Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/909/1357/431313/
Timestamp: 2019-06-17 20:46:29
Document Index: 247626371

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1028', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1582', '§ 1001', '§ 1001']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Eric Allen Manasen, Defendant-appellant, 909 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1990 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Eric Allen Manasen, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Eric Allen Manasen, Defendant-appellant, 909 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 909 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990)
Argued and Submitted June 4, 1990. Decided Aug. 3, 1990
A jury convicted him of possession of false identification in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a), (b) and (c) and of making a false statement as to his identity and the amount of currency in his possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Routine questioning by customs officials is normally not custodial interrogation that triggers Miranda. United States v. Troise, 796 F.2d 310, 314 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1980)). "To trigger the Miranda requirements at a customs inspection, not only must probable cause exist but also a person must reasonably believe that he is not free to leave."1 United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1980).
In United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit rejected an argument like Manasen's. There, Silva sought entry to the United States and lied when she told an immigration inspector that she was a United States citizen. After the inspector discovered her Venezuelan passport, he had probable cause to arrest her for an immigration violation. Instead of arresting her, he sent her through routine customs processing. An agent asked her to complete the standard customs declaration form. She gave false information about the amount of currency she was carrying and was convicted of making a false statement in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1001.
Silva argued on appeal that she should have received Miranda warnings before going through the customs process because there was probable cause to arrest for the immigration violation. Id. at 46. The Second Circuit rejected this argument. It held that probable cause to arrest on a charge unrelated to a customs violation did not trigger Miranda warnings during a routine customs inspection. Silva, 715 F.2d at 48. It found that although probable cause existed to arrest her, customs officials were still duty-bound to follow their normal process and were not precluded from asking her the usual inspection questions. Id. It reasoned that routine custom inquiries were an "inevitable burden commonly associated with border crossings" and fit within the exclusion recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629-30, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), that did not require warnings during general questioning absent the compelling atmosphere of custodial interrogation. Id. at 47; see also Chavez-Martinez v. United States, 407 F.2d 535, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1969) (routine customs process does not constitute custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes).
Manasen's argument is that when a fugitive with an outstanding arrest warrant seeks entry he should not be asked to identify himself unless he has been given Miranda warnings. We decline to accept such an argument. Customs officials are bound to examine every person entering the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1582. There was no reason to interrupt the routine questioning of Manasen. In fact, to hold otherwise would be to impair the effectiveness of United States Customs. " [N]ational self-protection reasonably requir [es] one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in."2 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).
Manasen also argues that he meets the requirements for the "exculpatory no" exception to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 which provides in part:
The exculpatory no doctrine provides an exception to liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. United States v. Alzate-Restreppo, 890 F.2d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 1989). It applies if five factors are present:
United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988). If the defendant fails to meet any one of the requirements, the exception does not apply. United States v. Becker, 855 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. 1988).
Manasen failed to meet the first requirement because his false statement was related to claiming the privilege of entering the United States. See United States v. Carrier, 54 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1981) (seeking entry into the United States is claim of privilege). The district court properly denied his motion to acquit.
Manasen relies on United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1982), to support his argument that Miranda warnings were required. The court there found that customs officers should have given the warnings because they had probable cause to believe that Duncan had committed an offense. Id. at 979. Implicit in this holding was a finding of custody
Manasen was not in custody. He had been placed with all other bus passengers in a standard processing room and given standard questions asked by customs agents. See United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1265 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1980) ("A person answering the initial questions of a customs agent at a border is not already in custody.").
Manasen mistakenly relies on Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that routine questioning that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response constitutes interrogation for Miranda purposes. Because Mata-Abundiz expressly limited its holding to "in-custody questioning," it does not apply here. Manasen was not in custody. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990) (responses to routine interrogation are not testimonial for purposes of Miranda)