Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/326/446
Timestamp: 2019-10-20 03:13:07
Document Index: 529808951

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 228', '§ 10', '§ 1', '§ 11', '§ 351', '§ 5', '§ 1', '§ 5', '§ 151', '§ 1']

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD et al. v. DUQUESNE WAREHOUSE CO. DUQUESNE WAREHOUSE CO. v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD et al. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
326 U.S. 446 (66 S.Ct. 238, 90 L.Ed. 192)
Argued: Nov. 1945.
The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 307, 45 U.S.C. 228a et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. § 228a et seq., established a system of annuity, pension, and death benefits for employees of designated classes of employers. The Railroad Retirement Board adjudicates claims of eligible employees for the various types of benefits created by the Act. § 10(b). The eligibility of an employee for such benefits is based on service to those included in the Act's definition of 'employer.' § 1(a). The question arose whether the Duquesne Warehouse Co. was such an 'employer.' The Board after a hearing found in No. 95 that it was. Duquesne, pursuant to the provisions of § 11 of the Act, brought suit in a district court to compel the Board to set aside its order. 1 That court rendered judgment for Duquesne. 56 F.Supp. 87. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, by a divided vote. 148 F.2d 473.
The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1094, 45 U.S.C. 351 et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. § 351 et seq., established a system of unemployment insurance for employees of designated classes of employers. The Railroad Retirement Board adjudicates claims of eligible employees for unemployment insurance payments. § 5(b). The eligibility of an employee for such payments is based on service to those included in the Act's definition of 'employer.' § 1(a). The question arose whether Duquesne was such an 'employer.' The Board after a hearing found in No. 103 that it was. The findings were identical to those which the Board made in No. 95 and were based on the same record. Duquesne, pursuant to § 5(f) brought suit in the district court for the District of Columbia to set aside that order. That court gave judgment for Duquesne. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. 149 F.2d 507. Since the definition of 'employer' under both Acts was the same, there was presented a conflict in decisions which led us to grant the petitions for writs of certiorari.
Duquesne operates two warehouses owned and leased to it by the Pennsylvania, one in Pittsburgh and the other in East Liberty, within the Pittsburgh city limits. Each warehouse is on a rail siding of the Pennsylvania. At East Liberty, Duquesne handles and stores carload sugar, all of which comes in and goes out over the Pennsylvania. The sugar is handled by Duquesne under so-called storage-in-transit privileges covered by tariffs filed by the Pennsylvania with the Interstate Commerce Commission. 2 Duquesne unloads the sugar from the Pennsylvania's cars on arrival and reloads the sugar into Pennsylvania cars on their departure. By the tariff the owners are required to do the loading and unloading. The work of unloading and loading is performed for the owner by Duquesne, who bills the owner for that service as well as for storage and other services rendered. At its Pittsburgh warehouse Duquesne handles freight which has come in, or is destined to movement, over the Pennsylvania, or which has both come in and is going out over the Pennsylvania. The commodities handled at that place are hauled in both carload and less-than-carload lots. Duquesne loads and unloads the carload shipments as they arrive at and depart from its platform, stores the goods, and performs other handling services in connection with their receipt and delivery. Duquesne charges the owner for these services. In the case of incoming less-than-carload shipments the freight is unloaded by the Pennsylvania from the cars to its platform and is delivered to and received by Duquesne there. In the case of outgoing less-than-carload shipments, Duquesne delivers the freight on the Pennsylvania's platform. Pennsylvania then issues its bill of lading, loads the freight into cars, and moves them out. During a part of the period relevant here, 3 Duquesne also performed unloading, storing and reloading services and certain other transit services at Erie, Pennsylvania, in connection with carload shipments of newsprint paper which were entitled to storage-in-transit privileges under the tariffs. These services were similar to those performed by Duquesne at East Liberty. 4
It appears that the definition of 'employer' in the present Acts derives without substantial change from the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. 151, First, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151, First. 5 We are referred to the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act which was sponsored by Mr. Eastman, Federal Co-ordinator of Transportation. Reliance is made on his testimony at the hearings 6 as indicating that the words in the carrier definition in the Railway Labor Act descriptive of transportation service were taken from the Interstate Commerce Act, 7 41 Stat. 474, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. 1, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1. The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 was sponsored by both labor and management, whose views were presented at the hearings by George M. Harrison. 8 References are made to his testimony that the carrier affiliates embraced within the definition of 'employer' are those who are engaged in service that is part of railway transportation. 9 Duquesne argues on the basis of that legislative history that any service 'in connection with the transportation' of property or any service 'in connection with' the receipt, etc., of 'property transported by railroad,' as used in the present Acts, means that kind of activity which is defined by the Interstate Commerce Act as forming a part of transportation service. On the other hand, the Board argues that the statutory definition of 'employer' is not so restricted. It stresses the broad sweep of the statutory language and the purpose to bring under the Act affiliates which carry out portions of the railroad's business. 10
Duquesne's answer is that the service of loading and unloading is done by it for its customers, that these services are rendered before railroad transportation has begun or after it has ended, that they are not and cannot be a part of railroad transportation since the tariff of the Pennsylvania forbids it from performing the ervices. Duquesne's conclusion is that under such circumstances loading and unloading are not and cannot be a part of railroad transportation. The question, however, is not whether in these cases the service of loading and unloading is being rendered by the Pennsylvania and is, therefore, in fact a part of its transportation service. It is not whether the affiliate would itself be subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. It is whether a carrier's affiliate is performing a service that could be performed by the carrier and charged for under the line-haul tariffs. If it is such a service, it is a transportation service within the meaning of the present Acts. Senator Wagner, who was in charge of the Retirement Bill in the Senate, stated that its coverage included 'not only those directly in the railroad business but those associated with it.' 11 And George M. Harrison, on whose testimony Duquesne heavily relies, stated that affiliates of carriers were included 'when those companies are engaged in the business of transporting passengers or property for the railroad, or other service that is a part of railway transportation.' 12 In other words if a service is involved which the railroad could perform as a part of its transportation service, it is within the present Acts. It then makes no difference that it is performed by a carrier affiliate rather than by the carrier itself. We think it plain that the definitions in question include at the very least those activities which would be transportation services when performed by a railroad but which it chooses to have performed by its affiliate.