Source: http://yavuzmavioglu.av.tr/jurisdiction-over-the-turkish-steel-cases-at-the-us-court-of-international-trade/
Timestamp: 2018-11-20 14:39:52
Document Index: 671733262

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1581', '§ 1581', '§ 516', '§ 1581', '§ 516', '§ 516', '§ 516', '§ 1581']

Ana Sayfa › Yayınlarımız › Jurisdiction over the Turkish Steel Cases at the U.S. Court of International Trade and a Discussion of Relevant Issues in Turkish Law and Policy
A. Turkish Law and Subsidies for the Steel Industry.
Turkey, like most other newly industrialized countries, has a variety of support programs for the domestic steel industry. These do not necessarily rise to a countervailable level, and Turkey has consistently maintained that they are at or below the de minimis level. Furthermore, Turkey has often contended that these subsidies are not necessarily tied to exports, a crucial factor in determining whether or not a subsidy or state support program qualifies as dumping or for a countervailing duty.
Nevertheless, certain Turkish programs appear problematic from an importing country perspective, and the U.S. government has consistently raised objections to several Turkish support programs for the steel industry.
Congress enacted the Customs Courts Act of 1980 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1581 et seq.) in order to increase and define the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade (previously the United States Customs Court) and to establish it as the comprehensive forum for resolution of civil disputes regarding imports and international trade. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, 19. Congress’ purpose in enacting this legislation was to bring the Court in line with “increasing complexities of modern day trade litigation.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, 18. When the Court was originally established as the United States Customs Court, international trade regulation was fundamentally based on tariff rates, and the Court’s jurisdiction thus revolved around classification and valuation cases. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, 19.
The growth of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements led to a significant reduction in tariff duties and new regulatory frameworks. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, 18. Jurisdiction in this area became “a jigsaw puzzle with enough missing pieces to make it difficult for any but the closest observer to discover what the completed puzzle was meant to depict.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, 19. As a result, there was great confusion over the respective areas of subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade and the District Courts resulting in inconsistent judicial decisions, preclusive dismissals, and forum shopping. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, 19.
However, while the Act greatly expanded and defined the jurisdiction of the Court, conflicts have arisen in the interpretation of the Act as regards the jurisdiction of the Court over anti-dumping and countervailing duties cases. See Wuxi Seamless Oil Pipe Co., Ltd. v. United States, 893 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1352 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013); Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores (Asocoflores) v. United States, 13 C.I.T. 584, 586-87 (1989); Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 23, 25-27 (1983).
In order for the Court to have jurisdiction to hear a case that falls under § 1581(c), the plaintiff must have exhausted all administrative remedies and the type of review must be covered by the statute § 516a. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969); Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Exhaustion is a long-standing rule in administrative law. See generally Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatises 20.01 et seq. (1958 ed., 1965 Supp.).
Fulfilling the statutory requirement of § 1581(c) and § 516a requires that the determination be listed in § 516a and follow the rules laid forth in § 516a.
In Essar Steel Ltd. v. United States, Commerce put in place a countervailing duty review. See 908 F.Supp.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013). Essar (plaintiff) sued stating the Commerce did not explain its AFA rate methodology, that Commerce should have included in its AFA calculation information from a 2006 review that concluded that Essar did not receive benefits under the CIP program, and then raised several new complaints including that Commerce did not apply the subsidy rate properly. See Essar, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1311.
The Court held that Essar failed to raise these issues at the appropriate time, and that the time for Essar to raise these issues was in its comments before remand. See id. Because Essar failed to raise these issues at the proper time, it therefore “abandoned its arguments by failing to exhaust its administrative remedies before Commerce.” See id. at 1312.
However, the Court has discretion to create exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine in certain circumstances. See Agro Dutch Indus Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1024, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Court has found certain exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply. See SeAH, 764 F.Supp.2d at 1325-26; Jiaxing, 751 F.Supp.2d at 1355-56.
These exceptions are where exhaustion “would be a useless formality,” where an intervening legal authority “might have materially affected the agency’s actions,” the issue involves a “pure question of law not requiring further factual development,” where “clearly applicable precedent” should have bound the agency, and where the party “had no opportunity to raise the issue before the agency.” See SeAH, 764 F.Supp.2d at 1325-26; Jiaxing, 751 F.Supp.2d at 1355-56.
However, the Court disagreed with the Government’s allegation that Habas had not exhausted its administrative remedies as regarded the contract date issue. See id. at 1801. The Court noted that Commerce had “in effect, changed horses midstream.” Id. at 1800. Commerce had not referred to the billing adjustment as a reason for rejecting the contract date in favor of the invoice date during the administrative review, and had only put it in the final results. Id. Commerce had essentially reached a result and then attempted to justify it, and Habas could not be said to have failed the exhaustion doctrine’s test on these grounds. See id.
However, in the same case, Habas challenged Commerce’ use of a single weighted-average period of review rather than quarterly-average costs when calculating the dumping margin. See 31 C.I.T. 1793, 1796 (2007). Commerce admitted that its final results did not take into account Habas’ legitimate concern that it had faced a price surge in the final quarter thus making the weighted average methodology unrepresentative. See id. at 1797. Commerce requested that the case be remanded for them to address these issues, which Habas “vehemently” opposed. See id. at 1798.
The Court, noting that “it is difficult not to sympathize with Habas’ palpable frustration,” expressed hesitation at remanding the issue to Commerce for further consideration. Id. The Court noted that Habas was justifiably skeptical of the result of a remand such as that requested by Commerce, and that Habas might be said to have exhausted their administrative remedies. See id. at 1799. Nevertheless, the Court also noted that the Government must be presumed to have acted in good faith, and that Habas had no specific evidence to substantiate its claim of prejudgment by Commerce. See id. The Court therefore remanded the case to Commerce, but with instructions to address Habas’ concerns. See id. Habas would then be able to challenge the final results of such a review under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) jurisdiction. See Essar, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1311.
In Nucor Corp. v. United States, US domestic steel producers alleged that the exhaustion doctrine barred a Turkish steel producer from making the argument that it had relied on Commerce’s adoption of an Export Price rather than a Constructed Export Price pricing methodology. 612 F.Supp.2d 1264, n. 81. However, the Court held that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply because the Turkish producer could not have reasonably made an argument of reliance prior to the final review being published and the application of the exhaustion doctrine was at the discretion of the court. See id. Furthermore, the Court noted that the domestic producers did not raise the issue during oral arguments. See id.
The Exhaustion Doctrine is an especially important issue for Turkish producers seeking to challenge decisions by U.S. governmental agencies. While all courts require the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the U.S. Court of International Trade takes an especially strict view, as they explicitly said in SeAH, 764 F.Supp.2d at 1325.
In Habas, the Court of International trade stated that “Commerce is the master of the anti-dumping law and that factual determinations supporting anti-dumping margins are best left to the agency’s expertise.” 31 C.I.T. at 1799. The Court reiterated this word for word in Nucor, 612 F.Supp.2d at 1336-37.
Given this strong preference for the administrative review, the Court exercises jurisdiction over relatively few cases. Those that it does hear are almost uniformly those in which Commerce has either acted in such a way as to make continuing with the administrative process largely futile (e.g., Habas), or those in which relief depended on the final results of the administrative review (e.g., Nucor and Borusan).
In comparing Ekinciler, where the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction, with Borusan, where the Court did exercise jurisdiction, it is striking how facially similar the complaint was. Neither Turkish producer had submitted a challenge to an administrative pricing issue during the review process. The fundamental difference between the cases was that in Borusan the Turkish producer had no way of knowing the administrative agency’s methodology while in Ekinciler, the Turkish producer should have reasonably expected to submit evidence regarding a pricing abnormality.
Because of the exceptionally strict view of the exhaustion doctrine taken by the Court, those steel producers seeking to challenge determinations at the Court of International Trade must be certain to have taken all foreseeable steps towards working within the administrative process. This can be a long and frustrating road as in Habas, but is ultimately necessary for obtaining judicial review.