Source: http://openjurist.org/208/f3d/1047/association-of-battery-recyclers-inc-v-united-states-environmental-protection-agency
Timestamp: 2015-06-30 12:56:41
Document Index: 260626475

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 261', '§ 6903', '§ 6921', '§ 6924', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 261', '§ 6903', '§ 6976', '§ 6903', '§ 261', '§ 261']

208 F3d 1047 Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency | OpenJurist
208 F. 3d 1047 - Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency	Home208 f3d 1047 association of battery recyclers, inc. v. united states environmental protection agency
208 F3d 1047 Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency 208 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc., et al.,Petitionersv.U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents
Nos. 98-1368, 98-1381, 98-1392 & 98-1394
Argued October 25, 1999Decided April 21, 2000
Donald J. Patterson, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners on the RCRA classification issues. With him on the joint briefs were Harold P. Quinn, Jr., Roderick T. Dwyer, Karl S. Bourdeau, Michael W. Steinberg, Joshua D. Sarnoff, David F. Zoll, Ronald A. Shipley, William R. Weissman and Steven J. Groseclose. Michael B. Wigmore and Robert N. Steinwurtzel entered appearances.
William R. Weissman argued the cause for petitioners on the LDR treatment standards issues. With him on the briefs was Steven J. Groseclose.
Michele L. Walter, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, and Steven Silverman, Attorney, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, argued the causes for respondents. With them on the brief was Cecilia Kim, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.
David R. Case argued the cause for intervenors Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Technology Council and National Mining Association. With him on the brief were Karen Florini, Donald J. Patterson, Jr., Harold P. Quinn, Jr., and Roderick T. Dwyer.
Before: Silberman, Ginsburg, and Randolph, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge Randolph.
Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.
Opinion dissenting in part by Circuit Judge Randolph.
These are consolidated petitions for judicial review of Environmental Protection Agency regulations promulgated on May 26, 1998, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795. The regulations--known collectively as the "Land Disposal Restrictions Phase IV" Rule-deal with residual or secondary materials generated in mining and mineral processing operations and EPA's classification of these materials as "solid waste"; with the treatment standards for a specific category of hazardous waste; and with EPA's test for determining whether certain wastes are hazardous. Our opinion is in three parts. The first part decides whether EPA properly defined "solid waste." We are unanimous that it did not. The second part decides, again unanimously, that EPA's treatment standards for a particular category of hazardous waste are lawful. The third part, written by Judge Ginsburg and joined by Judge Silberman, decides that EPA's test for determining toxicity is valid for certain wastes but not for others. I disagree with their conclusion for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion.
I. Definition of Solid Waste
Two petitioners--the National Mining Association and the American Iron and Steel Institute--and an intervenor-the Chemical Manufacturers Association--challenge the portion of EPA's Phase IV Rule defining a "solid waste" in terms of how materials "generated and reclaimed within the primary mineral processing industry" are stored. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(iii). The question is of substantial importance to these petitioners because, together, they represent most of the nation's producers of coal, metals, and industrial and agricultural minerals; two thirds of the nation's steel production; and more than ninety percent of the nation's productive capacity of basic industrial chemicals.
RCRA defines "solid waste" as "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material...." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). Solid wastes are "considered hazardous if they possess one of four characteristics (ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity) or if EPA lists them as hazardous following a rulemaking." Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a), 40 C.F.R. pt. 261). Disposal of hazardous waste is forbidden unless the waste is treated to reduce its hazardous constituents or stored in a manner ensuring that the hazardous constituents will not migrate from the disposal unit. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(5), (m)).
To understand the contentions of the parties, it will be helpful to outline the current solid waste classification system (most of which predates the Phase IV Rule and is not being challenged). EPA's general regulation defining "solid waste" begins by repeating a portion of the statutory definition: "a solid waste is any discarded material." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(1). It then defines "discarded material" to mean "any material which is Abandoned ... or Recycled, as explained in paragraph (c) of this section...." Id. § 261.2(a)(2). Paragraph (c) identifies four situations in which "recycled" materials will be considered "solid waste":when the materials are "used in a manner constituting disposal"; when the materials are "burn[ed] for energy recovery";when the materials are "reclaimed"; and when the materials are "accumulated speculatively." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(1)-(4).
The Phase IV Rule revised only the reclamation provision.Before the revision, EPA classified reclaimed spent materials and scrap metal as solid waste. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(3) & tbl.1 (1996). Reclaimed sludges and by-products were classified as solid waste only if they had been specifically listed in 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 as a hazardous waste following an EPA rulemaking. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(3) &tbl.1 (1996). Reclaimed sludges and by-products exhibiting a characteristic of hazardous waste, but not specifically listed as hazardous wastes, were not classified as solid waste. See id. This classification system applied without regard to the industry that produced the materials.
The Phase IV Rule purported to take materials reclaimed by the mineral processing industry outside this framework and to subject these secondary materials to a new test for determining whether they constituted "solid waste." See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(3) & tbl.1. We say "purported" because it is not clear to us that EPA accomplished its objective. The relevant part of the new recycling-reclamation provision reads:
Materials [listed in a table] are not solid wastes when reclaimed (except as provided under 40 CFR261.4(a)(17)).[1]
Id. The new § 261.4(a)(17) gave a so-called "conditional exclusion": if the provision's criteria were met, reclaimed mineral processing secondary materials would not be classified as solid waste. We have trouble making sense of these two provisions. The first provision (§ 261.2(c)(3)) broadly describes what is not a solid waste, unless it complies with the other provision. But the other provision--s 261.4(a)(17)--is an exclusion, and the consequence of not complying with the provision is, of course, loss of exclusion. In other words, read together, the provisions seem to say that something is not a solid waste unless it is not excluded from being a solid waste.Lewis Carroll would be proud. But petitioners make nothing of the point and we shall therefore assume that if secondary material of this sort--derived from mineral processing--does not meet the conditions specified in § 261.4(a)(17), EPA will consider the material "solid waste" potentially subject to full RCRA Subtitle C regulation.
As to the conditions set forth in § 261.4(a)(17), EPA's dividing line between "waste" and nonwaste is the manner of storage. If the mineral processor stores secondary material destined for recycling in tanks, containers, buildings, or on properly maintained pads, the materials are not considered "solid waste." See id. § 261.4(a)(17)(iii), (iv). Given our assumption (and that of the parties), if by-products and sludges exhibiting a characteristic of hazardous waste are not stored in such a manner prior to being recycled, they may be regulated as hazardous "waste."
How long the materials are stored is of no consequence according to the regulation. See Fed. Reg. 28,556, 28,582-83 (1998). They could be placed on the ground for only a few minutes before being put back into the production process, yet they would still be subject to RCRA if not stored in accord with § 261.4(a)(17). Petitioners say this rule extends EPA's authority far beyond the statute. They ask how secondary material held for recycling in production could possibly qualify as "waste" when the statute defines "waste" as "discarded materials"? 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
The question is not a new one. It was asked and answered in American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("AMC I"). The court began by referring to the "ordinary, plain-English meaning" of "discarded"--" 'disposed of,' 'thrown away,' or 'abandoned.' " Id. at 1184. Secondary materials destined for recycling are obviously not of that sort.Rather than throwing these materials away, the producer saves them; rather than abandoning them, the producer reuses them. After examining the structure and history of RCRA, see id. at 1184-92, the AMC I court concluded:"Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed its intent that 'solid waste' (and therefore EPA's regulatory authority) be limited to materials that are 'discarded' by virtue of being disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away." Id. at 1190. The court thereforeset aside an EPA rule regulating secondary "materials reused within an ongoing industrial process," id. at 1182, because the materials were "neither disposed of nor abandoned," id. at 1193.
The holding in AMC I thus appears to answer the question we have before us. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. vs. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme Court has a rule: "Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning." Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990); see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992). We too follow stare decisis. The complication, for an administrative agency, of conflicting interpretations of the same statute from different circuits is not present. The D.C. Circuit is the exclusive venue for pre-enforcement judicial review of RCRA regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1). And so, our interpretation of RCRA binds not only this court but also EPA.
EPA nevertheless insists that RCRA may be applied to materials that are not disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away, but are destined for reuse in an on-going industrial process. The argument is that AMC I was a narrow decision, and that "subsequent judicial opinions have sharply limited the scope of AMC I." 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,580. These later decisions, according to EPA, absolutely bar the agency from treating secondary materials as "discarded" (42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)) if and only if "reclamation is continuous in the sense that there is no interdiction in time--i.e. materials moving from one step of a recovery process to another without a break in the process, as for storage." 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,581. We believe EPA misapprehends the law of the circuit.
As to AMC I, EPA supports its interpretation of the decision on the basis that the court twice used the phrase "immediate reuse":
Here, Congress defined "solid waste" as "discarded ma-terial." The ordinary, plain-English meaning of the word"discarded" is "disposed of," "thrown away" or "aban-doned." Encompassing materials retained for immediatereuse within the scope of "discarded" strains, to say the least, the everyday usage of that term.
The question we face, then, is whether ... Congress was using the term "discarded" in its ordinary sense--"dis-posed of" or "abandoned"--or whether Congress was using it in a much more open-ended way, so as to encompass materials no longer useful in their original capacity though destined for immediate reuse in another phase of the industry's ongoing production process.
824 F.2d at 1183-84, 1185. EPA reads, or rather misreads, these passages to mean that it may treat secondary materials as "discarded" whenever they leave the production process and are stored for any length of time.
For one thing, "the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979)-an admonition the AMC I court itself repeated. See 824 F.2d at 1183 n.6 (quoting Reiter, 442 U.S. at 341); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) ("[W]e think it generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were the United States Code."). Yet EPA treats "immediate reuse" as if these were statutory terms in need of a regulatory definition. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,582-83. EPA supplies the definition: immediate reuse is "continuousrecirculation of secondary materials back into recovery processes without prior storage" unless the storage for later recycling complies with the conditions EPA sets forth in the new § 261.4(a)(17) of its regulations. 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,580-83. Of course, this thoroughly ignores the AMC I court's holding that, under RCRA, material must be thrown away or abandoned before EPA may consider it to be "waste." As we have said, material stored for recycling is plainly not in that category.
For another thing, in the two passages quoted above, the word "immediate" cannot mean what EPA thinks. The court wrote of secondary material "retained"--held for a time--and "destined"--denoting the future--for "immediate reuse."This more than suggests that the court had in mind materials that were being held or stored for later recycling or reuse. EPA assumes, without saying why, that when the AMC I court wrote "immediate" in these sentences it meant "at once." But the word "immediate" has another common meaning--"direct," as in "my immediate superior" or "the immediate cause of the accident." It is clear to us that this is what the AMC I court intended. It is clear because retaining signifies holding onto, keeping, storing. And so retaining, on the one hand, and reusing at once, on the other hand, sounds like a physical impossibility. It is clear because the AMC I court stressed, again and again, that it was interpreting "discarded" to mean what it ordinarily means. To say that when something is saved it is thrown away is an extraordinary distortion of the English language. Yet that is where EPA's definition leads. It is also clear that the AMC I court intended "direct" when it wrote "immediate" because EPA never even argued that materials sent back into the production process, with no intermediate storage, were "waste."EPA never made the argument because its rule at the time did not consider such secondary materials to be discarded (and thus "solid waste" under RCRA). EPA's AMC I brief stated: "when secondary materials are recycled by being returned directly (without undergoing significant reprocessing) for use as feedstock to the process which generated them, the activity often is like an on-going production process. Secondary materials being recycled in this way--referred to as a 'closed-loop' process--therefore are not defined as solid wastes." Brief for Respondent at 11 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(iii)(1986)), AMC I.
That the "immediate reuse" phrase was not mentioned in the critical portions of the AMC I opinion containing the court's holding is still another reason for rejecting EPA's position. The court stated: "In sum, our analysis of the statute reveals clear Congressional intent to extend EPA's authority only to materials that are truly discarded, disposed of, thrown away, or abandoned," 824 F.2d at 1190; and "[t]hese materials have not yet become part of the waste disposal problem; rather, they are destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the generating industry itself," id. at 1186 (italics in original); and "we are persuaded that by regulating in-process secondary materials, EPA has acted in contravention of Congress' intent," id. at 1193. Nothing here about saved materials being transformed into discarded materials unless they are placed back into the production process forthwith.
Still further, the AMC I court thought that EPA's final rule illegally regulated the following: "valuable metal-bearing and mineral-bearing dusts are often released in processing a particular metal. The mining facility typically recaptures, recycles, and reuses these dusts, frequently in production processes different from the one from which the dusts were originally emitted." Id. at 1181. The court must have been referring to the following illustration provided in the mining industry's brief:
If, for example, "an emission control dust from a primaryzinc smelting furnace" is not returned to the zinc production process but instead to on-site"cadmium recovery operations," it is classified as solid waste.
Brief for Petitioner American Mining Congress at 20 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 614, 640 (1985)), AMC I. In this example, the dust is not placed back into the production process at once, and yet the AMC I court held that EPA had no authority to regulate the dust as solid waste because it had not been thrown away or otherwise discarded. To state the matter more generally, the court in AMC I set aside EPA's rule because secondary materials which are treated prior to recycling cannot be considered discarded if they are "reused within an ongoing industrial process." 824 F. 2d at 1182.2
We have written enough to explain why we disagree with EPA's reading of AMC I and why the Phase IV Rule contradicts that decision. Later cases in this court do not limit AMC I, as EPA supposes. American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("API"), was, as EPA acknowledged in the Phase IV rulemaking, at "the end of the [jurisdictional] continuum ... where EPA's authority is most certain." 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,580. In that case, the Natural Resources Defense Council challenged EPA's decision not to regulate K061 slag. It was "undisputed" that K061, an individually listed, zinc-bearing hazardous waste generated from air pollution control equipment in steel industry electric furnaces, see 906 F.2d at 734, was