Source: http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Crawford_v_Metro_Govt_of_Nashville_555_US_271_129_S_Ct_846_172_L_
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 05:02:45
Document Index: 295613824

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 8', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000']

Crawford v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 129 S. Ct. 846, 172 L. Ed. 2d 650, 105 FEP Cases 353 (2009), Court Opinion
Crawford v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 129 S. Ct. 846, 172 L. Ed. 2d 650, 105 FEP Cases 353 (2009) [2009 BL 14004]
VICKY S. CRAWFORD, PETITIONER v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE
AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE.
[***653] [**847] Hide Headnotes
[1] Retaliation — Coverage ►108.0401 ►108.4501 ►108.4511 ►108.415925 ►108.4112 ►108.415915 ►108.415930 [Show Topic Path]
Opposition clause of Title VII's retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a), protects employees who answer questions about discrimination during employer's internal investigation, and thus female employee who described male co-worker's sexual harassment in response to employer's inquiry about any “inappropriate behavior”
by him is covered by clause, even though she did not instigate or initiate any complaint, since communication of belief that employer has discriminated virtually always constitutes opposition, word “oppose”
includes taking no action at all beyond disclosing position, argument that employers will refuse to ask about discrimination is unconvincing because Ellerth-Faragher defense provides strong inducement to ferret out and stop it, and requiring employees to initiate complaint puts them in catch-22.
(Metro) [**848] during an internal investigation into rumors of sexual
harassment by the Metro School District employee relations director
(Hughes), petitioner Crawford, a 30-year employee, reported that Hughes
had sexually harassed her. Metro took no action against Hughes, but
soon fired Crawford, alleging embezzlement. She filed suit under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that Metro was
retaliating for her report of Hughes's behavior, in violation of
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a), which makes it unlawful "for an employer to
discriminate against any . . . employe[e]" who (1) "has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice [***654] by this subchapter"
(opposition clause), or (2) "has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
under this subchapter" (participation clause). The court granted Metro
summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
opposition clause demanded "active, consistent" opposing activities,
whereas Crawford had not initiated any complaint prior to the
investigation, and finding that the participation clause did not cover
Metro's internal investigation because it was not conducted pursuant to
a Title VII charge pending with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Held: The anti-retaliation provision's protection
extends to an employee who speaks out about
discrimination not on her own initiative, but in
answering questions during an employer's internal
investigation. Because "oppose" is undefined by
statute, it carries its ordinary dictionary meaning of
resisting or contending against. Crawford's statement
is thus covered by the opposition clause, as an
disapproving account of Hughes's sexually obnoxious
behavior toward her. "Oppose" goes beyond "active,
consistent" behavior in ordinary discourse, and may be
used to speak of someone who has taken no action at
all to advance a position beyond disclosing it. Thus,
a person can "oppose" by responding to someone else's
questions just as surely as by provoking the
discussion. Nothing in the statute requires a freakish
rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination
on her own initiative but not one who reports the same
discrimination in the same words when [*272] asked a
question. Metro unconvincingly argues for the Sixth
Circuit's active, consistent opposition rule, claiming
that employers will be less likely to raise questions
about possible discrimination if a retaliation charge
is easy to raise when things go badly for an employee
who responded to enquiries. Employers, however, have a
strong inducement to ferret out and put a stop to
discriminatory activity in their operations because
Burlington [****2] Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742,
765, and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 807,
hold "[a]n employer . . . subject to vicarious
liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
with the statute's "`primary objective'" of "avoiding]
harm" to employees, Faragher, supra, at 806, for if an
employee reporting discrimination in answer to an
employer's questions could be penalized with no
remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to
keep quiet about Title VII offenses. Because
Crawford's conduct is covered by the opposition
clause, this Court does not reach her argument that
the Sixth Circuit also misread the participation
[**849] clause. Metro's other defenses to the retaliation
claim were never reached by the District Court, and
thus remain open on remand. Pp. 3-8.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS,
[***655] [*273] JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended,
42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), forbids retaliation
by employers against employees who report workplace race or gender
discrimination. The question here is whether this protection extends to
an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own
initiative, but in answering questions during an employer's internal
investigation. We hold that it does.
In 2002, respondent Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee (Metro), began looking into rumors of sexual harassment
by the Metro School District's [*274] employee relations director, Gene
Hughes.[fn1] 211 Fed. Appx. 373,
374 (CA6 2006). When
Veronica Frazier, a Metro human resources officer, asked petitioner
Vicky Crawford, a 30-year Metro employee, whether she had witnessed
"inappropriate behavior" on the part of Hughes, id., at 374-375,
Crawford described several instances of sexually harassing behavior:
once, Hughes had answered her greeting, "`Hey Dr. Hughes, what's up?,'"
by grabbing his crotch and saying "`[Y]ou know what's up'"; he had
repeatedly "`put his crotch up to [her] window'"; and on one occasion he
had entered her office and "`grabbed her head and pulled it to his
crotch,'" id., at 375, and n. 1. Two other employees also reported being
sexually harassed by Hughes. Id., at 375. Although Metro took no action
against Hughes, it did fire Crawford and the two other accusers soon
after finishing the investigation, saying in Crawford's case that it was
for embezzlement. Ibid. Crawford claimed Metro was retaliating for her
report of Hughes's behavior and filed a charge of a Title VII violation
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), followed by
this suit in [**850] the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee. Ibid.
The Title VII antiretaliation provision has two clauses, making it "an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees . . . [1] because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, [****3] or [2] because he has
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."
42 U. S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The one is known as the "opposition clause,"
the other as the "participation clause," and Crawford accused Metro of
violating both.
[*275] The District Court granted summary judgment for Metro. It held that
Crawford could not satisfy the opposition clause because she had not
"instigated or initiated any complaint," but had "merely answered
investigators in an already-pending internal investigation, initiated by
someone else." Memorandum Opinion, No. 3:03-cv-00996 (MD Tenn., Jan. 6,
2005), App. C to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. It concluded that her claim [***656] also
failed under the participation clause, which Sixth Circuit precedent
confined to protecting "`an employee's participation in an employer's
internal investigation . . . where that investigation occurs pursuant to
a pending EEOC charge'" (not the case here). Id., at 15a (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F. 3d 537, 543 (CA6
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds, holding that the
opposition clause "`demands active, consistent "opposing" activities to
warrant . . . protection against retaliation,'" 211 Fed. Appx., at 376
(quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. Appx. 607,
610 (CA6 2004)), whereas Crawford did "not claim to have instigated or
initiated any complaint prior to her participation in the investigation,
nor did she take any further action following the investigation and prior
to her firing." 211 Fed. Appx., at 376. Again like the trial judge, the
Court of Appeals understood that Crawford could show no violation of the
participation clause because her "`employer's internal investigation'" was
not conducted "`pursuant to a pending EEOC charge.'" Ibid. (quoting
Abbott, supra, at 543).
Because the Sixth Circuit's decision conflicts with those of other
Circuits, particularly as to the opposition clause, see, e.g., McDonnell
v. Cisneros, 84 F. 3d 256, 262 (CA7 1996), we granted Crawford's petition
for certiorari. 552 U. S. ___ (2008). We now reverse and remand for
[*276] II
The opposition clause makes it "unlawful . . . for an employer to
discriminate against any . . . employe[e] . . .
because he has opposed any practice made . . . unlawful . . . by this
subchapter." § 2000e-3(a). [1] [2] The term "oppose," being left undefined by the
statute, carries its ordinary meaning, Perrin v. United States,
444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979): "to resist or antagonize . . .; to contend
against; to confront; resist; withstand," Webster's New International
Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1958). Although these actions entail varying
expenditures of energy, "RESIST frequently implies more active striving
than OPPOSE." Ibid.; see also Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 1359 (2d ed. 1987) (defining "oppose" as "to be hostile or
adverse to, as in opinion").
[3] [4] [1] The statement Crawford says she gave to Frazier is thus covered by the
opposition clause, as an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually
obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee, an answer [**851] she says
antagonized her employer to the point of sacking her on a false
pretense. [5] Crawford's description [****4] of the louche goings-on would certainly
qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as "resist[ant]" or
"antagonistic]" to Hughes's treatment, if for no other reason than the
point argued by the Government and explained by an EEOC guideline: "When
an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has
engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that communication"
virtually always "constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity."
[6] Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9 (citing 2 EEOC Compliance
Manual §§ 8-II-B(1), (2), p. 614:0003 (Mar. 2003)); see also Federal
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U. S.___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 8)
(explaining that EEOC compliance [***657] manuals "reflect `a body of experience
for guidance'" (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998))).
It is true that one can imagine exceptions, like an employee's
description of a supervisor's racist joke as [*277] hilarious, but these will be
eccentric cases,
and this is not one of them.[fn2]
The Sixth Circuit thought answering questions fell short of
opposition, taking the view that the clause "`demands active, consistent
"opposing" activities to warrant . . . protection against retaliation,'"
211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell, supra, at 610), and that an
employee must "instigat[e] or initiat[e]" a complaint to be covered,
211 Fed. Appx., at 376. But though these requirements obviously
exemplify opposition as commonly understood, they are not limits of it.
"Oppose" goes beyond "active, consistent" behavior in ordinary
discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone who
has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it.
Countless people were known to "oppose" slavery before Emancipation, or
are said to "oppose" capital punishment today, without writing public
letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government. [7] And we
would call it "opposition" if an employee took a stand against an
employer's discriminatory practices not by "instigating" action, but by
standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor's order to fire a
junior worker for discriminatory reasons. Cf. McDonnell, supra, at 262
(finding employee covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
where his employer retaliated against him for failing to prevent his
subordinate from filing an EEOC charge). [8] [9] [10] There is, then, no reason to
doubt that a person can "oppose" by responding to someone else's
question just as surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in
the statute requires [*278] a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.
Metro and its amici support the Circuit panel's insistence on "active"
and "consistent" opposition by arguing that the lower the bar for
retaliation claims, the less likely it is that employers will look into
what [**852] may be happening outside the executive suite. As they see it, if
retaliation is an easy charge when things go bad for an employee who
responded to enquiries, employers [****5] will avoid the headache by refusing to
raise questions about possible discrimination.
The argument is unconvincing, for we think it underestimates the
incentive to enquire that follows from our decisions in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998). [11] Ellerth and Faragher hold "[a]n employer .
. . subject to vicarious [***658] liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with . . .
authority over the employee." Ellerth, supra, at 765; Faragher, supra, at
807. [12] [13] [14] Although there is no affirmative defense if the hostile environment
"culminates in a tangible employment action" against the employee,
Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765, an employer does have a defense "[w]hen no
tangible employment action is taken" if it "exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any" discriminatory conduct and "the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise," ibid. [15] Employers are thus subject to a strong inducement to
ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their
operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability. Ibid.; see
also Brief for Petitioner 24-28, and nn. 31-35 (citing studies
that Ellerth and Faragher have prompted many employers to adopt or
strengthen procedures for investigating, preventing, and correcting
discriminatory [*279] conduct). The possibility that an employer might someday
want to fire someone who might charge discrimination traceable to an
internal investigation does not strike us as likely to diminish the
attraction of an Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense.
That aside, we find it hard to see why the Sixth Circuit's rule would
not itself largely undermine the Ellerth-Faragher scheme, along with the
statute's "`primary objective'" of "avoid[ing] harm" to employees.
Faragher, supra, at 806 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U. S. 405, 417 (1975)). If it were clear law that an employee who
reported discrimination in answering an employer's questions could be
penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to
keep quiet about Title VII offenses against themselves or against
others. This is no imaginary horrible given the documented indications
that "[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent
instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination." Brake,
Retaliation, 90 Minn. L.Rev. 18, 20 (2005); see also id., at 37, and n.
58 (compiling studies). The appeals court's rule would thus create a real
dilemma for any knowledgeable employee in a hostile work environment if
the boss took steps to assure a defense under our cases. If the employee
reported discrimination in response to the enquiries, the employer might
well be free to penalize her for speaking up. But if she kept quiet about
the discrimination and later filed a Title VII claim, the employer might
well escape liability, arguing that it "exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct [any discrimination] promptly" but "the plaintiff
[****6] employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of . . . preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer." Ellerth, supra, at
765. [**853] Nothing in the statute's
text or our precedent supports this catch-22.[fn3]
[***659] [*280] Because Crawford's conduct is covered by the opposition clause, we do
not reach her argument that the Sixth Circuit misread the participation
clause as well. But that does not mean the end of this case, for Metro's
motion for summary judgment raised several defenses to the retaliation
charge besides the scope of the two clauses; the District Court never
reached these others owing to its ruling on the elements of retaliation,
and they remain open on remand.
[fn1] [16] Because this case arises out of the District Court's grant of
summary judgment for Metro, "we are required to view all facts and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, [Crawford]."
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 195, n. 2 (2004) (per curiam).
[fn2] Metro suggests in passing that it was unclear whether Crawford
actually opposed Hughes's behavior because some of her defensive
responses were "inappropriate," such as telling Hughes to "bite me" and
"flip[ping] him a bird." Brief for Respondent 1-2 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This argument fails not only because at the summary
judgment stage we must "view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences
in [Crawford's] favor," Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 195, n. 2, but also
because Crawford gave no indication that Hughes's gross clowning was
anything but offensive to her.
[fn3] Metro also argues that "[r]equiring the employee to actually
initiate a complaint . . . conforms with the employee's `obligation of
reasonable care to avoid harm' articulated in Faragher and Ellerth."
Brief for Respondent 28 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 807
(1998)). [17] [18] But that mitigation requirement only applies to employees who
are suffering discrimination and have the opportunity to fix it by
"tak[ing] advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer," ibid.; it is based on the general principle
"that a victim has a duty `to use such means as are reasonable under the
circumstances to avoid or minimize . . . damages,'" id., at 806 (quoting
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 231, n. 15 (1982)). We have never
suggested that employees have a legal obligation to report discrimination
against others to their employer on their own initiative, let alone lose
statutory protection by failing to speak. Extending the mitigation
requirement so far would make no sense; employees will often face
retaliation not for opposing discrimination they themselves face, but for
reporting discrimination suffered by others. Thus, they are not "victims"
of anything until they are retaliated against, and it would be absurd to
require them to "mitigate" damages they may be unaware they will
The question in this case is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (2000
ed. and Supp. V), prohibits retaliation against an employee who testifies
in an internal investigation of alleged sexual harassment. [*281] I agree with
the Court that the "opposition clause" of § 2000e-3(a) (2000 ed.)
prohibits retaliation for such conduct. I also agree with the Court's
primary reasoning, which is based on "the point argued by the Government
and explained by an EEOC guideline: `When an employee communicates to her
employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of
employment discrimination, that communication' virtually always
`constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity.'" Ante, at 4. I
write separately to emphasize my understanding that the Court's holding
does not and should not extend beyond employees who testify in internal
investigations or engage in analogous purposive conduct.
As the Court concludes, the term "oppose" does not denote conduct that
necessarily rises to the level required by the Sixth Circuit — i.e.,
conduct that is "`consistent'" and "instigated or initiated" by the
211 Fed. Appx. 373, 376 (2006). The primary definitions of the term
"oppose" do, however, require conduct that is active and purposive. See
Webster's New International Dictionary 1709-1710 (2d ed. 1953); Random
House Dictionary of the English Language 1010 (1966) (hereinafter Random
Dict.); 10 Oxford English Dictionary 866-867 (2d [**854] ed. 1989). [***660] For example,
the first three definitions of the term in the dictionary upon which the
Court principally relies are as follows:
"1. to act against or provide resistance to; combat.
2. to stand in the way of; hinder; obstruct. 3. to set
as an opponent or adversary." Random Dict. 1359 (2d
In accordance with these definitions, petitioner contends that the
statutory term "oppose" means "taking action (including making a
statement) to end, prevent, redress, or correct unlawful discrimination."
[19] In order to decide the question that is before us, we have no need to
adopt a definition of the term "oppose" that is [*282] broader than the
definition that petitioner advances. But in dicta, the Court notes that
the fourth listed definition in the Random House Dictionary [****7] of the
English Language goes further defining "oppose" to mean "`to be hostile
or adverse to, as in opinion'" Ante, at 4 (emphasis added). Thus, this
definition embraces silent opposition.
While this is certainly an accepted usage of the term "oppose," the
term is not always used in this sense, and it is questionable whether
silent opposition is covered by the opposition clause of
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a). It is noteworthy that all of the other conduct
protected by this provision — making a charge, testifying, or assisting or
participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing — requires
active and purposive conduct. "`That several items in a list share an
attribute counsels in favor of
interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well.'" S.
D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 U. S. 370, 378
(2006) (quoting Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 371 (1994)).
An interpretation of the opposition clause that protects conduct that
is not active and purposive would have important practical implications.
It would open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never
expressed a word of opposition to their employers. To be sure, in many
cases, such employees would not be able to show that management was
aware of their opposition and thus would not be able to show that their
opposition caused the adverse actions at issue. But in other cases, such
employees might well be able to create a genuine factual issue on the
question of causation. Suppose, for example, that an employee alleges
that he or she expressed opposition while informally chatting with a
co-worker at the proverbial water cooler or in a workplace telephone
conversation that was overheard by a co-worker. Or suppose that an
employee alleges that such a conversation occurred after work at a
restaurant or tavern frequented by co-workers or at a neighborhood
picnic attended by a friend or relative of a supervisor.
[*283] Some courts hold that an employee asserting a retaliation claim can
prove causation simply by showing that the adverse employment action
occurred within a short time after the protected conduct. See, e.g.,
Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U. S. 268, 273 (2001) (per
curiam) (noting that some cases "accept mere temporal proximity between
an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment
action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie
case"); see also Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Cooperative Extension of
Schenectady Cty., 252 F. 3d 545, 554 (CA2 2001); [***661] Conner v. Schnuk
Markets, Inc., 121 F. 3d 1390, 1395 (CA10 1997); Dey v. Colt Constr. &
Dev. Co., 28 F. 3d 1446, 1458
(CA7 1994). [**855] As a result, an employee claiming retaliation may be able to
establish causation simply by showing that, within some time period
prior to the adverse action, the employer, by some indirect means,
became aware of the views that the employee had expressed. Where the
protected conduct consisted of a private conversation, application of
this rule would be especially problematic because of uncertainty
regarding the point in time when the employer became aware of the
employee's private expressions of disapproval.
The number of retaliation claims filed with the [****8] EEOC has proliferated
in recent years. See U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
charges.html; Charge Statistics: FY 1992 Through FY 1996,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html (as visited Jan. 16, 2009, and
available in Clerk of Court's case file) (showing that retaliation
charges filed with the EEOC doubled between 1992 and 2007). An expansive
interpretation of protected opposition conduct would likely cause this
trend to accelerate.
The question whether the opposition clause shields employees who do
not communicate their views to their employers through purposive conduct
is not before us in this case; the answer to that question is far from
clear; and I do not understand the Court's holding to reach that issue
here. [*284] For present purposes, it is enough to hold that the opposition
clause does protect an employee, like petitioner, who testifies about
unlawful conduct in an internal investigation.