Source: http://procedurallytaxing.com/tax-court-again-rules-that-apa-and-administrative-law-principles-do-not-bar-irs-from-amending-answer-and-asserting-new-grounds-for-deficiency/
Timestamp: 2018-06-19 04:18:47
Document Index: 339854929

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 706', '§ 701', '§ 7441', '§ 702', '§ 706', '§ 7522', '§ 7522', '§ 7522', '§ 7522', '§ 7522', '§ 7522', '§ 7441']

Tax Court Rules that APA and Administrative Law Principles Do Not Bar IRS From Amending Answer and Asserting New Grounds for Deficiency
April 12, 2016 by Leslie Book 2 Comments
The relationship between administrative law principles and tax procedure is one that the courts are increasingly addressing. We have written before about the reach of administrative law principles as applied to Tax Court cases. For example we ran an excellent two-part post by Stephanie Hoffer and Chris Walker that pivots off their Minnesota Law Review article The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism. More recently, I discussed a Tax Court order in the case Illinois Tool Works v Commissioner in Tax Court Order Rejects APA Claim That IRS Precluded from Asserting Penalty in Answer. In that post, I discussed how the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that under the APA the IRS’s failure to assert a penalty in its notice of deficiency meant that IRS was barred from asserting a penalty in pleadings.
Yesterday the Tax Court held in Ax v Commissioner that the APA and general administrative principles embedded in the SEC v Chenery Supreme Court decisions of the mid-1940’s do not prevent the IRS from filing leave to amend its answer to raise grounds for a deficiency that were not raised in the original notice of deficiency. The Ax case is a regular division opinion and has a fuller discussion of the principles the Tax Court discussed in Illinois Tool Works and in other opinions as well. It also is noteworthy in that it has some harsh language for the taxpayer’s argument, referring to it as a “distortion” of Mayo, the APA and Chenery.
I will briefly describe the case below.
Ax involves an IRS examination that resulted in disallowed insurance expenses that flowed through from the taxpayers/shareholders’ interests in S-Corporations that paid over a million dollars in insurance premiums annually over two years to captive insurance companies. The initial notice of deficiency disallowed the deductions and relied on one theory, that the amount paid was not an insurance expense. The taxpayer timely petitioned, with the IRS timely filing an answer that generally denied the petition’s allegations. About 8 months after filing its original answer, IRS then filed leave to amend the answer and raise new grounds, that the transaction lacked economic substance and alternatively that the expenses were not ordinary or necessary. The taxpayer opposed the motion, essentially arguing that Chenery and the APA mandate limiting the Service to the positions in the stat notice.
I discussed Chenery in my post last year, noting that “SEC v Chenery generally stands for the proposition that the courts are not supposed to allow agencies to argue a new reason for their determination, or justify agency actions based upon arguments or issues that were not properly made below.”
Here is how the taxpayer used Chenery in its argument:
Chenery mandates “the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted [be] clearly disclosed and adequately sustained. ‘The administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise.’” Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 94, quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941). Also, “[t]he grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.” Id. at 87. Therefore, Respondent cannot add post-hoc grounds to support the final agency action in the notice of deficiency.
The Tax Court disagreed, noting that all of the above is accurate with the exception of the last sentence:
However, petitioners’ “Therefore” does not at all follow, because they have erred in selectively extracting statements from Chenery I. That case does not apply to all agency action that is subject to judicial review. Instead, the [Chenery] opinion plainly states:
“If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment. For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.” [citation omitted; emphasis in original.]
Ax discusses numerous Code provisions that suggest Chenery has no place in limiting the IRS to arguments made in the notice itself:
Section 7491, the burden shift rules, suggesting “Congress’s intention that the Tax Court will decide deficiency cases not by reviewing the agency’s determinations for abuses of discretion but by deciding issues according to the evidence”);
Section 7522(a), discussing adequacy of a notice of deficiency, which states that inadequacy of the notice does not invalidate it;
6512, which provides that Tax Court can decide an overpayment and how a deficiency case can be expanded in taxpayer’s favor; and
6213, which says that the Tax Court “redetermines” a deficiency and the IRS below “determines” a deficiency.
In light of the above, the Court concluded that the “Internal Revenue Code thus reflects Congress’s intention that the Tax Court will decide deficiency cases not by reviewing the agency’s determinations for abuses of discretion but by deciding issues according to the evidence. Consequently, the Chenery I principle simply has no application to this deficiency case.”
The taxpayers then served up their APA argument. Essentially, it argued that
[t]he APA separately imposes upon the reviewing court, in mandatory terms, the obligation “to hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, finding[s], and conclusion[s] found to be … unwarranted by the facts to the extent the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing Court.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(f). Here too, the Petition contends that the findings and conclusions in the Notice are unwarranted by the facts.
Tying this up, Ax argued that the Tax Court was limited to review the IRS actions findings and conclusion below. The Tax Court disagreed, pointing to how Ax ignored the context and other specific provisions the APA , such as venue, codified at 5 USC 703:
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. If no special statutory review proceeding is applicable, the action for judicial review may be brought against the United States, the agency by its official title, or the appropriate officer. Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement. [Emphasis in original.]
