Source: http://www.caaflog.com/2008/09/24/ali-caaf-writ-appeal-addl-thoughts-redux/
Timestamp: 2018-06-22 17:18:22
Document Index: 574909835

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 69', 'Art. 69', 'Art. 69', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 3']

CAAFlog » Ali CAAF Writ Appeal Add’l Thoughts — Redux
caaflog.com/?p=1421
4 Responses to “Ali CAAF Writ Appeal Add’l Thoughts — Redux”
In addition to the usual jurisdictional arguments, the government could also argue that any action on a writ would be premature since the Art. 69 review process is not yet complete, and Mr. Ali could prevail there. There is no need for immediate action since Mr. Ali is not in confinement, so there is no reason not to let the Article 69 review process run its course.
This is a “do the right thing” case. Once the Army JAG’s Art. 69 review is complete, assuming the Army JAG concludes there was jurisdiction to try Mr. Ali, and finds that there is no other error, the Army JAG should immediately certify the case to ACCA for review under Art. 69(d) so that the jurisdictional issue can get a full and fair review in the appellate courts. After all, if the government was sure enough of jurisdiction to try Mr. Ali in the first place, the government should not fear a full appellate review of that determination.
I thought the appellant’s argument regarding his status pretty compelling. If a servicemember is validly discharged before trial, it is clear the court-martial loses jurisdiction over him. So, if a civilian is fired by the contractor he was working for, is he still “serving with” or “accompanying” an armed force? I think not. If the accused were a civilian working directly for the US gov’t and still pulling a paycheck at trial, then the argument for Art. 2(a)(10) jurisdiction is stronger. Mr. Ali is a Canadian and Iraqi dual citizen, whose only connection to an armed force in the field was through a contractor. Once that contractor fired him, that severed any link between him and the armed force, and severed any Art. 2(a)(10) jurisdiction, just as if he were a discharged servicemember.
Three thoughts, sort of in reverse order.
1. As for Cloudesley’s thought on the JAG certifying the case over to ACCA: If I were the JAG’s advisor, I would tell him not to do that because it creates a “feeding the beast” problem. The military appellate courts already use the (in my mind disreputable) doctrine of “potential appellate jurisdiction” to give themselves jurisdiction over cases that have no real prospect of getting there via Article 66. I would be concerned that actually certifying cases over would give the appellate courts a token case to point to for the notion that cases (such as summary courts-martial) that cannot possibly meet the jurisdictional threshold are fair game for appellate court meddling because of the history of JAGs sending over such cases for review. The irony would be that the appellate courts’ illegitimate expansion of their All Writs jurisdiction would lead me to advise against giving them review where it is plainly allowed (through a JAG certification), but that’s where I would come out.
2. If there is going to be a fact-bound decision here, isn’t the more likely result that the CAAF (if it gets past the illegitimate jurisdictional basis) holds that there might be “contingency operations” that don’t allow for court-martial jurisdiction over civilians, but this isn’t one of them? Going the way suggested by No Man holds an Act of Congress unconstitutional, so I don’t think the scope of the holding is narrowed much if the idea is to limit the reach of the case and (possibly) avoid attracting SCOTUS attention.
3. My point to No Man on timing was that this is probably the absolute wrong time for a litigant to ask CAAF to fudge the jurisdictional issue, what with the SG having thrown down the gauntlet in the Denedo cert petition in arguing that CAAF is a court run wild.
Interesting — so, if court-martial jurisdiction over a civilian contractor simply boils down to an employment status, why couldn’t it be defeated simply by quitting?
Even if Art. 2 would give jurisdiction over the accused at the time the offense was committed, I don’t read Art. 3 as giving “continuing” jurisdiction under these circumstances.