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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 195', '§ 141', '§ 141', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 209', '§ 195', '§ 9', '§ 1', '§ 195', '§ 195', '§ 195', '§ 195', '§ 195', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 8', '§ 14', '§ 2']

Utah v. Evans (full text) :: 536 U.S. 452 (2002) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 536 › Utah v. Evans › Case
1. The Court rejects North Carolina's argument that Utah lacks standing because this action is not a "Case" or "Controversy," Art. III, § 2, in that the federal courts do not have the power to "redress" the "injury" that appellees allegedly "caused" Utah, e. g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561. Because there is no significant dif-
2. The Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputation" does not violate 13 U. S. C. § 195, which "authorize[s] the use of the statistical method known as 'sampling,'" "[e]xcept for the determination of population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives." Bureau imputation in
3. The Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputation" does not violate the Census Clause, which requires the "actual Enumeration" of each State's pop-
ulation "within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress ... , in such Manner as they shall by Law direct." Utah argues that the words "actual Enumeration" require the Census Bureau to seek out each individual and prohibit it from relying on imputation, but the Constitution's text does not make the distinction that Utah seeks to draw. Rather, it uses a general word, "enumeration," that refers to a counting process without describing the count's methodological details. The textual word "actual" refers in context to the enumeration that would be used for apportioning the Third Congress, succinctly clarifying the fact that the constitutionally described basis for apportionment would not apply to the First and Second Congresses. The final part of the sentence says that the "actual Enumeration" shall take place "in such Manner as" Congress itself "shall by Law direct," thereby suggesting the breadth of congressional methodological authority, rather than its limitation. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U. S. 1, 19. This understanding of the text is supported by the history of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which demonstrates that "actual Enumeration" does not limit census methodology as Utah proposes, but was intended to distinguish the census from the apportionment process for the First Congress, which was based on conjecture rather than a deliberately taken count. Further support is added by contemporaneous general usage, as exemplified by late-18th-century dictionaries defining "enumeration" simply as an act of numbering or counting over, without reference to counting methodology, and by contemporaneous legal documents, in which "enumeration" does not require contact between a census taker and each enumerated individual, but is used almost interchangeably with the phrase "cause the number of the inhabitants ... to be taken." Indeed, the Bureau's imputation method is similar in principle to other efforts used since 1800 to determine the number of missing persons, including asking heads of households, neighbors, landlords, postal workers, or other proxies about the number of inhabitants in a particular place. Nor can Utah draw support from the Census Clause's basic purposes: to use population rather than wealth to determine representation, to tie taxes and representation together, to insist upon periodic recounts of the population, and to take from the States the power to determine the manner of conducting the census. Those matters of general principle do not directly help determine the issue of detailed methodology before the Court. Nonetheless, certain basic constitutional choices may prove relevant. The decisions, for example, to use population rather than wealth, to tie taxes and representation together, to insist upon periodic recounts, and to take from the States the power to determine methodology all suggest a strong constitutional interest in
"Hot-deck imputation" refers to the way in which the Census Bureau, when conducting the year 2000 census, filled in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. The Bureau derives most census information through reference to what is, in effect, a nationwide list of addresses. It sends forms by mail to each of those addresses. If no one writes back or if the information supplied is confusing, contradictory, or incomplete, it follows up with several personal visits by Bureau employees (who may also obtain information on addresses not listed). Occasionally, despite the visits, the Bureau will find that it still lacks adequate information or that information provided by those in the field has somehow not been integrated into the master list. The Bureau may have conflicting indications, for example, about whether an address on the list (or a newly generated address) represents a housing unit, an office building, or a vacant lot; about whether a residential building is vacant or occupied; or about the number of persons an occupied unit contains. These conflicts and uncertainties may arise because no one wrote back, because agents in the field produced confused responses, or because those who processed the responses made mistakes. There may be too little time left for further personal visits. And the Bureau may then de-
In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 (1992), this Court considered, and rejected, a similar claim. A private plaintiff had sued the Secretary of Commerce, challenging the legality of a 1990 census counting method as "arbitrary and capricious" and contrary to certain specific statutes.
We can find no significant difference between the plaintiff in Franklin and the plaintiff (Utah) here. Both brought their lawsuits after the census was complete. Both claimed that the Census Bureau followed legally improper counting methods. Both sought an injunction ordering the Secretary
The reason North Carolina believes that court-ordered relief, i. e., the new document, cannot help is that, in its view, the statutes that set forth the census process make ultimate redress legally impossible. Those statutes specify that the Secretary of Commerce must "take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April" 2000, 13 U. S. C. § 141(a); he must report the results to the President by January 1,2001, § 141(b); the President must transmit to Congress by January 12,2001, a statement showing the "whole number of persons in each State ... and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled," 2 U. S. C. § 2a(a); and, within 15 days of receiving that statement, the Clerk of the House of Representatives must "send to the executive of each State a certificate of the number of Representatives to which such State is entitled," § 2a(b). The statutes also say that, once all that is done, each State "shall be entitled" to the number of Representatives that the "certificate" specifies "until the taking effect of a reapportionment under this section or subsequent statute." Ibid.
North Carolina adds that another statute, enacted after Franklin, nonetheless bars our consideration of this case. That statute authorizes "[a]ny person aggrieved by the use of any [unlawful] statistical method" to bring "a civil action" for declaratory or injunctive "relief against the use of such method." Pub. L. 105-119, Title II, § 209(b), 111 Stat. 2481. North Carolina argues that this statute, by directly authoriz-
Neither statute posing an absolute legal barrier to relief, we believe it likely that Utah's victory here would bring about the ultimate relief that Utah seeks. Victory would mean a declaration leading, or an injunction requiring, the Secretary to substitute a new "report" for the old one. Should the new report contain a different conclusion about the relative populations of North Carolina and Utah, the relevant calculations and consequent apportionment-related steps would be purely mechanical; and several months would remain prior to the first post-2000 census congressional election. Under these circumstances, it would seem,
This example is relevant here both in the similarities and in the differences that it suggests between sampling and imputation. In both, "'information on a portion of a population is used to infer information on the population as a whole.'" Brief for Appellants 18. And in Utah's view, and that of JUSTICE O'CONNOR, see post, at 482-483 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), that similarity brings
These same differences distinguish Bureau imputation in the year 2000 census from "the statistical method known as 'sampling.' " 13 U. S. C. § 195. The nature of the Bureau's
These differences, whether of degree or of kind, are important enough to place imputation outside the scope of the statute's phrase "the statistical method known as 'sampling.'" For one thing, that statutory phrase-using the words "known as" and the quotation marks that surround "sampling"-suggests a term of art with a technical meaning. And the technical literature, which we have consequently examined, see Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188, 201 (1974), contains definitions that focus upon differences of the sort discussed above. One text, for example, says that "[s]urvey sampling, or population sampling, deals with methods for selecting and observing a part (sample) of the population in order to make inferences about the whole population." Kish, supra, at 18. Another says that "sample, as it is used in the [statistics] literature ... means a subset of the population that is used to gain information about the entire population," G. Henry, Practical Sampling 11 (1990), or, in other words, "a model of the population," ibid. Yet another says that a "sampling method is a method of selecting a fraction of the population in a way that the selected sample
Further, the history of the sampling statute suggests that Congress did not have imputation in mind in 1958 when it wrote that law. At that time, the Bureau already was engaged in what it called "sampling," a practice that then involved asking a small subset of the population subsidiary census questions about, say, automobiles, telephones, or dish-
This background suggests that the "sampling" to which the statute refers is the practice that the Secretary called "sampling" at the time-for that is what Congress considered. And it suggests that the statutory word does not apply to imputation-for that is a matter that Congress did not consider. Indeed, had the Secretary believed that Congress intended to restrict the Bureau's authority to engage in apportionment-related imputation, he would likely have expressed an objection, for the Bureau had used such imputation in the past and intended to use it in the future. Hogan ~ 39, App. 266-267. Moreover, the Bureau's rationale for using sampling was quite different from its rationale for using imputation. An advance plan to sample a subset saves
Utah makes several additional arguments. It says that in House of Representatives, the Court found that two methods, virtually identical to imputation, constituted "sampling."
Nor are Utah's other two arguments convincing. As to the first, Utah has not claimed that the Bureau has used imputation to manipulate results. It has not explained how census-taking that fills in ultimate blanks through imputa-
In sum, imputation differs from sampling in respect to the nature of the enterprise, the methodology used, and the im-
Utah argues that the words "actual Enumeration" require the Census Bureau to seek out each individual. In doing so, the Bureau may rely upon documentary evidence that an individual exists, say, a postal return, or upon eyewitness evidence, say, by a census taker. It can fill in missing data through the use of testimonial reports, including secondhand or thirdhand reports, made by a family member, neighbor,
ords of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 178, 182-183 (rev. ed. 1966) (hereinafter Farrand). After making minor, here irrelevant, changes, the Committee of Detail sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which, in revising the language, added the words "actual Enumeration." Id., at 590, 591. Although not dispositive, this strongly suggests a similar meaning, for the Committee of Style "had no authority from the Convention to alter the meaning" of the draft Constitution submitted for its review and revision. Powell v. M cCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 538-539 (1969); see 2 Farrand 553; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U. S. 224, 231 (1993).
Contemporaneous general usage of the word "enumeration" adds further support. Late-18th-century dictionaries define the word simply as an "act of numbering or counting over," without reference to counting methodology. 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 658 (4th rev. ed. 1773); N. Bailey, An Etymological English Dictionary (26th ed. 1789) ("numbering or summing up"); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 759 (1961 ed.) ("the act of counting," "a count of something (as a population)"). Utah's strongest evidence, a letter from George Washington contrasting a population "estimate" with a "census" or "enumeration," does not demonstrate the contrary, for one can indeed contrast, say, a rough estimate with an
Contemporaneous legal documents do not use the term "enumeration" in any specialized way. The Constitution itself, in a later article, refers to the words "actual Enumeration" as meaning "Census or Enumeration," Art. I, § 9, cl. 4, thereby indicating that it did not intend the term "actual Enumeration" as a term of art requiring, say, contact (directly or through third parties) between a census taker and each enumerated individual. The First Census Act uses the term "enumeration" almost interchangeably with the phrase "cause the number of the inhabitants ... to be taken." And the marshals who implemented that Act did not try to contact each individual personally, as they were required only to report the names of all heads of households. Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 1, 1 Stat. 102. Cf. House of Representatives, supra, at 347 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part) (noting that the Census Acts of 1810 through 1950 required census workers to "visit each home in person"); see also post, at 504 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Nor can Utah draw support from a consideration of the basic purposes of the Census Clause. That Clause reflects several important constitutional determinations: that comparative state political power in the House would reflect comparative population, not comparative wealth; that comparative power would shift every 10 years to reflect population changes; that federal tax authority would rest upon the same base; and that Congress, not the States, would determine the manner of conducting the census. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 9-14, and n. 34 (1964); 1 Farrand 35-36,196-201,540-542,559-560,571,578-588,591-597,603; 2 id., at 2-3, 106; Kurland & Lerner 86-144; see The Federalist No. 54, pp. 336-341 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); id., No. 55, at 341-350 (J. Madison); id., No. 58, at 356-361 (J. Madison); 31 Writings of George Washington, supra, at 329. These basic determinations reflect the fundamental na-
Nonetheless, certain basic constitutional choices may prove relevant. The decisions, for example, to use population rather than wealth, to tie taxes and representation together, to insist upon periodic recounts, and to take from the States the power to determine methodology all suggest a strong constitutional interest in accuracy. And an interest in accuracy here favors the Bureau. That is because, as we have said, the Bureau uses imputation only as a last resortafter other methods have failed. In such instances, the Bureau's only choice is to disregard the information it has, using a figure of zero, or to use imputation in an effort to achieve greater accuracy. And Bureau information provided in the District Court suggests that those efforts have succeeded. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin., Census 2000 Informational Memorandum No. 110, App. 445448 (concluding that postcensus research confirms that imputation appropriately included individuals in the census who would otherwise have been excluded).
In the year 2000 census, the Census Bureau used the statistical technique known as "hot-deck imputation" to calculate the state population totals that were used to apportion congressional Representatives. While I agree with the Court's general description of the imputation process, its conclusion that the appellants have standing to challenge
Because not every address returned a questionnaire, the Bureau had its enumerators attempt to contact nonresponding addresses up to six times by phone or in person in an effort to obtain population information for each address. See Declaration of Howard Hogan ~ 73, App. 285 (hereinafter Hogan); Census 2000 Operational Plan IX.G. This was known as "nonresponse followup." Ibid. Also during this followup procedure, addresses that appeared vacant were marked as such while addresses determined to be nonexistent were noted for later deletion. See Hogan ~~ 69, 73, App. 283, 285. When all followup procedures were completed, the Bureau still lacked population information for approximately 0.4% of the addresses on the master address list because the Bureau had been unable to classify them as either "occupied, vacant, or nonexistent." Id., at 188. Additionally, the
As initially enacted, § 195 provided that "[e]xcept for the determination of population for apportionment purposes, the Secretary [of Commerce] may, where he deems it appropriate, authorize the use of the statistical method known as 'sampling' in carrying out the provisions of this title." 13 U. S. C. § 195 (1970 ed.). As relevant here, Congress re-
"In our common experience, 'sampling' occurs whenever the information on a portion of a population is used to infer information on the population as a whole[,] ... [although] [a]mong professional statisticians, the term 'sample' is reserved for instances when the selection of the smaller population is based on the methodology of their science." Report to Congress-The Plan for Census 2000, p. 23 (revised and reissued Aug. 1997).
