Source: http://taxappeals.state.wy.us/images/docket_no_200687.htm
Timestamp: 2017-02-24 12:34:36
Document Index: 786556505

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 36', '§ 39', '§39', '§ 39', '§ 11', '§ 3', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 3', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§16']

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF ) RICHARD AND GLENDA HLAVNICKA )
FROM A VALUATION DECISION OF THE ) Docket No. 2006-87
FREMONT COUNTY ASSESSOR ) 2005 PROPERTY VALUATION )
Rick L. Sollars, Western Law Associates, P.C., on behalf of Richard and Glenda Hlavnicka
(Petitioners or Taxpayers).
Oakley, Fremont County Assessor (Respondent or Assessor).
This matter originally came before the State Board of Equalization (State Board) as an appeal
by the Fremont County Assessor from a decision of the Fremont County Board of
Equalization (County Board). The Assessor appealed the County Board decision directing
her to re-assess the Taxpayers’ property using an agricultural classification. The State Board,
D. Roberts, Board Member, considered the hearing record and decision of the County Board. Neither party requested oral argument. The State Board entered a Decisions and Order dated
July 13, 2006, remanding the Assessor’s appeal to the County Board for further proceedings. Fremont County Assessor, (Hlavnicka Property), Docket No. 2005-86, July 13, 2006, ___
WL _____, (Wyo. St. Bd. Eq.). In response, on August 14, 2006, the County Board
requested, pursuant to Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 2, § 36, that the
original appeal by Taxpayers of the Assessor’s denial of their request for agricultural status
be certified to the State Board for its consideration as the finder of fact rather than as an
intermediate level of appellate review. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c). Compare Rules,
Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 2 and Rules, Wyoming State Board of
Equalization, Chapter 3. Laramie County Board of Equalization v. Wyoming State Board
of Equalization, 915 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo. 1996); Union Pacific Railroad Company v.
Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 859 (Wyo. 1990). The State Board
granted certification by order dated August 24, 2006. The appeal of the Taxpayers from the
Assessor’s agricultural status denial is thus before this Board the same as an initial appeal
pursuant to Rules, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Chapter 2.
The State Board has reviewed and carefully considered all the evidence presented at the
County Board hearing, including a tape recording of the testimony. There was no issue of
credibility of the witnesses with respect to the matters which dispose of this case, thus a
repeat of their testimony to this Board is not necessary. We have also been provided, in the
context of the Assessor’s original appeal to this Board, sufficient briefing on the relevant
issues, thus the receipt of further briefing is not required.
Within 30 days after the date or postmark date of an assessment schedule, whichever is later,
objections to local assessments must be filed with the county assessor indicating why the
assessment is incorrect. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39-13-109(b)(i). The Taxpayers’ assessment
schedule was dated April 25, 2005. The Assessor’s denial of agricultural status was dated
May 18, 2005. Taxpayers’ protest was filed with the County Assessor on May 20, 2005. The Taxpayers’ appeal is timely.
Taxpayers assert the County Assessor improperly denied agricultural valuation in 2005 for
their property. We affirm the Assessor’s denial of agricultural status.
1. Richard and Glenda Hlavnicka own and reside on 19.84 acres at 23 O’Brien Road
north of Lander, Wyoming. The Taxpayers’ property was formerly known as Lot 7 of the
O’Brien Subdivision in Fremont County, Wyoming. [Board Record, Exhibit A, p. 12].
2. Eileen Oakley is the Fremont County Assessor. [Board Record, Hearing Tape].
3. The Assessor sent Taxpayers an Assessment Schedule on April 25, 2005, listing the
total market value of the Taxpayers’ property at $283,600. Of this total, $136,000 was for
the Taxpayers’ land which is the value at issue in this proceeding. [Board Record, Exhibit
A, p. 12].
4. Richard and Glenda Hlavnicka applied for agricultural classification for their property
on May 2, 2005, using the Fremont County Affidavit for Agricultural Classification, 2005
Assessment Year. [Board Record, Exhibit P, pp. 73-76].
5. On May 18, 2005, the Assessor denied the Taxpayers’ application for agricultural
Property has characteristics of a subdivision or is in transition for further development.
Primary purpose or use of the land is other than producing a marketable agricultural product, i.e. home site, cabin site, or dude ranch facilities.
The land is not being used or employed, consistent with the land’s size location and capability to produce.
The owner/lessee does not report or pay taxes on farm machinery or other agricultural
Activities on the land, which appear agricultural in nature, do not by themselves
qualify the land for agricultural assessment.
[Board Record, Exhibit P, p. 72].
6. The Assessor’s letter advised the Taxpayers they could submit additional information
to the Assessor’s office which may affect the classification. The letter also informed the
Taxpayers if they disagreed with the Assessor’s decision, they could file a protest with the
County Board within 30 days of the assessment notice. [Board Record, Exhibit P, p. 72].
7. On May 20, 2005, the Taxpayers filed a protest with an attached letter challenging the
Assessor’s denial of agricultural classification. [Board Record, Exhibit 1, pp. 93-97]. 8. Mr. Hlavnicka testified on behalf of the Taxpayers. [Board Record, Hearing Tape]. 9. Mr. Hlavnicka stated he was not sure what the Assessor meant when she said the
Taxpayers’ property had characteristics of a subdivision. [Board Record, Hearing Tape]. He stated the owners of the land in the subdivision came before the county commissioners
the previous November to dissolve the subdivision. A year later, when receiving their tax
notices, nothing had changed. He was still listed as Lot 7 of the O’Brien Subdivision which
no longer exists. [Board Record, Hearing Tape].
10. Mr. Hlavincka provided testimony and evidence of more than $500 of revenue from
production on the land. The receipt for hay he sold indicated revenue of $829. [Board
Record, Exhibit P, p. 76]. A copy of the Taxpayers’ Federal Income Tax Form 1040,
Schedule F, showed $845 gross income. [Board Record, Exhibit P, p. 75].
11. Mr. Hlavincka testified the Assessor’s letter indicated “activities on the land which
appear to be agricultural in nature do not by themselves qualify for agricultural assessment.” He did not know what that meant. [Board Record, Hearing Tape]. 12. Mr. Hlavincka stated he bought calves this year (2005). He provided photos of the
calves and a hay field which was ready to be harvested to support his contention the land was
being used for agricultural purposes. [Board Record, Hearing Tape; Exhibit 1, p. 89].
13. Mr. Hlavincka stated the landowners who vacated the subdivision maintained the
Homeowners Association and the private road for the landowners. All of the information
was filed with the covenant and deed changes when the subdivision was dissolved. [Board
14. Mr. Hlavincka testified he believed they met all of the criteria for agricultural
classification because the subdivision was vacated and the Taxpayers sold over $500 worth
of hay. He emphasized only the agricultural classification was being protested. [Board
15. Eileen Oakley testified she was the Fremont County Assessor and was certified as a
property tax appraiser by Department of Revenue (Department). [Board Record, Hearing
16. The Assessor presented a complete description of the Taxpayers’ property. The
market value of the property was determined by using the Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal
system (CAMA) prescribed by the Department. [Board Record, Exhibit B, p. 13]. Only the
residential classification is in dispute. [Board Record, Exhibit R, p. 84].
17. The Assessor testified properties must meet the conditions of the statutes and rules
which govern agriculture value to qualify for agricultural classification. The statutes outline
those conditions and Chapter 10 of the Department’s Rules interpret the conditions. [Board
Record, Hearing Tape; Exhibit I, pp. 40-43].
18. The Assessor asserted to meet agricultural classification there were four qualifications,
all of which must be met. The initial qualification is that the land be used to produce forage. There were, however, other qualifiers. The Assessor must consider that certain activities
which appear to be agricultural in nature do not by themselves qualify land for the
agricultural classification. The Assessor must consider all requirements, not just the
appearance of the land. [Board Record, Hearing Tape].
19. The second requirement she must consider is whether the land is part of a platted
subdivision. The Assessor conceded the county commissioners had vacated the O’Brien
Subdivision, but she believed the vacation contravened the intent of the statutes on
subdivisions. [Board Record, Hearing Tape]. The Assessor testified the parcels in the
O’Brien Subdivision were required to be platted at the time they were formed and those
parcels would be required to be platted if they were formed today. [Board Record, Hearing
Tape; Exhibit K, p. 45]. 20. Chapter 10, Section 3(c)(ii) of the Department’s Rules define non-agricultural land
as “land in active transition from agricultural use to residential, commercial or industrial use,
which includes creation or division of a tract, parcel or other unit of land for the purpose of
sale or development for such use.” [Board Record, Hearing Tape; Exhibit I, p. 42]. 21. The Assessor testified the owners of the O’Brien Subdivision lots waited until the
subdivision was fully developed to begin the process of vacation. These lots were sold as
residential lots. The original restrictive covenants state their purpose is to insure the use of
the property for attractive country living, residential purposes only. The restrictive covenants allowed some animals but the use was regulated by an Architectural Control Committee. [Board Record, Exhibit D, pp. 18-21]. The amended restrictive covenants, filed after the
vacation of the subdivision, changed the wording minimally by adding the word
‘agricultural’ to the use. However, the Architectural Control Committee still controlled the
use of the land. [Board Record, Exhibit F, pp. 28-36].
22. The Assessor testified the statutes and rules require agricultural land to be used or
employed primarily in an agricultural operation, where primarily means chiefly or the first
importance. The Taxpayers’ land was defined by its own restrictive covenants as residential
with animal and agricultural use being limited by the Agricultural Control Committee. [Board Record, Hearing Tape; Exhibit R, p. 85].
23. The third qualification the Assessor must consider was whether the owner of the land
derived annual gross revenue of not less than $500. She conceded the Taxpayers presented
information meeting this requirement. [Board Record, Hearing Tape; Exhibit P, pp. 75-76].
24. The fourth qualification for agricultural status was quoted by the Assessor from the
being limited. Therefore, the Assessor concluded the land’s primary use was residential. The parcel had significant residential improvements as described in the CAMA printouts. [Board Record, Hearing Tape, Exhibit B, p. 13; Exhibit R, p. 86].
25. Using the methods prescribed by the Department to determine the productive
capabilities for agricultural value, the Assessor performed a calculation to determine the
capability of the Taxpayers’ land to produce and the expected revenue that would be derived
from that production. She used the Lander Area Soil Survey to find the Taxpayers’ soil type. [Board Record, Hearing Tape; Exhibit R, p. 86; Exhibits J & K, pp.44-45]. The Assessor used a conversion for each soil type by referring to the Legend of the Lander Area Soil
Survey. [Board Record, Assessor’s Exhibit L, p. 46]. She then used the Department’s 2005
Ag Land Valuation Study to determine: 1) the Land Resource Area, which is determined by
precipitation and temperature, and 2) the productive class. With this information she
determined the productive capability of the Taxpayers’ land at three to four tons of hay per
acre. Using the lower productive capacity of 3 tons of hay per acre and the 2005 Agricultural
Land Value Study price of $70 per ton of hay, she determined the 17.84 acres (total acreage
less 2 acres for the homestead) could produce $3,500 worth of hay. [Board Record, Hearing
Tape; Exhibit M, pp. 47-62; Exhibit R, p. 86]. She then compared the expected revenue of
$3,500 with the Taxpayers’ documented revenue of $845. The Assessor concluded the
Taxpayers were not using their land to its productive capability. [Board Record, Hearing
Tape; Exhibit P, p. 75; Exhibit R, p. 87].
26. The Assessor stated she applied the Department’s Rules equally and uniformly. Regardless of the fact that people feel they have used property as best they can and produced
as much as they can, the land had to meet the standards of a true agricultural operation to
assess everyone equally. [Board Record, Hearing Tape].
27. The Assessor reviewed the records of other small acreage parcels between 5 and 20
acres. The Assessor indicated only five small acreage parcels had an agricultural value. There were 247 other small acreage parcels valued as residential. The Assessor testified that
her office is receiving more and more applications for agricultural use. Agricultural status
is considered at the time of application. Her office has consistently and uniformly valued
these small parcels as residential. [Board Record, Assessor’s Exhibits N & O, pp. 63-71].
28. In conclusion, the Assessor argued Taxpayers’ parcel has activities which appeared
to be agricultural but did not meet all of the requirements for agricultural classification. The
land was previously agricultural, divided into parcels, sold with the primary use of the
property being residential and was correctly valued as residential land. [Board Record,
Hearing Tape; Exhibit R, p. 87].
29. The Board is required to “[d]ecide all questions that may arise with reference to the
construction of any statute affecting the assessment, levy and collection of taxes, in
accordance with the rules, regulations, orders and instructions prescribed by the department.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c)(iv). 30. The Board’s Rules provide:
31. The Board, in interpreting a statute, follows the same guidelines as a court:
We read the text of the statute and pay attention to its internal structure and the
functional relationship between the parts and the whole. We make the
determination as to meaning, that is, whether the statute’s meaning is subject
to varying interpretations. If we determine that the meaning is not subject to
varying interpretations, that may end the exercise, although we may resort to
extrinsic aids to interpretation, such as legislative history if available and rules
of construction, to confirm the determination. On the other hand, if we
determine the meaning is subject to varying interpretations, we must resort to
available extrinsic aids. General Chemical v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 902 P.2d 716, 718 (Wyo. 1995).
‘Determining the lawmakers’ intent is our primary focus when we interpret
statutes. Initially, we make an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious
meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and
connection. We construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia,
giving effect to each word, clause, and sentence so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous. We will not construe statutes in a manner which
renders any portion meaningless or produces absurd results.’ In re WJH, 2001
WY 54, ¶ 7, 24 P.3d 1147, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2001). TPJ v. State, 2003 WY 49, ¶ 11, 66 P.3d 710, 713 (Wyo. 2003).
32. The Board considers the omission of certain words intentional on the part of the
Legislature, and we may not add omitted words. “[O]mission of words from a statute is
considered to be an intentional act by the legislature, and this court will not read words into
a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them.” BP America Production Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 2005 WY 60 ¶ 22, 112 P.3d 596, 607 (Wyo. 2005), quoting
Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 29, 86 P.3d 270, 285 (Wyo. 2004). See also Parker v.
Artery, 889 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 1995); Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Security Comm’n., 858
P.2d 1122 (Wyo. 1993). The language which appears in one section of a statute but not
another, will not be read into the section where it is absent. Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550
P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1976).
33. It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must be
1139, 1142 (Wyo. 1985). 34. The issue raised by the Taxpayers concerns the Assessor’s denial of agricultural
classification for their land. 35. The Wyoming Constitution, article 15, § 11(b) provides in pertinent part: “[a]ll
which case proof by an affidavit showing qualification in a previous year shall suffice; or
(a) "Agricultural land" means contiguous or noncontiguous parcels of land presently being used and employed for the primary purpose of providing gross
41. Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue v.
42. With regard to appeals of property tax matters, the Wyoming Supreme Court has
43. We initially note that the Taxpayers have ignored the provision of the Department’s
Rules placing an additional burden on the landowners who seek agricultural classification
for a parcel of forty acres or less. Those landowners must provide proof that a parcel of that
size should be classified agricultural. Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 10,
§ 3(c)(x). Supra, ¶ 40. This burden applies whether or not the landowner chooses to appeal
an assessor’s determination of agricultural classification.
requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-103(b)(x)(B)(I). The Taxpayers’ purchase of calves
in 2005, after the assessment date, is not relevant to the issue before the State Board, the
classification of the Taxpayers’ land on January 1, 2005. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-103(b)(i)(A). B. Not Part of Platted Subdivision
46. The second statutory requirement for agricultural classification is that the land “is not
Platted subdivision” [sic] means for the purpose of Chapter 13 of Title 39, the
Rules, Wyoming Department of Revenue, Chapter 10, § 3(b). We note that neither of the
parties addressed this Department Rule.
47. The exhibits and testimony of record and the respective briefs filed do not adequately
address the interpretation and application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-103(b)(x)(B)(II) nor
the Department Rule. This lack of discussion and analysis however, based on our
conclusions with regard to the other requirements for agricultural classification, does not
prevent a final decision in this matter. Infra ¶¶ 49-53.
48. The third requirement to qualify for agricultural valuation is that the owner establish
Farming, showing a gross income of approximately $845 for Tax Year 2004, and a receipt
showing income of approximately $829 from the sale of hay. These amounts exceeded the
minimum income requirements set by the legislature for agricultural valuation, and could be
accepted as meeting the minimum gross revenues requirement set by the legislature for
agricultural valuation. D. Use Consistent With Size, Location and Capability to Produce Primarily in an
49. The Wyoming Constitution grants favorable treatment to agricultural and grazing
50. The pertinent definition of “consistent” is “in agreement or harmony; in accord;
development, yet generating enough agricultural revenue to meet the minimum gross
revenues standards of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-103(b)(x)(B)(III).
51. The statute expressly addresses the problem that “normal conditions” may not prevail
52. The Assessor prepared a calculation to quantify her view that the Taxpayers did not
acres, which she rounded down to $3,500. Supra, ¶ 25. This calculation is consistent with
statutory requirements of the Department’s mapping and agricultural manual, which we have
described in detail in other cases arising from Fremont County. E.g., Fremont County
reported by the Taxpayers, or approximately $845. Supra, ¶ 10. Based on this comparison,
she concluded the Taxpayers had not employed their land consistent with its capability to
produce. Supra, ¶ 25.
53. The Assessor’s calculation may not be the only approach to determining whether the
54. We are obliged to comment on the effect of the restrictive covenants on the
classification of the Taxpayers’ land as the issue was raised by the Taxpayers. [Taxpayers’
Brief, pp. 12-13]. If the restrictive covenants are a factor for consideration, it can only be as
the restrictive covenants supports the Taxpayers’ claim.
55. In their present form, we would be inclined to characterize the covenants as
of livestock which may be kept on any given property. [Board Record, Exhibit 10,
encumbered by restrictive covenants. 56. In their brief, the Taxpayers raised an issue that “other owners of property in the same
geographic location with similar or smaller acreage and use of that land, were being assessed
at the agricultural classification rate, which rendered the classification of the Taxpayers’ land
as residential by the Fremont County Assessor arbitrary and capricious.” [Taxpayers’ Brief,
pp. 7-8]. As a matter of law, any disparity can be of no concern if the other tracts properly
qualify as agricultural. In fact, the Taxpayers are plainly seeking to create a disparity
between themselves and other taxpayers who have located in large lot subdivisions in
Fremont County. The sole question at issue is whether these Taxpayers qualify for favorable
57. The Taxpayers, in summary, have not fulfilled their burden of proof or ultimate
burden of persuasion that the property in question qualifies for agricultural status.
IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED the decision of the Fremont County
Assessor denying the Taxpayers’ request for agricultural classification of the property at
issue is affirmed. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §16-3-114 and Rule 12, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by this decision may seek
DATED this day of September, 2006.