Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-fedorenko
Timestamp: 2019-06-20 21:39:25
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1', '§ 1325', '§ 316', '§ 1427', '§ 316', '§ 1427', '§ 20', '§ 1101']

United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 | Casetext
455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978)
United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Fort Lauderdale DivisionJul 25, 1978
J.V. Eskenazi, U.S. Atty., Alan M. Lubiner, Gen. Atty. (Nationality) Immigration Naturalization Service, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.
Gregg J. Pomeroy, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., Celentano Gildea, New Haven, Conn., for defendant.
The Government seeks to strip defendant of his American citizenship granted in 1970. Basically the Government charges that defendant lied on his application for a visa in 1949, particularly in not disclosing he served as a guard at the death camp at Treblinka during World War II. Further, the Government charges he participated in atrocities at Treblinka, precluding him from having the good moral character necessary to become an American citizen. Defendant, originally a Ukrainian, contends that he was not a guard voluntarily but he was forced to be one as a prisoner of war of Nazi Germany and denies committing any atrocities at Treblinka or elsewhere.
This memorandum opinion contains the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Rule 52, F.R.C.P. In addition, the court has included considerable detail about the evidence because of the extensive review of evidence afforded to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in denaturalization cases. U.S. v. Nowak, 356 U.S. 660, 78 S.Ct. 955, 2 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1958) and others. Further, the court has added observations to give the flavor of the trial as well.
Defendant Fedorenko came to America in 1949 and has been a respectable resident ever since. Following his arrival he worked on a farm in Connecticut. After a year he worked in a factory in Waterbury and then went to work for Scovill, a manufacturer of brass and copper products; he worked there, usually as a foundry worker, for 20 years until his retirement. He was emphatically described by fellow-workers at Scovill as an "excellent" worker who did not speak unkindly of anyone; that he was so good a worker he had no problems and was a "real gentleman" with no apparent prejudices of any type. The union representative at Scovill testified strongly as to his reliability and performance — a man who never put in a grievance and never had one filed against him. His foreman described defendant as a man who did his job well and cheerfully — a very conscientious and a very good worker. The court accepts these appraisals as accurately reflecting defendant's work-life and personal life for 29 years.
Defendant has retired on a social security pension and a pension from his 20 years labor at Scovill. He doesn't own a car; he doesn't own a house; he owns no real estate except a cemetery lot, and he has a burial insurance policy. He has accumulated a life savings of $5,000 but owes his attorney an unknown fee for a trial which lasted 14 days. He has never been arrested in 29 years — not even for a traffic offense. His one failure as a resident and citizen in 29 years: he received one parking ticket. Feodor Fedorenko has been a hard-working and responsible American citizen.
This suit was instituted in August, 1977 while defendant was a resident in Miami Beach, pursuant to the requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) that suit be filed "in the district in which defendant resides." Defendant challenged venue on the grounds that his presence in Miami Beach, where he was then living, was only temporary and that his permanent residence was in Waterbury, Connecticut. The court denied defendant's motion to transfer, holding that venue properly lay in the Southern District of Florida.
Although the Government produced only minimal proof to justify denial of the motion, defendant admitted at trial that he was a resident of Miami Beach from August 1976 to September 1977 after suit was filed.
However, in an effort to alleviate defendant's claim of financial hardship in producing witnesses in Florida the court — through the gracious hospitality of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut — held a portion of the trial in Waterbury. Although the hearing in Connecticut was originally scheduled to follow presentation of the Government's case in Fort Lauderdale in April, the Government's case was postponed until late May and June because of a recent appearance by Florida defense counsel.
The court appointed itself a special master under Rule 53 F.R.C.P. for the purpose of holding a hearing and receiving evidence in Waterbury. The parties stipulated that the evidence be received without the necessity of filing the report and further that it could be considered as if it had been presented at trial.
Defendant's initial counsel, Brian Gildea of New Haven, was permitted to withdraw after Gregg Pomeroy of Fort Lauderdale filed his appearance. However, Mr. Gildea assisted at the hearing in Connecticut.
A second problem developed prior to trial with regard to the Government's obtaining testimony of foreign witnesses. Early in November 1977, the court learned of the Government's intention to take depositions out of the country. Because it was concerned that the Government might intend to produce only deposition testimony of foreign witnesses, the court sua sponte entered an order prohibiting the use of deposition testimony at trial in order to enable the court to observe the witnesses' faces, body language and reactions in the courtroom, particularly in the presence of defendant and also his reactions to their testimony. The court felt that in-court testimony would be particularly critical in view of possible identification problems and the passage of 35 years since the events complained of at Treblinka. In addition, depositions taken by the Government in Israel almost surely would not have provided cross-examination. In compliance with the court's order the Government was compelled to bring its witnesses from Israel to Fort Lauderdale.
The court in its order suggested that if the Justice Department wished to bear the expense of defendant and his counsel, and the court's as well, to hear testimony of the Israeli witnesses at some neutral site such as Athens or Istanbul, the court would be willing to do so as a Special Master. The Justice Department declined but the court has since been informed by Government counsel at the pretrial conference that it would have been more economical for them to have done so inasmuch as they brought ten witnesses from Israel for the purposes of trial and most insisted on bringing their spouses as a condition of testifying.
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) provides that for good cause shown the United States Attorney shall institute proceedings to set aside an order admitting a person to citizenship and cancel the certificate of naturalization on the grounds that such order and certificate were "illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation".
Count 4 alleges that defendant wilfully failed to disclose the commission of crimes at Treblinka in response to question # 6 on his Application to File Petition for Naturalization (Form N-400).
Thus, the burden of proof in denaturalization cases has been clearly stated by the Supreme Court in Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 663, 78 S.Ct. 955, 957, 2 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1958), as follows:
Where citizenship is at stake the Government carries the heavy burden of proving its case by "'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence which does not leave `the issue in doubt' * * *." Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1352, 87 L.Ed. 1796. "Especially is this so when the attack is made long after the time when the certificate of citizenship was granted and the citizen has meanwhile met his obligations and has committed no act of lawlessness." Id., 320 U.S. at pages 122-123, 63 S.Ct. at page 1335.
[Denaturalization cases] are extremely serious problems. They involve not only fundamental principles of our political system designed for the protection of minorities and majorities alike. They also involve tremendously high stakes for the individual. For denaturalization, like deportation, may result in the loss "of all that makes life worth living." (citation omitted) Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 659, 66 S.Ct. 1304, 1307, 90 L.Ed. 1500 (1947).
In the opinion of the department, as a general rule, a good cause is not shown for the institution of proceedings to cancel certificates of naturalization alleged to have been fraudulently or illegally procured unless some substantial results are to be achieved thereby in the way of betterment of the citizenship of the country.
The statement of policy continues, as follows:
The legislation referred to, being retroactive, 21 is construed to be remedial rather than penal in its nature; for the protection of the body politic rather than for the punishment of the individuals concerned. Ordinarily, nothing less than the betterment of the citizenship of the country should be regarded as sufficient to justify the disturbance of personal and property rights which cancellation proceedings may occasion. This does not mean that such proceedings should not be instituted in any case where willful and deliberate fraud appears, as the perpetration of such fraud would indicate lack of the moral qualifications necessary for citizenship. If, however, many years have elapsed since the judgment of naturalization was apparently so procured, and the party has since conducted himself as a good citizen and possesses the necessary qualifications for citizenship, cancellation proceedings should not, as a rule, be instituted." Dept. of Justice Circular Letter No. 107 (Sept. 20, 1909), reprinted in Immigration and Naturalization Service Handbook at 6508, 08.1.
The court cannot help but question the application of this policy towards defendant in view of his 29 years of lawful conduct — except for one parking ticket — and hard work here in America.
The court observed at the trial and iterates it here: never in six years on the bench has the court seen the Government indulge in such expenses as daily copy of the reporter's transcript of testimony or having four lawyers at the Government's counsel table. Such expenditures of the taxpayers' treasure and talent have not occurred in this court's previous cases such as the prosecution of an alleged Mafia don, a continuing criminal enterprise case, the only dangerous special offender indictment in this district for the reputed salaried slayer for a narcotics importation gang which was responsible for at least 26 murders in the South Florida area according to the testimony in the District Court in Miami, as well as many other serious prosecutions.
In addition, the Government, which bears the expense of translators, hired two Russian translators for defendant's testimony. The extra one sat behind Government counsel's table — another first.
Clearly the expenditure of the resources of the Executive Branch lies within the discretion of that branch of the Government. However, the court must venture that in view of the similarity in the burden of proof between criminal cases and denaturalization cases, and in view of what is at stake for the naturalized American citizen, the defendant in a denaturalization case ought to have the same resources that are provided a defendant in a criminal case under the Criminal Justice Act; in short the naturalized citizen — provided the defendant's financial condition warrants it — should receive the benefit of court-appointed counsel and other experts at the Government's expense.
As an example of some of the emotional intensity surrounding the trial, the Jewish Defense League ran ads in newspapers offering chartered buses from Miami Beach to Fort Lauderdale on opening day. A demonstration outside the courtroom ensued with a chant: "Who do we want? Fedorenko. How do we want him? Dead." After the court was interrupted twice and the first three warnings were ignored by the demonstrators, a leader who was using an amplified bullhorn was arrested. A counter-demonstrator appeared two days later with an ensuing confrontation. If the trial had been brought into South Florida homes by television, the incidence of such confrontations likely would have inereased.
Fortunately, the U.S. Marshal Service and the Fort Lauderdale Police Department had performed at their usual outstanding level of competence in maintaining courtroom decorum and order in the environs around the court facility. The deputy marshals even apprehended one news reporter going through the judge's wastebasket under the bench.
EVIDENCE AS TO DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT, 1941-1949 PRE-TREBLINKA
The only evidence as to defendant's activities before Treblinka was given by defendant plus some opinions voiced by Government's expert Jenkins.
The Germans transported several truckloads of prisoners to Zytomir, a former Soviet training camp, and defendant described the conditions as very bad and with little water or food; the camp housed about 50,000 to 100,000 prisoners, with no barracks available for them. After two to three weeks he was then transferred to Rovno for about 10 days where there were fewer people than at Zytomir; the camp was surrounded by electrified barbed wire.
Defendant described the conditions at Chelm as so bad that if you became ill you rarely recovered. He also indicated that food was at a minimum and that approximately 40,000 prisoners of war died over the winter of 1941-1942. Defendant testified that he supplemented his food intake by eating grass and roots.
The court can take judicial notice from numerous news stories published during the trial that many spectators at the trial had been in various concentration camps or death camps in Europe or had lost relatives there, or both. Defendant's testimony on direct began shortly after lunch. During the lunch recess a memorial service for the dead at Treblinka was held in the park-like area immediately outside of the courtroom. (The United States courtroom in Fort Lauderdale is in temporary quarters and the splendid new facilities for the Fort Lauderdale court and Federal Building will not open until about three months hence). Judging from the spectators' reactions to the colloquy over translating problems at the beginning of defendant's testimony, the spectators were hardly receptive to defendant; but that was to be expected as he had been described over the period of two weeks by various witnesses as committing gross atrocities.
At Travnicki most of the guards were Volksdeutschers (ethnic Germans who resided outside Germany in the areas occupied by the German Army). Defendant is not a Volksdeutscher but Ukrainian. He was doing carpentry work at Travnicki and testified he had to work or he might be executed. He received several beatings from the guards. Just as defendant was a hard-worker in America, he clearly did not shirk work responsibility at Travnicki — undoubtedly why the Germans selected him. He indicated that sometimes a loaf of bread was given for working.
In the spring of 1942 defendant was sent to Lublin where at first the prisoners guarded their own camp and then were sent to the Jewish ghetto; again the Germans did not ask for volunteers but demanded them to go. At Lublin the Soviet prisoners guarded houses, furniture — whatever was left; they were issued rifles which were not fired. The Soviet prisoners were converted from workers to guards at Lublin.
The Government called six survivors at Treblinka, four of whom served as working prisoners at Camp 1 and two in what was described as Camp 2 (where the gas chambers were located.) Each of the Government witnesses testified as to general or specific instances of murder or brutality on the part of defendant.
Inasmuch as the actual operation of Treblinka is not an issue, it will be described in footnote form to assist in evaluating evidence of what defendant actually did there. Because of the nature of the Government's charge and also the nature of Fedorenko's defense, evidence was presented in clinical and gruesome details about the operation of the death camp known as Treblinka. The testimony was so gruesome that on more than one occasion the court doubted it would be possible to continue taking evidence until the usual recess time. Early recesses were required for the witnesses on several occasions.
Treblinka was a human abattoir. It contained only living facilities for the SS and the persons working there. The thousands who arrived daily on the trains had no need for barracks or mess halls: they would be dead before nightfall. It was operated with a barbarous methodology — brutally efficient — and such camps surely fill one of the darkest chapters in the annals of human existence, certainly the darkest in that which we call Western civilization. The camp at Treblinka was described repeatedly by witnesses with details to shock any listener. The camp was garrisoned by approximately 30 members of the SS and 150 Soviet, mostly Ukrainian, guards. Also in the camp were approximately 700 Jewish prisoners, mostly men, who performed various tasks.
The female prisoners were herded into a barracks where they were ordered to disrobe; they then filed into a barber shop set up at the end of the barracks where 20 men served as barbers. Each barber had about one minute to cut as much hair as possible from the head of each woman. Apparently the hair was used for various products as well as being steam cleaned in an effort to find if any valuables were hidden there. From the barber shop the women were herded out onto the path and both men and women made to run to Camp 2 where the gas chambers were located, referred to as "baths". As final sardonic actions, the path to Camp 2 was termed by the SS "Himmelweg" — the road to heaven. And on the gas chambers in Camp 2 was painted the Star of David.
Treblinka — bleaker than Bruegel's Triumph of Death. The death toll? One million victims, according to one witness.
The second witness, Schalom Kohn, testified that defendant beat him with his whip on two occasions and he saw defendant beat other Jewish prisoners at the arrival of the transport. He also testified he saw defendant beating prisoners at the lazaret.
Defendant's testimony was basically a denial of all charges. He contended he was a wachmann — a sentry or guard — not a noncommissioned officer. He testified that he was never in the barracks with the women undressed; he was only at the arrival of the transport on one or two occasions and did not know what was going on at the camp.
At least the latter is not credible to this court, neither in content nor from the manner in which the testimony was given. Defendant was far from convincing in his manner of speaking and appearance when he testified about unawareness of what was going on at Treblinka. (That testimony was in distinct contrast to his usual earnest testimony where he often volunteered extra items in his answers.) He testified he patrolled the fence as a guard and served in the tower. He testified he only served as a sentry outside of Camp 2 one day and saw what was going on, and reported to his zugwachmann — whom he identified as Rohoza — that he couldn't eat or sleep and didn't want to go back to that post again. He denied participating at all in Camp 2 or ever being near the gas chambers.
The phrase most constantly used throughout the trial was zugwachmann. The survivors were all convinced and all testified that zugwachmaenner were leaders among the Ukrainian or Soviet guards and that defendant was one. The word does not translate easily and despite the request of the court for any source of material providing a translation, none was offered. The survivor witnesses claimed that defendant was a zugwachmann because he had one or two stripes on his shoulder. Defendant explained the stripes away as being good conduct awards because he didn't walk around dirty or get drunk.
Apparently, Zugwachmann is the leader of a group of guards or sentries and the group is the size of a squad (could be as large as one-third of a company). See Heath's German Dictionary.
The Government offered no expert testimony on the rank-structure and testimony of their expert witness, Mr. Kempton Jenkins, didn't quite touch on the subject. His testimony about the camps was consistently inaccurate.
For example, see text at pages 912-913.
Defendant's description of who was a zugwachmann at least fits a logical pattern. He characterized zugwachmaenner as being Volksdeutschers because the Volksdeutschers', who were of ethnic German background, ability to speak both German and Russian or Ukrainian enabled the SS to use the Volksdeutschers as zugwachmaenner to transmit orders. From the evidence the chain of command in a descending order went as follows: SS (Schutzstaffeln); Volksdeutschers as zugwachmaenner; Soviet, basically Ukrainian, guards; working prisoners with a Nazi-imposed hierarchy of a head kapo, kapos, vorarbeiters (foremen), and regular working prisoners. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Fedorenko is a Volksdeutscher and there is nothing in the record from his background or education to raise the slightest suspicion that he could have learned more than a few words of German.
The court considered the possibility that defendant's mother was an ethnic German. The first (Christian) name, Anna, is not an infrequent one both among German and Russian names. Defendant consistently listed his mother's maiden name as Hubar. The court's very limited familiarity with the German language doesn't cause any suspicion that the surname, Hubar, is a German name. However, on defendant's application for citizenship her name is spelled H-u-b-e-r; that spelling is in red ink and those notations were added by the Immigration and Naturalization Inspector Zimon. Notice can be taken of library resources which indicate that the name is a Ukrainian rather than German name; for example, O. Hubar has been cataloged by the Library of Congress as the author of a work on Ukrainian literature.
Even if defendant's mother were an ethnic German, there is nothing to indicate that his father was an ethnic German. It seems highly doubtful — and speculative at most — to assume the German language was spoken in the Fedorenko home, at least before the father's death. Far more importantly, the evidence overwhelmingly rebuts any such speculation.
Fedorenko's testimony that only Volksdeutschers qualified as zugwachmaenner is supported by the berthing and messing arrangements at Treblinka. The SS didn't let the Volksdeutschers sleep or eat in the same barracks with them. Instead, the Volksdeutschers were permitted to sleep in a separate barracks — apparently giving them some privileges because of their German background — but were required to eat with the Soviet prisoner-guards, facilitating supervision of the guards by the zugwachmaenner.
The subject of pretrial and in-court identification and their reliability have received thorough attention by the courts in criminal cases. This attention has been focused on the dangers that pretrial identification may taint or make unreliable subsequent incourt identification. Thus to preserve the integrity and fairness of pretrial identification procedures, courts have imposed on their use certain requirements of due process. See, e. g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969).
The problems inherent in the use of photo spreads as a pretrial identification procedure were pointed out in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). In the usual case, where a witness has not had an opportunity to get a good look at a criminal under favorable conditions, there is a danger of misidentification of a photograph, even under the best of circumstances. This danger is greatly increased when the photograph is placed in a photo spread in such a manner that the witnesses' attention is drawn to it because of its size, color, placement or other distinguishing mark. Thus while the Court recognized that use of photo spreads was necessary in police work, it held that a conviction based on an in-court identification following a pretrial identification would not stand if the photo spread was so unduly suggestive as to foster "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 390 U.S. at 384, 88 S.Ct. at 971. Cases following Simmons have therefore followed a two-step formula in determining the admissibility of an in-court identification based on an out-of-court photo spread: ". . . (1) whether the procedures followed were `impermissibly suggestive', and then (2) whether, being so, they created `a substantial risk of misidentification'". United States v. Henderson, 489 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1973).
With a time interval of 35 years, rather than days or a few weeks as in the typical criminal case, the threshold of what suggestibility becomes impermissible must necessarily be lowered. The court cannot find a decision considering the question with a time lag of many years' duration. The Supreme Court did observe in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) that a lapse of seven months between the event and the confrontation ". . . would be a seriously negative factor in most cases." Id. at 201, 93 S.Ct. at 383. In the instant case where there is a gap of almost 35 years between the event and the witnesses' ability to observe the suggestive photo spreads, the photo spread should have been as clinically impartial as humanly possible to construct.
Only two of the photographs of the photo spread are claimed by Ms. Radwiker to be guards who were at Treblinka — # 16 and # 17. Page 3, which was shown by itself to several of the witnesses, contains 8 photographs, numbers 10 thru 17. Not only is each of the first six smaller than either # 16 or # 17 but each is also blurred, shadowed or otherwise indistinct. By contrast, photographs # 16 and # 17 are both much larger than the other photographs and are the only clear ones. Not only is defendant's photograph larger than the others but it is also unnecessarily so: along each side is a superfluous black border approximately one-half inch in width. At the very minimum, it should have been trimmed to reduce the size of the picture.
All six of these witnesses escaped from Treblinka during the uprising on August 2, 1943. Several of the witnesses had trouble identifying defendant's photograph in the sense that it took one to five minutes to do o. For example, Boraks took one to two minutes to identify photograph # 17 although he had looked at the same photo spread in an interview earlier that same day where the investigators were investigating # 16; witness Epstein looked at the picture four to five minutes after a three-hour interview and identified the person as a zugwachmann but couldn't remember his name. Turowski testified that he immediately recognized the person in picture # 16 (not Fedorenko). Ms. Radwiker indicated to him that # 17 was Fedorenko and asked if he recognized Fedorenko; Turowski testified that after awhile he came to the conclusion he recognized him.
Turowski, the first-survivor witness, was asked to identify defendant in the court-room on direct examination. He stood up in the witness stand and looked around the courtroom for forty seconds. Then Government counsel asked if the witness could come down from the witness stand to make an identification, if possible. The witness stepped down from the stand and took only one minute to make an identification of a middle-aged spectator sitting in the last row of the courtroom. Apparently sensing from the crowd reaction he had blundered, the witness backed away from the gentleman he had identified, then moved around the courtroom and in exactly another minute identified defendant.
Turowski and each of the six survivors at Treblinka also testified at a trial in Dusseldorf in 1965 against 11 SS personnel. Most also testified in Dusseldorf in 1970 against Stangl, the Commandant at Treblinka. The court noted that, according to the news article carried in the Miami Herald, May 31, 1978, describing Turowski's error, at the Dusseldorf proceedings the German court would locate defendants among the spectators in order to test the identification ability of the witnesses.
The second witness Kohn never once looked at the spectators' section when asked to identify defendant in the courtroom. At this point the court became quite suspicious that Federal Evidence Rule 615 excluding witnesses, invoked by defendant at the beginning of the trial, was being violated. The court had given the instruction that witnesses were not to discuss the case among themselves. Kohn scanned only the counsel tables and easily identified defendant — not exactly a difficult task in view of defendant's age being twice that of any of the other seven persons at the counsel tables.
In addition to the grave identification deficiencies of the Government's case, there are many other grave flaws in the identification testimony of the Government's witnesses as well as the credibility problems. Perhaps it is understandable that there are flaws in identification evidence after 35 years. That is part of the difficulty the Government faced in trying to meet its burden of proof. Among the more obvious identification flaws: Turowski described defendant as "slightly Chinese-looking". However, defendant Fedorenko simply does not look Oriental. He doesn't now and he didn't in the picture attached to his visa application.
Czarny also emphatically identified defendant's exhibit # 3 as Fedorenko and announced he could never make a mistake. Of course the photograph was not of Fedorenko. Boraks identified Fedorenko as being the only Soviet guard who wore black, completely contrary to the testimony of all the other witnesses about the uniforms worn by the Soviet guards. Witness Lewkowicz quickly looked away after the only incident when she described the atrocity allegedly committed by Fedorenko.
Czarny exhibited a number of other credibility flaws. He would become more theatrical when he was aware the court was watching him closely. His facial expressions became more dramatic especially during his courtroom identification of defendant and his testimony after lunch on re-direct about his previous misidentification of exhibit # 3 as being Fedorenko. Further, the witness clearly understood a number of questions in English but specifically denied any knowledge of understanding the English language, even to the court. This despite answering questions on more than one occasion without the benefit of a translator. One of those questions contained more than ten words. Witness Epstein also obviously understood English but denied it (also to the court) although his knowledge may not have been as extensive as Czarny's.
Fedorenko's cross-examination perhaps supplied the missing piece in the puzzle when the Government's counsel persisted in asking defendant to describe his zugwachmann Rohoza. Fedorenko testified that Rohoza was "just like me" in height and his hair color was "just like mine." The persistent questioning about Rohoza's appearance elicited this response: ". . . like my face, almost like my brother." And to a further question, that the resemblance between the two was such they looked like brothers. The court watched Fedorenko even more closely than usual when that line of questioning began and the court is firmly convinced that the answers were given guilelessly. From observation of his testimony and demeanor the court concludes defendant is unsophisticated — and perhaps feeling some effects of being in his eighth decade (e. g., see p. 1419 of transcript). The court doubts defendant is aware at this time of the exculpatory nature of the answers.
At the close of cross-examination the court asked questions of defendant for 50 minutes. Although defendant denied committing the atrocities during direct-examination, the court wanted the key answer from defendant face-to-face without the necessity of any translation. Confident that its location in the questioning would not favor or disfavor defendant and confident that defendant understood the question completely, the court instructed the translator to ask the question whether defendant had done any of the shooting and beating of prisoners as testified to in the courtroom and instructed defendant to "Please look at me, tell me either nyet or da, did you?"
Defendant has been back to the Soviet Union three times in the 1970's: once in 1972 "as a tourist"; again in 1973 for approximately three months and in 1975 for a period of 50 weeks. In late September or early October of 1973, several weeks before his departure from the Soviet Union in November, defendant asserts the Soviet Union investigated him at some length concerning his status in World War II and activities at Treblinka. A Russian Colonel asked questions of him on three different days, for a period of six hours on one occasion. The only other witness he saw was a witness named Kuzmienko who was only interrogated for five or ten minutes. He said the Russians came for him in a car and took him to the city of Siemferopol in the Crimea. He claimed that the Russian investigation cleared him of any wrongdoing and that they had taken statements of the six persons, Nikolai Korotkey, Wasyl Wasylenko, Michael Dudnik, Petro Schelno, Ivan Schevchenko and Nikolai Rohoza, whose testimony he wanted to obtain for this trial. Defendant sought a continuance in order to obtain the testimony or evidence of these six persons, five of them guards at Treblinka as well as Rohoza, defendant's zugwachmann. The court urged both sides to begin immediately to obtain more information about the potential witnesses and the procedures available and necessary to obtain the evidence from them.
The court suggested that the most preferable means would be by an evidentiary hearing with the court sitting as a special master although that apparently is precluded at this point by the resolution of the Judicial Conference. Of course, this cannot be done without the approval of the Soviet Government; however, the Soviet Government has given permission for a West German court to conduct hearings in the Soviet Union of Soviet witnesses in connection with a West German trial of various defendants for alleged atrocities at Majdanek, Poland. See Miami Herald, May 28, 1978.
At a post-recess hearing one evening after two weeks of trial and the Government not having rested its case, the court commented during colloquy on scheduling and the motion for continuance that it felt it was necessary in the interests of fair trial to give defendant an opportunity to present the testimony of these witnesses to corroborate his denial or claim of involuntariness. The court emphasized that it might be able to decide the case without the continuance but also recognized that, because of the uncertainty about obtaining testimony from the Russian witnesses, it might take years to obtain the testimony and decide the case.
The court felt an announcement had to be made to counsel in order to obtain maximum haste on their part in getting the testimony or whatever evidence could be obtained from the Russian witnesses.
In 1945 the prisoners of the British were required to register and defendant listed his birthplace as Sarny, Poland because every Russian citizen had to return to the Soviet Union. He selected the town of Sarny because some friends suggested it. Defendant used his correct name and birth date on the registration, visa applications and relevant documents for naturalization.
Defendant feared repatriation as did the other Soviet citizens at the camp. One witness testified that thousands committed suicide rather than be repatriated to the Soviet Union.
Defendant requested a continuance in the third week of trial in order to produce a witness who could testify that many Ukrainians committed suicide, including death by immolation, rather than suffer repatriation. The court rejected the motion for continuance on the basis the evidence would be merely cumulative.
While residing at the displaced persons camp at Osdorf near Hamburg, defendant applied for an immigration visa giving his correct name and date of birth, listing his place of birth as Sarny, Poland. In his history, considered by the Displaced Persons Commission, the same information was given together with some additional information: that he was a member of the Greek Orthodox faith and received his education at Sarny consisting of elementary school from 1915 to 1918. In addition he contended he was a farmer at Sarny until March 1942 when he was deported to Germany and employed as a worker at Poelitz. A typist who evidently spoke English but not German mistakenly typed Pelez rather than Poelitz in both places it appears on the Displaced Persons Commission report. Clearly a German location could not be spelled Pelez and the court must presume that the case analyst and reviewing persons on the Displaced Persons Commission and, more importantly, the reviewing Vice-Consul knew Poelitz was the location, particularly because it was identified as being "near Stettin." Jenkins testified vice-consuls received several months of German language training.
Poelitz is spelled with an umlaut in German, viz., Pölitz. It is located slightly less than 10 miles (15 kilometers) north of the center of Stettin, per National Geographic Society map of Germany (1944). Inasmuch as Poelitz and Stettin have been situated in Poland since World War II, it is difficult to locate Poelitz by the German spelling in most atlases. However, see p. 50 of Rand McNally's International Atlas (1969) which lists both German and Polish spellings. The name is spelled incorrectly in the transcript.
