Source: https://casetext.com/case/colonnade-corp-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2020-02-24 23:10:58
Document Index: 761647031

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7342', '§ 5121', '§ 5301', '§ 5146', '§ 7606', '§ 7342', '§ 5146', '§ 7606', '§ 5122', '§ 19', '§ 8', '§ 5146', '§ 5146']

Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 | Casetext
Exceptions to this requirement have developed, however, for "pervasively regulated business[es]," United…
Full title:COLONNADE CATERING CORP. v . UNITED STATES
90 S. Ct. 774
upholding the validity of warrantless inspections of businesses in the alcoholic beverage industry
Argued January 15, 1970 Decided February 25, 1970
Congress, which has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures respecting the liquor industry, has made it an offense under 26 U.S.C. § 7342 for a liquor licensee to refuse admission to a federal inspector, a sanction that precludes forcible entries without a warrant. Pp. 72-77.
Petitioner, a licensee in New York authorized to serve alcoholic beverages and also the holder of a federal retail liquor dealer's occupational tax stamp, 26 U.S.C. § 5121 (a), brought this suit to obtain the return of seized liquor and to suppress it as evidence. The District Court granted the relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. 410 F.2d 197. The case is here on a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted, 396 U.S. 814, to review the decision in light of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541.
Petitioner runs a catering establishment. A federal agent, a member of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service, was a guest at a party on petitioner's premises and noted a possible violation of the federal excise tax law. When federal agents later visited the place, another party was in progress. They noticed that liquor was being served. Without the manager's consent, they inspected the cellar. Then they asked the manager to open the locked liquor storeroom. He said that the only person authorized to open that room was one Rozzo, petitioner's president, who was not on the premises. Later Rozzo arrived and refused to open the storeroom. He asked if the agents had a search warrant and they answered that they did not need one. When Rozzo continued to refuse to unlock the room, an agent broke the lock and entered. Then they removed the bottles of liquor now in controversy which they apparently suspected of being refilled contrary to the command of 26 U.S.C. § 5301 (c).
It is provided in 26 U.S.C. § 5146 (b) and in 26 U.S.C. § 7606 that the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate has broad authority to enter and inspect the premises of retail dealers in liquors. And in case of the refusal of a dealer to permit the inspection, it is provided in 26 U.S.C. § 7342:
Page 73 26 U.S.C. § 5146 (b) provides: "The Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or other documents required to be kept by such dealer under this chapter or regulations issued pursuant thereto and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises."
26 U.S.C. § 7606 provides: "(a) Entry during day. "The Secretary or his delegate may enter, in the daytime, any building or place where any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects. "(b) Entry at night. "When such premises are open at night, the Secretary or his delegate may enter them while so open, in the performance of his official duties."
As defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5122 (a).
The question is whether the imposition of a fine for refusal to permit entry — with the attendant consequences that violation of inspection laws may have in this closely regulated industry — is under this statutory scheme the exclusive sanction, absent a warrant to break and enter.
Frank v. Maryland was overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, insofar as it permitted warrantless searches or inspections under municipal fire, health, and housing codes. The dictum that the provision for a fine on refusal to allow inspection made the use of force improper when there was no warrant was not disturbed; and the question is whether that dictum contains the controlling principle for this case.
The Government, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment bans only "unreasonable searches and seizures," relies heavily on the long history of the regulation of the liquor industry during pre-Fourth Amendment days, first in England and later in the American Colonies. It is pointed out, for example, that in 1660 the precursor of modern-day liquor legislation was enacted in England which allowed commissioners to enter, on demand, brewing houses at all times for inspection. Massachusetts had a similar law in 1692. And in 1791, the year in which the Fourth Amendment was ratified, Congress imposed an excise tax on imported distilled spirits and on liquor distilled here, under which law federal officers had broad powers to inspect distilling premises and the premises of the importer without a warrant. From these and later laws and regulations governing the liquor industry, it is argued that Congress has been most solicitous in protecting the revenue against various types of fraud and to that end has repeatedly granted federal agents power to make warrantless searches and seizures of articles under the liquor laws.
Page 75 12 Car. 2, c. 23, § 19.
Act of June 24, 1692, Mass. Acts and Resolves, Vol. 1, 1692-1714, p. 33, c. 5, § 8.
Section 29 of the Act of March 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 206, provided: "That it shall be lawful for the officers of inspection of each survey at all times in the daytime, upon request, to enter into all and every the houses, storehouses, warehouses, buildings and places which shall have been [registered] in manner aforesaid, and by tasting, gauging or otherwise, to take an account of the quantity, kinds and proofs of the said spirits therein contained; and also to take samples thereof, paying for the same the usual price."
The Court recognized the special treatment of inspection laws of this kind in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624:
We agree that Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand. The general rule laid down in See v. City of Seattle, supra, at 545 — "that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure" — is therefore not applicable here. In See, we reserved decision on the problems of "licensing programs" requiring inspection, saying they can be resolved "on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness." Id., at 546.
The controlling statutes set out in notes 1 and 2 of the majority opinion affirmatively define the conditions and times when agents may enter premises and inspect. Under 26 U.S.C. § 5146 (b) agents may enter to inspect "any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises." The time when this may be done is fixed as "during business hours." Section 7606 of 26 U.S.C. set forth in note 2 of the majority opinion, provides that agents may enter any building where taxable articles are kept, "so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects."
Petitioner brought proceedings under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the return of liquor seized by federal agents. One of those rules provides that "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court . . . for the return of the property . . . so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant. . . ." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41(e). (Emphasis added.) As I read that provision, it requires petitioner to show that the seizure in this case was illegal, either because it violated the Fourth Amendment, or because it was in violation of some law passed by Congress. In my opinion neither requirement has been met and therefore petitioner is not entitled to a return of the seized liquor.
The majority, far from finding this search unreasonable and therefore illegal under the Fourth Amendment, holds only that it was not authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 5146 (b), 7606(a), and that therefore the liquor must be returned. While these statutes do not in express terms authorize forcible breaking and entering to seize liquor kept in violation of federal law, it is perfectly clear that they do not in express terms declare such seizure illegal, and in my opinion those provisions impliedly authorize exactly the type of official conduct involved here. I am confident that when Congress said that federal liquor agents could search without a warrant and further provided for fines if the owner refused to permit such a search, it also intended to authorize forcible entry and seizure if that became necessary. I do not think Congress needed to speak any more clearly than it already has. Since I cannot conclude that this search and seizure was illegal under either the Fourth Amendment or any Act of Congress but was to the contrary carried out pursuant to congressional authorization, I would affirm the judgment below and hold that petitioner was not entitled to a return of the liquor.
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In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, the Court upheld against constitutional attack a statute that authorized warrantless searches of a liquor licensee's premises by Internal Revenue agents.
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