Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/18520050/2-Complaint
Timestamp: 2018-03-24 10:57:41
Document Index: 190949454

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1278', '§ 1102', '§ 12945', '§ 7297', '§ 2601', '§ 12945', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§ 45', '§ 1983', '§201', '§ 201', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1367', '§ 825', '§ 12945', '§ 12926', '§ 203', 'art: 20', '§ 825', '§ 72970', '§ 825', '§3294', '§3294', '§ 2699', '§ 2699', '§ 1102', '§ 1278', '§ 1278', '§ 1278', '§ 1102', '§ 1102', 'art: 12', '§ 1102', '§ 12945', '§ 12945', '§ 7297', '§ 72972', '§ 7297', '§ 7297', '§ 2601', '§\n11', '§ 2615', '§ 12945', '§ 12945', '§ 7297', '§ 7297', '§ 825', '§ 7297', '§ 825', '§ 12945', '§ 7297', '§ 7297', '§ 72972', '§ 7297', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§7293', '§ 12940', '§ 7293', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§ 12940', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 45', '§ 45', '§ 541', '§ 541', '§ 2617', '§ 12940', '§ 12945', '§3294', '§3291']

2 Complaint | Pathology | Defamation
Eugene Lee (SB# 236812) LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE 555 West Fifth St, Suite 3100 Los Angeles, CA 90013 Telephone: (213) 992-3299 Facsimile: (213) 596-0487 Email: elee@LOEL.com Attorney for Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
Case No. COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. Retaliation [Health & Safety Code § 1278.5]; II. Retaliation [Lab. Code § 1102.5]; III. Retaliation [Gov’t Code §§ 12945.1, et seq; 2 C.C.R. § 7297.7(a)]; IV. Interference with FMLA Rights [29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.]; V. Violation of CFRA Rights. [Gov’t Code §§ 12945.1, et seq.]; VI. Disability Discrimination [Gov’t. Code § 12940(a)]; VII. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation [Gov’t Code § 12940(m)]; VIII. Failure to Engage in Good Faith In An Interactive Process [Gov’t Code § 12940(n)]; IX. Defamation [Civ. Code §§ 45- 47]; and X. Procedural Due Process Violation [14th Amendment of U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1983]. XI. Violation of FLSA [29 U.S.C. §201 et seq.] JURY TRIAL DEMANDED I.
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 vs.
Plaintiff COUNTY OF KERN; PETER BRYAN (both individually and in his former official capacity as Chief Executive Officer Of Kern Medical Center); IRWIN HARRIS, M.D; EUGENE KERCHER, M.D. (both individually and in his official capacity as a President of Medical Staff of Kern Medical Center); JENNIFER ABRAHAM, M.D. (both individually and in her official capacity as Immediate Past President of Medical Staff at Kern Medical Center); SCOTT RAGLAND, M.D. (both individually and in his official capacity as President-Elect of Medical Staff of Kern Medical Center); TONI SMITH, (both individually and in her official capacity as Chief Nurse Executive of Kern Medical Center); WILLIAM ROY, M.D.; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. Defendants.
1 NATURE OF THE ACTION 2 This is an individual action brought by Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O.., a whistleblowing 3 physician with disabilities, against his employer, the County of Kern (“Defendant County” or 4 “the County”); and individual Defendants Peter Bryan (“Bryan”); Chief Executive Officer of 5 Kern Medical Center (“KMC”); Eugene Kercher, M.D., President of Medical Staff at KMC 6 (“Kercher”); Irwin Harris, M.D., Chief Medical Officer of KMC (“Harris”); Jennifer Abraham, 7 M.D., Immediate Past President of Medical Staff at KMC (“Abraham”); Scott Ragland, M.D. 8 (both individually and in his official capacity as President-Elect of Medical Staff of Kern 9 Medical Center); Toni Smith, Chief Nurse Executive of KMC, (“Smith”), both personally and in 10 their official capacities; William Roy, M.D., Chief of the Division of Gynecologic Oncology at 11 KMC (“Roy”); and DOES 1 through 10. 12 Plaintiff’s claims against his employer, Defendant County, allege violations of section 13 1278.5 of the Health & Safety Code 1 which prohibits retaliation against a health care provider 14 who reports suspected unsafe care and conditions of patients in a health care facility; section 15 1102.5 of the Labor Code which prohibits retaliation against an employee for reporting or 16 refusing to participate in suspected violations of the law; the California Family Rights Act 17 (sections 12945.1, et seq., of the Government Code) (“CFRA”) and the Family and Medical 18 Leave Act (sections 2601, et seq. of the United States Code) (“FMLA”) which prohibit 19 interference with an employee’s right to medical leave and retaliation for an employee’s exercise 20 of the right to medical leave; and the Fair Employment and Housing Act [subdivisions (a), (m) & 21 (n) of section 12940 of the Government Code] (“FEHA”) which prohibit discrimination against 22 23
All statutory references are to California Codes unless otherwise specified.
an employee with a disability, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in an interactive process; and recovery of wrongfully deducted wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.) (“FLSA”). Plaintiff sues Defendants County, Roy, Harris and DOES 1 through 10, for defamation; and also sues each of the individual Defendants except for Roy and Harris, both in their personal capacity and in their official capacity as members of the KMC Joint Conference Committee (“JCC”), for violation of Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution right to procedural due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Due Process”). Plaintiff brings this action for general, compensatory, and punitive damages; prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys’ fees; injunctive and declaratory relief; and other appropriate and just relief resulting from Defendants’ unlawful conduct, and as grounds therefore alleges: JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This Court has federal question jurisdiction over the FMLA, Due Process, and
FLSA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s transactionally-related state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 2. Venue is proper in Fresno in the Eastern District of California, as a substantial
part of the events and omissions giving rise to this claim occurred in the County of Kern, California. INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT 3. Assignment to Bakersfield is proper pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-120
(Appendix A) because the events giving rise to this civil action occurred in Bakersfield in the County of Kern, California. PARTIES
At all material times herein, Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. (“Plaintiff”) has
continuously been an employee of Defendant County, a citizen of the United States and California; and a resident of Los Angeles County, California. 5. At all material times herein, Plaintiff was an individual with disabilities within the
meaning of Section 12926(i) & (k) of the Government Code. 6. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant County is a
local public entity within the meaning of sections 811.2 & 900.4 of the Government Code and is operating in Kern County, California. 7. At all material times herein, the County has continuously been an employer
within the meaning of FMLA [29 C.F.R. § 825.105(C)], CFRA [Government Code § 12945.2(b)(2)], FEHA [Government Code § 12926(d)], and FLSA [29 U.S.C. § 203], engaged in interstate commerce and regularly employing more than fifty employees within seventy-five miles of Plaintiff’s workplace. 8. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant Peter Bryan is a
citizen of Colorado, and a resident of Denver, Colorado, and was Chief Executive Officer of KMC, and a member of the JCC. 9. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant Eugene Kercher
is a citizen of California, a resident of Kern County, California, and President of KMC Medical Staff, and a member of the JCC. 10. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant Irwin Harris is
a citizen of California, and a resident of Kern County, California, and Chief Medical Officer at KMC, and a non-voting member of the JCC. 11. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant Jennifer
Abraham is a citizen of California, and a resident of Kern County, California and Immediate Past President of KMC Medical Staff, and a member of the JCC. 12. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant Scott Ragland
is a citizen of California, and a resident of Kern County, California, President-Elect of KMC Medical Staff, and a member of the JCC. 13. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant Toni Smith is a
citizen of California, and a resident of Kern County, California, and Chief Nurse Executive of KMC, and a member of the JCC. 14. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant William Roy is
a citizen of California, and a resident of Kern County, California and Chief of the Division of Gynecologic Oncology at KMC. 15. The true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, are
presently unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to set forth the true names and capacities of said Defendants when they are ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that at all times relevant, each of the fictitiously-named Defendants was an agent, employee, or co-conspirator of one or more of the named Defendants, and was acting within the course and scope of said agency or employment. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants aided, assisted, approved, acknowledged and/or ratified the wrongful acts committed by Defendants as alleged herein, and that Plaintiff’s damages, as alleged herein, were legally caused by such Defendants.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 16. Plaintiff is a highly-qualified and capable pathologist with numerous professional
accomplishments that have included leadership roles in national, state and local pathology & medical societies. Plaintiff received extensive education and training at reputable academic and medical institutions. Plaintiff has managed several clinical laboratories and pathology departments that have achieved accreditation by the College of American Pathologists, frequently "with distinction.” Plaintiff has also been recognized by numerous pathologists and physicians for his professional leadership and commitment to set and uphold rigorous and ethical standards for patient care quality and safety. 17. In late 2000, Plaintiff was recruited to assume the position of Chair of the
Pathology Department at KMC, a teaching hospital owned and operated by Defendant County. Plaintiff was recruited in part to raise standards of patient care quality and safety at KMC. Plaintiff immediately set about implementing, among other things, a best-practices peer review system in the Pathology Department. 18. In 2001, Plaintiff began to report concerns to key members of KMC’s medical
staff and administration about the unacceptably high levels of unsatisfactory or non-diagnostic fine needle aspirations (“FNA”) – a method of using a needle and syringe to obtain deep internal tissue samples of vital organs – being taken by the Radiology Department at KMC for diagnosis by the Pathology Department. In 2003, Plaintiff began to report concerns to key members of KMC’s medical staff and administration about ineffective and unnecessary blood transfusions and an unacceptably high incidence of lost or incomplete product chart copy certifications (“PCC”) required for accurate tracking of dangerous blood transfusions. In 2004, Plaintiff began
to report concerns to key members of KMC’s medical staff and administration about the need for instituting a policy of requiring KMC Pathology Department review prior to undertaking significant surgical procedures based upon the reports of outside pathologists (“Internal Pathology Review”). In 2005, Plaintiff reported a concern to key members of KMC’s medical staff and administration about an inappropriate radical hysterectomy (cancer surgical procedure for removal of all female reproductive organs and regional lymph nodes) performed by Roy on a patient with a benign endometriotic cyst (“Roy Hysterectomy”). Also in 2005, Plaintiff began to report concerns to key members of KMC’s medical staff and administration about the need to review a series of serious diagnostic errors committed by a former KMC pathologist, including the failure to identify invasive adenocarcinoma in several prostate needle biopsies (“Prostate Biopsy Errors”). Also in 2005, Plaintiff reported concerns to KMC administration that KMC physicians had performed surgery on a wrong patient due to an error which Plaintiff believed would have been less likely had KMC implemented Internal Pathology Review per Plaintiff’s recommendation. Plaintiff reported several other concerns about inappropriate patient care and noncompliance with quality control standards. 19. In 2005, Roy began a campaign of making defamatory statements impugning
Plaintiff’s professional competence. Events culminated in October of 2005, when Kercher, Harris, Ragland and Abraham harshly reprimanded Plaintiff, based on false allegations, resulting from a 15-20-minute presentation given by Plaintiff during a monthly KMC oncology conference that allegedly exceeded conference time limits by approximately ten minutes. Plaintiff’s presentation had attempted to highlight several of Plaintiff’s above-mentioned concerns regarding Internal Pathology Review and their potential impact upon deciding the correct surgical procedure for the patient under discussion. The presentation was stopped before Plaintiff
could present the key diagnostic conclusions of his presentation. 20. After the conference, Harris solicited letters of disapprobation from conference
participants, including Roy. Roy submitted a letter (“Roy Letter”) containing several false statements of fact which defamed Plaintiff to other members of KMC’s medical staff and administration. On information and belief, Harris and DOES 1 through 10 republished the Roy Letter to third parties. Several KMC medical and administration officers including Bryan and Kercher were aware of Roy’s, Harris’s and DOES 1 through 10’s acts of defamation, but refused to intercede, and possibly approved or encouraged them. 21. In December of 2005, Plaintiff began medical leave initially in the form of
medically necessary reduced work schedule due to severe depression which was later extended to June 16, 2006. During Plaintiff’s sick leave, Bryan issued a series of verbal and written ultimatums to Plaintiff which threatened him with termination or demotion upon return from his leave. In a meeting in April of 2006, Bryan ordered Plaintiff to cease his reduced work schedule and begin full-time leave. On June 14, 2006, two days before Plaintiff’s medical leave was allegedly due to end, Bryan informed Plaintiff that he was demoting Plaintiff to a staff pathologist position, effective June 17, 2006, because Plaintiff had taken excessive sick leaves. Plaintiff’s base salary was ultimately reduced over $100,00 (over 35%) as a result. 22. Plaintiff resumed full-time work as a staff pathologist on October 4, 2006.
Plaintiff continued to suffer a hostile work environment and retaliation. Plaintiff submitted a written complaint to KMC leadership on December 4, 2006 about numerous additional concerns regarding the quality of patient care and the deterioration of the pathology department. On December 7, Plaintiff was placed on involuntary administrative leave allegedly “pending resolution of a personnel matter”. To date, Plaintiff remains on involuntary leave.
B. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 23. On October 24, 2000, the County entered into an employment contract with
Plaintiff (“Initial Contract”), hiring him to a full-time position as Chair of the Pathology Department at KMC and as Medical Director of the KMC clinical laboratory (“Lab Director”) for an employment term ending on November 30, 2006. As Lab Director, Plaintiff’s job duties included Medical Director of KMC’s blood bank and transfusion service. 24. On or about November 12, 2002, the County modified Plaintiff’s employment
contract to reflect an increase in his compensation and leave accrual rate, among other things. This second employment contract dated as of October 5, 2002 (“Second Contract”) extended Plaintiff’s employment term to October 4, 2007. A true and correct copy of the Second Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, and incorporated by reference herein. 25. The Pathology Department and consequently the Chair of Pathology is
customarily referred to as “the conscience of a hospital”, and Plaintiff’s job duties extended “beyond (his) own department and (he was) expected to be an effective contributor to the overall improvement efforts of the hospital as a whole.” Such duties included participation in many hospital committees including KMC’s Quality Management Committee. 26. According to Exhibit A of the Initial Contract, the County expected Plaintiff to
spend 80-90% of his time on clinical duties of a pathologist, and 10-20% of his time on administrative duties as Chair of the Department of Pathology (“Chair of Pathology”) and Lab Director. 27. Article V.10 of the Second Contract provides that Plaintiff will not be deemed a
classified employee, or have any rights or protections under the County's Civil Service Ordinance, rules or regulation.
Article II.3(B)(1) of the Second Contract guarantees that Plaintiff’s base salary
will be based on a benchmark salary in proportion to his full-effort commitment. In turn, the benchmark salary will be based on a national standard with four steps (A-D) with three criteria for step placement: clinical experience, teaching and administrative duties as set forth in the KMC Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual (“KAPP Manual”). 29. On information and belief, at the time of his hire, the County placed Plaintiff’s
salary level at Step C . 30. Article III.4 of the Second Contract entitles Plaintiff to the same right to unpaid
leave of absence as those provided to a regular County employee under the County’s policy, including six months cumulative unpaid leave of absence for illness or disability pursuant to Rule 1201.20 of the Rules of the Civil Service Commission for the County of Kern (“CSC Rules”). 31. Article IV.1(B) of the Second Contract requires “cause” for termination of
Plaintiff’s employment, which cause is defined as “serious administrative violation and/or unsatisfactory clinical performance.” 32. Article IV.3 of the Second Contract entitles Plaintiff to administrative review of
any corrective action for unsatisfactory clinical performance pursuant to the Bylaws of the Medical Staff of KMC (“Bylaws”); and for administrative review of any corrective action for violation of administrative policies of the County or KMC pursuant to the KAPP Manual. C. WHISTLEBLOWING 33. Throughout the course of his employment by KMC, Plaintiff has advocated for
appropriate patient care and compliance with the quality accreditation standards of the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospital Organizations, the College of American
Pathologists, the American Association of Blood Banks and the American College of Surgeons Commission on Cancer as well as applicable state & federal regulations designed to ensure safe care and conditions of patients. 34. Plaintiff reported his various concerns (“Concerns”) about inappropriate and/or
suspected unsafe patient care and conditions and non-compliance with applicable laws and regulations and accreditation standards to Bryan and key members of KMC’s medical staff, including but not limited to the following: (i) beginning in 2001, Plaintiff reported the unacceptably high levels of unsatisfactory or non-diagnostic FNAs being taken by the Radiology Department at KMC; (ii) beginning in 2003, Plaintiff reported the unacceptably high incidence of lost or incomplete PCC; (iii) beginning in 2004, Plaintiff reported the need for Internal Pathology Review; (iv) beginning in 2005, Plaintiff reported the Roy Hysterectomy; (v) beginning in 2005, Plaintiff reported the need to review the Prostate Biopsy Errors; and (vi) beginning in 2005, Plaintiff reported that KMC physicians had performed surgery on a wrong patient due to an error which Plaintiff believed would have been less likely had KMC implemented Internal Pathology Review. Unfortunately, Plaintiff’s reports not only appeared to fall on deaf ears, but also generated resentment and hostility among his peers at KMC. 35. On or about December 12, 2005, Plaintiff’s former attorney, Michael Young
(“Young”), sent a letter to Bernard Barmann, Kern County Counsel (“Barmann”), requesting Barmann meet with Plaintiff to discuss his Concerns. 36. On or about February 9, 2006, Barmann and Barnes met with Plaintiff. Plaintiff
reported his various Concerns, as well as the retaliation, defamation and hostile work environment Plaintiff was experiencing at KMC. 37. Finally, on or about November 28, 2006, after almost six years of trying to reform
