Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/board-of-trustees-of-university-of-alabama-v-garrett/
Timestamp: 2018-09-20 15:45:48
Document Index: 509074668

Matched Legal Cases: ['§12101', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§12101', '§501', '§501', '§ 501']

Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett | Understanding the ADA
Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett
July 2, 2018 By William Goren 1 Comment
Today’s case, National Association of the Deaf et. al. v. State of Florida et. al., comes to me from Courtney Cunningham who has been working this case for some time. The National Association of the Deaf (by way of disclosure, I have known the Executive Director of NAD for years), also stepped in. As usual, the blog entry is divided in the categories and they are: facts; issues presented; holdings; court’s reasoning sovereign immunity; court’s reasoning failure to state a claim; and takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Also, a heads up with respect to the following two weeks. My daughter comes back from camp on Monday after being away for four weeks. So, next week could be really interesting. With respect to the following week, my daughter starts school August 1 (I know we start really early here), and so a blog entry might not go up until the middle of that week. Now, turning to our case of the day…
The Florida Senate and Florida House livestream their legislative proceedings through a website and maintain archives of those videos. Florida State University also owns or operates a website that livestreams legislative proceedings and maintains archived recordings of such videos. The videos are not captioned. Videos are also posted on social media and those are not captioned either. In July, 2017, Sierra, a Deaf individual and a member of NAD sent a letter to the Florida Senate and to the Florida House requesting that they provide captions on the videos of their legislative proceedings. Neither responded to his letter or provided captions. NAD then filed a complaint against the Florida Senate and the Florida House with the Federal Communications Commission, probably because of this blog entry, different case involving the same plaintiff. That complaint was closed in March, 2018. NAD brought suit on behalf of its members, which included the complaining party, seeking monitory and injunctive relief. Defendants through the Florida Channel (a public affairs programming service wholly funded by the Florida legislature and produce and operated by Florida State University’s PBS station), responded to the FCC complaint by saying the Florida Channel produces a 24 hour television programming feed that is closed captioned. Any segment of legislative videos aired on that program are captioned. It also livestreams legislative proceedings, which is separate from the 24 hour television program. Those videos, which come from a different source than the captioned video displayed on the 24 hour television program, are put up on the Internet and made available to the public but do not include captions.
Is sovereign immunity applicable?
Did plaintiffs fail to state a claim?
Court’s Reasoning regarding Sovereign Immunity
A trend in the courts exists stating that absent the need to vindicate a fundamental right or protect a suspect class, Congress may not abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity.
Relying on a decision from the Western District of Oklahoma, the court said that the plaintiff had a fundamental right of access to publicly available information needed to participate in the democratic process. Also, the Western District of Oklahoma noted that in enacting the ADA, Congress found pervasive discrimination by State governments against persons with disabilities, including the deaf and hard of hearing with respect to judicial resources.
Plaintiffs are not seeking just any public information, but information going to the very heart of the democratic process-the text of legislative proceedings. Accordingly, the fundamental right to participate in the democratic process is involved.
Even if the fundamental right to participate in the democratic process is not involved, sovereign immunity is still forcibly waived because Congress found pervasive discrimination by State governments with respect to those with hearing loss.
Justice Breyer in his dissent in the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett documented more than a thousand instances of State discrimination against those with hearing loss in a variety of contexts.
In the ADA’s findings section, 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(3), Congress noted discrimination against individuals with disabilities in a variety of critical areas, including access to public services.
Adding captions to legislative videos removes a barrier to access for a service already provided to those who do not have a hearing loss. Further, the ADA allows defendants certain affirmative defenses. Accordingly, title II of the ADA is a congruent and proportional application of the 14th amendment and sovereign immunity is forcibly waived.
Sovereign immunity does not apply where the plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief against individuals heading State entities, which is the case here.
Where a State receive federal funds, sovereign immunity is waived. It is simply too early in the case absent discovery to reach the conclusion that the State does not take federal funds.
Court’s Reasoning Failure to State a Claim
Stating a claim under title II of the ADA or §504 to Rehabilitation Act means showing: 1) plaintiff is a qualified individual; 2) plaintiff was excluded from participating in a public entity’s services, program, or activities; and 3) plaintiff was discriminated against because of his disability.
Citing to the case we discussed here, the court said whether plaintiff was excluded from the public service turns on whether he had an equal opportunity as someone without a disability.
Florida Channel’s response to plaintiff’s FCC complaint indicated that some legislative proceedings are broadcast with close captioned but not all. A person without a hearing loss gets to watch all legislative proceedings online, but a person with a hearing loss may watch only those legislative proceeding that the Florida Channel chooses to broadcast. That does not constitute an equal opportunity.
Proving deliberate indifference as we have discussed previously, means showing that the defendant knew that harm to a Federal protected right was substantially likely and failed to act on that likelihood. Here, allegations in the complaint are that the plaintiff gave defendant notice of the alleged violations of title II of the ADA and §504. Further, NAD filed a complaint with the FCC prompting a response from defendants. Also, Sierra sent letters to the Florida House and to the Florida Senate, which the defendants never responded to. Finally, defendants response to the FCC complaint indicates no intent to change their current practices.
If you are a State legislature streaming legislative proceedings live, you better be sure they are captioned.
Accessing publicly available information needed to participate in the democratic process is a fundamental right and therefore, any discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny.
Language in the opinion suggests that with respect to discrimination against people with hearing loss, title II may be across-the-board, a permissible use of the equal protection enforcement clause.
Sovereign immunity does not apply to injunctive relief.
If you are representing a State agency and claim that you do not receive federal funds, that by itself, will not get you a motion to dismiss165
Whether a person is excluded from a program, service, or activity turns on whether that person has an equal opportunity as someone without a disability.
As we discussed in the blog entry noted above, deliberate indifference but not mean the same thing as deliberate indifference in tort law.
Due to what deliberate indifference means, it makes a great deal of sense for a plaintiff to issue a demand letter before filing suit under title II of the ADA. Such a letter would put the defendant on notice that a Federal protected right was involved and that they may be failing to act on that likelihood.
Filed Under: ADA, Constitutional law, Federal Cases, General, Rehabilitation Act, Title II Tagged With: §504, 42 U.S.C. §12101, ADA, Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, captions, congruent and proportional, deliberate indifference, equal opportunity, Federal Communications Commission, Federal protected right, Florida house, Florida Senate, fundamental right, legislative proceedings, legislative videos, Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District, live streaming, motion to dismiss, national Association of the Deaf v. state of Florida, rehabilitation act, Reininger v. Oklahoma, Sierra v. school board of Broward County, sovereign immunity, state legislature, title II
EEOC Final Rule on Affirmative-Action Requirements for Persons with Disabilities
January 26, 2017 By William Goren Leave a Comment
Today’s blog entry concerns the EEOC final rule on implementing affirmative-action requirements of §501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. So, this particular blog entry only applies to federal employees and to federal agencies. As usual, it is divided into categories and they are: some highlights; is the rule susceptible to being challenged; and thoughts. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories. Since the blog entry is so short, you probably want to read all of it as it wouldn’t be much additional time.
Sets hiring goals for persons with disabilities as follows:
greater or equal to 12% of employees at the GS-11 level or higher;
greater or equal to 12% of employees at GS-10 level or lower;
greater or equal to 2% of employees at the GS-11 level or higher who have targeted disabilities;
greater or equal to 2% of employees at the GS-10 level or lower who have targeted disabilities.
Requires as an affirmative action an agency to pay for personal assistance services if:
employee requires such services because of a targeted disability;
provision of such services plus reasonable accommodations enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job; and
it does not constitute an undue hardship.
Undue financial hardship is looked to the agency as a whole.
Reassignment to a vacant position without competition is something an agency must consider where the agency determines that no other reasonable accommodation will permit an employee with a disability to perform the essential functions of his or her current position.
Contains various reporting and notice requirements.
If an accommodation can’t be provided immediately, interim accommodation must be made absent an undue hardship.
Complaints must be filed with the EEO counselor within 45 days of the denial of reasonable accommodation.
Is the Rule Susceptible to Being Challenged
Rule would not subject to the Congressional review act since the rule concerns agency management and personnel (5 U.S.C. 804 (3) (B)).
Unable to find any case law suggesting a federal agency can bring a substantial due process claim or an equal protection claim against another agency when the regulations allegedly go too far. For that matter, I couldn’t find anything saying that an agency can use either of those principles as a defense when it fails to carry out regulations either. I also asked Lexis for help on that as well, and they couldn’t find anything.
So, you are left with individuals that would have to challenge the law. Three such individuals to come to mind are; a person with a disability who is neither covered by Schedule A nor has a targeted disability; a person covered by Schedule A but who does not have a targeted disability; or a person who is desirous of having their personal services/devices paid for to ameliorate their disability but who is not in need of personal assistance services.
Essentially, the rule breaks people with disabilities down into three categories: persons with disabilities generally; Schedule A; and persons with targeted disabilities. Targeted disabilities refers to those disabilities found on form SF-256. Schedule A allows an agency to hire a person with a disability that qualifies under Schedule A without going through the certificate process or having to post the job.
Any of the people in ¶ II 3 might claim that the regulations exceed the enforcement clause of the 14th amendment since persons with disabilities with respect to employment are in the rational basis class per this case. As such, the argument would go that affirmative-action for persons with disabilities goes too far. Further, one wonders if an argument could not be made that the distinctions between persons with disabilities, Schedule A, and targeted disabilities is not supportable either.
One of the biggest problems with respect to persons with disabilities is that we silo. That is, each disability has its own challenges. What I have found over the years is that people with the same disabilities, regardless of education level, tend to congregate with people of similar disabilities. Also, it is frequently difficult for a person with a disability to understand a disability that is not theirs. What that means is instead of a unifying disability force, you have group of disabilities attempting to get what is theirs. The siloing affect is such that it is quite an accomplishment that the ADA and its amendments were even passed. These particular regulations just plug into the siloing affect by separating persons with disabilities into different categories.
The United States Supreme Court does not like affirmative-action at all and that is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. The problem here is that persons with disabilities with respect to employment are in the rational basis class, thereby making affirmative-action as a remedy something even harder to successfully argue for then it would be for race, for example, which is subject to strict scrutiny.
It is interesting that the EEOC says that where a person with a disability can no longer perform the essential functions of their current job, the agency must consider transferring that person to a vacant position where they can perform the essential functions of with or without reasonable accommodations. The key term being, “consider.” That is, the term “consider,” on its face is not the same as “must.” So, the EEOC is taking a bit of a different position here when it comes to federal agencies that it has when it comes to the private sector (see this blog entry for example).
Filed Under: Constitutional law, Rehabilitation Act Tagged With: §501, Affirmative-action, Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, EEOC, EEOC final rules on affirmative-action for persons with disabilities, EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, Federal agencies, Final rule, Inc., rehabilitation act
Filed Under: ADA, Federal Cases, Final Federal Regulations, Rehabilitation Act, State Cases, Title I, Title II, Title III Tagged With: § 501, ADA, Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, Branson v. West, emotional support animals, Emotional support animals in the workplace, Equal benefits and privileges, Equal opportunities of employment, excessive documentation, financial undue hardship, Job accommodation network, logistical undue hardship, McDonald v. Department of environmental quality, Montana Supreme Court, Northern District of Illinois, reasonable accommodations, rehabilitation act, Service dogs, Service dogs in the workplace, title I, title II, title III, undue hardship
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Judge Kavanaugh and Persons with Disabilities September 5, 2018
Just When is a Modification or Accommodation Necessary Under Title III? August 27, 2018
Applicability of DOJ Service Dog Regulations to Rehabilitation Act Cases August 21, 2018