Source: http://www.uclpractitioner.com/class_action_fairness_act/page/2/
Timestamp: 2015-05-05 07:11:31
Document Index: 478174181

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1332', '§ 1332', '§ 1332', '§ 1453', '§ 1332', '§ 1332']

CAFA law review article: "The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake"
The April 2007 issue of the Hastings Law Journal contains an essay by Professor Laurens Walker of the University of Virginia School of Law: "The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake," 58 Hastings L.J. 849 (2007). Here is the abstract: This Article discusses the significance of the Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights, found in section 3 of the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act. The author argues that this section is the most significant provision of the law. In addition to expounding upon the notice provision of the Bill of Rights Section, the Article explores the possible responses that public officials could make. Additionally, the author predicts a strong degree of public participation in class action settlements, especially by the Attorneys General of the states. The Article also considers the Act's substantive regulation of settlement terms, including "coupon settlements," as well as general prohibitions on negative settlements and geographic discrimination. The author examines the public and private enforcement models and discusses the comparative efficiency of public versus private enforcement. Lastly, the Article considers the jurisdictional provisions found in sections 4 and 5 of the Class Action Fairness Act, particularly the changes to minimal diversity and the facilitation of removal to federal court.
Using a comparative study of class actions in federal and state court, the author predicts that jurisdictional provisions will result in the litigation of most major class actions in federal court, but with little impact on the outcome of these cases. The author finds that the Bill of Rights view toward public enforcement is a costly policy and political mistake, and a better solution would have been found in providing for more robust private enforcement.[Via Federal Civil Practice Bulletin]
In Preston v. Tenet Healthsystems Memorial Medical Center, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2007), the Fifth Circuit examined the term "citizen" for purposes of CAFA's "home state" and "local controversy" exceptions: "The underlying facts of this lawsuit and the reason for the parties contesting the citizenship issue emanate from a common origin of circumstances: the unmerciful devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina." Slip op. at 18. The Fifth Circuit talked at length about the kinds of evidence that can be used to prove citizenship for CAFA purposes. It then affirmed the district court's remand order: We recognize that Congress crafted CAFA to exclude only a narrow category of truly localized controversies, and the exceptions provide a statutory vehicle for the district courts to ferret out the “controversy that uniquely affects a particular locality to the exclusion of all others.” Evans [v. Walter Indust., Inc.], 449 F.3d [1159,] 1164 [(11th Cir. 1996)]. This particular Hurricane Katrina case symbolizes a quintessential example of Congress’ intent to carve-out exceptions to CAFA’s expansive grant of federal jurisdiction when our courts confront a truly localized controversy. Based on the medical records, affidavits, and attending factual circumstances, we determine that the district court did not clearly err in finding that one-third of the class members were citizens of Louisiana at the time of filing suit. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.Id. at 30. (Via Decision of the Day.) Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Class Action "Fairness" Act | Permalink
On Thursday, in Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2007), the Ninth Circuit held that the party seeking remand bears the burden of proving the "home state" and "local controvery" exceptions to CAFA removal jurisdiction. In so holding, the court discussed Lao v. Wickes Furniture Co., 455 F.Supp.2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2006), a decision that generated a lot of attention, including this Daily Journal article (subscription) (see also this blog post). In Lao, District Judge Stephen G. Larsen held that CAFA's "home state" and "local controversy" exceptions are not "exceptions" at all but rather "integral component[s] of the removal provisions themselves." Lao, slip op. at 20. The Ninth Circuit disagreed: We are not persuaded by Lao's reasoning because it is inconsistent with the statute. As noted above, §§ 1332(d)(4)(A) and (B) require federal courts – although they have jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2) – to “decline to exercise jurisdiction” when the criteria set forth in those provisions are met. Subsections (d)(4)(A) and (B) are not part of the prima facie elements of jurisdiction ... but, instead, are exceptions to jurisdiction.Serrano, slip op. at 13-14. The Ninth Circuit went on to conclude that the party seeking remand bears the burden of proving the "home state" and "local controversy" exceptions, just like any other exceptions to federal removal jurisdiction. Id. at 14-17.
In Saab v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006), the Eighth Circuit held that the CAFA provision permitting interlocutory appeals from remand orders (28 U.S.C. section 1453(c)(1)) "does not permit us to accept an appeal from the denial of a motion to remand when a class action has been removed to federal court on the basis of traditional diversity jurisdiction, § 1332(a)": Saab urges us to interpret § 1453(c)(1) expansively and to give federal courts of appeal the jurisdiction to review the grant or denial of a motion to remand any class action. This argument does not differentiate between class actions removed pursuant to § 1332(a) (traditional diversity jurisdiction) or § 1332(d) (CAFA diversity jurisdiction). We reject this contention.Slip op. at 2. [Hat Tip: Consumer Law & Policy Blog]
In DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New York, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (Nov. 17, 2006), the Second Circuit addressed CAFA's requirement that appeals be decided within 60 days after "filing": CAFA’s 60-day clock for rendering judgment starts running on the day that the Court’s order granting permission to appeal is filed. In so holding, we join several of our sister circuits. See Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2006); Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (11th Cir. 2006); Patterson v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., 444 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2006); Bush v. Cheap Tickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 685-86 (9th Cir. 2005).Slip op. at 6-7. Next, the court held that CAFA did not alter the rule that the party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction: It is well-settled that, prior to CAFA’s enactment, “[t]he party asserting federal jurisdiction [bore] the burden of proving that the case [was] properly in federal court.” Gilman v. BHC Sec., 104 F.3d 1418, 1421 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). It is an issue of first impression in this Court whether CAFA has changed this traditional rule. Substantially for the reasons articulated by the District Court, we join three of our sister circuits and hold that it has not. See Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2006); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005).Slip op. at 7. Finally, the court construed CAFA's "amount in controversy" provision in the context of an accounting claim. It determined that the amount of the fund of which the accounting was sought was not "in controversy," as that term is used in CAFA: [Plaintiff's] complaint does not even purport to suggest the value of, much less lay claim to, the [fund]. It seeks only an accounting, the results of which are presently unknown. For that reason, no one can say how much money may be ultimately claimed by [plaintiff]. .... [W]e may infer that if the accounting were to reveal such potential fraud, [plaintiff] and the putative class would stand to gain court-ordered restitution or a settlement. We cannot say beyond mere speculation, however, whether those damages, if they are awarded, would be more than $5 million. [Defendant] has thus failed to demonstrate that the claim here satisfies CAFA’s jurisdictional amount in controversy.Slip op. at 10, 12. [Hat tip: Consumer Law & Policy Blog]
New Seventh Circuit CAFA decision: Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. In Santamaria v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. Oct. 19, 2006), the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner) affirmed an order remanding a pre-CAFA action to California state court, where it was originally filed. The case was MDL'd to the Northern District of Illinois after a federal judge in California denied plaintiffs' motion to remand. On reconsideration, the federal judge in Illinois remanded the case back to California state court, and the defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit held that the federal judge in Illinois had the power to reconsider the California judge's ruling, then held that filing an amended complaint adding two new class representatives as plaintiffs did not "kick off a new action" for CAFA purposes. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court interpreted California law governing whether a later-filed action "relates back" to the original filing date (a rule that comes up mainly in the context of statute of limitations analyses). [Hat tip: How Appealing.]
UPDATE: For more on the Santamaria decision, see this post at Consumer Law and Policy Blog. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Class Action "Fairness" Act | Permalink
New Third Circuit CAFA opinion also holds that "less" is "more": Morgan v. Gay
On Monday, the Third Circuit joined the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that "less" is "more" when it comes to CAFA's appellate filing deadline. Morgan v. Gay, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2006). [Hat tip: How Appealing]
UPDATE: Consumer Law & Policy Blog has an interesting and more detailed discussion of the Morgan decision. UPDATE: The Legal Intelligencer reports that "Less Means More: 3rd Circuit Fixes Congressional Typo."
On September 7, 2006, the Federal Judicial Center issued a report entitled "The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: Second Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules." According to the introduction: [T]he Federal Judicial Center has undertaken a long-term study of the impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) on the resources of the federal courts. The following report presents preliminary data on the number, frequency, and types of class action filing and removal activity in the federal district courts between July 1, 2001, through June 30, 2005.Consumer Law & Policy Blog provides a more detailed summary of the report. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:01 AM in Class Action "Fairness" Act | Permalink
This article was recently posted at SSRN: Steinman, Adam, "'Less' is 'More'? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the Class Action Fairness Act's Appellate Deadline Riddle" (August 25, 2006). University of Cincinnati Public Law Research Paper No. 06-13. The full text is available for download here. My own blog posts on the recent federal decisions on the "less is more" issue are here, here, and here. [Hat tip: How Appealing]
More CAFA-related law review articles
CAFA Law Blog has compiled a lengthy list of law review articles related to the Class Action "Fairness" Act. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Class Action "Fairness" Act | Permalink
New Eleventh Circuit CAFA decision: Miedema v. Maytag Corp.
In Miedema v. Maytag Corp., ___ F.3d ___ (June 5, 2006), the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit that "less" is "more," and held that the seven-day period to file an application for permission to appeal a CAFA remand order is a deadline, not a waiting period: "[T]o read [the statute] literally would create an absurd result: there would be a front-end waiting period (an application filed 6 days after entry of a remand order would be premature), but there would be no back-end limit (an application filed 600 days after a remand order would not be untimely)." (Slip op. at 6-7.) My prior coverage of the Ninth Circuit's "less is more" decision, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006), is here and here. The Eleventh Circuit also held that CAFA does not alter the rule that the defendant bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists, or the rule that removal stautes should be strictly construed and any doubts resolved in favor of remand. (Slip op. at 8-14.) The court then affirmed the district court's remand order, holding that the defendant had not proven the requisite amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. (Slip op. at 14-19.) [Hat tip: How Appealing.] Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Class Action "Fairness" Act | Permalink
Spring/Summer 2006 issue of Competition
The Spring/Summer 2006 issue of Competition: The Journal of the Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law Section of the State Bar of California is now out. It has two articles of interest relating to CAFA:
Thomas S. Hixson, "The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: One Year Later"
Lisa Saveri, "Implications of the Class Action Fairness Act for Antitrust Cases: From Filing Through Trial"
Ninth Circuit denies en banc rehearing in CAFA "less is more" case: Amalgamated v. Laidlaw
Yesterday, the Ninth Circuit denied en banc rehearing of its "less is more" opinion, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006). The order denying rehearing is here. It is an interesting order because it includes not only a six-judge dissent, but also an introductory explanation (presumably authored by the original panel) further justifying the conclusion that CAFA's language and legislative history compel the result that the 7-day time period to file a petition for permission to appeal from an order granting or denying remand is a deadline, not a waiting period. My original post on Amalgamated is here. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Class Action "Fairness" Act | Permalink
New Fifth Circuit CAFA decision: Braud v. Transport Service Co.
Federal Civil Practice Bulletin has more on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Braud v. Transport Service Co., ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2006). Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Class Action "Fairness" Act | Permalink
New Ninth Circuit CAFA decision: Abrego v. Dow Chemical
Yesterday, the Ninth Circuit issued a new CAFA decision, Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 2006). Its key holdings are (1) CAFA did not alter the burden of proving that federal removal jurisdiction is appropriate; the defendant retains that burden (slip op. at 16-23); (2) for a "mass action" to be subject to removal, at least one plaintiff's claims must individually meet the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement (slip op. at 23-32); and (3) the district court has discretion to deny jurisdictional discovery; CAFA does not require that such discovery be permitted (slip op. at 32-38). The decision addresses the "bewildering" (slip op. at 23) language of CAFA in some detail and is worth a read. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 09:52 AM in Class Action "Fairness" Act | Permalink