Source: https://www.floridabar.org/news/tfb-journal/?durl=%2Fdivcom%2Fjn%2Fjnjournal01.nsf%2FAuthor%2F1F23234B2401BB9885256AF50015DC33
Timestamp: 2018-12-14 14:47:47
Document Index: 370879643

Matched Legal Cases: ['§501', '§41', '§501', '§501', 'art.\n10', '§45', '§501', '§501', '§501', '§817', '§501', '§8', '§42', '§19', '§75', '§201', '§17', '§19', '§501', '§2']

Florida Bar Journal – Obtaining Relief for Deceptive Practices Under FDUTPA – The Florida Bar
Preserving subjective reliance as an issue in nonclass, private actions accords with advancing FDUTPA’s purpose of protecting the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises60 while retaining the fundamental legal principle of causation of damages. As Blackie explained, “we think that the [federal statute’s] public purpose can be adequately served within the traditional compensatory suit framework by limiting recoveries to those who are in fact injured, and excluding those who[]… have not been injured.”61
1	Fla. Stat. §501.201 et seq.
2	David J. Federbush, The Unexplored Territory of Unfairness in Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, 73 Fla. B.J. 26 (May 1999), and The Unclear Scope of Unconscionability in FDUTPA, 74 Fla. B.J. 49 (Aug. 2000).
4	15 U.S.C. §41 et seq.
5	S 208 (S 0208ER), 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 39, amending Fla. Stat. §501.204(2). See www.leg.state.fl.us/.
6	Fla. Stat. §501.203(3)(b).
7	See, e.g., Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580, 584 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984); Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985); Izadi v. Machado (Gus) Ford, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1135, 1139 n.8 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1989); D.L.A. v. Father & Son Moving & Storage, Inc., 643 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1994).
8	761 So. 2d 1256, 1263 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2000).
9	See 785 F.2d at 1435 n.2. The administrative decision was Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–84 (1984), 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, 104. As the decision reflects, the Deception Statement was originally set forth in a letter dated October 14, 1983, by a majority of the FTC Commissioners to the Chair of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. The earlier standard had been “tendency or capacity” (rather than “likely”) to mislead. See accompanying Statement of Commissioner Pertschuk, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
10	Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 322–23 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. den., 507 U.S. 909 (1993); Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
11	Davis and Eddy, et al. v. Powertel, Inc. et al., 776 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 2000).
12	See Rollins, 454 So. 2d 580; FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997).
13	Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (omission in sale of residential real estate); Green Acres, Inc. v. First Union National Bank, 637 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (Johnson rule extends to commercial real estate transaction; noting, however, that 2d and 3d DCAs limit the rule to residential real estate transactions); Casey v. Cohan, 740 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (common law rule of caveat emptor generally continues to apply in nondisclosure cases).
14	See, e.g., Rollins, 454 So. 2d 580; Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, 693 So. 2d 602. 606 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1997) (FDUTPA creates a simplified statutory cause of action which bestows additional substantive remedies).
15	Izadi, 550 So. 2d 1135; Father & Son, 643 So. 2d 23; Millenium Communications, 761 So. 2d at 1264.
16	It is not clear that there is a right to jury trial on FDUTPA claims. See Federbush, supra note 2, at 34.
17	Izadi, 550 So. 2d at 1139 n.8.
18	Delgado, 693 So. 2d 602; accord, Sarkis v. Pafford Oil, 697 So. 2d 524, 528 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1997).
19	Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
20	Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
21	Porter & Dietsch v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 302 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979); accord, FTC v. Pharmtech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 294, 302 (D.D.C. 1983). In Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 67 (1974), the FTC had explained that in addition to scientific tests performed by the manufacturer, reasonable basis might also be supplied by medical literature reports on adequate, well-controlled tests, or the general state of medical knowledge at the time of the claim, however ascertained. A later decision held that a claim that scientific tests establish that a product works must generally be supported by at least two well-controlled scientific studies (as explained therein). Removatron Int’l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489, 1492 nn.3, 5 (1st Cir. 1989).
