Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2013cv00790/775187/16
Timestamp: 2017-05-26 03:52:23
Document Index: 299352620

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

ORDER, Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Pay Filing Fee 15 is granted; Plaintiff has 180 days from the filing date of this Order to pay the filing fee; the First Amended Complaint 6 is dismissed for failure to state a claim; Plaint iff has 30 days to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this Order; if Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Clerk must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a "strike" under 28 U for Harris v. Sawyer et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Harris v. Sawyer et al
ORDER, Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Pay Filing Fee 15 is granted; Plaintiff has 180 days from the filing date of this Order to pay the filing fee; the First Amended Complaint 6 is dismissed for failure to state a claim; Plaint iff has 30 days to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this Order; if Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Clerk must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 5/22/14. (REW)
Matthew Linden Harris,
No. CV 13-790-PHX-DGC (BSB)
Unknown Sawyer, et al.,
Plaintiff Matthew Linden Harris, who was formerly confined in the Maricopa
County Lower Buckeye Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Plaintiff subsequently filed a
First Amended Complaint (Doc. 6).
On July 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address indicating he is no
longer in custody. In a July 23, 2013 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed
and required Plaintiff to either pay the filing fee or show good cause why he cannot pay.
re-booked in the Maricopa County Jail and again had an inmate account from which
periodic partial payments could be withdrawn. On August 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed
another Notice of Change of Address indicating that he had again been released. On
December 5, 2013, the Court issued another order to show cause requiring Plaintiff to
either pay the $350.00 filing fee or file a “Response” to the Order. On January 10, 2014,
On August 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a response to the Order stating that he had been
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Pay the Filing Fee (Doc. 15).
The Court will dismiss the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend.
Motion for Extension of Time and Filing Fee
In his Motion for Extension of Time, Plaintiff asks that the Court grant him an
additional 180 days within which to pay the filing fee and that the Court allow him to
make monthly payments. The Court will grant the Motion; Plaintiff will have 180 from
the filing date of this order to pay the filing fee in full, and may make monthly payments.
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other
facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal
of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but
because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave
An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963
F.2d 1258,1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d
1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990).
nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Accordingly, causes of action alleged in an
original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived. King v.
Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).
After amendment, the original pleading is treated as
Plaintiff names the following Defendants in the First Amended Complaint: Officer
Sawyer; Unknown Sergeants 1 and 2 at Estrella Jail; Sergeants Waters, Tenny, Perks,
Rothschild, Dunn, Anders, McKay, Bernsten, Henry, Allan, Layton, Rosales, and Dauch;
Lieutenants Garcia and Stump; Detention Officers Johnson, Negbee, Carrasco, #B1499,
Gomes, Cruz, #A7519, Vasquez, Madrano, #B0614, Bordan, and Fritz; Maricopa County
Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio; Captain Haupmann; Chaplain Bristow; Dr. Joseph; and 17
Unknown Officers employed at the Lower Buckeye Jail.
Plaintiff raises six grounds for relief. In Count One, Plaintiff alleges his First
Amendment right to the redress of grievances was violated when, on multiple occasions,
he was denied grievance forms or detention officers failed to process his grievances.
In Count Two, Plaintiff claims his right of access to the courts was denied when
Defendants Gomes, Haupmann, Bordan, and Unknown Defendants denied him legal
forms. Plaintiff also claims he was unable to file motions and unable to communicate
with potential witnesses in his criminal case. Plaintiff further claims Defendants Dunn
and Stump refused to acknowledge his “pro per/pro se” status on three separate matters
and Defendant Dunn refused to allow him to attend court “on a family matter.” Plaintiff
claims he was unable to adequately defend his “criminal matter” and that he missed a
court date for his family case.
In Count Three, Plaintiff claims his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
when Defendant Fritz “rejected a piece of mail which contained a money order which
was acceptable under MCSO rules and regulations.”
retaliation for filing a lawsuit against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff
further claims that Defendant Cruz denied him access to the courts by refusing to process
legal mail.
Plaintiff claims this was in
In Count Four, Plaintiff claims his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
when he was denied weekly indigent packages, “preventing access to mail and basic
hygiene tasks.” Plaintiff further claims that from April 28, 2013 through May 5, 2013, he
was denied the opportunity to shower.
In Count Five, Plaintiff claims his First Amendment right to the free exercise of
religion was violated when, on two different occasions, he was not allowed to attend
religious services, even though he had been approved to attend.
In Count Six, Plaintiff claims his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
when he was denied psychiatric treatment despite repeatedly requesting treatment.
Plaintiff states that when he attempted to grieve the issue, Defendant Joseph refused to
address the issue with him.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and money damages.
Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances, Rhodes v.
Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005), but “[t]here is no legitimate claim of
entitlement to a grievance procedure,” Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.
1988), and the failure to follow grievance procedures does not give rise to a due process
claim. See Flournoy v. Fairman, 897 F. Supp. 350, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (jail grievance
procedures did not create a substantive right enforceable under § 1983); Spencer v.
Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (violations of grievance system
procedures do not deprive inmates of constitutional rights). “[N]o constitutional right
was violated by the defendants’ failure, if any, to process all of the grievances [plaintiff]
submitted for consideration.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). In
addition, “[t]he right to petition the government for redress of grievances . . . does not
guarantee a favorable response, or indeed any response, from state officials. Moreover,
the First Amendment’s right to redress of grievances is satisfied by the availability of a
judicial remedy.” Baltoski v. Pretorius, 291 F. Supp. 2d 807, 811 (N.D. Ind. 2003); see
also Ashann-Ra v. Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559, 569 (W.D. Va. 2000) (failure to comply
with state’s grievance procedure is not actionable under § 1983 and does not compromise
an inmate’s right of access to the courts).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied grievance forms and that
Defendants refused to process his grievances fails to state a claim.
The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits officials from actively
interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The right of access to the courts is only a right to bring
petitions or complaints to federal court and not a right to discover such claims or even to
ligate them effectively once filed with a court. Id. at 354. The right “guarantees no
particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability–the capability of bringing
contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.”
As a matter of standing, for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that
he suffered an “actual injury” with respect to contemplated litigation. Id. at 349. To
show actual injury with respect to contemplated litigation, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendants’ conduct frustrated or impeded him from bringing to court a
nonfrivolous claim that he wished to present. Id. at 352-53.
“[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal
claim.” Id. at 354. The right of access to the courts “does not guarantee inmates the
wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything
from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Id. at 355. The nonfrivolous
claim must be a direct or collateral attack on the inmate’s sentence or a challenge to the
conditions of his confinement. Id. “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply
one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and
incarceration.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff has failed to describe the specific injury he suffered as a result of the
alleged denial of access to the courts and, therefore, has failed to state an access to courts
criminal proceedings, a prisoner who is represented by counsel “has no constitutional
right of access to legal materials.” United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 717 (9th Cir.
1990). The state has the option of deciding whether to provide legal assistance or access
to a law library.
“Availability of legal assistance at government expense . . . is a constitutionally
permissible means of access.” United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.
1982). When an inmate is provided adequate access, he may not reject the method of
access provided and insist on a method of access of his or her choosing. Id. Accord
Further, to the extent Plaintiff claims he was denied access the court in his
Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1456 (7th Cir. 1988) (no denial of meaningful access to
See Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981).
courts where jail did not provide access to a law library to inmate who was represented
by counsel). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for access to the courts with
regard to his criminal proceedings.
Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v.
Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). However, a prison may adopt regulations which impinge on an
inmate’s constitutional rights if those regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Similarly, a viable
claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a
state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s
protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First
Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) did not
reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,
567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that his exercise of
his First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor behind the defendants’
conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977);
Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that his mail was withheld without a
valid penological purpose. He has therefore failed to state a claim for retaliation or for
the wrongful withholding his mail.
A pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement arises
from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than from the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 and n.16 (1979). Nevertheless, the same standards are applied, requiring proof
that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,
1128 (9th Cir. 1998).
Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary
due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). To
state a claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. “First, the
alleged constitutional deprivation must be, objectively, sufficiently serious”; and the
“official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities.” Id. at 834 (internal quotations omitted). Second, the prison official
must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with “deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In defining
“deliberate indifference” in this context, the Supreme Court has imposed a subjective
test: “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at
837 (emphasis added).
In Count Four, Plaintiff claims he was denied “indigent packages” and basic
hygiene supplies. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that the denial of these items
created a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Further, Plaintiff
has not alleged that a specifically named Defendant was aware of such a risk of harm and
failed to act. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in Count Four.
To state a First Amendment, free-exercise-of-religion claim, a plaintiff must allege
that a defendant burdened the practice of plaintiff=s religion by preventing him from
F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008).
religious services. Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the practice of his religion
was burdened because he was prevented from engaging in a sincerely held religious
belief, nor has he alleged facts showing that Defendants acted without a legitimate
In Count Five, Plaintiff claims that on two occasions he was not allowed to attend
penological purpose. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in Count Five.
Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a
violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a
plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need”
by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant
injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response
was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted).
“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d
1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must
both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate
indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to
respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the
indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a
prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the
way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05;
Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.
due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor
gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of
Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs.,
622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or
“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion
does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.”
Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care,
without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate
indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407
(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
In Count Six, Plaintiff claims that he repeatedly requested psychiatric treatment
and that his requests were denied. Plaintiff has not described his medical conditions and
it is therefore impossible for the Court to determine whether he suffered from a serious
medical need. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that a specific Defendant was aware of
his serious medical need and failed to act. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim in Count Six.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff
may submit a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The
Clerk of Court will mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a second
amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may
strike the second amended complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to
If Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain
statements telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated;
(2) the name of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what that Defendant did
or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered
because of that Defendant’s conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377
Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific
Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he names as a Defendant. If
injury suffered by Plaintiff, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for
Defendants has violated a constitutional right are not acceptable and will be
Conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of
Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “Second
Amended Complaint.” The second amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in
its entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original
Complaint or First Amended Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one
claim per count.
A second amended complaint supersedes the original and first amended
complaints. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Hal Roach, 896 F.2d at 1546. After amendment,
the Court will treat the original and first amended complaints as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963
F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original or first amended
complaints and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without prejudice is
waived if it is not alleged in a second amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County,
693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his
release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he
intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to
comply may result in dismissal of this action.
Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with
Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion
LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further
Because the First Amended Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a
claim, if Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint correcting the deficiencies
identified in this Order, the dismissal may count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes”
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
“if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on
the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28
Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not
If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including
these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963
F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any
order of the Court).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Pay Filing Fee (Doc. 15) is
granted; Plaintiff has 180 days from the filing date of this Order to pay the filing fee.
The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) is dismissed for failure to state a
claim. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a second amended
complaint in compliance with this Order.
If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint within 30 days, the
with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C.
Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action
The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a
civil rights complaint by a prisoner.
Dated this 22nd day of May, 2014.