Source: http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/OpinionsOrders/Opinions%20(2000-2001).aspx
Timestamp: 2014-10-30 22:53:47
Document Index: 415352614

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 38', '§ 23', '§9', '§ 15', '§ 185', '§ 9', '§ 160', '§ 553', '§ 8', '§ 44', '§ 42']

Opinions (2000-2001)
Rhode Island Judiciary > Courts > Supreme Court > OpinionsOrders > Opinions (2000-2001) Opinions (2000-2001)
The Superior Court had permitted plaintiff to pursue a private prosecution of her husband after the Attorney General had failed to prosecute. The defendant challenged the Superior Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine the private prosecution of a criminal complaint. The Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to establish a per se rule prohibiting private prosecutions, because the Attorney General's failure to assert control over a criminal prosecution initiated by a private complainant, even a misdemeanor charge, did not deprive the Superior Court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the charge. Earl H. Webster v. Louis A. Perotta et al; Stephen J. Riccitelli v. Louis A. Perotta et al; Vincent J. Ferrante, Sr. v. Town of Johnston et al; Ruth V. Bolton v. Louis A. Perota et al, No. 00-333 (June 27, 2001)
The defendant borrowed $32,000 from the check holder and gave holder a demand note due 14 days later. The defendant gave the holder a $32,000 post-dated check stating the holder could draw on the account on March 21, or at the latest March 24, but to contact defendant's assistant. There were delays. The holder finally presented the check in June and it was dishonored. The holder complied with the demand requirements of
G.L. 1956 § 19-9-26, but defendant did not pay the $32,000. The Court determined that the trial justice had not erred when it denied defendant's motions for acquittal, for certain instructions concerning specific intent, and for a new trial. Under § 19-9-26, defendant's failure to pay the check within seven days of receipt of the certified mailing constituted prima facie evidence of intent to defraud that could rebutted only by the affirmative action of payment of the check in full. That holder knew there might not be sufficient funds was not a defense. The defendant's statement that funds would be available on March 24 also created prima facie evidence of defendant's intent to defraud.
State v. Christopher Barnes, No. 99-469 (May 23, 2001) The Court reviewed the suppression of certain evidence by the trial justice.The spoliation doctrine was not applicable to good faith scientific testing.Even though sample had been consumed by state laboratory, and thus prevented testing by the defendant, does not violate an accused’s rights.A hearing justice's discretion is not exercised by merely granting or denying a party's request.It was an abuse of discretion to suppress the evidence in a Rule 403 hearing without giving the Court sufficient reasoning.
Intervenor newspaper cited the Access to Public Records Act as basis for reviewing plaintiff’s police personnel files.Intervenor moved for, and received, summary judgment against only plaintiff, and not against the defendant City, based solely upon APRA. On appeal, plaintiff argued the exception to APRA in G.L. 1956 § 38-2-2(4)(A)(I)
exempted records concerning a particular and an identifiable person, which, if disclosed, constituted an unwarranted invasion of privacy. The Rhode Island Court vacated the summary judgment because the plaintiff had not relied on APRA, so the trial justice erred in basing summary judgment on APRA, and only the plaintiff, and not the city, as the "public body" and record custodian, was included in the summary judgment motion. Summary judgment was vacated.
