Source: http://openjurist.org/157/f3d/1162/los-angeles-alliance-for-survival-v-city-of-los-angeles
Timestamp: 2017-08-18 15:14:29
Document Index: 718425776

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 1292', '§ 830', '§ 830']

157 F3d 1162 Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City Of Los Angeles | OpenJurist
157 F. 3d 1162 - Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City Of Los Angeles
157 F3d 1162 Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City Of Los Angeles
157 F.3d 1162
98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7191, 98 Cal. Daily
Op. Serv. 7195,
98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9933
LOS ANGELES ALLIANCE FOR SURVIVAL; Los Angeles Coalition to
End Hunger and Homelessness; Jerry Rubin,
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; Richard J. Riordan, Mayor of the City
of Los Angeles, in his official capacity; Bernard Parks,
Chief of Police for the City of Los Angeles, in his official
No. 97-56742.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 3, 1998.
Before: FLETCHER*, THOMPSON and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
We certify the following question to the California Supreme Court all as set forth in the attached request:
Is an ordinance1 that seeks to regulate the time, place and manner of solicitation of money or other thing of value or the sale of goods or services content based under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution? Cal. Const. art. I, § 2.
We stay all further proceedings in the district court and this court pending receipt of the answer to the certified question. If the California Supreme Court declines certification, we will resolve the issue according to our perception of California law.
The appellants stipulated at oral argument, that they do not oppose the preliminary injunction remaining in effect pending receipt of the answer to the certified question and further order of this court. We so order.
The clerk of the court is hereby directed to transmit forthwith, under the official seal of the Ninth Circuit, a copy of this order, the attached Request for Certification, and copies of all briefs and excerpts of record submitted to this court to the California Supreme Court. This case is withdrawn from submission until further order of the court.
REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION DIRECTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
Pursuant to Rule 29.5 of the California Rules of Court, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, before which this appeal is pending, hereby certifies to the Supreme Court of California a question that turns on whether the scope of protection of speech granted by the California Constitution's Liberty of Speech Clause, Cal. Const. art I, § 2, is broader than the protections afforded by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to regulation of solicitation. The answer may be determinative of the outcome of this appeal. We find no clear controlling precedent in the decisions of the California Supreme Court. We respectfully request that the Supreme Court of California answer the certified question presented below. Our phrasing of the question should not restrict the Court's consideration of the issue involved.
The City of Los Angeles is deemed the petitioner in this request because it sought the certification. The caption of the case and the names and addresses of counsel are as follows:
capacity, Defendants-Petitioners.
Carol A. Sobel, Santa Monica, CA; Mark D. Rosenbaum and Peter Eliasberg, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants-Respondents.
Byron R. Boeckman, Frederick N. Merkin and James K. Hahn, Office of City Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners.
Marc A. Becker, Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Amicus-Curiae.
On July 2, 1997, the Los Angeles City Council enacted Ordinance No. 171664 entitled "Prohibition Against Certain Forms of Aggressive Solicitation," codified as Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.59. The ordinance was signed by Mayor Richard Riordan and went into effect August 15, 1997. The stated goal of the ordinance is "to protect citizens from the fear and intimidation accompanying certain kinds of solicitation that have been an unwelcome and overwhelming presence in the city." The ordinance prohibits two kinds of solicitations--"aggressive solicitations" in all locations, § 41.59(b), and all solicitations in specific locations, § 41.59(c). The ordinance defines solicitation broadly as follows:
"Solicit, ask or beg" shall include using the spoken, written, or printed word, or bodily gestures, signs or other means with the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or other thing of value or soliciting the sale of goods or services.
Section 41.59(a)(1).
Appellees2 are groups and individuals that solicit immediate donations of money from members of the public on public fora throughout the City of Los Angeles. On September 11, 1997, appellees brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that it violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution. Appellees then requested a preliminary injunction which the district court granted on November 5, 1997.
The district court rejected appellants'3 argument for Pullman abstention, concluded that appellees were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim and found that appellants had conceded irreparable harm for purposes of the preliminary injunction. Relying on the California appellate decision in Alternatives and on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Carreras, the district court held that the ordinance was content-based under the California Liberty of Speech Clause. The district court's grant of the preliminary injunction rests on its finding that appellees were likely to succeed because § 41.59 is a content-based restraint of speech under California's Liberty of Speech Clause and because appellants did not dispute appellees' contention that the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor and that they face irreparable injury. Appellants timely appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
The answer to the certified question will resolve a critical issue of whether the California Constitution's Liberty of Speech Clause grants greater protection to speech used in conjunction with solicitation than does the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Under federal constitutional law, regulations of solicitation are reviewed as content-neutral restraints of speech. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730, 736, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). In contrast, the California appellate court decision in Alternatives and the Ninth Circuit opinion in Carreras hold that regulations of solicitation are reviewed as content-based restraints of speech under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution.
In Alternatives, a California appellate court struck down an ordinance that banned door-to-door solicitation during evening and nighttime hours. 145 Cal.App.3d 436, 439, 193 Cal.Rptr. 384 (1983). The court reasoned:
Time, manner and place regulations must be applicable to all speech without regard to content. The challenged ordinance permits unlimited access by persons who wish to approach residents about random subjects, but it does not do this for persons or organizations soliciting funds (such as ACW). The ordinance discriminates on the basis of the content of a speaker's message to the extent that a person who literally solicits from residents is regulated but one who seeks only a receptive listener is not.
Id. at 450, 193 Cal.Rptr. 384 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Carreras court found that "Alternatives for California Women is most plausibly interpreted as independently grounded on the California Liberty of Speech Clause." 768 F.2d 1039, 1048 n. 21 (9th Cir.1985). Applying Alternatives, the court found that an ordinance requiring ISKCON to have a permit to solicit was content-based under the California Constitution. Id. at 1048.
The Alternatives and Carreras decisions preceded the United States Supreme Court decision in Kokinda. We must determine whether these opinions reflect the Supreme Court of California's interpretation of California's Liberty of Speech Clause, a critical issue in the appeal before us.
California's Liberty of Speech Clause provides greater protection for expressive activity than does the First Amendment but the California Supreme Court has not answered the question of whether the Clause provides greater protection to speech used in conjunction with solicitation. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 908, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). There are no California Supreme Court cases that decide whether regulation of solicitation is content-neutral or content-based. But cf. People v. Fogelson, 21 Cal.3d 158, 165, 145 Cal.Rptr. 542, 577 P.2d 677 (1978) (noting that "[t]he state may, for example, reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of engaging in solicitation in public places"). Lower California cases present conflicting views.4 Compare Xiloj-Itzep v. City of Agoura Hills, 24 Cal.App.4th 620, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 879 (1994), with City of Fresno v. Press Communications, Inc., 31 Cal.App.4th 32, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 (1994).
Appellants rely on Xiloj-Itzep to support the proposition that regulation of solicitation is content-based, while appellees quote City of Fresno for the opposite proposition. See also Savage v. Trammell Crow Co., 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1580 n. 6, 273 Cal.Rptr. 302 (1990) (noting in dicta that "the government may validly draw a distinction between distributing leaflets and soliciting donations"); Ulmer v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal.App.3d 263, 127 Cal.Rptr. 445 (1976) (noting that begging and soliciting for alms do not necessarily involve communication and therefore are not protected by the First Amendment).
In Xiloj-Itzep, a California court of appeal affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction to halt the enforcement of a city ordinance prohibiting solicitation of persons travelling in vehicles. The court determined that the regulation was content-neutral. 24 Cal.App.4th at 636-37, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 879. In City of Fresno, addressing both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, a California court of appeal noted that "[a] restriction which is limited in effect to persons engaged in door-to-door 'peddling or soliciting' is content-based because it does not also apply to persons who go door-to-door merely looking for receptive listeners." 31 Cal.App.4th at 40, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 (citing Alternatives, 145 Cal.App.3d at 448, 193 Cal.Rptr. 384).
Although we currently have under review the grant of a preliminary injunction, certification is proper because the challenge to the regulation is a facial one and so there are no additional facts relevant to the certified question to be litigated before the district court. The answer to the certified question may be determinative of the cause pending before this panel.
This court agrees to follow the answer provided by the California Supreme Court.
The clerk of this court has been ordered to provide all relevant briefs and excerpts of record with this request and to forward all under the official seal of the Ninth Circuit pursuant to Rule 29.5(c)-(d).
WHEREAS, this law is timely and appropriate because current laws and city regulations are insufficient to address the aforementioned problems. The restrictions contained herein are neither overbroad nor vague and are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. Furthermore, in enacting this legislation, the Council recognizes the availability of community service and other sentencing alternatives, which may be appropriate remedies for violations of this law. The goal of this law is to protect citizens from the fear and intimidation accompanying certain kinds of solicitation that have become an unwelcome and overwhelming presence in the city.
Section I. Chapter IV of the Los Angeles Municipal Code is hereby amended by adding a new Section 41.59 thereto, to read as follows:
(1)"Solicit, ask or beg" shall include using the spoken, written, or printed word, or bodily gestures, signs or other means with the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or other thing of value or soliciting the sale of goods or services.
(2)"Public place" shall mean a place to which the public or a substantial group of persons has access, and includes, but is not limited to, any street, highway, sidewalk, parking lot, plaza, transportation facility, school, place of amusement, park, playground, and any doorway, entrance, hallway, lobby and other portion of any business establishment, an apartment house or hotel not constituting a room or apartment designed for actual residence.
(A) Approaching or speaking to a person, or following a person before, during or after soliciting, asking or begging, if that conduct is intended or is likely to cause a reasonable person to (i) fear bodily harm to oneself or to another, damage to or loss of property, or (ii) otherwise be intimidated into giving money or other thing of value;
(i) "Bank" means any member bank of the Federal Reserve System, and any bank, banking association, trust company, savings bank, or other banking institution organized or operated under the laws of the United States, and any bank the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
(B) Parking lots. No person shall solicit, ask or beg in any public Parking lot or structure any time after dark. "After dark" means any time from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise.
(i) He or she remains there after being asked to leave by the owner, driver, or operator of a public transportation vehicle; the agent of the owner, driver or operator of a public transportation vehicle; the owner or manager of a public transportation facility; the agent of the owner or manager of a public transportation facility; a member of a security force employed by the public transportation facility; or by a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 of Title 3 of the California Penal Code (commencing with Pen.Code, § 830); or
(A) He or she remains there after being asked to leave by the owner, manager or supervisor of the restaurant or other food establishment; the agent of the owner, manager or supervisor of the restaurant; a member of a security force employed by the restaurant; or by a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 of Title 3 of the California Penal Code (commencing with Pen.Code, § 830), acting at the request of any of the persons specified in this subdivision; or
/s/ Joel Waches
Judge Betty B. Fletcher Presiding Judge of the certifying panel
The City of Los Angeles ordinance in question is attached
We refer to the parties as they appear before our court. Appellees are the respondents to the certification request
Appellants are the petitioners for the certification request
Similarly, federal district courts are reaching conflicting results under the California Constitution. Compare International Society for Krishna Consciousness of California, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 966 F.Supp. 956, 969 (C.D.Cal.1997) (holding that regulations of solicitation are content-based under the California Constitution per Alternatives and Carreras ), and Berkeley Community Health Project v. City of Berkeley, 902 F.Supp. 1084, 1090 (N.D.Cal.1995) (same), and Church of the Soldiers of the Cross of Christ of the State of California v. City of Riverside, 886 F.Supp. 721, 725 (C.D.Cal.1995) (same), with Doucette v. City of Santa Monica, 955 F.Supp. 1192 (C.D.Cal.1997) (upholding a regulation prohibiting "abusive solicitation" under the First Amendment with no discussion of the California Constitution)