Source: https://casetext.com/case/huron-cement-co-v-detroit
Timestamp: 2019-03-25 16:49:37
Document Index: 427592000

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 391', '§ 391', '§ 391', '§ 390', '§ 392', '§ 392', '§ 392', '§ 391', '§ 391', '§ 1857', '§ 263', '§ 259', '§ 392', '§ 399']

Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 | Casetext
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Huron Cement Co.v.Detroit
U.S. Supreme CourtApr 25, 1960
362 U.S. 440•80 S. Ct. 813•
Argued February 29, 1960. Decided April 25, 1960.
In support of the claim that the ordinance cannot constitutionally be applied to appellant's ships, two basic arguments are advanced. First, it is asserted that since the vessels and their equipment, including their boilers, have been inspected, approved and licensed to operate in interstate commerce in accordance with a comprehensive system of regulation enacted by Congress, the City of Detroit may not legislate in such a way as, in effect, to impose additional or inconsistent standards. Secondly, the argument is made that even if Congress has not expressly pre-empted the field, the municipal ordinance "materially affects interstate commerce in matters where uniformity is necessary." We have concluded that neither of these contentions can prevail, and that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit application to the appellant's vessels of the criminal provisions of the Detroit ordinance.
The Detroit legislation also contains provisions making it unlawful to operate any combustion equipment in the city without a certificate, § 2.16, providing for an annual inspection of all such equipment used in the city, § 2.17, and further providing for the sealing of equipment in the event that the inspection requirements are repeatedly ignored, § 2.20. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the city has at any time attempted to enforce these provisions with respect to the appellant's ships. Accordingly, we do not reach the question of the validity of the inspection sections as they might be applied to appellant, but limit our consideration solely to what is presented upon this record — the enforcement of the criminal provisions of the code for violation of the smoke emission provisions.
The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting the health and welfare of the city's inhabitants. Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power. In the exercise of that power, the states and their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime activities, concurrently with the federal government. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia. 12 How. 299; The Steamboat New York v. Rea, 18 How. 223; Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352; Wilmington Transp. Co. v. California Railroad Comm., 236 U.S. 151; Vandalia R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 242 U.S. 255; Stewart Co. v. Rivara, 274 U.S. 614; Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79.
In determining whether the state has imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, it must be borne in mind that the Constitution when "conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce, . . . never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution." Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343; Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352; Boston Maine R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234; Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U.S. 528. But a state may not impose a burden which materially affects interstate commerce in an area where uniformity of regulation is necessary. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520.
For many years Congress has maintained an extensive and comprehensive set of controls over ships and shipping. Federal inspection of steam vessels was first required in 1838, 5 Stat. 304, and the requirement has been continued ever since. 5 Stat. 626; 10 Stat. 61; 14 Stat. 227; 16 Stat. 440; 22 Stat. 346; 28 Stat. 699; 32 Stat. 34; 34 Stat. 68; 60 Stat. 1097; 73 Stat. 475. Steam vessels which carry passengers must pass inspection annually, 46 U.S.C. § 391 (a), and those which do not, every two years. 46 U.S.C. § 391 (b). Failure to meet the standards invoked by law results in revocation of the inspection certificate, or refusal to issue a new one, 46 U.S.C. § 391 (d). It is unlawful for a vessel to operate without such a certificate. 46 U.S.C. § 390c (a).
These inspections are broad in nature, covering "the boilers, unfired pressure vessels, and appurtenances thereof, also the propelling and auxiliary machinery, electrical apparatus and equipment, of all vessels subject to inspection . . . ." 46 U.S.C. § 392 (b). The law provides that "No boiler . . . shall be allowed to be used if constructed in whole or in part of defective material or which because of its form, design, workmanship, age, use, or for any other reason is unsafe." 46 U.S.C. § 392 (c).
As is apparent on the face of the legislation, however, the purpose of the federal inspection statutes is to insure the seagoing safety of vessels subject to inspection. Thus 46 U.S.C. § 392 (c) makes clear that inspection of boilers and related equipment is for the purpose of seeing to it that the equipment "may be safely employed in the service proposed." The safety of passengers, 46 U.S.C. § 391 (a), and of the crew, 46 U.S.C. § 391 (b), is the criterion. The thrust of the federal inspection laws is clearly limited to affording protection from the perils of maritime navigation. Cf. Ace Waterways v. Fleming, 98 F. Supp. 666. See also Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450.
"[I]n recognition of the dangers to the public health and welfare, injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation, from air pollution, it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States and local governments in controlling air pollution, to support and aid technical research to devise and develop methods of abating such pollution, and to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to State and local government air pollution control agencies and other public or private agencies and institutions in the formulation and execution of their air pollution abatement research programs." 69 Stat. 322; 42 U.S.C. § 1857.
We conclude that there is no overlap between the scope of the federal ship inspection laws and that of the municipal ordinance here involved. For this reason we cannot find that the federal inspection legislation has pre-empted local action. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the teaching of this Court's decisions which enjoin seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501; Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598.
Compare, Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., where the Court concluded that "the [Locomotive] Boiler Inspection Act . . . was intended to occupy the field." 272 U.S. 605, 613.
An additional argument is advanced, however, based not upon the mere existence of the federal inspection standards, but upon the fact that the appellant's vessels were actually licensed, 46 U.S.C. § 263, and enrolled, 46 U.S.C. § 259-260, by the national government. It is asserted that the vessels have thus been given a dominant federal right to the use of the navigable waters of the United States, free from the local impediment that would be imposed by the Detroit ordinance.
The mere possession of a federal license, however, does not immunize a ship from the operation of the normal incidents of local police power, not constituting a direct regulation of commerce. Thus, a federally licensed vessel is not, as such, exempt from local pilotage laws, Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, or local quarantine laws, Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455, or local safety inspections, Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, or the local regulation of wharves and docks, Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559. Indeed this Court has gone so far as to hold that a state, in the exercise of its police power, may actually seize and pronounce the forfeiture of a vessel "licensed for the coasting trade, under the laws of the United States, while engaged in that trade." Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 74. The present case obviously does not even approach such an extreme, for the Detroit ordinance requires no more than compliance with an orderly and reasonable scheme of community regulation. The ordinance does not exclude a licensed vessel from the Port of Detroit, nor does it destroy the right of free passage. We cannot hold that the local regulation so burdens the federal license as to be constitutionally invalid.
The claim that the Detroit ordinance, quite apart from the effect of federal legislation, imposes as to the appellant's ships an undue burden on interstate commerce needs no extended discussion. State regulation, based on the police power, which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299; Lake Shore Mich. South. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 252 U.S. 23; Milk Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346; Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28.
Appellant has a federal certificate for each of its vessels — S. S. John W. Boardman, S. S. S. T. Crapo, and others. The one issued on March 21, 1956, by the United States Coast Guard for S. S. S. T. Crapo is typical. The certificate states "The said vessel is permitted to be navigated for one year on the Great Lakes." The certificate specifies the boilers which are and may be used — "Main Boilers Number 3, Year built 1927, Mfr. Manitowoc Boiler Wks." It also specifies the fuel which is used and is to be used in those boilers — "Fuel coal."
The federal statutes give the Coast Guard the power to inspect "the boilers" of freight vessels every two years, and provide that when the Coast Guard approves the vessel and her equipment throughout, a certificate to that effect shall be made.
Page 450 46 U.S.C. § 392.
Page 450 46 U.S.C. § 399 provides in part: "When the inspection of a steam vessel is completed and the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating approves the vessel and her equipment throughout, he shall make and subscribe a certificate to that effect."
Thus it is plain that the ordinance requires not only the inspection and approval of equipment which has been inspected and approved by the Coast Guard but also the sealing of equipment, even though it has been approved by the Coast Guard. Under the Detroit ordinance a certificate of operation would not issue for a hand-fired Scotch marine boiler, even though it had been approved by the Coast Guard. In other words, this equipment approved and licensed by the Federal Government for use on navigable waters cannot pass muster under local law.
The trial court in its opinion said: "It is agreed it is impossible to prevent emission of the kind of smoke prohibited by the smoke ordinance if the vessel is equipped with hand-fired scotch marine boilers. The Boardman has two boilers each with two doors and one steam air jet over each door. The Crapo has three boilers, each with two doors and one steam air jet over each door. The steam jets being installed at the suggestion of Benjamin Linsky, former Chief of the Bureau of Smoke Abatement for the City. "Testimony showed also that the plaintiff used a chemical in an attempt to reduce the smoke. Plaintiff urges it has done everything that it could possibly do with the equipment it has to prevent the emission of smoke. It was shown on trial that the fleet is subject to periodic inspection by the coast guard, which issues a search [ sic] of inspection. The Crapo in 1955, docked at Detroit twenty-two times for an average docking time of 23.9 hours and the Boardman docked at Detroit 25 times that year with an average stay of 16.2 hours. Both vessels were constantly engaged in interstate and foreign commerce during this period."
If local law required federally licensed vessels to observe local speed laws, obey local traffic regulations, or dock at certain times or under prescribed conditions, we would have local laws not at war with the federal license, but complementary to it. In Kelly v. Washington, supra, at 14-15, the Court marked precisely that distinction. While it allowed state inspection of hull and machinery of tugs over and above that required by federal statutes, it noted that state rules which changed the federal standards "for the structure and equipment of vessels" would meet a different fate:
"The federal and the state statutes are directed to the same subject — the equipment of locomotives. They operate upon the same object. It is suggested that the power delegated to the Commission has been exerted only in respect to minor changes or additions. But this, if true, is not of legal significance. It is also urged that, even if the commission has power to prescribe an automatic firebox door and a cab curtain, it has not done so; and that it has made no other requirement inconsistent with the state legislation. This, also, if true, is without legal significance. The fact that the Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority to the full extent conferred, has no bearing upon the construction of the Act delegating the power. We hold that state legislation is precluded, because the Boiler Inspection Act, as we construe it, was intended to occupy the field."
As we have seen, the Detroit ordinance contains provisions making it unlawful to operate appellant's equipment without a certificate from the city and providing for the sealing of the equipment in case of three or more violations within any 12-month period. The Court says that those sanctions are not presently in issue, that it reserves decision as to their validity, and that it concerns itself only with "the enforcement of the criminal provisions" of the ordinance. Yet by what authority can a local government fine people or send them to jail for using in interstate commerce the precise equipment which the federal regulatory agency has certified and approved? The burden of these criminal sanctions on the owners and officers, particularly as it involves the risk of imprisonment, may indeed be far more serious than a mere sealing of the equipment. Yet whether fine or imprisonment is considered, the effect on the federal certificate will be crippling. However the issue in the present case is stated it comes down to making criminal in the Port of Detroit the use of a certificate issued under paramount federal law. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, upheld the requirement of a state inspection certificate where a federal certificate might have been, but was not, issued. Cf. California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 112. Never before, I believe, have we recognized the right of local law to make the use of an unquestionably legal federal license a criminal offense.
What we do today is in disregard of the doctrine long accepted and succinctly stated in the 1851 Term in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 566, "No State law can hinder or obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act of Congress." The confusion and burden arising from the imposition by one State of requirements for equipment which the Federal Government has approved was emphasized in Kelly v. Washington, supra, in the passage already quoted. The requirements of Detroit may be too lax for another port. Cf. People v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489. The variety of requirements for equipment which the States may provide in order to meet their air pollution needs underlines the importance of letting the Coast Guard license serve as authority for the vessel to use, in all our ports, the equipment which it certifies.
Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, is not to the contrary. There a vessel enrolled under the laws of the United States was allowed to be forfeited by Maryland for dredging for oysters in violation of Maryland law. But the enrollment of vessels serves only a limited purpose. Smith v. Maryland, supra, was explained in Stewart Co. v. Rivara, 274 U.S. 614. The Court said, "The purpose of the enrollment of vessels is to give to them the privileges of American vessels as well as the protection of our flag." Id., at 618. Enrollment without more did not give the enrolled vessel a license to disregard the variety of pilotage, health and other such local laws which the opinion of the court in the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens. 12 How. 299 (written by Mr. Justice Curtis who also wrote for the Court in Smith v. Maryland), had left to the States to be obeyed by all vessels. The local regulations approved in the Cooley case never qualified the license to ply as a vessel nor penalized its movement on navigable waters. The federal license in the instant case, however, specifically describes the only equipment and fuel which these vessels are allowed to use, and Detroit is permitted to make their use criminal.