Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/86250/bullitt-county-vs-washer
Timestamp: 2017-01-22 14:26:45
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Bullitt County Vs Washer - Citation 86250 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Bullitt County Vs. Washer - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/86250CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-11-1889Case Number130 U.S. 142AppellantBullitt CountyRespondentWasherExcerpt:.....and are not reviewable here.
when a body like the county courts of kentucky has judicial powers, and also large administrative and executive powers, and is by law..... Judgment:
Bullitt County v. Washer - 130 U.S. 142 (1889)
When a body like the county courts of Kentucky has judicial powers, and also large administrative and executive powers, and is by law authorized to employ agents in the execution of the latter branch of powers, the acts of the agents are not in every case required to appear of record.
The original and amended petitions substantially aver that the County of Bullitt, by its duly authorized commissioner, entered into a written contract with plaintiff Washer for the erection by him of a bridge across Pond Creek according to specifications at prices stipulated therein; that in this contract the county guaranteed payment for the entire work; that the County Court of Bullitt County appointed commissioners, and
A demurrer to this amended petition was sustained by the circuit court, but upon writ of error from this Court, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
Washer v. Bullitt County,
110 U. S. 558
. The question raised by the pleadings in that case was whether Bullitt County had, under the statutes of Kentucky, authority to make the contract sued on, by which, according to the averments of the declaration, it undertook at its own cost to build across a boundary stream a bridge, one end of which was within another county.
The first assignment of error, namely that the court erred in allowing the second amended petition to be filed, has been so frequently considered and declared unfounded by this Court that it may be dismissed with the remark that amendments are discretionary with the court below, and not reviewable here.
129 U. S. 667
, decided March 5, 1889, and the authorities there cited. The same remark applies to the assignment that the court erred in overruling a motion for a new trial.
Arkansas Valley Co. v. Mann, ante,
130 U. S. 69
, decided March 5, 1889, and the cases there cited.
The leading assignments of error substantially present but one proposition, to-wit: conceding that the county had the power to build the bridge, as was determined by this Court on the former writ of error, the averments of the plaintiffs' petitions were not sustained by the evidence adduced at the trial, and the contract sued on was not made by the county in the mode provided by law. The statute law of Kentucky applicable to such contracts made by a county is found in Art. 17, § 1
, c. 28, of the General Statutes of that state (Frankfort, 1873):
In order to test the soundness of this position, it is necessary to consider the entire record taken together. In the first place,
it cannot be denied, indeed the plaintiff in error concedes, that there are a number of orders which, even
come up to the requirements of "orders of record," and "of the court properly constituted," having been made when a majority of the justices were present. Among these are --
the order of June 18, 1877. This order recognized Ridgway as commissioner; it adjudicated the necessity of erecting the bridge; it adopted the Brawner site for that bridge, and it appointed Ridgway a commissioner to confer with a commissioner from Jefferson County concerning plans and specifications, and cost.
The order of July 16, 1877. This order appropriated $600 for the building of the bridge at the Brawner site; it directed the commissioner to report plans and specifications, and the bids made; it authorized the county judge (W. Carpenter) to receive bids and to accept or reject the same as he might think proper, looking to the interest of the two counties.
The second order of November 19, 1877, which appropriated $600 for the bridge.
The order of November 18, 1878. This order showed a levy of a tax on the taxable property of the county for the purpose of paying for the bridge; a recognition of Washer as contractor for building the bridge, and of Danenhauer and Baecker as his assignees, and an allowance to them, as such assignees, in part payment of the bridge.
The order of November 18, 1879. This order appointed a committee to examine the work on the bridge and to report.
The order of January 19, 1880. This order confirmed the committee's report, and discharged the committee.
It gave neither the judge nor the commissioner power to contract, although it is conceded that the power was given to the county judge to accept bids. The alleged contract does not appear to have been reported to the court; nor was there
Mercer County Court v. Kentucky River Navigation Co.,
8 Bush 300, much relied on and quoted from by counsel for plaintiff in error, is, as a brief analysis will show, inapplicable to the controversy in the present case.
The Mercer County Court, a majority of the justices being present, made an order "that the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars be directed to be subscribed," and appointed one Joseph A. Thompson a commissioner to subscribe the same in the Kentucky River Navigation Company. The Gerrard County Court in like manner made an order that the sum of $100,000 should be subscribed on the part of Gerrard County, and also appointed an agent
The well settled maxim that a court of record can act only through its orders made of record, when applied to judicial proceedings, means that where the court must itself act, and act directly, that action must always be evidenced by the record. But in this instance, where a body has large administrative and executive powers, and is by law authorized to appoint agents, the principle cannot be so extended as to mean that all the acts of its agents shall appear of record.
"could be done under sections 36 and 37. Bullitt County therefore fell back upon the power conferred by § 1 of article 16 of chapter 28,
and made a contract by which it became responsible for the entire cost of the bridge.
Its power to do this, was, we think, clear."
110 U. S. 566
The ground upon which this objection rests is that the power to direct the contractor to discontinue the work resided only in the county court, composed of the county judge and a
We do not concur in the proposition that such action of the county court, evidenced by its record, was necessary to authorize the presiding judge to direct the contractor to stop the work. When that court, constituted as the law requires for such purpose and in the manner prescribed, entered into the contract sued on and charged the county with the amount specified therein, its jurisdiction in that special mode of organization extended no further. It then became the legitimate province of the county court, held by the county judge alone, to superintend and control the erection of the structure. According to the settled course of decisions in the highest court of Kentucky, the justices of the peace do not form a necessary part of the county court except when sitting as a court of claims or when engaged in appropriating the revenues of the county, levying taxes, laying charges upon the county, submitting questions of taxation to a popular vote, and making subscription to stock in railroads. Upon no other occasion, and with reference to no other matters, is the concurrence of the justices of the peace necessary. Gen.Stat.Ky. c. 27, art. 3, § 1;
306, c. 28, art. 17, §§ 1, 2. All the powers of the court which do not come within these enumerated exceptions are exercised exclusively by the county court presided over by the county judge alone. Gen.Stat.Ky. 304 to 307, inclusive. And as a general rule, when any power is conferred or duty imposed by statute upon the county court, the term is understood to mean a court held by the presiding judge alone, and not in conjunction with the justices, and should be held so to mean even when used in connection with fiscal matters if it relates to mere ministerial duties.
Bowling Green & Madisonville Railroad v. Warren County,
10 Bush 711;
When, therefore, Washer received the formal and official notice to stop work signed by the judge of the county court and the county attorney, he was not bound, before obeying it,