Source: https://www.lawinsport.com/content/articles/employment-law/item/how-cas-deals-with-excessive-contractual-penalties-in-football
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 21:08:28
Document Index: 309102466

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 190', 'Art. 163', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 20', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 163', 'Art. 190', 'Art. 190', 'Art. 190', 'UKSC ']

How CAS deals with excessive contractual penalties in football - LawInSport
Published 30 November 2016 By: Despina Mavromati
It is fairly common to have a penalty clause inserted in a football-related contract (e.g. a player-transfer contract)1 for the event of non-compliance with its terms. Due to the fact that contractual penalties are not explicitly regulated in the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP),2 Swiss law applies in the majority of the contracts (with an international dimension) and defines / interprets the modalities of such penalty clauses. In fact, disputes with an international dimension are brought to the appropriate judicial instances of FIFA and, in appeal, before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
Under Article R58 of the CAS Code (which defines the law applicable to the merits of the case) “The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations (…)”.3 Article 57 par. 2 of the FIFA Statutes foresees that “CAS shall apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law”. Player transfer - and other football - contracts usually refer to the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), with Swiss law to apply in case of lacunae and when appropriate.4
Numerous arbitral awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) have dealt with the issue of contractual penalties (in most cases in appeals against decisions rendered by the FIFA Player Status Committee, PSC and the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, DRC),5 and the CAS panels are called to determine whether a penalty is excessive and reduce it accordingly.
Notwithstanding the case-specific character of contractual penalties, this article examines:
How penalty clauses are generally treated under Swiss law; and
What are the conditions in order to qualify a contractual penalty as excessive under CAS case law.
What are the criteria to employ in order to reduce an excessive contractual penalty under CAS case law, and
What are the limits of control of excessive penalties in football by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT), but also
By foreign jurisdictions that are called to enforce CAS awards.
Contractual Penalties under Swiss Law
Under Swiss law, penalty clauses are legal and valid for the event of non-performance or for defective performance. They can be “exclusive”, in the sense that the claimant can request either performance or penalty (Article 160 par. 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations – “CO”).
It is also possible to agree a penalty in addition to performance in case of failure to comply with the provided time or place of the performance, (Article 160 par. 2 CO), in which case the penalty is “cumulative”. In the latter situation, it is possible to ask for the default interest (Article 104 CO).6 In order to define the kind of penalty clause (i.e. cumulative or exclusive, in case that this is not clearly specified in the contract), the creditor bears the burden to prove the cumulative nature of the clause, while the nature thereof depends on the nature and the meaning of the main obligation that is guaranteed.7
There is no need to prove damage or loss in order to pay the contractual penalty (Article 161 par. 2 CO). Furthermore, additional compensation (if the loss suffered exceeds the penalty amount) can only be claimed if the creditor proves that the debtor was at fault. Penalties cannot be claimed for an immoral undertaking or where non-performance was due to circumstances out of the control of the debtor (unless otherwise agreed between the parties, Article 163 par. 2 CO).8 As we will see below, and although the parties are in principle free to determine the amount of the contractual penalty (Article 163 par. 1 CO), the court may reduce penalties that it considers excessive (Article 163 par. 3 CO).
The following elements are necessary in order to qualify a penalty clause as a contractual penalty under Swiss law (Articles 160 et. seq. CO):
the parties bound by the penalty clause are mentioned,
the penalty is determined,
the conditions for the obligation to pay are set, and
the measure of the contractual penalty is identified.9
Excessive contractual penalties under CAS and SFT case law
Contractual penalties can be foreseen in a variety of football-related contracts. For example, Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP, in case of a unilateral termination of a contract by the club or the player prior to the foreseen expiration date, compensation is due either based on the terms of the contract or based on several (non-exhaustive) criteria. When determining compensation for unilateral termination based on Article 17, the hearing panel must examine whether the parties entered a buy-out clause or not (in which case the criteria of Article 17 should apply). Contractual penalties may also be inserted in loan/transfer contracts, contracts between clubs and players / agents / coaches etc.10 A frequent issue at stake in CAS football-related procedures arises in cases where a contractual penalty is foreseen in the contract and one of the parties argues that such penalty is excessive.
Under the relevant provisions of the Swiss CO, the CAS Panel may reduce penalties that it considers excessive (Article 163 para. 3 CO). Although there is no clear definition or specific criteria as to what renders a penalty “excessive” and this is decided on a case-by-case basis, an important characteristic of excessive penalties is that disproportion must significantly exceed the limits of what seems to be normal in light of the circumstances.11 Therefore, there must be a significant disproportion between the amount agreed and the interest of the creditor to maintain the entire claim. The disproportion must be measured at the moment when the non-respect of the contractual provision took place.12
According to the jurisprudence of the SFT, the criteria that can be taken into account include (but are not limited to) the nature and duration of the contract,13 the degree of fault and of the contractual violation, the economic situation of the parties, and the potential subordination of the debtor.14 There is no case law showing that e.g. an imbalance in the negotiating power between the parties could render the contractual penalty excessive as such.15 However, the “lack of reciprocity” could be an additional criterion in order to reduce a contractual penalty that was already found to be excessive.16
By means of example, a CAS panel has found that a contractual penalty representing 1.5 times the entire transfer compensation provided for in the contract and more than 12 times the outstanding amount due was excessive and therefore had to be reduced.17 Another example of an excessive penalty was where the parties (a player and a club) to a 3-year labour contract agreed on a penalty (for early termination of the contract) that was 4 times higher than the annual salary of the player.18 Furthermore, a penalty amounting to 223 years of salary was (obviously) found to be excessive.19 Inversely, a penalty of 10% of the entire debt was not found to be excessive,20 and a contractual penalty amounting to 20% of the transfer fee was found to be a proportionate deterrent in order to ensure that the debtor would pay the overdue amounts (considering the fact that an amount of EUR 5,000,000 was outstanding at the time).21
Reduction of excessive contractual penalties: conditions and criteria under CAS / SFT case law
Before deciding on the reduction of the excessive contractual penalty, the CAS panel has to determine that certain conditions are met: The (logical) substantive conditions are that the penalty is already due and that both the main obligation22 and the penalty clause are valid,23 since in case of invalidity the CAS panel will declare the clause null and void and will not need to reduce it.24
As to the formal conditions, the panel can neither award more than what was requested, nor award less than the other party has acknowledged, in accordance with the principle "ne ultra petita" ("not beyond the request" – i.e. that a court may not decide more than it has been asked to).
Based on the principle of the contractual freedom inferred from Article 163 par. 1 Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”), the general rule is that parties should be free to determine the amount of contractual penalty in their contract.25 The CAS panel should therefore respect such freedom and only intervene when the penalty unreasonably and flagrantly exceeds the amount admissible with respect to the sense of justice and equity,26 or reduce manifestly abusive penalties.27 Inversely, this means that the CAS Panel should not reduce a contractual penalty on the sole ground that it exceeds the damages suffered by the creditor.28
On the other hand, due to the fact that Article 163 CO is a public policy provision,29 the CAS panel can apply it even if the debtor has not expressly invoked said provision in order to request a reduction of the penalty. This also means that the CAS Panel should apply Article 163 CO even when Swiss law is not applicable to the contract between the parties30 (since this provision is part of the Swiss public policy within the meaning of Article 17 PILA).31 The judge must intervene only when the stipulated amount is excessively and blatantly high with respect to the sense of justice and equity.32 The debtor bears the onus to present and establish why the contractual penalty is excessive and should be reduced.33 The debtor therefore should not only claim that the penalty is excessive but should also explain e.g. the reasons for refusal to pay the outstanding amount on time, whether the penalty had been freely negotiated or imposed by the creditor etc. Otherwise the Panel has few objective criteria to evaluate the contractual penalty.34
All objectively relevant elements have to be taken into account by the CAS panel when determining the reduction of the excessive penalty.35 By means of example the panel may consider the debtor’s overall attitude, the severity of the breach of contract, the intentional character (or not) of the non-execution of the contract. Moreover, the Panel should reduce the contractual penalty to an extent to which the penalty is not a confiscatory measure (an inadmissible impediment to the debtor’s financial future).36 As shown above, the “lack of reciprocity” could be taken into account in order to reduce a contractual penalty that was already found to be excessive.37
At the same time, the panel will have to try to find a solution according to the parties’ presumed intention rather than substitute his / her views for that of the parties.38 Instead of reducing the penalty to an amount that the Panel deems fair, and based on the principle of contractual freedom, the Panel should rather reduce the penalty only to the extent that it is no longer excessive.
Subsequent control of the CAS Panel’s decision regarding excessive contractual penalties by the SFT
According to Article R59 CAS Code, all CAS awards are final upon their notification to the parties. However, a motion to set aside a CAS award is possible to be filed before the SFT on a very limited number of grounds, among which the violation of due process and the violation of public policy.39 The SFT thereby controls the decisions of CAS and has so far issued a few judgments interpreting the meaning and scope of contractual penalties.
In a recent case regarding a contractual penalty for the late payment of a player’s transfer fee, a motion to set aside the CAS award was subsequently filed and the SFT was called to decide whether the CAS had sufficiently reduced a contractual penalty that was found to be excessive.40 The CAS Panel had awarded the claimant a penalty of what corresponded to a quarter of the outstanding payment of the transfer fee. The debtor had requested the reduction of the excessive penalty based on the fact that it exceeded the maximum default interest of 15% per annum provided by the applicable Swiss Consumer Credit Act (to note that for compensation for a late payment a late interest of 5% applied).41 The SFT confirmed its view that it does not act as a court of appeal and, even if Article 163 par. 3 CO is a public policy provision, the SFT can only control (and prohibit) discriminatory / confiscatory measures ordered by the CAS panel.42 In this case, the SFT dismissed the appeal to the extent that the appellant (the debtor) had failed to explain that the awarded contractual penalty constituted an inadmissible obstacle to its financial future.43
In another recent case, the CAS Panel (annulling the previous decision of the Single Judge of the FIFA PSC) applied the contractual penalty awarding damages USD 1’500’000.44 In the subsequent motion to set aside the CAS award, the debtor claimed a violation of substantive public policy because the CAS Panel should have waived or reduced the penalty instead of setting a penalty at three times the transfer fee without previous CAS precedent.45 The SFT addressed Article 163 CO and the issue of excessive penalties. It reiterated its aforementioned view that Article 163 is a mandatory provision that falls within Swiss public policy, which however does not qualify as international public policy within the meaning of Art. 190 par. 2 (e) PILA and could not be invoked (and applied) in the context of international arbitrations in Switzerland. This shows the limits in the control exercised by the SFT with respect to Article 163 CO (as well as all other “public policy” provisions of domestic law) in the context of international arbitration – and more specifically in contractual penalties in football-related cases before CAS.46 The SFT should therefore not act as a court of appeal in cases related to Article 163 CO but should only sanction discriminatory or confiscatory measures ordered by the Panel.47
Recognition and enforcement of contractual penalty clauses by other jurisdictions
What happens when the CAS Panel has issued an arbitral award and the parties wish to have the award enforced in another jurisdiction under the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards of 1958 (NYC 58)?
In some jurisdictions (e.g. in England), liquidated damages in the event of breach must be proportionate to estimated loss. If they are not proportionate, they are considered to be penal and are therefore unenforceable. A recent decision of the English Supreme Court clarified the applicable test in this respect.48 There is a recent example of a decision rendered by the English High Court, which was called to enforce a CAS award ordering the debtor to pay an additional contractual penalty based on Article 163 CO.49 The English High Court held that, even if contractual penalties (“punishing clauses”) are not enforceable under English law, the penalty was not found to be against public policy within the meaning of Article V (II) of the NYC58.
The English Court highlighted therefore the narrow scope of the prohibition of penalty clauses under English law that does not protect a "universal principle of morality", as long as the penalty was not "injurious to the public good" to the extent that enforcement should be refused.
Deference should also be shown vis-à-vis the law applicable to the contract (which in this case was Swiss law, like in the majority of football-related contractual penalties as shown above). This interesting decision demonstrates the limits in the legality control of the contractual penalty clauses by the jurisdiction that is called to enforce the arbitral award, but also the contractual freedom of the parties and the pro-enforcement regime established under the NYC58.50
Penalty clauses for non-compliance with the terms of the contract are common in cases related to football. Under Swiss law, contractual penalties are valid but the judge / arbitrator has the authority to reduce them if they are excessive.
Notwithstanding the case-specific character of contractual penalties, CAS Panels have determined some general criteria under which these penalties are considered excessive and when and – to what extent – they should be reduced.
Although the provision regarding the reduction of excessive penalties (Article 163 par. 3 CO) constitutes part of Swiss public policy, the principle of freedom of contracts dictates that such reduction should only when the penalty is unreasonable and flagrantly exceeds the amount admissible with respect to the sense of justice and equity.
Moreover, as established by the SFT, the fact that Article 163 par. 3 CO is a provision of Swiss public policy does not mean that the arbitrators’ refusal to reduce contractual penalties can fall within Article 190 par. 2 (e) PILA (which foresees the annulment of an arbitral award for violation of public policy).
