Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/364/1/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-10-21 19:30:36
Document Index: 290014210

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 213', '§ 207', '§ 5', '§ 207', '§ 210', '§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 209']

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. V. UNITED STATES, 364 U. S. 1 (1960) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 364 > AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. V. UNITED STATES, 364 U. S. 1 (1960)
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. V. UNITED STATES, 364 U. S. 1 (1960)
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(b) If a trucking service can fairly be characterized as auxiliary to, or supplemental of, train service, there is compliance with the mandate of § 5(2)(b) that the railroad should be able to "use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations"; but, if the motor transportation is essentially unrelated to the rail service, the parent railroad is invading the field of trucking, and, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
170 F. Supp. 38, reversed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The permits in question are designed to allow appellee Pacific Motor Trucking Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Southern Pacific Company, to perform a particular type of transportation service for appellee General Motors Corporation. Prior to issuance of these permits, Pacific Motor already had been authorized to conduct certain trucking activities in a number of States into which Southern Pacific's extensive railway system penetrates. Without adverting to immaterial details, that authority may be described as follows: Pacific Motor held common carrier certificates from the Commission for the transportation of commodities, by way of service auxiliary to and supplemental of Southern Pacific rail service, over routes paralleling Southern Pacific lines in Oregon, California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. It also held contract carrier authority from the State of California for intrastate transportation of trucks and automobiles. Finally, it had been granted contract carrier permits by the Commission for the transportation of automobiles, trucks, and buses from certain points in California to three nonrail points in Nevada, to two points on the Mexican border, to certain points in Los Angeles chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Commission proceedings resulted in the grant of some, but not all, of the requested authority. On May 8, 1957, the Commission acted favorably on the Sub 34 application. 71 M.C.C. 561. However, the Commission thereafter consolidated the four applications and heard oral argument. On September 9, 1958, the Commission issued its final report, 77 M.C.C. 605, which may chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There is a preliminary challenge by Pacific Motor and General Motors to appellants' standing, a challenge which was sustained by two members of the lower court. We disagree with this holding. Since the basis for our view on the problem of standing will be more readily appreciated after the merits of the case have been fully treated, we postpone our discussion of this matter. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Commission long ago concluded that the policy of the transportation legislation requires that the standards of § 5(2)(b) -- then § 213(a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 555 -- be followed as a general rule in other situations, notably in applications for common carrier certificates of convenience and necessity under § 207. [Footnote 4] Kansas City Southern Transport Co., Common Carrier Application, 10 M.C.C. 221 (1938). And this chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is this "auxiliary to or supplemental of" verbalization of the policy of § 5(2)(b), as applied to § 207, that has found favor in this Court. See American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 355 U. S. 141; United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., supra; United States v. Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co., supra; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, supra. Moreover, while the Court has not specified the more particularized restrictions which it might regard as essential constituents of the "auxiliary to or supplemental of" concept, it is significant that the Court in Rock Island apparently accepted the Commission's view that the phrase implies a limitation of function, i.e., type of trucking service, and not merely a geographical limitation, i.e., place where the service is performed. [Footnote 7] 340 U.S. at 340 U. S. 436-444. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
But, while the judicial and administrative current has run strongly in favor of auxiliary and supplemental restrictions on motor carrier subsidiaries of railroads, the Commission has determined, and this Court has agreed, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The first question need not detain us long. The principal permits were qualified only by the following conditions: (1) the service was to be restricted to points which chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The last restriction was designed to obviate any dual operation problem under § 210, [Footnote 8] and is not pertinent to the auxiliary and supplemental standard. See 77 M.C.C. at 624. The second condition obviously is no restriction at all on present operations, and hence can hardly be said to limit the trucking to an auxiliary or supplemental service. We so recognized in American Trucking Associations, where the certificates contained a similar restriction. 