Source: https://casetext.com/case/the-sakito-maru
Timestamp: 2018-08-15 07:33:59
Document Index: 75548249

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 409', '§ 672', '§ 395', '§ 395', '§ 375', '§ 482', '§ 72', '§ 672']

THE SAKITO MARU, 41 F. Supp. 769 | Casetext
41 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1941)
United States District Court, S.D. California, Central DivisionOct 31, 1941
Cenac Towing Company v. Richmond
265 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1959)
…The Court, citing The Watuppa and the last clear chance rule, held that the Michigan was solely responsible…
Williamson v. the Carolina
158 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.C. 1958)
…Neither contain a discussion indicating the reason for the departure from the former admiralty rule. Later…
Cluff Bullard, Alfred T. Cluff and Hugh B. Rotchford, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for Hermosa Amusement Corporation, Ltd., and another.
Gladys Towles Root and H.C. Velpmen, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for Elwood Johnson and others.
Wayland Stearns, Leo B. Wayland and Frank L. Stearns, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for Grace E. Mayo.
H.C. Eastham, of San Pedro, Cal., for Roger Culp.
McCutchen, Olney, Mannon Greene and Harold A. Black, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for Helen McGrath.
Lillick, Geary, McHose Adams by James L. Adams, L. Robert Wood, and Reid R. Briggs, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisya.
Wright Millikan and Charles E. Millikan, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for Wilma Greenwood.
Claude F. Weingand, of Los Angeles, Cal., for L.R. Ohiser.
Reay, Scharf Reay, of Los Angeles, Cal., for J. Eldon Anderson.
Wilson Thomas, of Los Angeles, Cal., for Lucy Sylvester.
In Admiralty. Libel by Hermosa Amusement Corporation, Limited against the Motor Vessel Sakito Maru, etc., and Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisya, claimed by Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisya and cross-libel by Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisya against Hermosa Amusement Corporation, Limited, consolidated, with other cases.
At the time of the collision which occurred at about 7:10½ o&apos;clock A.M. on September 4, 1940, the "Olympic" was anchored on a fishing bank commonly known as "Horseshoe Kelp", about 3.3 nautical miles in a direction approximating 160 degrees true from the lighthouse, at the end of the west breakwater at the entrance of Los Angeles Harbor and in an area that occasionally is affected by fog.
The "Sakito Maru" at the time of the collision was on a voyage from New York to Yokahama, via the Panama Canal and Los Angeles Harbor. Until immediately prior to the collision and since noon, September 3, 1940, the "Sakito Maru" steered a course of 340 degrees true. The first officer went on watch at 3:55 o&apos;clock A.M. and with him on watch were an apprentice officer and two quartermasters, one of whom acted as helmsman, while the other stood lookout, on the bridge. A lookout was also maintained at the bow until daylight. At 5:20 o&apos;clock A.M. a one-point bearing was taken from the south end of Santa Catalina Island. This bearing was followed by three two-point bearings, taken from the southeast end of Santa Catalina Island and from Long Point on Santa Catalina Island. Another two-point bearing was taken at 5:58 o&apos;clock A.M. and still another two-point bearing at 6:08 o&apos;clock A.M. At 6:28 o&apos;clock A.M. a one-point bearing was taken on the southeast end of Santa Catalina Island. These various bearings fixed the position of the vessel and the same was marked from time to time on the navigating chart.
The master of the "Sakito Maru" was called to the bridge at 5:58 o&apos;clock A.M., at which time he was told of the position of the vessel. He returned to his quarters, but, pursuant to further instructions, was called again to the bridge at 7 o&apos;clock A.M. Up until that time the weather had been good with clear visibility. The engines of the vessel were set and had been set full ahead and she was proceeding at a speed of 16 knots. At about 7 o&apos;clock A.M. it could be seen that it was misty some distance ahead, although visibility on the port and starboard sides of the ship remained good. Visibility ahead at that time was estimated by Captain Sato, before recess, at three miles, and after recess, at one mile. At 7:03 o&apos;clock A.M. an order of slow ahead on the engines was given and promptly executed.
