Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1715409.html
Timestamp: 2019-06-19 22:05:09
Document Index: 19277449

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1326', '§ 1240', '§ 1240', '§ 1240', '§ 1240', '§ 1326', '§ 1240', '§ 1240', '§ 1326', '§ 1240', '§ 1240']

In applying § 1326(d), our cases generally focus on a single type of defect in a deportation hearing: the IJ's failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2). See, e.g., Vidal–Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1015. Under § 1240.11(a)(2), if an alien seeking lawful permanent resident status applies to the IJ for a waiver of a ground of inadmissibility, the IJ “shall inform the alien of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make application during the hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2).4 We have applied this obligation outside of the context of an alien's application for lawful permanent resident status, see Vidal–Mendoza, 705 F.3d at 1015, and we deem the IJ to have breached its obligation to inform an alien of “apparent eligibility” when the IJ either fails to give the alien any information about the existence of relief for which the alien is “apparently eligible,” see United States v. Lopez–Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.2010); United States v. Ortiz–Lopez, 385 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.2004); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir.2000), or when the IJ erroneously tells the alien that no relief is possible, see Arias–Ordonez, 597 F.3d at 977; see also United States v. Camacho–Lopez, 450 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Pallares–Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir.2004); United States v. Leon–Paz, 340 F .3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.2003). An IJ may also breach this regulatory obligation by stating that the alien is eligible for relief, but immediately negating that statement so that “it is as if he was told that he did not qualify for this relief,” which puts the alien in the same position as one who is never “made aware that he has a right to seek relief.” United States v. Melendez–Castro, 671 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (quoting Arrieta, 224 F.3d at 1079). Because an alien is entitled to the procedure set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (as we have construed it), we have concluded that an IJ's failure to comply with this procedure violates the alien's right to procedural due process. See United States v. Muro–Inclan, 249 F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (9th Cir.2001).
Second, we determine whether, in light of these factors and the circumstances of the alien's case, the alien carried the burden of proving “it was plausible (not merely conceivable) that the IJ would have exercised his discretion in the alien's favor.” Id. at 1263 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]stablishing ‘plausibility’ requires more than establishing a mere ‘possibility.’ “ United States v. Barajas–Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1089 (9th Cir.2011). In assessing whether the alien carried this burden, we “focus on whether aliens with similar circumstances received relief .” Rojas–Pedroza, 716 F.3d at 1263. “[T]he existence of a single case that is arguably on point means only that it is ‘possible’ or ‘conceivable’ that a similarly situated alien would be afforded voluntary departure. That is plainly insufficient ․ “ Valdez–Novoa, 780 F.3d at 920–21.
We now turn to the facts of this case, and consider whether Gonzalez–Flores can bring a collateral attack on his prior deportation order under § 1326(d). Gonzalez–Flores claims that he satisfies the three requirements for bringing such a collateral attack because the IJ failed to inform him of his “apparent eligibility to apply for” voluntary departure. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2). We need not decide whether the IJ adequately informed Gonzalez–Flores of his eligibility for voluntary departure because, even if the IJ's detailed colloquy with Gonzalez–Flores fell short of the requirements of § 1240.11(a)(2), Gonzalez–Flores suffered no prejudice from any such error, and therefore cannot demonstrate that the entry of the removal order was “fundamentally unfair” for purposes of § 1326(d)(3). See Rojas–Pedroza, 716 F.3d at 1266–67.
Applying our two-part test for prejudice, we first consider the positive and negative factors that are relevant to the IJ's exercise of discretion. Here, Gonzalez–Flores's positive equities are minimal: he lived in the United States for five years, he attended high school from age 15 through the eleventh grade, and he held a job for a few years from when he left high school until he committed a robbery. Although the IJ was not informed of Gonzalez–Flores's high school attendance and work history, these additional facts do not contradict the IJ's conclusion that Gonzalez–Flores's equities were “very few except for those normally associated with any residence of any duration.” Because none of Gonzalez–Flores's family members were United States citizens or lawful permanent residents, and because he resided in the United States for only five years, he lacked close family ties to the United States or a long residence here, the most typical favorable equities deemed important in other cases. See Arguelles–Campos, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 817. On the other hand, his negative equities are significant. He was convicted of robbery, which the IJ described as “a crime of violence as well as a crime of theft,” for which he was sentenced to 210 days in jail, plus probation. He was also convicted of a prior misdemeanor.
4. CFR § 1240.11.(a)(2) provides:(2) In conjunction with any application for creation of status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence made to an immigration judge, if the alien is inadmissible under any provision of section 212(a) of the Act, and believes that he or she meets the eligibility requirements for a waiver of the ground of inadmissibility, he or she may apply to the immigration judge for such waiver. The immigration judge shall inform the alien of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make application during the hearing, in accordance with the provisions of § 1240.8(d).