355 U.S. at 355 U. S. 154. And the first limitation, upon which appellees principally rely, is but a geographical, not a functional, restriction. As we have noted, Rock Island gives strong support to the view there expressed by the Commission that the essence of auxiliary and supplemental limitation is functional control. While it may be true, as appellees argue, that such a geographical limitation is a necessary ingredient of an auxiliary and supplemental restriction, it does not by any means follow that this ingredient makes the whole. Moreover, we have the strongest evidence that the Commission did not believe that it did, since the Commission specifically refrained from imposing the most general, but obviously the most significant, restriction -- that "the service by motor vehicle . . . should be limited to service which is auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service." 77 M.C.C., 622, 623. The conclusion seems inescapable that the conditions imposed upon the permits to Pacific Motor, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellees urge that nonetheless there were "special circumstances" within the meaning of American Trucking Associations. Appellees point to various findings of fact by the Commission, such as the need of General Motors for a service of the type here involved, Pacific Motor's experience and qualifications, and the unlikelihood that a significant amount of traffic would be diverted from rail to motor transportation even if the permits were granted. The difficulty with appellees' argument is that the Commission did not find that considerations of this nature constituted "special circumstances" under the American Trucking Associations rule, but rather viewed them simply as supporting the basic determinations which it was required to make under § 209(b) in order to issue a contract carrier permit to any applicant. [Footnote 9] And naturally we chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Commission assigned but a single reason for not imposing the normal restrictions upon the Pacific Motor permits: to do so would compel Pacific Motor to conduct a common carrier service. Appellees support this decision upon the ground that the Commission is without authority under § 209(b) to impose such character-destroying conditions upon a contract carrier permit. [Footnote 10] We need not determine whether the Commission possesses the power to attach such limitations or, in the alternative, to award a common carrier certificate, since we believe that, in any event, the Commission's reason is insufficient justification for its action. Assuming that the restrictions which would limit Pacific Motor's operations to an auxiliary and supplemental service would also be incompatible with a contract carrier operation, and that the Commission was consequently powerless to impose those restrictions, this alone does not, in our view, meet the "special circumstances" test. There is, for example, no finding that independent contract carriers were unable or chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus the decision of the District Court must be reversed, because we conclude that the Commission fell into error of law. The question then arises whether there should be a remand which permits further proceedings. Appellants argue that there should not be, because the Commission, according to appellants, found that there chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
were no special circumstances aside from the alleged impossibility of imposing the usual restrictions upon a contract carrier. It is true that the Commission based the rail-point restriction upon "the absence of any showing of unusual conditions." 77 M.C.C. at 623. But we cannot be certain that the Commission thereby intended to say that there were no special circumstances within the meaning of the American Trucking Associations principle. As we have pointed out, the rail-point restriction, standing alone, is different in kind from limitations which impose an auxiliary and supplemental service. Consequently, we cannot be sure that the Commission believes the same sort of circumstances determine the applicability of both types of restrictions. Moreover, the Commission's discussion of this point is open to the interpretation that it was repeating some of its conclusions with respect to the § 209(b) standards, e.g., "the effect which granting the permit would have upon the services of the protesting carriers." See note 9 supra. [Footnote 12] Under these circumstances, we would be warranted in precluding further proceedings only if, by an independent search of the record, we were able to conclude that, as a matter of law, there are no factors present which the Commission could have regarded as special circumstances. Although the findings of the Commission which are reflected in its opinion do not seem to us to comply with the American Trucking Associations standard, as the silence of the Commission seems to imply, we are unwilling in a complicated proceeding of this nature to deal with this problem ab initio or to say that the Commission could not have made additional findings on the basis of the evidence had it been aware that the ground its decision rested upon was insufficient. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There remains only the question of standing. Although the three-judge court concluded that the Commission had not exceeded its authority in this case, two members of the court also believed that "there was no showing of actual or anticipated direct injury such as would entitle [the appellants] to institute this action." 170 F.Supp. at 48. In support of this conclusion, appellees rely principally upon Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. United States, 130 F.Supp. 76, affirmed per curiam, 350 U.S. 892. That decision held that certain railroads had no standing to challenge a Commission order authorizing acquisition by one motor carrier of others. Since the lower court in Atchison stressed the fact that the Commission there had not created any additional motor carrier service, the decision clearly is not in point. In the instant case, not only has the Commission created new operating rights, but they are rights in which appellants have a stake. And chanroblesvirtualawlibrary