Source: http://openjurist.org/126/f3d/246
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 160', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

126 F3d 246 Alpo Petfoods Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board | OpenJurist
126 F. 3d 246 - Alpo Petfoods Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series126 F.3d
126 F3d 246 Alpo Petfoods Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board 126 F.3d 246
156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2295, 134 Lab.Cas. P 10,074
ALPO PETFOODS, INCORPORATED; Friskies Petcare, a Divisionof the Nestle Food Company, Petitioners,v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; Oil, Chemical & AtomicWorkers International Union, Respondents.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioners,v.ALPO PETFOODS, INCORPORATED; Friskies Petcare, a Divisionof the Nestle Food Company, Respondents.
Nos. 96-1572, 96-1604.
Argued March 5, 1997.Decided Sept. 11, 1997.
On September 6, 1994, the Union filed a charge alleging that Alpo had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), by laying off Gamble, Hager, and Speerhas in retaliation for their union activities. Following a two-day hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the ALJ issued a decision finding the company had violated the Act. The Board, in a March 20, 1996 decision and order, affirmed the ALJ's findings and conclusions in toto and adopted his recommended order with only a minor modification. See Alpo Pet Foods, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 956, 320 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 1996 WL 127873 (Mar. 20, 1996).
The ALJ credited Kirpsak's reasons as to why certain positions were retained but found "patently untrue" Kirpsak's testimony that he considered only the positions, and not the individuals, to be eliminated, especially in Gamble's case. See id., slip op. at 17. Indeed, because the ALJ saw this testimony as an attempt to mislead him and the Board, he drew the adverse inference that the true motivation behind Gamble's layoff was unlawful. See id., slip op. at 18. The ALJ also found that Gamble had been threatened by the human resources manager, a § 8(a)(1) violation, and intimidated by Kirpsak during the election campaign. See id. More generally, Alpo's turn to certain outsourcing, a decrease in machine efficiency after the layoffs, and the $0.20/hour raise evidenced to the ALJ that Alpo's failure to admit its economic mistake was unlawfully motivated and that it was not in such dire financial condition as to have made the layoffs economically necessary. See id., slip op. at 19. The ALJ concluded that the layoffs of Gamble, Hager, and Speerhas and the subsequent subcontracting of the work previously performed by them, to avoid recalling them, was a violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. See id. In addition, because Alpo had failed to demonstrate to the ALJ's satisfaction that the layoffs would have occurred in the absence of the protected union activities, Alpo failed to meet its burden under Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1980 WL 12312 (1980), enforced on other grounds, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 1612, 71 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982). See id., slip op. at 20. As a result of this decision, the Board ordered Alpo to, inter alia, reinstate Gamble, Hager, and Speerhas to their former positions with back pay and restored seniority rights.
The Board's decision is to be upheld if its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). This is so "even though we might have reached a different result had we heard the evidence in the first instance." NLRB v. General Wood Preserving Co., 905 F.2d 803, 810 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1016, 111 S.Ct. 590, 112 L.Ed.2d 595 (1990). "Substantial evidence has been held to mean 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Id. (quoting NLRB v. Aquabrom, Div. of Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir.1988)).
Discriminatory discharge is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).1 An employer's actions violate this section, however, only if they are motivated by anti-union animus. Goldtex, Inc. v. NLRB, 14 F.3d 1008, 1011 (4th Cir.1994). We have recently laid out the standards with which to deal with such cases:
FPC Holdings, Inc., v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 935, 942 (4th Cir.1995) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
The issue in this case, then, is whether substantial evidence on the whole record can sustain the Board's conclusion that the layoffs of Gamble, Hager, and Speerhas were partly or wholly motivated by the purpose of discouraging union activities at Alpo. See NLRB v. Instrument Corp. of America, 714 F.2d 324, 328 (4th Cir.1983). Although the Board's determination of motive will not be overturned if it is reasonable, "mere speculation as to the [employer's] real motives registers no weight on the substantial evidence scale." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Alpo, of course, can attempt to rebut the prima facie case, once established, by presenting a valid business justification. Goldtex, 14 F.3d at 1013; NLRB v. Nueva Eng'g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 967 (4th Cir.1985).
An examination of the other principal circumstantial evidence of the economic effects of the layoffs shows it to be on similarly weak ground. For instance, the Board noted that one of the retained maintenance department employees testified that work has not backed up sufficiently to necessitate Hager's transfer back to maintenance. See Alpo Pet Foods, slip op. at 14. However, because that same employee also testified that on one occasion in the seven months since the layoffs he came in to work and found one production line down and that he had to repair it so that the operators could run it, the Board concluded that the layoffs left Alpo "with a shortage of personnel but that it has chosen to suffer the shortage rather than recall them." Id., slip op. at 14-15. This is nonsense. No reasonable mind would accept one instance of the breakdown of complicated machinery over a seven month period as adequate to support the conclusion that Alpo would rather suffer a personnel shortage than recall these laid-off employees. See NLRB v. General Wood Preserving Co., 905 F.2d 803, 810 (4th Cir.) (stating that "[s]ubstantial evidence has been held to mean 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' " (quoting NLRB v. Aquabrom, Div. of Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir.1988))), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1016, 111 S.Ct. 590, 112 L.Ed.2d 595 (1990). This conclusion is bolstered by the Board's own conclusion that the amount of overtime assigned to the retained employees to do the work ordinarily performed by the laid-off employees was "minimal." Alpo Pet Foods, slip op. at 14.
As an initial matter, two pieces of such evidence that the Board relies on must be discounted. At a captive audience meeting just before the election, Kirpsak came near to Gamble and, looking down over his glasses, said "We don't need a union here." Alpo Pet Foods, slip op. at 12. However, an employer's speech that does not threaten reprisal or force, or promise a benefit, in relation to union activities is unqualifiedly privileged under the Act. See NLRB v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1, 9 (4th Cir.1962); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). An employer's lawful anti-union speech may not be chilled by the return threat that the Board may use it as evidence of unlawful motivation. See Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343, 1346-47 (2d Cir.1990). This episode may therefore play no part in the Board's prima facie case on Alpo's motivation. For the same reasons, Alpo's production manager's statement, at the initial captive audience meeting, that the organizing effort was like a knife in his back must be discounted.
Nevertheless, four other episodes do convincingly support the conclusion that substantial evidence underlies the finding that Alpo was unlawfully motivated in its layoff of Gamble. First, at one point Alpo's human resources manager told Gamble, "We know that you are a union leader because we have six people that have seen you hand out union petitions." He then added, "You know, this could be a very big financial burden on your family." Alpo Pet Foods, slip op. at 11. The Board properly concluded that this was a threat of termination that would have been a separate § 8(a)(1) violation had it been alleged in a timely fashion and thus very probative evidence. See id., slip op. at 18.
Second, there is substantial, indeed compelling, evidence that Alpo's human resources manager repeatedly surveilled Gamble's, and other employees', union activities. See id., slip op. at 10-12. We have previously held that "[i]t is an unfair labor practice for an employer to create in the minds of employees an impression that he is closely observing union organizational activity." J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 676, 683 (4th Cir.1980); see also Nueva Eng'g, 761 F.2d at 967. Again, although the surveillance was not timely alleged as a violation, it remains forceful evidence of unlawful motive. See Alpo Pet Foods, slip op. at 18.
As noted above, see supra part III.C., the instant case is plainly distinguishable from Goldtex, for in Goldtex it was undisputed that economic circumstances necessitated layoffs by the employer. See Goldtex, 14 F.3d at 1011. We were careful there to emphasize repeatedly in our two paragraph discussion that it was the posture of economic necessity that led us to conclude that the impermissible discharge of one employee does not "automatically infect" all simultaneous discharges. See id. 14 F.3d at 1012 ("Where, as here, layoffs were necessitated by economic circumstances, the impermissible discharge of one pro-union employee does not automatically infect all discharges made during that same month."); id. 14 F.3d at 1012-13 (distinguishing NLRB v. Frigid Storage, Inc., 934 F.2d 506 (4th Cir.1991), Hyatt Corp. v. NLRB, 939 F.2d 361 (6th Cir.1991), and Ballou Brick Co. v. NLRB, 798 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.1986), on the ground that the layoffs in those cases were not economically necessary); id. 14 F.3d at 1013 ("It is not disputed that the layoffs in this case were required because of a downturn in Goldtex's business fortunes ...."); id. ("Where layoffs are economically justified, the invalidation of a single impermissible discharge will not serve to similarly invalidate all contemporaneous terminations.").
Instead, here we are faced with the posture where substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion that Alpo was willing to sacrifice Hager and Speerhas under the seniority rules in order to get rid of Gamble. Although there are few cases directly on point, it is well-settled that, in the context of mass layoffs,5 § 8(a)(3) violations may be sustained where an employer orders the layoffs "for the purpose of discouraging union activity or in retaliation against its employees because of the union activities of some." Birch Run Welding & Fabricating, Inc. v. NLRB, 761 F.2d 1175, 1180 (6th Cir.1985). See also Hyatt Corp., 939 F.2d at 375-76 (upholding § 8(a)(3) violations, under Birch Run 's general layoff theory, where three union supporters and nine other employees were discharged over a seven month period); Merchants Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1011, 1016 (5th Cir.1978) ("Where the central aim of a mass lay-off is to discourage union activity, the discharge is unlawful, even though neutral or anti-union employees suffer in the process."); Majestic Molded Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir.1964) ("A power display in the form of a mass lay-off, where it is demonstrated that a significant motive and a desired effect were to 'discourage membership in any labor organization,' satisfies the requirements of § 8(a)(3) to the letter even if some white sheep suffer along with the black.").6 In Frigid Storage, we refused to allow an employer to wield an "undiscerning axe." Frigid Storage, 934 F.2d at 510. In that case, we upheld a § 8(a)(3) violation for the discharge of an employee, whose union sentiments were unknown, when he was fired on the Monday following the Friday discharge of two union adherents and the manager's anti-union tirade in which he had threatened to discharge an employee on Monday. See id. (citing Birch Run, Merchants, and Majestic ).
Even when the axe is wielded in accordance with seniority rules, courts enforce the Board's order as to all discharged employees, not just those whom the employer was explicitly targeting. In Tesoro Petroleum, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a § 8(a)(3) violation for the discharge of four employees. Three of the employees were union members, but the fourth and most junior had not revealed his union leanings. The fourth was fired to reach the three more senior. The court rejected the employer's economic justification and expressly noted that the fourth would be entitled to reinstatement and back pay along with the others. NLRB v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 431 F.2d 95, 96-97 (9th Cir.1970). Similarly, in Majestic Molded Products, the Second Circuit enforced the Board's order where the layoffs were in order of seniority, without regard to whether the employer was aware of any individual's pro-union sentiment, and a significant motive of the layoffs was to discourage union membership. Majestic Molded Prods., 330 F.2d at 605-06.
Machine Group         Aug. 93"Feb. 94    Aug. 94"Feb. 95
(before layoffs)   (after layoffs)
300 DIA END                84.0%              83.7%
307 DIA END                82.4               78.1
307 EZO END                56.4               58.6
Shearing                   76.9               79.7
Decorating                 75.1               72.6In other words, there was a decrease in two groups (307 DIA END and Decorating), an increase in two groups (307 EZO END and Shearing), and one group with no material change (300 DIA END). Although probably meaningless statistically, the average efficiency over all the groups was 74.96% before the layoffs and 74.54% after the layoffs, representing no material change. At least this simple comparison compares apples with apples, unlike the Board's which fails to consider relevantly comparable periods.