Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/520/646/271959/
Timestamp: 2019-05-26 05:38:16
Document Index: 375135940

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 801', '§ 636', '§ 2255', '§ 2254', '§ 2255', '§ 2254', '§ 54']

United States of America Ex Rel. Eugene Frank Irons, Appellant, v. Ernest L. Montanye, Superintendent, Attica Correctionalfacility, Appellee, 520 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1975) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1975 › United States of America Ex Rel. Eugene Frank Irons, Appellant, v. Ernest L. Montanye, Superintenden...
United States of America Ex Rel. Eugene Frank Irons, Appellant, v. Ernest L. Montanye, Superintendent, Attica Correctionalfacility, Appellee, 520 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1975)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 520 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1975)
Argued May 16, 1975. Decided July 7, 1975
It is unclear whether the claims presented here were made in the state courts. Appellant's brief in this appeal indicates that appellant did file a pro se brief during the initial appeal to the Appellate Division raising the issue of the validity of the search warrant.3 Neither Judge Burke nor Judge Curtin discussed the issue of exhaustion. Given the uncertainty in the record before us, we must remand for consideration whether the issues presented for review have ever been presented to the state courts. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490, 93 S. Ct. 1123, 35 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1973); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417-20, 83 S. Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963).
Even if appellant exhausted his state remedies, the question is open whether he deliberately waived his Fourth Amendment claims by failing to object to the introduction of the evidence at trial.4 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438-40, 83 S. Ct. 822. It will be relevant to determine whether appellant's claims were presented to the Appellate Division on direct appeal since under New York law "no objection (at trial) is required to preserve for appellate review a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right, and the failure to object does not waive the defendant's state remedies for the preservation of those rights." United States ex rel. Schaedel v. Follette, 447 F.2d 1297, 1300 (2d Cir. 1971). Failure to raise a constitutional issue on appeal may, however, constitute a waiver of state remedies. Id.
If the issues of exhaustion and waiver are resolved in appellant's favor, or if appellant does exhaust his state remedies without success, then appellant is entitled to a hearing on the issue of the constitutional validity of the search warrant under Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), even as modified by United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971).5 There is nothing whatsoever in the papers presently before us to support a finding of probable cause; indeed the very affidavit supposedly supporting the warrant is altogether missing, as apparently it was before Judge Burke.6 While in 1969 appellant, in a prior habeas corpus petition, presented this issue to Judge Burke, Judge Burke without a hearing, on the basis of the trial transcript and "Huntley"7 hearing transcript, decided that the search warrant was valid and the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15, 83 S. Ct. 1086, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963), does not favor deciding successive habeas corpus petitions if the first were adversely decided on the merits and the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.8 For the first decision to be given controlling weight it must also be final on the merits. In Sanders no appeal was taken from the first petition, making it final. Here, in the 1969 proceeding, appellant, proceeding without counsel, moved this court for a certificate of probable cause for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and for assignment of counsel. That motion was denied without opinion. Since on the merits, assuming exhaustion and waiver have been successfully resolved, we do not find the 1969 appeal to have lacked merit, note 6 supra, we presume the denial of the motion was without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Thus, we are not bound by the nonfinal 1969 proceeding.
We do not need to consider appellant's claims that the search warrant did not comply with the then-effective § 801 of the former New York Code of Criminal Procedure9 for nighttime searches because it did not state that the officer was positive that a gun would be found or that the warrant was void when executed because it was older than 10 days.10 We assume, without having to decide, that these claims are matters of state law unreviewable in federal courts.11 See United States ex rel. Terry v. Henderson, 462 F.2d 1125, 1131 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Sadowy v. Fay, 284 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 850, 81 S. Ct. 814, 5 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1961).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (3) reads:
Here Judge Curtin also reviewed the papers submitted to Magistrate Maxwell in deciding to dismiss the petition. Anything less would be an impermissible delegation of decision-making authority. Cf. CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375, 378-83 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 779 (1975). See generally Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 94 S. Ct. 2842, 41 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1974) (magistrate cannot conduct habeas corpus evidentiary hearings).
The State argues that in light of Irons' confession the issues in this appeal are at most harmless error, citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). It is elemental, however, that if the search were invalid the confession may have been tainted by illegal discovery of the jewelry obtained from Irons by means of the search. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963)
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963), involved 28 U.S.C. § 2255 but held there was no need to differentiate 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for purposes of that decision. Id. at 15, 83 S. Ct. 1068. Sanders points out that § 2255 requires a hearing unless the records " 'conclusively show' that the claim is without merit." Id. at 6, 83 S. Ct. at 1072. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963), mandates similar evidentiary treatment under § 2254. Where there are disputed facts, see note 6, supra, justice requires less weight to be given to prior habeas corpus applications which have been dismissed without a hearing. See generally United States ex rel. Lewis v. Henderson, 520 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1975)
See generally United States v. Smith, 340 F. Supp. 1023, 1029 (D. Conn. 1972), which says,
The Second Circuit has specifically left open the question of whether the admissibility in a federal trial of evidence seized at nighttime pursuant to a warrant issued by a state judicial officer is governed by Rule 41(c) or by state law, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 54-33a, which imposes no extra requirement of certainty for a nighttime search. United States v. Ravich et al., 421 F.2d 1196, 1201, n. 5 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 834, 91 S. Ct. 69, 27 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1970).