Under this definition, the Bureau's use of imputation was a form of sampling. The Bureau used a predefined, deterministic method to select a portion of the population and then used that portion of the population to estimate unknown information about the overall population. The Bureau's imputation process first selected a group of "donor" addresses, one for each address that had not been successfully enumerated. This donor group was a subset of the overall population. Indeed, the donor group was actually a subset of a subset of the population because it was selected from only those addresses that had not returned an initial question-
Indeed, the majority more generally acknowledges that the Bureau's reliance on imputation may be distinguishable
With respect to how a sample is selected, the majority argues that imputation does not look like methods employed "to find a subset that will resemble a whole through the use of artificial, random selection processes." Ante, at 467. But the Bureau's "nearest neighbor" imputation process is just as artificial as any other form of nonrandom selection, and it is beyond dispute that nonrandom selection methodsincluding those that produce nonrepresentative samplesmay be used for sampling. See, e. g., W. Hendricks, Mathematical Theory of Sampling 239-241 (1956); P. Sukhatme, Sampling Theory of Surveys with Applications 10 (1954); F. Stephan, History of the Uses of Modern Sampling Procedures, 43 J. Am. Statistical Assn. 12, 21 (1948) (all indicating that nonrandom selection methods may be used for sampling); see also Yates, supra, at 17; R. Jessen, Statistical Survey Techniques 16 (1978); W. Deming, Sample Design in
Fourth, the majority contends that some definitions of sampling, if viewed broadly, contain no limiting principle and thus might encompass even "the mental process of inference." Ante, at 470. But recognizing the Bureau's use of imputation as a form of sampling does not require that sampling be read so broadly. Instead, sampling under § 195 can be confined to situations where a selected subset of the popu-
Moreover, because the Bureau's authorization to use sampling for nonapportionment purposes was simultaneously a prohibition on the use of sampling for apportionment purposes, it makes even less sense to construe "sampling" narrowly when viewed as a prohibition given the broader historical context in which § 195 marked "the first departure from the requirement that the enumerators collect all census information through personal visits to every household in the Nation." House of Representatives, 525 U. S., at 336. Finally, even if one were willing to assume that the statutory prohibition should not be read to cover statistical techniques the Bureau had used for apportionment purposes prior to 1957, that still would not justify the use of imputation since the Bureau had never before added people to the apportionment count using that process. See Hogan ~~ 39, 41, App. 266-268.
Finally, the majority suggests that imputation is somehow "better" than making no statistical adjustment at all. Ante, at 470. But no party has cited a study suggesting that
Conducting a census to count over 200 million people is an enormously complicated and difficult undertaking. To facilitate the task, statisticians have created various methods to supplement the door-to-door inquiries associated with the "actual Enumeration" and "counting [of] the whole number
The use of the statistical technique known as hot-deck imputation increased the final year 2000 census count by 1,172,144 people, representing 0.42 percent of the Nation's total population. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin., Census 2000 Informational Memorandum No. 110, App. 443. Utilization of this method in the year 2000 census had important consequences for two States in particular, North Carolina and Utah: North Carolina gained
1 We gave some consideration to a similar question in Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U. S. 316 (1999),
when considering a challenge to the Department of Commerce's decision to use statistical sampling in the decennial census for apportionment purposes. There was no need, however, to decide the constitutional question in that case because we held that 13 U. S. C. § 195 "prohibits the use of sampling in calculating the population for purposes of apportionment." 525 U. S., at 340. Both JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE SCALIA, however, weighed in on the matter. See id., at 362-364 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); id., at 346-349 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part).
3 The word "count" did not appear in the original version of Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. It did, however, appear in the definitions of "enumeration."
5 Moreover, while the Court states that the Constitution "uses a general word, 'enumeration,' that refers to a counting process without describing the count's methodological details," ante, at 474, the meaning of "enumeration" has not materially changed since the time of the founding. To "enumerate" is now defined as "to ascertain the number of: COUNT," and also "to specify one after another: LIST." See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 416 (1988). "Enumeration" meant at the time of the founding, as it does now, to count individually and specifically and simply does not admit of various counting methodologies.
6 By "conjectural rule," we can presume that he meant to refer to the population estimates used by the Constitutional Convention to determine the number of Representatives of Congress from each State prior to the first census. See H. Alterman, Counting People: The Census in History 188 (1969) (hereinafter Alterman).
7 As described infra, at 503-504, Congress has implemented this power in a variety of ways, such as by authorizing marshals to "cause the number of the inhabitants to be taken" and to appoint as many assistants as necessary, establishing the timeframe within which the census is to be completed, and setting methods of payment for assistants. Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 1, reprinted in C. Wright, History and Growth of the United States Census (prepared for the Senate Committee on the Census), S. Doc. No. 194, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 925 (1900) (hereinafter Wright). In recent years, the Bureau through its delegated power has adopted a number of measures to reduce error, including "an extensive advertising campaign, a more easily completed census questionnaire, and increased use of automation, which among other things facilitated the development of accurate maps and geographic files for the 1990 census." Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U. S. 1, 8 (1996).
8 This traditional religious objection to census taking was based on the "sin of David, who brought a plague upon Israel by 'numbering' the people (2 Sam. 24:1-25, 1 Chron. 21:1-30)." P. Cohen, A Calculating People 256,
9 The 1753 bill contemplated by the British Parliament received a great deal of publicity and attention. Glass 17. The proposal provided that overseers would "go from house to house in their parishes, recording the numbers of persons actually dwelling in each house during the twelve preceeding hours." Id., at 18.
10 See also Dept. of Commerce and Labor, A Century of Population Growth: From the First Census of the United States to the Twelfth, 17901900, p. 4 (1909) (hereinafter Century) ("The people of Massachusetts and Connecticut manifested considerable opposition to census taking, seeing no advantage in it to themselves, and fearing that in some way the information obtained would be used by the British authorities to their disadvantage").
Another elaborate effort at population calculation was undertaken by the Governor of Massachusetts in 1763, who estimated his Colony's population in three ways. First, he made an estimate from a return to the General Court of "'rateable polls'" of males over 16 eligible to vote. He added an estimate of males who were too poor to pay the poll tax, and then added similar numbers of females. He made another estimate by multiplying the militia returns by four. He calculated a third estimate from the number of houses. Since many believed that houses averaged five occupants and others "preferred five and a half," he used both numbers. After giving the British Board of Trade several numbers, however, he concluded that the "actual population was none of these figures" and the population was in fact higher. Cassedy 73. In any event, "[s]ince all of the returns used in the estimates had been made for tax purposes, it was understood that they would be well on the low side." Ibid.
The Framers knew that the calculation of populations could be and often were skewed for political or financial purposes. Debate about apportionment and the census consequently focused for the most part on creating a standard that would limit political chicanery. While the Framers did not extensively discuss the method of census-taking, many
Discussion revealed a keen awareness that absent some fixed standard, the numbers were bound to be subject to political manipulation. While Gouverneor Morris appears to have been one of the strongest opponents of "fettering the Legislature too much," he at least recognized that if the mode for taking the census was "unfixt the Legislature may use such a mode as will defeat the object: and perpetuate the inequality." Founders' Constitution 102. He believed, however, that "[i]f we can't agree on a rule that will be just
Some who initially believed that the Congress should have discretion changed their minds after listening to the arguments by Randolph, Mason, and others. Roger Sherman, for example, "was at first for leaving the matter wholly to the discretion of the Legislature; but he had been convinced by the observations of (Mr. Randolph & Mr. Mason) that the periods & the rule of revising the Representation ought to be fixt by the Constitution." Id., at 104. Nathaniel Ghorum perceptively noted that "[i]f the Convention who are comparatively so little biassed by local views are so much perplexed, How can it be expected that the Legislature hereafter under the full biass of those views, will be able to settle a standard." Ibid. On the other hand, Reid continued to believe that "the Legislature ought not to be too much shackled." Ibid. He also thought that "[it] would make the Constitution like Religious Creeds, embarrassing to those bound to conform to them & more likely to produce dissatisfaction and Scism, than harmony and union." Ibid.
From the first census, Congress directed that the census be taken by actually counting the people. House of Representatives, 525 U. S., at 335. Congress enacted a series of requirements for how to accomplish the counting; none mention the use of sampling or any other statistical technique or method of estimation. Rather, the first Census Act described, among other things, how many census takers (or deputies) could be used, their pay, the consequences of falsifying papers, what address to attribute to persons who had
There was widespread awareness that the early censuses were not entirely accurate. The enumerators confronted many problems, including confusion regarding which houses belonged to which districts, danger on the roads, the unwillingness of citizens to give the required information, superstition, and a fear from some that the census was connected to taxation. Century 45-46. For example, in a 1791 letter from George Washington to Gouverneor Morris dated before the first census was complete, Washington noted the differ-
11 It was later believed that the disappointment was "largely due to the exaggerated estimates of colonial population." Wright 17. See also Alterman 205 ("Many census historians believe, as Washington hinted ... that the disappointment was due to the exaggerated hopes born of a newly won independence, as well as to the unrealistic estimates of the colonial population").
In recent decades, decisions regarding whether, and what kind of, imputation and other statistical methods should be utilized have changed from administration to administration. Departing from past practice, imputation was first used in the year 1960 census. The Bureau has used some form of it in every decennial census since then. Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts, App. 44; Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts, id., at 222. In the year 1970 census, about 900,000 persons were imputed to the apportionment count through household size and occupancy imputation. The Census Bureau also used a form of estimation that combined imputation and sampling. Declaration of Howard Hogan, id., at 268-269 (hereinafter Hogan). In 1980, the use of imputation shifted one seat in the House of Representa-
12 The Bureau states it "no longer has data available to determine whether count imputation affected apportionment in the 1960 or the 1970 Censuses." App. 224.
Questioning neighbors was not permitted until 1880 and even then census data could only be based on information provided by those "living nearest to such place of abode." Act of Mar. 3, 1879, § 8, id., at 937. Again, family members or agents of families were required by law "to render a true account" and those who "willfully fail[ed] or refuse[d]" were "guilty of a misdemeanor" and required to "pay a sum not exceeding one hundred dollars." § 14, id., at 938. That process is far different from a computation where data about one "donor" house, that appears on "Census Burea[u] records," Hogan, App. 255, compiled far away from the actual residence, is used to estimate data about another. With "status imputation," for example, the Census Bureau is willing to impute data even though it categorizes these households as "Donees" "for which we know nothing." Memorandum Series B-17, id., at 195. While subsequent Acts may permit other forms of proxy, they do not assist with our analysis of the original understanding. Nor are we called upon to judge their constitutionality here. Because hot-deck imputation is an estimation procedure that includes persons not
The Court takes the position that "enumeration" may be incompatible with gross statistical estimates, but concludes that such gross estimates are not at stake here. See ante, at 476. I derive little comfort from the fact that the Court has drawn a constitutional line at "'gross statistical estimates.'" Ibid. The Court neglects to explain the boundaries of such gross estimates, begging the question of how "gross" must "gross" be? The Court nonchalantly comments that the Census Bureau used the method "sparingly," see ante, at 477, and that the "inference involves a tiny percent of the population," ante, at 479. But the consequences are far from trivial. One State's representation in Congress is reduced while another's is fortified. If the use of hot-deck imputation in the next Census shifts the balance of power in "only" two or three seats, will the Court continue to defend the method? Today, we deal with hot-deck imputation. But if history is our guide, surely other statistical methods will be employed in future censuses and there will be similar challenges. By accepting one method of estimation as con-
13 See House of Representatives, 525 U. S., at 349 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part) ("The prospect of this Court's reviewing estimation techniques in the future, to determine which of them so obviously creates a distortion that it cannot be allowed, is not a happy one").
The case for appellants' standing is even weaker than I described it in Franklin. Redress of their alleged injuries
1 It cannot be deemed to refer to reapportionment under the new Presidential statement that appellants seek, because "reapportionment under this section" pursuant to the 2000 census has already occurred. The Presidential statement effecting "reapportionment under this section" must be transmitted "[o]n the first day, or within one week thereafter, of the first regular session" of the first Congress after the census, § 2a(a)-a deadline met by the President's statement under challenge here, but now long since passed.
I would not subscribe to application of this deformed new canon of construction even if there were something about