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BOWEN V. YUCKERT, 482 U. S. 137 (1987) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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(a) The severity regulation is not inconsistent with § 423(d)(1)(A), which defines "disability" in terms of the effect an impairment has on a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,and WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 482 U. S. 155. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 482 U. S. 159. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The question in this case is whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services may deny a claim for Social Security disability benefits on the basis of a determination that the claimant does not suffer from a medically severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Secretary has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1986). Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." If he is, disability benefits are denied. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decisionmaker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a medically chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 (1986). If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing work he has performed in the past. If the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not disabled. §§ 404.1520(e), chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent Janet Yuckert applied for both Social Security disability insurance benefits and SSI benefits in October, 1980. She alleged that she was disabled by an inner ear dysfunction, dizzy spells, headaches, an inability to focus her eyes, and flat feet. Yuckert had been employed as a travel agent from 1963 to 1977. In 1978 and 1979, she had worked intermittently as a real estate salesperson. Yuckert was 45 years old at the time of her application. She has a high school education, two years of business college, and real estate training. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded without considering the substantiality of the evidence. Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 1366, 1370 (1985). The court held that the Act does not authorize chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1982 ed. and Supp. III). In the court's view, this provision requires that "both medical and vocational factors [i.e., age, education, and work experience] be considered in determining disability." Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 1370. The court rejected the Secretary's contention that the 1984 amendments to the Act endorsed step two of the disability evaluation process. The court concluded that "[t]he legislative history does not suggest that Congress intended to permit findings of nondisability based on medical factors alone." Ibid. (citation omitted). Finally, the court relied upon Court of Appeals holdings that the burden of proof shifts to the Secretary once the claimant shows an inability to perform his previous work. [Footnote 2] In the court's view, step two of the Secretary's evaluation process is inconsistent with this assignment of burdens of proof, because it allows the Secretary to deny benefits to a claimant who is unable to perform past work without requiring the Secretary to show that the claimant can perform other work. Accordingly, the court invalidated the severity regulation, 20 CFR § 404.1520(c) (1986). [Footnote 3] Because of the importance of the issue, and because the court's decision conflicts chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Heckler v. Campbell, supra, at 461 U. S. 466 (footnote and citations omitted). In our view, both the language of the Act and its legislative history support the Secretary's decision to require disability claimants to make a threshold showing that their "medically determinable" impairments are severe enough to satisfy the regulatory standards. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
§ 423(d)(5)(A)(1982 ed. and Supp. III). See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 424 U. S. 336 (1976). [Footnote 5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals placed little weight on § 423(d)(1)(A) or its legislative history, but concluded that the severity regulation is inconsistent with § 423(d)(2)(A). We find no basis for this holding. Section 423(d)(2)(A), set forth supra, at 482 U. S. 140, was enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If there was any lingering doubt as to the Secretary's authority to require disability claimants to make a threshold chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 98-1039, p. 30 (1984). [Footnote 10] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Brief for Respondent 22. She contends that the Secretary imposed only a "de minimis" requirement prior to 1978, but has required a greater showing of severity since then. As we have noted, however, Congress expressly approved the facial validity of the 1978 severity regulation in the 1984 amendments to the Act. Particularly in light of those amendments and the legislative history, we conclude that the regulation is valid on its face. [Footnote 12] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
§404.1521(b)(1)-(6). I do not see how a claimant unable to show a significant limitation in any of these areas can possibly meet the statutory definition of disability. For the reasons set out by the Court in Part III of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I write separately, however, to discuss the contention of respondent and various amici (including 29 States and 5 major cities) that this facially valid regulation has been applied systematically to deny benefits to claimants who do meet the statutory definition of disability. Respondent directs our attention to the chorus of judicial criticism concerning the step two regulation, as well as to substantially unrefuted statistical evidence. Despite the heavy deference ordinarily paid to the Secretary's promulgation and application of his regulations, Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 453 U. S. 43 (1981), all 11 regional Federal Courts of Appeals have either enjoined the Secretary's use of the step two regulation [Footnote 2/1] or imposed a narrowing construction upon it. [Footnote 2/2] The chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To be sure, the Secretary faces an administrative task of staggering proportions in applying the disability benefits provisions of the Social Security Act. Perfection in processing millions of such claims annually is impossible. But respondent's evidence suggests that step two has been applied systematically in a manner inconsistent with the statute. Indeed, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Social Security Ruling 85-28, App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a. Applied in this manner, step two, I believe, can produce results consistent with the statute in the vast majority of cases chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In its opinion today, the Court analyzes the facial validity of the Secretary's severity regulation by interpreting § 423(d) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The critical error in the Court's analysis is readily apparent when one considers the language introducing paragraph (2) of § 423(d). Although the Court purports to set forth § 423(d) (2)(A) in its opinion, ante at 482 U. S. 140, it fails to quote the key language from the statute. The concurring opinion likewise chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
How the determination is to be made in most cases, including those brought by insured workers such as respondent Janet Yuckert, is set forth in paragraph (2)(A), whereas paragraph (2)(B) relates to the category of claims by surviving spouses of insured workers which is specifically excepted from paragraph (2)(A). Whether a claimant under (2)(A) has proved an "inability" to work "by reason of " a medical impairment chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A comparison of this process to that set forth in paragraph (2)(B) leaves no doubt whatsoever that consideration of the vocational factors is a key feature of the process in evaluating claims under paragraph (2)(A). In paragraph (2)(B), Congress authorized the Secretary to deny benefit claims by surviving spouses based on medical evidence alone. That paragraph specifies that the Secretary may promulgate listed severity levels of impairments at which an individual cannot engage in any gainful activity, and may deny benefits in such chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Despite the clarity of the statutory language and the purpose of individualized disability determinations, the Secretary has promulgated, as step two of his step evaluation process, the severity standard set forth in 20 CFR § 404.1520(c) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1986). Because that regulation prohibits agency adjudicators from considering a claimant's age, [Footnote 3/4] education, and work experience in cases where the claimant cannot perform his past work, the regulation is invalid on its face. [Footnote 3/5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Merely because both the statute and the regulation require analysis of the effect of the medical impairments on the claimant's ability to work does not mean, however, that the two are consistent in all respects. Moreover, examination of the description of the statutory scheme, as set forth in Heckler v. Campbell, reveals that the general declaration upon which the Court relies was supported with a discussion of the particulars of the statute that included both paragraphs (1)(A) and (2)(A) of § 423(d). By not including § 423(d)(2)(A) at this step of its analysis, however, the Court avoids the impossible task of explaining how the statutory scheme described in Campbell and the regulatory scheme set forth in the severity regulation can represent "precisely" the same approach when chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ante at 482 U. S. 146. Although I agree that a claimant who can perform most jobs is not disabled under the Act, I do not agree with the Court's implication that the statute authorizes the Secretary to review the medical evidence in a case and, solely on the basis of that information, to determine the claimant's ability to "perform most jobs." Under that interpretation of the statute, the agency adjudicators would decide whether a claimant covered by § 423(d)(2)(A) could perform the listed basic work activities, including responsiveness to supervision and adaptability to change in the workplace, without taking into account the claimant's age, education, and work experience. I simply cannot read the statutory language of §§ 423(d)(1)(A) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Even if a medical impairment affected different individuals' abilities to perform such functions to the same extent, regardless of age, education, and work experience, there is no guidance in the severity regulation as to what constitutes a "significant" limitation on the ability, for example, to use judgment or to adapt to changes in work conditions, or as to how the degree of limitation caused by a medical impairment on such functions is to be determined based solely on medical evidence. Nor does the regulation explain whether the claimant must be able to perform a few, most, or all of the § 404.1521 "[e]xamples" of "basic work activities" in order to be found capable of performing "most jobs." The concurring opinion appears to assume that the Secretary can deny benefits at that stage only if a claimant can perform all the basic work activities listed without any significant limitations. Ante at 482 U. S. 155-156. Assuming this to be true, the regulation does not recognize that less than "significant" limitations on several of the activities in combination could equate with an overall significant limitation on the ability to perform most jobs. In sum, the regulation authorizes disability determinations to be made in a manner inconsistent with the statutory mandate. Congress clearly intended to prohibit these assessments from being made in a vacuum when it specified in § 423(d)(2)(A) that a claimant's age, education, and work experience be taken into account in determining the effect of his medical impairment on his ability to work. [Footnote 3/7] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
