Source: https://ublawforum.wordpress.com/page/2/
Timestamp: 2017-12-14 17:08:58
Document Index: 229933256

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 10', '§ 10']

University of Baltimore Law Forum – Page 2
PURSUANT TO § 1-206(B) OF THE ESTATES AND TRUSTS ARTICLE, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION ENCOMPASSES IN VITRO FERTILIZATION USING DONATED SPERM; A COURT MAY USE THE GOLDBERGER FACTORS TO DETERMINE VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT; A TRIAL COURT CAN ISSUE A PERMANENT INJUNCTION FOR HARASSMENT BASED ON § 1-203(A) OF THE FAMILY LAW ARTICLE.
By: Virginia J. Yeoman
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the term “artificial insemination” includes in vitro fertilization using donated sperm, and that a consenting husband is presumed to be the father of the child born as a result of the procedure. Sieglein v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647, 652, 136 A.3d 751, 754 (2016). The court also held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the husband to be voluntarily impoverished or in issuing a permanent injunction based on harassment. Id.
Stephen Sieglein (“Sieglein”) and Laura Schmidt (“Schmidt”) married in 2008. Before marrying Schmidt, Sieglein had a vasectomy. When Schmidt desired a child, Sieglein refused to have his vasectomy reversed, but agreed to accompany Schmidt to the Shady Grove Fertility Reproductive Science Center (“Shady Grove”). In 2010, they both signed a consent form at Shady Grove, which demonstrated their desire to undergo assisted reproduction treatment, and their understanding of the risks and obligations involved.
Read More “PURSUANT TO § 1-206(B) OF THE ESTATES AND TRUSTS ARTICLE, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION ENCOMPASSES IN VITRO FERTILIZATION USING DONATED SPERM; A COURT MAY USE THE GOLDBERGER FACTORS TO DETERMINE VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT; A TRIAL COURT CAN ISSUE A PERMANENT INJUNCTION FOR HARASSMENT BASED ON § 1-203(A) OF THE FAMILY LAW ARTICLE.”
Despite not formally objecting, defense counsel properly preserved the issue of whether the circuit court inappropriately weighed defendant’s decision not plead guilty at sentencing; the circuit court did not impermissibly consider defendant’s rejection of the plea offer at sentencing.
January 31, 2017 January 31, 2017 ublawforum 1 Comment
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that defense counsel’s statements conveyed an objection to the circuit court’s perceived consideration of the defendant’s decision not to plead guilty at sentencing. Sharp v. State, 446 Md. 669, 113 A.3d 1089 (2016). As a result, the court held that defense counsel sufficiently preserved the issue for appellate review. Id. at 684, 113 A.3d at 1098. Ultimately, though, the circuit court’s statements at sentencing did not give rise to the inference of an impermissible consideration. Id. at 701, 113 A.3d at 1108.
On March 17, 2003, Raymond Evianiak (“Evianiak”), Justin Sharp (“Sharp”), and others were drinking at a party. While intoxicated, Evianiak insulted Sharp, leading to an argument. A few hours later Sharp proceeded to punch Evianiak and beat him with a bottle, in response to the earlier insult. At no point did Evianiak defend himself or retaliate against Sharp. Sharp was charged with attempted first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure.
On April 30, 2014, Sharp appeared in court for trial where he was advised of the maximum penalties he faced if convicted. The State offered a plea of first-degree assault and recommended a twenty-five year sentence, with all but ten years suspended. The court counter-offered a twenty-year sentence, with all but eight years suspended. Sharp declined both offers, pled not guilty, and elected a jury trial, at which point the court withdrew its plea offer.
Read More “Despite not formally objecting, defense counsel properly preserved the issue of whether the circuit court inappropriately weighed defendant’s decision not plead guilty at sentencing; the circuit court did not impermissibly consider defendant’s rejection of the plea offer at sentencing.”
Pursuant to § 10-402(C)(2)’s exception to the wiretap ban, an individual is not under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer when interceping an oral communication, absent restrictions on equipment use and some subsequent contact.
By: Ashley N. Simmons
During the summer of 1982, ten-year-old Donald W. (“Donald”) frequently stayed at his step-grandmother’s house. Donald’s step-uncle, David Seal (“Seal”), also resided in the Montgomery County home. Donald testified that he awoke one night to Seal fondling his private parts. The sexual abuse continued until Donald entered the seventh grade. Approximately twenty years later, Donald contacted Seal about the abuse. Seal apologized for his prior behavior and offered to make payments to Donald, which Donald declined.
On January 22, 2013, Donald, a resident of West Virginia, went to the Montgomery County Police Station and spoke with Detective Tracey Copeland (“Copeland”) regarding the abuse. Copeland and Donald made several unsuccessful phone calls to Seal in an attempt to obtain a confession. Ultimately, Copeland provided Donald with the recording device, showed him how to operate it, and then sent him home with the equipment.
Read More “Pursuant to § 10-402(C)(2)’s exception to the wiretap ban, an individual is not under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer when interceping an oral communication, absent restrictions on equipment use and some subsequent contact.”
An applicant must satisfy the unwarranted hardship standard to be granted a variance; the variance must have no adverse impact on the environment and conform to the purpose of the critical area program.