The Tax Court then found that its deficiency proceedings, which were in existence prior to the APA, superseded any limitations that the APA’s judicial review provisions imposed:
A deficiency case is one such “special statutory review proceeding”, and the Tax Court is the “court specified by statute”. Before the APA, “prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review” of a notice of deficiency was provided in the predecessor statutes to section 6213(a)–i.e., in section 272(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as in effect when the APA was enacted in 1946. By its terms, then, 5 U.S.C. sec. 704 thus left undisturbed the deficiency case regime described above…
I deleted the footnotes in the block quote above but notes 6 and 7 in the opinion also hit the point home that the APA did not come in on a blank slate, discussing both 5 USC 702 (which states that the APA is not meant to allow a court to “deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground”) and 5 USC 704 (essentially that the APA allows for court review when there is no other adequate remedy available). With respect to these, the opinion notes that the deficiency proceedings are an adequate legal remedy and that the APA is not meant to limit what the Tax Court had the statutory power to deny a taxpayer relief on appropriate legal or equitable grounds.
This this is a regular division opinion and that it has a detailed discussion of the APA as it is applied to Tax Court deficiency proceedings makes Ax significant. The Tax Court is surely correct in its conclusion. Yet, there is some loose language in the opinion, including a reference and citation to language in the O’Dwyer Fourth Circuit case from 1949 which stated that the Tax Court was not subject to the APA. As Professors Walker and Hoffer explained in their post here last year
This approach [the Tax Court’s view that it is not governed at all by the APA] contradicts general administrative law principles that every other federal court applies when reviewing agency actions. As we explain in Part II of our paper, the APA establishes the default standards for judicial review of all federal agency action. The IRS, an executive agency within the Treasury Department, is plainly an “agency” for purposes of the APA (5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)). And while the Tax Court used to be an agency before the enactment of the APA, as of 1969 it is an “[A]rticle I . . . court of record” (26 U.S.C. § 7441). For purposes of the APA, it is thus “a court of the United States” (5 U.S.C. § 702) and, for its review of IRS agency actions, a “reviewing court” subject to the APA’s judicial-review provisions (5 U.S.C. § 706).
The Ax opinion makes a forceful case that Congress has overridden the APA standard in deficiency cases. Yet some language in the opinion goes beyond the notion of overriding and still leaves perhaps for another day the application of these principles in other non-deficiency contexts. Administrative law principles are notoriously muddy. With Tax Court’s jurisdiction now including many types of cases beyond the traditional deficiency cases, I believe that courts will be wrestling with these issues in many more contexts. Those other cases are much more difficult from a policy and legal perspective. Stay tuned.
For a follow-up post on Ax by Professors Christopher Walker and Stephanie Hoffer, see here.
The “Tax” Court has again taken an Ax to the law. It should have denied the Commissioner’s motion for leave to amend his answer.
I.R.C. § 7522 mandates that a notice of deficiency “shall describe the basis for…the tax due…included in such notice.” But the Ax’s notice of deficiency did not comply with that law, or else the Commissioner would not have sought to amend his answer.
Unfortunately, the Ax’s attorneys did not wield § 7522 to whack the Commissioner’s leave motion. Because of their lapse, they allowed the Tax Court to turn § 7522 against their clients. The Tax Court, though, got its statutory interpretation wrong.
The Tax Court asserted that § 7522 “does not bear out petitioners’ position” as that law also says, “[a]n inadequate description [of the basis for the tax due shown in the notice] shall not invalidate such notice.” The petitioners, though, never argued that the alleged inadequate description of the basis for the tax due rendered their notice of deficiency invalid. Instead, they argued that the deficient deficiency notice warranted the Tax Court’s denial of the Commissioner’s motion for leave to buttress his notice. If § 7522 does not furnish a taxpayer with even that slight a protection, then one must wonder why Congress included § 7522 as part of the first “Taxpayer Bill of Rights.”
The “Tax” Court’s precedential ruling assures more taxes await the Axes.
The Tax Court wants the APA issue to cut both ways. But the Administrative Procedure Act does not hew a United States Tax Court exception from its provisions.
The Tax Court slays me. On one hand, the Tax Court claims it need not follow the APA because under that Act it is not an “agency.” On the other hand, as it did in Ax, the Tax Court claims it need not follow the APA because under that Act it is not a “reviewing court.” How does the Tax Court get away with this legalistic legerdemain?
In Ax, the Tax Court tells us that “[b]efore the APA, ‘prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review’ of a notice of deficiency” existed. Umm…where?
Before Congress enacted the APA, the law identified the Tax Court’s predecessors, the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court of the United States, as Executive Branch agencies. Where, then, was there “judicial review” of a deficiency notice? In the appellate courts?
The Tax Court’s disdain for the APA goes back to that law’s 1946 enactment. That year, the Tax Court was unquestionably an Executive Branch agency. Nevertheless, the Tax Court then took the position that the APA definition of “agency” did not apply to it. How that could be, I’ve never heard.
Today, as Professors Walker and Hoffer tell us, the Tax Court continues to evade the APA. In 1969 Congress created the United States Tax Court as a “court of record” under “article I of the Constitution of the United States.” I.R.C. § 7441. And a few months ago Congress purported to clarify that the Tax Court “is not an agency of, and shall be independent of, the executive branch of the Government.” Id. Does the Tax Court now concede it is a reviewing court under the APA? Hardly, because the Tax Court just gave the APA the Ax.
Given the Ax, Professors Walker and Hoffer (among others) should now reverse their argument:
1. As the Tax Court says, the United States Tax Court is not a reviewing court under the APA; therefore,
2. The Tax Court must not be a “court of the United States” under the APA; and so,
3. The Tax Court must comply with the APA (including the FOIA) because, if it is not a reviewing court, it must be an agency as defined by those Acts.
Let the Tax Court attempt to chop its way out of that argument.