Source: http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/thompson-v-county-alameda-30553
Timestamp: 2013-05-24 14:58:27
Document Index: 419845244

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 430', '§ 818', '§ 845', '§ 846', '§ 1176', '§ 315', '§ 845', '§ 1714', '§ 1024', '§ 5000']

Thompson v. County of Alameda - 27 Cal.3d 741 - Mon, 07/14/1980 | California Supreme Court Resources	Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library
Home > Opinions > Thompson v. County of Alameda	Citation 27 Cal.3d 741
Thompson v. County of Alameda , 27 Cal.3d 741
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendant County of Alameda (County) after County's [27 Cal.3d 746] general demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. We will affirm the judgment.
For purposes of this appeal, those factual allegations of the complaint which are properly pleaded are deemed admitted by defendant's demurrer. (White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 765 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222].) We recite the gravamen of plaintiffs' causes of action as contained in their amended complaint. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, and their minor son lived in the City of Piedmont, a few doors from the residence of the mother of James F. (James), a juvenile offender. Prior to the incident in question, James had been in the custody and under the control of County and had been confined in a county institution under court order. County knew that James had "latent, extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young children and that sexual assaults upon young children and violence connected therewith were a likely result of releasing [him] into the community." County also knew that James had "indicated that he would, if released, take the life of a young child residing in the neighborhood." (James gave no indication of which, if any, young child he intended as his victim.) County released James on temporary leave into his mother's custody at her home, and "[a]t no time did [County] advise and/or warn [James' mother], the local police and/or parents of young children within the immediate vicinity of [James' mother's] house of the known facts. ..." Within 24 hours of his release on temporary leave, James murdered plaintiffs' son in the garage of James' mother's home.
County demurred on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)), contending that Government Code sections 818.2, 820.2, 844.6, subdivision (a) (1), 845, 845.8, subdivision (a), and 846, granted County immunity. [27 Cal.3d 747]
We note preliminarily that Government Code sections 818.2, 845, and 846 afford the County no immunity. The alleged failures of County do not invoke these statutory immunities because the claimed omissions of County do not involve the adoption or failure to adopt any enactment or lack of enforcement of any law (§ 818.2), the failure to provide police protection (§ 845), or the failure to make an arrest or retain an arrested person in custody (§ 846). [1] Similarly inapplicable is section 844.6, subdivision (a) (1), applicable only to liability for injuries caused by a "prisoner," because a private residence utilized for the custody of delinquent children may not be deemed the equivalent of a prison (Patricia J. v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 278, 287 [132 Cal.Rptr. 211]); nor is a minor placed in the custody of his family or foster parents a "prisoner" for purposes of section 844.6.
In Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 795 [73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352], we characterized the determination of whether or not to release an offender as a discretionary decision clothed with immunity under section 820.2 when made by the appropriate authorities. We explained, "The decision to parole thus comprises the resolution of policy considerations, entrusted by statute to a coordinate branch of government, that compels immunity from judicial reexamination." (Johnson, supra, at p. 795; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1176.) In the present case, plaintiffs fail to allege that the releasing agent was not empowered to make the determination to release James. It follows that the decision to release James is immune from tort liability under section 820.2.
A further specific immunity within this context is conferred by section 845.8, which explicitly provides that "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: [¶] (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner ...." (Italics added.) [27 Cal.3d 748]
[3] Section 820.2 recites "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused." In Johnson we rejected a purely mechanical analysis of the term "discretionary." Rather, we both emphasized and evaluated those policy considerations which underlie grants of immunity in order to determine which acts are protected. As we subsequently declared in McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 260-261 [74 Cal.Rptr. 389, 449 P.2d 453], contentions such as those which are made here "have frequently required judicial determination of the category into which the particular act falls: i.e., whether it was ministerial because it amounted 'only to an obedience to orders, or the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own," or discretionary because it required 'personal deliberation, decision and judgment.' (Morgan v. County of Yuba (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 938, 942-943 ... [citations].)"
The discretionary nature of the selection of custodians for potentially dangerous minors and the determination of the requisite level of governmental supervision for such custodians becomes apparent when the underlying policy considerations are analyzed. Choosing a proper custodian to direct the attempted rehabilitation of a minor with a prior history of antisocial behavior is a complex task. (See Simpson, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System (1976) 64 Cal.L.Rev. 984, 1003-1015; Nejelski, Diversion: Unleashing the Hound of Heaven? in Pursuing Justice for the Child (Rosenheim edit. 1976) p. 94, at pp. 104-116.) The determination involves a careful [27 Cal.3d 749] consideration and balancing of such factors as the protection of the public, the physical and psychological needs of the minor, the relative suitability of the home environment, the availability of other resources such as halfway houses and community centers, and the need to reintegrate the minor into the community. The decision, requiring as it does, comparisons, choices, judgments, and evaluations, comprises the very essence of the exercise of "discretion" and we conclude that such decisions are immunized under section 820.2.
[4] Moreover, as previously noted, section 845.8 immunizes County from liability for "Any injury resulting from determining ... the terms and conditions of [a prisoner's] release. ..." As established in County of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 751, 757 [93 Cal.Rptr. 406], immunity under this section is provided when the questioned acts involve policy decisions made prior to or as an integral part of the decision to release. (Accord, Whitcombe v. County of Yolo (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 698, 713 [141 Cal.Rptr. 189].) The selection of James' mother as custodian and the degree of supervision to be exercised over her clearly involved such protected policy decisions.
We now examine the principal and most troublesome contentions of plaintiffs, namely, that County is liable for its failure to warn the local police and the parents of neighborhood children that James was being released or, alternatively, to warn James' mother of his expressed threat. We first inquire whether there would be liability in the absence of immunity (Smith v. Alameda County Social Services Agency (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 929, 935 [153 Cal.Rptr. 712]) and determine initially whether in any event County had a duty to warn for the protection of plaintiffs.
As we observed in Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728 [69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316], duty "'is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. ... But it should be recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the [27 Cal.3d 750] law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' (Prosser, Law of Torts [3d ed.] at pp. 332-333.)" (P. 734.) Courts, however, have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally "the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, ..." (Id., at p. 739.)
[5] The existence of "duty" is a question of law. (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 66-67 [271 P.2d 23].) "[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done." (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166].)
[6] It is a fundamental proposition of tort law that one is liable for injuries caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care. [7] We have said, however, that in considering the existence of "duty" in a given case several factors require consideration including "the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. [Citations.]" (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; compare Richards v. Stanley, supra, and Hergenrether v. East (1964) 61 Cal.2d 440 [39 Cal.Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164].) When public agencies are involved, additional elements include "the extent of [the agency's] powers, the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by budget; ..." (Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist. (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [31 Cal.Rptr. 847]; see Smith v. Alameda County Social Services Agency, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d 929.)
Bearing in mind the foregoing controlling considerations, we examine the propriety of imposing on those responsible for releasing or confining criminal offenders a duty to warn of the release of a potentially dangerous offender who, as here, has made a generalized threat to a segment of the population. Our earlier rulings in Johnson v. State of California, supra, 69 Cal.2d 782, and Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, furnish considerable guidance in our inquiry and plaintiffs rely heavily on both cases in support of their view that [27 Cal.3d 751] County had an affirmative duty to warn someone (the police, the offender's parent, or neighborhood parents) of the dangers arising from James' release.
Likewise in Tarasoff we were concerned with the duty of therapists, after determining that a patient posed a serious threat of violence, to protect the "foreseeable victim of that danger." (Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 439.) In reaching the conclusion that the therapists had a duty to warn either "the endangered party or those who can reasonably be expected to notify him, ..." (id., at p. 442), we relied on an exception to the general rule that one owes no duty to control the conduct of another. (Id., at p. 435; see Rest.2d Torts (1965) §§ 315-320.) As declared in section 315 of the Restatement, such a duty may arise if "(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or [27 Cal.3d 752] (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection."
We recognized in Tarasoff that "the open and confidential character of psychotherapeutic dialogue encourages patients to express threats of violence, few of which are ever executed. Certainly a therapist should not be encouraged routinely to reveal such threats; such disclosures could seriously disrupt the patient's relationship with his therapist and with the persons threatened." (17 Cal.3d at p. 441.) We further concluded that "the therapist's obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threatened danger. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Thus, we made clear that the therapist has no general duty to warn of each threat. Only if he "does in fact determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, [does he bear] a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger." (17 Cal.3d at p. 439, italics added.) Although the intended victim as a [27 Cal.3d 753] precondition to liability need not be specifically named, he must be "readily identifiable." (Ibid., fn. 11; see Mavroudis v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 594, 599-601 [162 Cal.Rptr. 724].)
Notwithstanding the danger illustrated by the foregoing statistics, parole and probation release nonetheless comprise an integral and continuing part in our correctional system authorized by the Legislature, serving the public by rehabilitating substantial numbers of offenders and returning them to a productive position in society. The result, as we observed in Johnson, is that "each member of the general public who chances to come into contact with a parolee bear[s] the risk that the rehabilitative effort will fail. ..." (69 Cal.2d at p. 799.) The United States Supreme Court very recently reached a similar conclusion in Martinez v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277 [62 L.Ed.2d 481, [27 Cal.3d 754] 100 S.Ct. 553, 557]. In Martinez, the high court rejected a contention that the California governmental immunity statutes (Gov. Code, § 845.8 in particular) deprived plaintiffs' decedent of her life without due process of law because of a parole decision that led indirectly to her death. (Martinez, 444 U.S. at p. 280-281 [62 L.Ed.2d at pp. 486-487, 100 S.Ct. at p. 557].) The Supreme Court observed that "the basic risk that repeat offenses may occur is always present in any parole system." (Ibid.)
[8] Bearing in mind the ever present danger of parole violations, we nonetheless conclude that public entities and employees have no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate with a violent history who has made nonspecific threats of harm directed at nonspecific victims. Obviously aware of the risk of failure of probation and parole programs the Legislature has nonetheless as a matter of public policy elected to continue those programs even though such risks must be borne by the public. (See Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 342, 347 [151 Cal.Rptr. 796].)
Furthermore, we foresee significant practical obstacles in the imposition of a duty in the form that plaintiffs seek, concluding that it would be unwieldy and of little practical value. As previously indicated a large number of persons are released and supervised on probation and parole each year in this state. Notification to the public at large of the release of each offender who has a history of violence and who has made a generalized threat at some time during incarceration or while under supervision would, in our view, produce a cacaphony of warnings that [27 Cal.3d 755] by reason of their sheer volume would add little to the effective protection of the public.
Unlike members of the general public, in Tarasoff and Johnson the potential victims were specifically known and designated individuals. The warnings which we therein required were directed at making those individuals aware of the danger to which they were uniquely exposed. The threatened targets were precise. In such cases, it is fair to conclude that warnings given discreetly and to a limited number of persons would have a greater effect because they would alert those particular targeted individuals of the possibility of a specific threat pointed at them. In contrast, the warnings sought by plaintiffs would of necessity have to be made to a broad segment of the population and would be only general in nature. In addition to the likelihood that such generalized warnings when frequently repeated would do little as a practical matter to stimulate increased safety measures, as we develop below, such extensive warnings would be difficult to give. [27 Cal.3d 756]
b.) Warnings to Parents of Neighborhood Children. In similar fashion, requiring the releasing agent to warn all neighborhood parents of small children that a potentially dangerous offender had been released [27 Cal.3d 757] in the area would require an expenditure of time and limited resources that parole and probation agencies cannot spare and would be of questionable value. The magnitude of the problem may be understood in the light of statistics contained in the above cited CPPCA report. In 1978 California probation departments employed a total of 18,331 persons, including professional probation officers, group counselors, clerical staff, business management professionals, psychiatrists, psychologists, medical specialists, other treatment personnel, and 5,156 part-time or volunteer staff members. As previously noted, these personnel exercised supervision over 315,000 probationers "on the streets" during that year. (CPPCA Rep., at p. 16; see also Keldgor & Norris, New Directions for Correction (Mar. 1972) 36 Fed. Probation, at p. 3 [a study of California's correctional system].)
Furthermore, such notice might substantially jeopardize rehabilitative efforts both by stigmatizing released offenders and by inhibiting their release. It is also possible that, in addition, parole or probation authorities would be far less likely to authorize release given the substantial drain on their resources which such warnings might require. A stated public policy favoring innovative release programs would be thwarted. (See Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d 698, 716; Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., supra, 88 Cal.App.3d 342, 347.)
The dissent speculates that the mother "might" have taken special care to control her son had she been warned of James' threats, inferring thereby that she would have maintained such constant surveillance over her son as to prevent any possible harm. Such attenuated conjecture, however, cannot alone support the imposition of civil liability. This is particularly true inasmuch as the County's original decision to release [27 Cal.3d 758] James from close confinement into the obviously less restrictive custody of his mother is a decision we already hold is immunized from liability.
In summary, whenever a potentially dangerous offender is released and thereafter commits a crime, the possibility of the commission of that crime is statistically foreseeable. Yet the Legislature has concluded that the benefits to society from rehabilitative release programs mandate their continuance. Within this context and for policy reasons the duty to warn depends upon and arises from the existence of a prior threat to a specific identifiable victim. (Cf. Morgan v. County of Yuba (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 938 [41 Cal.Rptr. 508].) In those instances in which the released offender poses a predictable threat of harm to a named or readily identifiable victim or group of victims who can be effectively warned of the danger, a releasing agent may well be liable for failure to warn such persons. [9] Despite the tragic events underlying the present complaint, plaintiffs' decedent was not a known, identifiable victim, but rather a member of a large amorphous public group of potential targets. Under these circumstances we hold that County had no affirmative duty to warn plaintiffs, the police, the mother of the juvenile offender, or other local parents.
Because we have concluded that County was either statutorily immunized from liability or, alternatively, bore no affirmative duty that it failed to perform, we need not reach the other contentions raised by County. [27 Cal.3d 759]
The issue before us is whether the foregoing allegations state a cause of action for wrongful death against the county. The basis for upholding the complaint is clear and straightforward. The county, having custody of James, stood in a "special relationship" to James that imports a duty to control his conduct and to warn of danger. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435-437 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166].) The county placed James in the temporary custody of his mother without informing her that James had threatened to kill a neighborhood child. Whether that failure to warn was negligent and proximately caused Jonathan's death are questions of fact which cannot be resolved on demurrer. Since under the alleged facts the county can claim no statutory immunity from liability arising from its failure to warn (see Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 797 [73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352]), the complaint states a cause of action. [27 Cal.3d 760]
The majority opinion in reaching a contrary result misreads controlling precedent. Although both Johnson v. State of California, supra, 69 Cal.2d 782 and Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, involved a failure to warn an identifiable victim, the reasoning of those decisions cannot be confined to that narrow scope. Instead, the cases stand for the principle that a special relationship, such as that between the state and a person in its custody, establishes a duty to use reasonable care to avert danger to foreseeable victims. If the victim can be identified in advance, a warning to him may discharge that duty; if he cannot be identified, reasonable care may require other action. But the absence of an identifiable victim does not postulate the absence of a duty of reasonable care.
In upholding plaintiffs' cause of action in Tarasoff, we relied on a federal district court decision, Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United States (D.N.D. 1967) 272 F.Supp. 409. In that case the Veterans Administration arranged for a patient to work on a local farm, but did not inform the farmer of the patient's threats to kill the patient's wife. The farmer, unaware of the danger to the wife, permitted the patient to come and go freely during nonworking hours. The patient borrowed a car, drove to his wife's residence, and killed her. The court held the Veteran's Administration liable, not because it failed to warn the wife, but because it failed to notify the farmer of the need to supervise the patient closely.
The principles underlying the Tarasoff decision indicate that even the existence of an identifiable victim is not essential to the cause of action. Our decision rested upon the basic tenet of tort law that a "'defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct.'" (Pp. 434-435, quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 399 [115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669].) (Italics added.) The "avoidance of foreseeable harm," we explained, "requires a defendant to control the conduct of another person, or to [27 Cal.3d 761] warn of such conduct ... if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the potential victim." (P. 435.) The relationship between therapist and patient fulfilled this requirement in Tarasoff; the relationship between the county and a juvenile under its custody suffices in the present case. fn. 1
Thus under the reasoning of Tarasoff and the principles of tort law endorsed in the case, the proper inquiry turns on whether Jonathan Thompson was a foreseeable victim. The complaint alleges that James had threatened to "take the life of a young child residing in the neighborhood"; since Jonathan falls within that description his killing was clearly a foreseeable consequence of James' release and subsequent lack of supervision. Whether Jonathan was also an identifiable victim is relevant not to the existence of a duty of care, but only to whether a warning to Jonathan personally was a reasonable means of discharging that duty. If, as the majority claim, a warning to the neighborhood families was not a reasonable way to reduce the danger, that fact cannot absolve the state of the duty to employ other methods. In particular, it cannot absolve the state from its failure to warn James' mother so that she could exercise proper care in observing and supervising James and thereby preventing the harm that ensued. [27 Cal.3d 762]
As to policy considerations, the majority first state that although parole and probation decisions are imprecise, and necessarily present an element of danger to the public, "the Legislature has nonetheless as a matter of public policy elected to continue those programs even though such risks must be borne by the public." (Majority opn. p. 754.) We appreciate the majority's fear that imposition of liability might interfere with the discretion of agencies who must decide whether to grant parole or probation. The Legislature, however, has considered that subject and determined that providing immunity to the state for basic policy decisions is a sufficient safeguard, and that it is unnecessary further to shield the state from liability for implementation of those decisions. As we explained in Johnson v. State of California, supra, 69 Cal.2d 782, 799: "once the proper authorities have made the basic policy decision -- to place a youth with foster parents, for example -- the role of ... immunity ends; subsequent negligent actions, such as the failure to give reasonable warnings to the foster parents actually selected, are subject to legal redress." fn. 2
Twelve years have passed since we filed the decision in Johnson. The Legislature has not amended the Government Code to enlarge governmental immunity beyond that described in Johnson. We have heard no outcry that Johnson imperils the state's parole and probation programs, no claim that the liability for failure to warn imposed by that case has interfered with legislative policy. We thus perceive no need for judicial creation of an expanded immunity. fn. 3 [27 Cal.3d 763]
The policy considerations favoring plaintiffs' cause of action in the present setting -- considerations not taken into account by the majority -- are weighty and substantial. The principle of compensating victims of negligence in order to recompense their injury and to deter future negligence is fundamental in our judicial system. Thus as a general principle, a plaintiff injured as a proximate result of a defendant's negligence is entitled to compensation. (See Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, 12 Cal.3d 382, 399.) Even if the government is the tortfeasor, "when there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception." (Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 219 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457]; Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 435 [99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121].) Consequently "[u]nless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail." (Ramos v. Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692 [94 Cal.Rptr. 421, 484 P.2d 93].) In the balance, I believe these basic precepts outweigh the majority's anxiety that the Legislature did not go far enough in immunizing implementation of parole and probation programs.
The other policy considerations advanced by the majority are of less moment. The majority quote a student comment (Tarasoff and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn (1975) 12 San Diego L.Rev. 932, 942-943, fn. 75) to the effect that predictions of dangerousness are not sufficiently reliable to justify civil commitment of persons as dangerous to others. fn. 4 The present case does not involve civil commitment. Moreover, [27 Cal.3d 764] the argument that predictions of danger are so unreliable that they should not serve as a basis for a warning was expressly rejected in Tarasoff (17 Cal.3d at pp. 438-439) and is contrary to legislative policy. (See Evid. Code, § 1024.)
­FN 1. Buford v. State of California (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 811 [164 Cal.Rptr. 264], also involved an assault upon an allegedly foreseeable but not identifiable victim. The Court of Appeal stated that "[t]he complaint shows that Daniels [the assailant] was confined to Atascadero State Hospital for commission of several criminal offenses and that various personnel were assigned to his rehabilitative care both during commitment and during his leave of absence. The nature of the relationship here resembles those cases [Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425; Harland v. State of California (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 475 (142 Cal.Rptr. 201) (state and resident of veteran's home)] in which a duty was imposed as a matter of law. Although there are substantial questions about the foreseeability of potential victims and the reasonableness of making a public warning about Daniels' release, these are questions for the trier of fact and should not be resolved against plaintiffs at the complaint stage." (104 Cal.App.3d at p. 824.)
­FN 2. The majority opinion implicitly recognizes the distinction drawn in the quoted language from Johnson. In holding plaintiffs' complaint states no cause of action for negligence in releasing James or in selecting his mother as custodian, the majority rely squarely upon statutory immunities; in finding no cause of action for failure to warn the mother, they speak in terms of policy considerations which, presumably, did not persuade the Legislature to enact a corresponding immunity.
­FN 3. It is arguable that imposition of a duty to warn the general public whenever a prisoner who might possibly be dangerous is released on parole or probation might, through the impact of repeated warnings, arouse the public to curtail parole and probation programs. Imposition of numerous sizable judgments for breach of that duty could have the same effect. But neither consideration has any significant bearing upon liability for failure to warn the person to whose custody the prisoner is released.
­FN 4. The quoted language from the San Diego Law Review, while only of tangential relevance to the present case, has serious implications. It implies (a) that Tarasoff was wrongly decided, and (b) that the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) and other statutes providing for commitment of persons dangerous to others are unwise and probably unconstitutional. I doubt that the justices of the majority subscribe to either proposition.
Date:Citation:Category:Status:	Mon, 07/14/198027 Cal.3d 741Review - Criminal AppealOpinion issued	Parties
1CLIFFORD K. THOMPSON, JR., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA (Defendant and Respondent)2COUNTY OF ALAMEDA (Defendant and Respondent) Disposition
Jul 14 1980Opinion: Affirmed	Cite This Case
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