Source: https://fr.scribd.com/document/355816398/City-of-Albuquerque-v-Soto-Enterprises-10th-Cir-2017
Timestamp: 2020-05-30 09:36:57
Document Index: 565408191

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1441', '§ 1332', '§ 1441', '§ 1442', '§ 1443', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§\n1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1', '§ 3721', '§ 1', '§ 1447', '§ 1446', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1446', '§ 1446', '§ 1441', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1445', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1441', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1441', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1446', '§ 1447', '§ 1446', '§ 1446', '§ 1446', '§ 1446', '§ 1446', '§ 1446', '§ 1447', '§ 1452', '§ 1447', '§ 1446', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1446']

City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enterprises, 10th Cir. (2017) | Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Supplemental Jurisdiction | Essai gratuit de 30 jours | Scribd
Filed: 2017-07-25 Precedential Status: Precedential Docket: 16-2065
enregistrerEnregistrer City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enterprises, 10th Cir.... pour plus tard
United States of America, Cross-Appellee v. Merchants National Bank of Mobile, Cross-Appellant, 772 F.2d 1522, 11th Cir. (1985)
Beatriz Wassmer vs. Velez
Parallel Iron LLC v. NetApp, Inc., C.A. No. 12-769-RGA (D. Del. Mar. 25, 2015).
02 JRS Business Corp vs Insurance.pdf
AG Stay Factum
SOTO ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a Miracle Delivery Armored Services,
No. 16-2065
Christopher J. Tebo, Assistant City Attorney (Jessica M. Hernandez, City Attorney, and Nicholas Bullock, Assistant City Attorney, with him on the brief), City Attorney’s Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
we have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal, and affirm. 1
The City of Albuquerque (“the City”) provides public-bus services to
Services (“Soto”) to count the fare money, transport it by armored car to the City’s
filed a partial motion to dismiss (the “motion to dismiss”), asserting that the City had
1 An order remanding a case to state court is a final or collateral order because it “puts the litigants ‘effectively out of court.’” First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714 (1996)).
3:38 p.m., Soto filed a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, alleging
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. So an hour and twenty minutes passed
between Soto’s motion to dismiss and its notice of removal.
court by filing the motion to dismiss. The district court agreed with the City’s
remand orders, the City filed a motion to dismiss Soto’s appeal, arguing that we lack
To decide whether we have appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s
waiver ruling, we are guided by two statutory subsections. The first is 28 U.S.C. §
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant
to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
Because Soto removed the case under § 1441, neither 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (which
governs federal-officer removal) nor 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (which governs removal of
civil-rights cases) applies here. On its face, § 1447(d) would lead us to believe that
we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order, but we
don’t read that subsection in isolation. Instead, we read § 1447(d) in pari materia
with its close neighbor, § 1447(c), and confine the reach of § 1447(d) to the two
remands mentioned in § 1447(c). In re Stone Container Corp., 360 F.3d 1216, 1218
Thus, the second guiding statutory subsection is 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which
So § 1447(c) speaks to two bases of remand: (1) those based on a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, which have no time limit, and (2) those based on “any defect
other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” which must be filed within 30 days of
removal. This means that under the governing interpretation, § 1447(d) limits our
jurisdiction “only when the district court remands on grounds permitted by §
1447(c).” In re Stone, 360 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Dalrymple v. Grand River Dam
expressly specified in § 1447(c), namely, that Soto waived its removal right by filing
a motion to dismiss in state court (which we will refer to as “waiver by
participation”). 2 Our sister circuits disagree about whether waiver by participation
falls within either of § 1447(c)’s two bases, and, until now, this court has not
“wade[d] into” that conflict. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
whether § 1447(d) limits our jurisdiction, we must determine whether waiver by
participation falls within either of the § 1447(c) bases—(1) lack of subject-matter
“Subject matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority to hear a given type
of case.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (quoting
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)). “[I]t represents ‘the extent to
which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.’” Id. (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004)). And because parties cannot waive
2 The waiver in this case differs from other types of waiver, such as waiver by
dismiss in state court, a form of waiver by participation during the state-court proceedings rather than by agreement.
subject-matter jurisdiction, they can challenge it “at any time prior to final
judgment.” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004).
But procedural rules set by the Supreme Court and by common law “do not
create or withdraw federal jurisdiction,” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 453 (2004)
(quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978)), and “a
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’
litigation conduct,” id. at 456. This stems from a fundamental principle that “[o]nly
Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at
(citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 1).
F.2d 1402, 1408 (7th Cir. 1989). It concerns the situation where a defendant has
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3721 (4th ed. 2017) (“A state court
taking some substantial offensive or defensive action in the state court action
concurring) (stating that waiver by participation is a “defect in removal procedure”).
And as a procedural, common-law limitation, waiver by participation doesn’t
procedural rules established by courts don’t create or withdraw federal jurisdiction).
matter jurisdiction’s core characteristics—(1) that only Congress can create or
destroy subject-matter jurisdiction, U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, and (2) that a party’s
litigation conduct can’t affect subject-matter jurisdiction, Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 453.
that a district court “cannot remand sua sponte based on a non jurisdictional defect
because procedural deficiencies are waivable”). So we cannot characterize a
procedural defect such as waiver by participation as jurisdictional. 3
3 The City argues that “waiver of the removal right can be colorably characterized as evidencing a lack of federal jurisdiction.” Appellee Response Br. at 8-9. This misapplies the colorable-characterization standard, which applies when the district court explicitly states one of the § 1447(c) bases. In that instance, we merely peek behind the district court’s label to ensure that the district court did not “dress[] in jurisdictional clothing a patently nonjurisdictional ground” or similarly dress a non-defect ground in defect clothing. Hill v. Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, LLC, 702 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007)); see Harvey, 797 F.3d at 804, 807 (reviewing whether the district court’s characterization of its remand as based on a defect was colorable).
declared that “[w]aiver may be a proper basis upon which to find lack of removal
jurisdiction; however, waiver does not divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction.”
at 1248; see 28 U.S.C. § 1446. So when a court finds that it lacks removal
jurisdiction, that finding hardly means it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction—it may or
may not. See Cogdell, 366 F.3d at 1248. 4
the district court remanded a case to state court after determining that “removal was
no longer available” because of the defendants’ waiver by participation. Id. at 336. 5
4 Though Cogdell preceded the Supreme Court’s Carlsbad decision by five years, it applied consistent logic. In Carlsbad, the Court analyzed supplemental jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction. 556 U.S. at 640. It determined that a district court could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, yet still have had subject-matter jurisdiction over them. Id. This shows that supplemental jurisdiction, like removal jurisdiction, requires more than subject- matter jurisdiction. To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a district court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims, and then choose to exercise that jurisdiction. Id.
5 In Weaver, the defendants participated in the state-court proceedings by seeking and obtaining dissolution of a temporary injunction. 610 F.2d at 336.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a district court’s belief that removal was
no longer available led “to the logical inference that [the district court] felt
jurisdiction was lacking.” Id. at 337. The court never explained what made this
inference “logical,” and we can fathom no explanation. To us, the inference relies on
a mistaken premise—that a remand based on a defendant’s participation in state court
state claims. 6 In fact, the federal court could have kept and resolved the removed
jurisdiction, it falls outside § 1447(c)’s subject-matter-jurisdiction basis. But before
we can address the case’s merits, we must also examine the second § 1447(c) basis
for remand, the “any defect” basis.
B. “Any Defect”
1. Meaning of “Any Defect”
Based on our circuit’s case law, we know that three grounds for remand
qualify within the meaning of “any defects” under § 1447(c): (1) noncompliance with
6 In Rothner, the Seventh Circuit also exercised appellate jurisdiction to review
and rejected Weaver’s reasoning, finding it “illogical,” “unpersuasive,” and “unsound.” Id. at 1417. Weaver’s reasoning is questionable even within the Fifth Circuit. In Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1543-44 (5th Cir. 1991), the court admonished the plaintiffs for confusing improper removal with a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and stated that “this court has had little difficulty in
distinguishing between removal jurisdiction, on the one hand, and original or subject matter jurisdiction, on the other hand.”
the time limits provided in § 1446(b); (2) noncompliance with the unanimity
requirements in § 1446(b)(2)(A); and (3) noncompliance with the forum-defendant
rule in § 1441(b), which forbids removal when a defendant is a citizen of the forum
state. Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 194 F.3d 1072, 1077 (10th Cir. 1999)
Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1970) (forum-defendant rule). 7
Because these three grounds are “defects” under § 1447(c), § 1447(d) limits our
jurisdiction to review remands based on them. 8
By contrast, the following grounds fall outside the “any defect” group: (1) the
district court’s discretionary decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction;
(2) the district court’s discretionary remand of pendent claims; (3) abstention; (4)
waiver of the federal forum in a forum-selection clause; and (5) the district court’s
7 In addition to these grounds, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held that violations of § 1445, which prohibits removing workers’ compensation claims, are also defects under § 1447(c). In re Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 756 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir. 2014); Kamm v. ITEX Corp., 568 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 2009); Albarado v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 199 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1999).
8 When a district court bases its remand order on one of these statutory defects, § 1447(d) limits our jurisdiction to reviewing “only whether the remand order is colorably characterized as based on” the statutory defect, e.g., a lack of unanimity. Harvey, 797 F.3d at 807. But § 1447(d) prohibits us from reviewing whether the district court correctly determined that a statutory defect existed. Id.
U.S. 706 (crowded docket). Because these grounds fall outside § 1447(c), they are
free from § 1447(d)’s limitation on our jurisdiction.
Knowing which grounds fall within or outside of the “any defect” group helps
defining characteristic—they involve remands based on the failure to comply with
the “legal requisites” of the removal statutes. Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249,
see Harvey, 797 F.3d at 806 (doubting whether § 1447(d) allows review of “merits
determinations that precede the remand” (quoting Powerex, 551 U.S. at 235)). And
Thus, we hold that “any defect” applies solely to failures to comply with the
statutory requirements for removal. We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s sensible
It would be unreasonable to assume that Congress would create a statutory right of removal, and in so doing go to the trouble of laying out specific and detailed requirements for exercising that right, and then—by means of the single word “improvidently”—extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the congressional scheme by remanding cases on any grounds that seem justifiable to them.
Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1410. 9
The historical interpretation of § 1447(c) supports this view. 10 See Snapper,
171 F.3d at 1254 (analyzing the statutory revisions’ effect). In 1996, Congress
amended § 1447(c). That section now states that “[a] motion to remand the case on
within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).”
§ 1447(c). In Snapper, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed this subsection’s amended
(referred to here as the “1948 version”) directed district courts to remand “[i]f at any
without jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1946)). Under this 1948
version, courts found that parties had improvidently removed cases when “one of the
9 When the Seventh Circuit decided Rothner, the court interpreted an older version of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) that used the term “improvidently” rather than “defects.” 879 F.2d at 1411. As the discussion illustrates, this change doesn’t affect our analysis.
10 Within this circuit, until now, it was unnecessary to analyze the statutory changes that § 1447(c) has undergone. See Harvey, 797 F.3d at 808-09 (Hartz, J., concurring) (assuming that the 1996 amendment was immaterial for that case’s purpose).
statutory, non-jurisdictional requirements for removal ha[d] not been satisfied.” In re
Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1411 (stating “it is logical and reasonable to interpret
[improvidently] to mean noncompliance with Congress’ specific and detailed
statutory provisions”).
“‘improvident[ly]’
was obviously vulnerable to a much broader interpretation,”
uncertainty, and “specifically endorsing the narrow interpretation” of improvidence,
Congress amended the statute in 1988 by removing “improvidently” and replacing it
with “any defect in removal procedure.” Id. at 1256 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
remands based on § 1441(b), the forum-defendant rule. 11 Id. at 1257-58. The Fifth
§ 1447(c), while the Eighth Circuit characterized it as jurisdictional, and thus not a
defect within § 1447(c). LaMotte v. Roundy’s, Inc., 27 F.3d 314, 316 n.3 (7th Cir.
