Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/480/522/case.html
Timestamp: 2018-07-21 07:22:07
Document Index: 199467777

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3147', '§ 3651', '§ 3147', '§ 3651', '§ 3147', '§ 3651', '§ 3147', '§ 3147', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 3651', '§ 924', '§ 1202', '§ 845']

RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED STATES, 480 U. S. 522 - Volume 480 - 1987 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 480 > RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED STATES, 480 U. S. 522 (1987) > Full Text
In the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA), Pub.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, Congress provided that anyone who commits a felony while on release pending judicial proceedings must be sentenced to at least two years' imprisonment in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (1982 ed., Supp. III). Under the Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651, federal judges have long had authority to suspend the execution of certain sentences,
Petitioner, Gloria Rodriguez, was arrested for selling cocaine. While released on a personal recognizance bond, she was arrested again, for selling heroin. She pleaded guilty to both charges. The sentencing judge recognized that § 3147 [Footnote 1] required that petitioner be sentenced to at least a 2-year term of imprisonment in addition to the sentences for the two drug offenses. Nevertheless, relying on § 3651, [Footnote 2] he suspended execution of that sentence, finding that, under the circumstances, a 2-year probation term was more appropriate. The United States appealed, arguing that § 3147 had superseded § 3651, and that the sentencing judge had no authority to suspend execution of the sentence imposed under § 3147. The Court of Appeals agreed with the United States, and reversed. 794 F.2d 24 (CA2 1986). Rodriguez then filed this petition for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals rested its conclusion in part on the legislative history of the CCCA, noting that various Senate and House Reports referred to § 3147 as establishing a "mandatory" sentence, as prescribing a "term of imprisonment of at least two years and not more than ten," and as "requir[ing] that the individual be imprisoned for an additional period of
time." See 794 F.2d at 26-29. Even if unrebutted, these passing references would not constitute the "clear and manifest" evidence of congressional intent necessary to establish repeal by implication. In fact, however, the totality of the legislative history of the Act demonstrates with unusual clarity that no repeal was intended. A Senate Report on an early version of the Act pointed out that statutes specifying minimum sentences did not create mandatory minimum terms of confinement, since such sentences could be suspended in favor of probation or parole. S.Rep. No. 98-225, p. 66, n. 129 (1983). The same Report also noted that the reported version of the provision eventually codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) would permit such suspension, and recommended that it be amended to eliminate that possibility. S.Rep. at 312-313. Congress subsequently did amend § 924(c), as well as certain other provisions of the CCCA, to make § 3651 unambiguously inapplicable. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 929(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III); 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202 (a); 21 U.S.C. § 845a(c) (1982 ed., Supp. III).
Additionally, and most impermissibly, the Court of Appeals relied on its understanding of the broad purposes of the CCCA, which included decreasing the frequency with which persons on pretrial release commit crimes and diminishing the sentencing discretion of judges. But no legislation pursues
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