Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/cacdce/2:2013cv04460/564772/251
Timestamp: 2019-09-23 01:17:51
Document Index: 339499992

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 209', '§ 1292', '§ 10', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 1292', '§ 10', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292']

MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Memorandum and Order re Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, to Certify Order for Immediate Interlocutory Appeal filed by Plaintiffs Good Morning to You Productions Corp, Majar Productions LLC, Rupa Marya, Robert Siegel for Rupa Marya v. Warner Chappell Music Inc :: Justia Dockets & Filings
Justia Dockets & Filings Ninth Circuit California Central District Rupa Marya v. Warner Chappell Music Inc Filing 251
MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Memorandum and Order re Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, to Certify Order for Immediate Interlocutory Appeal filed by Plaintiffs Good Morning to You Productions Corp, Majar Productions LLC, Rupa Marya, Robert Siegel. (Manifold, Betsy)
1 FRANCIS M. GREGOREK (144785) gregorek@whafh.com 2 BETSY C. MANIFOLD (182450) manifold@whafh.com 3 RACHELE R. RICKERT (190634) rickert@whafh.com 4 MARISA C. LIVESAY (223247) livesay@whafh.com 5 BRITTANY N. DEJONG (258766) dejong@whafh.com 6 WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP 7 750 B Street, Suite 2770 San Diego, CA 92101 8 Telephone: 619/239-4599 9 Facsimile: 619/234-4599 10 Interim Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs and the [Proposed] Class UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 WESTERN DIVISION 13 GOOD MORNING TO YOU ) Lead Case No. CV 13-04460-GHK (MRWx) 14 PRODUCTIONS CORP., et al., ) ) OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ 15 Plaintiffs, ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 16 ) OF COURT’S MEMORANDUM AND ) ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 17 v. ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 18 WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, ) 244) OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO 19 INC., et al. ) CERTIFY ORDER FOR IMMEDIATE ) INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL UNDER 20 Defendants. ) 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); MEMORANDUM 21 ) OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN ) SUPPORT THEREOF 22 ) 23 ) Date: November 16, 2015 ) Time: 9:30 a.m. 24 ) Room: 650 25 ) Judge: Hon. George H. King, 26 ) Chief Judge ) 27 ) 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 2 Page 3 4 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................ 1 5 II. 6 THE COURT NEED NOT RECONSIDER ITS THOUGHTFUL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION ....................................................... 2 7 A. Defendants‟ Motion Plainly Violates L.R. 7-18 ................................. 2 9 B. Standard of Review ............................................................................ 3 10 C. The Court Already Considered and Rejected Defendants‟ Argument that Summy Was Authorization to Publish and Register the Happy Birthday Lyrics Despite the Purported “Mistake” in Not Listing Patty Hill on the Registration ..................... 4 8 11 12 13 1. Defendants‟ Repetitious Argument Fails Under L.R. 7-18 ....................................................................... 4 2. Defendants‟ Argument Remains Legally Unsupported ............................................................................ 6 3. 14 Defendants‟ Argument Remains Factually Unsupported ............................................................................ 7 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 D. The Court Already Considered Whether Patty and Jessica Hill Transferred the Happy Birthday Lyrics to Summy................................................................................ 8 22 23 1. Defendants‟ Repetitive Argument Adds Nothing to the Court‟s Prior Careful Analysis of the 1944 Assignment ..................................................................... 8 2. Defendants‟ Repetitive Argument Remains Contrary to Controlling Ninth Circuit Precedent ...................... 9 24 25 26 27 28 -i- 3. Defendants‟ Repetitive Argument Still Ignores the Facts .....................................................................10 4. 1 Defendants‟ Circular Assignment Argument is Unavailing ...........................................................................11 2 3 4 5 III. 6 THE ORDER SHOULD NOT BE CERTIFIED FOR IMMEDIATE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B) ....................11 7 A. There Is No Qualifying “Controlling Question” of Law ....................12 B. There Is Not Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion ..............13 C. An Immediate Appeal Will Not Materially Advance the Ultimate Determination of this Litigation ....................................13 8 9 10 11 12 IV. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................14 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - ii - 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Page Cases Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) ............................................................................ 6 Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................12 Budget Cinema, Inc. v. Watertower Assocs., 81 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................ 9 Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2010) ..............................................................................13 Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) .............................................................................. 9 Henderson v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 10-4524-GHK (VBKx) 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166061 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2013) ............................................................................. 4,5, 9 In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982) ...........................................................................11 James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) ...........................................................................11 Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2000) ...........................................................................3, 9 Kronigsberg Int’l, Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 9 26 27 28 Mattell, Inc. v. Bryant, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ..............................................................14 - iii - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 McFarlin v. Conseco Services, LLC, 381 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2004) .....................................................................2, 12 Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................13 Rieve v. Coventry Health Care Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 856 (C.D. Cal. 2012) .............................................. 11, 12, 13, 14 Strauss v. Sheffield Ins. Corp., No. 05CV1310-H(CAB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98094, (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2006) .................................................................................................................13 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Coast Packaging Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ............................................................... 9 Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Kan. 1994), aff’d, 43 F.3d 1484 (10th Cir. 1994) ............ 4 Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., No. Civ A 3:98CV00542, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21978 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 1999) ..........................................................................................................................14 18 Yang Ming Marine Transp. Corp. v. Oceanbridg Shipping Int’l, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ................................................................. 9 19 Statutes 20 17 U.S.C. § 209 .................................................................................................................. 5 17 21 22 23 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) ....................................................................................................passim 24 25 26 27 28 Other Authorities Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer, Copyright, § 10.03[A][3] (2014) .......................................................................................... 9 - iv - 1 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2 Dissatisfied with the outcome on the cross-motions for summary judgment, 3 Defendants now ask the Court to reconsider its comprehensive and well-reasoned 4 43-page decision granting in part Plaintiffs‟ motion and denying Defendants‟ cross5 motion (“Summary Judgment Order”). Summ. J. Order, ECF No. 244. The 6 Summary Judgment Order set forth in detail the Court‟s meticulous review of all the 7 evidence before it and its careful analysis of the myriad legal and factual issues 8 raised by the parties. The summary judgment record, which stretched over the 9 course of nearly a year, is immense. The Court reviewed two rounds of joint briefing 10 (ECF Nos. 182 & 219), examined 126 exhibits comprising 1,947 pages (ECF Nos. 11 187-194), considered over 160 pages of 328 separately stated facts (ECF No. 183), 12 and heard over four hours of oral argument. Following the Court‟s exhaustive 13 review of the immense record, the Court found that Defendants do not own a 14 copyright to the Happy Birthday lyrics, but found several triable issues of fact which 15 prevented the Court from concluding that the Happy Birthday lyrics are in the public 1 16 domain. Under Local Rule (“L.R.”) 7-18, a motion for reconsideration may not “in any 17 18 manner repeat oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the 19 original motion.” Ignoring the clear mandate of L.R. 7-18 entirely, Defendants‟ 20 motion for reconsideration merely echoes their now-discredited summary judgment 21 arguments: it makes no new arguments, it presents no new evidence, and it cites no 22 new law. Defendants do not even feign compliance with L.R. 7-18. Defendants 23 simply think the Court “got it wrong.” The Court already addressed and rejected all 24 the issues Defendants raise in their motion for reconsideration in the Court‟s 25 meticulously-researched 43-page Summary Judgment Order. The Court should 26 27 28 1 The remaining factual issues in Claim I are set for a bench trial on December 15 and 16, 2015. Status Conference Mins., ECF No. 248. -1- 1 again reject these same tired arguments, and deny Defendants‟ non-conforming 2 motion out of hand. 3 Likewise, Defendants cannot meet their heavy burden for a permissive 4 interlocutory appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the Court may certify an order for 5 an immediate appeal only when the court of appeals can rule on a pure, controlling 6 question of law without having to determine any disputed facts. Indeed, an appeal 7 such as this, which “turns on whether there is a genuine issue of fact,” is “[t]he 8 antithesis of a proper § 1292(b) appeal.” McFarlin v. Conseco Services, LLC, 381 9 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). An interlocutory appeal here – 10 which has no merit in any event – will not advance the resolution of this litigation; it 11 will only prolong it. Thus, the Court should refuse to certify an interlocutory appeal. 12 Defendants have needlessly and unreasonably interposed their meritless 13 motion solely to delay these proceedings. The Court should deny it forthwith. 14 II. 15 THE COURT NEED NOT RECONSIDER ITS THOUGHTFUL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION 16 A. Local Rule 7-18 states as follows: “No motion for reconsideration shall in any 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Defendants’ Motion Plainly Violates L.R. 7-18 manner repeat oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion.” That is all Defendants‟ motion for reconsideration does: it merely echoes their now-discredited summary judgment arguments. They make no new arguments, present no new evidence, and cite no new law. As summarized in the following table and as discussed in detail in Sections C and D below, Defendants previously made every argument in their motion for reconsideration: 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 28 Issue Raised on Reconsideration (ECF No. 247) Where Raised in Joint Summary Judgment Brief (ECF No. 182) -2- Where Raised at March 23, 2015 Oral Where Addressed by Court Order (ECF No. 244) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Court failed to hold that 1935 registration certificate was prima facie evidence Summy was authorized to publish and register Happy Birthday lyrics despite omitting Patty‟s name Court failed to find that Patty and Jessica transferred the Happy Birthday lyrics to Summy at least as of 1944 1944 assignment from The Hill Foundation shows unambiguous intent to transfer the Happy Birthday lyrics from Patty and Jessica to Summy If 1944 assignment transferred the Happy Birthday lyrics to Summy, then whether Patty and Jessica authorized Summy to register and publish the lyrics in 1935 is immaterial 26 27 28 11-16 13; 26; fn. 16 5-6, 28-37 13; 26; fn. 16 5-6, 28-37 25; 48 14-15 The Court already considered and addressed all those arguments at length. Because Defendants‟ motion improperly repeats those same losing arguments again, their non-conforming motion should be denied. B. 24 25 15; 26; 44-542 Argument (ECF No. 208) 14:23-15:2; 16:6-8; 16:2417:1; 18:1923; 34:16-19 Standard of Review Reconsideration is “an „extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.‟” Kona Enters., Inc. v. 2 All citations to ECF documents refer to the ECF page numbers at the top of the page. -3- 1 Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In this 2 District, motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Rule 7-18, which 3 provides that reconsideration may be granted only when the moving party shows: 4 8 (a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time of such decision, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such decision, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before such decision. 9 Henderson v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 10-4524-GHK (VBKx) 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10 166061, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2013). It is “not a second chance for the losing 11 party to make its strongest case or to dress up arguments that previously failed.” 12 Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1482, 1483 (D. Kan. 1994), aff’d, 43 13 F.3d 1484 (10th Cir. 1994). 5 6 7 14 15 16 C. The Court Already Considered and Rejected Defendants’ Argument that Summy Was Authorization to Publish and Register the Happy Birthday Lyrics Despite the Purported “Mistake” in Not Listing Patty Hill on the Registration 17 Citing no new evidence and no change in the law, Defendants‟ main argument 18 in support of reconsideration, which they assert in various forms at least eight times 19 in their motion paper (Defs.‟ Mot. for Recons. 8-10, 12-14, 21 & 22, ECF No. 247), 20 21 22 is that the Court failed to treat the 1935 registration for E51990 as prima facie evidence that Summy owned a copyright to the Happy Birthday lyrics, not just the piano arrangement composed by its employee, Preston Ware Orem, despite the 23 purported “immaterial mistake” in not including Patty Hill‟s name in the 24 registration. Defendants‟ argument is flawed for at least three reasons. 1. Defendants’ Repetitious Argument Fails Under L.R. 718 First, Defendants raised this issue multiple times during the summary 25 26 27 28 judgment proceedings. Defendants offer no different or newly-discovered facts, and -4- 1 they cite no change in the law occurring after the Court‟s summary judgment 2 decision on this point. None of the “new” cases Defendants cite, the most recent of 3 which was decided in 2011 (more than three years before the cross-motion was 4 briefed), changed the law; they merely echo the cases Defendants cited before. Their 5 reconsideration argument merely repeats, albeit in slightly different words, the same 6 legal argument Defendants made repeatedly on summary judgment. See, e.g., Joint 7 Summ. J. Br. 15, 26 & 44-54, ECF No. 182; Summ. J. Hr‟g. Tr. 14:23-15:2, 16:6-8, 8 16:24-17:1, 18:19-23, & 34:16-19, March 23, 2015, ECF No. 208. Under L.R. 7-18, 9 it should be denied on this basis alone. In Henderson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10 166061 at *8, this Court denied a motion for reconsideration that similarly sought to 11 reframe old legal arguments: “Defendant does not set forth one material fact that we 12 failed to consider. Defendant‟s attempt to surreptitiously reframe these legal 13 arguments as a failure to consider material facts does not transform them into a 14 proper basis for reconsideration.” 15 The Court plainly considered – and properly rejected – that argument in the 16 Summary Judgment Order. For example, the Court addressed the question of 17 “immaterial mistake” with Defendants‟ counsel during the hearing on March 23, 18 2015. Hr‟g. Tr. 18:19-19:16; 32:10-15; 42:12-24. The Court also addressed the 19 “immaterial mistake” argument in its Summary Judgment Order. Summ. J. Order 20 11:28-12:2; 15:5-8. The fact that the Court, after considering all the evidence, 21 reached a different conclusion than Defendants argued for is not a basis for it to 22 reconsider its Summary Judgment Order. 23 Despite Defendants‟ argument, the Court did not ignore the presumption 24 given to them under the registration certificate for E51990. To the contrary, the 25 Court expressly accepted that under the 1909 Act, a registration certificate 26 constitutes “„prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.‟” Summ. J. Order 11 27 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 209 (1909 Act). The Court also expressly recognized that “„a 28 majority of courts have held that § 209 [of the 1909 Copyright Act also] creates a -5- 1 rebuttable presumption that the certificate holder has met all the requirements for 2 copyright validity.‟” Id. (quoting Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative 3 House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1991)).3 The Court simply 4 reached a different conclusion than Defendants wanted regarding whether the 5 presumption of validity had been rebutted or overcome. Defendants‟ dissatisfaction 6 with the outcome is no basis for the Court to reconsider its decision. 4 7 Defendants also repeat their prior argument that Plaintiffs offered no evidence 8 that the failure to name Mildred or Patty on the 1935 registration was an attempt to 9 defraud the Copyright Office. Defendants made that same argument before as well. 10 And the Court expressly considered (and properly rejected) it. Summ. J. Order 14- 11 15. Defendants‟ re-do of that argument again overlooks the fact that Plaintiffs 12 offered considerable evidence that (a) Patty was not the author of the Happy 13 Birthday lyrics; and (b) even if Patty was the author of the Happy Birthday lyrics, 14 she never transferred any right to those lyrics to Summy. Again, citing no new 15 evidence or changed legal standard, Defendants‟ dissatisfaction with the Court‟s 16 ruling on an issue it already has considered is no reason for the Court to reconsider 17 its decision. 19 2. Defendants’ Argument Remains Legally Unsupported Second, Defendants‟ argument was, and still is, unsupported by any legal 20 authority. As the Court correctly held in its Summary Judgment Order, the limited 21 presumption afforded by a registration certificate “is not an insurmountable one.”5 It 22 certainly is not conclusive proof of anything. If the Court were to reconsider its 23 careful analysis of this issue, Defendants‟ argument would make a registration 18 24 25 26 27 28 3 The Court quoted the same 24-year old Acad. of Motion Pictures case on which Defendants rest their motion for reconsideration. 4 Significantly, Defendants have not asked the Court to reconsider its allocation of the burden of proof. Summ. J. Order 9:19-10:2 (placing burden on Defendants). 5 See Summ. J. Order 11 (discussing limited scope of presumption). -6- 1 certificate – even one that purportedly omits important information – not just prima 2 facie evidence, but instead conclusive proof, and not merely of what was stated in 3 the certificate, but of what was omitted from it as well. 4 Defendants have cited no new authority or change in the law to require 5 reconsideration. No court has ever given such weight or breadth to any registration 6 certificate, and this Court was correct not to do so here. 3. Defendants’ Argument Remains Factually Unsupported Third, Defendants‟ argument also remains unsupported by any evidence. 7 8 9 Defendants have offered no proof – none in the voluminous summary judgment 10 record and no new evidence for the Court to reconsider now – that the omission of 11 Patty‟s name from the registration for E51990 was, in fact, a mistake at all, rather 12 13 14 15 than an accurate description of the limited scope of the work-for-hire covered by that copyright. As the Court correctly found, E51990 is a work-for-hire copyright for a derivative work. Summ. J. Order 13 (citation omitted). The record easily proves that 16 E51990 covered only new material added to Mildred and Patty Hill‟s pre-existing 17 work, Good Morning to All, by Summy‟s employee, Preston Ware Orem. Id. at 13- 18 14. The registration was entitled “Application for Republished Musical Composition 19 with New Matter.” Id. at 13 (quoting J.A. Ex. 48). The author of the new matter was 20 identified as “Preston Ware Orem, employed for hire by Clayton F. Summy Co.” Id. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendants have admitted that Mr. Orem did not write the Happy Birthday lyrics. Id. at 14 (citing ECF Nos. 95 at ¶ 97; 99 at ¶ 97). Therefore, the only new matter that could have possibly been added by Mr. Orem was the piano arrangement. Id. The 1935 work-for-hire copyright E51990, covering only new material added to the pre-existing musical composition Good Morning to All, was limited to Mr. Orem‟s piano arrangement. Leaving Patty Hill‟s name off that limited copyright registration was no mistake and Defendants presented no evidence to the contrary. Defendants‟ argument that Patty‟s name was “mistakenly” omitted from the -7- 1 registration rests now on reconsideration, as it rested before on summary judgment, 2 on at least two entirely unsupported factual premises: (1) that the registration was 3 not intended to cover only the new work added by Mr. Orem as Summy‟s employee; 4 and (2) that it was not intended to cover only the work-for-hire at all, since Patty 5 never worked for Summy. There is no evidence – none in the expansive summary 6 judgment record and none on reconsideration – to support either premise. In the 7 end, Defendants‟ argument that Patty‟s name was “mistakenly” omitted from the 8 1935 registration for E51990 is nothing more than tired, repetitive, and factually 9 unsupported speculative argument. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 D. The Court Already Considered Whether Patty and Jessica Hill Transferred the Happy Birthday Lyrics to Summy Defendants‟ second argument in support of reconsideration is that the Court overlooked portions of The Hill Foundation‟s assignment of various copyrights to Summy in 1944. After a meticulous review of all the evidence in the summary judgment record of three different assignments from the Hill sisters and The Hill Foundation to Summy, the Court rejected Defendants‟ argument that Patty and Jessica transferred the Happy Birthday lyrics to Summy in 1944. Summ. J. Order 35-37. Brushing aside the Court‟s detailed, careful analysis of all three transfers, Defendants argue that the Court ignored a few words from The Hill Foundation‟s 1944 assignment. Defendants‟ dismissive second argument also suffers from at least three fatal flaws. 1. Defendants’ Repetitive Argument Adds Nothing to the Court’s Prior Careful Analysis of the 1944 Assignment First and foremost, the Court carefully considered the exact same argument, and all the same evidence that Defendants again offer in support of it, in deciding the cross-motions for summary judgment. There is no doubt that the Court carefully reviewed The Hill Foundation‟s 1944 assignment to Summy. Its discussion of the 1944 transfer is set forth in the Summary Judgment Order. Defendants‟ attempt to use § 1292(b) to cite some additional cases or even -8- 1 raise new arguments they could have raised before is improper. Henderson, 2013 2 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166061 at *5-6 (citing L.R. 7-18; Yang Ming Marine Transp. 3 Corp. v. Oceanbridg Shipping Int’l, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 4 1999)) and *8-9 (citing L.R. 7-18; Kona, 229 F.3d at 890; Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. 5 Coast Packaging Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). For this reason 6 alone, the Court should deny Defendants‟ highly improper motion. 7 2. 