjudication of the merits of his unexhausted federal habeas claims merely because it is now futile to attempt to raise them in state court. A finding of futility merely eliminates the procedural pretense of requiring a federal habeas petitioner to return to an unavailable state forum for nonexistent relief. Futility, without more, does not mean that the federal courts may proceed to the merits of the petitioner's claims. As the court said in Whittlesey v. Circuit Court for Baltimore County, 897 F.2d 143, 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 922 (1990) (another escape case):
That it may now be "futile" for Whittlesey to await completion of his Florida sentence to challenge his Maryland conviction begs the question of how that futility has come about. The equitable principles governing habeas relief will not permit Whittlesey to create a situation in which seeking state postconviction relief is futile, and then invoke that same futility to avoid the exhaustion requirement.
When exhaustion is futile because state relief is procedurally barred, federal courts may only reach the merits if the petitioner makes the standard showing of "cause and prejudice" or establishes a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Caswell, 953 F.2d at 861 (3d Cir. 1992). Unlike the petitioners in Doctor, Toulson, and Lambert, Lines is not asserting his actual innocence or facts that would suggest a "miscarriage of justice" in the context of federal habeas jurisprudence. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Accordingly, we must focus on whether Lines can establish "cause and prejudice" for his default in state court. McCandless, 172 F.3d at 263. See also Caswell, 953 F.2d at 861 (citing Coleman, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n. 1).
The only purported "cause" on this record is prior appellate counsel's failure to raise and fairly present all of Lines' substantive claims in state court. However, that is not sufficient. The "cause" required to excuse a procedural default must result from circumstances that are"external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him" Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. "Attorney inadvertence is not `cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must `bear the risk' of attorney error. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Lines does not argue that counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective for failing to present the substance of his claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on direct appeal. In fact, he argues that his attorney could not present those claims because the Superior Court never reached them. Given the unique circumstances facing original appellate counsel, that attorney can not be faulted for failing to include Lines' substantive claims in the Petition for Allowance of Appeal. After all, the decision that Lines wanted the Supreme Court to review did not address the merits of his claims. Accordingly, counsel limited Lines' Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Superior Court's application of the fugitive forfeiture doctrine as that was the basis of the Court's dismissal of his appeal. Thus, we are not now charged with evaluating the stewardship of original appellate counsel, or assessing blame for any "dereliction" on his part. Moreover, claims of constitutional ineffectiveness must themselves be exhausted by proper presentation to the state courts and here that was not even attempted. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986). Thus, Lines has not demonstrated any "cause" for defaulting the claims raised on his direct appeal. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753.
This is not to suggest that counsel could not have included the substantive issues in his Petition for Allowance of Appeal. As we noted above, Doctor attempted exactly that when he appealed the Superior Court's application of the fugitive forfeiture rule although it appears that Doctor included his substantive claims in his brief, and that the substantive issue he briefed — a due process violation — did not fairly present his subsequent assertion that "a trial in absentia was never held." 96 F.3d at 680. As noted above, merely including a claim in the brief to the Supreme Court is not sufficient to fairly present the claim. However, we note what occurred in Doctor to contrast Doctor's appeal with Lines' appeal.
We reach the same conclusion with regard to Lines' severance claim. Lines can not now successfully argue that PCRA counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to include a severance claim in his PCRA petition, and he has not argued that counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it on direct appeal. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in dismissing Lines' habeas petition. Although the District Court's analysis differed from ours, the result is the same; although our analysis causes us to modify the District Court's relief.
Moreover, as noted above, that claim of ineffectiveness would itself have to be presented to the state courts in the first instance. Murray, supra.
Like Lines, Doctor fled during his bench trial on criminal charges. However, the trial court thereafter entered a guilty verdict against Doctor "apparently without conducting any further proceedings or attempting to inform Doctor, his attorney or the Commonwealth about its intention to enter a verdict." 96 F.3d at 678. Lines was not apprehended until five years later, and he was then formally sentenced on the guilty verdict that had been entered when he escaped. Doctor filed a direct appeal, and a state habeas corpus petition. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed his appeal pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. 1972(6), which allows an appellate court to quash an appeal "because the appellant is a fugitive." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Doctor's Petition for Allowance of Appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. However, unlike Lines, Doctor attempted to present his underlying claims on direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as well as his challenges to the Superior Court's application of the fugitive forfeiture rule.
