Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/48739909/LINCOLN-v-DAYLIGHT-CHEMICAL-et-al-TENTATIVE-ORDER-GRANTING-IN-PART-MOTION-TO-DISMISS-AND-DENYING-MOTION-TO-STRIKE-AS-MOOT
Timestamp: 2016-08-28 00:21:53
Document Index: 448275175

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1962', '§ 1964', '§ 1331', '§ 1964', '§ 1334', '§ 1367', '§ 1964', '§ 1962', '§ 529', '§ 1962', '§ 1964', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1962', 'Art. 42', 'Art. 42']

BrowseUploadSign inJoinBooksAudiobooksComicsSheet MusicWelcome to Scribd! Start your free trial and access books, documents and more.Find out more1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Charles Edward Lincoln III (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Daylight Chemical Information Systems, Inc. (“Defendant Daylight Chemical”), Yosef Taitz (“Defendant Yosef Taitz”), Appealing Dentistry (“Defendant Appealing Dentistry”), Orly Taitz, Inc. (“Defendant Orly Taitz, Inc.”), Law Office of Orly Taitz (“Defendant Law Office”), Dr. Orly Taitz, D.D.S., J.D. (“Defendant Orly Taitz”), and Defend Our Freedoms Foundation (“Defendant Defend Our Freedoms”). Defendants Daylight Chemical and Yosef Taitz now bring a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (“Motion to Dismiss”). All other Defendants join the Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. # 9, 13.) Defendant Orly CHARLES EDWARD LINCOLN III, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ) DAYLIGHT CHEMICAL, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) ) _________________________________ ) CASE NO. SACV 10-1573 AG (PLAx) [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AS MOOT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Taitz now also brings a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s First Claim (“Motion to Strike”). After reviewing all papers and arguments submitted, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Dismiss and DENIES the Motion to Strike as MOOT.
The following facts come from the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes these facts to be true. Because some of the facts “is/are difficult to decipher,” to borrow a phrase from Plaintiff (FAC ¶ 14), the Court will quote from the FAC. Plaintiff was “hired by Defendant Dr. Orly Taitz to work as law clerk or litigation assistant in her offices in Mission Viejo and Rancho Santa Margarita, California, starting on June 9, 2009 . . . .” (FAC ¶ 5.) “Plaintiff’s original (oral) agreement with Dr. Taitz was to be paid $10,000 to serve as her law clerk or litigation assistant in research, drafting, and support on Dr. Taitz’ defense against a suit by one Philip J. Berg, Lisa Liberi, and Lisa Ostella filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.” (Id. ¶ 6.) “Unilaterally, but after Lincoln had begun to work for her, and in fact after he had already presented himself in California on June 9, 2009, Dr. Taitz took back her agreement and reduced this amount, without Plaintiff’s actual or implied consent or agreement, to $7,500.00, outof [sic] which Plaintiff was expected to pay his hotel bills in Mission Viejo while working with Dr. Taitz.” (Id. ¶ 7.) “By this time [late June 2009], Defendants Dr. Taitz et al. had enlisted Plaintiff in all their litigation projects, for although the monetary compensation was not initially increased, the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s relationship had begun a surprising (but non-professionaly [sic]) evolution which led to Defendant Dr. Orly Taitz’ ultimate infliction of extreme emotional distress on the Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 10.) “Even at a very modest paralegal rate such as $40/hour, the Plaintiff Charles Edward Lincoln and Defendant Dr. Orly Taitz had originally agreed reasonable legal support/litigation clerk’s fee of $10,000, although never actually paid, would already have been more than used up 2