8 Second, Defendants argument that the 1944 assignment from The Hill 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Foundation can be applied retroactively to expand the limited scope of the 1935 copyright is inconsistent with controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere. The right to register a copyright cannot be retroactively assigned. An assignment of the right to register a copyright must be made before the copyright is registered by the new owner. While a writing, such as the 1944 assignment, may confirm a prior oral agreement to assign a copyright, the oral agreement must have been made before the attempt to register the copyright. 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer, Copyright, § 10.03[A][3] (2014).6 Moreover, the writing must be timely because permitting a third-party to 18 19 20 21 22 23 Defendants’ Repetitive Argument Remains Contrary to Controlling Ninth Circuit Precedent claim copyright ownership years later does not serve the statutory goal of enhancing “predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.” Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990). In Kronigsberg Int’l, Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit held that a letter agreement written three years after an alleged oral license was untimely and invalid. Then, as now, Defendants do 24 25 26 27 28 6 For the subsequent writing to be valid, the acquirer must prove the prior oral agreement. See Budget Cinema, Inc. v. Watertower Assocs., 81 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1996) (a later writing to confirm an alleged oral transfer of a copyright is not permitted “because there was no evidence that Budget discussed the rights to the work with [the copyright owner] prior to registration….”). -9- 1 not dispute the untimeliness of the 1944 assignment. They have offered no case law 2 or other authority to support their assertion that the 1944 assignment – regardless of 3 its limited scope – retroactively gave them any rights to register a copyright to the 4 Happy Birthday lyrics in 1935. 3. Defendants’ Repetitive Argument Still Ignores the Facts And third, even if the Court were to reconsider this argument and disregard 5 6 7 the fact that The Hill Foundation‟s 1944 assignment was far too late to expand the 8 limited scope of the E51990 copyright, Defendants‟ argument is inconsistent with 9 10 11 12 the detailed factual record. Defendants focus their argument only on The Hill Foundation‟s transfer to Summy. However, the record proves that The Hill Foundation itself had no rights to the lyrics and, thus, The Hill Foundation owned no such rights that it could assign to Summy. 13 14 Even if Patty or Jessica Hill had any rights to the Happy Birthday lyrics, a fundamental fact that is disputed, they never transferred any common law 15 copyrights or rights to any “books, musical compositions and arrangements, 16 including both the words and music thereof” to The Hill Foundation. As the Court 17 18 19 knows from its careful consideration of the 1944 transactions, Patty and Jessica Hill assigned only their “right, title and interest, joint and several, in and to” seven federal copyrights, including E51990, to The Hill Foundation. See J.A. Ex. 53 at 698 20 (ECF No. 189).7 They never assigned any rights to books, musical compositions, 21 arrangements, or words and music to The Hill Foundation – those words are not in 22 23 the assignment from Patty and Jessica to The Hill Foundation. Since The Hill Foundation could assign to Summy only what it received from Patty and Jessica, 24 25 26 27 28 7 In 1942, Patty and Jessica Hill assigned their “right, title and interest, joint and several, in and to” four federal copyrights and renewal copyrights for Song Stories for the Kindergarten, Song Stories for the Sunday School, and Good Morning to All to The Hill Foundation. See J.A. Ex. 42 at 620. - 10 - 1 The Hill Foundation had no rights to books, musical compositions, arrangements, or 2 words and music to assign to Summy. 3 Therefore, based on all the evidence in the summary judgment record and 4 already considered by the Court, Defendants‟ repetitive argument still has no factual 5 support, and it must be denied for this reason as well. 4. Defendants’ Circular Assignment Argument is Unavailing Defendants‟ final, desperate argument that it is immaterial whether Patty and 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Jessica authorized Summy to register and publish the Happy Birthday lyrics, is merely a fall-back to its main argument: even if Patty and Jessica gave Summy no rights to the lyrics, the 1935 copyright E51990 still covered the lyrics despite the “mistaken” omission of Patty‟s name from the registration. That circular argument fails for all the reasons discussed in Section C above. III. 14 THE ORDER SHOULD NOT BE CERTIFIED FOR IMMEDIATE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B) 15 An immediate interlocutory appeal by permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 16 is appropriate only where the underlying order: (1) involves a controlling question 17 of law; (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and 18 (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 19 termination of litigation. The party seeking an immediate interlocutory appeal must 20 demonstrate all three prerequisites, and even then, certification for an interlocutory 21 appeal is generally disfavored and should only be granted in “exceptional situations 22 in which allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and expensive 23 litigation.” Rieve v. Coventry Health Care Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 856, 878 (C.D. Cal. 24 2012) (citing In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). 