Source: http://mn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20161110_0001130.DMN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-06-27 22:42:31
Document Index: 554150814

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 1441', '§ 1331', '§ 299', 'art 192', '§ 1367', '§ 299', 'art 192', '§ 192']

| Timmons v. P F Enterprises, Inc.
Timmons v. P F Enterprises, Inc.
Sonja Jeanne Timmons, individually and as mother and natural guardian of K.M.T., J.B.H., and M.J.H, Plaintiff,v.P F Enterprises, Inc., and Parker Family Enterprises, Inc., Defendants, and Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation, Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP, Jerrold D. Parker a/k/a Jerry Parker, and Don Paplow d/b/a Don's Plumbing and Heating, Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs,v.Troy Haugen, Third-Party Defendant.
N. ERICKSEN United States District Judge
the consent of all defendants that had made an appearance in
state court, Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation (MERC)
removed four actions from state court on the basis of the
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). See
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012). After their removal, the
actions were consolidated. With the exception of Jerrold D.
Parker, Plaintiff settled with each defendant that has
appeared.[1]
Order dated October 12, 2016, the Court questioned whether
the four actions were removable on the basis of the
jurisdiction under § 1331. See Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (“Courts have an
independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges
it.”); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 506 (2006) (“The objection that a federal court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party,
or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the
litigation, even after trial and the entry of
judgment.” (citation omitted)). The Court cited
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005), Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Singh, 707
F.3d 583, 589-91 (6th Cir. 2013), Delgado v. M. Lipsitz
& Co., Civil No. 3:13-4324-N, 2014 WL 11456820, at
*2-3 & n.1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2014), and Elliot v.
City of Holly Springs, Civil No. 3:10-01-GHD-JAD, 2010
WL 2505599, at *3 (N.D. Miss. June 14, 2010), and granted the
parties an opportunity to submit memoranda that address
whether the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff and Parker submitted memoranda.
substance of Plaintiff's memorandum occupies
approximately 1.5 pages. Plaintiff did not discuss any of the
cases cited in the October 12 Order. Instead, Plaintiff
acknowledged the reservations about subject-matter
jurisdiction she expressed in the Rule 26(f) Report, which
Plaintiffs' Complaints allege violations of a Minnesota
Statute (Minnesota Statute § 299f.57), which states, in
part, that the federal safety standards adopted as a part of
49 CFR Part 192 are adopted as minimum safety standards for
the state of Minnesota. When plaintiffs were considering
where to bring their lawsuits against the defendants, and
although they would have liked to directly file their
lawsuits in this court, they did not feel that violations of
a Minnesota Statute using federal regulations as minimum
safety standards in the state of Minnesota was a sufficient
federal question to confer jurisdiction to this court. While
plaintiffs are not adverse at all to litigating their
Complaints in this court and have not sought remand of these
cases to Minnesota state court, they are concerned that: (a)
this court, after further review concerning whether a federal
question herein is of the nature and type that would confer
jurisdiction of these cases with this court, might determine
that such a federal question does not exist in these cases
and (b) based upon that determination, later might remand
this case to the Minnesota state court, causing a delay in
their ability to proceed to trial of their Complaints as
acknowledging her statements in the Rule 26(f) Report,
Plaintiff asserted that the Court has subject-matter
After significant written discovery, the depositions of
numerous fact witness and party by and between the parties
herein, and after significant expert witness discovery and
depositions by the parties, plaintiff came to a different
conclusion regarding whether the Court originally had and
continues to have federal question jurisdiction of this case.
More specifically, plaintiff has concluded that the federal
regulatory provisions alleged in her Complaints, as adopted
by Minnesota Statute, were such an important and integral
part of her case against MERC and CP Chem that they conferred
federal question jurisdiction to this Court of her claims
against those defendants and conferred supplement[al]
jurisdiction of her purely state law claims against those
defendants, against Parker, and against defendant Don Paplow
. . . pursuant to 28 USC § 1367.
concluded her memorandum by asserting that resolution of her
claims against MERC and Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP
will leave Parker as the sole remaining defendant,
that her claims against Parker do not involve a federal
question, and that the Court will have to decide whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against
Parker. Plaintiff did not advocate for or against the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against
asserted that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
After acknowledging that the Supreme Court “has held
that a case asserting a state law claim with an embedded
federal question is subject to federal jurisdiction”
under certain circumstances, Parker summarized
Elliott, which is one of the cases cited in the
October 12 Order, and asserted that the case was properly
removed on the basis of a federal question:
In the present case, Plaintiffs have alleged that MERC failed
to abide by the regulations set forth in Minnesota Statute
§ 299f.57, which adopted the federal standards of 49
C.F.R. Part 192. Moreover, Plaintiffs specifically alleged
MERC violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.625 and 192.616 when
it failed to properly odorize the natural gas it delivered to
Plaintiffs' residence and that such violations were a
proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages. Since
Plaintiffs' claim for relief clearly relies upon
MERC's alleged violation of . . . federal regulations
adopted in Minnesota, this case was properly removed on the
basis of federal question subject-matter jurisdiction.
maintained that the Court should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the claims against him and that the Court
may not approve Plaintiff's settlements with MERC and
Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP ...