Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/151/34/497664/
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 16:56:32
Document Index: 685193505

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 5596', '§ 1613', '§ 1613']

Delcio Rivera-rosario, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. U.S. Department of Agriculture and Mike Espy, Secretary,defendants, Appellees, 151 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 1998) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1998 › Delcio Rivera-rosario, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. U.S. Department of Agriculture and Mike Espy, Secret...
Delcio Rivera-rosario, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. U.S. Department of Agriculture and Mike Espy, Secretary,defendants, Appellees, 151 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 1998)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 151 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 1998) Submitted June 3, 1998. Decided Aug. 11, 1998
The eight employees initiated a district court case in the federal district court for Puerto Rico in 1986, and then reactivated it after the Department's November 1988 decision. In October 1989, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment seeking "enforcement" of the ALJ's May 1988 recommended decision, which they read to provide them relief without the time limitation on reparations proposed by the Department. The Department cross-moved for summary judgment, pointing to a provision in the pertinent Title VII remedies provision expressly limiting "back pay" awards to no earlier than the two-year period before the filing of a formal complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1).
Any reader of Title VII's bare language would be puzzled by a reference to an enforcement action. Under the statute, a federal employee who does not receive redress for discrimination from his agency within 180 days is entitled to bring a civil action "as provided in section 2000e-5" against his agency, just like any other employee discriminated against by a private employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), (d). The Supreme Court has expressly ruled that a federal employee, like a private employee, is entitled to a de novo determination in the district court on his or her discrimination claim. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 96 S. Ct. 1949, 48 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1976). In such a case, the Court can enjoin unlawful discrimination and provide affirmative relief as set forth in the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1).
Title VII does provide that "back pay" liability may not accrue from a date "more than two years prior to the filing of the charge" with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1). If Rivera had chosen to brief the issue, we might be faced with the interesting question whether the provision just cited applied to the home-leave allowances that Rivera seeks, as the district court held. However, Rivera has chosen not to brief the issue in this court, and it is therefore waived--even assuming that it is not foreclosed by the district court's prior decision which Rivera did not seek to appeal.
Finally, Rivera's brief makes what is scarcely more than a glancing reference to what is popularly known as the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596. Rivera refers to the statute in one sentence as a general mandate for reparations without a "two-years back" limitation on his Title VII award. The Supreme Court has indicated that where the gravamen of the claim is Title VII discrimination, the only remedy available is under Title VII. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S. Ct. 1961, 48 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1976). In all events, Rivera makes no effort to develop his argument under the Back Pay Act, and any such claim is waived.
The jurisdictional doubt that concerns me is based on what Professor Geoffrey Hazard, as Director of the American Law Institute, referred to as "ambivalence" of constitutional and statutory mandates, and interpretive precedents, about "the scope of jurisdiction of the federal district courts." American Law Institute, Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, Tentative Draft No. 2 ix (April 14, 1998). The more particular concern relevant to this appeal arises from tension between the possibly decisive implications of Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 96 S. Ct. 1949, 48 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1976), which the Per Curiam opinion takes as decisive of jurisdiction in this case, and other statutes and precedents. Chandler came to the Court before the statute that defined the trial court's jurisdiction was amended to confer on EEOC an authority like that the statute had conferred on the Civil Service Commission before amendment. Both the earlier statute and the amended statute authorized the agency to issue regulations. Most of the regulations issued by EEOC track those previously issued by CSC, but EEOC also issued additional regulations regarding the agency's (here DOA's) obligation to reach a final decision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(d) (1988) (An agency decision is final "only when the agency makes a determination on all of the issues in the complaint ...."); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1613.221 (1988).
See Girard v. Rubin, 62 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1995); Haskins v. United States Department of the Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1199 & n. 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 68, 98 L. Ed. 2d 32 (1987); Pecker v. Heckler, 801 F.2d 709, 711 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1986); Moore v. Devine, 780 F.2d 1559, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1986)
See Teledyne Continental Motors v. United States, 906 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals); G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co. v. Hawman, 870 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1989) (Secretary of Agriculture). The connection with the settled rule in civil cases generally, that no final appealable decision exists unless the dollar amount of liability is determined, has been remarked. Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 721 F.2d 629, 630 (7th Cir. 1983)