25 “Section 1292(b) is a departure from the normal rule that only final judgments are 26 appealable, and therefore must be construed narrowly.” James v. Price Stern Sloan, 27 Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). None of these three requirements are 28 present here. - 11 - 1 A. There Is No Qualifying “Controlling Question” of Law 2 The first requirement of § 1292(b) is met only where the controlling question 3 presents an “abstract legal issue” or “pure” question of law. Rieve, 870 F. Supp. 2d 4 at 879. Certification for an immediate interlocutory appeal is not appropriate where, 5 as here, appellate review would “necessitate a detailed inquiry into the record.” Id. 6 (interlocutory appeal not appropriate where the appellate court‟s “inquiry would 7 likely be fact intensive, unique to this case, and not the abstract type of question 8 [that] could be decided without significant engagement with the facts of this case”). 9 An interlocutory appeal permits expedited appellate review when “a case turn[s] on 10 a pure question of law, something the court of appeals could decide quickly and 11 cleanly without having to study the record….” Id. (quoting Ahrenholz v. Bd. of 12 Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2000). In Ahrenholtz, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 219 F.3d at 676-77, the Seventh Circuit held that a summary judgment decision is especially inappropriate for interlocutory review because “to decide whether summary judgment was properly granted requires hunting through the record . . . to see whether there may be a genuine issue of material fact lurking there….” As the Eleventh Circuit held in McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1259, an appeal (such as this one) that “turns on whether there is a genuine issue of fact,” is “[t]he antithesis of a proper § 1292(b) appeal.” 21 No review of the Court‟s detailed, fact-intensive Summary Judgment Order 22 could be done “quickly and cleanly without having to study the record” in this case. 23 Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 677. To the contrary, the purported “controlling questions” 24 Defendants have raised, and the underlying fact-specific questions of copyright 25 ownership decided by the Court after its painstaking review of the exhaustive 26 summary judgment record, are precisely the kind of questions that require a fact- 27 intensive appellate review; they are the antithesis of a proper § 1292(b) appeal. 28 - 12 - 1 B. 2 In deciding whether the second requirement has been met, the Court must 3 consider, first and foremost, “the strength of the arguments in opposition to the 4 challenged ruling.” Rieve, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (citations omitted). This prong is 5 not satisfied where, as here, “defendants have not provided a single case that 6 conflicts with the district court‟s construction or application of [the applicable law].” 7 Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010); Rieve, 870 F. Supp. 2d 8 at 880 (same) (citation omitted). Defendants‟ bald assertion that “reasonable judges 9 might differ” (Mot. Recons. 24)8 without providing any contrary legal support, does 10 not satisfy their burden. The Court already has engaged in an extremely detail- 11 oriented analysis of the facts under the applicable law.9 Defendants‟ dissatisfaction 12 with the outcome of the Court‟s analysis “is not a strong enough argument to create 13 the exceptional circumstances required for interlocutory appeal.” Rieve, 870 F. 14 Supp. 2d at 880. 15 C. 16 17 18 19 There Is Not Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion An Immediate Appeal Will Not Materially Advance the Ultimate Determination of this Litigation Finally, certification for interlocutory appeal is not appropriate where, as here, it “would actually delay the resolution of the litigation….” Rieve, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (citing Strauss v. Sheffield Ins. Corp., No. 05CV1310-H(CAB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98094, 2006 WL 6158770, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2006)). The instant case 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 Defendants cite Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011) for their “reasonable judges” standard. However, Reese held only that this prong is met when reasonable judges may differ where novel legal issues are presented not where, as here, the key determination turns on heavily detailed fact issues. Defendants have not raised any disputed legal issues, novel or otherwise, for the Court to reconsider. 9 As previously discussed, the summary judgment record consists of a joint brief (ECF No. 182), a supplemental joint brief (ECF No. 219), 1,947 pages of exhibits (ECF Nos. 187-194) and 328 uncontroverted facts (ECF No. 183); and four hours of oral argument. - 13 - 1 was filed over two years ago, a bench trial on Count One is set to take place on 2 December 15, 2015 (less than two months away), briefing on class certification is 3 scheduled in January and February of 2016, and the class certification hearing is set 4 for February 22, 2016. 5 interlocutory appeal at this stage of the proceedings would only delay the resolution 6 of the case. Rieve, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (determining that interlocutory appeal of 7 summary judgment order in a putative class action before class certification “would 8 significantly delay litigation”). 10 9 Status Conference Mins., ECF No. 248. As such, any In sum, Defendants have failed to meet their heavy burden of showing any 10 exceptional circumstances in this case to merit an immediate interlocutory appeal. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 For all these reasons, Defendants‟ motion for reconsideration makes no new 13 arguments, it presents no new evidence, and it cites no new law. Defendants‟ motion 14 to certify for immediate interlocutory appeal does not raise any pure question of law, 15 as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and which the Ninth 16 10 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 See also Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., No. Civ A 3:98CV00542, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21978, *9 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 1999) (declining to certify question of copyright ownership for interlocutory appeal, the court explained that “[i]f a question were to be certified, everyone would be forced to wait until a determination is made on appeal. At that point, the case would be remanded for trial with an opportunity for further appeals on other issues after trial.” The court concluded that denying interlocutory review was “more efficient than going through two rounds of appeals with a trial taking place sometime in between.”) Id. Finally, Mattell, Inc. v. Bryant, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2005), cited by Defendants at p. 25 of their motion for the proposition that certification should be granted when necessary to avoid “needless expenditure of judicial resources[,]” is easily distinguishable, as it turned on the fundamental threshold question of whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case on which there was no applicable precedent. Wanting to avoid the inevitable waste of resources were the court of appeals to find jurisdiction lacking, the court certified the issue for interlocutory review. - 14 - 1 Circuit can decide without having to determine any questions of fact. Therefore, the 2 Court should swiftly deny Defendants‟ meritless motion for reconsideration and its 3 equally meritless alternative motion to certify for permissive interlocutory appeal. 4 Dated: October 26, 2015 5 6 7 8 9 WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP By: /s/ Betsy C. Manifold BETSY C. MANIFOLD FRANCIS M. GREGOREK gregorek@whafh.com BETSY C. MANIFOLD manifold@whafh.com 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 RACHELE R. RICKERT rickert@whafh.com MARISA C. LIVESAY livesay@whafh.com 750 B Street, Suite 2770 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619/239-4599 Facsimile: 619/234-4599 WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP MARK C. RIFKIN (pro hac vice) rifkin@whafh.com JANINE POLLACK (pro hac vice) pollack@whafh.com BETH A. LANDES (pro hac vice) landes@whafh.com 270 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016 Telephone: 212/545-4600 Facsimile: 212-545-4753 Interim Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs 27 28 - 15 - 1 2 3 4 RANDALL S. NEWMAN PC RANDALL S. NEWMAN (190547) rsn@randallnewman.net 37 Wall Street, Penthouse D New York, NY 10005 Telephone: 212/797-3737 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 HUNT ORTMANN PALFFY NIEVES DARLING & MAH, INC. ALISON C. GIBBS (257526) gibbs@huntortmann.com OMEL A. NIEVES (134444) nieves@huntortmann.com KATHLYNN E. SMITH (234541) smith@ huntortmann.com 301 North Lake Avenue, 7th Floor Pasadena, CA 91101 Telephone 626/440-5200 Facsimile 626/796-0107 Facsimile: 212/797-3172 DONAHUE GALLAGHER WOODS LLP WILLIAM R. HILL (114954) rock@donahue.com ANDREW S. MACKAY (197074) andrew@donahue.com DANIEL J. SCHACHT (259717) daniel@donahue.com 1999 Harrison Street, 25th Floor Oakland, CA 94612-3520 Telephone: 510/451-0544 Facsimile: 510/832-1486 24 25 26 27 28 GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY, LLP LIONEL Z. GLANCY (134180) lglancy@glancylaw.com MARC L. GODINO (188669) mgodino@glancylaw.com - 16 - 3 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: 310/201-9150 Facsimile: 310/201-9160 4 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 WARNER/CHAPPELL:22329.v2 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 17 -