Source: http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f205400/205484.htm
Timestamp: 2013-06-19 20:44:40
Document Index: 798767142

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 371', '§ 1341', '§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 3231', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 1291', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3231', '§ 1291', '§ 371', '§ 1341', '§ 3742', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', 'in fine', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3742', '§ 1', '§ 3553']

Opening Brief for Appellant United States of America : U.S. v. Mitchell Mosallem
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and 04-3772
Appellant  Cross-Appellee,
BIRJ DECKMEJIAN,
Defendant  Appellee  Cross-Appellant.
OPENING BRIEF FOR APPELLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RALPH T. GIORDANO	REBECCA MEIKLEJOHN	DOUGLAS M. TWEEN	ELIZABETH PREWITT	Attorneys	U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division	26 Federal Plaza, Room 3630 New York, NY 10278	R. HEWITT PATE
JAMES M. GRIFFIN	Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
JOHN J. POWERS, III
STEVEN J. MINTZ
(202) 514-2414
Attorneys for Appellant  Cross- Appellee United States of America
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT	STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION	STATEMENT OF ISSUES	STATEMENT OF THE CASE	STATEMENT OF FACTS	SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT	ARGUMENT	Standard of Review
The District Court Erred By Granting the Downward Departure	Deckmejian's Circumstances Are Not So Extraordinary As to Justify a Downward Departure
The District Court Made No Finding That the Bureau of Prisons
Would be Unable to Care for Deckmejian's Medical Conditions	The District Court Relied On A Legally Inappropriate Factor	The District Court Never Compared Deckmejian's
Circumstances to Any Other Case	The District Court Made No Finding that
Deckmejian's Age Was Unusual In Any Respect	The Extent of the Downward Departure Was an Abuse of Discretion
The District Court Erred By Refusing to Impose Any Fine	CONCLUSION	CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
SPECIAL APPENDIX
Cases:	Page
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)	United States v. Ahmad, 2 F.3d 245 (7th Cir. 1993)	United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1995)	United States v. Barresi, 316 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2002)	United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1049 (1996)	United States v. Farraj, 211 F. Supp.2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)	United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1993)	United States v. Goff, 20 F.3d 918 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 987 (1994) United States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied 503 U.S. 1009 (1992)	United States v. Huerta, 371 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2004)	United States v. Johnson, 318 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2003)	United States v. Khawaja, 118 F.3d 1454 (11th Cir. 1997)	United States v. Kloda, 133 F. Supp.2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)	United States v. Kostakis, 364 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2004)	Cases:
United States v. Krilich, 257 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1163 (2002)	United States v. Leiva-Deras, 359 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004)	United States v. Malpeso, 943 F. Supp. 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1996),
aff'd, 126 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1997)	United States v. Marin-Castaneda, 134 F.3d 551 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1144 (1998)	United States v. Martinez, 207 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000)	United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1162 (2000)
United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2001)	United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1039 and 528 U.S. 870 (1999)	United States v. Petrelli, 306 F. Supp.2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)	United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 510 U.S. 954 (1993)	23
United States v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 967 and 537 U.S. 847 (2002)	United States v. Sanchez-Estrada, 62 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 1995)	United States v. Sentamu, 212 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2000)	United States v. Tappin, 205 F.3d 536 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000)	United States v. A. Alfred Taubman, No. 02-1253
and 297 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2002)
United States v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000)	United States v. Tucker, 986 F.2d 278 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 820 (1993)	FEDERAL STATUTES AND RULES
15 U.S.C. § 1	18 U.S.C. § 371	18 U.S.C. § 1341	18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)	18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)	18 U.S.C. § 3231	18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)	18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)	28 U.S.C. § 1291	MISCELLANEOUS
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003)	14
USSG § 5E1.2(2)	USSG § 5H1.1	USSG § 5H1.4	USSG § 5K2.0	Warren St. John, Advice From ExCons to a Jet-Set Jailbird: Best Walk on Eggs,
N.Y. Times, July 13, 2003	PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The United States appeals from that part of the final judgment imposing
sentence on defendant Birj Deckmejian by U.S. District Judge Thomas P. Griesa
(S.D.N.Y.).
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The district
court entered final judgment on June 3, 2004. The United States timely filed its
notice of appeal on July 1, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
1.	Whether the district court erred by granting Deckmejian a
downward departure primarily on the basis of medical conditions that are not
extraordinary and without finding that the Bureau of Prisons would be unable to
accommodate them.
2.	Whether the district court erred in the extent of the substantial
downward departure, which excused Deckmejian from imprisonment altogether. 3.	Whether the district court erred by refusing to impose any fine when
Deckmejian, who admits to having substantial assets, did not show any inability to
The Department of Justice for several years has investigated bid rigging,
fraud, and tax evasion in the advertising and graphic services industries in New
York. Recently, part of this investigation has focused on related conspiracies
centered around Grey Global Group, Inc. ("Grey"), an advertising agency
headquartered in Manhattan.
