Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98422/lincoln-union-vs-northwestern-co
Timestamp: 2018-09-19 17:26:51
Document Index: 351928952

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', 'Art. 10', '§ 10', '§ 237', '§ 344', '§ 1257', '§ 10']

Lincoln Union Vs Northwestern Co - Citation 98422 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Lincoln Union Vs. Northwestern Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98422
Decided On Jan-03-1949
Case Number 335 U.S. 525
Appellant Lincoln Union
Respondent Northwestern Co.
.....supreme court lincoln union v. northwestern co., 335 u.s. 525 (1949) lincoln federal labor union v. northwestern iron & metal co. no. 47 argued november 8-10, 1948 decided january 3, 1949 * 335 u.s. 525 appeal from the supreme court of nebraska syllabus a nebraska constitutional amendment and a north carolina statute provide, in effect, that no person in those states shall be denied an opportunity to obtain or retain employment because he is or is not a member of a labor organization. they also forbid employers to enter into contracts or agreements obligating themselves to exclude persons from employment because they are or are not members of labor unions. held: they do not violate rights guaranteed to employers,.....
Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co. - 335 U.S. 525 (1949)
U.S. Supreme Court Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949)
Decided January 3, 1949 *
Held: they do not violate rights guaranteed to employers, unions, or members of unions by the Constitution of the United States. Pp. 335 U. S. 527 -537.
1. These state laws do not abridge the freedom of speech and the right of unions and their members "peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," which are guaranteed by the First Amendment and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 335 U. S. 529 -531.
2. Nor do they conflict with Article I, § 10, of the Constitution, insofar as they impair the obligation of contracts made prior to their enactment. Pp. 335 U. S. 531 -532.
3. Nor do they deny unions and their members equal protection of the laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 335 U. S. 532 -533.
4. Nor do they deprive employers, unions or members of unions of their liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 335 U. S. 533 -537.
to the petition. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed. 149 Neb. 507, 31 N.W.2d 477. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 335 U. S. 537 .
No. 34. An employer and certain officers and agents of certain labor unions were convicted in a North Carolina state court of violations of N.C.Acts, 1947, ch. 328, N.C.Gen.Stat., ch. 95, Art. 10, for entering into a "closed shop agreement." The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, and sustained the validity of the statute under the Constitution of the United States. 228 N.C. 352, 45 S.E.2d 860. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 335 U. S. 537 .
Under employment practices in the United States, employers have sometimes limited work opportunities to members of unions, sometimes to nonunion members, and at other times have employed and kept their workers without regard to whether they were or were not members of a union. Employers are commanded to follow this latter employment practice in the states of North Carolina and Nebraska. A North Carolina statute and a Nebraska constitutional amendment [ Footnote 1 ] provide that no
person in those states shall be denied an opportunity to obtain or retain employment because he is or is not a member of a labor organization. To enforce this policy, North Carolina and Nebraska employers are also forbidden to enter into contracts or agreements obligating themselves to exclude persons from employment because they are or are not labor union members. [ Footnote 2 ]
These state laws were given timely challenge in North Carolina and Nebraska courts on the ground that, insofar as they attempt to protect nonunion members from discrimination, the laws are in violation of rights guaranteed employers, unions, and their members by the United States Constitution. [ Footnote 3 ] The state laws were challenged as violations of the right of freedom of speech, of assembly
and of petition guaranteed unions and their members by "the First Amendment and protected against invasion by the state under the Fourteenth Amendment." It was further contended that the state laws impaired the obligations of existing contracts in violation of Art. I, § 10, of the United States Constitution and deprived the appellant unions and employers of equal protection and due process of law guaranteed against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment. All of these contentions were rejected by the State Supreme Courts, [ Footnote 4 ] and the cases are here on appeal under § 237 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344 (now § 1257). The substantial identity of the questions raised in the two cases prompted us to set them for argument together, and, for the same reason, we now consider the cases in a single opinion.
First. It is contended that these state laws abridge the freedom of speech and the opportunities of unions and their members "peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." [ Footnote 5 ] Under the state policy adopted by these laws, employers must, other considerations being equal, give equal opportunities for
Cf. Wallace Corporation v. Labor Board, 323 U. S. 248 .
Second. There is a suggestion, though not elaborated in briefs, that these state laws conflict with Art. I, § 10, of the United States Constitution, insofar as they impair the obligation of contracts made prior to their enactment. That this contention is without merit is now too clearly established to require discussion. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 , 290 U. S. 436 -439, and cases
there cited. And also Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn., 310 U. S. 32 , 310 U. S. 38 ; East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U. S. 230 , 326 U. S. 232 .
