Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/216/1/570290/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:58:02
Document Index: 3469807

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1400', '§ 1413', '§ 1414', '§ 1414', '§ 1414', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 1531', '§ 614', '§ 1415', '§ 130', '§ 130', '§ 615', '§ 130', '§ 615', '§ 130', '§ 130', '§ 5341', '§ 5343', '§ 130', '§ 1400', '§ 130', '§ 130', '§ 130', '§ 130', '§ 130', '§ 130', '§ 130', '§ 130']

Brandon Calloway, et al.,appellants/cross-appellees v. District of Columbia, et al.,appellees/cross-appellants, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 2000 › Brandon Calloway, et al.,appellants/cross-appellees v. District of Columbia, et al.,appellees/cross-...
Brandon Calloway, et al.,appellants/cross-appellees v. District of Columbia, et al.,appellees/cross-appellants, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
Argued November 8, 1999Decided June 30, 2000
* The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act seeks to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A). As a condition of receiving funds under the Act, IDEA requires school districts to adopt procedures to ensure appropriate educational placement of disabled students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413. In addition, school districts must develop comprehensive plans for meeting the special educational needs of disabled students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2) (A). Known as "individualized education programs," or IEPs, these plans must include "a statement of the child's present levels of educational performance, ... a statement of measurable annual goals, [and] a statement of the special education and related services ... to be provided to the child...." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1) (A).
IDEA guarantees parents of disabled children an opportunity to participate in the identification, evaluation, and placement process. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(f), 1415(b) (1). Parents who object to their child's "identification, evaluation, or educational placement" are entitled to an "impartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b) (6), (f) (1), at which they have a "right to be accompanied and advised by counsel." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h) (1). Parents "aggrieved by" a hearing officer's findings and decision may bring a civil action in either state or federal court without regard to the amount in controversy.20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2).
Section 1415(i) (3) (B) of IDEA gives courts authority to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." Prevailing parents may also recover fees incurred during administrative proceedings. See Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). The amount of fees awarded "shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (C).
See also Blackman v. District of Columbia, 185 F.R.D. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that DCPS's noncompliance with IDEA has resulted in "significant delays both in the placement of children in appropriate educational settings and in the provision of crucial medical services, delays that have the potential to permanently harm the physical and emotional health of many young children."). At a June 1997 public hearing, DCPS identified several factors responsible for its noncompliance, including "inadequate management [,].... poor information management systems, lack of staff training, inappropriate staff allocation and lack of appropriate programs." Notice of Written Findings and Decision and Compliance Agreement, 63 Fed. Reg. 41370, 41373. A year later, the Secretary of Education stated that, after "working with DCPS over a number of years to address its serious and ongoing failure to comply with the requirements of [IDEA]," he determined that immediate compliance was "not feasible."Id. at 41371. The Secretary and DCPS entered into a Compliance Agreement mandating that DCPS "be in full compliance with the requirements of [IDEA in] no later than three years." Id. at 41374.
Responding to the concerns expressed in the Post article, the House Committee on Appropriations, while considering the District's fiscal year 1999 appropriations request, acted to stem "the growth in legal expenses ... and the usurping of resources from education to pay attorney fees." H.R. Rep. 105-670, at 50 (1998). The Committee adopted an appropriations rider that, in order to allow DCPS to "focus more clearly on teaching and learning rather than on litigation and expensive legal fees," limited the District's fee payments under IDEA. Id. Eventually becoming section 130 of the 1999 D.C. Appropriations Act, the rider imposed caps on both the hourly rate and total amount of compensation the District could pay lawyers of parents who prevail in IDEA actions and proceedings. See Section 130 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (October 21, 1998) (hereinafter, section 130). Specifically, section 130 provided that 1999 funds could not be used to pay attorneys' fees in excess of the amount at which the D.C. Code fixes compensation of attorneys who represent indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors: $50 per hour and $1,300 overall. See section 130;D.C. Code Ann. § 11-2604(a); D.C. Code § 11-2604(b) (1).Section 130 allowed the maximum total payment, but not the maximum hourly rate, to be waived for "extended or complex representation." See section 130; D.C. Code Ann. § 11-2604(c). In its entirety, section 130 reads as follows:
The families now appeal, and the District of Columbia cross-appeals. Although the United States defends section 130's constitutionality, it takes no position on the proper interpretation of the section. Our review of all issues is de novo. See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Our review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo, applying the same standards as the district court."); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying de novo review to a question of statutory construction).
Beginning with the families' appeal, we can easily dispose of their Supremacy Clause argument. Because IDEA is national legislation, the families argue, it preempts under the Supremacy Clause any state or local legislation that impedes its accomplishment, such as section 130. In support, the families cite Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), where we stated that "Congress frequently enacts legislation applicable only to the District and.... [a]bsent evidence of contrary congressional intent, such enactments should be treated as local law, interacting with federal law as would the laws of the several states."Even assuming the Supremacy Clause applies to Congress when it legislates for the District under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution--a proposition for which we have found no persuasive support--the families' argument suffers from a fatal weakness: it requires us to believe that Congress enacted section 130 for the purpose of having it instantaneously preempted by a statute enacted over a decade earlier. See Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (" [T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
In its cross-appeal, the District argues that section 130 not only prohibits the District from paying attorneys' fees greater than the prescribed amounts, but also prohibits courts from awarding such fees. In resolving this claim, we are guided by the well-settled principle that " [w]hile appropriation acts are 'Acts of Congress' which can substantively change existing law, there is a very strong presumption that they do not."Building & Construction Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Martin, 961 F.2d 269, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1992). As we have elsewhere observed, "the established rule [is] that, when appropriations measures arguably conflict with the underlying authorizing legislation, their effect must be construed narrowly. Such measures have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs." Donovan v. Carolina Stalite Co., 734 F.2d 1547, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Applying this principle, we agree with the district court that section 130 limits only District authority to pay fees from FY 1999 appropriations, not court authority to award fees under IDEA.
We begin, as we must, with section 130's plain language:"None of the funds contained in this Act may be made available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party who prevails in an action ... brought against [DCPS] under [IDEA]" in excess of $50 per hour or $1,300 total.Note that nothing in section 130 restricts court authority to award fees under section 1415(i) (3) (B) of IDEA; the rider concerns only District authority to pay fees from FY 1999 appropriations. As the district court observed, section 130 and IDEA regulate different government authorities: "The IDEA attorney's fees provision provides the courts with discretion ... to award reasonable attorneys' fees. By contrast, section 130 governs the District of Columbia's appropriations and right to pay those fees."
To be sure, restricting federal court authority to award fees might have been one way for Congress to help DCPS address its special education problems. It is not our function, however, to determine whether such a limitation would "accor [d] with common sense and the public weal. Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted); but see Slip Op. at 4-5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that "common sense tells us" that section 130 is "a limitation upon the district court's authority to award attorneys' fees").
The District argues that even if section 130 does not expressly amend IDEA, the appropriations rider nevertheless represents an implied limit on court authority to award fees.Otherwise, the District claims, section 130 might increase the District's eventual fee liability by encouraging litigation to recover fees in excess of section 130's caps. Repeals by implication, however, are disfavored--a policy that "applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely on an Appropriations Act." TVA, 437 U.S. at 190. " [I]n the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). No irreconcilable conflict exists here since, as we have pointed out, section 130 and IDEA are directed at different governmental entities.
Like the district court, we recognize the potential incongruity of courts' awarding fees that section 130 prohibits the District from paying during the same fiscal year. As the Supreme Court has made clear, however, reconciling inharmonious statutory directives is Congress' responsibility, not courts'. In TVA v. Hill, the Supreme Court faced a situation similar to this case. Acting pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., the Sixth Circuit halted construction of a nearly completed TVA dam in order to preserve the critical habitat of the snail darter. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 168-70. In the Supreme Court, TVA argued that Congress, by appropriating funds for completion of the dam after learning that the snail darter had been placed on the endangered species list, had implicitly amended the Endangered Species Act to allow construction to continue. See id. at 189-90. Disagreeing, the Court explained that " [w]hile it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, it is equally--and emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation." Id. at 194 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Just as the Supreme Court left it to Congress to resolve the incongruity of appropriating funds for a dam that another statute prohibited, we leave to Congress the resolution of the incongruity in this case.
The cases relied on by the dissent do not require a different result. See Slip Op. at 2-7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).In American Federation of Government Employees, AFLCIO v. Campbell, 659 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1980), we held that an appropriations rider containing language similar to section 130 "modified pro tanto" a substantive statute. 659 F.2d at 161. The rider provided that " [n]o ... funds appropriated for the fiscal year [1979] may be used to pay the salary or pay of any individual ... in an amount which exceeds [a five and one-half percent raise] as a result of any adjustments ... under [the 'prevailing rate' act]." Pub. L. No. 95-429, § 614(a), 92 Stat. 1001, 1018 (1978). Had the prevailing rate statute been given effect, government employees would have received raises in 1979 of between seven and twelve percent.Because of the appropriations rider, however, pay increases that year were limited to five and a half percent. Government employees "sued to enforce their alleged rights to wage increases based solely on the ... prevailing rate statute."Campbell, 659 F.2d at 159. We rejected their claim, concluding that the appropriations act, by including a new ceiling on wage increases, and "by express reference to the earlier statute, effectively modified [it]." Id. at 161. We thus gave the appropriations act the effect that its express terms required--limiting pay increases for FY 1979.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, 733 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1984), is equally distinguishable. See Slip Op. at 7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). That case concerned Office of Personnel Management regulations establishing new personnel policies for federal employees. Dissatisfied with the new policies, Congress passed an appropriations rider providing that " [n]one of the funds appropriated under this Act [funding OPM] shall be obligated or expended to implement, promulgate, administer, or enforce [the OPM regulations]."Devine, 733 F.2d at 116. The Director of OPM interpreted the rider to mean that "each federal agency would simply have to administer and enforce the regulations without OPM's assistance...." Id. at 116. We rejected this interpretation of the rider, resting our decision on two factors. First, because "the express terms of the regulations require [d] OPM to play a critical and continuing role in their implementation, administration, and enforcement," id. at 119, we doubted whether the regulations could "sensibly ... be effectuated without OPM's continued participation." Id. at 120. Indeed, we viewed the Director's interpretation of the rider as "abdicating [OPM's] central responsibility for executing, administering, and enforcing civil service rules and regulations." Id. at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, after examining the rider's legislative history, we found "clear indications of Congress' intent" to foreclose significant changes in personnel management policies. Id. at 120.
Neither factor is present in this case. To begin with, because the District plays no role in a court's awarding of fees, section 130 does not prevent the implementation of IDEA's fee provision in the same manner as the rider in National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine impeded implementation of OPM's regulations. Nor, for the same reason, does section 130 produce any "abdication" of District responsibility. Moreover, section 130's legislative history demonstrates no clear congressional intent to amend IDEA.Although the House Appropriations Committee wrote of an earlier version of section 130 that it would limit "the award of attorney fees," H.R. Rep. No. 105-670, at 50 (1998), see also Slip Op. at 4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), the Conference Report accompanying the final bill speaks only of "plac [ing] a limit on the payment of fees to attorneys." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-825, at 1116 (1998). As the Supreme Court has observed, " [l]egislative materials may be without probative value, or contradictory, or ambiguous, ... and in such cases will not be permitted to control the customary meaning of words...." United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940).
Id. at 92, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B).
(2) the maximum amount of compensation of the attor-ney exceeds the maximum amount of compensation un-der section 11-2604(b) (1), District of Columbia Code [i.e.,$1,300 total], except that compensation and reimburse-ment in excess of such maximum may be approved forextended or complex representation in accordance withsection 11-2604(c), District of Columbia Code.
Obviously, § 130 has some effect upon attorneys' fees under the IDEA. The question before us is what effect: Is § 130 a limitation for FY 1999 upon the court's pre-existing authority in § 615 to award attorneys' fees in excess of $50 per hour and $1,300 per case? Or does it merely "prohibit [ ] the District from paying during the same fiscal year" any fee the district court might award in excess of those caps, Slip Op. at 9-10, thereby leaving the District liable for such awards after the end of that fiscal year? Today the court, citing an interpretive presumption and then declining to address the evidence offered by the District to overcome that presumption, gives the latter answer. I would give the former: § 130 limits the authority of the district court under IDEA § 615 because in § 130 the Congress "by clear implication, if not express statement, modified pro tanto the previous substantive law." American Federation of Government Employees v. Campbell, 659 F.2d 157, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In Campbell this court held that an appropriations rider strikingly similar in text and structure to § 130 modified pro tanto the prior substantive statute to which it referred.There, the plaintiffs were federal employees whose wages were determined under the "prevailing rate statute," 5 U.S.C. §§ 5341-5349 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). That statute required that wages be "fixed and adjusted from time to time ... in accordance with prevailing rates," as determined by wage surveys of the private sector to be conducted by "lead agenc [ies]." Id. § 5343(a), (a) (3).
In § 130 we see the same two textual elements that were dispositive in Campbell: It expressly refers to "the fees of an attorney who represents a party who prevails in an action ... under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.)," and it lays out a comprehensive new framework for determining fees. As to the second textual element, this case is an even stronger one than Campbell: Where the appropriations rider in Campbell simply set a cap on wage increases, § 130 not only sets caps on attorneys' fees but also incorporates a detailed procedure by which a court may, under specified conditions, waive a cap. Section 130 thus "contains words that by clear implication, if not express statement, modif [y] pro tanto the previous substantive law."Campbell, 659 F.2d at 161.*
This conclusion drawn directly from the text of § 130 is also reflected in the legislative history of that provision. The District notes that the House Appropriations Committee, in the only report to discuss § 130 in any detail, stated that § 130 "limit [s] the award of attorney fees in special education cases." H.R. Rep. No. 105-670, at 50 (1998) (emphasis supplied) (discussing predecessor version of § 130 identical in relevant respects to enacted version). President Clinton agreed, both when he signed § 130 into law, see Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 4328, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 2108, 2112 (Nov. 2, 1998) ("the Act also includes language that would cap the award of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in [IDEA] cases"), and when he vetoed a bill containing essentially the same rider the following year, see District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2000--Veto Message, 145 Cong. Rec. H8941, H8942 (Sept. 28, 1999) (" [FY Both the Supreme Court and this court have found that appropriations riders that by their express terms limit or prohibit only payment may nonetheless alter the underlying substantive obligation and not just its payment. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 205-08, 223-24 (1980); Campbell, 659 F.2d at 159 n.6;City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Tayloe v. Kjaer, 171 F.2d 343, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 2000 provision identical in relevant part to § 130] would cap the award of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in [IDEA] cases") (emphases supplied).
The court today reaches the contrary conclusion by way of the presumption that an appropriations act does not alter substantive law. Slip Op. at 9, 9-10, 11. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that a presumption used to interpret a statute is "just that--a presumption [which] may be overcome" by contrary evidence that provides a "reliable indicator of congressional intent." Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984). In keeping with this teaching, both the Supreme Court and this court have found appropriations acts to have modified preexisting substantive law in the light of evidence from the text, see Campbell, 659 F.2d at 160-61, from legislative history, see, e.g., Will, 449 U.S. at 224, or from the structure of the act, see, e.g., Mitchell, 109 U.S. at 149-50; and, yes, in the light of common sense as well, see, e.g., Belknap, 150 U.S. at 595; Devine, 733 F.2d at 120. The District has sought to overcome the presumption with evidence from all of these sources; but the court today, scarcely even acknowledging the District's arguments, relies upon "bare statement [s] of law" instead of evaluating the evidence to determine whether "the facts ... present a different picture of congressional intent." Campbell, 659 F.2d at 160.**
In Devine, 733 F.2d at 114, the Office of Personnel Management had issued new personnel regulations less than a month before the Congress enacted an appropriations rider stating that " [n]one of the funds appropriated under this Act [funding the OPM] shall be obligated or expended to implement, promulgate, administer, or enforce the [new OPM regulations]." 733 F.2d at 116. Based upon the precise wording of the rider, the OPM took the position that the rider "does not prevent any agency other than OPM from implementing, administering and enforcing the regulations within that agency." Id. at 116-17. We rejected that argument for two reasons, both based expressly upon the intent of the legislature: first, the Congress did not intend personnel regulations to be applied by other agencies without the OPM's involvement; and second, "even assuming arguen do that the regulations could be implemented workably without further participation by the OPM, it is evident that Congress intended to prevent this." Id. at 119-20.
That § 130 expressly limits only the "pay [ment]" of IDEA attorneys' fees raises the possibility--and indeed, as the court notes, the presumption--that the Congress meant to affect only the payment and not the award of such fees. The Supreme Court has long held, however, that the use of "payment" or a similar term in an appropriations act does not end a court's inquiry into congressional intent. See United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1940) ("deny [ing] that such words [prohibiting only payment during a particular fiscal year] when used in an appropriation bill are words of art or have a settled meaning" sufficient to end the court's inquiry into congressional intent).
Both the Supreme Court and this court have found that appropriations riders that by their express terms limit or prohibit only payment may nonetheless alter the underlying substantive obligation and not just its payment. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 205-08, 223-24, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980); Campbell, 659 F.2d at 159 n.6; City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Tayloe v. Kjaer, 171 F.2d 343, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1948).