Source: https://openjurist.org/563/f2d/1287/overman-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 22:12:08
Document Index: 546012861

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1442', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 1442', '§ 660', '§ 652', '§ 652', '§ 606', '§ 659', '§ 652']

563 F2d 1287 Overman v. United States | OpenJurist
563 F. 2d 1287 - Overman v. United States
563 F2d 1287 Overman v. United States
563 F.2d 1287
44 A.L.R.Fed. 485
Ralph T. OVERMAN, Appellant,
UNITED STATES of America, Fred Hornkohl and Frances Overman,
Whether a domestic relations suit ought to come before a federal court in any aspect, even though a federal officer in an official capacity may be implicated in a peripheral fashion, is a matter of grave concern. With rare exceptions, such disputes traditionally have been subject to exclusive state jurisdiction. "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94, 10 S.Ct. 850, 853, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890); accord, Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383, 50 S.Ct. 154, 74 L.Ed. 489 (1930). See also Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967); Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960).
The Government appellees are entitled to that protection under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1970). That statute allows removal to the federal courts of any civil action against a federal officer "for any act under color of such office."4
In Willingham v. Moran, 395 U.S. 402, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969), the Court reviewed the history of this removal statute and agreed with the Government's argument that
the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy, and that one of its purposes was to provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses arising from their official duties. On this view, the test for removal should be broader, not narrower, than the test for official immunity. (Id. at 405, 89 S.Ct. at 1815.)
In district court, the federal defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) for want of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court, however, did not address the federal defenses as would have been proper but addressed a procedural issue in the central controversy, whether Frances Overman had become a party by service or appearance. We think the district court erred in this regard for, as observed in Willingham, "one of the most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tried in federal court." Id. at 407, 89 S.Ct. at 1816.
In 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp.1975), the United States waived its immunity from state garnishment actions directed at federal employees. The statute simply removed the bar of sovereign immunity to one narrow class of actions: enforcement of garnishment writs issued by state courts. See, e. g., Wilhelm v. United States Department of Air Force Accounting, 418 F.Supp. 162, 164 (S.D.Tex.1976). Nothing in the statute or legislative history, however, indicates any congressional intent to expose the Government to wider liability.
We do not believe that protection of the federal interest on removal requires the federal court to do more than address the federal defense. As we have held, appellant possesses no right to sue the United States or its fiscal officer in this case. Cf. Popple v. United States, 416 F.Supp. 1227 (W.D. N.Y. 1976). Having addressed the federal claim then, the balance of the controversy should be remanded to the state court for it concerns a matter that has long been within the exclusive province of the state courts.
There is, and ought to be, a continuing federal policy to avoid handling domestic relations cases in federal court in the absence of important concerns of a constitutional dimension. See, e. g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383, 50 S.Ct. 154, 74 L.Ed. 489 (1930); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967). Such cases touch state law and policy in a deep and sensitive manner, and "(a)s a matter of policy and comity, these local problems should be decided in state courts." Buechold v. Ortiz, supra, 401 F.2d at 373. This court will not lightly presume that Congress, when enacting § 659, meant for the federal courts to take over the entire domain of domestic relations law applicable to federal employees.5 Moreover, we will not readily infer that Congress intended to permit federal agencies to be dragged in as defendants by any federal employee or spouse of an employee who, unhappy with a prior state adjudication, seeks to contest it by suing the Government over wage garnishment rather than challenging the divorce decree in an appropriate state forum. To have federal courts adjudicating such disputes, where the only federal connection is garnishment of government wages, would truly be a case of the tail wagging the dog.
(28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1970).)
The federal courts have uniformly rejected jurisdiction of ordinary garnishment proceedings whether the federal defendants have sought removal or the action has been commenced initially in federal court. Wilhelm v. United States Dept. of Air Force Accounting, 418 F.Supp. 162 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Popple v. United States, 416 F.Supp. 1227 (W.D. N.Y. 1976); Golightly v. Golightly, 410 F.Supp. 861 (D. Neb. 1976); Morrison v. Morrison, 408 F.Supp. 315 (N.D. Tex. 1976); West v. West, 402 F.Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Bolling v. Howland, 398 F.Supp. 1313 (M.D. Tenn. 1975)
Mr. ULLMAN. No. The garnishment provision places the U.S. Government in the same position as a private employer. Non-support cases can be certified to the Federal courts only by the Secretary of HEW who must find that use of the Federal courts is the only reasonable way to enforce a court order. In the situation the gentleman cites, there would be no court order on which to base such a finding. (Bolling v. Howland, 398 F.Supp. 1313, 1316 (M.D. Tenn. 1975), quoting 120 Cong.Rec. H12,585-12,587 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1974) (emphasis is original).)
Congressman Ullman's comment about certification is a reference to 42 U.S.C. § 660 (Supp.1975). That provision provides federal jurisdiction for civil actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(8) (Supp.1975), if certified by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Since §§ 652(a)(8) and 659 are parallel provisions, that is, both are part of Pub.L. 93-647, § 606(a), 88 Stat. 2351, 2357, the presumption must be that if Congress had intended federal jurisdiction for cases arising under § 659 it would have explicitly provided for it, as it did for § 652(a)(8).