Source: http://elibrary.verlagoesterreich.at/main/e-journals/icl-vienna-journal-on-international-constitutional-law/2015/heft-3/icl-2015-3.html
Timestamp: 2017-04-27 03:21:46
Document Index: 514924748

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 2', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'Art 138', 'Art 138']

ICL 2015/3 - Heft 3 - 2015 - ICL - Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law - e-Journals
Volltext Cover Download ArticlesICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 291–343
Albi, Anneli Erosion of Constitutional Rights in EU Law: A Call for ‘Substantive Co-operative
Constitutionalism’
Part 2 epistemology of EU law and transnational constitutional law, rule of law/Rechtsstaat, constitutional courts, judicial dialogues, Article 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, uniformity/diversity, ICL 2015, 291 Abstract:Part 1 of this paper (published in the previous issue) documented comparative
case... Abstract:Part 1 of this paper (published in the previous issue) documented comparative
case law in a number of areas – from the single market to the Data Retention
Directive, European Arrest Warrant, ESM Treaty and constitutional review – where
constitutional rights and rule of law safeguards have been levelled downwards in the
context of implementation of EU law in different Member States. Here, Part 2 of the
paper propounds the concept of ‘substantive co-operative constitutionalism’,
exploring how European constitutional law and the European constitutional law
discourse could be recalibrated towards a greater responsiveness to substantive
constitutional values. Part 2 starts by outlining an increasing shift from the
mindset and vocabulary of classic, comparative (continental) European constitutional
law, to a more formal, procedural, thin version of EU constitutionalism, where the
keywords are supremacy, uniformity, direct effect, autonomy, effectiveness and
trust. Indeed in the context of democracy and legitimacy in transnational
governance, some scholars have written about the ‘erosion’, ‘twilight’ or ‘decline’
of constitutionalism or ‘the end of constitutionalism as we know it’. More recently,
Euro crisis measures have prompted heightened concerns about the prolonged and
perhaps even irreversible suspension of constitutionalism, the Rechtsstaat and
democracy. Yet in the mainstream EU and transnational constitutional law discourse,
such concerns have generally received limited attention. The article traces the
reasons for the shift in the paradigm of constitutionalism on the basis of the
literature on the epistemology of EU law and of transnational constitutional law,
and argues that such a shift is not the only way forward. The paper then proceeds to
outline some suggestions on how a more substantive version of co-operative
constitutionalism could be operationalised in practice. This includes a
significantly more probing and proactive role for the national constitutional
courts, supreme courts and national parliaments, as well as the creation of
mechanisms in the EU institutional and judicial framework for greater responsiveness
to constitutional values and constitutional diversity. Volltext	ArticlesICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 344–370
Ambast, Ashwita Where’s Waldo? Looking for the Doctrine of Proportionality in Indian Free Speech
Proportionality, India, Constitutional Law, Freedom of Expression, ICL 2015, 344 Abstract:The doctrine of proportionality has wide, growing transcontinental application
in... Abstract:The doctrine of proportionality has wide, growing transcontinental application
in the realm of constitutional rights adjudication. Indian constitutional law is no
exception to this trend. This article documents the use of proportionality analysis
by the Indian Supreme Court in cases involving the right to free speech. While it is
clear that the proportionality analysis has been employed by the Apex Court, it is
argued that the application of the doctrine is partial and inconsistent. Volltext	ArticlesICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 371–397
Gabardo, Emerson Understanding Brazilian Administrative Law, the Related Literature, and Education: A
Comparison with the System in the United States
US and Brazilian comparative law, Administrative law, Law teaching, Brazilian and US administrative legal scholarship, ICL 2015, 371 Abstract:This paper presents research on a typical subject in comparative law:... Abstract:This paper presents research on a typical subject in comparative law: doctrinal
thinking about (and teaching methods for) administrative law in Brazil and the
United States. The paper’s initial research hypotheses are as follows: 1) in
contrast to the United States, in Brazil, legal scholarship (legal academic writing)
has significantly influenced the construction of the theoretical principles that
form the basis of the public administration system; 2) the Brazilian understanding
of administrative legal scholarship is distinct from that of the United States
regarding several specific but representative issues; 3) in Brazil, administrative
law textbooks and monographs focus on general principles and direct state
intervention, whereas in the United States, administrative law education focuses on
regulatory issues; and 4) regulatory (and policy or decision-making) concepts are
more complex than they initially appear. These initial hypotheses will either be
confirmed or refuted at the end of the study. The methodological research scope is
an analysis of the study, teaching, and theoretical approach to the science of
administrative law through a comparison of the two systems. The conclusions aim to
assist legal researchers in both countries by broadening the understanding of the
differences in meaning between apparently similar institutions and expressions while
analyzing relevant semiological differences. Therefore, the paper does not represent
an analysis of the particular legal systems but instead offers a methodology for
understanding the two jurisdictions under consideration. Volltext	ArticlesICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 398–416
Zoethout, Carla M The European Court of Human Rights and Transnational Judicial Dialogue
References to Foreign Law and the Quest for Justification Transnational, Judicial Dialogue, European Court of Human Rights, Justification, ICL 2015, 398 Abstract:Over the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems more... Abstract:Over the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems more and
more inclined to use foreign sources of law, that is to say, law that does not
originate in the Convention itself or in one of the Member States of the Council of
Europe. Unlike in the US, there is little discussion in Europe about this form of
judicial dialogue in the caselaw of the ECtHR. This paper seeks both to clarify
transnational dialogue by the ECtHR and find ways to justify this practice, against
the backdrop of the American debate on this topic. First, the concept of
transnational judicial dialogue is analysed (Part II). Then judicial dialogue as it
presents itself in the judgments of the ECtHR is assessed, especially when
non-Convention or foreign law is being used in a substantive way (Part III).
