Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20181105_0002163.MAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-06-01 09:31:54
Document Index: 627605632

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 1631']

FindACase™ | Fusco v. United States
Kevin Fusco (“Fusco”), a federal inmate at the Maxwell Federal Prison Camp in Montgomery, Alabama, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 27, 2018. Doc. # 1. Pursuant to orders entered by this court, Fusco filed an amended § 2241 petition on October 12, 2018. Doc. # 7. This action is before the court on the claims in that amended petition.
Fusco challenges the validity of his convictions and sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit money laundering. He claims his convictions and sentence are void and that he is entitled to immediate release because (1) the federal district courts, including the court in which he was convicted and sentenced, are not lawfully established by Congress; (2) the United States suffered no “injury in fact” from his alleged crimes; and (3) his guilty plea was entered under duress in violation of his due process rights. Doc. # 7 at 1-3. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned concludes this action should be transferred to the Southern District of Florida.
Fusco's self-described § 2241 petition challenges the legality of his convictions and sentence. Generally, a federal prisoner must bring any collateral attack on the legality of his conviction or sentence through a motion to vacate under § 2255 rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017); Venta v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low, 2017 WL 4280936, at *1 (11th Cir. 2017). A petitioner challenging the legality of his federal detention may do so under § 2241 only if he shows that § 2255 would be an “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (the so called “saving clause”); see also Johnson v. Warden, 737 Fed.Appx. 989, 990-91 (11th Cir. 2018). Fusco does not attempt to show that § 2255 would be an inadequate vehicle to present his claims. Indeed he cannot, because his claims challenging the validity of his convictions and sentence fall squarely within the realm of injuries § 2255 addresses.
When a federal prisoner brings “a traditional claim attacking his [conviction or] sentence that he could have brought in a [§ 2255] motion to vacate, the remedy by [such] motion is adequate and effective to test the legality of his detention. . . . Allowing a prisoner with a claim that is cognizable in a [§ 2255] motion to vacate to access [§ 2241] nullifies the procedural hurdles of section 2255 and undermines the venue provisions.” McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1090. Here, regardless of the label Fusco places on his pleadings, his petition challenging his convictions and sentence must be considered as a motion under § 2255, rather than § 2241. Section 2255 remains Fusco's exclusive remedy to bring his challenge to his convictions and sentence. Because he challenges a judgment entered in the Southern District of Florida, jurisdiction to consider the § 2255 motion lies only in the Southern District of Florida as the district of conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, a court that finds it lacks jurisdiction to entertain a civil action may, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action to any other court in which the action could have been brought when it was filed. Because Fusco is proceeding pro se, in the interest of justice this action should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.