Source: https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/01/19/2012-886/sentencing-guidelines-for-united-states-courts
Timestamp: 2015-08-31 08:48:03
Document Index: 381152003

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1091', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 509', '§ 2', '§ 509', '§ 2', '§ 509', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', 'art 2', '§ 5', 'art 2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1791', '§ 3772', '§ 1716', '§ 11582', '§ 11592', '§ 532', '§ 542', '§ 423', '§ 21022', '§ 21052', '§ 87022', '§ 87072', '§ 482', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

Dates: (1) Written public comment.--Written public comment regarding the proposed amendments and issues for comment set forth in this notice, including public comment regarding retroactive application of any of the proposed amendments, should be received by the Commission not later than March 19, 2012.
-2795 (18 pages)
Shorter URL: https://federalregister.gov/a/2012-886 Action
The proposed amendments and issues for comment in this notice are as follows: (1) A proposed amendment on fraud and related offenses, including (A) An issue for comment in response to the issue of harm to the public and financial markets, as raised by each of two directives to the Commission in section 1079A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203; (B) a proposed change to § 2B1.4 (Insider Trading) to implement the directive in section 1079A(a)(1) of that Act, and related issues for comment on insider trading, securities fraud, and similar offenses; (C) proposed changes to § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) regarding mortgage fraud offenses to implement the directive in section 1079A(a)(2) of that Act, and a related issue for comment on mortgage fraud and financial institution fraud; and (D) issues for comment on the impact of the loss table in § 2B1.1(b)(1) and the victims table in § 2B1.1(b)(2) in cases involving relatively large loss amounts; (2) a proposed amendment on offenses involving controlled substances and chemical precursors, including (A) an issue for comment on offenses involving N-Benzylpiperazine (BZP); and (B) a proposed change to § 2D1.11 (Unlawfully Distributing, Importing, Exporting or Possessing a Listed Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy) that would create a guidelines “safety valve” provision for offenses involving chemical precursors that would be analogous to the provision in § 2D1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy); (3) a proposed amendment on human rights offenses, including (A) a proposed guideline applicable to human rights offenses; (B) proposed changes to § 2L2.1 (Trafficking in a Document Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or Legal Resident Status, or a United States Passport; False Statement in Respect to the Citizenship or Immigration Status of Another; Fraudulent Marriage to Assist Alien to Evade Immigration Law) and § 2L2.2 (Fraudulently Acquiring Documents Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or Legal Resident Status for Own Use; False Personation or Fraudulent Marriage by Alien to Evade Immigration Law; Fraudulently Acquiring or Improperly Using a United States Passport) to address cases in which the offense of conviction is for immigration or naturalization fraud but the defendant had committed a serious human rights offense; and (C) related issues for comment on human rights offenses; (4) a proposed amendment to § 2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States) to respond to a circuit conflict over application of the term “sentence imposed” in that guideline when the defendant's original “sentence imposed” was lengthened after the defendant was deported; (5) a proposed amendment presenting options for specifying the types of documents that may be considered in determining whether a particular prior conviction fits within a particular category of crimes for purposes of specific guideline provisions, and related issues for comment; (6) a proposed amendment to § 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History) to respond to an application issue regarding when a defendant's prior sentence for driving while intoxicated or driving under the influence (and similar offenses by whatever name they are known) is counted toward the defendant's criminal history score; (7) a proposed amendment to § 4B1.2 (Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1) to respond to differences among the circuits on when, if at all, burglary of a non-dwelling qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the guidelines, and related issues for comment; (8) a proposed amendment to § 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction) to respond to an application issue regarding the applicable guideline range in a case in which the defendant is sentenced on multiple counts of conviction, at least one of which involves a mandatory minimum sentence that is greater than the minimum of the otherwise applicable guideline range; (9) a proposed amendment to § 5K2.19 (Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts) to respond to Pepper v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011), which held, among other things, that a defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts may be considered when the defendant is resentenced after appeal; and (10) a proposed amendment in response to miscellaneous issues arising from legislation recently enacted, including (A) proposed changes to § 2P1.2 (Providing or Possessing Contraband in Prison) to respond to the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010, Public Law 111-225, and (B) proposed changes to Appendix A (Statutory Index) to address certain criminal provisions in the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009, Public Law 111-154, the Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, Public Law 111-211, the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Public Law 111-294, and certain other statutes, and a related issue for comment.
(B) “Safety Valve” Provision in § 2D1.11
4. “Sentence Imposed” in § 2L1.2
8. Multiple Counts (§ 5G1.2)
The Commission requests public comment regarding whether, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. 994(u), any proposed amendment published in this notice should be included in subsection (c) of § 1B1.10 (Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement)) as an amendment that may be applied retroactively to previously sentenced defendants. The Commission lists in § 1B1.10(c) the specific guideline amendments that the court may apply retroactively under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The background commentary to § 1B1.10 lists the purpose of the amendment, the magnitude of the change in the guideline range made by the amendment, and the difficulty of applying the amendment retroactively to determine an amended guideline range under § 1B1.10(b) as among the factors the Commission considers in selecting the amendments included in § 1B1.10(c). To the extent practicable, public comment should address each of these factors.
1. Dodd-Frank/Fraud Back to Top
The proposed amendment also includes a Part D, which responds to concerns suggesting that the impact of the loss table or the victims table (or the combined impact of the loss table and the victims table) may overstate the culpability of certain offenders in cases sentenced under § 2B1.1 that involve relatively large loss amounts.
Should the Commission amend § 2B1.1 to more directly account for the potential and actual harms to the public and the financial markets? For example, should the Commission provide a new prong in § 2B1.1(b)(14) that provides an enhancement of [2][4][6] levels if the offense involved a significant disruption of a financial market or created a substantial risk of such a disruption? In the alternative, should the Commission provide a new upward departure provision in § 2B1.1 that applies if the offense involved such a disruption or created a substantial risk of such a disruption?
Securities fraud is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1348 (Securities and commodities fraud), which makes it unlawful to knowingly execute, or attempt to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud any person in connection with a security or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The statutory maximum term of imprisonment for an offense under section 1348 is 25 years. Offenses under section 1348 are referenced in Appendix A (Statutory Index) to § 2B1.1.
Securities fraud is also prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1350 (Failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports), violations of the provisions of law referred to in 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47), and violations of the rules, regulations, and orders issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to those provisions of law. See§ 2B1.1, comment. (n.14(A)). In addition, there are cases in which the defendant committed a securities law violation but is prosecuted under a general fraud statute. In general, these offenses are likewise referenced to § 2B1.1.
The proposed amendment responds to the directive by amending the insider trading guideline, § 2B1.4 (Insider Trading), in several ways.
Second, it provides a 4-level enhancement that applies if the defendant, at the time of the offense, held one of several listed positions of trust. This enhancement parallels the enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)(18).
Issues for comment are also provided, both on insider trading offenses under § 2B1.4 and on securities fraud and similar offenses under § 2B1.1.
Similarly, §2R1.1 provides a special instruction under which the fine for an organizational defendant is calculated based on 20 percent of the volume of commerce, rather than on the pecuniary loss. See§2R1.1(d)(1). Should the Commission consider an analogous approach for insider trading cases in §2B1.4? In particular, should the Commission provide a special rule under which the gain enhancement in §2B1.4(b)(1) would use either the gain or an amount equal to [20] percent of the volume of trading, whichever is greater?
(A) A simple rescissory method (under which loss is based upon the price that the victim paid for the security and the price of the security as it existed after the fraud was disclosed), see, e.g.,
United States v. Grabske, 260 F.Supp.2d 866, 872-73 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
(B) A modified rescissory method (under which loss is based upon the average price of the security during the period that the fraud occurred and the average price of the security during a set period after the fraud was disclosed to the market), see, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Bakhit, 218 F.Supp.2d 1232 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
(C) A market capitalization method (under which loss is based upon the price of the security shortly before the disclosure and the price of the security shortly after the disclosure), see, e.g.,
United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 64 (2002); United States v. Peppel, 2011 WL 3608139 (S.D. Ohio 2011); and
(D) A market-adjusted method (under which loss is based upon the change in value of the security, but excluding changes in value that were caused by external market forces), see, e.g.,
United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
What changes, if any, should the Commission make to the existing rules for calculation of loss in cases involving securities fraud or similar offenses? For example, the calculation of loss in an investment fraud case is covered by Application Note 3(F)(iv) to § 2B1.1, which provides:
3. Specific Provisions in § 2B1.1. The directive requires the Commission to consider, among other things, the enhancements at § 2B1.1(b)(15) and (b)(18) (formerly (b)(14) and (b)(17), respectively). The Commission seeks comment on whether any changes should be made to either or both of these provisions in response to the directive. Should the Commission expand the scope or the amounts of the increases provided by subsection (b)(15) or (b)(18), or both, to ensure that the guidelines appropriately account for the potential and actual harm to the public and the financial markets? If so, how?
With regard to financial institution fraud more generally, the proposed amendment broadens the applicability of § 2B1.1(b)(15)(B), which provides an enhancement of 4 levels if the offense involved specific types of financial harms (e.g., jeopardizing a financial institution or organization). Application Note 12 to § 2B1.1 lists factors to be considered in determining whether to apply the enhancement in subsection (b)(15)(B) for jeopardizing a financial institution or organization. Currently, the court is directed to consider whether the financial institution or organization suffered one or more listed harms (such as becoming insolvent) as a result of the offense. The proposed amendment amends Note 12 to direct the court to consider whether one of the listed harms was likely to result from the offense but did not result from the offense because of federal government intervention.
The Commentary to § 2B1.1 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in Note 3(A)(v) by adding at the end the following:
Bank fraud is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1344 (Bank fraud), which makes it unlawful to knowingly execute a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution or (2) to obtain any of the property of a financial institution by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. The statutory maximum term of imprisonment for an offense under section 1344 is 30 years. Offenses under section 1344 are referenced in Appendix A (Statutory Index) to § 2B1.1. Other statutes relating to financial institution fraud or mortgage fraud include 18 U.S.C. 215, 656, 657, 1005, 1006, 1010, 1014, 1029, and 1033. These offenses are likewise generally referenced to § 2B1.1.
The proposed amendment would also expand the scope of § 2B1.1(b)(15) by amending the commentary to provide additional factors for the court to consider in determining whether one or more prongs of subsection (b)(15) apply. The Commission invites comment on whether it should make any further changes to subsection (b)(15), such as by expanding its scope or increasing its penalties, or both, to “ensure appropriate terms of imprisonment for offenders involved in substantial bank frauds or other frauds relating to financial institutions”. If so, what changes to subsection (b)(15) should be made?
1. The Commission has observed that cases sentenced under § 2B1.1 involving relatively large loss amounts have relatively high rates of below-range sentences (both government sponsored and non-government sponsored), particularly in the context of securities fraud and similar offenses. The Commission also has received public comment and reviewed judicial opinions suggesting that the impact of the loss table or the victims table (or the combined impact of the loss table and the victims table) may overstate the culpability of certain offenders in such cases.
In response to these concerns, the Commission is studying whether it should limit the impact of the loss table or the victims table (or both) in cases sentenced under § 2B1.1 involving relatively large loss amounts and, if so, how it should limit the impact.
(A) Limiting Impact of Loss Table if the Defendant Had Relatively Little Gain Relative to the Loss. Should the Commission insert a new specific offense characteristic in § 2B1.1 to limit the impact of the loss table in cases involving large loss amounts if the defendant had relatively little gain relative to the loss? Examples of such a provision are the following:
(Ex. 1)If the defendant's gain resulting from the offense did not exceed $10,000, the adjustment from application of subsection (b)(1) shall not exceed [14]/[16] levels.
(Ex. 2)If the defendant's gain resulting from the offense did not exceed $25,000, the adjustment from application of subsection (b)(1) shall not exceed [16]/[18] levels.
(Ex. 3)If the defendant's gain resulting from the offense did not exceed $70,000, the adjustment from application of subsection (b)(1) shall not exceed [18]/[20] levels.
(B) Limiting Impact of Victims Table if No Victims Were Substantially Harmed by the Offense. Should the Commission amend the victims table in § 2B1.1(b)(2) to limit the impact of the victims table if no victims were substantially harmed by the offense? For example, should the Commission provide that the 4-level and 6-level prongs of the victims table apply only if the offense substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of at least one victim?
3. Many guidelines refer to the loss table in § 2B1.1, such as § 2B5.3 (Criminal Infringement of Copyright or Trademark), § 2C1.2 (Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Gratuity), and § 2S1.1 (Laundering of Monetary Instruments; Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived From Unlawful Activity). Other guidelines maintain a certain proportionality with the fraud guideline even though they do not refer directly to the loss table in § 2B1.1, such as guidelines that use the tax table in § 2T4.1. If the Commission were to limit the impacts of the loss table or the victims table, or both, in § 2B1.1, what changes, if any, should the Commission make to other guidelines for proportionality?
2. Drugs Back to Top
Part A sets forth detailed issues for comment regarding offenses involving N-Benzylpiperazine (BZP) and whether the Commission should amend the guidelines applicable to offenses involving BZP, such as by providing a specific reference for BZP in the Drug Quantity Table in § 2D1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy). Among other things, the issues for comment ask whether the Commission should base the penalties for BZP on the penalties for MDMA (Ecstasy), on the penalties for amphetamine, or on some other basis.
Part B sets forth a proposed amendment that would create a “safety valve” provision in the guideline for chemical precursors, § 2D1.11 (Unlawfully Distributing, Importing, Exporting or Possessing a Listed Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy), that parallels the “safety valve” provision in § 2D1.1. The proposed amendment adds a new specific offense characteristic at § 2D1.11(b)(6) and a corresponding new application note. Under the proposed amendment, certain first-time, nonviolent offenders sentenced under the chemical precursor guideline, § 2D1.11, would be eligible to receive the same 2-level “safety valve” reduction (and using the same five “safety valve” criteria) as such offenders are eligible to receive under § 2D1.1.
1. The Commission seeks comment regarding whether the Commission should amend the guidelines applicable to offenses involving BZP, such as by providing a specific reference for BZP in the Drug Quantity Table in § 2D1.1.
The Guidelines Manual does not provide a specific reference for BZP in the Drug Quantity Table in § 2D1.1 and does not provide a marijuana equivalency for BZP in the Drug Equivalency Table in Application Note 10(D) to § 2D1.1. Accordingly, guideline penalties for offenses involving BZP are determined under Application Note 5 to § 2D1.1, which directs the court to determine the base offense level using the marijuana equivalency of the “most closely related controlled substance” referenced in the guideline. In determining the most closely related substance, the court shall, to the extent practicable, consider the following:
See§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.5).
District courts have suggested that the substance most closely related to BZP may be amphetamine, see United States v. Rose, 722 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1289 (M.D.Ala. 2010) (“BZP on its own may arguably be most similar to amphetamine”), or methylphenidate (Ritalin), see United States v. Beckley, 715 F.Supp.2d 743, 748 (E.D.Mich. 2010) (stating that, if the issue of BZP alone were before the court, “it would be obliged to conclude that the most closely related controlled substance * * * is methylphenidate”). However, the Eighth Circuit has upheld a district court's conclusion that BZP is most closely related to MDMA. See United States v. Bennett,__ F.3d __, 2011 WL 4950051 (8th Cir. 2011).
The Commission invites general comment on BZP offenses and BZP offenders and how these offenses and offenders compare with other drug offenses and drug offenders. For example, how is BZP manufactured? How is it distributed and marketed? How is it possessed and used? What are the characteristics of the offenders involved in these various activities? What harms are posed by these activities? B. Chemical Structure
Is the chemical structure of BZP substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance referenced in § 2D1.1? If so, to what substance?
Is the effect on the central nervous system of BZP a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect? Is that effect substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance referenced in § 2D1.1? If so, to what substance? Is the quantity of BZP needed to produce that effect lesser or greater than the quantity needed of the other such substance? If so, what is the difference in relative potency?
Courts have recognized that distinctions between BZP alone and BZP in combination with other substances may be appropriate. For example, the Second Circuit in United States v. Chowdhury, 639 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 2011), upheld a determination that BZP in combination with TFMPP is most closely related to MDMA, but in United States v. Figueroa, 647 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2011), remanded a determination that BZP alone is most closely related to MDMA, finding Chowdhury not applicable and the record otherwise insufficient. See id. at 470 (“Although we certainly do not foreclose the determination that MDMA is the appropriate substitute for BZP alone, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to determine the nature of the mixture, its chemical structure, and its intended neurological effects, the record on appeal does not permit us to determine whether the proper substitute is amphetamine * * *, MDMA, or another substance on the Drug Equivalency Table * * * ”).
The Commentary to § 2D1.11 captioned “Application Notes” is amended by adding at the end the following:
“9. Applicability of Subsection (b)(6).—The applicability of subsection (b)(6) shall be determined without regard to the offense of conviction. If subsection (b)(6) applies, § 5C1.2(b) does not apply. See§ 5C1.2(b)(2) (requiring a minimum offense level of level 17 if the ‘statutorily required minimum sentence is at least five years’).”.
3. Human Rights Back to Top
Part A of the proposed amendment addresses cases in which the defendant is convicted of an offense that Congress has indicated is a “serious human rights offense,”i.e., an offense under 18 U.S.C. 1091 (Genocide), 2340A (Torture), 2441 (War crimes), and 2442 (Recruitment or use of child soldiers). See 28 U.S.C. 509B(e). Such offenses are currently accounted for in the guidelines as follows:
(1) Genocide. Section 1091 offenses apply to a range of conduct committed “with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group”. See 18 U.S.C. 1091(a). The range of conduct includes (i) Killing members of the group; (ii) causing serious bodily injury to members of the group; (iii) causing permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group (e.g., by drugs or torture); (iv) subjecting the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group; (v) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (vi) transferring by force children of the group to another group. Id. The statutory maximum term of imprisonment is 20 years, or life imprisonment if the conduct involved killing and death resulted. See 18 U.S.C. 1091(b). In addition, section 1091(c) makes it a crime to “directly and publicly incite[] another” to violate section 1091(a); the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for this offense is 5 years. See 18 U.S.C. 1091(c). Section 1091 offenses are referenced in Appendix A (Statutory Index) to § 2H1.1 (Civil Rights).
(2) Torture. Section 2340A offenses apply to whoever commits or attempts to commit torture (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2340). The statutory maximum term of imprisonment is 20 years, or any term of years or life if death resulted. See 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a). Section 2340A offenses are referenced in Appendix A to §§ 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder), 2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder), 2A2.1 (Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder), 2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault), and 2A4.1 (Kidnapping, Abduction, Unlawful Restraint).
(4) Child Soldiers. Section 2442 offenses apply to whoever knowingly (1) recruits, enlists, or conscripts a child (i.e., a person under 15 years of age) to serve in an armed force or group or (2) uses a child to participate actively in hostilities. See 18 U.S.C. 2442(a). The statutory maximum term of imprisonment is 20 years, or any term of years or life if death resulted. See 18 U.S.C. 2442(b). Section 2442 offenses are referenced in Appendix A to § 2H4.1 (Peonage, Involuntary Servitude, Slave Trade, and Child Soldiers).
Option 1 establishes a new Chapter Two offense guideline, at § 2H5.1 (Human Rights). The new offense guideline reflects a consolidation into a single guideline of the various base offense levels and specific offender characteristics that are involved in the guidelines that currently account for these offenses. The new offense guideline contains alternative base offense levels of [18] if the defendant is convicted of the offense of incitement to genocide (which generally has a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 5 years) and [24] otherwise. The guideline also contains enhancements that apply if any victim sustained serious bodily injury (2 to 4 levels); if any victim was sexually exploited (6 to 10 levels); if any victim was abducted, involuntarily detained, or held in a condition of servitude (6 to 10 levels); if the number of victims was [10][50] or more (2 levels); if death resulted; or if the defendant was a public official [or military official] or the offense was committed under color of law [or color of military authority].
Option 2 establishes a new Chapter Three adjustment, at § 3A1.5 (Human Rights), that applies if the defendant [was convicted of]/[committed] a serious human rights offense. The proposed guideline provides an enhancement of [4]-[12] levels and a minimum offense level of [24]-[32]. The proposed guideline also requires that the defendant be placed in Criminal History Category [V][VI].
Part B of the proposed amendment addresses cases in which the offense of conviction is for immigration or naturalization fraud but the defendant had committed a serious human rights offense. Immigration and naturalization frauds are referenced in Appendix A to § 2L2.1 (Trafficking in a Document Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or Legal Resident Status, or a United States Passport; False Statement in Respect to the Citizenship or Immigration Status of Another; Fraudulent Marriage to Assist Alien to Evade Immigration Law) or § 2L2.2 (Fraudulently Acquiring Documents Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or Legal Resident Status for Own Use; False Personation or Fraudulent Marriage by Alien to Evade Immigration Law; Fraudulently Acquiring or Improperly Using a United States Passport), depending on the offense of conviction.
§ 2H5.1. Human Rights
(2) [18], if the defendant is convicted of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1091(c).
Definitions of ‘serious bodily injury' and ‘permanent or life-threatening bodily injury' are found in the Commentary to § 1B1.1 (Application Instructions). However, for purposes of this guideline, 'serious bodily injury' means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which is taken into account in the specific offense characteristic under subsection (b)(2).
2. Interaction With § 3A1.1 (Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim).—
(A) Hate Crime Motivation (§ 3A1.1(a)).—If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation of any person, an additional 3-level enhancement from § 3A1.1(a) will apply. An adjustment from § 3A1.1(a) will not apply, however, if a 6-level adjustment from § 2H5.1(b)(6) applies.
(B) Vulnerable Victim (§ 3A1.1(b)).—The base offense level does not incorporate the possibility that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim for purposes of § 3A1.1(b). Therefore, an adjustment under '3A1.1(b) would apply, for example, in a case in which the defendant recruited or used child soldiers (see 18 U.S.C. 2442) or transferred by force children of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group (see 18 U.S.C. 1091(a)(5)).
3. Interaction with § 3A1.3 (Restraint of Victim).—If subsection (b)(3) applies, do not apply § 3A1.3 (Restraint of Victim).
4. Interaction With § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill.—If subsection (b)(6) applies, do not apply § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).
The Commentary to § 2A1.1 captioned “Statutory Provisions” is amended by striking “, 2340A”.
The Commentary to § 2A1.2 captioned “Statutory Provisions” is amended by striking “, 2340A”.
The Commentary to § 2A2.2 captioned “Statutory Provisions” is amended by striking “, 2340A”.
The Commentary to § 2A4.1 captioned “Statutory Provisions” is amended by striking “, 2340A”.
The Commentary to § 2H1.1 captioned “Statutory Provisions” is amended by striking “, 1091”.
The Commentary to § 2H4.1 captioned “Statutory Provisions” is amended by striking “, 2442”.
The Commentary to § 2H4.1 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in the sentence beginning “'Peonage or involuntary servitude'” by striking “, slavery, and recruitment or use of child soldiers” and inserting “and slavery”.
“§ 3A1.5. Serious Human Rights Offense
1. ‘Serious Human Rights Offense'.—For purposes of this guideline, 'serious human rights offense' means violations of federal criminal laws relating to genocide, torture, war crimes, and the use or recruitment of child soldiers under sections 1091, 2340, 2340A, 2441, and 2442 of title 18, United States Code. See 28 U.S.C. § 509B(e).
The Commentary to § 2L2.1 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in Note 1 by adding at the end the following:
“ ‘Serious human rights offense' means violations of federal criminal laws relating to genocide, torture, war crimes, and the use or recruitment of child soldiers under sections 1091, 2340, 2340A, 2441, and 2442 of title 18, United States Code. See 28 U.S.C. § 509B(e).”.
The Commentary to § 2L2.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended by redesignating Notes 4 and 5 as Notes 5 and 6, respectively, and by inserting after Note 3 the following:
“4. Application of Subsection (b)(4).—For purposes of subsection (b)(4), 'serious human rights offense' means violations of federal criminal laws relating to genocide, torture, war crimes, and the use or recruitment of child soldiers under sections 1091, 2340, 2340A, 2441, and 2442 of title 18, United States Code. See 28 U.S.C. § 509B(e).”;
4. “Sentence Imposed” in § 2L1.2 Back to Top
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment responds to a circuit conflict over application of the term “sentenced imposed” in § 2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States) when the defendant's original “sentence imposed” was lengthened after the defendant was deported.
(1) if the “sentence imposed” exceeded 13 months, the enhancement is 16 or 12 levels, depending on whether the conviction receives criminal history points. See§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A); and
(2) if the “sentence imposed” was 13 months or less, the enhancement is 12 or 8 levels, depending on whether the conviction receives criminal history points. See§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).
“Sentence imposed” has the meaning given the term “sentence of imprisonment” in Application Note 2 and subsection (b) of § 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History), without regard to the date of the conviction. The length of the sentence imposed includes any term of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release.
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the later, higher sentence does not apply for purposes of the enhancement in § 2L1.2(b)(1). See United States v. Lopez, 634 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Guzman-Bera, 216 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 2010). These cases generally reason that there is a “temporal restriction” inherent in the enhancement and conclude that the “sentence imposed” is determined as of when the defendant was deported or unlawfully remained in the United States. See, e.g.,
Lopez, 634 F.3d at 950.
The Commentary to § 2L1.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in Note 1(B)(vii) by inserting before the period at the end the following:
5. Categorical Approach Back to Top
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment presents options for specifying the types of documents that may be considered in determining whether a particular prior conviction fits within a particular category of crimes for purposes of specific guidelines provisions (e.g., determining whether a defendant's prior conviction for nonresidential burglary under a particular state statute qualifies as an “aggravated felony” for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)).
Taylor holds that, in making such a determination, a sentencing court may “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.”Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. Because the court is not concerned with the “facts underlying the prior convictions,”id. at 600-02, the court may not focus on the underlying criminal conduct itself. This categorical approach “may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the elements” of the offense. Id. at 602. Thus, a prior conviction fits within the particular category of crimes “if either its statutory definition substantially corresponds to [the definition of the crime], or the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of [the specified crime] in order to convict the defendant.”Id.
Shepard applied Taylor to a case in which the prior conviction was the result of a guilty plea. In such a case, the Court held, the sentencing court may look to a limited list of documents to determine the class of offense: “The terms of the charging document, the terms of the plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.”Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26.
In cases where the defendant's prior conviction involved a provision that covers both conduct that fits within the category and conduct that does not, the Court has authorized courts to look at the judicial record to determine whether the prior conviction was in fact based on conduct that fit within the category of crimes. This analysis is called the “modified categorical approach.” Under this modified approach, the court may consider only those sources approved by Taylor and Shepard—the charging document, the jury instructions, any plea agreement or plea statement, or “some comparable judicial record of this information.” The Fifth Circuit has extended this list to include New York Certificates of Disposition, see United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2008), and the Ninth Circuit has included California Minute Entries, see United States v. Snellenberger, 548 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, courts have disallowed the use of a federal presentencing report, see, e.g.,
United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2005), a California abstract of judgment, see, e.g.,
United States v. Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2005), or a police report, see, e.g.,
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16; United States v. Almazan-Becerra, 482 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed the use of police reports in a Taylor analysis” but that such reports may be used when stipulated to by the defendant).
The proposed amendment presents options for specifying the types of documents that may be considered for purposes of the guidelines in determining whether a particular prior conviction fits within a particular category of crimes. Option 1 would apply only to determinations under the illegal reentry guideline, § 2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States). Option 2 would apply throughout the Guidelines Manual in any case in which the nature of the prior conviction is a disputed factor.
Option A would specify these four sources of information. Option B would incorporate Option A and add as a fifth source of information “any uncontradicted, internally consistent parts of the record from the prior conviction”. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 31 (“I would expand that list to include any uncontradicted, internally consistent parts of the record from the earlier conviction. That would include the two sources the First Circuit relied upon in this case,” which consisted of “the applications by which the police had secured the criminal complaints and the police reports attached to those applications.” [Emphasis in original.]) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Option C would incorporate Option A and add as a fifth source of information “any other parts of the record from the prior conviction, provided that the information in such other parts of the record has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy”. See§ 6A1.3 (Resolution of Disputed Factors)(Policy Statement). Option D would combine all three options, incorporating Option A as well as the additional sources of information in both Options B and C.
The Commentary to § 2L1.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in Note 1 by adding at the end the following:
(v) Any other parts of the record from the prior conviction, provided that the information in such other parts of the record has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. See subsection (a) to § 6A1.3 (Resolution of Disputed Factors).]
(vi) Any other parts of the record from the prior conviction, provided that the information in such other parts of the record has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. See subsection (a) to § 6A1.3 (Resolution of Disputed Factors).]”.
The Commentary to § 6A1.3 is amended by adding at the end the following:
2. Option 1 of the proposed amendment amends only § 2L1.2. However, the Supreme Court's “categorical approach” has been applied by lower courts to a variety of other guidelines that contain provisions that use a prior conviction as an aggravating factor if the prior conviction fits within a particular category of crimes. Among the most commonly applied are § 2K2.1 (Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition) and § 4B1.1 (Career Offender), each of which contain provisions that use a prior conviction as an aggravating factor if the prior conviction is a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense”. See, e.g.,§ 2K2.1(a)(1)-(4), § 4B1.1(a). Accordingly, Option 2 of the proposed amendment would apply throughout the Guidelines Manual.
As an alternative to Options 1 and 2, should the Commission apply the proposed amendment more broadly than Option 1 (§ 2L1.2-only) but more narrowly than Option 2 (guidelines-wide)? In particular, should the Commission apply the proposed amendment to § 2L1.2 as well as one or more other specific guidelines? If so, which guidelines should the Commission amend?
6. Driving While Intoxicated Back to Top
The issue does not occur when the prior sentence is a felony, because “[s]entences for all felony offenses are counted.”See subsection (c) of § 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History). However, when the prior sentence is a misdemeanor or petty offense, circuits have taken different approaches.
When the prior sentence is a misdemeanor or petty offense, § 4A1.2(c) specifies that the offense is counted, but with two exceptions, which are limited to cases in which the prior offense is on (or similar to an offense that is on) either of two lists. On the first list are offenses from “careless or reckless driving” to “trespassing,” and the exception applies if the prior offense is on (or similar to an offense that is on) the list. In such a case, the sentence is counted only if (A) the sentence was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the prior offense was similar to an instant offense. See§ 4A1.2(c)(1). On the second list are offenses from “fish and game violations” to “vagrancy,” and the exception applies to any offense that is on (or similar to an offense that is on) the list. In such a case, the sentence is never counted. See§ 4A1.2(c)(2).
Several circuits have held that a sentence for driving while intoxicated—whether a felony, misdemeanor, or petty offense—is always counted toward the criminal history score, without exception, even if the offense met the criteria for either of the two lists. These circuits rely on Application Note 5 to § 4A1.2, which provides:
Sentences for Driving While Intoxicated or Under the Influence.—Convictions for driving while intoxicated or under the influence (and similar offenses by whatever name they are known) are counted. Such offenses are not minor traffic infractions within the meaning of § 4A1.2(c).
The Seventh Circuit has read Application Note 5 as “reflect[ing] the Sentencing Commission's conclusion ‘that driving while intoxicated offenses are of sufficient gravity to merit inclusion in the defendant's criminal history, however they might be classified under state law.’ ”United States v. LeBlanc, 45 F.3d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 806 (2d Cir. 1992)). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has held, a sentence for driving while intoxicated is always counted, without exception. For example, such a sentence is counted even though it may otherwise qualify for a second-list exception, see LeBlanc, supra, 45 F.3d at 194-95 (sentence counts even though it was a local ordinance violation that was not also a violation under state criminal law).
The Eighth Circuit has also relied on Application Note 5 to hold that a sentence for driving while intoxicated is always counted, without exception. See United States v. Pando, 545 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colorado misdemeanor for driving a vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more other drugs which “affects the person to the slightest degree so that the person is less able than the person ordinarily would have been” to operate a vehicle was “similar” to driving while intoxicated or under the influence, and therefore automatically counted, without regard to the exceptions in § 4A1.2(c)(1) and (2)).
The Second Circuit took a different approach in United States v. Potes-Castillo, 638 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2011). In that case, the Second Circuit held Application Note 5 to be ambiguous and could be read either (1) to “mean that, like felonies, driving while ability impaired sentences are always counted, without possibility of exception” or (2) “as setting forth the direction that driving while ability impaired sentences must not be treated as minor traffic infractions or local ordinance violations and excluded under section 4A1.2(c)(2).”Id. at 110-11. The Second Circuit adopted the second reading and, accordingly, held that a prior sentence for driving while ability impaired “should be treated like any other misdemeanor or petty offense, except that they cannot be exempted under section 4A1.2(c)(2).”Id. at 113. Accordingly, such a sentence can qualify for an exception under the first list (e.g., if it was similar to “careless or reckless driving” and the other criteria for a first-list exception were met).
The proposed amendment responds to the application issue by amending Application Note 5 consistent with the approaches of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. Specifically, it amends Application Note 5 to clarify that such a sentence is always counted, without regard to how the offense is classified and without regard to whether any exception in § 4A1.2(c)(1) or (2) otherwise applies.
The Commentary to § 4A1.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in Note 5 by striking “are counted. Such offenses are not minor traffic infractions within the meaning of § 4A1.2(c).” and inserting “are always counted, without regard to how the offense is classified and without regard to whether any exception in § 4A1.2(c)(1) or (2) otherwise applies.”.
7. Burglary of a Non-Dwelling Back to Top
The term “crime of violence” is defined in several different ways in the guidelines and in statute. The definition that has given rise to the differences among the circuits is contained in subsection (a) of § 4B1.2 (Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1). This definition is used not only for determining whether a defendant's sentence is subject to enhancement in § 4B1.1, but also for determining whether a defendant's sentence is subject to enhancement in a variety of other guidelines. See, e.g.,§ 2K1.3(a)(1)-(2) & comment. (n.2); § 2K2.1(a)(1), (2), (3)(B), (4)(A) & comment. (n.1), § 2K2.1(b)(5) & comment. (n.13(B)); § 2S1.1(b)(1)(B)(ii) & comment. (n.1); § 4A1.1(e) & comment. (n.5).
The definition in § 4B1.2(a) provides, among other things, that a felony is a crime of violence if it “is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Thus, § 4B1.2(a) specifies that burglary of a dwelling is always a crime of violence but is silent about burglary of a non-dwelling.
Courts have observed that this clause in § 4B1.2(a) substantially parallels a clause in 18 U.S.C. 924(e), except that the statutory provision specifies that any burglary is a crime of violence while the guideline provision is more limited, specifying that burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence. There are different approaches among the circuits about whether burglary of a non-dwelling is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). The Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that burglary of a non-dwelling is never a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 733 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that, in promulgating § 4B1.2 with language limiting a crime of violence to “burglary of a dwelling,” the Commission “obviously declined” to adopt the view that all burglaries present the serious potential risk of physical injury to another necessary to bring the crime within the residual clause); see also United States v. Harrison, 58 F.3d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 938-39 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The Second and Eighth Circuits have held that burglary of a non-dwelling is always a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 264-67 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that burglary of a non-dwelling falls within the residual clause at § 4B1.2(a) in light of the identically worded residual clause in § 924(e), the circuit court's previous holding that the residual clause in § 924(e) includes burglary of a non-dwelling, and the absence of a relevant statement by the Commission on the issue); see also United States v. Ross, 613 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2010). The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have declined to adopt per se rules, holding instead that the question depends on the individual circumstances of each case. See, e.g., United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Matthews, 374 F.3d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hoults, 240 F.3d 647, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 928 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Turner, 349 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 2003).
Two issues for comment are also provided. The first issue for comment asks whether the Commission should consider a third option, i.e., to specify that whether burglary of a non-dwelling is a crime of violence depends on the individual circumstances of each case. The second issue for comment asks whether the Commission should also address the definition of “crime of violence” in '2L1.2, which presents a similar issue. Proposed Amendment:
The Commentary to § 4B1.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in Note 1, in the paragraph that begins “ ‘Crime of violence’ includes”, by striking “burglary of a dwelling” and inserting “burglary”.
The Commentary to § 4B1.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in Note 1 by inserting after the paragraph that begins “ ‘Crime of violence’ includes” the following:
“ ‘Crime of violence’ does not include burglary of a structure other than a dwelling [, unless the offense meets the requirement of subsection (a)(1), i.e., it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another].”.
1. The two options presented in the proposed amendment would amend § 4B1.2 in either of two ways—to specify that the offense of burglary is always a crime of violence, or to specify that the offense of burglary of a non-dwelling is never a crime of violence. Should the Commission instead consider a third option—to specify that, in determining whether burglary of a non-dwelling is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a), the court should determine whether the particular offense satisfies the requirements of the definition's residual clause (i.e., whether the offense “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”)?
2. The issue of whether burglary of a non-dwelling is a crime of violence is also presented in § 2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States), which contains its own definition of “crime of violence”. That definition, as with the definition in § 4B1.2(a), specifies that burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence, but is silent about burglary of a non-dwelling. If the Commission amends the definition in § 4B1.2 to clarify when, if at all, burglary of a non-dwelling is a crime of violence, should it also make a parallel change to the definition in § 2L1.2?
8. Multiple Counts (§ 5G1.2) Back to Top
The issue arises under § 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction) when at least one count in a multiple-count case involves a mandatory minimum sentence that affects the otherwise applicable guideline range. In such cases, circuits differ over whether the guideline range is affected only for the count involving the mandatory minimum or for all counts in the case. The cases indicate that there may also be an ancillary application issue over how the “total punishment” is to be determined and imposed under § 5G1.1(b).
The Ninth Circuit took a different approach in United States v. Evans-Martinez, 611 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 2010), holding that, in such a case, “a mandatory minimum count becomes the starting point for any count that carries a mandatory minimum sentence higher than what would otherwise be the Guidelines sentencing range,” but “[a]ll other counts * * * are sentenced based on the Guidelines sentencing range, regardless of the mandatory minimum sentences that apply to other counts.”See id. at 637. The Ninth Circuit stated that it would be more “logical” to follow the Fifth Circuit's approach but “such logic is overcome by the precise language of the Sentencing Guidelines”. See id.
The proposed amendment adopts the approach followed by the Fifth Circuit and makes three changes to § 5G1.2.
First, it amends § 5G1.2(b) to clarify that the court is to determine the total punishment (i.e., the combined length of the sentences to be imposed) and impose that total punishment on each count, except to the extent otherwise required by law.
Second, it amends the Commentary to clarify that the defendant's guideline range in a multiple-count case may be restricted by a mandatory minimum penalty or statutory maximum penalty in a manner similar to how the guideline range in a single-count case may be restricted by a minimum or maximum penalty under § 5G1.1 (Sentencing on a Single Count of Conviction). Specifically, it clarifies that when any count involves a mandatory minimum that restricts the defendant's guideline range, the guideline range is restricted as to all counts. It also provides examples of how these restrictions operate.
The Commentary to § 5G1.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in Note 1, in the paragraph that begins “In General.—”, by striking the period at the end and inserting “and determining the defendant's guideline range on the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five, Part A (Sentencing Table).”; and by inserting after such paragraph the following:
“Note that the defendant's guideline range on the Sentencing Table may be affected or restricted by a statutorily authorized maximum sentence or a statutorily required minimum sentence not only in a single-count case, see§ 5G1.1 (Sentencing on a Single Count of Conviction), but also in a multiple-count case. See Note 3, below.”.
The Commentary to § 5G1.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended by redesignating Note 3 as Note 4; and by inserting after Note 2 the following:
(B) Effect on Guidelines Range of Mandatory Minimum or Statutory Maximum.—The defendant's guideline range on the Sentencing Table may be affected or restricted by a statutorily authorized maximum sentence or a statutorily required minimum sentence not only in a single-count case, see§ 5G1.1, but also in a multiple-count case.
In particular, where a statutorily required minimum sentence on any count is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence on that count shall be the guideline sentence on all counts. See§ 5G1.1(b). Similarly, where a statutorily required minimum sentence on any count is greater than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the guideline range for all counts is restricted by that statutorily required minimum sentence. See§ 5G1.1(c)(2) and accompanying Commentary.
However, where a statutorily authorized maximum sentence on a particular count is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the sentence imposed on that count shall not be greater than the statutorily authorized maximum sentence on that count. See§ 5G1.1(a).
9. Rehabilitation Back to Top
The policy statement in the guidelines on post-sentencing rehabilitation is § 5K2.19 (Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts). Two options are presented:
Option 1 repeals § 5K2.19.
Option 2 amends § 5K2.19 to provide that rehabilitative efforts, whether pre- or post-sentencing, may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the efforts, individually or in combination with other circumstances, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.
Option 2 also adds commentary to § 5K2.19 that sets forth a two-part test for determining whether a departure may be warranted and factors for the court to consider in determining whether a departure may be warranted. See generally Pepper v. United States, supra; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 57-58 (2007) (in which the district court “quite reasonably attached great weight to the fact that [defendant] voluntarily withdrew from the conspiracy after deciding, on his own initiative, to change his life”).
Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 is amended by striking § 5K2.19 and its accompanying commentary.
Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 is amended by striking § 5K2.19 and its accompanying commentary and inserting the following:
“§ 5K2.19. Rehabilitative Efforts (Policy Statement)
In addition, pre-sentencing rehabilitative efforts may be relevant in determining acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility), and post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts may provide a basis for early termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(1).
Background: A defendant's post-offense rehabilitative efforts may be considered at sentencing. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). Such efforts may also be relevant in determining whether an adjustment applies under § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility) and whether a departure is warranted under § 5K2.16 (Voluntary Disclosure of Offense). Similarly, a defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts may be considered when the defendant is resentenced after appeal. See Pepper v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 1236 (2011) (holding that ‘when a defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant's postsentencing rehabilitation' and that such evidence ‘may, in appropriate cases,' support a sentence below the applicable guideline range).”.
Part A responds to the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010, Public Law 111-225 (August 10, 2010), which amended 18 U.S.C. 1791 (Providing or possessing contraband in prison) to make it a class A misdemeanor to provide a mobile phone or similar device to an inmate, or for an inmate to possess a mobile phone or similar device—specifically, “a phone or other device used by a user of commercial mobile service (as defined in section 332(d) of Title 47) in connection with such service”. See 18 U.S.C. 1791(d)(1)(F). Offenses under section 1791 are referenced in Appendix A (Statutory Index) to § 2P1.2 (Providing or Possessing Contraband in Prison). The other class A misdemeanors in section 1791 involve currency, alcohol, and certain controlled substances; those other types of contraband receive a base offense level of 6 in § 2P1.2. The proposed amendment amends § 2P1.2 to assign mobile phones and similar devices to a particular alternative base offense level in the guidelines. Two options are presented. Option 1 assigns a base offense level of 13. Option 2 assigns a base offense level of 6.
Part B responds to the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 (PACT Act), Public Law 111-154 (enacted March 31, 2010). The PACT Act made a series of revisions to the Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C. 575 et seq., which is one of several laws governing the sale, shipment and taxation of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. First, the PACT Act raised the criminal penalty at 15 U.S.C. 377 for a knowing violation of the Jenkins Act from a misdemeanor to a felony with a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 3 years. The proposed amendment amends Appendix A (Statutory Index) to reference section 377 offenses to § 2T2.1 (Non-Payment of Taxes). The possibility of an additional reference, to § 2T2.2 (Regulatory Offenses), is bracketed.
Second, the PACT Act created a new Class A misdemeanor at 18 U.S.C. 1716E, prohibiting the knowing shipment of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco through the United States mail. The proposed amendment amends Appendix A (Statutory Index) to reference section 1716E offenses to either or both of two bracketed options, § 2T2.1 and § 2T2.2.
Part C responds to the Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, Public Law 111-211 (July 29, 2010), which amended the criminal offense at 18 U.S.C. 1159 (Misrepresentation of Indian produced goods and services) to reduce penalties for first offenders when the value of the goods involved is less than $1,000. The maximum term of imprisonment under section 1159 had been 5 years for a first offender and 15 years for a repeat offender. The Act retained this penalty structure, except that the statutory maximum for a first offender was reduced to 1 year in a case in which the value of the goods involved is less than $1,000. The proposed amendment amends Appendix A (Statutory Index) to reference section 1159 offenses to § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud).
Part C also addresses an existing offense, 18 U.S.C. 1158 (Counterfeiting Indian Arts and Crafts Board trade mark), which makes it a crime to counterfeit or unlawfully affix a Government trade mark used or devised by the Indian Arts and Crafts Board or to make any false statement for the purpose of obtaining the use of any such mark. The maximum term of imprisonment under section 1158 is 5 years for a first offender and 15 years for a repeat offender. Offenses under section 1158 are not referenced in Appendix A (Statutory Index). The proposed amendment references section 1158 offenses to both § 2B1.1 and § 2B5.3 (Criminal Infringement of Copyright or Trademark).
Part E responds to the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Public Law 111-294 (enacted December 9, 2010), which substantially revised the criminal offense at 18 U.S.C. 48 (Animal crush videos). Section 48 makes it a crime to create or distribute an “animal crush video,” as defined in section 48 (which requires, among other things, that the depiction be “obscene”). The maximum term of imprisonment for a section 48 offense is 7 years. Section 48 is not referenced in Appendix A (Statutory Index). The proposed amendment amends Appendix A (Statutory Index) to reference section 48 offenses to § 2G3.1 (Importing, Mailing, or Transporting Obscene Matter; Transferring Obscene Matter to a Minor; Misleading Domain Names). An issue for comment is also included.
The Commentary to § 2P1.2 captioned “Application Notes” is amended by redesignating Notes 1 and 2 as Notes 2 and 3, respectively; and by inserting at the beginning the following:
“1. In this guideline, the term ‘mobile phone or similar device' means a phone or other device as described in 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1)(F).”.
Appendix A (Statutory Index) is amended by inserting after the line referenced to 15 U.S.C. 158 the following: “15 U.S.C. § 3772T2.1 [, 2T2.2]”;
“18 U.S.C. § 1716E[2T2.1], [2T2.2]”.
“18 U.S.C. § 11582B1.1, 2B5.3
18 U.S.C. § 11592B1.1”.
“41 U.S.C. § 532B4.1
41 U.S.C. § 542B4.1
41 U.S.C. § 423(e)2B1.1, 2C1.1”;
“41 U.S.C. § 21022B1.1, 2C1.1
41 U.S.C. § 21052B1.1, 2C1.1
41 U.S.C. § 87022B4.1
41 U.S.C. § 87072B4.1”.
“18 U.S.C. § 482G3.1”.
1. The proposed amendment would reference offenses under 18 U.S.C. 48 (Animal crush videos) to § 2G3.1. That guideline provides a base offense level of 10 and enhancements for distribution (ranging from 2 levels to 5 or more levels), certain conduct with intent to deceive a minor into viewing material that is harmful to minors (2 levels), use of a computer (2 levels), and material portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence (2 levels).
The Commission invites comment on offenses under section 48, including in particular the conduct involved in such offenses and the nature and seriousness of the harms posed by such offenses. Do the provisions in § 2G1.3 adequately account for offenses under section 48? If not, how should the Commission amend the guideline to account for offenses under section 48? For example, should the Commission provide one or more new alternative base offense levels, specific offense characteristics, or departure provisions to § 2G3.1 to better account for offenses under section 48? If so, what should the Commission provide?