Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/126/679/497923/
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 00:23:50
Document Index: 591949724

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 703', '§ 5221', '§ 185', '§ 654', '§ 1910', '§ 11', '§ 2589', '§ 702', '§ 5220']

Bob T. Moore and Susan Moore, Plaintiffs-appellants Cross-appellees, v. Ashland Chemical, Inc. and Ashland Oil, Inc.,defendants-appellees Cross-appellants, 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1997 › Bob T. Moore and Susan Moore, Plaintiffs-appellants Cross-appellees, v. Ashland Chemical, Inc. and A...
Bob T. Moore and Susan Moore, Plaintiffs-appellants Cross-appellees, v. Ashland Chemical, Inc. and Ashland Oil, Inc.,defendants-appellees Cross-appellants, 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997)
Oct. 20, 1997. Order Granting Rehearing En Banc Nov. 12, 1997
Before DAVIS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and FALLON, District Judge1 :
The foregoing conclusions are the results of our conscientious efforts to determine the standard for admitting clinical medical testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Daubert and by this court in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997) and other authorities cited herein. They represent neither a "let it all in" nor a "keep it all out" view. Instead, they reflect the interplay of the basic principles of the Federal Rules of Evidence, viz., the liberal standards of admissibility and relevance of Rules 401 and 402 and the assumption underlying Rules 702 and 703 "that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587, 592, 113 S. Ct. at 2793, 2796.
An expert must have scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, and a witness may be qualified as an expert by reason of knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Fed.R.Evid. 702; Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) . Rule 702, according to the Advisory Committee Note, permits expert testimony not only by experts carrying formal credentials such as university degrees and professional memberships but also by so-called skilled witnesses, whose experiences permit them to testify with authority on a given topic. Id. The areas of inquiry that expert testimony may address are similarly broad, including scientific and technical questions as well as any other areas of specialized knowledge. Id. The question of whether the witness is sufficiently qualified as an expert is a matter to be decided by the court pursuant to Rule 104(a). United States v. Normile, 587 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1978); Loftin & Woodard, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1978). In making this inquiry, the trial court has wide discretion in determining the qualifications of a witness as an expert with respect to a particular subject. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 2902, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885, 95 S. Ct. 157, 42 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1974); Robert v. Conti Carriers & Terminals, Inc. 692 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1982).
In Daubert, the question of an expert's qualification under Rule 702 was not raised. The court stated that the experts were well or impressively credentialed. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-583, 113 S. Ct. at 2791-92. Accordingly, Daubert does not affect the foregoing principles pertaining to qualifications.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Id. at 582, 113 S. Ct. at 2791. The court had granted certiorari in light of sharp divisions among courts applying and rejecting the test of Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
The court held that the Frye "general acceptance" test had been displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence, observing that: Rule 702 specifically governing expert testimony does not establish "general acceptance" as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility; the drafting history of the rule does not indicate an intention to incorporate such a standard; and a rigid "general acceptance" standard would be at odds with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony. Id. at 588-589, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-2795.
The Supreme Court also held that the Federal Rules require the trial judge to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Id. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. Citing Rule 702 as the primary locus of this obligation, the court decided that the trial judge, when faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, must determine pursuant to Rule 104(a) whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. The court explained that this entails a preliminary assessment of whether the underlying reasoning of the scientific testimony is soundly grounded in scientific knowledge and methodology and can be relevantly applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 592, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
Thus, the Daubert Court defined "scientific knowledge" in terms of "hard science" or "Newtonian science" i.e., knowledge obtained and tested through "the scientific method," of which Sir Issac Newton was the leading exponent. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert, Developing A Similarly Epistemological Approach To Ensuring The Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 2271, 2276-2277 (1994) (citing 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 490-491 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967)); Jennifer Laser, Comment, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 Loy. L.A.L.Rev. 1379, 1404 (1997); United States v. Hall, --- F. Supp. ----, ---- (C.D. Ill. 1997); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
In Daubert the Supreme Court noted that, although Rule 702 also applies to "technical, or other specialized knowledge," its discussion was "limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here." Id. at 590 n. 8, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n. 8. Nevertheless, we conclude that, except where it is self-evident that the court's remarks specifically apply only to "scientific knowledge," that the general principles of Rule 702 recognized by the decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony. Moreover, in Watkins v. Telsmith, 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997), another panel of this court recently concluded that "whether an expert's testimony is based on 'scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge,' Daubert and Rule 702 demand that the district court evaluate the methods, analysis, and principles relied upon in reaching the opinion."
The Daubert court began by stating that " [w]e interpret the legislatively-enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute." Id. at 587, 113 S. Ct. at 2793(citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163, 109 S. Ct. 439, 446, 102 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1988)) ("Because the Federal Rules of Evidence are a legislative enactment, courts turn to the 'traditional tools of statutory construction in order to construe their provisions.' ") Accordingly, a court must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. United States Nat. Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2182, 124 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1993) (citing United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122, 12 L. Ed. 1009 (1849)). A statutory text consists of words living a communal existence, the meaning of each word informing the others and all taking their purport from their context. Id. at 454, 113 S. Ct. at 2182 (citing NLRB v. Federbush, Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2nd Cir. 1941) (L.Hand, J.)). The maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, is often used to avoid giving one word a scope inconsistent with its companions and thus giving " 'unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.' " Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575, 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1069, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1995) (citing and quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S. Ct. 1579, 1582, 6 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1961)).
