Source: https://www.scribd.com/doc/61470952/NBA-Files-Suit-Against-Players-Over-Bargaining-Tactics
Timestamp: 2017-01-18 06:58:52
Document Index: 173821851

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 52', '§ 17', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 1331', '§ 1', '§ 2201', '§ 1367', '§ 185', '§ 1391']

NBA Files Suit Against Players Over Bargaining Tactics
BrowseInterestsBiography & MemoirBusiness & LeadershipFiction & LiteraturePolitics & EconomyHealth & WellnessSociety & CultureHappiness & Self-HelpMystery, Thriller & CrimeHistoryYoung AdultBrowse byBooksAudiobooksArticlesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoinJUDGE GARDEPh~UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, ATLANTA HAWKS, LP, BANNER SEVENTEEN LLC, BOBCATS BASKETBALL, LLC, CHICAGO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, CAVALIERS OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, DALLAS BASKETBALL LIMITED, THE DENVER NUGGETS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, DETROIT PISTONS BASKETBALL COMPANY, GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS, LLC, ROCKET BALL, LTD., PACERS BASKETBALL LLC, LAC BASKETBALL CLUB, INC., THE LOS ANGELES LAKERS, INC., HOOPS, L.P., MIAMI HEAT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, MILWAUKEE BUCKS, INC., MINNESOTA TIMBERWOLVES BASKETBALL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, NEW JERSEY BASKETBALL, LLC, NEW ORLEANS HORNETS NBA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, MADISON SQUARE GARDEN, L.P., THE PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL CLUB, LLC, ORLANDO MAGIC, LTD., PHILADELPHIA 76ERS L.P., SUNS LEGACY PARTNERS, L.L.C., TRAIL BLAZERS, INC., SACRAMENTO KINGS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, LP, SAN ANTONIO SPURS, L.L.C., MAPLE LEAF SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LTD., JAZZ BASKETBALL INVESTORS, INC., and WASHINGTON BULLETS, L.P., Plaintiffs, vs. NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, DEREK FISHER, KEYON DOOLING, JAMES JONES, MATT BONNER, MAURICE EVANS, ROGER MASON, JR., CHRIS PAUL, THEO RATLIFF, ETAN THOMAS, AMAR'E STOUDEMIRE, MIKE DUNLEAVY, JAMES FREDETTE, CHARLES JENKINS, and all those similarly situated, Defendants.
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Plaintiffs, the National Basketball Association and its member teams (collectively, the "NBA"), bring this Complaint against defendants, the National Basketball Players Association (the "NBPA" or the "Union"), the individual defendants, and the defendant class (collectively, the "Defendants"), and allege upon personal knowledge with respect to themselves and their own acts, and upon information and belief with respect to all other matters, as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. This action arises from the Union's threatened use of antitrust litigation to extract
more favorable terms and conditions of employment in ongoing collective bargaining negotiations with the NBA. The Union has repeatedly asserted that, unless it gets its way at the bargaining table, it will purport to renounce or "disclaim interest" in its role as the exclusive bargaining representative ofNBA players, an impermissible bargaining tactic it mistakenly believes would enable it to commence an antitrust lawsuit challenging the legality of the NBA's ongoing lockout ofNBA players and thereby to pressure the NBA to accede to the Union's preferred outcome in collective bargaining. The Union's improper threats of antitrust litigation are having a direct, immediate and harmful effect upon the ability of the parties to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. The NBA therefore seeks a declaration that the NBA's ongoing lockout, which is lawful as a matter of federal labor law, does not violate the antitrust laws. NATURE OF THE ACTION 2. This action involves a dispute over the lawfulness of the NBA's exercise of its
negotiating tactic, which the Union incorrectly believes would enable it to commence an antitrust challenge to the NBA's lockout, which the Union in turn believes would strengthen its position in negotiations over a renewed labor agreement. 5. Whatever the NBP A may choose to call itself after its purported disclaimer - such
or not any 'disclaimer of interest by the Union would be valid as a matter oflabor law, the lockout is lawful and protected from antitrust attack by virtue of the labor exemption provided by Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (as well as by Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 9. The NBA also requests a declaration that the lockout is lawful and protected from
antitrust attack by virtue of the non-statutory labor exemption. Because the NBPA's threatened disclaimer would not be a good faith, permanent relinquishment of the right to bargain with the NBA concerning the terms and conditions of the employment ofNBA players and would not be effective as a matter of federal labor law, it has no effect on the continuing application and validity of the non-statutory labor exemption. Nor could the purported disclaimer have any effect on the validity of the lockout or the application of the non-statutory labor exemption for so
long as proceedings remain pending before the NLRB. But even if, as a result of the proceedings now pending before the NLRB, the NBPA's purported disclaimer is not determined to be ineffective as a matter of federal labor law, the lockout would still not be "sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-bargaining process," Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996), and, accordingly, the non-statutory labor exemption would remain in effect. 10. The NBA requests a further declaration that the lockout is lawful under the
antitrust laws because it constitutes a reasonable, temporary bargaining measure designed to secure a new collective bargaining agreement, is ancillary to the legitimate purposes of the NBA's joint venture, and its pro competitive justifications therefore outweigh any alleged anticompetitive effects. 11. The NBA also requests a declaration that, because the lockout involves or grows
out of a labor dispute, the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the lockout. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 104. 12. In the alternative, the NBA requests a declaration that, if the NBPA's disclaimer
were not deemed invalid by the NLRB, and the collective bargaining relationship between the parties were not otherwise to continue, all existing contracts between NBA players and NBA teams (known as Uniform Player Contracts or "Ul'Cs") would be void and unenforceable. Because the terms of all Ul'Cs are prescribed, governed and regulated by the CBA - which together with the Ul'Cs comprehensively establish the terms and conditions of employment of all NBA players - the individual Ul'Cs are the product of the collective bargaining process between the NBA and the NBP A, and, as a matter of federal labor law, are void upon the effective termination of that process.
§§ 1331 and 1337, as an action arising under the Sherman and Clayton Acts (15 U.S.C. § 1 et
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02; and under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 14. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. PARTIES 15. PlaintiffNBA is organized as ajoint venture, with each of the 30 members
Atlanta Hawks, LP (Atlanta Hawks); Banner Seventeen LLC (Boston Celtics); Bobcats Basketball, LLC (Charlotte Bobcats); Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership (Chicago Bulls); Cavaliers Operating Company, LLC (Cleveland Cavaliers); Dallas Basketball Limited (Dallas Mavericks); The Denver Nuggets Limited Partnership (Denver Nuggets); Detroit Pistons Basketball Company (Detroit Pistons); Golden State Warriors, LLC (Golden State Warriors); Rocket Ball, Ltd. (Houston Rockets); Pacers Basketball LLC (Indiana Pacers); LAC Basketball Club, Inc. (Los Angeles Clippers); The Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. (Los Angeles Lakers); Hoops, L.P. (Memphis Grizzlies); Miami Heat Limited Partnership (Miami Heat); Milwaukee Bucks, Inc. (Milwaukee Bucks); Minnesota Timberwolves Basketball Limited Partnership (Minnesota Timberwolves); New Jersey Basketball, LLC (New Jersey Nets); New Orleans Hornets NBA Limited Partnership (New Orleans Hornets); Madison Square Garden, L.P. (New York Knickerbockers); The Professional Basketball Club, LLC (Oklahoma City Thunder); Orlando Magic, Ltd. (Orlando Magic); Philadelphia 76ers, L.P. (Philadelphia 76ers); Suns Legacy
Partners, L.L.C. (Phoenix Suns); Trail Blazers, Inc. (Portland Trail Blazers); Sacramento Kings Limited Partnership, LP (Sacramento Kings); San Antonio Spurs, L.L.C. (San Antonio Spurs); Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment Ltd. (Toronto Raptors); Jazz Basketball Investors, Inc. (Utah Jazz); and Washington Bullets, L.P. (Washington Wizards). 17. The NBP A, an unincorporated association, is a labor organization recognized by
the NBA and certified by the NLRB as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all NBA players. The NBP A regularly represents employees employed in this judicial district for purposes of collective bargaining, and maintains its headquarters at 310 Lenox Avenue, New York, New York. 18. With respect to the individuals named as defendants and class representatives: (a) Derek Fisher is a professional basketball player currently under contract
with the Los Angeles Lakers. Fisher is the President of the NBP A. (b) Keyon Dooling is a professional basketball player currently under contract
with the San Antonio Spurs. Bonner is a Vice President of the NBP A. (e) Maurice Evans is a professional basketball player currently under contract
recently played professional basketball under a contract with the Atlanta Hawks. Thomas is a Vice President of the NBPA. G) Amar' e Stoudemire is a professional basketball player currently under Stoudemire is the NBPA Player Representative for
NATURE OF TRADE AND COMMERCE 19. The NBA is engaged in, among other things, the public exhibition of professional
basketball games, an activity that includes a substantial volume of interstate activity. The NBA' s interstate transactions collectively involve annual expenditures and receipts of many millions of dollars. 20. The NBA's business in interstate commerce includes the production and
marketing ofNBA games in New York City. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 21. This action is brought, in part, against a defendant class pursuant to Rules 23(a),
(b)(I) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consists of (a) all basketball players who were, are or will be under contract to play professional basketball for an NBA team during all or any portion of the period commencing on July 1, 2011 and ending on the date of a final and unappealable judgment in this action; and (b) all other persons (including college and other basketball athletes) who, during all or any portion of the period commencing on July 1, 2011 and ending on the date of a final and unappealable judgment in this action, were, are or will be eligible to play basketball for an NBA team as a "Rookie" or "Veteran Player" (as those terms are defined in the CBA). The individual defendants described in paragraph 18 are the class representatives. 22. The class is so numerous and geographically widespread that joinder of all At a minimum, the class consists of over 420 players.
of (a) whether the lockout ofNBA players in support of the NBA's collective bargaining position is lawful and protected from antitrust attack by virtue of Section 20 of the Clayton Act; (b) whether the lockout ofNBA players in support of the NBA's collective bargaining position is
lawful and protected from antitrust attack by virtue of the non-statutory exemption from the antitrust laws; (c) whether the lockout ofNBA players constitutes only a temporary restraint, ancillary to the legitimate purposes of the NBA's joint venture, and has pro competitive justifications that outweigh any alleged anticompetitive effects; (d) whether this case involves or grows out of a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, such that the federal courts are without jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the lockout ofNBA players; and (e) whether, assuming that the NBPA's purported disclaimer is not determined to be ineffective as a matter or federal labor law and the collective bargaining relationship between the parties does not otherwise continue, the DPCs are consequently void. 24. The claims or defenses of the class representatives will be typical ofthe claims or
defenses of the class. These claims or defenses include the assertions that (a) the lockout of NBA players in support of the NBA's collective bargaining position is not exempt from antitrust attack by virtue of Section 20 of the Clayton Act; (b) because of the NBPA's purported disclaimer, the lockout ofNBA players in support of the NBA's collective bargaining position is not exempt from antitrust attack by virtue of the non-statutory exemption from the antitrust laws; (c) absent the statutory and non-statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws, the lockout constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade; (d) the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prevent a federal court from enjoining the lockout, and that the lockout would violate the antitrust laws; and (e) notwithstanding the NBPA's purported disclaimer of interest, the DPCs remain valid and enforceable. 25. The representative defendants will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
generally applicable to the class, thereby making declaratory relief with respect to the questions of law and fact identified above appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS The NBPA's History of Invoking Antitrust Laws and Disclaimer as a Collective Bargaining Tactic 29. For over 40 years, the NBA has, as a multi employer bargaining unit, engaged in
collective bargaining with the NBP A over the terms and conditions of employment for NBA players. During this period, the parties have entered into 14 collective bargaining agreements of increasing length and complexity. In virtually every collective bargaining negotiation since 1970, the players have commenced or have threatened to commence antitrust litigation as a tactic to pressure the NBA to accede to the Union's bargaining demands. Not one ofthese litigations proceeded to a final adjudication, or even to trial. Indeed, despite the NBPA's repeated invocation of the antitrust laws in an effort to gain leverage in bargaining, the ultimate resolution
on each such occasion (i.e., in 1976, 1983, 1988, 1994, and 1999) has always been the same: a collectively-bargained agreement between the NBA and the NBP A negotiated pursuant to
federal labor law containing the very practices the NBP A had challenged as antitrust violations. 30. As part and parcel of its pattern of improperly invoking the antitrust laws to
further its collective bargaining goals, the NBP A also has repeatedly threatened either to "decertify" as a Union or "disclaim interest" as the players' representative in an attempt to avoid the labor exemption to the antitrust laws that indisputably applies during the course ofthe collective bargaining process. 31. For example, in 1988, after the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey rejected the NBA players' argument that the non-statutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws ended immediately upon expiration of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (see Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987)), the player representatives ofthe NBPA - represented then as they are represented now by attorney Jeffrey L. Kesslerpurportedly voted to recommend to the players a decertification of the Union. Notwithstanding that vote, the NBP A continued to bargain with the NBA, and the parties reached a new collective bargaining agreement (the "1988 CBA"). 32. After the expiration of the 1988 CBA in 1994, the parties engaged in collective
bargaining for a successor agreement. However, after just two bargaining sessions, the NBP A declared the existence of a bargaining impasse, refused to meet with the NBA and threatened an antitrust lawsuit. In subsequent litigation, both this Court and the Second Circuit rejected the players' argument that the labor exemption to the antitrust laws ended at bargaining impasse, and found that the NBA's maintenance of employment terms beyond the expiration of the collective
agreement effective as of June 30, 1998, and invited the NBP A promptly to commence negotiations for a successor agreement. Those negotiations - which took place against the backdrop of repeated threats by the NBP A and NBA players to disclaim interest and bring antitrust claims - were unsuccessful. Consequently, on or about July 1, 1998, the NBA
commenced a lawful lockout ofNBA players in support of its collective bargaining position. The lockout lasted until January 20, 1999, when the NBA and the Union reached an agreement on a successor collective bargaining agreement covering the period from January 20, 1999 through June 30, 2005 (the "1999 CBA").
The NBA and the NBP A successfully negotiated a successor agreement to the
1999 CBA in the summer of 2005. That agreement - the most recently expired CBA - covered the time period from July 29, 2005 through June 30,2011. The Current Dispute 37. Commencing in August 2009, the NBA and NBPA met on numerous occasions
and attempted to negotiate a successor agreement to the 2005 CBA prior to its expiration on June 30, 2011. Despite the NBA's good faith efforts to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement, however, on May 24,2011, the NBPA filed with the NLRB an unfair labor practice charge against the NBA, which remains pending. When the 2005 CBA expired on June 30, 2011, the NBA exercised its federal labor law right, as part of the collective bargaining process, to impose a lockout ofNBA players. 38. In the weeks and months leading up to the expiration of the CBA, and continuing
to date, the NBP A has made clear that it intended to pursue a course of action, fully consistent with its prior conduct, of (a) threatening and seeking to effectuate a purported disclaimer of its role as the players' exclusive collective bargaining representative; (b) threatening and filing antitrust litigation directed and financed by the NBP A and its lawyers; (c) having its executives and lawyers negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with the NBA in settlement of the antitrust litigation; and (d) resurrecting the NBP A as a "union" representing all NBA players. 39. In furtherance of this course of action, the Union already has collected from many
occasions on behalf of the NFLPA in its bargaining with the National Football League ("NFL"). The first such instance occurred in 1989, when the NFLP A purportedly disclaimed interest in collective bargaining and thereupon directed and financed an antitrust challenge to the terms and conditions of player employment. In support of that disclaimer, Mr. Kessler swore under oath
that "the NFLPA's abandonment of collective bargaining rights was permanent and irreversible, and not designed to put pressure on the NFL to achieve a new collective bargaining agreement." Aff. of Jeffrey L. Kessler, McNeil v. NFL, No. 4-90-476 (Nov. 2, 1990) (emphasis in original). Yet, that very lawsuit was settled through negotiation of terms of a new collective bargaining agreement, after which the NFLP A resurrected itself as a union. 41. Earlier this year, with the NFL and NFLPA facing the imminent expiration of
