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KISSINGER V. REPORTERS COMMITTEE, 445 U. S. 136 (1980) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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KISSINGER V. REPORTERS COMMITTEE, 445 U. S. 136 (1980)
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No. 78-1088
Decided March 3, 1980*
Henry Kissinger served as an Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1969 to 1975 and as Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977. Throughout these periods, his secretaries monitored his telephone conversations and recorded their contents either by shorthand or on tape. The stenographic notes or tapes were used to prepare summaries and sometimes verbatim transcripts of the conversations (hereafter notes or telephone notes). In 1976, after the notes had been moved from Kissinger's office in the State Department to a private estate in New York, he donated them to the Library of Congress, subject to an agreement restricting public access to them for a specified period, and they were transported to the Library. Three requests for the notes were made to the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): (1) a request by a newspaper columnist (Safire), at a time when the notes were still located in Kissinger's State Department office, for any notes covering certain dates in which Safire's name appeared or in which Kissinger discussed information "leaks" with certain White House officials; (2) a request by the Military Audit Project, after the notes had been transferred to the Library of Congress, for all notes made while Kissinger was Secretary of State; and (3) a request at about the same time by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and others for notes made both while Kissinger was Presidential Assistant and while he was Secretary of State. The State Department denied the first request on the ground that the requested notes had been made while Kissinger was Presidential Assistant, and therefore were not agency records subject to FOIA disclosure. The second and third requests were denied on the grounds both that the requested notes were not agency records and that their deposit with the Library of Congress prior to the requests terminated the State Department's custody and control. During this period when he was no longer Secretary of State, Kissinger refused the Government Archivist's chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 137
requests for return of the notes. Suits were filed by the various FOIA requesters against Kissinger, the Library of Congress, the Secretary of State, and the State Department, seeking enforcement of the FOIA requests and a declaratory judgment that the telephone notes were agency records that had been unlawfully removed and were being improperly withheld. The District Court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor as to the notes made while Kissinger was Secretary of State, but denied relief as to the notes made while he was Presidential Assistant, finding that the former notes were "agency records" subject to disclosure under the FOIA, and that Kissinger had wrongfully removed them from the State Department in violation of the Federal Records Disposal Act. An order was entered requiring the Library of Congress to return the Secretary of State notes to the State Department and requiring the Department to determine which of the notes are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA and to provide the required materials to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
(b) Nor does the FOIA furnish the congressional intent to permit private actions to recover records wrongfully removed from Government custody. Under this Act, federal jurisdiction is dependent upon a showing that an agency has (1) "improperly" (2) "withheld" (3) "agency chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 138
records." Here, the State Department, a covered agency, has not "withheld" agency records within the meaning of the FOIA, since Congress did not mean that an agency improperly withholds a document that has been removed from the agency's possession prior to the filing of the FOIA request, the agency in such case having neither the custody nor control necessary to enable it to withhold. And an agency's failure to sue a third party to obtain possession is not a withholding under the Act. This conclusion that possession or control is a prerequisite to FOIA disclosure is reinforced by an examination of the Act's purposes, from which it is apparent that Congress never intended, when it enacted the FOIA, to displace the statutory scheme embodied in the Federal Records and Records Disposal Acts providing for administrative remedies to safeguard against wrongful removal of agency records as well as to retrieve wrongfully removed records. Pp. 445 U. S. 150-154.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and STEWART, WHITE, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., post, p. 445 U. S. 158, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 445 U. S. 161, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. BLACKMUN, J., took no part in the decision of the cases. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 139
Henry Kissinger served in the Nixon and Ford administrations for eight years. He assumed the position of Assistant chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 140
to the President for National Security Affairs in January, 1969. In September, 1973, Kissinger was appointed to the office of Secretary of State, but retained his National Security Affairs advisory position until November 3, 1975. After his resignation from the latter position, Kissinger continued to serve as Secretary of State until January 20, 1977. Throughout this period of Government service, Kissinger's secretaries generally monitored his telephone conversations and recorded their contents either by shorthand or on tape. The stenographic notes or tapes were used to prepare detailed summaries, and sometimes verbatim transcripts, of Kissinger's conversations. [Footnote 1] Since Kissinger's secretaries generally monitored all of his conversations, the summaries discussed official business as well as personal matters. The summaries and transcripts prepared from the electronic or stenographic recording of his telephone conversations throughout his entire tenure in Government service were stored in his office at the State Department in personal files.
