Source: http://openjurist.org/417/f2d/384/carter-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2016-12-08 16:45:12
Document Index: 436192699

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2101', '§ 2101', '§ 2101', '§ 2101', '§ 2101', '§ 2514', '§ 2514', '§ 231', '§ 2514', '§ 2516', '§ 231', '§ 2101', '§ 2101', 'art, 1962']

Each appellant was before the Grand Jury as a witness, but he was not under indictment, nor accused of any crime. In his capacity as witness, he lacked standing to question the constitutionality of the statute which was the basis of the Grand Jury's investigation. The Supreme Court decided this question in Blair v. United States, 1919, 250 U.S. 273, 279, 281-283, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979. See also Howat v. Kansas, 1921, 258 U.S. 181, 42 S.Ct. 277, 66 L. Ed. 550; United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood, 2 Cir., 1968, 394 F.2d 139. Compare United States v. Williams, 1951, 341 U.S. 58, 71 S.Ct. 595, 95 L.Ed. 747. We are cited to no case that has weakened or limited the authority of Blair.
"He is not entitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy, such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his, Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92, 115, 26 S.Ct. 358, 50 L.Ed. 673.
"He is not entitled to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct. * * * [i]n our system examination of witnesses by a grand jury need not be preceded by a formal charge against a particular individual. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652. It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the grand jury's labors, not at the beginning. Hendricks v. United States, 223 U.S. 178, 184, 32 S.Ct. 313, 56 L.Ed. 394.
"And, for the same reasons, witnesses are not entitled to take exception to the jurisdiction of the grand jury or the court over the particular subject-matter that is under investigation. In truth it is in the ordinary case no concern of one summoned as a witness whether the offense is within the jurisdiction of the court or not. At least, the court and grand jury have authority and jurisdiction to investigate the facts in order to determine the question whether the facts show a case within their jurisdiction." (250 U.S. pp. 282-283, 39 S.Ct. p. 471) Here, as the government's applications state, and as many of the questions asked the witnesses show, the grand jury was investigating possible violations of § 2101. If an indictment of anyone under § 2101 should result, the court, in trying the case, would certainly have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of § 2101. This is the usual way in which such a question is raised. Usually it can only be decided after the facts in a particular case are known. All courts properly hesitate to decide important constitutional questions in a factual vacuum. And the facts will often first be developed in a grand jury investigation. The granting of immunity to some witnesses may, in a particular case, be the only way to get the facts. Yet appellants' argument would defeat that inquiry, not at the behest of one accused of crime, but at the behest of a witness who might not have been accused if he had waived his privilege and who cannot be accused now that he has asserted it. We hold that, under Blair, such a witness has no standing to challenge the validity of § 2101. The immunity granted to appellants will not be destroyed if it be later held that § 2101 is unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied.
But we can find no constitutional weakness in § 2514. Similar statutes have been upheld many times. The leading case is Ullmann v. United States, 1956, 350 U.S. 422, 76 S.Ct. 497, 100 L. Ed. 511, which upheld an almost identical statute. In so doing, the court followed and reaffirmed a similar holding in Brown v. Walker, 1896, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819. To the same effect is Reina v. United States, 1960, 364 U.S. 507, 81 S.Ct. 260, 5 L.Ed.2d 249. Section 2514 was upheld in In re Parker, 10 Cir., 1969, 411 F.2d 1067.
Appellants say that even though they may now be fully protected from prosecution, they are not protected from other possible adverse consequences of their testimony, such as loss of job (Garrity v. New Jersey, 1967, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S. Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562), or the right to practice a profession (Spevack v. Klein, 1967, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L. Ed.2d 574). But in those cases such consequences were used to compel "waiver" of the privilege. Here, the privilege is preserved by the immunity granted. A similar argument was rejected in Ullmann, supra, 350 U.S. at 430-431, 76 S. Ct. 497.
Appellants say that § 2514 violates the Tenth Amendment in that it hampers the states in prosecuting offenses that are contrary to their laws, thereby trenching upon the reserved powers of the states. This argument was rejected in Reina, supra, 364 U.S. at 510-512, 81 S.Ct. 260.
Appellants say that the court could not order them to answer questions relating to possible violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) because it is not one of the acts mentioned in § 2514, either directly or by reference to the acts listed in § 2516. This overlooks the fact that acts denounced by § 231(a) (1) can be committed in violating § 2101. In investigating possible violations of § 2101, the grand jury can require answers to any questions even remotely relevant to that section. The immunity is coextensive with the inquiry. See In re Bart, 1962, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 304 F.2d 631; United States v. Harris, 2 Cir., 1964, 334 F.2d 460, reversed on other grounds, 1965, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240.
Appellants' showing was that they are members of the Black Panther Party, that some of the questions related to their activities as such members, that one question related to meetings presided over by one Bobby Seale, that certain conversations of Seale had been overheard by wiretaps, as shown by an affidavit of the Attorney General filed in an action pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in which Seale is a defendant. If we assume (we certainly do not decide) that this shows that the questions asked appellants were based upon such wiretapping, the assumption does not help appellants. As witnesses, they have no standing to question the source of the government's information. It will be time enough to do that if any of them should ever become a defendant, a most unlikely event in view of the immunity granted them. United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood, 2 Cir., 1968, 394 F.2d 139, 141-142, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855, 89 S.Ct. 111, 21 L.Ed.2d 124 (1968).