Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/331/398
Timestamp: 2019-07-16 14:25:07
Document Index: 738391686

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 152', '§ 9', '§ 159', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 201', '§ 1501', '§ 7']

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. E. C. ATKINS & CO. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
331 U.S. 398 (67 S.Ct. 1265, 91 L.Ed. 1563)
Argued: March 7—10, 1947.
The problem posed by this case is whether private plant guards, who are required to be civilian auxiliaries to the military police of the United States Army, are employees within the meaning of § 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 152(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3).
In1943, afte r the necessary additional guards had been recruited, a union 1 petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for investigation and certification of representatives pursuant to § 9(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(c). It was alleged that the union represented the sixty-four plant guards employed by respondent at its two plants. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was not the employer of the guards within the meaning of § 2(2) and that the guards were not employees as defined by § 2(3). A hearing was thereupon held and evidence concerning the status of the guards was introduced.
Laying aside for the moment the matter of militarization, we cannot say in this case that the Board would be legally unjustified in holding that the rank and file plant guards are employees within the meaning of the Act. They bear essentially the same relation to management as maintenance and production employees. In fact, they are indistinguishable from ordinary watchmen, gatemen, patrolmen, firemen and guardspersons who have universally been regarded and treated as employees for purposes of union membership and employee benefits. They perform such duties as inspecting persons, packages and vehicles, carrying cash to various parts of the plant, and generally surveying the premises to detect fires, suspicious circumstances and sabotage. Moreover, the guards in question are not supervisors; they possess no power to affect the working conditions of other employees. Without collective bargaining, they are subject to the unilateral determination by the employer of their wages, hours, seniority, tenure and other conditions of work. Individually, they suffer from inequality of bargaining power and their need for collective action parallels that of other employees. From any economic or statutory standpoint, the Board would be warranted in treating them as employees. Even under conventional standards, they are controlled by management to an extent sufficient to justify designating them as employees.
As stated by these regulations, the purpose of the military organization of the plant guards was 'to increase the authority, efficiency, and responsibility of guard forces at plants important to the prosecution of the war, and through military training to provide auxiliary forces throughout the United States to supplement the Army in wartime emergency situations.' 3 It was made clear, however, that plant managements were not relieved of their responsibility 'for providing adequate protection at all times against all hazards.' 4 In other words, employers who wished to obtain government contracts for the production of war materials were required to provide 'adequate protection' for their plants where the material was to be produced; if the existing plant protection forces were inadequate, additional guards were to be recruited by the employers. But all the original and additional guards were to be enrolled as civilian auxiliaries to the military police.
The military authorities reserved the right to veto the hiring or firing of any plant guard where such action by the employer might impair the efficiency of the guard force. 5 And the military plant guard officers were authorized to take appropriate action 'through the plant management' to correct conditions which might result in 'defective or inadequate performance by the guard forces of its ordinary protective duties.' 6
The functions of these civilian auxiliaries to the military police were stated to be twofold: '(1) To provide internal and external protection of the plant against sabotage, espionage, and natural hazards. (2) To serve with the army in providing protection to the plant and its environs in emergency situations.' 7 They were subject to call for military service even where emergencies arose at places other than the plants where they normally worked. To these ends, militay plant gu ard officers were authorized to exercise direct control over the guard forces 'only in matters relating to military instruction and duties as Auxiliary Military Police.' 8 But such orders 'will be issued only after consultation with and, if possible, concurrence by the plant management. * * * Control, therefore, will be exercised as heretofore through the plant management except at drill and except in emergency situations. Although the plant guard officers will be in command at all times, they will not supplant the civilian guard officers, and unless expediency demands otherwise will exercise their authority through the chain of command established by the plant management.' 9 The regulations also provided that the military drill of the guard forces should not exceed one hour per week 'except with the approval of the plant management.' 10
As to the employer's relations with the guard force, the regulations were explicit in recognizing that those relations remained essentially the same as if there were no militarization. According to Circular No. 15: 'Basically, the militarization of plant guard forces does not change the existing systems of hiring, compensation, and dismissal; all remain primarily a matter between the guards and the plant managements. Guards in the employ of a private employer may, as heretofore, he dismissed by that employer.' 11 A veto power over employment and dismissal, of course, was retained by the military. It was further provided: 'The status of the employer in respect to the employee benefits for the guard force is not changed. For example, social security, workmen's compensation, and employer's liability provisions remain unaffected.' 12 And the employer was expected to train the guard forces in their ordinary protective duties and was required to furnish them with uniforms and weapons. 13
The right of the plant guards to bargain collectively was recognized by Circular No. 15, paragraph 6h(2) of which provided: 'Auxiliary Military Police are permitted to bargain collectively, but no such activity will be tolerated which will interfere with their obligations as members of the Auxiliary Military Police. In view of recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (see In re Lord Mfg. Co. & United Rubber Workers of America, CIO, Case No. R4826, February 1943) (Lord Manufacturing Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 1032), the Auxiliary Military Police should be represented in collective bargaining with the management by a bargaining unit other than that composed of the production and maintenance workers, although both bargaining units may be affiliated with the same labor organization. Where the guards are not now included in the same bargaining unit, this is mandatory; where the guards are included in such unit, serious consideration will be given to effect a change to conform to the foregoing policies.' Provision was also made that collective bargaining agreements covering plant guards who were civilian auxiliaries should include a clause recognizing that nothing in the collective bargaining relationship should interfere with the duties imposed upon the guards as auxiliary military police. 14
The guards were required to sign agreements with the United States. 15 Each agreement stated that the individual, who had been or was about to be employed by the particular company as a guard at its plant, agreed that he would support and defend the Constitution, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution, and faithfully discharge his duties as a civilian auxiliary to the military police. He also acknowledged in this agreement that appropriate Articles of War had been read and explained to him and that he was subject to military law during his employment. The applicable regulations then provided that he could be court martialed where no other effective form of punishment would be effective. But 'Unlike the court-martial punishment of a person in military service, a court martial cannot punish a member of the Auxiliary Military Police by reduction in military grade or by forfeiture of pay and allowances. Analogous punishments might be imposed, such as reduction in grade in the guard organization or temporary suspension from duty. A fine, as distinguished from forfeiture, is regarded as an appropriate form of punishment.' 16 In all other respects, the guards remained subject to the civil courts.
The evidence and testimony submitted to the Board confirmed the fact that the plant guards in respondent's two plants were militarized in accordance with the foregoing regulations. The guards at each plant were under the direct supervision of a chief guard and several lieutenantsall of whom were civilians recruited by the respondent like the rank and file guards. The military superior of the chief guards was the District Plant Guard Officer stationed at the Continuous Security District Office of the War Department, Cincinnati, Ohio, an officer who also had charge of guard forces at other plants in the district. A general directive issued by this office repeated many of the provisions of Circular No. 15. 17 It also provided that orders and regulations for the auxiliary military police would be issued in the name of the Chief of the District 'after plant management has indicated its concurrence by signing the guard order in the lower left hand corner.' But the only guard orders received by the chief guards at respondent's plants were three general ones signed by the District Plant Guard Officer, orders that were applicable to all militarized guards in the district. All the specific orders that were ever issued emanated from the chief guards. About the only direct contact between the military authorities and these guards occurred during the weekly drill period.
Respondent recruited the necessary additional guards through its ordinary employment channels and it had the power to initiate dismissals from the force. Such actions, however, were subject to the approval of the military. Respondent at all times carried the guards on its regular pay rolls, determined their rate of compensation and paid their wages after making appropriate deductions. And since it did not operate on a cost-plus basis, respondent actually bore the cost of the guards' wages. 18 Respondent did not attempt to give orders to the guards, merely making suggestions to the chief guards. The latter worked in close cooperation with respondent's personnel manager and no friction developed. Respondent delegated to the chief guards its power to determine the guards' working hours and the promotion policies in regard to them. Finally, respondent maintained its liability as to the guards on matters of social security and workmen's compensation and was obliged to obey all minimum wage and maximum hour requirements.
We cannot say that the Board was without warrant in law or in fact in concluding that respondent retained 'a sufficient residual measure of control over the terms and conditions of employment of the guards' so that they might fairly be described as employees of respondent. 19 The most important incidents of the employee-employees relationshipwages, hours and promotionremained matters to be determined by respondent rather than by the Army. Respondent could settle those vital matters unilaterally or by agreement with the guards. And the guards were free to negotiate and bargain individually or collectively on these items. It is precisely such a situation to which the National Labor Relations Act is applicable. It is a situation where collective bargaining may be appropriate and where statutory objectives may be achieved despite the limitations imposed by militarization. Under such circumstances, the Board may properly find that an employee status exists for purposes of the Act.
The Board's determination that there was a relationship in this case deserving of statutory protection does not reflect an isolated or careless reconciliation of the rights guaranteed by the Act with the important wartime duties of plant protection employees. In the course of its administration of the Act during the war, the Board was faced with this problem many times. 20 It was well acquainted with the important and complex considerations inherent in the situation. The responsibility of representing the public interest in such matters and of reaching a judgment after giving due weight to all the relevant factors lay primarily with the Board. See Southern Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 316 U.S. 31, 47, 62 S.Ct. 886, 894, 86 L.Ed. 1246. In the absence of some compelling evidence that the Board has failed to measure up to its responsibility, courts should be reluctant to overturn the considered judgment of the Board and to substitute their own ideas of the public interest. We find no such evidence in this case.
Under such circumstances, it would be folly on our part to disregard or to upset the policy the Board has applied in this case. 21 Since the Board's order is in accord with the law and has substantial roots in the evidence, it should have been enforced by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Respondent's objections to the language and scope of the order are either without merit or have been removed by the demilitarization of the guards. And any issues concerning the subsequent deputization of the guards as policemen are answered by our decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 67 S.Ct. 1274. The judgment below is accordingly reversed.
The Board's conclusion in this respect is confirmed by the results reached under other statutes. Militarized guards have been treated as private employees for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. Walling v. Lum, 7 Wage Hour Rep. 570. And they have consistently been treated as such by the National War Labor Board. Detroit Steel Products Co., 6 War Lab.Rep. 495; Brewster Aeronautical Corp., 11 War Lab.Rep. 286, 15 War Lab.Rep. 239, 240243; Great American Industries, 11 War Lab.Rep. 287; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 15 War Lab.Rep. 500, 19 War Lab.Rep. 813; General Motors Corp., 18 War Lab.Rep. 541. And see National Labor Relations
In adopting the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1501 et seq., Congress provided in § 7(a)(2) that all actions of the National War Labor Board must conform to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Actan indication that Congress deemed the preservation of the right to collective bargaining to be essential in war industries.