Source: https://openjurist.org/185/f3d/529/united-states-of-america-v-tennessee-air-pollution-control-board-
Timestamp: 2017-08-24 06:01:51
Document Index: 68155257

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 13235', '§ 1323', '§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 7418', '§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 2']

185 F3d 529 United States of America v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board | OpenJurist
185 F. 3d 529 - United States of America v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board
185 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 1999)
TENNESSEE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Filed and Decided: July 22, 1999
The words "any administrative remedy or sanction," as used in § 7604(e)(2), clearly encompass the civil penalty imposed by the Board in the case at bar. The Board's enforcement authority is not limited to prospective, coercive action,3 nor is it restricted by "any other law," including the law relating to sovereign immunity.
The United States argues that the state suit provision is not an affirmative waiver of sovereign immunity. What the statute says, however, is this: "Nothing in this section or in any other law of the United States shall be construed to prohibit... any State... from... bringing any administrative enforcement action or obtaining any administrative remedy or sanction in any State or local administrative agency... against the United States... under State or local law respecting control and abatement of air pollution." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e). "[Any] other law" obviously includes the law of sovereign immunity, so this sentence tells us that nothing in the law of sovereign immunity shall be construed to prohibit any state from obtaining any administrative remedy or sanction against the United States. As we read it, this is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity.
Although the Clean Water Act contains no counterpart to the Clean Air Act's state suit provision, it does contain a federal facilities provision closely analogous to that of the Clean Air Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 13235. Both facilities provisions apply"notwithstanding any immunity." The one significant difference between the two provisions lies in the addition of the following clause in the Clean Water Act: "... and the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court." 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a). The Clean Water Act thus contains an express limitation, not found in the Clean Air Act, on the liability of the United States for civil penalties.
The federal facilities provisions of the two statutes may not be read in isolation, however; each provision must be interpreted in light of the remainder of the statute of which it is a part. Significantly, as we have said, the Clean Water Act contains no counterpart to § 7604(e) of the Clean Air Act, the subsection that authorizes states to "bring[] any enforcement action or obtain[ ] any judicial remedy or sanction in any State or local court" or "bring[] any administrative enforcement action or obtain[ ] any administrative remedy or sanction in any State or local administrative agency, department or instrumentality, against the United States."
Just as the Supreme Court cautioned us, in United States Dep't of Energy, to be mindful of the context of the word "sanctions" in the Clean Water Act, we must be mindful of the context of the federal facilities provision in the Clean Air Act. See United States Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. at 622 (holding the context of "sanctions" provided "a clarity that the term lacks in isolation"). Even if "sanction" when paired solely with "process" is limited to coercive penalties, the phrase "any administrative remedy or sanction" -- the phrase found in § 7604(e) -- is not so limited. "[A]ny administrative remedy or sanction" means precisely that, and a respectable argument can be made, we believe, that "sanction" in § 7418(a) has the same non-restrictive meaning it obviously has in § 7604(e). We do not rest our decision on this argument, however, because we believe § 7604(e) is dispositive in any event.
To construe "any administrative remedy or sanction" as limited to prospective, coercive action would be to render § 7604(e)(2) virtually meaningless, since administrative agencies are seldom empowered to take prospective, coercive action. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894) (holding an agency does not have the "authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine"). Cf. F. Cooper, 1 State Administrative Law 297-98 (2d ed. 1965); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law § 2.27 at 94-95 (3d ed. 1991).