Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/523/410/case.php
Timestamp: 2018-01-18 16:09:08
Document Index: 764014813

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1635', '§ 1635', '§ 1638', '§ 1638', '§ 1638', '§ 11706', '§ 11705', '§ 1', '§ 1640']

Going beyond these rights to damages, the Act also authorizes a borrower whose loan is secured with his "principal dwelling," and who has been denied the requisite disclosures, to rescind the loan transaction entirely "until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later." § 1635(a). A borrower who exercises this right to rescind "is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by [him], including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void" upon rescission. § 1635(b). Within 20 dayscralaw
3 Specifically, the Beaches claimed that the bank had failed to disclose properly and accurately (1) the amount financed, in violation of § 1638(a)(3); (2) the finance charge, in violation of § 1638(a)(3); (3) the annual percentage rate, in violation of § 1638(a)(4); (4) the number, amounts, and timing ofcralaw
4 Although the per curiam opinion posed the question as one "[u]nder Florida law," 692 So. 2d, at 147, it distinguished cases based on state law as inapposite and held that a defense of rescission was unavailable under the Act after three years.cralaw
5 See, e. g., In re Barsky, 210 B. R. 683 (Bkrtey. Ct. ED Pa. 1997); In re Botelho, 195 B. R. 558 (Bkrtey. Ct. Mass. 1996); In re Shaw, 178 B. R. 380 (Bkrtey. Ct. NJ 1994); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ablin, 177 Ill. App. 3d 390, 532 N. E. 2d 379 (1988); Community Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of N. Y. v. McClammy, 525 N. Y. S. 2d 629, 138 App. Div. 2d 339 (1988); Dawe v. Merchants Mortgage and Trust Corp., 683 P. 2d 796 (Colo. 1984) (en bane).cralaw
The terms of a typical statute of limitation provide that a cause of action mayor must be brought within a certain period of time. So, in Reiter v. Cooper, supra, at 263-264, we concluded that 49 U. S. C. § 11706(c)(2), providing that a shipper "'must begin a civil action to recover damages under [§ 11705(b)(3)] within two years after the claim accrues,'" was a statute of limitation raising no bar to a claim made in recoupment. See Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1179 (1950) (most statutes of limitation provide either that "all actions ... shall be brought within" or "no action ... shall be brought more than" so many years after "the cause thereof accrued" (internal quotation marks omitted)); H. Wood, 1 Limitation of Actions § 1, pp. 2-3 (4th ed. 1916) ("[S]tatutes which provide that no action shall be brought, or right enforced, unless brought or enforced within a certain time, are ... statutes of limitation").cralaw
The Act, however, has left even less to chance (if that is possible) than its "expire" provision would allow, standing alone. It is useful to look ahead to § 1640 with its provisions for recovery of damages. Subsection (e) reads that the i-year limit on actions for damages "does not bar a person from asserting a violation of this subchapter in an action to collect the debt which was brought more than one year fromcralaw
6 Since there is no claim before us that Florida law purports to provide any right to rescind defensively on the grounds relevant under the Act, we have no occasion to explore how state recoupment law might work when raised in a foreclosure proceeding outside the 3-year period.cralaw