Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/857/414/114841/
Timestamp: 2019-10-24 05:00:04
Document Index: 583362546

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2314', '§ 5861', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 802', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Clyde E. Dickerson, Defendant-appellant, 857 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1988) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1988 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Clyde E. Dickerson, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Clyde E. Dickerson, Defendant-appellant, 857 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1988)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 857 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1988) Argued May 20, 1988. Decided Sept. 15, 1988. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 26, 1988
The appellant, Clyde E. Dickerson, was charged in a three-count indictment with interstate transportation of stolen property (18 U.S.C. § 2314), possession of an unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1)). The appellant pleaded guilty to Count I, and was convicted on Counts II and III by a jury trial. He was sentenced to a five-year term of incarceration for Count I, and an eight-year term for Count II to run concurrently with the sentence on Count I. On Count III, the appellant was sentenced to a term of four years to run concurrently to the sentences imposed on Counts II and III, and an additional fifteen-year term pursuant to the enhancement provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1)1 to run consecutively to the sentences on Counts II and III. We note what may be an ambiguity between the sentences contained in the Commitment Order and the statements of the trial judge when he was imposing the sentences in open court.2
On appeal, the appellant contends that the district court violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment by imposing both a four-year sentence under Sec. 922(g) and an additional fifteen-year term under Sec. 924(e) (1). Dickerson also claims that the district court erred in applying the Sec. 924(e) (1) sentencing enhancement provision to him. We conclude that while the trial judge could not impose two separate sentences on Count III, he remains free to impose the sentencing enhancement provision of Sec. 924(e).
* In the district court, the Government filed a pre-trial Amended Information which charged the appellant with three previous offenses for burglary, thus subjecting him to the Sec. 924(e) (1) enhancement provision. Section 924(e) applies to felons who have violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).3 According to Sec. 924(e) (1):
In its pre-trial Amended Information, the Government charged the appellant with three prior burglary convictions.4 The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the enhancement provision, claiming that burglary does not constitute a "violent felony" which is subject to Sec. 924(e). The district court denied the appellant's motion in a pre-trial conference. After the trial and prior to sentencing, the district court conducted a hearing which enabled the appellant to present evidence of the non-violent character of his prior burglary convictions. However, the district court found that the appellant's past convictions satisfied the requirements of Sec. 924(e) (1). Sentencing Tr. at 20. The district court then proceeded to sentence the appellant to an additional, consecutive fifteen-year term of imprisonment for Count III, without vacating the original four-year term imposed on the same count.
On appeal, the appellant contends that the district court violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment by subjecting him to multiple punishments for Count III. The Double Jeopardy clause provides three fundamental protections. "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969) (footnotes omitted). See also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688-89, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436, 63 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1980) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause at the very least precludes federal courts from imposing consecutive sentences unless authorized by Congress to do so.").
445 U.S. at 689, 100 S. Ct. at 1436. See also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S. Ct. 1280, 1285, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405 (1958) ("Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, ... these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.").
Consequently, in analyzing the defendant's claim here, we must analyze the language of Sec. 9245 to determine the legislative intent. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S. Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1971); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 1294, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975) (analyzing congressional intent to discern whether a substantive violation of a federal gambling statute should be considered merged with the conspiracy violation). As this Court has emphasized previously, " [w]here the language and intent of the statute is clear, courts are without the authority to engage in any creative rewriting of a provision." Reed v. United States, 743 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135, 105 S. Ct. 2673, 86 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1985). See also United States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084, 1093 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that judicial inquiry into legislative intent usually ends when the language of the statute is unambiguous).
The appellant contends that Sec. 924 is an enhancement provision to assess punishment for violations of Sec. 922(g). While we acknowledge that other circuits have construed Sec. 924 to define a separate offense, see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 801 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brewer, 841 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1988), this Court has rejected such an interpretation of the statute. We have concluded that the language of Sec. 924(e) (1) prescribes a specific punishment for recidivists. Instead of authorizing a separate punishment for a separate offense, we have determined that Sec. 924(e) (1) is a sentencing enhancement provision for Sec. 922(g). On its face, Sec. 924 is entitled a "Penalties" provision. Section 924(e) (1) specifically applies to any "person who violates Sec. 922(g)." Section 924 does not indicate that it is a separate offense, but explicitly appears to enhance Sec. 922. In our recent decision in United States v. Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1988), we noted: "As revised, the statute [referring to both Secs. 922 and 924] clearly makes possession of weapons by all convicted felons a single offense, with additional convictions relevant only for sentencing." Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
Our interpretation accords with other courts of appeal that have analyzed the antecedent statutes to Secs. 922 and 924. The Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have all interpreted the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 ("ACCA"),6 which has been incorporated into Sec. 924(e), as a sentence enhancement provision. See United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 110, 98 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1987); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 1741, 100 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1988); United States v. Rush, 840 F.2d 574 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 2908, 101 L. Ed. 2d 940 (1988); United States v. West, 826 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gregg, 803 F.2d 568, 570 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 920, 107 S. Ct. 1379, 94 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1987); United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 715, 98 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1988).
By providing a means whereby a convicted criminal's past record becomes a factor in the sentencing process, Congress followed the modern penological philosophy that "the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949). To that end, Congress is well within its rights to direct stiffer punishments for convicted felons with a previous record for violent felonies.
Having concluded that Congress intended Sec. 924 to be a sentence enhancing provision rather than a separate offense, we must ascertain whether the trial judge exceeded his authority when he sentenced the appellant to consecutive four-year and fifteen-year terms for Count III. "If a federal court exceeds its own authority by imposing multiple punishments not authorized by Congress, it violates not only the specific guarantee against double jeopardy, but also the constitutional principle of separation of powers in a manner that trenches particularly harshly on individual liberty." Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689, 100 S. Ct. at 1436. Clearly, a sentence which fails to comply with the statute which authorizes it is erroneous and may be set aside on appeal. See Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166, 67 S. Ct. 645, 648, 91 L. Ed. 818 (1947).
In the context of multiple sentences which have been imposed for a single offense, "the role of the constitutional guarantee [against Double Jeopardy] is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977). See also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1145, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2540, 81 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1984).
In the case before us, it is clear that the trial judge could only impose one sentence for the single offense at issue in Count III. Because he has issued two consecutive sentences, we must vacate his sentences based on Count III, and remand for resentencing consistent with Sec. 924(e) (1).
Dickerson contends that Sec. 924(e) only applies to felonies which involve actual or potential injury to others. He claims that while Congress originally contemplated a broad definition of the term "burglary" under Sec. 924(e), it amended Sec. 924 to include only violent felonies. Because the term "burglary" encompasses a wide variety of non-violent crimes, such as theft of an unoccupied car or residence, the appellant argues that not all burglaries fall under the proscription of Sec. 924. We reject such an interpretation. Section Sec. 924(e) (2) (B) defines "violent felony" as "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that--(i) has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion ... that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." (emphasis added). It is clear from the language of the statute that all burglaries satisfy the prerequisites of Sec. 924. As the trial judge correctly noted, if Congress intended to include only crimes in which serious physical injury was involved, it would have worded the statute to say "burglary, arson, or extortion, and involves use of explosives or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another." Sentencing Tr. at 13.
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802)); ...
Sections 922 and 924 are based on the former statute 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202, which was repealed effective 180 days after May 19, 1986. The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 ("ACCA") was originally an amendment to the former firearm statute at 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a). H.R.REP. 1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 3182, 3664. Effective November 15, 1986, Sec. 1202(a) and its ACCA were incorporated into Secs. 922 and 924. See 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 1327, 1328. As revised, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) incorporates the first sentence from the former statute at 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a), while 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1) incorporates the ACCA provision. Firearms Owner's Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, Secs. 102(6), 104(a) (4) (100 Stat. 452, 458) (1986)
The ACCA provision has now been incorporated into 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1).