Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/334/304/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 06:14:46
Document Index: 771803285

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 811', '§ 878', '§ 878', '§ 811', '§ 811', '§ 811', '§ 878', '§ 878', '§ 811', '§ 878', '§ 811', '§ 811']

The jury returned a verdict of $42,500. The District Court then granted a motion, as to which decision had been reserved during the trial, to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and the judgment entered was therefore one of dismissal. However, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 153 F.2d 841, and directed that judgment be entered on the verdict for plaintiff. When the District Court entered judgment, it added to the verdict interest from the date thereof to the date of judgment. The mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals had made no provision for interest. No motion to recall and amend the mandate had been made, and the term at which it was handed down had expired. Motion to resettle so as to exclude the interest was denied by the District Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals has modified the judgment to exclude the interest in question and to conform to its mandate, 164 F.2d 21, and the case is here on certiorari, 333 U.S. 836. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The plaintiff has at no time moved to amend the mandate which is the basis of the judgment. That it made no provision for interest was apparent on its face. Plaintiff accepted its advantages, and brings her case to this Court not on the proposition that amendment of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
mandate has been improperly refused, but on the ground that the mandate should be disregarded. Such a position cannot be sustained. Hence, the question whether interest might, on proper application, have been allowed is not reached. [Footnote 1] In re Washington & Georgetown R. Co., 140 U. S. 91. [Footnote 2]
In each case, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court nevertheless gave judgment for the defendant as a matter of law; [Footnote 2/1] upon appeal, that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
judgment was reversed, and the cause was remanded with directions to enter judgment on the verdict. In both cases, the appellate courts' mandates were silent concerning interest, but the trial courts included in the judgments interest from the date of the verdict, not merely from the time when judgment was entered following receipt of the appellate courts' mandates. [Footnote 2/2] In the Pratt case, this action of the trial court was sustained as conforming to the mandate; in this case, the trial court's like action was reversed as being in excess of and, to that extent, contrary to the mandate.
The two cases thus present squarely conflicting decisions on two questions: (1) whether the appellate court's mandate includes the interest provided by 28 U.S.C. § 811, [Footnote 2/3] although the mandate makes no explicit mention of interest; (2) whether, if so, the interest allowed by the section properly runs from the date of the verdict, [Footnote 2/4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This Court, however, declines to answer the second question because it determines the first in respondent's favor, accepting, erroneously I think, the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this phase of the case. [Footnote 2/5] That court construed its mandate as not including interest. This was on the basis that the mandate was silent concerning interest, mentioning expressly only the principal sum awarded by the verdict. In such a case, the court said, "the District Court is without power to enter judgment for a different sum." [Footnote 2/6] Hence, it was held, the mandate was violated when interest was added to that sum. 164 F.2d 23. And, even upon the assumption that the mandate might have been amended to include interest by timely application for that purpose, this could not be done after expiration of the term at which the judgment was rendered, as petitioner sought to have done. [Footnote 2/7] Ibid. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As the Blair opinion points out, ordinarily there is no occasion to mention statutory interest expressly, since it chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
attaches as a legal incident from the statute allowing it. [Footnote 2/8] On the other hand, it has often been declared that interest is not allowed on judgments affirmed by this Court or the Circuit Courts of Appeals unless so ordered expressly. [Footnote 2/9] The Blair opinion, however, further notes that all the cases so declaring are founded upon another statute than the one involved here -- namely, 28 U.S.C. § 878. [Footnote 2/10] And, it may be added, the decisions relied upon by this Court and by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this phase of the case presently before us involved either § 878 or the allowance of other relief not based on § 811. [Footnote 2/11]
It becomes important, therefore, to ascertain whether the two statutes, §§ 811 and 878, are alike in their effects as requiring or not requiring explicit mention of the interest provided for in order for it to be included in a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
judgment or mandate. The two sections are very different in their terms. Section 878 authorizes the federal appellate courts to award damages for delay, [Footnote 2/12] and, in terms, makes the award discretionary with the reviewing court. Schell v. Cochran, 107 U. S. 625. It is in connection with such awards, as has been stated, that the repeated decisions now applied to petitioner's claim, grounded solely on § 811, have held that interest is to be deemed denied unless explicitly mentioned in the mandate. [Footnote 2/13]
The Court's decision ignores these vital differences in the statutes, their terms, and effects. Consequently it misapplies the decisions relating to § 878 and other situations chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since the Court does not decide that question, I reserve decision upon it. But I dissent from the refusal to decide it now. The question is of considerable importance for the proper and uniform administration of the statute; it is not entirely without difficulty, [Footnote 2/15] and the uncertainty chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Citing In re Washington & Georgetown R. Co., 140 U. S. 91; Thornton v. Carter, 109 F.2d 316. See text infra at 334 U. S.
See the cases cited in 334 U. S.
139 F.2d 260, 261. The authorities cited were In re Washington & Georgetown R. Co., 140 U. S. 91; Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275; De Witt v. United States, 298 F.1d 2; Green v. Chicago, S. & C. R. Co., 49 F.9d 7; Hagerman v. Moran, 75 F. 97.
Of the cases cited by the Circuit Court of Appeals, see 334 U. S. In re Washington & Georgetown R. Co., supra, is a § 878 case, and Thornton v. Carter, 109 F.2d 316, does not turn on § 811.
See the authorities cited in 334 U. S. see also 334 U. S.
"Interest shall be allowed on all judgments in civil causes, recovered in a district court, and may be levied . . . ;" "it shall be calculated. . . ." (Emphasis added.) See 334 U. S.
Cf. 334 U. S. The matter is somewhat complicated by the anomaly which would result from a decision that, while § 878 provides for allowance of interest as damages for delay when a decision is affirmed, neither that section nor § 811 explicitly provides any such indemnity when a judgment for the defendant is reversed with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff, and by the considerations, obviously relevant on the face of § 811, see 334 U. S. relative to securing uniformity in the allowance of interest as between the federal courts and courts of the state in which the federal court sits. Cf. Massachusetts Benefit Assn. v. Miles, 137 U. S. 689; cf. also Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64.