Source: http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=692&chapter=194573&layout=html&Itemid=27
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 14:57:59
Document Index: 456327571

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 12', '§ 13', '§ 14', '§ 15', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 18', '§ 19', '§ 20', '§ 21', '§ 22', '§ 23', '§ 24', '§ 25', '§ 26', '§ 27', '§ 28', '§ 29', '§ 30', '§ 31', '§ 32', '§ 33', '§ 34', '§ 35', '§ 37', '§ 40', '§ 41']

Online Library of Liberty - XXI - Politica
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Search this Title:Also in the Library:Subject Area: Political TheoryCollection: Books Published by Liberty FundOrder this book from Liberty FundXXI - Johannes Althusius, Politica [1614]Edition used:Politica. An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples, ed. and Trans. Frederick S. Carney. Foreword by Daniel J. Elazar (Indianapolis: 1995 Liberty Fund).
§ 9Most miserable is that commonwealth, therefore, in which its governor is imprudent or ignorant in the art of governing, in which he learns for the first time from his own experience those things that were necessary from the beginning.” 10 “An uninformed king destroys his people, and a city shall be inhabited through the intelligence of rulers.” 11 A wise king is called a pillar of the people.12 For what the eye is in the body, and the sun in the heavens, so is the magistrate in the commonwealth. He ought to be attentive to everything, and to keep many things secret. “Certain rulers are to be found who are not in the least evil, and who would like to rule well and to benefit their subjects, but do not know how. Indeed, even when they wish to do so and make the attempt, they instead inflict injury upon themselves and others as they pursue their intention. Thus the proverb is true, that a sword should not be given to a child.” 13 Nor should a wild and stubborn horse be given to one who is not skilled in ruling him. But no animal is more capricious than man, and none requires greater art to handle.14 For this reason God requires men for the administration of a commonwealth who excel in the practice and experience of things. … 15
§ 10There is a twofold division, as I have said,16 in this political prudence: one into its members, and the other into its kinds.17 The members of this prudence are two in number: namely, political understanding (intellectus) and choice (delectus) of things to be done and to be omitted in the administration of the commonwealth.18 By political understanding a magistrate sees, recognizes, knows, and comprehends the things that he is to do or to omit by reason of his office. … § 11A complete political understanding is composed of doctrine (doctrina) and practice (usus).19 They are therefore considered to be the parts of a perfect knowledge.20
§ 12Doctrine of things salutary and necessary for administration is supplied by the knowledge that comes through reading and listening. But he is rightly to be praised who is productive and useful to the commonwealth, not he who merely knows many things. The origin of intemperance is the wish to know more than enough, as Seneca declares. As we incline towards intemperance in all things, so in literary matters. And in so doing we learn not of life, but of learning. “The reading of many things is a weariness of the flesh.” 21 The best way to learn is to listen to a teacher in person. It is to be sought in the experience and practice of the learned through conversation with distinguished men among them; with theologians, jurists, philosophers, historians, generals, soldiers, and others. A prince can learn more in a brief time in colloquies around a table with these men—while wandering about and consulting them—than he would be able to gather in a longer period of time in schools. … § 13The means of learning from the voice of the dead, or from silent instructors, is provided principally by the reading of histories. For by them it is possible without peril or expense to observe others, to look upon their journeys, calamities, perils, wars, customs, virtues, vices, governments, life and death, joy and sadness, fortune and adversity, the beginning, middle, and end of imperia, as well as the causes, effects, foundations, assessories, conflicts, and relations of all events. … § 14But in this matter Cicero advises that “two errors are to be avoided. One is that we must not consider the unknown as known, and thus accept it without adequate investigation. [ … ] The other is that we ought not to devote excessive study and great pains to obscure and difficult matters that are not necessary.” 22
§ 15Three things are properly and unavoidably to be learned and known by the supreme magistrate in the administration of the commonwealth. The sinews and bond of imperium and commonwealth depend upon them. First is the rule of living and administering; the second is the nature of the people; and the third is the nature of rule (regnum).23 We will consider each of these in order.24
§ 16The rule of living, obeying, and administering is the will of God alone, which is the way of life, and the law of things to be done and to be omitted. It is necessary that the magistrate rule, appoint, and examine all the business of his administration with this law as a touchstone and measure, unless he wishes to rule the ship of state as an unreliable vessel at sea, and to wander about and move at random. Thus the administration and government of a commonwealth is nothing other than the execution of law. § 17Therefore, this law alone prescribes not only the order of administering for the magistrate, but also the rule of living for all subjects. …
§ 18This rule, which is solely God’s will for men manifested in his law, is called law in the general sense that it is a precept for doing those things that pertain to living a pious, holy, just, and suitable life. That is to say, it pertains to the duties that are to be performed toward God and one’s neighbor, and to the love of God and one’s neighbor. … It is evident from these things that laws or rights in human society are as fences, walls, guards, or boundaries of our life, guiding us along the appointed way for achieving wisdom, happiness, and peace in human society. When laws are taken away, human society, which we call symbiotic, is changed into a brutal life. …
§ 19This law, as we have said, is twofold. It is either common or proper.25 Common law (lex communis) has been naturally implanted by God in all men. “Whatever can be known about God has been manifested to men, because God has made it manifest to them.” 26 As to knowledge (notitia) and inclination (inclinatio), God discloses and prescribes the reason and means for worshipping him and loving one’s neighbor, and urges us to them. “For there was reason derived from the nature of the universe,” Cicero says, “urging men to do right and recalling them from wrong-doing, and this reason did not first become law at the time it was written down, but at its origin.” 27 It is commonly called the moral law (lex moralis).
§ 20By the knowledge imprinted within us by God, which is called conscience, man knows and understands law (jus)28 and the means to be employed or avoided for maintaining obedience to law. By this innate inclination, or secret impulse of nature, man is urged to perform what he understands to be just, and to avoid what he knows to be wicked. “When gentiles who do not have the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law unto themselves, even though not having the law, because they show forth service to a law written on their hearts. Their conscience bears witness to it, and their thoughts alternately accuse and even excuse them.” 29 Other witnesses of scripture also make clear that conscience duly excuses a man when he acts uprightly, and disturbs and accuses him when he deserves condemnation for acting wickedly. … 30 In this common law (jus commune) is set forth for all men nothing other than the general theory and practice of love, both for God and for one’s neighbor.31
§ 21There are different degrees of this knowledge and inclination. For law is not inscribed equally on the hearts of all. The knowledge of it is communicated more abundantly to some and more sparingly to others, according to the will and judgment of God. Whence it is that the knowledge of this law may be greater in some than in others. Nor does God urge and excite all persons to obedience of this law in the same manner and to an equal degree. Some men exert themselves more strongly, others less so, in their desire for it.32
§ 22Christ set forth two headings of this common law.33 The first heading pertains to the performance of our duty immediately to God, and the second to what is owed to our neighbor. § 23In the former are the mandates and precepts that guide the pious and religious life of acknowledging and worshipping God. These are in the first table of the Decalogue, where they instruct and inform man about God and the public and private worship of him. … § 24In the latter table are those mandates and precepts that concern the just, and more civil and political, life. Man is informed by them that he may render and communicate things, services, counsel, and right (jus) to his symbiotic neighbor, and may discharge toward him everything that ought to be rendered for alleviating his need and for living comfortably. Properly speaking, however, they are not called mandates and precepts, as the previous ones are, but rather judgments, statutes, and witnesses. They are contained in the second table of the Decalogue.
Affirmative precepts of the Decalogue are about duties to be perfomed that are owed to God and one’s neighbor. Negative precepts are about prohibited things that are to be omitted or avoided.
§ 25 The first precept of the first table is about truly cherishing and choosing God through the knowledge of him handed down in his word, and through unity with him accompanied by a disposition of trust, love, and fear. Forbidden by this precept are ignorance of God and of the divine will, atheism, errors concerning God, and enmity or contempt towards God.
The second precept is about maintaining in spirit and in truth a genuine worship of God through prayers and the use of the means of grace. In this precept a false or feigned worship of God is forbidden, whether through images, idolatry, hypocrisy, human traditions, magic, or anything else.
The third precept is about rendering glory to God in all things through the proper use of the names of God, oaths of allegiance to him, respect for what has been created by the Word of God, and intercessory prayers. Negatively this precept is about not taking away from the glory of God by perjury, blasphemy, cursing, abuse of the creation, superstition, a dissolute life, and so forth.
The fourth precept is about sanctifying the sabbath in holy services through hearing, reading, and meditating upon the Word of God, and through use of the sacraments. Negatively, it is about not violating the sabbath through occupational employment, marketing, physical labors, games, jokes, frolics, feasts, or the mere form of piety.
§ 26Whatever is in conflict with these precepts of the first table is called impious. And for that reason these precepts are always, absolutely, and without distinction binding upon all, to such a degree that the second table of the Decalogue ought to yield precedence to the first table as to a superior law. Therefore, if a precept of God and a mandate of the magistrate should come together in the same affair and be contrary to each other, then God is to be obeyed rather than the magistrate. And in like manner private utility ought to give way to public utility and the common welfare. Whence it is that these precepts of the first table can never be set aside or relaxed, and not even God himself is able to reject them.
§ 27The precepts of the second table are those that contain duties to be performed toward our neighbor. These are either proper or common. Proper duties are comprehended by the fifth precept, which is about those things that inferiors are expected to perform towards superiors, and vice versa. The dignity, honor, authority, and eminence of superiors are to be upheld through respect, obedience, compliance, subjection, and necessary aid. These are owed to more distinguished persons because of the gifts, talents, or services they bring to public or private office in the commonwealth, or because of their origins. And when a man fulfills these duties, he is at the same time upholding reason and order in the social life. Negatively, this precept is about not despising, scorning, or depreciating our neighbor by word or deed. It is also about not destroying order among the various stations in human society, and not introducing confusion into them.
Common duties, which are to be performed toward everyone, are treated in the remaining precepts. Of these the sixth requires the defense, protection, and conservation of one’s own life and that of the neighbor. The conservation of one’s own life comes first, and consists in defense, conservation, and propagation of oneself. … 34 Conservation of the neighbor’s life is his protection through friendship and other duties of charity, such as provision for food, clothes, and anything else he needs for sustentation. Negatively, this precept prohibits enmity, injury to the human body, assault, mutilation, blows, murder, terror, privation of natural liberty,35 and any other inhuman treatment.
The seventh precept concerns the conservation of the chastity of one’s own mind and body, and that of one’s neighbor, through sobriety, good manners, modesty, discretion, and any other appropriate means. Negatively, it pertains to the avoidance in word or deed of fornication, debauchery, lewdness, and wantonness.
The eighth precept concerns the defense and conservation of one’s own goods and those of one’s neighbor, and their proper employment in commerce, contracts, and one’s vocation. Negatively, it forbids the disturbance, embezzlement, injury, seizure, or impairment of another’s goods, or the misuse of one’s own. It condemns deceit in commerce and trade, theft, falsehood, injury, any injustice that can be perpetrated by omitting or including something in contracts, and an idle and disordered life.
The ninth precept concerns the defense and conservation of the good name and reputation of oneself and one’s neighbor through honest testimony, just report, and good deeds. Negatively, it prohibits hostility, perverse suggestions, insults of any kind, defamations, and slander, either by spoken or written words or by an act or gesture.
The tenth precept concerns concupiscence, and exerts influence on each of the other precepts of the second table. “We are taught [ … ] by the authority and bidding of laws to control our passions, to bridle our every lust, to defend what is ours, and to keep our minds, eyes, and hands from whatever belongs to another.” 36
Not only the fifth precept of the second table, but also the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth precepts concern the political society and the magistracy of the commonwealth, both as to persons and as to the goods of the subjects. § 28Whatever is in conflict with these precepts of the second table is called unjust. What is commanded or prohibited by them ought to be done or omitted by each person in keeping with his public or private vocation and out of love for his neighbor. God sometimes relaxes the fifth, sixth, and eighth precepts, and out of his great wisdom sets aside the things that ought to be done according to them. Thus he ordered Abraham to kill and sacrifice his son contrary to the sixth precept of the Decalogue. And Ehud, by special command of God, killed Eglon, and Jehu killed Joram. Thus he permitted to the Jewish people polygamy, divorce, marriage with the surviving widow of a deceased brother, and many other things that had been specifically prohibited in the second table. But his power of dispensation has not been given to men. …
§ 29The Decalogue has been prescribed for all people to the extent that it agrees with and explains the common law of nature for all peoples. It has also been renewed and confirmed by Christ our king. Jerome Zanchius says that this is the common judgment of theologians. … 37
§ 30Proper law (lex propria) is the law that is drawn up and established by the magistrate on the basis of common law (lex communis) and according to the nature, utility, condition, and other special circumstances of his country. It indicates the peculiar way, means, and manner by which this natural equity among men can be upheld, observed, and cultivated in any given commonwealth. Therefore, proper law (jus proprium) is nothing other than the practice of this common natural law (jus naturale) as adapted to a particular polity. It indicates how individual citizens of a given commonwealth are able to seek and attain this natural equity. Whence it is called the servant and handmaiden of common law (jus commune), and a teacher leading us to the observance of common law.
§ 31Proper law is established for two principal reasons, as Zanchius says.38 The first reason is that not all men have sufficient natural capacity that they are able to draw from these general principles of common law the particular conclusions and laws suitable to the nature and condition of an activity and its circumstances. The second reason is that natural law is not so completely written on the hearts of men that it is sufficiently efficacious in restraining men from evil and impelling them to good. This is because it merely teaches, inclines, and accuses men. It is therefore necessary that there be a proper law by which men who are led neither by the love of virtue nor by the hatred of vice may be restrained by the fear of punishment that this law assigns to transgressions of common law. In this sense, it is said that “law is set forth not for the just, but the unjust.” 39
§ 32There are two parts of this law. The first is its agreement with common law, and the second is its difference, as Francis Junius observes40 and the jurists teach.41 For if this law were to teach nothing other than what common law does, it would not constitute a new specie. If it set forth something entirely contrary to common law, it would be evil in that it would make mutable an otherwise immutable common law. It is truly necessary, therefore, that it not entirely depart from common law, that it not be generally contrary to it, and that it not completely combine with it and thus be identical with it.
Its agreement (convenientia) with common law is in those matters common to each law, namely, in the starting point from which analogical deductions are made, in the subject under consideration, and in the purpose. The starting point is the right and certain reason upon which both laws rely, and by which each decides what is just and declares it. The subject under consideration is the joint business and action to which both laws relate themselves and give directions. The purpose of each is justice and piety, or sanctity, and the same equity and common good in human society.
Its difference (discrepantia) from common law arises from the fact that, in accommodation to particular and special circumstances, it departs somewhat from common law, adding or subtracting something from it. Proper law differs for two reasons, each of which provides a necessity for adding or subtracting something from common law. And so mutability, or the possibility and necessity of just changes, is introduced. One reason is that, because of a better understanding by the legislator of order and utility, a law that for a long time was looked upon as just is changed. The other is the nature and condition of an activity so far as persons, things, circumstances, place, or time are concerned. Since the nature and condition of these circumstances may be diverse, inconstant, and changeable, it is not possible for proper law to acknowledge one and the same disposition of common law for everything and in everything, as Junis and Zanchius, together with the jurists, say.
§ 33Therefore, this law is rightly said to be mutable or subject to change with respect to circumstances and its consequent difference from common law. But it is altogether immutable with respect to its agreement with common law. So the jurists assert, together with Junius, Zanchius, Martyr, and Bucer. Thus common or moral law concludes from its principles that evildoers ought to be punished, but proposes nothing concerning the punishment. Proper law determines specifically that adulterers, murderers, and the like are to be punished by death, unless the punishment should be mitigated because of further circumstances. Various punishments, for example, exist in the Mosaic law for these crimes. Common law requires that God be worshipped. Proper law determines that this is to be done each seventh day. Therefore, common law commands in general. Proper law makes these commands specific, and accommodates them to the experience and utility of the commonwealth and the circumstances of each activity. For this reason, the moral precepts of the Decalogue, having no certain, special, and fixed punishment attached to them, are general. The forensic and political law then makes specific determinations, which it relates to the circumstances of any act.
§ 34This proper law is one thing among the Jews, another among the Romans, another among the Germans today, and still another among other peoples. However, almost all European polities use the Roman Law (jus Romanum), which is described in the Digest, Code, Novels, and Institutes.
§ 35Jewish proper law is twofold. It is in part ceremonial, and in part forensic or judicial. The ceremonial law, because of its emphasis, was directed to the observance and support of the first table of the Decalogue through certain political and ecclesiastical actions and things; or it was devoted to piety and divine worship. … § 37The forensic law was the means by which the Jews were informed and instructed to observe and obey both tables, or the common law, for the cultivation of human society among them in their polity, according to the circumstances of things, persons, place, and time. … § 40It should be observed that often one and the same law of the Jews could be said in varying respects to be moral (or common), ceremonial, and forensic, and to this extent mixed. What is moral in such a law is perpetual; what is judicial can be changed by the change of circumstances; and what is ceremonial is considered to have passed away. …
§ 41At this point we encounter the controversy over what we maintain to be the political doctrine of the Decalogue. In the judgment of others the Decalogue should instead be considered theological.42 Some persons consider that we thus sin against the law of homogeneity. Whence there is a deep silence among them about the role of the Decalogue in politics. But this is wrong in my judgment. For the subject matter of the Decalogue is indeed political insofar as it directs symbiotic life and prescribes what ought to be done therein. For the Decalogue teaches the pious and just life; piety toward God and justice toward symbiotes. If symbiosis is deprived of these qualities, it should not be called so much a political and human society as a beastly congregation of vice-ridden men. Therefore, each and every precept of the Decalogue political and symbiotic. The contemplative and practical life in every respect is embraced and completed in them, although the first and last precepts have the sole purpose of building up the souls of men and are merely speculative. If you would deprive political and symbiotic life of this rule and this light to our feet, as it is called,43 you would destroy its vital spirit. Furthermore, you would take away the bond of human society and, as it were, the rudder and helm of this ship. It would then altogether perish, or be transformed into a stupid, beastly, and inhuman life. Therefore, the subject matter of the Decalogue is indeed natural, essential, and proper to politics.
If the external and civil life of words, deeds and works is accompanied by true faith—together with holiness of thought and desire, and with a right purpose, namely, the glory of God—then it becomes theological. So therefore, when the works of the Decalogue are performed by the Christian to the glory of God because of true faith, they are pleasing to God. But if, to the contrary, they are performed by an infidel or heathen, to whom the Apostle Paul indeed ascribes a natural knowledge of and inclination towards the Decalogue,44 these works are not able to please God. But in political life even an infidel may be called just, innocent, and upright because of them.
Jurists and moralists also handle the concerns of both tables of the Decalogue, but in a manner fitting and proper to each art and profession, so that neither is confused with the purely theological or political. As the general doctrine of the Decalogue is therefore essential, homogeneous, and necessary in politics, so the special and particular doctrine of the Decalogue accommodated to individual and separate disciplines is proper to jurisprudence. And theology rightly claims for itself the pious and salutary doctrine of the Decalogue, which ought to be a teacher leading to Christ, so far as the Decalogue pertains to life eternal. …
[1 ] [The order, rule, and norm of administering here mean the entire teaching on political prudence (Chapters XXI–XXVII). Later, political prudence will be divided into its members (political understanding and political choice) and its kinds (proper prudence and borrowed prudence). Political understanding in turn will be divided into doctrine and practice. Doctrine still again will be divided into the rule of living and administering, the nature of the people, and the nature of rule or imperium. It is important, therefore, that the order, rule, and norm of administering (or political prudence in general) not be confused with the rule of living and administering (one of the subdivisions of political prudence), which will be discussed very soon.The types of admininistration refer to the ecclesiastical administration (Chapter XXVIII) and secular administration (Chapters XXIX–XXXVII).]
[2 ] [ Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae. ]
[3 ]Duties, I, 4. [Cicero relates prudence to wisdom, and understands them both to seek the essential truth of any given matter.]
[4 ] [The Four Virtues.]
[5 ] Psalm 78:70, 72.
[6 ] Petrus Gregorius, De republica, X, 4, 5. [Gregorius presents this passage as a statement by Moses in Deuteronomy 32. Althusius retains the reference to Deuteronomy 32, but does not mention Moses.]
[7 ] Job 12:12. [This Biblical reference is also to be found in Gregorius, De republica, X, 4, 5.]
[8 ] Gregorius, De republica, X, 4, 5. [Gregorius then proceeds with brief comments on memory and discretion, but does not mention judgment.]
[9 ]Ibid.,, X 4, 6. [There are slight variations in wording in this quotation and others here employed from Gregorius.]
[10 ] [Gregorius, De republica, X, 3, 3.]
[11 ] Ecclesiasticus 10:3.
[12 ] Wisdom 6:26.
[13 ] [Gregorius, De republica, X, 3, 3.]
[14 ] [This same comparison of man with an animal, although not in the same words, is found in Gregorius, ibid., X, 3, 4.]
[15 ] Exodus 18:21; Deuteronomy 1:13–15; Numbers 11:16.
[16 ] [Actually he has not said this before. But he has spoken earlier in this chapter of the division in the next sentence, namely, the distinction he has borrowed from Lipsius between political understanding and political choice.]
[17 ] [Chapters XXI–XXVI and XXVII respectively.]
[18 ] Political understanding is discussed in Chapters XXI–XXV and the first part of XXVI, and political choice in the latter part of XXVI.]
[19 ] [Doctrine is discussed in Chapters XXI–XXV, and practice in the first part of XXVI.]
[20 ] Whence practice (experience) begot me, and memory brought me forth; the Greeks call me sophia, and you sapientia.
[21 ] Ecclesiastes 12:12.
[22 ]Duties, I, 6. [The unacknowleged omission from this quotation reads, “and he who wishes to avoid this error, as all should, will apply both time and diligence to the weighing of evidence.” Althusius also makes other minor changes in wording.]
[23 ] [The word regnum, which is consistently rendered as “realm” in this translation unless otherwise noted, conveys in this instance much more the meaning of “rule.” For regnum is here used interchangeably with imperium, and will be dropped by Althusius in favor of imperium when he turns to a discussion of the nature of rule or imperium in Chapters XXIV–XXV.]
[24 ] [Chapters XXI–XXII, XXIII, and XXIV–XXV respectively.]
[25 ] There is another treatment of common law and proper law in Althusius’ Dicaelogica, I, 13 and 14.]
[26 ] Romans 1:19.
[27 ]Laws, II, 4.
[28 ] [In this discussion of common and proper law Althusius usually employs jus interchangeably with lex. Consequently, both Latin words will be translated as “law” except where noted. The reader should also observe that Althusius here employs common law (jus commune) in a different sense from that of Chapter IV where it refers to the fundamental law of a particular association.]
[29 ] Romans 2:14 f.
[30 ] I Corinthians 1:12; 4:4; 5:1 f.; 11:14; Acts 23:1; Psalm 26:1–3; I Timothy 1:19; Proverbs 28:1; Romans 2:15; 9; Ecclesiastes 7:22.
[31 ]See Benedict Aretius, Problemata theologica, “De cognitione Dei naturali,” loc. 1.
[32 ]See Romans 7:15–13; Psalm 10:4; 36:2; Romans 1:24, 28; I Timothy 4:2; Jeremiah 31.
[33 ] Matthew 22:34–40.
[34 ] [By propagation of oneself Althusius means “the legitimate union of man and wife, and the honorable procreation and education of children.” ]
[35 ] I have spoken more extensively about this in my Dicaeologicae libri tres [I, 25].
[36 ] Cicero, The Orator, I, 43. [ “not by unending debates fall of controversies, but” is the unacknowledged omission.]
[37 ]De redemptione, I, 10, 1 [actually thesis 1 of the second section (“De legibus humanis”) of Chapter 10].
[38 ] [ De redemptione, I, 11, 1.]
[39 ] I Timothy1:9.
[40 ]De politicae Mosis observatione.
[41 ] In commentaries on the Digest I, 1, 6.
[42 ] [For another discussion by Althusius of the respective uses of the Decalogue in politics and theology, see the preface to the third edition. Actually the discussion of the Decalogue here is somewhat out of place and should have come earlier. For the Decalogue is not proper law, Jewish or otherwise, but common law.]
[43 ] Psalm 119:105.
[44 ] Romans 1; 2.