Source: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2006/10/18/06-8762/special-conditions-dassault-aviation-model-falcon-7x-airplane-interaction-of-systems-and-structures
Timestamp: 2017-11-20 14:16:36
Document Index: 399818001

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 25', 'art 25', 'art 25', '§\u200921', 'art 34', 'art 36', '§\u2009611', 'art 25', '§\u200925', 'art 25', 'art 25', '§\u200925', '§\u200925', '§\u200925', 'art 25', '§\u200925']

Federal Register :: Special Conditions: Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 7X Airplane; Interaction of Systems and Structures, Limit Pilot Forces, and High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection
A Proposed Rule by the Federal Aviation Administration on 10/18/2006
We must receive your comments by December 4, 2006.
71 FR 61427
61427-61432 (6 pages)
Docket No. NM355
Notice No. 25-06-10-SC
06-8762
Special Condition No. 1. Interaction of Systems and Structures
Special Condition No. 2. Limit Pilot Forces
Special Condition No. 3. High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection
2. Limit Pilot Forces
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/06-8762 https://www.federalregister.gov/d/06-8762
Start Preamble Start Printed Page 61427
This action proposes special conditions for the Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 7X airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These design features include interaction of systems and structures, limit pilot forces, and electrical and electronic flight control systems. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design features. These proposed special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
You must mail two copies of your comments to: Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Airplane Directorate, Attn: Rules Docket (ANM-113), Docket No. NM355, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, 98057-3356. You may deliver two copies to the Transport Airplane Directorate at the above address. You must mark your comments: Docket No. NM355. You can inspect comments in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.
Thomas Rodriguez, FAA, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; facsimile (425) 227-1149.
On June 4, 2002, Dassault Aviation, 9 rond Point des Champs Elysees, 75008, Paris, France, applied for a type certificate for its new Model Falcon 7X airplane. The Model Falcon 7X is a 19 passenger transport category airplane, powered by three aft mounted Pratt & Whitney PW307A high bypass ratio turbofan engines. The airplane is operated using a fly-by-wire (FBW) primary flight control system. This will be the first application of a FBW primary flight control system in a private/corporate use airplane.
The Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 7X design incorporates equipment that was not envisioned when part 25 was created. This equipment affects the interaction of systems and structures, limit pilot forces, and high intensity radiated fields (HIRF) protection. Therefore, special conditions are required to provide the level of safety equivalent to that established by the regulations.
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Dassault Aviation must show that the Model Falcon 7X airplane meets the applicable provisions of part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-108.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Model Falcon 7X because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model Falcon 7X must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36 and the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.”
The Model Falcon 7X airplane will incorporate three novel or unusual design features: interaction of systems and structures, limit pilot forces, and electrical and electronic flight control systems. These proposed special conditions address equipment which may affect the airplane's structural performance, either directly or as a Start Printed Page 61428result of failure or malfunction; pilot limit forces; and electrical and electronic systems which perform critical functions that may be vulnerable to HIRF.
These proposed special conditions are identical or nearly identical to those previously required for type certification of other Dassault airplane models. In general, the proposed special conditions were derived initially from standardized requirements developed by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), comprised of representatives of the FAA, Europe's Joint Aviation Authorities (now replaced by the European Aviation Safety Agency), and industry.
Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Dassault Model Falcon 7X airplane. These additional proposed special conditions will pertain to the following topics:
Sudden Engine Stoppage,
High Incidence Protection Function,
Side Stick Controllers,
Lateral-Directional and Longitudinal Stability and Low Energy Awareness,
Flight Envelope Protection: Pitch, Roll and High Speed Limiting Functions,
Flight Control Surface Position Awareness,
Flight Characteristics Compliance via Handling Qualities Rating Method,
Proposed special conditions have been issued for the Model Falcon 7X with the novel or unusual design feature pertaining to Pilot Compartment View-Hydrophobic Coatings in Lieu of Windshield Wipers. This special condition was published for public comment in the Federal Register on July 12, 2006 (71 FR 39235).
Because of rapid improvements in airplane technology, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design features. Therefore, in addition to the requirements of part 25, subparts C and D, the following three special conditions apply.
The Dassault Model Falcon 7X is equipped with systems that may affect the airplane's structural performance either directly or as a result of failure or malfunction. The effects of these systems on structural performance must be considered in the certification analysis. This analysis must include consideration of normal operation and of failure conditions with required structural strength levels related to the probability of occurrence.
Previously, special conditions have been specified to require consideration of the effects of systems on structures. The special condition proposed for the Model Falcon 7X is nearly identical to that issued for other fly-by-wire airplanes.
Like some other certificated transport category airplane models, the Dassault Model Falcon 7X airplane is equipped with a side stick controller instead of a conventional wheel or control stick. This kind of controller is designed to be operated using only one hand. The requirement of § 25.397(c), which defines limit pilot forces and torques for conventional wheel or stick controls, is not appropriate for a side stick controller. Therefore, a special condition is necessary to specify the appropriate loading conditions for this kind of controller.
The Dassault Model Falcon X will utilize electrical and electronic systems which perform critical functions. These systems may be vulnerable to HIRF external to the airplane. There is no specific regulation that addresses requirements for protection of electrical and electronic systems from HIRF. With the trend toward increased power levels from ground-based transmitters and the advent of space and satellite communications, coupled with electronic command and control of the airplane, the immunity of critical avionics/electronics and electrical systems to HIRF must be established.
To ensure that a level of safety is achieved that is equivalent to that intended by the regulations incorporated by reference, a special condition is needed for the Dassault Model Falcon 7X airplane. This special condition requires that avionics/electronics and electrical systems that perform critical functions be designed and installed to preclude component damage and interruption.
It is not possible to precisely define the HIRF to which the airplane will be exposed in service. There is also uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling of electromagnetic energy to cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined. Based on surveys and analysis of existing HIRF emitters, adequate protection from exists when there is compliance with either paragraph 1 or 2 below:
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Dassault Model Falcon 7X. Should Dassault Aviation apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would apply to that model as well.
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the Start Printed Page 61429Dassault Model Falcon 7X airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability, and it affects only the applicant which applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.
In addition to the requirements of part 25, subparts C and D, the following proposed special conditions would apply:
a. For airplanes equipped with systems that affect structural performance—either directly or as a result of a failure or malfunction—the influence of these systems and their failure conditions must be taken into account when showing compliance with the requirements of part 25, subparts C and D. Paragraph c below must be used to evaluate the structural performance of airplanes equipped with these systems.
b. Unless shown to be extremely improbable, the airplane must be designed to withstand any forced structural vibration resulting from any failure, malfunction, or adverse condition in the flight control system. These loads must be treated in accordance with the requirements of paragraph a above.
c. Interaction of Systems and Structures.
(1) General: The following criteria must be used for showing compliance with this special condition for interaction of systems and structures and with § 25.629 for airplanes equipped with flight control systems, autopilots, stability augmentation systems, load alleviation systems, flutter control systems, and fuel management systems. If this special condition is used for other systems, it may be necessary to adapt the criteria to the specific system.
(a) The criteria defined herein address only the direct structural consequences of the system responses and performances. They cannot be considered in isolation but should be included in the overall safety evaluation of the airplane. These criteria may, in some instances, duplicate standards already established for this evaluation. These criteria are applicable only to structures whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing. Specific criteria that define acceptable limits on handling characteristics or stability requirements when operating in the system degraded or inoperative modes are not provided in this special condition.
(b) Depending upon the specific characteristics of the airplane, additional studies may be required that go beyond the criteria provided in this special condition in order to demonstrate the capability of the airplane to meet other realistic conditions, such as alternative gust or maneuver descriptions for an airplane equipped with a load alleviation system.
(1) Limit loads must be derived in all normal operating configurations of the system from all the limit conditions specified in subpart C (or used in lieu of those specified in subpart C), taking into account any special behavior of such a system or associated functions or any effect on the structural performance of the airplane that may occur up to the limit loads. In particular, any significant non-linearity (rate of displacement of control surface, thresholds or any other system non-linearities) must be accounted for in a realistic or conservative way when deriving limit loads from limit conditions.
(ii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section. For pressurized cabins, these loads must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.
(i) The loads derived from the following conditions (or used in lieu of the following conditions) at speeds up to VC/MC or the speed limitation prescribed for the remainder of the flight must be determined:
(A) the limit symmetrical maneuvering conditions specified in §§ 25.331 and in 25.345.
(B) the limit gust and turbulence conditions specified in §§ 25.341 and in 25.345.
(ii) For static strength substantiation, each part of the structure must be able to withstand the loads in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this special condition multiplied by a factor of safety, depending on the probability of being in this failure state. The factor of safety is defined in Figure 2.
(iii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph (c)(2)(ii). For pressurized cabins, these loads must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.
(1) The system must be checked for failure conditions, not extremely improbable, that degrade the structural capability below the level required by part 25 or significantly reduce the reliability of the remaining system. As far as reasonably practicable, the flightcrew must be made aware of these failures before flight. Certain elements of the control system, such as mechanical and hydraulic components, may use special periodic inspections, and electronic components may use daily checks in lieu of warning systems to achieve the objective of this requirement. These certification maintenance requirements must be limited to components that are not readily detectable by normal warning systems and where service history shows that inspections will provide an adequate level of safety.
(e) Dispatch with known failure conditions. If the airplane is to be dispatched in a known system failure condition that affects structural performance or affects the reliability of the remaining system to maintain structural performance, then the provisions of these Special Conditions must be met, including the provisions of paragraph (b), for the dispatched condition and paragraph (c) for subsequent failures. Expected operational limitations may be taken into account in establishing Pj as the probability of failure occurrence for determining the safety margin in Figure 1. Flight limitations and expected operational limitations may be taken into account in establishing Qj as the combined probability of being in the dispatched failure condition and the subsequent failure condition for the safety margins in Figures 2 and 3. These limitations must be such that the probability of being in this combined failure state and then subsequently encountering limit load conditions is extremely improbable. No reduction in these safety margins is allowed if the subsequent system failure rate is greater than 1E-3 per flight hour.
In addition to the requirements of § 25.397(c) the following special condition applies.
The limit pilot forces are:
Nose up 200 lbf (pounds force) Nose left 100 lbf.
b. For all other components of the side stick control assembly, but Start Printed Page 61432excluding the internal components of the electrical sensor assemblies to avoid damage as a result of an in-flight jam.
a. Protection from Unwanted Effects of High Intensity Radiated Fields. Each electrical and electronic system which performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capability of these systems to perform critical functions is not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated fields.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 10, 2006.
[FR Doc. 06-8762 Filed 10-17-06; 8:45 am]