Moreover, the Daubert opinion at several points clearly implies that it is drawing on principles of the Federal Rules that are generally applicable to all types of expert testimony. The court stated that "Rule 702 ... clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. Further, the court observed that the premise for the relaxation of the usual requirement of first-hand knowledge when any type of qualified expert testifies is "an assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline." Id. at 592, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 Thus, Daubert plainly indicates that the trial judge, when faced with the proffer of expert testimony in any field of study, must determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid under the principles of the discipline involved. Id.; See American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards And Procedures For Determining The Admissibility Of Expert Evidence After Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 578 (1994).
The Daubert court read Rule 702 to provide that " ' [i]f scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue' " an expert " 'may testify thereto.' " Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (emphasis by Court deleted). "Knowledge" in this context " 'applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.' " Id. at 590, 113 S. Ct. at 2795(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
In Daubert, the Court indicated that, (1) "scientific knowledge" within Rule 702 means principles, theories, techniques or inferences derived by the scientific method or by a body of sound scientific methods; and (2) that the proffered expert's opinion, inference, or testimony based on scientific knowledge, in order to have evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness, must be derived or inferred by the same methods. Id. at 590 n. 9, 113 S. Ct. at 2795; See also the court's "general observations" on principal scientific methods. Id. at 593-594, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-2797.
As the American College of Trial Lawyers' report concludes, " [W]hether the testimony concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to the 'knowledge and experience' of that particular field. To that extent, Daubert ought to be regarded as universally applicable to expert evidence." American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Evidence after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994).
For the same reasons, this court recently held in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997) that the application of Daubert in determining the admissibility of expert testimony is not limited to "scientific knowledge" or "novel" scientific evidence. Id. at 989-991. Moreover, in Watkins, this court concluded that:
Id. at 991(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.) (also citing and quoting Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 366-371 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rule 702 demands that experts "adhere to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their professional work." Id. at 369) (citing Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996))); See also Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Social science testimony ... must be tested to be sure that the person possesses genuine expertise in a field and that her court testimony 'adheres to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in [her] professional work.' ") (quoting Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." This condition goes primarily to relevance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. " 'Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.' 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER p 702, p. 702-18. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985) ('An additional consideration under Rule 702--and another aspect of relevancy--is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute'). " Id. at 591, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. "The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific 'knowledge' about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night." Id.
Accordingly, when faced with a proffer of a qualified expert's testimony to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the proffered opinion or inference is soundly grounded in the methodology of the expert's discipline and whether that opinion or inference is relevant to a fact in issue or to an understanding of the evidence. Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-592, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-2796.
The Court emphasized that the trial judge's inquiry under Rule 702 is a flexible one. Different approaches may be permissible, but the focus must be on the principles and methodology upon which the expert's opinion is based, not on the merits of the expert's conclusion. Id. at 594-595 n. 12, 113 S. Ct. at 2797-2798. "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Id. at 596, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2714, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987)). "Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56." Id. (citing cf., e.g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826, 113 S. Ct. 84, 121 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046, 110 S. Ct. 1511, 108 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1990)).
After declaring that evidentiary reliability of an expert's scientific opinion depends on whether it is soundly grounded in the the scientific method, the Daubert Court identified several individual methods or techniques within the body of hard or Newtonian scientific methodology as appropriate for trial judges' use in testing the methodology-relatedness of particular hard scientific opinion proffers. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. These hard scientific methods, now sometimes called "Daubert factors," are empirical testing, peer review and publication, known or potential rate of error, the existence and maintenance of operational standards, and acceptance within a relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-2797.
First, the goals of the disciplines of clinical medicine and hard or Newtonian science are different. In hard science, the usual motive is inquiring: to gain a new understanding of some mechanism of nature. Alvan R. Feinstein, Clinical Judgment 22 (1967) [hereinafter Feinstein]. In contrast, the care and treatment of the individual patient is the ultimate, specific act that characterizes a clinical physician. Id. at 27; Pellegrino and Thomasma, For The Patient's Good 71 (1988); Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice 120 (1981) (" [T]he whole process is ordained to a specific practical end--a right action for a particular patient--and ... this end must modulate each step leading to it in important ways."). The clinical physician, therefore, must take account of the immediacy of the problem confronting her for she bears an essential relationship to each patient. Additionally, she has many human values to consider--ethics, compassion, and must have a willingness to take responsibility in the face of the unknown. Edmond A. Murphy, The Logic of Medicine 6 (1976) [hereinafter Murphy]. The pursuit of these different goals of hard science and clinical medicine serves to shape the distinct objectives of the scientific experiment and the clinical treatment of a patient:
Prior to Daubert, this court took the position that, before admitting expert testimony, a trial court, as part of or in addition to its preliminary inquiry under Rule 703, must apply the Frye test, i.e., the court must determine that the witness used a well-founded methodology or mode of reasoning sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110, 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1991). In Daubert, however, the Supreme Court held that the Frye "general acceptance" test was displaced by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-589, 113 S. Ct. at 2793-2794. The court stated that the "general acceptance" test is at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules of Evidence and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony," and concluded that Frye is "incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence [and] should not be applied in federal trials." Id. Therefore, any requirement that the trial court apply the Frye "general acceptance" test in determining the admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence is no longer tenable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert that the test should not be applied in federal trials. Accordingly, we now read the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 703, without the influence of a Frye-focal lens.
