Source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Heart_of_Atlanta_Motel,_Inc._v._United_States/Concurrence_Goldberg
Timestamp: 2019-01-22 10:41:04
Document Index: 15751923

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 201', '§ 5', '§ 201', '§ 5', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 1', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201']

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Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States/Concurrence Goldberg
926560Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States — Concurrence
Moreover, that this is the primary purpose of the Act is emphasized by the fact that while § 201(c) speaks only in terms of establishments which 'affect commerce,' it is clear that Congress based this section not only on its power under the Commerce Clause but also on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. [1] The cases cited in the Court's opinions are conclusive that Congress could exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to accomplish this purpose. As §§ 201(b) and (c) are undoubtedly a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power for the reasons stated in the opinions of the Court, the Court considers that it is unnecessary to consider whether it is additionally supportable by Congress' exertion of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
^1 Hearings in Congress as well as statements by administration spokesmen show that the original bill, presented by the administration, was so based even though it contained no clause which resembled § 201(d)-the so-called 'state action' provision-or which even mentioned 'state action.' See, e.g., Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 23, 27-28, 57, 74, 230, 247-248, 250, 252-253, 256, 259; Hearings before Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 151, 152, 186; Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1396, 1410; Hearings before House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 7152, as amended by Subcommittee No. 5, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 2693, 2699-2700; S.Rep.No.872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2. The later additions of 'state action' language to § 201(a) and § 201(d) did not remove the dual Commerce Clause-Fourteenth Amendment support from the rest of the bill, for those who added this clause did not intend thereby to bifurcate its constitutional basis. This language and § 201(d) were added, first, in order to make certain that the Act would cover all or almost all of the situations as to which this Court might hold that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applied. Senator Hart stated that not to do so would 'embarrass Congress because * * * the reach of the administration bill would be less inclusive than that Court-established right.' Hearings before Senate Commerce Committee, supra, at 256. See also id., at 259-262. Second, the sponsors of § 201(d) were trying to make even clearer the Fourteenth Amendment basis of Title II. See, e.g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee, supra, at 1413-1418; Hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee, supra, at 259-262. There is no indication that they thought the inclusion of § 201(d) would remove the Fourteenth Amendment foundation of the rest of the title. Third, the history of the bill after provisions similar to § 201(d) were added contains references to the dual foundation of all Title II provisions before us. See Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee, supra, at 1396, 1410; Hearings before House Judiciary Committee, supra, at 2693, 2699 2700; 110 Cong.Rec. 1925-1928.
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This page was last edited on 22 December 2017, at 00:32.