Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/557/118/273016/
Timestamp: 2019-07-22 14:05:01
Document Index: 550273497

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2024', '§ 2021', '§ 2024']

Samuel C. Hanna, Plaintiff-appellant, v. American Motors Corporation, Defendant-appellee, 557 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1977 › Samuel C. Hanna, Plaintiff-appellant, v. American Motors Corporation, Defendant-appellee
Samuel C. Hanna, Plaintiff-appellant, v. American Motors Corporation, Defendant-appellee, 557 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 557 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1977)
Argued Jan. 17, 1977. Decided June 23, 1977
Plaintiff was honorably discharged from military service on February 22, 1973, and was reemployed by defendant as a "new hire" on March 22, 1973, well within the statutory 90-day period for reemployment. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (2). Defendant took the position that plaintiff had no veteran's reemployment rights under the Vietnam Veterans' Readjustment Act because he had been terminated before attaining seniority status and therefore was only a temporary employee and outside the scope of the Act. On April 2, his hourly wage as a new hire was increased from $4.14 to $4.52 per hour at the request of his foreman.
The statute in question1 provides that a job-qualified returning veteran is entitled to be restored to his former position or "to a position of like seniority, status and pay." 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (2) (B) (i). A workman "called to the colors was not to be penalized on his return by reason of his absence from his civilian job." The statute places the returning veteran on the seniority escalator "at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept his position continuously during the war." See Fishgold v. Sullivan Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284-285, 66 S. Ct. 1105, 90 L. Ed. 1230; 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (2). It accords an employee a leave of absence for purposes of pre-induction Armed Forces physical examinations, and therefore the employee must be permitted to return to his position "with such seniority, status, pay and vacation as such employee would have had if such employee had not been absent for such purposes." 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d) and (e). This protection is equal to that provided individuals embarking on active duty. Fortenberry v. Owen Bros. Packing Co., 267 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Miss. 1966), affirmed, 378 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1967). However, this statutory protection extends only to an employee who absents himself from a position "other than a temporary position." 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (2) (A) and (B) and § 2024(e).
Under Tilton v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 376 U.S. 169, 181, 84 S. Ct. 595, 11 L. Ed. 2d 590, a returning veteran is entitled to count his military service time toward a promotion if he demonstrates that as a matter of foresight it was reasonably certain that advancement would have occurred and that it did occur as a matter of hindsight. However, Tilton lays down the condition that a "returning veteran cannot claim a promotion that depends solely upon satisfactory completion of a prerequisite period of employment training unless he first works that period." Id. In Brickner v. Johnson Motors, 425 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1970), we applied Tilton and overruled our previous decision in Lesher v. P. R. Mallory & Co., Inc., 166 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1947), in interpreting the phrase "other than a temporary position." In Brickner we established a two-part test for determining whether a position is "other than temporary." If the position itself is temporary, the employee is excluded from the protection of the Act. To satisfy the second criterion, we held
Our mandate is "to construe the separate provisions of the Act as parts of an organic whole and give each as liberal a construction for the benefit of the veteran as a harmonious interplay of the separate provisions permits." Fishgold v. Sullivan Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S. Ct. at 1111. Accord, Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, --- U.S. ----, ----, 97 S. Ct. 2002, 52 L. Ed. 2d 595. The Act's purpose is " 'to assure that these changes and advancements in status that would necessarily have occurred simply by continued employment will not be denied the veteran because of his absence in the military service.' " Id. at ----, 97 S. Ct. at 2006, n. 8. In this task, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that "the Act protects only rights which are a mere function of time in grade and does not entitle the veteran to be treated as if he had been actively employed or trained during the period of military service." Tilton, supra, 376 U.S. at 176, 84 S. Ct. at 600. It is in the light of these principles that we apply Brickner to this case.
Plaintiff's position with defendant was "other than temporary" under the first Brickner test because the defendant concedes here that the position of assemblyman is permanent (App. 80). The foresight aspect of the second inquiry of Brickner is satisfied because, except for the four days spent at the preinduction physical examinations, plaintiff would have acquired permanent status by December 18, 1970, when he was laid off, for permanent status was automatic upon the completion of the probationary period. Collins v. Weirton Steel Co., 398 F.2d 305, 309-310 (4th Cir. 1968). His advancement to permanent status was not "subject to a significant contingency." Alabama Power, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 97 S. Ct. 2002.