Source: http://www.flra.gov/decisions/v54/54-072.html
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54:0674(72)CA - - IRS, Philadelphia Service Center and NTEU - - 1998 FLRAdec CA - - v54 p674 | FLRA.GOV
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The decision of the Authority follows: 54 FLRA No. 72 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PHILADELPHIA SERVICE CENTER (Respondent) and NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION (Charging Party) BN-CA-50594 _____ DECISION AND ORDER July 31, 1998 _____ Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair; Donald S.
Respondent. The Charging Party (the Union) and the General Counsel filed
oppositions to the Respondent's Exceptions.(1) The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1)
by failing to select a bargaining unit employee (the employee) for a position
as Lead Tax Examining Clerk because the employee engaged in activity protected
by section 7102 of the Statute. The Judge concluded that the Respondent
violated the Statute as charged and ordered that the employee be made whole
through retroactive promotion with back pay and benefits. Upon consideration of the Judge's decision, the exceptions, and the
entire record, we adopt the Judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendations
only to the extent consistent with this decision. II. Background and Judge's decision A. The Facts The facts are fully set forth in the attached Judge's decision and are
briefly summarized here. The events underlying this case took place at the Philadelphia Service
Center (PSC), an office within the Internal Revenue Service. The employee
worked as a tax examiner in the swing unit of PSC--a unit that processes tax
returns in the Data Conversion Branch from January through June and then
processes underreported tax returns in the Underreporter Branch from July
through December. The employee's supervisor varies depending upon the branch to
which she is assigned. The supervisor directly involved in this case was the
employee's Data Conversion Branch supervisor (the supervisor). For a period of
time, the supervisor served as swing manager for both branches, and thus, in
addition to supervising the employee in the Data Conversion Branch, she
supervised the employee in the Underreporter Branch. During her employment at PSC, the employee has been an active member of
the Union. She served as shop steward, membership coordinator, legislative
aide, and on a national-level joint labor-management organization. As one of
two Union representatives from PSC involved in this national-level joint
organization, the employee traveled extensively and spent approximately 70% of
her time on official time as a Union representative. On two separate occasions,
the supervisor told the employee that this traveling interfered with her
performance and that it put a hardship on the supervisor and the unit's
employees. Specifically at issue in this case is the employee's non-selection for
a GS-6, Lead Tax Examining Clerk position in the swing unit. In January,
February, March, and April of 1995, four Best Qualified Lists issued for the
position, with the employee appearing on each one. For the first three Best
Qualified Lists, the highest-ranking employee in each instance was offered the
position and declined the offer. The final Best Qualified List issued on April 5, 1995, and the employee
was first on the list. Unlike the three prior situations, the employee, as
highest ranking employee, was not offered the position. Instead, the Section
Chief for the Data Conversion Branch (Section Chief) showed the supervisor the
April certificate and asked whether the supervisor wanted to pick anyone from
the list for the Lead Tax Examining Clerk position. According to the
supervisor's testimony, she told the Section Chief that she did not want to
pick anyone from the list because she had someone "acting in that spot" (Acting
Clerk), and she was comfortable with that person.(2) Judge's Decision at 5. The supervisor also testified that
this Best Qualified List issued during peak season, so there was not "time to
stop and train someone else to do the position." Id. at 6. The Lead Tax Examining Clerk position was not filled from the April 5,
1995 Best Qualified List. An April 12, 1995 memorandum from the Section Chief
(April Memorandum) stated: "Per our conversation we are not selecting any one
to fill this position, based on the data we spoke (word unclear). Please
forward the package to personnel . . . ." Judge's Decision at 5. The position
eventually was filled in August 1995, and the Acting Clerk was the individual
selected. B. The Judge's Decision The Judge analyzed this case under the Authority's framework for cases
alleging discrimination for protected activity set forth in Letterkenny Army
Depot, 35 FLRA 113 (1990) (Letterkenny). Under Letterkenny,
the General Counsel has the burden to establish a prima facie
showing of discrimination by showing that: 1) the employee against whom the
2) such activity was a motivating factor in the agency's treatment of the
employee. Id. at 118. If the General Counsel fails to make the required
prima facie showing, the case ends without further inquiry.
Id. Once the General Counsel makes the required prima
facie showing, an agency may seek to establish the affirmative defense
that: 1) there was a "legitimate justification" for the action; and 2) the
same action would have occurred even in the absence of protected activity.
Id. The General Counsel may seek to establish that the agency's reasons
for taking the action were pretextual. The Judge first determined that the General Counsel showed by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employee was engaged in protected
activity and that the Respondent's refusal to select her for promotion was
motivated by this protected activity. The Judge then considered the
Respondent's affirmative defense that it did not promote the employee in April
1995 because it was peak season and there was insufficient time to train a new
Lead Tax Examining Clerk. The Judge found this defense to be "wholly
pretextual," and concluded that the Respondent failed to show it would have
taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity. Judge's
Decision at 8-9. In reaching this decision, the Judge relied upon two adverse inferences
he drew based upon the Respondent's failure to call the Section Chief as a
witness: 1) that the Section Chief and her supervisor, the Chief of the
Underreporter Branch, "had no justification for not selecting [the employee],"
Id. at 5 and 9; and 2) with regard to the April Memorandum, that the
"data" referenced concerned the employee's use of official time, Id. at
5, and therefore "[the Section Chief] based the decision not to select anyone
on the consideration of [the employee's] official time usage," Id. at 9.
