Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/sol/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:37:56
Document Index: 287015193

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 217', 'Sui Generis', '§ 217', '§ 217']

General Obligations Law § 17-101 [SOL]
Karpa Realty Group, LLC v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 05921 [2d Dept 2018]
"General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing which validly acknowledges the debt" (Lynford v Williams, 34 AD3d 761, 762; see Mosab Constr. Corp. v Prospect Park Yeshiva, Inc., 124 AD3d 732, 733). To constitute a valid acknowledgment, a "writing must be signed and recognize an existing debt and must contain nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it" (Sichol v Crocker, 177 AD2d 842, 843 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see U.S. Bank N.A. v Martin, 144 AD3d at 892-893; Mosab Constr. Corp. v Prospect Park Yeshiva, Inc., 124 AD3d at 733). Contrary to Deutsche Bank's contention, a letter written by Aird that accompanied his second short sale package submitted to Deutsche Bank's loan servicer did not constitute an unqualified acknowledgment of the debt or manifest a promise to repay the debt sufficient to reset the running of the statute of limitations (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v Kess, 159 AD3d 767, 768-769; U.S. Bank N.A. v Martin, 144 AD3d at 892-893; Hakim v Peckel Family Ltd. Partnership, 280 AD2d 645; Sichol v Crocker, 177 AD2d at 843).
Author DMGPosted on September 11, 2018 Categories SOL, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on General Obligations Law § 17-101 [SOL]
Fraud SOL
Gorelick v Vorhand, 2011 NY Slip Op 03207 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
"[A] fraud-based action must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it'" (Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532, quoting CPLR 213[8]; see CPLR 203[g]; Coombs v Jervier, 74 AD3d 724, 724). "The test as to when a plaintiff should have discovered an alleged fraud is an objective one" (Prestandrea v Stein, 262 AD2d 621, 622; see 2 NY PJI2d 3:20, at 192 [2011]). Thus "plaintiffs will be held to have discovered the fraud when it is established that they were possessed of knowledge of facts from which [the fraud] could be reasonably inferred" (Erbe v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 3 NY2d 321, 326; see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d at 532; Higgins v Crouse, 147 NY 411, 416; Stride Rite Children's Group v Siegel, 269 AD2d 875, 876; Watts v Exxon Corp., 188 AD2d 74, 76; Azoy v Fowler, 57 AD2d 541, 541-542).
"Ordinarily such an inquiry presents a mixed question of law and fact" (Erbe v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 3 NY2d at 326; see K & E Trading & Shipping v Radmar Trading Corp., 174 AD2d 346; Azoy v Fowler, 57 AD2d 541, 541-542). As a general matter, "knowledge of the fraudulent act is required and mere suspicion will not constitute a sufficient substitute" (Erbe v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 3 NY2d at 326; see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d at 532).
Where, as here, "it does not conclusively appear that a plaintiff had knowledge of facts from which the fraud could reasonably be inferred, a complaint should not be dismissed on motion and the question should be left to the trier of the facts" (Trepuk v Frank, 44 NY2d 723, 725; see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d at 532; see Pericon v Ruck, 56 AD3d 635, 636-637; Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648-649; Saphir Intl., SA v UBS PaineWebber Inc., 25 AD3d 315, 316). Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred when it, upon reargument, in effect, adhered to so much of the determination in the order entered September 11, 2009, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Harry Vorhand which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Milan Vorhand, Harry Vorhand, and Thomas Vorhand as time-barred.
Author DMGPosted on April 24, 2011 Categories SOL, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on Fraud SOL
Author DMGPosted on March 3, 2011 Categories No-Fault [general], No-Fault [Peer], SOL, [App Div 1st Dept], [App Term 1st Dept]Leave a comment on no fault gets curiouser and curiouser
Some good old fashioned SOL or Use it or lose it
Horst v Brown, 2010 NY Slip Op 02836 (App. Div., 1st, 2010)
CPLR 3211(e) explicitly provides that an objection or defense based
on the statute of limitations is waived unless raised in a responsive
pleading or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss. Defendant failed to do
either, and thus waived this defense (see Buckeye Retirement Co., L.L.C., Ltd. v Lee,
41 AD3d 183 [2007] [statute of limitations defense waived unless
raised by aggrieved party]).
As defendant waived the affirmative defense of statute of
limitations, Supreme Court erred in its sua sponte consideration of that
defense (see Paladino v Time Warner Cable of N.Y. City, 16
AD3d 646 [2005] ["court may not take judicial notice, sua sponte,
of the applicability of a statute of limitations if that defense has not
been raised"]).
While "courts generally allow pro se litigants some leeway on the
presentation of their case" (Stoves & Stones v Rubens, 237
AD2d 280, 280 [1997]), in this particular case it was error to treat
defendant's opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on
damages as either a motion to amend defendant's answer, or a cross
motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. "A
motion for summary judgment on one claim or defense does not provide a
basis for searching the record and granting summary judgment on an
unrelated claim or defense'" (Baseball Off. of Commr. v Marsh &
McLennan, 295 AD2d 73, 82 [2002], quoting Sadkin v Raskin &
Rappoport, 271 AD2d 272, 273 [2000]).
All concur except Gonzalez, P.J. and RomÁn, J. who dissent in part in a
memorandum by RomÁn, J. as follows:
Generally, when a defendant fails to plead the statute of limitations as
a defense in his or her answer or fails to move for dismissal on that
ground, via a pre-answer motion, the defense is ordinarily waived (see
Dougherty v City of Rye, 63 NY2d 989, 991-992 [1984]; Fade v
Pugliani, 8 AD3d 612, 614 [2004]). However, when a defendant fails
to plead an affirmative defense, as required by CPLR 3211(e) and
3018(b), but nevertheless asserts that defense in connection with a
motion for summary judgment, the waiver is said to be retracted and the
court can grant, when the defendant is the movant, or deny, when the
defendant is the opponent, summary judgment based upon the unpleaded
affirmative defense (see Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 918, 919-920
[2005]; Allen v Matthews, 266 AD2d 782, 784 [1999]; Adsit v
Quantum Chem. Corp., 199 AD2d 899 [1993]). The threshold inquiry is
whether in considering the unpleaded defense, the opponent of the
defense is prejudiced thereby (see BMX Wordlwide v Coppola N.Y.C.,
287 AD2d 383 [2001]; Allen v Matthews, 266 AD2d 782, 784 [1999];
Seaboard Sur. Co. v Nigro, Bros. 222 AD2d 574 [1995]; Rogoff v
San Juan Racing Assn. Inc., 77 AD2d 831 [1980], affd 54 NY2d
883 [1981]). Such prejudice, however, is ameliorated when the defense
was previously raised on a prior motion or during discovery (id.),
or when the opponent of the motion, where defendant seeks summary
judgment based upon said defense, is given an opportunity to fully
respond to the motion for summary judgment (Sheils v County of Fulton, 14 AD3d 919
[2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 711 [2005]; Kirilescu v American Home
Prods. Corp., 278 AD2d 457 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 933
[2001]; McSorley v Philip Morris, Inc., 170 AD2d 440 [1991], appeal
dismissed 77 NY2d 990 [1991]; International Fid. Ins. Co. v Robb,
159 AD2d 687 [1990]).
Cadlerock, L.L.C. v Renner, 2010 NY Slip Op 02849 (App. Div., 1st, 2010)
Defendant sufficiently pleaded his statute of limitations affirmative
defense (see Immediate v St. John's Queens Hosp., 48 NY2d 671,
673 [1979]). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the promissory note,
which required defendant to pay principal and interest payments monthly
for 20 years, after which the loan would have self-liquidated, was an
installment contract (see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc.,
81 NY2d 138, 141-142 [1993]), and, since the debt was not accelerated
while defendant was making the monthly payments, the applicable six-year
statute of limitations (CPLR 213[2]) began to run on the date on which
each installment became due and payable (see Phoenix Acquisition
Corp. at 141). Thus, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff from
seeking to recover the amount of the installment payments, including any
interest, that defendant defaulted on before April 18, 2002, when this
action was commenced (see id.; Sce v Ach, 56 AD3d 457, 458-459 [2008]).
