Source: https://www.scribd.com/doc/54803040/Powell-v-State-of-Alabama-Ala-Crim-App-Apr-29-2011
Timestamp: 2016-02-11 05:47:33
Document Index: 773971560

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 13', '§13', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 107', '§ 8', '§ 1001', '§ 8', '§ 1007', '§ 1007', '§ 1008', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§\n8', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§\n81', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 106', '§ 301', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 102', '§ 106', '§\n1', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§1', '§ 13', '§\n81', '§13', '§ 506', '§ 1', '§ 106', '§ 301', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13']

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CR-09-1192
Johnson Augustus Powell v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal from B l o u n t C i r c u i t (CC-08-301) Court
The a p p e l l a n t , J o h n s o n A u g u s t u s P o w e l l , was c o n v i c t e d o f one c o u n t o f u n l a w f u l t r a n s p o r t o f a r t i c l e s c o n t a i n i n g s o u n d s transferred without t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e owner, a v i o l a t i o n o f The t r i a l court sentenced
§ 1 3 A - 8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975.
CR-09-1192 Powell ordered to three y e a r s ' imprisonment. a $15,000 f i n e , The trial court also
P o w e l l t o pay
$1,750 i n
e a c h t o t h e R e c o r d i n g I n d u s t r y A s s o c i a t i o n o f A m e r i c a ("RIAA") and t h e M o t i o n P i c t u r e A s s o c i a t i o n o f A m e r i c a ("MPAA"), $50 t h e c r i m e v i c t i m s c o m p e n s a t i o n f u n d , a t t o r n e y s f e e s , and costs. The e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l e s t a b l i s h e d t h e pertinent facts. Turner and Jason On February Paul of 23, the 2008, Blount Deputies County following Charles Sheriff's to
D e p a r t m e n t were p a t r o l l i n g I n t e r s t a t e 65 i n B l o u n t C o u n t y when t h e y o b s e r v e d a v e h i c l e b e i n g d r i v e n b y P o w e l l t r a v e l i n g above the posted speed limit. The deputies asked initiated a traffic was Paul filled be to
stop, given,
d u r i n g which Deputy Turner consent to search
J o h n s o n f o r , and Deputy
searched with a
t h e v e h i c l e and
d i s c o v e r e d t h r e e d u f f e l bags what D e p u t y Paul
l a r g e q u a n t i t y of
b e l i e v e d to According
u n l a w f u l , o r " p i r a t e d , " c o p i e s o f CDs Deputies in Turner and P a u l , t h e CDs f o r CDs and
and DVDs were n o t DVDs, d i d n o t
packaged the
s t a n d a r d l i c e n s i n g and c o p y r i g h t i n f o r m a t i o n , and were l a b e l e d w i t h a b l a c k marker.
CR-09-1192 The Dabbs them. deputies a r r e s t e d Johnson County and c a l l e d Deputy Roger
of the Blount After
to assist advised rights,
on t h e s c e n e , and a f t e r
Powell h i s Miranda
waiving those
Powell decided t o cooperate
Dabbs, P o w e l l t o l d t h e o f f i c e r s t h a t he was i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f buying items and s e l l i n g CDs a n d DVDS a n d t h a t he w o u l d b u y t h e them f o r $ 5 . A t the time
f o r $3 a p i e c e and would s e l l
he was a r r e s t e d , P o w e l l was d r i v i n g t o a g a s o l i n e s t a t i o n t o meet someone t o s e l l officers that t h e CDs a n d DVDs. the items Powell also t o l d the Carolina, Deputies South Turner,
he s o l d
i n North
P a u l , a n d Dabbs a l l t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l . each deputy admitted from or s e l l that
On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , i f Powell had
he d i d n o t know
permission reproduce
t h e owners
of the copyrighted material to
t h e CDs a n d DVDs i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n . an i n v e s t i g a t o r with t h e MPAA and t h e
James H. D u f f , RIAA, a l s o t e s t i f i e d that on behalf of
for the State at t r i a l . t h e RIAA a n d MPAA cases he
Duff explained analyzes and
v. A r i z o n a , 384 U.S. 436 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .
CR-09-1192 copying of music and movies that belong t o t h e members t h e CDs a n d that he
t h e RIAA a n d MPAA. from Powell's
DVDs r e c o v e r e d
and e x p l a i n e d
b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e CDs a n d DVDs were u n a u t h o r i z e d copyrighted material. Duff based this
copies of the on h i s
b e l i e f t h a t t h e CDs a n d DVDs were " p i r a t e d "
i . e . , t h e CDs
and DVDs d i d n o t i n c l u d e " t h e a r t i s t work o r t h e s l e e v e o r t h e jewel case" associated with industry-produced CDs o r DVDs.
(R. 140.) pirated material blank
A d d i t i o n a l l y , D u f f b e l i e v e d t h e CDs a n d DVDs t o be t h e CDs and DVDs contained copyrighted using
t h a t had been "burned" onto r e w r i t a b l e d i s k s
CDs a n d DVDs, w h i c h he r e f e r r e d t o as CDRs a n d DVDRs.
D u f f e x p l a i n e d t h a t CDs a n d DVDs r e l e a s e d p u r s u a n t t o RIAA a n d MPAA standards contain copyrighted material that had been
"pressed" or DVD
i n t o t h e CD o r DVD. a "pressed" CD
Duff c o n t r a s t e d o r DVD
a " b u r n e d " CD that the while
by e x p l a i n i n g
former s t o r e s i n f o r m a t i o n
on t h e t o p o f t h e CD o r DVD,
t h e l a t t e r s t o r e s i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e CD o r DVD.
P o w e l l c o n c e d e d t h a t t h e CDs a n d DVDs r e c o v e r e d v e h i c l e were n o t " p r e s s e d . "
CR-09-1192 The following discussion regarding and the m u s i c and movie during
i n d u s t r y ' s u s a g e o f r e w r i t a b l e CDs Duff's testimony:
DVDs t o o k p l a c e
"[The State]: B a s e d upon y o u r t r a i n i n g , your e x p e r i e n c e , y o u r e d u c a t i o n and y o u r employment w i t h t h e s e two [ a s s o c i a t i o n s ] , do any o f t h e l i c e n s e e s t h a t a r e members o f t h e two [ a s s o c i a t i o n s ] e v e r g i v e permission to put t h e i r data, t h e i r intellectual p r o p e r t y , on r e c o r d a b l e [CDs] o r [DVDs]? " [ D e f e n s e C o u n s e l ] : O b j e c t i o n , Y o u r Honor. T h e r e i s no p o s s i b l e way he c o u l d know what t h e i r p e r m i s s i o n i s . He i s n o t a member o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t i s a l l speculative. "THE COURT: I ' l l l e t him answer. and any
" [ D u f f ] : I have b e e n t r a i n e d on t h e i r p r a c t i c e s i n v e s t i g a t e d many c a s e s , and t h e y do n o t a l l o w p r o d u c t t o be p u t on a r e - w r i t a b l e CD o r DVD. "[The S t a t e ] : Do I do not you know why that i s , s i r ?
"[Duff]:
know t h a t . can s a y t h a t i s t r u e industry-wide? throughout
"[The S t a t e ] : You the U n i t e d S t a t e s
" [ D u f f ] : That i s i n d u s t r y - w i d e picture industry] and the associations].
w i t h the [motion[recording-industry
"[The S t a t e ] : And any i n t e l l e c t u a l d a t a t h a t i s p l a c e d on a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h o s e [DVDs] and [CDs] t h a t you j u s t d e s c r i b e d w o u l d be p i r a t e d . Would t h a t be a f a i r s t a t e m e n t ? " [ D u f f ] : I t h i n k t h e y can s e l l o r g i v e away r i g h t s to another l a b e l or something l i k e
their that.
CR-09-1192 L i k e an a r t i s t w i l l change l a b e l s , b u t i t s t i l l h a s t o come down t o be p u t on a p r e s s e d CD o r a p r e s s e d DVD. "[The S t a t e ] : N o t a r e c o r d a b l e CD o r DVD?
" [ D u f f ] : N o t a r e c o r d a b l e CD o r DVD." (R. 142-43.) On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , Duff testified t h a t t h e RIAA a n d
MPAA were n o t t h e o w n e r s o f t h e c o p y r i g h t s i n q u e s t i o n , b u t that he, as an of agent the of the RIAA Powell distribution and MPAA, was a
representative extensively
the d i g i t a l
m a t e r i a l , b u t D u f f a d m i t t e d t h a t he was n o t v e r y f a m i l i a r w i t h the r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g d i g i t a l d i s t r i b u t i o n and could not t e s t i f y w h e t h e r t h e m u s i c a n d m o v i e s c o n t a i n e d on i n Powell's v e h i c l e had been legally
t h e CDs a n d DVDs f o u n d d i g i t a l l y downloaded. his belief,
D u f f r e p e a t e d h i s t e s t i m o n y t h a t i t was and i n s t r u c t i o n s from t h e
b a s e d on h i s t r a i n i n g
RIAA a n d MPAA, t h a t c o p y r i g h t e d m a t e r i a l " c a n n o t be p u t on a CDR o r a DVDR." lawfully purchased (R. 145.) music When a s k e d a CDR i f one c o u l d copy
noncommercial that
p u r p o s e , D u f f t e s t i f i e d y e t a g a i n t h a t i t was h i s b e l i e f t h e RIAA a n d t h e MPAA p r o h i b i t s u c h a c t i o n .
Powell introduced
CR-09-1192 into evidence information obtained f r o m t h e RIAA's Web site
that i ti s legal
f o r an i n d i v i d u a l
t o copy music
o n t o a CDR so l o n g as i t i s n o t b e i n g purpose. and Duff admitted
done f o r a c o m m e r c i a l
t h a t he h a d no k n o w l e d g e o f t h e CDs personal collection. the State based rested. on t h e
DVDs c o n t a i n e d
i n Powell's
At the conclusion of Duff's Powell State's contained consent
t h e n moved f o r a j u d g m e n t o f a c q u i t t a l failure to prove that
i n t h e CDs a n d DVDs was t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h o u t o f t h e owners. The trial court denied
Powell's on h i s
m o t i o n , and P o w e l l r e s t e d w i t h o u t c a l l i n g any w i t n e s s e s behalf. A f t e r both sides delivered their closing
t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. The jury convicted Powell of the unlawful transport of a r t i c l e s
c o n t a i n i n g sounds t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h o u t charged i n h i s indictment. Powell I.
c o n s e n t o f t h e owner as
Powell argues t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r o n e o u s l y denied
m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s h i s i n d i c t m e n t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t § 13A-881(a)(3), A l a . Code 1975, i s i m p e r m i s s i b l y vague. Powell
c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e does n o t f a i r l y a p p r i s e an o r d i n a r y
CR-09-1192 p e r s o n o f what s p e c i f i c a c t s a r e c r i m i n a l i z e d and a l s o a l l e g e s that the s t a t u t e allows f o r a r b i t r a r y enforcement. of these a l l e g a t i o n s , Powell the court, the refers State, to the In support at
defense statue, not
c o u l d n o t a g r e e on t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e
as w e l l as t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s a d m i s s i o n s t h a t t h e y w o u l d enforce this law under certain situations.
I n B a r b e r v. J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y R a c i n g A s s ' n , I n c . , 960 2d 599 ( A l a . 2 0 0 6 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t explained:
"'In reviewing the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e , we " a p p r o a c h t h e q u e s t i o n w i t h e v e r y p r e s u m p t i o n and i n t e n d m e n t i n f a v o r o f i t s v a l i d i t y , and s e e k t o s u s t a i n r a t h e r t h a n s t r i k e down t h e e n a c t m e n t o f a coordinate b r a n c h of the government."' Moore v. M o b i l e I n f i r m a r y A s s ' n , 592 So.2d 156, 159 (1991) ( q u o t i n g A l a b a m a S t a t e Fed'n o f L a b o r v. M c A d o r y , 246 A l a . 1, 9, 18 So. 2d 810, 815 (1944)). Overcoming t h a t p r e s u m p t i o n i s a heavy burden, which i s b o r n e by t h e p a r t y c h a l l e n g i n g t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s t a t u t e . Densmore v. J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , 813 So.2d 844, 856 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ; J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y Bd. o f H e a l t h v. C i t y o f B e s s e m e r , 293 A l a . 237, 301 So.2d 551 (1974) 960 So. In 2003), 2d a t Vaughn this 615. v. State, set 880 So. the 2d 1178 ( A l a . Crim. guidelines App. for
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenges
on v a g u e n e s s
CR-09-1192 "'"The d o c t r i n e o f v a g u e n e s s ... o r i g i n a t e s i n t h e due p r o c e s s clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, s e e L a n z e t t a v. New J e r s e y , 306 U.S. 451, 59 S . C t . 618, 83 L . E d . 888 ( 1 9 3 9 ) , a n d i s the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct i s u n l a w f u l , see U n i t e d S t a t e s v. N a t i o n a l D a i r y P r o d u c t s Corporation, 372 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . " ' " V o i d f o r vagueness s i m p l y means that c r i m i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y should not attach where one c o u l d n o t r e a s o n a b l y understand that h i s contemplated conduct i s p r o s c r i b e d . United S t a t e s v. H a r r i s s , 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S . C t . 808, 811, 98 L . E d . 989, 996 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . A vague s t a t u t e does n o t g i v e a d e q u a t e ' n o t i c e o f t h e r e q u i r e d c o n d u c t t o one who would a v o i d i t s p e n a l t i e s , ' Boyce M o t o r L i n e s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 34 2 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S . C t . 329, 330, 96 L . E d . 367, 371 ( 1 9 5 1 ) , i s n o t ' s u f f i c i e n t l y focused t o forewarn of b o t h i t s reach and coverage,' U n i t e d S t a t e s v. N a t i o n a l D a i r y P r o d u c t s C o r p o r a t i o n , 372 U.S. a t 33, 83 S . C t . a t 598, 9 L.Ed.2d a t 566, a n d 'may t r a p t h e i n n o c e n t by n o t p r o v i d i n g f a i r w a r n i n g , ' G r a y n e d v . C i t y o f R o c k f o r d , 40 8 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S . C t . 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972).
CR-09-1192 "'"As the United States Supreme C o u r t o b s e r v e d i n W i n t e r s v. New Y o r k , 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840 ( 1 9 4 8 ) : " ' " ' T h e r e must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence c a n n o t be r e q u i r e d t o guess a t t h e meaning o f the enactment. The v a g u e n e s s may be f r o m uncertainty in regard to persons w i t h i n the scope o f t h e a c t , o r i n regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.' "'"333 U.S. a t 515-16, 68 S.Ct. at 670, 92 [ L . E d . a t ] 849-50 [citations omitted]." " ' M c C r a r y v. S t a t e , 429 So. 2d 1121, 1123-24 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 2 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 464 U.S. 913, 104 S . C t . 273, 78 L . E d . 2 d 254 (1983).' " M c C a l l v. S t a t e , App. 19 9 0 ) . 565 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Ala. Crim.
"'"'As g e n e r a l l y s t a t e d , t h e v o i d - f o r vagueness d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e s t h a t a p e n a l statute define the c r i m i n a l offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people c a n u n d e r s t a n d what c o n d u c t i s p r o h i b i t e d a n d i n a manner t h a t d o e s n o t encourage arbitrary and discriminatory e n f o r c e m e n t . ' K o l e n d e r v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 [ 3 5 7 ] , 103 S . C t . 1855, 1858, 75 L . E d . 2 d 903 (1983) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . A statute
CR-09-1192 c h a l l e n g e d f o r v a g u e n e s s must t h e r e f o r e be scrutinized to determine whether i t provides both f a i r notice t o the p u b l i c t h a t c e r t a i n conduct i s p r o s c r i b e d and minimal guidelines to a i do f f i c i a l s i n the enforcement of t h a t p r o s c r i p t i o n . See Kolender, supra; Grayned v. City of R o c k f o r d , 408 U.S. 104, 92 S . C t . 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . " ' "Timmons v. C i t y o f Montgomery, 641 So. 2d 1263, 1264 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g M c C o r k l e v . S t a t e , 446 So. 2d 684, 685 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1983) However, " ' " ' [ t ] h i s p r o h i b i t i o n against excessive v a g u e n e s s does n o t i n v a l i d a t e e v e r y s t a t u t e w h i c h a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t b e l i e v e s c o u l d have b e e n d r a f t e d w i t h g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n . Many s t a t u t e s w i l l have some i n h e r e n t v a g u e n e s s , f o r " [ i ] n most E n g l i s h w o r d s a n d p h r a s e s there l u r k u n c e r t a i n t i e s . " R o b i n s o n v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 324 U.S. 282, 286, 65 S . C t . 666, 668, 89 L . E d . 944 ( 1 9 4 5 ) . Even t r a i n e d l a w y e r s may f i n d i t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s u l t l e g a l d i c t i o n a r i e s , t r e a t i s e s , and j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n s b e f o r e t h e y may s a y w i t h any c e r t a i n t y what some s t a t u t e s may c o m p e l or f o r b i d . ' " ' " S t e r l i n g v . S t a t e , 701 So. 2d 71, 73 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , q u o t i n g C u l b r e a t h v . S t a t e , 667 So. 2d 156, 158 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 5 ) , a b r o g a t e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s b y Hayes v. S t a t e , 717 So. 2d 30 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n , Rose v. L o c k e , 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S . C t . 243, 46 L . E d . 2d 185 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . "'"Mere d i f f i c u l t y o f a s c e r t a i n i n g i t s m e a n i n g or t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s s u s c e p t i b l e of d i f f e r e n t interpretations will not render a statute or o r d i n a n c e t o o vague o r u n c e r t a i n t o be e n f o r c e d . " ' S c o t t & S c o t t , I n c . v. C i t y o f M o u n t a i n B r o o k , 84 4
CR-09-1192 So. 2d 577, 589 ( A l a . 2002), q u o t i n g City of B i r m i n g h a m v. S a m f o r d , 274 A l a . 367, 372, 149 So. 2d 271, 275 (1963). The j u d i c i a l power t o d e c l a r e a s t a t u t e v o i d f o r v a g u e n e s s ' s h o u l d be e x e r c i s e d o n l y when a s t a t u t e i s so i n c o m p l e t e , so i r r e c o n c i l a b l y c o n f l i c t i n g , o r so vague o r i n d e f i n i t e , t h a t i t c a n n o t be e x e c u t e d , and t h e c o u r t i s u n a b l e , by t h e application of known and accepted rules of construction, to determine, with any reasonable d e g r e e o f c e r t a i n t y , what t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d . ' J a n s e n v. S t a t e ex r e l . Downing, 273 A l a . 166, 170, 137 So. 2d 47, 50 (1962) ." Vaughn, 880 616, quoting So. 2d a t 1194-96. of Chicago See v. a l s o B a r b e r , 960 Morales, 527 U.S. So. 2d 41, at 56
( 1 9 9 9 ) ( " V a g u e n e s s may two independent
i n v a l i d a t e a c r i m i n a l law First, i t may fail to
f o r e i t h e r of provide the
k i n d of n o t i c e t h a t w i l l enable o r d i n a r y people to understand what c o n d u c t i t p r o h i b i t s ; s e c o n d , i t may e n c o u r a g e a r b i t r a r y and Powell's 81(a)(3) adequately offense without of the is attack on discriminatory the (1) of alleged that the authorize and even
enforcement."). vagueness of §13A-8fails to the
threefold: him
elements of (2)
constituting sounds that and
transport the owner;
transferred the (3) statute that the
l a w f u l and
statute allows
a r b i t r a r y enforcement. that
A d d i t i o n a l l y , Powell
a r g u e s t h a t § 13A-8-86, t h e s t a t u t e
CR-09-1192 o u t l i n e s the range of punishments f o r o f f e n s e s 13A-8-81, does n o t i n c l u d e t h e o f f e n s e i s l i k e w i s e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. p r i n c i p l e s i n m i n d , we now contained in § thus,
o f t r a n s p o r t and,
With the aforementioned i n d i v i d u a l claims.
turn to Powell's A.
13A-8-81(a)(3) to provide is void that
is clear as a the what
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e c a u s e , he notice result statute of of i t s prohibited vagueness. "nebulous"
i t fails and,
Specifically, and fails to
c o n s t i t u t e s i t s elements." Section shall be a 13A-8-81(a)(3), felony for any Ala. Code to 1975, provides: ... "It any are the
a r t i c l e w i t h the knowledge t h a t the sounds or p e r f o r m a n c e s so t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h o u t consent of the owner." Although
s t a t u t e i s n o t a model o f p r e c i s e and unambiguous l e g i s l a t i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r one by the statute. to decipher the s p e c i f i c a c t p r o h i b i t e d that an individual violates (b) any article (d)
I t i s apparent o r she
t h i s Code s e c t i o n i f he containing
(a) t r a n s p o r t s (c) w i t h the
sounds o r p e r f o r m a n c e s
CR-09-1192 t h a t t h e s o u n d s o r p e r f o r m a n c e s were t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h o u t consent of the owner. Powell claims the to statute "define "The is the
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague i n t h a t i t f a i l s what c o n s t i t u t e s i t s e l e m e n t s . " that a statute contains a We
disagree. that is not
mere f a c t
d e f i n e d by t h e s t a t u t e o r as p a r t o f t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme does not automatically v. State, render 25 So. the 3d statute 1169, void 1176 for vagueness." App. with are
Lansdell 2007). §
(Ala. Crim. i n conjunction the offense
When § 1 3 A - 8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) i s a n a l y z e d the statutory elements of
13A-8-80,
clarified. S e c t i o n 13A-8-80, A l a . Code 1975, defines "owner" as:
"Unless the context c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s otherwise, t h e t e r m 'owner,' as u s e d i n t h i s a r t i c l e , shall mean t h e p e r s o n who owns, o r has t h e e x c l u s i v e l i c e n s e i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s to reproduce or the e x c l u s i v e l i c e n s e i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s to d i s t r i b u t e t o the p u b l i c c o p i e s of the o r i g i n a l f i x a t i o n of sounds embodied i n the master phonograph r e c o r d , master d i s c , master tape, master f i l m or other device used f o r reproducing recorded sounds on phonograph records, discs, tapes, films, v i d e o c a s s e t t e s o r o t h e r a r t i c l e s now known o r l a t e r d e v e l o p e d on w h i c h s o u n d i s r e c o r d e d and f r o m w h i c h the t r a n s f e r r e d sounds are d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y d e r i v e d , o r t h e p e r s o n who owns t h e r i g h t s t o r e c o r d or to authorize the recording of a live performance."
CR-09-1192 Thus, by e x a m i n i n g § 13A-8-80, we see d e f i n i t i o n s o r e x a m p l e s for "sounds," "performances," -in their "article," and "owner." are terms
t h e s e terms
common u s a g e --
t h a t c o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d by t h e a v e r a g e p e r s o n . no further clarification i s needed with
Accordingly, to these
terms. This used in C o u r t has a statute repeatedly their held that i t will give words and So.
"natural, See
ordinary, 935
commonly u n d e r s t o o d m e a n i n g . " 2d 1207, 1212 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
S e l l e r s v. S t a t e , "Transport"
i s defined, to
i n r e l e v a n t p a r t , as " t o t r a n s f e r o r c o n v e y another." ed. 2003). of Merriam-Webster's
f r o m one p l a c e
C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y 1330 and is
Thus, when t h e o r d i n a r y the and term "transport" and
commonly u n d e r s t o o d combined of in § with the
descriptions "article," and
"sounds," 13A-8-80 that
"performances,"
and a p p l i e d t o § 1 3 A - 8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) , i t i s r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t the for language an of § 13A-8-81(a)(3) person to is sufficiently what
definitive conduct § is
13A-8-
CR-09-1192 81(a)(3) d i d not p r o v i d e prohibits i s without s u f f i c i e n t n o t i c e o f what c o n d u c t i t
merit. B.
13A-8-81(a)(3)
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague i n t h a t i t c r i m i n a l i z e s c o n d u c t is "well within claims the that r i g h t of § the consumer."
unconstitutionally Act, "fair and 17 U.S.C. use" §§
i n f r i n g e s on h i s r i g h t s u n d e r t h e C o p y r i g h t 101 et seq., p u r s u a n t to the doctrine of
t i m e - s h i f t e d broadcasts,
non-commercial and DVDs. Powell 464
a r c h i v i n g of p e r s o n a l cites U.S. Sony C o r p . 417 I n Ex of
p r o p e r t i e s " o f h i s CDs A m e r i c a v. Universal
C i t y Studios,
(1984), i n s u p p o r t of t h i s parte Woodward, 631 explained: So.
contention. 2d 1065 (Ala. Crim. App.
1993), t h i s Court
"'Vagueness c h a l l e n g e s t o s t a t u t e s w h i c h do not i n v o l v e F i r s t Amendment f r e e d o m s must be e x a m i n e d i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e a t h a n d . ' J o r d a n v. S t a t e , 411 So.2d 816, 818 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). "'[B]ecause " [ t ] h e e s s e n t i a l purpose of the 'void f o r vagueness' d o c t r i n e i s to warn individuals of the criminal c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e i r c o n d u c t , " J o r d a n v. De G e o r g e , 341 U.S. 223, 230, 71 S.Ct. 703, 707, 95 L.Ed. 886 ( 1 9 5 1 ) , " [ o ] n e t o whose c o n d u c t a s t a t u t e c l e a r l y a p p l i e s may not
CR-09-1192 s u c c e s s f u l l y challenge i t f o r vagueness," P a r k e r v. L e v y , 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2562, 41 L . E d . 2 d 439 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , "even t h o u g h t h e s t a t u t e may w e l l be vague a p p l i e d t o o t h e r s , " A i e l l o v. C i t y o f W i l m i n g t o n , 623 F.2d 845, 850 (3d C i r . 1980). Therefore, a defendant who challenges a s t a t u t e on t h e g r o u n d s o f vagueness "must demonstrate that the s t a t u t e u n d e r a t t a c k i s vague as a p p l i e d t o his own conduct, regardless of the p o t e n t i a l l y vague a p p l i c a t i o n s t o o t h e r s . " A i e l l o , 623 F.2d a t 850 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . A c c o r d Rode v. D e l l a r c i p r e t e , 845 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (3d C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) . ' " S e n f [v. S t a t e , 622 App. 1993)] ( f o o t n o t e 631 So. Our this 2d a t review 1069. o f § 1 3 A - 8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) as a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s i n us that Powell's r e l i a n c e on the Inc., Sony and So. 2d 435, omitted)." 437 (Ala. Crim.
d e c i s i o n i s misplaced. Walt Disney Productions against recorder used the Sony, the
I n Sony, U n i v e r s a l S t u d i o s ,
f i l e d a copyright-infringement of the Betamax
("VTR"). VTRs to
studios claimed copyrighted
t h a t some i n d i v i d u a l s material The and, thus, alleged
i n f r i n g e d upon t h e t h a t Sony —
studios' copyrights.
studios should
as m a n u f a c t u r e r s o f t h e VTRs —
be h e l d v i c a r i o u s l y l i a b l e f o r t h e c o p y r i g h t v i o l a t i o n s u n d e r the t h e o r y of c o n t r i b u t o r y i n f r i n g e m e n t .
Sony a r g u e d t h a t
CR-09-1192 v a s t m a j o r i t y o f u s a g e o f t h e VTRs came i n t h e s h i f t i n g " -different that the the p r a c t i c e of r e c o r d i n g — or other form of "time-
a program to view at a In holding that the
noncommercial uses. c o r r e c t l y concluded not constitute
manufacturing infringement, VTRs were
contributory the
Supreme C o u r t c o n c l u d e d , i n p a r t , t h a t of substantial non-infringing
capable to the of
uses. was non¬ an U.S.
C o u r t , one either
of those n o n - i n f r i n g i n g uses or unauthorized,
commercial " t i m e - s h i f t i n g , " which c o n s t i t u t e d " f a i r use" of a u d i o v i s u a l work u n d e r 17 U.S.C.A. § 107. at 456. Although authorized or the Supreme Court recognized that See, Sony, 464
nonauthorized use"
noncommercial Act,
time-shifting we note that a and
constituted "fair Powell does not
under the C o p y r i g h t nor would with the
that his a c t i v i t i e s c o u l d be a
DVDs i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n "'A defendant who
classified statute
as t i m e - s h i f t i n g . on the ground of is the
v a g u e n e s s "must d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e vague as applied to his own
s t a t u t e under a t t a c k regardless of
CR-09-1192 potentially 622 So. vague a p p l i c a t i o n s t o o t h e r s . " ' 437 S e n f v. State,
( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g A i e l l o v. C i t y F.2d 2d 845, 156, 850 (3rd C i r . 1980)." (Ala. Crim. 717 App. So. Culbreath 1995), 2d 30
o f W i l m i n g t o n , 623 v. State, 667 on So. other
( A l a . C r i m . App. because §
(emphasis i n C u l b r e a t h ) . might conceivably
Thus, m e r e l y the use" this
criminalize "fair
t r a n s p o r t of a r t i c l e s noncommercial,
t h a t c o u l d be
c l a s s i f i e d as
a r g u m e n t e n t i t l e s P o w e l l t o no r e l i e f b e c a u s e h i s c o n d u c t d i d not fall into this category of activity. that Powell contends t h a t the
Furthermore, to the e x t e n t
h o l d i n g o f Sony a l s o p r o t e c t s home-audio r e c o r d i n g p r a c t i c e s , s u c h as a r c h i v i n g o r c r e a t i n g b a c k u p c o p i e s , we the Supreme C o u r t i n Sony l o o k e d observe that
e x c l u s i v e l y at the p r a c t i c e Therefore, any "fair we do use" of
of " t i m e - s h i f t i n g " a u d i o v i s u a l r e c o r d i n g s .
n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e C o u r t i n Sony r e c o g n i z e d practice other than the See noncommercial
audiovisual recordings. Nimmer, Nimmer on Rev. Ed.)("[T]he
a l s o 2 M e l v i l l e B. Nimmer & D a v i d § 8B.01[D] [2] [ i n Sony] (Matthew considered Bender, time-
CR-09-1192 shifting, and o n l y t i m e - s h i f t i n g , i n reaching use.") that the Copyright t o audio Act i t s conclusion
that off-the-air videotaping However, Powell's
i s fair
protects a r c h i v a l practices with respect deserves c l o s e r examination.
I n 1992, C o n g r e s s p a s s e d t h e
A u d i o Home R e c o r d i n g et seq. The AHRA
A c t o f 1992 ("AHRA"), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001 achieved, among others, the goal of
"[affording] direct
i m m u n i t y t o home t a p e r s who make c o p i e s commercial motivation."
or i n d i r e c t
2 Nimmer on
Copyright, The
§ 8B.01[C].
AHRA s t a t e s , i n p a r t :
"No a c t i o n may be b r o u g h t u n d e r t h i s t i t l e a l l e g i n g i n f r i n g e m e n t o f c o p y r i g h t b a s e d on t h e m a n u f a c t u r e , importation, or d i s t r i b u t i o n of a d i g i t a l audio r e c o r d i n g d e v i c e , a d i g i t a l a u d i o r e c o r d i n g medium, an a n a l o g r e c o r d i n g d e v i c e , o r an a n a l o g r e c o r d i n g medium, o r b a s e d on t h e n o n c o m m e r c i a l u s e b y a consumer o f s u c h a d e v i c e o r medium f o r m a k i n g digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings." 17 U.S.C.A. § 1007. "The exemption from copyright infringement l i a b i l i t y i n [17 U.S.C.A. § 1007] e x t e n d s n o t o n l y to the f o r e g o i n g a c t s o f i m p o r t a t i o n , manufacture, and d i s t r i b u t i o n , b u t a l s o t o 'the n o n c o m m e r c i a l u s e by a c o n s u m e r ' o f s u c h d i g i t a l r e c o r d e r s a n d t a p e s as w e l l as a u d i o r e c o r d e r s a n d t a p e s .
CR-09-1192 "The instant exemption, being limited to n o n c o m m e r c i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n s , i s much n a r r o w e r t h a n the foregoing exemption. In another respect, however, i t i s much b r o a d e r . The foregoing e x e m p t i o n d i d n o t c o n f e r a n y r i g h t t o engage i n t h e c r u c i a l a c t o f r e p r o d u c i n g any c o p y r i g h t e d works. The i n s t a n t e x e m p t i o n , b y c o n t r a s t , a l l o w s home users to copy otherwise protected musical c o m p o s i t i o n s and sound r e c o r d i n g s . I n t h e words o f one l a w m a k e r , 'No l o n g e r w i l l c o n s u m e r s be b r a n d e d c o p y r i g h t p i r a t e s f o r making a tape f o r t h e i r c a r o r for their c h i l d r e n . ' [ F n . 48.] This immunity a p p l i e s whether those d e v i c e s o r media a r e used t o make d i g i t a l m u s i c a l r e c o r d i n g s , o r a n a l o g m u s i c a l recordings. "Fn. 48. 138 Cong. H9033 ( d a i l y e d . Sept. 22)(statement o f Rep. H u g h e s ) ( t h e bill 'removes t h e l e g a l c l o u d o v e r home c o p y i n g o f p r e r e c o r d e d m u s i c i n t h e most p r o c o n s u m e r way p o s s i b l e . ' ) See S. Rep. (AHRA), p. 51 ('the m a k i n g o f an a u d i o g r a m by a c o n s u m e r f o r u s e i n h i s o r h e r home, car, or p o r t a b l e tape p l a y e r , o r f o r a f a m i l y member, i s p r o t e c t e d ' ) . "As p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , b e f o r e C o n g r e s s p a s s e d t h e AHRA i t was open t o a r g u m e n t w h e t h e r an i n d i v i d u a l who t a p e d m u s i c o f f t h e r a d i o i n t h e p r i v a c y o f h e r home and f o r p u r e l y p r i v a t e purposes thereby c o m m i t t e d c o p y r i g h t i n f r i n g e m e n t , o r was i m m u n i z e d from l i a b i l i t y under t h e f a i r use d o c t r i n e . Such t a p i n g t h a t takes p l a c e a t present i s , by v i r t u e o f t h e AHRA, immune f r o m l i a b i l i t y . [ F n . 55.] "Fn. 55. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008. ' [ T ] h i s l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l end the 22-year-old debate and make i t c l e a r t h a t home t a p i n g does n o t constitute copyright infringement.' 138 Cong. R e c . H9033 ( d a i l y e d . S e p t e m b e r 22, 1 9 9 2 ) ( s t a t e m e n t o f Rep. M o o r h e a d ) .
CR-09-1192 "Does t h i s mean t h a t a home d u p l i c a t o r c a n s e l l tapes t h e r e b y produced? As s e t f o r t h above, t h i s exemption i s limited by a restriction to n o n c o m m e r c i a l p u r p o s e s . Thus, m a k i n g a r e p r o d u c t i o n , whether done i n d i g i t a l or analog format, f o r p u r p o s e s o f s a l e -- e v e n f o r s a l e t o t h e c o n s u m e r s ' c h i l d r e n , one i m a g i n e s — r e m a i n s p r o s c r i b e d . The legislative history states: "'[A] p e r s o n who makes m u l t i p l e c o p i e s o f a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i o g r a m [ F n . 56] a n d s e l l those c o p i e s t o o t h e r s would n o t be protected by the p r o h i b i t i o n against copyright infringement actions contained i n this legislation.' "Fn. 56. The t e r m ' a u d i o g r a m ' was l a t e r changed t o ' d i g i t a l m u s i c a l r e c o r d i n g . ' See § 8 B . 0 2 [ A ] [ 1 ] s u p r a . " A l t h o u g h t h a t comment was d i r e c t e d a t a p r i o r b i l l , [Fn. 59] t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n i n t h e e n a c t e d t e x t o f t h e A u d i o Home R e c o r d i n g A c t o f 1992 o f t h e l a n g u a g e t h a t o n l y 'noncommercial use by a consumer' escapes l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e s forward that gloss. T a p i n g and s e l l i n g and o t h e r commercial a p p l i c a t i o n s t h e r e f o r e remain s u b j e c t t o c o p y r i g h t i n f r i n g e m e n t l i a b i l i t y . "Fn. 59. The o r i g i n a l t e x t o f t h e AHRA, i n s t e a d o f b a r r i n g s u i t a g a i n s t t h o s e who made noncommercial use, barred suit g e n e r a l l y b u t c o n t a i n e d an e x c e p t i o n f o r t h o s e who make c o p i e s ' f o r d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t commercial advantage'). S. Rep. (AHRA), p. 4 ( S e c . 1 0 0 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) o f b i l l ) . I t t h e n d e f i n e d 'not f o r d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t c o m m e r c i a l a d v a n t a g e ' a s b e i n g c o p y i n g 'by a consumer f o r p r i v a t e , n o n c o m m e r c i a l u s e . ' Id. (Sec. 1002(a)(2) o f b i l l ) . Although l e s s e x p l i c i t , t h e f i n a l t e x t o f t h e AHRA would seem t o c a r r y f o r w a r d t h e same meaning."
CR-09-1192 2 Nimmer on C o p y r i g h t , § 8B.07[C][2].
As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , P o w e l l b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g that § 13A-8-81(a)(3) Culbreath, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as a p p l i e d t o h i s 667 So. 2d a t 158-59. Although i t is
conduct. clear part,
t h a t C o n g r e s s a d d e d t h e AHRA t o t h e C o p y r i g h t A c t , i n t o p r o t e c t noncommercial, t h e AHRA does home-tapers those from who copyright engage i n ample
commercial t a p i n g a c t i v i t y . evidence in
Here, t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t P o w e l l ' s a c t i v i t i e s were c o m m e r c i a l According t o D e p u t y Dabbs, P o w e l l s t a t e d t h a t he them
w o u l d b u y t h e CDs a n d DVDs f o r $3 a p i e c e a n d w o u l d s e l l f o r $5 a p i e c e .
D e p u t y P a u l t e s t i f i e d t h a t he h e a r d P o w e l l s a y Although archival regarding
he was i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f s e l l i n g t h e CDs a n d DVDs. Powell's counsel cross-examined the deputies t o the t r i a l about court
a n d made a r g u m e n t s
p o t e n t i a l l y p r o t e c t e d a c t i v i t i e s , P o w e l l p r e s e n t e d no e v i d e n c e tending nature. t o show that his activities apparent were noncommercial i n
Thus, i t i s r e a d i l y
that the a c t i v i t i e s i n a s one
w h i c h Mr. P o w e l l were e n g a g e d c o u l d n o t be c l a s s i f i e d o f t h e a c t i v i t i e s p r o t e c t e d b y t h e AHRA.
CR-09-1192 Likewise, i t i s i r r e l e v a n t t h a t another i n d i v i d u a l might possibly valid, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge to under a different factual
have a s t r o n g e r , the validity
of § 13A-8-81(a)(3)
situation. context who
As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e Supreme C o u r t o b s e r v e d , i n t h e "Nor i s i t u n f a i r t o r e q u i r e t h a t one perilously close to an area of
o f vagueness:
proscribed line." (1951). fact,
conduct s h a l l take
t h e r i s k t h a t he may c r o s s t h e
B r y c e M o t o r L i n e s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 342 U.S. 337, 340 The f a c t s o f t h i s enter i n t o an a r e a Therefore, purview case i n d i c a t e t h a t P o w e l l of conduct p r o s c r i b e d did, i n
b y § 13A-8falling is
81(a)(3). within the
the fact that of the
c e r t a i n conduct might be that
lawful §
8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n f r i n g e s on some p r o t e c t e d r i g h t s f a i l s when we a p p l y t h e s t a t u t e t o t h e f a c t s a t hand. C. Powell also contends that and § 13A-8-81(a)(3) discriminatory allows f o r enforcement.
Powell d i r e c t s t h i s Court t o the various portions of the t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t i n w h i c h t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s d e s c r i b e d how a n d when
CR-09-1192 they e x e r c i s e d t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n i n e n f o r c i n g the p r o v i s i o n s of the statute. At their trial, own both Deputies played a suspect Paul a and Dabbs roll admitted in that
determining of § 13A-8Deputy
81(a)(3). Paul's
exchanges took
testimony: you remember t h e a c t u a l c o u n t o f r e c o v e r e d from P o w e l l ' s v e h i c l e ] ? 1,920, I b e l i e v e . right
"[The S t a t e ] : Do [the DVDs and CDs "[Deputy P a u l ] :
"[The S t a t e ] : And there?
t h a t i s what i s i n t h a t box
"[Deputy P a u l ] : Yes, s i r . "[The S t a t e ] : Now i f t h i s had b e e n some l i t t l e b l u e h a i r e d grandma r i d i n g down t h e r o a d w i t h t h r e e b u r n e d c o p i e s o f L a w r e n c e Welk, w o u l d you have a r r e s t e d her f o r t h a t ? "[Deputy P a u l ] :
"[Defense c o u n s e l on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ] : You said you w o u l d n ' t a r r e s t a l i t t l e b l u e - h a i r e d grandma. L a w r e n c e Welk CD's w o u l d be a c o p y r i g h t m a t t e r , wouldn't i t ? " [ D e p u t y P a u l ] : As f a r as I know.
CR-09-1192 "[Defense counsel]: b e t w e e n who y o u w i l l t h e same c r i m e ? So t h e r e is a distinction a n d w i l l n o t a r r e s t b a s e d on
" [ D e p u t y P a u l ] : The t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p l a y s a l o t i n t o my d e c i s i o n i n a r r e s t - m a k i n g , y e s . "[Defense counsel]: circumstances would a r r e s t grandma? So the t o t a l i t y be t h a t y o u d i d n ' t of the want t o
" [ D e p u t y P a u l ] : No, t h a t i s n o t c o r r e c t . "[Defense c o u n s e l ] : I s there a reason t h a t g e t s t o g e t away w i t h a c r i m e . "[Deputy P a u l ] : I d i d n ' t say t h a t e i t h e r . " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : I'm v e r y c o n f u s e d t h e n . You j u s t s a i d -¬ "[Deputy Paul]: I said the t o t a l i t y of the circumstances b a s e d on e v e r y t h i n g t h a t goes a l o n g w i t h t h a t t r a f f i c s t o p w i l l make my decision-making on who I a r r e s t a n d who I d o n ' t . The l a s t t i m e I c h e c k e d , t h a t was my d i s c r e t i o n . "[Defense counsel]: discretion? "[Deputy P a u l ] : Yes, (R. 88, 90.) The f o l l o w i n g e x c h a n g e s t o o k p l a c e d u r i n g D e p u t y Dabbs's So you arrest subject to grandma
testimony: "[The S t a t e ] : The f a c t t h a t t h e r e was some 1,920 DVD's a n d CD's i n t h e b a c k o f t h i s man's c a r , was t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t t o y o u as an i n v e s t i g a t o r ?
CR-09-1192 " [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : Yes s i r . "[The S t a t e ] : You t o l d Mr. G o l d s t e i n s o m e t h i n g a m i n u t e ago a b o u t t h e r e b e i n g m u l t i p l e c o p i e s o f e a c h t i t l e o r e a c h CD? " [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : On some o f them, y e s , "[The S t a t e ] : How many copies? sir.
" [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : Some o f them a r e as many as s i x o r seven c o p i e s .
" [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : You s a i d t h e q u a n t i t y m a t t e r s . So i f t h e r e was o n l y one o r t w o , t h e r e w o u l d n ' t have been a problem? " [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : No,
" [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : [ H o l d i n g a c o p y o f one o f t h e DVDs s e i z e d f r o m P o w e l l ' s v e h i c l e ] Do y o u know i f [ P o w e l l ] owns a c o p y o f ['The B u c k e t L i s t ' ] ? " [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : No, s i r , I d o n ' t . " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : Do you know i f t h i s a r c h i v e d c o p y o f ['The B u c k e t L i s t ' ] ? " [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : No, sir. i s an
"[Defense counsel]: Aside from this mystical s t a t e m e n t , do y o u h a v e a n y t h i n g t o s a y t h a t t h i s i s being possessed f o r sale? "[Deputy Dabbs]: Again, no, s i r . o t h e r than t h e sheer volume,
CR-09-1192 "[Defense possession counsel]: He is f o r s a l e , i s he? sir. traveling not charged with
" [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : No,
" [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : He i s c h a r g e d w i t h down t h e s t r e e t w i t h t h i s ? "[Deputy Dabbs]: That's c o r r e c t .
" [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : You t h i n k t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g i n h e r e n t l y wrong w i t h t r a v e l i n g down t h e s t r e e t w i t h this? "[Deputy Dabbs]: Again, s i r , I do. w i t h t h e sheer volume, y e s ,
"[Defense counsel]: Let's t a l k about t h e s h e e r volume. I f t h e r e [were] o n l y 10, t h a t w o u l d n ' t be a problem? " [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : To be h o n e s t w i t h y o u , we p r o b a b l y w o u l d n o t h a v e even l o o k e d f u r t h e r w i t h 10. "[Defense c o u n s e l ] : Fifty? looking.
" [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : We w o u l d s t a r t
" [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : I s t h e r e some f u z z y number t h a t turns t h i s i n t o a crime? " [ D e p u t y D a b b s ] : I f i t goes f r o m a few t o a s t a c k , I t h i n k we w o u l d s t a r t l o o k i n g f u r t h e r . (R. 110, 118-119.) A c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e i s n o t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague i f i t a l l o w s f o r some d e g r e e o f d i s c r e t i o n a r y e n f o r c e m e n t b y p o l i c e . As previously stated, i n order to satisfy the Fourteenth
CR-09-1192 Amendment statute of the United States Constitution, a criminal in 2d the
must p r o v i d e " m i n i m a l g u i d e l i n e s See
to a i d o f f i c i a l s Vaughn, 880 1264. Section So.
the enforcement of t h a t p r o s c r i p t i o n . " at 1195, quoting Timmons, 641 So. 2d
statute provides guidelines makes i t illegal to
f o r enforcement.
13A-8-81 or the
d i s t r i b u t e , transport, without the that
wholesale a r t i c l e s owners' consent. acts,
containing When it is
sounds t r a n s f e r r e d in context to with
e n f o r c e m e n t a u t h o r i t i e s w o u l d f o c u s t h e i r e f f o r t s on commercial activities. "blue-haired the not facts Thus, the hypothetical
situations have 13A-8to
i n v o l v i n g the no bearing is on
grandma" o r at hand.
"Aunt S a d i e Mae" Accordingly, vague for §
81(a)(3)
unconstitutionally discretion. D.
carefully direct police
contends v a g u e on the
13A-8-81(a)(3) upon r e a d i n g penalties not for
is § a the
unconstitutionally 13A-8-86 violation penalty he -of or the §
grounds t h a t forth the
statute 13A-8-81
setting -a
layperson faced.
S p e c i f i c a l l y , Powell
CR-09-1192 contends that § 13A-8-86 does not mention the offense of
"transporting" unauthorized 81(a)(3). Section part:
r e c o r d i n g s as s e t o u t i n § 13A-8-
13A-8-86, A l a . Code 1975,
i n relevant
"(a) Each s e p a r a t e m a n u f a c t u r e , d i s t r i b u t i o n , s a l e o r t r a n s f e r a t w h o l e s a l e o f any unauthorized r e c o r d i n g i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s a r t i c l e s h a l l upon c o n v i c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e a s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e p u n i s h a b l e as f o l l o w s : "(1) I f t h e o f f e n s e i n v o l v e s n o t l e s s t h a n 1,000 u n l a w f u l s o u n d r e c o r d i n g s o r n o t l e s s t h a n 65 a u d i o v i s u a l r e c o r d i n g s , by l i m p r i s o n m e n t n o t l e s s tthhaann t h r e e y e a r s , n o r more t h a n t e n y e a r s , o r by a f i n e o f n o t more t h a n $250,000.00 o r b o t h . "(2) For any other offense not described in subdivision (a)(1), by i m p r i s o n m e n t n o t l e s s t h a n one y e a r , n o r more t h a n t h r e e y e a r s , o r by f i n e o f n o t more t h a n $25,000.00 f o r t h e f i r s t o f f e n s e , o r b o t h , and by i m p r i s o n m e n t n o t l e s s t h a n t h r e e y e a r s n o r more t h a n 10 y e a r s , o r by f i n e o f n o t more t h a n $100,000.00, o r b o t h , f o r any s u b s e q u e n t o f f e n s e . " Although transporting 81(a)(3), violations § § 13A-8-86 does not mention as the offense in § of
unauthorized 13A-8-81(c)
recordings explicitly in
13A-8for
states: Section
13A-8-86(a)." offenses of
Thus, e v e n t h o u g h § 13A-8-86(a) l i s t e d
o n l y the
CR-09-1192 manufacture, recordings, faced distribution, Powell and wholesale of unauthorized
was f a i r l y of the
apprised unlawful
o f t h e p e n a l t i e s he transportation of
i f convicted
unauthorized 13A-8-81(c).
r e c o r d i n g s by v i r t u e o f t h e p l a i n
language o f §
A c c o r d i n g l y , P o w e l l ' s v a g u e n e s s c h a l l e n g e as t o merit. t h a t § 13A-8-81(a) (3) procedural safeguards
t h e p u n i s h m e n t he f a c e d i s w i t h o u t
B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g , we c o n c l u d e provides adequate notice and the
necessary t o ensure compliance w i t h due-process concerns under the not Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, § 13A-8-81(a)(c) i s court properly
P o w e l l ' s m o t i o n t o have i t d e c l a r e d s o . II.
Powell argues t h a t t h e t r i a l
court e r r e d i n denying h i s
m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s h i s i n d i c t m e n t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t § 13A-881(a)(3) i s p r e e m p t e d b y t h e C o p y r i g h t A c t o f 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 e t s e q . In General Motors Corp. v. K i l g o r e , stated: 853 So. 2d 171 ( A l a .
2 0 0 2 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t
" I n U n i t e d T r a n s p o r t a t i o n U n i o n v. F o s t e r , 205 F.3d 851 ( 5 t h C i r . 2000), the U n i t e d S t a t e s Court of Appeals f o r the F i f t h C i r c u i t s u c c i n c t l y l a i d out
CR-09-1192 the g e n e r a l stated: principles of preemption. The court
"'The Supremacy C l a u s e o f A r t i c l e V I of t h e U n i t e d States C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s C o n g r e s s w i t h t h e power t o p r e e m p t s t a t e l a w . See U.S. C o n s t . a r t V I , c l . 2. The Supreme C o u r t h a s i n s t r u c t e d f e d e r a l c o u r t s t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c p o l i c e powers o f t h e s t a t e s a r e n o t t o be s u p e r c e d e d b y f e d e r a l law u n l e s s " t h a t was t h e c l e a r a n d m a n i f e s t p u r p o s e o f C o n g r e s s . " R i c e v. S a n t a Fe E l e v a t o r C o r p . , 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S . C t . 1146, 91 L . E d . 1447 ( 1 9 4 7 ) . I n L o u i s i a n a P u b l i c S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 106 S . C t . 1890, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , the Supreme Court detailed the c i r c u m s t a n c e s when a f i n d i n g o f p r e e m p t i o n is appropriate: Preemption occurs when Congress, i n enacting a f e d e r a l statute, expresses a c l e a r i n t e n t t o p r e e m p t s t a t e l a w , when t h e r e i s outright or actual conflict between f e d e r a l and s t a t e l a w , where compliance with both federal and s t a t e law i s i n effect physically impossible, where there i s implicit in f e d e r a l law a b a r r i e r t o s t a t e regulation, where C o n g r e s s h a s l e g i s l a t e d comprehensively, thus occupying an e n t i r e field of r e g u l a t i o n a n d l e a v i n g no room for the states t o supplement f e d e r a l l a w , o r where t h e s t a t e law s t a n d s as an o b s t a c l e t o t h e accomplishment and e x e c u t i o n o f the f u l l o b j e c t i v e s o f Congress. P r e e m p t i o n may r e s u l t n o t o n l y from a c t i o n taken by Congress
CR-09-1192 i t s e l f ; a f e d e r a l agency a c t i n g within the scope of i t s congressionally delegated authority may preempt state regulation." "'476 U.S. a t 368-69, 106 S . C t . 1890 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . I n any c a s e , " [ t ] h e critical question i s whether Congress intended that f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n s supersede s t a t e l a w . " I d . a t 369, 106 S . C t . 1890.' "205 853 F.3d a t 859."
So. 2d a t 174. Section 301 o f t h e C o p y r i g h t Act provides:
"(a) On a n d a f t e r J a n u a r y 1, 1978, a l l l e g a l o r e q u i t a b l e r i g h t s t h a t a r e e q u i v a l e n t t o any o f t h e exclusive rights within the general scope o f c o p y r i g h t as s p e c i f i e d b y s e c t i o n 106 i n w o r k s o f a u t h o r s h i p t h a t a r e f i x e d i n a t a n g i b l e medium o f e x p r e s s i o n a n d come w i t h i n t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f c o p y r i g h t as s p e c i f i e d b y s e c t i o n s 102 a n d 103, whether c r e a t e d before o r a f t e r t h a t d a t e and whether p u b l i s h e d or unpublished, a r e governed e x c l u s i v e l y b y t h i s t i t l e . T h e r e a f t e r , no p e r s o n i s e n t i t l e d t o any s u c h r i g h t o r e q u i v a l e n t r i g h t i n any s u c h work u n d e r t h e common l a w o r s t a t u t e s o f any S t a t e . " Thus, a s t a t e law w i l l (1) t h e work at issue be p r e e m p t e d b y t h e C o p y r i g h t falls under the subject Act i f of
f o u n d i n §§ 102 a n d 103 o f t h e C o p y r i g h t right i s equivalent
A c t ; and right See
w i t h i n t h e scope o f c o p y r i g h t
f o u n d i n 17 U.S.C. § 106.
CR-09-1192 a l s o Bush v. Laggo P r o p s . , L.L.C., 784 So. 2d 1063, 1065 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 0 ) ( " T h u s , § 301 s e t s f o r t h a t w o - p r o n g e d test to
determine whether the C o p y r i g h t A c t preempts s t a t e law. F i r s t , the work at issue must be the within state the cause subject of matter must of be
e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e r i g h t s a v a i l a b l e u n d e r t h e C o p y r i g h t A c t . 17 U.S.C. § 3 0 1 . " ) . The s u b j e c t m a t t e r c o n t e m p l a t e d by § 1 3 A - 8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) under the s u b j e c t matter of the C o p y r i g h t A c t . Section falls 102
states: "(a) C o p y r i g h t p r o t e c t i o n s u b s i s t s , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s t i t l e , i n o r i g i n a l works of a u t h o r s h i p f i x e d i n any t a n g i b l e medium o f e x p r e s s i o n , now known o r l a t e r d e v e l o p e d , f r o m w h i c h t h e y can be p e r c e i v e d , r e p r o d u c e d , or o t h e r w i s e communicated, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r w i t h t h e a i d of a machine or d e v i c e . Works o f a u t h o r s h i p i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g categories:
"(2) musical works, accompanying words;
"(6) m o t i o n p i c t u r e s and o t h e r a u d i o v i s u a l works; "(7) s o u n d
CR-09-1192 C l e a r l y , t h e DVDs and CDs one of the definitions found i n Powell's v e h i c l e f a l l f o u n d i n § 102. Thus, t h e only under real
i n q u i r y necessary creates a right
for this equivalent 106.
i s s u e i s whether § to a right within
13A-8-81(a)(3) the scope of
c o p y r i g h t under § S e c t i o n 106
" S u b j e c t t o s e c t i o n s 107 t h r o u g h 122, t h e owner o f o: c o p y r i g h t u n d e r t h i s t i t l e has t h e e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s t o do and t o a u t h o r i z e any o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : "(1) t o r e p r o d u c e t h e c o p y r i g h t e d c o p i e s or phonorecords; work i n
"(2) t o p r e p a r e d e r i v a t i v e w o r k s b a s e d upon t h e c o p y r i g h t e d work; "(3) t o of the s a l e or rental, d i s t r i b u t e copies or phonorecords c o p y r i g h t e d work t o t h e p u b l i c by o t h e r t r a n s f e r o f o w n e r s h i p , o r by l e a s e , or l e n d i n g ;
"(4) i n the case of l i t e r a r y , musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, p a n t o m i m e s , and m o t i o n p i c t u r e s and o t h e r audiovisual works, to perform the c o p y r i g h t e d work p u b l i c l y ; "(5) i n the case of l i t e r a r y , musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, p a n t o m i m e s , and pictorial, graphic, or s c u l p t u r a l works, i n c l u d i n g the i n d i v i d u a l images of a motion p i c t u r e or other audiovisual work, to display the c o p y r i g h t e d work p u b l i c l y ; and
CR-09-1192 "(6) i n t h e c a s e o f s o u n d r e c o r d i n g s , t o p e r f o r m t h e c o p y r i g h t e d work p u b l i c l y by means o f a d i g i t a l a u d i o t r a n s m i s s i o n . " Nimmer on C o p y r i g h t d i s c u s s e s t h e i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n s t a t e r i g h t s t h a t a p p r o a c h a c o p y r i g h t and § 106:
" [ T ] h e r e f e r e n c e t o S e c t i o n 106 i n t h e p h r a s e f o u n d in Section 301 -'equivalent t o any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of c o p y r i g h t as s p e c i f i e d by S e c t i o n 106' -- s h o u l d be construed by way of identification and not limitation. Accordingly, i f a state-created right i s ' w i t h i n the g e n e r a l scope of c o p y r i g h t , ' i t i s s u b j e c t t o p r e - e m p t i o n , even i f t h e p r e c i s e c o n t o u r s o f t h e r i g h t d i f f e r f r o m any o f t h o s e c o n f e r r e d by S e c t i o n 106. " S t i l l , S e c t i o n 106 may be s a i d t o i d e n t i f y t h e general nature of the r i g h t s t h a t f a l l ' w i t h i n the g e n e r a l scope of c o p y r i g h t . ' Such a r i g h t must i n h e r e i n a work o f a u t h o r s h i p . I t c o n s i s t s of a r i g h t t o p r o h i b i t r e p r o d u c t i o n -- w h e t h e r i n c o p i e s or phonorecords and whether in original or d e r i v a t i v e f o r m -- p e r f o r m a n c e , d i s t r i b u t i o n , or d i s p l a y o f s u c h work. Thus, i n e s s e n c e , a r i g h t t h a t i s ' e q u i v a l e n t t o c o p y r i g h t ' i s one t h a t i s infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, d i s t r i b u t i o n , or d i s p l a y . The fact that the s t a t e - c r e a t e d r i g h t i s e i t h e r broader or narrower than i t s f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t w i l l not save i t from pre-emption " A b s t r a c t i n g t o the r e a l m of p r i n c i p l e , i f under s t a t e law the a c t of r e p r o d u c t i o n , performance, d i s t r i b u t i o n , o r d i s p l a y , no m a t t e r w h e t h e r t h e l a w i n c l u d e s a l l s u c h a c t s o r o n l y some, w i l l i n i t s e l f i n f r i n g e the s t a t e - c r e a t e d r i g h t , then such a r i g h t i s pre-empted. But i f q u a l i t a t i v e l y o t h e r elements are r e q u i r e d , i n s t e a d of, or i n a d d i t i o n t o , the acts of reproduction, performance, d i s t r i b u t i o n , or
CR-09-1192 d i s p l a y , i n order t o c o n s t i t u t e a s t a t e - c r e a t e d c a u s e o f a c t i o n , t h e n t h e r i g h t does n o t l i e " w i t h i n t h e g e n e r a l s c o p e o f c o p y r i g h t , ' and t h e r e i s no pre-emption. Thus, the 'extra element' test generally furnishes the cornerstone here." 1 Nimmer on C o p y r i g h t , omitted). § See 1.01[B][1](emphasis also 1 Nimmer on i n original; Copyright, §
1.01[B][1][k]("Pre-emption law i s c i v i l As
a p p l i e s whether
or c r i m i n a l i n nature."). i n Part I.A., an individual commits t h e
offense of "unlawful (a) transports
t r a n s p o r t " u n d e r § 1 3 A - 8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) , i f he any article containing (d) t h a t sounds or or
(c) w i t h
t h e knowledge
t h e sounds
were t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h o u t
c o n s e n t o f t h e owner. containing of the by § is
If the offense of unlawful sounds or performances
t r a n s p o r t o f an a r t i c l e
t r a n s f e r r e d without
owner u n d e r 301, we
§ 13A-8-81(a)(3) determine copyright
i s t o survive preemption "unlawful form of
equivalent performance, determine addition
reproduction, also
distribution, §
I f s o , we must
whether t o , or
requires a c t of
an e l e m e n t i n reproduction,
of, the or d i s p l a y .
CR-09-1192 I n i t i a l l y , we n o t e t h a t t h e " k n o w l e d g e " e l e m e n t o f § 13A8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) a l o n e does n o t s a t i s f y t h e e x t r a - e l e m e n t test. In
Crow v . W a i n w r i g h t , 720 F.2d 1224 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) , t h e U n i t e d States Court of Appeals f o r the Eleventh Circuit explained:
"The p r o p e r method o f a n a l y s i s i s t o e x a m i n e whether t h e elements o f a cause o f a c t i o n f o r t h e t o r t of copyright infringement are equivalent to the elements of t h e crime o f d e a l i n g i n s t o l e n p r o p e r t y as i t applies i n this case. See 1 Nimmer on C o p y r i g h t , § 1 . 0 1 [ b ] . D e s p i t e t h e name g i v e n t h e offense, t h e elements e s s e n t i a l t o e s t a b l i s h a violation of the F l o r i d a statute i n this case correspond almost e x a c t l y t o those o f t h e t o r t o f c o p y r i g h t i n f r i n g e m e n t . The s t a t e c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e d i f f e r s only i n that i t requires the prosecution to e s t a b l i s h s c i e n t e r , w h i c h i s n o t an e l e m e n t o f an i n f r i n g e m e n t c l a i m , on t h e p a r t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a l o n e does n o t r e n d e r t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e d i f f e r e n t i n a m e a n i n g f u l way. S e c t i o n 506 o f t h e C o p y r i g h t A c t , w h i c h s e t s f o r t h c r i m i n a l penalties for copyright infringement, also requires t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o p r o v e s c i e n t e r a s an e l e m e n t o f t h e c a s e . See U n i t e d S t a t e s v. S m i t h , 686 F.2d 234 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 8 2 ) . The a d d i t i o n a l e l e m e n t o f s c i e n t e r t r a d i t i o n a l l y necessary t o e s t a b l i s h a c r i m i n a l case m e r e l y n a r r o w s t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e s t a t u t e . The prohibited a c t -wrongfully distributing a c o p y r i g h t e d work — r e m a i n s t h e same. See H a r p e r & Row [ v . N a t i o n s E n t e r s . ] , 501 F.Supp. [ 8 4 8 , 853-54 S.D.N.Y. 1980] ( ' a d d i t i o n a l e l e m e n t s o f " k n o w l e d g e " and " i n t e n t " r e q u i r e d u n d e r s t a t e l a w do n o t a f f o r d ... rights ... " d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d " from those p r o t e c t e d by t h e c o p y r i g h t l a w s ' ) . " 720 F.2d a t 1226-27. mere See fact also that 1 a Nimmer state on law Copyright requires
§1.01[B][1]("[T]he
CR-09-1192 scienter Act does as a condition not, cannot to liability, the whereas the state law Copyright from preThus, of
emption.")(emphasis our preemption
in original; must
footnotes focus on
"transport." I n P a r t I.A., relevant another." ed. from 2003). one part, as we observed that "transport" i s defined, t r a n s f e r or convey f r o m one place in to
M e r r i a m - W e b s t e r ' s C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y 1330 Therefore, to the a c t of " t r a n s f e r r i n g or of an article
conveying sounds by
t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e owner i s p r o h i b i t e d § 13A-8-81(a)(3). to copyright, i t Although i t approaches a r i g h t appears that the to "transport" save §
equivalent of these
is a distinct The
enough a c t act of of
13A-8-81(a)(3) most closely 106 or or
preemption. the
approaches describes
t h i s c o p y r i g h t as t h e r i g h t " t o d i s t r i b u t e c o p i e s work t o t h e p u b l i c by s a l e
phonorecords of the c o p y r i g h t e d
o t h e r t r a n s f e r o f o w n e r s h i p , o r by r e n t a l , l e a s e , o r However, t h e two is literally acts are s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n c t . the relocation of the
lending." "Transport" while
CR-09-1192 "distribution" through sale would be the dissemination form of the articles
o r some o t h e r
of t r a n s f e r .
In essence, articles.
" t r a n s p o r t " i s merely the mobile possession of these Accordingly,
" t r a n s p o r t " does n o t a p p e a r t o be an a c t t h a t i s
e q u i v a l e n t t o one o f c o p y r i g h t . To l o o k a t t h i s q u e s t i o n whether c i v i l would attach from another angle, we c a n a s k Act
or c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y to unlawful transport
under t h e C o p y r i g h t pursuant to §
81(a)(3).
t h e r e a r e two e l e m e n t s one must
p r o v e i n a c o p y r i g h t - i n f r i n g e m e n t a c t i o n : (1) o w n e r s h i p o f t h e c o p y r i g h t by t h e p l a i n t i f f ; See 4 Nimmer on Copyright "copying" a n d (2) c o p y i n g b y t h e d e f e n d a n t . §13.01. most See also refers § to 13.01 n.4
copying, above, of
public distribution, "transport" copying,
or p u b l i c d i s p l a y ) . equivalent
As d i s c u s s e d
i s not a c t i o n
to the copyright
or p u b l i c d i s p l a y .
Furthermore, the liability
act of unlawful
t r a n s p o r t would not i n c u r c r i m i n a l A c t as w e l l . infringement.-willfully
under t h e C o p y r i g h t "(a) Criminal "(1)
S e c t i o n § 506 s t a t e s :
I n g e n e r a l . - - A n y p e r s o n who
i n f r i n g e s a c o p y r i g h t s h a l l be p u n i s h e d as p r o v i d e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 2319 o f t i t l e 18, i f the infringement was committed-¬ 40
CR-09-1192 "(A) f o r p u r p o s e s o f c o m m e r c i a l advantage or p r i v a t e financial gain; "(B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day p e r i o d , o f 1 o r more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a t o t a l r e t a i l v a l u e o f more t h a n $1,0 00; o r "(C) by t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by m a k i n g i t a v a i l a b l e on a c o m p u t e r n e t w o r k a c c e s s i b l e t o members o f t h e p u b l i c , i f s u c h p e r s o n knew o r s h o u l d h a v e known t h a t t h e work was i n t e n d e d f o r c o m m e r c i a l distribution." Again, i t i s c l e a r that the a c t of transport i s not equivalent acts necessary to
to the a c t of reproduction or d i s t r i b u t i o n , prove c r i m i n a l infringement.
Through § 1 3 A - 8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) ,
i n the context
the S t a t e o f Alabama has c r e a t e d a cause o f a c t i o n t h a t i s n o t c o n t e m p l a t e d b y t h e C o p y r i g h t A c t n o r e q u i v a l e n t t o one o f t h e r i g h t s d e s c r i b e d i n § 106. Therefore, § 301 does n o t r e q u i r e Accordingly, that § the t r i a l
the preemption of § 13A-8-81(a)(3). court d i d not err in concluding
claim of preemption.
CR-09-1192 III. Powell motion also argues t h e t r i a l court erred by d e n y i n g h i s Powell showing
judgment the State
of acquittal. failed
Specifically, evidence
contends that was
on t h e DVDs a n d CDs i n that James
o f owner
Duff, the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e for the State at t r i a l , one "authorized
f r o m t h e RIAA a n d MPAA who
was n o t an "owner" u n d e r § 13A-8-80 o r c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l over b u s i n e s s
consent" under § 13A-8-81(a)(e).
"'"'In determining the sufficiency of the evidence t o s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n , a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t must a c c e p t as t r u e a l l evidence introduced by the State, accord the State a l llegitimate inferences therefrom, and c o n s i d e r a l l evidence i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . ' " B a l l e n g e r v . S t a t e , 720 S o . 2 d 1 0 3 3 , 1 0 3 4 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), q u o t i n g F a i r c l o t h v . S t a t e , 4 7 1 S o . 2 d 4 8 5 , 488 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) , a f f ' d , 471 So. 2 d 493 ( A l a . 1985). "'The t e s t u s e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e sufficiency of evidence to sustain a c o n v i c t i o n i s whether, v i e w i n g the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder of fact could have found t h e defendant guilty b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . ' " Nunn v . S t a t e , 697 S o . 2 d 4 97 , 498 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) , q u o t i n g O ' N e a l v . S t a t e , 602 S o . 2 d 4 62 , 464 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1992). "'When t h e r e is legal evidence from which the jury 42
could, by fair inference, find the defendant g u i l t y , the t r i a l court should submit [the case] t o t h e j u r y , and, i n such a case, t h i s court w i l l not d i s t u r b the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n . ' " F a r r i o r v. S t a t e , 728 S o . 2 d 6 9 1 , 696 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 8 ) , q u o t i n g W a r d v . S t a t e , 557 S o . 2 d 8 4 8 , 850 (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 1990 ) . "The r o l e o f a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s i s n o t t o s a y what t h e facts are. Our r o l e ... i s t o j u d g e whether the evidence i s l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t to allow submission o f an issue f o r decision [by] t h e j u r y . " Ex parte Bankston, 358 S o . 2 d 1 0 4 0 , 1 0 4 2 ( A l a . 1978). "'"The trial court's denial of a m o t i o n f o r j u d g m e n t o f a c q u i t t a l must be r e v i e w e d b y d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e was l e g a l evidence before the j u r y at the time t h e m o t i o n was made f r o m w h i c h t h e j u r y b y fair inference could f i n d the defendant guilty. Thomas v . S t a t e , 3 6 3 S o . 2 d 1 0 2 0 (Ala. C r . App. 1978). In applying this standard, t h i s court w i l l determine only i f l e g a l e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d f r o m w h i c h t h e j u r y c o u l d have found t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y beyond a reasonable doubt. Willis v. S t a t e , 447 S o . 2 d 199 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) . When t h e e v i d e n c e r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t for the jury and such evidence, i f believed, i s sufficient to sustain a conviction, the denial of a motion f o r judgment o f a c q u i t t a l does n o t c o n s t i t u t e error. M c C o n n e l l v . S t a t e , 4 2 9 S o . 2 d 662 (Ala. C r . App. 1983)."' " G a v i n v . S t a t e , 891 S o . 2 d 907 , 974 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 3 ) , q u o t i n g W a r d v . S t a t e , 610 S o . 2 d 1 1 9 0 , 1191 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1 992). See a l s o , Ward v . State, 814 S o . 2 d 8 99, 9 0 8 - 9 1 0 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2000).
" ' " C i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e a l o n e i s enough t o s u p p o r t a g u i l t y v e r d i c t of the most heinous crime, p r o v i d e d the j u r y b e l i e v e s beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t the accused is guilty." W h i t e v . S t a t e , 294 A l a . 2 6 5 , 2 7 2 , 314 So. 2d 857, c e r t . d e n i e d , 423 U.S. 951 , 96 S. Ct. 373, 4 6 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1975). "Circumstantial evidence i s i n n o w i s e c o n s i d e r e d i n f e r i o r e v i d e n c e and i s entitled to the same w e i g h t as direct e v i d e n c e p r o v i d e d i t p o i n t s to the g u i l t of the accused." C o c h r a n v . S t a t e , 500 So. 2d 1161, 1177 ( A l a . C r . App. 1984), a f f i r m e d in pertinent part, reversed in part on o t h e r g r o u n d s , Ex p a r t e C o c h r a n , 500 So. 2d 1179 (Ala. 1985).'" H o l l a w a y v. State, 979 So. 2d 839, 843 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2007).
Section shall be a
13A-8-81(a)(3), felony f o r any
"It any are
a r t i c l e w i t h the knowledge t h a t the sounds or p e r f o r m a n c e s so t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h o u t Part I.A., a person c o n s e n t o f t h e owner." commits the offense
As d i s c u s s e d i n of (a) "unlawful transports the
t r a n s p o r t " u n d e r § 1 3 A - 8 - 8 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) , i f he o r she
(b) any a r t i c l e c o n t a i n i n g s o u n d s o r p e r f o r m a n c e s (c) w i t h
k n o w l e d g e (d) t h a t t h e s o u n d s o r p e r f o r m a n c e s were t r a n s f e r r e d without c o n s e n t o f t h e owner. Powell does n o t challenge the first
s u f f i c i e n c y of the State's evidence w i t h respect to the
two e l e m e n t s ; P o w e l l c h a l l e n g e s t h e S t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e o n l y w i t h respect to i t s alleged lack of
CR-09-1192 knew the material contained on the CDs owner. defines "owner" as: and DVDs was
S e c t i o n 13A-8-80, A l a . Code 1975,
"Unless the context c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s otherwise, t h e t e r m 'owner,' as u s e d i n t h i s a r t i c l e , shall mean t h e p e r s o n who owns, o r has t h e e x c l u s i v e l i c e n s e i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s to reproduce or the e x c l u s i v e l i c e n s e i n the U n i t e d States to d i s t r i b u t e t o the p u b l i c c o p i e s of the o r i g i n a l f i x a t i o n of sounds embodied i n the master phonograph r e c o r d , master d i s c , master tape, master f i l m or other device used f o r reproducing r e c o r d e d sounds on rds, discs, tapes, films, phonograph records, v i d e o c a s s e t t e s o r o t h e r a r t i c l e s now known o r l a t e r d e v e l o p e d on w h i c h s o u n d i s r e c o r d e d and f r o m w h i c h the t r a n s f e r r e d sounds are d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y d e r i v e d , o r t h e p e r s o n who owns t h e r i g h t s t o r e c o r d or to authorize the recording of a live performance."
^ .^1^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ A . n ^ ^ ^
§ 13A-8-81(e) s t a t e s :
" I n the absence of a w r i t t e n agreement or o p e r a t i o n of law t o the c o n t r a r y , the p e r f o r m e r or p e r f o r m e r s o f t h e l i v e p e r f o r m a n c e s h a l l be p r e s u m e d t o own the rights to r e c o r d or a u t h o r i z e the r e c o r d i n g o f t h e l i v e p e r f o r m a n c e . I n any p r o c e e d i n g where a p e r f o r m e r ' s c o n s e n t i s i n i s s u e , a p e r s o n who i s a u t h o r i z e d t o m a i n t a i n c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l o v e r b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s r e f l e c t i n g c o n s e n t s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d a proper w i t n e s s , s u b j e c t t o a l l r u l e s of e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o c o m p e t e n c y and a d m i s s i b i l i t y . " Duff, testified offered the on r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of behalf of the the RIAA and the t h e MPAA t h a t witness who
S t a t e , was the
CR-09-1192 a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e sound r e c o r d i n g s contained and t h e a u d i o v i s u a l works from Powell's vehicle.
on t h e CDs a n d DVDs s e i z e d
Duff described
t h e MPAA a n d t h e RIAA i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner:
" [ D u f f ] : The M o t i o n P i c t u r e A s s o c i a t i o n o f A m e r i c a i s a t r a d e group formed by t h e [ m o t i o n - p i c t u r e i n d u s t r y ] s o t h e [ i n d u s t r y ] w i l l n o t have t o r e s p o n d to s i t u a t i o n s l i k e t h i s . They h i r e t h e M o t i o n Picture Association and i t s a t t o r n e y s and i t s investigators and consultants to make the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r d i s c s , teach t h e i r classes that are ongoing with law enforcement, and t o p r o v i d e t e c h n o l o g y . T h a t was done s o t h e p r e s i d e n t o f P a r a m o u n t P i c t u r e s w o u l d n ' t have t o come t o Oneonta f o r a t r i a l o r t h e p r e s i d e n t o f A t l a n t i c R e c o r d s w o u l d n ' t have t o come t o t r i a l . They formed these trade i n d u s t r y groups, educate t h e people i n t h o s e g r o u p s , a n d gave them a u t h o r i t y t o a c t upon their behalf within their guidelines. "[The S t a t e ] : W o u l d t h a t be t r u e P i c t u r e A s s o c i a t i o n of America? "[Duff]: The industry. motion picture and f o r the Motion the recording
"[The S t a t e ] : A n d t h e R e c o r d i n g I n d u s t r y of America?
" [ D u f f ] : R i g h t . The r e c o r d i n g i n d u s t r y i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h the audio [CDs], the music. And t h e M o t i o n P i c t u r e A s s o c i a t i o n i s concerned with the a c t u a l movies, t h e [DVDs] and t h a t s o r t o f o p e r a t i o n . " (R. 126-27.) the A d d i t i o n a l l y , outside the presence of the j u r y ,
f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n took
CR-09-1192 "THE COURT: These two A s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t employed by, t h e Motion P i c t u r e I n d u s t r y Recording Industry Association. " [ D u f f ] : Yes, sir. you a r e and t h e
"THE COURT: Do e i t h e r o f t h o s e a s s o c i a t i o n s h a v e o w n e r s h i p o r l i c e n s i n g r i g h t s t o a l l t h e s e [DVDs] o r [CDs] t h a t were r e c o v e r e d f r o m Mr. P o w e l l ? " [ D u f f ] : They a r e n o t t h e o w n e r s . They a c t upon -¬ "THE COURT: J u s t answer my q u e s t i o n . Do t h e y have the ownership r i g h t s o r l i c e n s i n g r i g h t s t o t h e [CDs] o r [DVDs] i n [ t h e e v i d e n c e b o x c o n t a i n i n g t h e items s e i z e d from P o w e l l ' s v e h i c l e ] ? " [ D u f f ] : I don't the I n d u s t r y . " (R. 162-63.) At t h e c l o s e of the State's judgment of acquittal, evidence, Powell held asked f o r a a lengthy think s o . T h a t i s why t h e y hired
t h e motion's
" [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : Y o u r Honor, a t t h i s p o i n t , we would l i k e t o ask f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . I don't b e l i e v e t h e S t a t e h a s made a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e e s p e c i a l l y i n t h a t t h e r e h a s b e e n no t e s t i m o n y a t a l l as t o t h e p e r f o r m e r s ' c o n s e n t . T h e r e h a s b e e n no t e s t i m o n y a t a l l as t o a n y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e owner o f t h e s e r i g h t s . T h e r e h a s b e e n no t e s t i m o n y a t a l l o f a n y b o d y who i s a u t h o r i z e d t o m a i n t a i n custody and c o n t r o l o f b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s . N o t h i n g i n Subsection e o f [§ 13A-8-81] where we have b e e n c o n t e s t i n g t h e r i g h t s have b e e n l a i d o u t o r s e t before the Jury.
CR-09-1192 "THE COURT: [ D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ] , t h e r e a s o n I a s k e d Mr. D u f f t h o s e q u e s t i o n s o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e j u r y , I t h o u g h t t h a t was what h i s t e s t i m o n y was -¬ t h a t t h o s e two a g e n c i e s d i d n o t h a v e t h e o w n e r s h i p o r l i c e n s i n g o r p o s s e s s them. I t h i n k y o u may have a g r e a t c a s e o f p i r a t i n g [CDs] a n d [DVDs]. As f a r as the Court i s concerned, w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h a t I t h i n k t h a t i s what i s g o i n g on. I r e a l i z e y o u h a v e y o u r a r g u m e n t . I t h i n k we a l l r e a l i z e t h a t we h a v e t h i s S t a t u t e t h a t he i s b e i n g p r o s e c u t e d u n d e r a n d we don't have any l a w . W i t h r e s p e c t t o [defense c o u n s e l ' s ] m o t i o n , do y o u h a v e a n y t h i n g t o s a y ? " [ D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ] : Y e s , s i r . Your Honor, we b e g t o d i f f e r w i t h l e a r n e d c o u n s e l . We w i l l c o n c e d e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e p r o b a b l y l e a v e s a l o t t o be d e s i r e d . We w i l l a l s o c o n c e d e t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d do some work on t h i s a n d make i t a l i t t l e e a s i e r t o p r o c e e d . However, we b e l i e v e t h a t s i n c e t h i s was b r o u g h t u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f A r t i c l e 4, [§ 1 3 A ] - 8 - 8 0 , w h i c h goes t o g r e a t l e n g t h as d e s c r i b i n g who t h e owner i s i n v e r y b r o a d a n d l i b e r a l t e r m s . I t h i n k the e v i d e n c e has been c l e a r a t t h i s p o i n t , a t l e a s t t h e w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e w o u l d be c l e a r t h a t Mr. Duff r e p r e s e n t s the r e c o r d i n g i n d u s t r i e s of America both f o r t h e p r o d u c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n and s u p e r v i s i o n o f [CDs] a n d [DVDs]. Then y o u go down and y o u r e a d S u b p a r a g r a p h 3 w h i c h s a y s ' M a n u f a c t u r e , d i s t r i b u t e , t r a n s p o r t o r w h o l e s a l e any a r t i c l e w i t h t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e sounds o r p e r f o r m a n c e s a r e so t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e owner.' Mr. D u f f h a s t e s t i f i e d t h a t h a d t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e owner b e e n g i v e n , t h e s e w o u l d n o t be on [CDRs] o r [DVDRs]. There i s a l s o e v i d e n c e t h a t has been p u t b e f o r e t h e j u r y t h a t t h i s d e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t he was a s a l e s m a n . T h a t he was i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f s e l l i n g t h e s e . T h a t he b o u g h t them f r o m a f e l l o w b y t h e name o f B r e a d a t a T e x a c o S t a t i o n a n d t h a t he was s e l l i n g them t o i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a . I b e l i e v e he s a i d f u r t h e r t h a t he d i d n o t s e l l them t o s t o r e s . T h e r e i s enough k n o w l e d g e i m p u t e d h e r e a n d i n f e r e n c e s c a n be drawn f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t he
CR-09-1192 d i d know t h a t t h e s e were p i r a t e d [CDs]. I t i s obvious they are p i r a t e d CDs b a s e d upon t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Mr. D u f f . A n d i f t h e y a r e p i r a t e d CDs, t h e y a r e done s o w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e owner. T h a t i s p r e t t y c l e a r t h e way I s e e i t . I b e l i e v e we have made a c a s e a n d i t i s now f o r t h e J u r y t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r he i s g u i l t y o r n o t . Now maybe i f t h i s J u r y f i n d s t h i s d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y , t h e n Mr. G o l d s t e i n c a n do some s u r g i c a l work i n t h e way o f a p p e a l on t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h i s s t a t u t e . I f t h e y f i n d h i m n o t g u i l t y , t h e n we h a v e h a d a n i c e e x e r c i s e h e r e t o d a y d e a l i n g w i t h c u r i o u s s t a t u t e s a t b e s t . We believe that the evidence has been presented s u f f i c i e n t l y t o go t o t h e j u r y as t o w h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s d e f e n d a n t h a d k n o w l e d g e a t t h e t i m e he was t r a n s p o r t i n g f o r t h e purpose of wholesaling or otherwise these p i r a t e d [CDs] i n t h e S t a t e o f Alabama i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s s t a t u t e .
"THE COURT: ... I d o n ' t know t h a t we h a v e h a d t e s t i m o n y t h a t an owner h a s come f o r w a r d a n d s a y they d i d n ' t g i v e consent. " [ D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ] : The o w n e r s , Y o u r Honor, as I understand what Mr. Duff has said, i s the Association. They a r e t h e Ombudsman or the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e owners o f t h e s e — "THE COURT: s a i d 'no.' "[District s a i d no. I specifically attorney]: asked him t h a t a n d he he
No, s i r , I d o n ' t
"THE COURT: I a s k e d h i m i f t h e s e A s s o c i a t i o n s h a d the ownership or l i c e n s i n g r i g h t s t o a l l of these [CDs] a n d [DVDs] i n t h e b o x a n d he s a i d he d i d n ' t b e l i e v e so.
CR-09-1192 " [ A s s i s t a n t d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y ] : The owners o f t h e [CDs] make up t h e A s s o c i a t i o n . They a r e members o f t h e A s s o c i a t i o n . He l i s t e d o f f e i g h t members o f t h e A s s o c i a t i o n . They a r e t h e A s s o c i a t i o n . They a r e t h e ones t h a t own t h e r i g h t s . "THE COURT: T h a t ' s n o t what he said.
" [ A s s i s t a n t d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y ] : C o u l d we b r i n g him b a c k i n and a s k him t h a t ? On d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , t h a t i s what h i s t e s t i m o n y was. He named o f f e i g h t members. "THE COURT: I p o i n t b l a n k a s k e d him w h e t h e r o r these two Associations had the ownership l i c e n s i n g r i g h t s t o t h e s e [CDs] and [DVDs] i n box. not and the
" [ A s s i s t a n t d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y ] : The A s s o c i a t i o n i s made up o f t h e owners o f t h e r i g h t s . He g a v e t h e J u r y e i g h t m o t i o n p i c t u r e i n d u s t r i e s t h a t had [DVDs] i n h e r e and t h e y were t h e c o m p a n i e s t h a t make up t h e A s s o c i a t i o n . They j u s t f o r m e d t h e A s s o c i a t i o n to have one arm t o e n f o r c e t h e i r r i g h t s . "THE COURT: He rights. s a i d the A s s o c i a t i o n d o e s n ' t own the
"[District attorney]: Your Honor, Mr. Duff's t e s t i m o n y was t h a t t h e A s s o c i a t i o n s a r e a g r o u p o f p e o p l e r e p r e s e n t e d by the A s s o c i a t i o n who have a u t h o r i z e d t h e two A s s o c i a t i o n s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e i r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s -- t h e i r p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s i n t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y i s p r o t e c t e d . That t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e t e s t i m o n y t h a t he s a i d no one w o u l d p r o d u c e or a u t h o r i z e t h e use of [CDs] or [DVDs] on a recordable [CD] o r a r e c o r d a b l e [DVD]. T h a t t h e s e a r e c l e a r l y p i r a t e d t a p e s and i f t h e y a r e p i r a t e d tapes or d i s c s , then they are t h e r e f o r e i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s o f t h e owners r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e two A s s o c i a t i o n s . That p r e s e n t s , I t h i n k , a v a l i d j u r y question as to t h i s subsection 3 that he was
CR-09-1192 t r a n s p o r t i n g these f o r t h e purpose o f w h o l e s a l i n g or some o t h e r p u r p o s e w h i c h was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e u n d e r t h e s t a t u t e -- k n o w i n g o r h a v i n g r e a s o n t o know t h a t these are pirated or unauthorized pieces of i n t e l l e c t u a l property. "THE COURT: A n y t h i n g else, [defense counsel]?
" [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : Y e s , Y o u r Honor. F i r s t o f a l l , as [ t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y ] a n s w e r e d , he managed t o p u l l f r o m S u b s e c t i o n 2 a n d 3 -- my c l i e n t i s n o t c h a r g e d u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n 2 o r 3. He i s n o t c h a r g e d with manufacturing a n d he i s n o t c h a r g e d with distribution. He i s c h a r g e d with transporting. D e f i n i t i o n o f owner p u l l e d f r o m 13A-8-80, w h i c h s a y s u n l e s s ' t h e c o n t e x t c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s . ' The c o n t e x t c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s t h a t we e x a m i n e s e c t i o n e u n d e r 81 b e c a u s e t h a t i s t h e s e c t i o n he i s c h a r g e d u n d e r -¬ under t h e p l a i n S t a t u t e language. I t says very d i r e c t l y i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t -- I think we c a n a g r e e that there i s no w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t . The o p e r a t i o n o f l a w i s t o t h e c o n t r a r y . I d o n ' t know o f a n y l a w t h a t makes an A s s o c i a t i o n t o have t h e e x c l u s i v e a b i l i t y t o e n f o r c e licensing members. The p e r f o r m e r o r p e r f o r m a n c e s o r t h e l i v e p e r f o r m e r w o u l d be p r e s u m e d t o own t h e r i g h t s t o r e c o r d o r a u t h o r i z e . We h a v e n ' t h e a r d f r o m a n y o f those people. The p e r s o n who i s a u t h o r i z e d t o m a i n t a i n custody and c o n t r o l over b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s can t e s t i f y . We h a v e n ' t h e a r d f r o m t h a t p e r s o n . We do n o t have a n y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h e r e o r a n y b o d y who we c a n c a l l a n d s a y ' T h i s p e r s o n owns t h e r i g h t s . ' I c o n t e n d , Y o u r Honor, even i f we d i d , I t h i n k t h e t e s t i m o n y came o u t s e v e r a l t i m e s t h a t t h i s i s an i n t e l l e c t u a l property issue or reproduction issue. I w i l l s a y once a g a i n t h a t i t i s p r e e m p t e d b y T i t l e IV of the United States Code and t h a t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y reserved into copyrights of Section 301. "THE COURT: Do y o u have t h e s p e c i f i c Code s e c t i o n on t h a t as f a r a s c o p y r i g h t s ?
CR-09-1192 "[Defense "THE c o u n s e l ] : Yes, S e c t i o n 301. f o r the record?
COURT: I s t h a t s u f f i c i e n t
[ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : I t i s i n c l u d e d i n my i n i t i a l M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s . Y o u r Honor, as f a r a s t h i s c a s e i s c o n c e r n e d a n d t h i s S t a t u t e , I d o n ' t b e l i e v e we have a n y b o d y h e r e who r e p r e s e n t s anyone who a c t u a l l y h o l d s t h e r i g h t s and t h e assignments. "THE COURT: A t t h i s motion." (R. 168-77.) Initially, to Powell's we n o t e t h a t § 13A-8-81(e) i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e Section 13A-8-81(e) applies to live There time, I'm g o i n g t o deny your
case. like
those d e s c r i b e d i n § 13-8-81(a)(2).
was no e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d t h a t any o f t h e CDs o r DVDs s e i z e d from Powell's vehicle were u n a u t h o r i z e d r e c o r d i n g s o f some
l i v e performance. the authorized
Thus, P o w e l l ' s argument t h a t D u f f was n o t custodian of business records reflecting
c o n s e n t i s moot. In 2007), Hankins v. S t a t e , stated: 599 So. 2 d 1253 989 So. 2d 610 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
" [ T ] h i s Court i n C a r r o l l v. S t a t e , (Ala.Crim.App. 1992), noted:
"'"Where, as h e r e , t h i s C o u r t i s c a l l e d upon t o c o n s t r u e a s t a t u t e , t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r u l e i s t h a t t h e c o u r t has a duty t o
CR-09-1192 a s c e r t a i n and e f f e c t u a t e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t e x p r e s s e d i n t h e s t a t u t e , w h i c h may be g l e a n e d from the language used, the reason and n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e a c t , and t h e p u r p o s e s o u g h t t o be o b t a i n e d . " Ex p a r t e H o l l a d a y , 466 So.2d 956, 960 ( A l a . 1985). "[T]he fundamental r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o a s c e r t a i n and g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e i n enacting the statute In c o n s t r u i n g the s t a t u t e , t h i s Court s h o u l d gather the i n t e n t of the legislature from the language of the statute i t s e l f , i f possible We may a l s o l o o k t o t h e r e a s o n and n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e statute and the purpose sought t o be o b t a i n e d by e n a c t i n g t h e s t a t u t e . " Pace v. A r m s t r o n g W o r l d I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . , 578 So.2d 281, 283 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . " I f p o s s i b l e , t h e intent of the l e g i s l a t u r e should be g a t h e r e d from the language of the s t a t u t e itself. However, i f the statute is ambiguous o r u n c e r t a i n , the Court may c o n s i d e r c o n d i t i o n s t h a t might a r i s e under t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e s t a t u t e and e x a m i n e the r e s u l t s t h a t w i l l f l o w from g i v i n g the l a n g u a g e i n q u e s t i o n one p a r t i c u l a r m e a n i n g rather than another." Volkswagen of A m e r i c a , I n c . v. D i l l a r d , 579 So.2d 1301, 1305 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . '
So. 2d a t 1264-65." (emphasis added). the context c l e a r l y requires
989 So. 2d a t 616 Here, otherwise" situation
the phrase i s rather a t hand, we
"unless ambiguous. can see
However, g i v e n that this may be
the f a c t u a l a possible
CR-09-1192 situation the l e g i s l a t u r e could not foresee, but attempted t o Duff trade the
d r a f t § 13A-8-80 u s i n g b r o a d enough l a n g u a g e t o c o v e r . testified at trial that that were the RIAA and MPAA are
organizations interests of
t o represent
the recording i n copyright
and movie across the
industry, country.
D u f f e x p l a i n e d t h a t h i s r o l e was t o r e p r e s e n t
t h e v a r i o u s member s t u d i o s s o t h a t t h e s t u d i o s w o u l d n o t have t o send a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o every forum i n which a c o p y r i g h t r e l a t e d case c o u l d a r i s e . involves copyright Thus, t h e c o n t e x t utilizing i nthis situation from rights
t h e i r respective trade organizations to represent t h e i r at trial. We do n o t b e l i e v e holder § 13A-8-80 should
be r e a d t o label
r e q u i r e each c o p y r i g h t or movie s t u d i o — Alabama.
-- g e n e r a l l y , t h e r e c o r d
t o t e s t i f y at every c r i m i n a l proceeding i n
D u f f was a c o m p e t e n t w i t n e s s
who c a n be c o n s t r u e d
"owner" o f t h e r i g h t s d i s c u s s e d i n § 13A-8-80. State presented sufficient evidence that
Therefore, the the recordings vehicle owner.
on t h e CDs a n d DVDs r e c o v e r e d
the consent of the r i g h t f u l
CR-09-1192 D u f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e CDs a n d DVDs were n o t made p u r s u a n t t o i n d u s t r y standards opposed t o b e i n g i n t h a t t h e y were " b u r n e d " o n t o a d i s k as into the disk. Additionally, none
o f t h e CDs o r DVDs were p a c k a g e d i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i n d u s t r y p r a c t i c e , a n d no CD o r DVD was a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e artwork or information generally associated with typical
commercial reproduction. c h a r g e d w i t h any o f f e n s e
P o w e l l was n o t
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s a l e o f t h e CDs evidence i n d i c a t i n g that the buying testified and s e l l i n g that any Powell
o r DVDs, t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d was, i n fact, involved with Duff also
a c t i v i t y on P o w e l l ' s p a r t was n o t a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e c o p y r i g h t holders. commercial activity, I t w o u l d be f a i r f o r t h e j u r y t o i n f e r activity, evidenced or intent to engage that Powell's
commercial t h e consent
t h a t he was o p e r a t i n g w i t h o u t
of t h e owners.
Furthermore, taken
as a w h o l e , t h e e v i d e n c e
gave r i s e t o t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t P o w e l l was o p e r a t i n g w i t h t h e knowledge t h a t h i s a c t i v i t i e s c o n s e n t o f t h e owners. presented that were t a k i n g p l a c e without the
Thus, i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e
ample e v i d e n c e upon w h i c h t h e j u r y c o u l d have f o u n d proved each and every element of § 13A-8-
CR-09-1192 81(a)(3). Accordingly, the t r i a l court d i d not e r r i n denying
P o w e l l ' s m o t i o n f o r a judgment o f a c q u i t t a l . B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g , is due t o b e , a n d i s h e r e b y , AFFIRMED. W e l c h , P . J . , a n d Windom, B u r k e , a n d J o i n e r , J J . , c o n c u r . t h e judgment o f t h e t r i a l affirmed. court
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