Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/430/787/case.html
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 1151', '§ 1182', '§ 2', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 201', '§ 1151', '§ 201', '§ 1151', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 1154', '§ 1154', '§ 1153', '§ 1182']

Fiallo v. Bell (full text) :: 430 U.S. 787 (1977) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Fiallo v. Bell 430 U.S. 787 (1977)
U.S. Supreme CourtFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)Fiallo v. BellNo. 75-6297Argued December 7, 1976Decided April 26, 1977430 U.S. 787APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
406 F.Supp. 162, affirmed. Page 430 U. S. 788
The Act grants special preference immigration status to aliens who qualify as the "children" or "parents" of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. Under § 101(b)(1), a "child" is defined as an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural mother. [Footnote 1] Page 430 U. S. 789 The definition does not extend to an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural father. Moreover, under § 101(b)(2), a person qualifies as a "parent" for purposes of the Act solely on the basis of the person's relationship with a "child." As a result, the natural father of an illegitimate child who is either a United States citizen or permanent resident alien is not entitled to preferential treatment as a "parent."
The special preference immigration status provided for those who satisfy the statutory "parent-child" relationship depends on whether the immigrant's relative is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien. A United States citizen is allowed the entry of his "parent" or "child" without regard to either an applicable numerical quota or the labor certification requirement. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), (b), 1182(a)(14). On the other hand, a United States permanent resident alien is allowed the entry of the "parent" or "child" subject to numerical limitations but without regard to the labor certification Page 430 U. S. 790 requirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14); see 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 2.40 n. 18 (rev. ed.1975). [Footnote 2]
Appellants are three sets of unwed natural fathers and their illegitimate offspring who sought, either as an alien father or an alien child, a special immigration preference by virtue of a relationship to a citizen or resident alien child or parent. In each instance, the applicant was informed that he was ineligible for an immigrant visa unless he qualified for admission under the general numerical limitations and, in the case of the alien parents, received the requisite labor certification. [Footnote 3] Page 430 U. S. 791
A three-judge District Court was convened to consider the constitutional issues. After noting that Congress' power to fashion rules for the admission of aliens was "exceptionally broad," the District Court held, with one judge dissenting, that the statutory provisions at issue were neither "wholly devoid of any conceivable rational purpose" nor "fundamentally aimed at achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration." Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 162, 165, 166 Page 430 U. S. 792 (1975). The court therefore granted judgment for the Government and dismissed the action.
At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" the admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 214 U. S. 339 (1909); accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 408 U. S. 766 (1972). Our cases "have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control." Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 345 U. S. 210 (1953); see, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895); Fon Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (1889). Our recent decisions have not departed from this long-established rule. Just last Term, for example, the Court had occasion to note that "the power over aliens is of a political character, and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 426 U. S. 101 n. 21 (1976), citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra at 149 U. S. 713; accord, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 426 U. S. 81-82 (1976). And we observed recently that, in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, "Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." Id. at 426 U. S. 80. [Footnote 4] Page 430 U. S. 793
Appellants apparently do not challenge the need for special judicial deference to congressional policy choices in the immigration context, [Footnote 5] but instead suggest that a "unique coalescing of factors" makes the instant case sufficiently unlike prior immigration cases to warrant more searching judicial scrutiny. Brief for Appellants 52-55. Appellants first observe that, since the statutory provisions were designed to reunite families wherever possible, the purpose of the statute was to afford rights not to aliens, but to United States citizens and legal permanent residents. Appellants then rely on our border search decisions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975), for the proposition that the courts must Page 430 U. S. 794 scrutinize congressional legislation in the immigration area to protect against violations of the rights of citizens. At issue in the border search cases, however, was the nature of the protections mandated by the Fourth Amendment with respect to Government procedures designed to stem the illegal entry of aliens. Nothing in the opinions in those cases suggests that Congress has anything but exceptionally broad power to determine which classes of aliens may lawfully enter the country. See 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 272; 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 883-884.
"when the Executive exercises this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind Page 430 U. S. 795 the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant."
408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 770. We can see no reason to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case. [Footnote 6] Page 430 U. S. 796
342 U.S. at 342 U. S. 596-597. Page 430 U. S. 797
This distinction is just one of many drawn by Congress pursuant to its determination to provide some -- but not all -- families with relief from various immigration restrictions that would otherwise hinder reunification of the family in this country. In addition to the distinction at issue here, Congress Page 430 U. S. 798 has decided that children, whether legitimate or not, cannot qualify for preferential status if they are married or are over 21 years of age. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). Legitimated children are ineligible for preferential status unless their legitimation occurred prior to their 18th birthday and at a time when they were in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents. § 1101(b)(1)(C). Adopted children are not entitled to preferential status unless they were adopted before the age of 14 and have thereafter lived in the custody of their adopting or adopted parents for at least two years, § 1101(b)(1)(E). And stepchildren cannot qualify unless they were under 18 at the time of the marriage creating the stepchild relationship. § 1101(b)(1)(b).
