Source: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2012_11_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2016-06-29 20:02:29
Document Index: 17445683

Matched Legal Cases: ['§207', '§160', '§160', '§2', '§209', '§209', '§89', '§690', '§690', '§690', '§690', '§6301', '§3020', '§306', '§3020', '§1983', '§71', '§207', '§207']

TO RESEARCH NYPPL POSTINGS type in your key word or phrase in the box at the upper left and tap enter.N.B. “Cookies” provide a method for an Internet site to recognize a visitor and keep track of "visitor preferences." NYPPL does not use “cookies.” Google, its advertisers linked to this site by Google and others, however, may be using "cookies." A visitor's continuing to access NYPPL will be deemed to constitute the visitor's knowledge of, and the visitor's consent to, the use of "cookies" on NYPPL's LawBlog by Google, its advertisers and others. Friday, November 30, 2012
Newspaper reports admitted into evidence in an
administrative disciplinary proceeding
A volunteer firefighter filed an Article 78 petition
challenging the Volunteer Fire Company’s decision, to expel him from membership in the Fire Company following a hearing held pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-l.
The petitioner contended that the Fire Company had violated
§160.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which provides for the “sealing” of
certain record, when the Company admitted into evidence media reports related
to the petitioner's arrests or when it presented the testimony of a police
investigator who was involved in the relevant criminal investigations.
As to newspaper media reports concerning petitioner's
arrests, the Appellate Division, citing New York State Dept. of Mental
Hygiene v State Div. of Human Rights, 103 AD2d 546, 549, affd 66
NY2d 752, said that such newspaper reports are not "official records and
papers . . . relating to [the petitioner's] arrest or prosecution" within
the meaning of CPL §160.50(1)(c). Further, said the court, it is "
permissible to consider the independent evidence of the conduct [of the
petitioner] leading to the criminal charges." As to the testimony of the police investigator, the court
explained that the police investigator was "free to testify from
memory" concerning the conduct that led to the petitioner's arrests.”
The Appellate Division then stated there was substantial
evidence establishing that the petitioner had exhibited a lack of "good
moral character" in violation of Article II, §2 of the Fire Company's
Constitution and By-laws and had committed misconduct under General Municipal
Law §209-l". N.B. §209-l provides for the removal of volunteer officers and
volunteer members of fire departments charged with, and found guilty of,
misconduct or incompetence after a hearing. The decision is posted on the Internet at:
E-mails between a public employer and an applicant for
public employment may be subject to disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of
Hernandez v Office of the Mayor of the City of New York, 2012 NY Slip Op
08067, Appellate Division, First Department
Sergio Hernandez filed an Article 78 petition seeking a
court order annulling the determination of the Office of the Mayor of the City
of New York denying his requests under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
for certain e-mails sent from or “received by any government email accounts
assigned to the Office of the Mayor to or from Cathleen Black, at the time she
was a nominee for the position of New York City School Chancellor” and certain
Supreme Court directed the City to produce redacted copies
of such e-mails, which as the Appellate Division subsequently noted, were not exempt
from disclosure as inter- or intra-agency materials within the meaning of
Public Officers Law §89[2][g]. The City appealed the court’s order.
explaining that Black was not an agent of the City since she had not yet been
retained as Chancellor. In addition, said the court, Black was not acting
simply as an outside consultant on behalf of the City, but was a private
citizen with interests that may have diverged from those of the City.
Failure to correctly identify the court and the name of
the judge signing a search warrant a fatal defect
This LawBlog’s summary of Gusler v. City of Long Beach, USCA,
Docket #11-4493-cv [see http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2012/11/the-failure-to-name-parties-appealing.html]
noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, ruled that the failure to
correctly name the parties appealing a federal district court’s ruling was a
fatal jurisdictional defect.
In People v Gavazzi the defects challenged by Gavazzi
involved the name of the jurisdiction, the name of the court and the name of the justice signing a search
The Court of Appeals, Justice Smith dissenting, held that a
warrant to search Gavazzi’s residence in the Village of Greene, Chenango County, was defective as the result of the inadvertent typing of "Local Criminal
Court, Town of Broome, Broome County" at the head of the warrant instead
of "Local Criminal Court, Town of Greene, Chenango County." There is
no municipality of Broome in either Broome County or Chenango County and the
Village Justice signed the warrant without correcting the error. Further, said the court, the Justice’s signature on a line
marked "Signature of Judge or Justice” was illegible. The Appellate Division had held that the warrant did not substantially comply
with §690.45(1)* of the Criminal Procedure Law
because it contained "no information from which the issuing court can be
discerned" (see 84 AD3d 1427 at 1429). The Court of Appeals agreed with
the Appellate Division's analysis, explaining that a search warrant must contain
"[t]he name of the issuing court," again citing CPL §690.45 [1]).** Here, however, the Village Justice who signed the warrant
included no designation of his court, his signature was illegible, there is no
seal, and the caption referred to a nonexistent town.
In the words of the Appellate Division, "on its face
the warrant appears to [have been] issued by an unidentified judge in a
nonexistent court and town in a different county", concluding that the
warrant did not substantially comply with CPL §690.45(1).
The bottom line: evidence sized under color of
the warrant had to be suppressed.
* §690.45, in pertinent part,
provides that “A search warrant must contain: 1. The name of the issuing court
and, except where the search warrant has been obtained on an oral application, the
subscription of the issuing judge;"
** The Court of Appeals noted
that standard for adherence to the statutory requirement is "substantial —
rather than literal — compliance."
Supreme Court dismissed a former probationary employee’s
petition seeking to annul his termination from his position, the revocation of
his New York City Department of Education [DOE] teaching certification, his
placement of his name on the DOE's Ineligible/Inquiry list,* and his overall unsatisfactory rating for the
The Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s actions,
explaining that the probationer had failed to establish that his termination,
the revocation of his teaching certificate and his placement on the DOE's
ineligible/inquiry list, was done in bad faith.
Addressing the individual’s allegation of bad faith, the
court noted the
record contained evidence of good faith on DOE’s part. For example, said the
Appellate Division, the school principal’s "intention was not to terminate [the] petitioner's employment but to extend his probation for an additional year."
In addition, said the court, the record contained evidence of
deficiencies in individual's performance during the probationary period.
As to the individual’s challenge to the revocation of his
teaching certification and the placement of his name on the ineligible/inquiry
list, the Appellate Division ruled that those challenges were not untimely but
that Supreme Court had correctly sustained those administrative determinations.
Finally the Appellate Division pointed out that the lower court had correctly dismissed the individual’s challenge to his “U-rating” as it was premature
because he had not yet exhausted his administrative remedies.
Placing an individual’s name on the "Ineligible/Inquiry" list
maintained by the New York Department of Education bars that individual from
employment at any DOE school while his or her name remains on such list
[McPherson v. New York City Dep't of Education, 457 F.3d 211].
A tenured high school teacher alleged that the high school superintendent
neglected her duty to ensure the integrity of the school system by failing to
initiate disciplinary charges against the principal of the high school at which
The teacher alleged that he reported the school’s principal for alleged violations including failure to identify at-risk students as
required by Title I of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act (20
USC §6301, et seq.) and scoring irregularities on New York State
Regents mathematics examinations.
Following his reporting these alleged violations, the teacher
claimed that the principal retaliated against him by [1] placing several
disciplinary letters in his personnel file, [2] his being ordered to undergo
medical examination and [3] his removal from the school to a “temporary assignment
center.”* The teacher asked the Commissioner to remove the high school
superintendent and the Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education
from their respective positions because they failed to take disciplinary action
After considering a number of procedural issued, the
Commissioner said that the teacher’s application “must be dismissed on the
The Commissioner explained that a member of the board of
or regulation of the Board of Regents or Commissioner of Education.
The teacher alleged that the high school superintendent “neglected
her duty to ensure the integrity of the school system by failing to initiate
disciplinary charges against [the principal].” However, said the Commissioner,
the teacher s failed to meet his burden of proof as he did not establish how
the superintendent’s failure to file an Education Law §3020-a charge against
the principal, at his request, constituted a willful violation or neglect of
duty under the Education Law, requiring her removal under Education Law §306
nor did the teacher show that the superintendent “was under a legal obligation
to initiate Education Law §3020-a charges against [the principal].”
The Commissioner ruled that “On the record before me, I find
that [the teacher] has failed to demonstrate that [the high school superintendent]
has willfully neglected her duties [and] failed to establish any basis for [the
superintendent’s] removal” and denied the teacher’s application. * The teacher was later
restored to service at the school..
A school district may sue its board members, former board members, employees, and former employees for alleged mismanagement or
Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. v Barkan, 2012 NY Slip
Op 07652, Appellate Division, Second Department
The Roslyn Union Free School District initiated a lawsuit against
Michael Barkan, Karen Bodner, William Costigan, Mary Ann Combs Ronna Niederman,
Ellen Siegel, and Patricia Schissel to recover damages for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and negligence.
Supreme Court denied their respective
motions to dismiss the complaints insofar as asserted against each of them and they
appealed the Supreme Court’s ruling to the Appellate Division.
The Appellate Division sustained the lower court's decision, rejecting their argument that, in
the absence of specific enabling legislation, a school district may not
commence an action against current or former members of its board of education.
Citing a decision by the Court of Appeals in a prior appeal
in this action, Roslyn Union Free School Dist. v Barkan, 16 NY3d 643,
the court explained that the plaintiff here – the Roslyn Union Free School
District -- is a "corporation" and a corporation has the right to sue
Accordingly, said the court, the school district has the right to
prosecute an action "for injury and damages sustained by it by reason of
mismanagement or misconduct in its affairs, waste of assets, or derelictions in
duty by the directors, officers, agents or employees of the corporation."
Finding that the school district’s complaint “adequately
alleges causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty and
negligence,” the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal. The decision is posted on the Internet at:
information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P.
For the week of November 12 - 18, 2012 [Click on the caption to access the
full report]
DiNapoli: Improvements Needed At Saratoga
Auditors found lax spending controls at the Saratoga Housing Authority,
released Friday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.
DiNapoli: Schenectady’s Fiscal Condition
The City of Schenectady faces an unstable financial future, but increased
economic development and better long–term financial planning point to signs
of progress, according to an audit
issued Tuesday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.
DiNapoli: Dunkirk Mishandled Federal HUD
The City of Dunkirk spent more than $1 million from the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grant
program on unauthorized or questionable activities, according to an audit
issued Tuesday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. The findings have
been referred to HUD for further review.
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli last Friday announced his
office completed the following audits: Department
of Health; Division
of Housing and Community Renewal; Office
of Mental Health, Quality of Internal Control Certification; Office
of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation; Department
of Health Overpayments for Hospital Readmissions; and, Thoroughbred
Breeding and Development Fund.
Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and volunteers from the Comptroller’s
Office, along with family and friends, will deliver a semi–trailer
truckload of supplies to residents of Long Beach at 1 p.m. Saturday,
November 17, at the Long Beach Ice Arena as part of the Comptroller’s
Office’s Hurricane Sandy relief campaign. The Comptroller and staff
volunteers will unload the truck and assist the relief center with sorting
and distribution of the household and cleaning supplies. The Comptroller’s
Office continues to work with our partners in government to expedite the
approval of all storm related contracts and expenditures.
Springs Housing Authority criticized in audit
Audit Finds Problems In Dunkirk
Thruway toll hike on hold
Issued during the week ending November
16, 2012 [Click on the caption to access the full report]
Department of Health, Improper Payments
Related to the Medicare Buy-In Program (2010-S-76)
From March 2006 through February 2011, Medicaid made nearly 260,000 improper
payments, totaling about $26.8 million, for people enrolled in the Medicare
buy-in program. The improper payments included $21.1 million in Medicare
premiums for people who were ineligible for the buy-in program. This included improper
payments of $1.9 for 532 people who were deceased. The improper payments
resulted from insufficient DOH oversight, poor local district practices, and
weaknesses in certain Medicaid claims processing controls. Auditors recommended
DOH increase oversight of local districts, recover inappropriate Medicare
buy-in payments, and improve the Medicaid claims processing system to ensure
accurate payment of medical claims for individuals eligible for the buy-in
program. Division of Housing and Community Renewal,
Quality of Internal Control Certification (2012-S-31)
In 1987, the Legislature passed the New York State Governmental Accountability,
Audit and Internal Control Act requiring State agencies and public authorities
to institute a comprehensive system of internal controls over their operations.
By April 30 each year, DOB requires each covered agency to certify compliance
with the act. On April 26, 2011, DHCR submitted its annual Internal Control
Certification and reported full compliance with all provisions of the Act.
DHCR's internal control certification was submitted timely. However, auditors
identified several areas where the quality of the certification and/or the
actual internal control program could be improved. Office of Mental Health, Quality of Internal
Control Certification (2012-S43) See 2012-S-31 above for description of requirements
OMH's Internal Control Certification was submitted on time and generally
exhibited the necessary quality. Answers to most questions were complete and
responsive, and were supported by records and documents maintained by the
agency. However, OMH's certification did not provide sufficient detail in
describing the results of its reviews of high-risk activities. Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic
Preservation, Quality of Internal Control Certification (2012-S-49) See 2012-S-31 above for description of
requirements On June 25, 2012, Parks submitted its
annual Internal Control Certification and reported full compliance with all
provisions of the Act. Parks’ Internal Control Certification was submitted, 56
days after the April 30 deadline. Parks’ certification did not provide
the required level of detail, did not support some statements with sufficient
documentation, and was unable to provide evidence of the communication of the
Internal Control Officer designee to all staff. The office has not yet
completed a program of internal control review and its internal audit function
has not undergone an external quality assessment as required by professional
standards. Department of Health Overpayments for
Hospital Readmissions (Follow-Up) (2012-F-11) An initial audit report examined
whether the Department of Health (DOH) overpaid hospitals when the hospitals
readmitted patients they had recently discharged. The audit identified
overpayments totaling nearly $163,000 from a review of a judgmental sample of
claims from five hospitals. The hospitals have already refunded the
overpayments to Medicaid. The audit also identified four other hospitals with
questionable claims. In a follow-up report, auditors found DOH officials have
made progress in correcting the problems identified in the initial report. Of
the five prior audit recommendations, three have been implemented, one has been
partially implemented, and one is no longer applicable. Thoroughbred Breeding and Development Fund,
Selected Operating Practices (2011-S-36) The fund has been receiving the statutory
commissions due from the tracks, OTBs, and VLT operators. However, while
assessing the statutory commission rates due the fund, we found that the New
York Racing Association (NYRA) had shortchanged winning bettors by
approximately $7.4 million between Sept. 15, 2010 and Dec. 21, 2011. This
happened because NYRA was not complying with statutory retainage rates on
exotic bets. As a result of our finding, which was identified in December 2011,
an investigation was conducted by the NYS Racing and Wagering Board which led
to the firing of NYRA’s president/CEO and its senior vice president/general
counsel. Auditors found the fund improperly underreported statutorily
limited administrative expenses and promotional expenses by $399,908 for
calendar years 2009 and 2010.
Unless limited by the collective bargaining agreement, an
arbitrator has broad powers to fashion an appropriate remedy in resolving a contract
Westchester County Corr. Officers' Benevolent Assn. v County of Westchester,
2012 NY Slip Op 07307, Appellate Division, Second Department
An arbitrator issued an award that directed the Westchester
County Department of Correction to cease from denying correction officers the
use of a floating holiday or floating vacation day where the maximum allowable
number of correction officers who were permitted to take off from work on any
particular day had not been reached. When the Westchester County Corr. Officers'
Benevolent Association attempted to confirm the award, Supreme Court denied its
Article 75 petition.
The Appellate Division explained that "Courts are bound
by an arbitrator's factual findings, interpretation of the contract and
judgment concerning remedies," and a court may not "examine the
merits of an arbitration award and substitute its judgment for that of the
arbitrator simply because it believes that its interpretation would be the better
one," citing New York State Correctional Officers & Police
Benevolent Assn. v State of New York, 94 NY2d 321 and other decisions.
Further, said the court, even where an arbitrator makes
errors of law or fact, "courts will not assume the role of overseers to
conform the award to their sense of justice."
In contrast, while "judicial review of arbitration
awards is extremely limited," the Appellate Division noted that a court
may vacate an arbitrator's award where the arbitrator "exceeded his [or
her] power." Typically courts find that an arbitrator exceeds his or her
power where his or her award violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or
clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power.
In this instance the Appellate Division found that the
Supreme Court’s determination that the arbitrator had exceed a specifically
enumerated limitation on his power was incorrect.
The court noted that the collective bargaining agreement provides
that "[a] grievance dispute arising under any term of the Agreement
involving County policy or discretion may be submitted for arbitration only as
to the question of whether or not the County policy was disregarded, or was
applied in so discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious a manner as to
constitute an abuse of discretion." However, said the Appellate Division, this
provision “does not contain any limitation upon the arbitrator's power to
fashion an appropriate remedy where he or she determines that a County policy
has been applied in so discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious a manner as to
constitute an abuse of discretion.”
Here, the arbitrator determined that a policy of the
Westchester County Department of Correction that permitted only one correction
officer per day to use a floating holiday or vacation day was applied in an
arbitrary manner to the named grievant. As the collective bargaining agreement did not set out any limitation
on the arbitrator's power to award relief upon making such a finding, the court
ruled that the arbitrator had not exceed his power by “directing the Department
to cease and desist from denying correction officers the use of a floating
holiday or floating vacation day where the maximum allowable number of
correction officers who were permitted to take off from work on any particular
day, as determined by the Department, has not been reached.” The decision is posted on the Internet at:
Recommended penalty for firefighter who tested positive for
cocaine: termination in a random drug test
A firefighter who tested positive for cocaine in a random
workplace drug test failed to demonstrate that he consumed the cocaine
unknowingly. OATH Administrative Law Judge Tynia D. Richard did not find
the firefighter’s explanation – a supposition that three strange women had
surreptitiously drugged him while they drank together on a ski vacation in Lake
Placid – to be credible. The firefighter’s testimony concerning injuries that he
suffered before and after the positive drug test in an effort to mitigate the
proposed penalty failed to persuade the Administrative Law Judge. In the words
of Judge Richard: [The Department] seeks [the firefighter’s] termination,
citing the Department’s zero-tolerance policy. [The firefighter] seeks to
mitigate on the basis of injuries he sustained while working as a firefighter,
including some that occurred after his positive drug test while working for the
Department on light duty. I did not find such mitigation.”
ALJ Richard recommended termination of his employment. The
The “continuing jurisdiction” of the arbitrator once a
final determination is made is not automatic
New York State Dept. of Corr. Servs. (New York State Corr.
Officers & Police Benevolent Assn., Inc.), 2012 NY Slip Op 07242, Appellate
Upon the conclusion of a disciplinary arbitration the arbitrator found the
employee guilty of certain charges and made an “interim award,” imposing a
penalty of suspension without pay for 45 days and directing that the employee
“otherwise be made whole.”
The final award mirrored the arbitrator's interim award but
further provided that the arbitrator was "maintain[ing] jurisdiction . . . in the
event that any dispute [arose] between the parties over the implementation of
[the] [a]ward."
After the employee returned to work he filed a grievance
alleging that the Department of Correctional Services*
had not restored all of the back pay, time accruals and other benefits due him
as directed by arbitration award.
Ultimately it appears that the employee’s union, the New York
State Corr. Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. [NYSCOPBA] asked the
arbitrator to reopen the arbitration to ascertain whether employee had been
made whole pursuant to the terms of his award. A hearing date was
scheduled, but the Department, contending that the arbitrator was powerless to,
among other things, reopen, modify or explain the prior award, objected. Notwithstanding the Department’s objection, the arbitrator
conducted a hearing in which only NYSCOPBA participated and subsequently awarded
the employee approximately $4,000 in vacation and holiday accruals. The Department filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of
the Civil Practice Law and Rules seeking to vacate the award upon the ground
that the arbitrator exceeded his power in reopening the proceeding. In
rebuttal, NYSCOPBA argued that the Department had waived its right to seek
vacatur of the award and cross-moved to confirm the award. Supreme Court granted the Department’s application, vacating
the award whereupon NYSCOPBA appealed contending that the Department “waived
[its] opportunity to vacate the [challenged] arbitration award by, among other
things, failing to challenge the arbitrator's assertion of continuing
jurisdiction and/or participating in the [challenged] arbitration hearing."
The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling,
rejecting NYSCOPBA’s argument that the Department had waived any of its rights. The court explained that the Department was “not immediately aggrieved by the
arbitrator's purported retention of jurisdiction, the exercise of which
admittedly was conditioned upon a future … entirely theoretical dispute between
the parties as to the subsequent implementation of the award.”
Further, said the Appellate Division, while NYSCOPBA is
correct that "a party that participates in the arbitration may not later
seek to vacate the award by claiming it never agreed to arbitrate the dispute
in the first place," here the Department expressly objected to the proposed
hearing in writing, and it is undisputed that it did not attend in the hearing.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division said that it was satisfied that the
Department did not "actively participate [in the arbitration]."
As to merits of NYSCOPBA’s appeal, the court said that it is
well settled “that an arbitrator has broad discretion to determine a dispute
and fix a remedy, and that any contractual limitation on that discretion must
be contained, either explicitly or incorporated by reference, in the
arbitration clause itself.’
The Appellate Division said that the controlling provision
of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties specifically
provides that “[d]isciplinary arbitrators shall confine themselves to
determinations of guilt or innocence and the appropriateness of proposed
penalties . . . [and] shall neither add to, subtract from nor modify the
provisions of [the CBA]." Further, said the court, the CBA agreement
further provides that "[t]he disciplinary arbitrator's decision with
respect to guilt[,] innocence [or] penalty . . . shall be final and binding
upon the parties," which language “evidences a clear agreement by the
parties to the CBA to ‘limit the discretion of disciplinary arbitrators.’"
While there may be circumstances where an
arbitrator's retention of jurisdiction will be deemed permissible, in this instance the
Appellate Division concluded that “such circumstances cannot — in light of the
restrictive language of the underlying CBA — be said to exist here.”
Accordingly, court ruled that arbitrator's retention of
jurisdiction in this matter "clearly exceed[ed] a specifically enumerated
limitation [upon his] power” and the arbitrator's authority over the issues
submitted to him ended once he rendered his decision.
* The Department of Correctional Services is now
known as the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. The decision is posted on the Internet
Coollick v. Hughes,
USCA, 2nd Circuit, 10-5248-cv
The US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
Superintendent of the Connecticut Technical High School System was entitled to
qualified immunity in a §1983 action in which she was alleged to have deprived
the plaintiff of “sufficient notice” before the elimination of her position as
a guidance coordinator at a high school. The Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that in this instance the
Superintendent’s conduct, “even when viewed in the light most favorable to [the
plaintiff], did not violate the plaintiff’s clearly established rights."
The court explained that “Qualified immunity protects
federal and state officials from money damages and 'unnecessary and burdensome
discovery or trial proceedings.'” It, however, is an affirmative defense and the
federal or state officials being sued “have the burden of raising in their
answer and establishing at trial or on a motion for summary judgment.”
In determining if an official is entitled to a claimed right to “qualified immunity” the
courts apply the two-prong test set out in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808.
The first prong addresses the question of whether the
petitioner “stated a cause of action.” The second prong of the test asks did the “[g]overnment
official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the
challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he [or she] is doing violates that
In this instance the Circuit Court concluded that the
Superintendent’s action “were not objectively unreasonable in light of the law
that existed at the time of her conduct.”
Further, the Second Circuit said that it has held that when
a plaintiff is subject to a collective bargaining agreement that provides
adequate post-deprivation procedures, “such post-deprivation procedures . . .
are sufficient to satisfy due process” citing Harhay v. Town of Ellington Bd.
of Educ., 323 F.3d 206
The plaintiff , said the court, “utilized the grievance procedures
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement and received a favorable
decision" restoring her to the status she had prior to the Superintendent’s
actions and awarding her back pay and benefits.*
In any event, the court held that there was nothing “objectively
illegal, in a constitutional sense,” in the Superintendent’s action and
although she may have been incorrect in deciding that the plaintiff did not
have certain rights under the collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiff
was able to avoid any harm through the very grievance procedures in place to remedy
any such deprivation. Deciding that there was no constitutional bright lines transgressed
by the Superintendent in the course of her handling the plaintiff’s
termination, the Circuit Court ruled that the Superintendent was entitled to
Handbooks focusing on New York State and Municipal Public Personnel Law: The Discipline Book - A 458 page guide focusing on New York State laws, rules, regulations, disciplinary grievances procedures set out in collective bargaining agreements and selected court and administrative decisions concerning disciplinary actions and the termination of provisional and temporary state and municipal public officers and employees. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/5215.html A Reasonable Penalty Under The Circumstances - a 618-page volume focusing on New York State court and administrative decisions addressing an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/7401.html The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the relevant New York State laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions involving layoff and related matters. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/5216.html The Disability Benefits E-book: - This e-book focuses on disability benefits available to officers and employees in public service pursuant to Civil Service Law §§71, 72 and 73, General Municipal Law §207-a and §207-c, the Retirement and Social Security Law, the Workers’ Compensation Law, and similar provisions of law. For more information click on: http://booklocker.com/3916.html Are you an author looking for a publisher? For information click on the URL below: http://www.abuzzpress.com