Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/196785243/Property-Accession
Timestamp: 2017-06-22 15:02:32
Document Index: 625621912

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 442', 'Art. 442', 'Art 448', 'ART. 448', 'Art 546', 'Art 448', 'Art 448', 'Art 546', 'Art 445', 'Art 448', 'Art 448', 'Art 448', 'Art 448', 'Art 526', 'Art 448', 'Art. 5', 'Art. 1993', 'ART2', 'ART2', 'ART 2']

Property Accession | Judgment (Law) | Lease
Property AccessionUploaded by Claire RoxasRelated InterestsJudgment (Law)LeaseLawsuitPropertyOwnershipRating and Stats0.0 (0)Document ActionsDownloadShare or Embed DocumentEmbedDescription: consolidated case digestView Moreconsolidated case digestCopyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)List price: $0.00Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentALL FOR JESUSPROPERTYCASES
Bachrach Motor vs. Ledesma The Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., vs. Mariano Lacson Ledesma, Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., and the Philippine National Bank G.R. No. 42462, August 31, 1937 Imperial, J. Doctrine: Bonus is not civil fruits as contemplated in Art. 442. It is not one of those meant by the law when it says “other similar income” since the phrase refers merely to things analogous to rents, leases and annuities. Assuming that it is income, still, it is not income obtained or derived from the land itself, but income obtained as compensation for the risk assumed by the owner. Facts: The Talisay- Silay Milling Co., Inc., in order to secure its indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank, induced its planters, among whom was Mariano Ledesma to mortgage their land to the creditor bank. As compensation and bonus to those planters for the risk they were running with their property under the mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on December 22, 1923, granted to herein respondent, Mariano Lacson Ledesma, the sum of P19,911.11, Philippine currency, which sum, however, would not be payable until the month of January, 1930. Thereafter, or on December 20, 1929, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to recover from it the sum of P13,850 against the bonus or dividend which, by virtue of the resolution of December 22, 1923, said Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., had declared in favor of the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma as one of the owners of the hacienda which had been mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank to secure the obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., in favor of said bank.
The Philippine National Bank, on the other hand, on February 13, 1930, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that in had a preferred right to said bonus granted by the central to the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma as one of the owners of the haciendas which had been mortgaged to said bank to answer for the obligations of the Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., basing such allegation on the fact that, as said properties were mortgaged to it by the debtor Mariano Lacson Ledesma, by virtue of the deed to secure the obligations of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., and said bonus being a civil fruit of the mortgaged lands, said bank was entitled to it on the ground that the mortgage of August 9, 1923, had become due.
Issue: Whether the bonus in question is a civil fruit and hence should pertain to PNB on account of the mortgage of Ledesma’s land Held: No. The bonus is not a civil fruit. The Supreme Court held that the bonus had no immediate relation to the lands in question but merely a remote and accidental one and, therefore, it was not a civil fruit of the real properties mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank to secure the obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., being a mere personal right of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. It is not one of those meant by Art. 442 of the Civil Code when it sa ys “other similar income” since the phrase merely refers to things analogous to rents, leases, and annuities. Assuming that it is income, still it is
not income obtained or derived from the land itself, but obtained as compensation for the risk assumed by the owner. It should, moreover, be remembered that the bonus was not based upon the value or importance of the land but upon the total value of the debt secured. Hence, the PNB does not have a preferred right with regard to the bonus as against herein petitioner.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma. Digest by: 2S, San Beda Law 2010-2011
we find no reason to justify a rapture of the situation thus created between them. plaintiff. Catalino Bataclan. As Bataclan was not a party in the civil case. Therefore. to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2. Issue: Whether or not there is good faith.000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro.212. as far back as 1922. 37319. L-44606. on June 11.R. 1938 Facts: By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of a parcel of land of about 90 hectares. to clear the land and make improvements thereon.642. No. he says. When he failed to pay for the land. the plaintiff expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the land. he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2. instituted a civil case. To secure possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff. 1929. No.ALL FOR JESUS
Bernardo v. after all. In all the respects. When plaintiff entered upon the premises. 22.R. bill of exceptions) and the purchase price of P8. No. the defendant herein lost his right of retention. however. he found the defendant herein.212 to which he is entitled has not yet been paid to him. without pronouncement regarding costs. Bataclan G. The trial court found for the plaintiff in a decision which was affirmed by this Supreme Court on appeal (G. instituted against him a civil case. entitled for reimbursement in the total sum of P1. who appears to have been authorized by former owners. In obedience to the decision of this court in G. In this case. the defendant-appellant not being entitled.
.212. The said defendant could have become owner of both land and improvements and continued in possession thereof.R. Held: The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by eliminating therefrom the reservation made in favor of the defendant-appellant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2. November 28. So ordered The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff himself (p. 33017). for work done and improvements made. plaintiff was declared owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. 1931. the same is affirmed. on July 20.
builder or sower has acted in good faith. 1934." The defendant indicated that he was unable to pay the land and.
ISSUE: WON DEFENDANT BATACLAN IS STILL ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE COURT MANDATED COMPENSATION ARISING FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO TORIBIO
HELD: NO. Both parties appealed the decision. the court below. on January 24. plaintiff instituted a case against Bataclan in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction.
.642. On January 9. as far back as 1922. Bernardo was able to obtain a favorable decision from the court. The court thereafter made some modifications by allowing the defendant to recover compensation amounting to P2. Laurel) FACTS: Plaintiff Vicente Bernardo acquired a parcel of land from Pastor Samonte thru a contract of sale. rendered judgment holding Hilario and Dres as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to the Ignacios the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith. basing on Art 448 of the NCC. the plaintiff conveyed to the court his desire "to require the defendant to pay him the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare or a total price of P18. The plaintiff found the defendant herein. an order was issued giving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the defendant the sum of P2. Manresa. entitled to reimbursement in the total sum of P1.” Defendant further claims that he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code.212 to which he is entitled has not yet been paid to him. It appears that he has been authorized by former owners.000 for the whole tract of land.000. either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements from him. as owner of the land. on April 24. Francisco and Luis Ignacio concerning the ownership of a parcel of land. the plaintiff. a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. Thus. 1934. as we have already said. “The law. partly rice-land and partly residential. In this case. in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. 1934. to clear the land and make improvements thereon. The law provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. While the said argument is legally tenable. Subsequently. Catalino Bataclan. In this case. The land was sold on April 5. the same must perforce be denied because defendant Bataclan has lost his right of retention as he failed to pay for the land. Bernardo instituted a case against said vendor to secure possession of the land. chose to require the defendant. Plaintiff was likewise given 30 days from the date when the decision became final to exercise his option. Moran) Facts: Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres filed a complaint against Damian. requires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land”. 1935 to Toribio Teodoro for P8. at the instance of the plaintiff and without objection on the part of the defendant. plaintiff was declared the owner of the land but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith. as owner of the improvements to pay for the land. in the said premises.
The defendant avers that “he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2.212. After the trial of the case. for work done and improvements made. where the planter.212 and by reducing the price at which the plaintiff could require the defendant to purchase the land in question from P300 down to P200 per hectare. Thereafter.ALL FOR JESUS
BERNARDO v BATACLAN (1938. the lower court under Judge Alfonso Felix. IGNACIO v HILARIO (1946.
The Supreme Court set aside the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad and ordered the lower court to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot where they are erected. Right of remotion only available if he chose the latter and the owner of the building cannot pay The owner of the land. the court shall render a final judgment according to the evidence presented by the parties.” He cannot however refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. and. furthermore. the proper rent. Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention. the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ignacios praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad.
3. the period of time within which the Ignacios may pay for the land. Right of retention of builder in good faith The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. or (c) a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work. for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is."
2. under article 453. Felipe Natividad). in a motion filed in the same CFI (now handled by respondent Judge Hon. is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building. in the last instance. sowing or planting.000 for the buildings. Order amends judgment substantially and thus null and void The order of Judge Natividad compelling the Ignacios to remove their buildings from the land belonging to Hilario and Dres only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land. but it failed to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they are erected as well as the periods of time within which the option may be exercised and payment should
. all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory or unappealable. as well as the period of time within which Hilario and Dres may exercise their option either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land. After such hearing. Original decision did not become final as it failed to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot. the rights of both parties were well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. or sell to them the residential lot for P45. after having chosen to sell his land. Article 453 provides that “Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor. Option of the landowner to pay for the building or sell his land to the owner of the building. the other party fails to pay for the same. but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.
1. sown or planted in good faith.
4. offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. He is entitled to such remotion only when. Article 361 provides that “The owner of land on which anything has been built. has the option. after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454. After hearing. the motion was granted by Judge Natividad. is null and void. with costs against Hilarion and Dres. Hilario and Dres prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay the Ignacios for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot. Hence. and the one who sowed. the Ignacios should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore Hilario and Dres in the possession of said lot. either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. (b) an order to compel Hilario and Dres to pay them the sum of P2. and the time to which the option may be exercised In the decision of Judge Felix. upon the other hand.ALL FOR JESUS
Subsequently. the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof. under article 361.
Thus. the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never become final. these particulars having been left for determination apparently after the judgment has become final. for after the judgment has become final. no additions can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its execution. matters which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the present case. and certainty no authority is vested in him to settle these matters which involve exercise of judicial discretion. it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding. and within what time may the option be exercised.
. the sheriff being ignorant as to how. And execution cannot be had. The procedure is erroneous. for how much.ALL FOR JESUS
a "possessor in good faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448?
I. The encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of Depra’s property. Depra did not accept the payment of rentals so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court. which is an encumbrance on real property. thus the Municipal Court rendered it judgment that reads:
Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs. as lessors. had built a kitchen that encroached an area of 34 square meters.ALL FOR JESUS
Francisco Depra vs. Upon discovery. may only be rendered by Courts of First Instance. the rent to be paid is five (P5. and the defendants as lessees. She then filed a case of Unlawful Detainer against Dumlao.
Neither party appealed. the latter admitted the encroachment but alleged. Agustin Dumlao GR L-57348 16 May 1985
Facts: Depra is the owner of a parcel of land to which Dumlao. Whether or not the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRA conform to the juridical positions respectively defined by law. Depra’s mother wrote a demand letter asking Dumlao to move back from his encroachment. payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month the rent is due.
DEPRA claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession. However. living in an adjoining lot.00) pesos a month. Whether or not the Municipal Court’s decision was null and void ab initio because it has no jurisdiction over the case?
Depra then filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against Dumlao. that the present suit us barred by res judicate by virtue of the decision of the Municipal Court. and the lease shall commence on the day that this decision shall have become final. for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448.
In the trial court it was proven that Dumlao was a builder in good faith. whereas decisions affecting lease. over the disputed portion with an area of thirty four (34) square meters.
Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the
Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding because it was made in a void proceeding. acted without jurisdiction. 7. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works. even if the Decision were valid. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land. the rule on res judicata would not apply due to difference in cause of action. and the one who sowed. The Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease". 5 as he had manifested before the Municipal Court. Judiciary Act of 1948. of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchen removed. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement. we hold the same to be null and void. the cause of action was the deprivation of possession. sowing or planting. 7. the cause of action was based on ownership. jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen. but DEPRA refused to sell. In such case. the proper rent. the court shall fix the terms thereof (Paragraphing supplied) Pursuant to the foregoing provision. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith. However. 6 In this case." without more. or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. "
II. Furthermore. The judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of possession only (Sec. after having chosen to sell his encroached land. and to sell the encroached part of his land. 129). Rules of Court). Sec. Furthermore. 44(b). DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. Besides. ART. 448. a lease is an interest in real property. Rule 70. In the Municipal Court. However. he shall pay reasonable rent. which like "forced coownership" is not favored in law. the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First Instance. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to possession. while in the action to quiet title. DUMLAO had expressed his willingness to pay for the land. He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building.
. its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. Sec. He is entitled to such removal only when. Since the Municipal Court.
on the condition that after the accounting of the tolls collected by plaintiff. with him.
Plaintiff appealed the judgment. instead. which. there is still and amount due and payable to the said plaintiff. is not the payment envisaged in the decision which would entitle private respondents to the possession of the property. the ward’s uncle was named as his heir and successor in interest. It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits of the property. with right to retain the land until he has been fully paid such value. therefore.00. Thus. Furthermore. because the said order and writ in effect vary the terms of the judgment they purportedly seek to enforce. contending that in having issued the Order and Writ of Execution. belongs to petitioner and not to defendant/private respondent Quirino Comintan. It is claimed that it is only in the event that he loses in the bidding that he can be legally dispossessed thereof. In the said application." He argued that since said judgment declared the petitioner a possessor in good faith. On appeal. the uncle executed an affidavit relinquishing his rights over the property in favor of Comintan and Zamora. which according to the trial court amounts to P25. cannot be lawfully done. and/or with grave abuse of discretion. he has the right to retain the same until after he has participated and lost in the public bidding of the land to be conducted by the Bureau of Lands. Private respondents filed a motion for its execution requesting that they file a bond in lieu of the amount that should be paid to Ortiz. in his view. having the right to retain the property until after he has been paid for. defendants should reimburse jointly said plaintiff for the improvements introduced on the land. petitioner alleges that. would be tantamount to an amendment of a decision which has long become final and executory and. He likewise averred that no payment for improvements has been made and.
The plaintiff’s protest was investigated upon but his claim was not given due course. under the decision. with respect to portion "B".ALL FOR JESUS
Ortiz vs. plaintiff continued to cultivate and possess the latter’s property. which was formerly a subject of homestead application. Still. being the successful bidder. he is entitled to the payment of the value of the improvements introduced by him on the whole property. according to petitioner. the lot in question was sold at a public auction wherein defendant Comintan was the only bidder. his grandson and son-in-law and requested the Director of Lands to cancel the homestead application. the bond shall be held answerable.
. If Ortiz is to be not declared the successful bidder.
The judgment became final and executory. in accordance with the decision itself. The other half should be awarded to Zamora without prejudice to the right of Ortiz to participate in the public bidding of the lot. respondent court rules that half of the portion of land should be given to the defendant. respondent Court "acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Any contrary opinion. including the tolls collected by him from the passing vehicles. When his ward died. Kayanan
Facts: Plaintiff used to be the legal guardian of Martin Dolorico II. It was later found out that Ortiz collected tolls on a portion of the property wherein he has not introduced any improvement. which decreed that the fruits of the property shall be in lieu of interest on the amount to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for improvements.000.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition. The homestead application was cancelled to the protest of Ortiz saying that he should be given preference to purchase the lot inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has been in continuous possession of the same. a bond therefor had been filed by defendants (private respondents).
such as the tolls collected by him from March 1967 to December 1968. 2. This was originally owned by Baltazar Ignao.
Justo. to concede to the creditor the right to secure reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the principal of the debt while he remains in possession. No contention that the possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted. then he should be reimbursed by respondent Zamora in the corresponding amount for the improvements on Lot 5785-B. therefore. Private respondents Juan and Isidro each has 1/8 share on the land. petitioner is entitled to remain in possession thereof.
1. it appears that no public sale has yet been conducted by the Bureau of Lands and. the possessor can still retain the property (Art 546) until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful expenses made by him on the property. Hence. Petitioner cannot appropriate for his own exclusive benefit the tolls which he collected from the property retained by him. It was his duty under the law. and September 1969 to March 31. which brought his land share to 6/8. This is not disputed by respondent Eleuterio Zamora. and the balance to the payment of the obligation. therefore. he principal characteristic of the right of retention is its accessory character. In his first marriage. IAC
FACTS: Florencio Ignao and his uncles (private respondents) were co-owners of a parcel of land. he had four children. Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his good faith ceases. Thereafter. must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor. or when he answers the complaint. When Justo died. However. IGNAO VS. it is necessary. belong to Quirino Comintan. to apply such amount collected to the payment of the interest. amounting to about P25. owner of the land through which the toll road passed. including the father of the petitioner. C-90 on March 22. after deducting petitioner's expenses for administration. Florencio’s father owned 5/8 of the land. 4. In his second marriage. that the disputed tolls. Florencio inherited the 5/8 share of his father. The trial court itself clarified this matter when it placed the toll road under receivership. even after his good faith ceases. 3. after deducting the necessary expenses for his administration. Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor. further considering that the same was on portions of the property on which petitioner had not introduced any improvement. The omission of any mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be attributed to the fact that the tolls appear to have been collected after the rendition of the judgment of the trial court. who married twice. by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the true owner for the recovery of the property. 1970. 1966 confirming the award of one-half of the property to Quirino Comintan—whether or not petitioner is still entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property.
. As to the other lot.00.ALL FOR JESUS
The issue decisive of the controvery is—after the rendition by the trial court of its judgment in Civil Case No.000. which was later sold to his son Florencio for the same amount. We hold. all the fruits that the possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in court. It is accessory to a principal obligation. Justo acquired 1/8 share of brother Leon for P500. in order that this right to retain may be useful. he also had four children who waived their rights over the controverted land. After public sale is had and in the event that Ortiz is not declared the successful bidder.
. Such ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that "(t)he owner of the land . . because until division is effected such portion is not concretely determined. . . and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. In other words. Trial court ruled that the private respondents are builders in good faith.or to oblige the one who built . to pay the price of the land . . thereby depriving petitioner of his right to choose. Juan and Isidro. petitioner Florencio. Whether or not the provisions of Article 448 should apply to a builder in good faith on a property held in common has been resolved in the affirmative in the case of Spouses del Campo vs. quantitatively speaking. and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion. when. the Court categorically ruled that the right to appropriate the works or improvements or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the landowner. Petitioner's second assigned error is however well taken. to sell to private respondents. wherein the Court ruled that: The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds. However. but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract." The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts. and ordered the owner of the land. Before it was promulgated. when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was however made in good faith. . However. in Quemuel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. Thus. Florencio sol 134 sqm of his share. the parties may have unequal shares in the common property. plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build. Thus. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there is a co-ownership if good faith has been established. As cited in Eusebio vs. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances. Every co-owner is therefore the owner of the whole.
. shall have the right to appropriate . each co-owner has the same right as any one of the other co-owners. because the area occupied by the two houses built by private respondents exceeded the portion allotted to them.ALL FOR JESUS
Petitioner brought an action for partition. ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of Art 448 should apply on a property held in common RULING: Affirmative It should be noted that prior to partition. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court erred when they peremptorily adopted the "workable solution" in the case of Grana vs." As co-owners. then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. The decision for partition allotted 2/8 of the land to private respondents. plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. . Olaes. no actual partition was effected. But in a qualitative sense. "an undivided estate is co-ownership by the heirs. . Court of appeals. petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real property against private respondents. as in this case. the ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the home of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith. the part of the land they intruded upon. all the co-owners hold the property in common dominion but at the same time each is an owner of a share which is abstract and undetermined until partition is effected. . Abesia.
There is nothing in the language of these two article.90 plus other amounts. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value of his improvement. Spouses Timbang made known to the court that they had chosen to compel Filipinas Colleges to acquire the land and pay them the value thereof.. which would justify the conclusion of appellants that. Moreover.000 for it. Filipinas Colleges was ordered to pay the spouses P15.ALL FOR JESUS
Filipinas Colleges Inc. Bataclan. when such is demanded by the land-owner.807.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the appellants are valid
RULING: Negative.
The appellant spouses posited that because the builder in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof exercised their option under Art 448. It also declared Filipinas Colleges as the owner of undivided interest in Lot 2-1 on which the building sold in the auction sale is situated and ordered the sale in public auction of said undivided interest of the Filipinas Colleges in favor of Blas and against Filipinas Colleges. was ordered to deliver to Blas stock certificate and pay her P8. Filipinas Colleges. vs.200 representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the house. 590 cited by appellants is no authority for this conclusion.
The Sheriff of Manila sold the building in public auction in favor of the spouses Timbang as the highest bidders.
Meanwhile. purchaser of the said building. 448 and 546. the successful bidders pay Blas P5.750.
Filipinas Colleges failed to pay the said amounts. Personal properties of Filipinas Colleges were also auctioned in favor of the spouses. 66 Phil. upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land. Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. Garcia Timbang
Filipinas Colleges was declared to have acquired the rights of the spouses Timbang and in consideration thereof. the levied on the house of the builder and then sold the same in public auction. the appellants as owners of the land automatically became the owners of the building. The case of Bernardo vs. Filipinas Colleges was required to deposit this to the court within 90 days after the decision shall have become final. the builder lost his right of retention provided in Art 546 and by operation of Art 445. the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. The spouses asked for an order of execution. Under the terms of these article. which was granted by court. Although it is true it was declared therein that in the
. it is true that the owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building.
The lower court declared the Sheriff’s certificate of sale covering the school building null and void unless within 15 days from notice of said order. Maria Gervacio Blas was declared to be a builder in good faith of the school building constructed on the lot in question and entitled to be paid the amount of P19.
Bataclan. another remedy is suggested in the case of Ignacio vs. supra. if any. where this Court approved the sale of the land and the improvement in a public auction applying the proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of the land and the excess.. c. decide to leave things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee.e.. Hilario. supra.
. 605 and the cited case of Bernardo vs. Fadullon. Hilario. A further remedy is indicated in the case of Bernardo vs. the builder in good faith fails to pay for the same. wherein the court has ruled that the owner of the land in entitled to have the improvement removed when after having chosen to sell his land to the other party. Gaz. 801.. Ignacio vs. et al. and should they disagree as to the amount of rental then they can go to the court to fix that amount . the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building.. Should the parties not agree to leave things as they are and to assume the relation of lessor and lessee. Bataclan. 97 Phil. to be delivered to the owner of the house in payment thereof. what is the recourse or remedy left to the parties in such eventuality where the builder fails to pay the value of the land? While the Code is silent on this Court in the cases of Miranda vs. i. supra.
The question is.ALL FOR JESUS
event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative. 76 Phil. 51 Off. [12] 6226. a. b. nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof.. the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost.
and therefore. ISSUE Whether or not there should be a delivery of possession by the respondent to the petitioner
RULING When the decision of the trial court became final and executory. Moreover. since there is a pending case (Manotok v.
. Since the improvements have been gutted by fire.ALL FOR JESUS
MANOTOK REALTY INC V. Hence this petition for mandamus.The expropriation case was not granted and the law that provided for such was declared unconstitutional. petitioner is contending that the execution of the decision must now involve the delivery of possession.
Petitioner filed with the trial court motion for the approval of the petitioner's exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment(that is final and executory) which was dismissed. NHA) involving the expropriation of the land in question it is better to suspend the current case til after the outcome of the expropriation proceedings is done. CA affirmed and SC dismissed for lack of merit. the basis for private respondent's right to retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner. there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to the petitioner. CFI ruled declaring respondent Nilo Madlangawa a builder in good faith. TECSON
FACTS In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession against defendants. it becomes incumbent upon the respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. However. a fire engulfed the Tambunting estate covering the disputed area of the land.
Facts: This case involves a parcel of land with an area of only about 45 square meters.ALL FOR JESUS
SPOUSES DEL CAMPO VS. when. Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code. 1161-B with an area of 15 square meters for the defendants. the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. if they so decide. the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith. In case of disagreement. Plaintiffs and defendants are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the proportion of and 1/3 share each. the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Otherwise. Of course. defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. The trial court appointed a commissioner in accordance with the agreement of the parties. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established. However. However. The parties manifested their conformity to the report and asked the trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties should take possession of the 5 square meters of the land in question. The houses of plaintiffs and defendants were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. He submitted a report to the trial court recommending that the property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters for plaintiffs and Lot No. The house of defendants occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of plaintiffs. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances. and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art 448 is applicable to a builder in good faith when the property involved is owned in common
RULING: Affirmative The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds. respectively. An action for partition was filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. as in this case. at their own expense. then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build.
For his failure to pay realty taxes. Art 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties. sower or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. in strict point of law. sower or planter had acted in good faith. Art 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Thus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art 448 finds application in the said case
RULING: Negative By its clear language. the lot was sold at public auction who in turn sold it to the private respondents. one of whom has built some works or sown or planted something. Where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land.ALL FOR JESUS
PECSON VS. The rule on good faith laid down in Art 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether the builder. Nevertheless.
. Petitioner challenges the validity of the auction sale.
Art 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder. the court applied the provision therein on indemnity. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a four-door storey-apartment building. good faith or bad faith is irrelevant.
No. and there was nothing whatsoever to indicate on its face any vice or infirmity in the title of the registered owners-the spouses Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa.R. The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the private respondents. they offered to continue paying the real estate taxes for one-half of the property as this was their arrangement with the previous owners-to which
. Doray dela Rosa apparently offered to sell her house. Subsequently. ¬it was not registered. this petition. They personally inspected the subject property. the petitioners did not rely solely upon the certificate of title. Victoria Buenaventura. which offer was accepted by the petitioners. the petitioner spouses being purchasers in good faith. the OCT was cancelled by the Register of Deeds. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent sale is valid. The private respondents claim that the document is a forged deed. Juliana Salazar constructed a house on the lot she purchased. and Felicisimo Buenaventura-all heirs of Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa. the purchaser in good faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws. parents of the respondents Guevarras.00. Hence. The general rule is that if the property sold is registered land. As regards the spouses Guevarra. HELD: Yes. Victorino dela Rosa (widowed by then) sold one¬ half of the said property to Juliana Salazar for P 95. and covered by OCT. precjsely. Petitioner spouses caused the registration of a document entitled “Kasulatan ng Partihan at Bilihan.ALL FOR JESUS
Nuguid vs CA 171 SCRA 213. Immediately after the sale. but on appeal. one belonging to a certain Doray dela Rosa and the other to spouses Pedro Guevarra and Pascuala Tolentino. This notwithstanding. this was reversed by the Court of Appeals. and in lieu of rentals to the petitioners. Virgilio Buenaventura. This sale was not registered.sold to the petitioners the entire area of the property for the sum of P300. we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding t hat they themselves requested that they be allowed to refrain on the property until such time that the petitioners would need the entire premises. Ernesto Buenaventura.The Original Certificate of Title No. 1989 FACTS: The deceased spouses Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa were the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Bataan. 3778 covering the entire property was clean and free from any annotation of an encumbrance. Undeniably. G.00. the petitioners could not have known of the prior sale to Juliana Salazar as.” In this document. Upon being informed of the petitioners’ desire to purchase the land. 77423 March 13. Thus. The petitioners assert that the land subject of this case was offered to them for sale by Nicolas dela Rosa who then claimed that he had already purchased the shares of the heirs over the subject property as evidenced by a private document entitled “Kasunduan”. Marciana dela Rosa. they found the same to be occupied by two houses. and TCT was issued in the names of the petitioners.
Nuguid. Nuguid owned the lot. 448. on the contrary. SPOUSES NUQUID v CA (2005. therefore. Nuguid sought appropriation. until the payment of indemnity is full.  SC: Sps. when the petitioners registered the sale in their favor with the Register of Deeds. CA erred in upholding TC’s determination of indemnity (P53. Case 3 (Case at bar): CMV = P400. Remanded to TC for determination of CMV. He failed to pay realty taxes. Thus.34 million for rentals from Nov.000 paid thereafter. 546.  However. Current market value of the building should be the basis of the indemnity.ALL FOR JESUS
request the petitioners acceded. balance of P100. 15. Pecson entitled to retain ownership of the building and the income therefrom. TC directed Sps. HELD:  Pecson is a builder in good faith. 1993): 1.00 construction cost) and in also ordering Pecson to account for rent.000. petition. made no mention of the prior unregistered sale to their predecessorin-interest.
Rory Lambino
. the BPS (Pecson) has a RIGHT of RETENTION (which includes the right to the expenses and the right to the fruits) as a builder in good faith. The spouses Guevarra. 1997 (@ P28K/mo. and the right of retention until full reimbursement is made. 3. DISPOSITIVE: TC decision reinstated. had acted in good faith.e. they did so without any knowledge about the prior sale in favor of Juliana Salazar. and later to the Sps.000. Art. neither Doray dela Rosa nor the spouses Guevarra professed ownership over the portions of land they were occupying. in particular. 2.. 4. 2) Natural a.  Art. 5. Thus. they want to acquire the building. Nuguid to also pay P1. Juan and Erlinda Nuguid. Case 2: Nuguids sought delivery of possession of the lot and apartment building. ISSUE: W/N the spouses should pay rent collected during period of Pecson’s dispossession of the building? YES. so the LOT was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno. NCC entitles landowner (Nuguid) to either appropriate the building upon payment of indemnity or sell the land.)1 FACTS:  Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot in Kamias and built a four-door two-storey apartment building. he cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate.000 from Sps.  SC (Nov. while Pecson still owned the building (May 5. NCC entitles the BPS to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses. i.  Art. 1993 to Dec. Pecson already received P300. by their actuations they expressly acknowledged that they were not the real owners of the said property.) Thus. 448. Case 1: Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale. Nuguid is the landowner. 1993). Evidently. The petitioners. NCC: Case is apposite as when the landowner is the BPS who then later loses ownership through sale. Juliana Salazar. The landowner is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the BPS in good faith.
Dizon for respondents. Sept. J. M. M. de Lumanlan to vacate the lot occupied by her in Sta. holding that Tuason being the registered owner. Inc. 1963. are described in the lists submitted by them to the OWNERS which are attached hereto marked Annexes "B" and "C" and made part hereof. 1959. The terms of the compromise agreement between the heirs of Telesforo Deudor and J. Dec. Lower Court sustained plaintiff. DE LUMANLAN and the COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION).. Deudor. and the Deudors constituted a valid defense against the possessory action filed by Tuason & Co. Deudor.B. May 30. . Actg. Whatever amounts may have been collected by the DEUDORS on account thereof. Macalindong.. Tuason & Co. M. and that the compromise agreement legalized the possession of respondent. Oct. Jaramillo. It
. . These pronouncements are assailed by the petitioner in this appeal as legally incorrect and contrary to the decisions of this Court. J. jam. on 30 April. Tuason & Co. J. cit. Tuason & Co.. .201.R. 1961. M. 31.J.063. and defendant in her answer set forth affirmative defense that on 12 March. barrio Tatalon. 1963. and L-20105. Tuason vs. therefore. but on the basis of the evidence presented by both parties in the trial. L-15398. but as the Deudors had. petitioner bound and committed itself to sell to respondent Lumanlan the lot occupied by her at a reasonable price. petitioner. Q-4243) that ordered defendant (now respondent) Estrella Vda. she had bought the property she was occupying from one Pedro Deudor.M. That in the complaint filed in this case by plaintiff. 1949. that said respondent had a right to compel petitioner to accept payment for the lot in question. the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals held that. paragraph seventh of the compromise agreement (case Q-135 of the court of origin) provided: That the sales of the possessory rights claimed by the DEUDORS. and the question being purely one of possession. that under paragraph 7 of said Compromise Agreement.00 a month until restoration of the premises to plaintiff. Quezon City. petitioned for a review by certiorari of the decision issued by the Court of Appeals (Fifth Division) in its case CA-G. Inc.) Upon the facts thus stated. The Deudors had therein recognized the registered title of Tuason & Co. The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals (accepted by both parties) in this wise: . L-18932-34. 29. reversing the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 27259-R.. she was one of the buyers therein recognized. J. J. M. respondents.: J. and that in a compromise agreement between Pedro and Tuason on 16 March 1953. the Compromise Agreement (Exh. situated at Barrio North Tatalon. hereinafter called Tuason. approved by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. herein defendant sometime in April. Deudor vs. 1969. 2) between the petitioner Tuason & Co... the basis is that it being the registered owner of the property known as Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision. INC. -versusESTRELLA VDA.ALL FOR JESUS
J. over the lands claimed by them. 1962 and others). and therein constructed his house so that plaintiff prayed for ejectment and damages for the occupancy. Tuason and Sison for petitioner. 30. Tuason vs. sold their possessory rights to various persons. paying P240.. (Page 2 of Decision. and to remove therefrom the house and other structures constructed thereon. L-18768. Annex "A" of Petition. REYES.L. et al. L-12826. Mesa Heights Subdivision. and received payment of certain sums of money. C. . shall be deducted from the total sum of P1. . defendant's said evidence was "completely immaterial". M.. 1949 unlawfully entered into possession of 800 square meters. have been taken cognizance of in many decisions of this Court (Evangelista vs. Quezon City. Tuason & Co. September 10..00 to be paid to them. TUASON and CO. Jose Chuico and Wilfredo E. pursuant to this Supreme Court's ruling in Evangelista vs. No. so that she asked that her rights be recognized and the complaint dismissed. prior to the compromise.
the buyers listed in Annex "C" herein with the annotation "Refund" have decided not to continue with their former contracts or purchases with the DEUDORS and the sums already paid by them to the DEUDORS TOTALLING P101. Nowhere in her answer did the respondent Estrella Vda. Tuason & Co. or that the compromise agreement legalized the possession of the respondent. is governed by Article 1474 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines.182. Bolaños. Jaramillo.84 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be credited to the buyers and shall be deducted from the sums to be paid to the DEUDORS by the OWNERS.ALL FOR JESUS
shall be the joint and solidary obligation of the DEUDORS to make the buyer of the lots purportedly sold by them to recognize the title of the OWNERS over the property purportedly bought by them. ceded. the paragraph plainly imports that these buyers of the Deudors must "recognize the title of the OWNERS (Tuason) over the property purportedly bought by them" from the Deudors. new contracts of purchase for said property". Tuason & Co. 30. and. 99 Phil. she assails it. 10) that "Pedro Deudor and his co-owners and the plaintiff herein . But. 31. since the latter does not rely on the compromise but. vs. L-13429. vs. the respondent Lumanlan in her answer repudiated and assailed the compromise between the Deudors and J. Tuason & Co. 107. on Appeal. vs. 496. Inc.. in favor of the plaintiff J.063.'s predecessors twenty years after its issuance (Tiburcio vs. 1959. if and when they do so. L-18932.. M.M. Inc. and the Deudor vendees (as ruled by this Court in Evangelista vs. Tuason & Co. and much less the intervention of the herein defendant. traceable back to the original Certificate of Title No. Careful analysis of this paragraph of the compromise agreement will show that while the same created "a sort of contractual relation" between the J. Inc. as ruled by this Court in previous cases. M. Inc. Inc. Deudor. Lumanlan is by now barred from assailing the decree of registration in favor of Tuason & Co. shall be credited to the buyers. title and interest in the property including the land sold to herein defendant. on the contrary. Mesa Heights Subdivision'". Tuason & Co.. M. conspired together and helped each other . The Court of Appeals ruled that the price to be paid by Lumanlan to Tuason & Co..922. The DEUDORS also advise the OWNERS that. therefore. 95 Phil. "the sums paid by them to the Deudors . It is thus apparent that no legal basis exists for the pronouncement in the appealed decision that Tuason & Co. vs. the same in no way obligated Tuason & Co. What is worse. supra. by entering into a supposed Compromise" whereby "Pedro Deudor and his co-owners renounced.. whenever possible. Tuason & Co. vs. 1963). for the purchase of the lot occupied. Mesa Heights Subdivision. .." All that Tuason & Co... 735 of Rizal. had committed itself to sell to Lumanlan the lot occupied by her at a reasonable price.. 31. and signing newcontracts therefor.201." In other words. Inc. . Inc. waived and quitclaimed all their rights. . and to make them sign. 1267. new contracts of purchase for said property at the current paces and terms specified by the OWNERS in their sales of lots in their subdivision known at "Sta.. and to credit them for the amounts they had paid to the Deudors. agreed to. upon their recognizing the title of Tuason & Co. Jan. which provides that:
. but at "the current prices and terms specified by the OWNERS (Tuason) in their sales of lots in their subdivision known as 'Sta. Lumanlan must justify her possession on the basis of a pretended superiority of the Deudors' old Spanish informacion posesoria over Tuason's Certificate of Title No. but the sums already paid by them to the DEUDORS amounting to P134.00." The DEUDORS HEREBY advised the OWNERS that the buyer listed in Annex "B" herein with the annotation "continue" shall buy the lots respectively occupied by them and shall sign contracts. Tuason & Co.. . Tuason & Co. and "sign. Jaramillo. Sept. This is what is expressly provided. ante). L-16827. without the knowledge and consent. How then can she now claim to take advantage and derive rights from that compromise? Without the compromise agreement. p. . de Lumanlan claim that she had signed a new contract with J. M. she charged in paragraph 6 of her special defense (Rec. Further. Oct. PHHC. Macalindong. instead of recognizing the title of the owners (Tuason & Co. 1963).42 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be refunded to them by the OWNERS and deducted from the sums that may be due to the DEUDORS from the OWNERS (J. was to grant the Deudor buyers preferential right to purchase "at current prices and terms" the lots occupied by them. to sell to those buyers the lots occupied by them at the price stipulated with the Deudors. 622-623. . issued under the Registration Act No. Tuason & Co.) as required by the aforementioned compromise agreement. whenever possible. in consideration of the sum of P1. Santiago.
. Dizon. 35 Phil. 51. Macalindong. perhaps because such course appeared to her as more advantageous. Macalindong. that her right to claim such return. Makalintal. Bengzon.. took no part. vs. If he failed to make the necessary inquiry. but demanded that the Deudor buyers should sign new contracts with it at current prices specified for the sales of lots in "Sta. de Lumanlan. JJ. however. vs. he would have been informed that the land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of J.ALL FOR JESUS
Where the price cannot be determined in accordance with the preceding articles.. appellant is now bound conclusively by appellee's Torrens title (Sec. where we ruled that there being a presumptive knowledge of the Torrens titles issued to Tuason & Co. and can not pretend good faith. Angeles. 144) (Tuason & Co. 1962. L-15398. The Court of First Instance. or to have the amount offset against the sums she was sentenced to pay. did not err in holding that she was not a rightful possessor and sentencing her to vacate. ante). she has only herself to blame for the consequences now that the Deudors' claim has been abandoned by the Deudors themselves. is on leave. the buyer from the Deudors (or from their transferees) can not. Tuason & Co.. did not consider itself bound by the sales made by the Deudors. say now that she believed her vendor had rights of ownership over the lot purchased.
. and seek refuge thereunder). Estrella Vda. should be. reserved. Mesa Heights Subdivision" (ante) the aforequoted Article 1474 can have no bearing on the case. Act 496.J.. and respondent Lumanlan for the sale of the lot occupied by the latter. Lumanlan not being a buyer from Tuason & Co. but as no claim to such credit was ever advanced by her in the trial Court. Zuzuarregui. in good conscience. Equity demands. The reason given by the Court is that — Had he investigated before buying and before building his house on the questioned lot. a similar contention has been rejected in Tuason & Co. M. the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Court of First Instance reinstated. if the thing or any part thereof has been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer. and its predecessors-in-interest since 1914. or in any other manner. What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular case. concur. WHEREFORE.. therefore. Castro and Fernando.. However. Emas vs. and relied instead upon the Deudors' claim of ownership. C. the contract is inefficacious. Inc. Sanchez. As to Lumanlan's allegation in her counterclaim that she should be deemed a builder in good faith. no pronouncement can be made thereon in this appeal.. Inc. and by paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement (assuming that respondent-appellee still has the right to invoke the same. as it is.P. Lumanlan had chosen to ignore the Torrens title of Tuason & Co. Tuason & Co. Zaldivar. J. Respondent could have asked that she recover or be credited with the amounts paid by her to the Deudors. Since there has been no contract between petitioner Tuason & Co. Costs against respondent. December 29. Concepcion. J. Inc. hence. he must pay a reasonable price therefor.
2. no one can determine the precise extent or location of the property by merely examining his proper title. There was an agreement for Technogas to demolish the wall. Uy filed a complained but the case was dismissed. 3.ALL FOR JESUS
TECHNOGAS PHIL. V. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying.
HELD: 1. Uy bought an adjacent property. This prompted him to dig a hole along the wall. A case for malicious mischief was filed against Uy. CA 268 SCRA 5
FACTS: Technogas owned property with buildings and walls. The supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner doesn't militate against its right to claim the status of builder in good faith. Bad faith isn’t imputable to a registered owner of a land when a part of his building encroaches upon a builder’s land
. which led to the partial collapse of the wall.
Kee built his residence. Pleasantville has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.  Jardinico confronted Kee after discovering that the latter was occupying Lot 9. hence Jardinico filed an ejectment suit with damages. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner’s cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach) but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good
. CA: Kee was a builder in good faith.  Under the Contract to Sell. he was nonetheless guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to vacate said lot. and other improvements on the lot. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith. CTTEI’s employee.  Zenaida Octaviano. And as good faith is presumed. from Pleasantville Dev’t Corporation in Pleasantville Subdivision. Kee refused to vacate. RTC: Kee is a builder in bad faith. who had taken possession thereof. a store. Kee could and did possess the lot even before the completion of payments. Bacolod City.  It appears that Kee bought on installment Lot 8 from CT Torres Enterprises Inc (CTTEI). Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. that is. Thereafter. Jardinico discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson Kee.  Upon completing all payments and securing a TCT in his name. the principal. Kee believed that the said lot was the one he bought. and was thus liable for rental. Lot 9. as he was unaware of the “mix-up” when he began construction of the improvements. ISSUE: W/N Kee is a builder in good faith? YES HELD/RATIO:  The roots of the controversy can be traced in the errors committed by CTTEI when it pointed the wrong lot to Kee.  At the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. was the one who mistakenly pointed out Lot 9 (instead of Lot 8) to Kee’s wife. The erroneous delivery was due to the fault of CTTEI and thus imputable to Pleasantville. Violation of the Contract of Sale on Installment may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. Lot 9 was vacant.ALL FOR JESUS
PLEASANTVILLE DEV’T CORP v CA ()2 FACTS  Edith Robillo purchased a parcel of land. Assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith. Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise.  Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and he is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. the real estate agent of Pleasantville. an auto repair shop. At that time. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8.
their accretions were transferred to the other side. and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements. Also. On appeal. the IAC affirmed in toto the judgment thus the case at bar. there was alluvium deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible. So Melad and Binuyag filed separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its accretions. leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated. the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the same w/in 2 years. And Art. (they were planting corn) Agustin accompanied by the mayor and some policemen claimed the land and drove them away. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed HELD: YES Art.ALL FOR JESUS
AGUSTIN V. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these elements are present: 1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it resulted from the effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is adjacent to the river bank. In 1968. When they were cultivating said lands.
Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters. Art. IAC
FACTS: Private respondents. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current. Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying the western bank of the Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin. The Trial Court held ordered Agustin et. From 1919 to 1968. after a typhoon which caused a big flood. it is only just that such risks or dangers should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion. the owner of the land retains ownership. al to vacate the lands and return them to respondents. To cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including Agustin’s Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo Binuyag.
. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968. 459 states when the current of a river x x x segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate. the Cagayan River changed its course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side. 463 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches. respondent’s ownership over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the river.
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