Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/08-17094/08-17094-2012-04-17.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-22 00:43:28
Document Index: 737912855

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 2', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 2', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 15321', '§ 15532', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 15301', '§ 9428', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 15483', '§ 1973', '§ 5', '§ 9428', '§ 1973', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 1973', '§ 16', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 15483', '§ 15483', '§ 15484', '§ 15545']

Gonzalez, et al. v. State of Arizona, et al. :: Ninth Circuit :: US Courts of Appeals Cases :: US Federal Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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Justia.com Opinion Summary: Proposition 200, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-166(F)(the registration provision), required prospective voters in Arizona to provide proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote and required registered voters to show identification to cast a ballot at the polls, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-579(A)(the poll place provision). At issue on appeal was whether Proposition 200 violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment or Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, or was void as inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq. The court upheld Proposition 200's requirement that voters show identification at the polling place, but concluded that the NVRA superseded Proposition 200's registration provision as that provision was applied to applicants using the National Mail Voter Registration Form to register to vote in federal elections.Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by Email
This is a revision of a Previous Opinion originally issued on October 26, 2010
MARIA M. GONZALEZ,; LUCIANO
VALENCIA; THE INTER TRIBAL
COUNCIL OF ARIZONA, INC.;
ARIZONA ADVOCACY NETWORK;
STEVE M. GALLARDO; LEAGUE OF
ARIZONA; LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS OF ARIZONA;
FOUNDATION; HOPI TRIBE,
BERNIE ABEYTIA; ARIZONA HISPANIC
COMMUNITY FORUM; CHICANOS POR
LA CAUSA; FRIENDLY HOUSE; JESUS
GONZALEZ; DEBBIE LOPEZ;
EDUCATION PROJECT; VALLE DEL
SOL; PROJECT VOTE,
STATE OF ARIZONA; SHELLY BAKER,
La Paz County Recorder; BERTA
MANUZ, Greenlee County
Recorder; CANDACE OWENS,
Coconino County Recorder; LYNN
CONSTABLE, Yavapai County
Election Director; KELLY DASTRUP,
Navajo County Election Director;
LAURA DEAN-LYTLE, Pinal County
Recorder; JUDY DICKERSON,
Graham County Election Director;
DONNA HALE, La Paz County
Election Director; SUSAN
HIGHTOWER MARLAR, Yuma County
Recorder; GILBERTO HOYOS, Pinal
County Election Director;
LAURETTE JUSTMAN, Navajo County
Recorder; PATTY HANSEN,
Coconino County Election
Director; CHRISTINE RHODES,
Cochise County Recorder; LINDA
HAUGHT ORTEGA, Gila County
Recorder; DIXIE MUNDY, Gila
County Election Director; BRAD
NELSON, Pima County Election
Director; KAREN OSBORNE,
Maricopa County Election
YVONNE PEARSON, Greenlee County
Election Director; PENNY PEW,
Apache County Election Director;
HELEN PURCELL, Maricopa County
Recorder; F. ANN RODRIGUEZ, Pima
County Recorder, KEN BENNETT,
MARIA M. GONZALEZ; BERNIE
ABEYTIA; ARIZONA HISPANIC
EDUCATION PROJECT; LUCIANO
VALENCIA; VALLE DEL SOL;
FOUNDATION; PROJECT VOTE,
No. 08-17094
D.C. Nos.
2:06-cv-01268-ROS
06-cv-01362-PCTJAT
06-cv-01575-PHXEHC
THE INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF
ARIZONA, INC.; ARIZONA ADVOCACY
NETWORK; STEVE M. GALLARDO;
CITIZENS ARIZONA; LEAGUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS OF ARIZONA; HOPI
STATE OF ARIZONA; KEN BENNETT;
SHELLY BAKER, La Paz County
Recorder; BERTA MANUZ, Greenlee
County Recorder; CANDACE
OWENS, Coconino County
Director; KELLY DASTRUP, Navajo
County Election Director; LYNN
Election Director; LAURA DEANLYTLE, Pinal County Recorder;
JUDY DICKERSON, Graham County
Election Director; DONNA HALE,
La Paz County Election Director;
SUSAN HIGHTOWER MARLAR, Yuma
County Recorder; GILBERTO
HOYOS, Pinal County Election
Recorder; CHRISTINE RHODES,
Director; YVONNE PEARSON,
Greenlee County Election
Director; PENNY PEW, Apache
County Election Director; HELEN
PURCELL, Maricopa County
No. 08-17115
Roslyn O. Silver, Chief District Judge, Presiding
June 21, 2011â��Pasadena, California
Pamela Ann Rymer, Susan P. Graber, Marsha S. Berzon,
Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton, Jay S. Bybee,
Sandra S. Ikuta, N. Randy Smith, and Mary H. Murguia,
Judge Rymer participated in oral argument and deliberations but
passed away before joining any opinion.
Opinion by Judge Ikuta;
Concurrence by Judge Berzon;
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Pregerson;
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Rawlinson
Nina Perales, Esq. (argued), Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, San Antonio, Texas, for
plaintiffs-appellants Jesus Gonzalez, et al.
Jon M. Greenbaum, Esq. (argued), Robert A. Kengle, Lawyersâ�� Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington,
D.C., David J. Bodney, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, David B. Rosenbaum, Esq., Thomas L. Hudson,
Esq., Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, Arizona, Joe P. Sparks,
Esq., The Sparks Law Firm, Scottsdale, Arizona, Daniel B.
Kohrman, Esq., AARP, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffsappellants The Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, et al.
Samuel R. Bagenstos (argued), DOJ, Washington, D.C., for
amicus curiae United States.
Thomas C. Horne (argued), Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, Mary Oâ��Grady, Solicitor General, Phoenix, Arizona, for
defendant-appellee Ken Bennett.
Proposition 200 requires prospective voters in Arizona to
provide proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote,
see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Â§ 16-166(F) (the â��registration provisionâ��),
and requires registered voters to show identification to cast a
ballot at the polls, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Â§ 16-579(A) (the â��polling place provisionâ��). This appeal raises the questions
whether Proposition 200 violates Â§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1973, is unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth or Twenty-fourth Amendments to the Constitution, or is void as inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 1973gg et seq.
We uphold Proposition 200â��s requirement that voters show
identification at the polling place, but conclude that the
NVRA supersedes Proposition 200â��s registration provision as
that provision is applied to applicants using the National Mail
Voter Registration Form (the â��Federal Formâ��) to register to
On November 2, 2004, Arizona voters passed a state initiative, Proposition 200, which (upon proclamation of the Governor) enacted various revisions to the stateâ��s election laws.
As explained in more detail below, Proposition 200â��s registration provision amended Arizonaâ��s voter registration procedures to require the County Recorder to â��reject any
application for registration that is not accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.â�� Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Â§ 16-166(F). Proposition 200â��s polling place provision
amended Arizonaâ��s election day procedures to require voters
to present specified forms of identification at the polls. See id.
Â§ 16-579(A).
Shortly after Proposition 200â��s passage, a number of plaintiffs filed lawsuits against Arizona2 to enjoin these changes.
Two groups of plaintiffs are relevant to this appeal: the Gon2
We refer to the defendants collectively as â��Arizona,â�� even though Arizona county recorders were also named as individual defendants.
zalez plaintiffs (Gonzalez) and the Inter Tribal Council of
Arizona plaintiffs (ITCA).3
The district court consolidated the various complaints.
After the district court denied the plaintiffsâ�� motion for a preliminary injunction, Gonzalez and ITCA appealed. See Gonzalez v. Arizona (Gonzalez I), 485 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.
2007). Because the briefing schedule for the appeal extended
beyond the 2006 election, Gonzalez and ITCA moved for an
emergency interlocutory injunction (which would prevent the
implementation of Proposition 200 pending the disposition of
the appeal of the district courtâ��s denial of a preliminary
injunction), which we granted. See id. After Arizona petitioned for certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the emergency injunction and remanded the case to this court for a
determination of the merits of the appeal. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2006) (per curiam).
On remand, Gonzalez and ITCA pursued their claim for
preliminary injunctive relief only with respect to Proposition
200â��s registration requirement. Gonzalez I, 485 F.3d at 1048.
The panel in Gonzalez I affirmed the district courtâ��s denial of
the preliminary injunction, holding that Proposition 200â��s registration provision was not an unconstitutional poll tax and
was not superseded by the NVRA. See id. at 1049, 1050-51.
On remand, the district court held that Proposition 200â��s
polling place provision was not a poll tax under the Twentyfourth Amendment and its registration provision did not conflict with the NVRA, and granted summary judgment to Ari3
Jesus Gonzalez represented one group of plaintiffs, which consisted of
individual Arizona residents and organizational plaintiffs. The Inter Tribal
Council of Arizona, a non-profit organization of twenty Arizona tribes,
represented another group of plaintiffs, which included the Hopi Tribe,
Representative Steve Gallardo from the Arizona State House of Representatives, the League of Women Voters of Arizona, the League of United
Latin American Citizens, the Arizona Advocacy Network, and People For
the American Way Foundation.
zona on these claims. After trial, the district court resolved all
other claims in favor of Arizona, holding that Proposition 200
did not violate Â§ 2 of the VRA or the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not constitute a poll tax
Gonzalez and ITCA appealed the district courtâ��s rulings on
the NVRA and Twenty-fourth Amendment claims. In addition, ITCA challenged the courtâ��s determination that Proposition 200 was not a poll tax under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and Gonzalez challenged the courtâ��s determinations on the
Voting Rights Act and Equal Protection Clause claims. A
three-judge panel affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Proposition 200â��s polling place provision did not violate the VRA or the Fourteenth and Twenty-fourth
Amendments, but that Proposition 200â��s registration provision was superseded by the NVRA. Gonzalez v. Arizona
(Gonzalez II), 624 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010). In deciding
Gonzalez and ITCAâ��s challenge to the registration provision,
the panel overruled the contrary holding of Gonzalez I on the
ground that an exception to the law of the case rule applied.4
Under the law of the case doctrine, a court will generally refuse to
reconsider an issue that has already been decided by the same court or a
higher court in the same case. See Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484,
1488-89 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We have recognized exceptions to the
law of the case doctrine, however, where â��(1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or (3)
substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.â�� Id. at
1489 (footnote omitted) (quoting Caldwell v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re
Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Some of our cases indicated that a three-judge panel
could rely on these exceptions to overrule the law of an earlier published
opinion, so long as no subsequent panel had yet relied on it. See id. at
1492-93; see also Mendenhall v. NTSB, 213 F.3d 464, 469 n.3 (9th Cir.
2000); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regâ��l Planning Agency,
216 F.3d 764, 786-88 (9th Cir. 2000).
We now hold that the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are not
exceptions to our general â��law of the circuitâ�� rule, i.e., the rule that a pub-
See id. at 1185-91. A majority of the active judges of the court
voted to rehear the case en banc.
We first consider Proposition 200â��s registration provision.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Â§ 16-166(F). Gonzalez and ITCA contend
that this provision is preempted by the NVRA under both the
Supremacy Clause and the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In response, Arizona relies on the Supremacy
Clauseâ��s â��presumption against preemption,â�� see Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996), to argue that the
NVRA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts state voter
registration laws. Before addressing the partiesâ�� arguments,
we first consider whether the framework of the Elections
Clause or the Supremacy Clause properly governs this question.
[1] The Elections Clause establishes a unique relationship
between the state and federal governments. It provides:
lished decision of this court constitutes binding authority which â��must be
followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so,â�� Hart
v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001). To the extent that our
prior cases suggested otherwise, see Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1492-93; Mendenhall, 213 F.3d at 469 n.3; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 216 F.3d
at 786-88, they are overruled. This determination, however, does not affect
other recognized exceptions to the law of the circuit rule. See Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that where
â��the relevant court of last resortâ�� has â��undercut the theory or reasoning
underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are
clearly irreconcilable,â�� then â��a three-judge panel of this court and district
courts should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior opinion of this court as having been effectively
overruledâ��); see also Natâ��l Cable & Telecomms. Assâ��n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (holding that a â��courtâ��s prior judicial
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled
to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretionâ��).
U.S. Const. art. I, Â§ 4, cl. 1. In a nutshell, state governments
are given the initial responsibility for regulating the mechanics of federal elections, but Congress is given the authority to
â��make or alterâ�� the statesâ�� regulations.
The history of the Elections Clause reveals the reasoning
behind its unusual delegation of power. Under the Articles of
Confederation, the states had full authority to maintain,
appoint, or recall congressional delegates.5 At the Philadelphia Convention, delegates expressed concern that, if left
unfettered, states could use this power to frustrate the creation
of the national government, see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 808-09 (1995), most obviously by
neglecting to hold federal elections. The Framers decided that
Congress should be given the authority to oversee the statesâ��
procedures related to national elections as a safeguard against
potential state abuse. See id.; see also The Federalist No. 59,
at 168 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ron P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1981) (explaining that â��[n]othing can be more evident, than
that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the
national government, in the hands of the State legislatures,
would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their
mercyâ��). Over the protest of some Southern delegates,6 the
See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. V (â��[D]elegates shall be
annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each State shall
direct . . . with a power reserved to each state, to recall its delegates
. . . .â��).
South Carolinian delegates Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge
moved to exclude the language giving Congress this supervisory power
over the states. 5 The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the
Framers approved language giving Congress power to â��make
or alterâ�� the statesâ�� regulations. See 5 Elliotâ��s Debates 401-02
(statement of James Madison). As modified to give Congress
this supervisory power, this language became the Elections
Clause.7
[2] Thus, the Elections Clause empowers both the federal
and state governments to enact laws governing the mechanics
of federal elections. The clause gives states the default authority to prescribe the â��Times, Places and Mannerâ�� of conducting
federal elections. Nevertheless, because Congress â��may at any
time by Law make or alterâ�� the regulations passed by the
state, power over federal election procedures is ultimately
â��committed to the exclusive control of Congress.â�� Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946).8 While Congress may not
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General
Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787. Together with the Journal of the
Federal Convention, Luther Martinâ��s Letter, Yatesâ��s Minutes, Congressional Opinions, Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of â��98-â��99, and Other
Illustrations of the Constitution 401 (photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter Elliotâ��s Debates]. â��The states, they contended, could and must be relied onâ�� to regulate legislative appointments.
Id.; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275-76 (2004).
Alexander Hamilton described the need for congressional oversight of
the states as follows:
[The Framers] have submitted the regulation of elections for the
federal government, in the first instance, to the local administrations; which, in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail, may be both more convenient and more satisfactory; but
they have reserved to the national authority a right to interpose,
whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its safety.
The Court has generally construed Congressâ��s authority under the
Elections Clause expansively. See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S.
383, 386 (1915) (authority to enforce the right of an eligible voter to cast
ballot and have ballot counted); Ex Parte Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 753-54
always choose to exercise this power, â��[w]hen exercised, the
action of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the
regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them.â�� Ex
Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384 (1879); see also Foster v.
Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (stating that the Elections
Clause â��is a default provision; it invests the States with
responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections,
but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choicesâ�� (citation omitted)). Moreover, we have held that
the Elections Clause requires states to implement Congressâ��s
superseding regulations without compensation from the federal government. See Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d
1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, unlike virtually all other
provisions of the Constitution, the Elections Clause gives
Congress the power to â��conscript state agencies to carry outâ��
federal mandates. Id. In sum, a stateâ��s role in the creation and
implementation of federal election procedures under the Elections Clause is to administer the elections through its own
procedures until Congress deems otherwise; if and when Congress does so, the states are obligated to conform to and carry
out whatever procedures Congress requires. See Foster, 522
U.S. at 69.
As should be clear from this overview, the Elections Clause
operates quite differently from the Supremacy Clause. The
Supremacy Clause provides that the laws of the United States
â��shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.â�� U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Under our system of dual
sovereignty, courts deciding whether a particular state law is
preempted under the Supremacy Clause must strive to main(1888) (authority to regulate conduct at any election coinciding with federal contest); Ex parte Yarbrough (The Ku-Klux Cases), 110 U.S. 651, 662
(1884) (authority to make additional laws for free, pure, and safe exercise
of right to vote); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, 404 (1879) (authority to
punish state election officers for violation of state duties vis-a-vis congressional elections).
tain the â��delicate balanceâ�� between the States and the Federal
Government, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991);
see Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485, especially when Congress is
regulating in an area â��traditionally occupied by the States,â��
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505
U.S. 504, 516 (1992). The Supreme Court has crafted special
guidelines to assist courts in striking this balance. First, courts
applying the Supremacy Clause are to begin with a presumption against preemption. E.g., Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S.
70, 77 (2008); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. This principle
applies because, as the Court has recently noted, â��respect for
the States as independent sovereigns in our federal system
leads us to assume that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state-law causes of action.â�� Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187,
1195 n.3 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second,
the Court has adopted a â��plain statement rule,â�� holding that
a federal statute preempts a state law only when it is the â��clear
and manifestâ�� purpose of Congress to do so. Gregory, 501
U.S. at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted). Only where
the state and federal laws cannot be reconciled do courts hold
that Congressâ��s enactments must prevail. See, e.g., Altria, 555
U.S. at 76-77.
[3] In contrast to the Supremacy Clause, which addresses
preemption in areas within the statesâ�� historic police powers,
the Elections Clause affects only an area in which the states
have no inherent or reserved power: the regulation of federal
elections. See U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 804-05. As the
Supreme Court has explained, because federal elections did
not exist prior to the formation of the federal government, the
statesâ�� sole authority to regulate such elections â��aris[es] from
the Constitution itself,â�� id. at 805. Because states have no
reserved authority over the domain of federal elections, courts
deciding issues raised under the Elections Clause need not be
concerned with preserving a â��delicate balanceâ�� between competing sovereigns. Instead, the Elections Clause, as a standalone preemption provision, establishes its own balance. For
this reason, the â��presumption against preemptionâ�� and â��plain
statement ruleâ�� that guide Supremacy Clause analysis are not
transferable to the Elections Clause context. See Harkless v.
Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (declining to
apply Supremacy Clause preemption principles in analyzing
the preemptive effect of the NVRA). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has suggested as much. In Foster, the Supreme Court
upheld the Fifth Circuitâ��s determination that a state election
law was voided by a federal election law; however, instead of
adopting the Fifth Circuitâ��s Supremacy Clause analysis, the
Court analyzed the claim under the Elections Clause, without
ever mentioning a presumption against preemption or plain
statement rule. See Foster, 522 U.S. 67, affâ��g 90 F.3d 1026
(5th Cir. 1996). In fact, our survey of Supreme Court opinions
deciding issues under the Elections Clause reveals no case
where the Court relied on or even discussed Supremacy
Clause principles. Because the Elections Clause empowered
Congress to enact the NVRA, see Wilson, 60 F.3d at 1413-14,
the preemption analysis under that Clause applies here.
The Supreme Court first explained the principles of Elections Clause preemption in Siebold, 100 U.S. 371. In that
case, the Court likened the relationship between laws passed
by state legislatures and those enacted by Congress under the
Elections Clause to â��prior and subsequent enactments of the
same legislature.â�� Id. at 384. â��The State laws which Congress
sees no occasion to alter, but which it allows to stand, are in
effect adopted by Congress.â�� Id. at 388. Just as a subsequent
legislature is not required to make an â��entirely new setâ�� of
laws when modifying those of a prior legislature, neither is
Congress required to wholly take over the regulation of federal election procedures when choosing to â��make or alterâ��
certain of the statesâ�� rules. Id. at 384. There is no â��intrinsic
difficulty in such co-operationâ�� between the state and national
legislatures because the two governments do not possess an
â��equality of jurisdictionâ�� with respect to federal elections. Id.
at 392. In all instances, â��the laws of the State, in so far as they
are inconsistent with the laws of Congress on the same subject, cease to have effect as laws.â�� Id. at 397.
Over a century later, the Supreme Court clarified what constitutes a conflict under an Elections Clause analysis. See Foster, 522 U.S. 67. Foster considered whether a congressional
enactment superseded a Louisiana statute regulating the same
federal election procedure. Id. at 68-69. Specifically, federal
law set the date for congressional elections as the Tuesday
after the first Monday in November. Id. at 68. A Louisiana
statute established an open primary in October for the offices
of United States Senator and Representative. Id. at 70. Only
if the open primary failed to result in a majority candidate
would a run off election between the top two candidates be
held on Congressâ��s specified election day. Id. In response to
a challenge by Louisiana voters, the Court unanimously held
that the state and federal acts conflicted and thus that the federal statute superseded the Louisiana law. Id. at 74.
The Court rejected the stateâ��s claim that its statute and the
federal enactment could be construed harmoniously. Id. at
72-73. Louisiana asserted that â��the open primary system concern[ed] only the â��mannerâ�� of electing federal officials, not
the â��timeâ�� at which the elections will take place.â�� Id. at 72.
The Court discarded the stateâ��s â��attempt to draw this timemanner lineâ�� as â��merely wordplayâ�� and an â��imaginative characterizationâ�� of the statutes. Id. at 72-73. Building upon the
principles from Siebold, the Court declined to adopt a strained
interpretation of the statutes to reconcile a potential disagreement.9 See id. Rather, the Court emphasized Congressâ��s ple9
The dissentâ��s claim that in Foster there was a â��blatant conflictâ��
between the state and federal election laws, dis. op. at 4213, is incorrect.
Rather, the petitioners in Foster proffered a reading of the state and federal statutes that at least technically avoided a conflict. See Foster, 522
U.S. at 72 (arguing that â��because Louisiana law provides for a â��general
electionâ�� on federal election day in those unusual instances when one is
nary authority not only to supplant state rules but to conscript
states to carry out federal enactments under the Elections
Clause, and found it enough that, under a natural reading, the
state and federal enactments addressed the same procedures
and were in conflict. Id. Refusing to pare the statute â��down
to the definitional bone,â�� the Court held that the state enactment was void. Id. at 72, 74.
Reading Siebold and Foster together, we derive the following approach for determining whether federal enactments
under the Elections Clause displace a stateâ��s procedures for
conducting federal elections. First, as suggested in Siebold,
we consider the state and federal laws as if they comprise a
single system of federal election procedures. Siebold, 100
U.S. at 384. If the state law complements the congressional
procedural scheme, we treat it as if it were adopted by Congress as part of that scheme. See id. If Congress addressed the
same subject as the state law, we consider whether the federal
act has superseded the state act, based on a natural reading of
the two laws and viewing the federal act as if it were a subsequent enactment by the same legislature. Foster, 522 U.S. at
74; see id. at 72-73. If the two statutes do not operate harmoniously in a single procedural scheme for federal voter registration, then Congress has exercised its power to â��alterâ�� the
stateâ��s regulation, and that regulation is superseded.
Before applying this Elections Clause analysis here, we
must understand the scope and application of the federal and
needed, the open primary system concerns only the â��mannerâ�� of electing
federal officials, not the â��timeâ�� at which the elections will take placeâ��).
The Court rejected this reading as â��merely wordplay.â�� Id. The dissent provides a similarly strained reading of the NVRA and Proposition 200, see
dis. op. at 4203-04, 4206-07 which likewise falls short, see infra at
4138-43.
state statutes at issue, namely the NVRA and Proposition
200â��s registration provision.
The NVRA prescribes three methods for registering voters
for federal elections. 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1973gg-2(a). These methods
are: (1) â��by application made simultaneously with an application for a motor vehicle driverâ��s license,â�� id. Â§ 1973gg-2(a)(1);10
(2) â��by mail applicationâ�� using the Federal Form prescribed
by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC),11 id.
Â§Â§ 1973gg-2(a)(2), 1973gg-4; and (3) â��by application in personâ�� at sites designated in accordance with state law or state
voter registration agencies, id. Â§ 1973gg-2(a)(3). States must
â��establish procedures to registerâ�� voters through all three
methods â��notwithstanding any other Federal or State lawâ�� and
â��in addition to any other method of voter registration provided for under State law.â�� Id. Â§ 1973gg-2(a).12
In connection with prescribing these three methods of voter
registration, the NVRA mandates the creation of two new
voter registration applications. First, the NVRA requires
states to create a combined driverâ��s license and voter registration application form (the â��Motor Voter Formâ��) pursuant to
certain criteria set out in the statute. See id. Â§ 1973gg-3. The
Under this method, any application for a driverâ��s license submitted to
a state motor vehicle authority â��shall serve as an application for voter registration with respect to elections for Federal office unless the applicant
fails to sign the voter registration application.â�� Â§ 1973gg-3(a)(1). This provision earned the statute its informal name: the â��Motor Voter Law.â��
The responsibilities of the EAC were formerly held by the Federal
Election Commission (FEC). When Congress passed the Help America
Vote Act or 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, it created
the EAC, 42 U.S.C. Â§ 15321, which eventually absorbed the FECâ��s duties
under the NVRA, see 42 U.S.C. Â§ 15532. In this opinion, we refer to both
entities as the EAC.
States that do not require registration to vote or allow election-day
registration at polling places are exempt from the NVRA. See Â§ 1973gg2(b). These states are Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See 75 Fed. Reg. 47,729-01, 47,730 (Aug. 9,
NVRA also requires the EAC to create the Federal Form, a
nationally uniform voter application that applicants can use to
register by mail and in person at designated locations. See id.
Â§Â§ 1973gg-4, 1973gg-7(a)(2). In addition, states may (but are
not required to) create their own state mail voter registration
forms for federal elections (the â��State Formâ��), so long as
these forms meet certain criteria in the NVRA. See id.
Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(2).
The NVRA sets out a broad framework for the contents of
the Federal Form, including specifying certain items that must
be included on the form, along with other items that cannot
be. See id. Â§ 1973gg-7(b). Among other things, id. Â§ 1973gg7(b) provides that the Federal Form â��may require only such
identifying information . . . as is necessary to enable the
appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of
the applicant and to administer voter registration and other
parts of the election process.â�� Id. Â§ 1973gg-7(b)(1). Further,
the Federal Form must include a statement specifying â��each
eligibility requirement (including citizenship)â�� for voting
along with an â��attestation that the applicant meets each such
requirement,â�� id. Â§ 1973gg-7(b)(2)(A)-(B), and must require
â��the signature of the applicant, under penalty of perjury,â�� id.
Â§ 1973gg-7(b)(2)(C). In addition, the NVRA provides that the
Federal Form cannot include â��any requirement for notarization or other formal authentication,â�� id. Â§ 1973gg-7(b)(3).13
In full, section 1973-gg7(b) states that the Federal Form
(1) may require only such identifying information (including the
signature of the applicant) and other information (including data
relating to previous registration by the applicant), as is necessary
to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter registration and
other parts of the election process;
(2) shall include a statement thatâ��
The NVRA directs the EAC, in consultation with â��the chief
election officers of the States,â�� to develop the Federal Form
in a manner consistent with these broad guidelines. Id.
Â§ 1973gg-7(a)(2). The EAC discharged this statutory requirement by designing a Federal Form that met the criteria set
forth in section 1973gg-7(b). See 59 Fed. Reg. 32,311-01
(June 23, 1994), codified at 11 C.F.R., pt. 9428. As designed
by the EAC (and subsequently modified by HAVA, 42 U.S.C.
Â§Â§ 15301 et seq.), the Federal Form is a postcard.14 See 11
C.F.R. Â§ 9428.5. The top of the form asks â��Are you a citizen
of the United States of America?â�� and â��Will you be 18 years
old on or before election day?â�� with boxes for the applicant
to check yes or no.15 Applicants who check â��noâ�� to either of
these questions are instructed not to complete the form. If the
(B) contains an attestation that the applicant meets each such
(C) requires the signature of the applicant, under penalty of
(4) shall include, in print that is identical to that used in the attestation portion of the applicationâ��
(i) the voter eligibility requirements and penalties for false
applications set forth in Â§ 1973gg-6(a)(5);
(ii) a statement that, if an applicant declines to register to
vote, the fact that the applicant has declined to register will
remain confidential and will be used only for voter registration purposes; and
(iii) a statement that if an applicant does register to vote, the
office at which the applicant submits a voter registration
application will remain confidential and will be used only for
Id. Â§ 1973gg-7(b).
The Federal Form is set forth in Appendix A.
These two questions and the associated instructions were added to the
Federal Form by HAVA. 42 U.S.C. Â§ 15483(b)(4)(A)(i)-(ii).
applicant checks â��yesâ�� to both questions, the form then
requests the applicantâ��s name, address, date of birth, telephone number (optional), choice of party,16 race or ethnic
group,17 and â��ID number.â��18 It also requires the applicant to
attest (with a signature or mark) that he or she is a U.S. citizen, meets his or her stateâ��s voting eligibility requirements,
and has provided information that is â��true to the best of [his
or her] knowledge under penalty of perjury.â�� No other proof
of U.S. citizenship is required. The Federal Form postcard
may be dropped into the mail or delivered in person to one of
the designated offices.
As noted above, in addition to mandating the creation and
use of the Federal Form, the NVRA allows states to develop
and use an optional State Form for registering voters for federal elections. See 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(2). If a state
chooses to create a State Form, that form must conform to the
broad framework for the contents of the Federal Form set
forth in section 1973gg-7(b). See id. Arizona chose to create
a State Form19 that is similar to the Federal Form but requires
that first-time voters and persons who have moved between
Arizona counties â��also include proof of citizenship or the
â��Choice of partyâ�� is required in some states for voters who wish to
participate in closed primaries. It is not required to register to vote in general elections. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 32,314.
This box was included on the Federal Form to assist certain states in
their data collection efforts pursuant to Â§ 5 of the VRA. Id. at 32,315-16.
The â��ID numberâ�� is used for â��election administration purposes.â�� 11
C.F.R. Â§ 9428.4(a)(6), see 59 Fed. Reg. at 32,314 (explaining that ID numbers â��are not necessary for determining the eligibility of the applicant,â��
but rather are for assisting the states in administering the registration process). The Federal Formâ��s instruction booklet provides state-specific
instructions for the â��ID numberâ�� box: for Arizona, applicants must provide a driverâ��s license, non-operating identification license number, the
last four digits of a social security number, or write â��None.â�� These instructions are consistent with Arizonaâ��s election administration obligations
under HAVA. See infra at pp. 4144-45.
The Arizona State Form is set forth in Appendix B.
form will be rejected.â�� According to the State Form instructions, an applicant can satisfy this proof of citizenship requirement by writing in a designated box on the State Form the
number of the applicantâ��s Arizona driverâ��s license or nonoperating identification license issued after October 1, 1996,20
alien registration number, or specified tribal identification
number (as relevant). If the applicant lacks such a number, the
applicant must include a photocopy of one of the acceptable
documents listed on the State Form (such as a birth certificate,
U.S. passport, tribal document, or the like) along with the
form itself.
[4] While the NVRA permits states to use their own State
Forms to register voters for federal elections, the NVRA still
requires every state to â��accept and useâ�� the Federal Form
developed by the EAC. See id. Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(2) (â��In addition
to accepting and using [the Federal Form], a State may
develop and use a mail voter registration form that meets all
of the criteria stated in section 1973gg-7(b) of this title for the
registration of voters in elections for Federal office.â�� (emphasis added)). In this way, the NVRA guarantees that an applicant in any state seeking to register to vote in federal elections
may do so using the Federal Form.
Having reviewed the relevant provisions of the NVRA, we
now turn to Proposition 200â��s registration provision, which
states: â��The county recorder shall reject any application for
registration that is not accompanied by satisfactory evidence
of United States citizenship.â�� Ariz. Rev. Stat. Â§ 16-166(F).
The statute defines satisfactory evidence of U.S. citizenship to
include the number of the applicantâ��s driverâ��s license or nonoperating identification license, certain numbers associated
Arizona started requiring applicants to provide documentation of their
lawful status as U.S. residents as a condition of receiving a driverâ��s license
or non-operating identification license after October 1, 1996.
with Native American tribal status, the number of a certificate
of naturalization (or the in-person presentation of naturalization documents), or a legible photocopy of a U.S. birth certificate or passport.21 See id.
By its terms, this proof of citizenship requirement applies
to the Federal Form as well as to Arizonaâ��s State Form.22 In
Section 16-166(F) provides the following list of approved identification documents:
1. The number of the applicantâ��s driver license or nonoperating
identification license issued after October 1, 1996 by the department of transportation or the equivalent governmental agency of
another state within the United States if the agency indicates on
the applicantâ��s driver license or nonoperating identification
license that the person has provided satisfactory proof of United
2. A legible photocopy of the applicantâ��s birth certificate that verifies citizenship to the satisfaction of the county recorder.
3. A legible photocopy of pertinent pages of the applicantâ��s
United States passport identifying the applicant and the applicantâ��s passport number or presentation to the county recorder of
the applicantâ��s United States passport.
4. A presentation to the county recorder of the applicantâ��s United
States naturalization documents or the number of the certificate
of naturalization. If only the number of the certificate of naturalization is provided, the applicant shall not be included in the registration rolls until the number of the certificate of naturalization
is verified with the United States immigration and naturalization
service by the county recorder.
6. The applicantâ��s bureau of Indian affairs card number, tribal
treaty card number or tribal enrollment number.
Proposition 200 also amended state law to require Arizonaâ��s State
Form to â��contain . . . [a] statement that the applicant shall submit evidence
of United States citizenship with the application and that the registrar shall
reject the application if no evidence of citizenship is attached.â�� Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Â§ 16-152(A)(23). Because this provision does not affect the Federal
Form, we do not consider it here.
other words, Proposition 200â��s registration provision directs
Arizona county recorders to reject every Federal Form that is
submitted without the specified evidence of citizenship.
According to the Arizona Election Procedures Manual, which
has the force and effect of law, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Â§ 16-452,
if a rejected applicant wants to make a second attempt to provide evidence of citizenship, he or she must submit an entirely
new voter registration form in order to do so.23
We now turn to Gonzalez and ITCAâ��s contention that the
NVRAâ��s requirement that states â��accept and useâ�� the Federal
Form supersedes Proposition 200â��s registration provision as
applied to applicants using the Federal Form.24
[5] In assessing this argument, we apply the Elections
Clause framework we derived from Siebold and Foster and
consider the NVRA and Proposition 200â��s registration provision as if they comprise a single system of federal election
procedures. With respect to mail voter registration, the NVRA
provides that â��[e]ach State shall accept and useâ�� the Federal
Form â��for the registration of voters in elections for Federal
office.â�� 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(1). By contrast, Proposition
200â��s registration provision directs county recorders to â��reject
any application for registration that is not accompanied by
satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship,â�� as defined
The manual instructs county recorders:
If [a voter registration] form is not accompanied by proper proof
of citizenship, the voter registration form is not valid and either
will not be entered into the system or if it was entered into the
system, the record shall be canceled. If the registrant subsequently provides proof of citizenship, it must be accompanied by
a new voter registration form and a new registration date.
Arizona Secretary of State Elections Procedures Manual (Oct. 2007).
Gonzalez and ITCA do not challenge Proposition 200â��s registration
provision as applied to Arizonaâ��s State Form.
by Arizona law. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Â§ 16-166(F). When read
together, the federal and state enactments treat the same subject matter, namely, the procedure for registering by mail to
vote in federal elections using the Federal Form, but they do
not operate harmoniously. In fact, these procedures are seriously out of tune with each other in several ways.
First, the NVRA requires a county recorder to accept and
use the Federal Form to register voters for federal elections,
whereas the registration provision requires the same county
recorder to reject the Federal Form as insufficient for voter
registration if the form does not include proof of U.S. citizenship. Arizona attempts to harmonize these procedures, arguing that because the county recorder will accept the Federal
Form for voter registration so long as it includes satisfactory
evidence of citizenship, the county recorder is in fact complying with the NVRAâ��s mandate to â��accept and useâ�� the Federal
Form, per 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(1). Rejection of the Federal Form in certain circumstances, Arizona argues, does not
in itself mean that the state is failing to accept and use the
form. Indeed, Arizona asserts, Congress must have contemplated that some applicants using the Federal Form would be
rejected, because the NVRA directs states to notify â��each
applicant of the disposition of [his or her] application.â�� Id.
Â§ 1973gg-6(a)(2).
[6] We disagree. Although Arizona has offered a creative
avoid a direct conflict, we do not strain to reconcile a stateâ��s
federal election regulations with those of Congress, but consider whether the state and federal procedures operate harmoniously when read together naturally. See Foster, 522 U.S. at
72-74; Siebold, 100 U.S. at 384. Here, under a natural reading
of the NVRA, Arizonaâ��s rejection of every Federal Form submitted without proof of citizenship does not constitute â��accepting and usingâ�� the Federal Form. Arizona cannot cast
doubt on this conclusion by pointing out that the NVRA
allows states to reject applicants who fail to demonstrate their
eligibility pursuant to the Federal Form. Congress clearly
anticipated that states would reject applicants whose
responses to the Federal Form indicate they are too young to
vote, do not live within the state, or have not attested to being
U.S. citizens. Indeed, the NVRA instructs the EAC to request
information on the Federal Form for the precise purpose of
â��enabl[ing] the appropriate State election official to assess the
eligibility of the applicant.â�� 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1973gg-7(b)(1).
Thus, a state that assesses an applicantâ��s eligibility based on
the information requested on the Federal Form is â��accepting
and usingâ�� the form in exactly the way it was meant to be
used. In contrast, Proposition 200â��s registration provision
directs county recorders to assess an applicantâ��s eligibility
based on proof of citizenship information that is not requested
on the Federal Form, and to reject all Federal Forms that are
submitted without such proof. Rejecting the Federal Form
because the applicant failed to include information that is not
required by that form is contrary to the formâ��s intended use
The dissent likewise attempts to justify Arizonaâ��s rejection
of the Federal Form, but rests its arguments almost exclusively on the fact that Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(2) allows states to
develop and use a State Form, which may include requirements that are not included in the Federal Form. See dis. op
at 4200-03, 4204-06. According to the dissent, because states
may impose additional proof-of-citizenship requirements on
applicants using the State Form, it necessarily follows that
states may impose the same proof-of-citizenship requirements
on applicants using the Federal Form; that is, that they may
reject Federal Forms that do not include the additional proof
of citizenship. See dis. op. at 4203-06. But there is no logical
connection between the dissentâ��s premise and its conclusion,
which is contrary to the text of the statute. The NVRA clearly
requires states to accept and use the Federal Form (as
designed by the EAC) â��[i]n addition toâ�� the State Form.
The NVRAâ��s State Form provision, Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(2),
merely gives a state more options. Congress could have
required all states to use only the Federal Form, as designed
by the EAC, for federal elections. If Congress had done so,
then states could not use their state registration forms to register applicants for federal elections. Instead, Congress allowed
States to use their state registration forms to register applicants for both state and federal elections (provided the state
form complies with Â§ 1973gg-7(b)).25 But states cannot reject
applicants who register for federal elections who use the Federal Form. There is nothing illogical or inconsistent about
requiring states to accept the federal registration form in addition to their own state form.
In order to avoid the clear import of the NVRAâ��s text, the
dissent argues that the Federal Form merely establishes the
default minimum or baseline registration requirements. See
dis. op. at 4203-04, 4209. In effect, the dissent wants to
replace the words â��in addition toâ�� with the words â��instead
of,â�� so that â��a State may develop and use a mail voter registration form that meets all of the criteria stated in section
1973gg-7(b) of this titleâ�� instead of â��accepting and usingâ�� the
Federal Form. We have no authority to rewrite the statute,
however, and reject the dissentâ��s interpretation as being
inconsistent with the plain language. See id. (â��In addition to
accepting and using [the Federal Form], a State may develop
and use a mail voter registration form that meets all of the
criteria stated in section 1973gg-7(b) of this title for the registration of voters in elections for Federal office.â�� (emphasis
The dissent therefore has it exactly backwards in asserting that, under
our interpretation of Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(2), states may not use their state registration forms to register â��voters in elections for Federal office.â�� Dis. op.
at 4208. States may use their state registration forms to register voters in
elections for federal office; they simply may not require registrants to use
the State Form (or the equivalent of the State Form, namely, the Federal
Form altered to include additional state requirements).
[7] Second, Proposition 200â��s registration provision
clashes with the NVRAâ��s delegation of authority to the EAC
(not the states) to determine the contents of the Federal Form.
See id. Â§ 1973gg-7(a)(2). While states may suggest changes to
the Federal Form, the EAC has the ultimate authority to adopt
or reject those suggestions. See id. Â§ 1973gg-7(a). Here the
EAC sent Arizona a letter rejecting its proposal to modify the
Federal Form to require applicants to present documentary
proof of citizenship in order to register, see infra p. 4148 n.29,
but Arizona nevertheless proceeded to impose this additional
requirement on applicants using the Federal Form. Arizonaâ��s
insistence on engrafting an additional requirement on the Federal Form, even in the face of the EACâ��s rejection of its proposal, accentuates the conflict between the state and federal
procedures.26
Arizona attempts to minimize the clash between the NVRA
and Proposition 200 by noting that a proof of citizenship
requirement is consistent with the broad framework set out by
Congress in section 1973gg-7(b); specifically, Arizona notes
that the NVRA permits the Federal Form to seek such information as is necessary to â��assess the eligibility of the applicant,â�� id. Â§ 1973gg-7(b)(1), and does not expressly preclude
a requirement that applicants provide proof of citizenship.
Further, Arizona asserts that although Congress provided that
Arizona argues that McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 755-56 (6th
Cir. 2000), supports its conclusion that states may add requirements to the
Federal Form, so long as the NVRA does not expressly forbid those
requirements. Arizona is misreading McKay. In that case, the court
rejected a prospective voterâ��s objection to Tennesseeâ��s practice of requiring a full social security number as a precondition to successful registration, see id. at 754, stating that â��[t]he NVRA does not specifically forbid
use of social security numbers.â�� Id. at 756. But this holding does not help
Arizona because the Federal Form allows states to instruct applicants to
provide their full social security numbers in the â��ID numberâ�� box on the
Federal Form (and Tennesseeâ��s instructions do so). See supra p. 4135 &
n.18. McKay therefore does not support the proposition that a state may
condition registration on an applicantâ��s provision of information that is not
requested on the Federal Form.
the mail voter registration form â��may not include any requirement for notarization or other formal authentication,â�� id.
Â§ 1973gg-7(b)(3), Arizonaâ��s demand for proof of citizenship
does not amount to such a requirement. This argument misses
the point. Even assuming, without deciding, that Arizona is
correct in its interpretation of section 1973gg-7(b), this would
mean only that the NVRA allows Arizona to include a proof
of citizenship requirement on its State Form. See id.
Â§ 1973gg-4(a)(2) (allowing a state to â��develop and use a mail
voter registration form that meets all of the criteria stated in
section 1973gg-7(b)â��). It would not mean that Arizona has
authority to add this requirement to the Federal Form. Congress entrusted that decision to the EAC. Once the EAC determined the contents of the Federal Form, Arizonaâ��s only role
was to make that form available to applicants and to â��accept
and useâ�� it for the registration of voters.
[8] Third, Proposition 200â��s registration provision is discordant with the NVRAâ��s goal of streamlining the registration
process. See, e.g., Natâ��l Coal. for Students with Disabilities
Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 285 (4th Cir.
1998) (â��Congress passed the NVRA . . . to make it easier to
register to vote . . . .â��); ACORN v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 835
(6th Cir. 1997) (â��In an attempt to reinforce the right of qualified citizens to vote by reducing the restrictive nature of voter
registration requirements, Congress passed the [NVRA].â��).
While the EAC chose to design the Federal Form as a postcard, which could be easily filled out and mailed on its own,
Proposition 200â��s registration provision makes the Federal
Form much more difficult to use. For example, nothing on the
face of the Federal Form or in the state-specific instructions
for Arizona indicates that some applicants may need to provide a full social security number, a tribal identification number, or an alien registration number, as Proposition 200
requires.27 Nor does the Federal Form instruct that additional
Because the Federal Form can be used as a mail-in postcard, the dissentâ��s credit card analogy, see dis. op. at 4204, is not on point. A con-
documents, such as birth certificates or passports, must be
provided by some applicants. Even if an applicant were aware
of Arizonaâ��s requirement to provide documentary proof of citizenship with the Federal Form, the applicant would have to
locate the required document, photocopy it, and enclose the
photocopy with the form in an envelope for mailing. In short,
much of the value of the Federal Form in removing obstacles
to the voter registration process is lost under Proposition
Notwithstanding these concerns, Arizona asserts that Proposition 200â��s registration provision imposes little additional
burden on applicants, because only a small minority of applicants lack a driverâ��s license number, tribal identification number, or alien registration number, all of which could suffice to
show citizenship and can easily be written on the Federal
Form. For this reason, Arizona contends, its proof of citizenship requirement is not excessively burdensome under the
standard set forth in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, 553 U.S. 181, 199-200 (2008) (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). This argument misses the
mark. The goal of the NVRA was to streamline the registration process for all applicants; the fact that Proposition 200â��s
registration provision only partially undermines this goal does
not make it harmonious with the NVRA. Nor does Crawford
provide support for Arizonaâ��s argument. In Crawford, the
Court considered whether a polling place requirement
imposed a substantial burden on the right to vote, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 187. Even if Arizona
is correct that Proposition 200â��s registration provision does
sumer would rightly cry foul if a merchant claimed it would â��accept and
useâ�� mailed-in credit card information for a purchase, but then refused to
complete the transaction because the consumer failed to include additional
information that the merchant had not requested. By the same token, the
Federal Form does not request documentary proof of citizenship. Because
a state must â��accept and useâ�� this form it cannot reject it merely because
an applicant has mailed it in without including information that is not
expressly required.
not impose such a burden, this conclusion sheds no light on
the question before us here: whether the registration provision
is displaced by the NVRA under an Elections Clause analysis.
Because on its face the NVRA does not give states room
to add their own requirements to the Federal Form, Arizona
suggests that Congressâ��s subsequent enactment of HAVA permits us to reinterpret the NVRA to allow states to impose
additional requirements on applicants for voter registration.
Again, we disagree, because by its terms HAVA precludes
Congress enacted HAVA in response to the 2000 Presidential election and the ensuing controversial Florida recount. See
Fla. State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153,
1155 (11th Cir. 2008). For the most part, the NVRA and
HAVA operate in separate spheres: the NVRA regulates voter
registration, whereas HAVA is concerned with updating election technologies and other election-day issues at polling
places. However, a handful of provisions in HAVA relate to
the voter registration process, primarily by creating mechanisms through which states can ensure that the person who
appears to cast a ballot at the polls is the same person who
registered to vote. Relevant here, HAVA requires states to
obtain (or assign) unique identification numbers for all registered voters: each applicant must provide his or her driverâ��s
license number or the last four digits of his or her social
security number on the voter registration form, or if the applicant lacks such a number, the state must assign the applicant
a number â��which will serve to identify the applicant for voter
registration purposes.â�� 42 U.S.C. Â§ 15483(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii). In
addition, states are to take steps to verify that the applicantâ��s
claimed identity matches the identification number he or she
provided. See id. Â§ 15483(a)(5)(A)(iii) (requiring states to
â��determine whether the [identification] information provided
by an individual is sufficient to meet the requirementsâ�� of
HAVA); see also Crawford, 553 U.S. at 192.
HAVA also includes language limiting its scope. It clarifies
that â��[t]he requirements established by [HAVA] are minimum
requirements and nothing in [HAVA] shall be construed to
prevent a State from establishing election technology and
administration requirements that are more strict than the
requirements established under [HAVA] so long as such State
requirements are not inconsistent with the Federal requirements under [HAVA] or any law described in section 15545
of this title.â�� Id. Â§ 15484. Section 15545 is HAVAâ��s savings
clause: it provides that except for the changes to the NVRA
specified in HAVA, â��nothing in this Act may be construed to
authorize or require conduct prohibited under [a number of
federal laws, including the NVRA], or to supersede, restrict,
or limit the application of [those federal laws].â�� Id.
Â§ 15545(a).
Arizona argues that HAVA gives it the authority to impose
additional requirements on applicants using the Federal Form