Source: https://toc.123doc.org/document/970369-hunt-v-washington-apple-advertising-commission.htm
Timestamp: 2017-10-17 20:44:59
Document Index: 724180657

Matched Legal Cases: ['§441', '§203', '§441', '§434', '§100', '§100', '§441', '§441', '§437', '§441', '§201', '§441', '§441', '§441', '§441', '§527', '§527', '§441', '§431', '§441']

Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission - Tài liệu text
variety and grade. [Compliance] with North Carolina’s unique regulation would have required
Washington growers to obliterate the printed labels on containers shipped to North Carolina, thus giving
their product a damaged appearance. Alternatively, they could have changed their marketing practices to
accommodate the needs of the North Carolina market, i.e., repack apples to be shipped to North Carolina
in containers bearing only the USDA grade, and/or store the estimated portion of the harvest destined for
that market in such special containers. As a last resort, they could discontinue the use of the preprinted
containers entirely. None of these costly and less efficient options was very attractive to the industry.
Moreover, in the event a number of other States followed North Carolina’s lead, the resultant inability to
display the Washington grades could force the Washington growers to abandon the State’s expensive
inspection and grading system which their customers had come to know and rely on over the 60-odd
years of its existence.…
Unsuccessful in its attempts to secure administrative relief [with North Carolina], the Commission
instituted this action challenging the constitutionality of the statute. [The] District Court found that the
North Carolina statute, while neutral on its face, actually discriminated against Washington State growers
and dealers in favor of their local counterparts [and] concluded that this discrimination [was] not justified
by the asserted local interest—the elimination of deception and confusion from the marketplace—arguably
furthered by the [statute].
[North Carolina] maintains that [the] burdens on the interstate sale of Washington apples were far
outweighed by the local benefits flowing from what they contend was a valid exercise of North Carolina’s
[police powers]. Prior to the statute’s enactment,…apples from 13 different States were shipped into North
Carolina for sale. Seven of those States, including [Washington], had their own grading systems which,
while differing in their standards, used similar descriptive labels (e.g., fancy, extra fancy, etc.). This
multiplicity of inconsistent state grades [posed] dangers of deception and confusion not only in the North
Carolina market, but in the Nation as a whole. The North Carolina statute, appellants claim, was enacted
to eliminate this source of deception and confusion. [Moreover], it is contended that North Carolina
sought to accomplish this goal of uniformity in an evenhanded manner as evidenced by the fact that its
statute applies to all apples sold in closed containers in the State without regard to their point of origin.
[As] the appellants properly point out, not every exercise of state authority imposing some burden on the
free flow of commerce is invalid, [especially] when the State acts to protect its citizenry in matters
pertaining to the sale of foodstuffs. By the same token, however, a finding that state legislation furthers
matters of legitimate local concern, even in the health and consumer protection areas, does not end the
inquiry. Rather, when such state legislation comes into conflict with the Commerce Clause’s overriding
requirement of a national “common market,” we are confronted with the task of effecting an
accommodation of the competing national and local interests. We turn to that task.
As the District Court correctly found, the challenged statute has the practical effect of not only burdening
interstate sales of Washington apples, but also discriminating against them. This discrimination takes
various forms. The first, and most obvious, is the statute’s consequence of raising the costs of doing
business in the North Carolina market for Washington apple growers and dealers, while leaving those of
their North Carolina counterparts unaffected. [This] disparate effect results from the fact that North
Carolina apple producers, unlike their Washington competitors, were not forced to alter their marketing
practices in order to comply with the statute. They were still free to market their wares under the USDA
grade or none at all as they had done prior to the statute’s enactment. Obviously, the increased costs
imposed by the statute would tend to shield the local apple industry from the competition of Washington
apple growers and dealers who are already at a competitive disadvantage because of their great distance
from the North Carolina market.
Second, the statute has the effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry the competitive
and economic advantages it has earned for itself through its expensive inspection and grading system. The
record demonstrates that the Washington apple-grading system has gained nationwide acceptance in the
apple trade. [The record] contains numerous affidavits [stating a] preference [for] apples graded under
the Washington, as opposed to the USDA, system because of the former’s greater consistency, its
emphasis on color, and its supporting mandatory inspections. Once again, the statute had no similar
impact on the North Carolina apple industry and thus operated to its benefit.
Third, by prohibiting Washington growers and dealers from marketing apples under their State’s grades,
the statute has a leveling effect which insidiously operates to the advantage of local apple producers.
[With] free market forces at work, Washington sellers would normally enjoy a distinct market advantage
vis-à-vis local producers in those categories where the Washington grade is superior. However, because of
the statute’s operation, Washington apples which would otherwise qualify for and be sold under the
superior Washington grades will now have to be marketed under their inferior USDA counterparts. Such
“downgrading” offers the North Carolina apple industry the very sort of protection against competing outof-state products that the Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit. At worst, it will have the effect of an
embargo against those Washington apples in the superior grades as Washington dealers withhold them
from the North Carolina market. At best, it will deprive Washington sellers of the market premium that
such apples would otherwise command.
Despite the statute’s facial neutrality, the Commission suggests that its discriminatory impact on
interstate commerce was not an unintended by-product, and there are some indications in the record to
that effect. The most glaring is the response of the North Carolina Agriculture Commissioner to the
Commission’s request for an exemption following the statute’s passage in which he indicated that before
he could support such an exemption, he would “want to have the sentiment from our apple
producers since they were mainly responsible for this legislation being passed.” [Moreover], we find it
somewhat suspect that North Carolina singled out only closed containers of apples, the very means by
which apples are transported in commerce, to effectuate the statute’s ostensible consumer protection
purpose when apples are not generally sold at retail in their shipping containers. However, we need not
ascribe an economic protection motive to the North Carolina Legislature to resolve this case; we conclude
that the challenged statute cannot stand insofar as it prohibits the display of Washington State grades
even if enacted for the declared purpose of protecting consumers from deception and fraud in the
Finally, we note that any potential for confusion and deception created by the Washington grades was not
of the type that led to the statute’s enactment. Since Washington grades are in all cases equal or superior
to their USDA counterparts, they could only “deceive” or “confuse” a consumer to his benefit, hardly a
In addition, it appears that nondiscriminatory alternatives to the outright ban of Washington State grades
are readily available. For example, North Carolina could effectuate its goal by permitting out-of-state
growers to utilize state grades only if they also marked their shipments with the applicable USDA label. In
that case, the USDA grade would serve as a benchmark against which the consumer could evaluate the
quality of the various state grades.…
Was the North Carolina law discriminatory on its face? Was it, possibly, an undue burden on interstate
commerce? Why wouldn’t it be?
What evidence was there of discriminatory intent behind the North Carolina law? Did that evidence
even matter? Why or why not?
Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make
independent expenditures for speech defined as an “electioneering communication” or for speech
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U.S.C. §441b. Limits on electioneering
communications were upheld in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 203–209 (2003).
The holding of McConnell rested to a large extent on an earlier case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).Austin had held that political speech may be banned based on the
speaker’s corporate identity.
In this case we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell. It has been noted that
“Austin was a significant departure from ancient First Amendment principles,” Federal Election Comm’n
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 490 (2007) (WRTL) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). We agree with that conclusion and hold that stare decisis does not compel the
continued acceptance of Austin. The Government may regulate corporate political speech through
disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether. We turn to the
case now before us.
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation. It has an annual budget of about $12 million. Most of its funds
are from donations by individuals; but, in addition, it accepts a small portion of its funds from for-profit
In January 2008, Citizens United released a film entitled Hillary: The Movie. We refer to the film
as Hillary. It is a 90-minute documentary about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate in the
Democratic Party’s 2008 Presidential primary elections. Hillary mentions Senator Clinton by name and
depicts interviews with political commentators and other persons, most of them quite critical of Senator
In December 2007, a cable company offered, for a payment of $1.2 million, to make Hillary available on a
video-on-demand channel called “Elections ’08.”…Citizens United was prepared to pay for the video-ondemand; and to promote the film; it produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad for Hillary. Each
ad includes a short (and, in our view, pejorative) statement about Senator Clinton, followed by the name
of the movie and the movie’s Website address. Citizens United desired to promote the video-on-demand
offering by running advertisements on broadcast and cable television.
Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal law prohibited—and still does
prohibit—corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to
candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate,
through any form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections.…BCRA §203 amended
§441b to prohibit any “electioneering communication” as well. An electioneering communication is
defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate
for Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. §434(f) (3)
(A). The Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) regulations further define an electioneering
communication as a communication that is “publicly distributed.” 11 CFR §100.29(a) (2) (2009). “In the
case of a candidate for nomination for President…publicly distributed means” that the communication
“[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a State where a primary election…is being held within 30
days.” 11 CFR §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions are barred from using their general treasury
funds for express advocacy or electioneering communications. They may establish, however, a “separate
segregated fund” (known as a political action committee, or PAC) for these purposes. 2 U.S.C. §441b (b)
(2). The moneys received by the segregated fund are limited to donations from stockholders and
employees of the corporation or, in the case of unions, members of the union. Ibid.
Citizens United wanted to make Hillary available through video-on-demand within 30 days of the 2008
primary elections. It feared, however, that both the film and the ads would be covered by §441b’s ban on
corporate-funded independent expenditures, thus subjecting the corporation to civil and criminal
penalties under §437g. In December 2007, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
the FEC. It argued that (1) §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary; and (2) BCRA’s disclaimer and
disclosure requirements, BCRA §§201 and 311, are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and to the three
ads for the movie.
The District Court denied Citizens United’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and then granted the
FEC’s motion for summary judgment.
The court held that §441b was facially constitutional under McConnell, and that §441b was constitutional
as applied to Hillary because it was “susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the electorate
that Senator Clinton is unfit for office, that the United States would be a dangerous place in a President
Hillary Clinton world, and that viewers should vote against her.” 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 279. The court also
rejected Citizens United’s challenge to BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements. It noted that “the
Supreme Court has written approvingly of disclosure provisions triggered by political speech even though
the speech itself was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.” Id. at 281.
[Omitted: the court considers whether it is possible to reject the BCRA without declaring certain
provisions unconstitutional. The court concludes it cannot find a basis to reject the BCRA that does not
involve constitutional issues.]
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.”
Laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in the speech process…The law
before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions. Section 441b makes it a felony for all
corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or
defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election
and 60 days of a general election. Thus, the following acts would all be felonies under §441b: The Sierra
Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 days before the general election, that exhorts the public to
disapprove of a Congressman who favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association
publishes a book urging the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent U.S. Senator supports
a handgun ban; and the American Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for a
Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of free speech. These prohibitions are classic
examples of censorship.
Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation
can still speak. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to
extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the
treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, preserve
receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this information within
And that is just the beginning. PACs must file detailed monthly reports with the FEC, which are due at
different times depending on the type of election that is about to occur.…
PACs have to comply with these regulations just to speak. This might explain why fewer than 2,000 of the
millions of corporations in this country have PACs. PACs, furthermore, must exist before they can speak.
Given the onerous restrictions, a corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to make its views
known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign.
Section 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As a
“restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a
campaign,” that statute “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. “Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 at 19 (1976)…
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the
people. See Buckley, supra, at 14–15 (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.”) The right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened selfgovernment and a necessary means to protect it. The First Amendment “‘has its fullest and most urgent
application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or
inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,” which requires the
Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.”
The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations. This protection has
been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech. Under the rationale of these
precedents, political speech does not lose First Amendment protection “simply because its source is a
corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 784. The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply
The purpose and effect of this law is to prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations,
from presenting both facts and opinions to the public. This makes Austin’s anti-distortion rationale all the
more an aberration. “[T]he First Amendment protects the right of corporations to petition legislative and
administrative bodies.” Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 792, n. 31.…
Even if §441b’s expenditure ban were constitutional, wealthy corporations could still lobby elected
officials, although smaller corporations may not have the resources to do so. And wealthy individuals and
unincorporated associations can spend unlimited amounts on independent expenditures. See, e.g., WRTL,
551 U.S., at 503–504 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“In the 2004 election cycle, a mere 24 individuals contributed
an astounding total of $142 million to [26 U.S.C. §527 organizations]”). Yet certain disfavored
associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the
same political speech.
When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a person
may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to
control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.
What we have said also shows the invalidity of other arguments made by the Government. For the most
part relinquishing the anti-distortion rationale, the Government falls back on the argument that corporate
political speech can be banned in order to prevent corruption or its appearance.…
When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due deference; but Congress may
not choose an unconstitutional remedy. If elected officials succumb to improper influences from
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put expediency before
principle, then surely there is cause for concern. We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to
dispel either the appearance or the reality of these influences. The remedies enacted by law, however,
must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is
the governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical pre-election period is
not a permissible remedy. Here Congress has created categorical bans on speech that are asymmetrical to
preventing quid pro quo-corruption.
Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it
puts us on a course that is sure error. “Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to
adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at
stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.” [citing prior cases]
These considerations counsel in favor of rejecting Austin, which itself contravened this Court’s earlier
precedents in Buckley and Bellotti. “This Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the
First Amendment.”WRTL, 551 U.S., at 500 (opinion of Scalia, J.). “[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy
and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 at
119 (1940).
Austin is undermined by experience since its announcement. Political speech is so ingrained in our
culture that speakers find ways to circumvent campaign finance laws. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S., at
176–177 (“Given BCRA’s tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives…to
exploit [26 U.S.C. §527] organizations will only increase”). Our Nation’s speech dynamic is changing, and
informative voices should not have to circumvent onerous restrictions to exercise their First Amendment
rights. Speakers have become adept at presenting citizens with sound bites, talking points, and scripted
messages that dominate the 24-hour news cycle. Corporations, like individuals, do not have monolithic
views. On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to
point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected officials.
Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—
counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.
Today, 30-second television ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message. Soon,
however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web sites, will provide
citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues. Yet, §441b would seem to ban a
blog post expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate if that blog were created with
corporate funds. The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions
based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.
Due consideration leads to this conclusion: Austin should be and now is overruled. We return to the
principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech on
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.
When word concerning the plot of the movie Mr. Smith Goes to Washington reached the circles of
Government, some officials sought, by persuasion, to discourage its distribution. See Smoodin,
“Compulsory” Viewing for Every Citizen: Mr. Smith and the Rhetoric of Reception, 35 Cinema Journal 3,
19, and n. 52 (Winter 1996) (citing Mr. Smith Riles Washington, Time, Oct. 30, 1939, p. 49); Nugent,
Capra’s Capitol Offense, N. Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1939, p. X5. Under Austin, though, officials could have done
more than discourage its distribution—they could have banned the film. After all, it, like Hillary, was
speech funded by a corporation that was critical of Members of Congress. Mr. Smith Goes to
Washington may be fiction and caricature; but fiction and caricature can be a powerful force.
Modern day movies, television comedies, or skits on YouTube.com might portray public officials or public
policies in unflattering ways. Yet if a covered transmission during the blackout period creates the
background for candidate endorsement or opposition, a felony occurs solely because a corporation, other
than an exempt media corporation, has made the “purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value” in order to engage in political speech. 2 U.S.C. §431(9) (A)
(i). Speech would be suppressed in the realm where its necessity is most evident: in the public dialogue
preceding a real election. Governments are often hostile to speech, but under our law and our tradition it
seems stranger than fiction for our Government to make this political speech a crime. Yet this is the
statute’s purpose and design.
Some members of the public might consider Hillary to be insightful and instructive; some might find it to
be neither high art nor a fair discussion on how to set the Nation’s course; still others simply might
suspend judgment on these points but decide to think more about issues and candidates. Those choices
and assessments, however, are not for the Government to make. “The First Amendment underwrites the
freedom to experiment and to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use new
forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the people, and the
Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct it.” McConnell, supra, at 341 (opinion of
Kennedy, J.).
The judgment of the District Court is reversed with respect to the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. §441b’s
restrictions on corporate independent expenditures. The case is remanded for further proceedings
What does the case say about disclosure? Corporations have a right of free speech under the First
Amendment and may exercise that right through unrestricted contributions of money to political
parties and candidates. Can the government condition that right by requiring that the parties and
candidates disclose to the public the amount and origin of the contribution? What would justify such a
disclosure requirement?
Are a corporation’s contributions to political parties and candidates tax deductible as a business
expense? Should they be?