Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105513/district-columbia-ct-appeals-vs-feldman
Timestamp: 2018-02-23 17:07:36
Document Index: 708847679

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 111', '§ 11', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 172', '§ 1254', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1331']

District of Columbia Ct of Appeals Vs Feldman - Citation 105513 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals Vs. Feldman - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105513
Case Number 460 U.S. 462
Appellant District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals
Respondent Feldman
district of columbia ct. of appeals v. feldman - 460 u.s. 462 (1983) u.s. supreme court district of columbia ct. of appeals v. feldman, 460 u.s. 462 (1983) district of columbia court of appeals v. feldman no. 81-1335 argued december 8, 1982 decided march 23, 1983 460 u.s. 462 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit syllabus respondents filed petitions in the district of columbia court of appeals asking for waivers of that court's district of columbia bar admission rule that requires applicants to have graduated from a law school approved by the american bar association. the court issued per curiam orders denying the petitions. respondents then filed complaints in the.....
District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman - 460 U.S. 462 (1983)
U.S. Supreme Court District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)
1. The proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature. They involved a "judicial inquiry" in which the court was called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce "liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 , 211 U. S. 226 . With respect to both respondents, the court adjudicated claims of a present right to admission to the Bar. Pp. 460 U. S. 476 -482.
2. United States district courts have no jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had only in this Court. Thus, to the extent that respondents sought review in the District Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' denials of their petitions for waiver, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their complaints. But United States district courts do have subject matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state court judgment in a particular case. Accordingly, here the District Court has jurisdiction over the elements of respondents' complaints involving a general attack on the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Bar admission rule. Pp. 460 U. S. 482 -488.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 460 U. S. 488 .
§ 111, 84 Stat. 475 (codified at D.C.Code § 11-102 (1981)). Another provision amended 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to specify that the term "highest court of a State" as used in § 1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. § 172(a)(1), 84 Stat. 590. These provisions make the judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, like the judgments of state courts, directly reviewable in this Court. Cases no longer have to proceed from the local courts to the United States Court of Appeals and then to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254. See Key v. Doyle, supra, at 434 U. S. 64 . The third provision authorized the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to
the Committee [on Admissions] a certificate verifying that he has graduated from an approved law school. [ Footnote 1 ]"
In May, 1978, Feldman filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' refusal to waive Rule 46I(b)(3) on his behalf. Id. at 35a. [ Footnote 2 ] The complaint stated that the
Ibid. [ Footnote 3 ]
The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. at 78a, 79a. [ Footnote 4 ] The court found that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' order denying Feldman's petition was a judicial act "which fully encompassed the constitutional and statutory issues raised." Id. at 82a. The court stated that, if it were
In April, 1978, Hickey submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a petition for waiver of Rule 46I(b)(3) so that he could sit for the bar examination. Id. at 19a. In his petition, Hickey described his career in the Navy and his law school record. He also submitted affidavits from four law professors attesting to his competence in his legal studies. Hickey went on to suggest that it would be unfair to deny him, or other students currently enrolled at Potomac, a waiver after they had pursued three years of legal education in reliance on the court's previous policy of granting waivers to International graduates. [ Footnote 5 ] Hickey pointed out that denying his petition for waiver would impose an especially severe burden on him in view of his age and his status as a husband and father.
Hickey also suggested that it would be burdensome for him to attempt to comply with Rule 46I(b)(4), which permits graduates of unapproved law schools to sit for the bar examination after completing 24 credit hours at an approved law school. [ Footnote 6 ] Furthermore, Hickey contended that he would be unable to comply with the rule, because the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the District of Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for completion of the 24-credit-hour requirement.
In July, 1978, Hickey filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' denial of his waiver petition. Id. at 60a. [ Footnote 8 ] Hickey alleged that the denial of his petition violated the Fifth Amendment and the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 64a-65a. The allegations and prayer for relief in Hickey's complaint were virtually identical to the
Ibid. [ Footnote 9 ]
Both Hickey and Feldman appealed the dismissals of their complaints to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. [ Footnote 10 ] The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Hickey's and Feldman's antitrust claims on the ground that they were insubstantial. Feldman v. Gardner, 213 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 122, 661 F.2d 1295, 1298 (1981). [ Footnote 11 ] The court, however, concluded that the waiver proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals "were not judicial in the federal sense, and thus did not foreclose litigation of the constitutional contentions in the District Court." Ibid. The court therefore reversed the dismissals of the constitutional claims and remanded them for consideration on the merits. Ibid.
Ibid. (footnotes omitted). [ Footnote 12 ]
The District of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings. Review of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281 , 398 U. S. 296 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 , 263 U. S. 415 , 263 U. S. 416 (1923). A crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature. [ Footnote 13 ]
This Court has considered the distinction between judicial and administrative or ministerial proceedings on several occasions. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908), railroads challenged in federal court the constitutionality of rail passenger rates set by the State Corporation Commission. The question presented by the case was whether the federal court was free to enjoin implementation of the rate order. Id. at 211 U. S. 223 . In considering this question, we assumed that the State Corporation Commission was, at
least for some purposes, a court. Id. at 211 U. S. 224 . We held, however, that the federal court could enjoin implementation of the rate order because the Commission had acted in a legislative, as opposed to a judicial, capacity in setting the rates. Id. at 211 U. S. 226 . In reaching this conclusion, we stated:
We went on to suggest that the nature of a proceeding "depends not upon the character of the body, but upon the character of the proceedings." Ibid. See generally Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U. S. 15 , 405 U. S. 20 -22 (1972); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820 , 367 U. S. 827 (1961); Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 , 288 U. S. 259 (1933); Public Service Co. v. Corboy, 250 U. S. 153 , 250 U. S. 161 -162 (1919).
In In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945), we considered the petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of a State Supreme Court's refusal to admit him to the practice of law. At the outset, we noted that the record was not in the "customary form," because the state court had not treated the proceeding as "judicial." Id. at 325 U. S. 563 . In fact, the state court contested our certiorari jurisdiction on the ground that the state court proceedings had not been judicial in nature, and that no case or controversy therefore existed in this Court under Art. III of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 325 U. S. 564 -565. In considering this contention, we conceded that the state court proceedings might not have been judicial under state law, and that the denial of the petitioner's application for admission to the bar was treated
Id. at 325 U. S. 566 . We stated, however, that in determining the nature of the proceedings "we must for ourselves appraise the circumstances of the refusal." Ibid.
Id. at 325 U. S. 566 -567, quoting Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 819 (1824) (citations omitted). Applying this standard, we noted that the state court had concluded that the report of the Committee on Character and Fitness, which refused to issue a favorable certificate, should be sustained. The state court, therefore, considered the petitioner's petition "on its merits." 325 U.S. at 325 U. S. 567 . Although "no entry was placed by the Clerk in the file, on a docket, or in a judgment roll," ibid., we found that the state court had taken "cognizance of the petition and passed an order which [was] validated by the signature of the presiding officer." Ibid. (footnote omitted). We stated:
Id. at 325 U. S. 567 -569 (footnote omitted).
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. at 211 U. S. 226 . Nor did it engage in rulemaking or specify "the requirements of eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission to the bar. . . ." In re Summers, supra, at 325 U. S. 566 . Nor did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals simply engage in ministerial action. Instead, the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals involved a "judicial inquiry" in which the court was called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce "liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra, at 211 U. S. 226 .
In his petition to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, discussed in detail, supra at 460 U. S. 466 -468, Feldman contended that he possessed "the requisite fitness and good moral character necessary to practice law in this jurisdiction." App. 1a. In support of his position, he described in detail his legal
training and experience. He asserted that his professional education and training were "equal to that received by those who have attended an A.B.A.-approved law school." Id. at 4a. He further argued that granting his petition would not frustrate the objectives of the District of Columbia's procedures and requirements for admission to the bar. In his later letter, see supra at 460 U. S. 466 -467, Feldman pointed out that the court's former practice of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools raised questions about the fairness of denying his petition. He also made explicit legal arguments against the rule based both on the Constitution and on the federal antitrust laws. [ Footnote 14 ] All of this was done against the background of an existing rule.
In essence, Feldman argued on policy grounds that the rule should not be applied to him because he had fulfilled the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 46I(b)(3). Alternatively, he argued in his letter that the rule was invalid. In short, he was seeking "a declaration on rights as they [stood] . . . not on rights which [might] arise in the future. . . ." In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 325 U. S. 567 . This required the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to determine in light of existing law and in light of Feldman's qualifications and arguments whether Feldman's petition should be granted. The court also had before it legal arguments against the validity of the rule. When it issued a per curiam order denying Feldman's petition, it determined as a legal matter that Feldman was
not entitled to be admitted to the bar without examination or to sit for the bar examination. The court had adjudicated Feldman's "claim of a present right to admission to the bar," id. at 325 U. S. 568 , and rejected it. This is the essence of a judicial proceeding.
The same conclusion obtains with respect to the proceedings on Hickey's petition for waiver. In his petition, see supra at 460 U. S. 471 -472, Hickey asserted that he was substantively qualified to sit for the bar examination. In support of his position, he submitted affidavits supporting his competence and described in detail his military service and legal education. He also argued that he had relied on the court's former policy of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools in developing a reasonable expectation that he would be granted a waiver as well. Moreover, he suggested that ABA policy made it impossible for him to pursue the alternative route under the rules to being permitted to sit for the bar examination. Finally, he argued, based on equitable considerations such as his age, military service, and status as a father and husband, that he should be granted a waiver. He stated that "[f]ar more than most," he had "earned the right to sit for the bar examination." App. 24a.
Admittedly, the proceedings in both Feldman's case and Hickey's case did not assume the form commonly associated with judicial proceedings. As we said in In re Summers, supra, however, "[t]he form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is controlling." Id. at 325 U. S. 567 . [ Footnote 15 ]
A determination that the proceedings on Feldman's and Hickey's petitions were judicial does not finally dispose of this case. As we have noted, supra at 460 U. S. 476 , a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in this Court. Therefore, to the extent that Hickey and Feldman sought review in the District Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' denial of their petitions for waiver, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their complaints. Hickey and Feldman should have sought review of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' judgments in this Court. [ Footnote 16 ] To the extent
Id. at 597 (emphasis in original). [ Footnote 17 ]
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Doe v. Pringle, supra, properly emphasized the distinction between general challenges to state bar admission rules and claims that a state court has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission. We have recognized that state supreme courts may act in a nonjudicial capacity in promulgating rules regulating the bar. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U. S. 719 , 446 U. S. 731 (1980); Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 827 (plurality opinion); In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 325 U. S. 566 . Challenges to the constitutionality of state bar rules, therefore, do not necessarily require a United States district court to review a final state court judgment in a judicial proceeding. Instead, the district court may simply be asked to assess the validity of a rule promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding. If this is the case, the district court is not reviewing a state court judicial decision. In this regard, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 does not act as a bar to the district court's consideration of the case, and, because the proceedings giving rise to the rule are nonjudicial, the policies prohibiting United States district court review of final state court judgments are not implicated. United States district courts, therefore, have subject matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state court judgment in a particular case. They do not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had only in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
The remaining allegations in the complaints, however, involve a general attack on the constitutionality of Rule 46I(b)(3). See n 3, supra. The respondents' claims that the rule is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that only graduates of accredited law schools are fit to practice law, discriminates against those who have obtained equivalent legal training by other means, and impermissibly delegates the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' power to regulate the bar to the American Bar Association, do not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case. The District Court, therefore, has subject matter jurisdiction over these elements of the respondents' complaints. [ Footnote 18 ]
the complaints. We leave that question to the District Court on remand. [ Footnote 19 ]
As the District of Columbia Circuit recognized, it is a question of federal law whether "a particular proceeding before another tribunal was truly judicial" for purposes of ascertaining the jurisdiction of a federal court. Feldman v. Gardner, supra, at 134, 661 F.2d at 1310. See In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 , 325 U. S. 566 (1945).
Id. at 394 U. S. 438 . See also Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U. S. 351 , 410 U. S. 352 (1973); Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797 , 401 U. S. 805 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 , 394 U. S. 582 (1969). Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423 , 360 U. S. 436 -437 (1959) ("There can be no question as to the proper presentation of a federal claim when the highest state court passes on it. . . . We think this sufficient here to satisfy the statutory requirement that the federal right sought to be vindicated in this Court be one claimed below. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)" (footnote omitted)); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 , 395 U. S. 242 (1969); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 , 377 U. S. 133 (1964). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has relied on this limit on our certiorari jurisdiction to hold that a federal district court has jurisdiction over constitutional claims asserted by a plaintiff who has been denied admission to a state bar in a state court judicial proceeding if he failed to raise his constitutional claims in the state court. In Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas, 658 F.2d 1045 (1981), the Court of Appeals stated:
The Court of Appeals' reasoning in Dasher is flawed. As we noted in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281 (1970), "lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions." Id. at 398 U. S. 296 . If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's application for admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision. This the district court may not do.
Moreover, the fact that we may not have jurisdiction to review a final state court judgment because of a petitioner's failure to raise his constitutional claims in state court does not mean that a United States district court should have jurisdiction over the claims. By failing to raise his claims in state court, a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the state court decision in any federal court. This result is eminently defensible on policy grounds. We have noted the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 , 449 U. S. 549 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 , 449 U. S. 105 (1980); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372 , 430 U. S. 383 (1977). We also noted in Cardinale that one of the policies underlying the requirement that constitutional claims be raised in state court as a predicate to our certiorari jurisdiction is the desirability of giving the state court the first opportunity to consider a state statute or rule in light of federal constitutional arguments. A state court may give the statute a saving construction in response to those arguments. 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 439 .
Id. at 421 U. S. 792 . See also Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., supra, at 457 U. S. 434 -435; Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438 , 439 U. S. 442 (1979). In MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (CA9 1969), the court stated:
There are many crafts in which the State performs a licensing function. That function is important, not only to those seeking access to a gainful occupation, but to the members of the public served by the profession as well. State-created rules governing the grant or denial of licenses must comply with constitutional standards, and must be administered in accordance with due process of law. Given these acknowledged constitutional limitations on action by the State, it should be beyond question that a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over an individual's lawsuit raising federal constitutional challenges either to licensing rules themselves or to their application in his own case. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Curiously, however, the Court today ignores basic jurisdictional principles when it decides a jurisdictional issue affecting the licensing of members of the legal profession.
court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that those rules have been administered in an unconstitutional manner. According to the Court's opinion, respondents' contentions that bar admission rules have been unconstitutionally applied to them by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals somehow constitute impermissible attempts to secure appellate review of final judgments of that court. See ante at 460 U. S. 482 , 460 U. S. 483 -484, n. 16. There are two basic flaws in the Court's analysis.
the United States District Court to entertain a constitutional challenge to the rules themselves also authorizes that court to entertain a collateral attack upon the unconstitutional application of those rules. The Court's opinion fails to distinguish between two concepts: appellate review and collateral attack. If a challenge to a state court's decision is brought in United States district court and alleges violations of the United States Constitution, then by definition it does not seek appellate review. It is plainly within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V). There may be other reasons for denying relief to the plaintiff -- such as failure to state a cause of action, claim or issue preclusion, or failure to prove a violation of constitutional rights. [ Footnote 2/2 ] But it does violence to jurisdictional concepts for this Court to hold, as it does, that the federal district court has no jurisdiction to conduct independent review of a specific claim that a licensing body's action did not comply with federal constitutional standards. The fact that the licensing function in the legal profession is controlled by the judiciary is not a sufficient reason to immunize allegedly unconstitutional conduct from review in the federal courts. I therefore respectfully dissent.