Source: http://or.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140415_0000395.DOR.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-05-01 06:20:43
Document Index: 504092881

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 423', '§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404']

SARAH JANE STEWART, Plaintiff,v.CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, [1] Defendant
For Plaintiff: KATHRYN TASSINARI, ROBERT A. BARON, Harder Wells Baron & Manning, PC, Eugene, OR.
For Defendant: S. AMANDA MARSHALL, United States Attorney, ADRIAN L. BROWN, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, OR; DAVID MORADO, Regional Chief Counsel, HEATHER L. GRIFFITH, Special Assistant United States Attorneys, Social Security Administration, Seattle, WA.
Plaintiff Sarah Jane Stewart seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments under Title XVI.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Following a thorough review of the record, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the calculation and award of benefits.
Plaintiff filed her applications for DIB and SSI on July 7, 2009. Tr. 11. The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on October 28, 2011. Tr. 11. At the hearing Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. Tr. 11. Plaintiff and a Vocational Expert (VE) testified at the hearing. Tr. 11.
The ALJ issued a decision on January 26, 2012, in which he found Plaintiff was Page 1211
not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled to benefits. Tr. 21. That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on January 2, 2013, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Tr. 2.
Plaintiff was born on May 5, 1982, and was 29 years old at the time of the hearing. Tr. 158. Plaintiff has an eleventh-grade education. Tr. 95-96. She has past work experience as a caregiver. Tr. 204.
Plaintiff alleges she has been disabled since November 9, 2008, due to a chronic-pain disorder, fear of people and crowds, long-term depression, back and neck pain, panic disorder, and a learning disability. Tr. 203.
Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ's summary of the medical evidence. See Tr. 13-21.
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her inability " to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Breves v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is " relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11 (quoting Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)). It is more than a " mere scintilla" of evidence but less than a preponderance. Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d at 690).
The Commissioner has developed a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Keyser v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920. Page 1212
Each step is potentially dispositive.
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. d 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner determines the claimant does not have any medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner determines the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. &sect; &sect; 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. The criteria for the listed impairments, ...