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Operating Engineers v. Jones (full text) :: 460 U.S. 669 (1983) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Operating Engineers v. Jones 460 U.S. 669 (1983)
U.S. Supreme CourtOperating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983)Local 926, International Union ofOperating Engineers, AFL-CIO v. JonesNo. 81-1574Argued December 1, 1982Decided April 4, 1983460 U.S. 669APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA
(b) Here, the Union arguably violated § 8(b)(1)(A), because it is not unusual for workers in the construction industry, such as respondent, to Page 460 U. S. 670 fluctuate between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions and, in view of the low-level supervisory position that respondent held, it was not unlikely that he would from time to time serve in a nonsupervisory position, and that he might be intimidated by the Union's conduct once he again became a statutory employee. The Union's conduct also arguably violated § 8(b)(1)(B), since it was at least arguable that respondent was a "supervisor" within the Act's meaning, his complaint filed with the Regional Director having indicated that he would have collective bargaining responsibilities. It was for the Board, not the state courts, to decide whether respondent was the kind of supervisor who could invoke § 8(b)(1)(B). Cf. Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701. Pp. 460 U. S. 678-680.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 460 U. S. 684. Page 460 U. S. 671
Respondent Robert C. Jones [Footnote 2] was offered a supervisory position by the Georgia Power Co. (Company). Jones reported for work on June 12, 1978. By agreement, he took vacation time after his second day on the job and reported for work again on June 20, 1978. On this latter date, he was discharged. Page 460 U. S. 672
In a letter dated July 19, 1978, the Regional Director said that further proceedings on respondent's charge were unwarranted, and that he would not issue a complaint. [Footnote 4] He explained Page 460 U. S. 673 that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the Union had caused Jones' discharge; there was also a lack of evidence indicating that the Union had restrained or coerced the Company in the selection of its representative for purposes of collective bargaining. The Regional Director had instead come to the conclusion that Jones' discharge had been a part of changes in the Company's supervisory structure, and that the Union had merely participated in discussions regarding the changes.
Instead of appealing to the General Counsel, [Footnote 5] Jones proceeded to state court, suing both the Union and the Company. Count I of his complaint claimed that the Union had interfered with the contract between him and the Company. The allegations were simple. He pleaded that he had been a member of Local 926 from 1969 to 1974, when he resigned Page 460 U. S. 674 from the Union. More recently, the Company had offered him the job of equipment supervisor at one of its plants, and he and the Company had entered into a contract in reliance on which he had terminated his prior employment. The crucial allegation was that petitioner Thomas D. Archer, the business agent and representative of the Union, had
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the case against the Union. [Footnote 6] 159 Ga.App. 693, 285 S.E.2d 30 (1981). Following Georgia precedent it considered to be controlling, Sheet Metal Workers International Assn. v. Carter, 133 Ga.App. 872, 212 S.E.2d 645 (1975), and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Briscoe, 143 Ga.App. 417, 239 S.E.2d 38 (1977), the State Court of Appeals held the cause of action not preempted because Georgia had a deep and abiding interest in protecting its citizens' contractual rights and because the cause of action, which sounded in Page 460 U. S. 675 tort, was so unrelated to the concerns of the federal labor laws that it would not interfere with the administration of those laws. As an additional reason for not finding preemption, the court stated that the Union's acts were not even arguably within the ambit of § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA, thus purporting to distinguish Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701 (1963). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review, and petitioners appealed.
The issue before us "is a variant of a familiar theme." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 359 U. S. 239 (1959). The Court has often been asked to determine whether particular state causes of action or regulations may coexist with the comprehensive amalgam of substantive law and regulatory arrangements that Congress set up in the Page 460 U. S. 676 NLRA to govern labor-management relations affecting interstate commerce. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180 (1978); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Garmon, supra. Our approach to the preemption issue has thus been stated and restated. First, we determine whether the conduct that the State seeks to regulate or to make the basis of liability is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Garmon, supra, at 359 U. S. 245; see Sears, supra, at 436 U. S. 187-190. Although the "Garmon guidelines [are not to be applied] in a literal, mechanical fashion," Sears, supra, at 436 U. S. 188, if the conduct at issue is arguably prohibited or protected, otherwise applicable state law and procedures are ordinarily preempted. Farmer, supra, at 430 U. S. 296. When, however, the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of the Act or touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the State of the power to act, we refuse to invalidate state regulation or sanction of the conduct. Garmon, supra, at 359 U. S. 243-244. The question of whether regulation should be allowed because of the deeply rooted nature of the local interest involves a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by Congress, either in terms of negating the Board's exclusive jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of the asserted cause of action to the State as a protection to its citizens. See Sears, supra, at 436 U. S. 188-189; Farmer, supra, at 430 U. S. 297. [Footnote 8] Page 460 U. S. 677
We concluded that Perko's common law cause of action was preempted because it was founded on conduct that, for several reasons, was arguably within the ambit of § 7 or § 8. First, Perko was discharged both as a superintendent and a foreman. Even conceding that the position of superintendent was supervisory and beyond the reach of the Act, the foreman's position was arguably nonsupervisory, and covered by the Act. Hence, Perko's discharge arguably violated the proscription of § 8(b)(1)(A) against a union interfering with the protected rights of employees and that of § 8(b)(2) against causing an employer to discriminate against an employee contrary to § 8(a)(3). Second, the Union arguably violated § 8(b)(1)(A), since causing the discharge of a supervisor might coerce employees, who would fear meeting their supervisor's fate, into forgoing their § 7 rights to engage in concerted action. Third, the Union's conduct might also have violated § 8(b)(1)(B), which prohibits unions from restraining or coercing "an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." Perko, we concluded, may well have had sufficient grievance-handling responsibilities to come within the realm of supervisors whose selection the Union could not seek to dictate. Page 460 U. S. 678
"because workers in the construction industry frequently cycle in and out of supervisory jobs, discrimination against [an individual] in his attempt to become a supervisor would carry Page 460 U. S. 679 over to intimidate him once he again became a statutory employee."
See 572 F.2d at 552. The Board's "fluctuating status" approach is arguably applicable to this case. Jones was employed in the construction industry, and, in view of the low-level supervisory position he held, it was not unlikely that he would from time to time serve in a nonsupervisory position. [Footnote 9] It also is as clear here, as it was in Perko, that the Union's conduct was arguably prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(B), which forbids a union to coerce an employer in the choice of his bargaining representative. In Perko, there was some doubt whether Perko was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act; here there is no doubt in that respect. Of course, not every supervisor is a "representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances'" within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(B), Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 417 U. S. 811, n. 21 (1974). But in this case, Jones was to occupy the position of equipment supervisor; it is enough if, in this position, he would be authorized or expected to deal with grievances arising under the collective bargaining agreement, American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U. S. 411, 437 U. S. 427, n. 25 (1978); [Footnote 10] and Jones' complaint Page 460 U. S. 680 filed with the Regional Director indicated that he would have collective bargaining responsibilities. It is at least arguable that this was the case; and it was for the Board, not the state courts, to decide whether Jones was the kind of a supervisor who could invoke § 8(b)(1)(B). We thus agree with the Union and the Board that the Union, if it was responsible for Jones' discharge, arguably coerced the Company in the choice of its collective bargaining representative.
Second, the Court of Appeals believed that the Regional Director's rejection of the complaint for insufficient evidence of a violation satisfied all of the interests of the federal law and cleared the way for a state cause of action. If this position was grounded on the notion that supervisors do not have a cause of action in any circumstances, it is contrary to Board cases and to Perko. If, as seems more likely, the argument is that the complainant adequately submitted his dispute to the Board, it is untenable. Jones did not exhaust his administrative remedies, for he did not appeal to the General Counsel. Beyond that, the Garmon preemption doctrine not only mandates the substantive preemption by the federal labor law in the areas to which it applies, but also protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board over matters arguably within the reach of the Act. Even if Jones had satisfied ordinary primary jurisdiction requirements, which he did not, he Page 460 U. S. 681 would not have taken adequate account of the decision of Congress to vest in one administrative agency nationwide jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies within the Act's purview. Matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board are normally for it, not a state court, to decide. This implements the congressional desire to achieve uniform as well as effective enforcement of the national labor policy.
436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 197. Jones asserts that a § 8(b)(1)(B) unfair labor practice claim is made out only by proving coercion of an employer in the selection of its bargaining representative, whereas, he explains, to make out his state cause of action, it need only be shown that the Union caused, either coercively or noncoercively, the employer's selection of a supervisor. Because federal law does not forbid noncoerced but union-caused discharges, it is said that the state cause of action is as distinct from the federal unfair labor practice claim as were the causes of action this Court found not preempted in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra. [Footnote 11] Page 460 U. S. 682
This was not the case in Sears. There the state court action was for trespass. It challenged only the location of the Union picketing. The unfair labor practice charge, however, would have focused on whether the picketing had recognitional or work reassignment objectives, issues "completely Page 460 U. S. 683 unrelated to the simple question whether a trespass had occurred." 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 198. Permitting the trespass action to go forward accordingly created "no realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board's primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices." Ibid. The same cannot be said here. The Regional Director concluded that the Union had in no way been responsible for Jones' discharge. That same issue of causation would have been presented for decision had Jones' case come before the Board, just as the issue would recurringly be at the core of § 8(b)(1)(B) cases. Despite the Regional Director's determination, and the Board's undoubted jurisdiction to decide the issue had a complaint issued, Jones sought to relitigate the question in the state courts. The risk of interference with the Board's jurisdiction is thus obvious and substantial.
"[C]ourts have generally held over Board protest that employees' strikes over changes in even low level supervisory personnel are not protected. See Henning Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, [522 F.2d 1050, 1055 (CA7 Page 460 U. S. 684 1975)]; American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, [328 F.2d 88, 90-91 (CA7 1964)]; Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, [325 F.2d 531, 538-539 (CA5 1963)]. On the other hand, courts have found protected the writing of letters expressing opposition, NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 . . . (1948), or the simple voicing of complaints, NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.1960). By thus examining both the substantive interest and the means of advancing it, courts have balanced more finely the competing interests involved. The result is a general absence of per se rules."
I disagree with the Court's conclusion that the National Labor Relations Act preempts the state law claims in this case. On balance, I think the result reached by the Court is wrong, though the question is a close one; more importantly, I cannot accept the Court's analysis of our recent decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180 (1978). Page 460 U. S. 685
The Court recognizes that, if the conduct of the Union on which Jones' complaint was predicated was "arguably prohibited" by the Act, then the proper standard for preemption analysis is found in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra: is "the controversy presented to the state court . . . identical to . . . or different from" the federal labor law claim. Id. at 436 U. S. 197 (emphasis added). [Footnote 2/2] Other passages in Page 460 U. S. 686 our Sears opinion elaborate upon this rule, requiring, for example, that a federal claim must be "the same as the controversy presented to the state court." Id. at 436 U. S. 198; see also id. at 436 U. S. 196-197.
"permitting state causes of action for noncoercive interference with contractual relationships to go forward in the state courts would continually require the state court to decide in the first instance whether the Union's conduct was coercive, and hence beyond its power to sanction, or Page 460 U. S. 687 noncoercive, and thus the proper subject of a state suit. Decisions on such questions of federal labor law should be resolved by the Board."
This argument rests on a basic misunderstanding of our prior decisions. In stating the "identical controversies" standard in Sears, we said that a claim brought in state court is unpreempted unless "the controversy presented to the state court is identical to . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board." 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 197 (emphasis added). Plainly, Sears envisioned that state courts would decide in the first instance whether a particular claim is preempted under the "identical" controversy standard. Likewise, Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977) -- relied upon in Sears' formulation of the "identical" standard, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 197 -- indicated that state courts may, and in fact must, sort out preempted from nonpreempted portions of a complaint, even when no action before the Board has been taken. See 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 304-305. The Farmer and Sears models are analogous to the situation presented in this case. Just as state courts may distinguish the abusive manner of discrimination from discrimination itself, in cases modeled on Farmer, supra, at 430 U. S. 305, and the pure trespass aspects of picketing from the objectives of the same picketing in Sears cases, they could distinguish claims of coercive interference from those of noncoercive interference in cases like this one. As Farmer and Sears hold, state courts are competent to make such judgments without interfering with federal labor law policy. In short, while it is correct that the Board, and not state courts, is charged with deciding national labor policy, it is equally clear that no such exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Board with respect to questions of preemption. [Footnote 2/4] Page 460 U. S. 688
In Farmer, one Richard Hill belonged to the local of a national union, which operated a hiring hall. Hill was apparently subjected to discrimination in job referrals from the hall, and to a campaign of personal harassment. He filed suit in Page 460 U. S. 689 state court claiming, first, that the local had discriminated against him, and, second, that it had intentionally engaged in conduct causing him emotional distress. We observed that "these allegations of tortious conduct might form the basis for unfair labor practice charges before the Board," Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 302, and that Hill's tort claims were intertwined with "federally prohibited discrimination," hence creating "a potential for interference with the federal scheme of regulation." Id. at 430 U. S. 304.
The Court's reformulation of the "identical" controversies standard of Sears -- claims are identical if they share an important Page 460 U. S. 690 factual element -- is inconsistent with both Sears and Farmer. In Sears, the federal and state claims involved several common, fundamental factual questions -- whether any picketing had occurred; if so, where; and whether the property owner consented to it or not. These basic factual determinations, which the state courts and Board might resolve differently, would be critical to deciding both unfair labor practice claims and state trespass claims. Likewise, in cases following the Farmer model, state courts may make credibility determinations regarding whether any discrimination occurred, and if so, whether it did so in a manner supporting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The same factual issues would be involved in deciding an unfair labor practice charge under § 8 of the Act. Our decisions in Farmer and Sears thus make clear that the mere risk of differing factual determinations by the Board and state courts is insufficient to require preemption. Accordingly, the Court's reliance on the fact that the state and federal controversies at issue here are the same in one respect is misplaced. Instead, Sears and Farmer demand a more searching inquiry into the relationship between state and federal controversies.
"The discharge of supervisors is unlawful when it interferes with the right of employees to exercise their rights under Section 7 of the Act, as when they give testimony adverse to their employers' interest or when they refuse to commit unfair labor practices. The discharge of supervisors Page 460 U. S. 691 as a result of their participation in union or concerted activity -- either by themselves or when allied with rank-and-file employees -- is not unlawful, for the simple reason that employees, but not supervisors, have rights protected by the Act."
"reflect[s] a clearly focused congressional concern with the protection of employers Page 460 U. S. 692 in the selection of representatives to engage in two particular and explicitly stated activities."