Source: http://www.civillitigationbrief.com/2015/02/04/evans-v-wolverhampton-part-36-service-of-notice-to-appeal-and-relief-from-sanctions-in-the-reports-again/
Timestamp: 2017-02-27 06:44:56
Document Index: 344280590

Matched Legal Cases: ['ART 36', 'ART 36', 'art 36', 'art 36', 'EWCA ', 'art 36']

EVANS -v- WOLVERHAMPTON: PART 36: SERVICE OF NOTICE TO APPEAL AND RELIEF FROM SANCTIONS: IN THE REPORTS AGAIN – Civil Litigation Brief
» EVANS -v- WOLVERHAMPTON: PART 36: SERVICE OF NOTICE TO APPEAL AND RELIEF FROM SANCTIONS: IN THE REPORTS AGAIN
February 4, 2015 · by gexall · in Appeals, Applications, Civil Procedure, Part 36, Relief from sanctions The case of Evans -v- The Royal Wolverhampton Hospital Trust [2014] EWHC 3185 (QB) has been examined before in this blog. It was the case where the defendant made an ex parte application for permission to withdraw a Part 36 offer and also that the information it relied upon not be disclosed to the claimant. The defendant then made a subsequent application, after disclosure of the information, but served the notice of appeal late. The defendant’s application throws some light on the matter. (This was a preliminary application reported at [2014] EWCA Civ 1782. The substantive decision in the appeal has not yet been given.)
23. If there is to be an intervention by a judge sitting at first instance in the procedural framework for an appeal by means of the order that he or she makes, that should be on a considered basis and should be properly explained by the judge. With the benefit of the transcript of the hearing and the explanation by counsel, it can be seen that this did not
happen here. The question of abridgement of time for service of the notice of appeal was not debated at the hearing. The matter went by default in the drafting of what became paragraph 6 that was done by counsel after the hearing on 16 October, and the final form of the order was presented to the judge for approval without his attention being drawn to the point.
30. Against that background, the significance of the part of paragraph 6 of the order which refers to service of the notice of appeal can be put in context. As Mr Samuel, for the claimant, realistically accepted, it could not mean, as a matter of practical reality, that the filing and service of the notice of appeal had to take place at precisely the same moment. Those things would happen in different places and would be bound to be subject to some degree of difference in timing. If the notice of appeal was filed, for example, at 10.00 am on 29 October and then served at 10.30 am, that would constitute compliance with the order. Indeed, Mr Samuel accepted, in response to a scenario put to him by Lewison LJ, that if the notice of appeal had been filed on 20 October and then served on 25 October, that would have constituted compliance wit
h the order as well.
Tags: Appeal, Appeal Court, Civil Procedure Rules, CPR 3.9, Denton -v- White, Part 36
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