Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/60728557/10/Pls-%E2%80%99-Supplemental-Mem-Opp%E2%80%99n-1-2-They-admit-that-there-was-no
Timestamp: 2014-09-19 10:59:27
Document Index: 215386397

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 90', '§ 1464', '§ 500', '§ 1461', '§ 500']

Pls.’ Supplemental Mem. Opp’n 1-2. They admit that there was no for 11-10368 Dixon v Wells Fargo MTD Mem &amp; Order
Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See moreDownloadStandard viewFull view of .Save to My LibraryLook up keyword or sectionLike thisShare on social networks2Activity×Share to your social networks.TweetEmbedTable Of ContentsMEMORANDUM AND ORDERUnited States District Court for the District of MassachusettsDixons’ motion to remand and granted Wells Fargo’s motion toSupplemental Mem. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pls.’ SupplementalSuperior Court to prevent the loss of their home. See ProceduralSupplemental Mem. Opp’n 1-2. Arguing that the bank’s initiationMass. at 849-50 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary259. Just as “[i]t is no appropriate part of judicial businessPls.’ Supplemental Mem. Opp’n 1-2. They admit that there was no(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he question here is simply whether U.S(1985); see also Anzalone v. Administrative Office of Trialsection 90 nor in section 2 of the Restatement, which defines theRestatement’s more relaxed standard. This tension is notId. at 524. As the Supreme Judicial Court remarked in an early521. But, in so doing, the plaintiff’s second action was filed527. The court observed that “the plaintiff ha[d] sufferedId. at 526. Having acted in a manner “not consonant withWells Fargo not only should have known that the Dixons would takeRptr. 3d at 514 (“U.S. Bank agreed to ‘work with [Aceves] on a849. Binding the promisor to a promise made to take advantage ofThe Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is PromissoryEstoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New LookContracts § 90 (“The remedy granted for breach may be limited as46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936). “Because promissory estoppel allows a667. It is only under the current regime of either no liabilityJurisprudence Realism in Theory and Practice 219-20 (1962)F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Barnett Bank of Marion1951)); see 12 U.S.C. § 1464; 12 C.F.R. §§ 500.1(a) (giving theOTS “responsib[ility] for the administration and enforcement ofThat OTS regulations are “preemptive of any state law purportingsection 560.2(b)’s illustrative list of types of state laws thatsection 560.2, the court must analyze whether the law “affects594. Under this “as applied” rule, only generally applicable(discussing Judge Posner’s opinion). The Seventh Circuit thus83 (S.D. W. Va. 2008) (“If the plaintiff truly complains of aWells Fargo’s “servicing” of the mortgage. See 12 C.F.R*5 (“[R]equiring a bank to perform the obligations of its(“An award of Chapter 93A exemplary damages against defendant50966. This presumption is rebutted here, however, becauseHOLA because it “d[id] not attempt to impose substantiveDeliberation: A Reflection on Using Lessons from Practice to0 of .Results for: No results containing your search query{{& result_text }}
P. 111-10368 Dixon v Wells Fargo MTD Mem &amp; Order11-10368 Dixon v Wells Fargo MTD Mem &amp; OrderRatings: (0)|Views: 216
|Likes: 0Published by cbsradionewsFederal Court Ruling on Mortgage Foreclosure case.Federal Court Ruling on Mortgage Foreclosure case.More info:Categories:Types, Government & PoliticsPublished by: cbsradionews on Jul 23, 2011Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee moreSee lesshttp://www.scribd.com/doc/60728557/11-10368-Dixon-v-Wells-Fargo-MTD-Mem-amp-Order07/23/2011pdftextoriginal 1UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS)FRANK T. DIXON; DEANA M. DIXON, ))Plaintiffs, ))v. ) CIVIL ACTION) NO. 11-10368-WGYWELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. formerly )known as WACHOVIA MORTGAGE, FSB )formerly known as WORLD SAVINGS )BANK, FSB, ))Defendant. ))MEMORANDUM AND ORDERYOUNG, D.J.July 22, 2010
Frank and Deana Dixon (collectively “the Dixons”) bring thiscause of action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”),seeking (1) an injunction prohibiting Wells Fargo fromforeclosing on their home; (2) specific performance of an oralagreement to enter into a loan modification; and (3) damages.Wells Fargo, having removed the action from state court, nowmoves for dismissal of the Dixons’ complaint under Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the allegations are insufficient toinvoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel and that, to theextent the Dixons have stated a state-law claim, it is preempted
2by the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1700,and its implementing regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 500-99.
On January 6, 2011, the Dixons initiated this civil actionin the Massachusetts Superior Court sitting in and for the Countyof Plymouth, Civil Docket No. PLCV2011-00015, by filing a“Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Specific Performanceand Damages.” Compl., Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1; Summons & OrderNotice, Ex. D, ECF No. 1-4. They also filed an ex parte motionfor a temporary restraining order. TRO, Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2.After an initial continuance, the hearing on that motion was heldon February 14, 2011, and the Superior Court issued a preliminaryinjunction, enjoining Wells Fargo from prosecuting theforeclosure action it had filed against the Dixons until furtherorder of the court. Sup. Ct. Civ. Dkt. 3-4, Ex. C, ECF No. 1-3;Order Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 4. At the present time, thepreliminary injunction remains in effect. Mem. Opp’n Pls.’ Mot.Remand 1, ECF No. 13.On March 4, 2011, Wells Fargo removed the action to theUnited States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.Notice Removal, ECF No. 1. Wells Fargo filed its motion todismiss the Dixons’ complaint on April 11, 2011. Def.’s Mot.Dismiss, ECF No. 5; Mem. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.Supp.”), ECF No. 7. The Dixons opposed Wells Fargo’s motion and
3moved to remand the case. Mem. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pls.’Mem. Opp’n”), ECF No. 12; Pls.’ Mot. Remand, ECF No. 9; Mem.Supp. Pls.’ Mot. Remand, ECF No. 10.After a hearing on May 9, 2011, this Court denied theDixons’ motion to remand and granted Wells Fargo’s motion todismiss the Dixons’ contract claim as insufficiently pleaded.The Court took under advisement the two remaining issues: (1) thesufficiency of the allegations in the complaint with respect tothe doctrine of promissory estoppel; and (2) HOLA preemption.With leave of the Court, both parties have since filedsupplemental briefing. Supplemental Mem. Supp. Def.’s Mot.Dismiss (“Def.’s Supplemental Mem. Supp.”), ECF No. 16;Supplemental Mem. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pls.’ SupplementalMem. Opp’n”), ECF No. 18.
B.Facts Alleged
The Dixons reside at their home in Scituate, PlymouthCounty, Massachusetts. Compl. ¶ 2. Wells Fargo is a corporationdoing business in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 3.Wells Fargo alleges that it is the holder of a mortgage on theDixons’ home. Id. ¶ 6.On or about June 8, 2009, the Dixons orally agreed withWells Fargo to take the steps necessary to enter into a mortgageloan modification. Id. ¶ 7. As part of this agreement, WellsFargo instructed the Dixons to stop making payments on their