Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97091/american-federation-labor-vs-board
Timestamp: 2018-05-27 18:17:26
Document Index: 354341680

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 24']

American Federation of Labor Vs Labor Board - Citation 97091 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
American Federation of Labor Vs. Labor Board - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97091
Case Number 308 U.S. 401
american federation of labor v. labor board - 308 u.s. 401 (1940) u.s. supreme court american federation of labor v. labor board, 308 u.s. 401 (1940) american federation of labor v. national labor relations board no. 70 argued december 7, 8, 1939 decided january 2, 1940 308 u.s. 401 certiorari to the court of appeals for the district of columbia syllabus 1. a certification by the national labor relations board, under § 9(c) of the national labor relations act, that a particular organization of workers is the collective bargaining representative of the employees in a designated unit is not an order reviewable by the court of appeal for the district of columbia or a circuit court of appeals under § 10(f) of the act......
American Federation of Labor v. Labor Board - 308 U.S. 401 (1940)
U.S. Supreme Court American Federation of Labor v. Labor Board, 308 U.S. 401 (1940)
1. A certification by the National Labor Relations Board, under § 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, that a particular organization of workers is the collective bargaining representative of the employees in a designated unit is not an order reviewable by the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia or a Circuit Court of Appeals under § 10(f) of the Act. P. 308 U. S. 403 .
2. The Act does not provide for court review of such certifications except as incidental to review of an order restraining an unfair labor practice under § 10. Pp. 308 U. S. 404 , 308 U. S. 407 .
The question whether an independent suit may be maintained in the District Court to set aside such a certification upon the ground that it is contrary to the statute and inflicts irreparable injury is not involved in this ease. P. 308 U. S. 412 .
3. The due process clause is not infringed by withholding from federal courts jurisdiction which they never possessed. P. 308 U. S. 411 .
The question decisive of this case is whether a certification by the National Labor Relations Board under
The Board directed an investigation with appropriate hearings, and a consolidation of the proceeding for purposes of hearing with two other proceedings already initiated by locals of the Longshoremen's Union. Petitioners were made parties to the consolidated proceedings and participated in the hearings, at the conclusion of which the Board made its findings of fact and of law and certified that the workers who do longshore work in the Pacific Coast ports for the employers which are members of five designated employer associations of Pacific Coast shipowners or of waterfront employers, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of § 9(b) of the Act. It also certified that the CIO affiliate, Longshoremen's Union,
The petition prayed that the "order of certification" be set aside insofar as it attempts to designate a single exclusive bargaining representative for longshore employees of many employers on the Pacific Coast and denies to a majority of the longshore
The single issue which we are now called on to decide is whether the certification by the Board is an "order" which, by related provisions of the statute, is made reviewable upon petition to the Court of Appeals of the District or in an appropriate case to a circuit court of appeals. The question is distinct from another much argued at the Bar -- whether petitioners are precluded by the provisions of the Wagner Act from maintaining an independent suit in a district court to set aside the Board's action because contrary to the statute and because
Certification involves, under § 9(b), decision by the Board whether "the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof," and the ascertainment by the Board under § 9(c) of the bargaining representative who, under § 9(a) must be "designated or selected . . . by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such [bargaining] purposes." The Board is authorized by § 9(c) "whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees" to investigate "such controversy" and to certify the names of the appropriate bargaining representatives. In conducting the investigation, it is required to provide for appropriate hearing upon due notice "and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method" of ascertaining such representatives. By § 9(d), whenever an order of the Board is made pursuant to § 10(c) directing any person to cease an unfair labor practice and there is a petition for enforcement or review of the order by a court, the
All other provisions for review of any action of the Board are found in § 10 ,which, as its heading indicates, relates to the prevention of unfair labor practices. Nowhere in this section is there mention of investigations or certifications authorized and defined by § 9. Section 10(a) authorizes the Board "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8(158)) affecting commerce." Section 10(b) prescribes the procedure of the Board when any person is charged with engaging in any unfair labor practice, and requires that the person so charged shall be served with a complaint and notice of hearing by the Board, with opportunity to file an answer and be heard. Section 10(c) directs the Board, if it is of opinion, as the result of the proceedings before it, that any person named in the complaint has engaged in an unfair labor practice, "to issue" "an order" directing that person to cease the practice, and commanding
This brings us to the provisions for review of action taken by the Board in § 10(f) which is controlling in the present proceeding. That subdivision [ Footnote 1 ] appears as an integral part of § 10. All the other subdivisions relate exclusively to proceedings for the prevention of unfair labor practices. Both they and subdivision (f) are silent as to the proceedings or certifications authorized by § 9. Section 10(f), providing for review, speaks only of a "final order of the Board." It gives a right to review to persons aggrieved by a final order upon petition to a court of appeals in the circuit
See Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 364 , 305 U. S. 369 .
In analyzing the provisions of the statute in order to ascertain its true meaning, we attribute little importance to the fact that the certification does not itself command action. Administrative determinations which are not commands may for all practical purposes determine rights as effectively as the judgment of a court, and may be reexamined by courts under particular statutes providing for the review of "orders." See Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 , 307 U. S. 130 , 307 U. S. 135 et seq.; Federal Power Commission v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U. S. 156 . We must look, rather, to the language of the statute, read in the light of its purpose and its legislative history, to ascertain whether the "order" for which the review in court is provided is contrasted with forms of administrative action differently described as a purposeful means of excluding them from the review provisions.
Upon the introduction of the bill which was enacted as the Wagner Act, Congress had pointedly brought to its attention the experience under Public Resolution 44 of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1183. That resolution authorized the National Labor Relations Board, predecessor of respondent, "to order and conduct an election" by employees of any employer to determine who were their representatives for bargaining purposes. Section 2 provided that any order of the Board should be reviewed in the same manner as orders of the Federal Trade Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The reports of the Congressional committees upon the bill which became the Wagner Act refer to the long delays in the procedure prescribed by Resolution 44, resulting from applications to the federal appellate courts for review of orders for elections. [ Footnote 2 ]
And, in considering the provisions of § 9(d), the committee reports were emphatic in their declaration that the provisions of the bill for court review did not extend to proceedings under § 9 except as incidental to review of an order restraining an unfair labor practice under § 10. [ Footnote 3 ]
An argument, much pressed upon us, is, in effect, that Congress was mistaken in its judgment that the hearing before the Board in proceedings under § 9(c), with review only when an order is made under § 10(c) directing the employer to do something "provides an appropriate safeguard and opportunity to be heard," House Rep. p. 23, and that "this provides a complete guarantee against arbitrary action by the Board," Sen.Rep. p. 14. It seems to be thought that this failure to provide for a court review is productive of peculiar hardships, which were perhaps not foreseen in cases where the interests of rival unions are affected. [ Footnote 4 ] But these are arguments to be addressed to
Congress and not the courts. The argument too that Congress has infringed due process by withholding from federal appellate courts a jurisdiction which they never possessed is similarly without force. Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 596 ; see In re National Labor Relations Board, 304 U. S. 486 , 304 U. S. 495 .
The Board argues that the provisions of the Wagner Act, particularly § 9(d), have foreclosed review of its challenged action by independent suit in the district court, such as was allowed under other acts providing for a limited court review in Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Co., 305 U. S. 177 , and in Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U. S. 56 ; cf. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 . But that question is not presented for decision by the record before us. Its answer involves a determination whether the Wagner Act, insofar as it has given legally enforceable rights, has deprived the district courts of some portion of their original jurisdiction conferred by § 24 of the Judicial Code. It can be appropriately answered only upon a showing in such a suit that unlawful action of the Board has inflicted an injury on the petitioners for which the law, apart from the review provisions of the Wagner Act, affords a remedy. This question can be properly and adequately considered only when it is brought to us for review upon a suitable record.