Source: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLawRw/2005/22.html
Timestamp: 2017-07-24 05:30:15
Document Index: 506167879

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 3', 'art 1', 'UKHL ', 'UKHL ', 'UKHL ', 'art 3', 'art 3', 'art 3', 'UKHL ', 'art 2', 'UKHL ', 'art 9', 'art 4', 'art 6', 'art 7', 'art 8', 'UKPC ', 'UKHL ', 'UKHL ', 'UKHL ', 'UKPC ', 'UKHL ', 'UKHL ', 'UKHL ', 'UKHL ']

Sydney Law Review >>
[2005] SydLawRw 22
1. Introduction 2. History of Legislative Intervention in Tort Law 3.	A Brief Historical Survey of the Interplay of Statutes and Common Law in Tort A.	Construction of Statutes in Tort Law B. Analogy from Statutes in Tort Law 4. The Substance and Interpretation of the Civil Liability Reforms A. Provisions Which Restate the Common Law (i) Inherent Risks B. Standard of Care in Contributory Negligence C. Liability of Public Authorities 5.	Provisions Which Appear to Regulate or Change the Common Law Principles A. The Test for Breach of Duty in Negligence B.	Inherent and Obvious Risks Generally; Recreational and Dangerous Recreational Activities. (i) Inherent and Obvious Risks Generally (ii) Recreational and Dangerous Recreational Activities C. Causation Principles (i) Onus of Proof of Causation 6.	How Useful Will Recourse be to the Political History, the ‘Travaux Preparatoire’ and Other Extrinsic Materials? 7. Conclusion Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The
Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia
BARBARA MCDONALD[*] 1. Introduction With the introduction of various civil liability legislation around the
country (hereafter the Civil Liability Acts),[1] tort law in Australia
can no longer be regarded as largely a common law field. Tort law must now well
and truly grapple with theoretical
and practical issues of statutory scope and
interpretation that have arisen in many other fields of law[2] where
there exists a broad body of legislation as well as fundamental and wide ranging
common law principles. As Professor Harold Luntz has warned,[3] the legislative response to
the so-called insurance ‘crisis’ in Australia in 2002 may well prove
to have been misguided,
ill-informed and ineffective: it merely tinkers with a
system which has only a limited capacity to meet its own objectives or those
attributed to it[4] and which is clearly ineffective and arbitrary in
meeting the broader needs of injured and disabled members of the community. The
legislation may also prove to be harsh and unjust in its operation in some
circumstances, although much will depend on the way in
which it is construed by
the courts and on whether they baulk at the idea that the legislature intended
to achieve the stated purposes
of the legislation — to reduce insurance
premiums by reducing liability and to restore ‘personal
— at all costs. This article will not comment on the
justice or injustice of the provisions of the Civil Liability Acts nor
persistent failure of government to undergo or resurrect a long overdue bolder
and broader reappraisal of the existing compensation
systems and of the
alternative system in place in our close neighbour New Zealand.[5] Rather, it will consider the place and role of statute law and particularly the
Civil Liability Acts in the modern law of torts,
broad principles of statutory interpretation. It will take the Civil Liability
Act (NSW) 2002 (as amended)
(hereafter NSW CLA) as a model of the Australian
reforms for the purposes of considering the coherence of the law and a range of
pertinent questions: i) Is the legislation a code or a supplement to the common law? ii) Does the legislation ‘cover the field’ or only deal with some
particular mischief, leaving the common law intact?
iii) What room is there for the common law to continue to apply or develop in
the light of particular legislative provisions?[6] iv) To what extent may the development of the common law be affected indirectly
by some broader influence of these legislative enactments?
are not entirely new questions for tort law, as shown by the historical review
below, but what is new in Australia and unusual
in the common law world is that
statute law has encroached into issues at the very heart of the general
principles of negligence:
the negligence calculus and causation. The continuing
relevance of the common law principles and cases in a number of areas is
In this new order, the courts will have to meet the challenge of
restoring some coherence to the law of tort.[7] No one would dispute the ideal that the law, whether embodied in statute or
the common law, should be, if not readily comprehensible
by all who have to live
by it and apply it, then at least coherent. There is no doubt that the coherence
of tort law has been ill-served
by the rush to legislate in 2002 and that the
legislatures did not use the advantage that legislatures usually have over
the process of law reform, that is, to legislate rather than
adjudicate: to take the time necessary to give full consideration to
of fact situations in which a statutory rule may operate and to make express
provisions or exceptions for its operation
across that range.[8] Such a deliberate and careful process, although advised by the Chief Justice
of New South Wales in his influential speech entitled
‘Negligence: The
Last Outpost of the Welfare State’[9] did not happen, with the
period from the announcement of the project to passage of the final legislation
taking a mere seven months.
The first stage of the reforms introducing caps on
damages (and costs) at least had precedent in schemes for motor accidents and
medical liability claims.[10] But the timetable and process for the
second stage was more problematic. The Ipp Panel[11] consulted a number
of organisations and individuals and completed its task within the strict and
short deadline given it, but after
its Report was released on 2 October
2002,[12] there was barely any time for or attempt at consultation on
its recommendations. The second, much more substantial, stage of the
Liability reforms was enacted in Parliament barely three weeks later.[13]It would seem that the criticism of legislation as ‘hastily and
inconsiderately adopted’, referred to by Roscoe Pound
in 1908[14] as one of many ways that judges, academics and lawyers try to diminish the
validity of statute law, might be well deserved here.
However ignoring statute
law as apparently was done in the United States in the early 20th
Century is not an option for courts and lawyers in the 21st
Century.[15] Paradoxically, while the legislation in New South Wales was introduced in
2002 with the statement that it was the most important reform
negligence in 70 years[16] (no doubt an allusion to Donoghue v
Stevenson in 1932)[17] the legislation does not attempt to change or
formulate the general principles for determining the existence of a duty of
care. They
were the subject of that great case and have proved so difficult for
courts to agree upon or define with precision. Arguably the
duty of care is the
most important factor in determining the scope of negligence liability.[18]
This article will begin with an historical review of legislative intervention
into tort law, followed by a brief survey of how the
Australian courts’
interpretation of particular tort legislation reflects common questions of
statutory interpretation and,
perhaps more importantly, the limits of
legislative impact and influence upon the common law. Turning then to the NSW
CLA, it will
proceed with an overview of the act followed by an analysis of the
most problematic matters of interpretation. In this context, it
those areas where the statute merely restates the common law and secondly those
areas where the NSW CLA purports to
regulate or change the common law principles
dealing with three areas: the test for breach of duty in negligence, liability
risks generally and in recreational activities; and the principles
of causation. In this discussion, the questions set out above
as they arise, particularly the question as to the continuing relevance of the
body of common law case law on a
particular issue. The wording of the
legislation raises many issues for interpretation by the courts. As the impact
will depend very much on the way in which ambiguities and
uncertainties in its provisions are interpreted and as statutory interpretation
now allows or even requires reference to the legislative history and extrinsic
materials leading to an enactment, the article will
conclude with an appraisal
of the background sources relating to the NSW CLA as an aid to its
interpretation and a brief general
assessment of the continuing role of the
common law of torts in this statutory age. 2. History of Legislative Intervention in Tort Law
While the fundamental principles of tort law are found in the common law,
legislation has nevertheless played a significant role since
19th Century. Legislative intervention in tort law has historically
tended to be piecemeal and context-driven, through specific extensions
restrictions of liability rather than through broad-ranging reforms. Overall,
and until recently, legislatures have been more
concerned with supplementing or
extending common law remedies than with restricting them. In certain discrete contexts, legislatures have replaced or supplemented the
common law of tort by schemes or codes. For example defamation
law is codified
in Queensland and Tasmania, and partly so in Western Australia, while in New
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia
and the two territories it is a
‘mosaic of common law overlaid by, far from uniform,
legislation’.[19] There are many state and federal workers
compensation schemes dating back to the 1920’s but radically restricted in
and 1990s. [20] There are some limited schemes for sports
injuries and for victims of crime.[21] Some motor accident schemes
modify the common law but retain the fault basis,[22] while others such
as in Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory partly replace the common
law with no-fault compensation.[23] Many states have legislated in the
area of occupiers’ liability: Victoria, Western Australia, and South
Australia.[24] There is specific legislation dealing with damage by
animals, particularly damage by dogs.[25] There is state and federal
legislation dealing with damage by or on aircraft.[26] There is strict
liability for defective products under the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth).[27] There is strict statutory liability for loss caused by
misleading and deceptive conduct outside as well as within a contractual
setting, which applies to circumstances beyond the torts of deceit and
negligence.[28] While most of this piecemeal reform occurred in the 20th Century,
one of the most significant pieces of reform to the general scope of tort
liability occurred much earlier, in the midst of
the railway[29] and
industrial revolutions and at the height of free enterprise, trade expansion and
laissez faire politics. Known as Lord Campbell’s
Act,[30] the
Fatal Accidents Act (1846) was introduced in England in 1846 and followed
immediately in New South Wales.[31] Its descendant is the Compensation
to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) and similar statutes throughout Australia. It
provided a statutory exception to the common law rule that ‘in a civil
court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury’,[32] by providing for a ‘wrongful death’
claim by dependants of the deceased victim. Other significant legislative measures that extended general common law
liability in tort were: i	apportionment for contributory negligence where it was previously a
defence;[33] ii	contribution provisions, giving plaintiffs greater flexibility with regard to
joint tortfeasors and allowing wrongdoers to seek
contribution from other
wrongdoers liable for the same damage;[34] iii legislation in New South Wales in 1944[35] and the two
territories[36] providing a remedy for nervous shock, to overcome the
decisions of Bourhill v Young[37] and Chester v Waverley
Corporation,[38] discussed in more detail below; iv	survival of actions legislation;[39] v	legislation to make the crown vicariously liable for breaches of statutory
duties by officers of the crown and to make employers
liable for breach of a
statutory duty imposed directly on an employee.[40]Legislation abolishing common law remedies without the
provision of some alternative system or scheme of compensation (for example
workers compensation schemes or motor accidents schemes such as in Victoria) has
been rare and usually confined to anachronistic
common law actions such as
enticement of a wife or harbouring an errant wife, abolished by the Family Law
Act 1975 (Cth)[41] . Different states have used different methods to
redress the gender imbalance in regard to consortium actions: the action by a
for loss of his injured wife’s consortium and servitium was
abolished by statute in New South Wales, Western Australia, Tasmania,
Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory,[42] partly
abolished in Victoria,[43] but extended to give equal rights to a wife
of an injured husband in Queensland and South Australia.[44] 3.	A Brief Historical Survey of the Interplay of
Statutes and Common Law in Tort Referring to two ways that courts could ‘use’ statutes —
directly by construction and indirectly by analogy —
Professor Atiyah
wrote: Construction, as a matter of theory at least, requires the court to give effect
to what it thinks the legislation actually enacts.
Using statutes by way of
analogy quite clearly involves using them to produce results which the
legislation does not enact.[45] Roscoe Pound writing in
1908 subdivided these two uses further.[46] Construction of a statute
could be ‘liberal’ — that is, an intent to cover the field
could be readily inferred
— or ‘strict and narrow’; use by
analogy could treat a legislative policy as superior to those of the common law
or merely as of equal weight with a common law rule. To that could be added a
fifth category of case if not of ‘use’:
where the courts refuse to
draw an analogy from a body of statute law because they do not see it as
reflecting a compelling legislative
policy.[47] Paul Finn has argued
that all four of Pound’s categories have an appropriate place in our law
and showed how different Australian
cases across a range of areas have reflected
each of these approaches at one time or another.[48] A.	Construction of Statutes in Tort Law Where legislation is unambiguous, a court generally has little choice or
leeway in interpretation, no matter what judges, litigants,
lawyers or academics
would prefer. The court must give effect to the ordinary, plain or natural
meaning of the statute, read in context
and bearing in mind the legislative
intent or purpose.[49] This was so in the case of the Law Reform
Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1965 (NSW) which provided for apportionment for
fault but only, by reference to the definition of the
defendant’s ‘fault’ in the Act, where it would have been
complete defence at common law. Contributory negligence at common law was a
defence only to negligence in tort, not to intentional
torts (and not to strict
liability) and not to contractual claims based on breach of a contractual duty
of care. There was a widely
held view that where duty and liability in tort and
contract was concurrent, a plaintiff should not be able to avoid the partial
defence of contributory negligence by pleading the case in contract rather than
tort. Unfortunately this view overlooked the wording
of the statute. In Astley v
Austrust[50] the equivalent South Australian legislation was read
literally by the High Court which held that the NSW CLA did not provide for
apportionment for contributory negligence in contractual claims.[51]
In a remarkably quick reaction, most probably after lobbying by the insurance
industry and accountancy bodies, legislatures around
the country legislated to
make contributory negligence not only grounds for apportionment in tort claims
a complete defence at common law but also in
contractual claims where the duty breached was concurrent and co-extensive with
duty in tort.[52] While state legislatures were quick to act after Astley, they have not always
been so quick to react to judicial pleas for rectification
of unclear or badly
worded statutes. For example, the High Court has been called on several times to
settle questions of interpretation
of the Law Reform Miscellaneous Provisions
Act 1946 (NSW) (and its equivalents in other states) dealing with rights of
between tortfeasors. In Bitumen and Oil Refineries (Australia) Ltd
v Commissioner for Government Transport[53] the High Court referred to
a subsection of the equivalent English statute which the House of Lords had
considered and remarked: But as to the construction of the sub-section …their Lordships were unable
to agree. It is small wonder, considering the economy
of expression practised in
the provision and the apparent failure to advert to any of the many practical
problems involved in applying
a general principle of contribution between
persons liable jointly or severally for the same loss or damage.[54]That one subsection was the subject of three High Court
appeals over a period of 43 years in addition to at least one House of Lords
decision. Although Barwick CJ pointed out in Brambles Constructions Pty Limited
v Helmers[55] that the obscurity of the wording ‘cries out for
some legislative intervention’ in order to clarify the section, that
has fallen on deaf ears. Let us hope the same fate does not await the
uncertainties in some aspects of the new proportionate
liability regimes.[56]
Where legislation is ambiguous or its meaning unclear, the courts immediately
have more leeway in interpretation. The uncertainty
may require the court to
look carefully at the historical context of the legislation to determine what it
was intended to achieve
or what mischief it was intended to cure. Thus in
Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd[57] members of the High
Court looked at and relied on the Hansard record to elicit the intention of
Parliament in enacting a 1944 NSW
Act dealing with liability for nervous shock.
A common issue of interpretation is whether certain legislation is intended
to ‘cover the field’[58] or merely to remedy a particular
problem or fill a particular gap while allowing the common law to develop.
Legislation is often
silent as to its intentions in this regard. A prime example
in tort law is in relation to recovery for nervous shock in New South
After the stirring dissent of Evatt J in Chester v Waverley
Corporation,[59] the New South Wales Parliament became one of the few
in the common law world to pass legislation providing for a statutory liability
for nervous shock suffered by certain family members of the victim of a
defendant’s wrong.[60] This legislation was intended to overcome
the restrictions of the common law, set out in Bourhill v Young[61]that nervous shock is not generally compensable at common law and in
Chester that a person could only recover for nervous shock suffered
of actually seeing or hearing the victim killed, injured or put in peril by the
defendant. The legislation removed the
need for the named plaintiffs to prove an
independent duty of care to themselves and created a statutory liability to the
or spouse[62] even where they did not see or hear the
event.[63] But for other relatives, the statute required that they see
or hear the event. Other states did not enact legislation and it was in those states that the
common law continued its development so that eventually
in 1984, in Jaensch v
Coffey[64] on appeal to the High Court from South Australia, the common
law abandoned its requirements of sight or hearing of the actual accident
in line with the English case of McLoughlin v O’Brien,[65]extended recovery to the wife of a victim who had attended the
‘aftermath’ of the accident. Once freed of proving presence
scene, relatives in New South Wales, other than a parent or spouse, were then
often better off suing at common law than under
the statute, although they still
had to prove a duty of care to themselves (which the statute made unnecessary
where it applied).
Non-relatives of the victim, for example rescuers, friends,
passengers of vehicles, had to rely on the common law. For decades, the weight of authority was that the 1944 Act had not intended
to cover the field[66] but in Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty
Ltd,[67] it was decided in the District Court of New South Wales that
the children of a worker crushed to death on a building site could not
for their nervous shock because they had not seen the accident as required by s4
(1)(b) of the 1944 Act and that that Act
covered the field of nervous shock
actions leaving no room for the common law in New South Wales. The Court of
Appeal disagreed on
that point but was constrained by the then prevailing common
law requirement of attendance at the aftermath. Following the decision
High Court in Tame v State of New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty
Ltd[68] that direct perception of the accident or aftermath was not
essential at common law, an appeal to the High Court by the children
successful. The High Court held, finally, that the 1944 Act was not intended to
cover the field. Its wording was expansive or
‘extensive’ rather
than definitive or restrictive.[69] But by the time this issue was
settled, it was no longer of long-term importance in negligence cases because of
the 2002 reforms.[70] Apart from the statutory liability, the development of the common law for
recovery of nervous shock was cautious and slow. Courts
nomenclature of nervous shock with its inherent notion of a sudden event. Often
pronouncements and obiter dicta of the
higher courts were treated almost as
though they were statutory provisions. For example, the obiter dictum of Deane J
in Jaensch
v Coffey that ‘in the present state of the law [a] duty of care
will not exist unless the reasonably foreseeable psychiatric
sustained as a result of the death, injury or peril of someone other than the
[defendant]….’[71] In 2002 the High Court in Annetts liberated the law of nervous shock from
what had come to be regarded as a fixed or quasi-statutory
common law — the requirement of perception of the scene or aftermath
— and held that the ordinary
principles of negligence applied to claims
for nervous shock and that the relevant criteria for the existence of a duty
same as in all negligence cases. Reasonable foreseeability of shock
suffered by a person in the position of the plaintiff remained
of liability and a number of other factors might also point to a duty of care,
for example control by the defendant
and the pre-existing relationship between
the parties. Sudden shock was not a necessary requirement of recovery. Actual
of the accident or aftermath was not a fixed requirement. Rather
there were a number of relevant factors or salient features which
determinative of the existence of a duty of care, grounded on reasonable
foreseeability of the plaintiff. The last chapter in this saga so far is the NSW CLA. The ‘mental
harm’ provisions of the NSW CLA, in Part 3, far from
common law, in fact virtually mirror most of the common law developments
particularly those set out in Annetts. However
the legislation is more uneven in
its treatment of witnesses to and rescuers in an accident: the former appear
better off, the latter
worse off. It also winds back the clock for parents and
spouses of primary victims who previously had the benefit of the 1994
Act.[72] B. Analogy from Statutes in Tort Law More controversial than construction of statutes is the indirect effect of
statutory developments on the common law. It is generally accepted that the common law may evolve in the context of
changing social conditions, although judges disagree as
to whether it may
explicitly or expressly react to change and as to whether obsolescence on its
own is sufficient justification for
a court to overturn a long settled
principle. Justice Brennan has said: Within proper limits, judges seek to make the law an effective instrument of
doing justice according to contemporary standards in
contemporary conditions.
And so the law is changed by judicial decision, especially by decision of the
higher appellate courts.[73] Talking about the power of
the judiciary relative to that of the legislature, Justice McHugh of the High
Court recently stated: Law making in private law cases raising social economic and sometimes political
issues … has strengthened the position of the
judiciary. Cases concerning
such issues frequently enable the judiciary to change the direction of
society.[74] In doing so, how is a court to determine
contemporary standards and conditions? That is a broader question than the
paper allows.[75] The question in our context is: how
and when is it legitimate for a court to take into account statutory
developments when it is
considering the common law, on the basis that they
reflect significant changes in social policy or conditions or community values
and sentiment? In his Chorley Lecture in 1984, ‘Common Law and Statute’, Atiyah
asked several questions: Can the courts…use statutes as analogies for the purpose of developing the
common law? Can they justify jettisoning obsolete
cases, not because they have
actually been reversed by some statutory provisions, but because a statute
suggests that they are based
on outdated values? Could the courts legitimately
draw some general principle from a limited statutory provision, and apply that
principle as a matter of common law?[76] In
Esso,[77] the High Court was considering whether it should overturn its
earlier decision in Grant v Downs[78] which had a established a
‘sole purpose’ test for legal professional privilege and adopt
instead a ‘dominant purpose
test.’ In the end it did so, by a
majority, but not for one of the reasons advanced by the appellant, namely a so
called ‘doctrine
of analogy’ by which the Court should take into
account and follow a trend of legislative enactment on the issue. In an earlier
case, Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins,[79] the Full Federal Court
had concluded that the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) had ‘created an entirely
new setting to which the common law must now adapt itself.’[80] But the members of the High Court in Esso pointed out that there was a
fundamental difficulty with this line of reasoning in this
context and that was
that the legislation did not apply throughout Australia, but only at the time in
federal courts, one state and
one territory: There is no consistent pattern of legislative policy to which the common law in
Australian can adapt itself.[81] Australian courts
developing ‘but one common law’[82] are in a more difficult
position because of the federal system with its multiple states and split of
federal and state powers. While
in other cases, the High Court had taken into
account a body of federal law[83] or a uniform pattern of legislation
in five states in criminal law statutes,[84] this was not the case in
respect of legal professional privilege, where only three state legislatures and
had enacted the test but with varying application, and
other state parliaments, although they had considered the issue, had not done
so. Nevertheless, the fact that the common law under Grant v Downs was out of
step, not only with the common law position in Canada,
England, Ireland and New
Zealand, but also with the statutory provisions of the Commonwealth and New
South Wales, encouraged the
High Court to reconsider (and ultimately to
overturn) its previous decision. By contrast, four members of the majority of the High Court which recently
upheld the common law immunity from negligence of advocates
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid,[85] against the trend in
other countries, found support for their decision in the fact that the Victorian
Legal Practice Act (1996)
expressly provided that it did not abrogate the common
law immunity and that the legislature had deliberately not adopted the
of the Law Reform Commission of Victoria that the immunity be
removed by legislation. The sections of the NSW CLA imply that the
would be preserved.[86] Of course the failure of a legislature to adopt and enact a law reform
proposal does not necessarily reflect a considered decision
not to do so. It might equally reflect a lack of interest in, or of research
into, the issue, a practical inability,
or a lack of political will. In some
cases, courts have been prepared to take the step that the parliament in a
particular jurisdiction
had not taken, for example, to abolish the highway
authorities’ immunity, in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council,[87]and landlords’ immunity in Northern Sandblasting v Harris and Jones
v Bartlett,[88] where such immunities were inconsistent with other
developments in the law. The question of whether courts should regard the NSW CLA as evincing some
broad legislative policy of restricting liability for negligence,
be applied to aspects of the common law not mentioned by the act, is an issue
which has already surfaced and already
provoked disagreement at appellate court
level. In Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James[89] the New South Wales
Court of Appeal recently considered whether the law should recognise a common
law duty upon a doctor to avoid
the so-called ‘wrongful life’ of the
plaintiff. Ipp JA supported his decision to reject the imposition of a duty on doctors,
on doctrinal, philosophical and logical grounds, by the
following ‘policy
considerations’:[90] Generally speaking, at the present time, when legislatures throughout the
country have legislated or have foreshadowed legislation
restricting liability
for negligence… it would be quite wrong to expand, by judicial fiat, the
law of negligence into new areas.
Mason P (who dissented from
the majority decision denying the duty of care) disagreed in strong terms with
this view: I do not deny that legislation may exercise a gravitational pull upon the
development of legal principle in particular fields (see
generally Pilmer v Duke
Group Ltd (In Liq) [2001] HCA 31; (2001) 207 CLR 165 at 230 [170]). But I know of no legal
principle that directs the common law to pause or go into reverse simply because
of an accumulation of miscellaneous
statutory overrides. Parliament has
frequently overridden or modified fundamental legal doctrines such as client
self-incrimination privilege and natural justice. But the
common law has stood resolute to its fundamental principles except when
expressed legislation indicates that they must be abandoned in particular
contexts.[91] In D’Orta-Ekenaike, members of the
High Court majority refused to treat the recent wave of tort reform as
indicative of any
persuasive policy relevant to the issue of advocates’
immunity: Some other legislative events must be noticed. Since 1999, State legislatures
have given close attention to what has been called
‘tort law
reform’. In particular, close attention has been paid to the law of
negligence, and a number of statutes have
been passed since 2000 which have
dealt with that general subject. In none of that legislation has there been any
immunities from suit of advocates, witnesses or judges.[92]This approach implies that courts will be reluctant to
give the civil liability acts any greater application or influence than the
strict interpretation of their provisions requires. Even more questionable than finding some indirect legislative influence from
current statutes is the use of new legislative provisions
reformulating common law principles when a court is deciding a case which arose
before the commencement of the legislation.
It is arguable that this is what is
happening in the New South Wales Court of Appeal in a series of
cases[93] where causation is an issue. Instead of applying the common
law principles set out by the High Court in March v Stramere[94] and Bennett v Minister of
Community Welfare[95] the principles applied look remarkably like the
new provisions of the NSW CLA based on the recommendations of the Ipp Report
in turn drew extensively on the work of Stapleton.[96] For
reasons I set out below I do not think that the principles set out in the act
are the same as the common law principles laid
down in March. In the meantime,
special leave from these cases has been granted by the High Court which may or
may not be asked to
consider if it wants to reformulate the common law
principles settled in March and Bennett to take into account legislative
since those decisions. It seems unlikely that it would do so, as it
would mean that a plaintiff would have his or her case decided
legislative developments which occurred after the tort in question. While a
change in the common law at the highest
appellate level necessarily operates
retrospectively with regard to the parties before the court (or as a result of
some fiction[97] of the declaratory theory of judicial law-making that
the new common law rule was hidden, waiting for the court to find it),
application of statutes by analogy would seem to be an
unjustifiable expansion of legislative influence.[98] 4. The Substance and Interpretation of the Civil
Liability Reforms Now turning to the 2002 reforms. It is as well to note at the outset that the
NSW CLA is not only about tort law and not only about
personal injury law. It
also regulates liability for breach of contractual duties of reasonable care so
that contract lawyers will
also now have to grapple with how, for example,
common law causation and remoteness principles in contract law are affected by
‘causation’ principles set out in the Act. (Those statutory
principles will not however affect the common law principles
strict contractual warranties or duties). Furthermore, the act affects liability
for any type of loss or damage resulting
from negligence, based in
‘contract, tort, under statute or otherwise’,[99] despite
the fact that many of its provisions are based on the recommendations of the Ipp
Report which dealt only with liability
for personal injury and death. One of its
most important reforms, the introduction of proportionate liability to replace
several liability for negligence, applies only in respect of property
damage and purely economic loss. The overall purpose and tenor of the NSW CLA will be an important factor in
interpreting particular provisions. Thus, this part of
the article will first
give a brief overview of the NSW CLA before moving to an analysis of the most
problematic matters of interpretation.
Those include areas where the statute
merely restates the common law and three significant areas where the NSW CLA
purports to regulate
or change the common law principles: the test for breach of
duty in negligence, liability for obvious risks generally and in recreational
activities; and the principles of causation. A particular focus will be the
question of the continuing relevance of the body of common
law case law. The NSW CLA makes a number of significant changes to the common law,[100] all designed to reduce liability for negligence: i Reduction of common law damages and recoverable costs. These reforms do not go
as far as Sugarman suggests.[101] They reduce liability and change the
burden of liability for losses while still retaining liability for fault. They
do introduce
some disincentive against bringing claims, particularly small
claims, rather than relying on other sources of financial assistance
Medicare and private health insurance systems and government funded social
services or disability pensions. The legislation introduces caps on damages, both economic (for loss of past and
future earning capacity) and non-economic; threshold
amounts for damages for
non-economic loss; a higher discount rate for calculating lump sums; limits on
claims for gratuitous care;
and substantial limits on the recoverable legal
costs for smaller claims.[102] ii	A ‘modified Bolam’[103] defence for professional
negligence. That is, a professional will not now incur liability in negligence
if it is established that
the professional acted in a manner that, at the time,
was widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent
professional practice.[104] iii Protection from liability for negligence for volunteers connected to defined
community and voluntary organisations.[105] Protection does not extend
to voluntary or community organisations or entities for their own negligence
(whether in breach of an
ordinary or a non-delegable duty eg in a relationship
analogous to that of a school)[106] although the protection given to
volunteers will reduce their burden of vicarious liability.[107] iv Proportionate liability for property damage and economic loss claims.[108]
The legislation gives rise to a number of issues of interpretation and some
practical issues about which it provides little if any
guidance.[109]
v	A provision that an apology (whether or not with an express or implied
admission of fault) does not constitute an express or implied
and is not admissible as evidence of fault or liability.[110] This
provision and variants in other states are discussed by Vines’ article in
this volume.[111] vi A wide range of exclusions of liability for negligence where the person
injured is ‘under the influence of’ any alcohol
or drugs, including
medicinal drugs.[112] vii Exclusions of liability to those committing a ‘serious’ offence
which contributed to the injury.[113] The section does not operate
where the defendant also committed an offence (section 54 (5)) so that the
common law principles on
the ‘defence’ of illegality in the case of
joint illegal enterprises would continue to apply, effectively barring a claim
where the plaintiff and defendant are engaged in seriously criminal, risky,
anti-social behaviour.[114] viiiThe Act not only legislates for protection in cases of negligent or
intentional conduct causing injury or death in self-defence,
or defence of property (unless death in fact ensues after intentional or
reckless infliction), but limits damages
even where the act in self defence etc
is not a reasonable response, unless the court is satisfied that the
circumstances are exceptional
and the failure to award damages is harsh and
unjust.[115] There are a number of other reforms which
are less significant because they are responding to matters which were not
in the operation of the existing law. In these instances,
the reforms have little purpose other than to assist the impression that
legislature is being busy and perhaps to head off extravagant claims in the
future: i.	Exemplary or aggravated damages for personal injury caused by negligence are
abolished.[116] ii.	Good Samaritans are protected when acting voluntarily in an
emergency.[117] iii. Contributory negligence may now defeat a claim for damages if the court
thinks it just and equitable for it to do so.[118] This provision seeks
to overcome the decision of the High Court in Wynbergen v Hoyts Pty Ltd[119]that where a court has determined that the fault of both the plaintiff and
the defendant caused the plaintiff’s loss, it cannot
logically be
‘just and equitable’ under the apportionment legislation to hold the
plaintiff entirely responsible. (If
the defendant’s negligence was not
causative of the loss in the first place, then there is no liability. If it was,
should generally ensue if other requirements for the action
are met.) The circumstances in which a court would totally disregard
defendant’s causative negligence must be so rare that this section will
probably have little effect. It may be that courts,
even though armed with this
power and even though apportionment is within the discretion of the judge, will
continue to be persuaded
by the logic and tenor of the High Court’s
unanimous decision. A. Provisions Which Restate the Common Law In some provisions, the Civil Liability Act merely restates the common law or
sets out a position that the common law had already
reached. What Roscoe Pound
described as ‘declaratory’ statutes are not unknown. But what is the
point of such provisions,
apart from allowing the legislature to look busy? One
purpose may be to consolidate relevant legal principles which are otherwise
scattered across fields of the law. Another may be to extend the operation of a
legal principle to areas or facts outside those already
law. Another may be to demonstrate legislative support for or give the
legislature’s imprimatur to
a particular principle, perhaps to dispel
doubts about the principle’s validity. Another may be to ensure that the
not change or whittle away what the legislature sees as an important
principle, in other words to freeze the development of the common
law. If the provisions of an Act do not state the whole of the common law relevant
to a particular issue, judicial development of those
ancillary issues will
continue in a way that can expand, limit or change the scope of the rule, as
happens in New South Wales in
defamation law where the current statute, the
Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), leaves to the common law the definition of what is
‘defamatory’. Continuing interpretation of this element of
of action in defamation has a significant impact on the scope of defamation law.
Similarly, the task of a court in determining
when and where a defamatory slur
is ‘published’ depends on the common law principles, as statutes
rarely define what
is meant by the requirement of ‘publication’.
Thus the law of defamation must accommodate dramatic changes in methods
communication,[120] much as the law of copyright needs to. In contrast, where legislation sets out the whole common law rule it may
crystallise or freeze the development of the common law principles,
the courts from changing or moulding the principles in any way other than by
changing their interpretative method. For
example, legislation may give the
provisions a narrow and literal, rather than a wide, interpretation, possibly
because the previous
interpretation of the provision was out of step with
changes in legislative policies or other developments in the law. (i) Inherent Risks One example where the Civil Liability Act does no more than reflect the
common law is the section dealing with inherent risks which
provides that there
is no liability in negligence for harm suffered by another person as a result of
the materialisation of an inherent
risk.[121] Section 5I No Liability for Materialisation of Inherent Risk (1) A person is not liable in negligence for harm suffered by another person as
a result of the materialisation of an inherent risk.
(2) An inherent risk is a risk of something occurring that cannot be avoided by
the exercise of reasonable care and skill (3) This section does not operate to exclude liability in connection with a duty
to warn of a risk. ‘Inherent risk’ is defined as ‘a risk of something
occurring that cannot be avoided by the exercise of reasonable
skill’.[122] Logically of course, if a risk cannot be avoided by
reasonable care, there could be no negligence arising from its materialisation.
This was pointed out by Kitto J in Rootes v Shelton, a case involving water
skiing.[123] Many activities involve inherent risks. If on the other
hand the risk could have been avoided by reasonable care, then there may
negligence on the part of the defendant and the risk of such negligence is
neither inherent nor likely to have been readily
assumed (such as to give rise
to the common law defence of voluntary assumption of risk) by a participant in
an activity. It seems that it will continue to be helpful for reference to be made to
cases such as Rootes v Shelton which explain how the argument
negligence in relation to ‘inherent risks’ co-exists or is to be
compared with the defence of volenti non
fit injuria or voluntary assumption of
risk. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that the section of the NSW CLA
dealing with inherent risks falls under the heading ‘Voluntary
of Risk’. This is misleading. At common law, this phrase describes a
complete defence, the onus of proof of which
is on the defendant. But the
statement of ‘no liability’ for inherent risks set out in section 5I
is not expressed as
a defence, nor does it involve the same concept as the
common law defence. The common law defence is that the plaintiff voluntarily
assumed the particular risk, which may or may not have been inherent and may or
may not have been obvious, which caused the damage
or loss. Because it is so
difficult to prove, the defence is rarely used and defendants now tend to rely
on the partial defence of
contributory negligence. Many cases have dealt with
what is involved in the term ‘voluntary’, for example actual
and appreciation of the particular risk and practical freedom to
choose whether to take that risk. The Ipp Panel declined to recommend
provision relating to voluntariness as this is an ‘evaluative
question’ about which it would be difficult to make a
It appears that the common law defence of voluntary assumption of risk is
unchanged in relation to all non-obvious risks. The reforms
dealing with obvious
risks will be dealt with below. B. Standard of Care in Contributory Negligence
Another example of NSW CLA reflecting the common law is the provision that
the principles in relation to determining contributory
negligence are the same
as those for determining negligence.[124] This provision was apparently intended by the Ipp Panel to mean that the new
provision[125] which sets out a test for negligence or breach of duty
(discussed below),[126] also applies to contributory negligence. Again,
the section reflects the current common law position, although without explicit
to the necessary qualifications recognised at common
law,[127] which arguably must now be read into the provision. First,
that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence consists merely of failing
take reasonable care for his or her own safety rather than failing to take care
for other people’s safety, and second, that
it may often include failing
to protect himself or herself against the consequences of other people’s
negligence. It is the
first qualification which accurately explains why courts
generally treat a plaintiff’s negligence as less culpable than a
not the existence of some lower standard of care.[128]
C. Liability of Public Authorities In relation to the liability of public authorities, again some of the
statutory provisions reflect the current approach of the common
law, for example
the inability of the court to adjudicate upon the authority’s allocation
of resources;[129] or the principle that the court, when assessing the
existence of a duty of care or whether a duty was breached, will take into
the burden of taking precautions across the whole range of the
defendant’s responsibilities.[130] Contrary to widespread rumour,
the provisions only partially reinstate the immunity of highway authorities,
abrogated by the High
Court in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council,[131] making the immunity depend on a lack of actual knowledge of the particular
risk.[132] Other provisions on the liability of public authorities go
beyond the existing common law and appear to attempt to build some connection
with public law remedies.[133] The intersection of the common law
principles and the new statutory provisions in this most difficult and complex
area of the law
is worthy of detailed treatment on its own.[134] Nevertheless, it can at least be said that it is hard to imagine a court making
sense of these provisions without the aid of the
judicial discourse in the body
of case law about the fundamental legal and governmental issues and tensions
inherent in this area
of negligence law. 5.	Provisions Which Appear to Regulate or Change
the Common Law Principles A. The Test for Breach of Duty in Negligence
The provision on the test for negligence[135] tinkers with the
two-staged test set out by Mason J in The Council of the Shire of Wyong v
Shirt[136] in an apparent attempt to rein in the alleged tendency of
judges only to apply the first of the two stages. The well-known test set out by Mason J in Wyong v Shirt is as follows: Whether a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have foreseen that
his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff
or to a class of persons
including the plaintiff? If the answer be affirmative, it is then for the
tribunal of fact to determine:
2.	What a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk? The perception
of the reasonable man’s response calls for
a consideration of the (a)	magnitude of, and the degree of the risk, (b)	the probability of its occurrence, along with (c) the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and
(d) any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may
This test was of course not new then. It had its origins in the well known
dictum of Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co[137] that: Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs,
would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
In the United States the test became known as the negligence
calculus after the dictum of Judge Learned Hand in United States v Carroll
Towing Co[138] describing the notion in algebraic terms: … if the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied
by P; ie whether B is
less than PL. The Ipp Panel reported that ‘lower
courts’ seemed to be in danger of ignoring the process of balancing the
of the negligence calculus identified in Wyong v Shirt case. They
tended to treat a decision that a risk was foreseeable and not
far fetched as
conclusive that the defendant was negligent if he or she failed to take steps to
avoid it, rather than going through
the balancing process set out in the second
stage. Much of the difficulty with applying this test has arisen because dicta of
Lord Reid in (Wagon Mound (No 2))[139] have been cut up and quoted in
isolated extracts taken out of context which have then been applied as if they
were some statutory
definition of negligence. In the context of a fire or a risk of fire it was arguably perfectly
appropriate for a court to conclude that a reasonable person
would not neglect a
small (in the sense of low probability) risk of fire if it presented no
difficulty, no expense and no disadvantage.
A fire can start from a spark and
cause an uncontrollable conflagration wreaking damage to life and property
In that context it may be perfectly reasonable to decide
that the gravity of the risk, in the sense of the seriousness of the possible
likely damage, outweighs the other balancing factors and comes down against the
defendant. But that is not to say that it will
always be the case that the
balance will come out against the defendant in other cases involving foreseeable
but low probability
risks. That is a matter of fact, of weight and of balance of
many factors. It was never the law that a defendant was automatically negligent for failing
to guard against foreseeable risks. Foreseeability of
risk was only ever half
the question in regard to breach of duty. Just because some judges have
misapplied the test and not engaged
in a proper balancing act is no reason to
throw out the test. In Swain v Waverley Municipal Council,[140] McHugh J recently called
for the common law to set its face against the pernicious principles expounded
in the Wagon Mound (No 2)
which have done ‘such damage to the utility of
the common law doctrine of negligence that it is now on the verge of legislative
extinction in many jurisdictions’ and to adopt the approach Fleming set
out in the first edition of his book in 1957,[141] that a risk must be
unreasonable in the sense of involving a sufficiently significant risk of injury
before any issue of reasonable
practicality of response arises. Section 5B General Principles (1) A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of
harm unless: (a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or
ought to have known), and (b) the risk was not insignificant, and (c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person’s position
would have taken those precautions. (2) In determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions
against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the
following (amongst other
relevant things): (a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken (b) the likely seriousness of the harm, (c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm (d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.
What the legislation does, following the Ipp Panel’s recommendation, is
tinker with the common law test. Instead of the words
‘not far
fetched’, the legislation substitutes ‘not insignificant’.
Instead of ‘the cost’ of
taking precautions, there is substituted
‘the burden’. Instead of ‘any other countervailing
defendant may have’ the test requires the court to
balance ‘the social utility of the activity that creates the risk
harm’. The Ipp Panel preferred the words ‘not insignificant’ to indicate
a risk that is of a higher probability than is indicated
‘not far fetched or fanciful’ but not as high as indicated by the
words ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’.[142] This is a matter of very, very fine distinctions, which would challenge many
philosophers, let alone the ordinary person or lawyer
trying to apply the NSW
CLA. I suppose that a foreseeable risk can be insignificant even though it is
not far fetched. But, as Mason
J pointed out the probability of the risk is to
be considered at the second stage of the question not the first and this
is retained in the legislation. The Ipp Panel intend it to be ‘a
precondition of the application of the negligence calculus’.[143] Yet I think most people would find it hard to decide whether a risk was
significant or insignificant or ‘not insignificant’
until they had
thought about, at least, the probability of its occurring and the likely
seriousness if it did. The Victorian reforms attempt to provide some further guidance as to the
meaning of ‘not insignificant’. Section 48(3) of the Wrongs Act 1958
(Vic) as amended now provides, after the same provisions as s5B of the NSW CLA:
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) (b) — (a)	insignificant risks include, but are not limited to, risks that are far
fetched or fanciful; and (b)	risks that are not insignificant are all risks other than insignificant
risks and include, but are not limited to, significant
This is really no more than an attempt to codify logic or common sense
reasoning and may not provide any assistance to the tribunal
of fact charged
with evaluating whether a defendant’s conduct was reasonable or not. The substitution of ‘the social utility of the activity that creates
the risk of harm’ for ‘any other countervailing
the defendant ‘raises a different issue. While the common law wording
allowed the court to make a comparative
assessment of utility, benefits,
obligations and necessity[144] involved in the defendant’s
activities or position, the words seem to direct the tribunal to look at the
activity in isolation,
unless the word ‘social’ encourages the court
to look at the activity in a broader spectrum. While juries are theoretically
better suited to the task, it is interesting to speculate how a court comprising
a single judge is to go about evaluating the social
utility of a
defendant’s activities. [145] Each of the common law balancing considerations in the negligence calculus is
the subject of a body of case law. The authors of Balkin
and Davis’ Law of
Torts state ‘it is assumed that, when interpreting this legislation, the
courts will be guided by the
principles already developed by the common law over
the previous century or more.’[146] In conclusion, it is hard to see how this section will make the task of
judges and juries much easier or that it will necessarily
findings of negligence. It seems that the main point of embodying the negligence
calculus in legislation was
to ensure that lawyers and judges keep reading to
the second stage of the test. As Premier Carr said in his Second Reading speech
on 23 October 2002: Although people might argue that these considerations are already the law,
putting them in this bill will help curtail the willingness
of some courts to
find a creative way around them.[147] At least the
legislation on this point is relatively uniform across jurisdictions so that
some consensus may develop on interpretation
of the provision. .
B.	Inherent and Obvious Risks Generally;
Recreational and Dangerous Recreational Activities. What might be described as the cornerstone of the civil liability reforms is,
in the NSW CLA, Divisions 4 and 5, headed respectively
‘Assumption of
Risk’ and ‘Recreational Activities’. While the restrictions
and caps on damages and costs
go a long way to reducing all payouts, this is the
part that responds to the rhetoric about ‘personal responsibility’,
the idea that a person should take responsibility for his or her own actions
without blaming someone else (no matter, it is implied,
whether or not that
other person was at fault). Yet this is probably the most complex part of the
statute for the educated reader,
let alone for the uneducated one. Why that
should be so might be that legislators cannot usually bring themselves to (or
cannot admit
that this is what they are doing) explicitly legislate that one
person must bear the burden of another’s negligence, when all
criteria for responsibility are present. So instead they go as far as they dare,
attribute greater effects to their attempts
than actually follow, and hope that
the limits they can or appear to impose provide sufficient discouragement of
worthy claims to
achieve their aims. The exception to this legislative reticence is the provision[148] by
virtue of which a term of a contract for the supply of recreation services may
exclude, restrict or modify any liability that
results from breach of an express
or implied warranty that the services will be rendered with reasonable care and
skill. Where a
person enters a contract with a clause limiting or excluding
liability for death or personal injury caused by negligence, the clause
given statutory force by this provision and also by the new parallel provisions
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in relation to recreational
activities.[149] I said that I was not going to comment on the
injustice of these reforms but I am going to make an exception for this
measure. Why governments would wish to allow commercial
recreational providers to exclude liability for negligence, including even
grossest failure to take care, and shift the costs of their negligence onto the
public purse rather than bear them or pass them
on to all those who partake in
or benefit from the activity is, at best, puzzling. How quickly the public and
government have forgotten
the occasion in July 1999 when many young Australians,
on one of those rites of passage known as a ‘Contiki’ tour of
Europe, tragically lost their lives in the Swiss canyoning disaster, which could
have been prevented so easily. Or the divers left
behind near the Barrier Reef
and never found after a diving trip? In other cases, those who suffer from
negligence could include
the most vulnerable in our society: our
children.[150] It seems offensive to the fundamental values of a modern
civilised society to include this shedding of responsibility in a
responsibility’ program. But leaving aside contractual exclusions, the critical question is just what
exactly do Divisions 4 and 5 of the NSW CLA do? Do they
place ‘personal
responsibility’ onto participants of activities and if so, personal
responsibility for what? How do the
provisions differ in their application to a
recreational and a non-recreational activity? Do they provide the level of
for operators and providers of services that insurers said they
required in order to offer affordable premiums or insurance cover
at all? And
what level of protection is that? Protection from liability for risks that are
reasonably preventable, or only from those
that are not reasonably preventable?
Freedom from liability only when participants fail to take basic safety
precautions or freedom
for providers not to take basic safety precautions? (i) Inherent and Obvious Risks Generally Division 4 entitled ‘Assumption of Risk’ applies to all claims of
negligence: whether liability is in tort, contract,
under statute or otherwise,
including recreational activities, and not just in personal injury claims. It
may, for example, apply
to limit liability for failure to warn in any
professional advice case, unless the plaintiff has requested advice from the
on ‘the risk’— presumably meaning the particular
risk that occurs— and except where the risk is one of death
injury. In summary, the Division limits liability by making the defence of
voluntary assumption of risk easier to rely
on and by excluding a duty to warn
of obvious risks, except in specified circumstances. The section on ‘inherent risks’, which merely restates the common
law on circumstances which do not entail negligence,
discussed above, is
relevant background here. More significant are the sections on ‘obvious
risk’ dealing with a presumption
of awareness and duties to warn. The definition of ‘obvious risk’ for the NSW CLA is
wide[151] — a risk that would have been obvious to a reasonable
person in the position of the defendant — and includes risks that are of low probability and risks, which are
not physically observable. At common law, and subject of course to satisfaction of the negligence
calculus, a person may be liable both or either for failing
occurrence or materialisation of a foreseeable risk and/or for failing to warn
of a foreseeable risk, unless the plaintiff
had voluntarily assumed that risk.
Section 5G Injured Persons Presumed to be Aware of Obvious Risks (1) In determining liability for negligence, a person who suffers harm is
presumed to have been aware of the risk of harm if it was
an obvious risk,
unless the person proves on the balance of probabilities that he or she was not
aware of the risk. (2) For the purposes of this section, a person is aware of a risk if the person
is aware of the type or kind of risk, even if the
person is not aware of the
precise nature, extent of manner of occurrence of the risk. Section 5H No Proactive Duty to Warn of Obvious Risk (1) A person ‘the defendant’ does not owe a duty of care to
another person ‘the plaintiff’ to warn of an obvious risk to
the plaintiff. (2) This section does not apply if: (a) The plaintiff has requested advice or information about the risk from the
defendant, or (b) The defendant is required by a written law to warn the plaintiff of the
risk, or (c) The defendant is professional and the risk is a risk of the death or of
personal injury to the plaintiff from the provision of
a professional service by
the defendant. (3) Subsection (2) does not give rise to a presumption of duty to warn of a risk
in the circumstances referred to in that subsection.
Clearly the presumption of awareness of obvious risks now makes the defence
of voluntary assumption of risk easier for defendants
to prove in cases of
obvious risks: a person is presumed to have been aware of an obvious risk,
unless he or she proves that he or
she was not, whereas the common law placed
the onus of proof on the defendant to prove the plaintiff’s awareness and
of risk. However, the NSW CLA makes no further provision to render
the plaintiff’s awareness of a risk a defence to a claim
provision does not replace the common law defence. Nor, as mentioned above, does
it make any provision about the need
for proof that the risk was voluntarily
assumed, which is one of the other key elements of the common law defence. But as well as being clearly relevant to the defence, the obviousness of a
risk is also one of the factors (and it might be a factor
of great weight) which
are relevant to the existence of or ‘scope’[152] of a duty
of care and to the issue of breach of duty (because obviousness may affect the
probability of the risk occurring and the
need to warn of it or the precautions
needed to prevent it).[153] Any duty to warn is specifically attenuated
by s5H: it provides that there is no duty to warn of an obvious risk to the
except where the plaintiff has requested advice on the particular
risk, the defendant is required by law to warn, or the defendant
professional person and the risk is of personal injury or death.[154]
But what of the duty to prevent the occurrence or materialisation of a risk,
obvious or not? Because s5G comes within a Division entitled
‘Assumption
of Risk’, it is arguable that the presumption of awareness was intended to
apply only in relation to the
defence of voluntary assumption of risk and not to
the issue of any duty to prevent the occurrence of a risk or breach of that
which will continue to be determined by the common law principles
currently under some development.[155] This interpretation is
strengthened by the contrast with the more restrictive provisions of the NSW CLA
dealing with dangerous recreational
activities, discussed below.[156]
Although most cases dealing with obvious risks are personal injury cases, it
is well to emphasise that this provision has a wider
operation. It might apply
to limit liability in negligence in a range of situations: for example, pure
economic loss cases; a banker
providing general advice to a customer on foreign
exchange loans; a stockbroker advising a client; a builder or architect advising
a client. Duties to warn will vary now according to a number of factors, such as
whether a risk was the subject of a specific request
and whether it could be
classed as obvious. (ii) Recreational and Dangerous Recreational
Activities As noted above, the law relating to such activities attracted widespread
community comment because organisers of both not-for-profit
recreational activities suddenly found themselves without affordable insurance
cover. Members of Parliament spoke
in emotive and patriotic terms about the
importance of preserving ‘the Australian way of life’, as though
sporting, leisurely
and adventurous activities are unknown elsewhere in the
world. No doubt in response to these concerns, and despite the lack of hard
evidence or even consensus that the true cause of the problem was the state of
the common law,[157] the NSW CLA’s provisions take an even
stricter approach than that recommended by the Ipp Panel. According to the
General of New South Wales this was to give ‘greater assurance
for recreational service providers’.[158] Division 5, dealing with recreational activities[159] provides that
a person is not liable in negligence as a result of the materialisation of an
obvious risk of a dangerous recreational
activity (this applies regardless of
whether a warning was or was not given and regardless of whether the defendant
was in a vastly
superior position to the plaintiff to guard against the risk).
It also provides that a person does not owe a duty to a participant
recreational activity in respect of any risk, obvious or not[160] provided they have been given a risk warning, as defined very widely by the NSW
CLA.[161] In practice, much will turn upon whether the actual risk warning given by the
defendant was adequate in the terms of the statutory
requirements[162] and, secondly, on whether the activity involved comes within the definition of a
‘dangerous recreational activity’,
that is, whether it involves a
significant risk of physical harm. [163] The fundamental questions of interpretation involved in Division 5 are more
difficult to resolve: i	Can a risk of negligence by a defendant in relation to a dangerous activity
ever be classed as an ‘obvious risk of the activity’?
the opposite: the reasonable expectation of any participant is that the provider
will take at least reasonable care?
But expectations aside, it seems that the
unspecified negligence of another person is not a risk arising out of the
activity itself.[164] ii	For the purposes of s5M, is the risk of negligence by a defendant a risk that
may be the subject of a risk warning? Again, it
is hard to imagine a situation
where, outside contract, parties would be able to rely on a general, unspecific,
defendant might not take proper care or has no liability for
negligence or that the plaintiff enters or participates ‘at their
risk’. Such a warning is not a warning of the ‘general nature of the
particular risk’.[165] To conclude, although
there has been much fanfare of the high degree of protection given to
recreational providers by the legislation,
it is strongly arguable that it will
be difficult to rely on these provisions to excuse negligence in organising or
an activity, particularly a dangerous one.[166] C. Causation Principles The continuing role of the common law principles of causation and remoteness
of damage in negligence cases is particularly uncertain
legislative provisions. The Ipp Panel did not recommend a particular formulation
of the provisions but only of the
principles they should embody. The provisions
are much briefer. Division 3 Causation 5D General Principles (1) A determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the
following elements: (a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm
(factual causation), and (b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s
liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability). (2) In determining in an exceptional case, in accordance with established
principles, whether negligence that cannot be established
as a necessary
condition of the occurrence of harm should be accepted as establishing factual
causation, the court is to consider
(amongst other relevant things) whether or
not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent
Section 5E Onus of Proof In determining liability for negligence, the plaintiff always bears the onus of
proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact
relevant to the issue of
causation. The legislative provisions raise several questions: i In what respects do the
principles set out in the statute differ from the common
law principles of
causation? ii Do the common law principles of causation continue to have any
relevance? iii Does the provision
deal only with causation principles and not
with what Anglo-Australian law calls ‘remoteness of damage’? iv If
do the common law principles of remoteness of damage interplay with the
new causation principles? v If the provision does encompass
remoteness principles, do the common law principles of remoteness continue to
have any relevance? vi What is the intent
and effect of the provision concerning
the onus of proof ? Causation is a notoriously difficult
question for lawyers, philosophers and scientists alike. Debate about causation
goes back 2000
years. In law, academic and judicial views go around and around
with no-one ever entirely satisfied that he and she has got it exactly
has solved all issues of logic, legality and morality. The current common law
approach to causation for legal purposes in
Australia — the common sense
test — was set out by a majority of the High Court in March.[167]
The common law tradition is that what was a cause of a particular occurrence is
a question of fact which ‘must be determined
by applying common sense to
the facts of each particular case’…[168] It
was recognised that the notion of common sense incorporates value
judgements.[169] Although rejecting it as a complete test of causation,
Mason CJ and others in the majority nevertheless accepted that the ‘but
for’ test, applied as a negative criterion of causation, has an important
role to play as a threshold test in the resolution
of the causation question,
subject to certain qualifications when it would give a result contrary to common
sense, for example, where
there are two or more sufficient causes, or in some
cases involving successive events.[170] In contrast, McHugh J in March was of the view that the ‘but for’
test should be the exclusive test of causation, except
simultaneous sufficient causes, (although he does suggest that it be applied in
a practical common sense way which
enables a tribunal of fact, consciously or
unconsciously, to give effect to value judgements concerning responsibility,
such as ignoring
mere preconditions)[171] and that: Any other rule limiting responsibility for damage caused by a wrongful act or
omission should be recognised as a policy-based rule
concerned with remoteness
of damage, not causation.[172] Earlier he had said:
Whatever label is given to such a rule — “common sense
principles”, “foreseeability”, “novus
interveniens”, “effective cause”, “real and efficient
cause”, “direct cause”, “proximate
cause” and so
on — the reality is that such a limiting rule is the product of a policy
choice that legal liability is
not to attach to an act or omission which is
outside the scope of that rule even though the act or omission was a necessary
of the occurrence of damage to the plaintiff. That is to say, such
a rule is only concerned with the question whether a person should
responsible for an act or omission which ex hypothesi was necessarily one of the
sum of conditions …which produced
the damage.[173]The majority approach was affirmed in a series of cases
following March and has not been overturned by the High Court since, even
the Court has had ample opportunity to do so in any of the many difficult cases,
which it has considered.[174] As noted above, the legislative provisions are based on the recommendations
of the Ipp Panel. The Ipp Panel stated that it made no
overturn the ‘but for’ test and noted that the law has devised
satisfactory and fair rules for resolving
the exceptional cases referred to
above. It equated the ‘but for’ test with the ‘necessary
condition’ formulation,
now seen in the enacted provision.[175]
After considering alternative tests in ‘evidentiary gap cases’,
the onus of proof of causation in those cases and generally,
discussed below,
and subjective causation cases[176] , the Ipp Panel then considers the
‘second normative question of causation’ and recommends that the
has two elements — ‘factual causation and
scope of liability’.[177] Within ‘scope of liability’ the Panel notes common law terms and
criteria such as ‘real cause’, ‘effective
cause’,
‘new acts intervening’, ‘remoteness of damage’ and
‘foreseeability’.[178] These last terms are included
despite it being said by the High Court in Chapman v Hearse[179] that
‘reasonable foreseeability’ is a test of the limits of liability not
of causation.[180] Further, the Report does not once refer in this
discussion to the Wagon Mound No 1,[181] where reasonable
foreseeability was laid down for the common law world as a test of remoteness of
damage. Having defined what they see as included in the scope of liability question,
the Panel states that: It is in the context of the second element — namely scope of liability for
consequences — that the statement that causation
commonsense is most often made.[182] Although it is
obvious from a reading of March that the common sense test was seen by the
majority of the High Court, unlike McHugh
J, as a test of factual causation
only, leaving issues of remoteness or ‘scope’ to be determined
separately. Where does this confusion leave us in interpreting the statutory provisions?
It follows from what is said above that the provisions
are intended, despite the
misconstruction quoted in the last paragraph, to change the actual current
approach as set out in March
and to move ‘common sense’
considerations into a broader ‘scope of liability’ question which
will, arguably,
leave no room or need for a separate and discrete question of
whether or not the damage was too remote because that question and
used to answer it are only one of many ways of resolving the scope of liability.
This appears to be a statutory enactment
of the views of McHugh J in March. Where does this leave the remoteness principles laid down in the Wagon Mound
No 1? It seems strange that an enactment dealing with
‘Causation’ would sweep away a common law principle, in place for 40
years, without expressly saying so and
without the preparatory material
mentioning this effect. But a statute may impliedly overturn a common law
principle and courts are
used to determining whether this is the effect of a
statute. The way out of this dilemma may be for the courts to take up the suggestion
of the Ipp Report that the provisions should be regarded
as only providing a
framework in which to resolve cases and that the provisions should be regarded
as ‘legislative guidance’
only, which may or may not prove to be
helpful. Premier Carr also stated: ‘Its intention is to guide the courts
as they apply
a common sense approach.’[183] Such a purpose may
allow the courts, and indeed make it necessary for them, to continue to refer to
the principles set out in previous
cases, under several rubrics, as they
determine acceptable criteria, not listed in the enactment,[184] for
deciding upon the ‘scope of liability’ in a range of circumstances.
It must also be remembered that this provision on causation applies equally
to contractual claims for breach of a contractual duty
care.[185] The same questions of interpretation will arise in respect
of the common law principles of causation and remoteness in such claims.
(i) Onus of Proof of Causation Section 5E provides that in determining liability for negligence, the
plaintiff always bears the onus of proving, on the balance of
probabilities, any
fact relevant to the issue of causation. This again simply restates the common
law, which is that the plaintiff
bears the onus of proving, on the balance of
probabilities, all the elements of his or her action in negligence. ‘Onus’ in legal terminology generally refers to what is known as
the ‘legal’ onus of proof. However, common
law cases on a number of
factual issues in negligence also show that despite the ‘legal’ onus
remaining on the plaintiff
throughout a negligence case, a so-called
‘evidentiary’ onus may pass to the defendant, in the sense that if
does not answer or disprove an allegation of fact made by the
plaintiff, he or she runs the risk that the court may accept the
version of events and infer negligence.[186] Does s5E prevent a plaintiff from arguing that an ‘evidentiary
onus’ has passed to the defendant? The Ipp Panel recommended this provision to counter the suggestion that the
legal onus of proof should shift to a defendant once the
established that the defendant was under a duty to take reasonable care to avoid
the risk in question and failed to
take the required care. This approach has
been suggested in cases where several manufacturers or employers exposed the
to a risk of disease or injury or materially increased the risk. It
was an approach espoused by Lord Wilberforce in McGhee v National
Board,[187] but quickly denounced by the House of Lords in Wilsher v
Essex Area Health Authority.[188] Although this view had some support
in Australia, particularly by Gaudron J in Bennett,[189] generally her
view is construed and read down as involving only a shift of an evidentiary
onus.[190] The Ipp Panel states[191] that the principle has been
‘referred to with approval by various courts in recent cases’ and
that it represents a fundamental
change in the traditional law with the
potential to expand liability for negligence. This would be correct if Gaudron J
that followed her had been talking about the legal onus but not the
case if they had been referring to the evidentiary onus. There
difference: the passing of an evidentiary onus merely allows a court to infer a
conclusion of fact, it does not
require it to do so in the absence of further
evidence. It is unfortunate that the Ipp Panel neither drew any explicit distinctions
between the legal onus and the evidentiary onus nor gave
the names of any of the
‘recent cases’ on which its discussion was based. In the absence of
this clarification, it seems
that the section should be construed as using the
word ‘onus’ in the usual and strict ‘legal’
sense.[192] More difficult is to work out whether the new provisions, read together,
prevent an Australian court from following the case of Fairchild
v Glenhaven
Funeral Services Ltd[193] in which the House of Lords relaxed the usual
requirements of proof of causation in exceptional cases where there is an
‘evidentiary
gap’ as to whether the defendant’s negligence
caused a material increase in the risk of harm (and in the absence of evidence
that it materially contributed to the harm itself). As the Ipp Panel noted, the
High Court has not considered such an ‘evidentiary
gap’ case. The Ipp Panel recommended that ‘the detailed criteria for determining
the issue [of evidentiary gaps] should be left for common
development’[194] but recommended a series of principles (set out
in Recommendation 29). The statutory provisions on causation do not follow the
word for word and are much briefer. If the courts do consider
whether facts that do not satisfy the ‘but for’ test should
nevertheless be accepted as establishing factual causation in an exceptional
case, s5D(2) now requires the court to consider, ‘amongst
things’, which are not listed or suggested, ‘whether or not and why
responsibility for the harm should
be imposed on the negligent party.’
This may simply be a direction to the court to give reasons for its decision,
inconceivable that a court would not do so anyway. But importantly it
is left to the common law to develop or continue to develop
how it deals with
situations where the ‘but for’ test does not provide a satisfactory
way of dealing with such situations.
What is unclear is how this provision, s5D(2), sits with s5E on the onus of
proof of causation. Section 5 E is absolute in its terms that the onus remains
on the plaintiff. Section 5 D (2), particularly in view of the statement quoted
above from 7.33, would seem to qualify this in exceptional cases. In his Second
Reading speech on 23 October 2002, Premier Carr stated: …The very limited exception to the ‘but for’ test …was
developed by the court for those rare cases, often
in the dust diseases context,
where there are particular evidentiary gaps. By including this exception in the
bill it is not intended
that the bill extend the common law in any way. Rather,
it is to focus the courts on the fact that they should tread very carefully
considering a departure from the but for test.[195] One
reading of this statement and of the Ipp Report[196] is that in
exceptional cases involving an evidentiary gap the court may relax the causation
requirements including the onus of proof.
This too will be a matter of
interpretation for the courts. It is ironic however that while the
‘evidentiary gap’ principles
have developed and been critical in the
dust diseases cases, as Premier Carr recognises, the civil liability reforms in
most jurisdictions
do not apply to actions for damages for dust
diseases.[197] 6.	How Useful Will Recourse be to the Political
History, the ‘Travaux Preparatoire’ and Other Extrinsic Materials?
In CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd,[198] the joint
judgment of Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ affirmed a view that places
the identification of the context of
legislation as a necessary tool of
statutory interpretation in all cases, not just in cases requiring resolution of
some statutory
ambiguity. Furthermore, this view recognises that the context of
a statute encompasses both the existing law and the mischief to
be remedied, as
discerned from the range of extrinsic materials that relate to the statute. …the modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the
context be considered in the first instance, not merely
at some later stage when
ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses ‘context’ in its
widest sense to include such
things as the existing state of the law and the
mischief which by legitimate means such as [reference to reports of law reform
bodies],
one may discern the statute was intended to remedy: Attorney General v
Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436 at 461, cited in K & S Lake
City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd [1985] HCA 48; (1985) 157 CLR 309 at 312,
315.[199] Co-existing with the common law principles is
s15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), inserted in 1984, which is
mirrored in state legislation[200] . Both provide for consideration of a
range of extrinsic materials in the task of statutory interpretation.[200]
As a matter of common sense, the usefulness of extrinsic materials often
depends on the fullness, accuracy and clarity of their statements
explanations. Whether or not they are reliable as a source of legislative
intention also depends on their authorship or provenance.
question in this area is whether the concept of ‘legislative
intention’ refers to the subjective intent
of the legislators, so that the
relevant intention can be gleaned from the statements and debates of individual
or government ministers, or rather to some more objective
construct of legislative intent.[202] There are a number of background sources relating to the NSW CLA, which
served as a model for legislative changes around the country,
although the final
legislation in the various states often differs: i	The Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence Report.[203] No state enacts
the recommendations of the Ipp Panel in their entirety. Various states change
some of the recommended provisions,
adopt others word for word and do not adopt
others at all.[204] Nevertheless the Ipp Report may provide a useful
explanation of what was perceived as the mischief of the law and what the
drafters must be taken to have intended. However, a significant defect of the Ipp Report as a source of information on the existing state of the
law or on the mischief to be remedied by the statute
is the lack of evidence,
authority or sources to support many of its assertions about the practice,
content and alleged problems
of the current common law.[205] No doubt
this was due to the extraordinarily tight time frame imposed on the Ipp Panel
and its stated desire not to let the opportunity
for legislation to be passed
throughout the country to be lost by delay in meeting the schedule,[206]but it does mean that readers will often have to do their own research
into the existing state of the law that the recommendations
of that the Panel
were intended to overcome. A second problem is the assumptions on which the Ipp Panel was instructed to
proceed and the task it was set, that is, to recommend
changes to limit
liability and the quantum of damages. To a considerable extent this might be
seen to foreclose any debate as to
the purpose of any recommendation. However,
given that in some situations the Panel expressly declines to make a
for example, to exempt ‘not for profit’
organisations from liability or to introduce proportionate liability for
injury cases, and in other cases merely and deliberately recommends a
re-statement of the common law, it will be necessary to investigate
particular recommendation has a purpose of restricting the common law or
retaining the status quo. The former cannot
necessarily be presumed from the
overall purpose of the statute. The second purpose is consistent with giving the
appearance of being busy. The Report is also, of course, of more use where the state or federal parliament
concerned followed the Panel’s recommendation
than where it did not. In
the latter circumstance, the court will have to rely on other materials. The
Second Reading Speech of Premier
Carr on 23 October 2002 refers to those
instances where the Civil Liability (Personal Responsibility) Bill 2002 follows
the Ipp Panel’s
recommendation but not to those where it does not.
Attorney-General Robert Debus explains in an article in a university law journal
that, in one instance, the government made the legislation more restrictive than
the Ipp Panel recommended ‘to promote greater
certainty or a fairer
balance of responsibility’.[207] ii	The Second Reading speech of 23 October 2002 sets out some specific, some
broad, some emotive, purposes for the Act: to assist
in the reduction of
insurance premiums; to wind back the culture of blame; to prevent the
Americanisation of our society; to preserve
the Australian way of life; to
restore personal responsibility. It also makes some other specific comments which will be useful in relation to
particular sections, for example, ‘The bill
modifies particular aspects of
the common law. It does not establish a complete code’; ‘…it
extend the common law in any way’ (in relation to
dealing with evidentiary gaps in causation cases); ‘…it is to
the court’s attention that they should tread very carefully when
considering a departure from the ‘but for’
test’;
‘…The bill will codify the current law’ relating to inherent
risks. iii Parliamentary debates reported in Hansard. Others have warned of the
unwisdom of relying on parliamentary debates as a source
intention.[208] Problems include the preference a particular Member of
Parliament or a Minister may give to certain interests for a range of political
reasons, the views of others that such persons may select to promote, and the
special responsibilities that Ministers may have. iv The Position Paper of the Attorney–General’s Department of New
South Wales. This was issued before the final version
of the Ipp Report was
released on 2 October 2002 and used for the first draft of the second stage
Civil Liability (Personal Responsibility)
Amendment Bill 2002 which was later
changed in many respects as a result of the Ipp Panel’s recommendations.
as accurate a statement of the existing law or of ‘the
mischief’ to be remedied as one would usually find in a carefully
researched and carefully drafted report of a law reform commission. It
nevertheless provides some insight into what the framers had
in mind in relation
to some of the provisions, particularly those which do not follow the Ipp
Panel’s recommendations. It is
particularly relevant for example to the
provisions on the liability of public authorities, where its statement as to the
of the difficult and complex provisions will be illuminative: These provisions do not affect the ordinary duty of care that authorities owe to
members of the public in carrying out their activities.
Actions in negligence
(as affected by this Bill) will still be possible when authorities cause damage
as the result of their activities.[209] v	Explanatory memoranda: unfortunately it seems to be the practice for such
memoranda to paraphrase the provisions of a bill but
not to explain them. They
are often not helpful in determining meaning.[210] vi In relation to the proportionate liability sections of the Civil Liability
Acts around the country, there is much value in looking
at the Draft Model
Provisions to Implement the Recommendations of the Inquiry into the Law of Joint
and Several Liability released
by the Treasury and the New South Wales Attorney
General’s Department in July 1996, as well as the two reports of the
of Inquiry headed by Davis.[211] However, none of the
statutes enacting proportionate liability at state or federal level follow those
model provisions exactly and
some changes are difficult to interpret.[212]
7. Conclusion The immediate impact of the NSW CLA has been to require the courts to resolve
a number of issues as to the meaning and intent of the
various statutory
provisions.[213] The NSW CLA is so wide ranging and the relationship
between the provisions and the common law so complex that it will be some time
before a consensus settles on these issues. An obvious long term effect of the lack of uniformity in the legislative
provisions enacted by state legislatures around the country
reduction in the extent to which the principles of law and the court decisions
of one state will inform the principles
and decisions of another
state.[214] In addition, the common law of Australia is reduced in
content and application. The advantages we have so far enjoyed of having
High Court as a final court of appeal for a ‘common law of
Australia’ will be reduced. Many critical issues and questions in negligence and tort law remain wholly
or partly untouched by this legislation and require further
elucidation by the courts, including: i The test for the existence of a duty of care in many areas, particularly for
purely economic loss; ii The duty to control or protect a person from the torts
of third parties; iii The rationale and incidence
of vicarious liability,
especially for intentional torts of an employee or agent;iv Causation in ‘evidentiary gap’
cases and loss of chance cases;v The potential for a new tort of invasion of
privacy;vi The intentional torts[215] and the meaning of
‘intent’;vii The role and incidence of strict
liability.In addition there are several important categories
of cases which are expressly excluded from the operation of some or all of the
provisions of the NSW CLA, for example, dust diseases cases and smoking or
tobacco cases.[216] Whether or not the statutory enactments on general principles such as
causation will have an indirect influence on the development
in those areas which fall outside the direct application of the legislation
remains to be seen. Arguably, the express
exclusion by the legislature of these
categories should be regarded as conclusive that they were not to be affected,
this seems paradoxical and against the understanding of members of
the legislature. On the broader influence of any legislative policy
discerned from the Civil Liability Acts, there could be at least two approaches
the courts could take: discern some broad legislative
standard that liability in tort should be restricted rather than extended, or,
alternatively, take the view
that the legislatures had a clear opportunity to
restrict tort liability and that the enactments must be read as reflecting
how far they wished to go and no further.[217] In any event,
the courts would do well to exercise caution in trying to discern any consistent
community, legislative or governmental
attitudes or policies towards tort reform
over a period of time. In 2002 there were strident calls from the insurance
groups and government to restrict tort liability, while
in 2005 there have been equally strong calls, in the context of asbestos
to secure and extend the tort liability of corporate defendants. Even where the Civil Liability Act ‘reforms’ apply, it is
difficult to imagine that reference will not be needed to the
which expound, explain and illustrate the principles of law which form the basis
of or provide the context for so
many of the statutory provisions. The Acts are
not codes. It is not always clear whether they intend to ‘cover the
on a particular issue or merely provide a framework within which
the common law principles continue to operate. In some areas they
restate the
common law: in those areas the future development of common law principles will
be limited, although interpretation of
statutory wording may change over the
years. In others, the Civil Liability Acts make changes to the common law or
build upon a body
of law which is not suddenly irrelevant, but which will,
however quickly, become obsolete if it is not used. It will be important
advocates and judges to look past the statutory wording to the common law
context within which the enactments operate and to
promote and restore coherence
to the law of negligence. As for the apparent aim of ‘restoring personal responsibility’
and the other purposes of the legislation, it is to be
hoped that the courts do
not infer an intention to pursue these purposes at all costs, and certainly not
at the cost of promoting
a humane and responsible regard for others, and a fair
— or as fair as possible under the tort system — approach to
for unreasonable infliction of injury. [*]	Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. An earlier
version of this article was delivered as a paper at a conference
‘Working with Statutes’ held by the Bar Association of New South
Wales on 18–19 March 2005. I am very
grateful for the guidance of
Professor Harry Geddes on matters of statutory interpretation and comments by Mr
Bret Walker SC on the
paper, and for very helpful comments on the draft article
by Professor Jim Davis and Professor Harold Luntz. [1] The term ‘Civil Liability Acts’ refers to the various pieces of
state legislation introduced in 2002 and 2003 around
the country under various
names: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) as amended by the Civil Liability
(Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 (NSW); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT),
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Civil Liability
Act 2003 (Qld), Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Personal
Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT). All legislation enacted in
2002 and 2003 has been subject to frequent
amendment since then. [2] For example corporations law, evidence law, the law of restraint of trade
or unconscionable conduct or unfair contracts. [3] See for example Harold Luntz ‘Reform of the law of Negligence: Wrong
Questions – Wrong Answers’ [2002] UNSWLawJl 49; (2002) 25 UNSWLJ 836 and ‘A
Personal Journey Through the Law of Torts’ in this volume. [4] For instance, compensation for injury inflicted by others; corrective
justice; deterrence or regulation; allocation of risk or loss
efficiency or enterprise liability. [5] See Harold Luntz ‘Looking Back at Accident Compensation: An
Australian Perspective’ (2003) 34 Vict U of Wellington LR
279. [6] Note also that in Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214
CLR 269. McHugh J commented on the possibly increasing weakness of the
presumption that a statute is not intended to alter or abolish common
unless it evinces a clear intention to do so, in view of the frequency of
legislation doing so: at 284. [7] There are also challenges to the law of Contract because the statute also
affects contractual liability. On coherence, see William
Gummow, ‘The
Common Law and Statute’ in Change and Continuity: Statute, Equity and
Federalism (1999) at 26. [8] See Mason J describing the ideal legislative process in State Government
Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell [1979] HCA 40; (1979) 142 CLR 617 at 633–634, quoted
and discussed in Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law’ (1992) 22
UWALR 7 at 14. [9] James Spigelman, ‘Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare
State’ (2002) 76 ALJ 432. [10] Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW); Health Care Liability Act
2001 (NSW). [11] The panel appointed by a joint State, Federal and Territory ministerial
meeting to examine and review the law of negligence. [12] Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report
(2002) (hereafter Ipp Report): <http://revofneg.treasury.gov. au/content/review2.asp>
(15 August 2005). [13] The Ipp Panel acknowledged that there was a dearth of hard or empirical
evidence so the recommendations were ultimately based on
the collective sense of
fairness of the Panel members, informed by their knowledge and experience, by
their own researches and those
of the Panel’s secretariat, and by the
advice and submissions of those who have appeared before the Panel or who have
written representations to it: id at 1.39. [14] Roscoe Pound, ‘Common Law and Legislation’ (1908) 21 Harv LR
383 at 404. Compare the more co-operative relationship
between parliament and
courts in modern day Australia described by Keith Mason, ‘Rights Protected
by Statute and by the Courts’
[2003] UNSWLawJl 35; (2003) 26 UNSWLJ 442 at 444. [15] For academics and students, any course which covered only the common law
of torts, would give a very incomplete picture of the current
law. I note, on
the other hand, that, faced with 50 different states as well as a federal
jurisdiction, the leading torts casebook
in the United States by Victor
Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly & David Partlett, Prosser, Wade and Scwartz’s
on Torts (10th ed, 2000), analyses the
common law but often attempts no more than an end note to a chapter warning that
attorneys must carefully
research state statutes. Perhaps that is a hangover of
the judicial, professional and academic distaste for statute law identified
Roscoe Pound back in 1908 in the United States, (ibid), but it may just be a
matter of pragmatism. Perhaps also it has come to
Interestingly, it was only in the 7th edition of his treatise The Law
of Torts in 1987, 30 years after its first edition that John Fleming included a
[16] Robert Carr, NSW, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),
23 October 2002 at 5764. [17] [1932] AC 562. [18] The High Court of Australia had already exhibited a much more restrictive
approach to duties of care in respect of physical injury
decades, see Harold Luntz, ‘Torts Turn Around Down Under’ (2001) 1
Oxford Commonwealth Law Journal 95.
Division 2 of Part 1A of the NSW CLA
entitled ‘Duty of Care’ in fact deals with the principles relating
to the test for negligence or breach
of duty and the standard of care. The areas
in which the statute restricts the duty of care are in relation to the duties to
of obvious risks, except in some professional circumstances; duties in
relation to the risks of recreational activities; duties of
highway authorities;
and duties to persons under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There are also
immunities from liability for
certain persons, for example, volunteers or
‘Good Samaritans’. See at pages see sections 4–5 below and see
generally Joachim Dietrich, ‘Duty of Care Under the Civil Liability
Acts’ (2005) 13 TLJ 17 for a discussion of the reforms on duty issues
around the country. [19] John Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed, 1998) at 581. See also
Sally Walker, Media Law: Commentary and Materials (2000) at 3.5. At the time of
writing there were well-developed
proposals for uniform defamation laws
throughout the Australian states and territories, which will legislate on some
aspects of defamation
law but leave other aspects to the common law. [20] Fleming notes that the original English Workers’ Compensation Act
(1897) was inspired by Bismarck’s historical measure
of 1884, id at 575.
Australian workers compensation statutes include the Workers Compensation Act
1987 (NSW) as amended, and the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic). [21] For example Sporting Injuries Insurance Act 1978 (NSW); Victims Support
and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW). For further references see Rosalie Balkin
& Jim Davis, The Law of Torts (3rd ed, 2004) at para 12.12. [22] Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW). [23] For example Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) and see Balkin &
Davis, above n21 at Chapter 12. [24] Peter Handford, ‘Occupiers Liability Reform in Western Australia and
Elsewhere’ (1987) 17 UWALR at 182 and see note
28 below. [25] For example, Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW); Domestic (Feral and
Nuisance) Animals Act 1994 (Vic). For references to legislation in other states
see Balkin & Davis, above n21 at para 15.19. [26] Damage by Aircraft Act 1952 (NSW); Civil Aviation Act 1998 (Cth) as
amended; Civil Liability (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959
(Cth). [27] Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), Part VA. [28] Id at s52. [29] But note also an enactment in 1845 which according to Lord Wilberforce
imposed fencing obligations on railways but ‘which
it seems protects
cattle not children’, even after electrification of tracks: Herrington v
British Railways Board [1972] AC 911 at 922, quoted in Harold Luntz & David
Hambly, Torts Cases and Commentary (5th ed, 2002) at 460 along with
other details of legislative reform of occupiers’ liability. [30] (1846) 9 & 10 Vict c93. [31] (1847) 11 Vict no 32. [32] Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Cam 493; 170 ER 1033; See also Swan v Williams
(Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 172 at 174–184 (Samuels J) (hereafter
Swan). [33] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), modelled on the
United Kingdom’s Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK) which
in turn followed apportionment
in maritime law after the Brussels Convention of
1911. See Fleming, above n19 at 306. [34] Overturning the restrictive law rule of Merryweather v Nixan (1799) 8 Term
Rep 186, for example, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW).
[35] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW). [36] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Acts 1955 (ACT) and 1956 (NT). [37] [1942] UKHL 5; [1943] AC 92. [38] [1939] HCA 25; (1939) 62 CLR 1. [39] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW) [40] Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Amendment Act 1983 (NSW). [41] CLM, s120. [42] Law Reform (Marital Consortium) Act 1984 (NSW). For legislation in other
states see Balkin & Davis, above n21 at para 24.3. [43] Transport Accidents Act 1986 (Vic) s93. [44] Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld); Wrongs Act 1936 (SA). [45] Patrick Atiyah, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (1985) 48 Mod LR
1 at 6, quoted in Esso Australia v Commissioner of Taxation
[1999] HCA 67; (1999) 201 CLR 49 at
60 (hereafter Esso) (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron & Gummow JJ). [46] Pound, above n14 at 385. [47] Pound refers to a decision of the United States Supreme Court in Chambers
v Baltimore & Ohio RR [1907] USSC 156; (1907) 207 US 142 at 149 refusing to see the
‘universal’ enactment of Lord Campbell’s Act as of equal
weight with common law doctrines.
Compare Morgan v States Marine Lines Inc
[1880] USSC 197; (1970) 398 US 375, cited in Esso, above n45 at [26]. [48] Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law’ (1992) 22 UWALR 7 at
20. [49] The task of the court is to construe the legislation in its natural and
ordinary meaning, having regard to the context and the purpose
of the enactment
as informed by the history of the enactment and the state of the law when it was
enacted: McHugh J in Gifford, above
n6 at 341, Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade
Practices Commission [1983] HCA 9; (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 341; Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v
Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290 at 299. See generally Patrick Parkinson,
‘Interpreting Statutes’ Tradition and Change in Australian Law
(3rd ed, 2005) at 243 and cases cited therein; Dennis Pearce &
Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation In Australia (5th ed, 2001).
Sometimes however the courts may construe one of a recognised category of
statutes by ‘reference to general principles
rather than by a textual
analysis of individual enactments’: McHugh J in Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57; (1993)
177 CLR 598 at 619, with respect to a statute giving protection from liability
to a person carrying out a public duty. [50] [1999] HCA 6; (1999) 197 CLR 1 (hereafter Astley).
[51] [1999] HCA 6; (1999) 197 CLR 1. See also Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) [2001] HCA 31; (2001) 207 CLR
[52] For example, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Amendment Act 2000
(NSW). See now ss8 and 9, Law Reform Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1965 (NSW).
See also for references to legislation in other states
Balkin & Davis, above
n21 at para 10.15, footnote 92. [53] [1955] HCA 1; (1955) 92 CLR 200. [54] [1955] HCA 1; (1955) 92 CLR 200 at 207 (Dixon, McTiernan, Webb Fullager & Taylor
JJ). [55] [1966] HCA 3; (1966) 114 CLR 213. [56] See below Section 4. [57] Gifford, above n6. [58] For example, see Gummow J in Collier Constructions Pty Ltd v Foskett Pty
Ltd (1990) 19 IPR 44. [59] [1939] HCA 25; (1939) 62 CLR 1 (hereafter Chester). [60] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944, s4 (hereafter the 1944
Act). This legislation was followed in the Australian Capital Territory, Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1955 (Act), s23, and the Northern
Territory, Law Reform Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s24, in 1955 and
1956 respectively.
[61] [1942] UKHL 5; [1943] AC 92 (hereafter Bourhill). [62] With extended meanings given to the words ‘parent’ or
‘spouse’ in the legislation. [63] Although without a definition of ‘nervous shock’ it was left
to the common law to construe this phrase and it was considered
retaining the word ‘shock’ parliament intended to refer only to
illness caused by sudden events not long term
problems: Chiaverini v Hockey
(1992) ATR 81–223. [64] [1984] HCA 52; (1984) 155 CLR 549 (hereafter Jaensch). [65] [1982] UKHL 3; [1982] RTR 209. [66] There were dicta in Scala v Mammolitti [1965] HCA 63; (1965) 114 CLR 153 at
159–160, Mt Isa Mines v Pusey [1970] HCA 60; (1970) 125 CLR 383 at 408 and in several New
South Wales Court of Appeal cases Coates v Government Insurance Office of NSW
(1995) 36 NSWLR 1, FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Lucre [2000] NSWCA 346; (2000) 50 NSWLR 261.
[67] (NSW District Court, Naughton DCJ, 24 August 1999). [68] [2002] HCA 35; (2003) 211 CLR 317 (hereinafter Annetts). [69] Id at 332–334 (Gleeson CJ), 337–338 (McHugh J). [70] Schedule 3 of the Civil Liability (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 (NSW)
repealed Part 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW)
which provided for a statutory action for nervous shock. Note however in respect
of intentional injury Clause 11 of Schedule
1 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 as
amended provides that Part 3 of the 1944 Act ‘continues to apply despite
its repeal [sic]’ in relation to acts done
with intent to cause injury or
death etc as set out in ss3B(1)(a). [71] Jaensch, above n64 at 602. This view was rejected in FAI General
Insurance, above n66 but was applied in Tasmania: Klug v Motor
Insurance Board (1991) ATR 81–134. Note that in New South Wales this
common law basis for recovery may continue to be important as the drafter of the
CLA Part 3 does not seem to have had this situation in mind but has not
excluded it. [72] ‘Mere bystanders’ or witnesses, whom the NSW CLA now
recognises in s30 (2)(a), may thus be better off than at common
law which has so
far refused to recognise a duty Bourhill, above n61, Alcock v Chief Constable of
Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 390 at 403 and 416. On the other hand, parents and spouses
of negligently killed or injured victims are now clearly worse off than under
the 1944 Act which relieved them of the need to establish that the defendant
owed them a separate duty of care in addition to a liability
to the victim. They
now, like everyone else, have to show that they were owed a duty of care.
Perhaps this is fair given the increase
in the range of nominate medical
conditions recognised since that time and the difficulty of deciding if they
amount to an ‘illness’,
but in the absence of empirical data about
the number and range of verdicts or settlements of nervous shock claims by
spouses, it is hard to see that we are better off making such
claimants go through the legal hoops of establishing a duty of care
proved to have suffered a psychiatric illness following the negligently
inflicted death of a child or spouse. A more
appropriate enactment, which might
head off nervous shock and resulting claims, would be a modest bereavement
payment as in the United
Kingdom, Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (UK) s1A. Other
classes of persons now worse off than at common law are the rescuer or fellow
(as to which see Chadwick v British Transport Commission [1967] 1 WLR
912 but compare White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1998] UKHL 45; [1999] 2 AC
455; and Mt Isa Mines Ltd, above n66 respectively) who is called to the scene of
the accident after it occurs, and in the case of a rescuer
is exposed to some
danger. See Balkin & Davis, above n21 at 254–262 on the legislation
and common law in all states. [73] Brennan J in O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 at
267. Compare Kirby P with Samuels & McHugh JJ in Halabi
v Westpac Banking
Corporation (1989) 17 NSWLR 26. See also Samuels J in Swan, above n32. [74] Michael McHugh, edited extract of speech to Australian Bar Association,
Florence, July 2004, published in The Australian Financial
Review, 23 July 2004.
[75] Kylie Burns, ‘The Way the World Is: Social Facts in High Court
Negligence Cases’ (2004) 12 TLJ 215. [76] Atiyah, above n45 at 6. [77] Esso, above n45. [78] [1976] HCA 63; (1976) 135 CLR 674 (hereafter Grant). [79] [1998] FCA 144; (1998) 81 FCR 360 at 373. [80] Ibid. [81] Esso, above n45 at 62. [82] Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 653.
[83] MoorgateTobacco Co Ltd v Phillip Morris Ltd [No 2](1984) [1991] HCA 48; 174 CLR 379. [84] R v L [1991] HCA 48; (1991) 174 CLR 379. [85] [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92 (hereafter D’Orta-Ekenaike). [86] Id at [48]–[54] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne & Heydon JJ). [87] [2001] HCA 29; (2001) 206 CLR 512. [88] (1997) 188 CLR 313 and (2000) 205 CLR 166 respectively. [89] [2004] NSWCA 93 (hereafter Harriton). This case and the recent
‘wrongful birth’ cases are discussed by Stephen Todd in this volume.
[90] Harriton, above n89 at [322], and [337]. [91] Id at [164]. Mason P noted particularly that Parliament had
‘deliberately stepped back from the present issue’ when
legislated in respect of ‘wrongful birth’ claims and went on:
‘I see no pattern or guidance in the spate of
operating in areas other than the one presented for determination in these
appeals’. [92] D’Orta-Ekenaike, above n85 at [53] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne &
Heydon JJ). [93] See Tambree v Travel Compensation Fund (2004) Aust Contract R
90–195; Rufo v Hosking [2004] NSW 391; Ruddock v Taylor (2003) NSWSC 269.
[94] [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506 (hereafter March). [95] [1992] HCA 27; (1992) 176 CLR 408 (hereafter Bennett). [96] Especially Jane Stapleton, ‘Causation and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences’ (2003) 119 LQR 388, cited in the Ipp Report, above n12 at
para 7.26, footnote 6. [97] D’Orta-Ekenaike, above n85 at [358] (Callinan J). [98] On legislative influence, see Peter Strauss, ‘On Resegregating the
Worlds of Statute and Common Law’ (1994) Supreme Court Review 429 at 437
cited in Gummow, above n7 at 15. [99] CLA, s5A. [100] In addition to that discussed above in relation to recovery of damages
for mental harm. [101] See Stephen Sugarman, ‘Tort Reform through Damages Law
Reform’ in this volume. [102] See CLA, Part 2. [103] Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. See
discussion of this test in Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479, quoting Sidaway
v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] UKHL 1; (1985) AC 871 at 881 at 484 (Scarman, LJ).
The new test in s5O of the NSW CLA is described as ‘modified’
because the wording of the
section differs from the Bolam test as described in
Sidaway. [104] CLA, s50. [105] CLA, Part 9. [106] Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; compare NSW v Lepore [2003] HCA 4; (2003)
212 CLR 511. [107] See CLA s3C. See also Myles McGregor-Lowndes & Linh Nguyen,
‘Volunteers and the New Tort Law Reform’ (2005) 13 TLJ
at 41. [108] CLA, Part 4. [109] Barbara McDonald, ‘Proportionate Liability in Australia: The Devil
in the Detail’ (2005) 26 Aust Bar Rev 29. [110] CLA, ss67–69. This provision is somewhat of a
‘sleeper’: we will not know what impact it will have until people
and institutions begin to use or offer apologies, either from conscience or as a
pragmatic strategy to mend fences and head off a
desire to litigate, if they are
confident both that the apology cannot be used against them in evidence or that
it will not encourage
blame. [111] Prue Vines, ‘Apologising to Avoid Liability: Cynical Civility or
Practical Morality?’ in this volume. [112] CLA, Part 6. For a recent application see Russell v Edwards, (NSW
District Court, Sidis J, 23 November 2003). I am indebted to Andrew
Stone, for
drawing my attention to this decision. [113] Let us hope that the young boy who considerately leant out of the tram
window, in breach of a by-law, to be sick, fatally striking
too-close steel standard, would be treated sympathetically if injured today
Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust
(South Australia) [1938] HCA 35; (1938) 60 CLR 438. [114] Gala v Preston [1991] HCA 18; (1991) 172 CLR 243, compare Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138
CLR 438. Again I am indebted to Andrew Stone for pointing this out. Arguably
was not that which the provision was directed towards: rather it
may have been directed towards a person using criminal force in
self-defence. [115] CLA, Part 7. [116] CLM, s21. But such damages were rarely awarded in negligence actions
involving merely negligent conduct. Compare Gray v Motor Accident
(1998) 196 CLR 1, a running down case where the conduct was intentional and the
injury direct but the plaintiff nevertheless
sued in negligence and exemplary
damages awarded. For statutory provisions in motor and industrial accident
claims see Luntz &
Hambly, above n29 at 8.1.10. [117] CLA, Part 8. I know of no case in Australia where a Good Samaritan has
been held liable in negligence for personal injury, but see
Luntz & Hambly,
above n29 at 7.7.11 in respect of two cases concerning property damage where a
duty of care was not denied and
of other stautory protection, particularly for
emergency services. [118] CLM, s5S. See also sC5T in relation to contributory negligence in
Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) claims. [119] [1997] HCA 52; (1997) 149 ALR 25. [120] Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575.
[121] CLA, s5I.
[122] CLA, s5(2).
[123] [1967] HCA 39; (1967) 116 CLR 383 (hereafter Rootes).
[124] CLA, s5R.
[125] CLA, s5B.
[126] See under Heading 5.A. below.
[127] Fleming, above n19 at 302.
[128] See also above under Heading 4.B.
[129] CLA, S42(b). See Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 157 CLR 424 at
469 (Mason J). [130] CLA, s42(c). See generally Romeo v Conservation Commission of the
Northern Territory (1998) 192 CLR 431 and Crimmins v Stevedoring
Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59; (1999) 200 CLR 1 (hereafter Romeo). [131] Brodie, above n87. [132] CLA, s45. [133] For example, s44 which makes liability for failure to perform a
regulatory function depend on whether the plaintiff had standing
performance of the regulatory function. [134] See below n210 on the indications of legislative intent as to these
provisions. [135] CLA, s5B which confusingly is to be found under the heading of
‘Duty of Care’. [136] [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47–48. [137] [1856] EngR 223; (1856) 11 Exch 781. [138] (1947) 159 F 2d 169. 139 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co
Pty Ltd [1966] UKPC 1; [1967] 1 AC 617. [140] [2005] HCA 4; (2005) 213 ALR 249 at para 79–80. [141] Fleming, above n19. [142] Ipp Report, above n12 at para 7.15. [143] Id at 105. [144] Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd [1946] 2 All ER 333.
[145] See also Burns, above n75 at 215.
[146] Balkin & Davis, above n21 at 274.
[147] Carr, above n16
[148] CLA, s5N. [149] CLA, s68B, inserted by the Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for
Recreational Services) Act 2002 (Cth). (Query whether s5 N imports or overrides
the common law requirements that the terms must be brought to the attention of
contracting party before entering the contract.) See Elisabeth Peden &
John Carter ‘Consumers Beware; the Loss of Contractual
Recreational Risks (2004) 1 Australian Civil Liability 33. [150] Note that liability for injury to a child would usually be provided for
in a contract with the child’s parents, often requiring
indemnify the provider against a claim by the child. [151] CLA, s5F. [152] Romeo, above n132. There is some legitimate debate as to whether the
‘scope’ of a duty should be considered by the court
as a duty issue
or as an issue more relevant to deciding whether there has been a breach of
duty, ie what reasonable care in the
circumstances required of a defendant. [153] The High Court has reserved judgment in two cases which will deal with
the relevance of the obviousness of a risk to the duty of
care and breach of
duty questions: Vairy v Wyong Shire Council and Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City
Council and Ors, heard on 7 and
8 April 2005. [2005] HCA Trans 195, [2005] HCA
Trans 196. [154] For example, the Rogers v Whitaker circumstances, above n104. [155] See above n155. [156] Particularly CLA, s5L. [157] Ipp Report, above n12. [158] Robert Debus, ‘Tort Law Reform in New South Wales; State and
Federal Interactions’ [2002] UNSWLawJl 47; (2002) 25 UNSWLJ 825 at 829. [159] Widely defined in s5K to include any activity engaged in at a place where
people ordinarily engage in a recreational activity. [160] Debus, above n158. [161] Note that a defendant is not entitled to rely on a risk warning if the
harm resulted from the contravention of a written law, s5M
(7). But note also
that there is no such qualification to s5L relating to dangerous recreational
activities. [162] The operation of this section in relation to children and non-English
speakers is especially harsh. The provision that a warning
to the parent will be
effective against the child was justified by Premier Carr and others as being
that the government did not see
why recreational providers should have to take
better care of the child than the child’s parents would take: NSW
Assembly (Hansard) 23 October 2002. This seems odd given the greater
expertise and experience that one would reasonably expect the
provider to have
over that of many parents. And in a country where there is a large migrant
population with varying English skills
and a large tourist industry intent on
capturing tourists from non-English speaking neighbours the failure to advert to
of foreseeable groups in the community, such as blind people or
non-English speakers, as the common law has done at least since Glasgow
Taylor [1921] UKHL 3; [1922] 1 AC 44 at 67 (Sumner LJ), applied in Haley v London Electricity
Board [1964] UKHL 3; [1965] AC 778, is regrettable. [163] CLA, s5K. [164] If the negligence is identifiable in advance For example, a failure to
check or maintain equipment or to check weather reports then
situation may be different as the dangerous activity may be classified as
‘canyoning with unchecked equipment’
‘canyoning’. It is hard to imagine a court giving the NSW CLA this
operation, particularly as it leaves
the defence of voluntary assumption of risk
to cover situations where the plaintiff is aware of particular risks. [165] CLM, s5M(5). [166] An interesting question is whether Swain, above n140 would necessarily
have a different outcome if governed by the Civil Liability Act but with the
same evidence adduced. For the reasons I have given my tentative answer is that
it would not. In that case the plaintiff
seemed to base his case on the alleged
representation made by the placing of the flags on the beach that the area was
and to dive in. It was the placing of the flags that was alleged to
be negligent, not a failure to warn or a failure to prevent an
[167] March, above n94. [168] March, above n94 at 515 (Mason CJ), quoting Reid LJ in Stapley v Gypsum
Mines Ltd [1953] UKHL 4; [1953] AC 663, at 681, and 523 (Deane J). [169] March, above n94 at 523 (Deane J). [170] March, above n94 at 516 (Mason CJ). [171] Like having a head as a precondition to being decapitated! See March,
above n95 at 523 (Deane J). [172] March, above n94 at 534. [173] March, above n94 at 530–531. [174] Bennett, above n95, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 (hereafter
Chappel); Rosenberg v Percival [2001] HCA 18; (2001) 205 CLR 434 (hereafter Rosenberg). [175] Ipp Report, above n12 at 7.26. [176] In respect of which the NSW CLA makes an important provision s5D(3). [177] Ipp Report, above n12 at 7.42. [178] Note also Recommendation 29 (b) (ii), which includes ‘remoteness of
damage’ in its description of ‘scope of liability’.
[179] [1961] HCA 46; (1961) 106 CLR 112 at 121. [180] Although it is hard to ignore the role of foreseeability when determining
liability for the intervening conduct of third parties
where liability may
depend on whether it is the very kind of thing likely to happen. See March,
above n94 at 518 (Mason CJ). [181] Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon
Mound No 1) [1961] UKPC 1; [1961] AC 388. [182] Ipp Report, above n12 at 7.43. [183] Carr, above n16.
[184] But listed in Recommendation 29 (ii) (b) of the Ipp Report on which the
enactment was based.
[185] NSW CLA, s5A.
[186] For example, in cases where the plaintiff relies on the maxim res ipsa
loquitur: see Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] HCA 18; (2000) 200 CLR 121 at 132
[22]. This also seemed to occur recently in Swain, above n140 where although the
plaintiff did not provide evidence of what precautions
the defendant could or
should have taken to avoid the risk of injury to the plaintiff, on the question
of whether he had a legal
onus of proof, a majority of the High Court (Gleeson
CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ) did not upset the jury’s finding of negligence.
Compare the judgments of McHugh and Heydon JJ. [187] [1972] UKHL 7; [1972] 3 All ER 1008 at 1012. [188] [1987] UKHL 11; [1988] AC 1074. [189] Bennett, above n95 at 420–1. The Ipp Panel noted that the principle
set out by Gaudron J has also been cited with approval
by Gummow J and Kirby J
in Rosenberg, above n174 at 461 and in the problematic case of Chappel, above
n174 at 257 and 273, but arguably
it was obiter dicta in both those cases, or
was merely part of the common sense reinforcement of the ‘but for’
See also now Chester v Afshar in [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 AC 134. [190] See Luntz & Hambly, above n29 at 4.1.14 and the authorities discussed
in 4.1.11. [191] Ipp Panel, above n12 at 7.36. [192] This certainly seems to be the sense of id 7.36. [193] [2002] UKHL 22; [2002] 3 WLR 89. [194] Ipp Report, above n12 at 7.33.
[195] Carr, above n16.
[196] Id at 7.36 and 733.
[197] CLA, s3B(1)(b). [198] (1997) 141 ALR 618 at 634–635, quoted in Robert Geddes,
‘Purpose and Context in Statutory Interpretation’, paper
at Bar Association of New South Wales conference, ‘Working With
Statutes’, March 18 and 19, 2005, Sydney at
9. [199] Ibid. [200] Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), ss 33,34. See generally Robert Geddes,
‘Purpose and Context in Statutory Interpretation’, paper delivered
at Bar Association of
New South Wales conference, ‘Working With
Statutes’, March 18 and 19 2005, Sydney at 7. [201] See also Patrick Parkinson, ‘Interpreting Statutes’ Tradition
and Change in Australian Law (3rd ed, 2005); Johan Steyn, ‘The
Intractable Problem of Interpretation of Legal Texts’ [2003] SydLawRw 1; (2003) 25 Syd LR 5
at 8. [202] Johan Steyn, ibid. [203] Ipp Report, above n12. [204] See useful summary by Prue Vines, ‘Faith, Hope and Personal Injury:
The Ipp Report and the Civil Liability Acts’ (2004)
1(1) Australian Civil
Liability Newsletter, Lexis Nexis Butterworths at 1. [205] See for example paras 10.3–10.8; or para 11.12: ‘courts often
seem to think…’ [206] Ipp Report, above n12 at para 1.36. [207] Robert Debus, above n158 at 13. [208] Steyn, above n201. [209] Attorney General of New South Wales, Position Paper on Civil Liability
(Personal Responsibility) Bill 2002 at 44. [210] For example, see the ‘Explanatory Memoranda Relating to the
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program’, Chapter 3 issued
by Treasury on
reforms introducing proportionate liability into federal statutes. [211] Jim Davis, Inquiry into the Law of Joint and Several Liability: Report of
Stage 1 (1994); Jim Davis, Inquiry into the Law of Joint
and Several Liability:
Report of Stage 2 (1995). [212] For example, the addition of the words ‘or jointly’ to the
definition of ‘concurrent wrongdoers’ in CLA
s34(2) makes
application to cases of joint liability under contract problematic. [213] See for example the recent case of McCracken v Melbourne Storm Rugby
League Football Club and Ors (2005) NSWSC 107, which dealt with the meaning of
s3B (1) (a) of the CLA. [214] Even where sections of one state act mirror a section in another state
act, each will have to be interpreted in the context of the
whole statute for
that state. [215] CLA, s3B(1)(a). [216] For example, see CLA, s3B(1). [217] See the contrasting views expressed in the New South Wales Court of
Appeal in Harriton, above n89. AustLII:
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLawRw/2005/22.html