Source: http://nc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170329_0000950.ENC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-06-28 12:12:12
Document Index: 492526524

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 58', '§ 90', '§ 90', '§ 90']

| Spivey v. Norris
Spivey v. Norris
DANIELLE GORE SPIVEY, Plaintiff,v.DETECTIVE KEVIN NORRIS, in his official and individual capacity; LEWIS L. HATCHER, in his official capacity as Columbus County Sheriff; and WESTERN SURETY CO., as the SURETY for the Columbus County Sheriff, Defendants.
cause comes before the court on defendants' motions for
Civil Procedure. The appropriate responses and replies have
been filed and the matters are ripe for ruling. For the
reasons discussed below, defendants' motions are granted
filed this action on August 1, 2015, asserting seven claims
arising out of alleged harassment by Detective Kevin Norris
(Norris) of the Columbus County Sheriffs Office. On January
11, 2016, the Court allowed plaintiff to file an amended
complaint and granted in part a motion to dismiss by Norris.
Plaintiffs amended complaint asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims against Norris individually and in his official
capacity for violation of plaintiff s Fourth, Fourteenth and
First Amendment rights and malicious prosecution; against
Sheriff Hatcher in his official capacity for supervisory
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; against Norris
individually and in his official capacity for malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress under state law; against Norris in his
individual capacity and Sheriff Harris in his official
capacity for negligent infliction of emotional distress under
state law; and a claim against Western Surety upon bond under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-76-5. Defendants Norris in his
official capacity, Harris, and Western Surety have filed a
motion for summary judgment on all claims. Defendant Norris
in his individual capacity has moved separately for summary
alleges that Norris is married to a close friend of plaintiff
s mother and took advantage of this relationship to insert
himself into plaintiffs life. Plaintiff further alleges that
she became the subject and victim of a personal vendetta held
by Norris, who, after attempting and failing to break up
plaintiffs relationship with her husband, stopped plaintiffs
husband on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and had
plaintiff arrested on felony and misdemeanor charges
involving an allegedly forged prescription for narcotic pain
facts as they relate to plaintiffs charge, arrest, and
prosecution are as follows. Plaintiff saw Dr. Lawson, a
dentist, on August 17, 2012, to address swelling which had
occurred following a root canal performed by a different
provider. Lawson Dep. at 40-42. Dr. Lawson noted in his chart
that he prescribed plaintiff penicillin and twenty tablets of
Percocet[1] 10/650 that day. Id. at 42.
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lawson's office on August 20,
2012, for a tooth extraction and was prescribed twenty
tablets of Percocet. Id. at 47.
fall of 2012, Norris received information that plaintiff had
tried to fill a prescription for narcotic pain medication at
a CVS Pharmacy in Loris, South Carolina, and that the
pharmacist could not verify the prescription as being
legitimate. [DE 52 at 8]. Norris further became aware of an
allegation that plaintiff had passed a forged prescription at
the Rite Aid Pharmacy in Whiteville, North Carolina in August
2012. Id. Norris referred the matter to State Bureau
of Investigation (SBI) Agent Cherry for further investigation
due to Norris' marriage to a close friend of plaintiff s
mother. Norris Dep. 19; 39-40. Although Norris referred the
matter to Agent Cherry, Norris continued to participate in
the investigation, accompanying Cherry to interviews and
meetings. See generally [DE 52].
reviewed plaintiffs pharmacy records and reviewed the
original prescription from Dr. Lawson which had been filled
at the Rite Aid Pharmacy on August 17, 2012. Cherry Dep. at
36-37; 61. Cherry determined that it appeared to him the
prescription had been altered to reflect that thirty tablets
of Endocet/Percocet had been prescribed as opposed to twenty
tablets. Id. at 100. On November 6, 2012, Cherry and
Norris spoke to Dr. Lawson, who told the investigators that
his records reflected that twenty tablets of Percocet had
been prescribed to plaintiff on August 17, 2012. [DE 52 at
43]. Cherry's notes also reflect that he and Norris
interviewed Dr. Lawson a second time on November 29, 2012, at
11:10 a.m. regarding Dr. Lawson's general procedures when
writing prescriptions. [DE 52 at 11-12]. On November 7, 2012,
Cherry and Norris, along with an agent from the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control,
interviewed plaintiff at her place of employment in South
Carolina. [DE 52 at 15-16]. Plaintiff denied altering a
prescription but stated that her husband frequently took her
Percocet pills for his own use without plaintiffs permission.
Id; Spivey Dep. at 70.
November 19, 2012, an order was filed in Columbus County
Superior Court directing Dr. Lawson to provide plaintiffs
medical records to the Columbus County Sheriffs Office. [DE
52 at 18-19]. On November 29, 2012, Cherry and Norris met
with Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Nance who, after
hearing the recitation of the case, found that there was
probable cause to arrest plaintiff. ADA Nance told Cherry to
seek warrants for plaintiffs arrest. Cherry Dep. 13, 24,
94-5. The same day, Cherry appeared before Magistrate G.L.
Greene at 9:30 a.m. and provided as the complaining witness
sworn testimony regarding plaintiff. Magistrate Greene
determined that probable cause had been established and
signed arrest warrants for plaintiff for unlawfully obtaining
possession of Percocet by altering a prescription, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 90-108(a)(10), and unlawful possession of more
than fourteen but less than twenty-eight grams of opiates.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(4); [DE 52 at 57-58]. Also
the same day, Cherry telephoned plaintiff to inform her of
the outstanding warrants for her arrest and plaintiff later
turned herself in. Spivey Dep. 74-76.
January 15, 2013, plaintiff, represented by counsel, entered
an Alford plea[2] to a reduced charge of misdemeanor
possession of a Schedule II controlled substance. [DE 63-3 at
8-17]. Plaintiff understood that this outcome would allow her
to keep her nursing license and be able to expunge her
criminal record upon satisfaction of certain conditions under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-96. Spivey Dep. 80-81. Following
entry of her plea plaintiff was sentenced to a term of
probation. On February 22, 2013, a dismissal notice of
reinstatement was filed dismissing plaintiffs misdemeanor
simple possession conviction "per compliance to 90-96
conditions." [DE 63-3 at 6]. Plaintiff contends that,
although the document does not indicate as much, her
conviction was dismissed following production by her criminal
defense attorney of the original.
asked for this case to review the prescription that he wrote
on August 17, 2012, Dr. Lawson stated that in his handwriting
thirty tablets of Percocet 10/650 had been prescribed. Lawson
Dep. at 56-57. Dr. Lawson further stated that he had not been
shown the August 17, 2012, prescription by Cherry or Norris
when they interviewed him, and that if he had he would have
told them that it was in his handwriting and that he had
written the prescription for thirty tablets, not twenty as
was reflected in his chart. Id. at 57-59. Dr. Lawson
could not recall whether when he spoke to Cherry and Norris
they indicated that plaintiff was being investigated for
having altered Dr. Lawson's prescription, and that if
they had he would have asked to see the prescription from the
pharmacy to ensure that there was not a mistake in his
records. Id. at 62-63.
facts as they relate to the stop of plaintiff s husband's
vehicle are as follows. Norris has proffered evidence that
while on patrol on November 8, 2012, the day after plaintiff
was interviewed by Norris and Cherry at her workplace, Norris
witnessed a car travel left of center and come close to
hitting a bridge. Norris Dep. at 32. Norris initiated a
vehicle stop, interacted with Mr. Spivey who was driving the
car, noticed the odor of alcohol, and contacted the traffic
team who then took control of the scene. Id. at 36.
Plaintiff does not dispute that another deputy completed the
stop and transported her husband to the county jail where his
alcohol level was tested and he received a citation. Spivey
Dep. at 28-9.
motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless there
are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and the
of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). If that burden has been met, the non-moving party
must then come forward and establish the specific material
facts in dispute to survive summary judgment. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574,
588 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists for trial, a trial court views the
evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris,550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007). However, "[t]he mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving
party's position is not sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the
[fact ...