KMC from within in vain, Plaintiff formally reported his Concerns to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospital Organizations, the College of American Pathologists, and the California Department of Health Services (“Authorities”). 38. On December 13, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to David Culberson
(“Culberson”), interim Chief Executive Officer of KMC, and carbon-copied to members of KMC’s medical staff leadership, informing him that “KMC leadership has left me no choice but to report the above issues (Concerns) to the appropriate state and accrediting agencies (Authorities)”. D. DEFAMATION 39. In 2005, Plaintiff had reported the need for Internal Pathology Review to key
members of KMC medical staff and administration. Roy refused to submit outside pathology reports for Internal Pathology Review prior to surgery, preferring instead to refer all of his pathology cases to an acquaintance at the University of Southern California. 40. On or about April 15, 2005, Roy sent a letter which was addressed to Plaintiff and
carbon-copied to Dr. Leonard Perez (“Perez”), Chair of the OB-GYN Department at KMC. The letter contained the following statements of fact: Additionally, I cannot institute adjuvant therapy in a timely manner when it takes weeks and sometimes months to get an accurate diagnosis from your department…. Most importantly, delays in instituting appropriate adjuvant therapy due to delays in obtaining an accurate diagnosis, or instituting inappropriate therapy based on an inaccurate diagnosis can negatively affect patient survival. 41. Roy’s statements regarding delays of weeks and months were false. Perez
21 reasonably understood that the statements were about Plaintiff. Perez reasonably understood the 22 statements to mean that Plaintiff was not managing the Pathology Department in a competent 23 manner. Roy failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the statements. Roy 24
acted with malice in publishing the false statements. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of reputation and confidence among his peers at KMC. 42. On or about April 20, 2005, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Roy and carbon-
copied to Perez, Dr. Maureen Martin, Chair of Surgery (“Martin”), Kercher and Bryan. The letter stated: “Please refrain from making statements such as it takes weeks and sometimes months to get an accurate diagnosis from your department without citing specific instances. In my experience, such statements are typically untrue and consequently are unethical if not supported by facts.” As officers of KMC, Kercher and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede to protect Plaintiff from Roy’s defamatory acts, and in so doing, ratified them. 43. In May 2005, Harris informed Plaintiff that Roy had voiced concerns about the
Pathology Department and had submitted certain pathology reports for second-level peer review and investigation. Plaintiff requested that Harris identify the patient cases but Harris refused. Later, Plaintiff determined that no second-level peer review ever occurred. 44. On or about June 30, 2005, Martin and Harris told Plaintiff that Roy was making
negative comments about the Pathology Department. 45. On or about June 30, 2005, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Roy and carbon-
copied to Perez, Martin, Harris, Kercher and Bryan. The letter stated: It has come to my attention that you are making negative statements to numerous key members of the medical staff regarding pathology reports issued by this department. You are reported by others to claim that several of KMC pathology diagnoses do not agree with outside diagnoses rendered by other outside pathologists and that these discrepancies have or would have changed patient management. It would appear from these actions that you are claiming that our diagnoses are not correct. I do not recollect any true, substantial discrepancies between diagnoses rendered by this department and outside pathology departments based upon retrospective review of our cases since my arrival in December 2000. It is reported that you claim to have in your possession several such reports detailing incorrect diagnoses rendered by our department. It is also my understanding that you have been asked on several occasions to produce
examples of these discrepancies, and as of yet have not produced any such reports to individuals that have made these requests. To demonstrate and support the accuracy of your claims, I request that you produce copies of these reports for my review by July 15, 2005. 46. Roy’s statements of fact regarding incorrect diagnoses by the Pathology
4 Department were false. The key members of the KMC medical staff who heard the statements 5 reasonably understood that the statements were about Plaintiff and reasonably understood the 6 statements to mean that Plaintiff was not managing the Pathology Department in a competent 7 manner. Roy failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the statements. Roy 8 acted with malice in publishing the false statements. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a 9 significant loss of reputation and confidence among his peers at KMC. As officers of KMC, 10 Harris, Kercher and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roy’s 11 defamatory acts and in so doing, ratified them. 12 47. 13 copied to Harris, Bryan and Perez. The letter stated: 14 15 16 17 18 48. 19 bringing of them to Plaintiff’s attention “many times” and “in the presence of Dr. Perez” were 20 false. Harris, Bryan and Perez reasonably understood that the statements were about Plaintiff and 21 reasonably understood the statements to mean that Plaintiff was neither managing the Pathology 22 Department in a competent manner nor being truthful about Roy’s disclosures of the facts and 23 circumstances underlying his defamatory statements. Roy failed to use reasonable care to 24 Roy’s statements of fact regarding the existence of “discrepancies” and the I was quite surprised to receive your letter of June 5th. The "discrepancies" should be well known to you as I have brought them to your attention many times, both in the presence of Dr. Perez, and in a letter to you a couple of months ago, as well as multiple phone conversations. The inaccuracies, delays and refusals to refer specimens for outside review continue. The matter has been appropriately reported to the administration for a quality assurance review, as I have had no success in my pleadings to you directly. On or about July 15, 2005, Roy sent a letter addressed to Plaintiff and carbon-
determine the truth or falsity of the statements. Roy acted with malice in publishing the false statements. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of reputation and confidence among his peers at KMC. As officers of KMC, Harris and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roy’s defamatory acts and in so doing, ratified them. 49. Moreover, Roy’s statement of fact that he had reported the matter to KMC
administration for quality assurance review was false. Harris, Bryan and Perez reasonably understood that the statement was about Plaintiff and reasonably understood the statements to mean that Plaintiff was not managing the Pathology Department in a competent manner. Roy failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the statements. Roy acted with malice in publishing the false statements. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of reputation and confidence among his peers at KMC. As officers of KMC, Harris and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roy’s defamatory acts and in so doing, ratified them. 50. On October 12, 2005, Plaintiff gave a presentation at the monthly KMC oncology
conference (“Oncology Conference”) highlighting concerns regarding a patient that might need a hysterectomy, and the need for Internal Pathology Review. 51. Plaintiff’s presentation lasted approximately 15-20 minutes, which exceeded
alleged conference time limits by approximately ten minutes. Plaintiff was stopped before he could present his final slides stating his patient care quality conclusions. 52. On information and belief, presenters at prior and subsequent Oncology
Conferences, frequently exceeded time limits without interruption, incident, or reprimand. 53. Roy, Bill Taylor, Vice-Chair of Surgery, and Albert McBride, The Cancer
Committee Liaison, attended Plaintiff’s presentation at the October 12 Oncology Conference and
were requested by Harris to give him letters criticizing Plaintiff’s time infraction. 54. In response, Roy sent a letter (“Roy Letter”), dated October 13, 2005, addressed
to Harris. The Roy Letter stated in relevant part: With respect, Dr. Jadwin is a small rural community hospital pathologist, with very limited experience and no specialty training in regard to Gynecologic Oncologic Pathology…. Dr. Jadwin is not a clinician, and has neither the fund of knowledge nor the experience to make any recommendations regarding the treatment of patients, much less criticize the care provided by those, such as myself, whose training and experience were attained at some of the highest seats of learning in the U.S and abroad. Additionally, as you are aware, it is not infrequent that Dr. Jadwin's diagnoses are in err when reviewed by outside specialists, as in this particular case. The management of the patient would have been inappropriate if we accepted Dr. Jadwin's report, which as you know, was different from two other pathologists in his own department (three different opinions). I have no confidence in Dr. Jadwin and I am actively pursuing the possibility of having all specimens from the Gynecologic Oncology service evaluated outside, as is currently done for the Neurosurgery service…. I have discussed these issues with Dr. Perez, Chairman of the Department of Obstectrics and Gynecology, and he assures me of his full support. 55. The Roy Letter contained the following false statements of fact: (i) Plaintiff is a
