Source: http://www.narf.org/icwa/state/california/case/au.html
Timestamp: 2014-11-23 20:51:29
Document Index: 131021786

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1901', '§ 294', '§ 372', '§ 1367', '§ 1902', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 294', '§ 1912']

ICWA Guide Online | California Cases Federal Resources | Resources by State | Cases A-Z (Cite as: 141 Cal.App.4th 326)
re A.U., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
U., Defendant and Appellant.
D047847.
Joanne D. Willis Newton, under appointment by the Court of
J. Sansone, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Paula J. Roach, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
Fabian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
U. appeals from a judgment terminating parental rights to her
daughter, A.U., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. FN1
contends the court violated her constitutional right to due process
of law when it appointed a guardian ad litem on
her behalf without first providing her with notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Sonia
also maintains that neither the court nor the social services
agency met its duty to inquire into A.U.'s American Indian
heritage, and that they did not provide notice to the
child's prospective tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
in accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (the ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.; § 294;
Rules of Court, rule 1439(f)).FN2
references are to the California Rules of Court.
hold that the court erred when it appointed a guardian
ad litem to act on Sonia's behalf without first providing
her with notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding
the appointment. We
reject respondent's*856
argument that evidence of mental illness supports a finding that
Sonia was incompetent. However,
because there is no suggestion in the record that the
error affected the dependency proceedings or that Sonia's counsel and
guardian ad litem did not protect her rights, we conclude
that the error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. We
also conclude that the ICWA notice was deficient. Accordingly,
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On
January 20, 2005, the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (the Agency) filed a petition under section 300,
subdivision (b), alleging that newborn A.U. was at risk of
serious physical harm or illness due to her mother's inability
to provide regular care. A.U.'s
mother, Sonia, had a history of mental illness and drug
abuse and was living in a residential care facility for
mentally disabled adults. Over
the previous 12 years, the Agency had removed five other
children from her custody. Sonia
was not aware of her pregnancy until she gave birth
to A.U. at the care facility. The
baby was detained in foster care after her release from
March, A.U. was placed in the home of a maternal
aunt (Aunt) who had been caring for three of A.U.'s
siblings for more than 10 years.
1993, the Agency removed Sonia's two children from her care
and initiated dependency proceedings. At
that time, possibly due to methamphetamine use, Sonia was experiencing
auditory hallucinations that told her to abuse her children. Another
infant was detained at birth in 1994. After
reunification services proved ineffective, the juvenile court placed all three
of these children in long-term foster care with Aunt in
1995. Two
other children, born in 1996 and 1998, were also the
subjects of dependency proceedings. They
were later adopted together by a nonrelative family.
Agency was unable to identify A.U.'s father from the limited
information Sonia provided.
the detention hearing, the court appointed an attorney from the
alternate public defender's office to represent Sonia, who was not
court advised Sonia's attorney to request a special hearing if,
after meeting with Sonia, her attorney believed that the appointment
of a guardian ad litem on Sonia's behalf would be
court deferred findings on the applicability of the ICWA, detained
A.U. in foster care, and ordered the Agency to provide
Sonia with supervised visitation and appropriate reunification services.
was not present at the February 10, 2005 jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
court continued the hearing at the request of Sonia's attorney,
who had not yet met with her. On
March 1, Sonia's attorney asked the court to appoint a
guardian ad litem for Sonia. She
reported that Sonia had made inconsistent statements about how she
wished to proceed, and that she was unable to provide
the name of her treating physician. Sonia's
attorney did not believe that Sonia could assist her in
determining how to proceed with the case. Pursuant
to her attorney's request, the court appointed a guardian ad
litem for Sonia and continued the hearing to April 4.
was not served with the appointment order.
did not appear at the continued jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Her
attorney requested a continuance because neither the attorney nor Sonia's
guardian ad litem had been able to meet with Sonia
before the hearing. The
court denied the *857
motion. Based
on the evidence submitted in the detention and jurisdiction reports,
the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the
allegations of the section 300 petition were true. The
court continued the disposition hearing to May 9.
the disposition hearing, the Agency requested that the court bypass
reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11).FN3
court took judicial notice of the findings of facts and
conclusions of law made in the dependency cases of A.U.'s
siblings and found that Sonia had not made a reasonable
effort to treat the problems that led to the removal
of A.U.'s siblings from her care. The
court denied Sonia reunification services and set a permanency plan
hearing under section 326.66.
specific circumstances apply, reunification services need not be provided to
a parent or guardian. Section
361.5, subdivision (b)(10), provides: “[T]he
court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or
half-siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed
to reunify with the sibling or half-sibling after the sibling
or half-sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian
pursuant to Section 361 and that parent or guardian is
the same parent or guardian described in subdivision (a) and
that, according to the findings of the court, this parent
or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to
treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling
or half-sibling of that child from that parent or guardian.”
361.5, subdivision (b)(11), provides: “[T]he
parental rights of a parent over any sibling or half-sibling
of the child had been permanently severed, and this parent
is the same parent described in subdivision (a), and that,
according to the findings of the court, this parent has
not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems
that led to removal of the sibling or half-sibling of
that child from the parent.”
May 11, Sonia's guardian ad litem filed a notice of
intent to file a writ petition under rule 38.1. The
alternate public defender's office contracted with outside associate counsel to
assist with the writ. On
June 13, associate counsel filed a letter with this court
stating that, based on his review of the record, there
were no viable issues for an extraordinary writ and that
no writ petition would be filed.
September 6, the Agency requested a 60-day continuance of the
section 366.26 hearing to investigate A.U.'s Indian heritage and to
provide proper notice of the permanency plan hearing to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and to any tribes. The
court continued the hearing to November 8. The
Agency reported that A.U.'s great-great-great grandfather was a member of
the “Huiechol”
tribe of Mexico. A
form attached to the report, Judicial Council form JV-135, stated
that the great-great-great grandmother's tribe was located in “Rio
Colorado-Fort Yuma, Santa Ysabel”
and that she had attended an Indian school in Banning,
California, in 1917. The
Agency mailed notice of the November 8, 2005 permanency plan
hearing to the BIA on November 4.
November 8, on behalf of the Agency, county counsel requested
a second 60-day
continuance in order to provide notice to the tribes located
in the areas mentioned in the Judicial Council form. The
court denied the motion and went on to find that
the ICWA did not apply because the only tribe that
was specifically identified was located in Mexico. On
Sonia's behalf, her attorney requested a trial on the Agency's
recommendation to terminate her parental rights.
its report prepared for the permanency plan hearing pursuant to
section 366.26, the Agency reported that A.U. was in good
health, and that she was meeting developmental milestones. She
showed signs of bonding with Aunt. A.U.
was attached to her three siblings who also lived with
Aunt. Aunt
loved A.U. She
wanted to *858
adopt her in the event parental rights were terminated. Aunt
planned to allow Sonia to continue to have supervised visits
with A.U. and her other children. In
addition to being specifically adoptable, the social worker opined that
A.U. was generally adoptable due to her age, good health
and appropriate development.
social worker believed that Sonia was seriously mentally ill and
unable to care for A.U. Sonia
had been hospitalized periodically due to her mental health condition.
suffered from extreme mood swings and resisted psychiatric treatment. Sonia
did not take her medication consistently. She
was unable to manage her own affairs and was dependent
upon a representative payee to ensure that she had appropriate
on Sonia's past history of services, the social worker concluded
that Sonia was unable or unwilling to improve her circumstances.
loved her children but lacked basic parenting skills. For
example, she had to be shown how to give A.U.
a bottle. On
another visit, Sonia laid A.U. on a couch and then
became distracted. The
social worker intervened to show Sonia how to keep the
baby from falling.
did not attend the permanency plan hearing. The
parties submitted on the report. Counsel
did not present any affirmative evidence on Sonia's behalf. The
court made the findings required under section 366.26 and terminated
parental rights. On
Sonia's behalf, the guardian ad litem filed notice of this
April 11, 2006, Sonia filed a motion requesting that this
court take judicial notice of the United States Department of
the Interior's lists of federally recognized Indian tribes and designated
tribal agents for service of notice, and an article about
the history of federally funded Indian schools. On
April 28 and May 24, the Agency filed motions to
augment the record
with a social worker's report dated May 24, 2005, and
a declaration of a superior court clerk.FN5
motions were untimely filed under rule 37.4(d)(2).
declaration of the superior court clerk was not filed or
lodged in the trial court and is not a certified
transcript or agreed or settled statement of oral proceedings not
designated under rule 4. (See rules 12(a) and 37.1.)
the appellate court the trier of fact is not the
solution.”...’
re I.G.
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 427; see
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 73 P.3d 541.)
we remand for compliance with ICWA, the Agency's motions to
augment the record and Sonia's request for judicial notice are
denied as moot. (See
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1225, fn. 1, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 281.)
Challenge To The Appointment Of A Guardian Ad Litem Is
Agency argues that Sonia's request for appellate review of the
appointment of the guardian ad litem is untimely and that
the issue should have been raised in a rule 38.1
writ petition. The
guardian ad litem filed a notice of intent to file
a writ petition on May 11, 2005. (See
rule 38.) However,
after reviewing the record, associate counsel did not file a
Agency contends that the issue is waived on appeal.
*859 The appellate courts have recognized the inherent conflict of interest between a parent who did not consent to the appointment of a guardian ad litem and his or her attorney who recommended the appointment, and have held that a failure to timely file a writ petition challenging the appointment does not preclude later review. (In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 (Jessica G.); In re Joann E. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 353, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (Joann E.).) This court recently recognized this principle in In re Enrique G. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 676, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 (Enrique G.).
as here, the parent's guardian ad litem filed a notice
of intent to file a writ petition challenging the referral
order to a section 366.26 hearing. After
review, counsel decided not to proceed with the petition for
writ. (Enrique
G., supra,
140 Cal.App.4th at p. 681, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 728.)
93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 and In
re Joann E., supra,
104 Cal.App.4th 347, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 189, the Enrique
court concluded that one could not expect the guardian ad
litem to seek review of the order appointing him and,
similarly, could not expect counsel to seek review of the
very order he requested. (Enrique
140 Cal.App.4th at p. 683, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 729.)
view of these inherent conflicts of interest, to insist that
a parent seek writ review when a guardian ad litem
is appointed or “lose
her right to later complain about a violation of constitutional
rights would itself pose constitutional issues.”
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1190, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714.)
Agency's contention that Sonia has waived further review of the
appointment of the guardian ad litem is untenable in view
of the fact that Sonia did not receive notice of
a hearing to appoint a guardian ad litem nor of
the appointment order itself. In
addition, the record shows that Sonia did not have adequate
notice of the procedures required to challenge the appointment of
the guardian ad litem. Associate
counsel did not represent that he spoke with Sonia (or
with the guardian ad litem) before deciding not to pursue
the writ. There
is no evidence that Sonia was informed of her right
to object or to seek review of the appointment. (See
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1190, fn. 1, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714
[even if the parent was adequately advised of the necessity
of writ review, the due process exemption applies].) This
issue is timely raised and Sonia has not waived appellate
Court Erred By Appointing A Guardian Ad Litem Without First
Providing Sonia With Notice and Opportunity to be Heard
Sonia contends that the appointment of a guardian ad litem without affording her prior notice and an opportunity to be heard violated her constitutional right to due process of law. (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 667, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 (Sara D.); In re Joann E., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 356-357, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 189; Jessica G., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1186-1187, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714.) The Agency concedes that the record does not contain any evidence showing either that Sonia consented to the appointment of the guardian ad litem or that she was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard.
We review constitutional issues de novo. (Vo v. City of Garden Grove (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 425, 433, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 257,)
any proceeding in which an incompetent person is a party,
that person shall appear by a guardian ad litem appointed
by the court in which the action is pending. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 372.)
the context of dependency proceedings, the test for incompetence is
whether the party has the capacity to understand the nature
or consequences of the proceeding and is able to assist
counsel in the preparation of the case. (In
re Christina B.
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1450-1451, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 (Christina
B.);
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714; see
Pen.Code, § 1367.)
effect of the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
a parent in a dependency proceeding is significant because it
removes control over litigation from the parent and vests it
with the guardian ad litem. (Christina
B., supra,
19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1453-1454, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 918; Jessica
93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1186-1187, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714; In
re Daniel S.
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 912, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 (Daniel
S.).)
guardian ad litem is given broad powers to control trial
tactics and the “procedural
steps necessary to the conduct of the litigation.”
D., supra,
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 668, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909.)
Courts have recognized that the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a dependency case deprives a parent of the right to control and participate in litigation affecting the fundamental parental interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of one's children. (Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 668, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909; see In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 223, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 337.) Consequently, unless the parent consents to the appointment, the parent must be afforded due process before the court may appoint a guardian ad litem. (Jessica G., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714; Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 912, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646.) It is axiomatic that the court may not divest a parent of a fundamental interest without first providing the parent with notice and an opportunity to be heard. (C.V.C. v. Superior Court (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 909, 915, 106 Cal.Rptr. 123; see, generally, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865; Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 658, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551; Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753-754, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599.)
order to “
provide the court with the most accurate picture of the
circumstances so it can make an informed decision,’
the parent must be afforded an opportunity to respond. (Jessica
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187-1188, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714, quoting Sara
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 672, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909.) A
hearing to determine a parent's competence need not be formal.
115 Cal.App.4th at p. 912, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646.) However,
at the hearing, which may be closed to other parties,
the court or counsel must explain to the parent the
purpose of appointing a guardian ad litem, the parent's loss
of authority over the litigation, the guardian ad litem's role,
and why counsel believes the appointment is necessary. (Jessica
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187-1188, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714.) At
the court should make an inquiry sufficient to determine whether
the parent understands the nature of the proceedings and can
assist the attorney in protecting his or her rights. (Ibid.,
citing Sara
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 672, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, italics added.)
this case, the court did not provide Sonia with any
of the procedural safeguards necessary to protect her due process*861
rights. On
March 1, 2005, in Sonia's absence and without prior notice
to her, the court appointed a guardian ad litem on
her behalf after the following exchange with her attorney:
COURT: [¶]
[Sonia's attorney], anything you want to pass on at this
point? One
of the things you were going to be alert to
is whether we needed a guardian ad litem and so
“[SONIA'S
ATTORNEY]: Yes,
spoke with my client on the 10th of February. She
made inconsistent statements about how she would like to proceed
in this case. She
was unable to provide me with the name of her-the
doctor that was treating her at the shelter where she
resides. I
do not feel that I can plan her case with
the assistance of my client. I
would be requesting the court appoint a [guardian ad litem]
COURT [ (to the independent contract office (ICO) attorney) ]:
this something you would be willing-
“[ICO
ATTORNEY]: You
know, Your Honor, I am kind of curious. CPO
is not on the case.
COURT: They
could-off the record for a moment. [¶]
Back on the record. In
response to [counsel's] comments I am appointing the ICO office
to serve as guardian ad litem for the mother.”
appointing a guardian ad litem for Sonia, the court relied
on the conclusory statements of her attorney, without determining the
factual bases or foundation underlying the statements. The
court did not know why or how Sonia was unable
to assist her attorney in protecting her interests. (Sara
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 674, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909.) The
court was informed that Sonia was conflicted regarding the desired
outcome of the dependency proceedings, that she disliked court proceedings,
and that she was unable to remember a doctor's name;
those facts do not go to whether she understood the
nature of the proceedings and could assist her attorney in
is no evidence that Sonia consented to the court's appointment
of a guardian ad litem. She
was not provided with notice of the proceeding, nor was
she given an opportunity to respond. Her
attorney did not represent to the court that she had
advised Sonia of the purpose for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, the guardian's role in controlling litigation or
that the appointment would result
in the loss of Sonia's authority to make important decisions
affecting her fundamental interest in parenting her child. The
court thus had an obligation to ensure that Sonia was
advised of the consequences of the appointment of a guardian
ad litem before making the appointment. The
record shows that the court did not make the requisite
advisements, and did not inquire as to whether Sonia understood
the nature of the proceedings and could assist counsel in
protecting her rights. (Jessica
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 citing Sara
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 672, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909.).
Erroneous Appointment of the Guardian Ad Litem Was Harmless Beyond
argues that the erroneous appointment of a guardian ad litem
constitutes “structural
requiring automatic reversal of the order appointing the guardian ad
litem and all subsequent orders in the dependency case. (See
(1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309-311, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d
302; Judith
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, *862
556-557, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 14.) She
concedes that there is a split of authority in the
appellate courts as to whether the erroneous appointment of a
guardian ad litem for a parent in dependency proceedings constitutes
a structural error requiring automatic reversal or whether it is
a trial error subject to a harmless error analysis. (See
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705
re Angela C.
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 389, 395, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 922.)
This court has determined that it will review the improper appointment of a guardian ad litem to determine whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Enrique G., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 685-86, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 731; Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 912-916, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646; see also Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 673, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 [“Reversal is not required if the violation of the appellant's due process rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”].)
Citing Jessica G., Sonia argues that the erroneous appointment of a guardian ad litem was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the court cannot know what the parent might have done or suggested to her attorney if the guardian ad litem had been appointed. (Jessica G., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1189, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714.) However, Sonia does not support her claim with specific references to the record. Without any basis in the record to support a conclusion that the parent might have taken a course of action different from that taken by the guardian ad litem, we would have to conclude that the error was structural in order to reverse.FN6
court in In
re C.G.
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 27, 34, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 872, concluded that
that the erroneous appointment of a guardian ad litem for
a parent in a dependency case constituted structural error.
example of the application of the Chapman
harmless error analysis to the erroneous appointment of a guardian
ad litem is found in Sara
in which the appellate court concluded that the appointment was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In
prior to the appointment of the guardian ad litem, the
parent contested jurisdiction and informed the court that three additional
witnesses, including the parent, would testify at the jurisdictional hearing.
court appointed a guardian ad litem before the hearing concluded.
the guardian ad litem was appointed, the parent's attorney and
the guardian ad litem agreed to submit to the court's
jurisdiction in exchange for what was essentially nothing more than
an agreement to conform the petition to the proof presented
at the earlier hearings. (Sara
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 673, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909.) Without
speculating on the substance or effect of the omitted testimony,
court determined that the testimony might have had an impact
on the court's decision, and concluded that the error therefore
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
similar situation occurred in In
104 Cal.App.4th at page 360, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 189, in which
the parent intended to call a witness who was not
called to testify after a guardian ad litem was appointed.
contrast to Sara
Sonia does not specify how or when the proceedings in
this case might have been impacted by the appointment of
a guardian ad litem. Sonia
did not appear at any of the hearings in A.U.'s
dependency case. She
told the social worker, “I
don't want to *863
go to court. I
don't like court.”
review of the record does not reveal any information that
would allow us to conclude that anything Sonia might have
done or suggested to her attorney would have been different
if the guardian ad litem had not been appointed. (See
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 673, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909.)
neither Sonia's counsel nor her guardian ad litem compromised her
fundamental rights. (Daniel
115 Cal.App.4th at p. 914, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646; see
19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1454, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 918.) On
the contrary, the record shows that they protected Sonia's rights
at each juncture throughout the proceedings. Sonia's
attorney repeatedly requested continuances because Sonia was not present and
enlisted Aunt's help to try to secure Sonia's appearance at
the jurisdiction hearing. Sonia's
attorney vigorously advocated that the court provide Sonia the opportunity
to undergo a psychological evaluation before the disposition hearing to
determine whether she would benefit from services. Despite
Sonia's statements suggesting that she was resigned to, and comfortable
with, A.U.'s placement in Aunt's permanent custody, her attorney requested
contested hearings at the jurisdiction, disposition and permanency planning stages
of the proceedings. In
addition, Sonia's appellate rights were preserved.
is nothing in the record to show how the erroneous
appointment of a guardian ad litem might have affected Sonia's
rights to participate in the proceedings, contest the state's position,
consult with her attorney, or receive the effective assistance of
counsel. We
conclude that under the circumstances in this case, the erroneous
appointment of the guardian ad litem was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See
140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 685-86, 686-87, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp.
731, 732.)
Court Will Not Infer a Finding That Sonia Was Incompetent
From Evidence of Mental Illness
The Agency contends that Sonia's mental illness constitutes substantial evidence that she was incompetent. In support of its position, the Agency details Sonia's mental health history as well as anecdotal evidence of her current condition.
reject the argument that this court can infer from evidence
in the record of mental illness that Sonia was incompetent
at the time the court appointed a guardian ad litem
for her. The
mere presence of mental illness does not mean that a
party is unable to understand the proceedings and to assist
counsel in the preparation of the case. (See, e.g., In
re Christopher I.
(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 568-569, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 122; People
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d
478 [“A
defendant must exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words,
or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on
the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense
counsel.”];
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 502, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 779.)
record contains little, if any, evidence of Sonia's mental illness
or its effect on her ability to understand the proceedings
and to assist counsel. Other
than Sonia's statement that in the past her condition had
been diagnosed as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and personality disorder, and
third parties' anecdotal observations of her “odd
and mood swings immediately after A.U.'s birth, the record does
not contain any current*864
information from qualified mental health professionals
about Sonia's psychological or psychiatric condition, nor does it contain
any evidence to support a conclusion that her mental health
rendered her incompetent. Under
these circumstances, we will not infer from evidence of mental
illness in the record that Sonia's mental health condition prevented
her from being able to understand the proceedings and to
assist counsel in the preparation of the case. (See,
re Christopher I., supra,
106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 568-569, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 122; People
v. Ramos, supra,
34 Cal.4th at p. 508, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d
trial court's findings that Sonia suffered atypical psychosis and borderline
personality disorder were made in 1993 and 1994; findings
made in 1996 and 1998 refer only to Sonia's “history
of mental illness.”
despite significant concerns about Sonia's mental health in the earlier
dependency cases, the minute orders from those cases indicate that
the court did not appoint a guardian ad litem for
Sonia in those proceedings.
Errors Require Reversal
1978, Congress enacted the ICWA in order to “protect
U.S.C. § 1902.)
meet Congress's goals, “[p]roceedings
result in an individual case contrary to those preferences.”
for State Courts, Indian Child Custody Proceedings (Guidelines) 44 Fed.Reg.
67584, 67586, § A(1)
(Nov. 26, 1979).) These
requirements include the duty to inquire into a dependent child's
Indian heritage and to provide notice to any tribe or
potential tribes, the parent, any Indian custodian of the child
and, under some circumstances, to the BIA. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a);
1439(d), (f); Guidelines,
44 Fed.Reg. at p. 67588, § B.5.)
Agency Performed Its Duty to Inquire Into the Child's Indian
federal guidelines and California law, the court and the social
services agency have an “affirmative
to inquire whether a child who is the subject of
dependency proceedings “is
or may be an Indian child.”
1439(d); Guidelines,
The Agency is charged with obtaining “all
possible information”
about the child's Indian heritage. (In
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 630, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 (Louis
contends that the Agency did not meet its duty to
inquire into A.U.'s Indian heritage. She
concedes that the Agency interviewed maternal relatives and obtained sufficient
information to complete the required form. However,
Sonia maintains that the Agency's inquiry was deficient because the
social worker summarized only A.U.'s Mexican Indian heritage in an
addendum report to the court, while information concerning A.U.'s American
Indian heritage was contained in the attached form JV-135 but
not included in the report's narrative summary.
record shows that the Agency interviewed several family members about
A.U.'s Indian heritage, completed the required form and presented it
to the court for review, albeit belatedly. We
presume that the court reviewed the form JV-135 as well
as the narrative in the addendum report. Therefore
the Agency fulfilled its duty of inquiry when it obtained
possible*865
about A.U.'s Indian heritage and presented the results of its
inquiry to the court. (Louis
117 Cal.App.4th at p. 630, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 110.)
to the Tribes Was Deficient
Sonia contends that notice to Indian tribes was deficient. We agree. The Agency must strictly comply with ICWA notice requirements. (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 470, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 688.) Title 25 of the United States Code section 1912(a) provides:
pending proceedings and of their right of intervention. If
given to the Secretary in like manner, who shall have
fifteen days after receipt to provide the requisite notice to
the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe. No
or the Secretary: Provided,
prepare for such proceeding.”
