Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/664/1249/198325/
Timestamp: 2019-12-09 18:40:07
Document Index: 177579698

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 304', '§ 304', '§ 395', '§ 1651', '§ 304', '§ 1655', '§ 322', '§ 1655', '§ 10101', '§ 322', '§ 322', '§ 11909', '§ 1655', '§ 304', '§ 322', '§ 11909', '§ 11909', '§ 322', '§ 304', '§ 304', '§ 11909', '§ 304', '§ 322', '§ 11909', '§ 322', '§ 304', '§ 322', '§ 304', '§ 11909', '§ 304', '§ 304', '§ 304', '§ 11909', '§ 11909', '§ 304', '§ 1655', '§ 11909', '§ 304', '§ 322', '§ 11909', '§ 1655', '§ 304', '§ 11909', '§ 304', '§ 11909', '§ 11909', '§ 11909', '§ 10521', '§ 10521', '§ 10102', '§ 304', '§ 304', '§ 1655']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Rsr Corporation, Defendant-appellant, 664 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1980) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1980 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Rsr Corporation, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Rsr Corporation, Defendant-appellant, 664 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1980)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 664 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1980)
Congress enacted Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act on August 9, 1935. Pub. L. No. 74-225, 49 Stat. 543 (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327; presently codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). The new additions to the Interstate Commerce Act empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate various aspects of transportation of property by motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce, depending upon whether the carrier was classified as a common, contract, or private carrier. Section 204(a) (3) of the new Act, as codified in 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (3), gave the ICC powers to promulgate regulations governing the safety of operations of private motor carriers:
At issue in this case are a set of regulations issued under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (3) describing requirements for keeping and maintaining accurate daily driver logbooks. 49 C.F.R. § 395.8.
On October 15, 1966, Congress created the Department of Transportation by means of Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the "Department of Transportation Act"). Congress transferred the ICC's authority to regulate private motor carriers under § 304(a) (3) to the DOT. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(e) (6) (C) provided that:
(C) relating generally to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and equipment: Sections 204(a) (1) and (2), to the extent that they relate to qualifications and maximum hours of service employees and safety of operation and equipment; and sections 204(a) (3), (3a), and (5) (49 U.S.C. 304).
(2) (A) With respect to any function which is transferred to the Secretary by subsection (e) and which was vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission preceding such transfer, the Secretary shall have the same administrative powers under the Interstate Commerce Act as the Commission had before such transfer with respect to such transferred function. After such transfer, the Commission may exercise its administrative powers under the Interstate Commerce Act only with respect to those of its functions not transferred by subsection (e).
(ii) the term "administrative powers under the Interstate Commerce Act" means any functions under the following provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended: ... section() ... 222 (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 322) (except subsections (b) (2) and (b) (3) thereof) ...
After the passage of the Department of Transportation Act, regulation of private motor carriers was no longer under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(f) (2) (A).
On October 17, 1978, in a laudatory effort to recodify parts of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11916) (hereinafter referred to as the "Recodification Act"). It is undisputed that through this recodification, Congress intended no substantive change in the Interstate Commerce Act and related laws. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-1395, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 9-10 (1978), reprinted in (1978) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3009, 3012-13, 3018. The purpose of the recodification was merely to simplify language, replace obsolete terms, and eliminate superseded and obsolete material.3
The parties do not dispute that the information would have been proper if RSR had been charged with a violation of 49 U.S.C. § 322(g) and if that statute were still in effect. However, the government concedes that § 322(g) has been repealed by the Recodification Act because it has been replaced by § 11909(b). The Act requires that any reference to a former statute be deemed a reference to its replacement. Thus, under the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1655, the DOT has the power to promulgate regulations for private carriers under § 304(a) (3), for that section has not yet been recodified and remains in force. However, the DOT's former authority under the penalty provisions of § 322(g) must now be read as based instead upon § 11909(b), and § 11909(b) only authorizes penalties with respect to transportation subject to the ICC's jurisdiction. It is undisputed that at the time when this replacement statute was enacted, the ICC had no jurisdiction over private motor carriers, nor does it have that jurisdiction presently. Thus, although the DOT retains its power to issue regulations for private motor carriers, RSR argues that a congressional oversight has robbed these regulations of any enforcement through penal sanctions.
The government responds that the original § 322(g) by its terms did not apply to private carriers either, but only did so through reference to § 304(a) (3). Thus the fact that § 304(a) (3) remains in force allows § 11909(b) to apply to private carriers.
This argument is tempting but it does not prove the government's desired conclusion. If we substitute the new statute for the old in § 304(a) (3) as required by the Recodification Act, we obtain the following:
(3) To establish for private carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is found, reasonable requirements to promote safety of operation, and to that end prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and standards of equipment. In the event such requirements are established, the term "motor carrier" shall be construed to include private carriers of property by motor vehicle in the administration of subsection (c) of this section and section() ... (11909(b)) ... of this title.
