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Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 26', 'Art 6', 'Art 4', 'Arts 1', 'Art 10', 'Art 7', 'Art 8', 'Art 2', 'Art 8', 'art 4', 'Art 9', 'Art 2', 'Art 1', 'Art 5', 'Art 87']

Criminalisation of air accidents and the creation of a Just Culture. By Mildred Trögeler - PDF
Criminalisation of air accidents and the creation of a Just Culture. By Mildred Trögeler
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1 Criminalisation of air accidents and the creation of a Just Culture By Mildred Trögeler
2 A INTRODUCTION In air transportation the most crucial issue is safety. Article 44 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 stipulates that the overall objective of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is to ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world. 1 Safety is a very complex, multi-faceted activity that encompasses all fields of aviation and affects every single individual involved in aviation. Accidents are the result of an undesirable chain of events. To prevent the repetition of such events, the investigation process requires an effective safety occurrence reporting system, which means that all relevant accidents and incidents are reported and comprehensively documented by aviation professionals. Therefore, aviation professionals must be dedicated and contribute fully to the safety investigation of the reported occurrences. One of the most valuable tools in practice for the improvement of safety is the ability to learn from mistakes. 2 Safety investigation reacts to the need to learn from accidents and incidents, and to take appropriate remedial actions to prevent similar occurrences. In the aviation community there is an increasing concern over a perceived trend of authorities to initiate criminal prosecutions against aviation professionals. The fact that incident reports and material submitted in the course of safety investigations often find their way into separate judicial investigations has led to an increased fear amongst aviation professionals that routine operational decisions could now become the basis for criminal prosecutions. This is detrimental to aviation safety as it could, in turn, lead to a reduced willingness of occurrence reporting by those involved in such incidents or accidents. The chilling effect which potential prosecution has on openness and the flow of safety information following an aircraft accident or incident has an adverse effect on aviation safety and prevents lessons from being learned. This dilemma has impeded the effectiveness of safety investigations for decades. George Santayana, a philosopher once said Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. 3 The meaning of this statement reflects the objective of a so-called Just Culture which is aimed at preventing recurrence of accidents and incidents by encouraging active and transparent reporting of safety occurrences as well as full participation in safety investigation instead of punishing those involved. The key of a Just Culture is to strike the right balance between the need to improve aviation safety and the recognition of the judicial system s legitimacy to investigate and prosecute the 1 Convention on International Civil Aviation (adopted 7 December 1944, entered into force 4 April 1947) 15 UNTS 295 [hereinafter: Chicago Convention] art S Sharif The Failure of Aviation Safety in New Zealand: An Examination of New Zealand s Implementation of Its International Obligations under Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (2003) 68 Journal of Air Law & Commerce 339, DJ Piven and D Borgenicht and P Marchant The Worst-Case Scenario Almanac: History (Chronicle Books San Francisco 2006) 9. 1
3 committed crimes. At the heart of the establishment of a Just Culture lies three core principles. Firstly, the determination of appropriate safeguards which will ensure that individuals involved in safety investigations are not punished for their reported actions or omissions. Secondly, the protection granted shall not apply to cases in which unacceptable behaviour is involved such as wilful misconduct or gross negligence. Thirdly, the improvement of aviation safety should be achieved by encouraging full contribution to safety investigations. To ensure that the Just Culture concept works out effectively in practice, its principles have to be laid down in a suitable regulatory framework, which provides the indispensable legal certainty. This paper questions which form these principles should take in order to provide a Just Culture and whether these principles should be introduced by amending the current regulatory framework at international or European level or whether it should be left up to the national legislature to regulate. B INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK The ICAO was created in 1947 to promote the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation throughout the world. Article 26 of the Chicago Convention imposes an obligation on the State of Occurrence so far as its laws permit, to institute an inquiry into the accident in accordance with ICAO procedures and highlights the cooperation between the States involved. 1 Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention was first adopted by the Council on 11 April 1951 pursuant to Article 37 of the Chicago Convention and provides detailed Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for aircraft incident and accident inquiries. 4 The SARPs laid down in Annex 13 are aimed at complementing Article 26 of the Chicago Convention and provide for the procedures, not only to be applied in an investigation instituted under the requirement of Article 26, but also in the event of an inquiry into any aircraft accident which falls within the provisions of Annex 13. In view of the increasing criminalisation of aircraft accident investigation three aspects covered by Annex 13 are of considerable legal interest. First of all, in the aftermath of an aircraft accident or incident various authorities are likely to be involved in the investigation. Annex 13 stresses, on the one hand, the need to coordinate the investigation with the judicial authorities, 5 but on the other hand it ensures full 4 ICAO Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (9 th edn ICAO Montréal 2001) [hereinafter: Annex 13]. 5 Standard 5.10 of Annex 13. 2
4 independence in the conduct of the investigation by the investigation authority. 6 In addition, Annex 13 recommends that any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability should be separated from any investigation under the provisions of this Annex. 7 The sole purpose of an accident or incident investigation within the meaning of Annex 13 is the prevention of future accidents and incidents but not to apportion blame or liability. 8 Secondly, Standard 5.12 of Annex 13 refers to the non-disclosure of certain types of records which are collected by safety investigation authorities. The main objective of this Standard is to prevent the misuse of the safety-related data by parties conducting concurrent investigations serving a purpose other than aviation safety. However, the protection offered is apparently not absolute. The disclosure of safety information may be allowed when the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in that State determines that the disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future investigation. 9 Against this background, the problem arises that the right of decision-making granted to the appropriate authority implies a subjective discretion as to when disclosure outweighs the adverse impact of non-disclosure on aviation safety. As a consequence, this provision creates uncertainty by leaving the final decision on the disclosure to the national authority for the administration of justice. Finally, Annex 13 requires the establishment of a mandatory incident reporting system to facilitate the gathering of information on safety deficiencies. 10 Further, the introduction of a voluntary incident reporting system to ensure the collection of information which is not covered by the mandatory system is also desirable. 11 In case the State decides to establish such a voluntary system, it is under the obligation to provide a non-punitive system and to implement measures to protect the sources of information. 12 The ICAO Safety Management Manual 13 provides guidance in respect of mandatory and voluntary incident reporting. These three aspects of Annex 13 are crucial in balancing the improvement of aviation safety on the one hand and the proper administration of justice on the other hand. 2 Amendment 11 Due to the fact that aviation is a rapidly developing area, Annex 13 has been amended eleven times since The latest revision to Annex 13, Amendment 11, 14 emphasised the need to develop appropriate legal guidance that will assist States to enact national rules to protect information from safety related data collection and processing systems (SDCPS), while 6 Standard 5.4 of Annex Recommendation of Annex Standard 3.1 of Annex Standard 5.12 of Annex Standard 8.1 of Annex Recommendation 8.2 of Annex Standard 8.3 of Annex ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (2 nd edn ICAO Montréal 2009) Doc Was adopted by the Council at the seventh meeting of its 177 th Session on 3 March
5 allowing for the proper administration of justice in the State. 15 The protection of this safety information from inappropriate use should contribute to the enhancement of aviation safety. In the form of a series of principles this legal guidance is incorporated into Annex 13 as a new Attachment E. Therefore, Notes were added to Standard and Standard Shortcomings of the system and Annex 13 A number of safeguards have been introduced in Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention in order to protect, inter alia, those reporting safety occurrences in the course of a safety investigation. However, in most instances the degree of legal protection effectively offered in the Member States is much lower than what is implied by the text of the applicable regulations. 16 The dearth of effective legal protection is inherent in the very nature of these regulations. (a) Shortcomings of the system The Annexes to the Convention are not an integral part of the Convention and they are therefore not subject to the general international law of treaties 17. In contrast to the provisions of the Chicago Convention, the SARPs contained in the Annexes are not directly applicable at national level and require appropriate measures to implement them into the existing domestic legislation. Consequently, SARPs do not possess a legal force equal to that of the Chicago Convention. Apart from a handful of exceptions, 18 Contracting States are neither obliged to implement nor to comply with the standards of an Annex if such a State finds it impracticable to do so. 19 In this respect, each Contracting State has the exclusive decision-making power to determine what has to be considered as practicable. 20 The only international obligation Contracting States have pursuant to Article 38 of the Chicago Convention is to give immediate notification to ICAO, if they find it impossible to bring its own domestic regulations in line with the Annexes, and ICAO must then inform all other Contracting States of the difference. Unlike international Standards, Recommended Practices are only desirable ; States should only endeavour to conform to them and there is no legal duty to notify any instances of non-compliance with the Recommended Practices ICAO 35 th Session Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly (Montréal, 28 September to 8 October 2004) provisional edn (October 2004) F Schubert Legal Barriers to a Safety Culture in Aviation (2004) XXIX Annals of Air & Space Law 19, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS For instance, according to Article 33 of the Chicago Convention certificates of airworthiness and personnel licenses only have to be recognized as valid by other Contracting States if they are equal or higher than the minimum ICAO as laid down in the Annexes. 19 According to Article 37 of the Chicago Convention, the Contracting States only have to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards. 20 M Milde International Air Law and ICAO in M Benkö (ed) Essential Air and Space Law (Eleven International Publishing Utrecht 2008) vol 4, ICAO 36 th Session Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly (Montréal 18 to 28 September 2007) provisional edn (September 2007) 20. 4
6 Considering the lack of legally binding force of Recommended Practices and the possibility to notify differences to Standards, this system followed by ICAO does not provide effective legal protection and is to be considered as legally weak. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that many States failed in their legal obligation to notify their departure from or non-implementation of the SARPs. This silent treatment of the SARPs was passively tolerated by ICAO, not least because ICAO has no machinery or procedure for the enforcement of compliance with the SARPs at its disposal. In fact, the enforcement depends on the willingness of the States. As far as Annex 13 is concerned, this development towards non-compliance with international Standards by Contracting States without notifying differences came to light in a survey conducted by the EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission (PRC). The resulting statistics showed that one third of the States decided not to incorporate Standard 5.12 of Annex 13 into national law and half of those States have not notified ICAO accordingly. 22 This alarming situation was described appropriately by Michael Milde as follows: ICAO moves ahead like a fast locomotive happy with its speed but without noticing that many wagons of the train have become unhitched and stay behind. 23 The implementation of ICAO standards can be compared with the Emperor s new clothes, meaning while everybody was praising the clothes, the Emperor was actually naked. 24 In order to monitor the compliance with SARPs, numerous initiatives such as the US Internal Aviation Safety Assessment Programme (IASA) in 1992 and the launch of ICAO s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) in 1999 have been undertaken. 25 In the latter programme, ICAO conducts on-the-spot evaluation of the effective implementation of ICAO SARPs as well as their guidance material and publishes the results of the audits on its website. The enforcement power derives from the fear of loss of credibility within the international community through the publication of their failures in the implementation of SARPs. 26 Even though this ICAO audit programme can be regarded as a milestone towards a new air safety regime, 27 its success still hinges on the willingness of the Member States to contribute. The Chicago Convention does not provide ICAO with an executive function to control the 22 EUROCONTROL Legal Constraints to Non-punitive ATM Safety Occurrence Reporting in Europe (PRC Report) (EUROCONTROL Brussels 2002) M Milde Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards Problems of Safety Oversight (1996) 45 Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht 3, J Huang Aviation Safety and ICAO (Kluwer Law International Alphen aan de Rijn 2009) ICAO Assembly Resolution A32-11: Establishment of an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (September 1998). 26 M Milde International Air Law and ICAO in M Benkö (ed) Essential Air and Space Law (Eleven International Publishing Utrecht 2008) vol 4, J Huang Aviation Safety, ICAO and Obligations Erga Omnes (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 63, 69. 5
7 compliance with the SARPs. 28 To fully respect the sovereignty of the Member States the audit by ICAO can only be conducted with the consent of the Member States. 29 In addition, the audit findings cannot be published without the permission of the Member States. Further, another legal barrier which hinders the effectiveness of the system is the supremacy of domestic law over any procedures which may be established by ICAO underlined in Article 26 of the Chicago Convention. An inquiry into the circumstances of the accident should be instituted solely in accordance with procedures set out by the ICAO in so far as its law permits. 30 This Article consequently offers an escape hatch in the event that the States prefer to follow their own well-established procedures and techniques and thus further weakens the safeguards introduced by ICAO. To conclude, Article 26 and Article 38 of the Chicago Convention grant a great freedom of decision making to the Contracting States enabling them to disregard the international law. The system allows the Contracting States not to apply these provisions if they wish to do so. This may result in a conflict of law, if the Member State where the accident occurs applies different regulations and procedures. The option to opt out of a Standard and to follow domestic laws leads to a patch-worked application of international law which has an adverse impact on the uniformity and effectiveness of the safeguards as provided in the Chicago Convention and Annex 13. Consequently, this non-unified law, which may or may not be applicable to all States, and the lack of enforcement power to monitor and sanction failures of filing differences raises doubts of the effectiveness of this system. Acknowledging the problem, ICAO has introduced USOAP which records success in advancing aviation safety. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if this tool can effectively reduce the shortcomings of safeguards existing in the current system. One criticism in this respect is that the USOAP is based on the voluntary contributions of Member States and does not provide any enforcement measures. The only form of pressure is the fear the Member States may have of getting a bad reputation in relation to their safety standards in the aviation community. However, this can be theoretically circumvented by refusing the publication of the outcome of the audit. On the other hand, it may be argued that the refusal to publish in itself or more generally the refusal to cooperate with the ICAO s audit could be sufficient to raise suspicion within the aviation community which in the worst case could lead to the Member State being registered on the list of banned carriers by other States. Nevertheless, it would be too premature to withdraw ICAO rules any efficacy. It is not so much a question of legal validity or enforceability, rather the actual effectiveness is the 28 ICAO Safety Oversight Programme Implementation in Triennium (Presented by Angola, Australia, Bolivia, Canada, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) (18 February 1998) C- WP/ For instance, by signing a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with ICAO; ICAO Assembly Resolution A32-11: Establishment of an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (September 1998) [I-56]. 30 Art 26 of the Chicago Convention. 6
8 strength of these rules. 31 The significance of ICAO rules in practice illustrates the hushkits procedure in The US filed a complaint before the ICAO Council pursuant to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and alleged that the European Council Regulation 925/99 infringes provisions of the Chicago Convention as well as its Annex 16 in that it limits the operation and registration of hushkitted aircraft in the EU. 32 Finally, the EU withdrew this Regulation and adopted Directive 2002/30/EC which repeals the Regulation in dispute. 33 As this Directive reflects the principles as laid down in Resolution A 33-7 by ICAO such as the balanced approach of airport noise management, 34 the significance of ICAO standards and the weight of its policy guidance becomes apparent. 35 (b) Shortcomings of Annex 13 As far as Annex 13 is concerned, it does not provide an effective protection for the reporter of safety occurrences and the safety information itself. The introduction of Amendment 11 has not improved this situation since it is confined to describing an ideal environment without providing binding international provisions. What is the reason for such a failure to provide the necessary protection regarding the disclosure of safety related information? International organisations only have those competences which are delegated to them by the founding treaty. According to Article 37 (2) of the Chicago Convention, the ICAO is competent to adopt SARPs in the field of investigation of aircraft accidents and other matters concerned with the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation. The protection of safety information as well as its sources, which can be misused as evidence in a criminal trial, does not fall under the scope of the competence granted regarding aircraft accident investigation, nor is it directly linked to aviation safety. As a consequence, this protection remains an exclusive competence of the Contracting States making a harmonised approach in this field unlikely. Due to the shortcomings which are not only inherent in the system of the Chicago Convention itself but also in Annex 13, binding legal obligations which ensure the protection of sensitive safety information and those reporting safety occurrences cannot be implemented at international level. Because of the lack of competence and enforcement measures, the 31 L Weber Internationale Organisationen in S Hobe and N von Ruckteschell (eds) Kölner Kompendium Luftrecht Band 1 Grundlagen (Carl Heymanns Verlag Köln 2008) ICAO Council 166th Session Summary of Decisions (19 June 2002) C-DEC 166/12 [9]. 33 European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/30/EC of 26 March 2002 on the establishment of rules and procedures with regard to the introduction of noise-related operating restrictions at Community airports [2002] OJ L85/ ICAO 33 rd Session Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly (Montréal 25 September to 5 October 2001) Provisional Edition (October 2001) [A33-7]. 35 EW Stimpson ICAO: Recent Accomplishment and Challenges Ahead [ ] Issues in Aviation Law & Policy 13251,
9 safeguards in this field are limited to best practices. Therefore, the next issue to be addressed is whether the European regulatory framework compensates for the defects of the international framework. In other words, does the necessary protection of safety related information exist at European level? C EUROPEAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK The European framework dealing with aircraft accident and incident investigation consists of the Directive 94/56/EC 36, Directive 2003/42/EC 37 and the guidance material provided by EUROCONTROL, including, inter alia EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement (ESARR) At the end of this year Directive 94/56/EC will probably be replaced by the EU Proposal on aircraft accident and incident investigation Directive 94/56/EC At the European level, initiatives have been taken to create a common binding framework for air accident and incident investigation. Directive 94/56/EC establishes the fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil aviation accidents and incidents and transposes the main principles of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention into EU legislation. Directive 94/56/EC requires that each Member State shall ensure that every accident or serious incident in civil aviation is subject to an investigation conducted or supervised by a permanent body or entity. The body or entity concerned with accident investigation shall be functionally independent. 40 Further, the Directive also provides for investigations of incidents which have not reached the degree of severity of a serious incident when the investigation body may expect to draw air safety lessons from it. 41 As set out in Annex 13, the Directive also stresses that the sole aim of the technical investigation is to prevent future accidents to happen and not to apportion blame or liability. 42 Safety recommendations should not express an assumption of blame or liability for an accident or incident. 43 In addition, the Directive enables investigators to carry out their tasks more efficiently by making the publication of the final report issued after every accident or incident reporting in 36 Council Directive 94/56/EC of 21 November 1994 Establishing the Fundamental Principles Governing the Investigation of Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents [1994] OJ L319/14 [hereinafter: Directive 94/56/EC]. 37 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/42/EC of 13 June 2003 on Occurrence Reporting in Civil Aviation [2003] OJ L167/23 [hereinafter: Directive 2003/42/EC]. 38 EUROCONTROL ESARR 2: Reporting and Assessment of Safety Occurrences in ATM (3 rd edn EUROCONTROL Brussels 2009) [hereinafter: ESARR 2]. 39 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Investigation and Prevention of Accidents and Incidents in Civil Aviation, COM (2009) 611 final (28 September 2009) (Proposal) [hereinafter: the Proposal or the proposed Regulation]. 40 Art 6 of the Directive 94/56/EC. 41 Art 4 (1) of the Directive 94/56/EC. 42 Arts 1 and 4 (3) of the Directive 94/56/EC. 43 Art 10 of the Directive 94/56/EC. 8
10 the shortest possible time mandatory. 44 In respect to incident investigation, the resulting report has to be made available to parties likely to benefit from its findings with regard to safety. 45 However, with regard to the need for protection of those reporting or involved in an incident, the Directive fails to provide any protection mechanism, apart from an injunction in Article 8 (1) to protect the anonymity of those persons named in the report. 46 In particular, it is to be noted that the Directive has not transposed Standard 5.12 which refers to the nondisclosure of certain types of records which are collected by safety investigation authorities. These obvious safety flaws in Directive 94/56/EC have led to a proposal of a Regulation on aircraft accident and incident investigation by the European Commission which should replace the current Directive. In conclusion, the Directive succeeds in introducing the Annex 13 principle of separating technical from criminal investigation at European level. However, it fails to specify how such separation can be ensured. Moreover, this Directive remains silent on the disclosure of safety relevant data. As a consequence, the protection which should be achieved through the separation of both investigations is negated if the information collected in the course of technical investigation is at risk of being misused during a criminal trial. Like in Annex 13, the protection concerning the result of the investigation is reduced to a pure declaration of intent without any specification how the protection should be guaranteed. 2 Directive 2003/42/EC Beyond accident investigation, the crucial element in prevention of aircraft accidents is occurrence reporting and the analysis of the data collected in order to identify safety hazards and to draw safety lessons. Thus, in 2003, the Directive 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting in civil aviation was adopted, which obliges aviation professionals to report errors, abnormal events and other irregular circumstances in their daily operational work. 47 In the Directive, the protection of the reporter differs significantly in the mandatory and the voluntary reporting system. Under the first solely the names and addresses of persons reporting occurrences are deleted, 48 whereas reporters under the voluntary reporting system in terms of Article 9 enjoy a greater level of protection. Member States which decide to introduce a voluntary reporting system in accordance with Article 9 are under an obligation to establish the conditions for the de-identified safety information of the voluntary reports. 49 De-identification as defined in Article 2 (1) goes further than the simple erasing of names and addresses by requiring to remove all personal details pertaining to the reporter and technical 44 Art 7 (2) of Directive 94/56/EC. 45 Art 8 (1) of Directive 94/56/EC. 46 EUROCONTROL Just Culture Guidance Material for Interfacing with the Judicial (EUROCONTROL Brussels 2008) Art 2 (1) and Article 4 (1) of Directive 2003/42/EC. 48 Art 8 (2) in connection with art 4 (2) of the Directive 2003/42/EC. 49 Art 9 (2) of Directive 2003/42/EC. System 9
11 details which might lead to the identity of the reporter, or third parties, being inferred from the information. 50 This approach pays attention to the fact that by having information about the circumstances of the occurrence, the investigating authorities can draw conclusions on the persons involved. The obligation to refrain from recording the names and addresses of the reporters under the mandatory reporting system can consequently not be considered as an effective means to guarantee that the identity of the reporter remains undetected. As far as the balancing of the interests of the judicial and technical investigation authorities is concerned, Directive 2003/42/EC emphasises in line with Annex 13 that the prevention of accidents and incidents is the only objective of occurrence reporting and not to apportion blame or liability. 51 Directive 2003/42/EC formulates in Article 8 (3) and Article 8 (4), for the first time at European level, safeguards which protect safety reporters in respect of judicial proceedings. Article 8 (3) states that the judicial proceedings should not be instituted in cases of unpremeditated or inadvertent infringements of the law which come to their attention only because they have been reported under the national mandatory occurrence-reporting scheme, except in cases of gross negligence. However, this protection is stipulated to be without prejudice to the applicable rules of national penal rules with the consequence that in case of doubt the interest of the national judicial authority takes precedence over the individual protection of safety occurrence reporters. On top of that, Article 8 (5) even preserves unhindered access of judicial authorities to safety occurrence information. Indeed, it appears that the introduction of these provisions actually increases the risk of prosecution of safety reporters by making the report of certain events mandatory which would otherwise not have been voluntarily reported without providing the required protection to the safety reporter. 52 In the same way as Annex 13 and Directive 94/56/EC, Directive 2003/42/EC does not provide absolute protection due to the precedence of national penal laws over protection granted in the course of the technical investigation. Furthermore, even though Article 8 (4) obliges Member States to ensure that employees who report incidents of which they may have knowledge are not subject to any prejudice by their employer, it is stressed again that the exact arrangements have to comply with the national procedures and practices. 3 ESARR 2 Member States of EUROCONTROL are obliged to implement and enforce the EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement Reporting and Assessment of Safety 50 Art 2 (2) of Directive 2003/42/EC. 51 Art 1 of Directive 2003/42/EC. 52 EUROCONTROL Just Culture Guidance Material for Interfacing with the Judicial (EUROCONTROL Brussels 2008) 34. System 10
12 Occurrences in ATM (ESARR 2) into their own legal order. 53 ESARR 2 mandates the introduction of a harmonised occurrence reporting and assessment scheme and obliges the Member States to ensure the collection of appropriate safety related data and its communication to EUROCONTROL. The ESARR advisory material EAM 2/GUI 6 gives guidance on the establishment of Just Culture principles in ATM Safety data reporting and assessment. 54 It sets out how to establish, implement and maintain a Just Culture in 8 steps. 55 The overall aim is to prepare employees for unpleasant situations in the wake of a safetycritical occurrence by formulating guidelines and pointing out potential barriers in the implementation process. The ESARR 2 principles have been transposed to great extent into the Directive 94/56/EC and Directive 2003/42/EC leading to increased legal effect due to the fact that after this transposition EU Member States are bound by ESARR principles and those which are also EUROCONTROL Member States are no longer able to opt out from certain rules of ESARR as determined in the revised EUROCONTROL Convention Concluding remarks The review of the International and European legislative framework governing aircraft accident investigation leads to the conclusion that the existing system lacks the ability to provide a unified and efficient regime, when facing the conflicting interests. These shortcomings, due to a variety of reasons, have significant consequences. The need for adopting rules which adequately balance the interest of both, technical investigation and criminal inquiry cannot be ignored. At the International and European level, there are barriers which hinder the implementation of effective safeguards and which are difficult to overcome. One of the main obstacles is that the administration of justice including criminal law constitutes one pillar of state sovereignty and the Contracting States of the Chicago Convention as well as the Member States of the European Union have not exercised the option to delegate this sovereignty function. Criminal jurisdiction remains regulated by national laws. Consequently, harmonisation concerning the balance of these conflicting interests is hard to reach. Instead, the appropriate solution to reconcile these conflicting interests in order to provide for an appropriate administration of justice and enhance aviation safety must be found at the national level. 53 EUROCONTROL ESARR 2: Reporting and Assessment of Safety Occurrences in ATM (3 rd edn EUROCONTROL Brussels 2009). 54 EUROCONTROL ESARR Advisory Material 2/ Guidance Document 6: Establishment of Just Culture Principles in ATM Safety Data Reporting and Assessment (EUROCONTROL Brussels 2006) [hereinafter: EAM 2/GUI 6]. 55 ibid, NA van Antwerpen Cross-Border Provision of Air Navigation Services with Specific Reference to Europe (Kluwer Law International Alphen aan den Rijn 2008)
13 D CRIMINALISATION OF AVIATION ACCIDENTS Recent years have shown a growing concern about the criminalisation of aircraft accident investigation, in particular the interpretation of aviation safety by the criminal judiciary. Surprisingly, there is nothing new about criminalisation of aviation accidents, which has already existed since the birth of aviation. It is a problem which goes back over 150 years. In the wake of a French hot air balloon accident in 1852 criminal sanctions were imposed against the pilot who caused the accident. 57 It is almost impossible to avoid the situation where the safety investigation and the criminal inquiry are conducted simultaneously. However, in order to find out how the conflicting interests can be adequately balanced, it is important to assess how different legislation deals with the problem of concurrent investigations and; more specifically, what the conflicting interests are and what the prerequisites for holding aviation professionals liable are. 1 Concurrent investigations To analyse how different legislation resolve the conflict of interests between safety investigators and judicial authorities, it is important to assess which agency has the primary authority over the investigation and in the case of the interest of one agency prevailing, what the main reasons for this predominance are. (a) France The official body responsible for technical investigation of civil aviation accident and incidents on French territory is the BEA 58, an agency placed with the General Inspectorate of Civil Aviation within the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Book VII of the Civil Aviation Code, from Law No of 29 March and its implementing regulation No of 8 November make up the regulatory framework. In France air accidents usually lead to criminal investigations when there are a large number of fatalities. The investigating judge who prepares the criminal trial receives support from the Gendarmerie du Transport Aérien and court-appointed experts. 61 In the last two decades, the criminal investigation prevails over technical investigation, but that was not always the case. The investigation process was originally characterised by close cooperation between the BEA and the judiciary. 62 The technical investigation authority as well as the judicial authority were required to collaborate closely and refrain from using their formal powers to the disadvantage of the other authority. The key aspects for the coordination of both authorities are laid down 57 A Van Wijk Criminal Liability of Pilots Following an Airline Accident: A Histroy of the Issue Within the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA) (1984) IX Air Law 66, Bureau d Enquêtes et d Analyses pour la sécurité de l aviation civile [hereinafter: BEA]. 59 Code de l Aviation Civile, issus de la Loi No du 29 mars Décret d application No du 8 novembre S Foreman Aviation Accidents and the French Courts (2005) 20 Air & Space Lawyer 1, M Vigier Aircraft Accident Investigation Procedure - the French System (1984) IX Air Law 5, 7. 12