The defense of laches is unavailable in this action at law
commenced within the period of limitations (see Matter of American Druggists' Ins. Co., 15
AD3d 268 [2005], lv dismissed 5 NY3d 746 [2005]; Kahn v
New York Times Co., 122 AD2d 655, 663 [1986]). However, we conclude
that a triable issue of fact exists whether plaintiff's claims are
barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, i.e., whether defendant
justifiably relied on the nine years of inaction by plaintiff and its
predecessors-in-interest to reasonably conclude that his monthly
payments were sufficient to satisfy his payment obligations under the
note, and therefore was misled into paying a reduced amount for years
without realizing that interest was accruing at the 14% interest rate [*2](see Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc. v
Tocqueville Asset Mgt., L.P., 7 NY3d 96, 106—107 [2006]; Triple
Cities Constr. Co. v Maryland Cas. Co., 4 NY2d 443, 448 [1958]).
Author DMGPosted on April 6, 2010 Categories CPLR R. 3211, SOL, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on Some good old fashioned SOL or Use it or lose it
SOL Buden of proof for money owed pursuant to a contract
CPLR R. 3211(a)(5) Motion to dismiss for SOL (or other things, but SOL in this case)
Kuo v Wall St. Mtge. Bankers, Ltd., 2009 NY Slip Op 06511 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
The Supreme Court also correctly denied that branch of the defendant's
motion which was to dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of
limitations. "To dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5)
on the ground that it is barred by the Statute of Limitations, a
defendant bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie that the
time in which to sue has expired . . . In order to make a prima facie
showing, the defendant must establish, inter alia, when the plaintiff's
cause of action accrued. Where, as here, the claim is for the payment
of a sum of money allegedly owed pursuant to a contract, the cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff possesses a legal right to demand
payment'" (Swift v New York Med. Coll., 25 AD3d 686, 687, quoting Matter of Prote Contr. Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 198 AD2d 418, 420 [citations [*2]omitted]; see Cimino v Dembeck, 61 AD3d 802; Matter of Schwartz, 44 AD3d 779).
The defendant offered no evidence that would support a determination
that the plaintiff had a legal right to demand payment of her
compensation, in connection with the subject loan transaction, prior to
the defendant's receipt of the commission fees from the borrower.
Author DMGPosted on September 17, 2009 Categories CPLR R. 3211, SOL, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on SOL Buden of proof for money owed pursuant to a contract
CPLR § 217: Blown SOL, adjudicated in NY, Moved to Fed, UnBlown
217 Proceeding against body or officer; actions complaining about
conduct that would constitute a union's breach of its duty of fair
representation; four months
I found this by way of a guest blog on Sui Generis. Norman Olch, author of Full Court Press, writes about Cloverleaf Realty of New York, Inc. v. Town of Wawayanda, 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Case, involving the statute of limitations. Here is the time-line for the case:
NY DJ action. Case dismissed because four month SOL is blown. (CPLR 217)
Action then brought into Fed Ct. Fed Ct. dismisses because of prior dismissal in state court prevented this action proceeding in fed.
2nd Cir. reverses.
Do yourself a favor and check out his post.
Author DMGPosted on July 27, 2009 Categories CPLR § 217, SOLLeave a comment on CPLR § 217: Blown SOL, adjudicated in NY, Moved to Fed, UnBlown
Statute of Limitations Cannot be Asserted Sua Sponte
Orix Fin. Servs., Inc. v Haynes, 2008 NY Slip Op 09270 (App. Div., 1st)
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J.), entered
September 6, 2007, which, in an action on a "conditional sale contract
note," denied plaintiff's unopposed motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for a
default judgment and sua sponte dismissed the complaint as barred by
the statute of limitations, unanimously reversed, on the law, without
costs, the motion granted, and the matter remanded for further
proceedings including entry of judgment.
The statute of limitations must be pleaded as an affirmative
defense and cannot be asserted sua sponte by the court as a basis for
denying an unopposed motion for a default judgment (see
Buckeye Retirement Co., L.L.C., Ltd. v Lee
, 41 AD3d 183, 184 [2007]). We have reviewed plaintiff's submissions on the motion and find them sufficient for purposes of CPLR 3215.
Author DMGPosted on November 25, 2008 Categories SOLLeave a comment on Statute of Limitations Cannot be Asserted Sua Sponte