Appellants suggest that the distinction drawn in § 101(b)(1)(D) is unconstitutional under any standard of review, since it infringes upon the constitutional rights of citizens and legal permanent residents without furthering legitimate governmental interests. Appellants note in this regard that the statute makes it more difficult for illegitimate children and their natural fathers to be reunited in this country than for legitimate or legitimated children and their parents, or for illegitimate children and their natural mothers. And appellants also note that the statute fails to establish a procedure under which illegitimate children and their natural fathers could prove the existence and strength of their family relationship. Those are admittedly the consequences of the Page 430 U. S. 799 congressional decision not to accord preferential status to this particular class of aliens, but the decision nonetheless remains one "solely for the responsibility of the Congress, and wholly outside the power of this Court to control." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 342 U. S. 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Congress obviously has determined that preferential status is not warranted for illegitimate children and their natural fathers, perhaps because of a perceived absence in most cases of close family ties, as well as a concern with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity determinations. [Footnote 8] See Trimble v. Gordon, ante at 430 U. S. 771. In any event, it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision. [Footnote 9] Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 770.
We hold that §§ 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2) of the Page 430 U. S. 800 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 are not unconstitutional by virtue of the exclusion of the relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural father from the preferences accorded by the Act to the "child" or "parent" of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., establishes the terms and conditions for entry into the United States. Among its various conditions, the Act requires that an alien seeking to enter the United States as a legal permanent resident must come within a restrictive numerical quota and must satisfy certain labor certification requirements. INA §§ 201, 202, 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, 1182(a)(14) (1976 ed.), as amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 2703 (hereinafter 1976 Amendments). In recognition of the fact that such requirements frequently separate families, Congress has provided that American citizens may petition Page 430 U. S. 801 to have the requirements waived for their immediate families -- spouse, parents, children. INA §§ 201(a), (b), 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), (b), 1182(a)(14). [Footnote 2/1] Page 430 U. S. 802
The privilege is accorded only to those parents and children who satisfy the statute's definitions. Under INA § 101(b)(1), a "child" is defined as an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child by whom or on whose behalf a privilege is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its biological mother. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). [Footnote 2/2] A "parent" is defined under INA § 101(b)(2) solely Page 430 U. S. 803 on the basis of the individual's relationship with a "child" as defined by § 101(b)(1). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2). [Footnote 2/3] The definitions cover virtually all parent-child relationships except that of biological father-illegitimate child. Thus, while all American citizens are entitled to bring in their alien children without regard to either the numerical quota or the labor certification requirement, fathers are denied this privilege with respect to their illegitimate children. Similarly, all citizens are allowed to have their parents enter without regard to the labor certification requirement, and, if the citizen is over 21, also without regard to the quota. Illegitimate children, however, are denied such preferences for their fathers.
The unfortunate consequences of these omissions are graphically illustrated by the case of appellant Cleophus Warner. [Footnote 2/4] Page 430 U. S. 804 Mr. Warner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1154, [Footnote 2/5] petitioned the Attorney General for an immigrant visa for his illegitimate son Serge, a citizen of the French West Indies. Despite the fact that Mr. Warner acknowledged his paternity and registered as Serge's father shortly after his birth, has his name on Serge's birth certificate, and has supported and maintained Serge since birth, the special dispensation from the quota and labor certification requirements was denied because Serge was not a "child" under the statute. It matters not that, as the Government concedes, Tr. of Oral Arg. 226, Serge's mother has abandoned Serge to his father and has, by marrying another man, apparently rendered impossible, under French West Indies law, Mr. Warner's ever legitimating Serge. Mr. Warner is simply not Serge's "parent."
The Government contends that this legislation is not subject to judicial review. Pointing to the fact that aliens have no constitutional right to immigrate to the United States and to a long line of cases that recognize that policies pertaining to Page 430 U. S. 805 the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government, the Government concludes that "[t]he congressional decision whether or to whom to extend such a valuable privilege . . . is not a subject of judicial concern." Brief for Appellees 22.
My disagreement with the Court arises from its application of the principle in this case. The review the majority purports to require turns out to be completely "toothless." Cf. Trimble v. Gordon, ante at 430 U. S. 767. After observing the effects of the denial of preferential status to appellants, the majority concludes: "[B]ut the decision nonetheless remains one solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.'" Ante at 799. Such "review" reflects more than due deference; it is abdication. [Footnote 2/6] Page 430 U. S. 806 Assuming, arguendo, that such deference might be appropriate in some situations -- a supposition I find difficult to accept -- it is particularly inappropriate in this case.
This case, unlike most immigration cases that come before the Court, directly involves the rights of citizens, not aliens. "[C]oncerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united," H.R.Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1957), Congress extended to American citizens the right to choose to be reunited in the United States with their immediate families. The focus was on citizens and their need for relief from the hardships occasioned by the immigration laws. The right to seek such relief was given only to the citizen, not the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1154. [Footnote 2/7] If the citizen does not petition the Attorney General for the special "immediate relative" status for his parent or child, the alien, Page 430 U. S. 807 despite his relationship, can receive no preference. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d). It is irrelevant that aliens have no constitutional right to immigrate and that Americans have no constitutional right to compel the admission of their families. The essential fact here is that Congress did choose to extend such privileges to American citizens, but then denied them to a small class of citizens. When Congress draws such lines among citizens, the Constitution requires that the decision comport with Fifth Amendment principles of equal protection and due process. The simple fact that the discrimination is set in immigration legislation cannot insulate from scrutiny the invidious abridgment of citizens' fundamental interests.
The majority responds that, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, the Court recognized that First Amendment rights of citizens were "implicated," but refused to engage in the close scrutiny usually required in First Amendment cases. Therefore, it argues, no more exacting standard is required here. In that case, Mandel, a Belgian "revolutionary Marxist," could visit this country only if the Attorney General waived the statutory prohibition of visas to "[a]liens who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of World communism." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D). The Attorney General denied the waiver, and suit was brought by Mandel and several citizens who claimed their First Amendment right to hear Mandel in person was abridged by the denial. Rejecting the Government's contention that it had "unfettered discretion, and any reason or no reason [for denying a waiver] may be given," the Court upheld the denial only after finding that it was based on a "legitimate and bona fide" reason -- Mandel's abuses of visa privileges on a prior visit. 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 769. At the same time, however, the Court chose not to scrutinize more closely and accepted the reason without weighing against it the claimed First Amendment interest. It feared becoming embroiled in the "dangerous and undesirable" task of considering, Page 430 U. S. 808 every time an alien was denied a waiver, such factors as the projected number of people wishing to speak with the alien and the probity of his ideas. Id. at 408 U. S. 769.
Whatever the merits of the Court's fears in Mandel, cf. id. at 408 U. S. 774 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), the present case is clearly distinguishable in two essential respects. First, in Mandel, Congress had not focused on citizens and their need for relief. Rather, the governmental action was concerned with keeping out "undesirables." The impact on the citizens' right to hear was an incidental and unavoidable consequence of that political judgment. The present case presents a qualitatively different situation. Here, the purpose of the legislation is to accord rights not to aliens, but to United States citizens. In so doing, Congress deliberately chose, for reasons unrelated to foreign policy concerns or threats to national security, to deny those rights to a class of citizens traditionally subject to discrimination. [Footnote 2/8] Second, in Mandel, unlike the present case, appellees conceded the ability of Congress to enact legislation broadly prohibiting the entry of all aliens with Mandel's beliefs. [Footnote 2/9] Their concern was directed instead to the exercise of the discretion granted the Attorney General to waive the prohibition. In the present case, by contrast, we are asked to engage in the traditional task of reviewing the validity Page 430 U. S. 809 of a general Act of Congress challenged as unconstitutional on its face. Totally absent therefore is the specter of involving the courts in second-guessing countless individual determinations by the Attorney General as to the merits of a particular alien's entrance.
The class of citizens denied the special privilege of reunification in this country is defined on the basis of two traditionally disfavored classifications -- gender and legitimacy. Fathers cannot obtain preferred status for their illegitimate children; mothers can. Conversely, every child except the illegitimate -- legitimate, legitimated, step-, adopted -- can obtain preferred status for his or her alien father. The Court has little tolerance for either form of discrimination. We require that gender-based classifications "serve important governmental objectives, and . . . be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Califano v. Webster, ante at 430 U. S. 317; Califano v. Goldfarb, ante at 430 U. S. 210-211; Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 429 U. S. 197 (1976); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Stanton v Stanton, 421 U. S. 7 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). We are similarly hostile to legislation excluding illegitimates from governmental beneficence, finding it "illogical and unjust" to deprive a child "simply because its natural father has not married its mother." Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535, 409 U. S. 538 (1973). See also Trimble v. Gordon, ante p. 430 U. S. 762; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (CA5 1973), summarily aff'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Page 430 U. S. 810 New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F.Supp. 58 (Conn., 1972), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.Supp. 1226 (Md.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins Co., 391 U. S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968); cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971).
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra at 420 U. S. 652. In view of the legislation's denial of this right to these classes, it is clear that, whatever the verbal formula, the Government bears a substantial burden to justify the statute. Page 430 U. S. 811
The legislative history, however, gives no indication of why these privileges were absolutely denied illegitimate children and their fathers. [Footnote 2/10] The Government suggests that Congress may have believed that "such persons are unlikely to have maintained a close personal relationship with their offspring." Brief for Appellees 17. If so, Congress' chosen shorthand for "closeness" is obviously overinclusive. No one can dispute that there are legitimate, legitimated, step-, and adoptive parent-child relationships and mother-illegitimate child relationships that are not close, and yet are accorded the preferential status. Indeed, the most dramatic illustration of the overinclusiveness is the fact that, while Mr. Warner can never be deemed a "parent" of Serge, nevertheless, if he should marry, his wife could qualify as a step-parent, entitled to obtain for Serge the preferential status that Mr. Warner cannot Page 430 U. S. 812 obtain. Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F.Supp. 516 (SDNY 1967); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F.Supp. 531 (SDNY 1965). [Footnote 2/11] Similarly, a man who, in an adulterous affair, fathers a child outside his marriage cannot be the "parent" of that child, but his wife may petition as step-parent. Matter of Stultz, 15 I. & N.Dec. (1975).
The Government suggests that Congress may have decided to accept the inaccurate classifications of this statute because they considered a case-by-case assessment of closeness and Page 430 U. S. 813 paternity not worth the administrative costs. This attempted justification is plainly inadequate. In Stanley v. Illinois, supra, we expressed our low regard for the use of "administrative convenience" as the rationale for interfering with a father's right to care for his illegitimate child.
Given such hostility to the administrative convenience argument when invidious classifications and fundamental rights are involved, it is apparent that the rationale is inadequate in the present case. As I observed earlier, since Congress gave no indication that administrative costs were its concern, we should scrutinize the hypothesis closely. The likelihood of such a rationale is diminished considerably by the comprehensive and elaborate administrative procedures Page 430 U. S. 814 already established and employed by the INS in passing on claims of the existence of a parent-child relationship. All petitions are handled on a case-by-case basis, with the petitioner bearing the burden of proof. Moreover, the INS is no stranger to cases requiring proof of paternity. When, for example, a citizen stepmother petitions for the entrance of her husband's illegitimate child, she must necessarily prove that her husband is the child's father. [Footnote 2/13] Indeed, it is ironic that, if Mr. Warner marries and his wife petitions for Serge, her proof will, in fact, be one step more complex than his would be -- not only must she prove his paternity, but she must also prove their marriage. Nevertheless, she would be entitled to an opportunity to prove those facts; he is not.
Nor is a fear of involvement with foreign laws and records a persuasive explanation of the omission. In administering the Act with respect to legitimated children, for example, the critical issue is whether the steps undertaken are adequate under local law to render the child legitimate, and the INS has become expert in such matters. [Footnote 2/14] I note, in this connection, Page 430 U. S. 815 that, where a child was born in a country in which all children are legitimate, [Footnote 2/15] proof of paternity is the critical issue, and the proof problems are identical to those involved with an illegitimate child.
Given the existence of these procedures and expertise, it is difficult indeed to give much weight to the hypothesized administrative convenience rationale. Moreover, as noted previously, this Court will not allow concerns with proof to justify "an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." Gomez, supra at 409 U. S. 538. As the facts of this case conclusively demonstrate, Congress has "failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity." Trimble, ante at 430 U. S. 770-771. Mr. Warner is a classic example of someone who can readily prove both paternity and closeness. Appellees concede this. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. The fact that he is denied the opportunity demonstrates beyond peradventure that Congress has failed to "carefully tun[e] [the statute] to alternative considerations.'" Trimble, ante at 430 U. S. 772, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 513. That failure is fatal to the statute. Trimble, ante at 430 U. S. 772-773. [Footnote 2/16] Page 430 U. S. 816
"* * * *" "(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place to which the alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (b) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed. The exclusion of aliens under this paragraph shall apply to special immigrants defined in section 1101(a)(27)(A) of this title (other than the parents, spouses, or children of United States citizens or of aliens lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence), to preference immigrant aliens described in sections 1153(a)(3) and 1153(a)(6) of this title, and to nonpreference immigrant aliens described in section 1153(a)(8) of this title."