Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v38/38-034.html
Timestamp: 2017-01-24 17:47:24
Document Index: 431646653

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7121', '§ 7121', '§ 7513', '§ 7513', '§ 7513', '§\n552', '§ 7121', '§ 7701', '§ 752', '§ 4303', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 7701', '§ 752']

You are hereHome [Decision Number] 38:0309(34)NG - - AFGE Council 214 and Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH - - 1990 FLRAdec NG - - v38 p309
[ v38 p309 ] 38:0309(34)NG
The decision of the Authority follows: 38 FLRA No. 34 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES COUNCIL 214 (Union) and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO (Agency) 0-NG-1658 DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY
ISSUES November 23, 1990 Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
(the Statute). It involves nine proposals concerning the use of "last chance
agreements" for bargaining unit employees subject to disciplinary action.(1) We find that Proposals 1, 2(a), 2(b), 2(f), 2(g), and 7, which
establish procedures management will observe when offering employees last
chance agreements, do not interfere with the Agency's right to discipline
employees and are negotiable. Proposal 3, which requires the Agency to give the Union notice of, and
an opportunity to be present at, meetings concerning last chance agreements,
does not violate management's right to discipline employees or the Privacy Act
and, thus, is within the duty to bargain. Proposal 6, which states that local last chance or pre-removal
agreements shall not modify the parties' master agreement; Proposal 8, which
provides that neither the employee's nor the Union's rights are waived by the
agreement; and Proposal 9, which preserves the Union's right to change the
proposals during negotiations do not interfere with the right to discipline and
are not inconsistent with any law, rule or regulation. Therefore, we find that
those proposals are also within the duty to bargain. Proposal 2(d), by staying all disciplinary action pending resolution of
the grievance through the negotiated grievance procedure, and Proposal 2(e), by
expunging the disciplinary action upon the successful completion of the
probationary period, directly interfere with management's right to discipline
employees and are not appropriate arrangements under section 7106(b)(3) of the
Statute. Proposal 2(c), which permits challenges to last chance agreements
through the negotiated grievance procedure, violates sections 7121(d) and (e)
of the Statute and, thus, is outside the duty to bargain. Proposal 4, which
permits the Union to negotiate the terms of a last chance agreement on behalf
of an employee, is outside the duty to bargain because it is inconsistent with
sections 7114(a)(5)(A) and 7121(b)(3)(B) of the Statute. Proposal 5 is not
sufficiently specific and delimited to permit the Authority to issue a
negotiability determination and is dismissed on that ground. II. Background The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) provides logistic support and
resources to the Department of the Air Force necessary to keep the Air Force
units and weapon systems in a state of readiness. It accomplishes its mission
through 4 logistics centers and 12 specialized centers. The Union represents an
AFLC-wide bargaining unit comprising approximately 73,000 employees out of a
workforce of approximately 100,000 military and civilian employees worldwide.
The Union filed the instant petition for review because the Agency
alleged, in response to the Union's request to negotiate, that proposals
involving last chance agreements were nonnegotiable. The Agency filed a
statement of position and the Union filed a response. Both parties also filed
supplemental briefs. III. Preliminary Consideration At the outset, we reject as unsupported the Agency's claim that,
without regard to specific proposals, it has no duty to bargain over last
chance agreements under the Statute. The Agency contends that a last chance
agreement is a disciplinary instrument tailored to the special circumstances
involved in a particular disciplinary action. Such an agreement, the Agency
claims, may be negotiated with the concerned employee or the employee's
representative, but not with the Union unless the Union is acting on behalf of
a specific employee in the context of a particular disciplinary action. The
Agency argues that inasmuch as these agreements concern individual employees
and do not rise to the level of a collective bargaining agreement, it is
precluded from negotiating with the Union over such agreements. Statement of
Position at 8-10. In response, the Union contends that last chance agreements "represent
a direct assault on employee rights and on the Union's ability to vindicate
those rights." Response at 4. The Union explains that the procedures and
arrangements outlined in the proposals represent the minimum safeguards needed,
regardless of the circumstances of each individual case, because "[last chance]
agreements are inherently coercive[.]" Id. The Union argues that
"employees faced with the prospect of certain removal will often do almost
anything to keep their jobs." Id. We reject the Agency's general argument for the following reasons.
Under section 7114(a)(1) of the Statute, the Union, as the employees' exclusive
representative, is entitled to act for, and negotiate collective bargaining
agreements covering, all employees. Under section 7103(a)(12), collective
bargaining entails a good faith effort to reach an agreement with respect to
conditions of employment affecting bargaining unit employees. Collective
bargaining includes the duty to bargain mid-term over conditions of employment
of bargaining unit employees that are not embodied in a collective bargaining
agreement. See e.g., NTEU v. FLRA, 810 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (agency has a duty to bargain with the union mid-term). In addition, as
recognized by the National Labor Relations Board, a union has a statutory right
to bargain collectively over conditions of employment that have individual
application to unit employees. See Toledo Typographical Union No. 63
v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1220, 1223-25 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (an employer's proposal
permitting it to deal directly with employees concerning retirement and
separation incentives would deprive the union of its central role under the
National Labor Relations Act as the employees' representative in dealing with
the employer). In determining whether proposals involve a condition of employment
under the Statute, the Authority considers whether the proposals concern
bargaining unit employees and whether the proposals have a direct connection to
employees' work situation or employment relationship. Antilles Consolidated
237 (1986). The proposals in the present case relate to whether an employee's
employment will continue and the circumstances under which an employee will be
subject to disciplinary actions. Such matters clearly concern and have a direct
relationship to the work situation and employment relationship of bargaining
unit employees. See Veterans Administration Medical Center,
Leavenworth, Kansas and American Federation of Government Employees Local
85, 28 FLRA 759, 760-61 (1987) (expunction of investigation file which
resulted in discipline relates to the work situation and employment
relationship of the grievant); American Federation of Government Employees,
354-55 (1982), rev'd as to other matters sub nom. United States
F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (questioning of employees by management on matters
relating to disciplinary actions was found to be a matter affecting employees'
working conditions). Consequently, we find that the proposals concerning last chance
agreements involve conditions of employment that are within the duty to bargain
under the Statute to the extent that they are consistent with applicable laws
and regulations. Therefore, we will proceed to consider the Agency's
contentions regarding particular proposals. IV. Proposals 1, 2 and 7 (2) Proposal 1 AFLC shall not offer or attempt to persuade bargaining unit employees
to waive their rights in connection with disciplinary and/or adverse actions or
to waive their rights to challenge such actions through appropriate procedures,
such as; [sic] MSPB, EEO, Arbitration, etc. Proposal 2 The terms of "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreements offered by
AFLC Management to AFGE Council 214's bargaining unit members for signature
shall contain as a minimum the following provisions: a. Reinstatement/implementation of disciplinary or adverse action by
AFLC management will automatically reinstate full employees' rights. (If
necessary, AFLC management will reissue a notice of proposed action and letter
of final decision in order to restore full employees' rights. However, this
reissuance will not be inconsistent [with] or violative of Section 5.02 of the
Master Labor Agreement.) b. Implementation of "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreements shall
be for just cause and will not be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of management
discretion, based on disparate treatment, violate fundamental fairness or
public policy. c. Implementation of "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreements may be
challenged through the negotiated grievance procedures. d. Implementation
of "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreements will be stayed pending final
decision, if challenged through the negotiated grievance procedures.
(Underlining in the original.) e. Upon completion of the probationary period, the alleged
disciplinary or adverse action which led to the "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal"
agreement will be cancelled and expunged from bargaining unit employees'
personnel records. f. Signing "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreements does not
constitute admission of any wrong doing by bargaining unit employees. g. Duration of the probationary period contained in "Last Chance" or
"Pre-Removal" agreement will not exceed one (1) year. However, a lesser amount
may be negotiated. Proposal 7 "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreements will not be valid unless
(1) the employee is given the opportunity to consult and/or discuss the matter
with the Local President, or designee, [(2) the employee signs a statement
agreeing not to hold AFGE responsible in any way and (3) signed in the presence
of the Local President, or designee.](3)
A. Positions of the Parties 1. Agency The Agency contends that management has the right to discipline
employees "in accordance with applicable law" under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of
the Statute. Statement of Position at 8. A proposal interferes with this right,
the Agency contends, when it (1) insulates employees from discipline; (2)
prohibits an agency from taking disciplinary actions against employees under
prescribed circumstances; (3) requires the imposition of a particular
disciplinary action; (4) establishes a "statute of limitations" for taking
disciplinary action; (5) prohibits the agency from taking disciplinary action
for instances that occur prior to a particular time; (6) prohibits the agency
from withdrawing a disciplinary action and instituting a new disciplinary
action encompassing the same charge; (7) limits discipline charges to those for
which the employee has not been previously charged and precludes charges from
which the employee has been absolved; and (8) requires negotiations over the
criteria for imposing disciplinary action. Id. The Agency claims that last chance agreements "are disciplinary
instruments designed to permit an employee subject to a disciplinary action a
last opportunity to demonstrate that he or she can be successfully
rehabilitated, e.g., that his or her performance or conduct can be improved to
the agency's satisfaction, and that the disciplinary action should not be
taken." Id. at 8. The agreements "allow an agency, at its discretion, to
forego or delay implementation of a disciplinary action in order to give an
employee a last chance to demonstrate successful rehabilitation."
Id. The Agency asserts that "the decision to enter into a 'last chance'
agreement, whether implemented unilaterally or through negotiations with an
employee or the employee's representative, is a vital and integral part of
management's decision to discipline." Id. at 9. Last chance agreements,
the Agency asserts, directly involve factors upon which the decision to take
disciplinary action is based and thus are integral to the exercise of the right
to discipline employees under the Statute. Id. at 10. Specifically, the Agency claims that Proposal 1 would preclude a waiver
provision; Proposal 2 would require that certain provisions be included; and
Proposal 7 would "establish general requirements to bargain over such
agreements[.]" Id. at 10. By placing such restrictions on the use of
last chance agreements, the Agency asserts, the proposals would establish the
basis and criteria for imposing discipline. In addition, the Agency argues that Proposal 2(c) would allow
challenges to last chance agreements through the negotiated grievance procedure
even if the underlying disciplinary actions have been challenged in a different
forum. Challenges under these circumstances, the Agency argues, would violate 5
U.S.C. §§ 7121(d) and (e), which require employees to elect a
forum. In regard to Proposal 2(d), the Agency asserts that the proposal is not
a negotiable procedure, claiming that the effect of Proposal 2(d) is not only
to stay the last chance agreement but also to stay the underlying disciplinary
action. By staying the underlying disciplinary action, the Agency contends,
Proposal 2(d) directly interferes with management's right to discipline. The
Agency urges the Authority to reexamine its decisions finding that proposals
that do not prevent the agency from acting at all do not interfere with
management's rights under section 7106 of the Statute. Id. at 16-25.
The Agency further contends that the Union has failed to demonstrate
that the proposals constitute "appropriate arrangements," as set forth in
National Guard, 21 FLRA 24 (1986) (Kansas Army National Guard). As a
threshold issue, the Agency asserts that the Union did not articulate how
employees will be detrimentally affected by management's actions or how the
matter proposed for bargaining is intended to address, or compensate for, the
actual or anticipated adverse affects of the exercise of management rights.
Supplemental statement of position at 2. The Agency further asserts that the
proposals are not appropriate as arrangements for employees adversely affected
by management's right to discipline employees because: 1) employees'
utilization of last chance agreements will be substantively more restricted; 2)
in most cases the circumstances giving rise to last chance agreements are
solely within the employee's control; 3) the "proposals do not permit an
equitable 'quid pro quo' sufficient to prompt the employee into adhering to a
successful rehabilitation from the undesirable behavior[,]" and thus interfere
in that and other ways with management's right to effectively and efficiently
administer disciplinary action; 4) the interference with management's right to
discipline employees is greater than the benefit to employees because
management loses most of the benefit of last chance agreements and the benefit
to employees is only speculative; and 5) government operations would be unduly
burdened because management would be required to stay disciplinary actions
pending adjudication and parties would be forced to resort to third party
proceedings rather than resolving their differences locally. Id. at 3-6.
2. Union The Union urges the Authority to reject "the Agency's excessively broad
construction of its right to discipline." Response at 4. The Union argues that
"[w]hile last chance agreements arise in the context of discipline, they are
not discipline in themselves." Id. at 3. The Union asserts that the
proposals do not prevent the Agency from determining whether or not to enter
into a last chance agreement. The Union further argues that to the extent that
the Agency has discretion over the terms of last chance agreements, the
Agency's desire to retain complete discretion over those terms cannot serve as
a bar to the Union's proposals. Specifically, the Union states that Proposal 1 would prevent the Agency
from offering employees last chance agreements that contain a waiver of all
appeal rights. Id. The Union asserts that this proposal would not
prevent the Agency from using last chance agreements but only ensures "that
employees retain whatever rights they have by law to a proposal and reply
period and to appeal a disciplinary or adverse action." Id. Therefore,
the Union argues, Proposal 1 has no effect on whether disciplinary action is
taken, but rather it preserves an employee's option to challenge that decision.
Id. at 3-4. The Union contends that "Proposal [2] prescribes minimum provisions
which would be included or implied into all last chance agreements negotiated
with bargaining unit employees." Id. at 6. In particular, it contends
that Proposal 2(a) ensures the continuation of procedural rights; 2(b) "repeats
what the law requires[;]" 2(c) allows challenges to last chance agreements
through negotiated grievance procedures; 2(d) provides for stays when such
challenges are raised; 2(e), by requiring the Agency to expunge an employee's
disciplinary record relating to a last chance agreement, is only requiring what
is prescribed under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5); 2(f) maintains
employees' appeal rights; and 2(g) recognizes the Agency's discretion to
bargain over the duration of such agreements. Id. at 6-12. The Union asserts that Proposal 7 merely requires "the Agency to
maintain some evidence that it advised an employee of his right to consult with
a Union representative, if he so desired, prior to signing a last chance
agreement." Response at 15-16. In response to the Agency's argument that Proposal 2(c) violates 5
U.S.C. §§ 7121(d) and (e), the Union emphasizes that it is not the
intent of Proposal 2(c) to allow an employee to file a grievance on a matter
which had previously been filed with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
or under the Agency's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) procedure. However,
the Union argues that a subsequent decision to remove the employee would not
have to be appealed to the MSPB as a matter of law. That subsequent
disciplinary action may be a new matter, the Union argues. The Union further argues that in the event the Authority finds that the
proposals interfere with a management right, the proposals constitute
appropriate arrangements under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. In support of
its contention, the Union asserts that (1) the impact experienced by the
adversely affected employee is quite extensive because it entails removal from
employment; (2) the circumstances giving rise to a proposed removal or removal
may not entirely be within the employees' control and the issue may not be
determined until the exhaustion of appeal rights; (3) the extent of the impact
on the Agency's ability to exercise its right to discipline is "non-existent;"
and (4) the impact is proportionate to the benefits to be derived from the
proposed arrangement. Response at 17-19. B. Analysis and Conclusions 1. The Agency's Right to Discipline Employees Under Section
7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute a. Proposals 1, 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(f), 2(g), and 7 For the following reasons, we find that Proposals 1, 2(a), 2(b), 2(c),
2(f), 2(g), and 7 do not interfere with management's right to discipline
employees. Proposals that prevent an agency from taking disciplinary action
against an employee violate management's right to discipline employees under
section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. National Federation of Federal
Employees, Local 1655 and Department of Military Affairs, Illinois Air National
Guard, 35 FLRA 815, 819 (1990). Therefore, to the extent that proposals
would impinge upon an agency's right to determine the particular disciplinary
action to be imposed on an employee for misconduct, or preclude management from
exercising its right to discipline employees under specified circumstances,
such proposals are inconsistent with management's right to discipline
employees. West Point Elementary School Teachers Association, NEA and The
United States Military Academy Elementary School, West Point, New York, 29
FLRA 1531, 1538-40 (1987) (West Point), aff'd in part as to other
matters sub nom. West Point Elementary School Teachers Association v.
FLRA, 855 F.2d 936 (2nd Cir. 1988). Contrary to the Agency's contention, Proposals 1, 2, with the exception
of Proposals 2(d) and 2(e), and 7 do not interfere with management's right to
take disciplinary action against employees. Proposal 1 precludes the Agency
from offering or attempting to persuade bargaining unit employees to waive
statutory or contractual rights to appeal adverse actions or discipline. The
Agency's right to determine whether to enter into a last chance agreement or to
impose discipline, and to determine the type and length of discipline imposed,
is not diminished because an employee does not waive his/her appeal rights.
