Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/290/620/474571/
Timestamp: 2017-11-20 09:38:00
Document Index: 165674647

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1291', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Harrison Kerr Tigrett; Bradley Clark Kintz, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia; John T. Casteen, Iii; John P. Ackerly, Iii; Charles M. Caravati, Jr.; Champ Clark; William G. Crutchfield, Jr.; William H. Goodwin, Jr.; T. Keister Greer; Elsie Goodwyn Holland; Timothy Robertson; Terence P. Ross; Albert H. Small; Elizabeth A. Twohy; Henry L. Valentine, Ii; Walter F. Walker; Benjamin Warthen; James C. Wheat, Iii; Joseph Wolfe, in Their Capacities As Members of the University of Virginia Board of Visitors; William Harmon, in His Individual Capacity and in His Official Capacity As Vice President of Student Affairs of the University of Virginia; Karen Holt; Tillman Breckenridge; Sylvia Terry; Charles Tolbert; Shamim Sisson, in Their Individual Capacities and in the Official Capacities As Members of the University's Fact Finding Panel Formed by the Vice President of Student Affairs, William W. Harmon; John Hevner; Matthew O'malley; Steve Saunders; Mark Kringlen; Alton Powell Clark; Priya Kumar; Emily Halayko, in Their Individual Capacities and in Their Official Capacities As Members of the University of Virginia Judiciary Committee, Fall 1998, Defendants-appellees, 290 F.3d 620 (4th Cir. 2002) :: Justia
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Harrison Kerr Tigrett; Bradley Clark Kintz, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia; John T. Casteen, Iii; John P. Ackerly, Iii; Charles M. Caravati, Jr.; Champ Clark; William G. Crutchfield, Jr.; William H. Goodwin, Jr.; T. Keister Greer; Elsie Goodwyn Holland; Timothy Robertson; Terence P. Ross; Albert H. Small; Elizabeth A. Twohy; Henry L. Valentine, Ii; Walter F. Walker; Benjamin Warthen; James C. Wheat, Iii; Joseph Wolfe, in Their Capacities As Members of the University of Virginia Board of Visitors; William Harmon, in His Individual Capacity and in His Official Capacity As Vice President of Student Affairs of the University of Virginia; Karen Holt; Tillman Breckenridge; Sylvia Terry; Charles Tolbert; Shamim Sisson, in Their Individual Capacities and in the Official Capacities As Members of the University's Fact Finding Panel Formed by the Vice President of Student Affairs, William W. Harmon; John Hevner; Matthew O'malley; Steve Saunders; Mark Kringlen; Alton Powell Clark; Priya Kumar; Emily Halayko, in Their Individual Capacities and in Their Official Capacities As Members of the University of Virginia Judiciary Committee, Fall 1998, Defendants-appellees, 290 F.3d 620 (4th Cir. 2002)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 290 F.3d 620 (4th Cir. 2002)
Appellants Harrison Kerr Tigrett and Bradley Clark Kintz sued various officials connected to the University of Virginia (the "University") under provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Tigrett and Kintz, both former students at the University, were punished pursuant to its student disciplinary procedures, and they assert in their lawsuit that they suffered multiple deprivations of their constitutional rights. The district court for the Western District of Virginia denied their claims, Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 137 F. Supp. 2d 670 (W.D. Va. 2001), and this appeal followed. As explained below, we affirm.
Vice President Harmon then appointed a five-member factfinding panel, consisting of a law student (a member of the UJC), a professor, and three administrators, to hear the pending charges (the "1999 Panel").10 By letters of May 4, 1999, Harmon notified the UJC Defendants that the charges against them would be heard by the 1999 Panel, and they were advised that this panel would not be governed by the rules and practices of the UJC. Harmon further informed them that " [t]he panel will make findings of fact with respect to the pending charges and recommend an appropriate sanction to the President (or his designee) in the event of a finding of guilt." Harmon also specified that President Casteen would be the ultimate decision-maker, and that the Appellants would have the right to appeal the President's decision to the JRB "on the grounds that the sanction was unduly harsh, clearly excessive or grossly inappropriate to the offense, or for procedural error in violation of due process that had a substantial negative impact on the outcome." The JRB would be the final appeal "except on written permission to the Board of Visitors in the case of expulsion."
After reviewing the Report, the transcript of the 1999 Trial, and the correspondence of the Appellants' lawyers, President Casteen, on June 7, 1999, "affirm [ed] the findings of guilt reached by the panel." He adopted the Report's recommended sanction as to Kintz, imposing academic suspension for one semester plus seventy-five hours of community service. As to Smith and Tigrett, however, Casteen imposed more severe sanctions than had been recommended by the Report. With regard to Smith, he imposed two full years of academic suspension, rather than the one-year suspension recommended by the 1999 Panel, plus 100 hours of community service. Casteen suspended Tigrett for a full academic year, instead of the one semester recommended by the 1999 Panel, and he imposed seventy-five hours of community service. Tigrett promptly appealed Casteen's sanction to the JRB. His appeal was rejected on June 22, 1999, when the JRB determined that his case was "final under University procedure."
Shortly thereafter, on October 27, 1999, Tigrett filed an eleven-count complaint in the Western District of Virginia against the Rector and Visitors of the University, President Casteen, Vice President Harmon, the members of the Board of Visitors (the "Board"), the members of the 1998 UJC Panel, and the members of the 1999 Panel (collectively, the "University Defendants").11 Tigrett alleged ten separate due process and First Amendment claims under § 1983, as well as a state law contract claim, all arising from the handling of the student disciplinary charges made against him. On December 7, 1999, the University Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the various claims. By Opinion and Order of May 12, 2000, the district court addressed the University Defendants' contentions, Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 97 F. Supp. 2d 752 (W.D. Va. 2000). In that Opinion, the court determined that the Rector and Visitors of the University were immune from suit and it dismissed them. It further concluded that the University Defendants were immune from monetary damages in their official capacities, but that they were subject to suit in their personal capacities and for injunctive relief. With regard to Tigrett's specific claims, the court dismissed his state law contract claim, except to the extent that it sought prospective injunctive relief, and it partially granted the University Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
On April 6, 2000, Kintz filed a separate civil action against the University Defendants, which contained allegations nearly identical to those made by Tigrett in his October 27, 1999, complaint. On August 30, 2000, Kintz's lawsuit was consolidated with what remained of Tigrett's claims. On January 30, 2001, the University Defendants sought summary judgment on the claims of the Appellants. The court thereafter issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order of March 2, 2001, awarding summary judgment to the University Defendants on all of the remaining § 1983 claims. Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 137 F. Supp. 2d 670 (W.D. Va. 2001). With no federal claims remaining in the case, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Appellants' state law contract claims, and it dismissed those as well. The Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.12
We review an award of summary judgment de novo. JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Washington Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing an award of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
The Supreme Court has assumed, without actually deciding, that university students possess a "constitutionally protectible property right" in their continued enrollment in a university. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223, 106 S. Ct. 507, 88 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1985); see also Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978) (assuming that academic dismissals from state institutions can be enjoined if they are arbitrary or capricious); Henson v. Honor Comm. of the Univ. of Virginia, 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983) (assuming that student had "protectable property or liberty interest" in Honor Committee disciplinary proceeding). The Appellants contend that, as a result of the decision of the 1998 UJC Panel, they were each "expelled from the University effective immediately." As such, they assert that they were deprived of a constitutionally protected Fourteenth Amendment interest in their continued enrollment in the University.
In the alternative, the Appellants maintain that, even if they were not actually expelled by the 1998 UJC Panel, their due process rights were violated because they had a reasonable belief that they had been expelled. In support of this contention, they rely on a 1998 decision rendered in the Eastern District of New York, Sundbye v. Ogunleye, 3 F. Supp. 2d 254, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), where the court observed that it would "reject the suggestion that plaintiff must actually have been deprived of her liberty interest, and that her mere reasonable belief that such a deprivation had occurred is insufficient." As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, " [t]he first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in `property' or `liberty.'" American Mfr's Mut'l Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59, 119 S. Ct. 977, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1999); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) ("Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment."). Whether a deprivation of constitutional rights has occurred is not dependent upon the subjective feelings or beliefs of a plaintiff. In order to properly maintain a due process claim, a plaintiff must have been, in fact, deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.
The Appellants are unable, in this setting, to show that they were actually deprived of any constitutionally protected interest. And the Court has plainly and repeatedly recognized that an injury to reputation alone does not deprive an individual of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991) (stating that "injury to reputation by itself [i]s not a `liberty' interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976)). As such, injuries to the reputations of the Appellants resulting from improprieties by the 1998 UJC Panel are not actionable under § 1983. Additionally, although the Appellants contend that they suffered emotional distress and mental anguish, there is no evidence supporting these contentions. In seeking damages for emotional injury, a plaintiff cannot simply rely on "conclusory statements" or "the mere fact that a constitutional violation occurred." Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 640 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996)). Rather, the plaintiff "must establish that [he] suffered demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently articulated." Id. (quoting Price, 93 F.3d at 1254). Having failed to produce any such evidence, the Appellants' claims of emotional distress and mental anguish must also fail.
As an initial matter, the Appellants are mistaken in their claim that President Casteen was the ultimate factfinder. On the contrary, the 1999 Panel, which afforded them a thirteen-hour trial in which they fully participated, was the factfinder. President Casteen merely reviewed the findings of fact made by the 1999 Panel. While the Appellants correctly maintain that Casteen was the ultimate decision-maker, and that he meted out their respective one-year and one-semester suspensions, see supra at 625, their contention that they possess some due process right to appear before the final decision-maker is without merit. In Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976), the Sixth Circuit held that a tenured university professor could be dismissed by a Board of Regents without being afforded a hearing before that entity. Bates had appeared and presented evidence before a faculty grievance committee, which recommended his dismissal, but he was denied the opportunity to appear before the Board, which made the ultimate decision to terminate him. In ruling against him, the Sixth Circuit observed that:
Id. at 332 (emphasis added); see also Wexley v. Michigan St. Univ., 821 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (rejecting professor's claim that he was deprived of due process in being suspended by Board of Trustees without being afforded an opportunity to appear before it).
In the absence of a constitutional or statutory deprivation, the federal courts should be loathe to interfere with the organization and operation of an institution of higher education. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 n. 11, 106 S. Ct. 507 ("University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation."); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) (explaining that it is an "essential freedom" of a university to make its own judgments on selection of its student body); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S. Ct. 266, 21 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1968) (stating that courts "cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values"); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1971) (recognizing that in matters of school discipline the courts should "defer to the `expertise' of the school authorities"). There is simply no controlling authority for the proposition that the Appellants possessed a constitutional right to appear before President Casteen prior to his final decisions. Due process, as the Sixth Circuit explained, mandates only that they be afforded a meaningful hearing. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.") (citation and quotation omitted); Richardson v. Eastover, 922 F.2d 1152, 1160 (4th Cir. 1991).
In our recent decision in Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001), we had occasion to address the viability of a supervisory liability claim. As Judge Wilkins observed in that case, " [i]t is well settled that supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates." Id. at 235 (citations omitted). In order to demonstrate a supervisory liability claim under § 1983 the Appellants, pursuant to our 1994 decision in Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994), were obliged to establish three elements. Those elements are (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to citizens like them; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show "deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices," and (3) that there was an "affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by them. Id. at 799 (quoting Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990)).
Section 5 of the USOC prohibits " [u]nlawfully blocking or impeding normal pedestrian or vehicular traffic on or adjacent to University property."
Section 8 of the USOC prohibits " [d]isorderly conduct on University-owned or leased property or at a University-sponsored function." Disorderly conduct is defined "to include acts which break the peace or are lewd, indecent or obscene and which are not constitutionally-protected speech."
It is undisputed that the UJC Defendants "reviewed multiple drafts of the report, listing the Section 8 charge, before the report was finalized 48 to 72 hours before the November hearing."Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 137 F. Supp. 2d 670, 678 (W.D. Va. 2001).
Smith had filed an earlier suit in the Western District of Virginia against the Rector and Visitors of the University, President Casteen, Vice President Harmon, the members of the Board, and the members of the 1998 UJC Panel. The court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on most of Smith's claims Smith v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 78 F. Supp. 2d 533 (W.D. Va. 1999); Smith v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 115 F. Supp. 2d 680 (W.D. Va. 2000). However, in October 2000, certain of Smith's claims went to trial and were rejected by a jury.
If the Appellants could demonstrate a constitutional injury, they would nevertheless fail on the second prong of the Shaw test because they have not shown deliberate indifference by a UJC supervisor. Harmon maintained frequent contact with the UJC, and the Appellants contend that he went so far as to instruct the 1998 UJC Panel to postpone the UJC Trial. Significantly, after the trial, Harmon declined to impose the sanctions recommended by the UJC and referred the matter to the JRB.
It is doubtful whether the Appellants could make out the first prong of the Shaw test, i.e., that supervisors knew that the UJC was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to citizens like the Appellants. While there have been past objections to, and lawsuits involving, the University's student-operated disciplinary system, see, e.g., Henson v. Honor Comm. of the Univ. of Virginia, 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983), such difficulties have been with the entirely separate Honor Committee. See supra note 2. We need not decide this issue because, as explained above, the Appellants' claim otherwise fails.