Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/973/396/386525/
Timestamp: 2019-05-26 09:35:07
Document Index: 115475366

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 3']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Frank H. Bethley, Defendant-appellant, 973 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1992 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Frank H. Bethley, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Frank H. Bethley, Defendant-appellant, 973 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1992)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 973 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1992)
Frank H. Bethley was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) (1). After a jury trial, he was convicted and sentenced to 120 months imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. We find no error and affirm.
The government must not withhold potentially exculpatory evidence from the accused. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). Moreover, the government must not deliberately use perjured testimony or encourage the use of perjured testimony. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177-78, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959); United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987).
Bethley argues next that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). In reviewing this challenge, our task is to determine whether any reasonable jury could have found Bethley guilty on the evidence presented. In considering the permissible inference we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Black, 644 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981).
The above evidence is adequate to support the jury's verdict that Bethley possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) (1).
The district court found that Bethley had distributed a minimum of 30 ounces of cocaine during the six months prior to the offense for which Bethley was convicted. Based on this finding, the district court included 30 ounces of cocaine as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a) (2) of the Guidelines and increased the base offense level by eight points. Bethley disputes both the amount calculated and its relevance to the offense of conviction.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (2) governs this issue. It mandates that:
We must therefore determine whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Bethley distributed the 30 ounces of cocaine as part of "the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction." United States v. Byrd, 898 F.2d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 1990).
To qualify as relevant conduct, the prior conduct must pass the test of similarity, regularity and temporal proximity. United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1992). In other words, there must be " 'sufficient similarity and temporal proximity to reasonably suggest that repeated instances of criminal behavior constitute a pattern of criminal conduct.' " United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting William W. Wilkins, Jr. and John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C.L.Rev. 495, 515-16 (1990)). "When one component is absent, ... courts must look for a stronger presence of at least one of the other components." Hahn, 960 F.2d at 910.
Bethley's cocaine distribution activities took place within six months of the offense for which he was convicted. Moreover, those activities were of a continuous nature. The quantities involved were similar--ounce quantities. Finally, the source and type of drug were the same. The district court's conclusion that Bethley's distribution of 30 ounces of cocaine was relevant conduct to his offense of conviction is not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Moore, 927 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 205, 116 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1991).
The introductory commentary to § 3B explains that " [t]he determination of a defendant's role in the offense is to be made on the basis of all conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), ... and not solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction." See United States v. Rodriguez, 925 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1991). We use the "clearly erroneous" standard when reviewing a district court's findings of a defendant's status during a criminal offense. United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S. Ct. 3257, 106 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1989).
We have held that a "mule" or transporter of drugs may not be entitled to minor or minimal status. United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 137-38 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110 S. Ct. 1957, 109 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1990). And Bethley's activity was not limited to a single delivery of drugs. He regularly purchased cocaine and sold it during the six months preceding his arrest. The district court did not clearly err in declining downward adjustment for minor or minimal status.C.
A district court's determination that a defendant has obstructed justice within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1236 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 710, 112 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1991).