Source: http://dc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19990225_42028.DC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-07-23 04:36:26
Document Index: 330383208

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 22', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 558', '§ 558', '§ 23', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

MICHAEL A. DIAMEN, JOSEPH NICK SOUSA, AND JOSEPH WAYNE EASTRIDGE, APPELLANTS, APPELLANTS,v.UNITED STATES, APPELLEE. Before Schwelb and Ruiz, Associate Judges, and Kern, Senior Judge.
(Hon. H. Carl Moultrie, Trial Judge) (Hon. John H. Suda, Motions Judge)
Argued December 15, 1997 *fn1
Schwelb, Associate Judge: On January 6, 1975, following a five-week trial, appellants Michael A. Diamen, Joseph Nick Sousa, and Joseph Wayne Eastridge were convicted by a jury of first-degree murder while armed, D.C. Code §§ 22-2401, -3202 (1996), in connection with the stabbing death of Johnnie Battle. On March 16, 1979, appellants' convictions were affirmed by this court. Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
In April 1995, following earlier unsuccessful attempts by Eastridge *fn3 and Diamen *fn4 to have their convictions set aside, the three appellants filed a joint motion to vacate their convictions pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110 (1996). The motion was based on newly discovered evidence, and the appellants also claimed that the trial Judge had committed constitutional error at their trial by precluding each defendant from eliciting from any witness or co-defendant any evidence that would tend to inculpate any co-defendant.
The evidence adduced at the appellants' trial is set forth in detail in this court's opinion in Sousa, and we confine ourselves to a brief summary. The appellants, all three of whom are white, were members of a motor cycle club called the "Pagans." On November 1, 1974, several Pagans, including the appellants, went to the Godfather Restaurant on Wisconsin Avenue to continue a celebration of the birthday of one of the members of the group, a Pagan named Richard C. Richter. *fn5 The proprietor of the restaurant, who was familiar with Richter and his group, directed an employee to deny them service. As the Pagans left the restaurant, they encountered a group of young black men, including the decedent, Johnnie Battle. Insults and hostile words were exchanged, and a Pagan threw popcorn at one of the black men. The unpleasantness escalated into threats of violence, and Battle went to his car to arm himself with a handgun. As he was walking back towards the restaurant, Battle was confronted by several Pagans who were carrying knives. In an apparent attempt to take preemptive action, Battle shot and wounded one of the Pagans, Bruce Hunter. Battle continued to fire, but his pistol jammed, and he began to run. Several of the Pagans then pursued Battle, caught him, and stabbed him to death.
A short time after the murder, the three appellants and their co-defendant, Steven Jones, were apprehended by the police when Eastridge's car, which Sousa was driving, went through a red light. Jones had severe cuts on his hand, and blood was found on his clothing and on a newspaper in the vehicle. Small amounts of blood were found on the inside of Diamen's pants and on Sousa's shirt. *fn6 Several knives were recovered from the automobile and its occupants, and there was testimony, vigorously denied by Diamen, that Diamen had discarded another knife while the vehicle was being searched. According to the testimony of Dorothy Willetts, an associate of several of the Pagans, appellants Sousa and Eastridge, who had been released on bond, admitted to Ms. Willetts that they had participated in the killing of the decedent.
Testifying in their own defense, all three appellants denied any complicity in the pursuit of the decedent or in his murder. Jones also took the stand. Jones admitted that he chased Battle after Battle had shot Hunter. Jones claimed, however, that Battle had eluded him, and that he (Jones) did not participate in the killing and had no knowledge of it. All four defendants were convicted of first-degree murder while armed. The three appellants were sentenced to prison terms of twenty years to life, and each filed a timely notice of appeal.
On direct appeal, the convictions of Diamen, Sousa, and Eastridge were affirmed. *fn7 The court held that the trial Judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the appellants' motions for severance based, inter alia, on antagonistic defenses. Sousa, supra, 400 A.2d at 1042-43. *fn8 The court also "examined the multitude of other contentions made by appellants and [found] them to be without merit." Id. at 1038 n.1.
More than sixteen years after this court's affirmance of their convictions, the appellants jointly filed the § 23-110 motion which is the subject of the present appeals. They claimed that a six-year investigation conducted on their behalf by Centurion Ministries *fn9 has produced evidence exonerating the three appellants and identifying the "real" murderers. The new evidence adduced by the appellants consisted primarily of the following:
"1. an affidavit executed in December 1993 by the appellants' former co-defendant, Steven Jones, in which Jones admitted his own participation in the stabbing of Battle, *fn10 claimed that the three appellants were innocent, and asserted that his confederates in the killing were former Pagans Charles Jennings, John Woods, and a third man whom Jones declined to identify; it is undisputed, however, that Jennings and Woods are now deceased;"
"2. affidavits by three former Pagans who asserted, in 1993 and 1995 respectively, that Woods and Jennings, the two deceased men implicated by Jones, had both admitted their roles in the murder and had stated that the appellants were not involved; *fn11 these admissions by Woods and Jennings were allegedly made in the late 1970s;"
"3. an affidavit dated April 6, 1995, by John Gianaris, whom the appellants presented as a previously undiscovered eyewitness to the stabbing, and who stated, more than twenty years after the fact, that he saw "no more than four" men attacking Battle and that no car passed by the area at the relevant time; and"
"4. several affidavits expanding upon doubts cast at trial on the credibility of Ms. Willetts."
"The Court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of Justice . . . . A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within 2 years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending, only on remand of the case may the Court grant the motion." Super. Ct. Crim. R. 33. The appellants' motion was filed twenty years after they were convicted and sixteen years after the affirmance of their convictions.
Our local Rule 33 "is identical to the corresponding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure." Williams v. United States, 374 A.2d 885, 889 n.6 (D.C. 1977). It is therefore to be construed consistently with the federal rule and, in the absence of applicable local precedent, *fn12 we look to the case law construing Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. See Waldron v. United States, 370 A.2d 1372, 1373 (D.C. 1977).
"The time limitations of Rule 33 are jurisdictional. The court is without power to consider an untimely motion for a new trial." 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 558, at 360 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1998) (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Wright). Because Rule 33 requires that a motion based on newly discovered evidence be made within two years after final judgment, the court is without power to grant a motion filed after the expiration of that period. See, e.g., Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 470-71 (7th Cir. 1993); Jacobanis v. United States, 256 F.2d 485, 486 (1st Cir. 1958). The two-year limit is strictly enforced. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 409 (1993); United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Weinfeld, J.). A court is precluded from considering newly discovered evidence presented after the expiration of two years even where the court is convinced that "a grave miscarriage of Justice has taken place," Kaplan, supra, 101 F. Supp. at 11, and where "it is difficult to see how some of the vital evidence now presented could have been available to the defendant during the two-year period." Id. at 13.
Although this result may appear harsh, *fn13 see also Part IV, infra, there can be no doubt that it was intended by those who promulgated Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Prior to 1944, defendants in federal prosecutions "enjoyed sixty days from judgment to move for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and only three days otherwise." Smith, supra, 62 F.3d at 649 (citation omitted). Thereafter,
"[w]hen Rule 33 was adopted in 1944, the Advisory Committee recommended that time limits upon new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence be eliminated. The Committee and its supporters reasoned that a new trial should always be available when a criminal defendant can introduce new evidence tending to demonstrate his actual innocence. See 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 558, at 362-63 & nn.7-8. Although the Supreme Court rejected the Advisory Committee's proposal, and instead imposed a two-year limit on motions based on newly discovered evidence, the basic rationale for extending greater latitude to motions based on newly discovered evidence remains the same: to enable the district court to afford relief when new information bolsters a claim of actual innocence." Id. (emphasis added); see also Herrera, supra, 506 U.S. at 409; Kaplan, supra, 101 F. Supp. at 13-14. This history demonstrates beyond peradventure the Supreme Court's determination that a new trial may not be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence after two years have elapsed, regardless of any showing of actual innocence. *fn14 Indeed, it was for cases involving claims of actual innocence that Rule 33's two-year limitations period was purposely designed. *fn15
In the present case, the appellants predicated their motion on D.C. Code § 23-110, a provision which permits a defendant to file his motion "at any time," and not on Rule 33. They contend that the limitations of Rule 33 are not applicable, and that "the court below erred in concluding that appellants' failure to timely file a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 precluded it from entertaining a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence." But "[t]he nature of a motion is determined by the relief sought, not by its label or caption." Frain v. District of Columbia, 572 A.2d 447, 450 (D.C. 1990) (citation omitted). Insofar as the presentation of newly discovered evidence is concerned, the purpose of the appellants' motion is identical to that served by Rule 33. "By merely designating this a § 2255 motion, *fn16 the time constraints applicable to a motion based on newly discovered evidence cannot be so readily circumvented." United States v. Madonna, 556 F. Supp. 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y.) (citation omitted), aff'd, 697 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983); Guinan, supra, 6 F.3d at 470-71; United States v. DeCarlo, 848 F. Supp. 354, 355-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (Rule 33's time limits may not be avoided by styling motion as one for a writ of error coram nobis).
Moreover, the Supreme Court made it clear in Herrera that, even in capital cases, time limitations on motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence do not present a constitutional issue cognizable in habeas corpus. The Court pointed out that at common law, a new trial could be granted only during the term of court in which the final judgment was entered. 506 U.S. at 408. The Court also noted that a substantial majority of the states placed time limits on the filing of new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence; indeed, many of those limitations are substantially shorter than the District's two-year period. Id. at 410-11. *fn17 The Court was prepared to assume, for the sake of argument, that "in a capital case *fn18 a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." Id. at 417 (emphasis added). The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the lack of such a state remedy would be fatal, however, because Texas, like most jurisdictions, permitted the defendant to seek a pardon from the Governor, id. at 411, and because, according to the Court, "[h]istory shows that the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive clemency." Id. at 417. *fn19 Herrera thus holds that if the time for requesting a new trial has elapsed, the availability of discretionary authority in the Executive Branch to consider the defendant's newly discovered evidence and to grant him clemency *fn20 makes it constitutionally permissible to deny the defendant a further judicial forum without considering the merits of his claim of actual innocence. *fn21
The five defendants who were indicted as a result of the events of November 1, 1974 -- Diamen, Sousa, Eastridge, Jones, and Richter -- were tried together. In an apparent attempt to avoid a perceived or actual need for severance and multiple trials, *fn22 the Judge ruled, as we have noted, that no defendant would be permitted to elicit from any witness information which would tend to incriminate any other defendant. *fn23 The Judge also restricted arguments of counsel accordingly. The appellants contend that this ruling unconstitutionally impaired their right, protected by the Fifth Amendment, to present a defense. *fn24
This court has not definitively construed the term "special circumstances" as used in Doepel. In Peoples v. Roach, 669 A.2d 700, 702 n.5 (D.C. 1995), we suggested that "[s]uch special circumstances might consist of an intervening change in the relevant law." *fn25 In United States v. Palumbo, 608 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979), the court held that
in the absence of [1] newly discovered evidence that could not reasonably have been presented at the original trial, [2] a change in applicable law, [3] incompetent prior representation by counsel, or [4] other circumstances indicating that an accused did not receive full and fair consideration of his federal constitutional and statutory claims, a § 2255 petitioner may not relitigate issues that were adjudicated at his original trial and on direct appeal. Id. at 533 (footnotes omitted; bracketed numerals added).
An examination of the four "special circumstances" or "exceptions" identified in Palumbo reveals that none of them permits a trial Judge to disregard a ruling of the appellate court, or a successor division to second-guess a predecessor division's decision, simply because the trial Judge or the successor division disagrees with the earlier division's legal analysis and perceives a constitutional violation where the earlier division found none. *fn26 On the contrary, each Palumbo exception involves a circumstance which prevented the earlier division, through no legal error of its own, from correctly deciding the constitutional issue. In other words, the "special circumstances" must be such that, if the original panel had been apprised of them, its decision would have been different. See Minick, supra, 506 A.2d at 1117 (on collateral attack, the defendant must show that the initial ruling "is clearly erroneous in light of newly presented facts or a change in substantive law"). Any other reading of the phrase "special circumstances" would undermine the rule of M.A.P. v. Ryan, the doctrine of the law of the case, and the need for consistency which these rules represent. Indeed, if we were to adopt the appellants' argument, then a Judge of the Superior Court would be free to rule in 1996 that the Court of Appeals erred in 1979 when the appellate court decided, on the same record, the very question which is now before the Superior Court Judge. We know of no authority for such a startling proposition. *fn27
Of the four Palumbo exceptions, only the first -- newly discovered evidence -- has any possible application here. The appellants make no claim of a change in applicable law. *fn28 There is no allegation that their trial counsel were incompetent. *fn29 Finally, the appellants received a full and fair hearing on their ...