Source: http://openjurist.org/542/f2d/673/ohio-inns-inc-v-b-nye-j
Timestamp: 2017-08-17 10:11:59
Document Index: 529909779

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1985', '§ 1985', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1985']

542 F2d 673 Ohio Inns Inc v. B Nye J | OpenJurist
542 F. 2d 673 - Ohio Inns Inc v. B Nye J
542 F2d 673 Ohio Inns Inc v. B Nye J
542 F.2d 673
79 Lab.Cas. P 53,875
OHIO INNS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
William B. NYE, Director-Department of Natural Resources of
the State of Ohio; Hon. John J. Gilligan, Governor of the
State of Ohio; and the Department of Natural Resources of
the State of Ohio, Defendants-Appellees.
Submitted July 23, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1976.
The appeal was dismissed by an order of this court entered July 15, 1976, on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of final judgment. Involved in the computation of time was the question of whether appellant filed a timely motion to alter or amend the final judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). A Rule 59(e) motion is timely if filed not later than ten days after final judgment. Under Rule 6(a) the last day of the period to be computed must be included, unless the last day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
The first cause of action is the source of federal jurisdiction. The second and third causes of action allege claims for relief under Ohio law. The Court will first consider whether the complaint pleads a federal cause of action. Then the Court will determine whether it should exercise pendant jurisdiction over the state law claims. Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
The statute covers private conspiracies; but it was not "intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interference with the rights of others." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). For the conspiratorial conduct to be actionable "there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798 (footnote omitted). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that nonracial, class based discrimination is actionable under § 1985(3). Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973). See O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hospital, 472 F.2d 1140, 1145 (6th Cir. 1973); Crabtree v. Brennan, 466 F.2d 480, 481 (6th Cir. 1972); Hopkins v. Wasson, 329 F.2d 67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 854, 85 S.Ct. 102, 13 L.Ed.2d 57 (1964). There is no cause of action under § 1985(3) unless it is alleged that the conspiracy invidiously discriminated against a person (or persons) because he was a member of a class.2 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790.
Plaintiff asserts a "right to acquire, possess and enjoy its property free from official caprice." Plaintiff argues that this right arises under the equal protection or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiff relies principally upon Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53 S.Ct. 190, 77 L.Ed. 375 (1932).
In Sterling the Texas Railroad Commission entered an order limiting oil production. Affected oil producing companies sued in United States District Court alleging the order was unauthorized, arbitrary, and capricious and that it violated a federal right to the enjoyment and use of property. The district court issued a temporary restraining order. The governor, ignoring the restraining order, took action ultimately resulting in his declaring martial law and the forceful seizure of the oil fields. The United States Supreme Court held that the governor's actions deprived the oil companies of their Fourteenth Amendment due process clause right to the use and enjoyment of their properties in a lawful manner as determined by the court. The governor "(i)n the place of judicial procedure, available in the courts which were open and functioning, . . . set up his executive commands which brooked neither delay nor appeal." Id. at 400-402, 53 S.Ct. at 197. The decision rests upon a preference for due judicial procedures over the unilateral executive imposition of martial law. See also, Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F.Supp. 520 (D.Minn.1959). To the extent the decision in Sterling may have rested on the concept of economic substantive due process, id. at 396-397, it is no longer good authority. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-730, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212 (1949); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937). Today the due process clause guarantees only the right to notice and to be heard before the state deprives a person of his property. See, e. g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956). Property interests are also protected by the equal protection clause to the extent that legislative classifications cannot adversely affect the property interests of a class unless the classification is rationally related to a legitimate legislative goal. See, e. g., United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-173, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).3 Additionally, real property may not be taken by governmental action without just compensation. Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968). See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1165 (April, 1967).
The second count of the amended complaint realleges a state law claim for tortious interference with contract. The third count of the amended complaint alleges defamation. Plaintiff argues that the Court should exercise pendent jurisdiction over these claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). It is within the Court's discretion whether it will exercise pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130. Considering the insubstantial nature of the federal claim, the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims.
This action seeks money damages. A state is immune from suits brought in federal court by its own citizens "seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1356, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The state may waive its immunity, but waiver will not be lightly inferred. There must be "a clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation" before waiver may be found. Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 332 U.S. 47, 54, 64 S.Ct. 873, 877, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944).
Although it is undisputed that municipalities and other political subdivisions of the state are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); it is arguably an open question whether a state agency is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Cf. Deane Hill Country Club v. Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1967). Because the Court has held that the complaint fails to state a cause of action under § 1983 and that the Department is immune from suit, it is not necessary to decide whether the Department is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983.
Because of the Court's holding below that the amended complaint does not allege class based discrimination, the Court need not consider whether § 1985(3) applies to any conceptual classification of persons, or only to those classes against whom discrimination is viewed as inherently suspect. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) and the cases cited in footnote 3 below
Where the right denied is expressly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, the discrimination must be supported by a compelling state interest. See, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-343, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966)