Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/406/498/
Timestamp: 2013-12-19 04:43:16
Document Index: 235644699

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2201', '§ 323', '§ 323', '§ 1163', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 11', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 1163', '§ 4', '§ 2']

LAKE CARRIERS' ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. Ralph A. MacMULLAN et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews LAKE CARRIERS' ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. Ralph A. MacMULLAN et al.
406 U.S. 498 (92 S.Ct. 1749, 32 L.Ed.2d 257)
Argued: March 22 and 23, 1972.
[HTML] Although Michigan authorities indicated that they would not prosecute under Michigan Watercraft Pollution Control Act of 1970 until adequate land-based pump-out facilities were available to service vessels equipped with sewage storage devices, where the authorities had sought to obtain compliance as soon as possible, and, to avoid prosecution, owners and operators of Great Lakes bulk cargo vessels would be required to install sewage storage devices to retain sewage on board as soon as pump-out facilities were available, there was an "actual controversy" as to validity of Act, within Declaratory Judgment Act, that was ripe for decision and complaint challenging Act should not have been dismissed on theory that an advisory opinion was sought. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201; M.C.L.A. §§ 323.331 et seq., 323.333.
Michigan's Watercraft Pollution Control Act of 1970, appellees maintain, prohibits the discharge of sewage, whether treated or untreated, in Michigan waters and requires vessels with marine toilets to have sewage storage devices. Appellants, the Lake Carriers' Association and members owning or operating Great Lakes bulk cargo vessels, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the Act unduly burdens interstate and foreign commerce; contravenes uniform maritime law; violates due process and equal protection requirements; and is invalid under the Supremacy Clause primarily because of conflict with or pre-emption by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970. That law appears to contemplate sewage control after appropriate federal standards have been issued through on-board treatment before disposal in navigable waters, unless the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency provides on special application for a complete prohibition on discharge in designated areas. A three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of a justiciable controversy. The court also found 'compelling reasons to abstain from consideration of the matter in its present posture'the attitude of the Michigan authorities, who are not threatening criminal prosecution but are seeking industry cooperation; the availability of declaratory relief in the Michigan courts; the possibility of a complete prohibition on the discharge of sewage in Michigan's navigable waters under federal law; the absence of existing conflict between the Michigan requirements and other state laws; and the publication of proposed federal standards that Michigan might consider in interpreting and enforcing its law. Held:
(a) The absence of an immediate threat of prosecution is not a reason for abstention. In the absence of a pending state proceeding, exercise of federal court jurisdiction ordinarily is appropriate if the conditions for declaratory or injunctive relief are met. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), distinguished. Pp. 509510.
This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281, 2284, dismissing a complaint to have the Michigan Watercraft Pollution Control Act of 1970, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 323.331 et seq. (Supp.1971), declared invalid and its enforcement enjoined. 336 F.Supp. 248 (1971). We noted probable jurisdiction, 404 U.S. 982, 92 S.Ct. 450, 30 L.Ed.2d 366 (1971), and affirmed the District Court's determination to abstain from decision pending state court proceedings.
Appellantsthe Lake Carriers' Association and individual members who own or operate federally enrolled and licensed Great Lakes bulk cargo vesselschallenge the Michigan law on a variety of grounds. They urge that the Michigan law is beyond the State's police power law places an undue burden on interstate and foreign commerce, impermissibly interferes with uniform maritime law, denies them due process and equal protection of the laws, and is unconstitutionally vague. They also contend that the Michigan statute conflicts with or is pre-empted by federal law, primarily
is directed "(a)s soon as possible, after April 3, 1970, . . . (to) promulgate Federal standards of performance for marine sanitation devices . . . which shall be designed to prevent the discharge of untreated or inadequately treated sewage into or upon the navigable waters of the United States from new vessels and existing vessels, except vessels not equipped with installed toilet facilities." 84 Stat. 100, 33 U.S.C. 1163(b)(1).
are to become effective for new vessels two years after promulgation and for existing vessels five years after promulgation. 84 Stat. 101, 33 U.S.C. 1163(c)(1). Thereafter, "no State . . . shall adopt or enforce any statute or regulation . . . with respect to the design, manufacture, or installation or use of any marine sanitation device on any vessel subject to the provisions of this section." Id., § 1163(f). However, "(u)pon application by a State, and where the Secretary determines that any applicable water quality standards require such a prohibition, he shall by regulation completely prohibit the discharge from a vessel of any sewage (whether treated or not) into those waters of such State which are the subject of the application and to which such standards apply." Ibid. Thus, the federal law appears to contemplate sewage control through onboard treatment before disposal in navigable waters, unless the Administrator provides on special application for a complete prohibition on discharge in designated areas.
The District Court below did not reach the merits of appellants' complaint on the ground that "the lack of a justiciable controversy precludes entry of this Court into the matter." 336 F.Supp., at 253.
