Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19820310-884880
Timestamp: 2017-07-26 22:55:32+00:00
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BENTHEM c. PAYS-BAS
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8848/80Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1982-03-10;8848.80 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) ACCUSATION EN MATIERE PENALE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : BENTHEMDéfendeurs : PAYS-BASTexte : APPLICATION/R.EQUETE NÂ° 8848/80 Albert BENTHEM v/the NETHERLAND S Albert BENTHEM c/ PAYS-BA S
DECISION of 10 March 1982 on the admissibility of the applicatio n DÃCISION du 10 mars 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention : Is this provision applicable to appeal proceedings brought by the authorities, which lead to a decree by the Crown of the Netherlands . issued following advice of the Council of State, in which it refuses to confirm a licence granted to the applicant to exploit a liquid petrol gas installation? 1jso, does this procedure meet the requirements of Article 6, paragraph !? (Application declared admissible) .
Artlcle 6, paragrephe I, de la Convention : Cette disposition est-elle applicable Ã une procÃ©dure aboutissant, sur recours de l'administration, Ã un dÃ©cret de la Couronne des Pays-Bas, rendu sur avis du Conseil d'Etat, rejusant de confirmer une autorisation accordÃ©e au requÃ©rant en vue d'exploiter une station dlstributrice de gaz liquÃ©fiÃ©? Dans l'a,jfrrmative, cette procÃ©dure offre-t-elle les garanties de l'arricle 6. paragraphe 1?(RequÃ©te dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable) .
(%ranÃ§ais : voir p . 95)
The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows : The applicantâ¢ is a Netherlands citizen residing in Westellingwerf ( Groningen), where he runs a garage . From the statements and documents submitted it appears that on 5 April 1976 the applicant applied to the municipal authori ties for an extension â¢ The applicant is represented before the Commission by Mr N .S .I . Koerman . a lawyer practising in Amsterdam .
of his present licence for his garage for the operation of a liquid petrol gas (LPG) installation for delivery of the gas to motor vehicles . On 11 August 1976 the municipal authorities granted the licence imposing fifty-six conditions for the operation of the installation . Thereupon the Regional Health Inspector, who had advised the municipal authorities not to grant the licence, lodged an appeal against their decision with the Crown (Queen and responsible Minister) under Section 20 of the Nuisance Act, since in his opinion, inter alia, the distance between the installation and surrounding buildings was so small that this would create unacceptable risks . As such an appeal had no suspensive effect, the applicant was meanwhile entitled to operate the installation . On 7 February 1977 the Director General of the Ministry of Public Health and Environmental Protection submitted his report on the case to the Division for Administrative Litigation of the Council of State (Afdeling voor Geschillen van Bestuur van de Raad van State) which in accordance with the legal requirements had been asked for advice by the Crown . In this report the Director hald the view that the appeal was admissible in that the decision of the municipal authorities should be subject to further conditions . On 22 December 1977 the Division held an oral hearing . The applicant, participating in the proceedings as an "interested person" was heard . After the hearing the President of the Division requested the above Director-General to provide further information on the case . In this letter dated 18 May 1978 the Director-General now suggested that the licence be refused for the reason that in the meantime the situation had changed in that the risks of stockage and delivery of LPG were now considered to be greater and that in the future the Regional Health Inspectors would advise that greater distances between such installations and surrounding buildings be respected . On 12 September 1978 a further hearing was held where the applicant had again the opportunity to state his opinion . After the hearing the Chairman of the Division requested the Director-General to give further reasons for the contents of the above letter . The latter provided this information by letter dated 30 November 1978 . On 8 June 1979 the Division of Administrative Litigation sent its advice to the Minister of Public Health and Environmental Protection . By decision of 30 June 1979 the Crown quashed the decision of the municipal authorities inter alia on the ground that according to current views the distance between the LPG tanks and surrounding building should be considered differently and that due to the limited distance between the present installation and the surrounding buildings there was no possibility of excluding any risk by imposing conditions .
Consequently, the applicant had to close down the installation . COMPLAINTS In the applicant's submission the above procedure directly concerned th e deterntination of his civil rights and obligations . In effect, the refusal of the licence did not deprive him of the property right of the installation, but prevented him from being entitled to make use of the installation in conformity with its purpose . Moreover, in order to finance the purchase of the installation, he had obtained a bank loan which was meant to be reimbursed by means of the revenues of the sale of LPG to car drivers .
He further submitted that, in his opinion, Article 6 of the Convention had been violated in that the Crown formed part of the executive and could, therefore, not be considered as a tribunal . The fact that the Crown took the advice of a semi-judicial body-i .e . the Division for Administrative Litigations of the Council of State-did not make any difference . Neither could the Crown be considered as an "independent and impartial" body since the Minister concerned was answerable for its decisions to the Parliament . Furthermore, the Crown was not at all impartial . Often, the Crown had to review the decisions of a Minister, which actually implied that that Minister had to review his own decision . The fact that in the present case the decision by the Crown did not concern a ministerial decree, but the decision of a lower administrative organ-i .e ., the municipal authorities of Weststellingwerf-did not make any difference . In the proceedings in question the appellant was the Regional Inspector of Public Health, being a subordinate of the Minister of Public Health and Environmental Protection . In technically complicated cases, the advice of the Director-General of the Ministry given to the Division for Adntinistrative Litigation was of great importance . This Director-General, too, was a subordinate of the Minister . It was, therefore, not surprising that the Minister endorsed the appeal by his subordinate following the negative recommendation given by another subordinate . In other words, a decision could not be considered to be impartial where it had been called for by a subordinate of the decision-making body, while the advice which in practice is decisive was given by another subordinate of that body . In the applicant's submission, it did not make any difference that a decision of the Crown was given according to the advice by the Division for Administrative Litigation, which in cases such as the present one exclusively followed the technical advice of the DirectorGeneral for the Environment . The applicant further submitted that the Crown's decision should hav e been announced publicly .
THE LAW 1 . The applicant has complained that the decision of the Crown by which the decision of the municipal authorities to grant him a licence for the operation of an LPG installation was quashed did nid not satisfy the requirements of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention . Article 6, paragraph I provides inter alia as follows : "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing . . . by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . . . " 2 . In the Commission's view, a preliminary issue of substance arising under Article 6, paragraph 1 is whether it was applicable or not . The applicant alleges that it must be derived from the text of Article 6, its drafting history, the aim of the Convention and the Court's case law, in particular in the cases of Ringeisen and Ktinig, that the original grant of the licence for operating part of his LPG installation and the withdrawal thereof after appeal is determinative for his civil rights and obligations . The respondent Government submit that the Court's considerations in the Ktinig case can only lead to the conclusion that not every decision taken by the public authorities concerning or affecting the activities of private individuals, in the course of which contracts under private law may be concluded, can be said to amount to a determination of civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention . In their opinion, the decision by public authorities itself should relate directly to the private activities in question, and in cases where these activities may only be carried out under licence they should already be in the process of being carried out under a current licence which must have become irrevocable . Not only did the applicant's licence not relate to commercial activities as indicated by him, but also, even assuming that these activities fell under Article 6, paragraph 1, his right to carry out these activities was only of a provisional nature in the period between the granting of the licence by the municipal authorities and the reversal of their decision by the Crown ; before the licence was granted there was no right whatsoever . In the Commission's opinion the first issue arising is whether the decision in question constituted a determination of any civil rights or obligations of the applicant . Having made a preliminary examination of the parties' submissions on this point, in the light in particular of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Ringeisen, Golder and K6nig cases (Ringeisen Judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A, No. 13, p . 39, para . 94 ; GolderJudgment of 7 May 1974, Series A, No . 18, p . 18, para . 36 ; K6nig Judgment of
28 June 1978, Series A, No . 27 . pp . 30 et seq . paras . 90 et seq .), it has concluded that the case raises important and complex issues concerning the interpretation and application of Article 6, paragraph I whose determination requires an examination of the merits of the application . 3 . If Article 6, paragraph I were to be applicable, a second issue under the article arises, as to whether the procedure before the Crown satisfied the requirements of the article . The applicant submits that the Crown being the highest administrative authority cannot be considered as an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph I and that its decision is neither circumscribed by time limits, nor publicly announced . The respondent Government point out that the appeal proceedings before the Crown under the Nuisance Act constitute a fair hearing as required by Article 6 of the Convention and that the Crown's decision was sent to the interested parties and made available for general inspection . The Comntission has also carried out a preliminary examination of the arguments submitted by the parties on this point . It finds that if the answer to the preliminary question was in the affirmative, this part of the application will raise intportant questions under the Convention and is of such complexity that the determination of this issue should equally depend on an examination of its merits . It follows that the application cannot be regarded as manifestly illfounded within the meaning of Article 27, article 2 of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established . The Commission, therefore, without prejudging the merits, DECLARES THIS APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE
.-94
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant* est un resso rt issant nÃ©erlandais habitant Westellingwerf ( Groningue) oÃ¹ il exploite un garage . Des dÃ©clarations et documents produits, il apparait que, le 5 av ri l 1976, le requÃ©rant demanda Ã la municipalitÃ© d'Ã©tendre l'auto risation qu'il dÃ©ti ent pour exploiter son garage Ã l'exploitation d'une installation de gaz liquÃ©fiÃ©, afin de livrer du gaz Ã des vÃ©hicules automobiles . Le II aoÃ»t 1976, la municipalitÃ© accordait l'autori sation d'exploiter l'installation, tout en l'assortissant de 56 conditions . L'inspecteur rÃ©gional de la santÃ©, qui avait conseillÃ© Ã la municipalitÃ© de refuser l'auto risation, recourut contre cette dÃ©cision auprÃ¨s de la Couronne ( la Reine et le minist re de tutelle), conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 20 de la loi sur les nuisances car, Ã son avis, la distance sÃ©parant l'installation des habitations avoisinantes Ã©tait si faible qu'il en rÃ©sulterait des risques inadmissibles . Ce recours n'ayant pas d'effet suspensif, le requÃ©rant avait entre-temps le droit d'exploiter l'installation . Le 7 fÃ©vrier 1977, le directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral du ministÃ¨re de la SantÃ© publique et de l'Environnement prÃ©senta son rapport sur l'affaire Ã la division du contentieux administratif du Co_nseiGd'Etat (Afdeling voor Geschillen van Bestuur van de Raad van State) ;--, qtie, conformÃ©ment Ã la loi, la Couronne avait invitÃ© Ã donner son avis . Dans son rapport . le directeur exp ri ma l'avis que le recours Ã©tait recevable en . cefsens que la dÃ©cision de la municipalit W conditions .
Ã©devait@rso nuvel
Le 22 dÃ©cembre 1977, la"division 'tint une audience contradictoire au cours de laquelle le requÃ©rant, . cÃ´mparaissant en tant que . personne intÃ©ressÃ©e â¢, fut entendu . AprÃ¨sl'audience, le prÃ©sident de la division demanda au directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ©citÃ© de fournir un complÃ©ment d'informations . Dans sa lettre du 18 mai 1978, le directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral proposa alors de refuser l'autorisation, la situation ayant Ã© voluÃ© entretemps : on estimait dÃ©sormais plus graves les risques inÃ»Ã©rents au stockage et Ã la livraison de gaz liquÃ©fiÃ© et Ã l'avenir les inspecteurs rÃ©gionaux de la SantÃ© devaient conseiller des normes de distance accrveent re ce ty pe d'installations et les bÃ¢timents avoisinants. Le 12 septembre 1978 eut lieu une audience au cours de laquelle l e requÃ©rant eut Ã nouveau la possibilitÃ© d'exposer son point de vue . AprÃ¨ s * Le requÃ©rant est reprÃ©senlÃ© devam la Commission par Me N .S .I . Koerman, avocat Ã Anisierdani .
l'audience, le prÃ©sident de la division demanda au directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral de motiver davantage la teneur de la lettre susdite . Celui-ci fournit les informations dentandÃ©es par lettre du 30 novembre 1978 . Le 8 juin 1979 . la division du contentieux administratif adressa son avis au ministre de la SantÃ© publique et de l'Environnement . Par dÃ©cision du 30 juin 1979, la Couronne annula la dÃ©cision de la municipalitÃ©, en raison notamment de l'opinion couramment admise qu'il fallait apprÃ©cier diffÃ©remment la distance sÃ©parant les rÃ©servoirs de gaz liquÃ©fiÃ© des habitations voisines et qu'en l'occurence . ces distances Ã©tant faibles, ce n'est pas en imposant des conditions d'exploitation qu'on pourrait Ã©carter le risque . En consÃ©quence, le requÃ©rant dut fermer son installation . GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant soutient que la procÃ©dure exposÃ©e ci-dessus a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cisiv e pour ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil . En effet, le refus d'autorisation ne l'a pas privÃ© de son droit de propriÃ©tÃ© de l'installation mais l'a empÃªchÃ© de faire usage de l'installation conformÃ©ment aux buts pour lesquels elle avait Ã©tÃ© crÃ©Ã©e . En outre, pour financer l'achat de l'installation, il avait obtenu un prÃªt bancaire qu'il devait rembourser grÃ¢ce au produit de la vente du gaz liquÃ©fiÃ© aux automobilistes . Il soutient en outre, qu'il y a eu violation de l'article 6 de la Convention, puisque la Couronne ne peut pas Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial . Selon le requÃ©rant . la Couronne, faisant partie de l'exÃ©cutif, ne saurait Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme un tribunal . Le fait qu'elle consulte un organe semi-judiciaire - en l'occurrence la division du contentieux administratif du Conseil d'Etat - ne change rien Ã l'affaire . La Couronne ne peut pas non plus Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme un . organe indÃ©pendant et impartialâ¢, puisque le ministre de tutelle rÃ©pond de ses dÃ©cisions devant le Parlement . En outre, la Couronne n'est pas du tout impartiale . Elle doit souvent revoir les dÃ©cisions d'un ministre, ce qui suppose en fin de compte que le ministre rÃ©vise sa propre dÃ©cision . Le fait qu'en l'espÃ¨ce la Couronne n'avait pas Ã se prononcer sur un dÃ©cret ntinistÃ©riel mais sur la dÃ©cision d'un organe administratif infÃ©rieur - Ã savoir la municipalitÃ© de Weststellingwerf - ne change rien Ã l'affaire . Dans la procÃ©dure en question, l'appelant Ã©tait l'inspecteur rÃ©gional de la SantÃ© publique, qui dÃ©pend du ministre de la SantÃ© publique et de la protection de l'environnement . Pour les questions techniquement compliquÃ©es, l'avis donnÃ© par le directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral du ministÃ¨re Ã la division du contentieux administratif revÃªt une grande importance . Or, c e
directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral, lui aussi, dÃ©pend du ministre . Il n'est donc pas surprenant que le ministreâ¢ait fait sien le recours introduit par son subordonnÃ© en suivant la recommandation nÃ©gative donnÃ©e par un autre subordonnÃ© . Autrement dit, une dÃ©cision ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme impartiale lorsqu'elle a Ã©tÃ© sollicitÃ©e par un subordonnÃ©de l'organe dÃ©cideur, et que l'avis dÃ©cisif en pratique Ã©mane d'un autre subordÃ´nnÃ© du mÃªme organe . De l'avis du requÃ©rant, il ne fait aucune diffÃ©rence que la Couronne ait pris sa dÃ©cision en se conformant Ã l'avis de la division du contentieux administratif qui, dans des affaires comme celle-ci, suit toujours l'avis technique du directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral de l'environnement . Le requÃ©rant fait valoir en outre que la dÃ©cision de la Couronne n'a pas Ã©tÃ© rendue publiquement .
EN DROIT 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint que la dÃ©cision prise par la Couronne d'annuler l'autorisation que lui avait donnÃ©e la municipalitÃ© pour exploiter une installation de gaz liquÃ©fiÃ©, ne rÃ©pondait pas aux exigences de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . L'article 6, paragraphe 1, dispose notamment : -Toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement . publiquement, ( . . .) par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial, Ã©tabli par la loi . qui dÃ©cidera soit des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil, soit du bien-fondÃ© de toute accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle â¢ . 2 . Selon la Commission, il se pose, Ã titre prÃ©liminaire, la question essentielle de savoir si l'article 6 . paragraphe 1 . Ã©tait ou non applicable . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que l'on doit conclure du texte de l'article 6, de la genÃ¨se de sa rÃ©daction, du but de la Convention et de la jurisprudence de la Cour, notamment des arrÃ©ts Ringeisen et KSnig, que l'octroi initial de l'autorisation d'exploiter une partie de ses installations de gaz liquÃ©fiÃ© et l'annulation de cette autorisation aprÃ¨s recours ont Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cisifs pour ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil . Le Gouvernement soutient, quant Ã lui, que les considÃ©rants de la Cour dans l'arrÃªt Ktinig ne peuvent mener qu'Ã la conclusion que toute dÃ©cision d'une autoritÃ©publique qui concerne ou affecte, chez des personnes physiques, des activitÃ©s pouvant amener la conclusion de contrats de droit privÃ©, ne revient pas Ã dÃ©cider de droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil au sens de l'article 6 de la Convention . A son avis, la dÃ©cision de l'autoritÃ© publique doit concerner elle-mÃªme directement les activitÃ©s privÃ©es en question et, lorsque ces activitÃ©s sont soumises Ã autorisation, il faut dÃ©jÃ qu'elles soient menÃ©e s
conformÃ©ment Ã une autorisation irrÃ©vocable . Non seulement l'autorisation donnÃ©e au requÃ©rant ne concernait pas des activitÃ©s commerciales comme il le laisse entendre, mais Ã supposer mÃªme que ces activitÃ©s aient relevÃ© de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, le droit du requÃ©rant de mener ces activitÃ©s n'Ã©tait que provisoire dans la pÃ©riode allant de l'octroi de l'autorisation par la niunicipalitÃ© Ã l'annulation de cette dÃ©cision par la Couronne ; il n'existait avant l'octroi de cette autorisation, aucun droit d'aucune sorte . De l'avis de la Commission, le premier problÃ¨me qui se pose est celui de savoir si la dÃ©cision litigieuse revenait Ã dÃ©cider d'une contestation sur des droits ou obligations de caractÃ¨re civil du requÃ©rant . AprÃ¨s avoir procÃ©dÃ© Ã un examen prÃ©liminaire de l'argumentation des parties sur ce point, au vu notamment des arrÃ©ts rendus par la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans les affaires Ringeisen . Golder et KBnig (arrÃªt Ringeisen du 16 juillet 1971, SÃ©rie A . nÂ° 13 . p . 39 . par . 94 : Golder du 7 mai 1974, SÃ©rie A, nÂ° 18, p . 18, par . 36 : KÃ´nig du 28 juin 1978 . SÃ©rie A . nÂ° 27, pp . . 30 et suiv ., par . 90 et suiv .), elle estime que l'affaire pose . Ã l'Ã©gard de l'interprÃ©tation et de l'application de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . d'importantes questions dont la complexitÃ© appelle . pour en dÃ©cider, un examen au fond . 3 . Si l'article 6, paragraphe 1, devait Ãªtre reconnu applicable, il se poserait, au regard de cet article, une deuxiÃ¨me question : celle de savoir si la procÃ©dure suivie devant la Couronne rÃ©pondait aux exigences de cette disposi . tion . Le requÃ©rant soutient que la Couronne Ã©tant la plus haute instance adntinistrative, elle ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . et qu'en outre, sa dÃ©cision ne doit pas Ã©tre rendue dans un certain dÃ©lai ni publiquement annoncÃ©e . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur souligne, quant Ã lui, que la procÃ©dure de recours Ã la Couronne prÃ©vue par la loi sur les nuisances constitue bien le procÃ¨s Ã©quitable exigÃ© par l'article 6 de la Convention et que la dÃ©cision prise par la Couronne a Ã©tÃ© adressÃ©e aux parties intÃ©ressÃ©es et mise Ã la disposition du public . La Commission a Ã©galement procÃ©dÃ© Ã un examen prÃ©liminaire des arguments prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties sur ce point . Elle constate que si la rÃ©ponse Ã la question prÃ©liminaire est affirmative, cette partie de la requÃªte posera au regard de la Convention, d'importantes questions dont la complexitÃ© appellera Ã©galentent . pour en dÃ©cider, un examen au fond . Il s'ensuit que la requÃ©te ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention, et qu'aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'a Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli . Par ces motifs . et tout moven de fond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ© . la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE .
-98-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 10/03/1982Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page