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Ex Parte Quirin - Citation 97288 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Ex Parte Quirin - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97288
Case Number 317 U.S. 1
Appellant Ex Parte Quirin
ex parte quirin - 317 u.s. 1 (1942) u.s. supreme court ex parte quirin, 317 u.s. 1 (1942) ex parte quirin{|317 u.s. 1fn1|1} nos. ___, original motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus and united states ex rel. quirin v. cox{|317 u.s. 1fn2|2} nos. 1-7 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia argued july 29-30, 1942 decided july 31, 1942 per curiam decision filed, july 31, 1942{|317 u.s. 1fn3|3} full opinion filed, october 29, 1942{|317 u.s. 1fn4|4} 317 u.s. 1 syllabus 1. a federal court may refuse to issue a writ of habeas corpus where the facts alleged in the petition, if proved, would not warrant discharge of the.....
Ex Parte Quirin - 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
U.S. Supreme Court Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
1. A federal court may refuse to issue a writ of habeas corpus where the facts alleged in the petition, if proved, would not warrant discharge of the prisoner. P. 317 U. S. 24 .
2. Presentation to the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia of a petition for habeas corpus was the institution of a suit, and denial by that court of leave to file the petition was a judicial determination of a case or controversy reviewable by appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and in this Court by certiorari. P. 317 U. S. 24 .
3. The President's Proclamation of July 2, 1942, declaring that all persons who are citizens or subjects of, or who act under the direction of, any nation at war with the United States, and who during time of war enter the United States through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile acts, or violations of the law of war, "shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals," does not bar accused persons from access to the civil courts for the purpose of determining the applicability of the Proclamation to the particular case; nor does the Proclamation, which in terms denied to such persons access to the courts, nor the enemy alienage of the accused, foreclose consideration by the civil courts of the contention that the Constitution and laws of the United States forbid their trial by military commission. P. 317 U. S. 24 .
(1) That the specification sufficiently charged an offense against the law of war which the President was authorized to order tried by a military commission; notwithstanding the fact that, ever since their arrest, the courts in the jurisdictions where they entered the country and where they were arrested and held for trial were open and functioning normally. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, distinguished. Pp. 317 U. S. 21 , 317 U. S. 23 , 317 U. S. 36 , 317 U. S. 48 .
(2) The President's Order of July 2, 1942, so far as it lays down the procedure to be followed on the trial before the Commission and on the review of its findings and sentence, and the procedure in fact followed by the Commission, were not in conflict with Articles of War 38, 43, 46, 50 1/2 and 70. P. 317 U. S. 46 .
(3) The petitioners were in lawful custody for trial by a military commission, and, upon petitions for writs of habeas corpus, did not show cause for their discharge. P. 317 U. S. 47 .
5. Articles 15, 38 and 46 of the Articles of War, enacted by Congress, recognize the "military commission" as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war not ordinarily tried by courts-martial. And by the Articles of War, especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Pp. 317 U. S. 26 -28.
6. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, by the Articles of War has exercised its authority under Art. I, § 8, cl. 10 of the Constitution to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, of which the law of war is a part, by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals. And by Article of War 15, Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction. Pp. 317 U. S. 28 , 317 U. S. 30 .
conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. P. 317 U. S. 27 .
8. The offense charged in this case was an offense against the law of war, the trial of which by military commission had been authorized by Congress, and which the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, distinguished. P. 317 U. S. 45 .
9. By the law of war, lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war; unlawful combatants, in addition, are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. P. 317 U. S. 30 .
10. It has long been accepted practice by our military authorities to treat those who, during time of war, pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, as unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission. This practice, accepted and followed by other governments, must be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of War. P. 317 U. S. 35 .
11. Citizens of the United States who associate themselves with the military arm of an enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. P. 317 U. S. 37 .
12. Even when committed by a citizen, the offense here charged is distinct from the crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is irrelevant to the other. P. 317 U. S. 38 .
13. Article III, § 2, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution did not extend the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission or require that offenses against the law of war, not triable by jury at common law, be tried only in civil courts. P. 317 U. S. 38 .
committed by enemies not in or associated with our Armed Forces. It is a construction which has been followed since the founding of our government, and is now continued in the 82nd Article of War. Such a construction is entitled to great respect. P. 317 U. S. 41 .
15. Since violation of the law of war is adequately alleged in this case, the Court finds no occasion to consider the validity of other specifications based on the 81st and 82nd Article of War, or to construe those articles or decide upon their constitutionality a so construed. P. 317 U. S. 46 .
The applications, seven in number ( ante, p. 1, n 1), first took the form of petitions to this Court for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus to secure the release of the petitioners from the custody of Brigadier General
After the argument, this Court delivered a Per Curiam Opinion, disposing of the cases (footnote, p. 317 U. S. 18 ). A full opinion, which is the basis of this Report, was filed with the Clerk of the Court on October 29, 1942.
Post, p. 317 U. S. 18 .
All the petitioners were born in Germany; all have lived in the United States. All returned to Germany between 1933 and 1941. All except petitioner Haupt are admittedly citizens of the German Reich, with which the United States is at war. Haupt came to this country with his parents when he was five years old; it is contended that he became a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of his parents during his minority, and that he has not since lost his citizenship. The Government, however, takes the position that, on attaining his majority he elected to maintain German allegiance and citizenship, or in any case that he has, by his conduct, renounced or abandoned his United States citizenship. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325 , 307 U. S. 334 ; United States ex rel. Rojak v. Marshall, 34 F.2d 219; United States ex rel. Scimeca v. Husband, 6 F.2d 957, 958; 8 U.S.C. § 801, and compare 8 U.S.C. § 808. For reasons presently to be stated we do not find it necessary to resolve these contentions.
United States currency, which were in their possession when arrested. The currency had been handed to them by an officer of the German High Command, who had instructed them to wear their German uniforms while landing in the United States. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
The President, as President and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, by Order of July 2, 1942, [ Footnote 2/2 ] appointed a Military Commission and directed it to try petitioners for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War, and prescribed regulations for the procedure on the trial and for review of the record of the trial and of any judgment or sentence of the Commission. On the same day, by Proclamation, [ Footnote 2/3 ] the President declared that
While it is the usual procedure on an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts for the court to issue the writ and on the return to hear and dispose of the case, it may without issuing the writ consider and determine whether the facts alleged by the petition, if proved, would warrant discharge of the prisoner. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 , 312 U. S. 284 . Presentation of the petition for judicial action is the institution of a suit. Hence, denial by the district court of leave to file the petitions in these causes was the judicial determination of a case or controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals and reviewable here by certiorari. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 71 U. S. 110 -113; Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 , 316 U. S. 458 -461.
We are not here concerned with any question of the guilt or innocence of petitioners. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Constitutional safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on some who are guilty. Ex parte Milligan, supra, 71 U. S. 119 , 71 U. S. 132 ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 , 273 U. S. 535 ; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 , 316 U. S. 406 . But the detention and trial of petitioners -- ordered by the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger -- are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.
of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations, as well as of enemy individuals. [ Footnote 2/5 ] By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals. And the President, as Commander in Chief, by his Proclamation in time of war, has invoked that law. By his Order creating the present Commission, he has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war.
It is no objection that Congress, in providing for the trial of such offenses, has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns. An Act of Congress punishing "the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations" is an appropriate exercise of its constitutional authority, Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, "to define and punish" the offense, since it has adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of international law. United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153; See The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1, 24 U. S. 40 -41;
United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 43 U. S. 232 ; The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 423-28; 18 U.S.C. § 481. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Similarly, by the reference in the 15th Article of War to "offenders or offenses that . . . by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions," Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war ( compare 61 U. S. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 61 U. S. 82 ), and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction. Congress had the choice of crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against the law of war, or of adopting the system of common law applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. It chose the latter course.
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations, [ Footnote 2/7 ] and also between
those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but, in addition, they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. [ Footnote 2/8 ] The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals. See Winthrop, Military Law,2d ed., pp. 11997, 1219-21; Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, approved by the President, General Order No. 100, April 24, 1863, §§ IV and V.
Such was the practice of our own military authorities before the adoption of the Constitution, [ Footnote 2/9 ] and during the Mexican and Civil Wars. [ Footnote 2/10 ]
"Armed prowlers, by whatever names they may be called, or persons of the enemy's territory, who steal within the lines of the hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, or of destroying bridges, roads, or canals, or of robbing or destroying the mail, or of cutting the telegraph wires, are not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of war. [ Footnote 2/11 ]"
By a long course of practical administrative construction by its military authorities, our Government has likewise recognized that those who, during time of war, pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission. This precept of the law of war has been so recognized in practice both here and abroad, and has so generally been accepted as valid by authorities on international law [ Footnote 2/12 ] that we think it must be regarded as
guidance and direction, enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. Cf. Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U. S. 612 , 101 U. S. 615 , 101 U. S. 617 -18. It is as an enemy belligerent that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the United States, and unlawful belligerency is the gravamen of the offense of which he is accused.
Nor are petitioners any the less belligerents if, as they argue, they have not actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military operations. The argument leaves out of account the nature of the offense which the Government charges and which the Act of Congress, by incorporating the law of war, punishes. It is that each petitioner, in circumstances which gave him the status of an enemy belligerent, passed our military and naval lines and defenses or went behind those lines, in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. The offense was complete when, with that purpose, they entered -- or, having so entered, they remained upon -- our territory in time of war without uniform or other appropriate means of identification. For that reason, even when committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is irrelevant to the other. Cf. Moran v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632 ; Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1 , 273 U. S. 11 -12.
Presentment by a grand jury and trial by a jury of the vicinage where the crime was committed were, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, familiar parts of the machinery for criminal trials in the civil courts. But they were procedures unknown to military tribunals, which are not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article, Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243; In re Vidal, 179 U. S. 126 ; cf. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553 , and which, in the natural course of events, are usually called upon to function under conditions precluding resort to such procedures. As this Court has often recognized, it was not the purpose or effect of § 2 of Article III, read in the light of the common law, to enlarge the then existing right to a jury trial. The object was to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature as they might arise in the future, District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63 , but not to bring within the sweep of the guaranty those cases in which it was then well understood that a jury trial could not be demanded as of right.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, while guaranteeing the continuance of certain incidents of trial by jury which Article III, § 2 had left unmentioned, did not enlarge the right to jury trial as it had been established by that Article. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 , 127 U. S. 549 . Hence, petty offenses triable at common law without a jury may be tried without a jury in the federal courts, notwithstanding Article III, § 2, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65 ; District of Columbia
v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 . Trial by jury of criminal contempts may constitutionally be dispensed with in the federal courts in those cases in which they could be tried without a jury at common law. Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 , 128 U. S. 302 -304; Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267 , 131 U. S. 277 ; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 , 158 U. S. 594 -596; United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563 , 203 U. S. 572 ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 , 284 U. S. 440 ; Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33 , 313 U. S. 48 ; See United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 11 U. S. 34 . Similarly, an action for debt to enforce a penalty inflicted by Congress is not subject to the constitutional restrictions upon criminal prosecutions. United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475 ; United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37 , and cases cited.
The fact that "cases arising in the land or naval forces" are excepted from the operation of the Amendments does not militate against this conclusion. Such cases are expressly excepted from the Fifth Amendment, and are deemed excepted by implication from the Sixth. Ex parte Milligan, supra, 71 U. S. 123 , 71 U. S. 138 -139. It is argued that the exception, which excludes from the Amendment cases arising in the armed forces, has also, by implication, extended its guaranty to all other cases; that, since petitioners, not being members of the Armed Forces of the United States, are not within the exception, the Amendment operates to
Section 2 of the Act of Congress of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. 371, derived from the Resolution of the Continental Congress of August 21, 1776, [ Footnote 2/13 ] imposed the death penalty on alien spies "according to the law and usage of nations, by sentence of a general court martial." This enactment must be regarded as a contemporary construction of both Article III, § 2, and the Amendments as not foreclosing trial by military tribunals, without a jury, of offenses against the law of war committed by enemies not in or associated with our Armed Forces. It is a construction of the Constitution which has been followed since the founding of our Government, and is now continued in the 82nd Article of War. Such a construction is entitled to
the greatest respect. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 5 U. S. 309 ; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , 143 U. S. 691 ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304 , 299 U. S. 328 . It has not hitherto been challenged, and, so far as we are advised, it has never been suggested in the very extensive literature of the subject that an alien spy, in time of war, could not be tried by military tribunal without a jury. [ Footnote 2/14 ]
The exception from the Amendments of "cases arising in the land or naval forces" was not aimed at trials by military tribunals, without a jury, of such offenses against the law of war. Its objective was quite different -- to authorize the trial by court martial of the members of our Armed Forces for all that class of crimes which, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, might otherwise have been deemed triable in the civil courts. The cases mentioned in the exception are not restricted to those involving offenses against the law of war alone, but extend to trial of all offenses, including crimes which were of the class traditionally triable by jury at common law. Ex parte Mason, 105 U. S. 696 ; Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1 , 255 U. S. 9 ; cf. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U. S. 376 .
Petitioners, and especially petitioner Haupt, stress the pronouncement of this Court in the Milligan case, supra, p. 71 U. S. 121 , that the law of war
Elsewhere in its opinion, at pp. 71 U. S. 118 , 71 U. S. 121 -122 and 71 U. S. 131 , the Court was at pains to point out that Milligan, a citizen twenty years resident in Indiana, who had never been a resident of any of the states in rebellion, was not an enemy belligerent either entitled to the status of a prisoner of war or subject to the penalties imposed upon unlawful belligerents. We construe the Court's statement as to the inapplicability of the law of war to Milligan's case as having particular reference to the facts before it. From them, the Court concluded that Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a nonbelligerent, not subject to the law of war save as -- in circumstances found not there to be present, and not involved here -- martial law might be constitutionally established.
Since the first specification of Charge I sets forth a violation of the law of war, we have no occasion to pass on the adequacy of the second specification of Charge I, or to construe the 81st and 82nd Articles of War for the purpose of ascertaining whether the specifications under Charges II and III allege violations of those Articles, or whether, if so construed, they are constitutional. McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131 .
There remains the contention that the President's Order of July 2, 1942, so far as it lays down the procedure to be followed on the trial before the Commission and on the review of its findings and sentence, and the procedure in fact followed by the Commission, are in conflict with Articles of War 38, 43, 46, 50 1/2 and 70. Petitioners argue that their trial by the Commission, for offenses against the law of war and the 81st and 82nd Articles of War, by a procedure which Congress has prohibited would invalidate any conviction which could be obtained against them, and renders their detention for trial likewise unlawful ( see McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 49 ; United States v. Brown, 206 U. S. 240 , 206 U. S. 244 ; Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543 , 122 U. S. 555 -556; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 61 U. S. 80 -81); that the President's Order prescribes such an unlawful
From June 12 to June 18, 1942, Amagansett Beach, New York, and Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, were within the area designated as the Eastern Defense Command of the United States Army, and subject to the provisions of a proclamation dated May 16, 1942, issued by Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, United States Army, Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command ( see 7 Federal Register 3830). On the night of June 12-13, 1942, the waters around Amagansett Beach, Long Island, were within the area comprising the Eastern Sea Frontier, pursuant to the orders issued by Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. On the night of June 16-17, 1942, the waters around Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, were within the area comprising the Gulf Sea Frontier, pursuant to similar orders.
Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133, 3 U. S. 153 , 3 U. S. 159 -61; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 5 U. S. 441 ; Maley v. Shattuck, 3 Cranch 458, 7 U. S. 488 ; Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch 185, 8 U. S. 199 ; The Rapid, 8 Cranch 155, 12 U. S. 159 -164; The St.Lawrence, 9 Cranch 120, 13 U. S. 122 ; Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, 13 U. S. 197 -98; The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435, 16 U. S. 447 -48; United States v. Reading, 18 How. 1, 59 U. S. 10 ; Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 67 U. S. 666 -67, 67 U. S. 687 ; The Venice, 2 Wall. 258, 69 U. S. 274 ; The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509 , 97 U. S. 517 ; United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U. S. 227 , 120 U. S. 233 ; Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 297 .
In a number of cases during the Revolutionary War, enemy spies were tried and convicted by military tribunals: (1) Major John Andre, Sept. 29, 1780, see note 9 supra. (2) Thomas Shanks was convicted by a "Board of General Officers" at Valley Forge on June 3, 1778, for "being a Spy in the Service of the Enemy," and sentenced to be hanged. 12 Writings of Washington (Bicentennial Comm'n ed.) 14. (3) Matthias Colbhart was convicted of "holding a Correspondence with the Enemy" and "living as a Spy among the Continental Troops" by a General Court Martial convened by order of Major General Putnam on Jan. 13, 1778; General Washington, the Commander in Chief, ordered the sentence of death to be executed, 12 Id. 449-50. (4) John Clawson, Ludwick Lasick, and William Hutchinson were convicted of "lurking as spies in the Vicinity of the Army of the United States" by a General Court Martial held on June 18, 1780. The death sentence was confirmed by the Commander in Chief. 19 Id. 23. (5) David Farnsworth and John Blair were convicted of "being found about the Encampment of the United States as Spies" by a Division General Court Martial held on Oct. 8, 1778 by order of Major General Gates. The death sentence was confirmed by the Commander in Chief. 13 Id. 139-40. (6) Joseph Bettys was convicted of being "a Spy for General Burgoyne" by coming secretly within the American lines, by a General Court Martial held on April 6, 1778 by order of Major General McDougall. The death sentence was confirmed by the Commander in Chief. 15 Id. 364. (7) Stephen Smith was convicted of "being a Spy" by a General Court Martial held on Jan. 6, 1778. The death sentence was confirmed by Major General McDougall. Ibid. (8) Nathaniel Aherly and Reuben Weeks, Loyalist soldiers, were sentenced to be hanged as spies. Proceedings of a General Court Martial Convened at West Point According to a General Order of Major General Arnold, Aug. 20-21, 1780 (National Archives, War Dept., Revolutionary War Records, MS No. 31521). (9) Jonathan Loveberry, a Loyalist soldier, was sentenced to be hanged as a spy. Proceedings of a General Court Martial Convened at the Request of Major General Arnold at the Township of Bedford, Aug. 30-31, 1780 ( Id., MS No. 31523). He later escaped, 20 Writings of Washington 253n. (10) Daniel Taylor, a lieutenant in the British Army, was convicted as a spy by a general court martial convened on Oct. 14, 1777, by order of Brigadier General George Clinton, and was hanged. 2 Public Papers of George Clinton (1900) 443. (11) James Molesworth was convicted as a spy and sentenced to death by a general court martial held at Philadelphia, March 29, 1777; Congress confirmed the order of Major General Gates for the execution of the sentence. 7 Journals of the Continental Congress 210. See also cases of "M. A." and "D.C.," G.O. Headquarters of General Sullivan, Providence, R.I., July 24, 1778, reprinted in Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution (1822) 369; of Lieutenant Palmer, 9 Writings of Washington, 56n; of Daniel Strang, 6 Id. 47n; of Edward Hicks, 14 Id. 357; of John Mason and James Ogden, executed as spies near Trenton, N.J., on Jan. 10, 1781, mentioned in Hatch, Administration of the American Revolutionary Army (1904) 135 and Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (1941) 410.