By: Michael Louis Brown
Roy T. Schwalbach (“Schwalbach”) owned waterfront property in a community where piers and boating were common. In order to reach navigable water next to his property, Schwalbach sought a variance from a Worcester County ordinance that limited the length of piers to 100 feet. The variance was granted by the Worcester County Board of Zoning Appeals (the “Board”). In a written decision, the Board determined that Schwalbach would not be able to reach navigable water without the variance. Furthermore, the Board noted that the environmental impact would be mitigated, because Schwalbach’s permits were issued under the condition that he would fulfill specific planting requirements.
Read More “An applicant must satisfy the unwarranted hardship standard to be granted a variance; the variance must have no adverse impact on the environment and conform to the purpose of the critical area program.”
Read More “A foreign limited liability company lacking compliance with state registration requirements may maintain suit after infirmity is cured; the company must also meet the “person aggrieved” requirements of standing.”
Maryland State Bank: The Responsible Solution for Fostering the Growth of Maryland’s Medical Cannabis
January 11, 2017 January 11, 2017 ublawforum Leave a comment
By: David Bronfein*
In 2013, Maryland passed its initial medical cannabis law.[1] Although seemingly a success in the medical cannabis reform movement, the law only allowed for “academic medical centers” to participate in the program.[2] In essence, an academic medical center could dispense medical cannabis to patients who met the criteria for participation in their research program.[3] The success of this type of program structure was a concern for medical cannabis advocates,[4] and the concerns were validated when no academic medical centers decided to participate.[5] As a result of this lackluster program, the General Assembly responded by passing a bill[6] during the 2014 Regular Session to create a more inviting program, thereby making Maryland the 21st state to enact a comprehensive medical cannabis law.[7] Under H.B. 881, the program was broadened to allow patients, physicians, growers, processors, and dispensaries to operate within a framework that would be set up by the Natalie M. LaPrade Medical Cannabis Commission (the “Commission”).[8] The General Assembly further augmented Maryland’s medical cannabis law with the passage of H.B. 490.[9] The purpose of this legislation, among other things, was to make access to the program easier for patients and physicians.[10]
Maryland’s medical cannabis law tasks the Commission with the generation and promulgation of regulations that govern the medical cannabis program.[11] When H.B. 881 was enacted, the law called for adoption of regulations by the Commission “on or before September 15, 2014,”[12] but, due to many administrative delays, the program’s regulations were not promulgated until September 14, 2015.[13] After the governing regulations were completed, the Commission focused its energy on the creation of an application for which growers, processors, and dispensaries would apply for licensure into the program.[14] These applications were released on September 28, 2015, and called for all interested parties to submit their applications no later than November 6, 2015.[15] The fact that the Commission received 1,081 applications was a testament to the evolution of Maryland’s medical cannabis law and the inviting regulations promulgated by the Commission.[16] More specifically, there were 146 applications for fifteen growers licenses,[17] 124 applications for fifteen processors licenses,[18] and 811 applications for 94 dispensary licenses.[19]
Read More “Maryland State Bank: The Responsible Solution for Fostering the Growth of Maryland’s Medical Cannabis”
The Regression of “Good Faith” in Maryland Commercial Law
By: Lisa Sparks
“Good faith,” in the affirmative or as the absence of bad faith, has always been a challenge to define and judge as a matter of conduct, motive, or both. Different tests apply a subjective standard, an objective standard, or even a combination of the two. Some parties may be held to different expectations than others. This determination of good faith has always been fact-driven and somewhat transcendental. Until recently, however, the question invoked a construct of fairness, resting on a two-pronged metric, at least insofar as several key titles of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code were concerned. Since June 1, 2012, the various Maryland Uniform Commercial Code definitions of good faith have been stripped to the bare, subjective “honesty in fact.”[1] The ramifications of this deviation from the Uniform Law Commission’s[2] promulgated Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) and decades of jurisprudence with consistency among most states have yet to unfold; the bench and bar are just discovering the change. This comment explores how this occurred and what the potential consequences are and also recommends remediation of Maryland’s statutory language to conform to the UCC.
Read More “The Regression of “Good Faith” in Maryland Commercial Law”
Baltimore Law Clubs: A Tradition Promoting the Integrity of the Bar through Scholarship and Congeniality
January 9, 2017 January 9, 2017 ublawforum Leave a comment
By: The Honorable Stuart R. Berger and Bryant S. Green
Since before the civil war, lawyers and judges in Baltimore have had a tendency to organize informal, intimate, and exclusive clubs for the purpose of promoting congeniality and scholarship. Although this Anglo-American tradition traces back to as early as the sixteenth century, the institution of law clubs in the United States appears to have been a unique, local phenomenon until the 1960s and 1970s. Today, this tradition continues in Baltimore City, which currently plays host to no fewer than eight individual law clubs, with many more existing throughout the state. These law clubs offer their members the opportunity to pursue scholarly endeavors while also providing a social outlet for members of the bench and bar alike. While the members of these organizations certainly realize the intrinsic benefits attendant membership, Baltimore’s law clubs also benefit the legal profession by promoting scholarship and congeniality.
Read More “Baltimore Law Clubs: A Tradition Promoting the Integrity of the Bar through Scholarship and Congeniality”