Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19780506-799477
Timestamp: 2016-10-27 13:22:12+00:00
Document Index: 122926298

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 3", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 3", "l'article 3", "l'article 3", "l'article3", "l'article 3", "l'article 3", "l'article 3"]

KOTALLA c. PAYS-BAS
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Exception préliminaire rejetée (disparition de l'objet du litige) ; Violation de l'Art. 3 ; Satisfaction équitable non appliquéeNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7994/77Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-05-06;7994.77 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINEParties : Demandeurs : KOTALLADéfendeurs : PAYS-BASTexte : APPLICATION/RE Q UÃTE NÂ° 7994/77'
Josef Johann KOTALLA v/the NETHERLANDS' -~'JosefJÃ´hÃ¢n 'KOTAL Ac/PAYS-BAS' -
DECISION of 6 MaÃ¿ 1978 Ã´n the admissibility of the applicatio requÃªte
Artic% 3 of the Convention :
nDÃCISONdu6mai1978srlecvbitÃ©da
does not reqÃ»ire that a sentence of life imprisonmen t -laThisprovn must be re-examined with a view to a prisoner's being released through . an act of grace or otherwise (Particular reference to domestic case-lawl . Ibl Article 3 is not violatedwhen a prisoner serving a fife sentence gers th emdicalrtn(bwhsadteoflhrquisbtnofed IclDtsapoinedh . of beingre%ased do not constitute, for a pn'sone .r serving a life sentence, inhumantreatment where he can be reasonably . expected to assess rea6sticafly, the chances of his being refeased 5, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph a), of the Conventlon : Imprisonmen t .Article imposed by an administrative authority, which, as an act of grace, substituted imprisonmentfor the death penalty, represents detention "after convictidnby acourt".
Artic% 3 de /a Convention :
lal Cette-disposition n'exige pas qu'une peine de dÃ©tention Ã vie fasse l'objet .d'un rÃ©examenen vued'une fibÃ©ration parvoie de gr3cÃ©ou- Â° autre (RÃ©fÃ©rence particuliÃ¨re Ã la jurisprudence nÃ tibriafe) . (b) L'article 3 n'est pas violÃ© lorsqu'un condamnÃ© Ã la dÃ©tention Ã vie reÃ§oi soins qu'exige son mauvais Ã©tat de santÃ© mais n'est pa s tenprisol
ThÃ© applicantwas represented before the Commission by Mr W .G .A . Kousemaker, a lawyer practisinp in Broda. Le requÃ©rant Ã©taa reprAsentÃ© devant la - Commission par Mâ¢ W .G .A. Kousemaker, avocat A Breda .
L'espoir dÃ©Ã§u d'une libÃ©ration ne constitue pas, pour un condamnÃ© Ã la dÃ©tention Ã vie, un traitement inhumain lorsque l'intÃ©ressÃ© pouvait raisonnablement apprÃ©cier ses chances de libÃ©ration .
Article 5, paragraphe 1, lettre a), de la Conventlon: La dÃ©tention ordonnÃ©e par l'autoritÃ© non judiciaire qui, par mesure de grSce, a commuÃ© une peine capitale en une peine de dÃ©tention est une dÃ©tention -aprÃ©s condamnation par un tribuna7 ,
I francais : voir p . 242 )
The applicant, a German national, was born in 1 906. In 1948, he was condemned to death by a Dutch court for war crimes . In 7957 the death penalty was commuted, by way of a pardon, to a sentence of life imprisonment . He claims that all non-German war criminals condemned to life imprisonment in the Netherlands have been released and that he is in a very bad state of health, both physically and psychologicafly .
THE LAW (Extract ) 1 . The applicant has complained that his continued detention is in breach of Article 3 of the Convention ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment") on two grounds : (a) that in the execution of his sentence of lite imprisonment there is no legal possibility, in particular by reference to the courts, of having a limit set to the actual duration of the sentence ; (b) that there are special circumstances, in particular his state of health, which render his continued detention inhuman or degrading punishment . 2 . The Commission notes with regard to ground (a) that the applicant was sentenced to death, a penalty expressly permitted by the Convention in its Article 2 (1), and that this was later commuted, by way of pardon, to a sentence of life imprisonment . The Commission finds that imprisonment, even if it is imposed by an administrative authority as a substitute for a death penalty pronounced by a competent court after conviction, can nevertheless be considered to be detention after conviction by a competent court, within the meaning of Article 5 (1) (a) of the Convention . The applicant's detention was therefore consistent with Article 5 111 fa) of the Convention and it was nol in itself contrary to Articles 3, 5 or 18, read in conjunction with Article 5, as claimed by the applicant .
Nevertheless, issues may arise under Article 3 in relation to any lawful sentence of imprisonment as regards the manner of its execution and its length . In the latter context, the treatment of persons serving long-term prison sentences and particularly life sentences has given rise to increasing concern . . The General Report on the Treatment of Long-Term Prisoners prepared by the Sub-Committee No . XXV of the European Committee on Crime Problems in 1975 considered that "it is inhuman to imprison a person for life without any hope of releasÃ©" and that "nobody should be deprived of the chance of possible release" (paragraph 77 of the Report) . Furthermore, Resolution (76) 2 on the Treatment ofLong-Term Prisoners, adopted by the Ministers' Deputies of the Council of Europe on 17 February 1976, recommended to Governments of Member States, inter alia, to "adapt to life sentences the same principles as apply to long-term sentences and to ensure that a review of sentences with a view to determining whether or not a conditional release can be granted should take place if not done before, after eight to fourteen years of detention and be repeated at regular intervals . " The matter has also been considered by the Geman Federal Constitutional Court, in ajudgment dated 21 June 1977 (cf . EUGRZ 77, p . 267 et seq .), and by the Italian Constitutional Court, in a judgment dated 7/22 November1974 (cf . Raccolta uffiziale delle sentenze e ordinanze .delle Corte Constituzionale, vol . 42 (1974) p . 353, EUGRZ 77, p . 294-295) . Both Courts stated that, whilst the penalty of life imprisonment was not as such inconsistent with the Constitution, there ought to exist for the prisoner a legal possibility of obtaining conditional release, Ã¢fter a reasonable time by means other than an act of grace . The German Constitutional Court concluded that the absence of such possibility in thÃ© legal system imposed a duty on the legislature to legislate .in the matter but that a reasonable time should be allowed toelapse for an examination of all the problems involved . Only if thereafter no-satisfactory action had beem taken by the legislature should the Court intervene in the matter . â¢ The Commission observes that in none of these judgments is life imprisonment itself prohibited or declared to be contrary to the Convention . What is called for is a regular consideration of the possibility of release, on or without conditions, of individuals serving life sentences, and making thi sconideratlgqument,posiblyjdcantro . While the Commission recognises the desirability of such a requiremen t in the administration of criminal justice, it finds no provision of the Convention, including Article 3 invoked by the applicant, which can be read as requiring that an individual serving a lawful sentence of life imprisonment must have that sentence reconsidered by a national authority, judicial or administrative, I with a view to its remission or termination .
_24p_
The Commission further observes that in the piesent case the sentence of life imprisonment replaced a sentence of death and, as capital punishment is permitted by the Convention, it cannot hold that life imprisonment replacing it is in itself a breach of Article 3 . The special circumstances with regard to ground Ibl are said to be i the applicant's state of health ; ii . the fact that hope has repeatedly been raised that he would be would be released . As regards i . the applicant describes his state of health as follow s Following a cerebral haemorrhage in 1973 "he drags himself through the prison with the help of sticks, can hardly speak audibly and cannot think in a co-ordinated way and is in such a condition that the Roman Catholic prison chaplain had even thought it necessary to administer in May 1975 the last sacramentsto him" . The Government does not deny that the applicant's physical an d mental conditions are serious . It does not, however, consider that the applicant's health would necessitate his release . The Commission has examined all the evidence made available to it relating to this question . The Supreme Court, according to its decision of 11 February 1977, has also examined this question with regard to Anicle 3, and has held that if the State, where the state of health of a prisoner deteriorates, continues the detention but provides for the necessary medical care, it does not act contrary to Article 3 . It recalled that both the President of the District Court and the Court of Appeal have found that physical and psychological deterioration of the applicant was one that could befall any ageing human being and was not of an exceptional nature . The Supreme Court was thus satisfied that such a situation was not contrary to Article 3 . The Commission agrees with this conclusion, since it does not find any evidence which would indicate that the Dutch authorities have disregarded the applicant's physical and mental condition, or failed to provide necessary medical care . Their conduct does not then constitute a breach of Article 3 . As regards ii, the Commission agrees that during the examination of his requests for pardon the applicant may have cherished hope occasionally, in particular in relation to his request of 29 September 1971 when the Minister of Justice in a letter dated 16 February 1972 to the President of the Lower House expressed his opinion according to which the detention di the "three of Breda" ought to be put to an end .
- The Commission notes, however, that irn thÃ© same lettÃ©r the Minister stated clearly that thematterâ¢would be decided finally only aftÃ©rParliarnÃ©nt ` , would have had anopportunity to debate . 11, in spiteof this, the applicant may have developedunderstandabl . an imminent release, for which the Government-could betield ehopf responsible, the Commission does not consider that such expectation, constitutes a special circumstance,which would render continued detention . . . _ -. - . . - ., . . inhuman : . . . . - - ._ .. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-foundedâ¢ within thÃ© meaning of Article 27 .121 of the Convention . .. .. .. .. ... . ..
des faits pertinents "
est nÃ© en 190 4. En 1948; il a Ã©t Ã© -Ye7quÃ©rant,dioleman, condamnÃ© Ã rrmort par un tribunal nÃ©erlandais, poÃ»r crimÃ©s de guerm . 'Ãn ,1957, sa peine a Ã©tÃ© commuÃ©e en rÃ©clusion Ã vie pÃ r voie de grÃ¢ce.
Depuis 1956,il a demandÃ© Ã plusieurs reprises, mais sans succÃ¨s, sa libÃ©ratiÃ´npÃ¢rmesure degr5ce ou la suspension de l'exÃ©cution-de sa peine .l
'I/ fait valoir que tous7escriminels de guerre non alfemandscondamnÃ©s aÃ»x Pays-Bas Ã©la rÃ©clusion Ã vie ont Ã©tÃ© libÃ©rÃ©s ei que'son Ã©tat de santÃ© physiqueetpsychique-est.t~Ã©smauvais. - -,
(TRADUCTION) EN DROIT (Extrait) - ' -
. `Le requÃ©rant se plaint :que son maintien en dÃ©tention est incompatibl e :1 avec l'article 3 dÃ© la Conventionla Nul ne peutÃ©tresoumis Ã la-torture niÃ des peines ou traitement inhÃ»mains ou dÃ©gradants itl pour les deux motifs suivants' : . laldans l'Ã©xÃ©cution de sa peine d'emprisonnement Ã viÃ©, il nÃ© dispose
d'aucune possibilitÃ©'juridique, . notamment parl'interventiÃ´nd'un 'tribunal, de fairÃ¨ fixer une limite Ã la dtirÃ©Ã© effective de sapeine . ; . . .
;Ibl descirconstancesspÃ©ciales, enparticulier sonAtat-'dÃ©santÃ©, fon t . â¢de son maintien .en dÃ©tention une peine inhumaine oudÃ©gradante
. La Commission fait observer, en cÃ©quiconcerne lÃ© motif (a), que l .2 eafArquÃ©antÃ§odmÃ rt,peinxsÃ©maÃ»tori'pl -242- . :
Convention en son article 2, paragraphe 1, et que cette peine a Ã©tÃ© ultÃ©rieurement commuÃ©e par voie de grÃ¢ce enune peine d'emprisonnement 9 vie . La Commission estime que l'emprisonnement, mÃªme imposÃ© par une autoritÃ© administrative comme substitut Ã une peine de mort prononcÃ©e par un tribunal compÃ©tent aprÃ¨s la condamnation, peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme une dÃ©tention aprÃ¨s condamnation par un tribunal compÃ©tent, au sens de l'article 5, par . 1 (a), de la Convention . La dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant est donc compatible avec l'article 5, par . 1 (a) de la Convention et n'est pas, en elle-mÃªme, contraire aux articles 3, 5 ou 18 combinÃ© avec l'article 5, comme l'allAgue le requÃ©rant . NÃ©anmoins, une peine d'emprisonnement rÃ©guliArement infligÃ©e peu t
soulever un problÃ¨me sous l'angle de l'article 3 par la maniAre dont elle est exÃ©cutÃ©e et par sa durÃ©e . Quant A ce second aspect, le traitement des personnes purgeant une peine d'emprisonnement Ã vie a fait l'objet d'une attention croissante . Le Rapport gÃ©nÃ©ral sur le traitement des dÃ©tenus en dÃ©tention de longue durÃ©e Ã©tabli par le sous-comitÃ© NÂ° XXV du ComitÃ© europÃ©en pour les problÃ¨mes criminels en 1975 estime qu'a il est inhumain d'emprisonner une personne pour la vie sans lui laisser aucun espoir de libÃ©ration Â» et que Â« personne ne devrait Ãªtre privÃ© de la possibilitÃ© d'une libÃ©ration Ã©ventuelle Â» (paragraphe 77 du rapport) . En outre, la RÃ©solution (76) 2 sur le traitement des dÃ©tenus en dÃ©tention de longue durÃ©e, adoptÃ©e par les DÃ©lÃ©guÃ©s des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe le 17 fÃ©vrier 1976, a notamment recommandÃ© aux Gouvernements des Etats membres Â« d'adapter aux peines de dÃ©tention A vie les mÃªmes principes que ceux rÃ©gissant les longues peines Â» et de s'assurer que les cas des intÃ©ressÃ©s soient examinÃ©s afin d'Ã©tablir si une libÃ©ration conditionnelle peut leur Ãªtre accordÃ©e, si un tel examen n'a pas dÃ©jÃ eu lieu, Â« au plus tard aprÃ¨s huit A quatorze ans de dÃ©tention Â» et que cet examen Â« soit rÃ©pÃ©tÃ© pÃ©riodiquement n . La question a Ã©galement Ã©tÃ© envisagÃ©e par la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale allemande, dans un arrÃªt du 21 juin 1977 (cf . EuGRZ 77, pp . 267 et suivantesl, et par la Cour constitutionnelle italienne dans un arrÃªt des 7/22 novembre 1974 (cf . Raccolta ufficiale delle sentenze e ordinanze della Corte Costituzionale, vol . 42 119741, p 353 ; EuGRZ 77, pp . 294-295) . Ces deux cours ont dÃ©clarÃ© que, bien que la peine de l'emprisonnement Ã vie ne soit pas, comme telle, incompatible avec la Constitution, il devrait exister pour le dÃ©tenu une possibilitÃ© lÃ©gÃ¢le d'obtenir sa libÃ©ration conditionnelle aprÃ©s un dÃ©lai raisonnable par un moyen autre que la grÃ©ce . La Cour constitutionnelle allemande a conclu que l'absence d'une telle possibilitÃ© dans l'ordre juridique faisait un devoir au lÃ©gislateur de lÃ©gifÃ©rer en la matiÃ¨re, mais qu'un dÃ©lairaisonnable devait lui Ãªtre accordÃ© pour lui permettre d'examine r
tous les problÃ©mes qui se posent . Ce n'est que si ; une fois ce dÃ©lai Ã©coulÃ©, aucune mesure lÃ©gislative satisfaisante n'avait Ã©tÃ© prise que la Cour devrait intervenir dans ce domaine. La Commission observe que, dans aucun de c :es arrÃ¨ts, l'emprisonnement Ã vie lui-mÃ©me n'est interdit ou dÃ©clarÃ© contrk-ire Ã la Convention . Ce qui est demandÃ©, c'est que le cas des dÃ©tenus purgeant une peine d'emprisonnement Ã vie soit rÃ©guliÃ©rement examinÃ© afin d'Ã©tablir s'ils peuvent Ãªtre libÃ©rÃ©s, avec ou sans condition, et que cet examen devienne obligatoire et soit confiÃ©, si possible, Ã un tribunal . Bien qu'elle estime une telle mesure souhaitable dans l'administratio n de la justice pÃ©nale, la Commission est d'avis qu'aucune disposition de la Convention, ni en particulier l'article 3 invoquÃ© par le requÃ©rant, ne . peut Ãªtre .interprÃ©tÃ©e comme imposant aux autoritÃ©s nationales, judiciaires ou administratives, une obligation de rÃ©examiner le cas des dÃ©tenus purgeant une peine d'emprisonnement Ã vie rÃ©guliÃ©rement - prononcÃ©e, en vue d'une remise ou . . . . d'une interruption dÃ©finitive de celle-ci . â¢ La Commission note en outre que, dans laprÃ©sente affaire, la peine d'emprisonnement Ã vie remplace une peine de mort ; la peine capitale Ã©tant permise par la Convention, la Commission ne saurait considÃ©rer que la peine d'emprisonnement Ã vie qui lui a Ã©tÃ© substituÃ©e constitue elle-mÃªme une violation de l'article 3 . Les circonstances spÃ©ciales dont le requÃ©rant fait Ã©tat Ã l'appui du motil (b ) .3 sont lÃ¨s suivantes : i . son Ã©tat de santÃ© , ii . le fait qu'on lui a Ã plusieurs reprises permis d'espÃ©rer sa libÃ©ration . , En ce qui concerne i ., le requÃ©rant dÃ©crit son Ã©tat de santÃ© comme suit : Suite Ã une hÃ©morragie cÃ©rÃ©brale survenuÃ©en 1973, Â« il se trainÃ© dan s la prison Ã l'aide de bÃ©quilles, parle de faÃ§on presque inaudible, ne peut raisonner de maniÃ©re cohÃ©rente et son Ã©tat est tel que l'aumonier catholique de'la prison a mÃ©me jugÃ© nÃ©cessaire, en mai 1975, de lui administrer les derniers sacrements u : Le Gouvernement ne nie pas la gravitÃ© de la condition physique e t mentale du requÃ©rant . .Il n'estime toutefois pas . que son Ã©tat de santÃ© nÃ©cessite-sa libÃ©ration . La Commission a examinÃ© tous les Ã©lÃ©ments qui lui ont Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ© s
Ã ce 'sujet :La Cour suprÃªme, qui d'aprÃ¨s sadÃ©cision du 11 fÃ©vrier 1977 a Ã©galement examinÃ© la questiÃ´n sous l'angle de l'article3 ; est d'avis que si l'Etat, Ã©n cas de dÃ©tÃ©rioration de l'Ã©tat de santÃ© d'un dÃ©tenu, maintient sa dÃ©tentibn en lui assurant tous les soins inÃ©dicaux nÃ©cessaires, il ne contrevient pas Ã - 244' -
l'article 3 . Elle rappelle que le prÃ©sident du tribunal de district et la cour d'appel ont observÃ© que la dÃ©tÃ©rioration physique et psychologique Ã©tait un phÃ©nomÃ©ne pouvant frapper tout Ãªtre humain vieillissant et n'Ã©tait donc pas exceptionnelle . La Cour suprÃ©me, Ã son tour, a admis que cette situation n'Ã©tait pas contraire Ã l'article 3 . La Commission fait sienne cette conclusion car elle ne relÃ¨ve aucu n Ã©lÃ©ment permettant de penser que les autoritÃ©s nÃ©erlandaises n'ont pas tenu compte de la condition physique et mentale du requÃ©rant, ou qu'elles ont omis de lui assurer les soins mÃ©dicaux nÃ©cessaires . Leur comportement ne constitue donc pas une violation de l'article 3 . En ce qui concerne ii ., la Commission admet que, durant l'examen de ses demandes de grÃ¢ce, le requÃ©ranta pu occasionnellement nourrir l'espoir d'Ãªtre libÃ©rÃ©, en particulier aprÃ¨s sa demande du 29 septembre 1971, lorsque le Ministre de la Justice, dans une lettre du 16 fÃ©vrier 1972 au PrÃ©sident de la Chambre basse, dÃ©clara que, selon lui, il fallait mettre un terme Ã la dÃ©tention des Â« trois de Breda u . La Commission note toutefois que, dans cette mÃ©me lettre, le Ministre indiquait clairement que la question ne pourrait Ãªtre tranchÃ©e de faÃ§on dÃ©finitive qu'aprÃ©s que le Parlement aurait eu l'occasion d'en dÃ©battre . Si, malgrÃ© cela, le requÃ©rant a pu nourrir l'espoir comprÃ©hensible d'une libÃ©ration imminente, fait dont le Gouvernement pourrait Ã©tre tenu pour responsable, la Commission ne considÃ¨re pas que ce fait constitue une circonstancÃ© spÃ©ciale qui rendrait inhumain le maintien de sa dÃ©tention . Il s'ensuit que cette partie de la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'anicle 27 par . 2 de la Convention . .. .. .. .. ... .. .
- 245 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 06/05/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page