Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/604/114/7920/
Timestamp: 2019-10-22 04:00:33
Document Index: 605320647

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11', '§ 57', '§ 93', '§ 311', '§ 711', '§ 11']

Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff-appellee, v. An-car Oil Company, Inc., et al., Defendants-appellees,cyrus W. Partington et al., Intervenors-appellants, 604 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1979 › Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff-appellee, v. An-car Oil Company, Inc., et al., Defenda...
Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff-appellee, v. An-car Oil Company, Inc., et al., Defendants-appellees,cyrus W. Partington et al., Intervenors-appellants, 604 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 604 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1979) Argued April 3, 1979. Decided Aug. 27, 1979
The district court possesses a broad range of discretion in deciding whether or not to terminate an equity receivership and our review is limited to determining whether that discretion has been abused. Lincoln Thrift Association, supra, 577 F.2d 600; Bailey v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78, 82 (1st. Cir.), Cert. denied, 331 U.S. 834, 67 S. Ct. 1515, 91 L. Ed. 1847 (1947). In granting the motion to terminate the equity receivership, the district court did not issue any findings of fact or rulings of law. Despite the assertion of appellants that this omission constituted reversible error, there is more than enough information in the briefs and lengthy record for us to rule that the district court properly exercised its discretion. We see no need to remand for specific rulings and findings.
At the heart of appellants' argument is the assertion that the receivership assets were marshalled to protect their investments and that they, therefore, have an equitable lien on those monies. Appellants maintain that the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction over the receivership assets. This argument is based on section 2(a) (21) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (21),5 which provides that where a receiver has been appointed more than four months in advance of the date of bankruptcy, the receiver need not turn over the receivership assets to the bankruptcy court. They are also concerned that the termination of the equity receivership and filing of the petition in bankruptcy may deprive them of the opportunity to assert their fraud claims against An-Car. This speculative concern relates to Chapter VI § 57(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93(d).6
Harris v. Brundage, 305 U.S. 160, 163, 59 S. Ct. 131, 133, 83 L. Ed. 100 (1935). It is the forum for deciding initially appellants' claim that they have a lien on the receivership's assets.7 See Chapter XI § 311 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 711,8 Collier on Bankruptcy P 3.02 at 156-63 (14th ed. 1978). It would be premature for us to determine the applicability of section 2(a) (21) of the Act since this, too, is an issue which the bankruptcy court is empowered to decide. See In re Distillers Factors Corp., 187 F.2d 685, 687 (3d Cir. 1951); Yoshinuma v. Oberdorfer Insurance Agency, 136 F.2d 460, 461 (5th Cir. 1943). The district court order of September 14 did not affect any rights appellant may or may not have acquired in the fund marshalled by the equity receiver. It is the province of the bankruptcy court to determine whether appellants have acquired any legally recognizable interest in that fund.
Section 2(a) (21) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (21), provides in pertinent part: