Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/805/295/171286/
Timestamp: 2019-10-17 00:13:58
Document Index: 530846774

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1002', '§ 1001', '§ 7513', '§ 7513', 'art 650', '§ 907', '§ 907', '§ 905']

John P. Munnelly, Appellant, v. the United States Postal Service, a Public Corporation;william P. Bolger, Individually and As Postmaster General Ofthe United States; Thomas F. Ranft, Individually and Asregional Director of Mail Processing Department, Centralregional Office, United States Postal Service, Appellees, 805 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1986 › John P. Munnelly, Appellant, v. the United States Postal Service, a Public Corporation;william P. Bo...
John P. Munnelly, Appellant, v. the United States Postal Service, a Public Corporation;william P. Bolger, Individually and As Postmaster General Ofthe United States; Thomas F. Ranft, Individually and Asregional Director of Mail Processing Department, Centralregional Office, United States Postal Service, Appellees, 805 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1986)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 805 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1986) Submitted May 12, 1986. Decided Nov. 12, 1986
Munnelly argues that he, as a presidential appointee with the advice and consent of the Senate, cannot be removed by the Postal Service but rather must be removed by the President or impeached and convicted pursuant to Article I of the Constitution. In support of this position, he cites Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926). He further argues that the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970), did not alter his status as a presidential appointee and did not give the Postal Service the authority to remove him.
We are satisfied that the district court correctly held that the Postal Reorganization Act eliminated Munnelly's presidentially appointed position and established a new system under which Munnelly was employed by the Postal Service as a postmaster. He thus was subject to discipline and removal by the Postal Service pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 1001(e) (2), (3) (1982).
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute requiring Senate consent to presidential removal of postmasters whom the President originally appointed with the Senate's advice and consent. 272 U.S. at 176, 47 S.Ct at 45. However, the Court has long recognized that subsequent congressional legislation may modify the terms of a presidential appointment. See Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 108-09, 10 S. Ct. 431, 434, 33 L. Ed. 825 (1890) (naval cadet may have term of office modified by statute enacted subsequent to his appointment); cf. Head v. The University, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 526, 530-31, 22 L. Ed. 160 (1873) (state employee who held office "subject to law" may be removed by statute enacted subsequent to his appointment). The Court has also held that Congress has the authority to discontinue a post office where the effect of the discontinuance is to discharge a presidentially appointed postmaster. Ware v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 617, 633-34, 18 L. Ed. 389 (1867).
39 U.S.C. § 1001(e) (2), (3).
Congress has provided that personnel decisions be free from political influence and considerations. 39 U.S.C. § 1002(a)-(e). The Postal Reorganization Act specifically addressed the issue of the status of persons employed by the Postal Service prior to its reorganization as follows:
Thus, postmasters and other employees of the abolished Post Office Department became employees of its successor organization, the United States Postal Service, and became subject to direction, discipline, and removal by the Postal Service as provided in 39 U.S.C. § 1001(e). Congress had the authority to change the terms and conditions of Munnelly's presidential appointment. Crenshaw, 134 U.S. at 109, 10 S. Ct. at 434. We hold that Congress did so, eliminating Munnelly's former position and establishing a new system under which he was employed by the Postal Service.
We recognize that our role in reviewing the basis for Munnelly's removal is limited: "Judicial review of dismissal from federal employment is limited to a determination that the applicable procedures have been complied with, and that the dismissal was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious." Ross v. United States Postal Service, 664 F.2d 191, 192 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Alsbury v. United States Postal Service, 530 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828, 97 S. Ct. 85, 50 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976)). We must also consider whether the district court properly determined that a nexus exists between Munnelly's off-duty conduct and " [promotion of] the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982); see Graybill v. United States Postal Service, 782 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Munnelly first contends that the NADC findings of civil violations cannot constitute substantial evidence supporting his discharge because the findings were based on his plea of nolo contendere before the NADC. He argues that a nolo plea cannot be used against a person entering such a plea in any subsequent action. However, this court and several others have recognized that "a conviction pursuant to a nolo contendere plea gives rise to a variety of collateral consequences in subsequent proceedings." Crofoot v. United States Government Printing Office, 761 F.2d 661, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1984) (conviction upon nolo plea basis for civil mental health commitment); Noell v. Bensinger, 586 F.2d 554, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1978) (conviction upon nolo plea basis for revocation of Drug Enforcement Administration certificate of registration); Qureshi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 519 F.2d 1174, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1975) (conviction upon nolo plea basis for deportation); Sokoloff v. Saxbe, 501 F.2d 571, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1974) (conviction upon nolo plea basis for revocation of Drug Enforcement Administration certificate of registration).
The Federal Circuit's recent opinion in Crofoot v. United States Government Printing Office, 761 F.2d 661, is particularly relevant. In Crofoot, an employee of the Government Printing Office was discharged for "notoriously disgraceful conduct." Id. at 663. The discharge stemmed from the employee's plea of guilty to charges of false pretenses pursuant to a plea bargain accepted by the district court under the doctrine of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), which permits a court to accept a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty even though the defendant maintains his innocence, where the trial judge determines that there is a factual basis for the plea. 761 F.2d at 663; cf. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, 91 S. Ct. at 167. The Federal Circuit held that the employee's Alford plea, and the resulting conviction, could be considered as a basis for the employee's discharge. 761 F.2d at 665.
The court observed in so holding that the Alford plea is analogous to a plea of nolo contendere, id., and this analogy has also been recognized by the Supreme Court. 400 U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at 167. In any event, there is no significant difference between a nolo plea and an Alford plea in the context presented herein as to the collateral consequences which may follow its entry; we have already approved the use of a nolo plea where the collateral consequence was more severe than loss of employment. George v. Black, 732 F.2d at 110 (civil mental health commitment); cf. Crofoot, 761 F.2d at 661 n. 1 (arguing that an Alford plea may in some circumstances warrant more severe collateral consequences than a nolo plea). We conclude, therefore, that the district court correctly determined that the NADC findings based on Munnelly's nolo contendere pleas could be relied upon by the Postal Service as a basis for his removal.5
Munnelly next contends that the district court erred in finding a nexus between the NADC findings and the efficient operation of the Postal Service. The Postal Service may remove Munnelly "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a). Where an employee is removed for off-duty or off-work premises conduct, section 7513(a) has been read as requiring a nexus between the conduct and the efficiency of the service. See, e.g., Graybill v. United States Postal Service, 782 F.2d at 1573; Crofoot v. United States Government Printing Office, 761 F.2d at 664; Book v. United States Postal Service, 675 F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir. 1982). Munnelly asserts that his activities connected with the Omaha Public Power District were wholly unrelated to his duties and responsibilities as postmaster, and the NADC findings regarding his activities could therefore have no effect on Munnelly's job performance or on the efficient operation of the Omaha Post Office.
614 F. Supp. at 524-25 (citations omitted).
In Book v. United States Postal Service, 675 F.2d 158, we upheld the removal of a postmaster who had misappropriated $22.00 in postal property. Id. at 160-61. We stated, " [i]t was not an abuse of discretion for the agency to determine that Book's demonstrated lack of trustworthiness is directly connected to his job performance and position as postmaster." Id. at 161. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has affirmed the dismissal of a postmaster who was convicted of shoplifting $8.00 worth of goods. Yacovone v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 1028, 1030 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844, 102 S. Ct. 159, 70 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1981). The court noted that a legitimate factor in the Postal Service's decision to discharge the postmaster was "the federal interest in having a postmaster whose reputation does not represent an obstacle to the efficiency of the service." Id. at 1036. The district court correctly found that a nexus existed between the NADC findings and the efficiency of the Postal Service.
Munnelly also complains that Postal Service and district court reliance on adverse newspaper publicity regarding the NADC findings as an additional basis for removal is illegitimate and violates due process. However, this type of publicity directly affects the trust and confidence the public reposes in the Postal Service. Adverse publicity has been recognized as an appropriate consideration as to the efficiency of the service. See White v. United States Postal Service, 768 F.2d 334, 336 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (adverse television and newspaper reports of postmaster convicted of leaving scene of an accident); Yacovone, 645 F.2d at 1032, 1036 (publicity regarding shoplifting conviction). Munnelly's argument fails. We hold that his dismissal was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. Ross, 664 F.2d at 192.
Munnelly's final argument is that the Postal Service committed three procedural errors which vitiate its decision to remove him. Specifically, he contends that a clandestine meeting was held by Postal Service officials to discuss and agree upon his removal, that the official who decided to remove him was not higher in authority than the official who initially proposed his removal, and that his administrative appeal was reviewed by an individual who had been improperly designated by the Postmaster General. He argues that these occurrences were violative of the removal and appeals procedures set forth in Part 650 of the Postal Service's Employee and Labor Relations Manual. Munnelly cites and relies on a number of Supreme Court and court of appeals decisions that recognize that an administrative agency must follow its own procedures. E.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S. Ct. 968, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1959).
The district court considered and rejected each of Munnelly's claimed errors. It determined that the Postal Service complied with the applicable procedures. 614 F. Supp. at 522-23.
We have carefully reviewed Munnelly's contentions, the record and the findings of the district court. We cannot say that the district court's conclusion that there was no prior agreement involving Paul W. Carlin, Regional Postmaster General, to remove Munnelly was clearly erroneous. Nor do we find clear error in its determination that the individual who removed him was higher in authority than the official who proposed his removal. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). And even if we assume that Munnelly is correct in asserting that the Postmaster General improperly designated the Step II reviewing official for his appeal, his conclusory allegation of error does not meet his burden of demonstrating some measure of prejudice from the Postal Service's departure from proper procedures. Mercer v. Department of Health and Human Services, 772 F.2d 856, 859-60 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Shaw v. United States Postal Service, 697 F.2d 1078, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Alley v. Veterans Administration Medical Center, 690 F.2d 153, 154 (8th Cir. 1982).
I reluctantly join the decision to affirm the judgment of the district court because I believe a sanction short of discharge would have been more appropriate here, especially given appellant's long and outstanding career as postmaster, public service record and many awards. I make no excuses for appellant's misconduct, and I acknowledge that the nature of a sanction is a matter particularly committed to agency discretion. Nonetheless, even though I would have imposed a sanction short of discharge had the decision been mine to make, I cannot say that the agency's decision to discharge was an abuse of discretion. Cf. Book v. United States Postal Service, 675 F.2d 158, 161 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (endorsing sanction short of removal as imposed by the agency). Accordingly, I concur specially in the decision to affirm the judgment of the district court.
Munnelly also argues that the Postal Service could not remove him because 5 U.S.C. § 907(a) (1982) preserves his status as a presidential appointee. Section 907(a) addresses the reorganization of executive departments, and provides that " [a] statute enacted * * * or function affected by a reorganization under this chapter, before the effective date of the reorganization, has, except to the extent rescinded * * * by or under authority of law or by the abolition of a function, the same effect as if the reorganization had not been made." Id. Munnelly's contention must fail, however, because his employment as postmaster was continued pursuant to section 8 of the Postal Reorganization Act, rather than under 5 U.S.C. § 907(a). Moreover, this section is inapplicable where the reorganization has the effect of abolishing an executive department. 5 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1). The Postal Reorganization Act had just such an effect. Postal Reorganization Act Sec. 4(a), 84 Stat. at 773-74
The Postal Service contends that it had additional evidence independently corroborative of the NADC findings, such as expense and travel vouchers which contained overcharges for Munnelly's personal expenses. The district court did not rely on this evidence in determining that the Postal Service's removal of Munnelly was supported by substantial evidence. Nor does Munnelly argue that the quantity of evidence before either the Postal Service or the district court was insufficient to support the district court's affirmation of his discharge. Rather, he takes issue with the quality of the civil findings based on the nolo contendere plea, and we therefore need not consider the additional evidence in the record pointed to by the Postal Service and by Munnelly. We may not reweigh the evidence before the Postal Service, nor substitute our judgment as to where it preponderates. Bonet v. United States Postal Service, 712 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1983)