Source: https://savedaughters19.wordpress.com/2010/06/17/judges-and-judicial-accountability-in-india-with-reference-to-the-judges/
Timestamp: 2015-07-07 15:22:36
Document Index: 721908107

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 124', 'art. 124', 'art. 217', 'Art. 124', 'art. 226', 'art.10', 'art. 50', 'art. 124', 'art. 217', 'art. 124', 'art. 124', 'art. 124']

JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIA WITH REFERENCE TO THE JUDGES | Savedaughters19's Blog
Blogs I FollowThis Is My TruthThe Good VibesBarbara RaisbeckSOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT NEWS IN INDIAHindu MommyTHE HUMAN RESCUE TEAM INTERMEDIA LABORATORYshrinisaysLAW RESOURCE INDIASavedaughters19's BlogMitu KhuranaFollow Blog via Email
Blog Stats	119,752 hits
JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIA WITH REFERENCE TO THE JUDGES	JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
INDIA WITH REFERENCE TO THE JUDGES
(INQUIRY) BILL, 2005
Madhusudan Kesharwani
ªINTRODUCTION
‘Today it is the method of the appointment of the superior judiciary and the absence
of any disciplinary control including the removal of judge of a superior court which
raises problems of accountability….. there is also no method for disciplining a judge
of a superior court either for deviant behavior not amounting to misbehavior… the
conclusion is whilst the Indian higher judiciary is perhaps the most powerful
judiciary in the world today and societal perception for it is very, high accountability
mechanisms particularly in the disciplining of the judges of superior court and
representative character of the courts have not matched with its power and esteem’
Judiciary is one of the three important pillars of any democracy governed by
the rule of law. The legislature, executive and the judiciary are all creatures of our
Constitution. The view that the legislature is supreme is no longer recognised even in
England where the theory of parliamentary supremacy as propounded by Professor
Dicey, was in vogue for a long time. Recent judgments of courts in England have
declared that it is the Constitution that is supreme and that each of the three wings
has their respective jurisdictions and powers to the extent allocated to them in the
Constitution. Our Constitution contains checks and balances, which require all the
three wings to work harmoniously. It has created a separation of powers between all
1 T.R. Andhyarujina, Former Solicitor General of India.
IV year, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.the three branches or wings though the separation, it is now well accepted, is not as
rigid as it is under the American Constitution.
No person, however high, is above the law. No institution is exempt from
accountability, including the judiciary. Accountability of the judiciary in respect of its
judicial functions and orders is vouchsafed by provisions for appeal, reversion and
review of orders. What is the mechanism for accountability for serious judicial
misconduct, for disciplining errant judges. Our Constitution provides for removal of
a judge of the Supreme Court or the high court for proved misbehavior or proved
incapacity, by what is popularly called the process of impeachment, where under two
thirds of the members of each House of Parliament may vote for the removal of the
judge. So far, only one impeachment proceeding has been initiated against a Supreme
Court judge. It failed because Congress abstained from voting and consequently twothirds
majority was not available. It is now generally accepted that the present
impeachment process is cumbersome, time consuming and tends to get politicised. It
needs to be reformed urgently.
Firstly, accountability of higher judiciary in India for their judgments. Secondly, the
institutional methods of making judges accountable in India. The Indian judicial
experience is unique, the judicial accountability in the first sense was very much in
question in few decades of the Supreme Court from 1950 to 1973. There were
clashes between Supreme Courts decision on property and agrarian and economic
reform and the government’s view that the Supreme Court was unsympathetic and at
times hostile to its legislation on such matters. However from 1973 there have been
no such problems as the judiciary changes its direction. Its concerns now more for
human rights and civil rights of the citizens and community rights. No one speaks
about judges accountable for their judgment in economic and property matters
today. Today, it is the matter of appointments to the superior judiciary and the
absence of any disciplinary control including removal of a judge of superior court,
which raises problems of accountability.
The appointing authority of the judges of the superior courts with
acquiescence of the executive. At the same time, the only constitutional method of
disciplining a judge of a superior court viz by his removal for proved misbehavior by
an address given by both the houses of parliament to the president for his assent in
unwieldy and in one case, was shown to be politicised. There is also no method for
disciplining a amounting to misbehavior not amounting to misbehavior. Further, in
the absence of reformulation of the law of the contempt of the court by Supreme
Court, the existing law of the scandalising the court is perceived to operate as
deterrent to criticize a judge for his conduct.
As Justice Michael Kirby
‘In a pluralist society judges are the essential equalisers. They serve no
majority or any minority either. Their duty is to the law and to justice. They do not
bend the knee to the governments, to particular religions, to the military, to money,
to tabloid media or the screaming mob. In upholding law and justice, judges have a
vital function in a pluralist society to make sure that diversity is respected and the
rights of all protected’.
The Indian higher judiciary is perhaps the most powerful judiciary in the
world today and the societal perception of it is high, accountability mechanisms
particularly in the disciplining of the judges of superior court and the representative
character of the courts have not matched with its power and esteem.
2 says:2 Judge, High Court of Australia.
HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIA AND ABROAD
A procedure for removal of judges of the high court and Supreme Court by way of
address of the Houses of Parliament to the President is contained in Constitution of
India, art. 124(4) read with proviso (b) to art. 124(2) and proviso (b) to art. 217(1),
for proved misbehavior or incapacity.
Earlier, the Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 1964 was formulated laying down the
procedure as contemplated by Art. 124(5) and the Bill was referred to a joint
committee of the houses. After elaborate discussion before the committee in which
eminent Members of Parliament and the then Attorney General, C.K. Daphtary and
M.C. Setalvad, former Attorney General, gave their evidence, the joint committee
gave its report on 13 May 1966. The recommendations of the committee were taken
into account and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 was passed providing for procedure
for the investigation and proof of misbehavior and incapacity of judges of the
Supreme Court (including the Chief Justice of India), the Chief Justices and judges of
the high courts, where reference is made by the Speaker or the Chairman to a threemember
committee after admitting a motion initiated by a specified number of
Members. This is the ‘reference procedure’.
The present Bill of 2005 proposes introduction of ‘complaint procedure’ in
addition to the earlier ‘reference procedure’ contained in the 1968 Act. In a
‘complaint procedure’ any person may make a complaint to a judicial council against
judges of the Supreme Court (except the Chief Justice of India), chief justices and
In the place of the three-Member Committee under the 1968 Act, the Bill of
2005 proposes the constitution of a judicial council of five judges consisting of the
Chief Justice of India, two senior most judges of the Supreme Court and two senior
most chief justices of the high court and they will investigate and inquire into
allegations arising out of a complaint or a reference.
Where the allegations are proved, in the case of a ‘complaint procedure’, the
council will submit its report to the President of India who has to forward the same
One of the serious omissions in the Bill of 2005 is the absence of a power in
the Council to impose ‘minor measures’ under the ‘complaint procedure’, where the
charges which have been proved do not warrant removal but amount to ‘deviant or
bad behavior’ which warrant only ‘minor measures’. (Of course, in the case of a
reference by the Speaker/Chairman on a Motion for removal, the judicial council
may not impose or recommend any ‘minor measures’.
In such cases, in UK, USA, Canada and Germany, the judicial council or
similar bodies have been empowered to impose a variety of ‘minor measures’ such as
(1) issuing advisories, (2) request for retirement, (3) stoppage of assignment of
judicial work for a limited time (4) warning and (5) censure or admonition (public or
‘Minor measures’ were also advocated in the Report of 2001 by the National
Commission for Review of the Constitution of India headed by former Chief Justice
of India, Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah.
The first case which went up to the Supreme Court in connection with an
inquiry under that Act was the case of Justice V. Ramaswami, former Judge of the
Supreme Court. In that case, there was a Motion in the House of the People (Lok
Sabha) on 28 February 1991 and the Speaker of the House appointed Justice P.B.
Sawant Committee on 12 March 1991 after admitting the Motion. The committee
gave its report on 20 July 1992, holding some charges proved. Before the committee
started functioning, the 9th Lok Sabha was dissolved and it was contended that the
Motion in the House lapsed. This plea was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Committee of Judicial Accountability vs. Union of India
report, a plea was raised that the Judge was entitled to a copy of the report before it
was submitted to the House. This was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Ramaswami vs. Union of India
only in case an order of removal was passed by the President.
Thereafter, there were two other judgments of the Supreme Court in
connection with the same learned Judge as reported in
committee came up finally for discussion and voting in the House of the People
(Lok Sabha), the Motion for removal did not secure the requisite majority and,
therefore, it failed.
In the case of certain allegations against Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, the then
Chief Justice of Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court observed in a public
interest litigation case, that in-house ‘peer review’ procedure may be laid down by the
judiciary for correcting misbehavior or deviant behavior and that where the
allegations do not warrant removal of a Judge by address of the Houses, it is
permissible for the in-house mechanism to impose ‘minor measures’.
Sub-3, After the committee prepared theSarojini4. It was observed that the judge may question the reportKrishna Swami vs. Union of5 and Lily Thomas vs. Speaker, Lok Sabha6. When the report of the Justice Sawant3 1991 (4) SCC 689.
4 1992 INDLAW SC 1259, 1992 (4) SCC 506.
5 1992 INDLAW SC 1258, 1992 (4) SCC 605.
6 1993 (4) SCC 434.
underscored the need for imposition of certain minor measures in the event of the
proved misbehavior or incapacity not warranting removal. Law declared by the
Supreme Court in its judgments in relation to the Constitution of India, arts. 121,
124 and 217.
The federal judiciaries in US and Canada in their judgments have upheld the
imposition of such ‘minor measures’ by a judicial council (notwithstanding the
absence of any express provision there fore in the US or Canadian Federal
Constitutions) as part of a general power of the judiciary for ‘self regulation’. They
have also observed that entrustment of such a power to the judicial councils does not
amount to abdication of any part of impeachment power of the federal legislature,
inasmuch as the judicial councils may impose only ‘minor measures’ but may not
directly remove. They may only recommend removal.
upholding the validity of minor measures (in that case, it was withdrawal of judicial
work under the provisions of the US Act of 1939). He laid down that judicial selfregulation
or in-house measures were part of the ‘administration of justice’ and
derive force from the general power of the judicial branch to improve its efficiency.
Any statute permitting such action is therefore valid, though there is no express
provision for imposing such minor measures in the US Constitution.
The US Act of 1939 was replaced by US Act of 1980 and this was again
replaced by the US Act of 2002. The 1980 and 2002 statutes of US contain express
provisions for imposing ‘minor measures’. So far as removal is concerned, the
C. Ravichandran Iyer vs. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee7, the Supreme CourtChandler vs. Judicial Council8, Harlan J. laid the legal foundation for7 1995 (5) SCC 457.
