Source: http://allthingspros.blogspot.com/2012_06_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2014-11-01 00:16:31
Document Index: 90010866

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1']

Takeaway: An Applicant filed an RCE to pull from appeal in order to file declaration evidence of non-obviousness. While doing so, the Applicant took advantage of a little-used rule (§ 1.103(c)) to request suspension of prosecution for three months, thus giving the Applicant time to obtain the declaration. The Applicant then filed expert evidence under § 1.132 before the close of the suspension period. (Application of Hermann, Appl. No. 09/817,797, Tech. Center 2800, available on Public PAIR.) Details: There are two mechanisms by which an Applicant can request suspension of prosecution. You can file a petition under § 1.103(a), which requires a showing good and sufficient cause. Or you can request suspension under § 1.103(c) by simply checking a box on the RCE transmittal. No reason for the suspension is required. However, note that the request for suspension does not itself serve as the "submission" required to be filed with an RCE. Therefore, you should also file a response to the Final Office Action or refer to a previously filed After Final. My two cents: I think this route sounds like a very useful option once you decide to file declaration evidence. Typically, you're at final when you realize that declaration evidence is what you need to beef up your position. That means you're already going to need to file an RCE. So for a relatively small fee (currently $130), you can buy yourself an extra three months to obtain the declaration from the inventor or other expert. That's way cheaper than paying EOTs. Postscript: Unfortunately, the declaration evidence didn't work for the Applicant in 09/817,797. The Examiner not only found the declaration unpersuasive, the Examiner stated that "the declaration fails to teach why the device recited in the claims of the instant application is workable" and then gave a new enablement rejection. The Applicant submitted another declaration to address both the enablement and prior art rejections. The application is currently on appeal.
Appeal 2010009418; Appl. No. 11/799,800; Tech. Center 1700 Decided July 13, 2011
In the Answer, the Examiner maintained the asserted motivation to combine ("to contain and dispense the liquid detergent in a friendly fashion") and defended the motivation as follows: In this case, certainly, applicant would agree that the cleaning composition of Gutierrez et al. is obviously offered to consumers in some form, or type, of container. All cleaning products come with a container inherently. The only question remains, is the type of container, and whether it is well known in the art or not. Therefore, the appellant's assertion (pages 10, 11, and 12) that examiner's rejection has impermissibly utilized the current application as a road map for hindsight reconstruction, is respectfully disagreed with.
This case suggests to me that the way the courts view obviousness, all the possible types of containers and the advantages of each are not only available to the inventor, but are instantaneously available. Sure, the Seifert reference was one of many [hundreds? thousands?] containers for liquids, but it isn't as if the inventor had to read all of the references, one by one. The inventor already knows that Seifert's container is advantageous for detergents. And knows about all other types of liquid containers and their advantages. Simultaneously. It seems like the courts think that in predictable arts, choosing among any finite number of options is obvious because the evaluation is cost-free.
Maybe I'm reading too much into the BPAI's reasoning.. Maybe the courts don't really feel that evaluating a finite number of options has no cost whatsoever. Maybe the courts only feel that evaluating options is part of the inventive process, which means we don't reward inventors for simply going through the process. Except that in some scenarios, the cost of evaluating options must surely be prohibitive. And picking a particular one really is inventive.
Maybe in some technology areas, thousands of options can be easily modeled via computer. Under those facts, maybe an inventor doesn't deserve a patent for merely selecting one option among thousands. Maybe in other fields, evaluating even a dozen options has a high cost. Under those facts, maybe an inventor does deserve a patent for choosing one option. 5 comments:
Takeaway: On appeal, the Applicant argued that the reference's teleconferencing feature did not anticipate the limitation "single unitrary conference program" because the reference required two separate programs in order to provide the teleconferencing feature. The BPAI found that "single unitary computer program" read on two programs in the reference because the Applicant had almost no description of the program: merely a single rectangle in a figure. "Absent a description of the details of what might be contained in [Applicant's]
rectangle 106, we do not see how the present limitations might distinguish over Nakayama ... We fail to see how, for example, the combination of programs depicted in two rectangles (e.g., 100A, 120A) [in the reference] cannot be considered a “single unitary” or “integral” computer conferencing program adapted to real-time communication." (Ex parte Ditzik , BPAI 2012.) Details:
Ex parte Ditzik Appeal 2009014097; Appl. No. 11/023,361; Tech. Center 2600
A representative claim on appeal read: 23. A data conferencing system comprising:
(Emphasis added.) The Examiner rejected the independent claims as being anticipated by Nakayama. The Applicant amended to add the qualifier "single unitary," and argued that the conferencing function in Nakayama required two programs on a computer: an interlocution object program and an interloction conrol program. Thus, Nakayama did not satisfy the "single unitary" limitation, according to the Applicant.
The Examiner maintained the rejection and disagreed with the Applicant's characterization of the reference. The Examiner asserted that "the only functionality required of Applicants conferencing program is to achieve real-time communication," which Nakayama achieved with the interlocution control program alone. Thus, the "interlocution object program is not necessary for real-time communication." The Applicant repeated the argument on appeal. The Examiner maintained his position and elaborated on it, explaining that while the did recite a "single unitary computer conferencing program," it did not require that the entire conferencing operation be accomplished with a single program -- only that it be "adapted to real-time communication". The Examiner again asserted that Nakayama's control program performed real-time communication, cited to several specific sections of the reference.
The Board further noted that the phrase "single unitary" did not appear at all in the specification, and the Applicant relied solely on one of the figures as the basis for the limitation. Appellant’s argument reduces to the contention that instant Figure 4B shows one rectangle for program 106 and Nakayama shows two separate rectangles [designated Interlocution Control Program and Interlocution Object Program]. ... [W]e fail to see how, for example, the combination of programs depicted in two rectangles (e.g., 100A, 120A) cannot be considered a “single unitary” or “integral” computer conferencing program adapted to real-time communication. My two cents: The argument between the Applicant and the Examiner boils down to a "where do you draw the box" argument. The Examiner drew a box around the control program and mapped that to the claimed "conferencing program," then said the reference anticipates because the box meets the limitation "single unitary". The Applicant drew a box around the control program AND the interlocution program and mapped that to the claimed "conferencing program," and said no anticipation because the box does not meet "single unitary."
I see "where do you draw the box" issues in mechanical cases too, but there is usually a lot less room for maneuvering by either side. And I've definitely seen the Board reverse when the Examiner drew the box in a completely arbitrary or nonsensical way. Many computer cases are definitely vulnerable to this sort of rejection. 40 comments:
In the next Office Action, the Examiner explained that the declaration was defective because a § 1.131 declaration must be executed by the inventors. The Examiner also found the evidence insufficient to establish conception or diligence. In a second attempt to antedate the reference, the Applicant filed the same set of papers, once again executed by the Applicant's representative. But this time the declaration was styled as a § 1.132 declaration. In the Answer, the Examiner found the § 1.132 declaration insufficient to swear behind the reference, explaining that § 1.131 is the only mechanism available for antedating. The Applicant did not file a Reply Brief. The Board found both declarations to be ineffective in antedating the reference. The Board noted that plain language of § 1.131 requires an antedating declaration to be signed by all the inventors. Thus, the first declaration was ineffective. The Board found that the second declaration was also ineffective because § 1.132 is an improper mechanism for antedating: