Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/2705634/WATSON-et-al-v-THE-BOARD-OF-DIRECTORS-OF-WILLIAM-PENN-SCHOOL-DISTRICT-JOSEPH-ANDREWS-PATRICIA-ALFORD-Document-No-10
Timestamp: 2019-11-16 01:19:00
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n1983', '§ 1489', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2000', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1489', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§\n1983', '§ 1983', '§ 8501', '§ 8541', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

WATSON et al v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WILLIAM PENN SCHOOL DISTRICT JOSEPH ANDREWS, PATRICIA ALFORD - Document No. 10 | Complaint | Prejudice (Legal Term)
WATSON et al v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WILLIAM PENN SCHOOL DISTRICT JOSEPH ANDREWS, PATRICIA ALFORD - Document No. 10
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS: PLAINTIFFS ARE DENIED RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AS TO CLAIMS FOR RELIEF UNDER THE ADEA AND TITLE VII; PLAINTIFFS ARE GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AS TO THE SECTION 1983 CLAIM FOR RACE DISCRIMINATION AND ANY LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARISING THEREFROM; PLAINTIFFS ARE DENIED LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AS TO ALL OTHER CLAIMS. SIGNED BY JUDGE J. CURTIS JOYNER ON 8/29/06. 8/29/06 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(fdc) 2:2005cv05760 Pennsylvania Eastern District Court
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WATSON et al v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WILLIAM PENN SCHOOL DISTRICT JOS...
NDREWS, PATRICIA ALFORD
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 1 of 13
CHARLA WATSON and REGINALD WATSON : CIVIL ACTION
v. : 05-5760
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WILLIAM :
PENN SCHOOL DISTRICT, JOSEPH :
ANDREWS, and PATRICIA ALFORD :
JOYNER, J. August 29, 2006
Via the motion now pending before this Court, Plaintiffs
move for leave to amend the complaint. For the reasons outlined
below, the motion shall be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiffs, Charla Watson and Reginald Watson, husband and
wife, (“Plaintiffs”) brought this suit to recover for alleged
injuries to Mrs. Watson stemming from violations of 28 U.S.C. §
1983, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), and alleged loss of consortium for Mr. Watson as a
result of the alleged injury to his wife. In response to
Plaintiffs’ Complaint filed November 1, 2005, Defendants Patricia
Alford, Joseph Andrews, and the Board of Directors of William
Penn School District (“Defendants”), moved for dismissal of the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on
January 23, 2006. On February 23, 2006, noting that Plaintiffs
had failed to respond to Defendants’ motion or request an
extension of time, this Court entered an Order granting
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 2 of 13
Defendants’ motion to dismiss as uncontested pursuant to Local
Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(c) and dismissing the Complaint
without prejudice. In an attempt to revive their case,
Plaintiffs now seek leave of court to amend the complaint and
join additional defendants.
In support of this motion for leave to amend, Plaintiffs set
forth the sad story of the demise of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
office. Apparently, Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Frank J. Marcone
(“Plaintiffs’ Counsel”) “maintains an office for the practice of
law at 2530 N. Providence Road, Upper Providence, Delaware
County, Pennsylvania 19063, which is also the address of his
residence.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Permission to File an Am. Compl. and
to Include Add’l Defs. (“Pls.’ Mot.”) at ¶ 1.) According to
Plaintiffs’ motion, on January 18, 2006, a large tree fell on
Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s home, causing significant damage to the
structure. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiffs’ Counsel claims that, as
a result, “all organized work was severely hampered and files
were scattered, equipment had to be removed and the organization
of the client’s files was grossly affected.” (Id. at ¶ 4.)
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on January 23,
2006. Plaintiffs’ Counsel states that, during this period, he
was involved in assisting Mrs. Watson in navigating the
administrative process necessary to receive retirement payments
from the teacher’s union. (Pls.’ Mot. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs’
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 3 of 13
Counsel claims that he was also “intimately engaged in removing
his files from the residence office [to] another office outside
the home.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs’ Counsel admits that, as a
result of his personal involvement in the repairs to his home, he
“failed to address the issues raised” by Defendants’ motion.
(Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs’ Counsel claims that the tasks of
protecting his home and property, reporting to his insurance
company, replacing and repairing his cars, and preparing for
trial in another case all “distracted [him] from attending to the
response to [Defendants’ motion].” (Id. at ¶¶ 10-12.)
Plaintiffs move to amend the Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Defendants assert that leave to
amend cannot be granted at this point because judgment has
already been entered. The Third Circuit has found that, where a
final judgment has been entered, the broad discretion normally
available under Rule 15 is curtailed. Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297
F.3d 201, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2002); 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1489 (2d
ed. 1990). Before leave to amend can be granted, the court must
consider whether relief from the judgment is appropriate pursuant
to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Id.
The first inquiry, then, is whether this Court’s Order
dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint was a final judgment. Dismissal
without prejudice generally is not a final judgment. Ahmed, 297
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 4 of 13
F.3d at 207. Where, however, a plaintiff would be time-barred
from re-filing a claim at the point when a dismissal without
prejudice was entered, that dismissal is considered a final
judgment. Id. Thus, where a claim would be time-barred, that
claim can be amended only after relief from judgment is granted
pursuant to Rule 59(e) or 60(b). We examine whether any of the
claims dismissed pursuant to the Order of February 23, 2006
dismissing the Complaint without prejudice could have been
reasserted as of that date.
Plaintiffs’ original Complaint contained claims based on the
ADEA, Title VII, § 1983, and loss of consortium. The statute of
limitations for § 1983 actions in Pennsylvania is two years.
See, e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 348 (3d Cir. 1989).
Mrs. Watson’s § 1983 claim is based on the filing of criminal
charges subsequent to the meeting of October 14, 2004. (Proposed
Am. Compl. at ¶ 22.) Even counting from the date of the meeting
itself, less than two years elapsed from that date to the entry
of the order dismissing the original Complaint on February 23,
2006. Because Mrs. Watson could still cure and re-file a
complaint based on her § 1983 claims, the order dismissing the
Complaint without prejudice is not considered a final judgment.
Thus, amendment is available for the § 1983 claims pursuant to
Rule 15(a) without first seeking relief from judgment under Rule
59(e) or 60(b).
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 5 of 13
Mrs. Watson’s employment claims, however, are subject to a
different statute of limitations. To properly file a civil
action in district court pursuant to the ADEA or Title VII,
Plaintiffs generally must exhaust their administrative remedies
and receive a right-to-sue letter from the administrative agency
that investigated the complaint. See Seredinski v. Clifton
Precision Products Co., 776 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1985) (ADEA);
Hornsby v. United States Postal Svc., 787 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir.
1986) (Title VII). In this case, Mrs. Watson apparently filed a
complaint with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(“EEOC”). As discussed below, neither the original Complaint nor
the Proposed Amended complaint references or attaches
documentation of the EEOC’s investigation or the issuance of a
right-to-sue letter. Upon issuance of a right-to-sue letter from
the EEOC, Mrs. Watson would have had ninety days to file a civil
action to pursue her claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). After
the close of this ninety-day period, the claimant forfeits the
right to sue. See, e.g., McCray v. Correy Manufacturing, Co., 61
F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 1995).
Even if we assume that Mrs. Watson received a right-to-sue
letter and filed the original Complaint on the same day, the
ninety days would have started running on November 1, 2005.
Assuming a right-to-sue letter was actually issued and received,
no less than one hundred and fourteen days elapsed from the time
it was received to the time the Complaint was dismissed.
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 6 of 13
Plaintiffs, therefore, could not, as of the date of the Order,
have re-filed any claims based on the ADEA or Title VII, making
the dismissal without prejudice a final judgment. Thus, before
considering Plaintiffs’ motion to amend as to these claims, we
must determine whether relief from judgment is appropriate.
Loss of consortium is a derivative claim, and is, therefore,
governed by the statute of limitations of the source claim. See
Patterson v. American Bosch Corp., 914 F.2d 384, 387 n.4(3d Cir.
1990). Mr. Watson’s loss of consortium claim is broadly stated,
and appears to be based on all of the claims – § 1983, ADEA, and
Title VII – asserted by his wife. (Proposed Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 43-
44.) Thus, to the extent Mr. Watson seeks to recover for loss of
consortium stemming from Mrs. Watson’s § 1983 claim, Mr. Watson’s
claim is not subject to a final judgment. Similarly, to the
extent Mr. Watson’s loss of consortium claim is based on Mrs.
Watson’s ADEA and Title VII claims, Mr. Watson’s claim is subject
to a final judgment and relief from that judgment must be allowed
before the appropriateness of amendments under Rule 15(a) can be
Relief from judgment may be available in this context
pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Rule 59(e) requires that a
motion be filed within ten days of the entry of judgment. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration
"is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906,
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 7 of 13
909 (3d Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs’ motion, however, presents an
excuse for failure to respond, rather than an error of fact or
law. Thus, for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ ADEA and Title VII
claims, we analyze the motion under Rule 60(b), which provides,
inter alia, for relief from judgment for “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
The Third Circuit has noted that when a party requests
amendment after a final judgment has been entered, courts
generally determine the appropriateness of both reopening the
judgment and allowing amendment simultaneously. See Ahmed, 297
F.3d at 209. This analysis focuses on the futility of proposed
amendments, because such futility “may be a valid reason both for
denying a motion to amend under Rule 15(a) and for refusing to
reopen the judgment under Rule 60(b)” Id. (quoting 6 Wright, et
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1489). Even if the
amendments would not be futile, however, relief from judgment is
not available where the neglect in failing to respond is not
Failure to respond to a pleading is generally evaluated for
Rule 60(b)(1) as a question of “excusable neglect.” See Pioneer
Inv. Svcs., Inc. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship., 507 U.S. 380,
393 (1993); see also James v. Virgin Isl. Water and Power Auth.,
119 Fed. Appx. 397, 400 (3d Cir. 2005). In determining when an
error is “excusable” pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), the Court must
consider the factors set out by the Supreme Court in Pioneer.
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 8 of 13
See id.; see also In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litg., 235 F.3d 176,
182 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Cendant I”) (remanding for analysis pursuant
to the Pioneer factors); Scott v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 185
F.R.D. 202, 206 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(applying the Pioneer factors to
determination of whether mistake or neglect under Rule 60(b)(1)
is excusable).
The Court’s decision in Pioneer establishes the
determination of whether error is “excusable” as “at bottom an
equitable one.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. Thus, the Court must
consider the circumstances surrounding the act or omission
leading to the judgement from which relief is sought. Id. In
the context of Rule 60(b)(1), these circumstances include (1) the
danger of prejudice to the non-movant, (2) the length of delay
and its potential impact on further proceedings, (3) the reason
for the delay, including whether it was reasonably within the
control of the movant, and (4) whether the movant acted in good
faith. See id.
Plaintiffs’ Counsel claims that his home and home office
were affected by a tree that fell on his property on January 18,
2006, five days before Defendants’ motion to dismiss was filed
and twenty-two days before a response was due.1 Despite the fact
that Plaintiffs’ Counsel was obviously aware of the potential for
delay, he failed to contact the Court or opposing counsel, either
before or after Defendants’ motion was filed, to request
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5, 6.
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 9 of 13
additional time. Plaintiffs’ Counsel does not claim to have
contacted his clients to let them know about his trials and
tribulations with trees.
Plaintiffs’ Counsel did not communicate with the court
regarding his situation until after this Court entered an Order
granting Defendants’ motion as uncontested. The instant motion
seeking leave to belatedly file an amended complaint was filed
March 5, 2005 – forty-six days after the tree fell, and over a
month after Defendants’ motion was filed.
Although Plaintiffs themselves had little control over the
delay, Plaintiffs’ Counsel is well aware of his duties to his
clients. The decision to spend time replacing and repairing
automobiles instead of responding to motions or, at the very
least, requesting an extension, was clearly within Plaintiffs’
Counsel’s control. Counsel has demonstrated no good faith effort
to address the effects of the damage to his office as far as they
related to his obligations to his clients and this Court. Thus,
we cannot find that his neglect was excusable, and will not grant
relief from judgment on the ADEA and Title VII claims.2
We must still determine whether the amendments to the
remaining § 1983 claim and Loss of Consortium claim would be
Even if we granted relief from judgment, the proposed
amendments with regard to these claims would be futile because
they fail to allege that Plaintiffs exhausted the administrative
process as required by Title VII and the ADEA. Furthermore,
neither the ADEA nor Title VII provide for relief against
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 10 of 13
futile. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot bring a § 1983
claim to recover for age discrimination, because the ADEA
provides a comprehensive remedy for such wrongs. While the
question of whether § 1983 is preempted by the ADEA has not been
specifically addressed by the Third Circuit, the district courts
have generally concluded that the ADEA preempts other federal
remedies for age discrimination, including § 1983. See Cataldo
v. Moses, 361 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (D.N.J. 2004); Barlieb v.
Kutztown Univ. of Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., Civ. A. No.
03-4126, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25178 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2003)
(citing Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d 134, 138) (3d Cir. 1981)).
Thus, any amendment to the § 1983 claim, to the extent it seeks
recovery for age discrimination, would be futile.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged state
action in the Complaint. We are not persuaded, however, that
there is no set of facts that could show that the various
defendants acted under color of state law.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not plead sufficient
facts to support a conspiracy claim. Prior to 1993, courts
applied a heightened pleading standard to all § 1983 claims. The
Supreme Court, however, prohibited this practice, and held that §
1983 claims are subject only to the notice pleading requirement
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Young v. New
Sewickley Twp., 160 Fed. Appx. 263 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 11 of 13
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)). The Third Circuit has
not definitively resolved the question of whether conspiracy
claims are subject to a heightened pleading requirement. Compare
Brown v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-4485, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
15560, *4-5 (3d Cir. June 21, 2006) (per curiam) (concluding,
without mention of Leatherman, that a § 1983 conspiracies must be
plead with specificity) with Young, 160 Fed. Appx. at 266-67
(applying Rule 8(a) standard to determine sufficiency of
conspiracy pleading). In light of this uncertainty, we cannot
conclude that Plaintiff’s amendments are futile on the basis that
they lack sufficient specificity.
Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs cannot pursue any
Loss of Consortium claims against a state agency because such
claims are barred by the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act (the
“Act”). A school district is a local agency for the purposes of
42 Pa. C.S. § 8501 et seq., and is, therefore, covered by the
prohibition on tort liability for all local agencies as set forth
under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541. Because loss of consortium is a tort
claim under Pennsylvania law, it is barred by the Act and
amendment to such claims would be futile. Furthermore, as noted
above, the loss of consortium claims, as derivative claims, will
be dismissed to the extent that the substantive claims are
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 12 of 13
For the reasons set forth above, pursuant to the attached
order we grant Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend only to the
extent that it seeks to amend a § 1983 claim for race
discrimination and any loss of consortium claim against
individual defendants arising therefrom. Plaintiffs’ motion is
Case 2:05-cv-05760-JCJ Document 10 Filed 08/30/2006 Page 13 of 13
AND NOW, this 29th day of August, 2006, upon consideration
of the Motion of Plaintiffs for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint (Doc. No. 8), and all responses thereto (Doc. No. 9),
it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as follows:
(1) Plaintiffs are denied relief from judgment as to claims
for relief under the ADEA and Title VII;
(2) Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the Complaint as
to the § 1983 claim for race discrimination and any
loss of consortium claim against individual defendants
arising therefrom;
(3) Plaintiffs are denied leave to amend the Complaint as
to all other claims.
s/J. Curtis Joyner
J. CURTIS JOYNER, J.
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