Source: https://casetext.com/case/jackson-v-fed-express
Timestamp: 2020-02-19 14:44:45
Document Index: 628430180

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2601', '§ 120101', '§ 610', '§ 1983']

Jackson v. Fed. Express, 766 F.3d 189 | Casetext
Jackson v. Fed. Express
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766 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2014)
holding that a counseled party who partially opposed a motion for summary judgment had abandoned those claims it did not specifically oppose because "the papers and circumstances viewed as a whole" indicate "that abandonment was intended"
Summary of this case from BWP Media U.S. Inc. v. Polyvore, Inc.
Edward Scarvalone, Doar Rieck Kaley & Mack, LLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff–Appellant. David P. Knox, Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, TN, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before: WINTER, STRAUB, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
On March 16, 2010, appellant filed the present complaint against FedEx alleging, inter alia, that Sylvester and Benjamin were friends and that Sylvester terminated her in retaliation for complaining about Benjamin's sexual harassment. The complaint further alleged that Sylvester used racial slurs in her presence, pressured her to return to work while she was on medical leave recovering from an automobile accident, refused to accommodate her work to lingering injuries after she returned, and terminated her in part because of her age and race. The complaint asserted claims for: (i) retaliation for filing an internal complaint of sexual harassment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); (ii) termination because of her race, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a); (iii) violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ; (iv) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 120101 et seq. ; and (v) age discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 610 et seq.
1. Plaintiff filed a harassment complaint against a FEDEX employee in February of 2000[sic], after which, her performance rating declined.... The decline was motivated, in part, by the filing of the internal complaint.
2. When Plaintiff “zeroed” timecards in March of 2007, and was reprimanded for it, she did so under the express instruction of Sylvester.... Sylvester's motivation to write-up and subsequently terminate Jackson was ... motivated, in large part, to retaliate against Jackson for filing an internal complaint against Benjamin.
While the motion for summary judgment was briefed and pending, appellant, acting pro se although still represented by counsel, filed a request to reopen discovery in order to permit the deposition of certain FedEx employees, including Ralph Sylvester, and to obtain time-keeping reports (“FAMIS reports”) that appellant had prepared. Appellant stated in a letter to the court that her attorney “failed to subpoena [her] former operational manager Ralph Sylvester ... [and] allow[ed] discovery to close on February 1, 2011.” The letter was returned to appellant because it was not signed by her counsel. Counsel responded with a letter to the court explaining that he had previously requested production of the FAMIS reports, but FedEx's counsel had stated that “they were not in possession, custody, or control of this document.” He further stated that the deposition of Sylvester was “largely unnecessary” because it likely would “be favorable to FedEx.”
Appellant then brought this appeal pro se. On November 13, 2012, we dismissed appellant's retaliation claim as lacking “an arguable basis in law or fact,” but we appointed pro bono counsel to brief the grant of summary judgment on the claims deemed abandoned by the district court.
We express our gratitude to counsel for this service.
Rule 56 allows a party to seek a judgment before trial on the grounds that all facts relevant to a claim(s) or defense(s) are undisputed and that those facts entitle the party to the judgment sought. Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at 244. A statement of facts deemed by the moving party to be undisputed must be submitted by that party for each such fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); D. Conn. Local R. 56(a)(1). Such a statement must reference admissible evidence (when presented at trial in the form of testimony or other permissible method) in the record tending to prove each such fact, e.g., deposition testimony, admissions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, etc., seeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2) (nonmovant may object that cited material is inadmissible); D. Conn. Local R. 56(a)(3) (specific citation to evidence must be to “the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial” or to “evidence that would be admissible at trial”); Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir.1997) (“only admissible evidence need be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment,” and the Federal Rules of Evidence govern such admissibility). The non-moving party need not respond to the motion. However, a non-response runs the risk of unresponded-to statements of undisputed facts proferred by the movant being deemed admitted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); see, e.g., Jones v. Lamont, No. 05 Civ. 8126, 2008 WL 2152130, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“In view of [ pro se ] plaintiff's failure to respond to the motion, the well supported factual allegations set forth in defendants' Rule 56.1 statement are deemed admitted.”), aff'd, 379 Fed.Appx. 58 (2d Cir.2010).
A non-response does not risk a default judgment, however. See Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at 246 (contrasting Rule 55 default with summary judgment requirements). Before summary judgment may be entered, the district court must ensure that each statement of material fact is supported by record evidence sufficient to satisfy the movant's burden of production even if the statement is unopposed. Id. at 244 (district court must examine an unopposed motion for summary judgment “to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial” and that “the citation to evidence in the record supports the [unopposed] assertion” (internal quotations omitted)). In doing so, the court may rely on other evidence in the record even if uncited. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). And, of course, the court must determine whether the legal theory of the motion is sound. Thus, Rule 56 does not allow district courts to automatically grant summary judgment on a claim simply because the summary judgment motion, or relevant part, is unopposed. However, as discussed infra, a partial response arguing that summary judgment should be denied as to some claims while not mentioning others may be deemed an abandonment of the unmentioned claims.
As Vermont Teddy Bear discussed, many default rules such as Rule 55, Rule 4(a), Rule 16(f), and Rule 37(b)(2) are based on the “ancient common law axiom that a default is an admission of all well-pleaded allegations against the defaulting party,” while “[m]otions for summary judgment ... lack these ancient common law roots.” 373 F.3d at 246.
First, Vermont Teddy Bear involved a pro se litigant, and we are less demanding of such litigants generally, particularly where motions for summary judgment are concerned. See Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir.1994) (district court “should have afforded [ pro se litigants] special solicitude before granting the ... motion for summary judgment”); Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101–02 (2d Cir.2010) (discussing various forms of solicitude shown to pro se litigants). Second, the district court decision appeared to be the equivalent of a default judgment. Third, this court was left without a record sufficient for appellate review. None of these critical elements is found in the present appeal.
First, appellant was represented by counsel during discovery and at the time of the motion for summary judgment. Moreover, counsel responded to the motion, and the motion was fully submitted before the conflict with appellant over discovery developed. Therefore, the concern we show over ensuring that a pro se litigant understands the stakes in such a motion, see Ruotolo, 28 F.3d at 8 (“The failure of a district court to apprise pro se litigants of the consequences of failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment is ordinarily grounds for reversal.”), is simply irrelevant in the present matter.
We also note that, in Vermont Teddy Bear, the pro se was a defendant who had had a serious judgment entered against him. A grant of summary judgment to a plaintiff who bears the burden of proof of material facts must be supported by a strong proffer of evidence. The evidentiary proffer accompanying the motion must show the lack of any dispute of material facts that the plaintiff-movant has the burden of proving and that those undisputed facts entitle the plaintiff-movant to judgment. A defendant, of course, takes a risk in not responding to such a motion but may still prevail because Rule 56 requires the court to examine and verify that the plaintiff-movant's submission suffices to support an entry of judgment. Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at 244 (citing Amaker, 274 F.3d at 681).
However, where, as here, a defendant moves for summary judgment against a plaintiff who bears the burden of proving the factual elements of the claims asserted, the risk of a plaintiff not opposing a motion in whole or in part is even greater. To be sure, the district court must examine the defendant-movant's submission for evidentiary and legal sufficiency. But when a defendant-movant submits an evidentiary proffer sufficient to defeat a claim, a plaintiff who bears the burden of proof cannot win without proffering evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find in its favor on each fact material to its claim(s). See Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.2004) (once defendant-movant “demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” plaintiff bears burden of production to show “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” for each such fact). The present appeal is from the grant of just such a defendant's motion.
Where abandonment by a counseled party is not explicit but such an inference may be fairly drawn from the papers and circumstances viewed as a whole, district courts may conclude that abandonment was intended. Such an inference would have been proper here. Appellant's counsel responded to each of Fed Ex's proposed undisputed facts; appellant's opposition brief noted that “discovery has yielded the existence of issues of fact with respect to one ... claim [ ];” and the brief argued only that summary judgment should be denied as to that one claim.
Rule 56 also requires that a grant or denial of summary judgment is accompanied by an explanation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). However, absent some indication of a material issue being overlooked or an incorrect legal standard being applied, we do not require district courts to write elaborate essays using talismanic phrases. See, e.g., United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir.2011) (“strong presumption” on review of sentencing that the district court “considered all arguments properly presented to [it], unless the record clearly suggests otherwise”); cf. In re Mazzeo, 167 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.1999) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) explanation of reasoning does not require “punctilious detail or slavish tracing of the claims issue by issue and witness by witness” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Badgley v. Santacroce, 815 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir.1987) (same). All that is required is a record sufficient to allow an informed appellate review, the subject to which we now turn.
Unlike Vermont Teddy Bear, the record here is easily sufficient to allow an informed appellate review. Appellant's non-retaliation claims did not turn on multi-factor balancing legal tests or mixed issues of fact or law on which the movant bore the burden of proof. Here, the district court's legal reasoning is perfectly obvious. Even a cursory examination of the record reveals that plaintiff's case, apart from the retaliation claim, collapsed with her deposition. Plaintiff's deposition testimony contradicted important allegations in her complaint, e.g., she testified that she never heard Sylvester use a racial epithet, did not believe that her termination was based on race or age, was not denied medical leave, was simply asked about her expectations for returning to work when on that leave, and was not asked to do work that her injury prevented. Most of the critical facts asserted by FedEx as undisputed were, therefore, referenced to appellant's deposition testimony.
Contrary to the allegations in the complaint, appellant specifically denied hearing Sylvester “say anything that was racially derogatory or racially prejudiced or biased.” She did mention one individual who allegedly “heard [Sylvester] use the racial N word, something like that,” but her deposition failed to identify a single admissible, non-hearsay-based incident of racially derogatory language.
To sum up, when a party, whether pro se or counseled, fails to respond to an opponent's motion for summary judgment, a district court may not enter a default judgment. Rather, it must examine the movant's statement of undisputed facts and the proferred record support and determine whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment. Where a partial response to a motion is made— i.e., referencing some claims or defenses but not others—a distinction between pro se and counseled responses is appropriate. In the case of a pro se, the district court should examine every claim or defense with a view to determining whether summary judgment is legally and factually appropriate. In contrast, in the case of a counseled party, a court may, when appropriate, infer from a party's partial opposition that relevant claims or defenses that are not defended have been abandoned. In all cases in which summary judgment is granted, the district court must provide an explanation sufficient to allow appellate review. This explanation should, where appropriate, include a finding of abandonment of undefended claims or defenses.
In the present matter, therefore, the process contemplated by Rule 56 has thus been satisfied with regard to dismissal of the non-retaliation claims. b) Reopening Discovery
Relying on Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903 (2d Cir.1984), as amended, 748 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.1984), appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in not reopening discovery when it learned of a conflict between appellant and her attorney. However, in Dunton, there was an ongoing conflict of interest between a defendant and his attorney, who also represented the municipality. The defendant denied that he had a strong interest in avoiding personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by arguing that he was acting within the scope of his official duties, while the municipality had a strong interest in avoiding liability under Monell by arguing that he was acting on personal motives. Id. at 908–09. The situation here, however, is a disagreement over legal tactics, not a conflict of interest. Appellant's attorney never represented FedEx, and no motives-based conflict as in Dunton has been alleged.
In Dunton, a municipality provided counsel to a police officer who, upon seeing his wife engaged in illicit behavior in a car with another man, pulled the man from the vehicle and beat him up. The officer in Dunton alleged a current conflict of interest. He argued that, while it would have been in his best interest to assert that he was entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability because he was acting within the scope of his duties, his attorney “repeatedly stat[ed] that [the officer] acted not as a police officer but as an ‘irate husband.’ ” 729 F.2d at 907. The officer argued that counsel, in doing so, was motivated to show that the officer was not acting within the scope of his duties to avoid Monell liability for the municipality. Id. at 907 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). We held that there was an “imminent threat of serious conflict, [and] disqualification would have been appropriate here even before any proceedings began.” Id.
Even if a client does have a disagreement with her attorney on a matter such as the conduct of discovery, “all litigants are ‘bound by the concessions of freely retained counsel.’ ” Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 289 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir.2009)); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (“[In] our system of representative litigation ... each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent.”). Therefore, the district court correctly treated the pro se motion as belatedly seeking to reopen discovery.
There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion. Appellant and her attorney had seven months to conduct discovery. See Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 927 (2d Cir.1985) (when a party has “ample time in which to pursue the discovery that it now claims is essential,” a district court has broad discretion to deny a request for further discovery); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii) (court “must” limit scope of discovery where “the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action”). The scheduled time for discovery was over, and a fully briefed motion for summary judgment was pending when the request to reopen was made. A reopening under those circumstances would seriously undermine the orderly scheduling of discovery and summary judgment motions.
Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by only briefly stating its reasons for denying the motion to reopen discovery. We again disagree. The district court “substantially” adopted FedEx's reasons for denying the motion: (i) the motion was untimely, filed nine months after the close of discovery and well past the scheduling order's deadlines; (ii) it “fail[ed] to demonstrate good cause for reopening discovery”; and (iii) the motion was futile. However, a district court is not required to “write an opinion or lengthy order in every case,” and a court may “properly adopt a party's arguments on a given issue instead of issuing an order setting out a free-standing elaboration of the court's views.” Miranda, 322 F.3d at 177. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request or in not elaborating on the obvious reasons for denying it.
Appellant's request that, if we remand, we also vacate the district court's November 2012 grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim is denied as moot.
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