Source: https://iclg.com/practice-areas/international-arbitration/international-arbitration-2017/north-american-overview
Timestamp: 2018-07-17 18:55:52
Document Index: 634161717

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 201', '§ 11', 'art. 7', 'art. 11', 'art. 27', 'art. 16', 'art. 36', 'art. 36', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8']

International Arbitration 2017 | North American Overview | ICLG
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International Arbitration 2017 | North American Overview
II. Arbitration in the US and Canada
A. US Arbitration Framework
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is the starting point for US arbitration law.4 The FAA “declare[s] a national policy favoring arbitration”.5 The FAA applies to arbitrations related to interstate and foreign commerce and maritime transactions.6 State arbitral law is preempted by the FAA, but continues to apply to areas on which the FAA is silent.
The grounds for vacating an arbitral award in the US are very narrow. The FAA provides that arbitral awards may only be vacated upon a showing that: (i) “the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; (ii) “there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators”; (iii) “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing . . . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced”; (iv) or “the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”.20
Before 2008, courts also recognised a judicially-created vacatur ground where an arbitral award was issued in “manifest disregard of the law”. In 2008, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., holding that “§§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification”.21 Since Hall Street, the federal circuit courts have been split on whether “manifest disregard” survives. The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that “manifest disregard” is no longer available as a ground for vacatur.22 On the other hand, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits continue to apply the “manifest disregard” standard.23 The First, Third, and Tenth Circuits have adopted a middle ground. They acknowledge uncertainty as to whether “manifest disregard” is a legitimate basis to vacate an arbitration award, and evade its application by never finding the stringent standard met, thus rendering determination of its validity unnecessary.24 The circuits that continue to apply “manifest disregard” require proof of a clearly-established legal principle that the arbitrator willfully ignored.25
Arbitrators generally have the discretion to request the production of important documents. The IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration often serve as a guide.35 Article 27 of the Model Law also provides for court assistance in collecting evidence.36
Canada recognises the kompetenz-kompetenz principle in all of its jurisdictions. Arbitrators may thus rule on their own jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that “in any case involving an arbitration clause, a challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction must be resolved first by the arbitrator”.37 The only exception is where “the challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is based solely on a question of law” and the court is “satisfied that the challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is not a delaying tactic and . . . will not unduly impair the conduct of the arbitration proceeding”.38 Courts thus normally defer to arbitrators, for example, by granting stays of litigation while arbitral proceedings are pending.
In accordance with Model Law principles, Canadian courts exercise restraint in overturning international arbitral awards, whether made in Canada or abroad.41 The Model Law sets out the grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement, which include a party’s legal incapacity, defective notice, a tribunal acting outside its authority, improper composition of the arbitral tribunal, or denial of the opportunity to fully present a case.42 The Model Law also allows for vacatur where “the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of this State”.43 However, courts in Canada construe the public policy ground narrowly. Trial courts in Ontario, for example, will only review foreign awards on public policy grounds where there is either corruption, or fundamental unfairness combined with procedural or substantive rules differing markedly from those in the forum in which enforcement is sought.44 In Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp., the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that courts may not review international arbitral awards for errors of law.45 Quintette has been followed in other jurisdictions in Canada.46
1. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Proposed Rule Banning Mandatory Arbitration Clauses from Preventing Class Action Lawsuits
In May 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) issued a proposed rule for public comment that is aimed at preventing mandatory arbitration clauses from blocking class actions in contracts of consumer financial products and services. The proposed rule requires that companies that include arbitration clauses in their contracts: (1) include specific language provided by the CFPB that makes clear that the arbitration clauses cannot be used to stop consumers from being part of a class action in court; and (2) submit to the CFPB any claims filed and awards issued in arbitration. The proposed rule would apply to most consumer financial products and services that the CFPB oversees, and in particular products and services related to markets that involve lending, storing, and moving or exchanging money.47
The proposed rule is grounded in the results of a CFPB study released in May 2015 showing that class actions are a more effective means for consumers to challenge the practices of their financial services providers. The study found that very few consumers – about 2% – ever bring or even consider individual legal action against their financial services provides, given that “[o]ften the harm may be too small to make it practical for a single consumer to pursue an individual dispute, even when the cumulative harm to all affected consumers is significant”.48
The CFPB believes preventing mandatory arbitration clauses from blocking class action lawsuits will “incentivize companies to avoid being held accountable for their conduct”, and “make the individual arbitration process more transparent” by requiring companies that use arbitration clauses to provide certain data concerning claims, awards, and the conduct of financial services companies to the CFPB (e.g., a company’s non-payment of arbitration fees or failure to adhere to the arbitration forum’s standards of conduct).49
The CFPB’s proposed rule was issued in the wake of the Supreme Court’s December 2015 ruling in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,50 which upheld an arbitration clause that blocked class actions despite express language in the clause stating that it deferred to State laws prohibiting the inclusion of such waivers in arbitration agreements, on the basis that all such State laws had since been invalided by Supreme Court precedent.51 The dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justice Sotomayor, noted that this decision, along with the Supreme Court’s previous decisions in this vein, “have predictably resulted in the deprivation of consumers’ rights to seek redress for losses, and, turning the coin, they have insulated powerful economic interests from liability for violations of consumer-protection laws”.52 The rationale for the CFPB’s proposed rule accords closely with the reasoning of the dissent in Imburgia.
Some of the CFPB’s statements regarding the reasons for the proposed rule can be read as suggesting some hostility not only toward the effect of mandatory arbitration provisions in blocking class actions, but also the inherent characteristics of arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution. The CFPB states that “[a]rbitration clauses enable companies to avoid being held accountable for their conduct” and that the material it seeks to collect from arbitration administrators regarding claims, awards, and the conduct of the companies under its purview would “provide insight into whether companies are abusing arbitration or whether the process itself is fair”.53 (Emphasis added.) There is, however, no reason for concern at this time that these statements are harbingers of a more general shift in the tide of US policy favoring arbitration, and there are questions about the long-term future of such a rule under the Trump administration.
As of March 2017, the CFPB was still reviewing public comments on its proposed rule and has not provided a timeframe for issuing a final rule.
2. The enforceability of arbitration clauses in e-commerce consumer contracts
The perceived need to protect consumers from mandatory arbitration clauses that animates the CFPB’s proposed rule can also be detected in recent decisions concerning whether online consumers can be bound by arbitration clauses found in e-commerce contracts when there is ambiguity as to whether those clauses were drawn to the consumers’ attention.
In Sgouros v. Transunion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit declined to enforce an arbitration agreement arising from an online user’s purchase of a product from a credit reporting agency because the credit reporting agency’s website did not provide the consumer with reasonable notice that his use of the site or click of the “I Accept” button constituted assent to the agreement.54
Sgouros used TransUnion’s website to purchase a credit score package that provided him with his credit score. However, when Sgouros approached a car dealership to buy a car based on the credit score he bought from TransUnion, he was unable to do so because the car dealership calculated his score to be 100 points less.55 Sgouros filed a putative class action against TransUnion, alleging that it violated various consumer protection laws by failing to disclose that the formula it uses to calculate the scores provided to consumers on its website was different than that used by lenders.56 In response, TransUnion moved to compel arbitration on the basis that the website through which Sgouros purchased his credit score included a service agreement containing an arbitration clause.57
The Seventh Circuit examined how the TransUnion website was designed to interact with users like Sgouros making a purchase. Specifically, the Court noted that the arbitration agreement was found on page 8 of a 10-page service agreement of which only the first few lines were visible to users without scrolling through the scroll box.58 Although there was an “I Accept” button below the scroll box containing the service agreement, the Court held that it was not clear that by clicking the button, the user was agreeing to the terms of the service agreement; rather, a block of bold text below the scroll box told the user that clicking the button constituted authorisation for TransUnion to obtain his personal information, and did not say anything about contractual terms.59 The Court concluded that because “Illinois contract law requires that a website provide a user reasonable notice that his use of the site or click on a button constitutes assent to an agreement”,60 and no such reasonable notice was provided in this case, no contract containing an arbitration clause was formed between Sgouros and TransUnion, and TransUnion’s motion to compel arbitration was properly denied.61
In Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 4th 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), the California Court of Appeal for the Second District (Division 3) considered the enforceability of an e-commerce arbitration clause in the context of a form of Internet contract known as a “browsewrap” agreement. Unlike “clickwrap” agreements (such as the one in Sgouros) which require users to affirmatively click a button to confirm their assent to an agreement’s terms, in “browsewrap” agreements, a user’s assent is inferred from his or her use of the website.62 These websites typically include a hyperlink to the Terms and Conditions.
Stating first principles, the Court, quoting the Ninth Circuit, noted that “[w]hile Internet commerce has exposed courts to many new situations it has not fundamentally changed the requirement that ‘mutual manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of contract.’”63 Quoting the Second Circuit, the Court emphasised that “reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility”.64 On this basis, the Court reviewed the design of the website and concluded that “the Terms of Use hyperlinks—their placement, color, size other qualities relative to the ProFlowers.com Web site’s overall design—are simply too inconspicuous to meet that standard”.65 The Court added, in dicta, that “[o]nline retailers would be well-advised to include a conspicuous textual notice with their terms of use hyperlinks going forward”.66
The opinions in both Sgouros and Long engage at length with the minutiae of website design to probe whether, as a matter of fundamental contract law, online users of the websites could be said to have assented to the arbitration agreements contained within the vendors’ service agreements. In both cases, the courts found that the website could have done more to put users on notice of the terms and conditions. These decisions reveal a tendency to give consumers the benefit of the doubt when it is not abundantly clear that they should have been aware that certain terms and conditions governed their transaction. More broadly, as e-commerce transactions become more casual and commonplace for consumers, courts are feeling the need to safeguard the bargaining power of online consumers, and since arbitration clauses limit the avenues by which such consumers may seek redress, the applicability of those clauses must be unambiguous if they are to be enforced.
The Canada – European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”).67 which establishes an Investment Court System (“ICS”) to replace the investor-State arbitration provisions in existing bilateral investment agreements between EU Member States and Canada, was signed on October 30, 2016.68 The European Parliament voted in favour of CETA on February 15, 2017.69 Before it can come into full effect, however, CETA must still be approved by each Member State of the EU, and in Canada must be ratified by an Order in Council directed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and then be implemented by domestic enabling legislation.70 When that happens, the ICS will come into effect.
The ICS is envisioned to be a permanent arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes arising from the breach of obligations under CETA.71 The Tribunal will comprise 15 members appointed by a joint committee for a fixed term: five members will be Canadian nationals, five will be nationals of EU Member States, and five will be nationals of third-party countries.72 Cases will be presided over by three members of the Tribunal.73
The ICS combines the transparency of national courts with the expediency of arbitration. Like a court, the Tribunals’ hearings will be open to the public, unless the Tribunal determines that there is a need to protect confidential information.74 Documents such as expert reports and witness statements will be made publicly available.75 All members of the Tribunal must possess the qualifications for appointment to judicial office in their home countries, or otherwise be “jurists of recognised competence”,76 and are subject to strict ethics and conflicts of interest rules.77 The rules specify a mechanism to challenge an arbitrator on the basis of a conflict of interest,78 and the documents related to the challenge of an arbitrator are made publicly available.79 There is also an appeal mechanism for the review of awards based on errors in the application of law, “manifest errors” in the appreciation of facts, including domestic law, or on the grounds set out in Article 52(1) of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention, such as corruption, a “serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure”, or failure to state reasons, among other grounds.80
In order to benefit from the efficiency of an arbitral forum, the rules permit the Tribunal to expeditiously dismiss claims that are “manifestly without legal merit”81 or “unfounded in law”.82 The Tribunal is generally required to issue an award within 24 months of the date a claim is submitted, failing which it is required to provide the parties with reasons for the delay.83 Costs are generally borne by the unsuccessful party.84
The ICS reflects a number of features to safeguard the sovereignty of States subject to its jurisdiction and protect their power to regulate in the public interest. For example, it limits the grounds on which an investor can challenge a State85 and does not provide the Tribunal with the power to grant injunctive relief,86 avoiding the possibility that a government may be forced to change legislation or policy in response to investor suits. The Tribunal’s final award is limited to monetary damages or restitution, and it cannot award punitive damages.87 Moreover, although it can order interim measures to protect certain rights of parties to a dispute, such as orders relating to the preservation of evidence, the Tribunal cannot generally grant orders of attachment.88
CETA’s ICS provisions are among its most controversial, and nearly derailed efforts to sign the treaty.89 However, its proponents not only fought to preserve the ICS as an important feature of CETA, but are looking to apply its model beyond CETA, with ambitions of establishing a “Multilateral Investment Court” open to all countries that subscribe to its underlying principles.90 This reflects a view of the ICS as not only a specialised forum for trade disputes arising from CETA, but as an “important and radical change” in dispute resolution more broadly.91 Canada and the EU are committed to expeditiously implementing the Multilateral Investment Court “once a minimum critical mass of participants is established”.92
2. An arbitral panel’s breach of procedure as a basis to set aside the award: Popack v. Lipszyc, 2016 ONCA 135
In the recent case of Popack v. Lipszyc, the Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the primacy of the principle of finality in arbitration in holding that an arbitrator’s breach of procedure will not automatically provide a basis for a court to vacate the award. Rather, the inquiry centres around the effect of the procedural error on “the reliability of the result” and “the fairness, or the appearance of the fairness of the process”.93
The arbitration forum in this case was a Rabbinical Court. It committed a breach of procedure by receiving ex parte evidence from the parties’ previous arbitrator in a failed former arbitration, Rabbi Schwei, without notice to either party.94 When the appellant Mr. Popack learned of Rabbi Schwei’s involvement, he sent a letter to the panel stating that if the panel considers Rabbi Schwei’s testimony, he would request a hearing in his presence.95 The panel wrote back stating that the information provided by Rabbi Schwei had no impact on their award.96 The panel ultimately issued an award against Mr. Popack. Mr. Popack brought an application to set aside the award pursuant to Ontario’s International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.9. (“ICAA”). He argued that the panel had breached the procedure agreed upon by the parties by conducting the ex parte meeting with Rabbi Schwei, and that this warranted setting aside the award pursuant to Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (a schedule to the ICAA). Under the terms of the arbitration agreement, the parties were entitled to be “informed by the arbitrators of the scheduled hearing(s)”.97 Under Article 34(2)(a)(iv), a court “may” set aside an award if “the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties”.
The application judge accepted that the panel had breached the parties’ agreed-upon procedure, and that the breach provided a basis to set aside the agreement under Article 34(2)(a)(iv).98 However, she declined to set aside the award despite the procedural error, exercising her discretion under Article 34(2)(a)(iv).99 On appeal, Mr. Popack argued that the application judge’s refusal to set aside the award despite the procedural error and the potential prejudice to him was inconsistent with the approach to Article 34(2) taken in other cases.100
The Court of Appeal examined Canadian and foreign cases in which courts were asked to set aside arbitral awards on grounds involving procedural errors in the arbitration process, noting that they revealed an approach that “looks to both the extent that the breach undermines the fairness or the appearance of the fairness of the arbitration and the effect of the breach on the award itself”.101 The Court held that the application judge had properly considered these factors in arriving at her decision. Further, the Court held that Mr. Popack’s conduct upon discovering the panel’s ex parte meeting with Rabbi Schwei also militated against setting aside the award. Mr. Popack’s letter to the panel, which was itself ex parte, requested a hearing only if the panel considered Rabbi Schwei’s testimony in issuing its award. This, the Court held, amounted to a “tactical decision” which, if rewarded, “would eviscerate the finality principle that drives judicial review of arbitral awards and would cause ‘a real practical injustice’”.102
Separately, the Court also affirmed that the death of a material witness since the time of the hearing, and his consequent unavailability at any subsequent hearing, was relevant in deciding whether to set aside the award: “[T]he ability of the parties to effectively and fairly redo the arbitration process should the award be set aside can also be a factor in the exercise of Article 34(2) discretion, at least in cases where neither party bears any responsibility for the procedural error said to justify the setting aside of the initial order”.103
The Court of Appeal for Ontario’s holding in Popack that a mere procedural breach will not justify setting aside an arbitration award is consistent with Canadian courts’ “well-established preference in favour of maintaining arbitral awards rendered in consensual private arbitrations”.104 The opinion is also indicative of a pragmatic approach to judicial review of arbitral awards, which looks not only to the ultimate effect of an alleged error on the award, but also to whether it is practical for the parties to redo the arbitration process.
3. The entitlement of parties to enforce arbitration awards in the jurisdiction of their choice
In Sociedade-de-Fomento Industriale Private Limited v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation, 2014 BCCA 205, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reversed a lower court finding that an Indian entity seeking to enforce a foreign arbitral award against assets held by a Pakistani entity in British Columbia was not entitled to a Mareva injunction (a freezing order), because the parties lacked a real and substantial connection to British Columbia and because the award could have been enforced in Pakistan.
Sociedade-de-Fomento Industriale (“SFI”), an Indian entity, obtained an arbitration award in ICC proceedings against Pakistan Steel Mills (“PSM”), a steel corporation owned by the government of Pakistan. SFI’s efforts to collect its award from PSM were fruitless for 1n months. Then, SFI learned that PSM was going to purchase a shipment of coal on an FOB basis from British Columbia. SFI filed a petition in British Columbia to enforce its arbitral award pursuant to that province’s legislation adopting the New York Convention, the Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.154. It also sought and obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction to prevent the ship from leaving Vancouver or PSM from disposing of the assets on board without first paying the amount of the arbitral award.
PSM ultimately paid the full amount of the judgment obtained enforcing the award,105 but subsequently filed an action seeking damages on the basis that SFI should not have been granted the Mareva injunction. Without disputing that British Columbia courts had jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral award, PSM argued that different considerations applied to the grant of a Mareva injunction, and based on those considerations, SFI should not have been granted an injunction.106 The lower court agreed with PSM, finding that the “balance of convenience” analysis dictated that an injunction should not have been granted for two reasons: first, because both parties lacked substantial connections to British Columbia; and second, because SFI failed to disclose in its ex parte application that the award could have been enforced in Pakistan.107
In reversing the lower court on the first issue, the British Columbia Court of Appeal noted that a dedicated statutory provision, section 10 of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c.28, specifically provided that a real and substantial connection is presumed to exist in a proceeding to enforce an arbitral award made outside British Columbia, and “it would be illogical to ignore this presumed jurisdictional connection for interlocutory purposes, but recognize it for final judgment purpose”.108 On the second issue, the Court held that although the availability of foreign enforcement could be a factor in the balance of convenience analysis necessary to grant a Mareva injunction given the court’s broad equitable jurisdiction to issue that type of relief,109 the expert evidence concerning Pakistani law before the Court of the substantial delays that accompany enforcement proceedings in Pakistan and the considerable doubt as to whether Pakistani courts would enforce interest payments on the award dictated that the injunction was properly granted in the circumstances.110
This decision cements Canada’s place as an enforcement jurisdiction that will respect the letter and spirit of the New York Convention, even in the discretionary grant of equitable remedies. However, given that the British Columbia Court of Appeal did affirm that it is relevant to consider the possibility of foreign enforcement in the balance of convenience test for an injunction, it is unlikely that courts in Canada will be quick in the future to stop ships in port from sailing to their destinations in order to enforce arbitration awards against the security of their cargo. In other words, this precedent does not necessarily support the grant of an injunction in circumstances where there are no demonstrable concerns arising from enforcement in the defendant’s home jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when arbitral awards are issued against State-owned entities incorporated in jurisdictions whose court systems are demonstrably less reliable in enforcing arbitral awards expeditiously and fully (i.e., with interest), Canada may be an attractive jurisdiction for enforcement.
The United States and Canada are each home to mature and arbitration-friendly legal regimes. Although the laws regarding arbitration continue to evolve, the US and Canada remain important sites of international arbitration.
1. See Office of the US Trade Representative, Free Trade Agreements, at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (listing free trade agreements to which the US is a party); Foreign Affairs, Trade & Development Canada, Canada’s Free Trade Agreements, at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fta-ale.aspx?lang=eng (listing free trade agreements to which Canada is a party).
2. See Final Text of NAFTA, Ch. 11 § B, available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&language=en-US.
3. See Office of Trade Agreements Negotiation and Compliance, Bilateral Investment Treaties, at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp (listing BITs to which the US is a party); Foreign Affairs, Trade & Development Canada, Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection (FIPAs), at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng (listing BITs to which Canada is a party).
5. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; see also UNCITRAL, Status: Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.
14. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006).
21. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008).
22. Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
23. Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 567- 69 (7th Cir. 2015); Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir. 2012); Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d 655, 665 (9th Cir. 2012); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2011); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2008).
24. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59, 63-65 (1st Cir. 2015); Bellantuono v. ICAP Secs. USA, LLC, 557 F. App’x 168, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2014); Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2014).
25. See Renard, 778 F.3d at 567-68; Wachovia Secs., 671 F.3d at 483; Biller, 668 F.3d at 665; Jock, 646 F.3d at 121 n.1; Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 418; see also Raymond James Fin. Servs., 780 F.3d at 64; Bellantuono, 557 F. App’x at 174; Schafer, 551 F. App’x at 819-20.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
27. UNCITRAL, Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html.
28. UNCITRAL, Status: Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.
30. Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., 2010 SCC 19, paras. 14-34 (Can.).
31. UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration art. 7(2), (5) (2006) (“UNCITRAL Model Law”), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf.
32. Id. arts. 10, 11.
33. Id. art. 11(3), (4).
34. Id. arts. 12, 13.
35. See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#takingevidence.
36. UNCITRAL Model Law art. 27.
37. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34, para. 84 (Can.); see also UNCITRAL Model Law art. 16.
38. Dell Computer Corp., 2007 SCC 34, paras. 84, 86.
39. H&H Marine Engine Serv. Ltd. v. Volvo Penta of the Am. Inc., 2009 BCSC 1389, para. 55 (Can. B.C.).
40. Id. para. 54.
41. See UNCITRAL Model Law art. 36.
43. Id. art. 36(1)(b)(ii).
44. Schreter v. Gasmac Inc., (1992) 7 O.R. (3d) 608, para. 50 (Can. Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)); see also Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones, S.A. de C.V. v. STET Int’l, S.p.A., (1999) 45 O.R. (3d) 183, paras. 28-30 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
45. Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp., (1990) 50 B.C.L.R (2d) 207 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
46. E.g., Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones, 45 O.R. (3d) 183, para. 27; Dunhill Personnel Sys. Inc. v. Dunhill Temps Edmonton Ltd., (1993) 13 Alta. L.R. (3d) 241, para. 5 (Can. Alta. Q.B.).
47. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers their Day in Court, May 5, 2016, available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-proposes-prohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-their-day-court/ (“CFPB Press Release”).
50. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
51. Id at 471.
52. Id. at 477.
53. See CFPB Press Release.
54. Sgouros v. Transunion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1036 (7th Cir. 2016).
55. Id. at 1030.
56. Id. at 1033.
57. Id. at 1030.
58. Id. at 1033.
59. Id. at 1036.
62. Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 4th 855, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
63. Id. at 862 (quoting Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014)).
64. Long, 245 Cal. App. 4th at 865 (quoting Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)).
65. Id. at 865-66.
66. Id. at 867.
67. Foreign Affairs, Trade & Development Canada, Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement – Chronology of Events & Key Milestones, at http://international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/understanding-comprendre/chronology-chronologie.aspx?lang=eng.
68. Canada and EU sign historic trade agreement during EU-Canada Summit, October 30, 2016, at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/10/30/canada-and-eu-sign-historic-trade-agreement-during-eu-canada-summit.
69. European Commission on Trade, In Focus: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ (“EU: CETA In Focus”).
71. European Commission on Trade, CETA chapter by chapter, Art. 8.18, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/ (“CETA Chapters”).
72. Id., Art. 8.27.
74. Id., Art. 8.36.
75. Id. (referring to documents under Art. 3(2) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules).
76. CETA Chapters, Art. 8.27.
77. Id., Art. 8.30.
78. Id., Art. 8.30.
79. Id., Art. 8.36.
80. Id., Art. 8.28.
81. Id., Art. 8.32.
82. Id., Art. 8.33.
83. Id., Art. 8.39.
84. Id., Art. 8.39.
85. Id., Art. 8.10; see also European Commission on Trade, CETA explained, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-explained/.
86. CETA Chapters, Art. 8.34.
87. Id., Art. 8.39.
88. Id., Art. 8.34.
89. See, e.g., Paul Waldie, Investment Court System a sticking point for CETA critics, The Globe and Mail, Oct. 26, 2016, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/international-court-a-sticking-point-for-ceta-critics/article32540551/.
90. Government of Canada Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada & the European Union and its Member States, s. 6(i), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/jii-iic.aspx?lang=eng.
93. Popack v. Lipszyc, 2016 ONCA 135, para. 45.
94. Id., para. 3.
95. Id., para. 13.
96. Id., para. 18.
97. Id., para. 22.
99. Id., para. 26.
100. Id., para. 28.
101. Id., para. 31.
102. Id., para. 39.
103. Id., para. 42.
104. Id., para. 26.
105. Sociedade-de-Fomento Industriale Private Limited v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation, 2014 BCCA 205, para. 11.
106. Id., para. 18.
107. Id., para. 27.
108. Id., para. 44.
109. Id., para. 46, 49.
110. Id., para. 53.