Source: https://openjurist.org/137/f3d/527
Timestamp: 2019-03-26 06:20:31
Document Index: 103255274

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 842', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

137 F3d 527 United States v. Fox | OpenJurist
137 F. 3d 527 - United States v. Fox
137 F3d 527 United States v. Fox
137 F.3d 527
Jayson FOX, Defendant-Appellant.
Roger MILLER, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 97-2350, 97-2683.
After presentation of the evidence on May 22, 1997, the district court sentenced Fox to a term of 30 months imprisonment. This sentence reflects a four-level enhancement pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 2K1.3(b)(3) because the district court determined that Fox had sufficient knowledge and/or reason to believe that the explosives would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. As a result of this knowledge, the district court concluded that the four-level enhancement to Fox's sentence was appropriate.
After a sentencing hearing was held on June 24, 1997, the district court sentenced Miller to 25 months imprisonment, which reflects a base offense level of sixteen because the district court classified him as a "prohibited person" as defined by U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a)(3) and also includes the same four-level enhancement as applied to Fox pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(b)(3) for his knowledge of the subsequent use of the explosives. Fox and Miller filed timely notices of appeal.2
Fox and Miller appeal their sentences, arguing that the district court erred in its decision to apply the four-level enhancement to their sentences pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(b)(3) for their knowledge and/or reasonable belief that the stolen explosives would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. They attack the court's determinations as unsupported by the evidence.
Miller further challenges his sentence as fundamentally unconstitutional and in violation of both the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions because the district court characterized him as a prohibited person as defined by U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a)(3). He contends that the application of the enhanced base offense level is unconstitutional and violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because the guideline punishes him for his status of using or being addicted to a controlled substance. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the sentences imposed by the district court.
In reviewing a district court's sentencing determinations, we review the findings of fact underlying the application of the sentencing guidelines for clear error. United States v. Ewing, 129 F.3d 430, 433 (7th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). The district court's conclusion that the defendants had knowledge and/or reason to believe that the stolen explosives would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense is a factual determination and, therefore, is reviewed for clear error. Under this standard of review, we accord great deference to the district court's findings and reverse its judgment only if a review of the record demonstrates a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Friend, 104 F.3d 127, 129 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1007 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Andersen v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1984)).
Fox and Miller argue that the district court erred in its application of the four-level sentence enhancement to each of their sentences as required by U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(b)(3). At the defendants' sentencing hearings, the district court adopted the factual findings and guideline application discussed in each of the presentence reports and applied a four-level enhancement to both Fox and Miller's base offense levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(b)(3), which provides:
U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(b)(3). The defendants contend that the application of the sentence enhancement was improper because they did not have sufficient knowledge and/or reason to believe that the stolen explosives would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.
Fox argues that his discussions with Agent Kozlowski did not impart sufficient knowledge or provide him with reason to believe that the explosives were going to be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. Miller contends that because he was not present for the initial conversations between Fox and Agent Kozlowski and Fox did not relay or discuss those conversations with him, the district court incorrectly concluded that he had the requisite knowledge and/or reasonable belief that the explosive devices would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. The government responds, and we agree, that the district court did not err in its application of the four-level enhancement to either Fox or Miller's sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(b)(3).
In support of its finding, the district court focused on: (1) Fox's extensive discussions with Agent Kozlowski about how to hook up the explosives to a car; (2) his explanation that the FBI would not be able to trace use of the explosives back to Kozlowski; and (3) his statement when he exited the car, which was "I don't even want to know how you're going to use this." The court concluded that Fox would not have made any comment about his knowledge if he did not have reason to believe that the purchaser was going to use the explosives for an illegal purpose. In our review, we give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines and, accordingly, conclude that the district court did not err in applying the four-level enhancement to Fox's sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(b)(3).
Second, we review Miller's sentence. The district court further concluded in a subsequent sentencing hearing that the four-level enhancement to Miller's sentence also was appropriate. After viewing the witness and hearing the testimony, the district court judge commented on the believability, or lack thereof, of Miller's testimony and rejected his claim that he had no knowledge that the explosives would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. We will not review the district court's decision to give certain testimony less weight than other evidence. It is the proper role of the district court to make credibility determinations, and those findings must receive special deference. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-75, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12.
In assessing Miller's participation, the district court concluded that the manner in which these transactions occurred indicated that it was reasonably foreseeable that the stolen explosives would be used or possessed for an illegal purpose. In our opinion, the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous, and we agree with its determination that Miller in fact did have sufficient knowledge of the subsequent use of the explosives. Accordingly, the application of the four-level enhancement to Miller's sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(b)(3) also is appropriate.
Next, we address Miller's argument that the application of U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a)(3) violates state and federal constitutional provisions which guarantee the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Questions involving interpretation of the sentencing guidelines are reviewed de novo. Ewing, 129 F.3d at 433; United States v. Owolabi, 69 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir.1995). The sentencing guidelines establish the applicable base offense levels for the unlawful possession of explosive materials. Section 2K1.3 of the guidelines provides:
U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a). The guidelines define a prohibited person as anyone who "is an unlawful user of, or is addicted to, any controlled substance." See U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a)(3), Application Note 3(iii).
Miller contends that the application of the sentencing guidelines punishes his status of being addicted to a controlled substance. He focuses on his drug abuse and addiction as the reasons for his punishment and claims that the penalty enhancement within the applicable base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a)(3) seeks to punish him for his use of and/or addiction to marijuana. However, this focus is misplaced.
After reviewing the presentence report and listening to the testimony at Miller's sentencing hearing, the district court determined that Miller is a "prohibited person" as defined by the sentencing guidelines based on his unlawful use of a controlled substance. Miller is not being prosecuted for his status of using or being addicted to marijuana; rather, he is being prosecuted for the federal criminal offense of possessing, transporting, and selling stolen explosive materials. See 18 U.S.C. § 842(h). The penalty enhancement within the applicable base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a)(3) simply recognizes that a person who possesses, transports, or barters stolen explosives while using or under the influence of drugs substantially intensifies a potentially dangerous situation, which warrants the application of a greater base offense level. Accordingly, the district court properly interpreted the sentencing guidelines and applied the correct base offense level for Miller's unlawful use of marijuana in connection with his possession and sale of the explosives.
In addition, Miller contends that his sentence violates the state and federal constitutional guarantees to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court summarily rejected Miller's argument, and we too agree that the penalty enhancement within the applicable base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a)(3) is not in violation of either his state or federal constitutional rights and, more specifically, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The fact that a criminal's sentence includes a four-level enhancement within the applicable base offense level for use of or addiction to a controlled substance during the commission of another crime does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, the government prosecuted Miller for a federal criminal offense, and not a state crime, and the district court properly used the United States Sentencing Guidelines to determine his appropriate sentence. We conclude that the district court applied the correct base offense level for Miller's classification as a prohibited person pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3(a)(3).