Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/814/1564/336206/
Timestamp: 2020-02-21 10:36:59
Document Index: 333058206

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2412', '§ 5596', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 19881', '§ 2412', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', 'art, 461', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 1988', 'art, 461']

Morris v. Brewer, Petitioner, v. American Battle Monuments Commission, Respondent, 814 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Federal Circuit › 1987 › Morris v. Brewer, Petitioner, v. American Battle Monuments Commission, Respondent
Morris v. Brewer, Petitioner, v. American Battle Monuments Commission, Respondent, 814 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - 814 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987) March 25, 1987
Morris V. Brewer requests attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with interim judicial review of a Merit Systems Protection Board ("Board") decision. Brewer v. American Battle Monuments Commission, 23 M.S.P.R. 554 (1984); vacated and remanded, 779 F.2d 663 (Fed. Cir. 1985); modified, 31 M.S.P.R. 243 (1986). He also seeks fees and expenses incurred in connection with the fee application.
The fee petition was brought under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Petitioner also referred to the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) (1). In Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 808 F.2d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (in banc), affirming Olsen v. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, 735 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Austin v. Department of Commerce, 742 F.2d 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1984), this court held that the EAJA does not apply to attorney fees for Board proceedings involving employee tenure, but that such appeals from the Board to this court are "civil actions" to which the EAJA applies by terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A). Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1461-62. As discussed in Gavette, the Back Pay Act applies to proceedings before the Board and may also be invoked in actions before this court. Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A). The history of this legislation states Congress' intention that the EAJA not be given an "overly technical construction ... resulting in the unwarranted denial of fees." H.R.Rep. No. 99-120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 n. 26, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 132, 146 n. 26 ("1985 House Report").
In support the agency cites Gavette and Austin v. Department of Commerce, 742 F.2d 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1984). However, neither of these cases is analogous to or addresses the situation now before us. In Gavette the petitioner had prevailed on the merits on appeal to this court. Gavette, 785 F.2d at 1573, 1580. Thus in Gavette the petitioner was without question a prevailing party. In Austin this court denied a petition for attorney fees for an interim appeal wherein this court remanded for further proceedings before the Board, holding that "if a party wins on a purely procedural issue which results in a remand, this has not made him a 'prevailing party' under other attorney fee provisions." Austin, 742 F.2d at 1420.
Austin followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S. Ct. 1987, 64 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1980), in which the Court interpreted the phrase "prevailing party" in 42 U.S.C. § 19881 to permit an interlocutory award of attorney fees only if a party had "established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claim." Id. at 757, 100 S. Ct. at 1989. Mr. Brewer's position when he first filed his fee petition, before the Board's decision on remand, was analogous to that in Hanrahan and Austin; it is no longer so.
Although a court may not award fees under the EAJA at the time of decision of an interim appeal that does not resolve the merits of the claim, as in Hanrahan and Austin, nothing in these cases suggests that fee awards for the interim civil action must be excluded after the party becomes a "prevailing party." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A). The question of entitlement under such circumstances has not previously been decided by this court, but those courts that have treated the question have interpreted the "prevailing party" requirement to hold that a litigant who is eventually successful, but who was obliged to seek interim appellate review, may recover fees incurred for these steps along the way. This result implements the legislative purpose of the EAJA
This court's denial of Mr. Brewer's initial fee petition was consistent with Hanrahan and Austin and with the rulings of other circuits. See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1253, 1254 (2d Cir. 1984), which like Hanrahan involved fees claimed under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; the court stated that since "plaintiffs have not yet prevailed on the merits in any way ... an award of attorney's fees at this time would be premature", and remanded "with instructions to deny the motion for attorney's fees, without prejudice to its subsequent renewal". Similarly in McGill v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 712 F.2d 28, 30-32 (2d Cir. 1983), applying the EAJA, the Second Circuit held that since the plaintiff had not yet prevailed on the merits of a social security claim, the district court's order awarding attorney fees "at this time" was reversed.
In Dennis v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1985), the court held that after the applicant had prevailed on remand to the agency, fees for an interim appeal to the district court were recoverable under the EAJA. Id. at 972 n. 7. The court stated that the claimant
Id. at 971-72. In Miller v. United States, 753 F.2d 270, 273-75 (3d Cir. 1985), the court granted attorney fees under the EAJA for both the original appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board and the ensuing appeal to the Third Circuit. The court held that although the petitioner had not been a prevailing party at the time of the Third Circuit's interim remand to the MSPB, he became a prevailing party when reinstated by the Board on remand.
Holdings of other circuits have also been consistent in requiring a favorable result on the merits in order to satisfy the term "prevailing party" in these fee-shifting statutes. In Ware v. Reed, 709 F.2d 345, 354-55 (5th Cir. 1983), the court denied a request for interim fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, stating that: "Ware's request is premature. His status as a 'prevailing party' which would warrant the award of a reasonable attorney's fee is 'a matter which must await further developments.' " In accord is Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 652 (7th Cir. 1981). Similarly the Sixth Circuit, applying the EAJA in Kitchen Fresh, Inc. v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 1513, 1513 (6th Cir. 1984), denied fees for an interim appeal, stating: "petitioner has yet to prevail on the merits of any of its claims".
In Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 635-36 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S. Ct. 2999, 64 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1980), a section 1988 case which included appeals from the district court to the circuit court and the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit held after plaintiffs eventually prevailed that "Services relating to the various appeals taken ... are compensable...."
In a fee request under the EAJA, Escobar Ruiz v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1986), the court held:
Because ... Ruiz has not yet received a favorable determination of any of the merits of his underlying action, he cannot be a "prevailing party" for purposes of ... section 2412(d) (1) (A). As a result, he is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees at this time.
The District of Columbia Circuit in Massachusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 776 F.2d 1066, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Brown v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 747 F.2d 878, 879-80, 883 (3d Cir. 1984)) stated that "a claimant ultimately successful on remand may be awarded fees even for procedural victories" [although] "not ... at that particular time since the claimant's rights and liabilities and those of the government have not yet been determined.' " (emphasis in Massachusetts Fair Share) .
On Mr. Brewer's appeal this court held that the Board's decision was based on an erroneous legal premise, and remanded for review under the correct premise. The agency does not dispute that on remand Mr. Brewer prevailed; he achieved more than "some of the benefit ... sought in bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). Mr. Brewer achieved substantially all of the relief he sought: he obtained a reversal of the transfer, a reversal of the demotion, and back pay, suffering only a 15-day suspension. His appeal was a "necessary and important factor" in that success. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978).
The burden of proof resides with the agency to demonstrate either that its position during the proceedings before the Board and on appeal was "substantially justified", or that "special circumstances make an award unjust". See Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1467; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A). Congress left no doubt as to its intention that if the government does not carry this burden, the court must award fees:
H.R.Rep. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4984, 4989. Amending the Act in 1985, Congress clarified that it is the agency's position at the administrative level, as well as its position in litigation, that should be the basis of determination of "substantial justification", 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2) (D), and found "puzzling" this court's more rigorous standard in Gava v. United States, 699 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 1985 House Report at 9 & n. 16, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 138 & n. 16.
The statute states that the application for attorney fees and expenses shall be filed "within thirty days of final judgment in the action". 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A). The statute defines "final judgment" as one that "is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement". 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (G). The legislative history explains:
Fee petitions may be filed before a "final judgment". If the court determines that an award of interim fees is inappropriate the petition should be treated as if it were filed during the thirty-day period following the final decision. The overly technical approach in Auke Bay Concerned Citizens' Advisory Council v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1985) should be avoided.
In Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 803 F.2d 711 (Fed. Cir. 1986), this court applied these principles following a remand to the Claims Court. This court held that "Congress did not intend that an appellant be barred 90 days after an appellate court's judgment reversing and remanding becomes final." Id. at 712; see also Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1459 & n. 5.
Petitioner has withdrawn his request to this court for fees incurred before the Board. He has not, however, clearly separated these sums in the petition as first filed before us. A revised statement is required. In accordance with Scheunemeyer v. United States, 776 F.2d 329, 333 (Fed. Cir. 1985), fees incurred in the preparation and defense of this application may be included. The agency's objections to the amount of the charges, if renewed, will be considered at that time.
Many of the cases discussing the "prevailing party" standard arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act. In NLRB v. Doral Building Servs., 680 F.2d 647, 647 (9th Cir. 1982) the court remarked: "we cannot distinguish it from the Equal Access to Justice Act for purposes of defining 'prevailing party' ", referring to congressional intent that "the term 'prevailing party' as used in the EAJA ... should be consistent with the law developed under existing statutes." Id. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 n. 7, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983), the Court said in applying Sec. 1988: "The standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party' "