Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/236/130/511097/
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 19:02:17
Document Index: 577512056

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 221', '§ 220', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 1229', '§ 1101', '§ 2241', '§ 440', '§ 309', '§ 2241', '§ 1252', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 1101', '§ 924', '§ 3559', '§ 924', '§ 1229', '§ 844', '§ 841', '§ 1182', '§ 1101', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 924', '§ 924']

Gary Steele Appellant,v.j. Scott Blackman, Ins, District Director for Philadelphia District, 236 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2001) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 2001 › Gary Steele Appellant,v.j. Scott Blackman, Ins, District Director for Philadelphia District
Gary Steele Appellant,v.j. Scott Blackman, Ins, District Director for Philadelphia District, 236 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2001)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 236 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2001) Argued September 11, 2000Opinion Filed January 2, 2001
Gary Steele is a former resident immigrant who has been denied admission into the United States under 8 U.S.C. SS 1182(a) (2) (A) (i) (II) and (a) (2) (C). The District Court found that Steele is not entitled to apply for any waiver of inadmissibility because he is an "aggravated felon." Instrumental to this conclusion was the District Court's determination that one of Steele's prior state misdemeanor convictions constituted a conviction of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a) (43) (B). We will reverse.
The "rap sheet" submitted to the immigration judge as evidence of Steele's criminal record reflects that Steele has three New York state misdemeanor convictions.1 Steele's rap sheet indicates that in 1991, he was arrested for "Criminal Sale of Marihuana," a class A misdemeanor under New York's Penal Law § 221.40. We note that Penal Law § 220.40 defines "sale" to include "giv [ing] or dispos [ing] of to another" so that one may be convicted of "criminal sale" without evidence of a sale as commonly understood. Steele pled guilty to this offense and was sentenced to probation for three years. In 1993, Steele was again arrested for the same crime. Again, he pled guilty and paid a fine of five hundred dollars. In 1994, Steele was arrested for the "Criminal Possession of Marihuana," a class A misdemeanor under New York Penal Law S 221.05. Steele pled guilty and was sentenced to community service. Steele served no time in jail for any of these offenses.
Steele was charged with inadmissibility into the United States under both 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (i) (II), which makes inadmissible any alien who has been convicted of "a violation of... any law... of a State... relating to a controlled substance," and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (C), which makes inadmissible any alien who "has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance." At a hearing held on April 16, 1998, an immigration judge sustained the charges against Steele and ordered Steele removed to Grenada. The immigration judge also concluded that because Steele had committed an aggravated felony, he was barred by statute from any discretionary relief from inadmissibility, despite the fact that all of Steele's convictions constituted misdemeanors under New York state law.
Steele appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), asserting that he had not committed an aggravated felony and had a right to apply for a waiver and relief from deportation under 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), and 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Over a year later, on May 7, 1999, Steele's appeal was dismissed by the BIA. The BIA affirmed the judgment of the immigration judge that Steele was inadmissible and barred from any discretionary relief because he had committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43).
The District Court correctly concluded that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, despite the judicial review limiting provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform andImmigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (collectively "the 1996 Amendments"). We held in Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), that the 1996 Amendments did not foreclose district courts from hearing petitions for habeas corpus following removal orders where the petitioner has been convicted of an aggravated felony. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 235 ("ADEPA § 440(a) and IIRIRA § 309(c) (4) (G) are most reasonably understood as foreclosing judicial review under the APA, and not as relating to habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241."). We based our decision in Sandoval on a line of Supreme Court precedent extending back to Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868), concluding that these cases "establish the propositions that courts should not lightly presume that a congressional enactment containing general language effects a repeal of a jurisdictional statute and, consequently, that only a plain statement of congressional intent to remove a particular statutory grant of jurisdiction will suffice." Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 232.
Steele's removal was administered under the permanent provisions of IIRIRA, which differ in some respects from the transitional provisions analyzed in Sandoval. Section 1252 of Title 8 of the United States Code, as amended by IIRIRA, might be construed to divest district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions where a petitioner has been convicted of an aggravated felony offense. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1), (a) (2) (C), (b) (9). We recently considered this possibility, however, and, in accordance with our reasoning in Sandoval, determined that IIRIRA's permanent provisions do not preclude district courts from exercising their jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus following removal orders where the petitioner has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Liang v. INS, 206 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction in accordance with our decision in Liang.
Relief under section 1182(h) is also foreclosed in Steele's case. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) the Attorney General may waive the inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (i) (II) of an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense if that alien's inadmissibility relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana. Here, Steele has admitted to committing more than one offense for which he could be found inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (i) (II). Thus, a waiver under section 1182(h) is unavailable.
Section 1101(a) (43) of Title 8 defines the term "aggravated felony" as used in the Immigration Act. It provides that an aggravated felony is any "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (B).
Despite the "including" connector, the BIA has interpreted this definition as encompassing two categories of felony offenses: those involving "illicit trafficking" in a controlled substance and those involving "drug trafficking crime [s]" as defined in § 924(c). An offense falls within the scope of the first category if 1) the offense constitutes a felony under the law of the convicting sovereign and 2) the offense involves "the unlawful trading or dealing of any controlled substance...." See Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 541 (BIA 1992). Essential to the concept of "trading or dealing" is activity of a "business or merchant nature," thus excluding simple possession or transfer without consideration. Id.
Section 924(c) (2) of Title 18 defines "drug trafficking crime" as meaning "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substance Act [,]... the Controlled Substance Import and Export Act [s]... or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act...." Accordingly, the BIA finds within the second category of aggravated felony convictions any federal conviction for a violation of one of the specified statutes that is a felony conviction under federal law, i.e., a conviction for an offense punishable by imprisonment for over one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559. More relevant for present purposes, the BIA understands this second category to encompass convictions for state offenses, however characterized by the state, if those offenses would be "punishable" under one of the three specified federal statutes if federally prosecuted, so long as the hypothetical federal conviction would be a felony under federal law, i.e., would be punishable by a term of imprisonment of over one year.
This hypothetical federal conviction approach "require [s] a comparison between the elements of the [state] drug offense and [the elements of] a federal drug provision referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2)...." Matter of Davis at 544. Since the basis for the incapacities under the Immigration Act is "convict [ion] of an aggravated felony," 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), the Board looks to what the convicting court must necessarily have found to support the conviction and not to other conduct in which the defendant may have engaged in connection with the offense. Thus where, as here, the Service is relying on a state misdemeanor conviction, the requirements of this second category of "aggravated felony convictions" are "satisfied [only] by proving a conviction that includes all the elements of [a felony] offense for which an alien `could be convicted and punished' under the cited federal laws." Matter of Barrett at 174. Accordingly, the proposed "analogy between state statutes and offenses under the cited federal statutes will... be a matter of law." Id. at 177.
All of the state criminal proceedings against Steele were misdemeanor proceedings. Moreover, none of those proceedings involved findings or a plea satisfying the elements of an offense under the Controlled Substances Act punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. As the District Court correctly determined, the elements of the misdemeanor offense of "Criminal Sale of Marijuana" are met if the defendant has distributed 30 grams or less of marijuana without remuneration. Looking to federal law, the District Court also correctly concluded that "distributing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration" is treated as simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844 and is punishable by a maximum term of one year. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (4). Based on these two conclusions, the hypothetical felony approach should have led the District Court to hold that Steele has not been convicted of an aggravated felony within the meaning of the Act.
Though the Supreme Court has disapproved of broad presumption of collateral consequences without specific findings of injury-in-fact, see Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-17 (1998), we conclude that Steele has alleged facts sufficient to show a continuing injury and serious collateral consequences. Erroneous conviction of an aggravated felony will have several continuing and serious legal consequences for Steele, including serving as a permanent bar preventing his return to the United States to visit his family. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (A) (Supp. II 1996) (imposing a permanent bar on admissibility for aggravated felons). A determination that Steele's conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony would alleviate many of these collateral effects. See generally Bruce Robert Marley, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 855 (1998).
Our conclusion here finds support in the decisions of other courts. See Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 2000) (presuming collateral consequences from a determination of inadmissibility); Chavez v. United States INS, 55 F. Supp. 2d 555, 556-57 (W.D. La. 1999) (finding collateral consequences following deportation as a matter of law). Cf. Ramirez v. INS, 86 F. Supp. 2d 301, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that the appeal of a deported pro se petitioner who could not be contacted was moot). See generally Gerald L. Newman, Symposium: Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law after the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1963, 1996-97 (2000) (" [E]xecution of a removal order will not ordinarily moot the case in the Article III sense. For example, extinguishment of a permanent resident's entitlement to live in the United States normally results in continuing injury. More generally, the entry of a removal order creates inadmissibility barriers to future visits.")
Prior to 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) defined the term "aggravated felony" in relevant part as "any drug trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c) (2) of title 18, United States Code." Under this prior language, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2) clearly provided the only source for the definition of "drug trafficking crime."
Section 924(c) (2) of Title 18, which has remained unchanged during the relevant period, provides a sentence enhancement in federal prosecutions for defendants who have used or carried a firearm during or in relation to the drug trafficking crime that is the subject of the prosecution. It is in this context that § 924(c) (2) defines "drug trafficking crime" as "any felony punishable under" the three specified statutes. Thus, if one literally substituted the text of § 924(c) (2) for the text "any drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) (2)" in § 1101(a) (43)), no state offenses were included in the concept of "aggravated felony."
In 1990, Congress decided that this portion of § 1101(a) (43) should be changed to make clear that state drug trafficking offenses would be included. It did so by expanding the definition to encompass "any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance..., including any drug trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c) of title 18..." and by expressly stating that the "term [aggravated felony] applies to offenses described in [paragraph 43] whether in violation of Federal or State law...." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (1992).
Moreover, in fashioning its hypothetical federal felony approach, the BIA reads the phrase "felony punishable under" as found in § 924(c) (2) to mean "offense punishable as a felony under." It is only by so reading the statute that the BIA is able to find state misdemeanor convictions to be convictions of aggravated felonies. This reading is inconsistent with the reading of a number of Courts of Appeals in what seems to us an analogous setting. In several cases involving sentencing enhancements, Courts of Appeals have looked to state law classifications in order to determine if a given offense constitutes a felony under § 924(c). See United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). This is plainly inconsistent with the BIA's current jurisprudence in the deportation context, which finds state law consequences irrelevant. See In re K-V-D-, Int. Dec. 3422, 1999 WL 1186808 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (Filppu, Board Member, dissenting) (criticizing the BIA's current interpretation for this reason).