Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020160325E09/MOORES%20v.%20COLVIN
Timestamp: 2017-06-24 10:33:02
Document Index: 755962265

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 404', '§ 404', '§ 401', '§ 1382', '§ 423', '§ 423']

MOORES v. COLVIN | 173 F.Supp.3d 989 (2016) | By EDMUND F. BRENNAN | Leagle.com
173 F.Supp.3d
Citing Case 173 F.Supp.3d 989 (2016)
Kelly A. MOORES, Plaintiff,
Barbara Arlette Arnold , Law Office of Barbara Arnold, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff.
Bobbie J. Montoya, SS , United States Attorney's Office, Sacramento, CA, Carolyn B. Chen, Govt, Social Security Administration OGC, Region IX, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 17, 2009, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Lyme disease and bipolar disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d)), 404.1525 and 404.1526.
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she is limited to performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. The claimant should not work at production rate pace, but she is able to perform goal-oriented tasks. She is limited to no interaction with the public and only occasional interaction with coworkers. She is to perform work involving things and objects rather than people.
7. The claimant was born on July 6, 1969 and was 40 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 17, 2009, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir.1985). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir.1996). "`It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).
On August 26, 2011, nurse practitioner Rachelle A. Goering completed a Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire. AR 461-469. She reported that she had been treating plaintiff since March 2007 for Lyme disease and bipolar disorder. Id. at 461. Plaintiff's symptoms included nonrestorative sleep, chronic fatigue, morning stiffness, muscle weakness, irritable bowel syndrome, premenstrual syndrome, breathlessness, anxiety, panic attacks, depression, chronic fatigue syndrome, and pain in cervical spine and feet. Id. at 461-462. She opined that plaintiff's symptoms were severe enough to interfere with attention and concentration necessary to complete even simple tasks 40 percent of the time, and that she was incapable of performing even low stress jobs. Id. at 462. It was Ms. Goering's opinion that plaintiff could only walk one block without rest or severe pain; sit for six hours in an eight hour work day; and stand/walk for less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, but for only 10 to 15 minutes at one time. Id. at 463-464. She further opined that plaintiff could lift 10 pounds occasionally and 20 pounds rarely; would require unscheduled one hour breaks every 20 to 30 minutes; could rarely perform postural activities; and would be absent from work three or more days a month. Id. at 464-465. It was also her opinion that plaintiff could only work about 2 hours per day and was unable to engage the public or co-workers due to being easily stimulated, mental fogginess, and high anxiety. Id. at 465.
Non-examining psychologist Tawnya Brode, Psy.D. also completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. Id. 527-529. She opined that plaintiff was moderately limited in interacting appropriately with the general public and in accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors. Id. at 528. It was Dr. Brode's opinion that plaintiff was able to understand and remember work locations and routines, maintain adequate attention and concentration, sustain a workday/workweek schedule, interact with others in a superficial manner, adapt to changes, and respond to hazards. Id. at 529.
Ms. Goering's opinion is given little weight because the objective medical evidence does not support such severe functional limitations on the part of the claimant. In addition, the undersigned accords little weight to Ms. Goerging's opinion because a nurse practitioner is not an "acceptable medical source" (20 CFR 404.1513 416.913). "Furthermore, the claimant's lack of medical treatment and her overall activities of daily living are inconsistent with a complete inability to work."
As an initial matter, the ALJ fails to acknowledge that Dr. Hynote provided a treating-source opinion. The ALJ acknowledges that Dr. Hynote signed the Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire completed by Ms. Goering, but ultimately treats the opinion as only given by Ms. Goering. Id. at 33-34. The ALJ consistently refers to the opinion as that of Ms. Goering and disposes of it with reduced weight because Ms. Goering is a nurse practitioner and not a medical doctor. Id. at 34. The effect is to ignore entirely Dr. Hynote's participation in providing a medical opinion as to the plaintiff's functional capacity. Yet the record contains two copies of the Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire, one containing only Ms. Goering's signature, id. at 461-465, and another copy that includes Dr. Hynote's signature, id. at 530-534. This evidence establishes that Dr. Hynote reviewed the opinion initially provided by Ms. Goering and adopted it as his her own. Thus, the fact that Ms. Goering is not an acceptable medical source under the Commissioner's regulations, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 & 416.913, provides no basis for rejecting Dr. Hynote's opinion.
The ALJ's other reasons for rejecting Dr. Hynote's uncontradicted opinion are not clear and convincing. First, the ALJ rejected Dr. Hynote's opinion because "the objective medical evidence does not support such severe functional limitations on the part of the claimant." This conclusory statement, without any explanation, falls short of satisfying the clear and convincing standard. As explained by the Ninth Circuit:
To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient objective findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior cases have required even when the objective factors are listed seriatim. The ALJ must do more than offer his own conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretation and explain why he, rather than the doctors, are correct.
Lastly, in rejecting Dr. Hynote's opinion, the ALJ found that plaintiff's "lack of medical treatment and her overall activities of daily living are inconsistent with a complete inability to work." AR 34. An ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician who prescribed conservative treatment, yet opines that a claimant suffers disabling conditions. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001). But here, the record indicates that Dr. Hynote prescribed medication to treat plaintiff's Lyme disease. Treatment notes from September 2010 indicate that plaintiff was doing well on antibiotics. AR 406. She reported that pain in her body and joints were clearing, and that she experienced less fogginess. Id. However, the following month plaintiff reported that her symptoms had returned and that she was having difficulty sleeping and experiencing issues with low energy and body pain. Id. Plaintiff attributed her reports of improvement during the previous visit to a manic episode. Id. Plaintiff was directed to continue taking Zithromax and was prescribed Mepron. Id. In November 2010, plaintiff reported that her energy was still low, but that her joint and body pain were "under control." Id. at 407. She also stated that she had not started Mepron, as she had been denied Medi-Cal. Id. Treatment notes form December 2010 reflected that plaintiff was continuing to take her a Zithromax, but stated that she could not afford Mepron.4 In May 2011, plaintiff reported that she did not fill her prescription for antibiotics because she was "running out of money."5 Id. at 470.
Thus, the limited activity plaintiff performed at the health food store was not inconsistent with the limitations assessed by Dr. Hynote. Accordingly, none of the reasons articulated by the ALJ provided a basis for rejecting Dr. Hynote's opinion.
FootNotes 1. Plaintiff filed a request for the court to hold a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 20. The court finds that oral argument would not be of material assistance to resolution of the pending motions, and therefore plaintiff's request for a hearing is denied.
2. Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") is paid to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, disability is defined, in part, as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity" due to "a medically determinable physical or mental impairment." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: