Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/416/430/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-05-24 09:08:17
Document Index: 654204256

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 879', '§ 33', '§ 879', '§ 1405', '§ 879', '§ 879', '§ 1405', '§ 879', '§ 2521', '§ 702', '§ 879', '§ 879']

GOODING V. UNITED STATES, 416 U. S. 430 - Volume 416 - 1974 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 416 > GOODING V. UNITED STATES, 416 U. S. 430 (1974) > Full Text
(b) Though the affiant officer and the officers executing the warrant were D.C. police, rather than federal officers, and the legislative history of § 879(a) stressed federal enforcement, Congress manifested no purpose to dispense with the aid of other enforcement personnel in dealing with the narcotics problem. Pp. 416 U. S. 447-450.
District of Columbia Statutes: The older of the two conceivably relevant District of Columbia statutes, D.C.Code § 33-414 (1973), [Footnote 3] was enacted in 1956, and authorizes
District of Columbia statute to be considered, D.C.Code 23-521(f)(5), [Footnote 4] which specifically requires that search warrants be served in the daytime unless certain conditions
Federal Statutes and Rules: The general provision governing federal search warrants is found in Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 41. [Footnote 5] At the time the search in this case
took place, Rule 41(c) provided that warrants must be served in the daytime except where "the affidavits are positive that the property is on the person or in the place to be searched." [Footnote 6] In such event, the warrant
could direct "that it be served at any time." This provision was incorporated in the Rules in 1948 as a replacement for language previously contained in the Espionage Act of 1917. [Footnote 7] A second federal statute relating only to searches for "controlled substances" is found in 21 U.S.C. § 879(a), [Footnote 8] which was enacted in
1970. That section provides that a warrant may be served "at any time of the day or night" so long as the issuing authority "is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time." This provision, in turn, is the successor to a provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1405 (1964 ed.), [Footnote 9] enacted in 1956 to relax the "positivity" test of Rule 41 in cases involving certain narcotic drugs. [Footnote 10] Congress had passed this statute in response to the complaints of law enforcement officers that the positivity requirement gave commercial narcotics dealers a definite advantage over federal agents. Rule 41 is therefore not applicable to searches governed by the more specific narcotic search statutes. [Footnote 11]
The facts of this case must be understood in the context of these statutes. On February 11, 1971, an Assistant United States Attorney applied to a United States Magistrate sitting in the District of Columbia for a warrant authorizing a search of petitioner's apartment for evidence of illegal narcotics. The application included the brief notation: "Violation: U.S.C.; Title 26. Sections: 4704a." In connection with the application, an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department vice squad appeared before the Magistrate and swore that he had reason to believe petitioner was concealing property held in violation of that same code provision. [Footnote 12]
The Magistrate then issued a warrant directing the Chief of Police or "any member of MPDC" to search petitioner's apartment. [Footnote 14] The warrant specifically noted
The search warrant was executed on February 12, 1971, at 9:30 p.m. [Footnote 16] The officers engaged in the search were
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court, [Footnote 23] although none of the three judges who composed the panel completely agreed with any other on the proper rationale. All three agreed, however, that 21 U.S.C. § 879(a), rather than any provision of the District of Columbia Code, was the provision which determined the legality of this search. All three likewise agreed that the affidavit submitted by the District of Columbia police officer satisfied the requirements of that section. Judge Wilkey and Judge Fahy found that no greater showing for a night-time search was required by § 879(a) than was required by its predecessor statute governing federal narcotics searches, 18 U.S.C. § 1405 (1964 ed.), and that the affidavit need establish only probable cause to believe that the property would be on the premises at the time of the search. [Footnote 24] Judge Robinson believed that § 879(a)
There is little indication that Title 23 of the D.C.Code was intended to serve the sweeping purpose which petitioner attributes to it. [Footnote 34] The search warrant provisions upon which petitioner relies were part of the Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, which substantially reorganized the District of Columbia court system, providing for a new local court of general jurisdiction and relieving the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of much of its local burden. [Footnote 35] Prior to that time, all local felonies had been tried in the United States District Court, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, by their terms, had applied. The creation of the new Superior Court created the need for a new set of procedural
rules, and, though some important changes were made, the new rules quite closely tracked the Federal Rules. It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that the general provision relating to search warrants, found in D.C.Code § 2521 et seq. and then incorporated in similar form into the rules [Footnote 36] promulgated
There is no suggestion in any of the hearings or debates before Congress that a change from the prior law in this area was intended. The provision itself went unmentioned in the debates and hearings on the bill, a surprising omission if the bill effected the cutback petitioner says it did. Of like import is the fact that, in the long and heated discussions over § 702(b), the so-called "no-knock" provision of the bill, no defender of the bill saw fit to argue that any greater intrusion caused by the no-knock provision would be partially offset by the greater difficulty in obtaining warrants executable at night. [Footnote 41] While congressional silence as to a particular provision of a bill during debates which give extensive consideration to neighboring provisions is not easy to interpret, it would be unusual for such a significant
Fundamentally at issue in this case is the extent of the protection which we will all enjoy from police intrusion into the privacy of our homes during the middle of the night. The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect our reasonable expectations of privacy from unjustified governmental intrusion. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 360-362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In my view, there is no expectation of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of constitutional protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the privacy of our homes during the night. The idea of the police unnecessarily forcing their way into the home in the middle of the night -- frequently, in narcotics cases, without knocking and announcing their purpose -- rousing the residents out of their beds and forcing them to stand by in indignity in their night clothes while the police rummage through their belongings, does indeed smack of a "police state' lacking in the respect for . . . the right of privacy dictated by the U.S. Constitution." S.Rep. No. 91-538, p. 12 (1969). The public outrage at the series of mistaken night-time raids by narcotics agents in Collinsville, Illinois, last
Id. at 387 U. S. 536-537. The Court in Camara thus approved the issuance
The Court, while conceding this to be a "possible" meaning of the statute's final clause, argues that "it is by no means the only possible meaning attributable to the words." Ante at 416 U. S. 455. Unfortunately, the Court then fails to come forward with any alternative interpretation of these final words of § 879(a). Instead, the Court simply reads the disputed language out of the statute entirely, and decrees that the statute shall be interpreted as if it were not there. The Court holds that the statute requires only "a showing that the contraband is likely to be on the property or person to be searched at that time" to justify night-time execution of a search warrant. Ante at 416 U. S. 458. But the showing of probable cause required for issuance of any warrant necessarily includes a showing that the objects to be seized will probably be found on the premises at the time of the search. See Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206, 287 U. S. 210-211 (1932); Schoeneman v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 113, 317 F.2d 173, 176-177 (1963); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 315-318 (CA1 1966). This requirement is clearly imposed by the Fourth Amendment itself. It is also clearly mandated by the first part of the statutory language, which merely incorporates the constitutional requirement of probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The majority's interpretation of the statute thus leaves the final clause of § 879(a) -- the language in controversy here -- totally without meaning. See United States v. Thomas, 294 A.2d 164, 170 (DC Ct.App.)
(Kelly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 992 (1972); United States v. Gooding, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 273, 477 F.2d 428, 442 (1973) (Robinson, J., concurring in result). I cannot subscribe to such an evisceration of the statute. [Footnote 3/2]
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