Source: https://fr.scribd.com/document/284123423/Google-Spain
Timestamp: 2019-07-22 10:53:17
Document Index: 765392852

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'art 1', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'art 2', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ']

Google Spain - | Vie privée et informatique | Compétence
Transféré par Lau Bre
Jurisdiction - International Data Privacy Law-2015-Van Alsenoy-105-20
enregistrerEnregistrer Google Spain - pour plus tard
section 4 feedback sheet
Work Experience Research Booklet
Continental Bank and Trust Company, a Utah Corporation, Receiver for Inland Empire Insurance Company, a Corporation v. R. F. Apodaca, Superintendent of Insurance, of the State of New Mexico, 239 F.2d 295, 10th Cir. (1956)
Luis A. Higuit v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, 433 F.3d 417, 4th Cir. (2006)
International Data Privacy Law, 2015, Vol. 5, No.
Internet and jurisdiction after Google Spain: the
extraterritorial reach of the right to be delisted
Brendan Van Alsenoy* and Marieke Koekkoek**
Brendan Van Alsenoy is a legal researcher at ICRI/CIR, KU Leuven
iMinds. His research focuses on data protection, privacy, intermediary
liability, and trust services. Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and ICT/
Centre for Intellectual Property Rights, KU LeuveniMinds, SintMichielsstraat 6 B-3000 LeuvenBelgium. Tel: 32 16 32 07 80; Fax: 32 16
32 54 38; Email: brendan.vanalsenoy@law.kuleuven.be
Marieke Koekkoek is a research fellow at the Leuven Centre for Global
Governance Studies (GGS), KU Leuven. Her research focuses on
extraterritoriality in international trade and environmental law.
Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espanola de
Proteccion de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja Gonzalez [2014]
,http://curia.europa.eu..
Case C-131/12, para 94.
The term right to be forgotten is generally considered to be a misnomer.
As the phrase right to be delisted more accurately describes the true
meaning and scope of the CJEUs ruling, we will refer to the right to be
delisted rather than the right to be forgotten for purposes of this article.
See e.g. David Lee, Google ruling astonishing, says Wikipedia founder
Wales (BBC News Technology, 14 May 2014) ,http://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-27407017. accessed 19 December 2014. See also Christopher
Kuner, The Court of Justice of the EU Judgment on Data Protection and
# The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University
This article evaluates the Google Spain ruling and
its implementation from the perspective of public
After analysing the ruling itself, an analysis is made
of the Article 29 Working Party Guidelines concerning the territorial effect of delisting decisions.
The article outlines different ways in which the
right to be delisted might be implemented, using
case law to identify relevant jurisdictional considerations.
The authors conclude that insistence upon global
delisting may be justifiable in many cases, but not all.
request is justified, modify its search results globally? Or
should it only modify search results shown within the
EU? These questions go to the heart of a longstanding
debate regarding the relationship between law, jurisdiction, and the internet.6
To date, search engine operator Google has limited its
removal of search results under European data protection law to the European versions of its search engine.7
Internet Search Engines: Current Issues and Future Challenges (2014)
1, 2 ,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496060.
accessed 21 November 2014.
See e.g. Melanie Amann a.o., Europe: 1, Google: 0: EU Court Ruling a
Victory for Privacy (Part 1) (Spiegel Online International, 20 May 2014)
,http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/court-imposes-right-tobe-forgotten-on-google-search-results-a-970419.html. accessed 14
December 2014. For a comprehensive overview of commentary on Google
Spain see ,http://www.cambridge-code.org/googlespain.html. (accessed
1 March 2015).
See e.g. Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and the InternetRegulatory Competence of
Online Activity (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) 347;
Thomas Schultz, Carving Up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and
the Private/Public International Law Interface (2008), (19)(4) EJIL, 799
,http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=1662&issue=86. accessed 20
December 2014 and Niloufer Selvadurai, The Proper Basis for Exercising
Jurisdiction in Internet Disputes: Strengthening State Boundaries or
Moving Towards Unification? (2013) (13)(2) JTLP, ,http://tlp.law.pitt.
edu/ojs/index.php/tlp/article/view/124/127. accessed 20 December 2014.
See Peter Fleischer, Response to the Questionnaire addressed to Search
Engines by the Article 29 Working Party regarding the implementation of the
CJEU judgment on the right to be forgotten, 31 July 2014, ,https://docs.
Downloaded from http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/ by Pablo Palazzi on June 6, 2015
On 13 May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) held that individuals have a right to
obtain removal of certain search results.1 Such a right
exists insofar as the results (i) refer to information about
the individual concerned; (ii) show up following a web
search on the basis of that persons name; and (iii) refer
to information, which is inadequate, irrelevant or no
longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes
of the processing.2 The CJEUs recognition of the socalled right to be delisted3 has kicked up quite a storm.
Many scorn the ruling, labelling it a menace to the
publics right to know and a push for private censorship.4 Others embrace the ruling as a privacy victory,
adding that the detriment to freedom of expression
should be minimal in practice.5 Philosophical differences
aside, the ruling has also triggered many practical questions. Which criteria should a search engine operator use
when evaluating delisting requests? Should the operator
consult with website publishers before making a decision? How far should the right to be delisted extend,
geographically speaking? It is the last question, which
concerns the territorial reach of the right to be delisted,
that will be the focus of this article. Should a search
engine operator, upon finding that an individuals
International Data Privacy Law, 2015, Vol. 5, No. 2
whereas the signing of a data transfer agreement would
be governed by private international law.15 Because our
objective is to evaluate the guidance issued by the Article
29 Working Party, which aims to inform inter alia future
enforcement by DPAs, we will use public international
law as our normative framework here. Nevertheless,
reference will still be made to examples of private international law to further inform the application of public
international law principles.
The jurisdictional issues presented by Google Spain
are essentially two-fold. First, there is the question of
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. Is it legitimate
for the EU, in cases such as Google Spain, to regulate processing activities which, for the most part, take place
outside of EU territory? The second jurisdictional issue
concerns the implementation of the right to be delisted.
How far can (or should) the EU go when requiring
search engines to implement the CJEU ruling? If a
request for removal is granted, should it only affect
local search results (eg search results displayed in the
home-state of the data subject)? Or are there reasonable
legal grounds that compel a wider, perhaps even global,
google.com/file/d/0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/edit?pli=1. accessed
If you run a name search on google.co.uk today, you will in all probability
find a notice at the bottom of the page which says: Some results may have
been removed under data protection law in Europe. The message appears
regardless of whether the person in question has requested any removal of
Leila Abboud and Julia Fioretti, Europe debates how far to push right to
be forgotten (Reuters, 25 July 2014), ,http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/07/25/google-eu-privacy-idUSL6N0Q02JR20140725. accessed at
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the
implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union judgment
on Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos
(AEPD) and Mario Costeja GonzalezC-131/12 (2014) WP225 ,http
://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/
opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf. accessed 10
Cf. Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice (n 10).
See e.g. David Meyer, Why the EUs right to be de-linked should not go
global (Gigaom Research, 26 November 2014) ,https://gigaom.com/
2014/11/26/why-the-eus-right-to-be-de-linked-should-not-go-global/.
accessed 10 December 2014.
See also Alan McQuinn, EU Guidelines for Right to Be Forgotten Harm
Transparency and Represent a Vast Overreach on Internet Policy (The
Innovation Files, 3 December 2014) ,http://www.innovationfiles.org/euguidelines-for-right-to-be-forgotten-harm-transparency-and-represent-avast-overreach-on-internet-policy. accessed 19 December 2014.
Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction
on the Internet (Part 1) (2010) (18)(2) IJLIT, 181 3. The distinction
between public and private international law was discussed also discussed
extensively in the context of UEJF and LICRA v. Yahoo! and Yahoo France
[See Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA and UEJF, 433 F 3d 1199, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006),
1227, 1228, 1248f, 1249, 1250f] The discussion focused inter alia on the
action at hand, the interests at stake, the public/private nature of the
regulation(s) upon which the claim was based, the nature of the plaintiff,
etc. See also Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 230 50.
Cf. Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (n
14) 181 3. The distinction between public or private international law is
not merely academic. Whereas private law can be enforced through
recognition by a foreign court, public law by definition cannot be applied
in a State other than the regulating one. (Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public
Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law and
Some Suggestions for their Interaction (1979) 163 Recueil des Cours 324.
See also F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law
(1964) 111 Recueil des Cours 1, 13f, Ch. 4, reproduced in Frederick
A. Mann, Studies in International Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973),
492f.).
Territorial scope of Directive 95/46
The extraterritorial reach of Article 4(1)a
Article 4(1) specifies several situations in which Member
States must apply their national laws transposing the
Directive. The most important grounds are (i) the location of an establishment of the controller [Article
Search results of people using google.com remain unaltered, while people using google.es or google.be may
no longer be seeing the full picture.8 However, Google
still allows its EU users to switch to the .com version,
simply by clicking a button at the bottom of the page. By
not taking further measures to limit access to delisted
search results, Googles approach has provoked concerns
from EU Data Protection Authorities (DPAs).9 So what
should the search engine operator be doing?