In explaining the April Memorandum adverse inference, the Judge stated that
"the record would support no other assumption," because "[t]he vacancy
remained; it required filling and was filled a short time later . . .; and the
only matter shown on the record to involve 'data' at all, was [the employee's]
official time usage." Id. at 5 n.4. Along with these adverse inferences, the Judge set forth other
circumstances of the case that caused him to find the Respondent's
justification to be pretextual. The Judge noted that, with the exception of the
employee, "the consistent practice had been to select, for this position, the
employee first on the Best Qualified list[.]" Id. at 9. Further, the
Judge found that the supervisor was neither consulted regarding, nor shown,
earlier best qualified lists from which selections were made. It was significant to the Judge that only when the employee appeared
first on the list was the supervisor consulted and only then that the
supervisor decided she did not want to make a selection. As noted by the Judge,
the supervisor said she did not want to make a selection because: 1) someone
was acting in that position with whom the supervisor was comfortable; and 2) it
was peak season so she did not have time to train someone else for the
position; however, the Judge was not persuaded by either of these rationales.
First, the Judge concluded that the supervisor was not "forthright" regarding
the role of the Acting Clerk and that the supervisor "misrepresented the
departure of" the prior Lead Tax Examining Clerk (Prior Clerk). Id. at
6. Because of inconsistent testimony by the supervisor regarding the Prior
Clerk's departure date and the Acting Clerk's role, the Judge found that the
Prior Clerk was still serving in the position in April 1995, and that the
Acting Clerk was in fact her backup. Thus, according to the Judge, "the person
[the supervisor] claimed was acting as her lead examiner, and with whom she was
comfortable, was not acting as lead examiner[.]" Id. at 9. Second, the Judge found the assertion that it was peak season to be
pretextual. The Judge based this finding on the supervisor's testimony that
peak season in Data Conversion is January through May, and the fact that the
other selections were made during this asserted "peak season." Id. at
6-7. In making his ultimate conclusion that the Respondent violated the
Statute, the Judge also recognized the supervisor's acknowledged disapproval of
the employee's excessive traveling on union business. He therefore found that
"[the supervisor's] real reason for refusing to select [the employee] was [the
employee's] us[e] of official time which [the supervisor] plainly stated 'put a
hardship on me and my unit.'" Id. at 9. According to the Judge, but for
the employee's engaging in protected activity, she would have been selected for
the position.(3) Because the Respondent failed to
rebut the General Counsel's prima facie showing, the Judge held
that it violated section 7116(a)(1) and (2) of the Statute. III. Positions of the Parties A. The Respondent's Exceptions The Respondent argues that the adverse inferences drawn by the Judge
against the Section Chief and/or the Chief of the Underreporter Branch
concerning the reason for the employee's nonselection are not supported by the
record. The two adverse inferences drawn by the Judge were both related to the
Respondent's failure to call the Section Chief as a witness. First, the
Respondent notes that its failure to call the Section Chief as a witness does
not merit any adverse inference, because the Section Chief was available to be
called as a witness by both the General Counsel and the Respondent. Second, the
Respondent specifically challenges the adverse inference that the "data"
referenced in the April Memorandum refers to the employee's official time
usage. In that regard, the Respondent contends that the record does not support
any connection between the referenced "data" and the employee's official time
usage. The Respondent further argues that the record contains sufficient
evidence to show that it had a legitimate justification for not selecting the
employee, and that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of
protected activity. According to the Respondent, the supervisor's statements
about peak season both in a general context--peak season lasts from January
through May--and in a specific context--the supervisor's reaction to being
shown the April 1995 certificate--provide the legitimate justification for the
employee's non-selection. The Respondent states that the selection of the other
employees during January, February, and March does not render the justification
pretextual because the agency is the Internal Revenue Service, and it is
understandable that its workload increases in April.(4) B. The Charging Party's Opposition The Charging Party argues that the Respondent's exceptions merely
restate the arguments the Respondent presented to the Judge and present the
same justification for the employee's non-selection that the Judge found to be
wholly pretextual. Thus, according to the Charging Party, the Respondent has
not established a legitimate justification for its failure to promote the
employee. Because the Respondent failed to rebut the General Counsel's
prima facie case, the Judge's decision was proper. In response to the Respondent's exception to the Judge's adverse
inference regarding the April Memorandum, the Charging Party first notes that
whether the adverse inference was proper is inconsequential to the case's final
outcome and is not a basis for overturning the decision. The Charging Party
states that regardless of the adverse inference, the facts and circumstances of
the case remain unchanged and support the Judge's finding that the
justification given by the Respondent was wholly pretextual. Further, the
Charging Party maintains that the Judge made the adverse inference regarding
the term "data" in the context of the entire record before him and that the
record supports the inference. C. The General Counsel's Opposition The General Counsel asserts that the record supports the Judge's
determination that the justification relied upon by the Respondent to rebut the
General Counsel's prima facie case was wholly pretextual. Thus,
according to the General Counsel, the Judge's decision and order should be
adopted by the Authority. With regard to the Respondent's exception concerning the Judge's
adverse inferences, the General Counsel, like the Charging Party, states that
the Judge's decision is not dependent on the adverse inferences because the
record otherwise supports the Judge's conclusions. That is, regardless of
whether the adverse inferences are accepted, the Judge's decision does not turn
on them and should be upheld. Nonetheless, the General Counsel also contends
that the Judge correctly drew the adverse inference from the Section Chief's
failure to testify, especially because the Respondent chose to have the
supervisor testify regarding the Respondent's justification for not promoting
the employee but chose not to have the Section Chief as a corroborating
witness. IV. Analysis and Conclusions A. Preliminary Matter As a preliminary matter, the General Counsel did not timely file its
Opposition to Respondent's Exceptions (General Counsel's Opposition). However,
for the reasons set forth below, we have considered the General Counsel's
Opposition in this case. The Respondent filed its exceptions to the Judge's decision on May 27,
1997. Pursuant to the Authority's regulations, oppositions to exceptions are to
be filed with the Authority "within ten (10) days after service of any
exceptions." 5 C.F.R. § 2423.28(b) (1997). When service of exceptions on
the parties is by mail, five days are added to the prescribed period for filing
the opposition. 5 C.F.R. § 2429.22. Therefore, the parties'
oppositions to exceptions were due to be filed on June 11, 1997. The Charging Party sought a twenty-one day extension of time to file
its opposition (to July 2, 1997), which was granted. The Authority's order
specifically stated, "The Charging Party's opposition/cross exceptions to the
Respondent's exceptions must be filed by July 2, 1997." Authority's Order,
dated, June 6, 1997. The General Counsel's Opposition was filed on July 2, 1997; however,
the General Counsel did not seek an extension of time to file its opposition,
nor was the General Counsel included in the Authority's order granting the
Charging Party's extension of time to file its opposition. Thus, the General
Counsel's Opposition was untimely filed.(5) However, under the Authority's current practice, when an extension of
time is granted to a party, it is understood that a non-requesting, allied
party is also granted the extension (i.e., if a charging party seeks an
extension of time, the General Counsel is also granted the extension). Although
the order granting the extension of time in this case references only the
Charging Party, the General Counsel relied upon the current practice and will
not be penalized for doing so. As such, we have considered the General
Counsel's Opposition in this case. In order to eliminate any future confusion regarding extensions of time
to file documents with the Authority, for all cases filed after the issuance of
this decision, extensions of time to file will be granted only if a party
specifically requests such extension. Because the Authority's regulations
require that any party seeking an extension of time to file "shall state the
position of the other parties on the request for extension," 5 C.F.R.
