Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2004_documents/04me54%20Opn%20of%20Justices.htm
Timestamp: 2014-04-19 00:00:01
Document Index: 644296064

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 18', '§ 351', '§ 351', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 71', '§ 361', '§ 71', '§ 44', '§ 351', '§ 353', '§ 71', 'art.\n2002', '§ 3', 'art 3', 'art 3', '§ 502', 'art 3', '§ 71', '§ 361']

PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 3
OF THE MAINE CONSTITUTION
BY THE MAINE SENATE
AND THE MAINE HOUSE
ANSWERED April 16,
WHEREAS, it appears to the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the 121st Legislature that the following are important
questions of law and that this is a solemn occasion; and
WHEREAS, the Constitution of Maine, Article VI, Section 3
provides for the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court to render their
opinions on such questions; and
WHEREAS, there is now before the 121st Legislature for its
consideration Initiated Bill 4, L.D. 1893, Bill, "An Act to Impose Limits on
Real and Personal Property Taxes"; and
WHEREAS, the initiated bill may have constitutional
infirmities that can not be corrected by revision or amendment; and
WHEREAS, the initiated bill proposes broad changes to the
laws of this State that would limit the ability of both state and local
governments to raise revenues to support vital governmental functions; and
WHEREAS, these limitations, if constitutional, would require
the Legislature and local governments to make dramatic changes to their budgets
beginning with fiscal year 2004-05, and the Legislature is currently in the
process of reviewing a supplemental budget bill for that fiscal year; and
WHEREAS, the Legislature must decide whether to enact the
initiated bill as proposed or to put forth a competing measure to the initiated
bill as authorized by the Constitution of Maine, Article IV, Part Third,
WHEREAS, the Attorney General has indicated in the attached
opinion that there is a "substantial possibility" that key portions of the
initiated bill violate the Constitution of Maine and there is substantial doubt
about the effectiveness of remaining portions; and
WHEREAS, it is vital that the Legislature be informed as to
the questions propounded in this order; now, therefore, be it
ORDERED, the House concurring, that, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution of Maine, the Senate and the House of
Representatives respectfully request the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court
to give the Senate and the House of Representatives their opinion on the
Question 1. If
Initiated Bill 4 becomes law, would those provisions of the bill that require
the calculation of property taxes based on "full-cash value" or "appraised
value," as adjusted, violate the Constitution of Maine, Article IX, Section 8,
which requires taxes on real and personal property to be assessed and
apportioned equally and according to just value?
Question 2. Initiated Bill 4, in the part that proposes the Maine Revised Statutes,
Title 36, section 361, proposes a severability clause. If your answer to
Question 1 indicates that portions of the initiated bill are unconstitutional,
would any of the initiated bill's provisions remain effective by virtue of
Title 36, section 361 or Title 1, section 71, subsection 8?
OF CHIEF JUSTICE SAUFLEY,
CALKINS, AND
of Representatives of the State of Maine:
[¶1] The Senate and the House of
Representatives ask us for an advisory opinion addressing questions related to
the constitutionality of Initiated Bill 4, L.D. 1893 (121st Legis. 2004), "An
Act to Impose Limits on Real and Personal Property Taxes." Specifically, we are asked to advise
whether, if Initiated Bill 4 is enacted by the people, its provisions would
require the assessment of real estate taxes in violation of Article IX, Section
8 of the Maine Constitution.[1] We are also asked whether, if we answer
the first question in the affirmative, any of the remaining provisions of the
initiated bill would be effective by virtue of the severability provisions.
[¶2] The Maine Constitution requires the
justices of the Supreme Judicial Court to answer the questions propounded by
the Senate and House if they are important questions of law and present a
solemn occasion. Me. Const. art. VI, § 3. Because not all of the justices agree
that a solemn occasion exists, the undersigned justices briefly explain why we
conclude that this is a solemn occasion.
[¶3] A solemn occasion exists when the
questions are of a serious and immediate nature, Opinion of the Justices, 2002 ME 169, ¶ 6, 815 A.2d 791, 794; and the situation
presents an unusual exigency, as when the Senate and the House have serious
doubts as to action they can take, Opinion of the Justices, 709 A.2d. 1183, 1185 (Me. 1997). These factors are present.
[¶4] There is no question that the concerns
of the Senate and House are serious. Initiated Bill 4 makes a major structural change in the valuation of
property for property tax purposes, and it is the property tax upon which
municipalities rely for revenue. [¶5] Immediacy and an unusual exigency are
likewise present. The Legislature
has a constitutional duty to make a decision regarding Initiated Bill 4. That is, it must enact the bill,
propose a competing measure, or decide to take no action. Me.
Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18, cl. 2. The Attorney General has given the Legislature an opinion
that the valuation formula in Initiated Bill 4 is unconstitutional and that the
severability provisions do not save the rest of the act. The Legislature has before it an
immediate issue of whether to enact Initiated Bill 4 as written or propose a
competing measure.[2] In light of these circumstances, we
conclude that the requisite seriousness, immediacy and an unusual exigency
[¶6] In the past, a majority of justices
found that a solemn occasion existed when the House had a question about the
constitutionality of an initiated bill that had not yet gone to the
electorate. Opinion of the
Justices, 623 A.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Me.
1993). There may be policy reasons
in favor of amending the constitution to limit the use of advisory opinions
from the justices when the questions involve an initiative, but because such
amendment has not been enacted, the policy reasons do not allow us to decline
to give our opinions. Former Chief
Justice Emery indicated that although he considered Article VI, Section 3 of
the Maine Constitution "undesirable," Lucilius A. Emery, Advisory
Opinions from Justices, 2 Me. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1908), because the
provision remains in the constitution, "the Justices have no discretion in the
matter. Their opinion is not
'requested'; it is 'required.' There is no suggestion that they may choose whether or not to give
it." Lucilius A. Emery, Advisory
Opinion of the Justices, No. II, 11 Me. L. Rev. 15, 16 (1917).
[¶7] The members of the Maine Senate and the
House of Representatives have told us that they need our opinion in order to
undertake their responsibilities. We take them at their word that an opinion on the constitutionality of
the initiated bill by the justices would assist and inform the Senate and House
[¶8] The first
question propounded by the Legislature is the following:
1. If Initiated Bill 4 becomes law, would those provisions of the bill that
require the calculation of property taxes based on "full-cash value" or
"appraised value," as adjusted, violate the Constitution of Maine, Article IX,
Section 8, which requires taxes on real and personal property to be assessed
and apportioned equally and according to just value?
[¶9] It is our opinion that the answer to
this question is yes. For the
reasons set out below, we conclude that those provisions of the initiative that
base property taxes on "full-cash value" as defined by the proposed amendment
to Title 36 M.R.S.A. § 351(4) (contained in Initiated Bill 4, L.D. 1893
(121st Legis. 2004)) would violate the requirement of Article IX, Section 8 of
the Maine Constitution mandating that "[a]ll taxes . . . shall be apportioned
and assessed equally according to the just value thereof."[3]
[¶10] Because we are asked to give our
opinion on the constitutionality of a proposed law, and because that opinion
must be based on a reasonable anticipation of the Law Court's conclusion,
should it be called upon to rule on the constitutionality of the initiative as
enacted in the context of a live controversy, we begin our analysis by
addressing the Law Court's standard of review of initiated laws. In evaluating citizen initiatives, the
Law Court applies the ordinary rules of statutory construction. League of Women Voters v. Sec'y of
State, 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996) (citing Opinion of the
Justices, 460 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Me.
1982)). Accordingly, Initiated
Bill 4 carries a heavy presumption of constitutionality, and "'[b]efore [the
bill] may be declared in violation of the Constitution, that fact must be
established to such a degree as to leave no room for reasonable doubt.'" Id. at
771-72 (quoting Orono-Veazie Water Dist. v. Penobscot County Water Co., 348 A.2d 249, 253 (Me. 1975)).
[¶11] We must determine, therefore, whether
the application of the "full-cash value" definition referenced in the Question
is so contrary to the requirements of fair and equal taxation as to leave no
reasonable doubt that it violates the Maine Constitution. [¶12] Full-cash value is defined in Initiated
Bill 4 as follows:
4. Full-cash value. "Full-cash value" means the governmental entity's total assessed
valuation of real or personal property as shown on the 1996-97 tax bill under
"total value." For newly
constructed or newly purchased real or personal property that changes in
ownership after the 1996-97 assessment, "full-cash value" means the appraised
L.D. 1893 (121st Legis. 2004) (proposed as 36 M.R.S.A.
§ 351(4)).
[¶13] On its face, this definition creates
two different bases for tax value purposes: one for property acquired by its
current owner before the 1996-97 assessment and one for all property acquired
after that assessment. For taxpayers
who purchased before the 1996-97 assessment, property taxes would be based not
on fair market value, but on an assessed value from eight years ago.[4] For
those who acquired the property later, taxes would be based on a more recent
appraised value.[5] In other
words, the bill provides for disparate treatment of property based not on the
property's value but on the date of acquisition by the property's current
[¶14] The Maine Constitution provides that
"[a]ll taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by authority of this
State, shall be apportioned and assessed equally according to the just value
thereof." Me. Const. art. IX, § 8. In Eastler v. State Tax Assessor, the Law Court explained this provision as follows:
constitutional provision establishes two requirements for a valid property tax:
a valuation requirement and an apportionment requirement. Under the valuation requirement the
tax-levying authority must determine the market value of the property. See Shawmut Inn v. Town of Kennebunkport, 428 A.2d 384, 389 (Me. 1981) ("'Just value' is the
equivalent of 'market value.'"). Under the apportionment requirement the taxing authority must then
apportion the tax equally according to the market value. The purpose of the two constitutional
requirements is to equalize public burdens so that a taxpayer contributes to
the entire tax burden in proportion to his share of the total value of all
property subject to the tax. See
Opinion of the Justices, 155 Me. 30, 47,
152 A.2d 81, 89 (1959).
[¶15] Thus, property taxes must be based on
market value and must be apportioned equally according to that value. It bears highlighting that these
requirements are established by the unequivocal terms of the Maine Constitution. Me.
Const. art. IX, § 8. They
are neither statutorily nor judicially established.
[¶16] We are of the opinion that the proposed
use of the 1996-97 assessed value as the tax base for long-owned property runs
afoul of the requirement that a valid property tax must be based on market
value.[6] Although flexibility in the methodology
for determining market value is consistent with constitutional requirements,[7]
the end result of any methodology must be a reasonable determination of "market
value." Initiated Bill 4
creates an entire class of property owners whose taxes will not be based on
market value, except in those undeterminable instances where the 1996-97
assessed value coincides by happenstance with the current market value.[8]
[¶17] It is also apparent that, by creating
two separate non-market-value bases on which taxes will be founded, the
initiated bill violates the requirement of equal apportionment. The Law Court recently discussed the
equal apportionment requirement as it applied to municipalities in Delogu v.
City of Portland, 2004 ME 18, 843 A.2d
33. The Court noted that Article
IX, Section 8 "prohibits municipalities from engaging in unjust discrimination
in the assessment of real estate taxes or the apportionment of real estate tax
burdens." Delogu, 2004 ME 18, ¶ 12, 843 A.2d 33, --- (citing Ram's
Head Partners, LLC v. Town of
Cape Elizabeth, 2003 ME 131, ¶ 9, 834 A.2d
916, 919). "A finding of
discrimination is indicated when the municipal assessment system necessarily
results in unequal apportionment." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). The under or over
assessment of one set of similarly situated properties will support a finding
of unjust discrimination. Id. [¶18] Application of the definition of "full-cash value" will result in just that—the disparate taxation of two similar or identical properties with the resulting unjust discrimination. The violation of the equal apportionment provisions of Article IX, Section 8 is clear.
[¶19] Accordingly, we answer Question #1 in
the affirmative: If Initiated Bill 4 becomes law, those provisions of the bill
that require the calculation of property taxes based on "full-cash value" or
"appraised value," as adjusted, would violate Article IX, Section 8 of the Constitution
of Maine, which requires taxes on real and personal property to be assessed and
apportioned equally and according to just value.
[¶20] The Second Question propounded by the
legislature is the following:
Question 2. Initiated Bill 4, in the part that
proposes the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 36, section 361, proposes a
severability clause. If your answer to Question 1 indicates that portions of
the initiated bill are unconstitutional, would any of the initiated bill's
provisions remain effective by virtue of Title 36, section 361 or Title 1,
section 71, subsection 8?
[¶21] It is our opinion that the answer to
this question is also yes. The
portions of the initiated bill that are unconstitutional are severable by
virtue of 1 M.R.S.A. § 71(8) (Supp. 2003) and proposed 36 M.R.S.A. § 361, and
are not so integral as to invalidate the bill in its entirety. However, we express no opinion
regarding whether individual provisions would be effective for the reasons set
out below.[9]
[¶22] The Law Court begins a severability
analysis by considering Title 1, section 71(8), which states:
the statutes are severable. The
provisions of any session law are severable. If any provision of the statutes or a session law is
invalid, or if the application of either to any person or circumstance is
invalid, such invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications which
can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application. . . .
M.R.S.A. § 71(8) (emphasis added).
[¶24] Thus, there are two components to the
determination of the effectiveness of the remaining provisions of Initiated
Bill 4. A court would have to
decide: (1) whether the invalid provisions are so integral to the initiated
bill that the entire act would have to be struck down, and (2) whether,
individually, the remaining provisions can function and be given effect absent
the invalid provisions.
[¶25] We begin, as does the Law Court, by
focusing on legislative purpose in examining severability. When the provisions of a statute "are
so related in substance and object that it is impossible to determine that the
legislation would have been enacted except as an entirety, if one portion
offends the Constitution, the whole must fall." LaPointe, 308
A.2d at 292: see 2 Singer § 44:6,
at 580 ("[W]here the invalid portion was the principal inducement for the
passage of the statute, the whole statute must fail."). [¶26] A statute's finalized legislative
history ordinarily provides guidance as to its legislative purpose and whether
any invalid provisions were integral to the statute's enactment. See Bayside Enters., Inc., 513 A.2d at 1359; Lambert, 423 A.2d at 535. Typically, when the Law Court is asked to undertake a
severability analysis of an existing statute, there is a legislative record,
House and Senate debate, or a detailed summary attached to the bill.
[¶27] The legislative history available to us
in this instance is limited to the language of the bill itself and the Summary
attached to the bill. As set forth
in that Summary, Initiated Bill 4 contains at least three key features: the
roll-back to 1996-97 valuation for long-time owners, L.D. 1893 (121st Legis.
2004) (proposed 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 351(4), 352(1)); the limitation of "a maximum rate
of 1% on the value of the property," L.D. 1893, Statement of Fact (121st Legis.
2004); and a cap on annual property value increases of 2%, L.D. 1983 (proposed
36 M.R.S.A. § 353(2)).
[¶28] These features and other tax control
related measures are evident in the language of the bill itself. Viewed as a whole, the initiative
contains multiple separate goals and aims at creating a variety of tax related
changes. It is significant that
Initiated Bill 4 contains its own severability clause in proposed section 361,
which states that "[i]f any portion, word, clause or phrase of this initiative
for any reason is held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the remaining portions, clauses and phrases may not be
affected, but shall remain in full force and effect." L.D. 1893 (121st Legis. 2004). Given the standing presence of an existing severability
provision at 1 M.R.S.A. § 71(8), this provision demonstrates a compelling
intent to have the remaining sections stand on their own. [¶29] With all of this in mind, and on the
limited record available to us, we are of the opinion that the elimination of
the roll-back provision and related base valuation mechanisms are not so
integral to the initiative as to invalidate the bill in its entirety.
[¶30] We caution, however, that we do not
opine on the individual effectiveness of each remaining provision. Absent a record of "a concrete,
certain, or immediate legal problem" against which to assess each individual
provision, our opinion regarding the provisions' effectiveness will be unduly
speculative and hypothetical. Wagner
v. Sec'y of State, 663 A.2d 564, 567 (Me.
1995). Because of the complex
nature of Initiated Bill 4, it is impracticable to render an opinion in the
abstract regarding the effectiveness of its constituent parts. C. Answer
[¶31] Accordingly, we answer Question #2 in
the affirmative: If the provisions of the bill examined in Question #1 are
unconstitutional as we have opined, those provisions are not so integral to the
initiative as to render the entire bill invalid. Dated: April 16, 2004
Leigh I. Saufley Leigh
Howard H. Dana, Jr. Howard
Susan Calkins Susan
Jon D. Levy Jon
OF JUSTICE CLIFFORD,
RUDMAN AND
Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Maine:
[¶32] We do not concur in the opinion of our
colleagues on the Court and pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Maine
Constitution, we, the undersigned justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, have
the honor to submit our separate response to the questions propounded by the
Senate and House of Representatives on March 29, 2004.
[¶33] Although we respect the seriousness of
purpose and earnestness of concern by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, which have caused them to propound these questions, we
respectfully decline to answer the questions. Because the proposed law is yet to be voted on by the
people, there is no matter of "live gravity" and no question of sufficient immediacy
and seriousness to create a solemn occasion justifying our answer. It is important to distinguish between
a question of live gravity and one that is of potential live gravity. Our constitution requires that we
respond to the former and forbids us from responding to the latter.
[¶34] The doctrine of separation of powers,
articulated in Article III of the Maine Constitution, dictates that we decline
to answer questions presented by either the Legislature or the Governor
regarding matters within their respective authority. Me. Const. art.
2002 ME 169, ¶ 4, 815 A.2d 791, 794; Opinion of the Justices, 396 A.2d 219, 223 (Me. 1979). A narrow exception to this fundamental
principle of separation of powers is created by Article VI, Section 3, which
provides that "[t]he Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court shall be obliged to
give their opinion upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions,
when required by the Governor, Senate or House of Representatives." Me.
Const. art. VI, § 3. When
we receive a request for an advisory opinion pursuant to Article VI, Section 3,
we must first determine whether it is within the scope of our limited
constitutional authority to provide advisory opinions only "upon important
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." Opinion of the Justices, 2002 ME 169, ¶ 5, 815 A.2d at 794; Opinion of the Justices, 682 A.2d 661, 663 (Me. 1996). [¶35] Prior opinions of the justices of this
Court have articulated certain criteria to guide our determination of whether a
"solemn occasion" has been presented on "important questions of law." First, the issue on any question
presented must be one of "live gravity," referring to the immediacy and
the seriousness of actions that
the Legislature or the Governor must take and on which they seek guidance
through an advisory opinion. See
Opinion of the Justices, 2002 ME 169, ¶ 6,
815 A.2d at 794; Opinion of the Justices, 709 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Me. 1997). In 1997, the justices of this Court stated that "[a] solemn occasion
refers to an 'unusual exigency, such an exigency as exists when the body making
the inquiry, having some action in view, has serious doubts as to its power and
statutes.'" Opinion of
the Justices, 709 A.2d at 1185 (quoting Opinion
of the Justices, 95 Me. 564, 567, 51 A.
224, 225 (1901)).
[¶36] Opinions of the Justices propounded
pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Maine Constitution "are not binding
decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court." Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d
693, 695 (Me. 1996). Such an
judgment upon any party." Opinion
of the Justices, 396 A.2d at 223. Even recognizing those limitations,
such opinions are viewed as providing guidance on both present and future
controversies. Opinion
of the Justices, 2002 ME 169, ¶ 7, 815 A.2d
at 795. Thus, in 2002, we observed
that "the determination that a question presents a 'solemn occasion' is of
significant import, and we will not find such an occasion to exist except in
those circumstances when the facts in support of the alleged solemn occasion
are clear and compelling." Id. ¶ 8, 815 A.2d at 795. [¶37] The above principles apply to our
solemn occasion analysis any time questions are propounded pursuant to Article
VI, Section 3, but we must examine the solemn occasion issue with particular
rigor when, before the people vote, we are asked to give an advisory opinion
regarding the constitutionality of an initiated bill. Pursuant to the Maine Constitution, Article IV, Part 3,
Section 18, Clause 2, an initiated bill must either be enacted by the
Legislature without change or it must be submitted, as a referendum question,
to a vote of the people. Wagner
v. Sec'y of State, 663 A.2d 564, 566 n.3
(Me. 1995); Opinion of the Justices,
673 A.2d at 697. Although,
pursuant to the Maine Constitution, Article IV, Part 3, Section 18, Clause 2,
the Legislature may submit a competing measure for consideration on the ballot,
the initiated bill itself may not be withdrawn from the ballot or amended in
any way, even if a constitutional infirmity in the initiated bill should be
identified. Opinion of
the Justices, 673 A.2d at 697. [¶38] Like the initiated bill at issue in Wagner, Initiated Bill 4 may not be enacted, and its
provisions may never become effective to create a live controversy with the
immediate and serious impacts proper for consideration on judicial review. Short of a live controversy with
immediate and serious impacts, creating the solemn occasion justifying our
answering the propounded questions, we would be interfering with the political
process and the people's right of franchise by offering an opinion on the
constitutionality of Initiated Bill 4 before the electorate has expressed its
view. [¶39] The legislative findings submitted with
the questions propounded to us suggest that there is an immediate and serious
need for action and for our advice for the Legislature to properly consider the
fiscal year 2004-2005 budget and to properly determine whether to prepare and
submit to the voters a competing measure. Based on these findings, our colleagues offer a non-binding opinion on
the constitutionality of Initiated Bill 4 before the voters have had a chance
to address it. After addressing
the critical severability issue and offering a tentative opinion, they decline
to indicate which provisions may remain effective and they conclude:
Absent a record of "a concrete, certain, or immediate legal
problem" against which to assess each individual provision, our opinion
regarding the provisions' effectiveness will be unduly speculative and
hypothetical. Wagner v. Sec'y
of State, 663 A.2d 564, 567 (Me.
abstract regarding the effectiveness of its constituent parts. [¶40] This supports our conclusion that there
is no solemn occasion and that we shall not answer the question. Our most recent Opinion of the
Justices stated that "we will not answer
questions that are 'tentative, hypothetical and abstract.'" Opinion of the Justices, 2002 ME 169, ¶ 6, 815 A.2d at 795 (quoting Opinion
of the Justices, 330 A.2d 912, 915 (Me.
1975)). Separately, justices of
this Court have indicated that the questions presented must be sufficiently
precise for the justices to be able to determine "the exact nature of the
inquiry." Opinion of the
Justices, 155 Me. 125, 141, 152 A.2d 494,
501 (1959). [¶41] The questions presented here require an
analysis of intersecting laws, constitutional provisions, and facts. The complexity of the varying
considerations renders it impossible for us to be confident of the law and
other circumstances to such a degree as to "leave no room for reasonable
doubt." League of Women Voters
v. Sec'y of State, 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me.
1996). It would be far preferable
for the constitutionality of Initiated Bill 4 to be determined in a fully
litigated case.
[¶42] Should Initiated Bill 4 be enacted by
the people, the first impact of its provisions would be applicable to municipal
valuations for the tax year beginning April 1, 2005. 36 M.R.S.A. § 502 (Supp. 2003). If Initiated Bill 4 were enacted in early November, there
would be approximately five months between its adoption by the voters and its
initial impact. That would allow
time to address any constitutional concerns through judicial action in a
properly litigated case and through legislative action by the next Legislature,
convening in December 2004. [¶43] It is clear that any assessment
resulting from the initiated bill's provisions would have no direct impact on
the fiscal year 2004‑2005 State budget. Establishing valuations on April
1 of any year is but the first step in the assessment and collection of
property taxes. Before taxes can
actually be assessed, the mill rate must be set for each municipality based on
budgets adopted by municipal, school, and county authorities. Any impact on state or local budgets as
a result of the enactment of
Initiated Bill 4 and the valuations for April 1, 2005, would not occur until
the 2005-2006 State fiscal year, impacting a budget that is the responsibility of
the next Legislature. [¶44] The need for the Legislature to know if
it should submit a competing measure to the voters is insufficient
justification for us to answer the questions. Otherwise we would be required to answer any question
submitted pertaining to an initiated bill. The material submitted by the Senate and the House does not
suggest that the Legislature is in any way prevented from preparing and
submitting a competing measure to the voters, if it believes such is justified,
based on its own public policy and legal analysis. The decision to submit alternative legislation
is uniquely assigned to the Legislature by Article IV, Part 3, Section 18,
Clause 2 of the Maine Constitution, and should not turn on a premature opinion
by justices of this Court as to the constitutionality of the initiated bill
before it may become law.
[¶45] Because there is no current controversy
of live gravity, involving a matter with immediate and serious impacts, and
because we must be particularly cautious when the matter in question must be
presented to the electorate, regardless of any advice we give, we determine
that a solemn occasion does not exist and we respectfully decline to answer the
questions propounded to us.
Robert W. Clifford Robert
Paul L. Rudman Paul
Donald G. Alexander Donald
[4] Although it is always possible that current fair market value and the 1996-97 assessed value may coincide, it would be mere coincidence. [5] Because "appraised value" is unquestionably different from the 1996-97 assessed value, we need not determine whether appraised value means the value in the year acquired, or in each tax year. [6] Similarly, the Attorney General has opined that "[b]y requiring that property be assigned either the value stated on 1996-97 tax bills or, if acquired or newly constructed after that time, the appraised value at the time of construction or acquisition, the [initiated] bill results in a significant number of properties being valued at less than market value." Letter from Attorney General to Committee on Taxation, at 5.
[7] The Shawmut Inn Court explained that "this Court has permitted the local assessors considerable leeway in choosing the method or combinations of methods to achieve just valuations. [It has] found acceptable as techniques to aid local assessors at least three standard appraisal methods of determining the market value of real property: (1) the 'comparative' or 'market data' approach, (2) the 'income' or 'capitalization' approach, and (3) the 'reproduction cost less depreciation' or 'cost' approach." Shawmut Inn v. Town of Kennebunkport, 428 A.2d 384, 390 (Me. 1981). [8] We need not determine whether the phrase "appraised value" applied to recently purchased property would also violate the requirement that taxes be based on market value. [9] Because we have been asked to address effectiveness in the context of the severability provisions of 1 M.R.S.A. § 71(8) (Supp. 2003) and proposed 36 M.R.S.A. § 361, we do not address the claims asserted in the briefs regarding other possible constitutional infirmities.