According to the Article 29 Working Party, search
engine operators should implement the ruling in a way
that guarantees effective and complete protection of data
subjects rights and that EU law cannot easily be circumvented.10 In practice, this means that delisting should be
made effective on all relevant domains, including
.com.11 Critics argue that the approach advanced by the
Working Party goes a bridge too far.12 After all, search
engines such as Google offer their services on a global
scale. By requiring Google to modify search results on all
domains, it seems as if the EU is imposing its values
upon non-EU countries.13 This is problematic because,
at least in principle, each State is free to decide how to
balance privacy and freedom of expression.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the Google Spain
ruling and its extraterritorial effects from the perspective
of public international law. We should note that, as a
matter of principle, data protection law cannot be characterized as falling wholly within either public or
private international law.14 Kuner argues that the characterization instead depends on the specific activity or
issue in question. For example, an enforcement action
would fall within the ambit of public international law,
Brendan van Alsenoy and Marieke Koekkoek . Internet and jurisdiction after Google Spain
4(1)a] and (ii) the location of equipment being used
[Article 4(1)c].16 While both provisions may lead to an
extraterritorial reach of EU data protection law, we will
limit our current analysis to Article 4(1)a.17 Article 4(1)a
provides that Member States must apply their national
data protection laws if
the processing is carried out in the context of the activities
of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the
Member State [. . .].18
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2010 on applicable
law (2010) WP 179, 8 ,http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/
wpdocs/2010/wp179_en.pdf. accessed 19 July 2013. In addition to these
two primary criteria, the Directive also specifies in article 4(1)(b) that
Member States shall apply their national data protection laws when the
controller is not established on the Member States territory, but in a place
where its national law applies by virtue of international public law. This
provision mainly aims at situations in which EU law applies by virtue of
an international treaty or custom, e.g. in relation to activities carried out
by embassies in a foreign country. See Dan J.B. Svantesson, The
Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy LawsIts Theoretical Justification
and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses (2014), (50)(1) SJIL, 66.
For a discussion of 4(1)c see Lokke Moerel, The long arm of EU data
protection law: Does the Data Protection Directive apply to processing of
personal data of EU citizens by websites worldwide? (2011) (1)(1) IDPL,
28 et seq. For application of 4(1)c to the facts of Google Spain Brendan
Van Alsenoy, Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef Ausloos, Search engines after
Google Spain: internet@liberty or privacy@peril? (2013) (15) ICRI WPS
,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2321494.
Article 4(1)a of Directive 95/46 goes on to state that when the same
controller is established on the territory of several Member States, he must
take the necessary measures to ensure that each of these establishments
complies with the obligations laid down by the national law applicable.
Article 3(1) of (the latest draft of) the proposed Data Protection
Regulation contains a similar establishment rule. (This Regulation applies
to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an
establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union.) In addition,
Article 51 goes on to provide that Each Supervisory Authority shall be
competent for processing taking place in the context of the activities of an
establishment of a controller or a processor on the territory of its Member
State or affecting data subjects on the territory of its Member State. See
Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals
outside their territory if they are being carried out in
the context of the activities of an establishment of the
controller located on their territory.23
Application in Google Spain
Google Spains status as an establishment was not disputed.24 Instead, the arguments focussed on whether
Googles search engine activities may be viewed as taking
place in the context of the activities of this establishment. During oral arguments, Google asserted that the
processing at issue was not carried out in the context
of the activities of Google Spain, but rather of those of
Google Inc. Two arguments were made in support of
this assertion. First, the Spanish subsidiary does not actively participate in the operation of the search engine
service, which is carried out exclusively by Google Inc.25
Second, the Spanish subsidiary does not require the processing at issue to take place in order for it to conduct its
business operations. After all, its activities are limited to
the marketing of Google services and selling of advertising space. This activity, it was argued, does not depend
on the processing at issue, particularly if one considers
that Googles behavioural advertising model is not based
on the indexed content, but rather on the search queries
of users.26
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 19 December 2014,
15395/14, accessible at ,http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-15395-2014-INIT/en/pdf..
Cf. Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law (n 16). The notions of controller
and establishment do not coincide. A controller can have several
establishments, just as entities that jointly exercise control can concentrate
activities within one or more establishments. (Ibid, 11) The term
establishment is not formally defined by Directive 95/46, but according
to recital (19) implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable
arrangements; whereas the legal form of such an establishment, whether
simply branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining
factor in this respect. The CJEU has considered (in relation to the freedom
of establishment under article 50 TFEU) that a stable establishment
requires that both human and technical resources necessary for the provision
of particular services are permanently available. (Id.). See also The long arm
of EU data protection law (n 17) 34 35 (concluding that all subsidiaries
and most branch offices will qualify as establishments).
Cf. Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law (n 16) 2.
Lokke Moerel, Back to basics: when does EU data protection law apply?
(2011) (1)(2) IDPL, 97. The legislative history of the Directive shows that
Article 4(1)a does not embody the so-called country of origin principle
(ibid, 94 7). For an overview of divergent views see Back to basics 103.
Cf. Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law (n 16).
Case C-131/12, para 49.
Case C-131/12, para 51.
Similar reasoning was previously put forward by Googles global privacy
counsel in his response to the Article 29 Data Protection Working Partys
opinion on search engines. See Response to the Questionnaire addressed to
Search Engines (n 7) 7 8. In this letter, Googles privacy counsel also takes
the position that in order for Article 4(1)a to apply, it is necessary that the
establishment in question is acting as a controller towards the processing
in question (Ibid, p. 8). However, the legislative history of Directive 95/46
The determination of applicable law under Article 4(1)a
is closely related to the identification of the entity acting
as a controller and its establishment(s).19 Equally
important, however, is the reference to the context of
activities: this criterion implies that the establishment of
the controller must be involved in activities implying the
processing of personal data in question.20 Or rather, the
establishment must be involved in a real and effective exercise of activities in the context of which the personal data
are being processed.21
Article 4(1)a does not require that the establishment
in question is acting as a controller, nor that the processing is taking place on the territory of the Member State
in question.22 As a result, Article 4(1)a has the potential
for extraterritorial reach: Member States are expected
to apply their national laws to processing taking place
the activities relating to the advertising space constitute the
means of rendering the search engine at issue economically
profitable and that engine is, at the same time, the means
enabling those activities to be performed.28
The CJEU also considered the ratio legis of Directive 95/
46, which is to ensure effective and complete protection
of individuals with respect to the processing of their personal data.29 It noted that the EU legislature sought to
makes clear that such a requirement was no longer envisaged by the EU
legislator when the final draft was approved. For more information see
Lokke Moerel, Back to basics, when does EU data protection law apply?
(2011) (1)(2) IDPL, 97.
CJEU, Case C-131/12, para 56.
Ibid, para 54.
The Advocate General had similarly concluded that the processing of
personal data takes place within the context of a controllers establishment if
that establishment acts as the bridge for the referencing service to the
advertising market of that Member State, even if the technical data
processing operations are situated in other Member States or third countries.
(Advocate General Jaaskinen, Case C-131/12, para 67). Likewise, in its
opinion on search engines, the Article 29 Working Party had reasoned
that search engine processing activities take place in the context of the
activities of an establishment if the establishment is involved in the selling
of targeted advertisements to the inhabitants of that state. See Article 29
Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues
related to search engines (2008) WP148, 10.
See Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (OUP, 2008), 21 et
seq. (More generally, it may be submitted that a State may not exercise its
jurisdiction when it has no legitimate interest in or when it is not affected by
prevent individuals from being deprived of the protection
guaranteed by the directive and that protection from being
circumvented, by prescribing a particularly broad territorial scope. 30 Based on these observations, the CJEU concluded that the processing relating to the search engine
service should be viewed as taking place in the context of
the activities of an establishment located on EU territory.31
Under customary international law, there should be a
bona fide connection between the subject matter of a
dispute and the State asserting jurisdiction over it.32
There are approximately five general principles upon
which a jurisdictional claim might be based, namely (i)
the territoriality principle (objective and subjective); (ii)
the nationality principle (active or passive); (iii) the
effects principle; (iv) the protective principle; or (v) the
universality principle.33 For purposes of public international law, it is the territoriality principle that is the
primarybut not the solebasis of jurisdiction.34
The principle of territoriality entails that each State has
the right to regulate persons, matters, and events within
its own territory.35 It is based on the principle of sovereign
equality of States and the principle of non-intervention.36
A corollary of the territoriality principle is that States
should exercise some restraint before asserting jurisdiction extraterritorially: if a State wishes to be recognized as
sovereign within its own borders, it must respect the sovereignty of other States within their borders.37 Nevertheless, it would appear that States increasingly undertake to
regulate conduct taking place abroad.38 The seemingly
an activity.) (Ibid, 21 22.) See also Bernhard Maier, How Has the Law
Attempted to Tackle the Borderless Nature of the Internet (2010) IJLIT
(18)(2) 155, with reference to Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick, 194
ALR 4333 (10 December 2002), para 101.
See Cf. The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 80 et seq.;
Cf. How Has the Law Attempted (n 32) 143 and Robert Dover and Justin
Frosini, The extraterritorial effects of legislation and policies in the EU
and US (2012) Study for the European Parliaments Committee on
Foreign Affairs ,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/
join/2012/433701/EXPO-AFET_ET%282012%29433701_EN.pdf. last
accessed 19 December 2014.
Cf. Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 20 and Cf. Jurisdiction in
International Law (n 32) 27 et seq. See also The American Law Institute,
Restatement (Third) of the Law of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1988) Section 402.
Cf. Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 89 et seq.
Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, (OUP, 2008), 29.
Other arguments against extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction include
unforeseeability, limited enforceability, liability under multiple
jurisdiction, etc. See eg Cf. How Has the Law Attempted (n 32) 161 2.
See The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 61. For a
discussion of the development of international case law in this respect see
Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 89 108.
The counsel for the European Commission defended
an opposing viewpoint. She argued that Googles search
engine activities are closely related to the activity of
selling advertising space, which is precisely what subsidiaries such as Googles establishment in Spain are
engaged in. As a result, she concluded, the processing activities related to the search engine service are also being
carried out in the context of the activities of Googles
Spanish subsidiary. The counsels for the plaintiff, Spain,
and Austria, likewise emphasized the unity of organization that exists between Google Inc. and its Spanish subsidiary. They also underlined the link between the search
engine service and the selling of advertising space from a
business model perspective, arguing that the activity of
Googles establishment in Spain should not be regarded
as an ancillary activity, but rather as an integral part of
the primary activity (ie the selling of advertising space).
In the end, the CJEU embraced the arguments put
forth by Googles opponents. The Court considered that
the activities of the search engine operator and those of its
establishment are inextricably linked, as Googles search
engine service is closely related to the activity of selling
advertising space.27 Specifically, the Court reasoned that
borderless nature of the internet has of course, in no
small part, furthered this development.39
In Google Spain, it was the establishment of the controller that gave rise to the applicability of an EU Directive. Establishment is normally a strong connecting
factor. In theory, all this concept does is provide for a
straightforward application of the territoriality principle.40 If you are established and operate within a States
territory, you have to play by its rules. This makes sense.
However, things can get trickier when the territorial
nexus of establishment is used as a means to regulate
conduct abroad. Moerel has already pointed out that in
the case of Article 4(1)a, the principle of territoriality
may have a more or less virtual nature:41
So the territorial link of Googles establishment in
Spain is perhaps not as strong as initially thought. We
should, therefore, look to further justifications that
might solidify the EUs assertion of jurisdiction. Such
justifications are not, however, very difficult to imagine.
To begin with, the language used by the CJEU suggests
that at least one other jurisdictional principle was at play
For a charming metaphor (a story about eggs) on how the internet has
further complicated the issues sovereignty and jurisdiction see Jurisdiction
and the Internet (n 6) 1 3.
Cf. How Has the Law Attempted (n 32) 174.
Cf. The long arm of EU data protection law (n 17) 29.
Ibid, p. 29 30 (emphasis added). The use of a virtual connection to EU
territory as a means to regulate conduct taking place abroad is similar to
(but not the same as) the concept of territorial extension, whereby the
EU indirectly exports its standards to other jurisdictions by virtue of a
territorial connection. See Joanne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial
Extension in EU Law (2014) (62) (1) AJCL, 90. The Data Protection
Directive provides an example of territorial extension not in Article
4(1)a but in one of its other provisions, namely in Article 25 (in that it
entails evaluation of foreign legal systems with export from the EU as a
territorial trigger). See J. Scott, The New EU Extraterritoriality (2014),
manuscript on file with author.
Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Law of the Foreign Relations (n 34). See also
The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 82; Cedric
Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, United States and European
perspectives (2007) PhD. Thesis, 198, ,https://lirias.kuleuven.be/
bitstream/1979/911/2/doctoraat.pdf. accessed at 11 December 2014. See
also M. Huffman, A Retrospective of Twenty-Five Years on the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Houston Law Review 2007, Vol. 44,
p. 285, 298 300.
Cf. The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 82.
See also Deepa Rishikesh, Extraterritoriality Versus Sovereignty in
International Antitrust Jurisdiction (1990) (14)(3) World Competition,
49; Cf. A Retrospective of Twenty-Five Years (n 43).
See more generally John H. Currie, Public International Law (Irwin Law,
2001), 300.
in Google Spain, namely the effects principle. The effects
principle stipulates that a State may regulate behaviour
which takes place outside its territory insofar as it produces substantial effects within its territory.43 This principle is frequently applied in competition matters,
whereby States use it to assert jurisdiction over foreign
practices, which restrict competition in national
markets.44
Even though the effects principle has been developed
in the context of antitrust law,45 its logic can be extended
to other areas of law, including data protection law.
Similar to antitrust law, data protection cannot be fully
effective when applied strictly territorially.46 Moreover,
international human rights law offers direct support for
the proposition that States should consider the effects of
foreign conduct on their citizens privacy.47 In its ruling,
the Google Spain Court made repeated reference to the
need to ensure effective and complete protection of individuals.48 It also noted, on several occasions, that the
processing of personal data by search engines may bring
about a serious interference with the rights which Directive 95/46 was designed to protect.49 This language
suggests that the CJEUs conclusion was motivated in no
small part by the recognition that Googles search engine
activities may have a real impact (ie substantial effect)
on EU data subjects.50 In the words of the CJEU,
[. . .] it cannot be accepted that the processing of personal
data carried out for the purposes of the operation of the
Svantensson points out that signatories to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are in fact under an obligation to
provide legal protection against unlawful attacks on the privacy of the people
subject to its jurisdiction and those present within its territory, regardless of
the origins of the attack. (Cf. The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy
Laws (n 16) 78). Similar considerations apply in relation to the European
Convention of Human Rights and the European Charter of Fundamental
At first glance, the language of the CJEU may appear to be a reference to
the protective principle, according to which States may claim jurisdiction
over activities abroad which threaten its national interests. However, the
protective principle is typically invoked to protect state interests rather
than individual interests (eg national security). Cf. Jurisdiction in
International Law (n 43) 102 et seq. One might also infer from the CJEUs
language that the passive personality principle is at play, according to
which States may prosecute foreign nationals for offences committed
abroad that affect its own citizens. However, the application of this
principle is typically only considered justified in very serious crimes, such
as terrorism. See eg John G. McCarthy, The passive Personality Principle
and Its Use in Combating International Terrorism (1990) (13)(3)
Fordham Int. L.J., 307 8. Moreover, early commentaries of Directive 95/
46 suggest that the territorial scope of Directive 95/46 does not take into
account nationality or even the domicile of data subjects as such. See Back
to basics (n 22) 97.
Case C-131/12, paras 80 1.
To be clear, the protection offered by Directive 95/46 is not limited to EU
citizens, but extends to any individuals falling within the jurisdiction of a
State, which has implemented Directive 95/46. The term EU data
subjects thus refers to individuals falling within the jurisdiction of a State
belonging to the EEA.
The formal place of establishment of the controller is not
relevant [. . .] The controller of the data itself may be established outside of the EU. [. . .] [T]he territoriality principle
is in fact adhered to by Article 4(1)a as the data processing is
virtually connected to the territory of the EU (ie takes place in
the context of the activities of the establishment in the
Member State).42
search engine should escape the obligations and guarantees
laid down by Directive 95/46, which would compromise the
directives effectiveness and the effective and complete protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons which the directive seeks to ensure [. . .].51
CJEU, Case C-131/12, paragraph 58.
Cf. The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 85.
Cf. The long arm of EU data protection law (n 17) 41. See also Cf. Data
Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (n 14) 189.
See eg Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (n
14) 190. For example, the EU Derivatives Regulation imposes obligations
on contracts among entities in third countries only if those contracts have
a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU. [Regulation No.
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on
OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, O.J. 27 July
2012, L/201 59 at articles 4(1)v and article 11(12)]. (Cf.
Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law (n 42) 95.) Section
3.3 will discuss in greater detail how the competing interests of effective
enforcement of national rules and the principle of non-interference with
other States sovereignty might be balanced.
See generally Daniel Castro and Robert Atkinson, Beyond Internet
Universalism: A Framework for Addressing Cross-border Internet Policy
(2014) ITIF, 1 7 ,http://www2.itif.org/2014-crossborder-internet-policy.
pdf. accessed 19 December 2014.
See also Jonathan Zittrain, Be Careful What You Ask For: Reconciling a
Global Internet and Local Law (2003) Harvard Law School Public Law,
Research Paper No. 2003 03 5/2003, 5 ,http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
wg_home/uploads/204/2003-03.pdf. accessed 20 December 2014.
One might argue that the processing at issue in Google Spain (ie crawling,
indexing, storage, and referencing of webpage content) relies only to a
limited extent on the processing of personal data (as it seems reasonable
to assume that the majority of webpage content is still non-personal in
nature). This argument does, however, not preclude the CJEUs
interpretation: Article 4(1)a does not impose a quantitative threshold
with regard to the amount of personal data being processed. Furthermore,
as the present case concerns inter alia indexation on the basis of a persons
personal data processing is an important aspect.57 In
other words, holding Article 4(1)a inapplicable would be
the equivalent of extending special guest status to
foreign data controllers who offer their (data-intensive)
services on the EU market.58 If one considers that the
sale of advertising space is intrinsically linked to the
offering of the search engine service, it was quite logical
to hold Article 4(1)a applicable to the facts of Google
Finally, it is worth observing that the CJEU also took
note of a number of additional factors, which point to a
strong connection with EU territory. In particular, the
CJEU noted that
- there is a local version of Google Search that is offered
in Spanish through the website www.google.es;
- Google Search also indexes websites located in Spain;
- the Google group has recourse to its subsidiary Google
Spain for promoting the sale of advertising space generated on the website www.google.com; and
- Google Search is one of the most used search engines
in Spain.59
Although these factors were not explicitly relied upon by
the CJEU when considering the applicability of Article
4(1)a, they might nevertheless be considered as signs of a
close territorial connection with an EU Member State.60
To be clear, the assertions of jurisdiction in Google Spain
were at least partially extraterritorial.61 A significant
name, it would be illogical to exclude this processing from the territorial
scope of Directive 95/46 solely because the controller also engages in nonpersonal data processing.
Applying different rules to guests would undermine EU data protection
rules as well as create legitimacy problems. See also Kohl, U., Barbarians
in Our Midst: Cultural Diversity on the Transnational Internet. (2014)
European Journal of Law and Technology (5)(1) ,http://ejlt.org/article/
view/304/426. accessed 2 March 2015. Of course, this reasoning does not
extend to situations where the processing at issue is totally unrelated to
the activities of the establishment in question, which is precisely what
Googles counsel was arguing. For example, if a parent company is
engaged in a wide range of different processing activities, and some
subsidiaries only offer support for certain activities (and not for others),
different laws may be applicable (see also Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law
(n 16) 12 7). However, we consider the proposition advanced by (a.o.)
the European Commission, ie that there is a sufficient connection between
the activities of Google Spain and Googles search engine service,
reasonably sufficient to justify application of EU data protection law to
Case C-131/12, para 43. See also Albert Gidari, Client Update: The Right
to be Forgotten, Everywhere (Perkins Coie, Privacy & Security, 6 April
2014) ,http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-right-to-be-forgotteneverywhere-48744. accessed 20 December 2014.
Section 3.3 will discuss how the effects principle can be combined with the
presence of territorial nexi in order to justify assertions of extraterritorial
Contra: Cf. Client Update (n 59) accessed 25 February 2015 ([. . .] it is not
an extraterritorial act at all to apply local law against a controller deemed
to have an establishment within the territory). For a discussion of the
concept of extraterritoriality, see The Extraterritoriality of EU Data
The CJEUs implicit reliance upon the effects principle
in a cross-border dispute involving data privacy is by no
means novel. Svantesson has previously argued that
[t]he types of extraterritorial claims found in the context of
data privacy seem to fall squarely within the effects doctrine.52 Moerel has likewise pointed out that the jurisdictional grounds of 4(1) have been interpreted in such a
way as to extend protection to EU data subjects, even
though the language of Directive 95/46 mainly focusses
on territorial nexi.53
The effects principle is a controversial basis of jurisdiction,54 particularly in relation to internet content
regulation.55 Owing to the global nature of the internet,
any State might claim to be affected by online content
originating from anywhere in the world.56 However,
CJEUs interpretation of article 4(1)a is quite logical if
one considers the alternative. If the CJEU had ruled
otherwise, this would, in the long run, create an unfair
competitive advantage for non-EU based companies
(who only have subsidiaries in the EU) over EU companies (who have headquarters in the EU). The advantage
would be particularly significant in markets where
Territorial reach of the right to be
Think locally, but act globally?
The second jurisdictional issue raised by the Google
Spain ruling concerns its implementation. How far
should the right to be delisted extend, geographically
speaking? Should search engine providers modify their
search results globally? Or should they only be expected
to modify search results shown within the EU? In theory,
one could imagine roughly three modes of implementation:
1. Domain-based: search results are modified according
to the domain name extension used to access the
search engine (e.g., google.es, google.be, and google.com);
Privacy Laws (n 16) 60. See also Cf. Extraterritoriality and Territorial
Extension in EU Law (n 42).
In the same vein: Dan J. B. Svantesson, After Microsoft v. U.S.Law
Enforcement in the Cloud (1 of 2), (LinkedIn blog 31 December 2014)
,https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/after-microsoft-v-us-law-enforcementcloud-1-2-svantesson?_mSplash=1&trk=mp-reader-card. accessed 25
Id. (noting that it may be more useful to assess whether whether
jurisdictional claims with an extraterritorial effect can create clashes of
interest with foreign state) (Id.) See also Dan J.B. Svantesson, After
Microsoft v. U.S.Law Enforcement in the Cloud (2 of 2), (LinkedIn
blog 5 January 2015) ,https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/after-microsoftv-us-law-enforcement-cloud-2-dan-jerker-b-svantesson. (arguing that
to hold otherwise reflects an narrow and outdated view of
extraterritoriality).
For a more detailed discussion on how such an assessment could be made,
see Cedric Ryngaert and Marieke Koekkoek, Extraterritorial Regulation
of Natural Resources, A Functional Approach, in Wouters et al. (eds),
Ensuring Good Global Governance Through Trade, An Assessment of New
EU Trade Policies and Approaches, Edward Elgar Publishing (Forthcoming
summer 2015).
2. Geographic filtering: search results are tailored according to the geographic origin of the search query, regardless of which domain is used; or
3. Global implementation: all search results are modified,
worldwide, regardless of the geographic origin of the
query or domain name extension used to access the
As mentioned in the introduction, Googles current approach is largely65 domain-based, whereby it limits delisting to the European versions of its search engine. While
certain results might have been removed from google.es
or google.be, they remain available by a simple switch to
google.com or any other non-EEA domain name extension (e.g., google.ca).66 By making it so easy to retrieve
delisted search results, Googles current approach arguably undermines the effectiveness of the CJEU ruling.67
On the other hand, implementing local requirements on a
global scale can bring about unintended consequences,
not least with regard to the freedom of expression.68 After
all, the fundamental right to freedom of expression comprises the freedom to receive and impart information regardless of frontiers.69 So how should search engines
implement the ruling?
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that the
Google Spain ruling offers no explicit guidance on this
point. Nothing in the ruling of the CJEU suggests that
Google is justified in limiting its implementation to specific websites, countries, or regions.70 Nor does the ruling
explicitly require Google to extend its implementation to
non-EEA countries or domains. According to the Article
29 Working Party, however, Googles current domainbased approach is woefully inadequate. It reasoned that
Although concrete solutions may vary depending on the
internal organization and structure of search engines, delisting decisions must be implemented in a way that
As we will see later, Google actually combines the domain-based approach
with soft geographic filtering: when a user located outside the United
States types google.com as a URL, Google will first automatically redirect
the user to country-specific version of the search based on the geographic
origin of the query. Svantensson classifies this approach as the country
lens approach. See Dan J.B. Svantesson, Delineating the Reach of internet
intermediaries Content BlockingccTLD Blocking, Strict Geolocation Blocking or a Country Lens Approach? (2014) (11)(2)
SCRIPTed, 165,,http://script-ed.org/?p=1539. accessed 19 December
Switching between domains is facilitated by Google, which currently
offers a button linking to google.com at the bottom of the page of any
European version of the search engine. If an EU types for example
google.ca, there is no automatic initial redirect.
See also Europe debates how far to push right to be forgotten (n 9).
In the same vein, Cf. Beyond Internet Universalism (n 55); See Delineating
the Reach of internet intermediaries (n 65) 115.
See eg Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights; Article 11
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19 of the
Cf. Client Update (n 59).
portion of the regulated and adjudicated conduct took
place on foreign soil (e.g., it was Google Inc., with its
headquarters in Mountain View, which acted as the controller of the processing at issue). While the facts also
involved territorial nexi with EU territory, it would be
incorrect to say that Google Spain did not involve an
extraterritorial claim of jurisdiction.62 As argued by
Svantesson, rather than the location of a specific action,
the underlying interests at stake should also be considered when determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction is extraterritorial or not.63 However, this is not to
say that every application of Article 4(1)a of Directive
95/46 involves an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction, even if it has implications beyond EU territory. It is
inherent to the complexity of an interest-based approach
that the assessment of whether an exercise of jurisdiction
is extraterritorial or not shall be determined on a caseby-case basis.64
guarantees the effective and complete protection of these
rights and that EU law cannot be easily circumvented. In that
sense, limiting de-listing to EU domains on the grounds that
users tend to access search engines via their national
domains cannot be considered a sufficient means to satisfactorily guarantee the rights of data subjects according to the
judgment. In practice, this means that in any case de-listing
should also be effective on all relevant domains, including.
Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [. . .]
recognizes the right to data protection to everyone. In
practice, DPAs will focus on claims where there is a clear
link between the data subject and the EU, for instance where
the data subject is a citizen or resident of an EU Member
State.73
Notwithstanding this limitation, there remains a risk of
interference with the territorial sovereignty of non-EEA
countries. After all, an order to modify search results globally would impact search results shown in non-EEA
countries. While the target of the search might be a European citizen or resident, one cannot exclude the possibility that this person is of interest to the constituents of
other States. Case law has already made clear that this risk
is not merely hypothetical.74
Cf. Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice (n 10) para 20.
In this regard, one should note that language used in the executive
summary of the Working Partys document is stronger than the language
used in the body of the text. Here the Working Party observes that delisting decisions must be implemented in such a way that they guarantee the
effective and complete protection of data subjects rights and that EU law
cannot be circumvented. One could argue that the omission of the word
easily suggests that only global delisting would be deemed satisfactory.
On the other hand, the phrasing although concrete solutions may vary
depending on the internal organization and structure of search engines
clearly indicates there may be scenarios in which global implementation
across all domains would not be required. In Google Spain, the CJEU held
that the processing of data by Google Inc. took place within the context
of the activities of Google Spain. It cannot be excluded, however, that a
search engine operator structures its activities differently. For example, if
Google were to maintain separate indexes, whereby the processing
activities (such as crawling, indexing, key word advertising, display, or
results) related to one of those indexes would remain completely separate
from the sale of advertising space in the EU, application of Article 4(1)a
would be less straightforward. In such cases, however, application of
Article 4(1)c might still lead to the same outcome. For purposes of
The purpose of this section is to assess the approach
advanced by the Article 29 Working Party, using public
international law as our normative framework. In the
following section, we will analyse each of the three aforementioned approaches, citing examples from both
public and private international laws. Doing so will
allow us to elaborate further upon the jurisdictional considerations at stake with each approach. After that, the
paper will assess how these considerations could be
translated to the further implementation of the Google
Spain ruling.
Possible modes of implementation
The domain-based approach tailors search results in
light of the ccTLD (country code top level domain)
used to access the search engine. It means that the effect
of delisting a particular search result is limited to one or
more country-specific versions of the search engine
service.75 In a letter to the Article 29 Working Party,
Googles Global Privacy Counsel defended their current
domain-based approach as follows:
National versions of our search service are offered from the
relevant ccTLD (country code top level domains) for each
country, like google.fr for France and google.it for Italy.
We actively redirect European users from google.com to the
appropriate ccTLD, and European users overwhelmingly use
those services. Fewer than 5% of European users use google.com, and we think travelers are a significant portion of
those.76
Googles argument in favour of using a domain-based
approach is based on two premises. First, it assumes that
conceptual clarity, we will treat the Working Partys Guidelines as a bid
towards global implementation throughout the remainder of this paper.
The risk is well illustrated by the case of Max Mosley. While Mr Mosley is
an EU citizen, he is also internationally renowned. An order to globally
modify search results would impact the information accessible to nonEAA residents who may have a legitimate interest (under their national
law) in accessing the information. Cases like that of Mr Mosley are, of
course, the exception rather the rule. Nevertheless, they merit proper
consideration when considering how the right to be delisted should be
Jonathan Zittrain has also referred to this as google.de model, under
which links to neo-Nazi speech are removed from google.de but not from
google.com, even when the user of google.com is in Germany. See
Jonathan Zittrain, Is the EU compelling Google to become about.me?
(The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It Blog, 13 May 2014) ,http
://blogs.law.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/2014/05/13/is-the-eucompelling-google-to-become-about-me. accessed 19 December 2014.
See Response to the Questionnaire addressed to Search Engines (n 7) 3 4.
Interestingly, the Working Party did not consider the use
of (stricter) geographic filtering tools as a possible alternative mode of implementation. While we cannot categorically exclude that such an approach would satisfy
the Working Party, its language clearly suggests a bid
towards global implementation.72 The Working Party
did, however, imply that there should be limits as to who
might be able to benefit from the support of European
diction. Competition law, in turn, has a longstanding
tradition of determining at what point a particular activity hampers competition in a significant way. Article 102
TFEU, for example, imposes market dominance in a
substantial part of the internal market as thresholds.
The importance of market share might very well explain
why, in Foundem, Googles commitment to implement
the proposed measures on Google EEA Search Domains
only was deemed sufficient.84 In other areas of law, it can
be more difficult to determine when exactly the effects of
a certain action are sufficiently felt in the jurisdiction of
At least one precedent supports the claim that the
domain-based approach may also be suited for disputes
involving personality rights. In 2012, Max Mosley petitioned the Regional Court of Hamburg to order Google
to refrain from referencing certain photographs.85 The
photographs in question had been taken in violation of
the claimants private life, as previously determined by
the UK High Court.86 Although the publisher had been
condemned, the photos remained accessible online, including through Googles search engine. The injunctions
sought and obtained by Mr Mosley before the Hamburg
Court were confined to the German ccTLD .de.87
Google decided to extend its implementation of the ruling to all EU/EFTA
ccTLDs (In its decision, the CJEU presented a legal interpretation affecting
multiple countries simultaneously. We heard some DPAs and others call for
consistency across states in implementing it, and we have therefore decided to
respect that effort by extending each removal to all EU/EFTA ccTLDs.) (Ibid,
p. 4.).
Case COMP/C-3/39.740, Foundem and others v. Google, [2013] ,http
://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.
cfm?proc_code=1_39740. accessed 12 December 2014. See also Jeremy
Hodges and Aoife White, Google sued by Foundem in U.K. for AntiCompetitive Behavior, (BloombergBusiness, 10 January 2013) ,http
://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-10/google-sued-by-foundem-in-uk-for-anti-competitive-behavior.html. accessed 1 March 2015.
See Google, Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/49.740Foundem and
others, April 3 2013 ,http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/
dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf. accessed 20 December 2014.
For example, ICOMP, an industry initiative for organizations and
businesses involved in internet commerce commented that the proposed
domain name approach, limited to Member States of the European
Union, would not sufficiently address the issue. I-Comp did not, however,
advocate in favour of global implementation. See ICOMP, ICOMP
Response to the European Commissions RFI in Relation to Googles
Revised Proposed Commitmentstext of 21 October 2013 (2013),
,http://www.i-comp.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2013/12/
ICOMP_rfi.pdf. accessed 20 December 2014.
See Joaqun Almunia, Statement on the Google investigation (European
Commission Press Release, 5 February 2014), ,http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-14-93_en.htm. accessed 12 December 2014.
Cf. above; section 2.3.
A second possible mode of implementation involves geographic filtering, whereby search results are tailored to the
After all, if only 5% of EU consumers effectively switch to a non-EU
ccTLD, that would still mean that 95% of the EU consumers benefit from
The reader should note that Mr Mosleys petition concerned not only the
inclusion of the photos in SERPs of Google general search engine, but
also the storage, dissemination, and rendering accessible of the images
(or thumbnails) through Googles image search engine.
See Max Mosley v. News Group Papers Limited, [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB)
,http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2008/1777.html. accessed
19 December 2014. See also Isabel Hulsen, Man versus Machine: Max
Mosleys Battle against Google Hits the Courts, (Spiegel Online
International, 31 August 2012) ,http://www.spiegel.de/international/
zeitgeist/max-mosley-sues-google-in-landmark-battle-over-digital-rightsa-853008.html. accessed 19 December 2014.
Case 324 O 264/11 [2014], at paras 61 and 69, ,http://openjur.de/u/
674344.html. accessed 19 December 2014. In the end, the Hamburg
Court ordered Google to to refrain from spreading the [. . .] images in the
Federal Republic of Germany on all pages that belong to the domain of
[google.de]. It is not clear from the judgment why Mr Mosely limited his
petition to .de domain. In fact, the Court explicitly noted that the
existence of a .de was by no means a decisive factor in establishing the
Courts jurisdiction. Rather, what mattered was the presence of a
territorial connection beyond the mere accessibility of the infringing
content. The decisive factor warranting the Hamburgs Courts was the
objective and clear territorial connection of the [. . .] content in the sense
that a collision of conflicting interests [. . .] has or might occur [. . .] within
German territory (para 152). Owing to the nature of the content, its close
connection to Germany, and Mr Mosleys notoriety within Germany even
before the scandal, the Court considered highly likely that knowledge of
the litigious publications within Germany would occur (para 153).
the ruling should only affect European search results
(meaning search results targeted towards users located
in Europe).77 Second, it posits that its current domainbased approach is reasonably effective in achieving this
goal because a vast majority of users (95%) stick to their
country-specific version.
Google has put forth its domain-based approach in
other areas of EU law, including competition law. In
Foundem and others, for example, Google has been accused
of misusing its dominant market power to influence search
results in an anti-competitive manner.78 After more than a
year of investigation, Google offered up several commitments to address the competition concerns raised by the
Commission.79 The commitments were limited to Google
EEA Search Domains.80 Despite certain criticisms,81 the
commitments offered by Google appear to have satisfied
the European Commission, at least for the time being.82
Foundem and others offers an interesting example of
how international principles of jurisdiction and competition law can intertwine. As indicated earlier, assertions
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in competition matters are
typically justified under the effects principle. According
to the effects principle, a State may regulate foreign
conduct if it produces substantial effects within its territory.83 In light of the strong linkages between different
national economies, it is argued that foreign conduct
that substantially affects competition on national
markets can justify an assertion of extraterritorial juris-
Zittrain has referred to this model to the Youtube model, whereby certain
videos at the universal youtube.com links are withheld from certain
jurisdiction. See Is the EU compelling Google to become about.me (n 75).
Svantensson would most likely categorize this approach as strict geofiltering.
See Delineating the Reach of internet intermediaries (n 65) 162 et seq.
Geo-location can be achieved in several ways. For more information, see
Dan J.B. Svantesson, Extraterritoriality in Data Privacy Law, (Ex Tuto
Publishing, Kopenhagen 2013), 173; Cf. Delineating the Reach of internet
intermediaries (n 65) 161 8; Cf. The Proper Basis for Exercising Jurisdiction
in Internet Disputes (n 6) 17 9 and Marketa Trimble, The Future of
Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geo-location (2012)
(22) (3) Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J., 586 96.
Geographic filtering and domain-based approaches can of course also
work in conjunction. As previously noted, European visitors to
google.com (ie individuals who access google.com from inside the EAA)
are automatically redirected to their own country-specific version of the
search engine. Only if the user chooses to override, ie by clicking switch
to google.com, shall the redirect be overridden. This approach illustrates
how geographic filtering tools and domain-based approaches can work in
tandem. However, for purposes of conceptual clarity, we have chosen not
to distinguish between soft and hard geographic filtering in the context
of this article. For more information, see Delineating the Reach of internet
intermediaries (n 65) 164 5.
See eg also Carving Up the Internet (n 6) 819 21.
See also Delineating the Reach of internet intermediaries (n 65) 164 (Where
content is sufficiently valued by Internet users, they may seek to circumvent
the geo-location technologies used in order to access that content. While some
circumvention techniques are technologically advanced [. . .], others are easy
enough to be used by virtually anyone [. . .] or even inherent in the system-
by permitting the visualization of these objects in France
and enabling French internet users to potentially participate
in the exhibition or sale of such items, Yahoo! Inc. commits
a wrong on French territory, [. . .] which is at the source of
damage to both Licra and Uejf [. . .]96
The Court eventually went on to order to order Yahoo!
Inc. to take all necessary measures to prevent French residents from accessing the pages in question However, it
only confirmed its injunction after satisfying itself that it
would be technically feasible for Yahoo! to determine,
with sufficient probability, whether or not a page request
originated from French territory.97
A more recent case supporting the use of geographic
filtering is M. et Mme X et M. Y v. Google France.98 In
this case, the claimants had been victims of defamation,
which subsequently resulted in a criminal conviction.
Googles search engine connected the complainants
names with the case by referring to a website and a Facebook page, which in turn contained references to the
judgement. Here too, Google tried to argue that its
current domain-based approach should be deemed sufficient. The TGI, however, rejected the argument. Specifically, it reasoned that
It is in vain that Google France asks (...) that the injunction
be limited to links on Google.fr, seeing as it does not establish the impossibility to connect from French territory to
other domain name extension of Googles search engine.99
Several commentators read this ruling as a push for
global modification (rather than mere geographic
structure [. . .]. With this in mind, it will presumably always be possible to
circumvent geo-location technologies.)
Case No. RG: 00/05308, Association lUnion des Etudiant Juifs de France,
la Ligue contre le Racisme et lAntisemitisme c. Yahoo! et Yahoo France
[2000], 22 May 2000, ,http://www.legalis.net/spip.
php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=175. accessed 20
December 2014. This order was subsequently confirmed by the same
court (Case No. RG: 00/05308, Association lUnion des Etudiant Juifs de
France, la Ligue contre le Racisme et lAntisemitisme c. Yahoo! et Yahoo
France [2000], 20 November 2000 ,http://www.legalis.net/spip.
php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=217..
This case has been commented extensively by scholars interested in the
topic of internet and jurisdiction. See for example Jurisdiction and the
Internet (n 6) 99 100, 103 4 and 205 26; B. Maier, l.c., p. 145 8, Cf. Be
Careful What You Ask For (n 56) 10 11.
[2000], 22 May 2000.
Id. This reasoning essentially reflects an application of the effects
doctrine. (Marc Greenberg, A Return to Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo
Case and the Regulation of Online Content in the World Market (2003)
(18)(4) Berkeley Tech. L. J., 1208.)
See also Be Careful What You Ask For (n 56) 10.
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Ordonnance de refere du 16
Septembre 2014, M. et Mme X et M. Y/ Google France ,http://www.legalis.
net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=4291. accessed
geographic origin of the search query.88 Geographic filtering implies use of software to identify the geolocation of a
search engine user.89 In principle, such tools can operate
independently of the ccTLD used to access the search
engine.90 From the perspective of public international
law, the use of geographic filtering tools appears to offer
important benefits. It enables national authorities to
assert jurisdiction over foreign conduct, while at the same
time confining its impactat least for the most partto
its own national territory.91 A significant limitation of
geographic filtering tools, however, is that none of them
are completely effective. Anyone willing to invest a little
time and money can often circumvent them quite easily
(e.g., by using a proxy server).92
As with the domain-based approach, one can find
several examples of case law, supporting the use of geographic filtering tools. A first example is UEJF and LICRA
v. Yahoo! and Yahoo France, 93 one of the most famous
cases regarding internet jurisdiction.94 Here, Yahoo! was
sued for hosting an auction page displaying Nazi paraphernalia. This page was accessible from anywhere in the
world, including France, where the display of Nazi paraphernalia is outlawed. The UEJF and LICRA, two student
organizations seeking to combat anti-Semitism, filed for
injunctive relief before the Tribunal de Grande Instance
(TGI) of Paris.95 Yahoo! argued that the TGI did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case, as the facts at issue were
committed in the USA and not in France (the litigious
pages being hosted by a server located on US soil). The
TGI rejected this argument, reasoning that
filtering) of search results.100 While the TGIs reasoning
refers only to domain name extensions, its use of the
word impossibility could indeed be viewed as a bid
towards global implementation. However, its reference
to from French territory suggests geographic filtering
on the basis of the origin of a query (rather than on the
basis of ccTLD) might be sufficient.
Accessibility from within the territory of France was
also a determinative consideration in Max Mosely
v. Google Inc. and Google France. Prior to his victory
before the Hamburg Court, Mr Mosely managed to
obtain a decree for injunctive relief from the TGI of
Paris. The TGI ordered Google
The reasoning of the TGI is particularly interesting as
regards its rejection of the domain-based approach:
Whereas [. . .] [Google] argued that the court cannot [. . .]
issue prohibitory injunctions against websites other than
google.fr which do not target the public in France [. . .].
Whereas [. . .] it is up to [Google] to demonstrate that the
company referrals on websites it operates [. . .] have no
impact on that territory where these pictures were deemed
constitute a criminal offense.102
The reasoning of the TGI is interesting for several
reasons. First, it is interesting because it clearly rejects
the so-called targeting approach, an approach often
advocated in disputes regarding online content.103
Second, the reasoning implies that the search engine
provider failed to convince the TGI of the effectiveness
of its domain-based approach. Third, it suggests that the
burden of proof for demonstrating the effectiveness of
such measures resides with provider of the search engine
service, rather than the individual seeking protection.
In both of the aforementioned TGI cases, the accessibility of content (or references thereto) from inside the
French territory was determinative in establishing the
Courts jurisdiction. Although neither rulings explicitly
100 See eg Marc Rees, Exclusif : la justice condamne Google pour avoir ignore
le droit a` loubli (Nextinpact, 22 September 2014) ,http://www.
nextinpact.com/news/90020-exclusif-justice-condamne-google-pouravoir-ignore-droit-a-oubli.htm. accessed 19 December 2014.
101 Case No. RG 11/07970, Max Mosley c. Google Inc et Google France [2013]
, http://droitdu.net/2013/11/tgi-paris-17e-ch-6-novembre-2013-rg1107970-max-mosley-c-google-france-et-google-inc. accessed 12
103 For more information on the targeting approach see in particular
Carving Up the Internet (n 6) 816 18.
mandated the use of geographic filtering tools, their
underlying reasoning suggests that the use of geo-filtering would have likely been amenable, provided it is
implemented in an effective manner.
Global implementation involves delisting on all versions
of the search engine, regardless of the geographic origin
of the query or the ccTLD used to access the search
engine. This approach is arguably the most contentious
from the perspective of public international law, as it
implies the greatest interference with the territorial sovereignty of other States. Nevertheless, one does not need
to look back very far in order to find an example of an
injunction for global delisting. Although the case concerned private rather than public international law, the
reasoning of the Court is informative for our further
In Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, the Canadian
company Equustek claimed that Jack et al. had misappropriated its goodwill by performing a bait and switch.
(Jack et al. advertised Equustek products on their websites, but delivered their own products instead once a
sale was made). In the end, the Supreme Court of British
Columbia (SCBC) considered it necessary to issue an injunction with global effect in order to adapt to the borderless electronic web of the internet.104 The SCBC also
noted that Googles removal of search results from google.ca alone was inadequate to offer the plaintiff s effective relief. Specifically, it reasoned that
[A]lthough Google has a website for each country to which
searches made within that country default, users can override that default and access other countrys Google websites.
[. . .] [T]o be effective, even within Canada, Google must
block search results on all of its websites.105
The SCBC also observed that the defendants sales originated primarily in other countries.106 As a result, the
Courts process cannot be protected unless the injunction ensures that searchers from any jurisdiction do not
find the defendants websites.107 The reasoning of the
SCBC was not, however, limited to considerations of effectiveness alone. The Court also took into account the
104 Supreme Court of British Columbia, Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014
BCSC 1063, at paragraph 159, accessible at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/
jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm, last accessed 12 December 2014.
105 Case No. S112421, Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack [2014] BCSC 1063, at
para 159 ,http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.
htm. accessed 12 December 2014.
to withdraw and stop posting on its search engine Google
Images [. . .], which is accessible in France, the nine images
that Max Mosely has asked to be removed.101
The principle of territoriality implies that the geographical borders of a State should, as a rule, delineate its
ability to impose restrictions upon the accessibility of
online content.111 Both the domain-based and geo-filtering approaches sit rather comfortably with the principle
of territoriality. Under the domain-based approach,
delisting is limited to websites, which actively target the
inhabitants of the regulating State. The geo-filtering approach goes slightly further, by requiring website operators to take measures to prevent access from within the
territory of the regulating State.112 A major benefit of
108 Ibid, at para 149. According to the BCSC, this distinguished the current
situation from fact pattern underlying the TGIs judgment in Max Mosely
v. Google Inc. and Google France.
109 Ibid, at para 151. Applying this test, the Court reasoned that [. . .] the
plaintiffs have established that they are suffering irreparable harm by the
defendants ongoing sale of the [product] on the internet. The plaintiffs have
also established that Google is inadvertently facilitating that harm through
its search engines. While there are other search engines, Google does not
contest the plaintiffs assertion that Googles position as the search engine
used for 70 75% of internet searches means the defendants will not be
commercially successful if they cannot be found through Googles search
services. (Ibid, at para 152.)
110 Ibid, at paras 154 5.
111 Cf. Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6) 89 et seq. As noted by the District
Court of California: [a] basic function of a sovereign state is to determine by
law what forms of speech and conduct are acceptable within its borders.
(Case No. C-00-21275 JF, Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA and UEJF [2001] 169 F
Supp 2d 1181, 1186 ,http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/
FSupp2/169/1181/2423974/.. See also Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6)
112 Both approaches thus seek to somehow transpose geographical borders
onto cyberspace in order to create national cyberspaces. But make no
mistake: both the domain-based approach and the geo-filtering
approaches are rooted in the effects principle (rather than the territoriality
principle). In both instances, it is the accessibility of content in the
both approaches is that they minimize potential interferences with other States sovereignty.113 In principle, only
internet users residing in the territory of the regulating
State are affected by delisting.114 Nevertheless, there may
still be instances in which a demand for global implementation can be justified. As indicated earlier, the
effects principle allows States to regulate behaviour,
which takes place outside its territory insofar as it produces substantial effects within its territory.115 Depending on the circumstances, the continued availability of
certain types of content may produce substantial effects
within a States territoryeven when the content it is
not targeted at its inhabitants or requires additional
efforts to be reach.116 If this is the case, it does not,
however, provide a carte blanche: the regulating State
must still ensure that its demand for global implementation is in fact reasonable.
The jurisdictional principle of reasonableness requires
States to balance the need for effectiveness against the principle of non-intervention.117 It means States should weigh
the realization of their own policy objectives against the
risk of undue interference with the national policies of
other States.118 The main difficulty with reasonableness is
that it is an amorphous construct, meaning national authorities applying the principle may easily become
biased.119 Moreover, it is not always clear for the parties
involved which parameters will be considered relevant,
thus undermining legal certainty and foreseeability. Still,
principles such as reasonableness offer a more workable
territory of the regulating State and the resulting impact that supports the
jurisdictional assertion.
For a more detailed discussion of the respective advantages and
disadvantages of each approach, see Jurisdiction and the Internet (n 6)
140 1 (who characterizes the domain-based approach as a moderate
country of destination approach and geo-filtering as an outright country
of destination approach).
See also Be Careful What You Ask For (n 56) 11.
The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Laws (n 16) 82.
As indicated earlier, EU States are bound under human rights treaties to
adequately protect their citizens privacy interests regardless of the origins
of the attack (cf. above; section 2.3).
See Restatement (Third) of the Law of the Foreign Relations (n 34). The
principle of reasonableness is closely linked (but not identical to) the
principle of comity. For more information see Jurisdiction in
International Law(n 43) 42 et seq. See also Christopher Kuner, Data
Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2)
(2010) (18)(3) IJLIT, 244.
As a result, the application of the reasonableness principle would wind up,
not serving the interest of the international community but rather the
interest of one State. (Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (1983) (31)(4) Am. J. Comp. L., 584. See also
Data Protection Law (n 117) 244 5.
fact that the defendants activities also breached the laws
of other countries (rather than only the laws of
Canada).108
Having established its authority to issue an order with
worldwide effect, the SCBC went on to consider which
test should be applied in deciding whether or not to
grant it. In the end, the SCBC considered that one
should balance the interests of the actors involved,
having regard to all the relevant factors in each case in
order to reach a just and convenient result.109 According
to the SCBC, inter alia the following factors should be
(a) whether the interests of justice favour the granting
of the relief sought; and
(b) the degree to which the interests of those other than
the applicant and the identified non-party could be
affected.110
alternative in cases where multilateral treaty-making is
slow or unlikely to come about.120 The question before us
now is whether the EU can reasonably require global
delisting from search engine operators implementing the
Google Spain ruling.
In Google Spain, the CJEU made repeated references
to the need to ensure effective and complete protection
of data subjects. The first element to consider, therefore,
is what is required in order to ensure effective protection. According to Schultz,
Obstacles, to be effective, do not have to be impossible to
circumvent. They need only to make an action substantially
more difficult to perform, thereby altering the prices one
has to pay for the performance of actions.121
120 Cf. Carving Up the Internet (n 6) 808. Cedric Ryngaert, The Limits of
Substantive International Economic Law: In Support of Reasonable
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in Bert Keirsbilck et al. (eds), Facing the
Limits of the Law (Springer, 2009), 248. Moreover, it could be argued
preventing States from adopting legitimate policy objectives due to the
fact that multilateral action is (temporarily) impossible or inadequate
would, from a jurisdictional perspective, arguably have similar impact on
State sovereignty as an unjustifiable intervention in foreign State affairs.
121 Cf. Carving Up the Internet (n 6) 822, with reference to J. Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules (1955) (64)(3) Philosophical Review, 12.
122 See eg Ellen Goodman, Practical obscurity and the right to be forgotten:
pretty much privacy is enough, (LSE Media Policy Blog, 11 February
2015) ,http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/02/11/practicalobscurity-and-the-right-to-be-forgotten-pretty-much-privacy-isenough. accessed 1 March 2015. Practical obscurity exists where
information is technically available, but can only be found by spending a
significant amount of time and effort. Hartzog and Stutzman attribute the
term practical obscurity to the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court judgment U.S.
[489 U.S. 749 (1989)]. See Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic Stutzman,
The Case for Online Obscurity, (2013) (101)(1) Cal. L. Rev., 21.
123 See eg the specific comments by Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger in
The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, 6
February 2015, 26 7 ,https://drive.google.com/file/d/
0B1UgZshetMd4cEI3SjlvV0hNbDA/view. accessed 1 March 2015. (The
internet is global, the protection of the users rights must also be global. Any
circumvention of these rights must be prevented. Since EU residents are able
to research globally the EU is authorized to decide that the search engine has
to delete all the links globally.).
In the context of antitrust law, the concept of interest
balancing has emerged in an effort to constrain the (perceived) arbitrariness linked to the principle of reasonableness.125 When performing interest balancing, courts
weigh domestic and foreign interests against one
another, based on a list of identified factors.126 The
outcome of this balancing exercise is a determination as
to whether or not there exist sufficient grounds to
warrant extraterritorial jurisdiction. Interest balancing is
somewhat less perilous than mere reasonableness,
mainly because it requires courts to explicitly consider
both domestic and foreign State interests.127
In our view, the principle of interest balancing should
inform the further enforcement of the Google Spain
ruling. When looking at the context of internet search,
several factors seem relevant. First, one should consider
the potential interests other States might have with
regard to the referenced content. In principle, all signatories to the ICCPR have an interest in protecting the accessibility of information available on the web. Article
19(2) ICCPR provides that
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through
The exercise of assessing the potential interests of other
States should not be done purely in the abstract.128
124 As Svantesson observes: we may be tempted to say that when our courts
conclude that certain content is to be blocked or removed, we want that
blocking or removal to be global. However, the appeal of such a kneejerk
reaction will quickly evaporate upon a soberminded consideration [. . .].
[Many people] may not necessarily wish for Internet intermediaries to
engage in global blocking/removal based on court orders from all other
countries in the worldparticularly where such court orders stem from
restrictive, undemocratic laws with an extraterritorial effect. [Cf.
Delineating the Reach of internet intermediaries (n 65) 155]. Zittrain has
characterized this phenomenon as the slowest ship in the convoy
problem: see Be Careful What You Ask For (n 56) 5.
125 Cf. The Limits of Substantive International Economic Law (n 120) 239.
126 See eg Case Nos. 74-2142, 74-2354, 74-2812, and 74-2813, Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A. [1976], 549 F.2d 597, 605 08.
The list of factors are often first announced in the ruling in which they
are to be applied. These factors are not chosen in a completely arbitrary
fashion; courts apply similar factors in similar cases. See for a discussion
of different cases in which interest balancing was applied and a critique
hereof Cf. Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (n 119)
579 97.
127 Cf. The Limits of Substantive International Economic Law (n 120) 239.
128 See also Julia Powles, Results may varyBorder disputes on the
frontlines of the right to be forgotten, (Slate Future Tense, 25 February
2015) ,http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/
google_and_the_right_to_be_forgotten_should_delisting_be_global_
or_local.html. accessed 1 March 2015. ([There is]a major inadequacy in
the current delisting debateit is being fought in an entirely elliptical,
abstract, dehumanized way.)
Considering effectiveness from this light, many will
argue that Googles current domain-based approach is
sufficient. After all, the aim of the Google Spain ruling is
not to make information completely inaccessible, but
rather to increase its practical obscurity.122 Others will
argue that at least geo-filtering is required in order to be
reasonably effective. Considering the relative ease with
which the domain-based approach and even geo-filtering can be circumvented, others will argue that only
global implementation is adequate.123 In other words,
opinions will vary. The need for additional criteria is
thus clear. Absent such criteria, there is an inherent risk
that the decisions of national authorities will excessively
interfere with the sovereignty of other States.124
against global removal. Seeing as the CJEU only recently
recognized the right of individuals to obtain delisting, it
remains dubitableat least for the time beingwhether
all non-EEA countries would strike the same balance as
the CJEU did.133
Last but not least, one should also consider the presence of other connecting factors in relation to the territory of the forum State. Looking at the facts that
preceded the Google Spain ruling, one can find several
elements that would justify a Spanish order for global
129 In a similar vein (but with different outcome): Cf. Beyond Internet
Universalism (n 55) 12 4. A practical difficulty here is that States may not
necessarily possess sufficient information to fully assess the interests of
individuals residing in third countries. (Stacie Walsh, The Missing Link:
Where do Third Parties Stand in the Right to be Forgotten? (LSE Media
Policy Project Blog, 12 December 2014), ,http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
mediapolicyproject/2014/12/10/the-missing-link-where-do-third-partiesstand-in-the-right-to-be-forgotten/. accessed 18 December 2014.
130 Equally important, however, is ones mental adversary: is the searcher
someone with technical knowledge? Is it someone who might be willing to
invest some time and money to seek out delisted search results? Or is it
someone completely unaware of the fact that there may be a difference
between European and non-European search results?
131 In a similar vein (but with different outcome): Cf. Beyond Internet
Universalism (n 55) 10 11.
132 Harmonization of relevant legislation was also an important factor in the
decision of the court in Equustek. Case No. S112421, Equustek Solutions
Inc. v. Jack [2014] BCSC 1063, at para 149 ,http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/
jdb-txt/SC/14/10/2014BCSC1063.htm..
133 See however also Marc Rotenberg, The Right to Privacy Is Global, (U.S.
News Debate Club, 5 December 2014) ,http://www.usnews.com/debateclub/should-there-be-a-right-to-be-forgotten-on-the-internet/the-rightto-privacy-is-global.
1. the content at issue was published by a Spanish newspaper;
2. the indexed website was hosted by a server located in
3. the content at issue concerned a Spanish citizen; and
4. the relevant search term consisted of the name of a
Taken together, these elements suggest that the content
in question is more closely related to Spain than to any
other country. From this perspective, one could argue
that it should be up to the Spanish authorities to decide
whether Googles search results should be modified globally or not. Moreover, if Spain had decided to go after
the source of the publicationa move well within its
rights, at least from the perspective of public international lawthe information would have de facto
become globally inaccessible.
In conclusion, it seems that the question of whether
or not a global delisting order is justifiable under public
international law will depend on the facts of the case. In
cases like Google Spain, the connecting factors with the
EU seem sufficiently strong (and the connection to other
countries so weak) to justify an order for global implementation (if deemed appropriate by the competent authority). Conversely, if the facts are such that the
connection with other jurisdictions is stronger, it might
well be unreasonable to insist on global implementation.
There will always be a theoretical possibility that delisting imposed by one State affects the constituents of
another State. Instead, one should consider whether it is
sufficiently probable that delisting will actually affect
residents in other States. In cases such as Google Spain
(which involved an announcement in a local newspaper
of an event long gone by), we would argue that the interest of other States is quite low. Chances are small that the
constituents of non-EEA States would experience any
real adverse impact from such delisting. Conversely, if
the facts are such that the connection with other jurisdictions is stronger (eg if the search results referred to
content authored by a Canadian author working for a
US newspaper, or if the content refers to an individual of
interest in other jurisdictions), it might well be unreasonable to pursue global implementation.129
Second, one should consider the likelihood of adverse
impact if delisting is confined to local search results.
For example, how high is the likelihood of (continued)
adverse impact if the same search results remain available on other ccTLDs? How high is the likelihood of
adverse impact if the search engine provider were to
employ geo-filtering? As indicated earlier, the answers to
these questions will depend largely on how effective one
thinks these approaches are.130 However, they may also
enable differentiation between cases depending on the
subject matter. For example, cases involving additional
thresholds (such as market dominance in a substantial
part of the internal market) may be decided different
from those in which such additional thresholds are
A third relevant factor to consider is harmonization.
To what extent is the norm to be enforced shared by
other States? From a jurisdictional point of view, this is
an important question.131 The higher the degree of harmonization between the States, the less problematic an
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction becomes. (It is
difficult to consider the interference with other States
competences as excessive when the relevant states have
(near) unique legislation in place.132) As far as Google
Spain is concerned, this factor would probably weigh
134 Reliance on territorial links resonates well with the basic tenets of public
international law, which assumes the territory of the State as the more
preferable basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. By further considering the
adverse impact on other States as well as the degree of harmonization, the
potential for excessive interference can be substantially minimized. The
second factor (likelihood of adverse impact) is far more subjective and
should therefore mainly be considered as an additional justification for
tempering extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction in cases where
keeping it local clearly does not stand in the way of achieving the States
server location) are also EEA-based. Obviously, there
will be exceptions. Nevertheless, from a practical point
of view, it is perhaps easier to begin by sending the
message that the implementation should be global by
Search engine providers should resist global delisting
in cases where it is likely that the removal of search result
would significantly impact internet users in non-EEA
countries. In other words, providers should consider the
interests of non-EEA users when deciding removal
requests. If they reach the conclusion that the content
may actually be relevant to the constituents of other
States, they should either (i) reject the request altogether
or (ii) accommodate it through geo-filtering or using a
domain-based approach. If the individual appeals the
decision, DPAs could still issue an injunction requiring
global delisting if they believe it to be justified.
Before concluding, we should reiterate that the assessment criteria proposed in this paper are based exclusively on general principles of public international law. We
acknowledge that other important interests are at stake,
such as the power of a free and open internet as a global
force of change.137 These considerations should inform
the further debate regarding the geographic scope of
delisting. They cannot, however, be decisive. Cyberspace is not a world onto itself.138 Regulation of internet
activities is a State matter and as such falls within the
realms of public international law. Any criteria developed in the aftermath of the Google Spain ruling should
therefore also be based on jurisdictional considerations.
The EUs jurisdictional authority in Google Spain can be
justified by reference to two principles of international
jurisdiction, namely the territoriality principle and the
effects principle. While the territoriality principle typically supports a strong jurisdictional claim, jurisdiction
based on the effects principle is more contentious. A jurisdictional principle that could be of guidance here is the
principle of interest balancing, which requires national
authorities to balance the need for effective protection
against undue intervention in a foreign States policies.
Cf. above; section 3.1.
See eg Delineating the Reach of internet intermediaries (n 65) 165.
See also Be Careful What You Ask For (n 56) 8, noting that [i]nstead of
boasting an elite, libertarian demographic at variance with the mainstream
populations of the industrialized world, the Internet is less a conceptually
separate space with few direct links to non-Internet life and institutions, and
more a ubiquitous tool.
The previous section identified four factors to determine
whether a State can reasonably demand global delisting.
Of the four factors, greatest weight should be given
to the first (interests of residents of other states), third
(harmonization), and fourth factor (territorial nexi).134
None of the proposed factors are by themselves determinative. Instead, one should look at them in combination to determine whether, on the whole, an order for
global delisting might be justified.
Abstract notions of State sovereignty, reasonableness, and interest balancing are difficult to implement
in practice. While the proposed criteria may help make
these notions more tangible, critics will argue that they
are still too fuzzy. Moreover, they add complexity to
what is already a complex exercise (i.e. balancing an
individuals privacy interests against the publics interest
in having access to that information on the basis of a
name search).
The criteria developed in the previous section were
not developed with a corporate mind set. Public international law is first and foremost a matter for States,
who must carefully weigh their own interests against
those of the international community when exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In its guidance document,
the Article 29 Working Party indicated that that the implementation of the Google Spain ruling should in principle be global.135 In the abstract, this seems excessive.
The Working Partys position becomes more understandable, however, when read in conjunction with the
other guidance contained in this document. According
to the Article 29 Working Party, search engine operators
are only required to modify search results if the privacy
interests of the requestor are not overridden by the
publics interest in having access to that information on
the basis of a name search.136 If there is no overriding
public interest in the EAA, there is unlikely to be a
strong public interest in other States. As a general
matter, the risk of significant adverse impact on the
inhabitants of non-EAA States should therefore be
minimal. Moreover, if the individual concerned is not of
international interest, chances are high that other territorial nexi (e.g., establishment of the publisher and
serve as input to what is likely to remain an ongoing
debate in internet governance.
The authors would like to thank Uta Kohl Joanne Scott,
Peggy Valcke, Cedric Ryngaert and Joris Van Hoboken
for their valuable comments and feedback.
The research leading to this paper has received
funding from the agency for Innovation by Science and
Technology (www.iwt.be) in the context of the project
Security and Privacy for Online Social Networks (www.
spion.me), the Flemish research institute iMinds (www.
iminds.be), the Special Research Fund (Bijzonder
Onderwijs FondsBOF) of KU Leuven and the
European Communitys Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and
demonstration in the context of the REVEAL project
(revealproject.eu) (grant agreement no: 610928).
The contribution by Brendan Van Alsenoy has been
carried out under the academic supervision of Prof Peggy
Valcke. Prof Valcke acted as a volunteer member of The
Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten.
Neither Mr Van Alsenoy nor Prof Valcke has received any
direct or indirect financial support from Google for this
publication. The contribution by Marieke Koekoek has
been carried out under the academic supervision of Prof
Geert Van Calster and Prof Cedric Ryngaert. The viewpoints represented in this paper are entirely those of the
authors and should not be associated with any of the
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipv003
Advance Access Publication 8 April 2015
Although the existence of such a principle is not generally accepted, some courts have already referred to it as a
basis of limiting the extent to which jurisdiction could
The Article 29 Working Party was rather succinct
regarding the extraterritorial effects of the EUs right to
be delisted. Its guidance document contains no evidence
of a weighing of EU interests against the interests of
other States. Still, it may depend on the circumstances of
each case whether or not global delisting is appropriate.
In Google Spain, there were several elements, which provided a particularly strong link to EU territory. As a
result, insistence on global delisting in such a case may
be justified. However, it should not be excluded that
there may also be situations in which there are also
strong connections to other States, rendering bids for
global delisting more contentious.
Effectiveness of regulation is and will remain an important factor in deciding questions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Preventing States from effectively enforcing
their legislation is as much an infringement of sovereignty as applying domestic regulation extraterritorially.
However, effectiveness cannot be the sole criterion upon
which the further implementation of Google Spain is
based. This would run afoul of the basic tenet of public
international law that territory acts as the primary basis
of jurisdiction. Moreover, effectiveness alone can be
quite a subjective test and so will risk leading to bias. As
a result, one should take into account the potentially
competing interests of other States involved. This article
has proposed four factors for application of interest balancing to the context of internet search. While these
factors will undoubtedly be contested, we hope they will
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