Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19890323_0041089.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-02-28 14:38:00
Document Index: 511386158

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 1964', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1961', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1964', '§ 1964']

| United States v. Local 30
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.LOCAL 30, UNITED SLATE, TILE AND COMPOSITION ROOFERS, DAMP AND WATERPROOF WORKERS ASSOCIATION, RESIDENTIAL REPROOFERS LOCAL 30B, UNITED SLATE, TILE AND COMPOSITION ROOFERS, DAMP AND WATERPROOF WORKERS ASSOCIATION, STEPHEN TRAITZ, JR., EDWARD P. HURST, MICHAEL MANGINI, ROBERT CROSLEY, MICHAEL DALY, DANIEL CANNON, MARK OSBORN, ROBERT MEDINA, ERNEST WILLIAMS, JAMES NUZZI, STEPHEN TRAITZ, III, JOSEPH TRAITZ, RICHARD SCHOENBERGER; LOCAL 30, UNITED SLATE, TILE AND COMPOSITION ROOFERS, DAMP AND WATERPROOF WORKERS ASSOCIATION AND RESIDENTIAL REROOFERS, LOCAL 30B, UNITED SLATE, TILE AND COMPOSITION ROOFERS, DAMP AND WATERPROOF WORKERS ASSOCIATION, APPELLANTS
Appeal from the Judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, D.C. Civ. No. 87-7718.
Appellants Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association and Residential Reroofers Local 30B, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association ("the Roofers Union" or "appellants") appeal, at No. 88-1508, the district court's order granting the government's motion for a preliminary injunction. They also appeal, at No. 88-1620, the district court's order converting without objection the preliminary injunction into a final decree. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
The appeal of the order granting a preliminary injunction, at No. 88-1508, is moot. Once the order granting the permanent injunction was entered, the order granting the preliminary injunction merged with it, and appeal is only proper from the order granting the permanent injunction. See Securities & Exchange Commission v. First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 1981). However, we have jurisdiction over No. 88-1620 under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The fact that the district court retained jurisdiction in this case to provide such further relief as might be necessary to effectuate the permanent injunction does not deprive the district court's order of its finality under § 1291. See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Suter, 832 F.2d 988, 990 (7th Cir. 1987).
This appeal was taken after lengthy civil proceedings in the district court brought by the United States against the Roofers Union and thirteen of its leaders under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (RICO). The facts as found by the district court are set forth in great detail in the district court's opinion at 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988) and are not challenged as clearly erroneous by the parties to this appeal.
The government's civil complaint, filed in December 1987, alleged that the thirteen individual defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)*fn1 by conducting the affairs of the Roofers Union through a pattern of racketeering (Count One) and violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)*fn2 by conspiring to participate in and conduct the affairs of the Roofers Union through a pattern of racketeering (Count Two). The government prayed for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in order to bar the individual defendants from participating in the affairs of the Roofers Union and to appoint a trustee pendente lite to discharge all duties of the Roofers Union's officers until an election of new officers could be held.
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted in part the government's motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the government's request for the appointment of a trustee pendente lite and to set aside the December 1987 election of new Roofers Union officers.*fn3 However, the district court enjoined the individual defendants from participating in the Union's affairs and from continuing to be employed in the construction industry within the Union's jurisdiction.
The district court also imposed a "decreeship" against the Roofers Union and appointed a "court liaison officer" as the principal enforcement officer of the decree. The decree provided, inter alia, (1) that the Roofers Union develop a grievance/arbitration procedure for resolving contractual disputes between the Union and employers, (2) that an audit of the Roofers Union and its affiliated entities*fn4 be conducted, (3) that the district court "establish direct control of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Union that require expenditure of any funds of the Union" or its affiliated entities, (4) that all face-to-face collective bargaining agreement negotiations between Union representatives and any other person take place under the supervision of the court liaison officer, and (5) that all Union records be made available to the court liaison officer.
After the district court converted the preliminary injunction into a "final decree," the Roofers Union timely filed a notice of appeal. The individual defendants did not appeal the district court's orders.
Appellants challenge both the district court's authority under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) to enter the decree against the Roofers Union and the terms of the decree itself. In considering appellants' claims, we review the district court's grant of injunctive relief under the abuse of discretion standard. John F. Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 658 (3d Cir. 1986). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, and its legal conclusions are subject to plenary review. See e.g., International Union UAW v. Mack Trucks Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)
A. The Authority to Grant Injunctive Relief
We first address the district court's authority to impose the decree against the Roofers Union. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) provides
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate ...