Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/20081127532FSupp2d595_11080
Timestamp: 2014-08-02 02:46:48
Document Index: 197045839

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 59', '§ 59', '§ 59', 'art, 289', '§ 3153', '§ 1746', '§ 144', '§ 138', '§ 3551']

MORISSEAU v. DLA PIPER | Leagle.com Home
Citing Case MORISSEAU v. DLA PIPERNo. 06 Civ. 13255(LAK). 532 F.Supp.2d 595 (2008) Charlene MORISSEAU, Plaintiff,
January 23, 2008. Charlene Morisseau, e York City, Plaintiff Pro se.*Bettina B. Pleven, Edward Brill, Proskauer Rose LLP, New York City, for Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION
FootNotes* Plaintiff is a member of the New York Bar. She was represented by Other counsel from the inception of this action until April 9, 2007 (see. DI 169) and thus almost until the scheduled conclusion of the discovery period on May 25, 2007 (see DI 17). She subsequently was admitted pro hac vice and has prosecuted the case herself.1. DI 141,2. DI 149 at 6-10.3. Id. at 5-6, 9-14, 16, 18-19, 26-26.4. Id. at 6.5. 12 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.30[4], at 59-102 (3d ed.2007).6. Id. § 59.30[5][a].7. Id. § 59.30[4], at 59-102.8. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 3; Plevan Decl. (DI 114) (hereinafter "Plevan Decl.") Ex. 25, at P00412.9. Plevan Decl. Ex. 26. Mr. Bright's affidavit characterized her performance as "unsatisfactory in many respects. She could not work with other people. Her disagreements with her co-workers required that she be taken off one assignment and given another one in an attempt to find someone with whom she could work." Id. Ex. 27, at P04091. The Court, however, does not consider the affidavit for the truth of the matters asserted.10. Id. Ex. 25, at P00412, Mr. Bright's affidavit described the letter as making "reckless and false accusations against a number of people who worked at the Center," which were "directly refuted" by the witnesses she identified in the letter Id. Ex. 27, at P04091.11. Id. Ex. 25, at P00412.12. Morisseau v. Southern Ctr. for Human Rts., Inc., No, 06 Civ.2003 (WSD-AJB).13. Def. 56.1 Stir ¶ 4.14. Id. ¶ 5.15. Levine Decl. Ex. 1.16. E.g., Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of America, Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 746 (2d Cir. 1998); Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir.1997).17. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 95.18. Id. 597; see Morisseau Dep. 723:6-9; 725:14-19.19. Def. 56.1 St. 98; Morisseau Dep. 725:20-23.20. Plevan Decl. Ex. 28.21. Plevan Decl. ¶ 29'& Ex. 28.22. Morisseau Dep. 731:5-732:14; see also id. 735:19-736:7.23. Katz Dep. (Plevan Decl. Ex. 4) 66:7-19; see also Morisseau Dep. 747:7-22.24. Katz.Dep.66:16-23.25. Morisseau Dep. 751:13-22.26. Plevan Decl. Ex. 10.27. Def. 56.1 St. ¶¶ 118, 120; Plevan Decl. Ex. 11.28. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.29. Id. ¶ 13; Finnerty Decl. (DI 114) (hereinafter "Finnerty Decl.") ¶ 26 & Ex. 5, at D002766.30. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 14; Finnerty Decl. ¶ 26 & Ex. 5, at D002766.31. Def. 56.1 St. 415; Finnerty Decl. ¶ 26 & Ex. 5, at D002767.32. Def. 56.1 St. 16; Ochis Dep. (Plevan Decl. Ex. 6) 60:8-61:4.33. Ochis' version is contained in Exhibit 5 to the Finnerty declaration. The Court does not refer to it here, as it is unsworn. As will appear below, however, it, is admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of establishing the information known to Finnerty when he decided to terminate plaintiff's employment.34. Morisseau Dep (Plevan Decl. Ex. 2) 271:16-273:21.35. Id. 274:11-275:24; 278:8-15 (discussed nothing but Ochis in that conversation).36. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 18; Finnerty Decl. ¶ 26 & Ex. 5, at D002773.37. Morisseau Dep. 286:20-288:7.38. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 21.39. Id. 522; Morisseau Dep. 222:5-12.40. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 36.41. Id. ¶ 38.42. Id. ¶¶ 37, 39; Rappaport Dep. (Pleven Decl. Ex. 8) 43:13-44:18.43. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 40; Morisseau Dep. 552:7-554:24.44. Def. 56.1 St. ¶¶ 41-42.45. See Morisseau Dep. 536:12-539:9.46. Rappaport Dep. 158:6:25; see also Morisseau Dep. 565:2-24.47. Morisseau Dep. 567:14-568:5.48. Id. 568:6-19.49. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 46; see also Finnerty Decl. ¶ 23; Rappaport Dep. 163:6-18. Finnerty should not be confused with Joseph Finnerty, Jr. ("Finnerty Jr."), the former head of the New York office. Finnerty Decl. ¶ 3.50. Id. ¶ 48.51. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 66.52. Levine Decl. Ex. 4.53. Id.54. Id.55. Levine Dep. (Plevan Decl. Ex. 5) 120:5-121:3.56. Morisseau Dep. 232:23-233:6; 235:12-236:21; 760:20-761:14.57. Morisseau Dep. 975:10-985:11.58. Id. 983:9-18.59. Levine Dep. 173:23-175:3.60. Levine Decl. Ex. 7, at D000452-53.61. Id. at D000452.62. Id. at D000451.63. Id.64. Id. Plaintiff added: "I enjoy working with you Heidi and you know that. And I depend on you." Id.65. Levine Dep. 176:15-177:23.66. Morisseau Dep. 373:24-374:5; Levine Dep. 182:11-185:17.67. Levine Dep. 182:9-14.68. Id. 183:7-184:11.69. Id. 110:3-6.70. Id. 109:5-14.71. Id. 107:15-110:15.72. Id. 110:25-111:17.73. Id. 111:21-112:24; Finnerty Decl. ¶ 15.74. Levine Dep. 114:14-116:13; Finnerty Decl. ¶ 16.75. Finnerty Decl. ¶¶ 17-18.76. Id. ¶ 19.77. Morriseau Dep, 986:4-20.78. Levine's uncontradicted testimony that the Wyeth team meeting, at which plaintiff was present, began in the late morning and the fact that plaintiff's account of her meeting with Cannady does not refer to the Wyeth meeting suggest that the Cannady meeting occurred first.79. This of course was demonstrably untrue. Def. 56.1 St. ¶¶ 262-63. For example, plaintiff was recruited by Mr. Bynoe, an African-American partner based in Piper's Chicago office, id. ¶ 5, and spoke in her deposition of other minority associates. Indeed, as noted in the text, she asserted at the same meeting that "African Americans" were not "getting credit for their work on their performance reviews," something that would be very difficult to say if in fact there were no other African-Americans.80. Id. 987:24-991:2281. Id. 995:9-997:22.82. Id. 997:3-5; see also id. 992:5-7; 993:8-9.83. Id. 997:23-998:2.84. Levine Decl. Ex. 11, at D000987.85. Id.86. Id. at D9000986-87.87. Id. at D000986.88. Morisseau Dep. 499:4-19.89. Finnerty Decl. Exs. 4-5.90. Id. ¶ 21.91. Id. Ex. 4.92. Id. Ex. 5.93. Id. at D002/68-69.94. Finnerty Decl. ¶¶ 27-30 & Ex. 6.95. Finnerty. Decl. ¶¶ 31-35.96. Morisseau Dep. 910:2-9.97. Id. 653:21-654:24.98. Id. 656:9-21.99. Levine Decl. Ex. 17.100. Finnerty Decl. ¶ 35.101. Id. ¶ 38; Morisseau Dep. 707:18-710:10.102. Id, ¶ 38-39 & Ex. 9.103. Plevan Decl. Ex. 25, at P00412.104. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 192.105. Am Cpt ¶¶ 33, 65-83, 121-24.106. Id. ¶¶ 78-79.107. The affidavit is in, the record. Plevan Decl. EA. 27.108. Id. at P04041-92.109. Id. at P00415.110. Id. at P00415-16.111. Id. at P00417.
The report appears to be admissible under FED.R.Evm. 803(8), but it is unnecessary to decide this question.112. Plevan peel. Ex, 25, at P00414.
