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Judicial Declarations: Some reflections on quarrelsomeness and the abusive exercise of the right to institute legal proceedings
This featured item is an exclusive English translation of an article in French by Yves-Marie Morrissette, Rhodes Scholar and legal adviser to the veiled Communist Parti Québécois (PQ). (You can read the PQ’s Communist manifesto of 1972 or download it from the sidebar at CANADA How The Communists Took Control.)
This present article appeared in French under the title, “Quelques réﬂexions sur la quérulence et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester en justice“, published by the Barreau du Québec in their Congrès Annuel du Barreau du Québec (2002), ISSN 1185-7110. Any flaws in the translation are entirely our fault; Mr. Morissette has nothing to do with it. Feel free to suggest corrections, thank you. See next below for a PDF of the 2002 Conference announcement where this paper was presented.
Congrès du Barreau du Québec – 2002, Manoir Richelieu, Charlevoix, Salon de Thé (8h30 à 11h30). Pratique professionnelle (2002) : Le Justiciable qui se répresente seul, le plaideur trop belliqueux et le phénomène de la quérulence. Animateur : Me Jean Saint-Onge de Lavery, De Billy (Montréal). Conférenciers : L’honorable Lyse Lemieux, Juge en chef de la Cour supérieure du Québec et Yves-Marie Morissette, Faculté de droit, Université McGill, Montréal.1
Quelques réflexions sur la quérulence
et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester en justice
Yves-Marie Morissette *
* Professeur, Faculté de droit, Université McGill
* Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University
1. Je me référerai surtout, pour la conférence du 31 mai (2002), au texte paru en avril 2001 sous le titre « Pathologie et thérapeutique du plaideur trop belliqueux » 1. Il m’a cependant semblé utile, en prévision de cette conférence, d’explorer quelques pistes de réflexion complémentaires sur la quérulence, et de fournir un état des questions — une brève mise à jour, en somme — sur ce qui faisait déjà l’objet du texte publié au printemps 2001. Les notes qui suivent ont principalement pour objet d’identifier avec précision les sources que j’ai utilisées pour en permettre la consultation à qui s’y intéresserait.
1. I will refer in particular, for the conference of May 31st (2002), to the text published in April 2001 under the title “Pathologie et thérapeutique du plaideur trop belliqueux” 1. It however seemed to me to be useful, in preparation for this conference, to explore some complementary lines of thinking on quarrelsomeness, and to present the status of the questions – a short update, all in all – on what was already the subject of the text published in spring 2001. The main aim of the notes which follow is to allow precise identification of the sources I used for the purpose of consultation by those interested.
I. – CERTAINS ASPECTS PSYCHIATRIQUES ET JURIDIQUES DE LA QUÉRULENCE 2
A. Profil psychiatrique de la quérulence
I. – CERTAIN PSYCHIATRIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS Of QUARRELSOMENESS 2
A. Psychiatric Profile of the Querulent
2. La quérulence n’apparaît pas en tant que telle dans les deux répertoires de maladies psychiatriques les plus utilisés, la Classification statistique internationale des maladies et des problèmes de santé connexes de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé3 et le Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association4. Elle présente cependant un tableau clinique reconnu qui partage plusieurs caractéristiques avec des maladies répertoriées, dont la paranoïa et certains troubles de la personnalité (borderline personality disorder, narcissisme, etc.). Le plus souvent, le sujet n’aura pas conscience de sa situation — l’affection est dite « egosystonic » plutôt que « ego dystonic » en ce sens que, comme
2. Querulence [querulousness, quarrelsomeness] does not appear as such in the two most-used manuals of psychiatric diseases, the Classification statistique internationale des maladies et des problèmes de santé connexes of the World Health Organization3 and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association. 4 It however presents a recognized clinical picture which shares a number of characteristics with indexed diseases, including paranoia and some personality disorders (borderline personality disorder, narcissism, etc.). Generally, the subject will not be aware of his situation – the affliction is known as “egosystonic” rather than “ego dystonic” in the sense that, like
1. Voir Dévéloppements récents en déontologie, droit professionnel et disciplinaire, vol. 155, Éditions Yvon Blais inc., 2001, p. 167 [ci-après « Pathologie et thérapeutique »].
1. See Développements récents en déontologie, droit professionnel et disciplinaire, vol. 155, Editions Yvon Blais inc., 2001, p. 167 [hereafter, “Pathology and therapeutic”].
2. Je suis reconnaissant au Dr. Laurence Kirmayer, psychiatre et professeur à la Faculté de médecine de l’Université McGill, de m’avoir fourni de nombreux renseignements et références utiles sur le sujet.
2. I am grateful to Dr. Laurence Kirmayer, psychiatrist and professor at the Faculty of Medicine of McGill University, for having provided me with much information and many useful references on the subject.
3. La classification en est à sa dixième édition et est mieux connue sous son abbréviation anglaise, ICD-10, ou International Classification of Diseases.
3. The Classification is in its tenth edition and is better known by its English abbreviation, ICD-10, or International Classification of Diseases.
4. Le manuel, dont la quatrième édition date de 1994, est lui aussi habituellement identifié par une abréviation, DSM-4.
4. The manual, whose fourth edition goes back to 1994, is also usually identified by an abbreviation, DSM-4.
4 Congrès annuel du Barreau 2002
4 Bar Association Annual Conference 2002
l’érotomanie par exemple, elle échappe au sujet et s’auto-renforce. Ainsi, les manifestations de rejet à l’endroit du sujet érotomane5 sont interprétées par lui comme une confirmation du fait qu’il est aimé ; le quérulent interpréterait l’échec des recours qu’il exerce comme la confirmation qu’il n’a pas encore obtenu justice.
erotomania for example, it escapes the subject and is self-reinforcing. Thus, expressions of rejection toward the erotomaniac subject5 are interpreted by him as a confirmation of the fact that he is loved; the querulent would interpret the failure of the (legal) recourse he exerts as confirmation that he has not yet obtained justice.
B. Incidence du phénomène dans la jurisprudence québécoise
B. Incidence of the phenomenon in Quebec jurisprudence
3. Effectuant des recherches en vue de la conférence d’avril 2001, j’avais tenté d’identifier un certain nombre d’affaires tirées de la jurisprudence récente et dont chacune paraissait comporter un cas de quérulence non diagnostiqué. Plus d’une trentaine, je crois, ont été publiées depuis l’affaire Yorke c. Paskell-Mede6, mais le cas de figure en droit québécois, comme je le disais l’an dernier, demeure celui de Valery Fabrikant. Selon le psychiatre que j’ai consulté et à qui j’ai transmis les diverses affaires Fabrikant, le diagnostic s’imposerait ici d’emblée. Toutefois, il est intéressant de souligner que la perspective psychiatrique demeure thérapeutique et axée sur le sujet : « By anybody’s standard, me dit ce psychiatre, Fabrikant is functioning terribly and he has had terrible losses in his life ». Autrement dit, bien que psychiatrie et droit judiciaire puissent se rejoindre sur un diagnostic7, c’est toujours le sort du patient, et non celui de la Cour supérieure, qui préoccupe le psychiatre. On peut même supposer que, hors les cas extrêmes comme celui de Fabrikant, le quérulent n’intéressera guère le psychiatre : peut-être abuse-t-il des tribunaux, mais s’il vit en assez bonne harmonie avec ses semblables et assume sereinement sa condition, il n’a pas besoin d’être soigné, seulement tenu à distance par l’appareil judiciaire, ce qui n’est pas l’affaire du psychiatre.
3. Carrying out research for the conference of April 2001, I had tried to identify a certain number of matters drawn from the recent jurisprudence and each of which appeared to comprise a case of undiagnosed quarrelsomeness. More than about thirty, I believe, had been published since the business of Yorke c. Paskell-Mede6, but the representative case in Québec law, as I said last year, remains that of Valery Fabrikant. According to the psychiatrist that I consulted and to whom I transmitted the various Fabrikant cases, the diagnosis would obtain here from the start. However, it is interesting to stress that the psychiatric perspective remains therapeutic and centered on the subject: “By anybody’s standard,” the psychiatrist tells me, “Fabrikant is functioning terribly and he has had terrible losses in his life”. In other words, even though psychiatry and law can get together on a diagnosis7, it is always the fate of the patient, and not that of the Superior Court, which concerns the psychiatrist. One can even suppose that, outside of the extreme cases like that of Fabrikant, the querulent will hardly interest the psychiatrist: perhaps he abuses the courts, but if he lives in fairly good harmony with his fellows and assumes his condition peacefully, he does not need to be cured, only kept away from the legal apparatus, which is not the business of the psychiatrist.
5. Une description clinique parmi d’autres de l’érotomanie relève les caractéristiques suivantes : « Delusions centering around being loved intensely by another person — usually a famous person such as a movie star or a superior at work. [...] Subjects display paradoxical conduct: they interpret all verbal and physical denials as further proof of love. »
5. One clinical description among others of erotomania highlights the following characteristics: “Delusions centering around being loved intensely by another person — usually a famous person such as a movie star or a superior at work. [...] Subjects display paradoxical conduct: they interpret all verbal and physical denials as further proof of love.”
6. [1994] R.J.Q. 1964 (C.S. Lagacé) ; je pense ici, par exemple, aux affaires Nguiagain c. Commission de la fonction publique, [1996] R.J.Q. 3009 (C.S. Barakett), Byer c. Québec (Inspecteur général des institution financières), [1999] J.Q. 5789 (C.S. Fraiberg) ou Lecours c. Pilon, [2000] J.Q. 4953 (C.S. Picard).
6. [1994] R.J.Q. 1964 (C.S. Lagacé); I am thinking here, for example, of the matter of Nguiagain c. Commission de la fonction publique, [1996] R.J.Q. 3009 (C.S. Barakett), Byer c. Québec (Inspecteur général des institutions financières), [1999] J.Q. 5789 (C.S. Fraiberg) or Lecours c. Pilon, [2000] J.Q. 4953 (C.S. Picard).
7. L’une et l’autre, par exemple, tiennent compte du mode, du pattern, de comportement du sujet : la quérulence, en effet, ne se diagnostique que dans la durée.
Admin JMad : Si bien la quérulence existait comme maladie mentale, et si, comme « le Dr » Morissette l’indique ici elle ne peut être diagnostiquée « que dans la durée », comment les cours peuvent-elles s’autoriser à « diagnostiquer » un justiciable comme étant mentalement malade avec la quérulence sur la base d’une requête dans une seule cause ? C’est exactement ce que les règles de la Cour Supérieure et de la Cour d’appel prétendent « ordonner » en particulier une fois combinées aux nouvelles dispositions du Cpc de 2009 concernant la quérulence. Une cause, même tumultueuse, n’est pas le « long terme ». Nous pouvons commencer à nous demander, alors, ce que sont vraiment ces « registres » qui identifient tous ces justiciables allégués « mentalement malade ». Nos seigneurs et maîtres compilent-ils un « groupe de contrôle » pour une étude « à long terme » afin de défendre « les déclarations judiciaires de la folie » originales ? En serrant des personnes innocentes pour les forcer à réagir afin de les observer comme on observe des rats dans une expérience de laboratoire ?
7. One and the other, for example, take account of the mode, the pattern, of behavior of the subject: quarrelsomeness, indeed, is diagnosed only in the long-term.
Admin JMad: If querulousness as a mental illness did exist, and if, as according to “Dr.” Morissette here it is “only diagnosed in the long term”, how can the courts authorize themselves to declare a litigant mentally ill with querulousness on the basis of a single motion in a single case? Which is exactly what the Superior Court and Court of Appeal “Rules” purport to authorize, in particular when combined with the new 2009 provisions of the CCP on querulousness. One case, even a tumultuous case, is not the “long term”. We can start to wonder, then, what these “lists” really are, which are said to identify all these allegedly “mentally ill” litigants. Are our lords and masters compiling a “control group” for a study in order to vindicate the original “judicial declarations of madness”? By squeezing innocent people to force them to react, like rats in a lab experiment?
Quelques réﬂexions sur la quérulence et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester en justice 5
Some reflections on quarrelsomeness and the abusive exercise of the right to institute legal proceedings 5
C. Aspects juridiques de la quérulence
C. Legal aspects of quarrelsomeness
4. Outre quelques apparitions officieuses, la quérulence fait aussi de loin en loin des apparitions officielles dans la jurisprudence. J’en retiens deux illustrations. On a déjà jugé, à mon avis avec raison, qu’un diagnostic même tout à fait vraisemblable de quérulence, porté par un psychiatre appelé comme expert, ne saurait constituer une preuve d’aliénation mentale en défense à une accusation de voies de fait8. Dans une autre espèce9, plus intéressante, le demandeur se représentait lui-même et soutenait que son incapacité permanente de travailler résultant d’un état quérulent diagnostiqué par deux psychiatres10 lui donnait droit au crédit d’impôt pour déficience physique ou mentale prévu par l’article 118.3 de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu. Il fut débouté devant la Cour canadienne de l’impôt et devant la Cour d’appel fédérale, en raison du libellé spécifique de la loi qui vise, ici, les incapacités de se livrer aux activités de la vie courante, et non l’incapacité permanente de travailler.
4. In addition to some semi-official appearances, quarrelsomeness is also making headway in official appearances in the jurisprudence. I advance two illustrations of these. It has already been judged, in my opinion correctly, that a diagnosis even of quite probable quarrelsomeness, carried out by a psychiatrist called as an expert, could not constitute proof of mental unbalance in defense to a charge of assault.8 In another more interesting case, the applicant represented himself and alleged that his permanent disability to work resulting from a state of quarrelsomeness diagnosed by two psychiatrists10 entitled him to the tax credit for physical or mental deficiency envisaged by article 118.3 of the Income Tax Act. He lost before the Canadian Tax Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, because of the specific wording of the law which here is aimed at inabilities to engage in activities of everyday life, and not the permanent disability to work.
8. R. v. Walsh (1990), 95 N.S.R. (2d) 126 (N.S. Co. Ct.). Voir dans le même sens U.S. v. Riggin, 732 F.Supp. 958 (1990), un cas exemplaire de quérulence, où l’on peut lire, à la p.960 : « Dr. Small concluded that Mr. Riggin suffers from a rare form of “Paranoid Personality Disorder”. He further considered that Mr. Riggin may be suffering from delusional disorders of a persecutory type and further reported that Mr. Riggin behaves in a rigid, inflexible way and that he does seem to have the problem “quarrelsome paranoïa.” Ominously, Dr. Small concluded his report by stating that there is no good treatment for this condition. »
8. R. v. Walsh (1990), 95 N.S.R. (2d) 126 (N.S. Co. Ct.). See in the same sense U.S. v. Riggin, 732 F.Supp. 958 (1990), an exemplary case of quarrelsomeness, where one can read, at page 960: “Dr. Small concluded that Mr. Riggin suffers from a rare form of ‘Paranoid Personality Disorder’. He further considered that Mr. Riggin may be suffering from delusional disorders of a persecutory type and further reported that Mr. Riggin behaves in a rigid, inflexible way and that he does seem to have the problem ‘quarrelsome paranoïa.’ Ominously, Dr. Small concluded his report by stating that there is no good treatment for this condition.”
9. Roussel c. Canada, [1997] A.C.I. 1195, confirmé pour les mêmes motifs par Roussel c. Canada (Ministre du revenu national), [2000] A.C.F. 1724, 2000 D.T.C. 6608.
9. Roussel c. Canada, [1997] A.C.I. 1195, confirmed for the same reasons by Roussel c. Canada (Ministre du revenu national), [2000] A.C.F. 1724, 2000 D.T.C. 6608.
10. Le diagnostic était on ne peut plus explicite et il est peut-être utile de citer ici le rapport médical reproduit au par. 8 de la décision de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt : « Monsieur Roger Roussel se présente comme une personne intelligente qui a réussi à s’éduquer et à devenir autonome malgré les conditions d’adversité et de carence dans son enfance. Il est à l’emploi du gouvernement du Québec depuis 27 ans, mais n’a pas réussi, dans ses perceptions de lui-même, à obtenir la reconnaissance et le mérite qui lui reviennent. En effet, il se sent bloqué depuis 14 ans dans un poste de technicien en administration. En outre, monsieur Roussel a un profil de personnalité caractérisé par de la rigidité, une hypertrophie du moi et un manque de souplesse et d’adaptabilité dans une organisation telle qu’une bureaucratie gouvernementale. Dans ce contexte inévitablement conflictuel au travail et compte tenu de ses traits de personnalité, il s’est insidieusement développé chez monsieur Roger Roussel un trouble mental caractérisé par un délire de revendication qui l’amène à totalement s’investir dans des litiges sans fin. Cette pathologie correspond à ce que l’on appelle la paranoïa querulans de type processif. Il s’agit d’un trouble mental plutôt rare, caractérisé simplement par un délire de type persécutoire bien systématisé qui n’affecte pas les fonctions intellectuelles et le jugement en dehors de la sphère du délire. Cependant, ce délire envahissant affecte le comportement de la personne qui en est atteinte et qui consacre une bonne partie de sa vie à obtenir justice en s’impliquant dans des démarches judiciaires pratiquement sans fin et à son propre détriment.
10. The diagnosis could not have been more explicit and it is perhaps useful to quote the medical report reproduced at par. 8 of the decision of the Canadian Tax Court: “Mr Roger Roussel presents himself as an intelligent person who succeeded in educating himself and becoming autonomous in spite of conditions of adversity and deficiency in his childhood. He has been in the employ of the government of Quebec for 27 years, but has not succeeded, in his own perceptions of himself, in obtaining the recognition and the merit which are due to him. Indeed, he has felt blocked for 14 years in the post of a technician in administration. Moreover, Mr. Roussel has a personality profile characterized by rigidity, a hypertrophy of the ego and a lack of finesse and adaptability for an organization such as a governmental bureaucracy. In this inevitably conflictual context at work and taking into account his personality features, a mental disorder has insidiously developed in Mr. Roger Roussel characterized by a delirium of assertions which brings him to completely invest himself in litigations without end. This pathology corresponds so what is called quarrelsome paranoia of the litigious type. This is a question of a rather rare mental disorder, characterized simply by a well systematized delirium of the persecution type which does not affect the intellectual functions and the judgment outside the sphere of the delirium. However, this pervasive delirium affects the behavior of the person who is afflicted with it and who devotes a good part of his life to obtaining justice by involving himself in legal pursuits without end and to his own detriment.
6 Congrès annuel du Barreau 2002
6 Bar Association Annual Conference 2002
D. Plasticité du diagnostic
D. Plasticity of the diagnosis
5. Il me semble opportun avant de quitter la quérulence d’ajouter deux observations sur le sujet. La première concerne ce qu’on appelle en anglais « the apprehension of overinclusive diagnosis », un risque sérieux en psychiatrie où les symptômes sont moins tangibles qu’en orthopédie. La plasticité du diagnostic psychiatrique le rend en effet vulnérable à des manipulations, comme l’a démontré en URSS l’histoire de la « schizophrénie lente » ou « schizophrénie indolente »11. Ce diagnostic suscita à la longue des protestations véhémentes de la part de l’Association mondiale de psychiatrie. Il servit pourtant pendant des années à isoler en milieu psychiatrique des individus sains d’esprit mais opposés au régime. Or, une personne peut exhiber une propension à la quérulence tout en ayant des revendications de droit légitimes, et il n’est pas rares que les tribunaux servent de dernier retranchement à des justiciables tenaces dont les positions impopulaires ou gênantes demeurent néanmoins licites12. S’il peut être utile de connaître le profil psychiatrique de la quérulence dans l’appréciation de certains comportements, la prudence demeure de mise
5. It seems to me opportune, before leaving querulousness, to add two observations on the subject. The first relates to what is called in English “the apprehension of overinclusive diagnosis”, a serious risk in psychiatry where the symptoms are less tangible than in orthopedy. The plasticity of the psychiatric diagnosis indeed makes it vulnerable to manipulation, as has been demonstrated by the history of “creeping schizophrenia” or “slow schizophrenia” in the USSR.11 This diagnosis in the long term elicited vehement protests from the Worldwide Association of Psychiatry. It perhaps served to isolate for years in a psychiatric milieu individuals who were sound of mind but opposed to the regime. Now, a person can exhibit a propensity for quarrelsomeness while having legitimate legal claims, and it is not rare that the courts serve as the last barricade for those tenacious litigants whose unpopular or troublesome views remain nonetheless legitimate12. If it can be useful to know the psychiatric profile of quarrelsomeness in the appreciation of certain behaviors, prudence still is called for
Malheureusement, ils’agit d’une maladie chronique qui ne répond pas bien au traitement psychiatrique. Conclusion : J’arrive donc à la conclusion que monsieur Roger Roussel, compte tenu de son trouble mental, est inapte à reprendre son travail en tant que technicien en administration au MEQ [Ministère de l’Éducation du Québec]. Compte tenu aussi de la chronicité de sa maladie et de son pronostic réservé, je suis d’avis que l’on devrait considérer monsieur Roger Roussel en invalidité totale et permanente. »
Unfortunately, this is a matter of a chronic disease which does not respond well to psychiatric treatment. Conclusion: I thus conclude that Mr. Roger Roussel, taking into account his mental disorder, is inapt to resume his work as a technician in administration with the MEQ [Minister of Education of Quebec]. Taking into account also the chronic nature of his disease and his negative forecast, I am of the opinion that one should consider Mr. Roger Roussel as being in a state of complete and permanent disability.”
11. CHODOFF, Paul et REICH, Walter en donnent un compte rendu frappant dans l’ouvrage collectif dirigé par Sidney Bloch, Paul Chodoff et Stephen A. Green, Psychiatric Ethics, 3e éd., Oxford University Press, New York, 1999. Dans son chapitre « Misuse and abuse of psychiatry : an overview », Chodoff écrit sur la psychiatrie en URSS, p.58 : « … the Snezhnevsky system made it easy to classify dissenters as suffering such illnesses as ‘sugglish schizophrenia’, a diagnosis not disqualfied by ‘seeming normality’ and ‘absence of symptoms’, or, as illustrated by the case of General Grigorenko, by a panoply of human characteristics mislabelled as symptoms. ». Reich, dans un chapitre intitulé « Psychiatric diagnosis as an ethical problem », p. 196 et ss., retrace l’origine du diagnostic : « In its definition of the schizophrenic disorder this system employed such broad and loose criteria that it permitted the diagnosis of schizophrenia in cases in which, in the West, there would be no finding of mental illness. ». La liste des symptômes pertinents dans l’établissement de ce diagnostic comprend « originality, ideological formulations, fear and suspiciousness, religiosity, depression, ambivalence, guilt, internal conflicts, and behavioural disorganization, intensity, attention to detail, poor adaptation to the social environment, shift of interests, reformism » (p. 203).
11. CHODOFF, Paul and REICH, Walter give a striking account of it in the collective work directed by Sidney Bloch, Paul Chodoff and Stephen A. Green, Psychiatric Ethics, 3rd Ed., Oxford University Press, New York, 1999. In his chapter “Misuse and abuse of psychiatry: an overview”, Chodoff writes on psychiatry in the USSR, p.58: “… the Snezhnevsky system made it easy to classify dissenters as suffering such illnesses as ‘sugglish schizophrenia’, a diagnosis not disqualified by ‘seeming normality’ and ‘absence of symptoms’, or, as illustrated by the case of General Grigorenko, by a panoply of human characteristics mislabelled as symptoms.”. Reich, Reich, in a chapter entitled “Psychiatric diagnosis as an ethical problem”, p. 196 et ss., retraces the origin of the diagnosis: “In its definition of the schizophrenic disorder this system employed such broad and loose criteria that it permitted the diagnosis of schizophrenia in cases in which, in the West, there would be no finding of mental illness.”. The list of relevant symptoms in the establishment of this diagnosis includes “originality, ideological formulations, fear and suspiciousness, religiosity, depression, ambivalence, guilt, internal conflicts, and behavioral disorganization, intensity, attention to detail, poor adaptation to the social environment, shift off interests, reformism” (p. 203)
12. C’est peut-être ce qu’illustre une affaire comme Choueke c. Coopérative d’habitation Jeanne-Mance, [2001] J.Q. 2782 (C.A. Chamberland, Otis, Pelletier), REJB 2001-24642, où les parties, par ailleurs représentées par avocat, se montraient également récalcitrantes l’une envers l’autre.
12. This is perhaps what illustrates a matter like that of Choueke c. Coopérative d’habitation Jeanne-Mance, [2001] J.Q. 2782 (A.C. Chamberland, Otis, Pelletier), REJB 2001-24642, where the parties who were moreover represented by lawyers, were equally recalcitrant toward one another.
avant de restreindre la faculté d’un justiciable de s’adresser aux tribunaux. C’est d’ailleurs de façon évidente l’attitude pondérée qu’adoptent les tribunaux ici comme en Angleterre.
before restricting the faculty of a litigant to address the courts. This is moreover the obviously balanced attitude adopted by courts here, as in England.
E. Fonction thérapeutique du procès
E. Therapeutic function of the lawsuit
6. Enfin, et dans un registre voisin, il ne faut pas sous-estimer la valeur proprement thérapeutique du légendaire « day in court », souvent la seule occasion pour le sujet de droit de donner librement sa version de l’histoire. Il s’est développé en droit américain depuis une quinzaine d’années une influente école de pensée, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, qui s’efforce de mettre en lumière, voire de mesurer, l’effet thérapeutique des voies du droit, qu’il s’agisse de procédures judiciaires ou autres13. On veut ainsi évaluer avec plus de rigueur des phénomènes dont beaucoup de membres de la magistrature ont déjà fortement l’intuition, et que certains d’entre eux ont décrits avec éloquence ici ou ailleurs. J’en donnerais comme exemple, parmi bon nombre d’autres, les propos récents du juge Jack B. Weisntein14, un observateur averti de l’administration de la justice.
6. Lastly, and in a similar tone, one should not underestimate the, in the final analysis, therapeutic value of the legendary “day in court”, often the only opportunity for the subject of the law to freely give his version of the story. An influential school of thought has developed in American law over the past fifteen years or so, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, which endeavors to clarify, even to measure, the therapeutic effect of the paths of the law, which is to say, legal procedures or others13. The object is thus to evaluate with more rigour the phenomena concerning which many members of the magistrature already have a strong intuition, and which some of them have described with eloquence here or elsewhere. I would give as an example, amongst a good number of others, the recent remarks of Judge Jack B. Weisntein14, an informed observer of the administration of justice.
13 WEXLER, David B. a fait figure de pionnier dans ce champ, avec son ouvrage Therapeutic Jurisprudence : The Law as a Therapeutic Agent, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 1990. Beaucoup de choses se sont écrites depuis, dont deux ouvrages collectifs sous la direction, respectivement, de WEXLER, David B. et WINICK, Bruce J., Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 1991, et de STOLLE, Dennis P., WEXLER, David B. et WINICK, Bruce J., Practising Therapeutic Jurisprudence : Law as a Helping Profession, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 2000. CORVETTE, Barabara A.B. dresse un court inventaire des domaines d’intervention de cette école dans « Therapeutic Jurisprudence » (2000), 2 Sociological Practice 127, et trois auteurs, WINICK, Bruce J., WEXLER, David B. et DAUER, Edward A., font un rapprochement avec le « droit préventif » dans « Preface — a New Model For The Practice Of Law » (1999), 5 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 795. À ma connaissance, la quérulence n’a presque jamais été évoquée en tant que telle par les tenants de cette école (voir cependant l’article de MILLER et al, (1986), cité à la note 4 de « Pathologie et thérapeutique »); mais plusieurs s’intéressent au phénomène de la propension litigieuse (litigiousness) et attribuent aux tribunaux une fonction bénéfique de soupape de régulation sociale.
13 WEXLER, David B. has been a pioneer in this field, with his work Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 1990. Many things have been written since, including two collective works directed respectively by WEXLER, David B. and WINICK, Bruce J., Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 1991, and by STOLLE, Dennis P., WEXLER, David B. and WINICK, Bruce J., Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping Profession, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 2000. CORVETTE, Barabara A. B. has drawn up a short inventory of the fields of intervention of this school in “Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (2000), 2 Sociological Practice 127, and three authors, WINICK, Bruce J., WEXLER, David B. and DAUER, Edward A., make a synthesis in “preventive law” in “Preface – a New Model For The Practice Of Law” (1999), 5 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 795. To my knowledge, quarrelsomeness has almost never been evoked as such by the exponents of this school (see, however, the article of MILLER et al., (1986), quoted at note 4 of “Pathology and Therapeutic”); but a number are interested in the phenomenon of the litigious propensity (litigiousness) and attribute to the courts the beneficial function of a pressure valve for social regulation.
14. Senior Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York. Le juge Weinstein écrit, dans « Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass Society » (2000), 8 Journal of Law and Policy 385, p. 409 et 410 : « The most powerful weapon we have is empathy. The leavening influence of regard for our fellow human beings and concern for their welfare does more than any practice, procedure, rule or statute to ensure equality in the courts and our administrative agencies. Nisi prius, as well as other judges, can become hardened by too much exposure to tragedy. Few of us find the time or interest to volunteer and help people in our deprived communities and, thus, get to know how
14. Senior Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York. Judge Weinstein writes, in “Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass Society” (2000), 8 Journal of Law and Policy 385, pp. 409 and 410: “The most powerful weapon we have is empathy. The leavening influence of regard for our fellow human beings and concern for their welfare does more than any practice, procedure, rule or statute to ensure equality in the courts and our administrative agencies. Nisi prius, as well as other judges, can become hardened by too much exposure to tragedy. Few of us find the time or interest to volunteer and help people in our deprived communities and, thus, get to know how
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II. – LA PARTIE NON REPRÉSENTÉE (« LITIGANTS IN PERSON », « PRO SE LITIGANTS »), MAIS PARFOIS CONSEILLÉE PAR UN TIERS
II. – UNREPRESENTED (“LITIGANTS IN PERSON”, “PRO SE LITIGANTS”), BUT SOMETIMES ADVISED BY A THIRD PARTY
A. Quérulence et partie non représentée
A. Qarrelsomeness and the non-represented party
7. Si l’équation « quérulent, donc partie non représentée » se vérifie très souvent en pratique, on ne peut évidemment pas l’inverser et soutenir que toute partie non représentée est quérulente. Pourtant, il est indéniable que les deux phénomènes se recoupent. Or, la partie non représentée est devenue depuis quelque temps une préoccupation croissante pour les tribunaux. En témoignent, par exemple, la parution toute récente d’un article sur le sujet à la première page d’un grand quotidien15 mais aussi, et de façon plus sérieuse, les constats dressés l’été dernier par le Comité Ferland et les éléments de réforme proposés par lui dans son rapport16. Compte tenu de la très grande qualité de ce rapport qui, à mon sens, sur ce point comme sur beaucoup d’autres, vide la question telle qu’elle se présente actuellement ici, il est inutile de revenir en détail sur le problème. On peut cependant se demander si les aménagements proposés pour venir en aide aux justiciables non représentés sont susceptibles de réduire la fréquence des initiatives judiciaires sans espoir. La réponse appelle quelques nuances.
7. If the equation “quarrelsome, therefore non represented” is very often confirmed in practise, one obviously cannot reverse it and assert that every non-represented party is quarrelsome. However, it is undeniable that the two phenomena cross-check. However, the non-represented party has for some time become an increasing concern for the courts. In witness whereof, for example, the very recent publication of an article on the subject on the first page of a famous daily newspaper15 but also, and in a more serious way, the reports drawn up last summer by the Ferland Committee and the elements of reform proposed by him in his report16. Taking into account the very great quality of this report, which, in my view, on this point as on many others, disposes of the question such as it currently arises here, it is futile to reconsider the problem in detail. One can however wonder whether improvements proposed to come to the assistance of the non represented litigant are likely to reduce the frequency of hopeless legal initiatives. The answer involves a few subtleties.
they live. We must try to bridge the gap between them and us. We must try to open communication between the heart of the law and the hearts of those who seek justice from us. This goal requires not only that we act justly on a moral plane, but also that we make our reasoning understandable and, so far as practicable, acceptable to every level of society. Leading appellate judges have described the appellate functions as performed almost entirely through research and cogitation. Such a description is not useful for trial lawyers and district judges who observe and deal with real people who are sometimes irrational, but always unique, interesting and important. Often what they want most is a hearing to demonstrate that we understand their fears and their sense of mortality. The need for sensitivity to people is just as true for lawyers in their offices as it is for judges in their courtrooms. »
they live. We must try to bridge the gap between them and us. We must try to open communication between the heart of the law and the hearts of those who seek justice from us. This goal requires not only that we act justly on a moral plane, but also that we make our reasoning understandable and, so far as practicable, acceptable to every level of society. Leading appellate judges have described the appellate functions as performed almost entirely through research and cogitation. Such a description is not useful for trial lawyers and district judges who observe and deal with real people who are sometimes irrational, but always unique, interesting and important. Often what they want most is a hearing to demonstrate that we understand their fears and their sense of mortality. The need for sensitivity to people is just as true for lawyers in their offices as it is for judges in their courtrooms.”
15. MAKIN, Kirk, « Lawyerless litigants slow wheels of justice », The Globe and Mail, 14 janvier 2003, p. A-1 et A-6.
15. MAKIN, Kirk, “Lawyerless litigants slow wheels of justice”, The Globe and Mail, January 14th, 2003, pp. A-1 and A-6.
16. Ministère de la Justice du Québec, Une nouvelle culture judiciaire, Rapport du Comité de révision de la procédure civile, juillet 2001, aux pages 14-19 et 87-95 — voir http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/special/francais/crpc/nouv-culture/culture.pdf. Nul doute que le problème sourd depuis assez longtemps, comme je l’avais constaté dans le champ du droit de la famille lors de la préparation du rapport Possible et actuelle, une plus grande humanisation du droit de la famille ?, Fondation du Barreau du Québec, 1997, p. 61-62.
16. Ministry of Justice of Quebec, A New Legal Culture, Report of the Committee on the Revision of Civil Procedure, July 2001, on pages 14-19 and 87-95. See http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/special/francais/crpc/nouv-culture/culture.pdf. There is no doubt that the problem has been muffled for quite a long time, as I had noted in the field of family law during preparation of the report Possible and Current, Greater humanization of Family Law?, Quebec Bar Foundation, 1997, pp. 61-62.
Quelques réﬂexions sur la quérulence et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester en justice 9
Some reflections on quarrelsomeness and the abusive exercise of the right to institute legal proceedings 9
B. Le rapport Woolf et le «litigant in person» en droit anglais
B. The Woolf report and the “litigant in person” in English law
8 En Angleterre, le rapport Woolf 17 aura marqué un point tournant, je crois, dans l’attitude judiciaire devant ce problème. La réforme qui en est issue, commencée en 1999 18, montre une très louable ouverture envers les justiciables, ouverture à laquelle font d’ailleurs écho les recommandations du Comité Ferland. Ainsi, dans son rapport intérimaire de juin 1995, dont le chapitre 17 était intitulé « Litigants in person », Lord Woolf abordait en ces termes la question de la partie non représentée : « Only too often the litigant in person is regarded as a problem for judges and for the court system rather than the person for whom the system of civil justice exists. The true problem is the court system and its procedures which are still too often inaccessible and incomprehensible to ordinary people. » Ce renversement de perspective devait mener à l’adoption d’une gamme de mesures comprenant l’entrée en vigueur de nouvelles Civil Procedure Rules, la création de kiosques d’information juridique, une utilisation remarquablement innovatrice des technologies de l’information 19, le recours systématique à la médiation ainsi qu’à d’autres modes de règlement des différends, et la mise sur pied du Community Legal Service 2 0. L’un des
8 In England, the Woolf 17 report marked a turning point, I believe, in the judicial attitude toward this problem. The resulting reform, begun in 1999 18, exhibits a very creditable openness toward litigants, an openness which moreover echoes the recommendations of the Ferland Committee. Thus, in his interim report of June 1995, in chapter 17 entitled “ Litigants in person ”, Lord Woolf tackled the question of the non-represented party in these terms : “Only too often the litigant in person is regarded as a problem for judges and for the court system rather than the person for whom the system of civil justice exists. The true problem is the court system and its procedures which are still too often inaccessible and incomprehensible to ordinary people.” This inversion of viewpoints led to the adoption of a range of measures including the coming into effect of new Civil Procedure Rules, the creation of legal information kiosks, a remarkably innovative use of information technologies 19, the systematic recourse to mediation, as well as other modes of dispute settlement, and the setting up of Community Legal Service 20. One of
17 LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, Access to Justice — Final Report, Londres, 1996 (aussi connu sous le nom de son auteur, Lord Woolf, à l’époque Master of Rolls et aujourd’hui Lord Chief Justice). Le rapport Woolf pava la voie pour le livre blanc Modernising Justice, Cm 4155, HM Stationery Office, 1998.
17 LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, Access to Justice — Final Report, Londres, 1996 (also known by the name of its author, Lord Woolf, at that time Master of the Rolls and today Lord Chief Justice). The Woolf report paved the way for the white paper, Modernising Justice, cm 4155, HM Stationery Office, 1998.
18 Elle a été entamée par le Access to Justice Act 1999 , mais elle se poursuit toujours et à dessein : en effet, l’un des objectifs de son principal auteur était de mettre en place une structure permanente qui verrait à l’amélioration constante du fonctionnement de la justice civile, le Civil Justice Council, établi par la loi de 1999.
18 It was undertaken by the Access to Justice Act 1999, but it continues and its objective: in effect, one of the objectives of its principal author was to set up a permanent structure to see to the constant improvement of the operation of civil justice, the Civil Justice Council, established by the law of 1999.
19 Le Court Service, dont le site internet, très chargé, peut être consulté à l’adresse http ://www.court- service.gov.uk/, se présente désormais comme suit : « The purpose of the Court Service is the delivery of justice. [...] As the key service-delivery arm of the Department, the Court Service plays an important part in implementing the Lord Chancellor’s agenda for a modern justice system. » Le portail du Court Service permettra éventuellement d’accéder en ligne à tous les tribunaux ; plusieurs sont déjà accessibles de cette façon.
19 The Court Service, whose heavily visited Internet site can be consulted at the address: http: //www.court- service.gov.uk/, henceforth is presented as follows: “The purpose of the Court Service is the delivery of justice. [...] As the key service-delivery arm of the Department, the Court Service plays an important part in implementing the Lord Chancellor’s agenda for a modern justice system.” The Court Service portal will eventually make it possible to access all the courts online; a number are already accessible this way.
20 On trouvera dans The Community Legal Service — A Consultation Paper, Lord Chancellor’s Department, Londres, 1999, une vue d’ensemble des mesures qui ont accompagné la réforme Woolf. Le Community Legal Service, qui vise manifestement à combler certaines lacunes de l’aide juridique, définit sa raison d’être comme suit : « The Community Legal Service is the framework for comprehensive local networks of good quality legal and advice services, supported by co-ordinated funding, and based on the needs of local people. Its aim is to improve access to information and advice so that people in England and Wales can find out about their rights and how to enforce them. » Le rapport annuel du CLS rendu public au début de 2001 notait : « By October 2000 there
20 One will find in The Community Legal Service — A Consultation Paper, Lord Chancellor’s Department, London, 1999, an overall picture of measures which accompanied the Woolf reform. The Community Legal Service, which obviously aims at filling certain gaps left by legal aid, defines its raison d’être as follows: “The Community Legal Service is the framework for comprehensive local networks of good quality legal and advice services, supported by co-ordinated funding, and based on the needs of local people. Its aim is to improve access to information and advice so that people in England and Wales can find out about their rights and how to enforce them.” The annual report of the CLS made public at the beginning of 2001 noted: “By October 2000 there
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objectifs généraux du rapport final est d’assurer que désormais les « [l]itigants who are not legally represented will be able to get more help from advice services and from the courts. »
general objectives of the final report is to ensure that from now on “[l]itigants who are not legally represented will be able to get more help from advice services and from the courts.”
C. Accès à la justice et exercice abusif du droit d’accès aux tribunaux
C. Access to justice and the abusive exercise of the right of access to the courts
9 Il est trop tôt pour dresser le bilan d’une réforme de cette ampleur qui, du reste, se poursuit toujours. Pour le moment, tout indique que ses effets bénéfiques l’emporteront largement sur ses inconvénients. En matière de parties non représentées, les conseils gratuits ou très bon marché dispensés aux justiciables devraient permettre de guider sur la bonne voie ceux d’entre eux qui ont une apparence de droit sérieuse à faire valoir, et de raisonner ceux qui s’obstinent dans l’exercice de recours voués à l’échec. Malheureusement, cela ne saurait suffire : d’ores et déjà, les tribunaux anglais ont dû intervenir pour neutraliser avec des moyens de droit beaucoup plus fermes les débordements processifs qui sont la contrepartie de ces mesures d’accès à la justice. Comme l’écrivait Lord Justice Brooke dans un jugement du 21 septembre dernier :
9 It is too early to draw up an assessment of a reform of this breadth which, as for the rest, is still continuing. For the moment, all indicates that its beneficial effects will carry it broadly over its disadvantages. As regards unrepresented parties, the free or very reasonably priced advice should permit those litigants who seem to have the appearance of a serious right to vindicate to guide themselves along the right track, and to reason with those who are obstinate in the exercise of recourses doomed to failure. Unfortunately, that will not suffice: right now, the English courts have had to intervene to neutralize with much firmer means of law the litigious overflows which are the counterpart of these measures of access to justice. As Lord Justice Brooke wrote in a judgment of last September 21st:
10 The advent of the Civil Procedure Rules only serves to bolster the principle that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction the court has the power to restrain litigants from wasting the time of court staff and disturbing the orderly conduct of court processes in a completely obsessive pursuit of their own litigation, taking it forward by one unmeritorious application after another and insisting that they should be afforded priority over other litigants.21
D. Le phénomène des « McKenzie friends » en droit anglais
D. The phenomenon of “McKenzie friends” in English law
11 Il faut dire que, paradoxalement, le droit anglais présentait un terrain fertile pour un certain type d’abus, ceux qui surviennent
11 It must be said that, paradoxically, English law offered fertile ground for a certain type of abuse, those which occur
were 142 Community Legal Service Partnerships involving 265 local authorities covering over two thirds of the population of England and Wales. We are therefore well on course to meet our aim to cover at least 90% of England and Wales by a CLS Partnership by March 2002. »
were 142 Community Legal Service Partnerships involving 265 local authorities covering over two thirds of the population of England and Wales. We are therefore well on course to meet our aim to cover at least 90% of England and Wales by a CLS Partnership by March 2002.”
21 Attorney-General v. Ebert, [2001] E.W.H.C. Admin. 695 (Lexis), par. 35.
Quelques réﬂexions sur la quérulence et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester en justice 11
Some reflections on quarrelsomeness and the abusive exercise of the right to institute legal proceedings 11
lorsqu’une partie, sans être représentée par avocat, est assistée d’un tiers profane. Au Québec, l’alinéa 128(2)c) de la Loi sur le Barreau22, qui qualifie comme étant du ressort exclusif de l’avocat en exercice le fait de « plaider ou agir devant tout tribunal » (je souligne), empêcherait, je présume, une interprétation aussi libérale que celle retenue par la Cour d’appel d’Angleterre dans l’arrêt McKenzie v. McKenzie23. Dans cette affaire, la Cour, invoquant une remarque que Lord Tenterden avait faite en 183124, reconnut le droit de tout justiciable qui se représente lui-même de se faire assister d’un profane au cours d’un procès. Nul doute qu’en rendant cette décision par ailleurs assez limitée quant à sa portée intentionnelle25, la Cour était animée par le désir de faciliter l’accès à la justice26. Avec le temps, cependant, la décision engendra une pratique maintenant assez fréquente, connue sous le nom de « McKenzie friends ». Il existe même des associations qui visent à fournir à des parties non représentées des McKenzie friends27 et il est admis qu’une rémunération soit versée à ces derniers pour le service ainsi fourni28.
when a party, who is not represented by a lawyer, is assisted by a profane third person. In Quebec, subparagraph 128 (2) c) of the Loi sur le Barreau* 22, which qualifies as being the exclusive field of the practicing lawyer “ to plead or to act before any court ” (My underlines), would prevent, I suppose, an interpretation as liberal as that retained by the Court of Appeal of England in the case of McKenzie v. McKenzie23. In this affair, the Court, calling upon a remark that Lord Tenterden had made in 183124, recognized the right of every self-represented litigant to be assisted by a layman in the course of a lawsuit. No doubt that while rendering this decision which moreover was quite limited as to its intended range 25, the Court was animated by the desire to facilitate access to justice26. With time, however, the decision generated a now rather frequent practice known by the name of “McKenzie friends”. Associations even exist whose aim is to provide McKenzie friends to non-represented parties27 and remuneration of the latter for their services thus furnished is allowed28.
22 L.R.Q. c. B-1. Sur la portée des dispositions de la Loi sur le Barreau dans une situation de ce type, voir par exemple Barreau du Québec c. Gauthier, [2001] J.Q. 3976 (C.Q. Michaud), R.E.J.B. 2001- 27270 (verdicts de culpabilité sur plusieurs chefs d’accusation : avoir préparé des actes de procédure, avoir donné lieu de croire que l’on était autorisé à agir comme avocat, etc.).
22 L.R.Q C.B-1. On the range of the provisions of the Loi sur le Barreau in a situation of this type, see for example Bar of Quebec c. Gauthier, [2001] J.Q. 3976 (C.Q. Michaud), R.E.J.B. 2001-27270 (guilty verdicts on several counts of having prepared procedural documents, of having let it be believed that one was authorized to act as a lawyer, etc). *The Loi sur le Barreau is currently called An Act respecting the Barreau du Québec, still chapter B-1 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec. [8 Apr 2016]
23 [19971] P. 33, [1970] 3 All E.R. 1034.
24 In Collier v. Hicks (1831), 2 B. & A. 663, p. 669 : « Any person, whether he be a professional man or not, may attend as a friend of either party, may take notes, may quietly make suggestions, and give advice. »
24 Dans Collier v. Hicks (1831), 2 B. & A. 663, p. 669 : “Any person, whether he be a professional man or not, may attend as a friend of either party, may take notes, may quietly make suggestions, and give advice.”
25 Le rôle anticipé du tiers était très circonscrit : « He was merely there to prompt and to make suggestions to the husband in the conduct of his case, the calling of his witnesses and, perhaps more importantly, on the very critical and difficult questions of fact in this case, to assist him by making suggestions as to the cross-examination of the wife and her witnesses. »
25 The anticipated role of this third party was quite circumscribed : “He was merely there to prompt and to make suggestions to the husband in the conduct of his case, the calling of his witnesses and, perhaps more importantly, on the very critical and difficult questions of fact in this case, to assist him by making suggestions as to the cross-examination of the wife and her witnesses.”
25 Les circonstance de l’affaire s’y prêtaient : (1) il s’agissait d’une requête en divorce assez complexe, comportant des circonstances possibles d’adultère, et qui avait nécessité 10 jours d’enquête ; (2) le requérant était devenu inadmissible à l’aide juridique après le début de la procédure mais avant le procès ; (3) un jeune avocat inscrit dans un barreau australien, et en stage à Londres, avait offert de l’aider à mener bénévolement sa cause.
26 the circumstances of the case leant themselves to it: (1) it concerned a rather complex motion in divorce, comprising possible circumstances of adultery, and which had required 10 days of inquiry; (2) the applicant had become ineligible for legal aid after the commencement of the procedure but prior to the trial; (3) a young lawyer registered with an Australian bar, and in training at London, had offered to help him to conduct his law suit free of charge.
27 L’association Families Need Fathers, par exemple, groupe de pression actif dans le champ du droit de la famille, publie un bulletin intitulé McKenzie : voir http://www.fnf.org.uk/. Voir aussi Attorney General v. Ebert, supra, note 21, par.16., au sujet du Litigants in Person Society.
27 The association Families Need Fathers, for example, a pressure group active in the field of family law, publishes a bulletin entitled McKenzie : See http://www.fnf.org.uk/. See also Attorney General v. Ebert, supra, note 21, par.16., concerning the Litigants in Person Society.
28 Voir R. v. Bow County Court, ex parte Pelling, [1999] 4 All ER 751 (C.A.), [1999] 1 WLR 1807, par. 17.
28 See R. v. Bow County Court, ex parte Pelling, [1999] 4 All ER 751 (C.A.), [1999] 1 WLR 1807, par. 17.
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E. Les pouvoirs inhérents et l’encadrement récent des « McKenzie friends »
E. Inherent powers and the recent structuring of « McKenzie friends »
12 Entre 1999 et 2001, la Cour d’appel d’Angleterre a entrepris de restreindre par une série de décisions les interventions des McKenzie friends et les abus de procédure des parties non représentées. Je reviendrai sur ce second aspect de la question au par. 20 et m’entiendrai pour le moment aux McKenzie friends. Déjà dans R. v. Bow County Court, ex parte Pelling29, Lord Woolf avait confirmé au nom de la Cour la décision d’un juge de première instance de ne pas permettre les interventions d’un McKenzie friend et formulé quelques directives d’application générale sur le sujet30 ; la décision soulignait le danger qu’il y a à laisser un profane prendre le contrôle d’un litige au nom d’autrui, surtout lorsque, comme c’était le cas en l’occurrence, le profane en question préside un groupe de pression voué à la défense des droits des pères divorcés et prête son concours à une personne qui répond à cette description31. Mais le cas le plus révélateur ici reste probablement la décision de la Cour d’appel rendue en septembre dernier dans l’affaire Noueiri v. Paragon Finance PLC32. Confrontée à
12 Between 1999 and 2001, the Court of Appeal of England undertook to restrict by a series of decisions the interventions of McKenzie friends and the abuses of procedure by non-represented parties. I will return to this second aspect of the question in par. 20 and will for the moment deal with McKenzie friends. Already in R. v. Bow County Court, ex parte Pelling29, Lord Woolf had confirmed in the name of the Court the decision of a judge at first instance not to allow the interventions of a McKenzie friend and had formulated some directives of general application on the subject30 ; the decision underscored the danger of allowing a layman to take control of a litigation in the name of another, when, as it was the present case, the layman in question chairs a lobby dedicated to the defense of the rights of divorced fathers and lends his support to a person who answers this description31. But the most revealing case here remains probably the decision of the Court of Appeal rendered last September in the matter of Noueiri v. Paragon Finance PLC32. Confronted with
30 Ibid., par. 14. : « We do [...] stress: (i) that the authorities lay down that a McKenzie friend has personally no rights with regard to litigation, it is the litigants who have the right; (ii) that a McKenzie friend has no right to be an advocate; (iii) that both in proceedings in chambers and in proceedings in open court, the court has a discretion to exclude a McKenzie friend; and (iv) that the difference between the position in open court and in chambers is one of degree. That is because in open court a member of the public has, subject to the question of room, an entitlement to be present while in the case of a hearing in chambers he or she does not have that entitlement. In the case of an open court hearing, there usually must be some justification established if a person is not to have the benefit of the assistance of another person, or some evidence that that person has previously acted inappropriately or is acting inappropriately at the hearing which makes it reasonable for the court to deprive the litigant of the assistance which would otherwise be provided. »
31 Ibid., par. 17. : « There are [...] two features to Dr. Pelling’s activities to which we should refer. The first is that Dr. Pelling at times has difficulty in divorcing his campaigning role as chairman of the pressure group to which he belongs from that as an assistant of litigants in person. The second is that if a person chooses to regularly appear as a McKenzie friend, especially if he is also a clerk, because he is earning his living in this way, he must exercise considerable restraint or he will cease to conduct himself as an assistant and will indirectly run the case, using the litigant in person in the manner in which a puppet master uses a puppet. Such behaviour could provide a firm foundation for a judge not wishing him to be present as a “McKenzie friend”. »
32 [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1402 (Lexis), [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2357.
Quelques réﬂexions sur la quérulence et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester en justice 13
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un individu particulièrement tenace, dont il appert qu’il était lui-même quérulent33, et qui soulevait sans vergogne les arguments les plus extravagants sous prétexte d’aider des parties non représentées, la Cour rappelle la rigueur des conditions auxquelles les tribunaux britanniques, en vertu de la législation applicable, peuvent accorder discrétionnairement un droit d’audience à une personne qui n’est ni membre du Barreau ni elle-même partie à un litige. De telles dérogations doivent demeurer strictement encadrées par la loi et tout à fait exceptionnelles34, seules des personnes apparemment autorisées peuvent être admises à « postuler » ou rédiger les actes de la procédure écrite35, et il importe d’encourager les justiciables non représentés à utiliser les services de professionnels compétents. L’intéressé Anthony Alexander, qui se manifestait occasionnellement par l’entremise de deux sociétés, Peaceful Warriors Ltd. et Anthony Alexander Ltd., se voyait désormais interdire de représenter qui que ce soit, directement ou indirectement, sans autorisation préalable de la Cour obtenue sur demande écrite et motivée. Ces décisions coïncidaient par ailleurs avec des mesures destinées à venir en aide aux parties non représentées, par le moyen principalement de conseils
a particularly tenacious individual, who himself appears to have been quarrelsome33, and who shamelessly raised the most extravagant arguments under the pretext of helping non-represented parties, the Court points out the rigor of the conditions to which the British courts, under the terms of the applicable legislation, can discretionarily grant a right of hearing to a person who is neither a member of the Bar nor himself a party to the litigation. Such exemptions must remain strictly framed by the law and completely exceptional34, only only apparently authorized persons can be allowed to “apply to” or to draft written procedural documents 35, and it is important to encourage non-represented litigants to use the services of qualified professionals. The interested party, Anthony Alexander, who occasionally appeared via two companies, Peaceful Warriors Ltd. and Anthony Alexander Ltd., saw himself thenceforth prohibited from representing anyone, directly or indirectly, without prior approval of the Court obtained on written and justified request. These decisions in addition coincided with measures intended to come to the assistance of non-represented parties, primarily by means of advice
33 La Cour le présente en ces termes, par. 18-19.: « Mr Alexander described himself and his history in an application he made for a post as a CAB [Citizens Advice Bureau] worker at the RCJ [Royal Courts of Justice] Advice Bureau in January 1999. He was then 52 years old, and lived in London. He said he had qualified as an advocate in California and had frequently appeared in court on his own behalf and on behalf of others as a Mackenzie friend. The bureau did not in fact employ him. He was made bankrupt in February 2000. [...] In his affidavit he described how he helped litigants who were obvious victims of society who seemed in genuine need and had no other recourse but to turn to someone of goodwill to assist them. We had the opportunity of observing Mr Alexander when he addressed us for over an hour at the hearing. He has immense self-confidence as an advocate. The extent to which he gives appropriate assistance to those he sets out to assist, or assists the court in its task of administering justice, was the issue we had to determine. » Il appert, par. 33., qu’Alexander avait lui-même avait antérieurement fait l’objet d’un « Grepe v. Loam order » (sur cette notion, voir infra, par. 20).
33 The Court presents it in these terms, para. 18-19.: “Mr Alexander described himself and his history in an application he made for a post as a CAB [Citizens Advice Bureau] worker at the RCJ [Royal Courts of Justice] Advice Bureau in January 1999. He was then 52 years old, and lived in London. He said he had qualified as an advocate in California and had frequently appeared in court on his own behalf and on behalf of others as a Mackenzie friend. The bureau did not in fact employ him. He was made bankrupt in February 2000. [...] In his affidavit he described how he helped litigants who were obvious victims of society who seemed in genuine need and had no other recourse but to turn to someone of goodwill to assist them. We had the opportunity of observing Mr Alexander when he addressed us for over an hour at the hearing. He has immense self-confidence as an advocate. The extent to which he gives appropriate assistance to those he sets out to assist, or assists the court in its task of administering justice, was the issue we had to determine. » It appears, par. 33., that Alexander had himself previously been the object of a “Grepe v. Loam order” (on this notion, see infra, par. 20).
34 Au plan technique, la décision consacre une interprétation restrictive des articles27 et28 du Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, dispositions dont l’adoption paraît avoir été motivée par une volonté de faciliter l’accès à la justice.
34 At the technical level, the decision gives a restrictive interpretation to articles 27 and 28 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, provisions whose adoption appears to be justified by a will to facilitate access to justice.
35 Par. 81. : « Court staff should be particularly vigilant to ensure that formal documents such as an appellants notice should be signed either by the appellant himself or by someone, such as a solicitor, who has unquestionably the legal right to conduct litigation on the appellants behalf. »
35 Par. 81. : “Court staff should be particularly vigilant to ensure that formal documents such as an appellants notice should be signed either by the appellant himself or by someone, such as a solicitor, who has unquestionably the legal right to conduct litigation on the appellants behalf.”
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juridiques bénévoles ou bon marché, comme le relève le rapport annuel de la Cour d’appel pour l’année judiciaire 2000-200136.
free or inexpensive legal advice, as evidenced by the annual report of the Court of Appeal for the legal year 2000-200136.
F. Parallèle avec le droit québécois : l’avocat prête-nom et la partie conseillée par un profane
F. Parallel with Quebec law: the figurehead lawyer and the party advised by a lay person
13 Comme je l’ai dit plus haut, la législation en vigueur ici apparaît plus stricte que la législation britannique et le problème du McKenzie friend ne risque guère de se poser en tant que tel au Québec. S’est toutefois déjà posé le problème de l’avocat prête-nom qui, contre rémunération, appose sa signature sur les actes de procédure absurdes préparés par la partie elle-même. Comme le démontre l’affaire Barreau du Québec c. Lemieux37, les instances disciplinaires jugent sévèrement cette conduite puisqu’elle entraîne de la part de l’avocat un manquement à ses devoirs d’auxiliaire de la justice. En effet, on ne saurait prétendre que l’obligation qui incombe à l’avocat de
13 As I said further above, the law in force here seems more strict than the British law and the problem of the McKenzie friend hardly risks showing up as such in Quebec. However, the problem of the figurehead lawyer has already arisen, where the lawyer, for payment, affixes his signature to absurd procedural documents prepared by the party himself. As demonstrated in the matter of Barreau du Québec c. Lemieux37, the disciplinary authorities judge this conduct severely because it entails on the part of the lawyer a failure in his duties as an auxiliary of justice. Indeed, one could hardly pretend that the obligation which falls upon a lawyer to
36 Voir The Court of Appeal — Civil Division, Review of the Legal Year 2000-2001, HM Stationery Office, 2001, p. 11 : « In recognising the dangers posed when unsuitable lay persons seek to “assist” other litigants in person, the court gave guidance on the steps to be taken in such circumstances. » Pages 16-17 : « The Court has further developed its very successful liaison with the Royal Courts of Justice Citizens Advice Bureau through its Director, Joy Julien, and with other pro bono bodies. The RCJ Citizens Advice Bureau and its team of in-house lawyers offer professional assistance in providing advice and formulating grounds of appeal. The Bureau also refers cases to a team of pro bono lawyers from City law firms, who prepare litigant’s papers for court. Finally the Bar Pro Bono Unit offers a team of barristers who devote time to free representation. An experiment is about to begin which will enable most litigants in person, who obtain permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division to be represented by a barrister, pro bono, at the hearing. [...] The combined effect of these services is that most unrepresented litigants, who obtain permission to appeal, may now obtain pro bono assistance throughout the preparation and conduct of an appeal. This is a major and welcome advance. A new facility has recently been introduced in the form of the Personal Support Unit which is part of the RCJ Advice Bureau and is staffed by volunteers who offer practical assistance. They help litigants follow the procedures involved in conducting a case in person, and will accompany them to court to offer moral support. » Ce rapport peut être consulté en ligne : http ://www.courtservice.gov.uk/ info/reps/review_of_legal_year_2001.pdf
36 See The Court of Appeal — Civil Division, Review of the Legal Year 2000-2001, HM Stationery Office, 2001, p. 11 : « In recognising the dangers posed when unsuitable lay persons seek to “assist” other litigants in person, the court gave guidance on the steps to be taken in such circumstances. » Pages 16-17 : « The Court has further developed its very successful liaison with the Royal Courts of Justice Citizens Advice Bureau through its Director, Joy Julien, and with other pro bono bodies. The RCJ Citizens Advice Bureau and its team of in-house lawyers offer professional assistance in providing advice and formulating grounds of appeal. The Bureau also refers cases to a team of pro bono lawyers from City law firms, who prepare litigant’s papers for court. Finally the Bar Pro Bono Unit offers a team of barristers who devote time to free representation. An experiment is about to begin which will enable most litigants in person, who obtain permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division to be represented by a barrister, pro bono, at the hearing. [...] The combined effect of these services is that most unrepresented litigants, who obtain permission to appeal, may now obtain pro bono assistance throughout the preparation and conduct of an appeal. This is a major and welcome advance. A new facility has recently been introduced in the form of the Personal Support Unit which is part of the RCJ Advice Bureau and is staffed by volunteers who offer practical assistance. They help litigants follow the procedures involved in conducting a case in person, and will accompany them to court to offer moral support. » This report can be consulted online: http ://www.courtservice.gov.uk/ info/reps/review_of_legal_year_2001.pdf
37 [1996] J.Q. 4766 (T.P. Biron, Lafontaine, Grenier). Le Tribunal note : « par. 10. La liberté d’expression est certes un droit fondamental. Un justiciable a le droit de demander d’être entendu devant le tribunal au moyen de procédures, même si celles-ci peuvent paraître discutables aux yeux d’un observateur le moindrement averti. Il est toutefois du devoir d’un avocat qui comprend son rôle d’auxiliaire de la justice de refuser de prêter son nom à des tactiques dilatoires et à des documents aussi farfelus que ceux qu’on trouve dans le présent dossier. » Le même avocat fut par la suite radié en raison de troubles schizoïdes diagnostiqués : voir Lemieux c. Barreau du Québec (sub nomine Barreau du Québec c. Lemieux), [1996] D.T.P.Q. 149 (T.P. Biron, Mailloux, Poirier), et Lemieux c. Barreau du Québec, [1999] D.T.P.Q. 172 (T.P. Biron, Lavoie, Sylvestre).
37 [1996] J.Q. 4766 (T.P. Biron, Lafontaine, Grenier). The Tribunal notes : « par. 10. Freedom of expression is certainly a fundamental right. A litigant has the right to request to be heard before a court by way of procedures, even if the latter seem debatable to the eyes of the least informed observer. It is nonetheless the duty of the lawyer who understands his role as the auxiliary of justice to refuse to lend his name to dilatory tactics and to documents as far-fetched as those found in the present file. » The same lawyer was then radiated for a diagnosed schizoid disorder: see Lemieux c. Barreau du Québec (sub nomine Barreau du Québec c. Lemieux), [1996] D.T.P.Q. 149 (T.P. Biron, Mailloux, Poirier), and Lemieux c. Barreau du Québec, [1999] D.T.P.Q. 172 (T.P. Biron, Lavoie, Sylvestre).
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se conformer à la déontologie varie en intensité selon la part véritable qu’il a prise dans la rédaction des actes de procédures signés par lui. La précision est utile à une époque où, sous prétexte d’accès à la justice, des réseaux importants de « pro se litigants » se constituent38 et l’on préconise de plus en plus la décomposition (« unbundling »39) des services juridiques, ou le partage des tâches entre avocat et client, dans le but d’en réduire les coûts. En droit québécois, cependant, le problème le plus épineux est d’un autre ordre et rappelle celui considéré par la Cour d’appel d’Angleterre dans l’affaire Noueiri v. Paragon Finance PLC. Ce problème survient lorsqu’une personne qui n’est pas membre du Barreau (mais qui peut être un ancien avocat radié) conseille un justiciable sur le déroulement d’un litige, voire rédige en son nom des actes de procédure destinés à être revêtus de la seule signature de ce justiciable. Le récent arrêt de la Cour suprême du Canada dans le dossier Fort inc. Chrétien40, arrêt confirmant une décision de la Cour d’appel du Québec41, a fait largement la lumière sur cette question. Il met en scène en arrière-plan le Club juridique et son
conform to ethics varies in intensity according to the real share he took in drafting the procedural documents signed by him. The stipulation is useful in an era when, under the pretext of access to justice, significant networks of “pro se litigants” are forming38 and à la carte (i.e., “unbundling” 39) of legal services is increasingly recommended, or the sharing of tasks between lawyer and client, with a view to reducing costs. In Québec law, however, the thorniest problem is of another kind and recalls one considered by the Court of Appeal of England in the matter of Noueiri v. Paragon Finance PLC. This problem occurs when a person who is not a member of the Bar (but who may be a former radiated lawyer) advises a litigant on the advancement of litigation, or even writes procedural documents on his behalf intended to carry only the signature of this litigant. The recent Supreme Court of Canada case in the file of Fortin c. Chrétien40, a case confirming a decision of the Court of Appeal of Québec41, shed much light on this question. It features the Club Juridique in the background and its
38 Il s’agit d’un phénomène transfrontalier au sujet duquel on peut être tenté de paraphraser Karl Marx : « Justiciables de tous les pays, unissez-vous ! » Voir par exemple le site internet de Nolawyer, http ://www.nolawyer.com/proselnx.html, disponible en cinq langues.
38 It concerns a transborder phenomenon on the subject of which one can be tempted to paraphrase Karl Marx: “Litigants of all countries, unite!” See, for example, the Internet site of Nolawyer, http://www.nolawyer.com/proselnx.html, available in five languages.
39 Un auteur en donne la définition suivante : « The term “unbundling” is just now making it into the lexicon, descriptive of any process in which something complex is broken down into smaller and simpler components. In the legal context, “unbundling” refers to the process of breaking down the multiple roles an attorney might play into smaller simpler groups of tasks. [...] Unbundling (also called discrete tasks representation) offers clients a middle ground between dispensing with lawyers altogether or signing on for the full service package. The client is in charge of determining which services are to be performed by the client, which services are to be performed by the lawyer, and the extent or depth to which the lawyer will perform the services. [...] The client could contract separately to perform other tasks or perform them without using a lawyer. One of the cardinal principles of unbundling is “Use your lawyer only for what only your lawyer can do.” » Voir notamment, sur ce sujet qui ne manque pas de complexité, ZORZA, Richard, « Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice : From Threat to Opportunity » (1999), 67 Fordham Law Review 2659, ROTHERMICH, John C., « Ethical and Procedural Implications of “Ghostwriting” for Pro Se Litigants : Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice » (1999), 67 Fordham Law Review 2687 et MCNEAL, Mary Helen, « Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate Income Elderly Clients » (1997), 32 Wake Forest Law Review 295.
39 One author gives it the following definition: “The term ‘unbundling’ is just now making it into the lexicon, descriptive of any process in which something complex is broken down into smaller and simpler components. In the legal context, ‘unbundling’ refers to the process of breaking down the multiple roles an attorney might play into smaller simpler groups of tasks. [...] Unbundling (also called discrete tasks representation) offers clients a middle ground between dispensing with lawyers altogether or signing on for the full service package. The client is in charge of determining which services are to be performed by the client, which services are to be performed by the lawyer, and the extent or depth to which the lawyer will perform the services. [...] The client could contract separately to perform other tasks or perform them without using a lawyer. One of the cardinal principles of unbundling is ‘Use your lawyer only for what only your lawyer can do.’” See in particular on this subject, which does not lack for complexity, ZORZA, Richard, “Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice: From Threat to Opportunity” (1999), 67 Fordham Law Review 2659, ROTHERMICH, John C., “Ethical and Procedural Implications of ‘Ghostwriting’ for Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice” (1999), 67 Fordham Law Review 2687 et MCNEAL, Mary Helen, “”Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate Income Elderly Clients” (1997), 32 Wake Forest Law Review 295.
40 [2000] A.C.S. no. 51, 201 D.L.R. (4th) 223 (l’année de la décision, 2000, s’explique parce que le jugement fut rendu séance tenante le 2 novembre 2000; néanmoins, les motifs de la décision ne furent déposés au dossier que le 21 juillet 2001).
40 [2000] A.C.S. No 51,201 D.L.R. (4th) 223 (the year of the decision, 2000, is explained by the fact that the judgment was rendered forthwith on November 2nd, 2000; however, the reasons for the decision were filed in the record only on July 21st, 2001).
41 Fortin c. Chrétien, [1998] A.Q. 4010 (C.A. Brossard, Rousseau-Houle, Biron); il y a désaccord entre la Cour d’appel et la Cour suprême sur la notion de nullité partielle, que la seconde, contrairement à la première, estime inapplicable en l’espèce — voir [2000] A.C.S. 51, par. 40.
41 Fortin c. Chrétien, [1998] A.Q. 4010 (A.C. Brossard, Rousseau-Swell, Biron); there is dissension between the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court on the concept of partial nullity, which the latter, contrary to the former, deems inapplicable in that case — see [2000] A.C.S. 51, par. 40.
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fondateur Yvon Descôteaux. J’en retiens les éléments suivants : (1) le contrat par lequel une personne qui n’appartient pas au Barreau offre de rédiger un acte de procédure pour le compte d’autrui contrevient au sous-paragraphe 128(1)b) de la Loi sur le Barreau et est nul parce que contraire à l’ordre public, (2) par contre, l’acte de procédure issu de ce contrat constitue un acte juridique distinct et valide, qui concrétise le droit reconnu au justiciable par l’article 61 du Code de procédure civile de se représenter seul, (3) ce justiciable est libre de se faire « aider par un tiers dans la rédaction et la préparation de ses actes de procédure »42 et l’acte qui en résulte — contrairement par exemple à celui qu’un justiciable aurait fait préparer en connaissance de cause par une personne inhabile au sens de l’article 122 de la même loi — ne peut être invalidé, (4) il importe de concilier le droit du justiciable de se représenter lui-même avec les exigences de cette loi, mais on se méprend si l’on croit que l’accès à la justice impose d’assouplir ces exigences. Il faut saluer le réalisme et la lucidité de cette décision. Elle neutralise autant qu’il est possible de le faire la tension entre le droit individuel d’accès aux tribunaux et la définition légale du monopole d’exercice, c’est-à-dire des actes réservés aux membres du Barreau. Suffira-t-elle à contenir les excès du Club juridique et de son animateur ? D’une part, la nullité du contrat, solution de droit privé, ne le prive pas de sa valeur économique, pas plus qu’elle ne rend la contrebande de cigarettes moins lucrative ; il est donc probable que, sans autre mesure corrective, de nouveaux « clients » auraient recours aux mêmes services à l’avenir, et toujours contre rémunération. D’autre part, l’illégalité maintenant avérée de certaines activités de l’association, solution de droit public, devrait dorénavant permettre d’en empêcher la continuation et d’exposer les contrevenants à des sanctions pénales. Quelques autres décisions judiciaires ont elles aussi restreint des activités douteuses de la même association 43. Compte tenu, cependant, des antécédents disciplinaires de l’une des person-
founder Yvon Descôteaux. I retain the following elements: (1) the contract by which a person who does not belong to the Bar offers to write a procedural document for the account of others contravenes subparagraph 128 (1) b) of the Law on the Bar and is null because contrary to law and order, (2) on the other hand, the procedural document resulting from this contract constitutes a distinct and valid legal document, which concretizes the right recognized to a litigant by article 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure to represent himself, (3) this justiciable is free to be “aided by a third person in the drafting and preparation of his procedural documents ” 42 and the procedure which results - contrary, for example, to that which the litigant caused in full awareness to be made by a person unqualified within the meaning of article 122 of the same law - cannot be invalidated, (4) the right of the litigant to represent himself must be reconciled with the requirements of this law, but one is mistaken if he believes that access to justice requires moderating these requirements. One must congratulate the realism and the clarity of this decision. It neutralizes as much as possible the tension between the individual right of access to the courts and the legal definition of the monopoly of exercise, i.e. acts reserved to the members of the Bar. Will it be enough to contain the excesses of the Club juridique and its organizer? On the one hand, the nullity of the contract, a solution of private law, does not deprive it of its economic value, any more than it makes smuggling contraband cigarettes less lucrative; it is thus likely that, without another corrective measure, new “clients” would always have recourse to the same services in the future, and for payment. In addition, the now proven illegality of certain activities of the association, a solution of public law, should henceforth make it possible to prevent its continuance and to expose the contravenants to penal sanctions. A few other judicial decisions have also restrained the dubious activities of the same association 43. Taking into account, however, the disciplinary antecedents of one of the per-
42 Ibid., par. 43.
42 Je pense par exemple à De Niverville c. Descôteaux>, infra, note73, et à Lafrenière c. Club juridique, [1999] J.Q. 4449 (C.A. Robert), requête pour permission d’appeler rejetée [1999] C.S.C.R. 574.
42 I am thinking, for example, of De Niverville c. Descôteaux, infra, note 73, and of Lafrenière c. Club juridique, [1999] J.Q. 4449 (C.A. Robert), motion for permission to appeal dismissed [1999] C.S.C.R. 574.
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nes les plus directement concernées 44, de la façon dont le Club juridique recycle, si j’ose dire, l’arrêt Fortin c. Chrétien 45, et surtout du sort subi par certains de ses adhérents46, il y a lieu de se demander si une réponse plus globale, du type de celle mise à l’essai par la Cour d’appel d’Angleterre 47, et attaquant le problème à sa racine, n’est pas nécessaire afin de contrecarrer la demande (et donc l’offre) de conseils juridiques en violation de la Loi sur le Barreau.
sons most directly concerned 44, the manner in which the Club Juridique recycles, dare I say, the case of Fortin c. Chrétien 45, and above all the fate suffered by some of its adherents46, one must wonder whether a more global response, of the kind put to the test by the Court of Appeal of England 47, and attacking the problem at its root, is not necessary in order to thwart the demand (and thus the supply) of legal advice in violation of the Law on the Bar.
G. La partie non représentée mais conseillée par le juge
G. The non-represented party but counseled by the judge
14 Participant à un procès, la partie non représentée risque souvent de fausser la dynamique du contradictoire, au sens d’« adversarial », qui caractérise la plupart des procédures contentieuses pratiquées ici. Citons en exemple le cas des prévenus non représentés qui annoncent vouloir plaider coupable « avec explications » et qui dévoilent ensuite au cours d’une explication avec le procureur de la poursuite des éléments d’informations susceptibles de fonder une défense valable en droit. Quel doit être alors le rôle du procureur de la poursuite ? Mais c’est le plus souvent le juge que la partie non représentée place en situation délicate, comme en témoignent
14 The participant in a law suit, a non-represented party often risks falsifying the confrontational dynamic, in the “adversarial” sense, which characterizes most of the contentious proceedings practiced here. One example is the case of non-rep­re­sent­ed accused who wish to plead guilty “with explanations”, and who then bring out in the course of the explanation to the Crown prosecutor elements of information susceptible of founding a legally valid defense. What must then be the role of the Crown prosecutor? But, it is most often the judge rather than the non-represented party who is placed in a delicate situation, as witnessed
44 On a intérêt à prendre connaissance de la décision du Comité de discipline du Barreau du Québec dans le dossier Bernard c. Descôteaux, no 06-89-00412, en date du 21 mars 1990, ainsi que de la décision du même comité entre les mêmes parties, no 06-89-00420, en date du 23 mai 1990, pour comprendre à quoi l’on a affaire. Il s’agissait, semble-t-il, d’une forme aigüe de quérulence ou, peut-être, d’érotomanie.
44 One may find it beneficial to take note of the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the Quebec Bar in the file Bernard c. Descôteaux, No 06-89-00412, dated March 21st, 1990, as well as the decision of the same committee between the same parties, No 06-89-00420, dated May 23rd, 1990, to understand what we are dealing with. It was, it seems, an acute form of quarrelsomeness or, perhaps, erotomania.
45 Comme pour beaucoup d’autres associations semblables, l’internet est ici pleinement mis à contribution. Le Club juridique possède un portail passablement chargé, auquel on accède à l’adresse http://www.multimania.com/clubjuridique/index.html, et qui illustre une nouvelle fois les effets imprévisibles de la liberté d’expression. L’arrêt Fortin c. Chrétien y est présenté en ces termes : « Le 2 novembre 2000 dans le dossier <27152> la Cour Suprême du canada (sic) a confirmé le droit de se faire aider et conseiller dans la préparation des procédures par une personne non membre du barreau du québec (sic) afin de se représenter devant le tribunal sans avocat. Ce jugement vaut pour tout le canada (sic) grâce à des Québécois ! Le Club Juridique de Laval, de Montréal et de Québec a des membres au Québec, au canada (sic) et dans le monde. »
45 As wtih other similar associations, the Internet is fully exploited. The Club Juridique has a quite heavily visited portal, located at the address http://www.multimania.com/clubjuridique/index.html, and which once again illustrates the unforeseeable effects of freedom of expression. The case of Fortin c. Chrétien is presented there in these terms: “On November 2nd, 2000 in the file <27152> the Supreme Court of canada (sic) confirmed the right to be helped and advised in the preparation of procedures by a person not a member of the quebec bar (sic) in order to represent oneself at court without a lawyer. This judgment applies to all of canada (sic) thanks to the Québécois! Club Juridique of Laval, Montreal and Quebec has members in Quebec, canada (sic) and in the world.”
46 Certains échouent lamentablement (comme dans Vinette c. Bissonnette, [2001] J.Q. 1081 (C.S. Mongeau)). D’autres ont gain de cause (comme dans Place Lorraine inc. c. Desjardins, [1998] A.Q. 2377 (C.S. Tannenbaum) et jugement encore inédit de la Cour d’appel en date du 10 janvier 2002) et sont donnés en exemple par le Club juridique — voir cependant l’usage déplorable qui est fait de cette dernière décision sur le site Internet du Club juridique, dans un communiqué du 20 janvier 2002.
46 Some fail lamentably (as in Vinette c. Bissonnette, [2001] J.Q. 1081 (C.S. Mongeau)). Others have won (as in Place Lorraine Inc. c. Desjardins, [1998] A.Q. 2377 (C.S. Tannenbaum) and a still unpublished judgment of the Court of Appeal dated January 10th, 2002) are given here as an example by the Club Juridique – see, however, the deplorable use which is made of this last decision on the Internet site of Club Juridique, in an official statement of January 20th, 2002.
47 Voir supra, note 36.
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plusieurs des sources citées dans le rapport du Comité Ferland48.
several of the sources quoted in the report of the Ferland Committee48.
Cette question déborde de beaucoup le sujet qui m’intéresse ici et je ne peux donc l’aborder de front, mais je voudrais en dire quelques mots dans la mesure où elle a un lien avec la quérulence et les syndromes voisins. En se représentant elle-même, une partie perd le bénéfice d’une mise à distance ou d’une objectivation de sa situation par un tiers qui connaît le droit et qui lui est loyal, son avocat ; celui-ci est d’ailleurs tenu à un devoir général d’objectivité 49. Moins la partie s’avère elle-même capable de porter un regard critique sur sa situation, moins elle parvient, pour user d’une expression vieillotte, à modérer ses transports, plus la présence de l’avocat est nécessaire et plus son absence se fait sentir. Il n’y a rien d’étonnant, dans ces conditions, à ce que le quérulent préfère presque toujours plaider en personne. On peut bien sûr tenter de suppléer l’absence d’avocat en confiant au personnel du tribunal ou au juge une fonction d’assistance et d’information 50. C’est ce que rappelait le juge Gonthier dans l’arrêt Fortin, mais en précisant qu’on atteint vite la limite de ces solutions :
This question quite exceeds the subject which interests me here and I thus cannot approach it head-on, but I would like to say a few words insofar as it has a link to quarrelsomeness and neighboring syndromes. By representing himself, a party loses the benefit of distance or objectivity concerning his situation by a third person who knows the law and who is loyal to him, his lawyer the latter is moreover held to a general duty of objectivity 49. The less the part proves himself able to look critically on his situation, the less he come - to use an antiquated expression - to moderate his vehicles, the more the presence of a lawyer is necessary and the more his absence is felt. It is not surprising, in these conditions, that the querulent almost always prefers to plead in person. One can of course try to compensate for the absence of the lawyer by entrusting to the personnel of the court or to the judge a function of assistance and of information 50. This is what Judge Gonthier pointed out in the case of Fortin, while however underscoring that the limits of these solutions are quickly reached:
15 Les greffiers et greffières des cours fournissent également une aide technique précieuse aux justiciables et les juges encadrent et guident les personnes non représentées par des avocats dans l’exercice de leurs droits. Cependant, ils ne sauraient en aucune façon remplacer l’avocat 51.
15 The court clerks also provide invaluable technical assistance to litigants, and judges provide a framework and guide persons who are not represented by lawyers in the exercise of their rights. However, they would in no way replace the lawyer 51.
16 À ma connaissance, en droit positif québécois ou même canadien, on n’a pas encore formulé de règles visant à expliciter le rôle du juge qui entend une partie non représentée. Mais cela s’est fait en Australie, dans le champ du droit familial où comme ici les tribunaux font souvent face au problème. Aussi disposons-nous de deux décisions intéressantes à ce propos 52. Elles énoncent sur la question des
16 To my knowledge, in Québec or even Canadian substantive law, rules have not been formulated specifying the role of the judge who hears a non-represented party. But this has been done in Australia, in the field of family law where, as here, the courts are often faced with the problem. Also on this subject we have two interesting decisions 52. These state, on the question of the
48 Supra, note 16.
49 C’est même où que l’on soit un trait caractéristique de la fonction. En droit québécois, l’article 2.03 du Code de déontologie des avocats, R.R.Q., 1981, c. B-1, r.1, énonce parmi les devoirs généraux de la profession : « La conduite de l’avocat doit être empreinte d’objectivité, de modération et de dignité. »
49 It is even a feature characteristic of the function. In Québec law, article 2.03 of the Code of practice of lawyers, R.R.Q., 1981, C.B 1, r .1, states as among the general duties of the profession: “The conduct of the lawyer must be imbued with objectivity, moderation and dignity.”
50 Mais la distinction entre information juridique et conseils juridiques, souvent utilisée dans ce contexte, n’est pas facile à faire en pratique.
50 But the distinction between legal information and legal advice, frequently used in this context, is not easy to make in practise.
51 Supra, note 41, par. 54.
51 Johnson and Johnson (1997), 22 Fam. L.R. 141 et Re F : Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] Fam.C.A.348. La première de ces deux décisions impliquait un justiciable, médecin de son état, qui
51 Johnson and Johnson (1997), 22 Fam. L.R. 141 and Re F : Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] Fam.C.A.348. The first of these two decisions involved a litigant, a doctor in his state, who
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Some reflections on quarrelsomeness and the abusive exercise of the right to institute legal proceedings 19
parties non représentées des directives adaptées aux procédures régies par la Partie VII du Family Law Act 1975 53. Cette Partie VII a pour finalité spécifique l’intérêt des enfants, qui a préséance dans ces procédures sur l’intérêt des parties. Comme l’écrivait la Cour dans l’affaire Johnson :
non represented parties directives adapted to procedures regulated by Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 53. This Part VII is aimed specifically toward the interest of the children, who have precedence over the interest of the parties. As the Court wrote in the Johnson affair:
17 [i]n cases involving children, where contact and residence are the issues, the court is at all times constrained to act in the best interests of the child. Generally speaking, that obligation imposes upon the court the necessity to conduct as full and complete an enquiry into the relevant issues as is possible, and not to be inhibited by restrictive procedures 54
17 [i]n cases involving children, where contact and residence are the issues, the court is at all times constrained to act in the best interests of the child. Generally speaking, that obligation imposes upon the court the necessity to conduct as full and complete an enquiry into the relevant issues as is possible, and not to be inhibited by restrictrive procedures 54
18 Cela justifie certaines entorses à la procédure de type contradictoire, ainsi qu’une attitude plus interventionniste de la part des juges, ce que visent à encadrer les directives sur les parties non représentées que je reproduis en annexe dans leurs deux versions successives. Cependant, c’est l’évolution entre ces deux documents, et l’infléchissement qu’elle comporte, qui méritent d’être soulignés. En affirmant le caractère discrétionnaire des interventions du juge en vertu de ces directives, en reformulant à la baisse les paragraphes 4, 5 et 7 de manière à rendre plus réalistes les attentes des parties non représentées, et surtout en insistant sur le fait que ces directives ne sont pas destinées à fonder des motifs d’appel pour la partie non représentée, la Cour, par sa décision du 6 juin 2001 55, signale les
That justifies certain deviations from adversarial-style procedure, as well as a more interventionist attitude on the part of the judges, which aims to give a framework to the directives on non-represented parties that I am reproducing in annex in their two successive versions. However, it is the development from one to the other of these two documents, and the direction it connotes which are worth underscoring. By affirming the discretionary character of the interventions of the judge in virtue of these directives, by reformulating downward paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 so as to make the expectations of non-represented parties more realistic, the Court, with its decision of 6 June 2001 55, serves notice of the
s’était représenté seul en première instance et qui, sans être quérulent, était atteint d’un trouble de la personnalité qualifié par un psychiatre appelé comme expert de « intermittent explosive disorder » ou « episodic dyscontrol syndrome » — idem, par. 60. La seconde concernait un justiciable non représenté et particulièrement intransigeant, comme le fait ressortir la décision en appel.
had represented himself at first instance and who, without being querulous [quarrelsome], was afflicted with a personality disorder characterized by a psychiatrist, summoned as an expert, as “intermittent explosive disorder” or “episodic dyscontrol syndrome” — idem, para. 60. The second related to a non-represented and particularly intransigent litigant, as emerged in the appeal decision.
53. La Partie VII, adoptee en 1995, porte sur les procedures relatives aux enfants et «60B (1) The object of this Part is to ensure that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential, and to ensure that parents fulfill their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children. (2) The principles underlying these objects are that, except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests: (a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and (b) children have a right of contact, on a regular basis, with both their parents and with other people significant to their care, welfare and development; and (c) parents share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and (d) parents should agree about the future parenting of their children.”
53. Part VII, adopted in 1995, concerns the procedures relative to children and “60B(1) The object of this Part is to ensure that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential, and to ensure that parents fulfill their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children. (2) The principles underlying these objects are that, except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests: (a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and (b) children have a right of contact, on a regular basis, with both their parents and with other people significant to their care, welfare and development; and (c) parents share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and (d) parents should agree about the future parenting of their children.”
54. (1997), 22 Fam. L.R. 141, par. 121.
55. [2001] Fam. CA 348, par. 224-250.
