Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/449/449/1640339/
Timestamp: 2020-05-29 08:00:40
Document Index: 595043654

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 1382', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 41', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 1385', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23']

United Farm Workers Nat. Union v. Babbitt, 449 F. Supp. 449 (D. Ariz. 1978) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › District Courts › Arizona › District of Arizona › 1978 › United Farm Workers Nat. Union v. Babbitt
United Farm Workers Nat. Union v. Babbitt, 449 F. Supp. 449 (D. Ariz. 1978)
U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona - 449 F. Supp. 449 (D. Ariz. 1978)
449 F. Supp. 449 (1978)
UNITED FARM WORKERS NATIONAL UNION on behalf of itself and its members, et al., Plaintiffs,
Bruce BABBITT, Governor of the State of Arizona, et al., Defendants, Arizona Farm Bureau Federation, an Arizona Corporation, et al., Intervenors.
*450 Michael W. L. McCrory, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.
John A. La Sota Jr., Atty. Gen. of Ariz., Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, Phoenix, Ariz., for intervenors-applicants.
Provisions of the United States Constitution which plaintiffs claim are violated by the Act are the First and Fourteenth Amendments with respect to specific provisions *451 of the Act, which provisions it is alleged violate freedom of speech and assembly and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
In particular, plaintiffs' arguments deal with nine separate issues and at least as many provisions of the AERA in support of their contention that the AERA is unconstitutional. Those issues and the statutory provisions dealt with are: (1) A.R.S. § 23-1385(B) (6) and (7) [generally dealing with secondary boycotts as an unfair labor practice]; (2) A.R.S. § 23-1385(B) (8) [publicity directed at the ultimate consumer regarding nonuse of agricultural product as an unfair labor practice]; (3) A.R.S. § 23-1385(B) (12) [recognitional picketing as an unfair labor practice]; (4) A.R.S. § 23-1389 [employee representation and election procedures]; (5) A.R.S. § 23-1385(C) [access by union to workers on employer property]; (6) A.R.S. § 23-1382(1) [exclusion of stitchers and haulers from AERA]; (7) A.R.S. §§ 23-1384, 23-1385(B) (11), 23-1385(D) [elimination of "management rights" from bargaining process]; (8) A.R.S. §§ 23-1385(B) (13), 23-1393(B) [restriction and prohibition against striking and picketing]; and finally, (9) A.R.S. § 23-1392 [criminal penalties for violation of the Act].
Defendants further claim that all testimony and other evidence received by this Court during the course of a four day non-jury trial on January 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1977, should be rejected by this Court as immaterial and completely conjectural and consisting of legal conclusions rather than factual evidence even opinions and testimony given by the defendants' own experts.
A pertinent example would be the opinions expressed by the experts of both sides as to time periods to be expected in the operation of various provisions of the Act, the length of growing seasons, facts growing out of their personal experiences with organizing unions, or in the operation of analogous statutes, i. e., the National Labor Relations Act or the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act.
Again as to this last point, i. e., testimony concerning operation of the analogous statutes, what is admissible as to this line of testimony is not an opinion of the expert as to the legal effect of the particular provision of the AERA, but rather, given a particular interpretation of a provision, a hypothetical if you will as to the legal effect of a provision, the opinion of the expert as to the practical effect of such an interpretation based on his previous experience and expertise is admissible if the legal premise on which the question is based is accepted by the court. Even if a hypothetical question as such is not asked, but it is obvious that the opinion of the expert is based on a certain interpretation of a statutory provision, which the court accepts as the appropriate interpretation, then the interpretation and resultant opinion testimony based on this interpretation is admissible. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 286-87 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. School District 151, etc., 404 F.2d 1125, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1968); Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 184 (1966).
*452 Evidence presented during the four day trial was introduced relative to A.R.S. §§ 23-1384, 1385(A) (5), 1385(B) (11), 1385(D), 1389, and on the plaintiffs' claim that the exclusion of stitchers and haulers and sixteen-year olds from the AERA, § 1382(1) and 1382(1) (g), was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause as well as a similar claim that exclusion of those farm workers who did not work for the same employer the previous calendar year from representation elections was likewise a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Plaintiffs' response to defendants' Article III attack is that such attack is not valid because of the "Stipulation Regarding Enforcement of the Act," filed by the parties, which reflects some seven suits have been filed against the plaintiff (U.F.W.) and its members and supporters based on sections of the AERA, and that as a result speech activities have been enjoined including handbilling and oral conversations on three occasions by an ex parte temporary restraining order without notice or hearing.
As the court said in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 67 S. Ct. 1409, 91 L. Ed. 1666 (1947), a case or controversy is created by a showing that one is injured by the statute's operation or that a construction of the statute to avoid the constitutional questions is impossible. Certainly a challenge for facial invalidity meets the Rescue Army test.
§ 23-1392. Penalties.
Any person who willfully resists, prevents, impedes or interferes with any members of the board or any of its agents or agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this article, or who violates *453 any provision of this article is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Provided, however, that none of the provisions of this section shall apply to any activities carried on outside the state of Arizona.
It would appear on the face of this provision of the AERA that it cuts across and covers the entire Act, not just a limited area where a criminal penalty might be acceptable. It says in plain English that it applies to "any person" and further to any person "who violates any provision of this article is guilty of a misdemeanor . .."
Considering the enormous variety of activities covered by the Act, and the fact that (as will be more fully discussed later) many of these involve First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights, it is clearly a statutory provision so vague that men of common intelligence can only guess at its meaning. Conduct can only be prohibited and punished by certain, clear statutes, and such precision is necessary so that "the ordinary person can know how to avoid unlawful conduct." U. S. v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 68 S. Ct. 331, 92 L. Ed. 297 (1948). Even closer scrutiny is warranted where the regulation covers freedom of speech. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 86 S. Ct. 1407, 16 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1966).
In an area where application of a penal statute may restrict freedoms protected against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the U. S. Supreme Court has been constantly vigilant and protective of these rights.
The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute, susceptible of sweeping and improper application. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-3, 83 S. Ct. 328, 338, 9 L. Ed. 405 (1963).
There is no way for anyone to guess whether criminal provisions will apply to any particular conduct, in advance, and it is clear that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and does not adequately define prohibited conduct and is, therefore, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 88 S. Ct. 184, 19 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S. Ct. 1238, 16 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1966); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958); Conally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926).
Recently the U. S. Supreme Court considered the case or controversy issue in the context of a challenge to a criminal statute. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1973), the Supreme Court addressed the question whether a licensed physician's challenge to a Georgia anti-abortion statute presented a justiciable controversy. In that case, there was no record of a pending or threatened criminal prosecution and the Act had not been enforced against the plaintiffs. Still the court found a controversy did exist and reversed the lower court's dismissal saying:
The physician is the one against whom these criminal statutes directly operate in the event he procures an abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions and conditions. The physicians-appellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. They *454 should not be required to await and undergo criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. Crossen v. Breckenbridge, 446 F.2d 833, 839, 839-840 (6th Cir. 1971); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 (Kan.1972).
Yet courts have found case or controversies when criminal statutes were challenged as overbroad even before the acts went into effect or there had been any enforcement. Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee v. F.B.I., 507 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Brannon, 399 F. Supp. 133, aff'd 535 F.2d 1249 (4th Cir. 1975); Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F. Supp. 430 (D.Alaska 1974); Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Associated Students, University of California at Riverside v. Attorney General of the United States, 368 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal.1973); Valley Health Systems v. City of Racine, 369 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.Wis.1973); Mortillaro v. State of Louisiana, 356 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.La.1972).
Where it is not possible to separate that part of a law which is unconstitutional from the rest of the law, the whole law fails. Lynch v. U. S., 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. Ed. 1434 (1934); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 822 (1922); Harrison v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 232 U.S. 318, 34 S. Ct. 333, 58 L. Ed. 621 (1914); Gherma v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 P. 494 (1915).
In laws having these two characteristics, the usual approach of constitutional adjudication gradually cutting away the unconstitutional aspects of a statute by invalidating its improper applications case by case does not respond sufficiently *455 to the peculiar vulnerable character of activities protected by the first amendment. For an "overbroad" law of the sort described here "hangs over [people's] heads like a Sword of Damocles." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1974). That judges will ultimately rescue those whose conduct in retrospect is held protected is not enough, "for the value of a Sword of Damocles is that it hangs not that it drops." The resulting deterrent to protected speech is not effectively removed if "the contours of regulation would have to be hammered out case-by-case and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution [or other sanctions] to determine the proper scope of regulation. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1965). The only solution, then, is to strike down such an overbroad law altogether. . . . This result may be understood as an exception to the rule that individuals are not ordinarily permitted to litigate the rights of third parties, since an individual whose conduct may not itself be protected by the first amendment is awarded a judicial victory on the claim of a law's potential unconstitutional applications to the conduct of persons not before the court. American Constitutional Law, Laurence H. Tribe, The Foundation Press, 1978.
After consideration of the many-pronged attack made by plaintiffs on the constitutionality of the various provisions of the AERA, and the defendants' response thereto, this Court finds and concludes that the Agricultural Employment Relations Act, A.R.S. §§ 23-1381, et sequence, is unconstitutional in its entirety for the reason that A.R.S. §§ 23-1385(B) (8), 23-1392, 23-1393(B) are unconstitutional and void on their face, and A.R.S. §§ 23-1385(C) and 23-1389 are likewise unconstitutional when considered in context with the testimony and other evidence presented, and these sections are found to be in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and in violation of the freedom of speech and assembly provisions and of the due process and equal protection clauses with A.R.S. § 23-1393(B) also found to be in violation of the Seventh Amendment providing for right to trial by jury and with the rest of the Act falling by reason of its inseparability and inoperability apart from the provisions found to be invalid.
*456 The grape harvest occurs once annually and lasts from four to six weeks with a period of peak employment of three to four weeks.
Any labor organization seeking to organize Arizona agricultural workers employed in these industries must by reason of provisions of the AERA relating to the representation and election provisions of the AERA, and because of the very nature of the organizational process based on previous experience with analogous statutes, e. g., National Labor Relations Act and the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, take certain periods of time to accomplish certain organizational goals.
The election provisions of the AERA call for a Board investigation of the petition, the setting and holding of a pre-election hearing upon demand of the employer, decision *457 of issues raised at the hearing, and granting the employer ten days to provide a list of employees to the Board and the union.
Having stated these facts, our consideration turns naturally to that provision of the Act most important to a consideration of its constitutionality. This is A.R.S. § 23-1389 (employee representation, recognition, and election procedures). For a full analysis of this point as well as an exhaustive analysis of the AERA, see: "State Regulation of Agricultural Labor Relations The Arizona Farm Labor Law an Interpretive and Comparative Analysis." Warren H. Cohen, Jonathan Rose. Law and the Social Order, 1973, pp. 313 through 431, at 322.
Such a stated policy is but a recognition of the First Amendment right to free speech, to assemble peaceably, and the due process right of all in America who desire to do so to participate and retain membership in a union. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, ex rel. Paterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958); Hagne v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939); NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937); Lontine, et al., v. Van Cleave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973); American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1945). See also "A Preliminary Survey of the Arizona Farm Labor Act," Robert A. Kerry, Arizona Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 766 at 801.
*458 The section in question reads as follows:
E. In determining whether or not a question of representation exists, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief *459 sought. In no case shall the board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with § 23-1390.
