Source: http://vertumnus.courts.state.ny.us/claims/html/2002-030-510.html
Timestamp: 2018-03-22 17:50:19
Document Index: 792115247

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1012', '§505', '§1012', '§505', '§ 1012', 'Art. 6', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§304', '§10', '§101', '§9', '§1012', '§1014', '§ 22', '§23', '§ 22', '§1505', '§ 22', '§ 304', '§15', '§1014', '§15', '§ 15']

TARTAN v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, #2002-030-510, Claim No. 95057, Motion No. M-64382
Application by non-party to intervene pursuant to §1012 in a trial ready appropriation proceeding denied. Interest claimed by proposed intervenor not extant at time of taking. Interest based on contract between private parties. No interpleader would lie if there were an application for same by party pursuant to §505 EDPL since no interest at time of taking.
2002-030-510
M-64382
AND SOLOMON & WEINBERGBy: STEVEN SINATRA, ESQ.
HON. ELIOT SPITZER, NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERALBy: ROSE L. LOWE, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
The underlying claim is one for consequential damages resulting from the partial appropriation of certain real property located at the southwest corner of State Route 25A and Miller Place Road, Miller Place, New York, as well as the loss of fixtures, personal property, and a certain temporary easement. The claim was filed in the Office of the Chief Clerk on or about November 4, 1996. The vesting date occurred on or about June 6, 1995.
Trial of this claim had been scheduled for December 10, 2001, and has since been rescheduled for April 9, 2002.
On or about November 19, 2001 this Court signed an Order to Show Cause presented by Leon Petroleum, LLC, (hereafter Leon) the proposed intervenor herein, directing Tartan Corp. (hereafter Tartan), the Claimant herein, and Defendant to show cause why an Order should not be granted, "pursuant to §1012(a) Civil Practice Law and Rules and §505 Eminent Domain Procedure Law permitting Leon Petroleum, L.L.C. to intervene... [in this claim] and to succeed to all rights of Claimant in this proceeding within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of the order permitting intervention and thereafter permitting Leon Petroleum, L.L.C. to participate in the determination of any award...." The grounds asserted were that Leon would be "adversely affected" by any judgment, thus tracking the language of § 1012(a)(3) Civil Practice Law and Rules. A stay was imposed.
In or about August, 1999 - five (5) years after the taking herein - Leon asserts it purchased all the assets of Tartan, including the fee interest in the subject property. Allen K. Leon, currently the Managing Member of Leon, had served as Secretary of Tartan from 1979 to 1999, and was the person who verified Tartan's claim against the State. Agreements made in a Contract of Sale, executed on or about January 8, 1999, which included five, pre-printed, "Blumberg" form pages, and a thirty page Rider with Schedules and Appendices, are referenced as surviving the closing of title. [Affidavit of Allen K. Leon (hereafter Leon Affidavit) Exhibit "A"; also Exhibit "1" Affidavit of Kenneth L. Robinson, Esq., dated December 12, 2001]. Leon claims these documents demonstrate Tartan has "...assigned/sold its interest in the unpaid condemnation award...to Leon, including claims for the value of the property... and other consequential damages resulting from the State's condemnation." (Leon Affidavit, Paragraph 13).
Thereafter, and on or about September 17, 1999, Counsel for Leon wrote a lengthy letter to Counsel for the State indicating its alleged interest in this claim and other claims, as "successor in interest" to Tartan. [Leon Affidavit, Exhibit "B"]. He directed that "...no... payment be made to Tartan, or any designee of Tartan, on account of such claims,...[and indicated] that this letter should be deemed the undersigned's notice of appearance in connection with...the three claims...described." [Id.]. Copies of the letter are noted as being sent to Louis Algios, Esq., then counsel for Tartan, and to current counsel for Tartan, among others. [Id].
On or about September 22, 1999, the Assistant Attorney General responded by asking that Counsel for Leon "...forward a copy of the substitutions [as counsel] with the Court's endorsement to me and I will be glad to advise you of the current status of each claim...." [Leon Affidavit, Exhibit "C"].
Mr. Algios wrote to Counsel for Leon on September 23, 1999, disputing Leon's entitlement to any condemnation awards under the contract he had drafted. [Leon Affidavit, Exhibit "D"]. Counsel for Leon wrote back on October 1, 1999 reiterating its position, and indicating Leon's "intention to pursue its rights before the Department of Transportation." [Leon Affidavit, Exhibit "E"]. On October 8, 1999, Mr. Algios returned the salvo. [Leon Affidavit, Exhibit "F"].
Beyond this exchange, the affidavits furnished by all give no further facts concerning any entity's attempt to resolve the apparent contractual dispute. It seems that one of the three claims Leon's counsel refers to in his September 17, 1999 letter to the Assistant Attorney General was settled without any attempt by Leon to be included. [Affidavit of Kenneth L. Robinson, Esq., dated December 12, 2001, Paragraph 46]. Indeed, when another related claim was settled before this court on November 8, 2001, no mention was made of Leon's existence. (See, Claim No. 95056) At oral argument on January 14, 2002, Counsel for Leon was unable to state why Leon did not attempt to "intervene" earlier.
The Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction. N.Y. Const. Art. 6, § 9; Silverman v Comptroller, 40 AD2d 225, 226 (3d Dept. 1972); NYS Thruway Authority v State of New York, 51 Misc 2d 1003 (NY Ct Cl 1966). It is empowered, among other things, to hear claims against the State "...for the appropriation of any real or personal property or any interest therein...." [ Court of Claims Act § 9(2)];[1] "...[t]o order the interpleader of other parties known or unknown whenever necessary for a complete determination of the claim or counterclaim..." [Court of Claims Act § 9(6)]; and "...[t]o hear and determine special proceedings for the distribution of moneys deposited pursuant to...[§304(E) Eminent Domain Procedure Law]."[2] The mechanism for exercising that jurisdiction varies, though the simplest is a Claimant's timely service and filing of a claim, in accordance with the appropriate limitation period [see, Court of Claims Act §§10 and 11]. The Civil Practice Law and Rules apply in the absence of "contrary direction" in the Court of Claims Act or Rules. §101 Civil Practice Law and Rules; Court of Claims Act §9(9); Easley v State of New York, 10 Misc 2d 370, 372-373 (NY Ct Cl 1957).
In this case, the proposed intervenor seeks intervention as of right, relying on §1012(a)(3) Civil Practice Law and Rules. That section provides in pertinent part that "...[u]pon timely motion, any person shall be permitted to intervene in any action...when the action involves the disposition or distribution of, or the title or a claim for damages for injury to, property and the person may be affected adversely by the judgment." Any application to intervene should include "...a proposed pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." §1014 Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Monies deposited pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 22(2) are then subject to claims of "...any person claiming an interest in the fund [, who] may apply to the supreme court in and for the county of Albany, for an order of distribution....by verified petition setting forth the rights of any and all persons who may have, or claim to have, any interest in or lien or incumbrance on, the property so appropriated and the award therefor, and the names and addresses of such persons...." §23 Court of Claims Act. (emphasis added). Monies may be ordered deposited only when interests existing at the time of the actual appropriation are disputed [See, Abraham v State of New York, 31 Misc 2d 252 (1962)], or when the Court of Claims cannot determine the various interests. East River Savings Bank v State of New York, 266 AD 494, 498 (3d Dept. 1943).
To similar effect is Henion v Comptroller of State of N.Y., 197 AD2d 807 (3d Dept. 1993)[6] where the Appellate Division reversed in part and affirmed in part a judgment of the Albany County Supreme Court - transferring to Putnam County Supreme Court - cross-petitions brought pursuant to Article 78 Civil Practice Law and Rules to compel the New York State Comptroller to pay petitioners a judgment entered by the Court of Claims in an appropriation proceeding. The Appellate Division reversed that part of the Supreme Court judgment transferring the matter to Putnam County Supreme Court, and instead transferred the cross-petition to the Court of Claims for determination. The Appellate Division said "In 1971, both the Court of Claims Act and the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law were amended, for the express purpose of removing Supreme Court's jurisdiction over claims involving the respective interests and rights of parties to awards made for property appropriated by the State, and vesting that jurisdiction in the Court of Claims (Court of Claims Act § 22[1]; RPAPL former §1505[1]). As the...[petitioners] petition essentially sets forth a claim to the appropriation award, it must therefore be decided, in the first instance, by the Court of Claims (see also , Owasco Riv. Ry. v State of New York, 181 AD2d 665,666, 580 NYS2d 466) unless that court is unable for any reason to make such determination (see, Court of Claims Act § 22[1]). Furthermore, inasmuch as it appears that the...[petitioners] have preserved the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims by timely filing a notice of claim....(citations omitted), justice will be best served by a transfer of the cross petition to that court...(citation omitted)." Henion v Comptroller of State of N.Y., supra, at 808.
