Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/1998496156F3d340_1459/DESHAWN%20E.%20BY%20CHARLOTTE%20E.%20v.%20SAFIR
Timestamp: 2017-03-28 06:13:21
Document Index: 692317572

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 3501', '§ 1983', '§ 320', '§ 307', '§ 320']

DESHAWN E. BY CHARLOTTE E. v. SAFIR | 156 F.3d 340 (1998) | Leagle.com
156 F.3d 340 (1998)
DESHAWN E. BY CHARLOTTE E. v. SAFIR
DESHAWN E., by his parent, CHARLOTTE E., and Anthony C., by his parent, Valerie C., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Howard SAFIR, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Police Department; Raul Russi, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Probation; Peter Reinharz, in his official capacity as Chief of the Family Court Division of the New York City Law Department; and Michael Rodriguez, in his official capacity as police sergeant and head of the Manhattan Family Court Detective Squad, Defendants-Appellees.
Decided September 16, 1998.
Plaintiffs-appellants, a certified class of "all children arrested on possible delinquency charges who are summoned to appear at the probation service in a Family Court building and are interrogated by members of the New York City Police Department's Detective Squad" appeal from a decision and judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (John S. Martin, Jr., Judge), granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the policies and practices of the Family Court Detective Squad ("Squad") in conducting interrogations of children facing possible delinquency charges on the ground that: (1) the Squad's interrogations are so coercive as to produce statements that must be deemed involuntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) the Squad elicits involuntary waivers of plaintiffs' Miranda rights in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) questioning by the Squad without counsel violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. We affirm.
The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that "plaintiffs have not established a federal cause of action." Deshawn E. v. Safir, No. 96 Civ. 5296 JSM, 1997 WL 107544, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1997). Because the district court found that there was no federal claim, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed the complaint. Id. at *3-4. This appeal followed.
Applying Lyons to this case, we find that the plaintiffs have standing to seek equitable relief. Unlike Lyons, the plaintiffs in this case allege that they, as a certified class, are likely to suffer future interrogations by the Squad. See Nicacio v. INS, 768 F.2d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1985), amended, 797 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir.1985) (finding plaintiffs in class action suit had standing to seek prospective relief). Further, unlike Lyons, the plaintiffs in this case allegedly continue to suffer harm from the challenged conduct because the information secured by the Squad is used to enhance their cases and to obtain plea bargains. See Marisol A. v. Giuliani, No. 95 Civ. 10533 (RJW), 1998 WL 274472, at *8 & n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1998) (plaintiffs "were still alleging harm from inappropriate placements").
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.1996). We will affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment if we find, based on the record when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, that there is no general issue of material fact for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The Squad's failure to inform plaintiffs of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), does not, without more, result in § 1983 liability. While a defendant has a constitutional right not to have a coerced statement used against him, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive Miranda warnings. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive Miranda warnings because warnings are only a procedural safeguard designed to protect a person's right against self-incrimination). The remedy for a violation of the right against self-incrimination is "the exclusion from evidence of any ensuing self-incriminating statements" and "not a § 1983 action." Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1174, 116 S.Ct. 1267, 134 L.Ed.2d 214 (1996). Although a juvenile's Fifth Amendment rights may be violated by the Squad's interrogations in an individual case, the appropriate remedy is suppression following a hearing pursuant to People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 77-78, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965), to determine the admissibility of a statement made by a criminal defendant, and not a § 1983 class action.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Miranda warnings are only "suggested" and "were not intended to `create a constitutional straightjacket.'" Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602). Thus in Tucker, even though the police failed to read the defendant his fourth Miranda warning (the right to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one), the Court did not view that failure as a bar to the use of the fruits of the defendant's statements at trial. See id. at 450-51, 94 S.Ct. 2357.
The key inquiry for Fifth Amendment purposes is whether the statement introduced in a judicial proceeding was obtained, not by failure to read a defendant the Miranda warnings, but by coercion — an inquiry determined by the totality of the circumstances, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (listing the Miranda warnings as only two of five factors for the trial judge to weigh in determining voluntariness and providing that the absence of any of the five factors need not be dispositive).
Plaintiffs also argue that even if the statements are not actually used at trial, they are used as an incentive in plea bargaining and to enhance cases. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the Miranda-violating statements "provide[] an incentive for appellants to seek plea bargains" and "provide[] important ammunition in the prosecutorial arsenal."
In sum, we agree with the district court that the Squad's practice is not "so coercive as to amount to a per se constitutional violation." Deshawn E., 1997 WL 107544 at *2. Although we can not rule out the possibility that in some cases an individual juvenile's will may be overcome by the agents' conduct, any such plaintiff who is injured can recover through a Huntley hearing or an individual § 1983 claim.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the right to counsel attaches when "the respondent first appears before the court." FCA § 320.3. Normally, a juvenile's first appearance before the court is upon a "prepetition hearing" application, see FCA § 307.4, or the initial appearance upon a petition, see FCA § 320.1. Of course, juveniles have a right to counsel in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. See In re Cheri H., 121 Misc.2d 973, 469 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1983).
Finally, we easily reject plaintiffs' claim to a Sixth Amendment right to counsel based on the existence of judicial activity. There is no significant judicial activity when the Squad questions the juveniles. Because the adjustment process is investigatorial — to determine whether to initiate juvenile delinquency proceedings, no court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs.