Source: http://narf.org/icwa/state/nebraska/case/cw.htm
Timestamp: 2014-07-25 22:00:28
Document Index: 717919833

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n1902', '§\n1911', '§\n1915', '§\n1915', '§\n1912', '§\n43', '§\n43', '§\n43', '§\n43', '§\n43', '§\n43', '§\n43', 'art.\n3']

ICWA Guide Online | Nebraska Cases Federal Resources | Resources by State | Cases A-Z (Cite as: 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d 105)
re Interest of C.W., M.W., K.W., and J.W., children under
of Nebraska, Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
Sioux Tribe, Appellee and Cross-Appellee.
90-157.
Collateral Attack: Jurisdiction.
Collateral attacks on previous proceedings are impermissible unless
the attack is grounded upon the court's lack of jurisdiction
over the parties or subject matter.
Rights: Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error.
The improper admission of evidence by the trial
court in a parental rights termination proceeding does not, in
and of itself, constitute reversible error, for, as long as
an appellant properly objected at trial, this court will not
consider any such evidence in its de novo review of
Pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, qualified
expert testimony is required in a parental
rights termination case on the issue of whether serious harm
to the Indian child is **108
likely to occur if the child is not removed from
Expert Witnesses: Appeal and Error.
A trial court is allowed discretion in determining
whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert,
and unless the court's finding is clearly erroneous, such a
determination will not be disturbed on appeal.
Child Welfare Act: Courts: Jurisdiction.
The Indian Child Welfare Act does not divest
state courts of their jurisdiction over children of Indian descent
living off the reservation.
Child Welfare Act: Courts: Jurisdiction: Good Cause.
State courts may exercise jurisdiction concurrently with the
tribal courts in regard to those Indian children who do
not reside and are not domiciled on their tribe's reservation;
however, a state court must refer the matter to
a tribal court unless good cause is shown for the
retention of state court jurisdiction.
That a state court may take jurisdiction under
the Indian Child Welfare Act does not necessarily mean that
it should do so, as the court should consider the
rights of the child, the rights of the tribe, and
the conflict of law principles, and should balance the interests
of the state and the tribe.
Child Welfare Act: Evidence: Records: Good Cause:
Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, factual support
must exist in the trial record for the purposes of
appropriate appellate review as to good cause for failure to
comply with statutory child placement preference directives.
Child Welfare Act: Jurisdiction.
Regarding the Indian Child Welfare Act, in determining
whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be invoked
the trial court should consider practical factors that make trial
of the case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive, such as relative
ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of
obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the ability to secure attendance
of witnesses through compulsory process.
The Indian Child Welfare Act does not change
the cardinal rule that the best interests of the child
are paramount, although it may alter its focus.
The best interests of the child standard is
applicable to a decision over whether to transfer the jurisdiction
of a child custody proceeding to a tribal court.
Good cause exists for the denial of transfer
of the proceeding from a state to a tribal court,
for Indian Child Welfare Act purposes, based on the delay
of a tribe in expressing intent to intervene, the fact
that a state court forum provides better opportunity for production
of valuable evidence, and the consideration that transfer of the
proceeding to the tribal court would not be in
Guardians Ad Litem: Parental Rights.
Guardians ad litem have not been restricted in
their presentation of evidence or participation at trial, and there
is no reason why a guardian ad litem for a
child in a termination proceeding should be restricted.
Consideration of a case will be limited to
errors assigned and discussed.
15. Trial:
Proof: Appeal and Error.
A party who challenges a trial court, asserting
that the court abused its discretion with regard to sanctions
imposed for discovery violations, must show that the ruling of
the court was clearly untenable, depriving the litigant of a
substantial right and denying a just result in the matter
submitted for disposition.
Child Welfare Act: Good Cause.
Regarding the Indian Child Welfare Act, it is
patently clear that Congress envisioned situations in which the child's
best interests may override a tribal or family interest. The preferences for placement expressed by the act are to
be followed absent good cause to the contrary.
Sandra Hernandez Frantz, Lincoln, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Gary E. Lacey, Lancaster County Atty., and Alicia B. Henderson,
Lincoln, for appellee and cross-appellant State.
Kevin Ruser, Grand Island, for appellee and cross-appellee Rosebud Sioux
A series of petitions alleged separately that each of the
four children involved in this case lacked proper parental care
by reason of the fault and habits of their mother,
D.W., appellant. All four of the children had
been born out of wedlock and had been under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court for years prior to the
commencement of the termination proceeding that is the subject of
The Rosebud Sioux Tribe was notified of the first petition,
of which M.W. was the subject, by registered mail, return
receipt requested. The tribe received notice 20 days
before adjudication, but informed the Lancaster County Attorney in writing
over 1 month after M.W.'s adjudication as a neglected child
that the Rosebud Sioux Tribe would not accept jurisdiction of
the case, citing noneligibility of both the mother and M.W.
for enrollment. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe suggested that
the mother and M.W. might possibly be members of the
Sioux Tribe and subsequently notified by letter the Oglala Sioux
Tribe, informing it of the proceedings regarding M.W.
A second petition was filed in juvenile court, this one
concerning C.W., and a copy thereof was sent to the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe again
declined to intervene, but later posited that the mother was
eligible and should she decide to enroll herself in the
tribe, then the tribe should be sent notice.
The Oglala Sioux Tribe filed its notice of intervention and
petition for transfer for both M.W. and C.W. The juvenile court transferred the case; however, upon appellant's objection
to the transfer, the transfer was set aside, and C.W.
was also adjudicated as a neglected child.
Later, a third petition was filed in the interest of
K.W., and in light of the previous responses from the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe indicating its position on the matter, notice
was sent only to the Oglala Sioux Tribe.
Two weeks after K.W.'s adjudication as neglected, the juvenile court
was informed that the Oglala Sioux Tribe would decline to
intervene in the case because the mother was not on
the official records as the daughter of a member of
the tribe and was therefore not eligible for enrollment in
The mother's fourth child was the subject of the fourth
petition to be filed, which took place in Adams County
Court, as J.W. had been born in an Adams County
hospital. J.W. was adjudicated a neglected child and
her case was transferred to Lancaster County for disposition. After each adjudication concerning the four children, dispositional and
review hearings were held on a regular basis.
A supplemental petition requested termination of the mother's parental rights
on the grounds of abandonment, neglect, and her habitual use
of intoxicating liquor and narcotics. No personal service
of the supplemental petition was made on the mother and
ineffective service was made on the Oglala Sioux and Rosebud
Additionally, the appellant was given a substantial quantity of discovery
material 7 days before trial, and another stack of discovery
material at 7 p.m. the evening before trial, alleged by
the mother in her brief to have been purposed to
set the appellant at a tactical disadvantage.
The case was dismissed due to the insufficient notice to
the *821
tribe, but the State refiled, sending proper notice to the
tribe. Shortly before trial the Rosebud Sioux Tribe
filed a petition for transfer of jurisdiction to the tribal
court, which the court sustained. Three days later
the State filed **110
its motion for new trial and vacation of the juvenile
court's order of transfer of jurisdiction, which was ultimately sustained.
That same day the Rosebud Sioux Tribe filed
an order accepting the transfer of jurisdiction.
The trial on the termination of parental rights proceeded. The court terminated
the mother's parental rights, stating that she was unfit by
reason of abuse of intoxicating liquor and drugs, and that
reasonable efforts to correct the problems had failed. The court further terminated the parental rights of the respective
putative fathers of the children and ordered that the matter
be transferred to the Rosebud Sioux Tribe for the dispositional
phase of the proceeding. The juvenile court stayed
transfer of the children pending appeal.
Appellant alleges what we have summarized as 11 assignments of
error, in which she claims that the juvenile court erred
in that it (1) terminated her parental rights in violation
of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
1901 et seq. (1988) (hereinafter the ICWA); (2) obtained
jurisdiction of the matter in violation of the ICWA; (3) took judicial notice of a juvenile court file which
contained evidence admitted in violation of the ICWA and took
judicial notice of such file in violation of appellant's rights
to confrontation and cross-examination; (4) terminated her parental rights
when the petitioner had not provided qualified experts to testify,
as required under the ICWA; (5) abused its discretion
by refusing to transfer the case to the Rosebud Sioux
Tribal Court; (6) exercised jurisdiction when it no longer
had jurisdiction, as the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court had accepted
jurisdiction; (7) terminated appellant's parental rights when petitioner had
not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
nor had petitioner shown that
appellant had caused any direct harm to the minor children;
(8) considered the guardian ad litem's recommendations and evidence
when the guardian ad litem had not adhered to the
principles of the ICWA nor her statutory duties as guardian
ad litem; (9) admitted into evidence *822
information from tribal files, social worker files, and attorney files
as business records; (10) used violations of the ICWA
as to placement of Indian children and the consequences of
said placement against the appellant; and (11) should have excluded
discovery material that was produced to appellant late.
The county attorney and guardian ad litem cross-appeal, assigning as
error the juvenile court's ultimate transfer of the matter to
the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court.
In her first and second assignments of error the mother
generally alleges that the trial court obtained jurisdiction and that
her parental rights were terminated in violation of the ICWA.
The assignments are without merit.
While the mother contends that the ICWA has been violated
in many ways, she makes no references to the record
to where those violations may have occurred. She does refer
in her argument to the incidents of the court's taking
judicial notice of files containing evidence obtained in violation of
the ICWA, which we shall address later in discussion of
that specific assignment.
The third assignment of error alleges that the juvenile court
took judicial notice of a juvenile court file which contained
evidence admitted in violation of the ICWA and also that
such notice violated the mother's rights to confrontation and cross-examination.
Appellant objected at trial only to the court's
taking judicial notice of the predispositional reports and the attachments
thereto. We decide this case de novo on
the record, as we have held that **111
we are obliged to do, see In
re Interest of J.L.M. et al.,
234 Neb. 381, 451 N.W.2d 377 (1990), *823
and will consider only the relevant and untainted evidence.
While we recognize the Nebraska Evidence Rules are not applicable in a dispositional hearing, including a hearing to terminate parental rights, the requirements of due process control a proceeding to terminate parental rights and the type of evidence which may be used by the State in an attempt to prove that parental rights should be terminated. See In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987). The
improper admission of evidence by the trial court in a
parental rights termination proceeding does not, however, in and of
itself, constitute reversible error, for, as long as the appellant
properly objected at trial, this court will not consider any
such evidence in its de novo review of the record.
re Interest of D.S. and T.S.,
236 Neb. 413, 414-15, 461 N.W.2d 415, 418 (1990).
In the mother's fourth assignment of error, she alleges that
the petitioner had not provided qualified experts, in violation of
the ICWA. The assignment is
The only expert witness to whom the mother objected at
trial was Dr. Gary Melton, and thus, our review is
limited to his status as an expert.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs sets forth guidelines under which
expert witnesses most likely will meet the requirements of the
ICWA: (i)
area of his or her specialty. Id.
Dr. Melton obtained a Ph.D. from Boston University, is licensed
to practice psychology
in Nebraska, and is a certified clinical psychologist with extensive
clinical research experience with children. Dr. Melton's research
revealed that there exist no comparative studies between Native American
children and other children in their respective needs for stability
Appellant's own experts, Dr. Garrett Grandbois and Clyde Tyndall, concur
with a finding that Native American children need stability and,
in fact, had recommended that the mother establish and maintain
a stable home environment for her children.
of Welfare of T.J.J.,
366 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn.App.1985), Minnesota's Court of Appeals
noted in dicta that "a witness' background in Indian culture
does not necessarily determine whether that witness is qualified as
an expert under the Act."
Other courts have found that individuals who are professionals with
substantial education and experience in psychology are deemed to be
qualified experts under the ICWA. See In
re Kreft,
148 Mich.App. 682, 384 N.W.2d 843 (1986).
We find that evidence existed to support the trial court's
finding that Dr. Melton qualified as an expert. Dr. Melton possesses substantial education and experience in his area
of specialty, and his lack of experience with the Indian
way of life in no way compromised or undermined the
value of his testimony. The assignment of error as to
the use of his testimony at trial is therefore without
As to the mother's fifth and sixth assignments of error
regarding the propriety of the juvenile court's jurisdiction and failure
to transfer the matter to the tribal court, we find
(1) protecting the best interests of the Indian children
and (2) promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families. See 25 U.S.C. §
1902. The act is based on the assumption
that protection of the Indian child's relationship to the tribe
is in the child's best interests. Mississippi
ICWA §
1911 mandates that the Indian tribe have jurisdiction in all
custody proceedings "involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal
law." The ICWA does not, however, divest state
courts of their jurisdiction over children of Indian descent living
off the reservation. Kiowa
777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir.1985), cert.
479 U.S. 872, 107 S.Ct. 247, 93 L.Ed.2d 171 (1986).
tribal *826
courts in regard to those Indian children who do not
reside and are not domiciled on their tribe's reservation; however, a state court must refer the matter to a
tribal court unless good cause is shown for the retention
of state court jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. §
Under the ICWA, if the tribe or either parent of
the Indian child petitions for transfer of the proceeding to
the tribal court, the state court cannot proceed with the
placement of an Indian child living outside a reservation without
first determining whether jurisdiction of the matter should be transferred
to the tribe. See §
At a hearing on a petition to transfer a termination
of parental rights proceeding to tribal court under the ICWA,
the party opposing the transfer has the burden of establishing
that good cause not to transfer the matter exists. See,
1911(b); Mississippi
Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, supra.
Under the ICWA, factual support must exist in the trial
record for the purposes of appropriate appellate review as to
good cause for failure to comply with statutory child placement
preference directives. In
213 Neb. 741, 331 N.W.2d 785 (1983).
The Bureau of Indian Affairs has published nonbinding *827
federal guidelines interpreting the ICWA's definition of "good cause to
the contrary" as including, but not limited to, cases where
(1) the proceeding is at an advanced
stage when the petition to transfer is received, and the
petition is not promptly filed after receipt of notice; (2) the Indian child is over the age of 12
and objects to the transfer; (3) evidence necessary to
decide the case cannot be adequately presented to the tribal
court without undue hardship to the witnesses and parties; and (4) the parents of an Indian child over the
age of 5 are not available, and the child has
had little or no contact with the child's tribe or
members of the child's tribe. Additionally, the guidelines
specify that socioeconomic conditions and the perceived adequacy of tribal
or Bureau of Indian Affairs social services or judicial systems
may not be considered in determining whether good cause exists.
The burden of establishing good cause shall be
on the party opposing the transfer. Guidelines for State Courts;
Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. 67,584, 67,591 (1979)
(not codified).
The third element of the guidelines has been applied to
deny transfer due to considerations of forum non conveniens, such
as availability of witnesses and access to proof. See In
Interest of J.R.H.,
358 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1984). The Court of
Appeals of South Carolina found in Chester
Co. Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Coleman,
296 S.C. 355, 372 S.E.2d 912 (App.1988), that good cause
may exist under the statute: What
little we are able to glean from the record indicates
that a biological parent of the two older girls, both
of whom are over five years of age, may be
that none of the children has had any contact
with the tribe or has resided on the reservation for
a significant period of time; and that material witnesses
and evidence relating to placement are in South Carolina, not
South Dakota. These factors, together with evidence that
removal of the children would be disruptive and detrimental to
their best interests, may well constitute "good cause" for the
family court to retain jurisdiction.... Id.
at 359, 372 S.E.2d at 915. Unable to
make such a factual determination, the court remanded the cause
Iowa's Supreme Court, in Interest
of J.R.H., supra,
also interpreted "good cause" to include geographical conditions. The court subsequently found that there was good cause to
deny transfer of the proceedings to the tribal court in
South Dakota, as the evidence necessary to decide the case
could not be adequately presented in the tribal court without
undue hardship to the parties or witnesses.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota held in Matter
of Dependency and Neglect of
442 N.W.2d 233 (S.D.1989), that notice of the proceeding concerning
the dependency and neglect of children enrolled in the tribe
gave the tribe actual notice, even though the tribe did
not receive registered notice, and thus, the tribe's request to
transfer the case to the tribal court was untimely where
the tribe orally petitioned for transfer 1 year after receiving
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found in In
re Adoption of K.L.R.F.,
356 Pa.Super. 555, 515 A.2d 33 (1986), that an adoptive
Indian mother's placement of her Indian child with foster parents
was temporary. Thus, the Indian mother had the right and
ability under the federal ICWA to withdraw her consent to
the placement and to effectuate the immediate return of the
child, notwithstanding the fact that adoption may have been, at
one time, the "ultimate objective" of the parties, where placement
was purely consensual. The adoptive Indian parent furthermore
had standing, the court found, to rely upon and demand
compliance with provisions of the federal ICWA with respect to
the action to terminate her parental rights.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma similarly found, in Matter
754 P.2d 863 (Okla.1988), that the presence of the witnesses
in Okmulgee County and the best interests of the child
supported the finding of good cause to deny the mother's
request for transfer of jurisdiction to the tribal court.
Conversely, in In
re Armell,
194 Ill.App.3d 31, 141 Ill.Dec. 14, 550 N.E.2d 1060
(1990), the Appellate Court of Illinois strictly construed the Bureau
of Indian Affairs guidelines in finding that the best interests
of the child standard and the psychological effects of the
transfer were inapplicable in the determination of whether "good cause"
The only remotely applicable federal case is Mississippi
which stated that the domicile of illegitimate infants is that
of their mother. In Holyfield,
the mother's tribal reservation was the domicile of the twin
infants, and the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the
custody *830
proceeding, even though neither of the twins had ever actually
been on the reservation. Holyfield
neither speaks to nor disposes of any issue in this
The court stated, in its November 20, 1989, findings, its
reasons for the finding of good cause. The
court considered the 8-year history of the case, including the
facts that the appellant opposed the 1982 transfer to the
Oglala Sioux Tribe, pursuant to her right to do so
under the ICWA, and that in 1982 the Oglala Sioux
Tribal Court judge approved of placement of two of the
children in non-Indian homes. Not only was the
petition for transfer filed at an advanced stage in the
proceedings, but all of the evidence was located in Lancaster
County. To transfer the proceedings to the tribal
court, located in South Dakota, would pose an undue hardship
to the witnesses and parties, and in that we find
good cause to retain the proceedings in the juvenile court.
We affirm the juvenile court's decision to retain
jurisdiction of the matter in that court.
Appellant also claims in the seventh assignment of error that
her parental rights were terminated without the petitioner proving its
case beyond a reasonable doubt or showing that the mother
had caused any direct harm to the minor children.
As to the issue of whether proof of the mother's
direct harm to the children exists, the record is replete
with evidence of her addictions, as well as her subsequent
denials regarding the addictions to alcohol and inhalants. During the trial regarding the issue of termination of parental
rights, the mother was committed to a detoxification center for
protective custody. She had been committed to the
Hastings Regional Center between July and October 1989, she was
scheduled for a mental health commitment hearing because her guardian
ad litem alleged that she required commitment, and she spent
a night in jail for disturbing the peace at the
detoxification center. She also had served over 900
days in jail for offenses related to her alcohol and
inhalant addictions.
Dr. Melton testified, as an expert witness, that the children
would likely suffer serious emotional harm if returned to their
mother now or in the near future and that continued
contact would unsettle and undermine the stability of their
The evidence supports a causal relationship between the mother's behavior
and likely damage to the children, and we will not
ask the children to wait and see whether their mother
grows up in the future. She has not
found the incentive to mature and change her lifestyle over
the years this case has been progressing through the juvenile
court, when that was the only obstruction to having her
children returned to her.
Appellant alleged in the eighth assignment of error violations of
the ICWA in the guardian ad litem's recommendations and evidence.
She specifically cites that the guardian ad litem
"tried to keep out evidence that the Appellant presented" and
that the guardian ad litem did not make an effort
to find proper placement of the children so that they
"could avoid the certain identity crisis that they will now
experience." Brief for appellant at 33. The mother does not argue the principles of the ICWA
that have been violated.
Appellant alleges in the 10th assignment of error that the
juvenile court used violations of the ICWA as to placement
and consequences of those violations against the appellant. The assignment is without merit.
Upon initial placement of the children, efforts were made to
locate Indian foster
homes for them, but Indian foster homes were not available.
Even during trial, attempts were made to find
Indian families, to no avail.
The mother specifically requested on several occasions that her children
be placed in non-Indian foster homes, specifically directing that she
did not want the children placed with family *833
members. Additionally, the tribes with which the mother
is associated did nothing to assist in the children's placement
and honored her decision to allow the children to be
placed in non-Indian foster homes.
Seven years after the case began and 10 months after
the termination petition was filed, the mother filed a motion
to change placement. She did not appear for
hearing and presentation of evidence on that motion.
The mother's plea that placement was in violation of the
ICWA is without merit due to the fact that she
unilaterally made the determination that the placement of her children
should deviate from the ICWA scheme, and we therefore affirm
the juvenile court's decision to place the children with non-Indian
As to the cross-appeal of the Lancaster County Attorney and
guardian ad litem for the children, we reverse the juvenile
court's decision to transfer the proceedings to the Rosebud Sioux
Tribal Court for the purpose of disposition or placement of
We find Mississippi
not dispositive of the present case. In that
case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a parent may
not attempt to defeat the interests of the tribe **117
by temporarily moving away from the reservation to give birth.
While the case reflects that it is the
tribe's decision to determine what is in the Indian child's
best interests, the holding is applicable only where the child
is deemed domiciled on the reservation.
The Arizona Court of Appeals, in Matter
528, 667 P.2d 228 (App.1983), considered, in an adoption case,
the length of time a child had been with the
adoptive mother, the occurrence of bonding, and testimony that removal
of the child would cause psychological damage to the child.
The court expounded that from the congressional policy,
"[i]t is patently clear that Congress envisioned situations in which
the child's best interest may override a tribal or family
interest--the preferences for placement are to be followed absent 'good
cause to the contrary.' [25 U.S.C.] §
1915(a), (b)." 136 Ariz. at 534, 667 P.2d at
525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind.1988), the Indiana court dealt with a
child who had lived with the same foster family all
of her 7 years of life, recognizing that [to]
now sever and dislodge the child from the family and
culture she has known during all of her seven years
of life cannot be anything except devastating to the best
interests of the child. The purpose of the
ICWA, to protect the interests of the Indian family, is
patently clear. However, a paramount interest is the
protection of the best interests of the child. Id.
One of the qualified expert witnesses, Dr. Melton, testified that
removing the children from present foster homes and placing them
in equally stable foster homes would have significant consequences, would
be emotionally upsetting, and would produce psychological disorganization.
Another expert witness, Professor Ann Coyne, specializes in bonding and
attachment and in separation and loss, and has experience working
with special needs children, tribes, and the Department of Social
Services. She explained the nature of bonding and
that the consequences of breaking attachments for children include short-term
memory deficits, speech and language problems, and posttraumatic stress that
manifests itself in children as depression and difficulty in relating
to others. As Professor Coyne testified, "[F]or a
child, there's nothing more desparate [sic] than to be removed
from the person to whom they are attached." Professor Coyne testified that the grief process in children takes
at least 6 to 8 years from the time of
the loss and that, in this case, transfer to the
tribe and the inevitable grief over losing their psychological
parents would compromise the children's ability to benefit from that
culture because they would be too busy grieving and dealing
with the loss of the attachment.
From the beginning, the mother refused to allow transfer of
her children's cases to the tribal court and demanded that
her children be placed in non-Indian homes. While
she may be entitled to change her **118
mind, we cannot and will not close our eyes to
the extensive bonding and attachment these children have experienced with
the foster families who now wish to adopt them, in
the 7 years the mother has adhered to her initial
Although we realize that the guidelines deem inappropriate considerations of
tribal socioeconomic considerations and the perceived adequacy of the tribal
or Bureau of Indian Affairs social services or judicial systems,
we also recognize that, in the case of two of
the children, those considerations become necessary to a determination of
the best interests of the children *836
and, therefore, "good cause" not to transfer the case. Both C.W. and M.W. are mentally handicapped and have
special needs which the law specifically requires that we consider.
See 25 U.S.C. §
1915(b). See, also, 44 Fed.Reg. 67,584, 67,594 (1979).
The children will suffer if their respective foster
homes, the only stability they have ever known, are taken
The judgment terminating parental rights is affirmed. That
part of the court's
judgment transferring custody to the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court for
disposition is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings
AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR
Although the result reached today by the majority of this
court is correct, I disagree with the majority's route to
While the majority reiterates that "the Nebraska Evidence Rules are
not applicable in a dispositional hearing, including a hearing to
terminate parental rights," the majority, nevertheless, proceeds to discuss the
admissibility of testimony from Dr. Gary Melton, a psychologist, and
concludes that Melton's testimony is admissible because he was a
witness "qualified to testify as an expert under Neb.Evid.R. 702,"
which was the trial court's finding on a preliminary question
of admissibility and a conclusion which, under the circumstances and
the Nebraska Evidence Rules, is not clearly erroneous. The majority's acknowledgment that the Nebraska Evidence Rules are inapplicable
in proceedings to terminate parental rights renders the majority's discussion
about admissibility of an expert's testimony under the Nebraska Evidence
Rules both incongruous and unnecessary. That, however, may
incongruous feature of the majority's opinion in this case.
The majority then states that "the Nebraska rules of evidence
provide a guidepost" in determining whether evidence adduced over a
parent's objection at a hearing to terminate parental rights is
reconcilable with procedural due process. The expression about
a "guidepost" supplies no answer to the *837
question: Is application of the Nebraska Evidence Rules necessary
for procedural due process in a hearing to terminate parental
rights under the Nebraska Juvenile Code?
To answer the preceding question about procedural due process, we
must operate from two premises. First, the parent-child
relationship is accorded due process protection. Second, rules
of evidence are reliable standards for presentation of information to
produce reasonably trustworthy resolutions of controversies submitted to the judicial
Support for our first premise is found in decisions by
the U.S. Supreme Court as well as decisions of this
court. Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981),
involved due process considerations for proceedings to terminate parental rights.
In Lassiter,
the Court observed: For
all its consequence, "due process" has never been, and perhaps
can never be, precisely defined. "[U]nlike some legal rules,"
this Court has said, due process
"is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances." Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 [81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d
1230]. Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of "fundamental
fairness," a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as
its importance is lofty. Applying the Due **119
Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover
what "fundamental fairness" consists of in a particular situation by
first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the
several interests that are at stake. 452 U.S. at 24-25, 101 S.Ct. at 2158.
Court continued: This
Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need
for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right
to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or
her children" is an important interest that "undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Stanley
405 U.S. 645, 651 [92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d
551]. Here the State has sought not simply to
infringe upon that interest, but to end it. If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique
kind of *838
deprivation.... A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision to terminate his or her parental status
is, therefore, a
commanding one. 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 2159-60.
Shortly after Lassiter,
the Supreme Court decided Santosky
The Court remarked: In
it was "not disputed that state intervention to terminate the
relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplished
by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause."
[Citations omitted.] The absence of dispute reflected this
Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters
of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations omitted.] The
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State. Even when
blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than
do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds,
it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S.Ct. at 1394-95. Further, in Santosky,
the Court noted: "The
extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may
be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' " [Citations omitted.]
When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it
seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but
to end it. 455 U.S. at 758-59, 102 S.Ct. at 1397. Finally, in Santosky,
the Court concluded that "the child and his parents share
a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship." 455 U.S. at 760, 102 S.Ct. at 1398.
In other decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated that a
state may not constitutionally terminate parental rights without showing parental
unfitness. See Quilloin
434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554-55, 54 L.Ed.2d
511 (1978): We
have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent
and child is constitutionally protected.... We
have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be
offended "[i]f a State were to attempt to force the
breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the
parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and
for the sole reason that to do so was thought
to be in the children's best interest." Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862-863 [97 S.Ct. 2094, 2119, 53 L.Ed.2d
14] (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). See, also, Stanley
405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)
(the integrity of the family unit is protected by **120
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); In
re Interest of R.G.,
238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991) (the parent-child relationship
involves a liberty interest).
The Supreme Court's views concerning the requirement of due process
for a hearing to terminate parental rights, expressed in Santosky
v. Kramer, supra,
and Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services, supra,
have been adopted by this court regarding the Nebraska Juvenile
re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S.,
227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987); In
re Interest of L.J., J.J., and J.N.J.,
220 Neb. 102, 368 N.W.2d 474 (1985). Thus, a parent
has a fundamental interest in avoiding erroneous termination of parental
rights. See, Smith
431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977);
v. Kramer, supra.
Having concluded that the parent-child relationship is an interest which
is entitled to due process protection, we must now decide
whether current Nebraska procedure
affords that constitutional protection or, as the Supreme Court expressed
v. Organization of Foster Families, supra:
procedural due process must be afforded because a "liberty" or
"property" interest is within the *840
Fourteenth Amendment's protection, there must be determined "what process is
due" in the particular context.... ...
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands." Morrissey
408 U.S. 471, 481 [92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d
484] (1972). 431 U.S. at 847-48, 97 S.Ct. at 2111.
Under 25 U.S.C. §
1912(f) (1988) of the U.S. Indian Child Welfare Act and
43-1505(6) (Reissue 1988) of the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act,
a determination to terminate parental rights must be "supported by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." However, in proceedings
that are not subject to the federal and Nebraska Indian
Child Welfare Acts, "termination of parental rights is permissible when
the basis for such termination is proved by clear and
convincing evidence." In
226 Neb. 116, 117, 409 N.W.2d 607, 609 (1987). Accord, In
re Interest of M.P.,
238 Neb. 857, 472 N.W.2d 432 (1991); In
234 Neb. 381, 451 N.W.2d 377 (1990); In
227 Neb. 857, 420 N.W.2d 318 (1988). See,
also, Santosky
455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d
599 (1982).
we noted that the Nebraska Evidence Rules do not apply
in a dispositional hearing for a child under the Nebraska
Juvenile Code because the foremost purpose or objective of the
code is promotion and protection of a juvenile's best interests
and, therefore, "[t]o accomplish such goal and fashion a dispositional
remedy beneficial to the juvenile, a judge should have access
to the best available evidence which is relevant, reliable, and
trustworthy concerning a correct disposition for the juvenile." 227
Neb. at 263, 417 N.W.2d at 156.
While Neb.Rev.Stat. §
43-283 (Reissue 1988) states, "Strict rules of evidence shall not
be applied at any dispositional hearing," we have concluded that
the "rules of evidence" mentioned in §
43-283 are the Nebraska Evidence Rules. See In
However, one readily notes that §
43-283 does not contain a definition or characterization for "dispositional
hearing," and employs language identical to its statutory predecessor, §
43-206.03(4) *841
Reissue 1978): "Strict rules of evidence shall not be
applied at any dispositional hearing." Legislative history for
43-283 (Reissue 1988) and §
43-206.03(4) (Reissue 1978) supply no information or indication of the
Legislature's intent for the meaning of "dispositional hearing." Rather, the first one encounters "dispositional hearing"
in relation to proceedings to terminate parental rights and applicable
rules of evidence is in State
198 Neb. 604, 254 N.W.2d 404 (1977), when this court,
without explanation for its conclusion, stated: Appellants
urge that their objections should have been sustained and that
the **121
exhibits should not have been received or considered. Section
43- 206.03(4), R.S.Supp., 1976, provides that strict rules of evidence
shall not be applied at any dispositional hearing. Under such a statute, the Juvenile Court may exercise a
sound discretion in respect to determining the relevancy, competency, and
admissibility of testimony to be considered at a dispositional hearing.
We find no abuse of discretion by the
Juvenile Court. 198 Neb. at 608, 254 N.W.2d at 407. The preceding pronouncement regarding admissibility of evidence was thereafter
confirmed during review of a judgment terminating parental rights in
204 Neb. 546, 552, 283 N.W.2d 382, 386 (1979), when
the court expressed: We
first point out that section 43-206.03(4), R.R.S.1943, provides that strict
rules of evidence shall not apply at any dispositional hearing.
As we have previously stated, the juvenile court
may exercise a sound discretion in determining the relevancy, competency,
and admissibility of evidence to be considered at a dispositional
hearing. State
Thus, Bailey
began a line of Nebraska decisions, which includes today's decision,
in repeated reaffirmation that the Nebraska Evidence Rules do not
apply at a hearing to terminate parental rights. Thus, inapplicability of the Nebraska Evidence Rules at a hearing
to terminate parental rights is not the result of a
legislatively expressed directive, but originated and has evolved through judicial
interpretation of statutes pertaining to rules of evidence at a
hearing to terminate *842
parental rights as a "dispositional hearing." It is
quite likely that the Legislature, when enacting §
43-283, envisioned that a "dispositional hearing" meant a hearing for
personal disposition of a child who is subject to the
Nebraska Juvenile Code, and very unlikely that the Legislature viewed
the parent-child relationship as so insignificant or valueless that the
relationship might be extinguished on the basis of unreliable or
untrustworthy information presented to a court.
Because the parent-child relationship is entitled to protection of due
process and, further, since a parent has a recognized interest
in avoiding an erroneous termination and extinction of that valuable
right and relationship, Nebraska procedure for a hearing to terminate
parental rights must provide reasonable assurance that a parent may
avoid an erroneous termination of parental rights, and further requires
that parental unfitness, as a prerequisite
to termination of parental rights, be established by proof that
is clear and convincing unless the proceeding is governed by
the federal or Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act, in which
case proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Notwithstanding prior decisions of this court interpreting §
43-283 and reaffirming inapplicability of the Nebraska Evidence Rules in
a hearing to terminate parental rights, due process requires a
procedure that reduces the risk of a parental rights termination
resting on erroneous information presented to a juvenile court and
that promotes production of proof which is clear and convincing
or, in proceedings subject to the federal or Nebraska Indian
Child Welfare Act, proof which is beyond a reasonable doubt.
Certainly, application of the Nebraska Evidence Rules as reliable standards
for presentation of information at a hearing to terminate parental
rights is a step in the right direction for reducing
the risk of an erroneous extinguishment of parental rights and
will tend to supply courts with trustworthy information for resolving
a question about parental unfitness, a resolution which must be
made through proof which is clear and convincing or, in
proceedings governed by the federal or Nebraska Indian Child Welfare
Act, proof which is beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, application of the Nebraska Evidence Rules should eliminate horrible
hearsay, see In
227 Neb. 251, *843
417 N.W.2d 147 (1987), wading through dozens of documents,
re Interest of A.H.,
237 Neb. 797, 467 N.W.2d 682 (1991), and a jumble
of judicial notice, see In
234 Neb. 381, 451 N.W.2d **122
377 (1990), which seem to be ever-present problems in hearings
Consequently, in accordance with due process under Neb. Const. art.
3, the time has come to require that the Nebraska
Evidence Rules shall be applied in a hearing to terminate
parental rights, a requirement which will supply reliable and express
standards for production of reasonably trustworthy information to resolve controversies
between the State of Nebraska and one whose parental rights
are sought to be terminated under the Nebraska Juvenile Code.
Thus, while due process may never be precisely
defined, fundamental fairness requires and exists in reducing the risk
of an erroneous termination of parental rights through unreliable and
untrustworthy information presented to a juvenile court. For
that reason, the Nebraska Evidence Rules, as an aspect of
due process, should apply at a hearing to terminate parental
In the present case, when the Nebraska Evidence Rules are
applied, the State presented sufficient admissible evidence to demonstrate, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that termination of parental rights was required
under the circumstances, the conclusion reached by the trial court
and this court; hence, the trial court's judgment must be