Source: http://absurdiav.blogspot.com/2013/03/
Timestamp: 2018-03-21 07:19:06
Document Index: 306034264

Matched Legal Cases: ['§207', '§207', '§207', '§89', '§ 89', 'art, 131', 'art, 131']

March 2013 | Employment Law
Zembiec v County of Monroe, 2013 NY Slip Op 01736, Appellate Division, Fourth Department
A Monroe County Sheriff's Department (MCSD) employee challenged the Department’s decision that he was not entitled to General Municipal Law §207-c benefits available to law enforcement personnel injured in the line of duty.
Supreme Court concluded that the MCSD’s determination was arbitrary and capricious and granted awarding the individual disability benefits retroactive to December 4, 2009, the date of the employee's request for those benefits. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling.
The court took note of an earlier action involving the same parties [see Zembiec v County of Monroe [Appeal No. 2], 87 AD3d 1358] in which the employee sought disability benefits for the period August 12, 2008 through June 15, 2009 as well as his regular pay from June 15, 2009 through March 25, 2010. The Appellate Division denied that part of the employee’s petition seeking an award of regular pay from June 15, 2009 through March 25, 2010, explaining that the employee was required to report to a modified duty assignment on June 15, 2009, but did not do so
Among the arguments advanced by MCSD was that the employee’s claim in this proceeding was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.* The Appellate Division rejected this claim, stating that the employees current claim for benefits was based on a December 2, 2009 status report prepared by an MCSD physician, in which the physician determined that he was not fit to return to work. The court explained that the employee’s introduction of this status report in the prior proceeding did not establish the claims being asserted in this proceeding and in the prior proceeding arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions.
Although the proceedings both involve claims concerning the employee's entitlement to disability benefits and are arguably related in time inasmuch as certain events relevant to this appeal, i.e., the issuance of the status report and petitioner's second request for disability benefits, occurred while the prior proceeding was pending, the proceedings are based upon two different transactions — MCSD’s June 15, 2009 decision denying the §207-c benefits and its July 19, 2010 decision denying the §207-c benefits being sought by the employee.
In the prior proceeding the court was concerned only with the issue whether MCSD’s June 15, 2009 determination was "arbitrary and capricious" and the court's "review of [the] administrative determination [in the prior proceeding was] limited to the facts and record adduced before the agency.'" Thus the court could not rely on post-determination submissions, such as the December 2, 2009 status report, in evaluating MCSD’s determination.
The Appellate also rejected MCSD’s alternative argument that the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel** bared the employee’s instant claim, concluding that the issues concerning employee's ability to return to work and his eligibility for disability benefits in December 2009 had not been decided in the prior proceeding. The court explained that although it determined that Supreme Court erred in awarding the employee regular pay from June 15, 2009 through March 25, 2010, in the earlier proceeding, that determination had not foreclosed the possibility that employee might, at some point after June 15, 2009, again become eligible for disability benefits
* Res Judicata: Latin for a matter already decided or judged by a tribunal.
** The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars issues that have been litigated from being litigated again by the same parties.
The instant decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_01736.htm
The NYMUNIBLOG Editorial Team has posted the Harris Beach webinar, “Health Care Reform’s Impact on Public Entities: Don’t Get Caught Waiting for 2014 – What You Need to be Doing Now,” on the Internet.
It is is now available for downloading and streaming for those unable to attend on March 14, 2013 presentation at http://nymuniblog.com/?p=3120
Issued during the week ending March 17, 2013 [Click on the caption to access the full report]
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Tuesday announced his office completed audits of
the Town of Columbus;
the Town of Hamlin;
the Village of Lyndonville;
the Town of Mansfield;
the Town of Otselic; and,
the Town of Pittstown.
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Tuesday announced his office completed audits of:
the Niskayuna Central School District;
the Patchogue–Medford Union Free School District;
the Pine Bush Central School District; and,
the South Glens Falls Central School District.
An audit report released by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli on March 14, 2013 reports that the Mill Neck Manor School for the Deaf, a Nassau County provider of special education services for children with hearing disabilities, overcharged the State Department of Education* [SDE] more than $280,000, including charges for extra salary and benefits for the school’s Executive Director.
Mill Neck, part of the larger Mill Neck Family of Organizations, claimed $64,817 from the State for salary paid to its Executive Director, Mark Prowatzke, that should have come from elsewhere in the organization. Auditors also identified $7,688 in vacation costs that were claimed for reimbursement, but were not paid by the school to its employees.
DiNapoli recommendations included that:
1. SDE review the inappropriate and unsupported expenses and take action to recover such reimbursed expenses; and
2. Mill Neck School should not charge costs to the program that are not in compliance with the State Education Department’s Reimbursable Cost Manual (Manual).
3. Explain Manual requirements to staff involved in preparing the Consolidated Fiscal Reports and the cost reimbursement processes.
A copy of the audit report is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093013/11s40.pdf
DiNapoli has identified other fraud and improper use of funds in a recent series of audits of special education providers. There have been several criminal referrals, felony arrests, criminal convictions and hundreds of thousands of dollars in restitution made as a result of the audits. In total, 30 special education contractors have been or are being audited.
The Comptroller's recent audit of SED’s fiscal and program oversight of special education providers found that the agency has not conducted any on-site provider audits since 2007. A summary of key findings in this audit report, which was issued on December 18, 2012, is posted on the Internet at:http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093013/12s103.htm. The link to the full text of the December 2012 audit report, which is posted on the Internet, is: Link to full audit report (2012-S-103)
* SDE oversees special education programs for students with disabilities between the ages of 3 and 21. In addition to services provided by local school districts, these programs include services delivered to about 75,000 students by more than 300 for-profit and not-for-profit entities at an annual state cost of $1.3 billion.
Former town clerk alleged to have used town’s credit card to pay personal debts
State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli reported that a former clerk of the Town of Argyle, Washington County, used a town credit card to pay for more than $8,000 of personal expenses.
DiNapoli’s auditors found that from January 2009 through December 2012, the former clerk made four separate purchases totaling $8,347 that were not for town business. In addition, late fees and finance charges totaling $2,013 were accumulated. The town supervisor alerted auditors to the misuse.
The former clerk paid off the debt and admitted to improperly using the town’s credit card. The town did not pay for any of the unauthorized purchases, late fees or finance charges incurred. Charges were not filed because the clerk repaid the town.
DiNapoli’s recommendations for the town to avoid such situations in the future included:
1. The board should ensure that all town-issued credit cards are used for business purposes only and the monthly credit card statements are included with the monthly claims to be audited prior to payment;
2. The board and town clerk should assess the credit limit on the Clerk’s credit card account and reduce it to an appropriate level for the needs of the office;
3. The clerk should deposit all moneys intact and in a timely manner; and
4. The clerk should remit moneys collected to the town supervisor and other agencies in a timely manner.
Town officials agreed with several findings in the audit. Their comments are included in the audit report.
For a copy of the report, it is available on the Internet at: http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2013/argyle.pdf
Disqualification of applicant unable to meet Civil Service Commission’s hearing requirements not unlawful discrimination under the State’s Human Rights Law
A candidate for the position of a Nassau County police officer filed an Article 78 petition challenging the Nassau County Civil Service Commission’s decision disqualifying him for the position.
Although Supreme Court granted the candidates petition and annulled the Commission’s determination, the Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling and dismissed the candidate’s petition “on the merits.”
The Commission had appealed two rulings by Supreme Court:
The first was procedural: was the candidates Article 78 petition timely. The Commission contended that it was untimely, arguing that the Article 78 action was commenced more that four months after its determination disqualifying the candidate.
The Appellate Division disagreed with the Commission, holding that the candidate’s petition was timely. Noting that CPLR 217(1) specifies that the limitations period begins to run when "the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding upon the petitioner," the court explained that "An administrative determination becomes final and binding when the petitioner seeking review has been aggrieved by it."
Here, said the Appellate Division, the candidate “was not aggrieved until he was notified that he was disqualified from further consideration” for failing to meet its hearing requirements.
The second issue concerned the Commission’s exercise of its discretion when it adopted a more stringent audio logy standard than that established by the State’s Municipal Police Training Commission.
The Appellate Division ruled that the Commission had acted within the scope of its discretionary power when it adopted a resolution which modified the Municipal Police Training Commission standards and did not contravene the procedure for the adoption of "rules" in doing so.
As the appointing authority has wide discretion in determining the fitness of candidates, the disqualification of the petitioner for failing to meet those modified audiological, the court concluded that the modified standard was not arbitrary and capricious.
In addition court noted that the Commission’s determination that the candidate failed to meet the modified Municipal Police Training Commission hearing standards constituted an individualized finding that his disability prevents him from performing the functions of a police officer in a reasonable manner “such that his disqualification did not constitute unlawful discrimination under the State’s Human Rights Law.
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_01404.htm
Empire Ctr. for N.Y. State Policy v Teachers' Retirement Sys. of the City of N.Y, 2013 NY Slip Op 01329, Appellate Division, First Department
The Appellate Division, Third Department recently considered another “FOIL case” involving the not-for-profit Empire Center for New York State Policy’s request seeking the names of the New York State Teachers’ Retirement Systems [NYSTRS] retirees and concluded that the NYSTRS could lawfully deny such request within the exemptions from disclosure permitted by Public Officers Law §89(7)."*
The First Department came to the same conclusion in this action, holding “[The New York City Retirement System’s] decision to withhold the names of retirees of the public retirement system pursuant to the exemption set forth in Public Officers Law § 89(7) was not affected by an error of law.”
The City Retirement System’s determination, explained the court “is in accord with [the court’s] interpretation of that exemption in Empire Ctr. for N.Y. State Policy v New York City Police Pension Fund (88 AD3d 520 [1st Dept 2011]), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 18 NY3d 901 [2012]).**
Accordingly, said the First Department, “we adhere to our prior holding under the principle of stare decisis,*** which applies with particular force to issues of statutory interpretation.”
* Empire Ctr. for N.Y. State Policy v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 2013 NY Slip Op 01117, Appellate Division, Third Department at http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2013/02/a-foil-request-seeking-names-of-public.html
** The First Department also noted the decision in New York Veteran Police Assn. v New York City Police Dept. Art. I Pension Fund, 61 NY2d 659, cited by the Third Department in its ruling.
*** Latin for "to stand by things decided."
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_01117.htm
Back in 2004, employees of the Chinese Daily News started a class action, claiming mis-classification, unpaid overtime and denied meals and breaks. The trial court eventually certified a class, and the employees won summary judgment on whether reporters for the newspaper qualified under the professional exemption. The employees won millions of dollars after trial, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Not so fast, said the Supreme Court. Following the Supreme Court's Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes decision (discussed here), the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case. The Ninth Circuit decided that Wal-Mart requires reconsideration of the decision and sent it back to the district court.
Why? The trial court did not apply the proper analysis (after Wal-Mart) to determine whether there is sufficient commonality to certify the class. As explained by the Court:
On remand, the district court must determine whether the claims of the proposed class “depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution — which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
So, it's not enough that there are "common questions" in the abstract, because, as the Ninth Circuit stated (quoting Wal-Mart and its own later decision in Ellis v. Costco):
"any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common questions.” Wang [sic], 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). “What matters to class certification is not the raising of common questions — even in droves — but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Dissimilarities within the proposed class may “impede the generation of common answers.” Id. “If there is no evidence that the entire class was subject to the same allegedly
discriminatory practice, there is no question common to the class.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 2011).
The Ninth Circuit also decided that the district court would have to reconsider whether certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). That rule permits monetary recovery in class action cases when
First, the district court over-relied on the employer's policies applicable to all employees, but without considering whether issues pertaining to individual claims and defenses would "predominate" over the common policy. Second, the district court did not have the California Supreme Court's Brinker decision (you've heard of it, right?) to assess whether certification of a meal / rest claim was appropriate.
Of note, the Ninth Circuit also wrote this, which will likely be of interest to class action litigators:
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court disapproved what it called “Trial by Formula,” wherein damages are determined for a sample set of class members and then applied by extrapolation to the rest of the class “without further individualized proceedings.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. Employers are “entitled to individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility” for monetary relief. Id. at 2560.
Employers are also entitled to litigate any individual affirmative defenses they may have to class members’ claims. Id. at 2561.
The case is Wang v. Chinese Daily News and the opinion is here.
Labels: class action, dukes, Wage and Hour
Cash bonuses paid to New York City securities industry employees are forecast to rise by 8 percent to $20 billion during this year’s bonus season, according to an estimate released by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. Click here to view video.
DiNapoli Audit Finds Errors and Potential Abuses in STAR Program
Administrative shortcomings in the School Tax Relief program have resulted in duplicate and improper exemptions going to individuals or entities not eligible to receive them, according to an audit released Thursday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. Auditors estimate these exemptions cost New York State $13 million during the 2010–11 fiscal year and could top $73 million by the 2015–16 fiscal year.
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Friday announced his office completed audits of the
Albany City School District; and,
KIPP Tech Valley Charter School.
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Thursday announced his office completed audits of the
Village of Brightwaters;
Town of Bovina;
Cooperative Information Technology Services;
Village of Forestville;
Lakeville Volunteer Fire Department;
Town of Lindley;
City of Norwich;
Village of Parish; and,
The fact that subordinates failed to complete an assigned task standing alone is not sufficient to prove a charge of “failure to supervise”
The fact that subordinates failed to complete an assigned task, standing alone, is not sufficient to prove a charge of “failure to supervise”
OATH Index No. 681/13
The Department of Investigation discovered that certain sanitation workers collected and sold recyclable scrap metal, referred to as “mongo.” As a result their supervisor was charged with failure to supervise subordinates who engaged in the activity.
OATH Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey noted that the charge of failure to supervise requires more than proof that a subordinate did not complete a task; there must be proof of neglect or fault by the supervisor.
Judge Casey recommended dismissal of the charges, finding the Department of Sanitation did not prove that there was unauthorized material on the truck in a place where the supervisor should have discovered it before the crew was sent to the dump.
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/13_Cases/13-681.pdf