Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/94288/davis-vs-pringle
Timestamp: 2019-06-17 07:40:20
Document Index: 116431974

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3466', '§ 3466', '§ 17', '§ 57', '§ 9641', '§ 64', '§ 1', '§ 28']

Davis Vs Pringle - Citation 94288 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Davis Vs. Pringle - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/94288
Case Number 268 U.S. 315
Respondent Pringle
..... 1. under the bankruptcy act, as amended february 5, 1903, and june 15, 1906, debts owed the united states are not entitled to priority. so held of claims for freight, storage, and demurrage growing out of federal control of railroads and claims on bills of exchange and checks. p. 268 u. s. 317 . 2. section 64(b) of the bankruptcy act, giving priority to debts "owing to any person who, by the laws of the states or the united states, is entitled to priority," construed with other provisions of this and prior bankruptcy acts and held not to include the united states as a "person," and thus make applicable the priority provision of rev.stats. § 3466. id. nos. 786, 787; 1 f. 2d 860, 864 affirmed. no. 1085, reversed certiorari to three.....
Davis v. Pringle - 268 U.S. 315 (1925)
U.S. Supreme Court Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315 (1925)
1. Under the Bankruptcy Act, as amended February 5, 1903, and June 15, 1906, debts owed the United States are not entitled to priority. So held of claims for freight, storage, and demurrage growing out of federal control of railroads and claims on bills of exchange and checks. P. 268 U. S. 317 .
All the three cases depend upon the question whether the government has a right to the priority it claims. If that is denied, the additional inquiries that would be necessary before the federal agent could prevail in the railroad cases need not be gone into. Therefore, we take up that first. It may be assumed that the priority must be found, if at all, in the Bankruptcy Act and in its supposed incorporation of Rev.Stats. § 3466. That Act, as was said in Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U. S. 152 , 224 U. S. 160 , "takes into consideration . . . the whole range of indebtedness of the bankrupt, national, state and individual, and assigns the order of payment." It was passed with the United States in the mind of Congress, as is shown by the exception of debts due as taxes levied by the United States from the discharge in § 17, pt. 1, the limitation on debts owing to the United States as a penalty in § 57j (§ 9641), and the provisions as to priority in § 64 with which we are principally concerned. By "a" of that section,
normal usages of speech. It is incredible that, after the conspicuous mention of the United States in the first place at the beginning of the section and the grant of a limited priority, Congress should have intended to smuggle in a general preference by muffled words at the end. The states are mentioned in (5) before the United States, showing that their laws were primarily in mind. The United States seems added to avoid some possibly overlooked case. The ordinary dignities of speech would have led to the mention of the United States at the beginning of the clause, if within its purview. Elsewhere in cases of possible doubt, when the Act means the United States, it says the United States. We are of opinion that, to extend the definition of "person" here to the United States would be "inconsistent with the context," and therefore is within the exception at the beginning of § 1. We are confirmed in our opinion by the fact that, in earlier bankruptcy acts, a priority was given to the United States in express terms, and that, for instance, in the Act of March 2, 1867, c. 176, § 28; 14 Stat. 517, 530, "Fifth," persons entitled to priority by the laws of the United States are mentioned when the United States could not have been meant, having been fully secured by the same section, "Second." If it be legitimate to look at them ( Schall v. Camors, 251 U. S. 239 , 251 U. S. 250 ), the bills that were before Congress when the present law was passed contained the clause relied upon, but showed by their context that they could not refer to the United States. There was a change of purpose from that of the earlier acts. Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U. S. 152 , 224 U. S. 158 et seq. Public opinion as to the peculiar rights and preferences due to the sovereign has changed. We agree with the view of this point taken by the Chief Justice and Justices Van Devanter and Clarke in United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Wood, 258 U. S. 549 ,