13 small rural community hospital pathologist, (ii) Plaintiff has very limited experience in 14 Gynecologic Oncologic Pathology, (iii) Plaintiff is not a clinician, (iv) Plaintiff has neither the 15 fund of knowledge nor the experience to make any recommendations regarding the treatment of 16 patients, much less criticize the care given by doctors such as Roy, (v) it is not infrequent that 17 Plaintiff’s diagnoses are in err when reviewed by outside specialists, as in this particular case, 18 (vi) the management of the patient would have been inappropriate if Plaintiff’s report had been 19 accepted, and (vii) Plaintiff’s report was different from two other pathologists in his own 20 department, suggesting the deficiency of his report. Harris reasonably understood that the 21 statements were about Plaintiff and reasonably understood the statements to mean that Plaintiff’s 22 credentials and abilities as a pathologist and physician were deficient. Roy failed to use 23 reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the statements. Roy acted with malice in 24
publishing the false statements. The Roy Letter exceeded the scope of Harris’s request. Roy defamed Plaintiff despite Plaintiff’s numerous prior requests to stop defaming him. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of reputation and confidence among his peers at KMC. As an officer of KMC, Harris approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roy’s defamatory acts and in so doing, ratified them. 56. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Harris subsequently
republished the Roy Letter to DOES 1 through 10, and that DOES 1 through 10 further republished the Roy Letter to other members of KMC staff. Such other members of KMC staff reasonably understood that the statements contained in the Roy Letter were about Plaintiff and reasonably understood such statements to mean that Plaintiff’s credentials and abilities as a pathologist and physician were deficient. Harris and DOES 1 through 10 failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the statements. Harris and DOES 1 through 10 acted with actual malice in publishing the false statements. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of reputation and confidence among his peers at KMC. As officers of KMC, Harris, and DOES 1 through 10 accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roy’s defamatory acts or their subsequent republication, and in so doing, ratified them. 57. On or about October 17, 2005, Plaintiff was ordered to attend a meeting with
Kercher, Harris and Ragland who subjected Plaintiff to humiliating ridicule, yelling and inappropriate questioning regarding Plaintiff’s alleged violation of Oncology Conference time limits. Kercher, Harris and Ragland informed Plaintiff that they had received letters of disapprobation (“Disapprobation Letters”) from three conference participants and would be issuing a letter of reprimand later that day which would be entered into Plaintiff’s medical staff file. When Plaintiff asked to see the Disapprobation Letters, Kercher, Harris and Ragland refused
to provide them. As officers of KMC, Harris, Kercher, Ragland and Abraham approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roy’s defamatory acts or their subsequent republication by Harris and DOES 1 through 10, and in so doing, ratified such defamatory acts. 58. Later that day, Harris, Kercher, Ragland and Abraham sent a letter addressed to
Plaintiff (“Reprimand Letter”). The letter stated: “Your repeated misconduct at the Tumor Conference on October 12, 2005 was noted by numerous attendants, three of which have written letters of their dissatisfaction, which will be entered into your medical staff file.” The three letters to be entered into Plaintiff’s medical staff file included the Roy Letter. As officers of KMC, Harris, Kercher, Ragland and Abraham approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roy’s defamatory acts or their subsequent republication by Harris and DOES 1 through 10, and in so doing, ratified such defamatory acts. 59. During the period from on or about October 17, 2005 to on or about January
2007, Plaintiff submitted numerous requests to Harris, Ms. Karen Barnes, Deputy County Counsel (“Barnes”), and Bryan to see the Disapprobation Letters. He was continuously refused. As officers of KMC, Harris and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roy’s defamatory acts or their subsequent republication by Harris and DOES 1 through 10, and in so doing, ratified such defamatory acts. 60. On or about December 12, 2005, Young sent a letter to Barmann stating:
Recently, Dr. Jadwin was advised that several of the staff physicians had written letters of dissatisfaction regarding Dr. Jadwin’s professionalism and was advised that these letters were placed into his personnel/medical staff file. When the doctor asked to see these letters, he was refused access to them and was subsequently told that the letters had not been placed into his file. Dr. Jadwin then sent an e-mail to Deputy County Counsel, Karen Barnes, copy attached, regarding an opinion with respect to his right to inspect the file. At this juncture, there has been no reply to his request. Needless to say, Dr. Jadwin is extremely upset and emotionally distraught over the present state of affairs.
On or about January 6, 2006, Barnes sent a letter on behalf of Barmann and
addressed to Young. The letter included as an attachment a copy of the Roy Letter, redacted to conceal Roy’s identity. This letter afforded Plaintiff his first opportunity to see the Roy Letter and the defamatory statements contained therein. 62. On or about January 9, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Bryan, stating:
I have been victim of professional mistreatment by a few members of medical staff. You are aware of these instances. I believe this harassment is in response to the many quality management issues that I have raised. This harassment has led me develop depression, anxiety and insomnia. Most recent issue involving the October Oncology Conference is still unresolved. I request administrative leave with pay until this issue is resolved. 63. On or about February 10, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Roy,
10 challenging the truthfulness of the claims contained in Roy’s letter of July 15, 2005, that Roy had 11 reported certain patient cases handled by the Pathology Department to the KMC administration 12 for quality assurance review. Plaintiff stated “to my knowledge no credible report has been 13 submitted. As of today, I have not received notice of any deficient reports from you.” Plaintiff 14 further challenged the truthfulness of other defamatory statements contained in the Roy Letter 15 and demanded “immediate proof of these allegations within 14 days”. Plaintiff went on to state 16 that if Roy failed to produce such proof, then Roy should issue an apology meeting Plaintiff’s 17 specifications. 18 64. 19 in relevant part: 20 21 22 23 24 I received a copy of your letter to Dr. Roy dated February 10, 2006 and I must say that I am disappointed in your decision to send it… I know that you felt justified in sending the letter. You feel that Dr. Roy besmirched your reputation and challenged your professional competency. Furthermore, you feel that there is no evidence to support his characterizations of you and you are demanding that he recant his comments and apologize. All of these things may or may not be as you say. However, your decision to confront the issues this way is not a good one…. It On or about February 21, 2006, Bryan sent a letter addressed to Plaintiff, stating
is not your message that people react to but rather how you deliver it…. Dr. Roy's letter was correspondence submitted through the medical staff structure, and the staff officers and Chief Medical Officer have the obligation to decide what to do with that input. They can either ignore that correspondence because of a lack of supporting evidence, call for a review of the quality of your work, or cause a meeting to happen between you and Dr. Roy and Dr. Perez to further clarify the basis of Dr. Roy's concerns. 65. As an officer of KMC, Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede
against Roy’s defamatory acts or their subsequent republication by Harris and DOES 1 through 10, and in so doing, ratified them. 66. On or about March 16, 2006, Plaintiff sent an email addressed to Kercher and
carbon-copied to Bryan, stating: I am further requesting an investigation of Dr. Roy’s professional behavior by the medical staff… [H]e has made outrageous false statements about the pathology department and myself, which cause great concern about his ethical integrity…. I think it is outrageous that the medical staff sits by and lets this individual act in such a pompous, destructive manner. I feel a personal duty to the pathology department (and the hospital) to push the issue of his bad conduct in whatever venue may be needed to control the actions of this individual. 67. On or about March 30, 2006, Young sent a letter addressed to Roy, stating:
Dr. Jadwin is very upset with the alleged statements attributable to you regarding his reputation in the medical community. Unless you come forward with facts in support of your position to show the truth thereof or issue a written apology to Dr. Jadwin, he will have no alternative but to seek recourse against you for damaging his reputation. While professionals may justifiably have a difference of opinion regarding complex issues in the field of medicine, there is really no place for publishing statements about a colleague that are not true and intended to tarnish one’s reputation.” 68. To date, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges: (i) Roy has
20 never responded to Plaintiff’s repeated requests for factual substantiation of Roy’s numerous 21 defamatory statements; (ii) KMC never conducted an investigation into Roy’s professional 22 misconduct; and (iii) Harris, Kercher, Bryan and Abraham have approved, accepted, and refused 23 to intercede against Roy’s defamatory acts or their subsequent republication by Harris and DOES 24
1 through 10. E. MEDICAL LEAVE 69. As of December 16, 2005, Plaintiff was eligible for twelve weeks of medical
leave under FMLA and CFRA pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 and 2 C.C.R. § 72970(e), respectively, in that he had been regularly employed by Defendant County for 1250 hours in the twelve months immediately prior to the start of his leave and had not taken any medical or family leave during that time. 70. An eligible employee’s rights under CFRA and FMLA include a “reduced work
schedule” pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 825.203 that is “medically necessary” pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 825.117. 71. On or about December 16, 2005, Plaintiff submitted to KMC a copy of his
psychiatrist’s certification stating that Plaintiff needed a reduced work schedule leave until at least March 16, 2006 because of his serious medical condition. 72. circumstances. 73. On or about December 16, 2005 Plaintiff began his medically necessary reduced Plaintiff’s notice to KMC of his need for medical leave was reasonable under the
