Source: http://www.ipsofactoj.com/DecidedCases/international/2005A/part03/int2005A(03)-005.htm
Timestamp: 2017-09-26 10:58:24
Document Index: 316389189

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 3', 'Art.5', 'Art.8', 'Art.9', 'Art.10', 'Art.11', 'Art.2']

Gillan v Commissioner of Police [CAEW]
IpsofactoJ.com: International Cases [2005A] Part 3 Case 5 [CAEW]
R (Gillan)
LADY JUSTICE ARBEN DBE
Woolf LCJ
This is an appeal against the decision of 31 October 2003 of the Divisional Court (Brooke LJ and Maurice Kay J) which dismissed the appellants’ claims for judicial review. The appellants had challenged the lawfulness of their being stopped and searched on 9 September 2003 by police officers. The police officers rely on an authorisation made under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (the "2000 Act") by the Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and its subsequent confirmation by the Secretary of State to justify their actions.
An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to stop a vehicle in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to search-
An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to stop a pedestrian in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to search-
An authorisation under subsection (1) or (2) may be given only if the person giving it considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism.
An authorisation may be given-
The power conferred by an authorisation under section 44(1) or (2)-
A constable exercising the power conferred by an authorisation may not require a person to remove any clothing in public except for headgear, footwear, an outer coat, a jacket or gloves.
Where a constable proposes to search a person or vehicle by virtue of section 44(1) or (2) he may detain the person or vehicle for such time as is reasonably required to permit the search to be carried out at or near the place where the person or vehicle is stopped.
An application under subsection (5) must be made within the period of 12 months beginning with the date on which the vehicle or pedestrian was stopped.
the requirement for the authorisation by a senior police officer and its confirmation by the Secretary of State;
the limited life of the authorisation and the requirement for it to be regularly renewed; and
the precisely defined purpose for which the power may only be exercised.
On 13 August 2003, Assistant Commissioner Veness of the Metropolitan Police gave an authorisation under sections 44(1) and (2) of the 2000 Act in relation to the whole of the Metropolitan District. The authorisation ran for 28 days until 9 September 2003. It was duly confirmed by the Secretary of State. On 9 September 2003 Assistant Commissioner Veness gave a further authorisation under the same provisions, again in relation to the whole of the Metropolitan District. This authorisation again ran for 28 days until 6 October 2003. On 11 September 2003, the Secretary of State confirmed the further authorisation under section 46(4) of the 2000 Act, making no variations to it. This was part of a programme of successive authorisations or a "rolling programme" which has been taking place since the coming into force of sections 44 to 47 of the 2000 Act on 19 February 2001.
At about 1.15pm on 9 September 2003, the second appellant, wearing a photographer’s jacket, carrying a small bag and holding a camera in her hand was stopped close to the arms fair. She had apparently emerged from some bushes. The second appellant was in the area to film the protests against the arms fair. She was searched by a police officer from the Metropolitan Police notwithstanding that she showed her press cards to show who she was. She was told to stop filming. The police officer told her that she was using her powers under sections 44 and 45 of the 2000 Act. Nothing incriminating was found and the second appellant was allowed to go on her way. The record of her search showed she was stopped for five minutes but she thought it was more like thirty minutes. She says she felt intimidated and she was so distressed that she did not feel able to return to the demonstration although it had been her intention to make a documentary or sell footage of the demonstration.
The nature of the appellants’ case has developed as these proceedings continued. The original grounds of challenge can be summarised as follows:
The 13 August 2003 authorisation and its successor were ultra vires.
The use of the section 44 authorisation by police officers to stop and search the first appellant and other protestors was contrary to the legislative purpose and unlawful. In the circumstances it was clear that the guidance given to police officers was either non-existent or calculated to cause officers to misuse the powers. In the alternative, the guidance given was inadequate or misleading.
The decisions to authorise and the use of the powers under section 44 and section 45 to stop and search the appellants and other protestors were a disproportionate interference with the rights arising under Articles 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the "ECHR").
THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT BELOW
The Court noted that the appellants’ then-counsel (who did not appear before us) had submitted that there were a number of "clear indications" that Parliament intended a section 44 authorisation to be given and confirmed only in response to "an imminent terrorist threat to a specific location in respect of which normal police powers of stop and search were inadequate". This very narrow interpretation of the section 44 powers was rejected by the Court. It was inconsistent with the structure of the 2000 Act. Parliament had envisaged that an anti-terrorist authorisation might encompass an entire police area or district.