However, the term "motor carrier," which was the operative term expanding the scope of § 322(g) to encompass private motor carriers, does not appear at all in § 11909(b). § 322(g) applies to "(a)ny motor carrier ... who shall willfully fail or refuse to make a report to the Commission as required by this chapter ..." Thus, read in conjunction with § 304(a) (3), it is clear that § 322(g) would apply to private carriers to the extent that the ICC (or later, the DOT) issued regulations authorized by § 304(a) (3). On the other hand, § 11909(b) does not refer to "motor carriers" as defined in § 304(a) (3); rather, its scope is limited to "person(s) required to make a report to the Commission ... about transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter II of chapter 105 of this title." The ICC, however, has had no jurisdiction over private carriers since 1966. Its powers under § 304(a) (3), which might have given it jurisdiction, have been transferred to the Department of Transportation. Hence § 304(a) (3) cannot help the government get around the clear language of § 11909(b).
To this it may be objected that what Congress clearly meant to say in § 11909(b) was "subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission prior to the Department of Transportation Act." We then would look to § 304(a) (3) to see what the jurisdiction of the ICC was before 1966 and, finding that it included private motor carriers, all would be well. The problem is that although this is what Congress clearly meant to say, intended to say, and wanted to say, still Congress did not say it. It said something which, on its face, appears very different: we are instructed instead to look to the present jurisdiction of the ICC, which does not govern private carriers.
The government poses a second argument, based upon the Department of Transportation Act itself. If we substitute the new statute for the old in §§ 1655(f) (2) (A) and (B) we obtain:
(ii) the term "administrative powers under the Interstate Commerce Act" means any functions under the following provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended: ... section() ... § 11909(b). (emphasis added.)
The government's argument then goes as follows: Section 1655(e) (6) (C) transferred the ICC's functions under § 304(a) (3) to the DOT. These functions are what give enforcement power to the provisions of the former § 322(g) and the present § 11909(b). According to § 1655(f) then, with respect to powers under § 304(a) (3), the Secretary of the DOT now has the same administrative powers under § 11909(b) as the ICC had before the transfer. Before the transfer, the ICC had regulatory powers over private carriers under § 304(a) (3). It thus had jurisdiction over this sort of transportation. Thus the penalty provisions of § 11909(b) would apply to private carriers before the transfer. Hence the powers of enforcement under § 11909(b) over private carriers remain unchanged after the transfer to the DOT, and the DOT may impose regulations on private carriers enforced by penalties under § 11909(b).
"The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself." United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1820). Like all maxims of construction, its decisional force varies according to the facts and circumstances of each case and the maxim must be balanced against such countermaxims as construction according to the intent of the legislature and construction according to a reasonable reading of plain language. For example, it is often said that although penal statutes are to be strictly construed, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. Barrett v. U. S., 423 U.S. 212, 96 S. Ct. 298, 46 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976); Huddleston v. U. S., 415 U.S. 814, 94 S. Ct. 1262, 39 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1974); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 75 S. Ct. 504, 99 L. Ed. 594 (1955); American Fur Co. v. United States, 2 Pet. 358, 7 L. Ed. 450 (1829); United States v. Wiltberger, supra; United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1981). It is also said that the principle of strict construction does not mean that the narrowest possible construction must be given without concern for a manifest legislative purpose nor does it mean that common sense and the plain meaning of statutory language are to be disregarded. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 96 S. Ct. 335, 46 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1975); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971); United States v. Bramblett, supra; United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 68 S. Ct. 376, 92 L. Ed. 442 (1948); United States v. Scrimgeour, supra; United States v. Levy, 579 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S. Ct. 1243, 59 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1979).
In various ways over the years, we have stated that "when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite." United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-222 (73 S. Ct. 227, 229, 97 L. Ed. 260) (1952). This principle is founded on two policies that have long been part of our tradition. First, "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, (51 S. Ct. 340, 341, 75 L. Ed. 816) (1931) (Holmes, J.). See also United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, (73 S. Ct. 189, 97 L. Ed. 200) (1952). Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This policy embodies "the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should." H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurther and the Reading of Statutes, in Benchmarks 196, 209 (1967). Thus, where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.
Pub. L. 95-473, Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1466.
Subchapter II of chapter 105 of the Interstate Commerce Act (now codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10521-10529) exempts private carriers from the ICC's jurisdiction. 49 U.S.C. § 10521 states that the ICC has jurisdiction over "transportation by motor carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 10102(14) defines a "motor private carrier" as a person "other than a motor carrier." Before the passage of the Department of Transportation Act, § 304(a) (3) included private carriers in the definition of "motor carriers" under the ICC's jurisdiction for certain limited purposes. The Department of Transportation Act transferred the ICC's powers under § 304(a) (3) to the DOT. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(e) (6) (C). From that point on the ICC no longer had jurisdiction over private carriers