At her deposition, plaintiff was asked the basis for the allegation that the firm discouraged its personnel from supporting her application. Her response makes clear that the allegation is based entirely on inadmissible hearsay and, in one case, a memorandum that quite plainly does not support her position. Moriseeau Dep. 124:3-129:12. The memorandum reads, in relevant part: "Recently, Charlene has been contacting people at the firm to discuss an investigation the firm is conducting regarding certain charges made by her against the firm. If your assistance is needed in the investigation, I will let you know. If you have beep or are contacted by Charlene or somebody on her behalf, let me know about that, It is up to you whether or not you talk to her." Plevan Decl. Ex. 18 (emphasis added).113. Def. 56.1 St. 11216; Plevan Decl. Ex. 24. The subcommittee report confirmed that this "extinguishe[d]" any claim by Piper that plaintiff engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Plevan Decl. Ex. 25, at P00414.114. Morisseau Dep. 10:6. In a statement submitted in a state court matter, plaintiff stated under penalties of perjury that "the members of the Second Department Committees on Character and Fitness (a.k.a. Ninth Judicial Grievance Committee); the Office of Committees on Character and Fitness; the Office of the Chief Clerk, James Pelzer, and the judges of the Appellate Division, Second Department . . ., attempted to deny [her] admission as a practicing attorney in New York State." DI 52, Ex. A, first unnumbered page, ¶ 4.115. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).116. See id.117. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).118. Plaintiff of course submitted no papers in opposition to the summary judgment motion and so did not there claim that she suffered any other adverse employment action during her tenure at Piper. Nor do her present papers make any such assertion. Accordingly, there is no occasion to consider any disparate treatment claim other than the contention that plaintiff was fired on account of her race.119. In seeking relief under Rule 59(e), plaintiff argues that the Court erred on the summary judgment motion by holding her to a more stringent standard of qualification than was warranted. DI 149, at 6-10. As the previous decision makes clear, however, the Court did no such thing. While it recognized that it that plaintiff's failure to perform in a satisfactory manner "arguably" could be fatal to her prima facie case in the McDonnell Douglas sense of that term, it did not so hold. It instead assumed the existence of a prima facie case, but nevertheless concluded that "Where [wa]s no basis from which any reasonable jury could find that race played a factor in the decision to terminate plaintiff, as there [wa]s no evidence to support the notion that plaintiff's difficulties were race-related." Morisseau v. DLA Piper, 2007 WL 4292030, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007).120. To be sure, plaintiff's deposition is filled with her personal opinions and speculation that various individuals acted out of discriminatory motives and that minority associates were treated less favorably than others. But the Court has found no instance in which there is any admissible evidence — that is, testimony by plaintiff based on personal knowledge as opposed to conjecture, opinion or hearsay — to support any of this.
A good example, though it is not germane to the claim of discriminatory termination, is plaintiff's testimony that Katz's performance review was discriminatory. The only evidence to back up that charge is this: "Q. You believe that Aaron Katz discriminated against you? A. Yes, I do. Q. What makes you believe that? A. I believe his, reviews of the — performance reviews were discriminatory. I think he took credit for my work, parceled out credit for my work to the associates he wanted to promote." Morisseau Dep. 717:9-17. Needless to say, plaintiff's beliefs in this regard, which so far as the record discloses are not even based on personal knowledge, would not be admissible even if relevant.121. DI 149, at 11 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion)).122. Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 60-61 (2d Cir.1997). Accord, e.g., Sista v. CDC Ixis North Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 173-74 (2d Cir.2006).123. Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Title VII case).124. See Slattery v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.2001) (Title VII retaliation claims are analyzed under McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis).125. Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Group, 478 F.3d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir.2007) (collecting cases).126. Gordon v. New. York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir.2000).127. Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir.2001); Pellegrino v. County of Orange, 313 F.Supp.2d 303, 315 (S.D.N.Y.2004).128. As will appear, that is not the case as against all of the individual defendants.129. Of course, it is unnecessary, for an employer to establish that its proffered non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action was reasonable, as the civil rights laws do not alter an employer's freedom to make employment decisions for any reason as long as it does not do so on the basis of race and other proscribed employee characteristics. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.1993); Gobin v, New York City Health & Hosps. Coto., No. 04 Civ. 3207(WHP), 2006 WL 2038621, *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006). That Piper had sensible reasons for firing plaintiff, reasons as to Which the plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, however, is pertinent at step three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis because it is evidence that a discriminatory motive played no part in' its decision. Dister v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988).130. Finnerty Decl. ¶ 7.131. Morisseau Dep. 621:15-622:9; 997:23-998:2; Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 140.132. Gordon, 232 F.3d at 117; see also Murray v. Visiting Nurse Services of N.Y., 528 F.Supp.2d 257, 271-72, 2007 WI, 3254908, *11 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (collecting cases); Campbell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 1421(KMK), 2006 WL 839001, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006).133. E.g., Annett v. Univ. of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (10th Cir.2004); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 n. 5 (8th Cir.1998); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir.1997); Murray v. Visiting Nurse Servs. of N.Y., 528 F.Supp.2d 257, 277 n. 14, 2007 WL 3254908, at *15 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y.2007); Brown v. Pension Boards, 488 F.Supp.2d 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y.2007); Simpson v. New York State Dept. of Civ. Serv., No. 02-cv-1216, 2005 WL 545349, at *21 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2005); Pellegrino v. County of, Orange, 313 F.Supp.2d 303, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y.2004); Bombero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 142 F.Supp.2d 196, 210 (D.Conn.2000); see Ofoedu v. St. Francis Hosp. and Med. Ctr., No. 3:04 CV 1707(PCD), 2006 WL 264241,5, at *25 (D.Conn. Sept. 13, 2006).134. Def. 56.1 St. ¶ 46; see also Finnerty Decl. ¶ 23 Rappaport Dep. 163:6-18.135. Levine DeP. 109:5-110:6; see also. Finnerty bed. ¶ 13.136. Slattery, 248 F.3d 87.137. Id. at 95.138. It perhaps is well to emphasize that the Court in so holding does not rely on the Price Waterhouse defense, viz. that an employer that takes an adverse employment action against an employee in whole or in part for an improper reason nevertheless may avoid liability by proving that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the improper motive. See Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 161 (2nd Cir. 2001). Here, there is no evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, so plaintiff's case fails at step "three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. There is no need to consider whether Piper would have made the same decision in the absence of a retaliatory motive, as the evidence is insufficient to permit the conclusion that a retaliatory motive was present.
It should be noted in this regard that the 1991 amendments to Title VII do not affect this conclusion. While they limited the Price Waterhouse defense to the extent of foreclosing only damage awards, but not attorneys' fees, against employers in disparate treatment cases, they do not apply to retaliation claims. Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir.2000).139. There is no direct evidence of retaliatory motive for any of Piper's actions with respect to the plaintiff's bar admission.140. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (citing with approval decision holding three month interval too long to permit inference).141. Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Ext. of Schenectady Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001).142. E.g., Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir.1990) (3 months too long); Garrett v. Garden City Hotel, Inc., No. 05-CV-0962 (JFB), 2007 WL 1174891, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007) (more than 2 months too long) (collecting cases); Diaz v. Weill Med. Ctr. of Cornell Univ., No. 02 Civ. 7380(AJP), 2004 WL 285947, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2004) (6 months too long); Ashok v. Barnhart, 289 F.Supp.2d 305, 314 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (more than several months too long); Sussle v. Sirina Protection Sys. Corp., 269 F.Supp.2d 285, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (4 months or even less too long); Nicastro v. Runyon, 60 F.Supp.2d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (collecting cases to show that "claims of retaliation are routinely dismissed when as few as three months elapse between the protected EEO activity and the alleged act of retaliation."); Castro v. Local 1199, Nat'l Health & Human Servs. Employees Union, 964 F.Supp. 719, 728 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (one year too long).143. See Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 243 (2d Cir.2004); Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 143 n. 5 (2d Cir.2003).144. N.Y. State Teamsters Conf. Pension & Retirement Fund v. Express Servs., Inc., 426 F.3d 640, 648-49 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001)).145. Albrechtsen v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941, 123 S.Ct. 2606, 156 L.Ed.2d 626 (2003) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991) (per curiam)).146. Local Rule 56.1 is within the Court's authority in this respect. See N.Y. State Teamsters Conf., 426 F.3d at 648-49 (stating that "district courts have the authority to institute local rules governing summary judgment submissions" and upholding strict application of local rule deeming admitted facts uncontroverted by statements of opposing party supported by specific citations to record evidence allegedly raising factual issue); 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 3153, at 516-35 (1997).147. Plaintiff does not contend that there is anything in the entire record that bears on her post-employment termination and breach of contract claims save what was submitted on the summary judgment motion.148. DI 149, at 5 (referring to DI 56).149. Id. (referring to DI 63).150. Id. (referring to DI 65).151. DI 56, Ex. E.152. DI 149, at 11-12, 18-19 (referring to Brill Decl. (DI 63) Exs. 2-6).153. DI 149, at 11, 17-18 (referring to DI "63:5, pp. 3-4" and DI "63;6, p. 3," which in fact is Brill Decl. (DI 63) Ex. 5, at 6-7).
