Source: https://www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-v-russia-provisional-measures-state-terrorism-and-ihl/?pfstyle=wp
Timestamp: 2020-01-29 14:20:09
Document Index: 65118665

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 2', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art 2', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 30', 'Art. 30', 'art 30', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 2']

EJIL: Talk! – Ukraine v Russia (Provisional Measures): State ‘Terrorism’ and IHL
Home EJIL Analysis Ukraine v Russia (Provisional Measures): State ‘Terrorism’ and IHL
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May 3, 2017 at 22:26
Thanks for the post. I just want to pick up on the point you raise about the relationship between the Terrorism Financing Convention and IHL. There seems to me to be a serious problem, beyond the one you mention, with the Russian argument that indiscriminate attacks (at least in the sense of attacks that are directed at military objectives but which disproportionately affect civilians) are not intentional attacks on civilians within the meaning of Art. 2(1)(b) of the Terrorism Financing Convention. The problem is that it assumes that when an attack is directed at a military objective,the person engaging in the attack does not “intend” to attack civilians as well. I am open to correction but I do not think that this is the ordinary meaning of “intention” in most systems of criminal law. Most systems of criminal law would, I think, take the view that a person intends a consequence where they are aware that this consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.
So if a person directs an attack against a military objective but knows that such an attack would also kill civilians that person, in the ordinary meaning of intention, intends to kill those civilians too. So killing of civilians can be indiscriminate, thus in violation of IHL, and also be intended, therefore a terrorist act under the Terrorism Financing Convention.
In fact, this is true even if the killing of those civilians is proportionate as far as IHL is concerned. The fact that an attack is proportionate under IHL does not mean that the attacker does not “intend” to kill civilians as far criminal law is concerned. If the attacker is aware that the civilians will be killed presumably they intend to kill those civilians. It is important to recall that what IHL prohibits is not the intentional killing of civilians but rather intentionally directing attacks against civilians.
The point I make in the paragraph immediately above leads me to question your statement that
“And indeed, as far as Article 2(1)(b) ICSFT is concerned, every act which amounts to terrorist conduct will also be unlawful under Common Article 3 of the GCs when committed in the context of an AC. This is because terrorism is defined under Article 2(1)(b) ICSFT as deliberate attacks against persons not participating in hostilities, which is absolutely prohibited under IHL without any proportionality balancing to account for military necessity.”
I’m not quite sure what you mean by the words “which is . . .” at the end of that quote.
However, if Art. 21 does not prevent the joint application of Convention and IHL then it is entirely conceivable that acts that are lawful under IHL will be prohibited by the Convention. Unless “intention” means something different from what I think it usually means under criminal law.
Just to expand upon the point I made with respect to Art. 21 in the last paragraph of my comment above, perhaps Art. 21 should not be regarded as suggesting that if a matter is covered by IHL it is thereby excluded from the ambit of the Convention. Afterall, if Art. 21 excludes the application of the convention to situations of armed conflict covered by IHL, why does Art 2(1)(b) refer, in part, to concepts that are only meaningful in situations of armed conflict covered by IHL.
Rather Art. 21 may be construed as saying that if an act is lawful under IHL, it is not to be regarded as prohibited by the Convention. So even if an act is ordinarily prohibited by Art. 2(1)(b), the effect of Art. 21 may be to ensure that the act is nevertheless not prohibited by the Convention where it is consistent with IHL.
May 4, 2017 at 7:52
(1)	Art. 21 of ICSFT is a standard ‘without prejudice’ clause which has been followed in the negotiation for subsequent anti-terrorism conventions, including the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. It means that the ICSFT is without prejudice to IHL, the UN Charter, other relevant conventions etc. For example, a person could be held responsible for an offence under ICSFT as well as for a war crime under IHL, but his/her punishment for the IHL breach has to be pursued outside the context of ICSFT.
(2)	Cf. Art. 8(2)(b)(iv), ICC Statute: ‘war crime of intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects …. which would be clearly excessive re the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’. The mental element as stipulated in the Elements of Crime for this offence is the ‘knowledge’ that the attack would cause the aforesaid. Cf. ICC Statute, Art. 8(2)(b)(i),(ii), and (iii) which require the ‘intent’ to attack civilians, civilian objects, or personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission.
May 4, 2017 at 8:16
Thanks for the comment. I just wanted to note that the offences in Art. 8(2)(b)(i),(ii), and (iii), ICC Statute, that you refer to at the end of your comments do not merely require the ‘intent’ to attack civilians, civilian objects, or personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission. They are offences of “intentionally directing attacks” against those persons and objects. The “directing” bit is important.
May 4, 2017 at 9:34
Knut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (ICRC, CUP 2003), pp. 130-1:
– The PrepCom for the ICC adopted the position that the term ‘intentionally’ under Art. 8(2)(b)(i)ICC Statute was related to directing an attack and also to the object of the attack.
– ‘The crime thus demands that the perpetrator intended to direct an attack (this follows from the application of Art. 30(2)(a) ICC Statute, which requires that the perpetrator meant to engage in the conduct described, in conjunction with para. 2 of the General Introduction) and that he/she intended the civilian population or individual civilians to be the object of the attack. The latter intent requirement explicitly stated in the elements also appears to be an application of the default rule contained in Art. 30. In this particular case the standard defined in sub-para. 2(b) of that article applies, i.e. the perpetrator means to cause the consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. …’
General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes, ICC Statute:
Para. 2 As stated in art 30 ICC Statute, unless otherwise provided: the requisite mental element = intent AND knowledge.
Para. 3 Existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant circumstances.
Dr Kimberley N Trapp
Hi Dapo and Kriangsak,
Thank you for your comments! Dapo – we agree broadly in the result, but may get there somewhat differently. I think your reading of Article 21 is exactly right: Article 21 does not preclude the co-extensive application of IHL and the ICSFT, but rather ensures that conduct which is lawful (or at least not unlawful) as a matter of IHL is not criminalised under the guise of terrorism. This is relatively clear from ‘ordinary meaning’, and supported by the negotiating history of terrorism suppression conventions in general. First, there is the general approach of States in negotiating the terrorism suppression conventions (including the still under negotiation Comprehensive Convention)– which has been to avoid having the balances achieved by IHL upset by the terrorism suppression regime. Second, an exclusion clause (like Art. 19 of the Terrorist Bombing Convention – the result of which is an absolute exclusion of conduct to the extent governed by IHL, irrespective of whether the conduct is IHL compliant or not) was proposed for the ICSFT –– but was ultimately not included. Given the way in which terrorism has been defined in Article 2(1)(b), it could not have been otherwise – in that the definition very obviously covers conduct which occurs in the context of an AC and is therefore governed by IHL. Indeed, Kriangsak, I don’t think that Article 21 entirely has the effect you suggest. An individual who has committed an offence under both the ICSFT and IHL might be prosecuted under either regime. Had States wanted it otherwise, they would have relied on an Article 12 Hostages Convention type clause. The effect of Article 12 is that, if (i) conduct is prohibited under both the Hostages Convention and IHL, and (ii) IHL imposes an obligation to extradite or prosecute in respect of that conduct, then the IHL criminal law enforcement regime governs. Article 21 does not prioritise one criminal law enforcement regime over another, it simply ensures that the ICSFT does not interfere with rights etc. as set out under IHL.
And this brings us to the question of intention under 2(1)(b). Intention, in many domestic legal systems, would most certainly cover an attack against a military objective which knowingly caused civilian casualties (even if those civilian casualties were proportionate to the military advantage sought). But we are here interpreting the definition of the offence for the purposes of direct State responsibility – which is to say we rely on the ordinary meaning of 2(1)(b) in its context (which includes Article 21). To do this, we might take a broad approach to Art. 2(1)(b) and then read it down for Article 21 purposes (which is what I think Dapo you might be suggesting), or we might incorporate any regime interaction driven interpretations suggested by Article 21 into the Art. 2(1)(b) definition of the offence (which is what I am suggesting).
If ‘intention’ in Art. 2(1)(b) is interpreted as it might be under domestic law, a proportionate attack (where civilian casualties are knowingly caused) directed against a military objective would be a terrorist offence, support for which would amount to ‘terrorist financing’ under the ICSFT. The result of the latter is that the terrorism suppression regime would, in the first instance (pre-application of Article 21) prohibit that which is permissible under IHL. And so, I take the view that ‘intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian’ in Article 2(1)(b) must be read down (at least from the perspective of its more expansive meaning under domestic law) to cover intentionally directing attacks against civilians (as understood under IHL). As a result of this reading of 2(1)(b), terrorist conduct and prohibited AC conduct are co-extensive, and the prohibition of supporting such conduct under CA1 GCs is therefore also co-extensive with the ICSTF definition of the primary offence. Article 21 achieves precisely what it was intended to achieve. And from there, we get to my reliance on the ICTY’s jurisprudence vis à vis Russia’s indiscriminate attack argument.
Kimberley Trapp is a Senior Lecturer in Public International Law at UCL, Faculty of Laws. She is co-editor of Current Legal Problems, and a member of the Board of Editors of the Cambridge International Law Journal and the Journal of the Use of Force and International Law and serves on the Advisory Board of the Inter Gentes McGill Law Journal. Kimberley has published widely on issues relating to the use of force, State responsibility, the interaction between IHL and terrorism suppression, and the settlement of international disputes and is author of the OUP monograph State Responsibility for International Terrorism. Read Full