Source: https://m.openjurist.org/511/f2d/710
Timestamp: 2020-02-17 23:09:22
Document Index: 300614837

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 1441', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 1291', 'art, 93', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 185']

511 F2d 710 Aerojet-General Corporation v. Askew | OpenJurist
511 F. 2d 710 - Aerojet-General Corporation v. Askew
511 F2d 710 Aerojet-General Corporation v. Askew
511 F.2d 710
AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Reubin O'Donovan ASKEW, Governor of State of Florida, et
Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, et al., including its
Board of CountyCommissioners and Stuart Simon, its
County Attorney, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 74--1192.
Denied May 30, 1975.
Important questions concerning the doctrine of res judicata and the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution are presented in this much-litigated dispute over title to a large tract of land in Dade County, Florida. The judgment appealed from is the result of two lawsuits. Aerojet-General Corporation brought an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (a Florida state agency), and the Board of Education of the State of Florida, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent defendants from instituting prosecuting suits in Florida state courts to deny Aerojet's title to the land involved. Jurisdiction was asserted on the basis of diversity of citizenship and the existence of a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The second suit was filed by Metropolitan Dade County against Aerojet-General Corporation in a Florida state district court to quiet title to the subject land. It was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida by Aerojet on allegations of diversity of citizenship and existence of a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Subsequently the case was transferred to the Northern District. The suits were then consolidated and reciprocal motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties, there being no dispute as to the material facts. The District Court rendered judgment in favor of Aerojet, confirming its title to the land involved. 366 F.Supp. 901 (1973). Only Dade County has appealed. We affirm.
I. Background of the Present Appeal
Aerojet then brought a diversity suit against the Trustees and the Board of Education in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking specific performance of the option agreement to purchase the land. The principal defense was failure of consideration in that Aerojet's manufacturing plant built on the land involved was not in full operation but was in inactive status due to the current slowdown in solid fuel rocket development. The defendant state boards did not, however, raise as a defense their obligation to the counties under the 1965 Florida statute (F.S.A. § 253.111) in disposing of state lands. On September 21, 1970, the District Court granted Aerojet's motion for summary judgment, Aerojet-General Corporation v. Kirk, N.D.Fla., 1970, 318 F.Supp. 55, and ordered the defendants to convey the land to Aerojet. The defendant state boards appealed, and we affirmed the judgment of the District Court on December 9, 1971. 5 Cir., 453 F.2d 819, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892, 93 S.Ct. 110, 34 L.Ed.2d 149 (1972).
On November 21, 1973, the District Court rendered its decision in favor of Aerojet. Aerojet-General Corporation v. Askew, N.D.Fla., 1973, 366 F.Supp. 901. The Court held that F.S.A. § 253.111 unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contract as applied to Aerojet's contract, and that under the doctrine of res judicata the original federal court judgment of September 21, 1970 barred all the defendants from asserting the provisions of F.S.A. § 253.111 as a defense to Aerojet's action to effectuate the prior judgment.
A. Choice of Law: Federal or State
Federal law clearly governs the question whether a prior federal court judgment based on federal question jurisdiction is res judicata in a case also brought, as this one was, under federal question jurisdiction. We believe the same result obtains where, as in this case, the first suit was brought only under diversity jurisdiction. The federal doctrine of res judicata bars relitigating any part of the cause of action in question, including all claims and defenses that were actually raised or could have been raised.4 The forum state's law may be narrower than federal law on the scope of the cause of action deemed to be adjudicated for purposes of res judicata. In cases where both state law issues and federal questions are presented, if the narrower state law were applicable a party could split his cause of action and thus circumvent the federal law of res judicata, simply by not pleading his federal claim or defense. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940). In any subsequent federal court litigation, the prior case would appear to have been based only on diversity jurisdiction if the pleadings alone were considered. Looking beyond the pleadings to what could have been pleaded, however, is precisely what is required by the federal law of res judicata, and precisely what was called for in this case. The state boards could have pleaded a defense that would have brought a federal question directly into the case: their alleged obligation to Dade County under F.S.A. § 253.111.5 The fact that only questions of state law were actually pleaded and litigated in the prior federal court case cannot justify such frustration of the federal law of res judicata.
In Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947), the Court held that state law governs whether a state court judgment is res judicata in a subsequent federal diversity case. The Court noted, however, that 'where resort is had to a federal court not on grounds of diversity of citizenship but because a federal right is claimed, the limitations upon the courts of a State do not control a federal court sitting in the State.' 330 U.S. at 192, 67 S.Ct. at 662. See Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International U. of Op. Eng., 10 Cir., 1971, 439 F.2d 300, 307; Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 2 Cir., 1970, 429 F.2d 1136, 1144 n. 14; Williams v. Ocean Transport Lines, Inc., 3 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 1183, 1187--1190. The same reasoning must apply where the prior case is not brought in a state court but rather in a federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
A second reason for applying federal law under these circumstances is that several procedural elements of federal practice affect the doctrine of res judicata. For example, federal law on finality of judgments, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1971), and compulsory counterclaims, Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a), is often determinative of pleas of res judicata. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a); La Societe Anonyme des Parfums LeGalion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 2 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 1265, 1275. We see no persuasive reason to look to state law for some elements of res judicata, such as the scope of the cause of action or similarity of the parties, in light of the prominent influence of federal law on other elements of the doctrine. To do so would sacrifice the uniformity of the law which federal courts must apply. See generally, United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., E.D.Wash., 1962, 216 F.Supp. 709, 718--721, aff'd sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 9 Cir., 1964, 335 F.2d 379, 404; Hughes v. Dundee Mortgage & Trust Investment Co., D.Or., 1886, 28 F. 47; 1B Moore's Federal Practice 0.410(1).
We are aware of the importance of honoring the obligation to follow substantive law in diversity cases,9 but as the Supreme Court has stated in a similar context, 'there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work here. The federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction.' Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537, 78 S.Ct. 893, 901, 23 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958). In this lawsuit, whether considered as a federal question case or a diversity case, we believe such considerations are present.
1. Scope of the cause of action. Under the federal law of res judicata a party must raise all claims that are a part of or a defense to the cause of action under adjudication. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378, 60 S.Ct. 317, 320, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940); Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321, 47 S.Ct. 600, 602, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927); Southwest E & T Suppliers, Inc. v. American Enca Corp., 5 Cir., 1972, 463 F.2d 1165, 1167; see Wasoff v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 5 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 767, 769 & n. 8; Astron Industrial Associates Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 5 Cir., 1968,405 F.2d 958, 961--962; Acree v. Air Line Pilots Association, 5 Cir., 1968,390 F.2d 199, 203; Norman Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 5 Cir., 1961, 295 F.2d 362, 363--364; 1B Moore's Federal Practice 0.401, at 12--13. Our most recent discussion of the tests for determining whether the substance of two actions is the same for res judicata purposes appears in the Astron case, supra:
Under the federal law of res judicata, a person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative. See Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 618, 46 S.Ct. 420, 423, 70 L.Ed. 757 (1926); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445--446, 32 S.Ct. 424, 434--435, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912); Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U.S. 155, 160, 23 L.Ed. 843, 845 (1876); Dudley v. Smith, 5 Cir., 1974, 504 F.2d 979, 982; Astron Industrial Associates, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 5 Cir., 1968, 405 F.2d 958, 961; Kreager v. General Electric Company, 2 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 468, 472; Pan American Match, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 1 Cir., 1972, 454 F.2d 871, 874; Robison v. Sidebotham, 9 Cir., 1957, 243 F.2d 16, 21; Jamison v. Garrett, 1953, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 205 F.2d 15, 16; United States v. City of Philadelphia, 3 Cir., 1944, 140 F.2d 406, 408; United States v. Des Noines Valley R. Co., 8 Cir., 1897, 84 F. 40. Cf. Spokane & I.E.R. Co. v. Whitley, 237 U.S. 487, 35 S.Ct. 655, 59 L.Ed. 1060 (1915); Troxell v. Delaware L. & W.R. Co., 227 U.S. 434, 33 S.Ct. 274, 57 L.Ed. 586 (1913). Dade County asserts that it was in the state boards' best interest to keep the land, rather than convey it to either Aerojet or the County, and therefore it would have been against their interests to raise F.S.A. § 253.111 as a defense to Aerojet's specific performance suit. Assuming this assertion to be true, we nevertheless believe the interests of the state boards and the County were closely aligned.
The question whether a party's interests in a case are virtually representative of the interests of a nonparty is one of fact for the trial court. See Astron Industrial Associates, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 5 Cir., 1968, 405 F.2d 958, 961. We find no reason to overturn the District Court's determination that Dade County 'was in such close relationship to the parties to the first lawsuit before this Court, that its interests or the interests of those which it represents, were represented in that proceeding.' 366 F.Supp. at 910.
A. The Judgment of the Florida State Court
The writ of mandamus issued by the Supreme Court of Florida in favor of Dade County against the state boards rested explicitly upon the conclusion that the contract between Aerojet and the state boards was intended to permit modification by subsequent statute, such as F.S.A. § 253.111. The Florida state court judgment, like any judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, is entitled to a presumption of regularity. See Webster v. Estelle, 5 Cir., 1974, 505 F.2d 926, 928. The presumption, however, can be overcome by evidence that the judgment is the product of a nonadversary proceeding. In Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 49 U.S. 251, 255--256, 12 L.Ed. 1067, 1069 (1850), the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from a circuit court because
See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 63 S.Ct. 1075, 87 L.Ed. 1413 (1943); Chicago & G.T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 12 S.Ct. 400, 36 L.Ed. 176 (1892); Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 66 U.S. 419, 17 L.Ed. 93 (1862); Waialua Agr. Co. v. Maneja, 9 Cir., 1949, 178 F.2d 603.
Federal courts have declined to follow nonadversary decisions of state courts as well as federal courts. In federal taxation cases the federal courts have not considered themselves bound by collusive state court judgments--'collusive in the sense that all the parties joined in a submission of the issues and sought a decision which would adversely affect the Government's right to additional income tax.' Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45, 54 S.Ct. 308, 312, 78 L.Ed. 634 (1934). See Stallworth's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 5 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 760, 763; Saulsbury v. United States, 5 Cir., 1952, 199 F.2d 578, 580; In re Estate of Abely, 1 Cir., 1974, 489 F.2d 1327, 1328; Pierpont v. C.I.R., 4 Cir., 1964, 336 F.2d 277, 281; Peyton's Estate v. C.I.R., 8 Cir., 1963, 323 F.2d 438, 443--444; Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 7 Cir., 1962, 301 F.2d 231, 232; M. T. Straight's Trust v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 8 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 327, 329; Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 7 Cir., 1957, 246 F.2d 410, 418; In re Sweet's Estate, 10 Cir., 1956, 234 F.2d 401, 404; Wolfsen v. Smyth, 9 Cir., 1955, 223 F.2d 111, 113--114. Cf. United States v. Farish, 5 Cir., 1966, 360 F.2d 595, 596; Flitcroft v. C.I.R., 9 Cir., 1964, 328 F.2d 449, 454; Darlington's Estate v. C.I.R., 3 Cir., 1962, 302 F.2d 693, 694--695; Pitts v. Hamrick, 4 Cir., 1955, 228 F.2d 486, 491; Callagher v. Smith, 3 Cir., 1955, 223 F.2d 218, 224; Eisenmenger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8 Cir., 1944, 145 F.2d 103, 107; Nashville Trust Co. v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 1943, 136 F.2d 148, 150--151; 151; Bullard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 Cir., 1937, 90 F.2d 144, 147.11 See contra, C.I.R. v. Estate of Bosch, 2 Cir., 1966, 363 F.2d 1009.
In United States v. Harrison County, Mississippi, 5 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 485, we declined to give effect to a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court concerning title to disputed lands, in part because the decision was in apparent conflict with the Mississippi Constitution. This Court stated, 'We assume that this provision was not called to the attention of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, as it is not discussed in the opinion.' 399 F.2d at 491. If the absence of any discussion concerning an issue in a case is grounds for declining to follow a state court judgment, the lack of an adversary relationship between the parties is also grounds. See Gilmore v. Greene County Democratic Party Exec. Com., 5 Cir., 1966, 370 F.2d 919, 920; Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 5 Cir., 1944, 141 F.2d 348, on remand from 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943).
1. Inapplicability of the Erie doctrine. Irrespective of the nonadversary nature of the state court proceeding, the meaning of the contract between Aerojet and the Trustees is not controlled by state law, because a violation of the Contract Clause has been alleged, and 'the existence of the contract and the nature and extent of its obligation become federal questions . . .' Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 561, 62 S.Ct. 398, 401, 86 L.Ed. 452 (1942). See State v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28--29, 71 S.Ct. 557, 560--561, 95 L.Ed. 713 (1951); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 170, 67 S.Ct. 1584, 1585, 91 L.Ed. 1977 (1947); Higginbotham v. City of Baton Rouge, La., 306 U.S. 535, 538--539, 59 S.Ct. 705, 706, 83 L.Ed. 968 (1939); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441, 51 S.Ct. 435, 436, 76 L.Ed. 866 (1932); Larson v. State of South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 433, 49 S.Ct. 196, 197, 73 L.Ed. 441 (1929); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 379--380, 46 S.Ct. 569, 573, 70 L.Ed. 992 (1926); Cone v. Rorick, 5 Cir., 1940, 112 F.2d 894, 897; Florida Power & Light Co. v. City of Miami, 5 Cir., 1938, 98 F.2d 180, 181.13
Florida Power Corporation v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671, 674 (1944); see Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137, 1 S.Ct. 102, 112, 27 L.Ed. 104 (1882) ('The parties (to a contract) cannot be presumed to have contemplated a law which would defeat their engagements.'); Insurance Company of North America v. Stevens, 5 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 704, 705; Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Craton, 5 Cir., 1968, 405 F.2d 41, 47--48; Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Atlantic National Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 1967, 374 F.2d 601, 605. It would be unreasonable to hold that a party would give valuable consideration for an option to purchase which could be nullified at will by the state legislature.
C. Interpretation of F.S.A. § 253.111
2. The Contract Clause issue. Our belief in the correctness of our interpretation of F.S.A. § 253.111 is reinforced by the certainty that if the statute were construed to apply to Aerojet's contract it would violate Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, which declares that no state shall pass any 'Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.' See Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 369, 61 S.Ct. 983, 986, 85 L.Ed. 1404 (1941); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 382--397, 46 S.Ct. 569, 574--579, 70 L.Ed. 992 (1926); McGuire v. Sadler, 5 Cir., 1964, 337 F.2d 902, 905--906. Any other interpretation would clearly violate the Contract Clause and require us to hold the statute unconstitutional as applied in the circumstances here.
Responsibility for raising the constitutional issue--whether F.S.A. § 253.111 violates the Contract Clause--clearly lay with the defendant Trustees in the first federal case, rather than with Aerojet. Indeed Aerojet could not have raised the issue. The Florida statute was a potential defense of the Trustees to the specific performance action and could not have been pleaded in Aerojet's complaint. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908)
The very purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction is to avoid bias against parties from outside the forum state. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, at 111, 65 S.Ct. 1464, at 1471, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, at 74, 58 S.Ct. 817, at 820, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347, 4 L.Ed. 97, 108 (1816); The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 61, 87, 3 L.Ed. 38, 45 (1809). To permit Dade County to nullify a prior federal court judgment rendered in favor of Aerojet, an out-of-state party, through subsequent state court action would fly in the face of that purpose
See In re Air Crash Disaster, Dayton, Ohio, On March 9, 1967, S.D.Ohio, 1972, 350 F.Supp. 757, 762--764; Hassenplug v. Victor Lynn Lines, E.D.Pa., 1947, 71 F.Supp. 70, aff'd 3 Cir., 1947, 163 F.2d 828; Moore's Federal Practice 0.316(6). Contra Blum v. William Goldman Theaters, 3 Cir., 1949, 174 F.2d 914; Hartmann v. Time, 3 Cir., 1948, 166 F.2d 127. Despite occasional dicta suggesting that state law may govern res judicata in diversity cases, the only cases that have so held are Blum and Hartmann, supra. See Murphy v. Landsburg, 3 Cir., 1973, 490 F.2d 319, 322 n. 4; Provident Tradesmens B & T Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 3 Cir., 1969, 411 F.2d 88, 94; Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, 3 Cir., 1955, 224 F.2d 644. Those cases contain virtually no discussion of the choice of law problem, and we decline to follow them. Cf. 19 A.L.R.Fed. 709
Breeland v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 5 Cir., 1969, 421 F.2d 918, cited by the County, and Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 2 Cir., 1965, 346 F.2d 532, are inapposite. Those cases concerned collateral estoppel--in Breeland the collateral effect of a criminal conviction--rather than res judicata. See James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 5 Cir., 1971, 444 F.2d 451, 461 & n. 9; Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana v. Jernigan, 5 Cir., 1969, 410 F.2d 718, 725--728; St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Lack, 4 Cir., 1973, 476 F.2d 583, 585--586; Ritchie v. Landau, 2 Cir., 1973, 475 F.2d 151, 154; Greenberg v. Mobil Oil Corporation, N.D.Tex., 1970, 318 F.Supp. 1025, 1032. Moreover in Berner the court found plausible rationales for applying state or federal law, but did not reach the issue in rendering its decision. The application of state law on collateral estoppel cannot nullify a federal court judgment. That doctrine affects only the ancillary consequences of such judgments.
