Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/1981/47191-6-1.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 11:30:31
Document Index: 480834305

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 6', '§ 4']

State v. Lair :: 1981 :: Washington Supreme Court Decisions :: Washington Case Law :: Washington Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Washington Case Law › Washington Supreme Court Decisions › 1981 › State v. Lair
95 Wn.2d 706 (1981)
630 P.2d 427
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RICK LAIR, Defendant, DIANE WEBB, Petitioner.
No. 47191-6.
William Johnston, for petitioner.
Petitioner Diane Webb was convicted by a *708 jury of one count of possession of phencyclidine, a controlled substance. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction in an unpublished opinion, and we affirm.
On January 11, 1978, Bellingham police officers, acting on information supplied by an informant, obtained a search warrant authorizing a search for a "[c]ontrolled substance marijuana" at 1248 Humboldt Street in Bellingham. Armed with the search warrant, the officers searched the premises and discovered marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia. In addition, the police seized a container of white pills, an envelope containing two baggies of mushrooms, items which appeared to be hashish, and additional items which appeared to be other unmarked controlled substances.
Rick Lair and Diane Webb were each charged with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance count 1 for possession of marijuana and count 2 for possession of phencyclidine. Webb pleaded guilty to the first count, but went to trial on count 2. Lair was acquitted.
*709 2. On the following day, January 10, Farrow told one John Henifin that he, Farrow, could get marijuana from "Rick" if Henifin wanted to buy it.
[2] The veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test may *710 be satisfied in either of two ways: (1) the credibility of the informant may be established; State v. Thompson, 13 Wn. App. 526, 530, 536 P.2d 683 (1975); State v. Walcott, 72 Wn.2d 959, 966, 435 P.2d 994 (1967); or (2) even if nothing is known about the informant, the facts and circumstances under which the information was furnished may reasonably support an inference that the informant is telling the truth. State v. Johnson, 17 Wn. App. 153, 155, 561 P.2d 701 (1977); Spinelli v. United States, supra at 416. See generally State v. Chatmon, 9 Wn. App. 741, 515 P.2d 530 (1973) ("citizen" informant). See also Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 741 (1974).
Even knowing nothing about the inherent credibility of a source of information, we may still ask, "Was the information furnished under circumstances giving reasonable assurances of trustworthiness?" If so, the information is "reliable," notwithstanding the ignorance as to its source's credibility.
[3] In the present case, several circumstances are relevant to Farrow's veracity, even though he had no "track record". First, Farrow's statement was made against his penal interest and was made to a private individual, not a *711 law enforcement official. Statements against penal interest are not often made lightly and may support an inference of reliability. State v. Johnson, supra; United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 581, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 91 S. Ct. 2075 (1971).
Petitioner argues that Farrow's statement was not entitled to particular weight as an admission against penal interest, precisely because it was not made to a police officer. Since a private citizen would be less likely to make use of the information to the informant's detriment, it is urged, the statement would not be one against interest. It must be remembered, however, that the admission against penal interest is used to help determine the trustworthiness of the informant's information. One way of answering this question is to inquire whether an informant would have a motive to lie to his listener. United States v. Harris, supra at 583-84. Since one who admits criminal activity to a police officer faces possible prosecution, it is generally held to be a reasonable inference that a statement raising such a possibility is a credible one. See 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3, at 522-35 (1978).
Indeed, as a general proposition there is more reason to rely upon such admissions than admissions made directly to police, for in the latter situation there is always the chance that the informer is a stoolie who perceives he can admit to criminality without significant risk.
1 W. LaFave, supra § 3.3, at 530. See also Comi v. State, 26 Md. App. 511, 516-17, 338 A.2d 918 (1975); Commonwealth v. Kaschik, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 388, 344 A.2d 519 (1975).
Second, Farrow's information was corroborated by conclusory *712 statements of another informant, Henifin, whose veracity was established. United States v. Harris, supra at 581; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725, 78 A.L.R.2d 233 (1960); United States v. Allsenberrie, 424 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.1970). Petitioner argues that Henifin's corroborating statement has no significance, since Henifin's statements do not satisfy the basis-of-knowledge prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. See Moylan, supra at 773. A reliable informant's hearsay or conclusory statements, however, may be used to establish probable cause when they corroborate information given by an informant whose reliability has not been established, even though the conclusory statements themselves would not satisfy both of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards. United States v. Harris, supra; Jones v. United States, supra; see generally 1 W. LaFave, supra § 3.3, at 551-55. In the present case, Henifin, the reliable informant, corroborated Farrow's statement that marijuana was available from Rick at the Humboldt Street address.
[t]he reliability of an anonymous telephone informant is not significantly different from the reliability of a named but unknown telephone informant. Such an informant could easily fabricate an alias, and thereby remain, like an anonymous informant, unidentifiable.
State v. Sieler, supra at 48. When, however, there is an underlying factual basis for the statements, or other indications of reliability, the additional fact that an informant is named is at least more helpful than no name at all and may be one circumstance contributing to a conclusion that the *713 information in an affidavit was reliable. State v. Sieler, supra. This view is supported by those cases which require that, where the informer is anonymous,
the supporting documents or testimony must provide the issuing court with a stronger basis for finding the hearsay statements credible than if the informant is identified.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the seizure of the white powder enclosed within the folded paper packet was justified under the plain view doctrine. Petitioner urges *714 that the requirements of the plain view doctrine were not met because the seizure was not made under exigent circumstances, and because the material was neither come upon inadvertently nor immediately recognized as evidence.
The plain view doctrine has at least three elements: (1) a prior justification for police intrusion whether by warrant or by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement; (2) an inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence; and (3) immediate knowledge by police that they have evidence before them. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); State v. Daugherty, 94 Wn.2d 263, 267-68, 616 P.2d 649 (1980); State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004, 44 L. Ed. 2d 673, 95 S. Ct. 2407 (1975); State v. Johnson, 17 Wn. App. 153, 561 P.2d 701 (1977).
*715 The limits on the [plain view] doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale. The first of these is that plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances." Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure.
(Footnote and citations omitted. Some italics ours.)
An example of the applicability of the "plain view" doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465; Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate.... What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior *716 justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure.
It is clear from the above that the court contemplates exigent circumstances are not required to seize an object in plain view, if the officer has lawfully intruded into the place from which he viewed that object. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra; see Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096-1101 (1974).[1]
[6] Objects are immediately apparent for purposes of a plain view seizure when, considering the surrounding facts and circumstances, the police can reasonably conclude they have evidence before them. State v. Murray, supra at 535; United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1976); United States v. Wheeler, 459 F.2d 1228 (D.C. Cir.1972); People v. Caruso, 2 Ill. App.3d 80, 276 N.E.2d 112 (1971); see 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.11, at 176-77; § 6.7, at 482. In this case, the search warrant specified that the search was limited to marijuana, and the police had *717 already discovered the marijuana and its related paraphernalia. The folded paper packet was located on the same shelf as some of the marijuana. Although the officer knew the packet did not contain marijuana, he felt it might contain another controlled substance. One officer testified that it appeared to be the same or similar type of packet he had previously observed on other occasions to contain controlled substances. The trial court concluded that under all the circumstances, particularly the presence of other drugs on the same shelf and the officer's testimony as to prior experience with drugs in flat packages, the police could have reasonably believed they had evidence before them. Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court was correct on this point.
6. Although the search warrant limited the search to marijuana, the officers conducted a wide open, general search for all controlled substances and drugs.
In the situation presented by this case, we have difficulty discerning any difference between the "wide open" search and the search for marijuana specifically authorized by the warrant. Thus, the question becomes one of whether the officers exceeded the permissible scope and intensity of the search authorized by the warrant. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 99 S. Ct. 2319 (1979); see generally 2 W. LaFave, supra § 4.10.
By its nature a search for marijuana permits a very thorough search. The police may look in drawers, boxes, and other places ordinarily secluded from view. Thus, there *718 seems in practical effect to be little objective difference between an authorized search for marijuana and the general search referred to in finding of fact No. 6. Wherever marijuana may be found, other drugs may be present as well. This circumstance was recognized by the trial judge himself in his oral opinion:
This was pretty much a wide open, general search, in spite of the fact that the search warrant said that they were to search for marijuana; and my view then and my view now is that at least in the context of this case the subjective view of the officer is not that critical. It seems to me that if the officer in deed had a subjective view that he was within the warrant, and I conclude that a reasonable officer would not have that view or take that action, the officer's view that he's within the warrant doesn't help. Conversely, if the officer thinks that he's operating outside of the warrant but in fact I conclude that he's operating reasonably within the scope of the warrant, then I think the search is valid and that the evidence should be admitted. In other words, I think that we should apply an objective standard what a reasonable and competent officer would think he's right and conclusions he would draw and so forth as the situation then existed.... So applying the objective test we know that in a drug search that you are entitled to look for small matters and to have a wide ranging search, because we know that drugs can be concealed almost anywhere and it's obvious that they can be in fairly small contents; ...
*719 Here, there was no evidence whatever that the police sought a search warrant for marijuana as a pretext to search for other controlled substances. Nor is there any showing that they anticipated finding other drugs. On the other hand, we would be blind to the realities of contemporary law enforcement practice if we did not realize that a policeman in the course of a valid search is entitled to keep his senses open to the possibility of contraband, weapons, or evidence of a crime. This recognition is at the core of the plain view doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra at 466; Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 88 S. Ct. 992 (1968); State v. Dimmer, supra. In this case, there is no allegation that the police were not allowed to be attentive to the possibility of other incriminating items during the course of the search.
The degree of expectation required to make a discovery "inadvertent" has not been clarified by either the Washington courts or the federal courts. One interpretation of the inadvertence rule holds that a discovery will not be inadvertent if the officers "knew" the evidence would be found. United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 898, 58 L. Ed. 2d 246, 99 S. Ct. 262 (1978); Kalven, The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 244 n. 35 (1971); Comment, Criminal Procedure "Inadvertence": *720 The Increasingly Vestigial Prong of the Plain View Doctrine, 10 Mem. L. Rev. 399, 401-02 (1980). This is a narrow interpretation which is of limited effect, since "knowing" evidence is present would be grounds for probable cause. In such circumstances, the police should obtain a warrant. See 85 Harv. L. Rev., supra at 244-45; State v. Dimmer, supra. The other view, expressed by the Court of Appeals in the present case, is that an "expectation" by officers, even if they lack probable cause, negates inadvertence. United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir.1972); State v. Daugherty, supra.
BRACHTENBACH, C.J., and STAFFORD, HICKS, DORE, and DIMMICK, JJ., concur. DOLLIVER, J. (dissenting)
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971), defines inadvertent as "1: not turning the mind to a matter: heedless, negligent, inattentive ... 2: unintentional". The trial court found:
If the police officers were conducting a wide open search *721 "for all controlled substances and drugs", it is simply an impossibility for the discovery of the drug phencyclidine to have been inadvertent.
*722 I dissent.
ROSELLINI and UTTER, JJ., concur with DOLLIVER, J.
Reconsideration denied December 7, 1981.
[1] Some of the confusion over exigent circumstances may also have arisen because the exigent circumstances requirement is most often found in searches and seizures involving automobiles or searches incident to arrest. See Williamson, The Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent Circumstances, 31 Okla. L. Rev. 110 (1978); Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (1976).