Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2001/08/00-2162.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:16:00
Document Index: 510482341

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 1533', '§ 1533', '§ 1540', '§ 1540', '§ 1540', '§ 1270', '§ 1540', '§ 3613', '§12205', '§ 1540']

00-2162 -- Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton -- 08/21/2001
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (37713 bytes) (39921 bytes)
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, a non-profit corporation,
GALE A. NORTON,(*) Secretary of the Department of the Interior,
Defendant-Appellee. No. 00-2162
(D.C. No. CIV-98-322-LH/JHG)
Matt Kenna, Kenna & Hickcox, P.C., Durango, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
On August 3, 1994, the Secretary published a proposed regulation to list the Arkansas River basin population of the shiner as an endangered species. See Proposed Rule to List the Arkansas River Basin Population of the Arkansas River Shiner as Endangered, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,532, 39,532 (proposed Aug. 3, 1994). The shiner is a "small fish found in the Canadian (South Canadian) River in New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas; and the Cimarron River in Kansas and Oklahoma." Id. Pursuant to § 4(b)(6)(A) of the Endangered Species Act (the "ESA"), the publication of the proposed rule triggered a one-year period by the end of which the Secretary was required to either: (1) publish a final rule listing the shiner as endangered or threatened, (2) publish a notice that the one-year period be extended, or (3) publish a notice that the proposed regulation be withdrawn. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(A)(i).
In the August 3, 1994 proposed rule, the Secretary made a finding that critical habitat for the shiner was not determinable. See Proposed Rule to List the Arkansas River Basin Population of the Arkansas River Shiner as Endangered, 59 Fed. Reg. at 39,532. This finding triggered a maximum two-year period within which the Secretary was required to issue a final critical habitat designation for the shiner. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A), (b)(6)(C). The Center contends that final agency action on listing the shiner should have been completed by August 3, 1995, and action on designating critical habitat for the shiner should have been completed no later than August 3, 1996.
As of May 13, 1997, the Secretary had not taken final action on listing the shiner or designating critical habitat. On that date, the Center submitted to the Secretary a sixty-day notice of intent to sue pursuant to 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(2)(C).(1) Ten months later, having received no response from the Secretary to the sixty-day notice, the Center filed an action against the Secretary under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (allowing citizen suits for injunctive relief). The Center sought, inter alia, injunctive relief requiring the Secretary to take final action on the proposed rule to list the shiner as endangered and to take final action on designating critical habitat for the shiner.
A court may award litigation costs, including attorney's fees, in citizen suits brought pursuant to the ESA "whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). The Supreme Court, interpreting identical language in the Clean Air Act, has held that "absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not 'appropriate' for a federal court to award attorney's fees . . . ." Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983). When there has been no adjudication on the merits, this court has held that a claimant seeking attorney's fees under 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d), a statute that also allows fees to be awarded when "appropriate," must demonstrate that it was the catalyst behind the change in the defendant's conduct. See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1486 (10th Cir. 1995). Although this court has never held that the catalyst test applies to fee requests pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4), both parties advocate its application and we thus assume, without deciding, its applicability.(2)
To prevail under the catalyst test, the claimant must show: "(1) that [the] lawsuit is causally linked to securing the relief obtained and (2) that the defendant's conduct in response to the lawsuit was required by law." Powder River Basin Res. Council, 54 F.3d at 1486 (quotation omitted). The Secretary concedes that she was required to take final action on the proposed listing of the shiner and, accordingly, does not dispute that the Center has successfully met the second part of the catalyst test. Thus, the only issue before this court is whether the Center's lawsuit was causally linked to the relief obtained.(3) This is a factual determination reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See Collins v. Romer, 962 F.2d 1508, 1511 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Manning v. United States, 146 F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 1998) ("A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the record or if the appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." (quotations omitted)).
The Center can establish a causal link between its lawsuit and the Secretary's action without establishing that the suit was the only reason the Secretary took final action on the shiner. See Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1989). The Center, however, must demonstrate that its suit was a "substantial factor or a significant catalyst" prompting the Secretary's action. Id. (quotation omitted). The Center vigorously argues that the chronology of events leading to final agency action on the shiner, standing alone, raises a presumption that its lawsuit was the catalyst for the Secretary's final action. See Luethje v. Peavine Sch. Dist., 872 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding chronology may be used to establish the necessary causal link). The Center then asserts that the Secretary has failed to rebut that presumption with credible evidence.(4) Additionally, the Center argues that the district court erroneously required it to produce "smoking gun" evidence "above and beyond the chronology of events."
*.Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Gale A. Norton is substituted for
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, as a defendant in this action.
1.The shiner was one of ninety-five species listed in the sixty-day notice.
2.The Supreme Court recently held that the catalyst theory cannot be invoked to support an award of attorney's fees under either the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA") or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835, 1843 (2001). The attorney fee provisions in both the FHAA and the ADA authorize the court to award fees to the "prevailing party." See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (FHAA); 42 U.S.C. §12205 (ADA). The Court held that the term "prevailing party" is a legal term of art and does not "include[] a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct." Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1838. The statute at issue in this case, however, contains no express requirement that the party seeking attorney's fees be the "prevailing party" but, instead, provides, "The court, in issuing any final order in any suit brought pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). Thus, the basis of the Court's conclusion in Buckhannon is not applicable in this case. Because neither party raises the issue, we decline to address the continued applicability of the catalyst test to fee requests brought pursuant to statutes that do not contain a "prevailing party" requirement.
3.On appeal, the Secretary has abandoned the argument made before the district court that the Center must also demonstrate that its suit substantially contributed to the goals of the ESA.
4.It is the Center that bears the burden of demonstrating a causal link between its lawsuit and the Secretary's action. See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1486 (10th Cir. 1995). Whether it is assisted in doing so by the asserted presumption is a matter this court need not decide.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2001/08/00-2162.htm.