Source: https://openjurist.org/120/f3d/271/united-states-v-c-robey
Timestamp: 2019-12-08 13:16:19
Document Index: 662876226

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 922', '§ 1291', '§ 922', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 2']

120 F3d 271 United States v. C Robey | OpenJurist
120 F. 3d 271 - United States v. C Robey
120 F3d 271 United States v. C Robey
97 CJ C.A.R. 1540
William C. ROBEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 96-3183.
(D.C.No. 95-CR-10088-01)
Defendant-Appellant William C. Robey ("Robey") appeals his seventy-eight month prison sentence, imposed when he was convicted both of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and of possessing a firearm and ammunition after having been previously convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1) and affirm.
On September 20, 1995, Robey was charged in a nine count Indictment along with co-defendant Christopher H. Brown ("Brown") for various drug and firearms violations. Robey entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Counts 6 and 7 of the Indictment, which charged him with possessing a firearm and ammunition having previously been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and to Count 8 of the Indictment, which charged him with possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The other six charges were dismissed.
This circuit has rejected the argument that a defendant's inability to confront those who implicate him in a presentence report violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. In United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.1990), we explained that "[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutional requirements mandated in a criminal trial as to confrontation and cross-examination do not apply at non-capital sentencing proceedings." Id. at 1180 (citing cases). Accordingly, we reject Robey's constitutional challenge to his sentence.
Robey relies on United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812 (10th Cir.1995) for the proposition that "[u]nsworn out-of-court statements made by an unobserved witness and unsupported by other evidence form an insufficient predicate for a sentence enhancement...." Id. at 814. In Fennell, the presentence report relied on a telephone interview with the defendant's ex-girlfriend for the determination that the defendant had once tried to shoot his girlfriend with a machine gun. Id. at 813. The court used this information to impose four level sentence enhancement for "us[ing][a] machine gun in connection with a felonious assault." Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5)). We reversed and explained that not only was the hearsay evidence relied upon in the presentence report not corroborated by any other evidence found in the record, but that the police report of the alleged incident "tend[ed] to undermine, rather than buttress, confidence in the girlfriend's hearsay statements." Id.
We have explained that "[h]earsay statements need only contain minimal indicia of reliability to be used at sentencing." United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 113, 120 (10th Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752, 755 (10th Cir.1995)). In this case, we believe the record sufficiently corroborates the hearsay statements relied upon in the PSR to provide a minimal indicia of reliability.1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument is not needed in this case. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted on the briefs. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3
It is unclear whether Robey limited his objection below to the consideration of the 23 grams of crack cocaine found in Brown's possession, or whether Robey also objected to the consideration of the crack cocaine and marihuana seized from the residence at 3011 E. 16th Street. Assuming the latter, we note that there was sufficient evidence linking Robey to the 16th Street residence to include the drugs found there as relevant conduct. Moreover, the quantity of the drugs found in Brown's possession is such that even if the sentencing court had not considered the drugs found at the 16th Street residence, Robey's base offense level would have remained at 28. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3)(c)(6)