Source: http://www.amba-epo.org/indicators
Timestamp: 2016-07-31 00:12:59
Document Index: 64022060

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 23', 'Art. 23', 'Art.11', 'Art.10', 'Art.10', 'Art. 11', 'Art. 11', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 11', 'Art. 11', 'Art. 11']

AMBA | Indicators
ENCJ Indicator (click to expand and explore)
Proposal in CA/16/15
1. Legal basis of independence
Notes on indicator:
The legal basis for independence comprises a number of sub-indicators concerning the formal protections for independence that are in place as follows:
Re-evaluate this indicator!
Formal guarantees of the independence of the judiciary
1a. Is the independence of the Judiciary or the judge formally guaranteed?
1b. If the answer to 1a. is yes, is this done in/by:
Constitution means cannot be changed by simple majority
Law means can be changed by simple majority
Law - (I-2.9)1
Law - Art. 23(1) EPC1
The Constitution or equivalent documents
Notes on sub-indicator:This indicator measures the degree to which the independence of the Judiciary is formally safeguarded. Once suitable protections are in place, the degree of independence is determined by the ease with which the executive can impugn or alter these protections. It should be noted that in some constitutions the independence of the Judiciary is guaranteed, whilst in others only the independence of the judge is safeguarded. In this context, the difference may not be important if the protections are properly entrenched.
The strongest protection is a guarantee in the constitution or the state’s equivalent provisions. What is important is that the position of the Judiciary cannot be impugned by a simple majority of the legislature. Constitutional courts are also able to bolster the necessary protections. There is no single possible compliant system. The entire constitutional and historical protections need to be viewed as a whole.
1Recommends a stronger statement that court is autonomous judicial organ (I-2.1)
1Formally guaranteed in EPC, but only for five years
Formal assurances that judges are bound only by the law
1c. Are judges bound only by law?
1d. If the answer to 1c. is yes, is this guaranteed in/by:
Law - (I-29)1
Law Art. 23(3)1
Notes on sub-indicator:
This indicator measures whether judges are explicitly bound only by the law, and thereby prevented from responding to political, media and other external pressures. Again, the strongest protection is a constitutional safeguard. Weaker protection is provided by laws that can be changed by a simple majority of the legislature, or by judicial precedent.
1Statement at highest level in law (II-5). Includes concept of appearance of interference (II-1.1.1)
1"In their decisions, the members of the Boards shall not be bound by any instructions and shall comply only with the provisions of this Convention."
Formal methods for the determination of judges’ salaries
1e. Is the salary of judges determined by law?
1f. If the answer to 1e is yes, is this guaranteed in:
The independence of the Judiciary can be undermined if the salaries of judges are controlled by the executive, and if the executive is not bound by formal controls relating to fixing these salaries. Punitive salary cuts are totally unacceptable. But arbitrary executive control of judicial salaries exposes judges to the risk of inappropriate pressures and corruption. Formal protection for judges’ salaries is, therefore, of great importance. Again, the strongest protection is a constitutional safeguard. A legal safeguard that can be changed by a majority in the legislature is a weaker protection. Customs preventing interference in judicial salaries offers some, though often a weaker protection.
1No mention in report
1Only regulated in Staff Regulations
Formal mechanisms for the adjustment of judges’ salaries
1g. Is there a formal mechanism to adjust the salaries of judges to keep pace with the average development of salaries in the country and/or with inflation?
This indicator addresses whether a formal mechanism exists to adjust salaries to keep pace with the average development of salaries in the country and/or with inflation. In the absence of such a mechanism the salaries of judges would be arbitrarily determined, making formal protections ineffective. 1No mention in report, but assumed to be same as present
1Regulated in Staff Regulations
Formal guarantees for involvement of judges in the development of legal and judicial reform
1h. Is the involvement of the Judiciary in law and judicial reform formally guaranteed?
1i. If the answer to 1h. is yes, is this done in:
The Constitution or equivalent1 documents
1j. If the answer to 1h. is yes, can the Judiciary:
Propose changes of laws
Advise on legislative proposals
1k. Is the Judiciary involved in the formation and the implementation of judicial reform?
1l. Has the Judiciary initiated judicial reform?
This indicator measures whether the Judiciary has the formal right to propose law reforms, and to advise about proposed developments in legal and judicial practice. The independence of the Judiciary can be severely affected by law reform in general and judicial reform in particular. Such reforms can also offer opportunities to strengthen the independence of the Judiciary and to implement reforms that the Judiciary feels are necessary to improve its functioning. The strongest protection is a formal guarantee that the Judiciary is entitled to propose law reforms and to advise on proposals for law reform and judicial reforms proposed by the executive and/or the legislature.
1 cannot be changed by simple majority.
2 can be changed by simple majority.
This indicator is a particularly important support for the legal independence of the Judiciary. It is crucial in times of political tension. Judicial self-government is necessary to put independence into practice.
The ENCJ’s 2013 report on the “Distillation of ENCJ Guidelines Recommendations and Principles” defines a Council for the Judiciary as “a self-governing body that operates autonomously to guarantee judicial independence, the maintenance of the rule of law, the promotion of civil liberties and individual freedoms, basic human rights and the effective and transparent administration of justice”. From this perspective, a Council for the Judiciary is the preferred way for a Judiciary to govern its own affairs in a transparent manner.
In practice, Councils for the Judiciary vary greatly. They have a variety of different tasks assigned to them; they have different degrees of autonomy from the other state powers; and they have different organizational structures. It is hardly possible to state the minimum requirements for an organization to be properly regarded as Council for the Judiciary in the first place. This means that the contribution of Council for the Judiciary to organizational autonomy cannot be generalized. The indicators should allow for diversity.
In some countries, even in the absence of a Council for the Judiciary, the Judiciary is able to achieve a large degree of self-government, where, for example, the Ministries of Justice delegate to judges and representatives of civil society. Independent commissions or councils for the appointment and discipline of judges are a case in point. Consequently, the indicators allow for the possibility that a Council for the Judiciary will exist, and for the possibility that the responsibilities more normally entrusted to a Council for the Judiciary will, instead, be entrusted to one or more equivalent independent bodies. These indicators should be read as encompassing this latter possibility.
Formal position of the Council for the Judiciary
2a. Does your country have a Council for the Judiciary?
Yes - (I-2.5)1
2b. Is the position of the Council for the Judiciary formally guaranteed?
Law - (IV-3)
Where there is a Council for the Judiciary, the formal position of the Council for the Judiciary must be considered. Its position can be described in the constitution or by an ordinary law. Once again constitutional incorporation is by far the preferred option.
1Presidium has role of Council>
1Essential functions of the boards governed by President and/or Administrative Council
Formal relationship between the Council and the Judiciary
2c. Is this Council part of the Judiciary?
Yes - (IV)
Self-governance implies that the Council for the Judiciary is a part of the Judiciary itself. In practice, however, other practical solutions are sometimes adopted. The Council of the Judiciary as part of the Judiciary is the preferred option.
Compliance with ENCJ guidelines
2d. Is the Council organized in accordance with ENCJ Guidelines concerning:
At least 50% of the members of the Council are judges?
Yes - (IV-1)
At least 50% of the members of the Council who are judges are chosen by their peers?
Yes (IV-1)
Minister of Justice is not a member of the Council?
The Council controls its own finances independently of both the legislative and executive branches?
No (IV-2.2.2.2)
The Council controls its own activities independently of both the legislative and executive branches
Yes (IV-2.2.2)
Obviously, it is desirable that a Council for the Judiciary conforms with as many of the above guidelines as possible.
Responsibilities of the Council / Influence of judges on decisions
2e. Is the Council responsible for (or do judges have decisive influence over) the following:
The appointment and promotion of magistrates?
Yes - (II-2.1.3.5)1
No - Art.11(3) EPC1
The training of magistrates?
Yes - (IV-2.2.12)
Yes - PDC
Judicial discipline and judicial ethics?
Yes - (V-1.4)2
Only ethics2
Complaints against the Judiciary?
The performance management of the Judiciary?
Yes - (V-1.2)3
No - Art.10(2)(f) EPC3
The administration of courts?
Yes - (IV-2.2.2)
The financing of the Judiciary?
No - (IV-2.2.2.2)
Proposing legislation concerning the courts and the Judiciary?
Yes - (IV-2.1.4)
Yes - (R.12 EPC)5
The greater the self-governance of the Judiciary, the greater the number of responsibilities that will be entrusted to the Council for the Judiciary or an equivalent body.
Where there is no Council for the Judiciary, judges can still have a decisive influence on decisions with respect to the responsibilities enumerated above. Alternative ways to achieve the organizational autonomy of the Judiciary are captured in the indicator.
1 Proposal approved unless good reasons
2 The special Board is probably more independent
3 There is "supervision" by the President of the Court
1 Only selection - proposal President / decision Administrative Council
2 Administrative Council
3 In principle the President of the Office, but in practice the Vice President DG3?
4 On a day to day basis
5 Presidium proposes Rules of Procedure
3. Funding of the Judiciary
The funding of the Judiciary is a vulnerable aspect in the relations between state powers. There are two aspects that need to be covered by the indicators. The first aspect covers the institutional arrangements: the degree to which the Judiciary is involved in the determination of budgets, the way budgets are constructed and the degree of freedom for the Judiciary to allocate budgets once these have been determined. The second aspect is even more important: the degree to which the actual budgets that are the outcome of the budget process are sufficient for the Judiciary to fulfil its responsibilities.
Budgetary arrangements
3a. Is the funding of the Judiciary organised as to allow the courts:
To handle their caseload?
Yes - (VI-1)
To engage experts/translators/etc. in cases when necessary if fees paid by court?
To keep the knowledge and skills of judges and staff up to date?
Yes - (IV-2.2.1.2)
To facilitate judges and other personnel in matters of IT-systems, buildings etc.?
3b. Who makes the decisions?
a) Involvement in the preparation of the "budget allocated to courts"
Judiciary - (III-1.1.1)
Executive - (Art.10(2)(d) EPC)
b) Formal proposal on the budget allocated to courts
c) Adoption of the budget allocated to courts
Legislature - (VI-1)
d) Management of the budget allocated to courts
e) Evaluation/audit of the budget allocated to courts
The position of the Judiciary is stronger, the more often it has the lead in these phases.
3c. Is the funding of the Judiciary based upon transparent and objective criteria?
3d. If the answer to 3c is yes, is the funding based on:
Actual costs (e.g. number of judges and court staff)
Workload of courts
Fixed percentage of government expenditure or GDP
3e. Where have these criteria been defined?
In well-established practice
The indicator describes whether or not the funding of the Judiciary is based upon transparent, objective criteria. Possibilities are among others: actual costs (e.g. number of judges and court staff), the workload of courts and a fixed percentage of government expenditure or GDP. In the long run budgets should match the workload of the courts, while in the short run its actual costs must be covered, also in case the caseload declines. If such an objective system is in place, the issue is whether or not it can be changed easily. A system that is fixed by law offers more safeguards than a common practice.
Occurrence of conflicts about budgets
3f. How many times over the last ten years has government refused a budget proposal of the Judiciary or has the government promulgated a budget for the Judiciary that was opposed by the Judiciary?
The indicator counts the number of conflicts between the Judiciary and government about the budget of the Judiciary in the last five years. Has the government (e.g. minister of Justice or Minister of Finance) refused a budget proposal from the Judiciary or has the government promulgated a budget for the Judiciary that was opposed by the Judiciary?
Resolution of conflicts about budgets
3g. In case the government does not allocate sufficient funds, may the Judiciary address the parliament?
An important issue is how conflicts between the Judiciary and government about the budget are handled. The indicator describes whether or not the Judiciary has the right to address Parliament, where it is convinced that the government does not allocate sufficient funds.
Sufficiency of actual budgets
The formal arrangements need to guarantee that actual budgets are sufficient. The indicator deals with the sufficiency of budgets by distinguishing key activities that must receive adequate funding. These are:
a) handling of caseload;
b) engaging experts, translators etc. where necessary and when fees are paid by the court;
c) keeping the knowledge and skills of judges and staff up to date;
d) facilitating judges and other personnel in matters of IT systems, buildings etc.
4. Court management
The responsibility for court management differs between countries. While self-governance implies that the Judiciary is integrally responsible, in practice, in several countries (many aspects of) court management lies with the Minister of Justice or with court services under the authority of the Minister of Justice. These practices pose a risk for the independence of the Judiciary, as matters of court management such as housing and IT affect the functioning of the Judiciary. The more decisions taken by the Judiciary, the better independence is served.
Management responsibility of the courts
4a. Which authorities can take the following decisions?
a) General management of a court
b) Appointment of court staff (other than judges)
c) Other human resource management decisions on court staff
d) Decisions regarding the implementation and use of Information and Communication
Executive - (VI-3)
e) Decisions regarding court buildings
f) Decisions regarding court security
g) Decisions regarding outreach activities1
Judiciary - (IV-2.2.2.1)
1 This includes all communication and promotional activities aimed to inform society about the Judiciary
5. HR decisions about judges
Human resource decisions concerning selection and appointment, disciplinary processes and removal are an area of vulnerability for the independence of judges. In these areas, judges are exposed to potentially improper interference by other state powers, including, for example, political appointments of judges. Both interference and the appearance of interference undermine the perceived independence of the Judiciary. There need to be transparent processes regulated by law and under the supervision of the Judiciary. Re-evaluate this indicator!
Selection, appointment and dismissal of judges and court presidents
5a. Which authorities or bodies have the power to deliver the following decisions in the judiciary?
a) Proposal of candidates1 for the appointment as judges (not sc judges)
Judiciary - (II-2.1.3)
Executive - Art. 11(3) EPC
b) Decision on the appointment of a judge
Legislature - (II-2.1.3.5)
Legislature - Art. 11(3) EPC
c) Proposal for the dismissal of a judge
Judiciary - (II-1.1.2.2.2)1
Judiciary - Art. 23(1) EPC
d) Decision on the dismissal of a judge
Legislature - Art. 23(1) EPC
e) Proposal of candidates for the appointment as court presidents
Judiciary - (III-1.2)
Executive/Legislature - Art. 11(2) EPC1
f) Decision on the appointment of a court president
Legislature - (III-1.2)
Legislature - Art. 11(2) EPC1
g) Proposal for the dismissal of a court president
Legislature - (V-2.2)
Legislature - Art. 11(4) EPC1
h) Decision on the dismissal of a court president
5b. Same as question 5a, but for Supreme Court judges - not used in this table
1 The final proposal of candidate(s) which is transmitted to the body that appoints/elects them
The indicator measures the degree to which the Judiciary itself is responsible for the selection, appointment and dismissal of judges and court presidents
1 Separate tribunal as part of the court
1 In so far as a Vice-President is a court president
Compliance with ENCJ guidelines about the appointment of judges
5c. Is the appointment of judges in compliance with the ENCJ guidelines?
Is the appointment process open to public scrutiny and fully and properly documented?
Yes - (II-2.1)
Is the appointment process undertaken according to published criteria?
Is the appointment of judges is solely based on merit
Yes - (II-2.1.1)
Does the appointment process promote the diversity of people within the Judiciary, whilst avoiding discrimination
Does the appointment process provide for an independent complaint procedure
Yes - (II-2.2.5)
Yes - ILO
The ENCJ has developed guidelines for the appointment of judges. The indicator establishes the degree to which these guidelines are adhered to.
1 In practice this is rigorously enforced, but it is not apparent to the outside
Evaluation, promotion, disciplinary measures and training of judges
5d. Which authorities have the power to take the following decisions?:
a) Decision on the evaluation of a judge
Judiciary - (II-2.2.1)1
No formal evaluation
b) Evaluation of the performance management of courts
c) Decision on the promotion of a judge
Legislature - (II-2.2.3)
d) Adoption of ethical standards
Judiciary - (II-4)
Judiciary - Code of Conduct1
e) Application of ethical standards
f) Proposal for the appointment of a member of the disciplinary body for judges
Legislature - (V-1.4)
g) Decision on the appointment of a member of the disciplinary body for judges
h) Proposal for a disciplinary decision regarding a judge if any
Judiciary - (V-2.2)
i) Disciplinary decision regarding a judge if any
j) Decision on the follow-up to a complaint against the judiciary/a judge
k) Decision on the program/content of training for judges
Judiciary - (IV-2.2.1.2)
1 Written, step-by-step process in which the Judiciary commits itself to follow in every case where a judge has to be warned, reprimanded, or dismissed
1 Internal Circular No. 135 (CA/105/95)
Compliance with ENCJ guidelines about the promotion of judges
5e. Is the promotion of judges in compliance with the ENCJ standards?
Is the promotion process open to public scrutiny and fully and properly documented?
Is the promotion process undertaken according to published criteria?
Yes - (II-2.2)
Is the promotion of judges is solely based on merit?
Yes - (II-2.2.3)
Does the promotion process promote the diversity of people within the Judiciary, whilst avoiding discrimination?
Does the promotion process provide for an independent complaint procedure?
The ENCJ has developed guidelines for the promotion of judges. The indicator establishes the degree to which these guidelines are adhered to.
6. Irremovability of judges
Irremovability of judges comprises a number of sub-indicators as follows. Re-evaluate this indicator!
Formal guarantee of irremovability of judges
6a. Can a judge be transferred (temporarily or permanently) to another judicial office (to other judicial duties, court or location) without his/her consent?1
Yes - (II-1.1.2.2.1.3)1
6b. If no, is the irremovability guaranteed in:
The Constitution or equivalent text
6c. If yes, which authority or body decides on a (temporary or permanent) transfer of a judge without his/her consent?
Legislature - (II-1.1.2.2.1.3)
1 Not including measure following disciplinary proceedings.
A major guarantee of the independence of individual judges is their irremovability. It should not be possible to transfer judges without their consent, except for disciplinary reasons in exceptional circumstances. In some jurisdictions irremovability is not guaranteed. Safeguards offer protection in varying degrees.
The indicator captures whether or not irremovability is formally guaranteed. As disciplinary measures were already discussed, the indicator is about the removal of judges for other than disciplinary reasons. If protections are in place, a key factor is, as before, how easy these can be changed by the other state powers. The strongest protection is a guarantee in the Constitution or in documents that are equivalent in the sense that the position of the Judiciary cannot be changed by simple majority. A guarantee in laws that can be changed by simple majority offers weaker protection, whilst customary protection is even weaker.
1 Only in exceptional circumstances
1 No formal guarantee
Arrangements for the transfer of judges without their consent
6d. For what reasons can a judge be transferred without his/her consent?
Organisational - (II-1.1.2.2.1.3)
Other - non re-appointment1
For organizational reasons (e.g. closure of a court)
6e. At what level are these reasons prescribed?
Law - (II- 1.1.2.2.1.3)
Other - Customary
Other (less formal)
6f. In case a judge is transferred without his/her consent is he/she guaranteed an equivalent post (in terms of a position, salary…)?
Yes - (II-1.1.2.5)
Yes - Service Regulations
6h. Can a judge appeal if he/she is transferred without his/her consent?
Yes - (II-1.1.2.2.2)
6i. If yes, which authority or body decides on such an appeal?
Judiciary - (II-1.1.2.2.2)
Judiciary - ILO?
6g1. Can a judge be taken off a case without his/her consent?
No - (II-1.1.1.2)
No formal provision?
1 Question moved compared to ENCJ Report The indicator addresses the situation in which irremovability is not fully guaranteed.
As the transfer of judges without their consent is undesirable, the more limited the use of transfers and the better the legal protection of the judges, the better for the level of independence.
7. Procedures in case of threat to independence
Independence requires that judges are adequately protected from threats, in order to carry out their duties unhindered. Threats can come from private persons, but also from public figures, such as politicians, and the media.
Procedures in case of threat to independence comprise of two sub-indicators as follows:
- Existence of formal procedures in case of threat to independence; and
- Adequacy of formal procedures in case of threat to independence.
Existence of formal procedures in case of threat to independence
7a. When a judge or an authority considers that independence of an individual judge or of the judiciary is threatened, are there any specific procedures, other remedies or sanctions1 for protecting it?
1"Sanctions against persons seeking to influence judges in an improper manner", Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, para. 14.
This indicator captures whether a formal procedure exists when a judge or an authority within the Judiciary considers that the independence of an individual judge or of the Judiciary as a whole is threatened. This includes procedures to protect the independence of the Judiciary against improper influence of the media, including social media.
Adequacy of formal procedures in case of threat to independence
7b. If yes, who can launch such a request or a procedure?
A judge who believes his/her independence is threatened
President of a court
Judicial inspection body
Other independent body
7c. If yes, which authority or body has the power to react to such complaints from judges or authorities for protecting judicial independence? [several answers possible]
Higher court / President of a higher court
Supreme Court / President of the Supreme Court
7d. If yes, what are the measures that these authorities can take on the basis of a request in order to protect judicial independence?
Notification to other authorities
Other (specify): …
7e. Are there any procedures, other remedies or sanctions in place in order to protect the independence of the Judiciary against influence of the media, including social media?
Yes - (II-1.1.1.2)
Key issues to evaluate the adequacy of the procedures
8. Internal independence
Independence does not only mean independence from outside forces, but also internal independence. The judge should be able to decide a case in full independence. This does not mean that the Judiciary cannot develop non-binding guidelines for matters such as uniformity, consistency, timeliness and efficiency. It can reasonably be demanded from judges that they explain why they did not comply with a guideline, but they cannot be compelled to comply. Improper influence by (senior) judges and by the management of the court should be avoided.
Influence by higher ranked judges
8a. In your system, can higher ranked judges change a verdict of a lower ranked judge (outside of an appeal system, the precedent doctrine or a preliminary ruling system)?
8b. If yes, what kind of decisions can higher ranked judges deliver on their own initiative to ensure the uniformity or consistency of judicial decisions (outside of an appeal system or the precedent doctrine)?
A guideline (advisory opinion of general application for all courts/judges)
An advisory opinion of concrete application to a specific judicial decision
An obligatory decision of concrete application to a specific judicial decision, regarding minimum quality standards of a verdict (fe motivation)
The indicator describes whether higher ranked judges have the authority to intervene in a verdict of a lower ranked judge (outside of an appeal system, the precedent doctrine or a preliminary ruling system) and for what purpose (e.g. minimum quality, uniformity and consistency, timeliness and efficiency). To be able to assess whether such interventions are acceptable it is necessary to distinguish between types of interventions
Use and status of guidelines
8c. Have guidelines gotten broad coverage?
8d. Have the guidelines been developed by the judges of the courts?
8e. Are the guidelines binding?
The indicator focuses on the use of guidelines within the courts.
Influence by the management of the courts
8f. Can the management of the court exert influence in individual cases on the way judges handle their cases with respect to the uniformity/consistency?
8g. Can the management of the court exert influence in individual cases on the way judges handle their cases with respect to the timeliness/efficiency of judicial decisions?
The indicator describes whether the management of the court can exert influence in individual cases on the way judges handle their cases, for instance, with respect to the uniformity / consistency and timeliness / efficiency.
The ENCJ Report on Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary discusses and sets out internationally recognised indicators of objective independence of the judiciary.
This table compares our evaluation of these indicators under various scenarios for the boards of appeal, namely the Sedemund Treiber Report (CA/103/03 Add. 2), the present situation and the reform proposed in CA/16/15.
You can explore any interesting indicator, e.g. one that is particularly negative or positive, by clicking on the relevant row. This will open a sub-level which gives information about the indicator and lists the corresponding sub-indicators.
Clicking on a sub-indicator opens a further sub-level that shows the questions associated with this sub-indicator and the answers that we have given to the various scenarios, along with explanatory notes.
The answers for the reform proposed in CA/16/15 are in input fields of a form that you can change. To see how the changes affect the colour of a particular indicator click on the “Re-evaluate this indicator” button at the top of the indicator.
There is undoubtedly room for debate on the meaning and the evaluation of the various indications. If you have any comments or suggestions in this direction please email us.