Source: http://openjurist.org/192/f3d/81
Timestamp: 2015-10-04 23:44:06
Document Index: 288371081

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 5', '§ 3553', 'art 2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5']

192 F3d 81 United States of America v. Jorge Rivera "G" Ralph Moreno Nelson Estremera Amador Rivera William Mendez | OpenJurist
192 F. 3d 81 - United States of America v. Jorge Rivera "G" Ralph Moreno Nelson Estremera Amador Rivera William Mendez HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series192 F.3d
192 F3d 81 United States of America v. Jorge Rivera "G" Ralph Moreno Nelson Estremera Amador Rivera William Mendez 192 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 1999)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee-Cross-Appellant,v.JORGE RIVERA, aka "G" or "Pekino," RALPH MORENO, aka "Ralphie," NELSON ESTREMERA, aka "Danger" and AMADOR RIVERA, aka "Beast," Defendants-Appellants,WILLIAM MENDEZ, aka "Pep," or "Pepperoni," Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Docket No. 97-1223No. 320 -- August Term, 1998
Argued: April 12, 1999Decided: September 14, 1999
Defendant-appellant Nelson Estremera appeals from a judgment entered following a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dorsey, J.).
Affirmed. LEWIS H. CHIMES, New Haven, CT (Garrison, Phelan, Levin-Epstein Chimes & Richardson, P.C., on the brief), for Appellant Nelson Estremera.
JOHN H. DURHAM, Deputy United States Attorney, New Haven, CT (Stephen C. Robinson, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, Peter D. Markle and Anthony E. Kaplan, Assistant United States Attorneys, Joel B. Casey, Paralegal Specialist, on the brief), for Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Defendant-appellant Nelson Estremera appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dorsey, J.), convicting him, following a plea of guilty, of one count of conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Estremera argues that when calculating his sentence, the district court erred by (i) failing to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines range by reason of Estremera's "violent and tumultuous childhood"; and (ii) departing upward as to the term of supervised release as a hedge against downward departures affecting the term of imprisonment.1
Section 5K2.0 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides the sentencing court with discretion to depart from the applicable Guidelines range if "'there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.'" U.S.S.G.§ 5K2.0, p.s. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). Section 5H1.3 cautions that "[m]ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range, except as provided in Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 (Other Grounds for Departure)." U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3. Estremera contends that § 5H1.3 leaves open the possibility of a downward departure by reason of abuse he suffered as a child, and he seeks a remand for resentencing on the ground that the district court misunderstood its power to grant such a departure. See United States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that district court's refusal to downwardly depart is appealable only when the court (i) misapplied the Guidelines; (ii) misapprehended its authority to depart; or (iii) imposed an illegal sentence).
We first consider the government's claim that Estremera forfeited his right to such a departure by failing to seek it at sentencing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 provides that, in order to preserve an objection for appeal, a party must "make[] known to the court the action which that party desires the court to take . . . and the grounds therefor." Fed. R. Crim. P. 51.2 We have held objections to be adequate under Rule 51 where they "fairly alert[] the court and opposing counsel to the nature of the claim." United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1990). "[T]o communicate the nature of a claim, a party does not have to present precise or detailed legal arguments." United States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Estremera's argument at sentencing did not employ the term "mental or emotional conditions," or cite § 5H1.3 for the proposition that a departure for such a condition may be available. However, he did detail the circumstances of his "violent and tumultuous" upbringing, which (he claimed) "led to his extensive criminal history and involvement in gangs," and he sought a downward departure on that basis under § 5K2.0 of the Guidelines.
We think that Estremera's assertions fairly alerted the district court and the government to the nature of his claim, i.e., that he was a candidate for leniency because he was warped by episodes of childhood abuse. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 180 ("Although appellant failed to couch his objection in the specific terms 'double jeopardy,' the nature of his argument fairly alerted both the court and the prosecutor to his constitutional claim. . . ."). We are reluctant to treat as forfeiture Estremera's invocation of § 5K2.0 (under which he sought relief), rather than § 5H1.3 (which, citing (inter alia) § 5K2.0, limits such relief to circumstances other than the ordinary). Moreover, "the responses of the court and the government indicate that they were cognizant of the nature of [the] claim." Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 180. We therefore conclude that Estremera preserved this argument for appellate review.
As noted, the Guidelines foreclose any downward departure for lack of youthful guidance. See U.S.S.G.§ 5H1.12 ("Lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds for imposing a sentence outside the applicable guideline range."). Several of our sister circuits have nevertheless held that a downward departure may be appropriate in cases of extreme childhood abuse. See United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Ci