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January 21, 2017, 11:34:10 AM
Topic: Mexico-US matters (Read 170935 times)
In-depth look at a rising cartel and the dynamics impacting the region:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/operation-jalisco-the-rise-of-the-jalisco-new-generation-cartel-and-peña-nieto’s-militarise
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2009/01/13/mexicos-glass-house-2/J. Michael WallerMexico’s Glass Housemexico_southern_borderArticles | January 13, 2009 | Borders EmailPrintEvery country has the right to restrict the quality and quantity of foreign immigrants entering or living within its borders. If American policymakers are looking for legal models on which to base new laws restricting immigration and expelling foreign lawbreakers, they have a handy guide: the Mexican constitution.Adopted in 1917, the constitution of the United Mexican States borrows heavily from American constitutional and legal principles. It combines those principles with a strong sense nationalism, cultural self-identity, paternalism, and state power. Mexico’s constitution contains many provisions to protect the country from foreigners, including foreigners legally resident in the country and even foreign-born people who have become naturalized Mexican citizens. The Mexican constitution segregates immigrants and naturalized citizens from native-born citizens by denying immigrants basic human rights that Mexican immigrants enjoy in the United States.By making increasing demands that the U.S. not enforce its immigration laws and, indeed, that it liberalize them, Mexico is throwing stones within its own glass house. This paper, the first of a short series on Mexican immigration double standards, examines the Mexican constitution’s protections against immigrants, and concludes with some questions about U.S. policy. SummaryIn brief, the Mexican Constitution states that:Immigrants and foreign visitors are banned from public political discourse.Immigrants and foreigners are denied certain basic property rights.Immigrants are denied equal employment rights.Immigrants and naturalized citizens will never be treated as real Mexican citizens.Immigrants and naturalized citizens are not to be trusted in public service.Immigrants and naturalized citizens may never become members of the clergy.Private citizens may make citizens arrests of lawbreakers (i.e., illegal immigrants) and hand them to the authorities.Immigrants may be expelled from Mexico for any reason and without due process. The Mexican constitution: Unfriendly to immigrantsThe Mexican constitution expressly forbids non-citizens to participate in the country’s political life. Non-citizens are forbidden to participate in demonstrations or express opinions in public about domestic politics. Article 9 states, "only citizens of the Republic may do so to take part in the political affairs of the country." Article 33 is unambiguous: "Foreigners may not in any way participate in the political affairs of the country."The Mexican constitution denies fundamental property rights to foreigners. If foreigners wish to have certain property rights, they must renounce the protection of their own governments or risk confiscation. Foreigners are forbidden to own land in Mexico within 100 kilometers of land borders or within 50 kilometers of the coast. Article 27 states,"Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or of waters. The State may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider themselves as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the protection of their governments in matters relating thereunto; under penalty, in case of noncompliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the property acquired to the Nation. Under no circumstances may foreigners acquire direct ownership of lands or waters within a zone of one hundred kilometers along the frontiers and of fifty kilometers along the shores of the country." (Emphasis added)The Mexican constitution denies equal employment rights to immigrants, even legal ones, in the public sector. Article 32: "Mexicans shall have priority over foreigners under equality of circumstances for all classes of concessions and for all employment, positions, or commissions of the Government in which the status of citizenship is not indispensable. In time of peace no foreigner can serve in the Army nor in the police or public security forces."The Mexican constitution guarantees that immigrants will never be treated as real Mexican citizens, even if they are legally naturalized. Article 32 bans foreigners, immigrants, and even naturalized citizens of Mexico from serving as military officers, Mexican-flagged ship and airline crew, and chiefs of seaports and airports: "In order to belong to the National Navy or the Air Force, and to discharge any office or commission, it is required to be a Mexican by birth. This same status is indispensable for captains, pilots, masters, engineers, mechanics, and in general, for all personnel of the crew of any vessel or airship protected by the Mexican merchant flag or insignia. It is also necessary to be Mexican by birth to discharge the position of captain of the port and all services of practique and airport commandant, as well as all functions of customs agent in the Republic."An immigrant who becomes a naturalized Mexican citizen can be stripped of his Mexican citizenship if he lives again in the country of his origin for more than five years, under Article 37. Mexican-born citizens risk no such loss.Foreign-born, naturalized Mexican citizens may not become federal lawmakers (Article 55), cabinet secretaries (Article 91) or supreme court justices (Article 95).The president of Mexico, like the president of the United States, constitutionally must be a citizen by birth, but Article 82 of the Mexican constitution mandates that the president’s parents also beMexican-born citizens, thus according secondary status to Mexican-born citizens born of immigrants.The Mexican constitution forbids immigrants and naturalized citizens to become members of the clergy. Article 130 says, "To practice the ministry of any denomination in the United Mexican States it is necessary to be a Mexican by birth."The Mexican constitution singles out "undesirable aliens." Article 11 guarantees federal protection against "undesirable aliens resident in the country."The Mexican constitution provides the right of private individuals to make citizen’s arrests. flagrante delicto, any person may arrest the offender and his accomplices, turning them over without delay to the nearest authorities." Therefore, the Mexican constitution appears to grant Mexican citizens the right to arrest illegal aliens and hand them over to police for prosecution.The Mexican constitution states that foreigners may be expelled for any reason and without due process. According to Article 33, "the Federal Executive shall have the exclusive power to compel any foreigner whose remaining he may deem inexpedient to abandon the national territory immediately and without the necessity of previous legal action." Notional policy optionsMexico and the United States have much to learn from one another’s laws and practices on immigration and naturalization. A study of the immigration and citizenship portions of the Mexican constitution leads to a search for new policy options to find a fair and equitable solution to the immigration problem in the United States.Two contrary options would require reciprocity, while doing the utmost to harmonize U.S.-Mexican relations:1. Mexico should amend its constitution to guarantee immigrants to Mexico the same rights it demands the United States give to immigrants from Mexico; or2. The United States should impose the same restrictions on Mexican immigrants that Mexico imposes on American immigrants.These options are only notional, of course. They are intended only to help push the immigration debate in a more sensible direction. They simply illustrate the hypocrisy of the Mexican government’s current immigration demands on the United States – as well as the emptiness of most Democrat and Republican proposals for immigration reform.Mexico certainly has every right to control who enters its borders, and to expel foreigners who break its laws. The Mexican constitution is designed to give the strongest protections possible to the country’s national security. Mexico’s internal immigration policy is Mexico’s business.However, since Mexican political leaders from the ruling party and the opposition have been demanding that the United States ignore, alter or abolish its own immigration laws, they have opened their own internal affairs to American scrutiny. The time has come to examine Mexico’s own glass house.– – – J. Michael Waller, Ph.D., is the Center for Security Policy’s Vice President for Information Operations. [1] The official text of the Constitution of Mexico appears on the Website of the Chamber of Deputies, or lower house of Congress, of the United Mexican States: http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/txt/1.txt. An authoritative English translation of the Constitution of Mexico, published by the Organization of American States, appears on the Website of Illinois State University: http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/docs/1917const.html. Quotations in this document are from the OAS translation.
AnalysisEditor's Note: This is the 15th installment of an occasional series on water scarcity issues around the world.When determining borders, a river is often the clearest delineation between sovereign nations. But that clarity abruptly ends when countries must decide how to use the water that the river provides. Even managing rivers that do not determine borders, but rather travel through multiple countries, is precarious at best. The Rio Grande, which partly establishes the U.S.-Mexico border, is no exception. It has been and will continue to be vital to economic growth in the region, especially in Mexico, where the river and its tributaries are crucial to supporting new opportunities for manufacturing and energy.But growing demands and environmental pressures will increase tension over water resources in the coming decades. Unlike the waters of the Colorado River, which originate entirely in the United States, the watershed of the Rio Grande is more evenly split between the United States and Mexico. Although Mexico depends on the water resources far more than the United States does, both nations are vulnerable to increasing water stress, making it difficult for them to meet anticipated water treaty obligations.Exceptional ManagementThe Rio Grande is more than just the main river that runs along the Mexican border of Texas, emptying into the Gulf of Mexico. Its upper reaches stretch as far north as Colorado, though the majority of the basin area in the United States lies in New Mexico. Because of a combination of factors — such as high evaporation rates in the arid region, diversions for agricultural production in New Mexico and invasive plant species — a portion of the Rio Grande effectively dries up before being replenished at its confluence with the Rio Conchos. The Rio Conchos runs entirely through Mexico's territory, beginning in the mountains of Chihuahua and Durango and moving through the Chihuahuan Desert, and it accounts for roughly 14 percent of the Rio Grande's total watershed. On the U.S. side, one of the Rio Grande's primary tributaries, the Pecos River, runs through New Mexico before joining up again with the larger river farther south.Yet the cooperation between the United States and Mexico over the river systems of the Colorado and the Rio Grande (or Rio Bravo, as it is known in Mexico) is in some ways exceptional by international standards. Treaties signed in the first half of the 20th century clearly dictate the volumes of flow guaranteed to each country, and those agreements have successfully forestalled many past disputes. Specifically, the river's use is governed in two separate sections, with Fort Quitman, Texas, acting as the dividing point for legislation and management.It was not until the late 19th century that legal disputes over the use of the Rio Grande began. At the time, U.S. courts determined that the country had no legal obligation to deliver any water downstream. A 1906 case, however, determined that roughly 74 million cubic meters per year would be delivered to Mexico from the northwestern parts of the river but stipulated that the amount could be reduced in drought years. There were reductions in roughly a third of the years between 1939 and 2015. In fact, Mexico has not received the full allotment since 2012, and as little as 6 percent of the full amount was delivered in 2013.Along the southeastern portion of the Rio Grande, downriver from Fort Quitman, the allotments are governed by the 1944 water treaty, which requires Mexico to receive two-thirds of the water from its tributaries and to deliver the remaining third to the United States. These deliveries are somewhat flexible because the amount (just over 430 million cubic meters per year) is tracked in five-year blocks, and one year's deficit can be accounted for in the next year if necessary. Even if a deficit spans the entire five-year block, as was the case for much of the 1990s as well as from 2010 to 2015, it can still be compensated for in the following five-year span. Mexico even made up its accumulated deficit of 325 million cubic meters within the first few months of 2016. Still, the uncertainty over consistent volumes of delivery sometimes leads to calls for political action, especially for consumers in Texas.In addition to the two countries' shared surface water, Mexico and the United States share about 20 underground aquifers. Though these resources support the populations and economies of the border region, unlike surface water, no international treaty governs their use. Much like surface water, however, there is significant overexploitation and a decline in water quality. Consistent overuse ultimately threatens the viability of the aquifer systems.Demand FactorsWhen these agreements were signed in the early 20th century, less was known about the hydrology of the region, and the Rio Grande's limited water resources were likely over-allocated based on above-average yearly flows. Furthermore, demand is growing, not shrinking. Agriculture is the primary consumer of the basin's water, but expanding populations that could reach nearly 20 million people by 2020, the rapid rise of manufacturing capacities in Mexico (following North American Free Trade Agreement) and energy production on both sides all play a role in increasing water stress in the region.Mexican manufacturing capacity, especially in the automotive sector, may be slowing after having swelled between 2008 and 2014. But buoyed by the increasing number of nearby U.S. consumers, high-end manufacturing will soon determine Mexican economic growth, and water consumption by the sector will only rise.Manufacturing growth has also propelled the rapid expansion of Mexico's electrical grid and, in turn, the demand for energy: Mexico continues to rehabilitate its energy sector to revive production levels. And while the full benefits of Mexico City's recent energy reforms have yet to be seen, the energy sector will likely increase its water consumption (including for hydraulic fracturing) at sites located in the Rio Grande Basin. Moreover, Mexico will not be the only country drawing from the Rio Grande or aquifers to support energy production. Agriculture is the primary consumer of water in Texas, but the Eagle Ford shale formation crosses the Mexican border, and production on the U.S. side has already increased water use in several river basins over the past decade, a pattern that will likely continue.All of these factors contribute to current estimates that upper portions of the river will decrease by as much as a third by the end of this century, and lower portions will accumulate a deficit of more than 830 million cubic meters per year. The gap between supply and demand will grow, as will tension along the border. The treaties, signed decades ago, have been sufficient and their terms largely met until now. But overuse of water resources and environmental stress continue to rise, and basin conditions are poised to prevent amiable management of the water system in the long term. Efforts from both the private sector and governments will instead likely focus on implementing technological adaptations, including waterless hydraulic fracturing and water recycling, to mitigate water stress. Nevertheless, dwindling water supplies could hamper manufacturing growth and energy production in the basin, especially for Mexico. Moreover, Mexico's likely failure to meet delivery quotas will only ramp up tensions with the United States in the coming decades. Part 1: Yemen's Looming Water Crisis Part 2: U.S. Agriculture Wilts During California Drought Part 3: South Africa's Water Needs Will Be Costly Part 4: Indonesia's Disjointed Islands Make Water Scarcity a Problem Part 5: Mesopotamian Vitality Falls to Turkey Part 6: Water Use Reform Will Be Difficult for Fractured India Part 7: Sao Paulo Drought Could Benefit Brazil Part 8: Industrial Expansion Will Strain Mexico's Water Resources Part 9: China's Appetite Will Strain Australia's Water Part 10: Why Canada Cannot Export Its Water Part 11: The Sea Is a Relief for Spain's Water Problems Part 12: Central America: How a Drought Affects Migration Part 13: Algeria: A Desert Nation Fighting to Maintain Water Supplies Part 14: Southern Africa's Options Are Drying Up
« Reply #557 on: August 31, 2016, 05:13:44 PM »
Lets see how the LEFT will go after the President of Mexico. Money will pour in to anyone who runs against him in next election:http://www.breitbart.com/2016-presidential-race/2016/08/31/trumpmexicoarizonaimmigration/
« Reply #558 on: August 31, 2016, 09:51:14 PM »
Now we see how the LEFT will go out to undermine Trump.During the news conference the mex prez said nothing about the wall.Later he tweets otherwise.And of course the Huff post declares Trump a liar.The LEFt must be out in full fury over this. Logged
WSJ: Mexico's options in a Trump trade war
« Reply #559 on: November 22, 2016, 01:39:16 AM »
Mexico’s Options in a Trump Trade WarThe country could impose retaliatory duties and look for new trade partners.By Mary Anastasia O’GradyNov. 20, 2016 5:22 p.m. ETIf the sharp selloff of the Mexican peso after the Nov. 8 election of Donald Trump were set to music it might sound like a funeral dirge, the dearly departed being the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta). The peso has fallen to an all-time low of more than 20 to the dollar, and on Thursday the Bank of Mexico raised its benchmark interest rate to stem the bleeding.Mexico investors are worried that Mr. Trump might actually believe—as he argued in his campaign—that U.S. productivity growth and job creation depend on renegotiating Nafta to discourage U.S. investments south of the border. But Mexico won’t easily yield to a new deal that limits its access to U.S. markets in order to make it less attractive as a destination for capital.If Mr. Trump counters with tariff hikes in violation of Nafta, Mexico is likely to respond with its own duty increases. It did this with $2.4 billion in retaliatory tariffs on important U.S. export products in 2009 when the U.S. failed to live up to its Nafta obligation in trucking. There is even the possibility that Mr. Trump will carry out his threat to tear up the agreement. There are no winners in any of these narratives.In the 23 years since Nafta was launched, Mexico has cultivated a middle-class, a more-vibrant democracy and a diversified economy far less dependent than it once was on oil. The country now sends 80% of its exports to the U.S. A trade war would be an economic disaster and open the door to political instability.Thus it won’t be so easy for Mr. Trump to bully the neighbors. National pride will play a role in stiffening the Mexican spine, and President Enrique Peña Nieto’s government is signaling that it intends to face any crisis by deepening structural reforms, getting its fiscal house in order and looking more aggressively for new trading partners. The unspoken message to Mr. Trump is that if he plays the protectionist game, Mexico is ready to raise the stakes.Nafta’s demise would be bad for the U.S. too, although the U.S. stock market rally suggests that the fear of a trade war is overblown. Protectionist steel and textile tycoon Wilbur Ross is rumored to be in line for a job in the new administration. But Vice President-elect Mike Pence is a free trader from Indiana, which in 2015 exported $4.8 billion in goods to Mexico, its second-largest export market.From time to time Mr. Trump has had flashes of sanity on trade. In a joint press conference with Mr. Peña Nieto in Mexico in August, then-candidate Trump spoke of the need to “keep manufacturing wealth in our hemisphere.”Some expect the Trump administration to find a way to largely leave Nafta alone while it works on legitimate trade issues like China’s practice of intellectual-property theft. Mexico seems to want to help in this face-saving endeavor and has wisely decided not to escalate the rhetoric. It doesn’t need to: Americans have plenty to lose if Nafta is destroyed.Many U.S. corporations are now heavily invested in supply chains that crisscross the continent to create globally competitive products. These support millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs. Saying goodbye to duty-free access to Mexico under Nafta also would hit U.S. agricultural exports hard.Mexican Economy Minister Ildefonso Guajardo told Reuters on Nov. 10 that his government is “ready to talk so we can explain the strategic importance of Nafta for the region. Here we’re not talking about . . . renegotiating it, we’re simply talking about dialogue.”He also said Mexico will look for new markets, adding to more than 40 existing free-trade agreements. It had hoped for expanded opportunities via the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation accord that includes the U.S. and much of Asia. But President Obama wasn’t able to get TPP through Congress and Mr. Trump has promised to kill it. Mr. Guajardo said that Mexico will pursue the possibility of completing a smaller TPP with the countries that are expected to have ratified it by the end of 2016. He named Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia. Australia would probably be eager to replace the U.S. as Mexico’s chief food supplier.None of this would make up for the loss of U.S. market access under Nafta, which means that increasing Mexican competitiveness is urgent. Mr. Peña Nieto got historic constitutional reforms in energy and telecommunications through his Congress in 2013. Opening these markets to competition will attract capital and improve the infrastructure for producers but implementation takes time.Unfortunately the government’s debt burden has increased sharply in recent years and taxes have gone up, adding to disappointing economic performance. These are mistakes that Mexican policy makers cannot afford if Mr. Trump plays chicken with Nafta.Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.
Re: WSJ: Mexico's options in a Trump trade war
« Reply #560 on: November 22, 2016, 09:08:12 AM »
« Last Edit: November 22, 2016, 09:48:20 AM by DDF »
« Reply #561 on: November 23, 2016, 09:38:42 PM »
Wave of violence in Mexican state of GuerreroMexico - Security - 22 November 2016Vanguardia reported on 21 November 2016 the Mexican state of Guerrero experienced over 25 violent deaths in the in a short period between 19 and 20 November 2016. Police recovered the dismembered bodies of at least eight men in the municipality of Tixtla with the tortured remains being discovered in black bags scattered near the edge of a bridge (La Opinion). The finding came after authorities in Acapulco reported nine deaths, including two off duty Navy personnel, presumably related to organized crime. Authorities also reported five further homicides in three separate incidents in Acapulco and an additional five were found executed (Vanguardia). Authorities have indicated a spike in violence and cartel disputes over territory may stem the 18 November capture of Benito Escalante alias El Benny, alleged top hitman of the Los Beltrán Leyva cartel (El Universal and La Opinion). Due to the sudden increase in violence, Guerrero Governor Héctor Astudillo Flores announced security would be reinforced in high criminal activity zones (Noticias Acapulco).Bank of Mexico warns about possible restrictions on remittances from the U.S.Mexico - Business - 22 November 2016Bank of Mexico (Banxico) President Agustín Carstens warned on 22 November 2016 of the possibility the U.S. would exercise greater controls on remittance flows (Informador and El Universal). Carstens commented it would be both illegal and unlikely that the U.S. confiscate remittances sent by Mexicans from the U.S., but it would be entirely possible to place restrictions on those, for example, who could not demonstrate the resources were obtained legally. Carstens warned these were the types of scenarios Mexico needed to predict and prepare for in case it were to face them during the Donald Trump administration (El Universal).Mexican senate transfers greater port authority to secretariat of the Navy Mexico - Security - 22 November 2016Mexican Senate committees approved new law stemming from presidential proposal on 22 November 2016 to reform Mexican port authority by transferring a number of security responsibilities from the Communication and Transport Secretariat (SCT) to the Secretariat of the Navy (Excelsior). Senator Miguel Barbosa Huerta (PRD) outlined the details of the Navy's permanent duties, including responsibility for authorizing the arrival and departures of vessels, granting permits for maritime passenger transport, as well as regulating and monitoring waterways, among others (Quadratin). The SCT will remain responsible for overseeing the administration, development, and commercial aspects of the port, but security duties will lie exclusively with the Navy (Excelsior and Fuero).
Mexico-US matters - News and General Attitude
« Reply #562 on: November 24, 2016, 05:35:50 PM »
« Reply #563 on: November 29, 2016, 04:58:57 PM »
The next time we see Vincent Fox lambasting Trump someone should ask him , "exactly what is wrong with Mexico that its people have the need to flee north for jobs. Instead of bothering us why don't you Vincent, fix what is wrong with your country?"It is a huge country with lots of resources . What is wrong with them. Why are so many Indian Mexicans so poor? Why are those in power predominantly white descendetns of Spaniards?
