Source: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/354/178
Timestamp: 2013-12-10 10:35:22
Document Index: 618804488

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 102', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 103', '§ 193']

John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews John T. WATKINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America.
Argued: March 7, 1957
Decided: June 17, 1957
(w) On the record in this case, especially in view of the precise questions petitioner was charged with refusing to answer, it cannot [p181]
This is a review by certiorari of a conviction under 2 U.S.C. § 192 for "contempt of Congress." The misdemeanor is alleged to have been committed during a [p182]
Petitioner's name had been mentioned by two witnesses who testified before the Committee at prior hearings. In September, 1952, one Donald O. Spencer admitted having been a Communist from 1943 to 1946. He declared that he had been recruited into the Party with the endorsement and prior approval of petitioner, whom he identified as the then District Vice-President of the Farm Equipment [p183]
Petitioner answered these allegations freely and without reservation. His attitude toward the inquiry is clearly revealed from the statement he made when the questioning turned to the subject of his past conduct, associations and predilections: I am not now nor have I ever been a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. Rumsey was wrong when he said I had recruited him into the party, that I had received his dues, that I paid dues to him, and that I had used the alias Sam Brown.
I have made contributions upon occasions to Communist causes. I have signed petitions for Communist [p184]
In a special convention held in the summer of 1947, I led the fight for compliance with the Taft-Hartley Act by the FE-CIO International Union. This fight became so bitter that it ended any possibility of future cooperation.
The character of petitioner's testimony on these matters can perhaps best be summarized by the Government's own appraisal in its brief: A more complete and candid statement of his past political associations and activities (treating the Communist Party for present purposes as a mere political party) can hardly be imagined. Petitioner certainly was not attempting to conceal or withhold from the Committee his own past political associations, predilections, and preferences. Furthermore, petitioner told the Committee that he was entirely willing to identify for the Committee, and answer any questions it might have concerning, "those persons whom I knew to be members of the Communist Party," provided that, "to [his] best knowledge and belief," they still were members of the Party. . . .
The Subcommittee, too, was apparently satisfied with petitioner's disclosures. After some further discussion elaborating on the statement, counsel for the Committee [p185]
turned to another aspect of Rumsey's testimony. Rumsey had identified a group of persons whom he had known as members of the Communist Party, and counsel began to read this list of names to petitioner. Petitioner stated that he did not know several of the persons. Of those whom he did know, he refused to tell whether he knew them to have been members of the Communist Party. He explained to the Subcommittee why he took such a position: I am not going to plead the fifth amendment, but I refuse to answer certain questions that I believe are outside the proper scope of your committee's activities. I will answer any questions which this committee puts to me about myself. I will also answer questions about those persons whom I knew to be members of the Communist Party and whom I believe still are. I will not, however, answer any questions with respect to others with whom I associated in the past. I do not believe that any law in this country requires me to testify about persons who may in the past have been Communist Party members or otherwise engaged in Communist Party activity but who, to my best knowledge and belief, have long since removed themselves from the Communist movement.
I do not believe that such questions are relevant to the work of this committee, nor do I believe that this committee has the right to undertake the public exposure of persons because of their past activities. I may be wrong, and the committee may have this power, but until and unless a court of law so holds and directs me to answer, I most firmly refuse to discuss the political activities of my past associates.
The Chairman of the Committee submitted a report of petitioner's refusal to answer questions to the House of Representatives. H.R.Rep. No. 1579, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. The House directed the Speaker to certify the Committee's report to the United States Attorney for initiation of criminal prosecution. H.Res. 534, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
Petitioner waived his right to jury trial, and was found guilty on all counts by the court. The sentence, a fine of $100 and one year in prison, was suspended, and petitioner was placed on probation.
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The conviction was reversed by a three-judge panel, one member dissenting. Upon rehearing en banc, the full bench affirmed the conviction with the judges of the original majority in dissent. 98 U.S.App.D.C.190, 233 F.2d 681. We granted certiorari [p187]
We start with several basic premises on which there is general agreement. The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws, as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But, broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress. This was freely conceded by the Solicitor General in his argument of this case.
It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It is their unremitting obligation to respond to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its committees, and to testify [p188]
In particular, this exclusion of lex parliamenti from the lex terrae, or law of the land, precluded judicial review of the exercise of the contempt power or the assertion of privilege. Parliament declared that no court had jurisdiction to consider such questions. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, an action for false imprisonment was brought by one Jay, who had been held in contempt. The defendant, the Serjeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons, demurred that he had taken the plaintiff [p189]
into custody for breach of privilege. The Chief Justice, Pemberton, overruled the demurrer. Summoned to the bar of the House, the Chief Justice explained that he believed that the assertion of privilege went to the merits of the action, and did not preclude jurisdiction. For his audacity, the Chief Justice was dispatched to Newgate Prison.
The House of Lords intervened, [p190]
Later in that century, during the reign of Charles II, there was great unrest over the fact that the heir apparent, James, had embraced Catholicism. Anti-Catholic feeling ran high, spilling over a few years later when the infamous rogue, Titus Oates, inflamed the country with rumors of a "Popish Plot" to murder the King. A committee of Parliament was appointed to learn the sources of certain pamphlets that had been appearing. One was entitled: The Grand Question Concerning the Prorogation of this Parliament for a Year and Three Months Stated and Discussed. A Doctor Carey admitted to the committee that he knew the author, but refused to divulge his name. Brought to the bar of the House of Lords, he persisted in this stand. The House imposed a fine of £1,000 and committed the witness to the Tower.
A hundred years later, George III had managed to gain control of Parliament through his ministers. The King could not silence the opposition, however, and one of the most vocal was John Wilkes. This precipitated a [p191]
struggle that lasted for several years until Wilkes finally prevailed. One writer sums up the case thus: He had won a victory for freedom of the press. He had directed popular attention to the royally controlled House of Commons, and pointed out its unrepresentative character, and had shown how easily a claim of privilege might be used to sanction the arbitrary proceedings of ministers and Parliament, even when a fundamental right of the subject was concerned. It was one of life's little ironies that work of such magnitude had been reserved for one of the worst libertines and demagogues of all time.
Even as late as 1835, the House of Commons appointed a select committee to inquire into ". . . the origin, nature, extent and tendency of the Orange Institutions." This was a political-religious organization, vehemently Protestant in religion and strongly in favor of the growth of the British Empire. The committee summoned the Deputy Grand Secretary and demanded that he produce all the records of the organization. The witness refused to turn over a letter-book, which he admitted contained his answers to many communications upon Orange business. But it also contained, he said, records of private communications with respect to Orangeism. Summoned to the bar of the House of Commons, he remained adamant, and was committed to Newgate Prison.
Modern times have seen a remarkable restraint in the use by Parliament of its contempt power. Important investigations, like those conducted in America by congressional committees, are made by Royal Commissions [p192]
Their success in fulfilling their factfinding missions without resort to coercive tactics is a tribute to the fairness of the processes to the witnesses and their close adherence to the subject matter committed to them.
Unlike the English practice, from the very outset, the use of contempt power by the legislature was deemed subject to judicial review.
There was very little use of the power of compulsory process in early years to enable the Congress to obtain facts pertinent to the enactment of new statutes or the [p193]
administration of existing laws. The first occasion for such an investigation arose in 1827, when the House of Representatives was considering a revision of the tariff laws.
In the Senate, there was no use of a factfinding investigation in aid of legislation until 1859.
It is not surprising, from the fact that the Houses of Congress so sparingly employed the power to conduct investigations, that there have been few cases requiring judicial review of the power. The Nation was almost one hundred years old before the first case reached this Court to challenge the use of compulsory process as a legislative device, rather than in inquiries concerning the elections [p194]
In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, decided in 1881, an investigation had been authorized by the House of Representatives to learn the circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy of Jay Cooke & Company, in which the United States had deposited funds. The committee became particularly interested in a private real estate pool that was a part of the financial structure. The Court found that the subject matter of the inquiry was "in its nature clearly judicial, and therefore one in respect to which no valid legislation could be enacted." The House had thereby exceeded the limits of its own authority.
The matter came to the fore again when the Senate undertook to study the corruption in the handling of oil leases in the 1920's. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, and Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, the Court applied the precepts of Kilbourn to uphold the authority of the Congress to conduct the challenged investigations. The Court recognized the danger to effective and honest conduct of the Government [p195]
It was during this period that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was frequently invoked [p196]
When the matter reached this Court, the Government did not challenge in any way that the Fifth Amendment protection was available to the witness, and such a challenge could not have prevailed. It confined its argument to the character of the answers sought and to the adequacy of the claim of privilege. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190; Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219.
Abuses of the investigative process may imperceptibly lead to abridgment of protected freedoms. The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify, against his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference. And when those forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be disastrous. This effect is even more harsh when it is past beliefs, expressions or associations that are disclosed and judged by current standards, rather than those contemporary with the matters exposed. Nor does the witness alone suffer the consequences. Those who are identified by witnesses, and thereby placed in the same glare of publicity, are equally subject to public stigma, scorn and obloquy. Beyond that, there is the more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to [p198]
Accommodation of the congressional need for particular information with the individual and personal interest in privacy is an arduous and delicate task for any court. We do not underestimate the difficulties that would attend such an undertaking. It is manifest that, despite the adverse effects which follow upon compelled disclosure of private matters, not all such inquiries are barred. Kilbourn v. Thompson teaches that such an investigation into individual affairs is invalid if unrelated to any legislative purpose. That is beyond the powers conferred upon the Congress in the Constitution. United States v. Rumely makes it plain that the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's [p199]
Petitioner's contentions do point to a situation of particular significance from the standpoint of the constitutional limitations upon congressional investigations. The theory of a committee inquiry is that the committee members are serving as the representatives of the parent assembly in collecting information for a legislative purpose. Their function is to act as the eyes and ears of the Congress in obtaining facts upon which the full legislature can act. To carry out this mission, committees and subcommittees, sometimes one Congressman, [p201]
The authorizing resolution of the Un-American Activities Committee was adopted in 1938, when a select committee, under the chairmanship of Representative Dies, was created.
It defines the Committee's authority as follows: The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion [p202]
within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.
Unquestionably, the Committee conceived of its task in the grand view of its name. Un-American activities were its target, no matter how or where manifested. Notwithstanding the broad purview of the Committee's experience, the House of Representatives repeatedly approved its continuation. Five times it extended the life of the special committee.
Combining the language of the resolution with the construction it has been given, it is evident that the preliminary control of the Committee exercised by the House [p204]
The consequences that flow from this situation are manifold. In the first place, a reviewing court is unable [p205]
It is, of course, not the function of this Court to prescribe rigid rules for the Congress to follow in drafting resolutions establishing investigating committees. That is a matter peculiarly within the realm of the legislature, and its decisions will be accepted by the courts up to the point where their own duty to enforce the constitutionally protected rights of individuals is affected. An excessively broad charter like that of the House Un-American Activities Committee places the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance between the public need for a particular interrogation and the right of [p206]
Since World War II, the Congress has practically abandoned its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House. The sanction there imposed is imprisonment by the House until the recalcitrant witness agrees to testify or disclose the matters sought, provided that the incarceration does [p207]
The appropriate statute is found in 2 U.S.C. § 192. It provides: Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.
Applied to persons prosecuted under § 192, this raises a special problem in that the statute defines the crime as refusal to answer "any question pertinent to the question under inquiry." Part of the standard of criminality, therefore, is the pertinency of the questions propounded to the witness.
It is obvious that a person compelled to make this choice is entitled to have knowledge of the subject to [p209]
must be avoided here, as in all other crimes. There are several sources that can outline the "question under inquiry" in such a way that the rules against vagueness are satisfied. The authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves, might sometimes make the topic clear. This case demonstrates, however, that these sources often leave the matter in grave doubt.
