Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/479/388
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 15:46:17
Document Index: 776487894

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 36', '§ 7', '§ 81', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 10', '§ 702', '§ 702', '§ 702', '§ 702', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 702', '§ 4', '§ 36', '§ 81', '§ 36', '§ 81', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 5190', '§ 81', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 81', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 2', '§ 5190', '§ 36', '§ 5190', '§ 240', '§ 4', '§ 24']

Robert L. CLARKE, Comptroller of the Currency, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION. SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews Robert L. CLARKE, Comptroller of the Currency, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION. SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION.
479 U.S. 388 (107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757)
Decided: Jan. 14, 1987.
[HTML] Syllabus Petitioner Security Pacific National Bank (Security Pacific) applied to the Comptroller of the Currency for permission to establish an affiliate named Discount Brokerage, and to offer discount brokerage services not only at its branch offices but also at other locations inside and outside of its home State. A pertinent branching provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 81, originally enacted in 1927 as part of the McFadden Act, limits "the general business" of a national bank to its headquarters and any "branches" permitted by 12 U.S.C. 36. Section 36(c) provides that a national bank is permitted to branch only in its home State and only to the extent that a bank of the same State is permitted to branch under state law, and the term "branch" is defined in § 36(f) "to include any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office or any branch place of business . . . at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent." The Comptroller approved Security Pacific's application, concluding that the nonchartered offices at which Discount Brokerage would offer its services would not constitute branches under the McFadden Act because none of the statutory branching functions set forth in § 36(f) would be performed there, and that treating offices conducting brokerage activities as branches under § 36(f) would be inconsistent with the longstanding practice of banks in operating nonbranch offices dealing in United States Government or municipal securities. Respondent, a trade association representing securities brokers, underwriters, and investment bankers, brought suit in Federal District Court, contending that bank discount brokerage offices are branches within the meaning of § 36(f) and thus are subject to the geographical restrictions imposed by § 36(c). The court, relying on Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184, rejected the Comptroller's contention that respondent lacked standing to maintain the action, and ruled for respondent on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: 1. Respondent has standing to maintain this lawsuit. Under the "standing" standard set forth in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, supra, at 153, 90 S.Ct., at 829, the complainant must be injured in fact, and the interest sought to be protected by the complainant must be arguably within the "zone of interests" to be protected or regulated by the statute in question. The essential inquiry in determining standing is whether Congress intended for a particular class of plaintiffs to be relied upon to challenge an agency's disregard of the law. Cf. Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 347, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 81 L.Ed.2d 270. The "zone of interest" test provides standing in this case since the interest respondent asserts has a plausible relationship to the policies underlying §§ 36 and 81 with regard to Congress' concern to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly control over credit and money through unlimited branching. Pp. 394-403.
2. The Comptroller, whose construction of the statutory provisions is entitled to great weight, did not exceed his authority in approving Security Pacific's application. There is no merit to respondent's contention that the Comptroller's interpretation of the National Bank Act contradicts the plain language of the statute. The phrase "the general business of each national banking association" in § 81 need not be read to encompass all the business in which a bank engages, but, as interpreted by the Comptroller, can plausibly be read as covering only those activities that are part of the bank's core banking functions. The Act's history, including that predating the branching provisions of the McFadden Act, supports the Comptroller's interpretation. The history of the McFadden Act itself does not establish that Congress intended the locational restriction of §§ 81 and 36 to reach all activities in which national banks are specifically authorized to engage. The Comptroller reasonably interprets § 36(f) as requiring "competitive equality" between state and national banks only in core banking functions, and the operation of a discount brokerage service is not such a function. Pp. 403-409.
* In 1982, two national banks, Union Planters National Bank of Memphis (Union Planters) and petitioner Security Pacific National Bank of Los Angeles (Security Pacific), applied to the Comptroller of the Currency for permission to open offices that would offer discount brokerage services to the public.
In passing on Security Pacific's application, the Comptroller was faced with the question whether the operation of Discount Brokerage would violate the National Bank Act's branching provisions. Those limitations, enacted as §§ 7 and 8 of the McFadden Act, 44 Stat. 1228, as amended, are codified at
12 U.S.C. 36 and 12 U.S.C. § 81. Section 81 limits "the general business" of a national bank to its headquarters and any "branches" permitted by § 36. Section 36(c) provides that a national bank is permitted to branch only in its home State and only to the extent that a bank of the same State is permitted to branch under state law. The term "branch" is defined at 12 U.S.C. 36(f) "to include any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business . . . at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent."
The Comptroller concluded that "the non-chartered offices at which Discount Brokerage will offer its services will not constitute branches under the McFadden Act because none of the statutory branching functions will be performed there." App. D to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-971, p. 39a. He explained that although Discount Brokerage would serve as an intermediary for margin lending, loan approval would take place at chartered Security Pacific offices, so that Discount Brokerage offices would not be lending money within the meaning of § 36(f). Likewise, although Discount Brokerage would maintain, and pay interest on, customer balances created as an incident of its brokerage business, the Comptroller concluded that these accounts differ sufficiently in nature from ordinary bank accounts that Discount Brokerage would not be engaged in receiving deposits.
He further observed that treating offices conducting brokerage activities as branches under § 36(f) would be inconsistent with the "long-standing and widespread" practice of banks' operating nonbranch offices dealing in United States Government or municipal securities. Id., at 44a. Accordingly, the Comptroller approved Security Pacific's application.
Respondent, a trade association representing securities brokers, underwriters, and investment bankers, brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 577 F.Supp. 252. Among other things, respondent contended that bank discount brokerage offices are branches within the meaning of § 36(f) and thus are subject to the geographical restrictions imposed by § 36(c).
The District Court, relying on Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), held that respondent has standing and rejected the Comptroller's submission that national banks may offer discount brokerage services at nonbranch locations. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion,
244 U.S.App.D.C. 419, 758 F.2d 739 (1985), and rehearing en banc was denied, with three judges dissenting. 247 U.S.App.D.C. 42, 765 F.2d 1196 (1985).
and the Court looked to § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702, which "grants standing to a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.' " 397 U.S., at 153, 90 S.Ct., at 829. The Court of Appeals had interpreted § 702 as requiring either the showing of a "legal interest," as that term had been narrowly construed in our earlier cases, e.g., Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137, 59 S.Ct. 366, 369, 83 L.Ed. 543 (1939), or alternatively as requiring an explicit provision in the relevant statute permitting suit by any party "adversely affected or aggrieved."
See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (CA8 1969). This Court was unwilling to take so narrow a view of the APA's " 'generous review provisions,' " 397 U.S., at 156, 90 S.Ct., at 831 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 593, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955)), and stated that in accordance with previous decisions the Act should be construed "not grudgingly but as serving a broadly remedial purpose," ibid. (citing Shaughnessy, supra, and Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380, 82 S.Ct. 787, 794, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962)). Accordingly, the data processors could be "within that class of 'aggrieved' persons who, under § 702, are entitled to judicial review of 'agency action,' " 397 U.S., at 157, 90 S.Ct., at 831, even though the National Bank Act itself has no reference to aggrieved persons, and, for that matter, no review provision whatsoever.
It was thought, however, that Congress, in enacting § 702, had not intended to allow suit by every person suffering injury in fact. What was needed was a gloss on the meaning of § 702. The Court supplied this gloss by adding to the requirement that the complainant be "adversely affected or aggrieved," i.e., injured in fact, the additional requirement that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id., at 153, 90 S.Ct., at 829.
The Court concluded that the data processors were arguably within the zone of interests established by § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U.S.C. 1864, which forbids bank service corporations to "engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks." See 397 U.S., at 155, 90 S.Ct., at 830. In so holding, the Court relied on a brief excerpt from the legislative history of § 4 indicating that Congress intended to enforce adherence to "the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking." Ibid. (internal quotations omitted).
but significant guidance can nonetheless be drawn from that opinion. First. The Court interpreted the phrase "a relevant statute" in § 702 broadly; the data processors were alleging violations of 12 U.S.C. 24 Seventh, see 397 U.S., at 157, n. 2, 90 S.Ct., at 831, n. 2, yet the Court relied on the legislative history of a much later statute, § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, in holding that the data processors satisfied the "zone of interest" test. Second. The Court approved the "trend . . . toward the enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative action." 397 U.S., at 154, 90 S.Ct., at 830. At the same time, the Court implicitly recognized the potential for disruption inherent in allowing every party adversely affected by agency action to seek judicial review. The Court struck the balance in a manner favoring review, but excluding those would-be plaintiffs not even "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute. . . ." Id., at 153, 90 S.Ct., at 829.
The reach of the "zone of interest" test, insofar as the class of potential plaintiffs is concerned, is demonstrated by the subsequent decision in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971). There, an association of open-end investment companies and several individual investment companies sought, among other things, review of a Comptroller's regulation that authorized banks to operate collective investment funds. The companies alleged that the regulation violated the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, which prohibits banks from underwriting or issuing securities. See 12 U.S.C. 24 Seventh. The Comptroller urged that the plaintiffs lacked standing, to which the Court responded that plaintiffs not only suffered actual injury but, as in Data Processing, suffered injury from the competition that Congress had arguably legislated against by limiting the activities available to national banks.
Our decision in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984), provides a useful reference point for understanding the "zone of interest" test. There, we held that while milk handlers have the right to seek judicial review of pricing orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, consumers have no such right, because "allowing consumers to sue the Secretary would severely disrupt the complex and delicate administrative scheme." Id., at 348, 104 S.Ct., at 2455. We recognized the presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action, but held that this presumption is "overcome whenever the congressional intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.' " Id., at 351, 104 S.Ct., at 2457 (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S., at 157, 90 S.Ct., at 831). The essential inquiry is whether Congress "intended for a particular class of plaintiffs to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the law." 467 U.S., at 347, 104 S.Ct., at 2455 (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167, 90 S.Ct. 832, 838, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970)).
in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff. Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971).
The inquiry into reviewability does not end with the zone of interest test. In Community Nutrition Institute, the interests of consumers were arguably within the zone of interests meant to be protected by the Act, see 467 U.S., at 347, 104 S.Ct., at 2455, but the Court found that point not dispositive, because at bottom the reviewability question turns on congressional intent, and all indicators helpful in discerning that intent must be weighed.
In considering whether the "zone of interest" test provides or denies standing in these cases, we first observe that the Comptroller's argument focuses too narrowly on 12 U.S.C. 36, and does not adequately place § 36 in the overall context of the National Bank Act. As Data Processing demonstrates, we are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress' overall purposes in the National Bank Act. See supra, at ----.
Section 36 is a limited exception to the otherwise applicable requirement of § 81 that "the general business of each national banking association shall be transacted in the place specified in its organization certificate. . . ." Prior to the enactment of § 36, § 81 had been construed to prevent branching by national banks. Lowry National Bank, 29 Op.Atty.Gen. 81 (1911), approved in First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656-659, 44 S.Ct. 213, 215-216, 68 L.Ed. 486 (1924). We have described the circumstances surrounding the enactment of § 36 as part of the McFadden Act, and its subsequent modification by the amendments added through the Bank Act of 1933, in First National Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 87 S.Ct. 492, 17 L.Ed.2d 343 (1966), and we will not repeat that history in detail here. It is significant for our present inquiry that Congress rejected attempts to allow national banks to branch without regard to state law. See id., at 259, 87 S.Ct., at 496. There were many expressions of concern about the effects of branching among those who supported the McFadden Act, as well as among its opponents. Allusion was made to the danger that national banks might obtain monopoly control over credit and money if permitted to branch. 66 Cong.Rec. 4438 (1925) (remarks of Sen. Reed). The sponsor of the Act himself stated that "this bill is much more an antibranch-banking bill than a branch-banking bill." Id., at 1582 (remarks of Rep. McFadden).
In short, Congress was concerned not only with equalizing the status of state and federal banks, but also with preventing the perceived dangers of unlimited branching.
The interest respondent asserts has a plausible relationship to the policies underlying §§ 36 and 81 of the National Bank Act. Congress has shown a concern to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly control over credit and money through unlimited branching. Respondent's members complete with banks in providing discount brokerage servicesactivities which give banks access to more money, in the form of credit balances, and enhanced opportunities to lend money, viz., for margin purchases. "Congress has arguably legislated against the competition that respondent seeks to challenge," Investment Company Institute, 401 U.S., at 620, 91 S.Ct., at 1093, by limiting the extent to which banks can engage in the discount brokerage business and hence limiting the competitive impact on nonbank discount brokerage houses.
These cases can be analogized to Data Processing and Investment Company Institute. In those cases the question was what activities banks could engage in at all; here, the question is what activities banks can engage in without regard to the limitations imposed by state branching law. In both cases, competitors who allege an injury that implicates the policies of the National Bank Act are very reasonable candidates to seek review of the Comptroller's rulings. There is sound reason to infer that Congress "intended petitioner's class of plaintiffs to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the law." Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S., at 347, 104 S.Ct., at 2454. And we see no indications of the kind presented in Community Nutrition Institute that make "fairly discernible" a congressional intent to preclude review at respondent's behest. We conclude, therefore, that respondent was a proper party to bring this lawsuit, and we now turn to the merits.
"It is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws. See First National Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 658 44 S.Ct. 213, 215, 68 L.Ed. 486 (1924) ." Investment Company Institute v. Camp, supra, 401 U.S., at 626-627, 91 S.Ct., at 1097.
In respondent's view, the unambiguous meaning of § 81 is that "national banks may locate their business only at their headquarters or licensed branches within the same state." Brief for Respondent 11. However, § 81 is considerably more ambiguous than respondent allows. The phrase "the general business of each national banking association" in § 81 need not be read to encompass all the business in which the bank engages, but, as we shall explain, can plausibly be read to cover only those activities that are part of the bank's core banking functions.
Prior to 1927, the predecessor of § 81 (Rev.Stat. § 5190) provided that "the usual business of each national banking association shall be transacted at an office or banking-house located in the place specified in its organization certificate." In Lowry National Bank, 29 Op.Atty.Gen. 81 (1911), the Attorney General interpreted this statute to permit "a bank to maintain an extra-office agency, the power of which is restricted to dealing in bills of exchange, or possibly to some other particular class of business incident to the banking business," but to forbid "a bank to establish a branch for the transaction of a general banking business." Id., at 86. The Attorney General went on to cite cases which he viewed as "recognizing a vital distinction between a mere agency for the transaction of a particular business and a branch bank wherein is carried on a general banking business." Id., at 87. He summarized the distinction as follows:
Respondent's fallback position from its "plain language" argument is that the phrase "general business" in § 81 at least refers to all activities in which Congress has specifically authorized a national bank to engage, including the trading in securities that the McFadden Act authorized by the amendment of 12 U.S.C. 24 Seventh. See McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 2, 44 Stat. 1226. However, petitioner Security Pacific has provided a counter-example to this general thesis: In § 2(b) of the McFadden Act, Congress specifically authorized national banks' involvement in the safe-deposit business, and in doing so deleted language from the bill that arguably would have limited the bank's authority "to conduct a safe deposit business" to activities "located on or adjacent to the premises of such association." 67 Cong.Rec. 3231 (1926). In floor debates, Representative McFadden, in response to the question from Representative Celler whether the bill as amended would permit "a safe-deposit business to be conducted a block away or a mile away from a national banking association," replied that the deletion of the language regarding location "removes the limitations which might be very embarrassing to an institution." Id., at 3232.
In view of this exchange, we are not persuaded that Congress intended the locational restriction of § 81 and § 36 to reach all activities in which national banks are specifically authorized to engage.
"Section 36(f) defines the term 'branch.' Any place outside of or away from the main office where the bank carries on its business of receiving deposits, paying checks, lending money, or transacting any business carried on at the main office, is a branch if it is legally established under the provisions of this act." 68 Cong.Rec. 5816 (1927).
If we took literally Representative McFadden's view of § 36(f), we would have to conclude that Congress intended to overturn the Attorney General's opinion in Lowry National Bank, 29 Op.Atty.Gen. 81 (1911), which this Court had previously approved in First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, supra, at 658, 44 S.Ct., at 215. Congress never specifically indicated such an intention, and we find it hard to imagine that it would have made such a change without comment.
It is significant that in passing the McFadden Act, Congress recognized and for the first time specifically authorized the practice of national banks' engaging in the buying and selling of investment securities. See Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 2, 44 Stat. 1226.
Prior to 1927, banks had conducted such securities transactions on a widespread and often interstate basis, without regard to the locational restriction imposed by § 5190 on "the usual business of each national banking association." See, e.g., W. Peach, The Security Affiliates of National Banks 74 (1941); Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 Banking L.J. 483, 492, 494, n. 26 (1971).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Congress did not intend to subject a bank's conduct of a securities business to the branching restrictions imposed by 12 U.S.C. 36(f). We do not view our decision today as inconsistent with our prior decisions interpreting 12 U.S.C. 36(f) as embodying a policy of "competitive equality" between state and national banks. See, e.g., First National Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 90 S.Ct. 337, 24 L.Ed.2d 312 (1969). The Comptroller reasonably interprets the statute as requiring "competitive equality" only in core banking functions, and not in all incidental services in which national banks are authorized to engage.
We are not faced today with the need to decide whether there are core banking functions beyond those explicitly enumerated in § 36(f); it suffices, to decide this case, to hold that the operation of a discount brokerage service is not a core banking function.
It is so ordered. Justice SCALIA took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Petitioners' argument that respondent lacks standing to challenge the Comptroller's decision in these cases is predicated on their reading of the purpose behind the branching limitations of the McFadden Act. They argue that Congress' only concern in not allowing national banks to maintain more branches than their state counterparts may maintain under state law was to ensure that the national banks not use their newly granted branching authority to gain a competitive edge over state banks.
Close examination of the Act and its history, however, convinces me that this was not the only purpose of the branching restrictions. Rather, the McFadden Act was in large part a compromise in which Congress started from a general antibranching rule and created a limited exception just large enough to allow national banks to compete effectively with state banks, but also narrow enough to continue to serve the policy of exercising control on the financial power of national banks. The general policy against branching was based in part on a concern about the national banks' potential for becoming massive financial institutions that would establish monopolies on financial services. Petitioners' zone of interest argument is therefore predicated on too narrow a reading of the statutory purposes, and hence too narrow a view of the applicable "zone of interest" that the broad legislative scheme sought to protect.
The National Currency Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665, and the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, which provided, inter alia, for federal chartering of national banks, ended the 57-year hiatus during which there was no federal involvement in banking. The National Bank Act in Rev. Stat. § 5190 provided that "the usual business of each national banking association shall be transacted at an office or banking-house located in the place specified in its organization certificate,"
and in 1902 the Comptroller of the Currency stated his view that this statute prohibited national banks from branching. See Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, H.R.Doc. No. 10, Vol. 2, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 45-47 (1902). In 1911 the Attorney General issued an opinion affirming that view. He explained that neither the statute nor national banks' inherent powers gave them the legal authority to establish branches. Lowry National Bank, 29 Op.Atty.Gen. 81, approved in First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656-659, 44 S.Ct. 213, 215-216, 68 L.Ed. 486 (1924).
There was real fear of the effect that a central bank with unlimited branching power could have on the financial and political climate of the country.
The McFadden Act's branching limitations were thus geared in part "to prevent monopoly and to prevent an extreme concentration of financial power." See Hearings on Federal Branching Policy before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 408 (1977) (Professor Kenneth Scott explaining various justifications for the Act). It is quite apparent that in the final compromise legislation this view was well represented.
See also ante, at 401-402, and n. 16.
The legislative spirit of maintaining restraints on national banks' branching while allowing them just enough flexibility to compete with state banks was again in force six years later when Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), 48 Stat. 162, which allowed national banks to maintain branches outside of their home cities if state banks could. See 12 U.S.C. 36(c)(1). As the Court explained in First National Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 87 S.Ct. 492, 17 L.Ed.2d 343 (1966), the actual impetus for the changes in the branching rules at that time was the Comptroller of the Currency's advocacy of a total elimination of all branching restrictions. See id., at 259, 87 S.Ct., at 496 (citing Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency pursuant to S.Res. No. 71, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 7-10 (1931)). The proposal engendered the same sort of debate that the McFadden Act had, with some seeking a total lifting of restrictions on branch banking, and others wanting no further relaxation of the restrictions. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); 76 Cong.Rec. 9890-9899 (1932).
The bill discussed in that Report was not enacted; instead, in the midst of a filibuster by the antibranching forces, another compromise was reached, which continued to contain a general limitation on branching. As one of the conferees explained, "the controversy over the respective merits of what are known as 'unit banking' and 'branch banking systems,' a controversy that has been alive and sharp for years," was not settled. "It is not . . . here proposed to give the advocates of branch banking any advantage." 77 Cong.Rec. 5896 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Luce).
Given this understanding of the multiple purposes behind the branch banking restrictions, this case falls squarely within our decisions in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 91 S.Ct. 158, 27 L.Ed.2d 179 (1970); and Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971). Just as the Court found in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations and Arnold Tours, there is embodied in the antibranching rule of the McFadden Act a congressional purpose to protect competitors of national banks in order to ensure that national banks remain limited entities. Although much of Congress' attention focused on national banks' most obvious competitorsstate banksthere is no reason to believe that Congress "desired to protect" state banks "alone from competition." Arnold Tours, supra, 400 U.S., at 46, 91 S.Ct., at 159.
The Comptroller relied primarily on the fact that banks publicly solicit deposits and use deposited funds in lending, while credit balances maintained by brokers are not, as such, directly solicited from the public, and are subject to regulatory restrictions regarding use by brokers. See the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq. (restricting advertising, promotional, and selling practices of brokers regarding interest-bearing free credit balances); 17 CFR § 240.15c3-2 (1986) (regulating the use of credit balances by brokers).
Respondent also contended that national banks are entirely prohibited from offering discount brokerage services by the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. 24 (1982 ed. and Supp. III); 12 U.S.C. 78, 377, 378. This contention was rejected by the District Court, a holding that is not before us.
Section 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 402(b), is an example of a statute granting an explicit right of review to all persons adversely affected or aggrieved by particular agency actions (there, licensing actions by the Federal Communications Commission). See generally FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869 (1940).
Subsequently, in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 91 S.Ct. 158, 27 L.Ed.2d 179 (1970), the Court held that, under the rationale of Data Processing, travel agents have standing to challenge the Comptroller's decision to allow banks, pursuant to their incidental powers under 12 U.S.C. 24 Seventh, to provide travel services to their customers. The Court found it of no moment that Congress never specifically focused on the interests of travel agents in enacting § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act. 400 U.S., at 46, and n. 3, 91 S.Ct., at 159, and n. 3.
The zone test has also been the subject of considerable scholarly writing, much of it critical. See, e.g., 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 24:17 (2d ed. 1983); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1667, 1731-1734 (1975); Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 Yale L.J. 425 (1974); Scott, Standing in the Supreme CourtA Functional Analysis, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 645 (1973); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 633, 634, and n. 9 (1971).
The difference made by the APA can be readily seen by comparing the "zone of interest" decisions discussed supra, at 394-398, with cases in which a private right of action under a statute is asserted in conditions that make the APA inapplicable. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In Cort, corporate shareholders sought recovery of funds that a corporate official had expended in alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. 610,
Congress subsequently relaxed some of the restrictions on branching to which Representative McFadden alluded in the passage quoted above. For example, statewide branching by national banks is now permitted if state law explicitly permits statewide branching by state banks. 12 U.S.C. 36(c)(2). However, such modifications obviously do not represent an abandonment by Congress of the policy against unlimited branching.
Congress did of course later restrict the types of securities transactions in which national banks could engage, through passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933. See 12 U.S.C. 24 (1982 ed. and Supp. III); 12 U.S.C. 78, 377, 378. However, Congress showed no intention of placing geographic restrictions on the location of those securities transactions in which banks could still engage. Rather, Congress emphasized that the Glass-Steagall Act permitted banks "to purchase and sell investment securities for their customers to the same extent as heretofore." S.Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1933).
As amended, this statute appears at 12 U.S.C. 81.
Similarly, the evidence surrounding passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq., which eliminated a "loophole" in the McFadden Act by restricting interstate purchases of banks by bank holding companies, see Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS, 472 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 2545, 2551, 86 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985), evinces a legislative purpose that went beyond merely protecting local bank branches. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955) ("Ultimately, monopolistic control of credit could entirely remold our fundamental political and social institutions"); 101 Cong.Rec. 8030 (1955) (remarks of Rep. Rains) (bill is necessary "to close up and nail down the loopholes in our banking lawsloopholes which threaten not just the local independent bank but the whole traditional banking system as we know it and want to keep it").