Source: http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-motion-for-leave-to-file-brief-of-amic-90189/
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1738', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1738', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

A Motion For Leave To File Brief Of Amici Curiae And Brief Of Amici Curiae CATO Institute, New England Legal Foundation, et al., In Support Of Petitioner | Colony Cove Properties v. City of Carson | Cato Institute - JDSupra
Colony Cove Properties v. City of CarsonA Motion For Leave To File Brief Of Amici Curiae And Brief Of Amici Curiae CATO Institute, New England Legal Foundation, et al., In Support Of Petitioner
When state and local governments violate federal constitutional rights (e.g., First Amendment free speech), they can be sued in federal court — except when that government action violates the Fifth Amendment's protections for property rights. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, individuals and businesses alleging unconstitutional takings by state or local governments are required to exhaust state review procedures — seeking redress from the very officials who harmed them — before turning to federal courts. This constitutional anomaly is evident in Colony Cove v. Carson, where the operators of a rental property in California alleged an unconstitutional taking when the local rent control board refused to approve an increase in rent to allow their business to operate profitably. California law forecloses judicial review of the findings of rent control boards, so municipal governments have an unchecked license to determine whether such businesses may operate: A property owner's sole recourse is to appeal to the very rent control board who forbade her from charging a profitable rent in the first place. These "review" procedures, like some others across the nation, are wildly insufficient. Even more significantly, once a takings claim has been fully heard in state proceedings per Williamson County's command, it is usually barred from federal review based on various prudential doctrines. The result is the indiscriminate exclusion of takings claims from federal courts, a situation that invites opportunist states to usurp private property rights. Seeking to afford citizens across the nation the opportunity to assert Takings Clause claims in parity with other constitutional rights, Cato joined the New England Legal Foundation, National Federation of Independent Business, Institute for Justice, Goldwater Institute, and Professors James Ely and Richard Epstein in filing an amicus brief supporting the California property owners' petition for Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit's ruling against them. We argue that Williamson County should be overruled because it relegates takings claims to second-class status despite the constitutional first principle that uniform protection of individual rights is vital to our system of government. At the very least, the Court should require federal reprieve when state procedures for rectifying a taking are futile — as they were here. Finally, we argue that the Court should correct lower courts' misinterpretation of Williamson County, which puts property rights jurisprudence at odds with Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (a statute that gives people access to federal courts when a state denies them their constitutional rights).
Download PDF No. 11-189 In the Supreme Court of the United States __________ COLONY COVE PROPERTIES, LLC, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CARSON, CA AND CITY OF CARSON MOBILE-HOME PARK RENTAL REVIEW BOARD, Respondents. __________ On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit __________ A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE AND BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CATO IN-STITUTE, NEW ENGLAND LEGAL FOUNDATION, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, GOLDWA-TER INSTITUTE, RICHARD EPSTEIN, AND JAMES ELY IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER __________ ILYA SHAPIRO Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20001 (202) 842-0200 ishapiro@cato.org ILYA SOMIN Counsel of Record GMU School of Law 3301 Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA 22201 (703) 993-8069 isomin@gmu.edu Additional Counsel on Inside Cover ELIZABETH MILITO NFIB Small Business Legal Center 1201 F St., N.W. Washington, DC 20004 (202) 406-4443 NICK DRANIAS Goldwater Institute Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation 500 E. Coronado Rd. Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 462-5000 MARTIN J. NEWHOUSE JOHN PAGLIARO New England Legal Foundation 150 Lincoln Street Boston, MA 02110-2504 (617) 695-3660 DANA BERLINER SCOTT BULLOCK Institute for Justice 901 N. Glebe Rd., Ste. 900 Arlington, VA 22203 (703) 682-9320 1 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2(b), the Cato Institute, New England Legal Foundation, National Federation of Independent Business, Institute for Justice, Goldwater Institute, and Professors James Ely and Richard Epstein respectfully move for leave to file the attached brief as amici curiae in support of Petitioner. All parties were provided with 10-day notice of amici’s intent to file this brief as required under Rule 37.2(a). Counsel for the Petitioner consented to this filing. Counsel for Respondents, however, expressly withheld consent, stating in an email to amici’s coun-sel that respondents “will not consent to the filing of any amicus briefs.” The interest of the amici here arises from their re-spective missions to advance and support the rights that the Constitution guarantees to all citizens. Amici have participated in numerous cases of consti-tutional significance before this and other courts, and have worked in defense of the constitutionally guar-anteed rights of independent businesses and indi-viduals through their publications, lectures, court and public appearances, and other endeavors. A summary of the background and activities of each individual amicus follows: The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a nonpartisan public-policy research foundation dedi-cated to advancing the principles of individual lib-erty, free markets, and limited government. Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies was established in 1989 to help restore the principles of limited constitu-2 tional government that are the foundation of liberty. Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and studies, conducts conferences, publishes the annual Cato Su-preme Court Review, and files amicus briefs, includ-ing in various cases concerning property rights. This case is of central concern to Cato because it impli-cates the safeguards the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide for the protection of property rights against uncompensated takings. The New England Legal Foundation is a non-profit, nonpartisan, public interest law firm, incorpo-rated in Massachusetts in 1977 and headquartered in Boston. Its membership consists of corporations, law firms, individuals, and others, located primarily in New England, who support NELF’s mission of pro-moting balanced economic growth, protecting the free enterprise system, and defending economic rights. NELF regularly appears in state and federal courts, as party or counsel, in cases raising issues of general economic significance to the New England and na-tional business communities, including AT&T Mobil-ity LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), and others. The National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center is a nonprofit, public interest law firm established to provide legal re-sources and be the voice for small businesses in the nation’s courts through representation on issues of public interest affecting small businesses. The NFIB is the nation’s leading small business association, representing over 300,000 members in Washington, D.C., and all 50 states. Founded in 1943 as a non-3 profit, nonpartisan organization, NFIB’s mission is to promote and protect the right of its members to own, operate and grow their businesses. To fulfill its role as the voice for small business, the NFIB Legal Cen-ter frequently files amicus briefs in cases that will impact small businesses. The Institute for Justice is a nonprofit, public in-terest law center committed to defending the essen-tial foundations of a free society and securing the constitutional protections necessary to ensure indi-vidual liberty. A central pillar of IJ’s mission is to protect property rights, both because an individual’s control over his own property is a tenet of personal liberty and because property rights are inextricably linked to all other civil rights. IJ is the nation’s lead-ing legal advocate against the abuse of condemnation laws. It represents individuals in state and federal court and also files amicus briefs in significant cases. It frequently litigates against procedural barriers that block property owners from raising constitu-tional challenges to violations of property rights. The Goldwater Institute is a tax exempt educa-tional foundation that advances public policies that further the principles of limited government, eco-nomic freedom and individual responsibility. The in-tegrated mission of the Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation is to preserve individual lib-erty by enforcing the features of our state and federal constitutions that directly and structurally protect individual rights, including the Bill of Rights, the doctrine of separation of powers and federalism. The Goldwater Institute appeared before the U.S. Su-preme Court in McComish v. Bennett (No. 10-239), and has filed amicus curiae briefings before the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago (No. 08-1521) and 4 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (No. 08-322). James W. Ely, Jr. is the Milton R. Underwood Pro-fessor of Law and Professor of History at Vanderbilt University specializing in property law and the con-stitutional rights of property owners. He has written extensively on constitutional law and the history of property rights in the United States. Richard Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Profes-sor of Law at New York University School of Law, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoo-ver Institutions, and the James Parker Hall Distin-guished Service Professor Emeritus and senior lec-turer at the University of Chicago. He has written ex-tensively on property rights and regulatory takings. In this brief, amici discuss the manner in which this Court’s holding in Williamson County Reg’l Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), has been applied to deny some citizens, like the petitioner, any remedy for a government taking of their property. Amici then elaborate on how the courts below have transformed Williamson from a constitutional ripeness analysis to an unsubstantiated abstention doctrine squarely in conflict with the fundamental objective of 28 U.S.C. § 1983—namely, to ensure citizens a remedy in federal court when a state denies them their constitutional rights. Amici have no direct interest, financial or other-wise, in the outcome of this case. Their sole interest in filing this brief is to ensure the availability of a remedy for Fifth Amendment takings. 5 For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully re-quest that they be allowed to participate in this case by filing the attached brief. Respectfully submitted, ILYA SHAPIRO Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20001 (202) 842-0200 ishapiro@cato.org ILYA SOMIN Counsel of Record GMU School of Law 3301 Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA 22201 (703) 993-8069 isomin@gmu.edu ELIZABETH MILITO NFIB Small Business Legal Center 1201 F St., N.W. Washington, DC 20004 (202) 406-4443 NICK DRANIAS Goldwater Institute Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation 500 E. Coronado Rd. Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 462-5000 MARTIN J. NEWHOUSE JOHN PAGLIARO New England Legal Foundation 150 Lincoln Street Boston, MA 02110-2504 (617) 695-3660 DANA BERLINER SCOTT BULLOCK Institute for Justice 901 N. Glebe Rd., Ste. 900 Arlington, VA 22203 (703) 682-9320 Counsel for Amici Curiae September 14, 2011 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Should this Court overrule Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank of John-son City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), which precludes numerous federal constitutional property rights claims from ever being raised in federal court? 2. Should property owners be entitled as of right to file federal constitutional takings claims in federal court in cases where state courts have proven sys-tematically unavailing? 3. Does 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allow the filing of Takings Clause claims in federal court on the same basis as other federal constitutional rights claims? ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF..................1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................i TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................iv INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................1 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.................1 ARGUMENT...............................................................4 I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BE-CAUSE THE ISSUES PRESENTED ARE OF GREAT NATIONAL IMPORTANCE AND CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED BY THIS COURT................................................................4 II. THE EXCLUSION OF TAKINGS CASES FROM FEDERAL COURT IS AN INDE-FENSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALY...8 A. Federal Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Is Vital to the Uniform Protec-tion of Individual Rights .............................8 B. Williamson County Consigns Takings Clause Claims to Second-Class Status Relative to Other Constitutional Rights...11 C. There Is No Justification for Barring Takings Clause Claims from Federal Court in Situations Where Other Consti-tutional Right Claims are Permitted .......12 iii 1. Raising a Takings Clause claim for compensation in federal court is no more “premature” than federal consid-eration of other constitutional claims......12 2. State courts have no greater expertise with Takings Clause issues than on many other constitutional rights claims..13 III. EVEN IF THIS COURT DECLINES TO OVERRULE WILLIAMSON COUNTY, IT SHOULD STILL ALLOW FEDERAL COURT FILINGS IN CASES WHERE STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS ARE FU-TILE .................................................................15 IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION HIGH-LIGHTS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN WIL-LIAMSON COUNTY AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983..16 CONCLUSION.........................................................24iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).................................................23 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) ..............................................14 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 54 (1954).................................................11 Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011)...........................................23 Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)...............................................14 Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 353 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2004)..................................22 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)...............................................11 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)...............................................23 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009)...............................................23 Galland v. City of Clovis, 16 P.3d 130 (Cal. 2001)..........................................23 v Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)...................................................11 Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997).......................................15 Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2003).................................7 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).................................16 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)............................8-10 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010)............................................11 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).........................................16, 20 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)...............................................18 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) .............................18, 19-20, 22 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)..........................17-19, 20-21, 22 Resource Investments, Inc. v. U.S., 85 Fed. Cl. 447 (Ct. Claims 2009) ...........................4 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)...............................................11 vi San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Fran-cisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).............................passim Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011)...........................................23 Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997)...............................................12 Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002)...............................................11 Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm. v. Hamil-ton Bank of Johnson, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)...passim Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2006).................................................23 Statutes 28 U.S.C. § 1331........................................................16 28 U.S.C. § 1738..........................................................6 42 U.S.C. § 1983................................................passim Other Authorities Bryce M. Baird, Federal Court Abstention in Civil Rights Cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the New Doctrine of Civil Rights Abstention, 42 BUFFALO L. REV. 501 (1994)..................................21 vii Gerald Bowden & Lewis G. Feldman, Take It or Leave It: Uncertain Regulatory Taking Stan-dards and Remedies Threaten California’s Open Space Planning, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 371 (1981)......9 Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. Chi. Legal Forum 1..........................................13 Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y (2011) ...........................10, 15 Kirk Emerson & Charles R. Wise, Statutory Ap-proaches to Regulatory Takings: State Property Rights Legislation Issues and Implications for Public Administration, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 411 (1997) ......................................................................9 Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671 (2004)...............................................5 William Maker, Jr., What Do Grapes And Federal Lawsuits Have In Common? Both Must Be Ripe, 74 ALB. L. REV. 819 (2010)......................................61 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 The interest of amici arises from their respective missions to advance and support the constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens. Amici have partici-pated in numerous cases of constitutional significance before this and other courts, and have worked in de-fense of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of in-dividuals and independent businesses through their publications, lectures, court and public appearances, and other endeavors. The background and activities of each individual amicus are more fully described in the Motion for Leave to File accompanying this brief. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Amici incorporate by reference the description of facts outlined in the petition for writ of certiorari. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT This case presents an opportunity to rectify a sig-nificant indefensible anomaly in this Court’s juris-prudence: The blanket exclusion from federal court of numerous constitutional rights cases arising under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Under this Court’s decision in Williamson County Regional 1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.2(a), a letter from Petitioner’s counsel consenting to the filing of this brief has been submitted to the Clerk. Respondents’ counsel withheld such consent, so amici submit, supra, a motion for leave to file this brief pursu-ant to Rule 37.2(b). Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and that no person or entity other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 2 Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), a property owner’s claim that a state government has taken his property without paying “just compensation,” as required by the Tak-ings Clause, cannot be brought in federal court unless he has first obtained a “final decision” from the rele-vant state agency and sought “compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.” Id. at 186, 194. Once these state court proceedings have concluded, res judicata bars pursuit of that same claim in federal court. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 346-7 (2005) (recognizing this point). This lack of access to federal courts emboldens lo-cal governments to take aggressive, often unconstitu-tional regulatory action. They know that they can de-lay a federal court challenge by drawing out their ar-rival at a “final decision.” Even after a “final decision” is made, in practice the sole challenges to state agency decisions must be brought in state courts, that will likely prove sympathetic to their fellow state offi-cials. This regime effectively consigns Taking Clause claims to second-class status. No other individual constitutional rights claim is systematically excluded from federal court in the same way. This double standard cannot be justified on the ground that Takings Clause claims are “premature” before state court proceedings have run their exten-sive course, as was claimed in Williamson County. 473 U.S. at 195-97. To the contrary, the Williamson County rule incentivizes state agencies to prolong the administrative process in order to prevent the land-owner from making their federal challenge. Any other federal constitutional rights case initiated in federal 3 court is “premature” in exactly the same way, since there is always the chance that the plaintiff could have obtained redress in state court instead. Simi-larly, it is dangerously misguided to justify this sys-tematic exclusion from federal court by looking to the supposedly superior expertise of state judges on land-use issues. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347. State judges could be said to have similar superior exper-tise on a variety of other issues that arise in constitu-tional litigation, including ones relevant to other rights protected by the Bill of Rights. Williamson County is also an anomaly in the ju-risprudence surrounding 42 U.S.C. § 1983, forbidding Takings Clause § 1983 claims in circumstances where claims asserting other constitutional rights are rou-tinely permitted. Recognizing the indefensible nature of these anomalies, four Justices have already called for the overruling of Williamson County “in an appropriate case.” San Remo, 545 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Today, that case has arrived. Even if this Court chooses not to overrule Williamson County, it should at minimum allow plaintiffs to file Takings Clause cases in federal court whenever the state does not provide “reasonable, certain and ade-quate provision for obtaining compensation.” Wil-liamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. The present case offers a vivid example of such an extreme situation because California law does not allow inverse con-demnation actions in cases challenging rent control ordinances. 4 ARGUMENT I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BE-CAUSE THE ISSUES PRESENTED ARE OF GREAT NATIONAL IMPORTANCE AND CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED BY THIS COURT. Undoubtedly, the issues presented here, which ne-cessitate this Court’s review of the state-litigation re-quirement established for federal takings claims in Williamson County, are of great national importance. As the Court itself acknowledged in San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 346-7, this part of Williamson County’s holding has had the effect—whether intended or not—of denying a federal forum to virtually all liti-gants seeking redress against state actors for an al-leged taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Since only this Court has the power either to revise or overrule any portion of Williamson County, that alone is sufficient to justify granting certiorari. The obstacles Williamson County imposes against property owners wishing to assert a federal takings claim against a state or local government entity are well-known. The requirement that property owners first get a “final decision” from the relevant state agency, Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186, can lead to protracted delay. See Resource Investments, Inc. v. U.S., 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 498 (Ct. Claims 2009) (“compli-cated permitting processes are rife with delays,” cit-ing cases, including Williamson County, showing that delays of sixteen months to eight years are not ex-traordinary). The rule forbidding property owners from filing claims in federal court until they have fully exhausted all possible state court remedies has the effect of making it impossible to ever file a federal claim. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 346-47. 5 Since Williamson County was decided, the state-litigation requirement has generated massive and re-current legal confusion at both district and circuit court levels. Courts and commentators alike have virtually exhausted the resources of the English lan-guage in describing the difficulties Williamson County imposes on lower courts and its manifest un-fairness to takings plaintiffs.2 In Williamson County, the Court, reasoning that such a claim could not pro-ceed in federal court until it was “ripe,” established two conditions that had to be met before a federal court could hear the matter. First, “the government entity charged with implementing the regulations [had to have] reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulation to the property at issue.” 473 U.S. at 186. Second, the claimant had to have sought “compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.” Id. at 194. Thus the Court decreed: “if a State provides an adequate pro-cedure for seeking just compensation the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensa-tion Clause until it has use that procedure and been denied just compensation.” Id. at 195. The Court 2 See Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurispru-dence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 702-703 (2004) (collecting descriptions such as “unfortunate,” “ill-considered,” “unclear and inexact,” “bewildering,” “worse than mere chaos,” “misleading,” “decep-tive,” “source of intense confusion,” “inherently nonsensical,” “shocking,” “absurd,”‘ “unjust,” “self-stultifying,” “pernicious,” “revolutionary,” “draconian,” “riddled with obfuscation and in-consistency,” containing an “Alice in Wonderland quality” and creating “a procedural morass,” “labyrinth,” “havoc,” “mess,” “trap,” “quagmire,’’ “Kafkaesque maze,” “a fraud or hoax on landowners,” “a weapon of mass obstruction,” “a Catch-22 for takings plaintiffs”). 6 also adopted an exhaustion requirement, whereby all state procedures had to be utilized before a case could be brought in federal court. Id. at 196. In so doing, it failed to recognize that its pronouncement provided recalcitrant state and local officials with a pre-approved roadmap to insulate their decisions from disinterested review. By way of example, the property owner in Wil-liamson County was instructed that it should have utilized the inverse condemnation procedure avail-able under Tennessee law to ripen its takings claim. Id. This ignored the fact that inverse condemnation claims never succeed where direct challenges to the regulations have failed. In similar fashion, the Wil-liamson County rule requires individual applicants to seek variances just after their zoning applications are denied, see id. at 191, even though the standards for obtaining variances are higher than those for the original zoning applications, and are never granted in absence of changed circumstances. See, e.g., William Maker, Jr., What Do Grapes And Federal Lawsuits Have In Common? Both Must Be Ripe, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 819, 834 (2010-2011) (“Not only are the standards for a use variance different from the standards for site plan approval, they are much more stringent.”). But the worst irony of Williamson County’s ex-haustion requirement is that the plaintiff who satis-fies it has, in effect, lost the right to proceed in fed-eral court. This is because regulatory takings claims, once litigated in state court, cannot be re-litigated in federal court. Some supposed combination of general principles of res judicata, issue preclusion, the federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, or pos-sibly the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, doom any effort to 7 obtain federal judicial review of a federal constitu-tional claim once it has been litigated in state court. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J., con-curring).3 Precisely this anomalous state of affairs led the late Chief Justice Rehnquist to urge this Court to re-examine Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement. Joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, the Chief Justice wrote: I joined the opinion of the Court in Williamson County. But further reflection and experience lead me to think that the justifications for its state-litigation requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic. . . . I believe the Court should reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment tak-ings claim based on the final decision of a state or local government entity must first seek compensation in state courts. Id. at 352. See also Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the “requirement that all state remedies be ex-hausted, and the barriers to federal jurisdiction pre-sented by res judicata and collateral estoppel that may follow from this requirement, may be anoma-lous” but “is for the Supreme Court to [resolve], not us”). Colony Cove is the appropriate case for that re-view. 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that this effect of William-son County was not limited to making the federal court unavail-able for a federal takings claim. He pointed out that some state courts have applied the state-litigation requirement to refuse to allow plaintiffs to litigate federal claims even in state court. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 351, n. 2 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 8 II. THE EXCLUSION OF TAKINGS CASES FROM FEDERAL COURT IS AN INDEFEN-SIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALY. None of the proffered justifications for excluding takings cases, and only takings cases, from federal court withstand scrutiny. The anomaly created by Williamson County should be eliminated, so that Tak-ings Clause rights can be enforced in federal court akin to other constitutional rights. Even if the Court does not overrule Williamson County, it should insist that federal courts hear takings claims for which suitable remedies are not available in state court. A. Federal Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Is Vital to the Uniform Protection of Individual Rights. In its landmark 1816 decision, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), this Court out-lined two crucial reasons it is imperative that federal judicial review be made available for all constitu-tional claims: the need for uniformity, and the danger that state courts will fail to vindicate federal rights against their own state. Justice Joseph Story stressed “the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution.” Id. at 347-48 (Story, J.) (emphasis in original). If 50 different state judiciaries address takings claims with only the remote possibility of federal review, that uni-formity is unlikely to arise: Judges of equal learning and integrity, in dif-ferent states, might differently interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself: If there were no revising authority to control these jarring and 9 discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be dif-ferent in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable. Id. at 348. Justice Story’s concern has proved prescient in takings cases. States differ greatly in the extent of protection they provide for regulatory takings claims. See, e.g., Kirk Emerson & Charles R. Wise, Statutory Approaches to Regulatory Takings: State Property Rights Legislation Issues and Implications for Public Administration, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 411 (1997) (de-scribing diverse state standards); Gerald Bowden & Lewis G. Feldman, Take It or Leave It: Uncertain Regulatory Taking Standards and Remedies Threaten California’s Open Space Planning, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 371, 376-87 (1981) (highlighting decreased predict-ability in regulatory takings law due to divergent de-cisions from federal and state courts). While Martin’s holding directly addressed the need for federal appellate review of state decisions on federal issues, the same concern necessitates an ave-nue for aggrieved parties to file federal constitutional claims at the trial level as well, where the only insti-tutional alternative denies any federal review at all, except in the rare Supreme Court case. Second, Justice Story emphasized that federal re-view is essential because state courts might be un-duly partial to the interests of their own states: 10 The constitution has presumed . . . that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might some times ob-struct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between states; be-tween citizens of different states; between citi-zens claiming grants under different states; between a state and its citizens, or foreigners, and between citizens and foreigners, it enables the parties, under the authority of congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and de-termined before the national tribunals. Id. at 346-47. Such “state prejudices” and “state interests” are particularly likely to exert a pernicious effect when state courts are asked in regulatory takings cases to require state and local governments to pay compensa-tion for violations of the Takings Clause. State judg-es, many of whom are elected, often have close con-nections to the political leaders who control state pol-icy. See Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 99-100 (2011). While conscien-tious judges will surely try to rule impartially, their political and institutional loyalties could easily influ-ence their decisions, consciously or not. Moreover, state officials might deliberately seek judges more in-clined to undercut federal claims that threaten state government interests. Id. at 99. Where such dangers are present, a federal forum is essential for ensuring the protection of constitutional rights. 11 B. Williamson County Consigns Takings Clause Claims to Second-Class Status Relative to Other Constitutional Rights. No other constitutional right receives the same shoddy treatment the Takings Clause sustained in Williamson County. Plaintiffs alleging state-government violations of virtually any other constitu-tional right can assert their claims in federal court without first seeking redress in state court. This is true of rights guaranteed in the First Amendment, Second Amendment, and throughout the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010) (Second Amendment); Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (First Amendment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (Eighth Amendment). This same rationale famously applies to rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, including unenumerated rights. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 54 (1954); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). No other type of federal constitutional right is sys-tematically barred from federal court, forcing liti-gants to file claims in the courts of the very state gov-ernments who may have violated their rights to begin with. The result is an indefensible double standard. As this Court has emphasized, there is “no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be rele-gated to the status of a poor relation.” Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 12 C. There Is No Justification for Barring Tak-ings Clause Claims from Federal Court in Situations Where Other Constitutional Rights Claims Are Permitted. The Court has suggested two justifications for its anomalous treatment of Takings Clause claims. The first is that a plaintiff’s claim that his property has been taken without compensation is “premature” be-fore he has exhausted state “procedures” for obtain-ing such compensation. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195-97; cf. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.7 (1997) (referring to this rule as a “prudential ripeness requirement”). The second is that state courts likely have greater famili-arity with takings issues than federal courts do. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347 (claiming that “state courts undoubtedly have more experience than fed-eral courts do in resolving the complex factual, tech-nical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.”). These rationales cannot withstand scrutiny. If ap-plied to suits asserting violations of other rights, both would lead to the exclusion of numerous cases that are routinely heard by federal courts. 1. Raising a Takings Clause claim for compensation in federal court is no more “premature” than federal consid-eration of other constitutional claims. Under Williamson County, a federal claim that a state government has taken property without com-pensation in violation of the Takings Clause is “pre-mature” until the owner has tried to obtain compen-sation “through the procedures the state has provided for doing so,” including litigation in state court. Wil-13 liamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. This reasoning is flawed because it can be used to justify denial of a federal venue for any other constitutional rights claim—in all such cases, potential federal plaintiffs could be required to seek relief in state court instead. For example, under Williamson County’s reason-ing, a claim that a state statute that infringed on a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech could be “premature” until she has asked a state court to invalidate the state statute or executive action that gave rise to the free speech violation. Yet no one sug-gests that such claims must reach a “final decision” in state court before any federal court can step in. Even if a state court claim might potentially remedy the violation of federal rights, a violation giving rise to a federal cause of action has still occurred. Similarly, the possibility that a state court might remedy a Tak-ings Clause violation by providing compensation does not negate the brute fact of the violation. 2. State courts have no greater expertise with Takings Clause issues than on many other constitutional rights claims. The “expertise” rationale for Williamson County’s rule fares no better. It may be true that state judges know more than federal judges about “complex fac-tual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.” But the same can be said of issues that arise in many cases involving other constitutional rights. See Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. Chi. Legal Forum 1, 28-31 (giving numerous examples). This possibility has never been sufficient grounds for denying a plaintiff access to federal review. 14 For example, some Establishment Clause claims require a determination of whether a “reasonable ob-server . . . aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which [the conduct oc-curred]” would view the practice as communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). State judges likely have a more detailed knowledge of their com-munity’s perceptions than federal judges. Yet these supposed facts, whether true or false, do not prevent aggrieved parties from bringing Establishment Clause claims in federal court. Similarly, this Court has ruled that “the constitu-tional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such ad-vocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Whether any given speech is likely to incite “imminent lawless action” may well depend on varia-tions in local conditions. Although state judges may be best informed about such conditions, free speech claims are not thereby consigned to state courts. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in San Remo, “the Court has not explained why we should hand au-thority over federal takings claims to state courts, based simply on their relative familiarity with local land-use decisions and proceedings, while allowing plaintiffs to proceed directly to federal court in cases involving, for example, challenges to municipal land-use regulations based on the First Amendment or the 15 Equal Protection Clause.” 545 U.S. at 350-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Moreover, there is no reason to assume that state judges necessarily have greater knowledge of Takings Clause and other property rights issues than federal judges. They may have greater knowledge of local conditions and regulations, but the latter may have greater knowledge of relevant federal jurisprudence. Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment at 102-03. III. EVEN IF THIS COURT DECLINES TO OVERRULE WILLIAMSON COUNTY, IT SHOULD STILL ALLOW FEDERAL COURT FILINGS IN CASES WHERE STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS ARE FUTILE Even if the Court does not overrule Williamson County, it should allow federal adjudication of cases where state proceedings would be futile because there is no available state remedy. Williamson County ap-plies only in situations where the state has estab-lished a “reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.” 473 U.S. at 194. The procedures available to these plaintiffs fall far short of that standard when the state, in cases like the pre-sent one, does not allow inverse condemnation actions intended to obtain compensation. See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997) (holding that there is no inverse condemnation action under California law in cases challenging rent-control ordinances). A federal claim cannot possibly be dismissed as “premature” if there is no chance whatsoever of success in state court. There is also a fundamental injustice in tolerating the violation of a constitutional right that does not elicit any remedy in either a state or federal proceed-16 ing. It goes against the bedrock principle “that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.’” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quotation omitted). “The government of the United States has been em-phatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high ap-pellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the viola-tion of a vested legal right.” Id. IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION HIGH-LIGHTS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN WIL-LIAMSON COUNTY AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Williamson County contravenes the fundamental policy objectives of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute en-acted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, Section 1983 interpose[s] the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial’ [and] open[s] the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the Nation. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39, 242 (1972). In other words, the statute’s purpose is to protect fed-eral constitutional and statutory rights against in-fringement by state and local governments. More-over, Section 1983’s plain language and legislative history make clear that federal courts must make civil remedies available to plaintiffs who are deprived of their federal rights “under color of” state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district 17 courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-tions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Accordingly, Williamson County’s requirement that federal takings claims—claims that Fifth Amendment rights have been vio-lated—be relegated to state courts cannot be recon-ciled with the plain language and well-understood purpose of Section 1983. First, the plain language of Section 1983 broadly encompasses all federal rights: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in eq-uity, or other proper proceeding for redress. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the statute provides no ba-sis to cordon off property rights, including those un-der the Takings Clause, from all other constitutional rights for which an aggrieved plaintiff has an imme-diate right to sue in federal court. Second, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, Section 1983’s legislative history shows that the stat-ute was intended to create a federal cause of action for “every person” whose constitutional rights were violated by state or local governments—and to vest in the federal courts original jurisdiction over those claims. See, e.g., Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982) (stating that Congress intended Sec-tion 1983 to “throw open the doors of the United 18 States courts” to individuals who were threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of consti-tutional rights and to provide individuals who had been deprived of their federal rights with “immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any state law to the contrary”) (emphasis added). The impetus for the legislation was a message President Grant sent to Congress on March 23, 1871: A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and property insecure. . . . The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate. . . . I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and prop-erty, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Patsy and Monroe also refer to statements several members of Congress made when the Act was under consideration. Without exception, they underscore Congress’ intent to provide a federal court remedy for state and local government violations of constitu-tional rights, including property rights. Two mem-bers of Congress spoke specifically about the impor-tance of providing direct access to federal courts: Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the Senate, stated in his closing remarks that . . . the Supreme Court decided . . . that it was the solemn duty of Congress under the Consti-tution to secure to the individual, in spite of 19 the State, or with its aid, as the case may be, precisely the rights that the Constitution gave him, and that there should be no intermediate authority to arrest or oppose the direct per-formance of this duty by Congress. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added). Rep. Elliott stated that the critical issue was whether “the Gov-ernment of the United States [has] the right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exercise of his vested rights as an American citizen by . . . the assertion of immediate jurisdiction through its courts, without the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domiciled.” Id. (emphasis added). Patsy also notes that “a major factor motivating the expan-sion of federal jurisdiction through [Section 1983] was the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authori-ties had been unable or unwilling to protect the con-stitutional rights of individuals or to punish those who violated those rights.” Id. at 505. Other members expressed Congress’ dominant concern: that states were unable to protect the peo-ple’s constitutional rights. As Senator Osborn put it, That the State courts in the several States have been unable to enforce the criminal laws of their respective States or to suppress the disorders existing, and in fact that the preser-vation of life and property in many sections of the country is beyond the power of the State government, is a sufficient reason why Con-gress should . . . enact the laws necessary for the protection of citizens of the United States. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added). Senator Kerr added that “[t]his section gives to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights, privi-20 leges, or immunities of person or property, a civil ac-tion for damages against the wrongdoer in the Fed-eral courts.“ Id. at 178-79 (emphasis added). And Representative Lowe said, records of the (state) tribunals are searched in vain for evidence of effective redress (of feder-ally secured rights) . . . . What less than this (the Civil Rights Act of 1871) will afford an adequate remedy? The Federal Government cannot serve a writ of mandamus upon State Executives or upon State courts to compel them to protect the rights, privileges and im-munities of citizens . . . . The case has arisen . . . when the Federal Government must resort to its own agencies to carry its own authority into execution. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240. Rep. Beatty of Ohio said, certain States have denied to persons within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . . [M]en were murdered, houses were burned, women were outraged, men were scourged, and officers of the law shot down; and the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment or afford pro-tection or redress to the outraged and inno-cent. The State, from lack of power or inclina-tion, practically denied the equal protection of the law to these persons. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 505. Patsy also noted that juries complicated issues in state courts: “Of primary im-portance to the exhaustion question was the mistrust that the 1871 Congress held for the factfinding proc-esses of state institutions.” Id. at 506. It quoted the testimony of Justice Thomas Settle of the North 21 Carolina Supreme Court, before the House Judiciary Committee (“The defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries”); and noted that “[t]his Congress believed that federal courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to the existing de-fects in the factfinding processes of the state courts.” Id. The House Judiciary Committee also investigated and made findings regarding the inability of state au-thorities to protect constitutional rights. Id. at 505. Based on the foregoing, “[i]t [was] clear from the floor debates surrounding the Act that Congress not only intended to create a federal forum for such ac-tions, but that both the supporters and the opponents of the amendment expected the federal courts to be the primary forum in which the newly created cause of action would be litigated.” Bryce M. Baird, Federal Court Abstention in Civil Rights Cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the New Doctrine of Civil Rights Ab-stention, 42 BUFFALO L. REV. 501, 506-07, 510 (1994) (“Congress intended, and fully expected, that the fed-eral courts would be the primary guarantors of fed-eral rights”). And the Supreme Court ultimately con-cluded, The Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . . [was a] crucial ingredient[ ] in the basic alteration of our fed-eral system . . . . During that time, the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor of the basic federal rights of indi-viduals against incursions by state power. [I]n passing [Section 1983], Congress assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protect-ing constitutional rights. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 503. 22 Despite Section 1983’s plain language and evident purpose to protect constitutional rights by providing immediate access to federal courts for plaintiffs whose federal rights have been violated, these plain-tiffs have been shut out because Williamson County eviscerated Section 1983 and read Patsy so narrowly as to eliminate it from the law. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192 (drawing a distinction between ex-haustion and finality to avoid applying Patsy). Cases like Colony Cove cry out for an appropriate federal remedy to the deficiencies of state law. The Colony Cove plaintiffs cannot obtain an appropriate remedy in California state court. Under its Byzantine proce-dures, California refuses to recognize or allow any remedy offering just compensation for the takings it has perpetrated against the plaintiffs. It adds to that basic denial the procedural indignity of forcing plain-tiffs to seek redress from the same officials whom they charged with violating their rights. See, e.g., Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 353 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 2004). California’s institutional arrangements are an af-front to Section 1983’s core premise: to protect plain-tiffs from having to appeal to the same state officials whose decisions caused their original injury. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180. Congress was “abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privi-leges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.” Id. (emphasis added). This federal court remedy was crafted as a substitute for state remedies, irrespective 23 of their availability. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 110 (1980) (“Congress passed [Section 1983] in order to substitute a federal forum for the ineffective, al-though plainly available, state remedies”); Galland v. City of Clovis, 16 P.3d 130, 161 (Cal. 2001) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“The thrust of [the Court’s] decisions is that, far from relegating plaintiffs to the same cor-rupt system that inflicted their injury, section 1983 exists to give plaintiffs an adjudicative alternative that will ensure protection of their rights”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988) (“there is simply no reason to suppose that Congress . . . contemplated that those who sought to vindicate their federal rights . . . could be required to seek redress in the first instance from the very state officials whose hos-tility to those rights precipitated their injuries”). Williamson County cannot be reconciled with the plain language or legislative history of Section 1983. It also stands in stark contrast to the Court’s deci-sions regarding civil rights other than property rights.4 We respectfully ask the Court to take this opportunity to bring consistency to its Section 1983 jurisprudence by overturning Williamson County. 4See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (§ 1983 al-lows plaintiffs to seek money damages from government officials who violated their constitutional or statutory rights); Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011) (post-conviction claim for DNA testing may be properly pursued in § 1983 action); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (§ 1983 equal pro-tection claims may be brought in federal court against individu-als as well as state entities); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2006) (allowing § 1983 challenges to conditions of confinement under Eighth Amendment without exhausting state remedies). 24 CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted, ILYA SHAPIRO Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20001 (202) 842-0200 ishapiro@cato.org ILYA SOMIN Counsel of Record GMU School of Law 3301 Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA 22201 (703) 993-8069 isomin@gmu.edu ELIZABETH MILITO NFIB Small Business Legal Center 1201 F St., N.W. Washington, DC 20004 (202) 406-4443 NICK DRANIAS Goldwater Institute Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation 500 E. Coronado Rd. Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 462-5000 MARTIN J. NEWHOUSE JOHN PAGLIARO New England Legal Foundation 150 Lincoln Street Boston, MA 02110-2504 (617) 695-3660 DANA BERLINER SCOTT BULLOCK Institute for Justice 901 N. Glebe Rd., Ste. 900 Arlington, VA 22203 (703) 682-9320 Counsel for Amici Curiae September 14, 2011