Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/415/104/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-08-26 10:38:11
Document Index: 11870923

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 152', '§ 2', '§ 1101', '§ 861', '§ 1151']

Petitioners are the owners and managing agents of two ships which are registered under the laws of Liberia and fly the Liberian flag. They sought injunctive relief in the state courts in Texas to bar picketing of their vessels by respondent unions. The trial court denied relief, finding that the dispute was "arguably" within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that the jurisdiction of the state courts was therefore preempted. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, [Footnote 1] and we granted certiorari, 412 U.S. 927 (1973), to consider whether the activities here complained of were activities "affecting commerce" within the meaning of §§ 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 450, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6) and (7). [Footnote 2] We hold that they were chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondents are American maritime unions, apparently representing a substantial majority of American merchant seamen. [Footnote 3] Alarmed by an accelerating decline in the number of jobs available to their members, these unions agreed to undertake collective action against foreign vessels, which they saw as the major cause of their business recession. Specifically, these unions agreed to picket foreign ships, calling attention to the competitive advantage enjoyed by such vessels because of a difference chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
between foreign and domestic seamen's wages. All parties concede that such a difference does exist. [Footnote 4]
These signs were supplemented by pamphlets of similar import. [Footnote 5] The pickets were instructed not to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The trial court sustained this contention, holding that jurisdiction properly lay with the NLRB, and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. That court found that state jurisdiction was preempted by the Act when "the activities complained of are arguably either protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA as amended by the LMRA," [Footnote 7] see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), and that the conduct here met that test. The court rejected petitioners' argument that the picketing interfered with the "maritime operations of foreign flag chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ships," see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), in such manner as to remove it from the Board's jurisdiction. [Footnote 8] The court concluded:
In a series of cases decided over the past 17 years, [Footnote 10] this Court has discussed the application of the Labor Management Relations Act in situations which might be broadly described as disputes between unions representing workers in this country and owners of foreign flag vessels operating in international maritime commerce. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957), is the leading case on the subject. In Benz, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 27. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 397 U. S. 200. The pickets in Ariadne, unlike the pickets in Benz or Incres, were primarily engaged in a dispute as to whether an employer should hire unionized or nonunionized American workers to perform longshoremen's work, [Footnote 12] and the substandard wages which they were protesting were being paid to fellow American workers. The Court specifically noted: "[T]his dispute centered on the wages to be paid American residents." Id. at 387 U. S. 199. The term "in commerce," as used in the LMRA, is obviously not self-defining, and certainly the activities in Benz, McCulloch, and Incres, held not covered by the Act, were literally just as much "in commerce" as were the activities held covered in Ariadne. Those cases which deny jurisdiction to the NLRB recognize that Congress, when it used the words "in commerce" in the LMRA, simply did not intend that Act to erase longstanding chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
principles of comity and accommodation in international maritime trade. In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, 345 U. S. 577 (1953), the Court commented on the congressional intent with respect to the Jones Act of 1920 in these words:
The picketing activities in this case do not involve the inescapable intrusion into the affairs of foreign ships that was present in Benz and Incres; respondents seek chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In this situation, the foreign vessels' lot is not a happy one. A decision by the foreign owners to raise foreign seamen's wages to a level mollifying the American pickets would have the most significant and far-reaching effect on the maritime operations of these ships throughout the world. A decision to boycott American ports in order to avoid the difficulties induced by the picketing would be detrimental not only to the private balance sheets of the foreign shipowners, but to the citizenry of a country as dependent on goods carried in foreign bottoms as is ours. Retaliatory action against American vessels in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
foreign ports might likewise be considered, but the employment of such tactics would probably exacerbate and broaden the present dispute. Virtually none of the predictable responses of a foreign shipowner to picketing of this type, therefore, would be limited to the sort of wage-cost decision benefiting American workingmen which the LMRA was designed to regulate. This case, therefore, falls under Benz, rather than under Ariadne. [Footnote 14]
Since we hold that respondents' picketing was not "in commerce" as defined by the Act, we do not reach the question of whether the activity was otherwise of such a nature that state courts would be precluded by the LMRA from entertaining an action to enjoin it. Our conclusion that the activities here involved were not "in commerce" within the meaning of §§ 2(6) and (7) of the NLRA, as amended by the LMRA, resolves a question which, of course, is one for the courts in the first instance. Ariadne, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 200. The Court of Civil Appeals was therefore wrong in holding that the courts of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
But the fact that today's decision does not finally decide the legality of respondents' picketing should not obscure the significance of the Court's holding. Ninety-five percent of our export trade has already fled American-flag vessels for cheaper, foreign-registered shipping. [Footnote 2/2] In holding that respondents' picketing against foreign flag vessels does not give rise to a dispute "affecting commerce" within the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction, the Court effectively deprives American seamen, among all American employees in commerce, of any federally protected weapon with which to try to save their jobs. [Footnote 2/3] Additionally, the Court creates new difficulties chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
for the Board in its administration of the Act by making the Boards statutory jurisdiction turn on the identity of the competitor that might be affected by the picketing -- a distinction relevant in the determination whether picketing is protected or prohibited activity under the Act, but a distinction rejected in other contexts in the determination of Board jurisdiction. [Footnote 2/4]
There is, of course, no doubt that Congress possesses the power to subject foreign shipping in American territorial chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
waters to the federal labor laws. [Footnote 2/5] And the Court concedes that the picketing activities involved here fall literally within the term "commerce" as used in the Labor Management Relations Act. Ante at 415 U. S. 112.
As the Court concedes, none of the cases relied upon reached the question before us, that is, whether American seamen may employ economic weapons to try to save their jobs by improving the competitive positions of their domestic employers vis-a-vis foreign shipping. Yet the Court relies upon those decisions as supporting the proposition that we must conclude that Congress "simply did not intend that Act [LMRA] to erase longstanding principles of comity and accommodation in international maritime trade," ante at 415 U. S. 112-113, because the economic impact upon foreign shipping from respondents' picketing might severely disrupt the maritime operations of foreign vessels. Not a word or sentence in any opinion in those cases supports that reading. Rather, those decisions chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S. 24 (1963), the issue was whether the Board had power to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
adjudicate the legality of the efforts of a union to organize the members of a foreign crew. Again, the Court held that the Board was without jurisdiction under the Act, since adjudication of that question would require that the Board examine into the relations between that crew and its foreign flag employer. Id. at 372 U. S. 27-28.
Thus, the only appropriate issue in the instant case is whether NLRB cognizance of respondents' picketing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
But my disagreement with the Court does not rest alone on its failure adequately to rationalize and distinguish the case law. As the Court states, the Nation's labor laws must be read in light of the longstanding involvement of Congress with maritime affairs. If that involvement is examined, however, it will demonstrate that, beginning with its first session, 1 Stat. 55, Congress has been deeply engaged in legislating to protect American vessels from competition, usually by enacting discriminatory laws against foreign flag vessels. Myriad hearings and reports reflect congressional determination that the American merchant marine, largely because of protections afforded American seamen's wages and working conditions in collective bargaining fostered by the National Labor Relations Act, shall have legislative help chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
to support its efforts to compete on equal terms for a share of our foreign commerce. [Footnote 2/7]
That merchant marine is further to be "owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States, insofar as may be practicable," and is to be "manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel." 46 U.S.C. § 1101. See also Merchant Marine Act, 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 861. The 1936 Act furthers those aims by providing subsidies for the construction and operation of American flag shipping, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1171, and goes far in imposing discriminations against foreign flag shipping in regard to certain types of freight. 46 U.S.C. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary