Source: http://narf.org/nill/bulletins/cta/documents/us_v_diaz.html
Timestamp: 2014-07-29 12:44:00
Document Index: 709949835

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1152', '§ 1152', '§ 66', '§ 1152', '§ 1152', '§ 1152', '§ 66']

Linda DIAZ, Defendant–Appellant.
No. 10–2252.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 1:09–CR–01578–LH–1).
Samuel L. Winder, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Jack E. Burkhead, Assistant United States Attorney (Kenneth J. Gonzales, United States Attorney, and Jennifer M. Rozzoni, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the brief) Office the United States Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL, Chief District Judge FN*.
FN* The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, Chief District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
*1 Linda Diaz was convicted of knowingly leaving the scene of a car accident where she hit and killed a pedestrian. The accident occurred on the Pojoajue Pueblo Indian reservation. She was charged with committing a crime in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 . On appeal, among other issues, Diaz contends the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the crime because the government failed to prove that the victim was not an Indian, a jurisdictional requirement under § 1152 .
*2 We address each of these contentions in turn.
“We review the record for sufficiency of the evidence de novo ” to determine whether “a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir.1997) .
Diaz was charged with violating N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66–7–201 , which makes it a crime to leave the scene of an accident resulting in great bodily harm or death. Under the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 , if the accident occurs in Indian Country and the victim or perpetrator is non-Indian, a crime can be charged and tried in federal court. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 ; United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n. 2 (1977) . Diaz does not contest that she is an Indian and a member of the Pojoaque Pueblo so, under this statutory scheme, for federal court jurisdiction the government must prove that the victim was not an Indian. Id.
The term “Indian” is “not defined in [18 U.S.C. § 1152 ] or in related statutes addressing criminal jurisdiction in Indian country,” so we have adopted a two-part evidentiary test to determine whether a person is an Indian for the purposes of federal law. United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir.2001) . To find that a person is an Indian the court must first make factual findings that the person has “some Indian blood” and, second, that the person is “recognized as an Indian by a tribe or by the federal government.” Id. at 1280 (citations omitted). United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir.1996) (same test); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.1984) (same). A person satisfies the definition only if both parts are met; conversely the government can prove that a person is not Indian by showing that he fails either prong. This test, moreover, applies to determine the status of both a perpetrator or a victim of a crime in Indian Country.
Our cases applying this test have approved a totality-of-the evidence approach to determining Indian status, although certain types of evidence, by themselves, may not be sufficient. For example, a jury may not determine the lack of Indian heritage solely “on the basis of their names, appearance, speech, and testimony that they did not grow up on the [particular] Pueblo.” United States v. Romero, 136 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir.1998). And a jury may not find Indian heritage even if a person is a member of a particular tribe or pueblo; a showing of some “Indian blood” must also be shown. Prentiss, 273 F.3d at 1283. Evidence a person has an Indian tribal certificate that includes the degree of Indian blood, or membership in a tribe that will not accept members without a certain degree of consanguinity, however, has been held to satisfy the Prentiss test. United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d at 456 (Tribal enrollment certificates that specified the degree of consanguinity combined with cancelled tribal dividend payment checks were “ample evidence to support the jury's finding that appellants ... were Indians.”); United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir.1976) (government introduced “certificate of the Tribal Enrollment Officer of the Eastern band of Cherokee Indians that defendant is on Revised Roll No. 3902, was born May 8, 1943, and possesses three-fourths degree of Eastern Cherokee blood. That was adequate proof that defendant was a Cherokee Indian.”).
*3 Here, the government presented sufficient evidence of the victim's non-Indian status. First, the victim's father, a teacher, testified that during college he had researched his family genealogy and that of his wife, the victim's mother, going back several hundred years. That research disclosed his and his wife's family heritage as “Hispanic Jews” or “Sephardic Jews” and that neither he nor his wife had any Native American or Indian background. The victim's father also testified that his son was never enrolled in any tribe or pueblo and had not associated himself with any tribe or pueblo other than his job at a casino. Diaz presented no rebuttal evidence, and the government did not offer any blood or DNA tests.
We conclude this testimony was sufficient to establish the victim's lack of Indian status. While additional evidence from DNA testing might have been helpful, its absence does not undercut the testimony of the victim's father going back generations. Nor does the government have a duty—as Diaz contends—to bring forth tribal officials to disprove the victim was a member of their tribes. This is hardly realistic given the many tribes in New Mexico, and we are satisfied the father's testimony shows he was not a member of a tribe. In any event, tribal membership in some tribes is possible for individuals who are not Indians. Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 . Even if Espinoza were a member of a tribe or pueblo, this would not make him an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction unless he had Indian ancestors. Prentiss, 273 F.3d at 1283 .
B. Jury Instructions Second, Diaz contends the district court erred in instructing the jury on the knowledge requirement of the statute.
A. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall then immediately return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 66–7–203 NMSA 1978. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
*4 B. Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements of Section 66–7–203 NMSA 1978 where the accident results in great bodily harm or death is guilty of a fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31–18–15 NMSA 1978 .
C. Any person who knowingly fails to stop or to comply with the requirements of Section 66–7–203 NMSA 1978 where the accident results in great bodily harm or death is guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31–18–15 NMSA 1978 .
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66–7–201 .
In the jury instruction, the district court instructed the jury that Section B was a lesser included offense to Section C. When instructing the jury, the court defined the Section C offense as “knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in great bodily harm or death.” And, “[t]o find the defendant guilty of this crime you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt ... that the defendant knew that the accident resulted in great bodily harm or death of a person.” App. V. I at 88.
We disagree. First, the district court in fact rejected the government's position that Section B was a strict liability offense. Instead, the court instructed the jury that the Section requires a driver to know an accident occurred. And, although New Mexico courts have yet to address the knowledge required for a violation of Section B of this statute, they have upheld convictions in circumstances similar to those here. For example, in State v. Cumpton, 1 P.3d 429 (N.M.Ct.App.2000), the court upheld a conviction where the defendant challenged the knowledge requirement for Section B.
*5 In another case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to Section B because it does not contain a mens rea requirement. New Mexico v. Munoz, No. 28,327, 2009 WL 6667451 (N.M.App. Nov. 12, 2009) . In acknowledging Section B as a lesser included offense, the court found “[t]here is no confusion as to what Defendant should have done once he had hit something: he should have returned to the scene of the accident to ensure that there was no person there in need of aid.” Id. at *2.
C. Pre–Trial Evidentiary Rulings Prior to trial, the district court considered two motions in limine. In the first motion, Diaz sought to exclude testimony about her alcohol consumption in the hours before the accident. In the other motion, the government sought to exclude evidence that the victim had been drinking prior to walking on the roadside where he was hit. The district court allowed the evidence about Diaz's drinking under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) , concluding it tended to show why she might have left the scene of the accident rather than stop and render aid. The court denied evidence of the victim's drinking on relevancy grounds. We see no error by the district court.
United States v. Morris, 287 F.3d 985, 990 (10th Cir.2002) . Evidence is proper if it tends to prove, among other things, motive, knowledge, or intent. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(2) . “[E]xclusion of evidence under Rule 403 that is otherwise admissible under the other rules is an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly.” United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). “Admission of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Morris, 287 F.3d 985, 989–90 (10th Cir.2002) .
*6 As to evidence of the victim's intoxication, Diaz claims it was necessary to give the jury the proper context for the accident by showing why the victim would be walking on the highway at such a late hour. We agree with the court's conclusion as to relevance. Under the statute, the driver of a vehicle has a duty to stop and assist; the mental state of the victim or the reasons he was on the roadway do not relieve the driver's duty. Nor was his drinking intertwined with the elements of the crime such that its admission was necessary for the jury to determine guilt or innocense.
D. Comments on the Evidence Diaz next argues that the district court made inappropriate and prejudicial comments about the evidence in front of the jury. The comments stemmed from her attempts to elicit testimony showing where the victim was walking on the roadway and what the victim was wearing at the time of the accident. The court, in restricting additional testimony on the topics, commented that it could not “see the relevance of” this testimony and that it was “far afield from the issues in the case.” Supp.App. V. IV at 549. And when her attorney cross-examined a government witness about the design and safety of the road the judge interrupted to say “I'm having trouble understanding the relevance of whether or not that was a designated traffic lane or not.” When the lawyer continued with the cross examination, the judge repeated “I still can't see the relevance of that.” Id. Diaz claims the testimony helped explain that she did not realize she had struck a person and that the judge's remarks influenced the jury against her theory of the case.
The parties dispute the proper standard of review. But whether the standard is abuse of discretion or plain error review, we see no error. The district court has discretion “to comment reasonably upon the evidence, being careful not to become an advocate for any of the parties.” United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 203 (10th Cir.1980) . While the court's comments may have expressed some skepticism of this line of defense, Diaz adequately developed her theory at trial and argued it in closing. The court's comments in light of the entire record did not deprive Diaz of a fair trial or abuse the court's discretion.
*7 Given this extensive record, the district court's comments did not prejudice Diaz's right to a fair trial.
E. Undisclosed Impeachment Evidence
Finally, Diaz contends the government failed to disclose impeachment evidence about a witness. The witness, a Santa Fe Sheriff's officer, had been part of a SWAT team in the mid–1990's whose encounter with Diaz's cousin led to the death of a police officer. The cousin was later acquitted on a self-defense theory. He sued the SWAT team, and the lawsuit settled. Diaz claims the witness, who testified as the government's accident reconstruction expert, may have known that she was the cousin of the shooter and harbored bias against her as a result of the incident. Because the government did not disclose the SWAT team incident prior to trial, she claims it withheld impeachment evidence that undermined her defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) , and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) .
In applying Brady, we require “the prosecution to disclose all evidence that favors the defendant and is material either to guilt or to punishment.” United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 981 (10th Cir.2008) . To establish a Brady violation the “defendant must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) the evidence was material.” Id. For the evidence to be material, there must be a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Smith v. Cain, 132 S.Ct. 627, 630 (2012) . “The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) . And finally, although, “[i]mpeachment evidence is considered exculpatory for Brady purposes,” United States v. Torres, 569 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir.2009) , “evidence impeaching [a witness] may not be material if the State's other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith, 132 S.Ct. at 630 .
Diaz claims the undisclosed evidence was both favorable and material because the officer's trial testimony was important in establishing whether the victim was walking in an unsafe location and whether the car damage was consistent with striking a human. Even assuming favorability (and that is doubtful here), Diaz cannot show materiality—that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
*8 The district court correctly noted that the officer's testimony was of limited probative value. Diaz did not contest that her car was involved in an accident, and the officer did not testify about whether Diaz knew she had hit someone. Moreover, substantial evidence established that Diaz knew she hit a person, including her statements to her sister, niece, and son; her nervous demeanor and state of mind after the accident; and her failure to explain her actions immediately after the accident. Given this evidence, the district court did not err in concluding the undisclosed evidence was not material under Brady.
As to the officer's testimony about the victim's unsafe walking, the district court found it of no relevance, since a pedestrian's negligence does not obviate the obligation to stop and render aid. In any event, as the government points out, the officer provided some useful testimony to the defense. He testified that at the 45 miles per hour speed limit, the victim's body would have been visible against her windshield for “less than 1/10th of a second ... less than the blink of an eye.” Supp.App. V. IV at 542–43. This testimony tended to bolster Diaz's defense that she was not confident she had hit a person.
C.A.10 (N.M.),2012.
--- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 1592967 (C.A.10 (N.M.))