Source: http://vocasupport.com/casa/ga-incidents-2/helicopters-2/abc-chopper/
Timestamp: 2018-12-14 10:12:26
Document Index: 731112688

Matched Legal Cases: ['ART 133', 'art 133', 'art 133', 'art 133', 'art 133', 'art 133', 'arts 119', 'art 133', 'art 133', 'art 133', 'art 133', 'art 61']

ABC Chopper « Assistance to the Aviation Industry
Some comments from pprune:
7. Comparisons with the Bell helicopter incident at Hamilton Island:
16th Nov 2013, 17:30 #53 (permalink)
Linking the links i.e. accident(s) causal chains (back to reason)!
Having now read the report (AO-2011-102), scrolled through numerous media articles and video coverage, including the ABC 7:30 report (Report on ABC helicopter crash urges overhaul of regulations), I’m quite disturbed by some very interesting parallels coupled with some déjà vu(flashbacks) to episodes in the Senate Inquiry and previous Senate Estimates. {Note: The 7:30 vid is well worth watching but warning you’ll have to put up with large sections of Beaker fumbling along mi..mi..mi-ing . However it is not quite as bad as his appearances at the Senate inquiry/Estimates or the ‘head buried in the sand’ interview on 4 corners..see here- 4C Beaker interview }
So for a setting the scene here’s a quote from the 7:30 Report transcript(my bold):
PHILIPPA MCDONALD: The crash and subsequent fire was so intense that Air Transport Safety investigators feared they’d never determine exactly what happened. But an intense two-year forensic investigation uncovered far more than ever anticipated, with vital information provided by the United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory.MARTIN DOLAN: One of the key things they did for us was to feed into some modelling of human perception the flight data that we had for this flight which showed that the sort of increasing bank associated with this helicopter and this accident would probably until very late in the stage not have been detectable without visual reference or without reference to instruments.
PHILIPPA MCDONALD: Investigators believe the pilot experienced what’s called spatial disorientation. In the dark of night, with no visible horizon, he couldn’t recognise the chopper’s spiralling descent in time to recover.
Fellow chopper pilot and friend, David Wilson, knows how spatial disorientation can unhinge the senses.
DAVID WILSON, CHANNEL NINE PILOT: I don’t think there’d be a pilot out there today who couldn’t say he has never suffered from spatial disorientation. It’s a matter of firstly recognising it and then doing something about it because it fights all your senses. You think you’re sitting bolt upright, whereas you’re actually leaning at 45 degrees.
PHILIPPA MCDONALD: Gary Ticehurst was considered one of the nation’s best helicopter pilots and was qualified to fly under the conditions that night. But the Australian Transport Safety Bureau says this tragedy shows aviation regulations need to be tightened.
MARTIN DOLAN: We’re saying we’re not sure that flight in dark-night conditions, that the standards of safety are necessarily at the level they should be and we’re asking the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to take a close look at that.
PHILIPPA MCDONALD: The Civil Aviation Safety Authority says things will change. In future, all helicopters flying at night with passengers will have to be fitted with an autopilot or have a two-pilot crew.
This is where the neurons started pinging around, so I then referred to the report and in particular Appendix F – Accidents involving night VFR operations. In table F1 (halfway down the page) there was this entry:
200304282
Bell 407 helicopter, VH-HTD, aerial work (emergency medical services) en route from Mackay to Hamilton Island, Qld. Loss of control en route. Dark night conditions. 3 POB, all fatally injured.
It was then that it all started to gel and drew my attention to a recent post from PAIN post #34 , that linked to some working notes and this is where it gets interesting , from the PAIN notes:
1) CFIW: East of Cape Hillsborough, QLD, Bell 407, VH-HTD; 17 October 2003.
Report – R20050002.
Issue date 14 March 2005.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24411/a…304282_001.pdf
As a result of the investigation, safety recommendations were issued to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority recommending: a review of the night VFR requirements, an assessment of the benefits of additional flight equipment for helicopters operating under night VFR and a review of the operator classification and/or minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS
ATSB Safety Recommendation.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review it’s operators classification and/or it’s minimum safety standards required for helicopter Emergency Medical Services operations. This review should consider increasing; (1) the minimum pilot qualifications, experience and recency requirements, (2)
operational procedures and (3) minimum equipment for conduct of such operations at night.
Ok so if you then download the 2003 ATSB report (link above) and put that report alongside the AO-2011-102 report you will see some remarkable parallels..especially in the areas that deal with spatial disorientation and in the Safety Actions/Recommendations section (pg 71 onwards from 2003 report).
{Hmm..kind of makes you wonder why the ATSBeaker needed to rely on the United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory when they had already done the hard work back in 2003.}
On a final note here is a quote from the PAIN working notes from Coroner Henessy’s findings/recommendations:
16. The Coroner supports CASR draft regulations point 61 and 133 becoming final.
17. That beacons, both visual and radio, be placed on prominent and appropriate high points along routes commonly utilised by aero-medical retrieval teams, including Cape Hillsborough.
18. The Coroner supports the ATSB recommendations 20030213,and promulgation of information to pilots; 20040052, assessment of safety benefits of requiring a standby altitude indicator with independent power source in single pilot night VFR; 20040053, assessment of safety benefits of requiring an autopilot or stabilisation augmentation system in single pilot VFR; and R20050002, review operator classification and minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS operations.
Starting to join the dots?? More to follow..Sarcs (K2)
CASA SRs for AO-2011-102: AO-2011-102-SI-02 , AO-2011-102-SI-03
CASA SRs for air200304282: R20040053,R20050002, R20010195, R20030213.
Note: With the courage of their convictions and experience, you will note that the bureau of old issued R20030213 within a month of the accident.. compare that to ATSBeaker…27 months was it??
Last edited by Sarcs; 17th Nov 2013 at 10:20. Reason: Addendum: SR Links
16th Nov 2013, 19:51 #54 (permalink)
casa is out of touch with the Aviation Industry and so is mccormick
Good brief sarcs.The following is the history of the PART 133 [seven years have passed in this one, since the atsb SR] and still not complete, yet casa are loading the industry with a bunch of rubbish regs in this process:
CASR Part 133 – Australian air transport operations – rotorcraft –
Consultation updates in 2012 CASR Part 133 – Consultation Draft of CASR Part 133 – Australian Air Transport Operations – Rotorcraft Comments now closed.
26 Jun 2012 Briefing on CASR Part 133 – May 2012 Updated briefing on CASR Part 133 – May 2012
17 May 2012 Consultation updates in 2009 NPRM 0811OS – Passenger Transport Services, International Cargo and Heavy Cargo (above 8640kgs MTOW) – Rotorcraft This NPRM is now available.
6 May 2009 Consultation updates in 2008 NPRM 0807OS – Passenger Transport Services: terminology in and application of new CASR Parts 119, 121, 129, 131, 133 and 135 This NPRM closed for comment on 6 February 2009.
11 Dec 2008 Consultation updates in 2003 NPRM 0301OS – Air Transport and Aerial Work Operations – Rotorcraft NPRM 0301OS – Air Transport and Aerial Work Operations – Rotorcraft has been published. Your comments are invited by 30 May 2003.
27 Mar 2003 Consultation updates in 2002 MOS Part 133 – Air Transport & Aerial Work Operations – Rotorcraft Draft Chapter 11 titled Airworthiness and Maintenance Control to Manual of Standards – MOS Part 133 – Air Transport & Aerial Work Operations – Rotorcraft, has been published. Your comments are invited.
6 Aug 2002 Consultation updates in 2001 New technical working draft regulations for CASR 133 maintenance aspects CASR Part 133 maintenance aspects of the regulations have been developed and are available for review.
18 Oct 2001 Consultation updates in 2000 DP 0006OS – Commercial Air Transport Operations — Rotorcraft DP 0006OS – Commercial Air Transport Operations — Rotorcraft response period has been extended to close on 31 January 2001.
6 Dec 2000 DP 0006OS – Commercial Air Transport and Aerial Work Operations – Rotocraft DP 0006OS – Commercial Air Transport and Aerial Work Operations – Rotocraft has been published. Your comments are requested by 8 December 2000.
From the atsb site:
Output No: R20050002 Date issued: 14 March 2005 Safety action status:
17th Nov 2013, 05:25 #55 (permalink)
Can someone make sure the idiot reporters at the ABC get a copy of Sarcs # 53 where he does their job for them, properly and almost writes their story. What a sorry tale ABC investigative journalism makes, how sad that our national “razor sharp” press cannot research and develop a story that is very much in the nations interest. Why would they bother, it’s probably more self indulgent and PC to publicly weep and wail over a lost comrade, rather than to try to understand why he’s dead, why the ATSB and CASA are full of it and why entire industry is seriously pissed off. Wakey wakey Aunty…. I’ll stick my neck out and say that the Sarcs post more clearly defines, in one page the need for reform than all the bloody awful polly chatter, CASA waffle and ATSB probability statements ever printed. Nicely played Sarcs, please accept my vote for the post of the year award. Bravo……Indeed, well done sirrah.
17th Nov 2013, 13:23 #56 (permalink)
Captain 49’er & Beaker’s Pink Elephant insulation scheme cont/-
Aw shucks “K”.. but..but..but I’m not finished yet!! From the Hansard Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee 23/05/2012 Estimates (my bold):
Senator FAWCETT: I notice CASA is often another player in the coronial inquests and often you will highlight something, the coroner will accept it and basically tick off in his report on the basis that a new CASR or something is going to be implemented. Do you follow those up? I have looked through a few crash investigations, and I will just pick one: the Bell 407 that crashed in October ’03. CASR part 133 was supposed to be reworked around night VFR requirements for EMS situations. I notice that still is not available now, nearly 10 years after the event. Does it cause you any concern that recommendations that were accepted by the coroner, and put out as a way of preventing a future accident, still have not actually eventuated? How do you track those? How do we, as a society, make sure we prevent the accidents occurring again?Mr Dolan : We monitor various coronial reports and findings that are relevant to our business. We do not have any role in ensuring that coronial findings or recommendations are carried out by whichever the relevant party may be. I think that would be stepping beyond our brief.
History will show that the ‘Machiavellian One’ completely obfuscated the good Senator’s question until it was lost in all the ‘white noise’ of politics and parliamentary process.
That is of course until it was (in part) brought up again in the PelAir inquiry. The committee, with all available evidence presented, considered this enough of a ‘significant safety issue’ that they wrote no less than 5 recommendations to adequately address :
9.18 The committee recommends that the ATSB prepare and release publicly a list of all its identified safety issues and the actions which are being taken or have been taken to address them. The ATSB should indicate its progress in monitoring the actions every 6 months and report every 12 months to Parliament.Recommendation 18
The crash of VH-NTV provides the perfect example of why the PelAir report should not and cannot be flippantly ignored..10 years of procrastination and no lessons learnt!
The DAS & Chief Commissioner have closed the loop alright, they’ve closed the loop so that we are insulated from the rest of the world. How many more clearly preventable deaths will there be while these type of individuals continue to bluff the community with the mystique of aviation safety?? TICK..TOCK!
19th Nov 2013, 19:11 #57 (permalink)
Addendum to post #44
Better late than never I guess?? Regulatory requirements for class B aircraft maintenance
Date received:11 November 2013
Response from:Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response status:Monitor
Response text:With regard to Recommendation AO-2011-115-SR 050 you have recommended that CASA address the safety issue that the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 allow class B aircraft registration holders to maintain their aircraft using the CASA maintenance schedule in situations where a more appropriate manufacturer’s maintenance schedule exists.
You remain concerned that this safety issue may not be adequately addressed and have issued the recommendation that CASA proceed with our program of regulatory reform to ensure that all aircraft involved in general aviation operations are maintained using the most appropriate maintenance schedule for the aircraft type.
I accept this recommendation and CASA will address this issue, work has commenced and again it will involve consultation with industry. As this is likely to be a protracted process; CASA is not in a position to specify a specific completion date at this time.
ATSB action in response:The ATSB recognises the acceptance of the recommendation by CASA. The ATSB will continue to monitor the ongoing work by CASA until the issue has been satisfactorily addressed.
6. CAAP for HLS
http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_asset…s/ops/92_2.pdf
scroll down and read page 5,6 and 7.
in a nutshell, there’s two types of helicopter landing sites;
– Basic HLS
– Standard HLS
Basic HLS’s cannot be used for night operations.
5. Head of Power publications:
18th Sep 2011, 14:12 #46 (permalink)
Unfortunately a CAAP is only advisory, as the preamble says (bolding mine),
The information contained in this publication is advisory only. There is no legal requirement to observe the details as set out. The Civil Aviation Regulations detail the legal requirements that must be complied with in relation to use of areas for take-off and landing by a helicopter. While there may be a number of methods of ensuring that the requirements of the Civil Aviation Regulations are met, this CAAP sets out criteria which ensures compliance with the Regulations. The CAAP must be read in conjunction with the Civil Aviation Regulations.
Have not bothered to chase down AIP, CAR or any other regulatory/legal angle as to what landing sites require.
14th Nov 2013, 12:18 #79 (permalink)
Accidents – ATSB data
The following SR was attached. This has serious implications for NVFR operations [Further comments]:
Requirements for visual flight rule flights in dark night conditions Number: AO-2011-102-SI-02
Issue owner: Civil Aviation Safety Authority Operation affected:
Aviation – All general aviation operationsWho it affects:
All aircraft operating under the night visual flight rules (VFR)
ATSB – AO-2011-102
On 18 October 2013, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) stated that as part of the new pilot licencing rules (in development prior to August 2011), Civil Aviation Safety Regulation 61.970 will require pilots to demonstrate competency during biennial night visual flight rules assessments, which become effective in December 2013. As noted in Minimum requirements for night operations, this will certainly help maintain some pilots’ ability to a higher level than previously, but it will not ensure that the pilots are able to maintain their skills at an instrument rating standard.
 CASA will implement a regulatory change project to study the feasibility of rule changes that provide enhanced guidance on NVFR [night VFR] flight planning and other considerations, addressing all categories of operation.
 CASA will clarify the definition of visibility as outlined in CAR [Civil Aviation Regulation] 2 to ensure the primary coincident safety issue above is dealt with.
CAR 2 defines visibility as the “ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of distance, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day and prominent lighted objects by night”. CASA will, via regulatory change project, explore the potential to add the requirement that for night visual flight rules the determination of visibility must also include the ability to see a defined natural horizon. This will in effect address the root cause of the matters outlined in the … [safety issues], as pilots will need to have a discernible horizon throughout their flight.
o distinguishing the difference between NVFR / IFR and instrument conditions;
o including Certification standards for instrument and non-instrument rotorcraft; and
o emphasising the authority given by a NVFR rating.
and the atsb response:
ATSB comment/action in response:The ATSB welcomes the intent of the action proposed by CASA in response to this safety issue. In particular, the ATSB agrees that expanding what is meant by the term ‘visibility’ at night to include the requirement for a visual horizon will help ensure that pilots operating under the night VFR will have sufficient visual cues. However, given the importance of the safety issue, the ATSB is concerned about the indefinite nature of the proposed evaluation and other exploratory activities.
ATSB safety recommendation to: the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Action number: AO-2011-102-SR-59
Action status: Safety action pending
Requirements for autopilots in dark night conditions Number: AO-2011-102-SI-03Issue owner: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Operation affected: Aviation – All general aviation helicopter operations
Who it affects: All helicopters operating under the night VFR
(a) the flight is a VFR flight at night; and
(b) a passenger is carried in the flight; and
(c) the rotorcraft is not carrying a 2-pilot crew each of whom is authorised under [Part 61] to conduct an IFR flight in a rotorcraft.
In addition, as previously stated, CASA advised of further action proposed to address safety issue AO-2011-102-SI-02.
CASA will clarify the definition of visibility as outlined in CAR [Civil Aviation Regulation] 2 to ensure the primary coincident safety issue above is dealt with. CAR 2 defines visibility as the “ability, as determined by atmospheric conditions and expressed in units of distance, to see and identify prominent unlighted objects by day and prominent lighted objects by night”.
