Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/535/1205/24053/
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 01:08:23
Document Index: 759876267

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Dover Corporation, Norris Division, Respondent, 535 F.2d 1205 (10th Cir. 1976) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1976 › National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Dover Corporation, Norris Division, Respondent
National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Dover Corporation, Norris Division, Respondent, 535 F.2d 1205 (10th Cir. 1976)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 535 F.2d 1205 (10th Cir. 1976) Argued and Submitted May 19, 1975. Decided April 12, 1976. Rehearing Denied May 14, 1976
The National Labor Relations Board applies for enforcement of that part of its order entered in Dover Corporation, Norris Division, 211 NLRB No. 98, finding that the Dover Corporation violated § 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (1), and entering an order to cease and desist and to post a notice, inter alia.1
The Board found that Dover violated § 8(a) (1) by virtue of the threatening statements of a supervisor, Rike, during an organizational campaign and issued a remedial order. In opposing enforcement of the order Dover essentially argues that (1) there is insufficient evidence to establish that coercive statements were made; (2) there is insufficient evidence to establish that the employees considered the statements to be authorized by top management or capable of being carried out by the supervisor, Rike, who allegedly made the statements; (3) there is no evidence to support a finding that employees were restrained in the exercise of protected activities by the alleged statements; (4) the Board has failed to establish an ascertainable standard by which an employer can remedy unauthorized misconduct; and (5) the order of the Board is not appropriate for present enforcement. We will first outline the facts in our record pertaining to the § 8(a) (1) charge and then address the principal arguments made.
Essentially the Judge found that Rike did tell three union supporters they would be discharged;4 that while he was talking in a friendly manner and on the basis of his long union background and relationship with them, he was found to have made the remarks, which violated § 8(a) (1) (A. 19). He also found that Dover's attorney had met with approximately five employees and gave assurances that threats were no "doing of the company" and that "they had a right to organize and could not be interfered with for trying to organize, could not be fired from the company for this." (A. 14). He nevertheless found an 8(a) (1) violation and recommended a remedial order.
The Board majority found, however, that Rike's authority was such that it was not difficult to understand why employees might well be apprehensive about arousing his enmity and that the supposed attempt to counteract Rike's statements were "little more than some general bromides by the Company's counsel about the Company's good aims and intentions." (A. 41). The majority found a violation of § 8(a) (1) and a remedial order was entered.
* The § 8(a) (1) Violations
If made as the Judge found, we agree that the statements by Supervisor Rike are coercive and threatening and sufficient under the decisions in Serv-Air, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 557, 565 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840, 89 S. Ct. 121, 21 L. Ed. 2d 112 and Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 201-02 (10th Cir.) to sustain a finding of § 8(a) (1) violation. For several reasons Dover argues that substantial evidence does not support the Board's findings.
First, Dover says that the credibility findings made by the Judge and sustained by the Board should be overturned, pointing to several circumstances undermining the findings. We are not persuaded. Credibility findings are peculiarly within the province of the hearing officer and the Board and are ordinarily entitled to acceptance on review. N. L. R. B. v. Wylie Mfg. Co., 417 F.2d 192, 194 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913, 90 S. Ct. 915, 25 L. Ed. 2d 94. Dover argues for an exception to this rule, emphasizing that the Administrative Law Judge should not have credited Thompson and Curry as to occurrence of the threatening incidents since the Judge did not credit their testimony as it pertained to the unfair practices charged against the union (see n. 1, supra). We disagree. The Judge could credit some testimony of a witness although he disbelieved other testimony from the same witness. See Wylie, supra, 417 F.2d at 194.
Deciding whether particular statements amount to threats or coercion involves an exercise of judgment and is a matter initially for the Board. In making that determination it is the peculiar province of the Board to draw permissible inferences from credible testimony. N. L. R. B. v. Gold Spot Dairy, Inc., 417 F.2d 761, 762 (10th Cir.). That a supervisor lacks the power to hire or fire does not preclude the Board from finding unfair labor practices attributable to the employer arising from the supervisor's conduct. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 599, 61 S. Ct. 358, 365, 85 L. Ed. 368, 378. The employer is responsible for the acts of a supervisor when employees would have just cause to believe that he was acting for and on behalf of the company. Furr's Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 562, 566 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840, 88 S. Ct. 70, 19 L. Ed. 2d 105.
The Administrative Law Judge specifically found that Rike had no supervisory authority over any of the company employees other than three inspectors. Nonetheless, he found the statements violative of § 8(a) (1). The Board found that Rike was not a minor supervisor and that he did have some authority over the threatened employees (A. 40). The Board noted that Curry testified that all employee work required Rike's "O.K." and that Rike did not disagree. The Board also noted that the inspectors under Rike's control could require employees to redo their work. Thus the Board concluded that employees might well be apprehensive about arousing Rike's enmity.
On this basis the Board found that the statements made by Rike were coercive and therefore violative of § 8(a) (1).6 We accept this conclusion by the Board as supported by credible and substantial proof on which the Board could rely.
First, Dover argues that the Board has failed to establish an ascertainable standard whereby an employer can remedy unauthorized misconduct. The complaint of lack of a hard and fast rule is not persuasive. As noted, for obvious reasons the finding whether unlawful coercion occurred and the terms of any remedial order must depend on the particular factual setting, and the efficacy of notices and assurances to remedy misconduct must likewise be judged by the circumstances. See A. P. Green Fire Brick Co. v. NLRB,supra, 326 F.2d at 914; NLRB v. Gerbes Super Markets, Inc., supra, 436 F.2d at 21. We are reminded that " . . . the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence . . . " Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194, 61 S. Ct. 845, 852, 85 L. Ed. 1271, 1283; see also Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540, 63 S. Ct. 1214, 1218, 87 L. Ed. 1568, 1574. We cannot agree that the Board's findings and order are repugnant to policies of the Act or unsupported by the record.
Further, Dover contends that enforcement of the order is no longer appropriate since the Board consented to a representation election which has occurred, with certification of its results adverse to the union, and passage of time. Dover says that since the Board waived the "blocking effect" of an unfair labor practice charge, enforcement would be meaningless. NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25, 90 S. Ct. 1547, 26 L. Ed. 2d 21, involved a similar situation and upheld the Board's judgment that a remedial order was needed for its future effect. This remedial order was entered after an earlier order setting aside an election and ordering the employer to cease and desist from unlawful conduct. Occurrence of an intervening election and its certification, showing compliance during the latter election, did not render the cause moot or make enforcement of the cease and desist provision improper. Id. at 27, 90 S. Ct. at 1548, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 24. We likewise sustain the Board's determination here, despite the developments that are cited.
We have, however, examined the order in light of the arguments made by Dover to determine whether any modification is proper. See May Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 392, 66 S. Ct. 203, 212, 90 L. Ed. 145. In order that its provisions fairly take account of the fact that the election and certification occurred, a minor modification of the order is made as shown in the margin.8
I concur in light of the authorities supportive of the opinion and the Board's apparent "well settled" rule that interference, restraint and coercion under Section 8(a) (1) of the Act does not turn on an employer's good faith, lack of guilty scienter or motive.
I feel that the employer in the case at bar did everything reasonably or practicably possible to avoid a Section 8(a) (1) violation. The Board's "well settled" test does, in my judgment, impose an obligation on the employing company to insure or guarantee that none of its supervisory personnel shall say or do anything threatening or coercive. This rule does, in effect, impose the doctrine of strict liability upon the employer, regardless of good faith efforts which are evidenced in this record. There is nothing fair about the application of such a rule leading to a finding of an unfair labor practice.
The order also concerned charges filed by Dover against the union involved in this case, United Steelworkers of America, for violation of § 8(b) (1) and 8(b) (4). Since the Board received voluntary compliance by the union as to the part of the order dealing with the only unfair labor practices by the union found to have occurred, in violation of § 8(b) (1), we are concerned here only with the findings pertaining to employer practices