Under rule 703, a qualified expert may apply his relevant and reliably grounded knowledge and expertise to facts and data in the particular case in order to form and express a pertinent opinion or inference. The facts or data may be derived from (1) the first hand observation of facts, data, or opinions perceived by the witness before trial, (2) the facts, data or opinions presented at trial (as by the familiar hypothetical question or by having the expert attend the trial and hear the testimony establishing the facts, data, and opinions relied on), or (3) facts, data or opinions presented to the expert outside of court other than by his own direct perception. Fed.R.Evid. 703 advisory committee's note. If they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, such facts, data or opinions presented to the expert out of court need not be admitted or even admissible in evidence. United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir. 1986). The rule is designed to bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of experts themselves when not in court. United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S. Ct. 1168, 31 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1972), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1048, 92 S. Ct. 1308, 31 L. Ed. 2d 591 (1972). The Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 703, in part, states:
See also United States v. Burrell, 505 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Williams, 447 2d. at 1290.
The question of whether facts, data or opinions not admitted in evidence are of a type reasonably relied upon is a preliminary one for the court. Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S. Ct. 1017, 71 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1982); Michael H. Graham, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.1 (4th Ed.1996). Although only the terms "facts or data" appear in Rule 703, an opinion not in evidence, even if not admissible, may also form the basis of an expert's opinion if reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. See Graham, at p. 109-110, n. 18 (citing the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703). In determining the preliminary question of whether reliance by the expert is reasonable, the party calling the witness must satisfy the court, both that such facts, data or opinions are of the type customarily relied upon by experts in the field and that such reliance is reasonable. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal, Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1113-1114 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp. 566 F.2d 541, 544-47 (5th Cir. 1978). But see Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co. 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935, 110 S. Ct. 328, 107 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1989) (in making the 703 determination, "the trial court should defer to the expert's opinion of what data they find reasonably reliable."); See also, 3 Weinstein's Evidence p 703 at 703-17(1981).
Daubert's description of the trial judge's duty as gatekeeper under Rule 702 sheds light on her duty in this capacity under Rule 703 and the relationship between these duties. The trial judge's duty under Rule 702 is to determine whether the expert is qualified; whether his proffered opinion is grounded in the methodology of his discipline, i.e., the body of principles, methods, rules and postulates of his field of expertise; and whether his opinion is relevant to the case. In Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that a judge assessing a proffer must also pay attention to Rule 703, which "provides that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.' " Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Accordingly, the trial judge as gatekeeper has a duty under Rule 703 to determine whether such facts and data not admitted in evidence are of the type customarily relied upon by experts in the field and whether such reliance is reasonable.
The Supreme Court in Daubert admonished that a judge performing her gatekeeping duties under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules, including Rule 403. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The court stated that "Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury....' " Id. The court quoted Judge Weinstein as explaining: " 'Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.' Weinstein, 138 F.R.D., at 632." 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
As Rule 403 favors the admissibility of relevant evidence, such evidence is to be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1981); See 22 Wright & Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5221. Moreover, Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly because it permits the trial court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence. E.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633, (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 102 S. Ct. 2300, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1303 (1982). There must be a danger of unfair prejudice, not merely the danger of prejudice inherent in any relevant evidence; and its probative value must be substantially outweighed by that danger. As this court stated in United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 862, 100 S. Ct. 128, 62 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1979):
"Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice must be 'unfair.' " Dollar v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996, 98 S. Ct. 1648, 56 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1978). The Advisory Committee Note on Rule 403 provides that " [u]nfair prejudice within this context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." For example, evidence may be unfairly prejudicial because it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, triggers other mainsprings of human action, or may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER p 403 403-37 to 403-40 (citing authorities including United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1404 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Kang, 934 F.2d 621, 628 (5th Cir. 1991)). In addition, evidence may threaten "confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury" when "the probability that the proof and the answering evidence that it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues." McCormick, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185(West 2d ed.1972); See Ford v. Sharp, 758 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1985).
Dr. Jenkins, a specialist in pulmonary and environmental disease, based his opinion on principles, theories, methodology and techniques, which are well accepted within his discipline. In summary, the proffered testimony of Dr. Jenkins reflects that he: 1) Examined Moore personally: Dr. Jenkins saw Moore on three occasions, between June 26, and August 1, 1990. On each occasion the doctor personally observed the patient. The doctor performed a thorough physical examination of Moore. (Personal observation has always been an adequate basis for an expert's opinion, and indeed has been called " 'the most desirable of all bases.' " 3 WEINSTEIN p 703, 703-7; Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 489 (1962)). 2) Personally took a detailed medical history from Moore: Dr. Jenkins personally took Moore's history involving his health and the accident in an interview of approximately one and one-half hours. ("Reliance on patient statements to render a medical opinion is usually justified as trustworthy because patients have a strong incentive to tell their treating physician the truth--the desire to recover." In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Rheingold, supra at 495; Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (especially when corroborated by medical records, physical examination, and medical tests); See O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1978); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1965); Rheingold, supra at 488.) 3) Used Differential Diagnosis and Etiology: In his determination of the cause and nature of the disease, Dr. Jenkins performed or supervised a series of tests on Moore. He studied, compared and synthesized the results so as to eliminate all possibilities but the most likely diagnosis and cause of the disorder. The gamut of tests performed on Moore included pulmonary function tests, a bronchial challenge test, a bronchodilator test, an allergy test, X-rays, and laboratory tests. Dr. Jenkins and Dr. Alvarez testified that it would have been impossible for Moore to fake RAD signs on the objective tests. See Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 779-780 (5th Cir. 1965) (" [T]he physician making a diagnosis must necessarily rely on many observations and tests performed by others and recorded by them; records sufficient for diagnosis in the hospital ought to be enough for opinion testimony in the courtroom."; McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043-1044 (2nd Cir. 1995); Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1384 (4th Cir. 1995)). 4) Reviewed tests, reports and opinions of other doctors: Dr. Jenkins reviewed the records and reports of Dr. Simi, who had seen Moore shortly after the accident. Dr. Jenkins testified that Dr. Simi's records showed even more severe airways obstruction in response to bronchial dilators which indicated there was not any question that Moore had acquired reactive airways disease. Dr. Jenkins also stated that he had reviewed the allergy studies performed by Dr. Alvarez that confirmed the reactive airways disease diagnosis and ruled out an allergic or immunologic disease as the cause. (Reliance on reports and observations of other physicians and medical technicians is accepted practice in medical field and may be relied on by expert witnesses. Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962)). 5) Reviewed the MSDS: The Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes the Secretary to promulgate safety and health standards and requires employers to comply with them. 29 U.S.C. §§ 654(a) (2), 655. Pursuant thereto, the Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, requires that a manufacturer of hazardous chemicals inform its own employees and downstream employers and employees of the dangers posed by the chemicals. The manufacturer is required to prepare a material safety data sheet (MSDS) for each hazardous chemical, including the identity of the chemical; health hazards posed; and handling precautions. See Martin v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140 (6th Cir. 1993) Dr. Jenkins and Dr. Alvarez reviewed the MSDS that Dow Corning provided with the chemicals to which Moore was exposed. The MSDS is a type of fact or data reasonably relied upon by medical experts in forming opinions or inferences as to medical causation. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Company, 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995). Because federal regulations require manufacturers to truthfully disclose in the MSDS the identity and health hazards of materials, it is reasonable for medical experts to rely at least in part on the MSDS in forming diagnostic and causal opinions. See also Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir. 1989) ("In making this determination, the trial court should defer to the expert's opinion of what data they find reasonably reliable.") 6) Referred to medical literature on the properties of irritant chemicals that cause RAD: Dr. Jenkins relied on a medical treatise, Carl Zenz, OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION (2d Ed.1988), and a number of published articles in medical literature in forming his opinion or inference that the chemicals to which Moore was exposed were irritants that caused Moore's RAD. ("Facts or data found in the literature of the profession, even though not themselves admissible in evidence, properly form a part of the basis for an expert's opinion." Bauman v. Centex Corporation, 611 F.2d 1115, 1120, n. 6 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Nanda v. Ford Motor Co. 509 F.2d 213, 222 (7th Cir. 1974))). 7) Utilized his training and experience: During his 53 years of medical practice, Dr. Jenkins had a considerable amount of experience with injuries caused by occupational inhalants. Due to the chemical industries along the Gulf Coast, inhalant disease victims were a large part of the patients seen by the Pulmonary and Environmental Medicine sections that Dr. Jenkins headed at Baylor College of Medicine at Houston, Texas for a combined period of 43 years. Dr. Jenkins had been called upon to make a determination whether a particular condition was caused by a particular chemical on more than one hundred occasions. (A witness's training and long experience may qualify him as an expert and enable him to assist the jury regarding subjects within his training and experience. United States v. Chappell, 6 3d. 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1988); West Wind Africa Line, Ltd. v. Corpus Christi Marine Services Co., 834 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Later, focusing on Dr. Jenkins' affidavit, the court stated "I don't know where he got that information. I don't know whether the chemical irritants he's discussing include toluene. I don't know whether you need to have some significant level of exposure to toluene." Shortly thereafter, the court concluded the hearing as to Dr. Jenkins' testimony, stating " [a]s the motion in limine, Defendant's motion is granted if--I mean, the Defendants, I believe, have put you on notice that they want to explore the basis for this. So that's--He can't just say its generally accepted, blah, blah, blah....He doesn't know where that information is derived....I can't assess it because I haven't heard what it is." Id. at 30. From this and later events, we conclude that the court was inclined to grant the defendant-appellees' motion in part but withheld its ruling to permit the plaintiffs to put on additional proffer testimony as to the basis of Dr. Jenkins' causation opinion.
At the conclusion of Dr. Jenkins' testimony, the trial court stated, "I don't think this meets the 702 test ....for a number of reasons." Still hampered by an incomplete understanding of Dr. Jenkins' deposition, the court stated that "when asked if there was any scientific support for a diagnosis of causation between exposure to toluene and reactive airways disease, he had no such literature or research to back up such causation determination." R. Vol. 10 at 154. The court, also misunderstanding Dr. Jenkins' live testimony, stated that " [t]oday he said nothing other than he relied upon the MSDS, which listed a number of other chemicals, and from that stated that some of these other chemicals are known to lead to reactive airways disease, ergo his conclusion that toluene leads to reactive airways disease." Id. Further, the court again misconstrued Dr. Jenkins live testimony, stating that his testimony was not necessary because "his entire causation testimony is based upon the MSDS," which, "is in evidence." Id. at 155. Also, the court gave as a reason for its ruling the fact that Dr. Jenkins had no scientifically exact information concerning "the level of exposure, amount of exposure, and duration of exposure." Finally, in its remarks pertaining to its Rule 702 ruling, the court stated that Dr. Jenkins had acknowledged that he was not familiar with what type of research techniques the manufacturer used to determine and articulate the warnings of dangers from exposure to the chemical mixture that the manufacturer placed in the MSDS. Id. at 156. Alternatively, the court excluded Dr. Jenkins' testimony as to causation under Rule 403 because "it would be highly prejudicial and misleading to have the jury accept from Dr. Jenkins' history and credentials that his opinion as to causation is other than scientific speculation, because that's what I heard him testify to." Id. at 155.
The general rule is that the trial court has broad discretion in the matter of admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and its action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 82 S. Ct. 1119, 8 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1962); Congress & Empire Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658, 25 L. Ed. 487 (1878); Guillory v. Domtar Industries, Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1329 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Moore, 997 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1993); Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 1994); McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995). However, we have held that even though the trial court's discretion to admit or exclude evidence is generally broad, competent evidence cannot be excluded without a sound and acceptable reason. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1092 (5th Cir. 1994); Davidson Oil Country Supply Co. v. Klockner, Inc., 908 F.2d 1238, 1245 (1990).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that the trial court's determination of preliminary questions of facts concerning the admissibility of evidence under Rule 104(a) should be reviewed by the clearly erroneous standard. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2781, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987); See 2 Childress & Davis, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW, § 11.04, p. 11-22 (2d Ed.1992). In Daubert, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Bourjaily, citing it in stating that proof of such facts should be established by a preponderance of proof. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 10, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n. 10 (citing Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175-176, 107 S. Ct. at 2778-2779). Regarding the clearly erroneous standard, this court and a substantial number of the other courts of appeal have held that mixed questions of law and fact, legal inferences from the facts, or the application of law to the facts are not protected by the clearly erroneous rule and are freely reviewable. United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 642 (5th Cir. 1986); Carpenters Amended & Restated Health Benefit Fund v. Holleman, 751 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Grayson State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920, 102 S. Ct. 1276, 71 L. Ed. 2d 460; Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1353 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 662 F.2d 1116, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949, 102 S. Ct. 2021, 72 L. Ed. 2d 474; See 9A Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2589 at 608 (2d Ed.1995) (citing authorities); See also Childress & Davis, supra at 11-22 ("Because abuse of discretion review and clearly erroneous review tend to merge when the discretionary judgment calls overlay fact decisions, it is unlikely that the outcome is much altered in most cases.")
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) explicitly makes clear that Rule 702, as elucidated by Daubert, authorizes a qualified expert in a realm outside of hard science to testify to an opinion or inference based on his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education if it is soundly grounded in the principles and methodology of his discipline and is relevant to a fact in issue or to an understanding of the evidence. Even prior to Watkins, however, this circuit and others had at least implicitly understood this to be part of Daubert lore. See United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 1996) (engineer's opinion of potential for floods; real estate appraiser's opinion of value of land affected); Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1994) (doctors' opinions of silicone breast implants' cause of autoimmune disease); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994) (former sheriff's opinion of inadequate police discipline's cause of unjustifiable use of deadly force) ("Although ... Daubert dealt with scientific experts, its language relative to the 'gatekeeper' function of federal judges is applicable to all expert testimony offered under Rule 702." Id.); Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994) (economist's opinion of work-life expectancy); Cf. United States v. Murphy, 996 F.2d 94, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 971, 114 S. Ct. 457, 126 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1993) (expert's opinion that tools could have made marks on stolen cars' ignitions admitted).
Furthermore, as one commentator has recognized, simply because a non-scientific expert's testimony touches on evidence that theoretically could be tested by Newtonian science methodology, Daubert should not be interpreted so as to permit an advocate to put his or her opponent to the burden of establishing hard scientific reliability-validity upon demand. See 2 GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.5, at 79 (4th ed. 1996) ("For example, it would be ludicrous to require the proponent of a doctor's testimony to introduce evidence that every test the doctor conducted or reasonably relied upon under Rule 703 is scientifically reliable-valid. While 'widespread acceptance' is stated to be merely a factor in a judicial determination of reliability-validity, testimony by the expert that the 'scientific' evidence has received 'general acceptance' ... should be sufficient alone to support admissibility of 'scientific' evidence unless the opponent presents evidence creating a genuine issue as to the reliability-validity of the 'scientific' evidence ....") (footnotes omitted). See also G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, And Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 968 (1996) ("Fenner"). Cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing A Similarly Epistemological Approach To Ensuring The Reliability Of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2283-94 (1994).
For example, this court in Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787, 790-791 (5th Cir. 1994), concluded that a cardiologist's testimony was "ground [ed] in the methods and procedures of science" and was not mere "unsupported speculation," citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 despite his refusal to accept, as authoritative, either a single source or a collection of textbooks and journals in toto, because his testimony was based on "thirty years of experience as a practicing, board-certified cardiologist, on his review, among other things, of [the deceased plaintiffs'] medical records and the coroner's records, and on a broad spectrum of published materials."The Fourth Circuit in Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1383 (4th Cir. 1995), held that the testimony of experts who found a causal link between the plaintiff's liver failure and a combination of alcohol and Extra-Strength Tylenol was reliable although they did not use epidemiological data. Instead, they relied on the plaintiff's history, personal examinations of plaintiff, plaintiff's lab and pathology data, and peer-reviewed literature. In other words, the experts relied on the kind of data the medical community uses regularly in diagnosing patients. The court stated that it would "not declare such methodologies invalid in light of the medical community's daily use of the same methodologies in diagnosing patients." Id.
