Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/193/195/477611/
Timestamp: 2020-06-06 16:44:41
Document Index: 783265892

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2241', '§2', '§2', '§45', '§2', '§47', '§2']

Edwin P. Wilson, Appellant, v. United States Parole Commission; J.t. Holland, Warden, 193 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1999) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1999 › Edwin P. Wilson, Appellant, v. United States Parole Commission; J.t. Holland, Warden
Edwin P. Wilson, Appellant, v. United States Parole Commission; J.t. Holland, Warden, 193 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1999)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 193 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1999) Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on June 11, 1999Decided September 29, 1999
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. The petitioner, Edwin P. Wilson, a federal prisoner, attempted to contract for the murders of several people while he was in federal custody, but prior to the date on which the penitentiary received him for service of his sentence. He alleges that the United States Parole Commission violated its own rules when it applied the rescission guidelines of 28 C.F.R. §2.36 to his conduct, when the regulation's plain language applies only to "disciplinary infractions or new criminal behavior committed by a prisoner subsequent to the commencement of his sentence." The district court held that the Parole Commission's interpretation of its own guidelines was reasonable because Wilson was in federal custody awaiting trial on another indictment at the time of the new criminal behavior and denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Since, however, the same Parole Commission regulations at 28 C.F.R. §2.10 define sentence commencement as "the date on which the person is received at the penitentiary . . ., " we find that the Parole Commission contravened its regulation to which it is bound. We will reverse.
The central question before us is whether Wilson's criminal conduct triggers the application of the rescission guidelines, thus prolonging incarceration before parole eligibility. Our starting point on any question concerning the application of a regulation is its particular written text. See generally Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§45 - 47 (5th ed.) (1991). 28 C.F.R. §2.36 provides:
As a rule, a definition which declares what a term means is binding, National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp ., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982), and " [a] definition which declares what a term `means' . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 - 393 (1978), citing 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.07 (4th ed., Supp. 1978), See Leber v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 780 F.2d 372, 376 (3d Cir. 1986).
Exclusion of other definitions of "commencement of sentence" is not only required by the plain language but also by the regulation taken as a whole. Regulation §2.36 cautiously circumscribes the subject time period: time served at the prison between arrival at the prison and release on parole. Further, the regulation provides that " [c]redit shall be given towards service of these guidelines for any time spent in custody on a new offense," also differentiating the time serving the sentence in prison from "time spent in custody on a new offense."
The Parole Commission determined that Wilson's sentence commenced to run when he was first received into federal custody. The District Court agreed, asserting that " [t]he Commission's interpretation of its own guidelines as to when a sentence commences to run for the purpose of determining when an offense was committed is entitled to deference."
We find that the Parole Commission's interpretation is entitled to no deference as to the narrow question of when a sentence commences to run; the plain language of the regulation controls. Although courts often substantially defer to an agency's construction of its own regulations, Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1175 - 1176, 113 L. Ed. 2d. 117 (1991), and the Parole Commission enjoys a great deal of deference as to decisions regarding whether to grant parole to a particular individual, only where the meaning of a regulation is ambiguous should the reviewing court give effect to the agency's "reasonable interpretation," i.e., an interpretation which "sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulation . . . ." Id., 499 U.S. at 151, 111 S. Ct. At 1176, (quoting Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of Am., 423 U.S. 12, 15, 96 S. Ct. 172, 173, 46 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1975)).
Here, no deference is warranted because the Parole Commission's interpretation is inconsistent with the wording of the regulation. See id., 499 U.S. at 158. The administering agency's interpretation of a provision becomes relevant only if neither the plain meaning nor the legislative history determine interpretation of the provision, Stanley Work v. Snydergeneral Corp, 781 F. Supp. 659, 663 (E.D.Ca. 1990). We defer only where an agency's interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and the wording of the regulation.1 Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (1991).