Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/740/447/233454/
Timestamp: 2017-11-22 20:20:14
Document Index: 740157540

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 17151', '§ 1983', '§ 144', '§ 144', '§ 144']

Bennett L. Crowder, Ii, Plaintiff-appellant, v. J.k. Conlan, et al., Defendants-appellees, 740 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1984 › Bennett L. Crowder, Ii, Plaintiff-appellant, v. J.k. Conlan, et al., Defendants-appellees
Bennett L. Crowder, Ii, Plaintiff-appellant, v. J.k. Conlan, et al., Defendants-appellees, 740 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1984)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 740 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1984)
Argued June 6, 1984. Decided Aug. 2, 1984
Dr. Bennett L. Crowder, II, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Dr. Crowder initiated this suit on December 19, 1980, charging that the Jennie Stuart Memorial Hospital in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, its staff and other defendants had violated his civil rights by restricting his staff privileges at the hospital.
The ultimate issue in determining whether a party is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is whether the alleged infringement of federal rights is "fairly attributable to the state." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2754, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982). Therefore, if the actions of the defendants here were not state action, our inquiry ends. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2770, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1982).
In Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the State of New York could not be held responsible for the decisions of private nursing homes to discharge or transfer patients without notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The plaintiffs in Blum contended that state Medicaid regulations "affirmatively" ordered the decisions of the private nursing homes because the nursing homes were required to periodically assess whether their patients were receiving an appropriate level of care warranting the patient's continued stay in the facility. Blum, 457 U.S. at 994-95, 102 S. Ct. at 2780-2781. Adopting the standard set forth in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1975), the Court held that the plaintiffs had to demonstrate "a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S. Ct. at 2785, quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S. Ct. at 453. See also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 838-40, 102 S. Ct. at 2770-2771. Newsom v. Vanderbilt University, 653 F.2d 1100, 1113-16 (6th Cir. 1981); cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S. Ct. at 2754. Applying that test, the court found that the plaintiffs in Blum had failed to establish "state action" in the nursing homes' decisions to transfer or discharge patients because " [t]hose decisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008, 102 S. Ct. at 2788. The Court pointed out that mere approval or acquiescence by the state in the decision of a private party does not constitute state action. Id. at 1004-05, 102 S. Ct. at 2785-2786. See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 1737-1738, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978); Jackson v. Metro Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 357, 95 S. Ct. at 456. Instead, the Court noted that a "State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S. Ct. at 2786.
Factually, Blum differs from the present case because the plaintiffs there sued the State of New York in an attempt to hold it responsible for the actions of private nursing homes. Here, Dr. Crowder is suing a private entity claiming that its actions are "state action", even though the state was not directly involved in the challenged activities. This factual difference, however, does not undercut our applying the legal reasoning of Blum to the issue posed here. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1982) (legal reasoning of Blum applied when deciding whether private school acted under color of state law when it discharged certain school employees).
Dr. Crowder begins by arguing that state action is present because the hospital derives a considerable percentage of its revenues from governmental funding. In Blum this same claim was rejected even though the State subsidized the operating and capital costs of the nursing homes, and paid the medical expenses of more than ninety percent of the patients. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011, 102 S. Ct. at 2784. The actions of a private entity do not become state action merely because the government provides substantial funding to the private party. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840, 102 S. Ct. at 2771; Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 653 F.2d at 1115; Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hospitals, 487 F.2d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, Y416 U.S. 1000, 94 S. Ct. 2413, 40 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1974).
Next, Dr. Crowder contends state action is established because the hospital is subject to extensive state regulation. State regulation of a private entity, even if it is "extensive and detailed," is not enough to support a finding of state action. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 350, 95 S. Ct. at 453; see also Griffith v. Bell-Whitley Community Action Agency, 614 F.2d 1102, 1109 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928, 100 S. Ct. 3025, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1122 (1980). In order to invoke the doctrine of "state action," a complaining party must demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the challenged action and the regulatory scheme alleged to be the impetus behind the private action. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05, 102 S. Ct. at 2785-2786; Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., Inc., 498 F.2d 1183, 1192 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012, 95 S. Ct. 2639, 45 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1975); Griffith, 614 F.2d at 1109. Dr. Crowder has made no such demonstration here. The defendants' decision to restrict Dr. Crowder's staff privileges was based upon an internal investigation concerning Dr. Crowder's surgical and medical performances within the hospital community. Like the situation in Blum, this decision "ultimately turn [ed] on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008, 102 S. Ct. at 2788. It was not dictated by a regulatory rule of the state. Therefore, the State cannot be deemed responsible for the ultimate decision to restrict Dr. Crowder's staff privileges. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1981) (Decisions of public defender in representing her client were based upon professional relationship between the attorney and the client, and not dictated by any rule of conduct imposed by the State.).
Dr. Crowder also points out that the Mayor of Hopkinsville and the County Judge/Executive of Christian County, Kentucky serve as ex officio members of the hospital's Board of Trustees. This fact, although an important factor in establishing state action, see Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910, 99 S. Ct. 278, 58 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1978), is insufficiently linked to the challenged actions of the defendants in this case, and therefore, does not warrant a finding of state action.
Moreover, only two of the Board's thirteen members were public officials. This fact, combined with the knowledge that the Board's decision concerned professional standards of medical fitness, convinces us that the Board's decision cannot be characterized as "state action." Although it is true that this court has found "state action" in similar circumstances, see O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hospital, 472 F.2d 1140, 1143 (6th Cir. 1973); Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hospital, Inc., 437 F.2d 429, 430 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hospital Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1968), we believe the legal reasoning of these cases is no longer valid in light of the Supreme Court's recent holdings in this area of the law. Rather than looking to the number of public officials who serve on the governing board of a private institution, we believe the proper focus concerns whether the State has exercised "coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S. Ct. at 2786. Undoubtedly there may be situations where state action is manifest in the decisions of a private entity because public officials work behind the scene to influence a particular result, or because powerful and influential public officers add the prestige of their office to the actions or findings of a private institution. In this case, however, this situation does not exist, and there was no state action.
Furthermore, even assuming the continued validity of Meredith and its progeny, see Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910, 99 S. Ct. 278, 58 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1978); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 634-35 (2d Cir. 1974), this case is distinguishable from Meredith, Chiaffitelli and O'Neil because in each of those cases a majority of the members of the hospital's governing board were accountable to the public. O'Neil, 472 F.2d at 1143 ("board of directors shall at all times contain at least one member from each of the County's magisterial districts"); Chiaffitelli, 437 F.2d at 430 ("five of the nine members of the hospital's board of governors are ... responsible to the public"); Meredith, 397 F.2d at 34-35 (entire hospital commission "appointed by governing body of Allen County to operate the hospital"). Here, only two of the thirteen board members were responsible to the public. In our view, this is not sufficient state involvement to constitute "a close nexus between the [Commonwealth of Kentucky] and the challenged action of the [hospital's board] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S. Ct. at 2786, quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S. Ct. at 453. See also Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 395 F. Supp. 363, 368 (D.Ore.1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 792, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1976) (even though three of seven directors of hospital's board are publicly appointed, hospital is not a state actor).
In Hodges v. Metts, 676 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1982), we held government action had not been established in the operation of a private housing complex even though the mortgage secured by the operators had been insured by the federal government under section 221(d) (4) of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d) (4). In Hodges, we found that, although the Department of Housing and Urban Development would be entitled to take title on the mortgaged premises in the event of a default by the private owners, HUD's lack of involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the complex and the absence of a nexus between the challenged action (eviction without cause), and the limited governmental involvement demonstrated that the actions of the private landlord could not be imputed to the government. Id. at 1138.
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), and Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964), do not undermine our decision. In Hampton, black residents of the City of Jacksonville sued under the fourteenth amendment two privately owned golf courses when the owners restricted the use of the courses to white patrons only. Despite the defendant's argument that no state action was shown, the Fifth Circuit held the existence of a reverter clause in the deed conveying the city-owned golf courses to private individuals, which had the effect of assuring that the property involved would always remain as golf courses, was itself sufficient to constitute state action. The Hampton court stressed that this arrangement guaranteed the City complete control over the golf courses, "even though the daily operation [of the golf courses is] ... not subject in other matters to the City's discretion." Hampton, 304 F.2d at 322. Similarly, in Eaton, the Fourth Circuit ruled that two black physicians could maintain an action against a private hospital which had denied them staff privileges on account of their race. The Eaton court noted that the defendant hospital held a deed with the city and county governments which assured that the property in question would remain as a hospital. The hospital was also granted tax exempt status, provided significant capital construction subsidies and given the power of eminent domain to condemn property for use by the hospital. Eaton, 329 F.2d at 713-714. These factors, considered together, "demonstrate [d] the pervasive nature of the state's role in the functioning of the defendant hospital, day by day and over the span of years." Id. at 715. See also Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910, 99 S. Ct. 278, 58 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1978) (appointment of entire Board of Directors of hospital by public officials and distribution of hospital's profits to town support finding of "state action"). Here, the factors alleged by Dr. Crowder to constitute stte action do not establish the same type of interdependence between the hospital and the state found in Hampton and Eaton. Neither the State nor County have become involved in the daily operations of the hospital. Nor can it be said that either the State or County governments retain the type of control over the hospital's long-term future that was evident in Hampton and Eaton. More importantly, neither government body has positioned itself to the point that it has in effect become a "joint participant in the challenged activity" thereby making the decision to restrict Dr. Crowder's staff privileges state action. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S. Ct. 856, 862, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1961). In sum, we find that the connections between the State and the Jennie Stuart Memorial Hospital are insufficiently linked to the challenged actions of the defendants to warrant a finding of state action in the hospital's decision to restrict Dr. Crowder's staff privileges. Therefore, Dr. Crowder has not stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Finally, Dr. Crowder asserts the district court evidenced bias and prejudice against him violating his right to a fair trial. We disagree. Recusal motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 must be timely filed, contain a good faith certificate of counsel and satisfy substantive requirements of legal sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 144; Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981). Failure to follow these requirements "defeats a charge of bias." Id., cf. Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1980) (failure of party to sign affidavit supports denial of motion to recuse). Dr. Crowder concedes his motion was not timely filed and did not contain a proper certificate of counsel. However, he asserts good cause is shown because the claim of bias was raised "when first discovered and ... the [d]istrict [c]ourt had a duty to disclose such [bias] at the outset of litigation, even though in the Court's opinion, it would not influence the decision." In support of this claim, Dr. Crowder points to several comments of the district court in its memorandum opinions dismissing his lawsuit.
Motions for recusal should be timely filed. "Promptness in asserting disqualification is required to prevent a party from awaiting the outcome before taking action." Davis v. Cities Service Oil Co., 420 F.2d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 1970), citing In re United Shoe Machinery Corp., 276 F.2d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 1960). Here, Dr. Crowder waited until twelve days after the district court dismissed his complaint before filing his recusal motion. This failure to follow the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 144 therefore defeats Dr. Crowder's motion for recusal.