Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95959/mississippi-valley-barge-line-co-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-05-24 03:49:53
Document Index: 465867251

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 418', '§ 15', '§ 2', '§ 153', '§ 500']

Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co Vs United States - Citation 95959 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/95959CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-30-1934Case Number292 U.S. 282AppellantMississippi Valley Barge Line Co.RespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:.....conclusion. p.
292 u. s. 286
3. order of the commission permitting lower rail rates on sugar, to meet water competition on the mississippi and ohio rivers,
supported by the facts set forth in its report.
4. the policy of congress with respect to rail and water transportation, as evinced by the transportation and the inland waterways transportation acts, does not mean that carriers by rail shall be required to maintain a rate that is too high for fear that, through a change, they may cut into the profits of carriers by water. the most that it can mean, unless, conceivably, in circumstances of wanton or malicious injury, is that, where carriers by land an water are brought within the range of the regulatory powers..... Judgment:
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States - 292 U.S. 282 (1934)
1. Findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission may not be assailed in a suit to set its order aside in the absence of the evidence on which they were made. This settled rule cannot be avoided by the submission of additional evidence in the form of affidavits. P.
2. It is not for a court to substitute its judgment for that of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the adjustment of a rate schedule; the judicial function is exhausted when there is found a rational basis for the Commission's conclusion. P.
4. The policy of Congress with respect to rail and water transportation, as evinced by the Transportation and the Inland Waterways Transportation Acts, does not mean that carriers by rail shall be required to maintain a rate that is too high for fear that, through a change, they may cut into the profits of carriers by water. The most that it can mean, unless, conceivably, in circumstances of wanton or malicious injury, is that, where carriers by land an water are brought within the range of the regulatory powers of the Commission, as,
in establishing through routes or joint rates, there shall be impartial recognition and promotion of the interests of all. P.
292 U. S. 288
5. The permissive minimum rail rate in this case, fixed high enough to more than pay the cost of service, involves no discrimination against the complaining water competitor. P.
been 56˘ per 100 pounds; the new one was 30˘ per 100 pounds for the 80,000 minimum and 39˘ per 100 pounds for the 60,000 minimum. Between New Orleans and St. Louis, the old rate of 52˘ became 28˘ and 34˘.
Protests against these changes having been filed by the appellant and others, the Interstate Commerce Commission proceeded to an investigation under § 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, and, in the meantime, ordered that the schedules be suspended. There were full hearings of the parties in interest, with testimony and argument. On July 3, 1933, the Commission found by its report that the respondents (the interveners in the court below) had justified the proposed rates with the 60,000 pound minimum. It found that they had not justified the proposed rates with the 80,000 pound minimum, but that they had justified rates 4˘ higher. "So far as the 80,000 pound minimum is concerned," the Commission said, "this means all-rail rates from New Orleans of 34˘ to Chicago and 32˘ to St. Louis." Sugar cases of 1933, 195 I.C.C. 127. The rail carriers accepted this proposal, and an amended order of the Commission gave approval to the schedules so revised.
The settled rule is that the findings of the Commission may not be assailed upon appeal in the absence of the evidence upon which they were made.
Spiller v. A. T. & S.F. Ry. Co.,
257 U. S. 114
257 U. S. 116
262 U. S. 324
Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. United States,
270 U. S. 287
. The appellant did not free itself of this restriction by submitting additional evidence in the form of affidavits by its officers. For all that we can know, the evidence received by the Commission overbore these affidavits or stripped them of significance. The findings in the report being thus accepted as true, there is left only the inquiry whether they give support to the conclusion. Quite manifestly, they do. The structure of a rate schedule calls in peculiar measure for the use of that enlightened judgment which the commission by training and experience is qualified to form.
Florida v. United States, ante,
292 U. S.
It is not the province of a court to absorb this function to itself.
I.C.C. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
227 U. S. 100
Western Paper Makers' Chemical Co. v. United States,
. The judicial function
is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body. In this instance, the care and patience with which the Commission fulfilled its appointed task are plain, even to the casual reader, upon the face of its report. The rates were not approved as the respondents had submitted them. For the 80,000 pound minimum, they were found to be too low. Not till there had been an increase of 4˘ per 100 pounds did the schedule win approval. There was a sedulous endeavor to guard against a rate war that would end in mere oppression.
Following this declaration, which is in the last title of the act, a duty is imposed upon the Secretary of War to do certain acts with the object of developing facilities for inland waterway transportation, and in particular to investigate the subject of water terminals both for inland waterway traffic and for through traffic by water and rail; to advise and cooperate with communities, cities, and towns, and to ascertain whether the inland waterways "are being utilized to the extent of their capacity" and are meeting the demands of traffic. By earlier sections of the act, § 418; 49 U.S.C. § 15(1-4), the regulatory powers of the Commission had been broadened in respect of through or joint rates for carriers by rail and water,
, and by the Inland Waterways Transportation Act as amended in 1928, these powers
had a new extension. Act of May 29, 1928, c. 891, § 2, 45 Stat. 978; 49 U.S.C. § 153(e);
For the determination of this case, there is no need to go into the question whether the declaration of the policy of Congress to foster rail and water transportation creates a new standard of duty for the Commission in the ordering of rates, or is a source of private rights if the duty is ignored. That question does not become important until the policy of the lawmakers appears to have been flouted, and here it was obeyed. The admonition does not mean that carriers by rail shall be required to maintain a rate that is too high for fear that, through the change, they may cut into the profits of carriers by water. The most that it can mean, unless, conceivably, in circumstances of wanton or malicious injury, is that, where carriers by land and water are brought within the range of the regulatory powers of the Commission, as,
in establishing through routes or joint rates, there shall be impartial recognition and promotion of the interests of all.
The appellant insists that it is fighting for its life, and that the effect of the new competition will be to drive it out of business. Nothing in the findings gives substance to the fear. There is significance in the fact that the Federal Barge Line, the leading carrier by water, submitted without protest. We do not overlook a sentence that the appellant has lifted from its setting and put before us as a finding. "If respondents succeed, the barge lines will be dealt a staggering blow." Taken by themselves, the words suggest a finding that the new schedules will affect the barge lines to the point of destruction, or something very near it. Read in the light of the context, they are not a finding at all, but a summary of the grounds of protest, an outline of the pleadings, or of what amounts to the pleadings before an administrative body. This being so, we do not now consider whether the destruction of a rival through the mere force of competition is legally a wrong, unless "disinterested malevolence" (
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank,
256 U. S. 258
), or something akin thereto, has supplied the motive power.
M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagen,
207 Mass. 394, 397, 93 N.E. 584;
Nann v. Raimist,
255 N.Y. 307, 319, 174 N.E. 690.
Nor is there substance to the contention that discretion was abused by denying a rehearing.
For the purposes of this appeal, we have assumed, as it was assumed in the court below, that the appellant has a standing sufficient to maintain the suit.
See, however, Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States,
. We have made a like assumption in answer to the argument of counsel for the railways that the order of the Commission
is negative in form and substance, and hence not subject to review.
. These objections to the suit coalesce to such an extent with the merits of the appellant's grievance under § 500 of the statute (Transportation Act 1920) as to make it unnecessary to separate them.