Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/356/129
Timestamp: 2015-02-28 16:50:44
Document Index: 209054478

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 860', '§ 349', '§ 1481', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 402', '§ 1482', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 2', '§ 402', '§ 349', '§ 1481']

MITSUGI NISHIKAWA, Petitioner, v. John Foster DULLES, Secretary of State. | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews MITSUGI NISHIKAWA, Petitioner, v. John Foster DULLES, Secretary of State.
356 U.S. 129 (78 S.Ct. 612, 2 L.Ed.2d 659)
Reargued: Oct. 28, 1957.
[HTML] concurrence, FRANKFURTER, BURTON
[HTML] Mr. A. L. Wirin, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.
'(c) Entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless expressly authorized by the laws of the United States, if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state * * *.'
After hearing this testimony, the district judge announced from the bench that 'the court simply does not believe the testimony of the witness. That is all. I simply do not believe his testimony.' He went on to express his opinion that petitioner 'went over because as a Japanese citizen under the laws of Japan it was necessary for him to serve his hitch in the army. * * * He went over and he waited until they reached him on the draft, and when they did he was drafted.' Formally, the court found as a fact on the basis of petitioner's testimony alone, which did not include an admission to that effect, that his 'entry and service in the Japanese Armed Forces was his free and voluntary act.' Therefore he was held to have lost his nationality under Section 401(c) and judgment was rendered for respondent. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment.
We granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 907, 77 S.Ct. 148, 1 L.Ed.2d 116.
Whatever divergence of view there may be as to what conduct may, consistent with the Constitution, be said to result in loss of nationality, cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 78 S.Ct. 568, it is settled that no conduct results in expatriation unless the conduct is engaged in voluntarily. Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 73 S.Ct. 135, 97 L.Ed. 146.
The Government does not contend otherwise. Likewise, the parties are agreed that when a citizenship claimant proves his birth in this country or acquisition of American citizenship in some other way, the burden is upon the Government to prove an act that shows expatriation by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. In Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 210, 100 L.Ed. 806, we held that the rule as to burden of proof in denaturalization cases
applied to expatriation cases under Section 401(j) of the Nationality Act of 1940. We now conclude that the same rule should govern cases under all the subsections of Section 401.
The parties disagree as to whether the Government must also prove that the expatriating act was voluntarily performed or whether the citizenship claimant bears the burden of proving that his act was involuntary.
Petitioner contends that voluntariness is an element of the expatriating act, and as such must be proved by the Government. The Government, on the other hand, relies upon the ordinary rule that duress is a matter of affirmative defense and contends that the party claiming that he acted involuntarily must overcome a presumption of voluntariness.
Because the consequences of denationalization are so drastic petitioner's contention as to burden of proof of voluntariness should be sustained. This Court has said that in a denaturalization case, 'instituted * * * for the purpose of depriving one of the precious right of citizenship previously conferred we believe the facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably possible in favor of the citizen.' Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1335, 87 L.Ed. 1796.
The same principle applies to expatriation cases, and it calls for placing upon the Government the burden of persuading the trier of fact by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that the act showing renunciation of citizenship was voluntarily performed. While one finds in the legislative history of Section 401, and particularly Section 401(c), recognition of the concept of voluntariness,
there is no discussion of the problem of the burden of proof. What is clear is that the House Committee which considered the bill rejected a proposal to enact a conclusive presumption of voluntariness in the case of dual nationals entering or serving in the military forces of the nation of their second nationality.
It is altogether consonant with this history to place upon the Government the burden of proving voluntariness. The Court has said that 'Rights of citizenship are not to be destroyed by an ambiguity.' Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 337, 59 S.Ct. 884, 891, 83 L.Ed. 1320. The reference was to an ambiguity in a treaty, but the principle there stated demands also that evidentiary ambiguities are not to be resolved against the citizen.
Finally, the Government contends that even if it has the burden of proving voluntariness by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence, that burden has been met in this case. What view the District Court took of the burden of proof does not clearly appear. The Court of Appeals seemed at one point to accept the evidence in the District Court as sufficient even on the view of the burden of proof as above stated.
That conclusion is not supportable. Of course, the citizenship claimant is subject to the rule dictated by common experience that one ordinarily acts voluntarily. Unless voluntariness is put in issue, the Government makes its case simply by proving the objective expatriating act. But here petitioner showed that he was conscripted in a totalitarian country to whose conscription law, with its penal sanctions, he was subject. This adequately injected the issue of voluntariness and required the Government to sustain its burden of proving voluntary conduct by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence.
The Government has not sustained that burden on this record. The fact that petitioner made no protest and did not seek aid of American officialsefforts that, for all that appears, would have been in vaindoes not satisfy the requisite standard of proof. Nor can the district judge's disbelief of petitioner's story of his motives and fears fill the evidentiary gap in the Government's case. The Government's only affirmative evidence was that petitioner went to Japan at a time when he was subject to conscription.
Petitioner asserts that his service in the Japanese forces was performed under duress. His claim of duress is based on the fact that he was inducted into the Japanese armed forces pursuant to the compulsory conscription law of that country,
and that rumors of harsh punishment of draft evaders by the secret police and the ruthlessness of the government in power made him afraid to take any action to avoid service. The evidence to rebut this testimony, elicited on cross-examination, was that he had failed to take certain actions to avoid service; the only affirmative act urged in support of the voluntariness of his entry into service is that he went to Japan when he was of draft-eligible age
and remained there until inducted.
It is common ground that conduct will result in expatriation only if voluntarily performed. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311312, 36 S.Ct. 106, 108, 60 L.Ed. 297; cf. Acheson v. Kiyokuro Okimura, 342 U.S. 899, 72 S.Ct. 293, 96 L.Ed. 674; Acheson v. Hisao Murata, 342 U.S. 900, 72 S.Ct. 294, 96 L.Ed. 674. Accordingly, where a person who has been declared expatriated contests that declaration on grounds of duress, the evidence in support of this claim must be sympathetically scrutinized. This is so both because of the extreme gravity of being denationalized and because of the subtle, psychologic factors that bear on duress.
The issue that is ultimately decisive in a litigation is one thing, the mode for determining it quite another. The fact that conduct, in order to result in loss of citizenship, must be voluntary behavior does not inherently define the appropriate manner of its proof. The Government properly has a very heavy burden in expatriation cases: it must establish that the citizen committed an 'act of expatriation'i.e., engaged in conduct of which the consequence is loss of citizenshipby clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 210, 100 L.Ed. 806, adopting the standard of Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796, and Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525. This is incumbent on the Government although the evidence in cases such as these may well be difficult to obtain. Much more difficult would it be for the Government to establish the citizen's state of mind as it bears on his will, purpose and choice of actionin short, 'voluntariness.' According to the ordinarily controlling principles of evidence, this would suggest that the individual, who is peculiarly equipped to clarify an ambiguity in the meaning of outward events, should have the burden of proving what is state of mind was. See Selma, Rome & Dalton R. Co. v. United States, 139 U.S. 560, 567568, 11 S.Ct. 638, 640, 35 L.Ed. 266. Moreover, any other evidence of his state of mind, outside of his own mental disclosures, will often be found only abroad, where the Government may have no facilities for conducting the necessary investigation. The Court should hesitate long before imposing on the Government, by a generalized, uncritical formula, a burden so heavy that the will of Congress becomes incapable of sensible, rational, fair enforcement.
Where an individual engages in conduct by command of a penal statute of another country to whose laws he is subject, the gravest doubt is cast on the applicability of the normal assumptioneven in a prosecution for murder (see Leland v. State of Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302)that what a person does, he does of his own free will. When a consequence as drastic as denationalization may be the effect of such conduct, it is not inappropriate that the Government should be charged with proving that the citizen's conduct was a response, not to the command of the statute, but to his own direction. The ready provability of the critical factexistence of an applicable law, particularly a criminal law, commanding the act in question provides protection against shifting this burden to the Government on the basis of a frivolous assertion of the defense of duress. Accordingly, the Government should, under the circumstances of this case, have the burden of proving by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that the citizen voluntarily performed an act causing expatriation.
Since the courts below were not guided by this formulation, the judgment should not be allowed to stand. However, the Government should not be denied a further opportunity to bring forward the necessary proof if it is able to do so. Whether, in other classes of cases in which the defense of duress is asserted, the Government should have the burden of proving its absence is a question the Court need notand, therefore, should notreach. For that reason, I concur in the result announced but cannot join the opinion of the Court.
The Courts of Appeals have divided on the question whether proof of conscription, in the absence of anything more on either side, precludes a finding that service in a foreign army was voluntary. The Second and Third Circuits have held that it does. Augello v. Dulles, 220 F.2d 344; Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592; Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586. The District of Columbia Circuit has ruled that '(d)ress cannot be inferred from the mere fact of conscription.' Acheson v. Maenza, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 90, 202 F.2d 453, 458; Alata v. Dulles, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 182, 221, F.2d 52; but see Bruni v. Dulles, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 358, 235 F.2d 855.
Although the Court recognizes the general rule that consciously performed acts are presumed voluntary, see 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 860; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C.A., it in fact alters this rule in all denationalization cases by placing the burden of proving voluntariness on the Government, thus relieving citizen-claimants in such cases from the duty of proving that their presumably voluntary acts were actually involuntary.
One of the prime reasons for imposing the burden of proof on the party claiming involuntariness is that the evidence normally lies in his possession. This reason is strikingly applicable to cases of the kind before us, for evidence that an individual involuntarily served in a foreign army is peculiarly within his grasp, and rarely accessible to the Government. Nishikawa's case amply illustrates the proposition. In the eight months that passed between his notice to report for a physical examination and his actual induction Nishikawa could have taken a variety of steps designed to prevent his conscription, any of which would have been persuasive evidence of the involuntary character of his service. For example, he could have sought to return to the United States, to renounce his Japanese nationality, to advise Japanese officials that he was an American citizen, to enlist the assistance of American Consular officials in Japan, or to employ the aid of friends or relatives in the United States.
Nishikawa admits that he did none of these things. But if he claimed that he had, is it not apparent that he and not the Government is the logical party to bring forward the pertinent evidence? In such circumstances it seems to me the better course to require Nishikawa to prove his allegation of duress rather than to impose on the Government the well-nigh impossible task of producing evidence to refute such a claim.
54 Stat. 1168, 1169. The present provision, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 349(a)(3), 66 Stat. 267, 268, 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a)(3), eliminates the necessity that the expatriate have or acquire the nationality of the foreign state.
Spokesmen for the Labor and Justice Departments objected, stating that dual nationals should have the opportunity to be heard on the question of duress. Id., at 150156; 169170; 200 203. At the time of the hearings § 401(c) was not limited to dual nationals. The Senate Committee inserted the limitation. See 86 Cong.Rec. 12817.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has correctly concluded that little significance attaches to the failure of the House Committee to accept a suggestion that the word 'voluntarily' be inserted in subsections (b) through (g) of § 401. Hearings, supra, at 397398. 'It seems to us that the failure of the committee to accept this amendment is of little significance in view of the legislative history * * * indicating that such amendment was unnecessary and superfluous.' Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls, 1 Cir., 161 F.2d 860, 864, note 4.
Petitioner's evidence of conscription also dispelled the presumption created by § 402 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1169, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1482, that a national who remains six months or more within the country of which either he or his parents have been nationals, has expatriated himself under § 401(c) or (d). Even if valid, 'Section 402 does not enlarge § 401(c) or (d),' Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 730, 72 S.Ct. 950, 959, 96 L.Ed. 1249, and, like the analogous provision of § 2 of the Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1228, it creates 'a presumption easy to preclude, and easy to overcome.' United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353, 358, 44 S.Ct. 388, 389, 68 L.Ed. 728. The ambiguous terms of § 402 have since been superseded by § 349(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 268, 8 U.S.C. 1481(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(b), which establishes a conclusive presumption of voluntariness on the part of a dual national who performs an expatriating act if he had resided in the state of his second nationality an aggregate of ten years or more immediately prior thereto. Of course, the new statutory presumption is not in issue in this case and there is no need to consider its validity.