Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/801/1386/66158/
Timestamp: 2019-07-18 07:44:02
Document Index: 636449440

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 3184', '§ 533', '§ 552']

Penny Bevis, et al., Appellants, v. Department of State, et al.jay Peterzell, et al., Appellants, v. Department of Justice, 801 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1986) :: Justia
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Penny Bevis, et al., Appellants, v. Department of State, et al.jay Peterzell, et al., Appellants, v. Department of Justice, 801 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 801 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
Argued April 4, 1986. Decided Sept. 19, 1986
In upholding the FBI's refusal to release the material, the district court relied on an FOIA exemption which shields from disclosure "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would ... interfere with enforcement proceedings," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (A) (1982) ("exemption 7(A)"), and on FBI affidavits stating that release of the documents would interfere with pending enforcement proceedings in El Salvador.
Appellants Peterzell and Bevis, in August 1982 and January 1983 respectively, submitted requests under the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, for information in the FBI's files relating to the murders and disappearances of Americans in El Salvador, including the murders of four American churchwomen and the two AIFLD workers. The FBI declined to release documents relating to the specified murders as well as to the disappearance or killing of other Americans.
Peterzell and Bevis filed separate actions to compel disclosure. In each instance, the Department of Justice was granted summary judgment on a claim to exemption 7(A). The judgments were appealed, and the two appeals were consolidated by order of this court. Bevis v. Department of State, No. 84-5069, and Peterzell v. Department of Justice, No. 84-5075 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 29, 1984).
Before argument could be heard, five former Salvadoran National Guardsmen were convicted of the murders of the four churchwomen. On the government's motion, this court remanded the consolidated cases to the district court, Bevis v. Department of State, No. 84-5069, and Peterzell v. Department of Justice, No. 84-5075 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 1984), whereupon the FBI released the materials relating solely to those killings. The scope of the requests under the FOIA was therefore narrowed to investigatory materials concerning still-unresolved murders and disappearances, including the killing of the two AIFLD workers.
Following a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, and after examining supporting affidavits submitted by both sides, the district court concluded that " [i]t stands uncontroverted on the record that there are indeed enforcement proceedings now in progress in El Salvador to which these documents relate" and that "disclosure would interfere with the Salvadoran proceedings." Peterzell v. Department of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 1492 and Bevis v. Department of State, 575 F. Supp. 1253, 1255 (D.D.C. 1985). Therefore, in reliance on FOIA exemption 7(A), it granted appellees' motion for summary judgment. Id.
An investigatory record must meet two criteria to fall within FOIA exemption 7(A): first, it must be "compiled for law enforcement purposes," and second, its release must "interfere with enforcement proceedings." The government has the burden of demonstrating that the exemption applies. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1982).
Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Although Shaw dealt with the application of exemption 7(A) to state enforcement proceedings, its reasoning is equally applicable to the Salvadoran enforcement proceedings here at issue. The FBI's inquiry into the Salvadoran cases was "for a federally authorized purpose," i.e., pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982) (establishing extradition procedures), and 28 U.S.C. § 533(3) (1982) (authorizing FBI cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies at the request of the State Department). Thus, as in Shaw, there is "no reason why confidential information would be considered any less deserving of protection." This conclusion is supported by the strong U.S. public policy interest in facilitating Salvadoran efforts to bring to justice those who have murdered U.S. citizens. Given the U.S. interest in these foreign enforcement proceedings and the statutory authorization for the FBI's involvement therein, we see no reason to exclude them from the protection of exemption 7(A).
Therefore, we affirm the district court's holding that exemption 7(A) embraces these Salvadoran law enforcement purposes. Accord Donovan v. FBI, 579 F. Supp. 1111, 1119-20 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds on motion for reconsideration, 579 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeals dismissed as moot, 751 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1984).
This court has stated that " [e]xemption 7(A) ... cannot justify withholding unless the material withheld relates to a 'concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding.' " Carson v. U.S. Department of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In the instant case, however, we cannot discount the prospect of further Salvadoran proceedings. For years, the accepted wisdom has been that no one in El Salvador would ever be brought to trial in any of these murder cases. Yet the Salvadoran proceedings have now resulted in a number of convictions, including those of the two gunmen directly responsible for the AIFLD killings. A State Department cable reporting on these most recent convictions stated that the government of El Salvador "continues its efforts to fully prosecute remaining [AIFLD case] defendants." Exhibit A to affidavit of Special Agent Mencer dated March 24, 1986. Furthermore, information in the FBI investigatory records implicates suspects in the AIFLD murders in other disappearances and killings under active investigation. Affidavit of Special Agent Tatman, Parties' Joint Appendix at 335-39. We find, therefore, a sufficient showing of "concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding [s]" to support the exemption.
In carrying its burden of demonstrating how the release of the withheld documents would interfere with the Salvadoran proceedings, the FBI need not proceed on a document-by-document basis, detailing to the court the interference that would result from the disclosure of each of them. Rather, as we recently stated in Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the FBI may take a generic approach, grouping documents into relevant categories that are
sufficiently distinct to allow a court to grasp "how each ... category of documents, if disclosed, would interfere with the investigation." Campbell [v. Department of Health & Human Services], 682 F.2d at 265 [ (D.C. Cir. 1982) ]. The hallmark of an acceptable ... category is thus that it is functional; it allows the court to trace a rational link between the nature of the document and the alleged likely interference.
Although the FBI need not justify its withholding on a document-by-document basis in court, the FBI must itself review each document to determine the category in which it properly belongs. Absent such individual scrutiny, the categories would be no more than smaller versions of the "blanket exemptions" disapproved by Congress in its 1974 amendment of FOIA. Id. at 66 (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 2323, 57 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1978)).
In addition, the district court may, at its discretion, undertake an in camera inspection of the withheld materials in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B). If "the number of documents is excessive and it would not realistically be possible to review each and every one," it may be appropriate for the court to simply sample the withheld materials. Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).