Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98473/united-states-vs-bryan
Timestamp: 2019-06-25 10:36:38
Document Index: 151746172

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 859', '§ 102', '§ 859', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 860', '§ 859', '§ 859', '§ 859', '§ 860', '§ 859', '§ 859', '§ 102', '§ 7', '§ 25', '§ 859', '§ 102', '§ 3486']

United States Vs Bryan - Citation 98473 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Bryan - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98473
Case Number 339 U.S. 323
united states v. bryan - 339 u.s. 323 (1950) u.s. supreme court united states v. bryan, 339 u.s. 323 (1950) united states v. bryan no. 99 argued december 15, 1949 decided may 8, 1950 339 u.s. 323 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit syllabus respondent was the executive secretary, and had custody of the records, of an association which was under investigation by the committee on un-american activities of the house of representatives. the committee issued and served upon respondent a subpoena directing her to produce before the committee at a stated time, specified records of the association. respondent appeared before the committee, but refused to produce the records.....
United States v. Bryan - 339 U.S. 323 (1950)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950)
1. The presence of a quorum of the Committee at the time of the return to the subpoena was not an essential element of the offense ( Christoffel v. United States, 338 U. S. 84 , distinguished), and, when the Government introduced evidence that respondent had been validly served with a lawful subpoena directing her to produce records within her custody and control and that, on the return day, she intentionally failed to comply, it made out a prima facie case of willful default. Pp. 339 U. S. 327 -330.
2. The defense of lack of a quorum was not available to respondent under the circumstances of this case. Pp. 339 U. S. 330 -335.
(a) When a witness seeks to excuse a default on grounds of inability to comply with a subpoena, the defense must fail in the absence of a showing of even a modicum of good faith in responding to the subpoena. P. 339 U. S. 332 .
(b) Respondent having made no objection to the lack of a quorum on her appearance before the Committee, having relied on other grounds for noncompliance with the subpoena, and having raised the quorum question for the first time on her trial two years later, she cannot rely upon the defense of lack of a quorum on her trial for willful default. Pp. 339 U. S. 332 -335.
3. The trial court did not err in permitting the Government to read to the jury the testimony that respondent had given before the Committee when called upon to produce the records. Pp. 339 U. S. 335 -343.
did not bar the use at respondent's trial for willful default under R.S. § 102 of the testimony given by her before the Committee. Pp. 339 U. S. 337 -340.
(b) In R.S. § 859, the term "any criminal proceeding" does not apply to a prosecution for willful default under R.S. § 102. Pp. 339 U. S. 338 , 339 U. S. 342 -343.
(c) Congress intended the immunity provided by R.S. § 859 to apply only to past criminal acts concerning which a witness my be called to testify. Pp. 339 U. S. 339 -343.
Respondent was convicted of a violation of R.S. § 102, for failure to produce records in compliance with a subpoena of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives. 72 F.Supp. 58. The Court of Appeals reversed. 84 U.S.App.D.C. 394, 174 F.2d 525. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U.S. 846. Reversed, p. 339 U. S. 343 .
produce the books, papers, and records called for in the subpoenas deprives your committee of evidence necessary in the conduct of its investigation of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, which evidence is pertinent to the said investigation and places the said persons in contempt of the House of Representatives of the United States. [ Footnote 1 ]"
The resolution directing the Speaker to certify the Committee's report to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia for legal action was approved by the full House after debate. [ Footnote 2 ]
Respondent was indicted for violation of R.S. § 102 [ Footnote 3 ] in that she had failed to produce the records called for in the subpoenas, and had thereby willfully made default. At the trial, she contended, inter alia, that she was not guilty of willful default because a quorum of the Committee on Un-American Activities had not been present when she appeared on the return day. However, the trial court withdrew that issue from the jury's consideration by instructing the jury,
First. R.S. § 102 was enacted in 1857. Its purpose, as stated by its sponsors, was to avoid the procedural difficulties which had been experienced by the House of Representatives when person cited for contempt of the House were brought before its bar to show cause why they should not be committed, and, more important, to permit the imprisonment of a contemnor beyond the expiration of the current session of Congress. [ Footnote 4 ] Transmission of the fact of the commission of a contempt to the prosecuting authority is made under the Seal of the House or Senate by the Speaker or President of the Senate. [ Footnote 5 ] The judicial proceedings are intended as an alternative method of vindicating the authority of Congress to compel the disclosure of facts which are needed in the fulfillment of the legislative function. In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 , 166 U. S. 671 -672 (1897); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 , 294 U. S. 151 (1935).
"Default" is, of course, a failure to comply with the summons. In this case, we may assume, without deciding, that the subpoena served on respondent required her to produce the records of the association before the Committee on Un-American Activities, sitting as a committee. [ Footnote 6 ]
On the other hand, persons summoned as witnesses by competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery. A subpoena has never been treated as an invitation to a game of hare and hounds, in which the witness must testify only if cornered at the end of the chase. If that were the case, then, indeed, the great power of testimonial compulsion, so necessary to the effective functioning of courts and legislatures, would be a nullity. We have often iterated the importance of this public duty, which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform when properly summoned. See e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 , 250 U. S. 281 (1919); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 , 284 U. S. 438 (1932).
"For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule. [ Footnote 7 ] "
Every exemption from testifying or producing records thus presupposes a very real interest to be protected. If a privilege based upon that interest is asserted, its validity must be assessed. Since we assume in this case that the subpoenas refer to the production of papers before the Committee qua committee, we agree that respondent could rightfully have demanded attendance of a quorum of the Committee and declined to testify or to produce documents so long as a quorum was not present. But the courts need not treat as important that which the witness obviously regarded as unimportant. [ Footnote 8 ] Testimonial compulsion is an intensely practical matter. If therefore a witness seeks to excuse a default on grounds of inability to comply with the subpoena, we think the defense must fail in the absence of even a modicum of good faith in responding to the subpoena. That such was the situation in this case does not admit of doubt.
Such a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee cannot be condoned. Suppose one who has been summoned to produce papers fails to deliver them as required, but refuses to give any reason. May he defend a prosecution for willful default, many months later, on the ground that he had not been given a sufficient time to gather the papers? We think such a contention hardly tenable. Yet, at the return date, compliance with the subpoena was "impossible," just as in the present case. To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy it is, in itself, a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. See Bevan v. Krieger, 289 U. S. 459 , 289 U. S. 464 -465 (1933).
matter how the Committee had been constituted at the time. This Court considered a similar question in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906), where a witness had refused in the trial court to produce certain books and papers called for by a subpoena duces tecum on three grounds, one of which was that it was impossible to collect the records within the time allowed. The Court pointed out that, "[h]ad the witness relied solely upon the first ground, doubtless the court would have given him the necessary time." 201 U.S. at 201 U. S. 70 . But, having refused compliance for other reasons which the lower court could not remedy, the witness could not later complain of its refusal to do a meaningless act-to grant him additional time to gather papers which he had indicated he would not produce in any event. [ Footnote 9 ] Here, respondent would have the Committee go through the empty formality of summoning a quorum of its members to gather in solemn conclave to hear her refuse to honor its demands. Presumably the same formalism would be required if respondent had informed the Committee that she was not coming at all, and did not do so.
Admittedly her testimony relative to production of the books comes within the literal language of the statute; but the trial court thought that to apply the statute to respondent's testimony would subvert the congressional purpose in its passage. [ Footnote 10 ] We agree.
We need not set out the history of the statute in detail. It should be noted, however, that its function was to provide an immunity in subsequent criminal proceedings to witnesses before congressional committees, in return for which it was thought that witnesses could be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. [ Footnote 11 ] That purpose was
effectively nullified in 1892 by this Court's decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 , holding that R.S. § 860, [ Footnote 12 ] a statute identical in all material respects with R.S. § 859, was not a sufficient substitute for the constitutional privilege of refusing to answer self-incriminating questions. Under that decision, a witness who is offered only the partial protection of a statute such as §§ 859 and 860 -- that his testimony may not be used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings -- rather than complete immunity from prosecution for any act concerning which he testifies [ Footnote 13 ] may claim his privilege and remain silent with impunity.
Section 860 was ultimately repealed. Its usefulness undermined by the Counselman decision, it remained on the statute books until 1910, "a shield to the criminal and an obstruction to justice." [ Footnote 14 ] But the attention of Congress
has not, apparently, been called to the anomaly presented by the continued existence of R.S. § 859, which, like § 860, was a constituent part of an immunity "bargain" declared invalid in the Counselman case. [ Footnote 15 ] The courts must therefore give effect to the statute. Cameron v. United States, 231 U. S. 710 , 231 U. S. 720 (1914).
Since respondent did not refuse to answer the questions put to her by members of the House Committee, her argument is not of denial of any constitutional right, but solely that R.S. § 859 bars use of her testimony in her trial for willful default. [ Footnote 16 ] The history of that statute, its original
That purpose was "more effectually to enforce the Attendance of Witnesses . . . and to compel them to discover Testimony." [ Footnote 17 ] It had been the experience of Congress prior to 1857 that witnesses could not be compelled to disclose desired information, in part because of insufficient penalties for nondisclosure and in part because of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In an attempt to surmount the latter obstacle, Congress enacted what became R.S. § 859. By granting an immunity, it was the congressional intent to compel testimony which had hitherto been unavailable.
it assumes that Congress had some purpose to compel testimony of the kind here involved -- statements of refusal by the witness to answer questions or produce documents -- in return for which it was willing to grant an immunity. Such an assumption cannot be made. These statements have always been available to the Houses of Congress in contempt proceedings. They are uniformly printed in the reports of committees recommending contempt action, [ Footnote 18 ] and are relied upon by the Houses when deliberating in contempt cases. [ Footnote 19 ] In short, the purpose of the statute contradicts its application to testimony of this kind.
for no discernible reason, made proof of contempt vastly more difficult before the courts than in its own chambers, since, as we have indicated, the Houses of Congress themselves are accustomed to rely upon such testimony. There is not a hint of any such purpose in the legislative history of the statute or the decisions construing it. On the contrary, this Court has often noted that prosecution under R.S. § 102 was intended "merely to supplement the power of contempt by providing for additional punishment." Jurney v. MacCracken, supra, at 294 U. S. 151 .
The debates attending enactment of the statutes here in question and the decisions of this and other federal courts construing substantially identical statutes make plain the fact that Congress intended the immunity therein provided to apply only to past criminal acts concerning which the witness should be called to testify. [ Footnote 20 ]
In Glickstein v. United States, supra, this Court considered the problem thereby presented. It was there held that perjury committed in the course of testimony given pursuant to statute falls outside the purview of § 7(9) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 25(10), which, like R.S. § 859, provides that no testimony given by the witness (at a creditors' meeting) shall be used against him in any criminal proceedings. In the Court's view, such an immunity "relates to the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury." 222 U.S. at 222 U. S. 142 . The distinction is fully spelled out in a Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636 (1906), which was cited with approval in the Glickstein case:
That statement is at least equally applicable to statements made by the witness in refusing to answer questions or produce papers. Such, in fact, was the rationale and decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in just such a case. See In re Kaplan Bros., 213 F. 753 (1914). And see Cameron v. United States, supra, at 231 U. S. 719 ; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 , 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
The same reasons that led this Court to conclude that the clause excepting a prosecution for perjury from the reach of another immunity statute "was added only from superfluous caution, and throws no light on the construction," Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131 , 227 U. S. 141 (1913), lead us to hold that Congress did not intend the term, "any criminal proceeding," to encompass a prosecution of the witness for willful default under R.S. § 102. A contrary view would simply encourage the refusal of
" BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE"
" CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"
See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 , 284 U. S. 443 (1932); Leber v. United States, 170 F. 881, 888 (1909); London Guarantee & Accident Co., Ltd. v. Doyle & Doak, 134 F. 125 (1905); State ex rel. Berge v. Superior Court, 154 Wash. 144, 281 P. 335 (1929).
United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943), is, of course, inapplicable. That decision relates to the necessity of making a claim of immunity under the particular statute there involved. The opinion specifically states that the constitutional privilege, as distinguished from the statutory immunity under consideration in that case, must be claimed. Id. at 317 U. S. 427 .
"The second section of the bill provides that such person shall have the benefit of being exempt from prosecution as to the matter concerning which he is called to testify. "
Supra at 338 U. S. 88 . If this statement of the law is to be left standing, I do not see how we can say that what was timely for Christoffel is too late for Bryan. It is plain we are not following the Christoffel decision, and so I think we should candidly overrule it.
Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137 ; United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 .
The reasons given by the Court for its amendment of the statute have an anomalous basis: the Court feels compelled to alter the clear language of § 3486 in order not to "subvert the congressional purpose" which it admits has already been irrevocably frustrated by the decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 .
* This distinction between criminal trials and contempt proceedings at the bar of Congress is eminently reasonable in view of the practical differences between the two. See dissenting opinion in United States v. Fleischman, 339 U. S. 349 . For a discussion of congressional contempt procedures, see Eberling, Congressional Investigations 179 and passim (Columbia University Press, 1928).