§ 2429.23(a), all parties should be on notice of any request for extension
and thus have an opportunity to request their own extension of time to file.
B. The Adverse Inferences Drawn by the Judge As noted above, the Judge drew two adverse inferences from the failure
of the Section Chief to appear as a witness: 1) that the Section Chief could
not articulate any justification for not selecting the employee; and 2) the
"data" referenced in the April Memorandum concerned the employee's use of
official time. The Respondent directly challenges the adverse inference
regarding the April Memorandum and indirectly challenges the adverse inference
regarding the lack of justification for the employee's non-selection. According
to the Respondent, the adverse inference drawn against the Section Chief and/or
her supervisor concerning the reason for the employee's non-selection--that
"data" means the employee's official time usage--is not supported by the
record. 1. The Judge Properly Drew the Adverse Inference Against the
Respondent for Failure to Call a Witness In general, "when a party fails to call a witness who may reasonably be
assumed to be favorably disposed to the party, an adverse inference may be
drawn regarding any factual question on which the witness is likely to have
knowledge." International Automated Machines, Inc., 285 NLRB 1122, 1123
(1987) (IAM). See also 2 John W. Strong et al.,
McCormick on Evidence, 184 (4th ed. 1992) (McCormick). Thus,
it was reasonable for the Judge to draw the adverse inference that the Section
Chief's absence indicated that the Section Chief could not articulate a
legitimate justification for the non-selection. The Respondent contends, however, that no adverse inference should be
drawn with regard to the Section Chief's failure to appear because the Section
Chief was equally available to be called as a witness by both IRS and the
General Counsel. See O'Dovero Construction, Inc., 264 NLRB 751
(1982). In making this argument, the Respondent is overstating the National
Labor Relations Board's (Board) law regarding a witness' being "equally
available" to both parties. As the Board stated in IAM, "an adverse
inference is unwarranted when both parties could have confidence in an
available witness' objectivity." IAM, 285 NLRB at 1123. But where, as in
the instant case, the "missing witness is a member of management" and it can be
assumed that the witness would be favorably disposed toward management, an
adverse inference is warranted even if the witness was, technically, equally
available to be called by either party. Id. Thus, we find that the
Judge's adverse inference regarding the Section Chief's inability to articulate
a legitimate reason for the employee's nonselection was reasonable. 2. The Judge Improperly Drew the Adverse Inference Regarding the
April Memorandum The Judge's adverse inference that the "data" referred to in the April
Memorandum refers to the employee's use of official time is erroneous. There is
no logical rationale for drawing an adverse inference in the manner done by the
Judge in this particular instance. An adverse inference may be drawn if a party
fails "voluntarily to produce documents or other objects in his or her
possession as evidence." McCormick, 184. However, the document
referencing "data" is in the record; thus failure to produce the document is
not a ground for making an adverse inference. Further, there is no evidence that demonstrates how the Section Chief's
failure to appear as a witness necessitates that the word "data" in the April
Memorandum refers to the employee's use of official time. Although the
supervisor counseled the employee regarding her extensive travel for union
business, and testified to her concerns in that regard, there is no evidence
that demonstrates the supervisor spoke with the Section Chief regarding the
employee's use of official time. In fact, nothing in the record suggests that
the Section Chief was aware of the employee's use of official time.(6) Thus, there is no connection
between the "data" in the April Memorandum and the employee's use of official
time. We therefore disagree with the Judge on this adverse inference and do
not draw any adverse inference with regard to the Section Chief's failure to
appear and the meaning of "data" in the April Memorandum. See,
e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 24 FLRA 851,
857 (1986) (Authority disagreed with Judge's adverse inference). Despite our
rejection of this particular adverse inference finding by the Judge, we
nevertheless uphold the Judge's final decision in this case because there is
sufficient other evidence to support the Judge's ultimate conclusions. C. The Respondent's Asserted Justification for not Promoting the
Employee Was Pretextual In order to rebut the General Counsel's prima facie case,
the Respondent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it had a
legitimate reason for taking the action and that it would have taken the action
even in the absence of the protected activity. Letterkenny, 35 FLRA at
119. The Judge found that the Respondent did not rebut this showing because the
supervisor's justification regarding insufficient time to train a new employee
during peak season and her "comfort level" with the Acting Clerk were wholly
pretextual. Further, the Judge noted that the Respondent's consistent hiring
practice was not followed in this instance. The Judge's determination is
supported by the record. The record shows that three Best Qualified Lists resulted in selection
of the candidate with the highest score. Each of the three selections was made
without consultation with the supervisor. When the employee had the highest
score on the final Best Qualified List, however, the supervisor was consulted
and decided that she did not want to fill the position. The Judge considered and rejected the supervisor's two asserted
justifications for not selecting the employee, and the record supports his
findings in this regard. First, the Judge discredited the supervisor's
statement that she was comfortable with the Acting Clerk. The Respondent did
not challenge the Judge's credibility finding in this regard, thus this finding
need not be reviewed. Second, the record supports the Judge's determination that the
supervisor's assertion regarding it being "peak season" was pretextual. As the
Judge noted, the other selections were made in January, February, and
March--part of "peak season," according to the supervisor. Judge's Decision at
6. Further, although we recognize that April is a busy month for the Internal
Revenue Service, we agree with the Judge that the other selections in this case
were made during the period that Respondent described as the "peak
season"--January through May. Finally, it is undisputed that the supervisor was dissatisfied with the
employee's extensive traveling on union business and that she felt that it
interfered with the employee's performance. She testified that she counseled
the employee about this, and she stated that the travel had created a hardship
for her and her unit. Based upon the findings above, the record thus supports the Judge's
determination that the employee's protected activity was the reason for her
non-selection for the Lead Tax Examining Clerk position. We agree with the
Judge that the Respondent's asserted justification for the employee's
nonselection is pretextual. Based upon the Respondent's failure to rebut the
General Counsel's prima facie case, we find that the Judge
properly determined that the Respondent violated the Statute and, accordingly,
we deny the Respondent's exceptions. We also find the Judge's recommended
remedy to be appropriate, having noted (footnote 4 supra) that the
Respondent raised no exception in this regard. V. Order Pursuant to section 2423.41 of the Federal Labor Relations Authority's
Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, the Internal Revenue Service,
Philadelphia Service Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discriminating against bargaining unit employees by denying them
promotional opportunities because they have used official time or have engaged
in any other protected activity on behalf of the National Treasury Employees
Union, the exclusive representative of its employees. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
purposes and policies of the Statute: (a) Make whole Ms. Solone A. West by retroactively promoting her to
the position of Lead Tax Examining Clerk, GS-6, to April 5, 1995, and awarding
her back pay and allowances equal to that which she would have earned in this
position from April 5, 1995, to the date of her promotion, less that
compensation she has received during this period as a Tax Examiner, GS-5. (b) Post at its facilities at the Philadelphia Service Center,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be
they shall be signed by the Director of the Philadelphia Service Center, and
material. (c) Pursuant to section 2423.41(e) of the Authority's Regulations,
Authority, 99 Summer Street, Suite 1500, Boston, MA 02110-1200, in writing,
comply. NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY The Federal Labor Relations Authority has found that the Internal
Revenue Service, Philadelphia Service Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
us to post and abide by this Notice. WE HEREBY NOTIFY BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES THAT: WE WILL NOT discriminate against employees by denying them promotional
opportunities because they have used official time or have engaged in any other
protected activity on behalf of the National Treasury Employees Union, the
exclusive representative of bargaining unit employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
Labor-Management Relations Statute. WE WILL make whole Ms. Solone A. West by retroactively promoting her to
the position of Lead Tax Examining Clerk, GS-6, to April 5, 1995, and WE WILL
award her back pay and allowances equal to that which she would have earned in
this position from April 5, 1995, to the date of her promotion, less that
compensation she has received during this period as a Tax Examiner, GS-5. Internal Revenue Service Philadelphia Service Center Date: _______________ By:___________________________ (Signature) (Director)
is 99 Summer Street, Suite 1500, Boston, MA 02110-1200, and whose telephone
number is: (617) 424-5730. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY Office of Administrative Law
Judges WASHINGTON, D.C. 20424-0001 INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE PHILADELPHIA SERVICE CENTER Respondent and NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
UNION Charging Party Case No. BN-CA-50594
Jack T. Anagnostis,
Esquire Agatha L. Vorsanger, Esquire On Brief For the Respondent Martha D. Finlator, Esquire Paula Ricciardelli, Esquire On Brief For the Charging Party Barbara S. Liggett, Esquire David J. Mithen, Esquire For the General Counsel Before: WILLIAM B. DEVANEY Administrative Law Judge DECISION Statement of the
whether: (a) Respondent failed to select Ms. Solone A. West for a position
as Lead Tax Examining Clerk because of absence from work on official time, in
violation of §§ 16(a) (1) and (2) of the Statute; and/or (b)
Respondent told Ms. West that she wasn't promoted because she used too
much official time, in violation of § 16(a)(1) of the Statute? For
reasons fully set forth hereinafter, I find that Respondent's refusal to select
Ms. West in April, 1995, violated §§ 16(a)(1) and (2) of
June 9, 1995 (G.C. Exh. 1(a)), but the Complaint and Notice of
Hearing did not issue until July 31, 1996 (G.C. Exh. 1(c)) setting
the hearing for September 26, 1996, at a place to be determined in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. By Notice, dated August 30, 1996, (G.C.
