Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97426/crescent-express-lines-inc-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-03-27 07:06:56
Document Index: 515894325

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 208', '§ 301', '§ 306', '§ 306', '§ 306', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 308']

Crescent Express Lines Inc Vs United States - Citation 97426 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Crescent Express Lines, Inc. Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97426CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnDec-06-1943Case Number320 U.S. 401AppellantCrescent Express Lines, Inc.RespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:....."grandfather clause" of the motor carrier act, the interstate commerce commission issued a common carrier certificate limited to "special operations," "nonscheduled door-to-door service," "irregular routes," and "transportation of not more than six persons in any one vehicle."
authorized by the act and supported by the evidence. p.
320 u. s. 405
3. the limitation of the certificate to "transportation of not more than six persons in any one vehicle" is not inconsistent with the proviso of § 208 of the motor carrier act forbidding restriction of the right of a carrier to add equipment. pp.
320 u. s. 406
320 u. s. 409
4. it was the intent of congress to limit applicants under the "grandfather clause" to the type of equipment and service..... Judgment:
Crescent Express Lines, Inc. v. United States - 320 U.S. 401 (1943)
1. Upon an application for a certificate authorizing operation as a common carrier under the "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued a certificate more limited than that indicted in its earlier "compliance order."
that the applicant was not deprived of any procedural right. P.
320 U. S. 404
2. Under the "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued a common carrier certificate limited to "special operations," "nonscheduled door-to-door service," "irregular routes," and "transportation of not more than six persons in any one vehicle."
4. It was the intent of Congress to limit applicants under the "grandfather clause" to the type of equipment and service previously offered. P.
320 U. S. 410
This appeal brings here for review a judgment of a District Court [
] upholding an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, specifying limitations in a certificate proposed to be issued to appellant as a common carrier.
Following the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C. § 301
the appellant's predecessor, a partnership, made timely application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity under the grandfather clause of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 306(a).
The Commission then deferred determination of the applicant's rights until the decision of a number of test cases involving carriers performing a similar service.
See Sullivan County Highway Line, Inc., Application,
21 M.C.C. 717,
30 M.C.C. 133;
Irving Nudelman Application,
22 M.C.C. 275,
28 M.C.C. 91. In the meantime, the partners sold their business to the present appellant, which was substituted before the Commission by order of October 31, 1940. On September 2, 1941, the second order, providing for a more limited certificate, quoted at the beginning of this opinion, was issued.
(1) Appellant contends that the changes to which it objects in the last order, as compared with the earlier, were made without proper hearing or evidence. This argument proceeds upon the assumption that the earlier conclusions, as embodied in the 1938 order, endow appellant with something akin to a right to receive ultimately a certificate embodying the terms of the order. [
] However, under § 306, the Commission was directed to issue the certificates to applicants under the grandfather clause without further proof of convenience or necessity and without further proceedings. Its routine practice was to refer the application to its field force for investigation. [
] The applicant appeared before this examiner prior to the first order of the Commission. The compliance order was made upon the application, the supporting affidavits, and questionnaire. The mass of applications forced this summary procedure. [
] The compliance order gave opportunity to the applicant or other parties in interest to protest its conclusions. The order remains
In answer to the inquiry as to whether special or charter operations were conducted prior to June 1, 1935, appellant answered, "no special operations." [
] However, the record shows a number of instances where passengers made individual arrangements for their transportation to and from the mountains. No schedule of arrival or departure appears in the record. Instead of publishing arrivals and departures, routes, stops,
the advertisements referred to daily trips and asked prospective customers to arrange for reservations. There was convincing evidence that applicant's service prior to June 1, 1935, was special and nonscheduled.
"That no terms, conditions, or limitations shall restrict the right of the carrier to add to his or its equipment and facilities over the routes, between the termini or within the territory specified in the certificate, as the development of the business and the demands of the public shall require. [
The scope of the Commission's authority under this section depends upon the meaning given to the word "business." The appellant argues that it would be engaged in the same business if, in lieu of using seven-passenger sedans, it undertook to haul larger numbers of passengers in buses. But the special advantage to the public inherent in the use of small vehicles operating as occasion demands from door to door, rather than between terminals, sets off the appellant's business from the service provided by regular lines operating heavier equipment.
28 M.C.C. 91, 95-6. The limitation to six passengers in one load is less restrictive than limitation to a particular type of vehicle,
since it allows the carrier to employ sedans, open cars, station wagons, or any other suitable motor vehicle. 28 M.C.C. at 96. This allows flexibility in equipment while continuing the same business. 22 M.C.C. 285. The line between six-passenger and larger scale operation must be drawn somewhere, and the Commission has fixed it where the appellant conducted its business on June 1, 1935. The Crescent partnership gave some indication that it appreciated these special differences when, in 1938, it proposed to change its name to Crescent Cadillac Service, "for the sake of a better business name," thus emphasizing the commercial significance of the sedan-type vehicle. It appears from the application that Crescent owned no buses; it operated nothing but sedans. To authorize the appellant to change to the business of carrying passengers by bus would alter the position in the transportation system which it occupied on June 1, 1935.
Noble v. United States,
319 U. S. 88
agree with the Commission that the proviso is a prohibition against a limitation on the addition of more vehicles of the authorized type, not a prohibition of the specification of the type.
See Irving Nudelman Application,
28 M.C.C. 91. [
We are of the view that the power of the Commission to limit the certificate as it proposes to do is in accord with the purposes of the Motor Carrier Act. When Congress provided for certificates to cover all carriers which were already in operation, it did not throw open the motor transportation system to more destructive competition than that already existing. The right to certificates was limited to those then in
operation "over the route or routes or within the territory for which application is made." 49 U.S.C. § 306.
The statute, we have said, contemplated "substantial parity" between future and prior operations.
315 U. S. 22
305 U. S. 263
305 U. S. 266
Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States,
316 U. S. 74
316 U. S. 83
. Consequently, we held in
United States v. Maher,
307 U. S. 148
, that operations over irregular routes did not provide the requisite continuity to support an application for regular service between fixed termini, even when the highway between the fixed termini had been occasionally used for part of the distance in the irregular route operations.
51st Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, pp. 67, 68, 71; 55th Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, p. 110.
See Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States,
316 U. S. 84
The Commission construes "charter" to refer to one contractor taking over all the vehicle for a trip or trips and "special" to transportation services on weekend, holidays or other special occasions when the carrier assembles the passengers and sells individual tickets.
Fordham Bus Corp. v. United States,
29 M.C.C. 293, 297; 41 F.Supp. 712.
case was a contract carrier application under 49 U.S.C. § 309. Under subsection (b), the Commission was required to specify in the permit the "business of the contract carrier covered thereby."
We held that it was proper to limit the permit so that only shippers who "operate food canneries or meat packing businesses" in particular localities might be served. This limitation corresponded to the type of trade previously enjoyed by the carrier. The carrier contended for a limitation only as to commodities. The proviso in § 309(b), applicable in the
case, covers substantially the same ground as the proviso in § 308 dealt with in the present opinion.
Numerous instances of limitation of type are given in the
opinion. The rule of the
case has been applied in
Rubin and Greenfield Application,
33 M.C.C. 383, and
Greenberg Application,
33 M.C.C. 725.
See also Davidson Transfer and Storage Co. Application,
32 M.C.C. 777.