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Document Index: 503234520

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 5', '§ 1411', '§ 1414', '§ 1411', '§ 1415', '§ 504', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 300']

DELLMUTH V. MUTH, 491 U. S. 223 - Volume 491 - 1989 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 491 > DELLMUTH V. MUTH, 491 U. S. 223 (1989) > Full Text
(a) Congress may abrogate the States' immunity only by making its intention "unmistakably
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 491 U. S. 233. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 491 U. S. 233. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 491 U. S. 243, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 491 U. S. 243, filed dissenting opinions.
The hearing examiner found that Alex's original IEP was inappropriate, and made a number of recommendations. Both respondent and the school district then appealed the decision to the secretary of education, as provided under Pennsylvania law, see 22 Pa.Code § 13.32(24) (1988). The secretary remanded the case to the hearing examiner with instructions
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d
We have recognized that Congress, acting in the exercise of its enforcement authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, [Footnote 1] may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 427 U. S. 456 (1976). We have stressed, however, that abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets "the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States," Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 473 U. S. 238 (1985), placing a considerable strain on "[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine,'" Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 465 U. S. 100 (1984), quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 437 U. S. 691 (1978). To temper Congress' acknowledged powers of
839 F.2d at 128. Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Congress' intention is "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute," recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if Congress' intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative history will be futile, because, by definition, the rule of Atascadero will not be met.
The gist of the dissent's argument appears to be that application of the governing law in Atascadero is unfair in this case. The dissent complains that we "resor[t] to an interpretative standard that Congress could have anticipated only with the aid of a particularly effective crystal ball." Post at 491 U. S. . This complaint appears to be premised on an unrealistic and cynical view of the legislative process. We find it difficult to believe that the Ninety-fourth Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it
Page 491 U. S. 231
would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest. Rather, the salient point in our view is that it cannot be said with perfect confidence that Congress in fact intended in 1975 to abrogate sovereign immunity, and imperfect confidence will not suffice given the special constitutional concerns in this area. Cf. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 415 U. S. 373-374 (1974) (federal statute will not be construed to preclude judicial review of constitutional challenges absent clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent).
473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 246.
The EHA imposes substantial obligations on the States, as well as on local education authorities, as might be expected in an Act authorizing federal financial aid "to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children."
In accord with this overarching responsibility placed upon the States, the EHA contemplates that, in a number of situations where a local education authority cannot or will not provide appropriate educational services to the handicapped, the State will do so directly. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(c)(4)(A)(ii) (State to assure provision of services where local authority barred from receiving federal funds because it has failed to submit a proper application); § 1414(d) (State "to provide special education and related services directly to handicapped children residing in the area served by [a] local educational agency" that is unable or unwilling to establish or maintain programs, or to be merged with other local agencies to enable it to do so, or that has "handicapped children who can best be served by a regional or State center"). And in any event, where a local education authority would be entitled to less than $7,500 in EHA funding for a fiscal year, the State may not distribute the funds, but must use the funds itself to ensure provision of appropriate services. §§ 1411(c)(4)(A)(i),
This provision makes no distinction between civil actions based upon the type of relief sought, and hence plainly contemplates tuition reimbursement actions. See School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 359 (1985). In light of the States' pervasive role under the EHA, and the clarity with which the statute imposes both procedural and substantive obligations on the States, I have no trouble in inferring from the text of the EHA that "Congress intended that the state should be named as an opposing party, if not the sole party, to [a] proceeding" brought under § 1415(e)(2), whatever remedy is sought, and that Congress thereby abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 422 (CA1 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986). Indeed, in those situations where a State has elected to provide educational services to the handicapped directly, or where under the EHA it is required to provide direct services, the State would appear
id. at 37416 (emphasis added), that is, with respect to the administrative complaint, which of course may allege EHA violations by the State. [Footnote 2/2] The text and legislative
Ante at 491 U. S. 232. Nevertheless, although Congress did intend to abrogate the States' immunity from suit, the Court refuses to give effect to this intention because it was not, in the Court's view, "unequivocal and textual." Ante at 491 U. S. 230.
Ante at 491 U. S. 227-228. I maintain that the Court makes one very basic error here, for "[t]here simply is no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 259 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). But quite apart from that, the Court has never explained
Though the special and strict drafting regulations the Court has now foisted on Congress are unjustifiable, still worse is the Court's retroactive application of these new rules. It would be one thing to tell Congress how in the future the Court will measure Congress' intent. That at least would ensure that Congress and this Court were operating under the same rules at the same time. But it makes no sense whatsoever to test congressional intent using a set of interpretative rules that Congress could not conceivably have foreseen at the time it acted -- rules altogether different from, and much more stringent than, those with which Congress, reasonably relying upon this Court's opinions, believed itself
S.Rep. No. 99-388, pp. 27-28 (1986). See also 132 Cong.Rec. S15105 (Oct. 3, 1986) (amendment
It is perfectly clear that again today the Court ignores Congress' actual intent to abrogate state immunity -- an intent that is even plainer here than in the case of § 504, which lacked the EHA's frequent reference to the obligations of States -- instead resorting to an interpretative standard that Congress could have anticipated only with the aid of a particularly effective crystal ball. When § 1415 was enacted in its present form in 1975, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), and Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, supra, established that this Court would consider legislative history and make inferences from text and structure in determining whether Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Indeed, in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 440 U. S. 342-345 (1979), the Court evidently remained of the view that legislative history might be taken into account. Cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 437 U. S. 693-694 (1978). And later still, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 465 U. S. 99 (1984), the Court still was requiring only "an unequivocal expression of congressional intent," and citing cases in support -- Edelman and Quern -- that discuss legislative history in assessing whether Congress intended to abrogate immunity. Obviously, there was no rule in 1975 of the sort the Court has devised in this case, and I fail to understand what theory it is that justifies
Though I would hold that Pennsylvania is not immune from suit in federal court for breaches of its obligations under the EHA, I find it unnecessary to go on to consider the second question upon which certiorari was granted: whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Pennsylvania's secretary of state is precluded from deciding special education administrative appeals under § 1415(c) because he is an employee of the Commonwealth. There was an alternative ground for the Court of Appeals' judgment against Pennsylvania -- that, because of the secretary's remand to a hearing officer following respondent's administrative appeal, respondent was deprived of the timely "final" judgment to which he was entitled under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) and 34 CFR § 300.512 (1988). 839 F.2d at 124-125. Petitioner did not seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision on this alternative ground, which appears adequate to support the judgment below, and no purpose would be served by our considering whether the secretary's participation in the appeal was a violation of the EHA's procedural requirements. I would thus affirm the judgment below.
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