The Court assumes without deciding that both the memorandum and Ms. Cannady's statements would have been admissible over hearsay objection under FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).154. Brill Decl. (DI 63) Ex. 5, at 6-7.155. DI 149, at 12 (referring to Brill Decl. (DI 63) Ex. 6).156. Id. (referring to Brill Decl. (DI 63) Ex. 6, at D001361).157. DI 149, at 18-19.158. DI 65.
DI 65 contains also, as Exhibits B and C, copies of a letter from the firm's counsel to the EEOC and plaintiff's evaluation of April 2004, respectively.159. DI 65, Ex. A, at D002745-47.160. Id. at D002751161. Id. at D002901-03.162. Id. at D002904.163. An e-mail created within a business entity does not, for that reason alone, satisfy the business records exception of the hearsay rule, FED.R.Evm 803(6). See United States v. Stein, No. Si 05 Crim. 0888(LAK), 2007 WL 3009656, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007).164. "[T]he proponent of an admission by a party opponent must establish the declarant's competence; office or plant gossip does not become admissible simply because it is put into the mouth of someone whose statements are not subject to hearsay objection." Thomas v. Stone Container Corp., 922 F.Supp. 950, 957 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am.Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 816-17 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 984, 79 L.Ed.2d 220 (1984)i.165. DI 65, Ex. A, at D002753-54.166. DI 149, at 12.167. See Morisseau Dep. 373:2-15.168. DI 149, at 12.169. Morissseau Dep. 987:24-998:12.170. DI 150-51.171. DI 152.172. DI 151 ¶¶ 5-6 & Ex. A.173. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4-5.174. Id. 5, 7.175. DI 153.
The document in fact was not a declaration because it did not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746.176. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff first alleged a connection between Piper and New Perimeter in her deposition. See Morisseau Dep. 953:10-24.177. DI 153 at 3-4.178. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455.179. As the Supreme Court said in Liteky, "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a " valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994).
It should be noted also that the determination of whether such an affidavit is timely and legally sufficient is made by the judge whose recusal is sought. See., e.g., Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 32, 36, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921); LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Nat'l Auto Brokers Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072, 99 S.Ct. 844, 59 L.Ed.2d 38 (1979)) ("`a judge has an affirmative duty to inquire into the legal sufficiency of such an affidavit and not to disqualify himself unnecessarily . . . '").180. See, e.g., Apple v. Jewish Hosp. and Medical Center, 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir.1987) ("It is well-settled that a party must raise its claim of a district court's disqualification at the earliest possible moment after obtaining knowledge of facts demonstrating the basis for such a claim."); Lamborn v. Dittmer, 726 F.Supp. 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (same); Cranston v. Freeman, 290 F.Supp. 785, 816 (N.D.N.Y.1968) (Section 144 motion untimely when brought after commencement of trial), rev'd on other grounds, 428 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1970).
The ten day rule stated in the statute no longer is applied literally, as 28 U.S.C. § 138 abolished terms of court. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3551 (2007).181. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.1992)).
"Where a case, by contrast, involves remote, contingent, indirect or speculative interests, disqualification is not required." Id.182. Apple, 829 F.2d at 333. Accord, e.g., United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 639 (2d Cir.1995).183. Her argument that there was circumstantial evidence of breach of contract (DI 149, at 34-35) would be quite beside the point, even if it were correct. The relief sought for the alleged breach of contract is damages for lost wages and benefits and emotional distress. Am Cpt 139. As the Court noted, plaintiff has been precluded from offering evidence of any economic-injury as a sanction for her refusal to comply with a court order requiring production of documents, thus foreclosing recovery of lost wages and benefits. Absent circumstances not present here, damages for emotional distress are not available for breach of contract. E.g., Wehringer v. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co., 57 N.Y.2d 757, 759, 454 N.Y.S.2d 984, 440 N.E.2d 1331 (1982); Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 293 A.D.2d 598, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100 (2d Dept. 2002). Thus, plaintiff could not establish damages even if there had been a breach of contract. As damages are an element of a claim for breach of contract, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA) Inc., 341 F.Supp.2d 258, 270-71(S.D.N.Y.2004), plaintiff's contract claim necessarily fails. Comment