Source: http://sc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180823_0003173.DSC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-05-31 10:36:55
Document Index: 436159558

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

FindACase™ | Henry v. Sharp
Henry v. Sharp
John Henry, #299199, Plaintiff,
Kenneth Sharp, Thomas Commander, Demon Greene, Defendants.
THOMAS E. ROGERS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This is a civil action filed by a pro se state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Id.; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, or conjure up questions never squarely presented to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.1990) (The “special judicial solicitude” with which a [court] should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.).
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “ is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotation and citation omitted) A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). Under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation “was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff filed this case before exhausting the South Carolina Department of Corrections' administrative remedy process. ECF No. 1-2 at 7. The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” The United States Supreme Court has held that “the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). A plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is considered an affirmative defense, and not a jurisdictional infirmity. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-16 (2007). However, if the lack of exhaustion is apparent from the face of the prisoner's complaint, sua sponte dismissal prior to service of the complaint is appropriate. See Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2005); Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655-56 (4th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff attaches a Step 1 grievance received by SCDC on August 2, 2018 and responded to by SCDC on August 3, 2018. SCDC's Policy on Inmate Grievances is publicly available. See No. GA1-12, http://www.doc.sc.gov/policy/policy.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). Within five days of receipt of response to a Step 1, an inmate may appeal by filing a Step 2. Id. SCDC staff have 90 days to render a decision. Id. “A prisoner must, however, refrain from filing suit in federal court until all time periods for both steps to be completed runs, even if SCDC fails to respond to an inmate's grievance at either the Step 1 or Step 2 levels.” Wagner v. United States, 486 F.Supp.2d 549, 558 (D.S.C. 2007).
Plaintiff signed his complaint on August 20, 2018. Time has not yet run for SCDC staff to respond to any Step 2 filed. Plaintiff has not exhausted the South Carolina Department of Corrections' administrative remedy process before filing this complaint as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Accordingly, it is recommended that the district court summarily dismiss the complaint in this case without prejudice, and without issuance and service of process. See Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important ...