Thereafter, Doctor filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in an attempt to get federal habeas relief from his state court conviction. Doctor's § 2254 petition included a claim that his conviction in absentia violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial. The District Court dismissed Doctor's petition for failure to exhaust because the Sixth Amendment claim had not been presented in state court. Doctor argued that it was futile to return to state court to raise any unexhausted claims in a PCRA petition because the Pennsylvania courts had already determined that his flight constituted a waiver of his right to appeal, and they therefore would not address any PCRA petition that he might file in an effort to exhaust his Sixth Amendment claim for federal habeas purposes. 96 F.3d at 680.
We concluded that, under Pennsylvania law, Doctor could seek collateral relief by asserting his Sixth Amendment claim in a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-46 (Supp. 1996), because "all avenues of direct appeal are clearly foreclosed." 96 F.3d at 682. However, we recognized that such collateral review was problematic both because he had not raised his Sixth Amendment claim on direct appeal, and because "under the fugitive forfeiture rule[Doctor] waived all rights to have his claims considered." Id. at 681. We noted, however, that Pennsylvania courts allowed for a "limited exception" to the application of the fugitive forfeiture rule when a petitioner could demonstrate either a "miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society can tolerate," or "actual innocence." Id. at 682 (citing Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 (1988)). We concluded that the unique and rather bizarre circumstances surrounding Doctor's in absentia conviction were such that we could not conclude with certainty that the Pennsylvania courts would not find a miscarriage of justice. 96 F.3d at 682 ("Doctor alleges facts that could support a finding that `the proceedings resulting in his conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized society can tolerate.'").
In his § 2254 petition, Doctor claimed:"No record of trial of Absentia said to have been held on Aug. 29th 1986 — I was not convicted in a court of law — I was never told on record or otherwise I was found guilty — I was never given any appeal rights before or after sentencing. No attorney is on record to have represented me in the mysterious absentia trial held — the trial transcripts in my case stop on page 129 at which time case was continued generally." Doctor, 96 F.3d at 679.
Moreover, an examination of Pennsylvania cases established that when Doctor escaped, Pennsylvania courts recognized that they had the discretion to hear an appeal so long as custody of the fugitive-appellant "had been restored before the appellate process was ever initiated," id. at 685-6, as was the case there. Accordingly, we held that Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture rule was not an adequate and independent state rule, and that we could not say with certainty that the state courts would turn a deaf ear to Doctor's Sixth Amendment claim. Thus, we dismissed Doctor's petition and allowed him to attempt to exhaust his claim in state court. However, for all the reasons we have noted, it would be futile for Lines to do so. Moreover, Lines does not argue (nor can he) that our failure to address the merits of his claim would create the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice that we found in Doctor.
[60] DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge, dissenting.
Petitioners who have not fairly presented their claims to the highest state court have failed to exhaust those claims. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel. If, however, state procedural rules bar a petitioner from seeking further relief in state courts, "the exhaustion requirement is satisfied because there is `an absence of available State corrective process.' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999). Even so, this does not mean that a federal court may, without more, proceed to the merits. Rather, claims deemed exhausted because of a state procedural bar are procedurally defaulted, and federal courts may not consider their merits unless the petitioner "establishes `cause and prejudice' or a `fundamental miscarriage of justice' to excuse the default." Id. See also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731.
Slip Op. at 10-11. (Footnote omitted.)
Doctor had submitted a mixed habeas corpus petition, containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. Following the dictate of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), this court affirmed the district Court's dismissal of the petition. The district court, however, had dismissed the petition not only on failure to exhaust grounds. It also found that the Pennsylvania courts' refusal to consider the merits of Doctor's direct appeals based on the fugitive forfeiture rule constituted application of an independent and adequate state procedural rule. Doctor's failure to comply with that rule constituted a procedural default, requiring dismissal of the habeas petition since he had not shown cause and prejudice. Anticipating that Doctor might file a new petition containing only exhausted claims and that he would again be faced with the procedural default contention, this court addressed the merits of that defense.
