Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97301/kirschbaum-co-vs-walling
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Kirschbaum Co Vs Walling - Citation 97301 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Kirschbaum Co. Vs. Walling - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97301CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-01-1942Case Number316 U.S. 517AppellantKirschbaum Co.RespondentWallingExcerpt:.....s. 524
2. such employees are engaged in an "occupation necessary to the production" of goods in interstate commerce, within the meaning of § 3(j) of the act. p.
3. the employees here involved cannot be regarded as engaged in "service establishments" within the exemption of § 13(a)(2) of the act. p.
316 u. s. 526
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling - 316 U.S. 517 (1942)
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 held applicable to employees engaged in the maintenance and operation of a building whose tenants are engaged principally in the production of goods for interstate commerce. P.
, the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201
was sustained. In the cases now before us, we are required to consider the scope of the Act in relation to a particular phase of industrial activity. Specifically, the problem is this: under § 6 of the Act, an employer must pay prescribed minimum wages "to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," and, under § 7, overtime compensation must be given "any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." Section 3(j) provides that,
this concurrence of views of the two Circuit Courts of Appeals, [
] we brought the cases here because of the important questions presented as to the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 315 U.S. 792.
of the legislation, the history behind the particular field of regulation, the specific terms in which the new regulatory legislation has been cast, and the procedures established for its administration.
See, e.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation,
. Thus, while a phase of industrial enterprise may be subject to control under the National Labor Relations Act, a different phase of the same enterprise may not come within the "commerce" protected by the Sherman Law.
Compare, for example, United Leather Workers v. Herkert,
and Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
with Labor Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.,
and Labor Board v. Fainblatt,
. Similarly, enterprises subject to federal industrial regulation may nevertheless be taxed by the States without putting an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
and Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord,
with Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
which affect interstate commerce, [
] and the amendment of August 11, 1939, to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, extending the scope of that Act to employees who "shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect" interstate commerce, 53 Stat. 1404.
Compare Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros.,
. The history of Congressional legislation regulating not only interstate commerce as such, but also activities intertwined with it, justifies the generalization that, when the federal government takes over such local radiations in the vast network of our national economic enterprise, and thereby radically readjusts the balance of state and national authority, those charged with the duty of legislating are reasonably explicit, and do not entrust its attainment to that retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.
The Administrator does not contend that the employees in the cases before us are within the Act because Congress could have placed them there. The history of the legislation leaves no doubt that Congress chose not to enter areas which it might have occupied. As passed by the House, the bill applied to employers "engaged in commerce in any industry affecting commerce."
H.Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 2; 83 Cong.Rec. 7749-7750. But the bill recommended by the conference applied only to employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." H.Rep. No. 2738, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 29-30; 83 Cong.Rec. 9158, 9266-67. Moreover, in one of
its intermediate stages, the measure incorporated the
Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra,
in that it was specifically made applicable to intrastate production which competed with goods produced in another state. S. 2475, 75th Cong. 3rd Sess., as recommitted December 17, 1937, § 8(a). But, as reported by the House Committee on Labor, this provision was deleted. S. 2475,
as reported April 21, 1938;
H.Rep. 2182,
Since the scope of the Act is not coextensive with the limits of the power of Congress over commerce, the question remains whether these employees fall within the statutory definition of employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," construed as the provision must be in the context of the history of federal absorption of governmental authority over industrial enterprise. In this task of construction, we are without the aid afforded by a preliminary administrative process for determining whether the particular situation is within the regulated area. Unlike the Interstate Commerce Act and the National Labor Relations Act and other legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act puts upon the courts the independent responsibility of applying
the general terms of the statute to an infinite variety of complicated industrial situations. Our problem is, of course, one of drawing lines. But it is not at all a problem in mensuration. There are no fixed points, though lines are to be drawn. The real question is how the lines are to be drawn -- what are the relevant considerations in placing the line here, rather than there. To that end, we have tried to state with candor the larger considerations of national policy, legislative history, and administrative practicalities that underlie the variations in the terms of Congressional commercial regulatory measures and which therefore should govern their judicial construction.
encompasses these employees, in view of their relation to the conceded production of goods for commerce by the tenants. The petitioners assert, however, that the building industry of which they are part is purely local in nature, and that the Act does not apply where the employer is not himself engaged in an industry partaking of interstate commerce. But the provisions of the Act expressly make its application dependent upon the character of the employees' activities. And, in any event, to the extent that his employees are "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," the employer is himself so engaged. [
] Nor can we find in the Act, as do the petitioners, any requirement that employees must themselves participate in the physical process of the making of the goods before they can be regarded as engaged in their production. Such a construction erases the final clause of § 3(j) which includes employees engaged "in any process or occupation
A final objection to the decisions below need not detain us long. The petitioners' buildings cannot be regarded as "service establishments" within the exemption of § 13(a)(2). Selling space in a loft building is not the equivalent of selling services to consumers, and, in any event, the "greater part" of the "servicing" done by the petitioners here is not in intrastate commerce. The suggestion that the Act, if applied to these employees, goes beyond the bounds of the commerce power is without merit.
United States v. Darby, supra; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, supra.
* Together with No. 924,
Arsenal Building Corp. et al. v. Walling,
Administrator of the Wage & Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, on writ of certiorari, 315 U.S. 792, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. -- Argued April 29, 1942.
Compare Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall,
124 F.2d 42;
Killing-beck v. Garment Center Capitol, Inc.,
259 App.Div. 691, 20 N.Y.S.2d 521;
Robinson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
158 S.W.2d 441;
Cecil v. Gradison,
40 N.E.2d 958;
Pedersen v. Fitzgerald Construction Co.,
For the gradual development of this extension of federal authority,
see Shepard v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
184 F. 765,
reversed sub nom. Minnesota Rate Cases,
, as applied in
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
, and as confirmed by § 416 of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 484, and as extended by § 13(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act,