Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/994/1204/271582/
Timestamp: 2020-05-27 15:58:33
Document Index: 113960867

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 894', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 894', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 841', '§ 3', '§ 3553', '§ 3']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Chong Won Tai, Defendant-appellant, 994 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1993 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Chong Won Tai, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Chong Won Tai, Defendant-appellant, 994 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 994 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1993) Argued Nov. 12, 1992. Decided April 28, 1993
We review the district court's evidentiary rulings only to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion. United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1352 (7th Cir.), cert. den., --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 321, 116 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1991).
Clearly it did. It tended to show that when Tai demanded payment or service from someone, Tae often helped him extract it. That information, combined with the evidence that Tai thought Jung Lee owed him money, was highly probative on the issue of whether Tae's hotel-room attack on Jung Lee was part of Tai's loan-collection efforts. Or, to use the terminology of Rule 404(b), the evidence was admissible as tending to prove Tai's "identity" as the person responsible for the attack on Jung Lee. Essentially the same conclusion was reached in United States v. Czarnecki, 552 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 939, 97 S. Ct. 2652, 53 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1977), also involving a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 894, where a witness' testimony that he had previously collected loans for the defendant was held admissible to prove the defendant's identity as the person responsible for ordering the witness to commit extortion on a particular occasion.
But similarity in that sense was not the basis for admitting their testimony. Rather, it was admitted to demonstrate that Tai employed one of the participants in the attack on Jung Lee and therefore might have been connected with it, much the way evidence of a person's prior possession of a gun found at a robbery site might be admitted to prove the person's involvement in the robbery. See United States v. Waldron, 568 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080, 98 S. Ct. 1276, 55 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1978). In these kinds of cases, where the extrinsic act reveals the defendant's actual control over something involved in the charged act but is not wholly similar to the charged act, the similarity component of the analysis set forth in Shackleford cannot determine the admissibility of the evidence. Czarnecki, 552 F.2d at 702 (under Rule 404(b), the extrinsic act would have to be similar to the charged act "only if a basis for the relevance of the evidence is similarity.").
In addition to proving identity, there was another valid purpose for admitting most of the extrinsic act evidence against Tai, namely, to prove that Tai's "intent" in using harsh words with Jung Lee was to threaten him. Where specific intent is not an essential element of the crime charged, as in the crime of extortionate loan collection, the government may not introduce extrinsic act evidence to prove intent unless it has reason to believe that the defendant will claim innocent intent. Shackleford, 738 F.2d at 781. In this case, the government knew Tai would call an expert witness to testify that his recorded statements to Jung Lee really were not threatening in Korean, the language in which they were spoken, but sounded that way in the English translation because of differences between the two cultures.1 (Rec. at 51.) By claiming that his comments to Jung Lee were not in fact threatening, Tai put his intent in issue. Shackleford, 738 F.2d at 782.
The next step in assessing the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence is to balance its probative value against any unfair prejudicial effect it may have. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1502, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988); Fed.R.Evid. 403. Tai claims that the testimony concerning his other extortionate acts was unfairly prejudicial because it dealt with certain incidents in which Tae was not directly involved, thus going beyond what was necessary to establish a relationship between the two men. But most of the testimony did concern incidents involving both Tai and Tae, and to the extent it did not, it simply put those incidents in context, as is permissible. United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1415 (7th Cir. 1991). Further, since much of the evidence was relevant to another issue, proof of Tai's intent, it did not need to address only the relationship between Tai and Tae. We conclude that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial in its scope.
The instructions were in error to the extent they informed the jury that the extrinsic act evidence could be considered for purposes other than the proper purposes for which it was admitted. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92, 108 S. Ct. at 1502; Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1415-16. But we find that the error here was harmless. At worst, the erroneous instructions might have led the jury to decide issues that it did not need to decide, such as whether Tai had a motive for committing extortion. Taken as a whole, however, the instructions did not suggest that the jury could use the extrinsic act evidence as proof of criminal propensity; the district court clearly and carefully instructed the jury that the evidence could not be used for that purpose. Further, the extrinsic act evidence irrefutably established the nature of Tai's relationship to Tae and, through that, his responsibility for the attack on Jung Lee. Thus, used for its permissible purposes, the evidence was more than adequate to prove Tai's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
So the guns were relevant only to the extent they showed Tai to be the kind of person who would carry such weapons, thus making it more likely that he was the kind of person who committed extortion. Yet for that purpose, of course, the guns were not admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 404(b).
1. Offense-Level Increase.
(1) ... all acts and omissions ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense;
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions ... that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.
Several months after Tetzlaff was decided, however, the Sentencing Commission amended the commentary to § 3B1.1 to make clear that, in its view, the conduct relevant to that guideline included not just the "elements and acts cited in the count of conviction," but "all conduct included under § 1B1.3(a)." Guidelines Part B (Intro.Comm'y). Thus, the new commentary, effective November 1, 1990, rejects this and other courts' prior interpretations of § 3B1.1.
Tai urges us not to take such contrariness lying down. He says the amended commentary should be disregarded because it contradicts the plain language of the guidelines and is weak authority anyway, as Congress has no formal opportunity to review it. See United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813, 815 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 459, 121 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1992) (refusing to follow commentary that rejected the court's earlier interpretation of § 4B1.2). But the circuit courts that agreed with Tetzlaff prior to the commentary amendment, as well as those that had not previously addressed the issue, have since concluded that the amendment should be followed as a permissible clarification of § 3B1.1.2 This court, too, has held that a commentary amendment prevails over a previous decision to the contrary, as long as the amendment clarifies, but does not substantively change, the applicable guideline. United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1347 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 1177, 117 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1992).
Again, that guideline first requires consideration of "all acts and omissions ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense." Guideline § 1B1.3(a) (1). "Preparation" for the offense of conviction must be distinguished from actions that are merely similar to or factually related to the offense of conviction, for such actions are covered by another subsection which applies only to a certain category of offenses. Specifically, § 1B1.3(a) (2) makes relevant "all acts and omissions ... that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction," but only with respect to offenses to which § 3D1.2(d) is applicable.
Guideline § 3D1.2(d). Mercifully, the guideline lists the specific offenses to which it does and does not apply. Included in the latter group is extortionate loan collection under 18 U.S.C. § 894, referred to at § 2E2.1. Thus, Tai's offense is not covered by § 3D1.2(d), nor, therefore, by § 1B1.3(a) (2). As a result, any course of conduct or common scheme or plan of which the extortion of Jung Lee was a part cannot be considered in arriving at an offense-level increase under § 3B1.1.3 As noted above, we arrive at the same result, though in a different way, under Tetzlaff 's interpretation of § 3B1.1.
We review any departure from the guidelines to ensure that the grounds for the departure were appropriate, that the factual findings underlying the departure were not clearly erroneous, and that the extent of the departure was reasonable. United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1271 (7th Cir. 1991). In this case, the district court departed from the guidelines pursuant to § 4A1.3 by increasing Tai's criminal history points from one to four based on evidence that Tai had continued his extortionate activities while incarcerated at the MCC pending the instant trial. Tai does not contend that the district court's findings with respect to the MCC activity were clearly erroneous, nor that such activity was an improper ground for departure.4 Rather, Tai's position is that the extent of the departure was unreasonable.
In this case, the district court identified an appropriate ground for departure and picked a sentencing range from a higher criminal history category, but left out the intermediate step of explaining why the MCC activity made Tai's criminal history more comparable to that of defendants in the higher category. The government asks us to accept its own explanation for the extent of the departure, and Tai asks us to reject that explanation as unreasonable.5 But we will do neither, for it would be inappropriate to accept or reject an explanation that, for all we know, the district court never actually considered. Because the court offered no explanation for the extent of its departure, the case must be remanded for resentencing. United States v. Thomas, 906 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1990).
See: United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 943, 117 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1992) (rejecting its previous position that § 1B1.3(a) did not apply to § 3B1.1); United States v. Lillard, 929 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d 940, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting its previous position with respect to conduct occurring after the date of amendment); United States v. Ruiz-Batista, 956 F.2d 351, 353-54 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 105, 121 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1992) (finding the amendment to be a reasonable clarification of § 3B1.1); United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111, 117 (2nd Cir. 1991) (same)
The opposite would have been true in Tetzlaff, had the court found § 1B1.3 applicable, because the offense of conviction in that case, cocaine possession in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), is covered under § 3D1.2(d). See United States v. Fells, 920 F.2d 1179, 1184 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 2831, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1991)
Although Tai claims that the court may have relied on various other grounds in addition to the MCC activity, the record does not support that claim, so we will not consider whether those grounds would have been appropriate. (72-5 Tr. at 127.) We note that the MCC activity was a proper ground for departure because the guidelines do not take into consideration the effect of conduct (other than obstruction of justice) occurring while the defendant is awaiting trial for the offense of conviction. United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 973, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sanchez, 893 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1990); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
The government would treat the MCC activity as though it had resulted in a prior conviction for extortion, for which Tai probably would have been sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment, and which, therefore, would have increased his criminal history by three points. Guideline 4A1.1(a). Tai, however, says the better approach is to treat the MCC activity as though it resulted in a conviction contemporaneous to his actual convictions and was assigned an offense level of 20. Because that offense level is 13 levels lower than the offense level of Tai's actual convictions, it could not have been used to increase Tai's total offense level. Guideline § 3D1.4(c). Therefore, Tai says, the activity would not justify a criminal history departure, although it might justify a sentence at the higher end of the applicable range