The Second Circuit in McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Company, 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995), held that the district court properly admitted the testimony of a medical doctor as to the causal link between glue vapors and plaintiff's injury, rejecting defendant's contentions that the doctor's methodology was flawed because he "could not point to a single piece of medical literature that says glue fumes cause throat polyps" and because " 'differential etiology,' [does not] qualif [y] as scientific under Daubert." Id. However, the basis of the doctor's opinion included his care and treatment of the plaintiff, her medical history, review of her medical and surgical reports, pathological studies, review of defendant's MSDS, his medical training and experience, use of differential etiology, and reference to scientific and medical treatises. Id. The court found that " [d]isputes as to the strength of his credentials, faults in his use of differential etiology as a methodology, or lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony." Id. at 1044. " 'Vigorous cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.' " Id.,(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S. Ct. at 2798). See also Becker v. Nat'l. Health Prods., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (admitting one expert's opinion based, in part, on over 30 years experience as a physician, and a second expert's opinion based, in part, on "clinical experience with 10,000 patients solely in gastroenterology"); Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1014 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Nothing ... prohibits an expert witness from testifying to confirmatory data, gained through his own clinical experience, on the origin of a disease or the consequences of exposure to certain conditions").
The fact that an expert witness is highly credentialed cannot create a danger of "unfair" prejudice. "Unfair prejudice," as used in Rule 403 does not exist simply because the evidence is adverse to the opposing party. Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it is not material. There must be a danger of "unfair" prejudice in order for the discretion to exclude to arise. Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1979).
Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides: "Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected...." This Rule indicates that courts of appeals should not reverse on the basis of erroneous evidentiary rulings unless a party's "substantial right" is affected. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 1991).
Having determined that Dr. Jenkins' testimony as to the cause of Moore's injury was improperly excluded, we must address whether the exclusion affected Moore's "substantial rights". EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1094 (5th Cir. 1994). This question is not susceptible to mechanical analysis. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d at 573(quoting 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 103 at 103-6 (1990)) ("Rule 103 is silent as to what factors a court must consider in determining whether substantial rights have been affected, indicating that the court must proceed on a case to case basis rather than apply a mechanical rule.") We have stated repeatedly, however, that an error is harmless if the court is sure, after reviewing the entire record, that the error did not influence the jury or had but a very slight effect on its verdict. E.E.O.C. v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1095 (5th Cir. 1994); Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d at 573; Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 762 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Underwood, 588 F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir. 1979).
The defendants-appellees and the dissenting opinion argue that the exclusion of Dr. Jenkins' causation testimony was harmless because it was cumulative to that of Dr. Alvarez. The argument is without merit. The testimony about disease and causation by a doctor who has done the original history taking, examinations, testing, diagnosis and etiology of a patient cannot be cumulative to that of a subsequent treating physician who essentially adopts and relies on the original doctor's work, analysis and opinions. To so contend would be as untenable as arguing that testimony by the author of a medical treatise is merely cumulative to that of anyone qualified to read and explain the text. Dr. Jenkins was the only expert witness who had made a thorough, comprehensive clinical medical evaluation of Moore; his work was the essential foundation for the opinion and testimony of the other expert witnesses. See Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir. 1986) (wrongly excluded expert's testimony was more comprehensive than that of other experts admitted "and was, therefore, at least partially non-cumulative."); See also 22 Wright & Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5220 at 306 (1978) (" [T]he question to be asked is whether the evidence on one side is so full that no jury that rejected it would be likely to change its mind because of the introduction of the proffered evidence."). Dr. Jenkins' qualifications were more impressive and his experience was broader and more extensive than that of Dr. Alvarez. Id. Moreover, Dr. Jenkins' explanation of the knowledge, principles, methodology, and reasoning underlying his causation opinion was significantly more lucid and articulate than that of Dr. Alvarez.
The cases relied on by the dissenting opinion are distinguishable as instances in which the excluded expert testimony was truly cumulative because it was interchangeable with and not foundational or seminal to that of the experts whose testimony was admitted. See Kendra Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Homco, Ltd., 879 F.2d 240, 243 (7th Cir. 1989) (court stated that a "gaggle" of experts had been allowed to testify to the exact same issue such that the exclusion of one of the defendants' three experts was harmless error); Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1980) (the plaintiffs had already been allowed to place into evidence, through two other witnesses, the points they sought to prove by putting the defendant's expert's deposition testimony into evidence so that the exclusion of the expert's deposition was harmless error); Miley v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 473 F.2d 856, 858 (5th Cir. 1973) (appellant was allowed two experts at trial to testify to the same issue such that the exclusion of a third was harmless error). In the present case Dr. Alvarez's testimony was heavily dependent upon and not fungible with that of Dr. Jenkins. Moreover, the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Jenkins' testimony caused additional prejudicial effects to plaintiffs' case, such as undermining and confusing Dr. Alvarez's testimony, mismatching Dr. Alvarez against Dr. Jones, and possibly creating the false impression that Dr. Jenkins, the more qualified and experienced of plaintiffs' experts, did not support Dr. Alvarez's causation testimony.
The dissenting opinion relies primarily on Allen v. Penn. Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996), but that case is not persuasive here because it is markedly distinguishable from the present case. Allen was a products liability suit against the manufacturer of ethylene oxide sterilizers by the widow and child of a hospital maintenance worker who died of brain cancer after 20 years on the job in which he occasionally replaced cylinders containing the sterilizers. The plaintiffs proffered expert scientific testimony that there is a causal link between human brain cancer and ethylene oxide exposure. The plaintiffs' experts based their opinions on evidence developed with hard scientific methods, viz., epidemiological studies, animal studies, cell biology, and health organization conclusions. The defendants responded with numerous reputable epidemiological studies indicating there is not a correlation between the ethylene oxide exposure and cancer of the human brain. The trial court found the plaintiffs' experts to be unqualified and also excluded their testimony for lack of sufficient scientific grounding. This court of appeals affirmed, holding that under Rule 702 the scientific data relied on by the experts did not furnish a scientifically valid basis for their conclusions, due to the paucity of epidemiological evidence, the unreliability of animal studies, and the inconclusiveness of cell biology. Id. at 198. In expressing an opinion on an issue not reached by the trial court, this court stated that the evidence was also excludable under Rule 703 because " [i]n this case, there is no direct evidence of the level of Allen's exposure to EtO. The [experts'] opinion relies principally on the affidavit of a coworker and on extrapolations concerning EtO handling at the hospital where Allen worked based on conditions in other hospitals in the 1970's." Id. at 198.
The dissenting opinion strays farther afield in its reliance on Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit's decision was based largely on Arkansas negligence and proximate cause law. The divided panel held that a family who lived near the defendant's plant at which wood particles were treated with formaldehyde could not recover for their claims of minor afflictions, such as headaches, sore throats, watery eyes, running noses, dizziness, and shortness of breath, because they failed to produce evidence that they were exposed to a hazardous level of formaldehyde from the fibers emanating from the plant. The part of the first passage of Wright which the dissenting opinion quotes does not pertain to the admissibility of evidence but to minimum standards of proof and proximate cause. Id. at 1107. Also, the dissenting opinion omits the remainder of that passage, which reads: "We do not require a mathematically precise table equating levels of exposure with levels of harm, but there must be evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that a defendant's emission has probably caused a particular plaintiff the kind of harm of which he or she complains before there can be a recovery." Id. The Eighth Circuit stated, however, that the trial court should have "excluded Dr. Peretti's testimony, as Willamette requested it to do, because it was not based on scientific knowledge." Id. at 1108 (citing Daubert and Rule 702). This certainly indicates that Dr. Peretti purported to present hard scientific testimony. The opinion does not state what kind of doctor Peretti was or upon what he said his opinion was based. Two other doctors mentioned by Wright were Dr. Fred Fowler, an industrial hygienist, and Dr. Jimmie Valentine, a pharmacologist. There is no indication that Peretti was a clinical physician or that he based his opinion on the methodology of clinical medicine.
The Seventh Circuit decision relied upon by the dissenting opinion, Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996), is also a scientific evidence case that is clearly distinguishable from the present case involving the proffer of a clinical medical opinion. A 60 year old smoker with a history of coronary artery disease, previous heart attack, high blood pressure, cholesterol count, and continued smoking, who suffered another heart attack after using a nicotine patch for three days, brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of the patch. The court of appeal affirmed a summary judgment based on the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff's scientific expert's "opinion concerning the role of the nicotine patch in Rosen's heart attack," was inadmissible. Id. at 318. The Seventh Circuit affirmed because the "scientific evidence" supplied "nothing but a bottom line" offering "neither a theoretical reason to believe that wearing a nicotine patch for three days, or removing it after three days, could precipitate a heart attack, or any experimental, statistical, or other scientific data from which such a causal relation might be inferred or which might be cause to test a hypothesis founded on theory." Id. at 318-319. The scientific expert was Dr. Fozzard, "a distinguished cardiologist and department head at the University of Chicago." Id. at 318. His testimony was proffered, however, as hard "scientific evidence," not as clinical medical evidence. Id. at 318. The court of appeal opinion is devoid of any indication that the scientific expert had ever seen, examined, tested or taken a history from the plaintiff. Consequently, the Rosen decision deals solely with the proffer of hard scientific testimony insufficiently grounded in scientific methodology and not the proffer of clinical medical testimony soundly grounded in the principles and methodology of that discipline, as in the present case.
The question we must decide is whether the district court was overzealous in performing the "gatekeeper" role the Supreme Court assigned to it in Daubert1 to admit only expert opinions that are "reliable." Daubert explains that expert testimony must be "scientific," that is based on scientific "knowledge" that is "grounded in the methods and procedures of science,"2 and that assists the trier of fact by having a "valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry." Id. at 590-92, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-2796; see also G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, its Essential Dilemma, and its Progeny, 29 Creighton L.R. 939 (1996). At bottom, the district court was charged with making an assessment of whether the reasoning and methodology used by Dr. Jenkins was scientifically valid and whether that reasoning properly applied to the facts at hand.
As in other evidentiary questions, the proponent of the expert testimony must satisfy the trial judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the Daubert conditions have been met. Claar v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994). We review preliminary factual findings of the district court necessary for determining admissibility for clear error. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2778, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987). We reverse a district court's evidentiary ruling only for manifest abuse of discretion. Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g. Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996).
In Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g. Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996), this Court held that expert testimony regarding exposure to chemicals and medical causation of cancer was not scientifically valid. The proffered experts' testimony consisted of human epidemiological evidence suggesting a link between ethylene oxide (EtO) exposure and increased risk of brain cancer, scientific studies conducted on rats, and the fact that EtO is known as a mutagen and genotoxin. Id. at 196. There were absolutely no scientific studies on a link between human brain cancer and EtO exposure. Id. at 197. In excluding the proffered expert testimony, the court stated emphatically that
In Wheat v. Pfizer, Inc., 31 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1994), the plaintiff sought to offer the testimony of a doctor to support his claim that the drug Feldene caused the plaintiff's hepatitis. While the admissibility of the expert's testimony was rendered moot by the court's resolution of the case on other grounds, the court noted "in passing that [the doctor's] testimony would not have survived the test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." Id. at 343 (citation omitted). The court continued:
Finally, in Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 1994), a case cited by the majority, we considered whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing a cardiologist to give his opinion on the cause of the plaintiff's death. The court recognized that Daubert controlled the analysis. Id. at 789-90.
Our sister circuits are in agreement that medical causation testimony by physicians is indeed "scientific" expert testimony. Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 80 F.3d 777 (3d Cir. 1996) (testimony of plaintiff's treating physician on diagnosis and causes of plaintiff's cancer subject to Daubert as scientific evidence); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996) (doctors' opinions on cause of plaintiffs' diseases properly excluded under Daubert as not being scientifically reliable); Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994) (physician's testimony as to cause of plaintiff's injuries properly admitted because of valid scientific basis under Daubert); Hose v. Chicago Northwestern Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (physician's expert opinion on plaintiff's exposure to toxic fumes and dust as causing disease subject to Daubert factors); Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 1243, 137 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1997) (plaintiff's experts' opinions on cause of lung cancer deemed "scientific knowledge"); Raynor v. Merrell Pharm. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (doctor's testimony regarding cause of birth defects governed by Daubert factors); Cella v. United States, 998 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1993) (case decided before Daubert but recognizing that expert medical opinion is "scientific" and should have "an epidemiological or scientific foundation").
If somehow one accepts the majority's view that Dr. Jenkins' testimony was not "hard" "scientific" expert testimony, it is nonetheless controlled by Daubert. In Watkins v. Telsmith, 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997), this Court concluded that the Daubert analysis applied to proffered expert testimony of an engineer, based on his training and experience, regarding the design of a conveyor. We expressly rejected the holding of the majority in today's case and the position of the Tenth Circuit that "application of the Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases where expert testimony is based solely on experience or training." Id. at 989 (quoting Compton v. Subaru, 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996)).
The majority's numerous references to the trial court as confused as to whether Moore had been exposed to a single chemical or to a mixture of chemicals; lacking a full understanding of both Dr. Jenkins' testimony and the chemical contents of the leaking drum; and "labor [ing] under confusion" are not supported by a fair review of the record. Excerpts from the record, reproduced in the footnote below, demonstrate that the trial judge was fully aware of the chemicals to which Mr. Moore was exposed at Ashland's facility.3 The record simply does not justify the majority's refusal to give the deference due the trial court in excluding the evidence.
The Allen court cited with approval Wright v. Willamette Industries, 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996). In that case, the plaintiffs lived a short distance from the defendant's fibreboard manufacturing plant. Plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they argued were caused by breathing airborne formaldehyde and other harmful chemicals emitted from the plant. The court reversed the district court's ruling allowing expert opinion testimony that the plaintiffs' complaints were related to their exposure to the plant's emissions. The court explained that in a suit to recover damages in a tort action:
In Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit considered the admissibility of a highly qualified medical expert's opinion on causation that lacked formal scientific support. In that case, the plaintiff sought to connect his use of a nicotine patch, to help him stop smoking, to his sudden heart attack. A distinguished cardiologist and department head at the University of Chicago testified that the heart attack was indeed triggered by the use of the nicotine patch. The Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Posner, held that the district court correctly declined to permit this testimony because it had an inadequate scientific basis. The court stated: "Under the regime of Daubert a district judge asked to admit scientific evidence must determine whether the evidence is genuinely scientific, as distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist." Id. at 318(citation omitted).
As one court observed, where the excluded expert's testimony does not add a new angle or argument to the point at issue, the testimony is considered cumulative and its exclusion is harmless error. Kendra Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Homco, Ltd., 879 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1980); Miley v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 473 F.2d 856, 858 (5th Cir. 1973). Mr. Moore's position on causation was presented by Dr. Alvarez; he was not entitled to have that same position repeated by Dr. Jenkins.
The Daubert factors may be relevant and appropriate, however, in assessing other types of expert evidence outside the realm of hard science. For example, this court and others have recognized the utility of testing as a factor for assessing the reliability of proffered expert engineering testimony in alternative design cases. Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997); Cummins v. Lyle Industries, 93 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1996); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Industries, Inc., 97 F.3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996). It is self evident, of course, that an engineer's proffered conclusion as to a feasible alternative design lends itself to verification by controlled testing or experimentation, whereas a medical patient usually cannot practicably, ethically or humanely be subjected to experimentation under conditions like those believed by a clinical physician to have caused the patient's disease simply to verify the doctor's proffered opinion
The dissenting opinion at page 710 is simply mistaken in stating that Dr. Jenkins had "no information" concerning the size of the trailer, the amount of the spillage, the level or duration of exposure. The dissent, like the trial court, fails to heed Daubert's admonition that " [t]he focus ... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S. Ct. at 2797
509 U.S. at 589-90, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-2795