Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/806/94/45555/
Timestamp: 2019-09-23 00:47:39
Document Index: 167820334

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 409', '§ 86', '§ 2680', '§ 2674', '§ 2680']

Matt Myslakowski, Individually and As Next Friend of Mariemyslakowski, a Minor (85-1527), and Betty Galanos, Aspersonal Representative of the Estate of Tina Marie Kelly,deceased (85-1528), Plaintiffs-appellees, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellant, 806 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
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Matt Myslakowski, Individually and As Next Friend of Mariemyslakowski, a Minor (85-1527), and Betty Galanos, Aspersonal Representative of the Estate of Tina Marie Kelly,deceased (85-1528), Plaintiffs-appellees, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellant, 806 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1986)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 806 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1986) Argued Aug. 15, 1986. Decided Nov. 26, 1986
These are personal injury and wrongful death actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs after rejecting the government's contention that it was entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exception to governmental tort liability in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). We reverse.
Plaintiffs claimed that the government was negligent in (1) selling the vehicle in question to the public, (2) failing to affix proper warnings on the vehicle, and (3) designing the vehicle with dangerously low rollover resistance. The district court dismissed the design claim after concluding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the government was responsible for the design of the jeep. In opposition to the remaining claims, the government asserted that it is immune from liability because its acts involved the exercise of a discretionary function. Rejecting this contention, the district court found the government negligent in failing to warn the jeep's users of its high propensity to roll over, when used as a passenger vehicle. 608 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
We have no occasion to address the latter two contentions because we conclude that under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), the government is immune from liability for the acts and omissions complained of, and that the district court's contrary conclusion is error requiring reversal.
At common law, the United States, its agencies and employees, were exempt from suits brought by its citizens. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821). In Sec. 1346(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code, however, the government partially waived its sovereign immunity from tort liability. That section provides:
Thus, the government's waiver of sovereign immunity in Sec. 1346(b) does not apply when the challenged act or omission involves a discretionary function or duty. Indeed, " [i]f a case falls within the statutory exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2680, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222, 1225 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125, 105 S. Ct. 2655, 86 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1985).
The Postal Service sold the jeep to the original purchaser, Mr. Greenway, as part of a program to dispose of its surplus property. The authority for the sale is found in 39 U.S.C. § 401(5), enacted in 1970, which provides:
" [T]he Government's decision to sell the jeeps to the public was clearly a policy based discretionary function which is specifically within the purview of the execution of a statute and regulation (39 U.S.C. § 401(5) and 39 C.F.R. Sec. 211.2).... The evidence before this Court indicates that, in making that decision, the Government considered the economic need to operate efficiently by recouping some of its expenditures through the sale of surplus goods.... If the threat of tort liability hung over the Government for the mere decision to sell such surplus goods, it would improperly impede a Government function and, thus, put the Courts in the position of interfering with policy decisions which have been properly reserved to another branch."
608 F. Supp. at 371.
The court then distinguished between the "decision to sell the jeep" and "the decision as to the manner of the sale of [the] jeep," declaring that the latter was a "separate matter." 608 F. Supp. at 371. The district court determined that "the decision not to warn subsequent purchasers that the jeep, if used as a passenger vehicle, had a dangerous risk of rollover was not the exercise of a discretionary function," and that no immunity attached for the failure to give that warning. 608 F. Supp. at 372.
As the Court put it in U.S. v. S.A. Empressa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 820, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2768, 81 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1984): "Judicial intervention in such decisionmaking through tort suits would require the courts to 'second guess' the political, social, and economic judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory function. It was precisely this sort of judicial intervention in policymaking that the discretionary function exception was designed to prevent."
In Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980), a panel of this court held the government responsible in damages when a small aircraft struck a guy wire that stabilized a 1720-foot tower. It was shown that, following a discretionary decision by the Federal Aviation Administration to issue aeronautical navigation charts pursuant to its authority to "order the use of the navigable air space," the agency negligently failed to accurately locate the tower on a chart it issued.
Similarly, in Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951), the government was held liable for damages incurred when an oyster boat became stranded on the submerged hull of an old battleship that had been sunk by the United States in the Chesapeake Bay in 1911.
The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff had stated a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 633. Responding to the government's contention that it was not liable for the breach of a discretionary duty to mark the wreck, the court stated that the government's duty under the Wreck Acts, 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 736, 14 U.S.C. § 86, to either remove or mark the wreck was mandatory and therefore not within the discretionary function exception. The court also stated:
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed. 48 (1955), the government was charged with negligence in permitting a lighthouse light to become extinguished and in failing to warn the tug "Navajo" that the light was not functioning. The government conceded, however, that the case did not involve the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680, and the Court discussed 28 U.S.C. § 2674, a different statutory provision altogether. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64, 76 S. Ct. at 124. In passing, the Supreme Court noted that once the Coast Guard "exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by that light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order...." Id. at 69, 76 S. Ct. at 126.
Finally, we observe that three other courts have considered the very question we address today in connection with accidents involving the same type of jeep vehicles, and each has reached the conclusion we have reached. See Ford v. American Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 465 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 776 F.2d 1048 (1985); Shirey v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1251 (D.S.C. 1984); Louviere v. AM General Corp., 620 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. La. 1985). In all of these cases, the courts determined that the failure to warn subsequent purchasers of the jeeps' rollover propensities was an omission within the purview of the discretionary decisionmaking authority of the government for which Congress has provided immunity against liability under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Although not bound by these decisions, we cite them as cases consistent with our reasoning today.