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Timestamp: 2016-12-09 02:28:15
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1857', '§ 1857', 'art 50', 'art 52', '§ 52', '§ 52', '§ 52', '§ 1857', '§ 1857', '§ 1857', '§ 1857', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 52', '§ 52', '§ 52', '§ 52', '§ 52']

| 10/28/75 District of Columbia, Etc. v. Russell E. Train
10/28/75 District of Columbia, Etc. v. Russell E. Train
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ETC., PETITIONERv.RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ETC., RESPONDENTS, WASHINGTON AREA BICYCLIST ASSOCIATION, INC., METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COALITION FOR CLEAN AIR, INC., BREATHERS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ATMOSPHERIC HAZARDS TO THEENVIRONMENT, INTERVENORS. THE COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM, VIRGINIA, PETITIONERv.ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT. STATE OF MARYLAND, PETITIONER,v.RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT. CITY OF FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA, A MUNICIPALCORPORATION, PETITIONERv.
RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT. CITY OFALEXANDRIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF VIRGINIA, PETITIONERv.RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENTS. COMMONWEALTHOF VIRGINIA EX REL. STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, PETITIONERv.RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT
Nos. 74-1013, 74-1575, 74-1579, 74-1580, 74-1581, 74-1582 1975.CDC.215
Vacated and Remanded May 2, 1977.
MacKinnon and Robb, Circuit Judges, and Christensen,* Senior United States District Judge for the District of Utah. Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MacKinnon.
The State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the District of Columbia, the County of Prince William, Virginia, and the Cities of Alexandria and Fairfax, Virginia, petition this court for review of the action by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in promulgating "transportation control" regulations to be included in the air quality implementation plans for the National Capital Interstate Air Quality Control Region. *fn1 38 Fed.Reg. 33702 (Dec. 6, 1973). These regulations were adopted pursuant to section 110 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5. We affirm the regulations in part and remand the remainder to the EPA for revision and further proceedings in light of this opinion. I. Background.
Under the regulatory scheme established by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1679, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., the Administrator of the EPA was directed to promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards (section 109). The standards were promulgated at 36 Fed.Reg. 8186 (April 30, 1971). Each state *fn2 was then required to develop and submit for EPA approval by January 30, 1972, a plan for the implementation, maintenance and enforcement of these standards in each air quality control region within the state (section 110(a)(1)). The Administrator was directed to approve any state plan or portion thereof which satisfied the criteria enumerated in section 110(a)(2)-and disapprove the remainder.
Since automobile exhaust emissions are the chief source in the ambient air of three of the six pollutants for which standards were issued (40 CFR, Part 50), the Administrator determined that in some areas, transportation control plans would be necessary to reduce concentrations of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and photochemical oxidants to acceptable levels. However, because of the lack of experience with such plans, the deadline for the states to submit them was extended to February 15, 1973. 87 Fed.Reg. 10842 (May 31, 1972). For the same reason, many states were given two year extensions of the deadline for attainment of the primary standards. On January 31, 1973, this court decided NRDC v. EPA, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 384, 475 F.2d 968 (1973), which held that the Clean Air Act did not permit either delay in the submission of transportation control plans or the granting of blanket extensions of the attainment date of mid-1977. The states were accordingly directed to submit transportation control strategies by April 15, 1973, designed to attain the national air quality standards by mid-1975. *fn3
The various governmental units comprising the National Capital Region created an Air Quality Planning Committee to formulate a coordinated transportation control plan. Its recommendations were largely followed by the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia in the plans they submitted to the EPA during April and May, 1973. The plans included proposals for improved mass transit, parking disincentives, emission inspection programs, vehicle retrofit, control of gasoline evaporation during transfer, elimination of dry cleaning vapor losses, a ban on truck deliveries during certain hours, and aircraft taxiing emissions reductions. They were designed to bring about a 56 percent reduction in carbon monoxide emissions and a 67 percent rollback of hydrocarbon emissions. *fn4
On June 15, 1973, the Administrator approved some portions and disapproved other portions of the Maryland, Virginia and District of Columbia plans, noting that they contained certain regulatory and enforcement deficiencies, including a failure of the jurisdictions to guarantee that their legislatures would adopt laws and approve appropriations necessary to carry out the proposed measures. 38 Fed.Reg. 16556-57, 16558-59, 16563 (June 22, 1973). After the jurisdictions submitted supplemental material to cure some deficiencies, the Administrator, acting pursuant to section 110(c), published a proposed plan for each of the three portions of the Region and scheduled the necessary public hearings thereon. 38 Fed.Reg. 20758, 20779, 20789 (Aug. 2, 1973). At the same time, EPA announced its determination that the primary ambient air quality standards could not be achieved in the Region before May 31, 1977, and accordingly proposed to give each jurisdiction a two-year extension pursuant to section 110. A "preamble" to the EPA's transportation control plan was promulgated on November 6, 1973, 38 Fed.Reg. 30626, and regulations for the preconstruction review of parking facilities were released a week later, 38 Fed.Reg. 31536 (Nov. 15, 1973). On December 6, 1973, the balance of the regulations in the National Capital transportation control plan were issued, including a two-year extension of the attainment dates for each jurisdiction. *fn5 38 Fed.Reg. 33702-31. This plan was incorporated in essentially identical form into the implementation plans for each jurisdiction. 40 C.F.R. Part 52, Subparts J, V(Maryland), and VV(Virginia). These regulations are set out as an Appendix to this opinion and form the basis for this appeal. *fn6
(2) The creation of reversible, exclusive express bus lanes on specified corridors within the Region by January 1, 1975. (40 C.F.R.§§ 52.476(h), 52.1080(h), 52.2435(f));
(3) The adoption of an inspection and maintenance program by each of the three jurisdictions, applicable to all vehicles registered in the Region except antiques. The initial inspection cycle is to be completed by January 1, 1976. Failed vehicles must be retested within two weeks, and the jurisdictions must also adopt a program of enforcement to prevent intentional readjustment subsequent to the inspection. (40 C.F.R. 52.490, 52.1089, 52.2441);
(4) The creation of a network of at least 60 miles of bicycle lanes, built to EPA specifications, in each jurisdiction by July 1, 1976, and a requirement that all operators of automobile parking lots containing more than 50 spaces provide bicycle storage facilities. (40 C.F.R. 52.491, 52.1090, 52.2442);
(7) The retrofit of light-duty fleet vehicles (taxis, etc.) and medium-duty vehicles of model years 1971 through 1975 with an oxidizing catalyst device. (40 C.F.R.§§ 52.495, 52.1093, 52.2446). (The EPA states in its Brief, p. 41, that this regulation is being revoked in light of recent disclosures that catalytic converters emit sulphuric acid mists which may pose a significant health hazard);
(8) The retrofit of all pre-1968 light-duty vehicles (i.e. passenger cars) with a Vacuum Spark Advance Disconnect by January 1, 1976. This is an unspecified device that prevents the ignition vacuum advance from working at slow speeds or in low gear. It must produce at least 25 percent reduction in hydrocarbons and 9 percent reduction in carbon monoxide emissions. (40 C.F.R. §§ 52.496, 52.1094, 52.2447).
The plan originally contained provisions for parking surcharges,8 elimination of free on-street commuter parking,9 elimination of free employee parking10 and the establishment of fees for federal parking facilities.11 The surcharge regulations were subsequently revoked, 39 Fed.Reg. 1848 (Jan. 15, 1974), and Congress has since prohibited their use. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c)(2). While the others apparently have not yet been specifically revoked, the EPA concedes12 that the regulations relating to employee parking and federal parking facilities fall within the definition of "parking surcharge regulation" in section 1857c-5(c)(2)(i) and thus are void. The EPA rejected the state-proposed ban on deliveries by heavy-duty vehicles during certain hours in favor of a retrofit strategy because of enforcement problems and uncertainties in the amount of pollution abatement which would be achieved. Finally, the transportation control plans include gasoline vapor recovery regulations,13 parking management regulations14 and provisions for the control of dry cleaning solvent evaporation15 which are not challenged by the instant petitioners.
The express bus lane regulations consist of an order that the state construct such lanes along specified corridors according to EPA blueprint and a requirement for the submission of a compliance schedule. The bicycle lane/storage facilities regulations contain similar orders for the enactment of the program and the submission of a compliance schedule and legally adopted regulations. In addition, they require each state to conduct a comprehensive study of bicycle utilization and the feasibility of various designs. In the case of mandatory bus purchases to increase the regional bus fleet, each state is ordered to submit documents showing that the necessary financial commitments have been made by the state or by its local governments. II.
Virginia, Maryland and the local governments argue that the EPA regulations violate the principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment, that enforcement of the penalty provisions of the Clean Air Act against state officials would violate the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government,16 that enforcement against local officials would unconstitutionally interfere with the authority of the state over its political subdivisions, and that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the EPA to require states to enact laws or enforce federally-imposed implementation plans. In addition, Virginia and Maryland assert that various portions of the EPA plan are arbitrary and capricious. The District of Columbia makes generally the same points, but it also argues that elimination of the parking surcharges has made the implementation plans insufficient to attain the air quality standards and therefore the entire regulatory scheme should be remanded to the EPA for reevaluation. In keeping with the general policy of federal courts that constitutional questions should be avoided if the case can be decided on statutory grounds, see Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69, 67 S. Ct. 1409, 91 L. Ed. 1666 (1947), we shall first consider petitioners' claim that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the EPA to require the states to enact laws or administer and enforce implementation plans.
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a). After the states have fulfilled this "responsibility" by submitting implementation plans for EPA approval, the Administrator is directed to disapprove those submissions to the extent that they fail to contain certain elements enumerated in section 110(a)(2). For purposes of this action, the relevant elements are subsection of that section which requires that plans contain necessary emission limitations "including, but not limited to, . . . transportation controls;" subsection (i) which requires plans to contain "necessary assurances that the State will have adequate personnel, funding and authority to carry out such implementation plan;" and subsection which prevents approval of a state-submitted plan unless "it provides, to the extent necessary and practicable, for periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicles to enforce compliance with applicable emission standards."
(e) the term "person" includes:
The question remains, what kinds of requirements must a State or other governmental entity comply with? The most obvious situation is one in which a State is operating a direct stationary pollution source such as a municipal incinerator. It is no less clear, however, that the Act allows the control of many kinds of direct and indirect sources relating to mobile pollution. Parking and road facilities constitute such sources and the control of them is a valid exercise of the authority in section 110(a)(2)and 110(c) to promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to attain the national ambient air quality standards.
We agree with the Administrator that by including the states and their subdivisions within the definition of "person," Congress clearly intended that state-operated activities which are direct sources of air pollution would be subject to federal regulation the same as private pollution sources. Furthermore, the language in the statute is broad enough to include authority to require that the states conform their transportation system to federal standards, e.g. by constructing exclusive bus lanes or expanding their bus fleets. However, an analysis of the language of the Act, and particularly of its enforcement provisions, does not appear to support the Administrator's claim that Congress intended to authorize him to regulate sources of pollution caused by the general public by requiring the states to enact statutes and to administer and enforce the programs contained in the EPA plan.
When a state fails to submit a plan or submits an inadequate one under section 110(a), the Administrator is directed by section 110(c) to "promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth an implementation plan, or portion thereof, for a State . . . ." Under section 110(d), an "applicable implementation plan" is "the implementation plan, or most recent revision thereof, which has been approved under subsection (a) of this section [i.e., a state-submitted plan] or promulgated under subsection (c) of this section [i.e., a plan promulgated by the Administrator]. . . ." The federal enforcement procedures of section 113 are directed to correcting violations of the provisions of this "applicable implementation plan."
Section 110(c) is in fact the Administrator's only recourse when he disapproves a state-submitted plan in whole or in part, or if the state fails to submit a plan, since the Act contains no enforcement mechanisms which could be used to force a reluctant state to adopt and submit an adequate plan under section 110(a). See Plan for Arcadia v. Anita Associates, 379 F. Supp. 311 (C.D.Cal. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974):
There is no judicial remedy provided in the Act or elsewhere for the failure of the state to adopt and submit a plan. The only consequence of a state's failure to submit a plan is that the Administrator, then, has the duty to impose a plan upon the state, and no other remedy against the state exists.
We hold that these statutory provisions not only empower, but also require, the Administrator to disapprove state statutes and regulations, or portions thereof, which are not in accordance with the requirements of the Clean Air Amendments. Congress plainly intended the federal statute and regulations promulgated thereunder to take precedence over state laws and regulations. By enabling the Administrator to insert his own regulations in a state plan, it provided him with the needed authority to substitute appropriate provisions for inappropriate ones. Thereafter, as legal components of the state plan, the Administrator's regulations may be both federally and locally enforced; violations thereof are violations of a state plan. § 1857c-8(a)(1); see 1857c-7(d)(1), 1857c-9(b).
In our opinion, the logical interpretation of the procedures established in section 110 is that Congress intended the regulations promulgated by the Administrator under section 110(c) to be the actual substantive regulations which would be enforced against sources of air pollution. We find nothing in the language of the Act which would indicate Congress felt that state-adopted regulations are essential to achieve the federal goal of regulating air pollution.20 On the contrary, section 110(c) specifically contemplates that some states would fail to live up to their "responsibility." As the First Circuit indicated in NRDC v. EPA (supra) the Administrator's authority to substitute his own regulations gives him ample power to correct deficient state plans in those instances.
Had Congress intended to adopt the novel approach of empowering a federal agency to order unconsenting states to enact state statutes and regulations, thereby covering state legislatures into arms of the EPA, it most likely would have made that intent clear in the statute. It chose instead to adopt the quite unremarkable procedure of authorizing the promulgation of federal regulations to govern an area it believed to be subject to its commerce power, in those instances where state enactments did not meet federal standards. The states were simply given an opportunity to bring their regulations into line within a specified time. Nothing in the Act suggests Congress saw any deficiency in its authority to regulate the subject of air pollution which would require it to utilize the device of regulating by ordering state and municipal governmental units to adopt regulations.
42 U.S.C.§ 1857c-8(a)(1). This statute quite clearly contemplates that "the person in violation of the plan" and "the State in which the plan applies" may be two distinct entities. If Congress had expected that the states would be compelled, under pain of federal penalties, to enact and use their police power to enforce the plan, there would have been little point in requiring that two notices be given. The most "efficient" enforcement from the standpoint of commitment of federal resources would be to order the state to take action against the violator and proceed against state officials under section 113(b) or (c) if they fail to act. Furthermore, this section clearly indicates that of the two parties who are given notice, enforcement via compliance order or civil action is to be directed against the "person in violation" -- i.e., the actual polluter, rather than the state.
Whenever, on the basis of information available to him, the Administrator finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so widespread that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan applies to enforce the plan effectively, he shall so notify the State. If the Administrator finds such failure extends beyond the 30th day after such notice, he shall give public notice of such finding. During the period beginning with such public notice and ending when such State satisfies the Administrator that it will enforce such plan (hereafter referred to in this section as "period of federally assumed enforcement"), the Administrator may enforce any requirement of such plan with respect to any person --
by issuing an order to comply with such requirement, or
The procedures to be followed by the Administrator in commencing the "period of federally assumed enforcement" are further evidence that Congress intended his powers over the states to be limited. Upon discovering widespread violations, he gives notice to the state. If he finds that the state's failure to enforce the plan effectively extends beyond 30 days after this first notice, the Administrator is directed to issue a public notice of that finding. The "period of federally assumed enforcement" commences with this second notice. Had Congress intended that a state's failure to enforce the plan would be a "violation," a single notice would have sufficed as in subsection (1). Moreover, the fact that the second notice must be "public notice" indicates a congressional intent that the enforcement mechanisms which become available during the "period of federally assumed enforcement" (including the immediate possibility of daily fines, see section 113(c)(1)(i)), are to be used by the Administrator against those guilty of emitting excess pollutants rather than against the state. Finally, the provision for terminating the federal enforcement period suggests that the statute contemplates the state's act of satisfying the Administrator "that it will enforce such plan" will be an act of voluntary cooperation rather than one made under the compulsion of a compliance order or civil action.
Section 110(a)(2)requires that each state plan provide "to the extent necessary and practicable, for periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicles to enforce compliance with applicable emission standards" before it can meet with EPA approval. The House Report on the bill stated:
The legislation provides that States must require inspection of motor vehicles in actual use if the . . . [Administrator], after consultation with the State, determines that the achievement of ambient air quality standards requires such inspection and that such inspection is technologically and economically feasible.
It is clear that the Federal Government, when acting within a delegated power, may override countervailing state interests whether these be described as "governmental" or "proprietary" in character. As long ago as Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405
Id. at 196-97, 88 S. Ct. at 2024. See also Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 84 S. Ct. 1207, 12 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1964), and United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-85, 56 S. Ct. 421, 80 L. Ed. 567 (1936), both upholding federal regulations as applied to state-owned railroads; Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 53 S. Ct. 509, 77 L. Ed. 1025 (1933), which required a state university to pay federal customs duties on imported equipment; and Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 45 S. Ct. 176, 69 L. Ed. 352 (1925). In its most recent decision in this area, Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 95 S. Ct. 1792, 44 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1975), the Court upheld, on the basis of Wirtz, the application of federal wage control regulations to the wages of all state employees.23
Once Congress has properly determined that the emission of pollutants into the air has an effect on interstate commerce, it has power to regulate activities which generate that pollution either directly or indirectly, and it is irrelevant that a particular source of pollution is operated by the state. Moreover, where federal regulations duly adopted pursuant to the commerce power come into conflict with state practices and regulations, the federal regulations must prevail under the Supremacy Clause. See Fry v. United States (supra) 421 U.S. 542, 95 S. Ct. 1792 (1975); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 544, 78 S. Ct. 446, 2 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1958).
In light of the foregoing decisions, it is possible to determine that certain of the Administrator's regulations are valid exercises of the federal commerce power. Where a state is directly operating the source of air pollution, e.g., a state-owned fleet of automobiles, Congress has quite properly required that it conform to EPA regulations. The provisions requiring construction of exclusive bus lanes and purchases of additional buses arise from the regulation of "indirect" sources. The streets and highways and bus systems of the states are not being regulated by the Administrator as direct emitters of pollution but rather as factors which influence the use of pollution sources by other parties. We believe that these stateowned transportation systems are analogous to the railroad operated by the state in United States v. California (supra). This situation is similar to federal statutes passed in the 1890's requiring the railroads to operate safe trains. 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Acting under its commerce power, the federal government thus can order the states to operate their transportation systems in accordance with federal regulations designed to protect the health of the nation's citizens by requiring them to purchase buses and construct exclusive bus lanes. Obviously this may be financially burdensome, but "when Congress does act [under the commerce power], it may place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States." Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 1618, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1973).
We have somewhat more difficulty with the requirement that the states construct a system of bicycle lanes, since this requires construction of an additional separate transportation system rather than simply modifications to those presently in operation. However, since we set aside the regulations relating to bicycle lanes and storage facilities in Part III, D. (infra ) on the ground that they were not supported by adequate evidence in the record, there is no need for further discussion of their constitutionality at this time.
The Administrator began his analysis of the federal power to regulate the states by observing that they have contributed to air pollution by adopting certain transportation policies which encourage the use of motor vehicles.25 As we have indicated, he correctly determined that the federal government could order the states to modify their transportation systems to correct this problem by constructing bus lanes and purchasing additional buses. Turning to his promulgation of inspection and retrofit regulations, he gave two justifications for requiring the states to enact and enforce these regulations. First, "direct Federal enforcement and massive, duplicative Federal programs aimed at vehicles on an individual basis were not the means contemplated by the Act to solve these problems." 38 Fed.Reg. 30633 (Nov. 6, 1973). Second, he concluded "that the amendments of 1970 were designed to cure deficiencies that had resulted from total reliance upon state and local action to solve what was increasingly recognized as a national health problem." Id.
In enacting the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Congress created an interlocking governmental structure in which the Federal Government and the states would cooperate to reach the primary goal of the Act -- the attainment of national ambient air quality standards. Under its provisions, state and local governments retain responsibility for the basic design and implementation of air pollution strategies, subject to approval and, if necessary, enforcement by the Administrator. We believe that this approach represents a valid adaption of federalist principles to the need for increased federal involvement. The only alternative implementation would be for the Federal Government to assume some of the functions of traffic control and vehicle registration and directly enforce the programs contained in the various transportation control plans. The Administrator has determined that this would not be a practicable way of attaining national air quality standards . . . and we fail to see how this would represent less of an intrusion upon state sovereignty.
While we have previously held that the Clean Air Act does not empower the Administrator to order non-consenting states to enact statutes or regulations in those areas where it is his duty to promulgate regulations, we have yet to consider the validity of those provisions which provide that the "State shall not register or allow to operate on its streets or highways any [non-complying] vehicle [s]." Is this regulation within the commerce power? In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall laid the groundwork for answering this question when he stated that the power granted by the commerce clause was a
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196 (emphasis added). In the provision prohibiting vehicles, it is our opinion that the Administrator, acting pursuant to Congressional authority, has merely prescribed a rule by which commerce on state streets and highways is to be governed. Thus, we find the restraints on vehicle registration to be valid. In doing so, as we noted previously, there is a similarity to the longstanding Federal Safety Appliance Act which prohibits use of unsafe equipment on railroads. 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Also, the federal regulation is directly related to existing activities presently being carried on by the states, and it does not specify the manner in which the state is to comply. A state may comply with the prohibition on registering nonconforming vehicles merely by requiring applicants for vehicle registration to submit a certificate of compliance obtained from federal officials or from private sources not manned by state personnel.
3 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 478 (rev. ed. 1966), quoting from IV Letters and other Writings of James Madison 14-15. There is no question that the commerce power is here being used not as a "preventive provision against injustice among the States . . . [but] as a power . . . for the positive purposes of the General Government." We recognize the extent to which the Supreme Court has expanded the federal commerce power, but we are not willing to expand it beyond the limits that Congress specified or court decisions presently require.
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7, 95 S. Ct. at 1795 n. 7. After considering the statute under review in that case, the Court concluded that "we are convinced that the wage restriction regulations constituted no such drastic invasion of state sovereignty." Id.
Id. at 193-94. In Pennsylvania v. EPA (supra) the Third Circuit discounted the relevance of this latter statement:
500 F.2d at 259-60. However, when the Supreme Court itself interpreted Wirtz in Fry v. United States (supra) it stated:
421 U.S. at 548, 95 S. Ct. at 1796.
To summarize our holdings in this part, the exclusive bus lane regulations and the bus fleet regulations are valid federal regulations of state activities which affect commerce, under United States v. California (supra). The inspection and maintenance regulations and the retrofit regulations are invalid to the extent that they direct unconsenting states to enact regulations and thus go beyond the authority conferred by the Act, and in part because they require the states to administer and enforce federal regulatory programs and thus exceed constitutional power under the commerce clause. However, the commerce power does enable the federal government to prohibit the states from registering non-conforming vehicles and thus the provision to that effect in each regulation is constitutional.
There is one further matter which requires some comment. The foregoing discussion has not attempted to draw any distinction between the regulations promulgated for the District of Columbia and those covering the States of Maryland and Virginia. As a federal entity, the District is obviously in a somewhat different status than the states with regard to the extent of control Congress can assert over its affairs and does not enjoy the independent protections afforded to the states because of their sovereign status. However, the Clean Air Act treats it as a state for purposes of developing implementation plans. See 42 U.S.C. 1857h(d). Furthermore, the Administrator has placed considerable emphasis on assuring that the transportation control programs are applied uniformly throughout the National Capital Region.28 To preserve this approach, we shall accordingly vacate the District of Columbia portions of the regulations to the same extent as the Maryland and Virginia regulations have been determined to be invalid. If the concept of regional uniformity of regulation is to be abandoned, that determination is for the Administrator in the first instance. III.
As each of the regulations under review has been upheld to some extent, we shall next consider the other challenges raised by petitioners. The applicable standard for review of the Administrator's action in promulgating the various regulations which comprise the National Capital plan is the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act.29 South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974). Under this test, the petitioners challenge the validity of the regulations for VSAD retrofit, retrofit of medium and heavy-duty vehicles, development of exclusive bus lanes and construction of bicycle lanes.
Maryland and Virginia also contend that the retrofit regulations in general are arbitrary and unreasonable because the states are unable to determine what retrofit devices are practicable and approvable. They argue that instead there must be a single, uniform program of evaluating such devices. In light of our prior holding that the Act requires the Administrator to adopt complete regulations, including specification of approved devices, rather than leaving the job of supplying the details to the states, this argument has been mooted.33 Further, we note that the EPA has already taken steps to establish a retrofit device evaluation program of its own. 40 Fed. Reg. 3495-3507 (Jan. 22, 1975).
E. Increased Bus Fleet The National Capital plan includes regulations requiring Virginia and Maryland to submit compliance schedules showing that they, or their local governments, and the District of Columbia have made financial commitments sufficient to enable the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority to purchase 475 new buses. Maryland and Virginia argue that this creation of parallel agreements focusing on the same object contravenes Article I, section 10, of the Constitution, which prohibits the states from entering into any agreement or compact with another state without the consent of Congress. However, WMATA was established by a compact to which Congress consented. Pub.L. 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (Nov. 6, 1966). Title III, Article VII, section 18, of the WMATA compact enables the Northern Virginia Transportation District, which represents Virginia, and the Washington Suburban Transit District, which represents Maryland, to make commitments for the acquisition of transit facilities and equipment. Since Congress has already approved a compact and provided means for funding, the most that could be criticized in the regulation might be a technical error in leaving open the possibility that these commitments may be made directly to WMATA by the states rather than from the states to the Districts and thence to WMATA. However, because the result will be the same in either case, we conclude that this attack on the bus fleet regulations is without merit.
We believe that the EPA has taken the correct position on this issue. There has been no showing that any of the regulations in the present plan are likely to be proven unnecessary in the future. Furthermore, if we were to demand the promulgation of a perfect plan before any part of it may be enforced, the air quality standards might never be attained. IV.
Subpart J -- District of Columbia
(g) With respect to the measure for increased bus fleet and service approval in § 52.472: The District of Columbia shall no later than January 31, 1974, submit a compliance schedule to put the program into effect. The compliance schedule shall, at a minimum, provide that the District of Columbia shall, on or before March 1, 1974, submit to the Administrator a statement, signed both by a representative of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority indicating that, in the judgment of both of them, financial commitments have been made by the District of Columbia for the purchase of buses. This statement, taken in conjunction with the commitments made by the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland, must be sufficient to enable WMATA to purchase in the fiscal year beginning the next July 1, the number of buses below:
Fiscal Year 1975 -- 175 buses
Fiscal Year 1976 -- 150 buses
Fiscal Year 1977 -- 150 buses
(2) "Light-duty vehicle" means a gasoline-powered motor vehicle rated at 6,000 lb gross vehicle weight or less.
(c) The District of Columbia shall establish a retrofit program to ensure that on or before May 31, 1976, all mediumduty vehicles of model years prior to 1973 which are not required to be retrofitted with an oxidizing catalyst or other approved device pursuant to § 52.495 which are registered in the area specified in paragraph (b) of this section, are equipped with an appropriate air/fuel control device or other device as approved by the Administrator that will reduce exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide to the same extent as an air/fuel control device. No later than February 1, 1974, the District of Columbia shall submit to the Administrator a detailed compliance schedule showing the steps it will take to establish and enforce a retrofit program pursuant to this section. The compliance schedule shall include a date by which the District shall evaluate and approve devices for use in this program. Such date shall be no later than September 30, 1974.
(g) The District may exempt any class or category of vehicles from this section which the District finds is rarely used on public streets and highways (such as classic or antique vehicles) or for which the District demonstrates to the Administrator that air/fuel control devices or other devices approved pursuant to this section are not commercially available.
(2) "Heavy-duty vehicle" means a gasoline-powered motor vehicle rated at 10,000 lb gross vehicle weight or more.
(5) Methods and procedures for insuring that those installing the retrofit devices have the training and ability to perform the needed tasks satisfactorily and have an adequate supply of retrofit components
(4) "Fleet vehicle" means any of 5 or more light-duty vehicles operated by the same person [s], business, or governmental entity and used principally in connection with the same or related occupations or uses. This definition shall also include any taxicab (or other light-duty vehicle-for-hire) owned by any individual or business.
Subpart V -- Maryland
(g) With respect to the measure for increased bus fleet and service approved in § 52.1073: The State of Maryland shall no later than January 31, 1974, submit a compliance schedule to put the program into effect. The compliance schedule shall, at a minimum, provide that the State of Maryland shall, on or before March 1, 1974, submit to the Administrator a statement, signed both by a representative of the State of Maryland, and by a representative of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority indicating that, in the judgment of both of them, financial commitments have been made by the State of Maryland or by its local governments for the purchase of buses. This statement, when taken in conjunction with the commitments made by the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia, must be sufficient to enable WMATA to purchase in the fiscal year beginning the next July 1 the number of buses indicated below:
(4) "Fleet vehicle" means any of 5 or more light duty vehicles operated by the same (persons), business, or governmental entity and used principally in connection with the same or related occupations or uses. This definition shall also include any taxicab (or other light duty vehicle-for-hire) owned by any individual or business.
Subpart VV -- Virginia
(e) With respect to the measure for increased bus fleet and service approved in § 52.2423. The Commonwealth of Virginia shall no later than January 31, 1974, submit a compliance schedule to put the program in effect. The compliance schedule shall, at a minimum, provide that the Commonwealth of Virginia shall, on or before March 1, 1974, submit to the Administrator a statement, signed both by a representative of the Commonwealth of Virginia and by a representative of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority indicating that, in the judgment of both of them, financial commitments have been made by the Commonwealth of Virginia or by its local governments for the purchase of buses. This statement, when taken in conjunction with the commitments made by the District of Columbia and the State of Maryland must be sufficient to enable WMATA to purchase in the fiscal year beginning the next July 1 the number of buses indicated below:
(i) George Washington Parkway -- Washington Street -- Jefferson Davis Highway from Fort Hunt to National Airport.
(c) In connection with the light-duty vehicle inspection and maintenance program for the area specified in paragraph (b) of this section approved by the Administrator pursuant to § 52.2423, the Commonwealth of Virginia shall establish an inspection and maintenance program applicable to all medium-duty and heavy-duty vehicles registered in any area specified in paragraph (b) of this section that operate on public streets or highways over which it has ownership or control. The Commonwealth may exempt any class or category of vehicles that the Commonwealth finds is rarely used on public streets or highways (such as classic or antique vehicles). No later than April 1, 1974, the Commonwealth shall submit legally adopted regulations to the Administrator establishing such a program. The regulations shall include:
(1) Provisions for inspection of all medium-duty and heavy-duty motor vehicles at periodic intervals no more than 1 year apart by means of an idle emission test.
(c) The Commonwealth of Virginia shall establish a retrofit program to ensure that on or before May 31, 1977, all light-duty fleet vehicles of model years 1971 through 1975 and medium-duty vehicles of model years 1971 through 1975 which are registered in the area specified in paragraph (b) of this section and are able to operate on 91 RON gasoline, are equipped with an appropriate oxidizing catalyst retrofit device or other device, as approved by the Administrator, that will reduce exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide to the same extent as an oxidizing catalyst retrofit device. No later than April 1, 1974, the Commonwealth of Virginia shall submit to the Administrator a detailed compliance schedule showing the steps it will take to establish and enforce a retrofit program pursuant to this section including the text of statutory proposals, regulations, and enforcement procedures that the Commonwealth proposes for adoption. The compliance schedule shall also include a date by which the Commonwealth shall eate and approve devices for use in this program. Such date shall be no later than January 1, 1975.
(g) Any vehicle which is manufactured equipped with an oxidizing catalyst, or which is certified to meet the original 1975 light-duty vehicle emission standards set forth in section 202(b)(1)of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (without regard to any suspension of such standards), shall be exempt from the requirements of this section.