One of the controversial questions in this litigation is the extent of visibility at and just prior to the collision. All witnesses admit that the morning was foggy but the extent of visibility varies from 200 meters to a mile and over. Fortunately, the court has had the benefit of the testimony of a number of disinterested witnesses. While these witnesses gave their estimates, they were not mere guesses because of the location of the "Point Loma" and "Rainbow", which gave them markings to tie into. They also were able to give estimates compared with the length of the "Sakito Maru". From such testimony, I am of the opinion, that the "Olympic" was clearly visible to a person standing in the bow of the "Sakito Maru" for at least 1,800 feet. One of the disinterested witnesses produced by the "Sakito Maru" was William H. Collins, Master of the salvage tug "Ray R. Clark", who holds both an operator&apos;s and pilot&apos;s license for San Pedro and Long Beach area. He has owned boats since 1906 and has spent most of his time on the waters of Los Angeles Harbor. He testified as follows:
"Q. In other words, you generally underestimate than over? A. Usually, because you will say, `I have got 1200 feet of line, and that will reach over there&apos;, and you roll it out, and when you reach the end it still doesn&apos;t make it."
This testimony and other of like character has satisfied me that Captain Sato&apos;s estimate of 200 meters cannot be reconciled, even with his previous estimates and that of his first officer, who estimated the visibility at 7:09 o&apos;clock A.M. to be about 600 meters. In fact, the court is given little help from those on board of the "Sakito Maru". Outside of the testimony of Captain Sato and the first officer, T. Yokota, no one gave even an estimate of visibility. The lookout, S. Shimada, who had three years&apos; sea experience, did not know how far the "Olympic" was from the "Sakito Maru" when he first sighted her.
Almost without exception witnesses on the "Olympic" and nearby boats, when they first saw the "Sakito Maru", thought she was going to pass them by until all of a sudden she seemed to change her heading toward the "Olympic". The records of the "Sakito Maru" and Captain Sato&apos;s testimony establish the fact that when the lookout gave warning of the presence of the "Olympic", a full starboard order was given, and the "Sakito Maru" was actually responding to such order at the time of the impact. This fact convinces me that many witnesses saw the "Sakito Maru" long before her lookout discovered the presence of the "Olympic", and long before Captain Sato gave the full starboard order.
I consider the testimony received from the personnel of the "Sakito Maru" very unsatisfactory. The Captain testified that at 7 o&apos;clock A.M. his estimate was three miles, which he later changed to one mile. The first officer testified visibility at 7 o&apos;clock A.M. was three miles. At 7:09 o&apos;clock A.M. the first officer testified visibility was 600 meters. Other members of the crew would not or could not give an estimate.
The first fault charged by the "Olympic" against the "Sakito Maru" is immoderate speed. In attempting to arrive at the speed of the "Sakito Maru", I have disregarded the testimony of all eye witnesses who attempted to judge the speed and have accepted the evidence furnished by the "Sakito Maru". The testimony of Captain Sato and the first officer, is that the "Sakito Maru" was proceeding at her normal cruising speed of 16 miles per hour up to 7 o&apos;clock A.M. At 7:03 o&apos;clock A.M. she encountered fog ahead and reduced her speed to 6½ miles per hour; that it required three minutes for her speed through the waters to decelerate to 6½ miles per hour. At 7:09 o&apos;clock A.M. the lookout reported the presence of the "Olympic" ahead. That at that time the "Olympic" was 200 meters ahead. At 7:09 o&apos;clock A.M. the engines were reversed and at 7:10½ o&apos;clock A.M. came the collision.
The captain testified that at 7:09 o&apos;clock A.M. visibility extended only 200 meters. It is admitted that when the engines are going slow ahead at 6½ miles per hour and are reversed full astern, the "Sakito Maru" requires 300 meters to come to a full stop. Thus we find a motor vessel proceeding in the fog, approaching an entrance to a harbor where she has every reason to expect the presence of other vessels, proceeding at a speed where she could not possibly bring herself to a stop in time to avoid a collision with either an approaching or anchored vessel. This is a fault chargeable against this motor vessel. Even if the visibility had been in accordance with Captain Sato&apos;s estimate of 300 meters, the vessel was going at an immoderate speed. The Belgian King, 9 Cir., 125 F. 869; The Ernest H. Meyer, 9 Cir., 84 F.2d 496; Silver Line v. United States, 9 Cir., 94 F.2d 754.
"* * * With reference to a part of the argument, we think it proper to say a word. It is quite true that negligence must be determined upon the facts as they appeared at the time, and not by a judgment from actual consequences which then were not to be apprehended by a prudent and competent man. This principle nowhere has been more fully recognized than by this court. Lawrence v. Minturn, 17 How. 100, 110, 15 L.Ed. 58, 62; The Star of Hope (The Star of Hope v. Annan), 9 Wall. 203, 19 L.Ed. 638. But it is a mistake to say, as the petitioner does, that if the man on the spot, even an expert, does what his judgment approves, he cannot be found negligent. The standard of conduct, whether left to the jury or laid down by the court, is an external standard, and takes no account of the personal equation of the man concerned. The notion that it `should be coextensive with the judgment of each individual,&apos; was exploded, if it needed exploding, by Chief Justice Tindal, in Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 475. And since then, at least, there should have been no doubt about the law. Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 176, 52 Am.Rep. 264; Pollock, Torts, 7th Ed. 432."
While Captain Sato estimates the speed of his vessel at 6¼ to 6½ miles per hour at 7:09 o&apos;clock A.M., I am satisfied that he is in error in this respect, and that the vessel was proceeding at not less than 8 miles per hour. The records of his own vessel indicate a speed in excess of 6 miles per hour. According to the "Sakito Maru&apos;s" deck log and chart, she was 9,120 feet from the "Olympic&apos;s" position at 7:03 o&apos;clock A.M. All of that distance, except the last 536 feet, she covered between 7:03 o&apos;clock A.M. and 7:09 o&apos;clock A.M. Thus it will be seen that she covered approximately 8,584 feet in six minutes or 14 miles per hour. With reasonable allowance for error, it will be observed that my estimated speed of 8 miles per hour is conservative. A check of her tackometer readings also tends to verify my conclusions in this respect.
But in view of my findings heretofore expressed on the visibility, it is quite apparent, that the lookout was a lookout in name only. He was charged with the responsibility of seeing that which was within his vision. This he failed to do. If he had been an efficient lookout, the collision easily could have been avoided and this failure of the lookout must be charged as a gross fault against the "Sakito Maru". The Catalina, D.C., 18 F. Supp. 461, and cases therein cited.
First, the withdrawal of the bow from the wound of the "Olympic": The impact took place at 7:10½ o&apos;clock A.M. and the engines of the "Sakito Maru" were stopped at 7:11 o&apos;clock A.M. and were then put astern at 7:13 o&apos;clock A.M. and the "Olympic" sank at 7:14 o&apos;clock A.M. The wound according to the markings on the bow of the "Sakito Maru" after the collision, showed she had penetrated the "Olympic" 20 feet and 3 inches on the portside and 23 feet on the starboardside and a cross-ship&apos;s line between these two lines was 12 feet. The "Olympic" contends that good seamanship should have caused the "Sakito Maru" to hold her position in the wound until those on board were removed and that if she had done so, the sinking of the "Olympic" would have been delayed. The evidence on this feature of the case is very conflicting. I am of the opinion that the "Sakito Maru" did not put her engines astern until after the vessels had separated of their own accord. It seems to me that theorizing on whether the "Olympic" could have been kept afloat with such a wound in her mid-ship is too highly speculative to be placed in the category of a fault.
Second, the failure of the "Sakito Maru" to render immediate aid: The facts disclose that the "Sakito Maru&apos;s" engines were put astern at 7:13 o&apos;clock A.M. and backed at least 300 meters, dropped her anchor at 7:17 o&apos;clock A.M. and stopped her engines at 7:19 o&apos;clock A.M. and lowered a life boat at 7:20 o&apos;clock A.M. Inasmuch as there were other boats present at the scene of the collision, no loss of life was occasioned by any such delay, consequently, her conduct in no manner contributed to the loss of life and under the circumstances cannot be deemed a fault.
The "Sakito Maru" in its cross-libel charges the "Olympic" with many faults. She charges the "Olympic" with the failure of having a competent and attentive lookout on board. It appears that Louis R. Ohiser, the lookout, has proven himself to be an unstable witness and I have for the purpose of this opinion disregarded his testimony except where it has been amply corroborated. The evidence clearly shows that he saw the "Sakito Maru" long before the lookout of the "Sakito Maru" saw the "Olympic", and to that extent was more attentive to his duties than the "Sakito Maru&apos;s" lookout. In fact, the two are about equal as witnesses. One cannot tell the same story twice, while the other does not know anything except he was acting as a lookout and saw the "Olympic". Be that as it may, as a lookout, there was nothing Ohiser could do. His vessel was anchored. He could look and he could see, but there was nothing he could do to avoid the collision. The ability to avoid the collision rested entirely on the oncoming "Sakito Maru". The proctors for the "Sakito Maru" contend that he could have rung the bell louder, but there was no occasion to make a special effort in this regard until such time as it appeared that a collision was imminent. He had no reason to believe that the "Sakito Maru&apos;s" personnel could not see as well as he could; nor, that they had been unable to hear the various signals given by the "Olympic" and other vessels. The failure to have a lookout must have been a contributing cause of the collision before it can be classed as a fault. The Europe, 9 Cir., 190 F. 475; The Blue Jacket, 144 U.S. 371, 12 S.Ct. 711, 36 L.Ed. 469.
As heretofore pointed out the "Olympic" was not anchored in a channel or fairway but upon the open ocean, consequently, she was not anchored in violation of 33 U.S.C.A. § 409. This feature of the case resolves itself into the question whether or not a vessel at its own peril anchors on a fishing bank, when said fishing bank happens to be in close proximity to a course used by merchant vessels. It makes no difference whether the "Olympic" was anchored three months or one hour. Was it a fault per se for the "Olympic" to be so anchored at 7:09 o&apos;clock A.M. on September 4, 1940?
"Q. Was any reply made by the Master? A. He replied that he had, of course, nothing to do with that; that he was only acting for the owner. He gave us the name and address of the owner. I don&apos;t remember anything more."
The further charge is made that the "Olympic" was incompletely and inadequately manned, because it failed to comply with the statutory requirements of certified personnel, particularly 46 U.S.C.A. § 672(a), (b), (c). Without discussing the applicability of said sections to the "Olympic", suffice it to say, that the lack of such personnel, by no stretch of imagination contributed to the collision or the resultant damage and loss of life. If there had been more people on board the "Olympic", the loss of life would undoubtedly have been greater.
"Non-self propelled vessels over 100 gross tons, anchored or moored on the seas or on waters connected therewith, that are not protected from the hazards of the sea, which are patronized by the public for pleasure purposes, are subject to and shall be inspected and certificated pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress approved May 28, 1908. (46 U.S.C. § 395, 396, 397, 398 [46 U.S.C.A. §§ 395-398]) "The following general provisions constituting minimum requirements shall be followed in the inspection and certification of such vessels:"
It will be noted from that section that no rule making power is vested in the local inspectors. It will be further noted that Section 395 is a part of Chapter XIV, which provides for the inspection of steam vessels and that 46 U.S.C.A. § 375, provides for and invests in the Supervising Inspectors power to promulgate certain rules and regulations but nowhere do I find any such power vested in local inspectors. Even if they had such powers under Section 395, the same would of necessity have to apply to all seagoing barges. Heretofore, bulkhead requirements have been covered by Congress, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 482 and 483, and by the Supervising Inspectors, § 72, Rule III and Section 65 of Rule IV, as well as others, General Rules and Regulations prescribed by the Board of Supervising Inspectors. The Bee, 2 Cir., 138 F. 303; Towboat No. 1, Norfolk Western, 1 Cir., 74 F. 906; The H.M. Whitney, 2 Cir., 86 F. 697. I therefore held that the so-called minimum requirements of the local inspectors were a nullity and the failure to comply with the same does not establish the unseaworthiness of the "Olympic".
I further hold that the "Olympic" was not a seagoing barge within the contemplation of Section 395, 46 U.S.C.A. Congress has not defined the term "barge", except when used in connection with Sections 643(a), 660b and 672b, 46 U.S.C.A. § 672c. Generally speaking, "barge" is "a word of somewhat comprehensive signification" (9 C.J.S., Barge, p. 1542) and may cover crafts of many kinds. It may cover "`pleasure boats, or boats of state, furnished with elegant apartments, canopies, and cushions, equipped with a band of rowers, and decked with flags and streamers, used by officers or magistrates;&apos; and * * * `a flat-bottomed vessel of burden for the loading and unloading of ships.&apos;" the Mamie, D.C., 5 F. 813, 819.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as follows: "A small seagoing vessel with sails; a flat bottomed freight boat chiefly for canal and river navigation, either with or without sails. In the latter case also called a lighter. In the former, as in the Thames barges, generally dandy rigged having one important mast. * * * A rowing boat especially a ferry boat. * * * The second boat of a man of war; a long narrow boat generally with not less than ten oars for the use of the chief officers. * * * A large vessel propelled by oars or towed, generally much ornamented and used on state occasions. * * * An ornamental, houseboat. * * * A double decked passenger and freight vessel without sails or power and towed by steamboat." (Webster&apos;s International Dictionary definition also given).
In the limitation proceedings proctors for the "Sakito Maru", contended that the "Olympic" was not a "barge", a general name given to a large pulling boat. It is often given to flat bottomed craft, but more particularly to vessels built for towage purposes and cite as their authority Bradford&apos;s Glossary of Sea Terms.
I appreciate the fact that the "last clear chance" rule is not generally considered applicable in this country in admiralty (The Norman B. Ream, 7 Cir., 252 F. 409), at the same time our courts have not been backward in applying the rule under whatever name it may be labeled. The Yucatan, 9 Cir., 226 F. 437; Crowley Launch Tugboat Co. v. Wilmington Transportation Co., 9 Cir., 117 F.2d 651; American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. King Coal Co., 9 Cir., 11 F.2d 41; The William A. Paine, 6 Cir., 39 F.2d 586; The Europe, 9 Cir., 190 F. 475. However, Judge Augustus N. Hand, in the recent case of the Cornelius Vanderbilt, 2 Cir., 120 F.2d 766, 768, apparently recognized the rule under its true color when he stated:
"The Hempstead was aware of the approach of the Watuppa and her barge in time to avoid the collision and, if she was not, should have seen them but for her neglect to maintain a proper lookout. She had the Watuppa on her starboard hand and, as her master conceded, was bound to give the matter the right of way. The Watuppa, however, having a tow on a long hawser, difficult to manage in dangerous waters, could not readily swing her barge to the starboard of its position in the channel. Though each vessel neglected to blow passing signals, as required by the rules, and the Watuppa was on the wrong side of the channel, the outstanding fact is that the Hempstead had the last clear chance to prevent a collision by the exercise of ordinary care at a time when the Watuppa had the right of way and was not in a position to swing her tow away from the Hempstead&apos;s barges in time to avert disaster. Instead of holding back, the Hempstead took the risk of coming on and then attempting to swing her tow to port — a difficult manoeuvre in a narrow dangerous channel which failed of success."
The property damage claims of the Hermosa Amusement Corporation, Ltd., George W. Berger and Norma Rubin as set forth in the first count in her libel in intervention will be referred to David B. Head, Esq., U.S. Commissioner, as Special Master. The balance of the claims will be heard in this court.