Source: http://www.constitution.org/tb/t1b.htm
Timestamp: 2017-06-27 01:59:12
Document Index: 601032686

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n4', '§ 10', 'art 2', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 4']

Tucker's Blackstone: Note B Home
OF THE SEVERAL FORMS OF
THE concise manner in which the commentator, has
treated of the several forms of government, seems to require that the subject
should be somewhat further considered: this has been attempted in the following
pages; in the course of which the student will meet with considerable extracts
from the writings of Mr, Locke, and other authors, who have copiously treated
the subject; of which an epitome, only, is here offered for the use of those
who may not possess the means of better information.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.A nation or state is a body politic, or a society of men united together
to promote their mutual safety, and advantage, by means of their union.From the very design, that induces them to form a society that has its
common interests, and ought to act in concert, it is necessary that there
should be established a public authority, to order and direct what ought to be
done, by each, in relation to the end of the association.This political authority, is by some writers denominated the
sovereignty;[1] but, for reasons which will be hereafter explained,
I prefer calling it the government, or administrative authority of the state,
to which each citizen, subjects himself by the very act of association, for the
purpose of establishing a civil society.All men being by nature equal, in respect to their rights, no man nor
set of men, can have any natural, or inherent right, to rule over the rest.
This right cannot be acquired by conquest, for the few, are, in a state
of nature, unable to subdue the many.Were it ever possible that the few could triumph over the many, the
power thus acquired, can not be transmissible by inheritance, since it may fall
into hands incapable of maintaining it.The right of governing can, therefore, be acquired only by consent,
originally; and this consent must be that of at least a majority of the
people.[2]Since no person possesses any inherent right to govern, or rule over,
the rest; and since the few cannot possess, naturally power enough to subdue
the many; the majority of the people, and, much more the whole body, possess
all the powers, which any society, state, or nation, possesses in relation to
its own immediate concerns.This power which every independent state or nation, (however
constituted, or by whatever name distinguished, whether it be called an empire,
kingdom, or republic and whether the government be in its form a monarchy,
aristocracy, or democracy, or a mixture or corruption of all them,) possesses
in relation to its own immediate concerns, is unlimited, and unlimitable, so
long as the nation or state retains its independence; there being no power upon
earth, whilst that remains, which can control, or direct the operations, or
will, of the state in those respects.This unlimitable power, is that supreme, irresistable, absolute,
uncontrollable authority, which by political writers in general, is denominated
the SOVEREIGNTY;[3] and which is by most of
them, supposed to be vested in the government, or administrative authority, of
the state: but, which, we contend, resides only in the people; is inherent in
them; and unalienable from them.[4]Except in very small states, where the government is administered by the
people themselves, in person, the exercise of the sovereign power is confined
to the establishment of the constitution of the state, or the amendment of its
defects, or to the correction of the abuses of the government.The constitution of a state is, properly, that instrument by which the
government, or administrative authority of the state, is created: its powers
defined, their extent limited; the duties of the public functionaries
prescribed; and the principles, according to which the government is to be
administered, delineated.[5]The GOVERNMENT or administrative authority of the
state, is that portion, only of the sovereignty, which is by the constitution
entrusted to the public functionaries: these are the agents and servants of the
people.Legitimate government can therefore be derived only from the voluntary
grant of the people, and exercised for their benefit.The sovereignty, though always potentially existing in the people of
every independent nation, or state, is in most of them, usurped by, and
confounded with, the government. Hence in England it is said to be vested in
the parliament: in France, before the revolution, and still, in Spain, Russia,
Turkey and other absolute monarchies, in the crown, or monarch; in Venice,
until the late conquest of that state, in the doge, and senate, &c.As the sovereign power hath no limits to its authority, so hath the
government of a state no rights, but such as are purely derivative, and
limited; the union of the SOVEREIGNTY of a state with
the GOVERNMENT, constitutes a state of USURPATION and absolute TYRANNY, over
the PEOPLE.In the United States of America the people have retained the sovereignty
in their own hands: they have in each state distributed the government, or
administrative authority of the state, into two distinct branches, internal,
and external; the former of these, they have confided, with some few
exceptions, to the state government; the latter to the federal government.Since the union of the sovereignty with the government, constitutes a
state of absolute power, or tyranny, over the people, every attempt to effect
such an union is treason against the sovereignty, in the actors; and every
extension of the administrative authority beyond its just constitutional
limits, is absolutely an act of usurpation in the government, of that
sovereignty, which the people have reserved to themselves.These few preliminary remarks will be somewhat enlarged upon in the
SECTION I.Government, considered as the administrative authority of a state, or
body politic, may, in general, be regarded as coeval with civil society,
itself: Since the agreement or contract by which each individual may be
supposed to have agreed with all the rest, that they should unite into one
society or body, to be governed in all their common interests, by common
consent, would probably be immediately followed by the decree, or designation,
made by the whole people, of the form or plan of power, which is what we now
understand by the constitution of the state; as also of the persons, to whom
the administration of those powers should, in the first instance be confided.
Considered in this light, government and civil society may be regarded as,
generally, inseparable; the one ordinarily resulting from the other: but this
is not universally the case; man in a state of nature hath no governor but
himself: in savage life, which approaches nearly to that state, government is
scarcely perceptible. In the epoch of a national revolution, man is, as it
were, again remitted to a state of nature: in this case civil society exists,
though the constitution or bond of union be dissolved, and the government or
administrative authority of the state be suspended, or annihilated. But this
suspension is generally of short duration: and even if an annihilation of the
government takes place, it is but momentary: were it otherwise, civil society
must perish also.Even during the suspension, or annihilation of government, the laws of
nature and of moral obligation, which are in their nature indissoluble,
continue in force in civil society. Hence social rights and obligations, also,
are respected, even when there is no government to enforce their observance.
This principle, during state convulsions, supplies the absence of regular
government: but it cannot long supply its place; government, therefore, either
permanent or temporary, results from a state of civilized society.As the natural end and sole purpose of all civil power is the general
good of the whole body, in which the governors, or public functionaries,
themselves are necessarily included as a part, so, that civil power alone can
be justly assumed, or claimed by any governor, or public functionary, which is
delegated to him by the constitution of the state, as necessary, or conducive
to the prosperity of the whole body united; what is not so delegated is unjust
upon whatever pretence it is assumed. Any contract or consent conveying useless
or pernicious powers is invalid, as being founded on an error about the nature
of the thing conveyed, and its tendency to the end proposed.[6]The most natural method of constituting, or continuing civil power must,
since the general use of letters, be some deed, or instrument of convention,
between those who set about to establish a civil society or state, to serve as
an evidence of their common intentions in forming such an association; to limit
the powers which they meant to confer upon their public functionaries, and
agents: and to prescribe the mode by which those agents shall be from time to
time appointed, and the powers confided to them administered.[7] And
if it should happen that time and experience may demonstrate that the people
have adopted, or consented to a pernicious plan; whose destructive tendency
they have discovered; and now see their error; taking that plan to tend to
their good, which they find has the most opposite tendency; they are free from
its obligation, and may insist upon a new model of polity.[8]These speculative notions may be regarded as having received the most
solemn sanction in the United States of America; the supreme national council
of which hath, on the most important occasion, which hath ever occured since
the first settlement of these states by the present race of men, declared,
"that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever
the people to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its
foundations upon such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most "likely to effect their safety and
happiness."[9] Such is the language of that congress which dissolved
the union between Great Britain and America. Few are the governments of the
world, antient or modern, whose foundations have been laid upon these
principles. Fraud, usurpation, and conquest have been, generally, substituted
in their stead.When a government is founded upon the voluntary consent, and agreement
of a people uniting themselves together for their common benefit, the people,
or nation, collectively taken, is free, although the administration of the
government should happen to be oppressive, and to a certain degree, even
tyrannical; since it is in the power of the people to alter, or abolish it,
whenever they shall think proper; and to institute such new government as may
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. But if the government be
founded in fear, constraint, or force, although the administration should
happen to be mild, the people, being deprived of the sovereignty, are reduced
to a state of civil slavery. Should the administration, in this case, become
tyrannical, they are without redress. Submission, punishment, or a successful
revolt, are the only alternatives.It is easy to perceive that a government originally founded upon
consent, and compact, may by gradual usurpations on the part of the public
functionaries, change its type, altogether, and become a government of force.
In this case the people are as completely enslaved as if the original
foundations of the government had been laid by conquest.Thus, the nature of a government, so far as respects the freedom of the
people, may be considered as depending upon the nature of the bond of their
union. If the bond of union be the voluntary consent of the people, the
government may be pronounced to be free; where constraint and fear constitute
that bond, the government is no longer the government of the people, and
consequently they are enslaved.And, as the nature of the government, whether free, or the reverse,
depends upon the nature of the bond of union, whether it be the effect of a
voluntary compact, and consent, or of constraint, and compulsion; so the form
of any government, depends altogether upon the manner in which the efficient
force, and administrative authority of the state is distributed, and
administered. But, if the efficient force or administrative authority be,
altogether, unlimited; as if it extends so far as to change the constitution,
itself, the government, whatever be its form, is absolute and despotic: the
people in this case are annihilated .... Their regeneration can only be
effected by a revolution.On the contrary, when the constitution is founded in voluntary compact,
and consent, and imposes limits to the efficient force of the government, or
administrative authority, the people are still the sovereign; the government is
the mere creature of their will; and those who administer it are their agents
and servants.From hence it will appear that the nature of any government does not
depend upon the checks and balances which may be provided by the constitution,
since they respect the form of the government, only; but it depends upon the
nature and extent of those powers which the people have reserved to themselves,
as the Sovereign; or rather, upon the extent of those, which they have
delegated to the government; or, which the government in the course of its
administration may have usurped. An usurped government may be no less a
government of checks and balances, than a government founded in voluntary
consent and compact: witness the government of England, where the parliament
according to the theory of their constitution (and not the people,) is the
sovereign. The checks and balances of that Government have been the the topic
of applause among all those who are opposed alike to the government of the
people, or of an absolute monarch. But no people can ever be free, whose
government is founded upon the usurpation of their sovereign rights; for by the
act of usurpation, the sovereignty is transferred from the people, in whom
alone it can legitimately reside, to those who by that act have manifested a
determination to oppress them.
SECTION II."How the several forms of government we now see in the world at first
actually began," says the learned commentator,[10] "is matter of
great uncertainty, and has occasioned infinite disputes." The celebrated author
of the Rights of Man observes[11] that the origin of all governments
may be comprehended under three heads; superstition, power, and the common
rights of man. The first were governments of priestcraft, through the medium of
oracles; the second being founded in power, the sword assumed the name of a
sceptre; the third in compact; each individual in his own personal, and
sovereign right entering into the compact, each with the other, to establish a
government. A late political writer in England,[12] remarks, that
all the governments that now exist in the world, except the United States of
America, have been fortuitously formed. They are the produce of chance, not the
work of art. They have been altered, impaired, improved, and destroyed by
accidental circumstances, beyond the foresight, or control of wisdom. Their
parts thrown up against present emergencies, form no systematic whole. These
fortuitous governments cannot be supposed to derive their existence from the
free consent of the people; they are fruits of internal violence and struggles,
between parties contending for the sovereignty; or of fraudulent and gradual
usurpations of power by those to whom the people have entrusted the
administration of the government, or of successful ambition, aided by the
operation and influence of standing armies. A democratic government, however
organized, must, on the contrary, be founded in general consent and compact,
the most natural and the only legitimate method of constituting or continuing
civil power, as was observed elsewhere. It is the great, and, I had almost
said, the peculiar happiness of the people of the United States, that their
constitutions, respectively, rest upon this foundation.
SECTION III.The fundamental regulation that determines the manner in which the
public authority is to be executed, is what forms the constitution of the
state. In this is seen the form by which the nation acts in quality of a body
politic: how, and by whom the people ought to be governed, and what are the
laws and duties of the governors.[13]From this definition of a constitution, given us by Vattel, we might
reasonably be led to expect, that in every nation not reduced to the
unconditional obedience of a despotic prince, there might be found some traces,
at least, of the original compact of society, entered into by the people at the
first institution of the state. Yet it seems to be the opinion of the learned
commentator that such an original compact had perhaps in no instance been
expressed in that manner. But it is difficult not to imagine that such an
original contract must have been actually entered into, and even, formally
expressed, in every state where government hath been established upon the
principles of democracy. The various revolutions in the antient states of
Greece were often attended with the establishment of that species of
government: The original constitution of Venice was a pure democracy; and the
constitutions of several of the Swiss cantons partake also, in a great degree,
of the same character. Can we conceive such regulations to have been
established without being in some degree formally expressed? That the evidences
of them have not been handed down to us is not, I apprehend, a sufficient
reason for rejecting the opinion that they have had existence. If, therefore,
the opinion of the learned commentator be, that there never was an instance in
which government had been instituted by voluntary compact, and consent of the
people of any state, it would seem that there is room to doubt the correctness
of such an opinion. If, on the contrary, the opinion be referred to the
primitive act of associating by individuals totally unconnected in society,
before, I shall not controvert it any further.For it is evident that the foundations of the state or body politic of
any nation may have been laid for centuries before the existing constitution,
or form of government of such state. In England, the foundation of the state,
(such as it has been from the time of the Heptarchy,) is agreed to have been
laid by Alfred. And from that period till the union with Scotland, in the days
of Queen Anne, the state remained unchanged: but the government during the same
period was incessantly changing. Before the conquest it seems to have resembled
a moderate, or limited monarchy. From that period it seems to have been,
alternately, an absolute monarchy, a feudal aristocracy, an irregular
oligarchy, and a government compounded, as at present, of three different
estates, alternately, vieing with each other for the superiority, until it has
finally settled in the crown. The foundations of the American States were laid
in their respective colonial charters: with the revolution they ceased to be
colonies, and became independent and sovereign republics, under a democratic
form of government. When they became members of a confederacy, united for their
mutual defence against a common enemy, they renounced the exercise of a part of
their sovereign rights; and in adopting the present constitution of the United
States, they have formed a closer, and more intimate union than before; yet
still retaining the character of distinct, sovereign, independent states. In
all these permutations of their constitutions or forms of government, the
states, or body politic of each of the members of the American confederacy,
have remained the same, or nearly the same, as before the revolution.Thus, as has been already mentioned, society may not only exist, though
government be dissolved; but the state, or body politic, may remain the same,
whilst the government is changeable. Whenever the form of government is fixed,
the constitution of the state is said to be established; and this, as has been
observed before, may be effected either by fraud, or by force; or by a
temporary compromise between contending parties; or, by the general, and
voluntary consent of the people. In the two first cases, the constitution is
merely constructive, according to the will and pleasure of those who have
usurped, and continue to exercise the supreme power. In the third case
likewise, it is in general, merely constructive; each party contending for
whatever power it hath not expressly yielded up to the other; or which it
thinks it hath power to resume, or to secure to itself. Where the constitution
is established by voluntary, and general consent, the people, and the public
functionaries employed by them to administer the government, may be apprised of
their several, and respective rights and duties: and the same voluntary, and
general consent is equally necessary to every change in the constitution, as to
its original establishment. The constitution may indeed provide a mode within
itself for its amendment; but this very provision is founded in the previous
consent of the people, that such a mode shall supercede the necessity of an
immediate presumption of the sovereign power, into their own hands, for the
purpose of amending the constitution; but if the government has any agency in
proposing, or establishing amendments, whenever that becomes corrupt, the
people will probably find the necessity of a resumption of the sovereignty, in
order to correct the abuses, and vices of the government.And herein, I apprehend, consists the only distinction between limited
and unlimited governments. If the constitution be founded upon the previous act
of the people, the government is limited. If it have any other foundation, it
is merely constructive, and the government arrogates to itself the sole right
of making such a construction of it, as may suit with its own views, designs,
and interests: and when this right can be successfully exercised, the
government becomes absolute and despotic. In like manner, if in a limited
government the public functionaries exceed the limits which the constitution
prescribes to their powers, every such act is an act of usurpation in the
government, and, as such, treason against the sovereignty of the people, which
is thus endeavored to be subverted, and transferred to the usurpers.Inseparably connected with this distinction between limited and
unlimited governments, is the responsibility of the public functionaries, and
the want of such responsibility. Every delegated authority implies a trust;
responsibility follows as the shadow does its substance. But where there is no
responsibility, authority is no longer a trust, but an act of usurpation. And
every act of usurpation is either an act of treason, or an act of warfare.Legitimate government, then, can be established only by the voluntary
consent of the society, who by mutual compact with each other grant certain
specified powers, to such agents as they may from time to time chuse, to
administer the government thus established, and their agents are responsible to
the society for the manner in which they may discharge the trust delegated to
them. The instrument by which the government is thus established, and the
powers, or more properly the duties, of the public functionaries and agents,
are defined and limited, is the visible constitution of the state. For it has
been well observed by the author of the Bights of Man,[14] "that a
constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but
a real existence; and whenever it cannot be produced in a visible form there is
none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government, and a government,
is only the creature of a constitution. It is not the act of the government but
of the people constituting the government. It is the body of elements to which
you can refer, and quote article by article; and which contains the principles
on which the government shall be established, the manner in which it shall be
organized; the powers it shall have; the mode of elections; the duration of the
legislative body, &c."[15] Hence every attempt in any government
to change the constitution (otherwise than in that mode which the constitution
may prescribe) is in fact a subversion of the foundations of its own
authority.The acquiescence of the people of a state under any usurped authority
for any length of time, can never deprive them of the right of resuming the
sovereign power into their own hands, whenever they think fit, or are able to
do so, since that right is perfectly unalienable. Nor can it be supposed, with
any shadow of reason, that in a government established by the authority of the
people, it could ever be their intention to deprive themselves of the means of
correcting any defects which experience may point out or of applying a remedy
to abuses which unfaithful agents may practice to their injury. The sovereign
power therefore always resides ultimately, and in contemplation, in the people,
whatever be the form of the government: yet the practical exercise of the
sovereignty is almost universally usurped by those who administer the
government, whatever may have been its original foundation.It is the proper object of a written constitution not only to restrain
the several branches of the government, viz. the legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments, within their proper limits, respectively, but to
prohibit the branches, united, from any attempt to invade that portion of the
sovereign power which the people have not delegated to their public
functionaries and agents, but have reserved, unalienably, to themselves.A written constitution has moreover the peculiar advantage of serving as
a beacon to apprise the people when their rights and liberties, are invaded, or
in danger.It has been before remarked, that the constitutions of the several
United States of America, rest upon the ground of general consent, and compact,
between the individuals of each state respectively. To this it may be added,
that in every state in the union (Connecticut and Rhode-Island excepted) their
constitutions have been formally expressed in a visible form, or writing, and
have been established by the suffrages of the people, in that form, since the
revolution.The federal government of the United States rests likewise upon a
similar foundation; the free consent and suffrages of the people of the several
states, separately, and independently taken, and expressed.It is therefore a fundamental principle in all the American States,
which cannot be impugned, or shaken; that their governments have been
instituted by the common consent, and for the common benefit, protection, and
security of the people, in whom all power is vested, and from whom it is
derived: that their magistrates, are their trustees and servants, and at all
times amenable to them: and that when any government shall be found inadequate,
or contrary, to the purposes of its institution, a majority of the community
hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or
abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public
SECTION IV.Political writers in general seem to be agreed that the several forms of
government, which now exist, may be reduced to three; viz. 1st. the democratic;
or that in which the body of the nation keeps in its own hands the right of
commanding: 2dly. the aristocratic; or that in which that right is referred to,
or usurped by, a certain number of citizens, independent of the concurrence or
consent of the remainder; and 3dly, that in which the administration of the
affairs of the state is vested in a single person, which is denominated a
monarchy .... These three kinds may be variously combined, and united, and when
so combined and united they obtain the general appellation of mixed
governments; and sometimes of limited governments. Thus the Roman commonwealth,
after the establishment of the tribunes of the people, contained a mixture of
democracy, with aristocracy: the former being vested in the assemblies of the
people; the latter in the senate: thus, also, the government of Great-Britain,
in which there is supposed to be a portion of all three of these forms, is not
unfrequently stiled a limited monarchy.
SECTION V.When the body of the people in a state keeps in its own hands the
supreme power, or right of ordering all things relative to the public concerns
of the state, this, as was before observed, is a democracy. And, in such a
state, says Montesquieu, the people ought to do for themselves, whatever they
conveniently can; and what they can not well do, themselves, they should commit
to the management of ministers chosen by themselves.A democracy, therefore, may be either a pure and simple government, in
which every member of the state assists in the administration of the public
affairs, in person; or it may be representative, in which the people perform
that by their agents, or representatives, to the performance of which in
person, either insurmountable obstacles, or very great inconveniences, are
continually opposed.1. A simple democracy must necessarily be confined to a very small
extent of territory: for if it be the duty of every citizen to attend the
public deliberations and councils; to make laws; to administer justice: to
consult and provide for the protection and security of the state against
foreign enemies; or to compose domestic factions and strife; this will be
impracticable if the territory of the state be extensive; and, moreover, the
important business of agriculture, every species of industry, and the necessary
attention to the domestic concerns of each individual, must be neglected; and
where this continues to be the case for any considerable length of time, the
state must inevitably perish.Where the limits of a state are so confined as that the people can
assemble as often as may be requisite, for the administration of the public
concerns from every part of the state, such state must have too small a
population to protect itself against the hostile designs and attacks of
powerful, or ambitious neighbours; or, too small a territory to support the
number of its inhabitants; either of which circumstances must continually
endanger it's safety and independence.A pure democracy seems, therefore, to be compatible only with the first
rudiments of society, and civil government; or with the circumstances and
situation of a people detached from the rest of the world; as the inhabitants
of St. Marino, in Italy, are said to be, by the inaccessible cliffs of the
mountain, whose summit they inhabit. And it may be doubted (for reasons that
will hereafter be mentioned), whether there ever has been such a form of civil
government established among civilized nations. Perhaps nothing can be found so
nearly approaching to it, as in the history of the Aborigines of this
continent, as given us by the author of the history of Vermont.[16]
The form and manner of the Indian government, as that historian informs us, was
the most simple that can be contrived or imagined .... There was no king,
nobility, lords, or house of representatives, among them. The whole tribe
assembled together in their public councils: their most aged men were the
depositaries of what may be gathered from experience, observation, and a
knowledge of their former transactions. By them their debates and consultations
were chiefly carried on. Their councils were slow, solemn and deliberate, every
circumstance that could be foreseen was taken into consideration. The whole was
a scene of consultation and advice. And the advice had no other force or
authority, than what it derived from its supposed wisdom, fitness and
propriety.The strength, or power of the government, adds this author, is placed
wholly in the public sentiment. The chief has no authority to enforce his
counsels, or compel obedience to his measures. He is fed and clothed like the
rest of the tribe; his house and furniture is the same as that of others; there
is no appearance or mark of distinction; no ceremony, or form of induction into
office; no ensigns, or tokens of superiority, or power. In every external
circumstance, the chiefs are upon a level with the rest of the tribe; and that
only which gives weight and authority to their advice, is the public opinion of
their superior wisdom and experience. Their laws stand upon the same
foundation. There was no written law, record, or rule of conduct .... No public
precedent, established courts, forms or modes of proceeding. The causes and
occasions of contentions were few, and they did not much affect the tribe. And
when the chiefs interposed in the concerns of individuals, it was not to compel
but only to counsel and advise them. The public opinion pointed out what was
right; and an offender who had been deeply guilty fled from the tribe,
&c.Were we not (after the example of the antient Greeks and Romans) in the
habit of considering all those nations who are not seduced by the allurements
of polished life, as barbarians, and savages, should we not esteem this picture
of society, as the dream of a poet, describing the golden age, rather than a
just representation of the actual state of a people, whom we despise for their
ignorance; and of mankind, in those situations where the poisonous effects of
artificial refinement have not yet manifested themselves.And here it may not be amiss to mention another objection that is
frequently made to a democratic government; because, if such an objection
exists, it can only apply to such an one as we have just described. It is this;
that all power being concentrated in the people, whenever the whole people
assemble to deliberate upon any matter, there lies no appeal from their
decision, however hasty or ill-advised it may be, there being no law, nor
constitution to limit or control their determinations. Consequently they may
revoke to day, what they established yesterday; and to-morrow, may adopt a new
rule, different from either, which, in it's turn, may be again superceded the
day after. Hence, a perpetual fluctuation of councils is inseparable from a
pure democracy.Another objection, which is also frequently urged against this species
of government is, that it is, more than any other, subject to be agitated by
violent commotions excited by turbulent and factious men, who aim at grasping
all the power of the state into their own hands, and sacrifice every obstacle
to the attainment of their nefarious ends.As the first of these objections applies only to a pure, or simple
democracy, such as has been above described, it may be time enough to answer
it, when we find ourselves in danger of falling into such a form of government.
But I am inclined to suppose, that the objection would be altogether without
force, where the state of society among those about to establish a new form of
government may happen to be such, as that no other inconvenience, (which might
be apprehended from such a form of government) should constitute an objection
to its adoption. For where there is such a separation from the rest of the
world, and such a simplicity of manners, united to the existence of a very
small society, as to recommend the adoption of a government perfectly, and
simply, democratic, we may venture to affirm that no very great inconvenience
need be apprehended from in stability of counsels. And with regard to the evils
to be apprehended from violent commotions, we shall hereafter see, that they
mark the period when the democracy is subverted, or in imminent danger of it,
rather than that in which it flourishes: and such commotions are equally
incident to other governments during the period of their decline, as to
democracies; and in such governments they are likewise more violent, and more
fatal.2. But all the disadvantages of a pure, or simple democracy, such as we
have hitherto been speaking of, may, I apprehend, be effectually guarded
against, by one that is representative: that is, in which the people administer
the government by means of their agents, or representatives, chosen from time
to time by themselves, and removeable from the trust reposed in them whenever
they cease to possess the public confidence, in their wisdom, integrity, or
patriotism.[17]It is not necessary that the limits of a representative democracy should
be so confined, as to expose it to the danger of famine on the one hand, or to
the incursions and attacks of powerful and ambitious nations on the other: no
interruption need be given to agriculture and other necessary occupations; the
constitution of the state may be permanently fixed, by the people, and the
duties and functions of their representatives and agents so distributed and
limited, as that the laws of the state, and not the versatile will of a giddy
multitude, shall always prevail.
SECTION VI.Governments, says an American writer, may be variously modified on the
democratic principle. That which possesses the most energy, and at the same
time best guards its principles, is the most perfect. A democratic government
ought to have the most perfect energy; because there can be no excuse for
disobedience to an authority which is delegated by the community at large, and
only held during pleasure. But in communicating energy without gradual and
cautious experiment, there is danger of communicating with it, the power of
fencing in the government, and changing its principles. This was the danger
apprehended by many, at the time of adopting the present federal constitution.