The plaintiff sued EMTs who responded to a 911 call, but did not transport injured party to the hospital at party’s request and after determining that he did not need medical attention.Pursuant to G.L.1956 § 23-4.1-12(a), emergency rescue personnel enjoy a qualified immunity from negligence claims, provided they are not guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct in performing their functions. The plaintiffs requested jury instructions based, in part, on department of health protocols for EMTs. The trial justice rejected those instructions and told the jury that the EMTs could be held liable only if the alleged misconduct was a result of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The Rhode Island Court held that the instructions requested by the plaintiffs would have removed the issue of gross negligence from the jury's consideration.The judgment was affirmed. James E. Bjartmarz v. Pinnacle Real Estate Tax Service, No. 99-223 (May 11, 2001)
The plaintiff was injured while working on a folder machine sold by defendant. The trial justice held that in order to exercise personal jurisdiction under the Rhode Island long-arm statute, G.L. 1956 §9-5-33(a), defendant must have had sufficient minimum contacts with Rhode Island. defendant's affidavit stated that the machine in question was not sold directly to plaintiff's employer or to the Co-defendant, but was originally sold to a corporation in Germany The defendant testified that it never advertised, owned any property, maintained an office, or had any employees in the state. The Court held that there was insufficient minimum contacts with Rhode Island to establish in personam jurisdiction. Michael Sousa et al v. Town of Coventry et al, No. 00-51 (April 26, 2001)
The respondent, father, appealed the termination of his parental rights claiming that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support termination. However, the Court found that the record supported the trial justice's findings that DCYF developed numerous case plans and made referrals for respondent to address those issues which led to the child's placement. respondent's refusal to cooperate repeatedly undermined those efforts. The child never resided with respondent and he had never parented her. He did not comply with DCYF's treatment plan or meet its objectives. Given the likely duration of his incarceration for first-degree murder, it was improbable that he would be able to care for or meet the needs of the child for a long period of time. Further, DCYF was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and child, as respondent was previously proven to be unfit as to another one of his children. G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iv). Landy Paolella v. Radiologic Leasing Associates et al, No. 99-526 (April 18, 2001)
Decedent was a resident of Rhode Island and attended defendants' movie theater in Massachusetts. In the utter darkness decedent mistakenly thought there was a wall to her left, reached to steady herself on the nonexistent wall, lost her balance, fell, and suffered a broken hip and broken left elbow. The jury returned a verdict finding defendants 40 percent negligent and decedent 60 percent negligent. The Court applied choice of laws principles and determined that Massachusetts’s comparative negligence statute was the applicable law. In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determined the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state had a more significant relationship. Barbara Tateosian et al v. Celebrity Cruise Services, Ltd., No. 99-517 (April 12, 2001)
The plaintiff argued that an action against a union for unfair representation was a separate cause of action under state law that was not precluded or governed by federal law. plaintiff argued that in McDonald v. RI General Council, 505 A.2d 1176 (R.I. 1986) the Court reviewed Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, codified at 29 U.S.C.S. § 185 (1978), (LMRA) and found that G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14 applied. The Court responded that McDonald did not apply here. The employer in McDonald was a municipal employer. As a municipal employee, the plaintiff in McDonald did not have a federal cause of action under LMRA; therefore, the six-month federal statute of limitations was inapplicable. A private-sector employee's action for unfair representation against his or her union was covered by and subject to federal law. This case qualified as a hybrid type of action under LMRA, since the employee's grievance against the employer and defendant necessarily involved interpretation of the collective-bargaining and supplemental agreements. Under federal law, suits by private-sector employees against their unions for alleged unfair representation were governed by the § 160(b) six-month statute of limitations.
Appeal from a Superior Court judgment which denied plaintiff’s petition to foreclose defendants’ right of redemption.The Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice, finding that any interest that was reserved or not conveyed by deed should have been noted in plaintiff’s quitclaim deed.Consequently, all of plaintiff’s interest in the property was extinguished, including the defendants’ right of redemption.Any mistake that plaintiff made by omitting any other amounts due was unilateral and did not invalidate the redemption deed. State v. Byron Barber, No. 99-23 (March 14, 2001)
Appeal from a Superior Court judgment denying post-conviction relief. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice, finding that from the totality of the evidence, the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence, nor was he otherwise clearly wrong.Moreover, the Court found that no evidence of prejudice to the applicant was presented on his application for post-conviction relief. State v. David Medina, No. 99-107 (February 15, 2001)
Appeal from a Superior Court judgment granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court reversed, finding that the trial justice was clearly in error in dismissing the information charging the defendant with felony assault and battery.The Court held that the trial justice had no authority under the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure to dismiss a case without allowing the state to proceed with the presentation of evidence in support of its charges. In re Jarvis R. et al, No. 99-371 (February 15, 2001)
Cross-appeals to determine whether a Superior Court trial justice erred in vacating an arbitrator’s award concerning a contract dispute between the two parties to the case.The Court concluded that the trial justice did err in vacating the arbitrator’s award, concluding that the trial justice erred in failing to recognize the clear findings of fact made by the arbitrator. Michael Rubino v. Donna Rubino, No. 99-443 (February 12, 2001)
Appeal from a Superior Court order denying defendant’s motion to vacate his plea of nolo contendere.The Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice, finding that since the proper avenue for a claim attacking the voluntariness of a plea is by way of an application for postconviction relief, this appeal is not properly before this court.The Court also found that were the motion proper, the trial justice did not err in denying the requested relief, as the plea was voluntary an intelligently made and is not subject to collateral attack. State v. Charles Smith, No. 99-298 (February 8, 2001)
The Court held that defendant was entitled to summary judgment because defendant's right to set off survived a discharge in bankruptcy. The setoff claim satisfied the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 553(a), and defendant was not required to file a proof of claim to protect its setoff right from discharge. The defendant acquired a mortgage loan executed by plaintiff.The defendant also maintained four time-deposit accounts held by plaintiff and plaintiff’s parents.Subsequently, plaintiff filed for bankruptcy, and defendant bank froze the time-deposit accounts.Following the discharge, a foreclosure sale resulted in a deficiency and defendant applied the funds in the accounts against the deficiency. In re John Oliveira, No. 99-15 (January 29, 2001)
The respondent was brought before the Disciplinary Board for violations of the Court Rules of Professional Conduct.At the hearing, respondent admitted to violating R.I. Sup. Ct. art. V, R. 1.2(a), 1.4(a), 1.15(a)(b), 8.4(c). After respondent offered mitigation testimony, the board recommended the appropriate disciplinary sanction to impose was a 90-day suspension from the practice of law.The Court adopted the recommendation of the board, and suspended respondent from the practice of law for 90 days even after a determination that respondent admitted to his wrong, repaid his client, and fully cooperated with the Board. State v. Daniel M. Ilacqua, No. 99-433 (January 24, 2001)
The petitioners owned a small condominium in Rhode Island but spent the majority of their time at a separate residence in Florida. The respondent, Rhode Island Tax Administrator, assessed income tax deficiencies assessed The petitioners after they filed nonresident returns. The Court held that pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-8-28, petitioners sustained their burden of proof in proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they changed their domicile.The Court also held that strict requirements for the content of tax deficiency notices are required pursuant to G.L. 1956
§ 44-30-81, as well as Rhode Island case law.The Court found that the notices received by petitioners were ambiguous and potentially misleading.
The defendant appealed his sexual assault conviction arguing that the admission of certain uncharged sexual misconduct evidence was improper hearsay.The Court affirmed finding that the trial justice was correct in ruling that the defense had "opened the door" during cross-examination. The Court also held that the state was properly allowed to conduct a redirect examination of defendant's wife concerning her knowledge of the prior investigation because no hearsay objection was raised by defendant.Also, the trial justice properly gave a limiting instruction prior to closing arguments that the testimony could be used to show a pattern, design, scheme, plan, an intent, or a mode of operation of defendant. State v. Glenn A. Reed, No. 99-418 (January 9, 2001)
The plaintiff obtained car insurance from an insurer. His policy was later transferred to defendant insurer. The plaintiff's car was stolen. The defendant insurer denied plaintiff’s insurance claim based on alleged misrepresentations in the insurance application. Specifically, plaintiff’s care was garaged in a state other than that listed in the insurance policy. The trial justice awarded damages to plaintiff.On appeal, the Court held that plaintiff was never asked where the car was to be garaged when the policy was transferred and as such no misrepresentation was ever made. The Court also noted that the original insurance application was silent as to this issue. State v. Marc Gomes, No. 00-42 (January 8, 2001)
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and carrying a pistol without a license.At trial, the arresting officer was permitted to testify as to the description of defendant that was broadcast over the police radio based upon an eyewitness account.The Court affirmed.The Court found that the officer’s testimony was not objectionable hearsay because it was not offered to prove defendant's guilt.The Court held that the officer had probable cause to detain, arrest, and search defendant for weapons and therefore the officer's testimony about the description at trial was necessary to show why he apprehended defendant. The Court also held defendant did not properly preserve his objection as to testimony given by his former cellmate. In re Maya C. et al, No. 99-26 (January 8, 2001)
The defendant and a credit union signed a note to finance defendant's real estate project. The credit union closed and was placed into receivership. The defendant ceased making payments on the note, claiming damages for credit union's failure to provide more financing that had been previously agreed upon. The plaintiff corporation, legislatively created to protect the depositors of various failed financial institutions, acquired credit union's assets and the note from the receiver. Pursuant to G.L. (1956) § 42-116-6(b), plaintiff was only liable for such obligations of those institutions as it agreed to accept. Since plaintiff had not agreed to be liable for defendant’s claim against the credit union, defendant could not assert its recoupment defense because recoupment was not a " real defense. Jose A. Cabral et al v. George DuPont, No. 99-207 (January 5, 2001)
The plaintiffs agreed to buy a home from defendant. The plaintiffs agreed to deposit $ 16,000 of the purchase price in a separate joint interest bearing checking account. The defendant was to get the money if plaintiffs received permits to enlarge the home to three bedrooms. The defendant got a check for $ 16,000 after closing the sale. The Court affirmed trial justice’s findings that defendant forged plaintiff's endorsement, deposited the check into defendant's bank account, and breached the agreement. Based on G.L.
1956 9-21-10(a) (1956), the Court reversed the pre-judgment interest award to allow plaintiffs only the interest accrued while the money was in the interest bearing account.
The defendant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon. The Court held that trial justice properly denied motions for new trial and the alternative motion for judgment of acquittal in light of other evidence that inculpated defendant. In the justice's eyes a reasonable juror would have been justified in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also determined that the admissions of testimony by police expressing an opinion on defendant’s truthfulness and testimony by the state medical examiner concerning ballistics were not properly preserved for appeal since defense counsel’s objection to one of the three questions on the issue was merely a general one. Cadillac Lounge, LLC v. City of Providence, No. 99-407 (January 4, 2001)
The petitioner applied for and was granted an alcohol beverage license and an adult entertainment license by respondent, the Providence Board of Licenses. The proposed adult entertainment would be located in a M-1 zoning district where adult entertainment is a permitted use. Local residents appealed, and the licenses were revoked. The issue was remanded for a new hearing before the board where the petitions were denied. The Court quashed the board’s decision and determined that even though cities have power to deny or revoke licenses, that power is limited to licenses for activities or locations that present danger to the public health or safety. Since the board’s decision rested on other reasons, it was arbitrary and capricious and exceeded the board’s jurisdiction. State v. Steven R. Salvatore, No. 98-175 (January 4, 2001)
The defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 10 years for the two crimes. The Court affirmed the sentence. It was harmless error to admit the prosecution witness's testimony about statements made by defendant's coconspirator. It was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's motion to pass the case and declare a mistrial. The defendant's challenge as to the sufficiency of the jury instructions on statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy was not preserved for appeal. The state was not barred, by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, from seeking a life sentence without parole. In re Alicia S., No. 99-71 (December 26, 2000)
The plaintiff sued defendant for loss of consortium, negligent supervision and negligent retention of an employee arising from various incidents wherein the defendant’s employee placed harassing phone calls to the plaintiff.The defendant employer filed motions for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s main claims and the trial justice granted partial summary judgment.The Court concluded that, on the facts, no duty existed to anticipate that telephone calls would be made to the plaintiff, and that no duty existed after the termination of the calls to discharge defendant janitor. State v. Donna Dellatore, No. 98-298 (November 3, 2000)
The respondent appealed the termination of her parental rights by the trial justice.The Court affirmed the determination of the trial justice, finding that the trial justice had clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had failed to provide her children with a stable, secure, and consistent home life.Additionally, the trial justice had competent evidence of the respondent’s consistent failure to avail herself of the numerous treatment services offered to her by DCYF. State v. Adalberto Villafane, No. 99-20 (October 27, 2000)