Such a waiver may provide the Agency an additional incentive to enter into last
chance agreements, but it does not restrict the Agency's imposition of
discipline in a given situation. Accordingly, Proposal 1 does not directly
interfere with management's right to discipline employees.(4) A similar analysis is appropriate for Proposals 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(f),
2(g), and 7. Inasmuch as the proposals do not prescribe the circumstances under
which the Agency may impose disciplinary action, the proposals do not interfere
with the Agency's right to discipline employees. The proposals only become
operative once the Agency has decided not to exercise its right to discipline
an employee immediately. For example, Proposal 2(a) only requires the Agency to
reinstate the employee's right to appeal the underlying discipline in the event
the Agency determines to discipline the employee and does not restrict the
Agency's imposition of discipline. Proposal 2(f), which precludes the Agency
from considering an employee's entering into a last chance agreement as an
admission of wrongdoing, does not prevent the Agency from imposing discipline
or from considering evidence that it has obtained in support of its
disciplinary action. Proposal 2(b), which provides that last chance agreements
shall be for just cause and will not be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
management discretion based on disparate treatment or violative of fundamental
fairness or public policy, and Proposal 2(g), which provides that the
probationary period contained in the last chance agreement would not exceed one
year, do not prescribe the circumstances in which management may impose
discipline. These provisions apply only after the Agency has determined not to
impose immediate discipline. Finally, Proposal 7, which requires the Agency to
maintain evidence that employees were advised as to their right to consult the
Union before entering into a last chance agreement has no effect on the
Agency's right to discipline employees. Even assuming that Proposals 2(a), 2(b), 2(g) and 7 involve
management's right to discipline employees, the proposals concern negotiable
procedures which the Agency will observe when offering employees last chance
agreements. See West Point, 29 FLRA at 1540 (proposals that
specified the contents of an "advance notice" and "final decision" regarding
disciplinary actions were found to be negotiable procedures under section
7106(b)(2) of the Statute because agency was not prevented from exercising its
rights after expiration of procedural time frame). b. Proposals 2(d) and 2(e) Unlike Proposal 1 and the other sections of Proposal 2, Proposals 2(d)
and (e) preclude the Agency from taking disciplinary action under certain
circumstances and, therefore, directly interfere with management's right to
discipline employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. In general, a proposal to stay a disciplinary suspension or removal
pending the completion of the grievance and arbitration process is negotiable
as a procedure under section 7106(b)(2). American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1999 and Army-Air Force Exchange Service, Dix-McGuire
denied sub nom., AFGE v. FLRA, 455 U.S. 945 (1982). However, under 5
U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1), the usual 30-day advance notice of an intent to take
action against an employee is suspended when the agency has reasonable cause to
believe that the employee has committed a crime punishable by imprisonment. In
Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Eastern Mapping Agency, 21 FLRA 1105,
1106 (1986) (Eastern Mapping), the Authority found that proposals which
do not acknowledge management's authority in such situations substantively
interfere with the right to take disciplinary action and do not constitute
negotiable procedures under section 7106(b)(2). Compare American
Federation of Government Employees, Department of Education Council of Locals
and U.S. Department of Education, 36 FLRA 130 (1990) (Proposal 2, which
established an indefinite stay of disciplinary action but permitted the agency
to take immediate disciplinary action in the circumstances set forth in 5
U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1), did not interfere with management's right to
discipline employees). Inasmuch as the staying of the implementation of the
last chance agreement would in effect stay the proposed underlying discipline,
Proposal 2(d) would preclude the Agency from imposing the proposed disciplinary
action pending appeal through the negotiated grievance procedure. Thus,
Proposal 2(d), by staying all disciplinary actions for that period of time,
precludes the Agency from immediately removing an employee regardless of the
reason for the discipline or adverse action. For this reason, Proposal 2(d)
directly interferes with the Agency's right to take discipline against, and to
remove, employees. We reject the Union's contention that Proposal 2(d) constitutes an
appropriate arrangement within the meaning of 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. In determining whether a proposal is an appropriate arrangement under
section 7106(b)(3), we will determine, as a threshold matter, whether a
proposal or provision is an arrangement for employees adversely affected by the
exercise of management rights by examining "the effects or foreseeable effects
on employees which flow from the exercise of those rights, and how those
effects are adverse." Kansas Army National Guard, 21 FLRA at 31.
Proposals addressing "purely speculative or hypothetical concerns, or which are
otherwise unrelated to management's exercise of its reserved rights[,]" will be
excluded from consideration as appropriate arrangements. American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 3097 and Department of
Justice, 24 FLRA 453, 458 (1986) (Chairman Calhoun dissenting). Where an
adverse effect is reasonably foreseeable, and the disputed provision or
proposal is intended to be an arrangement for employees adversely affected, we
will proceed to examine whether the provision or proposal excessively
interferes with management's rights. National Federation of Federal
Engineering Command, Western Division, 36 FLRA 834, 841 (1990). In order to
determine whether the proposed arrangement contemplated by the proposal or
provision is "appropriate," within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3), we must
examine whether the negative impact on management's rights is disproportionate
to the benefits conferred by the proposal on employees. See Kansas
Army National Guard, 21 FLRA at 33. Initially, we find that Proposal 2(d) constitutes an arrangement for
adversely affected employees under section 7106(b)(3). The proposal affords
employees the right to stay the implementation of a last chance agreement and
thereby to forestall the effect of the underlying disciplinary action until the
employee has exhausted his or her appeal rights. Thus, it would ameliorate the
adverse effects on employees of management's exercise of its statutory right to
remove employees for cause. However, we find that the proposal does not constitute an appropriate
arrangement. While the proposal would ameliorate the adverse effects on
employees of management's right to remove employees for cause, the proposal
would abrogate management's right under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1) to remove an
employee when the Agency has a reasonable cause to believe that the employee
has committed a crime punishable by imprisonment. Thus, the proposal would have
a significant deleterious effect on management's right to impose disciplinary
actions, including removing employees. On balance, we find that the negative
impact on management's right is disproportionate to the benefit employees would
receive from the proposed arrangement. Eastern Mapping, 21 FLRA at
1107-08. A similar finding is appropriate for Proposal 2(e). Proposal 2(e) would
require the Agency to expunge from the bargaining unit employee's personnel
records the disciplinary or adverse action that led to the last chance
agreement. To the extent that this proposal would restrict the evidence the
Agency may consider to support a subsequent disciplinary action, the proposal
interferes with the Agency's right to discipline employees. See
Shipyard, 34 FLRA 1150, 1157 (1990) (Portsmouth Naval Shipyard)
(proposal preventing the agency from supporting disciplinary action with
employee's admission made during a discussion in which management failed to
inform the employee of the right to union representation directly interfered
with management's right to discipline); and American Federation of
Weapons Station, Concord, California, 32 FLRA 1023, 1047-50 (1988),
Weapons Station, Concord, California v. FLRA, No. 88-7408/88-7470 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 1989) (provisions restricting the type of evidence the agency could use
to establish that discipline was warranted interfered with management's right
to discipline employees). In finding that Proposal 2(e) interferes with the Agency's right to
discipline employees, the Authority rejects the Union's contention that the
proposal only implements the requirements of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e)(5). While that section provides that an agency shall maintain all
records used by the agency in making determinations about any individual with
such accuracy, relevance, timeliness and completeness as is reasonably
necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination, the Union
has not established, nor is it apparent from the record, that the inclusion of
the underlying disciplinary record would violate that provision of the Privacy
Act. Thus, we see no reason why, consistent with the Privacy Act and Proposal
2(e), reference may not be made to the underlying disciplinary action in
employees' personnel records. Those records also may accurately reflect that a
last chance agreement was entered into in lieu of the proposed disciplinary
action. Accordingly, we find unpersuasive the Union's claim that the inclusion
of last chance agreements would violate the Privacy Act. Contrary to the Union's argument, we find that Proposal 2(e) is not an
appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. Initially, we find that the proposal constitutes an arrangement because
it would: (1) protect employees who have entered into a last chance agreement
from having the underlying discipline considered in any subsequent personnel
action; (2) ameliorate the adverse effects on employees of management's
recording of disciplinary action taken against employees in employees'
personnel records; and (3) benefit employees by removing alleged disciplinary
actions from personnel records so that those actions could not be considered in
the event that an employee were subject to discipline in the future. However, we find that Proposal 2(e) is not an appropriate arrangement.
Although the proposal provides certain benefits to employees, the effect of the
proposal on the right of management to take disciplinary action in the future
is substantial. The proposed arrangement establishes a blanket prohibition on
the consideration of prior disciplinary actions which resulted in last chance
agreements when management determines the propriety of a subsequent
disciplinary action. In some situations, where the prior discipline was crucial
to supporting a subsequent disciplinary action, the proposal could prevent the
imposition of an otherwise warranted disciplinary action. See
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 34 FLRA at 1159. On balance, we find that the
benefit to employees is outweighed by the severe limitation it places on the
Agency's ability to discipline employees. Accordingly, Proposal 2(e) does not
constitute an appropriate arrangement negotiable under 7106(b)(3) of the
Statute. 2. Proposal 2(c) Violates 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121(d) and
(e) Without exception, Proposal 2(c) grants employees the right to
challenge a last chance agreement through the negotiated grievance procedures.
This would include enforcement of last chance agreements in cases originally
filed with the MSPB in which the MSPB retains jurisdiction. Such an event may
occur when an employee enters into a settlement agreement with the Agency after
the employee elected to pursue an appeal of the disciplinary action before the
MSPB. Under the proposal, any dispute as to whether the employee or Agency
violated the terms of that settlement agreement could be appealed under the
grievance procedure, notwithstanding the fact that the MSPB had retained
jurisdiction over the case.(5) To the extent that Proposal 2(c) includes cases in which parties before
the MSPB have entered their last chance agreements into the record, and the
MSPB has retained jurisdiction for enforcement purposes, it is inconsistent
with section 7121(d) and (e). Those sections require an aggrieved employee to
elect between the statutory appeals procedures or the negotiated grievance
procedure where the matter could be raised in either forum. Once an employee
elects to pursue a challenge to an agency's action in one forum, he/she is
precluded from pursuing the matter in the other forum. Proposal 2(c), in
effect, would permit employees to circumvent this requirement in cases where
the MSPB has retained jurisdiction by allowing the employees to pursue the same
matters through another forum, the grievance procedure. In ruling that Proposal 2(c) is inconsistent with sections 7121(d) and
(e), we find unpersuasive the Agency's reliance on the Authority's decision in
U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC),
Dover, New Jersey and National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE), Local
1437, 24 FLRA 837 (1986). The issue before the Authority in that case was
whether it had jurisdiction to review an arbitration award. The Authority held
that it did not have jurisdiction because the arbitrator's interpretation and
application of a prior settlement agreement was not separate and distinct from
the original issue of the grievant's removal. The issue in the instant case is
not one of proper jurisdiction, but whether an employee who had previously
exercised a right to pursue his/her dispute in a given forum may then elect to
pursue the matter in another forum. Accordingly, we find that Proposal 2(c) is outside the duty to bargain
because it is inconsistent with section 7121(d) and (e) of the Statute. V. Proposals 3 and 4 Proposal 3 Prior to offering bargaining unit employees a "Last Chance" or
"Pre-Removal" agreement, the Local President, or designee will be notified and
given an opportunity to be present in accordance with the Labor Statute. Proposal 4 After such notification and meeting in accordance with item three (3)
above, the Local President, or designee may bargain the terms and conditions of
the "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreement on behalf of the bargaining unit
employee or employees in question in that particular case. A. Positions of the Parties 1. Agency For the reasons previously stated, the Agency argues that Proposals 3
and 4 interfere with management's right to discipline employees under section
7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. The Agency contends that the proposals also
interfere with employees' rights to be represented by a representative of their
own choosing under sections 7102, 7114(a)(5), 7116(a)(1) and (b)(1), and
7121(b)(3)(B) of the Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a), and 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.404(e) and (f). The Agency states that "employees have the
right to raise matters involving prohibited personnel practices and matters
covered under 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303 or 7512 in forums other than the
negotiated grievance procedures. When doing so, they have the right to be
represented by an attorney or other representative, other than the exclusive
representative, of their own choosing. Further, they may represent themselves
when raising such matters through negotiated grievance procedures." Statement
of Position at 11. The Agency argues that only employees may waive these
rights. The Agency argues that the proposals have the effect of making the
Union the employee's representative in the involved disciplinary action.
Id. at 12. Such agreements, the Agency argues, "go to the heart of an
employee's efforts to avoid the underlying disciplinary action and thus
negotiations over such agreements are an integral part of the function of the
employee's representative. The requirement that the Union be the employee's
representative abrogates the employee's rights set forth above[.]" Id.
The Agency argues further that by granting the Union a contractual
right to be involved in last chance agreements the proposals assure the Union's
access to an employee's entire disciplinary file. Thus, it claims, the
proposals violate the employee's privacy rights, which are implicitly protected
by section 7102 of the Statute. The proposals, the Agency argues, preclude the
Agency from balancing the respective interests of employees and the
representational rights of the Union on a case by case basis, as required to
protect employees' rights under section 7102 and to comply with the privacy
requirements under the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"). 2. Union The Union argues that the Agency has completely misunderstood the
thrust of Proposals 3 and 4. The Union states that the proposals do not
interfere with employees' statutory right to represent themselves or to be
represented by someone of their own choosing. The Union notes that if the last
chance agreement is appealed within the negotiated grievance procedure, the
employee is entitled to be represented by only the Union or someone chosen by
the Union. However, if the last chance agreement "is raised in other contexts
such as during the proposal phase of an adverse action or in the context of an
MSPB appeal or an EEO complaint, the Union recognizes and agrees that the
employee can refuse Union representation." Response at 14. The Union asserts
that the intent of the proposal is to provide the Union the opportunity to meet
with the employee at the time the agreement is first raised. If the employee
declines the Union's representation, "the employee and the Agency would then be
free to negotiate whatever terms and conditions they desired into a last chance
agreement so long as the minimum provisions required by the Union's proposed
memorandum of understanding were included." Id. at 15. In response to the Agency's argument that the proposals violate the
Privacy Act, the Union argues that the last chance agreement meetings
constitute formal discussions or "Weingarten sessions," which the Union is
entitled to attend under section 7114(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute.
Id. at 13. The Union further argues that such meetings without Union
representation could constitute an unlawful bypass of the Union. Id.
B. Analysis and Conclusions 1. Management's Right to Discipline Employees For the reasons stated in regard to Proposals 1, 2(a), 2(b), 2(f),
2(g), and 7, we reject the Agency's argument that Proposals 3 and 4 interfere
with management's right to discipline employees. Neither proposal prescribes
whether, and under what circumstances, discipline would be imposed. The
decision to impose discipline, and the type of discipline imposed remains with
the Agency, under the terms of both proposals. Accordingly, we find that Proposals 3 and 4 do not interfere with
Statute. 2. Employees' Representational Rights Proposal 3 grants the Union the right of notification regarding the
Agency's intent to offer an employee a last chance agreement and the right to
be present when the offer is made. The proposal does not grant the Union any
right to actively participate in the negotiation of last chance agreements and,
therefore, does not grant the Union the right to negotiate on behalf of the
employee. The proposal only grants the Union a contractual right to be notified
of, and present at, meetings when an employee is offered a last chance
agreement. Therefore, the proposal does not violate employees' rights to choose
their representatives under the Statute. Inasmuch as Proposal 4 grants the Union the right to negotiate the
substantive terms of a last chance agreement, however, it requires that the
Union act on behalf of the employee in that regard. For the following reasons,
we find that Proposal 4 is inconsistent with sections 7114(a)(5)(A) and
7121(b)(3) of the Statute and, thus, is outside the duty to bargain. Under section 7121(b)(3)(B) of the Statute, employees have the right to
represent themselves in grievances pursued through the negotiated grievance
procedure. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1001 and
Department of the Air Force, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, 15 FLRA
804 (1984). Under section 7114(a)(5)(A) of the Statute, in matters not pursued
through the negotiated grievance procedure, employees have the right to choose
their own representatives. Id.; see also American Federation
of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1858 and U.S. Army Missile Command, The
Army Information Systems Command-Redstone Commissary, 27 FLRA 69, 82-83
(1987). Under the terms of Proposal 4, however, employees would not be able to
exercise these rights because the proposal grants the Union the right to
negotiate the substantive terms of last chance agreements. Inasmuch as the
negotiation of a last chance agreement may occur while the discipline is being
challenged through the negotiated grievance procedure, or through the statutory
appeals procedures, the requirement that the Union negotiate the terms of such
an agreement would deprive employees of their right to choose their own
representatives or to represent themselves. The Union's stated intent regarding the meaning of the proposal does
not warrant a different conclusion. First, the Union's assertion that the Union
has the exclusive right to represent an employee during the negotiated
grievance procedure is inconsistent with law. As noted above, employees have
the right to represent themselves in the negotiated grievance process.
Secondly, the Union's statement of intent that employees may reject Union
representation is not consistent with the proposal's language. Without
exception, Proposal 4 specifically grants the Union the right to negotiate the
terms of last chance agreements. Where a union's interpretation of its proposal is inconsistent with the
plain wording of the proposal, we will base our decision on the interpretation
of the proposal that is consistent with the wording. National Treasury
Firearms, 35 FLRA 26, 28 (1990). Accordingly, we find that Proposal 4, by prohibiting employees from
exercising their rights to choose a representative other than the Union or to
represent themselves in the negotiation of the terms of a last chance
agreement, is inconsistent with sections 7114(a)(5)(A) and 7121(b)(3)(B).(6) 3. Union Representational Rights Under Sections 7114(a)(2)(A) and
(B) of the Statute The Union argues that it has the statutory right to attend meetings in
which the Agency offers employees a last chance agreement because such meetings
between the Agency and the individual employee constitute formal discussions or
"Weingarten sessions" under sections 7114(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute. For
the reasons below, we do not agree with the Union's contention. In U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Federal
Correctional Institution (Ray Brook, New York) and American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3882, 29 FLRA 584 (1987) (Bureau of
Prisons) aff'd sub nom. American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 3882 v. FLRA, 865 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the
Authority found that an oral reply meeting in response to a proposed adverse
action did not constitute a formal discussion under section 7114(a)(2)(A) of
the Statute. In reaching its finding, the Authority discussed fully the intent
and application of section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. The Authority restated
its holding that "in order for the section 7114(a)(2)(A) right to exist, (1)
there must be a discussion; (2) which is formal; (3) between one or more agency
representatives and one or more unit employees or their representatives; (4)
concerning any grievance or personnel policy or practices or other general
condition of employment." Bureau of Prisons, 29 FLRA at 588-89. The
Authority further held that "in examining each of these elements, we will be
guided by that section's intent and purpose--to provide the union with an
opportunity to safeguard its interests and the interests of employees in the
bargaining unit--viewed in the context of a union's full range of
responsibilities under the Statute." Id. at 589. In finding that the
meeting did not involve a grievance within the meaning of section
7114(a)(2)(A), the Authority found that inasmuch as the agency had not taken
final action, the employee did not have a basis for filing a statutory or
contractual appeal of the agency's actions. There being no complaint, and thus
no grievance, by the employee, the Authority concluded that the union did not
have a right to be represented under 7114(a)(2)(A). Compare U.S.
Management, Chicago, Illinois, 32 FLRA 465 (1988) (a meeting provided for
by an enforceable term and condition of the settlement and dismissal of an MSPB
case concerned a grievance within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(A)). In determining whether a meeting concerns "any personnel policy or
practices or other general condition of employment" within the meaning of
section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute, the Authority has held that the meaning
of "any personnel policy or practices" involves "general rules applicable to
employees." Bureau of Field Operations, Social Security Administration, San
Francisco California, 20 FLRA 80, 83 (1985). Further, in discussing "other
general condition of employment," the Authority has concluded "that formal
discussions are limited to those discussions (except grievance meetings) 'which
concern conditions of employment affecting employees in the unit generally.'"
Id. at 83. Based on these standards, Proposal 3 does not concern a grievance or
involve a personnel policy or practices or other general conditions of
employment. As was the case in Bureau of Prisons, Proposal 3 would
include meetings in which the Agency has not taken final action and, thus,
would include meetings which did not concern a grievance within the meaning of
section 7114(a)(2)(A). Inasmuch as the last chance agreement meeting would
involve only the discrete action taken with respect to an individual employee,
the proposed meeting would not involve a personnel policy or practices or other
conditions of employment within that section. For these reasons, we find that meetings concerning last chance
agreements do not constitute formal discussions under section 7114(a)(2)(A) of
the Statute. We also find unpersuasive the Union's argument that the meetings
constitute "Weingarten sessions" under section 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute.
Section 7114(a)(2)(B) provides that an exclusive representative of an
appropriate unit shall be given the opportunity to be represented at any
examination by the agency in connection with an investigation if the employee
reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action and
the employee requests representation. This right under section 7114(a)(2)(B)
only exists if all of the conditions are met. Department of the Air Force,
FLRA 594, 602 (1987). We find that meetings involving last chance agreements do not
constitute an examination in connection with an investigation. The purpose of
section 7114(a)(2)(B) is to create representational rights for Federal
employees similar to the rights provided by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) in interpreting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See 124
Cong. Rec. 29184 (1978), reprinted in Legislative History of the
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 926 (1979) (Legislative History), where
Congressman Udall explained that the purpose of the House Bill provisions which
led to enactment of section 7114(a)(2)(B) was to reflect the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975)
(Weingarten). Under Weingarten, the right to representation at an
with his or her employer in connection with an investigation. Here, the meeting
at issue would not be an examination in connection with an investigation.
Rather, it involves a meeting in which the Agency would advise an employee of
its intent to hold in abeyance disciplinary action if the employee satisfies
certain conditions. In addition, the right to union representation only attaches if an
employee makes a valid request for union representation. Norfolk Naval
Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia, 35 FLRA 1069 (1990). Therefore, even if the
meeting at issue could be viewed as a "Weingarten session," to the extent that
Proposal 3 would require union representation in the absence of a request by
the employee for such representation, the proposal would fall outside the ambit
of section 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. b. Proposal 3 does not violate the Privacy Act As the Authority has held that a union may negotiate contractual
representational rights that exceed those established under the Statute,
Proposal 3 is within the duty to bargain unless it is inconsistent with law,
rule or regulation. See American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, Local 3354 and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farmers Home
Administration, Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri, 34 FLRA 919 (1990).
For the reasons discussed below, we find that it does not violate the Privacy
Act, as alleged by the Agency. The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, restricts the disclosure, and
redisclosure, of personally identifiable records. Subsection (b) specifically
restricts disclosure of "any record which is contained in a system of records
individual to whom the record pertains," unless the disclosure falls within one
of the specified exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Records required to be disclosed under FOIA constitute an exception to
the prohibition against disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2). The FOIA
provides that unless the disclosure of information in personnel and medical
files and similar files would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy," the information must be disclosed. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). In U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 37 FLRA No. 111 (1990) (INS), the Authority
recently analyzed under the Privacy Act a provision requiring an activity to
furnish to a union, when that union is not designated as the representative in
a disciplinary or adverse action, copies of notices of proposed actions, final
actions taken and the decision(s) on any subsequent appeals. The Authority
found that such a "blanket unsanitized disclosure of all proposed and final
disciplinary and adverse actions" was prohibited by the Privacy Act.
Id., slip op. at 19. The Authority did not apply this prohibition,
however, to specific unsanitized information, such as the type of information
that a union might request with regard to the processing of an individual
grievance. Id. In this regard, the Authority cited cases in which such
information was found to be disclosable. See Army and Air Force
Exchange Service (AAFES), Fort Carson, Colorado, 25 FLRA 1060 (1987)
(AAFES), and Department of Defense Dependents Schools, Washington, D.C. and
Department of Defense Dependents Schools, Germany Region, 28 FLRA 202
(1987). In our view, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the
Privacy Act. In the instant case, contrary to the Agency's contention, Proposal
3 would not assure the Union's access to an employee's entire disciplinary file
or require the disclosure of any portion of an employee's personnel records.
The proposal only grants the Union the right to be present when a last chance
agreement is offered to an employee. Although information in the employee's
personnel record may be revealed in such a meeting, the Privacy Act only
governs the disclosure of records by Federal agencies. King v. Califano,
471 F. Supp. 180, 181 (D.D.C. 1979) (personal opinion stated from memory does
not constitute a "record" within the meaning of the Privacy Act). See
also Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Dye, 642 F.2d 833,
836 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) ("remarks" do not constitute "records" under the
Privacy Act). Therefore, as the proposal does not require the disclosure of
"records" within the meaning of the Privacy Act, the Union's presence during
such meetings does not violate the Privacy Act. Even assuming that the information disclosed during such a meeting
constitutes "records" within the meaning of the Privacy Act, we find that the
release of such information does not constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy and, thus, is disclosable under the FOIA and the Privacy Act. Balancing
the public's interest in ensuring that the Agency complies with its
evenhanded manner and the employees' privacy interests, the public's interest
in disclosure outweighs the employees' interest. See AAFES, 25
FLRA at 1062-63; and U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 37 FLRA 515 (1990), application for
Oct. 1, 1990). This case is distinguishable from INS, in which the
Authority found a provision to be in conflict with the Privacy Act because it
required a broad disclosure of all disciplinary notices, without regard to a
showing of specified need. In contrast, any disciplinary documents disclosed
during a last chance agreement meeting would relate solely to the employee
affected by that agreement and to factors in the employee's record that are
relevant to that agreement. Accordingly, Proposal 3 does not require the
far-reaching and nonparticularized invasion into the privacy of unit employees
that was the case in INS. Even if disclosure is prohibited under exception (b)(2) of the Privacy
information for a "routine use." Disclosure of an employee's personnel record
for purposes of discussing the terms of a last chance agreement is relevant and
necessary to the Union's exercise of its representational rights and to the
Union's performance of its representational obligations to employees concerning
personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions.
Id. at 540-41. As the employees' exclusive representative, the Union has
an institutional obligation to "[represent] all the members of the
bargaining unit." [Emphasis in original.] American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1345 v. FLRA, 793 F.2d 1360, 1364 (D.C. Cir.
1986). Accordingly, we find that Proposal 3 is within the duty to bargain.
VI. Proposal 5 Local negotiations over "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreements
shall be in accordance with the Master Labor Agreement and Labor Statute. That
is; the Local President, or designee may utilized [sic] the services of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the Federal Service Impasses
Panel in the event an agreement cannot be reached with local AFLC management
due to an impasse. The proposal's language is unclear. The wording of the proposal does
not permit us to determine what the Union means by "local negotiations over
last chance agreements" and the record does not contain a statement as to the
Union's intent. Thus, we are unable to determine, for example, whether the
negotiations referred to in the proposal would relate to the specific terms of
particular last chance agreements or would address general concerns regarding
such agreements. Moreover, the record is unclear as to which parties would be
involved in these negotiations. Consequently, the proposal is not sufficiently
specific and delimited to provide a basis for determining its negotiability.
The Authority has consistently held that the parties bear the burden of
determination. A party failing to meet this burden acts at its peril.
See American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3760
Administration, 32 FLRA 813, 816 (1988), and the cases cited there. Accordingly, as we find that Proposal 5 is not sufficiently specific
and delimited to provide us with a basis for determining its negotiability, we
will dismiss the petition with respect to this proposal. VII. Proposals 6, 8 and 9 Proposal 6 Local "Last Chance" or "Pre-Removal" agreements shall not in any way
modify or otherwise change this agreement. Proposal 8 No rights of Employees or Union are waived by this agreement. Proposal 9 AFGE Council 214 may add, delete, modify or otherwise change the
above proposals as deemed appropriate by virtue of knowledge gained through
discussion(s)/negotiations or through Section 7114 of the Labor Statute on the
subject matter. A. Management's Right to Discipline Employees The Agency argues that Proposals 6, 8 and 9 violate management's right
to discipline employees. For the reasons discussed in regard to Proposals 1,
2(a), 2(b), 2(f), 2(g) and 7, we reject the Agency's argument that Proposals 6,
8 and 9 interfere with management's right to discipline employees. The
proposals simply do not proscribe whether, or under what circumstances,
discipline would be imposed. B. The Agency Has Not Established That Proposals 6, 8 And 9 Are
Outside the Duty To Bargain Proposal 6 provides that local agreements or pre-removal agreements
shall not modify the agreement reached by the parties concerning last chance
agreements. Proposals 8 and 9, in general, preserve the rights of the Union and
employees, including the Union's statutory bargaining rights. The Agency's
statement of position failed to address these proposals specifically, other
than to argue that they interfere with its right to discipline, an argument
that we have dealt with above. Inasmuch as the Agency has not established, and it is not apparent from
the record, that the proposals are nonnegotiable because they interfere with
the right to discipline or for any other reason, we find that they are within
the duty to bargain. VIII. Order The Agency shall upon request, or as otherwise agreed to by the
parties, bargain over Proposals 1, 2(a), 2(b), 2(f), 2(g), 3, 6, 7, 8, and
9.(7) The petition for review is dismissed as to Proposals
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 4 and 5. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) 1. In general, a "last chance agreement" is a contract
between an employee and an employer that gives the employee an opportunity to
conform his/her conduct or performance to meet the employer's requirements in
exchange for the retraction of disciplinary or adverse actions. 2. The Agency raises numerous arguments in support of its
contention that the proposals are nonnegotiable. With some exceptions, however,
it does not tailor its arguments to specific proposals. In addressing the
Agency's arguments as to the proposals' negotiability, the Authority will only
address those arguments that reasonably pertain to a given proposal or those
proposals that the Agency specifically addresses in its arguments. For purposes
of our analysis and discussion, proposals are arranged and discussed in terms
of the central issues raised by the parties. 3. The Union has withdrawn the 2nd and 3rd components of
Proposal 7. Response at 16. We, therefore, will not address the negotiability
of those portions of the proposal. 4. The Authority's finding in this regard is not
inconsistent with an agency's obligation to provide certain employees with
disabilities a "firm choice" between treatment and termination. Calton v.
Department of the Army, 44 M.S.P.R. 477 (1990). As noted above, the
proposals do not preclude the Agency's from providing employees a "firm
choice." Moreover, while agencies are obligated to provide certain employees
with disabilities with a firm choice, agencies do not have a right to insist
that employees waive their right to file discrimination charges against the
agency. Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944 (D.D.C. 1988). 5. MSPB could retain jurisdiction to enforce a last chance
agreement if, among other things, the settlement agreement had been entered
into the record. See Harris v. United States Postal Service, 44
M.S.P.R. 547 (1990). 6. Based on our finding that Proposal 4 violates sections
7114(a)(5) and 7121(b)(3)(B) of the Statute, it is unnecessary to address the
issue of whether the proposal also violates 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) and 5
C.F.R. §§ 752.404(e) and (f). 7. In finding that these proposals are negotiable, we make