Source: http://murderpedia.org/male.M/m/mathis-james.htm
Timestamp: 2017-07-26 12:47:08
Document Index: 620916477

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 1291', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

James Mathis | Murderpedia, the encyclopedia of murderers
J.L. Washington and his wife Ruby Washington, both 69
James Mathis, 51, was sentenced to death in Douglas County in May 1991 for killing J.L. Washington and his wife Ruby Washington, both 69. On Thanksgiving Day 1980, Mr. Mathis was seen in the back seat of the Washington's vehicle as they drove through their apartment complex. Their bodies were found in a wooded area. Both had been beaten, stabbed and shot.In 1989, a U.S. District judge reversed Mr. Mathis' death sentence because of ineffective counsel, but in 1992 the 11th Circuit sent the case back to the federal judge to explain the ruling.
975 F.2d 1493 James
Mathis, Petitioner-appellee, v. Walter Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, Respondent-appellant United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Oct. 14, 1992. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Denied Dec. 14, 1992 Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, FAY, Circuit Judge, and CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge. TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:
Petitioner James Mathis is a Georgia prison inmate. He stands convicted of two counts of murder, two counts of kidnapping, and one count of armed robbery. Petitioner faces death sentences on the murder convictions, life sentences on the kidnapping convictions, and a twenty-year sentence on the armed robbery conviction, with the latter three sentences to be served consecutively. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted
Mathis' petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) as to his death sentences and denied the petition as to his convictions. Mathis v. Zant, 744 F.Supp. 272 (N.D.Ga.1990). In granting habeas relief, the district court relied on two grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, id. at 273-74, and prosecutorial misconduct during the closing argument at sentencing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 275-76. Respondent Walter Zant appeals from the district court's judgment granting petitioner habeas corpus relief.
We vacate the district court's judgment granting relief as to petitioner's death sentences on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. We remand the case for further proceedings, but retain jurisdiction over all remaining claims. Our disposition of this case requires a brief exposition of its procedural history. On October 28, 1987, Mathis filed a habeas corpus petition in the federal district court. On December 9, 1987, the district court ordered respondent to file transcripts and records of the state proceedings within ten days under Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. fol. § 2254, and sua sponte allowed Mathis twenty days to amend his petition "to state any additional grounds for relief from conviction or sentence, including but not limited to petitioner's mental competency, which are known or could be known with the exercise of due diligence."1 Citing Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. fol. § 2254, the court further advised Mathis that "[f]ailure to so amend the petition will be considered a waiver of any additional grounds for relief." On December 17, 1987, respondent filed the requested transcripts and records. After Mathis had not amended his petition in response to the district court's order of December 9, respondent, on January 29, 1988, filed an answer to
Mathis' original petition. In his answer, respondent raised the following defense: Petitioner has received full and fair postconviction determinations of all of the issues raised in the instant petition during the review of his convictions both on direct appeal and through the [p]etitioner's two state habeas corpus actions. Those courts have made reliable determinations that there were no factual bases to any of the [p]etitioner's claims or that the [p]etitioner had procedurally defaulted on the presentation of some of those claims. The [p]etitioner has shown insufficient cause to require this Court to relitigate the factual claims allegedly supporting the issues raised herein.
After petitioner had submitted a brief and a supplemental brief, the district court, by order of July 26, 1988, rejected petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase, but sua sponte "defer[red] ruling on the petition and require[d] counsel to submit further affidavits and documentary information regarding the sentencing phase of petitioner's trial." In its order, the court observed that "[i]n the absence of a demonstration of existence of available mitigating evidence or prejudice resulting from [trial] counsel's closing argument [at sentencing], the Court could simply deny
Mathis's ineffective assistance claim." Citing the gravity of the proceedings, but no statutory authority, the court nevertheless granted petitioner "another opportunity to present all available information to buttress his claim" and directed petitioner "to submit any available affidavits or documentary evidence regarding mitigating circumstance within 30 days of [its] order."After petitioner had submitted affidavits and documentary evidence pursuant to the court's order, respondent filed a response to the court's order and to petitioner's submission of additional evidence raising, inter alia, the following objections:
On January 26, 1989, the district court relied heavily on the supplemental evidence submitted by petitioner in finding that petitioner had received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and granted petitioner habeas corpus relief as to his death sentences.2
Mathis v. Zant, 704 F.Supp. 1062 (N.D.Ga.1989). On March 15, 1989, the court rejected petitioner's remaining claims relating to the guilt phase. Mathis v. Zant, 708 F.Supp. 339 (N.D.Ga.1989). After we had dismissed respondent's appeal from the district court's judgment granting petitioner partial habeas corpus relief as an appeal from a nonfinal judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), Mathis v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir.1990), the district court, on September 12, 1990, once again granted petitioner relief as to his death sentences and denied relief as to his convictions. In its order on remand, the court granted petitioner relief as to his death sentences on two grounds. First, it referred to the rationale enunciated in its order of January 26, 1989, which, as mentioned above, drew substantially on petitioner's supplemental evidence.
Mathis, 744 F.Supp. at 273-74. Second, it granted relief on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument at sentencing. Id. at 275-76. Respondent appeals from the court's judgment granting habeas corpus relief as to petitioner's death sentences.
On May 28, 1981, a jury found
James Mathis guilty of murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery. At the sentencing proceeding, which commenced immediately after the return of the guilty verdict, Mathis' trial counsel, John Coney, did not cross-examine the state's witness and did not offer any evidence on his client's behalf. Mr. Coney concluded his short closing argument by stating:
Following the affirmance of his convictions and sentences on direct appeal,
Mathis, represented by new counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state court. In this petition, he alleged, among other things, that Mr. Coney was ineffective during the sentencing proceeding because he failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence and because his closing argument was deficient. Specifically, Mathis argued:
[Mathis] had a great deal of confidence in his Aunt Lizzie. He lived with she and her husband and it was somewhat my decision to in effect leave Lizzie out of it. I told James I was not going to get her actively involved in it because win or lose, she had been in that community for a long time and would still be living there and her health wasn't all that good anyway. She is a very emotional type person and Lizzie had blood pressure problems and things like that. And so, I didn't--well, I wouldn't let Lizzie come in the courtroom. Because I didn't think it was best for her. And I told
James that I was going to leave her out of it.
[Mathis' habeas counsel]: Did you speak to anyone, any uncles, cousins, aunts, uncles, anyone, regarding them testifying in the penalty stage for
Mathis' habeas counsel presented to the state court the affidavits of Lizzie Pounds and another family member; they both attested that they were not asked to testify during the sentencing phase of
Mathis' trial and that, had they been asked, they would have testified, among other things, that
Mathis had been abused by his father as a child and that Mathis was good-natured and tried to help his family and friends when he could.7 Habeas counsel asked Mr. Coney if he was aware that
Mathis had been abused as a child. In response, Mr. Coney admitted that, "Lizzie told me that they had been hard on him."8 Nevertheless, Mr. Coney did not pursue the child abuse as possible mitigating evidence. Indeed, Mr. Coney did not testify that he did anything is preparation for the sentencing phase of
Mathis' trial. Although Mr. Coney initially testified that he relied on a psychiatric evaluation of
Mathis to argue to the jury that "the electric chair was not the answer,"9 he retracted this testimony after reviewing the trial transcript.10 The trial transcript indicates that neither the evaluation nor the testimony of the doctor who prepared the evaluation was introduced at either the guilt or the sentencing phase of Mathis' trial.
According to the record of the State habeas proceeding, Coney determined early on in his representation of Mathis that the State's evidence of Mathis's guilt was very strong and that he should therefore concentrate on preparing for the penalty phase of the trial. Nevertheless, he interviewed only one family member about Mathis's character. He obtained a brief psychiatric report, but did not discuss the report with Mathis. He did not contact
Mathis's employer, or obtain a copy of his school, social service, or prison records.
Further, counsel's performance during the sentencing phase of a capital trial can be rendered ineffective by presenting a closing argument that is sufficiently unartful to undermine the Court's confidence in the outcome of the sentencing phase. [Citations omitted.] During the sentencing hearing, which took place between 9:30 and 11 o'clock at night, Coney did not present any mitigating evidence. He proceeded to make a closing argument to the jury that was not simply weak; it constituted an apology for having served as Mathis's counsel. In his argument, Coney effectively distanced himself from his client and communicated to the jury that his presence was an obligatory part of the American system of justice. . . . . .
The majority fails to make clear that the district court reached this conclusion that Mr. Coney rendered deficient performance during the sentencing phase after reviewing the same evidence before the state habeas court when that court concluded Mr. Coney's performance was not deficient. Only after the district court concluded, based on the existing record, that counsel's performance was deficient did the court permit
Mathis to produce additional evidence to support his allegations that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.
To support the allegations of prejudice, Mathis' habeas counsel presented to the district court some additional evidence that had not been presented to the state court, including the affidavits of additional family members, the affidavit of a psychologist who performed an examination of Mathis, and
Mathis' school, prison, and employment records. After reviewing all of the evidence, the district court concluded that Mr. Coney's "failure to present mitigating evidence, combined with a closing argument that did not even constitute an adequate plea for mercy, denied [Mathis'] right to effective assistance of counsel."14
The majority goes astray because it merges distinct issues. First, as discussed in subpart A below, the majority fails to distinguish (1) whether a district court is authorized to hear evidence in addition to that heard by the state court from (2) whether a district court is required to hear such evidence. Second, as discussed in subpart B below, the majority blurs (1) a district court's discretionary power to hear additional evidence with (2) the limitations on a district court's power to set aside state court findings of fact. A. District Court's Authority To Consider Additional Evidence The majority errs in remanding the case for the district court "to articulate its ground or grounds for ... sua sponte permitting petitioner to submit additional evidence on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing [and] to determine whether petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to present to the state courts the supplemental evidence submitted to the district court." The majority looks to case law that specifies when a district court is required to consider additional evidence and erroneously applies this case law to determine whether the district court may consider such evidence. It is well established that district courts have broad authority to consider any evidence relevant to a petitioner's claim. Here, the district court acted well within this authority.
B. Application of the Presumption of Correctness Under § 2254(d) Having concluded that the district court was authorized to hear additional evidence, I address the separate and distinct issue: whether the district court improperly circumvented the presumption of correctness accorded state court factual findings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). I stress what the majority ignores: that this issue is distinct. Federal courts must first decide whether to hear additional evidence and then, having heard the evidence, apply § 2254(d). As this court said in Thomas v. Zant:
While I acknowledge that the district court should have specifically discussed its application of § 2254(d), it is clear from the record that the district court did not circumvent any state court findings entitled to the presumption of correctness in reaching its conclusion that Mr. Coney's performance was deficient. Because the state court did not reach the question of prejudice, and therefore made no factual findings as to this issue, § 2254(d) is not applicable to the district court's prejudice analysis.40
III. Conclusion In this dissent, I consider only the single issue of whether our court is correct in remanding the case to the district court as the majority does. I conclude that the district court was clearly authorized to hear additional evidence on the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, and the court did not circumvent any state court factual findings entitled to a presumption of correctness under § 2254(d). Accordingly, a remand is unnecessary. It is my view that our panel should decide the heart of the case, that is, was the district court correct in concluding attorney Coney was deficient in his performance and as a result of the deficiency Mathis was prejudiced. Since the majority does not discuss that issue, I do not. *****
2 In its order of January 26, 1989, the district court responded to respondent's objections to the consideration of supplemental evidence in the following footnote: Respondent argues that petitioner improperly submitted additional evidence in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court disagrees. Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was addressed during state habeas corpus hearings. Petitioner filed affidavits concerning this issue pursuant to Court order, not to bypass state court proceedings.
Mathis v. Zant, 704 F.Supp. 1062, 1062 n. 1 (N.D.Ga.1989). Respondent's brief in support of his motion to alter and amend judgment of February 13, 1989, reiterated his objections to the consideration of supplemental evidence.
3 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 13 at 11
4 Id. at 34
5 Id. at 20-21, 34
6 Id. at 63-64
7 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 13 Attachments
8 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 13 at 68
9 Id. at 33
11 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 16 at 5
12 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
13 R1-12 at 8-11 (footnotes omitted)
14 R2-25 at 12
15 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 297, 83 S.Ct. 745, 749, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992)
16 Id. 372 U.S. at 312, 83 S.Ct. at 757
17 Id. (emphasis added)
18 Id. at 318, 83 S.Ct. at 760
20 Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992)
21 Tamayo-Reyes v. Keeney, 926 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir.1991), rev'd, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992)
22 Keeney, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1721
23 Keeney, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1727 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Townsend ). It is noteworthy that while Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Keeney, responded to other points made by Justice O'Connor in her dissent, see --- U.S. at ---- n. 2 ---- n. 3, ---- n. 5, 112 S.Ct. at 1717 n. 2, 1719 n. 3, 1720 n. 5, he did not respond to this point
24 Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575 (6th Cir.1992)
25 970 F.2d at 1578-79. The majority in this case, like the state in Sims, confuses a district court's discretionary power to hold a hearing with the limitations on the district court's power to set aside state court findings of fact. This is discussed in subpart B below
26 Because I would hold that Keeney is inapplicable to this case, I note only briefly two deficiencies in the majority's application of Keeney. First, the majority errs in applying Keeney retroactively without first undertaking a retroactivity analysis. Second, the majority errs in failing to make clear that Keeney retains the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to the cause and prejudice requirement. Keeney, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1721; see also Tamayo-Reyes v. Keeney, 969 F.2d 839 (9th Cir.1992) (after remand from Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit directed district court to undertake cause and prejudice and fundamental miscarriage of justice analysis)
27 Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977, 984 (11th Cir.1983); see also In re Wainwright, 678 F.2d 951, 953 (11th Cir.1982) ("[S]ection 2254(d) [cannot] be read to require the federal habeas court to determine section 2254(d)'s applicability prior to holding an evidentiary hearing on the habeas claims.")
28 Keeney, --- U.S. at ---- n. 5, 112 S.Ct. at 1720 n. 5
29 I acknowledge that the district court in this case failed to "include in its opinion granting the writ the reasoning which led it to conclude that any of the first seven factors were present, or the reasoning which led it to conclude that the state finding was 'not fairly supported by the record.' " Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551, 101 S.Ct. 764, 771, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). This court has, however, declined to remand notwithstanding such a failure when it is clear from the record that the district court did not improperly circumvent state court factual findings. See Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1545 (11th Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S. 1206, 104 S.Ct. 3575, 82 L.Ed.2d 874 (1984). This is such a case
30 See Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1306-07, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982)
31 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070
32 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 16 at 3-4
33 For example, the state court stated that, "Counsel testified that he felt the State had a strong case and that his main concern was to keep his client out of the electric chair." R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 16 at 3. The district court reached the same conclusion. R1-12 at 8
34 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 16 at 3
35 R1-12 at 8
36 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 13 at 63-64
37 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 16 at 4
38 R1-5 Respondent's Exh. 3 Tab 13 at 34-35
39 Id. at 20-21, 34
40 In one of its three instructions to the district court, the majority orders the court "to decide whether petitioner's development of supplemental evidence amounted to the presentation of a separate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel not yet exhausted in the state court." Mathis' claim that his trial counsel was ineffective during the sentencing phase of trial was clearly presented to and decided by the state habeas court; the state acknowledged as much in its answer to
Mathis' federal habeas petition. Moreover,
Mathis' presentation of new evidence to support the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness analysis does not amount to a "different legal theory" or a "new factual claim," as contemplated in Hart v. Estelle, 634 F.2d 987, 989 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981). Indeed, the state habeas court and the district court reached contrary conclusions as to the deficiency prong of the ineffectiveness analysis after reviewing the same record and evidence. Had the state court reached the proper legal conclusion that counsel was deficient, it may have, as the district court did, indicated a need for further evidence as to the prejudice prong