Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/642/538/136634/
Timestamp: 2020-05-25 18:17:56
Document Index: 351381185

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 9031', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 432', '§ 9006', '§ 9004', '§ 9006', '§ 9002', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 306', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 706', '§ 441', '§ 431', '§ 9003', '§ 404', '§ 9012']

In Re Carter-mondale Reelection Committee, Inc., Democraticnational Committee,petitioners, Carter-mondale Reelection Committee, Inc.,democratic National Committee, Petitioners, v. Federal Election Commission, Respondent,ronald Reagan and Reagan for President General Electioncommittee, Intervenor, 642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980) :: Justia
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In Re Carter-mondale Reelection Committee, Inc., Democraticnational Committee,petitioners, Carter-mondale Reelection Committee, Inc.,democratic National Committee, Petitioners, v. Federal Election Commission, Respondent,ronald Reagan and Reagan for President General Electioncommittee, Intervenor, 642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980) Argued Aug. 12, 1980. Decided Sept. 12, 1980
Within five days of receiving a complaint, the FEC is required to notify, in writing, any person alleged to have committed a violation, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (1), and that person is given 15 days in which to respond to the complaint. This is for the purposes of allowing the respondent to demonstrate to the FEC that no action need be taken on the basis of the complaint. Id. Except for a shorter period for violations which occur immediately preceding an election, the FEC is required for a period of 30 days to attempt to correct by informal methods of conciliation and persuasion any apparent violations, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (4) (A) (i), (ii). Only if that informal conciliation process fails are formal proceedings authorized. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (6) (A). In any event, the statute allows the Commission a maximum period of 120 days, beginning from the date the complaint is filed, in which to conduct its investigation without judicial intrusion. Only after that period has expired may a person aggrieved by the failure of the FEC to act on a complaint file a petition in this court for review. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (8) (A). As the Eighth Circuit held in Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662, 673 (8th Cir. 1979):
The statute thus provides a strong basis for scrupulously respecting the grant by Congress of "exclusive jurisdiction" to the FEC with respect to civil enforcement of the election laws' provisions. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b) (1). The campaign financing law does not provide automatic consequences for every violation. Rather, the statute provides for FEC enforcement through both informal consent proceedings and formal proceedings, including proceedings by the Commission and courts. Not every alleged, or even actual, violation is presumed to require a judicial proceeding. Investigations of complaints may result in a vindication of the alleged conduct to the complete satisfaction of all. Or an investigation may result in a determination somewhere in-between a vindication and a violation. But until an investigation is completed, and the FEC has issued an order, or the statutory time limit for action has expired, the FEC is allowed to conduct its investigation, in the pursuance of its duties, without judicial interference.
An additional, independent ground precludes interfering with the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction and lends further support for the decision to dismiss the petition as premature. The interpretation of the statute, as expressed in Committee to Elect Lyndon LaRouche, 613 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S. Ct. 1019, 62 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1980) precludes withholding funding from a candidate once the objective criteria for eligibility are met, because of the important constitutional free speech considerations inherent in public campaign financing. The FEC found that Mr. Reagan had "satisfied" the threshold statutory and regulatory requirements for eligibility to receive federal funding.7 Accordingly, it would be a violation of his constitutional free speech rights to delay payment of those funds pending an investigation. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976).
We add, however, that we are not interpreting the statute as barring the FEC from deciding as a matter of policy that it will investigate a complaint, a request for funds, or conduct during a political campaign if it reasonably appears that a patent fraud or other major violation of law is being committed. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a) (8) (FEC rulemaking authority); see also LaRouche, supra.8 Commission decisions within its jurisdiction are entitled to great respect by the courts because of the extremely delicate nature of the tremendous power entrusted to it. Nothing requires the Commission to be ineffective in assuring that only candidates who meet the objective criteria of the statute for federal election funds are to receive money from the federal treasury. Nothing in this decision is to be read to the contrary. The Commission has been vested with a wide discretion in order to guarantee that it will be sensitive to the great trust imposed in it to not overstep its authority by interfering unduly in the conduct of elections. The statute has its own penalties, procedures, remedies and time schedules and these should be observed.
That the Commission has authority in determining eligibility for funding to venture outside the documents submitted expressly in support of the candidate's eligibility is buttressed by this court's decision in Committee to Elect Lyndon LaRouche v. FEC, 613 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S. Ct. 1019, 62 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1980), interpreting the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 (1976). In that case the statute was interpreted to permit a pre-certification investigation when the "threshold submission (or the submission together with other reports on file with the Commission) contains patent irregularities suggesting the possibility of fraud," id. at 842 n.14 (emphasis supplied).
I do not think these limited administrative obligations or judicial review of the certification in light of these obligations would unduly interfere with the Commission's primary jurisdiction over administrative complaints under 2 U.S.C. § 437g or with its exclusive jurisdiction over civil enforcement of the Fund Act under 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b) (1), or that they would thwart the intent of the enforcement mechanisms provided by these sections. To suggest that because of the doctrines of primary or exclusive jurisdiction the court may not inquire into the Commission's examination of the face of an administrative complaint and its accompanying materials before certifying a candidate's eligibility would to my mind be putting the cart before the horse.
This is not to suggest that the public interest in prompt certification of majorparty candidates is not great. One would scarcely contest the importance of preventing the Commission's administrative complaint procedures from becoming a tool for the partisan obstruction of legitimate campaign activities. One of the underlying purposes of public funding-to permit the candidate to avoid a diversion of energy from important campaign issues to the raising of funds8 -would be frustrated if the candidate were left for more than a brief period on tenterhooks while an administrative investigation progressed.
The tenth allegation charged only that three of the respondent political committees, long before Mr. Reagan became the nominee for President, had improperly "included the name 'Reagan' in their names." See 2 U.S.C. § 432(e) (4) (unauthorized committee "shall not include the name of any candidate in its name")
We, Ronald Reagan and George Bush, the nominees of the Republican Party for President and Vice President of the United States, do certify and agree under penalty of perjury pursuant to Chapter 93 of Title 26 of the United States Code to the following conditions in order that we may be eligible to receive any payments under 26 U.S.C. § 9006:
(1) We and our authorized committees have not incurred and will not incur qualified campaign expenses in excess of the aggregate payments to which we will be entitled under 26 U.S.C. § 9004 and Sec. 9006;
(2) No contributions to defray qualified campaign expenses have been or will be accepted by us or our authorized committees, except to the extent necessary to make up any deficiency in payments received out of the fund on account of the application of 26 U.S.C. § 9006(c), and no contributions to defray expenses which would be qualified campaign expenses but for 26 U.S.C. § 9002(11) (C) have been or will be accepted by us or any of our authorized committees;
2 U.S.C. § 437c(b) (1) provides: "The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to, this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of title 26. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions." (Emphasis added)
The Act previously provided that the Commission had "exclusive primary jurisdiction," 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b) (1) (1976), but an amendment in 1979 dropped the word "primary" without otherwise indicating any legislative intent. Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 306(b) (1), 93 Stat. 1355; see H.R. Rep. No. 422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1979, p. 2860. It would seem that "exclusive jurisdiction" would encompass both judicial doctrines of (1) exhaustion of administrative remedies and (2) primary jurisdiction, Cf. United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S. Ct. 161, 164-65, 1 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1956).
Such interpretation would also include the congressional intent expressed in the 1976 Committee Report which indicated an intent to make the jurisdiction of the FEC substantially similar to that of the National Labor Relations Board as expressed by the Supreme Court in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959). Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Garmon stated:
Id at 242, 79 S. Ct. at 778. The opinion also referred to the administrative scheme of the Labor Act as vesting "exclusive primary competence (in) . . . the (National Labor Relations) Board." Id. at 245, 79 S. Ct. at 779. In explaining why it proposed to change the phrase describing the FEC's power over civil enforcement from "primary jurisdiction" to "exclusive primary jurisdiction," the House of Representatives Committee Report on H.R. 12406, i.e., the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, stated:
The phrase "exclusive primary jurisdiction" used to describe the congressional intent to centralize the civil enforcement of the Act in the Federal Election Commission is taken from the Supreme Court's decisions in San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775. There the Court recognized that Congress, in enacting the National Labor Relations Act, "entrusted administration of the labor policy for the nation to a centralized agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience" (Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242, 79 S. Ct. at 778). On that basis the Court stated that all complaints bottomed on an alleged violation of the NLRA are within that Agency's "exclusive competence" (id. at 245, 79 S. Ct. at 779) and that all other tribunals must therefore "yield to the primary jurisdiction of the National Board" (id). The Court's ruling in Garmon captures the essence not only of the NLRA's administrative scheme, but of this Act's enforcement procedures as well.
The Commission has voted to deny your request, on behalf of complainant Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee ("C-M"), for expedited investigation of the above-referenced matter and to schedule a hearing with respondents' counsel in order to implement such expedited discovery. The application of 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (1) to this matter requires that the respondents alleged in your complaint to have committed a violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") be provided 15 days in which to demonstrate that no action should be taken against them, prior to a Commission determination of reason to believe that such a violation occurred. The Commission has determined that only if a finding of "reason to believe" is made will the Commission proceed with an investigation of the alleged violation. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (2). Thus, the Commission believes it inappropriate at this time to grant the expedited investigation schedule that C-M has requested. Of course, should the Commission determine, after the appropriate statutory period, that based on the C-M complaint there is reason to believe a violation of FECA occurred, it will proceed with an investigation, and such appropriate relief, as quickly as is possible without denying respondents any due process rights to which they may be entitled.
The Commission has also voted to deny the C-M request to make the investigation of this matter, should one be undertaken, public. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (12) expressly forbids the Commission from making such investigation public, absent the written consent of the respondent(s) permitting the Commission to do so. No exceptions to this confidentiality rule are provided in FECA.
It is also clear on the facts here that judicial intervention at this time when the statute places the matter within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Commission would violate the confidential treatment of notification and investigation that is expressly required by 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (12) (A):
(12) (A) Any notification or investigation made under this section shall not be made public by the Commission or by any person without the written consent of the person receiving such notification or the person with respect to whom such investigation is made.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1976). See 117 Cong.Rec. 41936 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (suggesting arbitrary or capricious standard). Cf. LaRouche, 613 F.2d at 845-46
For example, the extent to which the Federal Election Campaign Act's contribution attribution provisions, see, e. g., 2 U.S.C. § 441a(7),(8) (1976), or criteria for determining "independent expenditures," see 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1976), apply to the determination of "contributions" for purposes of eligibility for public funding, 26 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (2) (1976), is unclear. At oral argument counsel for the petitioners stated that the question "whether the contribution provision of the FECA applie(s) to the certification provision of the Fund Act" is "a terribly important and interesting question, going to the heart of our allegation and our complaint."
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 404(c) (13), 88 Stat. 1263, 1293 (1974)
Indeed, these two investigatory options may not appear to exhaust the panoply of methods available to the Commission to fulfill its obligations under the Fund Act. It is a matter of public record that the Commission has in fact already employed another weapon in its enforcement arsenal by bringing in the district court here an action for declaratory relief asserting that the activities of three groups organized to promote the Reagan presidency-groups which were also named as respondents in the petitioners' administrative complaint-will violate 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1) (1976) (prohibiting unauthorized expenditures of more than $1000 on behalf of a publicly funded candidate). FEC v. Americans for Change, Civ. No. 80-1754 (D.D.C., filed Jul. 14, 1980). By order issued August 28, 1980 (with opinion to follow) the three-judge court convened in that case has resolved cross-motions for summary judgment in favor of the defendant groups. Id. (Aug. 28, 1980). The order does not indicate on what basis summary judgment was granted and as of this writing the three-judge court has not issued its opinion. At the very least, however, the bringing of the action illustrates the Commission's view that the administrative complaint mechanism is not the sole route to enforcement of the Fund Act