This shows the limits in the control exercised by the SFT with respect to contractual penalties in football-related cases before CAS. The SFT should therefore not act as a court of appeal in cases related to Art. 163 CO but should only sanction discriminatory or confiscatory measures ordered by the Panel.
Also, it seems that, once the contractual penalty has been reviewed by the hearing panel (under Swiss law), its subsequent control by a foreign jurisdiction (e.g. the jurisdiction in which the creditor seeks to enforce the arbitral award under the NYC5 58) is limited, even if contractual penalties are not enforceable in this particular jurisdiction (e.g. in England), to the extent that the penalty was not “injurious to the public good”. This is in line with the narrow scope of review foreseen under Article V of the NYC 58.
There can also be other forms of football contracts where penalty clauses are added, such as labour law contracts between football players and clubs, or contracts with football agents.
Even if Art. 17 par. 1 of the FIFA RSTP implicitly allows such penalties (“unless otherwise provided for in the contract”).
There is a difference between a jurisdictional clause (the arbitration clause that provides for the jurisdiction of a specific arbitral tribunal, in this case the CAS), and a clause that defines the law applicable to the merits of the case, which can be either specifically agreed upon in the contract concluded between the parties or decided based on Art. R58 CAS Code.
See e.g. CAS 2015/A/4144, Newell’s Old Boys v. Al Ain FC, award of 26 April 2016, par. 104. See also CAS 2014/A/3489 & 3490, Sociedade Esportiva Palmeiras v. David Braz de Oliveira Filho and Panathinaikos FC, award of 10 November 2014, par. 114: in this case, the panel applied Brazilian law (subsidiarily to the FIFA Regulations and to Swiss law), as the law applicable to the “underlying” contractual relationship. See also CAS 2012/A/2952, Kizito Musampa v. Trabzonspor Kulübü, award of 21 May 2013, par. 62, where the panel applied the FIFA Regulations and Swiss law but not the law applicable to the contract (Turkish law) because the parties had not made any submissions as to the provisions of Turkish law.
Under Art. R57 CAS Code (CAS Panel’s power of review) the Panel may review both the facts and the law of the case and therefore fully review the decision appealed against, see e.g. CAS 2011/A/2593 & 2598, Clube Náutico Capibaribe v. FIFA & SC de Braga SAD, award of 12 October 2012, par. 107.
Gaspard Couchepin, La clause pénale: Etude générale de l'institution et de quelques applications pratiques en droit de la construction, Zürich, 2008, par. 1182 f. (La clause pénale). Penalties can be either “variable” (accruing alongside the delay in payment) or “fixed” (payment of an agreed sum).
See Article 8 CO; when the penalty is rounded on the failure to fulfill a deadline, there is a presumption of a cumulative penalty, and the creditor is entitled to request both performance and the penalty. See also Michel Moser, in Thévenoz / Werro, Commentaire romand, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Bâle, 2012, ad. Article 160, n 13, p. 1155. See also CAS 2014/A/3555, FC Vojvodina v. Almami Samori Da Silva Moreira, par. 57: the definition used by the parties is not sufficient and we should rather look at the legal consequences of the clause (because the consequences may indicate the true intention of the parties). See also CAS 2013/A/3205, Marítimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. AEP Paphos, award of 20 December 2013, par. 57-58.
See e.g. CAS 2015/A/4144, Newell’s Old Boys v. Al Ain FC, award of 26 April 2016, par. 113. In this case, although the debtor was hampered by an insolvency process (all subsequent decisions should be taken by the Insolvency Judge), the debtor could not establish that the payment date was beyond his control (par. 118).
See CAS 2015/A/4057, Maritimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. Al-Ahli Sports Club, award of 30 November 2015, par. 83; see Gaspard Couchepin, La clause pénale, Zürich, 2008, par. 462.
On the difference between “true penalty clauses” and liquidated damages clauses (compensation for damages) see CAS 2013/A/3419, Marítimo da Madeira – Futebol SAD v. Clube Atlético Mineiro, award of 14 November 2014, par. 90 ff.: “A penalty clause can be defined as an accessory provision whereby the debtor promises an agreed penalty to the creditor in case the debtor does not perform or improperly performs a defined obligation” Thévenoz / Werro (eds.) Commentaire Romand, Code des Obligations I, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, p. 1147. Accordingly, the penalty clause is accessory to the main obligation and is autonomous. On the other hand, and as a general rule, liquidated damages clauses merely intent to recover the amount of the damages incurred by the other party.
ATF (decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal) 6B_27/2009 of 29 September 2009, at 1.2. See also CAS 2011/A/2593 & 2598, Clube Nautico Capibaribe v. FIFA & SC Braga SAD, award of 12 October 2012, par. 110, where the Panel held that the relationship between the contractual penalty and the interest of the creditor is “grossly disproportionate”. See another case where the penalty was not found to be disproportionate: CAS 2014/A/3555, FC Vojvodina v. Almami Samori Da Silva Moreira, award of 18 December 2014, par. 67.
“Disproportion crasse”, see ATF 133 III 201, at 5.2. See an example in CAS 2013/A/3205, Marítimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. AEP Paphos, award of 20 December 2013, par. 67, where there was a clear disproportion between the penalty (EUR 500,000) and the unpaid debt (EUR 15,000), which was too extreme and could not be justified by the circumstances of the case.
See CAS 2010/A/2202, Konyaspor Club Association v. Jonathan Tehoue, award of 9 May 2011, par. 29, according to which “a penalty clause that seeks to award the entire contract balance and award a free transfer, without any mitigation, would seem excessive for an early breach, but perhaps not so for a later breach”. See also CAS 2015/A/3999 & 4000, Al Ittihad Club v. Diego de Souza Andrade, award of 17 March 2016, par. 182.
See CAS 2015/A/4057, Maritimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. Al-Ahli Sports Club, award of 30 November 2015, par. 92. See ATF 133 III 201, at 5.2; see also CAS 2010/A/2202, Konyaspor Club Association v. Jonathan Tehoue, award of 9 May 2011, par. 28.
Such lack of reciprocity is often invoked by the parties and examined by CAS panels, see CAS 2015/A/4144, Newell’s Old Boys v. Al Ain FC, award of 26 April 2016, par. 124. See also CAS 2013/A/3411, Al Gharafa & Bresciano v. Al Nassr & FIFA, award of 9 May 2014, par. 95.
See ATF 133 III 43 at 3.3.1; ATF 114 II 264 at 1a; ATF 133 III 201 at 5.2. See also CAS 2011/A/2656, Gaston Nicolas Fernandez v. FIFA & Club Tigres de la UANL, award of 29 November 2012, par. 92
See CAS 2015/A/4057, Maritimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. Al-Ahli Sports Club, award of 30 November 2015, par. 93.
See CAS 2011/A/2656, Gaston Nicolas Fernandez v. FIFA & Club Tigres de la UANL, award of 29 November 2012, par. 92: additionally, in this case the imbalance was also due to the fact that there was no similar penalty provided in case of breach of contract by the club.
CAS 2014/A/3489 & 3490, Sociedade Esportiva Palmeiras v. David Braz de Oliveira Filho and Panathinaikos FC, award of 10 November 2014, par. 164.
See CAS 2015/A/3909, Club Atlético Mineiro v. FC Dynamo Kyiv, award of 9 October 2015, par. 105.
See CAS 2014/A/3664, Al Ittihad Club v. Club de Regatas Vasco da Gama, award of 9 January 2015, par. 50. An unreasonable penalty is the one that exceeds e.g. the value of the transfer fee, see CAS 2010/A/2317 & 2323, SC Fotbal Club Timisoara SA v. FC Slovan Liberec, award of 9 September 2011, par. 70.
Under Swiss law (Art. 20 CO), if the main obligation is void (Article 20 CO), the creditor cannot claim any right from accessory obligations (like the penalty clause).
See generally CAS 2009/A/1834, FK Baník Sokolov, a.s. v. FC Hradec Králové, award of 13 October 2009, par. 67. See however a case where the CAS Panel held that the penalty clause was null, CAS 2011/O/2580, award of 21 June 2012, par. 60 f. & 73 f. In the latter case, the contract was found by the Panel to infringe Art. 19 and 20 CO (unlawful / immoral clauses) by creating an excessive imbalance between the parties, whereas the penalty for breach was grossly disproportionate to his financial resources (1000 times higher than the Company’s respective penalty for breach).
See Gaspard Couchepin, La clause pénale, par. 918 to 920.
See CAS 2014/A/3555, FC Vojvodina v. Almami Samori Da Silva Moreira, award of 18 December 2014, par. 64.
ATF 133 III 43 at 3.3.1; ATF 114 II 264 at 1a. See also CAS 2015/A/3999 & 4000, Al Ittihad Club v. Diego de Souza Andrade, award of 17 March 2016, par. 185.
See CAS 2013/A/3419, Maritimo de Madeira Futebol SAD v. Clube Atlético Mineiro, award of 14 November 2014, par. 111.
See CAS 2015/A/3999 & 4000, Al Ittihad Club v. Diego de Souza Andrade, award of ; CAS 2010/A/2317 & 2323, SC Fotbal Club Timisoara SA v. FC Slovan Liberec, award of 9 September 2011, par. 69 (if the penalty clause has a punitive character); see also CAS 2013/A/3205, Maritimo de Madeira Futebol SAD v. AEP Paphos, award of 20 December 2013 (if the penalty clause has also a preventive character).
ATF 4A_510/2015, of 8 March 2015, at 6. See also below (Section (D) of this paper).
I.e. when the parties have agreed on the application of a foreign law or when a foreign law is applicable to the “underlying contractual relationship”, see CAS 2014/A/3489, Sociedade Esportiva Palmeiras v. David Braz de Oliveira Filho and Panathinaikos FC, award of 10 November 2014, par. 114.
See ATF 4P.88/2006 of 18 July 2006, at 5, 25 ASA Bulletin, 2007, 357, 366. The fact, however, that Art. 163 CO is part of Swiss public policy does not mean that the arbitrators’ refusal to reduce contractual penalties can fall within Art. 190 par. 2 (e) PILA (see also below). See Kaufmann-Kohler / Rigozzi, International Arbitration: Law and Practice in Switzerland, Oxford, 2015, p. 503.
ATF 133 III 201, at 5.2; see also CAS 2010/A/2202, Konyaspor Club Association v. Jonathan Tehoue, award of 9 May 2011, par. 28; ATF 4C.5/2003 of 11 March 2003, at 2.3.1; ATF 114 II 264 at 1a.
ATF 133 III 43 at 4.1. See also CAS 2013/A/3205, Marítimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. AEP Paphos, award of 20 December 2013, par. 65.
CAS 2015/A/4057, Maritimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. Al-Ahli Sports Club, award of 30 November 2015, par. 104.
ATF 101 Ia 545 at 1b.
CAS 2015/A/4057, Maritimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. Al-Ahli Sports Club, award of 30 November 2015, par. 110. See also CAS 2014/A/3664, Al Ittihad Club v. Club de Regatas Vasco da Gama, award of 9 January 2015, par. 55.
ATF 133 III 201 at 5.2 and 5.4.
According to Art. R59 CAS Code, all CAS awards are final upon their notification to the parties. A motion to set aside a CAS award is possible to be filed before the SFT for a very limited number of grounds, among which the violation of public policy under Art. 190 par. 2 Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA).
CAS 2013/O/3235, award of 26 August 2014.
Federal Law on Consumer Credit (LCC; RS 221.214.1), see 4A_634/2014 of 21 May 2015, at 5.2. The same SFT judgment is also mentioned below (under E: Recognition and Enforcement of Contractual Penalty Clauses by Other Jurisdictions).
ATF 4A_634/2014 of 21 May 2015, at 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. See also CAS 2015/A/4057, Maritimo da Madeira Futebol SAD v. Al-Ahli Sports Club, award of 30 November 2015, par. 101.
CAS 2014/A/3646, Club Atl. Boca Juniors v. Cl. Atlético Mineiro, award of 24 August 2015.
Art. 190 par. 2 (e) PILA; see ATF 4A_510/2015 of 8 March 2015, at 6.1.
4A_510/2015 of 8 March 2015, at 6.2.2. See also the note of Ch. Poncet in his website: https://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/domestic-public-policy-v-international-public-policy ).
See 4A_510/2015 of 8 March 2015, at 6.2.2.
English Supreme Court, Joint judgment Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi (El Makdessi) & ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (ParkingEye).
The CAS award in the case Pencil Hill Limited v. US Citta di Palermo S.p.A., see also of 23 February 2016 https://www.newyorkconvention.org/news
See ‘English Court enforces arbitral award including a contractual penalty’, stibbe.com, 5 February 2016, accessed on 16 November 2016, https://www.stibbe.com/en/news/2016/february/english-court-enforces-arbitral-award-including-a-contractual-penalty of. See also https://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2016/01/27/english-court-enforces-arbitral-award-including-a-contractual-penalty/ of 27 January 2016 (accessed on 16 November 2016).
Tags: CAS Code | Contract | Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) | Dispute Resolution | Employment | FIFA | FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber | FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players | New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards | Swiss Code of Obligations | Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) | Switzerland | UEFA | United Kingdom (UK)