Source: https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/2007/163.115
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 15:26:21
Document Index: 197170379

Matched Legal Cases: ['§88', '§1', '§1', '§5', '§1', '§1', '§1', '§3', '§1', '§2', '§4', '§2']

ORS 163.115 - Murder - 2007 Oregon Revised Statutes
2007 ORS Vol. 4 Chapter 163 Section 163.115
2007 ORS 163.115¹
• affirmative defense to certain felony murders
• sentence of life imprisonment required
• minimum term
(1) Except as provided in ORS 163.118 (Manslaughter in the first degree) and 163.125 (Manslaughter in the second degree), criminal homicide constitutes murder:
(A) Arson in the first degree as defined in ORS 164.325 (Arson in the first degree);
(B) Criminal mischief in the first degree by means of an explosive as defined in ORS 164.365 (Criminal mischief in the first degree);
(C) Burglary in the first degree as defined in ORS 164.225 (Burglary in the first degree);
(D) Escape in the first degree as defined in ORS 162.165 (Escape in the first degree);
(E) Kidnapping in the second degree as defined in ORS 163.225 (Kidnapping in the second degree);
(F) Kidnapping in the first degree as defined in ORS 163.235 (Kidnapping in the first degree);
(G) Robbery in the first degree as defined in ORS 164.415 (Robbery in the first degree);
(I) Compelling prostitution as defined in ORS 167.017 (Compelling prostitution); or
(J) Assault in the first degree, as defined in ORS 163.185 (Assault in the first degree), and the victim is under 14 years of age, or assault in the second degree, as defined in ORS 163.175 (Assault in the second degree) (1)(a) or (b), and the victim is under 14 years of age; or
(c) By abuse when a person, recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, causes the death of a child under 14 years of age or a dependent person, as defined in ORS 163.205 (Criminal mistreatment in the first degree), and:
(c) At any time after completion of a minimum period of confinement pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection, the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, upon the petition of a prisoner so confined, shall hold a hearing to determine if the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. The sole issue is whether or not the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. At the hearing the prisoner has:
(A) The burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the likelihood of rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time; and
(e) The board’s final order shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact shall consist of a concise statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings as to each contested issue of fact and as to each ultimate fact required to support the board’s order.
(f) Not less than two years after the denial of the relief sought in a petition under paragraph (c) of this subsection, the prisoner may petition again for a change in the terms of confinement. Further petitions for a change may be filed at intervals of not less than two years thereafter.
(b) "Neglect or maltreatment" means a violation of ORS 163.535 (Abandonment of a child), 163.545 (Child neglect in the second degree) or 163.547 (Child neglect in the first degree) or a failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or medical care that is likely to endanger the health or welfare of a child under 14 years of age or a dependent person. This paragraph is not intended to replace or affect the duty or standard of care required under ORS chapter 677.
(d) "Torture" means to intentionally inflict intense physical pain upon an unwilling victim as a separate objective apart from any other purpose. [1971 c.743 §88; 1975 c.577 §1; 1979 c.2 §1; 1981 c.873 §5; 1985 c.763 §1; 1989 c.985 §1; 1993 c.664 §1; 1995 c.421 §3; 1995 c.657 §1; 1997 c.850 §2; 1999 c.782 §4; 2007 c.717 §2]
Note: See note under 163.105 (Sentencing options for aggravated murder).
