Source: http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/ctapp/2002/20020823/88115.htm
Timestamp: 2014-03-07 16:08:07
Document Index: 558060024

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 452']

88115 -- In re Marriage of Riggle -- Marquardt -- Kansas Court of Appeals
No. 88,115
LORRI RIGGLE (BOWLES),
DAVID W. RIGGLE,
1. The right to appeal is entirely statutory and is not contained in the United
States or Kansas Constitutions. Kansas appellate courts have jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal only if the appeal is taken in the manner prescribed by
2. A civil appeal must be taken within 30 days from the entry of the judgment.
3. In Kansas, generally, the appellate courts look to the content of a motion, and
not its title, to determine the relief requested. 4. A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed within 10 days of the entry of
judgment. 5. In computing the time for filing motions, the day of the act from which the period of
time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period is included, unless
it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which case the period runs until the end
of the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. 6. When the filing period prescribed or allowed for a motion is less than 11 days,
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the
computation. "Legal holiday" includes any day designated as a holiday by the
Congress of the United States or by the legislature of this state. 7. When a notice is served on a party by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed
response period. 8. Pursuant to K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-2103(a), the running of the time for appeal is
terminated by a timely motion made pursuant to any of the rules enumerated in the
statutes. One of the rules is K.S.A. 60-259, which would include a motion to alter or
amend a judgment pursuant to K.S.A. 60-259(f). 9. An appellate court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation of a statute.
10. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not speculate as
to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute so as to add
something not readily found in the statute.
11. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) was promulgated and
to be used as a procedural mechanism for the establishment, modification, and
enforcement of child and spousal support. UIFSA was designed to correct the
problem of multiple support orders under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act of 1970. UIFSA establishes a one-order system whereby all states are
required to recognize and enforce the same obligation consistently. A priority scheme
is established for the recognition and enforcement of multiple existing support
12. If all of the parties involved in a child support proceeding who are individuals
in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state
has jurisdiction to enforce and modify the issuing state's child support order in a
13. A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that
not be modified under the law of the issuing state. If two or more tribunals have
issued child support orders for the same obligor and child, the order that controls and
must be so recognized under K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 23-9,207 and amendments thereto
establishes the aspects of the support order which are nonmodifiable.
14. Under Missouri law, generally, a parent's child support obligation ends when a
reaches the age of 18. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340.3(5) (2000). However, Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 452.340.5 provides that if the child is enrolled in and attending a secondary
school program of instruction, the parental support obligation shall continue, if the
child continues to attend and progress toward completion of the program, until the
child completes such program or reaches the age of 21, whichever first occurs. If the
child is enrolled in an institution of vocational or higher education not later than
October 1 following graduation from a secondary school or completion of a
graduation equivalence degree program and so long as the child enrolls for and
completes at least 12 hours of credit each semester, not including the summer
semester, at an institution of vocational or higher education and achieves grades
sufficient to reenroll at such institution, the parental support obligation shall continue
until the child completes his or her education, or until the child reaches the age of 22,
15. Under Missouri law, where the child is not physically or mentally incapacitated, in
order for child support payments to continue after the child's 18th birthday, the trial
court must find that the provisions of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340.5 (2000) have been
16. The documentation that is required by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340.5 (2000)
parent with sufficient information to determine whether the noncustodial parent is still
required to support his or her child through college.
17. Missouri child support may not be terminated for a child over the age of 18
that the child is in compliance with Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340.5 (2000).
18. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act has a specific choice of law provision
which states that the law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and
duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment
arrearages under the order.
19. General and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever
controlling. K.S.A. 23-9,604(a) clearly establishes that the duration of child support
payments must be determined under the law of the issuing state. Appeal from Johnson District Court; GERALD T. ELLIOTT, judge. Opinion filed
August 23, 2002. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Elizabeth Hill, of Caviar & Hill, L.L.C., of Leawood, for appellant.
Joseph W. Booth, of Rose, Nelson & Booth, of Overland Park, for
MARQUARDT, J.: Lorri Riggle Bowles appeals the trial court's decision that a
Missouri child support order was modifiable and Kansas law may be applied to terminate
child support. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to apply
David W. Riggle and Lorri were residents of Missouri when they divorced in
February 1985. They had two children: Brian, born in 1978, and Kevin, born in 1981. David paid child support in the amount of $150 per month for each child beginning
February 1985. Brian graduated from high school in 1996. He enrolled in 9 hours of college, but
received credit for only 1 hour. He received no credit for classes taken in the spring of
1997. Kevin graduated from high school in 1999. In the fall of 1999, he enrolled in 13
hours of college courses. He also enrolled for the spring semester in 2000.
In February 1999, David filed a motion to terminate child support for Brian. Lorri
filed a counter-motion to modify child support. In April 2000, the Missouri trial court
found that Brian was emancipated effective January 1, 1997, because he failed to
successfully complete his college course work. The trial court found that Kevin was
entitled to child support through the age of 22 if he passed his classes, and ordered David
to pay $391 per month for child support.
In March 2001, the Kansas trial court received a notice of registration of the April
2000 support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (adopted
by Kansas at K.S.A. 23-9, 101 et seq.) Lorri objected to the registration. At the time
the hearing on the issue of the registration, all of the relevant parties were Kansas
residents. The trial court affirmed the registration and assumed continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over the issue of child support.
When David registered the support order in Kansas, he filed a motion to modify
child support, arguing that his child support obligation should end pursuant to K.S.A.
2001 Supp. 60-1610(a) because Kevin had reached the age of majority. The trial court
determined that child support in the State of Missouri for a child after he or she reaches
the age of 18 is modifiable pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340.3(5). Accordingly, the
trial court found that the procedural and substantive law of Kansas would be applied in
determining the duration of support at future hearings to modify the Missouri support
In applying 60-1610(a)(1) to the facts of the case, the trial court determined that
child support should terminate no sooner than 30 days after the filing of the motion to
modify. All remaining child support orders were ordered to terminate on April 15, 2001.
Lorri filed a "Motion for Relief From Judgment," which was ultimately denied. Lorri
appeals. Timing of the Notice of Appeal
David argues that Lorri's notice of appeal was not timely filed; therefore, this court
is without jurisdiction to consider her appeal. David claims that Lorri's notice of appeal was
filed after the 30-day limitation set by K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-2103(a). In the absence of a
motion for extension of time or any excusable neglect, David urges this court to decline
jurisdiction and award him attorney fees. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which our scope of review is
unlimited. Cypress Media, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 268 Kan. 407, 414, 997
P.2d 681
The right to appeal is entirely statutory and is not contained in the United States or
Kansas Constitutions. Kansas appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only
if the appeal is taken in the manner prescribed by statute. Wasson v. United Dominion
Industries, 266 Kan. 1012, 1018-19, 974 P.2d 578 (1999). A civil appeal must be taken
within 30 days from the entry of the judgment. See K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-2103(a).
The journal entry determining the applicable choice of law was filed on August 23,
2001. The journal entry terminating child support was filed on August 24, 2001. On
September 10, 2001, Lorri filed a motion entitled "Motion for Relief From Judgment" and
argued that the journal entry of August 23, 2001, did not accurately reflect the trial court's
ruling. However, Lorri claims that the motion was actually a motion to alter or amend a
judgment pursuant to K.S.A. 60-259(f). Motions to reconsider, as well as motions for
rehearing, have often been treated as motions to alter or amend the judgment. See
v. City of Wichita, 251 Kan. 451, 460, 836 P.2d 1128 (1992). In Kansas, generally, the appellate courts look to the content of a motion, and not its
title, to determine the relief requested. See Denno v. Denno, 12 Kan. App. 2d 499,
501, 749
P.2d 46 (1988). Accordingly, we believe that Lorri's motion is equivalent to a motion to alter
or amend the judgment. See Honeycutt, 251 Kan. at 460. A motion to alter or
judgment must be filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment. See K.S.A. 60-259(f). In computing the time for filing motions, the day of the act from which the period of
time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period is included, unless it is
a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which case the period runs until the end of the next
day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the filing period prescribed
or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be
excluded in the computation. "Legal holiday" includes any day designated as a holiday by
the Congress of the United States, or by the legislature of this state. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-
206(a).
The journal entry which determined the applicable choice of law was filed on
Thursday, August 23, 2001. The time for filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment
began to run on Friday, August 24, 2001. Saturday and Sunday, August 25 and 26, 2001,
were not included in the 10-day calculation. August 27 through 31 were counted as the 2d
through the 6th day. We do not count Saturday, September 1 and Sunday, September 2,
2001, or Monday, September 3, 2001, which was Labor Day. We resume counting on
Tuesday, September 4, 2001. According to our calculations, the 10th day fell on Friday,
However, when a notice is served on a party by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period. See K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-206(e). It appears that the relevant journal
entries were mailed to Lorri. Accordingly, the time to file a motion to alter or amend the
judgment would have expired on Monday, September 10, 2001. Given these calculations,
Lorri's motion was timely.
Pursuant to K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-2103(a), the running of the time for appeal is
terminated by a timely motion made pursuant to any of the rules enumerated in the statutes. One of the rules is K.S.A. 60-259, which would include a motion to alter or amend a
judgment pursuant to K.S.A. 60-259(f). Accordingly, the clock governing Lorri's notice of
appeal did not begin to run until the trial court ruled on her motion. See State v.
Chiles, 260
Kan. 75, 77, 917 P.2d 866 (1996).
Lorri's motion to reconsider was heard on October 19, 2001, and the journal entry
from that hearing was filed on November 1, 2001. Lorri filed one notice of appeal on
September 28, 2001, and an amended notice of appeal on November 19, 2001. The
November 19, 2001, notice of appeal covers the August 23, 2001, and August 24, 2001,
journal entries. That notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the ruling on Lorri's motion
for reconsideration; thus, it was timely. After reviewing the applicable statutes and filing requirements for pertinent motions,
we are confident that we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Lorri's appeal. Given this
finding, David's request for attorney fees is denied.
