Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/138/1014/473721/
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 13:56:04
Document Index: 532353338

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5845', '§ 5861', '§ 5845', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5845', '§ 5861', '§ 2', '§ 5845', '§ 5861', '§ 5845', '§ 2', '§ 5845', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5845', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3565']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Eric Carmouche, Defendant-appellant, 138 F.3d 1014 (5th Cir. 1998) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1998 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Eric Carmouche, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Eric Carmouche, Defendant-appellant, 138 F.3d 1014 (5th Cir. 1998)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 138 F.3d 1014 (5th Cir. 1998) April 14, 1998
Carmouche agreed to plead guilty to count 2, which alleged unlawful possession of a short barrel shotgun, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1) and (d) and in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Counts 1 and 3 were dismissed pursuant to Carmouche's plea agreement. Carmouche was sentenced using a base offense level of 18 because his offense involved a firearm defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) (5). The district court imposed a one-level increase because the offense involved three weapons, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) (1) (A), and a two-level increase because the offense involved a "destructive device," see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) (3). The district court also granted a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Thus, Carmouche was sentenced using a net base offense level of 18. On November 12, 1996, the district court entered judgment against Carmouche.
Six days later, on November 18, 1997, Carmouche filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Correct Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35(c) Fed. R. Crim. P. and for Evidentiary Hearing." Carmouche argued that the district court erred by: (1) imposing sentence for possession of a shotgun barrel, rather than a shotgun; (2) applying the 1995 version of the sentencing guidelines; (3) imposing a three-level adjustment for the possession of other firearms and explosive devices; and (4) refusing to depart downward. More than sixty days later, on January 22, 1997, the district court entered an order denying Carmouche's November 18 motion. The following day, Carmouche filed a notice appealing his sentence and the district court's January 22 order denying the November 18 motion to correct his sentence.
The threshold issue in this case, and one that is determinative of our jurisdiction, is whether Carmouche's November 18 motion to correct his sentence suspended the ten-day time period for filing an appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). We conclude that it did and that we therefore have jurisdiction to entertain Carmouche's appeal. See United States v. Moya, No. 94-10907, 66 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. July 25, 1995) (unpublished), and 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3.
Carmouche pleaded guilty to count 2, which charged possession of a short barrel shotgun, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1) and (d) and in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Carmouche was sentenced using sentencing guideline § 2K2.1, the guideline applicable when the firearm is one defined by § 5845(a). Carmouche argues on appeal that his conviction for violation of § 5861(d) is invalid because the detached barrel found at his house does not meet the technical definition given for a short barrel shotgun in 18 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1) and (d). As a result, Carmouche contends that the district court's application of guideline § 2K2.1(a) (5) was error.
By disputing the district court's decision that Carmouche's offense involved a § 5845(a) firearm, and the district court's subsequent reliance upon guideline § 2K2.1(a) (5), Carmouche hopes to reap the benefit of § 2K2.1(b) (2). Section 2K2.1(b) (2) specifies a total base offense level of six when the firearm is possessed solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection. The favorable offense level provided in § 2K2.1(b) (2) is made expressly unavailable when the offense involves a firearm defined in § 5845(a). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application note 10.
Carmouche's plea is supported by a sufficient factual basis. The parties' joint Rule 11(f) factual stipulation recites that the police found the shotgun and the shotgun barrel, which was "made to fit the shotgun" and was less than thirteen inches long, " [i]n close proximity." The PSR reports that Carmouche knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully possessed a shotgun with a barrel length of twelve and one-half inches. Carmouche received a three-level reduction in his base offense level because he accepted responsibility for the relevant conduct described in the PSR. Of equal importance, Carmouche pleaded guilty to the indictment as charged and has not formally challenged his plea, either in the district court or in this Court, where his notice of appeal is limited to sentencing issues. The district court did not err by applying § 2K2.1(a) (5), the guideline applicable to Carmouche's offense, or by refusing to apply § 2K2.1(b) (2) to reduce Carmouche's sentence.
The district court's application of the 1995 guidelines was not reversible error. Although the plea agreement recites that the 1993 guidelines will be used, not every breach of a plea agreement requires reversal. United States v. Hooten, 942 F.2d 878, 884 (5th Cir. 1991). The guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing are to be used unless application of the current guidelines would implicate the ex post facto clause. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11. Carmouche claims that the ex post facto clause is implicated here because § 2K2.1(b) (2), providing a base offense level of six when firearms are possessed for hunting or collection purposes, was deleted from the guidelines in 1994. Carmouche is incorrect. Section 2K2.1(b) (2) appears in identical form in both the 1993 and 1995 version of the guidelines. Indeed, an examination of the 1993 and 1995 versions of the guidelines yields the conclusion that the provisions are substantively identical for all purposes relevant to this appeal. There are, therefore, no ex post facto concerns requiring application of the 1993 guidelines. In addition, because Carmouche was not prejudiced by the district court's application of the 1995 guidelines, any error was also harmless.
The district court increased Carmouche's base offense level by two levels because the offense involved "destructive devices" seized from Carmouche's house. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) (3). The guidelines define destructive devices as including any of a variety of destructive or explosive items, and any firearm that will, or can be readily converted to, "expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant," or any combination of parts designed or intended for converting a device into a destructive device. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application note 4. On appeal, Carmouche argues that the district court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing to explore Carmouche's contention that the explosive devices seized from his home belonged to another person, who was storing the items at Carmouche's house.
A district court's refusal to grant a downward departure is not reviewable on appeal unless the refusal is a violation of law. United States v. Palmer, 122 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 1997). We have previously held that a refusal to depart violates the law when the district court's refusal is based upon the mistaken belief that the court is without authority to depart. Id. at 222. We have no jurisdiction, however, when the district court's refusal to depart is based upon the determination that departure is not warranted on the facts of the case. Id.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) provides that an appeal must be filed within ten days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). That time period can be suspended, however, by the timely filing of certain post-judgment motions within the time period allowed for the filing of a notice of appeal. FRAP 4(b) includes a list of rule-based motions that effectively suspend the ten-day time period for filing an appeal. Id. In addition to those rule-based motions listed in FRAP 4(b), the Supreme Court allows a common law "motion for reconsideration" to suspend the time period for filing an appeal in a criminal matter. E.g., United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78-82, 84 S. Ct. 553, 556-57, 11 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1964). The Healy doctrine is applied notwithstanding the absence of any statutory or rule-based authority for allowing the judicially created motion for reconsideration to have a suspensory effect. United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 7-9 & n. 3, 97 S. Ct. 18, 19-20 & n. 3, 50 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1976); Healy, 376 U.S. at 78-80, 84 S. Ct. at 556; United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1995), corrected without substantive change, 60 F.3d 1142 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1466 (5th Cir. 1992). Rather, Supreme Court decisions premise the Healy doctrine upon long-standing criminal practice and the judicial efficiency achieved by allowing the district court to correct possible errors prior to a time consuming and potentially unnecessary appeal. Dieter, 429 U.S. at 7-9, 97 S. Ct. at 19-20; Healy, 376 U.S. at 78-80, 84 S. Ct. at 556; Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1466-67.
Our Court has been "quite permissive about what qualifies as a 'motion for reconsideration.' " Id. at 1466. When making that determination, the suspensory effect of a particular motion does not depend upon the caption selected by the movant. E.g., Dieter, 429 U.S. at 7-8, 97 S. Ct. at 19 (" [i]t is true that the Government's post-judgment dismissal motion was not captioned a 'petition for rehearing,' but there can be no doubt that in purpose and effect it was precisely that"); Moya, No. 94-10907 at 3-4, 66 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. July 25, 1995) (construing criminal defendant's Rule 35(c) motion to be a motion for reconsideration); Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1465-66 (construing government's motion for resentencing to be a motion for reconsidera-tion). To the contrary, "any request, however phrased, that a district court reconsider a question decided in the case in order to effect an alteration of the rights adjudicated," should be construed as a motion for reconsideration. Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1465-66 (internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S. Ct. 4, 7, 116 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991); Dieter, 97 S. Ct. at 19-20, 429 U.S. at 7-9.
FRAP 4(b) was amended in 1993 to add a list of motions that are capable of having a suspensory effect on the ten-day time period for filing an appeal. My colleagues find significance in the fact that Carmouche's motion is not among those listed in FRAP 4(b). But our application of the Healy doctrine is not derived from or dependent upon any rule-based or statutory authority. Dieter, 429 U.S. at 9 n. 3, 97 S. Ct. at 19 n. 3; Healy, 376 U.S. at 78-80, 84 S. Ct. at 556; Brewer, 60 F.3d at 1144; Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1466. We have therefore held that the 1993 amendment to FRAP 4(b) does not prevent us from permitting a common law motion for reconsideration of a type not articulated in FRAP 4(b) to have a suspensory effect on the appellate time table. E.g., Brewer, 60 F.3d at 1143-44.
Neither is this the first time that our Court has applied the Healy doctrine to a criminal defendant's request for reconsideration of a sentencing decision. See Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1464-71. Even United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 1993), which my colleagues cite as guiding extra-circuit authority, begins its analysis with an inquiry to determine whether the defendant's motion, styled in that case as a "motion to correct sentence," is in substance a motion for reconsideration, or instead, a motion properly brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(c). Id. at 867-68. Relying upon the "numerical" nature of the error alleged, the Court construed the relief requested to be within the ambit of Rule 35(c). Id. at 868.
I have no problem concluding in this case that Carmouche's motion is, in subject and effect, a motion for reconsideration of the district court's sentencing decisions. Rule 35(c) is intended to redress technical or obvious sentencing error that is so clear that the case would "almost certainly be remanded" for correction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c) advisory committee note. Rule 35(c) is not an appropriate vehicle for requesting that the district court reconsider its application or interpretation of the sentencing guidelines. Id. (Rule 35(c) "is not intended to afford the court the opportunity to reconsider the application or interpretation of the sentencing guidelines or for the court simply to change its mind about the appropriateness of the sentence").
The district court's jurisdiction to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 35(c) ends seven days after judgment is entered. See United States v. Bridges, 116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lopez, 26 F.3d 512, 518-20 (5th Cir. 1994) (both holding that Rule 35(c)'s seven day time limit for action by the district court is jurisdictional). However, and although neither the government nor my colleagues raise this point, the district court's authority to correct an erroneous sentence is also limited by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Neither Rule 35(c) nor 18 U.S.C. § 3582 authorize the district court's order denying Carmouche's post-judgment sentencing motion. Thus it is clear that the district court lacked authority, and perhaps jurisdiction, to decide Carmouche's motion when it was denied on January 22.1
There is a distinction, however, between the district court's authority to either grant or deny Carmouche's motion, and our authority under the Healy doctrine to permit that motion a suspensory effect. My colleagues would follow the First Circuit's lead in Morillo by holding that the district court's authority to correct an erroneous sentence is necessarily coextensive with the suspensory effect given a motion for reconsideration of sentencing issues. My response is that we considered and rejected that precise contention in United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1992).
Greenwood grappled with the relationship between the district court's authority to grant the subject sentencing motion and this Court's application of the Healy doctrine. The Court expressly avoided deciding whether the district court had any "inherent" authority to correct a sentence, and held instead that simple application of the Healy doctrine rendered any inquiry into the extent of the district court's corrective powers unnecessary. Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1470-72. Thus, the Court recognized that the scope of the district court's corrective powers and the suspensory effect that Supreme Court authority permitted a common law motion for reconsideration are distinct. Id. As a result, Greenwood applied the Healy doctrine notwithstanding an apparently valid contention that the district court lacked continuing authority to grant or deny the motion that was permitted to have suspensory effect. Id. at 1470-71; United States v. Carr, 932 F.2d 67 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a timely motion for reconsideration suspends the time period for filing an appeal until the motion is decided, without regard to whether the district court retains authority to correct the sentence as requested).2
Neither am I persuaded that Greenwood is wrongly decided. My colleagues cite Ibarra for the proposition that the Court should adopt a "bright-line rule" that any motion filed under a Rule 35(c) caption is ineffective to suspend the time period for filing an appeal more than seven days past judgment. But the "bright-line" rule announced in Ibarra, and invoked in Greenwood, requires liberal construction of any post-judgment pleading that comes close to requesting reconsideration of a question decided in the case as a common law motion for reconsideration that is effective to suspend FRAP 4(b)'s time period. Ibarra, 502 U.S. at 6-7, 112 S. Ct. at 6-7; Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1466-67.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that when making that liberal construction, we are not bound by the caption selected by the parties, and should examine the substance of the motion filed to determine whether the relief requested fits within the framework of a common law motion for reconsideration. E.g., Dieter, 429 U.S. at 7-9, 97 S. Ct. at 19-20. Clearly, the Court is not free to condone an approach that would effectively circumvent Rule 35(c) by construing every Rule 35(c) motion to be a common law motion for reconsideration. But I fail to see how the language cited by my colleagues, which reads as a command to liberally construe post-judgment pleadings to achieve the judicial efficiency justifying the Healy doctrine, can be used as a sword to deny appellate review because counsel has selected the wrong caption for the motion.
Litigants have no control over when or if the district court will decide a pending post-judgment motion. The "bright-line" rule established by the Supreme Court accords a post-judgment motion suspensory effect whenever it requests reconsideration of a question decided at trial that will effect an alteration of the rights adjudicated. Ibarra, 502 U.S. at 6-7, 112 S. Ct. at 7; Dieter, 429 U.S. at 7-9, 97 S. Ct. at 19-20; Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1466-67. I do not agree that denying review in a criminal case because there is a debatable issue about whether the district court's jurisdiction may have expired before it decided a pending motion that would otherwise suspend the time for filing an appeal will serve to "protect" the interests of the parties. I would therefore adhere to the Court's holding in Greenwood.
While recognizing that we are bound by our unpublished decision in Moya, supra, we write separately to urge this Court to reconsider en banc Moya 's holding that a pending Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c) motion will postpone running of the Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) time period for filing a notice of appeal until the judge disposes of the motion. We believe Moya was incorrectly decided for the following reasons.
Moya held that a defendant's motion to correct his sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c) was "one of the species of motions for reconsideration" that prevent running of the ten-day 4(b) time period until disposition of the motion. Moya, No. 94-10907, at 4. The Moya panel recognized that a Rule 35(c) motion was not one of those listed in Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) as postponing commencement of the ten-day period. Id. at 3. Nevertheless, the panel included Moya's 35(c) motion within the class of "motions for reconsideration" which the jurisprudence has traditionally given suspensory effect. Id., citing United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1466 (5th Cir. 1992). Finally, the panel found that the rule in Greenwood had survived the 1993 amendment to Rule 4(b). Moya, No. 94-10907, at 4, citing United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1144 (5th Cir. 1995).
We believe the en banc Court should overrule Moya because it disregarded the language and implications of Rule 4(b), and because it overlooked the effect of the 1991 amendment to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 and Rule 35's accompanying Advisory Committee Notes. We also urge the en banc Court to clarify the effect of a timely-filed Rule 35(c) motion on the running of the 4(b) period, in order to give appellants a "bright-line" standard for determining when the ten-day limitation on filing a notice of appeal begins to run. See, e.g., United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 869 (1st Cir. 1993).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 was amended in 19911 to codify a district court's "inherent authority" to correct an erroneous sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c), advisory committee notes (1991 amendment). The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that, while the Committee wanted to explicitly recognize such authority, it also "believed that the time for correcting such errors should be narrowed within the time for appealing the sentence to reduce the likelihood of jurisdictional questions in the event of an appeal...." Id. To that end, the Committee
contemplat [ed] that the [district] court would enter an order correcting the sentence and that such order must be entered within the seven (7) day period so that the appellate process (if a timely appeal is taken) may proceed without delay and without jurisdictional confusion.
In light of new Rule 35(c), Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) was amended to read, in pertinent part:
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) (amendment eff. Dec. 1, 1993) and advisory committee notes (1993 amendment). Rule 4(b), as discussed above, does not list a Rule 35(c) motion as one that postpones running of the ten-day period for filing a notice of appeal.
Both of these statutory changes were in effect when Moya was decided in 1995. Nonetheless, Moya summarily decided that a defendant's Rule 35(c) motion to correct his sentence, based on an asserted error in imposing supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2), was a "motion for reconsideration" that effectively postponed running of the 4(b) period until disposition of the motion. Moya, No. 94-10907, at 3-4. The Moya panel did not mention the Advisory Committee Notes to amended Rule 35(c), nor did it consider the combined effect of amended Rule 35(c) and amended Rule 4(b), except to observe that the Greenwood rule survived the 1993 amendments to Rule 4(b).3 Id., at 4.
Although we recognize that amended Rules 4(b), 35(c) and their accompanying notes are subject to more than one interpretation, we believe that the most reasonable construction is the one given by the First Circuit in United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 867-70 (1st Cir. 1993). There the First Circuit, guided by the erudite pen of Judge Selya, held that:
Id. at 869. Morillo thus recognized two different aspects of the issue: first, that the Healy doctrine continued to apply to a Rule 35(c) motion, notwithstanding the absence of a 35(c) motion from the list of motions in Rule 4(b) that interrupt the ten-day appeal period;5 and second, that application of the Healy doctrine is, however, limited to the seven-day period imposed by amended Rule 35(c). After seven days, the 35(c) motion is deemed denied, even if still pending. Id.; see also United States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 1993). In our view, the First Circuit's approach rationally effects the Advisory Committee's desire to balance judicial efficiency with a concern that "the appellate process ... proceed without delay and without jurisdictional confusion." Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, advisory committee notes (1991 amendment).
To the extent that Moya can be interpreted as holding that all Rule 35(c) motions indefinitely postpone running of the 4(b) period (that is, until the court disposes of the motion), we would urge the en banc Court either to overrule the decision, or at least to clarify its holding. The Supreme Court itself has observed, in refusing to accord suspensory effect only to meritorious motions for reconsideration, that " [w]ithout a clear general rule litigants would be required to guess at their peril the date on which the time to appeal commences to run." United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S. Ct. 4, 6, 116 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991). For the same reason, we would decline to adopt Judge DeMoss's approach (see supra at 1018) that a court accord suspensory effect only to those 35(c) motions that are more appropriately styled common-law "motions for reconsideration." Such an approach, while it may find some support in case law antedating the amendments to Rules 4(b) and 35,6 would fail to accord to potential appellants (whom, after all, the "bright line" rule is here intended to protect) a sufficient yardstick by which to measure the time within which to file a notice of appeal.
Ibarra is consistent with this approach. In that case, the government appealed the district court's adverse ruling on a motion to suppress drugs. Ibarra, 502 U.S. at 3, 112 S. Ct. at 4-5. The government originally sought to justify the objectionable search on a theory of continuing consent, but abandoned that theory in subsequent pleadings. Id. The government attempted to revive the continuing consent theory in a timely filed motion for reconsideration. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that a motion for reconsideration premised upon a disavowed theory is ineffective to suspend the time period for filing an appeal. Id. at 5-6, 112 S. Ct. at 6. The Supreme Court rejected that analysis, holding that the likelihood of success on the merits is immaterial to the Healy doctrine's "bright-line" approach. Id. at 5-7, 112 S. Ct. at 6-7
We so recognized in United States v. Lopez, 26 F.3d 512, 518-19 (5th Cir. 1994), where we also cited Morillo with approval. See also United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1994)
See United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78-80, 84 S. Ct. 553, 555-57, 11 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1964). See also United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S. Ct. 4, 6-7, 116 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991); United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8, 97 S. Ct. 18, 19, 50 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1976) (per curiam); Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1470-71