Under Former Similar Statute (ORS 163.010)
Where the only felony committed (apart from the mur­der) was the assault upon the victim which resulted in the killing, the assault merged with the killing and could not be an ingredient of a felony-mur­der. State v. Shirley, 7 Or App 166, 488 P2d 1401 (1971), Sup Ct review denied
Murder indict­ment charging failure to provide "adequate sustenance, and medical and hygienic care" was sufficiently particular. State v. House, 260 Or 138, 489 P2d 381 (1971)
Where the single crime of first de­gree mur­der is charged it was not error to instruct the jury that guilt may be es­tab­lished under either the felony-mur­der theory or premeditated mur­der theory; it was imma­te­ri­al that some members of the jury may have believed him guilty of premeditated mur­der while others may have believed him guilty of felony-mur­der. State v. Hazelett, 8 Or App 44, 492 P2d 501 (1972), Sup Ct review denied
Pre-1975 amend­ments
Defense of extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance is ques­tion for trier of fact if there is sufficient evidence to reasonably support inference which excludes de­fense. State v. Siens, 12 Or App 97, 504 P2d 1056 (1973), Sup Ct review denied
Expert testimony is not indispensable to disproving de­fense of extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance. State v. Siens, 12 Or App 97, 504 P2d 1056 (1973), Sup Ct review denied
Defense of extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance is not an af­firm­a­tive and thus according to ORS 161.055 (Burden of proof as to defenses) the state has burden of disproving it beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Siens, 12 Or App 97, 504 P2d 1056 (1973), Sup Ct review denied
This sec­tion does not require that "extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance" be caused by an "unexpected and provocative event." State v. Corbin, 15 Or App 536, 516 P2d 1314 (1973), Sup Ct review denied
Admission into evidence of death threats made month pre­vi­ous to hom­i­cide charged were held not to be in error because they tended to show defendant's indifferent attitude toward human life. State v. Gardner, 16 Or App 464, 518 P2d 1341 (1974), Sup Ct review denied
In order to convict defendant of mur­der, jury must find beyond reasonable doubt the nonexistence of "extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance." State v. McCoy, 17 Or App 155, 521 P2d 1074 (1974), aff'd 270 Or 340, 527 P2d 725 (1974)
Reckless mur­der could arise from attack on specific individual. State v. Draves, 18 Or App 248, 524 P2d 1225 (1974), Sup Ct review denied
Pre-1977 amend­ments
"Extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance" becomes issue in mur­der pros­e­cu­­tion when there is evidence at trial that raises it. State v. Keys, 25 Or App 15, 548 P2d 205 (1976)
Pre-1979 amend­ments
Where defendant was indicted for ag­gra­vat­ed mur­der under ORS 163.095 ("Aggravated murder" defined), con­vic­­tion on stipulated facts for inten­tional mur­der did not violate defendant's due process rights. Riley v. Cupp, 56 Or App 467, 642 P2d 333 (1982), Sup Ct review denied
Pre-1981 amend­ments
Since, under this sec­tion, defendant could receive lesser min­i­mum sen­tence for ag­gra­vat­ed inten­tional mur­der than for unag­gra­vat­ed inten­tional mur­der, pro­vi­sion of this sec­tion requiring defendant to serve 25 years before becoming eligible for parole was invalid under Article I, Sec­tion 15 of the Oregon Constitu­tion. State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153, 630 P2d 796 (1981)
When de­fense is extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance, jury should be instructed on meaning of whole term rather than singling out word "extreme" for amplifica­tion. State v. Ott, 297 Or 375, 686 P2d 1001 (1984)
Point of extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance de­fense is to provide basis for mitiga­tion that differs from finding of mental defect or disease to such extent as altogether to preclude crim­i­nal responsibility. State v. Ott, 297 Or 375, 686 P2d 1001 (1984)
Where de­fense is "extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance" trial court's instruc­tions to jury must contain five specified ele­ments. State v. Ott, 297 Or 375, 686 P2d 1001 (1984)
Pre-1985 amend­ments
Affirmative de­fense of extreme emo­­tion­al dis­tur­bance is separate and independent from ele­ments state must prove to obtain mur­der con­vic­­tion and accordingly does not violate due process clause of federal constitu­tion. State v. Lyon, 65 Or App 790, 672 P2d 1358 (1983)
Affirmative de­fense to felony mur­der, requiring defendant to prove he was not armed with dangerous weapon, did not require him to disprove ele­ment of robbery charge that defendant or his accomplices were armed with dangerous weapon and related jury instruc­tion did not unconstitu­tionally transfer to defendant burden of proof for ele­ment of underlying crime. Burrow v. Cupp, 787 F2d 1346 (1986)
This sec­tion does not violate equal protec­tion by virtue of ag­gra­vat­ed felony mur­der statute requiring addi­tional ele­ment of per­sonal com­mis­sion of hom­i­cide. Grooms v. Kenney, 826 F2d 883 (1987)
Pre-1995 amend­ments
Required and discre­tionary min­i­mum terms of confine­ment for per­son receiving life sen­tence constitute "mandatory min­i­mum sen­tence" as used in ORS 161.620 (Sentences imposed upon waiver from juvenile court). State v. Jones, 315 Or 225, 844 P2d 188 (1992)
Sentencing guide­lines do not impliedly repeal those parts of mur­der statute authorizing 10-year sen­tence with addi­tional 15-year sen­tence. State v. Morgan, 316 Or 553, 856 P2d 612 (1993); State v. Hostetter, 125 Or App 491, 865 P2d 485 (1993), Sup Ct review denied
Enact­ment of sen­ten­cing guide­lines in 1989 impliedly repealed indeterminate life sen­tence for mur­der. State v. Morgan, 316 Or 553, 856 P2d 612 (1993); State v. Hostetter, 125 Or App 491, 865 P2d 485 (1993), Sup Ct review denied
Pre-1999 amend­ments
1995 amend­ment revived and reenacted indeterminate life sen­tence for mur­der. State v. Francis, 154 Or App 486, 962 P2d 45 (1998), Sup Ct review denied
Require­ment that mur­der be punished by mandatory im­pris­on­­ment for life without providing parole mechanism was unconstitu­tionally dispropor­tionate in comparison to penalty of life im­pris­on­­ment with possibility of parole for greater crime of ag­gra­vat­ed mur­der. State v. McLain, 158 Or App 419, 974 P2d 727 (1999)
Indict­ment alleging com­mis­sion of crime by particular means sufficiently alerts defendant of charge to permit con­vic­­tion based on alternative means of com­mit­ting same crime. State v. Draves, 18 Or App 248, 524 P2d 1225 (1974), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Davis, 23 Or App 331, 541 P2d 1404 (1975), Sup Ct review denied
Defendant cannot be sen­tenced for both felony mur­der and underlying felony. State v. Fish, 282 Or 53, 577 P2d 500 (1978)
Fact that state may choose to prosecute defendant accused of per­sonally com­mit­ting hom­i­cide under this sec­tion or ORS 163.095 ("Aggravated murder" defined) does not by itself violate Article I, Sec­tion 20 of Oregon Constitu­tion or Fourteenth Amend­ment to United States Constitu­tion. State v. Reynolds, 289 Or 533, 614 P2d 1158 (1980)
Felony mur­der is not limited to neg­li­gent or accidental killing during felony. State v. Reams, 292 Or 1, 636 P2d 913 (1981)
"Year and a day rule," requiring that mur­der indict­ment allege that decedent died within a year and a day of the com­mis­sion of the act alleged to cause the death, is not applicable in Oregon. State v. Hudson, 56 Or App 462, 642 P2d 331 (1982), Sup Ct review denied
Where amend­ment to this sec­tion that permits imposi­tion of min­i­mum sen­tences in mur­der cases did not take effect until after mur­der in this case occurred, applica­tion of amend­ment offends constitu­tional pro­hi­bi­­tion against ex post facto laws. State v. Reese, 84 Or App 211, 733 P2d 495 (1987), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Young, 85 Or App 421, 736 P2d 626 (1987), Sup Ct review denied
Jury's unanimous con­vic­­tion of defendant of felony mur­der is not inconsistent with less than unanimous vote on first de­gree kidnapping because dissenting juror could have found defendant guilty of lesser included of­fense sufficient to support felony mur­der verdict. State v. Mendez, 308 Or 9, 774 P2d 1082 (1989)
Trial court was without authority to impose fine as punish­ment for defendant's mur­der con­vic­­tion. State v. Batty, 109 Or App 62, 819 P2d 732 (1991), Sup Ct review denied
Where crime was committed before basis for upholding min­i­mum sen­tence was included in rules, use of basis to uphold sen­tence was not ex post facto. Carroll v. Board of Parole, 124 Or App 180, 859 P2d 1203 (1993)
Where either of two felonies could be predicate felony supporting ag­gra­vat­ed mur­der sen­tence, court could impose separate sen­tence for that felony not found to be predicate for ag­gra­vat­ed mur­der. State v. Lyons, 124 Or App 598, 863 P2d 1303 (1993), aff'd on other grounds, 324 Or 256, 924 P2d 802 (1996)
Ac­tions against single victim that include more than one of listed means of mur­der provide grounds for single con­vic­­tion on multiple counts of mur­der but do not create grounds for multiple mur­der con­vic­­tions. State v. Beason, 170 Or App 414, 12 P3d 560 (2000), Sup Ct review denied
State v. Moore, 4 Or App 548, 480 P2d 458 (1971), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Smallwood, 5 Or App 245, 481 P2d 378 (1971), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Tucker, 5 Or App 283, 483 P2d 825 (1971), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Obremski, 5 Or App 302, 483 P2d 467 (1971), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Gairson, 5 Or App 464, 484 P2d 854 (1971), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Crenshaw, 6 Or App 55, 486 P2d 581 (1971); State v. Martinelli, 6 Or App 182, 485 P2d 647 (1971), Sup Ct review denied; State v. House, 260 Or 138, 489 P2d 381 (1971); State v. Davis, 16 Or App 405, 518 P2d 1039 (1974), Sup Ct review denied
Pre 1975 Amend­ments
51 OLR 459 (1972); 8 WLJ 128 (1972)
Pre 1979 Amend­ments
16 WLR 1, 67 (1979)
Pre 1981 Amend­ments
17 WLR 629 (1981)
26 WLR 435 (1990)