Source: http://fredericborel.blogspot.com/2012/11/
Timestamp: 2019-12-09 16:51:18
Document Index: 730108510

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1681', '§1346', '§1681', '§1681', '§1988', '§1988', '§1983', 'art, 488', 'art, 461']

Frédéric Borel: November 2012
U.S. v. Bormes
Immunity: Federal Government's sovereign immunity: remedies under the Tucker Act is subsidiary, superseded if a law imposing monetary liability has its own judicial remedies: Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U. S. C.§1681 et seq.; the Little Tucker Act, which grants district courts “original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Unit­ed States Court of Federal Claims, of . . . any. . . civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded . . . upon . . . any Act of Congress,” 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(2); the Little Tucker Act does not waive the Government’s sovereign immunity with respect to FCRA damages actions; the Little Tucker Act and its companion statute, the Tucker Act, provide the Federal Government’s consent to suit for certain money-damages claims “premised on other sources of law,” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U. S. 287, 290. The general terms of the Tucker Acts are displaced, however, when a law imposing monetary liability has its own judicial remedies. In that event, the specific re­medial scheme establishes the exclusive framework for determining the scope of liability under the statute. See, e.g., Hinck v. United States, 550 U. S. 501; FCRA is such a statute. Its detailed remedial scheme sets “out a carefully circumscribed, time-limited, plaintiff-specific” cause of ac­tion, and “also precisely defines the appropriate forum,” 550 U. S., at 507. FCRA authorizes aggrieved consumers to hold “any person” who “willfully” or “negligently” fails to comply with the Act’s re­quirements liable for specified damages, 15 U. S. C. §§1681n(a), 1681o; requires enforcement claims to be brought within a specified limitations period, §1681p; and provides that jurisdiction will lie “in any appropriate United States district court, without regard to the amount in controversy,” ibid. Because FCRA enables claimants to pursue monetary relief in court without resort to the Tucker Act, only its own text can determine whether Congress unequivocally intended to impose the statute’s damages liability on the Federal Government (U.S.S.Ct., 13.11.2012, U.S. v. Bormes, J. Scalia, unanimous).
Si une loi fédérale prévoit spécifiquement quels types de défendeurs (autres que le Gouvernement fédéral) peuvent être recherchés dans le cadre d'une action en dommages-intérêts, en fixant les modalités de l'action, il n'est pas possible pour le demandeur de se fonder en plus sur le Tucker Act pour pouvoir actionner aussi le Gouvernement fédéral. Cette précision est importante car un demandeur qui fonde son action sur le droit fédéral peut être tenté, comme en l'espèce, de la fonder en plus sur le Tucker Act, qui relève le Gouvernement fédéral de son immunité de juridiction (permettant ainsi d'agir en plus contre ledit Gouvernement fédéral), alors que ladite loi fédérale ne lève pas nécessairement dite immunité. Ainsi, en l'espèce, le FCRA prévoit précisément quel défendeur peut être actionné, de sorte que c'est sous l'angle du FCRA uniquement que la question de l'éventuelle levée de l'immunité du Gouvernement fédéral doit être examinée. Le FCRA prévoit de manière détaillée son propre schéma de remèdes judiciaires. Le Tucker Act ne peut pas être invoqué.
Posted by Frédéric Borel at 8:02 AM No comments:
Labels: Consumers aggrieved, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Federal Government's sovereign immunity, Immunity, Little Tucker Act, Scalia, Tucker Act, Unanimous
Attorney's fees: permanent injunction but no monetary damages: this case concerns the award of attorney’s fees in a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct by government officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff who secured a permanent injunction but no monetary damages was not a “prevailing party” under 42 U. S. C. §1988, and so could not receive fees. That was error. Because the injunction ordered the de­fendant officials to change their behavior in a way that directly benefited the plaintiff, we vacate the Fourth Circuit’s decision and remand for further proceedings; the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. §1988, allows “the prevailing party” in certain civil rights actions, including suits brought under §1983, to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” A plaintiff “prevails,” we have held, “when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relation­ship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 111–112 (1992). And we have repeatedly held that an injunction or declaratory judgment, like a damages award, will usually satisfy that test. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam).
Under these established standards, Lefemine was a prevailing party. Lefemine desired to conduct demonstra­tions in Greenwood County with signs that the defendant police officers had told him he could not carry. He brought this suit in part to secure an injunction to protect himself from the defendants’ standing threat of sanctions. And he succeeded in removing that threat. The District Court held that the defendants had violated Lefemine’s rights and enjoined them from engaging in similar conduct in the future; because Lefemine is a “prevailing party,” he “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circum­stances would render such an award unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of the courts below addressed whether any special circumstances exist in this case, and we do not do so; whether there may be other grounds on which the police officers could contest liability for fees is not a question before us. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion (U.S. S. Ct., 05.11.12, Lefemine v. Wideman, Per Curiam).
Honoraires d'avocats: des dépens sont-ils dus si le Tribunal accorde non pas des dommages-intérêts mais ordonne à la partie adverse de s'abstenir d'un certain comportement ? Oui, dans les actions fondées sur la législation fédérale protégeant les droits civils. Le demandeur est en effet considéré comme une partie victorieuse à l'action, condition pour se voir accorder des dépens par le Tribunal. Les dépens ne seront pas accordés s'il existe des circonstances spéciales qui rendraient injuste leur attribution. La Cour ne précise pas ici quelles sont ces circonstances spéciales.
Labels: Attorney's fees: permanent injunction but no monetary damages, Per Curiam, Prevailing party
P. v. Wyatt, S189786
Jury: jury instructions: jury instructions on a lesser included offense: given the evidence at trial, did the trial court prejudicially err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on simple assault?
The legal principles governing our analysis are settled. In criminal cases, even absent a request, a trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues the evidence raises. That obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present citation, but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. The existence of “any evidence, no matter how weak” will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 623; see People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 813; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 215.) In this regard, the testimony of a single witness, including that of a defendant, may suffice to require lesser included offense instructions. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646.) Courts must assess sufficiency of the evidence without evaluating the credibility of witnesses, for that is a task reserved for the jury. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.) The failure to instruct on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case does not require reversal “unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, at p. 165; see Thomas, at p. 814.) (Cal. S. Ct., S189786, P. v. Wyatt, 05.11.2012).
Instructions données au jury dans les cas où une infraction moins grave peut être incluse dans l’infraction poursuivie : la présente affaire pose la question de savoir si considérant les preuves disponibles, le Tribunal pénal de première instance a commis une erreur en omettant d’instruire spontanément le jury de la possibilité que soient réalisées les conditions d’une infraction moins grave que l’infraction en procès, susceptible de conduire à une sanction pénale moins sérieuse. La réponse à cette question est clairement fixée par la Cour. Dans le procès pénal, même sans requête, une cour pénale de première instance doit instruire le jury s’agissant des principes généraux du droit relevants pour résoudre les questions posées par les preuves à disposition. La Cour a jugé que cette obligation inclut le devoir de donner des instructions au jury sur la question des infractions moins graves englobées dans l’infraction en procès, lorsque les moyens de preuve posent la question de savoir si véritablement tous les éléments constitutifs de l’infraction en procès sont présents. Cette obligation tombe lorsqu’il n’existe aucune preuve que l’infraction pourrait être moindre que celle objet de la prévention. La déposition d’un seul témoin, y compris la déposition du prévenu, peut suffire à obliger d’instruire le jury sur la question de la possible réalisation d’une infraction moins grave incluse dans l’infraction en procès. Les Tribunaux doivent estimer si les preuves à disposition sont suffisantes, sans évaluer la crédibilité des témoins, cette tâche étant réservée au jury. Omettre d’instruire le jury comme indiqué précédemment dans le cadre d’un procès n’impliquant pas la peine de mort n’entraîne pas annulation du jugement, sauf si un examen complet du dossier établit une probabilité raisonnable que l’erreur ait affecté le dispositif de dit jugement.
Posted by Frédéric Borel at 8:29 AM No comments:
Labels: California Law, Credibility of witnesses, Harmless error, Jury, Jury instructions, Jury instructions on a lesser included offense