Source: https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1998/05/ftc.gov-9710087cmp.htm
Timestamp: 2018-02-21 09:35:12
Document Index: 67490549

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 18', '§ 45', '§ 12', '§ 44', '§ 18', '§ 45', '§ 45', '§ 18', '§ 45']

CUC INTERNATIONAL INC. - CMP
B237330
CUC INTERNATIONAL INC., a corporation, and HFS INCORPORATED a corporation.
Docket No. C-3805
The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having reason to believe that CUC International Inc. has agreed to acquire HFS Incorporated, both corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 45; and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its Complaint, stating its charges as follows:
1. Respondent CUC International Inc. ("CUC") is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business located at 707 Summer Street, Stamford, Connecticut 06901.
2. Respondent HFS Incorporated ("HFS") is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business located at 6 Sylvan Way, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054.
3. For purposes of this proceeding, Respondents are, and at all times relevant herein have been, engaged in commerce as commerce is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12, and are corporations whose businesses are in or affecting commerce as commerce is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 44.
II. THE ACQUISITION
4. Pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated May 27, 1997, CUC will acquire all of the voting shares of HFS for approximately $8.7 billion (the Acquisition).
5. For purposes of this Complaint, the relevant line of commerce in which to analyze the effect of the Acquisition is the sale of timeshare exchange services to timeshare developers and owners. A significant benefit of timeshare ownership is the right to exchange the use of that unit for another comparable unit at a different resort property (or at the same resort for a different time period). The ability of timeshare owners to trade timeshare ownerships for vacation through worldwide exchange networks is a major reason why consumers decide to purchase timeshare interests. In lieu of returning to the same resort every year for a vacation, the timeshare exchange program allows an owner the opportunity to stay at many different vacation destinations. The owner of a particular resort unit relies on the timeshare exchange company to provide the exchange properties and to process the exchange. Exchange companies label time periods according to whether they are high, mid, or low season. They also grade and rate each property to provide for an equal or fair exchange.
6. For purposes of this Complaint, the relevant geographic area in which to analyze the effects of the Acquisition is the world.
7. The relevant market set forth in Paragraphs 5 and 6 is highly concentrated, whether measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) or two-firm and four-firm concentration ratios. CUC and HFS are the only two competitors in the relevant market; thus the Acquisition would result in a monopoly in the relevant market.
8. Entry into the relevant market, which requires significant sunk costs, would not be timely, likely and sufficient to deter or counteract the adverse competitive effects described in Paragraphs 9 and 10 because of, among other things, the difficulty of establishing a worldwide network of timeshare resorts in order to provide the relevant services. The significant network externalities in this market result in high entry barriers: a new entrant cannot sign up members unless it already has a substantial membership and it cannot get a substantial membership if it cannot sign up new members. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that a new entrant not already in the timeshare exchange business could enter successfully.
9. The effect of the Acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition and to tend to create a monopoly in the relevant market in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, in the following ways, among others:
a. by eliminating direct actual competition between CUC and HFS;
b. by increasing the likelihood that the firm created by the merger of CUC and HFS would unilaterally exercise market power;
c. by increasing the likelihood that timeshare resort developers and timeshare owners would be forced to pay higher affiliation and exchange fees; and
d. by increasing the likelihood that timeshare exchange service provided to developers and owners would be reduced.
10. All of the above increase the likelihood that the only firm in the relevant market would increase prices or reduce services in the near future and in the long term.
11. The acquisition agreement described in Paragraph 4 constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
12. The Acquisition described in Paragraph 4, if consummated, would constitute a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Federal Trade Commission has caused this Complaint to be signed by the Secretary and its official seal to be affixed, at Washington, D.C. this fourth day of May, 1998.