Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nyedce/1:2013cv05588/347837/70
Timestamp: 2017-03-23 22:52:07
Document Index: 378895747

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 67', 'art 67', '§ 2601', '§ 8', '§ 825', '§ 825', '§ 825', '§ 825']

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 67 Motion for Reconsideration: For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum & Order, the Court GRANTS the portion of Defendant's reconsideration motion regarding whether prolonged walking or sta nding are essential functions of Plaintiff's job; there is a genuine issue of material fact as to that question, which shall be presented at trial, in addition to the claims and issues identified in the Court's 65 MSJ Order for Reyes v. Phoenix Beverages, Inc. :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 67 Motion for Reconsideration: For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum & Order, the Court GRANTS the portion of Defendant's reconsideration motion regarding whether prolonged walking or sta nding are essential functions of Plaintiff's job; there is a genuine issue of material fact as to that question, which shall be presented at trial, in addition to the claims and issues identified in the Court's 65 MSJ Order. But the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for reconsideration in all other respects. The parties are still required to submit a proposed joint pre-trial order no later than November 4, 2016. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 10/13/2016. (Levanon, Neta)
EDDY REYES,
13-CV-5588 (PKC) (VMS)
- against PHOENIX BEVERAGES, INC.,
On September 15, 2016, the Court denied the cross-motions for summary judgment of
Plaintiff Eddy Reyes (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Phoenix Beverages, Inc. (“Defendant”) on
Plaintiff’s claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.,
and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code. § 8-107. (Dkt.
65 (“MSJ Order”).) Defendant now seeks reconsideration of that MSJ Order pursuant to Rule 6.3
of the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York. (Dkt. 67.) For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with
Local Civil Rule 6.3, under which Defendant has moved for reconsideration, must be
“strictly construed” so as to avoid “unnecessary relitigation,” and may not be used as a substitute
for appealing a final judgment. Pena-Rosario v. Reno, No. 99-CV-4652, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6333, at *2–4 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2000). The grounds for reconsideration are therefore limited to
“an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct
a clear error or prevent manifest injustice,” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL
Irrevocable Trust (Kolel), 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted),
and such motions “will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court,” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255,
257 (2d Cir. 1995). “[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks
solely to relitigate an issue already decided,” id., because motions for reconsideration are not
“vehicle[s] for . . . taking a second bite at the apple,” Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners,
L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir.), as amended (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider the following holdings in its MSJ Order:
(1) prolonged walking or standing were not essential functions of Plaintiff’s job as an On Premises
Sale Representative (Def. Recon. Mot. 1 at 1–5, 8–13); (2) Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff
with the requisite notice of its specific fitness-for-duty certification requirement (id. at 5–6, 13–
21); (3) Defendant waived the defense of judicial estoppel (id. at 6–7, 21–23); and (4) Plaintiff
may proceed with his NYCHRL disability discrimination claim (id. at 23–24). In essence,
Defendant contests every ruling unfavorable to it.
Prolonged Walking and Standing as Essential Functions of Plaintiff’s Job
Defendant argues that, in ruling that prolonged walking or standing are not essential
functions of Plaintiff’s job, the Court overlooked portions of the testimony of William Tierno,
Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. (See Def. Recon. Mot. at 1–3, 8–9. Compare Dkt. 45 (Def. MSJ)
at 17–18 (citing “Ex. 19 at 81:2–11” after quoted Tierno testimony), with Def. Recon. Mot. at 2–
All citations to “Def. Recon. Mot.” refer to Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support
of Its Motion for Reargument and Reconsideration of the Court’s September 15, 2016
Memorandum & Order. (Dkt. 68.)
3 (“The additional portions of the Tierno deposition quoted at pages 17-18 of Defendant’s
Memorandum of Law [Dkt. 45] necessarily change [the Court’s] conclusion.”).) As Defendant
itself acknowledges, however, this cited testimony was not included in the materials submitted by
Defendant as cited in its summary judgment papers. (See Def. Recon. Order at 2 (“Defendant cited
‘Ex. 19 at 81:2-11’ for this quotation from [Tierno’s deposition]. Unfortunately, this was an
inadvertently incomplete citation . . . [and] [b]ased on the inadvertently incomplete citation . . .[,]
pages 79, 80 and 82 of the Tierno deposition were inadvertently excluded from Exhibit 19 . . . .”).)
Nevertheless, Defendant is correct that these portions of Tierno’s testimony appear in the
materials submitted by Plaintiff, which the Court overlooked. Upon review of this record
evidence—counterbalanced against the text of the Job Duties description provided to Plaintiff’s
doctor by Defendant, as well as against Plaintiff’s own testimony (see, e.g., Def. Recon. Mot. at
11 (Plaintiff testified that he would “walk[] from account to account” between “10 to 20 accounts
a day,” but that he “could sit down”)—the Court reconsiders its earlier holding and concludes that
there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether prolonged walking or standing were
essential functions of Plaintiff’s job. 2
The remainder of Defendant’s arguments regarding the Court’s holding on prolonged
walking or standing express mere disagreement with the Court’s conclusion, rather than any clear
error or manifest injustice. For example, Defendant argues that “[t]he Court overlooked the
material contradiction [with respect to its] finding that the physical demands of prolonged standing
and walking were not essential functions . . . [when they] are the very physical disabilities on Part
A of the FMLA Package that Plaintiff’s physicians found made Plaintiff ‘unable to perform any
of his/her job functions’[.]” (Def. Recon. Mot. at 12.) Yet, the Court’s MSJ Order quoted precisely
this referenced language from Plaintiff’s medical records to conclude that, rather than prolonged
walking or standing, “the most physical aspect of Plaintiff’s job, as described by Defendant, seems
to be the process of loading potentially heavy POS items into and out of Plaintiff’s car . . . , and
pushing and pulling an approximately 40-pound sample taste kit on wheels to and from Plaintiff’s
car and non-customer establishments,” activities from which he was no longer restricted as of
February 5, 2013. (See MSJ Order at 33–34 & n.31.)
In arguing for reconsideration, Defendant appears to conflate prolonged walking or
standing, from which Plaintiff was restricted, with any walking or standing. (See, e.g., Def. Recon.
Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider its holding that Defendant failed to
comply with the FMLA notice requirements because the record establishes that, in fact, Defendant
did comply with these requirements, and “[m]ore significantly, this was never an issue at any time
in the case.” (Def. Recon. Mot. at 5–6, 13–14.)
FMLA Notice Raised for the First Time on Summary Judgment
The Court need not spend much time on Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff only raised
noncompliance with the FMLA notice requirements for the first time in his summary judgment
briefing, as Plaintiff’s Complaint states a claim for FMLA interference (see Dkt. 1 ¶ 40), and as
the Court noted in its MSJ Order, the failure to follow the FMLA’s notice requirements may itself
form the basis of an FMLA interference claim (see MSJ Order at 21). Moreover, Defendant has
demonstrated no prejudice, i.e., that discovery would have differed meaningfully, resulting from
the Court’s consideration of this aspect of Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim, other than that
Defendant was not granted summary judgment in its favor. Indeed, as Defendant acknowledges,
Plaintiff briefed this issue both in opposition to Defendant’s summary judgment motion and in
Plaintiff’s affirmative motion for summary judgment. (See Def. Recon. Mot. at 13–14.) Yet,
Defendant never argued, either in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or on
reply in support of its own motion for summary judgment, what it argues now. Rather, Defendant
Mot. at 4 (arguing that essential functions of a job include inherent duties, “such as the ability to
show up to work and to stay awake”).) The Court acknowledged in its MSJ Order that Plaintiff’s
job entailed some walking, which Plaintiff’s medical records did not restrict him from doing; the
Court merely concluded that prolonged walking or standing appeared, from the record, to be “at
most[] marginal functions” thereof, based not only on its reading of Tierno’s testimony, but on
Plaintiff’s own testimony and the job description provided to Plaintiff’s doctors by Defendant.
(See MSJ Order at 31–34.) In light of the additional excerpts of Tierno’s testimony, which the
Court has now reviewed, the Court has reconsidered that holding, but does not conclude that this
is sufficient to warrant granting summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on this issue, for the
reasons discussed, supra, and in the Court’s MSJ Order.
argued strenuously that its “defense is that, consistent with the requirements of the FMLA and
NYCHRL, Defendant long has had a policy of requiring each sales representative who is out from
work for more than three days, because of a personal medical condition, to obtain a medical
certificate that he or she is physically capable to return to work full duty so as to be able to perform
the essential duties of the job without any restrictions . . . .” (Dkt. 59 (Def. Opp. to Pl.’s MSJ) at
1; see also Dkt. 48 (Def. MSJ Reply) at 5.) Defendant cannot now argue, in the guise of a
reconsideration motion, that because the Court did not accept that defense, the Court should not
have considered Plaintiff’s argument in the first place.
Compliance with FMLA Notice Requirements
With respect to Defendant’s argument that it did, in fact, comply with the FMLA’s notice
requirements, Defendant’s arguments do not merit reconsideration of the Court’s MSJ Order,
because they evince a fundamental misunderstanding of what the FMLA regulations require.
For example, Defendant cites to “Ex. B”—the response of Angelo Sgro, Defendant’s
former Director of Human Resources, to Plaintiff’s summary judgment affidavit (see Def. Recon.
Mot. at 8 n.5)—for the proposition that its Human Resources department “as a matter of course”
complied with the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d) to provide oral notice of the fitness-forduty certification requirement. (See id. at 15.) But this argument is inapposite. As the Court
discussed in its MSJ Order, the FMLA regulations permit an employer to provide oral notice, only
as to the standard fitness-for-duty certification requirement (and not as to the specific fitness-forduty requirement Defendant sought to impose here), and only if an employer has a handbook or
other written document that “clearly provide[s] that a fitness-for-duty certification will be required
in specific circumstances . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d)(3). (See also MSJ Order at 27.)
Defendant’s “Ex. B” states only, in relevant part, that it is Defendant’s “long standing [] policy or
standard” that “[n]o sales representative or other employee on FMLA leave or personal medical
leave of absence can return to his or her job without a written medical release stating that the
employee is cleared to return to his (or her) job full duty without any restrictions,” and that Plaintiff
“knew that policy[,] and Human Resource[s] personnel would have made it clear to him and other
employees if and when they asked.” (Dkt. 58-2 ¶¶ 4–5.) This establishes neither the existence of
a written standard fitness-for-duty certification requirement, as required by the FMLA regulations,
nor the requisite affirmative oral notice of that written policy, instead indicating that Defendant
would have provided oral notice “if and when [employees] asked.”
In an attempt to show that there did exist a written fitness-for-duty certification
requirement, in compliance with both 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d) and § 825.312(a), Defendant argues
that Plaintiff acknowledged in writing that he received a copy of Defendant’s Employee
Handbook, and that “Section 307 [there]of . . . provides that ‘Before returning to work from a sick
leave absence of 3 calendar days or more, an employee must provide a physician’s verification
that he or she may safely return to work.’” (Def. Recon. Mot. at 16 (emphasis in original).) It is
worth noting that, despite attaching other portions of this handbook, Defendant did not submit
Section 307 and instead cited only Tierno’s deposition testimony that it is his “understanding” that
“in the employee handbook it states that in order for an employee to come back from medical leave
they need to have full medical clearance.” (Compare id. (citing Def. MSJ Ex. 19 (Tierno
Deposition) at 88:3–21 and Lubelsky MSJ Aff. Ex. 15 (Tierno Deposition) at 91:11–92:3), with
Dkt. 44 (D’Ablemont MSJ Decl.) ¶ 10 (describing Exhibit 7 as a “true and correct copy of excerpts
from Defendant’s Employee Handbook”), and Dkt. 44-7 (D’Ablemont MSJ Decl. Ex. 7) (Sections
317–320 of Employee Handbook).)
But even if this evidence were sufficient to establish the existence of a written policy
regarding Defendant’s standard fitness-for-duty certification requirement, this evidence does not
establish that Defendant complied with the specific fitness-for-duty certification requirement,
which required Defendant to provide, in the time required, a list of the essential functions of
Plaintiff’s job and notice of the requirement that Plaintiff’s fitness-for-duty certification would
require a doctor to address the employee’s ability to perform those essential functions. (See MSJ
Order at 25, 29.)
Finally, Defendant argues conclusorily that “even if Defendant had failed to provide
adequate notice under the FMLA, and it did not, failure to provide notice does not constitute an
FMLA violation where, as here, ‘the lack of notice had no effect on the employee’s exercise of or
attempt to exercise any substantive right conferred by the Act’ because the employee was unable
to perform essential functions of his job after the end of his 12-week FMLA period.” (Def. Recon.
Mot. at 19 (citing Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 161–62 (2d Cir.
1999)). This argument merely restates what the Court held in the MSJ Order in denying Plaintiff
summary judgment: “the Court cannot grant summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor, as there exist
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was nonetheless able to perform the essential
functions of his job at the time his FMLA leave expired on February 18, 2013.” (MSJ Order at
34–35.) This conclusion, however, does not justify granting summary judgment in Defendant’s
favor. Because there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform
the essential functions of his job as of February 18, 2013—indeed, more now that the Court has
reconsidered its holding regarding whether prolonged walking or standing were essential functions
of Plaintiff’s job—Defendant has failed to establish any basis on which the Court should
reconsider its denial of summary judgment as to Defendant’s compliance with the FMLA notice
Defendant argues that it did not waive its judicial estoppel argument because its delay in
raising that defense resulted from “Plaintiff chang[ing] his story” at the August 20, 2015 premotion conference. (See Def. Recon. Mot. at 6–7, 21–23.) This argument fails because Plaintiff,
in his Complaint, asserted that he was able to return to work as early as December 26, 2012, having
“recovered to the point that he was physically capable of performing his duties.” (See Dkt. 1 ¶ 19;
see also id. ¶¶ 21, 23 (Plaintiff asserted that, between December 26, 2012 and February 7, 2013,
Plaintiff attempted to return to work “on several occasions”).) Indeed, Defendant’s current
contention—that on August 20, 2015, “for the first time, Plaintiff represented to the Court that on
December 26, 2012 and February 5, 2013, Plaintiff had been ready, willing and able to return to
his sales job without any restriction and without any accommodation” (Def. Recon. Mot. at 21
(emphasis added))—is at odds with its contention in support of summary judgment that “[s]ince
the filing of the Complaint in this case through the August 20, 2015 Pre-Motion Court conference,
Plaintiff contended only that he was wrongfully denied the right to come back to his job on
December 26, 2012 and February 5, 2013 and was fully able to carry out all of his responsibilities”
(Dkt. 48 (MSJ Reply) at 7 (emphasis added)).
For these reasons, while there is evidence in the record placing Plaintiff’s assertions in
dispute, as discussed in the Court’s MSJ Order, Defendant cannot now justify its failure to assert
judicial estoppel in its answer by claiming that it was unaware that Plaintiff intended to argue that
he could have fully returned to work at the time his FMLA leave expired. In fact, contrary to its
current assertion, Defendant argued in its summary judgment papers that it had asserted judicial
estoppel as a defense in its answer. (See Dkt. 48 (MSJ Reply) at 8–9.) As with its argument
regarding the FMLA notice requirements, therefore, Defendant’s argument appears to be
premised, not on any actual error in the Court’s MSJ Order, but on Defendant’s fundamental
dissatisfaction with the conclusions therein.
Finally, Defendant’s reconsideration motion does not address the Court’s substantive
rejection of judicial estoppel, separate and apart from its finding of waiver. The Court held that
even in the absence of waiver, Defendant’s judicial estoppel defense would fail in light of the
Second Circuit’s holding in Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1997). (See MSJ
Order at 16–17 (“There is nothing in Simon that indicates or suggests that judicial estoppel applies
to a situation where, as here, a plaintiff made an allegedly inconsistent statement to a private
insurer in seeking disability benefits.”).) The Court held explicitly that “the justification for
applying judicial estoppel as articulated in Simon—i.e., ‘protect[ing] judicial integrity by avoiding
the risk of inconsistent results in two proceedings’—does not justify estoppel here,” but made clear
that Plaintiff could still “be[] questioned or impeached at trial about his claim of disability” on
these forms. (Id. at 17 & n.17 (citing Eaton v. Goodstein Mgmt., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 6582, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17655, at *14–16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1999)).) And finally, the Court held that
Defendant’s evidence was “insufficient to find estoppel on Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law,”
because “[a]t most, Plaintiff’s statement to Defendant’s disability insurance company was that he
expected to be able to return to work on February 18, 2013, and indeed, Plaintiff stopped receiving
disability benefits as of that date,” such that there was no “inconsisten[cy] with Plaintiff’s
contention now that Defendant should have restored him to his job as of February 18, 2013.” (Id.
at 18.) Because Defendant’s motion for reconsideration does not address these substantive
holdings, it has not met its burden to show any “intervening change of controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice” that
would warrant reconsideration of the Court’s MSJ Order regarding judicial estoppel. See Kolel,
729 F.3d at 104.
Plaintiff’s NYCHRL Claim
Finally, Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider its Order permitting Plaintiff to
proceed with his NYCHRL claim, because it construes the Court’s Order as “unilaterally []
amend[ing]” Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See Def. Recon. Mot. at 24.) While it is true that, in his
Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that he “attempted to return to work thirty (30) days after he suffered
a temporary disability” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 47), his NYCHRL cause of action also incorporated the other
factual allegations made in the Complaint, including, inter alia, that “[b]etween December 26,
2012 and February 7, 2013, Plaintiff . . . attempted to return to work on several occasions” (id. ¶
23), and that “Defendant engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices by discriminating against
Plaintiff with regards to the terms and conditions of his employment on account of his temporary
disability in violation of [the NYCHRL]” (id. ¶ 51). (See also Dkts. 33, 35 at 1 (in letters in
advance of the Court’s August 20, 2015 pre-motion conference, Plaintiff alleged that “under the
NYCHRL, Defendant . . . discriminated against [Plaintiff] due to his temporary disability”); Dkt.
33 at 3 (“An employee may recover under the NYCHRL for a cause of action of disability
discrimination if the employee’s disability caused the behavior for which he was terminated. . . .
[Plaintiff] suffered a temporary disability and once suffered, Defendant immediately refused to
restore him to his position as an on-premise sales representative,” such that “Defendant
discriminated against [Plaintiff] due to his temporary disability as a matter of law.”).)
This is not Plaintiff “sneak[ing] in, in summary judgment papers, a factual or legal
contention that the party had not raised before,” as Defendant contends. (See Def. Recon. Mot. at
24.) Rather, this is a claim that has been part of Plaintiff’s case since the beginning, one which
implicates precisely the same issues as Plaintiff’s FMLA claim, which were fully fleshed out in
discovery, regarding whether and when Plaintiff became fit for duty. Therefore, Defendant has
not met its burden to show any basis upon which the Court should reconsider its MSJ Order with
regard to Plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the portion of Defendant’s reconsideration
motion regarding whether prolonged walking or standing are essential functions of Plaintiff’s job;
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to that question, which shall be presented at trial, in
addition to the claims and issues identified in the Court’s MSJ Order. But the Court DENIES
Defendant’s motion for reconsideration in all other respects. The parties are still required to submit
a proposed joint pre-trial order no later than November 4, 2016.