One of these conspiracies was a phony billing scheme involving The Color
Wheel, Inc. ("Color Wheel"), a Manhattan supplier of graphic services to Grey,
and defendant Deckmejian, who was one of Color Wheel's sales representatives
and the senior salesperson on the Grey account. Pursuant to this conspiracy, from
1991 until July 2000, Color Wheel issued to Grey roughly 140 invoices 
fraudulently inflated by some $450,000  in an effort secretly to recoup expenses
for which Color Wheel ordinarily would not be paid. These expenses included
substantial goods and services for the benefit of Grey executives and employees,
such as more than $60,000 worth of tickets to theater, sporting, and cultural
events, and more than $200,000 worth of graphics items such as wedding
invitations, cards, and brochures, plus expenses in connection with jobs for other
Grey clients that had gone over budget. Grey paid these invoices and, in turn, was
reimbursed by its clients, who were unaware that the invoices had been inflated.
Deckmejian was first charged on May 16, 2002, under 18 U.S.C. § 371, with
conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) in connection with the above-described scheme. Trial of this charge began on October 21, 2003. Deckmejian
testified over the course of two days. The trial ended on November 7, 2003 with
the jury finding Deckmejian guilty.(1) Before and during trial, Deckmejian did not
ask the government or the court for any dispensation or accommodation based on
To date, more than 40 individuals have been convicted of antitrust, fraud, and
tax violations in the government's investigation of the advertising and graphic
services industries. The vast majority have pled guilty, including the "ringleaders"
of the Grey-related conspiracies, Haluk K. Ergulec, the owner of Color Wheel, and
Mitchell E. Mosallem, an executive vice president and director of graphic services
at Grey. Ergulec was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment, and Mosallem was
sentenced to 70 months' imprisonment. At sentencing, which took place on May 4, 5, and 21, 2004, the district court
determined that Deckmejian was subject to a United States Sentencing Guidelines
("USSG") range of 24  30 months' imprisonment and a fine range of $5,000 
$50,000. Over the United States' objections, the district court granted a
downward departure and sentenced Deckmejian to three years' probation with
home confinement for the entire period. The court based its decision on
Deckmejian's medical conditions, and perhaps age (69),(2) and found that any term
of imprisonment would adversely affect his health. The court also refused to
impose a fine, contending that restitution of $186,000 was sufficient punishment. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Minutes after the jury returned its guilty verdict against Deckmejian, and
before receiving any expert medical testimony or medical records,(3) the district
court told the prosecution and defense counsel that the court questioned the
"fairness in subjecting [Deckmejian] to a prison sentence. I put that right out." Joint Appendix ("A-") 15. The court commented in part: So if he had been selling heroin, which undoubtedly it would have killed a lot
of people and wrecked their lives; if he had been robbing banks; if he had
been even engineering this whole thing, that would be one thing. Then one
would not  maybe I would not be engaged in this. But I think you've got to
weigh the level of his culpability with his condition, and really consider
whether anything like 30 to 37 months prison represents even the slightest
breath of justice. Because I don't believe it does.
A-24.(4)
At sentencing, the district court rejected both the upward enhancement to the
offense level urged by the United States and the reductions urged by Deckmejian.(5) The court determined the amount of the loss to be $450,000, based on trial
exhibits detailing roughly 140 invoices in which Color Wheel fraudulently billed
Grey's clients for entertainment tickets provided by Deckmejian for Grey
executives, free graphics items produced for executives of Grey, and expenses in
connection with jobs for other Grey clients that had gone over budget. A-34-35. The base offense level for fraud, together with the $450,000 loss and a two-level
increase for more than minimal planning, indicated a total offense level of 17
which, in conjunction with criminal history category of I, yielded a guideline
range of 24  30 months' imprisonment and a fine range of $5,000  $50,000. SPA-29, A-117.(6)
On Deckmejian's health, the court received certain medical records for
Deckmejian and letters from Murray J. Berenson, M.D., Deckmejian's personal
physician for 25 years, and H. Thomas Foley, M.D., J.D., a career federal
government doctor with experience at the National Cancer Institute and reviewing
the medical records of cancer patients who currently teaches at the Veterans
Administration Hospital in Washington, D.C. and continues to see patients on a
limited basis. See A-234-240 (Foley curriculum vitae).
Dr. Berenson's written submission opined that "the possibility of death in the
event of further physical deterioration will be increased if [Deckmejian] is
incarcerated" and "considering all the physical and emotional stress that Mr.
Deckmejian has been under, the possibility of incarceration in itself is enough to
put him at the highest risk of physical deterioration." A-188, 192. See also
A-518-519 (Berenson additional letter). Dr. Foley's response discussed each of
Deckmejian's alleged conditions and concluded that "[b]ecause none of Mr.
Deckmejian's conditions require active medical intervention at this time, and
because I believe that the Bureau of Prisons can provide the follow up care and
surveillance required for them, I do not believe that incarceration per se would
negatively affect his health." A-227. The United States also submitted a letter and attachment from the Health
Systems Administrator, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Northeast Regional Office. A-230-233. The Administrator stated that she reviewed the same letters from Drs.
Berenson and Foley and, based on the conditions described, stated that "[t]he BOP
has the physicians, staff, expert community consultant staff and facilities to
provide for Mr. Deckmejian's medical condition, at both medical referral centers
and general populations institutions." A-231. She added that the Bureau of
Prisons has "numerous medications for the treatment of Mr. Deckmejian's medical
needs" and that "the Bureau of Prisons houses approximately 12,000 inmates with
hypertension and 6,700 inmates with diabetes," two of Deckmejian's most salient
conditions. Id.
The court also heard brief testimony from Drs. Berenson and Foley. Dr.
Berenson explained Deckmejian's medical conditions as follows:
Lung cancer  Removal of part of one lung in 2001, but "[a]t the present time
we have no current or clinical evidence that he has active cancer." A-76. No
ongoing medication (checkup every three months). A-87.
Bladder cancer  Tumor removed in 2000, but no active cancer and no
ongoing medication or treatment (checkup every six months). A-76, 89-90.
Diabetes  Type II adult-onset diabetes, but no medications (controlled by
diet and exercise). A-74, 86.
High blood pressure  Takes a common medication, Vasotec (10 mg twice
per day). A-74-75, 83.
Reduced kidney function, but no medications other than Vasotec. A-75-76.
Bouts of diverticulitis (colon infection) and gout. A-74, 78.
Peripheral neuropathy (pain in feet). A-77.
Dr. Berenson was asked, by Deckmejian's counsel, specifically why he
thought incarceration would adversely affect Deckmejian. Dr. Berenson
Birj knows, for instance, and my entire practice knows, that they can call me
any time of the day or night. In the middle of the night Birj has called me and
talked to me about abdominal pain, an onset of fever and some diarrhea. By
questioning him I can tell him whether it is a bout of diverticulitis that might
be developing; I can describe to him how I would handle it overnight if we
can't see each other[.]
A-78.
On cross-examination, Dr. Berenson admitted that he had no familiarity with
Bureau of Prisons medical services or facilities and that he made no inquiries to
the Bureau of Prisons before submitting his letters to the court, A-82; that
Deckmejian has lived with high blood pressure for 25 years, A-84; that
Deckmejian experienced a stressful trial, conviction, and period awaiting
sentencing without needing any change in his blood pressure medication or
requiring medication for diabetes, A-85-86; that Deckmejian has no medical
restrictions on travel or work (but is restricted from vigorous exercise), A-87; that
Deckmejian has never required hospitalization for diverticulitis and, more
generally, has not been hospitalized within the past five years except for the lung
cancer surgery and bladder tumor removal, A-91-92; and that there is a
"significant" likelihood of Deckmejian's health substantially declining in the next
few years even if he were not to be imprisoned. A-92.
Dr. Foley described the medical records that he reviewed and opined that "the
records that I had from 2003 were sufficiently sort of the dog that didn't bark type. There were no references to anything serious going on. I didn't believe that there
was anything in the records that would have shown anything serious going on, that
was still going on." A-102. Dr. Foley gave his prognoses for Deckmejian's
conditions as follows:
Lung cancer  Deckmejian had "the earliest type of cancer" with no
metastasis, and required no radiation therapy or chemotherapy. A-103. He
has "only about 10 more percent chance that he will develop evidence of
metastasis in the next four years." A-105.
Bladder cancer  Deckmejian's tumor was "low grade" and "considered very
superficial." A-110. There is "no reason" to suppose that imprisonment
would significantly increase the likelihood of any cancer returning. A-110-111.
Diabetes  Deckmejian has "a really mild form of diabetes" that is "treated
completely by diet and exercise." A-106. Any potential need for future
medication "may happen in or out of jail and wouldn't have anything to do
with being in prison." A-109.
Kidney function  "[I]t is clear that anything he has with his kidney right now
is not related in his particular instance to his diabetes." A-107. The medical
records show a slight increase in one of Deckmejian's kidney tests, but "the
most likely cause is probably the relationship to a drug that he was taking." Id.
High blood pressure  "Dr. Berenson's records again show pretty good
control of the hypertension on this current dose of Vasotec." A-108.
Dr. Foley saw no reason to expect that any of Deckmejian's interrelated conditions
 hypertension, diabetes, and kidney disease  would spiral out of control in the
next two or three years. A-108-109.
The district court then briefly questioned Deckmejian, who testified that he is
unemployed but would be willing to work, even in a grocery store, A-113, 116;
that he walks his dog daily for several blocks and helps his wife shop, A-114, but
"[t]he health problems are a major problem in [his] life," A-115; and that he has
leg cramps and shortness of breath. Id. The district court began its ruling by stating that it had no doubt about the
qualifications or expertise of either Dr. Berenson or Dr. Foley. A-118. But the
court expressed its concern about the risks noted in Dr. Berenson's pre-sentencing
letter, especially his conclusion that "considering all the physical and emotional
stress that Mr. Deckmejian has been under, the possibility of incarceration in itself
is enough to put him at the highest risk of physical deterioration." A-118-119. The court then stated:
But neither the law nor common sense really tells us that the end of the
question is the availability of medical treatment in a federal prison. The
prison environment is something that must be considered. Also, although
federal prisons do their best within that prison environment to administer
medical treatment, I know from experience that there are lapses, undoubtedly
unintentional, where people do not get the treatment they need. A prison is a
prison, and prisons have lots of requirements. They are difficult places to
run. And with all the best intentions and sometimes with the best equipment
medical treatment can be somewhere down the list. I know this from
applications I have had from people who are incarcerated in federal
institutions. A-120.(7) At a later continuation of the sentencing, the court repeated that it had
weighed the judge's own "acquaint[ance] with prison medical facilities . . . along
with [Dr. Berenson's] opinion." A-132-133.
The court then granted the downward departure "on the grounds of the age
and health" (A-155) from 24  30 months' imprisonment to three years' probation,
repeating its reliance on the conclusions of Dr. Berenson's letter. A-121-122. The
court did not identify the offense level to which it intended to depart, nor did the
court explain how it arrived at 36 months of probation and home confinement
when the guideline range was 24  30 months. Deckmejian did not object to the
probation. Only on the third and final day of sentencing, after the government
requested home confinement, did the court impose any conditions on Deckmejian.
The court imposed restitution of $186,000 but no fine, saying:
I believe that the $186,000 is a very substantial amount, and I am not levying
a fine. It seems to me that the maximum consideration should go to
reimbursing the victims, and that's why I am agreeing with the Government
100 percent on its estimate of the amount due, and I'm ordering payment of
all of that in the way of restitution, but that is enough of a financial penalty. A-171.(8) The final judgment says that any fine is "waived or below the guideline range because of inability to pay." SPA-29. Deckmejian did not argue inability to
pay, and he did not submit any evidence on inability to pay. The Probation Office
determined that Deckmejian has a net worth of almost $2 million (see Presentence
Investigation Report separately attached). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred as a matter of law in granting the downward
departure. Neither Deckmejian's medical conditions nor age are extraordinary. His medical conditions are controlled and simply require monitoring. The district
court did not find that the Bureau of Prisons would be unable to accommodate
Deckmejian's conditions, and the court could not do so because Deckmejian gave
the court no factual basis whatsoever to support such a finding. Instead, the
district court's decision was infected by a legally inappropriate factor: the judge's
personal, subjective, and anecdotal "acquaintance" with Bureau of Prisons medical
The district court abused its discretion in the extent of the departure, because
Deckmejian's health does not justify excusing him from prison altogether. The
court readily could have recommended designation to a Bureau of Prisons hospital
facility, as has been done for comparable defendants with medical problems, and
thereby satisfied both the need for deterrence and its concerns about Deckmejian's
health. Alternatively, the court could have imposed a prison term of less than 24
months followed by a period of supervised release.
The district court erred as a matter of law by refusing to impose any fine
because the Guidelines mandate a fine absent inability to pay. Deckmejian did not
show any inability to pay. Indeed, the Probation Office found that Deckmejian has
substantial assets.
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), as amended by the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21,
117 Stat. 650 (2003) ("PROTECT Act"), "requires us to apply a de novo standard
of review when the sentence imposed is outside the applicable Guideline range to
determine whether a departure is justified by the facts of the case." United States
v. Kostakis, 364 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). Accord United States v. Huerta, 371 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2004); United
States v. Leiva-Deras, 359 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2004) ("That [PROTECT] Act
directs us to review downward departures de novo.").(9)
The extent of a downward departure is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
Kostakis, 364 F.3d at 51. Factual findings supporting the departure are reviewed
for clear error. See id. The District Court Erred By Granting the Downward Departure A district court may depart from a defendant's guideline range when it "finds
'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.'" USSG § 5K2.0 (2000) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). Age and health are subjects
covered by the Guidelines and indisputably were taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission. Section 5H1.1 says that age is not a basis for departure
unless the defendant is "elderly and infirm," and § 5H1.4 adds that only an
"extraordinary physical impairment" justifies departure on health grounds for
persons not yet "elderly."
"If the special factor is a discouraged factor, . . . the court should depart only
if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the
case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present." Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996). Accord United States v. Tappin, 205 F.3d 536, 540
(2d Cir.) ("because one of the major purposes of the Guidelines was to eliminate
unjustified disparities in sentences among similarly situated defendants, '[b]efore a
departure is permitted, certain aspects of the case must be found unusual enough
for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline.'") (quoting Koon, 518
U.S. at 98), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000). Deckmejian's Circumstances Are Not So Extraordinary
As to Justify a Downward Departure
"The general presumption is that the defendant's circumstances are not
unusual enough to justify departure. Hence, the defendant must provide evidence
that shows his situation is outside the heartland of the applicable guidelines." Leiva-Deras, 359 F.3d at 193. In the case of physical condition, this Court has
made clear that "[t]he standards for a downward departure on medical grounds are
strict." United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1039 and 528 U.S. 870 (1999). "Section 5H1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines
restricts departures based on physical condition to defendants with an
'extraordinary physical impairment,' such as those which render a defendant
'seriously infirm.'" United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 1995).
Deckmejian's own doctor conceded that none of his conditions are
imminently life-threatening, and they do not restrict him from working, traveling,
or normal daily activities. A-75, 87. Deckmejian's cancer is in remission, and he
requires only monitoring. A-90, 105. Cf. Altman, 48 F.3d at 104 ("The health
problems cited by the defendant simply need monitoring, and Altman does not
challenge the district court's finding that the Bureau of Prisons would be fully able
to monitor his health."). Deckmejian's diabetes does not require medication. A-86. His blood pressure is under control from a common medication. A-108. He has no treatment for sleep apnea. A-228. His occasional episodes of
diverticulitis are controlled by drinking liquids and, if necessary, antibiotics. A-79. By comparison, many defendants with more serious medical conditions have
been sent to prison. In Persico, this Court affirmed denial of a downward
departure despite the fact that the defendant, while imprisoned, had received a
triple coronary bypass, had a cancerous kidney removed, and also suffered from
hypertension. See 164 F.3d at 801. In Altman, a downward departure was denied
where the 64 year old defendant had a serious heart problem and degenerative hip
condition that had resulted in aortic valve replacement surgery and two hip
operations. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 18 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing
Altman's medical condition), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1162 (2000). See also United
States v. Johnson, 318 F.3d 821, 824-26 (8th Cir. 2003) (departure based on
coronary heart disease, hypertension, and Hodgkins Disease was abuse of
discretion where Hodgkins was in remission and other conditions controlled);
United States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1991) ("there is nothing
about Guajardo's . . . health (cancer in remission, high blood pressure, a fused
right ankle, an amputated left leg, and drug dependency) that justifies such a
downward departure"), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009 (1992); United States v.
Farraj, 211 F. Supp.2d 479, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("health condition that requires
monitoring every two months and might, in the future, require additional
procedures to remove skin cancer," plus inability to walk for long periods, was not
extraordinary impairment). But even if Deckmejian's conditions could be considered extraordinary, there
is no basis for finding that imprisonment would worsen his health in any way. Dr.
Foley testified squarely that imprisonment would have no effect, A-109-111, and
if some of Deckmejian's conditions should deteriorate, they would do so
regardless of imprisonment. A-109. The district court's medical basis for the
downward departure, Dr. Berenson's conclusory letter, was undermined by Dr.
Berenson's live testimony. Dr. Berenson admitted that Deckmejian's health is
likely to worsen even if he is not imprisoned. A-92. More specifically, when
asked directly why prison might be expected to affect Deckmejian adversely, all
Dr. Berenson could offer was that Deckmejian would not be able to call him on
the telephone as readily as he can now. A-78-79.
If Deckmejian can avoid prison on the facts of this case, then potentially
thousands of defendants who at some time were treated for cancer and have mild
diabetes and hypertension will be able to avoid prison as well. The district court never explained why Deckmejian's health conditions are more extraordinary than
 or even atypical when compared to  the "20,000 [Bureau of Prisons] inmates
per year who have acute, chronic, terminal, and resolved medical illnesses,"
A-232, the "12,000 inmates with hypertension," A-231, or the "6,700 inmates with
diabetes." Id. The District Court Made No Finding That the Bureau of Prisons Would be Unable to Care for Deckmejian's Medical Conditions
The "extraordinary physical impairment" required by the Guidelines for
justifying a health-based departure requires "medical conditions that the Bureau of
Prisons is unable to accommodate." Persico, 164 F.3d at 806 (citing Altman, 48
F.3d at 104). Accord United States v. Krilich, 257 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2001)
(impairment is "extraordinary in the sense that prison medical facilities cannot
cope with it"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1163 (2002). To make that finding, the
district court had to "ascertain, through competent medical testimony, that the
defendant needs constant medical care, or that the care he does need will not be
available to him should he be incarcerated." Krilich, 257 F.3d at 693 (citation
The district court made no factual finding of a medical condition that the
Bureau of Prisons would be unable to accommodate. To the contrary, the court
assumed that the prison system would be able to accommodate Deckmejian's
I will assume that the Bureau of Prisons would take steps that are medically
necessary to provide Mr. Deckmejian with medications, with testing, and with
treatment. . . . [I]f somebody got on the stand and spoke about the Bureau of
Prisons, I am sure they would say everything will be treated and there will be
testing and precautions and all that[.]"
A-71. But, in the court's view, that accommodation would not be sufficient. See
id. In any event, the district court had no basis for finding an "extraordinary
physical impairment" that the Bureau of Prisons would be unable to accommodate
because Dr. Berenson admitted to having no familiarity whatsoever with the
medical facilities or treatment available in the Bureau of Prisons system. A-82. Neither Deckmejian, nor Dr. Berenson in particular, offered any evidence to rebut
the United States' submission that the Bureau of Prisons can accommodate
Deckmejian's conditions and that the Bureau of Prisons currently administers
treatment for thousands of inmates with hypertension and diabetes. A-231.(10) Cf.
United States v. Martinez, 207 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (no evidence that
defendant's diabetes could not be cared for by Bureau of Prisons); United States v.
Petrelli, 306 F. Supp.2d 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("nor does the record suggest
that the treatment available while in custody would be inadequate in the event a
period of incarceration is imposed"). Moreover, Dr. Berenson did not testify that
Deckmejian needs constant care, and he did not testify that Deckmejian's current
care would be unavailable in prison.
Dr. Berenson's conclusions therefore were pure speculation. He never gave a
single example of care or treatment that Deckmejian would not be able to get in
prison that he currently receives or might need in the future. Deckmejian therefore
failed to challenge the Bureau of Prisons' ability to accommodate his conditions,
and the district court had no basis for finding an "extraordinary physical
impairment."
The District Court Relied On A Legally Inappropriate Factor
The district judge emphasized, with some vehemence, that he "weighed" his
own "acquaint[ance] with prison medical facilities" together with Dr. Berenson's
opinion in deciding to grant the departure. A-132-133. The court's acquaintance
with the Bureau of Prisons was purely anecdotal, based on "applications I have
had from people who are incarcerated in federal institutions," A-120, and a visit to
a New York state prison. A-95.
The district judge's personal, subjective, and anecdotal knowledge of Bureau
of Prisons capabilities cannot be a proper factor to weigh in determining whether
to grant a downward departure. First, the United States had no opportunity (or
even ability) to cross-examine or present contrary evidence on that factor. The
district judge never identified the inmates who sent him the "applications" and did
not explain their particular circumstances. Second, a proper finding about Bureau
of Prisons capabilities cannot be based on anecdote. Given the record, it is just as
likely that Deckmejian could be the case in which an inmate receives care and
treatment superior, rather than inferior, to what he would have obtained outside
prison. In any event, even if Bureau of Prisons medical facilities or care is sub-optimal, that fact still would not justify a downward departure. Cf. United States
v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir.) (even if it were Bureau of Prisons policy
to deny reassignment to relaxed-security facilities to alien prisoners who must be
deported, that policy would be inappropriate basis for downward departure), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 954 (1993). See also Krilich, 257 F.3d at 694 ("That the Bureau
has not provided (and does not propose to provide) the quality of care that top
private specialists provide is neither here nor there; wealthy defendants can afford
exceptional care, but this does not curtail the punishment for their crimes."). If the
district court believes that Bureau of Prisons medical care is inadequate, "the
appropriate way to remedy that defect would be pursuit of an action that
challenges such a policy head-on, not the ad hoc granting of departures that have
the effect of creating the very type of disparity in sentencing that the adoption of
the Guidelines was intended to eliminate." Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 646. The District Court Never Compared Deckmejian's Circumstances to Any Other Case
In United States v. Sentamu, 212 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2000), this Court
quoted the Supreme Court's explanation that "whether a discouraged factor
nonetheless justifies departure because it is present in some unusual or exceptional
way, are matters determined in large part by comparison with the facts of other
Guidelines cases" (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 98) (emphasis added). Accord
United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2001) (same).
Here, the prosecutor pointed out to the court that the record contained no
comparisons of Deckmejian to other defendants, A-134, and tried to explain that,
in the experience of the Antitrust Division, other defendants sentenced to prison
for antitrust and other "white collar" violations had more acute illnesses than
Deckmejian. A-129-130. The district judge, however, cut off the discussion,
stating: "I have no basis for comparing him [Deckmejian] to all these other people
that you talk about, and it really doesn't mean very much. I think we should move
on[.]" A-134-135. The court thus made no attempt to compare this case to other
Guidelines cases  indeed, it rejected the concept  but simply focused on
Deckmejian alone and concluded, without adequate foundation, that his health
would worsen in prison.
The District Court Made No Finding that Deckmejian's Age Was Unusual In Any Respect
Although the district court orally mentioned Deckmejian's age, the court
made no finding that Deckmejian's age was extraordinary, or even merely unusual,
in any way. To the contrary, the court commented that "69 years of age is not
elderly[.]" A-71. Since the court did not even consider Deckmejian to be elderly,
USSG § 5H1.1 provides no basis for a departure. Deckmejian's age therefore
cannot support the district court's decision. See Krilich, 257 F.3d at 692-93
(vacating downward departure for 69-year old defendant; "§ 5H1.1 and § 5H1.4
put normal age-related features off limits as grounds for reduced sentences. Older
criminals do not receive sentencing discounts."); e.g., United States v. Marin-Castaneda, 134 F.3d 551, 556-57 (3d Cir.) (age 67 did not warrant downward
departure), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1144 (1998); United States v. Goff, 20 F.3d 918,
921 (8th Cir.) (age 67; downward departure reversed), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 987
(1994); United States v. Tucker, 986 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 820 (1993).
The Extent of the Downward Departure Was an Abuse of Discretion
This Court reviews the extent of a downward departure for reasonableness. United States v. Barresi, 316 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 2002). "[T]he key question is
whether the reasons given by the district court are sufficient to justify the
magnitude of the departure." Id. at 73 (citation omitted).
Here, even assuming that a downward departure was appropriate in this
case,(11) the reasons given by the district court did not make it reasonable to excuse
Deckmejian from prison altogether. The court's concern about Deckmejian's
health could have been satisfied by sentencing Deckmejian to prison with a
recommendation that he be designated to a Bureau of Prisons hospital facility such
as Fort Devens in Massachusetts. The prosecutor specifically alerted the court to
this option and pointed out that "we have had defendants much more acutely ill as
they stand before the court for sentencing sent, with the court's recommendation,
accepted by the Bureau of Prisons, to Fort Devon [sic] to serve their sentence, and
this includes defendants that have had open heart surgery within three months of
having to surrender[.]" A-129-130. The district court gave no explanation why
this option would not work for Deckmejian, but simply rejected the United States'
position by saying  paradoxically, given that the court used the alleged severity
of Deckmejian's conditions to justify the departure  "I don't believe he needs to
be in a hospital and I think it would be very detrimental to have him in a hospital."
A-130-131.
Alternatively, the court could have sentenced Deckmejian to a prison term of
less than 24 months followed by home detention or supervised release. Cf. United
States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 1995) (initial sentence included four-level departure based on cancer, diabetes, hypertension, and gout to 6 months
imprisonment, with recommended placement in a medical facility, followed by 3
years of supervised release), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1049 (1996); United States v.
Kloda, 133 F. Supp.2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (one-level departure to imprisonment
for one year and one day in light of 63 year old defendant's age, health problems,
and family considerations).
A recent case in this Court reflects an exercise of discretion in granting a
departure based on health that preserved a term of imprisonment in the interest of
deterrence. In United States v. A. Alfred Taubman, No. 02-1253 (see also 297
F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2002)), the former Chairman of Sotheby's auction house was
convicted of price fixing in fine art auctions. Taubman was older (78) than
Deckmejian and claimed in his public filings in this Court (even though he did not
appeal his sentence) to have more serious health problems, including coronary
heart disease that had caused heart attacks and required three invasive
interventions (twice on an emergency basis); cerebrovascular disease that caused
small and medium strokes; diabetes that required medication; hypertension that
required medication; kidney problems; severe sleep apnea that required treatment;
an enlarged prostate that required medication; depression that required medication;
and severe hearing loss. Taubman claimed to need 15 different daily medications.
Based in part on these conditions, the district court granted a downward
departure from a range of 24  30 months' imprisonment to a prison term of one
year and one day. The Bureau of Prisons then designated Taubman to its special
medical facility at Rochester, Minnesota, which has a working relationship with
the Mayo Clinic. Taubman served his sentence and did not claim to have suffered
any extraordinary health problem in prison. See Warren St. John, Advice From
Ex-Cons to a Jet-Set Jailbird: Best Walk on Eggs, N.Y. Times, July 13, 2003
(available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File). By excusing Deckmejian from any prison time, the district court undermined
a critical purpose of the criminal laws and the Sentencing Guidelines: deterrence. "Business crimes are particularly suitable to deterrence. The certainty of a jail
term appropriate to tax cheaters like the Klodas deters others who might otherwise
be tempted to cheat." United States v. Kloda, 133 F. Supp.2d at 347. The same
applies to Deckmejian. The assertion in Dr. Berenson's letter that any prospect of imprisonment
would worsen Deckmejian's condition was not credible and was undermined by
his live testimony. First, Dr. Berenson's assertion was based on the "stress" that
Deckmejian experienced relating to indictment, trial, and conviction. A-192. But
Dr. Berenson admitted on cross-examination that throughout the pretrial, trial, and
sentencing period (which included Deckmejian testifying on two days) that
Deckmejian did not need any change in medications, was never hospitalized, and
experienced no notable health effects. A-85-86. Second, any criminal defendant
can be expected to experience "stress" relating to indictment, trial, and conviction. Under Dr. Berenson's reasoning, no convicted criminal with health problems
could be sent to prison, because the mere prospect of imprisonment would impair
his or her health.
Accordingly, to excuse Deckmejian from prison altogether was an abuse of
discretion.(12)
The District Court Erred By Refusing to Impose Any Fine
USSG § 5E1.2(2) (2000) states: "The court shall impose a fine in all cases,
except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to
become able to pay any fine." Absent a finding of inability to pay, a fine within
the guideline range therefore is mandatory. See, e.g., Bonito, 57 F.3d at 175;
United States v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v.
Salameh, 261 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The burden of establishing inability
to pay rests on defendant."), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 967 and 537 U.S. 847 (2002);
accord United States v. Sanchez-Estrada, 62 F.3d 981, 989 (7th Cir. 1995)
(language of § 5E1.2 "is to be taken seriously" and district court "must impose a
fine, unless the defendant demonstrates that he cannot pay anything") (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted); United States v. Khawaja, 118 F.3d 1454, 1459 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("The Guidelines require the imposition of a fine, unless the defendant
establishes [inability to pay].").
Deckmejian did not argue or offer any evidence regarding inability to pay. Nor did Deckmejian object to the Presentence Investigation Report's findings on
his financial condition. Indeed, Deckmejian himself submitted a financial
statement reporting almost $2 million in net worth. See Presentence Report
(separately attached hereto). And the district court agreed that Deckmejian has
"substantial assets which could be used to promptly pay the restitution." A-162. To the extent that the final judgment can be considered a finding of inability to
pay, that finding is unsupported by the evidence. The district court's reasoning that restitution could substitute for a fine was
erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmad, 2 F.3d 245, 248 (7th Cir. 1993)
("Priority for victims does not excuse a fine" and "Restitution is not a reason to
waive the fine or depart downward, although the court may consider restitution
when selecting a fine within the range"); United States v. Malpeso, 943 F. Supp.
254, 258, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (same), aff'd, 126 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1997). Indeed,
the court's finding that Deckmejian can pay substantial restitution is inconsistent
with any implied finding of inability to pay a fine. Cf. Ahmad, 2 F.3d at 248. Accordingly, "since the fine was mandated by the Guidelines, the district
judge was required to give [a valid] explanation before waiving its imposition." Bonito, 57 F.3d at 175. Refusing to impose any fine was error. E.g., United States
v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658, 666 (9th Cir. 1993) (error to refuse a fine before making
finding as to defendant's inability to pay; "If Ferrin can pay one, the court must
impose one.").
The sentence should be vacated in all respects other than the restitution order,
and the case remanded with instructions to re-sentence Deckmejian to
imprisonment within the Guideline range and a fine within the Guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g).
Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation, Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Requirements
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because:
this brief contains 7,163 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
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this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
WordPerfect Version 10 in 14-point Times New Roman style.
Dated: September 17, 2004	___________________
John J. Powers III
I hereby certify that today, September 17, 2004, I caused two copies of the
accompanying Opening Brief for Appellant United States of America, plus a copy
of the Presentence Report (separately filed) and Joint Appendix, to be served on
the following by Federal Express:
George L. Santangelo, Esq.
111 Broadway, Room 1706
Attorney for Defendant  Appellee  Cross-Appellant Birj Deckmejian ___________________
1. Deckmejian was tried with John F. Steinmetz, who was charged in a
separate count of the indictment with rigging bids to Grey, in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1. The jury acquitted Steinmetz.
2. The district court's oral explanation of the downward departure mentions
health and age. The final judgment entered by the court does not contain any
narrative justification for the departure. It lists the reason for the departure as
"Health," but does not mention age. Special Appendix ("SPA") (attached hereto)
30. For purposes of this appeal, the United States assumes that age was a basis for
the departure. 3. As part of his trial testimony, Deckmejian described his health in general
terms. 4. The 30  37 month range represented the prosecutor's quick calculation of
the offense level on the afternoon of the verdict, including an enhancement for
obstruction of justice.
5. The United States requested an upward enhancement for obstruction of
justice (perjury in Deckmejian's trial testimony). Deckmejian requested
reductions for mitigating role in the crime and acceptance of responsibility. 6. Because the crime did not continue after November 2001, the November
2000 edition of the Guidelines was used. 7. The court also commented: "I don't deny, I have seen the prison health
facilities. I haven't seen a federal one recently, but I have seen one up in the state
prison and they are doing their absolute best. But it doesn't answer the question." A-95. 8. The district court seemed to make the restitution order conditional, stating:
Now, I think it is quite obvious that if the government chooses to
appeal, and there was somehow a prison sentence, I will, to say the
least, reconsider the amount of restitution. . . . But a prison sentence
for Mr. Deckmejian would quite obviously reduce the idea of the
victim of the monies-owed scheme or the victims being made whole. That $186,000 restitution order will not stand if there is a prison
sentence resulting from any further litigation in this matter.
A-170-171. The United States believes that restitution was mandatory in this case
and that restitution cannot be conditioned on the government's decision to appeal
or be made a substitute for imprisonment. If the district court reduces the amount
of restitution on remand, the United States reserves its right to seek appropriate
review. 9. The PROTECT Act "also imposes on district courts a new requirement that
they must, in granting departures of any kind, 'state[] with specificity' in the
judgment the 'specific reason' for the departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)." Huerta, 371 F.3d at 96. In Huerta, this Court held the statement "extraordinary
family circumstances" to be insufficiently specific. See id. Here, the judgment
was equally deficient, saying only "Health." SPA-30. 10. The letter submitted by the United States from the Health Systems
Administrator, Bureau of Prisons Northeast Regional Office was not merely a
form letter. Ms. Cadogan stated that she reviewed the same letters from Drs.
Berenson and Foley that were submitted to the court, and she addressed her letter
to Deckmejian's conditions, specifically mentioning hypertension and diabetes. In
any event, Dr. Foley also told the court that the Bureau of Prisons would be able to
handle Deckmejian's conditions, and even the court said that Dr. Foley "is familiar
with the type of medical facilities in a federal prison to a degree that Dr. Berenson
is not." A-120. 11. In fact, as noted above, the United States does not believe that any
downward departure was justified in this case.
12. In addition, because the extent of the departure was based in part on the
legally inappropriate factor of the district judge's personal and anecdotal
knowledge of Bureau of Prisons capabilities, as discussed above, the sentence
should be vacated. "Having found that the district court relied on some improper
grounds in determining the extent of the departure, the appropriate course is to
remand for resentencing." Barresi, 316 F.3d at 75-76.