Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/590/45/224862/
Timestamp: 2019-08-18 13:12:48
Document Index: 142820770

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 214', '§ 1981', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 621']

18 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 1397, 18 Empl. Prac.dec. P 8771connie A. Keyse, Plaintiff-appellant, v. California Texas Oil Corporation and American Overseaspetroleum Ltd., Defendants-appellees, 590 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1978) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1978 › 18 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 1397, 18 Empl. Prac.dec. P 8771connie A. Keyse, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Calif...
18 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 1397, 18 Empl. Prac.dec. P 8771connie A. Keyse, Plaintiff-appellant, v. California Texas Oil Corporation and American Overseaspetroleum Ltd., Defendants-appellees, 590 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1978)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 590 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1978)
Argued Oct. 31, 1978. Decided Dec. 21, 1978
The statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is derived from the most analogous state statute. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1975). The applicable statute of limitations in a federal civil rights case brought in New York is the three years provided by N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2) liability based on a statute. See, e. g., Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 284-85 (2d Cir. 1974); Romer v. Leary, 425 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1970). Since Keyse alleged discrimination up until September 1968, but the present action was not commenced until nearly nine years later in June 1977, Keyse's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was clearly time-barred and hence was correctly dismissed.1
A prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII action is timely filing with the E.E.O.C. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 n.4, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 52 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1977); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1974). Prior to March 24, 1972, the effective date of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (now 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) required that where state agency proceedings had been instituted, the charge had to be filed with the E.E.O.C. within 210 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or within thirty days after notice of the termination of the state proceedings, whichever came Earlier. For Keyse the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred no later than September 1968, and hence the 210 day period would have ended sometime in 1969. However, Keyse did not file her charge with the E.E.O.C. until September 1972.
Keyse contends that she should be excused from the operation of this statutory bar on the ground that her failure to file timely charges with the E.E.O.C. resulted from misinformation received from both an E.E.O.C. employee and her own retained counsel. In support of this argument, she relies upon Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), Aff'd by an equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99, 98 S. Ct. 600, 54 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1977). Her reliance is misplaced. In Dartt, the Tenth Circuit held that equitable considerations can toll the time limits of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 Et seq. The affirmance of Dartt by an equally divided Supreme Court prevents the case from becoming a binding precedent. Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14, 30 S. Ct. 621, 54 L. Ed. 1001 (1910); See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837-38, 93 S. Ct. 7, 34 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). In any event, we have recently indicated that even assuming that tolling is permissible as held in Dartt, tolling would be improper if appellant was represented by counsel during the 210 day period. See Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195, 1200 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975).2
In Dartt, the plaintiff consulted a lawyer early, but he told her that she did not need a lawyer and could rely on the Federal Wage and Hour Division. Judge Metzner below distinguished Dartt on the ground that the plaintiff there had in effect been sent to the agency for information by the lawyer. Judge Metzner did not know that the plaintiff here had consulted a lawyer. Keyse v. California Texas Oil Corp., 442 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
Another factor distinguishing Dartt, as pointed out by the District Court, 442 F. Supp. at 1259, is that there the plaintiff missed the statutory deadline by a matter of days, not years, as in this case.