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Timestamp: 2019-10-23 10:17:53
Document Index: 56519003

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7103', '§ 7103', '§ 7117', '§ 7117', '§ 10', '§ 7123', '§ 7123', '§ 7123', '§ 7101', '§ 7123', '§ 7123']

EEOC V. FLRA, 476 U. S. 19 - Volume 476 - 1986 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 476 > EEOC V. FLRA, 476 U. S. 19 (1986) > Full Text
EEOC V. FLRA, 476 U. S. 19 (1986)
In the course of contract negotiations with petitioner, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), respondent American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) submitted the following proposal:
Page 476 U. S. 21
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the FLRA's decision. 240 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 744 F.2d 842 (1984). The Court of Appeals found the EEOC's claim that any proposal regarding contracting out was barred by the management rights clause "untenable in light of the plain text of the clause."
Page 476 U. S. 22
Id. at 224, 744 F.2d at 848. Since management's reserved right was conditioned upon compliance with "applicable laws," and since the proposed contract language "essentially echoes the statutory requirement that contracting-out determinations be made in accordance with applicable laws," the proposal would not affect the EEOC's reserved authority to make contracting-out decisions. Ibid. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the FLRA that, under 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii), which defines "grievance" to include "any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment," an alleged violation of the Circular would be grievable even in the absence of AFGE's proposal. 240 U.S.App.D.C. at 227, 744 F.2d at 850. The dissenting judge believed that the proposal was intended to, and would, place additional constraints on the EEOC's reserved rights with respect to contracting out. Id. at 228, 744 F.2d at 852 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
In this Court, the EEOC raises three principal arguments in support of its claim that AFGE's proposal is nonnegotiable. First, although it did not so argue to the FLRA or the Court of Appeals, the EEOC now contends that Circular A-76 is not an "applicable la[w]" within the meaning of the management rights clause, and therefore that AFGE's proposal, by requiring compliance with the Circular, would intrude on management's reserved rights. Second, and again for the first time in this Court, the EEOC asserts that an alleged violation of the Circular would not be grievable absent AFGE's proposal, because the Circular is not a "law, rule, or regulation" within the meaning of § 7103(a)(9)'s definition of "grievance." Third, the EEOC suggests that the Circular is a "Government-wide rule or regulation" for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(1), and argues that § 7117(a)(1) excludes such rules or regulations from the scope of the duty to bargain. This argument, too, was never presented to the FLRA.
Page 476 U. S. 23
This Court has interpreted § 10(e) to mean that a Court of Appeals is "without jurisdiction to consider" an issue not raised before the Board if the failure to do so is not excused by extraordinary circumstances. Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U. S. 645, 456 U. S. 665-666 (1982). See also Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U. S. 301, 440 U. S. 311, n. 10 (1979); May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U. S. 376, 326 U. S. 386, n. 5 (1945). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has similarly held that, under § 7123(c), review of "issues that an agency never placed before the Authority" is barred absent extraordinary circumstances. Department of Treasury v. FLRA, 227 U.S.App.D.C. 377, 382, 707 F.2d 574, 579 (1983). See also FLRA v. Social Security Administration, 243 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 342, 753 F.2d 156, 160-161 (1985). We agree with this interpretation of § 7123(c), which we think is not "waived" simply because the FLRA fails to invoke it. Section 7123(c) speaks to courts, not parties, and its plain language evinces an intent that the FLRA shall pass upon issues arising under the Act, thereby bringing its expertise to bear on the resolution of those issues. We need not decide whether an express waiver by the FLRA would be relevant
Page 476 U. S. 24
in determining whether there are "extraordinary circumstances" excusing a party's failure to raise an issue before that agency, for there is no such waiver here. We do, however, reject JUSTICE STEVENS' theory of implied waiver, which, it should be noted, is not offered as an interpretation of the exception for "extraordinary circumstances." We think that, if Congress had meant there to be two exceptions to the bar raised by § 7123(c), instead of one, it would have said so.
Page 476 U. S. 25
The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) is the agency designated by Congress to enforce the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. We must therefore presume that the FLRA has a thorough understanding of the provisions of that Act, including § 7123(c). [Footnote 2] See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 467 U. S. 844-845 (1984). Under that
Page 476 U. S. 26
provision, the Authority surely knew that it could have interposed an objection to our consideration of arguments advanced by the Solicitor General on behalf of the EEOC's construction of the statute, [Footnote 3] but it elected not to take such an approach in this Court. [Footnote 4] In so doing, it has waived the protection of § 7123(c) -- and given its palpable interest in having the merits decided, I believe it has acted wisely in doing so. [Footnote 5]
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