"An overview of the factual situation presented by the evidence in this case," said the District Court, "compels but one conclusion: that the plaintiffs here are seeking an advisory opinion. . . ." Ibid. The District Court also found "compelling reasons to abstain from consideration of the matter in its present posture," ibid.namely, "the attitude of Michigan authorities who seek the cooperation of the industry in the implementation of its program and have not instigated, nor does it appear, threatened criminal prosecutions," id., at 252;
and the publication of proposed federal standards that might be considered by Michigan in the interpretation and enforcement of its statute.
Appellants now urge that their complaint does present an "actual controversy" within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, that is ripe for decision. We agree. The test to be applied, of course, is the familiar one stated in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941): "Basically, the question in each case is whether . . . there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Compare, e.g., ibid., with, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969). Since, as appellees concede,
the Michigan requirements on the discharge of sewage will be preempted when the federal standards become effective, the gist of appellants' grievance is that, according to Michigan authorities, they are required under Michigan law to install sewage storage devices that (1) may become unnecessary once federal standards, authorizing discharge of treated sewage, become applicable or (3) may, in any event, conflict with other state regulations pending the promulgation and effective date of the federal standards. The immediacy and reality of appellants' concerns do not depend, contrary to what the District Court may have considered, on the probability that federal standards will authorize discharge of treated sewage in Michigan waters or that other States will implement sewage control requirements inconsistent with those of Michigan. They depend instead only on the present effectiveness in fact of the obligation under the Michigan statute to install sewage storage devices. For if appellants are now under such an obligation, that in and of itself makes their attack on the validity of the law a live controversy, and not an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945) (existing burden on interstate commerce justiciable controversy in absence of federal pre-emption or other conflicting state laws).
"Q. But you're insisting that the carriers get ready to comply and
"Q.because if you wait until pump-out stations are ready to begin (servicing) tanks, then there will be another great delay?
In this circumstance, compliance is coerced by the threat of enforcement, and the controversy is both immediate and real. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); City of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr, 255 F.Supp. 828, aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35, 87 S.Ct. 240, 17 L.Ed.2d 34 (1966). See generally, e.g., Comment, 62 Col.L.Rev. 106 (1962).
We agree that abstention was not proper on the majority of grounds given by the District Court, but hold that abstention was, nevertheless, appropriate for another reason suggested but not fully articulated in its opinion. Abstention is a "judge-made doctrine . . ., first fashioned in 1941 in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (that) sanctions . . . excape (from immediate decision) only in narrowly limited "special circumstances," Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492, 93 L.Ed. 1480, 69 S.Ct. 1333, 1344." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248, 88 S.Ct. 391, 395, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967), justifying "the delay and expense to which application of the abstention doctrine inevitably gives rise." England v. Louisiana State Board Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 418, 84 S.Ct. 461, 466, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964). The majority of circumstances relied on by the District Court in this case do not fall within that category. First, the absence of an immediate threat of prosecution does not argue against reaching the merits of appellants' complaint. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), this Court held that, apart from "extraordinary circumstance," a federal court may not enjoin a pending state prosecution or declare invalid the statute under which the prosecution was brought. The decisions there were premised on considerations of equity practice and comity in our federal system that have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding. In that circumstances, exercise of federal court jurisdiction ordinarily is appropriate if the conditions for declaratory or injunctive relief are met. See generally Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93, 91 S.Ct. 674, 681, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971) (separate opinion).
The last factor relied on by the District Courtthe publication of proposed federal standards that might be considered by Michigan in the interpretation and enforcement of its statute does, however, point toward considerations that fall within the 'special circumstances' permitting abstention. The paradigm case for abstention arises when the challenged state statute is susceptible of 'a construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the (federal) constitutional question. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152. Compare Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377.' Zwickler v. Koota, supra, 389 U.S., at 249, 88 S.Ct., at 396. More fully, we have explained:
That is precisely the circumstance presented here. The Michigan Watercraft Pollution Control Act of 1970 has not been construed in any Michigan court, and, as appellants themselves suggest in attacking it for vagueness, its terms are far from clear in particulars that go to the foundation of their grievance. It is indeed only an assertion by appellees that the Michigan law proscribes the discharge of even treated sewage in state waters. Section 3(2) of the Act does state that "(i)t is unlawful to discharge . . . sewage . . . from a recreational, domestic or foreign watercraft used for pleasure or for (commerce) . . .," and § 4(2) does require vessels equipped with toilet facilities to have sewage storage devices.
Yet § 3(1) seemingly contemplates the discharge of treated sewage by merely prohibiting any person from emitting sewage "which (renders) the water unsightly, noxious or otherwise unwholesome so as to be detrimental to the public health or welfare or to the enjoyment of the water for recreational purposes." Moreover, § 11 provides that "(t)o be enforceable, the provision (of the Act) or the rule (presumably promulgated thereunder) shall be of such flexibility that a watercraft owner, in carrying out the provision or rule, is able to maintain maritime safety requirements and comply with the federal marine and navigation laws and regulations." Michigan has thus demonstrated concern that its pollution control requirements be sufficiently flexible to accord with federal law. We do not know, of course, how far Michigan courts will go in interpreting the requirements of the state Watercraft Pollution Control Act in light of the federal Water Quality Improvement Act
But we are satisfied that authoritative resolution of the ambiguities in the Michigan law is sufficiently likely to avoid or significantly modify the federal questions appellants raise to warrant abstention, particularly in view of the absence of countervailing considerations that we have found compelling in prior decisions. See, e.g., Harman v. Forssenius, supra, at 537, 85 S.Ct., at 1183; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378379, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1326 1327, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964).
There is indeed a serious present controversy, involving important federal issues, and posing for the Lake Carriers an immediate choice between the possibility of criminal prosecution or the expenditure of substantial sums of money for antipollution devices and equipment which may not be compatible with the federal regulations which admittedly in due time will be pre-emptive. This presents a classic case for declaratory relief, 28 U.S.C. 2201, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941). As the opinion of the Court states, 'compliance (with the Michigan law) is coerced by the threat of enforcement, and the controversy is both immediate and real.'
"(b) An incinerating device which will reduce to ash all sewage produced on the watercraft. The ash shall be disposed of onshore in a manner which will preclude pollution." Section 3(2) flatly prohibits the discharge of sewage into Michigan waters.
These two sections unmistakably express Michigan's decision in favor of retention or incineration of sewage aboard ships rather than its treatment and discharged into state waters.
The majority opinion of the Court views § 3(1) as affording some flexibility and room for interpretation.
Yet, it seems clear from the context of the entire statute that § 3(1) is a general statement of environmental purpose applicable to all persons (as defined), expressing the overall statutory objective of prohibiting pollution of Michigan waters. This section can hardly be construed to contradict the specific provisions of § 4(2) which relate to the owners and operators of foreign and domestic vessels engaged in commerce upon Michigan waters. Indeed, the Michigan State Attorney General, the Department of Natural Resources and its Director, and the Water Resources Commission and its Executive Secretary all read the statute as "designed to prevent appellants and others in their class from pouring their filth, no matter how well treated, into Michigan waters of the Great Lakes." (Emphasis supplied.) Brief for Appellees 16.
Appellants also contend that the Michigan law is pre-empted by the Steamboat Inspection Acts of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 440, and of May 27, 1936, 49 Stat. 1380, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 361 et seq. An amicus curiae, moreover, presses the contention, suggested in appellants' complaint, that the Michigan law conflicts with the United States-Canadian Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, as well as enters into the domain of foreign affairs constitutionally reserved to the National Government. See Brief of Dominion Marine Association amicus curiae.
"Sewage" is defined under the Act to mean "human body wastes and the wastes from toilets and other receptacles intended to receive or retain body wastes." 84 Stat. 100, 33 U.S.C. 1163(a)(6).
The Michigan authorities have so far generally refrained from prosecution because adequate land-based pump-out facilities are not yet available to service vessels equipped with sewage storage devices. See infra, at 507508. After oral argument here, the Solicitor General of Michigan informed us "that local officials in Cheboygan County, Michigan, have 'ticketed' a Coast Guard Captain for discharging sewage into the waters of the Great Lakes." However, "to assure the Court that Michigan will not depart from the representations it has made to the Court," the Solicitor General stated that he is "taking immediate steps to quash the charge or have the local court stay its hand until" the decision here.
Michigan has filed an application with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for a prohibition under 33 U.S.C. 1163(f) on the discharge of any sewage, treated or untreated, into all of the State's waters subject to the Water Quality Improvement Act. The Administrator has indicated that any no-discharge regulation issued will not become effective before the effective date of the initial standards promulgated under § 1163(b) (1). See 36 Fed.Reg. 8739-8740. Appellants argue that the Administrator's authority to issue no-discharge regulations is narrow and could not encompass a complete prohibition on discharge throughout Michigan's navigable waters. Since we find, infra, that the possibility of such a prohibition is immaterial to the issues answered here, we need not now decide this question.
Although appellees took an equivocal position on this question in oral argument here, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-39, the District Court below expressly found such a concession, see 336 F.Supp., at 255, and appellees repeated the concession in opposing appellants' jurisdictional statement. See Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 11. In any event, the terms of the Water Quality Improvement Act are clear that pre-emption occurs at least when the initial federal standards promulgated under the Act become effective. See 33 U.S.C. 1163(f), quoted in part supra, at 503504. See also 36 Fed.Reg. 8739-8740.
We assume that these provisions apply to commercial watercraft, though even this is not textually clear. Section 3(2) in terms applies only to 'recreational' vessels, while § 4(2) despite the expansive definition of 'watercraft' in § 2(g)could be similarly limited in