On November 21, 1950 defendant filed a Declaration of Intention listing his birthplace as Sivash in the Ukraine. The same information is provided in his Declaration of Intention filed April 7, 1951.
Any Vice-Consul had a number of materials presented to him by an applicant for a visa. At that point the applicant had been interviewed by a voluntary sponsoring group (in defendant's case the Tolstoy Foundation) and by the Displaced Persons Commission. The Vice-Consul had a report from the Displaced Persons Commission as well as one from the Army CIC (Counter-Intelligence Corps) which checked any service record with the Axis forces. In addition, a report on conduct from the local German police was furnished together with any report from the Berlin Depository Center which contained a depository of Nazi party documents.
Jenkins also would have considered the kapos as excludable because they assisted the Germans. This is totally contrary to the reaction of every witness who survived Treblinka; each of the Israeli witnesses testified the kapos did only what they had to do and the witnesses were quite indignant when asked if they had ever testified against the kapos. The witnesses replied that there was no reason to do so. In addition, Jenkins speculated that the kapos were probably shot in 1945 during a period of retaliation, but the testimony was to the contrary.
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United Nations; or (b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
It has troubled the court that the word "voluntarily" appears in connection with service with the Axis military forces but is deleted from the phrase in section 2(a). The concern arises because the traditional principles of statutory construction would hold that the deletion of the word "voluntarily" in one subsection while its inclusion in another compels the conclusion that any assistance, whether voluntary or involuntary, in connection with concentration camp treatment of civilian population would be sufficient to bar that person from being entitled to relief under the Displaced Persons Act. The difficulty with that construction is that it would bar every Jewish prisoner who survived Treblinka because each one of them assisted the SS in the operation of the camp. Each did so involuntarily and under the utmost duress. For example, working prisoners led arriving prisoners to the lazaret to be executed; or wore armbands as part of the ruse at the lazaret; or cut the hair of the females to be executed; others played in the orchestra at the gate as part of that ruse, etc. Technically, this is assistance. It is also absurd to deem their conduct as "assistance or acquiescence" inasmuch as it was involuntary — even though the word "voluntarily" was omitted from the definition.
The Government listed witnesses who were Treblinka survivors and now reside in America, presumably as U.S. citizens. To interpret "assistance or acquiescence" without requiring it to be done "voluntarily" could imperil their status.
Fedorenko had rights that the typical prisoner of war does not have, for example: carrying a rifle and a pistol, being able to go on liberty for four hours and even being given some small stipend from the Germans. On the other hand, he clearly did not have the right to walk out of the gate, go to a city of his choice, or catch a train to his home or wherever else he wanted to go. Although not a typical prisoner of war, he was clearly not one of the captors. He was in some limbo state of having privileges not usually conferred on a prisoner of war but still in a position where disobedience of any consequence or an attempt to escape would certainly result in death.
At the time of the uprising on August 2, 1943 defendant and the other prisoner-guards near him fired under orders from the Commandant. However, defendant did not fire at any of the prisoners and the court doubts that he did anything other than shoot over their heads.
When asked on cross-examination why he didn't shoot the commandant, he replied: "If you shoot the commandant, it is like shooting yourself."
There is no dispute that defendant lied when he gave his birthplace as Sarny, Poland and stated he worked in a factory in Poelitz, Germany. This misrepresentation would have been cause to deny defendant's application for citizenship. Berenyi v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 630, 87 S.Ct. 666, 17 L.Ed.2d 656 (1967), In Re Petition of Haniatakis, 376 F.2d 728 (3rd Cir. 1967). However, in a denaturalization proceeding a different standard obtains. Despite the fact that the immigration laws prohibit giving of false answers and that therefore any misrepresentation is "illegal", once citizenship has been confirmed it may be taken away only if it can be clearly and convincingly shown that the misrepresentation was "material" Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 81 S.Ct. 147, 5 L.Ed.2d 120 (1960). Although Chaunt considered only the question of obtaining citizenship through "willful misrepresentation of a material fact", the court finds that the standard must be the same where the charge is "illegal procurement" by virtue of a false statement. See In Re: Field's Petition, 159 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
The Act of May 22, 1918, as amended 40 Stat. 559,§ 1(c) as in effect in 1949 prohibited the giving of any false statement in an application for permission to enter the United States. A similar provision in the current law may be found in Title 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
In Chaunt the Supreme Court held that proof of materiality requires clear and convincing proof that either (1) facts were suppressed "which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship" or (2) that their disclosure "might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship" 364 U.S. at 355, 81 S.Ct. at 151.
In the instant case the true facts regarding defendant's birthplace and nationality would not of themselves have justified denial of citizenship, for Ukrainians per se were not excluded under the Displaced Persons Act.
Displaced persons under the Act included any person who as a result of the actions of the authorities of Nazi or Fascist regimes, has been deported from or has been obliged to leave his country of nationality or of habitual residence. This definition would include Ukrainians who were forced from their homeland during the German invasion of the U.S.S.R.
Neither can the court conclude that the disclosure of these facts might have been useful in an investigation leading to the discovery of other facts possibly warranting denial of a citizenship. In fact, the truth regarding defendant's nationality and birthplace were revealed to the Government when defendant filed his Declaration of Intention in 1950 and again in 1951. Mr. Zimon, who interviewed defendant pursuant to his application for citizenship, testified that the disclosure of the previous false statement was not a cause for concern or further inquiry because it was a well known fact that many Ukrainians entering the country at that time had concealed their true nationality in order to avoid repatriation to the U.S.S.R. Further, Mr. Jenkins admitted defendant's being a Ukrainian was obvious from his name and religion.
Accord, and almost on all fours except it is an application rather than a denaturalization case: In Re Iwanenko's Petition, 145 F. Supp. 838 (N.D.Ill. 1956). Iwanenko came to U.S. in 1950 after defendant's arrival and the case describes the fear of repatriation in detail. Jenkins claimed there was no repatriation as late as 1949 and no reason to fear it. However, the Iwanenko opinion described how rumors were still circulating among Russian nationals. Of course, defendant listed Sarny, Poland as his birthplace in 1945 when repatriation was unquestionably a peril and he was consistent in his 1949 application.
The language in Chaunt is ambiguous. The word "possibly" in the phrase "possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship" could be read to modify the entire phrase, thus supporting the Government's interpretation that existence of facts warranting denial of citizenship need only be a possibility. However, if this were the intent of the Court, it would have been clearer to state "facts which might warrant denial." On the other hand, it appears that the proper grammatical interpretation is that "possibly" modifies only the first part of the phrase, meaning that the existence of facts justifying denial is presupposed, and the only question is whether the suppressed facts would have provided a link to their discovery.
What happened in the intervening time? Was no inquiry made into the German records about Fedorenko being in whatever units were at Poelitz? Unlikely — Jenkins testified such information would have triggered an inquiry. Did the inquiry show his status there? If so, did the Vice-Consul apply the test that Jenkins had described, resolving the doubts to the benefit of the applicants? After all, doubts were resolved in favor of members of General Vlasov's army and their applications were approved. We can't be sure because the Government did not produce the Vice-Consul to testify. Not only were the doubts often resolved in favor of applicants under the Displaced Persons Act, but the Supreme Court instructs the United States Courts to resolve the law "as far as is reasonably possible" in favor of the naturalized citizen. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122, 63 S.Ct. at 1335. Therefore this court must resolve the doubt in favor of defendant as to Counts 1, 2 and 3. This court specifically holds that petitioner lawfully entered the United States.
Count 4 of the complaint charges defendant with giving a false answer to question # 6 on the application form for citizenship (form N-400). That question asks "Have you ever committed any crime, whether or not you were arrested? Inasmuch as the court has determined that the Government has failed to prove defendant's commission of any crimes, it cannot be said that defendant's answer was not truthful. Therefore the Government has failed to meet its burden as to Count 4.
The Government contends that defendant willfully failed to reveal his status as an armed guard for the Germans in response to the question.
The complaint originally charged defendant with being a member of the German Army. It was amended at the pretrial conference.
It is clear that defendant served only in the Russian Army until his capture in 1941. Defendant has maintained that he was a prisoner of war until his surrender to the British. It is clear that he was transported from place to place and was obliged to obey orders under penalty of death and was not free to do whatever he chose. In view of the evidence the court concludes that there would be strong reason in defendant's mind to view himself as a prisoner of war; it therefore cannot be said that his omission was willful. United States v. Tooma, 187 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.Mich. 1960), United States v. Profaci, 274 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1960). Even if defendant clearly understood the question and willfully concealed the truth, the court must necessarily hold in accordance with the previous findings that the false answer was not proved to be material.
Good moral character is a difficult term to define. As the Supreme Court has stated, "the term, by itself is unusually ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitude, experience and prejudices of the definer". Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 263, 77 S.Ct. 722, 728, 1 L.Ed.2d 810 (1957). Thus it has been consistently held that to meet the requirements for citizenship a petitioner's character must measure up to that of the average citizen in the community in which he resides. Brukiewicz v. Savoretti, 211 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1954). Although the immigration laws require proof of good moral character only for the five years preceding naturalization conduct outside the statutory period is relevant and should be considered.
§ 316(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).
§ 316(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) provides that the court may take into consideration as a basis for its determination the petitioner's conduct and acts at any time prior to that period.
THE EQUITIES INVOLVED — AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR THE HOLDING
The authority of the Government to take away citizenship fraudulently or illegally procured has repeatedly withstood constitutional challenge. See Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1912); Schneiderman v. United States, supra; Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 34 S.Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101 (1913). Moreover, this right is ordinarily not subject to defenses of laches, Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961), estoppel, United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 S.Ct. 118, 62 L.Ed. 321 (1917) or res judicata, Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1912). Of course, this does not mean that the Government's power to bring suit is not subject to any limitations. The grant of citizenship confers on the individual all the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution, and the Government may not revoke that grant on the grounds that are arbitrary, punitive or discriminatory. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 84 S.Ct. 1187, 12 L.Ed.2d 218 (1964); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 91 S.Ct. 1060, 28 L.Ed.2d 499 (1971).
The Supreme Court has held on several occasions that a certificate of citizenship shall be cancelled unless there has been strict compliance with the conditions imposed by Congress as prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship. See Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17, 49 S.Ct. 15, 73 L.Ed. 156 (1928); United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 S.Ct. 118, 62 L.Ed. 321 (1917); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 S.Ct. 422, 61 L.Ed. 853 (1917).
Early in this century Congressional concerns in the area of immigration law focused on the economic and social problems created by an influx of immigrants. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906 instituted major procedural reforms in the administration of the laws in an effort to curb the widespread abuses occurring at that time. Thus many of the early denaturalization cases reflect the judicial concern for strict compliance with procedural requirements.
For a detailed outline of the history of the immigration laws see the Legislative History of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952; reported at [1952] U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News, pp. 1653-1674; pp. 1674-1682.
See Gordon Rosenfeld, Immigration Law Procedure § 20.1, 20-10 thru 20-11 (1975).
See, e. g., U.S. v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 S.Ct. 422, 61 L.Ed. 853 (1917); U.S. v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 S.Ct. 118, 62 L.Ed. 321 (1917); Johannessen v. U.S., 225 U.S. 227, 32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1912).
During the war and post-war era of the 40's and 50's the cases take on a different posture, as the Supreme Court was faced with denaturalization suits in which the charge of illegality almost invariably was the claim that defendant was not "attached to the principles of the Constitution."
