Source: http://openjurist.org/153/f3d/1298
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 05:24:49
Document Index: 242018460

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 228', '§ 228', '§ 3237', '§ 3237', '§ 3237', '§ 3237', '§ 228', '§ 228', '§ 228']

153 F3d 1298 United States v. Muench | OpenJurist
153 F. 3d 1298 - United States v. Muench	Home153 f3d 1298 united states v. muench
153 F3d 1298 United States v. Muench 153 F.3d 1298
12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 41
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Stephen MUENCH, Defendant-Appellant.
Thomas E. Miller, Asst. Fed. Pub. Defender, Gainesville, FL, Clyde M. Taylor, Jr., Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.
P. Michael Patterson, U.S. Atty., Audrey Ann Butler and Terry Flynn, Asst. U.S. Attys., Tallahassee, FL, William Wagner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Muench argues that under Travis, Johnston, and Lombardo, venue lies only in Texas because that is where he was obligated to send his support checks. Although we consider this to be Muench's strongest argument, we conclude that it fails because the failure to act cases upon which Muench relies are distinguishable from this prosecution under the CSRA. Proper venue " 'must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.' " United States v. Cabrales, --- U.S. ----, ----, 118 S.Ct. 1772, 1776, 141 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703, 66 S.Ct. 1213, 90 L.Ed. 1529 (1946)). Unlike this case, the failure to act cases did not involve statutes designed to protect victims who reside in another state. As the Fourth Circuit in Murphy explained, "[v]enue considerations are quite different where, as here, the action at issue is payment to an intermediary whose function is to forward the payment to a third party." 117 F.3d at 140 (distinguishing Johnston, 351 U.S. at 220, 76 S.Ct. 739). In each of the failure to act cases cited by Muench, there were only two possible venues, the place where the defendant was present when he failed to act, and the place designated for the required performance. See Murphy, 117 F.3d at 140. Here, the statute itself refers to another location, the state where the child resides. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 228. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that venue is proper in Florida, where the intended recipients of Muench's past due child support live.
Muench's argument is based on the fact that the indictment referred to a Texas court order that required him to pay support into a Texas state office. We do not think that venue in prosecutions under the CSRA should be controlled by the state court orders that designate payment of child support in a particular location. Procedures regarding where child support payments are processed are likely to vary from state to state and from case to case. For example, in Murphy, the defendant sent payments to a child support office in Texas which forwarded them to a Virginia child support registry for disbursement to the dependent children who lived in Virginia. See 117 F.3d at 138. The concurring opinion in Murphy reasoned that venue was proper in Virginia only because that is where the child support payments were designated for disbursement, explaining that the fact that the children lived in Virginia would not on its own support a finding of proper venue. See id. at 141-42 (Williams, J., concurring) (citing Johnston, 351 U.S. at 220, 76 S.Ct. 739). We agree with the majority in Murphy that the district where the children reside is a proper venue for prosecutions under the CSRA. See id. at 141. The CSRA specifically refers to the state where the victim of the crime resides, making it a crime to fail to pay past due child support to a child or children in another state. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 228.1 It follows that venue is proper in the state where the children live.
This case raises the issue of whether Muench's crime was a continuing offense such that it falls within the venue provision set out in 18 U.S.C.A. 3237 which states that "any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237(a). The district court applied 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237, finding that Muench's crime was a continuing offense that could be tried in either Texas or Florida. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit determined that a violation of the CSRA was a continuing offense subject to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237. Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1406.2
In United States v. Cabrales, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1772, 141 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998), the Supreme Court recently dealt with the question of whether the violation charged in a money laundering case constituted a continuing offense for purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237. The defendant in Cabrales purportedly laundered the proceeds of a Missouri drug conspiracy in Florida. Id. at ----, 118 S.Ct. at 1775. Because the government indicted Cabrales for a transaction that took place entirely in Florida, the Court held that the violation charged was not a continuing offense and that venue in Missouri was improper under the circumstances. Id. at ----, 118 S.Ct. at 1776 (explaining that the statutes defining the violations interdict only the financial transactions and not the anterior crimes that yielded the laundered funds). It was "immaterial" to the money laundering prosecution whether the defendant knew the location of the crimes that generated the money to be laundered, as long as she knew that the funds "derived from 'specified unlawful activity.' " Id. The Court stated that the Missouri venue of the drug trafficking activity that generated the money to be laundered was "of no moment" to the crime charged. Id. Thus, venue in Missouri was improper. Id.
Congress enacted the CSRA to address the difficulties associated with interstate collection of child support. See H.R.Rep. No. 771 (1992), 1992 WL 187429.3 As the district court noted, this case presents an excellent example of the statute operating as it was intended by filling "the gaps created by competing state enforcement mechanisms." (R.1-25-10). Over an eight-year period, Texas and Florida state agencies have been unable to collect child support from Muench. Muench's former wife has obtained a total of four state court orders requiring payment of support, none of which have been obeyed. Proper venue should promote a criminal statute's goals, not eviscerate them. Murphy, 117 F.3d at 140. With this in mind, we hold that venue was proper in this case in Florida, where the victims of Muench's crime reside.
The district court's restitution award does not create an ex post facto problem because the CSRA criminalizes failure to pay child support that was past due after the CSRA became effective. United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 753, 136 L.Ed.2d 690 (1997). Muench did not violate the CSRA by failing to make regular payments prior to October 25, 1992; he violated the statute by not making payments after the law's enactment. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 228(a) (providing for punishment for anyone who "willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation").
While this appeal was pending, Congress clarified its intent that a prosecution under the CSRA can be brought in the district where the child resides. A recent amendment to 18 U.S.C.A. § 228 added a venue provision that states that an action prosecuted under this statute may be brought, among other places, in the district where the child entitled to support resided during a period in which the defendant failed to pay support. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (Approved June 24, 1998)
In Murphy, the Fourth Circuit did not discuss whether or not a violation of the CSRA is a continuing offense. See 117 F.3d at 139-41. Rather, the Murphy court analyzed the question of proper venue in terms of the Fourth Circuit's test for venue cases which calls for an inquiry into the pertinent verbs that define the criminal offense. Id
We agree with the district court that Congress did not pass the CSRA merely to aid collection of child support in cases where the parent with the duty to pay child support moves to another state to avoid this obligation. See (R.1-25-10). Muench still lives in Texas, where the initial order of support issued. Although there are references in the legislative history of the CSRA to the scenario involving a parent who relocates to evade collection efforts, we read the legislative history to indicate that the statute was passed to deal with the problems associated with interstate collection of child support in general. See H.R.Rep. No. 771 (1992). More importantly, the language of the statute itself does not limit violations of the CSRA to situations in which the parent owing support moves to a different state. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 228
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