Source: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/65075.01-en-20060329/view/
Timestamp: 2017-11-24 01:50:06
Document Index: 205656991

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application no. 65075', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 1', '§ 27', '§ 38', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 25', '§ 14', '§ 12', '§ 22', '§ 21', '§ 18', '§ 23', '§ 1', '§ 255']

PROCACCINI GIUSEPPINA AND ORESTINA v. ITALY About Project
CASE OF GIUSEPPINA AND ORESTINA PROCACCINI v. ITALY
(Application no. 65075/01)
In the case of Giuseppina and Orestina Procaccini v. Italy,
1. The case originated in an application (no. 65075/01) against the Italian Republic lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Italian nationals, Ms Giuseppina Procaccini and Ms Orestina Procaccini (“the applicants”), on 19 November 1997.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr S. de Nigris de Maria, of the Benevento Bar, in the proceedings before the Chamber and subsequently by Mr S. de Nigris de Maria, Mr T. Verrilli, Mr C. Marcellino, Mr A. Nardone and Mr V. Collarile, of the Benevento Bar. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented successively by their Agents, Mr U. Leanza and Mr I.M. Braguglia, and their co-Agents, Mr V. Esposito and Mr F. Crisafulli, and their deputy co-Agent, Mr N. Lettieri.
3. The applicants alleged that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of civil proceedings to which they had been parties. Subsequently, the applicants indicated that they were not complaining of the manner in which the Court of Appeal had calculated the delays but of the derisory amount awarded in damages.
6. On 22 January 2004 the application was declared admissible by a Chamber of the First Section, composed of Mr C.L. Rozakis, Mrs F. Tulkens, Mrs N. Vajić, Mr E. Levits, Mrs S. Botoucharova, Mr A. Kovler, judges, Mr L. Ferrari Bravo, ad hoc judge, and also of Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar.
7. On 10 November 2004 a Chamber of the same Section, composed of Mr C.L. Rozakis, Mr G. Bonello, Mrs F. Tulkens, Mrs N. Vajić, Mr A. Kovler, Mrs E. Steiner, judges, Mr L. Ferrari Bravo, ad hoc judge, and also of Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar, gave judgment in which it held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
9. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24. The President of the Court decided that in the interests of the proper administration of justice, the case should be assigned to the same Grand Chamber as the cases of Riccardi Pizzati v. Italy, Musci v. Italy, Giuseppe Mostacciuolo v. Italy (no. 1), Cocchiarella v. Italy, Apicella v. Italy, Ernestina Zullo v. Italy, and Giuseppe Mostacciuolo v. Italy (no. 2) (applications nos. 62361/00, 64699/01, 64705/01, 64890/01, 64897/01, 65075/01 and 65102/01) (Rules 24, 42 § 2 and 71). To that end the President ordered the parties to form a legal team (see paragraph 2 above).
10. The applicants and the Government each filed a memorial. In addition, third-party comments were received from the Polish, Czech and Slovak Governments, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2). The applicants replied to those comments (Rule 44 § 5).
Ms C. Cavuoto, of the Benevento Bar Adviser.
Ms G. Procaccini, applicant, was also present at the hearing.
12. The applicants were born in 1932 and 1938 respectively and live in Benevento.
13. On 23 October 1989 Mr G.P., the applicants’ father, brought proceedings against E., a company, in the Benevento District Court to have a contract for the installation of windows in his flat set aside and seeking compensation for the damage incurred.
14. Preparation of the case for trial began on 30 November 1989. Of the eighteen hearings listed between 22 March 1990 and 18 May 1998 three were adjourned by the court of its own motion and three because E.’s lawyer had failed to appear, four were devoted to organising expert evidence, five to hearing evidence from witnesses, one was adjourned because the judge had withdrawn from the case, another one was adjourned because Mr G.P.’s lawyer had failed to appear and a further one was adjourned at his request. The applicants declared their intention to continue the proceedings following Mr G.P.’s death on 27 March 1995.
15. On an unspecified date the case was referred to the bench of judges dealing with the oldest cases (sezione stralcio).
Of the six hearings listed between 15 February 1999 and 9 October 2001 two were adjourned by the court of its own motion, one was adjourned by the judge responsible for preparing the case, one was devoted to a request to set the case down for hearing of oral submissions and two to hearing the submissions.
16. In a judgment of 30 May 2002, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 31 October 2002, the court granted the applicants’ claims in part and awarded them 945.40 euros (EUR) in compensation for the damage sustained.
17. On 10 October 2001 the applicants lodged an application with the Rome Court of Appeal under Law no. 89 of 24 March 2001, known as the “Pinto Act”, complaining of the excessive length of the above-described proceedings. The applicants requested the court to rule that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to order the Italian Government to pay compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained. The applicants claimed 25,000,000 Italian lire (EUR 12,911.42) each in non-pecuniary damages plus an unquantified amount for costs and expenses.
18. In a decision of 25 February 2002, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 23 April 2002, the Court of Appeal found that the proceedings had been excessively long. It held as follows:
“Whereas...
the applicants, as Mr Giuseppe Procaccini’s heirs, continued the proceedings he had instituted in the Benevento District Court by a summons served on 23 October 1989 seeking an order against the defendant company to replace a number of defective frames that it had installed;
– during the proceedings an expert report was ordered and produced;
– the proceedings are still pending before the sezione stralcio bench;
– there has without any doubt been a breach of the reasonable-time requirement in respect of proceedings that have lasted 9 years;
– for want of proof of pecuniary damage, a total amount of 2,250 euros can be awarded under the head of non-pecuniary loss for damage to quality of life plus statutory interest to accrue from the date of the claim, on account of the very low stakes involved in the proceedings.”
The Court of Appeal dismissed the claim for pecuniary damages for lack of proof and awarded a global sum of EUR 2,250, on an equitable basis, in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 750 for costs and expenses. That decision was served on 20 December 2002 and became final in February 2003.
19. When payment was not forthcoming, on 26 May 2004 the applicants served notice on the authorities to pay the amounts owed. When that proved unsuccessful they applied for a garnishee order, which was granted them on 12 May 2005 against the Bank of Italy. According to the information provided by the applicants at the hearing on 29 June 2005, the Court of Appeal’s decision had not yet been executed.
20. In a letter of 7 January 2003 the applicants informed the Court of the outcome of the domestic proceedings and asked it to resume its examination of their application.
In the same letter the applicants also informed the Court that they did not intend to appeal to the Court of Cassation because an appeal to that court could only be on points of law.
21. Award of just satisfaction in the event of a breach of the requirement to dispose of proceedings within a reasonable time and amendment to Article 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure
35. The applicants submitted that the Government were estopped from raising that question because they had never validly raised it before the Chamber. In any event the Government merely put forward arguments that had already been rejected by the Chamber in the admissibility decision and in its judgment on the merits of the case. They observed that up until the Court of Cassation’s departure from precedent, which had not been until after the decision in Scordino (cited above), the Italian courts had not felt bound by the Court’s case-law referred to by lawyers in appeals and that they were unaware of any judgment of the Court of Cassation prior to that departure from precedent in which it had entertained an appeal based solely on the fact that the amount awarded bore no relation to the amounts awarded by the European Court. They also pointed out that, as far as their case was concerned, the Court of Appeal’s decision had become final long before the Court of Cassation’s departure from precedent, and therefore asked the Court to reject the Government’s objection and confirm the judgment of 10 November 2004 (see paragraphs 13-15 of the Chamber judgment).
38 Nevertheless, the only remedies which Article 35 of the Convention requires to be exhausted are those that relate to the breaches alleged and at the same time are available and sufficient. The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, inter alia, Vernillo v. France, judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, pp. 11-12, § 27; Dalia v. France, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, pp. 87-88, § 38; and Mifsud v. France (dec.) [GC], no. 57220/00, ECHR 2002-VIII).
44. In its admissibility decision of 22 January 2004 the Chamber followed the decision in the Scordino case (cited above) according to which an applicant could still claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention where the amount awarded by the Court of Appeal was not considered by the Chamber as sufficient to repair the alleged loss and violation. In the present case, as the amount awarded to the applicants was not sufficient to amount to adequate redress the Chamber held that they could still claim to be victims.
45. The respondent Government submitted that the applicants were no longer “victims” of a violation of Article 6 § 1 because they had obtained from the Court of Appeal a finding of a violation and a sum which should be regarded as adequate having regard to their conduct and the very low stakes involved in the dispute.
49. At the hearing the Government indicated that as far as the procedural costs were concerned the applicants had obtained an order from the court for their reimbursement. With regard to the delay in paying the compensation, the Government pointed out that the present case had been communicated only in respect of the length of the civil proceedings and not regarding access to a tribunal on account of the delay in paying the amount awarded by the Court of Appeal. Lastly, referring also to the information provided at the hearing in the Scordino case (no. 36813/97) the same day, the Government explained that as the amount earmarked in the budget in respect of Pinto cases had been insufficient in 2002 and 2003 it had been increased in 2004 and 2005.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Government argued that the applicants should no longer be regarded as “victims” of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
b) The applicants
50. The applicants, for their part, considered that they were still “victims” of the violation in that the amount that had been awarded them by the Court of Appeal was not only derisory but had not even been paid to them. In reply to the Government’s submission that the stakes involved in the dispute were really very low, the applicants pointed out that in 1989 the amount at issue had been 8,558,000 Italian lire (4,419.84 euros) and that it was difficult to say how much this type of work would cost nowadays. They also pointed out that all that could be obtained by lodging an application under the Pinto Act was compensation and that it had not in any way expedited the proceedings, which were still pending.
51. The applicants took this opportunity to point out the other flaws in the Pinto Act to which they had themselves been exposed:
52. In the applicants’ submission, an analysis of the Pinto Act and the Italian courts’ manner of applying it showed that the purpose of the measures taken by the State was not to eliminate the delays but to create a remedy that would be such an obstacle that it would discourage claimants from lodging an application or continuing with one. The applicants were thus not only victims of the chronic delays in proceedings but also of the subsequent frustrations resulting from the obstacles instituted with the Pinto remedy. Furthermore, the Pinto Act had increased the workload of the courts of appeal without any provision being made for a concomitant substantial increase in the number of judges, which could only have adverse effects on the judges’ work.
53. In reply to the criticism of the various Governments regarding the criteria articulated by the Chamber, the applicant observed that the length of the proceedings was so bound up with the Italian judicial system that the Government omitted to ask the Court what they should change in the system in order to eliminate the delays. Instead, the Government asked the Court to lay down guidelines regarding damage or authorise the courts to continue using guidelines that were totally different from those used by the Court so that they could carry on running the Italian system without introducing any changes to expedite proceedings. The applicants argued that the Government erred in its assessment of the position as it was not for the European Court of Human Rights to avoid giving judgments that conflicted with national law but, on the contrary, the national law (including the Pinto Act) that should not conflict with the Convention. In the applicants’ submission, the Government could not properly argue that in some cases delays in legal proceedings gave applicants an advantage if they held out with unfounded arguments during proceedings, or if the stakes involved in the dispute were less than the just satisfaction awarded. The value of the application in question was of no relevance to the right to a hearing within a reasonable time and Article 6 did not require an applicant claiming the right to just satisfaction to have been successful. Furthermore, the Government’s reasoning was one that was expressed with hindsight at the end of proceedings, and it was never possible to say beforehand what the outcome would be. If a case was lost after twenty years of proceedings the non-pecuniary damage incurred was all the greater, since if the person had known earlier that they would lose they would probably have arranged certain aspects of their life differently.
55. With regard to the comments relating to the subsidiarity principle, the applicants submitted that Article 13 could not be construed as allowing a State to adopt a domestic remedy which would determine just satisfaction for violations of fundamental rights recognised by the Court according to criteria that were completely different from those used by the Court. The Court therefore had a duty to intervene regarding domestic decisions in order to ensure full reparation of the consequences of violations of the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. The Court’s intervention was always possible where the domestic courts had made a decision impairing the effectiveness of the domestic remedy. To accept wholesale the “subsidiarity” argument was tantamount to depriving the Court of its function, which was to ensure that the Contracting States applied the Convention and its Protocols.
93. Regarding non-pecuniary damage, the Court, like the Italian Court of Cassation (see its judgment no. 8568/05, paragraph 29 above), assumes that there is a strong but rebuttable presumption that excessively long proceedings will occasion non-pecuniary damage. The Court also accepts that, in some cases, the length of proceedings may result in only minimal non-pecuniary damage or no non-pecuniary damage at all that the length of proceedings may result in only minimal non-pecuniary damage or no non-pecuniary damage (see Nardone, cited above). The domestic courts will then have to justify their decision by giving sufficient reasons.
However, where the remedy has not met all the foregoing requirements, it is possible that the threshold in respect of which the amount will still allow a litigant to claim to be a “victim” will be higher.
97. The four-month period prescribed by the Pinto Act complies with the requirement of speediness necessary for a remedy to be effective. The only obstacle to this may arise with appeals to the Court of Cassation in respect of which no maximum period for giving a ruling has been fixed. In the instant case the judicial phase lasted from 10 October 2001 to 23 April 2002, that is, six months, which, even if it exceeds the statutory period, is still reasonable.
98. However, the Court finds it unacceptable that more than three years after the decision was deposited with the registry the applicants have still not received their compensation and have been obliged to bring enforcement proceedings occasioning them further costs.
104. In the present case, and contrary to the respondent Government’s assertion, the Court notes that the Court of Appeal did not find that the applicants’ conduct had had a significant effect on the length of the proceedings. The Court of Appeal’s decision, giving few reasons, appears to take account only of the excessive period, assessed at nine years, and the low stakes involved in the dispute. The Court reiterates that the stakes involved in the dispute cannot be assessed with regard only to the final outcome, otherwise proceedings that are still pending would have no value. Regard has to be had to the overall stakes involved in the dispute for the applicants. It would appear that in awarding EUR 2,250 for nine years’ delay, the rate per year is EUR 250. Furthermore, the applicants had to share that sum. The Court observes that the amount awarded is approximately 14 % of what it generally awards in similar Italian cases. This factor alone leads to a result which is manifestly unreasonable having regard to its case-law. It will revert to this matter in the context of Article 41 (see paragraph 143 below).
105. In conclusion, and having regard to the fact that various requirements have not been satisfied, the Court considers that the redress was insufficient. As the second condition – appropriate and sufficient redress – has not been fulfilled, the Court considers that the applicants can in the instant case still claim to be “victims” of a breach of the “reasonable-time” requirement.
106. The applicants complained of a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:
107. On 13 July 2004 the applicants informed the Court that they were not complaining of the manner in which the Court of Appeal had assessed the delays, but of the derisory amount of damages awarded and still not paid.
108. In its judgment, the Chamber found that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 because the length of the proceedings did not satisfy the “reasonable-time” requirement and that this was another example of the practice referred to in the Bottazzi judgment (see paragraphs 21-22 of the Chamber judgment).
109. According to the applicants, the Pinto Act had been approved hastily in order to stem the tide of applications against Italy and the many judgments finding a violation, which had given rise to the finding of a practice in Italy incompatible with the Convention. By taking some of the judges off court-of-appeal cases to work on Pinto applications, instead of appointing sufficient numbers of new ones, the Government had merely increased the backlog in the courts of appeal. The applicant did not see how that could prevent further violations.
111. The Court reiterates that its case-law on the intervention of third parties in civil proceedings makes the following distinction: where the applicant has intervened in domestic proceedings only on his or her own behalf the period to be taken into consideration begins to run from that date, whereas if the applicant has declared his or her intention to continue the proceedings as heir he or she can complain of the entire length of the proceedings (see, as the most recent authority, M.Ö. v. Turkey, no. 26136/95, § 25, 19 May 2005).
112. The period to be taken into consideration therefore began on 23 October 1989, when proceedings were instituted in the Benevento District Court, and ended on 31 October 2002, when the judgment was deposited with the registry. It therefore lasted just over thirteen years for one level of jurisdiction.
113. The Court notes that the Court of Appeal assessed the length of proceedings at the date of its decision, namely, 25 February 2002. Accordingly, a period of eight months could not be taken into account by the Court of Appeal.
114. The Court notes that the Government did not dispute the length of proceedings taken into consideration by the Chamber; that the applicants cannot in any case now go back before a court of appeal to seek application of the new precedent set by the Court of Cassation on 26 January 2004 (see judgment no. 1339); and that the remaining period of eight months was not sufficient in itself to amount to a second breach in respect of the same set of proceedings (see, a contrario, Rotondi v. Italy, no. 38113/97, §§ 14-16, 27 April 2000, and S.A.GE.MA S.N.C. v. Italy, no. 40184/98, §§ 12-14, 27 April 2000). Accordingly, the Court considers that since the applicants can claim to be “victims” of the length of the proceedings, it can take into consideration the entire domestic proceedings on the merits and not only those already examined by the Court of Appeal (see, a contrario, Gattuso v. Italy, (dec.), no. 24715/04, 18 November 2004).
115. The Court has already reiterated the reasons that led it to conclude in the four judgments against Italy of 28 July 1999 (see Bottazzi, cited above, § 22; Ferrari, cited above § 21; A.P., cited above, § 18; and Di Mauro, cited above, § 23) that there was a practice in Italy (see paragraph 64 above).
116. It notes that, as the Government have stressed, a domestic remedy has since been introduced. However, that has not changed the substantive problem, namely, the fact that the length of proceedings in Italy continues to be excessive. The annual reports of the Committee of Ministers on the excessive length of judicial proceedings in Italy (see, inter alia, CM/Inf/DH(2004)23 revised, and Interim Resolution ResDH(2005)114) scarcely seem to reflect substantial changes in this area. Like the applicants, the Court does not see how the introduction of the Pinto remedy at domestic level has solved the problem of excessively lengthy proceedings. It has admittedly saved the Court the trouble of finding these violations, but the task has simply been transferred to the courts of appeal, which were already overburdened. Furthermore, given the occasional divergence between the case-law of the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 22-29 above) and that of the Court, the latter is again required to give a decision as to the existence of such violations.
118. The Court notes that in the present case the Court of Appeal also found that a reasonable time had been exceeded in respect of a shorter period than the one taken into consideration by the Court. However, the fact that the “Pinto” proceedings, examined as a whole, and particularly the execution stage, did not cause the applicants to lose their “victim” status constitutes an aggravating circumstance regarding a breach of Article 6 § 1 for exceeding the reasonable time. The Court will therefore revert to this issue under Article 41.
120. In the pleadings lodged with the Court in 2005 the applicants appeared to consider that Articles 13 and 17 had been breached and asked the Court to find that a Pinto application was not an effective remedy on account of the obstacles it had created and the manner in which it had been applied. They also asked the Court to rule on a possible violation of Article 34 of the Convention since, given the series of obstacles constituted by the Pinto Act that had to be surmounted before an application could be lodged with the Court, it could be considered that there had been an interference with the right of individual application.
125. Hundreds of cases are currently pending before the Court in respect of awards made by the courts of appeal in “Pinto” proceedings prior to the Court of Cassation’s departure from precedent and/or the delay in payment of the amounts in question. The Court, while acknowledging with satisfaction the favourable developments in Italian case-law, and particularly the recent judgment of the plenary Court of Cassation (see paragraph 27 above), regrets to observe that where a deficiency that has given rise to a violation has been put right, another one related to the first one appears: in the present case the delay in executing decisions. It cannot over-emphasise the fact that States must equip themselves with the means necessary and adequate to ensure that all the conditions for providing effective justice are guaranteed.
126. In its Recommendation of 12 May 2004 (Rec. (2004)6) the Committee of Ministers welcomed the fact that the Convention had now become an integral part of the domestic legal order of all States Parties while recommending that member States ensure that domestic remedies existed and were effective. In that connection the Court feels it important to stress that although the existence of a remedy is necessary, it is not in itself sufficient. The domestic courts must be able, under domestic law, to apply the European case-law directly and their knowledge of this case-law has to be facilitated by the State in question. The Court refers in this regard to the contents of the Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers on the publication and dissemination in the member states of the text of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the case-law of the Court (Rec (2002)13) of 18 December 2002) and on the European Convention on Human Rights in university education and professional training (Rec (2004)4) of 12 May 2004), not forgetting the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers (Res (2002)12) setting up the CEPEJ (see paragraphs 32-33 above) and the fact that at the Warsaw Summit in May 2005 the Heads of State and Governments of the member States decided to develop the evaluation and assistance functions of the CEPEJ.
128. Without seeking to determine what measures may be taken by the respondent State in order to comply with its obligations under Article 46 of the Convention, the Court would draw its attention to the conditions indicated above (see paragraphs 67-105) regarding the possibility for a person to still claim to be a “victim” in this type of case and invite it to take all measures necessary to ensure that the domestic decisions are not only in conformity with the case-law of this Court but also executed within six months of being deposited with the registry.
130. In its judgment the Chamber gave an indication of the method of calculation used by the Court in determining an equitable assessment of the non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the length of civil proceedings and the possibility of reducing that sum on account of the existence of a domestic remedy (see paragraph 25 of the judgment).
132. The applicants referred to the considerable difference in standard of living between the third-party States and Italy and submitted that the level of compensation could not therefore be the same. They noted that compensation served as a coercive measure against non-complying States that were bound by their undertaking under Article 1 of the Convention to respect the fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Convention. In her submission, a richer State could properly be ordered to pay higher amounts than those required from poorer ones in order to encourage it to remedy its judicial system, particularly where the State in question was found to have committed the same type of violations for dozens of years in respect of thousands of cases. They noted that the criteria established in the judgment in question had merely revealed the criteria that had been applied for a very long time by the Court and were perfectly compatible with the standard of living of Italian citizens. They stated that Italian lawyers, who had access to the judgments in French or English – for want of an Italian version – had already succeeded in deducing from the Court’s judgments all the criteria now being disputed by the Government. They submitted further that the Court could not be expected to draw up an exhaustive list of all the possibilities of reducing or increasing awards. They argued, lastly, that it was down to the domestic courts to consult the Court’s case-law in order to find the Court’s response to a given situation.
