Source: http://openjurist.org/312/f3d/113/burns-v-b-barnhart
Timestamp: 2013-05-25 04:28:38
Document Index: 613585563

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 220', '§ 416', 'art 404', '§ 416', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 402', '§ 361', '§ 361', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 404', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', 'art, 279']

312 F3d 113 Burns v. B Barnhart ) | OpenJurist
312 F. 3d 113 - Burns v. B Barnhart )	Home312 f3d 113 burns v. b barnhart )
312 F3d 113 Burns v. B Barnhart ) 312 F.3d 113
Joseph BURNS, Appellantv.*Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration*(Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c))
Five months after Dr. Laviolette's evaluation, the ALJ issued a decision denying Burns benefits. The ALJ found that Burns "retains the capacity to make an adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy." The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration declined review, effectively making the ALJ's determination the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"). At that point, Burns had exhausted his administrative remedies. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.2001).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2002) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2002). While our review of the District Court's order is plenary, we may reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner only if we conclude that the ALJ's findings were not supported by "substantial evidence." Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.1984); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). We have referred to it as "less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla." Jesurum v. Secretary of the United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir.1995). We also have made clear that we are not permitted to weigh the evidence or substitute our own conclusions for that of the fact-finder. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992).
Using this definition, the Social Security Administration applies a five-step test to determine whether a person is disabled for purposes of qualifying for SSI.1 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2002). Step one requires a determination of whether the claimant is currently engaging in "substantial gainful activity," 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b), as defined in the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 220.141 (2002). If the person is found to be engaged in substantial gainful activity, the application will be denied. Step two of the evaluation process requires that the claimant show that he suffers from a "severe impairment." 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(C). If the claimant fails to show that his impairments are "severe," he will be denied benefits. Step three allows the claimant to demonstrate that his disability meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 ("Listing of Impairments"). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). At this step, an ALJ often enlists the help of an expert to explain the medical evidence. If the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, the claimant is considered disabled per se and the evaluation process ends. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir.1999).
A vocational expert was then called to testify. Testimony of vocational experts, as we have said before, "typically includes, and often centers upon, one or more hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ.... The ALJ will normally ask the expert whether, given certain assumptions about the claimant's physical capability, the claimant can perform certain types of jobs, and the extent to which such jobs exist in the national economy." Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 217. The ALJ asked the vocational expert a series of hypothetical questions involving Burns, incorporating a number of his alleged limitations. In the second hypothetical — the only one at issue in this appeal — the ALJ stated: "I'd like for you to assume a person of the same age, education and work background as Mr. Burns, and further assume that the individual is capable of light exertional work, provided it involves no more than occasional postural activity, and no more than simple repetitive one, two-step tasks. Would such an individual be able to perform ... other work?" By "other work," the ALJ was referring to work other than the stock position he had held at the beer distributor. In response to the ALJ's questioning, the vocational expert concluded that Burns could perform other work, naming, as examples, laundry sorter, ticket taker, or packer.2
[I]n terms of occupational adjustment, I would say he'd work fair, at best. In terms of work rules, his common sense is more in the Borderline range. His general intellectual functioning is there. Relating to coworkers, he's kind of hostile.... His judgment is borderline.... His interaction with an authority figure, he would need an authority figure to keep an eye on him.... Functioning independently, again, he's borderline. He would be fair, at best. His attention and concentration was in the Borderline range of intellectual functioning. His Verbal and Performance test scores were consistently in the Borderline range. He would not be good at doing complex or detailed types of task. He would only be able to do simple tasks in a fair way at best.... He behaved in an emotionally stable manner fair, at best. Again, he does show some flightiness of ideas, disassociated kind of ways, and he shows underlying hostility. In a social situation, he does try to avoid trouble, but he would need supervision, and he seems to have some loose associations that some people would just wonder where he is coming from.... Reliability: He is borderline in terms of his general intellectual functioning.
At the hearing, the ALJ solicited testimony from the vocational expert through a series of hypothetical questions. Again, in the hypothetical question at issue here, the ALJ stated: "I'd like for you to assume a person of the same age, education and work background as Mr. Burns, and further assume that the individual is capable of light exertional work, provided it involves no more than occasional postural activity, and no more than simple repetitive one, two-step tasks. Would such an individual be able to perform ... other work?"3 In response, the vocational expert concluded that Burns could work as a laundry sorter, ticket taker, or packer. The ALJ adopted this conclusion for his finding that Burns could make a successful vocational adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, as required for step five in the evaluation process.
Discussing hypothetical questions posed to vocational experts, we have said that "[w]hile the ALJ may proffer a variety of assumptions to the expert, the vocational expert's testimony concerning a claimant's ability to perform alternative employment may only be considered for purposes of determining disability if the question accurately portrays the claimant's individual physical and mental impairments." Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 218. A hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert "must reflect all of a claimant's impairments." Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir.1987) (emphasis added). Where there exists in the record medically undisputed evidence of specific impairments not included in a hypothetical question to a vocational expert, the expert's response is not considered substantial evidence. Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 218 (citing Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir.1983)).
The Commissioner relies upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577 (8th Cir.2001), as authority for finding the hypothetical to be sufficiently inclusive of Burns' limitations. In Massanari, the Court held that an ALJ's hypothetical question that asked the vocational expert to assume that the claimant was able to do "simple, routine, repetitive work" accounted for the claimant's borderline intellectual functioning and other deficiencies. Id. at 582. But, Massanari can be readily distinguished on its facts. The Massanari Court clearly noted that the deficiencies in intellectual functioning that the psychological evaluation identified were in "concentration, persistence, [and] pace." Id. These few specific deficiencies, the court concluded, were accounted-for in the phrase used in the hypothetical — "simple, routine, repetitive work." Burns' mental deficiencies, however, go far beyond those of the claimant in Massanari. The phrase "simple, routine, repetitive work" (or the similar phrase used in Burns' hypothetical) is not sufficiently descriptive of the previously noted deficiencies that Dr. Laviolette diagnosed.
The deficiency in the hypothetical, along with the fact — as detailed below — that we reject Burns' contention that, based on the record before us, he meets or equals an impairment found in the Listing of Impairments, necessitates that we remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings. See Wallace v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir.1983).
Under § 12.05 of the Listing of Impairments, a person suffering from "mental retardation" is considered disabled if he can demonstrate, in addition to other requirements, that he falls within one of its four sub-sections outlining sufficient degrees of severity.4 Burns alleges that he falls within sub-section "C," which requires "[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation."
Based on his score, then, Burns' claim clearly fails. He does not have an IQ score between 60 and 70. Burns, however, argues that, in determining his IQ score for purposes of the regulation, the Commissioner should take into account the five-point margin of error for IQ scores, as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. rev.2000) ("DSM-IV").5 Accordingly, Burns urges that his IQ should be considered to be 70. Burns finds support for his argument in several opinions of district courts within our circuit. See Gist v. Barnhart, No. Civ. A. 01-2754, 2002 WL 1832808, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 2, 2002); Gorecki v. Massanari, 197 F.Supp.2d 154, 163 (M.D.Pa.2001); Hampton v. Apfel, No. Civ. A. 97-6651, 1999 WL 46614, at *3 (E.D.Pa. January 6, 1999); Halsted v. Shalala, 862 F.Supp. 86, 90 (W.D.Pa.1994). But we note that there are a fair number of opinions adopting the opposing viewpoint, including two opinions from district courts within our circuit. See Williams v. Apfel, No. 99-039, 2000 WL 376390, at *12 (D.Del. March 30, 2000) (refusing to take into consideration a measurement error of 5 points); Colavito v. Apfel, 75 F.Supp.2d 385, 402-04 (E.D.Pa.1999) (same); see also Anderson v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that it was proper not to factor an error range into a claimant's IQ); Lawson v. Apfel, 46 F.Supp.2d 941, 948 (W.D.Mo.1998) (refusing to take into consideration a measurement error of 5 points); Bendt v. Chater, 940 F.Supp. 1427, 1431 (S.D.Iowa 1996) (same).
We conclude that if we were to read an error range of five points into the regulation, it would violate the plain language of the regulation, which requires "[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appx. I, § 12.05. The basic tenets of statutory construction hold true for the interpretation of a regulation such as this, see Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998), and we cannot ignore the plain wording of the regulation. See Wilson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 193 F.3d 195, 198-200 (3d Cir.1999) (refusing to defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of one of its own regulations where that regulation is clear and unambiguous). Where the language of a regulation is plain and unambiguous, as it is here, further inquiry is not required. Idahoan Fresh, 157 F.3d at 202.
Moreover, Burns has not offered any reason why we should not assume that the Commissioner, in promulgating the regulation, was aware of the standard margin of error and could have incorporated or referenced it if the stated numbers were to be given an expansive reading.6 Incorporating the error range would essentially alter the regulatory language to say "IQ of 60 through 75," rather than "IQ of 60 through 70." We know of no authority allowing us to do so. In fact, the true five-point error in Burns' score of 75 could just as easily mean that his actual IQ is 80 rather than 75. So, automatically reading 75 to mean "70" could result in a number of persons who are clearly not mentally retarded under the regulations qualifying for benefits. We will thus not assume that a score of 75 should be read as "70."
Given the plain and unambiguous wording of the statute, as well as the absence of a mandate in the regulations to consider error ranges where specific IQs are referenced and the other concerns detailed above, we find that the Commissioner properly refused to factor the possible measurement error in calculating Burns' IQ and that Burns, with an IQ of 75, does not meet or equal § 12.05.7 See also Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 582-83 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that a claimant with an IQ score of 71 should not be "allowed the benefit of the mental retardation categorization"); Cockerham v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 492, 495-496 (8th Cir.1990) (refusing to give the claimant "the benefit of the doubt" and consider an IQ score of 71 presumptively to establish disability).
Many courts of appeals have opined as to the handling, on appellate review, of the situation in which there is an unexplained inconsistency or conflict between the DOT and the testimony of the vocational expert — with mixed results and varying treatment.8 For two reasons, however, in this instance we need not select from the alternatives chosen by the various courts. First, we will remand, and the ALJ can remedy the situation if it should arise again. Second, the Social Security Administration recently has issued a ruling that squarely addresses how this situation should be handled. See 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1) (stating that Social Security Rulings "are binding on all components of the Social Security Administration"). Social Security Ruling 00-4p requires that the ALJ ask the vocational expert whether any possible conflict exists between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT, and that, if the testimony does appear to conflict with the DOT, to "elicit a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict." The Ruling requires that the explanation be made on the record and that the ALJ explain in his decision how the conflict was resolved. Thus, on remand, the conflicts that persist, if any, should be treated accordingly.
Initially, Burns notes that the DOT does not list the job of "laundry sorter." See 1 United States Dep't of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles § 361 et seq. (4th ed. 1991) ("Laundering Occupations"). He submits that even if the vocational expert meant to name the position of "laundry worker," this job is divided into laundry worker I, laundry worker II, and laundry worker III. See 1 Dictionary of Occupational Titles §§ 361.685-014, 361.685-018, & 369.387-010. Both laundry worker I and II require the ability to do "medium work," and laundry worker III requires the ability to do "semi-skilled work." Thus, the vocational expert's testimony that he could work as a "laundry sorter" appears to conflict with the ALJ's finding that he could perform only light work that was unskilled.
Burns makes an additional argument that his aptitude level per se disqualifies him from any of the jobs specified by the vocational expert based on the aptitude levels for those jobs set forth in the DOT. He asserts that his IQ score of 75 on the WAIS-R test places his aptitude level in the lowest ten-percent of the population, and that, according to the DOT, the jobs for which he was found qualified require an aptitude level above the lowest ten-percent of the population. Because we find no such levels incorporated into the DOT, we reject Burns' argument. While aptitudes are discussed in various occupational handbooks, see, e.g., J. Michael Farr, et al., Guide for Occupational Exploration (3d ed.2001), aptitude levels are not in the DOT or any other source of which the Social Security Administration has taken administrative notice. Therefore, the DOT and testimony of the vocational expert was not necessarily inconsistent in this regard, so the duty on the part of the ALJ to inquire into conflicts did not arise.9
Burns also takes issue with the ALJ's determination of his residual functional capacity based on his physical exertion limitations — i.e., his ability to work despite his physical limitations — contending that the ALJ's determination was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.10
In making disability determinations, the Social Security Administration looks to see whether a claimant can perform the physical exertion requirements of either his past relevant work or jobs that exist in significant numbers in the economy. The physical exertion requirements are labeled as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967 (2002). The ALJ determined that Burns' exertional residual functional capacity enabled him to engage in a "slightly reduced range of light work." Light exertional work "generally requires the ability to stand and carry weight for approximately six hours of an eight hour day."11 Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 119 (citing Social Security Ruling 83-10).
