Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98759/labor-board-vs-electrical-workers
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 10', '§ 7', '§ 151', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 10', '§ 7', '§ 10', '§ 7']

Labor Board Vs Electrical Workers - Citation 98759 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Labor Board Vs. Electrical Workers - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98759CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnDec-07-1953Case Number346 U.S. 464AppellantLabor BoardRespondentElectrical WorkersExcerpt:
labor board v. electrical workers - 346 u.s. 464 (1953)
upon the facts of this case, the discharge of certain employees by their employer did not constitute an unfair labor practice within the meaning of §§ 8(a)(1) and 7 of the taft-hartley act; their discharge was "for cause" within the meaning of § 10(c) of that act, and the action of the labor board in not requiring.....Judgment:
Upon the facts of this case, the discharge of certain employees by their employer did not constitute an unfair labor practice within the meaning of §§ 8(a)(1) and 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act; their discharge was "for cause" within the meaning of § 10(c) of that Act, and the action of the Labor Board in not requiring their reinstatement is here sustained. Pp.
346 U. S. 465
(a) In the circumstances of this case, in which the employer was an operator of a radio and television station, the distribution by the employees in question of handbills which made public a disparaging attack upon the quality of the employer's television broadcasts, but which had no discernible relation to a pending labor controversy, was adequate cause for the discharge of these employees. Pp.
346 U. S. 467
(b) The fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords these employees no substantial defense. Pp.
346 U. S. 476
(c) There is no occasion to remand this cause to the Board for further specificity of findings, for even if the employees' attack were treated as a concerted activity within § 7 of the Act, the means used by them in conducting the attack deprived them of the protection of that section when read in the light and context of the purpose of the Act. Pp.
346 U. S. 477
Upon review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board, 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, the Court of Appeals remanded the cause to the Board for further findings. 91 U.S.App.D.C. 333, 202 F.2d 186. This Court granted certiorari. 345 U.S. 947.
Order of Court of Appeals set aside, and cause remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss,
346 U. S. 478
The issue before us is whether the discharge of certain employees by their employer constituted an unfair labor practice, within the meaning of §§ 8(a)(1) and 7 of the Taft-artley Act, [
] justifying their reinstatement by the National Labor Relations Board. For the reason that their discharge was "for cause" within the meaning of § 10(c) of that Act, [
] we sustain the Board in not requiring their reinstatement.
after January 31, 1949, were begun between representatives of the company and of the respondent Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, American Federation of Labor (here called the union). The negotiations reached an impasse in January, 1949, and the existing contract of employment expired January 31. The technicians nevertheless continued to work for the company and their collective bargaining negotiations were resumed in July, [
] only to break down again July 8. The main point of disagreement arose from the union's demand for the renewal of a provision that all discharges from employment be subject to arbitration and the company's counterproposal that such arbitration be limited to the facts material to each discharge, leaving it to the company to determine whether those facts gave adequate cause for discharge.
The company's letter discharging them tells its side of the story. [
a complaint based on those charges and, after hearing, a trial examiner made detailed findings and a recommendation that all of those discharged be reinstated with back pay. [
] 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1527. The Board found that one of the discharged men had neither sponsored nor distributed the "second-lass City" handbill, and ordered his reinstatement with back pay. It then found that the other nine had sponsored or distributed the handbill, and held that the company, by discharging them for such conduct, had not engaged in an unfair labor practice. The Board accordingly did not order their reinstatement. One member dissented.
at 1507
Under § 10(f) of the Taft-artley Act, [
] the union petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for a review of the Board's order and for such a modification of it as would reinstate all ten of the discharged technicians with back pay. That court remanded the cause to the Board for further consideration and for a finding as to the "unlawfulness" of the conduct of the employees which had led to their discharge.
91 U.S. App.D.C. 333, 202 F.2d 186. [
] We granted certiorari because of the importance of the case in the administration of the Taft-artley Act. 345 U.S. 947.
"No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. [
There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer. It is equally elemental that the Taft-artley Act seeks to strengthen, rather than to weaken, that cooperation, continuity of service, and cordial contractual relation between employer and employee that is born of loyalty to their common enterprise. [
Congress, while safeguarding, in § 7, the right of employees to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection," [
] did not weaken the underlying contractual bonds and loyalties of employer and employee. The conference report that led to the enactment of the law said:
This has been clear since the early days of the Wagner Act. [
] In 1937, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, said:
See also Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U. S. 252
Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board,
336 U. S. 260
Many cases reaching their final disposition in the Courts of Appeals furnish examples emphasizing the importance of enforcing industrial plant discipline and of maintaining loyalty, as well as the rights, of concerted activities. The courts have refused to reinstate employees discharged for "cause" consisting of insubordination, disobedience, or disloyalty. In such cases, it often has been necessary to identify individual employees, somewhat comparable to the nine discharged in this case, and to recognize that their discharges were for causes which were separable from the concerted activities of others whose acts might come within the protection of § 7. It has been equally important to
identify employees, comparable to the tenth man in the instant case, who participated in simultaneous concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, but who refrained from joining the others in separable acts of insubordination, disobedience, or disloyalty. In the latter instances, this sometimes led to a further inquiry to determine whether their concerted activities were carried on in such a manner as to come within the protection of § 7.
See, e.g., Hoover Co. v. Labor Board,
191 F.2d 380;
Maryland Drydock Co. v. Labor Board,
183 F.2d 538;
Albrecht v. Labor Board,
181 F.2d 652;
Labor Board v. Kelco Corp.,
178 F.2d 578;
Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. Labor Board,
176 F.2d 749;
Labor Board v. Reynolds Pen Co.,
162 F.2d 679, 680;
Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Labor Board,
159 F.2d 280;
Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
157 F.2d 486;
Labor Board v. Draper Corp.,
145 F.2d 199;
Labor Board v. Aintree Corp.,
135 F.2d 395;
United Biscuit Co. v. Labor Board,
128 F.2d 771;
Hazel-tlas Glass Co. v. Labor Board,
127 F.2d 109;
Conn, Ltd. v. Labor Board,
108 F.2d 390
The above cases illustrate the responsibility that falls upon the Board to find the facts material to such decisions. The legal principle that insubordination, disobedience, or disloyalty is adequate cause for discharge is plain enough. The difficulty arises in determining whether, in fact, the discharges are made because of such a separable cause, or because of some other concerted activities engaged in for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection which may not be adequate cause for discharge.
Cf. Labor Board v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co.,
130 F.2d 503.
In the instant case, the Board found that the company's discharge of the nine offenders resulted from their sponsoring and distributing the "second-lass City" handbills
of August 24-September 3, issued in their name as the "WBT Technicians." Assuming that there had been no pending labor controversy, the conduct of the "WBT Technicians" from August 24 through September 3 unquestionably would have provided adequate cause for their disciplinary discharge within the meaning of § 10(c). Their attack related itself to no labor practice of the company. It made no reference to wages, hours, or working conditions. The policies attacked were those of finance and public relations, for which management, not technicians, must be responsible. The attack asked for no public sympathy or support. It was a continuing attack, initiated while off duty, upon the very interests which the attackers were being paid to conserve and develop. Nothing could be further from the purpose of the Act than to require an employer to finance such activities. Nothing would contribute less to the Act's declared purpose of promoting industrial peace and stability. [
The fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords these technicians no substantial defense. While they were also union men and leaders in the labor controversy, they took pains to separate those categories. In contrast to their claims on the picket line as to the labor controversy, their handbill of August 24 omitted all reference to it. The handbill diverted attention from the labor controversy. It attacked public policies of the company which had no discernible relation to that controversy. The only connection between the handbill and
at 1512, n. 18. This underscored the Board's factual conclusion that the attack of August 24 was not part of an appeal for support in the pending dispute. It was a concerted separable attack purporting to be made in the interest of the public rather than in that of the employees.
We find no occasion to remand this cause to the Board for further specificity of findings. Even if the attack were to be treated, as the Board has not treated it, as a concerted activity wholly or partly within the scope of those mentioned in § 7, the means used by the technicians in conducting the attack have deprived the attackers of
the protection of that section when read in the light and context of the purpose of the Act. [
"(c) . . . If, upon the preponderance of the testimony taken, the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act:
That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him. . . . If, upon the preponderance of the testimony taken, the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact, and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint.
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
91 U.S. App.D.C. at 335, 336, 202 F.2d at 188, 189.
National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151
Hoover Co. v. Labor Board,
191 F.2d 380, 389,
and see Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
157 F.2d 486, 496;
United Biscuit Co. of America v. Labor Board,
128 F.2d 771.
See Labor Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co.,
(discharge for violation of an obligation to make deliveries, even though crossing a picket line, sustained);
336 U. S. 255
-263 (arbitrary unannounced interruptions of work not protected by § 7);
(discharge of seamen for disobedience on shipboard while away from home port sustained);
Allen-radley Local v. Wisconsin Board,
(mass picketing unprotected);
Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Local v. Wisconsin Board,
(violence, while picketing, unprotected);
Labor Board v. Sands Manufacturing Co.,
(discharge for repudiation of employee's agreement sustained);
(discharge for tortious conduct, violence, or sit-own strike sustained);
and see Associated Press v. Labor Board,
Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind.L.J. 319 (1951); Recent Cases, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1321 (1953).
The issue before us is not whether this Court would have sustained the Board's order in this case had we been charged by Congress, as we could not have been, "with the normal and primary responsibility for granting or denying enforcement of Labor Board orders."
. The issue is whether we should reverse the Court of Appeals, which is so charged, because that court withheld immediate decision on the Board's order, and asked the Board for further light. That court found that the Board employed
an improper standard as the basis for its decision. The Board judged the conduct in controversy by finding it "indefensible." The Court of Appeals held that, by "giving "indefensible" a vague content different from
unlawful,' the Board misconceived the scope of the established rule." 91 U.S. App.D.C. 333, 202 F.2d 186, 188. Within "unlawful," that court included activities which "contravene . . . basis policies of the Act." The Court of Appeals remanded the case for the Board's judgment whether the conduct of the employees was protected by § 7 under what it deemed "the established rule."
Instead, the Court, relying on § 10(c), which permits discharges "for cause," points to the "disloyalty" of the employees and finds sufficient "cause" regardless of whether the handbill was a "concerted activity" within § 7. Section 10(c) does not speak of discharge "for disloyalty." If Congress had so written that section, it would have overturned much of the law that had been developed by the Board and the courts in the twelve years preceding the Taft-artley Act. The legislative history makes clear that Congress had no such purpose, but was rather expressing approval of the construction of "concerted activities" adopted by the Board and the courts. [
] Many of the legally recognized tactics and weapons of
"Concerted activities" by employees and dismissal "for cause" by employers are not dissociated legal criteria under the Act. They are like the two halves of a pair of shears. Of course, as the Conference Report on the Taft-artley Act said, men on strike may be guilty of conduct "in connection with a concerted activity" which properly constitutes "cause" for dismissal, and bars reinstatement. [
] But § 10(c) does not obviate the necessity for a determination whether the distribution of the handbill here was a legitimate tool in a labor dispute, or was so "improper," as the Conference Report put it, as to be denied the protection of § 7 and to constitute a discharge "for cause." It is for the Board, in the first instance, to make these evaluations, and a court of appeals does not travel beyond its proper bounds in asking the Board for greater explicitness in light of the correct legal standards for judgment.