CASA will, via regulatory change project, explore the potential to add the requirement that for night visual flight rules the determination of visibility must also include the ability to see a defined natural horizon. This will in effect address the root cause of the matters outlined in the … [safety issues], as pilots will need to have a discernible horizon throughout their flight.
The ATSB notes that the introduction of Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) 133.571 will require all air transport flights in helicopters with passengers at night to be in helicopters equipped with an autopilot or with a two-pilot crew. This extends the range of operations required to have such risk controls. Although it does not directly address the situation for other helicopter operations, effective risk controls for such operations will be potentially addressed in any safety action taken by CASA to address the safety recommendation AO-2011-102-SR-59.
The ATSB will monitor the progress of that safety action.
28th Nov 2012, 11:09 #69 (permalink)
That’s the quandary of NVFR in Australia.Evidently it’s called the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Who knew?
Every thing old is new again RVDT.
Final ATSB report released on QLD Oct03 crash, 3 fatalities
A Bell 407 which crashed in Queensland near Mackay in October 2003, killing 3.FACTUAL INFORMATION
On the evening of 17 October 2003, an air ambulance Bell 407 helicopter, registered VH-HTD (HTD), being operated under the ‘Aerial Work’ category, was tasked with a patient transfer from Hamilton Island to Mackay, Queensland. The crew consisted of a pilot, a paramedic and a crewman. Approximately 35 minutes after the departure of the helicopter from Mackay, the personnel waiting for the helicopter on the island contacted the Ambulance Coordination Centre (ACC) to ask about its status. ACC personnel then made repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact the helicopter before notifying Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR), who initiated a search for the helicopter. AusSAR dispatched a BK117 helicopter from Hamilton Island to investigate. The crew of the BK117 located floating wreckage, that was later confirmed to be from HTD, at a location approximately 3.2 nautical miles (NM) east of Cape Hillsborough, Queensland. There were no survivors.
Following 12 days of side scan array sonar searches, underwater diving and trawling, the main impact point and location of heavy items of wreckage were located. The wreckage was recovered and examined at a secure on-shore location.
Although the forecast weather conditions did not necessarily preclude flight under the night Visual Flight Rules (VFR), the circumstances of the accident were consistent with pilot disorientation and loss of control during flight in dark night conditions. The effect of cloud on any available celestial lighting, lack of a visible horizon and surface/ground-based lighting, and the pilot’s limited instrument flying experience, may have contributed to this accident. Although not able to determine with certainty what factors led to the helicopter departing controlled flight, the investigation determined that mechanical failure was unlikely.
The circumstances of the accident combined most of the risk factors known for many years to be associated with helicopter Emergency Medical Services (EMS) accidents, such as:
the pilot was inexperienced with regards to long distance over water night operations out of sight of land and in the helicopter type
the pilot did not hold an instrument rating and had limited instrument flying experience
the pilot was new to the organisation and EMS operations.
the accident occurred on a dark night with no celestial or surface/ground-based lighting
the flight path was over water with no fixed surface lit features
forecast weather in the area of the helicopter flight path included the possibility of cloud at the altitude flown
a number of different organisations were involved in providing the service
the operation was from a base remote from the operator’s main base
actual or perceived pressures may have existed to not reject missions due to weather or other reasons
an apparent lack of awareness of helicopter EMS safety issues and helicopter night VFR limitations
divided and diminished oversight for ensuring safety
no single organisation with expertise in aviation having overall oversight for operational safety
Following the accident, the Queensland Department of Emergency Services took initiatives to implement:
increased safety standards in the Generic Service Agreements to Community Helicopter Providers (CHP) to include increased pilot recency and training requirements, a pilot requirement for a Command Instrument Rating, crew resource management training, a Safety Management System and a Safety Officer
the recommendations of the reviews associated with the aeromedical system/network
the establishment of a centralised clinical coordination and tasking of aeromedical aircraft and helicopters for Southern Queensland1, including all CHP state-wide through a centre in Brisbane, with a parallel system planned for all Northern Queensland by July 2005
the establishment of a requirement for a safe arrival broadcast for flights of less than 30 minutes duration and the nomination of a SARTIME for all flights
the revision of the standard operating procedures for helicopter emergencies to attempt to establish communication with an aircraft when lost for a maximum 5 minute period, then immediately contacting AusSAR
the establishment of a requirement for CHP to provide updated contact/aircraft details on a bi-annual basis and amend the standard operating procedures containing this information accordingly
a requirement for CHP operations to ensure sufficient celestial lighting exists for night VFR flights to maintain reference to the horizon
I wonder if that comment from the ATSB is directed at CASA.
The official report has been pulled from the ATSB web site.
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 28th Nov 2012 at 11:10.
14th Nov 2013, 10:48 #48 (permalink)
atsb – Reports
The ABC chopper report has been releasedInvestigation: AO-2011-102 – VFR flight into dark night involving Aérospatiale, AS355F2 (Twin Squirrel) helicopter, VH-NTV, 145 km north of Marree, SA on 18 August 2011
14th Nov 2013, 13:06 #49 (permalink)
Finally..only took 27 months!!
Not too many surprises there I guess?? It is interesting that the ATSBeaker have issued yet another SR (AO-2011-102-SR-59)to Fort Fumble, that would be 5 for 2013. Considering prior to March (refer here: Safety Recommendations for 2013) there was only one SR issued to FF within the last 5 years, that is somewhat of a world record for ATSBeaker.
Speaking of Beaker just heard him mi..mi..mi-ing on the wireless talking about that particular SR (above)…hmm wonder if he is aware the two mentioned in my previous post have expired???
Remember this..?? Flight control system event involving Cessna 210N, VH-JHFWell…
AO-2011-115-SI-01 – ‘time expired’
AO-2011-115-SI-02 – ‘time expired’
‘Tick..tock!’
26th Nov 2013, 11:12 #65 (permalink)
mi..mi..Beaker(coached by McSkull & GWM) & the art of good spin bowling!
It would appear that mi..mi..mi Beaker (ably coached by McSkull and the GWM) has been working on his googly, not only has he mesmerised Aunty but it seems his spin (ozfuscation style) has bamboozled the poms as well… (my bold):
Australia tightens rules for helicopter night flyingAustralia is tightening up rules for flying helicopters at night following the release of the final report into the August 2011 crash of a Eurocopter AS355F2 Twin Squirrel helicopter at Lake Eyre in South Australia.
Helicopter air transport operations with passengers at night will be required to have an autopilot fitted or operate with a two-pilot crew.The helicopter, which was carrying a film crew for Australian broadcaster ABC, crashed, killing the film crew, comprising a reporter and cameraman, and well-known and respected helicopter pilot Gary Ticehurst.
The helicopter was conducting a 30min flight after last light and although there was no low cloud or rain, it was a dark night, according to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
After take-off, the helicopter levelled at 1,500ft (460m) above mean sea level, shortly after which it entered a gentle right turn and began descending. The turn tightened and the descent rate increased, resulting in it hitting the ground at high speed with a bank angle of about 90 degrees. The crew were fatally injured and the helicopter destroyed.
The ATSB determined that before departure, the pilot had selected an incorrect destination on the global positioning system. After initiating the right turn, the pilot probably became spatially disorientated. Contributing factors were the dark night conditions, high pilot workload associated with establishing the helicopter in cruise flight and probably trying to correct the incorrect GPS input, the pilot’s limited night flying and instrument flying experience and the fact the helicopter was not equipped with an autopilot.
The ATSB identified safety issues with existing regulatory requirements, whereby flights for some types of operations are permitted under visual flight rules in dark night conditions that are effectively the same as instrument meteorological conditions, but without the same level of safety assurance as provided by requirements under instrument flight rules. {Note: Forgot to add that the bureau identified the same issues a decade ago }
New regulations being introduced next year will require all air transport flights in helicopters with passengers operating at night to be equipped with an autopilot or a two-pilot crew. While this extends the range of operations required to have such risk controls, the ATSB notes it does not address the situation for other helicopter operations, namely those not carrying passengers.
Now back to the Adelaide Oval where the Poms are all out for 133 and mi..mi..mi..Beaker finished up with figures of 2 for 10!