work schedule that permitted him to perform all of his duties as Chair of Pathology, and reduced his schedule only as to his duties as a regular pathologist. 74. On or about March 2, 2006, Plaintiff was finally provided with a Request for
Leave of Absence form which he then submitted to KMC’s HR Department. KMC’s HR Department formally approved the leave on March 13, 2006. 75. Also on or about March 2, 2006, Plaintiff received a document entitled
“Designation of Leave (Serious Health Condition of Employee-Intermittent)” (“Leave
Designation Notice”) from the HR Department at KMC that informed Plaintiff: You also have the right to be reinstated to the same or an equivalent job with the same pay, benefits and terms and conditions of employment on your return from leave. Please note that the leave provisions for County employees are more generous than those mandated by FMLA and CFRA and, accordingly, you may be eligible for more than the twelve (12) weeks of unpaid leave described above.” 76. On or about April 10, 2006, Plaintiff sent an email to Bryan stating: “I believe
that we have a meeting this Thursday at 1500. I can discuss a schedule with you. I have been working only to help out Phil and Savita during periods of shortage, and to keep on top of some administrative work. I am always available for necessary discussions. Just have Arlene or Tracy call me.” 77. On or about April 17, 2006, Bryan wrote a letter addressed to Plaintiff,
purportedly memorializing Bryan’s April 13, 2006 meeting with Plaintiff in which he acknowledged, “Yes, the Department of Pathology continues to function well as it has for many years, and yes, you have made many positive changes in the department.” Bryan also acknowledged that Plaintiff’s whistleblowing activity had created “the dysfunctional relationship you have with some key members of the staff” and asked for Plaintiff to either cease upsetting staff with his whistleblowing activity or to step down as Chairman on his return from medical leave. 78. On or about April 20, 2006, Plaintiff received notice from KMC’s HR
Department that his “Intermittent Leave of Absence” had expired on March 15 and that in order to extend his leave, he would need to submit a “Request for Leave of Absence” form to the HR Department by “no later than Tuesday, April 25, 2006”. 79. On or about April 26, 2006, Plaintiff submitted a Request for Leave of Absence
form to KMC’s HR Department, along with a copy of his psychiatrist’s certification that Plaintiff
needed an extension of his reduced work schedule leave for six months to one year because of his serious medical condition. 80. However, on or about April 28, 2006, Bryan met with Plaintiff, Barnes and Steve
O’Conner of the HR Department (“O’Conner”) and ordered Plaintiff to convert his reduced work schedule to involuntary full-time medical leave despite the fact that Plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to continue working his reduced work schedule (“Forced FT Leave”). Bryan further told Plaintiff that he needed to know by June 16, 2006 whether Plaintiff would resign as Chair; and that if he resigned he would be in the same position as Adam Lang, a former staff pathologist at KMC, who retained only hospital privileges but whose employment contract had been terminated. Hence, Bryan threatened Plaintiff not only with removal from chairmanship, but termination of the Second Contract. 81. On or about April 28, 2006, Bryan wrote a letter to Plaintiff purportedly
memorializing the April 26, 2006 meeting and stating that he required Plaintiff to go on full-time leave from May 1, 2006 to June 16, 2006 when Plaintiff’s right to medical leave would purportedly expire; and required Plaintiff to either return to work full-time on June 17, 2006 or resign, purportedly because “the hospital needs you here full-time.” 82. On or about May 5, 2006, Plaintiff underwent nasal surgery followed by a
difficult recovery which limited his ability to breathe and exert himself for approximately one month. 83. On or about May 29, 2006, Plaintiff fractured his foot and avulsed a ligament
from his ankle in an accident which limited his ability to walk, stand or sit without elevating his ankle for approximately three months. 84. On or about June 2, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Bryan, stating:
Unfortunately, I underwent sinus surgery in early May which took some time to recover from. Then last Monday, I suffered a serious fall down a staircase that will require a cast on my left ankle and impose serious restrictions on my mobility for at least four weeks. I would greatly appreciate an extension of the June 16 deadline as my physical ailments of late simply have not permitted me to consider and render such an important decision nor do they physically permit me to come to the office by June 16. 85. On or about June 14, 2006, Bryan sent an email addressed to Plaintiff informing
Plaintiff that Bryan was unilaterally removing Plaintiff from his position as Chair of Pathology. The email stated: My response to your request for an extension of medical leave has a two part answer. First, I will extend leave to a Personal Necessity Leave for your employment status only. This means that you have 90 days of extended leave which will protect your overall employment status. At the end of this 90 day period, you must either return to duty or resign from employment. Second, I will not extend your leave as it relates to your appointment as Chairman, Department of Pathology. I am implementing the provisions of paragraph 9.6-4, REMOVAL, Medical Staff Bylaws, and withdrawing your appointment as Chairman, Department of Pathology. This institution needs to have full-time leadership in the department and because of your leave you have not been able to provide it. Should you return to work after the completion of your Personal Necessity Leave then your employment contract will be modified as mutually agreed to reflect that you are still an employed pathologist (should you choose this option), but you will not retain the duties and appointment of a chairman. My decision to do this, Dr. Jadwin, is based solely on your inability to provide consistent and stable leadership in the department for most of the past eight to nine months. You have used all of your sick and vacation time in addition to using all available time under the medical leave provisions of County policy. It is unfortunate that you had your accident which delayed your return but the hospital needs to move on. 86. Later, on or about June 14, 2006, Bryan sent a letter addressed to Plaintiff
reiterating that Bryan was rescinding Plaintiff’s Chairmanship of the Pathology Department because Plaintiff had “essentially been out on either full or part-time leave for the past eight or nine months” – an inaccurate statement – and because “the Department of Pathology needs a full-time chairman.” 87. On information and belief, on or about July 10, 2006, the JCC approved
Plaintiff’s removal from Chairmanship by a majority vote. 88. Plaintiff’s demotion breached the guarantee of reinstatement contained in the
Leave Designation Notice. 89. On or about September 18, 2006, Barnes sent Plaintiff a proposed amendment
(“Amendment”) to the Second Contract which included a base salary reduction of over 35% (“Paycut”), allegedly as a consequence of Plaintiff’s removal from Chairmanship. 90. On or about September 18, 2006, Plaintiff sent an email addressed to Barnes
protesting the Paycut. The email stated: Mr. Bryan stated in his letter to me that his decision to strip me of my chairmanship was based on the sick leaves I was taking. KMC's proposed reduction of my base salary seems to have the purpose of punishing me further. I wish to return to work at KMC, but I believe the proposed drastic reduction in my base salary as benchmarked against Dr. Dutt's is utterly unfair on numerous levels. I am left feeling that this is simply another retaliatory effort on the part of KMC. 91. On or about September 20, 2006, Culberson sent a letter addressed to Plaintiff
explaining the Paycut. 92. On or about September 22, 2006, Plaintiff executed the Amendment
memorializing the Paycut and submitted it to Barnes. 93. On or about October 3, 2006, the Board of Supervisors for Defendant County
voted to approve the Amendment. 94. On October 4, 2006, Plaintiff’s 90-day personal necessity leave ended and
Plaintiff returned to work at KMC as a staff pathologist. Plaintiff’s former subordinate, Philip Dutt, MD (“Dutt”), was chosen to replace Plaintiff as Acting Chair of Pathology. 95. Between on or about October 4, 2006 until on or about December 7, 2006, Dutt
yelled at, harassed, insulted and ridiculed Plaintiff, both verbally and in a series of emails.
On or about December 4, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Culberson and
carbon-copied to key members of KMC’s medical staff and administration, protesting Dutt’s behavior and raising additional concerns about patient care quality, safety and legal noncompliance. 97. On or about December 7, 2006, Culberson sent a letter addressed to Plaintiff
informing him that he was being placed on involuntary paid administrative leave “pending resolution of a personnel matter”. To date, Plaintiff remains on such involuntary leave. F. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 98. In 2003, Plaintiff had notified KMC that he suffered from depression due to work-
related hostility and KMC’s failure to resolve Plaintiff’s compliance and patient care concerns. KMC subsequently permitted Plaintiff to undertake a medically necessary reduced work schedule leave as a reasonable accommodation. 99. By December 16, 2005, Plaintiff was suffering extreme stress from the hostile
work environment created by the harassment, defamation, discrimination, and retaliatory adverse actions of Defendants and each of them. Plaintiff’s depression subsequently became disabling in that it limited his ability to enjoy life, without anxiety or insomnia.. 100. On or about December 16, 2005, Plaintiff submitted to KMC a copy of his
psychiatrist’s certification that Plaintiff needed a reduced work schedule leave because of his serious medical condition. 101. On or about January 9, 2006, Plaintiff met with Bryan regarding his request for a
medically necessary reduced work schedule, and clarified that it was necessary because of the reoccurrence of his disabling depression. Bryan orally approved Plaintiff’s reduced work schedule.
