Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/46/736.html
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 11:42:30
Document Index: 764726236

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1126', '§ 1126', '§ 1126', '§ 1126']

Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1988) :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 3d › Volume 46 › Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1988)
Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1988)
(Opinion by Kaufman, J., with Mosk, Broussard, Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson, JJ., and Stone (Steven J.), J., concurring.) [46 Cal. 3d 737]
In March 1985, Russell Peterson, a police officer with the City of Long Beach Police Department (hereafter City or Department), submitted to the [46 Cal. 3d 739] Department a request to engage in off-duty employment as a civil process server for Long Beach Memorial Hospital. Although the chief of police initially approved Officer Peterson's request, the Department thereafter denied his application on the grounds that such off-duty activity conflicted with Department regulations and was incompatible with Officer Peterson's duties as a police officer.
The City, in response, argued that section 1126 was not intended to preclude a local agency from proscribing additional or different off-duty [46 Cal. 3d 740] activities from those enumerated in the statute. fn. 2 During the course of the grievance proceedings, the City agreed to permit Officer Peterson to serve civil process outside of the City limits, but steadfastly maintained that service of civil process within the City was incompatible with his duties as a peace officer and was subject to the control of the Department.
The manual expressly prohibits two specific types of outside employment; section 3/112 prohibits employment in any establishment where the primary purpose is the selling or serving of alcoholic beverages; section 3/210.07 provides that employees "shall not serve civil processes or assist in civil cases, except as legally required, particularly those where they may be personally involved. They shall avoid entering into civil disputes, particularly while performing their police duties, but shall prevent or abate a breach of the peace or crime in such cases." (Italics added.) fn. 3 [46 Cal. 3d 741]
[2] It is axiomatic that the fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent, and that in determining such intent we look first to the words of the statute themselves. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 891, 895 [231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; Regents of University of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1986) 41 Cal. 3d 601, 607 [224 Cal. Rptr. 631, 715 P.2d 590].) [46 Cal. 3d 742]
As these differing interpretations suggest, it is not altogether self-evident whether the statute's specification of activities which "may be prohibited" was intended to be exclusive or merely exemplary. On the one hand, the Association suggests that the phrase should be interpreted as an affirmative [46 Cal. 3d 743] grant of limited powers, thus negating by implication any powers not specifically mentioned. (See Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 190, 195-196 [132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 553 P.2d 537]; Martello v. Superior Court (1927) 202 Cal. 400, 405 [261 P. 476].) The City, on the other hand, asserts that the phrase represents merely a legislative attempt to define certain discretionary criteria for the guidance of the local authorities, not an effort to preempt the field altogether. (See, e.g. People v. Durbin (1963) 218 Cal. App. 2d 846, 849 [32 Cal. Rptr. 569] ["'The ordinary meaning of "shall" or "must" is of mandatory effect, while the ordinary meaning of "may" is purely permissive in character.'"], quoting 27A Words and Phrases (permanent ed.) p. 674; see also California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board (1977) 70 Cal. App. 3d 833, 842 [139 Cal. Rptr. 155].)
Because the words of the statute themselves provide no definitive answer, it is appropriate to refer to extrinsic sources for evidence of legislative intent. fn. 5 [3] "'Where [statutory language] is susceptible of more than one meaning, it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its intention can be ascertained.' ... To discern legislative intent, we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny." (Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 567, 570 [194 Cal. Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787].)
Section 19251, however, differed from section 1126 in one key respect. With regard to the appointing power's authority to define incompatible activities, section 19251 provided as follows: "Each appointing power shall [46 Cal. 3d 744] determine and prescribe, subject to approval of the board, those activities which, for employees under his jurisdiction, will be considered inconsistent, incompatible or in conflict with their duties as state officers or employees. In making this determination the appointing power shall give consideration to employment, activity or enterprise which ...." (See Stats. 1949, ch. 474, § 1, p. 823, italics added.) The statute then set forth the same categories of activities which were later incorporated into section 1126. In 1963, the operative language was amended to read: "Consideration shall be given to employment, activity or enterprise which ...." (Stats. 1963, ch. 1411, § 1, p. 2948, italics added.)
The City argues that sections 1126 and 19251 clearly serve the same purpose -- the deterrence of conflicts of interest between a public employee's official duties and his outside activities. [4] Statutes in pari materia should be construed together. (People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 562, 585 [146 Cal. Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274].) Therefore, the City contends, the Legislature must have intended that the activities enumerated in subsections (1) through (4) of section 1126, subdivision (b) would serve the same limited, illustrative function as those set forth in section 19251.
The Association compares section 1126 with section 19251 as well, but finds less significance in their common purpose than in the singular textual difference noted above. [5] , [1c] Relying on the principle that a material [46 Cal. 3d 745] change in the language of a legislative enactment is ordinarily viewed as showing an intent on the part of the Legislature to change the meaning of the statute (Twin Lock, Inc. v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal. 2d 754, 761 [344 P.2d 788]), the Association contends that if the Legislature had intended subsections (1) through (4) to serve merely as nonexhaustive criteria, it would have employed the same unambiguous language as section 19251. (See City of Port Hueneme v. City of Oxnard (1959) 52 Cal. 2d 385, 395 [341 P.2d 318] ["'Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.'"].)
The amendment did not affect, however, the local agency's authority to proscribe collateral activities not specifically enumerated in the statute. The purpose of the amendment, in fact, appears to have been aimed at strengthening rather than diluting the bill; the amendment, in effect, set minimum standards to which local officers and employees were required to conform; [46 Cal. 3d 746] the local agency was left free to define additional or more stringent standards.
[6] The words of a statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must, to the extent possible, be harmonized, both internally and with each other. (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 836, 844 [157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].) [1d] Construed as an enumeration of legislative guidelines rather than as an exhaustive catalogue of local agency powers, it is clear that subsections (1) through (4) harmonize more fully with the unqualified prohibition against "any" incompatible outside employment contained in subdivision (a) of section 1126. [46 Cal. 3d 747] Such a construction also harmonizes more completely with the otherwise unqualified grant of plenary authority to local agencies, set forth in the first sentence of subdivision (b) of the statute.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the construction of section 1126 which we adopt is consistent with numerous opinions of the Attorney General. Though clearly not controlling authority, the opinions of the Attorney General are accorded great respect by the courts. (Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 24, 30 [219 Cal. Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195]; Wenke v. Hitchcock (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 746, 751-752 [100 Cal. Rptr. 290, 493 P.2d 1154].) [1e] A review of numerous advisory opinions rendered over the 25 years section 1126 has been in effect reveals a consistent application of the statute to any factual situation involving a potential conflict of loyalties, whether or not specifically enumerated in subsections (1) through (4). (See, e.g. (1975) 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 109 [§ 1126, subd. (b) doctrine of incompatibility applies to a member of a school board concurrently serving as a member of a city personnel board]; (1980) 63 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 868 [county assessor may determine, pursuant to § 1126, subd. (b), that employee's purchase of land at tax-deeded land sale within the county is incompatible with his duties as an appraiser in the assessor's office]; (1985) 68 [46 Cal. 3d 748] Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 175 [pursuant to § 1126, subd. (b), city police department may determine whether police chief may undertake to contract with private parties to provide private security services by off-duty police officers for a fee]; (1987) 70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 157 [school board may determine, pursuant to § 1126, subd. (b), that board member's operation for profit of a private preschool facility conflicts with his duties as a member of the board].)
FN 2. Although the point might be arguable, the City implicitly conceded below, and expressly maintained at oral argument, that service of civil process did not fall within any of the four enumerated categories of activities set forth in subdivision (b), subsections (1) through (4) of section 1126.
FN 3. During the grievance proceeding, Officer Peterson argued that section 3/210.07 applied exclusively to officers acting in their official capacities in cases in which they were personally involved. The hearing officer implicitly ruled that the prohibition against service of civil process extended to off-duty employment as well, and applied regardless of whether the officer was personally involved in the civil matter. Officer Peterson did not challenge this construction of the Department regulation in his subsequent petition for writ of mandate and petition for review. Nor did he challenge the regulation on either procedural or substantive due process grounds. There is no contention made that Officer Peterson failed to receive adequate notice and a hearing, that the Department is somehow estopped from asserting the regulation, or that the regulation bears no reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental objective. The sole question before us concerns the purpose and scope of section 1126.
FN 4. These are set forth in full in footnote 1, ante, at page 739.
FN 5. The Association suggests that any possible ambiguity is resolved by reference to the Legislative Counsel's Digest of section 1126. The digest, in pertinent part, describes the effect of the statute as follows: "Prohibits incompatible employment for compensation by officers and employees of local agencies .... Authorizes local agencies to determine outside activities of officers and employees that are incompatible to their duties .... Specifies prohibited activities ...." As is readily apparent, the digest simply mirrors the ambiguity inherent in the statute itself. Nothing in the digest indicates whether the Legislature intended the activities "specified" in subdivision (b), subsections (1) through (4), to be exhaustive or merely exemplary.
FN 6. Section 1127 provides: "It is not the intent of this article to prevent the employment by private business of a public employee, such as a peace officer, fireman, forestry service employee, among other public employees, who is off duty to do work related to and compatible with his regular employment, or past employment, provided the person or persons to be employed have the approval of their agency supervisor and are certified as qualified by the appropriate agency."