Nor was it a groundless apprehension, says the writer, to whom I am indebted
for these remarks. The democratic principle being at that time, as it were,
forlorn, destitute, and despised by the world, was in danger of being laughed
out of countenance even in this country, and of being banished from it as a
thing of too mean an origin to be admitted into polished societies.I repeat it, says the same writer, that a democratic government ought to
possess the most perfect energy; without which, true freedom, and the real and
essential rights of man, are without protection. Many maxims taken from other
governments are inapplicable to ours, and therefore with respect to us, are
erroneous. All monarchies, however modified, are governments of usurpation, or
prescription. In the exercise of their authority, the interest and pleasure of
the governing party are more considered, than the general welfare: of course,
the more energetic such authority is, the greater is the oppression felt from
it. In governments by compact, where, of course, the authority is legitimate,
and exercised for the general good, the reverse is true. Energy in such a
government, is the best support that free-dom can desire; and freedom is more
perfect in proportion to the degree of energy .... If the laws of a democracy
prove unwholesome in their effects, it is because the members of the
legislature have erred in their judgment, as the best and wisest men are liable
to do; in which case, they will soon correct the error: or because they have
been improperly chosen, in which case, it depends on the people to correct it,
at the next election. In a democracy a legislator, as well as every other
public functionary, is responsible to the community for the uprightness of his
conduct. If he concurs in an unconstitutional act, he is guilty of usurpation,
and contempt of the sovereign authority, which has forbidden him to pass the
bounds prescribed by the constitution. He has violated his oath, and the most
sacred of all duties. To omit him at the next election is not an adequate
punishment for such a crime. Abuse of power is despotism, and the democracy
that does not guard against it, is defective. If in any department of
government, a man may abuse, or exceed his powers, without fear of punishment,
the right of one man is at the mercy of another, and freedom in such a
government, has no existence.It is indispensably necessary to the very existence of this species of
democracy, that there be a perfect equality of rights among the citizens: the
unqualified use of the term equality has furnished the enemies of democracy
with a pretext to charge it with the most destructive principles. By equality,
in a democracy, is to be understood, equality of civil rights, and not of
condition. Equality of rights necessarily produces inequality of possessions;
because, by the laws of nature and of equality, every man has a right to use
his faculties, in an honest way, and the fruits of his labour, thus acquired,
are his own. But, some men have more strength than others; some more health;
some more industry; and some more skill and ingenuity, than others; and
according to these, and other circumstances the products of their labour must
be various, and their property must become unequal. The rights of property must
be sacred, and must be protected; otherwise there could be no exertion of
either ingenuity or industry, and consequently nothing but extreme poverty,
misery, and brutal ignorance.It is further indispensably necessary to the very existence of this
species of democracy, that the agents of the people be chosen by themselves;
that in this choice, the most inflexible integrity, be regarded as an
indispensible constituent; and where that is found, it is but reasonable to be
satisfied with something beyond mediocrity, in other qualities. A sound
judgment united with an unfeigned zeal for the public weal, will be more
certain of promoting and procuring it, than the most brilliant talents which
have not the foundation of integrity for their support, and the stimulus of an
active zeal for the public good, for its advancement. Besides, if none but men
of the first talents were to be employed as public agents, even where no
superiority of talents may be required, such a circumstance would inevitably
discourage modest merit from offering its services, or accepting an offer of
the public confidence, on any occasion: and such a discouragement would soon
operate to substitute the glare of superficial talents, for the solid worth of
integrity, sound judgment, and love of the public weal.In this species of democracy, it is further indispensably necessary to
its preservation, that the constitution be fixed, that the duties of the public
functionaries be defined, and limited, both as to their objects, and their
duration; and that they should be at all times responsible to the people for
their conduct. The constitution, being the act of the people, and the compact,
according to which they have agreed with each other, that the government which
they have established shall be administered, is a law to the government, and a
sacred reverence, for it is an indispensible requisite in the character and
conduct of every public agent. A profound obedience to the laws, and due
submission to the magistrate entrusted with their execution, is equally
indispensible on the part of every citizen of the commonwealth, in order to
preserve the principles of this government from corruption. Neglect of the
principles of the constitution by the public functionary is a substitution of
aristocracy, for a representative democracy: such a person no longer regards
himself as the trustee, and agent of the people, but as a ruler whose authority
is independent of the people, to whom he holds himself in no manner
accountable; and he so degenerates into an usurper and a tyrant. On the other
hand, when any individual can with impunity defy the magistrate, or disregard
the laws, the sinews of the government are destroyed, and the government itself
is annihilated. As distant as heaven is from earth, says Montesquieu, is the
true spirit of equality from that of extreme equality. The former does not
consist in managing so that every body should command, or that no one should be
commanded; but in obeying and commanding our equals.The constitution of Athens, as established by Solon, was in some measure
representative;[18] there was a senate, consisting of five hundred
deputies who were annually elected; so were the archons, and other magistrates
of the republic. But the whole body of the people likewise assembled, both
ordinarily, on stated days, and also on extraordinary occasions. By the
constitution it proved that the people should ratify or reject all the decrees
of the senate; but should make no decree which had not first passed the senate.
This regulation in process of time was so far disregarded, as, that amendments
to the decrees of the senate were at first proposed; which being acquiesced in,
other decrees, afterwards, were substituted in stead of those of the senate.
This innovation in the constitution changed the nature of the government
entirely, and introduced all the mischiefs of faction, corruption and anarchy;
the people delivered themselves over to the influence of their vicious and
corrupt orators, and intriguing demagogues; and the event finally proved that
the smallest innovations are capable of subverting the constitution of a
state.Thus while a democracy may be pronounced to be the only legitimate
government, and that form of government, alone, which is compatible with the
freedom of the nation, and the happiness of the individual, we may perceive
that it is on every side surrounded by enemies, ready to sap the foundation,
convulse the frame, and totally destroy the fabric. In such a government a
sacred veneration for the principles of the constitution, a perfect obedience
to the laws, an unremitting vigilance on the part of the people over the
conduct of their agents, and the strictest attention to the morals and
principles of such as they elect into every office, legislative, executive, or
judiciary, seem indispensably necessary to constitute, and to preserve a
sufficient barrier against its numerous foes.The enemies of a democratic government fail not on all occasions to
magnify, and to multiply, at the same time, all the disadvantages of this
species of government, just as some curious opticians have contrived lenses,
which represent the same object, magnified, in an hundred different places, at
once. They are ready to mention on all occasions the tumults at Athens, and at
Rome (which last was in no sense whatever a democracy,) and they repeat the
banishment of Aristides, the imprisonment and fine of Miltiades, and the death
of Socrates, with so much indignation, that one might almost suppose they were
the only examples to be found in history, where virtuous men had ever been
oppressed by a government; or where cruelty had ever been exercised towards the
innocent. But cruelty and even violence in a republic, are very different in
their effects from cruelty, or violence in a monarch. In a republic ten
thousand people, or the whole state, combine to oppress one man: in the other
case, one individual inflicts torture upon a whole nation, or the whole human
race. Not to mention the tyrants who have deluged their territories with the
blood of their own subjects, and whose names are held in detestation by the
whole human race, Alexander of Macedon, the favourite of historians, both
antient and modern, crucified two thousand Tyrians round the walls of their
city, because they would not submit to him as a conqueror, but offered to
receive him as a friend, and ally; and the same abominable tragedy was
afterwards repeated by him at Gaza.[19] In the scale of good and
evil, is it better that a whole nation should be sometimes unjust, and even
cruel, to a Socrates, or a Miltiades, or that one man should possess the power
of tyrannizing over the whole human race?But in America, such scenes of violence, tumult, and commotion, as
convulsed and finally destroyed the republics of Athens and Rome, can never be
apprehended, whilst we remain, as at present, an agricultural people, dispersed
over an immense territory, equal to the support of more than ten times our
present population. Nothing can be more inconsistent with the habits and
interest of the farmer and the husbandman, than frequent and numerous
assemblies of the people. In a country, whose population does not amount to one
able bodied militia man for each mile square, would it not be absurdity in the
extreme, to pretend, that the same dangers are to be apprehended, as in those
antient cities; or in the modern capitals of France, or England, whose
inhabitants, respectively, may be estimated as equal to the population of the
largest state in the American confederacy? Or can we expect the same readiness
in an independent yeomanry to excite, or to favour popular commotions, as in
the Athenian populace, hired by their demagogues to attend the public meetings;
or bribed, like the degenerate citizens of Rome, when they contented themselves
with demanding from their rulers, bread, and the exhibition of public games, as
all they required? Those who pretend to draw any parallel between those ancient
republics, and the American states, must either be totally ignorant, or guilty
of wilful misrepresentation. Attica was a small but an immensely populous
state: the people had arrived at the summit of luxurious refinement, indolence,
and corruption. The public orators were often secretly in the pay of the
factious demagogues, contending for pre-eminence, within the state; or, of its
enemies, without. The delusions of eloquence were constantly, and successfully
employed to beguile an enervated and infatuated people to their destruction.
The multitude were on all occasions agitated by the breath of their orators, as
the waves of the sea by the wind. The Roman metropolis, on the other hand, was
a military city, in which every citizen was a soldier, and a sovereign; for
Rome was not the head of the republic, but the mistress of the empire, and of
the globe. Her citizens may be regarded as the lords of the human race; in the
forum they tyrannized over the rest of the world, and in the campus
martins, over each other, A Marius, a Scylla, an Anthony, and an Octavius,
were by turns their idols, and their scourges. Who can perceive the most
distant resemblance between either of these republics, and the states of
New-England, of Pennsylvania, of the Carolina's, or Virginia? Who will venture
to compare those of Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, or Tennessee, to them? But the
improvements which the representative system has received in America, will, I
trust, prove an effectual guard against those scenes of violence, which have
stained the annals of the antient republics; without weakening, or in any
degree impairing the public force, and energy, on the one hand, or endangering
the liberties of the people, on the other; this leads us to a short digression
SECTION VII.The analysis and separation of the several powers of government; which
if not a discovery reserved for the eighteenth century, bids fair to be
practically understood, more perfectly than in earlier times. It consists in
the just distribution, of the several distinct functions, and duties, of the
public agents, according to their respective natures.The essential parts of civil power may not improperly be divided into
the internal, or such as are to be exercised among the citizens of a state,
within the state itself, and the external, or such as may be exercised towards
foreign nations, or different and independent states: the design of civil
government being, both to promote peace and happiness, with an undisturbed
enjoyment of all their rights, to the citizens of the state, by good order at
home; and to defend the whole body, and all its members from any foreign
injuries; and to procure them any advantages that may be obtained by a prudent
conduct towards foreigners. These powers, which in all great empires, and
monarchies, and even in smaller states, are generally united in one and the
same man, or body of men, according to the system adopted by the states of the
American confederacy, are, as was before observed, separated from each other;
the former branch, being with some exceptions, confided to the
state-governments, the latter to the federal government.The former branch of these powers, or that which is to be exercised
within the state, are, shortly, these. 1st. The power of directing the actions
of the citizens by laws requiring whatever is requisite for this end, and
prohibiting the contrary by penalties; determining and limiting more precisely
the several rights of men, appointing the proper methods for securing,
transferring, or conveying them, as the general interest may require, and even
limiting their use of them, in certain cases, for the same general purpose.
2dly. Another power of the same class is that of appointing in what manner, and
what proportion each one shall contribute towards the public expences out of
his private fortune, or private gains, by paying taxes, as the state of the
people will admit. These two branches of power are commonly called legislative;
and in this state, and I believe in every other in the union, they are confided
to two distinct bodies of men chosen at stated periods by the people
themselves, one of which is called the house of delegates, or representatives,
the other the senate; the first being generally vested with the initiative
authority, or right of commencing all laws; the other, that of amending,
ratifying, or rejecting. Both bodies being absolutely independent of each
other.The power of jurisdiction in all cases of controversy between the
citizens of the state about their rights, by applying the general laws to them;
and of trying, and enforcing the penalties of the laws, against all such as are
guilty of crimes which disturb the public peace and tranquility, constitutes a
second subordinate branch of those powers which are to be exercised within the
state; and this power is vested, partly in persons selected for their superior
knowledge of the laws of the state, whose province it is to pronounce what the
law is in each particular case, and who hold their office during good
behaviour, who are stiled judges; and partly by persons indifferently chosen on
the spot, to decide upon the matters of fact which are disputed in each case,
who are denominated juries; being sworn well and truly to decide between the
parties. And without their unanimous verdict, or consent, no person can be
condemned of any crime. This is commonly called the judiciary department. And
in this state no person can be at the same time a legislator, and a judge, or a
member of the executive department of the government, of which it now remains
to speak.The power of appointing inferior magistrates (that of appointing the
judges of the superior courts being by the constitution of this state vested in
the legislature) and ministerial officers to take care of the execution both of
the ordinary laws, and of the special orders of the state, given by the proper
departments; and of collecting the public revenue; paying the public creditors;
defraying the public charges; and commanding, and directing the public force,
pursuant to the laws and constitution of the state, is ordinarily called the
executive department: and in this state, this subordinate branch of internal
powers, is confided to the discretion of another distinct body, composed of the
governor, and the executive council, or council of state; by whose advice the
governor administers the executive functions according to the laws of the
commonwealth.The external powers, or such as are to be exercised towards foreign, or
other independent states, are these two; the first that of making war for
defence of the state, and for this purpose arming and training the citizens to
military service; and appointing proper officers to conduct them; erecting
necessary fortifications; and establishing a naval force: And the second, that
of making treaties, whether such as fix the terms of peace after a war, or such
as may procure allies or confederates to assist in it, or such as without any
view to war may procure, or confirm to a state and it's citizens, any other
advantages by commerce, hospitality, or improvement in arts; and for this
purpose the power and right of sending ambassadors, or deputies to concert such
treaties with those of other nations .... To which we may add, thirdly, the
power of deciding amicably any controversies which may possibly arise between
different states, members of the same confederacy; all of which powers some
authors include under one general name, viz. the federative; and all these, and
some others of pretty extensive operation are vested in the federal government
of the United States. The first appertain generally to the congress, composed
like the state legislature, of two bodies, the one chosen by the people; the
other appointed by the state legislatures. The second subordinate class belongs
to the executive department, or president of the United States, assisted with
the advice and consent of the senate. The third subordinate branch appertains
to the federal judiciary; the judges of which, like those of the state, hold
their offices during good behaviour, though differently appointed, viz. by the
president and senate, instead of the legislative body as in this state.Power thus divided, subdivided, and distributed into so many separate
channels, can scarcely ever produce the same violent and destructive effects,
as where it rushes down in one single torrent, overwhelming and sweeping away
whatever it encounters in its passage.This analysis and separation is perfectly impracticable in a simple
democracy, and is equally irreconcileable to the principles of monarchy; for in
both these the sovereign power seems to be indivisible, and exerts itself every
where, and on all occasions: In the former, the people being at once
legislator, judge, and executive magistrate, and acted upon by the same
impulse, they may at the same time make a law, and condemn the previous
violation of it; and, as in the case of Socrates, in the same moment wreak
their vengeance on the victim of their fury. But no such case can happen in an
extensive confederacy, composed of states possessing respectively a
representative form of government, and in which the constitution is fixed, the
limits of power are defined and ascertained, and uniform laws, and modes of
proceeding are prescribed to be observed in every case, according to its
nature, before it occurs.Thus, the sovereignty of the people, and the responsibility of their
representatives and agents, being the fundamental principles of a
representative democracy, however organized, or in other words, however the
several powers of government may be distributed, or by whomsoever they may be
exercised, the censorial power of the people, which is in effect a branch of
the sovereign power, itself, may be immediately exercised upon that
representative or agent who forgets his responsibility. It is this powerful
control, which without a resumption of the sovereign power into the hands of
the people, as is sometimes necessary for the reformation of the constitution,
preserves the several branches of the government within their due limits: for
the people where they are as vigilant, and attentive to their rights as they
ought to be, will be sure to take part against those who would usurp either the
rights of the people, or the proper functions of a different agent; and thus by
their weight restore the constitutional balance. On the other hand, where such
vigilance and attention to their just rights is wanting on the part of the
people, the progress of usurpation is often as little perceived as that of a
star, rising in the east whilst the sun is in the meridian. It reaches the
zenith before the departure of day discovers it's ascent. But wherever there is
a due vigilance on the part of the people, not only the errors or vices of the
administration, but any defects in the fundamental principles of the government
are more readily discovered in a representative democracy, than in any other
form of government. This sometimes produces parties, but they are never violent
until a general spirit of encroachment, or of corruption, is discovered to
exist in the public functionaries and agents; then indeed more violent parties
arise, and such as may endanger the public happiness. But they are engendered,
and fostered by the government, and not as is falsely supposed, by the people.
The latter are always more disposed to submission, than to encroachment, and
often distrust their own judgments rather than suspect the integrity of their
representative, or agent: a delusion from which they seldom recover until it is
almost too late.If any possible device can ensure happiness to the state, and security
to the individual, it must be the establishment of this important principle of
responsibility in the public agents; and its union with that other important
principle, the separation and division of the powers of the government. Bold
and desperate must that representative be who dares openly to violate his duty,
where he knows himself amenable to the people for such a breach of trust. And
wicked arid corrupt must be that administration, all the parts of which unite
in one conspiracy against the peace and happiness of the people collectively,
and the security of every individual of the community.The limitation of power; the frequency of elections, by the body of the
people; the capacity of every individual citizen to be elected to any public
office, to which his talents and integrity may recommend him; and the
responsibility of every public agent to his constituents, the people, are the
distinguishing features of a representative democracy; and whilst the people
preserve a proper sense of the value of such a form of government, will
effectually guard it against the snares, intrigues, and encroachments of its
counterfeit, and most dangerous enemy, (aristocracy) of which we shall now
proceed to speak.
SECTION VIII.An aristocracy is that form of government in which the supreme power is
vested in a small number of persons. It may be absolute, or limited; absolute,
where it is not founded in the consent and compact of the society, over which
the government is established; or limited, where that consent has been given,
and the constitution and its powers have been fixed, and limited, at the time
of such consent; but in which the other important characters of a
representative democracy have not been preserved. It may likewise be temporary;
as where the members of the supreme council, or senate, sit there only for a
certain term, and then retire to their former condition: or perpetual, during
their lives. It may likewise be hereditary; where the representatives of
certain families (distinguished by the flattering epithet of the well-born,)
are senators by birth: or elective, where either at certain periods the whole
senate is chosen, or vacancies are supplied by election. And this election may
be either popular: as where the body of the people chuse the person whom they
may think proper to advance to the senatorial dignity; which is also called
creation, where the person so chosen is advanced from the plebeian to the
senatorial order; or it may be made by the whole senatorial order, from among
themselves; or by the senate itself, out of the members of the senatorial
order: in which case it has been stiled co-optation: or by the senate itself
out of the order of plebeians; in which case, as in one before mentioned, it
obtains the name of creation.This form of government is capable of such an approximation, and
resemblance, in its external form, to a representative democracy, that the one
is frequently mistaken for the other. The discriminating features of a
representative democracy, as we have before observed, are the limitation of
power; the frequency of elections, by the whole body of the people; the
capacity of every citizen of the state to be elected to any public office, to
which his talents and integrity may recommend him; and the responsibility of
the public agent to the people, for his conduct. If all, or either of these
characters be wanting in the constitution of the state, it is an aristocracy,
though it should be founded upon the consent of the people: if either of these
characters be wanting in the mode of administering the government, it then
becomes an aristocracy founded upon fraud and usurpation. Seldom has such a
government failed to spring up, from the immediate ruins of monarchy: never,
perhaps, has it hitherto failed to undermine and subvert a government founded
on the principles of a democracy. There is not in nature a spirit more subtle
than aristocracy; nothing more unconfinable, nothing whose operations are more
constant, more imperceptible, or more certain of success; nothing less apt to
alarm in infancy; nothing more terrible at maturity. .... .... .... Malum quo non aliud velocius ullum; Mobilitate
viget, vousque acquirit eundo; Parva metu primo; mox sese attollit in
auras, Ingrediturque solo et caput inter nubila
In aristocracies where the whole power is lodged in a senate, or council
of men of eminent stations or fortunes, one may sometimes expect sufficient
wisdom and political abilities to discern and accomplish whatever the interest
of the state may require. But there is no security against factions, seditions,
and civil wars; much less can this form secure fidelity to the public interest.
The views of a corrupt senate will be the aggrandizing of themselves, their
families, and their posterity, by all oppressions of the people. In hereditary
senates these evils are certain; and the majority of such bodies may even want
a competent share of talents to discharge the duties of their stations. Among
men born in high stations of wealth and power, ambition, vanity, insolence, and
an unsociable contempt of the lower orders, as if they were not of the same
species, or were not fellow-citizens with them, too frequently prevail. And
these high stations afford many occasions of corruption, by sloth, luxury, and
debauchery, the general fore-runners and attendants of the basest venality. An
unmixed hereditary aristocracy, if not the worst, must be among the very worst
forms of government, since it engenders every species of evil in a government,
without producing any countervailing benefit, or advantage.In a council of senators elected for life, by the people, or by any
popular interest, there is more reason to expect both wisdom and fidelity, than
in the case of an hereditary aristocracy: but here the cogent tie of
responsibility is wanting; and without that, the ambitious views of enlarging
their powers, and their wealth, will supercede all ideas of gratitude, or
fidelity to those to whom they owe their elevation.When new members are admitted into the senatorial order by an election,
in which the right of suffrage is confined to such as have already obtained an
admission into that order; or where the right of admission into the senate
itself is vested in that body; the senate will infallibly become a dangerous
cabal, (without any of the advantages desirable in civil polity,) and attempt
to make their office hereditary. When senators are entitled to the privileges
of that station in consequence of possessing a certain degree of wealth, the
burthens of the state will, without exception, be thrown upon the poorer
classes of the people. Thus aristocracy, whatever foundation it may be raised
upon, will always prove a most iniquitous and oppressive form of
government.In absolute monarchies, and in perfect democracies, the seeds of
aristocracy are contained in wealth; but they do not germinate so long as these
governments remain unmixed: for power is not attached to riches in the former,
they. being hidden from the sight there, lest they should tempt the grasp of
the sovereign: in the latter, they minister to domestic luxury, or furnish the
means of secret corruption only. The moment that wealth becomes influential,
the principle of democracy is corrupted; when it is allied with power, the
democracy itself is subverted; when this alliance becomes hereditary in any
state, the democratic principle may be regarded as annihilated.But the most easy and successful mode in which an aristocracy commences,
or advances, consists in the secret and gradual abuse of the confidence of the
people, in a representative democracy. Slight, and sometimes even imperceptible
innovations, occasional usurpations, founded upon the pretended emergency of
the occasion; or upon former unconstitutional precedents; the introduction of
the doctrines of constructive grants of power; of the duty of self-preservation
in a government, however constituted, or however limited; of the right of
eminent domain, (or in other words, absolute power,) in all governments; these,
with the stale pretence of the dangers to be apprehended from the giddy
multitude in democratic governments, and a thousand other pretexts and
arguments of the same stamp, form the ladder by which the agents of the people
mount over the heads of their constituents, and finally ascend to that pinnacle
of authority and power, from whence they behold those who have raised them with
contempt, and treat them with indignation and insult. The only preventative
lies in the vigilance of the people. Where the people are too numerous, or too
much dispersed to deliberate upon the conduct of their public agents, or too
supine to watch over that conduct, the representative will soon render himself
paramount to, and independent of, his constituents; and then the people may bid
a long farewell to all their happiness.The first form of government established at Venice, was founded upon
principles perfectly democratic. Magistrates were chosen by a general assembly
of the people; and their power continued only for one year. This simple form of
government (we are told by Doctor Moore,[20] whose enquires and
researches upon this subject afford an useful, and an awful lesson to all
democratic states;) remained uncorrupted for one hundred and fifty years.
Upwards of three hundred years were afterwards employed in gradual, and almost
imperceptible changes in the government, and encroachments upon the rights of
the people, before that system of terror, which finally rendered the Venetian
government the most tyrannical and formidable to its own citizens that the
world has ever known, was completed by the establishment of the state
inquisition. From that period the most complete despotism hath with unremitting
rigor been exerted not only over the actions, but over the minds, of every
citizen of that miserable state. A word, a look, nay silence itself, may be
interpreted to be treasonable, in a government whose maxim is, "that it is
better that an innocent person should suffer from an ill grounded suspicion,
than the government should be endangered by any scrutiny into its conduct."Should it be enquired how such important changes can possibly be
effected where the supreme power is vested in the people, as in the American
States, we may give the answer in the words of De Lolme.[21] The
combination of those who share either in the actual exercise of the public
power, or in its advantages, do not allow themselves to sit down in inaction.
They wake, while the people sleep. Entirely taken up with the thoughts of their
own power, they live but to encrease it. Deeply versed in the management of
public business, they see at once all the possible consequences of measures.
And, as they have the exclusive direction of the springs of government, they
give rise, at pleasure, to every incident that may influence the minds of a
multitude who are not on their guard; ever active in turning to their advantage
every circumstance that happens, they equally avail themselves of the
tractableness of the people during public calamities, and its heedlessness in
times of prosperity. By presenting in their speeches arguments and facts, which
there is no opportunity of examining, they lead the people into gross, and yet
decisive errors. In confirmation of these observations he cites two instances
from the history of his own country, which have occurred within the present
century; and which may serve to shew how slight a movement of the political
machine, may effect a total change in its operations. In Geneva in the year
1707 a law was enacted that a general assembly of the people, should be held
every five years to treat of the affairs of the republic, but the magistrates
who dreaded those assemblies soon obtained from the citizens themselves, the
repeal of the law; and the first resolution of the people, in the first of
these periodical assemblies, in the year 1712, was to abolish them for ever.
The profound secrecy with which the magistrates prepared their proposals to the
citizens on that subject, and the sudden manner in which the latter, when
assembled, were acquainted with it, and made to give their votes upon it; and
the consternation of the people when the result was proclaimed has confirmed
many in the opinion that some unfair means were used. The whole transaction has
been kept secret to this day: but the common opinion is, that the magistrates
had privately instructed the secretaries in whose ear the citizens were to
whisper their suffrages; when a citizen said "approbation, he was to be
considered as approving the proposal of the magistrates; when he said
"rejection," it was to be considered that he meant to reject the
periodical assemblies .... In the year 1738 the citizens enacted at once into
laws a small code of forty-four articles, by one single line of which they
bound themselves forever to elect the four syndicts, or chiefs of the council
of twenty-five out of the members of the same council; whereas they were before
free in their choice. They, at that time, suffered the word approved to be
slipt into a law; the consequence of which was to render the magistrates
absolute masters of the legislature. So watchful, so active, so persevering, so
noxious, so incompatible with the principles of a democratic government, are
those of aristocracy, that we may venture to pronounce it the most dangerous
enemy to a free government. If a single germ of aristocracy be once ingrafted
upon a republican government, the stock will soon cease to bear any other
branches.In an aristocracy, says Montesquieu,[22] the republic is in
the body of the nobles; and the people are nothing at all.
SECTION IX.Monarchy is that form of government in which all the parts of the
supreme power are committed to one person. And such a government may be either
despotic, absolute, and unlimited;or limited. In the former case the administration is vested altogether
in the prince, without any check, or restriction whatsoever. In this
government, according to Montesquieu, the prince is all in all. The
people were all equal, and their equality is the most abject slavery. The
principle of this kind of government is fear generated in
ignorance.[23] Submission constitutes the only security which the
people enjoy: and the safety of the tyrant is alike the result of their tenors,
and their ignorance.In this government the will of the prince is the only law, manners and
customs, says Montesquieu, supply the place of general laws, and the will of
the prince constitutes the law in particular cases. Hence in a despotic
government there are no laws which can be properly so called: laws are
established: manners are inspired; these proceed from a general spirit, those,
from a particular institution. It is a capital maxim, that the manners and
customs of a despotic empire should never be changed; for nothing would more
speedily produce a revolution.In China, the fundamental laws of the empire are spoken of; the emperor
presumes not to change them: but on particular occasions he dispenses with
them. They are binding upon all the world but himself; and so far binding even
upon him, that he leaves them to his successor, to dispense with, as he had
done before him.A limited monarchy (if indeed such a form of government can be any where
found) is one where by some original laws in the very constitution or
conveyance of power, the quantity of it is determined, and limits set to it,
with reservations of certain public rights of the people, not intrusted to the
prince; and yet no court or council, constituted which does not derive its
power from him. How far the government established over the Israelites in the
person of Saul .... when Samuel their prophet "told the people the manner of
the kingdom, and wrote it in a book, and laid it up before the Lord," may have
furnished a model for this species of monarchy, is foreign from our present
enquiry.Baron Montesquieu distinguishes that species of monarchy in which there
are intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers, likewise, from the
absolute or despotic kind, above-mentioned: yet he acknowledges that even in
this, the prince, is the source of all power, civil and political; but that he
governs by fundamental laws. "And these," says he,[24] "necessarily
suppose the intermediate channels through which the power flows. The most
natural, intermediate, and subordinate power is that of the nobility. No
nobility, no monarch, but there may be a despotic prince."But I incline to refer this latter form of government to the class of
mixt governments, rather than to the simple monarchical form. It partakes,
however, of both; wherever the prince alone is the source of all power, the
government is really absolute, in spite of forms. Though the establishment of
different ranks, and orders may vary the condition of the people, whereby the
burthens of government are unequally borne, yet this does not alter the nature
of the government, unless there be some certain powers annexed to those
different ranks, or some of them, which may on certain occasions control or
check the administration of the monarch. Where no such incidental powers exist,
the government is still absolute in the person of the prince: and wherever they
do exist, their existence constitutes a mixt government. In Spain, since the
suppression of the cortes, the monarchy is absolute; yet there is in Spain a
splendid nobility, whose condition is far above the rest of the people, but,
who, possess no power in respect to the operations of the government In France,
before the late revolution; in Russia, in Prussia, and in Sweden under the
government of its late monarch, this was also the case. In all. these countries
the prince is supposed to govern by fixt laws; yet in all of them, I apprehend
he was absolute. In England, the nobility form a separate branch of the supreme
legislature; the power of the crown is according to the theory of that
government, limited thereby; and this constitutes the English government, what
is ordinarily stiled, a limited monarchy, but more properly a mixt government.
Baron Montesquieu, at the same moment that he is speaking of that species of
monarchy in which there are intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers,
subjoins; "that the prince is the source of all power political and civil." I
am at a loss to conceive how the power of such a prince can be said to be
limited. He considers indeed the ecclesiastical power in Spain and Portugal, as
forming a barrier against the torrent of arbitrary power in those countries:
but the ecclesiastical power can scarcely be considered as a dependent power on
the crown in either of these kingdoms. It for a long time maintained a
superiority over the civil power, in those, and most other countries in Europe;
and even at this day, it might hazard a revolution in either of those two
kingdoms, if the monarch should attempt to treat it as a subordinate, dependent
power.It must, however, be confessed, that there is a wide difference between
those governments, where liberty hath never been known to exist, or has been
long banished, as in Turkey, and in most of the Asiatic, and African states,
and those, where absolute authority hath been acquired by gradual usurpations,
or, violent exertions, made at particular epochs, to suppress those branches of
the government, which, in mixt governments, are supposed to form some check
upon the supreme executive authority: as was the case in the suppression of the
cortes, or assembly of the nobles, in Spain, by Charles V. Of the states
general, and provincial parliaments, in France, by Louis XIII. And of the diet
of the States, and the senate of Sweden, by the late king Gustavus III. In
these last cases, the laws relating to property being previously established,
and the privileges of the several orders and ranks of persons, understood, and
admitted by general custom, and implied consent, the assumption of power by the
prince, was directed to the abolition of public, rather than private rights. In
such states, the business of legislation is ordinarily confined to a single
subject, that of revenue. The antient laws on all other subjects remaining
unaltered, the people seem to possess some rights: whereas in the Turkish and
Asiatic governments, the subject is held to be the slave of the sovereign and
his property is held at his master's will. In the European monarchies, on the
other hand, the higher orders, or nobility often, possess very extensive powers
over the commonalty, or peasantry, as they are frequently stiled, without
interfering with, or in any manner diminishing the authority of the government
over either; but, on the contrary, strengthening and supporting it on every
occasion, where its oppressions might incline the people to resistance, if they
possessed the means of making it. And this may serve to explain the maxim, "no
nobility, no monarch." The foundations of this species of monarchy are to be
sought for, in the antient feudal governments, the prince having by degrees
usurped, and annihilated all those privileges which might possibly interfere
with his own authority; yet leaving the nobility in possession of such as might
enable them to maintain a superiority over the people, without danger to the
throne. Such was the state of France under Louis XIV, and his successors.If this kind of monarchy be considered as limited, it pro. ceeds not so
much from the nature of the government, as from the character of the nation,
previous to its establishment. If the prince from an apprehension of rousing
that spirit of liberty, which has been smothered, rather than extinguished,
pursues moderate measures, the people are flattered into a notion, that this
circumstance is owing, equally, to the excellence of their government, and, to
the benignity of their monarch. The distinction between the character of the
prince, and the nature of the government, is soon lost sight of. Hence that
profound veneration, that enthusiastic predilection for their own government,
which is found almost universally, to prevail in all nations. The moderation of
Augustus Caesar, after he was established in the empire of Rome, contributed
not less to the annihilation of the spirit of liberty, in the nation, than his
own previous tyranny, and that of his successors, did, to the enjoyment of it.
The same moderation in the late king of Sweden's administration, after
subverting the constitution, was calculated to obliterate the remembrance of
that transaction, and even to persuade the nation that they were more free,
than before he became absolute. His posterity will probably evince to them the
change in their condition.This species of monarchy being usually founded upon usurpation, rather
than conquest, the prince does not always exert his authority to the utmost
extent; but reserves such an exercise of it for extraordinary emergencies. When
they occur, and the people feel new oppressions, if the spirit of liberty be
not wholly extinguished among them, such oppressions are regarded as
usurpations. From hence it happens that these governments are neither so
durable, nor so tranquil, as those more rigorous despotisms, which are founded
in conquest, and in which the spirit of liberty has been long since
annihilated. In these last, the people, being already reduced to the most
abject slavery, are incapable of distinguishing between one act of tyranny and
another: they are divested of all power of resistance; and therefore acquiesce
in any new burthens which their cruel task-masters may impose, without
presuming to murmur, or to complain: but where the people are not yet reduced
to such an abject state, a series of oppressions, heaped upon them from time to
time, irritate and inflame their minds, much more than such an instantaneous
accumulation of injuries, as would amount to a total privation of liberty at
once. Reiterated oppressions, though comparatively slight, have often the same
effect as superficial wounds; a number of which are often more painful than a
single one, that is mortal. The irritation of temper among the people, thus
produced, generally manifests itself by open opposition, with the first
favourable occasion; the suppression of such an opposition renders the
government more absolute, despotic, and tyrannical: on the other hand its
success overturns, or changes the nature of, the government. Such appears to
have been the origin and progress of the late revolution in
France.[25]The distinction of ranks in this kind of government contributes not, as
we have already observed, to impose any check upon the government, in favor of
the people, in general. The nobility, are, according to Montesquieu, at once
the slaves of the monarch, and the despots of the people. Their privileges have
no relation to the government, otherwise than to exempt them from the utmost
severity of those oppressions, which are indiscriminately heaped upon the lower
orders; but they are great, as they respect the lower orders. An admission into
the higher class gains an exemption from that intermediate oppression, which
these orders exercise over the inferior ranks of the people. This produces a
stimulus which Montesquieu has dignified with the epithet honour; which, as he
informs us, is the vital principle of this kind of monarchy, and excites men to
aspire to preferments, and to distinguishing titles. The term honour, thus
understood, conveys no very favourable impression to the ear of a republican.
As, in a simple monarchy, the nation is as it were concentrated in the
person of the prince, the lustre of the throne is often mistaken for the
prosperity of the nation. Does a prince maintain an immense army in his
territories; are the ports of his dominions filled with a powerful navy; does
he not only inspire his neighbours with the terror of his arms, but even
overawe remote nations by the greatness of his power: is he always on the watch
from some specious cause, or pretext for a quarrel; does he ransack the records
of nations to discover some obsolete claim to their territories; does he seize
upon the dominions, or usurp the sovereignty of some weaker state; doth he
carry fire and sword into every quarter; doth desolation mark the footsteps of
his ambition; and the misery, or extermination of the human race point out the
progress of his successes? such a prince hath arrived at the pinnacle of glory:
and his frauds, avarice, injustice, cruelties, usurpation, and tyranny, are
lost amidst the lustre of his diadem; and, together with the groans,
execrations and curses of the victims to his ambition, are consigned to
oblivion by the partial pen of the historian .... Let the most partial admirers
of the most renowned princes of antiquity, or of modern ages call this an
exaggerated picture of a flourishing monarchy! In a mixt hereditary monarchy
the features may be somewhat softened; but they are still the features of an
enemy to the human race, if we may judge from some of the fairest examples of
that species of government.
SECTION X.From an union of the principles of these three simple forms of
government, or the combination of any two of them, arises what political
writers denominate a mixt, or complex form of government. These complex forms
are innumerable, according as monarchy, either hereditary or elective, is
combined with some of the several sorts of aristocracies, or democracies, or
with both. And further important diversities may arise according as the several
essential parts of the supreme power are entrusted, differently, with the
prince, the senate, or the popular assembly; or according to the mode in which
the prince, or either of those co-ordinate assemblies may themselves, be
constituted. As whether the prince, or the members of the senate, be hereditary
or elective, and if elective, for what periods, and out of what bodies, they
may be elected; and by whom, and in what manner such election may be made. And
again, by whom the popular assemblies shall be elected; for what periods; and
whether any, and what qualifications in respect to estate, shall be required
either in the electors, or in the representative.Political writers seem to have differed in opinion respecting these
kinds of mixt governments; for whilst some of them appear to regard such forms
of government as corruptions of the simple forms, others have bestowed the most
exalted encomiums on them, as uniting the advantages, and avoiding the
inconveniences inseparable from each of them, singly. It is obvious, says
Doctor Hutchinson,[26] that when by any plan of polity these four
advantages can be obtained, wisdom in discerning, the fittest measures for the
general interest; fidelity, with expedition and secrecy in the determination
and execution of them; and concord, and unity; a nation must have all that
happiness which any plan of polity can give it; as sufficient wisdom in the
governors will discover the most effectual means, and fidelity will chuse them;
by expedition and secrecy they will be most effectually executed, and unity
will prevent one of the greatest evils, civil wars, and seditions. The great
necessity of taking sufficient precaution against these mischiefs of factions
and civil wars, leads most writers in politics to another obvious maxim, viz.
that the several parts of the supreme power if they are lodged by any complex
plan in different subjects, some granted to a prince, others to a senate, and
others to a popular assembly, there must in such case be some nexus
imperii, or political bond, that they may not be able, or incline to act
separately, and in opposition to each other. Without this, two supreme powers
may be constituted in the same state, which may give frequent occasions to
civil wars. This would be the case if both the senate, and popular assembly,
claimed, separately, and independently, the legislative power; as it happened
in Rome, after the tribunes held assemblies of the plebeians, without authority
of the senate, and obtained that the decrees of the plebeians should have the
force of laws, while the senate insisted upon the like force to their decrees.
The like was the case in many nations of Europe, while the ecclesiastical state
pretended to make obligatory laws, and exercise certain jurisdictions,
independently of the civil. If therefore the several essential parts of the
supreme power are distributed among different persons, or courts, they must
have a strong bond of union. If a prince has the executive, and the power of
peace and war, while another body has the legislative, the power of raising
tributes must be at least necessarily shared with the legislative council, that
it never may be the prince's interest to make war without their concurrence:
and the prince must have a share in the legislative. Without such bonds, laws
might be enacted which the prince would not execute, or wars entered into which
the nation would not support .... But there is no such necessity, adds the same
writer, that all the parts of the supreme power should be committed either to
one person, or to one council: And the other interests of the state may require
that they should be divided.It is evident, from the case here supposed, that this ingenuous writer
had the British constitution (in which there is an hereditary prince, in whom
the supreme executive authority, in. eluding the power of peace and war, is
vested,) in his eye, when he wrote this passage, evidently calculated to
justify that principle in the British constitution, that the regal character
must possess some share in the legislature; as otherwise it might happen, that
laws might be enacted, which he, being responsible to no one for his conduct,
would not execute. That constitution must indeed be radically defective, where
the executive authority may safely refuse to execute the law. But it may be
doubted whether this defect is at all remedied, by allowing to the executive
magistrate, not only an absolute negative over every act of the legislature,
but in fact an initiative authority within the legislature itself: and this
initiative has been so long sanctioned by practice, that it is now considered
as the peculiar province of the principal minister of the crown,[27]
to bring forward every specific proposition for a tax that may be made in the
house of commons; to whom the initiative might, in this case, is said to
belong, exclusively not only of the crown, but even of the house of lords, or
second branch of the legislature. But to return to our subject.Dr. Hutchinson[28] concludes, that none of the simple forms
can be safe for a society. That if those deserve to be called the regular forms
which are wisely adapted to the true ends of civil polity, all the simple forms
are to be called rather rude and imperfect. That complex forms, made up of all
three, will be found the best, and most regular, according to the general
doctrine, both of ancients and moderns.It was observed in another place, that governments may be variously
modified upon the democratic principle: and it is perhaps susceptible of proof,
that a representative democracy is more capable of such a modification, as may
unite all the real advantages of the three simple forms of government, without
hazarding the inconveniences actually inseparable from either, singly, than any
other state, or body politic whatsoever.The professed design, and obvious advantages of these mixt governments,
is said to consist in the union of the public virtue and goodness of intention,
to be found in popular assemblies, with the superior wisdom usually ascribed to
a select council, composed of the most experienced citizens; and the strength,
energy, and union of a government committed to the hands of a single
person.The benefits of the democratic, or popular branch, strictly speaking,
may be preserved by a popular assembly, chosen annually, by the people of
convenient districts, in fair and equal proportions, from among themselves;
wherein the right of electing, and of being elected, shall be extended to every
citizen having a sufficient evidence of a permanent common interest with, and
attachment to the community: which assembly should possess the initiative right
in the establishment of all laws, and more especially such as may impose or
create any burthen upon the state, or its citizens. To preserve this branch
from falling under the influence of men of wealth, an agrarian system should be
established, to prevent the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, and
the establishment of patronage and dependence among the yeomanry or farmers, by
reducing them from the state of absolute proprietors of their farms, to that of
tenants or vassals, over whom, their rich landlords may acquire a kind of
feudal authority and control. The best mode of obviating such an accumulation
seems to be the partibility of estates among all the children, or collateral
relations of persons dying intestate, and the absolute prohibition of all
perpetuities in lands. If the members of this assembly be rendered incapable of
holding, or accepting any lucrative office which may be created by the
legislature, or filled by the choice of any other department of the government,
their purity, integrity, and independence, will be unimpaired and unsuspected.
