Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/454/54/489778/
Timestamp: 2017-09-24 03:20:45
Document Index: 624487750

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 1158', '§ 245', '§ 1252', '§ 1158', '§ 245', '§ 1255']

Pierre Philippe Tchuinga, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, Respondent, 454 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2006) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 2006 › Pierre Philippe Tchuinga, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, Respondent
Pierre Philippe Tchuinga, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, Respondent, 454 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2006)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 454 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2006)
Tchuinga, a citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States on or about September 19, 1997. He was detained, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")2 charged him with inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 212(a) (6) (C) (i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (6) (C) (i), as an immigrant who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, sought to procure a visa or other documentation, or admission to the United States or other benefit under the INA. He was also charged with inadmissibility under INA § 212(a) (7) (A) (i) (I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (7) (A) (i) (I), as an immigrant who, at the time of his application for admission, did not possess valid unexpired entry or travel documents.
During his initial hearing with the Immigration Judge ("IJ"), Tchuinga conceded inadmissibility under INA § 212(a) (7) (A) (i) (I) but contested the charge of inadmissibility under INA § 212(a) (6) (C) (i). He also filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Tchuinga claimed that he had suffered persecution in Cameroon as a member of a militant political party, the Social Democratic Front ("SDF"). The IJ notified him of the consequences of filing a frivolous application for asylum. An INS official reviewed Tchuinga's application and found him to have a credible fear of persecution and paroled him into the United States pending his removal hearing.
After considering the evidence, the IJ concluded that Tchuinga was subject to removal under INA § 212(a) (7) (A) (i) (I) for failing to have valid entry or travel documents at the time of his application for admission, which he had conceded, and INA § 212(a) (6) (C) (i) for having sought an immigration benefit through fraud. Specifically, the IJ found that Tchuinga held himself out to be a citizen of France and knowingly presented a document that was not his own (his brother's passport) in an attempt to secure admission to the United States. The IJ found that Tchuinga's brother was able to offer him a safe haven in France and that Tchuinga "accordingly [has] not claimed in any way that the fraud he perpetrated upon the U.S. consulate and attempted to perpetrate upon the INS was occasioned by his flight from his home country or any genuine fears that propelled him to travel to the United States."
Examining the documents that Tchuinga had produced, the IJ found that he "has knowingly provided to this Court false documentation in an attempt to secure asylum" and thus had knowingly filed a frivolous application for asylum. Specifically, the IJ found that Tchuinga had knowingly presented false documents indicating that he was an appointed official of the SDF party so that he could exaggerate the nature of his membership and the extent to which he was persecuted on account of his role with the party. The IJ issued a decision denying Tchuinga's claims and finding that, because Tchuinga had submitted fraudulent evidence, he was barred from applying for any other benefits under the INA as having submitted a frivolous application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (6) ("If the Attorney General determines that an alien has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum . . . the alien shall be permanently ineligible for any benefits under this Act, effective as of the date of a final determination on such application.").
During the course of these proceedings, Tchuinga married an American citizen, who filed an I-130 visa application for him, a necessary prelude to an application for adjustment of status.3 By the time of the remanded asylum hearing with the IJ, the I-130 application had been approved. Tchuinga informed the IJ of the approved visa application. The IJ stated that, in light of her previous determination that Tchuinga was subject to a permanent bar from benefits for knowingly filing a frivolous asylum application, she would not consider an application for adjustment of status. At a subsequent hearing on Tchuinga's asylum claim, the IJ also provided another reason for not considering his application for adjustment of status, noting that a regulation stated that "[a]n arriving alien who is in removal proceedings" is ineligible to apply for adjustment of status, 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c) (8). Tchuinga's counsel elected not to submit the adjustment application to the IJ, and instead sought a determination from the Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services regarding whether it would accept the application.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the BIA, but the BIA denied the appeal, finding the IJ's credibility assessment not clearly erroneous and noting the inconsistencies in the documents he presented. The BIA issued its decision on February 14, 2005. Tchuinga did not file a petition for review of this decision. Instead, on February 24, 2005, he filed a motion to reopen with the BIA to apply for adjustment of status, based on our recent decision in Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that arriving aliens are eligible to adjust their status in proceedings before an IJ).4 Tchuinga did not raise the frivolous asylum application issue in his February 24, 2005 motion to reopen. On May 17, 2005, the BIA issued a decision declining to reopen the petitioner's case, concluding that the petitioner was barred from adjusting his status due to the frivolous asylum application bar, notwithstanding Succar. On June 9, 2005, Tchuinga filed a petition for review with this Court.
A petition for review must be filed within 30 days of the date of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1). A motion to reopen will not toll the 30-day period for seeking judicial review. See Zhang, 348 F.3d at 292 (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 395-406, 115 S. Ct. 1537, 131 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1995)). Tchuinga did not file a petition for review appealing the February 14, 2005 decision. Instead, he filed a motion to reopen, which the BIA denied in its May 17, 2005 decision. It is this latter decision, denying his motion to reopen, that Tchuinga now appeals. Thus, his appeal is timely only as an appeal of the BIA's denial of the motion to reopen.
Our review is thus limited to determining whether the BIA abused its discretion by denying Tchuinga's motion to reopen on the grounds that Tchuinga is ineligible for adjustment of status notwithstanding Succar. See Nascimento v. INS, 274 F.3d 26, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2001) (limiting review to issues addressed in motion to reopen). We do not have jurisdiction to revisit the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision to apply the frivolous asylum application bar.
The BIA denied Tchuinga's motion to reopen because he failed to establish a prima facie case for adjustment of status. See Zhang, 348 F.3d at 292 (explaining that the BIA may deny a motion to reopen based on the petitioner's failure to establish a prima facie case for relief). We see no abuse of discretion in this determination. Our decision in Succar removed one impediment to Tchuinga's application for adjustment of status. However, the frivolous asylum application bar still remains. At the time Tchuinga applied for adjustment of status, he was barred from such relief under the frivolous asylum application bar. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (6). He therefore has failed to establish a prima facie case for adjustment of status in his motion to reopen.
In Succar, we held that 8 C.F.R § 245.1(c) (8) (a regulation purporting to make "arriving aliens" ineligible to apply for adjustment of status) was invalid as inconsistent with the relevant statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. See Succar, 394 F.3d at 36. This is the same regulation at issue in Tchuinga's case.