Source: http://www.thecplrblog.com/cplr-6514/
Timestamp: 2018-01-20 20:42:30
Document Index: 2876023

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6514', '§ 6514', '§ 6514', '§ 3026', '§ 6514', '§ 5701', '§ 3026', '§ 6514', '§ 6514', '§ 6512', '§ 6512', '§ 6512']

theCPLRblog: CPLR § 6514
CPLR § 6514 and Fun With Constructive Trusts
CPLR § 6514 Motion for cancellation of notice of pendency
(b) Discretionary cancellation The court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it may require, may direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if the plaintiff has not commenced or prosecuted the action in good faith.
Maiorino v Galindo, 2009 NY Slip Op 06123 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
Inasmuch as the motion was made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704; Smith v Meridian Tech., Inc., 52 AD3d 685, 686). In general, it may be appropriate to impose a constructive trust in situations " [w]hen property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest'" (Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121, quoting Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 NY 380, 386). The necessary elements for the imposition of a constructive trust are: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2) a promise; (3) a transfer in reliance on that promise; and (4) unjust enrichment (see Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d at 121; Pereira v Glicker, 61 AD3d 948; Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d 32, 37). Here, the complaint does not adequately plead a cause of action to impose a constructive trust on the Bethpage property. While there was a confidential relationship between the plaintiff and Galindo as 50% shareholders in Demo, and Galindo and Madia may have been unjustly enriched by the alleged diversion of Demo's assets, there was no promise to either the plaintiff or Demo with respect to the Bethpage property and no transfer of that property in reliance on any promise. Indeed, there is no allegation that either the plaintiff or Demo had any preexisting interest or expectation of an interest in the Bethpage property. The complaint contains the plaintiff's acknowledgment that Madia borrowed the money using his own credit to pay for the purchase of the property, and it is not alleged that any assets of Demo or personal funds of the plaintiff were used in the purchase of the property (see Gargano v V.C. & J. Constr. Corp., 148 AD2d 417, 418—419).
Inasmuch as the cause of action seeking to impose a constructive trust on the Bethpage property was the only cause of action in the complaint that would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of that property, that branch of the defendants' motion which was to cancel the notice of pendency should have been granted (see CPLR 6514[b]; Shkolnik v Krutoy, 32 AD3d 536, 537; Distinctive Custom Homes Bldg. Corp. v Esteves, 12 AD3d 559).
August 09, 2009 at 06:15 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
CPLR § 3026; CPLR § 6514; 22 NYCRR 130-1.1; CPLR § 5701; Standing
CPLR § 3026 Construction
Congel v Malfitano, 2009 NY Slip Op 03122 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the challenged [*2]pleading is to be construed liberally (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Bernberg v Health Mgt. Sys., 303 AD2d 348, 349). Accepting the facts alleged as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the court must determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88; Bernberg v Health Mgt. Sys., 303 AD2d at 349). However, where, as here, the moving party has submitted evidentiary material, the court must determine whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he or she has stated one (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; Pincus v Wells, 35 AD3d 569, 570).
The defendant waived the defense of lack of standing by failing to raise it in his answer or in his initial moving papers to dismiss the complaint (see Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Mastropaolo, 42 AD3d 239, 242; Lewis v Boyce, 31 AD3d 395, 396). In any event, contrary to the defendant's contention, the plaintiffs possess standing (see Benedict v Whitman Breed Abbott & Morgan, 282 AD2d 416, 418; Shea v Hambro Am., 200 AD2d 371, 372).
However, the Supreme Court should not have awarded the plaintiffs costs and disbursements under CPLR 6514(c). CPLR 6514(c) authorizes an award of costs and disbursements if the cancellation of the notice of pendency is made pursuant to that section. Here, however, the Supreme Court invoked its "inherent power," and not CPLR 6514, to cancel the notice of pendency (see Nastasi v Nastasi, 26 AD3d 32, 36; 13-65 Weinstein, Korn, & Miller, New York Civil Practice: CPLR ¶ 6514.11 [2008]). Thus, the Supreme Court had no authority to award costs and disbursements under CPLR 6514(c) (see Ryan v La Rosa, 22 Misc 2d 125), and the plaintiffs never requested costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion. [*3]
In order to determine the amount of costs and disbursements to which the plaintiffs were purportedly entitled, the Supreme Court appointed a referee and directed the defendant to pay the referee's fee. Despite our conclusion that the hearing should not have been held in the first instance, it has already taken place. Accordingly, we direct the plaintiffs to pay one half of the referee's fee and the defendant to pay one half of the referee's fee.
(c) Appeals by permission
Robertson v United Equities, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 03149 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
The appeal from so much of the amended order as directed a hearing to aid in the disposition of the motion of the defendant United Equities, Inc., which was for an award of an attorney's fee and to impose a sanction against the plaintiffs and/or their attorney, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, is not appealable as of right, as it did not determine that motion and did not affect a substantial right (see CPLR 5701[a][2][v], [c]; Youngquist v Youngquist, 44 AD3d 1034, 1035), and leave to appeal [*2]has not been granted from that portion of the amended order. Furthermore, the appeal from so much of the amended order as, sua sponte, directed dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant United Equities, Inc., is not appealable as of right, as it did not decide a motion made upon notice (see CPLR 5701[a][2], [c]; Consolidated Resources, LLC v 21-220-230 Owner's Corp., 59 AD3d 579), and leave to appeal has not been granted from that portion of the amended order.
April 26, 2009 at 05:36 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
CPLR § 6514(a); § 6514(c); § 6512
(a) Mandatory cancellation
§ 6512 Service of Summons1
Deans v Sorid, 2008 NY Slip Op 08448 (App. Div., 2d)
The plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, to impose a constructive trust in her favor on certain real property formerly owned by her. She filed a notice of pendency on the property on April 12, 2007. On or about May 1, 2007, the defendant Harvey Sorid was served with four copies of the summons and complaint at the business office of all of the defendants. On May 4, 2007, the plaintiff mailed two copies of the summons and complaint to the business office, addressed to each of the defendants Jay Sorid and Susan Sorid (hereinafter together the appellants). The envelopes were marked "privileged + confidential."
The appellants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 6514(a) to cancel the notice of pendency and pursuant to CPLR 6514(c) for an award of costs, arguing that Harvey Sorid did not have an ownership interest in the premises and that service was not properly effectuated upon either of them within the 30-day time limit of CPLR 6512. The appellants did not challenge personal jurisdiction [*2]as it was undisputed that service was effectuated upon them in June 2007. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that Harvey Sorid had an equitable interest in the property and therefore service upon him was sufficient to avoid cancellation of the notice of pendency, and that, in any event, service had been effectuated on the appellants pursuant to CPLR 308(2) within the statutory time period. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the appellants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 6514(a) to cancel the notice of pendency and pursuant to CPLR 6514(c) for an award of costs. We affirm the order insofar as appealed from.
CPLR 6514(a) provides for mandatory cancellation of a notice of pendency if service of a summons has not been completed within the time period set forth in CPLR 6512, which is 30 days after filing of the notice of pendency. In multi-defendant cases, service is sufficient for purposes of CPLR 6514(a) if it is timely made on any one defendant with an ownership interest in the subject property (see Merchants Bank of N.Y. v Rosenberg, 31 AD3d 507; Weiner v MKVII-Westchester, 292 AD2d 597; Rabinowitz v Larkfield Bldg. Corp., 231 AD2d 703; Slutsky v Blooming Grove Inn, 147 AD2d 208, 212).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the defendant Harvey Sorid did not have an ownership interest in the subject property (cf. Merchants Bank of N.Y. v Rosenberg, 31 AD3d 507). Accordingly, service upon him was insufficient to meet the requirements of the statute.
However, for the purposes of CPLR 6514, service upon the appellants was timely effectuated pursuant to CPLR 308(2). While the envelopes mailed to their business office erroneously bore the legend "privileged + confidential" instead of "personal and confidential," under the circumstances of this case, where the defect does not implicate personal jurisdiction and no prejudice resulted from the mislabeling, the defect was properly disregarded pursuant to CPLR 2001 (see Patrician Plastic Corp. v Bernadel Realty Corp., 25 NY2d 599, 608; Matter of Perez v Villamil, 19 AD3d 501; Federal Loan Home Mtge. Corp v Torres, 238 AD2d 306, 307).
1. CPLR § 6512 reads:
A notice of pendency is effective only if, within thirty days after filing, a summons is served upon the defendant or first publication of the summons against the defendant is made pursuant to an order and publication is subsequently completed. If the defendant dies within thirty days after filing and before the summons is served upon him or publication is completed, the notice is effective only if the summons is served upon his executor or administrator within sixty days after letters are issued.
The emphasis and footnote are mine.
November 08, 2008 at 09:21 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)