Source: http://narf.org/icwa/state/indiana/case/ds.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-11 20:22:27
Document Index: 722244670

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1901', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 102', '§ 1901', '§ 31', '§ 1901', '§ 1903', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 1912', '§ 31', '§ 1912']

ICWA Guide Online | Indiana Cases Federal Resources | Resources by State | Cases A-Z (Cite as: 577 N.E.2d 572)
the Matter of the Termination of the Parental Rights of
D.S., Mother, and
D.E.S.,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF ST. JOSEPH COUNTY, Indiana, Appellee
71S04-9109-CV-680.
of the Congressional purposes in adopting the Indian Child Welfare
Act was to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, §§ 2,
3, 4(4), 102, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901,
1902, 1903(4), 1912(d).
mother of child is a native American Indian, the mother
and child, at least
presumptively for purposes of initiating inquiries under the Indian Child
Welfare Act, constitute an "Indian family." Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978, §§ 2,
1902, 1903(4), 1912(d). In
proceeding to terminate parental rights of a child born to
native Potawatomi Indian mother and Caucasian father, probate court was
required to serve notice to the Potawatomi Tribe in form
which conformed to the Indian Child Welfare Act. Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, §§ 2,
of parental rights of Indian child based on state law
evidentiary standard that termination be based on "clear and convincing
evidence" that termination
child, rather than under federal law which requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt that mother's parental rights should be terminated, was
error. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, § 102(f),
West's A.I.C. 31-6-5-1 et seq.
proceeding to terminate parental rights of Indian child, it was
error to fail to inquire of expert witnesses as to
their specific qualifications related to placement of native American children.
Bruce J. Bondurant, South Bend, for appellee.
This cause comes to us on a petition to transfer
brought by Respondent-Appellant, D.S., ("the mother") whose parental rights were
terminated by the St. Joseph Probate Court. The determinative issues
involve the application of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901
(1988) (hereinafter "ICWA"). Specifically, the mother alleges the following errors
in the proceedings below: (1)
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case. (2)
The trial court applied the wrong evidentiary standard to the
The record reveals that D.E.S. ("the child") was born to
the mother and father on July 10, 1987. The mother
is a native Potawatomi Indian and the father is Caucasian,
making the child one-half Indian. The child and his parents
resided in South Bend, not on an Indian reservation. The
child left the hospital to go home with his mother
on July 16, 1987. The next day two representatives from
the St. Joseph County Welfare Department visited the home to
check on the child, who had been born six weeks
prematurely and was considered to be an at-risk infant due
to his mother's prenatal alcohol abuse. The father forced the
welfare workers to leave and the mother became upset with
him for doing so and called the police. The police
arrived and found the father and mother arguing and, apparently,
intoxicated. After consulting with the Welfare Department, they removed the
child from the home.
A hearing was held and the child was ordered detained
by the Department of Welfare
on July 22, 1987. After a second hearing, held on
September 30, 1987, the trial court determined the child to
be in need of services, pursuant to Ind.Code Ann. § 31-6-4-3(a)(1)
(West 1982), and ordered that he remain in foster care
until his parents demonstrated control of their substance abuse problems.
The trial court conducted a hearing on termination of parental
rights on January 26, 1989, during which Welfare Department workers
testified that the mother had not satisfactorily completed treatment programs
aimed to control her alcohol consumption and reunite her with
her child. The trial court ordered, on February 3, 1989,
termination of parental rights of the mother, finding that the
ICWA did not apply; that substance abuse by the mother,
which necessitated removal of the child from her home, would
not be remedied; that reasonable services offered to help the
mother fulfill her parental obligations were ineffective; and that termination
of parental rights was in the best interests of the
child. The trial court noted that subpoenaes had been served
on two representatives of the Potawatomi Indian Nation; however, these
are not contained in the record. Representatives of the Potawatomi
Indian Nation were present at the original July 22, 1987,
detention hearing, but not at any of the subsequent hearings.
In an unpublished memorandum decision the Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding first that the trial court properly had jurisdiction to
hear the case because "there was no Indian family" and
because "good cause" supported the trial court's
decision to not transfer to the tribal court. Matter
of Termination of Parental Rights of D.S.
(1990), Ind.App., No. 71A04-8908-CV-363 at 3-4. The Court of Appeals
additionally held that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of
parental rights of the mother. Id.
at 4-5. Because the trial court did not follow the
provisions of the ICWA as they relate to jurisdiction and
the evidentiary standard to be applied in terminating parental rights,
The question of the trial court's jurisdiction concerns whether this case *574 should have been transferred to the Potawatomi tribal court, if one exists. It is true, as the Court of Appeals noted, that one of the Congressional purposes in adopting the ICWA was to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1912(d) (1988). The Court of Appeals decided that the mother and her child in this case did not constitute an Indian family. We disagree and hold that a mother and child do constitute a "family". Furthermore, where the mother is a Native American Indian, the mother and child, at least presumptively for purposes of initiating ICWA inquiries, constitute an "Indian family."
An Indian child is defined in the ICWA as "any unmarried person who is under age 18 and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988). The record in the present case does not reflect whether the mother is a member of an Indian tribe, although it does show that she is an Indian. Upon remand, the factual question of tribal membership must be answered by the trial court.
Assuming that the child is an Indian child, as defined
by the ICWA, then the ICWA applies and its provisions
controlling termination of parental rights should have been followed by
the trial court. The provisions of the ICWA reflect a
preference for tribal court jurisdiction. In fact, section 1911(a) provides
that the tribal court retains exclusive
jurisdiction for Indian children residing or domiciled on the reservation.
An illegitimate child's domicile is determined by that of his
mother and her domicile is generally established by physical presence
in a place in connection with an intent to remain
there. Mississippi
(1989), 490 U.S. 30, 48, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1608, 104
L.Ed.2d 29, 46. In this case, the mother was domiciled,
off the reservation, in South Bend, Indiana. Therefore, the child
was domiciled in South Bend off the reservation. Consequently, section
1911(a) does not apply and the courts must proceed to
section 1911(b), which also reflects a preference for tribal court
jurisdiction. This section provides that, for children not domiciled within
the reservation, jurisdiction must be transferred to the tribal court
upon a petition by either the parent or the tribe,
absent good cause not to transfer to the tribal court.
The Court of Appeals noted that no one in the
present case requested such a transfer to the tribal court.
However, absent proper notice, the tribe would not have had
an opportunity to file such a petition. The trial judge
noted at the end of the January 26, 1989, hearing
that subpoenaes were served on Antonia Shubert and Loretta Hale,
two representatives of the Potawatomi Indian Nation, on January 19,
1989. However, these returns are not located in the record
before this Court. Therefore, there is no record to use
to determine the adequacy of the content of such notice.
Additionally, the record does not show whether notification directed to
these two individuals complies with the notice requirement set out
in the statute. The ICWA provides as follows: (a)
the parent or Indian custodian and the
of the pending proceedings
and of their right of intervention. If the identity or
location of the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe
cannot be determined, such notice shall be given to the
Secretary in a like manner, who shall have fifteen days
That the parent or *575
Additionally, the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") published guidelines regarding
the notice requirements which correspond to and supplement the requirements
in section 1912(a). These guidelines set forth in detail the
notice requirements of the ICWA. Additionally, we note that the
BIA also published regulations for providing notice to the Bureau
in cases where the parents or the Indian child's tribe
cannot be found. 25 C.F.R. § 23.11
(1990). Finally, the BIA authorizes tribes to designate an agent
for service of notice of child custody proceedings. 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.12.
In the case before us, it does not appear that
the trial court followed federal law. Although the trial judge
noted verbally that Antonia Shubert and Loretta Hale received subpoenaes
by personal service of the termination of parental rights hearing,
copies of these subpoenaes do not appear in the record.
Therefore, we cannot determine the adequacy of such notice. Furthermore,
the record does not show that these women were the
tribal agents designated and entitled to receive service of notice.
Therefore, we must remand this case to the trial court
to serve notice to the Potawatomi tribe in a
form which conforms to the ICWA.
Standard and Termination of Parental Rights of Indian Children
The mother next asserts error in the proceedings below regarding the evidentiary standard used to terminate her parental rights over the child. The ICWA provides: (f)
a reasonable doubt, including testimony by qualified expert witnesses, that
physical damage to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)
(1988). The evidentiary standard required by the Act is clear.
The welfare department is required to produce evidence which shows
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that the mother's parental rights should
be terminated. The trial court's order terminating the mother's parental
rights does not indicate the standard of proof used. However,
the court said the ICWA did not apply and instead
terminated the mother's parental rights according to Ind.Code Ann. § 31-6-5-1
(West 1982). Under state law, the termination must be based
on "clear and convincing evidence" that termination of parental rights
is in the best interests of the child. Matter
(1989), Ind., 538 N.E.2d 1385, 1387. Therefore, proceeding under state
law rather than federal law, which imposes a greater evidentiary
burden of proof, was error.
Finally, the mother disputes the qualifications of the expert witnesses who testified at the termination of parental rights hearing because the ICWA refers to testimony of "qualified expert witnesses." 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1988). In Matter of Adoption of T.R.M. (1988), Ind., 525 N.E.2d 298, this Court noted that the BIA established guidelines for determining who is a qualified expert witness for purposes of the ICWA. Id. at 311. The BIA states: (b)
Persons with the following characteristics are most likely to meet
the requirements for a qualified expert witness for purposes of
Indian child custody proceedings: (i)
the Indian child's tribe. *576
(iii) A professional person having substantial education and experience
in the area of his or her specialty. 44 Fed.Reg. 67583, 67593 (1979). The trial court in this
case failed to inquire of the expert witnesses as to
their specific qualifications related to the placement of Native American
Indian children. This omission constitutes error. One of the problems
the ICWA sought to correct was the failure of welfare
workers to understand Indian culture and practices concerning the raising
of children. House Report on Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978. H.R.Rep.
1386, 95th. Cong., 2d Sess. 10, Reprinted
1978 U.S.Code
7530, 7532. The record does not reveal that any consideration
for these concerns was given by the trial court in
ruling on the underlying qualifications of the expert witnesses.
We vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reverse
the judgment of the trial court, and remand for proceedings
to be conducted consistent with this opinion and the Indian
GIVAN and DICKSON, JJ., dissent without separate opinion.
577 N.E.2d 572