Source: http://tennesseeconstructionlaw.blogspot.com/2007/12/
Timestamp: 2018-06-19 23:39:10
Document Index: 63215671

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 67']

Tennessee Construction Law: December 2007
Trial court believes construction company's testimony over homeowner; Reasonable opportunity to cure violated by prohibiting contractor from entering
DAVID LAVY d/b/a DL CONSTRUCTION v. JOAN CARROLL (Tenn.Ct.App. December 27, 2007).
This is a home construction case in which the homeowner appeals the trial court's decision finding her liable to the contractor for the amount remaining due under their original agreement as well as for subsequently authorized modifications. The homeowner contended below that the contractor's work was defective, but the trial court ruled that she was required to have given the contractor notice of any defects in his work and then afforded him a reasonable opportunity to cure these alleged deficiencies. On appeal, the homeowner argues that the trial court erred both in finding that she had not done this and in holding that these actions were required of her as a matter of law. We affirm.
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/lavyd_122707.pdf
"Mr. Lavy testified that he was prohibited from ever returning to Ms. Carroll’s property after the incident on January 22, 2005. Testimony from Mr. Underhill corroborated Mr. Lavy’s account of these events. Thus, there was certainly evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that Mr. Lavy had not been provided a reasonable opportunity to cure. Put simply, the trial court believed Messrs. Lavy and Underhill rather than Ms. Waite. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we conclude that Ms. Carroll’s argument here is without merit." Id
"The trial court did not find that Mr. Lavy had been previously notified of any problems with his work, nor did it find that Mr. Lavy had ever refused to address any issues that had been brought to his attention. It did find, however, that, soon after he made his request for final payment, Ms. Carroll’s agents prohibited him from reentering the property. While Ms. Carroll contends that Mr. Lavy’s requesting payment and making filings with the Register of Deeds relieved her of the obligations imposed by McClain and Carter, she has failed to cite any law which would support this proposition. Likewise, the Court is unaware of any such authority. Filings under the lien law would have no effect on her duty to first give the contractor notice of the claimed defects and then allow him a reasonable opportunity to cure." Id
Labels: contractors, TN Court of Appeals
In this boundary line dispute, Ralph Davis and his wife Jackie Davis ("the Davises") sued Daniel Cuel and Francine Cuel ("the Cuels"), alleging that the Cuels had improperly claimed a portion of the Davises' property as their own. Existing surveys supported the Cuels' claim, but the Davises asserted that a prior agreement gave them the right to an additional 0.42-acre tract ("the southern disputed area") on the Cuels' side of the survey boundary. The Cuels, meanwhile, believed that they were entitled to more land than the existing surveys indicated, so they hired a surveyor, Dave Bruce, to conduct a new survey ("the Bruce survey"). The Bruce survey indicated that the Cuels are entitled not only to the southern disputed area, but also to an additional area north of it ("the northern disputed area"), on what the earlier surveys had regarded as the Davises' side. The Bruce survey further indicated that an additional tract claimed by the Davises, immediately north of the northern disputed area, is actually a county right-of-way.
The trial court adopted the Bruce survey and awarded both the northern and southern disputed areas to the Cuels. As a consequence of this ruling, the Davises, the plaintiffs in this case, actually end up with less land than they started with. They appeal, claiming that the evidence preponderates against the court's factual findings, and also that they should have prevailed on a theory of estoppel or acquiescence. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the court's findings, and, even assuming that the Davises did not waive their alternative theories of recovery at trial, the evidence does not support those theories. We affirm.
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/burnettec_122707.pdf
"King states that “[m]uch of the technical information and some of the marketing information utilized by CMS were actually Lone Star documents which CMS used replacing the name ‘Lone Star Epoxies’ with the name ‘Concrete Maintenance Specialists’ which gave the impression that the products were actually CMS products.” This statement fails to help Homeowners because it does not allege that Lone Star played any role in altering the documents, which would be necessary to establish that they were representations or conduct of the purported principal rather than of the purported agent. In addition, the foundation of King’s statement is unclear, and she does not allege that the documents were actually used to make representations to Homeowners, only that the documents existed. This is clearly inadequate to create a disputed issue of material fact on the issue of apparent agency." Id.
Labels: agency, Summary Judgment, TN Court of Appeals
Fraudulent statements made by home builder to first purchaser suspend 4-year SOR, but do not constitute common law fraud against remote purchasers
ROBERT JENKINS ET AL. v. CHASE BROWN ET AL. (Tenn.Ct.App. December 17, 2007).
This appeal involves a dispute regarding the liability for the structural defects in a four-year-old house in a Mt. Juliet subdivision. Shortly after purchasing the house from its original owners, the property owners discovered that the house had been constructed on improperly compacted fill and other debris. When additional structural problems manifested themselves, the property owners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Wilson County seeking compensatory and punitive damages against the contractor who built the house and his wife, the original owners, the original owners' real estate agent and broker, their own real estate agent and broker, and their home inspector.
Following an eight-day trial, the jury determined that the contractor and the original owners had engaged in intentional and reckless misrepresentation by concealing the house's structural problems. The jury also determined that both real estate agents and the developer of the subdivision were at fault. The jury awarded the property owners $58,720.80 in compensatory damages to be apportioned among the parties at fault. The jury also awarded the property owners $20,000 in punitive damages against one of the original owners and $50,000 in punitive damages against the contractor. The trial court reduced the punitive damage award against the original property owner to $14,000, and granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the two real estate agents with regard to the property owners' Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims.
On this appeal, the property owners take issue with the dismissal of their claims against the real estate agents and their brokers based on their use of an outdated and incomplete real property disclosure form. The contractor also takes issue with the judgments awarded against him for compensatory and punitive damages. We have determined that the trial court did not err by dismissing the property owners' claims against the real estate agents and their brokers based on the use of the incomplete and outdated disclosure form. We have also concluded that the property owners presented insufficient evidence to establish their common-law fraud claim against the contractor who built the house. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment requiring the contractor to pay compensatory and punitive damages.
"Based on our review of the record, we have concluded that it contains sufficient material evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Mr. Wright had committed 'fraud' with regard to his dealings with the Browns by concealing the extent to which fill material had been used on the lot and by asserting that the house had been constructed on 'original dirt.' This conduct amounts to 'fraud ... in performing the ... construction of' the house for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-205(b). Therefore, Mr. Wright was not entitled to assert the four-year statute of repose in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 in this case." Id.
"It is important to note at the outset of this discussion that the 'fraud' that is relevant with regard to the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-205(b) is different from the Jenkinses’ commonlaw fraud claim. In the context of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-205(b), the fraud necessary to prevent a defendant from invoking the four-year statute of repose in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 need not be made directly to the plaintiff. The same is not necessarily the case with regard to common-law fraud claims." Id.
"The Jenkinses concede that they never talked with Mr. Wright about the house. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record that the Jenkinses were privy to any of the misrepresentations that Mr. Wright may have made to the Browns regarding the structural stability of the house. Accordingly, there is no evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that the Jenkinses relied on any misrepresentations that Mr. Wright may have made. There is likewise no evidence that when Mr. Wright represented to Mr. Brown that the house was constructed on “original dirt” that he intended or understood that anyone other than Mr. Brown would rely on the statement. Thus, in light of the essentially undisputed evidence that Mr. Wright had no role in the Browns sale of the house to the Jenkinses, the Jenkinses cannot recover from Mr. Wright for fraud." Id.
Labels: Fraud, TN Court of Appeals
County Powers Relief Act does not prevent cities from requiring residential developers to build or pay for sidewalks
Effect of County Powers Relief Act on City's Authority to Require Developers of Certain Real Property to Construct Sidewalks or Pay a Fee in Lieu of Construction (TN Attorney General Opinion 07-161, December 13, 2007).
"The Act restricts the enactment of impact fees and adequate facilities taxes after its June 20, 2006, effective date by providing that:
no county shall be authorized to enact an impact fee on development or a local real estate transfer tax by private or public act. In addition, this part shall be the exclusive authority for local governments to adopt any new or additional adequate facilities taxes on development. Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-2913 (2007)." Id.
