Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95374/fetters-vs-cunningham
Timestamp: 2017-06-22 18:46:16
Document Index: 453301329

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 192', '§ 1014', '§ 591', '§ 1014', '§ 102', '§ 192', '§ 1014', '§ 1014', '§ 1014']

Fetters Vs Cunningham - Citation 95374 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Fetters Vs. Cunningham - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/95374CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMay-25-1931Case Number283 U.S. 638AppellantFettersRespondentCunninghamExcerpt:.....title 2, § 192), in having refused to answer pertinent questions put to him by a committee of the united states senate. it is not necessary to reproduce the indictment. for present purposes, the facts pleaded therein sufficiently appear in the opinion of this court in
. after indictment, respondent was arrested in pennsylvania upon a warrant issued under § 1014, r.s. (u.s.c. title 18, § 591), and taken before a united states district judge sitting as a committing magistrate. section 1014 provides:
"for any crime or offense against the united states, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the united states, or by any commissioner of a circuit court to take bail, or by any chancellor, judge of a supreme or..... Judgment:
Fetters v. Cunningham - 283 U.S. 638 (1931)
1. In proceedings under § 1014, R.S., the inquiry is limited to the question whether there is probable cause to believe the prisoner guilty, so as to justify his commitment and removal for trial. P.
283 U. S. 641
2. When the indictment is produced before the committing magistrate, it is received not as a pleading, but as evidence establishing or tending to establish the commission of an offense, and the magistrate has authority to pass upon it only in that aspect. He has no authority to determine it sufficiency as a pleading. P.
3. The magistrate in removal proceedings has no power to hold the facts pleaded in an indictment insufficient to charge an offense, when that question is reasonably open to a difference of opinion. Doubtful questions of law relating to the sufficiency of the indictment or the validity of the statute upon which the indictment is based, as well as all doubtful questions of fact, are matters to be left for the trial court to determine. P.
p. 812, to review an order of the district court discharging the relator Cunningham in habeas corpus. The relator was in custody of a U.S. Marshal for removal for trial under an indictment in the District of Columbia.
26 F.2d 272; 33
On April 20, 1928, an indictment was returned by a grand jury in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia charging the respondent, Cunningham, with a violation of § 102, R.S.
(U.S.C. Title 2, § 192), in having refused to answer pertinent questions put to him by a committee of the United States Senate. It is not necessary to reproduce the indictment. For present purposes, the facts pleaded therein sufficiently appear in the opinion of this Court in
After our decision in the
the court of appeals granted a rehearing, but, upon consideration, adhered to its former decision. 50 F.2d 411. Thereupon, the United States marshal applied to this Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted, but with an order vacating the judgments of both lower courts and remanding the cause to the district court with directions to dismiss the proceeding as abated.
282 U.S. 802. This was done because the United States marshal named in the petition had gone out of office and no substitution had been made within the statutory
In proceedings under § 1014, R.S., the inquiry is limited to the question whether there is probable cause to believe the prisoner guilty, so as to justify his commitment and removal for trial. This inquiry may take place in advance of indictment or without the production of the indictment if one has been returned. When the indictment is produced before the committing magistrate, it is received not as a pleading, but as evidence establishing or tending to establish the commission of an offense, and the magistrate has authority to pass upon it only in that aspect. He has no authority to determine its sufficiency as a pleading.
Whether the indictment in this case properly could be held sufficient by the trial court upon demurrer we have no occasion to consider. Without going into particulars, we think it clearly sufficient for removal purposes. The most that can be said is that the question whether the indictment is sufficient to put the respondent on trial is fairly debatable. It was never intended by § 1014 that an examining magistrate should have the power in removal proceedings to hold the facts pleaded in an indictment insufficient to charge an offense when that question is reasonably open to a difference of opinion. Doubtful questions of law relating to the sufficiency of the indictment or the validity of the statute upon which the indictment
is based, as well as all doubtful questions of fact, are matters to be left for the trial court to determine.
3 F.2d 903, 904, and cases cited.
, this Court, after pointing out that the proceedings under § 1014, R.S., were intrusted not only to judges and commissioners of the United States and judges of state courts, but to any "mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state where [the accused] may be found," said (p.
271 U. S. 150
And see Rodman v. Pothier,
The first order of commitment and removal made by the district judge was proper, and should have been sustained. In the trial court, the accused will have every opportunity to test the sufficiency of the indictment, since there, it is not evidence, but the very "foundation of the charge."
198 U. S. 12