Source: http://openjurist.org/324/f3d/288
Timestamp: 2013-05-19 18:35:00
Document Index: 159074584

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 1983']

324 F3d 288 Batten v. Gomez | OpenJurist
324 F. 3d 288 - Batten v. Gomez	Home324 f3d 288 batten v. gomez
324 F3d 288 Batten v. Gomez 324 F.3d 288
Lucinda Langdon BATTEN; Brittany Rose Langdon, a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, Cynthia A. Singletary, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.Steven GOMEZ, in his official and individual capacities as a Senior Investigator for the District Attorney of Riverside County, California; Sandra Shuster, in her official and individual capacities as Senior Investigator for the District Attorney of Riverside County, California, Defendants-Appellees, andLee Guy, in his official and individual capacities as Deputy Sheriff of Bladen County, North Carolina; Larry Guyton, in his official and individual capacities as an Investigator for the Sheriff's Department in Bladen County, North Carolina; Steve Lesane, in his official and individual capacities as Deputy Sheriff of Bladen County, North Carolina; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; The Insurance Company of North America, Defendants.
No. 02-1087.
ARGUED: Richard Brooks Glazier, Beaver, Holt, Sternlicht, Glazier, Carlin, Britton & Courie, P.A., Fayetteville, North Carolina, for Appellants. Andrew John Hanley, Crossley, McIntosh, Prior & Collier, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: H. Gerald Beaver, Beaver, Holt, Sternlicht, Glazier, Carlin, Britton & Courie, P.A., Fayetteville, North Carolina, for Appellants.
Entitlement to qualified immunity must be analyzed in two steps, which are to be "considered in proper sequence." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). As a "threshold question," a court must ask whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... the facts alleged show [that] the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If the answer is no, then the analysis ends; the plaintiff cannot prevail. Id. If the answer is yes, then "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established" at the time of the events at issue. Id. This determination must be made "in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. If the right was not "clearly established" in the "specific context of the case" — that is, if it was not "clear to a reasonable officer" that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged "was unlawful in the situation he confronted" — then the law affords immunity from suit. Id. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Accordingly, the answer to both Saucier questions must be in the affirmative in order for a plaintiff to defeat a defendant police officer's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
To state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for illegal extradition, an individual must show that the violation of the state's extradition laws "cause[d] the deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution and statutes of the United States." Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 322 (4th Cir.1977) (arrest and transportation of alleged fugitive without extradition proceedings does not constitute defense to criminal prosecution but does create cause of action pursuant to § 1983). In this case, Batten's § 1983 illegal extradition claim fails for the simple reason that there was no violation of North Carolina's extradition laws.
The North Carolina Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (NCUCEA), N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-721-750, sets up a series of detailed procedures that must be followed by a state demanding the extradition of a person charged with a crime in the state demanding extradition. Under the NCUCEA, an extradition request must be made in writing to the Governor. Id. § 15A-723. The request must include a supporting affidavit charging the defendant with the crime and a copy of the charge must be attached to the request, id., and, if the defendant has not been arrested, the Governor must sign an arrest warrant for the defendant, id. § 15A-727.5 A defendant must be notified of her rights when arrested to contest extradition and must be informed of the nature of the charges against her and her right to counsel. Id. § 15A-730. The NCUCEA, however, permits a person who learns of criminal charges against her in another state to elect to travel voluntarily to that state to face the charges. Id. § 15A-746 ("[N]othing in this section shall be deemed to limit the rights of the accused person to return voluntarily and without formality to the demanding state, nor shall this waiver procedure be deemed to be an exclusive procedure or to limit the powers, rights or duties of the officers of the demanding state or of this State.").
In this case, Batten was given an option, she could either voluntarily accompany Shuster and Gomez to California or she could be arrested by Bladen County and held in jail pending formal extradition. Batten, after privately conferring with her attorney, voluntarily accompanied Shuster and Gomez to California. Simply put, Batten knowingly and voluntarily chose to waive her extradition rights and go to California. Under such circumstances, we see no constitutional infirmity. Cf. Pierson v. Grant, 527 F.2d 161, 164-65 (8th Cir.1975) (holding that waiver of extradition rights is voluntary as long as the alleged fugitive had a general knowledge and understanding of what was involved in the waiver when he signed it); Morrison v. Stepanski, 839 F.Supp. 1130, 1140 (M.D.Pa.1993) (holding that waiver of extradition rights must be "knowing" in the sense that the alleged fugitive understands that he has certain rights under the law and affirmatively indicates an intention to relinquish those rights and "voluntary" in the sense that it was given with the alleged fugitive's free choice). Accordingly, the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Shuster and Gomez on Batten's § 1983 illegal extradition claim.
Indisputably, the seizure of Brittany constitutes an interference with Batten's liberty interest and thus triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981); Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir.1994). To meet the requirements of due process, the state must afford notice and an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). Generally, absent exigent circumstances, due process requires a hearing before state officials may remove a child from her home. Jordan by Jordan, 15 F.3d at 343; see also Morrell v. Mock, 270 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 71, 154 L.Ed.2d 14 (2002). Moreover, if exigent circumstances are present, there must be prompt "adequate post-deprivation process to ratify the emergency action." Jordan by Jordan, 15 F.3d at 343. Finally, due process requires "pre-enforcement notice and some opportunity to object before law enforcement officials may separate a parent from her child pursuant to an out-of-state" order. Morrell, 270 F.3d at 1097-1100 (holding that, after balancing the nature of each parent's liberty interest in their relationship with the child, the risk of harm from erroneous deprivations, and the government's interests in facilitating interstate recognition and enforcement of child custody decrees and in deterring the unilateral removal of children through the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, due process requires "pre-enforcement notice and some opportunity to object before law enforcement officials may separate a parent from her child pursuant to an out-of-state default order transferring custody").
We conclude, however, that Shuster and Gomez are entitled to qualified immunity on Batten's claim that the seizure of Brittany deprived Batten of her liberty interest, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the companionship, care, custody, and control of her child. In assessing whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the state official's actions, we focus upon "the right [not] at its most general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged." Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 995 (4th Cir.1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ("The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."). This does not mean, however, that a state official will be protected by qualified immunity unless the very act in question has previously been held unlawful. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. Rather, the unlawfulness must be apparent in light of pre-existing law. Id.
The gist of Batten's argument is that it was clearly established that due process required notice and an opportunity to be heard before a state official could interfere with a mother's liberty interest in her child. The statement of the right at this level of generality, however, is of little help in determining the reasonableness of Shuster and Gomez's conduct. Id. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034. As the court in Morrell explained, "[t]he appropriate question is whether it would be clear to reasonable officials in the defendants' position that enforcing the [out-of-state] order without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard in [the home state] was unconstitutional." 270 F.3d at 1100.
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