Source: https://www.gordondefense.com/tag/appellate-court
Timestamp: 2020-01-28 02:05:17
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appellate court Archives - Gordon Defense
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CURTILAGE IN COLLINS VS. VIRGINIA
584 U. S. ____ (2018), No. 16–1027.
The Supreme Court handed down an important search and seizure case in Collins vs. Virginia.
Officers from the Albemarle County Police Department observed the same motorcycle driver commit a traffic infraction in two separate incidents. In both situations, the cyclist got away from the officers. In both situations, he was driving the same motorcycle.
The officers investigated and determined that the motorcycle was stolen and in the possession of Collins. The motorcycle had an extended frame. Collins’ facebook page showed the motorcycle that was used in the traffic infractions at the top of the driveway of a house. The officer went to the house and parked on the street. From his position, he saw a motorcycle that had an extended frame covered with a white tarp at the same location and angle on the driveway as the facebook photograph. The officer took a picture of the motorcycle from the street and then walked up to them to where the motorcycle was parked. In order to “investigate further” he pulled off the tarp and observed the same motorcycle that eluded them earlier, and that was in the facebook photos. The officer ran the plates and found that it was stolen. When Collins returned him, he admitted that he bought the motorcycle without a title. He was charged with receiving stolen property.
Collins filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the motorcycle. He argued that the officer trespassed on the curtilage to conduct an investigation in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of appeals affirmed because the officer had probable cause and that there were numerous exigencies that justified the officer’s entry. The Supreme court affirmed saying that the Fourth Amendment’s Automobile Exception and that the motorcycle was contraband.
The Supreme Court noted that “When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.” Furthermore, the court determined that the part of the driveway where the motorcycle was parked and searched was curtilage. In this case, it was because it was “an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home life extends,” thus being in the curtilage and requiring a warrant. This is because “A visitor endeavoring to reach the front door of the house would have to walk part way up the driveway, but would turn off before entering the enclosure and instead proceed up a set of steps leading to the front porch” and “When [the officer] searched the motorcycle, it was parked inside this partially enclosed top portion of the driveway that abuts the house.”
Because of this, the officer’s actions were an encroachment on the fourth amendment in the item searched (the motorcycle) but also in the encroachment of his home. So the next question was if the automobile exception justified the invasion of the curtilage. Writing for the court, Justice Sotomayor used the following hypothetical:
“Applying the relevant legal principles to a slightly different factual scenario confirms that this is an easy case. Imagine a motorcycle parked inside the living room of a house, visible through a window to a passerby on the street. Imagine further that an officer has probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was involved in a traffic infraction. Can the officer, acting without a warrant, enter the house to search the motorcycle and confirm whether it is the right one? Surely not.
The reason is that the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself.”
Sotomayor noted that “Nothing in our case law, however, suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant.” Further, “The Court already has declined to expand the scope of other exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home.” The court went on to say that “searching a vehicle parked in the curtilage involves not only the invasion of the Fourth Amendment interest in the vehicle but also an invasion of the sanctity of the curtilage[ ]” for the same reason that officers may not enter a home to make an arrest without a warrant even when they have probable cause. She also said that “The automobile exception does not afford the necessary lawful right of access to search a vehicle parked within a home or its curtilage because it does not justify an intrusion on a person’s separate and substantial Fourth Amendment interest in his home and curtilage.”
The court denied Virginia’s request to make a bright-line rule saying that “the automobile exception does not permit warrantless entry into ‘the physical threshold of a house or a similar fixed, enclosed structure inside the curtilage like a garage’” so that the officers wouldn’t have to make case by case determinations. The court stated that the officers already have to do this because the curtilage has already been afforded constitutional protection. Also, Virginia’s proposed rule mistakenly places emphasis on visibility. Sotomayor said, “So long as it is curtilage, a parking patio or carport into which an officer can see from the street is no less entitled to protection from trespass and a warrantless search than a fully enclosed garage.” Finally, “Virginia’s proposed bright-line rule automatically would grant constitutional rights to those persons with the financial means to afford residences with garages in which to store their vehicles but deprive those persons without such resources of any individualized consideration as to whether the areas in which they store their vehicles qualify as curtilage.”
The Supreme Court held that the automobile exception did not allow the officer to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the decision on the Supreme Court of Virginia.
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Circuit Vacates Conviction and Remands Case for Improper Summation Argument
In United States of America vs. Ballard, No. 17-427 CR, 2018 WL 1357392, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a case for a new trial after the prosecutor used improper argument in their summation.
Ballard was charged with trafficking minors, coercion and enticement to engage in interstate travel for illegal sexual activity. In the government’s rebuttal, the prosecutors said the defense theory of the trial was a “government frame-up.” This was a serious mischaracterization of the defense’s argument and the court said in front of the jury that they “didn’t hear” the defense counsel say that the police had framed Ballard. Ballard asked for a motion for new trial under Rule 33, but was denied because the district court observed that the prosecutor’s remarks were a response to an allegation by the defense that one victim was encouraged to lie by an investigator.
Ballard also complained because the government insinuated that it had more evidence than what they were allowed to offer in the trial. The defense objected, and the court said:
“Well, I’m not sure if it is [improper] or not. It certainly is the law. There’s an item of evidence that people are permitted to bring into this Court and get on the stand and ask questions and put that information out to the jury, but there are rules to say there’s some evidence you can’t. So, you have to decide the case based on the proof you heard, not on something you didn’t hear or wasn’t presented to you here in the courtroom. If you do that, you’ll be okay.”
This was improper. The Court did not instruct the jury that they should not assume that such evidence exists or that the jury can find reasonable doubt from a lack of evidence regardless of why the evidence was lacking. Further, because this was after summation arguments (so right at the very end), the defense did not have the chance to clarify the burden of proof, and the jury did not get further instruction as to the burden of proof.
The court considered errors together and found them both to be improper. The court further noted that vacating a conviction based on substantially improper remarks when a defendant’s guilt is established by overwhelming evidence. But that was not the case here given that the government’s evidence was the testimony of the alleged victims. There were also several problems in their credibility as there were several times where there were great contradictions. In a close case like this where the government has made improper summation arguments this, vacating the sentence is appropriate.
The Second Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case back to the district court for a new trial. No. 17-427-CR, 2018 WL 1357392.
May 11, 2018 /by Jeremy Gordon
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Third Circuit Vacates Sentence Based on Plain Error
In United States vs. Aminov. No. 17-1703, the Third Circuit reversed a sentence based on plain error.
Aminov was sentenced in 2011 for aiding and abetting in the production of a document without lawful authority. The PSI recommended a Sentencing Guidelines range of 0-6 months instead of the government’s suggested range of 12-16 months. Aminov was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release. He was accused of healthcare fraud while on supervised release and sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. He was then charged with violation of supervised release. He asked for a concurrent sentence, or in the alternative, a consecutive sentence at the low end of the guideline range. The government sought a consecutive sentence at the high end of the guideline range stating in the sentencing memorandum that “[a]t his original sentencing, in this case, the government advocated for a term of imprisonment in the range of 10 to 16 months. Judge Shapiro imposed a sentence below the government’s recommended range. This was repeated in their sentencing closing arguments. The court gave a sentence at the top of the guideline range and said “I am looking back at what Judge Shapiro saw in you and she imposed a below-guideline range sentence, significantly below guideline range sentence. And in return for her doing that, you immediately went back out and engaged in further similar criminal conduct.” No objection was made to this statement.
Aminov appealed his sentence. It was subject to plain error analysis where he must show:
(1) an error; (2) that is plain or obvious; (3) that affects the defendant’s substantive rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
The Third Circuit said that plain error was established here because the range of punishment was not 10-16 months like the prosecutor said, but 0-6 months like what was in the PSI. The district court crafted its sentence in consideration of incorrect facts and committed plain error. It affected the outcome of the district court proceedings because the district court relied on it as support for its sentencing decision and said the same. Finally, allowing a sentence to stand on incorrect information would undermine public confidence in the judicial process.
The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the sentence to the district court for resentencing. No. 17-1703
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United States of America v. Jose Prisciliano Gracia-Cantu, No. 15-40227, 2018 WL 2068684
Gracia-Cantu pled guilty to being an alien unlawfully present in the United States after previously being deported. He also had a prior conviction for Assault Family Violence under Texas Penal Code 22.01(a)(1) and 22.01(b)(2). The presentence report recommended an eight level increase for this under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), calling the family violence conviction an “aggravated felony.” Gracia-Cantu argued that the Texas Assault Family Violence is not a “crime of violence” under 18 USC § 16 and as such, the conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. The district court found that the Texas Family violence conviction was an aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), by looking at the judgment conviction that stated that the injury occurred by “striking said Maria Garcia on or about the head with an object: to wit, a can.” The district court then stated that it would require force to strike someone in the head with a can. Gracia-Cantu was sentenced to 41 months and appealed his sentence.
The Fifth Circuit began by addressing whether the family violence case applied under 18 USC § 16(a). Section 16(a) defines a crime of violence as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Prior Fifth Circuit precedent held that Texas Assault Family Violence was not a crime of violence under 16(a). While the government argued that precedent had been overruled by United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014), and Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016), the Fifth Circuit disagreed. The Fifth Circuit held that the government’s argument had no merit because of the “rule of orderliness,” which states that one panel of the court may not overrule another unless a “Supreme Court decision ‘expressly or implicitly’ overrules one of our precedents.” Further, this was confirmed in cases after Castleman, such as United States v. Reyes-Contreras, 882 F.3d 113, 123 (5th Cir. 2018). Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s prior precedent stood and Gracia-Cantu’s conviction was not a crime of violence under 16(a).
Next the court looked at whether the crime of violence was a crime under § 16(b). The Fifth Circuit noted that § 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague after the Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions vs. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). But since this was not objected to at the time of sentencing it was subject to plain error review. “To obtain relief under plain-error review, an appellant must show: (1) an error or defect that was not affirmatively waived; (2) the legal error is clear or obvious; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights; and (4) if the first three prongs are satisfied, that the court should exercise its discretion to correct the error because it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Dimaya established that it is error to use § 16(b) to show that an offense is a crime of violence. But there were cases that came out before this that would have kept this argument from succeeding at that time. The first two prongs having been met, the court then looked to see if this violated his substantial rights. The court determined that it did because his sentence of 41 months was 11 months above the applicable guidelines for his case without the eight-level increase for the crime of violence. This satisfied the third prong. The court then determined that the disparity between the imposed sentence and the applicable guidelines range can warrant the court’s exercise of discretion. Further, the fact that the higher sentence came from applying a statute declared unconstitutional void by the Supreme Court while the claim was on direct appeal also was considered. The court looked at the totality of the circumstances and determined that the error should be corrected.
The Fifth Circuit vacated Gracia-Cantu’s sentence and remanded the case back down for resentencing. No. 15-40227, 2018 WL 2068684
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McCalla pled guilty to conspiracy to possess at least five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Mandatory minimum, in that case, was ten years. His range of punishment was 136 to 168 months. He was sentenced to 126 moths and the court found that a sentence below the advisory guideline range would be sufficient but not greater thank necessary to comply with the requirements of section 3553. McCalla was informed that he had the right to appeal. He did not file a direct appeal. In his 2255 motion he alleged that he would have appealed his sentence if counsel had consulted him and that counsel knew that McCalla was unhappy with the indictment and sentence. McCalla also stated that he “expressed his desire to challenge [this] unbelievable result” and requested an evidentiary hearing.
The magistrate replied that he McCalla’s motion should be denied, that McCalla did not ask counsel to file an appeal, that counsel did not have a duty to consult McCalla and that “no rational defendant would have wonted to appeal.” The magistrate ruled that McCalla was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because his claim was meritless. The District court adopted the recommendation of the Magistrate’s court and denied the certificate of appealability.
On appeal the court started by stating that both a direct appeal and effective assistance of counsel are rights. Further, the accused has the authority to make certain decisions regarding the case such as whether to take the appeal. Counsel is to advise the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal and make a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s wishes. When a defendant has not instructed counsel to file a notice of appeal there is a constitutional duty to consult when a defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. When counsel’s performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he would have otherwise taken then that is prejudice even if the appeal would not have won.
McCalla’s statement that he wanted to challenge his sentence showed that he was interested in appealing. Counsel was to advise McCalla about the advantages of taking an appeal. Counsel did not. If counsel had done their duty then McCalla would have asked his attorney to appeal the sentence. This showed that McCalla had alleged facts, that, if true, established a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal Neither the fact that he not have been successful nor the fact that the sentencing judge notified Thompson that he had a right to appeal changes the conclusion of the court. This means that the district court abused their discretion when they denied his evidentiary hearing on this.
The Eleventh circuit reversed with orders to schedule an evidentiary hearing.
McCalla v. United States. No. 16-15623, 2018 WL 1747722
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The Tenth Circuit recently reversed in United States v. Dahda. Dahda was convicted on a drug conspiracy for over 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana. On appeal, Dahda alleged seven grounds for relief, including that the district court erred in applying Dahda’s base offense level by miscalculating the amount of marijuana attributed to Dahda.
While the rest of the grounds were rejected on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed on Dahda’s claim that the district court miscalculated the base offense level. The court indicated that “the government bears the burden to prove drug quantity through a preponderance of the evidence and the base-offense level may consist of an estimate if it contains some record support and is based on information bearing a ‘minimum indicia of reliability.’”
However, the Tenth Circuit found the information used to sustain Dahda’s offense level was not reliable. The appellate court found that the quantities of marijuana found in pallets varied. The government’s witnesses indicated that each pallet had between five to ten to eighty pounds of marijuana. Toward the end of the conspiracy, each pallet usually contained 80 pounds, but there “could have been” times when the pallets contained more than 80 pounds. There was also no indication of the time periods that the government’s witnesses were referencing when discussing the pallets that contained 80 pounds. The court found that there was no way to tie the testimony of the government’s witnesses to the shipments that were attributed to Dahda and as such, it was insufficient. The court also rejected the government’s harmless error analysis.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, United States v. Dahda, No. 15-3237
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Fourth Circuit Announces New Savings Clause Test in United States v. Wheeler
United States v. Wheeler, __F.3d__, 2018 WL 1514418 (4th Cir. 2018)
The Fourth Circuit recently handed down a very important and precedential decision on the applicability of the savings clause to the legality of a petitioner’s sentence.
Appellant Gerald Wheeler was charged in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana, possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Wheeler pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which agreed to an enhanced penalty pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 851 for the drug count.
In 2008, the district court sentenced Wheeler to 120 months in prison on Count One based on the statutory mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) and 851. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Wheeler’s sentence in 2009. United States v. Wheeler, 329 Fed. Appx. 481 (4th Cir. 2009).
In 2010, Wheeler filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 alleging his counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, failing to argue that Wheeler’s 1996 North Carolina conviction for possession of cocaine did not qualify to enhance his sentence under section 851. The district court dismissed Wheeler’s 2255 motion as foreclosed by the Fourth Circuit’s holdings in United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Simmons, 635 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2011). Those decisions held, “[T]o determine whether a conviction is for a crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one year [under North Carolina law], … we consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history.” Harp, 406 F.3d at 246; Simmons, 635 F.3d at 146. Pursuant to this reasoning, the district court found that Wheeler received a 6 to 8-month sentence for the 1996 conviction, thus, “his offense was punishable by imprisonment for more than a year” because it was a Class I felony which carried a maximum sentence of 15 months. Wheeler filed a notice of appeal and motion for COA with the Fourth Circuit on August 3, 2011.
While Wheeler’s motion for COA was pending, the Fourth Circuit overturned Simmons on rehearing en banc. The court determined that “in deciding whether a sentencing enhancement was appropriate under the Controlled Substances Act, a district court could no longer look to a hypothetical defendant with the worst possible criminal history…. [A] sentencing court may only consider the maximum possible sentence that the particular defendant could have received.” United States v. Kerr, 737 F.3d 33, 37 (4th Cir. 2013). Even so, the Fourth Circuit denied Wheeler’s motion for COA because it determined Simmons did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
Wheeler subsequently submitted a request for authorization to file a second 2255 motion with an alternative petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241 seeking application of the savings clause (28 U.S.C. 2255(e)). The Fourth Circuit denied Wheeler’s request to file a second or successive 2255 but did not address his 2241 petition which was pending at the time before the district court.
The district court stayed the 2241 petition pending the resolution of United States v. Surratt, No. 14-6851. The majority panel in Surratt distinguished the court’s decision in In re Jones, which granted savings clause relief after setting forth a three-part test based on the legality of a petitioner’s conviction, but not his sentence. Following Surratt, the district court denied Wheeler’s 2241 petition because it did not challenge the legality of his conviction, only his sentence.
Wheeler once again appealed, and the Fourth Circuit subsequently granted rehearing en banc in Surratt, thus vacating the panel’s prior opinion. However, rehearing in Surratt was found to be moot after his sentence was commuted by President Obama. The Fourth Circuit lifted the stay pending rehearing and has finally addressed the merits of Wheeler’s 2241 claims.
First, the Fourth Circuit addressed the government’s “shifting position” on jurisdiction. The government initially conceded that Wheeler met the savings clause requirements before the district court. However, on appeal, the government did an “about-face,” and argued that the court was without jurisdiction because Wheeler had failed to satisfy the savings clause requirements. The Fourth Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause the savings clause requirements are jurisdictional, we must reject Appellant’s waiver argument. Though the Government’s change of position is a ‘distasteful occurrence[ ]’ and is ‘not to be encouraged, its about-face is irrelevant to our resolution of’ this appeal.”
The court then turned to whether Wheeler’s 2241 petition satisfied the savings clause requirements of the circuit. The Fourth Circuit’s seminal decision, In re Jones, held that a petitioner must satisfy three elements to meet the savings clause requirements:
[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction when: (1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.
The question now before the court was whether Jones applies to sentencing arguments. The Fourth Circuit held it does and announced a new savings clause test for erroneous sentences:
“[W]e conclude that 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when: (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping requirements of 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.”
After applying the new savings clause test to Wheeler’s 2241 claims, the Fourth Circuit held that Wheeler did, in fact, show that 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
The Fourth Circuit VACATED and REMANDED to the district court to have his 2241 petition addressed on the merits.
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Eleventh Circuit Vacates Sentence So Defendant Can Get Benefit of Time Served in Federal Institution
In United States v. Jacinto-Gonzalez, 2018 WL 1378021, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a sentence in order for an inmate to be credited with the time that he spent in a federal facility.
Jacinto- Gonzalez was arrested and charged with being in the United States after being previously deported. He pled guilty on June 23 and had been in custody since March 26. His punishment range was between 8 and 14 months. His counsel asked the court “to fashion a sentence that gives him credit for that time.” The court said it was hard to know how much credit Jacinto-Gonzalez would get and sentenced Jacinto-Gonzalez to eight months confinement with no credit for time served. The court said:
“What I’ve essentially done is given him credit for the time served and calculate it as a 13- or 14-month sentence, depending on whether you’re giving him credit or not for the 30 days he did on state time, which technically he should not get credited against this, but the bottom line is eight months with no credit for time served before today.”
When his attorney objected, the court said that he was effectively getting credit. The court placed in the order that: “The defendant has received credit for his prior time in custody. Thus, the defendant SHOULD NOT receive credit for any time served prior to October 4, 2017, the date of sentencing (emphasis added)”
The court stated that while 18 USC 3585(b) says that “‘a defendant shall be given credit” for time served in official detention “that has not been credited against another sentence.’” The Supreme Court has also stated that section does not authorize a district court to compute the credit at sentencing. Rather, it is the Bureau of Prisons that computes credit for time served. This means that although the court could adjust Jacinto-Gonzalez’s sentence for the amount of time served that he had, the court didn’t have the authority to prevent the BOP from calculating the time served.
The government said that this error was harmless and invited. The court disagreed. First Jacinto-Gonzalez just asked that the court also consider his time served when the court was deciding the appropriate length of the sentence under 2L1.2 of the Guidelines. Second, with regard to harmlessness, Jacinto-Gonzalez did not necessarily receive a shorter sentence by getting sentenced to 8 months with no credit for time served. Finally, it wasn’t clear when he went in and out of federal custody meaning it’s not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the sentence.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed with orders that the district court can consider the time spent by Jacinto-Gonzalez received in state custody pursuant to 2L1.2 comment 6, but the court can’t preclude the BOP from performing its own calculation of time served. 2018 WL 1378021
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Third Circuit Vacates Sentence for Plain Error Due to Improper Sentencing Guideline Calculation
In United States v. Bell, 2018 WL 1432956, the Third Circuit vacated an improperly assigned sentence.
Bell pled guilty to the offense of felon in possession of a firearm. He was enhanced at sentencing due to the ACCA and his priors.
Bell’s first ground for appeal, that his priors did not meet the standard for the ACCA was denied.
Bell’s second ground was that his sentence was improperly calculated. The PSI calculated his sentence at 37 and assessed a three-level downward variance for acceptance of responsibility down to 34. When combined with his criminal history category of IV, his sentencing range came out to 262-327 months. The court adopted the PSI and granted a downward variance to 202 months.
Bell argued that his offense level should have started at 34 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) which after the three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility would put him at a 31 (note: level 31 criminal history category 6 would be 188–235 months on the 2016 manual). The government conceded this to be accurate AND conceded this to be plain error under Rule 52(b) and Molina Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) “When a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct range—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error.”
The Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded it back to the district court. United States v. Bell, 2018 WL 143295
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