Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-cooper-7
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:34:12
Document Index: 184320802

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1344', '§ 1029', '§ 1341', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3']

U.S. v. Cooper, 912 F.2d 344 | Casetext
912 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1990)
U.S.v.Cooper
Argued and Submitted August 14, 1990.
In February, 1989, defendant-appellant Roslyn Cooper was charged in a four-count indictment with bank fraud (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344), false use of a credit card ( 18 U.S.C. § 1029) (two counts), and mail fraud ( 18 U.S.C. § 1341). Pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, Cooper pled guilty to bank fraud and the other counts were dropped. Cooper was sentenced to serve a prison term of twelve months and a three-year period of supervised release, and a restitution order was entered in the amount of $9200.43. Cooper challenges the district court's interpretation and application of sections 3E1.1 and 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Cooper had represented that she owned no assets on the "Personal Financial Statement" defendants are required to complete as part of the presentence investigation process. Viewing this misrepresentation as an attempt by Cooper to portray herself as destitute and thereby avoid imposition of a fine or restitution order, in the supplemental PSR Gray recommended a two-level increase in Cooper's offense level under Guidelines section § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. In addition, because the fraudulent automobile purchase established Cooper's continued involvement in illegal activities, notwithstanding her proffered statement of remorse, Gray also withdrew his recommendation of the reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
This court has determined that whether or not a defendant has accepted responsibility for his crime is a factual issue, subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition, the Commentary to § 3E1.1 emphasizes that:
Section 3E1.1 instructs the district court to reduce a defendant's offense level by two points if it finds that he "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." Section 3E1.1 makes clear that entering a guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to the reduction as a matter of right. See Gonzalez, 897 F.2d at 1020 (citing Application Note 3, § 3E1.1); United States v. Guarin, 898 F.2d 1120, 1122 (6th Cir. 1990).
Citing United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989), Cooper argues that the district court impermissibly based its denial of the two-level reduction upon her failure to inform the probation officer of and accept responsibility for the fraudulent automobile purchase, despite the fact that that activity was not part of the offense with which she was charged. In Perez, the First Circuit held that a sentencing court could not penalize a defendant by denying him the reduction for acceptance of responsibility where its denial was based upon the defendant's refusal to make statements which could incriminate him on charges to which he had not pled guilty. 873 F.2d at 459. It further concluded that "the only plausible reading of the Guidelines for cases in which a plea agreement has been made, is that `acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct' means the criminal conduct to which the defendant pleads guilty." Id.
While we note in passing that at least two other circuits have rejected the holding and reasoning of Perez , we decline to express an opinion on the position taken by the First Circuit because Perez is clearly distinguishable from the case presented here. The district court's denial of Cooper's request for the two-level reduction was premised upon a finding that she had not met her burden of showing sincere contrition for the offense with which she was charged, not upon her failure to own up to the fraudulent car purchase. See United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 631 (2d Cir. 1990) (distinguishing from Perez cases affirming district courts' denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility credit which rested upon deference to the sentencing judge's credibility determination that the defendant had not accepted responsibility for the crimes of which he had been convicted).
United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tellez, 882 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1989).
Although the Ninth Circuit appears not to have previously addressed the issue directly, it is well established in a substantial number of other circuits that a district court may consider continued criminal conduct by a defendant as evidence of a lack of sincere remorse and, accordingly, deny the two-level reduction under 3E1.1, even in the face of a defendant's assertions to the contrary or agreement to plead guilty. In United States v. Sanchez, 893 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1990), for example, the Fifth Circuit found that, given the defendant's failure to abide by the conditions of his pre-trial release in attempting to purchase a firearm and continuing to use drugs, the district court was justified in denying the two-level reduction under 3E1.1, despite the defendant's surrender to police upon learning of the outstanding warrant for his arrest and guilty plea. Observing that "the `Background' explanation to § 3E1.1 suggests that a showing of `sincere remorse' by the accused is the underlying rationale for reducing a sentence," it held that the district court "had every reason to conclude that Sanchez's involvement with firearms and controlled substances demonstrated a lack of remorse to justify [the] reduction." Id. at 681 (citing United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1989)).
In Jordan the district court denied the defendant's request for the reduction on the basis of his undisputed participation in two separate incidents of drug-related activity (use of cocaine and dealing to minors) during the presentence period. 890 F.2d at 974. It acknowledged Jordan's plea of guilty and admission of responsibility for the offense of conviction, but nevertheless "was persuaded that `this is one of those cases where the old adage actions speak louder than words certainly comes into play.'" Id. at 971.
Id. at 974; see also United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 159 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant's arrest for drug dealing while he was out on bond awaiting sentencing justified the district court's decision to deny the 3E1.1 credit, even though defendant had pled guilty and expressed remorse and a need for drug treatment); United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1816, 108 L.Ed.2d 946 (1990); United States v. Davis, 878 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.) (no clear error in district court's decision to deny award of two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility based on conclusion that defendant's continued drug use while out on bond was inconsistent with having accepted responsibility for her criminal conduct), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989). Similarly, Cooper's subsequent fraudulent purchase of the car detracts from the credibility of her expressions of remorse for the fraudulent activities of which she was convicted.
That set of facts is not before us. As noted previously, the Oliveras court specifically distinguished its case from other Second Circuit opinions which affirmed the district court's denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility credit out of "deference to the sentencing judge's determination that the defendant had not accepted responsibility for the crimes of which he had been convicted." Id. at 631. Such is the case here. At no time did the district court indicate that it was basing its denial of the credit upon Cooper's failure to accept responsibility for the three dismissed indictment counts or to admit and show contrition for the fraudulent purchase of the automobile. Instead, it legitimately considered evidence of Cooper's continued criminal conduct, about which she dissembled, to belie her professions of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for the offense of conviction. See Guarin, 898 F.2d at 1122 (" Perez-Franco is instructive only when, absent the district court's allegedly illegitimate expectation, there is clear evidence that the defendant actually accepted responsibility" for the crime of conviction).
[D]efendant argues that her offense level should not be increased two levels for obstruction of justice . . . citing the First District [sic: Circuit] Perez-Franco case. However, it's distinguishable.
Given that the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its determination on the obstruction-of-justice issue, our resolution of the parties' dispute on this matter would be purely advisory. Accordingly, consistent with our recent decisions in United States v. Munster-Ramirez, 888 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1951, 109 L.Ed.2d 313 (1990), and United States v. Turner, 881 F.2d 684 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 199, 107 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989), we decline to review Cooper's allegations of error in the district court's application of 3C1.1.