their most recent collective bargaining agreement, the NFLP A again employed the identical disclaimer tactic, asserting in Brady v. NFL that it was (once again) permanently abandoning its role as the collective bargaining representative of NFL players. Yet this second purported disclaimer produced (entirely predictably) the very same result as its first purported disclaimer a settlement of antitrust litigation brought by NFL players (again, directed and funded by the NFLP A) through the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement and the reconstitution of the NFLP A as a union representing all NFL players. In each instance, as here, the purported disclaimer had no purpose other than to create bargaining leverage by misusing the antitrust laws to secure a more favorable collective bargaining agreement.
disclaimer of interest is to enable the players to contend that there no longer exists a collective bargaining relationship between the NBA and the NBP A and that, accordingly - in their view there is no bar to the NBA players' antitrust claims against the NBA, including their threatened antitrust attack on the ongoing lockout. 43. In light of the NBPA's persistent abuse of the tactic of disclaimer and its threat to
good faith in an effort to reach a successor collective bargaining agreement, but rather engaging in a strategy calling for a sham disclaimer followed by antitrust litigation; and (b) any purported disclaimer by the NBP A would be invalid and ineffective
than 200 NBA Players who were parties to purportedly "fully guaranteed contracts for the 199811999 NBA Season," claiming, among other things, "[t]hat the NBA and its teams anticipatorily breached each of those contracts by advising the Players Association that the teams will not pay the salaries due under these guaranteed contracts during the NBA's 'lockout'" (the "Lockout Pay Grievance"). 46. On October 19, 1998, the Lockout Pay Grievance was denied in its entirety. The
and the collective bargaining relationship between the parties were not otherwise to continue, the UPCs - which were the product ofthat collective bargaining relationship and are dependent on the continuation of that relationship - would be void and unenforceable as a matter oflaw.
48. 49. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Federal labor laws afford employers, including the members ofa multiemployer
53. 54. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Despite any purported disclaimer of interest, the NBPA is and will continue to be
a labor organization within the meaning of the NLRA, with the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing on a concerted basis with the NBA with respect to the terms and conditions of employment ofNBA players. 55. The lockout is being imposed by the NBA during, and as an integral part of, the
NBA and the NBP A were no longer in place and even if it were unlikely to be revived, the nonstatutory labor exemption would continue to protect the lockout from antitrust scrutiny unless and until there has been a "sufficient[] distan[ ce] in time and in circumstances from the collective bargaining process [such] that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly interfere with that process," Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) - and no such distance in time and circumstances from the collective bargaining process can be found to exist in this case. 58. Further, where there is - as here - an unfair labor practice charge pending before
the Board (which here includes the specific issue of the validity of any disclaimer by the NBP A), the non-statutory labor exemption will continue to apply "until final resolution of Board proceedings and appeals therefrom." Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1989). 59. Notwithstanding any purported disclaimer of interest by the NBPA, the non-
exemption do not provide antitrust immunity for the ongoing lockout, the NBA contends that the lockout is not a violation of the antitrust laws because it constitutes a temporary bargaining measure designed to secure a new collective bargaining agreement, is ancillary to the legitimate purposes of the NBA's joint venture, and has pro competitive justifications that outweigh any alleged anticompetitive effects. 64. Defendants contend to the contrary and have threatened antitrust litigation
lockout as part of a dispute with the NBA players over the terms and conditions of their employment. The NBA and the players, including Defendants, are engaged in the same industry (professional basketball); and the dispute is between one or more employers or associations of employers (the NBA and the NBA teams) and one or more employees (the players).
in any relation of employment with NBA players and withholding from NBA players, and persons seeking to become NBA players, moneys or things of value. Therefore, federal courts lack jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the ongoing lockout under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 69. Defendants dispute the NBA's contentions set forth in paragraphs 67 and 68.
There thus exists a substantial, present and justiciable controversy between the NBA and the Defendants as to whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the lockout. 70. By reason of the foregoing, the NBA is entitled to a declaration that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the lockout.
71. 72. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated as though fully set forth herein. Under the CBA, the NBA recognized the Union as the exclusive collective
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § IS9(a), requires that all terms and conditions of employment of players employed by NBA teams be negotiated on a collective basis between the NBA and the Union, absent an express agreement between those parties authorizing individual negotiations. 74. The NBA and the Union have, in numerous prior rounds of collective bargaining,
repeatedly agreed to authorize individual negotiations between players and teams within the framework of the CBA and the UPC. The UPCs are the product of these negotiations, and thus
of the collective bargaining process, and include employment terms agreed to by the NBA and Union during that process. Further, the UPCs refer to and incorporate numerous terms and conditions of player employment set forth in the CBA, and rely on the CBA to establish other terms and conditions of player employment that are not expressly set forth in the UPCs. Thus, as the arbitrator in the Lockout Pay Grievance determined, the UPCs are controlled by, dependent upon and closely intertwined with the CBA. 75. Based upon the foregoing, if the Union's purported disclaimer of interest were
ultimately not deemed invalid, and the collective bargaining relationship between the parties were not otherwise to continue, the UPCs would be void and unenforceable. 76. Defendants contend to the contrary. There thus exists a substantial, present and
not violate the antitrust laws without regard to any purported disclaimer by the NBP A because the NBPA's purported disclaimer of interest is insufficient to terminate the non-statutory exemption to the antitrust laws; (c) on their third claim, judgment declaring that the ongoing lockout does not
violate the antitrust laws without regard to any purported disclaimer by the NBP A because such conduct would constitute a temporary bargaining measure, is ancillary to the legitimate purposes of the NBA's joint venture, and has procompetitive justifications that outweigh any alleged anticompetitive effects; (d) on their fourth claim, judgment declaring that the N orris- LaGuardia Act
deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the ongoing lockout without regard to any purported disclaimer by the NBP A; (e) on their fifth claim,judgment declaring that if the NBPA's disclaimer
defendant class action under rule 23(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(l)(B), and/or (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and certifying the Class as defined above; and
New York, New York August 2, 2011
. hkin (1M 8380) thony 1. reyer (AD 3571) SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER FLOMLLP Four Times Square New York, New York 10036 Telephone: (212) 735-3000 Facsimile: (212) 735-2000 jeffrey.mishkin@skadden.com anthony.dreyer@skadden.com
NBA Files Suit Against Players Over Bargaining Tactics by FindLaw1.1K viewsEmbedDownloadDescriptionThe National Basketball Association has filed a declaratory action in federal court seeking a judicial ruling that the lockout begun in June does not violate federal antitrust laws. The NBA asserts...The National Basketball Association has filed a declaratory action in federal court seeking a judicial ruling that the lockout begun in June does not violate federal antitrust laws. The NBA asserts that the lawsuit comes in response to threats from the NBA Players Association to renounce its representation of the NBA players and launch an antitrust challenge designed to give the Players Association the upper hand in contract negotiations.Interests: Types, Business/Law, Court FilingsRead on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Copyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)Download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentShow moreShow less