Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19831215-1035883
Timestamp: 2017-04-24 23:22:48+00:00
Document Index: 41153405

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 4", "l'article 9", "l'article 4", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 1", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 27", "l'article 13", "l'article 9", "l'article 1", "l'article 1", "l'article 13", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 6-1 ; Préjudice moral - constat de violation suffisant ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure nationale ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure de la ConventionNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10358/83Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-12-15;10358.83 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) JUGEMENT PUBLIC, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : C.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 10358/8 3 C . v/the UNITED KINGDO M C . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 15 Decembre 1983 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 15 dÃ©cembre 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 9 of the Convention : 7his provision primarily protects the sphere of private, personal beliefs, and not every act in the public sphere which is dictated by such convictions . h does not authorises the right to refuse to abide by legislation (tax law), the operation of which is providedfor by the Convention, and which applies neutrally and generally in terms of freedom of conscience . Artlde 13 of tbe Convent/on : 7his provision does not guarantee a remedy against legislation, ar such, in order, for example, to have one's taxes allocated for a particular purpose .
Ar[icle 9 de la Convention : Cette disposition protÃ¨ge en premier lieu ce qui relÃ¨ve du for intÃ©rieur et pas nÃ©cessairement tout comportement public dictÃ© par une conviction . Elle n'autorise pas Ã se soustraire Ã une lÃ©gislation gÃ©nÃ©rale neutre sur le plan de la conscience et, qui plus est, prÃ©vue par la Convention (loi fiscale) . Article 13 de la Convention : Cette disposition ne garantit pas un recours contre la lÃ©gislation comme telle, par eremple pour obtenir une afjectation particuliÃ¨re du produit de l'impÃ´t que l'on paie .
THE FACTS ((ranÃ§ais : voir p . 148) The facts as they have been submitted on behalf of the applicant by Miss F . J . Hampson of the University of Essex may be summarised as follows : The applicant is a B ritish citizen resident in Oxfordshire and a technical wri ter by profession, born in 1939 . He is employed by a publishing house, and further permi tt ed to undertake assignments as a free-lance journalist .
The income tax on his salary is deducted at source by his employer, and the tax due on his free lance work, after deduction of expenses, is payable direct to the Inland Revenue . The applicant's assessment for the tax owing for the financial year 1981/82 amounts to Â£ 90, which he is willing to pay, but only on receipt of a guarantee that it will not be spent on purposes which are an outrage to his conscience and religious and philosophica] beliefs . He therefore accepts both that tax is owing, and the amount that is due to the Inland Revenue . The applicant is a member of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) a central tenet of whose belief is pacifism . He is not prepared to pay that proportion of his taxes which is used to finance armaments weapons' research and allied industries as these purposes are inconsistent with his beliefs . The Peace Campaign has calculated that a sum equivalent to forty per cent of the Revenue raised by direct income tax in 1980/81 was spent on artnaments, weapons' research and allied industries and the applicant having paid substantially more than 60 per cent of the income tax due from him in the year 1980/81, wishes to divert the whole of the sum still owing on his free lance eamings to peaceful purposes . The applicant indicated his philosophical convictions to the Inland Revenue and informed them that he was not prepared to pay the sum in question without guarantees as to its destination . The Inland Revenue applied to Oxford County Court for payment of the sum due, and the applicant entered a defence relying upon his freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention . The applicant appeared in person before the Registrar of Oxford County Court sitting in Chambers on 22 November 1982, when his defence was rejected but the Registrar refused to award costs to the Inland Revenue, recognising that the defence was not vexatious or an abuse of the processes of the Court . The applicant applied to have the order of the Registrar set aside, which request was refused by the County Court on 6 December 1982 . The applicant then sought leave to appeal against that order on 7lanuary 1983 which was refused . The applicant sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal, his application being dismissed on 18 February 1983 . The Inland Revenue has indicated to the applicant that it intends to seek enforcement of the judgment debt and the applicant therefore has to choose between paying a sum which will be used for further purposes which he opposes as a matter of belief and conscience, or having a judgment debt enforced against him . He contends that no procedure exists whereby he can effectively evoke the right to nwtifest his pacifist beliefs by directing a proportion of his tax to increase the resources available for peaceful purposes . He invokes Articles 9 and 13 of the Convention .
