Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19790504-841778
Timestamp: 2017-04-24 10:03:13+00:00
Document Index: 142191485

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 327", "l'article 6", "l'article 80", "l'article 19", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6"]

X. v. BELGIQUE
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8417/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1979-05-04;8417.78 Analyses : (Art. 10-1) LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION, (Art. 10-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 10-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 10-2) PREVUE PAR LA LOI, (Art. 11-2) PROTECTION DES DROITS ET LIBERTES D'AUTRUIParties : Demandeurs : X. v. BELGIQUETexte : APPLICATIQN/REQUETE NÂ° 8417/78 X . v/BELGIU M X .c/BELGIQU E DECISIQN of 4 May 1979 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISIQN du 4 mar 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention : Examination to determine to what extent a criminal court may take into account information given by a third person who does not reveal his sources . Article 6, paragraph 3(d) of the Convention : This provision cannot b eintrpdasg othecudanlimrghtovebu before the court any informant especially if the fatter has secured a promise fiom rhe police not to reveal his identity . Article 19 of the Convention : The Commission is not competent to examine alleged errors of fact or law committed by national courts, except where it considers that su^h errors might have invofved a possible violation of the rights and freedom set out in the Convention
6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : Examen du point de savoir dan s .Article quelle mesure un juge pÃ©nal peut tenir compte d'informations rapportÃ©es par un tiers qui ne rÃ©vÃ©te pas ses sources. Article 6, paragraphe 3, litt. d, de la Convention : Cette disposition ne peut Ã©tre interprÃ©tÃ©e comme reconnaissant Ã l'accusÃ© un droit absolu de faire convoquer Ã l'audience tout informateur ou dÃ©nonciateur, notamment lorsque celui-ci a obtenu de la police de garder l'anonymat . Article 19 de la Convention : La Commission ne peut examiner de prÃ©tendues erreurs de fait ou de droit commises par le juge national que dans la mesure oÃ» ces erreurs pourraient impfiquer une violation des droits et libertÃ©s ga2nus par fa Convention.
(English : see p . 205 l
Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme sui t Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant belge nÃ© en 1948 . Lors de l'introduction de sa requÃªte, il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de Bruges . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par MaÃ®tre J . Van Londersele, avocat Ã Ninove . Dans la nuit du . . . dÃ©cembre 1975, la maison du frÃ©re du requÃ©rant fut dÃ©vastÃ©e par un incendie au cours duquel il trouva la mort . Une information fut ouverte contre le requÃ©rant au mois d'avril 1976 aprÃ©s qu'une personne, qui souhaitait garder l'anonymat, ait dÃ©clarÃ© Ã la police que les deux frÃ¨res s'Ã©taient disputÃ©s le jour mÃªme de l'incendie . Le . . . dÃ©cembre 1976, la chambre des mises en accusation de la cour d'appel de Gand renvoya le requÃ©rant devant la cour d'assises de Flandres, siÃ©geant Ã Bruges . L'acte d'accusation fut dressÃ© le . . . mars 1977 . II relate notamment les faits et circonstances suivantes : les causes exactes de l'incendie n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablies par les experts, qui ont initialement attribuÃ© le sinistre Ã une imprudence de la victime ; entendu par la police judiciaire le . . . avril 1976, Ã la suite des rÃ©vÃ©lations d'un informateur, l'accusÃ© dÃ©clara d'abord tout ignorer des causes de l'incendie avant de reconnaitre qu'il en Ã©tait l'auteur ; il donna des faits des versions diffÃ©rentes devant le juge d'instruction, tout en confirmant avoir agi dans un accÃ©s de colÃ©re . Le . . . avril 1976, puis encore les . et . . mai 1976 et le . . . octobre 1976, il revint sur ses aveux et nia les faits qui lui Ã©taient reprochÃ©s, indiquant qu'il ignorait comment il avait pu les admettre . Au cours de l'audience devant la cour d'assises, les dÃ©fenseurs du requÃ©rant tentÃ¨rent vainement d'obtenir des prÃ©cisions relatives Ã l'informateur qui avait orientÃ© les poursuites . L'officier de police qui avait recueilli sa dAposition en avril 1976, se borna Ã indiquer que a son informateur Ã©tait un homme qui lui avait dÃ©clarÃ© avoir assistÃ© Ã la dispute du . . . dÃ©cembre 1975 au domicile du recourant ; que cet informateur avait refusÃ© de donner d'autres prÃ©cisions afin de ne pas Ãªtre reconnu par la famille du recourant ; qu'il avait demandÃ© qu'on ne rÃ©vÃ©le pas son identitÃ©, de peur de reprÃ©sailles n . Auparavant, Ã la question d'un jurÃ©, l'officier de police avait admis que, asans la dÃ©position de ce tÃ©moin anonyme, il Ã©tait fort possible qu'aucune instruction n'aurait Ã©tÃ© ouverte Â» Ã l'encontre du requÃ©rant . Il refusa toutefois de rÃ©vÃ©ler le nom de cette personne et invoqua Ã cet Ã©gard le secret professionnel . Les dÃ©fenseurs du requÃ©rant demandÃ©rent alors Ã la cour de prononcer le huis clos et de poursuivre momentanÃ©ment les dÃ©bats en l'absence de l'accusA, afin que le nom de l'informateur puisse Ãªtre rÃ©vÃ©lÃ© sans dommag e
pour celui-ci et que son tÃ©moignage puisse Ãªtre rÃ©futÃ© . La cour refusa . Elle dÃ©cida que l'officier de police judiciaire pouvait lÃ©gitimement invoquer le secret professionnel et que la poursuite de la procÃ©dure Ã huis clos avec exclusion temporaire de l'accusÃ© n'accordait pas Ã l'informateur une garantie suffisante . En effet, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 327 du code d'instruction criminelle, le prÃ©sident de la cour doit a instruire chaque accusÃ© de ce qui .se sera fait en son absence, et ce qui en sera rÃ©sultÃ© n . Par arrÃªt du lendemain, . . . septembre 1977, le jury reconnut la culpabilitÃ© du requÃ©rant . La cour condamna celui-ci Ã une peine de douze annÃ©es de travaux forcÃ©s . Invoquant notamment la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 .d, de l a
Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, le requÃ©rant forma un pourvoi en cassation . Ce pourvoi fut rejetÃ© le . . . janvier 1978 . La cour considÃ©ra notamment que Â« lorsqu'il comparait comme tÃ©moin devant le juge et qu'il y est tenu de dire toute la vÃ©ritÃ©, conformÃ©ment Ã . l'article 80 du code d'instruction criminelle, l'officier depolice peut nÃ©anmoins taire le nom de son informateur lorsque celui-ci a dÃ©posÃ© sous la condition que son anonymat sera respectÃ© et que le fonctionnaire de police qui a acceptÃ© cette condition estime en conscience devoir cacher ce nom Â» . Elle ajouta qu'il Â« ressortait des piÃ©ces auxquelles elle pouvait avoir Ã©gard que le demandeur avait eu l'occasion de contester s'Ã©tre querellÃ© avec son frÃ©re la nuit des faits, fait que l'informateur anonyme a portÃ©A la connaissance du tÃ©moin, l'officier de police ; qu'il avait en outre pu attirer l'attention des membres du jury sur la circonstance que les indications fournies par l'informateur n'avaient pas Ã©tÃ© confirmÃ©es devant eux par ce dernier et sous serment ; qu'il ressortait pareillement de ces piÃ©ces que le jury a pu Ã©valuer librement et en conscience la forceprobante du tÃ©moignage de l'officier de police n
S.GRIEF Le requÃ©rantse plaint de sa condamnation et de la procÃ©dure judiciair e Il soutient n'avoir pu se dÃ©fendre correctement devant la cour d'assises parce qu'il ignorait l'identitÃ© de l'informateur et n'a pu, de cÃ© fait,rÃ©futer efficacement des allÃ©gations de disputes avec la victime, dont la gravitÃ© et la coÃ¯ncidence avec l'incendie Ã©taient de nature Ã influencer le jury . Il fait valoir que la facultÃ© laissÃ©e Ã l'officier de police de se retranche r derriÃ©re le secret professionnel heurte les droits fondamentaux de l'accusÃ© tels qu'ils rÃ©sultenrdes articles 5, paragraphe 1, 6 paragraphes 1, 2, 3 .d, e t14delaConvi . - 202 -
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant, qui s'est vu infliger par la cour d'assises de Flandres une peine de douze ans de travaux forcÃ©s pour incendie volontaire ayant entrainÃ© la mort, se plaint de sa condamnation ainsi que de la procÃ©dure judiciaire en cause . En ce qui concerne les dÃ©cisions judiciaires dont se plaint le requÃ©rant, la Commission a frÃ©quemment dÃ©clarÃ© que, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 19 de la Convention, elle a seulement pour tÃ¢che d'assurer le respect des obligations rÃ©sultant, pour les Parties, de la Convention . En particulier, la Commission n'a pas compÃ©tence pour traiter d'une requ@te allÃ©guant que des erreurs de droit ou de fait ont Ã©tÃ© commises par des tribunaux internes, sauf si elle considÃ©re que de telles erreurs pourraient impliquer une violation Ã©ventuelle de l'un des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã sa jurisprudence constante (voir par exemple les dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des RequÃ©tes NÂ° 458/59, Annuaire 3, pp . 223, 233, et NÂ° 1140/61, Recueil de DÃ©cisions 8, pp . 57, 62) . Dans la prÃ©sente affaire, il est vrai, le requÃ©rant invoque notamment l'article 6, paragraphe 3 .d et se plaint de n'avoir pu obtenir la convocation d'un informateur dont les dÃ©clarations ont Ã©tÃ© mentionnÃ©es Ã l'audience . La cour d'assises a effectivement autorisÃ© un tÃ©moin, officier de police, Ã ne pas divulguer l'identitÃ© d'un informateur qui avait rÃ©clamÃ© l'anonymat . Le tÃ©moin s'est ainsi bornÃ© Ã rÃ©vÃ©ler Ã l'audience que son informateur Ã©tait un individu de sexe masculin qui lui avait dÃ©clarÃ© avoir la certitude que le requÃ©rant avait eu avec la victime une vive altercation le soir mPme de l'incendie . Aux termes de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 .d, de la Convention, toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction a droit Ã Â« interroger ou faire interroger les tÃ©moins Ã charge et obtenir la convocation ou l'interrogation des tÃ©moins Ã dÃ©charge dans les mÃªmes conditions que les tÃ©moins Ã chargeÂ» . Cette disposition vise Ã assurer l'Ã©galitÃ© entre la dÃ©fense et le ministÃ©re public en ce qui concerne la citation et l'interrogation des tÃ©moins, mais n'accorde pas Ã l'accusÃ© un droit illimitÃ© pour obtenir la convocation de tÃ©moins en justice Icf . DÃ©cision sur RequÃ©te NÂ° 4428/70 c/Autriche, Annuaire 15, p . 264) . L'article 6, paragraphe 3 .d ne saurait Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ© comme garantissant Ã l'accusÃ© le droit absolu de faire convoquer Ã l'audience tout informateur ou dÃ©nonciateur ayant contribuÃ© Ã orienter l'enquÃªte, en vue de le faire soumettre Ã un interrogatoire contradictoire . Dans le cadre de leurs fonctions, les officiers de police judiciaire peuvent Ã©tre, en effet, amenÃ©s Ã recueillir des confidences de personnes ayant un intÃ©rÃ©t lÃ©gitime Ã garder l'anonymat ; si cet anonymat devait Ãªtre refusÃ© et si ces personnes devaient ctre obligÃ©es de Ã§omparaitre Ã l'audience, nombre de renseignements nÃ©cessaires Ã la rÃ©pression des infractions pÃ©nales ne seraient jamais portÃ©s Ã la connaissance des autoritÃ©s responsables des poursuites .
La question qui se pose en l'espÃ©ce est dÃ©s lors moins celle du droit de l'accusÃ© de faire citer un informateur que celle de l'utilisation Ã l'audience des dÃ©clarations de l'informateur au regard du droit du requÃ©rant Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . L'officier de police judiciaire a, en effet, indiquÃ©, sous serment, que son informateur avait fait Ã©tat d'une violente dispute entre l'accusÃ© et la victime le soir de l'incendie, sans que la dÃ©fense puisse apprÃ©cier l'origine et la validitÃ© de telles dÃ©clarations . Il y a lieu de relever, toutefois, que le requÃ©rant a pu faire entendre divers tÃ©moins contestant l'existence d'une telle dispute et que l'attention du jury a Ã©tÃ© attirÃ©e sur la valeur d'une dÃ©claration non . confirmÃ©e Ã l'audience sous la foi du serment . Par ailleurs, la Commission observe que ce tÃ©moignage indirect ne constituait pas le seul Ã©lÃ©ment de preuve : le requÃ©rant avait, en effet, fait Ã la police puis devant le juge d'instruction des aveux dÃ©taillÃ©s, encore que partiellement contradictoires, qu'il rÃ©tracta par la suite sans pouvoir expliquer cette modification de son attitude . Eu Ã©gard Ã l'ensemble,de ces circonstances, un examen des faits critiquÃ©s ne permet dÃ©s lors pas Ã la Commission de dÃ©celer l'apparence d'une violation desdroits garantis par la Convention et notamment son article 6 . Elle estime, par ailleurs, que les articles 5, paragraphe 1, etJ4 de la Convention invoquÃ©spaÃ¯ le requÃ©rant sont sans pertinence pour l'examen de l'affaire . Par ces motifs, la Commission DÃCLARE LA REOUÃTE IRRECEVABLE .
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I TRANSLATIONI THE FACTS The facts of the case may be summarised as follows : The applicant is a Belgian national born in 1948 . At the time of introducing his application he was a prisoner in Bruges prison . He is represented before the Commission by Mr J . Van Londersele, a lawyer practising in Ninove . During the night of . . . December 1975, the house of the applicant's brother was ravaged by a fire in which he died . Criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant in April 1976 after the police had been informed by someone who wished to remain anonymous that the two brothers had quarelled on the very day of the fire . On . . .December 1976 the Indictment Chamber 1"Chambre des mises en accusation"1 of the Ghent Court of Appeal committed the applicant for trial at the Flanders Assize Court sitting in Bruges . The indictment was drawn up on . . . March 1977 . It sets out the following facts and circumstances in particular The exact cause of the fire was not estblished by the experts, who initially ascribed the accident to carelessness on the part of the victim ; when questioned by detectives on . . . April 1976, in the wake of revelations by an informant, the accused declared first of all that he knew nothing about the cause of the hre but later admitted that he had started it ; he gave different versions of the facts to the investigating judge while confirming that he had acted in a fit of anger . On . . . April 1976 and again on . May 1976 and . . . October 1976 he retracted his confession and denied the charges against him, saying that he did not know how he could have admitted them During the Trial at the Assize Court counsel for the applicant attempted unsuccessfully to obtain details about the informant who had set the proceedings in motion . The police officer who had taken his statement in April 1976 confined himself to saying that "his informant was a man who said he had been present at the dispute at the applicant's house on . . . December 1975 ; that the informant had refused to provide other details in order not to be recognised by the applicant's family ; and that he had asked that his identity should not be revealed for fear of reprisals" . Earlier, in reply to a question from one of the members of the jury, the police ofticer had admitted that "but for the statement by this anonymous witness, it was more than likely that no proceedings would have been taken" against the applicant . He refused, however, to reveal the person's name and claimed privilege in this respect on the grounds of professional confidence .
Counsel for the applicant then requested the Court to exclude the public and to temporarily continue the proceedings in the absence of the accused, so that the informant's name could be revealed without risk of detriment to him and so that his evidence could be refuted . The Court refused . It decided that the police officer could legitimately claim privilege and that cominuing the proceedings in camera and temporarily excluding the accused did not provide sufficient safeguards for the informant . And, indeed, Section 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the President of the Court must "inform each accused person of what will be done in his absence and what was the result" . The next day . . September 1977, the jury found the applicant guilty . The Court sentenced him to 12 years' hard labdur . Claiming among other things that Article 6, paragraph 3 .d, of the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated, the applicant appeÃ¢led to the Court of Cassation . This appeal was dismissed on . . . January .1978 . The Court held, in particular, that "when appearing before the judge as a witness and under an obligation to say the whole truth, in pursuance of Section 80 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a police officer may nonetheless withhold the name of his informant where the latter has made a statement on condition that his anonymity will be preserved and where the police officer who accepted this condition considers in all conscience that he should withhold the name" . It added that it "appeared from the documents which it had been able to consider that the appellant had had an opportunity to deny that he had qÃ»arrelled with his brothÃ«r on the night of the events in question, a quarrel which the anonymous inforinant brought tÃ´ the knowledge of the witness (the police officer) ; that he had also been able to draw the jury's attention to the fact that the information provided by the informant had not been affirmed before them by the informant under oath ;and that it similarly appeared from these documents that the jury had been able freely and in conscience toweigh the probative force of the police officer's evidencÃ©" .
COMPLAINT S The applicant complains of his conviction and of the judicial procedur e He claims that he was unable to defend himself properly in the Assize Court because he did not kndw the informant's identity and was consequently unable to effectively rebut the allegations of quarrels with the victim, whose seriousness and simultaneity with the fire were likely to influence the jury .Hepointsuhaepolicfer'sightoakerfugbhindt e
plea of privilege runs counter to the fundamental rights of an accused person as provided for in Articles 5, paragraph 1 ; 6, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 .d ; and 14 of the Convention . _206_
THE LA W The applicant, who was sentenced by the Flanders Assize Court to 12 years' hard labour for arson which caused loss of life complains of his conviction and of the judicial procedure involve d As regards the court decisions of which the applicant complains, the Commission has frequently declared that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its sole task is to ensure that the obligations resulting (rom the Convention upon the Parties to it are fulfilled . In particular the Commission is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of fact or law have been committed by national courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the nghts and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention . In this connection the Commission refers to its constant jurisprudence Isee, for example, the decisions on the admissibility of Applications Nos . 458/59, Yearbook 3, pp . 222 and 233, and 1140/61, Collection of Decisions 8, pp . 57 and 621 . Admittedly in the present case, the applicant invokes Article 6, paragraph 3d in partlcular and complains that he was unable to secure the appearance of an informant whose statement had been referred to in the trial . The Assize Court did indeed authorise a witness-a police officer-not to divulge the identity of an informant who had asked to remain anonymous . The witness accordingly confined himself at the trial to revealing that his informant was a man who had told him that he was certain that the applicant had had a violent altercation with the victim on the very evening of the fire . By Ihe terms of Article 6, paragraph 3 .d, of the Convention, any person charged with a criminal offence has a right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him" . The purpose of this provision is to ensure equality between the defence and the prosecution as regards the summoning and examination of witnesses, but it does not grant the accused an unlimited right to secure the appearance of witnesses in court Icf . decision on Application No . 4428/70 vAustria . Yearbook 15, p . 2641 . Article 6, paragraph 3 .d . cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing an accused person an absolute right to have brought before the court, with a view to having him cross-examined, any informant who has been partly responsible for the direction investigations have taken . In the course of theh duties police officers may well have occasion to take conlidential information from persons with a ligitimate interest in remaining anonymous ; if such anonymity were to be refused and if these people were to be required to appear in court, much information needed if crimes are to be punished would never be brought to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities
The question which arises in the present case is tFiÃ©refore notso'muc htaofecusd'rightoavenfmsuoedtaprin court as that of weighing'the court's use of statements made by an informant againsi the applicant's right to a fair trial within thÃ¨ meaning-of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention .â¢ ' . - - . - ThÃ© policeof icer di inde dsta Ã© undei~oath that his informani ha d reported' a violent dispute between the accused and the victim on the eveningofthe fire, and tFie defencÃ¨ was not able to eJaluate'thesource ahd validity ofâ¢such statements It should, however, be pointed out that the applicant had been ablÃ©toproduce in court various witnesses who contested Ihat such a disputÃ© had taken plÃ¢ce and that the jury's attention was drawn to the stalus of astatement made under oath and not corroborated during the proceedings in cour t The Commission also points out that this indirÃ¨ct testimony was no t Ihe only item of evidence the applicant had made detailed, albeit partly contradictory . confessions to the police and then to the examining magistrate, which he subsequently retracted without being able to account for this change in his attitude . . . . . In the light of all the circumstances, an examination of the fact s complained of accordingly does not disclose to the Commission any appearance of a violation of the rlghts guaranteed by the Convention, in particular by Article 6 It also considers that Articles 5, paragraph 1 and 14 of the Convention invoked bv the applicant are irrelevant to the cas eForihsan,teComis
.. .Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 04/05/1979Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page