Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/738/246/135110/
Timestamp: 2020-04-02 17:17:37
Document Index: 42801317

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5861', '§ 2255', '§ 4244', '§ 2255', '§ 4244', '§ 4244']

United States of America, Appellee, v. John Gary Peeler, Appellant, 738 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1984 › United States of America, Appellee, v. John Gary Peeler, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. John Gary Peeler, Appellant, 738 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1984)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 738 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1984) Submitted March 16, 1984. Decided June 27, 1984. Rehearing Denied July 26, 1984
John Gary Peeler pled guilty to two counts of violating 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861 and 5871 (1982) arising out of the manufacture and sale of pipe bombs. He then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence on the grounds that (1) he was mentally incompetent at the time he pled guilty; (2) his attorney was ineffective and had a conflict of interest; and (3) his guilty plea was involuntary because it was induced by promises of leniency made by government prosecutors and his attorney. Peeler argues on appeal that the district court1 erred in denying his motion without a hearing. We affirm.
Following indictment, Peeler moved pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1982) for a judicial determination of mental competency. On October 31, 1981, the district court ordered him to undergo psychiatric evaluation at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri. On March 25, 1982, the district court conducted a competency hearing and made a tentative finding that Peeler was competent to stand trial. Out of an "abundance of caution," however, it ordered him returned to the Medical Center for supplemental testing.
On July 23, the district court held a hearing for change of plea and sentencing. The court had before it the July 2 supplemental report of Dr.'s Logan and Reuterfors. They both agreed that Peeler had responded to treatment and that, while his condition was "fragile," he was not sufficiently rational to understand the legal proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. After discussing the matter with Dr. Stevens, Peeler's attorney stated to the court that he believed that a guilty plea was proper under the circumstances. Peeler spoke about twenty-five words during the hearing and his courtroom behavior was observed. The district court concluded that " [f]rom [the July 21 report and from the statement made by Mr. Peeler and by his counsel, the Court finds that he would be sufficiently rational to enter a plea of guilty knowingly if this is what he wants to voluntarily do." Following the plea, Peeler and his attorney were given a short break to study the presentence report and thereafter Peeler engaged in extended discussions with the district court concerning its accuracy. He was sentenced to two three-year terms to be served consecutively.
A section 2255 movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless "the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief...." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This standard is presumptively met where the movant alleges incompetence at the time of plea and that issue was presented and adjudicated in the proceedings leading to conviction. Rose v. United States, 513 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1975). A prior adjudication of competency cannot, however, operate as an absolute bar to a section 2255 evidentiary hearing on the same issue. There exists the possibility that the petitioner could present evidence not considered, or improperly considered, by the district court that would entitle him or her to an evidentiary hearing.2 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1962) (allegation of events outside the "files and records of the case" entitle prisoner to section 2255 hearing); Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1960) (report outside "files and records of the case" cannot serve as basis for denying section 2255 hearing). Thus, a prior competency determination conducted in accordance with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 will bar a section 2255 evidentiary hearing on the same issue unless the petitioner presents evidence not considered, or improperly considered, by the district court which raises a "bona fide question or reasonable doubt" as to his or her competence. Belvin v. United States, 538 F.2d 1335, 1336 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100, 97 S. Ct. 1123, 51 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1977).
In summary, the district court determined Peeler's competency in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4244 and that determination was supported by ample evidence. In his section 2255 motion, Peeler has failed to produce any evidence not considered, or improperly considered, by the district court in the original proceeding which raises a bona fide question or reasonable doubt as to his competency. Under these circumstances, "the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief," and the district court did not err in denying him an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
The remaining two grounds of Peeler's motion are that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary due to unkept promises of leniency made by government prosecutors and his attorney. Unlike the issue of competence, these claims were not previously resolved in the proceedings leading to his conviction. Peeler must still, however, "allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief; merely stating unsupported conclusions will not suffice." Woods v. United States, 567 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1978).
A conflict of interest rises to the level of a sixth amendment violation if "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [the] lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980); United States v. Unger, 700 F.2d 445, 450 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 339, 78 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1983). There is no evidence that an actual conflict of interest existed. The district court concluded that only Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm agents, and not North Little Rock police, were involved in the investigation. Peeler offers as evidence a news report which states that he "was one of two men who [were] arrested in October as part of an Arkansas State Police investigation of organized crime in the Little Rock area." There is no evidence, however, of the relationship between the Arkansas State Police and the North Little Rock Police Department, much less of the relationship between his attorney and the police department. Peeler's claim reduces to an unsupported assertion, and the district court properly denied an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Peeler's claim that his attorney was ineffective must be similarly rejected. Peeler had personally retained his attorney. He fails to indicate which witnesses were not called or what relevance their testimony would have to his defense. Indeed, his attorney did secure one lay witness who testified favorably to Peeler's position at the May 6 hearing, as well as two expert witnesses and documentary evidence dating back to 1970. Nor can we say that a guilty plea under the circumstances was unwarranted. Peeler simply fails to offer any evidence that his attorney's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, --- U.S. ----, ----, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). We therefore need not reach the second element--prejudice to the defendant--of a sixth amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Id. at ----, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
The district court characterized this claim as a "groundless assertion" and we agree. The only evidence offered by Peeler in support of this alleged promise is the district court's statement that " [n]o other counts of the indictment [beyond the two Peeler pled guilty to] will be given any consideration at all by the Court." The district court found no evidence that the government or Peeler's attorney made such a promise or that the Parole Commission improperly computed the time to be served. The government prosecutor stated in open court that " [t]he United States will make no recommendation as to sentence." Furthermore, the plea was entered in accordance with the provisions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, including the following colloquy between Peeler and the district judge:
While representations made in compliance with Rule 11 do not foreclose subsequent investigation into the voluntariness of a plea, United States v. Goodman, 590 F.2d 705, 710 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985, 99 S. Ct. 1801, 60 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1979), they are entitled to great weight:
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1628-1629, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1977). Peeler's allegation that he was promised leniency is unsupported by specific facts. The district court was thus correct in denying the section 2255 motion on this issue without an evidentiary hearing.
Our precedents support this principle. See Belvin v. United States, 538 F.2d 1335, 1336 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100, 97 S. Ct. 1123, 51 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1977) (prior determination of competency conclusive where section 2255 motion fails to raise "bona fide question or reasonable doubt"); Rose, 513 F.2d at 1255 (prior determination conclusive in "appropriate circumstances"); Dranow v. United States; 407 F.2d 47, 49 (8th Cir. 1969) (prior determination conclusive where section 2255 motion contains only bald conclusion of incompetency); Richards v. United States, 342 F.2d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 1965) (same); Krupnick v. United States, 264 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1959) (prior determination would "ordinarily be res adjudicata"). Dictum in other cases is not controlling. Wheeler v. United States, 340 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1965) (no competency determination in proceeding leading to conviction); Breaton v. United States, 303 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1962) (same); Simmons v. United States, 253 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1958) (same). But see Bradley v. United States, 347 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1016, 86 S. Ct. 628, 15 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1966) (prior determination of competency forecloses issue in subsequent section 2255 proceeding)