Source: http://nc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191121_0004050.WNC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-04 12:01:34
Document Index: 106643757

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 1383', '§ 405']

NEVONDAY D. SIMMONS Plaintiff,
ANDREW M. SAUL[1], Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment, (Doc. Nos. 13, 14); the Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R"), recommending that this Court uphold the decision of the Commissioner, (Doc. No. 18); Plaintiff's Objection to the M&R, (Doc. No. 21); Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Objection, (Doc. No. 22); and the parties' briefs and exhibits in support. The motions are ripe for adjudication.
A. Review of the Magistrate Judge's M&R
A district court may assign dispositive pretrial matters to a magistrate judge for "proposed findings of fact and recommendations." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). The Federal Magistrate Act provides that "a district court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id. at § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983). However, "when objections to strictly legal issues are raised and no factual issues are challenged, de novo review of the record may be dispensed with." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). De novo review is also not required "when a party makes general or conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations." Id.
B. Review of a Final ALJ Decision under the Social Security Act
The Court must decide whether substantial evidence supports the final decision of the Commissioner and whether the Commissioner fulfilled his lawful duty in his determination that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act (SSA). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1382(c).
The SSA, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), limits this Court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner to (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision (Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971)), and; (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The district court does not review a final decision of the Commissioner de novo. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). As the SSA provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In Smith v. Heckler, the Fourth Circuit noted that "substantial evidence" has been defined as being "more than a scintilla and [do]ing more than creat[ing] a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be established. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 782 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Perales, 402 U.S. at 401); see also Seacrist v.Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 1976) ("We note that it is the responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical evidence…. ").
The Fourth Circuit has long emphasized that it is not for a reviewing court to weigh the evidence again, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, assuming the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; see also Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d at 345; Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775. Indeed, this is true even if the reviewing court disagrees with the outcome-so long as there is "substantial evidence" in the record to support the final decision below. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff makes an objection to the M&R that the Magistrate Judge ignores the ALJ's pattern of “cherry-picking” the evidence to support his findings of moderate limitations at Step 3. After conducting a de novo review of the M&R, Plaintiff's objection thereto, and the record, the Court agrees with the M&R's analysis.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Subparagraph 2 of Listing 12.05B is met if an individual has extreme limitation in one or a marked limitation in two of the following functional domains (a) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (b) interacting with others; (c) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (d) adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. Papp. 1 &sect; 12.05B. Under the regulations, a limitation is "moderate" if the individual&#39;s ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively and on a sustained basis in that domain is "fair." 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. Papp. 1 &sect; 12.00F.2.c. A limitation is "marked" if such functioning is "seriously limited," id. at&sect; 12.00F.2.d, and "extreme" if the individual cannot function in the domain at all, id. at&sect; 12.00F.2.e. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had a moderate limitation in each of those domains and therefore did not meet the Listing. ...