Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/397-f-3d-103-594928734
Timestamp: 2020-06-02 12:39:10
Document Index: 246560828

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 120', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 924', '§ 211', '§ 1', '§ 3553', '§ 5']

397 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2005), 03-1675, United States v. Crosby - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 594928734
397 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2005), 03-1675, United States v. Crosby
Docket Nº: 03-1675.
Party Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jerome CROSBY, Defendant-Appellant.
Case Date: February 02, 2005
397 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2005)
Jerome CROSBY, Defendant-Appellant.
Argued: Jan. 14, 2005
This appeal of a sentence imposed in a federal criminal case requires us to begin the process of implementing the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, --- U.S. ----, 125 S.Ct. 738, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2005) (" Booker/Fanfan "). 1 Defendant-Appellant Jerome Crosby appeals from the October 23, 2003, judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., Chief Judge), sentencing him to imprisonment for ten years after he pled guilty to a firearms violation. We conclude that the District Court should have the opportunity to consider whether to resentence, and we therefore remand for that purpose.
The District Court accepted the Defendant's guilty plea. During the plea colloquy, the Defendant did not dispute that on March 9, 2002, he possessed a firearm. In entering his guilty plea, the Defendant purported to reserve the right to appeal "the determination concerning his Florida convictions." 2
The District Court then conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes concerning enhancements required by the federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). At sentencing, Chief Judge Scullin applied the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The Judge started with a base offense level of 24, applicable to a defendant who has violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) after conviction of at least two felonies involving a crime of violence. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) (2). The Judge then made three enhancements based on judicial fact-finding. First, the Judge added four levels for using the possessed firearm in connection with another felony. See id. § 2K2.1(b) (5). The Judge deemed pointing the loaded shotgun at the pursuing police officer to be the New York felony of first degree reckless endangerment. See N.Y. Penal L. § 120.25 (McKinney 2004). Next, the Judge added three levels for creating a substantial risk of injury to a law enforcement officer. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b) (1). Finally, the Judge added two levels for obstruction of justice, finding the Defendant's testimony at the pretrial hearing to have been materially false. See id. § 3C1.1. The resulting adjusted offense level of 33, in Criminal History Category IV, yielded a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months. See id. Ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
Recognizing that the Guidelines required imposition of as much of the Guidelines sentence as the statutory maximum permitted, see id. § 5G1.1(a); 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (2), the District Judge sentenced Crosby to imprisonment for ten years, followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100.
The principal issue on appeal concerns the lawfulness of the sentence. 3 At oral argument just two days after the Supreme Court's decision in Booker/Fanfan, Crosby contended that the enhancements, which were based on the District Judge's fact-finding and which the District Judge felt compelled to add under the Guidelines, violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
In considering this issue, we are mindful that this will be the first sentencing appeal decided by our Court since the decision in Booker/Fanfan. As such, it will likely be of special interest to the district judges of this Circuit as they confront a host of new issues. It would be entirely inappropriate for us even to try to anticipate all of those issues, much less resolve them. Nevertheless, we believe that in the aftermath of a momentous decision like Booker/Fanfan, which will affect a large number of cases confronting the district judges of this Circuit
almost daily, it is appropriate for us to explain the larger framework within which we decide this appeal. We do so in the hope that our explanation will be helpful to bench and bar alike. In formulating our thoughts on these matters, the members of this panel have greatly benefitted from numerous suggestions and comments by other judges of this Court.
Since November 1, 1987, sentences in federal criminal cases have been determined pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"), Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, §§ 211-238, 98 Stat.1987 (1984), and the Guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing Commission, see U.S.S.G. §§ 1A1.1-8F1.1. As it stood prior to the decision in Booker/Fanfan, the SRA specified several requirements for selecting an appropriate sentence. Especially pertinent to the pending appeal are sections 3553(a) and 3553(b), 4 set out in the margin. 5 Section 3553(a) specifies several factors that sentencing judges are required to consider in determining a sentence.
Among these factors are the applicable provisions of the Guidelines. See Subsection 3553(a) (4). Subsection 3553(b) (1), with an exception not pertinent to this appeal, generally requires the sentencing judge to impose a sentence within the range resulting from application of the Guidelines to the specific facts of the defendant's offense conduct (not limited to the precise offense of conviction) and the defendant's criminal record. This subsection also permits the sentencing judge to select a sentence above or below the applicable Guidelines range, but only on the basis of circumstances "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, cmt. background. A sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range, selected in conformity with the statutory and Guidelines standards for varying from the applicable range, is known as a "departure."
Booker/Fanfan was the culmination of a series of decisions explicating the requirements of the Sixth Amendment in the context of sentencing. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, --- U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). In the Substantive Opinion, the Court ruled that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Substantive
Opinion at 20. 6 This ruling, the Court explained, was required for "enforcement of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in today's world." Id. at 11. As the Court explained, the...