Source: http://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/f15334.htm
Timestamp: 2014-07-31 15:32:22
Document Index: 767533461

Matched Legal Cases: ['§87', '§87', '§89', '§89', '§86', '§87', '§87']

FOIL-AO-15334
I have received your correspondence and apologize for the delay in response. You have raised several issues, and I will attempt to address them.
Perhaps the primary issue involves public access to "assessment data and tax information on someone else’s property to be used in a comparable arguement" [sic]. A member of the Broadalbin Planning Board appears to believe that records of that nature are personal and may be withheld. I disagree with his contention and point out, since he referred to the federal Freedom of Information Act, that that statute applies only to records of federal agencies; it does not apply to entities of state or local government.
More pertinent is the New York Freedom of Information Law. As a general matter, that statute is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. Further, when records are accessible under the Freedom of Information Law, it has been held that they should be made equally available to any person, regardless of one's status, interest or the intended use of the records [see Burke v. Yudelson, 368 NYS 2d 779, aff'd 51 AD 2d 673, 378 NYS 2d 165 (1976)]. As, the Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, has held that:
Farbman pertained to a situation in which a person involved in litigation against an agency requested records from that agency under the Freedom of Information Law. In brief, it was found that one's status as a litigant had no effect upon that person's right as a member of the public when using the Freedom of Information Law, irrespective of the intended use of the records. Similarly, unless there is a basis for withholding records in accordance with the grounds for denial appearing in §87(2), the use of the records, including the potential for commercial use or fund-raising, is in my opinion irrelevant; when records are accessible, once they are disclosed, the recipient may do with the records as he or she sees fit.
The only aspect of the Freedom of Information Law that involves the ability to deny access based on the intended use of the records, 89(2)(b)(iii), represents what might be viewed as an internal conflict in the law. As indicated above, the status of an applicant or the purposes for which a request is made are irrelevant to rights of access, and an agency cannot inquire as to the intended use of records. The cited provision states that an agency may withhold records when disclosure would constitute an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy", and that an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy includes the "sale or release of lists of names and addresses if such lists would be used for commercial or fund-raising purposes." Due to the language of §89(2)(b)(iii), rights of access to a list of names and addresses, or equivalent records, may be contingent upon the purpose for which a request is made [see Scott, Sardano & Pomeranz v. Records Access Officer of Syracuse, 65 NY 2d 294, 491 NYS 2d 289 (1985); Federation of New York State Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. New York City Police Dept., 73 NY 2d 92 (1989); Goodstein v. Shaw, 463 NYS 2d 162 (1983)]. However, for reasons to be considered in detail, §89(2)(b)(iii) is, according to judicial decisions, inapplicable with respect to a request for an assessment roll.
Long before the enactment of the Freedom of Information Law, it was established by the courts that records pertaining to the assessment of real property are generally available [see e.g., Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Hoyt, 107 NYS 2d 756 (1951); Sanchez v. Papontas, 32 AD 2d 948 (1969), including assessment rolls. Moreover, even though the Freedom of Information Law authorizes an agency to withhold a list of names and addresses if the list is requested for commercial or fund-raising purposes, in a decision rendered more than twenty years ago, it was held that assessment rolls are accessible even though the request was made for a commercial purpose.
Section 89(6) of the Freedom of Information Law provides that records available under a different provision of law remain available, notwithstanding the grounds for denial of access appearing in the Freedom of Information Law. In Szikszay v. Buelow [436 NYS 2d 558 (1981)],the court found that assessment rolls or equivalent records are public records and were public before the enactment of the Freedom of Information Law. Specifically, it was found that:
"An assessment roll is a public record (Real Property Tax Law [section] 516 subd. 2; General Municipal Law [section] 51; County Law [section] 208 subd. 4). It must contain the name and mailing or billing address of the owner of the parcel (Real Property Tax Law [sections] 502, 504, 9 NYCRR [section] 190-1(6)(1)). Such records are open to public inspection and copying except as otherwise provided by law (General Municipal Law [section] 51; County Law [section] 208 subd. 4). Even prior to the enactment of the Freedom of Information Law, and under its predecessor, Public Officers Law [section] 66, repealed L.1974, c. 578, assessment rolls and related records were treated as public records, open to public inspection and copying (Sanchez v. Papontas, 32 A.D.2d 948, 303 N.Y.S.2d 711, Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Hoyt, 202 Misc. 43, 107 N.Y.S.2d 756; Ops. State Comptroller 1967, p. 596)" (id. at 562, 563).
In consideration of the issue of privacy and citing the provision dealing with lists of names and addresses, it was held that:
"The Freedom of Information Law limits access to records where disclosure would constitute 'an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' (Public Officers Law [section] 87 subd. 2(b), [section] 89 subd. 2(b)iii). In view of the history of public access to assessment records, and the continued availability of such records to public inspection, whatever invasion of privacy may result by providing copies of A.R.L.M. computer tapes to petitioner would appear to be permissible rather than 'unwarranted' (cf. Advisory Opns. of Committee on Public Access to Records, June 12, 1979, FOIL-AO-1164). In addition, considering the legislative purpose behind the Freedom of Information Law, it would be anomalous to permit the statute to be used as a shield by government to prevent disclosure. In this regard, Public Officers Law [section] 89 subd. 5 specifically provides: 'Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit or abridge any otherwise available right of access at law or in equity of any party to records.'" [id. at 563; now section 89(6)].
"...the records in question can be viewed by any person and presumably copies of portions obtained, simply by walking into the appropriate county, city, or town office. It appears that petitioner could obtain the information he seeks if he wanted to spend the time to go through the records manually and copy the necessary information. Therefore, the balancing of interests, otherwise required, between the right of individual privacy on the one hand and the public interest in dissemination of information on the other...need not be undertaken...
"Assessment records are public information pursuant to other provisions of law and have been for sometime. The form of the records and petitioner' s purpose in seeking them do not alter their public character or petitioner's concomitant right to inspect and copy" (id.).
Based upon the foregoing, I believe that an assessment roll or its equivalent must be disclosed, irrespective of the intended use of that record. I point out that the same conclusion was reached by Supreme Court in Nassau County in an unreported decision [Real Estate Data, Inc. v. County of Nassau, Supreme Court, Nassau County, September 18, 1981].
Second, you asked whether a tape recording or notes of an executive are "FOILABLE". While I believe that those materials fall within the coverage of the Freedom of Information Law, their content and the effects of their disclosure are the primary factors in considering the extent to which they must be disclosed. As you may be aware, §86(4) of the Freedom of Information Law defines the term "record" to mean:
Based on the foregoing, I believe that a tape recording or notes of an executive session constitute "records" that fall within the coverage of the Freedom of Information Law. However, depending on their content, several of the grounds for denial might be applicable. Disclosure of portions of the records might, if disclosed, result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; if a matter involves collective bargaining or the purchase of goods or services, disclosure might "impair present or imminent contract awards or collective bargaining negotiations [see §87(2)(c)]; opinions, advice, suggestions, recommendations and the like , as well as notes to oneself, would constitute intra-agency materials that may be withheld [see §87(2)(g)]. In short, while those materials constitute "records", there are likely grounds for withholding substantial elements of them.
Next, you asked whether records maintained by a contractor retained by the Town fall within the scope of the Freedom of Information Law. In this regard, based on the definition of the term "record", documents need not be in the physical possession of an agency to constitute agency records; so long as they are produced, kept or filed for an agency, the courts have held they constitute "agency records", even if they are maintained apart from an agency’s premises..
For instance, it has been found that records maintained by an attorney retained by an industrial development agency were subject to the Freedom of Information Law, even though an agency did not possess the records and the attorney’s fees were paid by applicants before the agency. The Court determined that the fees were generated in his capacity as counsel to the agency, that the agency was his client, that "he comes under the authority of the Industrial Development Agency" and that, therefore, records of payment in his possession were subject to rights of access conferred by the Freedom of Information Law (see C.B. Smith v. County of Rensselaer, Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, May 13, 1993).
Additionally, in a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, it was found that materials received by a corporation providing services for a branch of the State University that were kept on behalf of the University constituted "records" falling with the coverage of the Freedom of Information Law. I point out that the Court rejected "SUNY's contention that disclosure turns on whether the requested information is in the physical possession of the agency", for such a view "ignores the plain language of the FOIL definition of 'records' as information kept or held 'by, with or for an agency'" [see Encore College Bookstores, Inc. v. Auxiliary Services Corporation of the State University of New York at Farmingdale, 87 NY 2d 410. 417 (1995)].
In sum, insofar records are maintained for the Town, I believe that the Town would be required to direct the custodian of the records to disclose them in accordance with the Freedom of Information Law, or obtain them in order to disclose them to you to the extent required by law.