Source: http://spriggslawgroup.blogspot.com/2013/
Timestamp: 2017-09-26 01:50:20
Document Index: 793288091

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 15', 'art 14', 'art 14', 'art 14', 'art 14', 'art 14', 'art 14', 'art 15']

Spriggs Law Group: 2013
The ASBCA then addressed the sovereign act defense. With regard to road blockages and border and gate restrictions imposed by the government, the contractor did not allege that such actions were targeted at the contractor or were taken to achieve some sort of financial advantage in connection with the particular contract. The Board stated the contractor in effect admitted that the requirements complained of were imposed in connection with general government regulations and operations.
The Board said: "Such acts, being of a public and general nature, not targeted at a specific contractor, would constitute sovereign acts. Actions taken by the United States in its sovereign capacity shield the government from liability for financial claims resulting from those acts, although a contractor is allowed additional time to perform." The Board's opinion does not include a detailed and in depth discussion of the sovereign act defense.
We've written often about the application of the sovereign act defense to claims arising from actions of the government taken as a result of sequestration. Although this ASBCA case does not involve sequestration, it signals in a general sense how the ASBCA may address the defense if raised by the government with regard to actions undertaken as a result of sequestration. In many prospective cases there may be no clear causal nexus between sequestration and the action taken by the government. Nevertheless, expect the government to assert the sovereign act defense.
It would appear the ASBCA may look to the general nature sequestration and it may recognize the sovereign act defense by rationalizing that sequestration did not target any particular contract or contractor. In the broader sense, however, as in the Winstar Supreme Court case, it would appear Congress fully intended that its actions would result in changes, cancellations and terminations of procurement contracts, in which case the defense would not apply. We'll see. The Supreme Court probably eventually will have to decide the issue.
Posted by William Spriggs at 1:43 PM 2 comments:
In our opinion, lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) is not best value. It is not part of the best value continuum. It should be removed from FAR Part 15 along with the misnomer "continuum". LPTA has become the way in which agencies inveigle contractors into the best value game only to change the rules to LPTA in the source selection process. What the contractor thought was best value becomes LPTA. But the contractor thought that innovation in the technical proposal would be to its advantage. No, sorry, we're going with the lowest price. Time after time, complaint after complaint, we continue down the LPTA path deluding ourselves into thinking that we are reaching the best value decision.
Best value is a term of art reserved for a special process of cost versus technical superiority tradeoffs. The agency is asked to look at technical superiority to see if that superiority is worth the price premium. If, indeed, and in honest reality, the technical proposals are equal, then the best value axiomatically is the lowest price. But how often does that happen? Equal. Hardly. Evaluators have not done their job, most likely.
What's lost on the contemporary crowd is the history of advertised and negotiated procurement. It's time for a lesson. In the old days, there was what was known as advertised procurement and there was negotiated procurement. In advertised, the government specified exactly and in detail what it wanted the the contractor promised to comply in every respect. If the contractor demonstrated it would meet the requirements, the contract went to the lowest priced bidder. (That's where the term bidder came from - advertised procurement involved bidders - not offerors.) The bids were opened in public in front of anyone who wanted to see them, anyone could look at them and the winning price was chalked up (literally). There even was a dance called the two step which was a kind of qualifying round where the bidders were thoroughly checked out and pronounced qualified before they even submitted their prices.
FAR Part 14 is the lost part of FAR. The old advertised procurement is now called sealed bidding. It used to be all the rage and now you hardly ever hear of it. (I have not see a sealed bidding procurement in years.) Well, guess what. LPTA procurements belong in Part 14 where they can be handled properly just as they were in the old advertised procurement days.
The problem with the way LPTA is administered today is that it is used for performance specifications. We got away from the detailed specifications the government used in advertised procurements because Senator Chiles went on TV with a 4 inch mousetrap specification in his hands. Well, the government needs to specify exactly what it wants, in detail, if it is to use the likes of LPTA. We pretty much agree on that. If we are looking at whether the technical requirements are met, it seems we ought to specify with particularity what we require. As soon as you go there, you are in Part 14.
We need to rediscover FAR Part 14 and start using it where the government can specify what it wants. Follow those rules. Once the contractor is qualified and we have confidence it can do what we want, we should go to the lowest price. And, we really ought to consider the old two step as well. Use of LPTA today is entirely misplaced and misleading. Too many contractors think they are in a best value procurement when they are not. Let's call it what it is. If the government wants a performance specification, do a true best value tradeoff analysis. If it knows what it wants, use FAR Part 14 to find a qualified contractor with the lowest price.
Come to think of it, this is just another reason we need to hear from the old timers. How many of you understand what we just said? Too few, I fear. But the old timers are applauding and saying let's rediscover the virtues of FAR Part 14 and rid ourselves of the vices of Part 15.
Posted by William Spriggs at 12:14 PM 3 comments:
Sean Stackley recently called our acquisition system the most "complex, chaotic, over regulated and overseen process in the world." We may disagree with him. We are not so sure about the chaotic part. But it is time to remind ourselves that the federal procurement system is by design a tilted and uneven playing field. The government writes the rules. How many of us participate in any way in the rule making process? The best we can do is join a trade association. But how many of us actively participate in the efforts to affect the rules? And with what result? What influence does industry really have in how the game is played? We elect our representatives to Congress. But how many of us sit with the staff members to suggest less micromanagement or changes to the statutes?
It is high time to remind ourselves that federal procurement is based on contracts of adhesion. What are contracts of adhesion? In this context, and in the legal sense, they are contracts in which the government dictates the terms and conditions. Our mentor, Gil Cuneo, was fond of reminding all of the audiences before which he spoke that one must start with the understanding that when you enter the government marketplace, you must be prepared to deal with contracts of adhesion. The closest commercial counterpart is the insurance contract, to which we all can relate. The insurance company dictates the terms and conditions. How many times has each of us negotiated the terms of our insurance policies?
Yes, government contract terms and conditions are dictated by the government. And if the term or condition is not written in the contract, chances are it will be read into the contract by operation of law. See our article on the Christian doctrine. There are no changes or termination for convenience clauses in the commercial marketplace contracts. Making changes unilaterally and terminating for convenience would be breaches of contract there. But, like it or not, the government contract will contain these clauses whether they are written in the contract or not. (Of course, if the contract is for a "commercial item", the unilateral change is eliminated in government contracts.) Here, we've picked but two of the hundreds of clauses dictated by the government that will be found in government contracts. In most every case, the contractor has no control over whether the clause is included or not. And in many instances, it is there even if you can't see it.
So, what do we make of these contracts of adhesion? Contractors play on a tilted and even uneven playing field. Tilted in the sense that the government controls the entire system, from clauses to remedies. Uneven, in the sense that the professional contract administration staff for the government often does not understand the rules and applies them unevenly and even unfairly. Is it any wonder that in order to invite contractors into its marketplace the government employs ombudsmen? That's a warning to let the seller beware.
What's the point of all this? The government owes its contractors a special duty. It's known as the duty of good faith and fair dealing. It's know as the obligation to cooperate, communicate, not interfere and disclose information vital to performance. We've written about these corollary duties over and over again. Some accuse us of taking sides. But put all this in the proper perspective. The contracting party with this unusual control occupies a position of special trust. And since it is public contracting, that trust is owed to all citizens, all taxpayers, but including all contractors. That position of trust brings with it certain obligations. Our trustees should not be driving unreasonably hard bargains and bullying contractors into submission. They should be assisting contractors to succeed.
Posted by William Spriggs at 8:05 AM 3 comments:
Posted by William Spriggs at 7:03 AM 1 comment:
Posted by William Spriggs at 5:35 AM 9 comments:
One of the possible consequences of sequestration is that there may well be a greater risk now of violations of the Antideficiency Act. Unless the meat ax cuts are squarely and precisely made, some obligations and expenditures may be made which exceed the actual amounts obligated and committed to be expended.
What is the Antideficiency Act? That Act prohibits making or authorizing an obligation or expenditure in excess of the amount available under any appropriation, apportionment, administrative subdivision of funds, allowance or allocation of funds unless authorized by law. It also covers involving the government in any obligation to pay money before funds have been appropriated and it prohibits accepting voluntary services except in cases of emergency involving the safety of human life or the protection of property. Finally, it prohibits making obligations or expenditures in excess the amount permitted by agency regulations.
Federal employees who violate the Act can be disciplined administratively, suspended without pay or removed from office. They may also be subject to criminal penalties and actually be sent to jail. We are not aware of any public employee who has ever been sentenced to jail time for violation of the Act.
Agency heads are required to report violations to the President and to Congress. OMB has issued further instructions which can be found in OMB Circular No. A-11 (2012). That document describes violations as: "obligations or expenditures in excess of the lower of the amount in the affected account, the amount apportioned, or any administrative subdivision of funds specified in your agency's fund control regulations as being subject to the Antideficiency Act." It also explains that "obligations and expenditures that exceed allowance and allocations are violations of the Antideficiency Act."
(A friend of ours told the story of a contracting officer saying to the contractor, go ahead and perform the service, we cover it with next year's funding. Yes, that's a violation.)
As if the job of the contracting officer were not already hard enough, our public servants must now be even more careful to see exactly where the meat ax falls in sequestration. They must question carefully whether they are making obligations and expenditures which exceed funds which have been chopped off. And, as Sean Stackley recently said, "We ask our acquisition folks and program managers to navigate the most complex, chaotic, over regulated and overseen process in the world." And then we ask them to take a 20% pay cut.
Posted by William Spriggs at 6:49 AM 2 comments:
Judge Peacock of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has sustained the appeal of Lockheed Martin in a Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) claim made by the Air Force. After a thorough discussion of the many faults in the Air Force's argument in favor of its claim, Judge Peacock simply points out that for an agency to prevail on such a claim, it must show damages or prejudice. Having failed in the attempt, the ASBCA denies the Air Force's claim for $14+ million.
TINA was first passed in 1962 to put the government on an equal footing with contractors in contract negotiations where submission of cost or pricing data is required. TINA now applies to any negotiated contract expected to exceed $700,000, a modification of a contract exceeding $700,000 and in certain cases a subcontract exceeding that same amount. Of course, there are exceptions not relevant here. And there are other arguments a contractor can make in defending the government's defective pricing claim.
In the Lockheed Martin case, the Air Force claimed that Lockheed's failure to disclose date resulted in overstatement of the prices the Air Force paid. And the Air Force grounded its argument on the rule of law that there is a presumption that the non-disclosure of data resulted in an overstatement of the price. Fair enough. There is such a rule. But Judge Peacock pointed out that the ASBCA analyzes the evidence carefully in applying the presumption. And, he pointed out, the presumption can be rebutted and is not a substitute for specific proof establishing the amount of damages.
The government has the ultimate burden of showing a causal relationship between incomplete or inaccurate data and an overstated contract price. "In this case, the government not only has failed to prove the amount of any increase, appellant has rebutted the presumption that an overstated CCIP contract price resulted from the alleged nondisclosure of the data in question." Judge Peacock concluded that it was not necessary for him to address the other issues and defenses raised by Lockheed Martin. Even whether the data were timely disclosed was something he did not need to address.
"To establish defective pricing, it is axiomatic that the allegedly undisclosed data lead to a higher negotiated price. Here, the evidence establishes that any nondisclosure of the Bridge prices did not contribute to an overstatement of the CCIP contract prices. Even if all the other elements of the government's claim were established, its damages are zero." Repeat, even if all the other elements of the government's claim were established, its damages are zero.
The lesson? Cut to the chase. What were the damages, if any. If none, there is no claim.
Posted by William Spriggs at 5:05 AM No comments:
Posted by William Spriggs at 12:40 PM No comments:
Cost estimates on cost reimbursement contracts are not to be taken at face value. FAR 15.404-1(d) says a cost realism analysis is the process of independently reviewing and evaluating specific elements of proposed cost estimates to determine if they are realistic for the work to be performed, reflect an understanding of what's required and are consistent with the contractor's technical proposal. The analysis is mandatory on cost reimbursement contracts. The purpose is to determine probable costs. The probable (not face value) costs are then used to determine best value. That's the regulation.
What does GAO say? In a recent decision, GAO said that when an agency evaluates proposals, the offeror's proposed estimated costs are not controlling because the government is bound (in cost reimbursement contracts) to pay actual allowable costs. Based on the cost realism analysis, proposed costs should be adjusted. FAR 15.404-1(d)(2)(ii). Government agencies are obliged to employ analysis methods which provide a "measure of confidence" that the "most probable costs" are "reasonable and realistic" in view of the information available at the time of evaluation.
In another decision within the last year, GAO sustained a protest where the agency failed to conduct a meaningful analysis of why it accepted the contractor's proposed costs at face value. GAO said: "When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost-reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed costs are not controlling since such costs may not accurately reflect the actual costs the government will incur." It's really a "should cost" exercise. GAO will test the agency evaluation to see if it is "reasonable, not arbitrary, and adequately documented." GAO will sustain a protest where the cost realism analysis is not adequately documented.
The government is not required to conduct an in-depth cost analysis or to verify each and every cost item. Determination of the probable cost is, after all, a matter of informed judgment. But the judgment must be rational. The cost realism analysis must be performed with an eye to what the contractor proposes in its technical proposal. It is not rational for an agency to apply the same mechanical test and analysis to all contractors without reference to their specific technical approaches. And even where the contractor puts a cap on its costs, an agency must still consider whether capping costs may so constrain the contractor that its ability to perform the work may be impaired.
Perhaps the biggest area of costs open to question is the estimated number of labor hours required to perform the work. Proposed staffing levels may be unrealistic according to any number of measurements (the technical proposal itself and prior staffing levels for similar work). Whether labor rates are realistic also is often challenged.
In the end, the cost analysis should be used to test the contractor's risk of nonperformance. Performance risk in today's world is of the highest concern. A proper cost analysis should inform the government's assessment of the performance risks.
Posted by William Spriggs at 6:42 AM No comments: