Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105285/bread-political-action-comm-n-vs-fec
Timestamp: 2016-12-08 14:39:32
Document Index: 37870589

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 310', '§ 310', '§ 310', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 441', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 1331', '§ 437']

Bread Political Action Comm N Vs Fec - Citation 105285 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Bread Political Action Comm'n Vs. FEC - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/105285CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-08-1982Case Number455 U.S. 577AppellantBread Political Action Comm'nRespondentFECExcerpt:
bread political action comm'n v. fec - 455 u.s. 577 (1982)
section 310(a) of the federal election campaign act of 1971 lists three categories of plaintiffs who may challenge the constitutionality of any provision of the act in a federal district court action in which the district court must certify all questions of constitutionality to the court of appeals sitting en banc: (1) the federal election commission, (2) "the national..... Judgment:
Only parties belonging to one of the three categories listed in § 310(a) may invoke its expedited procedures, and since appellants are not within any of those categories, they may not invoke such procedures. The text of § 310(a) states plainly enough which plaintiffs may invoke its special procedures. This plain language controls the construction of § 310(a), absent "clear evidence" of a "clearly expressed" contrary congressional intent, and appellants have not met the burden of showing such "clear evidence" of a contrary intent. The fact that Congress wanted a broad class of questions to be speedily resolved does not imply that it intended the courts to augment the enumeration of qualified plaintiffs. Nor is there any merit to appellants' contention that Congress specified the three enumerated classes of plaintiffs simply to remove any doubts about their standing, but not to exclude others by implication. Pp.
Section 310(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 88 Stat. 1285, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), lists three categories of plaintiffs who may challenge the constitutional validity of FECA in specially expedited suits: (1) the Federal Election Commission (FEC), (2) "the national committee of any political party," and (3) "any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President." In this case, we address a question we expressly reserved in
453 U. S. 187
, n. 6 (1981): whether a party not belonging to one of the three categories listed in § 437h(a) may nonetheless invoke its procedures.
The appellants are two trade associations and three political action committees (PAC's): the National Restaurant Association and its associated PAC, the Restauranteurs Political Action Committee, the National Lumber and Building Material Dealers Association and its associated PAC, the Lumber Dealers Political Action Committee, and the Bread Political Action Committee, the PAC associated with the American Bakers Association. In order to challenge the validity of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(D), which has the effect of limiting the extent to which trade associations and their PAC's may solicit funds for political purposes, [
] the appellants filed an action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking expedited consideration of their suit under the procedures set forth in § 437h. [
] The District Court denied certification under § 437h on the ground that the plaintiff trade associations and PAC's do not belong to
Our analysis of this issue of statutory construction "must begin with the language of the statute itself,"
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U. S. 187
(1980), and, "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."
(1980). Moreover, when the statute to be construed creates, as § 437h does, a class of cases that command the immediate attention of this Court and of the courts of appeals sitting en banc, displacing existing caseloads and calling court of appeals judges away from their normal duties for expedited en banc sittings, close construction of statutory language takes on added importance. As we have said:
(1973) (citations omitted). In short, the plain language of § 437h(a) controls its construction, at least in the absence of "clear evidence,"
445 U. S. 121
(1980), of a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,"
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra,
120 Cong.Rec. 10562 (1974). [
] In the House, Representative Frenzel echoed this theme in responding to a question from another Member of the House about the constitutionality of the Amendments:
"I do call the attention of the gentleman to the fact that any
under this bill has a direct method to raise these questions and to have those considered as quickly as possible by the Supreme Court."
at 35140 (emphasis added).
Reaching out for some support, the appellants hypothesize that Congress specified the three enumerated classes to remove any doubts about their standing, but not to exclude others by implication. According to the appellants, absent explicit congressional authorization, the members of the three listed classes might not meet the prudential standing requirements this Court imposes.
-501 (1975). This argument, however, puts
the Commission or, under the proper circumstances, a private person to bring a civil action to enforce the Act, and such suits are themselves given expedited treatment under § 437g(a)(10), being advanced on the calendar ahead of all other actions except those given even higher priority by either § 437g or § 437h. Thus, any challenge, constitutional or nonconstitutional, may be raised as a defense in an enforcement action, and will be afforded expedited review. [
] Furthermore, plaintiffs meeting the usual standing requirements can challenge provisions of the Act under the federal question jurisdiction granted the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). [
Perhaps because Senator Buckley's intent as expressed in the legislative history remains uncertain, the appellants have submitted to this Court affidavits from Senator Buckley and David A. Keene, the Executive Assistant to the Senator who prepared the original draft of § 437h, expressing the belief that the amendment was not intended to exclude organizations from challenging the constitutionality of the Act.
Affidavit of James Buckley (Nov. 11, 1977), reprinted at App. 110, 112; Affidavit of David A. Keene (Oct. 21, 1977), reprinted at App. 106, 109.
We cannot give probative weight to these affidavits, however, because "[s]uch statements
represent only the personal views of th[is] legislato[r], since the statements were [made] after passage of the Act.'"
386 U. S. 639
, n. 34 (1967).
See also Quern v. Mandley,
, n. 10 (1978), in which we noted that "
observations by a single member of Congress carry little, if any, weight."