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limites inhérentes de cette solution. Et elle le fait éloquemment, en dissipant certaines illusions sur l’accès à la justice 56, lequel est peut-être mieux servi, en fin de compte, par des mesures extérieures au prétoire, comme celles adoptées par la Cour d’appel d’Angleterre 57, que par des lignes de conduite peu réalistes. Ce qui est sûr, en tout cas, c’est que de telles directives risquent d’être sans grand effet sur l’authentique quérulent qui, lui, au contraire, y trouvera des motifs additionnels de contestation.
inherent limits of this solution. And it does it eloquently, by dissipating certain illusions concerning access to justice 56, which is perhaps better served, in the final analysis, by measures external to the court, such as those adopted by the Court of Appeal of England 57, rather than by hardly realistic lines of conduct. What is certain, in any case, is that such directives are likely to be without much effect on the authentic querulent who, on the contrary, will find in them additional grounds for contestation.
QUELQUES MESURES CORRECTIVES ACTUELLE­MENT UTILISÉES PAR LES TRIBUNAUX
A FEW CORRECTIVE MEASURES CURRENTLY USED BY THE COURTS
A. Overall picture
Il existe en droit local une gamme de mesures correctives pour remédier aux abus de procédure, dont certaines sont on ne peut plus classiques (ex. l’action en dommages-intérêts pour abus de droit) et d’autres de création relativement récente (ex. la requête pour rejet selon les articles 75.1 et 75.2 du Code de procédure civile). Le pro­blème n’est pas nouveau et on le retrouve dans tous les grands systèmes de droit occidentaux. Certains ont d’ailleurs sécrété une jurisprudence abondante sur les critères permettant de calibrer l’abus de procédure 58, une question que j’avais étudiée dans un article paru
There exists in local law a range of corrective measures to cure abuses of procedure, some of which could not be more traditional (e.g. the action in damages for abuse of right) and others of relatively recent creation (e.g. the motion to dismiss pursuant to Articles 75.1 and 75.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The problem is not new and one finds it in all the great Western systems of law. Some, moreover, have secreted an abundant jurisprudence on the criteria allowing abuse of procedure to be gauged 58, a question I had studied in an article published
56. Ibid., par. 242-243: « It should be recognised that persons who represent themselves are almost always at a disadvantage in legal proceedings. Advocacy is a professional skill that has almost always been performed by highly trained lawyers in our legal system. They not only bring those skills to bear but also professional objectivity that a litigant in person lacks, particularly in family law pro­ceedings. It is simply not possible to create a level playing field [reference au point 7 de la première version des directives] where one party is represented by a professional and the other is not. Thus, to provide a guideline to judges of this type, if applied literally, not only sets the judge an impossible task but is likely to create unreal expectations on the part of the litigant in person and at the same time give a false impression of lack of impartiality by the judge to the party who is represented. [...] Litigants may be self-represented by choice or increasingly, as a result of being unable to afford representation while at the same time failing to qualify for legal aid. The Court is moving to deal with this situation in a number of ways but it cannot by the use of guidelines affect its obligation to conduct trials according to law. »
56. Ibid., par. 242-243: « It should be recognised that persons who represent themselves are almost always at a disadvantage in legal proceedings. Advocacy is a professional skill that has almost always been performed by highly trained lawyers in our legal system. They not only bring those skills to bear but also professional objectivity that a litigant in person lacks, particularly in family law pro­ceedings. It is simply not possible to create a level playing field [a reference to point 7 from the first version of the directives] where one party is represented by a professional and the other is not. Thus, to provide a guideline to judges of this type, if applied literally, not only sets the judge an impossible task but is likely to create unreal expectations on the part of the litigant in person and at the same time give a false impression of lack of impartiality by the judge to the party who is represented. [...] Litigants may be self-represented by choice or increasingly, as a result of being unable to afford representation while at the same time failing to qualify for legal aid. The Court is moving to deal with this situation in a number of ways but it cannot by the use of guidelines affect its obligation to conduct trials according to law. »
57. Voir supra, note 37.
57. See supra, note 37.
58. La jurisprudence est bien fournie ici même, ainsi que dans les provinces de common law et en Angleterre — plus qu’en France, par exemple, où le problème est généralement traité sur le plan de la responsabilité civile plutôt que sur celui du droit judiciaire. Le caractère inquisitoire de la procé­dure suivie en France y est probablement pour beaucoup. Par ailleurs, c’est sans conteste en droit
58. The jurisprudence is abundant even here, as well as in the common-law provinces and in England — more than in France, for example, where the problem is generally dealt with via civil liability rather than judicial law. The inquisitorial character of the proce­dure followed in France probably has a lot to do with it. Moreover, it is uncontested in
Quelques réflexions sur la quérulence et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester… 21
en 198459. Je m’en tiendrai ici à la jurisprudence qui intéresse plus directement la quérulence et les syndromes voisins, sans revenir sur la question des dépens frustratoires récemment illustrée par l’affaire Tisserand Entreprises inc. c. Gentra Canada Investment Inc. 60. Deux aspects me semblent d’actualité : l’utilisation qui est maintenant faite, en droit anglais comme en droit québécois, des pouvoirs inhérents des tribunaux, et une tendance émergente dans la jurisprudence sur l’abus de droit. À cela s’ajoutent bien entendu les innovations jurisprudentielles déjà prises en considération aux paragraphes 12-14 ci-dessus.
in 198459. I will stick here to the jurisprudence which more directly concerns querulousness and related syndromes, without reconsidering the question of frustratory costs recently illustrated in the matter of Tisserand Entreprises inc. c. Gentra Canada Investment Inc. 60. Two aspects seem to me to be current: the use which is now made, in English law as in Quebec law, of the inherent powers of the courts, and an emerging trend in the jurisprudence on abuse of right. To that are obviously added the jurisprudential innovations already taken into account at paragraphs 12-14 above.
B. Origine et portée actuelle du pouvoir inhérent en droit anglais
B. Origin and current scope of inherent power in English law
Ces ordonnances existent depuis plus d’un siècle en droit anglais et il est probable qu’elles se pratiquaient longtemps avant que les tribunaux n’en consacrent explicitement le principe. Leur origine dans la jurisprudence anglaise publiée remonte à l’arrêt Grepe v. Loam61, ce qui explique qu’elles soient connues sous le nom de « Grepe v. Loam orders ». Elles ont pour fondement juridique le pouvoir inhérent des tribunaux d’assurer le déroulement juste et équitable des procédures qui s’instruisent devant eux et, de façon plus générale, de maintenir l’intégrité de l’administration de la justice. Lord Woolf, à l’époque Master of the Rolls, en a méticuleusement retracé
These ordinances have existed for more than a century in English law and it is probable that they were practiced long before the courts explicitly enshrined the principle. Their origin in the published English jurisprudence goes back to the case of Grepe v. Loam61, which explains why they are known as “Grepe v. Loam orders ”. They have as a legal basis the inherent power of the courts to ensure the just and equitable advancement of procedures instructed before them and, more generally, to maintain the integrity of the administration of justice. Lord Woolf, at the time Master of the Rolls, meticulously traced
américain que l’on trouve le foisonnement le plus riche de décisions judiciaires sur cette question. Si sur ces questions le droit des états est parfois, comme dans le cas de la Californie, très dévelop­pé, c’est en droit fédéral que l’on trouve la célèbre Règle 11 des Federal Rules oî Civil Procedure. Celle-ci a inspiré à elle seule plusieurs centaines de décisions publiées, dont beaucoup sont intéres­santes pour le type de sanction imposée au plaideur abusif. Outre le rejet du recours abusif et les dommages accordés à la victime, ces sanctions comprennent diverses restrictions sur les recours futurs ou, dans les cas les plus lourds, l’injonction : voir respectivement Bigsby v. Runyon 950 F. Supp. 761 (1996), certiorari refusé 522 U.S. 1118, et Merrigan v. Affiliated Bankshares of Colorado 775 F. Supp. 1408 (1991), certiorari refusé 506 U.S. 823.
Americain law that one finds the richest expansion of court orders on this question. If on these questions the law of the States is sometimes quite developed, as is the case with California, it is in federal law that one finds the celebrated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This alone has inspired several hundreds of published decisions, many of which are interesting for the type of sanction imposed on the abusive litigant. In addition to the dismissal of the abusive recourse and damages granted to the victim, these sanctions include various restrictions on future recourses or, in the most serious cases, the injonction: see respectively Bigsby v. Runyon 950 F. Supp. 761 (1996), certiorari refused 522 U.S. 1118, and Merrigan v. Affiliated Bankshares of Colorado 775 F. Supp. 1408 (1991), certiorari refused 506 U.S. 823.
59. « L’initiative judiciaire vouée à l’échec et la responsabilité de l’avocat ou de son mandant » (1984), 44 Revue du Barreau 397.
59. [Translation:] “The legal initiative doomed to failure and the civil liability of the lawyer or of his mandatary” (1984), 44 Revue du Barreau 397.
60. [1998] J.Q. 1665 (C.A. Proulx, Forget, Pidgeon), [1998] R.L. 581, commenté dans « Pathologie et thérapeutique », p. 189 et ss.&NBSP; Pour une extension récente de la condamnation aux dépens frustratoires non contre l’avocat mais contre un tiers (en l’occurrence contre l’actionnaire et l’administrateur de la demanderesse), voir Plastocap inc. c. Bundock, [2000] J.Q. 4715 (C.S. Babin).
60. [1998] J.Q. 1665 (A.C. Proulx, Forget, Pidgeon), [1998] R.L. 581, commented on in “Pathology and Therapeutic”, p. 189 et seq.. For a recent extension of the judgment ordering frustratory costs not against a lawyer but against a third party (in fact against the shareholder and the administrator of the applicant), see Plastocap Inc. c. Bundock, [2000] J.Q. 4715 (C.S. Babin).
61. [1887] 37 Ch. D. 168.
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l’évolution dans Ebert v. Venvil 62. La question précise qui se posait dans cette affaire était de savoir si, dans l’exercice du pouvoir inhérent en question, la High Court pouvait assujettir à l’exigence d’une autori­sation préalable de l’un de ses juges l’exercice d’un recours futur, d’un recours dans un autre district de la même Cour, ou d’un recours devant une autre juridiction (en l’espèce, le County Court). L’existence dans la législation britannique d’une disposition visant spécifiquement les recours vexatoires63 et créant une procédure distincte à cette fin donnait naissance à une complication : le Parlement avait-il souhaité que cette procédure prenne la place du pouvoir inhérent exercé dans Grepe v. Loam ? Malgré quelques décisions en sens contraire en Nouvelle-Zélande et en Australie, dont un arrêt de la High Court of Australia64, la Cour d’appel dans Ebert v. Venvil conclut que le pouvoir inhérent a une portée étendue, qu’il a déjà été exercé de la sorte, et qu’il comprend sûrement la faculté d’assujettir à un contrôle les recours futurs65 comme les recours exercés devant le County Court (a fortiori du fait que cette juridiction est elle-même soumise au pouvoir de contrôle de la High Court). Mais le pouvoir inhérent des tribunaux ne suffit pas nécessairement à la tâche. Ainsi, quelque temps après la décision Ebert v. Venvil s’instruisait une demande d’injonction du Procureur général qui devait mener le 21 septembre 2001 à un juge­ment de deux juges de la High Court (Queen’s Bench Division —
its evolution in Ebert v. Venvil 62. The precise question which arose in this case was to know whether, in the exercise of the inherent power in question, the High Court could subject to the prior authorization of one of its judges the exercise of a future recourse, a recourse in another district of the same Court, or a recourse before another jurisdiction (in the present case, the County Court). The existence in the British legislation of a provision specifically targeting vexatious recourses63 and creating a distinct procedure for this purpose gave rise to a complication: had the Parliament wished that this procedure take the place of the inherent power exerted in Grepe v. Loam? In spite of some decisions to the contrary in New Zealand and Australia, including a case at the High Court of Australia64, the Court of Appeal in Ebert v. Venvil concludes that the inherent power has an extended range, that it had already been exercised, and that it surely included the faculty of subjecting future recourses to control65 such as the recourses exercised before the County Court ( a fortiori owing to the fact that this jurisdiction itself is subjected to the supervisory power of the High Court). But the inherent power of the courts is not necessarily sufficient to the task. Thus, some time after the decision in Ebert v. Venvil a motion for an injunction was in­stru­ment­ed by the Attorney general which on September 21st, 2001 was to lead to a judgment by two judges of the High Court (Queen’s Bench Division —
62. [2000] Ch. 484 (CA), [1999] 3 W.L.R. 670 ; compte tenu du nombre de décisions qui peuvent être consultées sous ce nom par l’entremise de la banque Lexis « England and Wales Reported and Unreported Cases », il est utile de préciser qu’il s’agit ici d’un jugement du 30 mars 1999.
62. [2000] Ch. 484 (CA), [1999] 3 W.L.R. 670; given the number of decisions which might be consulted under this name in the Lexis database “England and Wales Reported and Unreported Cases”, it is useful to specify that this is a judgement of 30th March 1999.
63. Il s’agit de l’article 42 du Suprême Court Act 1981, dont l’origine lointaine est le Vexatious Actions Act 1896. L’article 42 est reproduit ici en annexe ; qu’il suffise de signaler pour le moment qu’il per­met un contrôle très étendu sur les agissements d’un justiciable, mais que ce contrôle ne peut être exercé qu’à la demande du Procureur général. Voir à titre d’illustration, dans un cas apparent et grave de quérulence, H.M. Attorney General v. Nyantekyi [2001] E.W.H.C. Admin. 845 (Lexis).
63. This is Article 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, whose remote origin is the Vexatious Actions Act 1896. Article 42 is reproduced here in appendix; it suffices for the moment to indicate that it allows a very wide control over the intrigues of a litigant, but that this control can be exercised only at the request of the Attorney General. By way of illustration, see an apparent and serious case of querulence (quarrelsomeness), H.M. Attorney General v. Nyantekyi [2001] E.W.H.C. Admin. 845 (Lexis).
64. Commonwealth Trading Bank v. Inglis (1974), 131 C.L.R. 311.
66. Woolf, Lord écrit : « The court undoubtedly has the power to stay or strike out vexatious proceed­ings when they are commenced under its inherent power. We can see no reason in principle why it should not also, in accord with the general approach to the granting of quia timet injunctions, exer­cise that power to prevent the serious loss that anticipated but unidentified proceedings could cause the defendants to those proceedings. » Entre une interprétation très restrictive du pouvoir inherent (il ne pourrait avoir pour objet qu’une procédure déjà amorcée devant la juridiction) et une interprétation extensive (il pourrait avoir pour objet toute procédure actuelle ou future devant la juridiction sollicitée ou une autre), la Cour penche pour la seconde interprétation mais préfère se contenter de réiterer la finalité du principe sous-jacent, servir les fins de la justice (voir ci-dessous, note 69).
66. Woolf, written Lord: “The court undoubtedly has the power to stay or strike out vexatious proceed­ings when they are commenced under its inherent power. We can see no reason in principle why it should not also, in accord with the general approach to the granting of quia timet injunctions, exer­cise that power to prevent the serious loss that anticipated but unidentified proceedings could cause the defendants to those proceedings.” Between a very restrictive interpretation of inherent power (it could have as object only the one procedure already instituted before the jurisdiction) and an extensive interpretation (it could have as object any current or future procedure before the jurisdiction solicited or another), the Court leans toward the second interpretation but prefers to satisfy itself with reiterating the finality of the subjacent principle, to serve the ends of justice (see below, note 69).
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Administrative Court) dans le dossier Attorney General v. Ebert66. Malgré quatre Grepe v. Loam orders prononcés contre lui, et une ordonnance obtenue par le Procureur général en vertu de la disposi­tion législative déjà évoquée plus haut67, Ebert, selon la preuve, persistait et avait notamment présenté en trois ans et demie 151 demandes d’autorisation pour amorcer de nouvelles procédures judiciaires. En cours de route, il s’était comporté de manière propre­ment outrageante envers le personnel des greffes. Aussi le Procureur général demandait-il qu’Ebert se voit dorénavant interdire l’accès physique au palais de justice, sauf permission écrite de la Cour, obtenue sur demande présentée et tranchée par écrit. La Cour fait droit à la requête du Procureur général, constatant qu’elle fait face ici à « a very extreme instance of extreme litigation » (par. 8), et relevant par ailleurs que dans trois décisions récentes et inédites des mesures semblables avaient dû être imposées en raison de comportements inacceptables 68.
Administrative Court) in the file Attorney General v. Ebert66. In spite of four Grepe v. Loam orders pronounced against him, and an ordinance obtained by the Attorney General in virtue of the legislative measure already evoked further above67, Ebert, according to the proof, persisted and had in particular presented in three and a half years 151 requests for authorization to commence new legal procedures. En route, he had behaved in a manner properly outrageous towards the personnel of the registry offices. Also, the Attorney General requested that Ebert be henceforth prohibited physical access to the law courts, except on written permission of the Court, obtained on written request determined in writing. The Court made law at the request of the Attorney General, noting that it was confronted here with a “very extreme instance of extreme litigation” (par. 8), and putting forward in addition that in three recent and new decisions similar measures had had to be imposed because of unacceptable behaviors 68.
C. Origine et portée du pouvoir inhérent en droit québécois
C. Origin and scope of inherent power in Quebec law
L’arrêt Ebert v. Venvil est intéressant à plus d’un titre, mais notamment parce que la Cour d’appel d’Angleterre, se prononçant en faveur d’une interprétation libérale du pouvoir inhérent69, s’appuie
The case of Ebert v. Venvil is interesting in more than one way, but in particular because the Court of Appeal of England, deciding in favor of a liberal interpretation of inherent power69, rests
66. Supra, note 21.
67. Supra, note 36. A ce sujet, la Cour note, ibid., par. 23 : « The case for the Attorney-General on this application is that since the s. 42 order was made against him, Mr Ebert’s conduct has been such that further constraints must now be imposed on him to stop his interfering with the proper adminis­tration of justice. »
Admin JMad: Ma question ne serait pas s’il y a « un cas » pour l’Attorney General, mais s’il y a un « pouvoir » pour que l’Attorney General trouve un cas. Les cours Britanniques « peuvent-elles faire droit nouveau » sur seulement la parole de l’AG ? Sûrement, une loi du Parlement (si c’est toujours le corps siegeant là-bas après l’abdication de 1972 au CEE) devrait autoriser l’Attorney General à déclencher les cours ?
67. Supra, note 36. On this subject, the Court notes, ibid, para. 23: “The case for the Attorney-General on this application is that since the s. 42 order was made against him, Mr. Ebert’s conduct has been such that further constraints must now be imposed on him to stop his interfering with the proper adminis­tration of justice.”
Admin JMad: My question would be not whether there is “a case” for the Attorney General, but whether there is a “power” for the Attorney General to find a case. Can the UK courts “make new law” on the mere say-so of the AG? Surely, a law of Parliament (if that is the organism still sitting there after the 1972 abdication to the EEC) would have to authorize the Attorney General to trigger off the courts?
68. Ibid., par. 30-32. Dans In re de Court, par exemple, la Cour avait notamment interdit à l’intéressé d’exercer un recours judiciaire sauf par l’entremise d’un tiers mandate à cette fin (« a next friend who could act for him »). Le Times du 27 novembre 1997 commentait la decision en ces termes:
« Sir Richard Scott VC was concerned with a litigant who had spat at the Chancery Clerk of the Lists. A medical certificate showed that he should be regarded as a person under disability: he had made over 100 attempts at instituting ridiculous or incomprehensible legal proceedings. The Vice-Chancellor held that he was in contempt of court. »
68. Ibid., para. 30-32. In In re de Court, for example, the Court had notably prohibited the interested party from exercising any legal recourse except through a third party mandated to this end (“a next friend who could act for him”). The Times of 27 November 1997 commented on the decision in these terms:
“Sir Richard Scott VC was concerned with a litigant who had spat at the Chancery Clerk of the Lists. A medical certificate showed that he should be regarded as a person under disability: he had made over 100 attempts at instituting ridiculous or incomprehensible legal proceedings. The Vice-Chancellor held that he was in contempt of court.”
69. Il s’agit de l’article de Jacob, I.H., « The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court » (1970), 23 Current Legal Problems 23, que Lord Woolf introduit ainsi : « We prefer to approach the issues from a standpoint of principle. Doing so, the starting point must be the extensive nature of the inherent jurisdiction of any court to prevent its procedure being abused. We see no reason why, absent the intervention of a statute cutting down the jurisdiction, that jurisdiction should apply only in relation to existing pro­ceedings and not to vexatious proceedings which are manifestly threatened but not yet initiated. »
Admin JMad : I.H. Jacob semble avoir été un mauvais choix de doctrine. Voir Joan Donnelly, “Inherent Jurisdiction and Inherent Powers of Irish Courts”, Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 2009:2, 122, où Mme Donnelly démêle l’interprétation confuse de Jacob, puisque « le pouvoir inhérent » et « la juridiction inhérente » sont deux choses différentes, non un seule notion compréhensive.
69. This is the article by I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970), 23 Current Legal Problems 23, which Lord Woolf introduces this way: “We prefer to approach the issues from a standpoint of principle. Doing so, the starting point must be the extensive nature of the inherent jurisdiction of any court to prevent its procedure being abused. We see no reason why, absent the intervention of a statute cutting down the jurisdiction, that jurisdiction should apply only in relation to existing pro­ceedings and not to vexatious proceedings which are manifestly threatened but not yet initiated.”
Admin JMad: I.H. Jacob seems to have been a poor choice of doctrine. See Joan Donnelly, “Inherent Jurisdiction and Inherent Powers of Irish Courts”, Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 2009:2, 122, where Ms. Donnelly disentangles the confused interpretation of Jacob, since “inherent power” and “inherent jurisdiction” are two different things, not one all-encompassing notion.
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avant tout sur un argument de principe tiré d’une source doctrinale déjà citée par la Cour supérieure du Québec dans Yorke c. Paskell-Mede70. Ces ordonnances ont toutes le même fondement historique et il ne faut donc pas s’étonner qu’invoquant le précédent Yorke c. Paskell-Mede, la Cour suprême du Yukon ait récemment conclu qu’elle était elle aussi investie du pouvoir inhérent d’encadrer par ordonnance le comportement d’un plaideur au comportement abusif 71. L’existence de ce pouvoir paraît maintenant bien admise en droit québécois et on ne semble pas mettre en doute que la Cour du Québec en dispose elle aussi par l’effet de l’article 46 du Code de procédure civile72. La portée des ordonnances qui correspondent en droit québécois aux Grepe v. Loam orders du droit anglais n’a pas encore donné lieu ici à un débat aussi serré que celui de l’affaire Ebert v. Venvil. Quoiqu’il en soit, les modalités de ces ordonnances, qu’elles soient accordées dans l’exer­cice du pouvoir inhérent ou en réponse à une demande d’injonction, sont multiples. Elles comprennent selon la jurisprudence publiée73 : (1 )
above all on an argument of principle drawn from a doctrinal source already cited by Quebec Superior Court in Yorke c. Paskell-Mede70. These ordinances all have the same historic foundation and one ought not be surprised that by invoking the precedent of Yorke c. Paskell-Mede, the Supreme Court of the Yukon had recently concluded that it also was invested with the inherent power to structure by ordinance the comportment of an abusive litigant 71. The existence of this power now seems thoroughly admitted in Quebec law and it seems that the power of the Court of Quebec which it possesses by virtue of the effect of article 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be doubted72. The scope of the ordinances which correspond in Quebec law to Grepe v. Loam orders in English law has not yet given rise here to a debate as hot as that in the case of Ebert v. Venvil. At all events, the modes of these ordinances, whether they are granted in the exercise of the inherent power or in answer to a motion for an injunction, are multiple. They include, according to the published jurisprudence,73 :(1)
70. Supra, note 6. On notera, incidemment, que l’arrêt Grepe v. Loam, supra, note 61, n’est pas men­tionné dans cette décision.
70. Supra, note 6. It will be noted, incidentally, that the case of Grepe v. Loam, supra, note 61, is not mentioned in this decision.
71. Voir Mazhero v. Yukon (Ombudsman & Privacy Commissioner), [2001] Y.J. No. 49, par. 43.
71. See Mazhero v. Yukon (Ombudsman & Privacy Commissioner), [2001] Y.J. No. 49, para. 43.
72. Le Tribunal des droits de la personne s’est prévalu de ce pouvoir dans Chayer c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [1998] J.T.D.P.Q.46 et la question a été étudiée dans Office municipal de Montréal c. Simard, [2000] J.Q. 1396 (C.Q.) où le juge Aznar conclut, avec raison il me semble, qu’un tribunal administratif — la Régie du logement — ne peut, à la différence de la Cour du Québec, exercer le pouvoir en question en l’absence d’un texte légal explicite. Dans Office municipal d’habitation de Montréal c. Simard, [2001] J.Q. 3758 (C.S.), la Cour supérieure rejetait une demande de la même partie requérante pour faire déclarer vexatoires les intiatives du même intimé.
72. The Human Rights Tribunal availed itself of this power in Chayer c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [1998] J.T.D.P.Q.46 and the question has been studied in Office municipal de Montréal c. Simard, [2000] J.Q. 1396 (C.Q.) where Judge Aznar concludes, correctly it seems to me, that an administrative tribunal — the Rental Board — cannot, unlike the Court of Quebec, exercise the power in question in the absence of an explicit legal text. In Office municipal d’habitation de Montréal c. Simard, [2001] J.Q. 3758 (C.S.), the Superior Court dismissed an application from the same applicant to declare the initiatives of the same respondent vexatious.
73. Il s’agit, en ordre chronologique, des affaires Yorke v. Paskell-Mede, [1994] R.J.Q. 1964, [1996] J.Q. 5102 (C.S. Lagacé), Nguiagain c. Québec (Commission de la fonction publique), [1996] A.Q. 3434 (C.S. Barakett), [1996] R.J.Q. 3009, requête pour permission d’en appeler rejetée, [1997] C.S.C.R. 74, Droit de la famille —2500, J.E. 96-1846 (C.A. Brassard, Rousseau-Houle, Philippon), De Niverville c. Descôteaux, [1997] A.Q. 448 (C.S. Rolland), [1997] R.J.Q. 1049, Barreau du Québec c. Siminski, [1999] J.Q. 1568 (Q.L) (C.S. Chaput), Byer c. Québec (Inspecteur général des institutions financières) [1999] J.Q. 5789 (Q.L.) (C.S. Fraiberg), [2000] R.L. 615, requête pour permission d’en appeler rejetée, [2000] C.S.C.R. 529, Calais Dévéloppement inc., Syndic c. Drazin, [1999] J.Q. 5791 (C.S. Guibault), [2000] R.R.A. 202, Chayer c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [1998] J.T.D.P.Q. 46 (T.D.P.Q. Sheehan), Fabrikant c. Corbin. [2000] J.Q. 2924 (C.S. Rolland), Lecours c.
73. These are, in chronological order, the cases of Yorke v. Paskell-Mede, [1994] R.J.Q. 1964, [1996] J.Q. 5102 (C.S. Lagacé), Nguiagain c. Québec (Commission de la fonction publique), [1996] A.Q. 3434 (C.S. Barakett), [1996] R.J.Q. 3009, motion for permission to appeal dismissed, [1997] C.S.C.R. 74, Droit de la famille —2500, J.E. 96-1846 (C.A. Brassard, Rousseau-Houle, Philippon), De Niverville c. Descôteaux, [1997] A.Q. 448 (C.S. Rolland), [1997] R.J.Q. 1049, Barreau du Québec c. Siminski, [1999] J.Q. 1568 (Q.L) (C.S. Chaput), Byer c. Québec (Inspecteur général des institutions financières) [1999] J.Q. 5789 (Q.L.) (C.S. Fraiberg), [2000] R.L. 615, motion for permission to appeal dismissed, [2000] C.S.C.R. 529, Calais Dévéloppement inc., Syndic c. Drazin, [1999] J.Q. 5791 (C.S. Guibault), [2000] R.R.A. 202, Chayer c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [1998] J.T.D.P.Q. 46 (T.D.P.Q. Sheehan), Fabrikant c. Corbin. [2000] J.Q. 2924 (C.S. Rolland), Lecours c.
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l’interdiction faite à la partie visée d’intenter de nouvelles procédures ou de continuer des procédures déjà intentées devant la Cour supérieure ou dans un district donné — procédures dont l’ordonnance précise parfois qui doit en être la cible ou quel doit en être l’objet — sans l’autorisation préalable du juge responsable de la juridiction concernée ; (2) l’interdiction faite à la partie visée d’intenter quelque procédure que ce soit, civile, pénale ou administrative, y compris une assignation par subpoena, contre une personne physique ou morale nommément désignée, et l’interdiction d’inciter quiconque à faire de même, sans l’autorisation préalable du juge responsable de la juridic­tion concernée ; (3) l’interdiction faite à la partie visée de communiquer par fax ou par téléphone, directement ou par personne interposée, avec un juge ou un membre du personnel du palais de justice&nnbsp;; (4) l’interdiction faite aux avocats et au personnel de l’Aide juridique de transmettre à une personne physique ou morale nommément désignée ou à ses avocats quelque procédure que ce soit en prove­nance de la partie visée sans l’autorisation préalable du juge responsable de la juridiction concernée ; (5) l’interdiction faite aux greffiers et autres fonctionnaires de la Cour de recevoir, délivrer, timbrer, enregistrer au plumitif ou mettre au rôle d’audience les procé­dures provenant de la partie visée si elles ne sont pas valablement autorisées ; (6) l’interdiction faite aux huissiers de signifier de telles procédures si elles ne sont pas valablement autorisées ; et (7) l’inter­diction faite à la partie visée de déposer des plaintes ou de former des griefs contre un ou plusieurs membres du Barreau, ou de l’Ordre des médecins, autrement que par l’entremise du syndic et selon la loi. Le choix de la procédure d’injonction dans quelques-uns de ces cas semble avoir été dicté par le fait que la partie requérante souhaitait voir inclure dans l’ordonnance des conclusions étrangères au déroulement de la procédure devant la Cour elle-même — et qui concernaient, par exemple, le processus disciplinaire dans un ordre professionnel. Dans toutes les affaires publiées, sauf une, la partie visée se représentait
the prohibition directed to the party concerned against instituting new procedures or continuing procedures already instituted before the Superior Court or in a given district — procedures concerning which the ordinance sometimes specifies who must be the target or what the object must be — without the prior approval of the judge responsible for the jurisdiction concerned; (2) the prohibition directed to the party concerned against instituting any procedure whatsoever, whether civil, penal or administrative, including a summons by subpoena, against a natural or a moral person by name indicated, and a prohibition against prompting anyone else to do likewise, without the prior approval of the judge responsible for the jurisdiction concerned; (3) the prohibition directed to the party concerned against communicating by fax or telephone, directly or by any intermediary, with a judge or a member of the personnel of the courthouse; (4) the prohibition directed to lawyers and to the personnel of Legal Aid against transmitting to a natural or a moral person designated by name or to the lawyers of same any procedure originating from the party envisaged without prior approval of the judge responsible for the jurisdiction concerned; (5) the prohibition directed to the clerks and to other civil servants of the Court against receiving, delivering, stamping, recording in the docket or placing on the role for hearing procedures originating from the party concerned if they are not validly authorised; (6) the prohibition directed to the bailiffs against serving such procedures if they are not validly autorised; and (7) the prohibition directed to the party concerned against filing complaints or formulating objections against one or more members of the Bar, or the Medical Orders, otherwise than through the Syndic and according to law. The selection of the procedure of injunction in some of these cases seems to be dictated by the fact that the applicant party wished to see included in the ordinance conclusions foreign to the course of procedure before the Court itself — and which concerned, for example, the disciplinary process in a professional Order. In all the published cases, but one, the party concerned was self- represented
Pilon, [2000] J.Q. 4953 (C.S.Picard) (voir aussi, visant la même partie, Lecours c. Association des vacanciers du Lac Morency, [2001] J.Q. 5072 (C.S. Crépeau), par. 130, Jonquière (Ville) c. Simard, [2001] J.Q. 3224 (C.S. Banford).
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elle-même74. Signalons en dernier lieu que les tribunaux se montrent néanmoins fort prudents avant de déclarer qu’un plaideur est « vexatoire »75, reconnaissant que la multiplication des recours n’est pas en soi synonyme d’abus et que dans un litige les meilleures intentions peuvent mener à une détérioration catastrophique des relations entre les parties 76.
himself 74. We would mention lastly that the courts nevertheless are extremely careful before declaring that a litigant is “vexatious” 75, recognizing that the multiplication of recourses is not in itself synonymous with abuse and that in a litigation the best intentions can lead to a catastrophic deterioration of the relations between the parties 76.
D. Abus de droit et frais extrajudiciaires
D. Abuse of right and extrajudicial costs
Nous touchons ici à un domaine plus vaste que celui de la quérulence : l’intransigeance dans l’exercice d’un droit, ou d’un droit prétendu, et les conséquences qu’elle entraîne pour la personne qui, se heurtant à cette intransigeance, est contrainte d’encourir des frais de justice pour surmonter la situation. Même si, théoriquement, rien n’empêche de conclure qu’une partie revendiquant la sanction d’un droit au fond (par ex., un droit de propriété) peut abuser ipso facto de son droit d’ester en justice, de telles situations étaient jusqu’à récem­ment très inhabituelles en droit 77. Le plus souvent, comme dans les cas typiques de troubles de voisinage, c’est la victime de l’abus de droit, et non celui qui abuse de son droit de propriété, qui exercera un recours en justice pour obtenir dédommagement ; on l’indemnisera alors pour le préjudice qu’elle a subi au fond. Sur un plan conceptuel, si l’abus d’un droit au fond était susceptible, dès qu’il se traduit par une contestation judiciaire, de constituer par surcroît un abus du droit d’ester en justice, on ne devrait faire aucune distinction entre deman­deurs et défendeurs. En effet, comme il est tout à fait possible d’abuser du droit d’ester en justice en défense comme en demande, opposer
We are here touching upon a wider area than that of querulousness: intransigence in the exercise of a right, or a claimed right, and the consequences that this involves for the person who, encountering this intransigence, is forced to incur court fees to overcome the situation. Even if, theoretically, nothing prevents concluding that a party claiming the sanction of a right to the limit (e.g., a property right) can abuse ipso facto his right to institute legal proceedings, such situations were very unusual in law until recently; 77. Generally, as in the typical cases of troubles between neighbors, it is the victim of the abuse of right, and not the person who misuses his property right, who will exercise a recourse to justice to obtain compensation; he will thus be compensated for the damage he suffered, to the limit. On a conceptual level, if the abuse of a right to the limit were likely, as soon as it results in a legal dispute, to constitute in addition an abuse of the right to institute legal proceedings, one should make no distinction between applicants and defendants. In effect, since it is completely possible to abuse the right to institute legal proceedings in defense as in demand, to oppose
74. Le dossier Chayer c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, supra, note 73, ne donne pas d’indication sur ce point mais tout indique que l’intimée se représentait elle-même. Dans le dossier Calais Développement inc., la partie visée par l’ordonnance était représentée par un avocat dont le comportement au cours du litige est sévèrement censuré par la Cour.
74. The file Chayer c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, supra, note 73, gives no indication on this point but all suggests that the respondent was self-represented. In the file Calais Développement inc., the party subject of the ordinance was represented by a lawyer whose behaviour in the course of litigation was severely censured by the Court.
75. Voir Girouard c. Vincent, R.E.J.B. 2000-22219 (C.S. Dalphond), Financière Banque Nationale c. Shaw, [2001] J.Q. 2396 (C.S. Melançon) et Office municipal d’habitation de Montréal c. Simard, [2001] J.Q. 3758 (C.S. Chrétien).
75. See Girouard c. Vincent, R.E.J.B. 2000-22219 (S.C. Dalphond), Financière Banque Nationale c. Shaw, [2001] J.Q. 2396 (C.S. Melançon) and Office municipal d’habitation de Montréal c. Simard, [2001] J.Q. 3758 (S.C. Chrétien).
76. Une vérité qu’illustre bien, par exemple, l’affaire Maison du Parc c. Chayer, [2001] J.Q. 2663 (C.S. Julien).
76. A truth well illustrated, for example, by the business in Maison du Parc c. Chayer, [2001] J.Q. 2663 (S.C. Julien).
77. Inhabituelles mais pas inconnues des tribunaux : voir par exemple Fortin c. Weynandt, [1976] C.S. 161, où la Cour qualifie d’abusif le recours d’une partie revendiquant de manière intraitable le droit à une ancienne servitude devenue inutile.
77. Unusual but not unknown to the courts: see, for example, Fortin c. Weynandt, [1976] S.C. 161, where the Court characterized as abusive the recourse of a party claiming in an intractactable manner the right to an ancient servitude become useless.
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une défense ferme à une action pour abus de droit éventuellement couronnée de succès devrait selon ce raisonnement équivaloir à un abus du droit d’ester en justice. Or, à ma connaissance, ce n’est pas ainsi que les tribunaux ont traditionnellement traité le problème 78. Peut-être était-ce attribuable au particularisme du régime des dépens et des frais de justice, régime dont il a toujours été accepté qu’il ne permet pas, normalement, d’indemniser la partie victorieuse pour la totalité des dépenses qu’elle aura encourues dans la défense de ses droits. À mesure cependant que l’écart s’élargit entre, d’une part, les frais et dépens tarifés et, d’autre part, le coût réel d’une action en justice victorieuse, on souhaitera mieux indemniser la partie qui s’est appauvrie pour obtenir gain de cause. Dans ces conditions, il devient tentant, dès que l’on est en présence d’un abus de droit au fond, de laisser s’estomper la distinction évoquée plus haut et d’accorder en sus des frais et dépens les honoraires extrajudiciaires encourus par la victime de l’abus. Peut-être observe-t-on actuellement dans la jurispru­dence québécoise récente une tendance dans ce sens. C’est ce qui semble ressortir de l’arrêt Choueke c. Coopérative d’habitation Jeanne-Mance 79, dossier où un juge de première instance accueille une action de la partie demanderesse fondée sur un bail, et où une majorité de la Cour d’appel casse cette décision, deux de ses juges accueillant la demande reconventionnelle du défendeur et lui accor­dant pour cause d’abus de droit de la part de la demanderesse des dommages substantiels correspondant aux honoraires extrajudiciaires qu’il a encourus, le juge dissident se contentant de maintenir l’appel, sans accorder au défendeur les dommages qu’il réclame pour hono­raires extrajudiciaires. Ce jugement avait été précédé de plusieurs décisions comparables par des tribunaux de première instance 80. Voilà
a firm defense to an action for abuse of right eventually crowned with success should, according to this reasoning, be equivalent to an abuse of the right to institute legal proceedings. However, to my knowledge, it is not thus that the courts traditionally have treated the problème 78. Perhaps it was attributable to the particularism of the regime for costs and court fees, a regime concerning which it has always been accepted that it does not normally permit compensating the victorious party for the totality of the expenditures it will have incurred in the defense of its rights. To the extent, however, that the gap widens between, on the one hand, the tariffed expenses and costs and, on the other hand, the real costs of a victorious legal action, one would prefer to compensate the party which impoverished itself to win. Under these conditions, it becomes tempting, as soon as one is in the presence of an abuse of right to the limit, to allow the distinction mentioned above to blur and to grant in addition to expenses and costs the extra-judicial fees incurred by the victim of the abuse. Perhaps we are currently seeing in recent Québec jurisprudence a tendency in this direction. This is what seems to come out of the case of Choueke c. Coopérative of Jeanne-Mance 79, a file in which a judge at first instance receives an action of the moving party based on a lease, and where a majority of the Court of Appeal invalidates this decision, two of its judges receiving the counterclaim of the defendant and granting to him, on account of abuse of right by the applicant, substantial damages corresponding to the extra-judicial fees that it incurred, the dissenting judge being satisfied to maintain the appeal, without granting to the defendant the damages it claimed for extra-judicial fees. This judgment was preceded by a number of comparable decisions by courts of first instance 80. Here
78. Pour prendre un exemple des plus connus, il n’est nulle part question dans Drysdale c. Dugas (1896), 26 S.C.R. 20 que le défendeur Drysdale, condamné aux dépens parce qu’il est débouté en appel, a commis un abus du droit d’ester en justice en s’obstinant à poursuivre la contestation sur son prétendu droit d’exploiter une écurie bruyante et nauséabonde.
78. To take a better known example, there is no question anywhere in Drysdale c. Dugas (1896), 26 S.C.R. 20 that the defendant Drysdale, condemned to costs because he lost on appeal, has committed an abuse of right to exercise legal proceedings in his determination to pursue the contestation of his claimed right to exploit a noisy and foul-smelling stable.
79. R.E.J.B. 2001-24642 (CA Otis. Chamberiand, Pelletier).
80. Voir par exemple Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing inc. c. Chambre des notaires du Québec, R.E.J.B. 2000-18844 (C.S. Tellier). Syndicat des salarié(es) des Industries Leader (C.S.D.) c. Industries Leader inc., R.E.J.B. 2001-26382 (C.S. Picard). Société de conseils Durany inc. c. Gravel, R.J.B.Q. 2001-25869 (C.S. Dubois), Poulin c. Promutuel Charlevoix-Montmorency, société mutuelle d’assurances générales, R.E.J.B. 2001-24594 (C.S. Viens) et Pavillons Des Jardins inc. c. Métallurgie Syca inc., R.E.J.B. 2001-25057 (C.Q. Mayrand). Voir aussi, cependant,
80. See for example Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing inc. c. Chambre des notaires du Québec, R.E.J.B. 2000-18844 (C.S. Tellier). Syndicat des salarié(es) des Industries Leader (C.S.D.) c. Industries Leader inc., R.E.J.B. 2001-26382 (C.S. Picard). Société de conseils Durany inc. c. Gravel, R.J.B.Q. 2001-25869 (C.S. Dubois), Poulin c. Promutuel Charlevoix-Montmorency, société mutuelle d’assurances générales, R.E.J.B. 2001-24594 (C.S. Viens) et Pavillons Des Jardins inc. c. Métallurgie Syca inc., R.E.J.B. 2001-25057 (C.Q. Mayrand). See also, however
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une tendance jurisprudentielle qui donne à réfléchir. Quoiqu’il en soit, il est certain que, si elle devait s’affirmer, elle lèverait d’autres obs­tacles auxquels continuent de faire face les victimes de quérulence et de comportements assimilables 81.
a jurisprudential trend which gives pause to reflect. At all events, it is certain that, if it were to be affirmed, it would raise other obstacles which the victims of querulence and similar behaviors continue to face 81.
Une fois acquis que la quérulence est véritablement un trouble sérieux de la personnalité, voire une maladie mentale grave, il me semble que le droit doit s’appliquer à en minimiser les effets dom­mageables, tant d’ailleurs pour ceux qui en sont la cible (y compris les tribunaux) que pour ceux qui en sont atteints. Il est utile en un premier temps d’en bien connaître la symptomatologie, et l’on constate sur ce point que la jurisprudence, déjà, rejoint la psychiatrie, en retenant comme manifestations du problème un ensemble de facteurs et de comportements caractéristiques. La science médicale, semble-t-il, est presque impuissante devant ce problème ; du moins est-ce l’avis de certains experts déjà cités par les tribunaux. Mais peut-être le droit l’est-il aussi dans l’état actuel des choses. En effet, malgré le caractère spectaculaire, disons-le, de la jurisprudence sur les pouvoirs inhérents des tribunaux et sur les injonctions contre des quérulents notoires, il n’est pas sûr que la solution soit à la mesure du problème. Le plaideur pathologiquement processif, comme Fabrikant ici ou Ebert à Londres, reporte alors son dévolu sur le tribunal et n’a de cesse d’obtenir de lui la permission de relancer ses recours : ainsi Ebert qui, en trois ans, saisit non moins de 151 fois un juge de la High Court pour enfin pouvoir recommencer à poursuivre les personnes par qui il se sentait lésé, jusqu’à ce qu’on lui interdise l’accès physique au palais de justice. Lorsque le problème atteint cette ampleur, et nous en avons plusieurs exemples locaux, dont quelques-uns, malheureusement, sont aussi teintés de crapulerie, je pense que la privation pure et simple de la capacité d’exercice du droit d’ester en justice s’impose. Un curateur devrait dans ce cas être seul à pouvoir exercer les droits
Once it is established that querulousness is truly a serious personality disorder, even a grave mental illness, it seems to me that the law must endeavor to minimize the detrimental effects, as much moreover for those who are the target (including the courts) as for those who are afflicted with it. It is useful to first know the symptomatic well, and one notes on this point that the jurisprudence, already, has joined psychiatry, by retaining as manifestations of the problem an aggregate of factors and characteristic behaviors. Medical science, it seems, is almost impotent before this problem; at least this is the opinion of certain experts already quoted by the courts. But perhaps the law is, too, in the current state of things. Indeed, in spite of the spectacular character, let us say it, of the jurisprudence on the inherent powers of the courts and on the injunctions against notorious querulents, it is not sure that the solution is tailored to the problem. The pathologically litigious litigant, like Fabrikant here or Ebert in London, then sets his sights on the court and endlessly demands its permission to recommence his recourse: thus, Ebert, over three years, seized a judge of the High Court no fewer than 151 times to at last be able to resume the suit against people he felt had injured him, until he was forbidden physical access to the law courts. When the problem reaches this breadth, and we have several local examples, of which some, unfortunately, are also tainted with villainy, I think that the pure and simple deprivation of the party’s capacity to exercise legal proceedings is essential. A curator would have to have, in that case, the sole power to exercise the rights
Boileau c.Travailleurs et travailleuses unis de l’alimentation et du commerce (T.U.A.C.), section locale 501, R.E.J.B. 2001-25319 (S.C. Champagne) et Marquise, Auxilium Technologies inc., [2001] J.Q. 4041 (C.S. Ravie), par. 107-112.
81. Je pense ici à une affaire comme le dossier Drazin, supra, note 73.
81. Here, I am thinking of a case like the Drazin file, supra, note 73.
Quelques réflexions sur la quérulence et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester… 29
de l’intéressé, et comme ce dernier sera tenté de contester sans relâche devant les tribunaux les décisions de son curateur, la loi (il faut évidemment que ce soit elle) devrait prévoir un régime d’exception qui, une fois confirmé en diagnostic rigoureux, porté en bonne et due forme, prive le quérulent de sa faculté de s’adresser aux tribunaux. La solution est radicale, certes, mais adaptée au problème. En cette époque de prolifération des droits individuels, l’idée peut être impopu­laire auprès du législateur ou du public, mais cela tient au fait qu’ils sont mal renseignés sur le nœud du problème. Quand au redres­sement des autres formes d’abus de procédure, il me semble que le droit tel qu’il existe actuellement suffit à la tâche.
of the interested party, and, as the latter will be tempted relentlessly to dispute at court the decisions of his or her curator, the law (obviously, it must be the law) must envisage a regime of exception which, once confirmed via rigorous diagnostic, carried out in good and due form, deprives the “querulent” of his or her faculty to address the courts. The solution is radical, certainly, but is adapted to the problem. In this time of proliferation of individual rights, the idea may be unpopular with the legislator or with the public, but that is because they are not well informed on the crux of the problem. As to a remedy for other forms of abuse of process, it seems to me that the law as it currently stands is sufficient to the task.
30 Congrès annuel du Barreau 2002 / 30 Bar Association Annual Conference 2002
Suprême Court Act 1981
Part II Jurisdiction: The High Court: Powers Section 42: Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings
(1) If, on an application made by the Attorney General under this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground —
(a) instituted vexatious civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; or (b) made vexatious applications in any civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court, and whether instituted by him or another, or (c) instituted vexatious prosecutions (whether against the same person or different persons),
the court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a civil proceedings order, a criminal proceedings order or an all proceedings order. (1A) In this section — “civil proceedings order” means an order that — (a) no civil pro­ceedings shall without the leave of the High Court be instituted in any court by the person against whom the order is made; (b) any civil proceedings instituted by him in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the High Court; and (c) no application (other than one for leave under this section) shall be made by him, in any civil proceedings instituted in any court by any person, without the leave of the High Court;
“criminal proceedings order” means an order that — (a) no information shall be laid before a justice of the peace by the person against whom the order is made without the leave of the High Court; and (b) no application for leave to prefer a bill of indictment shall be made by him without the leave of the High Court; and
“all proceedings order” means an order which has the combined effect of the two other orders. (2) An order under subsection (1) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely. (3) Leave for the institution or continuance of, or for the making of an application in, any civil pro­ceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under subsection (1) shall not be given unless the High Court is satisfied that the proceedings or application are not an abuse of the process of the court in question and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application. (3A) Leave for the laying of an information or for an application for leave to prefer a bill of indictment by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under subsection (1) shall not be given unless the High Court is satisfied that the institution of the prosecution is not an abuse of the criminal process and that there are reasonable grounds for the institution of the prosecution by the applicant. (4) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the High Court refusing leave required by virtue of this section. (5) A copy of any order made under sub­section (1) shall be published in the London Gazette.
Quelques réﬂexions sur la quérulence et l’exercice abusif du droit d’ester en justice 31 / Some reflections on quarrelsomeness and the abusive exercise of the right to institute legal proceedings 31
Directives of the Family Court of Australia (Full Court) on non-represented parties
Les directives furent d’abord formulées dans l’arrêt Johnson and Johnson (1997), 22 Fam. L.R.141 :
[The directives were first formulated in the case of Johnson and Johnson (1997), 22 Fam. L.R.141:]
The obligations of trial judges when hearing cases involving unrepresented litigants under Pt VII of the Family Law Act are:
(1) to inform the litigant in person of the manner in which the trial is to proceed, the order of witnesses and the party’s right to cross-examine witnesses;
(2) to explain to him or her any procedures relevant to the litigation;
(3) to assist unrepresented litigants by taking basic information from witnesses such as name, address and occupation;
(4) to explain to the unrepresented party the effect and possible undesirability of the interposition of witnesses and the right to object to the same;
(5) to advise the litigant in person of his or her possible right to object to the tendering of evidence which is or may be inadmissible;
(6) to inform the litigant of his or her possible right to a claim of privilege in relation to a question or tendering of evidence:
(7) to ensure as far as possible that a level playing field is maintained at all times;
(8) to attempt to clarify the substance of submissions of unrepresented parties, espe­cially where garrulous or misconceived advocacy ignores or obfuscates the substantive issues.
It is undesirable for trial judges to give legal advice to a litigant in person, as:
(1) it may be unfair or give the appearance of unfairness to other parties;
(2) the advice given may not be with full knowledge of the facts.
Ces directives furent remaniees dans I’arret Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (F. v. F.) [2001] Fam.CA 348
[These directives were revised in the case of Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (F. v. F.) [2001] Fam.CA 348]
The revised Guidelines are as follows: —
2. A judge should inform the litigant in person of the manner in which the trial is to pro­ceed, the order of calling witnesses and the right which he or she has to cross examine the witnesses;
3. A judge should explain to the litigant in person any procedures relevant to the litiga­tion;
5. If a change in the normal procedure is requested by the other parties such as the call­ing of witnesses out of turn the judge may, if he/she considers that there is any serious
32 Congrès annuel du Barreau 2002 / Bar Association Annual Conference 2002
possibility of such a change causing any injustice to a litigant in person, explain to the unrepresented party the effect and perhaps the undesirability of the interposition of witnesses and his or her right to object to that course;
7. If a question is asked, or evidence is sought to be tendered in respect of which the liti­gant in person has a possible claim of privilege, to inform the litigant of his or her rights;
8. A judge should attempt to clarify the substance of the submissions of the litigant in person, especially in cases where, because of garrulous or misconceived advocacy, the substantive issues are either ignored, given little attention or obfuscated.
— clarify the particulars of the orders sought by a litigant in person or the bases for such orders.