Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/885/490/144250/
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 09:41:05
Document Index: 801098853

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 641', '§ 1382', '§ 1361', '§ 1382', '§ 1361', '§ 1361', '§ 1382']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Susan Alexis Komisaruk, Defendant-appellant, 885 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1989) :: Justia
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Susan Alexis Komisaruk, Defendant-appellant, 885 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1989)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 885 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1989)
Argued and Submitted Nov. 2, 1988. Decided May 10, 1989. As Amended Sept. 5, 1989
The Supreme Court has instructed that " [w]ithin limits, the [district] judge may control the scope of rebuttal testimony ... [and] may refuse to allow cumulative, repetitive, or irrelevant testimony." Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87, 96 S. Ct. 1330, 1334, 47 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1976) (emphasis added).
In support of her argument, Komisaruk mistakenly relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952). In Morissette, the district court ruled that the crime of converting government property (18 U.S.C. § 641) required no criminal intent, that a claim of ignorance that the property was owned by the government was no defense, and that the jury was allowed to presume the defendant possessed the requisite intent. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the statute was not intended to apply to "unwitting, inadvertent, and unintended conversions" of government property. Id. at 270, 72 S. Ct. at 254. The Supreme Court ruled that Morissette was entitled to have the jury determine whether he had the requisite intent to violate the statute or whether he was unaware that the government owned the property because he mistakenly believed it had been abandoned.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of evidence challenging title to Forest Service lands in a case where the defendant was charged with destruction of Forest Service signs. United States v. Tijerina, 446 F.2d 675, 681 (10th Cir. 1971). Tijerina also tried to invoke his reliance on foreign law which he believed superseded federal law. Id. at 679. He claimed that the removal was not unlawful because the property was part of a Spanish land grant. He believed that, under the Spanish land grant, ownership had transferred to the heirs of the grantees. Id. Similarly, we affirm the district court's order rejecting Komisaruk's evidence that was irrelevant to her intent to damage government property.
We have held that a defendant does not possess an unlimited right to "cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, [she] might wish." Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985)). The trial court may properly exclude evidence on cross-examination " 'that is repetitive or only marginally relevant'." Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986)). The words used by Komisaruk in defacing the building were not relevant to any issue in the case. The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of these witnesses.
Komisaruk requested the court to instruct the jury on the offense of entering military property for any purpose prohibited by law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382, as a lesser included offense. She claims that the offense of entering military property for any purpose is a lesser included offense to the crime of destruction of government property under 18 U.S.C. § 1361. The district court refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense on the ground that 18 U.S.C. § 1382 is not a lesser included offense to 18 U.S.C. § 1361 because a person could destroy government property without going upon government land. Komisaruk argues that this ruling was erroneous and warrants reversal because the district court used a "mechanistic approach" to determine whether a lesser included offense instruction was proper.
This court's interpretation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c) has required the application of the "inherent relationship" test wherein "(1) a lesser included offense must be identified, and (2) a rational trier of fact must be able to find the defendant guilty of the included offense but innocent of the greater offense." United States v. Martin, 783 F.2d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
After this matter was submitted, following oral argument, the Supreme Court, in Schmuck v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 103 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1989), rejected this test because "the inherent relationship approach, in practice, would require that Rule 31(c) be applied in a manner inconsistent with its language." Id. at 1451. The Court reasoned that " [w]ere the prosecutor able to request an instruction on an offense whose elements were not charged in the indictment, [the] right to notice would be placed in jeopardy." Id. The Supreme Court therefore overruled the "inherent relationship" test and held that the elements test, where "one offense is not 'necessarily included' in another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense," must be applied instead. Id. at 1450. The Court stated that:The elements test, in contrast [to the inherent relationship test], permits lesser offense instructions only in those cases where the indictment contains the elements of both offenses and thereby gives notice to the defendant that he may be convicted on either charge. This approach preserves the mutuality implicit in the language of Rule 31(c).
Applying the "elements" analysis to the present matter, we conclude that the district court was correct in its assessment that the crime of entering military property for any purpose prohibited by law is not a lesser included offense to the charge of destruction of government property. To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361, the government must present evidence establishing willful injury to government property. The offense entering military property for any purpose proscribed in section 1382 requires proof that the accused entered United States military property for any purpose prohibited by law. 18 U.S.C. § 1382. The requirement that military property be entered is not a subset of the elements of the crime of destruction of government property. The district court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on trespass.