137. It indicates next that the amount it will award in respect of non-pecuniary damage may be less than that indicated in its case-law where the applicant has already obtained a finding of a violation at domestic level and compensation by using a domestic remedy. Apart from the fact that the existence of a domestic remedy is fully in keeping with the subsidiarity principle embodied in the Convention, such a remedy is closer and more accessible than an application to the Court, is faster and is processed in the applicant’s own language; it thus offers advantages that need to be taken into consideration (see paragraph 25 of the Chamber judgment).
139. Applicants should also be awarded an amount in respect of stages of the proceedings that may not have been taken into account by the domestic courts in the reference period where they can no longer take the case back before the court of appeal seeking application of the change of position adopted by the Court of Cassation on 26 January 2004 (see its judgment no. 1339, paragraph 23 above) or the remaining length was not in itself sufficiently long to be regarded as amounting to a second violation in respect of the same proceedings.
141. The applicants claimed EUR 8,875 each for non-pecuniary damage, that is EUR 10,000 less the EUR 1,125 awarded by the Court of Appeal.
142. The Government submitted that the finding of a violation would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction having regard to the stakes involved in the dispute.
143. The Court finds that on the basis of the circumstances of the present case (see paragraphs 104 and 111-14 above) it would have awarded each applicant, in the absence of domestic remedies, the sum of EUR 8,000. It notes that each applicant was awarded EUR 1,125 by the Court of Appeal, which is approximately 14 % of what the Court would have awarded each applicant. In the Court’s view, this factor in itself leads to a result that is manifestly unreasonable in the light of the criteria established in its case-law.
Having regard to the characteristics of the domestic remedy chosen by Italy and the fact that, notwithstanding this national remedy, the Court has found a violation, it considers, ruling on an equitable basis, that each applicant should be awarded EUR 2,500.
As the further delay suffered by the applicants after the first finding of a violation by the Court of Appeal was less than one year it is not necessary to add any amount under that head. However, EUR 3,200 should be added for the extra frustration arising from the delay in paying the amount due from the State, which at 29 June 2005 had still not been paid.
144. Accordingly, the applicants are each entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the sum of EUR 5,700, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
145. The applicants claimed EUR 1,500 for costs and expenses incurred before the Chamber and EUR 13,516.56 for the written and oral proceedings before the Grand Chamber against the respondent Government. In respect of drafting memorials in reply to the observations of the third-party Governments, they claimed EUR 1,904.06 each from the third-party Governments plus 2 % CPA (contribution to the lawyers’ insurance fund) and 20 % VAT (value-added tax). Referring to the judgment of Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy ([GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, §§ 255-58, ECHR 2000-VIII), the lawyer who had represented the applicants before the Chamber also requested that the fees be paid directly to him.
146. The Government did not express a view on the costs incurred before the Chamber, but pointed out that the claim in respect of the proceedings before the Grand Chamber was disproportionate.
147. Regarding the claim against the third-party Governments, the Court reiterates that the present case is directed only against Italy and that it is only in respect of that country that it has found a violation of the Convention. Accordingly, any request for an order against another country for the reimbursement of costs and expenses must be rejected.
148. Moreover, according to the Court’s case-law, an award can be made in respect of costs and expenses only in so far as they have been actually and necessarily incurred by the applicant and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, having regard to the evidence before it, the above-mentioned criteria and the length and complexity of the proceedings before the Court, it finds the amount claimed by the lawyer who had represented the applicants before the Chamber to be excessive in view of the work done. Furthermore, given that a legal team was formed for the various cases being examined concurrently (see paragraph 9 above), the Court considers that the case is distinguishable from the case of Scozzari (cited above) and that the lawyer’s claim should not be granted. It considers that the amount awarded by the Chamber should be confirmed for the proceedings before it, that is, EUR 750 per applicant, and that each applicant should be awarded EUR 1,500 for the work before the Grand Chamber, that is, a total sum of EUR 2,250 each, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
2. Holds that the applicants can claim to be “victims” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention;
(a) that the respondent State is to pay each applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 5,700 (five thousand seven hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,250 (two thousand two hundred and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
GIUSEPPINA AND ORESTINA PROCACCINI v. ITALY JUDGMENT