Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/638/848/211402/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 21:31:18
Document Index: 499201481

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 14', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Jack R. Harper, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Arden Mays Merckle, Defendant-appellee, 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1979 › Jack R. Harper, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Arden Mays Merckle, Defendant-appellee
Jack R. Harper, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Arden Mays Merckle, Defendant-appellee, 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1979)
March 5, 1981.Rehearing Denied April 7, 1981.
Harper filed his complaint on August 8, 1975 alleging with factual particularity a cause of action against Judge Merckle arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for violation of Harper's constitutional rights. The complaint was based jurisdictionally on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) and demanded a judgment for damages and costs. After two recusals, the case came to rest in the hands of George C. Young, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Defendant's motion to dismiss based upon his alleged immunity from suit was denied on April 26, 1977. Following additional pleading and discovery, on March 26, 1979 the case went to trial, which culminated in a jury verdict on special interrogatories for Judge Merckle. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and subsequently denied Harper's Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for new trial. Harper noticed timely appeal from the entry of judgment and the denial of new trial.
Defendant asserts that notwithstanding his failure to press the point at trial,8 this Court should consider whether he is absolutely immune from suit because our cases mandate affirmance of a district court decision whose "result is correct ... (al)though based upon an improper ground." Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027, 1038 (5th Cir. 1979). See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S. Ct. 454, 459, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943); Raven v. Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980, 99 S. Ct. 1787, 60 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1979). Judge Merckle's assertion is correct; accordingly, we consider the immunity question.
We accept,9 however, that "(e)very person," means "every person except judges," Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1220, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting), who generally have been accorded the unique treatment embodied in the term "absolute immunity." The cases establish "as a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself."10 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871). To determine whether Judge Merckle indeed acted within the "outer perimeter," Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575, 79 S. Ct. 1335, 1341, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1434 (1959), of "the authority vested in him," 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347, we turn to the cases decided by the Supreme Court and our Court bearing upon this question.11
From the earliest days of our Republic to the present, only on five occasions has the Supreme Court addressed squarely the issue of judicial immunity.12 Only the first case, Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L. Ed. 285 (1863), contains a hint of equivocation. There, plaintiff, an attorney, attempted to bring suit against the judge who disbarred him. Drawing heavily on English authority, Justice Field held the defendant judge immune from tortious liability. "Any other doctrine would necessarily lead to the degradation of the judicial authority and the destruction of its usefulness." Id. at 526. But in so holding, Justice Field also wrote that judicial immunity was to obtain "unless perhaps where the (judicial) acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly." Id. (emphasis added). Three years later in Bradley v. Fisher, supra, Justice Field dismissed his earlier language as obiter dictum and plugged the gap opened by the "malice" language of Randall.13 In so doing he set the stage for the next century or so of consistent jurisprudential development in the area.
The most recent and authoritative pronouncement on this question is Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). Plaintiff, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, sued Judge Stump under § 1983 in connection with his approval of an ex parte petition to have plaintiff sterilized. Sterilization had been sought by plaintiff's mother, who was concerned that her "somewhat retarded" daughter's occasional nocturnal association with "older youth or young men" might result in pregnancy. Petition to Have Tubal Ligation Performed on Minor and Indemnity Agreement, reprinted in 435 U.S. at 351 n. 1, 98 S. Ct. at 1102 n. 1. Plaintiff was not told the true purpose of the operation but was told she was to have an appendectomy. After she married, plaintiff's "inability to become pregnant led her to discover" "the true nature of her surgery." Id. at 353, 98 S. Ct. at 1103.
The Supreme Court held Judge Stump immune from suit under the civil rights statute. In the process, the Court cast aside considerable debris14 that tended only to burden analysis such as this, and elucidated a cogent two-part test that under the unusual and rare facts of this case leads us to conclude that Judge Merckle cannot assert absolute judicial immunity. The Court extended the protection of judicial immunity to all "judicial acts"15 unless those acts fall clearly outside the judge's subject matter jurisdiction. Stump, supra, 435 U.S. at 359-64, 98 S. Ct. at 1106-08. Watson v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 611 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1980); see generally Williams v. Rhoden, 629 F.2d 1099 at 1101 (5th Cir. 1980); Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 269, 66 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1980); Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979); Almon v. Sandlin, 603 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1979); Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1979); Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1966). We must ask, then, (1) whether Judge Merckle's actions on August 16, 1974 were "judicial acts," and if so, (2) whether or not they fall clearly outside his jurisdiction16 as a county judge in the State of Florida.
What is or is not a "judicial act" is not wholly free from doubt. See generally Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir. 1979); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds, Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Dennis v. Sparks, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980). Stump does reveal several characteristics of a "judicial act" drawn in part from our decision in McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972), which the Court cited approvingly. In McAlester, a Texas judge inexplicably lost his temper and jailed for contempt an elderly and somewhat deaf man, James O. McAlester. McAlester had come with his wife to deliver fresh clothing to their son who was incarcerated and due to stand trial before the defendant later that day. The judge in McAlester was held immune from suit under § 1983. For the Court, Judge Goldberg wrote that "four factors ... when taken together, compel the conclusion" that a judicial act was involved:
The emphasis that we place upon the third and fourth factors of McAlester is clearly warranted under the language of Stump. There Justice White distilled the relevant cases addressing the term "judicial act" and concluded that consideration must be given not only to "the nature of the act itself" but also "to the expectations of the parties." 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S. Ct. at 1107, see Crowe v. Lucas, supra, 595 F.2d at 990. While in Stump "both factors indicate(d) that ... approval of the sterilization petition was a judicial act," 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S. Ct. at 1107 (footnote omitted), in the case before us they do not. We think it clearly unreasonable to conclude that Harper entertained the expectation that judicial matters were at hand when he entered Judge Merckle's office on nonjudicial business. Plaintiff's incredulity during the "hearing," see supra at pp. 852-53, indicates as much.
The elements of the tort of false imprisonment, so reiterated by our own Court in Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, 97 S. Ct. 174, 50 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1976), are: "(1) intent to confine, (2) acts resulting in confinement, and (3) consciousness of the victim of confinement or resulting harm ...." To state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the commission of a constitutional tort, plaintiffs additionally must satisfy the prerequisites of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Although we do not doubt that "illegality" must be proved by the plaintiff in a § 1983 false imprisonment, we nonetheless find error in submitting that issue to the jury. The illegality of Judge Merckle's actions could hardly be more lucid. Defendant's theory at trial was that he was acting as a "conservator of the peace"20 when he jailed Harper. Such an officer has the power to arrest and to commit pending trial. Judge Merckle did more; he acted as complaining witness, "arresting" officer although Harper was not formally arrested finder of fact, and judge.21 All of these actions were taken without regard for the Fourteenth Amendment, see Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835, 841 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 409 U.S. 848, 93 S. Ct. 53, 34 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1972), or the Constitution of the State of Florida, see e. g., Fla.Const. art. I, § 14 (bail as a matter of right).
Defendant asserted at trial that he was entitled to qualified immunity since his actions the very ones we hold to be nonjudicial were consistent with his state constitutional status as a conservator of peace.23 We regard that status for purposes of the immunity question, as analogous to that of a police officer empowered to arrest and detain suspected violators of the law. Accordingly, the immunity potentially applicable to Merckle is qualified: he would be immune from damage liability under § 1983 unless "he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took ... would violate the constitutional rights of (plaintiff) ..., or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of (plaintiff's) constitutional rights ...." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1000, 43 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1975). Essentially, then, defendant may show "good faith and probable cause," Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S. Ct. at 1219, clearly a cognizable defense under § 1983, id; Bryan v. Jones, supra.
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967) the Court determined that the record of Congressional proceedings that accompanied the passage of what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) "gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities." 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1217. But see Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw.U.L.Rev. 615, 620-23 (1970); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 Yale L.J. 322 passim (1969). Thus, we take as settled law the proposition that in the vast majority of § 1983 cases in which judges are named as defendants, judicial immunity will bar the action. Moreover, as our analysis infra at p. 859 & n.17 reveals, we can envision no situation where a judge acts after he is approached qua judge by parties to a case that could possibly spawn a successful § 1983 suit. In fact, we note that even a judge who is approached as a judge by a party for the purpose of conspiring to violate § 1983 is properly immune from a damage suit. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Dennis v. Sparks, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980). But cf. Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980)
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 34 S. Ct. 27, 58 L. Ed. 142 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L. Ed. 285 (1868). Only Stump and Pierson dealt with judicial immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Cf. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719, 100 S. Ct. 1967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S. Ct. 855, 55 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976)
Here we refer to the Court's textual admonition that reviewing courts' visceral aversions to defendants' assertedly "judicial" actions amount to nothing in immunity analysis. "Disagreement with the action taken by the judge," wrote Justice White for the Court, "does not justify depriving that judge of his immunity." 435 U.S. at 363, 98 S. Ct. at 1108. Indeed, Justice Field recognized in 1871 that "(c)ontroversies involving ... the liberty and character of the parties, and consequently exciting the deepest feeling" comprise precisely the "class of cases that the losing party feels most keenly the decision against him, and most readily accepts anything but the soundness of the (judge's) decision ...." Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348
Somewhat along these lines, the Court also suggested in Stump that the degree of tragedy wrought by a defendant judge's action does not stand as an independent factor to be weighed in an immunity analysis. See 435 U.S. at 363, 98 S. Ct. at 1108. Thus, we do not intimate, and indeed consider it inappropriate to do so, that Judge Merckle's actions were more or less egregious than Judge Stump's.
While our resolution of the case eliminates the need to determine whether Judge Merckle's actions were within his jurisdiction, we do note that Stump mandates a broad construction of the term "jurisdiction." See 435 U.S. at 357, 98 S. Ct. at 1105; see also Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973). In fact, the Court in Stump drew on Bradley's distinction between acts "in excess of jurisdiction" (criminal court judge convicts plaintiff for a nonexistent crime, cf. Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 93-97 (5th Cir. 1980)) and acts "in clear absence of all jurisdiction" (probate judge tries a criminal case), see Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352. Immunity is lost to the judge only in the latter class of jurisdictionally defective cases
To exemplify the extremely limited applicability of our holding we point out that our considerable research has revealed only one case, Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978), arguably within the ambit of our holding. See generally Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 Va. L. Rev. 833, 848 n.65 (1978). There, defendant, a traffic court judge sent a deputy sheriff out to purchase some coffee from a coffee vendor. Both judge and deputy sheriff tasted the coffee and concluded it was "putrid." On the defendant judge's orders, the coffee vendor was handcuffed, brought before the judge in his chambers, and subjected to "20 minutes" of the judge "screaming at him, threatening him and his livelihood ... and thoroughly scaring him." Id. at 53. After his first release, the vendor was again brought before the judge for an abbreviated, but similar encounter. The reported case does not even address the immunity issue, presumably because the judge was willing to concede his actions were not "judicial acts," but dealt in large part with the propriety of a $60,000 punitive damages jury award for the coffee vendor. That award was affirmed
Any doubt on this point is resolved in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979) ("the first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws' "). Moreover, in that case, the Supreme Court warned us not to view a " '(s) 1983 false imprisonment action' exclusively in terms of traditional tort-law concepts ...." Id. at 142, 99 S. Ct. at 2693
We hasten to point out that illegality per se of Merckle's actions has no effect on the judicial immunity issue. For this proposition, we look no further than Stump: so long as he meets the test (judicial act not clearly outside his subject matter jurisdiction), a "judge is absolutely immune from liability ... even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S. Ct. at 1106