A habeas petitioner is entitled to federal review of a procedurally defaulted claim only if he can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and prejudice resulting therefrom. Doctor, 96 F.3d at 683. However,"[a] state rule provides an independent and adequate basis for precluding federal review of a state prisoner's habeas claim only if: (1) the state procedural rule speaks in unmistakable terms; (2) all state appellate courts refused to review the petitioner's claims on the merits; and (3) the state courts' refusal in this instance is consistent with other decisions." Id. at 683-684.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 536, 541, 610 A.2d 439, 441 (1992). This was the state of the law when the Superior Court held that the trial court erred in failing to quash Lines's post-verdict motions and that Lines had"forever forfeited his right to appeal by electing to become a fugitive after post-trial procedures have begun." Commonwealth v. Lines, 415 Pa. Super. 438, 443, 609 A.2d 832, 834, allocatur denied, 532 Pa. 662, 618 A.2d 983 (1992). It was the state of the law when the Supreme Court denied Lines's Petition for Allowance of Appeal.
On the other hand, when Lines sought relief from his conviction in the state courts Pennsylvania law had changed. By that time the fugitive forfeiture rule, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, had become an impenetrable barrier to relief of any sort in the state courts.
Not only were an appeal and a PCRA petition futile, there was a total absence of available state corrective process of any sort. In these circumstances exhaustion is excused and Lines must be permitted to assert in a habeas petition both the grounds he raised in his abortive appeal to the Superior Court and the ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the failure of trial counsel to move for severance which he did not raise in any Pennsylvania court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1):
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in courts of the State; or
The same impenetrable barrier prevailed when Doctor sought relief in the state courts. In his case, however, this court detected a small chink in this barrier, namely, an appeal or a PCRA petition in which the once fugitive petitioner seeking relief from a waiver "can demonstrate a `miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society can tolerate.'" Doctor, 96 F.2d at 682. This court rejected Doctor's futility contention stating "[w]e cannot conclude that there is no chance that the Pennsylvania courts would find a miscarriage of justice sufficient to override the waiver requirements and permit review under PCRA." Id. at 683. Doctor contended that lack of a trial even in absentia violated his Sixth Amendment rights. This court opined that the Pennsylvania courts might consider this a miscarriage of justice claim which would override a fugitive forfeiture waiver. It would follow that had this court not found that Doctor's unexhausted claim asserted miscarriage of justice, it would have concluded that it would have been futile to require him to return to the Pennsylvania courts and exhaustion would have been excused.
In the present case Lines does not assert any claims which might be characterized as a "miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society can tolerate." Thus the reasoning of Doctor compels the conclusion that exhaustion was excused in the present case because it would have been futile to require that Lines exhaust state remedies.
It is my view that it is unnecessary to determine the extent to which Lines raised his various claims in one or another of his abortive state court proceedings. From the outset under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then prevailing application of the fugitive forfeiture rule, Lines had no right to appeal or to post conviction relief of any sort. The fact that he did seek state court relief is of no moment. It was all an exercise in futility which he had no obligation to pursue. In these circumstances he should be permitted to assert in the district court all the claims set forth in his § 2254 petition.
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In Lines, the Third Circuit held "[w]e think it obvious that [the petitioner] could not successfully amend a [Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] that has now been denied for seven years and include within it claims that he could have included when he first filed the petition."
Summary of this case from Rush v. Beard
noting if state procedural rules bar petitioner from seeking further relief in state courts, exhaustion will be deemed satisfied because there is absence of available state corrective process
Summary of this case from Osbourne v. DelBalso
noting that "federal courts should be most cautious before reaching a conclusion dependent upon an intricate analysis of state law that a claim is procedurally barred"
Summary of this case from Burkhart v. Archeuleta
noting that "federal courts should be most cautious before reaching a conclusion dependent upon an intricate analysis of state law that a claim is procedurally barred."
Summary of this case from King v. Raemisch
dismissing petition with prejudice on appeal because all of petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted
Summary of this case from Temple v. Coleman
Summary of this case from Desavage v. Lawler
In Lines, the petitioner had filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court and a petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. He then filed a PCRA petition and after it was denied, he appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Courts.
Summary of this case from Wynn v. Rozum
In Lines, the Third Circuit observed that "`[f]utility exists where: `a state's highest court has ruled unfavorably on a claim involving facts and issues materially identical to those undergirding a federal habeas petition and there is no plausible reason to believe that a replay will persuade the court to reverse its field.'"
Summary of this case from Cooper v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation Parole
noting petitions should be dismissed for failure to exhaust even it is "unlikely that further state process is available"
Summary of this case from Pace v. Vaughn