Finally, in City of Syracuse v State of New York, 121 Misc 2d 8,11 (NY Ct Cl 1983), a case concerned with determining entitlement to a fund created by an Agreement of Adjustment under § 304(E)(1) Eminent Domain Procedure Law, the Court of Claims said:
The Eminent Domain Procedure Law confers upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine not only the value of appropriated property, but also to resolve conflicts of title and order the distribution of an award or fund resulting from the acquisition of property by the State of New York (EDPL 501subd [A]; 505). The EDPL provisions were intended to avoid prolonged and duplicative litigation in the Court of Claims and Supreme Court over title interest in the property, and conflicting claims to the proceeds of an appropriation...(citation omitted)
The Court of Claims then granted Claimant's application for payment of the entire fund, saying that the Claimant's lessees "...had no legal interest in, or lien against the...premises at the time of the acquisition." (emphasis added) Id., at 12.
Neither party here - the Claimant or the State - has made application to interplead Leon. Nor would such a request be appropriate given that whatever interest Leon Petroleum asserts arose after the appropriation, and involves contractual obligations of the parties to the contract, not entitlement to a portion of an appropriation award based upon title disputes or liens extant at the time of the taking. Accordingly, the Court is not constrained to direct such interpleader given the procedural infirmity, as well as the lack of a cognizable interest on Leon's part at the time of the taking. When the property was transferred by deed to Leon, the appropriated portion was already the State's: the property interest was never Leon's.
Similarly, neither Claimant nor "...the person who succeeded claimant in interest to said claim or any interest therein...." - here, allegedly, Leon - sought "to secure from the court of claims and serve upon the attorney-general an order substituting him as party to said claim...." , "...within six months after...[becoming] invested with the title to said claim or any interest therein...." §15 Court of Claims Act.[7] See, Thellusson v State of New York, supra. This infirmity is procedural as well, given there is a clear statutory framework for asserting rights of assignment that appears to have been completely ignored.
Finally, the motion to intervene - even assuming any right to do so - is untimely, as well as procedurally defective given the failure to include a proposed claim as required. See, §1014 Civil Practice Law and Rules. The taking occurred almost six (6) years ago. Whatever agreements were entered into by Claimant and Leon were executed five (5) years ago. It is inappropriate for Leon - who has had notice of the pendency of this and other proceedings involving property in which it purportedly has some interest - to sit idly by while the matter is litigated to the point of trial, and only then attempt intervention.
At this point, this appropriation claim is scheduled for trial. Leon's remedy, if any, lies elsewhere.
[3] "...In the event that by assignment or by operation of law, some person other than the claimant named in the claim has succeeded to the interest of...the claimant...named in such a claim, it shall be the duty of the personal representative of said claimant or of the person who succeeded claimant in interest to said claim or any interest therein within six months after he becomes invested with....any interest therein, to secure from the court of claims and serve upon the attorney-general an order substituting him as party to said claim instead of the party named in said claim, to whose right, title and interest he has succeeded, and in the event that he fails so to do, the court of claims on motion of the attorney-general, on such notice as the court may require, to all parties who have appeared in said action or proceeding or to the assignee or successor of the claimant may dismiss said claim." §15 Court of Claims Act; See, Thellusson v State of New York, 176 Misc 301 (NY Ct Cl 1941)(Assignee failed to file assignment until five years after execution; remedy in other courts); Ottaviano, Inc. v State of New York, 41 Misc 2d 578 (NY Ct Cl 1964) (No jurisdiction over purported assignment of proceeds of judgment; not an assignment of claim.)
[6] In the trial court decision more facts are recited, confirming once again that the ‘interest' claimed existed at the time of the appropriation, the Attorney General had sought to implead the petitioners, and the petitioners claimed title by a right of reverter. See, Henion v Comptroller of State of N.Y., 153 Misc 2d 977 (Albany Co. Sup. Ct. 1992), aff'd as modified, 197 AD2d 807 (3d Dept. 1993).
[7] In the same vein, the attorney-general has not made a motion to dismiss the claim for failure to seek an order of substitution, in accordance with § 15 Court of Claims Act.