Source: http://onsecondopinion.blogspot.com/2009/
Timestamp: 2020-08-14 05:47:39
Document Index: 159863081

Matched Legal Cases: ['arts 1', 'art 22', 'art 21', 'arts 14', 'art 17', 'art 6', 'arts 5', 'art 10', 'art 12']

On Second Opinion Blog: 2009
James Madison's Second Amendment related proposal with attached conscientious objector clause as presented to Congress in June, 1789:
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person." [OSA, pp.654-655]
The historians make these three assertions regarding Madison's proposal:
Assertions #14, 15, and 16
"The final clause was derived from a similar provision recommended by the Maryland Convention. Id. at 181. Its presence confirms that the principal subject was the militia. That clause was also the sole subject of recorded House debate on the entire article." [pp.27-28]
Fact Checking of Assertion #14
Contrary to the historians' assertion, the Maryland Convention recommended no amendments to the Constitution. After ratification by a vote of 63 to 11, the Maryland Convention established a committee to consider possible amendments. This committee approved 13 and rejected 15 minority proposals. The conscientious objector clause was one of those rejected by the committee. The committee could not agree on a final course of action and failed to make any report of amendments. Without a report from the committee, the Convention took no action on any proposals of amendment, even those adopted by the committee. The source cited in the brief specified nothing about the provision being recommended by the Maryland Convention and indicated only that it was a minority proposal. [See The Origin of the Second Amendment, pp.356-361, for details from the Maryland minority about their amendment proposals.]
The Second Amendment clauses in Madison's proposal were clearly taken from the 17th provision in the Virginia Ratifying Convention's proposed Bill of Rights. The 19th provision of that same Bill of Rights was a conscientious objector clause. [FVRBA, p.192] To claim that Madison specifically based his proposal on what was actually a committee rejected proposition never adopted by the Maryland Convention, which recommended no amendments, while ignoring the proposal on the same subject in the Bill of Rights he promised to support and that he actually voted for in order to achieve ratification by Virginia is inane. One has to wonder whether the historians are just not very familiar with ratification era Bill of Rights sources or are simply trying to divert attention again to avoid mentioning that Madison's Second Amendment predecessor and its attached conscientious objector clause both came from Virginia's proposed Bill of Rights, which they have never mentioned the existence of.
Fact Checking of Assertion #15
In the historians' use of the term "militia," government authorization and control are a given, even in bill of rights provisions. Thus, their statement that the conscientious objector clause language Madison added to the Second Amendment clauses "confirms that the principal subject was the militia" completely ignores the purpose for bill of rights provisions - to protect specific rights against government abuse. Also, the term "militia" is not even found in Madison's conscientious objector clause. His objector clause was clearly intended as protection for individuals with religious convictions as an exception from government military power. The Second Amendment clauses were intended as protections for rights that were exceptions to government powers. All of the proposed protections later adopted in the first eight amendments, which were state bill of rights derivatives, protected rights against abuse of the powers given to government. The historians' implication of intended government military control over any of the protections Madison grouped together in this proposal are misplaced because neither the Second Amendment clauses nor the conscientious objector clause were intended to give any level of government power over the militia. Madison treated them only as protections for private rights against government power, and that is exactly how his contemporaries understood them also.
Fact Checking of Assertion #16
The final assertion that the conscientious objector clause was "the sole subject of recorded House debate on the entire article" is a fallacious argument that implies discussion about the objector clause can be taken as applying to the Second Amendment predecessor clauses. The objector clause was later deleted by the Senate after it had engendered numerous and contentious arguments in the House. And contrary to the historians assertion, there were statements made in the House that clearly related to the Second Amendment predecessor. Congressman Scott (PA) indicated that the conscientious objector clause would force the government to rely on a standing army, and that such reliance would eventually lead to violation of "another article" in the Constitution that specifically protected the people's "right of keeping arms." [FVRBA, p.194, OSA, p.703]
Congressman Benson (NY) wanted the conscientious objector clause deleted. He stated:
"It is extremely injudicious to intermix matters of doubt [the objector clause] with fundamentals." [OSA, p.697]
Obviously, he considered the Second Amendment predecessor among the fundamentals.
Conclusion - Assertions #14, 15, and 16 are all Erroneous
Contrary to the historians' assertions:
#14 - Madison could not have derived language for a conscientious objector clause from an amendment recommended by the Maryland Convention because that convention did not recommend any amendments to the Constitution, and a proposed conscientious objector clause was rejected in a committee.
#15 - Madison's conscientious objector clause tacked on to his Second Amendment predecessor did not confirm that the principal subject of either was the militia rather than protection of individual rights. It did not even mention the militia and was clearly a protection for private rights.
#16 - Discussion concerning the conscientious objector clause was not "the sole subject of recorded House debate on the entire article" claimed by the historians in their brief as demonstrated by Congressman Scott's comments on the right of the people to keep arms.
These errors of fact, taken along with a number previously addressed and documented, indicate that none of the signatories to the professional academic historians' Heller amicus brief are overly familiar with period Bill of Rights developmental sources. The cumulative effect of all these erroneous statements is to demonstrate that any statement in the brief regarding Second Amendment intent is unreliable and likely to be completely erroneous because it is founded on numerous errors of fact.
Posted by David E. Young at 12:25 AM No comments:
Labels: Bill of Rights, Congressman Benson, Congressman Scott, Heller brief, Madison, professional historians, Second Amendment, state bills of rights, Virginia Ratifying Convention
Diversionary Arguments Abound in the Historians' Heller Amicus Brief
Completely ignoring the restrictive clause of the Second Amendment protecting "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" against infringement, the historians had this to say about Madison's version taken to Congress:
Assertion #13
"Taking the Virginia and New York recommendations as his model, Madison again made the militia the urgent question to confront." [p.25]
Fact Checking of Assertion #13
On the contrary, there was no reason for Madison to deal with militia powers that were already established in the Constitution exactly as the Federalists wanted them. As examined in the previous two posts, what Madison had every reason to do was satisfy the overwhelming Antifederalist demands for adding a bill of rights to the Constitution, the protections of which they took from those already found in the existing state bills of rights. The ratifying convention related proposals for a bill of rights invariably included protection for the right to keep arms. [OSA, pp.151, 260, 446, 459, 481, 505, 735] In the model Bill of Rights developed by George Mason, author of the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, he combined his own original well regulated militia clause with protection for the right to keep and bear arms. [OSA, p.459] Both Mason and Madison understood the predecessor state bill of rights provisions as limits on the state legislatures, and that these same limits were now being placed in a federal bill of rights to protect the same rights against federal abuse of power.
What both the Second Amendment and James Madison's version were intended to do was to assure that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." This Madison restrictive language is exactly the same in both provisions. [OSA, pp.654, 716] It is also the language that the historians have consistently bent over backwards to ignore and divert attention away from whenever feasible throughout their brief. Readers are assured that the militia is what "Madison again made" the "urgent question to confront" while the right of the people to keep and bear arms is completely ignored once again in the brief. Where are the period historical sources indicating that Madison considered making the militia powers an urgent question for Congress to confront in relation to his Bill of Rights proposals? There is a reason such sources have not been cited in the brief, because they do not exist. If, as the historians assert, the question Madison was pushing as an amendment to Congress was the militia and it was "urgent", why didn't Madison even mention it in his speech to that body?
The historians presented a page-long straw man argument about what the various points in Madison's notes for his amendments speech to Congress meant. Attempting to divert all attention to the militia clause, they then emphasized that Madison "did not discuss the right to bear arms" in his speech. True, but he also did not discuss freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to petition, the right to counsel, protection against cruel and unusual punishments, and a very great number of other specific rights eventually protected in the U.S. Bill of Rights. Most of the rights he did "discuss," as the historians describe it, were simply mentioned, not discussed. Readers are informed that Madison wanted provisions for freedom of religion, the press, and criminal jury trials as protections against the states, also mentioned in his speech. But where is the "urgent" militia question mentioned in his speech or his notes? Apparently it is not as urgent as the historians purpose of diverting attention away from the right to keep and bear arms clause language.
All of these Madison notes and Congressional speech arguments are used by the historians to divert attention away from much more relevant and important information. In addition to guiding readers away from consideration of the restrictive right to keep and bear arms clause, these arguments divert attention away from the fact Madison stated that the American state bills of rights were intended to limit legislative power. This is a view that directly contradicts the historians' claim upon which this entire brief is founded. Madison stated in his speech to Congress that American bills of rights were intended "to raise barriers to power in all forms and departments of Government." This concept was repeated more than once and was a major point of Madison's Congressional speech introducing his Bill of Rights amendments. The historians are forced to ignore Madison's stated views in order to pursue their confused arguments that are founded on an accumulation of errors about Second Amendment intent. [See parts 1, 2, and 3 of this series for the historians' earliest erroneous statements regarding the intent of the state bills of rights, which contain the Second Amendment's predecessor language.]
Conclusion - Assertion #13 is Erroneous
The historians' assertion that the militia was what Madison considered as an "urgent question to confront" is without historical foundation and is used for entirely diversionary purposes in their brief. Madison never mentioned this "urgent" need for Congress to confront militia powers, and the period evidence clearly indicates, as shown in the previous post, that his concern was private rights in the case of all of the predecessors of the first eight amendments.
Labels: Heller brief, Madison, militia, professional historians, Second Amendment, state bills of rights
Root Causes of Never-ending Second Amendment Dispute - Part 22
More Error Based Confusion in the Historians Heller Amicus Brief
The historians claim that:
Assertion #12
"In drafting the amendments that evolved into the Bill of Rights, James Madison had no reason to place a private right to firearms on his agenda." [p.25]
Fact Checking of Assertion #12
The historians' claim that Madison was not intent on a Second Amendment predecessor relating to "a private right to firearms" completely ignores relevant period sources on Bill of Rights development. The Antifederalists who prepared Second Amendment predecessor language for a new federal bill of rights understood that it would protect the specified rights against the new government in exactly the same way that the state bill of rights predecessors it was based upon protected the same rights against abuse by the state governments, and Madison also understood the proposals this way (as examined in a number of prior parts of this series).
In effect, the historians are arguing that Madison did not have a clue about what he was doing with his own Second Amendment predecessor, although they do not openly state this. Instead, they do the equivalent by completely ignoring every piece of historical evidence about his efforts to organize, group related proposals, and insert these groups of related amendments into the Constitution. They also ignore the period comments by contemporaries indicating how they understood Madison's proposal. He did not intend to add a list of amendments at the end of the Constitution as ultimately occurred. Instead, Madison intended to insert amendments directly into the document at locations where related material was already located. Which provisions did Madison group the Second Amendment with and where did he plan to put it in the Constitution? Was it grouped and placed along with the Tenth Amendment that the historians have directly related its intent to? No. Was it to be placed among the militia powers that the historians have insisted all along it was related to? No.
Madison grouped the Second Amendment predecessor among a large collection of private rights protections. He wanted all of these inserted into the Constitution directly after clauses 2 and 3 of Article I, Section 9. These are the only provisions in the U.S. Constitution that protect specific private rights against violation by the new federal government. Exactly which rights did he group his Second Amendment related language with? - First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Amendment predecessors, private rights protecting provisions all. [OSA, pp.654-656]
Based on Madison's own actions, it is clear that the historians' assertion is completely off base. Further evidence of Madison's private rights understanding is found in the fact that contemporaries who commented on this proposal understood it just as he did - as protection for private arms rights.
Fisher Ames, a Massachusetts member of the House wrote this about Madison's proposals:
"The rights of conscience, of bearing arms, of changing the government, are declared to be inherent in the people. Freedom of the press, too." [OSA, p.668]
Tench Coxe's article explaining the purpose for every one of Madison's proposals treated the Second Amendment predecessor as assuring that "the people are confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear their private arms." For what purposes? To prevent tyranny by the government itself or by government raised military forces. [OSA, p.671]
Conclusion - Assertion #12 is Erroneous
The period evidence directly contradicts the historians on this matter. Madison had every reason to pursue a Bill of Rights provision protecting the private right to keep and bear of arms. Madison's actions regarding the Second Amendment are no different than those relating to the other private rights protections in the first eight amendments.
Readers of the professional historians' Heller amicus brief have two choices. They can choose to ignore the period evidence indicating the Second Amendment was intended to protect private rights, just as the historians have done. The alternative is to give the Founders a little credit for understanding exactly what they were doing and saying exactly what they meant by recognizing that the historians have founded their brief on an accumulation of errors that undermine every claim they make about the intent of the Second Amendment and its predecessors.
Posted by David E. Young at 12:58 AM No comments:
Labels: Heller brief, Madison, Private Rights, professional historians, Second Amendment, state bills of rights
Root Causes of Never-ending Second Amendment Dispute - Part 21
Error Based Confusion Reigns In Historians' Heller Amicus Brief
Professor Rakove's brief presented historical material in proper
chronological order with one exception. That exception was
presentations of subsequently adopted right to keep arms proposals
from Virginia and New York that were followed in the brief by
discussion of three earlier proposals protecting the same right. (See
parts 14, 15, and 16 of this series where the Pennsylvania minority,
Massachusetts minority, and New Hampshire Convention proposals
protecting the keeping of arms are examined in proper chronological
This relocation of discussion between the Virginia and Madison's
arms proposals about earlier protections for the right to keep arms
serves two purposes in the brief. Grouping the undeniably private
right protecting earlier proposals together at this point and
distinguishing them from the Virginia/New York proposals, which
combined the right to keep arms with a well regulated militia
reference, helps deemphasize the included right to keep arms
protection while advancing the militia powers only related view of
the historians. A second reason for using the earlier protections as
transition material separating the Virginia proposal from Madison's
version that was based directly upon it is to divert attention away
from the complete inconsistency between Madison's actual language
and the "reserved power of the states" argument that the historians
insist on reading into it.
This is James Madison's Second Amendment predecessor:
a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a
free country;” [OSA, p.654]
Here is one of the historians' interesting claims about Madison and
his proposal's intent:
"But as the eventual Tenth Amendment demonstrates, Madison also
intended to rebut Anti-federalist charges of "consolidation" by
affirming the reserved powers of the states and the people, in a
manner akin to the Second Amendment." [p.25]
Fact Checking of Assertion #11
There is more than one factual historical problem buried within this
assertion. First, Madison's Second Amendment predecessor did not
even mention the "states" or "powers". Thus, it is quite clear that
Madison was not using his version of the Second Amendment
with any intention of protecting "reserved powers of the states"
Second, James Madison was a Federalist leader and one of the
Framers most responsible for taking powers away from the states
and giving paramount authority over them to a new federal
government in the U.S. Constitution. The historians' bold implication
that somehow Madison had changed his mind and for some strange
reason now intended to assure "reserved powers of the states"
relating to arming the militia is nothing short of preposterous.
What is most interesting is how the historians attribute Madison's
intent to Congressional Second Amendment language not found
anywhere in Madison's actual proposal. He changed Virginia's
"free state" reference to "free country" because his version was
intended to protect against the country's new government while
the language it was taken directly from originally protected against
Virginia's new state government.
The attempt to tie the Tenth Amendment to the Second Amendment
in the brief is without historical foundation because the two
amendments came from such completely different sources. The
Tenth Amendment predecessor was included in Virginia's list of
"other" amendments specifically because it was not developed from
the existing state bills of rights protections. It related to the division
of powers between the federal and state governments and the
people. It did not relate to any specific rights. The contrary was
true for Madison's Second Amendment predecessor. It and the
other protections later incorporated into the first eight
amendments were all included in a “bill of rights” that was
developed from state bill of rights provisions that Madison
understood as protecting rights of the people against abuse by
The Second Amendment's well regulated militia reference was, for
example, developed directly from the 1776 Virginia Declaration of
Rights language because that was the verbatim source for the 1788
Virginia Ratifying Convention's proposed Bill of Rights clause.
Madison promised to support those Bill of Rights provisions in
order to achieve ratification of the U.S. Constitution by Virginia.
It was not the historians' proffered militia powers dispute that
brought about the Second Amendment. Instead, it was clearly the
Bill of Rights dispute that resulted in addition, not only of the Second
Amendment, but of the other first eight amendments to the
Constitution as well. [See OSA pp.457-462 for Virginia's proposed
bill of rights and list of other amendments.]
The powers reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment include
those that are, specifically, "not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution". But power to provide for arming the militia was
delegated to the United States by the Constitution. Thus, if the Tenth
Amendment is anything like the Second Amendment as the historians
claim, neither amendment protects "reserved powers of the states"
over arming the militia because it is not a reserved power of the
states, and there is no period evidence that Madison intended to
The Constitution itself does reserve certain militia powers to the
states - specifically officering and training of the militia. The Second
Amendment has nothing more to do with these actual "reserved
powers of the states" over the militia than it does with the powers
not reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment, such as
arming the militia. It is also clear that the Federalists, who had
super-majorities in both houses of Congress had no reason
whatsoever to alter any of the Article I, Section 8 powers they had
previously partitioned between the federal and state governments
just as they wanted them.
Conclusion - Assertion #11 is Erroneous
Madison had no intention of protecting "reserved powers of the
states" in his Second Amendment predecessor because no such
terminology is found in his proposal. Also, there is nothing similar
about the Second and Tenth Amendments. Their sources and
purposes are separate and distinct. The Second relates to a specific
right that was developed from limitations on state authority
found in the existing state bills of rights, just like the other
provisions in the first eight amendments. The Tenth Amendment
relates to proper construction of the division of powers between
the state and federal governments and the people who gave power
to both. The historians' argument about "reserved powers of the
states" being a purpose of the Second Amendment is just another
clever manifestation of the collective rights argument, which
apparently has a thousand lives and emanations in the hands of gun
control supporters.
Posted by David E. Young at 12:44 AM No comments:
Labels: Bill of Rights, Heller brief, professional historians, Second Amendment, state bills of rights, state ratifying conventions
Posted by David E. Young at 11:28 PM No comments:
Labels: Bill of Rights, George Mason, Heller brief, Mason Triads, professional historians, state bills of rights
Ignored Facts, Unfounded Assertions, and the Rakove Professional Historians' Heller Amicus Brief
Returning to the George Mason quote in the professional historians' Heller brief:
"George Mason similarly imagined how the militia might be disarmed: not by the federal government confiscating weapons, but rather, “Under various pretences, Congress may neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia, and the State Governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right to arm them.”"[p.20]
One paragraph later, the historians assert:
"Text and context both establish that the dominant issue throughout the period of ratification was the future status and condition of the militia, not the private rights of individuals. Even when Anti-Federalists spoke of the militia being disarmed, their expressed concern was not the specter of federal confiscation or prohibition of private weapons, but rather that the national government might neglect to provide arms." [p.21]
Fact Checking Assertion #10
Other Antifederalists in addition to Mason made disarming arguments related to future destruction of the militia by federal failure to arm them, which would result in the necessity of a federal standing army for defense. However, directly contrary to the historian's claim, Antifederalists also used the term disarm in the sense of federal confiscation or prohibition of private weapons. For example, an Antifederalist writing under the pseudonym Aristocrotis stated the following in a pamphlet entitled The Government of Nature Delineated:
"The second class or inactive militia, comprehends all the rest of the peasants; viz. the farmers, mechanics, labourers, etc, which good policy will prompt government to disarm." [The Origin of the Second Amendment, p.331]
Aristocrotis' statement can only be interpreted as relating to taking private arms away from all the rest of the farmers, mechanics, laborers, etc. who are not made part of a government formed select militia, which Aristocrotis had just described prior to the above statement in his pamphlet.
In another example, an Antifederalist article printed in the Philadelphia Freeman's Journal and addressed "To the PEOPLE OF AMERICA" noted that:
"[Congress] well know the impolicy of putting or keeping arms in the hands of a nervous people, at a distance from the seat of a government, upon whom they mean to exercise the powers granted in that government. . . they at their pleasure may arm or disarm all or any part of the freemen of the United States, so that when their army is sufficiently numerous, they may put it out of the power of the freemen militia of America to assert and defend their liberties, however they might be encroached upon by Congress." [OSA 211, 212]
This Antifederalist statement similarly used disarm to mean removal of all arms from the freemen of the United States, not a failure of government to provide them with arms.
Disarming arguments from the period were often stated in terms of disarming the people, arguments the historians avoided addressing by specifying Antifederalist militia disarming statements. The brief previously denied that the Founders treated the militia as the mass of the people, a completely erroneous statement documented in part 17. Both of the above Antifederalist disarming examples not only directly contradict the assertion in the brief, but they also further illustrate the fact that the historians are either largely unfamiliar with relevant period sources indicating the militia were understood as the people or they are in complete denial of period reality as documented in easily available sources.
Assertion #10 is also Misleading
The historians' assertion also misrepresents and diverts attention away from much of the disarming argument during the ratification period. In conjunction with Mason's disarming statement, it is used to further separate the clear bill of rights related disarming statements voted on in two ratifying conventions from the militia powers only related history being advanced by the historians to explain away "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" provision of the U.S. Bill of Rights. In the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention this proposal was made:
"That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil power." [OSA, p.151]
This Antifederalist disarming language was simply added to the existing Mason Triad from Pennsylvania's 1776 Declaration of Rights. The state's right to bear arms language was treated as a variant of a well regulated militia reference by the historians themselves earlier in their brief in order to divert attention away from it (see part 6, below). It is obvious that Pennsylvania's language, both the 1776 state bill of rights and the 1787 proposed federal bill of rights, was intended to protect private rights to possess and use arms for self defense, defense of the state, and in the latter case for defense of the country and for hunting, and that the use of disarming relates to preventing confiscation or prohibition of private weapons used for any and all of those purposes. The disarming language here cannot be taken in any other way. This is undoubtedly the reason why the historians felt compelled to address so many pages of their brief trying to explain away Pennsylvania bill of rights language during both periods (see parts 5 through 8 and 14).
Another Antifederalist disarming statement is the proposed amendment adopted by the New Hampshire Ratifying Convention:
"Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion." [OSA, p. 456]
This clearly related to preventing confiscation or prohibition of private weapons. If Congress could not disarm any citizen, it could not disarm any militiaman of his own weapons either, thus preventing disarming of the militia as then understood, the mass of the people. The historians simply divert attention away from the above clearly Second Amendment related provisions by arguing they do not contain a militia reference like the Second Amendment does.
Federalists, who were openly opposed to disarming of the people, made some of the clearest arguments about disarming them of their own arms, all of which the historians ignore here by specifying a particular use of disarming by Antifederalists. It was because of the often stated fear by Antifederalists that the people would be disarmed that Federalists offered a counter argument that disarming was not intended or possible under the proposed U.S. Constitution. Here are some examples:
"Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in almost every Kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence, raised in the United States." [Noah Webster], [OSA, p.40]
The people must be disarmed here refers to taking private arms away from the people.
"Tyrants never feel secure until they have disarmed the people. . . .But the people of this country have arms in their hands, . ." [The Republican], [OSA, p.190]
This reference also uses disarmed to mean taking arms away from the people and prohibiting their possession.
"Congress have no power to disarm the militia. Their swords, and every other terrible instrument of the soldier, are the birthright of an American." [Tench Coxe], [OSA, p.276]
Clearly, it was not the birthright of an American to be given arms by the government. The vast majority of all small arms suitable for military defense were privately owned weapons belonging to the people who possessed them. The disarm reference related to confiscating and prohibiting privately owned arms.
"The people are not to be disarmed of their weapons. They are left in full possession of them." [Zacharia Johnson], [OSA, p. 452]
Disarmed is used here to mean confiscation and prohibition of private arms.
In addition to Federalist disarming statements relating to the impossibility of confiscation and prohibition of private arms, there were a large number of Antifederalist disarming statements directly related to a specific Pennsylvania Executive Council action calling for collection of all publicly owned arms from militiamen in the state for clearing and repair. This action did not relate to privately owned arms, but shows Antifederalists used disarm in relation to removing arms from the hands of militiamen. Antifederalist commentary there pointed out the advantage of the militia being able to rely on their own arms, which could not be collected by the government, rather than those belonging to the state (Pennsylvania provided publicly owned arms for one-fourth of its militiamen).
Conclusion - Assertion #10 is Erroneous and Presents an Extremely Misleading View of Period Disarming Arguments
Period evidence contradicts the historians that militia disarming references by Antifederalists did not relate to confiscation or prohibition of private weapons. Also, the historian's argument is misleading because disarming arguments of the period often equated the militia and the people as in the two Antifederalist examples. There are numerous other references to disarming the people from Federalists, who also opposed confiscation or prohibition of private weapons, and who also understood the people to be the militia. The historians used this assertion in relation to the Mason quote, once again, to separate militia related arms discussion from discussion of private arms, when the period sources indicate no such unnatural separation, and instead, routinely equated the militia and the people, as noted in post 17. Militia arms were overwhelmingly the people's privately owned arms.
Rather than enlightening, the historians' assertion further confuses readers about period disarming statements, thus indicating the historians are confused about the subject. Disarming of the militia during the ratification era meant disarming of the people because period sources treated them as one and the same.
Posted by David E. Young at 4:13 PM No comments:
Labels: arms, disarming, Heller brief, professional historians, Second Amendment, state bills of rights
Posted by David E. Young at 8:32 PM No comments:
After their presentation of militia powers development in the Federal Convention, which was discussed below in part 10, the historians proceeded to discuss militia matters relating to arms during the ratification period while virtually ignoring the widespread and intense bill of rights dispute from that period. That there were incessant demands for the protections found in the state bills of rights, all of which included Second Amendment predecessors, goes entirely unmentioned by the historians, who are supposedly presenting the history of a Bill of Rights provision. Many of the historians' statements regarding the ratification era debate are completely contradicted by period sources and in some cases by evidence from within their own brief. For an example of the latter, take this statement from the historians:
Fact Checking Assertion #8
The above assertion is directly contradicted by the historians' own brief because they distinctly noted that the first three arms protecting provisions addressed in state ratifying conventions, which were treated out of order later in their brief, related to "private ownership of firearms." Those three provisions were directly addressed in the previous three parts of this series by placing them back in their proper developmental order. None of these provisions were combined with references to a well regulated militia, something the historians have used to misinterpret the purpose of the right to arms provisions that well regulated militia references were later combined with. The historians separated the three early arms proposals from any connection with the Second Amendment even though they all clearly protected the right of the people to keep their own arms. Pennsylvania's provision prevented individuals from being disarmed, as did Samuel Adams' proposal and that adopted by the New Hampshire Ratifying Convention.
Further discussing ratification debate about "the comparative merits and risks of a standing army or the militia," the historians stated that:
"these exchanges treated the militia not as the disembodied mass of the people, but as a legal institution subject to concurrent national and state administration." [p.19]
Fact Checking Assertion #9
This statement is directly contradicted by numerous period sources, only a few of which are presented here. The use of the term militia in Hamilton's The Federalist #29, a source referred to on the previous page in the historians' brief, directly refutes their statement. Hamilton provides three different definitions of the militia in this text alone:
[OSA, pp.197,198]
Contrary to the historians' claim, Hamilton's descriptions treat the militia as the mass of the people, not as an institution. For another Federalist's viewpoint, look back at part 12 and Tench Coxe's Federalist Mantra (below). Coxe describes the militia as "ourselves" in an article addressed to "the Citizens of America." He also describes the militia as "the yeomanry of America from sixteen to sixty." Were the yeomanry of America from sixteen to sixty an institution? Would one describe an institution as ourselves, meaning the citizens of America?
Also in direct conflict with the historians' claim, this time from an Antifederalist, is George Mason's statement in the Virginia Ratifying Convention:
"Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers." [OSA, p.430]
Mason's view also contradicts the historians since he treats the militia as the mass of the people, not as an institution.
Conclusion - Assertions #8 and #9 are Both Erroneous
It is not true that discussion of citizens access to firearms during the ratification period focused nearly exclusively on the merits and risks of a standing army or the militia as the historians asserted. As noted by the historians themselves, proposals protecting private possession of arms were discussed and voted on in a number of the state ratifying conventions. It is also not true that such discussion during the period treated the militia as an institution rather than as the mass of the people. Alexander Hamilton's usage in The Federalist #29, Tench Coxe's usage in A Pennsylvanian III and George Mason's usage in the Virginia Ratifying Convention all directly contradict this assertion by the historians. A considerable amount of other period historical evidence also contradicts the historians regarding these two points (see 800 pages of period sources in The Origin of the Second Amendment for numerous other examples).
Those relying on the historians' brief for their understanding of period sources and history should once again consider the fact that, in spite of their claims, the historians are either not overly familiar with relevant period sources, or they are so biased as not to notice when those sources contradict their own statements. What is more likely is that both of these possibilities are in play.
Posted by David E. Young at 1:31 AM No comments:
Labels: arms, George Mason, Hamilton, Heller brief, Jack Rakove, militia, professional historians
Historians Ignore the Bill of Rights History of the Second Amendment
The arms protecting provision adopted by the New Hampshire Ratifying Convention, even though recognized right along with the Pennsylvania minority and Sam Adams Massachusetts proposals in the professional historians' Heller amicus brief as relating to “private ownership of firearms," was treated in exactly the same way as the other two provisions discussed in prior posts. All connection to the ongoing political struggle for a federal bill of rights was completely overlooked and no relationship to the future Bill of Rights provision protecting the people's right to arms noted. Even though New Hampshire's proposals obviously related to protections later found in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Amendments, the historians disposed of the arms provision without further comment on that state's Bill of Rights proposals than by quoting the Second Amendment predecessor and stating it was "a formula unique to the discussions of 1787-1788." They provide no bill of rights related connection whatever, even though their brief is purportedly a presentation of the Second Amendment's history.
Here is the New Hampshire arms provision in its original bill of rights related context:
"X. That no standing army shall be kept up in time of peace, unless with the consent of three fourths of the members of each branch of Congress; nor shall soldiers, in time of peace, be quartered upon private houses, without the consent of the owners.
XII. Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion".[The Origin of the Second Amendment, p.446]
Within these three bill of rights related proposals are found the very first ratifying convention adopted predecessors for freedom of religion, the right to keep arms, and against quartering of soldiers, protections found in the First, Second, and Third Amendments. New Hampshire's language that "Congress shall never" make laws to "disarm any citizen" is exactly the type of language it used in its protection of religious freedom. In fact, New Hampshire doubles up on the strongest of restrictive language by declaring that "Congress shall make no laws" about religion or "to infringe" rights of conscience, adding restrictive language of the type later used in the Second Amendment to the exact quote of the restrictive language later used in the First Amendment.
New Hampshire's use of First Amendment type restrictive language to protect a Second Amendment related right is used by the historians to classify it as "unique" and ignore the clear relationship to the Second Amendment's strong protection for the right to keep arms. Failure by the historians to relate New Hampshire's bill of rights related arms proposal, or the prior ones in the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts conventions, to the ongoing political struggle for a federal bill of rights and later development of the Second Amendment is typical for this brief.
Such failure stands in stark contrast to discussion of a period Bill of Rights proposal by Richard Henry Lee in the Confederation Congress (misidentified as the Continental Congress). Professor Rakove's brief singles out Lee's proposed Bill of Rights to further a militia argument and to emphasize that it had no arms provision. That this is the sole mention of a ratification era “Bill of Rights” within the brief is bizarre considering the massive amounts of historical information relating to this subject and the stated intent of the brief to present the history of a U.S. Bill of Rights provision. As in this case of the New Hampshire arms proposal and R.H. Lee's proposed Bill of Rights, the historians' routinely pursue less relevant sources while disassociating clearly Second Amendment related bill of rights provisions rather than associating and connecting them historically to development of the Second Amendment.
This is a further reason why the historians brief is completely unreliable.
Posted by David E. Young at 4:04 PM No comments:
Labels: Bill of Rights, Heller brief, Jack Rakove, New Hampshire, professional historians, state ratifying conventions
Posted by David E. Young at 7:20 PM No comments:
Jefferson on the Moral Prohibition Against Saddling Posterity With Our Debts
Thomas Jefferson's views on government debt can be inserted into the modern debate over deficit spending by the Federal Government as if they were specifically meant for the present "crisis." Jefferson argued that "we act as if we believed" that "the aggregate body of fathers may alienate the labor of all their sons, of their posterity, in the aggregate, and oblige them to pay for all the enterprises, just or unjust, profitable or ruinous, into which our vices, our passions, or our personal interests may lead us." Because "an individual father cannot alienate the labor of his son," Jefferson stated that we are "unauthorized to saddle posterity with our debts, and morally bound to pay them ourselves".
[Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, XIII, 358]
Jefferson's views on federal deficit spending, federal usurpation of state authority, and the expansion of federal executive authority are right to the point in light of modern trends in federal government policy.
“I am not for transferring all the powers of the States to the General Government and all those of that government to the executive branch. I am for a government rigorously frugal and simple, applying all the possible savings of the public revenue to the discharge of the national debt, and not for a multiplication of officers and salaries merely to make partisans, and for increasing, by every device, the public debt on the principle of its being a public blessing.”
[Dumbauld, ed., Jefferson: His Political Writings, 47]
A way to approach straightening out the mess that is occurring in Washington DC is to insist that the Constitution be obeyed. Only state governments, not the federal government, should exercise powers reserved to the states by the Constitution, and only the state governments should tax for those purposes, not the federal government. The federal government has no constitutional power over education or health care because these are clearly reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Also, it should be evident that no one can justifiably be taxed by any level of government to pay for the gambling debts and losses due to open speculation by others, whether by individuals speculating in the housing market or corporations speculating in credit default swaps.
Posted by David E. Young at 12:15 PM No comments:
Labels: deficit spending, saddling posterity with debt, speculation, Thomas Jefferson
Posted by David E. Young at 1:21 PM
Labels: Frederick Muhlenberg, Heller brief, Jeremy Belknap, Pennsylvania minority, professional historians, Samuel Adams, state bills of rights