Source: https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/item/the-legality-of-fixed-term-employment-contracts-in-european-professional-football-the-mueller-case-and-beyond
Timestamp: 2019-06-16 17:08:55
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Matched Legal Cases: ['CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', '§ 64', 'CJEU ', '§ 69', '§ 14', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'art2', 'CJEU ', '§ 32', 'CJEU ']

Published 09 December 2016 | Authored by: Sven Demeulemeester, Alexander Vantyghem
The RPHLC takes into account the uncertainty for a club regarding the timeframe that a professional football player can successfully be employed by that club to justify recourse to fixed-term contracts.
Whilst seemingly attractive at first glance, the RPHLC’s reasoning may not hold. First of all, the Directive and the Framework Agreement primarily aim to protect the worker, not the employing club. In addition, unlike broadcasters, the media and artists, sports clubs do not seem to have a protected status under German law. Moreover, the fact that a worker might get injured is true for every profession where physical fitness is essential. A construction worker with a chronic back injury is equally useless to his or her employer. The example of course is fairly extreme, but the point is where the line should be drawn.
The comparison made to a professional coach’s “wear and tear” to justify fixed-term contracts, is tricky.[12] The question is whether players can simply be compared to coaches. A player is one of a significant number of players working at the club. With an important group of players at the club, some tactical flexibility always remains possible. Also, different team tactics may vary depending on the opponent. One may wonder why “as a rule” a player may fit in a club’s (tactical) plan on day one of his contract and no longer when he is at the club for a longer time.
Finally, using a player’s aging and consequent decrease in skills and fitness as a justification for the use of a fixed-term contract is tricky in the light of the prohibition on age discrimination. It should be stressed that the CJEU has proved to be rather intransigent when it comes to non-discrimination based on age, even accepting a direct horizontal effect where a directive expresses an overriding constitutional principle, considered to be an element of the EU legal order.[13]
Finally, it cannot be excluded that (some) player’s role develops into another one at the club - such as a scout, (youth) coach, etc. – once capability on the pitch declines.
Team composition renewal
The RPHLC further accepted the need for a football club to continually refresh the squad.
A contrarian argument would be that, the longer a (set of) player(s) is at the club, the likelier it is that the club will obtain positive sporting results.
Squad stability touches upon the essence of sports and competition. A stable team leads to competitiveness and to better sporting results. Clubs (must) invest time, effort and money for future success, often at the expense of immediate, short-term success.[14] It may even be argued that research has proved that the best-performing clubs have the most stable squads.[15] Players with longer term contracts perform better, ceteris paribus.[16] Also, the best-performing clubs rely relatively more on a core group of players.[17] It is often argued that it takes at least 2 to 3 years to form a homogeneous team unit out of a group of players and to make them perform to the best of their abilities, as a result of which it is considered essential for a club to be able to work throughout that whole period with the same players. Of course, some changes to the squad can never be avoided; but the ideal for sports directors is to hold on to a “skeleton” of key players and to strengthen specific positions with talented youngsters or through external hiring. It remains to be seen however whether taking this premise as a justification for an overall use of fixed-term contracts is not “a bridge too far”.
On this point, the RPHLC, however, has touched upon a sensitive issue. Adopting indefinite term contracts in football is said to hamper the influx of young talents,[18] which in turn may have an adverse effect on the investment of clubs in youth training facilities. The protection of young workers is generally accepted as an overriding imperative requirement in the general interest and, hence, probably one of the better legal lines of defence in this context.[19] However, in Germany, an indefinite duration employment contract seems difficult to terminate, which in turn triggers fears that an indefinite duration contract is de facto a permanent contract until the age of retirement.[20] This context seems very country-specific. Indeed, in (most, if not all) other European countries, an indefinite duration contract can, in principle, be ended provided a notice period is respected or compensation in lieu of notice is paid as soon as a sufficient reason can be invoked (e.g. lack of performance). In such countries, indefinite duration contracts do not really prevent clubs from offering young players a chance to enter the team.
Fans need for change
The RPHLC also referred to the public’s need for change and variety.
Some may disagree and argue that fans identify with certain players that at some stage become true “symbols” of their club. For example, think of Johan Cruijff at Ajax or Lionel Messi at Barcelona.
It is true, however, that such “symbolic” players are probably the exception as fans identify with the team rather than with its individual players.[21] Fans seem predominantly interested in a successful team. Some authors even question whether football fans, contrary to the stereotype of the Hornbyesque fan(atic) sticking to supporting one club only, are not just “glory-hunting polygamists”. According to these authors, they may not be all that loyal to their club. To put it in S. Kuper and S. Szymanski’s words, “People are fans of The Beatles, or The Cure, or The Pixies, but they generally like more than one band at the same time, and are capable of moving on when their heroes fade”. The same would go for football[22].
In that perspective, success can to some extent of course be bought through recruiting new players, which prima facie seems to plead in favour of flexible contracts and easy-to-replace players.
This being said, such sporting success may also be achieved gradually, especially since squad stability seems to have its merits as well. Also, at least in most countries, indefinite term contracts may be easier to terminate than fixed-term contracts, so the question is whether fixed-term contracts are the means to achieve this objective. Either way, even when assuming that fixed-term contracts allow for higher player mobility, which may be beneficial to sports, one may fail to see how fan expectations can trump fundamental rights players enjoy as workers.
Player’s benefit
Job security for players appears a laudable objective and one the RPHLC invokes.
However, the RPHLC’s argument that the use of fixed-term contracts is in the player’s own best interest seems rather circular, as the RPHLC stated that the ending of fixed-term contracts at clubs makes room for subsequent transfers.[23]
It is, moreover, tricky to generalise. Top players usually have good bargaining power at the “negotiating table” and most probably will be able to move to a club of their choice if they really want to. Some go even further and consider that, in professional football, the power has shifted dramatically for the benefit of players. In its 2014 Kanu ruling,[24] the Liège employment court president even went so far as to state that, where workers as a rule are the weaker party in relation to their employer, football players (and their entourage) today clearly have the upper hand with their clubs. For those players, the contractual stability rather works to the advantage of the clubs, not the players.
The reasoning in Kanu, however, is not transferable to all football players. Lesser players still compare the situation in their clubs to “David versus Goliath”, and could truly benefit from contractual stability and, hence, benefit from a fixed-term employment contract. Although some argue that in practice, clubs that really want to get rid of a player’s contract usually succeed in doing so relatively risk-free[25], others, including FIFPro, believe full reciprocity of rights and obligations in the event of a breach of contract is still lacking in practice.[26]
Porras: termination of fixed-term contracts
The discussion on the required nature of the employment contract between a player and a club clearly is not settled yet.
Although the discussion may seem academic at first glance, the debate becomes very practical when dealing with one of the main issues regarding fixed-term contracts: the rules around contract termination.[27]
In its Porras ruling of 14 September 2016, the CJEU clearly stated that the concept of equal treatment between fixed-term and permanent workers regarding employment conditions also covers the compensation that the employer must pay to a worker on account of the termination of a fixed-term contract.[28]
As a result, workers could be tempted to invoke the termination rules applying to indefinite term contracts if these would be more beneficial.
Moreover, the CJEU has referred to its settled case law, under which the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations may not be treated differently, unless such treatment is objectively justified. While, ultimately, it is up to the national courts to determine whether such objective justification is present, the CJEU has repeated its case law under which “the concept of ‘objective grounds’” requires the unequal treatment to be justified by “precise, specific factors, characterising the employment condition to which it relates, in the particular context in which it occurs and on the basis of objective, transparent criteria in order to ensure that unequal treatment in fact meets a genuine need, is appropriate for achieving the objective pursued and is necessary for that purpose”.
Again, the concept of "objective grounds" within the meaning of the Framework Agreement must be understood as not permitting a difference in treatment between fixed-term workers and permanent workers to be justified on the basis that the difference is provided for by a law or collective bargaining agreement.
Furthermore, “reliance on the mere temporary nature of the employment (…) cannot constitute an objective ground”, since accepting such reasoning would make the Directive and the Framework Agreement meaningless and would be tantamount to perpetuating a situation that is disadvantageous to fixed-term workers.
The justification brought forward in the Porras ruling by the Spanish government, i.e. the “duration and expectation of stability of the employment relationship”, was cast aside.
The Porras case does not apply to the activity of football, which is of course even more specific and atypical with contractual stability being considered necessary to safeguard a competitive balance and the stability and integrity of the competition. However, in this respect, football may face the argument that is not very consistent in seeking to secure such stability as it allows transfers mid-season – during the winter transfer “window” – that, in turn, may result in significantly different squad compositions in the second half of the sporting season. Also, less restrictive rules may achieve the same goals (e.g. the breach of an indefinite contract by the player prohibits this player from playing for another in the same competition during the same season).
The question is whether the stakeholders in sport can do something to counter the uncertainty that is currently marking the debate.
In this respect, it should be noted that the Framework Agreement creates the opportunity for social partners to conclude agreements adapting and/or complementing the Directive’s provisions in a way that takes into account the specific needs of the social partners concerned[29]. This option was not exercised – at least not at the European level - for professional football and, hence, professional football is, in general, subject to the Framework Agreement’s provisions.
There may however be some margin for the social partners in professional football to conclude specific collective bargaining agreements, provided, again, that they succeed in duly motivating the specificity of professional football.
The debate on whether professional football presents sufficiently distinct characteristics to justify the use of fixed-term employment contracts and, more importantly, specific termination rules, will probably rage on for years to come. This “journey” has been interesting so far and seems far from over.
The argument that fixed-term employment contracts are not justifiable may in addition be invoked in the wider context of the challenge of the current transfer system in football[30].
The diametrically opposed position taken by the courts of first instance and appeal in the Müller case clearly shows that both sides have their arguments.
Finally, stakeholders in the world of football, and sport in general, may turn to the (underused) tool of social dialogue to try and save what they perceive as a necessity for the way their activity is organised.
Notes on the Directive’s effect
The Directive implements the Framework Agreement. EU directives are addressed to the Member States, who are obliged to transpose them into their national legal systems. So, the provisions set out in EU directives apply in the different EU Member States in the manner that they are transposed by the Member States. National implementing legislation is key.
Since EU directives are only addressed to the Member States, they create obligations on the Member States only and cannot, as such, create obligations for an individual and cannot be invoked against another individual.
However, if a Member State has not correctly fulfilled its obligation to transpose a directive’s rules, there can still be – under certain circumstances – direct effect of an EU directive’s provisions. Private individuals can rely on such an EU directive in procedures before national courts against the Member State, to the extent that the provisions concerned are unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise and to the extent the EU Member State has not transposed the directive by its particular time deadline.[1]
Although individuals can, in principle, only invoke an EU directive’s direct effect against a Member State,[2] [3] there is also the notion of "indirect horizontal effect". This means that in a dispute between two private individuals, such as a player and a club, national courts will have an obligation to interpret national law in light of EU directives, even if they are not transposed on time into national law. Account must be taken of the results sought by such directives, even in the framework of litigation between individuals.
The obligation for Member States to achieve the result foreseen in an EU directive is imposed upon all state authorities, including the judicial authorities.[4] Indeed, national jurisdictions must ensure that there is the full effect of EU law (including EU directives) when deciding on disputes – even between individuals.[5] National judges may make preliminary referral requests to the CJEU seeking clarification of directives to ensure a uniform interpretation of national laws throughout the EU. Such interpretation has however a limited reach: in proceedings between two private individuals, a national judge cannot interpret national law against an EU directive (a “contra legem” – against the law - interpretation)[6] as it must uphold the general principles of EU law, such as legal certainty and non-retroactivity.[7]
However, this rule in turn must be nuanced. If a national law is manifestly contrary to the provisions of a directive implementing so-called fundamental or constitutional EU principles,[8] then the national judge must nevertheless set aside this internal regulation as the directive in that case has a direct horizontal effect. However, it should be noted that this case law, which the CJEU developed in the Mangold[9] and Kücükdeveci[10] cases, is fairly recent, has so far been limited to non-discrimination cases, and is not without criticism.[11] No doubt, national judges can, and in some cases must, seek further guidance from the CJEU in this respect.
[1] CJEU, 4 December 1974, Van Duyn, C-41/74, EU:C:1974:133.
[2] CJEU, 26 February 1986, Marschall, 152/84, EU:C:1986:84 ; and 14 July 1994, Faccini Dori, C-91/92, EU:C:1994:292 .
[3] However, a Member State cannot invoke an EU directive against an individual.
[4] CJEU, 10 April 1984, von Colson and Kamann, 14/83, EU:C:1984:153, CJEU,13 November 1990, Marleasing, C-106/89, EU:C:1990:395 ; CJEU, 19 January 2010, Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21.
[5] CJEU, 5 October 2004, Pfeiffer, C-397 to C-403/01, EU:C:2004:584 .
[6] CJEU, 4 July 2006, Adeneler, C-212/04, EU:C:2006:443.
[7] CJEU, 8 October 1987, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, 80/86, EU:C:1987:431. Therefore, in a scenario where national legislation is clearly contravening an EU directive, an individual/private entity cannot invoke the EU directive and must pursue other lines of action (such as a liability claim against a Member State).
[8] Cf. supra : the principle of free movement, the general principles of EU law (non-discrimination, legal certainty etc.) and the rights protected by the charter.
[9] CJEU, 22 November 2005, Mangold, C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709 ;.
[10] CJEU 19 January 2010, Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21 ;
[11] The CJEU seems to consider that EU directives that express cq clarify fundamental principles of EU law require a heightened degree of effectiveness, as a result of which in some cases national courts may not apply national legislation contravening fundamental principles expressed in the EU Directive. This presents a field of tension with the general principle that EU directives have no direct horizontal effect as EU law cannot become effective in horizontal cases before specifying EU legislation has been adopted.
[1] The relationship between a professional footballer and his club in general qualifies as an employment relationship to which the protection offered to workers under EU law applies.
[2] Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded on 6 June 1997 between the general cross-industry organizations (UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC).
[3] “Europe's trade unions came together to form the ETUC, so as to speak with a single voice on behalf of European workers and have a stronger say in EU decision-making. Since 2008, Europe’s economic and financial crisis and the introduction of austerity policies have reinforced the need for a body to defend workers’ interests at EU level” – ETUC, accessed 8 December 2016, https://www.etuc.org/aims-and-priorities
[4] Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP.
[5] CJEU 22 November 2005, Mangold, C-144/04, § 64.
[6] Article 249 TFEU; Article 2 of Directive 1999/70 read in conjunction with the 17th recital in its preamble.
[7] CJEU 4 July 2006, Adeneler, C-212/04, §§ 69 - 74.
[8] R. Blanpain, ‘Fixed-term employment contracts: the exception?’ in X., Fixed-term Employment Contracts. A Comparative Study, 18.
[9] Arbeitsgericht Mainz: ArbG Mainz, 19.03.2015 - 3 Ca 1197/14 (First Instance judgment Heinz Müller case).
[10] Landesarbeitsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz: LAG Rheinland-Pfalz, 17.02.2016 - 4 Sa 202/15 (Appeal judgment Heinz Müller case).
[11] Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz (“TzBfG”), article § 14, (2).
[12] Even for coaches, it seems doubtful whether fixed-term contracts are the solution, given the precarious nature of this specific job and the frequent contract termination prior to the expiration of the contract term.
[13] CJEU 19 January 2010, C-555/07, Kücükdeveci; CJEU 22 November 2005, Mangold, C-144/04; C.W.G. Rayer, European Court of Justice, 19 January 2010, C-555/07 (SEDA Kücücdevici / Swedex GmbH & Co. KG); D. Schiek, Constitutional principles and horizontal effect : Kücükdeveci revisited, 374.
[14] S. Van Den Bogaert, Practical regulation of the mobility of sportsmen in the EU post Bosman, Kluwer [2005], 279
[15] CDES, Research on third-party ownership of players’ economic rights, 2014.
[16] B. Buraimo, B. Frick, M. Hickfang and R. Simmons, “The economics of long-term contracts in the footballers’ labour market”, S.J.P.E. [2015].
[17] https://www.football-observatory.com/IMG/pdf/wp58_eng.pdf.
[18] P. Drabik, Compatibility of fixed-term contracts in football with Directive 1999/70/EC. Part2: The Heinz Müller case, www.asser.nl.
[19] S. Van Den Bogaert, Practical regulation of the mobility of sportsmen in the EU post Bosman, Kluwer [2005], 239.
[20] J. Rain, ‘The Heinz Müller Case’, Football Legal December 2015, 216.
[21] S. Van Den Bogaert, Practical regulation of the mobility of sportsmen in the EU post Bosman, Kluwer [2005], 280.
[22] S. Kuper and S. Szymanski, Soccernomics, 2012. More fanatic football fans may of course disagree with this point. There may be ‘glory’ fans that shift their allegiance according to the most successful club team of the moment as there are fans who only support the national team once every two years. It probably comes down to which type of fans are being referred to.
[23] K. Mekenkamp, The Müller case: revisiting the compatibility of fixed-term contracts in football with EU law, www.asser.nl.
[24] Liège Employment Court President, Kanu, 28 August 2014, n° 1469.
[25] S. Van Den Bogaert, Practical regulation of the mobility of sportsmen in the EU post Bosman, Kluwer [2005], 281. There are cases where clubs are sanctioned for early contract termination but they are still rather rare.
[26] https://www.fifpro.org/news/fifpro-takes-legal-action-against-fifa-transfer-system/en/.
[27] Regarding contract termination, the much-publicised Belgian Dahmane case has already stressed the importance of equal treatment between professional footballers and regular workers as such, and is not based on the Directive or the Framework Agreement but on the general non-discrimination principle laid down in the Belgian Constitution. The ‘specificity of sport’ was considered insufficient to allow for differentiation.
[28] CJEU 14 September 2016, Porras, C-596/14, § 32.
[29] Article 6 (3) of the Framework Agreement : ‘This Agreement does not prejudice the right of the social partners to conclude, at the appropriate level, including European level, agreements adapting and/or complementing the provisions of this Agreement in a manner which will take account of the specific needs of the social partners concerned.’
[30] The transfer system is currently being challenged by FIFPro in the light of EU law (free movement, competition and fundamental rights) (https://www.fifpro.org/news/fifpro-takes-legal-action-against-fifa-transfer-system/en/). In Belgium, French football player Lassana Diarra has also sparked litigation in the framework of which he has asked for a preliminary CJEU ruling (Tribunal de Commerce du Hainaut, Division Charleroi, R.G. n° A/16/00141).
Alexander is a sports law associate at ALTIUS, a Brussels based law firm. He advises both domestic and international clients on all aspects of Belgian and international sports law, and is particularly experienced in proceedings before the FIFA decision-making bodies and the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne.