Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/852/430/451066/
Timestamp: 2019-10-23 16:01:02
Document Index: 83438684

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 185', '§ 3102', '§ 185', '§ 3102', '§ 1291', '§ 157', '§ 158', '§ 185']

John K. Laws, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Calmat, Defendant-appellee, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1988 › John K. Laws, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Calmat, Defendant-appellee
John K. Laws, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Calmat, Defendant-appellee, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988) Argued Feb. 4, 1988. Submitted May 4, 1988. Decided July 12, 1988
John K. Laws ("Laws") appeals the district court's denial of his motion to remand to state court the lawsuit he initiated against his employer, Calmat Corporation ("Calmat"). In addition, he appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Calmat. Laws argues that his right to privacy under the California State Constitution was violated by Calmat's mandatory drug testing program. Laws argues that reversal is required because the district court erroneously found that his state law claim is preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, section 3102 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act ("MCSA"), 49 U.S.C. § 3102, and the United States Department of Transportation Regulations ("DOT regulations") promulgated under the authority of the MCSA. We affirm the district court.
On April 27, 1987, Calmat removed this action to federal court on grounds of federal question subject matter jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, section 3102 of the MCSA, 49 U.S.C. § 3102, and the DOT regulations promulgated under the authority of the MCSA. The district court then granted summary judgment for Calmat on the grounds that, pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA, Laws' proper remedy was through the grievance and arbitration provisions in the CBA. Moreover, the court found that Laws' state law claim conflicted with the DOT regulations and, therefore, failed under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. No findings were made regarding sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").1 Laws timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both the denial of a motion to remand an action to state court for lack of removal jurisdiction and the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 996 (1987).
This court first repeated the now familiar proposition that the preemptive effect of section 301 of the LMRA2 is so powerful that for the purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule it will transform state claims into federal ones. Id. at 1085.3 Thus, if an employee attempts to escape application of section 301 by alleging only state law violations--when in fact the claims implicate the CBA--the employee will be subject to the artful pleading doctrine, which "requires that the state law complaint be recharacterized as one arising under the collective bargaining agreement. The case may then be removed to federal court and adjudicated under the appropriate federal law." Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984). In this way, an employee subject to a CBA will not be able to avoid the application of federal laws by filing only state claims.
Utility Workers, at 1086 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1916, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985)) (emphasis added). We concluded that Local 246's constitutional claims were "substantially dependent" upon analysis of the CBA. Specifically, we noted the articles in the CBA which recognized SCE's right to manage the plant, direct the work force and implement safety rules. Utility Workers, at 1086. Because the union's state constitutional claims could not be resolved without considering the CBA we affirmed the district court's dismissal of those claims. Id. at 1087.
Applying the test to the present case, we must hold that Laws' claim is also "substantially dependent upon" the Calmat-Union CBA. Laws' conditions of employment are governed by the CBA. A drug and alcohol testing program, upon which all employees' continued employment depends, is a working condition whether or not it is specifically discussed in the CBA. Moreover, Laws' state law claim arises out of his suspension and threatened discharge. Calmat stated the reason for Laws' suspension as "insubordination" for refusing to take the urinalysis test. Under Article IX, Section 1 of the CBA, " [a]n employee may be discharged or disciplined for ... insubordination" and may protest through the grievance and arbitration procedures any punishment considered unjustified. In addition, Calmat and the Union have previously agreed and included in the CBA that "intoxication" due to drugs or alcohol is grounds for "discharge or disciplinary layoff." Although the manner of discovering employee intoxication is not in the current CBA, the reference to "intoxication" seems to identify this arena as a subject for the collective bargaining process--not the courts. Thus, Laws' alleged state claim should be treated as an "artfully pled" section 301 claim.4 See Utility Workers, at 1087.
Contrary to Laws' assertion, Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, --- U.S. ----, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987), does not require a different result. Laws cites the following language to support his position:
Id. 107 S. Ct. at 2432 n. 10. Laws further notes that the Court wrote:
Unlike the employees in Caterpillar, Laws was a union-represented employee at all times relevant to his claim. Moreover, as discussed above, his complaint arises from dissatisfaction with a working condition and disciplinary measures taken when he refused to conform to that condition. Thus, his "rights" are not wholly separate from the CBA, but are inextricably intertwined with it.5 See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 105 S. Ct. at 1912. The district court therefore correctly determined that Laws' state cause of action implicated his CBA and could be removed to federal court.6
Section 7 identifies protected or arguably protected employee activity, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and section 8 enumerates certain "unfair labor practices" which are illegal if engaged in by management, Sec. 8(a), or labor, Sec. 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158. The question of whether the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") has exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute is raised by both parties on appeal
Section 301 provides in pertinent part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties...." 29 U.S.C. § 185
This complete preemption reflects the goals of national labor laws, which were enacted to avoid the application of inconsistent state laws and thus ensure the integrity of both the collective bargaining process--and any agreement the process produces. See e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985)
We also reject Laws' argument that his Union cannot bargain away his right to be free from mandatory drug testing. In Utility Workers we wrote that " [d]rug testing does not implicate the sort of 'nonnegotiable state-law rights' that preclude preemption under section 301.... The question of drug testing obviously implicates important personal rights. To the best of our knowledge, however, no court has held that the right to be free from drug testing is one that cannot be negotiated away, and we decline to make such a ruling here." At 1086 (citations and footnote omitted)
Our holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988). Although the Court reaffirmed the proposition that the NLRA will preempt state law claims requiring interpretation of a CBA, it added that Sec. 301 "says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements." Id. at ----, 108 S. Ct. at 1883. The employee's cause of action in Lingle alleged violation of a well-established and recognized tort provided to workers under Illinois law. Id. at ---- - ----, 108 S. Ct. at 1881-82. Not only had the state courts interpreted the state's Workers' Compensation Act to apply to employees who are parties to a CBA, the Illinois courts also set forth the specific factual questions for review of such claims. Id. The California courts have not applied in a published opinion the California constitutional right of privacy in a drug-testing context. Thus Laws' claim is not an established or recognized state law claim. Moreover, in the instant case, we believe Laws' claim is inextricably intertwined with his CBA. See id. at ----, 108 S. Ct. at 1884 ("judges can determine questions of state law involving labor-management relations only if such questions do not require construing collective-bargaining agreements")