On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the telephone notes from his office in the State Department to the New York estate of Nelson Rockefeller. Before removing the notes, Kissinger did not consult the State Department's Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center (FADRC), the center responsible for implementing the State Department's record maintenance and disposal program. Nor did he consult the National Archives and Records Service (NARS), a branch of the General Services Administration (GSA) which is responsible for records preservation throughout the Federal Government. Kissinger had obtained an opinion from the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, however, advising him that the telephone summaries were not agency records, but were his personal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 141
papers which he would be free to take when he left office. [Footnote 2] After Kissinger effected this physical transfer of the notes, he entered into two agreements with the Library of Congress deeding his private papers. In the first agreement, dated November 12, 1976, Kissinger deeded to the United States, in care of the Library of Congress, one collection of papers. Kissinger's telephone notes were not included in this collection. The agreement established terms obligating Kissinger to comply with certain restrictions on the inclusion of official documents in the collection and obligating the Library to respect restrictions on access. The agreement required that official materials in the collection would consist of "copies of government papers of which there is an original or record copy in government files." It also provided that all such materials must have been "approved for inclusion in the Collection" by "authorized officials."
After this agreement was executed, the Department of State formulated procedures for the review of the documents and their transfer to the Library of Congress. Employees reviewed the collection and retained (a) original or record copies chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 142
of documents belonging to the agency, and(b) any materials containing classified information. In the donation process, Kissinger was also required to sign the Department's Standard Separation Statement affirming that he had
Three separate FOIA requests form the basis of this litigation. All three requests were filed while Kissinger was Secretary of State, but only one request was filed prior to the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 143
removal of the telephone notes from the premises of the State Department. This first request was filed by William Safire, a New York Times columnist, on January 14, 1976. Safire requested the Department of State to produce any transcripts of Kissinger's telephone conversations between January 21, 1969, and February 12, 1971, in which (1) Safire's name appeared or (2) Kissinger discussed the subject of information "leaks" with certain named White House officials. The Department denied Safire's FOIA request by letter of February 11, 1976. The Department letter reasoned that the requested notes had been made while Kissinger was National Security Adviser, and therefore were not agency records subject to FOIA disclosure. [Footnote 3]
The third FOIA request was filed on January 13, 1977, by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP), the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, and a number of other journalists (collectively referred to as the RCFP requesters). This request also sought production of the telephone notes made by Kissinger both while he was National Security Adviser and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 144
Proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia commenced February 8, 1977. The RCFP requesters and Safire instituted an action under the FOIA, seeking enforcement of their FOIA requests. On March 8, 1977, MAP filed a similar suit. Both suits named chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 145
Kissinger, the Library of Congress, the Secretary of State and the Department of State as defendants. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the summaries were agency records that had been unlawfully removed and were being improperly withheld. Plaintiffs requested as ultimate relief that the court require the Library to return the transcripts to the Department with directions to process them for disclosure under the FOIA.
Both Kissinger and the private parties appealed from the lower court judgment. The Court of Appeals, without discussion, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 146
affirmed the trial court judgment ordering production of the summaries made while Kissinger was Secretary of State. The Court of Appeals also held that the summaries made during Kissinger's service as National Security Adviser need not be produced. The court found that this request had not been withdrawn, and reasoned that three considerations supported nonproduction: (1) the FOIA does not cover those Presidential advisers "who are so close to him as to be within the White House"; (2) the relocation of the transcripts to the State Department did not bring them within its disclosure responsibilities under the FOIA; and (3) the fact that portions of the transcripts may reflect the affairs of the NSC, an agency to which the FOIA does apply, provided no basis for disclosure in the absence of an FOIA request directed to that agency.
We first address the issue presented by Kissinger -- whether the District Court possessed the authority to order the transfer of that portion of the deeded collection, including the transcripts of all conversations Kissinger made while Secretary of State, from the Library of Congress to the Department of State at the behest of the named plaintiffs. The lower courts premised this exercise of jurisdiction on their findings that the papers were "agency records" and that they had been wrongfully removed from State Department custody in violation chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 147
of the Federal Records Disposal Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3303. We need not, and do not, decide whether the telephone notes are agency records, or were wrongfully removed, for even assuming an affirmative answer to each of these questions, the FOIA plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.
Under the Records Disposal Act, once a document achieves the status of a "record" as defined by the Act, it may not be alienated or disposed of without the consent of the Administrator of General Services, who has delegated his authority in such matters to the Archivist of the United States. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3303, 3303a, 3308-3314 (1976 ed. and Supp. II); GSA, Delegations of Authority Manual, ADM P. 5450.39A. Thus, if Kissinger's telephone notes were "records" within the meaning of the Federal Records Act, a question we do not reach, then Kissinger's transfer might well violate the Act, since he did not seek the approval of the Archivist prior to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 148
transferring custody to himself and then to the Library of Congress. We assume such a wrongful removal arguendo for the purposes of this opinion.
This Court has spent too many pages identifying the factors relevant to uncovering congressional intent to imply a private cause of action to belabor the topic here. [Footnote 4] Our most recent pronouncement on the subject, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979), readily disposes of the question. First, the language of the Records Acts merely "proscribes certain conduct," and does not "create or alter any civil liabilities." Id. at 444 U. S. 19. The Records Act also expressly provides administrative remedies for violations of the duties chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 149
it imposes, implicating our conclusion in Transamerica Mortgage that it is
Congress expressly recognized the need for devising adequate statutory safeguards against the unauthorized removal of agency records, and opted in favor of a system of administrative standards and enforcement. See U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Records Management 27 (1949). Thus, regardless of whether Kissinger has violated the Records and Records Disposal Acts, Congress has not vested federal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 150
courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate that question upon suit by a private party. That responsibility is vested in the administrative authorities. [Footnote 5]
The FOIA represents a carefully balanced scheme of public rights and agency obligations designed to foster greater access to agency records than existed prior to its enactment. That statutory scheme authorizes federal courts to ensure private access to requested materials when three requirements have been met. Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(b), federal jurisdiction is dependent upon a showing that an agency has (1) "improperly"; (2) "withheld"; (3) "agency records." Judicial authority to devise remedies and enjoin agencies can only be invoked, under the jurisdictional grant conferred by § 552, if the agency has contravened all three components of this obligation. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the telephone notes were "agency records," since we conclude that a covered agency -- here the State Department -- has not "withheld" those documents from the plaintiffs. We also need not decide the full contours of a prohibited "withholding." We do decide, however, that Congress did not mean that an agency improperly withholds a document which has been removed from the possession of the agency prior to the filing of the FOIA request. In such a case, the agency has neither chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 151
the custody nor control necessary to enable it to withhold. In looking for congressional intent, we quite naturally start with the usual meaning of the word "withhold" itself. The requesters would have us read the "hold" out of "withhold." The act described by this word presupposes the actor's possession or control of the item withheld. A refusal to resort to legal remedies to obtain possession is simply not conduct subsumed by the verb "withhold."
Most courts which have considered the question have concluded that the FOIA is only directed at requiring agencies to disclose those "agency records" for which they have chosen chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 152
to retain possession or control. [Footnote 6] See also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 437 U. S. 221 (1978), describing the Act as reaching "records and material in the possession of federal agencies. . . ."
If the agency is not required to create or to retain records under the FOIA, it is somewhat difficult to determine why the agency is nevertheless required to retrieve documents which have escaped its possession, but which it has not endeavored to recover. If the document is of so little interest to the agency that it does not believe the retrieval effort to be justified, the effect of this judgment on an FOIA request seems little different from the effect of an agency determination chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 153
that a record should never be created, or should be discarded. [Footnote 8]
A similarly strong expression of congressional expectations emerges in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A), providing for recovery of certain costs incurred in complying with FOIA requests. This section was included in the Act in order to reduce the burdens imposed on the agencies. The agency is authorized to establish fees for the "direct costs" of "document search and duplication." The costs allowed reflect the congressional judgment as to the nature of the costs which would be incurred. Congress identified these costs, and thus the agency burdens, as consisting of "search" and "duplication." During chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 154
the enactment of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, it was emphasized that agencies generally are not obligated to provide extensive services in fulfilling FOIA requests. S.Rep. No. 93-854, p. 12 (1974), reprinted in House Committee on Government Operations and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974: Source Book, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 164 (Joint Comm.Print 1975) (hereinafter Source Book II). When agencies do provide additional services in conducting a search, they are clearly authorized to allocate that cost to the requester. Ibid. It is doubtful that Congress intended that a "search" include legal efforts to retrieve wrongfully removed documents, since such an intent would authorize agency assessment to the private requester of its litigation costs in such an endeavor.
This construction of "withholding" readily disposes of the RCFP and MAP requests. Both of these requests were filed after Kissinger's telephone notes had been deeded to the Library chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 155
of Congress. [Footnote 9] The Government, through the Archivist, has requested return of the documents from Kissinger. The request has been refused. The facts make it apparent that Kissinger, and the Library of Congress as his donee, are holding the documents under a claim of right. Under these circumstances, the State Department cannot be said to have had possession or control of the documents at the time the requests were received. It did not, therefore, withhold any agency records, an indispensable prerequisite to liability in a suit under the FOIA.
Safire's request sought only a limited category of documents. He requested the Department to produce all transcripts of telephone conversations made by Kissinger from his White House office between January 21, 1969, and February chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 156
12, 1971, in which (1) Safire's name appeared; or (2) in which Kissinger discussed the subject of information "leaks" with General Alexander Haig, Attorney General John Mitchell, President Richard Nixon, J. Edgar Hoover, or any other official of the FBI.
Nor does his request for conversations in which his name appeared require a different conclusion. Safire never identified chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 157
the request as implicating any National Security Council records. The request did not mention the National Security Council or any subject relating to the NSC. To the contrary, he requested to see transcripts Kissinger made from his White House office. Moreover, after the State Department denied the request on the grounds that these were White House records, Safire's appeal argued these were State Department records, again never suggesting they were NSC records. The FOIA requires the requester to adequately identify the records which are sought. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). Safire's request did not describe the records as relating to the NSC or in any way put the agency on notice that it should refer the request to the NSC. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(b)(iii). Therefore, we also need not address the issue of when an agency violates the Act by refusing to produce records of another agency, or failing to refer a request to the appropriate agency.
The RCFP requesters nevertheless contend that, if the transcripts of telephone conversations made while adviser to the President were not their "agency records," they acquired that status under the Act when they were removed from White House files and physically taken to Kissinger's office at the Department of State. We simply decline to hold that the physical location of the notes of telephone conversations renders them "agency records." The papers were not in the control of the State Department at any time. They were not generated in the State Department. They never entered the State Department's files, and they were not used by the Department for any purpose. If mere physical location of papers and materials could confer status as an "agency record," Kissinger's personal books, speeches, and all other memorabilia stored in his office would have been agency records subject to disclosure under the FOIA. It requires little discussion or analysis to conclude that the lower courts correctly resolved this question in favor of Kissinger. See also Forsham v. Harris, post, p. 445 U. S. 169. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 158
As an abstract matter, I concur in the Court's view that FOIA's reach should not be conditioned upon the legality of a documents transfer under the Federal Records and Records Disposal Acts. 44 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq.; 44 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II). These Acts establish a fairly comprehensive scheme for internal records management, one element of which is an administrative process for regulating and enforcing records disposal standards. Thus, the "legality" of a document transfer for purposes of the Records Acts is, in a practical sense, partly a matter of administrative discretion. Conceptually, it seems strange to import such a discretionary factor into the legal standards that govern chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 159
private rights of action under FOIA. And it is not surprising that the Records Acts and FOIA fail to mesh: the former scheme is evidently directed toward fostering administrative interests, while the latter is definitely designed to serve the needs of the general public. Consequently, the Records Acts either may fail to promote the interests embodied in FOIA or may address concerns that are irrelevant to FOIA. [Footnote 2/1]
Indeed, I would go further. If the purpose of FOIA is to provide public access to the records incorporated into Government decisionmaking, see Forsham v. Harris, post at 445 U. S. 188 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), then agencies may well have a concomitant responsibility to retain possession of, or control over, those records. [Footnote 2/2] But, as with so many questions that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 160
the Court must resolve, the difficulty is where to draw the line. We could hardly assume that Congress intended agencies to be prevented from surrendering all documents that might be of interest to requesters -- so broad a rule would not only swamp the agencies with paper, but would also seem incompatible with the records management goals of the Records Acts. See S.Rep. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1950). Perhaps the appropriate test would take into account the importance of specific records; it might also consider the length of time records would be held, and the historical frequency of requests for documents of a particular type. To suggest the elements of such a test, however, is to expose how ill-suited a court is to define them adequately. It is Congress which has the resources and responsibility to fashion a rule about document retention that comports with the objectives of FOIA.
Although one might hope that Congress will soon address this problem, we must decide the case currently before us. I have little difficulty concluding that records which should have been retained for FOIA purposes may be reached under FOIA even though they have already passed beyond the agency's control. [Footnote 2/3] In the absence of an analytically satisfying standard for determining which records should be retained, however, it is necessary to resolve this case by looking to an approach that is currently practicable. My Brother STEVENS' chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 161
position fairly fits this prescription. While turning an FOIA suit upon the Records Acts is, as I have recognized, conceptually problematic, the records statutes do formulate document retention criteria that are not unduly burdensome and that carry a congressional imprimatur.
Accordingly, I agree with MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' conclusion with respect to the "improper withholding" issue, and therefore dissent from 445 U. S.
I cannot agree that this conclusion is compelled by the plain language of the statute; moreover, it seems to me wholly inconsistent with the congressional purpose underlying the Freedom of Information Act. The decision today exempts documents that have been wrongfully removed from the agency's files from any scrutiny whatsoever under FOIA. It thus creates an incentive for outgoing agency officials to remove potentially embarrassing documents from their files in order to frustrate future FOIA requests. It is the creation chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 162
of such an incentive, which is directly contrary to the purpose of FOIA, rather than the result in this particular case, [Footnote 3/2] that prompts me to write in dissent.
Everyone seems to agree that the summaries of Dr. Kissinger's State Department telephone conversations [Footnote 3/3] should be considered "agency records" subject to disclosure under FOIA if they were "agency records" under the definitions set forth in the Federal Records Act (FRA). The parties disagree, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 163
however, as to the proper application of that Act to the facts of this case. The requesters argue that the summaries were "records" under the FRA because they were, documents "appropriate for preservation" by the agency under 44 U.S.C. § 3301. Dr. Kissinger, on the other hand, argues that the summaries were personal papers which he could dispose of at will under the FRA and which were never subject to disclosure under FOIA. The Government takes an intermediate position, arguing that the summaries were "agency records" only to the extent that they contained significant information that was not reflected in other agency records. [Footnote 3/4]
I cannot accept Dr. Kissinger's argument that the summaries are private papers. As the District Court noted, they were made in the regular course of conducting the agency's business, were the work product of agency personnel and agency assets, and were maintained in the possession and control of the agency prior to their removal by Dr Kissinger. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 164
They were also regularly circulated to Dr. Kissinger's immediate staff, and presumably used by the staff in making day-to-day decisions on behalf of the agency. Finally, Dr. Kissinger himself recognized that the State Department continued to have an interest in the summaries even after they had been removed, since he had a State Department employee review them in order to extract information that was not otherwise in the agency's files. App. 248a. Under these circumstances, I find it difficult to believe that none of the summaries was "appropriate for preservation" by the agency. Thus, although a remand might be necessary, as the Government suggests, see 445 U. S. 4, supra, to determine which summaries were agency records and which were not, it is clear that at least some of them fell within that category at the time Dr. Kissinger removed them from his files at the State Department. [Footnote 3/5]
The second question to be considered is whether the State Department continued to have custody or control of the telephone summaries after they were removed from its files, so that its refusal to take steps to regain them should be deemed a "withholding" within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act. As I stated at the outset, I do not agree with the Court that the broad concepts of "custody" and "control" can be equated with the much narrower concept of physical possession. [Footnote 3/6] In my view, those concepts should be applied to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 165
bring all documents within the legal custody or control of the agency within the purview of FOIA. Thus, if an agency has legal right to regain possession of documents wrongfully removed from its files, it continues to have custody of those documents. If it then refuses to take any steps whatsoever to demand, or even to request, that the documents be returned, then the agency is "withholding" those documents for purposes of FOIA.
In this case, I think it is rather clear that the telephone summaries were wrongfully removed from the State Department's possession. [Footnote 3/7] Under these circumstances, the State chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 166
Department's failure even to request their return [Footnote 3/8] constituted a "withholding" for purposes of FOIA.
On the other hand, if the agency is unable to advance a reasonable explanation for its failure to act, a presumption arises that the agency is motivated by a desire to shield the documents from FOIA scrutiny. [Footnote 3/9] Thus, if the agency believed chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 167
or had reason to believe that it had a legal right to the documents and that the documents were still valuable for its own internal purposes, and nevertheless did not attempt to regain them, its inaction should be deemed an improper withholding.
In this case, the State Department refused the FOIA requests on the ground that the telephone summaries were not agency records and, in any event, were no longer within the agency's custody or control. By the time the FOIA actions were filed, there was substantial reason for doubting the Department's resolution of the first issue, inasmuch as the General Counsel of GSA had rendered a legal opinion that the documents were probably agency records and should be returned to the Government for proper archival screening. [Footnote 3/10] Because of their very nature, there was also substantial reason for believing that, if they were agency records, the summaries would have to be considered valuable documents. Finally, the fact that the documents had been removed by the head of the agency shortly before the expiration of his term of office raised an inference that the removal had been motivated by a desire to avoid FOIA disclosure. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 445 U. S. 168
Under these circumstances, it is at least arguable that the continued inaction of the State Department, contrary to the views of the Archivist, was improper.