Source: http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/?currentPage=17
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 16:47:53
Document Index: 729264668

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 2', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', 'art 1', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 102', '§ 112']

Patentee Describing Single Embodiment as "The Present Invention" Leads to Narrow Claim Constructions
Justin E. Gray | Tuesday, September 8, 2009 at 1:12 PM
Lydall Thermal/Acoustical, Inc. v. Federal-Mogul Corp. (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2009) (nonprecedential)
In this case, the district court (Eastern District of Michigan) entered final judgment of noninfringement pursuant to a stipulation by the parties that allowed the plaintiff Lydall to appeal the district court's claim constructions of any of thirteen terms. Lydall appealed the construction of two terms. The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Lourie, affirmed the district court's claim construction of these two terms. This case provides a good example of how statements in a patent specification consistently describing "the present invention" in a particular way can potentially lead to narrow claim constructions.
The disputed claims at issue are directed to flexible insulating shields that can be used for thermal and acoustic insulation. At issue on appeal was the construction of two claim terms: "fibrous batt of fibers" and "tufts of fibers." The district court construed "fibrous batt of fibers" to mean "a composite batt having a layer of insulating fibers sandwiched between layers of binding fibers" as the district court found that "there is not a hint in the specification that the batt can be a single homogenous layer" and the specification consistently described the batt has having an insulating layer between binding layers. The district court constructed "tufts of fibers" to mean "clusters of binding fibers which have been intentionally needle-punched on a downstroke and which extend beyond an opposite surface of the batt" as the court found "the specification and the drawings made clear that 'tufts' had to extend beyond the exit or second side of the needle and that the patent made no mention of a tuft appearing on the entry or first side of the needle."
For the term "fibrous batt of fibers", Lydall argued that the term should not be limited to multi-layer batts but should also include single-layer batts, citing to the claim language and various portions of the specification and file history. The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that the patent specification "discloses a single embodiment of the invention" and "[a]lthough Lydall is correct in saying that the claim language 'fibrous batt of fibers' does not, in isolation, suggest a layered batt, Lydall's arguments completely ignore the consistent use of the term 'batt' in the specification." The specification "identifies a three-layered batt as 'the present invention' ... [and] repeatedly describes the batt as having an insulating layer disposed between two binding layers." Citing its prior Honeywell decision, the Federal Circuit explained that "when a patentee consistently describes one embodiment as 'the present invention,' 'the public is entitled to take the patentee at his word.'" Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's construction of this claim term.
For the term "tufts of fibers", Lydall argued that both the parties and the district court agreed that "tufts of fibers" are "clusters of fibers" and there was nothing in the specification or file history to indicate that this term should be given anything other than its ordinary and customary meaning. Again, the Federal Circuit disagreed. Stating that while Lydall was correct that the ordinary meaning of "tufts" is "clusters," a court "will adopt an alternative meaning 'if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.'" (quoting from CCS Fitness). Finding that "[e]very time the specification discusses how to create the tufts of fibers, it states that the tufts form on the opposite side of the needle's entry point ...[t]he specification identifies a batt with tufts on the upper and lower surfaces as 'the present invention' ... [and] the specification consistently describes the batt with tufts on both sides", the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's narrower construct of "tufts of fibers" as "clusters of binding fibers which have been intentionally needle-punched on a downstroke and which extend beyond an opposite surface of the batt."
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in Federal Circuit
Federal Circuit Debates Whether Claim Term "Animal" Includes Humans
Justin E. Gray | Friday, September 4, 2009 at 1:14 PM
Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc. (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 2009)
In this case, the district court (District of Delaware) entered final judgment that the defendants infringed certain claims of two of plaintiff's patents and, based on the court's claim construction, plaintiff stipulated that the defendants did not infringe one of plaintiff's patents-in-suit. Both plaintiff and defendant appealed on various issues, including claim construction of two terms. The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Gajarsa, affirmed the claim claim construction of one term and reversed on the other, remanding back to the district court for further proceedings. Judge Lourie wrote an opinion dissenting in part, to which Judge Rader joined (this particular panel consisted of five judges).
The disputed claims in one of the patents relate to "heterotrophic organisms and a process for culturing them for the production of lipids with high concentrations of omega-3 highly unsaturated fatty acids (HUFA) suitable for human and animal consumption as food additives for use in pharmaceutical and industrial products." One essential omega-3 fatty acid is Docosahexaenoic acid ("DHA"), which is produced in limited quantities by the human body and plays an important role in the development of various organs. The disputed claims in the other patent relate to methods for increasing the concentration of omega-3 HUFA in animals by feeding them microorganisms of the order Thraustochytriales or lipids extracted from such microorganisms.
Two issues on appeal were the constructions of the claim terms "non-chloride sodium salt" and "animal." The district court construed the term "non-chloride sodium salt" to encompass sodium hydroxide (NaOH) and construed the term "animal" to exclude humans.
A. "Non-Chloride Sodium Salt"
Regarding this term, the Federal Circuit found the district court's claim construction "comports with the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of record." Specifically, defendants primary argument was that the plaintiff disclaimed coverage of NaOH during prosecution, citing to "selected statements spanning two pages of the prosecution history." While the Federal Circuit found that "the selected statements arguably support [the defendants'] assertion, those statements are undercut considerably by additional statements recited in the same two pages of prosecution history relied upon by [the defendants]: (1) the applicant's explicit statement that NaOH is a non-chloride sodium salt, and (2) the applicants' statements distinguishing the prior art at issue from the claimed invention on alternative grounds unrelated to the way NaOH was used in the prior art reference." Citing to its prior precedent, the Court found that the plaintiff "committed no clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope" and affirmed the district court's claim construction.
B. "Animal"
The district court had construed this term to mean "any member of the kingdom Animalia, except humans." The Federal Circuit, citing Phillips, stated that "[w]hen a patentee explicitly defines a claim term in the patent specification, the patentee's definition controls." In this case, the patentee explicitly provided in the specification that "[t]he term 'animal' means any organism belonging to the kingdom Animalia." The Court found that since it was "undisputed that humans are members of the kingdom Animalia, it was error for the district court to limit the claim term 'animal' to exclude humans."
Defendants argued that, when the specification is considered in its entirety, it clearly limits "animal" to non-human animals. In this regard, defendants appeared to raise three arguments. First, defendants pointed out that the specification discloses and enumerates a number of "economic food animals" (including cows, sheep, goats, bison, buffalo, antelope, deer, and camels) but the Federal Circuit responded by stating that this actually supports a broad definition of the unmodified term "animal" as found in the patent claims, and the applicable specification language did not contain "words or expressions that manifestly exclude coverage of humans." Second, the defendants argued the fact that the claims refer to "raising" and "feeding" animals, along with the fact that dependent claims are directed to certain types of animals such as cows, sheep, and goats, shows a disclaimer of coverage for humans. The Federal Circuit responded by stating that the terms "raising" and "feeding" can also apply to humans, and "the patent plainly contemplates that the invention is applicable to humans", citing to various passages from the specification. Finally, the defendants argued that the extrinsic evidence of record demonstrated that the ordinary meaning of "animal" is a non-human animal. However, the Federal Circuit found that since "the patentee explicitly defined 'animal,' [the defendants'] extrinsic evidence is simply irrelevant." The district court's construction of "animal" was therefore reversed.
In dissent, Judge Lourie opined that, while the term "animal" was defined "in a single line in the [] patent ... [t]his case illustrates the unusual situation in which a purported definition of a claim term in the written description is totally negated by the remainder of the text of the patent." Judge Lourie found it was "clear that humans should be excluded from the construction of the term 'animal' ... [as] the specification is not directed to raising children; it is directed to raising non-human animals." First, the specification states that "[t]he present invention concerns a method for raising an animal ... and food products derived from such animals." Judge Lourie noted that using the words "the present invention" can limit the invention to what is described (citing Honeywell v. ITT) and "[f]ood products are not derived from humans." Judge Lourie also found the enumeration of "economic food animals" in the specification "strongly supports a conclusion that the term 'animal' encompasses only those animals raised for production of food and milk products, thereby not including humans." Finally, Judge Lourie pointed to various portions of the specification that he believed differentiated between humans and other non-human animals. He concluded "it is clear that one of ordinary skill in the art would conclude that, despite the purported definition in the specification, the term 'animal' in the claims cannot include humans."
This decision shows yet again that reasonable minds (in this case five Federal Circuit Judges) can still disagree over a particular claim construction of an arguably simple term ("animal"), even when the term appears to have been explicitly defined in the patent specification.
Summary of Local Patent Rules Affecting Claim Construction Practice (Part 2 of 6)
Justin E. Gray | Tuesday, September 1, 2009 at 10:20 AM
Presently, eleven federal district court have enacted local patent rules. The rules are generally used to help streamline what can be very complicated disputes. Among these rules are rules that affect claim construction practice in each district court. Practitioners should be able to benefit from understanding these differences in practice. In this five-part six-part series, this blog will undertake to briefly summarize the applicable claim construction rules in each of these eleven courts. Today, we focus on the United States District Courts for the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of North Carolina.
Western District of Pennsylvania (rules available here)
The parties first simultaneously exchange a list of claim terms to be construed and claim elements which the parties contend should be governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6;
Within 10 days of this exchange, the parties are required to meet and confer to narrow the list of claim terms in dispute and prepare a Joint Disputed Claim Terms Chart to be filed with the Court, including proposed constructions and intrinsic evidence related to each claim term;
30 days after filing the Joint Disputed Claim Terms Chart, the Plaintiff (or the Defendant in cases where an alleged infringer has filed a DJA of non-infringement/invalidity and the Defendant patent holder has counterclaimed for infringement) files its opening claim construction brief, including proposed constructions of each claim term in dispute, the function and structure for each 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 term, extrinsic evidence, and the anticipated length of time needed to present its case at the claim construction hearing;
20 days after the opening brief filing, the opposing party files its response brief, including the same information as required in the opening brief and a concise (under five-page) statement regarding the opening party's offer of extrinsic evidence;
15 days after the response brief filing, the opening party files its reply brief, including a concise (under five-page) statement regarding the opposing party's offer of extrinsic evidence;
Prior to the claim construction hearing (which is routinely scheduled to be 15 days after the reply brief filing, subject to the Court's availability), the Court may issue an order regarding extrinsic evidence and any other matter the Court deems appropriate regarding the hearing.
Eastern District of North Carolina (rules available here)
15 days after service of the Preliminary Non-Infringement and Invalidity Contentions, the parties simultaneously exchange a list of claim terms for construction and claim elements which the parties contend should be governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6;
20 days after this exchange, the parties simultaneously exchange preliminary proposed constructions of each claim term, the structures/acts/materials associated with potential 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 claim elements, and extrinsic evidence each party intends to rely upon;
The parties are required to meet an confer to narrow both the list of proposed terms for construction and to resolve differences in proposed constructions;
45 days after the exchange of preliminary proposed constructions, the parties are required to file a Joint Claim Construction Statement containing:
Agreed upon constructions;
Each party's proposed construction of terms in dispute, along with identification of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence;
Anticipated length of time needed for the Claim Construction Hearing; and
A statement indicating whether any party intends to provide live testimony at the hearing, including the identity of witnesses and a summary of expert opinions to be offered live at the hearing.
30 days after filing the Joint Claim Construction Statement, claim construction discovery ends;
45 days after filing the Joint Claim Construction Statement, the parties simultaneously file opening claim construction briefs;
20 days after filing opening briefs, the parties simultaneously file response briefs;
Prior to the claim construction hearing (which the Court will conduct to the extent it believes a hearing is necessary), the Court may issue an order regarding extrinsic evidence and any other matter the Court deems appropriate regarding the hearing.
Neither of these districts appear to have rules constraining the number of terms that the Courts will construe or the length of claim construction briefs. While the Western District of Pennsylvania does not allow for the exchange of simultaneous briefs, the Eastern District of North Carolina does. Unlike the courts of Massachusetts and New Jersey (discussed in part one of the series), neither of the Pennsylvania or North Carolina courts require the parties to identify the most important claim terms to be construed.
Stay tuned for parts three through five six of this series. Part one of the series can be found here.
in Local Patent Rules
BPAI Construes "Pharmaceutical Compound" as a Compound that "Achieve[s] Any Discernable Physiological Effect"
Justin E. Gray | Monday, August 31, 2009 at 7:27 PM
Ex parte Pickar (BPAI Aug. 31, 2009)
Today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"), in an opinion by Administrative Patent Judge Lebovitz, affirmed a rejection of claims relating to pharmaceutical composition comprising an estrogen and an additional compound.
At issue in the appeal was the proper scope of the term "pharmaceutical composition" as used in the claims. The Applicants argued that the anticipatory prior art reference that disclosed a composition administered to rats would not be understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to be a "pharmaceutical composition" as described in the patent claims.
The BPAI noted that the phrase "pharmaceutical composition" was not defined in the specification, but the specification did "characterize[] the 'invention as a 'pharmaceutical composition' for 'alleviating the symptoms of post-menopausal syndrome in women' and 'to minimize undesirable side effects of estrogen treatment or therapy.'" However, since the claims did not recite "that the 'pharmaceutically effective amount' is for treating a specific disease, symptom, or condition, or a specific subject," the BPAI interpreted "the claims broadly to include amounts to achieve any discernable physiological effect in a subject produced by administration of the estrogen and [the additional] compound" and would "not interpret 'pharmaceutical composition' more narrowly than the claim language mandates."
Subsequently, the BPAI affirmed the Examiner's rejections of the claims at issue.
in BPAI
Prosecution Disclaimer Applies Even if the Disclaimer Results in a Negative Claim Limitation
Justin E. Gray | Thursday, August 20, 2009 at 9:19 AM
RFID Tracker, Ltd. V. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Fed. Cir. Aug. 18, 2009) (nonprecedential)
In this case, the district court (Eastern District of Texas) entered final judgment of noninfringement after claim construction and a stipulation by the plaintiff that the defendants did not infringe under the entered claim construction. The Federal Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed.
The disputed claims relate to an inventory control system that includes radio frequency identification ("RFID") tags attached to inventory items, an interrogator/reader, and a computer. The district court construed the claim term "interrogator/reader" as "an interrogator/reader includes a field generator and a receiver, but not a transmitter." As none of the parties disputed that the accused devices contained a transmitter, the district court entered final judgment of noninfringement.
One disputed claim recited, in part, an "interrogator/reader" that included a "field generator" and a "receiver." RFID argued that the claim used "the open-ended term 'including,' which, similar to 'comprising,' raises a presumption that the 'interrogator/reader' is not limited to a 'field generator' and a 'receiver' and may include a transmitter." The Federal Circuit found that while "the specification does not rebut RFID's alleged presumption that the interrogator/reader can include a transmitter ... [during prosecution] [t]he applicant differentiated its claims from the prior art on the ground that the claimed interrogator/reader was simple, unlike the complex readers of the prior art that contained and used a transmitter." Father, "[i]n light of these statements during prosecution, RFID cannot now contend that the claimed interrogator/reader is anything more than 'simply a receiver and a field generator in its simplest form.'"
While the district court's construction included a negative limitation (the phrase "but not a transmitter"), "[i]f the applicant unequivocally disavows claim scope, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer applies even if the disclaimer results in a negative claim limitation," (citing Am. Container Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed both the claim construction and the final judgment.
Federal Circuit Construes Golf Ball Claim to Require Cover Layer Hardness be Measured On the Ball
Justin E. Gray | Friday, August 14, 2009 at 1:28 PM
Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co. (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2009)
In this case, the district court (District of Delaware) granted summary judgment of no anticipation and entered final judgment after a jury verdict that all but one of the asserted claims of the patent at issue were not obvious. The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Dyk, reversed the summary judgment order and also vacated the obviousness judgment and remanded for a new trial.
The disputed claims related to multi-layer polyurethane-covered golf balls. As stated by the Federal Circuit, "[a]ccording to the specification, a major advantage of the patented invention is that it presents a 'dual personality' golf ball that is capable of travelling great distances, yet does not exhibit diminished playability or durability." The accused products at issue were the Titleist Pro V1, Pro V1*, and Pro V1x golf balls.
The claim term at issue on appeal was "cover layer having a Shore D hardness." The term "Shore D hardness" refers to a durometer measurement of a material's hardness rated on the Shore D hardness scale, which is described in the ASTM D-2240 standard. The issue between the parties was whether the hardness of the cover layer was to be measured while the cover layer was on or off the golf ball. The district court noted that "on-the-ball" hardness measurements can differ from "off-the-ball" measurements. Ultimately, the district court construed the term such that the hardness measurement of the cover layer was to be taken on the ball.
On appeal, Acushnet argued that the district court's claim construction was erroneous because the patent specification noted in several places that the hardness values are "measure in accordance with the ASTM method D-2240", which states that hardness should not be tested on a rounded or curved surface (i.e. the surface of a golf ball). The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that the claims focused on "[a] golf ball" with a "cover layer" having a certain hardness, "rather than focusing on the hardness of the material used to create the cover layer." Further, the Court found that the patent specification pointed to "the hardness of the assembled ball (rather than of the cover materials in isolation) as the relevant characteristic." The Federal Circuit also agreed with the district court's finding that "there is no 'cover layer' to measure until a golf ball is produced." Finally, the Court pointed out that Acushnet's own witnesses testified at trial that that persons having ordinary skill in the art typically took Shore D hardness measurements "on the ball." The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's claim construction.
As a side note, the jury found that dependent claim 5 of the patent at issue invalid as obvious, while finding at the same time that all other asserted claims, including the independent claim from which claim 5 depends, not invalid. This was truly a strange result as an independent claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim stemming from that independent claim is invalid for obviousness. While this issue was initially raised to the district court judge by the patentee, not the accused infringer, after the jury was polled, the judge indicated she would not send the jury back for additional deliberations. In light of this, Acushnet asked the Federal Circuit for, and was subsequently granted, a new trial on obviousness as the jury verdict contained a "irreconcilable inconsistency."
Summary of Local Patent Rules Affecting Claim Construction Practice (Part 1 of 6)
Justin E. Gray | Thursday, August 13, 2009 at 8:31 AM
Presently, eleven federal district courts have enacted local patent rules. The rules are generally used to help streamline what can be very complicated disputes. Among these rules are rules that affect claim construction practice in each district court. Practitioners should be able to benefit from understanding these differences in practice. In a five-part six-part series, this blog will undertake to briefly summarize the applicable claim construction rules in each of these eleven courts. Today we focus on the United States District Courts for the District of Massachusetts and the District of New Jersey.
District of Massachusetts (rules available here)
The parties first simultaneously exchange a list of claim terms to be construed and proposed constructions. The suggested date for this exchange is 120 days after completion of preliminary disclosures;
20 days (suggested) after exchanging the list of claim terms and proposed constructions, the parties simultaneously file opening claim construction briefs. The Court suggests that opening briefs be limited to 25 pages, absent leave of Court;
10 days (suggested) after filing opening briefs, the parties simultaneously file reply briefs. The Court suggests that reply briefs be limited to 15 pages, absent leave of Court;
15 days (suggested) after filing reply briefs, the parties finalize the list of disputed terms and file a joint claim construction and prehearing statement containing the following information:
the anticipated time needed for the Markman hearing and identification of proposed witnesses to testify at the hearing;
procedural information concerning technology tutorials (if needed);
the order of presentation at the hearing (term-by-term, party-by-party, etc.); and
a joint claim construction chart showing the terms at issue, the parties' proposed constructions, and supporting evidence.
The Court suggests limiting of the number of claim terms to no more than 10 per patent, and asks the parties to prioritize them in order of importance for the Court.
District of New Jersey (rules available here)
First, the parties exchange a list of claim terms for construction and identify any terms which should be governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6;
After this initial exchange of terms, the parties are required to meet and confer to limit the terms in dispute;
21 days after exchanging initial lists, the parties exchange preliminary proposed constructions of all terms in dispute (including all terms suggested by both the patentee and accused infringer), including information related to construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (if applicable), and specifically identifying all intrinsic and extrinsic evidence used in support of the proposed constructions;
After this exchange of proposed constructions, the parties are required to meet and confer again to narrow the issues;
30 days after exchanging proposed constructions, the parties file a joint claim construction and prehearing statement containing the following information:
agreed upon claim constructions;
each party's proposed construction of each disputed term with identification of all references to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to be used in support of the party's construction and in opposition to the other party's proposed construction;
an identification of the most significant terms, including identifying terms that are case or claim dispositive or that would help in promoting settlement;
the anticipated time needed for the Markman hearing; and
identification of witnesses that may called at the Markman hearing, including a summary of testimony.
30 days after filing of the joint claim construction and prehearing statement, claim construction discovery ends;
45 days after filing of the joint claim construction and prehearing statement, the parties simultaneously file opening Markman briefs;
60 days after filing opening briefs, the parties simultaneously file response briefs;
14 days after filing response briefs, the parties propose a Markman hearing schedule to the Court.
In both Massachusetts and New Jersey, the parties simultaneously file both opening and responsive Markman briefs. Also, in both courts the parties are asked to inform the court of which terms are the most important. New Jersey's adds two mandatory meet and confers prior to the filing of briefs, in order to both narrow the list of terms to be construed and to narrow the disputes in proposed constructions. Massachusetts' court adds a request that the parties to narrow the list of terms to ten per patent.
Stay tuned for parts two through five six of this series.
Reines and Greenblatt Publish "Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009"
Justin E. Gray | Tuesday, August 11, 2009 at 8:04 AM
Yesterday, Dennis Crouch's Patently-O blog published an article by Ed Reines and Nathan Greenblatt of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP entitled "Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009." Edward Reines and Nathan Greenblatt, Interlocutory Appeals of Claim Construction in the Patent Reform Act of 2009, 2009 Patently-O Patent L.J. 1 (2009).
In this article, the authors criticize the current proposal in the 2009 Patent Reform Act of interlocutory claim construction appeals as "misguided" and point out that this proposed solution to the Cybor de novo review standard "does not address the true issue in any event - it masks it." Id. at 3-4. The authors raise an interesting point that interlocutory appeals may put the Federal Circuit in the position of "reversing its own interlocutory claim construction order after further development of the facts at trial, resulting in at least two appeals and three proceedings in the district court for the same case." Id. at 10.
The article provides a great prospective on the interlocutory appeal debate and is a must-read for those interested. The article can be found in its entirety here.
Federal Circuit Gives Term "Sealed" Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
Justin E. Gray | Monday, August 10, 2009 at 12:51 PM
In re Shoner (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2009) (nonprecedential)
In this case, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI") affirmed the Examiner's rejections of the patent application claims at issue as obvious. The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Lourie, affirmed.
The disputed claims related to a cellular tire liner and air chamber system for pneumatic tires. The Examiner initially found that a single prior art reference disclosed all of the claim elements except for a claimed "segment configuration" of the tire liners. In rejecting the claims as obvious, the Examiner also cited to numerous prior art publications that she felt demonstrated that it was "notoriously well-known" to produce tire cores in segments in order to facilitate mounting. The BPAI affirmed the Examiner's decision.
On appeal, the applicant argued that its application claimed an air chamber that "is sealed separately from the rest of the tire cavity" and that the prior art did not teach this separately sealed cavity. In response, the Director of the PTO pointed out that the PTO is required to give claims their "broadest reasonable interpretation" and such an interpretation of the applicant's claims was not as limited as the applicant suggested.
The Federal Circuit found that while "the specification of the '800 application describes an invention that has a sealed air chamber that is structurally separate from the rest of the tire cavity ... [the patent claims do] not limit the invention to one in which the air chamber is sealed with an inner tube or similar structure. [The claims] require[] only that the air chamber be 'sealed and pressurized.'" The Court further found there was "no limitation in the language [of the claims] that would narrow the meaning of 'sealed' to a particular structure ... and there is nothing in the specification that would explicitly limit the air chamber to a particular structure." The Court therefore adopted the PTO's broad interpretation of "sealed" as "any structure that seals and pressurizes the air chamber." Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit agreed with both the Examiner and the BPAI that the prior art did teach a "sealed and pressurized" air chamber and affirmed the rejection of the claims.
BPAI Rejects Claims, Finding PHOSITA Would Have to Make Speculative Assumptions Concerning the Meaning of Claim Language
Justin E. Gray | Friday, August 7, 2009 at 12:15 PM
Ex parte Brune (BPAI Aug. 7, 2009)
Today, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"), in an opinion by Administrative Patent Judge Macdonald, reversed a rejection of claims (and entered a new ground of rejection) relating to a method for data exchange between network devices.
While the examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), the BPAI first considered whether the claims at issue were definite. Two claim construction issues were involved, one related to steps in a method claim, and the other relating to construction of a means-plus function claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.
Before getting to the merits of the appeal, the BPAI noted that the PTO gives claims their "broadest reasonable interpretation" and the PTO is "not required in the course of prosecution to interpret claims in the same manner as courts are required to during infringement proceedings" as district court judges "operate under the assumption the patent is valid." Also, "[a] prior art [rejection] cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of claim language."
First dealing with the method claim, the BPAI stated it was "unable to discern the steps" of the claim. The BPAI quote the following phrases from the claim: "wherein a device can be selected using a control device; "wherein a user interface for the selected device is generated based on description data which [is] stored;" and "wherein the user interface of a first device is displayed." (emphasis in opinion). The BPAI noted that "[a]n undisputable method claim has clauses that are designated by a present participate and separated with a comma (or a semicolon that includes a comma)." In view of the BPAI's "inability to identify the steps" of the claim, it found a "material issue of claim interpretation is present which must be resolved before the merits of the Examiner's and Appellants' position can be properly considered" and therefore rejected the claim as indefinite.
Next dealing with the means-plus-function claim, the claim at issue recited a "control means for generating a user interface display for enabling user control of first and second devices via said user interface display, the control means receiving description data associated with the first and second devices via said digital bus." The BPAI found that while "generating a user interface display" was the function associated with the "control means" of the claim, the specification did "not describe, with particularity, sufficient structure, material, or acts for performing the 'generating' limitation" of the claim. This default would cause a PHOSITA "to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of the claim language" and the BPAI therefore rejected this claim as indefinite as well.
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