As we noted earlier, see footnote 6 supra, avoiding state court bias is a major purpose of diversity jurisdiction and an important reason for applying federal law to determine whether a prior federal court diversity judgment is res judicata in a subsequent diversity case. It should be noted that our holding accomplishes that purpose without intruding into the legitimate domain of state law under the Erie doctrine. Where a federal court judgment based on diversity jurisdiction is pleaded as res judicata in state court, the danger of state court bias causing untoward effects on the integrity of federal court judgments is minimal. If bias were a problem one party or the other would have filed the suit in federal court or removed it there. Accordingly, state law has been held to govern whether a federal court diversity judgment is res judicata in a subsequent state court action. See Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 22 L.Ed. 588 (1875); Crescent City, Etc., Co. v. Butchers' Union, Etc., Co., 120 U.S. 141, 7 S.Ct. 472, 30 L.Ed. 614 (1887). Where a state court judgment is pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent federal court diversity action, applying state law is also appropriate. propriate. There is little chance of bias against any of the parties or their privies, since the first case has gone to judgment in a state court, rather than being brought in, or removed to, federal court. The federal courts have uniformly applied state law under these circumstances. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4, 8, 60 S.Ct. 215, 217, 84 L.Ed. 447 (1940); Wright v. Georgia R. & B. Co., 216 U.S. 420, 429, 30 S.Ct. 242, 245, 54 L.Ed. 544 (1910); Lynn Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 3 Cir., 1972, 453 F.2d 1177, 1182--1184; Anderson v. Moorer, 5 Cir., 1967, 372 F.2d 747, 751--752; Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 4 Cir., 1965, 344 F.2d 894, 896; Gedeon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 3 Cir., 1965, 342 F.2d 15, 17; Gramm v. Lincoln, 9 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 250, 255 n. 6; Standard Acc. Inc. Co. v. Doiron, 1 Cir., 1948, 170 F.2d 206, 208. Cf. Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Company, 4 Cir., 1967, 380 F.2d 69, 79 (federal law applies to determine whether a prior state court judgment is res judicata in a federal court suit under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (LMRDA))
Except for the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in the mandamus suit brought by Dade County against the Trustees, the Florida law of res judicata on the scope of the cause of action and the doctrine of virtual representation is the same as the federal law. See Hinchee v. Fisher, Fla., 1957, 93 So.2d 351, 353; Gordon v. Gordon, Fla., 1952, 59 So.2d 40, 43--44; Wolfson v. Rubin, Fla., 1951, 52 So.2d 344, 346; Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., Fla., 1950, 46 So.2d 26, 30; Lockhart v. Dade County, Fla., 1946, 25 So.2d 646, 647 (scope of cause of action); City of New Port Richey v. State, Fla., 1962, 145 So.2d 903, 905--906; Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., supra, 46 So.2d at 30; Sauls v. Freeman, Fla., 1888, 24 Fla. 209, 4 So. 525 (identity of parties). Though the District Court should have applied federal law, there is no need to remand. The state court mandamus decision and our reasons for not following it are discussed fully in section III, infra