Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/328/152/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-01-28 13:38:16
Document Index: 237215511

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 27', '§ 9', '§ 23', '§ 9', '§ 240', '§ 347', '§ 313', '§ 7767', '§ 4', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 14', '§ 9', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 791', '§ 9', '§ 4', '§ 767', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9']

1. Compliance with requirements for a state permit under Iowa Code, 1939, ch. 363, is not a condition precedent to, or an administrative procedure that must be exhausted before, securing a federal license. Pp. 328 U. S. 163, 328 U. S. 170, 328 U. S. 182. chanrobles.com-red
(h) The express provision of § 27 requiring that the Act be not construed as affecting the laws of the States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein, indicates that § 9(b) should not be given a like effect in the absence of a similar provision. Pp. 328 U. S. 175-178. chanrobles.com-red
(e) There is ample opportunity and authority for the Commission to require by regulation the presentation of evidence satisfactory to it of petitioner's compliance with any of the requirements for a state permit that the Commission considers appropriate to effect the purposes of a federal license. P. 328 U. S. 167. chanrobles.com-red
Petitioner applied to the Federal Power Commission for a license to construct, operate, and maintain a power project on navigable waters in Iowa. The State intervened and urged that the application be denied because petitioner had not presented satisfactory evidence of its compliance with the requirements of Iowa Code, 1939, ch. 363, as to the issuance of a permit by the State Executive Council. The Commission dismissed the application "without prejudice to renewal within one year upon satisfying the requirements of Section 9(b) of the Federal Power Act." 52 P.U.R.(N.S) 82. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. 151 F.2d 20. This Court granted certiorari. 3265 U.S. 715. Reversed, p. 328 U. S. 183. chanrobles.com-red
This case illustrates the integration of federal and state jurisdictions in licensing water power projects under the Federal Power Act. [Footnote 1] The petitioner is the First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative, a cooperative association organized under the laws of Iowa with power to generate, distribute, and sell electric energy. On January 29, 1940, pursuant to § 23(b) [Footnote 2] of the Federal Power Act, it chanrobles.com-red
On April 2, 1941, it also filed with the Commission an application for a license, under the Federal Power Act, to construct an enlarged project essentially like the one it now wishes to build. The cost of the enlarged project is estimated at $14,600,000. It calls for an 8,300-foot earthen dam on the Cedar River near Moscow, an 11,000-acre reservoir at that point, and an eight-mile diversion canal to a power plant to be built near Muscatine on the Mississippi. The canal will create two other reservoirs totaling 2,000 acres. It is alleged that the three reservoirs incidentally will provide needed recreational facilities. The power plant will have four turbo-generating units with a total capacity of 50,000 kw., operating with an average head of 101 feet of water provided by the fall from the canal to the Mississippi. Water will be pumped from the Mississippi up to the head bays of the power intake dam at the plant to meet possible shortages in supply. The tailrace will extend for a mile along the shore of the Mississippi to a point below Dam 16 on that River. Transmission lines will connect the project with a source of steam standby electric current at Davenport, Iowa, 24 miles up the Mississippi. The plant is expected to produce 200,000,000 kwh. of marketable power per year, of which 151,000,000 kwh. will be firm energy in an average year. Interchange of energy is proposed with the Moline-Rock Island Manufacturing Company near Davenport, and the project is suggested as an alternative to the addition chanrobles.com-red
On August 11, 1941, the petitioner, pursuant to that finding, filed with the Commission an application for a license to construct the project above described. On November 4, 1941, the Commission granted the Iowa's petition to intervene, and, since then, the State has opposed actively the granting of the federal license. chanrobles.com-red
We believe that the Commission would have been justified in proceeding further at that time with its consideration of the petitioner's application upon all the material facts. Such consideration would have included evidence submitted by the petitioner pursuant to § 9(b) chanrobles.com-red
While it now appears from its brief and the argument in this Court that it is the opinion of the Federal Power Commission that the requirements of Chapter 363 of the Code of Iowa as to this project have been superseded by those of the Federal Power Act, yet, at the time of the original hearing, the Commission felt that the courts were the appropriate place for the decision on Iowa's contention as to the applicability and effectiveness of Chapter 363 chanrobles.com-red
On the applicant's petition for review of the dismissal, it was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 151 F.2d 20. We then granted certiorari under § 240(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 347(a), and § 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, chanrobles.com-red
The findings made by the Commission on June 3, 1941, in response to the petitioner's declaration of intention are not in question. For the purposes of this application, it is settled that the project will affect the navigability of the Cedar, Iowa, and Mississippi Rivers, each of which has been determined to be a part of the navigable waters of the United States; will affect the interests of interstate commerce; will flood certain public lands of the United States, and will require for its construction a license from the Commission. [Footnote 7] The project is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Commission under the Federal Power Act. The question at issue is the need, if any, for the presentation of satisfactory evidence of the petitioner's compliance chanrobles.com-red
To require the petitioner to secure the actual grant to it of a State permit under § 7767 as a condition precedent to securing a federal license for the same project under the Federal Power Act would vest in the Executive Council of Iowa a veto power over the federal project. Such a veto power easily could destroy the effectiveness of the federal act. It would subordinate to the control of the State the "comprehensive" planning which the Act provides shall depend upon the judgment of the Federal Power Commission or other representatives of the Federal Government. [Footnote 9] chanrobles.com-red
If a State permit is not required, there is no justification for requiring the petitioner, as a condition of securing its federal permit, to present evidence of the petitioner's compliance chanrobles.com-red
In the Federal Power Act, there is a separation of those subjects which remain under the jurisdiction of the states from those subjects which the Constitution delegates to the United States and over which Congress vests the Federal Power Commission with authority to act. To the extent of this separation, the Act establishes a dual system of control. The duality of control consists merely of the division of the common enterprise between two cooperating agencies of Government, each with final authority in its own jurisdiction. The duality does not require two chanrobles.com-red
agencies to share in the final decision of the same issue. Where the Federal Government supersedes the state government, there is no suggestion that the two agencies both shall have final authority. In fact, a contrary policy is indicated in §§ 4(e), 10(a)(b) and (c), and 23(b). [Footnote 12] In those sections, the Act places the responsibility squarely upon federal officials, and usually upon the Federal Power Commission. A dual final authority, with a duplicate system of state permits and federal licenses required for each project, would be unworkable. "Compliance with the requirements" of such a duplicated system of licensing would be nearly as bad. Conformity to both standards would be impossible in some cases, and probably difficult in most of them. [Footnote 13] The solution adopted by Congress, as to what evidence an applicant for a federal license should submit to the Federal Power Commission, appears in § 9 of its Act. It contains not only subsection (b), [Footnote 14] but also subsections (a) and (c). [Footnote 15] Section 9(c) permits chanrobles.com-red
the Commission to secure from the applicant "[s]uch additional information as the commission may require." This enables it to secure, insofar as it deems it material, such parts or all of the information that the respective states may have prescribed in state statutes as a basis for state action. The entire administrative procedure required as to the present application for a license is described in § 9 and in the Rules of Practice and Regulations of the Commission. [Footnote 16] chanrobles.com-red
Furthermore, the Executive Council, which includes the Governor of the State, on July 5, chanrobles.com-red
The Act leaves to the states their traditional jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government, through Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, administer the public lands and reservations of the United States and, in certain cases, exercise authority under the treaties of the United States. These sources of constitutional authority are all applied in chanrobles.com-red
The closeness of the relationship of the Federal Government to these projects and its obvious concern in maintaining control over their engineering, economic, and financial soundness is emphasized by such provisions as those of § 14 authorizing the Federal Government, at the chanrobles.com-red
Further light is thrown upon the meaning of the Federal Power Act by the statement, made by Representative William L. LaFollette of Washington, a member of the Special Committee on Water Power, which reported the bill which later became the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. In the debate which led to the insertion in § 9(b) chanrobles.com-red
As indicated by Representative LaFollette, Congress was concerned with overcoming the danger of divided authority so as to bring about the needed development of water power, and also with the recognition of the constitutional rights of the states so as to sustain the validity of the Act. The resulting integration of the respective jurisdictions of the state and Federal Governments is illustrated by the careful preservation of the separate interests of the states throughout the Act, without setting up a divided authority over any one subject. [Footnote 19] chanrobles.com-red
The effect of § 27 in protecting state laws from supersedure is limited to laws as to the control, appropriation, chanrobles.com-red
use or distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other uses of the same nature. It therefore has primary, if not exclusive, reference to such proprietary rights. The phrase "any vested right acquired therein" further emphasizes the application of the section to property rights. There is nothing in the paragraph to suggest a broader scope, unless it be the words "other uses." Those words, however, are confined to rights of the same nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes. This was so held in an early decision by a District Court relating to § 27 and upholding the constitutionality of the Act, where it was stated that "a proper construction of the act requires that the words other uses' shall be construed ejusdem generis with the words `irrigation' and `municipal.'" Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 F.6d 6, 619.
This section, therefore, is thoroughly consistent with the integration, rather than the duplication, of federal and state jurisdictions under the Federal Power Act. It strengthens the argument that, in those fields where rights are not thus "saved" to the states, Congress is willing to let the supersedure of the state laws by federal legislation take its natural course. [Footnote 20] chanrobles.com-red
It does not itself require compliance with any state laws. Its reference to state laws is by way of suggestion to the chanrobles.com-red
When this application has been remanded to the Commission, that Commission will not act as a substitute for the local authorities having jurisdiction over such questions as the sufficiency of the legal title of the applicant to its riparian rights, or as to the validity of its local franchises, if any, relating to proposed intrastate public utility service. Section 9(b) says that the Commission may wish to have "satisfactory evidence" of the progress made by the applicant toward meeting local requirements, but it does not say that the Commission is to assume responsibility for the legal sufficiency of the steps taken. The references made in § 9(b) to beds and banks of streams, to proprietary rights to divert or use water, or to legal rights to engage locally in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing power neither add anything to nor detract anything from the force of the local laws, if any, on those subjects. Insofar as those laws have not been superseded by the Federal Power Act, they remain as applicable and effective as they were before its passage. The State of Iowa, however, has sought to sustain the applicability and validity of Chapter 363 of the Code of Iowa in this connection on the ground that the Federal Power Act, by the implications of § 9(b), has recognized this chapter of Iowa law as part of a system of dual control of power project permits, cumbersome and complicated though it be. If it had been the wish of Congress to make the applicant obtain consent of state, as well as federal authorities, to each project, the simple thing would chanrobles.com-red
The purpose of this section, as thus explained, is consistent with the contention of the Commission in this case. It provides for presentation of information to the federal commission, and protects the constitutional rights of the States. This explanation does not support the contention of the State of Iowa that § 9(b) amounts to the subjection of the federal license to requirements of the state law on the same subject. The inappropriateness of such chanrobles.com-red
It was a major undertaking involving a major change of national policy. [Footnote 23] That it was the intention of Congress chanrobles.com-red
The detailed provisions of the Act providing for the federal plan of regulation leave no room or need for conflicting state controls. [Footnote 25] The contention of the State of chanrobles.com-red
It is the Federal Power Commission, rather than the Iowa Executive Council, that, under our constitutional Government, must pass upon these issues on behalf of the people of Iowa, as well as on behalf of all others. chanrobles.com-red
We are all agreed that Congress has the constitutional power to promote a comprehensive development of the nation's water resources, and that it has exercised its authority by the Federal Power Act. 41 Stat. 1063, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53; New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377. And, in view of Congress' power, of course, this enactment overrides all State legislation in conflict with it. But the national policy for water power development formulated by the Federal Power Act explicitly recognizes regard for certain interests of the States as part of that national policy. This does not imply that general uncritical notions about so-called "States' rights" are to be read into what Congress has written. It does mean that we must adhere to the express Congressional mandate that the public interest which chanrobles.com-red
To safeguard the interests of the States thus protected by § 9(b), Congress has directed that notice be given to the State when an application has been filed for a license, the granting of which may especially affect a State. § 4(f), 49 Stat. 838, 841, 16 U.S.C. § 767(f). If a State does not challenge the claim of an applicant, the evidence chanrobles.com-red
submitted by the applicant, if found to be satisfactory by the Commission, has met the demands of § 9(b), and a State cannot thereafter challenge the Commission's determination. But a real problem in administration is presented to the Power Commission when a State does intervene and claims that the applicant has not complied with its lawful requirements. For, before the Commission can meet the duty placed on it by § 9(b), it must ascertain the scope and meaning of the State law. Suppose the State law is not clear or is susceptible of different constructions and has received no construction by the only authoritative source for the interpretation of State laws -- namely, the highest court of the State. Must the Federal Power Commission give an independent interpretation of the laws of the State? This is not to suggest an unreal or hypothetical situation. The Federal Power Commission submitted here a compilation of laws relating to State requirements relevant under § 9(b) for not less than thirty States. Are the lawyers of the Commission to make themselves the originating interpreters of the laws of these States? Are they to construe, for instance, the laws of New Jersey and Oklahoma and Arizona and Illinois when the courts of those States have not spoken? And if they do and the State appeals from the decision, must the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia become the interpreter of these various laws? Finally, in the event of a further appellate review, is this Court to construe State legislation without guidance by the State courts? Time out of mind, and in a variety of situations, this Court has admonished against the avoidable assumption by this Court of the independent construction of State legislation. See, e.g., Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159, 279 U. S. 207-209; Brandeis, J., dissenting, in Railroad Comm'n v. Los Angeles R. Corp., 280 U. S. 145, 280 U. S. 158, 280 U. S. 164-166. It is pertinent to recall the classic statement of the reason for leaving to the controlling interpretation of local courts the meaning chanrobles.com-red
151 F.2d 20. Even we cannot construe the requirements of Iowa law in the absence of a determination by the Iowa Supreme Court. And, in much more conventional types of litigation, we have evolved the procedure whereby federal litigation is stayed until the State law is authoritatively chanrobles.com-red
If it be said that the procedure for which the Federal Power Commission contends may take time, there is no chanrobles.com-red