Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/369/121/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-07-31 03:35:12
Document Index: 231196094

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 47', '§ 1252', '§ 1253', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 201', '§ 1404']

DiBella v. United States :: 369 U.S. 121 (1962) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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DiBella v. United States 369 U.S. 121 (1962)
U.S. Supreme CourtDiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962)DiBella v. United StatesNo. 21Argued January 16-17, 1962Decided March 19, 1962*369 U.S. 121CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
These two cases present variants of the same problem: the appealability of an order granting or denying a pretrial motion to suppress the evidentiary use in a federal criminal trial of material allegedly procured through Page 369 U. S. 122 an unreasonable search and seizure. [Footnote 1] A brief recital of the procedural history of each will place our problem in context.
On October 15, 1958, a warrant was issued by a United States Commissioner in the Eastern District of New York for the arrest of Mario DiBella upon a complaint charging unlawful sales of narcotics. The warrant was executed on March 9, 1959, in DiBella's apartment, and was followed by seizure of the drugs, equipment, and cash now in question. DiBella was arraigned and released under bail the next day. On June 17, 1959, a motion to suppress was filed on his behalf with the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and hearing was scheduled for July 6. Several continuances followed, and, before the hearing was held on August 25, an indictment against DiBella was returned in the same district. The motion was ultimately denied, without prejudice to renewal at trial. 178 F.Supp. 5. The Court of Appeals Page 369 U. S. 123 for the Second Circuit held the order appealable, in accordance with its prior decisions, because the motion was filed before return of the indictment. 284 F.2d 897.
The settled view of the Second Circuit, that a ruling on a pre-indictment motion invariably lays the basis for immediate appellate review, in that it constitutes a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, even though an indictment intervenes, has not been squarely passed upon by this Court. We have denied appealability from orders on post-indictment motions to both the Government, Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, and the defendant, Page 369 U. S. 124 Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221. The Court has, however, in fact allowed appeals from orders granting and denying pre-indictment motions, [Footnote 2] and these dispositions have given rise to explanatory dicta that lend support to the rule developed in the Second Circuit. [Footnote 3] Not only disagreement among the circuits, but dubieties within them demand an adjudication based upon searching consideration of such conflicting and confused views regarding a problem of considerable importance in the proper administration of criminal justice.
Since the procedural aspects of law deal with the practical affairs of men, and do not constitute an abstract system of doctrinaire notions, Congress has recognized the need of exceptions for interlocutory orders in certain types of proceedings where the damage of error unreviewed before the judgment is definitive and complete, see Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 252 U. S. 370, has been deemed greater than the disruption caused by intermediate appeal. Page 369 U. S. 125 See 30 Stat. 544, 553 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 47 (bankruptcy proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (orders invalidating federal statutes); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (injunctions issued or refused by statutory three-judge courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)-(4) (injunctions, receivership, admiralty, patent infringement). Most recently, in the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1770, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), Congress expanded the latitude for intermediate appeals in civil actions through the device of discretionary certification of controlling questions of law. See Note, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 351, 378-379. [Footnote 4]
Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 326 U. S. 126. [Footnote 5] Similarly, so as not to frustrate the right Page 369 U. S. 126 of appellate review, immediate appeal has been allowed from an order recognized as collateral to the principal litigation because touching matters that will not "affect, or . . . be affected by, decision of the merits of [the] . . . case," Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 337 U. S. 546, when the practical effect of the order will be irreparable by any subsequent appeal. E.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1; Swift & Co. v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U. S. 684, 339 U. S. 688-689. To like effect is Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which, as amended in 1961, 368 U.S. at 1015, allows appeals in multiple litigation from an express entry of "final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties," but only when the trial judge certifies that "there is no just reason for delay."
Again, the decisions according finality to civil orders in advance of an ultimately concluding judgment have rested on finding a particular claim to be independent, because Page 369 U. S. 127 "fairly severable from the context of a larger litigious process." Swift & Co. v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, supra, at 339 U. S. 689. No such severability inheres in a motion seeking the suppression of evidence at a forthcoming trial; its disposition, as the Court recognized in Cogen v. United States, supra, at 278 U. S. 223, "will necessarily determine the conduct of the trial and may vitally affect the result." No less when it precedes indictment, the motion presents an issue that is involved in, and will be part of, a criminal prosecution in process at the time the order is issued.
The precise question before us has been much canvassed in the lower courts. It has not only produced a conflict among the circuits, but has provoked practical difficulties in the administration of criminal justice, and caused expressions of dissatisfaction even in courts that have sustained an appeal. Although only the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have clearly departed from the Second Circuit's view, [Footnote 6] the consensus in the others is far from unwavering. [Footnote 7] Page 369 U. S. 128 The First Circuit, for example, has declined to permit pretrial entertainment of any suppression motions other than those explicitly authorized by the language of Rule 41(e). Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382, 386-389 (1952); accord, e. g., Benes v. Canary, 224 F.2d 470, 472 (C.A.6th Cir. 1955). And see In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 465-466 (C.A.2d Cir. 1947) (opinions of L. Hand and A. Hand, JJ.). These opinions manifest a disinclination to treat as separate and final rulings on the admissibility of evidence which depend on factual contentions that may be more appropriately resolved at a plenary trial. Similarly, a California District Court has recently dismissed for want of equity a pre-indictment bill to suppress, on the ground that at the time relief would issue, there was an adequate remedy at law by motion in the criminal trial; and the Ninth Circuit refused an application for prerogative writs. Rodgers v. United States, 158 F.Supp. 670 (1958); id. at 684 note. See also Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F.2d 788 (C.A.5th Cir. 1938). In the Third Circuit, which up to now has agreed with the Second, the latest opinion on the subject expresses doubts as to the validity Page 369 U. S. 129 of its precedents. United States v. Murphy, 290 F.2d 573, 575 n. 2 (1961).
We should decide the question here -- we are free to do so -- with due regard to historic principle and to the practicalities in the administration of criminal justice. An order granting or denying a pre-indictment motion to suppress does not fall within any class of independent proceedings otherwise recognized by this Court, and there is every practical reason for denying it such recognition. To regard such a disjointed ruling on the admissibility of a potential item of evidence in a forthcoming trial as the termination of an independent proceeding, with full panoply of appeal and attendant stay, entails serious disruption to the conduct of a criminal trial. [Footnote 8] The fortuity of a pre-indictment motion may make of appeal an instrument of harassment, jeopardizing by delay the availability of other essential evidence. See Rodgers v. United States, supra, 158 F.Supp. at 673 n. 1. Furthermore, as cases in the Second Circuit make clear, appellate intervention makes for truncated presentation of the issue of admissibility, because the legality of the search too often cannot truly be determined until the evidence at the trial has brought all circumstances to light. See In re Milburne, 77 F.2d 310, 311 (1935); Grant v. United States, 291 F.2d 227, 229 (1961). [Footnote 9] Page 369 U. S. 130
In the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, § 201, 70 Stat. 567, 573, 18 U.S.C. § 1404, Congress did grant the Government the right to appeal from orders granting pretrial motions to suppress the use of seized narcotics as Page 369 U. S. 131 evidence; but, though invited to do so, [Footnote 10] it declined to extend this right to all suppression orders. Since then, each Congress has had before it bills to accomplish that extension, [Footnote 11] at least one of which has been reported favorably. [Footnote 12] As yet, however, none has been adopted.
We hold, accordingly, that the mere circumstance of a pre-indictment motion does not transmute the ensuing evidentiary ruling into an independent proceeding begetting finality even for purposes of appealability. Presentations before a United States Commissioner, Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 282 U. S. 352-354, as well as before a grand jury, Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 309 U. S. 327, are parts of the federal prosecutorial system leading to a criminal trial. Orders granting or denying suppression in the wake of such proceedings are truly interlocutory, for the criminal trial is then fairly in train. When, at the time of ruling, there is outstanding a complaint, or a detention or release on bail following arrest, or an arraignment, information, or indictment -- in each such case, the order on a suppression motion must be treated as "but a step in the criminal case preliminary to the trial thereof." Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221, 278 U. S. 227. Only if the motion is solely for return of property, Page 369 U. S. 132 and is in no way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant can the proceedings be regarded as independent. Ibid.; see Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 354 U. S. 404 n. 17; In re Brenner, 6 F.2d 425 (C.A.2d Cir. 1925).
United States v. Lester, 21 F.R.D. 30, 31 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1957). Rule 41(e), of course, specifically provides for making of the motion in the district of seizure. On a summary hearing, however, the ruling there is likely always to be tentative. Page 369 U. S. 133 We think it accords most satisfactorily with sound administration of the Rules to treat such rulings as interlocutory.