Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19820204_0041186.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-28 18:33:48
Document Index: 466243324

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7401', '§ 1857', '§ 7420', '§ 7420', '§ 405', '§ 10', '§ 113', '§ 1857', '§ 7413', '§ 113', '§ 113']

| Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency
BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER,v.ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT
We look first at the relevant part of the Act, since "the doctrine of administrative exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the particular administrative scheme at issue." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1975). Section 120 was enacted in 1977 as an amendment to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I 1977) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a. (1976)). It assesses an administrative penalty against air polluters equal to the economic value the violator derives from continuing noncompliance after the date of notification by EPA. The statute directs that not later than six months after August 7, 1977, the Administrator shall promulgate regulations governing the procedures for assessment and collection of the noncompliance penalty. Id. at § 7420(a)(1)(A), § 7420(b).
In the leading case of Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S. Ct. 459, 463-464, 82 L. Ed. 638 (1938), the Supreme Court referred to the "long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."*fn1 As the Court explained in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-195, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 1662-1663, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969), it is more desirable to let the administrative process go forward without interruption than to permit the parties to petition the courts at various intermediate stages. In that way, the agency can develop the necessary factual background, apply any special expertise it might possess, and correct its own errors. This judicial forbearance demonstrates a proper respect for administrative autonomy and allows the agency to function more efficiently and responsibly. See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 765, 95 S. Ct. at 2466.
Despite the frequently reiterated benefits of exhaustion, courts have declined to require it when no purpose would be served by deferring review. For example, where a dispute centers on legal questions such as constitutional or statutory interpretation, and the facts are uncontested, then the interest in "full administrative fact gathering and utilization of agency expertise" is not harmed by earlier judicial scrutiny. McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 486, 91 S. Ct. 1565, 1569, 29 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1971). In those circumstances, a rigid exhaustion requirement would entail "a commitment of administrative resources unsupported by any administrative or judicial interest." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 766,*fn2 95 S. Ct. at 2467.
Another exception to the exhaustion requirement applies when irreparable injury will result unless the court promptly intervenes in the administrative process. See Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24, 94 S. Ct. 1028, 1040, 39 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1974). Thus, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), the Court permitted judicial review of a decision to terminate disability benefits, even though the claimant had not exhausted the Social Security Administration's internal review procedures. The Court reasoned that a quick resolution of the claimant's dispute with the agency was essential, since he was so dependent upon the benefits for his survival that "an erroneous termination would damage him in a way not recompensable through retroactive payments." Id. at 330-331, 96 S. Ct. at 1900-901. Finally, exhaustion has been excused in some cases when agency action clearly violates statutory or constitutional rights. See Babcock and Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1138 (3d Cir. 1979).*fn3
It may be observed that the concepts of "final decision" and "exhaustion" are often closely intertwined and sometimes confused. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court noted that the Social Security Act itself requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, in the form of a "final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing," 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as a jurisdictional prerequisite for judicial review. 424 U.S. at 327-328, 96 S. Ct. at 899. The question before the Court was whether the initial "denial of Eldridge's claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently "final' decision with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion requirement." Id. at 330, 96 S. Ct. at 900. In deciding that it was sufficient, the Court invoked "the core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered." Id. at 331, n.11, 96 S. Ct. at 901. See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 764-767, 95 S. Ct. at 2466-2467.
In general, exhaustion refers to the steps which the litigant must take, whereas finality refers to the conclusion of activity by the agency. As in the Standard Oil case, a party may take all the measures available to it in the administrative process to obtain relief, and yet not obtain a final reviewable order. It is also possible that an agency order may be final for purposes of appeal, even though the party has not pursued his administrative remedies to the end. For example, an agency order may be appealable under § 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act even though the aggrieved party still has a right to internal reconsideration or review.*fn4
Section 120 was enacted by Congress in 1977 to combat what it perceived as recalcitrance by industry in coming into compliance with Clean Air Act standards. Before then, § 113 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413), allowed a court to impose civil fines and even criminal penalties on violators. Despite § 113's sanctions, the uncertainty and delay of litigation made it profitable for violators to continue their noncompliance. Section 120 eliminates this incentive by assessing a mandatory administrative penalty equal to the economic value gained from continuing noncompliance. The sanction is designed to end the competitive advantage realized by firms that do not install or operate necessary pollution control equipment. The offender gains nothing by fostering administrative and judicial delays, because the penalty begins to accrue on the date of notification by EPA. This unique economic sanction is independent of, and in addition to, whatever judicial penalties might be imposed under § 113.*fn5