Exh. 1(e)), the place of hearing was set, pursuant to which a hearing was
duly held on September 26, 1996, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, before the
opportunity to be heard, to introduce evidence and testimony on the issues
party waived. At the conclusion of the hearing, October 28, 1996, was fixed as
the date for mailing post-hearing briefs which time was subsequently extended,
on Motion of the Charging Party, to which the other parties did not object, for
good cause shown, to November 29, 1996. Respondent, Charging Party and
General Counsel each timely mailed an excellent brief, received on, or before,
December 2, 1996, which have been carefully considered. The Transcript(2) and Exhibits were not received by
this Office until March 3, 1997. Upon the basis of the entire record,
following findings and conclusions: FINDINGS 1. National Treasury Employees Union
(hereinafter, "NTEU") is the certified exclusive representative of a nationwide
unit of employees of the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter, "IRS"),
including employees in the Philadelphia Service Center (hereinafter,
"Respondent"). 2. Ms. Solone A. West is employed as a
Tax Examiner, GS-5; is included in the bargaining unit; has held her present
position for five years; and has been employed by Respondent for about ten
years (Tr. 18, 29). Ms. West is assigned to a "Swing Unit" which is a
group of employees who split their time between two branches. From January
through June, the "Swing Unit" processes tax returns in the Data Conversion
Branch and from July through December "swings" to the Underreporter Branch to
work on tax returns involving under reported income (Tr. 19). 3. Ms. West has a different supervisor
depending on which branch she is working. In Data Conversion, from January
through June, she is supervised by Ms. Lorraine T. Ings (Tr. 18) and
in Underreporter, from July through December, she is supervised by
Ms. Yvette Love (Tr. 18); however, Ms. Ings has served as swing
manager for both branches when the Underreporter Branch was without a manager
(Tr. 42, 43) and, on and off, has supervised Ms. West for about three
or four years (Tr. 19). 4. Ms. West has been an active member of NTEU
for several years and has served as steward, membership coordinator and
legislative aide (Tr. 20). In 1993, Ms. West was appointed by NTEU to
serve on the CORS business team, which was a national level, joint
labor-management effort to re-engineer and improve IRS. She was one of two NTEU
representatives from Philadelphia on this team and participation required
significant travel and high usage of official time (Tr. 21, 22). During
her tenure on CORS, which extended from 1993 to July, 1995, Ms. West
estimated that 70% of her time was on official time as a NTEU representative.
Currently, as a steward, she estimated that she spends 20% of her time on
official time as a NTEU representative and 80% of her time doing tax examiner
work (Tr. 21). Although Ms. West's use of official time was not
questioned, it was clear that her absence as a member of CORS inconvenienced
management (Tr. 22, 58). 5. Ms. West grieved her performance
appraisals covering the years 1993, 1994 and 1995 and her appraisal was raised
in each instance (Tr. 26). Both in the 1993 and the 1994 grievances,
Ms. West's use of official time was discussed and, clearly, had affected
her initial performance appraisal. Her 1993 appraisal, which Ms. Ings had
initialed (Tr. 27), was raised by the Branch Manager, Ms. Sharon
Glenn (Tr. 27), and the adjusted appraisal (Tr. 34), which was used
for her bid for the Lead Tax Examining Clerk opening, discussed hereinafter,
was dated April 20, 1994 (Res. Exh. 1). The grievance meeting on her
1994 appraisal(3) was held in February, 1995
(Tr. 28). Ms. West testified Ms. Ings, "A . . . She really didn't like the
fact that I had a nerve to grieve my evaluation again. "Q Did she say why she thought you should not
grieve? "A Because that I am not in the work place to
-- why should my evaluation be any better than anyone else's if I'm not there
to perform my duties." (Tr. 28). Ms. Ings confirmed Ms. West's
testimony and, when asked if she remembered making statements at the February,
1995, grievance meeting, testified as follows: "A I probably did because her travel status
did put a hardship on me and my unit because, as I stated before, I always had
to get somebody to complete Solone's work."
(Tr. 58). Moreover, in 1994, when Ms. West was her
employee, Ms. Ings counseled Ms. West and testified, ". . . at
that particular year, Solone was doing a lot of traveling. She was on some type
of task force. And I just felt that her traveling probably interfered with her
performance because she probably could have came (sic) up higher had she not
been traveling as much. So she wasn't there to do the work, therefore, her
standards fell." (Tr. 49-50). On cross-examination, she made it clear that
she told Ms. West, ". . . I said something to her to the
effect about her traveling status puts a hardship on my unit because I always
have to get somebody to do her work." (Tr. 58). 6. On November 14, 1994, Respondent
posted a vacancy announcement for: Lead Tax Examining Clerk, GS-6 (Res.
Exh. 2). The closing date was November 28, 1994, and the Best
Qualified list was issued January 20, 1995. Ms. West was fourth on
this list, with a score of 134; Mr. Patrick Hopkins was third, with a
score of 137; Ms. Lendora M. Goodwin was second, with a score of 151; and
Ms. Melissa A. Knight was first, with a score of 159 (Res.
Exh. 2). On January 24, 1995, Ms. Knight was
selected; but she declined the position because she had, ". . .
already accepted another position of a higher grade" (Res. Exh. 2;
Tr. 23). On February 13, 1995, a new Best
Qualified list issued on which Ms. Goodwin was first; Mr. Hopkins was
second; Ms. West was third; and a Ms. Mary L. Gingrich was fourth,
with a score of 132 (Res. Exh. 3). Ms. Goodwin was selected on
February 21, 1995, but declined the position (Res. Exh. 3;
Tr. 25). On March 9, 1995, a new Best Qualified
list issued on which Mr. Hopkins was first; Ms. West was second;
Ms. Gingrich was third; and Ms. Patricia Martin was fourth, with a score
of 127 (Res. Exh. 4). Mr. Hopkins was selected on March 15,
1995, but declined the position (Res. Exh. 4). On April 5, 1995, a new Best Qualified
list issued on which Ms. West was now first; Ms. Gingrich was second;
Ms. Martin was third; and a Ms. Debra R. Henesey was fourth, with a score
of 118 (Res. Exh. 5). But, rather that select Ms. West as the
highest scoring candidate, as it had done on the three prior occasions,
Ms. Mary McKeever, Section Chief, Data Conversion Branch (Tr. 71) and
Ms. Ings' supervisor, came to Ms. Ings, showed her the April, 1995,
certificate and, ". . . asked me [Ings] did I want to pick anybody
from the list, and at that particular time I told her no because I had already
cast (sic) someone acting as my lead." (Tr. 44); ". . . as I
said, I already had someone acting in that spot. I was comfortable with the
person that I had." (Tr. 45). Nevertheless, Ms. Ings recognized that
the vacancy still existed and that it would be announced again, as she said,
". . . I guess it had to be if we didn't choose anybody at that
particular time. That's the usual procedure." (Tr. 47). 7. Ms. McKeever on April 12, 1995,
in a memorandum to Rose Mary, whose position was not identified,
requested, "Per our conversation we are not selecting
any one to fill this position, based on the data we spoke (word unclear).
Please forward the package to personnel . . . ." (Res.
Exh. 6)(Emphasis supplied). Ms. McKeever was not called as a witness
and, of course, no explanation was provided as to what "data" she had discussed
with Rose Mary, or why she had talked to Rose Mary about not filling this
position. I draw the adverse inference that the "data" referred to concerned
Ms. West's official time usage.(4) Ms. Ings testified that the only certification
she was shown was the April certification on which Ms. West was first;
that Ms. McKeever never discussed the vacancy announcement until
April (Tr. 43); and she knew nothing about the selection of
Ms. Knight or Ms. Goodwin [Mr. Hopkins was a Tax Examiner, GS-6
(Res. Exhs. 2, 3 and 4) and apparently not under her supervision. In any
event, she was not asked about presenting, ". . . [the] piece of
paper asking them to accept or decline the position" (Tr. 56), to Mr.
Hopkins] until she received the notification of their selection. I draw the
further adverse inference that Ms. McKeever, knowing that Ms. West
was first on this certification and without justification for not selecting
Ms. West, went to Ms. Ings to conceal her, McKeever's, and/or her
supervisor's, Mr. William E. Mesure, Chief Underreporter Branch, refusal
to select Ms. West. 8. Ms. Ings gave as justification for her
refusal to select Ms. West that, ". . . she had already cast
(sic) someone acting as my lead" (Tr. 44). Then she added, "Well, as I
person that I had. Plus, it was during peek (sic) season . . . we're
pretty busy around peek (sic) season, and we don't really have the time to stop
and train someone else to do the position. Debbie, the employee that I had as
my acting lead, I was comfortable with her; my employees were comfortable with
her. . . ." (Tr. 45). Later she emphasized that, "
. . . I just didn't have the time to train anybody at that particular
time, and we just usually don't pick leads during peek (sic) seasons."
(Tr. 46). The justification given was wholly pretextual. First, Ms. Ings was not forthright in her
assertion that Ms. Debbie Kent was acting as Lead Tax Examiner Clerk
(Tr. 45, 46, 47) and misrepresented the departure of Ms. Roshita
Travers (Tr. 47). Ms. Travers had been the Lead Tax Examiner Clerk
during the entire period Ms. West had been in her unit - about five years
(Tr. 29) - and she had been selected for another position. Indeed, because
Ms. Travers was leaving, this vacancy had been posted in November, 1994.
Ms. Ings first said, "When Roshita [Travers] left me -- well, while she
was my lead, Debbie was my back (sic). So once Roshita left, I just chose
Debbie to be the acting lead until that position got filled." (Tr. 47).
But Ms. Travers had "missed her training" (Tr. 52) and was, "still
sitting with me" (Tr. 52). Not only was Ms. Travers still there in
April, 1995, she was there at least until, "the latter part of '95"
(Tr. 53) and quite probably through all of 1995, "When we swung in that
conversion of '96 [i.e., January, 1996], Roshita didn't swing back with
us"; ". . . So when we swung in '96 of this year, she didn't come
back with me." (Tr. 51). Ms. Ings first insisted that
Ms. Kent, after January, 1995, was her acting lead (Tr. 45-46, 47).
When, on cross-examination, she admitted Ms. Travers was still there, she
said Ms. Kent was her backup, "As her back up because Roshita was still
there with me. She knew the job. Okay. Debbie would act when Roshita was out as
my back up." (Tr. 52); ". . . Roshita was still acting as the
lead . . ." (Tr. 53). But thereafter, she again asserted
that, no, Ms. Kent was functioning as lead tax examiner
(Tr. 53). Second, Ms. Ings testified that the peak
season in Data Conversion is January through about May (Tr. 51, 53). As
noted above, Ms. Knight had been selected on January 24;
Ms. Goodwin had been selected on February 21; and Mr. Hopkins
had been selected on March 15, each within the Data Conversion peak
period; but when the April Certification issued with Ms. West as the top
candidate, for the first, and only time, Ms. Ings asserted,
". . . we don't really have the time to stop and train someone else
to do the position. . . ." (Tr. 45) and ". . . we
just usually don't pick leads during peek (sic) seasons" (Tr. 46).
Ms. Ings' assertions were belied by the selection of Knight, Goodwin and
Hopkins. Moreover, there could not have been a more propitious time to train a
new Tax Examining Clerk as, regardless of which version of Ms. Ings'
testimony is accepted, Ms. Travers, a Lead Tax Examiner with many years
experience was present awaiting assignment to a new position, and available to
train a new lead tax examiner if Ms. Ings were truthful in the assertion
that Ms. Kent was acting as her lead, or if, Ms. Ings were truthful
in the assertion that Ms. Travers was still acting as the lead, as I
believe she was, then Ms. Kent, who had experience as Ms. Travers'
back-up, was present and available to train a new lead tax examiner.
Third, as Ms. West stated, the swing unit
always operates in a peak season (Tr. 19), i.e., from January to
June in the Data Conversion branch and from July to December in the
Underreporter Branch. 9. Ms. West testified, or her testimony can be
read to mean, that after she, West, learned of Ms. Knight's selection she
asked Ms. Ings about it and Ms. Ings told her, ". . . who's
going to do the job if you're not going to be there. I mean, I would have to
train somebody and why should you get paid for this position and you're not
going to be there?" (Tr. 24). Ms. Ings did not recall any
conversation with Ms. West about her not being selected in January, 1995
(Tr. 50), and she did not remember any conversation with Ms. West
after the vacancy announcement in November of 1994 (Tr. 50) - indeed, she
denied any conversation with Ms. West (Tr. 50). I do not credit
Ms. West's testimony that she spoke to Ms. Ings in January, 1995,
about her, West's, not having been selected. I have not credited
Ms. West's testimony for a number of reasons. First, Ms. Ings did not
recall any such conversation. Second, Ms. West testified that
Ms. Knight, a friend, had come to her and told her that she, Knight, had
got the promotion; that she, West, had asked about her performance appraisal
and was told she, Knight, had not got an award. Understandably, because
Ms. West had received an award, she believed, albeit erroneously (Res.
Exh. 2), that she must have been rated higher (Tr. 23-24).
Ms. West testified, "Q Did you talk with anyone in management
after you learned of Melissa Knight's selection? "A No. I went to the union office."
(Tr. 24). As a Union official, Ms. West knew that
the Union got a copy of the Best Qualified list (Tr. 26) and, even though
the Union's copy did not have scores (Tr. 32), she would have known that
candidates were listed in the order of their scores, with the highest being
first, etc. Once she saw the Best Qualified list, she would have known
that Ms. Knight had ranked first; that she, West, had ranked fourth; and
that Respondent had selected the employee ranked first. Third, Ms. Ings
was not the selecting official and had Ms. West asked her why she, West,
was not selected, it is not believable that she would have responded as
Ms. West stated. Rather, she would have said just that, namely, that she
had not been the selecting official. Fourth, Ms. West's statement is not
convincing as a reply as to why, in January, 1995, Ms. Ings said she was
not selected, thus, Ms. West stated, "Well, it was -- I had asked her
about the position, and most of the time -- at that time, I was on the travel
status. So her main thing was who's going to do the job if you're not going to
be there. I mean, I would have to train somebody and why should you get paid
for this position and you're not going to be there?" (Tr. 24). This sounds
more like a statement Ms. Ings might have made if Ms. West, in 1994,
when the vacancy announcement came out, had asked Ms. Ings about the
vacancy. The obvious difficulty is that any statement in November was more than
six months before the charge was filed (G.C. Exh. 1(a)). Or, it may very
well stem from Ms. Ings' January, 1995, statement at the grievance meeting
that Ms. West's, ". . . traveling status puts a hardship on my
unit because I always have to get somebody to do her work." (Tr. 58); or
it could well have been Ms. West's question in April, when she was not
selected even though she was then first on the Best Qualified list, and
Ms. Ings' response, inasmuch as Ms. Ings, for the first and only time
in April made the decision not to select; but I am convinced that Ms. Ings
did not, in January, 1995, tell Ms. West that she had not been selected
because she was away from work too much on official time, i.e.,
Ms. Ings did not tell Ms. West she was not selected because
". . . who's going to do the job if you're not going to be there
. . . why should you get paid for this position and you're not going
to be there?", and this, and no other, is, in essence, the allegation of
Paragraph 22 of the Complaint. CONCLUSIONS General Counsel has shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that Ms. West was engaged in protected activity and that a
motivating factor in Respondent's refusal to select her for promotion to Lead
Tax Examining Clerk in April, 1995, was her engagement in protected activity.
Accordingly, General Counsel had made a prima facie showing that
Respondent violated §§ 16(a)(1) and (2) of the Statute by its
refusal to select Ms. West for promotion in April, 1995. Letterkenny
Army Depot, 35 FLRA 113 (1990); Federal Emergency Management Agency,
52 FLRA No. 47 (1996). Respondent failed to rebut this showing and
its affirmative defense that it did not promote Ms. West in April, 1995,
because it was peak season and it did not have time to train a Lead Tax
Examining Clerk was wholly pretextual. Respondent failed to show that the same
action would have been taken in the absence of the protected activity. Thus, I
have drawn the adverse inferences from Respondent's failure to call
Ms. McKeever, the supervisor of Ms. Ings who supervised
Ms. West, and from Respondent's Exhibit 6, which was a memorandum
from Ms. McKeever that: (a) Ms. McKeever, knowing that she,
and/or Mr. William E. Mesure, Chief Underreporter Branch, had no
justification for not selecting Ms. West, inasmuch as Ms. West was
first on the Best Qualified list and the consistent practice had been to
select, for this position, the employee first on the Best Qualified list; and
(b) that Ms. McKeever based the decision not to select anyone on the
consideration of Ms. West's official time usage. Further, Ms. Ings
had not been consulted, or shown the promotion certifications issued for this
position, in January, in February, or in March, 1995, when, on each occasion,
the selectee had declined the position; that it was only when Ms. West, on
the April certification, was first on the Best Qualified list that she was
shown the promotion certification and, upon seeing the list, with Ms. West
first, she said she did not want to make a selection because she already had
someone acting that she was comfortable with and it was peak season and didn't
have time to train someone else for the position. In fact, the person
Ms. Ings claimed was acting as her lead examiner, and with whom she was
comfortable, was not acting as lead examiner and her assertion about it being
peak season was wholly pretextual. Ms. Ings had made it clear when she
counseled Ms. West in 1994, that her, West's, traveling on "some type of
task force" (Tr. 49) interfered with her performance and that her
traveling status put a hardship on her, Ings', unit because she, Ings, always
had to get somebody to do her, West's, work (Tr. 58). Ms. Ings, at
the February, 1995, grievance meeting on Ms. West's grievance, again said
that Ms. West's, ". . . travel status did put a hardship on me
and my unit because . . . I always had to get somebody to complete
Solone's work." (Tr. 58), and, it seems apparent, that Ms. Ings' real
reason for refusing to select Ms. West was Ms. West's usage of
official time which she plainly stated, "put a hardship on me and my unit".
Therefore, I conclude that Respondent violated §§ 16(a)(1) and
(2) of the Statute by its failure and refusal to promote Ms. West on
April 5, 1995. I further find that, but for her engaging in protected
activity, Ms. West would have been selected on April 5, 1995, for
promotion to Lead Tax Examining Clerk, GS-6. The record shows that
Ms. West was a good and productive employee as she received a performance
award in 1994; she had about 10 years experience with Respondent and had
been a GS-5 Tax Examiner for about five years; she was on the Best Qualified
list for this position four consecutive times and was first on the
April 5, 1995, Best Qualified list; and Respondent had consistently, until
Ms. West topped the Best Qualified list, picked the person highest on the
list. The vacancy remained, required filling and was filled a short time
later. Because, as fully set forth above, I have
found that Ms. Ings did not tell Ms. West in January, 1995, that she
was not selected because she was away from work too much, I do not find an
independent violation of § 16(a)(1) of the Statute and the
allegations Paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Complaint are
dismissed. Having found that Respondent violated
§§ 16(a)(1) and (2) of the Statute by its failure and refusal to
promote Ms. West on April 5, 1995, it is recommended that the
Authority adopt the following: ORDER Pursuant to § 2423.29, of the
§ 18, of the Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7118, it is hereby
ordered that the Internal Revenue Service, Philadelphia Service Center,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discriminating against its employees by
denying them promotional opportunities because they have used official time or
have engaged in any other protected activity on behalf of the National Treasury
Employees Union, the exclusive representative of its employees. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering
order to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute: (a) Make whole Ms. Solone A. West by
retroactively promoting her to the position of Lead Tax Examining
Clerk, GS-6, to April 5, 1995, and awarding her
back pay and allowances equal to that which she would have earned in this
compensation she has received during this period as a Tax Examiner,
GS-5. (b) Post at its facilities at the Philadelphia
Service Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached Notice on
such forms, they shall be signed by the Director of the Philadelphia Service
Center, and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
material. (c) Pursuant to § 2423.30, of the
Authority's Rules and Regulations, 5 C.F.R., § 2423.30, notify the
Regional Director of the Boston Region, Federal Labor Relations Authority, 99 Summer Street, Suite 1500,
Boston, MA 02110-1200, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order,
as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith. ___________________________________ WILLIAM B. DEVANEY Administrative Law Judge Dated: April 23, 1997 Washington, DC NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
that the Internal Revenue Service, Philadelphia Service Center, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, violated the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
and has ordered us to post and abide by this Notice. WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
WE WILL NOT discriminate against our employees
by denying them promotional opportunities because they have used official time
or have engaged in any other protected activity on behalf of the National
Treasury Employees Union, the exclusive repre-sentative of our
employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner,
Statute. WE WILL make whole Ms. Solone A. West by
Clerk, GS-6, to April 5, 1995, and WE WILL award
GS-5. Internal Revenue Service Philadelphia Service Center Date:______________
By:_____________________________ (Signature) (Director)
with the Regional Director of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Boston
Region, whose address is: 99 Summer Street, Suite 1500, Boston,
Massachusetts 02110-1200, and whose telephone number is: (617)
424-5730. FOOTNOTES: Authority's Footnotes Follow: 1. The General Counsel's opposition was
untimely filed. However, for the reasons set forth in section IV.A., the
General Counsel's opposition has been considered by the Authority. 2. The Acting Clerk was not on any of
the Best Qualified Lists. 3. The Judge stated that he found no
additional independent violation of section 7116(a)(1) as alleged in paragraphs
22 and 26 of the complaint. No exceptions were taken to this finding. 4. The Respondent does not except to
the Judge's finding regarding the General Counsel's showing of a prima
facie case or the Judge's recommended remedy. Therefore, those aspects
of the Judge's decision are not addressed below. 5. The Authority has expressly held
that a charging party that has not sought an extension of time may not use the
General Counsel's "approved extension to enlarge the time for filing its
opposition." U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Hartford District Office, Hartford, Connecticut, 41 FLRA 1309 n.1 (1991)
(SSA). The same rationale logically applies when a charging party has
received an extension of time and the General Counsel has not. 6. Although the General Counsel
contends that because the employee's protected activity was highly visible it
is "unlikely" that the Section Chief was unaware of the employee's official
time usage, the record does not demonstrate that the Section Chief had
knowledge of the official time usage. ALJ's Footnotes Follow: 1. For convenience of reference,
(a)(2) will be referred to, simply, as, "§ 16(a)(2)." 2. General Counsel's unopposed motion
to correct the transcript, being wholly meritorious, is granted and the
transcript is hereby corrected as follows: Page Line From To 26 24 was reached were raised 3. Attended by: Terry Bolhill, Ms.
West's then manager; Lorraine Ings, who was no longer her manager but