Source: https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2012/06/
Timestamp: 2017-04-23 05:32:10
Document Index: 187198460

Matched Legal Cases: ['§7501', '§9', '§18', '§18', '§18', '§18', '§9', '§18', '§ 3020', '§3020', '§3813', '§80', '§ 22', '§44', '§1711', '§3012', '§296', '§3813', '§3813', '§ 3813', '§3020', '§ 3020', '§7511', '§3020', '§7511', '§3020', '§1266']

New York Public Personnel Law: June 2012
Type in a key word or two concerning the subject or issue in which you are interested in the box at the upper left and tap enter to access any relevant material posted. Saturday, June 30, 2012
Of particular interest to those involved in law enforcement The following information has been received from AELE. AELE describes itself as "an extraordinary and unique resource, with free
publications and online back issues since 2000." AELE has a searchable library
of more than 32,000 case digests organized into 700 + indexed topics. There are
no advertisements, tracking “cookies” or popups on its website. Users do not
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AELE’s July 2012 case notes and publications alert 1. ECWs: Few police or correctional officers will use their firearm
against an aggressor. Many will use an ECW in a dart or stun mode. That is why
officers need to know the law of their Federal Circuit before an incident
occurs, not after a lawsuit is filed. Training officers need to keep current on
case law, and to modify an agency's ECW policy and in-service training, as
In May, AELE created a single webpage where ECW
cases are summarized. Since then, the site has expanded by a third, and now
summarizes more than 200 cases. If printed on paper, the summaries are now 40
pages long, and are growing. Almost all cases cited have a link to the full
decision. More than 10,000 of your colleagues have visited the webpage since May.
On June 27th we added
a cautionary flag for 84 case summaries (about 42% of the total).
summaries now begin with the word RESTRICTIVE -- because a court has
determined, a jury has found, or a settlement has indicated, that the quantum
of force used either was, or may have been, unreasonable. View here.
2. ECW Resources: AELE also began a webpage where ECW articles, deployment
policies, IACP conference materials and other ECW resources can be found. There
are links more than 80 documents and informational sites. View here.
3. Monthly Law Journal: The
June article on weapon confusion has been updated with additional cases and the
article was repaginated. An appellate court unceremoniously rejected an appeal
by the BART officer who fired his Glock in mistake. View here.
4. Two New Monthly Law Journal articles.
• Teaching 4th Amendment Based Use-of-Force
Author and trainer James Marker explains a state
law enforcement academy's decision to avoid teaching a force continuum and to
concentrate on standards announced in Supreme Court opinions. View here.
• Video and Audio Taping Police Activity AELE introduced this topic in a May, 2009
article in the Monthly Law Journal. Much has happened since then. In addition
to significant decisions in Illinois, Maryland and Massachusetts, the U.S.
Justice Dept. has weighed in, with six policy recommendations. View at here.
Persons interested in contributing an article
should contact AELE.
5. The July 2012 issues of AELE’s three
periodicals have been uploaded.
The current issues, back issues since 2000,
three 37-year case digests, and a search engine are FREE. Everyone is welcome
to read, print or download AELE publications without charge. SOS: Share Our
Stuff! The main menu is at: http://www.aele.org/law
Among the new cases are several that warrant
• Electronic Control Weapons - Dart Mode
A Taser was used in dart mode to restrain an
intoxicated man who was perceived as attempting to break away from an officer
after resisting an attempt to handcuff him. The man had a medical condition
which caused his arm to suffer involuntary tremors.
The trial court found that the suspect's alleged
crimes were two relatively minor misdemeanors, that he did not pose a threat to
the officers, and that he did not struggle with the officers, resist arrest, or
try to escape, so that the use of the Taser was objectively unreasonable if the
facts were as the plaintiff alleged. The officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity. Shekleton v. Eichenberger, #11-2108, 2012
U.S. App. Lexis 9041 (8th Cir.). *** Fire, Police & Corrections
Personnel Reporter ***
• Injuries to Trainees
A fire department "live burn" training
exercise got out of hand. A recruit participating in the exercise became
trapped on the third floor of the three-story vacant building being burnt, and
died from her injuries. Her surviving family filed a federal civil rights
lawsuit claiming that the city had acted with deliberate indifference to the
decedent's safety, in violation of substantive due process.
Such a claim could not be pursued in the absence
of any evidence that the department actually intended to inflict harm on the
participating recruits, for which there was no evidence. Slaughter v. Baltimore, #10-2436, 2012 U.S.
App. Lexis 11482 (4th Cir.).
An insulin-dependent diabetic prisoner was hired
to work in a public works program off the prison premises. After he experienced
an incident in which he became ill from low blood sugar, he was removed from
the program. He sued, claiming that the true reason for his termination was his
gay sexual orientation. He claimed that officers supervising the work crews
treated him differently than other heterosexual insulin-dependent diabetic
inmates working on the project, taunting and harassing him.
The prisoner adequately stated a claim of
class-based discrimination based on sexual orientation, so that the dismissal
of his lawsuit was improper. His claim was not a "class-of-one" equal
protection claim barred in the context of public employment by Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture,
#07-474, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008).Davis v. Prison Health Services, #10-2690,
2012 U.S. App. Lexis 9548, 2012 Fed. App. 131P (6th Cir.).
6. Selected criminal law and procedure
cases are at two other free websites.
http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/the-informer/informer-editions-2012/
http://www.kenwallentine.com/Xiphos.html
AELE has a free
search tool covering our
database of more than 32,000 case summaries, since 1975.
We also have three menus of the more than 32,000
case summaries, divided into 700 + topics.
1. Law enforcement civil liability at http://www.aele.org/law/Digests/civilmenu.html
2. Employment law and discipline at http://www.aele.org/law/Digests/emplmenu.html
3. Jail and prisoner legal issues at http://www.aele.org/law/Digests/jailmenu.html
View or print our guide: How to
Navigate AELE’s Online Law Libraries.
All relevant medical records must be considered in making a determination
regarding an application for accidental disability retirement benefits
Baird v New York State & Local Retirement Sys., 2012 NY
Slip Op 05053, Appellate Division, Third Department
Darlene A. Baird was employed by the Westchester County Department of Social Services. She was
injured in the course of performing a physical test during an interview for
another position with the Department. Although Baird returned to work, she left after three days
due to pain in her right shoulder and arm. When she subsequently applied for accidental
disability retirement benefits, her application was denied based on the Retirement System's expert finding that she
was not permanently incapacitated from the performance of her job duties. The Comptroller
sustained the hearing officer’s determination and Baird appealed. The Appellate Division said that the Retirement System's determination
relies primarily upon the report of its physician, Dr. Charles Ricciardelli. Based
on his examination of Baird, Dr. Ricciardelli concluded that although she had pain
in her right upper arm caused by the accident, she was "exaggerating the pain,
and had only a mild, partial disability."
However, said the court, the record includes the report of
an MRI of Baird's right shoulder taken after Dr. Ricciardelli examined her
indicated that Baird had a biceps tendon tear. As the record did not indicate
that Dr. Ricciardelli was given the chance to review the right shoulder MRI
report; nor did the Retirement System call him to testify, “there is no basis
for concluding that his opinion would have remained unchanged in light of the
new information contained [in the MRI report]. Although the Comptroller is vested with authority to
evaluate conflicting medical opinions and credit the opinion of one expert over
that of another, the Appellate Division said that the medical proof relied upon
“must articulate a rational, fact-based opinion based upon a physical
examination and review of all the relevant medical records.”
Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that as Dr.Ricciardelli
had not been given the opportunity to clarify his opinion based upon a review
of all the relevant medical records, the Comptroller's determination was not supported by
substantial evidence and must be annulled and remitted for further proceedings.
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05053.htm
Municipality may have voluntarily assumed a special duty
to an injured employee based on "justifiable reliance" Morgan-Word v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2012 NY Slip Op
05151, Appellate Division, Second Department
Assistant Principal Rolanda Morgan-Word alleged that she was injured while
attempting to break up a fight between two students at a school. Supreme Court denied
the New York City Department of Education’s motion for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint and the Department appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling,
explaining that although a municipality "is immune from negligence claims
arising out of the performance of its governmental functions unless the injured
person establishes a special relationship with the municipality which would
create a special duty of protection with respect to that individual," a special relationship may be formed "when a
municipality voluntarily assumes a special duty that generates justifiable
reliance by the person who benefits from the duty."
In order to demonstrate such a special duty, a plaintiff
must show: "(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or
actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured,
(2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead
to harm, (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and
the injured party, and (4) the injured party's justifiable reliance on the
municipality's affirmative undertaking."
In this instance, said the court, the Department failed to
establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, because it "failed to eliminate triable issues of fact" as to whether it assumed a
special duty with respect to Morgan-Word.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court
properly denied its motion for summary judgment.
Broad arbitration clause
precludes judicial interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement where “public
policy” is not at issue
City of Utica v Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union
182, 21 Misc 3d 1109(A), Affirmed
by the Appellate Division, 41 AD3d 1232
The Teamsters filed a contract grievance alleging that a member of the
collective bargaining unit had been terminated by the City “without just cause”
and in violations of the “progressive discipline” procedures set out in the
relevant collective bargaining agreement. When Utica rejected its demand for
arbitration, the Teamsters sued seeking a court order compelling arbitration;
the City resisted, contending that the employee in question was “on probation”
and thus an “employee-at-will.” Justice Hester said that a “Court's analysis in
this matter is governed by …. §7501 [of the CPLR which] provides that
"[i]n determining any matter arising under this article, the court shall
not consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is
tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute."
Accordingly, a court's role in reviewing applications to stay arbitration is a
limited one and it is not the Court's role to interpret substantive provisions
of the contract or to pass on the merits of the dispute.
In this matter neither party contended that submitting the issue to arbitration
implicates a “public policy” issue. Accordingly, the question as to whether
arbitration was authorized because “the parties did agree by the terms of their
particular arbitration clause to refer their differences in this specific area
Noting that there was a “broad arbitration clause” set out in the collective
bargaining agreement, Justice Hester concluded that each of the objection
raised by the parties such as the City’s claim that this particular grievance
is not arbitrable and the Teamsters’ claim that Utica violated “past practice”
was a contract interpretation and thus issues for the arbitrator to resolve.
In addition, Justice Hester pointed out that the City’s claim that the
grievance was untimely filed was also an issue involving contract
interpretation and thus ripe for an arbitrator to decide.
Indicating that “it is not the Court's duty to examine the scope of the
substantive provisions of the contract to determine whether this particular
grievance falls within the scope” of the collective bargaining agreement,
Justice Hester denied the City’s petition seeking a stay of the arbitration.
Failure to properly supervise juveniles in her care
Failure to properly supervise juveniles
OATH Index No. 728/12
A juvenile counselor responsible for supervising teenagers
incarcerated in a special support dorm lost track of a girl, leaving the teen
unattended for a half-hour, and failed to take a proper headcount of the girls
in her charge. Although the girl was not harmed, OATH Administrative Law
Judge Joan R. Salzman recommended an 18-day suspension, noting that keeping
count of the juveniles under her supervision was the most important duty of
employee’s job, and that she had previously made a similar mistake. The decision is posted on the Internet at: Admin. for Children’s Services v. Matos-Miranda
Supreme Court rules on the Patient Protection and Affordable
Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al., United States Supreme
Court, Docket #11-393
In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, [124 Stat. 119]. The Act’s purpose was to in­crease the
number of Americans covered by health in­surance and decrease the cost of
health care. While the Act’s 10 Titles run over 900 pages and contain
hundreds of provisions, the National Federation case concerned constitutional
challenges to two key provisions, usually referred to as the Individual Mandate
and the Medicaid Expansion.
ruling almost 200 pages in length,*
including dissents, the majority first indicated that it did not consider
whether the Act embodies sound policies, commenting that “That judgment is
entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders.” It characterized the question for it to address in this action as “Does Congress have the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged
provisions?”
Essentially the Act’s “Individual Mandate” requires most Americans to maintain “minimum
essential” health insurance coverage. It excludes some individuals, such as
prisoners and undocumented aliens from this mandate. While many individuals are expected to obtain the required insurance through their employer or under a government pro­gram
such as Medicaid or Medicare, individuals who are not exempt and who do not
receive health insurance through a third party are required to purchase
insurance from a private company.
in 2014, individuals required to purchase insurance from a private
company that fail to do so would make a “[s]hared responsibility payment” to the
Federal Government calculated as a
percentage of household income, subject to a floor based on a specified dollar
amount and a ceiling based on the aver­age annual premium the individual would otherwise have to pay for qualifying private health insurance.
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause to enact such legislation, the
court ruled: "The commerce power ... does not authorize the mandate.”
said the court, “Neither the Act nor any other law attaches negative legal
consequences to not buying health insur­ance, beyond requiring a payment to the
IRS.” Thus,
the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain in­dividuals pay a financial
penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a
tax. Be­cause the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not [the Supreme
Court’s role] to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”
* Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, and III–C, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, joined; an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which
Justices Breyer and Kagan, joined; and an opinion with respect to Parts III–A,
III–B, and III–D. Justice Ginsburg, filed an opinion concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which Justice
Sotomayor, joined, and in which Justices Breyer and Kagan, joined as to Parts
I, II, III, and IV. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito filed a
dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.
The Syllabus [prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader] and the Opinions of the Court are posted on the
Workers’ compensation benefits not available for injuries sustained by an individual in the course of an altercation unrelated to his or her employment
Workers’ compensation benefits not available for injuries
sustained by an individual in the course of an altercation unrelated to his or
her employment Belaska v New York State Dept. of Law, 2012 NY Slip Op 05046,
Ann M. Belaska challenged a Workers' Compensation Board,
ruling that her injury did not arise in course of her employment and denied her
claim for workers' compensation benefits. Belaska, a clerk employed by the Department of Law, sustained
injuries to her chest, neck and shoulder after she was involved in an
altercation with a fellow passenger on a shuttle bus ride from work to a
satellite parking lot.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s determination, explaining
that injuries stemming from an assault which arose in the course of employment
are presumed to have arisen out of the employment unless substantial evidence
is presented that the assault was motivated by purely personal animosity,
citing Matter of Rosen v First Manhattan Bank, 84 NY2d 856.
In this instance, said the court, Belaska testified that, at
the end of the bus ride to her car after work, a passenger tried to exit before
her and she told the passenger to wait for her because of her disabilities.
When that passenger became frustrated because Belaska was not getting off the
bus fast enough, a verbal altercation ensued which then became physical,
leading to Belaska’s injuries. Noting that Belaska had testified that she had never before
met the person who allegedly assaulted her, the Appellate Division held that substantial
evidence supports the Board's determination that the assault on Belaska arose
from personal hostilities unrelated to her employment.
The decisions is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05046.htm
ALJ recommends disciplinary charges be
dismissed base after finding the testimony of witnesses not credible
Two correction officers who broke up a fight between two
inmates were charged with beating and kicking both inmates. OATH Administrative
Law Judge John B. Spooner found that the testimony of the two inmates, who did
not report being assaulted by officers until a day later and who gave
contradictory accounts, was not credible. He recommended that the charges
against the officers be dismissed. The decision is posted on the Internet at: Dep’t of Correction v. Harris (in PDF)
to defend and indemnify an employee being sued triggered by allegations of
misconduct related to the performance of official duties
Dreyer v City of Saratoga Springs, 22 Misc 3d 1109(A)
The principal issue in Erin Dreyer’s suit against the City of Saratoga Springs
and its City Council is whether the City is required to provide or pay for
Dreyer’s defending herself in two Federal court actions in U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of New York, Moore v Dreyer and Curley, 05-CV-1060
and Cornick v City of Saratoga Springs, Curley and Dreyer, 06-CV-0138.
Dreyer served as the City’s Deputy Commissioner of Public Safety. The
relationship between Dreyer and Police Chief Edward Moore and Assistant Chief
James Cornick became strained and ultimately Moore and Cornick alleged that
certain of Dreyer's actions constituted criminal violations and misconduct by a
public official. This resulted in the New York State Police investigating
Dreyer's conduct. Later a Special Prosecutor was appointed and a Grand Jury was
convened to review Dreyer's conduct.
Although the Grand Jury returned a "no-bill", [it did not indict
Dreyer for any crime], it reported that she had committed several acts of
misconduct, performed negligently, and deliberately acted to create and foster
dissension in the police department. The report recommended that she be
disciplined or removed from office.
Subsequently Moore commenced a Federal court action to recover damages against
Dreyer and Curley in which he alleges that the two conspired under color of law
and state action to violate his constitutional rights through adverse employment
actions designed to create a hostile work environment and to force him to
resign, and further, that Dreyer, with Curley's approval, intentionally and
maliciously implemented a course of hostile and disparaging conduct,
disseminated, publicly and privately, defamatory information about him, and
illegally retaliated when he spoke out against their conduct.
The City Council decided that Curley's conduct, as alleged in Moore's
complaint, fell within the scope of his official duties as Commissioner of
Public Safety, and adopted a resolution to defend and indemnify Curley but
determined that Dreyer's acts, as alleged in Moore's complaint, were not within
the scope of her official duties as Deputy Commissioner of Public Safety and
refused to provide to her a defense and indemnification. It did the same with
respect to the lawsuit filed by Cornick.
Dreyer sued the City, contending that the City's determination not to provide
for her defense was made in violation of law, was irrational and was arbitrary
and capricious. She argued that by enacting City Code §9-1, the City intended
to give City officers and employees the same protections afforded to such
personnel by Public Officers Law §18. Section
18, in pertinent part, provides “the provisions of this section shall apply to
any public entity (a) whose governing body has agreed by the adoption of local
law, bylaw, resolution, rule or regulation (i) to confer the benefits of this
section upon its employees....”
Dreyer claimed that as Deputy Commissioner she was for all practical purposes
the alter ego of the Commissioner and had been properly invested by the
Commissioner to carry out his broad authority to manage and supervise the
police department. The City, in rebuttal, said that it correctly concluded that
claims alleged against Dreyer arose from actions taken outside of her official
duties and did not give rise to an obligation of the City to defend her in both
actions and that its determination was rational and proper. Further, said the
City, its decision that Curley's conduct giving rise to these two actions fell
within his official responsibilities and that hers did not, do not constitute
disparate treatment of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner.
Justice Nolan said that a defense under Public Officers Law §18 (a) must be
provided even though an employee's actions "may be characterized as
intentional wrongdoing" unless it can be determined that the conduct was
"entirely unrelated to the employer's business". The court also noted
that a municipal employer's statutory duty under Public Officers Law §18 to
provide a defense to its officers and employees has been likened to an
insurance company's contractual duty to provide a defense to one of its insured
policyholders and, citing Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v Cook, 7 NY3d 131,
commented that the Court of Appeals recently said that "when [an
insurance] policy represents it will provide the insured with a defense, we
have said that it actually constitutes litigation insurance' in addition to
liability coverage".
Justice Nolan decided that in determining whether or not to provide Dreyer representation
and indemnification, the City's inquiry should have been confined to merely a
review of the two complaints "to ascertain whether [they] charge[d] that
[Dreyer] was acting within the scope of...her employment at the time of the
alleged wrongdoing" and “If the complaints made such allegations - and
they do - the City's analysis ends there, and a defense must be provided
unless, by local law, the City had adopted - which it had not - additional
review requirements.”
In contrast, said the court, “any independent factual analysis by a
municipality is appropriate only when the complaint fails to allege that an
employee at the time of the wrongdoing was acting within the scope of
The bottom line: in determining whether Dreyer was entitled to be defended in
the Moore and Cornick actions, the City was limited by Public Officers Law §18(3)
and City Code §9-1 to a review of the allegations in the complaint, which did
allege Dreyer was acting within the scope of her employment. By going beyond
these allegations and engaging on its own in an independent assessment of the
underlying facts, the City exceeded the limits on its discretion imposed by
Public Officers Law §18(3) (a) and City Code 9-1. Accordingly, the court
directed the City to provide Dreyer with a defense in both federal actions and
to reimburse her reasonable costs of her defense to date in both actions.
Justice Nolan said that he would jurisdiction to fix said amount if the parties
are unable to agree such amount.
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006_52618.htm
Appealing an Education Law Section 3020-a arbitration award
an Education Law Section 3020-a arbitration award
Tarasow v NYC Dept. of Educ., 21 Misc 3d 1113(A)
Helen Tarasow, a tenured a guidance counselor employed by the New York City
Department [DOE], was ordered removed from her school and subsequently
disciplinary charges were filed against her alleging [1] that Tarasow failed to
notify school authorities and parents of a12-year-old student counseled by her
that the student exhibited “intentionally made scratches or cut marks on her
wrists,” and [2] Tarasow failed to keep
proper files and records for each assigned student, or to properly monitor and
document students' progress and results of guidance interventions. A hearing on
the charges pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a was held and the arbitrator
1. DOE had proved the first specification, noting among other things, that a
self-inflicted series of "cuts," "would certainly raise grave
suspicion as to the mental state of the person," and that Tarasow should
have reported her suspicion rather than allowing the child to go home alone;
2. Although Tarasow has had "some training in psychotherapeutic
counseling," she wrongly usurped the role of a psychiatrist or
psychologist instead of reporting the self-inflicted cuttings, and that it was
irrelevant that the psychiatric evaluation found the student not to be suicidal
given his finding that Tarasow lacked the authority and was not empowered to
make a determination about the student's mental status.
3. Tarasow proved that her files were likely discarded.
The Arbitrator concluded that "is no doubt [Tarasow] is a caring,
dedicated Guidance Counselor," that her actions "were not borne of
neglect," that she "truly believed she was doing the right
thing," and that terminating her employment would "deprive the
students of an individual who can and does provide effective counseling to
students." However, noted the Arbitrator, Tarasow expressed no remorse for
her actions, but only a "grudging acceptance of the requirement to do [the
right thing] to stay out of trouble."
DOE asked that Tarasow be terminated; Tarasow asked that a non-monetary penalty
The penalty imposed by the arbitrator: a two-month suspension without pay, so
as to "produce a real change in her behavior" and both DOE and
Tarasow filed petitions pursuant to CPLR Section 7511 seeking to vacate an
Justice Feinman, after considering the petition by Tarasow and the
cross-petition by the DOE to vacate the arbitrator's awards, denied both
petitions and confirmed the arbitrator’s award.
The decision sets out a “Legal Analysis” of CPLR Article 75, which controls in situations
involving a challenge to an arbitration award. The court noted that CPLR
7511(b) sets forth the limited grounds on which a petitioner can seek to vacate
an award, namely misconduct by the arbitrator, partiality, exceeding the arbitrator’s
powers, or procedural error.
Citing Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 NY3d 471, the decision
state that “Judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited and
where the arbitration hearing is conducted pursuant to Education Law §3020-a,
judicial review is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR 7511.
Further, where the parties are required to engage in compulsory arbitration, as
occurred in the instant matter, judicial review under CPLR article 75 requires
that the award "must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and
capricious" and the determination must be in accord with due process and
supported by adequate evidence, and must also be rational and satisfy the
arbitrary and capricious standards of CPLR Article 78. "The test of whether
a decision is arbitrary or capricious is "determined largely by whether a
particular action should have been taken or is justified . . . and whether the
administrative action is without foundation in fact.'" (See Pell v Board
of Educ., 34 NY2d 222].
Other points made by Justice Feinman:
1. A reviewing court must defer to the administrative fact finder's assessment
of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses
2. In an Education Law Section 3020-a proceeding, the arbitrator is free to
fashion a remedy as he or she believed proper, referring to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in Silverman v Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 NY2d 299.
3. As to DOE's petition seeking vacatur of the award on the ground that it was
irrationally lenient, it must be denied based in part on the credibility
finding of the arbitrator that Tarasow is a dedicated guidance counselor and a
benefit to her students, and on the evidence in the record that she has always
had satisfactory ratings in her job. His implicit finding that she was guilty
of bad judgment on this one occasion is rationally based.
4. The arbitrator rationally credited Tarasow's statement that in the future,
she would immediately report any similar incident, as sufficient proof that no
matter what her personal thoughts might be in a situation, she would follow the
DOE rules.
5. The award of an arbitrator need not conform to the traditional relief that a
N.B. Section 3020-a.5 sets out
a very short statute of limitations to appeal a Section 3020-a arbitrator’s
decision. Subdivision 5 provides as follows: 5. Appeal. Not later than ten days after receipt of the hearing
officer's decision [emphasis supplied], the employee or the
employing board may make an application to the New York state supreme court to vacate
or modify the decision of the hearing officer pursuant to section seven
thousand five hundred eleven of the civil practice law and rules. The court's
review shall be limited to the grounds set forth in such section. The hearing
panel's determination shall be deemed to be final for the purpose of such
proceeding. In no case shall the filing or the pendency of an appeal delay the
implementation of the decision of the hearing officer.
In contrast, CPLR Section 7511 provides that “An application to vacate or
modify an award may be made by a party within ninety days after its delivery ….”
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_52066.htm
Continuation on leave of absence from a teaching position upon permanent
appointment to a classified service position critical to educator’s right to reinstatement
to the teaching position
Fehlhaber v Board of Educ. of Utica City School Dist., 2012
NY Slip Op 04904, Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Craig S. Fehlhaber was initially employed by the Utica City
School District as a tenured teacher. In 1997 the district appointed Fehlhaber
as "Clerk of the Works" and later as Superintendent of Buildings and
Grounds. In 2010 the Board abolished the position of Superintendent
of Buildings and Grounds and Fehlhaber asked to be "bump" vertically
into the position of Maintenance Foreman or, in the alternative, to resume a
teaching position. The Board denied both of these requests and Fehlhaber filed an
Article 78 petition seeking a court order directing the Board to place him in
one of those positions. Supreme Court dismissed his petition and Fehlhaber
appealed..
Supreme Court had ruled that Fehlhaber had failed to file a
timely notice of claim. However, the Appellate Division agreed with Fehlhaber
that “no notice of claim was required” in this instance.
Although, said the court, Education Law §3813(1) mandates
that a notice of claim be filed when a claim is asserted against a board of
education, "the notice of claim requirement is inapplicable to cases which
seek to vindicate tenure rights which are legal rights guaranteed by State law
and in the public interest," citing Cowan v Board of Educ. of Brentwood
Union Free School Dist., 99 AD2d 831 and other decisions.
That said, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court
had properly dismissed the petition on the merits. Although Fehlhaber contended that he was entitled to a vertical
"bump" into the position of Maintenance Foreman pursuant to Civil
Service Law §80(6), the court noted that the record established that the Utica
Municipal Civil Service Commission, after consulting with the New York State
Civil Service Commission, said that "[i]n order for the rights of bumping'
to exist, the [Fehlhaber] would have to demonstrate a legal entitlement to that
bumping right.”
The Utica Commission, however, determined that Fehlhaber did
not have any such bumping right. Here, said the court, in a case concerning an
employee's bumping rights under the Civil Service Law, Matter of Hughes v Doherty, 5 NY3d 100, the Court of
Appeals ruled that "judicial review of [the Commission's] classification
system and determinations are limited to whether there was a rational basis for
the agency's conclusion.... Unless the [Commission's] determinations were
arbitrary or capricious, a court should not undermine its actions."
As the Appellate Division found that Fehlhaber failed to
establish that the Commission's determination was arbitrary or capricious, or
that there was no rational basis for its determination, it sustained the
Supreme Court’s dismissal of his Article 78 petition on the merits. Fehlhaber had raised an alternative theory -- that he is
merely on a leave of absence* from his tenured teaching position and was thus
entitled to be reinstated to that position. The Appellate Division said that it
agreed with Supreme Court that “[Fehlhaber] voluntarily abandoned his teaching position
and thereby relinquished his tenure rights, at the latest, upon leaving the
position for which the leave of absence was approved.”
Although it is well settled that "[t]he burden of
proving abandonment is upon the [Board] and must be established by clear and
convincing evidence that the [educator], by a voluntary and deliberate act,
intended to relinquish [his or] her teaching position and forfeit [his or] her
tenure rights," in this instance the Board granted Fehlhaber a leave of
absence in 1997 "[t]o assume duties as Clerk of the Works." When Fehlhaber left the Clerk of the Works position in 2002, he received a permanent appointment to the position of Superintendent of
Buildings and Grounds, a position in the classified service, and he failed to
seek reinstatement as a teacher or an extension of his leave of absence when he received that permanent appointment.
* 4 NYCRR 5.2, Leaves of Absence, applies to employees in
by the State Department of Civil Service. Subdivision (c) provides as follows: (c) Successive leaves of absence. Where a leave of
absence without pay has been granted for a period which aggregates two years,
or more if extended pursuant to subdivision (b) of this section, a further
leave of absence without pay shall not be granted unless the employee returns
to his position and serves continuously therein for six months immediately
preceding the subsequent leave of absence. Many local civil service commissions
have adopted a similar rule.
Judge found to have presided over judicial matters involving persons with whom he had a “close relationship” removed from office
Judge found to have presided over judicial matters involving
persons with whom he had a “close relationship” removed from office
Matter of Young, 2012 NY Slip Op 05089, Court of Appeals
The State Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained six
charges of misconduct alleged against Lafayette
D. Young, Jr., a Justice of the Macomb Town Court, St. Lawrence County, finding
that he had engaged in serious misconduct when he presided over matters
involving persons with whom he and his paramour had close relationships. The Commission determined that Judge Young should
be removed from his office.* The Commission found that “In all cases, but one, [Judge
Young] neither disqualified himself nor disclosed [his] relationship to the defendant
or complaining witness. Additionally, in many of the cases at issue, Judge
Young’s conduct gave the appearance of favoritism towards the Petrie family
defendant or complaining witness.” Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that "ex parte communications with[certain] parties further exacerbated Judge Young's improper conduct as they highlight his close
relationships to the Petrie family and his partiality towards them."
Holding that "Such
conduct demonstrates a misuse of his judicial office and damages public
confidence in his integrity and impartiality," the Court of Appeals sustained the sanction imposed by the Commission: that Judge Young, removal from his position, as the appropriate penalty under the circumstances. * See New York Constitution,
Article VI, § 22; Judicial Law §44
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05089.htm
Continuation of employment upon the expiration of a contract of employment may not be automatic
employment upon the expiration of a contract of employment may not be automatic
Goldman v White Plains Ctr. for Nursing Care, LLC, 11 NY3d 173
Some public employments, typically those involving employment in a position
having academic rank at a public college or university [see, for example 4
NYCRR 335.10] or as a school superintendent or an associate school
superintendent, [see, for example, Education Law §§1711(3) and 2507(1)], are
controlled by employment contracts between the parties.
The issue to be resolved in the Goldman case was whether the expiration of a
two-year employment contract gives rise to successive one-year implied “common
law” contracts of employment when the employee continues working for the
employer without a new agreement in place. In this instance the Court of
Appeals concluded that Lorraine Goldman became an at-will employee at the end
of the two-year period and did not enjoy any “successive one-year implied
contract of employment with White Plains.
Goldman’s initial contract of employment, executed in 1990, provided that the
parties would "enter into good faith negotiations . . . with respect to
renewal of th[e] Agreement on mutually agreeable terms" no less than nine
months before the contract was due to expire.” The agreement could be
terminated by the mutual consent of the parties or "[b]y either party
giving notice to the other at least six (6) months prior to the end of the
Employment Period of its intention not to renew this Agreement." At
expiration of the contract or termination of employment, the employer would
"be released of any responsibility or obligation hereunder, except for
payment of salary and benefits accrued to the effective date of such expiration
or termination." Finally, the contract included a provision that stated it
was the "entire Agreement and understanding" of the parties and could
"not be changed, modified or amended, except by a writing signed by"
Goldman and her then employer.
During the course of the two-year term, Goldman and her employer did not discuss
renewal of the agreement and neither sent a notice of termination. After the
contract expired on March 31, 1992, Goldman continued to serve as the
facilities’ administrative director and received annual salary adjustments.
However the facilities were purchased by White Plains Center for Nursing Care,
LLC and NMC Acquisitions, LLC (White Plains) from Goldman’s initial employer in
October 2004. In conjunction with that transaction, White Plains Center
executed an assignment and assumption of contracts, which listed Goldman’s 1990
employment contract among the documents provided to the purchasers. Three
months later, White Plains Center terminated Goldman's employment.
In deciding Goldman’s breach of contract action, the Appellate Division
concluded that the application of an implied contractual arrangement after
expiration of the two-year term was inconsistent with the express language of
the original employment agreement. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that “A
fundamental tenet of contract law is that agreements are construed in
accordance with the intent of the parties and the best evidence of the parties'
intent is what they express in their written contract.”
Goldman’s contract provided that in the event the agreement was allowed to
expire at the conclusion of the two-year term, her then employer would have no
further obligations to her other than compensating her for accrued salary and
benefits. Further, said the court, the contract “unambiguously indicate that
the parties understood that the employment contract would end at the conclusion
of the two-year period unless an extension was agreed upon.”
Rejecting Goldman’s argument that under “common law” she had a one-year implied
contract on the same terms as set forth in the original agreement each year
that her employment continued after the expiration of the written contract, the
Court of Appeals held that “this contention conflicts with the well-established
rule that, ‘absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment
relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by
either party.’”
The court then pointed out that Goldman’s argument relies on a common-law rule
that recognizes an inference that parties intend to renew an employment
agreement for an additional year where the employee continues to work after
expiration of an employment contract. In a footnote, the Court of Appeals
explained that “The common law created a presumption of a new term of
employment of only one year to avoid a statute of frauds problem.”
However, said the court, this common-law presumption — developed in the 19th
century before the establishment of the employment-at-will doctrine — can be
rebutted by demonstrating that the parties did not intend to allow a contract
to renew automatically.
In this instance, said the court, Goldman’s employment became an at-will
arrangement upon the expiration of the agreement under the terms of the
contract itself on March 31, 1992 and thus White Plains was entitled to summary
judgment dismissing the breach of contract claim.
The Court of Appeals then observed that “Parties to future contracts can avoid
uncertainty regarding application of the common-law rule simply by specifying
that continuation of the employment relationship after the expiration of the
contractual period will result in either successive one-year extensions of
employment or at-will employment status.”
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_07760.htm
positive for alcohol at the workplace
OATH Index No. 1405/12
OATH Administrative Law Judge Tynia D. Richard recommended a
30-day suspension* for a sanitation worker who tested positive for alcohol in a
random workplace test.
The employee contended that the positive test was caused by
ingestion of herbal supplements that unbeknownst to him contained alcohol. Judge Richard found that there was no evidence that the
amount of alcohol in the supplements was sufficient to trigger a positive breath
test, particularly when the confirmatory test administered 22
minutes after the initial screen test also was positive. The decision is posted on the Internet at: Dep’t of Sanitation v. Anonymous (in PDF),
OATH Index No. 1405/12 * The Commissioner imposes followup drug/alcohol
testing in addition to the 30-day suspension.
Governor Cuomo signs legislation on public disclosure of teacher evaluations that protects teachers' right to privacy and parents' right to know
Governor Cuomo signs legislation on public disclosure of
teacher evaluations that protects teachers' right to privacy and parents' right
Chapter 68 of the Law of 2012
On June 25, 2012 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed legislation that will require
the public disclosure of teacher evaluation data. The Governor said that this new law, which takes effect July
1, 2012, “ensures that parents and the general public can assess how schools
across New York are performing.”
According to the Governor, this new law requires school
districts and BOCES to fully disclose their evaluation results to the public
and require requires the State Education Department to post and make widely
available important data that will allow the public to analyze and compare how
schools are performing. School districts and BOCES will also be required to
notify and fully disclose to parents and legal guardians the final specific
ratings and composite evaluation scores of the teachers and principals to which
their student is assigned.
The law amends §3012-c of the Education Law by adding a new
subdivision, Subdivision 10, to read as follows:
10. Each school district and board of cooperative
educational services shall fully disclose and release to the public and the department
the final quality ratings and composite effectiveness scores from the annual professional
performance reviews of its teachers and principals as provided in this
a. The commissioner shall
fully disclose professional performance review data for teachers and principals
in each school district and board of cooperative educational services on the
department website and in any other manner to make such data widely available
to the public. Such data shall be suitable for research, analysis and comparison
of professional performance review data for teachers and principals. Such public
disclosure shall include but not be limited to the final quality ratings and
composite effectiveness scores by school district for principal evaluation
data, by school building for teacher evaluation data and, within each district and
school building, by class, subject and grade; final quality ratings and composite
effectiveness scores by region, district wealth, district need category,
student enrollment, type of school (i.e. elementary, middle and high school),
student need (e.g., poverty level), and district spending; final quality
ratings and composite effectiveness scores by the percentage or number of teachers
and principals in each final quality rating category, moving to a higher rating
category than the previous year, moving to a lower rating category than the previous
year, and retained in each rating category; and data on tenure granting and
denial based on the final quality rating categories.
b. Each school district and board of cooperative educational
services shall fully disclose and release to the parents and legal guardians of
a student the final quality rating and composite effectiveness score for each of
the teachers and for the principal of the school building to which the student
is assigned for the current school year upon the request of such parents and legal guardians. The governing
body of each school district and board of cooperative educational services shall
provide conspicuous notice to parents and legal guardians of the right to
obtain such information. Parents and legal guardians may review and receive such
data in any manner, including by phone or in person; shall receive an oral or
written explanation of the composite effectiveness scoring ranges for final
quality ratings; and be offered opportunities to understand such scores in the context
of teacher evaluation and student performance. Reasonable efforts shall be made
to verify that any such request is a bona fide request by a parent or guardian
entitled to review and receive such data pursuant to this paragraph.
c. The department and each school district and board of cooperative
educational services shall ensure that any release to the public of annual
professional performance review data, or any other data that is used as a
component of annual professional performance reviews, does not include
personally identifying information for any teacher or principal, provided, however,
that nothing shall impair the right of parents and legal guardians to review
and receive the final quality rating and composite effectiveness score of
individual teachers and principals as provided in paragraph b of this subdivision.
Annual professional performance reviews of individual teachers and principals
shall not be subject to disclosure pursuant to article six of the public officers law.
d. Nothing in this subdivision shall prohibit the
department from collecting such data and materials from school districts and boards
of cooperative educational services as is necessary to carry out its functions
and duties, including its responsibilities related to the federal Race to the
Disagreement with a superior’s directive not a defense to disciplinary charges alleging insubordination
Disagreement with a superior’s directive
not a defense to disciplinary charges alleging insubordination
OATH Index No. 196/12 OATH Administrative Law Judge Faye Lewis found that a
correction officer had been insubordinate on two dates and recommended a 10-day
suspension. In the first instance, the employee refused to open a
security gate when ordered to do so by a superior officer. He also he refused
to relinquish his post to another officer when ordered. The correction officer disagreed with the order to report to
a different post, but ALJ Lewis found this was not a defense because respondent
was required to follow direct orders. The decision is posted on the Internet at: Dep’t of Correction v. Joseph (in PDF)
filing of a timely a notice of claim -- a “condition precedent” when suing a
school district – must be pleaded in the complaint
Dianne Munro was employed as the Purchasing and Accounts Payable Manager by
Ossining Union Free School District. In April 2007 she commenced this action
against the District under New York State's Human Rights Law (Executive Law §296)
seeking to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination on the basis
The District filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss Munro’s petition on the
grounds that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations (see
Education Law §3813[2-b]) and that she had failed to timely serve a notice of
claim (see Education Law §3813[1]). Munro opposed the District’s motion and
cross-moved for permission to serve a late notice of claim. The Supreme Court
granted the District's motion to dismiss the complaint and Munro’s motion to
for leave to serve a late notice of claim. Munro appealed.
The Appellate Division first addressed the notice of claim issue, observing
that an entity wishing to sue a school district for violations of the Human
Rights Law must serve a notice of claim on the district within three months
after accrual of the claim. Further, compliance with this requirement is a
condition precedent to such a lawsuit and must be pleaded in the complaint.
In the event the entity has not served a timely notice of claim, if the
one-year statute of limitations applicable to such actions has not run, the
entity may seek permission to serve a late notice of claim in accordance with
Education Law § 3813[2-a]).
A court, in determining whether, in its discretion, to grant such an
application, must consider (1) whether the district had actual knowledge of the
essential facts constituting the claim within the time required for service of
a timely notice of claim or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) whether the
claimant had a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim,
and (3) whether the school district would be substantially prejudiced in its
defense on the merits if the application were to be granted.
Further, the statute requires that the court consider "in
particular," the first factor, and, accordingly, that factor is entitled
to the greatest weight, but none is determinative.
Here Munro argued that the District had actual knowledge of the essential facts
constituting her claim because she allegedly reported various incidents.
However, Munro did not provide any details about the substance of her alleged reports
that would permit a record-based conclusion that the District was thereby put
on notice of the essential facts underlying her current claims under the Human
Further, the Appellate Division said that Munro offered no excuse at all for failing
to serve a timely notice of claim.
Accordingly, even if the District would not be prejudiced were the application
to file a late notice of claim granted, the Supreme Court did not improvidently
exercise its discretion in denying Munro leave to serve a late notice of claim.
Union rather than officers or board members to acknowledge it does not assert the right to violate the Taylor Law
Union rather than officers or board members to
acknowledge it does not assert the right to violate the Taylor Law
New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 55 AD3d 699
Supreme Court [see 18 Misc.3d 414] issued an order conditioning the
reinstatement of the Transport Workers Union’s right to payroll deductions for
union dues from the paychecks of their members employed by the New York City
Transit Authority by requiring affidavits from the President and each individual
member of the Executive Board of Local 100 of Transport Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, stating that “the Union does not assert the right to strike
against any government, to assist or participate in any such strike, or to
impose an obligation to conduct, assist, or participate in such a strike, and
that the Union has no intention, now or in the future, of conducting,
assisting, participating, or imposing an obligation to conduct, assist, or
participate in any such strike, or threatening to do so, against the [Transit
Authority] or any governmental employer.”
The Union appealed and the Appellate Division modified the lower court’s order “on
the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by requiring “the Union submit a
duly-authorized affirmation stating unequivocally that the Union does not
assert the right to strike against any government, to assist or participate in
any such strike, or to impose an obligation to conduct, assist, or participate
in such a strike, and that the Union has no intention, now or in the future, of
conducting, assisting, participating, or imposing an obligation to conduct,
assist, or participate in any such strike, or threatening to do so, against the
[Authority] or any governmental employer” rather than require the Union’s president
and board members to so state.
The Appellate Division explained that the Civil Service Law Article 14, [the
Taylor Law], prohibits public employees and public employee organizations from
engaging in, or causing, instigating, encouraging, or condoning, a strike and
in the event this prohibition is violated, the Public Employment Relations
Board or the Supreme Court may order the forfeiture of the organization's right
to have union dues automatically deducted from the paychecks of its members.
However, said the court, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its
discretion in requiring that each member of the Union's Executive Board submit
an affidavit containing the same statement that the Union does not assert the
right to violate the Taylor Law. Reinstating the automatic deduction should
depend, not only on the Union's full compliance with the appropriate orders of
the court but “also on its willingness to state that it has no intention of
engaging or supporting illegal strikes now or in the future.”
Accordingly, it is the Union, rather than its officers or board members, which
is required to undertake this obligation.
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_07887.htm
See, also, MTA Bus Co. v Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 55 AD3d 695, decided the same by the
Appellate Division, Second Department concerning the same issue. The text of
the MTA decision is posted on the Internet at:
thttp://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_07883.htm
Audits of special education contractors by the State
Comptroller reveal the use of public funds for inappropriate and unallowable
expenses Source: Office of the New York State Comptroller Thomas P.
Three private contractors hired to provide special education services for pre-K
children are alleged to have used public money for inappropriate and unallowable expenses according
to audits released on June 25, 2012 by New York State Comptroller Thomas P.
DiNapoli. The State Department of Education [SED],
through private contractors, provides special education services to children
aged three to 21. Contractors are reimbursed for expenses and fees by New York
City and counties in accordance with rates set by SED, which oversees special
education programs statewide. According to the Comptroller, the probe so far has led to felony arrests of four
contractors and the restitution of $610,000.
Placing counseling memoranda in an individual’s personnel
file does not constitute a disciplinary action for the purposes of Education
Law §3020-a
Board of Educ. of Dundee Cent. School Dist. (Coleman), 2012
NY Slip Op 04849, Appellate Division, Fourth Department
The Dundee Central School District filed two disciplinary
charges, setting out 16 specifications against a teacher. The teacher asked the
disciplinary hearing officer to dismiss six specifications on the ground that
the conduct encompassed by those specifications had been the subject of
counseling memoranda placed in teacher's personnel file. The memoranda had warned
the teacher "of the serious consequences of any future incident[s] . . .
." The Hearing Officer granted the teacher's motion, concluding
that "it would be both improper and unfair under the just cause protocol
to permit and entertain formal charges, identical in nature to those at issue
in the foregoing counseling memoranda, [because], by all accounts, the matters
have not repeated." Ultimately the hearing officer found the teacher
guilty of certain specifications and imposed a penalty of a six-month
suspension without pay "but with continued medical insurance
benefits." Dundee commenced this proceeding pursuant to
Education Law § 3020-a (5) and CPLR §7511 challenging the penalty, the
continuation of health benefits during the period of the teacher’s suspension
without pay and the dismissal of the six specifications. The district also
contended that the penalty of a six-month suspension was "excessively
lenient."
Supreme Court remanded the matter to the hearing officer, concluding
that” the Hearing Officer erred in dismissing the six specifications and lacked
statutory authority to direct [the school district] to pay for [the teacher’s]
health insurance* during the period of
suspension.” The Hearing Officer subsequently sustained, in whole or in
part, three of the six specifications, but he reimposed the same penalty,
finding that the teacher had previously been disciplined for the conduct at
issue in those specifications through the counseling memoranda, explaining that
"[i]t would be inherently unfair and totally contrary to the just cause
protocol to issue further discipline to the [teacher] for actions that
were never repeated." The school district then commenced a second proceeding
pursuant to Education Law §3020-a and CPLR §7511 to vacate the Hearing
Officer's decision to the extent that the Hearing Officer determined that the
penalty of a six-month suspension was appropriate and failed to comply with the
prior judgment. Supreme Court agreed and vacated the penalty and remitted the
matter to a different hearing officer regarding only the issue of the penalty.
With respect to the issue of the dismissal of certain of the
specifications by the hearing officer, the Appellate Division said that “we
conclude that the Hearing Officer's decision to grant the motion of [the
teacher’s] to dismiss six of the specifications was arbitrary and capricious. The
court pointed out that “It is well settled that counseling memoranda such as
those placed in [the teacher’s] personnel file are not considered disciplinary actions,
citing Holt v Board of Educ. of Webutuck Cent. School Dist., 52 NY2d 625.
In Holt, said the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals specifically
stated that such memoranda may "be used to support a formal charge of
misconduct within three years of the occurrence which the evaluation addresses."
As to the issue of the hearing officer exceeding his
authority, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court “properly determined
that the Hearing Officer exceeded his statutory authority in directing [the
school district] to pay for [the teacher’s] health insurance benefits during
the period of suspension. The court explained that "In recommending a
penalty under [section] 3020-a of the Education Law, a hearing [officer] is
limited to one of the penalties set forth in that section, i.e., a
reprimand, a fine, suspension for a fixed time without pay or dismissal'" [emphasis in the decision].
As, said the court, “[an employer’s] contribution toward an
employee's health insurance is a form of compensation … the Hearing Officer
improperly imposed what amounted to ‘a penalty of suspension at reduced pay’” [emphasis supplied].
Addressing Supreme Court’s remanding the matter to a
different hearing officer with respect to the issue of the penalty to be
imposed, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court “properly determined
that the Hearing Officer's decision on remittal to impose the same penalty was
arbitrary and capricious inasmuch the Hearing Officer based his decision on an
erroneous interpretation of the law”
Noting that the hearing officer refused to impose any
additional penalty after sustaining some of the remitted six specifications
based on his continuing belief that the counseling memoranda constituted a form
of discipline, the Appellate Division again pointed out that “it is well
established that counseling memoranda are not disciplinary measures under
Education Law §3020-a” and that the hearing officer's conclusion that the
teacher had previously been disciplined for the conduct encompassed by those
specifications is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court concluded
that Supreme Court had properly vacated the penalty imposed by the hearing officer
and remitted the matter to a different hearing officer for imposition of a
penalty. * The court ordered the
teacher to reimburse the Dundee Central School District for any such costs that had been
previously paid by it of behalf of the teacher.
The decision is posted on the Internet
York State. This more than 1500 page e-book is now available from the Public
York City Transit Authority subject to local laws that do not interfere with
its providing transportation
Tang v New York City Tr. Auth., 55 AD3d
Kim Tang sued the NYC Transit Authority to recover damages for alleged
retaliation by the Transit Authority in violation of the New York City
Administrative Code barring unlawful discrimination.
Supreme Court dismissed Tang’s complaint based on the Authority’s claim that
Public Authorities Law §1266(8) exempted it from all local laws affecting its
Tang appealed and the Appellate Division overturned the lower court’s ruling,
holding that Section 1266(8) did not exempt the Authority from all local laws
but only those laws "conflicting with [Title 11 of the Public Authorities
Law] or any rule or regulation" of the Transit Authority.
Section 1266(8) authorizes the Authority to “do all things it deems necessary,
convenient or desirable to manage, control and direct the maintenance and
operation of transportation facilities, equipment or real property operated by
or under contract, lease or other arrangement with the authority and its subsidiaries,
and New York city transit authority and its subsidiaries.”
Citing Bogdan v New York City Tr. Auth., 2005 US Dist LEXIS 9317, the Appellate
Division concluded that language of Section 1266(8) indicates the Legislature “did
not intend to prohibit the application of all Local Laws to the [Transit
Authority], but only such laws that interfered with the accomplishment of its
transportation purposes."
As compliance with the provisions in the New York City Administrative Code
against unlawful discrimination in employment would not interfere with the
function and purpose of the Transit Authority, the court vacated the Supreme
Court’s dismissal of Tang’s petition.
Employee charged with being disrespectful to another
charged with being disrespectful to another
Hospitals Corp. (Metropolitan Hospital Center) v. McCaskey, OATH Index No.
2195/08
ALJ Faye Lewis recommended dismissal of a charge that a special officer was
disrespectful to a doctor in a psychiatric emergency room when he remarked
"You're trying to kill me today". The statement, made when the doctor
brought three patients to the emergency room at one time, was essentially a
complaint that the emergency room was overcrowded and understaffed.
Although the officer's "choice of language was not ideal," in the
absence of any showing that the brief exchange disrupted hospital operations,
misconduct was not established.
Questions concerning the prosecution of grievances and whether the compliant is grievable is for the arbitrator to resolve
concerning the prosecution of grievances and whether the compliant is grievable
is for the arbitrator to resolve
Hartsdale Fire Dist. v Greenburgh Uniform
Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 55 AD3d 731
The collective bargaining agreement between the Hartsdale Fire District and the
Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Association contained a broad arbitration
clause providing for the arbitration of disputes "concerning the meaning,
application or interpretation of this Agreement, which remains unresolved after
presentation to, and processing through the grievance procedure."
Hartsdale resisted the Association’s demand for arbitration, contending that
(a) the underlying grievance was not subject to arbitration; that the
Association had not satisfied the procedural steps with respect to the
grievance procedure; and (3) that only a unit member, rather than the
Association, could file a grievance and demand arbitration.
Supreme Court dismissed Hartsdale’s petition seeking a permanent stay of
arbitration and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s holding.
The Appellate Division said that there was “a reasonable relationship between
the subject the disputes, which involves the [Association’s] grievances over
the [Hartdale’s] directives that the [Association’s] union members work and
train in a fire-damaged firehouse before the firehouse was fully repaired, and
the general subject the collective bargaining agreement.” Further, said the
court, the CBA does not specifically exclude from arbitration the subject the
grievances that concern public health and the safety of public employees.
Accordingly, said the court, the question of the scope of the substantive
provisions of the CBA is a contract interpretation and application reserved for
As to Hartsdale’s claim that the Association failed to comply with a condition
precedent before demanding arbitration, the Appellate Division pointed out
that, in general, “disputes over the parties' adherence to the grievance
procedure set forth in the parties' CBA is for the arbitrator to determine, not
for the courts.”
Finally, said the Appellate Division, Hartdale’s claim that “grievances must be
pursued only by individual employees, rather than by the [Association],
especially in light of the [Association’s] contention that [Hartsdale] has a
past practice of hearing grievances pursued solely by the [Association], is a
matter for the arbitrator to resolve.”
As to Hartsdale’s representation that only the aggrieved employee could file a
grievance, in general, making a decision to file a grievance typically is
viewed as vested in the employee organization and not an individual member of
the negotiating unit. Further, the Association argued that it “owned the right
to go to arbitration” which is the traditional view in such situations.
In Hickey v Hempstead Union Free School District, 36 A.D.3d 760, the Appellate
Division said that a union member generally has no individual rights under a
collective bargaining agreement that he or she can enforce against an employer.
In the absence of a contract provision stating otherwise, an employee may
proceed directly against the employer only when the union fails in its duty of
fair representation and "In order to establish a breach of the duty of
fair representation, it is necessary to show that the union's refusal to demand
that the grievance go to arbitration was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
As to the alleged “past practice” whereby only individuals filed grievances, it
is unlikely that such a practice would be viewed as a union’s abandoning or
forfeiting its right to file grievances and demand arbitration with respect to
alleged violations of the collective bargaining agreement.
The full text of the Hartsdale decision is posted on the Internet at:
The full text of the Hickey decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2007/2007_00493.htm