Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/398/410
Timestamp: 2017-04-27 01:51:37
Document Index: 447850483

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 462', '§ 462', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 456']

Joseph Thomas MULLOY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews Joseph Thomas MULLOY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.
398 U.S. 410 (90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362)
Argued: April 20, 1970.
[HTML] Robert Allen Sedler, Lexington, Ky., for petitioner.
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, the petitioner was convicted for refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces in violation of § 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 62 Stat. 622, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and fined $10,000, and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 412 F.2d 421. We granted certiorari, 396 U.S. 1036, 90 S.Ct. 680, 24 L.Ed.2d 680, to consider the petitioner's contention, raised both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, that the order to report was invalid because his local board had refused to reopen his IA classification following his application for a IO classification as a conscientious objector. The argument is that it was an abuse of discretion for the board to reject his conscientious objector claim without reopening his classification, and by so doing to deprive him of his right to an administrative appeal.
* On October 17, 1967, the petitioner, who was then 23 years old and classified IA (available for military service), wrote to his local Selective Service Board that '(a)fter much, much thinking, seeking, and questioning of my own religious upbringing and political experience I have concluded that I am a conscientious objector. I am therefore opposed to war in any form.' In response to this letter the clerk sent him the Special Form for Conscientious Objectors (SSS) Form 150), which he promptly completed and returned.
In response to the petitioner's request to discuss his application with the board, the clerk wrote that the board had decided to grant him a personal appearance. This interview took place on November 9 and lasted about 10 or 15 minutes. It was attended by three of the four local board members. The re sume of the interview prepared by the clerk stated that the petitioner 'advised that he was claiming a C.O. classification because he had learned through experience and did not until later in life realize the importance of now believing as he did,' and that he 'felt that military service would interrupt his work and there would be no one else to take his place.' The minute entry in the petitioner's file indicated that all members present felt the information in the form, and accompanying letters, together with what was learned at the interview, did not warrant a reopening of the petitioner's IA classification. However, no formal vote on the petitioner's application was taken until January 11, 1968, at which time the minute entry indicated, all four members were present and again it was noted that all 'felt this information did not warrant reopening' of the IA classification. After receiving notification of the board's action, the petitioner wrote to the board on January 21 seeking to appeal its failure to reclassify him IO. He said that he considered the November interview to have been a reopening of his case. On January 23 the board replied that the interview had been extended as a matter of courtesy, and that it had not at any time reopened the petitioner's classification. On the same day the petitioner was ordered to report for induction on February 23, 1968. The petitioner reported, but refused to submit to induction. This refusal resulted in the criminal charge that led to his conviction under 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
Under the Selective Service regulations a 'local board may reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant * * * (if presented with) facts not considered when the registrant was classified which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant's classification * * *.' 32 CFR § 1625.2
Even if the local board denies the requested reclassification, there is a crucial difference between such board action and a simple refusal to reopen the classification at all. For once the local board reopens, it is required by the regulations to 'consider the new information which it has received (and to) again classify the registrant in the same manner as if he had never before been classified.' 32 CFR § 1625.11. A classification following a reopening is thus in all respects a new and original one and, even if the registrant is placed in the same classification as before, '(e)ach such classification (following the reopening) shall be followed by the same right of appearance before the local board and * * * of appeal as in the case of an original classification.' 32 CFR § 1625.13. Where, however, in the opinion of the board, no new facts are presented or 'such facts, if true, would not justify a change in such registrant's classification * * *,' 32 CFR § 1625.4, the board need not reopen, and following such a refusal to reopen, the registrant has no right to a personal appearance or to an appeal. Thus, whether or not a reopening is granted is a matter of substance, for with a reopening comes the right to be heard personally and to appeal. While the petitioner here was given an interview as a matter of courtesy, the board's refusal to reopen his classification denied him the opportunity for an administrative appeal from the rejection of his conscientious objector claim. Therefore, if the refusal to reopen was improper, petitioner was wrongly deprived of an essential procedural right, and the order to report for induction was invalid.
Though the language of 32 CFR § 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant's classification. While differing somewhat in their formulation of precisely just what showing must be made before a board is required to reopen, the courts of appeals in virtually all Federal Circuits have held that where the registrant has set out new facts that establish a prima facie case for a new classification, a board must reopen to determine whether he is entitled to that classification.
Not to do so these courts have held, is an abuse of discretion, and we agree.
Yet here the board did precisely that. For it is clear that the petitioner's SSS Form 150 and the accompanying letters constituted a prima facie showing that he met the statutory standard for classification as a conscientious objector (50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964 ed., Supp. IV)), and the Government now virtually concedes as much.
The Government suggests, however, that the board might have concluded that the prima facie claim had been undercut by the petitioner himselfby his statements at the courtesy interview or because his demeanor convinced the board that he was not telling the truth. There is, however, but scant evidence in the record that the board's action was based on any such grounds. And, in any event, it is on precisely such grounds as these that board action cannot be predicated without a reopening of the registrant's classification, and a consequent opportunity for administrative appeal.
This is not to say that on all the facts presented to it the board might not have been justified in refusing to grant the petitioner a IO classification; it is to say that such refusal could properly occur only after his classification had first been reopened. The board could not deprive the petitioner of the procedural protections attending reopening by making an evaluative determination of his claim while purportedly declining to reopen his classification.
'A sincere claimant for conscientious objector status cannot turn to the habeas corpus remedy (to challenge the legality of his classification) because his religious belief prevents him from accepting induction under any circumstances. As a result he is limited to seeking review in a criminal trial for refusal to submit. In this criminal proceeding, as in any proceeding reviewing a draft classification, his defense of invalid classification is tested by the 'basis in fact' formula. Under these circumstances conviction is almost inevitable, since the Board's refusal to grant the conscientious objector classification is based on an inference as to the sincerity of the registrant's belief and there will almost always be something in the record to support an inference of lack of sincerity.' United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246, 248249 (C.A.7th Cir. 1967).