Much of appellants' argument here seeks to establish that due process of law is denied employees and union men by that part of these state laws that forbids them to make contracts with the employer obligating him to refuse to hire or retain nonunion workers. But that part of these laws does no more than provide a method to aid enforcement of the heart of the laws -- namely, their command that employers must not discriminate against either union or nonunion members because they are such. If the states have constitutional power to ban such discrimination by law, they also have power to ban contracts which if performed would bring about the prohibited discrimination. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 , 219 U. S. 570 -571.
banned by a valid state law. So here, if the provisions in the state laws against employer discrimination are valid, it follows that the contract prohibition also is valid. Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422 , 297 U. S. 427 . And see Sage v. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99 , 235 U. S. 104 -105. We therefore turn to the decisive question under the due process contention, which is: does the due process clause forbid a state to pass laws clearly designed to safeguard the opportunity of nonunion members to get and hold jobs, free from discrimination against them because they are nonunion workers?
In 1907, this Court, in Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 , considered the federal law which prohibited discrimination against union workers. Adair, an agent of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, had been indicted and convicted for having discharged Coppage, an employee of the railroad, because Coppage was a member of the Order of Locomotive Firemen. This Court there held, over the dissents of Justices McKenna and Holmes, that the railroad, because of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, had a constitutional right to discriminate
against union members, and could therefore do so through use of yellow dog contracts. The chief reliance for this holding was Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 , which had invalidated a New York law prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries. This Court had found support for its Lochner holding in what had been said in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 , a case on which appellants here strongly rely. There were strong dissents in the Adair and Lochner cases.
In 1914, this Court reaffirmed the principles of the Adair case in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 , again over strong dissents, and held that a Kansas statute outlawing yellow dog contracts denied employers and employees a liberty to fix terms of employment. For this reason, the law was held invalid under the due process clause.
The Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitutional doctrine was for some years followed by this Court. It was used to strike down laws fixing minimum wages and maximum hours in employment, laws fixing prices, and laws regulating business activities. See cases cited in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 , 313 U. S. 244 -246, and Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53 , 310 U. S. 66 -67. And the same constitutional philosophy was faithfully adhered to in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590 , a case strongly pressed upon us by appellants. In Adams v. Tanner, supra, this Court with four justices dissenting struck down a state law absolutely prohibiting maintenance of private employment agencies. The majority found that such businesses were highly beneficial to the public, and upon, this conclusion, held that the state was without power to proscribe them. Our holding and opinion in Olsen v. Nebraska, supra, clearly undermined Adams v. Tanner.
Appellants also rely heavily on certain language used in this Court's opinion in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 . In that case, the
Court invalidated a state law which in part provided a method for a state agency to fix wages and hours. [ Footnote 6 ] Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 267 U. S. 552 , 267 U. S. 565 . In invalidating this part of the state act, this Court construed the due process clause as forbidding legislation to fix hours and wages or to fix prices of products. The Court also relied on a distinction between businesses according to whether they were or were not "clothed with a public interest." This latter distinction was rejected in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 . That the due process clause does not ban legislative power to fix prices, wages, and hours, as was assumed in the Wolff case, was settled as to price-fixing in the Nebbia and Olsen cases. That wages and hours can be fixed by law is no longer doubted since West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 ; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 , 312 U. S. 125 ; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177 , 313 U. S. 187 .
This Court, beginning at least as early as 1934, when the Nebbia case was decided, has steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases. In doing so, it has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition or of some valid federal law. See Nebbia v. New York, supra, at 291 U. S. 523 -524, and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra, at 300 U. S. 392 -395, and cases cited. Under this constitutional doctrine, the due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in
[For concurring opinions of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, see post, p. 335 U. S. 542 .]
[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, joined by MR. JUSTICE MURPHY insofar as it applies to Nos. 34 and 47, see post, p. 335 U. S. 557 .]
State v. Whitaker, 228 N.C. 352, 45 S.E.2d 860; Lincoln Federal Labor Union No.19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 149 Neb. 507, 31 N.W.2d 477. See also American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20, 189 P.2d 912. An appeal in this latter case was also argued along with the two cases considered in this opinion. We have treated the Arizona case in a separate opinion, post, p. 335 U. S. 538 , because the challenged Arizona amendment presents a question not raised in the Nebraska or North Carolina laws.
This contention rests on the premise that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the prohibitions and guarantees of the First Amendment applicable to state action. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 , 319 U. S. 639 . The pertinent language of the First Amendment is