« Reply #564 on: December 11, 2016, 07:46:25 PM »
AnalysisBy Reggie ThompsonToday marks the 10th anniversary of Operation Michoacan, and to many, the start of Mexico's deadly war on drugs. But a decade later, the country's prospects for security and peace don't seem much better than they did when the massive crackdown on Mexican cartels began in 2006.Most people point to Felipe Calderon's presidency as the moment when things began to go wrong for Mexico. In the face of rising crime, and under mounting pressure from the United States to stem the flow of drugs across its southern border, Calderon sent 5,000 soldiers and federal police officers into the streets of Michoacan state, firing the first shots of what would become a long and bloody struggle. But it is neither fair nor accurate to pin the blame for the conflict that ensued on a single decision. Crime-related violence plagued Mexico long before Calderon took office, albeit at a lower level than in the years that followed his declaration of war on the country's cartels. Moreover, Calderon was not the first president to deploy Mexico's armed forces against drug lords and their assets; he was just the first to do so on such a tremendous scale.Cartels in the CrosshairsOperation Michoacan signaled the beginnings of a concerted effort by Mexico City to tackle organized crime. Though day-to-day security tasks normally fell to local police agencies, corruption had become so pervasive at the lower levels of Mexican law enforcement that their federal counterparts — the army, marines and federal police — had to step in to maintain law and order in some areas. Under Calderon's orders, some 45,000 troops were deployed throughout Mexico each year to combat crime, more than twice the average manpower that Calderon's predecessor, Vicente Fox, had dedicated to the same cause. Upticks in arrests and killings of cartel members began to noticeably disrupt trafficking activities as crime groups' capabilities steadily eroded.But the military's success came at a price. As Mexican crime groups came under greater pressure from law enforcement, they began to fight back against the government and among themselves, vying for the trafficking routes, recruits and resources that were left. Violence skyrocketed in several of the cities and regions that were vital to the drug trade and other illegal activities. Treating the SymptomsTen years on, the future of Mexico's security environment looks no more promising than it did at the start of Calderon's campaign. Still, the intervening decade has brought some positive changes. From a tactical perspective, public safety has visibly improved in the areas that the government targeted because of their rampant violence, such as Ciudad Juarez and parts of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon. Meanwhile, most of the large cartels that once controlled swaths of Mexican territory have splintered as military operations have left them leaderless and riven by infighting.What has not changed is Mexico's proximity to the massive market for drugs that lies just north of its border. Despite the heavy blows Mexican officials have dealt to major drug trafficking organizations, the smaller fragments left in their wake have picked up where their predecessors left off. Driven by persistently high demand for the drugs they have to offer, Mexican traffickers have kept supply chains to the United States and beyond running, even as state security forces try to shut them down. Though the power of individual crime groups has faded in the face of continued law enforcement efforts, the scope, location and intensity of violence has ebbed and flowed over the years, rather than declining permanently.This reality is unlikely to change so long as there are profits to be made. Since the United States and its foreign partners began cracking down on cocaine smuggling routes through the Caribbean in the 1980s, Mexico — situated between Central America and the United States and blessed with well-developed transportation infrastructure — has proved ideally suited to serve as a land bridge for northbound drugs. Though the use of cocaine has sharply declined since the mid-2000s, heroin and methamphetamine have taken over bigger and bigger shares of the U.S. drug market, and both are increasingly produced and transported by Mexican cartels. The emerging preference for heroin and methamphetamine has even hiked up profit margins, since the cartels do not have to buy these drugs from South American producers.A War With No End in SightWith foreign demand propping up Mexican crime, it is unlikely that Mexico City will retreat from its drug war anytime soon. The country's cartels pose a threat to national security that is far too great for the government to address on its own. Consequently, Mexico City will continue to rely on Washington's help, in the form of security training and intelligence sharing, to target cartel members and criminal networks. Perhaps even more important, Mexico's enduring effort to quash drug trafficking across its borders is a fundamental part of its relationship with the United States. Any attempt to scale down its operations against cartels would immediately meet with pushback from Washington. Lacking other means of going after the country's criminal groups, Mexico's government will keep tasking federal forces with protecting the Mexican public. Over the past three years, Mexico City has tried to create new law enforcement bodies to bridge the gap between the military and local police, since soldiers do not have the writ or capacity to conduct criminal investigations and combat low-level crime. But forming and implementing these organizations will take years, leaving Mexico City with little choice in the meantime but to count on the military to protect its citizens from the criminals in their midst.In all likelihood, Mexico's decadelong drug war will continue for decades to come. Fueled by geography and the economics of the illegal drug trade, trafficking and violence will remain a thorn in Mexico's side and a blemish on U.S.-Mexico relations. Though crime may not linger at the heights the country has seen over the past 10 years, Mexican cartels are central to the global drug market, and for now they have made it clear that they are here to stay. Logged
WaPo: Trump dines with Carlos Slim!
« Reply #565 on: December 21, 2016, 06:43:47 AM »
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-dines-with-carlos-slim-as-relations-warm-with-mexican-leaders/2016/12/19/652ccf7c-c60f-11e6-bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.7c07624af833&wpisrc=nl_p1most-partner-1&wpmm=1 Logged
Stores looted in response to gasoline prices being set by market?
« Reply #566 on: January 09, 2017, 01:10:25 AM »
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAr_xIttchohttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7BBF-_uCnQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xO4Af8SIKBohttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvGzvP75_f8
« Last Edit: January 09, 2017, 01:11:56 AM by Crafty_Dog »
Stratfor: Fuel price protests
« Reply #567 on: January 09, 2017, 11:39:41 PM »
Mexican authorities confirmed Jan. 5 that nationwide protests against the government's recent gasoline and diesel price hikes have resulted in four deaths and more than 700 arrests. Officials also said that around 1,700 businesses have been looted over the past two days. In Veracruz, two people were found dead amid the looting and a third was killed by a driver fleeing police. A police officer was also killed in Mexico City while defending a gas station.The protests began Jan. 1 in Mexico City following the implementation of a 20 percent increase in gasoline prices and a 16.5 percent increase in diesel prices. According to Treasury Secretary Jose Antonio Meade, the government will not be providing subsidies or fiscal incentives to the sectors of the economy most affected by the hikes. Over the past few days, the initially small demonstrations have spread to some 20 states. Despite the participation of left-wing organizations such as the National Coordinator of Education Workers, a dissident faction within Mexico's National Education Workers' Union, many of the rallies appear to have been motivated by citizens' anger at the price increases. The protests have largely remained regional and have not yet coalesced into a coordinated national movement. Powerful trucking and transportation unions, however, have staged strikes in several states, lending weight to the demonstrations. Nevertheless, the transportation disruption is not yet severe enough to sway the government.The protests have coincided with heightened pressure on the government from lawmakers, governors, mayors and the Roman Catholic Church to evaluate measures to reduce the harmful effects of the price hikes. But President Enrique Pena Nieto has rebuffed their criticism, insisting that alternatives to price increases would entail either tax increases or more budget cuts. The president argues that because there have already been deep spending cuts, any further belt-tightening would require the suspension of social programs. He has also pointed out that raising taxes would make Mexico less attractive to foreign investors. The price reform is part of a larger reform package — including energy, education, labor and fiscal reforms — that forms the cornerstone of Pena Nieto's agenda, and he appeared on television late Jan. 5 to announce that his government has no plans to reverse its decision. The president added that because the cost of oil in Mexico has risen by 60 percent in the past year alone, failing to increase the price of gasoline accordingly would cost the government around $10 billion.At the moment, the Mexican government appears determined to ride out the unrest as it did in the 2013-14 protests over education reform. And given the sporadic, localized nature of the demonstrations, the government's approach might work. Even so, there is a risk of violent demonstrations spiraling out of control and sparking further protests. Supply chain disruptions could also occur as looters attempt to hijack gasoline trucks. The president's liberalization measures are still likely to remain the law of the land in Mexico, no matter who wins the country's 2018 presidential election, but they could face setbacks if leftist candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador wins the upcoming vote.==================================================ummaryMexico has marked the start of 2017 with a wave of protests over a proposed increase in fuel prices. The protests involve a wide range of political groups: Social movements such as teachers' unions have joined in the country's southwest, truckers' unions have blocked roads, and regular citizens have come out into the streets. Looting also began on Jan. 1, damaging hundreds of stores across the country, with most of the ransacking occurring in urban areas such as Mexico City, Veracruz and parts of Mexico state.Though media attention has focused on the fact that some protests are violent, the violence is not the full story. What's more interesting is that the protests are not part of a centrally organized movement. Instead, their strength depends on regional movements, such as transport unions, and on how many demonstrators they draw out through efforts like online calls to protest. To truly understand their importance, one must analyze the underlying causes of the protests and how they will affect the country's politics if they grow.AnalysisThe rise in fuel prices that ignited the protests is a part of the energy reform that Mexico began in 2013. The upstream portion of the reform, which removed the 75-year monopoly the Mexican state held on oil production, was removed by congressional vote. Bidding rounds were held starting in 2015, and there are now private companies investing in oil exploration and production in Mexico's territory.But the fuel price increase is part of the downstream reforms, specifically those concerning the domestic fuel market. As part of overall energy reform, Mexico opened all parts of hydrocarbons production, refinement, transportation and sale to private investment. That also meant making Mexico's subsidized retail fuel market attractive to foreign investors part of the plan. When it was crafting the reform, the Mexican government intended for fuel prices to be liberalized and brought in line with market prices beginning in 2018. Before that, the government set prices that were lower than the cost of producing and transporting gasoline and diesel in the country. The government in 2016 decided to begin that process a year sooner, crafting a transitional pricing scheme derived from the U.S. Gulf Coast prices and creating two additional taxes on fuel sales that went into effect on Jan. 1, 2017. The scheme will precede the full 2018 liberalization of fuel prices. By then, the government expects prices to fluctuate in accordance with a pricing scheme reflecting the global price of crude oil.Consequently, any plan to expose Mexican consumers to fuel prices that could fluctuate depending on market conditions would be fraught with risk. Mexico's revenue shortfall when oil prices collapsed in 2014 compounded those risks. The sudden price decline and Mexico's hedging of oil revenue (which locked prices for Mexican crude oil exports in at a set yearly level) cost the country. In 2012, the federal government received 852 billion pesos (roughly $40 billion) from oil revenue, and by 2015, this figure had dropped to only 408 billion pesos. The magnitude of Mexico's fuel price hike is the direct result of this revenue shortfall. The new pricing scheme and new taxes drove fuel prices up between 14 and 20 percent from their previous levels.Unpredictable RisksDespite the current debacle in Mexico, even greater risks could lie ahead. Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has publicly stated he does not intend to renege on his decision to raise fuel prices. It is a logical choice: A sudden policy shift would introduce too much uncertainty over Mexico's future regulatory decisions for the domestic fuel market. Potential investments in fuel storage, transport and retail infrastructure could even be reduced if the government suddenly changed course as a result of public pressure. Moreover, because the Mexican Constitution bars Pena Nieto from running for another term, he has little to lose politically, and thus little incentive to back down.The risk comes from the unknown aspects of the protests, particularly if they grow. If a security forces crackdown at a demonstration takes lives or inflicts mass injuries, it could trigger even more unrest. There is also the issue of other political parties, such as the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), jumping on the bandwagon. The party has announced protests for next week in Mexico City. This move to oppose Pena Nieto's unpopular policy makes sense with a presidential election set for next year. But the PRD joining the protests confers some legitimacy on the demonstrations as well, making it possible for them to swell.It is unclear how long the protests will last or how violent they will become. At the moment, it is a mass display of unconnected protests rather than a coordinated effort at undermining the energy reform. Because there are multiple interests and organizations from various regions involved, they will not find common ground easily (apart from general opposition to higher fuel prices) or be able to quickly create the connections necessary to form a unified front against the government. Even with the logistical support of parts of the PRD, labor unions and a widespread online campaign, if the protest movement does not soon succeed on some level (by bringing the government to the negotiating table on the reforms, for example), it may fizzle out.Any Reversal of ReformSo Pena Nieto is in a difficult spot. On the one hand, reneging on a part of Mexico's energy reform would tell investors that pro-business reforms in Mexico bow to extreme pressure from street action. On the other hand, pushing forward with the price hikes is going to inflame protests in the short run and potentially hurt the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the 2018 vote, which promises to be rather competitive. The protests will not easily roll back energy reforms — those were etched into the country's constitution years ago. Still, any reversal of Pena Nieto's reform drive would erode investor confidence in Mexico, complicate the country's fiscal picture and likely hand the PRI a notable political defeat. Logged
« Reply #568 on: January 09, 2017, 11:58:25 PM »
Too bad they don't get this upset about mass graves or systemic corruption.
« Reply #569 on: January 16, 2017, 05:47:04 AM »
This is weird. Paying with drug money?And why is this drug lord still so rich to begin with?http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mexican-drug-lord-pay-families-victims-including-murdered-us-agent-1m-1601096?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=rss&utm_content=/rss/yahoous&yptr=yahoo