An examination of the legislative history of § 423(d) provides strong additional support for respondent's position. The disability definition in § 423(d) has its roots in another statutory provision that was first enacted in 1952. In that year, Congress amended the Social Security Act in part to guarantee that the insured status of workers would not be adversely affected if they were permanently and totally disabled for periods of time prior to retirement. As part of this amendment, Congress added to the Act its § 216(i), which contains the definition of "disability" and "period of disability" for purposes of that program. 66 Stat. 771, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1952 ed.). In 1954, Congress replaced those definitions with slightly different ones contained in a new § 216(i). 68 Stat. 1080, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1952 ed., Supp. IV). When Congress amended the Act in 1956, in part to establish a program to provide benefits for certain insured disabled individuals prior to retirement, it adopted the § 216(i) definition for purposes of the new program. It added § 223 to the Act, which set forth the terms of the new program and included a definition of "disability" nearly identical to that set forth in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
S.Rep. No. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The new language in § 423(d)(2)(A) was aimed at answering these questions. Congress made it clear that medical factors, and not local job conditions, are the primary focus in disability cases. It tempered the new restrictiveness of the statute, however, by specifying that consideration of the vocational factors is a necessary component of the disability determination in all cases where a claimant is not working and the medical impairment is not of a level presumed to be disabling, except those expressly exempted from § 423(d)(2)(A). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, the Court quotes the 1967 Senate Report's summary of the overall disability evaluation process which, as the Court points out, contemplated a sequential evaluation. Ante at 482 U. S. 148-149. Expressly included in that sequential evaluation, however, is the consideration of the vocational factors in cases where an insured worker cannot do his previous work. [Footnote 3/11] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The legislative history of the 1984 Act also does not stand as an endorsement of the severity regulation. Each of the three congressional Reports contains a brief description of the general disability-determination process. In each of these descriptions, the preliminary steps of the Secretary's step-evaluation process were characterized somewhat differently. The Senate Report, see ante at 482 U. S. 151, explained that the new provision requiring consideration of combined impairments would not authorize a departure from the sequential evaluation process. Omitted from the heart of the Court's quotation, however, is the Report's express incorporation by reference of the 1967 interpretation. The Report chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In sum, Congress acknowledged that the Secretary was in the midst of reevaluating the severity regulation, and indicated its willingness to await the Secretary's results, rather than to address the matter in the midst of the overwhelming legislative task it already faced regarding the matters properly before it. The brief remarks about the step evaluation process simply cannot be read as an endorsement of the facial validity of the severity regulation. These congressional comments in 1984 cannot outweigh the clear language of §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A) and the legislative history of those provisions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Secretary attempts to avoid the facial contradiction between his severity regulation and the statute by interpreting the regulation as representing only a de minimis threshold standard. The Secretary apparently has recognized finally what every Federal Court of Appeals has concluded -- application of a threshold severity regulation that is greater chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Whether a de minimis threshold standard is authorized under the statute is not before this Court. The regulation on its face simply does not describe a standard that incorporates into the threshold step an implicit consideration of the vocational factors. The language of step two does not represent chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I agree with the approach of the Court of Appeals in this case. Contrary to this Court's implications, ante at 482 U. S. 147, that court did not address the question whether the statute authorizes a threshold showing of medical severity. The Court of Appeals addressed only the facial validity of the severity standard in step two of the sequential evaluation process. It expressly declined to consider whether other threshold severity standards, such as a de minimis standard, would be authorized under the statute. See Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 1365, 1369, n. 6 (CA9 1985). Invalidating step two does not prohibit the adoption of a threshold screening standard chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although the Court peremptorily finds "no basis" for holding that the severity regulation is inconsistent on its face with the statute, ante at 482 U. S. 147, no less than five Federal Courts of Appeals, including the court below, have found the same blatant contradiction in the plain language that I find. See Brown v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 870, 871 (CA8 1986) (citing Courts of Appeals that have "point[ed] out that, while the provision [in the severity regulation] explicitly requires the Secretary to disregard the claimant's age, education, and work experience, the Act expressly requires those factors to be taken into account when determining disability"); Hansen v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 174 ("regulation on its face . . . conflicts with the statutory directive" which is "to consider a claimant's ability both to perform past work and, given individual vocational factors, to engage in other work"); Johnson v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 1202, 1212 (CA7 1985) ("[O]n its face, the step-two severity regulation conflicts with the Social Security Act's purposes and the plain language of the statute's definitions of disability"), cert. pending sub nom. Bowen v. Johnson, No. 85-1442; Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 547, 553 (CA3 1985) (severity regulation cannot be analyzed "except according to its plain language and the manner in which the Secretary uses it"; "[a]s it stands, . . . [it] is inconsistent with the Social Security Act, and therefore, is invalid"). Obviously, these cases do not support the assertion in the concurring opinion that the courts rested their judgments on "frustration . . . in dealing with the Secretary's application of step two." Ante at 482 U. S. 157.