Source: http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1922&chapter=115316&layout=html&Itemid=27
Timestamp: 2013-05-25 04:37:16
Document Index: 652881349

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 10', '§ 13', '§ 13']

Online Library of Liberty - SECTION XVI.: MODERATE REFORM—ITS ARRANGEMENTS—THEIR INADEQUACY. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3
Front Page Titles (by Subject) SECTION XVI.: MODERATE REFORM—ITS ARRANGEMENTS—THEIR INADEQUACY. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3	Return to Title Page for The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3The Online Library of LibertyA project of Liberty Fund, Inc.
Search this Title:Also in the Library:Subject Area: EconomicsSubject Area: Political TheorySubject Area: LawSECTION XVI.: MODERATE REFORM—ITS ARRANGEMENTS—THEIR INADEQUACY. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3 [1843]Edition used:The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 3.
MODERATE REFORM—ITS ARRANGEMENTS—THEIR INADEQUACY.
Comprised or comprisable under the denomination of moderate reform, what are the arrangements which at different times have been proposed?
The inadequacy, and little less than uselessness of them, even on the supposition of their being, all of them, brought forward together, and comprised in one proposal, and carried into effect—
Much more the inadequacy of them, taken singly, or in any number less than the whole—
Such are the sub-topics, destined for consideration in the present section.
Supposing moderate reform, in its most perfect shape, thus inadequate,—supposing radical reform, as hereinabove described, the only remedy that presents any tolerable chance of proving adequate,—whence happens it, that by a set of men professing themselves “Friends of the People,” and, as such, enemies to corruption,—to corruption—the radical disease for which reform has all along been looked to in the character of the only remedy,—whence comes it, that by these men the adequate remedy has all along been rejected?—the inadequate one, if any, embraced and brought forward?
For a solution of this problem, the source or principle referred to and employed will be the state of interests. But, to show in what particular way, in the case here in question, the state of interests thus operates—operates in such manner as to oppose an insuperable bar to every proposition for adequate reform from such a quarter, will be the business of the ensuing section.
For a general conception of the aggregate mass, of the distinguishable arrangements, capable of presenting a title to a place in the system distinguished by the appellation of The Moderate Reform System,—take, in the first place, the following analytical table of the several proposals for parliamentary reform, brought forward in parliament since the commencement of the present reign:—moderate and radical taken together:* —† App. No. 4, Hon. W. Pitt, anno 1782; No. 6, Alderman Sawbridge, anno 1784; No. 9, Mr. (now Earl) Grey, anno 1792.‡ App. No. 3, Duke of Richmond, anno 1780.∥ App. No. 1, Earl of Chatham, anno 1770; No. 2, Alderman Wilkes, anno 1776; No. 5, Hon. W. Pitt, anno 1783; No. 7, Right Hon. W. Pitt, anno 1785; No. 8, Right Hon. H. Flood, anno 1790; No. 10, Mr. (now Earl) Grey, anno 1793; No. 11, Mr. (now Earl) Grey, anno 1797; No. 12, Mr. (now Earl) Grey, anno 1800; No. 14, Hon. T. Brand, anno 1810; No. 15, Hon. T. Brand, anno 1812.For this system, considered as a whole, the most determinate basis that can be found may be seen in the paper originally printed anno 1793, by the Society formed anno 1792, principally of Whig members, under the name of The Friends of the People, and reprinted (I understand) by Mr. Evans, in his Parliamentary Reform pamphlet, just published.Total number of the occasions on which reform has been advocated in parliament,15Deduct number of occasions on which no specific proposition has been brought forward,†3Remains the number of the occasions, in—each of which, specific propositions, one or more, have been brought forward,12Deduct number of the occasions on which the species of reform proposed has been radical,‡2Remains, for the number of occasions on—which the species of reform proposed has been of the moderate cast,10Appendix—No. 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15.∥
On these occasions, the following are the heads to which the several proposed arrangements that have been brought forward, have presented themselves as referable:—
Proposed Arrangements applying to the situation ofElector.
i. Arrangements, giving extension to the electoral franchise, or right of suffrage, and thus making advances more or less considerable towards virtual universal suffrage.
1. In the case of a county seat, admitting copyholders, Nos. 11 & 14.
2. In the case of a county seat, admitting leaseholders, No. 11.
3. In the case of the proposed number of additional borough seats (or inallborough seats?) admitting householders at large, Nos. 11 & 13.
Proposed Arrangements applying to the situation ofRepresentative.
ii.—giving Increase to the number of Seats regarded as not venal, viz.
4.—1. County seats, Nos. 1, 2, 7, 14, 15.
5.—2. County-division, or territorial-district seats; viz. Seats formed by division of counties into such districts, Nos. 11, 13, 14.
6.—3. Populous town seats, Nos. 2, 7, 12, 14.
iii.—applying Diminution to the number of Seats regarded as venal, viz.
7.—1. Suppression without compensation proposed, Nos. 2, 5, 12, 14, 15.
8.—2. Suppression with compensation proposed, No. 7.
iv.—excluding from all seats a part,—but a part only, and that an indeterminate one—of the number of the Members regarded as sold to the C—r-General, by the circumstance of their holding situations of profit, from which they are removable by him at pleasure.
9. To the at present established septennial duration of the power conferred by a seat substituting triennial, No. 11.
Proposed Arrangements applying to both situations; or rather to that ofElector,and that ofCandidate.
v.—diminishing the Expenses and other inconveniences incident to Elections.
10.—1. By causing the poll to be taken in districts of small extent, carved out of the electoral districts: say voting-districts, or sub-districts, Nos. 11, 13, 14.
11.—2. By causing the poll to be taken for all places on one and the same day, Nos. 11, 13.
12.—3. By inhibiting every elector from giving his vote in more places than one, No. 11.
These six clusters of arrangements—consider them now in their respective bearings upon the state and condition of the two situations in question; viz. that of elector and that of representative: including in the latter case that of candidate, or proposed candidate.
I. As to that ofElectors.
In the account given of radical reform, taken according to the present edition of it (see § 5, § 6,) four expedients or arrangements were stated as essentially necessary, and of the goodness of their title to that character, some presumption, it is hoped, afforded. These are,—1. Virtual universality of suffrage; 2. Practical equality of suffrage—i. e. practical equality in respect of the quantum of the influence exercised by the several electors in virtue of their respective suffrages; 3. Freedom of suffrage; 4. Thence, as an indispensable instrument of freedom, inviolable secresy of suffrage.
Consideration had of their mutual relation and relative importance, with as much, perhaps, if not with greater, propriety—this order might have been changed, or even reversed.
1. First, then, as to secresy of suffrage. Upon the effect given to the principle here in question depends, as hath been so often observed, freedom of suffrage—freedom, viz. in both its contrasted modes,—freedom as against terrorism, and freedom as against bribery.
In no individual scheme of reform, capable of being designated by the generic term moderate reform, is any such proposition in favour of secresy of suffrage to be found.
2. Consequently, no such security as is afforded by that principle against non-freedom, alias spuriousness of suffrage, in whichsoever of those two modes it is considered.
3. As to virtual universality of suffrage. Originally, by those advocates for reform, who in 1792 and 1793 acted in a society under the title of the Friends of the People,—in the instances of what has hereinabove been designated by the name of the householder plan, no inconsiderable advance was made. But to the county seats it was not proposed that this extension should be applied: and of the existing county seats it was proposed (anno 1797,) that from 92 the number should be increased to 113:—increased by 25: a little more than a fourth.* Moreover, the leader of that eminently useful association having since put from him an arrangement so effectual,—scarcely does it seem at present entitled to be numbered among the arrangements belonging to moderate reform: from the system of moderate reform it seems to have been as it were expelled, and driven for refuge into that of radical reform.
Be this as it may,—to the giving force and effect to the universal interest, in the struggle which it has to maintain against all partial interests in general,—and in particular against the hitherto irresistible separate and sinister interest of C—r-General and Co.,—the efficiency of virtual universality would, it has been shown (§ 7, 8,) be altogether precarious,—without the assistance of freedom, and thence of secresy of suffrage. Hence it is, that without that shield to freedom,—by whatsoever plan—whether the abovementioned householder-plan, or any other, any advance were made towards virtual universality of suffrage,—it would be matter of some uncertainty, whether, with reference to the universal interest, service or disservice would be the effect of it.
4. Lastly, as to practical equality of suffrage.
Reference had to the existing state of things—towards the sort of equality here in question, an advance—nor that an inconsiderable one,—would be made by virtual universality of suffrage,—on the supposition that full effect would be given to virtual universality; even supposing that, were it possible, no separate attention to practical equality would be paid. Still, however, without such separate attention, the most effectual provision that on that supposition could be made for practical equality, would remain in a state very far from complete. Take, for example, New Sarum and Gatton: by the application of the principle of virtual universality to those two boroughs respectively—those same two boroughs still continuing to fill each of them a parliamentary seat—the contrast which the state of those two seats of snug proprietorship would, in respect of equality as between the effect of one right of suffrage and another—the contrast which the state of those two seats of snug proprietorship would form with the state of Yorkshire, for example,—would be no less striking than at present.
In any all-comprehensive advance made towards this species of equalization, would evidently be included the breaking down of the several counties, each into two or more less extensive electoral districts.
In no edition of moderate reform have I been able to observe any such decomposition advocated. By Mr. Brand,—whose edition, together with that which was once Earl Grey’s, may be stated as being the two by which the advances made towards radical reform were most extensive,—this decomposition is indeed distinctly brought to view,—but no less distinctly is an exclusion put upon it.
But in the section (§ 10) in which bribery and terrorism are brought together and confronted,—it has been shown how, as well by the vote-compelling as by the competition-excluding operation of it, the seductive force of terrorism is increased: increased by and in proportion to the geographical extent possessed by an electoral district:—in proportion to remoteness from the poll-book,—expense and consumption of time by journeys and demurrage will have been seen to be increased; thence, to a proportionable extent, exclusion put upon such electors, in whose instance the repelling force of those inconveniences is not overcome by the compelling force of terrorism; oppression and spuriousness, in the case of all those, in whose instance to the pressure produced by the expense and labour of the journey, is added the obligation of contributing by their suffrages to the advancement of a candidate, to whose advancement they are absolutely or comparatively averse.
Out of the six above-stated clusters of proposed arrangements proposed by moderate reform,—such, then, is the inefficiency of the three first—viz. 1. Those having for their object, or professed object, the giving extension to the electoral franchise; 2. Those having for their object, or professed object, the giving increase to the number of seats regarded as not venal; 3. Those having for their object, or professed object, the diminution in the number of seats regarded as venal: and in these three groups will be found comprised all those which have immediate relation to the situation of elector.*
Next as to what regards the situation of theRepresentativeBody and itsMembers.
In relation to this part of the election system, three in number are the arrangements which, in the present edition of radical reform, are proposed as so many essential arrangements, necessary to the establishing in that quarter the union of due independence with due dependence: viz. 1. Exclusion of placemen from the right of voting (leaving them always in possession of the right of speech and motion;) 2. Measures, such as shall be necessary, for the securing on the part of each member a constant and punctual attendance on the service of the House; 3. Impermanence of the situations respectively occupied by the members in virtue of their respective seats; viz. that degree of impermanence which corresponds to and is produced by the annual recurrence of the election process.
Observe, on this occasion, the object and use of these several proposed arrangements:
1. By the first of them, a correspondent degree of independence, as towards C—r-General, is produced on the part of the members, individually considered.
2. By the second of them,—besides the additional sureties afforded for intellectual aptitude and active talent,—a remedy, in the nature of a check, is provided: provided against that disorder, which, in addition to the improbity it gives birth and assistance to on the part of members individually considered,—gives birth and support to the various devices by which C—r-General and Co. contrive to give increase to the aggregate of the effect, produced by the aggregate mass of the matter of corruption in their hands; viz. by keeping out of the House, on the several particular occasions, a number, more or less considerable, of the members by whom, if present, a check more or less efficacious might be opposed to their particular measures.
3. The third has for its object—the giving the necessary strength to those ties by which the dependence of representatives on their constituents is established.
Arrangements belonging to the general head in question, three: the two first for due independence, the third for due dependence.
Observe now what appears to be the habitude of moderate reform, as towards these several last-mentioned proposed arrangements:
1. In relation to the first, it seems rather difficult to say, whether, in what has been proposed, as above, moderate reform, considered in its present state, ought or ought not to be considered as taking any part.
For the purpose of shutting the door of the House against actual corruption-eaters—persons actually sitting with the bread of corruption in their mouths—a proposition, as above noticed (viz. in § 13,) was indeed, in one instance (anno 1810,) brought forward. But, by the honourable gentleman (Mr. Brand) by whom, on that occasion, it was brought forward, it was, on the next occasion (viz. anno 1812,) abandoned.
On this occasion, supposing its title to a place in the budget of moderate reform admitted,—a simple reference to what (in § 13) has been said on the subject of its inadequateness may here suffice. By the place it leaves to the domini, among the corruption-eaters,—while the acknowledged fures are excluded,—the principle, instead of being reprobated, is approved and confirmed.
2. As to the second point, viz. attendance. Of the disorder produced by the violation of this duty—the fulfilment of which forms a necessary preliminary to the performance of every other,—in no one of all the several proposals, included in the moderate reform system, are any symptoms to be found, indicative of any the slightest glance, as having ever been directed towards this object: to the disorder itself,—nor consequently to any arrangement considered as presenting the prospect of a remedy. On this subject, moderate reform, in every one of its editions, maintains the most completely uninterrupted silence.
3. As to the third point, viz. impermanence: impermanence of the situation of representative, as constituted by annuality of election.
As to this matter, for the purpose of reducing to its minimum the length of the term, and thence raising to a corresponding maximum the degree of due dependence—of dependence, on the part of each representative, as toward his constituents,—under radical reform, the comparatively short time indicated by the word annuality is insisted upon as above; viz. the reduction of the at present established long term indicated by the word septenniality, to the dimensions of this short term.
On the other hand, on the occasion of the reduction, which, in some degree or other, both editions of particular reform concur in proposing,—moderate reform insists at stopping at the stage indicated by the word trienniality. Triennial parliaments it admits of and calls for: against annual parliaments it insists on shutting the door.
That, in comparison of annuality, the remedy indicated by trienniality is inadequate,—and in what respects and degrees it is so,—are questions, the answers to which may afford matter for a separate section.
Remain two proposed arrangements, the utility of which, as far as they go, is here admitted; but, in relation to which, the doubt is—whether, having, as far as appears, been deserted by the men who at one time were their advocates, and who still continue to belong to the denomination of reformists—viz. moderate reformists,—they can with propriety be at present regarded as having a place in the moderate reform system: whether, from having in former days been sound, practical, and necessary, they may not, in the eyes of existing moderation, have become wild and visionary. These are—1. The householder plan, as above mentioned: an article of the number of those which apply more especially to the situation of electors. This, as far as it goes, is an advance made towards virtually universal suffrage: and, in that character has been mentioned, as an arrangement which—though not completely adequate—might, by radical reformists, for the present at any rate, be acceded to without much reluctance.
But, by a radical reformist it could not be refused to any electoral district—to any part of the population: whereas, by no moderate reformist, by whom it has ever been advocated, does it appear that the application of it has been proposed—any further than to such town electoral districts, as upon his plan were proposed to be established: at any rate, to some of the counties in their capacity of electoral districts.
Lastly, as to the plan for exclusion or reduction of the expense, delay, vexation, and disorder, at present attendant on, or incident to, the election-process;—viz. 1. Voting by districts; 2. Carrying on the process in all places on the same day; 3. Arrangements to prevent the same person from giving his vote in or for places more than one.
Neither of the second, nor of the third, of these proposed arrangements, do I find any mention in my own Plan (drawn up anno 1809) as herein printed. Regarding at that time their importance, as being—howsoever in an absolute view considerable,—inferior, in a comparative sense, viz. as compared with the others herein brought to view,—it has never yet happened to me to apply to either of them any considerable portion of attention: useful and unexceptionable, in so far as practicable,—such is the character in which they have, on each occasion, presented themselves to a cursory glance.
In regard to voting by districts,—in the ensuing Plan of radical reform it may be seen presented in a shape rather more determinate, it is believed, than in any of the moderate reform plans: nor, in any one of them, does it seem to present itself in a form sufficiently determinate for contrast and discussion.*
[* ]For the immediate subject-matter of this analysis, see Mr. Meadly’s paper, as reprinted in the Appendix to this work.
[* ]On turning to the document from which this article in Mr. Meadley’s paper, here reprinted, was taken, viz. Cobbett’s Parl. Deb. xvii. p. 128 (Debate of May 21st, 1810,) I find, that in the plan on that day brought forward by the Hon. T. Brand, one proposed arrangement was, that “the right of voting should be given to all householders paying parochial and other taxes.” The reason for the mention thus made of it in this place is—that, in that paper reprinted from Mr. Meadley’s, it will not be to be found. I hope not to find any other occasion for regretting my inability (pressure of time considered) to make the like reference to the sources in every one of the other instances. On the other hand, as to this modification of the householder plan,—it appears not that it entered into Mr. Brand’s design to make application of it, in any other instance than that of the populous and at present unrepresented towns to which it was his design to give seats: to the counties, it seems pretty clear that it was not the design of this gentleman, any more than it had been Earl Grey’s, that the advance thus made towards virtually universal suffrage should be extended.
[* ]Taking the representation upon its present footing,—one feature it possesses, which in the way here in question is eminently prejudicial,—and in the instance of which, whatsoever use it may have had, has for centuries been in great measure, if not altogether, obsolete.This is, all over England,—in the case of the counties without exception—and in the case of the boroughs, with no more than five exceptions—the having two seats, filled by one such territorial-electoral district. To this sort of duplicity I know not whether any rational cause has anywhere been assigned. Was it for provision against sickness?—was it that, in their negociations with the crown, the fidelity of each agent might find a safeguard in that of the other? Note, that by the want of the press, and even of the pen, the negociations in question were rendered comparatively secret and unchecked.Suppose each county divided,—though it were into no greater a number of districts than two, with a seat allotted to each,—here would be some advance made towards practical equality of suffrage as above explained: here would be some advance, but that advance still far from adequate.Under moderate reform,—it appears not that even this first step towards the equality in question has ever found favour among the advocates of these modes.By Mr. Brand in particular,—by Mr. Brand, whose edition of moderate reform seems to have come nearest to radical,—the idea of thus dividing counties is brought forward and rejected.But, in the circumstance by the consideration of which this rejection is stated—stated as having been produced,—I cannot, relation had to the great end as above explained, discover any determinate inconvenience.The result which, in the speech ascribed to that gentleman, is stated as the ultimate inconvenience, is—that on such a plan, some inhabitant of a town comprised in the county,—in contradistinction to some inhabitant of the country part of that same county,—would be generally returned. So far the honourable gentleman. But under a system of free suffrage, supposing this result to take place, no inconvenience can I find in it. Neither the inhabitant of the country part, nor the inhabitant of the town part, would be chosen, unless by the majority of the electors he were deemed fitter than any other person they could choose: and, so long as they chose the fittest person that was to be had, whether a town or the country were the seat of his residence, would, for any reason I can see, be a matter of complete indifference.In the next place, no cause can I discover adequate to the production of that same result.“The freeholders of the town,” says Mr. Brand, “would uniformly prevail over the freeholders of the county, because they could almost always outnumber them at an election.” Yes, at present, while the only territorial districts, viz. the counties, are, most of them, with reference to this, not to speak of other purposes, so excessively extensive. Yes: under the existing state of things: scarcely, however, it should seem, in the state of things which be himself proposes. Hertfordshire, for argument’s sake, he supposes to be divided into four districts. But so small is the extent of that county,—divide it into four practically equal districts, and, in a central spot of each, place the poll-booth,—small indeed would be the number of the electors that, by remoteness from that spot, would (one should think) find themselves practically excluded from the exercise of their right of suffrage.
[* ]For the sake of distinction and clearness of conception,—for any such districts as, for the purpose of the more commodious collecting of the votes, may be proposed to be carved out of the electoral districts, I employ the appellation of sub-districts: understanding all along, by electoral districts, those which correspond to, and in number agree with, the number of the seats:—or, in contradistinction to the electoral districts, these sub-districts might be termed voting districts.To express what is here expressed by dividing the country into districts (some of them, in the ensuing Plan, territorial, others population, districts,)—the phrase employed by an honourable gentlemana is, “making the returns by districts:” to express what is here expressed by voting, or collecting the votes in sub-districts, to be called voting districts, he says, “taking the votes by districts.” The occasions,—for speaking of the districts which, upon the plan in question, would have to correspond with the number of the seats, presenting themselves so continually,—hence the necessity of providing a name to speak of them by. As to the phrase employed by the honourable gentleman,—though the propriety of it may be considered as unexceptionable, yet, as it affords not any name for the thing I had such frequent occasion to bring to view, it could not, on every occasion, be rendered applicable to my purposes: nor indeed, till after some little expense in the way of attention, was the state of things which it presents brought within my view.
[a]Mr. Brand—Cobb. Deb. xvii. 131.—Anno 1810, May 21.