Section 44(4) gave the relevant senior officer a broad discretion as to the width of the authorisation required, subject to the Secretary of State’s confirmation. The Court rejected the appellants’ construction and concluded that "the judicial function in scrutinising a decision of this kind is necessarily a limited one". The assessment of national security and the measures required to protect it was one primarily for the Government and Parliament. There was no ground upon which the Court should set aside the decision in question.
The third ground was founded on the proposition that the section 44 authorisations and the exercise of the powers under them constituted a disproportionate interference with the appellants’ rights under Articles 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The appellants had submitted that the use of the powers in question (although they could, in appropriate circumstances, permissibly interfere with fundamental rights) was not proportionate in the context of peace protestors. Additionally, the scale of interference was significantly more in this instance than what was necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose.
The Court noted that "[i]f there were any question of the police using these powers as part of day-to-day policing on the streets of London" then the appellants’ submission with regard to the proportionality of the powers’ use would have "considerable force". However, there was no evidence of this before the Court. The Court concluded that the threat posed by terrorist activity was such that it provided the necessary justification for any violation of the appellants’ rights under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 that might otherwise be established. No breach of Article 5 was either pursued by counsel or found.
This is that the Divisional Court erred in concluding that the authorisation made by the first respondent on 13 August 2003 and confirmed by the second respondent on 14 August 2003 was lawful. The ground is linked to an allegation that the Divisional Court had inappropriately shown deference to the decision of the respondents in coming to their interpretation of the powers contained in section 44. In particular Mr Rabinder Singh QC argues that a restricted meaning was required to be given to the word "expedient" in section 44(3). By contrast he contends that the only conclusion that can be drawn from the extent of the use of the powers is that the authorisations were being used as an additional tool by the police with the "full sanction" of both respondents. This is not what Parliament intended and therefore the making and confirmation of the authorisations was unlawful.
The Divisional Court erred in concluding that the use of stop and search powers under the authorisation against the appellants did not thwart or frustrate the legislative purpose of the 2000 Act. This ground is based on Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1968] AC 997. It primarily concerns the first respondent since it is a ground that deals with the exercise of the authorisation under section 44, and does not directly relate to the second respondent. The appellants submit that there was a failure on the part of the police to ensure that the duty to give appropriate instructions to officers relating to the exercise of powers under section 44 was actually effected. As the appellants note, the statement of Commander Messinger (who was in charge of policing the arms fair) does not reveal what instructions (if any) were given to officers under his command prior to the stop and search of the appellants on 9 September 2003. The appellants contend that:
the only thing that officers were told was that a section 44 authorisation was in force; and
there is no evidence that the respondents had intelligence that the arms fair was a terrorist target or that terrorists were amongst the ranks of those protesting (point (b) is not in dispute).
The allegation is that the Divisional Court failed to construe sections 44 to 47 of the 2000 Act in accordance with the "principle of legality". The appellants describe the principle of legality as being "that fundamental rights cannot be overridden by, or pursuant to, general words" and submit that such a principle was recognised in R v Home Secretary, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115. Although this argument was not advanced in the same terms in the Divisional Court it is similar to the appellants’ submission as to statutory construction which was argued below. The appellants argue that the Divisional Court’s construction of the word expedient in section 44(3) as "advantageous" or "suitable to the circumstances of the case" should have taken into account more fully the following wording, namely "for the prevention of acts of terrorism". Fundamental rights were being overridden by the wide interpretation of the "general" word "expedient".
Here it is contended that the Divisional Court failed to construe sections 44 to 47 of the 2000 Act in accordance with the requirements of section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 so that it would be compatible with rights under the ECHR, in particular Articles 5, 8, 10 and 11.
This ground is also based on the Human Rights Act 1998. It is suggested that the Divisional Court erred in concluding that the authorisation, its confirmation and the use of the stop and search powers thereunder were prescribed by law and constituted a disproportionate interference with the appellants’ rights under Articles 5, 8, 10 and 11. The appellants contend that the authorisation, its confirmation and the use of powers under it are not prescribed by law since the expression "prescribed by law" requires a provision to be "adequately accessible and reasonably foreseeable". The making of the confirmation and the extent of the authorisation were not made public and it was only when Liberty started to ask questions that its existence became known. The citizen could do nothing to "regulate their conduct to avoid being stopped and searched". In addition, the appellants submit that the authorisation and the use of powers under it, against peace protestors, are not a proportionate means of achieving the legislative purpose of preventing acts of terrorism. Interference with human rights had not been minimised. The power was being used as if it were "part of day-to-day policing on the streets of London".
The contention under this head is that the Divisional Court failed to give any consideration to Article 15 of the ECHR and the power of the United Kingdom to take measures to derogate from its obligations in times of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Had there been such an emergency, Parliament would and should have made an appropriate derogation rather than passing "legislation in a vague and overbroad manner". It is also argued that if there were really a public emergency threatening the nation, Parliament, as is permitted by Article 15 would have derogated from its obligations under the ECHR in order to address such an emergency. If no such derogation is made, then the 2000 Act should be construed very narrowly and in accordance with the ECHR.
that of the 2000 Act. What is suggested is that section 44, in view of its subject matter; should be construed restrictively. We will describe this as the " Interpretation Question";
that of the Assistant Chief Constable (here Mr Veness) who in his discretion granted the authorisations. We will describe this as the "Authorisation Question",
that of the Secretary of State, in exercising his discretion to confirm the authorisations. We will refer to this as the "Confirmation Question";
that of the officer (here Commander Messinger) who was in charge of the police officers who were to exercise the power to stop and search. We will refer to this as the "Command Question"; and
that of the officers who respectively stopped and searched each of the appellants. We will refer to this as the "Operational Question".
A number of the appellants’ contentions are couched in terms that are critical of the Divisional Court’s reasoning. We are not impressed by that criticism, which we consider is based on a misreading of the judgment. However, we do not propose to deal expressly with the criticism; what we are concerned with is what is the right answer to the issues and as we will express our views as to this, our views on the specific criticisms of the approach adopted by the Divisional Court will not advance this appeal.
This brings us to the general approach that the courts should adopt when reviewing the exercise of a power which is provided by Parliament for the prevention of terrorism. Possible terrorist activities create unusual difficulties for the authorities who have the responsibility for preventing them happening. Quite apart from the serious direct damage that they can cause, there is the continuing damage that can result from the fear of the public of further incidents. In addition, the range and nature of the terrorist incidents that are possible increase the difficulty in taking preventive action. For this reason, the courts will not readily interfere with the judgement of the authorities as to the action that is necessary. They will therefore usually not interfere with the authorities’ assessment of the risk and the action that should be taken to counter the risk.
Avoiding the use of the word "deference" because of its inaccurate connotations, the position is that, while the courts will respect the authorities’ view as to matters of security, this does not mean that the court has no role as to proportionality. What action is or is not proportionate is still very much an issue for the judgment of the court. The court will usually place in the scales the authorities’ evaluation of the action needed to avoid the terrorist incident as against the court’s assessment of the effect on the member of the public. But the ultimate determination of what is or is not proportionate still rests with the court. This task has to be performed in accordance with the approach indicated by Lord Steyn in R (Daly) v Home Secretary [2001] 2 AC 532 at p.547.
ARTICLES 5, 8, 10 & 11
The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance. Although the process of classification into one or other of these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion, the Court cannot avoid making the selection upon which the applicability or inapplicability of Article 5 depends.
The starting point must be the concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.
Based on these criteria, cases will, depending on their specific facts, fall on one side or the other of the "dividing line". Lester & Pannick, Human Rights Law and Practice (2004), p.163, provides a number of examples of what will constitute an infringement of Article 5. In Guzzardi itself, the EctHR held that a suspected mafia member was deprived of his liberty during one phase of his detention, when he was made the subject of a compulsory residence order requiring him to live on a small island subject to strict police supervision. In Engel v Netherlands the EctHR held that "strict arrest" imposed on soldiers for disciplinary offences amounted to a deprivation of liberty despite the different standards that apply to army personnel. In the unreported case of Hojemeister v Germany, the Commission held that detention incidental to a lawful search was not sufficient to trigger Article 5 protection.
Pannick & Lester [2004:164] note that "[d]etention does, however, depend upon the intention of the authorities". Accordingly, where the police intend merely to question a suspect without detaining him, Article 5 will not apply. In X v Germany 88 19/79: 24 DR 158 (1981) at 161, the Commission decided that the object of police action was not clearly to deprive those involved of their liberty; the police action was: "[....] simply to obtain information from them about how they obtained possession of the objects found on them and about thefts which had occurred in the school previously." The Commission therefore held that a 10 year-old girl who was questioned at a police station for two hours without being arrested, locked into a cell or formally detained was not deprived of her liberty for the purposes of Article 5.
Where a person is briefly detained on the street or at a customs post in order to check for stolen, prohibited, or dutiable goods, there is a deprivation of liberty, albeit only for a short period: the person is not free to move anywhere without the agreement of the officer until the procedure is complete.
Under ECHR Article 5(1) and the Human Rights Act 1998, a deprivation of liberty does not take place if someone is detained for a very limited time. Searches of the person falling short of arrest entail a detention for only a short period.
The existence of [Article 2 of Protocol 4] shows either that those who originally framed the Convention on Human Rights did not contemplate that [Article 5] should go beyond preventing actual deprivation of liberty, or extend to mere restrictions on freedom of movement [....] The resulting picture is that [Article 5] of the Convention guaranteed the individual against illegitimate [....] imprisonment, or confinement so close as to amount to the same thing – in sum against deprivation of liberty stricto sensu but it afforded no guarantee against restrictions [....] falling short of that.
the likely limited nature of any infringement of Article 5 in any normal stop and search;
the fact that the main aim of a stop and search will not be to deprive an individual of his liberty but rather to effect a verification of one form or another (for example, the rapid verification that the person stopped is not carrying articles of a kind that could be used in connection with terrorism); and
Article 2 of Protocol 4 which, in dealing specifically with the right to liberty of movement, gives some indication of the intended scope of Article 5,
The case might be different if the powers, ostensibly granted for the limited purposes of the 2000 Act, were in fact used, wrongly, in order to control or deter attendance at demonstrations. The evidence of the two appellants, that we have recorded at para. 16-17 above, gives some cause for concern in those respects, particularly in view of the alleged seizure from the first appellant of papers relating to the demonstration, and the alleged prevention of the second appellant from filming. However, as we indicate in paras. 56-57 below, those issues were not tested in these proceedings, because the thrust of the appellants’ case, and thus the response of the respondents, was directed primarily at the general conformity of the legislation with articles 10 and 11: on which issue, as we have said above, the legislation itself cannot be criticised.
The Commander’s responsibilities in relation to section 44 did not end with his designating the fair as an appropriate event in connection with which stop and search powers should be used. Indeed, we do not believe for a moment that he would regard it as all that was required. We expect that he would agree with us that officers who were to exercise the powers should receive carefully designed instructions (or if this had been done previously, a reminder) on their use. The evidence as to what happened is lamentable. There is reference to the officers being told they could use their powers and a slide being shown. There is little else, and there is no evidence of an explanation being given to the officers who would be dealing with the public as to the limits on their powers and as to how the powers should be deployed.
We received no satisfactory explanation from the first respondent as to the inadequacies of the evidence. However, it was clear to us that part of the explanation could be that while the nature of the appellants’ case has changed as the proceedings progressed, it has been, as Mr Rabinder Singh accepts, focused on the issues of principle and not on the circumstances of the individual appellants. It was no doubt also recognised that proceedings for judicial review are not the correct forum in which to investigate factual issues. Nonetheless, it is still regrettably the position that in answer to the respondents’ statements of what happened to them, the only response is the notes made by the police officers. We are without any statements from the officers.
The onus is on the first respondents to show that the interference with the appellants of which complaint is made was lawful. It is not possible to say that the onus has been discharged on the evidence before us. On the appellants’ evidence remarks were made that suggest that the powers could have been used in order "to police" the protest. This would not be a lawful use of the power. We have also pointed out in para. 49 above to the potential evidential difficulties under Articles 10 and 11 that are presented by some parts of the appellants’ evidence. As we have said, the form of these proceedings does not permit the resolution of those matters; but we feel sure that the respondents will wish to review very carefully those aspects of this operation, and of the briefing that the officers on the ground received before performing their powers and duties under the Act. This is the sum of what can be said on the limited evidence available.
Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1968] A.C. 997
R v Home Secretary, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115
R (Daly) v Home Secretary [2001] 2 AC 532
Engel v Netherlands (1976) I EHRR 647
Guzzardi v Italy, (1980) 3 EHRR 333
Hojemeister v Germany, unreported
X v Germany 88 19/79: 24 DR 158 (1981)
In the Matter of an Application under section 83.28 of the Criminal Code 2004 SCC 42
Terrorism Act 2000: s.44, s.45
European Convention on Human Rights: Art.5, Art.8, Art.9, Art.10, Art.11, Protocol 4 (Art.2)
Lester & Pannick, Human Rights Law and Practice (2004)
Prof Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2002)
Mr Rabinder Singh QC & Mr Rajiv Menon (instructed by Liberty) for the Appellants
Mr John McGuiness QC, Mr Philip Sales & Mr Philip Coppel (instructed by Metropolitan Police Directorate of Legal Services) for the Respondent.