Source: http://www.readbag.com/globaltelematics-pitf-i-776clarifyreconsidermotion11-15-04
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 10:24:36
Document Index: 613423984

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 23', '§ 43', '§ 10', '§ 6', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 23', '§ 3', '§ 19', '§ 37']

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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER; and MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING PIERCE COUNTY, a local government in the State of Washington, GLORIA IRENE THEIN, a resident of Pierce County, CITY OF TACOMA, a local government in the State of Washington, WILLIAM LaBORDE, a resident of Tacoma, KING COUNTY, a local government in the State of Washington, KAREN UFFELLMAN, a King County resident, Plaintiffs, and, CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, THE SIERRA CLUB, 1000 FRIENDS OF WASHINGTON, KING COUNTY LABOR COUNCIL, WASHIGNTON STATE LABOR COUNCIL, CITY OF KENMORE, TRANSPORTATION CHOICES COALITION, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL 587, and AEROSPACE MACHINIST UNION, Intervenors Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, Defendant, and SALISH VILLAGE HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Washington non-profit association, G. DENNIS VAUGHN, a citizen and taxpayer resident of King County, and PERMANENT OFFENSE, Intervenor Defendants. Rowley &amp; Klauser, LLP 1
Seattle Business Center · Suite 160 557 Roy Street · Seattle, WA 98109 Phone (206) 285-4445 · FAX (206) 285-4446
Honorable Mary Yu Motion set without oral argument for Thursday, November 23, 2004 Cause No. 02-2-35125-5 SEA INTERVENOR DEFENDANTS': (1) MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER; and (2) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Association, Mr. G. Dennis Vaughan, and Permanent Offense who hereby: (1) move the Court pursuant to CR 7(b) and KCLR 7 for an Order Clarifying the Court's November 5, 2004 ORDER GRANTING/DENYING MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; and (2) move the Court pursuant to CR 59 to Reconsider its November 5, 2004 ORDER GRANTING/DENYING MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, for the reasons set forth below. I. MOTION TO CLARIFY COURT'S RULING BACKGROUND: The Court's November 5, 2004 Order denied Intervenor Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granted Sound Transit's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. B. RELIEF REQUESTED: The issues needing clarification related to what the Court
intended by this CR 56 Order. These questions are: (1) Did the Court intend to enter a CR 56(d) Order upon the whole case for all the relief sought in the two cross-motions for partial summary judgment pleadings? (2) Did the Court intend to enter an interlocutory partial CR 56(d) Order upon some -- but not all -- claims, with remaining claims to be adjudicated at trial, but with no final judgment yet being entered in the case? (3) Did the Court intend to enter an interlocutory CR 56(d) Order upon some -- but not all -- claims, with remaining claims to be adjudicated at trial, but intending to enter a CR 54(b) final judgment on the adjudicated claims, with appropriate findings for no just delay, such that RAP 2.2(d) appeal provisions apply? (4) If the Court intended an Order described in Questions Number (2) or (3) above, what does the Court ascertain to be material facts existing without substantial controversy justifying its decision, and what material facts are actually controverted and left to be ascertained at trial? and (5) If the Court intended an Order described in Question Number (1) above, does the Court intend to enter a CR 54 judgment with future entry pursuant to CR 58, or does the Court consider its November 5, 2004 &quot;Order Granting/Denying Motions For Partial Summary Judgment&quot; as the final judgment in the case?
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY RELIED UPON: CR 54 distinguishes between Judgments, which do trigger appeal periods, and Orders,
which do not. The Court's November 5, 2004 Order is denominated as an &quot;Order,&quot; and not a &quot;Judgment.&quot; It appears that a judgment must be entered, and it is not clear from the Court's Order whether that will be a final judgment disposing of all claims and defenses, or whether it will be a final judgment on some -- but not all -- claims, or whether no final judgment of any kind is presently intended by the Court. The parties need clarification of the intended reach and scope of the Court's November 5, 2004 Order because it is not possible with the current status of this case to know if immediate appeal periods have been triggered on some or all claims and/or, if a trial is to be held as scheduled on December 13, 2004. Nor is it possible for the parties to know what claims and factual disputes exist to be adjudicated at trial. If the Court's Order on Partial Summary Judgment motions is intended as a final judgment disposing of some -- but not all -- claims and factual disputes, it is imperative that the Court inform the parties on the following questions: (a) What claims and factual disputes continue to exist?
(b) Which facts does the Court believe are not in material dispute? and (c) Which claims does the Court believe it has resolved? It is imperative, in the event the Court decided fewer than all claims, that the Court consider CR 54(b) findings, which need not be entered (in which case no appeal periods commence) or might be entered (in which case appeal periods do commence). CR 54(b) provides for expedited review on fewer than all claims existing in a case, but only when its requirements are met. Otherwise, the certification process more likely creates an impediment to prompt appellate review. If the Court fails to enter the required findings of fact, the appellate courts are likely to remand for entry of the those findings. Absent the required findings, no final judgment exists until all of the claims are decided. CR 54(b)
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The factors that should be considered in this Court's CR 54(b) findings are expressly set forth in Nelbro Packing Co. v. Baypack Fisheries, LLC, 101 Wn.App. 517, 6 P.3d 22 (2000). These factors are: 1. 2. What is the relationship between the adjudicated and the unadjudicated claims? Are questions which would be reviewed on appeal still before the trial court for determination in unadjudicated portions of the case? Is it likely that a need for review may be mooted by future developments in the trial court? Will an immediate appeal delay trial of unadjudicated matters without gaining any offsetting advantage in terms of simplification and facilitation of that trial? and What are the practical effects of allowing an immediate appeal?
6 7 8 4. 9 10 5. 11 12 13 14 15 3.
Intervenor Defendants ask for clarification of the Court's November 5, 2004 Order so that the parties may have knowledge sufficient to prepare for trial, whether a trial is contemplated, and to know when will appeal periods commence and on what claims.
II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 16 Intervenor defendants ask the Court to reconsider its November 5, 2004 Order &quot;Grant17 ing/Denying Motions For Partial Summary Judgment.&quot; Although Intervenor Defendants could 18 request reconsideration on numerous provisions set forth in the Court's Order, only two key 19 issues are raised here: 20 A. 21 A statute enacted through the initiative process -- I-776 -- is, as are other statutes, 22 presumed constitutional. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn.2d 454, 458, 319 P.2d 828 23 (1957) (emphasis added). A Washington Constitution Article One § 23 claim alleging the 24 unconstitutionality of a state statute (I-776) must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Island 25 County v. State, 135 Wn.2d 141, 147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998). 26 27 28
SOUND TRANSIT HAS FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF VALID BONDS:
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Sound Transit must prove three elements: Element &quot;A&quot; Element &quot;B&quot; that a valid contract exists; that the challenged legislation substantially impairs it's contract; and
Element &quot;C&quot; if so, that there is no legitimate public purpose to justify the impairment. Johanson v. Department of Social and Health Services, State of Wash., 91 Wn.App. 737, 959 P.2d 1166, review denied, 137 Wn.2d 1010, 978 P.2d 1099 (1998). The first of these three elements -- Element &quot;A&quot; -- requires Sound Transit to establish
7 that it issued valid bonds. The question of validity of public contracts includes the burden to 8 prove the following: 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1. Is there legislative or constitutional authority delegated to the municipality to issue the bonds for the particular purpose? 2. Was the statute authorizing the bond issue constitutionally enacted? If not constitutionally enacted or if unconstitutional for any other reason, the issue is void and recitals are of no effect. 3. Is the purpose for which the bonds are issued a public and corporate purpose, as distinguished from a private purpose? 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.04, at 575 (3d ed., 1995) This statement from McQuillen was specifically adopted by our State Supreme Court in King County v. Taxpayers of King County, et al., 133 Wn.2d 584, 595, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997). Moreover, the Court in that case also recognized that the burden of proof on each of these three elements rests with the parties asserting the validity of the bonds. In this case, Intervenor Plaintiff Sound Transit and the State of Washington are those parties asserting bond validity. King Cy. v. Taxpayers, supra, at page 595. Neither have properly met their burden. Intervenor Defendants have made the argument that the State Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from creating local municipal corporations by special law. Washington
Constitution Article Eleven § 10. The legislature is powerless to delegate power that it does not possess. State ex rel Tax Comm'n v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1962). The legislature was powerless to delegate to the county commissions the power to create independent local Rowley &amp; Klauser, LLP 5
governments, which is the undeniable consequence of either the 1993 or the 1994 amendments to RCW 81.112.030, which according to the Court's Order, eliminated voter ratification of Sound Transit formation. A recent case involving similar constitutional issues is Granite Falls Library Capital Facility Area v. Taxpayers of Granite Falls, 134 Wn.2d 825, 953 P.2d 1150 (1998). At issue was the creation, tax levy, and debt issue of a new RCW 27.15 Library Capital Facility District. That statute (as did original RCW 81.112.030) required voter approval of the formation of the district, and on the question of new debt that statute requiring a three fifths voter approval, consistent with Washington Constitution Article Eight § 6. The ballot requirements and the election outcome were key considerations thought by the Court to avoid related due process, Washington Constitution Article One § 19 suffrage protections, and Article Eleven local government formation restrictions. The 1993 and 1994 amendments to RCW 81.112.030 (even if their enactment complied with Article §§ 19 and/or 37) clearly eliminated the precise underpinnings thought necessary in Granite Falls Library, supra. The Court's Order does not consider this glaring problem with Sound Transit's assault on I-776. The Court's November 5, 2004 Order does not even address Sound Transit's affirmative obligation to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the first two elements [Element &quot;A&quot; and &quot;B&quot;]. Sound Transit's September 27, 2004 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and supporting documents gave this Court no basis for adjudicating them favorably to Sound Transit. In essence, the Court has absolved Sound Transit from the burden of proving its case. In addition, this Court has created a non-existent burden upon Intervenor Defendants to disprove the validity of Sound Transit's bonds, and then it has prevented Intervenor Defendants' ability to do so by invoking a &quot;laches&quot; bar that does not apply, was never pled, and was not preserved. It was inappropriate for the Court to enter a CR 56 ruling in favor of Sound Transit on the issue of valid bonds where the Court made no factual or legal showing of entitlement to the relief Intervenor Plaintiff Sound Transit requested.
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Although Intervenor Defendants had no burden of proof, their own Motion For Summary Judgment demonstrated that it was impossible -- as a legal proposition -- for Sound Transit to prove that it issued valid bonds, because: (1) Sound Transit did not meet RCW 81.112.030 voter approval conditions; (2) Sound Transit could not constitutionally issue debt without specific voter approval of agency formation; (3) Sound Transit could not constitutionally issue debt without specific voter approval of new and added local municipal debt limits, and (4) Sound Transit exceeded the statutory authority of RCW 81.104.180. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions in the record, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). All facts and reasonable inferences are considered most favorably to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Generally, questions of fact are properly left to the trier of fact; however, when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion, questions of fact may be determined as a matter of law. Trane Co. v. BrownJohnston, Inc., 48 Wash.App. 511, 513-14, 739 P.2d 737 (1987). Factual disputes existed regarding the question of the controlling &quot;financial framework&quot; alleged to have been &quot;impaired&quot; by I-776. Sound Transit relied solely upon documents generated by itself, and the supporting expert opinion of an official from Merill Lynch, the financial advisor to Sound Transit and architect of the novel Series 1999 security provision. This Series 1999 security provision was obviously designed not for security for bond purchasers, but rather to concoct a shell to protect Sound Transit's delegated taxing power from future amendment by the sovereign (&quot;the people&quot;). That factual disputes exist about that bond question is evident by comparing Sound Transit's Jeff Brown Declarations to Intervenor Defendants' Thomas A. Rubin declarations.
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The record also shows that Sound Transit was engaged in discussions with the actual bond purchasers following remand of this case, that those bond purchaser's were aware of the existence of this lawsuit, and that their concerns were limited to the impact of I-776 on future bonds. Though the opportunity for factual support from actual purchasers existed, Sound Transit failed to offer even a scintilla of evidence from these bond purchasers to support Sound Transit's claim that I-776 impaired the financial framework inducing 1999 Series bond purchasers' contract with Sound Transit. The Thomas Rubin analysis of the appropriate financial framework is the valid analysis, for it includes that which was omitted in Sound Transit's motion -- the bond purchasers are presumed to be familiar with legal restraints upon the issuer's authority. Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 102 Wn.2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (1984). This is particularly material to Sound Transit's unequivocal duty to prove I-776 unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Sound Transit sought -- and received -- an Order from this Court that it is free to continue to collect the MVET -- and to spend it as it wishes -- without any requirement that the MVET or other pledged tax revenue be applied to the retirement of the bonds, as is specifically required by RCW 81.104.180. The appropriate remedy (if an
&quot;impairment&quot; is found to exist) is not to provide Sound Transit blank check immunity from I776; the remedy is to enforce I-776 except to the limited extent necessary to protect legitimate interests of the bond purchasers, whose rights are the rights protected by Washington Constitution Article Two § 23. As Intervenor Defendants have previously argued, the express provisions of RCW 81.104.180 could not be clearer. Sound Transit was only delegated power to pledge the MVET for the purpose of retiring bonds. That statute did not authorize Sound Transit to pledge to &quot;levy&quot; and then to withdraw the levied tax from bond retirement purposes. But this is precisely what this Court has ruled Sound Transit has the authority to do. A municipality's powers are limited to those conferred in express terms or those necessarily implied. In re Seattle, 96 Wn.2d
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616, 629, 638 P.2d 549 (1981). Where the State Legislature has explicitly restricted the delegation of &quot;pledging&quot; authority for the MVET to &quot;retire bonds,&quot; this Court can not grant Sound Transit the authority to &quot;pledge&quot; the MVET for other purposes than bond retirement. This Court's ruling directly conflicts with and is beyond the authority delegated to Sound Transit and bond purchasers in RCW 81.104.180. To the extent that factual matters can be deemed undisputed, they do not support entry of an Order in Sound Transit's favor as a matter of law. To the extent material facts are in dispute, no summary judgment order is appropriate. The credibility of expert witnesses and the legitimacy of their opinions must be evaluated in a trial on the merits following cross examination. B. THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS INAPPLICABLE: Intervenor Defendants previously briefed the &quot;latches&quot; argument to establish (1) that this &quot;defense&quot; was not pled by any party, (2) that Sound Transit did not assert this issue for inclusion in the Court's May 3, 2004 post-remand Issue/Scheduling Order, (3) that mention of a &quot;laches&quot; defense was first raised in responding briefs, (4) that such equitable defenses are not available where the question of the authority of municipal corporations is raised [ see Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 102 Wn.2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (1984)], (5) that neither the State nor Sound Transit offered proof to establish all of the required elements of &quot;laches,&quot; and (6) that citizens are always entitled to establish that a municipal corporation's formation is &quot;void&quot; [see McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, §§ 3.45-3.56 (3d. ed)]. In any event, the record of this case clearly shows: (1) that the Sound Transit formation question involves the violation by the State Legislature of two state constitutional restrictions designed to avoid deceptive or misleading legislative practices (Article Two § 19 in 1993 and Article Two § 37 in 1994); (2) that Sound Transit's 1996 ballot measure was expressly restricted to approving a tax measure (and not the formation of the entity or compounded local debt limits);
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(3) that no information was provided to 1996 voters about the manner in which Sound Transit claimed to have come into existence as an independent municipal corporation with debt limits beyond those of the three participating counties; (4) that no information was provided to inform 1996 voters that Sound Transit even claimed to be a municipal corporation with a separate and additional debt limit distinct and independent of the three participating counties; and (5) that, to the extent a factual record exists relative to the Intervenor Defendants, the record shows that the Intervenor Defendants did not know of the Sound Transit formation questions and -- in the case of Intervenor Defendant Permanent Offense -- involved statewide voters living outside the local boundaries of Sound Transit or the boundaries of any of the three participating counties, with absolutely no knowledge of Sound Transit whatsoever.. Neither the State nor Sound Transit offered any evidence from which the Court could conclude that the Intervenor Defendants &quot;should have&quot; known of any problems with formation enabling legislation or Sound Transit's formation or the effect that a void incorporation would have on Sound Transit's contracts. Finally, the type of &quot;conclusive&quot; closure of the &quot;lack of authority&quot; question sought by Sound Transit and by the State to be obtained through &quot;laches&quot; arguments in this case was rejected by the State Supreme Court in Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 102 Wn.2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (1984). In Chemical Bank, the Court recognized the availability of declaratory relief to those seeking closure on municipal &quot;authority&quot; issues, and the Court rejected the effort to gain such closure by resort to equitable defenses by those who had failed to seek closure through available remedies. The Supreme Court's reasoning is particularly applicable in this case where bond issuer Sound Transit invokes equity to foreclose debate about the validity of its own bonds, where it had the exclusive power to raise the questions in a bond validation proceeding under RCW 7.25, and which would have provided
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the only opportunity to actually litigate these issues. King County v. Taxpayers of King County, et al., 133 Wn.2d 584, 595, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997) Finally, as argued above, this Court cannot switch the burden of proof on questions of bond validity from Intervenor Plaintiff Sound Transit to the Intervenor Defendants, and then prevent the Intervenor Defendants from defending by resort to equitable bars. The Intervenor Defendants defend a state statute (I-776) against Sound Transit's claim that I-776 is unconstitutional, a defense for the benefit of the entire State, and no claim of right based upon the lapse of time is available. RCW 4.16.160. A Court is precluded from imposing a shorter period under
the doctrine of laches than that of a relevant statute of limitations. Brost v. L.A.N.D., Inc, 37 Wn. App. 372, 680 P.2d 453 (1984). Just as no statute of limitations bar exists to such defenses, no laches bar can be imposed by this Court. Moreover, defenses to a cause of action are not time barred. Seattle First Nat. Bank, N.A. v. Siebol, 64 Wash. App. 401, 824 P.2d 1252, rev. denied 119 Wn.2d 1010, 833 P.2d 386 (1992). The Court must reconsider and change this portion of its decision. III. CONCLUSION
Intervenor Defendants ask the Court to clarify its November 5, 2004 Order. Questions related to possible appeal depend on such clarification as well as the status of a scheduled December 13, 2004 trial on the merits. Intervenor Defendants also ask the Court to reconsider and reverse those rulings adjudicating the bond &quot;impairment&quot; and &quot;laches&quot; arguments of Intervenor Plaintiff Sound Transit. The financial and legal consequences of this Court's November 5, 2004 Order finding I-776 unconstitutional are immense. The most obvious of those consequences include: · assuring the collection of billions of dollars of MVET revenues beginning December 5, 2002 and extending over the next three decades and their expenditure in contravention of state law;
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ignoring void municipal corporations, injecting judicial life where legislative life did not exist, and doing so by misapplying judicial &quot;equitable&quot; notions;
inviting any local government to insulate its taxes from state voter or legislative control by the artifice of a pledge of taxing power ostensibly made to secure a de minimus bond issue whose purchasers' &quot;lien&quot; evaporates the instant the &quot;lien&quot; emerges; and
inviting the creation of compounded local debt limits by elected officials without voter approval. DATED this 15th day of November 2004. ROWLEY &amp; KLAUSER, LLP
_____________________________ ______________________________ Robert C. Rowley, WSBA #4765 James J. Klauser, WSBA #27530 Co-counsel to Intervenor Defendants Salish, Vaughan, and Permanent Offense
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Clarification/Reconsider Motion