Source: http://badsoftware.com/orthop.htm
Timestamp: 2017-03-24 12:04:29
Document Index: 162866943

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', 'art. 2004', '§ 2738', '§ 51', 'art. 2520', 'art. 2801']

01/08/91 ORTHOPEDIC
& SPORTS INJURY v. WANG LABORATORIES,
INC., [Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion] [1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [2] ORTHOPEDIC & SPORTS INJURY CLINIC,
ET AL., [3] Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. [4] WANG LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee [5] Nos. 90-4278, 90-4341 [6] 922 F.2d 220 [7] January 8, 1991 [Editor's note: as a Table Case, this opinion has limited precedential
value] [8] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District
of Louisiana; No. CV-88-0028-LC; Earl E. Veron, Judge. BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1991.C05.20 (http://www.versuslaw.com) [9] APPELLATE PANEL: [10] Rubin, Jerry E. Smith, and Barksdale, Circuit Judges. Rubin, Circuit
Judge, dissenting. [11] DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE SMITH [12] Orthopedic & Sports Injury Clinic
(the Clinic) bought a computer from Wang Laboratories,
Inc., (Wang), and contracted with Wang
to maintain and perform repairs on it. While attempting to fix the computer,
Wang's employees requested and used the Clinic's
last back-up disk and, in the course of their attempted repairs, lost five
years of medical and accounting data stored on the disk. [13] The Clinic, its member physicians, and their medical corporations
sued Wang in state court for negligence, recklessness,
gross negligence, and damages in excess of $1 million. Wang
removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity. Wang
moved for and received a partial summary judgment from the district court,
which limited the Clinic's claims to only those damages allowed by the
parties' maintenance agreement and dismissed the individual doctors and
the professional medical corporations. [14] The Clinic successfully requested certification under Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and filed a notice of appeal. The Clinic
also filed a first supplemental and amended complaint alleging three new
claims under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Act , the Louisiana law of redhibition, and the federal antitrust laws.
It later filed a second supplemental and amended complaint. Wang
again successfully moved for summary judgment. [15] The Clinic now pursues its interlocutory appeal. It contends that
(1) summary judgment was inappropriate on its claim of gross negligence;
(2) the court erred in not applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur;
(3) summary judgment was inappropriate on its claims of unfair or deceptive
trade practices; (4) summary judgment was inappropriate on its claim for
redhibition; and (5) the court erred in ruling that the individual doctors
and their corporations lacked adequate standing to sue Wang.
Finding no error, we affirm. I. [16] The Clinic bought a computer from Wang
in 1984 and contracted for Wang to maintain
and perform repairs on it. The Clinic also purchased a software program
from Cycare, Inc. (Cycare), to keep track of the medical records and accounts
and likewise contracted with Cycare to maintain the software. [17] The Clinic began having problems with the computer (code errors
appearing when turning on the machine) in July 1987, and Paul Wardell,
a Wang service technician, began working on
the problem that month. Wardell replaced the EPROM (erasable programmable
read-only memory)*fn1 board on the computer, and that seemed to solve the
problem. Replacing the part required the disks to be reformatted. To do
this, the removable disk has to be placed into the disk drive and reformatted,
which erases the data currently on it, and then the data on the hard disk
has to be backed up to the removable disk. The hard disk is then reformatted,
and the data is transferred from the removable disk back to the hard disk. [18] Before working on the computer, Wardell instructed two employees
of the Clinic to back- up the data on the computer. Prior to the new board's
installation on July 23, Gloria Doyle, a Clinic employee, ran a backup
to the data and created back-up set no. 2. To verify that the information
was copied, Wardell and a Clinic employee ran a verification procedure.
The Clinic also had an extra set of backup referred to as back-up set no.
1. Wardell returned on July 24 to fix a loose cable, as the computer would
not operate. After installation of the new board, the computer appeared
to be working. [19] On August 4, the problem, code errors (called "I91 errors"), surfaced
again. Wardell thought the disk alignment might be the problem. He began
testing the alignment and found it to be within an acceptable range, but
there were still I91 errors. On August 6, two other Wang
representatives joined Wardell at the Clinic. On that day, Doyle performed
a backup on set no. 1. The machine was disassembled and put back together,
and Wardell returned the following Monday after the additional Wang
employees had not been able to fix the problem on Friday. A back-up was
attempted on set no. 2, but it was unsuccessful, and all data on back-up
set no. 2 was erased. The Clinic still had set no. 1. [20] On August 11, Wang representatives
returned to the Clinic and replaced the magnet, velocity transducer, and
voice squall assembly and completed the realignment. The information on
the back-up disk needed to be transferred back onto the hard disk so that
the new alignments would coincide with the backup disk; without such realignment
the data would be inaccessible. When this was attempted, the first disk
of set no. 1 did not copy onto the hard drive. This is significant, as
all three disks of each back-up set are essential (disk no. 1 contained
codes to read the information on other disks.). [21] The parties dispute why disk no. 1 would not copy. The Clinic contends
that the Wang employees were responsible for
the data loss. Doyle claims that she overheard Wardell say that he should
not have placed the magnet on that disk; however, she was not in the same
room and did not see on what disk the magnet was placed. Wardell admits
he made the statement. Nevertheless, he contends the disk he put the magnet
on was not disk no. 1, but was one of his service disks. Moreover, Wang
averred that the damage to the disk is inconsistent with damage that would
have occurred from placing a magnet on it. [22] The Clinic presents an affidavit from its expert, Thomas White,
and alleges that Wang was grossly negligent
in using the last back-up copy while attempting repairs to the machine
and in failing to make a sufficient number of copies, to test and verify
the computer before backups were performed, and to print the data before
attempting to reformat or copy the last data. Wang
filed affidavits and deposition excerpts refuting all of the above. II. [23] As we have noted, the appeal is before this court on interlocutory
certification.*fn2 The only issue remaining in the district court is the
Clinic's action against Wang for damages as
limited by the contract; that matter is being held in abeyance pending
resolution of the instant appeal. [24] We apply the same summary judgment test as does the district court.
Ayo v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 771 F.2d 902, 904 (5th Cir. 1985). "The
mere existence of a disputed factual issue, therefore, does not foreclose
summary judgment. The dispute must be genuine, and the facts must be material."
Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy & Zatzkis, 799 F.2d
218, 222 (5th Cir. 1986). The substantive law identifies those facts that
are material, and "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). [25] As the magistrate recognized, summary judgment turns on whether
a proper jury question is presented, and the judge is generally not to
weigh the evidence or make credibility choices. Id. at 249, 106 S. Ct.
at 2510-11 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.
Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970)); see Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc.,
814 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987). If the moving party carries its burden
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), the opposing party must do more than simply show
some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89
L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). III. [26] The Clinic maintains that the district court incorrectly granted
Wang's first summary judgment motion on the
gross negligence issue.*fn3 It contends that the court was wrong in accepting
the magistrate's conclusion that the Clinic's only evidence presented in
opposition to Wang's motion, an affidavit
from its expert, White, failed to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to the gross negligence claim.*fn4 [27] Instead, the Clinic maintains that the magistrate unfairly dismissed
White's affidavit as improperly lacking facts upon which to base an opinion
and erred in opining on an ultimate issue in the form of a legal conclusion.
The Clinic cites a number of cases such as Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co.,
868 F.2d 1428 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935, 110 S. Ct. 328, 107
L. Ed. 2d 318 (1989), and Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F.2d 66 (5th Cir.1988),
to demonstrate that White's affidavit was not inadmissible and unqualified
per se and was sufficient to create a material issue of fact. [28] We disagree with the Clinic and affirm the summary judgment on
the gross negligence issue. While gross negligence would void the limitation
of damages clause in the contract in either Louisiana, see La.Civ.Code
Ann. art. 2004 (West 1987), or Massachusetts, see Gillespie v. Papale,
541 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (D.Mass. 1982) 4, we do not believe that the Clinic
has adequately presented evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to the gross negligence claim. It has, however, sufficiently demonstrated
that issues of material fact may exist regarding its ordinary negligence
claim. [29] Although the Clinic adequately detailed the caselaw on the disqualification
of proffered expert opinions, the magistrate found that White's affidavit
fits each of these disqualification requirements. Indeed, White's affidavit
is wholly or almost wholly conclusory and is not supported by sufficient
facts. We thus agree with the magistrate and the court that the affidavit
is insufficient to defeat Wang's summary judgment
motion on the gross negligence issue. [30] We have recognized that there is a level of conclusoriness below
which an affidavit must not sink if it is to provide the basis for a genuine
issue of material fact. We have held that the district court may inquire
into the reliability and foundation of any expert's opinion to determine
its admissibility. Washington v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 839 F.2d
1121, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1988). Accord Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 919
F.2d 304, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejection of expert's affidavit). [31] When the "source upon which an expert's opinion relies" is of little
weight, we have held "that the jury should not be permitted to receive
that opinion." Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987).
Accord Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 919 F.2d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir.1990)
(exclusion of expert's testimony). Indeed, "unsupported ... affidavits
setting forth 'ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law' are
insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment."
Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
2d § 2738 (1983)). It seems that this principle should be especially
applicable where, as here, the expert is opining on gross negligence, an
issue more properly left to judges and juries. Moreover, White's affidavit
offers no explanation of how he distinguishes between simple and gross
negligence. [32] Without more than credentials and a subjective opinion, an expert's
testimony that 'it is so' is not admissible". Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 424.
On this basis, the court properly granted Wang's
summary judgment motion on the gross negligence issue. See Haspel v. Rollins
Protective Serv., Inc., 490 So. 2d 530, 533 (La. App. 4th Cir.1986) (affirming
summary judgment on wilful or wanton negligence because contract's limitation
of liability clause was clear and because insufficient evidence of negligence
was presented). IV. [33] The Clinic raised res ipsa loquitur as a bar to Wang's
motion for partial summary judgment on the gross negligence claim. The
magistrate did not address this issue in his report, and the Clinic did
not object to the report on this basis. Accordingly, Wang
argues that the Clinic cannot now raise it, relying upon Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985). We disagree; the
Clinic is still able to request that the issue be considered on appeal,
even if it did not question the magistrate's findings. Thomas, 474 U.S.
at 148-49, 106 S. Ct. at 471-72. [34] However, res ipsa loquitur does not apply. The Clinic has not shown
that Wang had exclusive control of the computer
and the damaged disk at all times during which the data might have been
lost. In fact, it is evident that Wang did
not. Moreover, res ipsa loquitur would not establish the gross negligence
necessary to avoid the contractual limitation of damages. V. [35] The Clinic next maintains that the court inappropriately granted
summary judgment on its claims of unfair or deceptive trade practices.
We disagree. Both the court and the magistrate correctly determined that
the facts that the Clinic alleges concerning this issue simply "do not
present a situation involving any unfair trade practice." [36] The Clinic alleged in its supplemental complaint that Wang's
practice of "deliberately failing to notify customers of known defects
in their computer constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices under
the Louisiana ...." In other words, Wang knew
of the potential problems with the old EPROM model but waited until the
Clinic's problems occurred to do anything about it. The Clinic filed three
affidavits in opposition to summary judgment (i.e., Rea, Abernathy, and
Abshire). The magistrate concluded that the affidavits were contradictory
and conclusory and that there was no genuine issue of material fact as
to deceptive trade practices.*fn5 [37] Wang argues that the Clinic is not
protected by the UTPA because it is not a business competitor of Wang
and because the purchase of the computer does not fall within the definition
of a consumer transaction under the Act. We agree. "Consumer transaction
means any transaction involving trade or commerce to a natural person,
the subject of which transaction is primarily intended for personal, family
or household use." La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 51:1402(3) (West 1987). Moreover,
the Clinic did not allege a cognizable violation of the UTPA.*fn6 VI. [38] The Clinic further argues that the court inappropriately granted
summary judgment on its claim for redhibition. "Redhibition is the avoidance
of a sale on account of some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders
it either absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect,
that it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased it, had
he known of the vice." La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 2520 (West 1987); see LaFleur
v. Boyce Mach. Corp., 294 So. 2d 498, 499 (La. 1974). We disagree with
the Clinic's contentions and uphold the summary judgment. [39] The Clinic argues that Louisiana law should govern all its claims
and that Massachusetts law governs only the construction or interpretation
of the agreement. Wang contends that the parties
chose Massachusetts law and that it governs all issues. [40] The contract states, "This Agreement shall be deemed to have been
made in, and shall be construed pursuant to the laws of the commonwealth
of Massachusetts." The Clinic argues that this merely provides that the
contract is to be interpreted, not enforced or governed, under Massachusetts
law and accordingly, that tort or other claims arising out of Wang's
performance are not precluded by the contract. [41] We believe that Massachusetts substantive law should govern the
negligence issues in this dispute. Since the contract provides for limited
damages in the case of Wang's negligence,
the contract's choice-of-law clause specifying Massachusetts law applies.
Massachusetts law also applies to the gross negligence issue, since in
order to make the determination between gross and ordinary negligence,
we must use Massachusetts law on ordinary negligence as a starting point. [42] Thus, the discrepancies between that state's two standards should
be what is relevant here, and not a comparison between Massachusetts's
ordinary negligence law and the gross negligence law of Louisiana. But
even accepting the Clinic's argument on this point, it still would not
prevail. [43] The Clinic argues that it demonstrated a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the alleged defect in the old EPROM rose to the level
of a redhibitory vice and whether that vice was the legal cause of the
Clinic's damages. First, Wang contends that
the Clinic made a permissible waiver under Louisiana law of any cause of
action for redhibition by agreeing to the limited warranty. See California
Chem. Co. v. Lovett, 204 So. 2d 633, 636 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1967). The agreement
expressly excludes "warranties, express or implied, including without limitation
any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose."
See Datamatic, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F. Supp. 715, 720 (W.D.La. 1985),
aff'd, 795 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1986) (similar manufacturer's limited warranty
precluded a buyer's redhibitory action). [44] Second, the Clinic failed to establish an essential element of
its case -- that the old EPROM was defective. "A complete failure of proof
on an essential element renders all other facts immaterial...." Washington,
839 F.2d at 1122. All that the Clinic proved was that a trade service bulletin
notified Wang representatives that error codes
might be solved by replacing the R*fn7 Eprom with the upgraded R10 Eprom.
Wang notes that four years had passed before
the Clinic's problems surfaced and that those problems had nothing to do
with the loss of data. Moreover, the R7 Eprom had been replaced when the
data loss occurred. [45] The Clinic counters that the R7 Eprom "set in motion a series of
events" resulting in the loss of its data. The Clinic's argument is tenuous,
and we agree with Wang and the district court
that summary judgment was appropriate. Putting it simply, redhibition smacks
of merchantability, which the Clinic expressly waived. VII. [46] The Clinic further contends that the court erred in ruling that
the individual physicians and their corporations lacked standing to sue
Wang. Its argument is without merit. [47] The magistrate concluded that the individual physicians and their
corporations lacked standing because the contract was between the Clinic
and Wang, the doctors were not named in the
contract and did not sign it, and the Clinic is a separate entity. Under
Louisiana law, a partnership is an entity distinct from its partners and
is the proper party to maintain an action for damage to the partnership
property. La.Civ.Code art. 2801; Dalby v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 365 So. 2d 568, 570 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). The magistrate
concluded that there is no indication that the contract was entered into
on behalf of the individual members or the individual corporations, rather
than the partnership. Nor is there any indication that the partnership
will not protect the individual interests of the partners. And, under Fed.R.Civ.P.
17, the real party in interest is the Clinic, as the basis for the suit
is the service agreement. [48] The Clinic frames the issue as whether the individual doctors,
or their professional corporations who suffer personal damage as a result
of another's negligence, can sue under Louisiana law. We do not believe
that there is a case for tort liability here. The doctors' complaints stem
from the contract, the computer and data apparently are the Clinic's property,
and the doctors are complaining about the same loss of data on which the
Clinic's claims are based. In short, the individual doctors and their corporations
allege no damage to property they own for which the Clinic could not recover.7 [49] Finding no error, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court
granting Wang's summary judgment motions. [50] CASE RESOLUTION [51] Affirmed. [52] MINORITY OPINION [53] RUBIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. [54] I respectfully dissent. I think that the affidavit of Thomas N.
White, Jr. was not "conclusory" and unsupported by "specific facts", as
the majority opinion labels it, but was sufficiently explicit to create
a genuine dispute of material fact, for, if credited by the factfinder,
it was sufficient to support a finding of gross negligence. [55] These are the facts and opinions based on fact recited by White: [56] I have reviewed the circumstances concerning the loss of all computer
business data on August 11, 1987, by Orthopedic
and Sports Injury Clinic. In so reviewing I have examined the affidavits
of Paul Wardel and Betty J. Ledbetter, the deposition transcripts of Gloria
Doyle, Mark Bimle and Ed Martinez together with attached exhibits. [57] It is never acceptable to subject the last copy of valuable data
to even a properly working computer unless extreme precautions have been
taken, unless there is no alternative to subjecting the data to such risk
and only when there is a compelling need to use the data. [58] None of those circumstances existed. [59] In addition and much worse, Wang subjected
this only copy of this valuable data to a computer known by Wang
to be malfunctioning. [60] Other related acts of negligence well below the standard of practice
are: [61] a. Failure initially to make sufficient copies (at least two) of
the first set of backup disks in the next format (and saving the old format
set). [62] b. Failure to test and verify the reformat and backup process with
valueless test data before subjecting valuable data to this process. [63] c. Subjecting any valuable data to loss while modifying and repairing
the Orthopedic and Sports Injury Clinic computer. [64] d. Failure to make a print out of the data before attempting a
reformat or copy of the last copy. [65] These statements appear to me to be explicit and, to the extent
they state opinions, sufficiently based on recited facts. An opinion, which
is admissible under Fed. Rule of Evidence 702, is necessarily a conclusion,
but that is not sufficient to condemn it as "conclusory" else all opinion
evidence would be inadmissible. [66] White's affidavit is, therefore, sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact. Neither judges nor juries know or are expected
to know what standards of care are required in repairing a computer under
the circumstances described in the majority opinion. The question is not
what would constitute gross negligence on the part of a layman, but what
is gross negligence by a computer-servicing expert. We are dependent on
the industry's standards of care to determine both whether there was a
departure from the standard and, if so, how egregious that nonconformity
was. White was well qualified to inform the factfinder of both. According
to his affidavit he had this experience: [67] I am an electronics engineer, BSEE 1964, Southern Methodist University.... [68] I first began working with computers and computer installations
in 1963 and have continued doing so to date. I have had complete large
computer systems under my control and authority. I wrote computer specifications
for computer installations at the Manned Spaceflight Center in Houston.
At one time I was responsible for a very large complete missile and satellite
tracking operation in the United States space effort with about 80 engineers
and technicians working for me, said operation included a centralized computer
system. I continue to have exposure to standard procedures in the operations
of computer systems.... [69] I am also an attorney licensed to practice law in California with
fifteen years experience. A large part of my practice is devoted to matters
involving electronics and computer companies and their computer operations. [70] I would not substitute our judgment on whether the alleged negligence
was "gross" for that of the factfinder who, after hearing the testimony,
might conclude that Wardel's failures to comply with industry standards,
explicitly described by White, were sufficient to justify affixing the
pejorative description1 to what the majority concedes was sufficient to
constitute negligence if proved. ***** BEGIN FOOTNOTE(S) HERE ***** [71] *fn1 EPROMS are computer chips which contain basic operating instructions
for the computer's disk drive. [72] *fn2 Wang notes that appealability
as to the individual doctors and their corporations' claims is uncertain.
The certification order for this appeal certifies the order of December
13, 1988 (amended on January 13, 1989), relating to gross negligence, and
the November 15, 1989, order on redhibition and unfair and deceptive trade
practices, but it adds that the December 13, 1988, and January 13, 1989,
orders are made final and appealable under rule 54(b). The January 13 amended
order made the dismissal of the doctors and their corporations final so
that it could be appealed. Thus, the district court certified the appealability
of an order it had already made appealable, and in fact had been appealed,
but the appeal was voluntarily dismissed. Making matters even more complicated,
the Clinic deleted the individual losses in the second amended complaint.
The notice of appeal includes the Clinic, doctors, and their corporations.
Given our decision to affirm the summary judgment, we find it unnecessary
to resolve this procedural issue. [73] *fn3 The district court held "that reasonable minds could not differ
as to whether Wang's personnel's conduct was
grossly negligent. Clearly gross negligence has not been exhibited by the
defendant's personnel." [74] Indeed, "gross negligence" and "ordinary negligence" are significantly
different in degree. Driscoll v. Pagano, 313 Mass. 464, 48 N.E.2d 11, 13
(1943). Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude
than ordinary negligence. Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505,
506 (1919). Gross negligence is more than just simple inadvertence. "It
amounts to indifference to present legal duty and to utter forgetfulness
of legal obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is heedless
and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others."
Id. [75] The Louisiana courts have also recognized the difference between
gross negligence and ordinary negligence. In Cates v. Beauregard Elec.
Coop., Inc., 316 So. 2d 907, 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 328 So.
2d 367, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97, 50 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1976),
the court described the higher conduct required to prove gross negligence: [76] The terms 'willful', 'wanton', and 'reckless' have been applied
to that degree of fault which lies between intent to do wrong, and the
mere reasonable risk of harm involved in ordinary negligence. These terms
apply to conduct which is still merely negligent, rather than actually
intended to do harm, but which is so far from a proper state of mind that
it is treated in many respects as if harm was intended. The usual meaning
assigned to do [sic] the terms is that the actor has intentionally done
an act of unreasonable character in reckless disregard of the risk known
to him, or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and
so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. It usually
is accompanied by a conscious indifference to consequences, amounting almost
to a willingness that harm should follow. [77] *fn4 White's affidavit provides in pertinent part as follows: [78] 6. It is my expert opinion that Wang
Laboratories was grossly negligent (as different from simple negligence)
in its duties and that gross negligence was the cause of the loss of data.... [79] It is never acceptable to subject the last copy of valuable data
and only when there is a compelling need to use the data. None of those
circumstances existed. [80] In addition and much worse, Wang subjected
to be malfunctioning. [81] Other related acts of negligence well below the standard of practice
are: [82] a. Failure initially to make sufficient copies (at least two) of
the first set of backup disks in the new format (and saving the old format
set). [83] b. Failure to test and verify the reformat and backup process with
valueless test data before subjecting valuable data to this process. [84] c. Subjecting any valuable data to loss while modifying and repairing
the [Clinic's] computer. [85] d. Failure to make a print out of the data before attempting a
reformat or copy of the last copy. [86] *fn5 Rea's and Abshire's affidavits appear to be attempts to bring
gross negligence back into the case. Abernathy's affidavit at least addressed
"latent defects" and practices "injurious to customers." [87] *fn6 See Gautreau v. Southern Milk Sales, Inc., 509 So. 2d 495,
497 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (The court found tortious conversion did not
amount to an unfair trade practice and stated, "[a] trade practice is unfair
when it offends public policy and when the practice is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers."); see
also Coffey v. Peoples Mortgage & Loan, Inc., 408 So. 2d 1153, 1156
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) (declining to impose penalties under UTPA against
finance company for charging usurious interest). [88] *fn7 We also believe the physicians' claim for mental anguish is
meritless. [89] MINORITY OPINIONFOOTNOTES [90] *fn1 Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 494, 23
L. Ed. 374 (1875) ("gross negligence is ordinary negligence with a vituperative
epithet"). ***** END FOOTNOTE(S) HERE ***** [Editor's note: Illustrations from the original opinion, if any, are
available in the print version] Copyright 1996 VersusLaw, Inc. (206) 250-0142. http://www.versuslaw.com 19910108 1991.C05.20 Return to Bad Software: What To Do When Software Fails.