8 (1970) 398 US 74.
judicial council of the circuit and the judicial conference of US may only make a
The UK Act of 2005 and the Canadian Bye laws issued under the Canadian
Act of 1985 and the German Constitution, also provide for imposing minor
Orders of the Judicial Conference of US
the US Court of Appeals that, in spite of absence of express provisions in the
Constitution, such in-house or intra-judicial correctional mechanisms for imposition
of ‘minor measures’ were valid and might be imposed by a judicial council, even
though there is no such provision for imposing ‘minor measures’ in the US
Such minor measures would include (1) issuing advisories, (2) request for
retirement, (3) stoppage of assignment of judicial work for a limited time (4) warning,
(5) censure or admonition (public or private).
In this connection, the Law Commission has referred in this report to the
fact that such judicial councils or similar bodies consisting only of judges have been
constituted in several countries such as USA, UK, Canada (federal) and States, Hong
Kong, Germany, Sweden, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore, Israel, Zambia,
Trinidad and Tobago, New South Wales, Victoria.
John H. McBryde vs. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability9, in a very elaborate judgment, it was observed by9 (2001) 264 F. 3d. 52.
COMPOSITION OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL MAY BE CHANGE IN
When the judicial council is conducting investigation or inquiry into allegations
against the judges of the supreme court (in a complaint procedure) or against the said
judges or the Chief Justice of India (in a reference procedure), the judicial council
must not consist of the senior chief justices of the high courts. All the members of
the council must be judges of the Supreme Court. Withdrawal of judicial work may
be of two types, (1) withdrawal pending proceedings and (2) withdrawal of work as
‘minor measure’ at the end of the inquiry
.Where withdrawal of judicial work of a judge as a ‘minor measure’, if it is for
an indefinite period, several judgments including that of Lord Slynn in the Privy
judicial council by itself may not impose ‘removal’. However, in the US both in the
federal as well as states, the withdrawal of the work by the judicial council are only
for a limited period. The Law Commission has therefore recommended that one of
the minor measures that may be imposed by the council is ‘withdrawal of judicial
work for a limited period’. That will be valid.
judge, if passed under the 1968 Act by the President after reference to the judges’
committee and its recommendation, may be challenged on the judicial side. In order
to preclude such a challenge under the Constitution of India, art. 226, High Court
and in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
226 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, it is necessary to incorporate a
Rees vs. Crane10, have observed that it may amount to removal and theJustice V. Ramaswami’s case, the order of removal of aL.Chandra Kumar’s case that art.10 1994 (1) All ER 833.
provision for appeal to the Supreme Court against (1) the orders of removal passed
by the President in the case of a complaint procedure or reference procedure and (2)
the orders of judicial council imposing ‘minor measures’ in a complaint procedure.
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL
Judicial independence, correctly understood, is not an end in itself. Although it is
sometimes characterised as such in the flowery speeches of public officials, most
thoughtful scholars recognise that judicial independence is an instrumental value – a
means to achieve other ends
limits, defined by the purposes it serves. Disagreement persists as to what those
purposes are, but most would accept some variation on the theme that judicial
independence enables judges to follow the facts and law without fear or favor, so as
to uphold the rule of law, preserve the separation of governmental powers, and
promote due process
who are subject to intimidation from outsiders interested in the outcomes of cases
the judges decide lack the independence necessary to follow the facts and law. At the
same time, one may just as fairly conclude that judges who are so independent that
they may disregard the law altogether without fear of reprisal likewise undermine the
rule of law values that judicial independence is supposed to further.
Although some trumpet judicial accountability as if it were an end in itself,
Accountability like independence is better characterised as an instrumental value that
11. As an instrumental value, judicial independence has12. Given these objectives, one may fairly conclude that judges11 Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in
Judicial Independence At The Crossroads, 11-14 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry
Friedman eds., 2002).
12 Rule of Law and the Age of Aquarius, 41 Hastings L.J. 757, 760 (1990).
promotes three discrete ends: the rule of law, public confidence in the courts, and
institutional responsibility.
First, judicial accountability promotes the rule of law by deterring conduct
that might compromise judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality. To say that
judicial accountability promotes judicial independence seems counterintuitive.
Accountability does, after all, diminish a judge’s literal independence; the judge who
is made accountable to an impeachment process, for instance, loses her
‘independence’ to take bribes with impunity. But properly employed, Accountability
merely diminishes a judge’s freedom to make herself dependant on inappropriate
internal or external influences that might interfere with his capacity to follow the rule
of law. By deterring bribery, favoritism, bias and so on, Accountability promotes the
kind of independence needed for judges to adhere to the rule of law.
Second, judicial accountability promotes public confidence in judges and the
judiciary. Regardless of whether independent judges follow the law, if the public’s
perception is otherwise, reforms calculated to render judicial decision-making subject
to popular or political branch control are sure to follow, to the ultimate detriment of
the rule of law itself. A system of judicial accountability that reassures a sometimesskeptical
public that judges are doing their jobs properly and yet respects the
judiciary’s independence may forestall resort to more draconian and counterproductive
forms of court control.
Third, judicial accountability promotes institutional responsibility by
rendering the judiciary responsive to the needs of the public it serves as a separate
branch of government. The public is entitled to courts that administer justice
effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously. The judiciary spends taxpayer money just
like the other branches of government and, just like the other branches, the judiciary
must be subject to regulation aimed at making its operations more streamlined and
If there is no written Constitution, the constitutional conventions govern. In
our country, the Supreme Court of India laid down more than 42 years ago in
‘…………though our legislatures have plenary powers, they function within
the limits prescribed by the material and relevant provisions of The
Constitution……..’
‘In a democratic country governed by a written constitution, it is the
Constitution which is supreme and sovereign
stated that after the coming into force of the (UK) Human Rights Act, 1998, the
British system, which was once based on parliamentary supremacy has now moved
from that principle to the system of Constitutional supremacy.
Charter of Rights & Freedoms, Canada has moved from Parliamentary supremacy to
constitutional supremacy. He said that ‘when the Charter was introduced, Canada
went, in the words of Chief Justice Brian Dickson, from a system of Parliamentary
supremacy to constitutional supremacy.’
13.Keshav14 special reference No.1 of 1964, as follows:15’., in International Transport Roth Gmbth vs. Home Secretary16, Laws J, in Vriend vs. Alberta17, Iacobucci J stated that after the Canadian13 Rescuing Judicial Accountability From The Realm Of Political Rhetoric, Charles
Gardner Geyh, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 911.
14 (1965 (1) SCR 413).
16 2002(3) WLR 344.
17 1998(1) SCR 493.
Peoples’ Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India 2003 INDLAW SC 290, AIR 2003 SCOur Constitution contains checks and balances which require all the three
wings to work harmoniously. It has created a separation of powers between all the
three branches or wings though the separation, it is now well accepted, is not as rigid
as it is under the American Constitution.
The Indian judiciary’s powers of judicial review to declare Parliamentary and
executive action ultra vires of the Constitution have been recognised ever since 1950,
when the Constitution came into force. Constitution of India, art. 50 states that the
state will take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services
Judicial independence refers to the independence of the judge as well as the
independence of the judiciary as an institution. Individual independence means that
the judge is free to decide a case according to law and he may not be interfered with
by anybody without process. The Indian judiciary is independent and the
Constitution has insulated it from interference both by legislature or executive.
Constitution of India, arts. 121 and 211 prohibit any discussion in the
Parliament or state legislatures on the conduct of a judge of the Supreme Court or
high court in the discharge of their respective duties. The high courts and Supreme
Court are courts of record and have powers to punish for contempt. Under the
Constitution of India, arts. 144, all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of
India will act in aid of the Supreme Court.
Judges are also immune under various laws like Judges (Protection) Act, 1985
from civil or criminal action for their acts, speech etc, in the course of or while acting
or purporting to act in the discharge of their official or judicial duties or functions.
However, judges have to abide by the oath they have taken, namely, that ‘they will
bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established’.
The fact that the powers of judges are very wide is in itself an indication that
the powers may not be allowed to be absolute. Among the constitutional limitations
on the judges, the most important one is the provision for ‘removal’ of judges of the
high courts/Supreme Court by address of the Houses of Parliament to the President
on the ground of ‘proved misbehavior or incapacity’. This is provided in
Constitution of India, art. 124 (2) and (4) in respect of judges of the Supreme Court
and in view of art. 217, that procedure is attracted to the ‘removal’ of judges of the
high court also.
Dato ‘Param Cumarasamy as Vice-President of the International
Commission of Jurists and as former UN Special Rapporteur on independence of
the judiciary, in his speech in November 2004 at Chennai on ‘judicial accountability’
sated that:
‘Accountability and transparency are the very essence of democracy. No one
single public institution or for that matter, even a private institution dealing
with the public, is exempt from accountability. Hence, the judicial arm of the
government too is accountable’.
would also be intolerable because they would render impossible the orderly conduct
of the social and economic affairs of a society’, ‘Courts are institutions run by human
beings. Human beings are subject to selfish or venal motives and even moral
paragons differ in the quality of their mental faculties and in their capacity for
Stephen B. Burbank18; says a ‘completely independent court in this sense18 As Stephen B. Burbank, in his recent book on ‘Judicial Independence’.
judgment and wisdom’. ‘Wholly unaccountable Judges are likely to deviate from what
the law might demand’
In the book ‘Judges and Judicial Accountability’ edited by Cyrus Das (2004),
retired Justice Tun Mohd Dzaiddin Abdullah, Chief Justice of Malaysia
‘To be faithful to his oath is the test of his integrity as a judge. Implicit in this
is that he must resist any influence or temptation. Indeed, independence is a
vital component of a judge’s accountability, since a judiciary which is not
truly independent, competent or possessed of integrity would not be able to
give any account of itself’.
‘Thus judicial accountability is an indispensable counterbalance to the judicial
independence, for an unaccountable judge would be free to disregard the ends that
independence is supposed to serve’.
In the federal system in USA
now replaced by the Judicial Improvement Act, 2002, which enables the judicial
council, as part of an ‘in house’ mechanism, to pass final orders short of removal,
such as, request for retirement, withdrawal of cases, public or private censure or
admonition and where the judge is removed, for disqualifying from holding any
other public office etc. the UK Act of 2005, the Canadian Bye laws, Federal
Germany’s Disciplinary Rules and all the States in US provide for ‘minor measures’.
19 said:, the legislature enacted an Act in 1980 which isINTERNATIONAL TRADITIONS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
19 Judges and Judicial Accountability’ edited by Cyrus Das (2004).
resolution of the UN General Assembly dated 29 November 1985 which endorsed
the proceedings of the 7
Treatment of Offenders passed at Milan, Italy during the period 26 August to 6
September 1985. The UN adopted the basic principles on the independence of the
judiciary by consensus. The UN General Assembly subsequently welcomed the
principles and invited governments ‘to respect them and take them into account
within the framework of their national legislation and practice’, by its proceedings
dated 13 December 1985.
As regards independence of the judiciary, the following seven principles were
(1) the independence of the judiciary will be guaranteed by the state and
enshrined in the Constitution or the laws of the country. It is the duty
of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the
(2) the judiciary will decide matters before it impartially, on the basis of
facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions,
improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason;
(3) the judiciary will have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature
and will have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue
submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law;
(4) there will not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with
the judicial process, nor will judicial decisions by the courts be
subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial
review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of
sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law;
(5) everyone will have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals
established procedures of the legal process will not be created to
displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial
(6) the principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and
requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are
conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected; and
(7) tt is the duty of each member state to provide adequate resources to
enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions.
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary’ is contained in theth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and theINTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS
: 1981 (SIRACUSA)We will next refer to the instruments promoted by the International Commission of
Jurists. These are contained in the draft principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary (Siracusa Principles), which were formulated during 25-29 May 1981. These
principles also refer to the judicial independence, qualification, selection, postings,
transfer, promotion etc.
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION MINIMUM STANDARDS OF
, NEW DELHI (1982)We will next refer to the minimum standards of judicial independence laid down by
the International Bar Association. These were adopted by the 19
Conference held in New Delhi in October 1982. They deal with judicial
independence, the terms and nature of judicial appointments. So far as the subject of
discipline and removal of judges is concerned, these are contained in paras 27 to 32
‘(27) The proceedings for discipline and removal of judges must ensure
fairness to the judge, and adequate opportunity for hearing.
(28) The procedure for discipline must be held in camera. The judge may
however request that the hearing be held in public, subject to final and
reasoned disposition of this request by the disciplinary tribunal. Judgments in
disciplinary proceedings, whether held in camera or in public, may be
(29) The grounds for removal of judges will be fixed by law and will be
(30) All disciplinary actions will be based upon standards of judicial conduct
promulgated by law or in established rules of court.
(31) A judge will not be subject to removal unless, by reason of a criminal act
or through gross or repeated neglect or physical or mental incapacity, he has
shown himself manifestly unfit to hold the position of judge.
(32) In systems where the power to discipline and remove judges is vested in
an institution other than the Legislature, the tribunal for discipline and
removal of judges will be permanent and be composed predominantly of
th BiennialWORLD CONFERENCE OF INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY
, 1983We will next refer to the World Conference on the Independence of Judiciary held at
Montreal in 1983. The resolution related to the Universal Declaration on the
Independence of Judges. After dealing with the independence and accountability of
international judges, it dealt with national judges separately. Para 2 of part II after
referring to independence of the judiciary; para 3 refers to the qualifications,
selection and training; para 4 relates to posting, promotion and transfer and para 5 to
the tenure. Para 6 deals with immunities and privileges and para 7 with
disqualifications. Para 8 deals with discipline and removal.
, 1999Another Conference on Independence of judges and lawyers was organised at
Caracas, Venezuela during 16-18 January 1999 by the International Commission of
Jurists. The Conference passed a plan of action upholding the principles of rule of
law, independence of the judiciary and human rights.
, 2002We will next refer to the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002, which after
referring to the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, set out
earlier formulated various principles relating to the independence of the judiciary
.BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF JUDGEMENTS IN JUSTICE V
.RAMASWAMI
’S CASESJustice V. Ramaswami was appointed as Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana and there were certain allegations of financial impropriety and other
irregularities against him while he was working as Chief Justice of that High Court at
Chandigarh. By the time of the inquiry, he had been elevated to the Supreme Court.
The then Chief Justice of India, Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji, took note of the
allegations and advised Justice Ramaswami, to abstain from judicial functions until
the allegations were cleared. On 18 July 1990, upon receipt of the letter, Justice V.
Ramaswamy applied for leave for six weeks in the first instance with effect from 23
July 1990. The Chief Justice directed the office to process his application for leave.
These facts are contained in statement of the Chief Justice of India to the Bar dated
20 July 1990.
The Chief Justice of India then appointed a Committee consisting of three
Judges of the Supreme Court (B.C. Ray, K.J. Shetty and M.N.Venkatachaliah JJ),
presided over by Justice B.C. Ray, to go into the facts to find out whether there was
any prima facie truth in the allegations requiring the judge not to exercise judicial
Thereafter, on 28 February 1991, 108 Members of the Lok Sabha presented a
Motion to the Speaker of the 9th Lok Sabha for Address to the President for the
removal of the learned Judge under the Constitution of India, art. 124(4) read with
the provisions of Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. A three member committee consisting
of Justice P.B. Sawant, Judge of the Supreme Court, Justice P.D. Desai, Chief Justice
of Bombay High Court and Justice O. Chinnappa Reddi, a Jurist who was also
former judge of the Supreme Court, to investigate into the grounds on which the
removal was prayed for.
Sub Committee of
Judicial Accountability vs. Union of India20We will refer to the various constitutional issues decided in the judgment separately.
After the said judgment, the Committee started the inquiry and framed 14 charges on
the basis of the allegations. Justice V. Ramaswami did not participate in the inquiry in
spite of notice. The Committee took evidence and prepared an elaborate report in
20 1991(4) SCC 103 699).
regard to 14 charges, on 20 July 1992. They held charge Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13
and 14 have been proved, that charge No. 5 was not proved (subject to the finding
on charge No. 7), charge Nos. 6 and 10 were also not proved. It held that charge No.
12 was partly proved.
Justice Ram swami’s wife Sarojini Ram swami filed writ petition 514 of 1992
requesting for a direction that the Committee hand over a copy of the report to
Justice Ramaswami before it was submitted to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in order
to enable Justice V. Ramaswami to question the findings of the Committee in judicial
review proceedings in a court of law.
Sarojini Ramaswami vs. Union of India
21Several important constitutional principles were again laid down by the Supreme
Court in this judgment to which we will be referring in detail. Thereafter, one Mr.
Krishnaswamy who was a Member of Parliament filed a writ petition (WP. 149 of
1992) seeking a review of the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in
on Judicial Accountability vs. Union of India
Another person Raj Kanwar filed a writ petition 140 of 1992 contending that
the notice of Motion and its admission by the speaker were unconstitutional. Both
these writ petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court by its third judgment in
Sub Committee22.Krishnaswamy vs. Union of India
Parliament, Justice V. Ramaswami was given a copy of the Report and he, in fact,
filed a written memorandum before the Parliament. In Parliament, he was
represented by Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate. Several Members having abstained, the
23. After the report of the Committee was tabled in21 1992(4) SCC 506.
22 1991(4) SCC 699.
23 1992(4) SCC 605 on 27 October 1992.
Motion for removal did not ultimately succeed. Thereafter one Lily Thomas filed a
writ petition stating that those Members of Parliament, who abstained from voting,
must be deemed to have accepted the findings of the Committee. This writ petition
The Committee then referred to the provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act,
1968 and the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 and pointed out that the judges of the
Supreme Court and the high court exercise vast powers under the Constitution and
the laws and that the vastness of the powers and the immunity granted to them
required, that judges must be fearless and independent, but they must adopt a high
standard of rectitude so as to inspire confidence in the public who may seek and who
may want to seek redress in the court. While it was necessary to protect the judges
from false and malicious attacks, it was also necessary to protect the fair image of the
institution of judiciary from those judges who conducted themselves in a manner as
to blur that image.
It then considered the meaning of the word ‘proved misbehavior’ used in the
Constitution and stated that these words were perhaps borrowed from Australian
Constitution, s. 72(ii). They referred to the opinions of Dr. Griffith, Solicitor General
and of C.W. Pupincus QC, which were placed before the Senate in Australia in the
case of alleged misbehavior of Justice Murphy. The Committee then referred to an
article by Wrisley Brown
judge of the Federal Judiciary in USA. The Committee also referred to the cases in
USA of Judge Steward F. La Motte
to the cases of Judge Walter L Nicson
24 as to what conduct would warrant impeachment of a25, to the case of Judge Harry E. Claiborne26 and27, Judge Alcee L. Hastings,28 and of Judge24 Harvard Law Review, Vol. 26, p.684.
25 Jr (FLA) 341 Southern Reporter (2d series 513).
26 Report 99 – 688, 9th Congress 2
27 Jr (101 – 36 or 101st Congress first Session).
nd Session.Richard A Napolitano
One of the important propositions laid down by the Committee is related to the
‘standard of proof’ required in impeachment proceedings. The Committee referred
to an article by Chief Justice Ben F. Overton of the Supreme Court of Florida, in the
Chicago-Kent Law Review. In the US, the standard of proof was higher than
preponderance of probabilities, namely, the standard required was ‘clear and
convincing evidence’ and that was the standard required in the case of ‘misbehavior’,
which was treated as an impeachable offence. The Committee felt that the standard
in our country must be ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’.
They further added as follows: ‘The Constitution, the Judges (Inquiry) Act,
1968 and the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969, give us an indication, however slight it
may be, that an inquiry into the act is thought to share the nature of quasi criminal
proceedings. The word ‘investigation’ usually associated with criminal cases is used
both in the Constitution of India, art. 124(4) and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The
Committee is required by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, s. 3(3) to frame definite
‘charges’ against the judge on the basis of which the investigation is proposed to be
held. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, s. 6 uses the words ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’.
Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969, r. 7 talks of ‘plea of judge’ and again uses the words
‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’. In our view, the use of the words ‘investigation’, ‘charge’,
‘plea’, ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’, all of which are ordinarily associated with criminal
proceedings, do inform us of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings’. ‘In fact,
as far back as 1870, the Privy Council issued a memorandum of the removal of
colonial judges where it described.
29, and finally to the case of Stephen Chandler vs. Judicial Council30.28 (Report 100 – 810, 110th Congress second Session).
29 (317 F. Supp. 79 (1970)).
30 10t h Circuit of the US (398 US 74).
The removal procedure in the United States for impeachment on the ground
of ‘conviction for treason, bribery or other high crimes or misdemeanors’ in the
federal system. The majority of the states also have similar provisions for removal of
judges of states. In some states, provision was made for removal by an address of the
governor to both houses of legislatures or by a joint resolution of the legislatures. In
some states the removal power was vested in the state Supreme Court while in some
states special courts were provided to hear removal charges. In the State of New
York, the Court was known as the ‘Court on the Judiciary’
passed in 1932 (incorporated in Title 28 of the US Code) and that law was replaced
by another Act in 1939, which made provision for judicial councils. That law was
replaced by the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act,
1980. In this enactment, judicial councils were empowered to receive complaints
against judicial conduct, which was ‘prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts, or alleging that such a judge or
magistrate is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or
physical disability’. That Act prescribed an elaborate judicialised procedure for
processing such complaints within the administration system of the judicial councils
concerned and the judicial conference of US. So far as states were concerned, 50
States had laws for disciplining their judges and in each, a variously constituted
commission was organized in either a single tier or in many tiers depending upon the
perceived desirability of separating fact finding from judgment and recommendation
tasks. The Commission’s recommendations would be transmitted to the State
Supreme Court for its authoritative imprimatur, except in states where they were to
be received by the legislatures that retained judicial removal power
31. A federal law was32.31 Henry J Abraham, the Judicial Process, 3rd Ed, p. 45.
32 Robert J. Janosik, Encyclopedia of the American Judicial System, Vol. II., p. 575-78.
B.C. Ray J then referred to the First World Conference on the Independence
of Judges held at Montreal on 10 June 1983 and to the following clauses in the
Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice which concerned ‘discipline
and removal of national judges’:
‘Clause 2.32 – A complaint against a judge will be processed expeditiously and
fairly under an appropriate practice, and the judge will have the opportunity
to comment on the complaint at the initial stage. The examination of the
complaint at its initial stage will be kept confidential, unless otherwise
requested by the judge.
Clause 2.33 (a) – The proceedings for judicial removal or discipline, when
such are initiated, will beheld before a court or a board predominantly
composed of members of the judiciary and selected by the judiciary. (b)
However, the power of removal may be vested in the legislature by
impeachment or joint address, preferably upon a recommendation of a court
or board as referred to in 2.33(a).
Clause 2.34 – All disciplinary action will be based upon established standards
Clause 2.35 – The proceedings for discipline of judges will ensure fairness to
the judge and the opportunity of a full hearing.
Clause 2.36 – With the exception of proceedings before the legislature, the
proceedings for discipline and removal will be held in camera. The judge
may, however, request that the hearing be held in public, subject to a final
and reasoned disposition of this request by the disciplinary tribunal.
Judgments in disciplinary proceedings, whether held in camera or in public,
Clause 2.37 – With the exception of proceedings before the legislature or in
connection with them, the decision of a disciplinary tribunal will be subject
to appeal to a court.
Clause 2.38 – A judge will not be subject to removal except on proved
grounds of incapacity or misbehavior, rendering him unfit to continue in
Clause 2.39 – In the event that a court is abolished, judges serving in this
court will not be affected, except for their transfer to another court of the
same status’.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND VIEWS OF LAW COMMISSION ON
(INQUIRY) BILL, 2005Judicial independence is not absolute. Judicial independence and accountability are
two sides of the same coin. The present proposals in the Bill of 2005 together with
recommendations for enabling the judicial council to impose ‘minor measures’
including stoppage of assignment of judicial work are constitutional. They ought not
to be viewed as an encroachment on judicial independence by the executive or by the
Bill of 2005, s. 3(1) provides for the establishment of a National Judicial
Council consisting only of judges is constitutionally valid and is consistent with the
concept of independence of judiciary, judicial accountability and doctrine of
separation of powers. S. 2(d) be substituted by the following definition: (d) ‘Judge’
means a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a high court and includes the chief justice
of a high court and also the Chief Justice of India for purposes of the reference
procedure but will not include the Chief Justice of India for the purposes of the
complaint procedure; ‘complaint procedure’ means a procedure which is initiated by
way of a complaint to the council under s. 5; ‘reference procedure’ means a
procedure which is initiated by way of a motion for removal which is referred by the
speaker or chairman to the council.
A special provision be inserted in the Bill of 2005 to enable the judicial
council to impose ‘minor measures’, in the complaint procedure. The omission in the
Bill of 2005, in this behalf, needs to be rectified by providing, in the case of a
complaint procedure, for the imposition of following minor measures by the
National Judicial Council, viz.,
(1) Issuing advisories;
(2) Issuing warnings;
(3) Withdrawal of judicial work pending and future for a limited time;
(4) Request that the judge may voluntarily retire;
(5) Censure or admonition, public or private.
It is not permissible for the judicial council to recommend imposition of
minor measures on a reference by the speaker/chairman of either House of
Parliament. The judicial council may itself impose such ‘minor measures’ while
disposing of the complaint. However, while returning the reference to the House it
may not recommend any minor measure to be passed by the House.
The procedure in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and in the proposed Bill of
2005 enabling investigation/inquiry by the judicial council by way of a complaint
procedure, in addition to a reference procedure, is not an infringement of the
Parliamentary process contained in art. 124(4) and does not amount to impermissible
delegation and is valid.
Bill of 2005, s. 22 permits the judicial council itself to conduct an
investigation or appoint a committee to conduct the investigation is constitutionally
valid. It is permissible for Parliament to make a law to provide that the judicial
council might, as an interim measure, recommend withdrawal of judicial work from a
judge of the Supreme Court or high court, for the purpose of an effective
Bill of 2005, s. 5(2) has been amended to provide that the complaint must be
in the form prescribed in the rules, must give full particulars of the ‘misbehavior or
incapacity’ which is the subject matter of the allegation and must contain a
verification as to which of the allegations are within the personal knowledge of the
complainant and which are based on information received and from whom.
There must be a provision in the Bill of 2005 that every complainant and
every person including a witness and a lawyer who participates in the investigation
and inquiry, whether or not he seeks confidentiality about his name, must undertake
to the judicial council that he will not reveal his own name, the name of the judge
complained against, the contents of the complaint or any of the documents or
proceedings to anybody else including the media without the prior written approval
of the judicial council and it will be for the judicial council to decide when and to
what extent the contents of the complaint will be disclosed to the public. It must be
made clear that this is notwithstanding anything contained in the Right to
Information Act, 2005. Once the enquiry is completed before the judicial council, if
`minor measures’ are imposed on a complaint procedure, the same may be published
by the judicial council with the qualification that in the case of `private censure or
admonition’, the name of the complainant and of the judge concerned will not be
published. In the case of recommendation for removal, since the report is to be
submitted to the Speaker/Chairman, it will be for the Speaker/Chairman to decide
when such report may be published. Bill of 2005, s. 19 must be amended to provide
that the violation of the confidentiality provisions abovementioned would be an
offence and that procedure for punishing such offence would be as prescribed under
the Bill of 2005, s. 20
A right of appeal to the Supreme Court is available only to the judge who is
aggrieved by an order passed against him either for removal or where it is a final
order of the judicial council imposing minor measures. The Bill of 2005 must include
a provision to make it clear that where a judge of the high court or Supreme Court
who is under investigation or inquiry before the judicial council, reaches the age of
superannuation during the pendency of the said proceedings, the proceedings may be
continued for the purpose of imposing the minor measures such as censure or
admonition, public or private.
The Bill of 2005 must be made applicable to complaints relating to
‘misbehavior’, which occurred before the commencement of the proposed
enactment but restricted to a period of two years before the commencement of the
enactment provided the judge has not retired by the date the complaint is filed
before the judicial council.
33.CONCLUSION
33 Judges (Inquiry) Bill 2005.
As an instrumental value, judicial independence has limits, defined by the
purposes it serves. Disagreement persists as to what those purposes are, but most
would accept some variation on the theme that judicial independence enables judges
to follow the facts and law without fear or favor, so as to uphold the rule of law,
preserve the separation of governmental powers, and promote due process. Judicial
independence, correctly understood, is not an end in itself. Although it is sometimes
characterized as such in the flowery speeches of public officials, most thoughtful
scholars recognise that judicial independence is an instrumental value-a means to
achieve other ends.
Given these objectives, one may fairly conclude that judges who are subject
to intimidation from outsiders interested in the outcomes of cases the judges decide
lack the independence necessary to follow the facts and law. At the same time, one
may just as fairly conclude that judges who are so independent that they may
disregard the law altogether without fear of reprisal likewise undermine the rule of
law values that judicial independence is supposed to further.
Judicial Accountability promotes the rule of law by deterring conduct that
might compromise judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality. To say that
Accountability does, after all, diminish a judge’s literal independence: the judge who
is made accountable to an impeachment process, for instance, loses his/her
internal or external influences that might interfere with her capacity to follow the
rule of law. By deterring bribery, favoritism, bias and so on, Accountability promotes
the kind of independence needed for judges to adhere to the rule of law.
After the making of the proposed bill (Judges (Inquiry) Bill 2005), it will be
going to pass in the session of Parliament. The present Bill of 2005 proposes
introduction of ‘complaint procedure’ in addition to the earlier ‘reference procedure’
contained in the 1968 enactment. In a ‘complaint procedure’ a complaint may be
made by any person to judicial council against judges of the Supreme Court (except
the Chief Justice of India), chief justices and judges of high courts.
It will also put restriction and it will make sure that no organ of the state
cross its limit. Meaning thereby it will put restriction on the biasness by any judges
and them accountable to the public at large to establish independence of judiciary as
well as rule of law.
As it is rightly said by Clifford Wallace J.
‘Judicial corruption certainly exists, I know of no country that is completely
free of corruption, with its insidious effect of undermining the rule of law.
Attempts to solve judicial corruption, however, may themselves weaken the
rule of law if the judiciary comes under the influence or control of legislative
or executive branch. The challenge to all the governments, therefore, is to
eradicate judicial corruption without intruding on the independence of
judiciary’.
34:34 Former Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals ( Ninth Circuit).
Found Interesting- Share with your friends.PrintEmailShare on TumblrPocketLike this:Like Loading...
June 17, 2010savedaughters19	Post navigation
←→	2 thoughts on “JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIA WITH REFERENCE TO THE JUDGES”	sneha says:	I need a copy of judicial accountability bill. Can you please help me get that. I will be very grateful.
Reply	October 11, 2010 at 11:17 pm
madhusudan kesharwani says:	yep tell me the year i will provide you and if you want you can contact me my email id is “madhusudan_kesharwani@rediffmail.com
Reply	August 9, 2011 at 9:11 pm
| The Hexa Theme.	This Is My TruthDream, Desire, Hope, Expectation...A Touch, A Kiss...A long Road, A Destination Unknown...The Good VibesAre you willing to step-up, change your life and become a better person in 365 days?Barbara RaisbeckphotographySOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT NEWS IN INDIANATIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH DESK – A SHAKTI VAHINI RESEARCH INITIATIVEHindu MommyIndian mother parenting US born kidsTHE HUMAN RESCUE TEAM INTERMEDIA LABORATORYA Self Styled Laboratory of Neuroinformatics: Interlecting in Nano Age WorldshrinisaysEnriching experiencesLAW RESOURCE INDIALEGAL RESOURCE CENTRE / COURT JUDGMENTS / LEGAL ARCHIVESSavedaughters19's Blogmy struggles as a woman and a motherMitu Khurana