Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/395/621/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:16:13
Document Index: 691976344

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2553', '§ 2502', '§ 2531', '§ 2012', '§ 2012', '§ 2012', '§ 2012']

KRAMER V. UNION FREE SCH. DIST. NO. 15, 395 U. S. 621 - Volume 395 - 1969 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 395 > KRAMER V. UNION FREE SCH. DIST. NO. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969) > Full Text
New York law provides basically three methods of school board selection. In some large city districts, the school board is appointed by the mayor or city council. N.Y.Educ.Law § 2553, subds. 2, 4 (1953), as amended (Supp. 196&). On the other hand, in some cities, primarily those with less than 125,000 residents, the school board is elected at general or municipal elections in which all qualified city voters may participate. N.Y.Educ.Law §§ 2502, subd. 2, 2553, subd. 3 (1953). Cf. N.Y.Educ.Law § 2531 (1953). Finally, in other districts such as the one involved in this case, which are primarily rural
Although the New York State Department of Education has substantial responsibility for education in the State, the local school districts maintain significant control over the administration of local school district affairs. [Footnote 3] Generally, the board of education has the basic responsibility for local school operation, including prescribing the courses of study, determining the textbooks
At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue in this case. The requirements of § 2012 that school district voters must (1) be citizens of the United States, (2) be bona fide residents of the school district, and (3) be at least 21 years of age are not challenged. Appellant agrees that the States have the power to impose reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the availability of the ballot. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 380 U. S. 91 (1965); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904). The sole issue in this case is whether the additional requirements of § 2012 -- requirements which prohibit some district residents who are otherwise
Thus, state apportionment statutes, which may dilute the effectiveness of some citizens' votes, receive close scrutiny from this Court. Reynolds v. Sims, supra. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968). No less rigid an examination is applicable to statutes denying the franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and age. [Footnote 6] Statutes granting the franchise to
We turn therefore to question whether the exclusion is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. First, appellees [Footnote 13] argue that the State has a legitimate interest in limiting the franchise in school district elections
Whether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident citizens "primarily interested" deny those excluded equal protection of the laws depends, inter alia, on whether all those excluded are, in fact, substantially less interested or affected than those the statute includes. In other words, the classifications must be tailored so that the exclusion of appellant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated state goal. [Footnote 14] Section 2012 does not meet the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise. The classifications in § 2012 permit inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and, on the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions. [Footnote 15]
The statute also requires that a voter be a citizen of the United States and at least 21 years of age. Appellant meets these requirements, and does not challenge the citizenship, age, or residency requirements of § 2012. See infra at 395 U. S. 625. The statute is set out in the Appendix, infra.
"The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 193 U. S. 633; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 179 U. S. 335, absent, of course, the discrimination which the Constitution condemns."
Three classes of persons are qualified under New York law to vote in these school elections: (1) parents or guardians of children attending public schools within the District; (2) persons who own taxable real property within the District, and their spouses, and (3) persons who lease taxable real property within the District, and their spouses. [Footnote 2/2] The appellant, a bachelor who lives with
Although at times variously phrased, the traditional test of a statute's validity under the Equal Protection Clause is a familiar one: a legislative classification is invalid only "if it rest[s] on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation's objectives." Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U. S. 552, 330 U. S. 556. [Footnote 2/3] It was under just such a test that the literacy requirement involved in Lassiter was upheld. The premise of our decision in that case was that a State may constitutionally impose upon its citizens voting requirements reasonably "designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot." 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 51. A similar premise underlies the proposition, consistently endorsed by this Court, [Footnote 2/4] that a State may exclude nonresidents from participation in its elections. Such residence requirements, designed to help ensure that voters have a substantial stake in the outcome of elections and an opportunity to become familiar with the candidates and issues voted upon, are entirely permissible
Clearly a State may reasonably assume that its residents have a greater stake in the outcome of elections held within its boundaries than do other persons. Likewise, it is entirely rational for a state legislature to suppose that residents, being generally better informed regarding state affairs than are nonresidents, will be more likely than nonresidents to vote responsibly. And the same may be said of legislative assumptions regarding the electoral competence of adults and literate persons on the one hand, and of minors and illiterates, on the other. It is clear, of course, that lines thus drawn cannot infallibly perform their intended legislative function. Just as "[i]lliterate people may be intelligent voters," [Footnote 2/5] nonresidents or minors might also, in some instances, be interested, informed, and intelligent participants in the electoral process. Persons who commute across a state line to work may well have a great stake in the affairs of the State in which they are employed; some college students under 21 may be both better informed and more passionately interested in political affairs than many adults. But such discrepancies are the inevitable concomitant of the line-drawing that is essential to law making. So long as the classification is rationally related to a permissible legislative end, therefore -- as are residence, literacy, and age requirements imposed with respect to voting -- there is no denial of equal protection.
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U. S. 429, 342 U. S. 435 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). With good reason, the Court does not really argue the contrary. Instead, it strikes down New York's statute by asserting that the traditional equal protection standard is inapt in this case, and that a considerably stricter standard -- under which classifications relating to "the franchise" are to be subjected to "exacting judicial scrutiny" -- should be applied. But the asserted justification for applying such a standard cannot withstand analysis.
Nor is there any other justification for imposing the Court's "exacting" equal protection test. This case does not involve racial classifications, which, in light of the genesis of the Fourteenth Amendment, have traditionally been viewed as inherently "suspect." [Footnote 2/7] And this statute is not one that impinges upon a constitutionally protected right, and that consequently can be justified only by a "compelling" state interest. [Footnote 2/8] For "the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage
upon anyone. . . . ;" Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 88 U. S. 178.