Source: http://blog.transportbusinesslaw.com/tag/carmack/
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 05:06:43
Document Index: 150825113

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13102', '§ 14706', '§ 13102', '§ 13102', '§ 14704', '§ 376', '§ 14704', '§ 13102', '§ 14704']

CARMACK | Transport Business Law & Compliance
MOTOR CARRIERS & BROKERS (CARMACK) – Gazillionth decision ruling that a “broker” is not a “motor carrier” under 49 U.S. Code § 13102, and that the Carmack Amendment (49 U.S. Code § 14706) applies only to the latter and not to the former. But note how ridiculous is the plaintiff shipper’s argument that § 13102(23)(B)’s definition of “transportation” extends to the mere “arranging for [movement of] … property”. Such arguments continue to be offered, and, as here, no mention of sanctions on the party who wasted the court’s and other litigants’ time on them.
Infinity Air, Inc. v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00307-MO (U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, June 20, 2013). Court-issued opinion available here.
Note Court’s analysis in its Footnote 1 of plaintiff’s argument that a “broker” can be a “motor carrier” through the plaintiff’s tortured reading of the definition of “transportation” per § 13102(23)(B)’s definition of “transportation”, i.e., that “transportation” extends to the mere “arranging for [movement of] … property” – therefore by that logic a “broker” is also a “motor carrier”:
“The definition of ‘transportation’ does not alter my analysis. Section 13102(23)(B) states that ‘transportation’ includes ‘services related to [the] movement [of passengers or property], including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and property.’ If the definition of ‘motor carrier’ incorporated the definition of ‘transportation’ and extended to any person ‘arranging for [the movement of] . . . property,’ brokers would cease to exist under the Act. I decline to read the definition of ‘motor carrier’ in a way that renders the definition of ‘broker’ meaningless. Applying the canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, I interpret the general term ‘arranging for’ to be similar to the other specific terms in the series, which all relate to the conduct of the actual transporter. Because Echo did not ‘arrange for’ the movement of property in this more limited sense, it is a broker rather than a motor carrier under the Act.”
Posted in NEW RULES & DECISIONS	| Tagged BROKERS, CARMACK, MOTOR CARRIERS
REMARKS / Court case deciding pretrial motion about what evidence should be allowed at upcoming trial relating to damage to freight – one issue: Does parking a truck rig on consignee railroad’s tracks amount to “delivery” under Carmack? Comment: Seriously? “Delivery?” Isn’t this claim more like the drunk who denied smoking in bed: “It was on fire BEFORE I got into it”. Well … I think the point here is not that “delivery” (if it was that) was well done, but that it happened in any way, shape or form.
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Beemac Trucking LLC, 8:11CV8 (U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, April 30, 2013. Copy of court-issued opinion available here.
See this week’s blog post here.
Posted in COMMENT	| Tagged CARMACK, MOTOR CARRIERS
REMARKS: “MOTOR CARRIER & “TRUTH-IN-LEASING” / Federal statute (49 U.S.C. § 14704) gives “a person injured” by violation of the “Truth-in-Leasing” regulations (49 C.F.R. § 376.12 / “Written Lease Requirements”) a private right of action in court to recover money damages from the offending “carrier” or “broker”. Here court found an issue of fact to be sent to the jury or to the court as trier of fact: Should an individual defendant’s actions be ascribed to an “agent” (not covered by the statute) or a “carrier (covered by the statute)?”
From New Rules & Decisions week of December 17, 2012.
Mervyn v. Nelson Westerberg, Inc., 2012 WL 6604492 (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, December 17, 2012). Free copy available here.
A straightforward reading of 49 U.S.C. § 14704 (“Rights and remedies of persons injured by carriers or brokers”) [free copy available here] makes clear that its remedies are available only to a “carrier” or a “broker”.
And each of those terms is defined in the statute. 49 U.S.C. § 13102 [free copy available here].
What is significant here is that the defendants collectively organized their business in such a way as to muddy the proverbial waters as to what they actually were under the “agent” versus “carrier” headings.
As a result, the motion to dismiss on grounds that the statute did not offer a remedy against a defendant that was neither a “carrier” nor a “broker” – the defendant organization had so organized itself that the acts of an “agent might be attributed also to a “carrier”.
As a result this case proceeds in the direction of trial on the issue of whether or not the defendants or one of them constituted a “carrier” against whom a private right of action under 49 U.S.C. § 14704 will provide a remedy.
Legal take-away & Practical take-away:
In some circumstances it can be a good thing for a defendant in the trucking business to Continue reading →
Posted in COMMENT	| Tagged CARMACK, CORPORATE ORGANIZATION, MOTOR CARRIERS