We examine the ALJ's conclusions as to Burns' residual functional capacity with the deference required of the substantial evidence standard of review. The ALJ, nonetheless, must have evaluated all relevant evidence, Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 40-41 (3d Cir.2001), and explained his reasons for rejecting any such evidence. Burnett v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir.2000). He also must have given Burns' subjective complaints "serious consideration," Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir.1993), and made specific findings of fact, including credibility, as to Burns' residual functional capacity. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120; see also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir.1981).
Importantly, Burns does not point to any relevant medical opinion that supports his allegations that his pain and exertional limitations are more severe than the ALJ found them to be. Cf. Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706-07 (remanding to the ALJ to reconsider a denial of disability benefits because the ALJ's opinion did not address contradictory medical evidence). Instead, he notes only his testimony before the ALJ. As for pain, Burns did testify to experiencing various forms of pain, and the ALJ clearly addressed that testimony and did not reject Burns' allegations completely. As already mentioned, the ALJ found that Burns did suffer from chronic back pain. Nevertheless, the ALJ noted that other parts of Burns' testimony, namely those addressing the number and type of activities he engages in on a daily basis, seemed to belie his assertion that the pain is disabling. In fact, as the ALJ noted, Burns specifically stated that he does not experience pain when he plays the drums. Likewise, Burns' testimony regarding his limitations does not seem consistent with other parts of his testimony. While he testified that he can only lift one pound and could not work an eight-hour day, he admittedly engages in activities — most obviously, taking care of his four dogs and playing drums — that require him to be able to lift more than a pound and to exert at least some effort.12 With this contradictory testimony and the lack of significant medical evidence or a medical opinion fully supporting his subjective assessment of his limitations or complaints of pain, cf. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1067-68 ("Where medical evidence does support a claimant's complaints of pain, the complaints should then be given `great weight' and may not be disregarded unless there exists contrary medical evidence."), we cannot say that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's ruling or his rejection of parts of Burns' testimony as not fully credible. Cf. Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873-74 (3d Cir.1983) (stating that an ALJ should note in his decision when he did not find a witness credible).
As for the side effects of the medication, the ALJ specifically addressed this issue in his opinion. Cf. Stewart v. Secretary of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir.1983) (refusing to find that the ALJ's "implicit rejection" of the claimant's side effects was supported by substantial evidence where the ALJ gave no indication in his opinion that the issue was considered). In rejecting Burns' claim that he could not work due to the side effects of the medication he took — namely drowsiness — the ALJ noted that the record contained "no significant complaints of side effects from medication," that Dr. Laviolette noted that Burns did not, in fact, seem drowsy at the consultative examination, and that Burns did not seem drowsy at the administrative hearing. Likewise, there was no medical evidence as to any physical limitations resulting from any side effects from medication. Drowsiness often accompanies the taking of medication, and it should not be viewed as disabling unless the record references serious functional limitations. Here, there is no such evidence. Thus, the ALJ's decision to discount Burns' allegations of side effects was based on substantial evidence.
This test is the same as that for determining whether a person is disabled for purposes of receiving social security disability benefitsCompare 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 with § 404.1520. See also Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 526, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir.1992). As a result, we consider case law developed under both SSI and social security disability benefits law.
Although the ALJ asked the vocational expert other hypothetical questions, those questions are not at issue here because, in them, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to make assumptions regarding Burns' residual functional capacity that the ALJ did not eventually adopt as a part of his findings of fact — a conclusion that we do not disturb
05Mental retardation. Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning manifested during the development period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22.
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appx. I, § 12.05
The Commissioner does not dispute the existence of this margin of error. It should be noted, however, that the DSM-IV lists the five points as an approximate error rangeDiagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 42 (4th ed. rev.2000).
Another factor counseling against the incorporation of the error range is the fact that, as mentioned above, the regulations already have directed that "[i]n cases where more than one IQ is customarily derived from the test administered,e.g., where verbal, performance, full scale IQs are provided in the Wechsler series, we use the lowest of these in conjunction with 12.05." Thus, a policy of giving the claimant the "benefit of the doubt" is already incorporated into the regulations. Burns, in fact, benefitted from the policy. While he scored a verbal score of 75, a performance score of 77, and a full scale score of 75, the regulations instruct that his score be considered a 75.
Burns also argues that the ALJ should have scheduled a supplemental hearing in order to receive testimony from a medical expert about whether Burns could establish medical equivalency to § 12.05. We reject this argument as well. In neither Dr. Laviolette's report nor anywhere else in the record is Burns diagnosed with mental retardation. In fact, Dr. Laviolette did not even conclude that Burns could not work. Rather, she stated that, for instance, in terms of occupational adjustment, Burns's would perform "fair, at best." While this is not a ringing endorsement of his ability to work, it is not a clear statement that he could not do so. In addition, § 12.05 requires that the claimant initially manifested deficient intellectual functioning before he turned twenty-two years old. InWilliams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1185 (3d Cir.1992), we placed this burden on the claimant. Burns has not come forward with any proof of this sort. For these two reasons, it was reasonable for the ALJ not to have inquired further.
The courts of appeals for four circuits have held that an ALJ may base his conclusions on a vocational expert's testimony that conflicts with the DOTSee Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146 (5th Cir.2000) ("To the extent that there is any implied or indirect conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT in this case, ... the ALJ may rely upon the vocational expert's testimony provided that the record reflects an adequate basis for doing so."); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229-1230 (11th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1089, 120 S.Ct. 1723, 146 L.Ed.2d 644 (2000) ("We agree with the Sixth Circuit that when the VE's testimony conflicts with the DOT, the VE's testimony `trumps' the DOT."); Conn v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 51 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir.1995) ("[T]he ALJ was within his rights to rely solely on the vocational expert's testimony."); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (5th Cir.1995) ("[A]lthough the DOT raises a presumption as to the job classification, it is rebuttable. We make explicit here that an ALJ may rely on expert testimony which contradicts the DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation."). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, has held that an ALJ always must prefer the DOT over the testimony of a vocational expert, see Smith v. Shalala, 46 F.3d 45, 47 (8th Cir.1995) ("[W]hen expert testimony conflicts with the DOT, the DOT controls."), although the court seems to have quickly retreated from that bright-line rule. See Montgomery v. Chater, 69 F.3d 273, (8th Cir.1995) ("The DOT classifications may be rebutted, however, with VE testimony which shows that `particular jobs, whether classified as light or sedentary, may be ones that a claimant can perform.'" (citation omitted)). Other courts of appeals have adopted a middle view. These courts require an ALJ to explain any decision to prefer the testimony of a vocational expert over the DOT. See Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he ALJ must investigate and elicit a reasonable explanation for any conflict between the Dictionary and expert testimony before the ALJ may rely on the expert's testimony as substantial evidence to support a determination of nondisability."); see also Mimms v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir.1984) ("Although both the ALJ in his opinion, and the vocational expert in her testimony at the hearings, concluded that the claimant's vocational capacity was for sedentary, semi-skilled positions, the jobs selected by the expert and relied upon by the ALJ, as being appropriate, require the capacity to perform light work. Consequently, we must conclude that the Secretary failed to demonstrate the existence of substantial gainful employment of a sedentary nature, which the claimant was capable of performing."). See generally Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir.2002).
Burns, however, is certainly free on remand to examine the vocational expert based on the aptitude level required for a job as detailed in other occupational handbooks
We emphasize that this relates only toexertional aspects of Burns' residual functional capacity.
Further evidence that the ALJ did not ignore Burns' allegations of his own limitations is the fact that the ALJ expressly disagreed with the finding, made by the state agency, that Burns could do medium exertional work, and, instead, determined that Burns could do light exertional work at most
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