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Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), pp. 874-890
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INT'LL.J. 10. supra. and quotations of. As will be seen. and there is little point in repeating this material. at 43. the Commission received rather regular feedback from * Whewell Professor of International Law.OnRe-reading 10 EUR. some of the reflections in this helpful and timely symposium do call for some comment. the articles. The final text with commentary and apparatus is in JAMES ON STATERESPONSIBILITY: LAWCOMMISSION'SARTICLES INTRODUCTION.94 AJIL660 (2000).JamesCrawford. References to.INT'L L. which some of the contributors tend to ignore. & Simon Olleson. in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-thirdSession. 865 (2002). TheILC'sArticleson Responsibilityof Statesfor InternationallyWrongful Acts: Completionof the SecondReading. Peel. As will be clear from the text. Indeed. I will do so thematically. UN Doc.Pierre Bodeau. focusing on the questions that now seem the most important.2Whatever the trials and longueursof their production. as well as the official ILC commentaries to the articles.THE INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARIES(2002).295 (1998). Supp. the criticisms of what may have been left undone-so that it is possible to be selective.. Furthermore. and if the text cannot defend itself with the aid of the commentaries. and GaetanoArangio-Ruiz). No. Nonetheless.James Crawford.which also appear in the Commission'sFifty-thirdReport. In addition to debates in the literature (some of it appearing in time to be reflected in the text). University of Cambridge. 2 theDraftArticleson StateResponsibility."David D. TheILCArticleson StateResponsibility:TheParcdoxical RelationshipBetweenFormand Authority. I may not be the best person to comment on the outcome. the symposium is striking for the comparative absence of suggestions as to how particular provisions could have been worded differentlyassuming at least that the ILC was correct in limiting the text to issues of state responsibility and to invocations of that responsibility by states. the articles with their commentaries now exist and may be assessed as a whole. Caron. to some extent. David Caron points out in general terms the interaction between ILC and government representatives.Jacqueline Peel.org/law/ilc>. 12 EUR. The first reading was the product of decades of work under successive special rapporteurs (RobertoAgo. these are mostly questions of a general character. 874 .435 (1999). Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 3 In his contribution to this symposium. An initial point should be made.The second readingwas equally a collective process and many members contributed to the final result.THE ILC'S ARTICLESON RESPONSIBILITYOF STATESFOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS: A RETROSPECT ByJames Crawford' The development of the articles on state responsibility of the International Law Commission (ILC)' has been described elsewhere.TEXTAND CRAWFORD. SeeJamesCrawford. The phases of the of first and second are well (1955-1996) (1998-2001) development readings enough known. Rather than deal with the comments successively.James Crawford. The author was the International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility (1997-2001). As I was formally responsible for shaping the work on second reading. Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law.Director. TheILC'sDraftArticleson StateResponsibility:TowardCompletionof a SecondReading. &Jacqueline RevisingtheDraftArticlesonStateResponsibility. 92 ASILPROC. A/56/10 (2001). 56th Sess. Willem Riphagen.96 AJIL857.J. 963 (2001). Views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the ILC. in particular in the ILC's Yearbook. it is too late for individuals to make up for any deficiencies. I do not agree with his view that "relatively few governments offered comments on ILC drafts. a matter discussed by Edith Brown Weiss and one to which I will return.un. available at <http://www.3 The ILC process did not occur in isolation. I agree with much of what is said here-in terms of both the descriptions of what was done and intended by the ILC and. Anything less than a full-scale defense of the text will be seen as an unauthorized retreat.will be identified below by articleand paragraph number. UN GAOR.
stood any chance of acceptance by the Sixth Committee. Bederman. DavidJ. substantial.2002] SYMPOSIUM:THE ILC'S STATE RESPONSIBILITYARTICLES 875 governments. Introductionand Overview. Daniel Bodansky andJohn Crook note. through the Sixth Committee and otherwise. and South Africa on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)).Article 54 (countermeasures by states other than injured states) was reduced between 2000 and 2001 from a substantive article to a saving clause in response to the general views of governments. and did it with remarkable promptness. relatively speaking. and of course the ILC's consultations were not necessarily representative. as well as the decision to retain chapter IV of part 1 dealing with responsibility of one state for the conduct of another.96 AJIL 773. reasons were given. Article 53 (termination of countermeasures). despite the criticism (arguablyjustified) that it did not form part of the secondary rules of responsibility. The fact that government comments were carefully taken into account may well have played a role in the relatively benign reception of the articles by the Sixth Committee at the fifty-sixth session of the UN General Assemblyin October 2002. which was particularly significant in the latter stages of the work. and in the rapid adoption of the Assembly's Resolution 56/83. These government comments and statements (many of them expressed by legal advisers in the regular week for their attendance in NewYork) formed part of a process of feedback that paralleled and indeed overshadowed the less direct and more subtle "feedback loop" with the International Court ofJustice. But they were not negligible. the process of comment and feedback during the second reading was.and the concept of invocationas the key organizingidea in chapter I of part 3. 7 Daniel Bodansky &John R. 4 E. which was first suggested by France in 1999. The final balance struck in the chapter on countermeasures owed much to government comments.g. . Of more than fifty governments6 that expressed views in the debate. Several articles owe their language. in accordance with the ILC's recommendation. The General Assembly did no less (and no more) than the ILC had hoped. CounterintuitingCountermeasures. Crook.7 It annexes the articles (the term "draft"is deleted) and commends them to the attention of governments. useful as the latter were in providing support and occasional language for the text. 790 (2002). As the editors of this symposium.. 773.5 Such opinions cannot simply be manipulated. The draft articles in the course of their development were subjected to several hundred oral comments in the Sixth Committee (most of them informally made available in writing). and in a few cases even their existence. More particularly. Altogether.4 to comments of governments. there was widespread support in the Sixth Committee and in written comments for such matters as the retention of the articles on countermeasures. government comments on the countermeasures articles were of greater significance than the Court's statements. The exclusion of any form of punitive or "exemplary"damages (as at one stage envisaged for Article 41) resulted from nearly unanimous criticisms of governments. In fact. 6Fifty-twostatements were made. the distinction between injured and other states (Articles 42 and 48). On the positive side. Neither of these possibilities. this decision helped to consolidate the ILC's view that former Article 19 (international crimes of states) should be deleted. Where suggestions were rejected. 5See the contribution to this symposium by David Bederman for this process as it affected the articles on countermeasures. the simplification of former chapter III of part 1 on breach. It is true that the forms of discussion fell short of consultation processes adopted by national law commissions. Over and above the specific points on drafting. Two of these were made on behalf of groups of states (Norway on behalf of the Nordic Group. as well as many hundreds of pages of written comments. published by the United Nations Secretariat. only two (Mexico and Guatemala) made criticisms of such a kind as to imply rejection of the ILC's proposals-and they did so in terms of a preference for an immediate diplomatic conference rather than outright rejection of the text. the comments conveyed a sense of the sustainable balance of the articles as a whole. and there was little support even for a deferral of a resolution to the following year. Resolution 56/83 leaves open the question of the form of the articles. 96 AJIL817 (2002). however.