"The Proposed Ordinance is not an adequate facilities tax. First, and most importantly, it is not a privilege tax on development. The Proposed Ordinance does not declare the development of property to be a taxable privilege. Also, unlike the taxes described above, it is not the intent of the Proposed Ordinance to ensure that developers pay their fair share of new or expanded public facilities caused by a substantial increase in property development. The City wants to create a network of sidewalks as part of its desire to promote the health, safety and welfare of the public. This desire exists outside of any residential development boom that might create the need for new or expanded sanitary sewers, roads, waterworks, and other facilities. Furthermore, the fee in lieu of construction is based on the actual cost of constructing the required sidewalk, not a calculation of the gross square footage or number of lots or units being developed. Finally, it must be noted that the default position of the Proposed Ordinance is for the developer to build the sidewalk, not for the City to impose a tax and collect revenue. Under the Proposed Ordinance, the City collects funds from the developer only when the developer requests a waiver of the construction requirement and the waiver is approved by the City’s Director of Engineering." Id.
"The General Assembly’s use of these particular terms demonstrates its desire to limit counties from enacting impact fees while allowing cities to do so. If the General Assembly had intended to limit cities, it could have used the term “local governments” as it did in the second sentence with regard to the restriction on adequate facilities taxes or the term “municipality” as it did in the third sentence." Id.
Government need only cure constitutional defects to preclude development of landfill with zoning ordinances
CONSOLIDATED WASTE SYSTEMS, L.L.C. v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY (Tenn.Ct.App. November 30, 2007).
The developer of a "construction and demolition" landfill appeals the denial of its application for a permit to construct the landfill. When the developer first applied for a permit in 1999 to develop the landfill, the Metropolitan Government denied the application based upon two zoning ordinances. In the lawsuit that ensued, the trial court found the ordinances unconstitutional.
In the appeal that followed, this Court affirmed the trial court and issued a stay of 150 days to afford the Metropolitan Government the opportunity to cure the constitutional infirmities. The Metropolitan Government timely amended one of the ordinances in 2003, but not the other ordinance, believing the amendment to that ordinance cured the constitutional infirmities identified in the first appeal.
Following the post-remand amendments to the ordinance, the developer renewed its request for a permit to construct the landfill. The Metropolitan Government again denied the permit, this time stating the landfill would violate Section 17.16.110(A)(2) of the Metro Code because the property was zoned in a district that permitted construction and demolition landfills with "conditions" and the proposed landfill did not meet the requisite conditions for two reasons. The landfill was within 100 feet of a property line for a residential area, and it was within 2000 feet of a park. Believing the Metropolitan Government had not cured the constitutional infirmities, the developer filed a motion to compel the Metropolitan Government to issue the twice-requested permit. After analyzing the two relevant ordinances and this court's opinion in the first appeal, the trial court concluded that the Metropolitan Government had cured all constitutional infirmities. It also concluded that the proposed landfill did not meet the requisite conditions for the reasons stated by the Metropolitan Government, and thus, affirmed the denial of the permit.
We have determined, as the trial court did, that the Metropolitan Government cured the constitutional infirmities and find no error with the determination that the plaintiff did not meet the requisite conditions for a construction and demolition landfill. Accordingly, we affirm.
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2007/consolidatedw_113007.pdf
"The trial court went on to conclude that the Metropolitan Government had corrected the constitutional infirmities in the buffer ordinance and, therefore, was in compliance with the declaratory judgment issued in this case and the mandate of this Court. Moreover, and significant to the second issue, is that the trial court found that '[n]o evidence has been presented that the ‘new’ buffer ordinance, which sets the current conditions that construction and demolition landfills must comply with, has any constitutional defects.' Finally, the trial court found Consolidated’s argument that the Metropolitan Government was out of compliance with its ruling in this case because it is still using the 'table ordinance,' to be without merit because, as the trial court determined, the table ordinance 'did not contain any constitutional defects.'" Id.
Labels: TN Court of Appeals, zoning ordinances