Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/451/232/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:58:07
Document Index: 186247487

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 1442', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 1442', '§ 1442', '§ 1291', '§ 3731', '§ 1291', '§1442', '§ 1442', '§ 1442', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 13', '§ 1442', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 22', '§ 5', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 1291', '§ 3731', '§ 1291', '§ 3731', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 12', '§ 1291', '§ 1291']

Arizona v. Manypenny :: 451 U.S. 232 (1981) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 451 › Arizona v. Manypenny
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 451 U. S. 250. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 451 U. S. 251.
Respondent William Dale Manypenny had been employed for six years as a Border Patrol Agent in the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). On the moonlit evening of March 15, 1976, he and fellow Agent Gerald Wayne Hjelle were assigned to patrol the Sweetwater Pass, located on federal land in Pima County, Ariz., approximately 10 miles from the Mexican border. [Footnote 1] INS officials knew that the Pass was frequently traveled by aliens illegally entering the United States. While patroling the Pass, respondent and his colleague were expected to stop and question any person suspected of being an alien and to arrest that person if he could not produce a lawful entry permit. [Footnote 2] Both agents wore plain clothes, as was customary for patrol work in that rugged desert area. Tr. 248-249, 293.
Three Mexican males were traveling north along the trail when respondent's electronic sensor system signaled their approach. [Footnote 3] Following standard procedure, Agent Hjelle stationed himself near where the path emerged from the canyon onto higher ground. Respondent took a position some 100 yards to the south, on a bluff overlooking, but out of sight of, the path. The plan called for Ejelle to stop any suspected illegal alien, identify himself, and conduct a brief inquiry to determine the suspect's status, while respondent approached from behind.
The three men emerged from the canyon and saw Hjelle, who ordered them to stop. Id. at 117, 283-284. Before Hjelle could begin his questioning, one of the men turned and ran back south toward the border. Respondent shouted after him to halt. Id. at 174. When the fleeing man failed to stop, respondent fired three shotgun blasts in his direction. One hit the fugitive in the buttocks, causing multiple wounds. Id. at 105-106. Another struck him in the upper spine, severing the cord and leaving him a quadriplegic. Id. at 87-88, 93.
Respondent was indicted in the Superior Court of Pima County, Ariz., for assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-249A and B (Supp. 1973). [Footnote 4] Because the charge arose from an act committed while on duty for the INS, respondent, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), [Footnote 5] removed the case to the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict of guilty was returned. Respondent then timely moved for arrest of judgment or, alternatively, for a new trial. See Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 33 and 34 [Footnote 6] The District Court granted respondent's motion to arrest judgment and dismissed the indictment; it did so on the ground that the State could not assert its criminal jurisdiction over federal lands. 7 Record 7-8. The State immediately moved for reconsideration; the District Court also granted the State's motion and took the matter under advisement. App. 36-38. Nine months later, the District Court vacated its previous order arresting judgment. 445 F.Supp. 1123 (1977). The court, on reconsideration, held that Arizona retained criminal jurisdiction over all land within its exterior boundaries. [Footnote 7] Having determined that it properly could exercise jurisdiction over Arizona's claim, the District Court then proceeded sua sponte to construe respondent's motion under Rule 34 as a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). Although an immunity defense had not been raised at trial, and the State had not introduced any evidence designed to overcome that defense, the court concluded that it had erred in failing to instruct the jury on such a defense. Relying on principles enunciated in In re Neale, 135 U. S. 1, 135 U. S. 75 (1890), and Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722 (CA9 1977), the District Court reasoned that respondent
would be immune from prosecution on a state criminal charge if he acted under color of federal law and in the honest belief that his actions were necessary and proper for the execution of his federal duties. 445 F.Supp. at [1126] 1127. The court applied this standard to the evidence adduced at trial, and concluded that a reasonable jury could not have found respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1128. The presumed motion for acquittal was granted, and the jury verdict was set aside.
Claiming that the trial court had exceeded its authority, [Footnote 8] the State filed a timely notice of appeal from the acquittal. It invoked the appellate court's jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. [Footnote 9] The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a brief per curiam opinion citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54 (1978), initially dismissed the appeal on double jeopardy grounds. [Footnote 10] Upon timely petition for rehearing, however, the Court of Appeals withdrew the opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a, and substituted another in its place. This time, by a divided vote, the court dismissed Arizona's appeal on the ground that jurisdiction was lacking.
608 F.2d 1197 (1979). It noted that, under settled precedent of this Court, the Government may take an appeal from an adverse decision in a criminal case only if expressly authorized by statute to do so. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 430 U. S. 568 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 420 U. S. 336 (1975); United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 144 U. S. 312, 144 U. S. 318-323 (1892). Emphasizing the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the court held that the statute authorizes an appeal only when the United States is the prosecutor, not when a state prosecution has been removed to federal court.
The Court of Appeals declined to consider whether state law provided Arizona with a right to appeal in this case. Instead, the court reasoned that a criminal proceeding removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) arises under federal law, and accordingly is to be controlled by that law, rather than state law. The court concluded that "only Congress can authorize an appeal by a state in a § 1442(a)(1) criminal prosecution," and Congress had not done so. 608 F.2d at 1200. The Court of Appeals also rejected the suggestion that the general appeals statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, [Footnote 11] provided authorization for Arizona's appeal. 608 F.2d at 1199, n. 3.
The dissenting judge discerned separate bases for appellate jurisdiction in 18 U.S.C. § 3731 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 608 F.2d at 1200-1202. [Footnote 12]
We begin by noting that, had respondent's trial occurred in state, rather than federal, court, Arizona's statutes, as construed and applied by the courts of that State, would enable the State to obtain the appellate review it seeks. Under Arizona law, the prosecution is authorized to seek review, by certiorari, when its claim is that the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has abused its discretion. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 12-2001 (1956). [Footnote 13] The State's petition for review
has ben routinely granted in numerous instances exactly like this case, where the prosecution seeks review of a judgment of acquittal following a guilty verdict. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz. 216, 624 P.2d 1264 (1981); State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Moya, Real Party in Interest), 124 Ariz. 560, 606 P.2d 411 (1980); State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123, 538 P.2d 397 (1975). See also State v. Allen, 27 Ariz.App. 577, 557 P.2d 176 (1976); State v. Lopez, 26 Ariz.App. 559, 550 P.2d 113 (1976); State v. Gradillas, 25 Ariz.App. 510, 512, 544 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1976). [Footnote 14]
The Court of Appeals concluded that the fact of removal substantially alters the State's right to seek review. Reasoning that a case brought pursuant to §1442(a)(1) arises under federal law, the court held that state enabling statutes retain no significance. But a state criminal proceeding against a federal officer that is removed to federal court does not "arise under federal law" in this preempting sense. Rather, the federal court conducts the trial under federal rules of procedure while applying the criminal law of the State. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 100 U. S. 271-272 (1880). See Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 54 (b)(1), Advisory Committee Notes, 18 U.S.C.App. pp. 1480-1481. [Footnote 15]
This principle is entirely consistent with the purpose underlying the removal of proceedings commenced in state court against a federal officer. Historically, removal under § 1442(a)(1) and its predecessor statutes was meant to ensure a federal forum in any case where a federal official is entitled to raise a defense arising out of his official duties. [Footnote 16] The act
of removal permits a trial upon the merits of the state law question free from local interests or prejudice. See Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S. 510, 286 U. S. 517-518 (1932); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9, 270 U. S. 32 (1926). It also enables the defendant to have the validity of his immunity defense adjudicated in a federal forum. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 395 U. S. 407 (1969). For these reasons, this Court has held that the right of removal is absolute for conduct performed under color of federal office, and has insisted that the policy favoring removal "should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of § 1442(a)(1)." Ibid.
At the same time, the invocation of removal jurisdiction by a federal officer does not revise or alter the underlying law to be applied. In this respect, it is a purely derivative form of jurisdiction, neither enlarging nor contracting the rights of the parties. [Footnote 17] Federal involvement is necessary in order to insure a federal forum, but it is limited to assuring that an impartial setting is provided in which the federal defense of immunity can be considered during prosecution under state law. Thus, while giving full effect to the purpose of removal,
this Court retains the highest regard for a State's right to make and enforce its own criminal laws. Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. at 286 U. S. 517-518.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 432 U. S. 201 (1977). Because the regulation of crime is preeminently a matter for the States, we have identified "a strong judicial policy against federal interference with state criminal proceedings." Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 420 U. S. 600 (1975). A State's interest in enforcing its criminal laws merits comparable judicial respect when pursued in the federal courts. Cf. Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. at 286 U. S. 518.
Respondent here, by obtaining a federal forum, has fully vindicated the federal policies supporting removal. The plainest evidence of this vindication is the District Court's application of the immunity defense. No further purpose of the removal statute would be served by denying the State a right to seek review when that very right is available under applicable state law. On the contrary, it would be anomalous to conclude that the State's appellate rights were diminished solely because of the removal. The statutory goal of ensuring fair and impartial adjudication is not advanced when the State, in effect, can be penalized by the defendant's decision to remove a criminal prosecution. Absent any indication that the removal statute was intended to derogate from the State's interest in evenhanded enforcement of its laws, we see no justification for providing an unintended benefit to a defendant who happens to be a federal officer. [Footnote 18]
Although the purposes of the removal statute do not support denial of a State's customary right to seek appellate review, we do not suggest that this alone establishes the State's right to appeal in federal court. Authorization to seek review under Arizona law is not a grant of federal appellate jurisdiction. Nor, when added to the conclusion that removal itself fails to diminish Arizona's appellate rights, does this authorization amount to a grant of equivalent federal jurisdiction at the appellate level. Because the criminal removal statute does not confer federal appellate jurisdiction, some independent federal basis is required if a State is to perfect its appeal. Petitioner contends, in part, that such authorization derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the general statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction. Brief for Petitioner 49-58. Respondent argues, however, that § 1291 cannot support Arizona's appeal, because it has been found inadequate, standing alone, to support a criminal appeal by the Federal Government. Brief for Respondent 32-40. This argument deserves close attention, for it draws on the important tradition disfavoring criminal appeals by the sovereign.
proceedings. [Footnote 19] But while it is settled that a civil appeal, or an appeal by the defendant in a criminal case, may be taken from any final decision of a District Court, this Court has observed on prior occasions that, "in the federal jurisprudence, at least, appeals by the Government in criminal cases are something unusual, exceptional, not favored.'" Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 389 U. S. 96 (1967), quoting from Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 354 U. S. 400 (1957). This federal policy has deep roots in the common law, for it was generally understood, at least in this country, that the sovereign had no right to appeal an adverse criminal judgment unless expressly authorized by statute to do so. [Footnote 20] Accordingly, from the early days of the Republic, most state courts refused to consider appeals by prosecutors who lacked the requisite statutory authority. [Footnote 21]
Both prudential and constitutional interests contributed to this tradition. The need to restrict appeals by the prosecutor reflected a prudential concern that individuals should be free from the harassment and vexation of unbounded litigation by the sovereign. See, e.g.,State v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422, 425-426 (1849); People v. Corning, 2 N.Y. 9, 16 (1848). This concern also underlies the constitutional ban against double jeopardy, which bars an appeal by the prosecutor following a jury verdict of acquittal. See, e.g., People v. Webb, 38 Cal.467, 476-480 (1869); State v Burris, 3 Tex. 118 (1848); State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169, 171 (1845). See also Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 437 U. S. 16 (1978); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 369 U. S. 143 (1962). See generally United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 449 U. S. 129-130 (1980). In general, both concerns translate into the presumption that the prosecution lacks appellate authority absent express legislative authorization to the contrary.
This presumption was first announced as a rule of federal law in United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892). There, the Court held that no appellate right by the Federal Government exists in the absence of express enabling legislation from Congress. The Court also concluded that the general grant of appellate jurisdiction contained in the Judiciary Act of 1891 did not satisfy this requirement. [Footnote 22] In subsequent decisions, the Court has reaffirmed that the Federal Government enjoys no inherent right to appeal a criminal judgment, and that the grant of general appellate jurisdiction, now contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, does not authorize such a federal appeal. DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121, 369 U. S. 130 (1962); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S.
394, 354 U. S. 400-403 (1957). See Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 389 U. S. 96-97 (1967); United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S. 159, 289 U. S. 161 (1933).
Respondent contends that Sanges and its progeny must be read to foreclose a criminal appeal in federal court by any governmental entity unless the appellate right derives from an express federal statute. We do not believe that Sanges is to be so broadly construed. Sanges holds simply that the federal sovereign may not subject one of its citizens to continued federal prosecution in its own courts where it has not been expressly permitted to do so under federal law. 144 U.S. at 144 U. S. 323. [Footnote 23] Our continuing refusal to assume that the United States possesses any inherent right to appeal reflects an abiding concern to check the Federal Government's possible misuse of its enormous prosecutorial powers. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice when extending to the Executive a right to expand criminal prosecutions, Sanges and its subsequent applications have placed the responsibility for such assertions of authority over citizens in the democratically elected Legislature, where it belongs. Congress has properly assumed this responsibility by first defining, and then broadening and clarifying, the Federal Government's right to appeal an adverse criminal judgment. [Footnote 24]
The concern to restrict prosecuting authority to express congressional grants, however, does not justify a requirement of express authorization by Congress when the sovereign seeking to appeal is a State, rather than the Federal Government. Nothing in the language or logic of the Sanges opinion contains any suggestion of that kind. Nor should such an intimation be read into the Court's subsequent decisions adhering to Sanges' principle. [Footnote 25] For the purposes of
In sum, the Court's prior decisions restricting the availability of § 1291 in a criminal context flow from a tradition of requiring that a prosecutorial appeal be affirmatively sanctioned by the same sovereign that sponsors the prosecution. The intention to restrict sovereign power in this area is adequately addressed when the legislature responsible for that power has spoken in express terms, or when a legislative enactment has been authoritatively construed by the sovereign's highest court. We conclude that § 1291 neither compels nor forecloses appellate jurisdiction in an appeal taken by a State as prosecutor. Instead, the provision permits a State to appeal if it is authorized to do so by state law. Petitioner Arizona can rely on § 1291 combined with appellate authorization from the Arizona Legislature. [Footnote 26] In the circumstances of this case, no more is required. [Footnote 27]
Arizona argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to act on a Rule 29(c) motion 11 months after a guilty verdict, in violation of the Rule's 7-day requirement. Brief for Appellant in No. 77-3453 (CA9), pp. 8-11. The State also contended that the District Court had misapplied relevant immunity law, and that the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the jury verdict. Id. at 17-24.
Having found jurisdiction, the dissent concluded on the merits that the judgment of acquittal should be reversed. 608 F.2d at 1205. The Court of Appeals' majority, however, did not reach the merits. In view of the posture of the case, we also intimate no view on the merits. Neither do we have any occasion now to decide whether the instant appeal would be barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 395 U. S. 793-796 (1969). That question was not decided by the Court of Appeals, and the parties have not raised it before this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg 33.
A writ of certiorari may be obtained by filing a petition for special action, pursuant to Rule 4, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. (1973). The certiorari provision itself speaks of review to determine whether the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction, but, as consistently construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, the statute also authorizes review for abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz. 216, 222, 624 P.2d 1264, 1270 (191); State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123, 538 P.2d 397 (1975); State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court, 95 Ariz. 319, 322, 390 P.2d 109, 111 (1964); State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens, 79 Ariz. 29, 300, 28 P.2d 1077, 107 (1955). See Rule 3, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. (1973) .
A separate Arizona statute permits the State to appeal from an "order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the state." Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-4032.5 (1978), formerly 13-1712.5. Although there is little case law interpreting this provision, it may furnish an additional basis for appellate review here. See generally State ex rel Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz., at 220, 624 P.2d at 1268; State v. Wynn, 114 Ariz. 561, 563, 562 P.2d 734, 736 (App. 1977) .
In concluding that federal law controls all aspects of a case before the federal court under § 1442(a)(1), the Court of Appeals relied on several decisions, none of which involved proceedings removed from state to federal court. See D'Oench, Duhme Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 (1940); Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996 (CA9 1979). Moreover, in each of these cases, federal law was deemed controlling because the rights that the complainant sought to protect or enforce were created by federal statutes. In contrast, petitioner here seeks to enforce a state statute.
This Court elsewhere has reviewed the "long history" of the federal officer removal statute. Willingham v. Moran, 395 U. S. 402, 395 U. S. 405-406 (1969). It has been 100 years since the Court in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (1880), first emphasized the need to safeguard the exercise of legitimate federal authority:
In the area of general civil removals, it is well settled that, if the state court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, the federal court acquires none upon removal, even though the federal court would have had jurisdiction if the suit had originated there. Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U. S. 448, 319 U. S. 449 (1943); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 305 U. S. 389 (1939); Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U. S. 377, 258 U. S. 382 (1922). This principle of derivative jurisdiction is instructive where, as here, relevant state court jurisdiction is found to exist and the question is whether the federal court in effect loses such jurisdiction as a result of removal. Of course, because appellate, rather than original, jurisdiction is at issue, the analogy is not perfect. See Subpart B, infra.
By enacting the current version of 18 U.S.C. § 3731, see 84 Stat. 1890, Congress manifested an intent to remove all statutory barriers to a criminal appeal taken by the Federal Government. United states v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 420 U. S. 337 (1975). Petitioner argues that this intent should inform our deliberations concerning a state prosecution's appellate rights upon removal to federal court. A proper respect for the State's interest in enforcing its own criminal laws, however, counsels against that conclusion. While the policy announced in § 3731 might perhaps be viewed as indicative of congressional support for any prosecutor's appeal in federal court, the statute does not speak in such terms. Moreover, if § 3731 is construed to extend broad appellate rights to a State that does not authorize comparable rights under state law, one result might be to inhibit the exercise of the removal right, contrary to established federal policy. In light of these uncertainties, and our resolution of the case on other grounds, we do not reach the question whether § 3731 applies to the States.
Congress, from the very beginning, provided that final civil judgments were reviewable as a matter of statutory right. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. Later, when the growing volume of appellate business threatened to overwhelm this Court's docket, Congress acted to establish circuit courts of appeals. Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 1295, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1890); 21 Cong.Rec. 10220-10222 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Evarts). While preserving, under § 5 of the 1891 Act, 26 Stat. 827, several designated categories of cases under this Court's direct appellate jurisdiction, the Act, in § 6, conferred on the new intermediate appellate court the power to review and revise final judgments in all other cases, civil and criminal, "unless otherwise provided by law." 26 Stat 828. Through a succession of recodifications and technical amendments, § 6 of the 1891 Act has been carried forward as 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
There is disagreement among scholars as to whether, at common law in England, the prosecution could appeal. See R. Moreland, Modern Criminal Procedure 273 (1959); L. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 57 (1939); Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 Yale L.J. 486, 491 (1927); Note, Criminal Procedure -- Right of State to Appeal, 45 Ky.L.J. 628, 629 (1957). See generally United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 144 U. S. 312 (1892).
See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. at 144 U. S. 313-318, and cases cited therein. See also L. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 58 (1939); Comment, State Appeals in Criminal Cases, 32 Tenn.L.Rev. 449, 450-451 (1965) .
In Sanges, the Government sought review of 3 lower court judgment quashing the federal indictment. The Court determined that no provision of the new 1891 Judiciary Act had conferred upon the United States the right to appeal a criminal judgment. 144 U.S. at 144 U. S. 322-323.
Id. at 144 U. S. 323.
At least partially in response to the Sanges decision, Congress passed the Criminal Appeals Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 conferring limited rights of appeal on the United States in criminal cases. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 2119, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1906); S.Rep. No. 5650, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1907). Following this Court's opinion in United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 (1970), Congress broadened the Federal Government's right of appeal to its current status under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 84 Stat. 1890.
Respondent and the dissent unsuccessfully attempt to derive support from the decision in Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9 (1926). There this Court awarded Maryland mandamus relief after the State had challenged the legality of removing a particular criminal prosecution to federal court. In general, this decision supports the ability of a State to secure review in a removed criminal prosecution. Moreover, the decision held simply that mandamus was appropriate in the absence of any other means of reviewing the District Court's order refusing remand. Respondent and the dissent seek to rely on the Court's further statement in Soper, 270 U.S. at 270 U. S. 30, that, once a criminal action is removed to federal court, "a judgment of acquittal in that court is final. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310." Although this statement is merely dictum, to respondent and the dissent, it implies that a state prosecutor lacks congressional authorization to take an appeal in federal court. We, however, adopt what we view as a more sensible reading, namely, that the Court's statement reflects an awareness of controlling double jeopardy doctrine, which, at the time, was thought to protect a defendant once a judgment of acquittal had been entered in federal court. See, e.g., Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 195 U. S. 130, 195 U. S. 133 (1904); United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 163 U. S. 671 (1896). But see United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332 (1975). Since this Court had earlier assumed, without deciding, that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to state prosecutions, see Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 187 U. S. 85-86 (1902), it would not have been unreasonable for a state court or prosecutor to make the same assumption in 1926. Of course, the decision in Soper could hardly reflect awareness that, 11 years later, the Court would decline to extend Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection in prosecutions brought by a State. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969).
We have no occasion to address the situation where state law does not authorize the review sought by its prosecutor in federal court. We note, however, that, in the majority of States, the prosecution possesses at least some rights to appeal from an adverse judgment in a criminal case. See Note, Limited Right of Appeal for the State, 14 Hous.L.Rev. 735, 737 (1977). Similarly, because we find that appellate jurisdiction exists under § 1291 combined with relevant Arizona law, we do not decide the applicability of § 3731 to the States. See n 18, supra.
question. I agree with the Court's conclusion that such jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. *
The question whether the prosecutor had authority to prosecute an appeal is, I believe, a question controlled by the law of the sovereign that the prosecutor represents. I therefore agree with the Court's conclusion that the holding in United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, to the effect that a federal prosecutor had no such authority in 1892, is not controlling in this case. The controlling authority is conferred by Arizona, which does empower its prosecutors to appeal in the situation presented here.
United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892), announced the general rule that governments may not appeal in criminal cases in the federal courts in the absence of express statutory authority. Finding, inter alia, that the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 was not sufficiently express, [Footnote 2/1] Sanges refused to allow an appeal by the Federal Government. Today,
The Court proposes the novel interpretation of Sanges and its progeny as
Ante at 451 U. S. 249. [Footnote 2/2] I find this reading of the Sanges rule inaccurate: in my view, Sanges plainly requires express authorization from the legislative body controlling federal court jurisdiction for all government appeals in criminal cases in the federal courts. [Footnote 2/3] The Court stated that the express authorization must be made by the legislature "acting within its constitutional authority." 144 U.S. at 144 U. S. 318. Since Congress is the only entity constitutionally empowered to grant express authority for government appeals in the federal courts, the Sanges principle necessarily confines our inquiry to whether there is express authorization in federal statutes controlling criminal appeals by the States in federal court. Therefore, the Court's finding that Arizona, the sovereign sponsoring the prosecution in the instant case, has sanctioned prosecutorial appeals in its courts is irrelevant to the question of federal appellate jurisdiction
here. Focusing as we must on federal statutes, I find the pertinent federal statutes wholly barren of any express authorization of criminal appeals by States to the federal courts of appeals. [Footnote 2/4] Today, as in 1892, § 1291
Id. at 144 U.S. 323323.
This conclusion is supported by Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9 (1926), which relied on the Sanges rule to conclude that a State has no right of appeal from a decision of a federal district court in a criminal case removed from state court. In Soper, four United States prohibition agents and their chauffeur were indicted for murder in the State of Maryland. The defendants petitioned the Federal District Court for removal, averring that they were federal agents [Footnote 2/5] and that their acts "were done in the discharge of their official duties as prohibition agents." 270 U.S. at 270 U. S. 22. The District Court granted defendants' petition, and the State subsequently applied to this Court for a writ of mandamus to overturn the removal order. Over respondent's objection that mandamus did not lie to correct an erroneous removal order, this Court granted the writ. Observing that "there should be a more liberal use of mandamus [in removal of State criminal cases] than in removal of civil cases," id. at 270 U. S. 29, the Court specifically noted:
on a writ of error, and a judgment of acquittal in that court is final. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310. . . . "
Id. at 270 U. S. 30 (emphasis added). Significantly, the predecessor to § 1291 was available then, as it is now, to support an argument that the State had a right of appeal. Nonetheless, on the strength of Sanges, the Court concluded that a judgment of acquittal was unreviewable [Footnote 2/6] because there was no express federal statute authorizing an appeal by the State. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Hamilton, 475 F.2d 529, 530-531 (CA3 1973).
The Court attempts to deflect the force of this precedent by interpreting Maryland v. Soper as merely
Ante at 451 U. S. 248, n. 25. But this is a clearly incorrect reading, for it ignores the fact that, at the time Maryland v. Soper was decided, the prohibition contained in the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause was applicable only against the Federal Government in federal prosecutions, and not against state governments in state prosecutions. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937). [Footnote 2/7] It was not until 32 years later that Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), overruled Palko and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause was applicable against the States. Since the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to prosecutions initiated by the States, and state substantive law governed criminal cases removed to federal district court, Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 100 U. S. 271 (1880), the Court's suggestion that the statement in Maryland v. Soper referred to double jeopardy limitations is plainly unfounded.
Ante at 451 U. S. 249. The Arizona statute supposedly authorizing appeal, however, is anything but "express." That statute provides:
If it be true the State's petition for review "has been routinely granted" by the appellate courts, ante at 451 U. S. 240, this hardly qualifies as an authoritative construction by the State's highest court that the statute itself authorizes review in every case. The Court has failed to cite a single precedent in which the Arizona Supreme Court has investigated the intent of the state legislature in passing the statute authorizing
"Our continuing refusal to assume that the United States possesses any inherent right to appeal reflects an abiding concern to check the Federal Government's possible misuse of its enormous prosecutorial powers. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice when extending to the Executive a right to expand criminal prosecutions, Sanges and its subsequent applications have placed the responsibility for such assertions of authority over citizens in the democratically elected legislature, where it belongs."
Ante at 451 U. S. 247.
It is difficult to understand how the Court's insistence that the democratically elected legislature speak with a clear voice can be satisfied without interpretive decisions of the State's highest court holding that the state legislature has done so in the case of § 12-2001. Indeed, the Court's application of a less stringent requirement of clarity in the case of state legislation than in the case of federal legislation, see, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 430 U. S. 568 (1977) ("express congressional authorization"); United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 420 U. S. 336 (1975) ("express statutory authority"); DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121, 369 U. S. 130 (1962) ("expressly authorized by statute"); Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 354 U. S. 399 (1957) ("expressly conferred by statute"); United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S. 159, 289 U. S. 161 (1933) ("express statutory authority"); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. at 144 U. S. 318 ("statute expressly giving the right"), is surely unprecedented. The Court has offered no justification for its more expansive treatment of state statutes. Indeed, since the Court has convinced itself that there are "express" provisions in the Arizona statute, I see no logical barrier -- under the Court's novel determination of what is
"express" -- to a construction of § 1291 as an express grant of authority for state appeals, without reference to state statutes.
The Court has noted time and again that appeals by the government in criminal cases are exceptional, and not favored. E.g., Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 389 U. S. 96-97 (1967); DiBella v. United States, supra, at 369 U. S. 130; Carroll v. United States, supra, at 354 U. S. 400. I would have thought, therefore, that the Court would be especially careful before concluding that Congress intended that § 1291 would authorize criminal appeals by the State in removal cases. [Footnote 2/8] See Will v. United States, supra, at 389 U. S. 96-97 ("the Criminal Appeals Act is strictly construed against the Government's right of appeal"). Instead, the Court has abandoned its traditional presumption in this area to imply -- on the strength of its own policy analysis -- authorization for a state appeal in a criminal case where no federal statute expressly authorizes one. But
Carroll v. United States, supra, at 354 U. S. 399.
This case admittedly presents an anomalous circumstance, [Footnote 2/9] and concededly there is great temptation to correct it. But because I believe it is for Congress, not the courts, to make changes in federal jurisdictional statutes, cf. Will v. United States, supra, at 389 U. S. 97, n. 5, I respectfully dissent.
26 Stat. 827-828, and to the circuit courts of appeal from final decisions of the district courts "in all cases other than those provided for in the preceding section of this act, unless otherwise provided for by law," id. at 828.
The Court also finds that allowing an appeal would not frustrate the removal statute's primary purpose of providing an impartial setting in which a federal official's immunity defense may be considered. Ante at 451 U. S. 241-242. But the Court candidly admits that this alone would not establish the State's right to appeal in federal court. Ante at 451 U. S. 244.
Because Sanges dealt with a Government appeal to this Court, see n. 1, supra, the Court observed that "[t]he appellate jurisdiction of [this Court] rests wholly on the acts of Congress." 144 U.S. at 144 U. S. 319.
"[s]hould the final judgment be an acquittal, in whole or in part, the State could not have a writ of error to review it. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310. Unless this Court entertains the petition for mandamus, the State is without any redress."
See Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. at 12 [argument of counsel -- omitted].
In Palko, the Court rejected the broad thesis that
302 U.S. at 302 U. S. 323. Observing that
the Court declined to adopt the argument that "there is a denial of life or liberty without due process of law if the prosecution is one on behalf of the People of a State." Id. at 302 U. S. 322.