Source: https://www.4pb.com/case-detail/hb-v-local-authority-anor-wardship-costs-funding-order-2017/
Timestamp: 2019-03-25 05:40:33
Document Index: 618093278

Matched Legal Cases: ['§9', '§58', '§28', '§96', 'Art 6', 'Art 8', 'Art 6', 'Art 8']

HB v A Local Authority and Anor (Wardship - Costs Funding Order) (2017) - 4PB Family Law Barristers London
As a result, the mother was not eligible for non-means non-merits tested legal aid, and her income took her slightly beyond the £733 monthly income threshold for means and merits tested legal aid. The mother’s leading and junior counsel, and solicitor, all acted pro bono. The mother’s counsel accepted the costs funding order they sought was without precedent but contended that it was possible for the court to find a power to make such an order in proceedings of this nature.
The local authority applied for permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction, then for orders making the children wards of court, preventing them leaving the jurisdiction and authorising the retention of the children and mother’s passports.
LB Tower Hamlets v M concerned two without notice applications for orders under the inherent jurisdiction to prevent older children from travelling to Syria. In explaining the use of wardship Hayden J said that the “status of a Ward of the High Court of England and Wales has achieved international recognition” made it particularly appropriate in such circumstances, and he was able to make orders to retrieve their passports [§9-11]. Macdonald J noted that Hayden J did not seek to lay down a general rule or purport to give general guidance that the inherent jurisdiction should be used in preference to care proceedings in all cases of alleged radicalization. Hayden J described how “the conventional safeguarding principles will still afford the best protection” [§58] referring to provisions under Part IV CA 1989.
In Re Y the local authority brought inherent jurisdiction proceedings in respect of a 16 year old boy who might seek to travel to Syria. Hayden J again considered it was the appropriate jurisdiction for those issues, but reiterated he did not seek to “set out a paradigm approach for applications of this kind. I am quite sure that there will be cases, particularly with younger children perhaps when they are of necessity separated from their family, where only care proceedings under the Children Act will be appropriate” [§28]. MacDonald J was satisfied the President in Re M did not endorse any general guidance.
Mr Justice MacDonald concluded that the mother’s application for costs funding order against the local authority must be dismissed for the following reasons:
Whilst “superficially attractive legally and has a greater moral attraction” [§96], the argument that the court can fund a parent under the inherent jurisdiction to protect the child’s welfare by ensuring the arguments are put properly, cannot be sustained against established legal principles. The “court cannot simply make any order under the inherent jurisdiction that is required to ensure that justice is done” [Wicks v Wicks [1995] Fam 65]. See also London Borough of Redbridge v SA [2015] 3 WLR 1617 at [36]. Authority of public expenditure requires clear statutory authority which must be in clear, express and unambiguous language. A general power or duty (such as under the inherent jurisdiction) cannot be used to circumvent a clear statutory code.
Art 6 and Art 8 do not prevent a State party imposing a means test to decide which cases the State must fund to meet the imperatives of Art 6 and Art 8. If an applicant’s rights are breached through this process the remedy is found in the Administrative Court.