Source: https://m.openjurist.org/971/f2d/452
Timestamp: 2020-02-24 21:53:27
Document Index: 214912647

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 924', '§ 856', '§ 841', '§ 856', '§ 846', '§ 856', '§ 856', '§ 856', '§ 856', '§ 2']

971 F. 2d 452 - United States v. Sturmoski W
971 F2d 452 United States v. Sturmoski W
971 F.2d 452
Walt Anthony STURMOSKI, a/k/a Anthony W. Williams,
Sturmoski also argues that the search warrant affidavit fails to establish probable cause. We evaluate informant information for probable cause in a search warrant affidavit under the "totality of the circumstances" test. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Sturmoski bases this claim on the fact that neither Sergeant Rhem nor Simonson attempted to establish the veracity of the first confidential informant. However, there is no need for a declaration of the reliability of an informant when the informant's information is corroborated by other information. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). Here, the record clearly demonstrates that the confidential information was corroborated by independent information.
Sergeant Rhem told Simonson that he had knowledge of independent information that confirmed informant # 1's information. In addition, informant # 1 made an admission against his own penal interest: he admitted to personal involvement in manufacturing methamphetamine in the past. Further, informant # 2 had observed a methamphetamine laboratory in a garage at 237 90th Street, S.W. during the summer of 1990. Informant # 2 also stated that "methamphetamine oil" was buried on the premises. Sturmoski contends that this information is stale and, therefore, cannot be used to corroborate the statements of the first confidential informant. We disagree. The offense in question was ongoing and continuing. Therefore, the passage of time is not of critical importance. See United States v. Erickson, 676 F.2d 408, 410 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853, 103 S.Ct. 118, 74 L.Ed.2d 103 (1982); see also United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1048, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073, 105 S.Ct. 565, 83 L.Ed.2d 506 (1984). Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, sufficient probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant.
In United States v. DePugh, 452 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 920, 92 S.Ct. 2452, 32 L.Ed.2d 805 (1972), we held that "the description is sufficient [if it] enable[s] the officers to ascertain the place to be searched" with reasonable effort. Here, the warrant provides the defendant's name; the buildings were described in detail; and a commonly used address on the premises is contained in the warrant. Further, Agent Ainsworth, who also participated in the search, was familiar with the premises because he investigated a fire on the property in July, 1990. Thus, Ainsworth's presence provided additional reliability that the correct premises would be searched. See United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 866-67 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 1632, 95 L.Ed.2d 205 (1987).
With regard to the horse trailer, "[a] search warrant authorizing a search of a certain premises generally includes any vehicles located within its curtilage if the objects of the search might be located" in those vehicles. United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459, 1461 (10th Cir.1990). In Gottschalk, we held that "the scope of the warrant ... include[s] those automobiles either actually owned or under the control and dominion of the premises owner or, alternatively, those vehicles which appear, based on objectively reasonable indicia present at the time of the search, to be so controlled." Id. The search team discovered the horse trailer within the curtilage of the premises described by the search warrant. Moreover, the search team observed a path from Sturmoski's office trailer leading to the horse trailer, which provided reasonable indicia of control over the vehicle. Therefore, we conclude that the warrant described the premises and vehicles with sufficient particularity.
Sturmoski next argues that the district court incorrectly admitted evidence of prior acts under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We review the district court's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Garot, 801 F.2d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir.1986). Sturmoski contends that both the testimony of Jackie Sturmoski and the testimony of Agent Ainsworth contained highly prejudicial and impermissible character evidence. Sturmoski also asserts that because Jackie Sturmoski was not on the prosecution's witness list, he was unfairly surprised by her testimony.
Appellant's contention concerning the "surprise" testimony by Jackie Sturmoski fails because Sturmoski suffered no prejudice from the nondisclosure. Jackie Sturmoski testified on the same day the witness list was produced so that Sturmoski's counsel could not have relied on the witness list in order to prepare for trial. Under these circumstances, any failure in not preparing for Jackie Sturmoski's testimony simply cannot be attributed to the nondisclosure in the witness list. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting her testimony. See United States v. Carter, 756 F.2d 310, 312 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1009, 106 S.Ct. 3307, 92 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986); United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1083 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 829, 42 L.Ed.2d 839 (1975).
Sturmoski also asserts that Jackie Sturmoski's testimony concerning her detection of an acidy smell in the area, some glassware in a garage, and her statement that Sturmoski always carried a gun with him to the garage is either impermissibly stale or is improper because it was used to demonstrate that appellant's conduct in January of 1991 was in conformity with his conduct in August of 1990. With regard to appellant's staleness argument, we have held that there is no set rule regarding the age of prior acts. See United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845, 104 S.Ct. 146, 78 L.Ed.2d 137 (1983); see also United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir.1988). Instead, the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined. The record indicates that Jackie Sturmoski testified regarding events that occurred only a few months earlier--events that she directly observed and that suggested the presence of a methamphetamine laboratory six months earlier. Under these facts, we conclude that Jackie Sturmoski's testimony was not impermissibly stale.
The defense, in its opening statement, stated that the creation of Renee, Ltd. and Sturmoski's desire to procure phenylacetic acid was for the purpose of manufacturing mechanics soap. The government introduced the testimony of Jackie Sturmoski and Agent Ainsworth in order to rebut this assertion and to demonstrate why Sturmoski desired to procure phenylacetic acid. In United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375 (10th Cir.1989), we emphasized that the use of prior drug involvement to show plan, motive or intent in a drug trafficking offense is appropriate. Moreover, the district court gave an instruction, prepared by the defense, which explained the limited use of prior acts as evidence in order to avoid any prejudice to the defendant. Therefore, given the facts of this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in allowing both Jackie Sturmoski and Agent Ainsworth to testify.
Sturmoski also argues that the district court erred in qualifying Agent Swierc as an expert in the areas of methamphetamine labs and the use of firearms in the operation of those labs. Appellant asserts that this subject matter is not appropriate for an expert and that Swierc's testimony was not at all "helpful to the trier of fact" as required by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We review the district court's admission of expert testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1091 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067, 107 S.Ct. 955, 93 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1987).
After reviewing the trial transcript, we conclude that the agent's testimony was useful to describe the value of clandestine laboratories and the presence of firearms at those laboratories. Without the agent's testimony, the jury would have known neither the investment that a methamphetamine lab requires nor the desire of the operator of such a lab to protect that investment through the use of firearms. Further, under Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, opinion testimony describing the overall activities based on "the tools of the narcotics trade" found with the defendant is permissible. United States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 762-63 (D.C.Cir.1988). The agent's testimony was indispensable to demonstrate to the jury that guns are tools of the narcotics trade--particularly where a large investment in chemicals and equipment has been made.1 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion either in classifying Agent Swierc as an expert or in admitting his testimony.V.
Because the grant of a severance is within the sound discretion of the district court, we will not reverse that decision absent a strong showing of prejudice. United States v. Strand, 617 F.2d 571, 575 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841, 101 S.Ct. 120, 66 L.Ed.2d 48 (1980). Rule 8(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
Thus, joinder is proper under Rule 8(a) if the offenses are of the same character, see United States v. Eagleston, 417 F.2d 11, 14 (10th Cir.1969), if they grow out of a common scheme or plan, see Roth v. United States, 339 F.2d 863, 865 (10th Cir.1964), or if the offenses are based on connected acts or transactions. See United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 591 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188, 105 S.Ct. 957, 83 L.Ed.2d 964 (1985). Prejudicial joinder occurs under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only "if an individual's right to a fair trial is either threatened or actually deprived." Id. Prejudicial joinder did not occur in this case. First, joinder was appropriate under Rule 8(a) because the possession of the firearm was part of the drug trafficking offense. Second, given the ample evidence of the defendant's involvement with methamphetamine laboratories, it is clear that the prior marijuana conviction did not unduly influence the jury. Third, no undue emphasis was placed on Sturmoski's prior conviction. See United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 290 (10th Cir.1983) (defendant failed to make a persuasive showing of prejudice where prior conviction did not receive undue emphasis at trial). The record reveals plenty of evidence on which the jury could have convicted Sturmoski on the methamphetamine charges without any mention of the prior marijuana conviction. Thus, we cannot conclude that joinder deprived or threatened Sturmoski's right to a fair trial.
Sturmoski also asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for a bill of particulars because such a bill was necessary to inform him of the specific nature of the charges against him, the time, place, and manner of the commission of the alleged offenses, and to enable him to prepare a defense and avoid unfair surprise at trial. We review the district court's decision to deny a motion for a bill of particulars under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir.1988).
Appellant asserts that the district court's imposition of two consecutive thirty-year sentences for two convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) constitutes punishment for the same act. Sturmoski was convicted of maintaining a place to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856 [Count III], attempting to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846 [Count IV], carrying and using a firearm to facilitate maintaining an establishment for the purpose of methamphetamine manufacture [Count V], and carrying and using a firearm to facilitate the attempt to manufacture methamphetamine [Count VI]. Appellant maintains that the above convictions punish him twice for the possession of one firearm in the commission of only one offense. He argues that maintaining a place to manufacture methamphetamine inherently suggests attempting to manufacture and that attempting to manufacture suggests maintaining a place. Two separate convictions, however, can arise from an essentially identical set of facts as long as double jeopardy is not implicated. See United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1292-93 (10th Cir.1988).
We have held that consecutive sentences may be imposed for multiple 924(c) counts if the offenses underlying each 924(c) count do not constitute a single offense for double jeopardy purposes. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1315-17 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 534, 102 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); see also United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1425, 1433-34 (10th Cir.1992). Thus, we must decide whether the underlying offenses in Count III (maintaining a place to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856) and Count IV (attempting to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846) constitute separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. If so, then two consecutive sentences may be imposed under 924(c) even though the underlying offenses arise out of the same criminal episode, Abreu, 962 F.2d at 1434, and even though the same gun is paired with each underlying offense. See Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1316 (where defendant received two separate 924(c) convictions for using the same gun in connection with a robbery and first degree murder, court vacated the sentence and conviction on one 924(c) count because the underlying offenses constituted a single offense for double jeopardy purposes); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 943 (6th Cir.1989) (determination of whether 924(c) counts merge depends on whether they are tied to separate predicate offenses, not on whether there was more than one gun involved).
In the context of a single prosecution, where the offenses underlying separate 924(c) counts cover the same criminal episode, we must limit our review to whether Congress intended multiple convictions and sentences for the underlying offenses. See United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1505-06 (10th Cir.1992); see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) ("With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended."). We discern the intent of Congress by looking first to the plain language of the statute and then to legislative history. Morehead, 959 F.2d at 1506; United States v. Lanzi, 933 F.2d 824, 825 (10th Cir.1991). If legislative intent is unclear, we apply the "rule of statutory construction" from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).2
Congress eventually enacted § 856 as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-52. In September of 1986, the Senate added § 856 and a number of other provisions to the House version of this act, H.R. 5484, see 132 Cong.Rec. S13,779-80 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986), and summarized § 856 as a provision that "outlaws operation of houses or buildings, so-called 'crack houses' where 'crack', cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and used." Id. at S13,780; see also id. at S14288 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (the Senate bill "recognizes crack's insidious impacts on neighborhoods by outlawing crack houses") (statement of Senator Chiles). This legislative history demonstrates that, by enacting § 856, Congress unequivocally determined to create a distinct offense--with its own, separate punishment--aimed specifically at criminalizing the use of property for narcotics-related purposes.3 Thus, Sturmoski's double jeopardy claim must fail.
Sturmoski also challenges his sentence on the grounds that the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines by calculating his sentence based on the laboratory's productivity--even though it was impossible to produce any amount of methamphetamine at his lab. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.4, Application Note 2 specifies that when there is no drug seizure reflective of the scale of the offense, the judge may consider the size or the capability of the laboratory involved to determine the offense level. We have held that it is appropriate to "estimate the ultimate quantity of produceable drugs" if the missing chemical was present. United States v. Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 687, 112 L.Ed.2d 678 (1991); see also United States v. Leopard, 936 F.2d 1138 (10th Cir.1991). Therefore, the district court correctly computed appellant's sentence by calculating the amount of methamphetamine the laboratory could have produced had the missing chemical been available.
Appellant finally contends that the sentence imposed was disproportionate and excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it is in effect a life sentence. We agree with the Eighth Circuit's determination in United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1380-82 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 101, 116 L.Ed.2d 71 (1991), that a life sentence for a drug trafficker does not violate the Eighth Amendment. With regard to whether Sturmoski's sentence is disproportionate to his conduct, we follow the Supreme Court's analysis in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). After reviewing the three factors announced in Solem and the facts of this case, we conclude that Sturmoski's sentence was not disproportionate to his conduct and compares with sentences received by others who have engaged in similar conduct in this jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions.
We note that in United States v. Perrone, 936 F.2d 1403 (2d Cir.1991), the Second Circuit expressed concern over the use of expert testimony to demonstrate that guns are commonly used in the drug trade because this knowledge is "seemingly within the grasp of any citizen." Id. at 1411. We disagree that this type of information is within the grasp of any citizen. Therefore, expert testimony concerning the tools of the drug trade is appropriately admitted to assist the trier of fact
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182.