Source: https://www.magdalenchambers.co.uk/2016/11/
Timestamp: 2019-11-15 13:53:29
Document Index: 621732897

Matched Legal Cases: ['UKHL ', 'UKSC ', 'UKSC ', 'UKSC ', 'EWCA ', 'art 23', 'EWCA ']

November 2016 - Magdalen Chambers
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Team Magdalen get proud 2nd Place at the YRes Devon Quiz
November 18, 2016 /0 Comments/in Frontpage Article, Images, Newsletter, Publications /by Lisa Lyons
Article 8 – the right to respect for family life
November 18, 2016 /0 Comments/in Family Law, Frontpage Article, News, Publications /by Lisa Lyons
Practitioners will of course be familiar with Article 8 and the right to respect for family life, which touches on everything in the jurisdiction of the Family Court.
The formula settled upon to reflect consideration of Article 8 in judgments has tended to focus on necessity and proportionality, with an occasional reference to there being no lesser measure available to protect a child’s rights.
The Immigration and Asylum Tribunal has been at the forefront of the development of a more detailed assessment of Article 8 in the context of the removal of foreign nationals to their country of origin. The classic tests were set out by the House of Lords in R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2004 UKHL 27:
In Hashim Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2016 UKSC 60, the Supreme Court had reason to consider the Article 8 tests again in the context of the deportation of foreign criminals, the Immigration Rules and Article 8.
What may be of interest to family practitioners is the recasting of the Article 8 test. The Supreme Court did not refer to the classic formulation in Razgar but said this:
The Supreme Court considered paragraph 74 of Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39 which sets out the proper approach to assessing proportionality. In immigration cases, this approach is likely to qualify the Tribunal’s approach to the last two Razgar questions.
The judgment of Dickson CJ in Oakes provides the clearest and most influential judicial analysis of proportionality within the common law tradition of legal reasoning. Its attraction as a heuristic tool is that, by breaking down an assessment of proportionality into distinct elements, it can clarify different aspects of such an assessment, and make value judgments more explicit. The approach adopted in Oakes can be summarised by saying that it is necessary to determine
whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter.
For the family practitioner, the changes, if they are changes, to the recasting of the Article 8 tests may lead to little change in the content of judgments. Outcomes may not be significantly affected. However, the change in language is of some importance and is undoubtedly relevant to ancillary procedural issues in the Family Court, for example the sharing of confidential information between agencies. Although outside the scope of this note, practitioners may wish to consult John Fotheringham’s article in Family Law November 2016 1342 on the Named Person Service and the Supreme Court’s decision in The Christian Institute and others v The Lord Advocate 2016 UKSC 51 for an example of the application of the test.
Members ranked in Chambers and Partners 2016
November 8, 2016 /0 Comments/in Frontpage Article, News, Publications /by Lisa Lyons
Exeter-based practitioner with significant experience. His chancery practice includes probate and wills work, property disputes and contentious trusts.
Strengths: “If someone said: ‘I have a chancery problem and need an Exeter barrister,’ I would give Michael’s name.”
Strengths: “Christopher Naish is very highly experienced and has a wealth of knowledge of family law. He also is very good at establishing a good relationship with clients and putting them at their ease.” “A commanding presence, with good attention to detail, and great in cross-examination.”
Has a diverse family practice encompassing cohabitation disputes, financial remedies and private children law. She has over 15 years’ experience and is used to handling cases that involve dealing with litigants in person.
Strengths: “Good at looking at the wider picture, being pragmatic and finding the best solution for clients.” “Extremely impressive – she’s strong, sensible and very insightful. Her advice on when to fight and when not to fight undoubtedly helped the client enormously.”
The Right Warrant: Issuing Warrants Following the Breach of A Suspended Possession Order.
November 2, 2016 /0 Comments/in Frontpage Article, Housing, Publications /by Lisa Lyons
The Court of Appeal has recently given judgment in the case of Cardiff CC v Lee (Flowers) [2016] EWCA Civ 1034, which is concerned with the correct application to be made for a warrant for possession where there has been a breach of a suspended possession order (‘SPO’). It is not a simple application on Form N325 (request for warrant of possession of land) – that is appropriate where an outright possession order has been made. Instead, an application must first be made for permission to issue a warrant in accordance with rule 83.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Such an application may be made in accordance with Part 23 and may be made without notice being served on the tenant.
This decision is of great significance because the general practice until now has not been to make such an application. The Court of Appeal observed that rule 83.2, which was introduced in 2014 to “address what might reasonably have been considered to be a weakness of the system, namely that there was no judicial scrutiny of the landlord’s case that the conditions had been breached” (paragraph 3), requires a two stage procedure: application for permission followed by application for a warrant (paragraph 9). In giving the judgment of the court, Arden LJ stressed that this rule provides “an important protection for tenants” (paragraphs 23 and 31), where the landlord has to show that it has “informed the court (among other matters) that the appellant had breached the terms of suspension” (paragraph 9).
The main focus of the appeal in Cardiff CC v Lee (Flowers) [2016] EWCA Civ 1034 (it having been conceded that rule 83.2 was the correct rule) shifted to whether the circuit judge was correct to dismiss the tenant’s appeal notwithstanding that no application for permission had been made in accordance with rule 83.2. The Court of Appeal held that he was. The District Judge at first instance had on the facts of that case, held a contested hearing at which the issue of whether there had been a breach had been considered along with any other arguments advanced by the tenant. The Court of Appeal relied upon rule 3.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules (an error of procedure does not invalidate a step in proceedings unless the court so orders, and can be remedied by the court), and rule 23.3(2)(b), which allows for the dispensing of an application in form N244, in coming to this conclusion. However, this does not provide carte blanche for the future for landlords to avoid following the correct procedure. The Court of Appeal placed heavy reliance in that case on the fact this was a genuine mistake, the social landlord did not know it was entitled to proceed as it had, and the fact that all issues had been considered by the judge in any event. Such a situation is unlikely to be available in the future because social landlords should be aware of this decision and Arden LJ said: “Social landlords must ensure that from now on their systems are such that the same mistake will not be made in the future.”
It is now clear that permission needs to be sought from the court following an allegation of breach of an SPO and the court must consider whether there has been a breach before granting permission. However, the fact that this can be made without notice to the tenant and without a hearing potentially, I think, opens a can of worms. If a District Judge were to do this then they would presumably need to give the tenant the right to set aside the permission that had been given in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules. My view (and it is just a view) is that the way forward is to make provision in future SPO’s for this procedure, in the same way that previously occurred in the old PPO’s. It strikes me that this would be of benefit to both parties as it allows everyone to know in advance what procedure will be followed in the event of a breach.