Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/199/329/475889/
Timestamp: 2017-09-23 21:56:14
Document Index: 493735845

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 201', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 201', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 201', '§ 841', '§ 1', '§ 201', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 3742']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Benjamin Y. Owusu (98-3356), Larry Latham (98-3847), and Anthony Latham (98-3850), Defendants-appellants, 199 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2000) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 2000 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Benjamin Y. Owusu (98-3356), Larry Latham (98-3847)...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Benjamin Y. Owusu (98-3356), Larry Latham (98-3847), and Anthony Latham (98-3850), Defendants-appellants, 199 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2000)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 199 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2000)
This appeal involves three individuals who were part of a conspiracy to distribute drugs in Columbus, Ohio. Larry Latham and Benjamin Owusu were the primary participants in the conspiracy, and Anthony Latham was involved in the chain of distribution. Owusu pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and cooperated with the government. After a jury trial, Anthony and Larry Latham were convicted of several federal drug violations.1 Anthony appeals: (1) the district court's refusal to grant him a mitigating role adjustment to his offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.2; (2) the district court's calculation of theamount of drugs attributable to him; (3) the district court's application of an enhanced sentencing penalty for the distribution of "crack" cocaine pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1; and (4) the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial based on the government's alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). We AFFIRM each of these district court decisions.
Larry's counsel raises the following issues on appeal: (1) the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal of Counts 1, 2, 3, and 11 of the indictment; (2) the district court's calculation of the quantity of drugs attributable to him; (3) the district court's enhancement of his sentence for his leadership role in the conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a); and (4) the district court's enhancement of his sentence for possession of a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1). In addition, Larry makes several pro se arguments. We REVERSE the district court's denial of Larry's motion for judgment of acquittal of Count 2 and AFFIRM the rest of the district court's decisions.
Owusu, Peoples, Broomfield, McGraw, and Walton cooperated with the government and testified against Larry and Anthony at trial. A jury convicted both of them of Count 1, conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine, over 50 grams of crack cocaine, and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 841(b) (1) (A) (ii) & (iii), and 21 U.S.C. § 846. The jury also found Anthony guilty of Counts 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, charging him with distribution of and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (B) (iii). The jury concluded that Larry also was guilty of Counts 2, 3, and 11, charging him with distribution of and possession withintent to distribute heroin and crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 841(b) (1) (A) (iii). The district court sentenced Anthony to 168 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. It sentenced Larry to life imprisonment on Counts 1 and 11 and to 240 months of imprisonment on Counts 2 and 3, to run concurrently with his life sentence.
Owusu pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine, over 50 grams of crack cocaine, and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 841(b) (1) (A) (ii) & (iii), and 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was sentenced to 144 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release.
Anthony's appeal involves four different issues: (1) the district court's refusal to grant him a mitigating role adjustment to his offense level; (2) the district court's calculation of the quantity of drugs attributable to him; (3) the district court's application of an enhanced sentencing penalty for the distribution of "crack" cocaine; and (4) the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial based on the government's promises of more lenient sentences in exchange for witnesses' testimony in alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2).
Finally, Anthony argues that the district court should have granted him a new trial because the government allegedly violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). He relies on United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1998), which held that the government violates this provision when it impermissibly promises witnesses something of value, such as a more lenient sentence, in exchange for testimony. This decision, however, was vacated and reversed by the Tenth Circuit in an en banc decision. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999). Moreover, we expressly rejected this analysis and holding in United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 419-24 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999) (holding that this provision does not apply to the government based on a thorough examination of canons of statutory construction, historical practice, the prosecutor's established prerogatives, and legislative history). Because 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) does not apply to the government, Anthony's argument must be rejected.
Larry's counsel raises the following issues on appeal: (1) the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal of Counts 1, 2, 3, and 11 of the indictment; (2) the district court's calculation of the quantity of drugs attributable to him; (3) the district court's enhancement of his sentence for his leadership role in the conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a); and (4) the district court's enhancement of his sentence for possession of a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1). Larry makes several additional arguments in his supplemental pro se brief.
Larry claims the government did not submit sufficient evidence that he was involved in a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine, 50 grams of crack cocaine, and heroin under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 841(b) (1) (A) (ii) & (iii), and 21 U.S.C. § 846. The government's only evidence of conspiracy, he asserts, was provided by individuals who had been charged with or convicted of federal drug offenses and who testified in expectation of a more lenient sentence. Larry argues that because the government's actions violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2), this testimony should be excluded under United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998). As discussed in Part II.A.4 supra in response to a similar argument by Anthony, the Singleton decision was vacated and reversed by the Tenth Circuit, and we have expressly rejected its analysis and holding. See United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 419-24 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999); see also United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999). Therefore, the district court properly denied Larry's motion for judgment of acquittal of Count 1 on this basis.
Larry asserts that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to support Count 2, that he was involved in a sale of heroin on April 17, 1992, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Police Detective Enoch White testified that he was working undercover with an informant at that time, and they went to a house on Miami Avenue to buy drugs from Larry. They were waiting in a front room of the house for Larry to arrive for approximately twenty minutes when a white automobile pulled up to the front of the house. Larry and another man, Charles Smith, stepped out of the car and walked directly to the kitchen area located in the back of the house. The informant then went to the back of the house, while White remained in the front room. The informant returned to the front room with Smith, who was holding one gram of heroin. Smith gave the heroin to the informant, who gave it to White. White paid Smith $500 in cash, talked about possible future deals, and then Smith returned to the back area of the house. White admits that Larry never came to the front of the house and that he only dealt with Smith and the informant during this transaction.
Larry argues that this evidence is not sufficient to establish that he was involved in this sale of heroin because White never saw Larry with any drugs and did not have any direct contact with him. The applicable statute states, "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally -- (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). The government appears to argue that Larry remained in the kitchen while Smith carried out the transaction on his behalf by bringing the drugs from the kitchen and then taking the money back to him, and, therefore, Larry knowingly and intentionally distributed drugs to White. The government did not, however, submit any additional evidence to support this argument, to prove that Larry was actually involved in this deal, or to show that he routinely had Smith carry out his transactions. Because sufficient evidence did not exist from which a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Larry was guilty of this offense, the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal of Count 2. Therefore, we reverse the district court's denial of Larry'smotion for judgment of acquittal of Count 2.
Larry also claims the government presented insufficient evidence to find him guilty of Count 3, distribution of heroin on May 7, 1992, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Detective White testified that he went to the informant's house at 62 North Waverly on that date to purchase drugs. He arrived at the house at the same time as Larry and two other individuals. White went inside to the front area of the house, while Larry and the informant went to the kitchen area for approximately three or four minutes. White was then called to the kitchen area and asked to show that he had $1,000 cash to purchase two grams of heroin. After displaying the money, Larry told White that he did not have the drugs on him and had to go get them. Larry left the house and was gone for approximately ten minutes. When Larry returned, he went to the kitchen area while White remained in the front room. White was able to see what was happening in the kitchen through a reflection from the front of the microwave, and he observed Larry pulling something out of his pocket. Five minutes later, White was called into the kitchen and a package containing two grams of heroin was on the kitchen table. White picked it up and put the money on the table, as instructed by Larry. He did not see Larry pick up the money. White then went upstairs with the informant, who gave him an ounce of heroin which was to be "fronted" to him by Larry. White never ended up paying Larry for this "fronted" heroin, even though he attempted to do so on several occasions.
Larry also argues that the government submitted insufficient evidence of Count 11, that he distributed more than 50 grams of crack cocaine on October 27, 1994, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (A) (iii). Federal agent ParisWilson testified that he went undercover and befriended a man named Hyman Dixon, who helped make arrangements for him to purchase drugs from different individuals, including Anthony Peoples. On October 27, 1994, Dixon told Peoples that Wilson wanted to purchase an eighth of a kilogram of crack cocaine, and Peoples said he would have to obtain that amount from Larry. Wilson and Peoples made several attempts to get in touch with Larry and eventually met up with him at Peoples's grandmother's house. Once they arrived at the house, Peoples went directly to the kitchen where Larry was sitting at the kitchen table. Wilson followed him, but Larry and Peoples told him not to come into the kitchen. Wilson stood in the adjoining living room but could see part of the kitchen through a reflection from a mirror and observed Peoples walking toward Larry. Peoples then left the kitchen and asked Wilson to go out to the front porch of the house with him. Peoples told Wilson how much money Larry wanted for the crack cocaine, they haggled over the price, Peoples took the money inside the house, and then Peoples returned to the porch with 57 grams of crack.
Larry argues that Wilson's testimony does not establish that Larry was involved in this transaction because the crack cocaine was purchased from Peoples on the porch of the house without Larry present. Although Wilson saw Peoples walking toward Larry, he did not see any drugs being exchanged between them. In addition, Larry also questions the credibility of Wilson's testimony. However, we do not make credibility determinations in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence. See Hilliard, 11 F.3d at 620. Moreover, Wilson's testimony was corroborated and supplemented by Peoples's testimony. Peoples testified that on the night of October 27, 1994, he met with Larry in the kitchen of his grandmother's house, and Larry gave him a couple of ounces of crack cocaine. Peoples then sold the crack to Wilson on the front porch of the house and gave the money to Larry. Larry argues that Peoples's testimony should be excluded because it was provided in expectation of a more lenient sentence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). As discussed in Parts II.A.4 and II.B.1.a supra, this is not a valid argument.
Taken together, the testimony from Wilson and Peoples provides sufficient evidence upon which a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Larry was directly involved in the sale of 57 grams of crack cocaine to White on October 27, 1994, satisfying the elements of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (A) (iii). The district court thus properly denied Larry's motion for judgment of acquittal of Count 11.
We review a sentencing court's calculation of the quantity of drugs for which a defendant is accountable for clear error. See United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 152 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 999 (1996). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, "a defendant is accountable for all quantities of drugs with which he was directly involved and, in the case of joint criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities." United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 646 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 942 (1994). See also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1). The government must prove the quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990). As we explained in Part II.A.2 supra, if the exact amount of drugs involved is uncertain, the court may make an estimate supported by competent evidence in the record.
Larry argues that this testimony is not credible because it is vague. Testimony from Peoples, McGraw, Velma Broomfield, and Derrick Russell, however, provided similar evidence of large amounts of cocaine attributable to Larry through the conspiracy. Peoples, for instance, testified that in 1988 Larry and Owusu had worked up to purchasing five to ten kilograms every couple of weeks and they were purchasing ten to fifteen kilograms three to four times a month in 1989 and 1990. This testimony also establishes more than 150 kilograms of cocaine for which Larry could be held accountable. Larry also argues that this testimony is tainted because the witnesses expected to receive more lenient sentences in exchange for their cooperation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). As already discussed in Parts II.A.4, II.B.1.a, and II.B.1.d supra, this argument must be rejected. Larry has not identified any other reason to find that the sentencing court lacked foundation in concluding Owusu's testimony was credible. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in holding Larry accountable for 150 kilograms of cocaine.
Larry argues that because Peoples was the only individual he could have arguably led or directed, he was not leading five individuals. It is not necessary, however, for a defendant to have led or directed five individuals to receive this sentencing enhancement. It may apply " [i]f the defendant organized or led at least one participant, and if the activity involved five or more people or was otherwise extensive." Ward, 68 F.3d at 151. In this case, the drug conspiracy involved more than five participants, including Owusu, Larry, Anthony, McGraw, Peoples, and Broomfield. Because Larry was an organizer or leader of a conspiracy involving more than five individuals, the district court did not err in concluding that Larry's offense level should be increased by four levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).
We review a district court's factual finding of possession of a firearm for enhancement of a defendant's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1) for clear error. See United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1133 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1016 (1996). The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the base offense level of a defendant convicted of a drug offense should be increased by two levels " [i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1). This enhancement "should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 commentary, applic. note 3. The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "(1) the defendant actually or constructively 'possessed' the weapon, and (2) such possession was during the commission of the offense." United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 858 (1996). Constructive possession may be established if the defendant has ownership, dominion, or control over the weapon. See id. If the offense committed is part of a conspiracy, however, the government does not have to prove that the defendant actually possessed the weapon, but instead may establish that a member of the conspiracy possessed the firearm and that the member's possession was reasonably foreseeable by other members in the conspiracy. See United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1459 (6th Cir. 1991).
In addition, in United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991), the court reviewed the case law in this and other circuits and concluded, "The cases are all consistent in that they recognize that enhancement is appropriate if a weapon is found . . . in the automobile that facilitated the drug transaction." In that case, possession was found when a gun was located on the front passenger seat of the defendant's car during drug sales carried out in and about the car. When Larry and Owusu were stopped by the state troopers, they were returning to Ohio from New York where they had purchased two kilograms of cocaine they were planning to sell in Columbus as part of their conspiracy to distribute drugs. Because the guns were found in the car facilitating their conspiracy, the district court could have found Larry had constructive possession of the guns during this offense. Moreover, even if the weapons were in Owusu's exclusive possession, this possession occurred in connection with the conspiracy between Larry and Owusu to distribute drugs. We have held that where a defendant knew his coconspirator was trafficking drugs with a gun in the car, possession was reasonably foreseeable and could be imputed to him. See United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1192 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 903 (1993). Here, the two guns were found in the car along with the cocaine, and a rational fact finder could conclude that Larry was aware of their presence. Therefore, Owusu's possession would be reasonably foreseeable to Larry and could be imputed to him. Under these circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in adding two points to Larry's base offense level for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1).
Owusu appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a downward departure of his sentence for "an extraordinary physical impairment" under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. A defendant may appeal his sentence if it was "imposed in violation of law" or "imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencingguidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1)-(2). Ordinarily, however, a court's refusal to exercise its discretion and grant a downward departure is not reviewable. See United States v. Landers, 39 F.3d 643, 649 (6th Cir. 1994). We may review a denial of a downward departure only if the district court incorrectly believed it lacked the authority to grant such a departure as a matter of law. See United States v. Coleman, 188 F.3d 354, 357 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). A district court judge has no duty "to state affirmatively that he knows he possesses the power to make a downward departure, but declines to do so." United States v. Byrd, 53 F.3d 144, 145 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, "an appellate court should be reluctant to 'treat as ambiguous' a ruling which does not affirmatively state that the judge knew he could depart downward but failed to do so." Id. (quoting United States v. Barrera-Barron, 996 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 937 (1993)). We should therefore assume that a district court is exercising its proper discretion when it concludes that a downward departure is unwarranted. See id.