Source: http://famguardian1.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/Liability.htm
Timestamp: 2019-05-20 08:43:32
Document Index: 533083323

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1461', '§1461', '§ 1461', '§\u202f103', '§1461', 'art. 2068', 'art. 1757', 'art. 1757', 'art. 1997', 'art. 1997', 'art. 1998', 'art. 1997', '§7601', '§6331', '§3403', '§4374', '§4401', '§5005', '§5043', '§5703', '§6001', '§ 6703', '§26']

Legal Obligation and Authority-Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Offer in Compromise (Doubt as to Liability), IRS Form 656-L
Doubt as to Liability Offers, Internal Revenue Manual Section 4.18.2
26 U.S.C. §1461. Liability for withheld tax
TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 3 > §1461
§ 1461. Definitions
(Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 360; Pub. L. 89–809, title I, § 103(i), Nov. 13, 1966, 80 Stat. 1554.)
[26 U.S.C. §1461]
[EDITORIAL: This is the ONLY statute making ANYONE liable in the entire Internal Revenue Code Subtitle A]
Joint and several liability. Responsible together and individually. The person who has been harmed can sue and recover from both wrongdoers or from either one of the wrongdoers (if he goes after both of them, he does not, however receive double compensation). See also Joint and several liability; Joint tort-feasors.
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pp. 1223-1226:
OBLIGATION. A generic word, derived from the Latin substantive "obligatio," having many, wide, and varied meanings, according to the context in which it is used. Enyeart v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 146, 285 N.W. 314, 318. That which a person is bound to do or forbear; any duty imposed by law, promise, contract, relations of society, courtesy, kindness, etc. Goodwin v. Freadrich, 135 Neb. 203, 280 N.W. 917, 923. Duty. Rucks-Brandt Const. Co. v. Price, 165 Okl. 178, 23 P.2d 690. Duty imposed by law. Helvering v. British-American Tobacco Co., C.C.A., 69 F.2d 528,530. Law or duty binding parties to perform their agreement. An undertaking to perform. State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4, 97 A.L.R. 431. That which constitutes a legal or moral duty and which renders a person liable to coercion and punishment for neglecting it; a word of broad meaning, and the particular meaning intended is to be gained by consideration of its context. An obligation or debt may exist by reason of a judgment as well as an express contract, in either case there being a legal duty on the part of the one bound to comply with the promise. Schwartz v. California Claim Service, 52 Cal.App.2d 47, 125 P.2d 883, 888. Liabilities created by contract or law, Rose v. W. B. Worthen Co., 186 Ark. 205, 53 S.W.2d 15, 16, 85 A.L.R. 212; or tort. Exchange Bank v. Ford, 3 P. 449, 451, 7 Colo. 314. As legal term word originally meant a sealed bond, but it now extends to any certain written promise to pay money or do a specific thing. Lee v. Kenan, C.C.A.Fla., 78 F.2d 425, 100 A.L.R. 869. A formal and binding agreement or acknowledgment of a liability to pay a certain sum or do a certain thing. United States v. One Zumstein Briefmarken Katalog 1938, D.C. Pa., 24 F.Supp. 516, 519.
The binding power of a vow, promise, oath, or contract. or of law, civil, political, or moral, independent of a promise; that which constitutes legal or moral duty, and whlch renders a person liable to coercion and punishment for neglecting lt. Webster.
A tie which binds us to pay or do something agreeably to the laws and customs of the country in which the obligation is made. Inst. 3, 14.
Obligatlon is (1) legal or moral duty, as opposed to physical compulslon: (2) a duty incumbent upon an individual, or a specific and limited number of individuals, as opposed to a duty imposed upon the Gorld at large; (3) the right to enforce such a duty. (jus in personam,) as opposed to such a right as that of property, (jus in rent,) which avalls against the world at large: (4) a bond contalning a penalty, with a condition annexed, for the payment of money, performance of covenants, or the llke. Mozley & Whitley.
"Obligation" la the correlative of "right." Taking the latter word in itd polltlc~ethical sense, as a power of free action lodged In a person, "obligation" 1s the corresponding duty, constraint, or binding force which should prevent all other persona from denying, abridging, or obstructing such right, or interfering with its exercise. And the same ie itd meaning as the correlative of a "jus in rent.'' Taking"right" aa meaning a "jw in personm," (a power. demand, claim, or privilege inherent In one person, and incident upon another,) the "obligation" is the coerclve force or control imposed upon the person of incidence by the moral law and the positive law, (or the moral law as recognized and sanctioned by the positive law,) constraining him to accede to the demand, render up the thing claimed, pay the money due, or otherwise perform what is expected of him with respect to the subject-matter of the right.
A penal bond or "writing obligatory." that is, a bond containing a penalty, with a condition annexed for the payment of money, performance of covenants, or the like, and which differs from a bill, the latter being generally without a penalty m condition, though it may be obligatory. Co.Litt. 172.
A deed whereby a man binds himself under a penalty to do a thlng. Com.Dig. Obligation (A): Taylor v. Glaser. 2 Serg. & R., Pa., 502; Denton v. Adams, 6 Vt. 40. The word has a very broad and comprehensive legal signiflcation and embraces all instruments of writing, however informal, whereby one party contracts with another for the payment of money or the delivery of specific articles. State v. Campbell, 103 N.C. 344, 9 S.E. 410; Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Mlnn. 353, Gil. 224; Slnton v. Carter Co., 23 F. 535.
In English expositions of the Roman law, and works upon general jurisprudence. "obligation" is used to translate the Latin "obligatio." In this sense its meaning is much wider than as a technical term of English law. See Obligatio.
Conjunctive or alternative obligation. The former is one in which the several objects in it are connected by a copulative, or in any other manner which shows that all of them are severally comprised in the contract. This contract creates as many different obligations as there are different objects; and the debtor, when he wishes to discharge himself, may force the creditor to receive them separately. But where the things which form the object of the contract are separated by a disjunctive, then the obligation is alternative, and the performance of either of such things will discharge the obligor. The choice of performing one of the obligations belongs to the obligor, unless it is expressly agreed that it shall belong to the creditor. Civ.Code La. art. 2068; Dougl. 14; 1 Ld. Rayrn. 279; Galloway v. Legan, 4 Mart. N. S. (La.) 167. A promise to deliver a certain thing or to pay a specified sum of money is an example of an alternative obligation. Civ.Code La. arts. 2063, 2066, 2067.
Contractual obligation. One which arises from a contract or agreement.
Determinate or indeterminate obligation. A determinate obligation is one which has for its object a certain thing: as, an obligation to deliver a certain horse named Bucephalus, in which case
the obligation can be discharged only by delivering the identical horse. An indeterminate obligation is one where the obligor binds himself to deliver one of a certain species: as, to deliver a horse,
where the delivery of any horse will discharge the obligation.
Divisible or indivisible obligation. A divisible obligation is one which, being a unit, may nevertheless be lawfully divided, with or without the consent of the parties. An indivisible obligation is one which is not susceptible of division: as, for example,.if I promise to pay you one hundred dollars, you cannot assign one-half of this to another, so as to give him a right of action against me for his share.
Joint or several obligation. A joint obligation is one by which two or more obligors bind themselves jointly for the performance of the obligation. France v. France, 94 Or. 414, 185 P. 1108.
A several obligation is one where the obligors promise, each for himself, to fulfill the engagement.
Moral obligation. A duty which is valid and binding in conscience and according to natural justice, but is not recognized by the law as adequate to set in motion the machinery of justice; that is, one which rests upon ethical considerations alone, and is not imposed or enforced by positive law. Taylor v. Hotchkiss, 81 App.Div. 470, 80 N. Y.S. 1042; Bailey v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 569, 31 A. 925, 46 Am.St.Rep. 691. A duty which would be enforceable by law, were it not for some positive rule, which, with a view to general benefit, exempts the party in that particular instance from legal liability. Backhaus v. Lee, 49 N.D. 821, 194 N.W. 887, 890; Longstreth v. City of Philadelphia, 245 Pa. 233, 91 A. 667.
Natural or civil obligation. A natural obligation is one which cannot be enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according to natural justice; Blair v. Williams, 4 Litt., Ky., 41. As, for instance, when the action is barred by the act of limitation, a natural obligation still subsists, although the civil obligation is extinguished; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 197, 4 L.Ed. 529; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 318, 337, 6 L.Ed. 606. A civil obligation is a legal tie, which gives the party with whom it is contracted the right of enforcing its performance by law. Civ.Code La. art. 1757; Poth. Obl. 173, 191.
Obedientid obligation. One incumbent on parties in consequence of the situation or relationship in which they are placed. Ersk. Prin. 60.
Perfect or imperfect obligation. A perfect obligation is one recognized and sanctioned by positive law; one of which the fulfillment can be enforced by the aid of the law. Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124, 92 Am.Dec. 56. But if the duty created by the obligation operates only on the moral sense, without being enforced by any positive law, it is called an "imperfect obligation," and creates no right of action, nor has it any legal operation. The duty of exercising gratitude, charity, and the other merely moral duties are examples of this kind of obligation. Civ.Code La. art. 1757; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 600, 24 L.Ed. 793.
Personal or heritable obligation. An obligation is heritable when the heirs and assigns of one party may enforce the performance against the heirs of the other. Civ.Code La. art. 1997. It is personal when the obligor binds himself only, not his heirs or representatives. An obligation is strictly personal when none but the obligee can enforce the performance, or when it can be enforced only against the obligor. Civ.Code La. art. 1997. An obligation may be personal as to the obligee. and heritable as to the obligor, and it may inlike manner be heritable as to ihe obligee, and personal as to the obligor. Civ.Code La. art. 1998. For the term personal obligation, as used in a different sense, see the next paragraph.
Thus, when an estate owes an easement, as a right of way, it is the thlng, and not the owner, who owes the easement. Another instance of a real obligation occurs when a person buys an estate which has been mortgaged, subject to the mortgage; he is not liable for the debt, though the estate Is. In these cases the owner has an interest only because he ir mized of the servient estate or the mortgaged premises, and he may discharge hlmself by abandoning or parting with the property. The obligation is both personal and real when the obligor has bound himself and pledged his estate for the fulfllment of the obligations. In the clvil law and in Louisiana, a real obligation is one which is attached to immovable property, and it passes with such property into whatever hands the property may come, without maklng the third possessor personally responslble. Civ.Code La art. 1997.
Primary obligation. An obligation which is the principal object of the contract. For example, the primary obligation of the seller is to deliver the thing sold, and to transfer the title to it. It is dlstlnguished from the accessory or secondary obligation to pay damages for not doing so.,, 1 Bouv.Inst. no. 702. The word "primary" and "direct, contrasted with "secondary,"	when spoken with reference to an obligatlon.
refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation, rather than to the character and limits of the obllgation itself. Kllton v. Providence Tool Co., 27, R.I. 605, 48 A. 1039.
Primitive or secondary obligation. A primitive obligation, which in one sense may also be called a principal obligation, is one which is contracted with a design that it should itself be the first fulfilled. A secondary obligation is one which is contracted and is to be performed in case the primitive cannot be. For example, if one sells his house, he binds himself to give a title; but if he finds he cannot as when the title is in another, then his secondary obligation is to pay damages for nonperformance of the obligation.
Principal or accessory obligation. A principal obligation is one which arises from the principal object of the engagement of the contracting parties; while an accessory obligation depends upon or is collateral to the principal. See Poth. Obl. no. 182. For example, In the case of the sale of a house and lot of ground, the principal obligatlon on the part of the vendor is to make title for it; the accessory obllgation is to deliver all the title-papers which the vendor has relatlng to it, to take care of the estate until it is delivered, and the like. See, further, the title Accessory Obligation.
Pure obligation. One which is not suspended by any condition, whether it has been contracted without any condition, or, when thus contracted, the condition has been accomplished. Poth. Obl. no. 176. See simple obligation.
Simple or conditional obligation. Simple obligations are such as are not dependent for their execution on any event provided for by the parties, and which are not agreed to become void on the
happening of any such event. Conditional obligations are such as are made to depend on an uncertain event. If the obligation is not to take effect until the event happens, it is a suspensive condition; if the obligation takes effect immediately, but is liable to be defeated when the event happens, it is then a resolutory condition. Civ.Code La. arts. 2020, 2021; Moss v. Smoker, 2 La.Ann. 989. A simple obligation is also defined as one which is not suspended by any condition, either because it has been contracted without condition, or, having been contracted with one, the condition has been fulfilled; and a conditional obligation is also defined as one the execution of which is suspended by a condition which has not been accomplished, and subject to which it has been contracted.
Single or penal obligation. A penal obligation is one to which is attached a penal clause, which is to be enforced if the principal obligation be not performed. A single obligation is one without any penalty: as where one simply promises to pay another one hundred dollars. This is called a single bill, when it is under seal.
Solidary obligation. In the law of Louisiana, one which binds each of the obligors for the whole debt, as distinguished from a "joint" obligation, which binds the parties each for his separate praportion
of the debt. Groves v. Sentell, 14 S.Ct. 898, 153 U.S. 465, 38 L.Ed. 785. See Solidary.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pp. 1223-1226]
Guardian T. & D. Co. v. Fisher, 200 U.S. 57, 26 S.Ct. 186 (1906)
"An individual may be 69*69 under no obligation to do a particular thing, and his failure to act creates no liability, but if he voluntarily attempts to act and do the particular thing he comes under an implied obligation in respect to the manner in which he does it. A surgeon, for instance, may be under no obligation, in the absence of contract, to assume the treatment of an injured person, but if he does undertake such treatment he assumes likewise the duty of reasonable care in such treatment. The owner of a lot is not bound to build a house or store thereon, but if he does so he comes under an implied obligation to use reasonable care in the work to prevent injury therefrom to others. Holmes on the Common Law, 278. Even if the water company was under no contract obligations to construct waterworks in the city or to supply the citizens with water, yet having undertaken to do so it comes under an implied obligation to use reasonable care, and if through its negligence injury results to an individual it becomes liable to him for the damages resulting therefrom, and the action to recover is for a tort and not for breach of contract."
[Guardian T. & D. Co. v. Fisher, 200 U.S. 57, 26 S.Ct. 186 (1906)]
26 U.S.C. §7601(a):
26 U.S.C. §6331(a):
"'Tax' is legal imposition, exclusively of statutory origin, and liability to taxation must be read in statute, or it does not exist." Bente v. Bugbee, 137 A. 552; 103 N.J. Law. 608 (1927)
§3403 states that employers shall be liable for payment of tax withheld from employee wages
§4374 places tax liability on foreign insurance policies;
§4401 establishes tax liability on wagering;
§5005 lays a tax liability for distilled spirits, wines and beer on distillers or importers;
§5043 establishes wine tax liability on wine cellar proprietors or importers;
§5703 places cigar and cigarette tax liability on manufacturers or importers.
Admit that the United States Supreme Court has held in C.I.R. v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 89 (1959), and in U.S. v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 358-359 (1957), that a regulation that purports to create a legal requirement not imposed by Congress in the underlying statute is invalid.
Without question, a taxing statute must describe with some certainty the transaction, service, or object to be taxed, and in the typical situation it is construed against the Government, Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S. Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858
This conclusion is supported by the statute which provides the underlying requirements for keeping records, making statements, etc., located at 26 USC §6001: Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe. Whenever in the judgement of the Secretary it is necessary, he may require any person, by notice served upon such person, or by regulations, to make such returns, render such statements, or keep such records, as the Secretary deems sufficient to show whether or not such person is liable for tax under this title. The only records which an employee shall be required to keep under this section in connection with charged tips shall be charge receipts, records necessary to comply with section 6053 (C), and copies of statements furnished by employees under section 6053 (a).
Clarification via 26 USC sec 6053(a) is as follows: (a) REPORTS BY EMPLOYEES. – Every employee who, in the course of his employment by an employer, receives in any calendar month tips which are wages (as defined in section 3121(a) or section 3401(a)) or which are compensation (as defined in section 3231(e)) shall report all such tips in one or more written statements furnished to his employer on or before the 10th day following such month. Such statements shall be furnished by the employee under such regulations, at such other times before such 10th day, an in such form and manner, as may be prescribed by the Secretary.
Unraveling Sec. 6001 straightens out the meaning of Sec. 6011, which requires filing returns, statements, etc., by the person made liable (Sec. 3401(d)), as distinguished from the person required to make returns (payments) at Sec. 6012 (sec. 3401(c)). Even though a person might be a citizen or resident of the United States employed by an agency of the United States, and thereby be required to return a prescribed amount of United States – source income, he is not the person liable under Sec. 6011 and attending regulations.
The "method of assessment" prescribed at 26 USC Sec. 6303 is therefore dependent on the taxing statute and must rest on authority specifically conveyed by a taxing statute which prescribes liability where the Secretary (1) has provided specific notice, including the statute and type of tax being imposed, or (2) supports assessment by regulatory application. In the absence of one or the other, an assessment by the Secretary is of no consequence as it is not legally obligating.
2) the case of United States v. Sullivan 274 U.S. 259 (1927) states that I can, by law, raise objections and controversies on a return.
"Purpose of rules that federal agencies are required to abide by their own regulations even where such regulations are more generous than required by law is to prevent unjust discrimination and denial of adequate notice of procedures by the agency in violation of due process."
United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827, 828 (9th Cir.) (1978)
“If the form or return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make a return at all.” United States v. Sullivan 274 U.S. 259 at 262
Also, in my effort to understand the IRS’ determination and threat to penalize me I have discovered the following statement from the IRS’ own Internal Revenue Manual at [120.1] 10.9 (08-12-1998):
The intent of the law [6702] is to stop the flow of returns, amended returns, or documents which purport to be returns, that contain altered line items or claim clearly unallowable deductions or credits based on a frivolous position.
It is unreasonable to believe that my submission of duly promulgated tax forms in the proper and specific manner for which they were created qualifies as a frivolous action. Therefore, to attempt to press this matter from your position will place the IRS in direct conflict with the Court, as well as its own governing Manual provisions. As a result, it appears to have entrapped me with civil penalties despite the fact that the IRS itself has promulgated the Forms by which I can make contentions of factual nature.
Furthermore, the IRS Penalty Handbook [120.1] 1.2.1 [08-20-1998] details 10 points explaining how penalties are to encourage ‘Voluntary Compliance’.
“In the present context these principles require…timely and adequate notice detailing reasons…, by presenting arguments and evidence… FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 275-277 (1949)”
“This court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out…in all types of cases where administrative...actions were under scrutiny.”
pursuant to the standards of due process of law as held by the U.S. Supreme Court, and the burden of proof being upon the Secretary pursuant to 26 USC § 6703(a),
I want to remind you of the Statues and Regulations I am relying upon for the determination if I am liable for any tax or subject to any internal revenue tax as found in the definition of Taxpayer as in code sect 7701 (a)(14). I first am relying upon the privacy act statement in the 1040 instruction book where the Secretary of the Treasury cites code sects. 6001, 6011. and 6012. They clearly say I have to pay taxes I am liable for according to regulations , that is not statutes but REGULATIONS and that I have to have Gross Income according to Regulations. I have relied upon the following REGULATIONS and their Statutes: All are found in 26 CFR and now I will list them, 1.1-1b, 1.61-1, 1.16-2, 1.861-1, 1.861-8, 1.863-1c, 1.861-2, 1.861-3, 1.861-4. I cannot find any provisions of these Regulations that describe my situation in any of the examples of taxable situations or sources of income found in these Regulations. I was unable to also find any other REGULATIONS describing the earned income of a U.S. Citizen who lives and works within the U.S. I want to also remind you that the Regulations are the official interpretations of the Secretary of the Treasury of the provisions and scope of the Statutes. These Regulations are binding upon the IRS.
26 U.S.C. §26. - Limitation based on tax liability; definition of tax liability
TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter A > PART IV > Subpart A > Sec. 26.