Subsequently, an attempt is made to define when and why the use of foreign law by
the ECtHR can be considered a justifiable approach in judicial decision-making (Part
IV). The paper rounds off with some concluding remarks (Part V). Volltext	Notes & EssaysICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 417–431
Šlosar?ík, Ivo EU Law in the Czech Republic: From ultra vires of the Czech Government to ultra vires of
the EU Court?
Czech Republic, Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, European Union, European Arrest Warrant, Lisbon Treaty, ultra vires, ICL 2015, 417 Abstract:Before the Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2004, its constitution
has... Abstract:Before the Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2004, its constitution
has been amended with objective to guarantee constitutional conformity of the EU
accession. The Czech legal system has been opened to external legal provisions and a
constitutional mechanism has been established for transfer of competencies to an
external entity, all framed by the explicitly formulated constitutional principle of
loyalty to the international obligations of the Czech Republic. However, the
‘European amendment’ of the Czech Constitution has left several important issues
unanswered, such as the principle of supremacy of the EU law or relations between
the Czech Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the EU.This article analyses how the Czech Constitutional Court tackled with EU-related
constitutional issues that emerged during the first decade of Czech membership in
the EU. Focused on four key cases decided by the Czech Constitutional Court (sugar
quotas, European Arrest Warrant, Lisbon Treaty, Slovak Pensions), the article will
demonstrate how the Czech Constitutional Court combined a conservative and pragmatic
approach in its EU law related case-law by formulating a constitutional doctrine of
a ‘EU-friendly’ interpretation of Czech constitutional rules, while, at the same
time, leaving the EU law formally outside the frontiers of Czech constitutional law
and refusing EU law to be used as the ultimate argument in intra-judiciary disputes
in the Czech Republic. Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 432–437
Haas, Philipp ‘No to Meat’-March on Holy Saturday – Freedom of Assembly and the Constitutional Court’s
E 717/2014, ICL 2015, 432 The Constitutional Court held that the bare carrying of crosses near churches
and the... The Constitutional Court held that the bare carrying of crosses near churches
and the possible disturbance of church-goers do not serve as a base to prohibit an
assembly. It stated that the prohibition of an assembly may only be an ultima ratio
solution. Therefore, the Constitutional Court repealed the decision of the
Administrative Court of Upper Austria. The present decision is remarkable as it
indicates a change in the procedure of scrutiny regarding an alleged infringement of
the freedom of assembly. In connection with other recent decisions the judgment at
hand reveals at least a partial change in the scope of judicial review regarding the
right to freedom of assembly as guaranteed in Article 12 StGG and ipso facto a
successive approximation to the level of scrutiny the ECtHR applies when addressing
Article 11 ECHR. Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 438–444
Wittmann, Martin C Blackening of Files for Hypo Committee of Inquiry illegal
UA 2/2015 et al, ICL 2015, 438 Since the beginning of 2015, the newly inserted Art 138b para 1 subpara 4 B-VG
stipulates... Since the beginning of 2015, the newly inserted Art 138b para 1 subpara 4 B-VG
stipulates that the Constitutional Court pronounces on divergences of opinion
between a National Council’s committee of inquiry, 25% of its Members and legal
entities concerning the obligation of the latter to provide information to the
committee of inquiry. In the present judgment with regard to the Hypo committee of
inquiry, the Court had to apply this new provision for the first time. In response
to the committee’s request to submit files and documents in accordance with the
object of investigation, the Federal Minister of Finance blackened text passages to
a significant extent. He argued that a complete submission would not comply with the
statutory confidentiality and secrecy provisions. Since the committee issued a
so-called ‘decision of persistence’, the Finance Minister filed an application to
the Court to settle this divergence of opinion promptly.The Court concluded that all legal entities required to provide information must
submit the requested files and documents (covered by the object of investigation)
without blackening regardless of statutory secrecy provisions. At the same time, the
Constitutional Court made it clear that this obligation does not confer the
committee unrestricted competence to publish the pieces of information obtained in
such a way but itself has to weigh up the competing private and public
interests. Volltext	Developments CEEICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 445–450
Safta, Marieta | Toader, Tudorel Constitutional Court of Romania: Religion in Schools
Decision No 669 of 12 November 2014 (published in the Official Gazette
Romania, No 59 of 23 January 2015), ICL 2015, 445 The Constitutional Court ascertained the unconstitutionality of the provisions
of National... The Constitutional Court ascertained the unconstitutionality of the provisions
of National Education Law which established the possibility that pupils may not
attend Religion classes provided that a request in this respect is made in writing
by parents or the legal guardian, because these provisions constituted an
infringement of the constitutional provisions of Article 29 on freedom of
conscience. The Court stated that in adopting its regulations in education, the
legislature must take into account that Article 29 para 6 of the Constitution
guarantees the right to religious education and not the obligation to attend
Religion classes. In this respect, free expression of options necessarily involves
the person’s own initiative to attend the subject of Religion and not the tacit
consent or the express refusal to attend Religion classes. Volltext	Developments CEEICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 451–456
Benke, Károly | Pivniceru, Mona-Maria Constitutional Court of Romania: Constitutionalization of the Obligations under
International Treaties and European Union binding Acts
Decision No 64 of 24 February 2015 (published in the Official Gazette
of Romania, Part I, No 286 of 28 April 2015), ICL 2015, 451 The Constitutional Court of Romania assessed that the right to measures of
social protection... The Constitutional Court of Romania assessed that the right to measures of
social protection provided by the Constitution has to be interpreted in the light of
the international treaties to which Romania is a party. As a result of this
interpretation of the Constitution, the aforementioned fundamental right comprises
the right of the employees to information and consultation in the event of
collective redundancies. Moreover, the Court held that the failure of the
legislative to comply with certain obligations of constitutional relevance that are
incumbent on as the result of Romania’s accession to the European Union is in breach
with the Constitution of Romania. Volltext	Developments CEEICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 457–462
Mokrá, Lucia Slovak Constitutional Court: Citizenship Law in the European Context
No PL ÚS 11/2012, ICL 2015, 457 On 17 September 2014, after almost four years of deliberations, the
Constitutional Court of... On 17 September 2014, after almost four years of deliberations, the
Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic failed to deliver a decision on
conformity of the State Citizenship Act with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic
as well as the existing international treaties on human rights. The inability to
decide on this crucial piece of the national legislation citing procedural grounds
shows the on-going political sensitivity surrounding this issue. While the European
Court for Human Rights delivered judgments validating the State Citizenship Act’s
conformity with the European Convention on Citizenship already by mid 2013, the
inability of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic to render its judgment
more than a year later created a gap in the Slovak constitutional system. Volltext	Book ReviewsICL 2015/3, Jahrgang 2015, Heft 3, S. 463–477
Da Silva, Michael Review Essay: Jeff King, Judging Social Rights
Cambridge University Press, 2012, ISBN 9781107 400 320, 370 pp. ICL 2015, 463 Decades after social rights were recognized as international human rights (IHR)
under the... Decades after social rights were recognized as international human rights (IHR)
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
constitutional social rights are increasingly common but remain part of the avant-garde
of contemporary constitutionalism. Recent works
examine best practices for implementing social rights. Some
explore the record of constitutionalization as a mode of implementation by highlighting
social rights’ legislative recognition in new constitutions and judicial
recognition in established orders. Yet social
rights are not a necessary part of the modern liberal democratic constitutions and theorists
still contest the status of social rights. Practical and theoretical work remains before
social rights are firmly established in contemporary constitutionalism’s
mainstream.Jeff King’s Judging Social Rights (JSR) purports to explain why
nations with background conditions mirroring ‘the social and political conditions
presently obtaining in the United Kingdom’
ought to constitutionalize social rights and how they can do so without falling into
familiar pitfalls with social rights adjudication. King argues that (i) certain nations
ought to recognize constitutional social rights (CSR) to protect social human rights
(SHR) and (ii) incrementalism, a method of judicial interpretation, minimizes potential
problems with this constitutionalization process. This argument requires proof of the
existence of SHR, the ability of CSR to protect SHR, and the ability of incrementalism
to avoid the negative effects of such constitutionalization. King has mixed success
developing such proofs. His argument for the constitutionalization of social rights is
incomplete, but his argument for incrementalism ably blends legal theory, international
law, and comparative constitutional law.The following defends an interpretation of JSR that maximizes its
strengths. Issues with King’s argument for the constitutionalization of social rights do
not affect his argument that incrementalism can minimize problems with
constitutionalizing social rights. I thus recommend reading JSR as a
conditional argument: if one wants to constitutionalize social rights, then
incrementalism helps avoid the negative consequences thereof. My interpretative argument
consists of two substantive parts. After a brief synopsis of JSR,the first substantive section outlines weaknesses in King’s arguments for
the constitutionalization of social rights. The second then suggests that King’s best
work comes after he assumes that CSR exist. There, I defend my alternative
interpretation of JSR by demonstrating that this interpretation avoids
problems King runs into in the early part of his text, makes sense of qualifiers King
places on his argument, and highlights JSR’s strongest arguments. If my
defense succeeds, then JSR stands as an important argument for how to
constitutionalize social rights and for judicial incrementalism in general even if there
are flaws in its argument for recognizing CSR. Volltext	Fachgebiete