Source: http://openjurist.org/686/f2d/202/kraska-v-united-mine-workers-of-america-international-union-united-mine-workers-of-america
Timestamp: 2013-05-22 19:04:17
Document Index: 49867811

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 481', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 481', '§ 412']

686 F2d 202 Kraska v. United Mine Workers of America International Union United Mine Workers of America | OpenJurist
686 F. 2d 202 - Kraska v. United Mine Workers of America International Union United Mine Workers of America	Home686 f2d 202 kraska v. united mine workers of america international union united mine workers of america
686 F2d 202 Kraska v. United Mine Workers of America International Union United Mine Workers of America 686 F.2d 202
111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2185, 95 Lab.Cas. P 13,825
KRASKA, Walter and Gorka, Josephv.UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al.Appeal of INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al.
No. 81-2922.
Argued June 8, 1982.Decided Aug. 20, 1982.
Kraska and Gorka then renewed their motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the district judge (1) set aside their disqualification; (2) order that they be allowed to take office; and (3) enjoin the upcoming election (which would fill the offices for which plaintiffs had been disqualified). The district court determined that it had jurisdiction under Title I of the LMRDA and granted the plaintiffs' motion. Defendants have appealed solely on the jurisdictional issue. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
The contrasting remedial schemes provided in Titles I and IV of the LMRDA reflect, in large measure, the underlying substantive differences between the two titles. Title IV regulates union election procedures such as the frequency of elections, the distribution of campaign literature, the inspection of membership lists, the eligibility of candidates for office, campaign financing, and the removal of officers guilty of serious misconduct. 29 U.S.C. § 481. The title thus purports to oversee a union's relationship with its membership as a whole. The rather cumbersome administrative and judicial procedures by which the provisions of Title IV may be enforced were carefully crafted by Congress to ensure that no individual could "block or delay" a union election, Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140, 85 S.Ct. 292, 296, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964), and "to settle as quickly as practicable the clouds on the incumbents' titles to office." Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Association, 389 U.S. 463, 468 n.7, 88 S.Ct. 643, 647 n.7, 19 L.Ed.2d 705 (1968). As the Supreme Court explained in Calhoon v. Harvey, supra, "Reliance on the discretion of the Secretary is in harmony with the general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies, and, where that fails, to utilize the agencies of Government most familiar with union problems to aid in bringing about a settlement through discussion before resort to the courts." 379 U.S. at 140, 85 S.Ct. at 296. See also Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 532, 92 S.Ct. 630, 633, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972) (suit by the Secretary was made exclusive "for two principal reasons: (1) to protect unions from frivolous litigation and unnecessary judicial interference with their elections, and (2) to centralize in a single proceeding such litigation as might be warranted with respect to a single election").
Title I, in contrast, reflects congressional concern with the union members' rights as individuals. Introduced on the floor of the Senate after the remaining provisions of the bill had been drafted, Title I guarantees to each union member equal rights to participate in union affairs, freedom of speech and assembly, and the right to sue. 29 U.S.C. § 411. To ensure prompt vindication of these individual rights-modeled, as they were, on our constitutional Bill of Rights, see United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, --- U.S. ----, ----, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 2343, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982)-Congress provided that union members aggrieved under Title I could proceed directly with private litigation in the federal courts.
Notwithstanding the obvious differences between Titles I and IV, the substance of the two titles clearly overlaps to some extent. Title I, for example, assures that union members "shall have equal rights and privileges ... to nominate candidates, (and) to vote in elections ..." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1); Title IV provides that "a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to ... reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) and shall have the right to vote...." 29 U.S.C. § 481(e). Because the remedies furnished for the breach of these two sections diverge so dramatically, however, much of the litigation and scholarly comment in this area has been directed to the question whether, in any given set of circumstances, a plaintiff can proceed directly under Title I or must instead refer his complaint to the Secretary of Labor under Title IV. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. at 141-42, 85 S.Ct. at 296-297 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting the substantive similarities between Titles I and IV but concluding, ultimately, that it is the "(r)emedies (which) shape the significance of rights."). See, generally Berchem, Labor Democracy in America: The Impact of Titles I & IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 13 Vill.L.Rev. 1 (1967); Note, Pre-Election Remedies Under the Landrum-Griffin Act: The "Twilight Zone" Between Election Rights Under Title IV and the Guarantees of Titles I and V, 74 Colum.L.Rev. 1105 (1974); Comment, Titles I & IV of the LMRDA: A Resolution of the Conflict of Remedies, 42 U.Chi.L.Rev. 166 (1974); Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 Yale L.J. 407 (1972).
Analysis of this issue generally has rested on two distinct factors: first, the timing of the lawsuit (was it filed and is it being disposed of before or after a union election?), and second, the nature of the underlying complaint (is it more easily characterized as a Title I, or as a Title IV, issue?). Clearly, the federal courts have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 412 to consider suits raising archetypical Title I issues, such as discrimination, that are filed prior to an election. Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967). Moreover, it is well established that if the complaint alleges a Title IV-type grievance-if, for example, the union member objects to eligibility standards for union office that are applied evenhandedly but are nonetheless unreasonable-direct federal litigation is precluded and the complainant must bring his objection to the Secretary of Labor. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964). This is true regardless whether the union member initiates his action before or after the disputed election. Mamula v. United Steelworkers of America, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962) (plaintiff alleged that union's constitution failed to prescribe nominating procedures; Title I suit filed prior to election is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds); McDonough v. Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, 470 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1972) (ballot counting dispute; suit filed post-election but before ballots were counted; no Title I jurisdiction); McGuire v. Grand International Division of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 426 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1970).
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