Source: https://kupdf.net/download/title-2-article-124-133-criminal-law-ii-review-notes-revised-penal-code_59940a44dc0d60845e300d19_pdf
Timestamp: 2019-12-10 13:11:04
Document Index: 346369433

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 124', 'Art. 125', 'Art. 126', 'Art. 127', 'Art. 128', 'Art. 129', 'Art. 130', 'Art. 131', 'ART. 3', 'art. 3', 'Art. 132', 'Art. 133']

TITLE 2: Article 124-133: Criminal Law II Review Notes- Revised Penal Code - Free Download PDF
August 16, 2017 | Author: AizaFerrerEbina | Category: Search And Seizure, Search Warrant, Detention (Imprisonment), Crime & Justice, Crimes
Criminal Law II Revised Penal Code Title Two CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE Article 124-133 Revie...
CRIMINAL LAW II (Article 124-133)
TITLE TWO: CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE *these crimes violate certain provisions of the Bill of Rights (Art. III, 1987 Constitution) CHAPTER ONE: Arbitrary Detention or Expulsion, Violation of Dwelling, Prohibition, Interruption, And Dissolution of Peaceful Meetings and Crimes against Religious Worship Section One: ARBITRARY DETENTION AND EXPULSION Classes of Arbitrary Detention 1) Arbitrary detention by detaining a person without legal ground (124) 2) Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities (125) 3) Delaying release (126) *Right to Liberty The penalties for the three classes of arbitrary detention are the same, as provided in Article 124. Art. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person, shall suffer; 1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three days; 2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the detention has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days; 3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen days but not more than six months; and 4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months. The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of any person. ELEMENTS 1) Offender is a public officer or employee 2) He detains a person 3) Detention is without legal grounds The public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime, but when they detain a person they have no legal grounds therefor. Private individuals who conspired with public officers in detaining a person are guilty of arbitrary detention. (accomplice, accessory or principal by inducement/indispensable cooperation) Examples: 1) Policemen and other agents of the law
Judges Mayors Barangay captain Municipal councilor
ILLEGAL DETENTION – if detention is perpetrated by other public officers because they are acting in their private capacity. -
If offender is a private individual (Illegal Detention – Article 267-268)
DETENTION – actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. A person is detained when he is placed in confinement or there is a restraint on his person. “WITHOUT LEGAL GROUNDS” occurs when, 1) The person detained has not committed any crime, or, at least, there is no reasonable ground for suspicion that he has committed a crime 2) The person detained is not suffering from violent insanity or any other ailment requiring compulsory confinement in a hospital Therefore, the LEGAL GROUNDS for the detention of any person are 1) The commission of a crime 2) Violent insanity or any other ailment requiring compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT – usual cause of arbitrary detention A peace officer must have a warrant of arrest properly issued by the court to justify an arrest. If there is no warrant of arrest, the arrest of a person by a public officer may constitute arbitrary detention. LAWFUL ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant arrest a person: 1) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter) 2) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter) 3) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confines while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (continuous act of committing a crime – evading the serving of his sentence) “IN HIS PRESENCE” – when the officer sees the offense being committed, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, or when the offense
is continuing or has not been consummated at the time the arrest is made, the offense is said to be committed in his presence. “PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS” – must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion in arrests without a warrant PROBABLE CAUSE – such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It must be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witness he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. (not same as suspicion) The crime of arbitrary detention can be committed through imprudence. PERIODS OF DETENTION WHICH THE LAW PENALIZES 1) 2) 3) 4)
If the detention has not exceeded 3 days If the detention has continues more than 3 days but not more than 15 days If the detention has continued more than 15 days but not more than 6 months If the detention has exceeded 6 months
PENALTY, respectively 1) ARRESTO MAYOR in its maximum period (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) to PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) in its minimum period 2) PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium and maximum periods (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) 3) PRISION MAYOR (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) 4) RECLUSION TEMPORAL (12 years and 1 day to 20 years)
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. ELEMENTS 1) The offender is a public officer or employee 2) He has detained a person for some legal ground 3) He fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within a) 12 hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent b) 18 hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent
c) 36 hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent If the offender is a private person, the crime is illegal detention, not arbitrary detention. “SHALL DETAIN ANY PERSON FOR SOME LEGAL GROUND” – the detention is legal in the beginning because the person detained was arrested under any of the circumstances where arrest without warrant is authorized by law. If the detention of a person is not for some legal ground, it will be a case under Article 124, not under Article 125. Article 125 applies only when the arrest is made without a warrant of arrest. But the arrest must be lawful. It does not apply when the arrest is by virtue of a warrant of arrest. If the arrest is made with a warrant of arrest, the person arrested can be detained indefinitely until his case is decided by the court or he posts a bail for his temporary release. “SHALL FAIL TO DELIVER SUCH PERSON TO THE PORPER JUDICIAL AUTHORIRIES” – what constitutes a violation of Article 125 is the failure to deliver the person arrested to the proper judicial authority within the period specified therein. Delivery does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge. “PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES” – the courts of justice or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the “Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law. A detained person should be release when a judge is not available, if the maximum hours for detention provided under Article 125 have already expired. The filing of the information to proper judicial authorities may be waived if a preliminary investigation is asked for by the person arrested. The accused must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125, in the presence of his counsel. The illegality of detention is not cured by the filing of the information in court.
Art. 126. Delaying release. — The penalties provided for in Article 124 shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who delays for the period of time specified therein the performance of any judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or unduly delays the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner or the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person. ACTS PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 126 1) Delaying the performance of a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner 2) Unduly delaying the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner
3) Unduly delaying the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person (e.g. Habeas Corpus proceedings) ELEMENTS 1) The offender is a public officer or employee 2) There is a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or there is a proceeding upon a petition for the liberation of such person 3) The offender without good reason delays: 1) the service of the notice of such order to the prisoner; or 2) the performance of such judicial or executive order for the release of the prisoner; or 3) the proceedings upon a petition for the release of such person Wardens and jailers are the public officers most likely to violate Article 126.
Art. 127. Expulsion. — The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being thereunto authorized by law, shall expel any person from the Philippine Islands or shall compel such person to change his residence. ACTS PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 127 1) Expelling a person from the Philippines 2) Compelling a person to change his residence *Right of Abode *Right to Travel ELEMENTS 1) The offender is a public officer or employee 2) He expels any person from the Philippines, or compels a person to change his residence 3) The offender is not authorized to do so by law Only the court by a final judgment can order a person to change his residence, as illustrated in ejectment proceedings, expropriation proceedings and in the penalty of destierro. PENALTY PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years)
Section Two: VIOLATION OF DOMICILE CRIMES 1) Violation of Domicile by entering a dwelling against the will of the owner thereof or making search without previous consent of the owner (128)
2) Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained (129) 3) Searching domicile without witnesses (130) *Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Art. 128. Violation of domicile. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so. If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. ACTS PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 128 1) Entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof 2) Searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner 3) Refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after having been required to leave the same ELEMENTS 1) Offender is a public officer or employee 2) He is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or to make a search therein for papers and other effects If the offender who enters a dwelling against the will of the owner thereof is a private individual, the crime committed is TRESPASS TO DWELLING. “NOT BEING AUTHORIZED BY JUDICIAL ORDER” – there is authorization by judicial order when the public officer is armed with a search warrant duly issued by the court. “AGAINST THE WILL OF THE OWNER” – entrance of the public officer must be against the will of the owner of the dwelling, which presupposes opposition or prohibition by said owner, whether express or implied. If owner did not give consent, yet did not oppose or prohibited the entrance, the crime is not committed. An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant or without a warrant, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence, whatever its source, will supply the place of search warrant. Article 128 is not applicable when a public officer searched a person outside his dwelling without search warrant and such person is not legally arrested for an offense, because the papers or other effects
mentioned in Article 128 must be found in the dwelling. (Crime committed is GRAVE COERCION, if violence or intimidation is used, otherwise, it is UNJUST VEXATION.) “HAVING SURREPTITIOUSLY ENTERED SAID DWELLING” – what constitutes the crime is the refusal of the offender to leave the premises when required to do so – not the entrance into the dwelling, despite done surreptitiously. QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES 1) The offense is committed at nighttime 2) Any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime are not returned immediately after the search made by the offender PENALTY PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) in its minimum period PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) in its medium and maximum periods (if with qualifying circumstances)
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. — In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same. ACTS PUNISHABLE IN CONNECTION WITH SEARCH WARRANTS 1) Procuring a search warrant without just cause 2) Exceeding his authority or by using unnecessary severity in executing a search warrant legally procured ELEMENTS OF PROCURING A SEARCH WARRANT WITHOUT JUST CAUSE 1) The offender is a public officer or employee 2) He procures a search warrant 3) There is no just cause SEARCH WARRANT – an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. USES OF A SEARCH WARRANT Search and seizure of the following personal property: 1) Subject of the offense 2) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense
3) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense REQUISITES OF A SEARCH WARRANT 1) 2) 3) 4)
Upon probable cause One specific offense Probable cause determined personally by the judge Particular description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized anywhere in the Philippines
No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. A search warrant shall be valid for ten days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void. The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH – such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the same place sought to be searched. TEST OF LACK OF JUST CAUSE – whether the affidavit filed in support of the application for search warrant has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. PERJURY – executing a false affidavit or making a false statement under oath Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircraft for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence, it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. ELEMENTS OF EXCEEDING AUTHORITY OR USING UNNECESSARY SEVERITY IN EXCEUTING A SEARCH WARRANT LEGALLY PROCURED: 1) The offender is a public officer or employee 2) He has legally procured a search warrant 3) He exceeds his authority or uses unnecessary severity in executing the same PENALTY ARRESTO MAYOR (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) in its maximum period to PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) in its minimum period
Fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality. ELEMENTS 1) 2) 3) 4)
The offender is a public officer or employee He is armed with search warrant legally procured He searches the domicile, papers, or other belongings of any person The owner, or any member of his family, or two witnesses residing in the same locality are not present
In violation of domicile under Article 128, the public officer has no authority to make a search; in searching domicile without witnesses under Article 130, the public officer has a search warrant. SEARCH – to go over or look through for the purpose of finding something; to examine PENALTY ARRESTO MAYOR (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) in its medium and maximum periods
Section Three: Prohibition, Interruption, and Dissolution of Peaceful Meetings Art. 131. Prohibition, interruption and dissolution of peaceful meetings. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, without legal ground, shall prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful meeting, or shall dissolve the same. The same penalty shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who shall hinder any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its meetings. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall prohibit or hinder any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances. ACTS PUNISHED IN CONNECTION WITH PEACEFUL MEETINGS, ASSOCIATIONS, AND PETITIONS 1) Prohibiting or interrupting, without legal ground, the holding of a peaceful meeting, or dissolving the same (Right to Peaceful Assembly) 2) Hindering any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its meetings (Right to Association)
3) Prohibiting or hindering any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances *Freedom of Speech, of Expression, or of the Press *Right to Peaceful Assembly *Petition the Government for Redress or Grievances ELEMENTS 1) The offender is a public officer or employee 2) He performs any of the acts mentioned above A private individual cannot commit this crime. If the offender is a private individual, the crime is DISTURBANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER (Article 153) To commit the crime defined in paragraph 1 of Article 131, the public officer must act without legal ground. To constitute the violation, 1) the meeting must be peaceful, and 2) there is no legal ground for prohibiting, or interrupting or dissolving that meeting. The right to peaceful meeting is not absolute. The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal right, nor injurious to the right of the community or society and this power may be exercised under the police power of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations and promote the good order or safety and general welfare of the people. (Ignacio, et.al vs. Ela) When the meeting to be held is not peaceful, there is legal ground for prohibiting it. CASE TITLE: Ignacio, et. al vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 347, G.R. No. L-6858, May 31, 1956 FACTS: It appears that petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as Jehova’s Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic organization. In its publication "FACE THE FACTS", that society branded the latter as a religious organization which is "a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth." Desiring to hold a meeting in furtherance of its objectives, petitioners asked respondent to give them permission to use the public plaza together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, respondent allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious denomination as it is his belief that said kiosk should only be used "for legal purposes." And when their request for reconsideration was denied, petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus. It is now contended by petitioners that the action taken by respondent is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by our Constitution. ISSUE: The issue raised involves a little digression on the extent to which the right to peacefully assemble guaranteed by the Constitution may be invoked.
HELD: "The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of wellordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign ‘police power’, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose." It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be "injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society", and this power may be exercised under the "police power" of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of the case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by respondent for some time previous to the request made by petitioners. Respondent never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering that the tenets of petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which respondent must have considered in denying their request. The right to peaceably assemble is not absolute and may be regulated. (Navarro vs. Villegas) CASE TITLE: Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 371, G.R. No. L-31687, February 26, 1970 FACTS: On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the Mayor of the city of Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from 4-11pm.On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the grounds that, they have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstration during weekdays due to the events that happened from the past week. On the same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for its rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end before dark. The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the ground that it violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances (ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioner’s right to the equal protection of the law (art. 3, sec. 1). ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents act on denying the request of the petitioner violates the petitioners’ right to peaceable assembly and right to the equal protection of the law. HELD: That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner; That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order; That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to be held. That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving respondent Mayor's appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders; That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public: That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society. There is no legal ground to prohibit the holding of a meeting when the danger apprehended is not imminent and the evil to be prevented is not a serious one. The offender must be a stranger, not a participant, in the peaceful meeting. Interrupting and dissolving the meeting of municipal council by a public officer is a crime against a legislative body, not punished under Article 131. (People vs. Alipit, et.al.) CASE TITLE: People vs. Alipit, 44 Phil. 910, G.R. No. L-18853, August 22, 1922 FACTS: That on or about the 30th of May, 1920, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, Philippine Islands, the defendants Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, being the municipal president and the chief of police respectively of the said municipality of Cabuyao, did willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and acting under a previous agreement and conspiracy entered into between themselves and assisting and cooperating with each other, after the accused Exequiel Alipit had fired his revolver in the air, enter the session room of the municipality building of Cabuyao wherein the municipal council of
Cabuyao was holding a meeting presided over by the vice-president, Manuel Basa, and once in said room, the aforesaid accused Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, abusing their authority as municipal president and chief of police respectively, the former with a revolver in his hand, and both using violence and intimidation not only upon the person of said vice-president Manuel Basa, but also upon those of the councilors present at the aforesaid meeting, and without any justifiable motive or legal authority and by means of force, arrested said vice-president Manuel Basa and compelled him to submit himself to the arrest against the latter's will and over his protest and that of each and every one of the councilors and took him to the jail of the municipal building of Cabuyao, the accused Victorio D. Alemus taking at the same time possession of all the papers concerning the meeting that was being held by the municipal council of Cabuyao, by which acts the defendants succeeded in interrupting and dissolving the aforesaid meeting. ISSUE: The question is whether or not that meeting of the council in which there was a quorum of the absence or inability of the municipal president on account of the absence or inability of the municipal president (or of both causes) was a meeting the disturbance and interruption of which should be punished. HELD: Nobody has the right to dissolve, through violence, the meeting of a council under the present of the existence of such a legal defect which was not apparent, but required an investigation before it could be determined. Any stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal police, must respect the meeting of the municipal council which for the time being, at least, raises the presumption that no defect exists to render it illegal. That meeting of the municipal council was entitled to this respect on the part of the defendants and the aforesaid presumption was effective as to them. We are of the opinion that the law violated by the accused is Act No. 1755, which in its section 1, says: Any person who willfully or by force or fraud prevent or attempts to prevent the meeting of the Philippine Commission or the organizing or meeting of the Philippine Assembly or of any Insular legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter established, or the meeting or organizing of any provincial board or municipal or township council, and any person who willfully disturbs the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly, or in Insular legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter established, or any provincial board or municipal or township council, while in session, or who is guilty of any disorderly conduct in the immediate view or presence of any such body tending to interrupt the proceedings of such body or to impair the respect due to its authority, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both, in the discretion of the court. And in view of the allegations contained in the information herein, the accused may, and must, be convicted of a violation of said section 1 of this Act and punished accordingly. Stopping the speaker who was attacking certain churches in public meeting is a violation of Article 131. (People vs. Reyes, et.al) CASE TITLE: People vs. Reyes, et.al., C.A.-G.R. No. 13633-R, July 27, 1955
