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United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 | Casetext
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U.S.Jun 30, 1975
506 F.2d at 896. In Hart II, after reconsidering its earlier judgment in light of United States v. Ortiz, 422…
In each instance whether the Fourth Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether a vehicle may be…
417 Citing cases
holding that officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences based on their knowledge and experience
holding that answers to police questioning may properly be taken into account in examining whether there is probable cause to search a vehicle
holding that the constitutionality of a checkpoint stems, in part, from the fact that “[a]t traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion,” thus offering greater protection to drivers' “liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials.”
Summary of this case from State v. Conner
The Fourth Amendment held to forbid Border Patrol officers, in the absence of consent or probable cause, to search private vehicles at traffic checkpoints removed from the border and its functional equivalents, and for this purpose there is no difference between a checkpoint and a roving patrol. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, followed. Pp. 892-898.
Charles M. Sevilla, by appointment of the Court, 420 U.S. 905, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John J. Cleary.
Sanford Jay Rosen filed a brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Border Patrol officers stopped respondent's car for a routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint on Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, Cal., on November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff'd, post, p. 916, to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), required probable cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints. We granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 824 (1974).
In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government's contention that the Nation's strong interest in controlling immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving patrols near the border. The facts did not require us to decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic checkpoints, which differ from roving patrols in several important respects. 413 U.S., at 273; id., at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring).
A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress in this and similar cases produced an extensive factual record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in southern California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62 air miles and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is on the principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint in a year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308, 312 (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca described the checkpoint as follows:
"Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow lights over the highway stating `ALL VEHICLES, STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE.' Three-quarters of a mile further north are two black on yellow signs suspended over the highway with flashing lights stating `WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS.' At the checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of California weighing station, are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended over the highway. These signs each state `STOP HERE — U.S. OFFICERS.' Placed on the highway are a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, standing behind a white on red `STOP' sign checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U.S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent building which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for nighttime operation." 368 F. Supp., at 410-411.
The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this checkpoint in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy traffic, and personnel shortages keep it closed about one-third of the time. When it is open, officers screen all northbound traffic. If anything about a vehicle or its occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carrying aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants about their citizenship. If the officer's suspicion persists, or if the questioning enhances it, he will "inspect" portions of the car in which an alien might hide. Operations at other checkpoints are similar, although the traffic at some is light enough that officers can stop all vehicles for questioning and routinely inspect more of them.
Such places typically include the trunk, under the hood, and beneath the chassis. If the vehicle is a truck, a camper, or the like, the officer inspects the enclosed portion as well. But an immigration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), the officer removed the back seat cushion because there were reports that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which the springs had been removed. Id., at 286 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The Government maintains that these characteristics justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic checkpoints despite the Court's holding in Almeida-Sanchez. It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that case. First, a checkpoint officer's discretion in deciding which cars to search is limited by the location of the checkpoint. That location is determined by high-level Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include the degree of inconvenience to the public and the potential for safe operation, as well as the potential for detecting and deterring the illegal movement of aliens. By contrast, officers on roving patrol were theoretically free before Almeida-Sanchez to stop and search any car within 100 miles of the border. Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.
These differences are relevant to the constitutional issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable also may limit police use of unnecessarily frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and investigation. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968); Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, at 771-772. While the differences between a roving patrol and checkpoint would be significant in determining the propriety of the stop, which is considerably less intrusive than a search, Terry v. Ohio, supra, they do not appear to make any difference in the search itself. The greater regularity attending the stop does not mitigate the invasion of privacy that a search entails. Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well. Where only a few are singled out for a search, as at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches especially offensive. See Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L. J. 1007, 1012-1013 (1968).
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint limits to any meaningful extent the officer's discretion to select cars for search. The record in the consolidated proceeding indicates that only about 3% of the cars that pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411. Throughout the system, fewer than 3% of the vehicles that passed through checkpoints in 1974 were searched, Brief for United States 29, and no checkpoint involved in Baca reported a search rate of more than 10% or 15%. 368 F. Supp., at 412-415. It is apparent from these figures that checkpoint officers exercise a substantial degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search. The Government maintains that they voluntarily exercise that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers should be free of judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed realistically, this position would authorize the Border Patrol to search vehicles at random, for no officer ever would have to justify his decision to search a particular car.
This degree of discretion to search private automobiles is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S., at 269-270; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). We are not persuaded that the differences between roving patrols and traffic checkpoints justify dispensing in this case with the safeguards we required in Almeida-Sanchez. We therefore follow that decision and hold that at traffic checkpoints removed from the border and its functional equivalents, officers may not search private vehicles without consent or probable cause.
The degree of the invasion of privacy in an automobile search may vary with the circumstances, as there are significant differences between "an automobile and a home or office." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S., at 279 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Not every aspect of a routine automobile "inspection," as described in n. 1, supra, necessarily constitutes a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. There is no occasion in this case to define the exact limits of an automobile "search."
The Government lists in its reply brief some of the factors on which officers have relied in deciding which cars to search. They include the number of persons in a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver and passengers, their inability to speak English, the responses they give to officers' questions, the nature of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into account in deciding whether there is probable cause to search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at 884-885, the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers. In this case, however, the officers advanced no special reasons for believing respondent's vehicle contained aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search invalid.
I wish to stress, however, that the Court's opinion is confined to full searches, and does not extend to fixed-checkpoint stops for the purpose of inquiring about citizenship. Such stops involve only a modest intrusion, are not likely to be frightening or significantly annoying, are regularized by the fixed situs, and effectively serve the important national interest in controlling illegal entry. I do not regard such stops as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, whether or not accompanied by "reasonable suspicion" that a particular vehicle is involved in immigration violations, cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873, and I do not understand today's opinion to cast doubt upon their constitutionality.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in the judgment.[fn*] [fn*] Page 899 [This opinion applies also to No. 74-114, United States v.Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873.]
Like MR. JUSTICE WHITE I can, at most, do no more than concur in the judgment. As the Fourth Amendment now has been interpreted by the Court it seems that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is powerless to stop the tide of illegal aliens — and dangerous drugs — that daily and freely crosses our 2,000-mile southern boundary. Perhaps these decisions will be seen in perspective as but another example of a society seemingly impotent to deal with massive lawlessness. In that sense history may view us as prisoners of our own traditional and appropriate concern for individual rights, unable — or unwilling — to apply the concept of reasonableness explicit in the Fourth Amendment in order to develop a rational accommodation between those rights and the literal safety of the country.
The Court today recognizes that as many as 12 million illegal aliens are now present in this country. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at 878, and n. 4. See also U.S. News World Report, July 22, 1974, p. 27; id., Dec. 9, 1974, p. 77. By all indications the problem will increase in the future, not abate. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402-403 (SD Cal. 1973). In the Baca case Judge Turrentine conducted a thorough review of the entire problem and the present Government response. Appended to this opinion is an excerpt from Judge Turrentine's Baca opinion describing the illegal alien problem and the law enforcement response.
Given today's decisions it would appear that, absent legislative action, nothing less than a massive force of guards could adequately protect our southern border. To establish hundreds of checkpoints with enlarged border forces so as to stop literally every car and pedestrian at every border checkpoint, however, would doubtless impede the flow of commerce and travel between this country and Mexico. Moreover, it is uncertain whether stringent penalties for employment of illegal aliens, and rigid requirements for proof of legal entry before employment, would help solve the problems, but those remedies have not been tried.
I would hope that when we next deal with this problem we give greater weight to the reality that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only " unreasonable searches and seizures" and to the frequent admonition that reasonableness must take into account all the circumstances and balance the rights of the individual with the needs of society. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); United States v. Biswell 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
The United States through legislative action has determined that it is in the best interest of the nation to limit the number of persons who can legally immigrate into the country in any given year. These controls reflect in part a Congressional intent to protect the American labor market from an influx of foreign labor. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 . . . (1929); § 201(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, as amended by the Act of October 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 911, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (a).
The increasingly large numbers of Mexican nationals seeking to illegally enter this country reflects the substantial unemployment and underemployment in Mexico — fueled by one of the highest birth rates in the world. Moreover, Mexican employment statistics are not likely to improve dramatically since fully 45 percent of Mexico's population is under 15 years of age and, therefore, will soon be attempting to enter the labor market.
The opportunities available to Mexican aliens have traditionally been in agriculture. While still true in many parts of the United States Southwest, in recent years the pattern has changed and more and more illegal aliens are obtaining employment in the service and manufacturing sectors of our economy. These aliens are increasingly found in virtually all regions of the country and in all segments of the economy. State Social Welfare Board. Issue: Aliens in California, 12 (1973) [Hereinafter cited as Aliens in California].
Illegal aliens pose a potential health hazard to the community since many seek work as nursemaids, food handlers, cooks, housekeepers, waiters, dishwashers, and grocery workers. Immigration and medical officials in Los Angeles, for example, have discovered that the illegal alien population in Los Angeles' barrio is infected with a high incidence of typhoid, dysentery, tuberculosis, tapeworms, venereal disease and hepatitis. L. A. Times, Sept. 16, 1973, pt. II, at 1.
This problem along the Mexican-American border has existed for some time with the original responsibility for securing the integrity of the border being assigned to the U.S. Army, along with the Departments of Treasury and Labor, who had about 20,000 men assigned to the border between Brownsville, Texas, and San Diego, California, in 1920. National Geographic Magazine, "Along Our Side of the Mexican Border." (July 1920).
In fiscal 1973 approximately 208,000 I-186 cards were issued and it is estimated that over two million such cards are currently in circulation. Hearings on Illegal Aliens, pt. 1, 173.
The Border Patrol agents have the power to apprehend illegal aliens since by regulation the Attorney General has designated Border Patrol agents to be immigration officers and authorized them to exercise powers and duties as such officers [ 8 C. F. R. § 103.1(i)]; immigration officers by statute § 101(a) (17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 911, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (17), are empowered, without a warrant, to stop and interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to remain or to be in the United States. See Au Yi Lau v. I. N. S., 144 U.S.App.D.C. 147, 445 F.2d 217 (1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 864 . . . .
Sec. 287(a)(3) of the 1952 Immigration Act provides authority for an immigration officer within a reasonable distance from the border of the United States to board and search any conveyance or vehicle; "reasonable distance" as used in that section of the Act means within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States, 8 C. F. R. § 287.1(b).
Immigration officers also are authorized to conduct inspection of aliens seeking admission or readmission to, or the privilege of passing through, the United States, and also are authorized and empowered to board and search any vehicle or like conveyance in which they believe aliens are being brought into the United States. Sec. 235(a) of the 1952 Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a).
While the Border Patrol would like to apprehend all deportable aliens right on the border by agents on the line watch, inspections at regular points of entry are not infallible and illegal crossings at other than legal ports of entry are numerous and recurring. The maintenance of continuous patrol over the vast stretches of the border in Southern California is physically impossible, since the approximately 145 miles of boundary creates geographic barriers to effective patrol and manmade devices such as fences and electronic devices are in large part ineffective.
Once the illegal alien gets settled in a big city far away from the border it becomes very difficult to apprehend him, and therefore, the Border Patrol attempts to contain the illegal entrant within this district. Aliens in California at 7. With this objective in mind, they have (pursuant to their statutory authority discussed above) established, since at least 1927, strategically located traffic inspection facilities, commonly referred to as checkpoints, on highways and roads, for the purpose of questioning vehicle occupants believed to be aliens, as to their right to be, or to remain, in the United States, and also to search such vehicles for illegal aliens. Immigration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol Handbook 9-1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Handbook].
When the checkpoints, whether permanent or temporary, are in operation, an officer standing at the "point" in full dress uniform on the highway will view the decelerating oncoming vehicles and their passengers, and will visually determine whether he has reason to believe the occupants of the vehicles are aliens (i. e., "breaks the pattern" of usual traffic). If so, the vehicle will be stopped (if the traffic at the checkpoint is heavy, as at the San Clemente checkpoint, the vehicle will be actually directed off the highway) for inquiries to be made by the agent. If the agent does not have reason to believe that the vehicle approaching the checkpoint is carrying aliens, he may exchange salutations, or merely wave the vehicle through the checkpoint.
In the United States, during fiscal 1973, approximately 55,300 deportable aliens were apprehended by Border Patrol agents working traffic checking operations. In the Chula Vista sector the number for that period was 21,232, while in the El Centro sector the total was 3,825. During fiscal 1973, a total of 4,975 of the above were visitors apprehended at the checkpoints and a majority of these were those who were in violation of the terms of temporary border passes (Form I-186).
The placement of the checkpoints and their operations are coordinated between the two sectors located in this district and with Border Patrol activities to the east in Arizona. In actual operation the checkpoints, be they "permanent" or "temporary," have the same basic accouterments. Typically, about one-half mile to one mile south of the checkpoint is the first notification that the checkpoint is ahead. The notice is in the form of a black on yellow sign indicated "STOP AHEAD" which has floodlights for nighttime illumination, Handbook at 9-9. Next, about 200 yards from the checkpoint is another sign cautioning the traffic to slow down or to be careful; this sign usually has flashing yellow lights attached. For the fifty yards directly south of the checkpoint there are placed traffic cones evenly spaced along each side of the highway. The actual checkpoint has a sign indicating to the traffic to stop, with official Border Patrol vehicles parked on each side of the stop zone showing the official Border Patrol emblem and/or the designation U.S. OFFICERS. At this point the agents assigned at the "point," in their official uniform, conduct checking and inspection operations. Beyond the checkpoint is usually a sign indicating "THANK YOU."
5. The cost of the transportation provided to the aliens is approximately $225 to $250 for each alien for the trip through the checkpoint on to the Los Angeles area. Since smuggling operations are almost exclusively "cash and carry" businesses and the average income among Mexican nationals who may wish to seek residence here illegally is quite small, this cost tends to act as a very significant deterrent in and of itself. The checkpoints are the major reason for such a high price and if they were discontinued for any length of time it would be one more encouragement to illegal immigration.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in the judgment.[fn*] [fn*] Page 914 [This opinion applies also to No. 74-114, United States v.Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873.]
Given Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), with which I disagreed but which is now authoritative, the results reached in these cases were largely foreordained. The Court purports to leave the question open, but it seems to me, my Brother REHNQUIST notwithstanding, that under the Court's opinions checkpoint investigative stops, without search, will be difficult to justify under the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion. In any event, the Court has thus dismantled major parts of the apparatus by which the Nation has attempted to intercept millions of aliens who enter and remain illegally in this country.