Defendants, and each of them, knew or should have known that Plaintiff was an
individual with a disability that limited his major life activities of taking pleasure in life, without experiencing anxiety, insomnia or difficulty breathing and moving, and/or was perceived by Defendants as having such limitations. 103. On or about March 2, 2006, Plaintiff sent an email to Bryan, repeating his
previous verbal request weeks earlier that KMC hire a locum tenens pathologist to assist with the Pathology Department’s workload during Plaintiff’s reduced work leave. 104. On or about March 24, 2006, Plaintiff sent an email to Bryan, expressing his
disappointment that KMC had not yet hired a locum tenens pathologist to assist with the Pathology Department’s workload during Plaintiff’s reduced work leave, as Plaintiff had previously requested. 105. On or about April 10, 2006, Plaintiff sent an email to Bryan, stating that he had
not been informed that KMC had finally hired a locum tenens pathologist. The email stated: I don't know of Dr. Bhargava and didn't know that a contract with Dr. Bhargava was signed. Had I known, I would have placed him on the call schedule for the coming months. I felt obligated to take some of the call, even though I am off, because there would not be enough resources for the call schedule. 106. On or about April 17, 2006, Bryan wrote a letter addressed to Plaintiff in which
17 he acknowledged that “Yes, the Department of Pathology continues to function well as it has for 18 many years, and yes, you have made many positive changes in the department.” 19 107. 20 O’Conner, and ordered Plaintiff to convert his reduced work schedule to involuntary full-time 21 medical leave despite the fact that Plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to continue working his 22 reduced work schedule. 23 108. 24 On or about May 5, 2006, Plaintiff underwent nasal surgery followed by a Nevertheless, on or about April 28, 2006, Bryan met with Plaintiff, Barnes and
difficult recovery, which limited his ability to breathe and exert himself for approximately one month. 109. On or about May 29, 2006, Plaintiff fractured his foot and avulsed a ligament
from his ankle in an accident which limited his ability to stand, sit without elevating his ankle, or walk for approximately three months. 110. On or about June 2, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Bryan, requesting an
extension of Plaintiff’s leave, which was due to expire on June 16, 2006, because of Plaintiff’s nasal surgery and foot injury. 111. On or about June 14, 2006, Bryan sent an email addressed to Plaintiff informing
Plaintiff that Bryan was unilaterally removing Plaintiff from his position as Chair of Pathology purportedly because “[t]his institution needs to have full-time leadership in the department and because of your leave you have not been able to provide it.” 112. Later, on or about June 14, 2006, Bryan sent a letter address to Plaintiff
containing statements similar to those contained in Bryan’s email of earlier that day, and reiterating that “the Department of Pathology needs a full-time chairman.” 113. At all times material here, excluding a portion of the time when he was out on
voluntary full-time medical leave, Plaintiff has been able to perform the essential functions of the employment positions he held with Defendants and each of them, with reasonable accommodation. 114. Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation of his disabilities from Defendants,
and each of them, in the form of a reduced work schedule and/or recuperative leave. 115. Allowing Plaintiff to take the medical and/or recuperative leave that he requested
would have been a reasonable accommodation of Plaintiff’s disabilities.
Holding open Plaintiff’s position as Chair of Pathology while he was on leave
would have been a reasonable accommodation of Plaintiff’s disabilities. 117. Holding open Plaintiff’s position as Chair of Pathology while he was on leave
would not have been unduly burdensome for the County or KMC. G. DUE PROCESS 118. Pursuant to 9.6-4 of the Bylaws, Bryan was not authorized to remove Plaintiff
from his position as Chair of Pathology, but could only recommend to the JCC that he be removed. 119. It is customary for the County and/or KMC to remove a Department Chair
pursuant to 9.6-4 of the Bylaws only for cause. 120. It is customary for the County and/or KMC to provide a hearing and opportunity
to be heard before removing a Department Chair of KMC from office, and before a demotion that results in a substantial and/or excessive reduction in compensation 121. When necessary, it is customary for the County and/or KMC to appoint a
temporary replacement as “Acting” senior manager in the place and stead of a senior manager, such as Plaintiff, when the senior manager’s position is left vacant because of a leave of absence or termination of employment. 122. Defendants, and each of them except Dr. Roy, demoted and reduced the
compensation of Plaintiff without cause or justification. 123. Defendants, and each of them except Dr. Roy, demoted and the reduced the
compensation of Plaintiff without providing him with the customary hearing. H. ADVERSE ACTIONS 124. Defendants, and each of them, have taken adverse employment actions against
Plaintiff, creating a hostile work environment, subjecting him to acts of defamation and ratification thereof, demotion and excessive reduction in pay, disparate treatment, unwarranted criticism and reprimands, threats, requests for his resignation, interference with and denial of his right to medical leave, refusing to engage in good faith in an interactive process and denying him reasonable accommodation and procedural due process because of his protected characteristics and/or activities alleged herein. I. DAMAGES AND CAUSATION 125. As a result of Defendants' acts and omissions alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered
pecuniary losses, such as loss of wages and benefits, and has been required to incur medical and legal expenses and to hire an attorney in order (i) to enforce Plaintiff's rights, (ii) to enforce provisions of the law protecting whistleblowers, employees who exercise their right to medical leave under CFRA and FMLA, and employees with disabilities that need reasonable accommodation, and (iii) to take such action both in his own interest and in order to enforce important rights affecting the public interest. 126. After Plaintiff’s returned from leave on October 4, 2006, Defendants and each of
them except Roy and Harris, placed Plaintiff in the position of staff pathologist and excessively reduced his salary by $100,842 or over 35% (which actions are hereinafter referred to collectively as “demotion” or “demoted”). 127. On information and belief, Plaintiff’s salary for his work as a staff pathologist for
KMC is less than the benchmark National Medical Group Association (“NMGA”) median salary for a clinical and anatomic pathologist with Plaintiff’s qualifications and experience, in breach of the Second Contract. 128. During the time that Defendants placed Plaintiff on involuntary full-time leave,
including the period from December 7, 2006 to date, Defendants effectively denied Plaintiff the opportunity to earn Professional Fees as set forth in Article II of the Second Contract. 129. As a further result of Defendants’ acts and omissions alleged herein, Plaintiff has
suffered and continues to suffer non-economic damages, such as emotional distress, anxiety, humiliation, and loss of reputation. 130. The acts and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, alleged herein were and
are a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's harm. 131. The acts and omissions of Defendants Bryan, Harris, and Roy alleged herein are
despicable, oppressive and were done in conscious disregard of the rights of whistleblowers, such as Plaintiff, and of the safety of public patients, and have evidenced actual or implied malicious intent toward Plaintiff, thereby entitling him to an award of punitive damages against Defendants Bryan, Harris and Roy pursuant to §3294 Civil Code in an amount sufficient to make an example of Defendants Bryan, Harris, and Roy and discourage others from conscious disregard for the rights of whistleblowers and the safe care and condition of public patients. Plaintiff does not know the financial worth of Defendants Bryan, Harris, or Roy or the amount of punitive damages sufficient to accomplish the public purposes of §3294 Civil Code and will seek leave to amend this complaint when such facts are known or proceed according to proof at trial. 132. Plaintiff has mitigated his damages by seeking and maintaining medical and
psychiatric treatment and by taking progressive steps to try to protect his reputation and restore confidence in the Pathology Department at KMC. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES 133. On July 3, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Tort Claims Act complaint with the County of
Kern. The complaint disclosed Plaintiff’s claims of defamation against Roy, Harris and
Defendants DOES 1 through 10, and of retaliation against Defendant County for engaging in whistleblowing activity concerning unsafe patient care and conditions at KMC and his refusal to participate in activities that he reasonably believed to be unlawful against Defendant County (a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and incorporated by reference herein). The Office of the County Counsel for the County of Kern sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel, dated September 15, 2006 (a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 3 and incorporated by reference herein), giving notice that Plaintiff’s complaint was deemed rejected by operation of law and informing Plaintiff that he had six months from the date of such notice to file a court action on his claims. Plaintiff continues to be employed by KMC as a staff pathologist and continues to be subject to a hostile work environment and retaliation on an ongoing basis. As such, Plaintiff intends to file amended Tort Claims Act complaints with the County of Kern on a periodic and continuing basis. 134. On August 3, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of
Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), followed by an amended complaint filed on November 14, 2006. The complaint stated claims against Defendant County for discrimination on the basis of disability, as well as failure to engage in good faith in an interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, violations of Plaintiff’s medical leave rights. Plaintiff received a right-to-sue notice from the DFEH, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit 4 and incorporated by reference herein. 135. Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to sue under Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code,
without seeking any penalties, with the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) on January 5, 2007, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 5 and incorporated by reference herein. Plaintiff will amend this complaint, if appropriate, in
accordance with Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(C) to seek attorneys fees pursuant to Labor Code § 2699 for violation of Labor Code § 1102.5 in the event the LWDA does not investigate, pursue and/or fails to issue a citation regarding this claim. 136. Plaintiff intends to file a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor alleging
denial of Plaintiff’s right to family and medical leave under federal law. No right-to-sue notice has issued as Plaintiff has a free-standing private right of action under FMLA. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FIRST CLAIM (Retaliation in Violation of Health & Safety Code § 1278.5) (Against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10) 137. Plaintiff alleges this first and separate claim for Retaliation in violation of Health
& Safety Code § 1278.5 against Defendant County. 138. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 136, inclusive, above. 139. At all material times herein, Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 provided protection
from discrimination and retaliation for health care workers who reported suspected unsafe care and conditions of patients in health care facilities. 140. Defendants and each of them knew of Plaintiff’s whistleblowing activity
regarding suspected unsafe care and conditions of patients at KMC. 141. Defendants and each of them have violated Section 1278.5 of the Health and
Safety Code by engaging in a continuous and ongoing pattern and practice of discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff because he engaged in whistleblowing activity protected by Section 1278.5 of the Health and Safety Code. 142. A motivating factor for the acts and omissions of Defendants and each of them
described herein was Plaintiff’s reports to his employer, Barmann, and Authorities regarding what he reasonably believed to be unsafe patient care and conditions. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. SECOND CLAIM: (Retaliation In Violation Of Lab. Code § 1102.5) (Against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10) 143. Plaintiff alleges this second and separate claim for Retaliation in violation of
7 Labor Code § 1102.5 against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive 8 144. 9 1 through 136 above, inclusive. 10 145. 11 provides in pertinent part: 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 146. 20 unsafe care and conditions of patients at KMC to his employer, Barmann, and Authorities. 21 22 23 148. 24 Defendants, and each of them, engaged in a continuous and ongoing pattern and 147. Defendants, and each of them, knew of Plaintiff’s whistleblowing reports Plaintiff reported his reasonable suspicions about illegal, non-compliant, and 1102.5. (a) An employer may not make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation. (b) An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation. (c) An employer may not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation. At all material times herein, Labor Code § 1102.5 was in effect, and Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
protected by Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code.
practice of discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff because he engaged in activity protected by Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code. 149. Plaintiff's activity protected by Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code was a
contributing factor in the continuous pattern and practice of discrimination and retaliation of Defendants, and each of them, against Plaintiff described in this complaint. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. THIRD CLAIM [Retaliation (CFRA - Gov’t Code §§ 12945.1, et seq.)] (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.) 150. Plaintiff alleges this third and separate claim for violations of Government Code
10 §§ 12945.1, et seq., against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 11 151. 12 1 through 136 above, inclusive. 13 152. 14 C.C.R. § 7297.7(a) prohibit any person from discriminating, discharging, or retaliating against an 15 employee for exercising his right to medical leave. 16 153. 17 employer shall guarantee to reinstate an employee to the same or comparable position, and must 18 do so unless refusal to reinstate is “justified” by the defenses stated in 2 C.C.R. § 72972(c). 19 154. 20 C.C.R. § 7297.7(c) for refusing to reinstate Plaintiff to the same or comparable position on his 21 return from medical leave. 22 155. 23 to medical leave, including denying him a medically necessary reduced work schedule; 24 Defendants, and each of them, retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his right At all material times herein, the County lacked “justification” pursuant to 2 Pursuant to 2 C.C.R. § 7297.2(a), CFRA requires that upon granting of leave, an At all material times herein, Section 12945.2(a)(1) of the Government Code and 2 Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
unjustified notice of Defendants’ intent not to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; Defendant’s unjustified refusal to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; demoting him; and excessively reducing his salary and chance to earn professional fees, bonuses and promotion. 156. Plaintiff's exercise of his right to medical leave was a motivating reason for
Defendants’ adverse treatment Plaintiff. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. FOURTH CLAIM [Interference With FMLA Rights in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.] (Against Defendants County, Bryan, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.) 157. Plaintiff alleges this fourth and separate claim for violations of 29 U.S.C. §§
11 2601, et seq. against Defendants County, Bryan, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of 12 them. 13 158. 14 1 through 136 above, inclusive. 15 159. 16 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) imposed liability on covered employers and “any person who acts directly or 17 indirectly in the interest of the employer to any of the employees of such employer” for 18 interfering, restraining, or denying the exercise of, or attempt to exercise, any right provided 19 under FMLA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). 20 160. 21 attempt to exercise, Plaintiff’s rights under FMLA. 22 161. 23 exercise Plaintiff’s rights under FMLA included interference with and denial of Plaintiff’s right 24 Defendants’ interference, restraint, or denial of the exercise of, or attempt to Defendants, and each of them, interfered, restrained, or denied the exercise of, or At all material times herein, FMLA was in effect and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
to a medically necessary reduced work schedule; requiring Plaintiff to take full-time medical leave when he was ready, willing, and able to work part-time, exhausting his medical leave more rapidly than permitted; unjustified notice of Defendants’ intent not to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; Defendant’s unjustified refusal to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; Defendants’ excessive reduction in Plaintiff’s salary. 162. Plaintiff's exercise of his rights under FMLA was a motivating reason for
Defendants’ adverse treatment of Plaintiff. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. FIFTH CLAIM [Violation of CFRA Rights in violation of Gov’t Code §§ 12945.1, et seq.] (Against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.) 163. Plaintiff alleges this fifth and separate claim for violations of Government Code
13 §§ 12945.1, et seq., against Defendants County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of 14 them. 15 164. 16 1 through 136 above, inclusive. 17 165. 18 employment practice for an employer to violate an employee’s rights under the CFRA pursuant 19 to section 12945.2(a) of the Government Code. 20 166. 21 employers who discriminated against an employee for exercising his right to leave or otherwise 22 interfered with an eligible employee’s CFRA rights pursuant to 2 C.C.R. § 7297.1 and Section 23 1615(a)(2) of the United States Code. 24 At all material times herein, the CFRA imposed strict liability on covered At all material times herein, the CFRA was in effect and made it an unlawful Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
Pursuant to 2 C.C.R.§ 7297.10, CFRA expressly incorporates federal
implementing regulations for FMLA that are not inconsistent with CFRA. 29 C.F.R. 825 § 825.700(a) provides that “[i]f an employee takes paid or unpaid leave and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee’s FMLA entitlement.” 168. Pursuant to 2 C.C.R. § 7297.4(6), an employer must designate leave as CFRA
leave within 10 days of notice of the employee’s need for leave; but the greater protections of 29 C.F.R. § 825.208 which require an employer to do so “within two days absent extenuating circumstances” should apply. 169. In Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001), the court
construed 29 C.F.R. Sec. 825.200(e) and held that where an employer does not designate the method used in calculating employees’ entitlement to leave, “the option that provides the most beneficial outcome for the employee will be used.” 170. Pursuant to Government Code § 12945.2(a) and 2 C.C.R. § 7297.2(A), medical
leave requested is not be deemed to have been granted unless the employer provides the employee, upon granting the leave request, a written guarantee of employment in the same or a comparable position upon the termination of the leave. 171. Pursuant to 2 C.C.R. § 7297.2(a), CFRA requires that upon granting of leave, an
employer shall guarantee to reinstate an employee to the same or comparable position, and must do so unless refusal to reinstate is “justified” by the defenses stated in 2 C.C.R. § 72972(c). 172. At all material times herein, the County lacked “justification” pursuant to 2
C.C.R.C § 7297.7(c) for refusing to reinstate Plaintiff to the same or comparable position on his return from medical leave.
Defendants, and each of them, discriminated against Plaintiff and otherwise
interfered with his CFRA rights because he exercised, or tried to exercise, his CFRA rights, including untimely designation of the initial leave as CFRA leave without providing notice of the method of calculation, untimely notice of how KMC calculated Plaintiff’s entitlement to the extension of his CFRA leave,; interference with and denial of Plaintiff’s right to a medically necessary reduced work schedule; requiring Plaintiff to take full-time medical leave when he was ready, willing, and able to work part-time which exhausted his medical leave more rapidly than permitted; unjustified notice of Defendants’ intent not to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; Defendant’s unjustified refusal to reinstate Plaintiff to his former or comparable position on his return from leave; and Defendants’ excessive reduction in Plaintiff’s salary. 174. These violations may also mean that Defendant further violated Plaintiff’s CFRA
rights by informing him that his medical leave was exhausted as of June 16, 2005, while Plaintiff may have been entitled to medical leave even as of October 4, 2006 when he returned to work. 175. Plaintiff's exercise of, or attempt to exercise, his CFRA rights was a motivating
reason for Defendants’ adverse treatment of him. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. SIXTH CLAIM [Disability Discrimination in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940(a)] (Against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive) 176. Plaintiff alleges this sixth and separate claim for Disability Discrimination in violation of Government Code § 12940(a) against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 177. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
1 through 136 above, inclusive. 178. 179. The FEHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in employment. Defendants, and each of them, through their course of conduct denied Plaintiff a
benefit of employment, in whole or in part, because he is an individual with known disabilities in violation of Government Code 12940(a) and 2 C.C.R. §7293.7. 180. In addition to the adverse actions alleged above, Defendants, and each of them,
discriminated against Plaintiff, denied him reasonable accommodation, and refused to engage in good faith in an interactive process because of his known disabilities. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. SEVENTH CLAIM (Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation in Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940(m)) (Against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive) 181. Plaintiff alleges this seventh and separate claim for Failure to Provide Reasonable
13 14 15 182. 16 1 through 136 above, inclusive. 17 183. 18 Plaintiff's known disabilities in violation of Section 12904(m) of the Government Code and 2 19 C.C.R. § 7293.9. 20 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. 21 22 23 24 EIGHTH CLAIM (Failure to Engage In Interactive Consultation In Violation of Gov’t Code § 12940(n)) (Against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive) Defendants, and each of them, failed to provide reasonable accommodation of Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs Accommodation in violation of Government Code § 12940(m) against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.
Plaintiff alleges this Eighth and separate claim for Failure to Engage in Good
Faith in an Interactive Consultation in violation of Government Code § 12940(n) against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 185. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
1 through 136 above, inclusive. 186. Defendants, and each of them, failed to engage in good faith in a prompt,
ongoing, interactive consultation regarding reasonable accommodation of Plaintiff's disabilities in violation of Section 12940(n) of the Government Code. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. NINTH CLAIM (Violation of Due Process Right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Against Defendant Bryan both personally and as former CEO of KMC, Defendant Kercher both personally and as President of Medical Staff of KMC, Defendant Ragland both personally and as President-Elect of Medical Staff of KMC, Defendant Abraham (both personally and as Immediate Past President of Medical Staff of KMC, and Defendant Smith both personally and as Chief Nurse Executive of KMC in their capacity as members of the Joint Conference Committee of KMC) 187. Plaintiff alleges this Ninth and separate claim for violation of Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution Right of Procedural Due Process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Bryan, both personally and in his former official capacity as Chief Executive Officer of KMC; Defendant Kercher both personally and as President of Medical Staff of KMC, Defendant Ragland both personally and as President-Elect of Medical Staff of KMC, Defendant Abraham (both personally and as Immediate Past President of Medical Staff of KMC, and Defendant Smith both personally and as Chief Nurse Executive of KMC in their official capacity as members of the Joint Conference Committee of KMC. 188. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
1 through 136 above, inclusive. 189. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a public
employee’s right of procedural due process regarding governmental actions that deprive him of life, liberty, or property interest of constitutional magnitude. 190. At all material times herein, Plaintiff had a property interest in his position as
Chair of Pathology and in the resulting excessive salary reduction of constitutional magnitude. 191. Defendants, and each of them, intentionally, or with deliberate indifference to, or
with a conscious disregard of, Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights, denied Plaintiff his right to procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution when they decided to demote Plaintiff and substantially and excessively reduced his salary by a sum of constitutional proportion. 192. Defendant Bryan, was acting or purporting to act under color of law in the
performance of his official duties as Chief Executive Officer of KMC when he unilaterally, arbitrarily, and capriciously decided to demote Plaintiff and excessively reduced his salary by a sum of constitutional magnitude without providing Plaintiff with the customary notice of hearing and opportunity to be heard to which he was entitled. 193. When Plaintiff complained to Bryan that he had been deprived of the customary
hearing regarding his demotion and excessive reduction in pay; the Joint Conference Committee met and ratified Bryan’s decision to demote Plaintiff and substantially and excessively reduce his salary without providing Plaintiff with prior notice of the hearing or an opportunity to be heard. 194. Defendants and each of them, were acting or purporting to act under color of law
in the performance of their official duties as member of the Joint Conference Committee of KMC when they arbitrarily, and capriciously decided to demote Plaintiff and substantially and
excessively reduce his salary without providing Plaintiff with the customary notice of hearing and opportunity to be heard to which he was entitled. 195. Thereafter, the Kern County Board of Supervisors met and voted to confirm
Plaintiff’s demotion and the excessive reduction in Plaintiff’s salary without providing Plaintiff with notice of the hearing or an opportunity to be heard. 196. The conduct of Defendants, and each of them, violated Plaintiff’s 14th
Amendment right of procedural due process. 197. harmed. 198. Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s procedural due process right was a substantial As a legal result of the conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff was
factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. TENTH CLAIM (Defamation in Violation of Civ. Code §§ 45-47) (Against Defendants County, Roy, Harris, DOES 1 through 10, and Each of Them) 199. Plaintiff alleges this Tenth and separate claim for Defamation in violation of Civil
Code §§ 45-47 against Defendants Roy, Harris, the County, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them. 200. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
1 through 136 above, inclusive. 201. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges Defendants, and each of them,
included the Roy Letter in papers stored in Plaintiff's personnel file, where they are continuously republished to anyone who consults his personnel file. 202. The above-alleged defamatory statements have continuously been false.
As a result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered harm to his
profession, reputation, and experienced feelings of shame, mortification, and hurt 204. Defendants' wrongful conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to
Plaintiff's profession and reputation. 205. At all material times, Defendants, and each of them, either knew that each
statement was false or had serious doubts about the truth of each statement, and that they acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, entitling Plaintiff to an award of punitive damages against the individual Defendants. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated in pertinent part hereinafter. ELEVENTH CLAIM (Violation of FLSA) (Against Defendant County, and DOES 1 through 10 inclusive) 206. Plaintiff alleges this Eleventh and separate claim for reimbursement of deductions
from his salary made in violation of FLSA against Defendant County and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. 207. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs
1 through 136 above, inclusive. 208. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 541.118(1), an employee will not be considered “on a
salary basis” if deductions from his predetermined compensation are made for absences occasioned by the employer. 209. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 541.118(6), where a deduction not permitted by these
interpretations is inadvertent, or is made for reasons other than lack of work, the exemption will not be considered to have been lost if the employer reimburses the employee for such deductions and promises to comply in the future.
From April 28 to October 3, 2006, Defendants, and each of them, unlawfully
required Plaintiff to take involuntary full-time unpaid leave rather than reduced scheduled leave even though he was occasionally ready, willing, and able capable of working part-time during that period of time. 211. During the period from April 28 to October 3, 2006, clinical pathology work was
always available to Plaintiff at KMC. 212. Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of salary for those periods of time during the
period from April 28 to October 3, 2006 when he was ready, willing, and able to work, and was prevented from doing so by the County; and also entitled to a promise that the County will comply in the future. WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for relief as stated herein and in pertinent part hereinafter.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, as follows: 213. Reinstatement to his former position as Chair of Pathology and reimbursement for
lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of his employer pursuant to Section 1278.5(g) of the Health and Safety Code and Section 12965 of the Government Code. 1. Recovery of all reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred, pursuant to Section 1278.5(g) of the Health and Safety Code, Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 12965 of the Government Code, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) [FMLA], and 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. 2. That Defendant County be enjoined from retaliating against whistleblowers in violation
of Section 1278.5 of the Health and Safety Code and Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code. 3. That Defendant County be required to expunge from Plaintiff's personnel records any and all references to Plaintiff as having a "poor relationships" with staff or words to that effect. 4. That Defendant County be required to comply with all of the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act relating to providing reasonable accommodation and engaging in good faith in an interactive consultation regarding reasonable accommodation [Government Code §§ 12940 (m) & (n)]. 5. That Defendant County be required to provide training to the managerial staff at KMC regarding compliance with Section 1278.5 of the Health & Safety Code, Section 1102.5 of the Labor Code, Sections 12940(m) and (n) of the Government Code, and CFRA (Government Code §§ 12945.1, et seq.). 6. General and compensatory damages according to proof. 7. Liquidated damages under FMLA/CFRA and FLSA according to proof. 8. Punitive damages against Defendants Roy, Harris, and Bryan pursuant to §3294 Civil Code; 9. Pre-judgment interest pursuant to §3291 of the Civil Code. 10. For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
Dated: January 5, 2006 20 21 22 23 24
By: ___________________________________ Eugene Lee Attorney for Plaintiff DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1 Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury for all issues and claims for which a jury is 2 permitted. 3 Dated: January 5, 2006 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 By: ___________________________________ Eugene Lee Attorney for Plaintiff DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. LAW OFFICES OF EUGENE LEE
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