Source: https://tacticalpolicek9training.com/vathekan-v-prince-georges-county/
Timestamp: 2019-02-21 00:24:03
Document Index: 602135677

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Vathekan v. Prince George's County - Police & Military K9 Sales and Training
Vathekan v. Prince George’s County
Vathekan v. Prince George's County
No. 96-2246
ESTHER VATHEKAN, Plaintiff - Appellant,
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND; JEFFREY J. SIMMS, Defendants - Appellees, and THE CITY OF TAKOMA PARK, MARYLAND; B. L. RICH; UNKNOWN OFFICERS, of the Prince George's County Police Department; UNKNOWN OFFICERS, of the City of Takoma Park Police Department, Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CA-95-2782-S)
Argued: December 3, 1997 Decided: August 28, 1998
In reviewing a summary judgment, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). We also must "draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. , 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we set forth the facts in the light most favorable to Vathekan, the nonmovant. 1
A canine will not be committed until an amplified announcement has been given. This will enable innocent persons to exit the area and afford suspects an opportunity to surrender. . . . It will be the canine handler's responsibility to ensure that the announcement is made.
Simms then released the dog into the house at the basement entrance. Simms followed and issued the command, "Find him!", which signaled the dog to begin the search and to bite whomever it found in the house. After first searching in the basement, the dog ran up the stairs to Vathekan's quarters and began to "use[] his head in an attempt to force open the door." This indicated to Simms that there was a "human presence" on the other side of the door. Simms called the dog back down the stairs because one of the rooms in the basement had not yet been cleared. As soon as Simms and the dog completed the search of the basement, the dog ran back upstairs to the closed door, stopped, and again alerted to someone's presence on the ground floor.
Simms acknowledges that "[t]here was no announcement made" after the dog alerted at the interior door. According to Lieutenant David Morris, the commander of the Prince George's County Special Operations Division, canine officers are trained to give a second warning when a dog alerts to a person's presence behind an interior door. VanNess Bogardus, Vathekan's expert, was more pointed. 2 Bogardus said:
Simms allowed the dog to go through the interior door into the ground floor area. Once through the door, the dog fixed on the target whose presence he had indicated to Simms moments before: that turned out to be Esther Vathekan. The dog bounded to the bed where Vathekan slept and bit into the left side of her skull. She struggled in vain to escape as the dog shook her violently. Suddenly, the dog let go of Vathekan's skull and then clamped its jaws firmly onto the right side of her face. Vathekan was now wide awake and fully conscious of the cracking sound of the bones in her face being crushed under the dog's vise-like grip. From his position across the street, Lopez could distinctly hear Vathekan's screams of terror and pain. 3
Vathekan sued Simms and Prince George's County in the District of Maryland under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. She also asserted various state law claims. The case was initially submitted to a magistrate judge, who on January 6, 1996, recommended that summary judgment be denied as to the § 1983 claim. On July 15, 1996, however, the district court rejected that recommendation, holding that "[h]ere the use of canine force was objectively reasonable" for Fourth Amendment purposes. The court then granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claim in favor of Simms alone on qualified immunity grounds. Later, the district court shifted course and suggested to the parties that the dog's attack on Vathekan did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment at all. The court asked for and received briefing on whether the incident was governed instead by substantive due process standards under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thereafter, on August 22, 1996, the court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the ground that the dog's attack "[did] not approach the level of shocking the conscience" required for a violation of substantive due process. See Vathekan v. Prince George's County , 935 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Md. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). Vathekan now appeals.
"[ A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force -- deadly or not -- in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)(emphasis in original). This includes attacks by police dogs improperly deployed by their handlers. See Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1991). In Kopf the police (including, coincidentally, a Prince George's County canine officer) were searching for two fleeing suspects, including the plaintiff, when a police dog alerted to their presence in a narrow passage behind a shed in the backyard of a house. The police claimed to have given a loud warning that they were about to send the dog into the passageway, but neither the plaintiff nor nearby civilian witnesses heard any warning. The police released the dog, which bit the cornered suspects several times even after they attempted to surrender. We held that these facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, supported a § 1983 excessive force claim based on the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 267- 68 (citing Graham ). Accordingly, if Vathekan was seized by the dog, her claim of excessive force is properly evaluated under the Fourth Amendment.
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs whenever "there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied ." Brower v. County of Inyo , 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original). The Court held in Brower that if the police purposely detain a person under the mistaken impression that he is someone else, they have seized him under the Fourth Amendment. "A seizure occurs even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention or taking." Id. at 596 (citing Hill v. California , 401 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1971)); see also Rucker v. Harford County , 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991) ("a fourth amendment seizure may occur notwithstanding that the person restrained was mistakenly thought to be another, because he nevertheless is the intended object of the specific act of physical restraint"); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme , 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that "when officers mistakenly shoot an innocent victim thinking that he is the suspect they are pursuing, the seizure [i]s intended even though the target [i]s not," and Fourth Amendment applies).
Simms knew there was a "human presence" behind the interior door before the dog went through it to the main floor. Simms believed at that time that the person behind that door might have been a burglar. By allowing the dog to pass through the interior door, Simms intended that the dog find and bite that person . The seizure of Vathekan was therefore purposeful, even if Simms would not have seized her had he known she was innocent. Cf. Brower , 489 U.S. at 596 . Since Simms intended the dog to seize Vathekan because he thought she might be a burglar, he seized her for Fourth Amendment purposes even though she turned out to be innocent. See Hill , 401 U.S. at 802 -05 (holding that arrest of innocent man in suspect's apartment is Fourth Amendment seizure).
In considering a claim of qualified immunity, "our first task is to identify the specific right that the plaintiff asserts was infringed by the challenged conduct." Wilson v. Layne , 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citation omitted). As we discussed above, Vathekan's claim is based on her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force in the course of a Fourth Amendment seizure brought about by a police dog that was deployed without a verbal warning.
We must also determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. See Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Wilson, 141 F.3d at 114. "[W]e must inquire whether the established contours of the [right] were sufficiently clear at the time of the attack to make it plain to reasonable officers that their actions under these particular circumstances violated" Vathekan's rights. Winfield v. Bass , 106 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prior case holding identical conduct to be unlawful is not required. Specifically, "the exact conduct at issue need not have been held to be unlawful" so long as the unlawfulness of the conduct is manifest under existing authority. Wilson, 141 F.3d at 114. Fourth Circuit precedent is one source for determining whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See id.
In evaluating whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim, the question is "whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the use of force alleged was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances." Rowland v. Perry , 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). "The immunity test and the test on the merits both rely on an objective appraisal of the reasonableness of the force employed." Id.The objective reasonableness of force should be assessed "in full context, with an eye toward the proportionality of the force in light of all the circumstances." Id.
Fourth Circuit precedent existing in 1995 clearly established that failure to give a warning before releasing a police dog is objectively unreasonable in an excessive force context. See Kopf , 942 F.2d at 266, 268; compare Robinette v. Barnes , 854 F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding fatal attack on suspect by police dog objectively reasonable because of undisputed testimony that police shouted three warnings before releasing dog). In Kopf we held that the improper deployment of a police dog that mauls the target constitutes excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Kopf , 942 F.2d at 268. Kopf was decided in 1991, four years before the attack on Vathekan. Accordingly, it was clearly established in 1995 that failing to give a verbal warning before deploying a police dog to seize someone is objectively unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
If the facts of this case were undisputed, we would proceed by applying the clearly established law to determine whether Simms is entitled to qualified immunity. A factual issue critical to resolution of this issue is contested, however. When resolution of a case depends on determining what actually happened, "the issue is inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment." Rainey v. Conerly , 973 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir. 1992). This is because "[d]isputed facts are treated no differently in this portion of the qualified immunity analysis than in any other context." Buonocore v. Harris , 65 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Pritchett v. Alford , 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, "summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper as long as there remains any material factual dispute regarding the actual conduct of the defendants." Id.at 359-360 (citations omitted). Here, there is a key instance where Vathekan and Simms dispute what Simms actually did in the search of Vathekan's home. This dispute of material fact is sufficient to preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
Vathekan asserts that Simms failed to give a verbal warning before releasing the dog into the house. Simms, by contrast, says that he gave a "very loud" warning, and his fellow officers also say that they heard a warning. As we noted above, it is settled that if no warning was given at this point, Simms's actions were objectively unreasonable. In Kopf the victim and civilian witnesses said they heard no warning before the dog was released, but all of the police officers said a warning was given. We held that this dispute created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to bar summary judgment. See Kopf , 942 F.2d at 268. Here, as in Kopf , we have a victim and a civilian witness ready to testify that they heard no warning, contradicting the account of Simms and the other officers.
Simms argues that the fact that Vathekan and Lopez swear that they "did not hear" a warning is insufficient to support a claim that no warning was given. Yet this argument directly contradicts our holding in Kopf, where the fact that civilian witnesses "heard no such warning" was enough for the plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on the issue of whether a warning was given.
Kopf, 942 F.2d at 266. Furthermore, Simms's position is incompatible with the summary judgment principle that we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, Vathekan). If a warning is not given, then a witness will not hear one. A juror could reasonably conclude that if certain witnesses did not hear a warning, then no warning was given, even if other witnesses testify to a warning.
Simms further argues that Lopez's sworn statement that he did not hear any warning should be discounted because of a statement he made to the police on the scene that could be interpreted to suggest that Lopez was too far away to hear any announcement. But a sworn statement may not be disregarded for summary judgment purposes merely because it contradicts an earlier unsworn statement. See Shockley v. City of Newport News , 997 F.2d 18, 23 (4th Cir. 1993). At most, Lopez's unsworn statement creates a question about his credibility, and credibility questions are for the jury to resolve. See Rainey , 973 F.2d at 324. In addition, it is uncontradicted that Lopez was in a position to hear, and did hear, Vathekan's screams of pain as the dog attacked her. It is reasonable to conclude that if Lopez could hear Vathekan's screams, then he was also in a position to hear a loud warning from Simms, who was positioned just below Vathekan's window at the time a warning should have been given. Accordingly, at this stage Lopez's statement -- that he was in a position to hear a warning and did not hear one -- cannot be discounted as incredible. There is a genuine issue of fact whether Simms made a warning before releasing his dog into Vathekan's home. This factual dispute is enough to prevent the award of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
Vathekan also sued Prince George's County under Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which established that municipalities and counties could be liable for constitutional deprivations under § 1983. 4 Municipal liability "is derivative of, but narrower than" the liability of individual officers. Kopf v. Wing , 942 F.2d 265, 269 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Spell v. McDaniel , 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987)). Thus, Vathekan can prevail on her Monell claim only if Simms used excessive force against her, "and this use of force was caused by an unconstitutional custom or practice of the county." Id.Under this theory Vathekan has alleged that Prince George's County violated her civil rights by "fail[ing] to adequately train and supervise its officers in the proper use of police dogs."
At the beginning of the case, the district court bifurcated the Monell claim against the county over Vathekan's objections. The court stayed discovery against the county and postponed consideration of the Monell claim until the claim against Simms was resolved. Once the district court erroneously concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to Vathekan's claim against Simms, it granted summary judgment as a matter of course to the county. See Vathekan v. Prince George's County , 935 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Md. 1996). Because we conclude that Vathekan properly stated a Fourth Amendment claim, we must now reverse the grant of summary judgment to Prince George's County and remand for reconsideration of the Monell claim.
The defendants dispute several of the key facts. See e.g. , part II.B.3., infra .
Bogardus is an expert in the training and use of police dogs. He was assigned to dog units in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department for several years, and he has trained both police dogs and their handlers for over a decade.
The force of a police dog's bite is between 1,200 and 2,000 pounds per square inch. See Douglas U. Rosenthal, Note, When K-9s Cause Chaos -- An Examination of Police Dog Policies and Their Liabilities , 11 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 279, 296 (1994).
These units of local government are not eligible for immunity on Monell claims. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit , 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., for a unanimous court) ("[U]nlike various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit -- either absolute or qualified -- under § 1983"); accord Burtnick v. McLean , 76 F.3d 611, 612-13 (4th Cir. 1996