Source: http://blog.wcmlaw.com/author/bgibbons/
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 13:47:59
Document Index: 628235942

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 200']

Brian Gibbons | Of Interest
Author Archives: Brian Gibbons
You Only Plead Twice – Second Department Upholds Right to Amend Complaint to add Wrongful Death Seven Years Later (NY)
In Assevero v Hamilton & Church Props, the Second Department recently allowed plaintiffs to amend their 2008 complaint to include new allegations of wrongful death after the plaintiff passed away in 2015 – seven years after the underlying accident.
The case arose from a 2007 accident in which Hugh Assevero sustained injuries while working at a renovation project at a building owned by the defendants. Assevero alleged that he was descending an unsecured ladder, which shifted suddenly, causing him to fall from the third floor of the building to the basement. He commenced an action in 2008 to recover damages based upon, inter alia alleged violations of Section 240(1) and 241(6) of the Labor Law. Following the completion of depositions, Assevero moved for summary judgment on his 240(1) claim, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the 240(1) and 241(6) on the basis of the homeowners’ exception. In 2012, the court granted defendants cross motion to dismiss the statutory claims and denied Assevero’s motion. Assevero appealed. Several months after the court partially granted the defendants’ cross-motion – i.e., during the pendency of his appeal –Assevero died. His wife substituted in as administrator of his estate. Approximately three years after Assevero’s death, the Second Department issued a decision on Assevero’s appeal, and denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion, finding that they failed to make a prima facie showing that their home qualified as a two family home.
Then, approximately three months after the Second Department’s original decision, the plaintiff moved the Supreme Court for leave to amend the complaint and add a new cause of action for Assevero’s wrongful death. The plaintiff argued that Assevero died as a result of “complications of treatment for pain resulting from” his fall from the ladder. In support of her motion, she submitted Assevero’s autopsy report, which indicated that the cause of his death was “acute intoxication due to the combined effects of fentanyl, benzodiazepines, lidocaine and cyclobenzaprine,” and that the manner of death was “misuse of prescription medication.” The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, and defendants appealed.
Now before the Second Department for the second time, the justices noted that under the CPLR, “leave to amend a pleading should be freely given when there is no significant prejudice or surprise to the opposing party and where the evidence submitted in support of the motion indicates that the proposed amendment may have merit.” The Court went on to note a movant’s low burden in these situations, explaining, “leave to amend will be granted unless such insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt.” In the case at bar, the Second Department held that because Assevero died during his appeal and its prior order reinstated the causes of action alleging violations of §§ 240(1) and 241(6), the defendants failed to demonstrate surprise or prejudice resulting from the delay in asserting the wrongful death cause of action. Further, the Court held that the plaintiff’s the proposed amendment was “neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit.”
Perhaps what is most striking about this outcome is not the application of the law, but the underlying facts and the significant delay. Of course, this goes to show that even where a new allegation – especially in the case of wrongful death – significantly alters a defendant’s valuation of the case, courts mean it when they say, “leave to amend a complaint should be freely given.” Thanks to Evan King for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.
Posted in Litigation, New Jersey | Tagged CPLR, Pleadings
Court of Appeals finds Question as to Constructive Notice Despite Security Footage (NY)
Premises cases can hinge on notice of an allegedly defective condition, and an eventual accident. For defendant property owners, proving that you did not create or have notice of the dangerous condition is a continuous uphill battle. It is even more difficult when the condition is water or debris that is transient and could manifest at any time. Under such circumstances, a defendant property owner must show when the area was last inspected and/or cleaned on the date of the accident to establish that the condition was not present for a sufficient period of time to constitute constructive notice.
In Parietti v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 A.D.3d 1039, 34 N.Y.S.3d 474 (2d Dept. 2016), reversed (Sept. 14, 2017), plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet spot near an ice machine inside a Wal-Mart store. Wal-Mart submitted affidavits from store employees who were working in the area at and around the time of the accident and surveillance footage which showed a Wal-Mart employee constantly walking and inspecting the area where the accident occurred. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the trial court’s initial denial of the defendants motion and found that defendant Wal-Mart established that the alleged wet condition was not present for a sufficient period of time for Wal-Mart’s employees to discover and remedy it prior to the accident. This was supported by plaintiff’s own testimony that she did not see the water when she initially walked in the area.
Thereafter, plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals heard the case and concluded that despite the evidence presented, a question of fact exists as to the length of time the water was present and if it were long enough that Wal-Mart should have discovered and remedied the condition. While the Court did not elaborate, it is possible that the footage actually hurt Wal-Mart’s position in that the area was constantly inspected so the condition, should have been noticed and cleaned immediately.
This decision highlights the difficulty in obtaining summary judgment on a slip and fall case for a defendant. It is even more difficult when the defendant does not have footage or a witness to testify about when the area was last inspected or cleaned on the date of the accident. We expect Parietti to be widely cited by the plaintiff”s bar in summary judgment motion practice going forward. Thanks to Dana Purcaro for her contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.
Posted in Litigation, New York, Premises Liability
Second Circuit Reaffirms Privity Requirement In Additional Insured Endorsement (NY)
It is easy for claims professionals, contractors, and others to look no further than an underlying contract when determining whether a tendering party qualifies as an additional insured. After all, when the promise to procure additional insured coverage is memorialized in a written contract, parties may expect the coverage to follow.
Of course, the experienced professional knows that insurance policy language determines additional insured status, not an underlying contract. But it is important to carefully parse policy language as well, because even judges are capable of struggling with the application of clear policy language. One additional endorsement that often causes confusion in the construction, legal, and insurance industries is the additional insured endorsement requiring contractual privity.
The Second Circuit recently addressed that issue in Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Harleysville Insurance Company. There, the injured claimant was the employee of a sub-subcontractor on a construction project who was injured while performing his job duties. After suit was filed, the general contractor’s insurer claimed its insured was an additional insured under the sub-subcontractors policy because the sub-subcontractor’s contract required it to name the general contractor as an additional insured.
Like many policies, the sub-subcontractor’s policy contained a blanket additional insured endorsement. However, that endorsement conferred additional insured status on a third party “when you and such person or organization have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement that such person or organization be added as an additional insured on your policy.” When the issue was presented to the trial court, it ruled that the general contractor was an additional insured because the underlying contract required that party to be named as an additional insured, but the Second Circuit reversed.
Relying on relatively recent New York precedent, the Second Circuit reasoned that when interpreting the intention of parties to an insurance contract, courts are confined to the four corners of the policy, not extrinsic evidence such as underlying contracts. Because the policy required privity between the insured and purported additional insured, the general contractor was not an additional insured.
Cincinnati should serve as a reminder to always start with policy language when analyzing rights and obligations under a policy. Even then, words are to be afforded their actual meaning. We expect this decision to widely cited going forward, to support the privity requirement in assessing AI status. Thank you to Michael Gauvin for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.
Posted in Coverage, Litigation, New York
We Didn’t Start the Fire: First Department Uphold Denial of Building Owner’s MSJ (NY)
Living in New York City offers unmatched opportunities and experiences. There are, of course, trade-offs – high rents, small living spaces, and old infrastructures. Residents do the calculus and decide that living in New York justifies these downsides. Unfortunately, living in an older building can present additional considerations, including maintenance concerns and structural issues which, can lead to lawsuits.
In Daly v. 9 East 36th LLC, the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the lower court’s denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion. The apartment building was built in the 1930’s and there was no evidence that any interior electrical upgrade had ever been performed. On June 19, 2013, plaintiff, a tenant in the building, sustained personal injuries from a fire in his rent-stabilized studio apartment. The Fire Incident Report of the fire department’s Bureau of Fire Investigation found that the fire originated in an area of electrical wiring and noted multiple extension cords plugged in to one outlet with a power strip.
Before the fire plaintiff had on multiple occasions requested to the building superintendent that more outlets be installed and showed the existing outlets were in disrepair. Plaintiff utilized extension cords for many of his appliances as a result. Plaintiff purportedly also complained that the fuses in the apartment would blow and shut down the electric in his apartment and occasionally the building. The super testified that he had conversations with the plaintiff regarding updating the electrical system and that the defendant had repeatedly refused to make repairs due to costs.
The court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment finding that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant had actual or constructive notice that a dangerous condition existed in plaintiff’s apartment that it failed to remedy, specifically that plaintiff’s expert opined that the building’s 1930’s electrical system constituted a dangerous condition and whether there was notice of the same. The majority of found that the building owner had a non-delegable duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition, taking into account the foreseeability of injury to others and that it was an issue of fact whether defendant’s decision not to upgrade the electricity kept the apartment reasonably safe. The majority was unwilling to conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff’s lifestyle and electrical consumption were above and beyond the reasonable needs of any modern tenant.
The dissent argued that the plaintiff should have adapted his electrical usage to the building’s limitations rather than seek any kind of upgrade. Further, the dissent noted that the absence of any evidence that the building’s wiring did not meet code standards or was otherwise defective, no basis exists for imposing liability for declining to upgrade the building’s wiring to suit plaintiff’s electrical usage.
The dissent’s arguments appear reasonable and account for a common sense approach. However, the majority, in allowing the matter to proceed, put considerable weight on the plaintiff’s expert testimony in spite of the fire marshal’s finding. Thanks to Justin Pomerantz for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.
Posted in Litigation, New York, Property
Food for Thought Regarding Quantum of Bodily Injury Damages
As defense attorneys and claim professionals, we collectively talk about case values in nearly certain terms. A surgically repaired meniscus is worth X, a SLAP tear is worth Y, a cervical fusion is worth Z, and so on. (I’m not posting injury values here, lest a crafty plaintiff attorney reference our blawg at a mediation some day.) And while the facts of a case, differing treatment histories, witness presentation, or intangible factors invariably offer reasons to deviate from our initial numbers, the injury itself does offer a starting point, a baseline. And we develop these baselines from our experience, from verdict searches, and by assessing risk at trial.
But for the most part, the jurors who actually decide on the case values begin their jury service with absolutely no idea what an injury is “worth,” in terms of compensatory damages.
Case in point — we were recently on trial in New York County, which, compared to other NYC boroughs, trends toward more reasonable damages awards. (Of course, this is a very broad characterization of the boroughs.) Without getting into the specifics, plaintiff’s counsel was looking for $250,000 for her client, who was injured in a pedestrian knockdown, and already had summary judgment on liability. We saw damages much closer to $100,000. (The case settled after plaintiff’s testimony for $125,000.00.)
After the jury was disbanded, we spoke with one of the dismissed jurors, who was curious about how settlement talks had progressed. (Jurors are savvy enough to realize that settlement discussions are taking place outside of their presence.) We informed the dismissed juror that the plaintiff, who had just testified, and was not particularly endearing or sympathetic, had been seeking at least $200,000 to settle. The juror, who was college educated, attentive, and worked for a venture capital firm, immediately responded, “Oh, is that all? I would have thought way more.” Yikes. Granted, we had not yet presented our witnesses, but the $125,000 settlement now looked even better.
When the jury is only asked to decide a quantum of damages, as opposed to issues of credibility, liability or causation, their calculus may be less scientific than we would prefer. Perhaps jurors are used to seeing subway ads, which constantly remind commuters about multi-million dollar verdicts. Or, perhaps those who work in the venture capital world, like my juror, deal with too many “zeroes” in terms of dollars, and are not ideal defense jurors for damages. Who knows?
We continue to rely on our experience, and on intimately knowing the facts and law of our case, so we can stick to our guns on values. But jurors do not bring the same experience into the courtroom. It’s our job to mold their thinking toward our planned conclusion.
Watch Where You Step: 2nd Department Affirms Sole Proximate Cause Defense (NY)
New York Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6) are notoriously plaintiff-friendly, and liability defenses are often limited at trial. Defenses usually center on the sole proximate cause argument, which is often difficult to prove. However, in Melendez v 778 Park Ave. Bldg. Corp., 2017 Slip Op 06175, the Second Department affirmed the dismissal based on the sole proximate cause defense as well as other causation based arguments.
Plaintiff and coworkers were erecting a scaffold in the yard area of the defendant’s building to make a platform even with the sidewalk. Plaintiff was building the platform portion of the scaffold by placing wooden planks on top of steel I-beams when he stepped onto an unsecured wooden plank, causing him to fall. Plaintiff alleged violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200, and common-law negligence against the owner and general contractor. The Supreme Court granted the portions of defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6) cause of action. The plaintiff appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment. The Court opined that in order to succeed on a cause of action alleged violation of Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a violation of the statute and that violation was a proximate cause of the accident. In this case, the plaintiff was found to be sole proximate cause as he chose to step upon an unsecured plank that he had just seconds before placed on a narrow steel beam rather than standing upon the secured planking that was available to him and which he had used in the time leading up to the accident.
The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action because the alleged violations of the Industrial Code provisions were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, or conversely, did not apply to the facts of this case. The Court also affirmed the dismissals of the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence actions as against the general contractor, determining that the plaintiff’s injuries did not arise from a dangerous condition on the premises, but from the manner in which the work was being performed. On that basis, a defendant must have the authority to exercise supervision and control over the work to be liable. Here, the defendant did not have the authority to control, direct or supervise the method or manner in which the work was performed.
The sole proximate cause defense is case specific and often difficult to prove. However, this case provides an example of the Appellate Division rendering a decision, taking the events leading up to the accident into fair account. The Court’s common sense analysis resulted in a properly affirmed dismissal. Thanks to Justin Pomerantz for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.
Posted in Labor Law, Litigation