Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/560/09-367/dissent.html
Timestamp: 2017-05-22 23:29:22
Document Index: 135339892

Matched Legal Cases: ['§3664', '§3556', '§3551', '§3663', '§3663', '§3663', '§3553']

Dolan v. United States (Dissent by Justice Roberts) :: 560 U.S. ___ (2010) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
Dolan v. United States 560 U.S. ___ (2010)
In the absence of §3664(d)(5), any order of restitution must be imposed at sentencing, if it is to be imposed at all. Restitution “may be imposed in addition to [a] sentence” of probation, fine, or imprisonment only if it is authorized under §3556. See §§3551(b)–(c). Section 3556, in turn, authorizes courts to order restitution “in imposing a sentence on a defendant” (emphasis added), pursuant to yet other provisions requiring such orders to be made “when sentencing a defendant,” §§3663(a)(1)(A), (c)(1), 3663A(a)
(1) (emphasis added). The mandatory restitution provisions of §3663A “apply in all sentencing proceedings for convictions of” certain crimes. §3663A(c)(1) (emphasis added). And the court “at the time of sentencing” must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence”—including its reasons for “not order[ing] restitution” if it fails to do so. §3553(c).
Footnote 1 Whether that date must itself be set at sentencing is not before us. The order setting the date plainly cannot be entered 182 days after sentencing, as happened here. See App. 3–4.
Footnote 2 United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711 (1990), is equally inapposite: The statute in that case rested the lower court’s authority on whether a bail hearing had been held at all (it had), whereas here the only statutory condition is whether the losses were determined within 90 days of sentencing (they were not).