Source: https://openjurist.org/965/f2d/436
Timestamp: 2019-01-22 08:33:46
Document Index: 464349901

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 922', '§ 3109', '§ 3109', '§ 3109']

965 F2d 436 United States v. Soria | OpenJurist
965 F. 2d 436 - United States v. Soria
965 F2d 436 United States v. Soria
965 F.2d 436
Julio Javier SORIA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 90-2692.
As Amended June 11, and June 19, 1992.
Soria was charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(c). Soria filed several pre-trial motions, including motions to suppress statements he made to the police and the evidence seized during the search of his home, to exclude evidence of the nature of his prior felony conviction, and to sever the firearms counts from the other counts. The district court denied the motions.
Soria argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his home because the executing officers failed to knock and announce their authority and purpose before entering. We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Somers, 950 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1067 (7th Cir.1990). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 1067 (citation omitted). We will accept the district court's findings of fact and determinations of credibility unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Somers, 950 F.2d at 1284.
"[F]ederal standards control the admissibility of evidence in a federal prosecution even though the evidence was seized [during the execution of a search warrant] by state officials...." United States v. Singer, 943 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir.1991). "[E]vidence seized by state law enforcement officers is admissible in a federal criminal proceeding if it is obtained in a manner consistent with the protections afforded by the United States Constitution and federal law." Id.; United States v. D'Antoni, 874 F.2d 1214, 1218 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 907 (7th Cir.1988).1 The fourth amendment, through the fourteenth amendment, demands that state officials act reasonably in conducting searches. Singer, 943 F.2d at 761; United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 844 (7th Cir.1985) (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963)).
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3109, a federal law enforcement officer is authorized to forcefully enter a private residence "to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant." An officer's failure to knock and announce his presence before entering will be excused if exigent circumstances exist to justify such an entry. Singer, 943 F.2d at 762. "[I]t is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant--subject of course to the general fourth amendment protection 'against unreasonable searches and seizures.' " Id. at 761 (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1693, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979)).
Detective James Cesar, who was in charge of the search, testified that the plain-clothes officer knocked on the side door of Soria's home in order to have it opened through a ruse. He stated that the officer was to have presented himself as a salesman to gain peaceable entry and to ensure the safety of the officers. See United States v. De Feis, 530 F.2d 14, 15 (5th Cir.) (entry by ruse or deception not violative of § 3109), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 92, 50 L.Ed.2d 95 (1976); United States v. Raines, 536 F.2d 796, 799-800 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 327, 50 L.Ed.2d 293 (1976).
In denying Soria's motion to suppress, the district court noted that while the proper procedure in executing a search warrant is "to loudly announce identity, purpose and authority while knocking on the door," it could not find that the search violated Soria's fourth amendment rights. We agree. The officers' duty was only to act reasonably in executing the warrant. See Singer, 943 F.2d at 761. They announced their authority and purpose contemporaneously with their forcible entry into Soria's home, which occurred only after there was no response to three intervals of normal knocking over the period of one minute. Although Detective Cesar testified that there were no exigent circumstances, he had information that Soria was the type of person that might be violent. Detective Cesar also stated that a ruse was used to enter Soria's home in order to gain peaceable entry and to ensure the safety of the officers. Strict compliance with the knock-and-announce rule may be excused where there is reason to believe that the executing officers would be in danger if a more reasonable entry was made. See Singer, 943 F.2d at 762 (citing Ker, 374 U.S. at 47, 83 S.Ct. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting)); United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 596 (3rd Cir.1983) ("[A] police officer's reasonable belief that announcement might place him or his associates in physical peril would excuse compliance with [§ 3109].").
Soria contends that the district court erred in refusing to grant him a new trial because several witnesses' statements were improperly admitted at trial. The decision to grant a new trial is a matter within the discretion of the district court and will be disturbed on appeal only if the district court abused that discretion. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 470 (7th Cir.1989). Similarly, in reviewing the district court's evidentiary rulings, we are limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion. United States v. Lennartz, 948 F.2d 363, 366 (7th Cir.1991).
Johnson testified that he knew that Soria was involved in drugs through "street talk." The district court sustained Soria's hearsay objection, and noted that it would instruct the jury to disregard the statement. Soria argues the district court never gave such an instruction. The district judge's statement that "I will instruct them to disregard the portion of the last response" was made while the jury was present. It can be inferred that the instruction was directed toward the jurors. Soria failed to make an additional objection at that time. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987). Because he did not do so, we review only for plain error, and we find no plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
It is presumed that the jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence unless there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be "devastating" to the defendant. Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 3109 n. 8. We have no reason to believe that either situation is present here.
Soria also takes issue with an officer's statements that Soria had told him that he was a convicted criminal, that he had "served some time," and that he was not supposed to possess a firearm. We review a district court's decision to admit evidence of a defendant's prior crimes for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 808 (7th Cir.1985). In determining whether evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible we apply a four-part test. Lennartz, 948 F.2d at 366. That evidence may be admitted where:
Id. (quoting United States v. Scop, 940 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.1991)).
As the district court noted in denying Soria's pre-trial motions, any prejudice could be cured by an instruction that the jury only consider the prior conviction as evidence on the firearms count. See United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 58 (8th Cir.1989). Soria submitted a proposed limiting instruction, but it was not given. On appeal, Soria argues only that he was prejudiced by the officer's statement. He fails to allege that the district court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction or whether he objected at trial. Therefore, the argument was waived. Fed.R.Crim.P. 30; United States v. Brothers, 955 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir.1992). Additionally, we find that there was no plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Brothers, 955 F.2d at 496.
Soria maintains that the district court erred in allowing the admission of his offer to a police officer to trade money and ten ounces of cocaine for a Corvette under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Rule 404(b) generally excludes evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts to prove that because the person committed the prior bad act, he likely committed the act at issue. United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1074 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 124, 112 L.Ed.2d 92 (1990).
The government offered the evidence of Soria's offer on the basis that it directly related to the conspiracy charge--i.e., the offer established Soria's knowledge and ability to obtain a large amount of cocaine in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Sophie, 900 F.2d at 1076 (Rule 404(b) does not apply where testimony is directly related to the charged offense); United States v. Hawkins, 823 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir.1987) (same); Chaimson, 760 F.2d at 805 (where specific intent is an element of the crime charged, evidence of other acts may be introduced to establish that intent).
Section 6A1.3(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that a court may consider any information for sentencing purposes "provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." United States v. Smith, 938 F.2d 69, 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 254, 116 L.Ed.2d 208 (1991). We will uphold a sentence pursuant to the guidelines if the guidelines were properly applied to factual conclusions that are not clearly erroneous. United States v. Baldwin, 956 F.2d 643, 646 (7th Cir.1992). We review for clear error a district court's determination of the quantity of drugs involved in an offense. Id.
In objecting to Johnson's reliability at sentencing, Soria asserted that Johnson's uncorroborated testimony about Soria's involvement in large-quantity drug transactions should not have been relied upon because the jury did not make any finding with regard to the amount of cocaine Soria possessed in convicting him of conspiracy. The quantity of drugs is not an element of that offense; therefore, it is not an issue for jury determination. United States v. Levy, 955 F.2d 1098, 1106 (7th Cir.1992). "[F]acts germane only to sentencing are resolved by the judge not the jury." Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 938 F.2d at 70). Moreover, the information that Johnson gave the police was not totally uncorroborated--a yellow purse containing several thousand dollars was recovered from Soria's home. The district court properly relied upon Johnson's testimony in sentencing Soria.
The government's suggestion that the admission of the money and handgun seized from Soria's home and his statements to the police were harmless error has some merit. There was substantial evidence aside from the evidence which Soria argues should have been suppressed that supported his drug trafficking activities upon which the jury could have relied on in convicting him, i.e., Johnson's testimony about several large quantity drug transactions in which Soria was involved and about Soria's possession of a handgun during a cocaine delivery. See Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 526, 112 L.Ed.2d 536 (1990); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a)