and exhausted by the approximately 250+ hours Plaintiff spent working for Dr. Taitz and Defend our Freedoms Foundations, Inc., between June 9 and June 31, 2010 [sic].” (Id. ¶ 12.) “Lincoln continued to work closely and continuously with Dr. Taitz throughout July, 2009, and on Saturday, while in Cambridge, Massachusetts, New York City, and Rancho Santa Margarita, August 1, 2009, at 7:02 P.M., Yosef (Yosi) Taitz sent, apparently from his Daylight Chemical Information office, a certain e-mail which was destined to change the relationshp and situation between Plaintiff and Defendants forever, which should be considered the first of the key ‘predicate acts’ on which R.I.C.O. is based, in that it was intended to advance a scheme to defraud, aimed not merely at the Plaintiff but at the United States of America, for purposes or with a state of mind that is/are difficult to decipher.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff now alleges twelve claims against various Defendants. Except where specifically noted, the claims appear to be against all Defendants. The claims are numbered as follows: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) Malicious Prosecution; Breach of Contract for Legal Representation; Breach of Contract to Form Real Estate Management and Redemption Management Company as a Partnership, LLP or LLC; Breach of Contract and/or Promissory Estoppel to Provide Office Space; Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Defamation Per Se; Breach of Contract and Legal Malpractice in relation to 4 Via Corbina Management and Litigation; Tortious Interference with de Leon and Aldana Mortgage Redemption Contracts (against Defendant Orly Taitz only); Tortious Interference with Contract (against Defendants Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical only); Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Advantage (against Defendants Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical only); Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Breach of Employment Contract or, in the alternative, Equitable Action in Quantum Meruit; Federal racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d) and§ 1964(c) (“RICO”)
Defendants Daylight Chemical and Yosef Taitz submitted a Request for Judicial Notice in support of the Motion to Dismiss. They ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following document: Civil docket for Case No. 2:10-cv-00615-RGK-PJW (C.D.Cal.) (“RJN No. 1 ”). Defendants Law Office and Orly Taitz also submitted several Requests for Judicial Notice. They ask the Court to take judicial notice of 15 documents from the docket in the matter of Rivernider, et al. v. Us. Bank National Association, USDC, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 9:09-cv-81255-WPD. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. Courts may take judicial notice of “undisputed matters of public record,” but generally may not take judicial notice of “disputed facts stated in public records.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). Facts subject to judicial notice may be considered on a motion to dismiss. Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court GRANTS judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff’s address on the docket in RJN No. 1 is 1928 Fletcher Avenue, South Pasadena, CA 91030, and that the case was filed in January 2010 and terminated in October 2010. The Court does not assume that this is Plaintiff’s true address but simply takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff’s address is listed that way. The Court also GRANTS judicial notice of the fact that the 15 documents from the Southern District of Florida case exist, but not for the truth of any assertions contained within those documents. Defendants Daylight Chemical and Yosef Taitz also submit several evidentiary objections to the exhibits filed by Plaintiff in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The Court has reviewed the objections and relies only on admissible evidence. See F.T.C. v. Neovi, Inc., 598 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1118 n.5 (S.D.Cal. 2008). 4
As stated previously, there are two motions currently before the Court. The first is a Motion to Dismiss. The second is a Motion to Strike, which is limited to Claim One. The Court will first address the Motion to Dismiss.
As noted, Defendants Daylight Chemical and Yosef Taitz now bring a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which Defendants Orly Taitz, Law Office, Defend Our Freedoms, Orly Taitz, Inc., and Appealing Dentistry join. (Dkt. # 9, 13.) Thus, all Defendants are properly deemed joined in the Motion to Dismiss.. The Court first considers the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), and then turns to the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Vacek v. United States Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted)). Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that the deficiencies of the complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff only pleads federal question jurisdiction in his Complaint. He does not assert diversity jurisdiction, although Defendants attack diversity jurisdiction in their Motion to Dismiss. Because the Complaint only asserts federal question jurisdiction, the Court addresses 5
that basis for jurisdiction first. And because the Court finds that federal question jurisdiction exists, the Court need not consider Defendants’ alternative challenge to diversity jurisdiction.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction under three federal statutes. The FAC states, in pertinent part, “This Court has jurisdiction as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), Civil R.I.C.O., as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supplemental Jurisdiction over inextricably intertwined California state claims . . .).” (FAC ¶ 2.) The FAC states only one claim arising under federal law, namely Claim Thirteen for RICO violations. The Court considers whether the federal statutes listed by Plaintiff in the FAC could authorize federal jurisdiction here. The first statute cited, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), creates a private right of action for racketeering violations: “Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court . . . .” This is clearly a federal statute, arising under the laws of the United States. Defendants argue that federal jurisdiction should be defeated because Plaintiff’s sole federal claim, for RICO violations, is not colorable. When considering jurisdiction, the Court questions whether the federal claim “clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.” Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). If the question is not “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” then the Court has jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envir., 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). “Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Nonetheless, a court may deny jurisdiction if the federal claim is “so insubstantial, 6
implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court.” Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County, N.Y., 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974). As the Court discusses in Section 1.2.13, Plaintiff’s RICO allegations are weak. But for jurisdictional purposes, the Court does not now consider whether Plaintiff’s RICO claims might ultimately fail. Bell, 327 U.S. at 682. Plaintiff spends 25 paragraphs setting forth his RICO violations. Although the allegations are frequently incomprehensible, the federal claim is not insubstantial nor immaterial. Nor are the allegations clearly frivolous. It is possible that Plaintiff has asserted the RICO claim simply to obtain federal jurisdiction, but it’s not obvious that this is the case. A robust consideration of plausibility here would improperly blur the lines between Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). For all these reasons, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction at this time because of Plaintiff’s alleged federal claim for violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1962. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). The Court now turns to whether Plaintiff’s claims survive the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
A court should dismiss a complaint when its allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “‘[D]etailed factual allegations’ are not required.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (stating that “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations”)). The Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pollard v. Geo Group, Inc., 607 F.3d 583, 585 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010); Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1993). 7
But the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A court should not accept “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements,” id., or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). The pleading standard that Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but demands more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1955). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. Where a complaint fails to meet this standard, it may be dismissed with prejudice. See Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir.1980). As stated previously, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that the deficiencies of the complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson, 353 F.3d at 758. Plaintiff alleges thirteen claims against various Defendants, as listed in the Background section. The majority of these claims appear to be against all Defendants. The Court now looks at each claim.
1.2.1 Claim One, for Malicious Prosecution
This claim appears to be against all Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Dr. Orly Taitz, acting individually and/or as agent for Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical Information, falsely charged Plaintiff of forging her signature (or signing without permission) on certain motions filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in the Court of Judge William P. Dimitrouleas.” (FAC ¶ 24.) 8
As stated in Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal.4th 336, 341 (2004), “[I]n order to establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution of either a criminal or civil proceeding, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor [citations]; (2) was brought without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice [citations].’” Plaintiff fails to state a claim because he has not alleged that Defendant Orly Taitz commenced an action against him for the alleged false charge of forgery. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the forgery matter was addressed through an Order to Show Cause in the Florida case. (FAC ¶ 24.) Plaintiff attempts to argue in his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss that the hearing on the Order to Show Cause “became the exact sort of proceeding upon which plaintiff could base a malicious prosecution action.” (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 13:18-19.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites only Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916 (1976). But in Twyford, the court found that a request for admissions was not a separate action that could support a claim for malicious prosecution. Id. at 922. Likewise, there is no support for Plaintiff’s argument that an Order to Show Cause is a separate proceeding sufficient to support a malicious prosecution claim. Because Plaintiff fails to allege the first requirement of a claim for malicious prosecution, the Court need not consider arguments about the other two requirements. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim One as to all Defendants.
1.2.2 Claim Two, for Breach of Contract for Legal Representation
Plaintiff attaches the alleged contract as Exhibit A to the FAC. As attached, the agreement is unsigned. He also attaches an alleged “Alternative ‘New Agreement’ between Orly Taitz and Charles Edward Lincoln” as Exhibit B to the FAC, which he acknowledges was never signed. Plaintiff alleges – in a footnote – that “Dr. [Orly] Taitz had both final and executed copies [and] Plaintiff has not possessed either of the signed originals since he signed them in early October.” (FAC, fn.1.) 9
Regarding the substance of the alleged contract, Plaintiff alleges that he “hired, retained, and entered into a formal agreement with Dr. Orly Taitz to represent him in litigation in at least five states.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Defendant Orly Taitz allegedly breached this contract by “never perform[ing] any meaningful legal services.” (Id. ¶ 31.) A breach of contract claim has four elements: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for non-performance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) resulting damage. E.g., McDonald v. John P. Scripps Newspaper, 210 Cal. App. 3d 100, 104 (1989). Without a valid contract, there can be no claim for a breach of contract. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Orly Taitz “was prevented from complying or implementing the contract by Yosef Taitz.” (FAC ¶ 28.) Other than this brief reference, Plaintiff presents no allegations in this claim about any defendants other than Orly Taitz. And the one allegation against Defendant Yosef Taitz does not show that there was any sort of contract with him. Nor does Plaintiff allege anything about the other Defendants for this claim. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Daylight Chemical, Yosef Taitz, Orly Taitz, Inc., Appealing Dentistry, Law Office, and Defend Our Freedoms. Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Defendant Orly Taitz. The threshold requirement for a breach of contract claim is the existence of a valid contract. The documents Plaintiff attaches to the FAC are insufficient to show that there was a contract or that Exhibit A reflects the actual terms of the alleged contract. Even if Plaintiff’s single cursory allegation in a footnote that the contract was signed were sufficient to establish the existence of a contract, Plaintiff fails to allege that he performed under the terms of the contract. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Orly Taitz. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Two as to all Defendants.
1.2.3 Claim Three, for Breach of Contract to Form Real Estate Management and Redemption Management Company as a Partnership, LLP or LLC
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Orly Taitz “agreed to assist Plaintiff Charles Edward Lincoln in managing several distinct real properties in California, Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts, and Texas, but Dr. Orly Taitz made these promises with no intention ever meaningfully to do so.” (FAC ¶ 37.) Plaintiff attempts to implicate several other Defendants by alleging that “Dr. Taitz did all these things either at the behest of or while acting as agent of and for Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical Information . . . .” (Id. ¶ 39.) As stated previously, a breach of contract claim requires the existence of a valid contract. Plaintiff has not alleged that there was a contract. Plaintiff’s bare-bones allegation here that a defendant “agreed” to do something isn’t sufficient to show a contract. Plaintiff also fails to allege a specific breach of any contract. Further, Plaintiff’s cursory allegations of agency – or acting “at the behest” – between Defendant Orly Taitz and two other Defendants are insufficient to state a claim based on vicarious liability. As to the other Defendants, Plaintiff does not mention Defendants Orly Taitz, Inc., Law Office, Appealing Dentistry, or Defend Our Freedoms. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Three as to all Defendants.
1.2.4 Claim Four, for Breach of Contract and/or Promissory Estoppel to Provide Office Space
Plaintiff alleges this claim against all Defendants, but notes that “in connection with this count . . . Orly Taitz, Inc., may be most directly implicated.” (FAC ¶ 40.) Oddly, Plaintiff includes citations to caselaw in the sections of the FAC supporting this claim. (E.g., id. ¶¶ 4547.) First and foremost, Plaintiff yet again fails to allege a specific contract. He doesn’t say whether the supposed contract was written or oral, or express or implied. He merely alleges that 11
“[i]n September and October 2009, Defendant Dr. Orly Taitz offered . . . several rooms of space in and adjacent to her Dental and Law Offices . . . for a term of 1-2 years to use as [a] personal office . . . .” (Id. ¶ 41.) This is not a sufficient allegation of a contract. In addition, Plaintiff’s alternative allegation of promissory estoppel also fails. To establish promissory estoppel, a litigant must prove: “(1) the existence of a promise, (2) which the promisor reasonably should have expected to induce the promisee’s reliance, (3) that the promisee actually induce[d] such reliance, (4) that such reliance is reasonable, and (5) that injustice can only be avoided by the enforcement of the promise.” Aguilar v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Union Local #10, 966 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff alleges none of these elements. Although Plaintiff alleges generally what Defendant Orly Taitz offered, he provides no specifics about the nature of the supposed promise. He also fails, among other shortcomings, to allege whether or not the rooms were ever made available to him, whether his reliance was reasonable, or whether the promise should now be enforced. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Four as to all Defendants.