The Chief of Police who ordered the speaker in a public meeting of the Iglesia ni Cristo, then attacking the Catholic and Aglipayan churches, to stop and fired two shots in the air which dispersed the crowd and stopped the meeting, is liable under Article 131. PENALTY PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) in its minimum period
Section Four: Crimes against Religious Worship CRIMES 1) Interruption of religious worship (132) 2) Offending the religious feelings (133) *Free Exercise and Enjoyment of Religious Profession and Worship Art. 132. Interruption of religious worship. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall prevent or disturb the ceremonies or manifestations of any religion. If the crime shall have been committed with violence or threats, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. ELEMENTS 1) The offender is a public officer or employee 2) Religious ceremonies or manifestations of any religion are about to take place or are going on 3) The offender prevents or disturbs the same QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES -
If committed with violence or threats
Reading of Bible and then attacking certain churches in a public plaza is not a ceremony or manifestation of a religion, but only a meeting of a religious sect. (People vs. Reyes, et.al) CASE TITLE: People vs. Reyes, et.al., C.A.-G.R. No. 13633-R, July 27, 1955 FACTS: The Iglesia ni Cristo held a meeting at a public plaza after securing a permit to do so from the mayor. The meeting started with some singing, after which the minister of the sect read from the Bible and then delivered a sermon, in the course of which he attacked the catholic and Aglipayan churches. The Chief of Police ordered his policemen to stop the minister. When the minister refused, the Chief of Police fired two shots in the air which dispersed the crowd and stopped the meeting.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief of Police is liable under Article 132 of the Revised Penal Code HELD: The act of the Chief of Police is not a violation of Article 132, but of Article 131. PENALTY PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) in its minimum period PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) in its medium and maximum periods (if with qualifying circumstances)
Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. ELEMENTS 1) The acts complained of were performed 1) in a place devoted to religious worship, or 2) during the celebration of any religious ceremony 2) The acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES – those religious acts performed outside of a church, such as processions and special prayers for burying dead persons. CASE TITLE: People vs. Mandoriao, Jr., C.A., 51 O.G. 4619 When the application of the Church of Christ was to hold the meeting at a public place and the permit expressly stated that the purpose was to hold a prayer rally, what was held on that occasion was not a religious ceremony, even if a minister was then preaching “(that Jesus Christ was not God but only a man”). The rally was attended by persons who are not members of the sect. TITLE: People vs. Mandoriao, Jr., C.A., 51 O.G. 4619 FACTS: The Iglesia ni Cristo held a religious rally at a public place in Baguio. About 200 people attended the meeting; about 50 of who were members of the Iglesia ni Cristo but the rest were outsiders and curious listeners. While Salvio, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo, was expounding on his topic to the effect that Christ is not God, but only man, the crowd became unruly. Some people urged Mandoriao to go up the stage and have a debate with Salvio. Mandoriao however, was not able to speak before the microphone because the wire connecting it was abruptly disconnected. ISSUE: Whether or not the meeting was a religious ceremony. HELD: The meeting here was not a religious ceremony. A religious meeting is an “assemblage of people met for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform religious services in recognition of God as an object of worship…” The meeting here was not limited to the
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The supposed prayers and singing of hymns were merely incidental because the principal object of the rally was to persuade new converts to their religion. Assuming that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant cannot be said to have performed acts or uttered words offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The act complained of must be directed against a dogma or ritual, or upon an object of veneration. There was no object of veneration at the meeting. “ACTS NOTORIOUSLY OFFENSIVE TO THE FEELINGS OF THE FAITHFUL” – the acts must be directed against religious practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule, as mocking or scoffing at or attempting to damage an object of religious veneration. (People vs. Baes) Offense to feelings is judged from complainant’s point of view. (People vs. Baes) CASE TITLE: People vs. Baes, 68 Phil. 203, G.R. No. L-46000, May 25, 1939 FACTS: That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid accused, while holding the funeral of one who in life was called Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with the rites of religious sect known as the "Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed, through the churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church and is devoted to the religious worship thereof, against the opposition of the undersigned complainant who, through force and threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard. An act committed in grave profanation of the place, in open disregard of the religious feelings of the Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts complained of constitute the crime defined and penalized by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code HELD: Whether or of the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No. 58. "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful." CASE TITLE: People vs. Mandoriao, Jr., C.A., 51 O.G. 4619
Remarks that those who believed that Christ is God are anti-Christ, that all the members of the Roman Catholic Church are marked by the demon, and that the Pope is the Commander of Satan are notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. PENALTY ARRESTO MAYOR (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) in its maximum period to PRISION CORRECCIONAL (6 months and 1 day to 6 years) in its minimum period
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