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INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, Appellant v. Larry DAVIS. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, Appellant v. Larry DAVIS.
476 U.S. 380 (106 S.Ct. 1904, 90 L.Ed.2d 389)
Argued: Feb. 25, 1986.
[HTML] concurrence, REHNQUIST, POWELL, STEVENS, O'CONNOR
[HTML] Syllabus Appellee was formerly employed as a ship superintendent for a stevedoring company. When he, with others, attempted to organize the company's ship superintendents and to affiliate with appellant Union, a Union official allegedly assured them that the union would get them their jobs back if they were discharged for participating in Union-related activities. After he was discharged apparently because of such activities, appellee filed a suit against appellant in an Alabama Circuit Court, alleging fraud and misrepresentation under an Alabama statute. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury entered a verdict in appellee's favor. Throughout the trial, appellant defended the suit on the merits, and not until its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict did it claim that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction because the suit was pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Circuit Court denied the motion and entered judgment on the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the pre-emption claim was a waivable defense that was required to be affirmatively pleaded under Alabama law, and that since it was not so pleaded, it was deemed waived.
Held: 1. The Alabama Supreme Court's holding that appellant had waived its pre-emption claim by noncompliance with state procedural rules governing affirmative defenses did not present an independent and adequate state ground supporting the court's judgment, and the court erred in declining to address that claim on the merits. Pp. 387-393.
The opinion in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), set forth a general standard for determining when state proceedings or regulations are pre-empted by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), see 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II): Subject to exception only in limited circumstances, "when an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act 29 U.S.C. 157 or § 158, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S., at 245, 79 S.Ct., at 780. This general standard has been applied in a multitude of cases decided since Garmon, and it must be applied again today. Before addressing that question, however, we must consider the very nature of such pre-emptionwhether Garmon pre-emption is in the nature of an affirmative defense that must be asserted in the trial court or be considered forever waived or whether it is in the nature of a challenge to a court's power to adjudicate that may be raised at any time.
At this meeting, several of the superintendents expressed a fear of being discharged for participating in union-related activities. According to Davis' witnesses, Holland's response to this was to reassure them that the Union would get them their jobs back with backpay if that happened. According to Holland, however, Holland's response was that they would be protected in that manner only if they were determined not to be supervisors under the Act and that he did not know whether or not they would be considered supervisors.
On the day following the organizational meeting, Ryan-Walsh fired Trione. Trione contacted the ILA, which supplied him with an attorney. The attorney filed an unfair labor practice charge against Ryan-Walsh with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging that Trione was an employee under the Act and that Ryan-Walsh had violated § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging him for participating in union activities. See 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3).
Trione did not, as he had a right to do, appeal this determination to the NLRB General Counsel. See 29 CFR § 102.19 (1985). Shortly thereafter, Davis was also discharged by Ryan-Walsh, apparently for his continued efforts to organize the ship superintendents and to join the Union.
In response to his discharge, Davis filed this suit against the ILA in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, alleging fraud and misrepresentation under Ala.Code § 6-5-101 (1975).
The case proceeded to trial, and a jury entered a verdict in Davis' favor in the amount of $75,000. Throughout the trial, the Union defended the suit on the merits, raising no issue that the suit was pre-empted by the NLRA. In its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, however, the ILA raised for the first time a claim that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the field had "been preempted by federal law and federal jurisdiction." App. 96a. The Circuit Court denied the Union's motion without opinion and entered judgment on the jury's verdict.
the Alabama court held that "it is not the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a damage claim for the tort of fraud even if it arises in the context of a labor-related disputethat is pre-empted. Rather, it is the state court's exercise of that power that is subject to preemption." 470 So.2d 1215, 1216 (1985). The court's view was that as a state court of general jurisdiction the Circuit Court had had subject-matter jurisdiction over this ordinary tort claim for damages. As a waivable defense, the pre-emption claim was required under Alabama law to be affirmatively pleaded. Since it was not so pleaded, it was deemed waived.
"The instant facts fall squarely within the 'peripheral concern' exception to federal preemption of state jurisdiction of labor-related disputes. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 79 S.Ct. 773, 778-79, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). The National Labor Relations Board has already determined that an employer's supervisors are not protected by the Labor Management Relations Act. Thus, in this case, Davis has no remedy before the NLRB, and this dispute, although somewhat labor-related, is, at most, only of 'peripheral concern' to the NLRB. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966)." Id., at 1216-1217, n. 2 (citations omitted).
The Alabama Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the judgment against the Union. The Union appealed to this Court; Davis moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground because the Alabama Supreme Court's decision was based on an application of a state procedural rule. The ILA's submission, however, raised a substantial question whether reliance on the procedural rule rested on an erroneous view of the scope of Garmon pre-emption, a matter of federal law, and hence whether the procedural ground relied on was adequate and independent. We noted probable jurisdiction, 474 U.S. 899, 106 S.Ct. 224, 88 L.Ed.2d 223 (1985).
"When resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded. . . . In such a case, the federal-law holding is integral to the state court's disposition of the matter, and our ruling on the issue is in no respect advisory." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1092, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, supra, 324 U.S., at 126, 65 S.Ct., at 463; Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164, 37 S.Ct. 318, 320, 61 L.Ed. 644 (1917)).
Building on this cornerstone, the Garmon Court went on to set out the now well-established scope of NLRA pre-emption. Given the NLRA's "complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration," 359 U.S., at 243, 79 S.Ct., at 778, the Court held that "due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield," id., at 244, 79 S.Ct., at 779, when the activities sought to be regulated by a State are clearly or may fairly be assumed to be within the purview of § 7 or § 8. The Court acknowledged that "at times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections." Ibid. Even in such ambiguous situations, however, the Court concluded that "courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board." Id., at 244-245, 79 S.Ct., at 779-780. Thus, the Court held that "when an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Id., at 245, 79 S.Ct., at 780.
In Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 83 S.Ct. 531, 9 L.Ed.2d 514 (1963), we considered the application of these principles to a situation in which the Georgia courts had awarded relief based on a complaint that contained allegations that made out "at least an arguable violation of § 8(b)." Id., at 546, 83 S.Ct., at 534. There, we reviewed a claim that "the subject matter of the suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board," id., at 543, 83 S.Ct., at 533, and held that, even though the state court was authorized to adjudicate the claim as a matter of state law, the state court "clearly exceeded its power" in awarding relief on the complaint. Id., at 548, 83 S.Ct., at 535. Specifically, "the state court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or to adjudicate this controversy, which lay within the exclusive powers of the National Labor Relations Board." Id., at 546-547, 83 S.Ct., at 534-535.
"We believe our power to review this case rests upon solid ground. The federal question raised by petitioner in the Georgia court, and here, is whether the Georgia courts had power to proceed with and determine this controversy. The issue ripe for review is not whether a Georgia court has erroneously decided a matter of federal law in a case admittedly within its jurisdiction nor is it the question of whether federal or state law governs a case properly before the Georgia courts. What we do have here is a judgment of the Georgia court finally and erroneously asserting its jurisdiction to deal with a controversy which is beyond its power and instead is within the exclusive domain of the National Labor Relations Board." Id., at 548, 83 S.Ct., at 535 (citations omitted).
See also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 497-498, n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 3177-3178, n. 5, 77 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983). Curry made clear that when a state proceeding or regulation is claimed to be pre-empted by the NLRA under Garmon, the issue is a choice-of-forum rather than a choice-of-law question. As such, it is a question whether the State or the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute. If there is pre-emption under Garmon, then state jurisdiction is extinguished.
Davis does not seriously dispute this conclusionat least as a general matter. He concedes, in fact, that "when a particular issue has been placed by Congress within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, a state court will have no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue. In such cases, any judgment issued by the state court will be void ab initio because subject matter jurisdiction is pre-empted." Brief for Appellee 13. Davis notes, however, that this Court has acknowledged that Garmon does not pre-empt "all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Lockridge, supra, 403 U.S., at 289, 91 S.Ct., at 1919. Specifically, Davis points to Garmon § own recognition that some controversies that are arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 are not pre-empted:
"Due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system . . . has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." 359 U.S., at 243-244, 79 S.Ct., at 778-779 (citations omitted).
Both before and since Garmon we have identified claims that fall within one or both of these articulated exceptions. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra; Farmer v. Carpenters supra; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra; Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1958); Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 78 S.Ct. 923, 2 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 78 S.Ct. 206, 2 L.Ed.2d 151 (1957); Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025 (1954).
Expecting that the Union would put its best foot forward in this Court, we look first at its submission here that there is an arguable case for pre-emption. The Union's brief states that its conduct was protected by federal law if Davis was an employee, that in order to find the Union liable the jury must have found that Davis was a supervisor, and that "the state law controversy of whether the Union made a misrepresentation and the federal controversy of whether the superintendents were in fact supervisors are 'the same in a fundamental respect.' " Brief for Appellant 16 (quoting Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S., at 682, 103 S.Ct., at 1462. So far, the argument proceeds in the right direction. As for the critical issue of whether Davis is an employee or a supervisor, the Union asserts only that "absent a clear determination by the NLRB that the ship superintendents are supervisors rather than employees, superintendents are arguably employees and the state is preempted from applying its law." Brief for Appellant 13. In making this contention, the ILA relies on our cases indicating that pre-emption can be avoided if an individual's supervisory status has been determined " 'with unclouded legal significance.' " Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers, 382 U.S. 181, 190, 86 S.Ct. 327, 332, 15 L.Ed.2d 254 (1965) (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S., at 246, 79 S.Ct., at 780). See also Jones, supra, 460 U.S., at 680, 103 S.Ct., at 1460. It does not undertake any examination of Davis' duties as a ship superintendent. It makes no attempt to show that Davis was more like an employee than a supervisor as those terms are defined in § 2(1) and (11) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 152(1) and (11).
Hanna Mining also does nothing for the Union's submission. The Court there, relying on Garmon, held that there was no pre-emption because the Board or its General Counsel had in fact adversely decided the issues on which the claim of pre-emption rested. Obviously, no inference may be drawn from that decision that a party makes out a case for pre-emption by merely asserting that the issue involved has not been decided by the Board. The Union's position is also negated by Interlake S.S. Co., supra, where the Court found pre-emption only after examining the facts and deciding "whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to show that either of the organizations was arguably a 'labor organization' within the contemplation of § 8(b)." Id., 370 U.S., at 178, 82 S.Ct., at 1239. The Court went on to hold that while there was persuasive evidence that the marine engineers were supervisors, the Board had nevertheless effectively decided that the union involved was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. While agreeing with the principles announced by the Court, Justice Douglas dissented because he had a different view of the facts of the case. Consequently, a party asserting pre-emption must put forth enough evidence to enable a court to conclude that the activity is arguably subject to the Act.
Nothing in Curry, and certainly nothing in Kalb, foreordains the result in this case. State-court judges and trial courts of general jurisdiction in Alabama and in the other 49 States are experts primarily in state law, not federal law. Indeed, with the advancing march of federal legislation in areas heretofore left to state law, it would be an impossible task for any judgefederal or stateto keep abreast of the various areas in which there might be federal pre-emption. Here Alabama, by application of a neutral statute with a precise counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has said that a defendant who wishes to claim federal pre-emption as a defense to state-court exercise of jurisdiction may not wait to raise that claim until after the case has gone to verdict. The Court, saying otherwise, allows a sophisticated defendant as in the present case to gamble on obtaining a favorable verdict and raise a pre-emption defense only if it loses on the merits. To me this result defies common sense; if Congress had ordained it, I would reach it albeit with reluctance. But it is this Court, not Congress, that has ordained the result. I believe the Court is mistaken in doing so, and I therefore cannot join Part II of its opinion.
In Garmon, this Court held that when an activity is protected or prohibited by the Act, or arguably protected or prohibited, courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board. Id., at 245, 79 S.Ct., at 779. In the absence of the Board's clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited, nor arguably so, courts must stay their hand. "Whether federal law does apply is to be decided" by the Board. Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 229, 90 S.Ct. 876, 879, 25 L.Ed.2d 240 (1970) (separate memorandum of Harlan, J.) (emphasis added). The Court today purports to follow Garmon, but nonetheless requires that the party "claiming pre-emption must carry the burden of showing at least an arguable case before the jurisdiction of a state court will be ousted," ante, at 396, and proceeds to require here that the Union make a showing "sufficient to permit the Board to find that Davis was an employee, not a supervisor." Ante, at 395. In transforming the notion that some activities are arguably protected or prohibited into a requirement that a party claiming pre-emption make out an "arguable case," ante, at 396, it seems to me that the Court misses the point of its decision in Garmon. As a result of the decision today, a court, under the guise of weighing the sufficiency of the evidence, will be making precisely the determination that Garmon makes clear is for the Board, and only the Board, to make.
To understand how far the Court strays from the practical and congressionally mandated standard articulated in Garmon, it is sufficient to look to the basis of the broad pre-emption doctrine. Under the Act, some activities are protected and some are prohibited; other activities are subject to state regulation, while still others, not at issue in this case, are to be left unregulated by both federal and state authorities. Thus, the determination of whether an activity falls within the sphere of protected or prohibited is the crucial question under federal law, and one which this Court recognized is not always an easy determination to make. Garmon, 359 U.S., at 244, 79 S.Ct., at 779. Accordingly, Congress deprived state courts of jurisdiction over actually or arguably protected or prohibited conduct and "confided primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal," thereby ensuring that the federal scheme would be administered uniformly with the wisdom and insight resulting from specialized expertise and experience. Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 490, 74 S.Ct. 161, 165, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1953), quoted in Garmon, 359 U.S., at 242, 79 S.Ct., at 778.
Permitting courts to determine whether activity is protected or prohibited could result in a court's finding unlawful an activity that the Board might embrace as lawful.
"This was a case, therefore, where a state court was shown not simply the arguable possibility of Labor Board jurisdiction over the controversy before it, but that the Board had actually determined the underlying issue upon which its jurisdiction depended" (emphasis added). Id., at 184, 82 S.Ct., at 1243.
Davis was fired for union activities. According to Davis, he was assured by the Union that, if fired, he could obtain reinstatement. Davis' ability to obtain reinstatement turns on whether Davis is a supervisor. If Davis is a supervisor, the Act would not protect him against retaliatory actions by his employer based on his union activities and Davis' suit would be cognizable in state court for the Union's alleged intentional misrepresentation. However, if Davis is not a supervisor, the employer would have committed an unfair labor practice in firing him, and Davis would be entitled to redress by the Board. Thus, the issue here falls within the rubric of "arguably"the conduct at issue is arguably protected because Davis may be a statutory employee, not a supervisor.
The crucial question then was whether Davis was a supervisor. The task of identifying supervisors is an "aging but nevertheless persistently vexing problem." NLRB v. Security Guard Service, Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 145 (CA5 1967). Supervisory status is an inherently fact-specific determination that turns on an individual's duties, not job title or classification. See, e.g., Winco Petroleum Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 1118 (1979) (giving an employee the title "supervisor" or even theoretical power to perform some supervisory functions does not convert a rank-and-file employee into a statutory supervisor); Pattern Makers Assn., 199 N.L.R.B. 96 (1972) (shop foreman with supervisory authority who worked with tools 40% of his time was supervisor despite contract which defined supervisory employees as persons who did not work with tools of trade). It is precisely because of the difficulty in assessing the statutory supervisory status of an individual, and the need for uniformity in the interpretation of the federal labor laws, that this Court, in Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers, 382 U.S. 181, 86 S.Ct. 327, 15 L.Ed.2d 254 (1965), held that state law can be applied only if the supervisory status of the individuals in question "has been settled with unclouded legal significance."
Id., at 190, 86 S.Ct., at 332. The supervisory status of Davis has never been settled by the Board.
Thus, in asserting that Davis was arguably a supervisor, the Union "advanced an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary to its language and that has not been 'authoritatively rejected' by the courts or the Board." Ante, at 1914, quoting Interlake, 370 U.S., at 184, 82 S.Ct., at 1243. That is the only kind of showing that is properly required under Garmon.
"The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." 29 U.S.C. 152(11).
Supervisors as defined in this section are expressly not considered to be employees as defined in § 2(3) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. 152(3).
Only employees as defined in § 2(3), however, are given rights under § 7 of the Act, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. 157, which provides:
Apparently, however, an insufficient number of cards was obtained, see 29 U.S.C. 159(a), and no representation petition was filed with the NLRB.
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
Assuming, as we decide infra, that the judgment below did not rest on an independent and adequate state ground and that we therefore have jurisdiction over this case, this is a proper appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1257(2), since the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a state statute, § 6-5-101, as applied, against a claim of federal pre-emption.