22	Ward Laboratories v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 827 (1960).
23	International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1060 (1984).
24	Avalon Industries, 83 F.T.C. 1728, 1750, 1756 (1974).
25	FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); see also FTC v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. den., 510 U.S. 1110 (1994) (heat detector operation demonstrated in a cardboard house set on fire; false implied representation of correspondence to actual conditions).
26	Basic Books, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1960); accord, FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 572 (7th Cir. 1989).
27	Heinz Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), quoted in the Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 178.
28	J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967).
29	Warner Lambert, 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1414 (1975), aff’d, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. den., 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
30	Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 964, 967 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 445 U.S. 934 (1980).
31	Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962).
32	Heinz Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282.
33	Wilmington Chemical Corp., 69 F.T.C. 828, 866 (1966).
34	103 F.T.C. at 183.
35	FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 387.
36	Accord, FTC v. Wilcox, 926 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (S.D. Fla. 1995); FTC v. SlimAmerica, Inc., 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶72,579 at 85,201 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
37	103 F.T.C. at 183.
38	See, e.g., Rhodes Pharmacal, Inc., 208 F.2d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 1953); In the Matter of A.A. Friedman Co., 74 F.T.C. 1056, 1070 (1968); In the Matter of Benrus Watch Co., Inc., 64 F.T.C. 1018, 1032 (1964); Firestone, 481 F.2d at 250.
39	Leonard Porter, 88 F.T.C. 546, 626 n.5, 630 (1976).
40	See also Equifax v. FTC, 678 So. 2d 1047, 1052 (11th Cir. 1982).
41	A practice which “offends established public policy . . . and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers. . . .”, as cited in Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976). Samuels, et al. v. King Motor Company of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001), erroneously cited that standard.
42	See, e.g., Urling, 468 So. 2d 451 (false termite inspection certificate); Day v. Le-Jo Enterprises, Inc, 521 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988); Warren v. Monahan Beaches Jewelry Center, Inc., 548 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1989) (false representation that ring was diamond); Izadi, 550 So. 2d 1135 (auto financing offer which advertiser never intended to keep); Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Savage, 570 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1990) (false oral representation of auto’s condition actionable despite written “as is” warranty disclaimer); Cummings v. Warren Henry Motors, Inc., 648 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1994) (intentional concealment that consumer was entering a lease agreement, rather than a sales agreement, for an auto); W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Myers, 696 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1996) (financier of purchaser of consumer goods misrepresented fee charged as nonfiling insurance rather than default protection, included the charge in amount to be financed rather than finance charge, thereby providing it a fund against which to offset bad debt losses and increasing the base upon which interest was computed); Sarkis, 697 So. 2d 524 (allegations by dealer that supplier submitted false test results indicating it had supplied higher grade gasoline, to justify the [higher] price charged); Fort Lauderdale Lincoln v. Corgnati, 715 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1998) (false representation that auto had never been in accident or repainted and was in “showroom condition”); GMAC v. Laesser, 718 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1998) (switching consumer from outright purchase of auto to lease-purchase through false representation of financial benefit to consumer by doing so). See also Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1995) (evidence that dealer misrepresented limited edition nature of car and type of engine and amount his trade-in was actually allocated, and failed to disclose manufacturer suggested retail price, created jury questions as to deceptive nature of acts; reversing directed verdict for defendant); Milan Davich, Jr. v. Norman Brothers Nissan, Inc., 739 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999) (failure to disclose car’s paint damage; discovery issue).
43	“[W]e can discern nothing from the language contained on the postcard which would [be] likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances to conclude that the credit card . . . is a Visa or MasterCard credit card as urged by the Department.” 761 So. 2d at 1264.
44	See 5 U.S.C. §45(a)(2) (actions “to prevent” persons . . . from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts”); The Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.T.C. 795, 909–14 (1994).
45	Fla. Stat. §501.207(1)(b).
46	Sheffield v. Davis, 562 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1990) (plain meaning rule).
47	Gutter v. Wunker, 631 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1994) (fraud), dsm’d, 637 So. 2d 235; Gilchrist Timber Company, et al., v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., et al., 696 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997) (negligent misrepresentation).
