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Timestamp: 2019-01-23 08:18:59
Document Index: 170788633

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 25', 'art. 2', 'art. 46', 'art. 26', 'art. 27', 'art. 6']

A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT: RECONSIDERING CONGRESS S ROLE IN BRINGING EQUALITY TO AMERICA S LONG-FORGOTTEN CITIZENS - PDF
A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT: RECONSIDERING CONGRESS S ROLE IN BRINGING EQUALITY TO AMERICA S LONG-FORGOTTEN CITIZENS
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1 A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT: RECONSIDERING CONGRESS S ROLE IN BRINGING EQUALITY TO AMERICA S LONG-FORGOTTEN CITIZENS CÉSAR A. LÓPEZ MORALES ABSTRACT I.INTRODUCTION II.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT PROBLEM A. Puerto Rico-U.S. Relations: The Struggle for Self- Determination ( ) B. Puerto Rico-U.S. Relations: Post-Colonial Era of Disenfranchisement ( ) III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRITORIAL CITIZENS RIGHT TO VOTE A. Declarations and Treaties in International Human Rights Law International and Regional Instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Inter-American Democratic Charter Binding Treaty Obligations: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Issue #1: U.S. International Legal Obligations under the ICCPR Issue #2: Unreasonable Restrictions to the Right to Vote B. Customary International Law IV. THE PRO-RATA PROPOSAL: A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT A. Romeu v. Cohen: Background of the Pro-Rata Proposal J.D. Candidate, 2014, Boston University School of Law; B.S.F.S. International Politics, 2011, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Thank you to Professor Robert D. Sloane for his guidance, time, and dedication in the preparation of this Note, as well as to my girlfriend, Viviana Álvarez, for her support during this process. 151
2 152 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 B. Legal Feasibility (Constitutionality) of the Pro-Rata Proposal Extending the Presidential Vote to Territorial Citizens Legal Justifications for the Pro-Rata Proposal C. The Proposal s Effectiveness: Ensuring Substantive Compliance with International Law V. CONCLUSION ABSTRACT Despite the close relationship between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the United States, the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico continue to be excluded from the federal political process, as they remain unable to vote in presidential elections. This exclusion prevents Puerto Ricans from choosing among those competing ideologies, policies, and party platforms that directly affect them. In light of this perennial disenfranchisement, this Note argues that the United States is violating its international legal obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and customary international law to guarantee all of its citizens the right to vote for the leaders that represent them. This Note seeks to demonstrate that in addition to the traditional alternatives of statehood or a constitutional amendment, it is possible to devise a formal mechanism that guarantees substantive compliance with international law. Judge Pierre N. Leval s Pro-Rata Proposal is an example of said mechanism as it directly enfranchises all territorial residents by taking the votes cast by U.S. citizens in the territories for each presidential candidate and allocating them according to each state s proportion of the total U.S. population or proportion of the total electoral votes. Finally, this Note argues that the Pro-Rata Proposal is both a legally feasible and effective solution to Puerto Rico s disenfranchisement problem. In light of the courts failure to provide a remedy in recent decades, this Note places the burden on Congress to bring equality to America s long-forgotten citizens. I. INTRODUCTION We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring you protection, not only to yourselves, but to your property; to promote your prosperity, and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our government... This is not a war of devastation, but one to give all within the control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization.
3 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 153 Major General Nelson A. Miles 1 In 1952, the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico agreed to become an associated state of the United States known as Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico ( Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ). 2 Sixty years later, Puerto Ricans find themselves largely polarized as to their commitment to the island s current political status. 3 Puerto Rico s unique political status continues to be the central issue driving party politics and political mobilization. 4 It is unclear whether certain features of the Commonwealth arrangement, even if consistent with U.S. municipal law, satisfy international law. One of these features, and likely the most problematic, is Puerto Ricans perennial disenfranchisement from U.S. presidential elections and their limited participation in federal lawmaking processes. 5 Because Article II of the U.S. Constitution bestows exclusive authority to elect the President upon state electors, the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico are unable to participate in the election of the President and Vice-President of 1 KARL STEPHEN HERRMANN, A RECENT CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO BY THE INTERNATIONAL REGULAR BRIGADE UNDER COMMAND OF THE BRIG. GENERAL SCHWAN 33 (1907). 2 PUERTO RICO CONST. The United States Congress approved the new Constitution that established the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Pub. L. No. 447 of July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327 (1952). 3 On November 6, 2012, around 53.97% of the Puerto Rican electorate expressed their desire to change the island s current political status. In this plebiscite, 1,878,969 of the 2,402,941 registered voters cast ballots, for a turnout rate of 78.19%. STATE ELECTIONS COMMISSION, GENERAL ELECTIONS 2012 AND PLEBISCITE ON PUERTO RICO POLITICAL STATUS (San Juan, Puerto Rico 2012) available at TERRITORIAL_ACTUAL_ISLA.xml. [hereinafter 2012 PLEBISCITE ON PUERTO RICO POLITICAL STATUS]. 4 The two main political parties in Puerto Rico are the Popular Democratic Party ( PDP ), which supports the current Commonwealth status or an enhanced version of the arrangement, and the New Progressive Party ( NPP ), which supports statehood. A minor third party is the Puerto Rican Independence Party ( PIP ). See Ángel R. Oquendo, Liking to Be in America: Puerto Rico s Quest for Difference in the United States, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT L L. 249, (2004) (describing the centrality of Puerto Rico s political status in the island s party structure). 5 Puerto Ricans are not able to participate in U.S. presidential elections and their participation at the federal level is limited to the presence of a non-voting Resident Commissioner in the House of Representatives. Amber L. Cottle, Silent Citizens: United States Territorial Residents and the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, , 320 (1995); see José A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Out of the Colonial Closet, 33 FOREIGN POL Y 66, (1979) ( [N]o word other than colonialism adequately describes the relationship between a powerful metropolitan state and an impoverished overseas dependency, disenfranchised from the formal lawmaking processes that shape its people s daily lives. ) (emphasis added).
4 154 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 the United States. 6 This constitutional provision inevitably leads to a strange and seemingly inequitable dichotomy between the 3.7 million disenfranchised Puerto Ricans that reside in the island and the nearly 5 million Puerto Ricans who live in one of the fifty states and enjoy full voting rights. 7 Further, since territorial residents possess limited voting rights, their participation in matters of national interest is in many ways restricted. 8 As a matter of policy, the absence of the federal franchise prevents these residents from choosing among those ideologies, policies, and party platforms that directly affect them. 9 Federal courts, however, have continuously held that because the Constitution itself specifically grants the right to appoint electors to the states, the exclusion of U.S. citizens in the territories cannot be unconstitutional. 10 Nevertheless, even if the absence of a presidential vote is constitutionally permissible, this scenario of disenfranchisement and limited participation is at least questionable as a matter of international law. 11 The right to vote and to equal political participation is a fundamental 6 Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.... U.S. CONST. art. II, 1. 7 See Eduardo Guzmán, Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States The Right of the United States Citizens to Vote for the President and the Need to Re-evaluate America s Territorial Policy, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 146 (2001) (arguing that the claim of a right to participate in presidential elections highlights this dichotomy by raising questions about the kind of citizenship that Puerto Ricans possess ). 8 With respect to Puerto Rico, the founder of the Commonwealth, Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, recognized that [o]ne thing that is basically lacking... is the very important principle of participation by the people of Puerto Rico in federal legislation that applies to them, a fact that is bound in the long run to accumulate irritations. Luis Muñoz Marín, Governor of Puerto Rico, Speech at the University of Kansas 6-8 (Apr. 23, 1955), available at see Cottle, supra note 5, at 316 ( [Territorial residents] are shut out of the debate and decision-making process of the executive branch of the Federal Government. ). 9 Cottle, supra note 5, at Igartúa De La Rosa v. United States (Igartúa III), 417 F.3d 145, 148 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) ( That the franchise for choosing electors is confined to states cannot be unconstitutional because it is what the Constitution itself provides. ); Attorney Gen. of the Territory of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984); but see Guzmán, supra note 7, at (noting that the term states in Article II has evolved to a point that might encompass the U.S. territories). 11 See infra Part III; see also Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C.L. Rev (2009) (questioning whether Puerto Rico s current political status fully complies with the requirem8ents of associated statehood imposed by international law); Dorian A. Shaw, Note, The Status of Puerto Rico Revisited: Does the Current U.S.-Puerto Rico Relationship Uphold International Law?, 17 FORDHAM INT L L.J (1994).
5 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 155 right guaranteed and protected not only by the U.S. Constitution, 12 but also by several sources of international law. 13 Nonetheless, because the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant this right to territorial citizens, Puerto Rico s relationship with the United States reflects an ongoing tension between U.S. municipal law and international law. 14 To the extent that Puerto Rico s current arrangement fails to comply with international law, it is worth asking whether there is any formal constitutional mechanism, in addition to statehood or a constitutional amendment, that could guarantee substantive compliance with international human rights law. 15 Whether such a formal solution exists is the main question that this Note intends to explore and address. This Note argues that international human rights law requires all citizens of a State to vote and participate in that State s formal political processes. Because the President and Vice-President are privileged constitutional players in the United States formal lawmaking and political process, international law would seem to require all U.S. citizens, including Puerto Ricans and other territorial residents, to participate in their democratic election. Moreover, even though Puerto Ricans also lack voting representation in Congress, this Note will only address their exclusion from participating in presidential elections. This particular exclusion has been the cause of immense resentment in th[e] territories resentment that has been especially vocal in Puerto 12 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ( No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. ); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). 13 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( UDHR ) G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, Dec , 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 14 Lawson & Sloane, supra note 11 (describing how international law and U.S. constitutional law collide in Puerto Rico s current legal arrangement with the United States). 15 International law is exclusively concerned with a State s substantive compliance of its rules and norms. On the other hand, U.S. constitutional law is also concerned with the formal compliance of its rules, standards, and principles. The important task is to come up with creative mechanisms to ensure substantive, even if not formal, international legal compliance... in a fashion that elides perennially debated issues of constitutional law and theory. Id. at 1130 (emphasis in original). Professor Lawson argues, for example, that Puerto Rico s current legal arrangement is unconstitutional because the Constitution s Appointments Clause requires that the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint the island s principal government officers. As a solution to this problem, Professors Lawson and Sloane suggest presidential pro forma appointments to the winning candidates as an example of a formal mechanism that ensures in part substantive compliance with international law s principle of self-governance. Id. at 1131.
