Source: http://openjurist.org/102/f3d/1361/united-states-v-reyes
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 05:33:29
Document Index: 614179153

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 924', '§ 3161', '§ 846', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 3162']

102 F3d 1361 United States v. Reyes | OpenJurist
102 F. 3d 1361 - United States v. Reyes	Home102 f3d 1361 united states v. reyes
102 F3d 1361 United States v. Reyes 102 F.3d 1361
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Jose Virgilio REYES, also known as Jose Rafael Garcia,Defendant-Appellant.
No. 95-20281.
Defendant-Appellant, Jose Virgilio Reyes, principally appeals his conviction of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Reyes claims that reversal of his conviction is mandated because the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict and because the district court's instructions to the jury constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment. Reyes also contends that his prosecution was barred because the government dismissed the original federal complaint against him solely to avoid the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. We affirm.
On January 12, 1994, the government filed a motion to dismiss the federal criminal complaint filed against Reyes without prejudice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a). The district court granted the government's motion. On July 20, 1994, Reyes was charged by federal indictment with the following offenses: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) knowing delivery of a suitcase containing firearms to a common carrier without giving written notice to the carrier that the firearms were being transported or shipped in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e); (3) knowing possession of firearms that had been shipped in interstate commerce from which the manufacturer's serial number had been obliterated in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); and (4) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the drug-trafficking crime of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
Reyes argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for "carrying" a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).1 Because Reyes moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence, the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, "viewing the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Pruneda-Gonzalez, 953 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 978, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 575 (1992). In a non-vehicular context, a violation of the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1) "requires a showing that the gun was in reach during the commission of the drug offense." United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928, 112 S.Ct. 1990, 118 L.Ed.2d 587 (1992). See also United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1328 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 241, 136 L.Ed.2d 170 (1996).
The evidence introduced at Reyes's trial was sufficient to support a conviction for carrying a firearm under § 924(c)(1).2 At trial, R.B. Stewart, a Houston police officer, testified that on September 24, 1992, he observed Reyes helping a taxicab driver retrieve a suitcase out of a cab near the Greyhound bus station in Houston. Officer Stewart's suspicions were aroused when he noticed that the suitcase had a large padlock on it and appeared large, heavy, and newly purchased. Officer Stewart testified that he observed Reyes enter the bus station and approach the ticket counter carrying the suitcase. Officer Stewart observed Reyes purchase a one-way ticket to New York with large bills. Reyes filled out a name tag, writing the name "Jose Garcia" and the destination "New York City" on the tag. The suitcase was then sent downstairs to be loaded on a bus.
We conclude that the foregoing evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that Reyes had a firearm within his reach when he delivered approximately two pounds of marijuana for transport on a Greyhound bus. Therefore, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Reyes's conviction under § 924(c)(1) for "carrying" a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.
Reyes argues that reversal of his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) is warranted because the variance between the district court's jury instructions and the indictment amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment.3 See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-18, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273-74, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). Because Reyes did not raise this alleged error before the district court, we review the court's instruction for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278-79 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 807, 115 S.Ct. 54, 130 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994). "Plain error is error so obvious and substantial that failure to notice it would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings and would result in manifest injustice." Id. at 279. This appeal provides our first occasion to apply plain error analysis to a constructively amended indictment after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
"The Fifth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant will be tried only on charges alleged in a grand jury indictment." United States v. Arlen, 947 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939, 112 S.Ct. 1480, 117 L.Ed.2d 623 (1992). "The indictment cannot be 'broadened or altered' except by the grand jury." Id. (citations omitted). "A constructive amendment occurs when the trial court 'through its instructions and facts it permits in evidence, allows proof of an essential element of a crime on an alternative basis permitted by the statute but not charged in the indictment.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Slovacek, 867 F.2d 842, 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1094, 109 S.Ct. 2441, 104 L.Ed.2d 997 (1989)). We have held that "[c]onstructive amendments are reversible per se, as contrasted with variances between the indictment and proof that are evaluated under the harmless error doctrine." United States v. Chandler, 858 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir.1988).
We agree with Reyes that proof of the defendant's guilt of a predicate offense is an essential element of a conviction under § 924(c)(1). We also agree with Reyes that a conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana has different elements than does the substantive offense of possession with the intent to distribute.4 We therefore conclude that the district court constructively amended the indictment by modifying an essential element of the charged offense when it instructed the jury that it could convict Reyes under § 924(c)(1) based upon proof that he was guilty of a conspiracy rather than a substantive offense.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Olano instructed that our authority to correct a forfeited error is discretionary. The Court stated that "[i]f the forfeited error is 'plain' and 'affect[s] substantial rights,' the Court of Appeals has authority to order correction, but is not required to do so."5 Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. We choose to exercise the discretion afforded us under the Supreme Court's mandate and refuse to disturb the jury's verdict in this case.
Although the rights asserted by Reyes are undoubtedly important, a combination of several factors leads us to conclude that affirming his conviction would not result in manifest injustice. First, the predicate offense of conspiracy that the jury was instructed upon was a "drug trafficking crime" under § 924(c)(1) that could have been the charged predicate offense in the indictment. Furthermore, Reyes was clearly prepared at the time of trial to defend against this conspiracy charge and was, in fact, separately convicted of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana.
On the other hand, were we to reverse Reyes's conviction despite his failure to object, no rational defense attorney would ever object under these circumstances. By failing to object, the defendant loses the likely correction of the district court's error. What he or she gains, however, is worth substantially more. Not only does the defendant still have the same hope (however remote) of being acquitted by the jury, but the defendant also knows that a conviction will result in a reversal by the court of appeals. We refuse to reverse a conviction when doing so would create such perverse incentives. Our decision not to disturb the jury's verdict in this case does not "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)).
We also recognize that it is not the role of appellate courts to judge the guilt or innocence of criminal defendants. The Constitution allocates that duty to a jury in no uncertain terms. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Our decision today is not meant to imply that overwhelming evidence of guilt is sufficient, by itself, to sustain a conviction under the plain error standard. Rather, we merely conclude that under the unusual circumstances presented by this case-including a jury instruction on a predicate offense permitted by § 924(c)(1), a separate conviction by the jury on the instructed predicate offense in circumstances in which the jury clearly rejected Reyes's contention that he did not knowingly possess marijuana, overwhelming evidence of guilt of both the charged offense and the instructed offense, and substantial incentive for sandbagging by the appellant-reversal of Reyes's conviction is not warranted.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) provides that a government "attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate." FED.R.CRIM.P. 48(a). The "leave of court" requirement of Rule 48(a) has been interpreted "to allow the courts to exercise discretion over the propriety of a prosecutorial motion to dismiss." United States v. Welborn, 849 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 351 (5th Cir.1982)). "The primary purpose of the requirement is to prevent harassment of a defendant by charging, dismissing and re-charging without placing a defendant in jeopardy." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Section 924(c)(1) requires the imposition of specified penalties if the defendant, "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ...[,] uses or carries a firearm." Although the indictment charged Reyes with using and carrying a firearm, the district court properly instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant of violating § 924(c)(1) if he used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. See United States v. Johnson, 87 F.3d 133, 136 n. 2 (5th Cir.1996)
Alternatively, Reyes raises a claim under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments contending that "[t]he Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all elements of the crime with which he is charged." United States v. Gaudin, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 2314, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). See also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278-81, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080-83, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (holding that a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction mandated reversal and that harmless error analysis was inapplicable in this situation). Reyes argues that proof of guilt of the charged predicate offense is an essential element of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Although the jury in the instant case found Reyes guilty of a conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, it made no separate finding that Reyes was guilty of the substantive offense of possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. Because the jury made no finding on an essential element of the crime with which he was charged, Reyes contends that his conviction must be reversed
The cases relied upon by Reyes in support of his fifth and sixth amendment claim are distinguishable. Those cases involved a situation in which the jury returned a verdict that was fatally flawed because an essential element of the crime that the jury was instructed upon was withheld from it. In the instant case, the jury found all of the elements of the crime that it was instructed upon-Reyes carried or used a weapon while conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana. Reyes's true complaint is that the jury found him guilty of a different crime than was charged in the indictment. In other words, Reyes contends that "the jury [was] permitted to convict [him] upon a factual basis that effectively modifie[d] an essential element of the offense charged." See United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 631 (5th Cir.1996) (internal quotation omitted) (defining "constructive amendment").
In order to establish a conspiracy to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute, the government must prove that: (1) an agreement existed among two or more persons to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute the drug; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant voluntarily joined the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 892, 115 S.Ct. 240, 130 L.Ed.2d 163 (1994). To prove possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, however, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute it. See, e.g., United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 724 (5th Cir.1994)
Even Justice Stevens, in dissent, acknowledged that "[a] forfeited error, ... even if it is plain and affects substantial rights, 'may' be corrected at the discretion of the reviewing court under Rule 52(b)." Olano, 507 U.S. at 744, 113 S.Ct. at 1783 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
Reyes also relies upon United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988), and argues that the district court erred in dismissing his criminal complaint without prejudice because the district court did not consider the relevant factors articulated in the Speedy Trial Act. Reyes's argument is unavailing because the district court's dismissal of Reyes's criminal complaint was not pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act. In the instant case, Reyes never filed a motion to dismiss for a violation of the Act. Rather, dismissal without prejudice was ordered pursuant to the government's motion under Rule 48(a)
In addition, Reyes relies upon United States v. Delgado-Miranda, 951 F.2d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir.1991), and argues that the government's failure to provide him with notice and a hearing prior to the dismissal of his complaint violated his right to due process of law. In Delgado-Miranda, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a criminal defendant "has a liberty interest in being free from reprosecution in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that a decision whether to dismiss without prejudice for a Speedy Trial Act violation impacts this liberty interest." Id. The court, therefore, concluded that "before a district court can enter a dismissal without prejudice, and thereby permit the defendant's reprosecution, it must hold a hearing" and provide the defendant with notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. Id
Delgado-Miranda is not controlling precedent in this circuit and is distinguishable from the instant case on the same grounds as Taylor. See note 7, supra. This circuit has never decided whether a defendant is entitled to procedural due process in the context of a dismissal pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act or Rule 48(a). See United States v. Comeaux, 954 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that a defendant's purported right to a hearing under Rule 48(a) is unclear). We need not decide this issue today. Reyes has raised this issue for the first time on appeal and must therefore satisfy the stringent plain error standard. See FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(b). Under this standard, we "cannot correct an error ... unless the error is clear under current law." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. Because Reyes's asserted right is not clear under current law, his procedural due process claim must be rejected.
See FED.R.CRIM.P. 12(b), which provides, in part, that "[t]he following must be raised prior to trial: (1) Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution." Furthermore, to the extent that Reyes's Rule 48(a) objection is based on the government's alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act, we think it significant that the Act explicitly requires the defendant to move for a dismissal "prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendre...." 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)
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