48	See, e.g., FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1982) (routine fraud cases are “proper cases”); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., et al., 748 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1984).
49	1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,725 at 69,704 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1983).
50	FDUTPA itself has been held by a federal court not to apply to securities transactions. Crowell, et al. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Services Co., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
51	524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
52	FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (D. Minn. 1985); FTC v. National Business Consultants, 781 F. Supp. 1136, 1143 (E.D. La. 1991) (misrepresentations and omissions); FTC v. Patriot Alcohol Testers, 798 F. Supp. 851, 861 (D. Mass. 1992); FTC v. Pacific Medical Clinics Management, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶69,777 at 67,587 (S.D. Cal. 1992); FTC v. Figgie International, n. 25 supra at 606; U.S. v. Building Inspector of America, 894 F. Supp. 507, 522 (D. Mass. 1995).
53	The legislature is presumed to be acquainted with judicial decisions on a subject concerning which it subsequently enacts a statute. Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So. 2d 471, 475 (Fla. 1984).
54	Kirby Center v. Dept. of Labor and Employment Security, 650 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1995).
55	Fla. Stat. §501.202(3).
56	Fla. Stat. §501.207(c) provides that the enforcing authority may bring “An action on behalf of one or more consumers or government entities [per 2001 amendment] for the actual damages caused by an act or practice in violation of this part” (emphasis added). It would seem unlikely that state authorities would bring such actions on behalf of small numbers of consumers.
57	Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
58	Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1990), appeal after remand, 622 So. 2d 570; Ady v. American Honda Finance Corp., 675 So. 2d 577, 581 (Fla. 1996); Raskin v. Community Blood Centers of Florida, Inc., 699 So. 2d 1015, 1015 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1997), rev. denied, 707 So. 2d 1124. Cf. Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding Club, 403 So. 2d 1367, 1370 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981). There, in a civil damages action under Florida’s misleading advertising statutes, which also provide for criminal penalties (§§817.40, .41, .44), the court opined that “one who seeks by civil suit to vindicate a violation of the statute as a private wrong must show that the wrong was the proximate cause of his injury or damage, and proof of reliance is necessary to prove the causal connection.” Accord, Smith v. Mellon Bank, 957 F.2d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 1992); State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. v. Novotny, 657 So. 2d 1210, 1213 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1995).
59	E.g., Cavalier Carpets, Inc. v. Caylor, 746 F.2d 749, 757 (11th Cir. 1984); Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 723 (11th Cir. 1987).
60	Fla. Stat. §501.202(2).
61	524 F.2d at 907 n.22. Blackie is still considered a leading case. Finkel, 817 F.2d at 361; 3 Bromberg and Lowenfels on Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud (2d ed., 2000), §8.6 (600) at p. 8:803.
62	See Conn. GSA §42-110 et seq.; 815 ILCS (Ill.) 505/2; Mich. S.A. §19.418(1); N.C. GSA §75-1.1(a); Pa. CSA §201-2,3; Tex. B. & C. C. §17.50.
63	“The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of this act is to complement the body of federal law governing. . . unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts of practices in order to protect the public . . . . It is the intent of the legislature that, in construing this act, the courts be guided by final decisions of the federal courts and final orders of the federal trade commission interpreting the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters . . . .” RCWA §19.86.920.
64	“Any other interpretation would effectively undermine class actions based on the . . . CPA.” 6 P.3d at 72.
65	Amoco v. GMC, 463 N.E. 2d 625 (Oh. App. 1982); Vazquez v. Superior Court, 484 P. 2d 964 (Cal. 1971).
66	The decision in Hinchcliffe v. American Motors Corp., 440 A.2d 810, 815 (Conn. 1981), was based on the Connecticut statute’s provision that plaintiff need only prove “ascertainable loss,” rather than actual damages. The decision in Canady v. Mann, 419 S.E.2d 597 (N.C. App. 1992), did not reach the reliance issue. Furthermore, the court relied on the FTC’s obsolete “tendency or capacity to deceive” standard. The decision in Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W. 2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985), noted that the Texas statute’s relevant language was “a deceptive act or practice which is the producing cause of the consumer’s actual damages,” and that language containing the term “reliance”; i.e., “sustained actual damages as a result of reliance on” enumerated acts, had been rejected. Dix, et al. v. American Bankers Life Assurance Co., 415 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 1987), was another class action decision holding that class members need not prove individual reliance, which proof would otherwise create a predominance of individual issues defeating class certification. It discussed federal securities precedent, but failed to note precedent holding there is a rebuttable presumption of reliance. Weinberg et al. v. Sun Company, Inc., 740 A.2d 1152 (Pa. Super. 1999), was another class certification decision, but it affirmed a denial of class certification as plaintiffs had failed to provide sufficient evidence of causation. In Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Company, 726 N.E.2d 51 (Ill. App. 4 Dist. 2000), the court affirmed the denial of certification of a nationwide class because the laws of other states might require reliance. Similarly, the FTC Act cases cited in Latman did not reach the reliance issue, and are inapposite. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1989), was not even a deception case; it was an unfairness case. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979), was not a consumer monetary redress case. It also utilized the pre-1983 deception standard.
67	Fla. Stat. §501.211(1): “Anyone aggrieved by a violation of this part may bring an action to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this part and to enjoin a person who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise likely to violate this part.”
68	776 So. 2d at 975.
69	N.G.L. Travel Associates v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 764 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2000); accord, Bio-Med Plus, Inc. v. Health Coalition, Inc., 2001 Fla. App. Lexis 11444 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. August 15, 2001) (appellant was competitor, not consumer, of appellee).
70	Delgado, 693 So. 2d 602, addressed damages only, and not equitable relief; it did not deny any requested relief.
71	It cited a New Jersey case, City Check Cashing v. Nat’l. State Bank, 582 A.2d 809 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1990), but that state’s statute limits private relief to persons suffering ascertainable losses of money or property, and contains no reference to FTC interpretations. N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. The 1996 law review article it cited also failed to address such provisions, and erroneously cited to the pre-1993 version of FDUTPA.
72	Beacon Property Management, Inc. v. PNR, Inc., 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 4339, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D 915 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001).
73	United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunrise Mold Co., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1481 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Laboratorios Roldan v. Tex Int’l Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1570 (11th Cir. 1984); Klinger v. Weekly World News, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“anyone aggrieved”); Contemporary Restaurant Concepts, Ltd., v. Las Tapas-Jacksonville, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1560, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Big Tomato v. Tasty Concepts, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“anyone aggrieved”); Nassau v. Unimotorcyclists Society of America, Inc., 59 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 1999. But see IC Industries v. I.C. Industries, 595 F. Supp. 340, 344 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Packaging Corp. Int’l. v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1983); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir. 1990) (copyright infringement).
74	See Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. at 388.
75	Niresk Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. den., 364 U.S. 883 (1960).
76	103 F.T.C. at 183 n.58.
77	See Contemporary Restaurant Concepts, 753 F. Supp. at 1563; Nassau, 59 F. Supp. at 1237.
78	1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th ed. 2001) §2:33, at p. 2-58. See cases cited therein.
79	See supra note 5.
80	See Sam’s Club v. Bair, 678 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1996).
81	Section 501.202. See Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 19 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. 1944); Klonis v. State Dept. of Revenue, 766 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 2000).
82	See Byte Int’l. Corp. v. Maurice Gusman Trust, 629 So. 2d 191, 192 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1993).
83	Senate Staff Analysis, Committee on Commerce and Economic Opportunities, CS/SB 208, March 22, 2001, see supra note 5 at p. 6. The legislative history of the parallel House bill, containing these same changes, is in accord. See HO685; Staff Analysis, House Committee on Agriculture & Consumer Affairs, March 10, 2001 at 3 (“The [Information Service Technology Development] Task Force believed the Legislature intended the definition of ‘consumer’ to track the definition of ‘person’ in s. 1.01(3), F.S., a definition that includes businesses.”), p. 4.