Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/265/1/63049/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:15:44
Document Index: 339131079

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 1', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 8', '§ 1343', '§ 1983']

Albert J. Tullier, Sr., Appellant, v. Frank Giordano, Registrar of Voters for the Parish of Plaquemines, Appellee, 265 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1959) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1959 › Albert J. Tullier, Sr., Appellant, v. Frank Giordano, Registrar of Voters for the Parish of Plaquemi...
Albert J. Tullier, Sr., Appellant, v. Frank Giordano, Registrar of Voters for the Parish of Plaquemines, Appellee, 265 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1959)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 265 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1959)
The complaint, after averring that the defendant is the Registrar of Voters for Plaquemines Parish and detailing the plaintiff's qualifications as a voter in that Parish, alleges that the defendant denied registration to the plaintiff and to a considerable number of other named persons upon the applicant's failure or refusal to meet a requirement by the defendant that the applicant interpret in writing certain selected clauses or sections of the Constitution of Louisiana and of the Constitution of the United States. The complaint alleges that the defendant registrar "has never hesitated to register without any constitutional interpretations or readings those voters of his own political faction, party or alignment"; that the defendant is "systematically discriminating against all voters hostile to him or nonsympathetic with his political faction"; that a deputy registrar informed plaintiff "that he would be permitted to register but must first divulge his political preferences, if he aligned himself with the political faction of defendant, he would be permitted to register. This complainant refused to do"; and further "that the above described practices and actions of defendant in discriminating against him while permitting others to register who were unable to pass any constitutional test has had the effect of depriving him of his right to vote not only for candidates in primary elections but also in federal elections, i. e., for Congress, United States Senator and President."
The district court concluded: "This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. U. S. Constitution, Amend. 14; Title 42, U.S.C. [§] 1983; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031 [85 L. Ed. 1368]; U.S.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 2." We agree.
"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators." Touching the elective franchise possibly in an indirect or remote way was Article II, Section 1, Clause 3, later amended by the Twelfth Amendment, prescribing the procedure for electing the President and Vice President.
"* * * While, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states, see, Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 170, 22 L. Ed. 627; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217, 218, 23 L. Ed. 563; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 38-39, 13 S. Ct. 3, 11, 12, 36 L. Ed. 869; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283, 58 S. Ct. 205, 207, 82 L. Ed. 252, this statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by § 2 of Art. I, to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by the exercise of its powers to regulate elections under § 4 and its more general power under Article I, § 8, clause 18 of the Constitution `to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers.' See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717; Ex parte Yarbrough, supra, 110 U.S. [651], 663, 664, 4 S. Ct. [152] 158, 28 L. Ed. 274; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 22 S. Ct. 783, 46 L. Ed. 1005; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 64, 21 S. Ct. 17, 20, 45 L. Ed. 84.
"Obviously included within the right to choose, secured by the Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted at Congressional elections. This Court has consistently held that this is a right secured by the Constitution. Ex parte Yarbrough, supra; Wiley v. Sinkler, supra; Swafford v. Templeton, supra; United States v. Mosley, supra [238 U.S. 383, 35 S. Ct. 904, 59 L. Ed. 1355]; see Ex parte Siebold, supra; In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 8 S. Ct. 1263, 32 L. Ed. 274; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429. And since the constitutional command is without restriction or limitation, the right unlike those guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, is secured against the action of individuals as well as of states. Ex parte Yarbrough, supra; Logan v. United States, supra." United States v. Classic, 1941, 313 U.S. 299, 315, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 1037, 85 L. Ed. 1368.
"Where discrimination is sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23, 24, 13 S. Ct. 3, 6, 36 L. Ed. 869; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 538, 47 S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed. 984; See Pope v. Williams, supra, 193 U.S. [621], 634, 24 S. Ct. [573, 576, 48 L. Ed. 817]. But the necessity of a showing of purposeful discrimination is no less in a case involving political rights than in any other." Snowden v. Hughes, 1944, 321 U.S. 1, 11, 64 S. Ct. 397, 402, 88 L. Ed. 497.
Such a denial of registration, if admitted, may be a violation of state law, but it does not constitute such "purposeful discrimination between persons or classes of persons" as would amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The judgment is therefore
"Any consideration of the constitutionality of the challenged portions of this amendment begins with the fundamental fact that, under our constitutional system, the qualification of voters is a matter committed exclusively to the States. The Supreme Court has spoken on the subject in language as clear as it is decisive. Witness, for example, what it said in Pope v. Williams, 1904, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S. Ct. 573, 48 L. Ed. 817:
"`The privilege to vote in any state is not given by the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. Ed. 627. It may not be refused on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States. In other words, the privilege to vote in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the state may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper * * *.'"
Following this quotation (168 F. Supp. 177-181) is a full discussion of the rights of the states to control election machinery, together with citation of supporting Supreme Court cases.
The case of Snowden v. Hughes, 1944, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L. Ed. 497, is in my opinion, direct support for the position that the court below had no jurisdiction to try this case. The brief quotation in the majority opinion from that case is not sufficient to bring the holding of the Supreme Court into proper focus. The Snowden case was discussed by us at some length in the case of Simmons v. Whitaker, 1958, 252 F.2d 224; and the more extended quotation from it at pages 229-231, as well as in the dissenting opinion in Reddix v. Lucky, 5 Cir., 1958, 252 F.2d 930, 939-940, demonstrate, in my opinion, that the holding of the Supreme Court in Snowden is directly opposite to that attributed to it by the majority opinion.
The Act under which appellant invoked federal jurisdiction was one of a series concerning which the Supreme Court said in Collins v. Hardyman, 1950, 341 U.S. 651, 656, 71 S. Ct. 937, 939, 95 L. Ed. 1253:
The Supreme Court has held uniformly that this series of statutes, to be constitutional, must be given a narrow and limited application. The reason for this was thus set forth in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Hague v. C. I. O., 1939, 307 U.S. 496, 521 et seq., 59 S. Ct. 954, 966, 83 L. Ed. 1423, where he discussed the Fourteenth Amendment which they were designed to implement:
"The reason for this narrow construction of the clause and the consistently exhibited reluctance of this Court to enlarge its scope has been well understood since the decision of the Slaughter-House Cases [16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394]. If its restraint upon state action were to be extended more than is needful to protect relationships between the citizen and the national government, and if it were to be deemed to extend to those fundamental rights of person and property attached to citizenship by the common law and enactments of the states when the Amendment was adopted, * * * it would enlarge Congressional and judicial control of state action and multiply restrictions upon it whose nature, though difficult to anticipate with precision would be of sufficient gravity to cause serious apprehension for the rightful independence of local government."
28 U.S.C.A. § 1343; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
Snowden v. Hughes, 1944, 321 U.S. 1, 10 and 11, 64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L. Ed. 497; See also, Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Company, 1898, 169 U.S. 557, 569, et seq., 18 S. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853; McCloskey v. Tobin, 1920, 252 U.S. 107, 108, 40 S. Ct. 306, 64 L. Ed. 481