11 The forum-defendant rule prohibits removal when a case is removed for diversity jurisdiction and the defendant “is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
version by eliminating the words “in removal procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
meaning of “any defect” to include all statutory-based defects but never intended to
Snapper and other circuits that this statutory history shows that “any defect” is
In re Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 756 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir. 2014) (“‘[D]efect’ refers to a
failure to comply with the statutory requirements for removal
.”); Kamm v. ITEX
833, 837 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the legislative history “reflects a
congressional fine-tuning of § 1447(c) in an attempt to identify motions to remand
Code to govern removal”); Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico v.
Ericsson Inc., 201 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (defining defect as “the failure to
§ 1446(a) and (b)”); see also Graphic Commc’ns Local 1 B Health & Welfare Fund
“A” v. CVS Caremark Corp., 636 F.3d 971, 974-76 (8th Cir. 2011) (declining to
broaden defect’s meaning).
Now that we’ve concluded that “any defect” means a failure to comply with
common-law creation not included in the removal statutes, it does not qualify as “any
defect” under § 1447(c). Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1407-08.
found in § 1446(b)(1). Under § 1446(b)(1), a removing party must file a notice of
removal “within 30 days” of receiving “service or
a copy of the initial pleading.”
finding that “the defendant waited too long in light of events taking place in state
court,” even though “the defendant’s time ran out in advance of the limit in the
statute.” 879 F.2d at 1422 (emphasis in original). And, as Judge Hartz explained in
his Harvey concurrence, § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day-timing requirement and waiver by
797 F.3d at 809 (Hartz, J., concurring). In Judge Hartz’s words “the remover lingers
too long in state court” by removing beyond § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day requirement; and
by participating in the state-court proceedings, the remover “lingers too lovingly.” Id.
removal under § 1446(b)(1) have some similarities, their application differs. The
timing requirements of § 1446(b)(1) are certain and easily calculated. But issues
follow a “long-settled common law rule that opposing a motion for a temporary
restraining order does not waive the right to remove”). And perhaps the most difficult
(11th Cir. 2004) (finding that Florida’s 20-day requirement for filing motions to
dismiss resulted in a “quandary” for defendants who filed for removal in a timely
In addition, we note that Congress could have broadened § 1447(c)’s language
language. For instance, in the bankruptcy-removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452,
Congress authorized district courts to remand on “any equitable ground.” Had
Congress included “any equitable ground” in § 1447(d), it might well have reached
all delays instead of just the timing delay identified in § 1446. Things Remembered,
which “stems from the principle that ‘equity aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights.’” Biodiversity Conservation All. v. Jiron, 762 F.3d 1036,
Thus, because waiver by participation lies outside of § 1447(c)’s “any defect”
and subject-matter-jurisdiction bases, § 1447(d) doesn’t limit our jurisdiction to
review the case’s merits. 12
and thus, we review that determination de novo. O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman
Generally, a defendant waives removal “by taking some substantial offensive
tribunal before filing a notice of removal with the federal court.” PR Grp., LLC v.
Windmill Int’l, Ltd., 792 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Yusefzadeh,
365 F.3d at 1246). This waiver must be clear and unequivocal, meaning that “short of
[the defendant] seeking an adjudication on the merits,” the “right to removal is not
12 Similar to remands based on waiver by forum-selection clauses, remands based on waiver by participation don’t fall within either § 1447(c) ground; but these remands based on waiver by participation still remain lawful through a district court’s inherent power to remand. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1263 n.26.
.” Windmill, 792 F.3d at 1026 (quoting Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327
minutes passed between Soto’s filing the motion to dismiss and its answer, and that
Soto’s subjective intent to remove; but Soto showed its objective intent to remain in
state court by filing a motion to dismiss, which submitted the case’s merits to the
state court for adjudication. See Alwert v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Cox Enters.,
“regardless of its intent,” Soto’s conduct in state court foreclosed its removal right.
Id. This is because the waiver rules aim to prevent defendants from “seeking an
adjudication on the merits,” which means that a state defendant can waive removal
court’s adjudication by addressing the substantive merits of the City’s tort claims.
See Styskal v. Weld Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 365 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that an “on the merits” adjudication means one that passes directly on the
court, it manifests a “clear and unequivocal” intent to submit the case to the state
court’s jurisdiction, and thus waives removal. We favor a bright-line rule to avoid
considerations. 13 Yet we also recognize that in limited circumstances, this bright-line
We will not find waiver of the right to remove when a state’s procedural rules
compel a defendant’s state-court participation. For this exception to apply, we look
for potential harm to defendants. 14 For instance, upon remand, would a defendant lose
its opportunity to file a motion to dismiss because it failed to comply with a state’s
13 Unlike motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, motions to dismiss for defenses such as lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or insufficient process make it unnecessary for a court to adjudicate the case’s merits. Styskal, 365 F.3d at 858. Because of this, such motions don’t implicate waiver’s goal of promoting judicial economy and preventing piecemeal and duplicative litigation.
14 Soto argues that this standard is inflexible and creates inconsistencies within this circuit. Yet, Soto failed to present cases from this court to show what inconsistencies this rule creates. To the flexibility issue, an inflexible standard brings certainty to litigants, which outweighs our concern with the potential for harsh results. We note that the district court case cited by Soto, May v. Board of County Commissioners, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D.N.M. 2013), aligns with today’s opinion. Because the defendant in that case filed a motion to dismiss in state court based on improper venue, it did not seek a “final determination on the merits of the case before removal,” and thus retained its right to remove. Id. at 1297-98.
period, this 20-day time limit created a “quandary” for state defendants. Id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b)). A defendant in Florida might have filed for timely removal only
See id. But unlike the 20-day filing requirement in Yusefzadeh, New Mexico’s
procedural rules didn’t compel Soto to file a state motion to dismiss before its 30-day
removal or filing a motion to dismiss. So, absent Soto’s participating in the state case
its state motion to dismiss. 15 Soto jumped the gun, unlike the defendants in
1-012(B), which requires parties to file their motions to dismiss “before pleading,” to
15 This hypothetical assumes that Soto removed on Day 1 of the removal period.
But Soto misses the point. For the exception to apply, we don’t examine whether
compelled the participation. New Mexico’s rule didn’t compel Soto to answer the
City’s complaint and, consequently, didn’t compel Soto to file its motion to dismiss
For the reasons stated above, we DENY the City’s motion to dismiss this
appeal and AFFIRM the district court’s order of remand.
Juridiction complémentaire
Documents similaires à City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enterprises, 10th Cir. (2017)
Sophia Vallesteros Khe
13. Garcia vs Mojica
Judiciary Gov.ph
8. 171377-2015-Excellent Quality Apparel Inc. v. Visayan
Board vs Tan
Ong Ching Kian Chung digest
RIZZA JANE MORADA
Sunga-Chan v Sunga
Populaire dans Supplemental Jurisdiction
Defendants’ motion to move to federal court - DaVinci Investment vs. City of Arlington
Court documents in Gary Xu Case
Bassem Kandil v. Gary Yurkovic, 3rd Cir. (2013)
7-15-13 – Herbalife Memo - Motion to Dismiss Bostick Complaint
Rodney Joe Fillmore v. John Eichkorn Karl J. Koenig Damon L. Carlton, Kansas Highway Patrol Troopers Athena E. Andaya, Shawnee County Assistant District Attorney Earl Hindman, Shawnee County D.O.C. Director Scott Greeno Rhonda Redmon Richard Hamilton Todd Rogers Timothy James Brian Cole Kenneth Akins David Seymour Merrill McCue Kenneth Sloop Tammy Reedy Thomas Merkel T. Rork Shannon Ridgeway, 77 F.3d 492, 10th Cir. (1996)
Response to KVC motion to dismiss Schwab lawsuit
Nickerson v. Wells Fargo MTD
Stroman Complaint
Eastwood v. Molecular Defenses MTD
Civil Procedure Outline Number 2 - 1L
Civ Pro Abernathy Fall 2010 Outline
mpj-10
Civ Pro Outline - Draft From Barbri
Magnetic Products, Incorporated v. Trestain - Document No. 6
Howard Eubanks, Sr. v. Joseph Gerwen, Individually and as Chief of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department Daniel Losey, Individually and in His Official Capacity as an Officer for the Fort Lauderdale Police Department James Wigand, Individually and as an Officer for the Fort Lauderdale Police Department, 40 F.3d 1157, 11th Cir. (1994)
91990479-Civil-Procedure-Study-Guide.doc
StienCivProOutline