I.. Causesof Action in the Law of Nations. [ 1970] 2 Y. and another to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the consequences of the violation. as it were. 9 Bodansky & Crook. to discuss some of the questions raised about their character and future. 306. Neither natural law nor treaty practice distinguished some specific domain where responsibility for breach applied. Whether the original imperative was natural law or the sanctity of promises. Rather. ). we might still find the forms of action ruling from behind the scenes."8 To be precise.B."1 No doubt. and 8 Commentaries. To pursue the analogy with the common law approach to civil procedure. case by case. there seems to be no trace of a formulaic approach to responsibility in early international law. of course. goes back to Ago. even if the forms of action were subsequently abolished and apparently general legal ideas about civil obligations began to flourish in the law schools. Comm'n 177. UN Doc. A/CN. in default. '0For an account in the field of civil obligations.A/1970/Add.B. see DAVID IBBETSON. the distinction between primary and secondary obligations was. not general. 11Ian Brownlie. by claiming cessation or reparation or. as compared with others where it did not. If in the course of time categories of cases arose. Admittedly. Whatever the position concerning the development of the common law of tort and crime. there emerged a general conception of the rights and duties of states. 13.Y.. by taking countermeasures. the distinction between the content of a substantive obligation and the consequences of the breach of an obligation does not entail that the legal system in question has any general ("trans-substantive") rules of responsibility. The articles specify the default rules that determine when a breach occurs and. and his own expression of the distinction quoted with approval: "[I] t is one thing to define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes. to a secondary obligation or series of such obligations (cessation. Int'l I. in general. I propose first to mention certain issues regarding the content of the articles. it might be that a legal system resolved the problem of the consequences of breach by allowing a claimant. In that event.A HISTORICALINTRODUCTIONTO THE LAWOF OBLIGATIONS(2001). reparation . This approach. too. THE CONTENT OF THE ARTICLES The Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Obligations as an Organizing Device An initial point concerns the distinction between primary and secondary obligations as the central organizing device of the articles. and (uniquely) he is cited in the commentary by name. 96:874 Against this background. In their final form they also specify what other states may do to invoke responsibility."' I do not think this example corresponds to the development of the international law of responsibility. the common law They note that the category of secondary rules is said to comprise-like distinctive set of rules that apply across the various substantive rules of civil procedure-"a areas of law. . is an exercise in classification. supra note 7. immediately by operation of the law of state responsibility."9 But they suggest that the distinction is confusing and may even be illusory.51. To this extent. to assert the breach and the (hypothetical) tribunal to sort out remedies on an ad hoc basis.l). rights and duties could be developed by treaty or custom in particular ways for particular states. para. INT'L L. at rather greater length. the content of the resulting secondary obligations. might the range of available responses to noncompliance. the key idea is that a breach of a primary obligation gives rise. emphasizing the interweaving of theory and practice. they would probably be experiential. 1979 BRIT. at 780 n. and of the consequences of breaches of those rights.876 THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol.. and then. 2 (quoting Roberto Ago. The distinction is subjected to an illuminating critique by the editors of this symposium.4/SER. Second Report on State Responsibility. not historical exegesis. so.
the law of the sea) by considerable effort. and they certainly are. 2d ed.however.. The rule would be applied and it would normally be treated as a lex specialis. global. in fact a large and increasing number of instruments. One cannot tell states. 102 contains an absolute obligation on UN members and does not have a discretionary character. or its own rule about remedies.'4But there is no presumption that international obligations 12 [1957] 1 Y. has developed. or some other feature that calls for coordinated multilateral treatment. diplomatic and consular relations). achieving any consensus on it at the time would have been impossible-as became clear on the only occasion Garcia-Amador'swork was debated. or at best as reflecting some analogy with public law. V.2002] SYMPOSIUM:THE ILC'S STATE RESPONSIBILITYARTICLES 877 is. 2002): "Art. 1.A particularrule of conduct might contain its own special rule of attribution. it provided the key to their completion as well as their scope.that is. in the field of economic relations there is no reason why rights and obligations should not be differentiated. To focus on the substantive law of state responsibility in the field of diplomatic protection was to give that area priority. Many parts of international law do not fall into these categories... IV..THECHARTEROF THE UNITED NATIONS:A COMMENTARY 1282 (Bruno Simma ed.g. 1. as excluding the general rule.are possible. other than the inability to invoke the treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.. UN Doc. ch. In such a case.13 There is no international legislature. merely directive principles. 13 . whole areas of international lawwould have been seen as containing merely directive principles. 102 must not be misunderstood as a mere provision setting out the conditions under which an international agreement may be invoked before an organ of the UN" (footnote omitted). The first. 14Article 102 of the UN Charter says that treaties and international agreements entered into by member states "shallas soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat. These cannot be replaced by a single text. It may be supported by a number of reasons.12Clearly. or regulations noncompliance with which does not produce responsibility. and all such codifications will be partial by definition. Indeed. regional and bilateral. historical point is that it provided a wayout of the impasse into which the ILCwas led in the 1950s by the work of the first special rapporteur. there would be little point in arguing about questions of classification.Compare. as is the UN Convention of 1982.g. even if it had the resources. it was all the same enormously useful in defining the scope of the articles. imposing a range of obligations. On that basis. F. was not the main point.4/SER. No doubt.A/1957 (413th-416th meetings).. para. principled as well as pragmatic. human rights). notwithstanding the World Trade Organization. There was a more subtle point still..g. Ago's distinction responded to what the ILC commentary now refers to as the principle of independent responsibility. and the retreat from one area paved the way for a major advance. a strategic retreat was called for. For example. comprehensively.It might have been thought to imply that international law contains subareaswhere the principle of responsibilityapplies (as with contracts and delicts) and other areas where it does not. which could be enforced only by reprisals (a sort of decentralized criminal law) and not by claims of responsibility. what obligations they are to have. the law of the sea). In specific fields. Comm'n 154-68.Although the field of injuries to aliens and their property was and remains important.. but on analysis these fields involve numerous relatively standardized transactions that occur on a regular basis and are regarded as matters of obligation (e. But if the distinction is somewhat relative. or collective values of conformity with certain common standards in order to ensure orderly interaction (e. Even in certain fields where the underlying values may be thought to be universal (e. This text fails to discuss the consequences of noncompliance. Garcia-Amador. This quasi-political consideration. codification of a kind has proved valuable. somewhat relative. A/CN. Art. however. and there would be no point in the ILC's compiling them. There is no possibility of codifying the substantive international law of obligations in a general way. It could only be done in specific fields (e.g.B. Int'l L."It has never been suggested that noncompliance with Article102 producesresponsibility. Commentary to pt. Treaties are not statutes of general application. or at least does so only to the extent specified (as with the tort of breach of statutory duty in the common law).
the treaty is an undifferentiated instrument. The articles reflect the ILC's belief that trans-substantive default rules exist regardthe former ing attribution. but not fault or injury-hence. the range of possible situations of breach escapes classification in terms of any noncircular definition of"damage. when suchpain or sufferingis inflictedbyor at the instigationof r withthe consentor acquiescenceof a public officialor otherpersonacting in an officialcapacity. 10. is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession.." as the RainbowWarriorarbitration showed. .A. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel. Thus.It does not include pailn or suffering arising only from. wrongful emission of chlorofluorocarbons). issues are included in the articles but not the latter. by addressing the actors to whom the primary rule applies). or intimidating or coercing him or a third person. supra note 7. 17Article 1(1) provides: For the purposes of this Convention. From an undifferentiated base. this could be properly classified as a secondary rule. but it cannot be prevented a priori from the attempt.I.. 1984. and that attribution is part of the complete specification of a primary rule (i. BRIGITTESTERN. or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. In international law.A. despite conduct apparently inconsistent with an international obligation. inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. In theory and in practice. and even certain rules where the eventual occurrence of damage is in principle unknowable and untraceable to any given breach (e. 96:874 in any field are of this character. that fault and injury relate to whether a particular rule of conduct has been violated (and hence are secondary rules). the ways of identifying the state for the purposes of determining breach appear to be common. Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. at 781 (footnote omitted). By contrast with the rules relating to damage. the term "torture"means any act by which severe pain or suffering. however. 217. 16Certain French authors. In truth. Ago's move to a set of articles dealing with secondary obligations associated with breach was a step in the direction of profitable generalization. justifications. international law has to perform-or attempt to perform-all the different functions that developed legal systems perform. Rainbow Warrior (NZ/Fr. It comprises areas that-in terms of domestic analogies-may be seen as like those of contract and tort. Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture17) may special rules of attribution be devised. and only in exceptional cases (e.). if international law had a rule that. But there are also rules of conduct that are independent of actual damage. It may or may not do so with eventual success.LE PRtJUDICEDANS 1A THEORIEDE LARESPONSABILITE INTERNATIONALE(1973). actual damage had to be shown before responsibility arose. punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed. Dec. 266-67.e. whether physical or mental. and so is the law of responsibility. 107-10 (1990). In principle.. it reflected the situation as it had developed in international law. the international law of responsibility is applied across the field of international obligations. e. and remedies.g.. It is not the function of the law of state responsibility to tell states what obligations they may have. Bodansky and Crook go on to suggest that the ILC may have been inconsistent in treating the rules of attribution as "secondary. But the "public" and the "private" are indistinguishable.16 The common law has such a rule for negligence but not for breach of contract. Admittedly. . Whatever the range of state obligation in international law.g. chapter II seem to have no rival of a general character. 20 R.878 THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALLAW[ [Vol. 1460 UNTS 112 (emphasis added).. have argued for such a general rule.." while the issue of fault or damage as a prerequisite to responsibility was treated as "primary": One couldjust as well argue .. as did France in its commentaries on the draft articles. In the absence of express provision 15 Bodansky & Crook.g. paras. and others that might be seen as analogous to public law. there are rules whose purpose is to prevent actual damage to the state or its nationals. it therefore has no general rule requiring damage for responsibility.. the rules of attribution set out in part 1.'1 But of course the articles are not a repository for all possible secondary rules.
55 ("Lexspecialis"). 19 . 54th Sess. by inhibiting the elaboration of more variegated international norms-liability rules. Since the ILCwas not engaged in posterior analytics. TheLex Specialis Principleand theIssue of Self-Contained Regimes As this discussion shows. Again. They note: The ILC articles presume that international law is a unified body of law. Rarely (and never. Whether this is a desirable approach will be a matter of debate. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-firstSession. the articles do not presume that conflicts of obligations cannot occur. states may well have valid but conflicting international obligations to different states at the same time-a possibility not excluded by the rules of the Vienna Convention dealing 18 Art. to some extent the classification of a rule of responsibility as secondary or not is linked to the issue of its generality. this is the subject of illuminating comment by the editors. as far as I am aware. But a one-size-fits-allapproach may come at a certain price. to lex specialisderogations created by particular states in particular settings). the formulation of the forms of reparation was made somewhat more flexible. Article 56 makes it clear that the articles are not intended to constitute a code of the secondary rules. Supp.20Instead.4/498. UN Doc. In addition. paras. This qualification is assured by Article 55. or 3..19 I think it is true that the articles "presume that international law is a unified body of law. for example. by implication) is the state taken to have guaranteed the conduct of its nationals or of other persons on its territory. 10. 82-86. in terms of their effect on the content of the secondary rules of reparation. supra note 7. which provides: "These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law."'8 Article 55 is located in part 4 and it potentially applies to any article in parts 1. The articles are aimed at specifying certain generalrules concerning the existence or consequences of the breach of an international obligation. with common characteristics that operate in similar ways across its various fields (subject. Second Report on State Responsibility. many see unity and coherence in international law as virtues. 211James Crawford.even when it has entered into obligations in completely general terms. that does not seem to be much of a criticism. Thus. para. related to the development of international law rather than to any logical necessity. and so forth. property rules. of course. The ILC discussed whether to address conflicts of obligations. at 781 (footnotes omitted). The phrase "the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State" succinctly summarizes the content of parts 1-3. Bodansky & Crook. 9 (1999) [hereinafter Crawford. In response to the fragmentation of international law. for this and other reasons. each with their own characteristic set of remedies-which can be used in a more precise way to pursue a complex range of community goals. UN GAOR. It results from this analysis that the distinction between primaryobligations and secondary rules of responsibility is to some extent a functional one. No. Second Report]. A/CN. and decided that the issue could not be resolved by any general formula. A/54/10 '(1999). UN Doc. a given obligation (in general terms) will be interpreted as an obligation on the state to do that which conduces to the performance of the obligation. The rules of attribution are thus an implicit basis of all international obligations so far as the state is concerned." But this "unification" can be understood only in a limited sense.2002] SYMPOSIUM:THE ILC'S STATE RESPONSIBILITYARTICLES 879 to the contrary. 2. For example.
26 Outright deletions were draft Articles 2. TheStanding of States:A Critiqueof Article40 of theILC'sDraftArticleson StateResponsibility. No doubt.25On the contrary. one cannot specify the resultsof that process-but at least the relation between the general and the special seems to be right as a matter of principle. 1969. 40-41.a lexspecialisto the nth degree. CRAWTFORD.. among which by far the most important is chapter I of part 3. to enslave or torture people. supra note 7. Chapter I A number of the participants in the symposium note the deletions and simplifications made in the articles in the process from first to second reading.880 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. any truly self-contained regime. the tailoring seems to me as flexible as the rules of interpretation.. On first reading. Beyond this point. 24Id.23 But these questions are essentially theoretical.2001 BRIT. 55. if states wish to create such a regime (still governed by international law). behind the walls of a self-contained regime. 27 SeeJames Crawford.." this article managed to confuse and conflate issues of the consequences of a breach in an irremediable way. 13. none of which are contained in the section on the validity of treaties. . and part 3 (settlement of disputes). Arts. openedfor signatureMay 23. 25 Bodansky & Crook. supra note 1. 2.g.22But this is not a question on which the articles needed to take a position. 23. dealing with the invocation of responsibility. from rather minor deviations up to the (nearly) closed system. Presumably. 2' Except a peremptory norm of general international law. that may indicate that it is not such a legal system-but not that it is not some kind of legal system of the international community as a whole. The Concept of Invocation of Responsibility:Part 3. and of states members of that community inter se. at 343-45.2' Such conflicts."24 In light of these considerations. 96:874 with the relations between treaties. at 315-38. For the evolution of other articles.e. Trevor C.26They place less emphasis. as Weiss notes. 2000). there cannot be. 58-59. it seems to me inaccurate to describe the articles as adopting "one-size-fits-all"rules. especially in draft Article 40. that in respect of some breaches of international obligations all states can be considered as in some sense 21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 11. see id. In my view. it is for the special rule to determine the extent of exclusion. 1155 UNTS 331. See. 12. according to many theorists. cannot occur in integrated legal systems governed by the rule of law. In this sense at least.B. para. INT'LL. 4. Hartley. InternationalLaw and theLaw of theEuropeanUnion-A Reassessment. at 781. the test being whether there is "some actual inconsistency.27It may be true. 19. Under the form of a definition of "injured State. it is a unified legal system. at the international level. A genuinely self-contained regime would be a special lexspecialis. 22 is It often argued that the European Union is such a regime. and in good weather so it may be. para. What is perfectly clear is that there can be many variants on the lex specialisoption. According to the commentary. on the additions. If they can occur in international law.. the degree of unification or conflict in the international system is both a political question and (in relation to existing regimes) a question of interpretation.Y. But the underpinnings of EU law still seem to be international treaties ultimately functioning as such. or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other. LIBERAMICORUMIN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNNOF HADLEY23 inJUDICIAL REVIEWIN INTERNATIONALPERSPECTIVE: (Mads Andenas ed. 21. hermetically sealed against bad weather.. A group of states could not allow themselves.whether any particularrule operates in derogation from the default rules in the articles is a matter of interpretation: the articles lay down no presumption in favor of the general at the expense of the particular. 1. perhaps. issues of the consequences of a breach were mixed up with issues of entitlement to invoke responsibility. Seealso Commentaries. Art. As a general matter. there seems to be nothing to stop them.As noted already. all self-contained regimes are subject to this limitation (in which case they are not self-contained). with the qualifications made above. 20.
as well as any rights of individuals and nonstate entities to make less formal claims.. suffered by the victim as obligee or beneficiary of the obligation breached. As to states. which note that [t] here is in general no requirement that a State which wishes to protest against a breach of international law by another State or remind it of its international responsibilities in respect of a treaty or other obligation by which they are both bound should establish any specific title or interest to do so. 28See the contribution to this in theTwenty-first Censymposium by Edith Brown Weiss. 802-03 (2002). or even the taking of countermeasures. the Commission may have intentionally left undisturbed the right of 'non-injured states' to make less formal claims that a state has breached its international obligations."31In fact. 1971 ICJREP. and it continues to follow a misleading private-lawanalogy in the field of responsibility when what was involved in that case. 11. I will return to this issue below. Articles 42 and 48 seek to make that distinction. material or moral. InvokingStateResponsibility tury. This would be in effect a diplomatic form of "solidaritymeasure. 2 (footnotes omitted). Art. 48. 31 Weiss. or to give undue preference to subjective feelings of affront. 127 (June 21). Thus. in the actual context of international relations. was the most public of possible obligations. should be considered to have a legal interest in compliance with the obligation. it is true that the articles intentionally left open the possibility that third states (neither "injured"nor "interested"in the sense of Article 48) might nonetheless remind a defaulting state of its obligations. . In fact. AdvisoryOpinion. para. so as to preserve possible rights in the same or analogous cases. although there were disagreements over terminology (use of the phrase "interested State"in Article 48 was vigorously and successfullyresisted by Bruno Simma).30 It may be that Ethiopia and Liberia were in some sense injured qua former members of the League of Nations.2002] SYMPOSIUM:THE ILC'S STATE RESPONSIBILITYARTICLES 881 "injured. 56. irrespective of any issue of responsibility. or indeed to preserve the effect of the underlying rule (the state as legislator rather than claimant). supra note 28.29The International Court said so expressly in its Namibiaopinion.e. para. in the end few members of the ILC disagreed on the substance of the two articles.16. protest and similar measures may be called for. 3( Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) NotwithstandingSecurityCouncil Resolution 276 (1970). As the commentaries note. the effect of conferring singular or individual rights upon states arising from a breach of a multilateral obligation would tend to be either to treat those states as proprietors of the right (which they are not)."i. the articles do not cover the question of invocation of responsibility by nonstate entities. para. but such a broad and generic definition of injury does not help: it aggregates what should be disaggregated. Such informal diplomatic contacts do not amount to the invocation of responsibility unless and until they involve specific claims by the State concerned. There is thus a range of possibilities. such as for compensation for a breach affecting it. or specific action such as the filing of an application before a competent international tribunal."not covered by the saving clause in Article 54. Weiss suggests that "bykeeping the definition narrow.96 AJIL 798. while not individually harmed. 29 Commentaries. harm.32 In practice. at 800. if it was an obligation at all. those injured were the people of South West Africa as a whole. 32 Commentaries. a vital distinction sets individually injured states (Article 42) apart from those which. Moreover. Art."28But the notion of legal injury in such cases conflicts with the natural sense of "injury. which accounts for a degree of complexity in the formulations. Much the same was true of the comments of governments in 2000 and 2001. Ethiopia and Liberia were not individually injured by apartheid in South West Africa. 42. although Article 33 expressly reserves that possibility. It is expressly referred to in the commentaries.
A. he is critical of the use of the term "commensurate" in Article 51. 1011. 85 (Sept. 2 R. as he notes. First. But it is one thing to advance across a wobbly bridge and quite another. 25). that countermeasures were alwaysintended by Ago and seen by the ILC as an integral part of the law of responsibility. 1027-28. and this was as much the case for the purposes of part 3 of the articles as for the purposes of part 2. Pragmatically. and I must confess that if a separate chapter on countermeasures had not been included in the first-readingtext.34and was adopted by the ILC in place of the double negative of the first-reading text.I. 4 ILR 526. That word./Slovk. This change in emphasis on the nature and purpose of countermeasures likewise places in some doubt the Commission's use of earlier international law sources. I doubt that I would have proposed it on second reading. each of the cases envisaged is distinct andjustified in its own terms. even while incorporating some ambiguities that may constrain such behavior. supra note 5. :5 Bederman. which nonetheless proceeded on the assumption that forcible countermeasures were lawful at the time." But governments (whether or not they favored former Article 19) were overwhelmingly opposed to any form of punitive measure in the field of responsibility. .). first. Bederman raises three issues of the effect of the countermeasures articles. ChapterII If the distinction between different forms of legal interest or injurywas the focus of debate concerning chapter I of part 3 in the ILC session of 2000 but was largely settled. and no further simplification of the categories seemed possible. But in any event the outcome has so far been deemed broadly acceptable. 56. that proportionate countermeasures can constitute a circumstance precluding wrongfulness and that the concept thus had an indisputable place in chapter V of part 1. No doubt. and third. 1997 ICJREP. v. In this context. "not out of proportion. although David Bederman's account seems cautiously positive. at 822 (footnote omitted). para. reprisals or countermeasures have occasionally been abused "forpurely punitive reasons. to decide to retreat. '34 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. it must be remembered. Countermeasuresand Dispute Settlement:Part 3.3 :< Bederman. Whether the right balance wasstruck remains to be seen. Responsibility of Germany for Damage Caused in the Portuguese Colonies in the South of Africa (Port. 527 (1928).).the overall effect on the international legal process of the Commission's approach may be to permit more aggressive forms of countermeasures."Bederman reads into the change a rather drasticchange in the scope of countermeasures: The use of countermeasures for purely punitive reasons-without any hope or expectation that the malefactor state will actually back down from its offensive conductappears to be now precluded by the articles.882 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol.7. While not disagreeing with thisjudgment. supra note 5. at 819. Ger. In his words: [T] he primary thrust of these provisions is to superimpose procedural values of rectitude and transparency on states' assessments of countermeasure options.it might have seemed a bridge too far.35 To be sure. was used by the International Court in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project. the balance of the countermeasures articles remained controversial throughout. 96:874 On the other hand. second.33 The risk of legitimizing countermeasures by regulating them was a very present factor in the ILC debates. that a clear majority both of the ILC and of the Sixth Committee favored the retention of a separate chapter. but neither do any of the modern arbitral or judicial decisions. having crossed it.A. At no stage did the ILC countenance the use of countermeasures for purely punitive purposes. :3Not even the tribunal in the Naulilaa arbitration. the third factor was influenced by the first and second. Ironically.
and proportionate even if the intention was to harm. or that the shift (if it was a shift) in the Court's language from proportionality to commensurability was intended to produce any change in the law in that regard.2002] SYMPOSIUM:THE ILC'S STATE RESPONSIBILITYARTICLES 883 However. and the imposition of countermeasures in stages was never meant to be excluded. and the dispute is exacerbated. including the injured state. including prompt access to effective provisional measures. proportionate countermeasures may be taken to ensure not only cessation. The advantage of the synonym "commensurate"is that it helps to stress the element of qualitativeequivalence. the reference to "purely punitive" countermeasures tends to confuse the issues of subjective motive andjustification. 94-96. The motivations of governments are notoriously difficult to assess: a countermeasure may be disproportionate even when the government has no ulterior motive. it is legitimate to take into account "the importance of the interest protected by the rule infringed and the seriousness of the breach.the mere fact that the target state declares itself unmovable on the issue does not preclude the injured state from taking countermeasures. several points of explanation are necessary. the guiding principles had been usefully set out by the tribunal in the Air arbitration. Fr. .A. Countermeasures are not to be directed only at the fainthearted."which is also the title to Article 52. Rather. on the other hand. but also reparation in accordance with part 2. 53 (termination of countermeasures). both in their emphasis on the reversibilityof countermeasures (another lesson from the Court in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros)and in Article 53. 18 R. I do not agree with Bederman that the articles exclude "limited forms of escalation .A.A. 51." the International Court did not intend to contradict the decision of the tribunal in the Air ServicesAgreementarbitration (which it had already relied on) to the effect that the underlying principle can be taken into account in the overall balance. which was such an important factor in the Gabikovo-Nagymaros case itself. supra note 37. paras. A related issue concerns escalation. we are far from such a situationin general international 37Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Often."40 The two principal controversies during the second reading concerned the procedural conditions for taking countermeasures and the taking of countermeasures by states other than the injured state-that is. Thus. First. Evidently. at 822. this is a major difficulty with countermeasures.37In the words of the commentary."39At the same time. measures taken by one side produce still further measures on the other. 40Art. 91.I. para. the Court actually used the term "proportionate. in an attempt to limit escalation. In the passage cited. requiring termination of countermeasures "assoon as the responsible State has complied with its obligations under PartTwo in relation to the internationally wrongful act. they do not envisage a purely static situation. provided alwaysthat the other conditions for countermeasures.I. 39 Bederman. 38Commentaries. 417 (1978) [hereinafter Air Services Agreement Award]. 18 R. as covered by Article 48. especially in light of the need to 'induce' a malefactor state to abide by its international obligations. the injured state must take into account the response of the target state. The articles were formulated with this difficulty in mind. 41 Air Services Agreement Award. the standard is objective. para. Art."38Second. taking into account the rights of the states affected. On the one hand. they also provide for de-escalation.41In a world that subjected legal disputes to general and effecServicesAgreement tive international adjudication. citedin Commentaries. As to the former. in using the phrase "commensurate. And third. especiallyproportionality. But. 6. at 445-46. except possibly emergency interim measures pending resort to the court. With these qualifications. Conversely.are met at the time they are taken and for as long as they are taken. supra note 5.. there would be no room for countermeasures. . both initially and subsequently. Art.A.). 3. by states with a legal interest in compliance. I do not think that modern international law allows purely punitive countermeasures. Of course. 52.
There is practically speaking no chance thatjurisdiction will be upheld. Despite the lack of any prospect of an actual determination on the merits. and the obligation to suspend countermeasures would not apply.4. are Bederman.. but nonetheless decline to strike the case from its list. some governments strongly opposed it. Earlierversions of what became Article 52 were rather rigid and could have been manipulated by a state seeking to avoid its responsibility. Art. the disputing states are obliged to negotiate and the countermeasures must be suspended if the dispute is effectivelysubmitted to a competent international tribunal. having once indicated provisional measures." that is. Article 52 (3) "is based on the assumption that the court or tribunal to which it refers hasjurisdiction over the dispute and also the power to order provisional measures. notably under the presidency ofJudge Gilbert Guillaume. A/55/10 (2000). Arguably. ofJuly 10. The issue for the ILC was twofold: how to establish an appropriate interface between countermeasures and existing dispute settlement obligations. UN GAOR. para. it is only the dispute over jurisdiction that is "pending" before the court.4/507/Add. in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. and it is for the Court.org>. UN Doc. discretion seemed the better part of valor. and it will presumably take some time (up to two years) before a final decision onjurisdiction. and not least the United States itself. at 826. but nonetheless retained the case on the list. 45James Crawford. "Solidaritymeasures. the articles allow the immediate taking of urgent countermeasures that may be necessary to preserve the injured state's rights. subject to that. the International Court might refuse to order provisional measures on the sole ground that it finds no appearance. More difficult situations. 2002.Third Report on State Responsibility. 10. In their final form. at 108-09. In response to the comments of governments. Third Report]. we might say. UN Doc.44 The issue that caused the most difficulty in the final stages was that of countermeasures taken by states other than the injured state. even prima facie. the relevant provisionswere progressivelymodified and simplified. the lacuna (if any) seems to be a relatively minor one. Supp."42In that case. without departing from the basic idea. particularlyhaving regard to the interaction of these issues with the general mandate of the SecurityCouncil.45Although the proposal received a degree of support both within and outside the ILC. but meanwhile the dispute is in some sense "pending" before the Court. the dispute would no longer be "pending"before the tribunal in terms of Article 52 (3) (b). A/CN. In 2000. on the basis of a review of rather scanty practice. 8. Bederman raises "the problem caused when a tribunal. measures taken by Article 48 states in (what they perceive to be) the general interest." as Martti Koskenniemi calls them. But since under Article 52(3) (a) the requirement of suspension does not arise unless the wrongful act has ceased. it is a small and rather contingent tribute. however. I proposed an article avowedly delegeferendathat covered both "collective countermeasures"taken at the request of and on behalf of an injured state. 413 (2000) [hereinafter Crawford. 96:874 law. Despite many reforms in the Court's practice and procedure.4" There may be a lacuna here. where there is not even an appearance of jurisdiction. not the parties."Commentaries. 42 43In its order . where there was no individual injured state. In the end. this example highlights the problem of the absence of any summary procedure before the Court. and how to encourage the settlement of disputes as an aspect of the regime of countermeasures. Rwanda). supra note 5. including (but not limited to) those governments which frequently take or threaten countermeasures.884 THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 44 According to the commentary. in their final form they attracted a considerable degree of support from governments. but it does exist in relation to some states and disputes. 55th Sess. but if so. para. to determine whether it has jurisdiction. later decides that it does not havejurisdiction over a dispute. In that case. for the time being the case is still in a sense "pending" before the Court. the Court declined provisional measures on grounds of probable lack ofjurisdiction. of jurisdiction. available at <http://www. can be envisaged. So-called collective countermeasures were dropped from Article 54. No. the court is not in a position to deal with the case on the merits. and "solidaritymeasures. 52. and the suspension of countermeasures would no longer be required. Perhaps it is a tribute that the vice of countermeasures should pay to the virtue of international adjudication. For example. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-second Session. Although they had been controversialthroughout.icj-cij.
such thinking as there had been on general principles of responsibilitybefore 1900 was affected by the approach of Justinian's Digestand the continental European codes. As Bodansky and Crook note. For example. Moreover. or even the most important. It is true that early influential pronouncements on state responsibility-certainly in the period after 1918-bore the unmistakable stamp of continental European lawyerssuch as Dionisio Anzilotti and Max Huber. British and American lawyerswere influential in the mixed commissions of this and earlier periods. By this stage. influence. Nor. On the other hand. AdvisoryOpinion. obligation and breach-were alreadyadapted to a considerable degree to the international state system of the time. the limits even of progressive development of state responsibility had evidently been reached."as distinct from "common law"approaches to responsibility.towardwhom are those obligationsowed.46 At a general level. 48 Cf.B. 337. even arcane.Reservationsto the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. leaving the matter for development in practice. Referring to one of the earliest major controversies over a subject arguablywithin the scope of the articles. II. Fisheries case (UK v. the ILC'sgeneral approach after 1963 was seen from the common lawworld as rooted in civilian thinking on the law of obligations. 47Bederman. the contrast seems to me overdrawn. codification grows out of past experience.48 But the ILC decided the riskwas worth running-and governments in the Sixth Committee broadly supported that view. and as highly abstract. 18). civilian lawyersheld no monopoly. Accepted principles of sovereign equality and consent produced a system in which questions of responsibilitytook the following form: what are the obligations of the respondent state in the given situation.INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONSTO WHICH THE UNITED STATESHAS BEENA PARTY495 (1898). 832.2002] SYMPOSIUM:THE ILC'S STATE RESPONSIBILITYARTICLES 885 now dealt with by a comprehensive saving clause. 1951 ICJREP. the general categories of international law-treaty and custom. More fundamentally. How do they relate to the tradition of international law. Bederman askswhether the attempt of the ILC to restrain countermeasures may not produce the paradoxical effect of encouraging them. on the other hand. four of the five special rapporteurs on state responsibility were trained in a civil law tradition. and to its future? Inevitably. 1951 ICJREP. it is not clear that the disagreements as to "direct"and "indirect"injury that surrounded the Alabamaarbitration49related to any particular continental schools of thought.47It would not be the first time that a decision to regulate some unilateral act in the interests of controlling it produced such unintended effects: both treatyreservations and straight baselines have probably proliferated beyond the expectations of the International Court at the time of allowing them. But this was not the only. one way or another. essays in progressive development may assume a direction to "progress"that proves illusory or ephemeral. . In that respect a contrastwasoften drawnwith the "sound"common lawyer'spragmatismunderlying Humphrey Waldock's work on the articles on the law of treaties. 49 1JOHN BASSETTMOORE. As so often with comparative law generalizations. SolidarityMeasures:StateResponsibilityas a NewInternationalOrder?2001 BRIT. THE CHARACTERAND FUTURE OF THE ARTICLES A second group of issues concerns the character and future of the articles.15 (May 28). with all the limitations that may entail. TheArticlesas a Productof the Civilian Legal Tradition An initial question concerns the relation of the articles to distinctively "civilian. and that this emphasis was highlighted and developed in particular by Ago.). at 826. The point is touched on in many of the contributions. No doubt. and how have they been breached? Treaties 46 See further Martti Koskenniemi.116 (Dec. supra note 5. Y. INT'L L.
263 n.4/507. Cas. the negative rules of attribution. if they ever were.2.Crawford. Crawford. It is doubtful whether a single generally applicable principle has emerged in that field in whose terms the decisions can be explained. to be identified with any particular national legal tradition or school.Q. passim. the immunity of ambassadors.Third Report. it resembled the evolution of the common law of torts before Donoghue v.). was not based on any codified approach. Second Report. Comments from governments on these changes did not in any way reflect a civilian-common law divergence."53 The suggestion that "more could have been done"54 first requires an assessment of what has been done. 53 Weiss. according to whom the articles "should have done more to recognize the expanded universe of participants in the international system entitled to invoke state responsibility.4/507/ Add. But they are not. and the first-reading articles were significantly amended or simply deleted.51 an increased willingness by common lawyers to think in terms of general categories of the law of obligations. solidary responsibility. L." For example.886 THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. . annex (Add. Moreover. nor did approaches within the ILC itself. para. 96:874 were precisely not analogous to statutes of general application-which meant that treaties could themselves be modified or even superseded by subsequent custom or by tacit consent. the abolition of the slave trade. the content of the law of state responsibility.45 INT'L & COMP. paras. or even on any general principle of law. I believe the outcome is simpler and cleaner. in relation to each of causation. and inducing breach of contract. 54 Id. 52 For example." whereas on points relevant to the articles. modified (if at all) only around the fringes. at 816. or were overrefined (e. It was dependent largely on diplomatic correspondence or decisions of arbitral commissions in relation to particular fact situations. Weiss cites Article 33(2) but tends to underrate its significance. at 809..g. id. Diplomatic negotiations usually focused on the proposed rule of conduct rather than on the this is true whether the conparticular consequences of its (still hypothetical) breach-and text was the neutrality of Belgium. Each of these issues was addressed on second reading. This is a theme explored by Weiss. 52 (1996). respectively. we are still working out the content of the "international minimum standard" on a case-by-case basis-as witness current developments in the application of Articles 1105 and 1110 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and their equivalents in bilateral investment treaties.. In some respects at least.27-30. it was not that they addressed issues from a civilian (as distinct from a common law) approach but that they addressed nonissues (e. A/CN.3). at least in the important field of injury to the persons and property of aliens. UN Doc. or the most-favored-nation clause. being essentially based on a bilateral state-to-state conception. The Articles as Limited to an Interstate Approach to International Law A more serious criticism is that the articles reflect an outdated statist approach to international law. 5' Although this has been denied. different European countries turned out to approach the matter in quite different ways.489. Article 33 reads in whole as follows: 50 1932 App. supra note 28. supra note 20. and a certain tendency to assume the existence of a single "civilian approach. Other factors are also relevant: a certain convergence of thinking across the common lawcivil law divide (at least in Europe).. Stevenson.g. all strictly pleonastic). or tried to force substantive rules of international law into a particular form (former Articles 21-26). and that the articles now say more or less what can be said in general terms about the secondary rules of state responsibility. EuropeanLegalSystemsAreNot Converging.'2 If there was a criticism to be made of the first-reading articles. supranote 45. 562 (appeal taken from Scot. A/CN. See. or used inappropriate domestic law analogies (former Article 19). UN Doc. the question of "capacity" to breach international law: see former Article 2). Pierre Legrand.
it required some recognition of the existence of correlative rights of various kinds. 1928 PCIJ (ser. depending.55 That did indeed imply a bilateral and purely interstate conception of responsibility."with the inference that for every breach there would be an injured state entitled individually to vindicate its rights. As the International Court rather unobtrusively held in the LaGrandcase. 763 (1999). In the new version of part 2.INT'LL.L. 15. Merits (Int'l Ct. to which individual investors are not privy. or the international community as a whole. it nonetheless clearly envisages that some "person or entity other than a State"may be directly entitled to claim reparation arising from an internationally wrongful act of a state. equally unobtrusively. in the PolishRailwayWorkers case. see Derek Wyatt. 77. and that nonstate entities could not be directly injured by beaches of international law. B) No.At the same time. arising from the international responsibility of a State. availableat <http://www.147 (1982). a decision not referred to in LaGrand. one 55 Under former Article 40."57 In this respect.2002] SYMPOSIUM:THE ILC'S STATE RESPONSIBILITYARTICLES 887 Article 33 Scope of international obligations set out in this Part 1. part 2 was expressed in terms of the rights of "the injured State. a standard bilateral or regional investment treaty is an interstate agreement.5sOn the other hand. 57 Id. "on the character and content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach. AdvisoryOpinion. This provision completes the framework of the subject of the responsibility of states. cf. As adopted on first reading.icj-cij. whether or not they are classified as "human rights. New Legal Orderor Old?7 EUR. Justice June 27. inter alia. the two paragraphs of Article 33 emphasize the variety of situations that may be involved. to several States.org>.g. paras. . Ole Spiermann. and the subtlety of possible interactions between states as legislators and actors and nonstate entities as beneficiaries and claimants."that is. REV. which are dealt with in part 2. This article (new to the second-reading text) seeks to do two things. the Courtwas reaffirmingwhat the Permanent Court had said. which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State. or only to the other contracting state (s). This Part is without prejudice to any right.J. 78.56 an interstate treaty may create individual rights. In form a saving clause. But Article 33(1) could not stand on its own. obligations without some correlative right of action. Paragraph 1 makes it clear that the secondary legal relationships created as a result of the breach may arise as between the responsible state and one or more states. but the implication was that each was separately injured and no provision was made to deal with the situation of a plurality of injured states. 3).Avoiding this implication is the function of Article 33 (2). 2001). the formulation of the secondary consequences of responsibility in terms of obligations rather than rights was a deliberate step back from a rigidly bilateral conception of injury. Separate Opinion of Vice-President Shi. The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part may be owed to another State. The OtherSideof the Story:An UnpopularEssayon the Making of theEuropeanCommunityLegal Order. because it would have implied that all secondary obligations were owed to states or collectives of states. 58Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. or to the international community as a whole. For example.On the issue as it relates to rights under European Union law.). It is a matter of interpretation whether the primary obligations (e. allowing the full range of possibilities in terms of right-duty relationships and avoiding any negative inferences that might otherwise have been drawn from the decision to deal in detail only with issues of invocation of responsibility bystates. Taken together. there might be some or many injured states. at 17-19 (Mar. are obligations "in the air.." This phrasing avoids any suggestion that the obligations of cessation and reparation.10 EUR.S.. of fair and equitable treatment) created by such a treatyare owed to qualified investors directly. hence Article 33(1). 56 LaGrand Case (Ger. which fitted poorly not merely with such notions as crimes of state (former Article 19). depending in particular on the character and content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach. U. 2. v. but also with the extended conception of "injuredState"in former Article 40.
v. .1 (2002). Professor Giorgio Gaja is the special rapporteur onl this new topic. at some level a modern bilateral investment treaty disaggregates the legal interests that were clumped together under the Mavrommatis formula. The responsibility of nonstate entities for breaches of international law raises novel and difficult questions. o) SeealsoWeiss. 6i See Report of the Working Group on Responsibility of International Organizations. UN Doc. without endangering the economy (or the survival) of the text as a whole. but it was approaching the margins of acceptability for some influential states. Conceptually. A/CN. UN Doc. This is a disparate topic: the ILC has just begun its study of the responsibility of international organizations. S. 30). and might further have implied that issues of international responsibility can only arise as between states. which covered the responsibility of states and was not confined to their responsibility to other states. directly between the investor and the responsible state. Afr. amounted to substantial progress. " Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. is thereby formed. was not accompanied by any detailed regulation in the articles of the ways in which state responsibility may be invoked by nonstate entities.. ' Commentaries. who effectively opts in to the situation as a secondary right holder by commencing arbitral proceedings under the treaty. and could have given rise to significant controversy.62 Above all. 1966 ICJREP. what Article 33 clearly shows is that the secondary obligations arising from a breach may be owed directly to the beneficiary of the obligation.6' but that will leave various other issues untouched. this acknowledgment. 7 n. para. at 12 (Aug. and the debate in UN Doc. Instead. and the clear rejection of the narrow approach to standing adopted by the Court in South WestAfrica.622 (2002). Liber. which was being separately treated. Second Report on Diplomatic Protection. 96:874 might argue that bilateral investment treaties in some sense institutionalize and reinforce (rather than replace) the system of diplomatic protection. as noted already.6 (July 18). A/CN.2740 (2002).4/506 & Add.). 6: South West Africa cases (Eth. First Report on Diplomatic Protection. 25. supra note 28. A/CN. Dugard. 2. para. and that in accordance with the Mavrommatis formula. Second Phase. there was a need not to raise so many new issues that the acceptability of the text as a whole might have been put in question. UK). For example. Diplomatic protection had already been carved off from the articles (likewise not haxvingbeen treated on first reading). A/CN. as the commentaries explain. if it did not already exist. A new legal relation. the project certainly did not extend to the responsibility of entities other than states." This phrase would have suggested that only states are members of that community. the ILC fought off demands by states (and some of its own members) to use the formula "the international community of States as a whole. important though it is. The articles take no position on that question.4/SR. The commentary to Article 48.4/523 & Add.60 Thus.4/L. But there were several reasons for not venturing further. UN Doc.1 (2000). However. 62 See the reports by Special Rapporteur John R. A) No. in this case the investor.4/514 (2001). Afr. The first-reading articles had not done so.888 THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol.63taken together with Article 33. Second Phase.766 makes it clear that there is a "deliberate departure" from that decision. This subject could have been brought within the scope of the project. the interests and concerns advocated by Weiss were given a textual basis and an explanation. S. True. given that it had dragged on for so many years. which involves the interpretation of the primary obligation. Art. Third Report on Diplomatic Protection. The frank acceptance in Article 48 of the various ways in which states may invoke responsibility in some general interest.59 the rights concerned are those of the state. v. The ILC had a compelling interest in completing the project on time. at 815 (briefly noting this possibility). "the international community as a whole" is a more inclusive category. 1924 PCIJ (ser. In addition.Jurisdiction. not the investor. it seems that diplomatic protection should be regarded as a form of invocation of state responsibility. 18.64 In these various ways. but it is at least a distinct form of invocation. A/CN. UN Doc.
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots.in his view. for example. applying Article 31 of the Vienna Convention to a treaty dating from 1890. without the further sanction (or dismemberment) that could follow from a diplomatic conference.20021 SYMPOSIUM:THE ILC'S STATE RESPONSIBILITYARTICLES 889 TheAuthorityof theArticlesand theFutureof the Text As to the form and potential authority of the text. although the ultimate tests of acceptance have still to be met. notwithstanding that the former is widely regarded as a successful exercise and the latter is not. supranote 34. supra note 3. interpreted. 66 . in state practice. Indeed. If a conference is subsequently held and a convention concluded. from Caron's qualified skepticism about the value of the articles to Weiss's criticism that they did not go further. the question is what their status is likely to be. Something needs to be said about the possible future form of the text and the likely authority of the articles if no diplomatic conference is convened. it is "this influence amid controversy that is paradoxical. General Assembly Resolution 56/83 leaves open the question whether a diplomatic conference on the law of state responsibilityshould be convened."65I would note that both the influence and the controversyhave still to be tested. At the same time. quite accurately. it will of course substitute for the present text-and will do so whether or not it is successful as a convention. 67 On the rather strict conditions for the application of the Vienna Convention. at 857. The articles have already been referred to in argument before international tribunals. and that is a process which will require careful assessment.1045. 858. and in separate opinions of the International Court. Merits. except for comparative purposes. which on almost every occasion where it has been applied by international courts has been applied as customary international law and not by reason of its being a treaty. Some governments might perhaps have difficulties with this or that article because of its implications for some substantive issue in which they were interested. See. On the assumption that the articles stand as at present. it did apply qua treaty to an amendment of 1989. supra note 21. For the most part. The same care over time has attended resort to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. the various contributions in the symposium adopt different approaches. In the Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Projectcase. Id. "The ILC'swork on state responsibilitywill best serve the needs of the international community only if it is weighed. Caron identifies. archives. 46. It may be doubted whether the appetite for such an exercise exists. If governments do not proceed to a diplomatic conference. But for the most part a diplomatic conference would require governments to take firm positions on abstract and difficult issues. the Vienna Convention did not apply qua treatyto the 1977 bilateral treaty that was principally at stake in that case. 13). and applied with much care. the level of controversy underlying the final text can also be overstated. 1999 ICJREP. any more than to the draft articles on succession of states with respect to property. According to Caron. para. I entirely agree. a weakness on the part of many governments 65 Caron. No one now refers. That issue was postponed until the fifty-ninthsession of the Assemblyin 2004."66Speaking for myself. but that more evidence can be found of the former than the latter. the point of the ILC'srecommendation./ Namib. to the draft articles on the law of treaties. The articles will have to prove themselves in practice. as a treaty. There is no indication that this made any difference. was to allow such a process of testing and assessment to continue (it had of course started long before) on a case-by-case basis. see Article 4. Caron notes "the paradox that [the articles] could have more influence as an ILC text than as a multilateral treaty".67 This response may be thought rather bland-but it is not clear what other response can be made. in arbitraldecisions. at 873. in the firstplace at least.at 38. the Vienna Convention has been applied to treaties concluded long before. and debts. it maywell be for a similar combination of reasons that led a majorityof the ILC to suggest that the adoption of the text by a General Assembly resolution would be sufficient. See1997 ICJREP.1059-60 (Dec.).
Its recommendation on the state responsibility articles paralleled an earlier recommendation concerning the articles on succession of stateswith respect to nationality. 2001).which were likewise annexed to a General Assemblyresolution pending subsequent consideration of a possible diplomatic conference. which imposes itself on individuals and requires due process of law. availableat <http://www. now belatedly back on the agenda. where the text must be embodied in domestic law to have its effect. more generally. By contrast.un. the statute for an international criminal court. In effect. for example. 9 GA Res.69 Constitutionally. supra note 3. This was the case with large parts of the Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. 55/153 (Jan. The lesson of that and other cases has not been lost on the ILC. the preferable way of handling any lawmaking text may be the standard method of a diplomatic conference followed by a treaty that is subject to ratification (or not) by governments.8 Caron.890 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. . and they do not require legislative implementation.org/docs>. at 865-66.or. and would be the case with any eventual product of a diplomatic conference on jurisdictional immunities. the secondary rules of state responsibility are only indirectly applicable in national courts. for example. This approach is evidently preferable where the text in question is. which-as Caron argues-requires care in its recipients but does not contravene any general principle. in such a field the ILC'swork is part of a process of customary law articulation. from the rather unhappy process that has attended the ILC'sarticles onjurisdictional immunity of states and their property. . 96:874 in dealing with standard lawmaking texts:68that can be seen. 30.
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