Claim Five, for Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Plaintiff bases this claim on the alleged contract for legal representation, attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint and addressed in Section 1.2.2. Plaintiff alleges this claim against all Defendants on various conspiracy and agency theories. In vague terms, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Dr. Orly Taitz breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by interfering with or failing to cooperate with the plaintiff in the performance of the contract.” (FAC ¶ 50.) First, Plaintiff fails to allege conspiracy or agency liability. Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at 1940. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Daylight Chemical, Yosef Taitz, Appealing Dentistry, Defend Our Freedoms, Law 12
Office, or Orly Taitz, Inc. Second, the Court already concluded in Section 1.2.2 that Plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged a valid contract for legal representation between Plaintiff and Defendant Orly Taitz. Without a contract, there can be no claim for breach of the implied covenant. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Five as to all Defendants.
1.2.6 Claim Six, for Defamation Per Se
To state a claim for defamation, Plaintiffs must allege “(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.” 5 Witkin 10th Torts § 529 (2005). There can be no defamation without a falsehood. Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 809 (2002). In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges no specific statements that were allegedly defamatory. As noted previously, an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Plaintiff provides the web addresses for several websites, but does not identify any particular statements on those sites that were allegedly defamatory. In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that a certain press release, attached to the FAC as Exhibit C, contains defamatory statements. He argues that “[t]hough the press release/letter to the UN did not name Lincoln by name, Levy, in his interview with Levy ‘points out the shady background of Taitz’s former associates who have become enemies, such as convicted forger Lucas Smith and disbarred attorney Charles Edward Lincoln III.’” (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 19:5-9.) Of course, Plaintiff actually is a disbarred attorney, and one of the elements of a claim for defamation is that the statement must be false. Nonetheless, because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss looks primarily at the sufficiency of the pleadings, any clarifications that Plaintiff tries to make in his Opposition can’t bolster his claim. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Six as to all Defendants.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 thing.
1.2.7 Claim Seven, for Breach of Contract and Legal Malpractice in relation to 4 Via Corbina Management and Litigation
While Plaintiff styles this is a claim for breach of contract and legal malpractice, the only (barely) coherent allegation is for breach of fiduciary duty. (FAC ¶ 60.) Plaintiff instead includes several rambling paragraphs about an alleged romantic relationship between himself and Defendant Orly Taitz. (E.g., id. ¶¶ 61, 62.) Plaintiff has an obligation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to present a plain and short statement showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Here, Plaintiff has done no such
The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Seven as to all Defendants.
1.2.8 Claim Eight, for Tortious Interference with de Leon and Aldana Mortgage Redemption Contracts (against Defendant Orly Taitz only)
Plaintiff alleges that Dennis and Milenne de Leon and Herman and Olga Aldana were “prospective property management/mortgage redemption clients.” (FAC ¶ 68.) It is unclear from the allegations whether the de Leons and Aldanas were prospective clients only (Id. ¶ 75) or whether there was a contract with them (Id. ¶ 76). It is also unclear from the allegations how Defendant Orly Taitz interfered with either the prospective business relationship or a contract. For example, Plaintiff alleges: As a direct and proximate result of Dr. Taitz’ breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Lincoln, Dr. Taitz tortiously (intentionally, with gross negligence, and recklessly), interfered with Lincoln’s contract and advantageous prospective business relationship with the de Leon and Aldana families, who were also subjected to extreme emotional distress and otherwise injured and oppressed by Taitz false and malicious prosecution and defamation of Lincoln in the months of November 2009-February 2010 (and Dennis and Milenne de Leon in fact paid all 14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 FAC ¶ 75.
of Philip J. Berg’s legal fees and travel expenses, along with Lincoln’s and certain witnesses’ travel expenses, to Florida in January 2010).
There are an awful lot of words in that one sentence, but the Court cannot decipher the meaning. Nor is the meaning made clear by any of the other allegations supporting this claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Eight as to Defendant Orly Taitz, who is the only defendant subject to this claim.
1.2.9 Claim Nine, for Tortious Interference with Contract (against Defendants 10 Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical only) 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s allegations supporting Claim Ten are identical to those supporting Claim Nine. (Compare FAC ¶¶ 81-82 with ¶¶ 85-86.) Plaintiff fails to identify what specific prospective business advantage Defendants have allegedly interfered with. Plaintiff also fails to identify specifically how Defendants Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical interfered. The only allegation of interference is that “Defendant [Orly] Taitz revealed to Lincoln that Yosef Taitz had ordered or instructed or threatened Taitz that she would have to surrender all her rights to marital estate 15 1.2.10 Claim Ten, for Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Advantage (against Defendants Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical only) As the Court concluded already, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a valid contract between Plaintiff and Defendant Orly Taitz (or anyone else). Without a contract, there can be no tortious interference with a contract. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Nine as to Defendants Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical, who are the only defendants subject to this claim.
or property if she honored her several agreements or continued her relationship with Plaintiff Charles Edward Lincoln.” (Id. ¶ 86.) But this is insufficient. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Ten as to Defendants Yosef Taitz and Daylight Chemical, who are the only defendants subject to this claim.
1.2.11 Claim Eleven, for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)
To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must allege: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Cervantes v. J.C. Penny, 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979). The conduct must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Davidson v. City of Westminister, 32 Cal. 3d. 197, 210 (1982). Plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts to support his IIED claim: • Plaintiff and Defendant Orly Taitz engaged in an “oppressive and exploitative” sexual relationship (FAC ¶ 89); • Defendant Orly Taitz “badger[ed] him to move to live . . . within 5 minutes of her office” so they could maintain their relationship (Id.); • Plaintiff “refus[ed] to completely subordinate himself to the Defendant [Orly Taitz]” (Id. ¶ 91); • Defendant Orly Taitz “promised Lincoln a long list of benefits including comprehensive dental care, special medical care and a ‘holistic’ program of therapy for which Defendant Dr. Orly Taitz would pay, plus all sorts of bizarre promises about buying the Plaintiff fine furniture and a new stylish and expensive wardrobe, complete with exotic items such as Vicuna jackets, none of which ever 16
materialized, needless to say.” (Id. ¶ 92); Defendant Orly Taitz “either directly and/or indirectly placed or caused to be placed a series of harassing and intimidating telephone calls to a number of people in late December 2009 and Early January 2010, including at least 130 calls placed to Plaintiff’s estranged wife” (Id. ¶ 95). Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged behavior that “exceed[s] all bounds” of tolerated behavior. Davidson, 32 Cal.3d. at 210. Even taken as a whole, the Court cannot conclude that these allegations support a claim for IIED against any Defendant. In particular, the Court is hard pressed to see how the alleged promise of buying Plaintiff a nice jacket could constitute extreme behavior. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Eleven as to all Defendants.
1.2.12 Claim Twelve, for Breach of Employment Contract or, in the alternative, Equitable Action in Quantum Meruit
As stated previously, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the existence of any valid contract. Accordingly, his claim for breach of employment contract fails. Plaintiff alleges an alternative claim, seeking quantum meruit. Quantum meruit “refers to the well-established principle that ‘the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered.’” Id. (quoting Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal. 2d 334, 342 (1938)); Spires v. American Bus Lines, 158 Cal. App. 3d 211, 217 (1984) (Quantum meruit recovery for services is justified “where services were performed by a party at the request of another under circumstances in which compensation for such services would be expected”). To recover in quantum meruit, a party need not prove the existence of a contract, but must show the circumstances were such that “the services were rendered under some understanding or expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to be made.” Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf, 32 Cal. 4th 453, 458 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendants Yosef Taitz, Daylight Chemical, 17
Orly Taitz, Inc., Appealing Dentistry, Law Office, or Defend Our Freedoms owe him anything here under a theory of quantum meruit. But Plaintiff does state a claim for quantum meruit against Defendant Orly Taitz. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff worked somewhere between 60 and 120 hours per week from June 2009 through November 2009. (FAC ¶¶ 102, 103, 107.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not paid for any of this work. (Id. ¶ 101.) The circumstances alleged are such that Plaintiff and Defendant Orly Taitz allegedly both understood that some compensation would be due for Plaintiff’s work. Plaintiff includes a specific prayer for relief for this claim, asking that “Defendants be ordered to pay for one year of health and dental coverage for the Plaintiff as well in addition to back pay/in quantum meruit and Robert J. Ponte’s Lexis-Nexis bill of ca. $7,200.00.” (Id. ¶ 108.) At this stage, the Court finds only that Plaintiff has stated a claim in quantum meruit against Defendant Orly Taitz and makes no determination about what, if any, relief might ultimately be appropriate. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Twelve as to Defendants Yosef Taitz, Daylight Chemical, Orly Taitz, Inc., Appealing Dentistry, Law Office, and Defend Our Freedoms. The Court DENIES the Motion as to Defendant Orly Taitz.
1.2.13 Claim Thirteen, for Federal racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d) and§ 1964(c).
Plaintiff has alleged violations of the federal racketeering laws (“RICO”). In particular, Plaintiff has alleged violations of all subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Section 1961 sets forth definitions of relevant terms, including racketeering activity, enterprise, pattern of racketeering activity, among others. The four subsections of § 1962 make unlawful various activities relating to a pattern of racketeering, which is defined as at least two acts of racketeering activity. § 1961(6). The racketeering statute includes an exhaustive list of predicate acts. § 1961(1). While 18
Plaintiff alleges several predicate acts (For example, FAC ¶¶ 113, 115, 120, 121, 125) he does not identify what statute those acts violate and whether those statutes are racketeering predicate acts. It is also unclear whether the alleged predicate acts could be considered racketeering activity under § 1961. One alleged predicate act is that Defendant Orly Taitz used “the telephonic wires to solicit, albeit in a call initiated by Charles Edward Lincoln, further perjured testimony against himself as a condition for any sort of professional reconciliation and future attorney-client cooperation between Lincoln and Taitz.” (Id. ¶ 125.) Plaintiff doesn’t identify what statute this action, or any other alleged predicate act, might violate. His other RICO allegations are largely conclusory and implausible. For example, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants Orly Taitz, Yosef Taitz, Appealing Dentistry, Defend Our Freedoms Foundation, and Daylight Chemical Information Corporation all agreed and conspired together to violate the terms of §§ 1962(a), 1962(b), and 1962(c), in particular, by agreeing to each of the predicate acts committed within the one year period between August 1, 2009, and July 4, 2010, and by further agreeing to inflict wrongful and malicious injury on the Plaintiff Charles Edward Lincoln, at all times using the electronic wire telephonic facilities of interstate commerce and communication.” (Id. ¶ 133.) The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Thirteen as to all Defendants.
Plaintiff’s Request for Conversion to Motion for Summary Judgment
In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that “the barrage of judicial notices filed by the Defendants in this case constitutes evidence and matters outside of the pleadings.” (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 20:9-10.) Accordingly, Plaintiff asks the Court to deem the Motion to Dismiss to be a motion for summary judgment, and to allow discovery before ruling on the motion. But there has not, in fact, been a “barrage” of documents submitted for judicial notice. The Court notes that only one single document was submitted by Defendants, and that while the Court granted judicial notice, it did not address that document in this Order. The Court finds that there is no reason to convert the Motion to Dismiss to a motion for 19
summary judgment. Plaintiff’s request is DENIED.
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Dismiss.
Defendants Law Office and Orly Taitz filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s first claim, for malicious prosecution. Defendants Defend Our Freedoms, Orly Taitz, Inc., and Appealing Dentistry joined in the Motion to Strike. Because the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss Claim One, the Motion to Strike is DENIED as MOOT.
The Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss in their entirety Claims One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Claim Twelve as to Defendants Yosef Taitz, Daylight Chemical, Orly Taitz, Inc., Appealing Dentistry, Law Office, and Defend Our Freedoms. The Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss Claim Twelve as to Defendant Orly Taitz. The Court DENIES the Motion to Strike as MOOT. Dismissal is with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file any amended complaint within 14 days of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: February 14, 2011
_______________________________ Andrew J. Guilford United States District Judge
LINCOLN v DAYLIGHT CHEMICAL, et al. - [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AS MOOT by Jack Ryan57 viewsEmbedDownloadDescription[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN
DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AS
MOOT[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING INPART MOTION TO DISMISS ANDDENYING MOTION TO STRIKE ASMOOTInterests: Types, Research, LawRead on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Copyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)Download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentShow moreShow less
RelatedUrban Industries, Inc. Of Kentucky, Etc. v. Joan Thevis, Intervenor-Appellant v. Michael G. Thevis, 670 F.2d 981, 11th Cir. (1982)by Scribd Government DocsLamaster v. Keeler, 123 U.S. 376 (1887)by Scribd Government DocsMoore and Co Precendential Opinionby sam ignarskirules40-56by Dennis Aran Tupaz AbrilArt. 42 - Ph vs . Granadaby Josine Protasio60 Day Limit to Rule Ccp660by Rod SatreExploring the Benefits of Pre Trial Conference Procedure to Judicial Proceedings in Nigeriaby Enweka Arthur ObinnaNevada Reports 1935-1936 (56 Nev.).pdfby thadzigs05 Grant vs Mcauliffeby Stacy WheelerMarenco v Visa - 1st Amended Complaintby Master ChiefStatutes in Pari Materiaby Angelique Porta DMvR-Burgyan#18 Feb 3 HEARING TRANSCRIPT as Filed in Ddcby Jack RyanHaag vs Barnes Full Textby SyElfredGeugenio v caby cmv mendozaFeb.8by Circuit MediaJesse Ventura Does Not Want Chris Kyle Case Moved to Dallasby Robert Wilonskyworkplacby Chris BuckWorld's Fair Mining Co. v. Powers, 224 U.S. 173 (1912)by Scribd Government DocsHofer et al v. Old Navy Inc. et al - Document No. 32by Justia.comProcedure_I_Notesby GHWilkinsTimberlane Lumber Coby samdelacruz1030United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964)by Scribd Government DocsRule 32 - Trial by Commssnrsby bubblingbrook4/15/11 SDNY Memorandum and Order- Bifurcation of RICO Claimby TexacoEcuadorEngel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926)by Scribd Government Docs2f34fby reginald900Florida Law by Gerald Keaneby Gerald KeanePleadings Casesby cmv mendozaSimilar to LINCOLN v DAYLIGHT CHEMICAL, et al. - [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AS MOOTUrban Industries, Inc. Of Kentucky, Etc. v. Joan Thevis, Intervenor-Appellant v. Michael G. Thevis, 670 F.2d 981, 11th Cir. (1982)Lamaster v. Keeler, 123 U.S. 376 (1887)Moore and Co Precendential Opinionrules40-56Art. 42 - Ph vs . Granada60 Day Limit to Rule Ccp660Exploring the Benefits of Pre Trial Conference Procedure to Judicial Proceedings in NigeriaNevada Reports 1935-1936 (56 Nev.).pdf05 Grant vs McauliffeMarenco v Visa - 1st Amended ComplaintStatutes in Pari Materia DMvR-Burgyan#18 Feb 3 HEARING TRANSCRIPT as Filed in DdcHaag vs Barnes Full Texteugenio v caFeb.8Jesse Ventura Does Not Want Chris Kyle Case Moved to DallasworkplacWorld's Fair Mining Co. v. Powers, 224 U.S. 173 (1912)Hofer et al v. Old Navy Inc. et al - Document No. 32Procedure_I_NotesTimberlane Lumber CoUnited States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964)Rule 32 - Trial by Commssnrs4/15/11 SDNY Memorandum and Order- Bifurcation of RICO ClaimEngel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926)2f34fFlorida Law by Gerald KeanePleadings CasesDepartment of LaborKlayman v Judicial Watch FLSD 116