Source: https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2002/08/06/02-19840/pipeline-safety-high-consequence-areas-for-gas-transmission-pipelines
Timestamp: 2016-05-26 02:49:21
Document Index: 427523928

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 192', '§ 192', 'art 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', 'ART 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192']

Federal Register | Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas For Gas Transmission Pipelines
Dates: This rule is effective September 5, 2002.
Effective Date: 09/05/2002
-50835 (12 pages)
Document Number: 02-19840
Shorter URL: https://federalregister.gov/a/02-19840 Related Topics
This final rule defines areas of high consequence where the potential consequences of a gas pipeline accident may be significant or may do considerable harm to people and their property. The definition includes: current class 3 and 4 locations; facilities with persons who are mobility-impaired, confined, or hard to evacuate, and places where people gather for recreational and other purposes. For facilities with mobility-impaired, confined, or hard-to-evacuate persons and places where people gather, the corridor of protection from the pipeline is 300 feet, 660 feet or 1000 feet depending on the pipeline's diameter and operating pressure. This final rule is the first step in a two-step process to develop integrity management program requirements for gas transmission operators. In the second step, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) will propose requirements to improve the integrity of gas transmission pipelines located in these high consequence areas. This definition satisfies, in part, the Congressional mandate in 49 U.S.C. 60109 for RSPA to prescribe standards that establish criteria for identifying each gas pipeline facility located in a high-density population area.
Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission Operators 2 actions from January 9th, 2002 to August 2002
Hard-To-Evacuate Facilities—Proposed §§ 192.761 (c) and (d)
Areas Where People Congregate—Proposed § 192.761(e)
Baltimore Gas Electric Company, ChevronTexaco, CMS Energy,Consumers Energy Company, Duke Energy Gas Transmission, El Paso Corporation, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., Enron Transportation Services, Kinder Morgan, National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation, the Energy Distribution Segment of NiSource Inc. (NiSource EDG), North Shore Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, PECO Energy, Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, Questar Regulated Services, Southwest Gas and, Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Company.
In the following section we discuss these comments and how we addressed them in developing the final definition of high consequence areas for gas transmission pipelines.
Southwest Gas Corporation suggested that the definition of high consequence area be added to the general definition section in part 192 (§ 192.3) so that all definitions are in the same location.
Many of the commenters (AGA, APGA, Consumers Energy, National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation, North Shore Gas, New York Gas Group, Peoples Gas, Questar, Southwest Gas) recommended that the definition be limited to transmission pipelines operating at or above 20% of specified minimum yield strength. Baltimore Gas Electric recommended exempting transmission piping operated as part of and integral to a distribution system if the piping is operated below a determined pressure, such as 300 psig and is less than a determined diameter, such as 30 inches. CMS Energy recommended excluding from the definition pipelines that operate at pressures lower than 40% of the maximum hoop stress. Energy Distribution Segment of NiSource Inc. recommended that high consequence areas be limited to pipelines operating at or above 30% SMYS.
The proposed definition of high consequence areas included class 3 and class 4 locations, as those areas are defined in § 192.5. In the Notice, we said that because class location definitions are based on population density, gas operators already maintain current data on the location of people in areas adjacent to their pipelines. It seemed more logical to structure a definition using this data rather than basing the definition on a Census Bureau definition, as we had done for hazardous liquid pipelines.
However, several pipeline distribution companies (Baltimore Gas Electric, NiSource EDG, PECO Energy) objected to RSPA's assumption that information about population density is in the hands of operators. These commenters explained that many local distribution companies utilized class four criteria when constructing a facility, and, therefore, never established a population density baseline and do not track changes in population density.
Response: RSPA recognizes that some operators, particularly local distribution companies, may have designed their pipelines for a class 4 location, and, as a consequence, may not maintain current data on the number and location of buildings near their pipelines. However, we continue to believe that it is preferable to base a definition for high consequence areas for gas transmission operators on the existing class location definitions, and to allow the majority of operators to use the information they have on people and buildings near their pipelines rather than to base the definition on the Census Bureau definitions. An operator who does not maintain the data needed to define a class location will need to decide whether to treat its entire system as being within a high consequence area, or to take steps to identify which segments of the system are actually in high consequence areas. Either decision will be acceptable to OPS.
Baltimore Gas Electric maintained that it would have problems identifying facilities unless there is some publicly available data source. The distribution system operator argued that without corresponding data validation source references, the definition creates an unattainable requirement on system operators.
Peoples Gas recommended adding a lower bound on the number of people that are present in the facility, and to add the word “known.” Peoples Gas suggested that the phrase difficult to evacuate apply to facilities with confined or mobility-impaired persons and not be an additional, separate factor because any structure in an emergency could be difficult to evacuate.
Baltimore Gas Electric maintained it was not practical or attainable to analyze every place where people may congregate on an intermittent basis.
Citizens for Safe Pipelines urged that public recreation areas be included. The group thought that the proposed standard was too high and would be difficult to measure, and suggested that the standard should simply be evidence of public use, including evidence of vehicle traffic or camping sites, particularly near watercourses. The citizens' group explained that in the west, watercourses are places where people congregate on public land for recreation. The group recommended that operators use regular aerial patrol and consult with public land management and local government officials to identify these areas. The group also recommended including religious buildings, because significant numbers of people regularly congregate in these buildings. Consumers Energy commented that the example of a museum did not fit because the proposed definition was aimed at outdoor facilities. The company maintained that the language was too broad and should be limited to well-defined areas, or data would be difficult to develop and maintain. Consumers Energy further maintained that the proposed occupation period was too restrictive, and too hard to identify, and suggested using a weekly basis for the occupation period or eliminating it.
New York State Department of Public Service commented that it is unclear whether we intended for areas where people congregate to include facilities such as transportation terminals, manufacturing facilities or business locations, and recommended clarifying the language to include these facilities. The Department of Public Service questioned the basis for the 20 or more persons congregating at least 50 days in a 12-month period, and explained that a stadium or arena may be used less than 50 days per year but, nonetheless, attract large crowds to individual events. North Shore Gas suggested that the areas where people congregate be known and well-defined. The company also suggested the usage rate should be 5 days a week for 10 weeks in a 12-month period instead of the proposed 50 days in 12 months, because it would be easier for operators to monitor. North Shore Gas thought that the example of a museum is out of place if outside areas are being targeted.
Where a pipeline is near a building with mobility-impaired or confined persons, or near an area where people congregate, we proposed that the protected area from the pipeline should be 660 feet or 1000 feet, depending on the diameter and operating pressure of the pipeline. In the NPRM we explained that we based the proposed 660-foot and 1000-foot corridors on a model developed by C-FER, a Canadian research and consulting organization. (More information on this model is in Docket #7666). The C-FER analysis was based on a simplified model of a gas pipeline rupture. The model included a simplified mathematical treatment of several phenomena important to characterizing the extent of damage following a pipeline rupture, as for example, critical heat flux, the time of ignition of the escaping gas, the height of the burning jet, and the pipe decompression rate. The model also included estimates of several important parameters associated with the phenomena. The model validated the distance of 660 feet as the impact area for pipelines smaller than 30 inches in diameter and operating at 1000 psig or less. The model also showed that a pipeline with a diameter greater than 30 inches and operated at a pressure greater than 1000 psig has the potential to impact an area greater than 660 feet from the pipeline.
New York Department of Public Service maintained that the heat flux value of 5000 btu/hr-ft
used in the C-FER formula is too high. A lower critical heat flux value should be used, which would increase the width of the predicted impact zone.
Other Area of Potential High Consequence Not Proposed Back to Top
The Washington State Department of Ecology recommended including unusually sensitive areas and navigable waterways as high consequence areas, because these may be affected by a fire ignited by a gas pipeline rupture. The Department also recommended that we require operators to consult with state and local government officials to identify environmentally sensitive areas.
Other Areas Back to Top
Our review of accident data concluded that the maximum spill from a gas rupture resulting in a spill from a liquid pipeline has been too small to necessitate additional protection. We believe the impact of pipelines on infrastructure is adequately treated by existing regulations, although we will consider the comments about pipeline bridges in developing the integrity management program requirements. For example, pipelines supported by bridges (vehicular, railroad, pedestrian, pipeline), or that cross public roads, highways or railroads have special design factors. (§ 192.111). Special welding requirements apply to pipeline crossings of rivers, railroads, highways, tunnels and bridges (§ 192.243 ). More frequent patrols are required at highway and railroad crossings (§ 192.705).
Costs Associated With the Definition Back to Top
Williston Basin commented that assessment costs are a significant expense and that the definition will directly affect assessment costs. The company argued that because the high consequence area definition and integrity management rulemaking are directly related, the definition cannot be complete without evaluating the definition under the requirements of the integrity management rule.
We have included class 3 and 4 location areas, as those areas are defined in § 192.5, to give additional protection to populated areas from a gas release. These areas will encompass about 85% of populated areas. These are the areas where most gas transmission pipeline operators maintain data on population and buildings near their pipelines. However, because the class location definitions may not cover all areas where a pipeline may pose a risk to the public, we have also included as high consequence areas:
3. The definition places more emphasis on areas where people congregate near a pipeline, such as camping grounds and recreational areas near bodies of water. These areas may not be identified under the current class 3 location definition.
PART 192—[AMENDED] Back to Top
2.Section 192.761 is added under a new undesignated centerheading of “High Consequence Areas” in subpart M to read as follows: Subpart M—Maintenance Back to Top
HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS Back to Top
§ 192.761 Definitions.
The following definitions apply to this section and § 192.763:
(a) An area defined as a Class 3 location under § 192.5;
(b) An area defined as a Class 4 location under § 192.5;