First, Lorri questions whether a Missouri support order is modifiable under Missouri
law. Second, she challenges the application of Kansas law instead of Missouri law to
determine how long David must pay child support. Resolution of this matter requires us to interpret certain provisions of the UIFSA. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court's review is unlimited. An
appellate court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation of a statute. Babe Houser
Motor Co. v. Tetreault, 270 Kan. 502, 506, 14 P.3d 1149 (2000).
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are
scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to
the intention of the legislature as expressed rather than determine what the law should or
should not be. Stated another way, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate
courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute
so as to add something not readily found in the statute. In re Marriage of Killman,
264 Kan.
33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998).
Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. To this end,
it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions to make
them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. State v. Engles, 270 Kan. 530, 533, 17
P.3d 355
Modification of the Missouri Order UIFSA was promulgated and intended to be used as a procedural mechanism for the
establishment, modification, and enforcement of child and spousal support. UIFSA was
designed to correct the problem of multiple support orders under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act of 1970, K.S.A. 23-451 et seq. Gentzel v.
Williams, 25 Kan.
App. 2d 552, 556, 965 P.2d 855 (1998). UIFSA establishes a one-order system whereby all
states are required to recognize and enforce the same obligation consistently. A priority
scheme is established for the recognition and enforcement of multiple existing support
obligations. Gentzel, 25 Kan. App. 2d at 557.
UIFSA addresses the ability of courts of this state to modify existing child support
orders. According to K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 23-9,613:
"If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in
the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state's
child support order in a proceeding to register that order."
When these proceedings were initiated, Lorri, Kevin, and David were all residents of
Kansas. In addition, David registered the Missouri judgment in Kansas, and the Kansas trial
court assumed continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.
This matter would be easy to resolve were it not for K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 23-9,611(c),
"A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not
modified under the law of the issuing state. If two or more tribunals have issued child support
for the same obligor and child, the order that controls and must be so recognized under K.S.A.
23-9,207 and amendments thereto establishes the aspects of the support order which are
nonmodifiable." This leads us to the question: Is the duration of David's child support obligation modifiable
under Missouri law?
In Missouri, generally, a parent's child support obligation ends when a child reaches
the age of 18. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340.3(5). However, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340.5
"the child is enrolled in and attending a secondary school program of instruction, the parental
support obligation shall continue, if the child continues to attend and progresses toward
of said program, until the child completes such program or reaches age twenty-one, whichever
occurs. If the child is enrolled in an institution of vocational or higher education not later than
October first following graduation from a secondary school or completion of a graduation
equivalence degree program and so long as the child enrolls for and completes at least twelve
of credit each semester, not including the summer semester, at an institution of vocational or
education and achieves grades sufficient to reenroll at such institution, the parental support
obligation shall continue until the child completes his or her education, or until the child reaches
age of twenty-two, whichever first occurs."
Termination of the requirement to continue to pay child support under Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 452.340.5 only occurs where the trial court finds that the statutory prerequisites have not
been met. See Kessinger v. Kessinger, 829 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Mo. App. 1992).
In a case where the child is not physically or mentally incapacitated, in order for child
support payments to continue after the child's 18th birthday, the trial court must find that the
provisions of § 452.340.5 have been satisfied. Lyons v. Sloop, 40 S.W.3d 1, 8
(Mo. App.
The documentation that is required by § 452.340.5 provides the parent with
information to determine whether the noncustodial parent is still required to support his or
her child through college. Lyons, 40 S.W.3d at 7. A child's failure to comply with
statutory requirements in one or more semesters relieves the parent of his or her obligation
to provide child support during that semester; however, it does not relieve the parent of the
responsibility for future payment. To the extent that a child complies with the statutory
preconditions for subsequent terms or semesters, he or she remains eligible for parental
support until he or she completes his or her college education or reaches the age of 22,
whichever first occurs. Lyons, 40 S.W.3d at 8; see Lombardo v.
Lombardo, 35 S.W.3d 386,
390 (Mo. App. 2000).
In interpreting the Missouri statute, we recognize that there is no case law directly on
point, but we feel certain that child support may not be terminated for a child over the age
of 18 provided that the child is in compliance with § 452.340.5. The language of the
is clearly mandatory; the "parental support obligation shall continue until the child
his or her education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-two." (Emphasis added.) Choice of law issue
Lorri argues that the trial court erred by applying Kansas law in terminating David's
child support obligation. We question whether we need to address this, since under K.S.A.
2001 Supp. 23-9,611(c), Kansas may not modify David's obligation to pay child support. However, we will examine the trial court's choice of law decision.
UIFSA has a specific choice of law provision which reads:
"The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount and
payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the order." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 23-9,604(a). General and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever
unless it appears the legislature intended to make the general statute controlling. In re
of Antonopoulos, 268 Kan. 178, 189, 993 P.2d 637 (1999).
K.S.A. 23-9,604(a) clearly establishes that the duration of child support payments
must be determined under the law of the issuing state. In this case, that means Missouri law
must be applied to the issue of the duration of David's child support payments. The trial court erred when it modified the Missouri order by applying Kansas law. This case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to apply Missouri law.
URL: http://www.kscourts.org/kscases/ctapp/2002/20020823/88115.htm.