Representation and recognition by the union, and the requirement that an employer bargain with the union, can only be achieved if the union is chosen to represent the employees through the election procedures set out in the A.R.S. § 23-1385(A) (5). Before an election can be held, the union must first demand and be denied recognition *460 by the employer. A.R.S. § 23-1389(C) (1). There is no time set out in the law within which the employer must answer this request.
If the employer does not petition for an election, and denies a request for recognition, then the union must petition for an election showing that at least thirty percent of the employees in the unit wish to be represented by the union. A.R.S. § 23-1389(C) (1). If the AERA Board has reasonable cause to believe that a sufficient number of workers desire to have a union to represent them to justify an election, it will set a pre-election hearing. Again no time period is provided in the Act for how soon the Board must act. Since time for such notice is not provided, the general application of the Arizona Administrative Procedure Act stamps a twenty day period (A.R.S. § 41-1009) on how soon the hearing will be held.
Once the Board has fixed the time for a union election, the employer has ten days to submit to the Board a list of his employees eligible to vote. A.R.S. § 23-1389(I). Then the election must be by secret ballot. If the union wins a majority of the votes cast, it will be certified by the Board as the representative for that unit and the employer will be required to bargain collectively with the union. § 23-1385(A) (5); see also § 23-1385(D).
In any event, it is also clear from these provisions that many other migratory workers could not vote, even though presently employed, simply because they had not worked for the employer in a particular unit, either for six months or at any time during the preceding calendar yearthe practical effect being that a particular worker must be employed during two successive harvests before being entitled to vote.
Groups of workers may thus be hired for the same unit at different times of the year, and yet an election among one group will bar an election by a group hired later in the year. An employer could, for example, *461 respond to a petition for an election filed by a small minority of his permanent, year-round employees, and if they should vote for no-union, then no matter how many hundreds or thousands of employees that employer hires for that unit, thereafter they are barred from holding another election for twelve monthsclearly an absolute frustration of their right of free association.
Defendants have argued that even if an election were held before or after the peak period, the plaintiff union could object on the grounds that a non-representative electorate selected the collective bargaining representative. But here again, as if in anticipation of this kind of reaction, A.R.S. § 23-1385(B) (12) prohibits picketing or boycotting "(b) Where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under § 23-1389 has been conducted." or "(c) Where a petition has been filed under § 23-1389."
This problem has been well recognized by the courts, and where an election is not a feasible alternative, the NLRA and the courts have recognized the validity of informal methods of designating a union for ordering collective bargaining and an essential method of preserving the rights of employees. Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 95 S. Ct. 429, 42 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1974); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S. Ct. 1918, 23 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1969); Bishop v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Big Three Industries, 497 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Kaiser Agr. Chem. Div. of Kaiser A & C Corp., 473 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1973); J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Gilistan Division v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Drives Inc., 440 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1971).
The Ninth Circuit, in following NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, noted that without ultimate authority to order collective bargaining regardless of election results, the statutory procedures themselves become an aid to an employer's attempt to prevent unionization. NLRB v. L. B. Forster Co., 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969).
We find this to be true of three sections: A.R.S. § 23-1385(B) (8), A.R.S. § 23-1385(C), and A.R.S. § 23-1393(B).
8. To induce or encourage the ultimate consumer of any agricultural product to refrain from purchasing, consuming or using such agricultural product by the use of dishonest, untruthful and deceptive publicity. Permissible inducement or encouragement within the meaning of this section means truthful, honest and nondeceptive publicity which identifies the agricultural product produced by an agricultural employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute. Permissible inducement or encouragement does not include publicity directed against any trademark, trade name or generic name which may include agricultural *462 products of another producer or user of such trademark, trade name or generic name.
As to the first requisite, the U. S. Supreme Court has held on many occasions that truthfulness is not a prerequisite to First Amendment protection.
In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S. Ct. 1575, 29 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971), the court said:
It is elementary, of course, that in a case of this kind the courts do not concern themselves with the truth or validity of the publication. Under Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 [51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931)], the injunction, so far as it imposes prior restraint on speech and publication, constitutes an impermissible restraint on first amendment rights.
Again in N. Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), the court also indicated that First Amendment protections apply to other than just truthful statements.
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truthwhether administered by judges, juries or administrative officialsand especially one that puts the burden on proving the truth to the speaker. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 [78 S. Ct. 1332, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460, 1472 (1958)]. The constitutional protection does not turn upon the "truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 [83 S. Ct. 328, 344, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405] (1963).
That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the "breathing space" that they "need to survive," (citing case) was also recognized by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Sweeney v. Paterson, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 23, 24, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942), cert. denied 317 U.S. 678 [63 S. Ct. 160, 87 L. Ed. 544] (1942).
See also Vanesco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (D.C.N.Y.1975), aff'd without opinion 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S. Ct. 763, 46 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1976). The court in Vanesco held that a statute prohibiting "deliberate misrepresentations" and regulations prohibiting "misrepresentations" in political campaigns, which on the face of the statute were not based on a finding of actual malice, was an overbroad infringement upon First Amendment rights and was unconstitutional on its face.
*463 The statute here involved likewise contains no intent requirement, and in fact is even broader since it is not limited to "deliberate" misrepresentation.
Although defendants, as to this particular provision and with so many others, are always proposing the narrowest interpretation possible, and suggesting that this is the way that this, and many other provisions, should be interpreted to save constitutionality of a statute, yet, as has been said, where First Amendment rights are involved, this prohibition in this section of the statute involving as it does a prior restraint on free speech, must be narrowly drawn, and the speaker should not be "chilled" by the potential that some interpretation of his expression concerning which he has no knowledge may make his statement "untruthful." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 408 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573-74, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963); Cafeteria Workers Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295, 64 S. Ct. 126, 88 L. Ed. 58 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
The next questionable part of this section, namely A.R.S. § 23-1385(B) (8), is that which limits consumer picketing by the union solely to situations in which the union has a primary dispute with a particular grower and the picket signs must identify that grower. However, if that particular grower with whom the union has a primary dispute sells to a trade association which utilizes a trade name on the products sold which include the particular grower's product, the union is forbidden in its consumer picketing from referring to that trade name.
However, it must be noted that A.R.S. § 23-1382.6 is the only definition of "dispute," and it is there defined as ". . . any controversy between an agricultural employer and his agricultural employees . . .." Construing A.R.S. § 1385(B) (8) in light of A.R.S. § 23-1382.6 means that a labor organization is permitted to conduct picketing against a particular employer only if that employer's employees have a controversy over terms and conditions of employment.
In AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941), the Illinois Supreme Court had enjoined picketing by a labor union on the ground that there was no dispute between the employer and his immediate employees. The United States Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that an injunction was inconsistent with "the right to free discussion" and therefore unconstitutional. It follows that if a primary dispute is not required for primary picketing, it cannot be made a requirement for secondary picketing. The same "right to free discussion" is abridged, and it is not outweighed by the State's interest in protecting the secondary employer since the existence of a primary dispute has no relation to whether the secondary employer is being subjected to economic coercion. See also: Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957), where the Arizona Supreme Court held unconstitutional A.R.S. § 23-1322 which required a "bona fide dispute regarding wages and working conditions" between an employer and a majority of his employees as a prerequisite to lawful picketing. See also: NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 84 S. Ct. 1063, 12 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1964).
This section of A.R.S. § 23-1385(B) (8) therefore is invalid on its face as a violation of the free speech provision of the First Amendment to the Constitution.
*464 C. . . . No employer shall be required to furnish or make available to a labor organization, and no labor organization shall be required to furnish or make available to an employer, materials, information, time, or facilities (emphasis added) to enable such employer or labor organization, as the case may be, to communicate with employees of the employer, members of the labor organization, its supporters, or adherents.
Even defendants agree that there must be an accommodation between organizational rights and property rights by citing Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 92 S. Ct. 2238, 33 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1972), but no such accommodation is permitted by this section of the statute.
Beginning with Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276, 90 L. Ed. 265 (1946), which held that ownership of property didn't always mean absolute domain and that private property was not per se immune from a constitutional protection of people on or entering upon property, the courts continued to assert this same principle.
In Peterson v. Talisman Sugar Co., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973), the court found that a labor camp was more analagous to the traditional "company town" than shopping centers discussed in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 88 S. Ct. 1601, 20 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1971); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1976); and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 33 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1971) relied upon by defendants.
The court in Peterson v. Talisman Sugar Co., supra, went on to hold that a labor camp was a functional equivalent of a municipality and the company had to accommodate its property rights to the extent necessary to allow the free flow of ideas and information between the union and the migrant workers. See also: Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975); United Farm Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Mel Finerman Co., 364 F. Supp. 326 (D.Colo.1973); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind.1972); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.Mich.1971); "First Amendment and the Problems of Access to Migrant Labor Camps After Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner," 61 Cornell L.Rev. 560 (1976).
*465 However, as to alternative means of communication, A.R.S. § 23-1389(I) provides that an employer need only provide a list of names of the people working for him, and this, taken in conjunction with A.R.S. § 23-1385(C)'s provision which states that no employer shall be required to furnish or make available information to enable a union to communicate with employees, effectively deprives the union of any alternative form of communication due to the migrant nature of the workers.
*466 2. If the parties within two days after the issuance of the order cannot agree upon an arbitrator to decide the issues, the Court "shall" appoint one "to decide the unresolved issues."
The effect of the section is apparent, if the union should insist under the "employees' rights" section (A.R.S. § 23-1383) that they have a right to bargain concerning an issue which is contrary to that of the employer's position under the "management rights" sections (A.R.S. §§ 23-1384, 23-1385(B) (11), 23-1385(D)), then any resultant strike by the union in support of their position can be unilaterally deemed "unlawful" by the employer who can, without the consent of the union, submit the dispute to binding arbitration by an outsider. The act then mandates the Court to submit the matter to a stranger and deprives the Court of further jurisdiction to hear the matter on its merits.
Such unilateral compulsory arbitration constitutes a clear denial of due process under the law for when the effect of statutes has been to coerce parties to submit to arbitration, without agreement or assent on their part to do so, the courts have declared them unconstitutional [Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 44 S. Ct. 323, 68 L. Ed. 686 (1924); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103 (1923); Graves v. Northern P. R. Co., 5 Mont. 556, 6 P. 16 (1885)] as depriving parties of liberty and property without due process of law, 55 A.L.R.2d 445, 510, or as depriving parties of constitutional right to a trial by jury. Re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, app. dismissed, 350 U.S. 858, 76 S. Ct. 105, 100 L. Ed. 762 (1955).
In light of the findings of this Court,
IT IS ORDERED that a permanent injunction shall issue enjoining defendants from applying or enforcing any of the provisions of A.R.S. § 23-1381, et seq.
The Court having found that the Agricultural Employment Relations Act, A.R.S. § 23-1381, et sequence, is unconstitutional in its entirety for the reason that A.R.S. §§ 23-1385(B) (8), 23-1392, 23-1393(B) are unconstitutional and void on their face, and A.R.S. §§ 23-1385(C) and 23-1389 are likewise unconstitutional when considered in *467 context with the testimony and other evidence presented, and these sections having been found to be in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and in violation of the freedom of speech and assembly provisions and of the due process and equal protection clauses with A.R.S. § 23-1393(B) also found to be in violation of the Seventh Amendment providing for right to trial by jury and with the rest of the Act falling by reason of its inseparability and inoperability apart from the provisions found to be invalid,