Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/203/607/360616/
Timestamp: 2020-02-28 21:56:16
Document Index: 685038920

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 18', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 11']

In Re Lambert et al, 203 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1953) :: Justia
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In Re Lambert et al, 203 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 203 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1953) Argued December 3, 1952
Decided February 19, 1953
Three propositions then become certain. (1) Proceedings concerning the custody of children have always been equity proceedings, and a jury has never been either required or used in this jurisdiction in such proceedings. (2) The intent of the Juvenile Court statute was to restrict and not to expand jury trials or, indeed, to expand any other feature identified with usual court procedure as such. It was the theory of this statute that children ought not to be labeled criminals and that proceedings against them for offenses which are criminal in nature should be as far removed from the characteristics of a criminal trial as possible. (3) The legislative history of the present statute shows that the last half of the sentence relating to jury trials, above quoted, was designed to reinstate rights which would have been denied by the first half of the sentence. The old law had been that, in all "prosecutions" in the Juvenile Court in which the Constitution required a jury, a jury trial should be had unless expressly waived in open court.4 In the early drafts of the bills which preceded the present statute, the critical sentence read: "The court shall hear and determine all cases of children without a jury."5 Objection was made to this total abrogation of the right to jury trial. When the bill was introduced in the 75th Congress,6 the last half of the present sentence — "unless a jury be demanded by the child, his parent, or guardian or the court" — had been added. The sentence thus written became the provision in the present statute. The added clause in the final new law was intended to restore upon demand those rights which would have been denied by the first drafts. No right to jury trial in custody cases existed theretofore, so it would not have been withdrawn by the first drafts of the new law. Thus it was not restored by the last draft; if it was included in the present statute it was an addition to rights under the old law. We find no intention to make such an addition. Our conclusion is fortified by the reason assigned by the House Committee for providing jury trial upon demand. In its report to the House7 the Committee said that jury trial was provided on demand, "due to the fact that the District of Columbia is a Federal jurisdiction." This was an obvious reference to the requirement of the Federal Constitution that jury trial be available in all "criminal prosecutions".8 That reference was not applicable to custody cases.
52 Stat. 597 (1938), D.C.Code § 11-908 (1951)
In re Lambert, D.C.Mun.App., 1952, 86 A.2d 411
52 Stat. 599 (1938), D.C.Code § 11-915 (1951)
34 Stat. 75 (1906), D.C.Code § 18-262 (1929)
H.R. 10363, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (1936); H. R. 12513, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (1936)
H.R. 3863, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1937)
H.R.Rep.No.177, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937)
52 Stat. 598 (1938), D.C.Code § 11-909 (1951)