Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/584/16-285/
Timestamp: 2019-12-12 11:11:26
Document Index: 747060639

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2', '§157', '§157', '§216', '§216', '§2', '§178', '§1651', '§1751', '§7', '§7', 'art, 737']

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis :: 584 U.S. ___ (2018) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. ___ (2018)
Despite employment contracts providing for individualized arbitration to resolve employment disputes, employees sought to litigate Fair Labor Standards Act claims through collective actions. The Federal Arbitration Act generally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements, but the employees argued that its “saving clause” removes that obligation if an arbitration agreement violates some other federal law and that the agreements violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The National Labor Relations Board ruled that the NLRA effectively nullifies the Arbitration Act in such cases. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce the arbitration terms the parties select, 9 U.S.C. 2-4. The saving clause allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements only on grounds that exist for the revocation of any contract, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. The NLRA, which guarantees employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” 29 U.S.C. 157, does not mention class or collective actions nor indicate a clear and manifest wish to displace the Arbitration Act. The catchall term “other concerted activities” should be understood to protect the things employees do in exercising their right to free association in the workplace. The Board’s interpretation of the Arbitration Act, which it does not administer, is not entitled to Chevron deference.
The National Labor Relations Act does not preclude enforcement of agreements to arbitrate individually.
No. 16–285. Argued October 2, 2017—Decided May 21, 2018[1]
As a matter of policy these questions are surely debat- able. But as a matter of law the answer is clear. In the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms—including terms providing for individualized proceedings. Nor can we agree with the employees’ suggestion that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) offers a conflicting command. It is this Court’s duty to interpret Congress’s statutes as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another. And abiding that duty here leads to an unmistakable conclusion. The NLRA secures to employees rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum. This Court has never read a right to class actions into the NLRA—and for three quarters of a century neither did the National Labor Relations Board. Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long enjoyed separate spheres of influence and neither permits this Court to declare the parties’ agreements unlawful.
Ernst & Young replied with a motion to compel arbitration. The district court granted the request, but the Ninth Circuit reversed this judgment. 834 F. 3d 975 (2016). The Ninth Circuit recognized that the Arbitration Act gener- ally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written. But the court reasoned that the statute’s “saving clause,” see 9 U. S. C. §2, removes this obligation if an arbitration agreement violates some other federal law. And the court concluded that an agreement requiring individualized arbitration proceedings violates the NLRA by barring employees from engaging in the “concerted activit[y],” 29 U. S. C. §157, of pursuing claims as a class or collective action.
On first blush, these emphatic directions would seem to resolve any argument under the Arbitration Act. The parties before us contracted for arbitration. They pro- ceeded to specify the rules that would govern their arbitrations, indicating their intention to use individualized rather than class or collective action procedures. And this much the Arbitration Act seems to protect pretty absolutely. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333 (2011); Italian Colors, supra; DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U. S. ___ (2015). You might wonder if the balance Congress struck in 1925 between arbitration and litigation should be revisited in light of more contemporary developments. You might even ask if the Act was good policy when enacted. But all the same you might find it difficult to see how to avoid the statute’s application.
The employees’ efforts to distinguish Concepcion fall short. They note that their putative NLRA defense would render an agreement “illegal” as a matter of federal statutory law rather than “unconscionable” as a matter of state common law. But we don’t see how that distinction makes any difference in light of Concepion’s rationale and rule. Illegality, like unconscionability, may be a traditional, generally applicable contract defense in many cases, including arbitration cases. But an argument that a contract is unenforceable just because it requires bilateral arbitration is a different creature. A defense of that kind, Concepcion tells us, is one that impermissibly disfavors arbitration whether it sounds in illegality or unconscion- ability. The law of precedent teaches that like cases should generally be treated alike, and appropriate respect for that principle means the Arbitration Act’s saving clause can no more save the defense at issue in these cases than it did the defense at issue in Concepcion. At the end of our encounter with the Arbitration Act, then, it appears just as it did at the beginning: a congressional command requiring us to enforce, not override, the terms of the arbitration agreements before us.
A close look at the employees’ best evidence of a potential conflict turns out to reveal no conflict at all. The employees direct our attention to the term “other con- certed activities for the purpose of . . . other mutual aid or protection.” This catchall term, they say, can be read to include class and collective legal actions. But the term appears at the end of a detailed list of activities speaking of “self-organization,” “form[ing], join[ing], or assist[ing] labor organizations,” and “bargain[ing] collectively.” 29 U. S. C. §157. And where, as here, a more general term follows more specific terms in a list, the general term is usually understood to “ ‘embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’ ” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001) (discussing ejusdem generis canon); National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 10). All of which suggests that the term “other concerted activities” should, like the terms that precede it, serve to protect things employees “just do” for themselves in the course of exercising their right to free association in the workplace, rather than “the highly regulated, courtroom-bound ‘activities’ of class and joint litigation.” Alternative Entertainment, 858 F. 3d, at 414–415 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis deleted). None of the preceding and more specific terms speaks to the procedures judges or arbitrators must apply in disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum, and there is no textually sound reason to suppose the final catchall term should bear such a radically different object than all its predecessors.
Still another contextual clue yields the same message. The employees’ underlying causes of action involve their wages and arise not under the NLRA but under an en- tirely different statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act. The FLSA allows employees to sue on behalf of “themselves and other employees similarly situated,” 29 U. S. C. §216(b), and it’s precisely this sort of collective action the employees before us wish to pursue. Yet they do not offer the seemingly more natural suggestion that the FLSA overcomes the Arbitration Act to permit their class and collective actions. Why not? Presumably because this Court held decades ago that an identical collective action scheme (in fact, one borrowed from the FLSA) does not displace the Arbitration Act or prohibit individualized arbitration proceedings. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 32 (1991) (discussing Age Discrimination in Employment Act). In fact, it turns out that “[e]very circuit to consider the question” has held that the FLSA allows agreements for individualized arbitration. Alternative Entertainment, 858 F. 3d, at 413 (opinion of Sutton, J.) (collecting cases). Faced with that obstacle, the employees are left to cast about elsewhere for help. And so they have cast in this direction, suggesting that one statute (the NLRA) steps in to dictate the procedures for claims under a different statute (the FLSA), and thereby overrides the commands of yet a third statute (the Arbitration Act). It’s a sort of interpretive triple bank shot, and just stating the theory is enough to raise a judicial eyebrow.
What all these textual and contextual clues indicate, our precedents confirm. In many cases over many years, this Court has heard and rejected efforts to conjure conflicts between the Arbitration Act and other federal statutes. In fact, this Court has rejected every such effort to date (save one temporary exception since overruled), with statutes ranging from the Sherman and Clayton Acts to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Credit Repair Organizations Act, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Italian Colors, 570 U. S. 228; Gilmer, 500 U. S. 20; CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U. S. 95 (2012); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477 (1989) (over- ruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953)); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220 (1987). Throughout, we have made clear that even a statute’s express provision for collective legal actions does not necessarily mean that it precludes “ ‘individual attempts at conciliation’ ” through arbitration. Gilmer, supra, at 32. And we’ve stressed that the absence of any specific statutory discussion of arbitration or class actions is an important and telling clue that Congress has not displaced the Arbitration Act. CompuCredit, supra, at 103–104; McMahon, supra, at 227; Italian Colors, supra, at 234. Given so much precedent pointing so strongly in one direction, we do not see how we might faithfully turn the other way here.
The employees rejoin that our precedential story is complicated by some of this Court’s cases interpreting Section 7 itself. But, as it turns out, this Court’s Section 7 cases have usually involved just what you would expect from the statute’s plain language: efforts by employees related to organizing and collective bargaining in the workplace, not the treatment of class or collective actions in court or arbitration proceedings. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U. S. 9 (1962) (walkout to protest workplace conditions); NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213 (1972) (resignation from union and refusal to strike); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251 (1975) (request for union representation at disciplinary interview). Neither do the two cases the employees cite prove otherwise. In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 558 (1978), we simply addressed the question whether a union’s distribution of a newsletter in the workplace qualified as a protected concerted activity. We held it did, noting that it was “undisputed that the union undertook the distribution in order to boost its support and improve its bargaining position in upcoming contract negotiations,” all part of the union’s “ ‘continuing organizational efforts.’ ” Id., at 575, and n. 24. In NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U. S. 822, 831–832 (1984), we held only that an employee’s assertion of a right under a collective bargaining agreement was protected, reasoning that the collective bargaining “process—beginning with the organization of the union, continuing into the negotiation of a collective-bargaining agreement, and extending through the enforcement of the agreement—is a single, collective activ- ity.” Nothing in our cases indicates that the NLRA guarantees class and collective action procedures, let alone for claims arising under different statutes and despite the express (and entirely unmentioned) teachings of the Arbitration Act.
The dissent sees things a little bit differently. In its view, today’s decision ushers us back to the Lochner era when this Court regularly overrode legislative policy judgments. The dissent even suggests we have resur- rected the long-dead “yellow dog” contract. Post, at 3–17, 30 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). But like most apocalyptic warnings, this one proves a false alarm. Cf. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 435 (1978) (“ ‘Lochnerizing’ has become so much an epithet that the very use of the label may obscure attempts at understanding”).
Ultimately, the dissent retreats to policy arguments. It argues that we should read a class and collective action right into the NLRA to promote the enforcement of wage and hour laws. Post, at 26–30. But it’s altogether unclear why the dissent expects to find such a right in the NLRA rather than in statutes like the FLSA that actually regulate wages and hours. Or why we should read the NLRA as mandating the availability of class or collective actions when the FLSA expressly authorizes them yet allows parties to contract for bilateral arbitration instead. 29 U. S. C. §216(b); Gilmer, supra, at 32. While the dissent is no doubt right that class actions can enhance enforcement by “spread[ing] the costs of litigation,” post, at 9, it’s also well known that they can unfairly “plac[e] pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims,” Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. 393, 445, n. 3 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The respective merits of class actions and private arbitration as means of enforcing the law are questions constitution- ally entrusted not to the courts to decide but to the policy- makers in the political branches where those questions remain hotly contested. Just recently, for example, one federal agency banned individualized arbitration agreements it blamed for underenforcement of certain laws, only to see Congress respond by immediately repealing that rule. See 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (2017) (cited post, at 28, n. 15); Pub. L. 115–74, 131Stat. 1243. This Court is not free to substitute its preferred economic policies for those chosen by the people’s representatives. That, we had always understood, was Lochner’s sin.
I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to add that the employees also cannot prevail under the plain meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Act declares arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforce- able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. As I have previously explained, grounds for revocation of a contract are those that concern “ ‘the formation of the arbitration agreement.’ ” American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. 228, 239 (2013) (concurring opinion) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 353 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)). The employees argue, among other things, that the class waivers in their arbitration agreements are unenforceable because the National Labor Relations Act makes those waivers illegal. But illegality is a public-policy defense. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§178–179 (1979); McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639, 669–670 (1899). Because “[r]efusal to enforce a contract for public-policy reasons does not concern whether the contract was properly made,” the saving clause does not apply here. Concepcion, supra, at 357. For this reason, and the reasons in the Court’s opinion, the employees’ arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms.
Moreover, the Court paints an ahistorical picture. As Judge Wood, writing for the Seventh Circuit, cogently explained, the FLSA’s collective-litigation procedure and the modern class action were “not written on a clean slate.” 823 F. 3d 1147, 1154 (2016). By 1935, permissive joinder was scarcely uncommon in courts of equity. See 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1651 (3d ed. 2001). Nor were representative and class suits novelties. Indeed, their origins trace back to medieval times. See S. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action 38 (1987). And beyond question, “[c]lass suits long have been a part of American jurisprudence.” 7A Wright, supra, §1751, at 12 (3d ed. 2005); see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 363 (1921). See also Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae 5–16 (describing group litigation’s “rich history”). Early instances of joint proceedings include cases in which employees allied to sue an employer. E.g., Gorley v. Louisville, 23 Ky. 1782, 65 S.W. 844 (1901) (suit to recover wages brought by ten members of city police force on behalf of themselves and other officers); Guiliano v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, 105 Conn. 695, 136 A. 677 (1927) (suit by two employees to recover for injuries sustained while residing in housing provided by their employer). It takes no imagination, then, to comprehend that Congress, when it enacted the NLRA, likely meant to protect employees’ joining together to engage in collective litigation.[7]
5 The Court cites, as purported evidence of contrary agency precedent, a 2010 “Guideline Memorandum” that the NLRB’s then-General Counsel issued to his staff. See ante, at 4, 19, 22. The General Counsel appeared to conclude that employees have a §7 right to file collective suits, but that employers can nonetheless require employees to sign arbitration agreements waiving the right to maintain such suits. See Memorandum GC 10–06, p. 7 (June 16, 2010). The memorandum sought to address what the General Counsel viewed as tension between longstanding precedent recognizing a §7 right to pursue collective employment litigation and more recent court decisions broadly construing the FAA. The memorandum did not bind the Board, and the Board never adopted the memorandum’s position as its own. See D. R. Horton, 357 N. L. R. B. 2277, 2282 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (CA5 2013); Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. Indeed, shortly after the General Counsel issued the memorandum, the Board rejected its analysis, finding that it conflicted with Board precedent, rested on erroneous factual premises, “defie[d] logic,” and was internally incoherent. D. R. Horton, 357 N. L. R. B., at 2282–2283.
July 25, 2016 Application (16A93) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from August 24, 2016 to September 23, 2016, submitted to Justice Kagan.
July 29, 2016 Application (16A93) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until September 23, 2016.
September 2, 2016 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due October 3, 2016)
September 7, 2016 Consent to filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for petitioner.
September 20, 2016 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for respondent.
September 29, 2016 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including November 14, 2016.
September 30, 2016 Brief amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation filed.
September 30, 2016 Brief amicus curiae of International Association of Defense Counsel filed.
October 3, 2016 Brief amicus curiae of Equal Employment Advisory Council filed.
October 3, 2016 Brief amici curiae of National Association of Manufacturers, et al. filed. VIDED.
October 3, 2016 Brief amicus curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States filed.
October 3, 2016 Brief amicus curiae of New England Legal Foundation filed.
October 3, 2016 Brief amicus curiae of Atlantic Legal Foundation filed.
November 14, 2016 Brief of respondent Jacob Lewis in opposition filed.
November 29, 2016 Reply of petitioner Epic Systems Corporation filed.
November 30, 2016 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of January 6, 2017.
January 13, 2017 Petition GRANTED The petition for a writ of certiorari in Nos. 16-300 and 16-307 are granted. The cases are consolidated and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.
January 25, 2017 The following briefing schedule is adopted: Petitioners in Nos. 16-285 and 16-300 and respondents in No. 16-307 will file opening and reply briefs under the schedule set forth in Rules 25.1 and 25.3. Respondents in Nos. 16-285 and 16-300 and petitioner in No. 16-307 will file response briefs under the schedule set forth in Rule 25.2. VIDED.
February 20, 2017 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for the Respondent.
February 21, 2017 The time to file the joint appendix and the opening briefs is extended to and including April 28, 2017. VIDED.
February 21, 2017 The time to file the response briefs is extended to and including July 27, 2017. VIDED.
April 11, 2017 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for the petitioner.
April 28, 2017 The time to file the joint appendix and the opening briefs is further extended to and including June 9, 2017. VIDED.
April 28, 2017 The time to file the response briefs is further extended to and including August 9, 2017. VIDED.
June 7, 2017 Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner Epic Systems Corporation.
June 9, 2017 Brief of petitioner Petitioner Epic Systems Corporation and Respondent Murphy Oil USA, Inc. filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Equal Employment Advisory Council filed.
June 16, 2017 Brief amici curiae of National Association of Manufacturers, et al. filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of The Retail Litigation Center, Inc. filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of the United States supporting Petitioners in Nos.16-285 and 16- 300 and supporting Respondents in No.307 filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of The Business Roundtable supporting Epic Systems Corp., Ernst & Young LLP, and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of The Employers Group in support of Petitioners in Nos. 16-285 and 16-300 and in support of the Respondent Murphy Oil USA in No. 16-307 filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Washington Legal Foundation in support of Petitioners in Nos. 16-285 and 16-300 and Respondent Murphy Oil in No.16-307 filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation filed.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of HR Policy Association filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Atlantic Legal Foundation filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Law Professors filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amici curiae of Mortgage Bankers Association and State Mortgage Lending Association filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of International Association of Defense Counsel filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amici curiae of American Staffing Association, et al. filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Bristol Farms filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of New England Legal Foundation filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of DRI-The Voice of the Defense Bar filed. VIDED.
June 16, 2017 Brief amici curiae of Council on Labor Law Equality, et al. filed. VIDED.
July 19, 2017 SET FOR ARGUMENT on Monday, October 2, 2017. VIDED.
August 2, 2017 Record received from the U.S.C.A. 7th Circuit is located on PACER with the exception of SEALED documents which are electronic.
August 9, 2017 Brief of respondent Jacob Lewis filed.
August 9, 2017 Record received from the U.S.D.C. Northern Dist. of Illinois is electronic.
August 10, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of National Academy of Arbitrators filed. VIDED.
August 15, 2017 Brief amici curiae of Ten International Labor Unions, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Statement of amici in support of motion of NLRB for divided argument filed. VIDED.
August 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Brief amici curiae of Labor Law Professors filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Motion for divided argument filed by NLRB. VIDED.
August 16, 2017 Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument filed. VIDED.
August 16, 2017 Brief amici curiae of Maryland, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Brief amici curiae of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Brief amici curiae of Main Street Alliance, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of American Association for Justice filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Public Citizen, Inc. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Susan Fowler filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
August 16, 2017 Brief amicus curiae of New York Taxi Workers Alliance filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
September 8, 2017 Reply of petitioner Epic Systems Corporation and respondent Murphy Oil USA, Inc. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
September 25, 2017 Motion for divided argument filed by NLRB GRANTED.
October 2, 2017 Argued. For petitioners in Nos. 16-285 & 16-300: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D. C.; and Jeffrey B. Wall, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For petitioner, acting as respondent, in No. 16-307: Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Washington, D. C. For respondents in Nos. 16-285 & 16-300: Daniel R. Ortiz, Charlottesville, Va. VIDED.
October 3, 2017 Letter of NLRB regarding oral argument filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
May 21, 2018 Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. VIDED.
June 22, 2018 JUDGMENT ISSUED.
Oral Argument - October 02, 2017
Opinion Announcement - May 21, 2018
Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., No. 15-2997 (7th Cir. May. 26, 2016)
Epic Systems sent an email to employees, containing an arbitration agreement mandating that wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through individual arbitration and that the employees waived “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding.” The agreement included a clause stating that if the “Waiver of Class and Collective Claims” was unenforceable, “any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.” It stated that employees were “deemed to have accepted this Agreement” if they “continue[d] to work at Epic.”.The following day, Lewis, a “technical writer” at Epic, followed instructions for registering his agreement. Later, Lewis had a dispute with Epic, and sued Epic in federal court, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and Wisconsin law. Lewis responded that the arbitration clause interfered with employees’ right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection and was unenforceable. The district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, and is also unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1.