Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/31/628.html
Timestamp: 2019-09-19 11:16:13
Document Index: 223620733

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11150', 'art 1', '§ 11150', '§ 102', '§ 205', '§ 11157', '§ 263']

Myers v. Eastwood Care Center, Inc. :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 3d › Volume 31 › Myers v. Eastwood Care Center, Inc.
(Opinion by Richardson, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court.) [31 Cal. 3d 629]
The licensee, Eastwood Care Center, Inc., owns and operates a long-term health care unit, which is a skilled nursing facility known as Lyncrest Convalescent Hospital, in Lynwood, Los Angeles County (facility). The facility was inspected by representatives of the California Department of Health Services (department) on two occasions in late June 1979. "A" and "B" citations, based on asserted violations of the Act occurring as early as October 1978, were issued by the Director of the State Department of Health Services. Pursuant to statutory procedures, the facility contested the citations, and the penalties assessed were upheld at an ensuing informal conference. On August 15, 1979, after the conference, the facility notified the director that it intended to contest both the citations and proposed penalties. Thereafter, on July 21, 1980, the Attorney General filed an action on behalf of the director to enforce the citations and collect the penalties. The superior court then sustained the facility's demurrer on the ground that the director's action was barred by the statute of limitations. Judgment favorable to [31 Cal. 3d 631] the facility was thereupon entered. This appeal followed. We will reverse the judgment, concluding that the action was timely filed.
Section 1428, subdivision (c), provides that "If a licensee notifies the director that he intends to contest a citation, the director shall immediately [31 Cal. 3d 632] notify the Attorney General. Upon such notification, the Attorney General shall promptly take all appropriate action to enforce the citation and recover the civil penalties prescribed thereon, and shall take such other action as he shall deem appropriate, in the superior court of the county in which the long-term health care facility is located."
The departmental regulations then in effect are consistent with the director's view. Section 72721, subdivision (e), of title 22 of the California Administrative Code (repealed Mar. 21, 1982, (reg. 82, No. 8)) provided that the director shall refer the matter to the Attorney General if the licensee notifies the director of his intent to contest the citation "after an informal conference has been held ...." (See Myers v. Astoria Convalescent Hospital (1980) 105 Cal. App. 3d 682, 685 [164 Cal. Rptr. 495] [dicta consistent with the regulation]; Lackner v. Perkins (1979) 91 Cal. App. 3d 433, 437 [154 Cal. Rptr. 138] [same].) Deferring formal notice to the Attorney General until after the conclusion of the conference is consistent with the stated purposes of the Act to provide prompt and effective discovery of violations and enforcement of the applicable statutes and regulations through administrative action.
If section 1428, subdivision (c), is interpreted to require the director to notify the Attorney General to commence a superior court action before [31 Cal. 3d 633] the administrative review has taken its course, a substantial and unnecessarily increased burden would be cast upon the Attorney General. More significantly, the citation procedures would be prematurely removed from an informal administrative to a formal judicial arena.
The director is acting for the state in her capacity as head of the department. Civil administration of the laws of the state is vested in the Governor and, to assist him, executive and administrative personnel and responsibilities are divided into departments as provided by law. (Gov. Code, § 11150.) All the powers of the head of a department pursuant to chapter 2, part 1, division 3 of title 2 of the Government Code (§ 11150 et seq.), are vested in the director. (§ 102.) The department is empowered to "commence and maintain all proper and necessary actions and [31 Cal. 3d 634] proceedings for any and all of the following purposes: (a) To enforce [the department's] rules and regulations ...," and it "shall sue and be sued under the name of the State Department of Health Services." (§ 205.) The Attorney General is authorized, as the legal advisor to all state departments and their officers, to "institute and prosecute all necessary actions or proceedings for the enforcement of such law and for the punishment of all violations thereof." (Gov. Code, § 11157.) Section 1428, subdivision (c), specifically requires the director to notify the Attorney General of a contested citation and the Attorney General is then mandated to take enforcement action.
The facility emphasizes the accepted principle that a cause of action arises on the date upon which the act occurs which gives rise to the claim. It correctly asserts that "As a general rule a cause of action arises when the wrongful act was committed and not at the time of the discovery; the statute commences to run even though a plaintiff is ignorant that he has a cause of action." (Avner v. Longridge Estates (1969) 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 616 [77 Cal. Rptr. 633].) However, as we noted in United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 586, 596 [83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 463 P.2d 770], in focusing on the commencement [31 Cal. 3d 635] of the statutory period, "Ordinarily this is when the wrongful act is done and the obligation or the liability arises, but it does not 'accrue until the party owning it is entitled to begin and prosecute an action thereon.'" (Italics added; see also Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187 [98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421]; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Actions, § 263, pp. 1116-1117.)
Section 1428, subdivision (c), requires the director to notify the Attorney General so that he may take action "to enforce the citation and recover the civil penalties prescribed thereon." More precisely, the enforcement action is brought not upon the original violation, but to effectuate the administrative decision once the licensee has informed the director of its intent to contest the decision. (See People v. West Publishing Co. (1950) 35 Cal. 2d 80, 85-87 [216 P.2d 441] [cause of action to collect taxes under pre-1951 law accrued not on day after tax was payable but after the finality of the State Board of Equalization determination of amount which was due and payable]; Dept. of Social Welfare v. Stauffer (1943) 56 Cal. App. 2d 699 [133 P.2d 692] [statutory right of recovery against decedent's estate for improperly paid old age relief accrues not on death but on issuance of letters of administration].) Unlike the cases cited by the facility which deal with accrual of causes of action in cases involving tort and contract claims, the action here is an enforcement action which may not be maintained until there is something requiring enforcement. Nothing in section 1428 authorizes the Attorney General independently to bring an action for the purpose of enforcing a citation or collecting a fine.
In contrast, section 1430 permits the Attorney General to bring an action to enjoin or seek civil damages for a violation "except where the state department has taken action and the violations have been corrected to its satisfaction ...." Such an action is brought upon the complaint of the Attorney General or that "of any board, officer, person, corporation or association, or by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public." An action pursuant to section 1428, however, first requires that a citation be issued and finally contested before the Attorney General may act. (Cf. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 744, 759 [163 Cal. Rptr. 585, 608 P.2d 673] ["the fact that a defendant is permitted under a third party procedure to bring a declaratory cross-complaint in the original tort action does not alter the general rule that, [31 Cal. 3d 636] for statute of limitations purposes, the defendant's indemnity action does not accrue until he has suffered actual loss through payment."].)