Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/249/354
Timestamp: 2015-06-02 21:40:58
Document Index: 721719415

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 1', '§ 1321', '§ 354', '§ 847', '§ 841', '§ 1', '§ 1717', '§ 11', '§ 2026']

UNITED STATES v. UNION PAC. R. CO. | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews UNITED STATES v. UNION PAC. R. CO.
249 U.S. 354 (39 S.Ct. 294, 63 L.Ed. 643)
Argued: Jan. 30, 1919.
Most of the acts of Congress which granted lands in aid of railroads provide that they shall be 'free from toll or other charge upon the transportation of any property or troops of the United States.'
This clause was construed in Lake Superior & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. 442, 23 L. Ed. 965, as conferring only the free use of the roadbed as a highway. Since then, under appropriate legislation, payment has come to be made by the government for the transportation of property and troops at rates equal to 50 per cent. of those charged private parties. The Union Pacific, having entered into an agreement to that effect, claimed payment at the full rate for certain persons carried as passengers upon the request of the government. The Auditor of the War Department refused to allow payment for these passengers at more than half fares, on the ground that they were within the provision for transporting 'troops of the United States'; and his ruling was sustained by the Comptroller of the Treasury. 21 Decisions of the Comptroller, 651. Thereupon this suit was brought in the Court of Claims for the amount disallowed; and judgment was rendered for the railroad. 52 Ct. Cl. 226. The case is here on appeal. The questions presented are whether any of the following classes of persons are to be deemed 'troops of the United States' within the provision of the land grant acts:
None of these persons traveled as part of a moving army, troop, or body of soldiers; that is, they traveled separately as individuals, and (with few exceptions) each on a different day and to widely scattered destinations. Under recent acts of Congress and Army Regulations,
the transportation of persons of some of these classes is paid for by the government.
In defining the transportation rights secured to the United States, these land grant acts draw a broad distinction between freight and passengers. All 'property' of the government, whatever its character and intended use, is to be carried 'free of toll or other charge'; but of the many persons in its service, only 'troops.' The history of the legislation shows that both the broad term, 'any property,' and the narrower one, 'troops,' was adopted deliberately. The earliest land grant act in which the provision appears is that of September 20, 1850 (
9 Stat. 466, 467, c. 61, § 4), under which the Illinois Central was constructed. The bill as introduced
provided for the free transportation of 'troops and munitions of war.' It was amended so as to read 'any property or troops.' There had been an earlier act granting land to the state of Illinois for the construction of a canal (Act March 30, 1822, c. 14, 3 Stat. 659), which was amended (Act March 2, 1833, c. 87, 4 Stat. 662) so as to permit, on the same terms, the use and disposition of the land for railroads. That act provided for the free transportation of 'any property of the United States or persons in their service.'
In 1850 the word 'troops' had (and it has ever since had) an established meaning namely, 'soldiers collectivelya body of soldiers.' Thus the army appropriation act of that year (Act Sept. 28, 1850, c. 78, § 1, 9 Stat. 504, 506) provides for the 'transportation of the army including the baggage of the troops when moving either by land or water' and for 'mileage, or the allowance made to officers for the transportation of themselves and baggage when traveling on duty without troops.' The contemporary legislation draws a clear distinction also between troops, that is, those then having the status of soldiers, and those who once had been in, or were seeking to enter, the military service. Thus the army appropriation act of March 2, 1847 (
9 Stat. 149, 151, c. 35), which provides in substantially the same terms as that of 1850 for the transportation of troops, makes specific provision for 'forwarding destitute soldiers to their homes,' for the 'comfort of discharged soldiers,' and for 'expenses of recruiting,' which include the cost of transportation. See Army Regulations, 1857, § 1321. And the resolution of March 3, 1847, 9 Stat. 206 (No. 7), authorizes the refund of moneys expended by the states and individuals 'in organizing, subsisting, and transporting volunteers previous to their being mustered and received into the service of the United States for the present war, and for subsisting troops in the service of the United States.' In view of the established meaning of the term 'troops' as used by Congress the duty of the court is merely to apply the provisions of the act to the several classes of persons described above.
First. The first three classes, namely, discharged military prisoners, discharged enlisted men, and rejected applicants for enlistment, are clearly not 'troops of the United States.' Their status is that of the civilian. They form no part of the military establishment. They may go where they please and do what they please, subject to no more interference by the military authorities of the government, than if they had never been, or had never sought to be, connected with the army. They were traveling for their own personal ends. Congress recognizes the distinction between those forming part of the army and those who do not, because they are recruits or have been discharged; and it makes special provision for their transportation.
Such had formerly been also the opinion of the Comptroller of the Treasury. Compare Digest, Second Comptroller's Decisions, vol. 4, §§ 354 and 355.
Second. Applicants for enlistment who have been accepted provisionally, but have yet to be subjected to the final examination at the recruiting depots and to take the oath before they become a part of the soldiery of the nation, are not 'troops of the United States.' It is the actual enlistment, the oath of allegiance, that changes the status from a civilian to soldier. Compare In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 156, 157, 11 Sup. Ct. 54, 34 L. Ed. 636; Tyler v. Pomeroy, 8 Allen (Mass.) 480; 19 Decisions of the Comptroller, 367; Army Regulations, 1913, § 847. The officers at the recruiting stations are expressly forbidden to administer this oath. Army Regulations, 1913, § 841. Such applicant is then not even a potential soldier; for he may be rejected on final examination.
And it is the actual and not the potential status that must govern. Compare Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 522, 537. The fact that under the Army Regulations he receives the same rations as an enlisted man, and that he is subject to the same medical attention,
does not effect a change of status. And the fact that the transportation is for the purposes of the government in connection with its military establishment is immaterial. Workmen in armor plants and civilian clerks in the War Department at Washington travel for purposes of the government, but are obviously not 'troops of the United States' within the meaning of the land-grant legislation. The army appropriation acts make specific provision for the transportation of 'troops' and of 'recruits.'
Third. Retired enlisted men en route to their homes after retirement are also not 'troops of the United States.' They travel for their own purposes. Congress has declared that such retired men shall for certain purposes be deemed a part of the army (Act Feb. 2, 1901, c. 192, § 1, 31 Stat. 748 Comp. St. § 1717); but they may be employed only after Congress has authorized the raising of volunteer forces, and not even then for field duty (Act April 25, 1914, c. 71, § 11, 38 Stat. 347, 350 Comp. St. § 2026h). The Army Regulations for 1913 make no provision requiring any service from retired enlisted men. Practically they have retired from, and not simply into a different branch of, the army. Compare Murphy v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 511, 522; Army Regulations, 1913, article 20. See also United States v. Tyler, 105 U. S. 244, 26 L. Ed. 985. The fact that they may thereafter be called into the army does not make them 'troops of the United States.' Any male citizen may at some time be called into the service. Compare Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. United States, supra.