Source: http://ok.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180702_0000644.WOK.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-01-22 23:20:39
Document Index: 268247547

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2412', 'art, 362', '§ 404', 'art, 350', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412']

On March 13, 2018, the Court entered a Judgment reversing the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) and remanding this case for further administrative proceedings. See J. (Doc. No. 25); see also Haese v. Berryhill, No. CIV-17-15-CG, 2018 WL 1304840 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 13, 2018). Plaintiff David Scott Haese now moves for an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $6587.40 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Pl.'s Mot. Att'y Fees (Doc. No. 26). Defendant has objected to the Motion (Def.'s Obj. (Doc. No. 27)), and Plaintiff has replied (Pl.'s Reply (Doc. No. 28)).
In the administrative proceedings below, the ALJ erred in multiple ways and failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints as required by the relevant Social Security Rulings and regulations and by Tenth Circuit authority. First, the ALJ's discussion of an alleged lack of objective medical evidence to support Plaintiff's complaints was not “‘closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence'” in the record. Haese, 2018 WL 1304840, at *3 (quoting Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2004)) (citing SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996) at *4); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b)-(c), 416.929(b)-(c). Next, the ALJ's decision cited Plaintiff's criminal history, but the discussion failed to reflect why or how this history was relevant to Plaintiff's credibility or residual functional capacity. See Haese, 2018 WL 1304840, at *3. Third, the ALJ's finding regarding Plaintiff's failure to make lifestyle modifications failed to comport with Social Security Ruling 02-1p and thus could not be used to support an adverse credibility determination. See Id. at *4. Finally, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's credibility based upon his lack of pursuit of medical treatment but improperly failed to consider whether “Plaintiff's explanations or other record evidence, ” including evidence of lack of financial resources, provided justification for the treatment Plaintiff sought and received. See Id. (citing SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7, *8).
Reversal therefore was required based upon the ALJ's failure to apply the correct legal standards, as well as a lack of substantial evidence to uphold the credibility determination (and thus a lack of substantial evidence to uphold the assessment of residual functional capacity). See Id. at *5. The Court declined to address other propositions of error raised by Plaintiff. See Id. (citing Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Defendant objects to any award of fees, arguing that the government's position was substantially justified with respect to the denial of Plaintiff's applications for benefits. See Def.'s Obj. at 4-7; see also Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We consider the reasonableness of the position the Secretary took both in the administrative proceedings and in the civil action Plaintiff commenced to obtain benefits.”). While thorough, the ALJ's assessment of the evidence reflected legal errors and resulted in an assessment that lacked substantial evidence and did not comport with Tenth Circuit authority in multiple respects. See Haese, 2018 WL 1304840, at *2-5. Defendant now primarily repeats the arguments previously made in support of affirmance and does not show “a reasonable basis in law and in fact” for the ALJ's denial of benefits. Hadden, 851 F.2d at 1267; see Def.'s Obj. at 4-7; see also Gutierrez, 953 F.2d at 584-86 (finding that district court abused its discretion in denying fees to plaintiff where the ALJ's findings were unreasonable based on the record before the ALJ). Defendant thus has not shown that the United States' position before the SSA and this Court was substantially justified. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(D).
The Court is aware of no special circumstances that would make an award of attorney's fees unjust. See Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Thus, the only remaining issue is the reasonableness of Plaintiff's fee request. See Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(A).
Plaintiff seeks an attorney's fee award of $6587.40, calculated as follows:
• 3.7 attorney hours for work performed in 2016, at a rate of $193.00 per hour; 26.1 attorney hours for work performed in 2017, at a rate of $197.00 per hour; and 2.8 attorney hours for work ...