They will not impose burthens which they must share in bearing, nor will they
create offices, and increase emoluments, of which no part can arrive to
themselves. They will not forfeit the confidence of their constituents by an
abuse of the power confided to them, nor will they desire to extend those
powers which another may be called upon the next year to exercise in their
stead. If they have the power of nomination to office, in some of the more
important ministerial and judiciary departments, in such mode as to give to the
senate the power of selecting a smaller number from the whole number of persons
nominated; and to the executive department, the final choice between those whom
the senate may prefer; it might be expected that offices filled in such a mode,
would be bestowed on persons eminent for their integrity, capacity, and
diligence. If they were vested with a kind of censorial power likewise, or the
right of impeaching such of the public agents as may betray their trust, and
endanger the public happiness, such an assembly might be supposed to unite in
it all the advantages which could be expected from a general assembly of the
people in a democratic state.If there be a second council, composed of fewer members, more advanced
in age, and chosen from larger districts, by electors chosen for that especial
purpose in the smaller districts by the people themselves, such a council may
be presumed likely to possess more wisdom than any hereditary counsellors, and
as much, both of wisdom, integrity, and of weight among the people, as any
similar council constituted in any other mode: if one third, or one fourth of
the members should in continual rotation go out, every third or fourth year,
there would always remain a sufficient number who may be supposed to have
acquired an intimate acquaintance with the nature of the business they would
have to transact; whilst the short period of three or four years, at the end of
which they must vacate their seats, and either return to the level of the rest
of their fellow citizens, or owe their re-election to a general approbation of
their conduct, would induce them constantly to bear in mind their duty to the
public .... If no personal privileges were annexed to their station; and they,
as well as the members of the popular assembly, were incapable of election to
any other office; it would Insure an honest independence of conduct, unswayed
by hopes, and unawed by fears, from any other branch of the government. If to
such a council every act of the initiative or popular assembly, were
necessarily submitted for their amendment, approbation, or rejection, it might
be presumed that no laws would be enacted, the nature and consequence of which
had not been fully considered and digested, before they should become
obligatory upon the people. If in those cases where the popular assemblies
might have the power of nomination to office, the character of those
recommended by popular favour were to undergo a scrutiny in such a council, and
the number of candidates were reduced to two, or at most three, out of whom the
final appointment should be made, the demagogues of faction would probably be
excluded from office, in favour of those citizens, whose virtues and talents
might give them a just title to a preference. A senate thus constituted, and
restricted, might also, perhaps, be safely entrusted with the power of trying
impeachments; in those cases, at least, where a member of the supreme judicial
court, should incur the notice of the censorial power of the popular assembly:
In all other cases, I should presume, that the judicial courts, would be the
proper tribunals for such trials. In no simple aristocracy could a council as
wise, as virtuous, and as faithful, be found.The regal, or executive power of the state, might upon the same
principles be lodged either in the hands of a single magistrate; or in such a
magistrate with the advice and consent of a council, composed of a few select
citizens, eminently distinguished for their fidelity, patriotism, wisdom, and
experience, in the affairs of the state. The best mode of chusing such an
executive body would probably be, by electors chosen from among the people, in
several convenient districts, whose power should extend to that business,
alone. If the chief magistrate be chosen in this manner, and for a short
period; if after a certain period he be ineligible, for some years; if his
council, (where such is assigned him) be composed of persons chosen in a
similar manner, and going out by rotation at the end of two or three years,
after their election; if they be precluded from any other lucrative office,
during the period for which they may be elected; if they be liable to the
censorial power of the popular assembly, and when removed from office return to
the condition of private citizens; such an executive, on all necessary
occasions, would possess all the energy, secrecy, unanimity, and dispatch to be
found in a monarchy, without any danger of becoming the tyrants of the people,
instead of their servants and agents. And a government so constituted would
probably unite in itself every advantage which theorists ascribe to any
complex, or mixt form of government, whatsoever.But such a government would be a REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY, and not a MIXT GOVERNMENT, of that
nature which those writers prefer. For it is the essence of this latter species
of government, that the several powers, which, together, share the
administration, or as it is ordinarily called, the supreme power, or
sovereignty, should be, (in theory, at least) entirely independent of each
other. Thus in England, we are told that the legislature of the kingdom (in
which the absolute rights of sovereignty, (or jura summi imperii) are
said to reside) is entrusted to three distinct powers, entirely independent of
each other; viz. the king, in whom the supreme executive power is also lodged;
the house of lords, composed of an aristocratical assembly of persons, selected
for their piety, their birth, their wisdom, their valour, or their property;
and thirdly, the house of commons, freely chosen from the people among
themselves, which makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body,
actuated by different springs, and attentive to different interests, composes
the British parliament, and has the supreme disposal of every thing; there can
no inconvenience be attempted by either of these branches," says judge
Blackstone, "but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch being
armed with a negative power, sufficient to repel any innovation which it shall
think inexpedient."[29]Such is the outline of the far-famed British constitution, as sketched
by the masterly pen of judge Blackstone, whose able commentary, and high
wrought panegyric, upon it; together with the elaborate researches, and
encomiums of De Lolme; and the elegant eulogium of president Montesquieu, are
well deserving the attentive perusal of the student. And, if to all these, the
suffrage of a late exalted character in the government of the United States can
afford any additional lustre, the British constitution may be selected, not
only as the most perfect model of these kinds of mixt governments, but as the
most stupendous monument of human wisdom.It would far exceed the proposed limits of this essay to enter into a
minute examination of its structure, and to point out the essential difference
between its theoretical excellencies, and its practical defects, corruptions,
and radical departures from those very principles, which have been supposed to
constitute that superiority and pre-eminence, which these and other writers
have ordinarily ascribed to it. But the following observations from the pen of
a native, whose stile and manner evince a superiority both of genius and
discernment, whilst they leave no doubt upon the mind, that he had seen and
felt all that he describes, may lead us to conclude, that the practical abuses,
corruptions, and oppressions of that government, are at least equal to the
theoretical pre-eminence of its constitution."It is perhaps susceptible of proof," says this nervous
writer,[30] "that these governments of balance and control have
never existed but in the visions of theorists. The fairest example will be the
constitution of England. If it can be proved that the two members of the
legislature who pretend to control each other are ruled by the same class of
men, the control must be granted to be imaginary. That opposition of interest
which is supposed to preclude all conspiracy against the people can no longer
exist. That this is the state of England, the most superficial observation must
evince. The great proprietors, tided and untitled, possess the whole force of
both houses of parliament, that is not immediately dependent on the
crown.[31] The peers have a great influence in the house of commons.
All political parties are formed by a confederacy of the members of both
houses. The court party by the influence of the crown, acting equally in both,
supported by a part of the independent aristocracy: The opposition by the
remainder of the aristocracy, whether commoners, or lords. Here is every
symptom of collusion: no vestige of control. The only case where it could
arise, is where the interest of the peerage, is distinct from that of the other
great proprietors.""Who can, without indignation," adds the same writer,[32]
"hear the house of commons of England called a popular representative? A more
insolent and preposterous abuse of language is not to be found in the
vocabulary of tyrants. The criterion that distinguishes laws from dictates,
freedom from servitude, rightful government from usurpation, the law being an
expression of the general will is wanting. This is the grievance which the
admirers of the revolution in 1688, desire to remedy according to its
principles. This is that perennial source of corruption, which has increased,
is increasing, and ought to be diminished. If the general interest is not the
object of the government, it is, it must be, because the general will does not
govern. We are boldly challenged to produce our proofs: our complaints are
asserted to be chimerical, and the excellence of our government is inferred
from its beneficial effects. Most unfortunately for us, most unfortunately for
our country, these proofs are too ready, and too numerous. We find them in that
monumental debt, the bequest of wasteful, and profligate wars, which wrings
from the peasant something of his hard-earned pittance; which already has
punished the industry of the useful and upright manufacturer, by robbing him of
the asylum of his house, and the judgment of his peers: to which the madness of
political quixotism adds a million for every farthing that the pomp of
ministerial empyricism pays; and which menaces our children with convulsions
and calamities, of which no age has seen the parallel. We find them in the
bloody roll of persecuting statutes that are still suffered to stain our code;
a list so execrable, that were there no monument to be preserved of what
England was in the eighteenth century, but her statute-book, she might be
deemed still plunged in the deepest gloom of superstitious barbarism. We find
them in the ignominious exclusion of great bodies of our fellow citizens from
political trusts, by tests which reward falsehood, and punish probity; which
profane the rites of the religion they pretend to guard, and usurp the dominion
of the God, they profess to revere. We find them in the growing corruptions of
those who administer the government, in the venality of a house of commons
which has become only a cumbrous and expensive chamber for registering
ministerial edicts .... in the increase of a nobility arrived to a degradation,
by the profusion and prostitution of honours, which the most zealous partizans
of democracy would have spared them. We find them, above all, in the rapid
progress which has been made to silence the great organ of public opinion, the
Press, which is the true control on ministers and parliaments, who might else,
with impunity, trample on the impotent formalities, that form the pretended
bulwark of our freedom .... The mutual control, the well-poised balance of the
several members of our legislature, are the visions of theoretical, or the
pretexts of practical politicians. It is a government not of check, but of
conspiracy .... a conspiracy which can only be repressed by the energy of
popular opinion."If this be a true picture of the government of Great Britain (and
whether it is or not, I shall leave it to others to enquire and determine,) the
epoch can not be far distant, which Judge Blackstone hints at in the
introduction to his commentaries.[33] If ever it should happen" says
that enlightened author "that the independence of any one of the three branches
of the legislature should be lost, or that it should become subservient to the
views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of the
constitution." In which case, according to Sir Matthew Hale,[34] the
subjects of that kingdom are left without all manner of remedy.Such, then, being the history of the British constitution, the most
perfect model of these mixt governments, (as agreed on all hands by their
admirers, and advocates,) that the world ever saw, we may apply to them
generally, the observations of an excellent politician[35] of the
last century. "If all the parts of the state do not with their utmost power
promote the public good; if the prince has other aims than the safety and
welfare of his country; if such as represent the people do not preserve their
courage and integrity; if the nation's treasure is wasted; if ministers are
allowed to undermine the constitution with impunity; if judges are suffered to
pervert justice, and wrest the law; then is a mixed government the greatest
tyranny in the world: it is tyranny established by law; and the people
are bound in fetters of their own making. A tyranny that governs by the sword,
has few friends but men of the sword; but a legal tyranny (where the people are
only called to confirm iniquity with their own voices) has on its side the
rich, the timid, the lazy, those that know law, and get by it, ambitious
churchmen, and all whose livelihood depends upon the quiet posture of affairs:
and the persons here described compose the influencing part of most nations; so
that such a tyranny is hardly to be shaken off."
SECTION XI.I cannot better conclude what relates to the several kinds of government
of which we have been speaking, whether simple, or complex, than by a summary
of their several characters, corruptions, and transitions from one to another,
for which I am indebted to the pen of a most intimate friend,[36]
from whom I have borrowed several passages in the preceding part of this
essay."In a democratical government all authority is derived from the people
at large, held only during their pleasure, and exercised only for their
benefit. The constitution is a social covenant entered into by express consent
of the people upon the footing of the most perfect equality with respect to
civil liberty. No man has any privilege above his fellow-citizens, except
whilst in office, and even then, none but what they have thought proper to vest
in him solely for the purpose of supporting him in the effectual performance of
his duty to the public."In every other form of government, authority is acquired more by
usurpation than by appointment of the people; it serves to give dignity and
grandeur to a few, and to degrade the rest; and it is exercised more for the
benefit of the rulers, than of the nation. The constitution is established upon
a compromise of differences betwixt two or more contending parties, each,
according to the means it possesses, extorting from the others every concession
that can possibly be obtained, without the smallest regard to justice, or the
common rights of mankind. It is a truce, by which the people are always
compelled to surrender some, and generally a very large portion of their
freedom; and of course they have a right to reclaim it, whenever more
favourable circumstances put it in their power. If the prince, at the head of
an armed force, reduces them to unconditional submission, he becomes a despotic
monarch, and the people are in the most deplorable state of slavery. They have
no longer the presumption to imagine themselves created for any other purpose
than to be subservient to his will, and to administer to his pleasures and
ambition. They even think it an honor to be made the base instruments of his
tyranny. They look up to him with a reverential awe surpassing what they feel
for the almighty parent of the universe. Such is the servility of man degraded
by oppression."If the people retain still some resources which may render the issue of
the contest doubtful, the prince for his own safety, most humanely grants them
some privileges, and is then a limited monarch. They are often deluded into an
opinion that what liberties they enjoy are entirely derived from his bounty;
and taught to consider themselves as the happiest of mankind in having a
sovereign who graciously condescends to allow them the possession of what
happily he had not the power to wrest out of their hands."A despotic government is often both quiet and durable, because the
tyrant, having an army at command, is thereby enabled to keep the people in awe
and subjection, and to deprive them of all opportunity of communicating their
complaints, or deliberating on the means of relief. Conspiracies happen often
among the troops, the reigning prince is murdered, or dethroned, but another
tyrant takes his place, and the nation remains in peaceable servitude, scarcely
sensible of the re volution .... When the government is less despotic, the
people have more both of power and inclination to resist oppression. They are
not so thoroughly stripped of the means of defence, they have more opportunity
of concerting measures, and their mental faculties retain more of their natural
activity. Such a government must generally be contentious and changeable. The
rulers can not be long satisfied with a limitation of prerogative, or the
people with the abridgment of their privileges. The same is also true in all
mixt governments, the component, or balancing powers being ever at variance,
until corruption, intrigue, or faction, establishes in one branch, a permanent
superiority and influence over the others, or finally destroys them."Often it happens that the contest for power is betwixt the prince and
nobles, the people having been previously enslaved. In this case the form of
government is variable so far as relates to the prince and nobility; but the
slavery of the people is lasting. This happens in all feudal governments."Sometimes the dispute is betwixt the bulk of the people, and a few
leading men, who having been honoured with the confidence of their
fellow-citizens, betray their trust, grasp at power, and endeavour to establish
themselves in permanent superiority. Their success constitutes an aristocracy,
which is generally a most oppressive government, although often for the sake of
blinding the people, it is dignified with the name of a republic. Indeed every
constitution, that has hitherto existed under that name, has partaken more or
less of the nature of an aristocracy; and it is this aristocratical leaven that
has generally occasioned disorders and tumults in every republican government;
and has so far brought the name into disrepute, (even in America, where the
sovereignty is confessedly in the people,) that it is becoming a received
opinion, that a commonwealth, in proportion as it approaches to democracy,
wants those springs of efficacious authority, which are necessary to the
production of regularity and good order, and degenerates into anarchy and
confusion. This is commonly imputed to the capricious humour of the people, who
are said to run riot with too much liberty, to be always unreasonable in their
demands, and never satisfied, but when ruled with a rod of iron."These are the common place arguments against a democratic constitution.
They are the pleas of ambition to introduce aristocracy, monarchy, and every
species of tyranny and oppression. Unfortunate indeed for the liberties of
mankind, if it be true, that to render them orderly, it is necessary to render
them slaves. However generally this position may have been admitted, we may
venture to deny that it is an inference fairly drawn from experience. Without
better proof than has been adduced, we cannot justly admit that the people at
large are capricious or unreasonable, or that a democratic government will be
productive of disorder or tumult. The blame in such cases is indeed generally
laid on the people, but it is easy to see that the charge is unjust. So far
from being unreasonable in their demands, there is perhaps no one instance in
history, where they have ventured at once to push their claims to the full
extent of reason, and to make an ample demand of justice. They rarely complain
at once of more than one or two grievances. When these are removed, they become
sensible of others. In proportion as they acquire more freedom, they gain more
strength of mind, and independence of spirit. They see further into the nature
and extent of their own rights, and call louder for a restoration of them. This
is called turbulence and caprice, but is in reality only a requisition of
justice; which being either refused, or but partially and unwillingly granted,
it is to the oppressors, and not the oppressed, that the mischief is to be
imputed."It is thus, I apprehend, and no otherwise," continues the same writer,
"that a government approaching to democracy is apt to be disorderly. The people
have a right to complain, so long as they are robbed of any portion of their
freedom; and if their complaints are not heard, they have a right to use any
method of enfranchising themselves. On the contrary, I am inclined to believe,
that in general the people are pretty easily satisfied when no injustice is
intended towards them; and if it be allowed to reason a priori in such a
case, I conclude that a real democracy, as it is the only equitable
constitution, so it would be of all the most happy, and perhaps, of all the
most quiet and orderly."I shall conclude this summary with remarking, that if ever there was a
country in which a fair experiment could be made of the efficacy, advantages,
duration, and happiness to be derived from a democratic government, that
country is United America.
SECTION XII.Political bodies, whether great or small, if they are constituted by a
people formerly independent, and under no civil subjection, or by those who
justly claim independency from any civil power they were formerly subject to,
have the civil supremacy in themselves, and are in a state of equal right and
liberty with respect to all other states, whether great or small. No regard is
to be had in this matter to names; whether the body politic be called a
kingdom, an empire, a principality, a dukedom, a country, a republic, or free
town. If it can exercise justly all the essential parts of civil power, within
itself, independently of any other person or body politic, and no other hath
any right to rescind or annul its acts, it has the civil supremacy, how small
soever it's territory may be, or the number of it's people, and has all the
rights of an independent state.[37]This independency of states, and their being distinct political bodies
from each other, is not obstructed by any alliance or confederacies whatsoever,
about exercising jointly any parts of the supreme power; such as those of peace
and war, in leagues offensive and defensive. Two states, notwithstanding such
treaties, are separate bodies and independent.[38]They are then, only, deemed politically united when some one person, or
council, is constituted with a right to exercise some essential powers for
both, and to hinder either from exercising them separately. If any person or
council is empowered to exercise all these essential powers for both, they are
then one state:[39] such is the state of England and Scotland, since
the act of union made at the beginning of the eighteenth century, whereby the
two kingdoms were incorporated into one, all parts of the supreme power of both
kingdoms being thenceforward united and vested in the three estates of the
realm of Great Britain: by which entire coalition, though both kingdoms retain
their antient laws and usages in many respects, they are as effectually united
and incorporated, as the several petty kingdoms, which composed the heptarchy,
were before that period.[40]But when only a portion of the supreme civil power is vested in one
person, or council for both, such as that of peace and war, or of deciding
controversies between different states, or their subjects, whilst each state
within itself exercises other parts of the supreme power, independently of all
the others; in this case they are called systems of states: which
Burlamaqui defines to be an assemblage of perfect governments, strictly united
by some common bond, so that they seem to make but a single body with respect
to those affairs which interest them in common, though each preserves its
sovereignty full and entire, independently of all the others .... And in this
case, he adds, the confederate states engage to each other only to exercise
with common consent, certain parts of the sovereignty, especially those which
relate to their mutual defence, against foreign enemies. But each of the
confederates retains an entire liberty of exercising as it thinks proper, those
parts of the sovereignty, which are not mentioned in the treaty of union, as
parts that ought to be exercised in common.[41] And of this nature
is the American confederacy, in which each state has resigned the exercise of
certain parts of the supreme civil power which they possessed before (except in
common with the other states included in the confederacy) reserving to
themselves all their former powers, which are not delegated to the United
States by the common bond of union.A visible distinction, and not less important than obvious, occurs to
our observation in comparing these different kinds of union. The kingdoms of
England and Scotland are united into one kingdom; and the two contracting
states by such an incorporate union are, in the opinion of Judge Blackstone,
totally annihilated, without any power of revival; and a third arises from
their conjunction, in which all the rights of sovereignty, and particularly
that of legislation, are vested. From whence he expresses a doubt whether any
infringements of the fundamental and essential conditions of the union, would
of itself dissolve the union of those kingdoms, though he readily admits, that
in the case of a federate alliance, such an infringement would certainly
rescind the compact between the confederate states.[42] In the
United States of America, on the contrary, each state retains its own
antecedent form of government; its own laws, subject to the alteration and
control of its own legislature, only; its own executive officers, and council
of state: its own courts of judicature, its own judges; its own magistrates,
civil officers, and officers of the militia; and, in short, its own civil
state, or body politic, in every respect whatsoever. And by the express
declaration of the twelfth article of the amendments to the constitution, the
In Great-Britain, a new civil state is created by the annihilation of
two antecedent civil states; in the American States, a general federal
council, and administrative, is provided, for the joint exercise of such of
their several powers, as can be more conveniently exercised in that mode, than
any other; leaving their civil state unaltered; and all the other
powers, which the states antecedently possessed, to be exercised by them,
respectively, as if no union, or connection, were established between them.The antient Achaia seems to have been a confederacy founded upon a
similar plan; each of those little states had its distinct possessions,
territories, and boundaries; each had its senate, or assembly, ifs magistrates
and judges; and every state sent deputies to the general convention, and had
equal weight in all determinations. And most of the neighbouring states, which,
moved, by fear of danger, acceded to this confederacy, had reason to felicitate
themselves. The republic of Lycia was a confederacy of towns, which they ranged
into three classes, according to their respective importance. To the cities of
the first rank, they allowed three votes, each, in the general council, to
those of the second two, and to those of the third one .... The assembly of the
Amphictyons, that assembly whose councils enabled Greece to withstand the power
of the Persian monarchy, and whose decisions were held in such veneration that
their sentences were seldom, or never, disputed, was composed of deputies from
the several states of Greece, in number twelve, each of which sent to this
grand council one, two, or three delegates, according to their respective
importance. The Helvetic confederacy consists in the union of several
republics. They have a common assembly, in which all matters interesting to the
whole community are debated; whatever is there determined by a majority, binds
the whole; they all agree in making peace, and declaring war; and the laws and
customs, which prevail throughout the Swiss cantons, are, excepting the
difference of religion between the Protestant, and Popish cantons, nearly the
same. There are, however, some important differences both in constitution, and
administration.[43]The United Provinces of the Netherlands before their late revolution,
maintained a common confederacy; each province possessing a constitution and
internal government of its own, independent of the others: this government is
called the states of that province; and the delegates from them formed the
states-general, in whom the sovereignty of the whole confederacy was vested;
but though a province might send two or more delegates, yet such province had
no more than one voice in every resolution; and before that resolution could
have the force of a law, it must have been approved by every province .... The
council of state consisted likewise of deputies from the several provinces; but
its constitution was different from that of the states-general; it was composed
of twelve deputies, (some of the states sending two, and some one, only), who
voted by persons, and not by provinces, as in the states-general. Their
business was to prepare estimates, and ways and means, for raising the revenue,
as well as other matters that were to be laid before the
states-general.[44]It is very probable, says the president Montesquieu,[45] that
mankind would have at length been obliged to live constantly under the
government of a single person, had they not contrived a constitution, (such as
we are now speaking of) that has all the internal advantages of a republican,
together with the external force of a monarchical, government. It was these
associations, he adds, that contributed so long to the prosperity of Greece. By
these the Romans attacked the universe, and by these only the universe
withstood their power: for when Rome was arrived to her highest pitch of
grandeur, it was the associations beyond the Danube, and the Rhine,
associations formed by terror, (such was the foundation of the American
confederacy) that enabled the barbarians to resist her.A confederate government, according to the same author, ought to be
composed of states of the same nature, especially of the republican kind. The
spirit of monarchy is war and the enlargement of empire and dominion: Peace and
moderation is the spirit of a republic. These two kinds of government cannot
naturally subsist in a confederate republic. Greece was undone as soon as the
kings of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons. The confederate
republic of Germany, composed of princes and free towns, subsists by means of a
chief, who is in some measure the magistrate, and in some the monarch of the
union.These confederacies by which several states are united together by a
perpetual league of alliance, are chiefly founded upon this circumstance, that
each particular people chuse to remain their own masters, and yet are not
strong enough to make head against a common enemy. The purport of such an
agreement usually is, that they shall not exercise some part of the sovereignty
there specified, without the general consent of each other. For the leagues to
which these systems of states owe their rise seem distinguished from others (so
frequent among different states) chiefly by this consideration; that in the
latter, each confederate people determine themselves by their own judgment to
certain mutual performances, yet so that in all other respects they design not
in the least to make the exercise of that part of the sovereignty, whence those
performances proceed, dependent on the consent of their allies, or to retrench
any thing from their full and unlimited power of governing their own states.
Thus we see that ordinary treaties propose, for the most part as their aim,
only some particular advantage of the states thus transacting; their interests
happening at present to fall in with each other; but do not produce any lasting
union as to the chief management of affairs.[46] Such was the treaty
of alliance between America and France in the year 1778, by which among other
articles it was agreed, that neither of the two parties should conclude either
truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first
obtained; and whereby they mutually engaged not to lay down their arms until
the independence of the United States should be formally or tacitly assured by
the treaty or treaties which should terminate the war. Whereas in these
confederacies of which we are now speaking, the contrary is observable; they
being established with this design, that the several states shall forever link
their safety one with another, and, in order to this mutual defence, shall
engage themselves not to exercise certain parts of their sovereign power,
otherwise than by a common agreement, and approbation.[47] Such were
the stipulations, among others, contained in the articles of confederation and
perpetual union between the American states, by which it was agreed, that no
state should without the consent of the United States in congress assembled
send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference,
agreement, alliance, or treaty with, any king, prince, or state: nor keep up
any vessels of war, or body of forces, in time of peace; nor engage in any war,
without the consent of the United States in congress assembled, unless actually
invaded; nor grant commissions to any ships of war, or letters of marque and
reprisal, except after a declaration of war, by the United States in congress
assembled; with several others:[48] yet each state respectively
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction and right which is not expressly delegated to the United States in
congress assembled.[49] The promises made in these two cases here
compared run very differently: in the former thus: "I will join you in this
particular war, as a confederate, and the manner of our attacking the enemy
shall be concerted by our common advice; nor will we desist from the war, till
the particular end thereof, the establishment of the independence of the United
States be obtained." In the latter thus: "none of us who have entered into this
alliance will make use of our right, as to the affairs of war and peace, except
by the general consent of the whole confederacy." We observed before, that
these unions submit only some certain parts of the sovereignty to mutual
direction. For it seems hardly possible that the affairs of different states
should have so close a connection, as that all and each of them should look on
it as their interest to have no part of the chief government exercised without
the general concurrence. The most convenient method, therefore, seems to be,
that the particular states reserve to themselves all those branches of the
supreme authority, the management of which can have little or no influence, on
the affairs of the rest.[50] Thus the American states, have reserved
to themselves the uncontrolled right of framing, establishing, and revoking
their civil laws, and the administration of justice according to them, in all
cases whatsoever, in which they have not specifically consented to the
jurisdiction of the United States. But as to all affairs, on which the safety,
peace, and happiness of the federal union, hath a joint dependence, these says
Puffendorf, ought in reason to be adjusted by a common
constitution.[51] This does not, however, says
Barbeyrac,[52] hinder but each confederated state may provide for
its particular safety, by repressing its rebellious subjects. And herewith the
present constitution of the United States fully agrees. For although congress
are bound to guarantee to every state in the union a republican form of
government, and to protect each of them against invasion; and also against
domestic violence: yet this last is only to be done where the legislature, or
executive of the state (where the legislature cannot be convened) shall make
the application. Nor does any thing in the constitution prohibit any state from
keeping troops, or ships of war, except in time of peace; nor from engaging in
war, if it be either actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as not to
admit of delay.[53] Yet where no such invasion, or imminent danger
exists, the engaging in war, whether offensive or defensive; and after that
peace, as the result and issue of war, are among those things, which can not be
undertaken, or adjusted, but by the common consent of the confederacy. To which
we may add, with Puffendorf, taxes and subsidies as they contribute, and are
necessary, to the mutual support; and alliances with foreign states, as they
may promote the common safety. It falls under the same head of duties, that in
case any dispute arise among the confederates themselves, the other members who
are unconcerned shall immediately interpose their mediation, and not suffer the
controversy to come to blows.[54] Or the confederates may establish
some common tribunal by which their differences may be decided, such as the
Amphictyonic council among the Grecian states; or as the supreme court of the
United States, which hath original jurisdiction by the federal constitution, in
all cases of controversy between two or more states. As for those other
matters, which seem not so necessary to be transacted in common, (among which
Puffendorf reckons negotiations of traffick, such as taxes, for the particular
use of any single state, the constituting of magistrates, the enacting laws,
the power of life and death over their respective citizens, or subjects, the
ecclesiastical authority, where such an authority is permitted, and the like;
there is no reason, but that they may be left to the pleasure of each distinct
government: though at the same time particular states ought to manage their
privileges as that they shall cause no disturbance in the general union ....
.... Whence it is evident, that one or more of the allies cannot be hindered by
the rest, from exercising, according to their own judgment, such parts of the
civil administration, as are not in the compact of union, referred to the
common direction.[55] And this, with the exception of commercial
treaties (which, for very cogent reasons, were by the common consent
surrendered by the respective states, to the general confederacy,) may be
considered as sketching the general outline of the American union.Since, in these systems, it is necessary that there should be a
communication of certain affairs expressed in the compact of union; and since
this cannot be conveniently done by letters; and since, even where this could
be done, delays might be attended with great prejudice, or inconvenience to the
confederacy, a determinate time and place ought to be settled for the holding
assemblies and one or more persons appointed, who shall have power to call the
states together, in case of any extraordinary business, which will not admit of
delay. Though it seems a much more compendious method to fix a standing
council, made up of persons deputed by the several confederates, who shall
dispatch business according to the tenor of their commission; and, to whom the
ministers of the confederacy in foreign parts, shall give an immediate account
of their proceedings, and who shall treat with the ambassadors of other
nations, and conclude business in the general name of the confederates; but
shall determine nothing that exceeds the bounds of their commission. How far
the power of this council of delegates extends, is to be gathered from the
words of the compact itself, or from the warrant under which they act. This is
certain; that the power whatever it be, is not their own, but derived to them
from those whom they represent; and although the decrees, which they publish,
pass solely under their own name, yet the whole force and authority of them
flows from the states, themselves, by whose consent such a council hath been
erected: so that the deputies are no more than ministers of the confederate
states, and are altogether as unable to enjoin any thing by their own proper
authority, as an ambassador is to command and govern his
master.[56]
SECTION XIII.The dissolution of these systems happens, when all the confederates by
mutual consent, or some of them, voluntarily abandon the confederacy, and
govern their own states apart, or a part of them form a different league and
confederacy among each other, and withdraw themselves from the confederacy with
the rest. Such was the proceeding on the part of those of the American states
which first adopted the present constitution of the United States, and
established a form of federal government, essentially different from that which
was first established by the articles of confederation, leaving the states of
Rhode Island and North Carolina, both of which, at first, rejected the new
constitution, to themselves. This was an evident breach of that article of the
confederation,[57] which stipulated that those "articles should be
inviolably observed by every state, and that the union should be perpetual; nor
should any alteration at any time thereafter be made in any of them, unless
such alteration be agreed to in the congress of the United States, and be
afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state." Yet the seceding
states, as they may be not improperly termed, did not hesitate, as soon as nine
states had ratified the new constitution, to supersede the former federal
government, and establish a new form, more consonant to their opinion of what
was necessary to the preservation and prosperity of the federal union. But
although by this act the seceding states subverted the former federal
government, yet the obligations of the articles of confederacy as a treaty of
perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, between all the parties thereto,
no doubt remained; and if North Carolina and Rhode Island had never acceded to
the new form of government, that circumstance, I conceive, could never have
lessened the obligation upon the other states to perform those stipulations on
their parts which the states, who were unwilling to change the form of the
federal government, had by virtue of those articles a right to demand and
insist upon. For the inadequacy of the form of government established by those
articles could not be charged upon one state more than another, nor had North
Carolina or Rhode Island committed any breach of them; the seceding states
therefore had no cause of complaint against them. On the contrary, these states
being still willing to adhere to the terms of the confederacy, had the right of
complaining, if there could be any right to complain of the conduct of states
endeavouring to meliorate their own condition, by establishing a different form
of government. But the seceding states were certainly justified upon that
principle; and from the duty which every state is acknowledged to owe to
itself, and its own citizens, by doing whatsoever may best contribute to
advance its own happiness and prosperity; and much more, what may be necessary
to the preservation of its existence as a state.[58] Nor must we
forget that solemn declaration to which everyone of the confederate states
assented[59] .... that whenever any form of government is
destructive of the ends of its institution, it is the right of the people to
alter or abolish it, and to institute new government. Consequently whenever the
people of any state, or number of states, discovered the inadequacy of the
first form of federal government to promote or preserve their independence,
happiness, and union, they only exerted that natural right in rejecting it, and
adopting another, which all had unanimously assented to, and of which no force
or compact can deprive the people of any state, whenever they see the
necessity, and possess the power to do it. And since the seceding states, by
establishing a new constitution and form of federal government among
themselves, without the consent of the rest, have shewn that they consider the
right to do so whenever the occasion may, in their opinion, require it, as
unquestionable; we may infer that that right has not been diminished by any new
compact which they may since have entered into, since none could be more solemn
or explicit than the first, nor more binding upon the contracting parties.
Their obligation, therefore, to preserve the present constitution, is not
greater than their former obligations were, to adhere to the articles of the
confederation; each state possessing the same right of withdrawing itself from
the confederacy without the consent of the rest, as any number of them do, or
ever did, possess. Prudence, indeed, will dictate, that governments established
by compact should not be changed for light or transient causes; but should a
evince a design in any one of the confederates to usurp a dominion over the
rest; or, if those who are entrusted to administer the government, which the
confederates have for their mutual convenience established, should manifest a
design to invade their sovereignty, and extend their own power beyond the terms
of compact, to the detriment of the states respectively, and to reduce them to
a state of obedience, and finally to establish themselves in a state of
permanent superiority, it then becomes not only the right, but the duty of the
states respectively, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards
for their future security.[60] To deny this, would be to deny to
sovereign independent states, the power which, as colonies, and dependent
territories, they have mutually agreed they had a right to exercise, and did
actually exercise, when they shook off the government of England, first, and
adopted the present constitution of the United States, in the second
instance.Another case from which a dissolution of these confederacies may follow,
may be, where from any accident, or want of concert among the confederate
states, the legislative or executive authority of the federal government may
happen to be suspended, so as that no legislature or executive magistrate can,
for a long space of time, succeed to and exercise the functions of the former.
As if a majority of the states should refuse any longer to chuse
representatives, or to supply the vacancies in the senate, in either of these
cases it would seem that the legislature would be destroyed; on the other hand,
if it should happen that no president should be chosen at the period when a
president ought to be elected, here there would be a suspension both of the
legislature and the executive, inasmuch as the president is an essential
constituent part of the legislative body, since all bills, before they become
law, must be submitted to him for his approbation. Now whenever the
administration of any government is wholly suspended, a dissolution of the
government follows of course; for, as Mr. Locke observes, whenever there is no
remaining power[61] within the community to direct the public force,
or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government
left; where laws cannot be executed at all, it is all one as if there were no
laws. And if this be a sufficient reason for the dissolution of civil
government, the reason is much stronger why it should amount to a dissolution
of a federal government; whose existence is infinitely of less
consequence, than the former. Civil society, and civil government its cement
and support, may well subsist without the aid of federal government, but they
are so intimately blended, with each other, that civil society is in danger,
the moment that civil government is exposed to hazard: it may, indeed, survive
for a little time; as the pulsations of the heart are known to continue after
every other vital function is suspended; but if they be not speedily restored,
the whole animal frame perishes together.Intestine wars are another cause which must necessarily break these
unions, unless upon the establishment of peace, the league be also revived. A
man must be far gone in Utopian speculations, says the author of the
Federalist,[62] who can seriously doubt, that if the American States
should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the
subdivisions into which they might be thrown, would have frequent and violent
contests with each other. And as the prevention of such contests, was among the
most cogent reasons to induce the adoption of the union, so ought it to be
among the most powerful, to prevent a dissolution of it.Conquest, where the conqueror happens to possess himself of one or two,
or more of the confederate states, is another mode by which these confederacies
may be dissolved; for the conqueror in this case, acquires no manner of right
over those states that remain, nor can he demand to be admitted into the
confederacy, by virtue of the league which engaged the conquered states to the
others, for, says Puffendorf,[63] the alliance must always be
presumed to expire, when any one people are brought under a foreign yoke, or
are made an accession of another kingdom; because the league being made between
free states, considered in that capacity, whenever this condition fails, the
league must fail with it. But the American confederacy did not act upon these
principles, when the states of Georgia and South Carolina were actually
conquered by the British arms, and the British government was re-established in
them. The rest of the confederates did not abandon them in this situation, but
continued the contest until Great Britain agreed to acknowledge those states,
as well as the rest of their confederates, free and independent states. An
example which I trust the members of that confederacy will hold in reverence
for ever, even, though the guarantee of a republican form of government
contained in the present federal constitution should be wholly forgotten.On the other hand, these systems do more closely unite, and are
incorporated into the same civil state, either, if all the confederates, by a
voluntary submission, incorporate themselves together, under the entire rule
and government of some one person, or council, in all things; as in the union
between England and Scotland before mentioned: or if some one state, which hath
the advantage of strength and power, reduces the rest to the condition of
dependent provinces. And lastly, if some particular man invade the sovereign
command, through the favor of the soldiers, the esteem of the commonalty, or
the strength of a prevailing faction.[64] From which last source
more danger may be apprehended to the American Confederacy, than from all the
SECTION XIV.Having in the preceding section considered the several modes by which a
system, or confederacy of states may be dissolved. I shall add a few words only
concerning the dissolution of civil government, which, according to Mr.
Locke,[65] and other writers, may happen either by conquest, and
tearing up the roots of society at once, or by the public functionaries who are
entrusted with the administration of the government, abusing, or betraying
their trusts, and instead of consulting the happiness of the people,
endeavouring to establish a model and form of government different from that
which they have been entrusted to administer. All which may be summed up in the
words of the American declaration of independence, "that whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of those ends for which it is instituted, is is
the right of the people to alter, or to abolish it, and to institute new
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their happiness and
safety. Prudence indeed will dictate that governments long established, should
not be changed for light, or transient causes. But when a long train of abuses
security.I shall now proceed to offer to the student a view of the constitution
of the commonwealth of Virginia, after which I shall go on to consider that of
the United States, from which a more correct view will be obtained of the
nature of the American governments, in general, than could be given in a
general essay upon the nature of the several kinds of government.
[1] Vattel B. 1. c. 1.[2] See Rousseau's Social Compact.[3] 1. Blacks Com. 49.[4] "Power in the people," says Mr. Burgh, "is like light in the sun,
native, original, inherent, and unlimited, by any thing human. In government it
may be compared to the reflected light of the moon; for it is only borrowed,
delegated and limited by the intention of the people, whose it is, and to whom
governors are to consider themselves as responsible, while the people are
responsible only to GOD, themselves being the losers, if they pursue a false
scheme of politics." Political Disquisitions, vol 1. c. 2.[5] Paine's Rights of Man, part X. p. 42. Albany Edition.[6] Hutchinson's Mor. Phil. vol. 2. 221.[7] Ibid. 226. 227. [8] Ibid. 232.[9] Declaration of American Independence.[10] 1. Vol. 48.[11] Page 40. Albany Edition.[12] Mackintosh on the French Revolution, pa. 115, 3d London
edition.[13] Vattel, B. 1. c. 3. §. 27.[14] Page 42. Albany Edition.[15] What (says Judge Patterson, 2. Dallas, 308.) is a constitution? It
is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people in which
certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution
is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the
supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the legislature, and
can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it. The life-giving
principle and the death-doing stroke must proceed from the same hand. What are
legislatures? Creatures of the constitutions: They derive their power from the
constitution: It is their commission, and therefore all their acts must be
conformable thereto, or they will be void. The constitution is the work or will
of the people themselves, in their original sovereign, and unlimited capacity.
Law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivation and subordinate
capacity. The one is the work of the Creator, the other of the creature. The
constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and
prescribes the orbit within which it must move. In short the constitution is
the sun of the political system, around which all legislative, executive, and
judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet
in this there can be no doubt, that every act of the legislature, repugnant to
the constitution is absolutely void.[16] Page 139.[17] It has been said, that to call a government "a representative
democracy, is a contradiction in terms, and as improper as to call it a
democratic aristocracy." .... Swift's Laws of Connecticut, vol. 1, 21 .... With
all deference to this opinion, I would ask, whom do these representatives
represent? If they represent themselves, only, then I grant the government is
not a representative democracy, but an elective oligarchy, or if you please, a
democratic aristocracy: in which the people have indeed no power but to "chuse
their rulers.".... But if these representatives represent their constituents,
that is, the people; then is their authority not their own, but the authority
of the people; and a government administered either directly or indirectly by
the authority of the people is a democracy, as is agreed on all hands: if
administered by the people themselves, then is it a simple democracy; but if
the people appoint some few from among themselves to represent them, then I
conceive such a government play, with the strictest propriety, be called a
representative democracy.[18] Travels of Anacharsis. vol. 2. c. 14.[19] Robertson's History of Greece.[20] Travels into Italy.[21] P. 186. 187. 188 Phila. Edi.[22] B. 8. c. 5.[23] Spirit of Laws. B. 3. c. 9. 10. B. 5. c. 14.[24] B. 2. c. 4.[25] St. Estienne.[26] Hutch. Moral Phil. vol. 2. 244.[27] See 1 Black. Com. p. 308.[28] Hutch. Mor. Phil. vol. 2. 258.[29] Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1. 51.[30] Mackintosh's Defence of the French Revolution, pa. 264. [31] Ibid. 337. [32] "It was reckoned, there were 232 members of the first parliament of
George the first who had places, pensions, or titles: besides a great many
brothers, and heirs apparent, of the nobility, or persons otherwise likely to
be under undue influence; the number of which was not below fifty, which added
together makes 282. A frightful majority," says Mr. Burgh, "on the side of the
court. And there is no reason, he adds, to suppose the Augean stable is
generally clearer now, than it was then." Pol. Disq. vol. 2. 44.[33] Blacks. Com. vol. 1. 51. [34] Of Parliaments, 49. [35] Davenant .... 11. 300. (quoted in Burgh's Pol. Disq. vol. 3.
4.)[36] T. T. T. formerly a delegate in congress from South Carolina, and
after wards a member of the house of representatives in congress, from the same
state.[37] Hutcheson's Moral Phil. vol. 2. 239. Vattel. B. 1. c. 1. §
4. [38] Ibid. Vattel. Ib. § 10. [39] Ibid.[40] By the act of union, 5 Ann. c. 8. it is declared that the kingdoms
of England and Scotland shall be united into one kingdom by the name of Great
Britain: That the united kingdom shall be represented by one parliament: That
the succession to the monarchy of G. B. shall be the same as was before settled
with regard to England. The laws relating to trade, customs, and excise, shall
be the same in Scotland, as in England. But all the other laws of Scotland
shall remain in force but alterable by the parliament of Great Britain .... v.
1. Black. Com. 96.[41] Burlamaqui B. 2. part 2. c. 1. §. 40. 44.[42] See Black. Com. vol. 1. p. 96. 97. and 98. in notes.[43] Burgh's Pol. Disq. B. 1. c. 4.[44] Guthrie's Geography, article Netherlands.[45] B. 9. c. 13.[46] Puffendorf's L. n. & b. B. 7. c. 5.[47] Ibid. B. 7. c. 5.[48] Articles of confederation and perpetual union between the United
States of America, Art. 6.[49] Ibidem, Art. 2.[50] Puffendorf, B. 7. c. 5.[51] Puffendorf B. 7. c. 5.[52] Ibidem, in notis.[53] C.U.S. Art. 4. & 2. [54] Puffendorf, B. 7. c. 5[55] Puffendorf, B. 7. c. 5.[56] Puffendorf, B. 7. c. 5.[57] Article 13.[58] See Vattel, B. 1. c. 2. and the other writers on government,
generally. [59] Declaration of Independence.[60] Declaration of Independence.[61] On civil government. c. 19.[62] Federalist No. 6.[63] B. 7. c. 5. [64] Ibid.[65] On civil government. c. 19. a work with which every American ought
to be perfectly acquainted.