Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/search/index.html?query=habeas&scope=onlysyllabi
Timestamp: 2014-08-22 10:13:17
Document Index: 800920419

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2254', '§ 2254', '§2254', '§2255', '§2255']

Haber's?
Your query habeas returned 165 results. Your search has returned a large number of results. You might want to
consider using additional terms to narrow it. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH[Syllabus]
MUNAF V.GEREN[Syllabus]
FELKER V. TURPIN, WARDEN, 518 U.S. 1051 (1996).[Syllabus]
MAYLE V. FELIX[Syllabus]
LONCHAR V. THOMAS, WARDEN, 517 U.S. 314 (1996).[Syllabus]
BANKS V. DRETKE[Syllabus]
In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?
WALKER V. MARTIN[Syllabus]
1. Where both the federal district court judge and state trial court judge who had originally sentenced Petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under the test this Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did the Fourth Circuit err in denying relief by reformulating the Strickland test so that: a. ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be assessed under the ""windfall"" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell even where trial counsel's error was no ""windfall"" ; and b. The petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient performance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment; and 2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be ""contrary to "" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of this Court that is controlling as to law and fact""? 3. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve ""an unreasonable application of"" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of relevant precedent that ""reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable""?
WOODFORD V. GARCEAU[Syllabus]
For purposes of applying the rule in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court; respondent's application is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because it was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date.
GONZALEZ V. CROSBY[Syllabus]
RUMSFELD V. PADILLA[Syllabus]
(1) Whether the President has authority as Commander in Chief and in light of Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, to seize and detain a United States citizen in the United States based on a determination by the President that he is an enemy combatant who is closely associated with al Qaeda and has engaged in hostile and war-like acts, or whether 18 U.S.C. 4001(a) precludes that exercise of Presidential authority? (2) Whether the district court has jurisdiction over the proper respondent to the amended habeas petition?
STEWART V. MARTINEZ-VILLAREAL, 523 U.S. 637 (1998)[Syllabus]
O'NEAL V. MCANINCH, 513 U.S. 432 (1995).[Syllabus]
GARLOTTE V. FORDICE, 515 U.S. 39 (1995).[Syllabus]
SLACK V. MCDANIEL[Syllabus]
If a person's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and he subsequently exhaust his state remedies and refiles the 2254 petition, are claims included within that petition that were not included within his initial 2254 filing ""second or successive"" habeas applications?
RASUL V. BUSH[Syllabus]
Whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?
MAGWOOD V. PATTERSON[Syllabus]
CULLEN V. PINHOLSTER[Syllabus]
HARRINGTON V. RICHTER[Syllabus]
NELSON V. CAMPBELL[Syllabus]
Whether a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 by a death-sentenced state prisoner, who seeks to stay his execution in order to pursue a challenge to the procedures for carrying out the execution, is properly recharacterized as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254?
DUNCAN V. WALKER[Syllabus]
A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2)'s meaning, so that provision did not toll the limitation period for filing respondent's second federal habeas petition during the pendency of his first federal habeas petition.
SCHRIRO V. LANDRIGAN[Syllabus]
BEARD V. KINDLER[Syllabus]
WILKINSON V. DOTSON[Syllabus]
CALDERON V. ASHMUS, 523 U.S. 740 (1998)[Syllabus]
MILLER-EL V. COCKRELL[Syllabus]
The Fifth Circuit erred when it declined to issue a certificate of appealability to review the District Court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner.
PLILER V. FORD[Syllabus]
(1) Whether the dismissal of a "mixed" habeas corpus petition is improper unless the district court informs the petitioner about the possibility of a stay of the proceeding pending exhaustion of state remedies and advises the petitioner with respect to the statute of limitations in the event of any refiling? (2) Whether a second, untimely habeas petition may relate back to a first habeas petition, where the first habeas petition was dismissed and the first proceeding is no longer proceeding?
RHINES V. WEBER[Syllabus]
HOLLAND V. FLORIDA[Syllabus]
DANFORTH V. MINNESOTA[Syllabus]
CAREY V. SAFFOLD[Syllabus]
As used in 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2), which tolls the limitations period for filing federal habeas petitions while a petition for state collateral relief is "pending," the term "pending" covers the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court; that rule applies to California's collateral review system; and the case is remanded for reconsideration of the question whether respondent's state petition was timely filed.
SAWYER V. SMITH, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)[Syllabus]
TYLER V. CAIN[Syllabus]
The rule in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39-that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt-was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A).
LINDH V. MURPHY, WARDEN, 117 S.CT. 2059, 138 L.ED.2D 481 (1997).[Syllabus]
BELL V. THOMPSON[Syllabus]
LAMBRIX V. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)[Syllabus]
ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS[Syllabus]
The post-removal-period detention statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, implicitly limits an alien's detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States, and does not permit indefinite detention; the application of that limitation is subject to federal court review.
LOCKYER V. ANDRADE[Syllabus]
The Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Andrade's sentence for a "third strike" conviction is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
JIMENEZ V. QUARTERMAN[Syllabus]
WOODFORD V. NGO[Syllabus]
EVANS V. CHAVIS[Syllabus]
STRICKLER V. GREENE[Syllabus]
BALDWIN V. REESE[Syllabus]
By statute and this Court's caselaw, a state prisoner must exhaust available state court remedies on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings before a federal court may consider granting habeas corpus relief. This Court had held that exhaustion requires a state prisoner to fairly present his claim to the state's highest court and that fair presentment requires the prisoner to have alerted the state court that the claim is a federal one. Does a state prisoner alert the State's highest court that he is raising a federal claim when -- in that court--he neither cites a specific provision of the federal constitution nor cites at least one authority that has decided the claim on a federal basis?
EDWARDS V. CARPENTER[Syllabus]
Whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as "" cause"" for the procedural default of another habeas claim when the ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted."
HARBISON V. BELL[Syllabus]
UTTECHT V. BROWN[Syllabus]
RENICO V. LETT[Syllabus]
O�SULLIVAN V. BOERCKEL[Syllabus]
THOMPSON V. KEOHANE, WARDEN, ET AL., 516 U.S. 99 (1996)..[Syllabus]
SCHLUP V. DELO, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).[Syllabus]
LAWRENCE V. FLORIDA[Syllabus]
WEEKS V. ANGELONE[Syllabus]
1. Is there any ""compelling"" reason to review the Fourth Circuit's application of this Court's recent decision in Buchannan V. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), to the facts of petitioner's case, which are substantially indistinguishable from those in Buchanan?"
SPENCER V. KEMNA, 523 U.S. 1 (1998)[Syllabus]
BOBBY V. BIES[Syllabus]
SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON[Syllabus]
TREST V. CAIN, 522 U.S. 87 (1997)[Syllabus]
JONES V. BOCK[Syllabus]
CALCANO-MARTINEZ V. INS[Syllabus]
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 precludes courts of appeals from exercising jurisdiction to review a final removal order against aliens removable by reason of aggravated felony convictions, but such aliens may pursue habeas relief in the district court.
ROE V. FLORES-ORTEGA[Syllabus]
Whether trial counsel has a Sixth Amendment duty to file a notice of appeal following a guilty plea in the absence a request by the defendant, particularly where the defendant has been advised of his appeal rights.
MICKENS V. TAYLOR[Syllabus]
In order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into defense counsel's potential conflict of interest about which the court knew or reasonably should have known, the defendant must establish that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.
MILLER-EL V. DRETKE[Syllabus]
BRACY V. GRAMLEY, WARDEN, 520 U.S. 899 (1997).[Syllabus]
WOOD V. ALLEN[Syllabus]
YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO[Syllabus]
(1) Whether, in applying the objective test for a "custody" determination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a court must consider the age and experience of a person if he or she is a juvenile? (2) Whether a state court adjudication can be deemed an "objectively unreasonable" application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because it declines to "extend" the rule of a Supreme Court precedent to a new context.
LACKAWANNA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYV. COSS[Syllabus]
Title 28 U. S. C. §2254 does not provide a remedy when a state prisoner challenges a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction for which the petitioner is no longer in custody.
HOHN V. UNITED STATES, 524 U.S. 236 (1998)[Syllabus]
FRY V. PLILER[Syllabus]
PEGUERO V. UNITED STATES[Syllabus]
CASTRO V. UNITED STATES[Syllabus]
When a United States District Court re-characterizes a pro-se federal prisoner's first post conviction motion as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. $2255, does such re-characterization render the prisoner's subsequent attempt to file a first titled §2255 petition a second or successive petition within the purview of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)'.' CLARK V. MARTINEZ[Syllabus]
CONE V. BELL[Syllabus]
PACE V. DIGUGLIELMO[Syllabus]
WALL V. KHOLI[Syllabus]
BERGHUIS V. SMITH[Syllabus]
BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS[Syllabus]
WIGGINS V. SMITH[Syllabus]
Does defense counsel in capital case violate the requirements of Stricland v. Washington by failing to investigate available mitigation evidence that could well have convinced a jury to impose a life sentence, as this Court concluded in Williams v. Taylor and as most Courts of Appeals have concluded, or is defense counsel's decision not to investigate such evidence virtually unchallengeable so long as counsel's decision not to investigate such evidence virtually unchallengeable so long as counsel knows rudimentary facts about the defendant's background, as the Fourth Circuit held in this case.
CLAY V. UNITED STATES[Syllabus]
For the purpose of starting the clock on the 1-year limitation period for federal prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2255, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a certiorari petition contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction.
O'DELL V. NETHERLAND, WARDEN, 117 S.CT. 1969, 138 L.ED.2D 351 (1997).[Syllabus]
CAREY V. MUSLADIN[Syllabus]
HAMDI V. RUMSFELD[Syllabus]
Did the court of appeals erred in holding that the U.S. has established the legality of the military's detention of Yaser Esam Hamdi, a presumed American citizen who was captured in Afghanistan during the combat operations in late 2001, and was determined by the military to be an enemy combatant who should be detained in connection with the ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan?
FIORE V. WHITE[Syllabus]
Whether a state can flaunt the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and evade federal habeas corpus relief for an incontestably innocent prisoner by claiming that an appellate decision constitutes ""new law,"" when in fact the state did not and could not prove a key element of the crime at trial? 3. Whether federal habeas relief should be extended to protect federal constitutional rights when a state refuses to retroactively apply a case which based its decision on the already existing clear language of the statute?
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE FOR THIRD JUDICIALDIST. V. OSBORNE[Syllabus]
BEARD V. BANKS[Syllabus]
EDWARDS V. BALISOK, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).[Syllabus]
PORTUONDO V. AGARD[Syllabus]
Whether the Second Circuit Court of Appeals erred in extending this Court's decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 509 (1965)-- which prohibited a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's right to remain silent-- to a prosecutor's comment on a testifying defendant's presence in the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses?
SMITH V. TEXAS[Syllabus]
CENTRAL VA. COMMUNITY COLLEGE V. KATZ[Syllabus]
CARLISLE V. UNITED STATES, 517 U.S. 416 (1996).[Syllabus]
SMITH V. SPISAK[Syllabus]
JAMA V. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT[Syllabus]
YOUNG V. HARPER, 520 U.S. 143 (1997).[Syllabus]
ARTUZ V. BENNETT[Syllabus]
Is a state court post-conviction application ""properly filed"" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), which tolls the one-year statute of limitations for Habeas corpus petitions in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it is filed in a court that does not have the power to hear the merits of the application?"
SMITH V. ROBBINS[Syllabus]
1. Did the Ninth Circuit err in finding that California's no-merit brief procedure-- in which appellate counsel who has found no nonfrivolous issues remains available to brief any issue the appellate court might identify--violated the Sixth Amendment Anders right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal? 2. Did the Ninth Circuit err when it ruled that the asserted Anders violation required a new appeal, without testing the claimed Sixth Amendment error under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)? 3. Did the Ninth Circuit violate the rule announced in Teague v. lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),which prohibits the retroactive application of a new rule on collateral review, when it invalidated California's wellsettled, good-faith interpretation of federal law?
BOWLES V. RUSSELL[Syllabus]
WHORTON V. BOCKTING[Syllabus]
VAN V. GOLDSTEIN[Syllabus]
RENO V. KORAY, 515 U.S. 39 (1995).[Syllabus]
SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN[Syllabus]
1) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)? (2) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?
SELING V. YOUNG[Syllabus]
In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), this Court held that the Kansas law authorizing commitment of sexually violent predators is civil in nature and does not violate the double jeopardy or ex post facto clauses. The Kansas law was modeled on Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute: Whether an otherwise valid civil statute can be divested of its civil nature and held to violate the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses because the administrative agency operating the commitment facility fails to provide for treatment and other conditions of confinement mandated by statute at some time during the individual's commitment."