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DELCOSTELLO V. TEAMSTERS, 462 U. S. 151 (1983)
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DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
The issue in each of these cases is what statute of limitations applies in an employee suit against an employer and a union, alleging the employer's breach of a collective bargaining agreement and the union's breach of its duty of fair representation by mishandling the ensuing grievance or arbitration proceedings. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, held in a similar suit that an employee's claim against the employer was governed by a state statute of limitations for vacation of an arbitration award, rather than by a state statute for an action for breach of contract, but left open the issues as to what state statute should govern the employee's claim against the union or whether, instead of applying a state statute of limitations, the provisions of § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act establishing a 6-month limitations period for making charges of unfair labor practices to the National Labor Relations Board should be borrowed. In No. 81-2386, respondent local union brought a formal grievance under the collective bargaining agreement based on petitioner employee's alleged improper discharge. After a hearing, a joint union-management committee informed petitioner of its conclusion that the grievance was without merit, and the committee's determination became final on September 20, 1977. On March 16, 1978, petitioner filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the employer had discharged him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and that the union had represented him in the grievance procedure in a discriminatory, arbitrary, and perfunctory manner. The District Court ultimately granted summary judgment against petitioner, concluding that Mitchell compelled application of Maryland's 30-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards to both of petitioner's claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In No. 81-2408, petitioner local union invoked arbitration after it was unsuccessful in processing respondent employees' grievances based on the employer's alleged violations of the bargaining agreement arising from job-assignment practices. On February chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 152
"Congress established a limitations period attuned to what it viewed as the proper balance between the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and
Page 462 U. S. 153
an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective bargaining system."
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., post, p. 462 U. S. 172, and O'CONNOR, J., post, p. 462 U. S. 174, filed dissenting opinions. chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 154
Each of these cases arose as a suit by an employee or employees against an employer and a union, alleging that the employer had breached a provision of a collective bargaining agreement and that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by mishandling the ensuing grievance and arbitration proceedings. See infra at 462 U. S. 162; Bowen v. USPS, 459 U. S. 212 (1983); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U. S. 554 (1976). The issue presented is what statute of limitations should apply to such suits. In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56 (1981), we held that a similar suit was governed by a state statute of limitations for vacation of an arbitration award, rather than by a state statute for an action on a contract. We left two points open, however. First, our holding was limited to the employee's claim against the employer; we did not address what state statute should govern the claim against the union. [Footnote 1] Second, we expressly limited our consideration to a choice between two state statutes of limitations; we did not address the contention that we should instead borrow a federal statute of limitations, namely, § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). [Footnote 2] These cases present these two issues. chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 155
We conclude that § 10(b) should be the applicable statute of limitations governing the suit, both against the employer and against the union.
On March 16, 1978, DelCostello filed this suit in the District of Maryland against the employer and the union. He chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 156
alleged that the employer had discharged him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and that the union had represented him in the grievance procedure "in a discriminatory, arbitrary and perfunctory manner," App. in No. 81-2386, p.19, resulting in an unfavorable decision by the joint committee. Respondents asserted that the suit was barred by Maryland's 30-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards. [Footnote 4] The District Court disagreed, holding that the applicable statute was the 3-year state statute for actions on contracts. [Footnote 5] 510 F.Supp. 716 (1981). On reconsideration following our decision in Mitchell, however, the court granted summary judgment for respondents, concluding that Mitchell compelled application of the 30-day statute to both the claim against the employer and the claim against the union. 524 F.Supp. 721 (1981). [Footnote 6] The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District Court's order. 679 F.2d 879 (CA4 1982) (mem.).
Donald C. Flowers and King E. Jones, respondents in No. 81-2408, were employed as craft welders by Bethlehem Steel Corp. and represented by petitioner Steelworkers Local 2602. [Footnote 7] In 1975 and 1976, respondents filed several chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 157
grievances asserting that the employer had violated the collective bargaining agreement by assigning certain welding duties to employees in other job categories and departments of the plant, with the result that respondents were laid off or assigned to noncraft work. The union processed the grievances through the contractually established procedure and, failing to gain satisfaction, invoked arbitration. On February 24, 1978, the arbitrator issued an award for the employer, ruling that the employer's job assignments were permitted by the collective bargaining agreement.
Respondents filed this suit in the Western District of New York on January 9, 1979, naming both the employer and the union as defendants. The complaint alleged that the company's work assignments violated the collective bargaining agreement, and that the union's "preparation, investigation and handling" of respondents' grievances were "so inept and careless as to be arbitrary and capricious," in violation of the union's duty of fair representation. App. in No. 81-2408, p. 10. The District Court dismissed the complaint against both defendants, holding that the entire suit was governed by New York's 90-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards. [Footnote 8] The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of its prior holding in Mitchell v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 624 F.2d 394 (CA2 1980), that such actions are governed by New York's 6-year statute for actions on contracts. [Footnote 9] Flowers v. Local 2602, United Steel Workers of America, 622 F.2d 573 (CA2 1980) (mem.). We granted certiorari and vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of our reversal in Mitchell. Steelworkers v. Flowers, 451 U.S. 965 (1981). On remand, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the 6-month period of § 10(b) applies. Accordingly, following our decision in Mitchell, it applied the 90-day arbitration statute and affirmed the dismissal as to the employer. As to the union, however, the chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 158
court reversed, concluding that the correct statute to apply was New York's 3-year statute for malpractice actions. [Footnote 10] 671 F.2d 87 (CA2 1982).
"The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation
Page 462 U. S. 159
within the interstices of the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has not spoken, but left matters for judicial determination within the general framework of familiar legal principles."
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 327 U. S. 395 (1946). [Footnote 13] See, e.g., 427 U. S. 180-182 (1976); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 404 U. S. 101-105 (1971); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696 (1966); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906); Campbell v. Haverhill,@ 155 U. S. 610 (1895). chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 161
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 432 U. S. 367 (1977), quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 421 U. S. 465 (1975). chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 162
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. was a straightforward suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, for breach of a collective bargaining agreement by an employer. Unlike the present cases, Hoosier did not involve any agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, and the suit was brought by the union itself, rather than by an individual employee. We held that the suit was governed by Indiana's 6-year limitations period for actions on unwritten contracts; we resisted the suggestion that we establish some uniform federal period. Although we recognized that "the subject matter of § 301 is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law,'" 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 701, quoting Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 369 U. S. 103 (1962), we reasoned that national uniformity is of less importance when the chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 163
case does not involve
It has long been established that an individual employee may bring suit against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962). Ordinarily, however, an employee is required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or arbitration remedies provided in the collective bargaining agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 (1965); cf. Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U. S. 679 (1981) chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 164
(exhaustion of intra-union remedies not always required). Subject to very limited judicial review, he will be bound by the result according to the finality provisions of the agreement. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757, 461 U. S. 764 (1983); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U. S. 593 (1960). In Vaca and Hines, however, we recognized that this rule works an unacceptable injustice when the union representing the employee in the grievance/arbitration procedure acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its duty of fair representation. In such an instance, an employee may bring suit against both the employer and the union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration proceeding. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U. S. 554 (1976); United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56 (1981); Bowen v. USPS, 459 U. S. 212 (1983); Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U. S. 25 (1970). Such a suit, as a formal matter, comprises two causes of action. The suit against the employer rests on § 301, since the employee is alleging a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union's duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. [Footnote 14]
"Yet the two claims are inextricably interdependent.
Page 462 U. S. 165
'To prevail against either the company or the Union, . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract, but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union.'"
In Mitchell, we analogized the employee's claim against the employer to an action to vacate an arbitration award in a commercial setting. We adhere to the view that, as between the two choices, it is more suitable to characterize the claim that way than as a suit for breach of contract. Nevertheless, the parallel is imperfect in operation. The main difference is that a party to commercial arbitration will ordinarily be represented by counsel or, at least, will have some experience in matters of commercial dealings and contract negotiation. Moreover, an action to vacate a commercial arbitral award will rarely raise any issues not already presented and contested in the arbitration proceeding itself. In the labor setting, chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 166
by contrast, the employee will often be unsophisticated in collective bargaining matters, and he will almost always be represented solely by the union. He is called upon, within the limitations period, to evaluate the adequacy of the union's representation, to retain counsel, to investigate substantial matters that were not at issue in the arbitration proceeding, and to frame his suit. Yet state arbitration statutes typically provide very short times in which to sue for vacation of arbitration awards. [Footnote 15] Concededly, the very brevity of New York's 90-day arbitration limitations period was a major factor why, in Mitchell, we preferred it to the 6-year statute for breach of contract, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 63-64; but it does not follow that, because 6 years is too long, 90 days is long enough. See also Hoosier, supra, at 383 U. S. 707, n. 9. We conclude that state limitations periods for vacating arbitration awards fail to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights under § 301 and the fair representation doctrine. [Footnote 16]
Moreover, as JUSTICE STEVENS pointed out in his opinion in Mitchell, analogy to an action to vacate an arbitration chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 167
award is problematic, at best, as applied to the employee's claim against the union:
The most serious objection is that it does not solve the problem caused by the too-short time in which an employee could sue his employer under borrowed state law. In a commercial setting, a party who sued his lawyer for bungling an chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 168
arbitration could ordinarily recover his entire damages, even if the statute of limitations foreclosed any recovery against the opposing party to the arbitration. The same is not true in the § 301/fair representation setting, however. We held in Vaca, and reaffirmed this Term in Bowen, that the union may be held liable only for "increases if any in [the employee's] damages caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance." 386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 197-198; 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 223-224; see Czosek, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 29. Thus, if we apply state limitations periods, a large part of the damages will remain uncollectible in almost every case unless the employee sues within the time allotted for his suit against the employer. [Footnote 17]
"the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. . . . The processing . . . machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective
Page 462 U. S. 169
bargaining agreement."
These objections to the resort to state law might have to be tolerated if state law were the only source reasonably available for borrowing, as it often is. In this case, however, we have available a federal statute of limitations actually designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here -- a statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the suggested state law parallels. [Footnote 20] We refer to § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, which establishes a 6-month period for making charges of unfair labor practices to the NLRB. [Footnote 21] chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 170
At least as important as the similarity of the rights asserted in the two contexts, however, is the close similarity of chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 171
We stress that our holding today should not be taken as a departure from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal causes of action, in labor law or elsewhere. We do not mean to suggest that federal courts should eschew use of state limitations periods anytime state law fails to provide a perfect analogy. See, e.g., Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 61, n. 3. On the contrary, as the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvious state law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods. Nevertheless, chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 172
when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from state law. See 462 U. S. supra. As Justice Goldberg cautioned:
For the past century federal judges have "borrowed" state statutes of limitations, not because they thought it was a sensible chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 173
form of "interstitial lawmaking," but rather because they were directed to do so by the Congress of the United States. [Footnote 2/1]
Today the Court holds that the Rules of Decision Act does not determine the result in these cases, because it believes that a separate federal law, growing out of "the policies and requirements of the underlying cause of action," ante at 462 U. S. 159, n. 13, "otherwise require[s] or provide[s]." The Court's opinion sets forth a number of reasons why it may make good sense to adopt a 6-month statute of limitations, but nothing in that opinion persuades me that the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States "require or provide" that this particular limitations period must be applied to this case. [Footnote 2/2] chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 174
As the Court recognizes, "resort to state law [is] the norm for borrowing of limitations periods." Ante at 462 U. S. 171. When federal law is silent on the question of limitations, we borrow state law in the belief that, given our longstanding practice and congressional awareness of it, we can safely assume, in the absence of strong indications to the contrary, that Congress intends by its silence that we follow the usual rule. [Footnote 3/1] chanrobles.com-red
Page 462 U. S. 175
In Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696 (1966), we applied the "norm" to a suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. I see no reason in these cases to depart from our usual practice of borrowing state law, for we have no contrary indications strong enough to outweigh our ordinary presumption that Congress' silence indicates a desire that we follow the ordinary rule. As a result, I would look to state law for a limitations period. For the reasons given by JUSTICE STEVENS in his separate opinion in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 451 U. S. 72-74 (1981), I think that a malpractice action against an attorney provides the closest analogy to an employee's suit against his union for breach of the duty of fair representation, and I would apply the State's statute of limitations for such an action here. In DelCostello's action against his employer, I, like JUSTICE STEVENS, would follow Mitchell. [Footnote 3/2]