That issue is not before us, however, in light of the Government's position that the immediate subject under inquiry before the Subcommittee interviewing petitioner was only one aspect of the Committee's authority to investigate un-American activities. Distilling that single topic from the broad field is an extremely difficult task upon the record before us. There was an opening statement by the Committee Chairman at the outset of the [p210]
In effect, this was a device to enable the investigations to proceed with a quorum of one or two members and [p212]
which would have penalized labor unions controlled or dominated by persons who were, or had been, members of a "Communist action" organization, as defined [p213]
The most serious doubts as to the Subcommittee's "question under inquiry," however, stem from the precise questions that petitioner has been charged with refusing to answer. Under the terms of the statute, after all, it is these which must be proved pertinent. Petitioner is charged with refusing to tell the Subcommittee whether or not he knew that certain named persons had been members of the Communist Party in the past. The Subcommittee's counsel read the list from the testimony of a previous witness who had identified them as Communists. Although this former witness was identified with labor, he had not stated that the persons he named were involved in union affairs. Of the thirty names propounded to petitioner, seven were completely unconnected with organized labor. One operated a beauty parlor. Another was a watchmaker. Several were identified as "just citizens" or "only Communists." When [p214]
Having exhausted the several possible indicia of the "question under inquiry," we remain unenlightened as to the subject to which the questions asked petitioner were pertinent. Certainly, if the point is that obscure after trial and appeal, it was not adequately revealed to petitioner when he had to decide at his peril whether or not to answer. Fundamental fairness demands that no witness be compelled to make such a determination with so little guidance. Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject [p215]
We are mindful of the complexities of modern government and the ample scope that must be left to the Congress as the sole constitutional depository of legislative power. Equally mindful are we of the indispensable function, in the exercise of that power, of congressional investigations. The conclusions we have reached in this case will not prevent the Congress, through its committees, from obtaining any information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role in our scheme of government. The legislature is free to determine the kinds of data that should be collected. It is only those investigations that are conducted by use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect the rights of individuals against illegal encroachment. That protection can be readily achieved through procedures which prevent the separation of power from responsibility and which provide the constitutional requisites of fairness for witnesses. A measure of added care on the part of the House and the Senate in authorizing the use of compulsory process and by their committees in exercising that power would suffice. [p216]
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (upheld conviction under R.S. § 102, forerunner of 2 U.S.C. § 192 for refusal to answer questions in inquiry into charges of corruption among certain Senators with respect to pending bill on sugar tariff); cf. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521.
Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (upheld power of Senate to punish as a contempt the action of a witness in allowing the destruction and removal of papers subject to the subpoena of a Senate committee; held that enactment of 2 U.S.C. § 192 did not impair contempt power of Houses of Congress).
See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43-44; Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 51-52; Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 244-250; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90-92.
32. In a report to the House, the Committee declared: While Congress does not have the power to deny to citizens the right to believe in, teach, or advocate, communism, fascism, and naziism, it does have the right to focus the spotlight of publicity upon their activities. . . .
40. In 1947, Judge Charles E. Clark, now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote about the Committee: Suffice it to say here that its range of activity has covered all varieties of organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the C.I.O., the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Farmer-Labor party, the Federal Theatre Project, consumers' organizations, various publications from the magazine "Time" to the "Daily Worker," and varying forms and types of industry, of which the recent investigation of the movie industry is fresh in the public mind. While it has avoided specific definition of what it is seeking, it has repeatedly inquired as to membership in the Communist party and in other organizations which it regards as communist controlled or affected.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612; United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507; Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451.
50. The Committee convened in executive session on January 22, 1953, and adopted the following resolution: BE IT RESOLVED, that the Chairman shall have authority from time to time to appoint subcommittees composed of one or more members of the Committee on Un-American Activities for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do.
As I see it, the chief fault in the majority opinion is its mischievous curbing of the informing function of the Congress. While I am not versed in its procedures, my experience in the Executive Branch of the Government leads me to believe that the requirements laid down in the opinion for the operation of the committee system of [p218]
Legislative committees to inquire into facts or conditions for assurance of the public welfare or to determine the need for legislative action have grown in importance with the complexity of government. The investigation that gave rise to this prosecution is of the latter type. Since many matters requiring statutory action lie in the domain of the specialist or are unknown without testimony from informed witnesses, the need for information has brought about legislative inquiries that have used the compulsion of the subpoena to lay bare needed facts and a statute, 2 U.S.C. § 192 here involved, to punish recalcitrant witnesses. The propriety of investigations has long been recognized and rarely curbed by the courts, though [p219]
The use of legislative committees to secure information follows the example of the people from whom our legislative system is derived. The British method has variations from that of the United States, but fundamentally serves the same purpose -- the enlightenment of Parliament for the better performance of its duties. There are standing committees to carry on the routine work, royal commissions to grapple with important social or economic problems, and special tribunals of inquiry for some alleged offense in government.
Our Congress has, since its beginning, used the committee system to inform itself. It has been estimated that over 600 investigations have been conducted since the First Congress. They are "a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate. . . ." McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
The Court indicates that, in this case, the source of the trouble lies in the "tremendous latitude" given the Un-American Activities Committee in the Legislative Reorganization Act.
It finds that the Committee "is [p220]
the Committees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce have [p221]
to determine the extent to which current [p222]
literature . . . containing immoral [or] obscene . . . matter, or placing improper emphasis on crime . . . are being made available to the people of the United States . . . ;
of the extent to which criminal or other improper practices . . . are, or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations . . . to the detriment of the interests of the public. . . .
The Court finds fault with the use made of compulsory process, power for the use of which is granted the Committee [p223]
I know of no such claim ever being made before. Such a requirement has never been thought applicable to investigations, and is wholly out of place when related to the informing function [p225]
Coming to the merits of Watkins' case, the Court reverses the judgment because: (1) The subject matter of the inquiry was not "made to appear with undisputable clarity" either through its "charter" or by the Chairman at the time of the hearing and, therefore, Watkins was deprived of a clear understanding of "the manner in which the propounded questions [were] pertinent thereto", and (2) the present committee system of inquiry of the House, as practiced by the Un-American Activities Committee, does not provide adequate safeguards for the protection [p226]
A subpoena had issued for Watkins to appear at the Chicago hearings, but he was not served. After Watkins was served, the hearing in question was held in Washington, D.C. Reference at this hearing was made to the one conducted in Chicago. Watkins came before the [p227]
I think the Committee here was acting entirely within its scope, and that the purpose of its inquiry was set out with "undisputable clarity." In the first place, the authorizing language of the Reorganization Act
must be read as a whole, not dissected. It authorized investigation [p228]
into subversive activity, its extent, character, objects, and diffusion. While the language might have been more explicit than using such words as "un-American," or phrases like "principle of the form of government," still, these are fairly well understood terms. We must construe them to give them meaning if we can. Our cases indicate that, rather than finding fault with the use of words or phrases, we are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body in granting authority to the Committee was with a legitimate object "if [the action] is capable of being so construed." (Emphasis added.) People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 487, 2 N.E. 615, 627-628 (1885), as quoted and approved in McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, at 178. Before we can deny the authority, "it must be obvious that" the Committee has "exceeded the bounds of legislative power." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951). The fact that the Committee has often been attacked has caused close scrutiny of its acts by the House as a whole, and the House has repeatedly given the Committee its approval. "Power" and "responsibility" have not been separated. But the record in this case does not stop here. It shows that, at the hearings involving Watkins, the Chairman made statements explaining the functions of the Committee.
And, furthermore, Watkins' action at the hearing [p229]
The Court makes much of petitioner's claim of "exposure for exposure's sake," and strikes at the purposes of the Committee through this catch phrase. But we are bound to accept as the purpose of the Committee that stated in the Reorganization Act, together with the statements of the Chairman at the hearings involved here. Nothing was said of exposure. The statements of a single Congressman cannot transform the real purpose of the Committee into something not authorized by the parent resolution. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 290, 295 (1929). The Court indicates that the questions propounded were asked for exposure's sake, and had no pertinency to the inquiry. It appears to me that they were entirely pertinent to the announced purpose of the Committee's inquiry. Undoubtedly Congress has the power to inquire into the subjects of communism and the Communist Party. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). As a corollary of the congressional power to inquire into such subject matter, the Congress, through its committees, can legitimately seek to identify individual members of the Party. Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241 (1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843. See also Lawson v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 17 171, 176 F.2d 49, 52-53 [p230]
The Court condemns the long-established and long-recognized committee system of inquiry of the House because it raises serious questions concerning the protection it affords to constitutional rights. It concludes that compelling [p231]
As already indicated, even if Watkins' associates were on the stand, they could not decline to disclose their Communist connections on First Amendment grounds. While there may be no restraint by the Government of one's beliefs, the right of free belief has never been extended to include the withholding of knowledge of past events or transactions. There is no general privilege of silence. The First Amendment does not make speech or silence permissible to a person in such measure as he [p232]
chooses. Watkins has here exercised his own choice as to when he talks, what questions he answers, and when he remains silent. A witness is not given such a choice by the Amendment. Remote and indirect disadvantages such as "public stigma, scorn and obloquy" may be related to the First Amendment, but they are not enough to block investigation. The Congress has recognized this since 1862, when it first adopted the contempt section, R.S. § 103, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 193 declaring that no witness before a congressional committee may refuse to testify
We do not have in this case unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures with respect to a witness' personal and private affairs so ably and properly denounced in the Sinclair case, supra, at 291-292. This inquiry is far different from the cases relied upon by the Court. There is no analogy to the case of Richard Thompson,
case, involving criticism of the royal family. There is no resemblance to John Wilkes' struggle for a seat in Parliament. It is not Briggs,
where the prosecutor sought to develop the national origin of policemen. It is not Kilbourn, [n16] involving a private real estate pool. [ 354 U.S. 233] Nor is it Quinn, [n17]Emspak, [n18] or Bart, [n19] involving the Fifth Amendment. It is not Rumely,
involving the interpretation of a lobbying statute. Nor is this
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Reed v. County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153 (1926).
The Committee originated in 1938 under H.Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 Cong.Rec. 7568, and was patterned after a resolution of 1934 authorizing the investigation of Nazi propaganda. H.Res.198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong.Rec. 4934. The resolution read much the same as the present authority of the Committee which is quoted below. By a succession of House Resolutions (H.Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong.Rec. 1098; H.Res. 321, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 Cong.Rec. 572; H.Res. 90, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 Cong.Rec. 886; H.Res. 420, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Cong.Rec. 2282; H.Res. 65, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 Cong.Rec. 795), the Committee continued in existence until in 1945, by amendment of the House Rules, it was made a standing committee. 91 Cong.Rec. 10, 15. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 retained it as one of the standing committees and provided: All proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the subjects listed under the standing committees named below shall be referred to such committees, respectively: . . .
S.Res. 202, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., in pertinent part provides: . . . authorized and directed to make a full and complete study and investigation of whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce in furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of the law of the United States or of the State in which the transactions occur, and, if so, the manner and extent to which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or corporations by which such utilization is being made, what facilities are being used, and whether or not organized crime utilizes such interstate facilities or otherwise operates in interstate commerce for the development of corrupting influences in violation of law of the United States or of the laws of any State: Provided however, That nothing contained herein shall authorize (1) the recommendation of any change in the laws of the several States relative to gambling, or (2) any possible interference with the rights of the several States to prohibit, legalize, or in any way regulate gambling within their borders.
H.Res. 298, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., in pertinent part provides: . . . authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of (1) all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation, and (2) all activities of agencies of the Federal Government intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation.
H.Res. 596, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., in pertinent part provides: . . . authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study (1) to determine the extent to which current literature -- books, magazines, and comic books -- containing immoral, obscene, or otherwise offense matter, or placing improper emphasis on crime, violence, and corruption, are being made available to the people of the United States through the United States mails and otherwise, and (2) to determine the adequacy of existing law to prevent the publication and distribution of books containing immoral, offensive, and other undesirable matter.
S.Res. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., in pertinent part provides: . . . authorized and directed to conduct an investigation and study of the extent to which criminal or other improper practices or activities are, or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations or in groups or organizations of employees or employers to the detriment of the interests of the public, employers or employees, and to determine whether any changes are required in the laws of the United States in order to protect such interests against the occurrence of such practices or activities.
See supra, p. 226. See also the statement by Congressman Velde, Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, April 9, 1954, at Washington, D.C., where Mr. Velde stated, inter alia: