Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97873/industrial-addition-assn-vs-commissioner
Timestamp: 2017-03-25 20:13:28
Document Index: 564752410

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1141', '§ 1141', '§ 1141', '§ 1142', '§ 1141', '§ 1141', '§ 1141', '§ 41']

Industrial Addition Assn Vs Commissioner - Citation 97873 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize industrial Addition Assn. Vs. Commissioner - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97873CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJan-02-1945Case Number323 U.S. 310Appellantindustrial Addition Assn.RespondentCommissionerExcerpt:.....and the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia are given jurisdiction to review decisions of the tax court -- that is, power to act judicially upon a petition for review. p.
323 u. s. 314
3. by § 1141(b)(1), one of the courts of appeals is designated as the court of proper venue -- that is, the place where the petition will be heard. p.
4. the objection that the petition is filed in the wrong circuit, being one to venue, may be waived by the government, and this it did here by stipulating that the case be heard in the court of appeals designated by the parties. p.
(a) the stipulation is not required to be filed within three months of the decision of the tax court...... Judgment:
Industrial Addition Assn. v. Commissioner - 323 U.S. 310 (1945)
1. In § 1141 of the Internal Revenue Code, relating to review of decisions of the Tax Court, the terms "jurisdiction" and "venue" have their usually accepted meaning. P.
2. By § 1141(a), all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia are given jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tax Court -- that is, power to act judicially upon a petition for review. P.
(a) The stipulation is not required to be filed within three months of the decision of the Tax Court. P.
Nash-Breyer Motor Co. v. Burnet,
283 U. S. 483
323 U. S. 315
5. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the court below within the three months' period allowed for that purpose by § 1142. That court was not the court of proper venue under § 1141(b)(1). More than three months after the decision of the Tax Court, the parties made and filed a stipulation to have the case heard in the court below.
the court below, on filing of the petition, had jurisdiction, and, on the filing of the stipulation, was the court of proper venue. Dismissal of the petition for want of jurisdiction was therefore improper . P.
p. 690, to review a judgment dismissing for want of jurisdiction a petition for review of a decision of the Tax Court, 1 T.C. 378.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, on the Commissioner's motion, dismissed the petition for review for want of jurisdiction. 141 F.2d 636. We granted certiorari, 323 U.S. 690, to resolve an asserted conflict of the decision below with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Wegener v. Commissioner,
119 F.2d 49. The question presented is whether the court below had jurisdiction of the petition for review of the decision of the Tax Court, notwithstanding petitioner's failure to file the stipulation during the three-month period within which review of the Tax Court's decision could be sought.
The use in juxtaposition, in the statute, of the terms "jurisdiction" and "venue" marks a significant distinction. On the one hand, the statute confers power on the Circuit Courts of Appeals generally to act judicially on petitions for review presented to them -- which is "jurisdiction." On the other, such of those courts as are specified by the statute, or the stipulation which it authorizes, are designated as the place where, for convenience of the courts or parties or both, the petition will be heard -- which is "venue."
Want of jurisdiction, unlike want of venue, may not be cured by consent of the parties; but when the court has jurisdiction, it has power to decide the case brought before it even though the court having venue is one sitting in another circuit.
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore R.,
General Electric Co. v. Marvel Co.,
. The right to have a cause heard in the court of the proper venue may be lost unless seasonably asserted, and, in that event, the court of
trial having jurisdiction, but not the proper venue, may render a judgment binding on the parties.
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore R., supra,
Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., supra,
. The government may waive objections to venue, just as any other litigant may,
Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States,
237 U. S. 24
Peoria & P.U. R. Co. v. United States,
-536, and here such waiver, by stipulation, is contemplated by § 1141(b)(2).
We have no reason to suppose that the terms "jurisdiction" and "venue" were used in the statute in other than their usually accepted meaning, and no convincing reason has been advanced why that meaning should not be accepted here. Unless these plain terms are to be disregarded, all the Circuit Courts of Appeals are given jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tax Court upon a petition for review -- that is, power to act judicially upon the petition.
Peoria & P.U. R. Co. v. United States, supra,
-536. Consequently, when, in this case, petitioner filed its petition with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that court did not lack power to proceed with the cause, although the court of proper venue was the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, as prescribed by § 1141(b)(1). The parties were free to waive this defect of venue by filing the stipulation in compliance with subsection (b)(2) designating the court below as the one to act upon the petition, which was already before it and of which it then had jurisdiction.
The government relies, as did the court below, on our decision in
. When that case arose, the provision in the applicable Revenue Act for choice of venue by stipulation of the parties did not permit them to stipulate for review in any circuit, but limited their choice to two specified circuits. The parties in that case stipulated for review of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in a circuit not authorized by the statute, and thus did not conform to the statutory venue requirement. We sustained the action of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for review on the ground that the court was not bound to exercise its jurisdiction where the proper venue was in another court, saying, p.
283 U. S. 487
: "The restriction on the power of the parties to stipulate as to venue would be meaningless if they could waive it without the consent of the court." In this case, the stipulation conforms to the statute, and is without the infirmity found to be fatal in the
Nash-Breyer
See Peoria & P.U. R. Co. v. United States,
-536, where this Court explained the same distinction made in the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 219, 28 U.S.C. §§ 41(28), 43.