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Timestamp: 2019-11-17 20:14:06
Document Index: 536378982

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 9']

ECONOMY LIGHT & POWER CO. V. UNITED STATES, 256 U. S. 113 (1921) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 256 > ECONOMY LIGHT & POWER CO. V. UNITED STATES, 256 U. S. 113 (1921)
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3. The Desplaines River in Illinois, which was used from a very early day to about the year 1825 as a link in a well known route between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi in the transportation of furs and supplies by canoes and other light-draft boats, but has not since chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
11. Where there was no application under the statute, but the party chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
256 F.7d 2 affirmed.
This was a suit brought by the United States against appellant in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, for an injunction to restrain defendant from constructing a dam in the Desplaines River at a point in Grundy County, Illinois, without the consent of Congress or authority of the legislature of the state, and without approval of the location and plans by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War of the United States. Relief was prayed upon two grounds: (1) that the riverbed where the dam was being constructed was the property of the United States; (2) that the Desplaines River was a navigable waterway of the United States, and the proposed construction of a dam therein was in violation of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1899, c. 425, § 9, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151. The first ground was overruled by the district court and disregarded by the circuit court of appeals. We need not consider it further. The second ground was sustained by the district court, and its final decree granting an injunction was chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 256 F.7d 2. The present appeal followed.
There is no contention that the consent of Congress for the building of the proposed dam has been obtained, that its construction has been authorized by the Legislature of the State of Illinois, or that the location and plans have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War. The substantial defense is that the Desplaines River, at the site of the proposed dam, which is below the City of Joliet and just above the point where the Desplaines joins the Kankakee to form the Illinois River, is not navigable in fact, and not within the description "navigable river, or other navigable water of the United States," as employed in the Act of 1899. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The district court found that there was no evidence of actual navigation within the memory of living men, and that there would be no present interference with navigation by the building of the proposed dam. The circuit court of appeals did not disturb this finding. 256 F.7d 2, 798. But both courts found that, in its natural state, the river was navigable in fact, and that it was actually used for the purposes of navigation and trading in the customary way, and with the kinds of craft ordinarily in use for that purpose on rivers of the United States, from early fur-trading days (about 1675) down to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Details are given in the opinion of the circuit court of appeals, and need not be repeated. Suffice it to say that there was a well known route by water, called the Chicago-Desplaines-Illinois route, running up the Chicago River from its mouth on Lake Michigan to a point on the west fork of the south branch; thence westerly by water or portage, according to the season, to Mud Lake, about two miles; thence to the Desplaines near Riverside, two miles; thence down the Desplaines to the confluence of that river with the Kankakee, where they form the Illinois River; thence down the Illinois to its junction with the Mississippi. During the period mentioned, the fur trade was a leading branch of commerce in the western territory, and it was regularly conducted upon the Desplaines River. Supplies in large quantity and variety, needed by the early settlers, also were transported over this route between Chicago and St. Louis and other points. Canoes and other boats of various kinds were employed, having light draft but capable of carrying several tons each, and manned by crews of six or eight men. The route was navigated by the American Fur Company regularly during a period of years down to about 1825, after which it was disused because the trade had receded to interior portions of Illinois that could be reached chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
But, in spite of these changes, the circuit court of appeals finds (256 F.8d 4) that the Desplaines River is a continuous stretch of water from Riverside (at the Chicago divide) to its mouth, and although there is a rapid, and in places shallow water, with boulders and obstructions, yet these things do not affect its navigable capacity; that the same is true of the upper part of the Illinois River, above the head of steamboat navigation, and that both streams are navigable, and are within the Act of 1899.
The public interest in navigable streams of this character in Illinois and neighboring states, and the federal authority over such as are capable of serving commerce among the states, does not arise from custom or implication, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1 Stat. 51, 52, note; Rev.Stats. U.S., 1878 ed., pp. 13, 16. This was under the Confederation, but the first Congress under the new Constitution expressed a design to have it continue in full effect, in the Act of August 7, 1789, c. 8, 1 Stat. 50. A purpose to preserve the rights of public highway in the navigable rivers was again manifested in § 9 of Act of May 18, 1796, c. 29, 1 Stat. 464, 468. The territory of Indiana (including what is now Illinois) was set apart and organized by Act of May 7, 1800, which in § 2 reiterated that purpose, c. 41, 2 Stat. 58, 59, and in an act providing for the disposal of the public lands therein (Act of March 26, 1804, c. 35, § 6, 2 Stat. 277, 279, 280), it was again declared "that all the navigable rivers, creeks, and waters, within the Indiana Territory, shall be deemed to be and remain public highways." Illinois was set apart and a separate territorial government established therein by Act of February 3, 1809, c. 13, 2 Stat. 514. By § 2, the government was to be "in all respects similar" to that provided by the Ordinance of 1787 and the Act of August 7, 1789, and the inhabitants were to enjoy all the rights, privileges, and conditions granted by the Ordinance. An act to enable the people of Illinois to form a state government, approved April 18, 1818, c. 67, 3 Stat. 428, contained a proviso (§ 4, p. 430) that such government should not be repugnant to the Ordinance of 1787. The state constitution declared its purpose to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There can be doubt that the waters of the Chicago-Desplaines-Illinois route "and the carrying places between the same" constituted one of the routes of commerce intended by the Ordinance, and the subsequent acts referred to, to be maintained as common highways. It did not make them navigable in law unless they were navigable in fact, but declared the public rights therein so far as they were navigable in fact, and it is curious and interesting that the importance of these inland waterways, and the inappropriateness of the tidal test in defining our navigable waters, was thus recognized by the Congress of the Confederation more than 80 years before this Court decided 77 U. S. 563, and more than 60 years before 53 U. S. 455.
To the extent that it pertained to internal affairs, the Ordinance of 1787, notwithstanding its contractual form, was no more than a regulation of territory belonging to the United States, and was superseded by the admission of the State of Illinois into the Union "on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever." 44 U. S. 610; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 117 U. S. 159; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 243 U. S. 217. But, so far as it established public rights of highway in navigable waters capable of bearing commerce from state to state, it did not regulate internal affairs alone, and was no more capable of repeal by one of the states than any other regulation of interstate commerce enacted by the Congress, being analogous in this respect to legislation enacted under the exclusive power chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. 44 U. S. 229-230; Ex parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663, 225 U. S. 683, 225 U. S. 690-691; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 231 U. S. 38.
Nothing inconsistent with this was decided in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 107 U. S. 688-689; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 119 U. S. 546; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288, 123 U. S. 295-296; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 125 U. S. 8-11. Those cases simply hold, in effect, that a state formed out of a part of the Northwest Territory has the same power to regulate navigable waters within its borders that is possessed by other states of the Union -- that is to say, until Congress intervenes, the power of the state, locally exerted, is plenary. Nevertheless, where the navigation serves commerce among the states or with foreign nations, Congress has the supreme power when it chooses to act, and is not prevented by anything the states may have done from assuming entire control in the matter. In short, that the rule laid down in 27 U. S. 252, and 70 U. S. 731, applies to states formed out of the Northwest Territory, as well as to others. This is not questioned. But, as was recognized in the Gilman case (p. 70 U. S. 731), Congress may exercise its authority through general, as well as through special, laws, its power in either case being supreme. The Act of 1899 (30 Stat. 1151), upon which the present bill is founded, is a due assertion of the authority of Congress over all navigable waters within its jurisdiction, and it must be accorded due weight as such.
The circuit court of appeals, in passing upon the question of navigability, correctly applied the test laid down by this Court in 77 U. S. 563, and 87 U. S. 440-443 -- that is, the test whether the river in its natural state is used or capable of being used as a highway for commerce over which chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We concur in the opinion of the circuit court of appeals that a river having actual navigable capacity in its natural state and capable of carrying commerce among the states is within the power of Congress to preserve for purposes of future transportation, even though it be not at present used for such commerce, and be incapable of such use according to present methods, either by reason of changed conditions or because of artificial obstructions. And we agree that the provisions of § 9 of the Act of 1899 (30 Stat. 1151) apply to such a stream. The act in terms applies to "any . . . navigable river, or other chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is contended that, supposing the Desplaines is navigable, the purpose of the Act of 1899 was in effect accomplished because appellant or its predecessor, before proceeding with the enterprise, submitted the plans for the proposed dam to the War Department, and that Department "in substance gave its approval," although it did not formally approve the plans because it did not consider the Desplaines River a navigable water of the United States. It appears, however, that there was no application for an approval under the Act of 1899, and the Department was not called upon to exercise its jurisdiction under that act. There was an informal hearing before the Secretary at which the representatives of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary