Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/cacdce/2:2007cv03190/388920/355
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 04:29:58
Document Index: 391477062

Matched Legal Cases: ['ART 28', 'ART 4', 'ART 14', 'ART 16', 'ART, 22', '§ 243', '§ 69', '§ 243', '§ 69', '§ 1170', 'art 393', 'ART. 19', 'ART. 28', 'arty 4', 'ART. 21']

ORDER Re: PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE by Judge Ronald S for John Young v. Aron Wolfe et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings
Justia Dockets & Filings Ninth Circuit California California Central District Court John Young v. Aron Wolfe et al Filing 355
John Young v. Aron Wolfe et al
Filing 355
ORDER Re: PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. 1) The Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 312 . 2) The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 313 . 3) The Court GRAN TS IN PART, DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs Motion in Limine No. 3 314 . 4) The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 5 315 . 5) The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion in Limine No. 6 316 . 6) The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 7 317 . 7) The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 9 318 . 8) The Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 10 319 . 9) The Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 11 320 . SEE ORDER FOR FURTHER AND COMPLETE DETAILS. (jre)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 JOHN YOUNG, 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. 15 ARON WOLFE, et al., 16 17 Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CV 07-03190 RSWL (AJWx) ORDER Re: PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE [312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320] 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Currently before the Court are Plaintiff John 20 Young’s (“Plaintiff”) Motions in Limine (“MIL”) Nos. 1, 21 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 [312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 22 317, 318, 319, 320] against Defendants Aron Wolfe, 23 Christina Martinez, and Robert Ochoa (collectively, 24 “Defendants”). Having reviewed all papers submitted 25 pertaining to these Motions, the Court NOW FINDS AND 26 RULES AS FOLLOWS: 27 1. The Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART 28 Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #1 [312]. 1 1 2. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #2 2 [313]. 3 3. The Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART 4 Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #3 [314]. 5 4. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #5 6 [315]. 7 5. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #6 8 [316]. 9 6. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #7 10 [317]. 11 7. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #9 12 [318]. 13 8. The Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART 14 Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #10 [319]. 15 9. The Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART 16 Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #11 [320]. 17 A. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #1 18 As an initial matter, Plaintiff seems to change 19 and/or fails to specify what evidence he seeks to 20 exclude in MIL #1. While Plaintiff names categories of 21 evidence (all adverse character evidence including prior 22 arrests, discipline history in jail or in prison, 23 Plaintiff’s rap lyrics, prior complaints Plaintiff has 24 filed, and inmate appeals Plaintiff has lodged), he does 25 not specifically state what evidence or testimony he 26 seeks to exclude. Plaintiff then appears to focus only 27 on excluding evidence of Plaintiff’s and Plaintiff’s 28 witnesses’ criminal history to attack their character. 2 1 However, Plaintiff does not name which witness and what 2 specific evidence he is seeking to exclude. 3 Additionally, Plaintiff’s MIL #3 and #10 also seek 4 to exclude evidence of Plaintiff’s prior convictions and 5 arrests as well as Plaintiff’s alleged prior criminal 6 activity prior to the date of the incident. However, in 7 Plaintiff’s Reply, he states MIL #1 is not to exclude 8 criminal convictions but instead seeks to exclude: 1) 9 activities while in Plaintiff’s present state of 10 incarceration including disciplinary charges or 11 infractions; 2) rap lyrics written by the Plaintiff; 3) 12 Plaintiff had or having a “strike” or that Plaintiff was 13 a member of a gang; 4) Plaintiff having made other 14 complaints of misconduct; 5) Plaintiff having filed 15 other civil actions; and 6) comments made on behavioral 16 forms about Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not provide 17 information as to specific disciplinary charges or rap 18 lyrics he seeks to exclude. 19 Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to 20 make a fact more or less probable than it would be 21 without the evidence,” and “the fact is of consequence 22 in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. 23 Evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. 24 Evid. 402. Fed. R. However, under Federal Rules of Evidence 25 (“Fed. R. Evid.”) 403, the court may exclude relevant 26 evidence if its probative value is substantially 27 outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. 28 The “Rule 403 weighing process is primarily for the 3 1 district court to perform . . . and broad discretion 2 [is] afforded them in balancing probative value against 3 prejudice.” Longnecker v. General Motors Corp., 594 4 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1979). In making this 5 determination, the court must consider whether the 6 prejudice is unfair. Unfair prejudice “means an undue 7 tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 8 commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” 9 Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1981). 10 Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), applicable in civil as 11 well as criminal cases, evidence of an individual's 12 character is not admissible “for the purpose of proving 13 that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular 14 occasion.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(3), however, provides 15 that “evidence of a witness’s character may be admitted 16 under Rules 607, 608, and 609.” Rule 404(b) also 17 provides that evidence of wrongful acts can be 18 introduced as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 19 preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 20 mistake or accident.” 21 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). “Rule 404(b) is ‘one of inclusion which admits 22 evidence of other crimes or acts relevant to an issue in 23 the trial, except where it tends to prove only criminal 24 disposition.’” 25 Cir. 1987). Heath v. Cast, 813 F.2d 254, 259 (9th If a trial judge determines that the 26 balancing “weighs in favor of admitting the evidence, he 27 should ordinarily instruct the jury carefully as to the 28 limited purpose for which the evidence is admitted.” 4 1 U.S. v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1978). 2 Pursuant to Rule 608, “a witness’s credibility may 3 be attacked or supported by testimony about the 4 witness’s reputation for having a character for 5 truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the 6 form of an opinion about that character.” 7 608(a). Fed. R. Evid. Additionally, “extrinsic evidence is not 8 admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s 9 conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s 10 character for truthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). 11 However, on cross-examination they may be inquired into 12 if they are probative of the character for truthfulness 13 or untruthfulness of a witness. 14 Id. While Rule 404(a) prohibits evidence of a person’s 15 character to prove a person acted in accordance with 16 that character trait, Rule 404(b) allows evidence of a 17 crime, wrong, or other act for a different purpose such 18 as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 19 plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack 20 of accident. 21 Therefore, Plaintiff’s MIL #1 is GRANTED IN PART, 22 DENIED IN PART. The Court will allow evidence of 23 Plaintiff’s and Plaintiff’s witnesses’ criminal activity 24 and other acts for purposes of establishing bias and 25 impeachment of Plaintiff (should he choose to testify). 26 The evidence is excluded for all other purposes. 27 B. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #2 28 Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice 5 1 of the possible punishment Plaintiff faced in the 2005 2 criminal case where Plaintiff was charged with 3 violations of California Penal Code § 243(c)(2) and § 69 4 stemming from the May 15, 2004 incident. California 5 Penal Code § 243(c)(2) states that possible punishment 6 for battery on a peace officer may be imprisonment of 7 not more than one year or a $10,000 fine, or pursuant to 8 section 1170(h), for sixteen months, or two or three 9 years, or by both the fine and imprisonment. California 10 Penal Code § 69 lists the possible punishment as a fine 11 up to $10,000, up to one year in county jail, or both. 12 Section 1170 states that changes by the act that added 13 this subdivision applies to any person sentenced on or 14 after October 1, 2011. 15 Cal. Pen. Code § 1170. Defendants dispute this request arguing Plaintiff 16 did not provide what facts he intends to present to the 17 jury in regards to this request, that these sections did 18 not apply at the time Plaintiff was charged and 19 acquitted, that the Penal Codes fail to account for the 20 variety of sentencing options available, and this is 21 irrelevant to any issue in trial. 22 A court may take judicial notice of a fact that is 23 not subject to reasonable dispute because it “can be 24 accurately and readily determined from sources whose 25 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 26 Evid. 201(b)(2). Fed. R. A court “must take judicial notice if 27 a party requests it and the court is supplied with the 28 necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). 6 1 Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with 2 sufficient evidence as to the relevance of the possible 3 sentences for these violations except to state in his 4 Reply that it is relevant to damages. Walker v. 5 Woodford, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1023 (S.D. Cal. 2006) 6 affirmed in part 393 F. App’x 514, 2010 WL 3448559, 7 certiorari denied 562 U.S. 1233 (2011). Additionally, 8 this information is subject to reasonable dispute 9 because while the possible sentences are listed in the 10 Penal Codes, it is disputed whether these were the 11 actual sentences Plaintiff faced in his criminal trial 12 since section 1170 applies to sentences after October 1, 13 2011 and Plaintiff’s criminal trial was in 2005. The 14 Court has not been provided with the necessary 15 information as to the “possible sentences” Plaintiff 16 faced in the criminal trial. Therefore, Plaintiff’s MIL 17 #2 is DENIED. 18 C. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #3 19 Plaintiff’s MIL #3 seeks to exclude evidence of 20 prior arrests and convictions, however Plaintiff does 21 not identify in his MIL which of the five incidents he 22 listed were only arrests or also convictions. In 23 Plaintiff’s Reply, he lists the five incidents and 24 states they are Plaintiff’s convictions. Based on 25 Plaintiff’s representations to the Court, it appears the 26 five incidents all led to convictions. 27 Fed. R. Evid. 609 states that to attack a witness’s 28 character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal 7 1 conviction, if the crime was punishable by death or by 2 imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence must 3 be admitted subject to Rule 403. Additionally, for any 4 crime regardless of punishment, a court must admit the 5 evidence if the court “can readily determine that 6 establishing the elements of the crime required 7 proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest act or 8 false statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). If more 9 than ten years have passed from the conviction or 10 release from confinement, evidence of the conviction is 11 only admissible if “1) its probative value, supported by 12 specific facts and circumstances, substantially 13 outweighs its prejudicial effect; and 2) the proponent 14 gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the 15 intent to use it so that the party has a fair 16 opportunity to contest its use.” 17 Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). In regards to their admissibility, Plaintiff lists 18 the first conviction as possession of burglary tools in 19 Arizona 2000 and Defendants argue Plaintiff admitted it 20 was a conviction for possession of forgery instruments. 21 Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 609(b), evidence of this 22 conviction is allowed for the limited purpose of 23 impeachment of Plaintiff (should he choose to testify) 24 and bias against Defendants. Plaintiff’s conviction for 25 receipt/concealing stolen property (045506) on November 26 10, 2004 will also be allowed. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). 27 This conviction is probative because Plaintiff’s 28 incarceration at the time of the May 15, 2004 incident 8 1 was because of this arrest and conviction. Plaintiff’s convictions for criminal threats on 2 3 October 23, 2008 and residential burglary on August 13, 4 2010 (PA065631) will be excluded. While Fed. R. Evid. 5 608 states that evidence of a criminal conviction must 6 be admitted for attacking a witness’s character for 7 truthfulness, it must be admitted subject to Fed. R. 8 Evid. 403. The nature of the convictions are not 9 relevant for purposes of impeachment or bias. Moreover, 10 the prejudicial impact these convictions would have 11 outweigh any probative value that exists. The 12 misdemeanor conviction for possession of burglary tools 13 in Los Angeles County is also excluded because it is not 14 admissible for impeachment since possession of burglary 15 tools does not involve dishonesty or false statements. 16 Medrano v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1507 (9th 17 Cir. 1992). Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s MIL #3 18 is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. 19 D. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #5 20 Plaintiff seeks to exclude Defendants from offering 21 any evidence not previously disclosed pursuant to 22 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 26. Plaintiff 23 does not offer what exact evidence or testimony he is 24 seeking to exclude and as such cannot identify any 25 prejudice or disruption of trial that would result from 26 permitting this unknown evidence. Ball v. Cnty. of Los 27 Angeles, No. 2:13-cv-07739-CAS (FFMx), 2015 WL 1467179, 28 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 9 1 A motion in limine “should rarely seek to exclude 2 broad categories of evidence, as the court is almost 3 always better situated to rule on evidentiary issues in 4 their factual context during trial.” Id.; see Sperberg 5 v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th 6 Cir. 1975). All evidence should have been disclosed 7 pursuant to FRCP 26 and 37. If Defendants attempt to 8 introduce evidence or witnesses during trial in 9 violation of FRCP 26 or 37, Plaintiff can raise his 10 objections at the time of trial. 11 MIL #5 is DENIED. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 12 E. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #6 13 Plaintiff requests the Court limit testimony of 14 defense witnesses to actual knowledge of events at the 15 time of events in 2004 and 2005. Plaintiff seeks to 16 exclude evidence which he has failed to specifically 17 identify to the Court and which is not proper at the 18 motion in limine stage. Based on Plaintiff’s MIL #6, 19 “it is impossible for the Court to determine the precise 20 scope of evidence” Plaintiff seeks to exclude. William 21 Hablinski Architecture v. Amir Const. Inc., No. CV-0322 6365-CAS (RNBx), 2005 WL 4658149, at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. 23 2005). The Court cannot speculate what questions will 24 be asked and how any witness will answer these 25 questions. Plaintiff’s request encompasses too broad a 26 category to rule on at this juncture. Therefore, 27 Plaintiff may raise any objections to evidence offered 28 by Defendants or testimony he believes is inadmissible 10 1 at the time of trial. 2 DENIED. Thus, Plaintiff’s MIL #6 is 3 F. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #7 4 Plaintiff seeks to admit testimony of Deputy 5 Shannon (“Shannon”) from his trial testimony during 6 Plaintiff’s criminal trial in 2005. Defendants argue 7 the testimony should be excluded because it does not 8 satisfy any exception to the hearsay rule and does not 9 satisfy the residual exception. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(4) states that a declarant is 10 11 unavailable as a witness if the declarant cannot be 12 present or testify because of death. Fed. R. Evid. 13 804(a)(4). If a declarant is unavailable, former 14 testimony will not be excluded by the hearsay rule if 15 the testimony: “(A) was given as a witness at a trial, 16 hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during the 17 current proceeding or a different one; and (B) is now 18 offered against a party who had—or, in a civil case, 19 whose predecessor in interest had—an opportunity and 20 similar motive to develop it by direct, cross—, or 21 redirect examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). A hearsay statement not covered by a hearsay 22 23 exception under Rules 803 or 804 will not be excluded 24 if: “(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial 25 guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as 26 evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on 27 the point for which it is offered than any other 28 evidence that the proponent can obtain through 11 1 reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve 2 the purposes of these rules and the interests of 3 justice.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). Additionally, the 4 statement will only be admissible if before trial, the 5 party seeking to admit the statement gives the adverse 6 party “reasonable notice of the intent to offer the 7 statement and its particulars.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(b). This residual exception to the hearsay rule “should 8 9 be used only in extraordinary circumstances where the 10 court is satisfied that the evidence offers guarantees 11 of trustworthiness and is material, probative and 12 necessary in the interest of justice.” U.S. v. Tome, 61 13 F.3d 1446, 1452 (10th Cir. 1995)(internal citations and 14 quotation marks omitted). Courts have “considerable 15 discretion in applying the residual exception to the 16 hearsay rule.” Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 17 140 (5th Cir. 1982). Under Rule 804, Shannon is unavailable because he 18 19 has passed away. However, Plaintiff has failed to show 20 that the prosecutor in Plaintiff’s criminal trial is a 21 predecessor in interest to Defendants in this case and 22 that the prosecution had a similar motive to develop 23 Shannon’s testimony. Plaintiff was prosecuted by the 24 district attorney’s office and Defendants did not have 25 any representatives on their behalf at the time of 26 Plaintiff’s criminal trial. Hannah v. City of Overland, 27 Mo., 795 F.2d 1385, 1390 (8th Cir. 1986). Additionally, 28 the prosecutor’s objective and motive in questioning 12 1 Shannon was to prove that Plaintiff assaulted the 2 sheriff’s officers, not whether Defendants’ use of force 3 was objectively reasonable. Id. The prosecutor did not 4 have a similar motive in questioning Shannon on the same 5 matter that Defendants would question Shannon if he were 6 available. Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 7 F.2d 1179, 1187 (3rd Cir. 1978). 8 allowed under Fed. R. Evid. 804. 9 The testimony is not Under Rule 807, Plaintiff has failed to provide the 10 Court with evidence on how Shannon’s testimony is 11 evidence of a material fact. Plaintiff does not specify 12 what parts of the testimony he seeks to elicit. 13 Plaintiff’s counsel first states he intends to offer 14 “almost all” of Shannon’s testimony and then in his 15 Reply, states he intends to offer all of Shannon’s 16 testimony. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide 17 Defendants and this Court with the specific testimony he 18 seeks to introduce and provide how it is evidence of a 19 material fact and more probative on the point for which 20 it is offered than any other evidence. Plaintiff has 21 failed to do so and therefore, Plaintiff’s MIL #7 is 22 DENIED. 23 G. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #9 24 Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence that he was 25 housed in the “Discipline” module of the Men’s Central 26 Jail (“MCJ”) and the reasons an inmate may be housed in 27 the “Discipline” module on the grounds that it is 28 irrelevant, prejudicial, and impermissible character 13 1 evidence. Defendants counter that the “Discipline” 2 module should be admissible because it is not being 3 offered to show character; rather, the evidence is being 4 offered to show Defendants’ state of mind. 5 Plaintiff’s housing in the “Discipline” module is 6 not being used to show Plaintiff acted in accordance 7 with a character trait. Additionally, its probative 8 value is not substantially outweighed by a danger of 9 unfair prejudice because this evidence is not being 10 offered to show character, but rather Defendants’ state 11 of mind on the date of the incident. 12 Therefore, Plaintiff’s MIL #9 is DENIED. However, 13 Defendants are precluded from using Plaintiff’s housing 14 in the “Discipline” module to establish character and 15 action in conformity with such character. 16 H. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #10 17 Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence of Plaintiff’s 18 alleged criminal activity prior to and following the May 19 15, 2004 incident because it would violate Fed. R. Evid. 20 403 and 404. Defendants argue evidence of Plaintiff’s 21 encounters with LASD are probative to show Plaintiff’s 22 potential bias and the 2004 conviction is particularly 23 probative because that was the basis for Plaintiff’s 24 incarceration at the time of the incident with 25 Defendants. 26 Pursuant to Rule 608, “a witness’s credibility may 27 be attacked or supported by testimony about the 28 witness’s reputation for have a character for 14 1 truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the 2 form of an opinion about that character.” 3 608(a). Fed. R. Evid. Additionally, “extrinsic evidence is not 4 admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s 5 conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s 6 character for truthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). 7 However, on cross-examination they may be inquired into 8 if they are probative of the character for truthfulness 9 or untruthfulness of a witness. 10 Id. While Rule 404(a) prohibits evidence of a person’s 11 character to prove a person acted in accordance with 12 that character trait, Rule 404(b) allows evidence of a 13 crime, wrong, or other act for a different purpose such 14 as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 15 plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack 16 of accident. Plaintiff’s criminal activity prior to the 17 May 15, 2004 incident will be allowed for the limited 18 purpose of impeachment (if Plaintiff testifies), bias 19 against Defendants, and Plaintiff’s damages. Peraza, 20 722 F.2d at 1457; Bordeharay, 2016 WL 7260920 at *3. 21 They are excluded for all other purposes. Plaintiff’s 22 criminal activity after the May 15, 2004 is excluded for 23 all purposes because it is irrelevant and even if it was 24 relevant, its probative value is substantially 25 outweighed by the prejudicial effect it may have subject 26 to Fed. R. Evid. 403. Therefore, Plaintiff’s MIL #10 is 27 GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. 28 /// 15 1 I. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #11 2 Plaintiff seeks to admit the prior testimony of 3 Michael Sutton (“Sutton”), who was also an inmate in the 4 “Discipline” module at the time of the May 15, 2004 5 incident. Sutton testified at Plaintiff’s prior 6 criminal trial in 2005 and during the second trial for 7 this case in 2013. As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s 8 MIL #11 only requests the admission of Sutton’s trial 9 testimony from the 2005 criminal trial and second trial 10 in this case in August 2013. It then appears in 11 Plaintiff’s Reply, he adds that he also wants to admit 12 Sutton’s deposition testimony taken by Defendants 13 sometime in 2008. Plaintiff did not request Sutton’s 14 deposition testimony be admitted in his original MIL and 15 does not provide this Court with what portions of the 16 deposition he seeks to introduce and its relevance; 17 thus, the request to admit Sutton’s 2008 deposition 18 testimony is DENIED. 19 Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) states that a declarant is 20 unavailable as a witness if he is absent from the 21 hearing and the proponent of the statement has been 22 unable to procure the declarant’s attendance by process 23 or other reasonable means. Before a witness will be 24 deemed unavailable under Rule 804(a)(5), the proponent 25 of a statement must show a good–faith effort to procure 26 the witness's attendance at trial. If a declarant is 27 unavailable, former testimony will not be excluded by 28 the rule of hearsay if the testimony: “(A) was given as 16 1 a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, 2 whether given during the current proceeding or a 3 different one; and (B) is now offered against a party 4 who had—or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in 5 interest had—an opportunity and similar motive to 6 develop it by direct, cross—, or redirect examination.” 7 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). 8 Plaintiff attempted to locate Sutton by searching 9 the Board of Parole Hearing’s website, hiring an 10 investigator, and attempting to contact Sutton’s mother. 11 Plaintiff asserts he has attempted to contact Sutton 12 from June 2016, approximately eight-nine months prior to 13 the start of trial. While Plaintiff has been 14 unavailable to locate Sutton, his efforts have not been 15 unreasonable. 16 Cir. 1983). U.S. v. Thomas, 705 F.2d 709, 712 (4th It does not appear Plaintiff had Sutton’s 17 address or information that would help him locate 18 Sutton. 19 1985). U.S. v. Winn, 767 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. Therefore, Sutton is unavailable under Rule 20 804(a)(5)’s definition of unavailability. 21 However, Plaintiff has failed to show that the 22 prosecutor in Plaintiff’s 2005 criminal trial is a 23 predecessor in interest to Defendants in this case and 24 that the prosecution had a similar motive to develop 25 Sutton’s testimony. Plaintiff was prosecuted by the 26 district attorney’s office and Defendants did not have 27 any representatives on their behalf at the time of 28 Plaintiff’s criminal trial. Hannah, 795 F.2d at 1390. 17 1 Additionally, the prosecutor’s objective and motive in 2 questioning Sutton was to prove that Plaintiff assaulted 3 the sheriff’s officers, not whether Defendants’ use of 4 force was objectively reasonable. Id. The prosecutor 5 did not have a similar motive in questioning Sutton on 6 the same matter that Defendants would question Sutton if 7 he were available. Lloyd, 580 F.2d at 1187. Therefore, 8 Plaintiff’s request to admit Sutton’s testimony from the 9 2005 criminal trial is DENIED. 10 Defendants were represented at this case’s second 11 trial in August 2013. Defendants had the opportunity 12 and motive to develop Sutton’s testimony. This meets 13 the requirements of Rule 804 and Plaintiff’s request to 14 admit Sutton’s testimony from the August 2013 civil 15 trial is GRANTED. However, if not already done so, 16 Plaintiff must disclose to Defendants and this Court 17 what parts of Sutton’s testimony from the August 2013 he 18 seeks to offer during trial so that Defendants have an 19 opportunity to review it prior to trial. Therefore, 20 Plaintiff’s MIL #11 is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 DATED: March 14, 2017 S/ 23 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW 24 Senior U.S. District Judge 25 26 27 28 18