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains that the absence of any procedure whereby he may effectively invoke the right to manifest his pacifist beliefs by directing a proportion of the tax due from him to peaceful purposes represents a breach of Articles 9 and 1 3
of the Convention . He contends that the final decision is either the debt upon which he received notice of the final demandbased on the assessment following the preliminary hearing in Oxford County Court on 22 November 1982, or the date of the fmal re fusal of leave to appeal by the Court of Appeal on 18 February 1983 . He also points out that he has exhausted the available remedies under domestic law, a view confirmed by the decision in Cheney v . Conn (1968 f ALL ER 779) that English Cou rt s cannot take account of the United Kingdom's intemational obligations when admissible legislation is clear an unambiguous . The applicant also contends that he may be considered "a victim" within the meaning of Article 25 (1) of the Convention, since he is not complaining of domestic law in abstracto, but of the fact that a final demand for payment of income tax has been made, and that he is now liable to enforcement of the judgment debt as soon as the Inland Revenue seek a warrant to do so, and notwithstanding the fact that this step has not yet been taken . The applicant contends that pacifism comes within the scope and ambit of Article 9 of the Convention as a philosophical belief, as was recognised in Application No . 7050/75 (Arrowsmith v . the United Kingdom, D .R . 19 p . 5 at p . 19) . The manifestation in practice of pacifism requires that an adherent should oppose recourse to force in the settlement of disputes and therefore should not sÃ»pport, directly or indirectly, weapon procurement, weapon development and other defence related expenditure . Where forty per cent of the monies raised by taxation are used for such purposes, it is a necessary part of the manifestation of a pacifist's belief in practice and observance that forty per cent of his or her taxes be diverted to different, peaceful purposes . The present case is thus to be distinguished from Application No . 5442/72 (D .R . I p . 41 ) and the Arrowsmith case referred to above, especially because the diversion of forty per cent of the applicant's taxes to peaceful purposes is not merely consistent with her beliefs, but necessa ry for the manifestation of them in practice and observance . The applicant contends furthermore that his submissions are distinguishable from the conscientious objector cases (eg 7565/76, D .R . 9 p . 117 and 7705/76 D .R . 9 p . 196) since those cases relate to a factual situation where there is a requirement of some form of service, recognised by Article 4 (3) (b) of the Convention . Thus Article 9 has to be read subject to Article 4 (3) (b) where the fulfdment of such an obligation is at issue . But it has nevertheless been recognised in the conscientious objector cases that, where a form of civilian service may be perfortned, the duties thereof should not interfere with the practice of any religious belief (Application No . 5591/72, Collection 43 p . 161) . Hence Article 4 (3) (b) constitutes a limited exception to Article 9, which only applies to a requirement of military or civilian service and not to the manifestation of beliefs, including pacifist beliefs .
Under the terms of the present law, and in particular the Public Accounts Charges Act 1881, Section 1(2), Inland Revenue receipts are paid into a single account . The applicant merely requires that a separate account, "earmarked" for peaceful purposes is established, and submits that such a change in the law as this would require is necessary in order to enable him to pay his taxes without thereby acting in a fashion inconsistent with the manifestation of his pacifist beliefs . The applicant further contends that nojustification can be found in Article 9 (2) of the Convention for the interference with his freedom of conscience about which he complains . Although he recognises that the interference under Article 9(I) of the Convention is "prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 9 (2), he contends that the only conceivable justifications which could be invoked are either the interests of public safety, the protection of public order, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others . As far as an argument may be made with reference to public safety, the applicant stresses that he is willing to pay the full amount of tax due and that his case is distinguishable from that of other groups who for non-religious or nonphilosophical reasons may oppose certain categories of public spending . Pacifists would appear to be the only group who can bring their beliefs within the scope of Article 9 and claim that the manifestation of those beliefs entails opposition to all as opposed to certain elements of military expenditure and thus the diversion of forty per cent of their tax to peaceful purposes . Nor is his position to be compared with that of someone who objects to a particular level of military spending, or spending on a particular military project . In these circumstances, given the narrow basis of his objection, it cannot be argued that a massive precedent would be set by recognising the legitimacy of the applicant's objection . The same arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to a justification based upon the protection of public safety . Similarly the applicant contends that no justification can be mounted on the basis of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, since the Goverrnnent would then have to establish their defence expenditure unequivocally and undeniably did protect the rights and freedoms of its citizens . Levels of military expenditure are however a question of political choice, and no "minimum" level of military expenditure can be established as necessary in order to protect a given population . In this respect the present case is distinguishable from Application No . 2988/66, (10 YB p . 472), concerning the requircment for compulsory car insurance, where the amount of premiums were related directly to the compensation of victims of motor accidents, a correlation which does not exist in relation to military spending . Furtherrnore a Government could either take the view that no military spending, or large military spending, would protect its citizens and could not therefore justify imposing its choice in this respect on the proponents of the opposite argument . Finally even assuming that defence expenditure is for the protection of citizens, the Government must establish that it is necessary in a democratic society to raise funds for thi s
expenditure from all citizens . The applicant contends that it is not necessary or proportionate to the aim of the protection of citizens from war by means of military expenditure to require pacifists to help finance something which they disapprove of on account of their philosophical convictions . Thus it is the necessity of the Iimitation on the right of pacifists to manifest their philosophical beliefs in observance and practice which must be justified under the terms of the Convention, and not the need for defence expenditure . No choice therefore arises between two conflicting "pressing social needs", namely defence expenditure and non-interference with the right of pacifists to manifest their beliefs in observance and practice . The applicant asks only that a proportion of his taxes which would go towards military expenditure should be diverted to peaceful purposes . In this respect the applicant recalls that the Government allows pacifists not to fight when the state is actually under an immediate threat by permitting conscientious objection, and that it cannot therefore justify forcing pacifists to pay for military expenditure in peace time, since they are thereby being obliged to pay for something which they are not going to be obliged to do since it violates their conscience . Finally it would be possible to earmark tax raised for specific purposes, as is already done in the case of national insurance contributions . With respect to the application of Article 13 of the Convention the applicant cohtends that he has had no opportunity for his claim that his rights under Article 9 of the Convention have been violated, in as far as the United Kingdom makes no provision for the diversion of forty per cent of the taxes of pacifists to peaceful purposes, to be considered by a national authority capable of giving an effective remedy .
THE LAW 1 . The applicant invokes Article 9 of the Convention in relation to his complaint that he should not be obliged to pay a portion of his taxes without an assurance that they will not be applied for military or related expenditure . Article 9 provides : "1 . Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either `alone or in community with others and in public or private, tÃ´ manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance . 2 . Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health of morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others . " The applicant, who is a Quaker, contends that to compel him to contribute to expenditure for armaments, rather than for peaceful purposes,is an outrage to his conscience and contmry to the requirements of the manifestation of his belief through practice . He contends that the manifestation in practice of his Quaker beliefs requires him to oppose recourse to force in the settlement of disputes and not to support - 146 -
directly or indirectly weapon procurement, weapon development and other defence related expenditure . It is therefore his contention that it is a necessary part of the manifestation of his Quaker belief in practice and observance that forty per cent of his income tax be diverted to different, peaceful purposes . This step is not merely consistent with the Quaker beliefs, but necessary to their manifestation . Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, i .e . the area which is sometimes called the forum inrernum . In addition, it protects acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes, such as acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised form . However, in protecting this personal sphere, Article 9 of the Convention does not always guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by such a belief :- for instance by refusing to pay certain taxes because part of the revenue so raised may be applied for military expenditure . The Commission has so held in Application No . 7050/75 (Arrowsmith v . the United Kingdom, Comm . Report, para . 71, D .R . 19 p . 5), where it stated that " the term 'practice' as employed in Art . 9(1) does not cover each act which is motivated or influenced by a religion or a belief . " The obligation to pay taxes is a general one which has no specific conscientious implications in itself. Its neutrality in this sense is also illustrated by the fact that notax payer can influence or determine the purpose for which his or her contributions are applied, once they are collected . Furthermore, the power of taxation is expressly recognised by the Convention system and is ascribed to the State by Article 1, First Protocol . It follows that Article 9 does not confer on the applicant the right to refuse, on the basis of his convictions, to abide by legislation, the operation of which is provided for by the Convention, and which applies neutrally and generally in the public sphere, without impinging on the freedoms guaranteed by Article 9 . If the applicant considers the obligation to contribute through taxation to arms procurement an outrage to his conscience he may advertise his attitude and thereby try to obtain support for it through the democratic process . The Commission concludes that there has been no interference with the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article 9(I) of the Convention and it follows that this aspect of the applicant's complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
2 . The applicant has also complained that he has been denied the opportunity to voice his objection to his payment of taxes without an assurance as to their ultimate destination and invokes Article 13 of the Convention which provides : "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity . " - 147 -
However, the Commission notes that the right to specify the purpose for which money raised by taxation is to be spent is not expressly gu aranteed by the Convention, and cannot, in the light of the Commission's finding in respect of the applicant's complaint under Atticle .9 of the Convention above, be implied from its terms . In as far as the applicant complains of the operation of laws to secure the payment of taxes, the liability to which he does not dispute, the Commission recalls the terms of the final paragraph ofAnicle I First Protocol, which provides a wide discretion to Member States in the enforcement of precisely such measures . The applicant complains that the legislation in the United Kingdom does not provide for him to make conscientious objection to the allocation of revenue arising from his taxation to specific purposes, but the Commission recallsthat, in accordance with its established case law, A rticle 13 of the Convention does not guarantee the right to challenge or review legislation for its conformity with the Convention, but merely ensurÃ©s a machine ry wherebyindividuals may a ttempt to vindicate their claims of violations of the Convention (judgment of the Court of 25 November 1980 in the case of Young James and Webster, Series A Vol 44) . In the present case the applicant is not prevented from holding the view that the legislation relating to collection of taxation should be amended to permit his conscientious views in relation to the application of those funds to be taken into account . In these circumstances the Conuaission concludes that the applicant has not established the absence of a remedy for a complaint conceming a right guaranteed by the Convention as envisaged by Article 13 of the Convention, and it follows that this aspÃ©ct of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
For these reasons the Contmissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
(lRADUC77ON) EN FAI T Les faits, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s au nom du requÃ©rant par Mlle F .J . Hampson, de l'UniversitÃ© d'Essex, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant, un ressonissant b ritannique nÃ© en 1939, habitant l'Oxfordshire, est auteur de livres techniques . Il est employÃ© par une maison d'Ã©dition, qui l'autorise Ã faire en plus des reportages comme joumaliste indÃ©pendant . - 148 -
L'impÃ´t sur le revenu de son salaire est retenu Ã la source par son employeur et l'impÃ´t exigible, aprÃ¨s dÃ©duction des frais, sur son travail indÃ©pendant est payable directement au fise . Le montant de l'impÃ´t d Ã» par le requÃ©rant pour l'annÃ©e fiscale 1981/1982 est de Â£ 90, qu'il est disposÃ© Ã payer mais seulement aprÃ©s avoir reÃ§u l'assurance qu'il ne sera pas affectÃ© Ã des objectifs heurtant sa conscience et ses convictions religieuses et philosophiques . Le requÃ©rant reconnait donc tout Ã la fois qu'il doit cet impÃ´t et que le montant doit en Ãªtre versÃ© au fisc . Le requÃ©rant est membre de la SociÃ©tÃ© religieuse des Amis (quakers) dont l'une des convictions essentielles est le pacifisme . Il n'est pas disposÃ© Ã s'acquitter de la partie de ses impÃ´ts qui servira Ã financer la recherche sur les armements et industries connexes car ces objectifs sont incompatibles avec ses convictions . L'organisation . Campagne pour la paix - a calculÃ© qu'un montant Ã©quivalant Ã 40 % des recettes fiscales provenant de l'impÃ´t direct sur le revenu en 1980/81 a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©pensÃ© pour la recherche sur les armements et les industries connexes . Or, le requÃ©rant a versÃ© sensiblement plus de 60 % du montant dÃ» par lui au titre de l'impÃ´t sur le revenu pour l'annÃ©e 1980/81 ; il dÃ©sire que l'ensemble de la somme qu'il reste devoir pour ses revenus provenant d'une activitÃ© indÃ©pendante soit affectÃ©e Ã des objectifs pacifiques . Le requÃ©rant a fait connaitre ses convictions philosophiques au fisc et l'a infotmÃ© qu'il n'Ã©tait pas disposÃ© Ã verser la somme en question sans recevoir en contrepartie des assurances quant Ã son affectation . L'administration fiscale s'adressa au tribunal du comtÃ© d'Oxford pour une sommation de payer la somme due et le requÃ©rant invoqua pour se dÃ©fendre la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience et de religion que lui garantit l'article 9 de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant comparut personnellement le 22 novembre 1982 devant le greffier du tribunal du comtÃ© d'Oxford siÃ©geant en chambre du conseil . Son moyen de dÃ©fense fut rejetÃ© mais le greffier refusa cependant d'accorder au fisc le bÃ©nÃ©fice des frais et dÃ©pens, reconnaissant que le moyen invoquÃ© n'Ã©tait ni chicanier ni abusif . Le requÃ©rant demanda l'annulation de la dÃ©cision du greffier, ce que le tribunal de comtÃ© refusa le 6 dÃ©cembre 1982 . Le requÃ©rant demanda alors Ã pouvoir interjeter appel de cene dÃ©cision le 7 janvier 1983, mais l'autorisation lui en fut refusÃ©e . Il demanda la mÃªme autorisation Ã la Court of Appeal, mais sa demande fut rejetÃ©e le 18 fÃ©vrier 1983 . L'administration fiscale a indiquÃ© au requÃ©rant qu'elle se proposait de recouvrer par la contrainte cette dette constatÃ©e en justice, ce qui oblige le requÃ©rant Ã choisir entre s'acquitter volontairement d'une somme qui sera utilisÃ©e pour des objectifs contraires Ã ses convictions ou se voir soumis Ã l'exÃ©cution forcÃ©e pour une dette constatÃ©e en justice . Selon lui, aucune procÃ©dure ne lui permet de faire valoir son droit de manifester ses convictions pacifistes en affectant une partie de son impÃ´t Ã l'augmentation des ressources pour la paix . II invoque Ã cet Ã©gard les articles 9 et 13 de la Convention . - 149 -
GRIIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint de ce que l'absence de toute procÃ©du re lui pennettant de faire valoir son droit de manifester ses convictions pacifistes en affectant Ã des objectifs pacifiques une partie de l'impÃ´t qu'il doit, constitue une violation des articles 9 et 13 de la Convention . Il faut, Ã son avis, considÃ©rer la dÃ©cision finale comme Ã©tant soit la sommation de payer fondÃ©e sur l'Ã©valuation faite aprÃ¨s l'audience prÃ©liminaire du 22 novembre 1982 devant le tribunal du comtÃ© d'Oxford, soit le refus, opposÃ© par la Cou rt of Appeal le 18 fÃ©vrier 1983, de l'auto ri ser Ã interjeter appel . II souligne Ã©galement avoir Ã©puisÃ© les recours Ã sa disposition en droit inteme, point de vue confirmÃ© par l'arrÃªt Cheney c/Conn (1968 1 ALL ER 779), selon lequel les ju ri dictions anglaises n'ont pas Ã tÃ¨nir compte des obligations internationales du RoyaumeUni lorsque la lÃ©gislation applicable est claire et dÃ©pou rv ue d'ambiguÃ¯tÃ© Ã© galement qu'il peut Ãªtre qualifiÃ© de â¢victimeâ¢ au sens .LerquÃ©antfim de l'a rt icle 25 par . 1 de la Convention car il ne se plaint pas de la lÃ©gislation interne considÃ©rÃ©e in abstracto mais du fait qu'une sommation de payer l'impÃ´t sur le revenu lui a Ã©tÃ© adressÃ©e et qu'il peut Ã prÃ©sent se voir contraint de payer la de tte constatÃ©e en justice dÃ¨s que le fisc demandera l'autori sation d'exÃ©cuter le jugement, mÃªme si cette mesure n'a pas encore Ã© tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant soutient que le paciftsme relÃ¨ve de l'article 9 de la Convention puisqu'il s'agit d'une conviction philosophique, comme l'a reconnu la Commission Ã propos de la requ@te No 7050/75 ( Arrowsmith c/Royaume-Uni, D .R . 5 p . 19) . la manifestation pratique du pacifisme exige du pacifiste qu'il s'oppose au recou rs Ã la force pour rÃ©gler les conflits et, dÃ¨s lors, qu'il ne finance pas, directement ou indirectement, les foumitu re s d'armes, la mise au point d'armements et d'autres dÃ©penses liÃ©es Ã la dÃ©fense . Lorsque 40 % des rece tt es fiscales sont affectÃ©es Ã ces objectifs, cela fait nÃ©cessairement partie de la manifestation pratique de la conviction d'un pacifiste de dÃ©toumer 40 % de ses impÃ´ts vers des objectifs diffÃ©re nts et pacifiques . La prÃ©sente affaire doit dÃ¨s lo rs Ãªtre distinguÃ©e de la requÃªte No 5442/72 (D .R . 1 p . 41) et de l'affaire Arrowsmith prÃ©citÃ©e, essentiellement p arce que distraire 40 % des impÃ´ts du requÃ©rant pour les affecter Ã des fins pacifiques n'est pas seulement conforme Ã ses convictions mais nÃ©cessaire Ã leur manifestation pratique .
Le requÃ©rant soutient en outre que son argumentation se distingue des affaires d'objection de conscience (par exemple Nos 7565/76, D .R . 9 p . 117 et 7705/76, D . R . 9 p . 196), qui conce rn ent une situation de fait exigeant une certaine forme de serv ice, dÃ»ment reconnue par l'article 4 p ar . 3 b) de la Convention . Il faut dÃ¨s lors lire l'article 9 sous rÃ©serv e des dispositions de l'article 4 par . 3 b) lorsque l'accom . Il a nÃ©anmoins Ã© tÃ© reconnu dans les affÃ¢i--plisemntd'u obliganestju res d'objection de conscience que, lorsqu'une forme de se rv ice civil peut Ãªtre accomplie, les obligations qui en dÃ©coulent ne doivent pas porter att einte Ã la pratique d'une quelconque conviction religieuse (requÃªte No 5591/72, Recueil 43 p . 161) . - 150 -
L'article 4 par . 3 b) constitue dÃ¨s lors une ezception Ã l'article 9, qui ne s'applique qu'Ã l'obligation du service militaire ou civi] et non Ã la manifestation de convictions pacifistes notamment . Selon la lÃ©gislation actuelle, et singuliÃ¨rement la loi de 1881 sur les comptes de l'Etat, article 1 par . 2, les recettes fiscales sont versÃ©es Ã un compte unique . Le requÃ©rant exige simplement que soit crÃ©Ã© un compte sÃ©parÃ©, dont les fonds seront â¢ rÃ©servÃ©s â¢ Ã des objectifs pacifiques . Selon lui, la modification que cela suppose dans la lÃ©gislation est nÃ©cessaire pour qu'il puisse s'acquitter de ses impbts sans pour autant heurter la manifestation de ses convictions pacifistes . Le requÃ©rant soutient en outre que rien dans l'article 9 par . 2 de la Convention ne justifte l'atteinte Ã la libertÃ© d'opinion dont il se plaint . Certes, l'ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice des droits reconnus Ã l'article 9 par . 1 de la Convention est dans son cas â¢ prÃ©vue par la loi â¢, au sens de l'article 9 par . 2, mais selon le requÃ©rant, les seules justifications pouvant Ã¨tre invoquÃ©es sont la sÃ©curitÃ© publique, la protection de l'ordre ou la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . Or, s'agissant de la sÃ©curitÃ© publique, le requÃ©rant souligne qu'il est parfaitement disposÃ© Ã s'acquitter de la totalitÃ© de l'impÃ´t qu'il doit et que son cas se distingue Ã cet Ã©gard de celui d'autres groupes qui, pour des raisons qui ne sont ni religieuses ni philosophiques, s'opposent Ã certaines catÃ©gories de dÃ©penses publiques . Les pacifistes sont, semble-t-il, les seuls dont les convictions relÃ¨vent de l'article 9 et qui peuvent prÃ©tendre que la manifestation de leurs convictions exige une opposition Ã toutes les dÃ©penses militaires, et pas seulement Ã certaines d'entre elles, et donc une affectation de 40 % de leurs impÃ´ts Ã des objectifs pacifiques . La situation du pacifiste ne peut pas non plus se comparer Ã celle de la personne qui objecte Ã un certain montant des dÃ©penses militaires ou des dÃ©penses affÃ©rentes Ã tel ou tel projet militaire . Dans ces conditions, et compte tenu de la base trÃ¨s Ã©troite de l'objection du requÃ©rant, on ne peut pas soutenir qu'en reconnaissant sa lÃ©gitimitÃ©, on crÃ©erait un prÃ©cÃ©dent massif . Les mÃªmes arguments s'appliquent mutatis mutandis Ã une justification fondÃ©e sur la protection de la sÃ©curitÃ© publique . De m@me, le requÃ©rant soutient que l'on ne peut fonder aucune justification sur la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui puisque le Gouvernement aurait alors Ã prouver que les dÃ©penses consacrÃ©es Ã la dÃ©fense protÃ¨gent clairement et incontestablement les droits et libertÃ©s de ses citoyens . L'importance des dÃ©penses militaires est cependant une question de choix politique et aucun niveau â¢ minimum â¢ ne saurait Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ© nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection d'une population donnÃ©e . A cet Ã©gard, la prÃ©sente affaire se distingue de la requÃªte No 2988166, Annuaire 10 p . 472, concernant l'obligation de contracter une assurance automobile, car le montant des primes est directement liÃ© Ã l'indemnisation des victimes d'accidents de la route, lien qui n'existe pas en ce qui concerne les dÃ©penses rnilitaires . En outre, un gouvernement peut estimer que la protection de ses citoyens n'exige aucune dÃ©pense militaire o u
nÃ©cessite au contraire de grosses dÃ©penses militaires, si bien qu'il ne peut justifier d'imposer son choix aux tenants de la thÃ¨se opposÃ©e . Enfin, Ã supposer mÃ©me que les dÃ©penses consacrÃ©es Ã la dÃ©fense soient nÃ©cessaires Ã la protection des citoyens, le gouvemement doit prouver qu'il est nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique de collecter des fonds auprÃ¨s de tous les citoyens pour alimenter ce gen re de dÃ©penses . Le requÃ©rant avance qu'il n'est ni nÃ©cessaire ni proportionnÃ© au but de protection des citoyens contre la guerre par des dÃ©penses militaires d'exiger des pacifistes qu'ils aident Ã financer quelque chose qu'ils dÃ©sapprouvent en raison de leurs convictions philosophiques . Ce qu'il faut justifier au regard de la Convention, c'est donc la nÃ©cessitÃ© de limiter le droit des pacifistes Ã manifester ein pratique leurs convictions philosophiques et non celle de prÃ©voir des dÃ©penses pour la dÃ©fense . Il ne s'agit donc pas de choisir entre deux - besoins sociaux impÃ©rieux . qui seraient contradictoires ; Ã savoir les dÃ©penses de dÃ©fense et la non-ingÃ©rence dans le droit des pacifistes Ã manifester en pratique leurs convictions . Le requÃ©rant demande seulement d'affecter Ã des fins pacifiques une partie du montant de son impÃ´t qui irait normalement Ã des dÃ©penses militaires . Il rappelle Ã cet Ã©gard que le Gouvernement permet aux pacifistes de ne pas combattre lorsque l'Etat est rÃ©ellement et immÃ©diatement menacÃ©, puisqu'il autorise l'objection de conscience : il ne saurait dÃ¨s lors prÃ©tendre obliger les pacifistes Ã financer des dÃ©penses militaires en temps de paix car cela revient Ã les obliger Ã financer des opÃ©rations auxquelles ils .ne seront finalement pas obligÃ©s de participer puisqu'elles sont contraires Ã leur conscience . Enfin, il serait parfaitement possible d'affecter l'impÃ´t prÃ©levÃ© Ã des objectifs prÃ©cis, comme on le fait dÃ©jÃ pour les cotisations de sÃ©curitÃ© sociale . 1â¢Surl'apictonde 3 de la Convention, le requÃ©rant soutient n'avoi r pas la possibilitÃ© de faire examiner,par une instance nationale apte Ã fournir un recours effectif le grief selon lequel il-y a eu violation des droits garantis par l'article 9 de la Convention dans la mesure oÃ¹ le Royaume-Uni ne prÃ©voit pas d'affecter Ã desobjectifs pacifiques 40 % des recettes fiscales des pacifistes .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant invoque l'article 9 de la Convention Ã l'appui de son grief selon lequel il ne devrait pas Ãªtre obligÃ© de s'acquitter d'une partie de ses impÃ´ts sans recevoir l'assurance que le montant prÃ©lÃ©vÃ© ne sera pas affectÃ© Ã des dÃ©penses militaires ou paramilitaires . L'article 9 est ainsi libellÃ© : Â« 1 . Toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience et de religion ; ce droit implique la libertÃ© de changer de religion ou de conviction, ainsi que la libertÃ© de manifester sa religion ou sa conviction individuellement ou collectivement, en public ou en privÃ©, p ar le culte, l'enseignement, les pratiques et l'accomplissement des rites .
2 . La libertÃ© de manifester sa religion ou ses convictions ne peut faire l'objet d'autres restrictions que celles qui, prÃ©vues par la loi, constituent des mesures nÃ©cessaires, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© publique, Ã la protection de l'ordre, de la santÃ© ou de la morale publiques ou Ã la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . Le requÃ©rant, adepte des Quakers, soutient que l'obliger Ã participer aux dÃ©penses d'armements, plutot qu'Ã des dÃ©penses pacifiques, violente sa conscience et heurte les exigences de la manifestation de ses convictions . Il fait valoir que la manifestation pratique de ses convictions de Quaker l'oblige Ã s'opposer au recours Ã la force dans le rÃ¨glement des conflits et Ã ne pas financer, directement ou indirectement, les fou rn itures d'armes, la mise au point d'armements et d'autres dÃ©penses liÃ©es Ã la dÃ©fense . Selon lui, cela constitue donc une partie nÃ©cessaire de la manifestation pratique de sa conviction de Quaker de dÃ©tourner Ã des fins pacifiques 40 % de son impÃ´t sur le revenu . Cette mesure n'est pas seulement conforme Ã ses convictions de Quaker mais nÃ©cessaire Ã leur manifestation . L'article 9 protÃ©ge avant tout le domaine des convictions personnelles et des croyances religieuses, ce que l'on appelle parfois le for intÃ©rieur . De plus, il protÃ¨ge des actes intimement liÃ©s Ã ces comportements, tels les actes du culte ou de dÃ©votion qui sont des aspects de la pratique d'une religion ou d'une conviction sous une forme gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnue . _ Cependant, pour protÃ©ger ce domaine personnel, l'article 9 de la Convention ne g arantit pas toujours le droit de se compo rter dans le domaine public d'une maniÃ¨re dictÃ©e p ar cette conviction : par exemple en refusant de s'acqui tter de certains impÃ´ts parce qu'une pa rt ie des recettes fiscales ainsi prÃ©levÃ©es peuvent Ãªtre affectÃ©es Ã des dÃ©penses militaires . La Commission l'a dÃ©clarÃ© Ã propos de la requÃªte No 7050/75 ( Arrowsmith c/Royaume-Uni, rapport Comm ., par . 71, D .R . 19 p . 5), oÃ¹ elle a prÃ©cisÃ© que -le terme'pratiques', au sens de l'article 9 par . 1, ne dÃ©signe pas n'importe quel acte motivÃ© ou inspirÃ© p ar une religion ou une conviction- . L'obligation d'acquitter l'impÃ´t est une obligation d'ordre gÃ©nÃ©ral qui n'a en elle-mÃ©me aucune incidence prÃ©cise au plan de la conscience . En ce sens, sa neutralitÃ© est illustrÃ©e Ã© galement par le fait qu'aucun contribuable ne peut influencer l'affectation de ses impÃ´ts, ni en dÃ©cider une fois le prÃ©lÃ¨vement effectuÃ© . En outre, par l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel, le systÃ¨me de la Convention reconnait expressÃ©ment Ã l'Etat le pouvoir de lever l'impÃ´t . Il s'ensuit que l'article 9 ne confÃ¨re pas au requÃ©rant le droit d'invoquer ses convictions pour refuser de se soume tt re Ã une lÃ©gislation dont la Convention prÃ©voit la mise en auvre et qui s'applique de maniÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©rale et neutre dans le domaine public, sans empiÃ©ter sur les libe rtÃ©s garanties p ar l'article 9 .
Si le requÃ©rant estime que l'obligation de contribuer par l'impÃ´t aux foumimres d'armes violente sa conscience, il peut faire connaÃ®tre son attitude et essayer, par les voies dÃ©mocratiques, de rallier Ã sa thÃ¨se d'autres partisans . La Commission formule l'avis qu'il n'y a pas eu ingÃ©rence dans les droits garantis au requÃ©rant par l'anicle 9 par . 1 de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que le grief du requÃ©rant est, sur ce polnt, manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint Ã©galement de n'avoir pas eu la possibilitÃ© de faire valoir qu'il s'oppose au paiement de l'impÃ´t sans recevo'v en contrepartie l'assurance de sa destination finale . II invoque Ã cet Ã©gard l'article 13 de la Convention ainsi libellÃ© : â¢ Toute personne dont les droits et libertÃ©s reconnus dans la prÃ©sente Convention ont Ã©tÃ© violÃ©s, a droit Ã l'octroi d'un recours effectif devant une instance nationale, alors mÃ©me que la violation aurait Ã©tÃ© commise par des personnes agissant dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions officielles . La Commission relÃ©ve cependant que le droit de spÃ©cifier l'affectation du produit de l'impÃ´t n'est pas expressÃ©ment garanti par la Convention et ne peut pas non plus Ãªtre dÃ©duit de son libellÃ© vu la conclusion Ã laquelle elle est arrivÃ©e Ã propos du grief tirÃ© par le requÃ©rant de l'article 9 de la Convention . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant se plaint de la mise en muvre de lois propre s Ã assurer le paiement d'impÃ´ts auxquels le requÃ©rant reconnaÃ®t Ãªtre assujetti, la Commission rappelle le libellÃ© du dernier alinÃ©a de l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel, qui laisse aux Etats membres un large pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire pour appliquer prÃ©cisÃ©ment ce genre de mesures . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de ce qu'au Royaume-Uni la lÃ©gislation ne lui permet pas de faire objection de conscience Ã l'affectation Ã certains objectifs des recettes provenant de son impÃ´t . La Commission rappelle cependant que, selon sa jurisprudence constante, l'article 1 3 de la Convention ne garantit pas le droit de contester ou de contrÃ´ler la conformitÃ© d'une lÃ©gislation avec la Convention ; cette disposition assure simplement le fonctionnement d'un mÃ©canisme permettant aux individus de faire valoir leurs griefs de violation de la Convention (Cour eur. D .H ., arrÃªt du 25 novembre 1980 dans l'affaire Young, James et Webster, sÃ©rie A vol . 44) . En l'espÃ©ce, rien n'empÃªche le requÃ©rant de professer l'idÃ©e que la lÃ©gislation sur le prÃ©lÃ¨vement des impÃ´ts devrait Ãªtre amendÃ©e pour permettre de tenir comptÃ© de ses opinions sur l'affectation des recettes fiscales . Dans ces conditions, la Commission estime que le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©tabli l'inexistence d'un recours permettant, comme le prÃ©voit l'article 13 de la Convention, d'exposer un grief concernant un droit garanti par la Convention . Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte, sur ce point Ã©galement, est manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQU@TEIRRECEVABLE . - 154 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 15/12/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page