Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19730405_0040334.C02.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-06-20 13:14:44
Document Index: 742783716

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 77', '§ 77', '§ 1341', '§ 371', '§ 2510', '§ 2510']

Appellant Arthur Tortorello appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict returned November 12, 1971 after a ten day trial before Milton Pollack, District Judge, in the Southern District of New York finding Tortorello guilty on two counts of sale of unregistered securities, in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) and (2) (1970); on two counts of violation of the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (a) (1970); on one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970); and on one count of conspiracy to sell unregistered securities, to violate the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and to violate the mail fraud statute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).*fn1
The chief issue on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in denying after a post-verdict hearing, 342 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y.1972), Tortorello's motion to suppress certain evidence obtained by electronic surveillance pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1970). Other subordinate claims of error are raised by Tortorello.
There was a great deal of evidence adduced at the ten day trial which established Tortorello's role in the fraudulent scheme. The evidence of course must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government at this stage of the case. United States v. D'Avanzo, 443 F.2d 1224, 1225 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850, 30 L. Ed. 2d 89, 92 S. Ct. 86 (1971). With the exception of his claim regarding an asserted defense of good faith, Tortorello does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
A substantial portion of the evidence against Tortorello at the trial of the instant case in the district court resulted from this eavesdropping and wiretapping.*fn2 Tortorello moved to suppress such evidence, claiming that the orders were improperly applied for, granted, renewed, and executed. After a post-verdict hearing, Judge Pollack filed a detailed, well reasoned opinion on May 18, 1972 denying the motion. United States v. Tortorello, 342 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y.1972).
Tortorello contends that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1970) (the Act), is unconstitutional on its face.
Those portions of Title III which are germane to this appeal may be briefly summarized. The Act defines the circumstances under which interception of wire or oral communications*fn3 may be authorized by a state. Section 2516(2) provides that, upon application by the "principal prosecuting attorney" of a state or a political subdivision thereof, a state judge "may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute" an order authorizing interception of wire or oral communications to obtain evidence of certain enumerated offenses.*fn4 Section 2516(2) requires that a state statute authorizing the interception by law enforcement officers of wire or oral communications must contain certain minimal safeguards, in conformity with Section 2518, against intrusion upon rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.
We nevertheless conclude that Tortorello has been directly affected by Title III. Were it not for the Act, the evidence uncovered by the state's electronic surveillance would not have been admissible in the instant federal action. This would have been so because of the Supreme Court's decision in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 2 L. Ed. 2d 126, 78 S. Ct. 155 (1957). Benanti involved Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act which prohibited the interception and use of wire communications without prior authorization from the sender. The Court held that wiretap evidence obtained by state officers under sanction of state law, but in violation of Section 605, could not be used in a federal court. See Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 97 L. Ed. 231, 73 S. Ct. 232 (1952). Since the evidence here was intercepted by state officers, with some participation by federal officers, it could not have been used in the district court below without the authorization provided by Title III. See Section 2517(1) and (3). We hold that Tortorello has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act.*fn5
The crux of Tortorello's argument challenging the constitutionality of the Act is that the procedures provided by Section 2518 for obtaining a wiretap or eavesdrop order suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as those provided for in the former New York electronic surveillance statute which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040, 87 S. Ct. 1873 (1967). Tortorello also relies on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), where another electronic surveillance was held to violate the Fourth Amendment. Berger and Katz did not hold, however, that all electronic surveillance is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. They merely held that the wiretaps and eavesdrops involved in those cases were infected with certain faults which rendered them unconstitutional.
(2) The statute failed to require that a description provided of the particular conversations or communications to be intercepted.
The Act represents an attempt by Congress to establish a limited system of electronic surveillance within the guidelines of Berger and Katz. Section 2518 obviously was drafted with these decisions in mind. We are satisfied that the Act does comply with the guidelines established by the Court in Berger and Katz. An examination of the relevant sections of the Act shows that they provide for particularity in the application and order, judicial supervision, and ...