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Timestamp: 2017-10-17 18:53:50
Document Index: 670803696

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 441', '§ 441', '§441', '§ 441', '§ 431', '§ 431', '§ 431', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 110', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441']

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n (full text) :: 518 U.S. 604 (1996) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n
518 U.S. 604 (1996)
(a) The outcome is controlled by this Court's FECA case law. After weighing the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their political views, against a "compelling" governmental interest in protecting the electoral system from the appearance and reality of corruption, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14-23 (per curiam), the Court has ruled unconstitutional FECA provisions that, inter alia, limited the right of individuals,
(c) Because this expenditure is "independent," the Court need not reach the broader question argued by the Colorado Party: whether, in the special case of political parties, the First Amendment also forbids congressional efforts to limit coordinated expenditures. While the Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to consider this facial challenge by the failure of the parties and the lower courts to focus specifically on the complex issues involved in determining the constitutionality of political parties' coordinated expenditures, that lack of focus provides a prudential reason for the Court not to decide the broader question. This is
(b) Section 441a(d)(3) cannot withstand a facial challenge under the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (per curiam). The anticorruption rationale that the Court has relied on is inapplicable in the specific context of campaign funding by political parties, since there is only a minimal threat of corruption when a party spends to support its candidate or to oppose his competitor, whether or not that expenditure is made in concert with the candidate. Parties and candidates have traditionally worked together to achieve their common goals, and when they engage in that work, there is no risk to the Republic. To the contrary, the danger lies in Government suppression of such activity. Pp. 644-648.
BREYER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which O'CONNOR and SOUTER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 626. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, J., joined as to Parts I and III, post, p. 631. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined, post, p. 648.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by David H. Remes, David H. Miller, Arthur B. Spitzer, Steven R. Shapiro, Joel M. Gora, and Arthur N. Eisenberg; for the Democratic National Committee et al. by Joseph E. Sandler and Robert F. Bauer; for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson; and for the Washington Legal
B. Chandler III, Attorney General of Kentucky, Pamela J. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, Morgan G. Ransdell, Assistant Attorney General, Sheryl G. Snyder, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, W A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia; for the Committee for Party Renewal et al. by E. Mark Braden and Stephen E. Gottlieb; and for the Republican National Committee by George J. Terwilliger III, John P. Connors, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Robert L. Hodges, and Darryl S. Lew.
This Court subsequently examined several of the Act's provisions in light of the First Amendment's free speech and association protections. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480 (1985) (NCPAC); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981); Buckley, supra. In these cases, the Court essentially weighed the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their political views against a "compelling" governmental interest in assuring the electoral system's legitimacy, protecting it from the appearance and reality of corruption. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 256-263; NCPAC, supra, at 493-501; California Medical Assn., supra, at 193199; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 14-23. After doing so, the Court found that the First Amendment prohibited some of FECA's provisions, but permitted others.
FECA also has a special provision, directly at issue in this case, that governs contributions and expenditures by political parties. § 441a(d). This special provision creates, in part, an exception to the above contribution limits. That
After exempting political parties from the general contribution and expenditure limitations of the statute, the Party Expenditure Provision then imposes a substitute limitation upon party "expenditures" in a senatorial campaign equal to the greater of $20,000 or "2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State," § 441a(d)(3)(A)(i), adjusted for inflation since 1974, §441a(c). The provision permitted a political party in Colorado in 1986 to spend about $103,000 in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for the United States Senate. See FEC Record, vol. 12, no. 4, p. 1 (Apr. 1986). (A different provision, not at issue
The FEC agreed with the Democratic Party. It brought a complaint against the Colorado Party, charging a violation. The Colorado Party defended in part by claiming that the Party Expenditure Provision's expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment-a charge that it repeated in a counterclaim that said the Colorado Party intended to make other "expenditures directly in connection with" senatorial elections, App. 68, , 48, and attacked the constitutionality of the entire Party Expenditure Provision. The Federal District Court interpreted the provision's words "'in connection with' the general election campaign of a candidate" narrowly, as meaning only expenditures for advertis-
The summary judgment record indicates that the expenditure in question is what this Court in Buckley called an "independent" expenditure, not a "coordinated" expenditure that other provisions of FECA treat as a kind of campaign "contribution." See Buckley, supra, at 36-37, 46-47, 78; NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 498. The record describes how the expenditure was made. In a deposition, the Colorado Party's Chairman, Howard Callaway, pointed out that, at the time of the expenditure, the Party had not yet selected a
So treated, the expenditure falls within the scope of the Court's precedents that extend First Amendment protection to independent expenditures. Beginning with Buckley, the Court's cases have found a "fundamental constitutional difference between money spent to advertise one's views
Given these established principles, we do not see how a provision that limits a political party's independent expenditures can escape their controlling effect. A political party's independent expression not only reflects its members' views about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also seeks to convince others to join those members in a practical democratic task, the task of creating
We recognize that FECA permits individuals to contribute more money ($20,000) to a party than to a candidate ($1,000) or to other political committees ($5,000). 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a). We also recognize that FECA permits unregulated "soft money" contributions to a party for certain activities, such as electing candidates for state office, see § 431(8)(A)(i), or for voter registration and "get out the vote" drives, see § 431(8)(B)(xii). But the opportunity for corruption posed by these greater opportunities for contributions is, at best, attenuated. Unregulated "soft money" contributions may not be used to influence a federal campaign, except when used in the limited, party-building activities specifically designated in the statute. See § 431(8)(B). Any contribution to a party that is earmarked for a particular campaign is considered a contribution to the candidate and is subject to the contribution limitations. § 441a(a)(8). A party may not simply channel unlimited amounts of even undesignated contributions to a candidate, since such direct transfers are
also considered contributions and are subject to the contribution limits on a "multicandidate political committee." § 441a(a)(2). The greatest danger of corruption, therefore, appears to be from the ability of donors to give sums up to $20,000 to a party which may be used for independent party expenditures for the benefit of a particular candidate. We could understand how Congress, were it to conclude that the potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was a serious matter, might decide to change the statute's limitations on contributions to political parties. Cf. California Medical Assn., 453 U. S., at 197-199 (plurality opinion) (danger of evasion of limits on contribution to candidates justified prophylactic limitation on contributions to PAC's). But we do not believe that the risk of corruption present here could justify the "markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by" the statute's limitations on expenditures. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44. See also id., at 46-47, 51; NCPAC, supra, at 498. Contributors seeking to avoid the effect of the $1,000 contribution limit indirectly by donations to the national party could spend that same amount of money (or more) themselves more directly by making their own independent expenditures promoting the candidate. See Buckley, supra, at 44-48 (risk of corruption by individuals' independent expenditures is insufficient to justify limits on such spending). If anything, an independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seem less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor. In any case, the constitutionally significant fact, present equally in both instances, is the lack of coordination between the candidate and the source of the expenditure. See Buckley, supra, at 45-46; NCPAC, supra, at 498. This fact prevents us from assuming, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, that a limitation on political parties' independent expenditures is
We therefore believe that this Court's prior case law controls the outcome here. We do not see how a Constitution that grants to individuals, candidates, and ordinary political committees the right to make unlimited independent expenditures could deny the same right to political parties. Having concluded this, we need not consider the Party's further claim that the statute's "in connection with" language, and
In support of its argument, the Government points to a set of legal materials, based on FEC interpretations, that seem to say or imply that all party expenditures are "coordinated." These include: (1) an FEC regulation that forbids political parties to make any "independent expenditures ... in connection with" a "general election campaign," 11 CFR § 110.7(b)(4) (1995); (2) FEC Advisory Opinions that use the
The Government argues, on the basis of these materials, that the FEC has made an "empirical judgment that party officials will as a matter of course consult with the party's candidates before funding communications intended to influence the outcome of a federal election." Brief for Respondent 27. The FEC materials, however, do not make this empirical judgment. For the most part those materials use the word "coordinated" as a description that does not necessarily deny the possibility that a party could also make independent expenditures. See, e. g., AO 1984-15, , 5766, at 11,069. We concede that one Advisory Opinion says, in a footnote, that "coordination with candidates is presumed." AO 1988-22, , 5932, at 11,471, n. 4. But this statement, like the others, appears without any internal or external evidence that the FEC means it to embody an empirical judgment (say, that parties, in fact, hardly ever spend money independently) or to represent the outcome of an empirical investigation. Indeed, the statute does not require any such investigation, for it applies both to coordinated and to independent expenditures alike. See § 441a(d)(3) (a "political party ... may not make any expenditure" in excess of the limits (emphasis added)). In any event, language in other FEC Advisory Opinions suggests the opposite, namely, that sometimes, in fact, parties do make independent expendi-
Finally, we recognize that the FEC may have characterized the expenditures as "coordinated" in light of this Court's constitutional decisions prohibiting regulation of most independent expenditures. But, if so, the characterization cannot help the Government prove its case. An agency's simply calling an independent expenditure a "coordinated expendi-
Finally, the Government and supporting amici argue that the expenditure is "coordinated" because a party and its candidate are identical, i. e., the party, in a sense, "is" its candidates. We cannot assume, however, that this is so. See, e. g., W. Keefe, Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in America
We recognize that the Party filed a counterclaim in which it sought to raise a facial challenge to the Party Expenditure Provision as a whole. But that counterclaim did not focus specifically upon coordinated expenditures. See App. 68-69. Nor did its summary judgment affidavits specifically allege that the Party intended to make coordinated expenditures exceeding the statute's limits. See id., at 159, , 4. While this lack of focus does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider a facial challenge to the Party Expenditure Provision as overbroad or as unconstitutional in all applications, it does provide a prudential reason for this Court not to
More importantly, the opinions of the lower courts, and the parties' briefs in this case, did not squarely isolate, and address, party expenditures that in fact are coordinated, nor did they examine, in that context, relevant similarities or differences with similar expenditures made by individuals or other political groups. Indeed, to our knowledge, this is the first case in the 20-year history of the Party Expenditure Provision to suggest that in-fact coordinated expenditures by political parties are protected from congressional regulation by the First Amendment, even though this Court's prior cases have permitted regulation of similarly coordinated expenditures by individuals and other political groups. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 46-47. This issue is complex. As JUSTICE KENNEDY points out, post, at 629-630, party coordinated expenditures do share some of the constitutionally relevant features of independent expenditures. But many such expenditures are also virtually indistinguishable from simple contributions (compare, for example, a donation of money with direct payment of a candidate's media bills, see Buckley, supra, at 46). Moreover, political parties also share relevant features with many PAC's, both having an interest in, and devoting resources to, the goal of electing candidates who will "work to further" a particular "political agenda," which activity would benefit from coordination with those candidates. Post, at 630. See, e. g., NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 490 (describing the purpose and activities of the National Conservative PAC); id., at 492 (coordinated expenditures by PAC's are
Finally, we note that neither the parties nor the lower courts have considered whether or not Congress would have wanted the Party Expenditure Provision's limitations to stand were they to apply only to coordinated, and not to independent, expenditures. See Buckley, supra, at 108; NCPAC, supra, at 498. This nonconstitutional ground for exempting party coordinated expenditures from FECA limitations
In agreement with JUSTICE THOMAS, post, at 631-634, I would hold that the Colorado Republican Party (Party), in its pleadings in the District Court and throughout this litigation, has preserved its claim that the constraints imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), both on its face and as interpreted by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), violate the First Amendment.
