Source: http://nc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191207_0004431.WNC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-09 17:21:31
Document Index: 762453255

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924']

WINSTON GERALD LITTLEJOHN, Petitioner,
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Petitioner's Motion to Vacate Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [CV Doc. 1][1] and the Government's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Motion to Vacate [CV Doc. 10]. The Petitioner is represented by Joshua Carpenter of the Federal Defenders of Western North Carolina.
On June 28, 2006, Petitioner Winston Gerald Littlejohn (“Petitioner”) was charged in a Bill of Indictment with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count One); one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 Count Two); and one count of possession and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, that is Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Three). [CR Doc. 1: Indictment]. On May 4, 2007, Petitioner and the Government entered into a Plea Agreement, pursuant to which Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to Counts Two and Three, and the Government agreed to dismiss Count One. [CR Doc. 13 at 1: Plea Agreement]. The Petitioner faced a maximum term of twenty 20 years' imprisonment for Count Two, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, and a mandatory consecutive sentence of not less than 7 years to life for Count Three, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Petitioner pleaded guilty in accordance with his Plea Agreement. [CR Docs. 13, 14].
The Petitioner's sentencing hearing was held on October 29, 2007. At the hearing, the Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 87 months on Count Two and 84 months on Count Three, to be served consecutively to the term imposed on Count Two, for a total term of 171 months' imprisonment. [CR Doc. 17 at 2: Judgment]. Judgment on this conviction was entered on November 9, 2007. [Id.]. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal from this Judgment.
On June 17, 2016, Petitioner filed motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is invalid under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). [CV Doc. 1]. After conducting an initial review of Petitioner's § 2255 motion to vacate, the Court ordered the Government to respond. [CV Doc. 2].
Then, upon the request of the Government, this matter was stayed pending the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ali, No. 15-4433, or United States v. Simms, No. 15-4640. The Fourth Circuit then ordered that Ali would be held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, No. 18-431. On the Government's request, this matter was in turn stayed pending Davis. [Docs. 6, 7]. The Court ordered that the Government would have 60 days to respond to Petitioner's motion once the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Davis. [Doc. 7]. The Supreme Court decided Davis on June 24, 2019. The Government timely filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner's § 2255 motion to vacate. [CV Doc. 10]. The Petitioner, despite being represented by counsel, did not respond.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner is entitled to relief when his original sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or [when] the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The Petitioner argues he is entitled to relief on these grounds because, under Johnson, his conviction on Count Three was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. [CV Doc. 1].
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Here, the Petitioner argues his &sect; 924(c) conviction is invalid under Johnson. [Doc. 1 at 2-6]. Section 924(c) criminalizes the use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence.” Under § 924(c), a crime is one of violence if it either “has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, ” (the “force clause”) or “by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or ...