Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/956/271/326238/
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 16:31:03
Document Index: 602887647

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3553']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Jesus Jesse Reyna, Defendant-appellee,jacqlynn Garrett, Rey Solis, Defendants, 956 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1992 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Jesus Jesse Reyna, Defendant-appellee,jacqlynn Gar...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Jesus Jesse Reyna, Defendant-appellee,jacqlynn Garrett, Rey Solis, Defendants, 956 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1992)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 956 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1992) March 3, 1992
A jury convicted Jesus Jesse Reyna of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and (2) possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). The government appeals the district court's decision refusing to enhance Reyna's sentence for obstruction of justice. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On December 13, 1989, a federal grand jury charged Reyna and several co-defendants with (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and (2) possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). After a two-week trial, a jury convicted Reyna on both counts. Based upon a factual finding that Reyna was responsible for 1,400 pounds of marijuana in the conspiracy, the district court determined Reyna had a base offense level of 28 under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The government argued that during trial Reyna testified untruthfully several times and, hence, deserved a two-level enhancement under Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. After refusing to enhance Reyna's sentence, the court sentenced Reyna to seven and one-half years in prison on the conspiracy count, with a concurrent sentence of five years on the possession count. The district court also imposed concurrent five-year and two-year periods of supervised released.
Section 3C1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides that " [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels." United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3C1.1 (Nov. 1990). The application notes to § 3C1.1 set forth a non-exhaustive list of the types of conduct to which the enhancement applies. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n. 3). Included as conduct worthy of the obstruction enhancement is "committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n. 3(b)).
When applying § 3C1.1, a court should evaluate the defendant's testimony and statements in a light most favorable to the defendant. United States v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361, 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Black v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 144 (1991); U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n. 1). A false statement deserving application of the obstruction enhancement is one that, if believed, would tend to influence the issue under determination. Head, 927 F.2d at 1372. The defendant must also make the statement intentionally. Although § 3C1.1 is not designed to punish a defendant who exercises his constitutional right to testify at trial, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n. 1), it is designed to punish a defendant who perjures himself because there is no constitutional right for the defendant to commit perjury while testifying. United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 953 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 899 (1989).
Once the district court determines that a defendant intentionally testified untruthfully as to a material fact while under oath--in other words committed perjury--the district court must enhance the defendant's sentence under § 3C1.1 unless the court's findings of fact support a downward departure. United States v. Alvarez, 927 F.2d 300, 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2246 (1991). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Court shall impose sentence specified in the Sentencing Guidelines unless the court finds an aggravating or mitigating circumstance that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines).
Although this court has examined section 3C1.1 issues on numerous occasions, an examination of two of our cases should provide guidance on the application of the provision. First, in United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (6th Cir. 1991), the district court enhanced the defendant's sentence for obstruction of justice because the defendant had "told one bare-faced lie after another during his sentencing proceedings, and done so deliberately, to minimize ... the grievousness of the beating that this woman was subjected to." This court agreed that the defendant's statements were "perjurious attempts to materially influence the proceedings" and thus deserved a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. Id. at 1131. Second, in Alvarez, 927 F.2d at 302-03, the district court found that while under oath the defendant "lied openly, continuously, almost ridiculously before the jury." This court held that since the district court made a finding that the defendant had testified untruthfully as to a material fact, the district court acted appropriately in enhancing the defendant's sentence for obstruction of justice. Id. at 303.
The common thread running through cases like Hamilton and Alvarez is that once the district court has determined that the defendant intentionally testified untruthfully as to a material fact, an obstruction enhancement is required. However, a case like United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1991), is distinguishable from cases like Hamilton and Alvarez. In McDonald, the government argued that the district court should have given the defendant a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice because he perjured himself. Id. at 1218-19. Although the district court admitted that portions of the defendant's testimony were inconsistent with the testimony of more credible witnesses, the district court found that the inconsistencies did not rise to such a level so as to require an enhancement for obstruction of justice. Id. at 1219. The Eleventh Circuit, in upholding the district court's decision, stated: