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US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 453 > LEHMAN V. NAKSHIAN, 453 U. S. 156 (1981)
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STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed chanrobles.com-red
The 1974 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 [Footnote 1] added a new § 15, [Footnote 2] which brought the Federal Government within the scope of the Act for the first time, Section 15(a) [Footnote 3] prohibits the Federal Government from discrimination based on age in most of its civilian employment decisions concerning persons over 40 years of age. Section 15(b) [Footnote 4] provides that enforcement of § 15(a) chanrobles.com-red
In 1978, respondent Alice Nakshian, who was then a 62-year-old civilian employee of the United States Department of t.he Navy, brought an age discrimination suit against the Navy under § 15(c). She requested a jury trial. The defendant moved to strike the request, and the District Court denied the motion. Nakshian v. Claytor, 481 F.Supp. 159 (DC). The court stressed that the "legal or equitable relief" language used by Congress to establish a right to sue the Federal Government for age discrimination was identical to the language Congress had previously used in § 7(c) of the Act [Footnote 6] to authorize private ADEA suits. That language, chanrobles.com-red
On interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Nakshian v. Claytor, 202 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 628 F.2d 59. The appellate court rejected the Secretary's argument that a plaintiff is entitled to trial by jury in a suit against the United States only when such a trial has been expressly authorized. Instead, the court viewed the question as "an ordinary question of statutory interpretation," and found sufficient evidence of legislative intent to provide for trial by jury in cases such as this. Noting that Congress had conferred jurisdiction over ADEA suits upon the federal district courts, rather than the Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals concluded that, "absent a provision as to the method of trial, a grant of jurisdiction to a district court as a court of law carries with it a right of jury trial.'" Id. at 63, 628 F.2d 63 (quoting 5 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¦ 38.32 [2], p. 38-236 (1979) (footnotes omitted)). The Court of Appeals also adopted the District Court's view of the "legal . . . relief" language in § 15(c). Further, it was the court's view that the existence of the explicit statutory right to jury trial in suits against private employers does not chanrobles.com-red
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 424 U. S. 399, quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 312 U. S. 586. See also United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 445 U. S. 538. Thus, if Congress waives the Government's immunity from suit, as it has in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976 ed. and Supp. III), the plaintiff has a right to a trial by jury only where that right is one of "the terms of [the Government's] consent to be sued." Testan, supra, at 424 U. S. 399. Like a waiver of immunity itself, which must be "unequivocally expressed," United States v. Mitchell, chanrobles.com-red
See Glidden Co., supra. And there is no jury trial right in this same range of cases when the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a)(2) and 2402. Finally, in tort actions against the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b), Congress has similarly provided that trials shall be to the court without a jury. 28 U.S.C. § 2402. [Footnote 8] chanrobles.com-red
Section 15 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976 ed. and Supp. III), prohibits age discrimination in federal employment. Section 15(c) provides the means for judicial enforcement of this guarantee: any person aggrieved "may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes" of the Act. Section 15 contrasts with § 7(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976 ed., Supp. III), which authorizes civil actions against private employers and state and local governments, and which expressly provides for jury trials. Congress accordingly demonstrated that it knew how to provide a statutory right to a jury trial when it wished to do so elsewhere in the very "legislation cited," Galloway, supra, at 319 U. S. 389. But in § 15, it failed explicitly to do so. [Footnote 10] See chanrobles.com-red
Moreover, another basis of the decision in Lorillard was that, when Congress chose to incorporate the enforcement scheme of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) into § 7 of the ADEA, it adopted in ADEA the FLSA practice of making jury trials available. 434 U.S. . at 434 U. S. 580-583. Again, that reasoning has no relevance to this case, because Congress did not incorporate the FLSA enforcement scheme into § 15. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(f) (1976 ed. . Supp. III). Rather, 15(a) and (b) are patterned after § 717 (a) and (b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in March, 1972. See Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111-112, which extend the protection of chanrobles.com-red
As already indicated, it is unnecessary to go beyond the language of the statute itself to conclude that Congress did not intend to confer a right to trial by jury on ADEA plaintiffs proceeding against the Federal Government. But it is helpful briefly to explore the legislative history, if only to demonstrate that it no more supports the holding of the Court of Appeals than does the statutory language itself. chanrobles.com-red
Congress expanded the scope of ADEA in 1974 to include state and local government and Federal Government employers. State and local governments were added as potential defendants by a simple expansion of the term "employer" in the ADEA. The existing substantive and procedural provisions of the Act, including § 7(c), were thereby extended to cover state and local government employees. In contrast, Congress added an entirely new section, § 15, to address the problems of age discrimination in federal employment. Here Congress deliberately prescribed a distinct statutory scheme applicable only to the federal sector, [Footnote 14] and one based not on chanrobles.com-red
Finally, in a 1978 amendment to ADEA, Congress declined an opportunity to extend a right to trial by jury to federal employee plaintiffs. Before the announcement of Lorillard, the Senate, but not the House, had included an amendment to § 7(c) to provide for jury trials in a pending bill to revise ADEA. After Lorillard, the Conference Committee recommended and Congress enacted the present § 7(c)(2), closely resembling the jury trial amendment passed by the Senate. But the Conference did not recommend, and Congress did not enact, any corresponding amendment of § 15(c) to provide for jury trials in cases against the Federal Government. Indeed, chanrobles.com-red
202 U.S.App.D.C. at 69, n. 8, 628 F.2d 69, n. 8.
But even if the legislative history were ambiguous, that would not affect the proper resolution of this case, because the plaintiff in an action against the United States has a right to trial by jury only where Congress has affirmatively and unambiguously granted that right by statute. Congress has most obviously not done so here. Neither the provision for federal employer cases to be brought in district courts rather than the Court of Claims, nor the use of the word "legal" in that section, evinces a congressional intent that ADEA plaintiffs who proceed to trial against the Federal Government may do so before a jury. Congress expressly provided for jury trials in the section of the Act applicable to private sector employers, and to state and local governmental entities. It did not do so in the section applicable to the Federal Government as an employer, and indeed, patterned that section after provisions in another Act under which there is no right to trial by jury. The conclusion is inescapable that Congress did not depart from its normal practice of not providing a chanrobles.com-red
Respondent brought this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Navy, alleging violations of the ADEA. She demanded a jury trial, and the Secretary moved to strike that demand. The District Court denied the motion to strike, but certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether a jury trial is available in an ADEA action against the Federal Government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals granted the Secretary's petition for interlocutory review and affirmed the ruling of the District Court that respondent is entitled to a jury trial. Nakshian v. Claytor, 202 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 628 F.2d 59 (1980). Relying principally on the fact that Congress vested jurisdiction over ADEA suits against the Federal Government in the federal district courts, rather than in the Court of Claims, and on the authorization in § 15(c) chanrobles.com-red
It is well settled that the "United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.'" United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 424 U. S. 399 (1976), quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 312 U. S. 586 (1941). Consent to suit by the United States must be "unequivocally expressed." United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 445 U. S. 538 (1980); United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 395 U. S. 4 (1969). In the ADEA, the United States has expressly waived its immunity, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976 ed. and Supp. III), so that there can be no doubt of its consent to be sued. The requirement that a waiver of immunity be unequivocally expressed, however, does not, as the Court suggests, carry with it a presumption against jury trial in cases where the United States has waived its immunity. Indeed, we have previously declined to adopt such a presumption. See Law v. United States, 266 U. S. 494 (1925); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547 (1921). [Footnote 2/1] chanrobles.com-red
Moreover, the Court's view that there is a presumption against jury trials in suits against the Federal Government is belied by the very statutes that it cites to indicate that Congress has often "conditioned [the] waiver [of immunity] upon a plaintiff's relinquishing any claim to a jury trial." Ante at 453 U. S. 161. The fact that Congress has found it necessary to state expressly that there is no jury trial right in a broad range of cases against the Government, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2402, demonstrates that Congress does not legislate against the backdrop of any presumption against a jury trial right in suits against the United States. I believe, therefore, that, once the Government unequivocally waives its immunity from suit, the plaintiff's right to jury trial is a question of statutory construction. [Footnote 2/2] The proper inquiry is whether the statute expressly or by fair implication provides for a jury trial. [Footnote 2/3] See Law v. United States, supra; United States v. chanrobles.com-red
Pfitsch, supra; 5 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¦ 38-31[2], p. 38-237 (1981); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2314, p. 69 (1971). I turn, therefore, to the statute itself.
Congress passed the ADEA in 1967 to protect older workers against discrimination in the workplace on the basis of age. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(b), 623; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 441 U. S. 756 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 577. See generally Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 50 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 924, 945 (1975). The Act's protection was originally limited to employees in the private sector, see Pub.L. 9202, § 11, 81 Stat. 605, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1970 ed.), [Footnote 2/4] but Congress amended the Act in 1974 by adding § 16, which extended protection to federal employees as well. 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Section 15(a) provides that personnel actions affecting federal employees "shall be made free from any discrimination based on age," while § 15(b) grants the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to enforce the statutory provisions. [Footnote 2/5] Although there chanrobles.com-red
In Lorillard v. Pons, supra, the Court construed § 7(b) and § 7(c) [Footnote 2/6] -- a provision identical to § 15(c) in all relevant respects -- to afford age discrimination plaintiffs the right to a jury trial against private employers. [Footnote 2/7] The Court reached this result for two reasons. First, the Court found that the language in § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures" of certain provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), suggested that Congress intended to grant a jury trial right because "[l]ong before Congress enacted the ADEA, it was well established that there was a right to a jury trial in private actions pursuant to the FLSA." 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 580. Second, and more significant for this case, the Court found that § 7(c)'s authorization of the courts to grant and individuals to seek "legal or equitable relief," 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (emphasis added), strongly suggested that Congress intended to grant a jury trial right. 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 583. Thus, the Court held, as a chanrobles.com-red
434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 583. [Footnote 2/8] chanrobles.com-red
This strong inference that Congress intended to legislate a jury trial right is reinforced by Congress' decision to vest jurisdiction in the District Courts, rather than the Court of Claims, to decide ADEA suits brought against the Federal Government. This Court has previously observed that vesting jurisdiction in the district courts rather than the Court of Claims supports an inference of a right to jury trial. In United States v. Pfitsch, the Court stated that "the right to a jury trial is an incident" of the grant of "exclusive jurisdiction in the District Courts." 256 U.S. at 256 U. S. 552. Similarly, in Law v. United States, the Court held that the District Court erred in denying a right to a jury trial under the War Risk Insurance Act, when the court concluded that its jurisdiction "was the exceptional jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims," rather than that "exercised in accordance with the laws governing the usual procedure of the court in actions at law for money compensation." 266 U.S. at 266 U. S. 496. [Footnote 2/9] chanrobles.com-red
Congress' vesting of jurisdiction in the federal district courts under § 15(c) of the ADEA suggests, therefore, that it intended to provide a jury trial right to federal ADEA plaintiffs. [Footnote 2/10] The legislative history of the 1974 ADEA amendments, extending protection to federal employees, is consistent with chanrobles.com-red
S.Rep. No. 9690, p. 55 (1974). When the Act was amended in 1974, Congress intended that "Government employees . . . be subject to the same protections against arbitrary employment based on age as are employees in the private sector." 12 Cong.Rec. 8768 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen, principal proponent of ADEA extension to federal employees) (emphasis added). [Footnote 2/11] To be sure, Congress did not provide for identical enforcement schemes for private sector and federal sector age discrimination complaints. But when Congress departed from the "same protections" for federal employees, ibid., that it had granted private sector employees, it did so expressly. Not only did Congress, in § 15, not expressly disallow jury trials where the Federal Government is the defendant, but Congress used the same language in § 15(c) that it had used in § 7(c) in authorizing suits in the district courts for legal or equitable relief against private parties. This strongly suggests chanrobles.com-red
The bill which led to codification of a jury trial right in § 7(c)(2) was introduced by Senator Kennedy before this chanrobles.com-red
Court decided Lorillard. In order to settle a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the availability of jury trials in ADEA suits against private employers, [Footnote 2/13] Senator Kennedy proposed an amendment to the ADEA which would state in haec verba that jury trials are allowed. 123 Cong.Rec. 34317-34318 (1977). [Footnote 2/14] Senator Kennedy's amendment was adopted by the Senate without debate. Lorillard was subsequently decided. Thereafter, Congress passed the Kennedy amendment, with a modification proposed by the House at Conference extending the jury trial right beyond that proposed by Senator Kennedy and passed by the Senate to include claims for liquidated damages. I can discern no congressional intent to preclude the right to a jury trial in ADEA actions against the Federal Government from this sequence of events. The more plausible explanation, and the one with textual support in the relevant legislative history, H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 9950, pp. 114 (1978), is that Congress understood from the Lorillard opinion that conferring the power to award legal relief suggested a jury trial right, [Footnote 2/15] and that the reason Congress proceeded with the Kennedy amendment was to make clear not only that suits for wages chanrobles.com-red
The Court also argues that the absence of any reference in § 15 to the FLSA "powers, remedies. and procedures" to which § 7 refers and upon which Lorillard partially relied suggests that Congress did not intend to allow jury trials against the Federal Government. But our decision in Lorillard rested equally on the provision in § 7(c) for "legal or equitable relief" as a strong and independent indication of congressional intent to allow jury trials. In addition, the more likely explanation for the absence of any reference in § 15 to the FLSA sections referred to in § 7(b) is that Congress intended to use existing administrative procedures "to enforce the provisions of [§ 15(a)] through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without backpay." 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Prior to the 1974 amendments extending ADEA coverage to federal employees, employment discrimination complaints by federal employees were processed by the Civil Service Commission, so that it is not surprising that Congress decided to use existing administrative machinery in § 15(b) to enforce ADEA provisions protecting federal employees. chanrobles.com-red
Based on the language of § 15(c) and on the legislative history, which is consistent with my interpretation of that language, I would hold that Congress intended to allow jury trials in ADEA suits against the Federal Government. chanrobles.com-red
The Court's statement that "[i]n Lorillard, the authorization for the award of legal' relief was significant largely because of the presence of a constitutional question" is not correct. Ante at 453 U. S. 163. To be sure, a constitutional question was present in Lorillard, but the Court specifically declined to ground its decision on the Seventh Amendment. See 453 U. S. 7, supra. Rather, it construed the language "legal or equitable relief" in § 7(c) of the ADEA. The Court concluded that, when Congress used the words "legal . . . relief," which are equally present in § 15(c), it intended that a jury trial right be available. That Congress used the words "legal . . . relief" in § 7(c) differently from the way it used the same words in § 15(c) is implausible.