Source: https://casetext.com/case/dreger-v-new-york-state-thruway-authority
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 00:11:10
Document Index: 388477196

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 10', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 11', '§ 11']

Dreger v. New York State Thruway Authority, 81 N.Y.2d 721 | Casetext Search + Citator
Dreger v. New York State Thruway Authority
We reverse the order dated August 21, 2007, insofar as appealed from. A claim against the State is allowed…
Liddell v. State of NY
Claimant there sought similar relief pursuant to CPLR 205 (a) and Court of Claims Act Â§ 10 (6). The trial…
Full title:WALTER DREGER et al., Appellants, v. NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY…
81 N.Y.2d 721 (N.Y. 1992)
593 N.Y.S.2d 758
609 N.E.2d 111
In Dreger, this Court was faced with the question of whether an action brought pursuant to section 11 CTC of the Court of Claims Act had been properly commenced.
Summary of this case from Fry v. Village of Tarrytown
Decided December 16, 1992
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department, Condon A. Lyons, J., Louis C. Benza, J.
Lewis Stanzione, Catskill (Ralph C. Lewis, Jr., of counsel), for Walter Dreger and another, appellants in the first above-entitled action.
Saperston Day, P.C., Buffalo (Thomas F. Segalla and Peter L. Powers of counsel), for Patricia Charbonneau and another, appellants in the second and third above-entitled actions.
In each of these actions a claim against the State or the Thruway Authority was dismissed for failure to serve a copy of the claim on the Attorney-General in the manner prescribed by Court of Claims Act § 11 CTC. In Dreger, the claimant served the Thruway Authority but neglected to serve the Attorney-General. In Charbonneau and Dalton, copies of the claims were mailed to the Attorney-General but were not sent by certified mail as the statute requires. Because of these failures, the actions were subsequently dismissed and are now time-barred. Pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 CTC (6) and CPLR 205 (a), however, a party whose "timely commenced" action has been dismissed and is now time-barred may apply to the court for permission to recommence the action, provided the action was not dismissed for failure to prosecute or under other circumstances not relevant here. The question on appeal is whether these claimants failed to meet the statutory timely commencement requirement because of their failure to serve the Attorney-General properly.
The Court of Claims Act contains no recommencement provision of its own, but section 10 (6) expressly incorporates the time limitations and tolling provisions of CPLR article 2, and section 9 (9) requires that Court of Claims practice follow Supreme Court practice, unless other provisions are expressly made. Thus, these actions may be recommenced if they qualify for recommencement under CPLR 205 (a). Claimants rely on our decision in Finnerty v New York State Thruway Auth. ( 75 N.Y.2d 721), where we held that the requirement of service on the Attorney-General could not be waived by the State because it implicated subject matter jurisdiction. They contend that it has long been the rule that recommencement under CPLR 205 (a) or its predecessor is possible when a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was the basis for the dismissal of the prior action (George v Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170; Gaines v City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533). Inasmuch as Finnerty stated that failure to serve the Attorney-General resulted in a loss of subject matter jurisdiction, they contend they are entitled to seek recommencement of their actions.
Court of Claims Act § 11 CTC establishes a notice requirement in addition to that which may be applicable under other statutes: serving a copy of the claim or notice of intention on the Attorney-General, either personally or by certified mail with a return receipt requested (see, MacFarland-Breakell Bldg. Corp. v New York State Thruway Auth., 123 Misc.2d 307, affd 104 A.D.2d 139 [governmental entity separate from State must be served in addition to Attorney-General]). Under section 11, both filing with the court and service on the Attorney-General must occur within the applicable limitations period, and there is no basis for believing that the Legislature intended filing to independently constitute commencement. Because suits against the State are allowed only by the State's waiver of sovereign immunity and in derogation of the common law, statutory requirements conditioning suit must be strictly construed (Lurie v State of New York, 73 A.D.2d 1006, affd 52 N.Y.2d 849). Accordingly, where, as here, claimants have not met the literal requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 CTC, their actions are not timely commenced, and relief under CPLR 205 (a) is not available.
The Court of Claims Act has no analogue to CPLR 304. Nor does Court of Claims Act § 10 CTC (6) — which allows claimants to seek to file their claim "at any time before an action asserting a like claim against a citizen of the state would be barred under the provisions of article two of the civil practice law and rules" — incorporate the CPLR definition of commencement of an action, found in article 3. Thus, in contrast to the CPLR, the Court of Claims Act does not specify when an action is "commenced."
In Dreger, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of two suits in the Court of Claims because the method of service was regular mail. Failure to file with the Court and serve on the Attorney General are also jurisdictional defects warranting dismissal of the claim (Ivy v. State of New York, 27 AD3d 1190 [4th Dept 2006] ; Davis v. State of New York, 89 AD3d 1287 [3d Dept 2011]).
In Dreger, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of two suits in the Court of Claims because the method of service was via regular mail, not by certified mail, return receipt requested as is required by the Act.
Summary of this case from Johnson v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicle
In Dreger, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of two suits in the Court of Claims because the method of service was regular mail.
Summary of this case from Messam v. State
Summary of this case from Johnson v. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev. of N.Y.
Summary of this case from Evangelista v. State
In Dreger, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of two suits in the Court of Claims because the cases were initiated with service by regular mail, not certified mail, return receipt requested, as the Court of Claims Act (the "Act") provides.
Summary of this case from Igiehon v. Wind
In Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721 (1992), the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of two cases from the Court of Claims in which service was made by regular mail, rather than certified mail, return receipt requested.
In Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721 (1992), the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of two cases from the Court of Claims because service was accomplished by regular mail.
In Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721 (1992), the Court of Appeals held that lack of service of the Claim upon the Attorney General and failure to serve the Claims by certified mail, return receipt requested, meant that the Claims were not timely commenced for purposes of CPLR § 205(a) authorizing recommencement of an otherwise timely action that had been dismissed.
Summary of this case from Duncan v. State of New York
In Dreger v. New York State Thruway Auth., 81 N.Y.2d 721, 593 N.Y.S.2d 758, 609 N.E.2d 111 (1992), the Court of Appeals held that lack of service of the Claim upon the Attorney General and failure to serve the Claims by certified mail, return receipt requested, meant that the Claims were not timely commenced for purposes of CPLR § 205(a) authorizing recommencement of an otherwise timely action that had been dismissed.
In Dreger v. New York State Thruway Auth. (81 N.Y.2d 721), the Court of Appeals concluded that if a claimant has not met the literal requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11, the action is not timely commenced and CPLR 205 (a) relief is not available (supra, affg Charbonneau v. State of New York, 178 A.D.2d 815, affg 148 Misc.2d 891).
Summary of this case from Gurley v. State
In Dreger v. New York State Thruway Auth. (81 N.Y.2d 721, 593 N.Y.S.2d 758, 609 N.E.2d 111), the Court of Appeals concluded that if a claimant has not met the literal requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11, the action is not timely commenced and CPLR 205(a) relief is not available (id., aff'g Charbonneau v. State of New York, 178 A.D.2d 815, 577 N.Y.S.2d 534, aff'g.