6 156 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 Rico. 16 The importance of this exclusion rests on the fact that not only does the President sign bills into law that fully apply throughout the United States, including Puerto Rico, but also exercises authority as Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces over thousands of Puerto Ricans in active service. 17 In addition, the United States has suffered from an impaired reputation in the community of nations after being consistently criticized in the United Nations for hypocritically preaching democracy to the world while practicing nineteenth-century colonialism at home. 18 Since the U.S. Constitution grants the power to elect the President to state electors, as opposed to citizens, coming up with formal mechanisms that ensure substantive compliance with international law is a difficult and tricky task. Two undisputed and universally acknowledged formal solutions are statehood and a constitutional amendment akin to the Twenty-Third Amendment, which gave the District of Columbia the power to appoint presidential electors. Contrary to the widespread assumption that statehood or a constitutional amendment are prerequisites to the federal enfranchisement of territorial residents, 19 this Note contends that there are other formal mechanisms, such as Judge Pierre N. Leval s Pro-Rata Proposal, that increase the participation of these residents at the federal level. 20 The Pro-Rata Proposal directly enfranchises all U.S. territorial residents by taking the number of votes cast by U.S. citizens in the territories for each presidential candidate and allocating them according to each state s proportion of the total U.S. population or proportion of the total electoral votes. 21 This Note proceeds in three substantive parts. Part II provides a general background of Puerto Rico s relationship with the United States since It focuses particularly on those events relevant to Puerto Rico s 16 Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 127 (2nd Cir. 2001) (Leval, J., writing separately) (citing Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States (Igartúa II), 229 F.3d 80, (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, J., concurring)). 17 Section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act provides, The statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States U.S.C. 734 (2006). 18 Romeu, 265 F.3d at 128 (Leval, J. writing separately) (citing Special Committee on Decolonization Hears Petitioners on the Question of Puerto Rico, United Nations Press Release GA/COL/2970, 19 June 1997). 19 See, e.g., Igartúa De La Rosa v. United States (Igartúa III), 417 F.3d 145, 148 (1st Cir. 2005); Igartúa II, 229 F. 3d 80, (1st Cir. 2000); Igartúa I, 32 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1994); Attorney Gen. of the Territory of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017, (9th Cir. 1984). 20 Romeu, 265 F.3d at (Leval, J., writing separately). 21 Id. at 130.
7 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 157 disenfranchisement and its unique political status. Part III explains the underlying tension that exists between U.S. municipal law and international human rights law with respect to the right to vote and equal political participation. More importantly, this Part argues that excluding territorial residents from participating in presidential elections violates both international law and U.S. international treaty obligations. Part IV emphasizes the need to come up with a formal mechanism that addresses U.S. non-compliance with international law. This Part will focus on the feasibility and effectiveness of the Pro-Rata Proposal. This Part will argue that Judge Pierre N. Leval s Pro-Rata Proposal is a feasible option because Congress may enact a statute compelling the several states to include the pro rata share of votes cast in the territories as part of their popular vote. This Note posits that because the states of the Union do not have unfettered authority to appoint their respective electors and because Congress has enacted voting rights legislation preempting state voting laws in the past, there is no reason why Congress cannot enact a statute embracing the aforementioned proposal pursuant to its powers under the Territorial Clause and Treaty Clause of the Constitution. 22 Moreover, the Proposal is effective because it guarantees substantive compliance with international law. II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT PROBLEM Puerto Rico s relationship with the United States has shaped the island s modern political history and socio-economic development. The programmatic nature and ideology of the main political parties in Puerto Rico continue to revolve around the island s political status. As a matter of international law, Puerto Rico evolved from being a U.S. colony in the traditional sense to a self-governing territory under the unique status of Commonwealth. 23 As a matter of constitutional law, it is unclear that the U.S. Constitution recognizes anything beyond the mutually exclusive categories of State and Territory 24 and, even if it does, it is highly 22 Id. at 128 (noting that the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act compels the several states to accept overseas absentee votes); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (banning state law residency requirements and compelling states to accept absentee votes). 23 Lawson & Sloane, supra note 11, at 1152 ( Puerto Ricans approved Public Law 600 and the Puerto Rican Constitution in free and fair referenda, thus exercising their right as a former colony to external self-determination by choosing associated statehood in connection with the United States of America. ); see also Letter from Luis Muñoz Marín, Governor of Puerto Rico, to the President of the United States (Jan. 17, 1953), in 28 DEP T ST. BULL. 563, 588 (Apr. 1953). 24 Lawson & Sloane, supra note 11, at 1127 (quoting T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
8 158 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 unlikely that the Commonwealth ceased to be a Territory. 25 Regardless of the legal identity of Puerto Rico s political status, the United States continues to violate international law and its treaty obligations by excluding Puerto Ricans and other territorial citizens from participating in presidential elections. 26 A. Puerto Rico-U.S. Relations: The Struggle for Self-Determination ( ) Following the mysterious sinking of the USS Maine in Havana in 1898, the United States declared war against Spain and immediately targeted Spain s few remaining colonial possessions. 27 General Nelson A. Miles led the American invasion of Puerto Rico and quickly gained control of the island. Miles, influenced by a Manifest Destiny mindset and a civilizing mission-like rhetoric, promised Puerto Ricans a large measure of [political] liberty that would bestow upon them the immunities and blessings of the American civilization. 28 After a few months of military occupation, Spain and the United States signed the Treaty of Paris, which brought an end to the Spanish-American War and effectively ceded Spain s colonies to the United States. 29 Pursuant to the Treaty of Paris and the Territorial Clause of the Constitution, the U.S. Congress now had plenary SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002)). 25 The majority view among academics and among the three branches of the Federal Government is that Puerto Rico remains a federal territory. See e.g., JOSÉ TRIAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD (1997); Juan R. Torruella, Hacia Dónde vas Puerto Rico?, 107 YALE L.J. 1503, 1514 (1998) (quoting David M. Helfeld, Congressional Intent and Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 21 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 255, 307 (1952)) (stating that Congress continues to possess plenary power over Puerto Rico, and may in theory annul the Constitution of Puerto Rico and veto any insular legislation which it deems unwise or improper ); but see Rafael Hernández Colón, On the nature of the Commonwealth V, CARIBBEAN BUSINESS (San Juan), Oct. 14, 2004, at 27, (arguing that Puerto Rico is no longer a Territory for constitutional purposes because Congress relinquished its plenary authority over Puerto Rico when the Commonwealth was created). 26 See infra Part III. 27 See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and LatCrit Theory: The Case of Racial Transformations Circa the Spanish-American War, , 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 921, 926 (2000). 28 HERRMANN, supra note 1, at Pursuant to the signing and ratification of the Treaty of Paris, the United States acquired Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Atlantic and Guam and the Philippines in the Pacific. Cuba was immediately granted independence, while the other possessions became territories of the United States. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, 30 Stat. 1754, 1759.
9 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 159 authority to determine [t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the [new] territories. 30 In 1900, Congress passed the Foraker Act, which provided for the establishment of a civil government for Puerto Rico that consisted of a governor and supreme court appointed by the President of the United States, a limited elected legislature, and an elected non-voting Resident Commissioner in Congress. 31 Since most of the authority of this civil government was concentrated in the hands of a presidentially appointed governor and executive council, the Foraker Act failed to meet local expectations among those who sought political inclusion into the federal Union and among those who advocated for greater autonomy from the metropolis. 32 In 1917, Congress passed the Jones Act, which transformed the legislature into a fully elected bi-cameral legislature with more powers. 33 More importantly, 5 of the organic act granted U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto Rico. 34 Despite this statutory grant of U.S. citizenship and the strengthening of the local government, little else changed regarding Puerto Rico s colonial relationship with the United States. 35 Shortly after the United States acquired Puerto Rico, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, while all constitutional protections apply to incorporated territories, only those constitutional rights that are fundamental extend to unincorporated territories like Puerto Rico. 36 Without any legal explanation 30 Id.; The Territorial Clause of the Constitution provides, The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.... U.S. CONST. art. IV, 3, cl Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, (1900); Torruella, supra note 25, at Unlike the Charter of Autonomy enacted during the final years of Spanish rule, the real authority of the Foraker s civil government was centralized in hands of a presidentially appointed Executive. The Foraker Act reaffirmed U.S. colonial rule over Puerto Rico by refusing to either incorporate it as a state or facilitate the island s transition towards selfgovernment. 1 ANTONIO QUIÑONES Calderón, HISTORIA POLÍTICA DE PUERTO RICO [POLITICAL HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO] (2002). 33 The Jones Act decentralized the authority and strengthened the local government by transferring some legislative functions that belonged to the Executive to the new bi-cameral legislature. Jones Act, Pub. L. No , ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. 737 et seq. (2006)). 34 Id. 35 José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, (1978); Torruella, supra note 26, at See, e.g., DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); see also Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, A Most Insular Minority: Reconsidering Judicial Deference to Unequal Treatment in Light of Puerto Rico s Political Process Failure, 110 COLUM L. REV. 797, 798 (2010).
10 160 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 as to which constitutional rights qualify as fundamental, the Court decided on a case-by-case basis, in a series of cases known as the Insular Cases, 37 which constitutional protections applied to the new territories. In 1922, Chief Justice Taft explained in the Court s decision of Balzac v. Porto Rico that, despite the enactment of the Jones Act, only fundamental constitutional rights extended to Puerto Rico because, [h]ad Congress intended to take the important step of changing the treaty status of Porto Rico by incorporating it into the Union, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have done so by the plain declaration, and would not have left it to mere inference. 38 Without suggesting a formal analogy to the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson decision, the Plessy-like rationale of the Insular Cases doctrine 39 led the Court to hold that Congress can discriminate against an unincorporated territory and its citizens so long as there is a rational basis for its actions. 40 Since the Insular Cases have never been overruled, 41 Balzac s 37 See Cepeda Derieux, supra note U.S. 298, 306 (1922) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury is not a fundamental right applicable in Puerto Rico). 39 The analogy of the Insular Cases to the Supreme Court s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), revolves around the complicity of the federal courts in the perpetuation of injustice and inequality. JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 3 (1985); see also Igartúa III, 417 F.3d 145, 162 (1st Cir. 2005) (Torruella, J. dissenting) (citation omitted) ( There is no question that the Insular Cases are on par with the Court s infamous decision in [Plessy] in licencing the downgrading of the rights of discrete minorities within the political hegemony of the United States. ); Consejo de Salud de Playa de Ponce v. Rullán, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 30 (D.P.R. 2008) ( [T]he Balzac decision made no common sense and again showed extreme racism as well as ignorance of the realities of the island at the time. ); Gerald L. Neuman, Constitutionalism and Individual Rights in the Territories, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) ( The harm done by the Insular Cases doctrine in the Twentieth Century is undeniable. [It]... was a vehicle of injustice... and their presence in the United States Reports is painful to citizens of both the territories and the states. ). Commentators have noted that it is no surprise that with the exception of two justices, all of the Court s members that decided the Insular Cases also joined the Court s decision in Plessy. Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT L. L. 283, (2007). 40 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, (1980) (holding that lower level of economic aid to families with dependent children to residents of Puerto Rico did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); see also Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (denying Supplemental Security Income to U.S. citizens who moved to Puerto Rico). 41 The Supreme Court relied on the Insular Cases in its recent case of Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) to hold that detained enemy combatants in the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were entitled to the protection of the writ of habeas corpus. See Lawson & Sloane, supra note 11, at 1146 (noting that no current scholar, from any
11 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 161 precedent of gradations of citizenship means that U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico still do not enjoy some of the constitutional rights and protections guaranteed to their fellow citizens in the states. 42 With the emergence of international human rights law and the creation of the United Nations at the end of World War II, colonial powers could no longer ignore the local and international criticism of their practices overseas. As a result, Congress passed a law in 1947 allowing Puerto Ricans to elect their own governor by popular vote, 43 and, three years later, Congress enacted Public Law 600 authorizing Puerto Ricans to draft their own constitution. 44 An overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans favored the new, congressionally approved constitution that provided for the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 45 B. Puerto Rico-U.S. Relations: Post-Colonial Era of Disenfranchisement ( ) The Commonwealth s establishment in 1952 did not fully abrogate the preexisting statutory framework governing relations between Puerto Rico and the United States. 46 It did not change, for example, Puerto Rico s participation at the federal level, which still consists of an elected nonvoting Resident Commissioner in Congress. 47 Puerto Rico s Governor Luis Muñoz Marín and his fellow party members strongly believed that the new political status could only be dissolved by mutual consent and that it methodological perspective, defends the Insular Cases even though they remain good law. ) (emphasis added). 42 Torruella, supra note 25, at Lawson & Sloane, supra note 11, at 1147 (citing Elective Governor Act of Aug. 5, 1947, Pub. L. No , ch. 490, 1, 61 Stat. 770, ). 44 Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No , 64 Stat Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No , 66 Stat The Commonwealth received an almost unanimous approval from the delegates in the Constitutional Delegation. Nearly 80.7% of the Puerto Rican electorate supported the new constitution in a general referendum. QUIÑONES CALDERÓN, supra note 32, at The Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act incorporates several provisions from the previous organic acts and, along with Public Law 600 and the Constitution of Puerto Rico, governs the current legal arrangement between Puerto Rico and the United States. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No , 64 Stat. 319 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.). 47 Professor Gary Lawson once referred to Puerto Rico s Resident Commissioner in Congress as a glorified lobbyist. Gary Lawson & Robert Sloane, Remarks at the Boston University School of Law Faculty Brown Bag Lunch Talk: The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico s Legal Status Reconsidered (Nov. 5, 2012). This seems to be a fair description considering that, even though the Commissioner is allowed to serve on congressional committees, the Commissioner may not vote for the proposed bill once it reaches the House floor.
12 162 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 irrefutably ended the island s colonial relationship with the United States. 48 Others argue that while the Commonwealth brought greater autonomy to the local government, it did not ultimately change Puerto Rico s colonial status. 49 The United States repeatedly asserted before the United Nations that the recently formed Commonwealth of Puerto Rico became a self-governing, freely associated state pursuant to a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms may be changed only by common consent. 50 By making these statements, the United States incurred a series of obligations as a matter of international law. 51 The Trusteeship Council concluded that because the United States fulfilled its obligations under Article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter, the United States no longer had to render reports regarding Puerto Rico s progress towards self-governance Speech by Muñoz Marín, supra note 8, at Though the formal title has been changed, in constitutional theory Puerto Rico remains a territory. This means that Congress continues to possess plenary but unexercised authority over Puerto Rico. Helfeld, supra note 25, at 307; see also TRIAS MONGE, supra note 25 (making the case for true self-determination and explaining how Puerto Rico s state of affairs has come about). 50 Frances P. Bolton, U.S. Rep. to the Gen. Assembly, Nov. 3 Statement by Mrs. Bolton in Committee IV (Trusteeship) (Nov. 3, 1953), in 29 DEP T ST. BULL. 802, 804 (Dec. 1953) (describing the Commonwealth arrangement as a bilateral compact of association between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States which has been accepted by both and which in accordance with judicial decisions may not be amended without common consent ). However, the Federal Government s position is that Puerto Rico never ceased to be a federal territory for purposes of constitutional law. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, (1980) (holding that, because Congress... is empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitution,... [it] may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions ); see also REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO S STATUS 26 (2011), available at ( Under the Commonwealth option, Puerto Rico would remain, as it is today, subject to the Territory Clause of the U.S. Constitution. ). 51 The United States bound itself as a matter of international law to its representations in the Trusteeship Council regarding the Commonwealth, regardless of what Congress may have intended. Lawson & Sloane, supra note 11, at 1155 (explaining that [i]t is well established that a State may, by repeated, public representations intended to induce reliance on the part of other States,... bind itself unilaterally ) [citing Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, (Dec. 22); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, (Dec. 20); Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on December 23, 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, (Nov. 18); Legal Status of South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 22 (May 11)]. 52 G.A. Res. 748, 5, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/2630, at 25 (Nov. 27, 1953) (declaring that the United States fulfilled its international obligations and no longer had to render reports to the Trusteeship Council because the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have been invested with attributes of political sovereignty ).
13 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 163 Shortly after the Commonwealth s establishment, Puerto Rico s limited participation at the federal level triggered numerous debates between the two main political parties, the pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic Party ( PDP ) and the pro-statehood New Progressive Party ( NPP ). 53 In 1960, Governor Luis Muñoz Marín of the PDP led a crusade to enfranchise Puerto Ricans, arguing that the presidential vote was an indispensable feature of the Commonwealth s culmination. 54 As part of this crusade, Muñoz Marín participated in a congressional public hearing of the House Judiciary Committee regarding the proposed bill of the Twenty-Third Amendment and even met with then-vice President Richard M. Nixon to discuss the importance of the presidential vote for the Commonwealth s growth. 55 Even though extending the presidential vote to Puerto Rico was official PDP policy, this topic exacerbated divisions within the party between those who supported a closer relationship with the United States and those who advocated for greater autonomy and political liberty. 56 By 1962, the PDP abandoned altogether the enfranchisement discourse in order to mend these intra-party divisions. 57 As part of a new effort to strengthen Puerto Rico s ties with the United States, Governor Luis A. Ferré of the NPP revived the disenfranchisement debate. 58 In early 1970, Ferré and President Nixon created a jointly appointed ad hoc committee to evaluate the feasibility of granting Puerto Ricans the right to vote for President and Vice President. 59 The committee concluded that the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico should be able to participate in presidential elections due to: (1) the historically high participation of Puerto Ricans in the Armed Forces and the possibility of a military draft; (2) Puerto Ricans reliance on federal welfare programs; (3) the fact that the payment of the federal income tax not is not a constitutional prerequisite to the right to vote; and (4) the fact that the territorial incorporation doctrine 53 The PDP supports the continuation of Puerto Rico s Commonwealth arrangement with the United States, albeit with some modifications. Party leaders, however, disagree with respect to the changes to the status quo, ranging from more autonomy over domestic issues to greater political participation at the federal level. On the other hand, the NPP supports statehood for Puerto Rico and considers the Commonwealth status to be a continuation of the island s colonial relationship with the United States. See Oquendo, supra note QUIÑONES CALDERÓN, supra note 32, at Id. at 355 (citing ANTONIO QUIÑONES CALDERÓN, SABOTAJE EN EL SENADO [SABOTAGE IN THE SENATE] (1972)). 56 Id. at 357; JOSÉ TRIAS MONGE, HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO RICO [CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO] 190 (1989). 57 TRIAS MONGE, supra note 56, at QUIÑONES CALDERÓN, supra note 32, at Id. at 421.
14 164 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 does not preclude federal enfranchisement. 60 The committee suggested holding a referendum to determine whether a majority of Puerto Ricans in fact desired the presidential vote. 61 The PDP-controlled legislature rejected the committee s recommendations because it preferred an integral and comprehensive approach towards the Commonwealth s development, as opposed to a step-by-step approach that prioritized specific and clearly defined measures, such as the presidential vote for Puerto Rico. 62 In 1975, a new ad hoc committee, jointly appointed by President Nixon and PDP Governor Rafael Hernández Colón, drafted a Compact of Permanent Union to develop the maximum of self-government and selfdetermination within the framework of the Commonwealth. 63 The committee s final report included in its appendix the findings and recommendations of Ferré s 1971 committee. In addition, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group considered a series of proposals to revise the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act s provision on the applicability of federal legislation in Puerto Rico. 64 Some of these proposals included that: (1) federal law may only apply at the request or with the consent of the Government of Puerto Rico; 65 (2) Puerto Rico and Congress must agree on a specific definition of those federal laws to be applied in Puerto Rico by generic consent; and finally that (3) Puerto Rico may delay the application of newly enacted federal laws until the matter is considered and resolved by a joint committee. 66 The Committee also stated that alternative mechanisms devising mutually satisfactory ways by which the people of Puerto Rico may participate more meaningfully in federal decisions affecting them must take precedence over any proposal requiring an amendment to the U.S. 60 THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR PUERTO RICO: REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR PUERTO RICO (1971) 8-9 [hereinafter 1971 ADVISORY GROUP REPORT]. 61 Id. at 1; see also 5 JOSÉ TRIAS MONGE, HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO RICO [CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO] at 88 (1989). 62 QUIÑONES CALDERÓN, supra note 32, at ; 1971 ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 60, at Puerto Rico s Choice, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1975; see also RAFAEL HERNÁNDEZ COLÓN, HACIA LA META FINAL: EL NUEVO PACTO UN PASO ADELANTE [TOWARDS THE FINAL GOAL: THE NEW COMPACT A STEP FORWARD] (José A. Hernández Mayoral et al. eds., 2011) (compiling different documents regarding the preparation of the Compact of Permanent Union). 64 HERNÁNDEZ COLÓN, supra note 63, at The Advisory Group noted that this system was employed by Great Britain in the Statute of Westminster. Id. at This arrangement was inspired on similar agreements between the Netherland Antilles and Surinam with Holland since Id. at 193.
15 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 165 Constitution. 67 Because many scholars and government officers at the time, including the committee members, believed that granting Puerto Ricans the right to vote for President required either statehood or a constitutional amendment akin to the Twenty-Third Amendment, the presidential vote essentially became an ancillary matter in Puerto Rico s political status debate. 68 The Compact, introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as H.R , failed to produce any federal legislation and its aspirations gradually vanished after the electoral defeats in 1976 of Governor Hernández Colón and President Gerald Ford. 69 While the number of Commonwealth supporters has significantly decreased since it was established in 1952, the opposite is true for statehood supporters. 70 In November 2012, Puerto Ricans participated in a nonbinding plebiscite that addressed: (1) whether they agreed to continue under the current territorial status, and (2) which non-territorial option they preferred between statehood, independence, and sovereign free-associated state. 71 For the first time in the history of the Commonwealth, 54% of the voters expressed their desire to change the status quo, and, with respect to the second question, approximately 61% preferred statehood compared to 33% that favored free association and 5.5% for independence. 72 Even though the PDP leadership has strongly criticized the plebiscite and its results, it is indisputable that at least a significant majority of the population favors some kind of permanent relationship with the United States. 73 Interestingly, a poll that was conducted in 2010 revealed that 67 Id. at Several scholars that contributed to the 1971 Ad Hoc Advisory Group Report on the Presidential Vote agreed that, absent a constitutional amendment, extending the federal franchise to Puerto Rico was neither a legally or politically feasible solution. See e.g., David M. Helfeld, The Constitutional and Legal Feasibility of the Presidential Vote for Puerto Rico, in SIX SPECIAL STUDIES REQUESTED FOR THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR PUERTO RICO (1971); Carl J. Friedrich, Participation versus Autonomy in Puerto Rican Federal Relations, in SIX SPECIAL STUDIES (1971). 69 HERNÁNDEZ COLÓN, supra note 63, at 73, Even though nearly 80.7% of the electorate favored the Commonwealth in the 1952 constitutional referendum, only 48.6% favored the Commonwealth in the 1993 plebiscite, compared to 46.3% supporting statehood. In the 1993 plebiscite, 1,700,990 of the 2,312,912 registered voters cast ballots for a turnout rate of 73.5%. Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, 1993 Status Plebiscite Vote Summary, ELECTIONS IN PUERTO RICO (January 8, 2013, 8:30PM), The 2012 plebiscite results might not be the best indicator of the current support for either the Commonwealth or statehood for reasons that are explained below. See infra note PLEBISCITE ON PUERTO RICO POLITICAL STATUS, supra note The voter turnout rate in the 2012 plebiscite was 78.19%. Id. 73 PDP President and current Governor of Puerto Rico, Alejandro García Padilla, claimed that the results of the plebiscite did not produce a clear result because more than
16 166 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32: % of Puerto Rico s electorate favored voting for the President of the United States and considered their U.S. citizenship to be very important. 74 Since it is not clear whether a simple majority of the population favors statehood or whether Congress has the political will to admit Puerto Rico into the Union, addressing the existing disenfranchisement problem remains a crucial issue that cannot be further postponed. III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRITORIAL CITIZENS RIGHT TO VOTE International human rights have become a sort of secular religion in the international legal system. 75 International human rights law has undergone a process of universalization and internationalization, 76 and, as a result, human rights have become a matter of international concern, as opposed to a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. 77 Moreover, popular sovereignty, the idea that political legitimacy and governmental authority are grounded on the consent of the people in the territory in which a government purported to exercise power, has become half of the Commonwealth supporters left the second ballot blank since that ballot did not include as an alternative the Commonwealth as we know it. García Padilla also claimed that if you consider that 470,000 chose to leave the second ballot blank, the votes for statehood, while officially reported as 61%, fall under the 50% mark (43.85%). Letter from Governor Alejandro García Padilla to President Barack Obama (Nov. 9, 2012); Pete Kasperowicz, Congress expected to ignore Puerto Rico s vote for statehood, THE HILL (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 8, 2012, available at (confirming that the 61 percent vote in favor of statehood is seen by some in Congress as a statistical fiction ). 74 Rafael Hernández Colón, A recent survey on voting for the President in the Commonwealth (II), CARIBBEAN BUSINESS (San Juan), Sept. 30, 2010, at Elie Wiesel, Remarks at the White House 7th Millennium Evening of The Perils of Indifference: Lessons Learned From a Violent Century (Apr. 12, 1999), available at 76 Louis Henkin describes the distinct phenomena of universalization and internationalization in international human rights law. He explains, Universalization has brought acceptance, at least in [moral] principle and rhetoric, of the concept of individual human rights by all societies and governments and is reflected in national constitutions and law. [On the other hand,] [i]nternationalization has brought agreement, at least in political-legal principle and in rhetoric, that individual human rights are of international concern and a proper subject for diplomacy, international institutions, and international law. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 17 (1990). 77 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 provides, Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.... (emphasis added).
17 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 167 one the basic tenets of international human rights law. 78 It follows that the right to equal political participation in a state s formal political processes has become an indispensable feature of this basic principle of popular sovereignty. 79 Similarly, this fundamental right of equal political participation is at the very essence of modern democratic regimes. 80 The right to vote is the political-legal manifestation of this basic principle of equal political participation in a constitutional democracy, such as the United States. Several important Supreme Court decisions acknowledge the unique and almost sacrosanct role of the right to vote in a democratic system. 81 Federal courts have been eager to protect the right to vote as a fundamental constitutional right because it is critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic process. 82 Furthermore, aggressive judicial review of this fundamental right responds to the needs of clearing the channels of political change and participating in the design and administration of [those] political institutions at the federal level. 83 The recognition of the right to vote and equal political participation in U.S. municipal law is inextricably linked to the principle of popular sovereignty in international human rights law. The relationship between U.S. municipal law and international human rights law results from the fact that the U.S. legal system incorporates international law into its jurisprudence. 84 Thus, because international law is part of U.S. municipal law, the fundamental right to vote and to equal political participation 78 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT L L. 866, 867 (1990) ( [B]y the end of the Second World War, popular sovereignty was firmly rooted as one of the fundamental postulates of political legitimacy. ). 79 See generally Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT L L. 539 (1992). 80 That the will of the people is to be the basis of the authority of government is as good a summary as any of the basic democratic idea. James Crawford, Democracy and the Body of International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (Gregory Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). 81 See e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (2004) ( [H]istory has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country. The right to vote freely for the candidate of one s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. ). 82 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105 (1980). 83 Id. at 82, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (citations omitted) ( For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations. ); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ( International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.... ).
18 168 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 enshrined in international human rights law binds the United States both domestically and internationally. The United States has in fact violated its international legal obligations towards the U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico by excluding them from participating in presidential elections. Even if the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant territorial citizens the power to elect the President, the United States must extend the federal franchise to all of its citizens in order to comply with international human rights law. 85 In order to do so, the United States must devise formal and legally feasible mechanisms that ensure substantive compliance with international human rights law. A. Declarations and Treaties in International Human Rights Law International human rights law is comprised of both international and regional instruments, whose enforcement mechanisms vary in terms of effectiveness. 86 These instruments include non-binding agreements, such as declarations and resolutions, and legally binding agreements, such as treaties or conventions. Declarations and resolutions are non-binding agreements that may describe aspirational principles and make recommendations regarding a specific issue that states agree to work towards. 87 Some provisions, however, may ripen into binding norms of customary international law if there is widespread state practice that corroborates the legal nature of the provision. 88 On the other hand, an international treaty creates binding law between the member-states. 89 Under the international legal norm of pacta sunt servanda, the parties must adhere to all treaty provisions in good faith. 90 Because treaty obligations are binding as a matter of international law, a State cannot invoke its municipal 85 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 46(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ( A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. ). 86 Regional human rights enforcement is more effective in some respects than global attempts, because regional treaties are more likely to reflect shared normative expectations, heightening compliance by member states. However, not all regional human rights treaties provide the same degree of protection of participatory rights as the European Convention: the standards contained in the African Charter, for example, are significantly weaker. Fox, supra note 79, at 561 n INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 36 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS]. 88 Id. at Vienna Convention, supra note 85, art. 26 ( Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. ). 90 Id.
19 2014] A SOLUTION TO PUERTO RICO S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 169 law to justify a breach of these obligations. 91 The following subsections discuss several non-binding and binding instruments that the United States has signed, which are relevant to Puerto Rico s disenfranchisement. 1. International and Regional Instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Inter-American Democratic Charter The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( UDHR ), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, recognized the importance of participatory rights in the design and management of the State s formal lawmaking processes. 92 The UDHR s formal expression of a right to vote and equal political participation triggered the emergence of popular sovereignty as an international legal norm. UDHR Article 21 provides: (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives; [and that] (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 93 It is true that the UDHR does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law. 94 Nevertheless, in light of the widespread state practice corroborating Article 21, it seems appropriate to claim that Article 21 s recognition of a right to vote and equal political participation has ripened into a binding norm of customary international law. 95 An example of a regional instrument acknowledging the importance of the right to vote and equal political participation is the Inter-American Democratic Charter ( IADC ), which was adopted in 2001 by the United States and thirty-four other members of the Organization of American 91 Id. art. 27 ( A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. ). 92 UDHR, supra note 13, art Id. (emphasis added). 94 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, (2004) (citing John P. Humphrey, The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 39, 50 (Evan Luard ed.1967)) (quoting Eleanor Roosevelt calling the Declaration a statement of principles... setting up a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations and not a treaty or international agreement... impos[ing] legal obligations ). 95 See infra Part III (B).
20 170 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:185 States. 96 The IADC contains several provisions that address this fundamental right. First, Article 3 provides: Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia... the holding of periodic, free and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people Furthermore, Article 6 provides: It is the right and responsibility of all citizens to participate in decisions relating to their own development. This is also a necessary condition for the full and effective exercise of democracy. 98 In conclusion, the IADC reaffirmed the region s commitment to the promotion and preservation of democracy, as well as the right to vote and equal participation of all citizens. 2. Binding Treaty Obligations: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( ICCPR or Covenant ) is one of the key pillars of international human rights law and the primary international legal instrument for civil and political rights. 99 As of March 2013, 167 states, including the United States, have ratified the Covenant, which entered into force on March 23, The ICCPR establishes the right to vote as a matter of international human rights law. 101 The ICCPR creates a binding obligation upon all parties to the treaty to comply with these provisions as a matter of international law. 102 Article 25 of the ICCPR, which recognizes the right to vote and equal political participation as a matter of international human rights law, provides: Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 96 Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States ( IADC ), 28th Spec. Sess., OAS Doc. OEA/ Ser. P/AG/RES.1 (XXVIII E/01) (OAS General Assembly) (Sept. 11, 2001). 97 Id. art Id. art. 6. (emphasis added). 99 ICCPR, supra note U.N. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, ch. IV, section 4, available at 4&chapter=4&lang=en. 101 Caroline Carter, The Right to Vote for Non-Resident Citizens: Considered Through the Example of East Timor, 46 TEX. INT L L.J. 655 (2011); see also Fox, supra note Protection of civil and political rights is a binding obligation from the time a state becomes party to that covenant.... INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 990 (Louis Henkin et al., eds., 1987).
Dear members of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources:
Testimony of Hon. Alejandro García-Padilla, Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and President of the Popular Democratic Party, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources August