Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/787/527/197926/
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 03:41:36
Document Index: 679273987

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 1343', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 2101', '§ 1072', '§ 101', '§ 201', '§ 204', '§ 101', '§ 210', '§ 207', '§ 217', '§ 2101', '§ 1301', '§ 210', '§ 7151', '§ 204', '§ 2101', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 5732', '§ 101']

Michael J. Salazar, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services,defendant-appellee, 787 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1986 › Michael J. Salazar, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Servi...
Michael J. Salazar, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services,defendant-appellee, 787 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1986)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 787 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1986)
Michael Salazar appeals from the final order of dismissal entered by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in this case involving alleged employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. We affirm.
Salazar's complaint asserted 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (4) as the basis for exercise of jurisdiction over his claim by the district court. Section 1343(a) (4) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person ... [t]o recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights...." This language does not by itself include any waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States. Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972); Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971); Garcia v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 814 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Service Arms Co. v. U.S. Treasury Dept. Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 416 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Okla. 1975). When federal court jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to this statute, we must look to the specific "Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights" invoked to determine whether that Act by its terms expresses Congress' consent to suits against the United States by persons in the plaintiff's position.
Salazar asserts that his action is authorized by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 and the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1982). The portions of that statute pertinent to our discussion are found in Sec. 717, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16:
Subsection (c) is a clear expression of consent to suits against the United States by persons covered by subsection (a). Carreathers v. Alexander, 587 F.2d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1978); McNutt v. Hills, 426 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1977); cf. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S. Ct. 1961, 48 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1976) (Sec. 717 intended by Congress to remedy pre-enactment situation wherein many courts held judicial relief from federal employment discrimination barred by sovereign immunity); Staff of Subcommittee on Labor of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2137, Legislative History of Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (H.R. 1746, PL 92-261) amending Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1744 (Comm.Print 1972) (hereinafter "Senate Comm.Print "). The government asserts in this suit, however, that Sec. 717 does not apply to positions in the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service, and thus does not apply to Salazar with respect to any personnel action affecting him in his capacity as an active member of the commissioned Regular Corps prior to 1970 or with respect to his request to be returned to active duty from his status as a commissioned officer in the Reserve Corps in 1975.
We note first of all that it has been held that Sec. 717 does not afford protection "to the uniformed personnel of the various armed services." Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978); Gonzalez v. Department of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1983). These cases observe that although Sec. 717(a) makes specific reference to the "military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5," these departments include great numbers of civilian employees, as well as uniformed military personnel. The definitions of "military departments" and "armed forces" contained in the United States Code, as well as the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, compel the view "that the term 'military departments' in section 717(a) of Title VII, when read in the context of the statutory definitions to which it refers, can be fairly understood to include only civilian employees of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and not both civilian employees and enlisted personnel...." Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928; Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d at 1224; see also Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (district court opinion reviewed and affirmed in Johnson v. Alexander) ; 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1982); 10 U.S.C. § 101(4) & (7) (1982).
1. PHS is consistently included with the armed forces in statutory definitions of "uniformed services." 5 U.S.C. § 2101(3) (1982); 10 U.S.C. § 1072(1) (1982); 37 U.S.C. § 101(3) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 201(p) (1982).
2. Commissioned officers in PHS "shall be citizens and shall be appointed without regard to the civil-service laws and compensated without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of Title 5 [the statutes establishing pay rates and systems for employees of federal agencies]." 42 U.S.C. § 204 (1982).
3. Commissioned PHS officers receive pay and allowances according to the same statutory scheme established for the armed forces. 37 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1982).
4. "Commissioned [PHS] officers on active duty and retired officers entitled to retired pay ... shall be permitted to purchase supplies from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps at the same price as is charged officers thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 210(b) (1982).
5. The grades, ranks and titles of commissioned PHS officers are organized in a manner directly corresponding to those in the Army. 42 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1982).
6. In time of war or emergency involving national defense proclaimed by the President, he may declare the PHS to be a military service constituting a branch of the land and navel forces of the United States and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 42 U.S.C. § 217 (1982).
7. Part III of Title 5, United States Code, dealing generally with employees of the federal government, defines the "civil service" and the "competitive service" to except positions in the uniformed services, including PHS. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101(1), 2102(a) (1982). Sections 2104(a) and 2105(a) of Title 5 then define "employee" in a manner which excludes anyone not appointed in the civil service. Commissioned PHS officers, therefore, are not "employees" of the federal government.
8. The Civil Service Commission, until replaced by the Office of Personnel Management in 1978, was designed to assist the President in the administration of the competitive service. However, it was never given authority over personnel-type actions in the uniformed services. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1976); Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928 ("it is abundantly clear that the Civil Service Commission was never authorized to review or police discrimination within the armed forces") citing S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-13 reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2724-35 (summary of Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and need for reform). An exception which proves this rule may be found in certain specified positions created in PHS by Congress and expressly included in the classified civil service. 42 U.S.C. § 210(g) (1982). These positions are clearly not those of commissioned PHS officers and the fact that Congress specifically included them in the civil service demonstrates again that body's awareness of the different status and statutory scheme governing commissioned officers. As will be discussed in detail infra, the legislative history of Sec. 717 shows that Congress never contemplated applying it to federal personnel actions not governed by the Civil Service Commission, except for the clearly specified case of Library of Congress employees.
In fact the central concern expressed with respect to federal employees in discussion of this bill in both the House and the Senate was a general dissatisfaction with the Civil Service Commission's performance in implementing the national policy of equal employment opportunity expressed in 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970) (currently codified at Sec. 7201(b) of the same title) and mandated by Executive Orders 112462 and 11478,3 and a belief that that Commission had been forced into a nearly automatic conflict of interest. See House Report at 2158-2160; S.Rep. No. 415, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1971) reprinted in Senate Comm.Print at 423-425. The original versions of Sec. 717 in both H.R. 1746 and S. 2515 used identical language to respond to this concern by transferring authority for enforcing the federal anti-discrimination policy to the EEOC. During the course of hearings on S. 2515 before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, however, the committee became convinced that the Civil Service Commission was "sincere in its dedication to the principles of equal employment opportunity ... and ... has the will and desire to overcome any such conflict of interest." S.Rep. No. 415 at 15; Senate Comm.Print at 424. As a result, the bill was amended by the committee to leave enforcement authority with the Civil Service Commission and to strengthen that commission's ability to accomplish the task. It was this substitute provision that eventually was passed by the Senate and, through the manipulations of the conference committee, became part of the version of H.R. 1746 enacted by both houses of Congress.4
Since, as previously noted, officers in the PHS Commissioned Corps are specifically excluded from the operation of the civil service laws by 42 U.S.C. § 204 and from the competitive service as defined by 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq., we must hold that these 1972 Amendments did not extend the protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to commissioned officers, or to applicants for commissioned officer positions, in the Public Health Service. Section 717 therefore contains no waiver of sovereign immunity applicable to Salazar.
30 F.R. 12319 (1965) as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 11375, 32 F.R. 14303 (1967); Ex.Ord. No. 11478, 34 F.R. 12985 (1969), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 1232 (1976)
34 F.R. 12985 (1969), as amended by Ex.Ord. No. 11590, 36 F.R. 7831 (1971), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 1236 (1976). It is noteworthy that Ex.Ord. No. 11478 by its terms extends the federal policy of equal opportunity only to "civilian employees of the Federal Government," Id. (emphasis added) and not to members of the uniformed services. Cf. Ex.Ord. No. 10614, 20 F.R. 3699 (1955) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 5732 app. at 544 (1976) (the term "civilian employees" distinguished from "military personnel" which is defined to mean "members and former and deceased members of the uniformed services" as defined by 37 U.S.C. § 101)