Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ga-court-of-appeals/1704235.html
Timestamp: 2020-06-02 02:52:14
Document Index: 777911191

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 51', '§ 51']

DIXON v. KRAUSE | FindLaw
DIXON v. KRAUSE et al.
No. A15A0229.
Daniel Dixon filed suit against Justin Wayne Krause, a police officer with the Greenville Police Department, in his individual and official capacity, and the City of Greenville (the “City”), raising federal and state claims for malicious prosecution and seeking attorney fees. The trial court granted summary judgment to Krause and the City, finding that the totality of the circumstances established probable cause to support the arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution of Dixon and, as a result, Dixon's claims failed as a matter of law.1 Dixon appeals, contending that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were questions of fact as to whether probable cause existed to prosecute him on several offenses. We agree and reverse.
“On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review of the law and evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Footnote omitted.) McKissick v. S.O.A., Inc., 299 Ga.App. 772 (684 S.E.2d 24) (2009).
Around the same time, Dixon was heading home after leaving his friend's house located about a mile away from the intersection of Mountville Road and Highway 109. Dixon had been at his friend's house from approximately 11 p.m. on July 15 to 1:30 a.m. on July 16, and did not go anywhere else during this time. Dixon, a white male, was wearing a light blue shirt, jeans and a black-and-white helmet.
When the prosecutor presented the case to the grand jury, he called Krause as the only witness, and the prosecutor was unaware that Krause had initially identified the suspect as a black male. Dixon was subsequently indicted by a grand jury on charges of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (OCGA § 40–6–395(b)(5)(A)) (Count 1), DUI (OCGA § 40–6–391) (Count 2), reckless driving (OCGA § 40–6–390) (Count 3), driving without a license (OCGA § 40–5–20(a)) (Count 4), improper passing (OCGA § 40–6–46) (Count 5), failure to maintain lane (OCGA § 40–6–48) (Count 6), and improper display of license plates (OCGA § 40–2–41) (Count 7).
Just before trial, the prosecutor received the recorded dispatch calls in which Krause stated that the suspect was a black male. The prosecutor then nolle prossed all charges against Dixon, because Krause had withheld the fact that he had identified the suspect as a black male in the radio calls to dispatch, and the prosecutor did not believe he could obtain a conviction since the original suspect and Dixon were not the same race. The prosecuting attorney explained that he relies upon the information provided by the arresting officer in pursuing an indictment, including the officer's description of a suspect, and that Krause should have supplied that information.
Dixon contends that in granting summary judgment to Krause on the state and federal malicious prosecution claims, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that there was probable cause to indict him on charges related to the initial high-speed chase originating in the City—fleeing, reckless driving, improper passing, and failure to maintain lane.2 We agree that questions of material fact remain as to this issue.
“On motion for summary judgment the burden of establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact is upon the moving party and all doubts are to be resolved against the movant. The movant has that burden even as to issues upon which the opposing party would have the trial burden.” (Citation omitted.) Sawgrass Builders, Inc. v. Key, 212 Ga.App. 138(1) (441 S.E.2d 99) (1994). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment only if the defendant establishes that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one essential element of his case. See Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga.App. 889, 892 (658 S.E.2d 362) (2008).
“In order to prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) a criminal prosecution; (2) instigated without probable cause; (3) with malice; (4) pursuant to a valid warrant, accusation, or summons; (5) that terminated in the plaintiff's favor; and (6) caused the plaintiff damage.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) McNeely v. Home Depot, Inc., 275 Ga.App. 480, 482 (621 S.E.2d 473) (2005); see also OCGA § 51–7–40. Where a federal claim for malicious prosecution is alleged, as is the case here, state law supplies the essential elements. See Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1004(II) (11th Cir.1998).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Warner, 301 Ga.App. 39, 42(2) (686 S.E.2d 835) (2009).
Generally, a jury decides whether probable cause exists, and the trial court determines the issue only when the material facts are undisputed. See, e.g., K–Mart Corp. v. Coker, 261 Ga. 745, 746(1) (410 S.E.2d 425) (1991); Ye v. Kroger Co., 252 Ga.App. 712, 713(1) (556 S.E.2d 87) (2001). See also OCGA § 51–7–43 (“Lack of probable cause shall be a question for the jury, under the direction of the court.”).
Krause points to the circumstances of his identification, such as the fact that he only briefly got a glimpse of the initial motorcyclist in dimly-lit conditions, to show that it was reasonable that he made a misidentification of the initial motorcyclist, and he argues that any error on his part was not fatal to a probable cause analysis. To adopt Krause's argument, we would have to view the evidence in his favor, which we are not permitted to do. When viewed in Dixon's favor, the evidence shows that Krause unequivocally stated that he got a good look at the suspect. Nevertheless, the circumstances of Krause's identification must be considered and resolved by the jury, as the finder of fact, not by the trial court or this Court. See Wimberly v. State, 233 Ga. 386, 387(3) (211 S.E.2d 281) (1974) (“Identity is a question for the [trier] of fact, and where a witness identifies a defendant ․ the credibility of the witness making such identification is not to be decided by [a] court.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Finally, the “reasonableness” of Krause's belief that Dixon was the initial motorcyclist is belied by the fact that, in readying the case for prosecution, he failed to set forth a full, fair and complete statement of the facts. As discussed above, Krause failed to tell his supervisor, the Chief of Police, the prosecutor, or the grand jury, that he had initially identified the suspect as a black male. Moreover, the evidence supports an inference that Krause deliberately withheld this information from the prosecutor, because his statements identifying the “black male” were recorded, these recorded statements were readily accessible, and there was no apparent reason why Krause failed to provide these recordings to the prosecutor. Given Krause's concealment of facts, a jury could conclude that his belief that probable cause existed was not “honest” or “reasonable.” See Willis v. Brassell, 220 Ga.App. 348, 353(4) (469 S.E.2d 733) (1996) (probable cause cannot exist if defendant failed to make a fair, full, and complete statement of the facts as they existed, or if he concealed facts); see also Holmes v. Achor Center, Inc., 249 Ga.App. 184, 192(2)(b) (547 S.E.2d 332) (2001) (where material issues can be eliminated only by making credibility judgments, the movant has not met his burden to be entitled to summary judgment).
Given these questions of material fact, the trial court was not permitted to decide the issue of probable cause, and we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claims. Since we conclude that the malicious prosecution claims survive, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Dixon's derivative claim for attorney fees. See Racette v. Bank of America, N.A., 318 Ga.App. 171, 181(6) (733 S.E.2d 457) (2012).
1. Dixon also raised claims of wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, and the trial court granted summary judgment on these counts. On appeal, Dixon challenges only the grant of summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claims.
2. In this case, there is no dispute that Krause had probable cause to arrest Dixon for DUI (Count 2), driving without a license (Count 4), and improper display of license plates (Count 7). However, since these offenses arose from a separate transaction—the stop of Dixon—the probable cause to arrest Dixon for Counts 2, 4, and 7 would not preclude a malicious prosecution claim as to Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6. See Remeneski v. Klinakis, 222 Ga.App. 12, 15(1) (473 S.E.2d 223) (1996) (holding that a finding of probable cause as to one related offense arising from the same transaction is a binding determination that there was probable cause for all related charges arising from the same transaction or occurrence).