See, e. g., Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943), Baumgartner v. U.S., 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944), Knauer v. U.S., 328 U.S. 654, 66 S.Ct. 1304, 90 L.Ed. 1500 (1946), Maisenberg v. U.S., 356 U.S. 670, 78 S.Ct. 960, 2 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1958), Nowak v. U.S., 356 U.S. 660, 78 S.Ct. 955, 2 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1958).
In this era the court was clearly concerned that citizenship not be revoked solely on the basis of one's political or ideological beliefs. Consequently the court began to exercise a virtually de novo right of review of lower court findings.
See Baumgartner v. U.S., 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944).
Perhaps the most striking illustration of the scope of Supreme Court review is found in Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 78 S.Ct. 955, 2 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1957) where the court virtually dismissed the testimony of the witnesses and the findings of two lower courts. This case presents a startling contrast to the standards used in considering petitions for naturalization where the burden is on the petitioner. See, e. g., Berenyi, supra.
In the late 50's and early 60's courts were faced with another category of cases as the Government began a program of seeking deportation of known or suspected underworld undesirables.
See Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 75 S.Ct. 746, 99 L.Ed. 1074 (1955). Among the cases which appear to be part of the Government's effort are U.S. v. Montalbano, 236 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 1956) affirmed sub nom. Genovese v. U.S., 352 U.S. 952, 77 S.Ct. 327, 1 L.Ed.2d 244 (1956); U.S. v. Anastasio, 226 F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1955); Corrado v. U.S., 227 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1955); U.S. v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1963).
Thus in Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) the Court found no reason to apply the equitable principles of laches in favor of defendant.
However, lower courts have exercised discretion in determining whether citizenship should be granted. For example in Petition of R., 56 F. Supp. 969 (D.Mass. 1944) the court considered whether citizenship should be denied petitioner on the grounds that she had committed the crime of adultery. Judge Wyzanski observed that with respect to the requirement of showing good moral character: "Congress seems to have invited the judges to concern themselves not only with the technicalities of the criminal law, but also with the norms of society and the way average men of good will act . . ." Id. at 971. The court went on to hold that under the circumstances the certificate of citizenship should be granted.
Similarly, in In Re Bespatow, 100 F. Supp. 44 (W.D.Pa. 1951) the court considered whether a conviction of manslaughter barred petitioner from citizenship. After examining the circumstances of the killing and considering petitioner's good behavior for 37 years, the court held that citizenship should be granted. Some courts have subsequently interpreted Section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) as a limitation on the court's discretion in determining good moral character.
Gutierrez-Sosa v. Del Guercio, 247 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1957); Petition for Naturalization of O___ N___, 233 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); In re C___ C___ J___ P___, 299 F. Supp. 767 (N.D.Ill. 1969).
It is clear that in defining the statutory criteria, the courts continue to exercise discretion in order "to ameliorate hardship and injustice which otherwise would result from a strict and technical application of the law." Wadman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 329 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1964). See e. g. In re Briedis, 238 F. Supp. 149 (N.D.Ill. 1965); In Re Edgar, 253 F. Supp. 951 (E.D.Mich. 1966); Flumerfelt v. United States, 230 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1956).
Additionally, in In re Iwanenko's Petition, 145 F. Supp. 838 (N.D.Ill. 1958), a case similar in many respects to the instant one and containing extensive facts outlining the fear of many Ukrainians about repatriation to the Soviet Union, the court did not stop with a technical analysis of whether petitioner's entry had been lawful under the Displaced Persons Act. Instead, the court went beyond technicalities to consider the humanitarian purposes of the law and concluded petitioner should not be excluded from citizenship.
From the evidence and observing defendant for nearly three weeks in trial, the court concludes defendant is an unsophisticated man with very little education who is not only willing but anxious to work. He also is a man who is not interested in "making waves" or causing trouble. Unquestionably the Germans spotted these qualities in him and selected him for training as a guard.
The court agrees with the assertion of defendant's counsel that Mr. Fedorenko wants to please and on cross-examination would finally give the answers he thought would please the questioner if the questions were slightly changed and the subject matter approached from a different angle. Consequently, the court tended to discount the later answer[s] given on a series of questions on the same subject on cross-examination. Despite the waiver of rights and the presence of an interpreter the court discounted the statement given the Immigration and Naturalization Service two years ago. With defendant's difficulty in communicating and his tendency to volunteer information that is harmful to his interest there was a pressing need for assistance of counsel.
If the court were convinced that the allegations charging defendant with atrocities at Treblinka were true, there is no doubt that defendant would not be entitled to citizenship in a country which prides itself on its adherence to principles of equality and human dignity, and whose citizenry largely comprises descendants of immigrants who sought refuge from political oppression. However, this court must decide this case on the record before it and the strict burden of proof has not been met.
Because the court has not found defendant committed the atrocities the Government claims he committed at Treblinka, it is not necessary for the court to confront the issue of whether sufficient duress was shown (or could be shown, in the eyes of the law) by defendant to excuse such conduct. If the court had found that the Government met its burden of proof in establishing that defendant committed the alleged atrocities at Treblinka, then it would have been necessary for the court to have granted a continuance in order for defendant to present testimony of the Russian witnesses he claimed could exonerate him.
The court recognizes that "[a]n alien has no moral nor constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship if, by false evidence or the like, an imposition has been practised upon the court, without which the certificate of citizenship could not and would not have been issued" Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 241, 32 S.Ct. 613, 617, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1911). Nevertheless, where defendant has been a responsible citizen and resident for twenty-nine years, and the record as to his conduct thirty-five years ago is inconclusive, the court finds that the equities should be weighed in favor of defendant. Neither is the equitable balance tipped against defendant by his answers in 1945 and 1949. He was a victim of Nazi aggression, fearful of repatriation, many years and many miles from a home he thought to be empty of his wife and children, and was longing for a chance in America.