14 in the joint ministerial instructions of 3 January The close cooperation was to be built on trust and loyalty: This meant in practice the investigation authority was to establish the facts due to its expertise, whereas the judicial authority was expected to rely on these facts and to facilitate the investigators work as far as possible. 64 The turning point and the end of the cooperation between both authorities was the Airbus A crash at Habsheim, near Mulhouse, on 26 June During a demonstration flight of an air show the pilot flew at a low speed below 100 feet without noticing the forest at the end of the runway, where the aircraft finally crashed. 65 The resulting fire killed three passengers. In the course of the investigation the BEA took the flight recorders and when the recorders were returned, a few seconds recorded prior to the crash were missing. The BEA was therefore alleged to have tampered with the recorders in order to conceal a defect in the aircraft. 66 These suspicions were upheld for years resulting in an intense debate about the trustworthiness of the BEA. This was the last time that technical investigations took precedence over criminal proceedings. 67 The reason for the supremacy of criminal investigation lies in the special features of the French criminal law system and the French mentality. 68 According to French Law, in the event of an aircraft accident the judicial authority firstly seizes the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and makes them available to the BEA so that it has the possibility to make a copy under the supervision of a police officer. 69 This procedure contradicts the spirit of Standard 5.12 of Annex 13 which explicitly states that the records derived from these devices should not be made available for purposes other than safety investigation unless an appropriate authority has determined that the proper administration of justice outweighs the adverse impact on aviation safety. The author s understanding is that this restriction refers to the possibility of being exempted from the non-disclosure of records, when the judicial authority finds that the circumstances of the particular case justify this exemption. Therefore, it is critical to allow the judicial authority to have these recordings at their disposal and to thereby encourage that these records are used for purposes other than safety investigation without explicitly justifying why the interest to administer justice prevails over advancing aviation safety. Furthermore, the BEA can only remove debris, fluids or pieces of wreckage for determining the cause and circumstances of the accident with the 63 Instruction interministérielle du 3 janvier 1953 relative à la coordination de l'information judiciaire et de l enquête technique et administrative en cas d'accident survenu à un aéronef français ou étranger sur le territoire de la métropole et les territoires d'outre-mer. 64 ibid, Commission D Enquête sur l accident survenu le 26 Juin 1988 à Mulhouse-Habsheim (Haut-Rhin) à l Airbus A 320, immatriculé F-GFKC Rapport Final (1990) 28 Journal Officiel de la République Française Édition des Documents Administratifs < (22 July 2010). 66 D MacKenzie Fresh Evidence Prompts Row over Airbus Crash (1990) 1726 New Scientist 30, S Foreman Aviation Accidents and the French Courts (2005) 20 Air & Space Lawyer 1, ibid, Book VII Capter I Article L of the French Civil Aviation Code (Code de l aviation civile). 13
15 permission from the investigating judge and the examination of the objects should not lead to its destruction or alteration. 70 In this context, it is questionable whether Article 5 (2) of Directive 94/56/EC has been adequately transposed into French law. According to this Article the investigator in charge should be authorised to have, inter alia, free access to the accident site, flight recorders as well as other recordings and only where appropriate, in cooperation with the authorities for the judicial inquiry, which means that the judicial authority should only be involved when circumstances allow it. 71 However, the requirement to first seek permission from the judicial authority in order to access the crash site and to analyse potential pieces of evidence contradicts the intention of Article 5 (2) of Directive 94/56/EC. Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that this provision has not been adequately transposed into national law as it offers an escape hatch by also stating that such powers must be exercised in accordance with the legislation in force in the Member States. Another feature of the French criminal procedure law, which encourages the priority of criminal investigation, is the application of the Napoleon Code. This Code, not predicting the occurrence of aircraft accident at the time it was adopted, stipulates that fatal accidents must be investigated in order to establish blame. Criminal investigations may last up to 15 years so that the judicial authority can still continue for years after the BEA has concluded the investigation report. 72 This gives the judicial authorities the opportunity to continue searching for the answer they are looking for, when they are not satisfied with the findings of the official report of the BEA. 73 In most cases, the extension of the investigation process is encouraged by the society which would like to see someone to be held responsible and punished for the fatalities. Influenced by the media, there is an increasing trend in France to move away from the need to reveal the real cause of the accident towards finding a scapegoat for what happened. 74 The motivation for the predominance is also deeply routed in the public mindset that there is no certainty that the BEA is not influenced by the interests of the government or the civil aviation industry and it is consequently not ensured that its investigation has the sole purpose of improving aviation safety. 75 This argument is also based on the absence of statutory provisions ensuring the essential independence of the agency in charge of the technical 70 Book VII Capter I Article L of the French Civil Aviation Code (Code de l aviation civile). 71 Art 5 (2) of Directive 94/56/EC. 72 D Esler Flight Risk: The Threat of Criminalization Aviation Week < generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=bca&id=news/bca0309p1.xml> (22 July 2010). 73 S Foreman Aviation Accidents and the French Courts (2005) 20 Air & Space Lawyer 1, ibid. 75 Notes from the presentation given by Simon Foreman at the Royal Aeronautical Society Conference: The Proposed EU Regulation on Air Accident Investigation; The Criminalisation of Air Accidents and the Just Culture (London 27 April 2010). 14
16 investigation. 76 Some judges fear that the involvement of technical investigations reduces the likelihood of successful judicial proceedings due to the risk that, for example, evidences are concealed. 77 Furthermore, it is believed that the overall objective of the investigation is to respect the rights of the families of the deceased passengers to hold the perpetrators criminally accountable for their mistakes. In this respect, one peculiarity of French criminal procedures law is the right granted to victims to initiate criminal proceedings. 78 However, in most cases the prosecutors have already taken the initiative, when the victims decide to exercise their right. The judicial authority is therefore also regarded as an instrument to satisfy the rights of the victims. 79 From the French perspective, the rights of the victims are only respected when the interests of the judiciary prevail as the BEA is suspected of not being completely independent. 80 As a consequence, the judiciary has priority to investigate any object from the accident site that might be used as evidence which may delay and prevent the safety investigators from carrying out their investigation. This negative impact on the technical investigation can be illustrated by means of the inquiry into the Air France Concorde F-BTSC crash 81 at Gonesse on 25 July The supersonic aircraft (SST) ran over a titanium strip on the runway, causing tires on one of the landing gear legs to explode and the resulting fragments hit the fuel tank and caused a major fuel leak, igniting the fuel. The stricken aircraft rotated off the runway but crashed into a nearby hotel, killing 113 people. 82 The safety investigation was not only carried out by the BEA but also by the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the United Kingdom which was entitled to participate as a joint State of Manufacture. In addition, an immediate judicial inquiry was launched as well as the Minister of Transport sent his own panel of experts to advice him personally. In fact, three investigation teams had to compete for access to the physical evidence and the French police controlled access to the crash site on behalf of the judiciary leading to significant delays as well as hampered access to the crash site to the disadvantage of the safety investigator. On top of that, evidence was removed from the crash site before full technical investigation was conducted Sénat session Ordinaire de , N 205, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 9 février 1999, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des Affaires économiques et du Plan (1) sur le projet de loi, adopté Par L'assemblée Nationale, relatif aux enquêtes techniques sur les accidents et les incidents dans l' aviation civilepar J-F Le Grand < (22 July 2010). 77 ibid. 78 S Foreman Aviation Accidents and the French Courts (2005) 20 Air & Space Lawyer 1, ibid. 80 ibid. 81 BEA Accident on 25 July 2000 at La Patte d Oie in Gonesse to the Concorde registers F-BTSC operated by Air France, Investigation Report by Bureau Enquệtes Accidents, f-sc000725a < (22 July 2010). 82 ibid, The Royal Academy of Engineering, Accidents and Agenda An Examination of the Processes that Follow from Accidents and Incidents of High Potential in Several Industries and their Effectiveness in Preventing further Accidents, Full Sector Reports (2005) 12 < Full_Sector_Reports.pdf> (22 July 2010). 15
17 To conclude, the French criminal law system and the mindset of the French society clearly illustrate that the judicial authority gains the upper hand in the course of an investigation in France. This raises concerns in respect of the compliance with Annex 13 and the implementation of Directive 94/56/EC. Both require that the sole aim of the safety investigation is the prevention of future accidents and not to apportion blame or liability, but this objective is hard to realise, when the judicial authority has the power of disposition of all physical material relevant for the safety investigation and the crash site. Furthermore, the power of disposition granted to the judicial authority also infringes clearly Standard 5.4 and Standard 5.6 of Annex 13, according to which the BEA should have unrestricted authority over its conduct and unrestricted control over potential pieces of evidence. In particular, the BEA should have unhampered access to the wreckage and material originated from the accident. Even though the joint ministerial instructions of 3 January 1953 provides for the cooperation between both authorities, in accordance with Standard 5.10 of Annex 13, these instructions have proved to be ineffective since they lack a real legislative status and they are not used anymore in practice. 84 (b) United Kingdom The Air Accidents Investigation Branch is an independent unit of the Department of Transport and responsible for investigating all accidents and serious incidents in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 13. The sole purpose of the investigation, in accordance with Standard 3.1 of Annex 13 as well as Articles 1 and 4 (3) of Directive 94/56/EC, is to establish the causes of the accident and ensure the continued safety without apportion blame or liability. The power of the AAIB to investigate aircraft accidents and incidents originates from the Civil Aviation Act Furthermore, the Civil Aviation Investigation Air Accident and Incidents Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2798) specify the procedures to be followed in an investigation and the powers of the investigators. In carrying out their investigations, the inspectors have free access, inter alia, to the accident site and potential physical evidence such as the aircraft, its contents, its wreckage or the flight recorders and any other records. 85 Compared to France, the technical investigators in the UK, in line with Standard 5.4, have unrestricted authority to access the crash site and dispose of material which can furnish evidence. Furthermore, the inspectors are empowered to summon and question witnesses as well as to request and examine any books, papers, documents and articles which they consider as being relevant. 86 Theses inspectors also have control over the removal of debris and components and can take measures for the preservation of evidence Sénat session Ordinaire de , N 205, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 9 février 1999, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des Affaires économiques et du Plan (1) sur le projet de loi, adopté Par L'assemblée Nationale, relatif aux enquêtes techniques sur les accidents et les incidents dans l' aviation civilepar J-F Le Grand. 85 S 9 (1) of Air Accident Investigation Regulations S 9 (2) (a) of Air Accident Investigation Regulations Ss 9 (1) (b) and 9 (2) (e) of Air Accident Investigation Regulations
18 The question arises as to how the UK system of air accident and incident investigation handles the intervention of judicial authorities. The approach in the case of concurrent investigations can be summarized as follows: air accident and incident investigation in the UK focuses on clear delineation on the one hand but cooperation between both technical and criminal inquiries on the other hand. 88 Following Recommendation 5 of Annex 13, the judicial proceedings aimed at apportioning blame or liability is separated from any safety investigation. This separation of the Crown Prosecution Service and the AAIB as well as the coordination of their investigating work is guaranteed and regulated by the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the three transport accident investigation agencies and the Crown Prosecution Service 89. The MoU stresses that [t]he public interest requires that safety considerations are of paramount importance, the consequence of which may mean that the interests of an [A]AIB investigation have to take precedence over the criminal investigation. 90 In the aftermath of an aircraft accident, the police pursue inquiries in order to establish whether there is sufficient evidence to justify criminal proceedings or if there are fatalities, the police may investigate on behalf of Her Majesty s Coroner. When the AAIB and the police investigations proceed in parallel, the AAIB will cooperate with the police without either body hindering the other. In order to comply with Standard 5.10 of Annex 13 and to improve the coordination between the police inquiries and the technical investigations the Lord Chancellor has provided guidance material entitled Disasters and the Law - Deciding the form of inquiry in which he highlights the importance of cooperation by saying that: [i]t would require firm indications of serious criminality to justify a criminal investigation taking precedence over an inquiry held in public.... Colleagues will wish to bear in mind that the holding of such an inquiry in advance of criminal proceedings may adversely affect the ultimate prospects of a successful prosecution, but nevertheless, unless the criterion mentioned in the previous sentence is met, this is likely to be justified. 91 In addition, Her Majesty s Coroner has a duty to hold an inquest into all circumstances of a sudden, violent or unnatural death including aircraft accident fatalities. 92 In contrast to France, the Coroner s Court has the mandate to consider the rights of the victim of the accident. In France, the only statutory body which can have this function is the criminal court. The 88 S 9 (1) of Air Accident Investigation Regulations 1996: in cooperation with the authorities responsible for the judicial inquiry. 89 Hereinafter: MoU. 90 MoU between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, and Rail Accident Investigation Branch (October 2008) Thames Safety Inquiry Final Report by Lord Justice Clarke (Cm 4558, 2000) S 8 (1) of Coroners Act
19 Coroner s Court, unlike the criminal court, does not attempt to determine any question of civil or criminal liability. 93 The investigations of the AAIB and the Coroner pursue different objectives, but they are still connected in relation to the factual information and evidence. Therefore, even though both authorities are separated, they work closely together in the investigation. For instance, the Coroner will be in touch with the progress of the investigations and may consult the inspectors in deciding which witnesses should be summoned. 94 To conclude, the investigation procedure in the UK is the opposite of the one in France. In the course of the safety investigation the AAIB has unrestricted authority to conduct the investigation and does not have to ask the judicial authority to access the crash site or to dispose of potential evidence. In contrast to France, there is a clear separation and the independence of all investigating parties is guaranteed by law. Furthermore, best practice guidelines have been established enabling the inspectors of technical investigations to control any inquiry work at the accident site whilst integrating also the Coroner s inquiry and the judicial inquiry into their work in order to ensure effective cooperation. Unlike France the cooperation of both authorities does not only exist on paper, but is also carried out in practice. The investigation procedures and regulations followed in the UK do comply with the expectations of Annex 13 and go even further by regulating and ensuring the cooperation of both authorities in a MoU in order to avoid any derogation regarding the success of their investigation. This approach to guarantee successful cooperation is exemplary, since it creates certainty between the parties and demonstrates the will to respect and not hinder each other. From a practical point of view, this system avoids delays in carrying out the technical investigation and ensures that the cause of the accident can be found and safety recommendations can be published as soon as possible without ignoring the proper administration of justice. (c) Germany In Germany, aircraft accident investigation was originally carried out for the exclusive purpose of criminal prosecution. 95 Already in 1931 von Unruh expressed his concern about the focus on criminal investigations, whereas the field of improving safety was receded into the background. 96 This focus becomes clear when considering the fact that the investigation procedures were not initiated when the suspected perpetrator lost its life in the accident. In 93 CN Shawcross and KM Beaumont Shawcross Beaumont: Air Law vol 1 (4 th edn Butterworths London March 2009) Chapter VI No The Royal Academy of Engineering, Accidents and Agenda An Examination of the Processes that Follow from Accidents and Incidents of High Potential in Several Industries and their Effectiveness in Preventing further Accidents, Full Sector Reports (2005) W Guldimann Die Untersuchung von Flugunfällen [1957] Recht und Praxis 1, A von Unruh Zur Frage der Untersuchung von Flugunfällen [1931] Archiv für Luftrecht 6, 7. 18
20 addition, aircraft accident investigation was exclusively subject to general provisions of criminal proceedings and was not regulated by specific provisions on aviation law. 97 Since 1998, the BFU 98 (Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation) is the responsible body to investigate into civil aircraft accidents and serious incident in the territory of Germany and is subordinated to the Federal Ministry of Transport (BMVBS) 99. The Magna Charter of safety investigation conducted by the BFU is the FlUUG 100 (Law Relating to the Investigation into Accidents and Incidents Associated with the Operation of Civil Aircraft). 5 LuftVO 101 (the Regulations for the Notification of Aircraft Accidents and Incidents) deals with the establishment of occurrence reporting systems. Even though the BFU as higher federal authority is under supervision of the Federal Ministry of Transport, 102 it is functionally and organizationally independent. 103 In order to ensure this independence and objectivity, instructions relating to the initiation, the content and scope of the investigation are not allowed. 104 In accordance with Standard 3.1 of Annex 13, Article 1 and Article 4 (3) of Directive 94/56/EC, the sole purpose of the investigation is to determine the cause of the accident and not to address the question of potential liability or blame. 105 However, the states right to prosecution, which is based on the principle of legality, 106 remains unaffected thereof. This effectively means that the investigation carried out by the public prosecutors ( Staatsanwaltschaft ) with the object of clarifying the issue of blame should not lag behind the independent activities of the BFU with the aim of improving aviation safety. The independence and separation of the investigation authorities may function well on paper, but is difficult to put into practice. At the beginning of the investigation both authorities have to document, photograph and secure potential pieces of evidence at the accident site. As far as the access to the scene of the accident is concerned, the Chief Investigator can only make decisions with the consensus of the public prosecutors so that the BFU has to be in constant contact with the judicial authority. 107 This required permission of the public prosecutors can already be seen as an infringement of Standard 5.4 of Annex 13 due to the fact that the authority of the BFU over its conduct is restricted. Consequently, the German procedure fails to comply with Annex 13 in this respect. 97 ibid, Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung. 99 Bundesministeriun für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung. 100 Flugunfall-Untersuchungsgesetz. 101 Luftverkehrs-Ordnung. 102 Art 87 (3) German Constitution (GG) (2) FlUUG transposes Article 6 Directive 94/56/EC into national law (3) FlUUG (1) and (2) FlUUG. 106 The principle of legality is embedded in 152 (2) Strafprozessordnung [hereinafter: StPO]. 107 CH Schuberdt and D Herriman Handbuch der Flugunfalluntersuchung (Springer Berlin 2005)
A SAFETY CULTURE WITH JUSTICE: A WAY TO IMPROVE SAFETY PERFORMANCE
A SAFETY CULTURE WITH JUSTICE: A WAY TO IMPROVE SAFETY PERFORMANCE Dr John Bond C-MIST; e-mail: john.bond007@ntlworld.com A Just Safety Culture as it relates to industrial safety has been defined as A