The central holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), is that spending money on one's own speech must be permitted, id., at 44-58, and this is what political parties do when they make the expenditures FECA restricts. FECA calls spending of this nature a "contribution," § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i), and it is true that contributions can be restricted consistent with Buckley, supra, at 23-38. As the principal opinion acknowledges, however, and as our cases hold, we cannot allow the Government's suggested labels to control our First Amendment analysis. Ante, at
We had no occasion in Buckley to consider possible First Amendment objections to limitations on spending by parties. Id., at 58, n. 66. While our cases uphold contribution limitations on individuals and associations, see id., at 23-38; California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182, 193-199 (1981) (plurality opinion), political party spending "in cooperation, consultation, or concert with" a candi-
It makes no sense, therefore, to ask, as FECA does, whether a party's spending is made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert with" its candidate. The answer in most cases will be yes, but that provides more, not less, justification for holding unconstitutional the statute's attempt to control this type of party spending, which bears little resemblance to the contributions discussed in Buckley. Supra, at 627-628 and this page. Party spending "in cooperation, consultation, or concert with" its candidates of necessity "communicate[s] the underlying basis for the support," 424 U. S., at 21, i. e., the hope
After the Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought this action against the Party, the Party counterclaimed that "the limits on its expenditures in connection with the general
IJUSTICE BREYER acknowledges as much when he asserts earlier in his opinion that "the unmodified term 'expenditure'" reflects a congressional intent "to limit all party expenditures." Ante, at 621 (emphasis in original).
Finally, though JUSTICE BREYER notes that this is the first Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) case to raise the constitutional validity of limits on coordinated expenditures, see ante, at 624, that is, at best, an argument against granting certiorari. It is too late for arguments like that now. The case is here, and we needlessly protract this litigation by remanding this important issue to the Court of Appeals. Nor is the fact that the "issue is complex," ibid., a good reason for avoiding it. We do not sit to decide only easy cases. And while it may be true that no court has ever asked whether expenditures that are "in fact" coordinated may be regulated under the First Amendment, see ibid., I do not see how the existence of an "in fact" coordinated expenditure would change our analysis of the facial constitutionality of § 441a(d)(3), since courts in facial challenges under the First Amendment routinely consider applications of the relevant statute other than the application before the court. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973). Whether or not there are facts in the record to support the finding that this particular expenditure was actually coordinated with a candidate, we are not, contrary to the suggestion of JUSTICE BREYER, incapable of considering the Government's interest in regulating such expenditures
2JUSTICE BREYER'S remaining arguments for avoiding the facial challenge are straw men. See ante, at 625 (if § 441a(d)(3) were invalidated in its entirety, other FECA provisions that the Party has not challenged might apply to coordinated party expenditures); ibid. (if § 441a(d)(3) were upheld as to coordinated expenditures but invalidated as to independent expenditures, issues of severability would be raised). That resolution of the primary question in this case (the constitutionality of § 441a(d)(3) with respect to all expenditures) might generate issues not previously considered (such as severability) is no reason for not deciding the question itself. Without suggesting that remand is the only appropriate way to deal with possible corollary matters in this case or that these arguments have merit, I point out that we can, of course, decide the central question without ruling on the issues that concern JUSTICE BREYER.
See 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) ("[E]xpenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate").
4 Three Members of the Buckley Court thought the distinction untenable at the time, see 424 U. S., at 241 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and another Member disavowed it subsequently, see Federal Election Comm'n v. NCPAC, 470 U. S. 480, 518-521 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 678 (1990) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (stating that distinction "should have little, if any, weight in reviewing corporate participation in candidate elections").
5 See H. Alexander, Money in Politics 234 (1972): "The constitutional arguments against limiting campaign spending also apply against limiting contributions; specifically, it is the right of an individual to spend his money to support a congenial viewpoint .... Some views are heard only if interested individuals are willing to support financially the candidate or committee voicing the position. To be widely heard, mass communica-
6 To illustrate the point that giving and spending in the political process implicate the same First Amendment values, I note that virtually everything JUSTICE BREYER says about the importance of free independent expenditures applies with equal force to coordinated expenditures and contributions. For instance, JUSTICE BREYER states that "[a] political party's independent expression not only reflects its members' views about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also seeks to convince others to join those members in a practical democratic
task, the task of creating a government that voters can instruct and hold responsible for subsequent success or failure." Ante, at 615-616. "Coordinated" expression by political parties, of course, shares those precise attributes. The fact that an expenditure is prearranged with the candidate-presumably to make it more effective in the election-does not take away from its fundamental democratic purposes.
between that facilitates the dissemination of the spender's message-for instance, an advertising agency or a television station. See Powe, supra, at 258-259. To call a contribution "speech by proxy" thus does little to differentiate it from an expenditure. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 243-244, and n. 7 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The only possible difference is that contributions involve an extra step in the proxy chain. But again, that is a difference in form, not substance.
The other justification in Buckley for the proposition that contribution caps only marginally restrict speech-that is, that a contribution signals only general support for the candidate but indicates nothing about the reasons for that support-is similarly unsatisfying. Assuming the assertion is descriptively accurate (which is certainly questionable), it still cannot mean that giving is less important than spending in terms of the First Amendment. A campaign poster that reads simply "We support candidate Smith" does not seem to me any less deserving of constitutional protection than one that reads "We support candidate Smith because we like
7 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the Court purported to scrutinize strictly the contribution provisions as well as the expenditure rules. See id., at 23 (FECA's contribution and expenditures limits "both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests"); id., at 25 (contribution limits, like expenditure limits, are "'subject to the closest scrutiny'" (citation omitted)). It has not gone unnoticed, however, that we seemed more forgiving in our review of the contribution provisions than of the expenditure rules. See, e. g., California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
8 As I explain in Part III, infra, the interest in preventing corruption is inapplicable when the subject of the regulation is a political party. My analysis here is more general, however, and applies to all individuals and entities subject to campaign finance limits.
It flatly bans all expenditures by all national and state party committees in excess of certain dollar limits, without any evidence that covered committees who exceed those limits are in fact engaging, or likely to engage, in bribery or any-
Buckley's rationale for the contrary conclusion, see supra, at 641-642, is faulty. That bribery laws are not completely effective in stamping out corruption is no justification for the
9 JUSTICE STEVENS submits that we should "accord special deference to [Congress'] judgment on questions related to the extent and nature of limits on campaign spending," post, at 650, a stance that the Court of Appeals also adopted, see 59 F.3d 1015, 1024 (CAW 1995). This position poses great risk to the First Amendment, in that it amounts to letting the fox stand watch over the henhouse. There is good reason to think that campaign reform is an especially inappropriate area for judicial deference to legislative judgment. See generally BeVier 1074-1081. What the argument for deference fails to acknowledge is the potential for legislators to set the rules of the electoral game so as to keep themselves in power and to keep potential challengers out of it. See id., at 1075 (" 'Courts must police inhibitions on ... political activity because we cannot trust elected officials to do so'" (emphasis deleted)) (quoting J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 106 (1980)). See also R. Winter, Political Financing and the Constitution, 486 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 34, 40, 48 (1986). Indeed, history demonstrates that the most significant effect of election reform has been not to purify public service, but to protect incumbents and increase the influence of special interest groups. See BeVier 1078-1080. When Congress seeks to ration political expression in the electoral process, we ought not simply acquiesce in its judgment.
12 Nor, for that matter, does JUSTICE BREYER explain what sorts of quid pro quos a party could extract from a candidate. Cf. ante, at 615.
The structure of political parties is such that the theoretical danger of those groups actually engaging in quid pro quos with candidates is significantly less than the threat of individuals or other groups doing so. See N ahra, supra, at
In sum, there is only a minimal threat of "corruption," as we have understood that term, when a political party spends to support its candidate or to oppose his competitor, whether
I am persuaded that three interests provide a constitutionally sufficient predicate for federal limits on spending by political parties. First, such limits serve the interest in avoiding both the appearance and the reality of a corrupt political process. A party shares a unique relationship with the candidate it sponsors because their political fates are inextricably linked. That interdependency creates a special danger that the party-or the persons who control the party-will abuse the influence it has over the candidate by virtue of its power to spend. The provisions at issue are appropriately aimed at reducing that threat. The fact that the party in this case had not yet chosen its nominee at the time it broadcast the challenged advertisements is immaterial to the analysis. Although the Democratic and Republican nominees
Finally, I believe the Government has an important interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of federal campaigns. As Justice White pointed out in his opinion in Buckley, "money is not always equivalent to or used for speech, even in the context of political campaigns." Id., at 263 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is quite wrong to assume that the net effect of limits on contributions and expenditures-which tend to protect equal access to the political arena, to free candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden of fundraising,