California law, notice must be sent when there is “reason
to believe the child may be an Indian child.”
1439(f)(5).) “[T]he
juvenile court needs only a suggestion of Indian ancestry to
trigger the notice requirement.”
(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 844, 848, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 256.) If
the tribe's location or identity cannot be determined, notice must
be given to the BIA. (25
U.S.C. § 1912(a);
1439(f)(4); Dwayne
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 255, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 639.)
November 8, 2005, at the scheduled permanency plan hearing, the
Agency realized that it had not provided notice to the
child's prospective tribes and requested a 60-day continuance in order
to provide proper notice. On
appeal, the Agency contends that it was not required to
provide notice to the tribes because it properly notified the
BIA. The
Agency argues that the responsibility to research and investigate the
identity of any tribe rests with the BIA, not with
position is untenable for two reasons. First,
as discussed, ante,
about a child's Indian heritage (see Louis
117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 632-633, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 110) and identifying
the child's tribe and prospective tribes whenever possible (see, e.g.,
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521, 550, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 530; Dwayne
P. v. Superior Court, supra,
103 Cal.App.4th at p. 257, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 639; In
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 737, 740, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 267.). The
Agency's duty includes researching the identity of tribes within a
specific location as well as the history of non-federally registered
tribes in the area to determine whether they have been
absorbed into a federally registered tribe. (See,
e.g., Louis
117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 632-633, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 110.)
Agency may contact *866
the BIA and/or any tribal entities if it requires assistance
locating or identifying the child's prospective tribe. FN9
233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1420, 285 Cal.Rptr. 507; Louis
observations of the Louis
court illustrate the extent to which a social service agency
must attempt to fulfill its obligation to identify the child's
tribe. “There
are eight recognized Apache Tribes, but the Chiricahua Tribe is
not one of them. (68
Fed.Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003).) The
social worker contacted the San Carlos Apache Tribe, presumably to
determine the affiliation of members of the Chiricahua Tribe. She
learned members of the Chiricahua Tribe had blended with the
San Carlos Apache tribe. If
all members of the Chiricahua Tribe had merged with the
San Carlos Apache Tribe, notice solely to that tribe is
sufficient. (25
1439(f)(3).) However,
the social worker did not represent that the San Carlos
Apache Tribe absorbed all members of the Chiricahua Tribe. Further,
the San Carlos Apache Tribe is located in Arizona, as
are the Tonto and White Mountain Apache Tribes. (68
Fed.Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003).) Minor's
counsel represents the three tribes live in close proximity. We
have no reason to doubt that representation. If
it is true, the social worker should have determined whether
any members of the Chiricahua Tribe were absorbed into either
the Tonto or the White Mountain Apache Tribes or confirmed
the San Carlos Apache Tribe absorbed all members of the
Chiricahua Tribe. Once
the social worker learns which tribe or tribes absorbed the
Chiricahua, she need notice only those tribes. (25
1439(f)(3).) If
the social worker cannot determine which tribes absorbed the Chiricahua,
she should give notice to the BIA and the tribes
she knows absorbed members of the Chiricahua Tribe. (25
100 Cal.App.4th [1,] 4, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) Serving
the BIA eliminates the need to serve the remaining Apache
Tribes. (25
1439(f)(4).)”
the BIA (or a tribe) for assistance in identifying the
child's tribe does not substitute for proper notice. (In
re Kahlen W.
(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 1422, 285 Cal.Rptr. 507; 25
1439(f)(4).)
in this case, county counsel asked the trial court to
continue the proceedings to allow the Agency sufficient time to
properly notify the prospective tribes. This
suggests that the Agency had the ability to identify and
notify the prospective tribes of the section 366.26 hearing. We
conclude that the Agency properly understood its obligation to inquire
into the identity of any “tribes
for membership”
and to provide notice to any prospective tribes. (Rule
1439(f)(3); see
25 U.S.C. § 1912.)
view the information contained in form JV-135 about A.U.'s American
Indian heritage and county counsel's representation to the court that
the Agency needed more time to provide notice to A.U.'s
prospective tribes, the court's determination that the Agency was not
required to provide notice to prospective tribes was error.
The Absence of a Determinative Response by the BIA, the
Court Erred When It Did Not Wait 60 Days before
Finding That the ICWA Did Not Apply
contends that the notice provided to the BIA was untimely.
Agency sent notice by registered or certified mail to the
BIA of the November 8, 2005 permanency plan hearing on
November 4. That
hearing was continued to November 22, without further notice to
the BIA. The
Agency did not file with the court the proof of
registered or certified mail, the return receipts, or any responses
from the BIA. (Rule
1439(f).)
record does *867
not reflect when the BIA received
notice of the dependency proceedings. (§
subd. (c)(3)).
1439(f) states in part: “The
parent or legal guardian and Indian custodian of an Indian
child, and the Indian child's tribe, must be notified of
the pending petition and the right of the tribe to
intervene in the proceedings, and proof of such notice, including
copies of notices sent and all return receipts and responses
received, must be filed with the juvenile court.”
1439(f)(6) states:
after a reasonable time following the sending of notice under
this rule-but in no event less than 60 days-no determinative
response to the notice is received, the court may determine
that the act does not apply to the case unless
further evidence of the applicability of the act is later
the absence of a determinative response by the BIA to
the notice sent on November 4, the court erred when
it found on November 8 that ICWA did not apply.
therefore remand the matter with the following observations:
satisfy the notice provisions of the Act and to provide
a proper record for the juvenile court and appellate courts,
[a social services agency] should follow a two-step procedure. First,
it should identify any possible tribal affiliations and send proper
notice to those entities, return receipt requested. (Rule
1439(f).) Second,
[the agency] should provide to the juvenile court a copy
of the notice sent and the return receipt, as well
as any correspondence received from the Indian entity relevant to
the minor's status. If
the same procedure should be used with respect to the
notice to BIA.’
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 702-703, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 54, quoting In
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 739-740, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 267.)
any dependency hearing concerning foster care or termination of parental
rights, the BIA is entitled to “fifteen
days after receipt to provide the requisite notice to ...
U.S.C. § 1912(a),
§ 294,
subd. (c)(3).) The
hearing shall not be held “until
at least ten days after receipt of notice by ...
(rule 1439(h); see
subd. (c)(2).) In
computing these periods, the day of the hearing is included,
and intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded. Legal
holidays include state holidays. (Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc., rule 6(a); In
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 12.)
this case, notice to the prospective Indian tribe or tribes
was not provided in accord with federal and state law.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a);
subd. (c); rule
1439(f).) We
are therefore compelled to reverse the judgment giving A.U. a
permanent home and to remand the case for compliance with
the requirements of the ICWA and with applicable state law.
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254-1255, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 427; see,
re Francisco W.
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 704, 711, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 171.)
judgment terminating parental rights is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the juvenile court, with directions that
require the Agency to give proper notice under applicable federal
and state law to any prospective tribes and the BIA,
and file with the court the notices, return receipts, and
any responses; (2)
vacate the appointment of the guardian ad litem for future
hearings in this matter; and
(3) hold a new permanency plan hearing under section 366.26
If, at the permanency plan hearing, the court determines that
ICWA notice was proper and no Indian tribe seeks to
intervene or otherwise indicates that the child is an Indian
child as defined by ICWA, the court shall reinstate its
findings and orders terminating parental rights. If,
on the other hand, an Indian tribe determines that the
child is an Indian child under ICWA, the court shall
conduct the jurisdiction, disposition, and all subsequent hearings in accordance
with ICWA and applicable state law.
CONCUR: BENKE,
Acting P.J., and HUFFMAN, J.