Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/660/1240/41965/
Timestamp: 2019-07-22 02:00:07
Document Index: 356473051

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1133', '§ 3', '§ 4332', '§ 4332', '§ 5', '§ 1346']

State of Minnesota by Joseph N. Alexander, Its Commissionerof Natural Resources, Appellant,andminnesota United Snowmobilers Association, Inc., et al.,intervenors- Appellants, v. John R. Block,* Individually and As Secretary Ofagriculture of the United States, Appellee,andsierra Club, et al., Intervenors-appellees.national Association of Property Owners, et al., Appellants,andstate of Minnesota, by Joseph N. Alexander, Its Commissionerof Natural Resources, Intervenor-appellant, v. United States of America; and John R. Block, * Secretary Ofagriculture, Individually and in His Officialcapacity, Appellees,andsierra Club, et al., Intervenors-appellees.national Association of Property Owners; Ely-winton Boundarywaters Conservation Alliance; Range Actioneers,inc.; Crane Lake Sportsmen's Club; Andcity of Winton, Appellants, v. John R. Block,* Individually and in His Official Capacity Assecretary of Agriculture; and R. Max Peterson, Individuallyand in His Official Capacity As Chief of the United Statesforest Service, Appellees,andsierra Club, et al., Intervenors-appellees, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1981 › State of Minnesota by Joseph N. Alexander, Its Commissionerof Natural Resources, Appellant,andminnes...
State of Minnesota by Joseph N. Alexander, Its Commissionerof Natural Resources, Appellant,andminnesota United Snowmobilers Association, Inc., et al.,intervenors- Appellants, v. John R. Block,* Individually and As Secretary Ofagriculture of the United States, Appellee,andsierra Club, et al., Intervenors-appellees.national Association of Property Owners, et al., Appellants,andstate of Minnesota, by Joseph N. Alexander, Its Commissionerof Natural Resources, Intervenor-appellant, v. United States of America; and John R. Block, * Secretary Ofagriculture, Individually and in His Officialcapacity, Appellees,andsierra Club, et al., Intervenors-appellees.national Association of Property Owners; Ely-winton Boundarywaters Conservation Alliance; Range Actioneers,inc.; Crane Lake Sportsmen's Club; Andcity of Winton, Appellants, v. John R. Block,* Individually and in His Official Capacity Assecretary of Agriculture; and R. Max Peterson, Individuallyand in His Official Capacity As Chief of the United Statesforest Service, Appellees,andsierra Club, et al., Intervenors-appellees, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981)
Submitted June 18, 1981. Decided Sept. 30, 1981
These appeals arise from three consolidated cases involving multiple challenges to provisions of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (BWCAW Act or the Act). On cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota upheld all portions of the Act.1 National Association of Property Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Minn. 1980). In this opinion, we will consider separately two groups of appeals. In Case No. 1, appellants allege that Congress unconstitutionally applied federal controls on the use of motorboats and snowmobiles to land and waters not owned by the United States. In Case No. 2, appellants assert that certain provisions of the legislation violate the Constitution and conflict with preexisting treaties and statutes.
The Wilderness Act of 1964 prohibited use of motorized vehicles in any national wilderness area. That Act, however, provided a specific exception for the Boundary Waters Canoe Area:Other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, the management of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area * * * shall be in accordance with regulations established by the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the general purpose of maintaining, without unnecessary restrictions on other uses, including that of timber, the primitive character of the area, particularly in the vicinity of lakes, streams, and portages: Provided, That nothing in this chapter shall preclude the continuance within the area of any already established use of motorboats. (16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (5) (1976).)8
The boundaries of the BWCAW circumscribe a total surface area of approximately 1,080,300 acres 920,000 acres of land and 160,000 of water. The United States owns approximately 792,000 acres of land surface, while the State of Minnesota owns approximately 121,000 acres of land,12 in addition to the beds under the 160,000 acres of navigable water. See National Association of Property Owners v. United States, supra, 499 F. Supp. at 1253. Congress recognized that Minnesota would retain jurisdiction over the waters, but provided that the State could not regulate in a manner less stringent than that mandated by the Act.13
Minnesota brought this action14 against the United States on December 27, 1979, challenging the application of section 4 to land and waterways under state jurisdiction that fall within the boundaries of the BWCAW. The district court rejected the State's claim, holding that section 4, as applied to nonfederal property, constituted a valid exercise of Congress' legislative power under the property clause of the United States Constitution. National Association of Property Owners v. United States, supra. 499 F. Supp. at 1261.
The property clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States * * *." U.S.Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In a recent unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld an expansive reading of Congress' power under the property clause. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 49 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1976).16 The Court concluded that
the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are "needful" rules "respecting" the public lands. * * * And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that "(t)he power over the public lands thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations." (Id. at 539, 96 S. Ct. at 2291.)
With this guidance, we must decide the question left open in Kleppe the scope of Congress' property clause power as applied to activity occurring off federal land. Without defining the limits of the power, the Court in Kleppe, relying on its decision in Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 17 S. Ct. 864, 42 L. Ed. 260 (1897), acknowledged that "it is clear the regulations under the Property Clause may have some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal control." 426 U.S. at 546, 96 S. Ct. at 2295. In Camfield, the Court concluded that Congress possessed the power to control conduct occurring off federal property through its "power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to (the public lands') own protection." Camfield v. United States, supra, 167 U.S. at 526, 17 S. Ct. at 867.17
Under this authority to protect public land, Congress' power must extend to regulation of conduct on or off the public land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal lands.18 Congress clearly has the power to dedicate federal land for particular purposes. As a necessary incident of that power, Congress must have the ability to insure that these lands be protected against interference with their intended purposes. As the Supreme Court has stated, under the property clause "(Congress) may sanction some uses and prohibit others, and may forbid interference with such as are sanctioned." McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359, 43 S. Ct. 132, 135, 67 L. Ed. 301 (1922) (emphasis added).
This court has previously held that Congress, under the property clause, could prohibit hunting on waters within the boundaries of the Voyagers National Park in Minnesota, even though the waters were subject to state jurisdiction. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949, 97 S. Ct. 2666, 53 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1977). In Brown, the purpose of the challenged regulations extended beyond the mere protection of the federal land from physical harm. This court, in effect, affirmed the district court's approval of the regulations as necessary because "hunting on the waters in the park could 'significantly interfere with the use of the park and the purposes for which it was established.' " Id. at 822 (emphasis added).19
Having established that Congress may regulate conduct off federal land that interferes with the designated purpose of that land, we must determine whether Congress acted within this power in restricting the use of motorboats and other motor vehicles in the BWCAW. In reviewing the appropriateness of particular regulations, "we must remain mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress." Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra, 426 U.S. at 536, 96 S. Ct. at 2290. Accord, United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30, 60 S. Ct. 749, 756, 84 L. Ed. 1050 (1940); United States v. Brown, supra, 552 F.2d at 822. Thus, if Congress enacted the motorized use restrictions to protect the fundamental purpose for which the BWCAW had been reserved, and if the restrictions in section 4 reasonably relate to that end, we must conclude that Congress acted within its constitutional prerogative.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981) (hereinafter Virginia Surface Mining), the Supreme Court articulated the test to be applied to tenth amendment challenges brought under the rationale of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976).26 The Court, in holding that environmental regulations of surface mining did not interfere with state police power, stated that a tenth amendment claim must satisfy three requirements:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty." And, third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions." (Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., supra, 101 S. Ct. at 2366 (citations omitted).)
The Supreme Court recently reiterated its reluctance to rule on a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute on its face, particularly a claim alleging an unconstitutional taking of property. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2369-70, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981). The Court stated:
"(T)his Court has generally 'been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' Rather, it has examined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the government action that have particular significance." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 100 S. Ct. 383, 390, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1979) (citations omitted).
Like the Court in Virginia Surface Mining, we have before us no challenges to the actual application of section 5(c) to particular parcels of land.36 We may consider, therefore, only whether section 5(c) on its face constitutes an unconstitutional taking. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S. Ct. 318, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979), we conclude that it does not.
In Allard, plaintiffs challenged the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which applied the Acts' prohibitions to birds lawfully captured prior to the effective dates of the Acts. Specifically, the regulations at issue stated that birds, their parts, eggs, or nests lawfully acquired "may not be imported, exported, purchased, sold, traded, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade or barter * * *." Id. at 54, 100 S. Ct. at 321. The Supreme Court recognized that this regulation could substantially affect the value of this property and its potential for profit, but concluded that compensation was not necessarily required. The Court held that "the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property in this case does not effect a taking," id. at 67-68, 100 S. Ct. at 328 (emphasis added), reasoning:
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. (Id. at 65-66, 100 S. Ct. at 327.)
The case law relied on by appellants does not support their position. In those cases, private individuals possessed the power to limit owners' use of their own property. For example, in Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 33 S. Ct. 76, 57 L. Ed. 156 (1912), under the challenged ordinance, owners of two-thirds of the property in an area, at their discretion and without standards, could set the building line for the rest of the property in their area. The Court invalidated the regulation, because
(o)ne set of owners determine(s) not only the extent of use but the kind of use which another set of owners may make of their property. * * * The statute and ordinance (confer) the power on some property holders to virtually control and dispose of the proper rights of others * * *. (Id. at 143, 33 S. Ct. at 77.)39
Section 5 grants no power to one set of landowners to control either the extent or kind of use that others may make of their own property. Rather, Congress legitimately established a property regulation, the right of first refusal, and merely delayed its implementation until the occurrence of a contingency that Congress determined would make the regulation necessary. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 16, 59 S. Ct. 379, 387, 83 L. Ed. 441 (1939). Congress itself established the restrictions affecting the property and gave no one discretionary power over neighboring landowners. Resort owners may choose whether to require the government to buy them out, but this right relates only to the resort owners' property. We conclude, therefore, that Congress delegated no legislative power to private individuals.
The State maintains that the plain language should be construed to apply to property only within the BWCAW because Congress provided no authorization to acquire land outside the boundary waters area. Minnesota argues that, because 5(c) contains no authorization to acquire lands, reference must be made to section 7(d) (1), which limits acquisition to land within the BWCAW. We believe, however, that section 5(c) when read with section 5(d), which authorizes funds to acquire lands as provided by section 5, grants independent authority to acquire property.40 Thus, we conclude that section 5(c) applies to all lands riparian to the lakes listed in 5(a), whether inside or outside the boundaries of the BWCAW.
Appellants assert that both Treaties, by guaranteeing that the border waterways remain "free and open," grant individuals the right to engage in commerce in those waters and that the limit on motorboat use interferes with this right by preventing individuals from engaging in commerce. They argue that the restrictions cannot be applied to the waters along the international boundary because section 17 of the Act41 operates as a saving clause, in effect voiding any section of the Act that conflicts with any treaty. The district court held that the provisions of the BWCAW Act are consistent with both treaties.42 National Association of Property Owners v. United States, supra, 499 F. Supp. at 1251, 1272. We agree.
(w)e believe that the intent of the "free and open" provision for these waters was to ensure that this important route remained open, on an equal basis, to the nations of both countries. It would not be correct, however, to interpret "free and open" so broadly as to prohibit either United States or Canadian authorities from imposing any limitation upon the manner in which such waterways and portages may be used. In agreeing to free and open use of these waterways and portages, neither party intended to relinquish its sovereign role of imposing statutory limitations on behavior which would not be in the best interest of the respective country. (National Association of Property Owners v. United States, supra, 499 F. Supp. at 1234.)43
We are influenced by Canada's and the United States' determination of their powers under the Treaty. As the Supreme Court has explained, where ambiguities exist in a treaty "it is appropriate that we should look to the practical construction which has been placed upon it." Pigeon River Improvement, Slide and Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 158, 54 S. Ct. 361, 366, 78 L. Ed. 695 (1934).44 By enacting section 17 of the Act along with section 4, Congress clearly indicated its belief that the Webster-Ashburton Treaty did not inhibit its power to preclude motor use along the international boundary.45 Canada, as well, through the Province of Ontario, similarly banned motor use of the waterways along much of the border, indicating its view that the Treaty permits each party to evenhandedly restrict use of motorboats on their side of the border.
NAPO asserts that the district court erred in failing to enjoin the implementation of sections 4 and 5 until the Secretary of Agriculture files an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as required under section 102(2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1976). The district court concluded that the Secretary need not file an EIS.
NAPO's argument rests on a basic misconception about the events necessary to trigger the requirements of NEPA. Section 102(2) (C) mandates that
(C) include (an EIS) in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment * * *. (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).)
For an EIS to be required, some future federal action, on which an EIS may have some effect, must be anticipated. The motorboat restrictions, however, do not contemplate any such action. These regulations automatically went into effect on January 1, 1979, by force of the Act itself. The Secretary had no discretion or power to circumscribe, delay, or expand the motorboat restrictions. Because the Secretary has no discretion to act, no purpose can be served by requiring him to prepare an EIS, which is designed to insure that decisionmakers fully consider the environmental impact of a contemplated action. See State of South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 80, 66 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1980). See also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350, 99 S. Ct. 2335, 2337, 60 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1979); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922, 97 S. Ct. 1340, 51 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1977).
Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland, originally named as a party, has been replaced by John R. Block, his successor in office. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c) (1)
Prior to Kleppe, language in Supreme Court opinions supported the argument that Congress' power over federally owned property did not exceed "the rights of an ordinary proprietor * * *." Ft. Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527, 5 S. Ct. 995, 996, 29 L. Ed. 264 (1885) (dicta). Accord, Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264, 83 S. Ct. 426, 437, 9 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1963) (dicta). The Court in Kleppe, however, rejected any narrow construction of the property clause, holding that Congress possessed full legislative/police power over activity occurring on federal property. In other words, any conduct taking place on United States land may be subject to congressional authority, regardless of its relationship to that land. Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra, 426 U.S. at 540, 96 S. Ct. at 2292
Appellants' narrow and improper construction of the property clause would limit the reach of Congress' power to the particular factual situations approved in Camfield and United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 47 S. Ct. 597, 71 L. Ed. 1040 (1927) (protecting forests against dangers of fire occurring on federal land). See also United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979)
The case relied on by appellants, Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 27 S. Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed. 956 (1906), has been greatly limited by the Supreme Court. In Kleppe, the Court wrote that Kansas v. Colorado "does no more than articulate the obvious: The Property Clause is a grant of power only over federal property. It gives no indication of the kind of 'authority' the Clause gives Congress over its property." Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra, 426 U.S. at 537-38, 96 S. Ct. at 2290-91.
The Court then cited Camfield with approval as establishing Congress' police power over nuisances occurring off federal land as long as it is directed to protecting the federal land. Id. at 538, 96 S. Ct. at 2291. These cases, read together, establish that Congress has no plenary authority over conduct on nonfederal land, Kansas v. Colorado, supra; rather, Congress must demonstrate a nexus between the regulated conduct and the federal land, establishing that the regulations are necessary to protect federal property. Camfield v. United States, supra.
Two other district courts have affirmed Congress' power to regulate conduct on nonfederal land to further the purpose of federal lands. United States v. Maki, 5-78-2M (D. Minn. 1978) (McNulty, Magis.) (approving Secretary of Agriculture's action banning snowmobiles in BWCA to promote wilderness purpose). United States v. Hells Canyon Guide Service, No. 79-743 (D.Ore. Nov. 14, 1979) (Juba, Magis.) (Secretary of Agriculture has power to regulate motorized use of Snake River, although water subject to state jurisdiction), appeal docketed, No. 80-3095 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1980). Relying on United States v. Brown, supra, the court in Hells Canyon concluded that "Congress' power over federal lands includes the authority to regulate activities on non-federal waters in order to protect the archaeological, ecological, historical and recreational values on the lands." Slip op. at 5
Because we decide that the tenth amendment does not bar this legislation, we may assume, without deciding, that the limits imposed on the exercise of Congress' power under the commerce clause apply equally to exercises of power under the property clause, a question left open in National League of Cities. See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17, 96 S. Ct. at 2474 n. 17
Should any individual owner believe that, as applied to his particular parcel, § 5(c) constitutes an unconstitutional taking, he may bring suit for relief under the appropriate standards. See generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S. Ct. 318, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978)
Alternatively, the availability of an individual remedy for just compensation under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2), 1491 (Supp. II 1978), may save the section from any alleged unconstitutionality. See Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., Inc. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 1014, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 1698, 68 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1981)
Similarly, in State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L. Ed. 210 (1928), the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that gave property owners uncontrolled power to determine whether neighboring property could be used for a designated purpose
Such executive interpretations of treaties are entitled to much weight. See, e. g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194, 81 S. Ct. 922, 926, 6 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1961); United States v. Conners, 606 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1979); Dupree v. United States, 559 F.2d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1977)
Although the pleadings are not clear, NAPO may also be claiming that an EIS is required under some sections, such as 4(e) (snowmobile restrictions) or 5(c) (option to purchase land), that grant the Secretary discretion in implementing the Act. To the extent that NAPO questions action under such sections, these challenges are not ripe for judicial consideration. The Secretary need not file an EIS until he makes a proposal or recommendation for federal action. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2728, 49 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1976). NAPO points to no such plan, but rather alleges that, potentially, the Secretary's exercise of his power under the Act would have a significant environmental impact. The mere possibility of such hypothetical, potential impact does not give rise to the EIS obligation. See id.; BRS Land Investors v. United States, 596 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1979); Lake Berryessa Tenants' Council v. United States, 588 F.2d 267, 272 (9th Cir. 1978). Appellant, of course, remains free to challenge any future plans for federal action under the BWCAW Act if issued without an EIS