Source: http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/201006/?pg=65
Timestamp: 2018-04-22 16:15:05
Document Index: 382458297

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 10', '§ 25', '§ 12', '§\n13', '§ 13']

State v. Kuhs, CR-07-0301-AP, 2/24/10.
A “Best Interests” Attorney May Not Make Reports to the Court. In accordance with Arizona Rules of Family Law 10(E), the court may appoint a best interest attorney (BIA) to represent the children’s interests. Rule 10 states that a BIA “shall not submit a report or testify in court.” A BIA may not provide information or reports that are treated as evidence upon which the court’s decision is based. Aksamit v. Krahm, 1 CA-CV 08-0806, 3/18/10.
A Medical Malpractice Defendant Who Testifies as a Standard of Care Expert Is Subject to Expert Disclosure Requirements, and a Party Who Causes a Mistrial May Be Assessed Monetary Sanctions Under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)( 3). A doctor defending a malpractice action who testifies about his compliance with the standard of care is subject to the expert disclosure rules. When a party’s discovery violations results in a mistrial, and thereby “[u]nreasonably expands or delays the proceeding,” the trial court has discretion to impose sanctions. Solimeno v. Yonan, 1 CA-CV 09-0139, 3/18/10.
In Connection with a Motion to Dismiss, a Trial Court Has Discretion to Consider Documents That Are a Matter of Public Record or Central to the Complaint Without Converting it to a Motion for Summary Judgment. Generally, if a motion to dismiss contains “matters outside the pleading,” then the court should treat the motion as one for summary judgment. That general rule, however, is subject to several exceptions. A Rule 12(b)( 6) motion that ( 1) refers to a contract or other document attached to the complaint, ( 2) presents a document that is a matter of public record, or ( 3) refers to a document “central to the complaint” need not be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Strategic Development and Construction, Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, LLC, 1 CA-CV 09-0187, 3/18/10.
Deed Restrictions for a Community with No Common Areas May Not Be Amended by Majority Vote to Require Membership in a New Homeowners’ Association When No Similar Covenant Existed Before. A.R.S. § 10-3601(B) addresses admission of members to a nonprofit corporation, and provides that “[n]o person shall be admitted as a member without that person’s consent. Consent may be express or implied.” In the context of a homeowners’ association with a club, a nonprofit corporation, each homeowner must consent to be a member of the club. Although such consent can arise by a property owner accepting a deed restriction, a deed restriction cannot be amended to make all homeowners members of a club when no such similar covenant existed before. Such an amendment would markedly change the obligations of the implicated lot owners, and it is not reasonable to use the amendment provision to direct that one group of lot owners may, in effect, take the property of another group in order to fund activities that do not universally benefit each homeowner’s property or areas owner in common by all. Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimey, 1 CA-CV 08-0388, 3/16/10.
Upon Dissolution of a Marriage, an Unequal Division of Jointly Held Property Cannot Be Made Solely to Reimburse Each Spouse for Separate Funds That Were Used to Purchase the Jointly Held Property. A.R.S. § 25-318(A) governs the division of marital property upon dissolution, and provides that each spouse is to be assigned his or her separate property and all jointly held property is to be divided equitably. The family court has broad discretion in allocating the property but an unequal division of jointly held property cannot solely be made to reimburse each spouse for separate funds that were used to purchase the jointly held property. Inboden v. Inboden, 1 CA-CV 08-0180, 2/25/10.
Family Court May Order a Substantially Unequal Distribution of Marital Assets
and Debts. Ordinarily marital assets and debts should be divided equally. But, in rare circumstances, the family court may make an unequal distribution. In considering whether to make an unequal distribution, the family court should consider, along with any other relevant factor, the relative contributions made by each spouse to the community, the division of other marital assets and debts, and the length of the marriage. Flower v. Flower, 1 CA-CV 08-0234, 2/25/10.
A Late Cost Bond on Appeal from Compulsory Arbitration Does Not Deprive the Superior Court of Jurisdiction Over an Appeal. In connection with compulsory arbitration pursuant to ARIZ.R.CIV.P. 72-77, Rule 77(b) requires the filing of a cost bond in connection with an appeal to superior court. A.R.S. § 12-133(H) allows perfection of an appeal “within the time limited by rule of court,” and Rule 6(b) authorizes the superior court to extend time for all filings, with exceptions not applicable here. The tardy filing of the cost bond, though, does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction. Riendeau v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 CA-CV 09- 0202/CV 09-0203, 2/25/10.
Under the Ecclesiastical
Abstention Doctrine, Courts
Lack Jurisdiction to Resolve
Disputes That Require an
Inquiry Into Church Doctrine
or Belief, and That Doctrine
Applies Equally to
Congregational and Hierarchical
Churches. Under the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine, courts lack
jurisdiction over claims that involve
ecclesiastical disputes and require
an inquiry into church doctrine or
belief. The ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine applies equally to disputes
involving hierarchical churches and
congregational churches. In addi-
tion, secular courts will not involve
themselves in disputes related to
hiring, firing, discipline or adminis-
tration of clergy. A dispute over the
hiring of clergy that turns on an
inquiry over whether the person
had been ordained according to
church rites implicates the ecclesi-
astical abstention doctrine. Ad Hoc
v. Reiss/Schmuki v. Our Lady of the
Sun, 1 CA-CV 08-0360/CV 09-
0079, 2/23/10.
COURT OF APPEALS CRIMINAL MATTERS For the purposes of A.R.S. §
13-3553(A)( 1), which prohibits the sexual exploitation of minors by duplicating images, the downloading of an image from a remote computer via the Internet constitutes “ duplication” rather than “receiving,” and thus provides a basis for prosecution under the statute as well as for upholding a conviction based upon such conduct. A.R.S. § 13-3553(A)( 1) prohibits “[r]ecording, filming, photographing, developing or duplicating any visual depiction in which a minor is engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct.” Thus, the downloading or creation of an electronic copy of an image from the Internet is not so significantly different from making any other type of “duplicate” that it should be treated differently under the law. Acts of transmitting and receiving images over the Internet are separate and distinct from actively and intentionally making a copy by downloading and saving an image from the Internet in a specific computer location. State v. Windsor, 2 CA-CR 2009-0090, 3/30/10.
—continued on p. 70
After a valid traffic stop has concluded, reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity must exist before an officer may commence a new, nonconsensual and forcible detention to facilitate a canine sniff of a car. Under the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Terry v. Ohio and United States v. Sokolow the Fourth Amendment requires that a police officer have some minimal, objective justification for a detention based upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity which may include a traffic violation, rather than detaining an individual based upon an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Although in determining whether circumstances give rise to a new detention following the conclusion of a traffic stop a reviewing Arizona