Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97150/united-states-vs-a-s-kreider-co
Timestamp: 2017-04-25 15:14:14
Document Index: 768590221

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1113', '§ 3226', '§ 1113', '§ 284', '§ 284', '§ 284', '§ 1113', '§ 262', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 1113', '§ 24', '§ 1113']

United States Vs a S Kreider Co - Citation 97150 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize United States Vs. A. S. Kreider Co. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97150CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMay-26-1941Case Number313 U.S. 443AppellantUnited StatesRespondentA. S. Kreider Co.Excerpt:
united states v. a. s. kreider co. - 313 u.s. 443 (1941)
1. section 24(20) of the judicial code, which gives the district courts jurisdiction concurrent with the court of claims over certain suits against the united states, provides that no suit shall be allowed thereunder unless the same shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made.
that the six-year period is an outside limit consistent with the five-year limit on..... Judgment:
that the six-year period is an outside limit consistent with the five-year limit on suits for the recovery of internal revenue taxes set by § 1113(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, amending R.S. § 3226. P.
313 U. S. 446
2. In response to a claim of tax refund, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found an overpayment in the amount claimed and sent the taxpayer a certificate of overassessment in that amount bearing notation that a stated part of it was barred by limitations, and enclosed a check for the difference, which the taxpayer accepted.
that there was no account stated upon which the taxpayer could ground an action for the part not repaid, and thus avoid the five-years limitation of § 1113(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926 on suits to recover internal revenue taxes.
Bonuit Teller & Co. v. United States,
313 U. S. 448
3. To establish an account stated, there must be a balance struck in such circumstances as to import a promise of payment, on the one side, and of acceptance, on the other. P.
p. 552, to review the affirmance of a judgment sustaining a claim for a refund of taxes.
97 F.2d 387; 30 F.Supp. 722.
and (g) of § 284 [
] of the Revenue Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 9, 66, 67) authorized him to remit only that part of the 1920 tax which was paid in 1926.
Relying principally on
Bonwit-Teller & Co. v. United States,
, respondent maintains that its action was commenced well within the applicable period of limitation. Further, respondent contends that both courts below correctly refused to regard § 284(b)(2) as a limitation on the Commissioner's duty to make refunds under § 284(g). We find it unnecessary to examine the latter contention, for we are of opinion that respondent sued too late.
Undoubtedly respondent has failed to begin its action within either of the periods specified in § 1113(a).
See A. S. Kreider Co. v. United States,
97 F.2d 387, 388. The suit was not instituted until March 7, 1932, although the last tax payment was made on July 26, 1926, and the claim for refund was disallowed in October, 1929. [
] But, as already
Section 24(20) gives the district courts jurisdiction concurrent with the court of claims of certain suits against the United States. To equate the right thus conferred to the existing right to sue in the court of claims (
28 U.S.C. § 262), the statute provides:
We think the quoted language was intended merely to place an outside limit on the period within which all suits might be initiated under § 24(20). Clearly, nothing in that language precludes the application of a different and shorter period of limitation to an individual class of actions even though they are brought under § 24(20). Phrasing the condition negatively, Congress left it open to provide less liberally for particular actions which, because of special considerations, required different treatment.
See Christie-Street Commission Co. v. United States,
136 F. 326, 332, 333.
in § 1113(a) has no meaning whatever unless the limitation in § 24(20) is construed not to govern proceedings for the recovery of "internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected." [
Bonwit-Teller & Co. v. United States, supra,
does not remove the bar of § 1113(a) here. There, we held, under the peculiar facts disclosed, that the taxpayer could evade the limitations of that section by grounding its action on a subsequent "account stated," rather than on the original wrongful overassessment. But the instant case is plainly distinguishable, for, assuming that familiar doctrines of contracts furnish the test (
289 U. S. 367
289 U. S. 370
), we are unable to find the requisites of an account stated in the transactions on which respondent relies.
To establish an account stated, respondent must show that a balance was struck "in such circumstances as to import a promise of payment on the one side, and acceptance on the other."
291 U. S. 65
12 Pet. 300, 325 [argument of counsel -- omitted];
125 U. S. 650
. But plainly,
R. H. Stearns Co. v. United States, supra.
In fact, a contrary inference is the only legitimate supposition respondent could make. At most, respondent could assume that the United States promised
Acceptance by respondent, another essential of an account stated, is equally lacking. By accepting the check for $1,362.50, respondent agreed only to a partial account stated (
compare Sturm v. Boker,
150 U. S. 340
), thereby converting that much of the statement into an account settled. The institution of this suit is ample proof that respondent never intended to accept the certificate in its entirety as a correct computation of the amount which it claimed was due.
It should be noted that this action seeks recovery of money which was paid in 1921. We assume, so far as this decision is concerned, that the phrase "such tax" in the quoted language refers to the total tax for the year in question, whenever determined and assessed; or, stated differently, that "payment" within the meaning of this statute does not occur until the entire tax for 1920 is paid, including deficiency assessments made several years later.
Compare Union Trust Co. v. United States,
70 F.2d 629.
We assume also that the Commissioner's refusal in 1929 to make the refund was a "disallowance" of respondent's claim.
Compare Bonwit-Teller & Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 265
with United States .v Bertelsen & Peterson Engineering Co.,
306 U. S. 276
Apparently the applicability of a specific limitation instead of the general Tucker Act limitation has not been challenged for 35 years.
136 F. 326. The specific limitation has been assumed to apply in numerous cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Bertelsen & Peterson Engineering Co.,
Bates Mfg. Co. v. United States,