Source: http://www.lareau-law.ca/authority.html
Timestamp: 2017-03-25 05:49:57+00:00
Document Index: 304086500

Matched Legal Cases: ["l'article 494", "l'article 25", "l'article 26", "l'article 15", 'art. 25', 'art. 25', 'art. 25', 'art. 25', 'arrêt ', '§3', 'art=81', 'art 1984', 'art. 122', 'art. 32', 'art. 14', 'art. 15', 'art.182', 'art. 320', 'art. 32', "l'article 186", "l'article 185", "l'article 62", "l'article 15", 'art. 14', 'art. 32', 'art. 14', "l'article 32", '§ 601', '§ 602', 'art 3']

Bibliography on Authority of the Law / Bibliographie sur
Words / Mots clés : ordre de la loi, permission de la loi
updated and corrections / mise à jour et corrections: 4
2007, Ottawa, Canada
First posted on the internet on 26
BOURQUE, Sophie (Mme la juge), "Les moyens de défense", dans
Barreau du Québec, École, Droit
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007, aux pp. 175-207, et voir la "défense des
personnes autorisées a) Les personnes qui appliquent la loi",
aux pp. 193 -194 (Collection; Collection de droit
2007-2008; vol. 12),
Canada, KF 385 ZB5 C681 v. 12 1007-08;
"L'article 25 C.cr.169
édicte qu'une personne qui, par la loi, est autorisée ou
obligée à faire quoi que ce soit dans l'exécution
ou l'application de la loi, est justifiée, si elle s'appuie sur
des motifs raisonnables, à utiliser la force nécessaire
à l'exécution de ses fonctions170.
Bien qu'on pense surtout aux agents de la paix et
que souvent l'utilisation de leurs pouvoirs a fait couler beaucoup
d'encre, cette disposition s'applique
à toute personne autorisée par la loi à appliquer
ou à administer la loi. Ainsi, le citoyen qui
procède à une arrestation en vertu de l'article 494 C.
cr., le gardien de sécurité dans un magasin à
rayons171, un préposé aux
bénéficiaires172 ou les
gardiens de prison173 sont toutes des
personnes visées par les articles 25 et suivants C.cr.
Il y a donc trois éléments
nécessaires pour la justiication de l'utilisation de la force:
premièrement, il faut que la personne soit autorisée
à agir; deuxièmement, il faut qu'elle s'appuie sur des
motifs raisonnables et, troisièmement, elle ne peut utiliser que
la force nécessaire174.
169. Notons que la Cour suprême dans l'affaire R. c. Finta, [1994] 1 R.C.S. 701,
EYB 1993-67654, a décidé que l'article 25 C.cr. ne
permettait pas la défense d'obéissance à un ordre
d'un supérieur lorsqu'une personne raisonnable aurait su que les
gestes qu'elle posait constituaient un crime contre l'humanité
ou un crime de guerre.
170. Notons que le Code criminel, auc articles 25 et suivants C.
cr., prévoit une série de dispositions relativement
à la justification de l'utilisation de la force, dans certaines
situations particulières telles la prévention d'une
violation de la paix ou d'une infraction, l'évasion et la
répression d'émeutes.
171 R. c. Wilson, (1994) 29
C.R. (4th) 302 (C.S. C.-B.); R. v.
Asante-Mensah, REJB 2003-44444 (C.S.C.).
172. R. c. Trottier, REJB
2002-36831 (C.Q.).
173. R. c. Berrie, (1976) 24
C.C.C. (2d) 66 (C.P. C.-B.); R. c.
F. (V.A.), (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 74 (Q.B. Sask.).
174. D'ailleurs, l'article 26 C.cr. vient également
préciser que tout excès de force entraîne la
responsabilité criminelle de la personne qui l'a commis." (p.
CANADA, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE
CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, Freedom and Security under the Law, Second
Report -- Volume 1, [Ottawa]: The Commission, 1981, xxii, 664 p.,
see "Criminal Code, Section 25(1) -- 'Protection of Persons acting
Under Authority'" pp. 377-379, ISBN: 0660109514
Mr. Justice D.C. McDonald); available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/mcdonald1979-81-eng/mcdonald1979-81-eng.htm
(accessed on 17 February 2009); also published in French/aussi
en français: COMMISSION D'ENQUÊTE SUR CERTAINES
DE LA GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA, Liberté et la
devant la loi: deuxième rapport -- volume 1, [Ottawa]: La
1981, ISBN: 0660907682 (vol.1 et 2) (Président: D.C. McDonald);
disponible à http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/mcdonald1979-81-fra/mcdonald1979-81-fra.htm (vérifié le 17 février 2009);
CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General
of Justice Canada], [November 1994], v, 35 p., and see "Appendix --
What this consultation paper does not deal with", at p. 35; this
publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;
39 p., et voir "ANNEXE -- Quelles questions le présent document
n'aborde-t-il pas?", à la p. 39; cette publication est
What this consultation paper does not
For a variety of reasons, this paper does not discuss a number of other
General Part issues. These include: the way to deal with
the physical element of an offence, some fault elements of crimes ,
attempts to commit an offence, people who counsel others to commit
offences or conspire with others to commit offences, other defences
(such as entrapment, emergency surgical or medical treatment), the
principle of legality, omissions, extraterritorial jurisdiction, double
jeopardy, the treatment of
people who act under legal authority or have been given
orders to act a certain way, and the rules concerning people who have
authority over children."
(p. 35;
emphasis added) -----------------
questions le présent
Pour diverses raisons, le présent document ne traite pas des
questions suivantes concernant la Partie générale :
l'élément matériel des infractions,
l'élément moral exigé pour certaines infractions ,
les tentatives de commettre une infraction, le fait de conseiller
à une personne de commettre une infraction ou de comploter avec
une autre personne de commettre une infraction, la notion
d'impossibilité, certains moyens de défense (notamment la
provocation policière et le traitement chirurgical ou
médical d'urgence), le principe de la légalité,
les omissions, l'application extra-territoriale, la double
incrimination, le traitement des
personnes qui exercent des pouvoirs légaux ou qui
ont reçu des ordres de supérieurs les forçant
à agir d'une certaine façon et la discipline des enfants." (p. 39; mots mis en gras
à la fin par moi)
CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Law Enforcement and
Criminal Liability: White Paper, June 2000; [Ottawa; Department
of Justice Canada], 2001, 9, 4 p.; notes: tabled in the House of
Commons, 19 September 2000, Sessional Paper no. 362-23; available
at web.archive.org/web/20050211160024/http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/lecl.html
(accessed on 14 July 2006; web archive); also
published in French / aussi publié en français: CANADA,
Ministère de la Justice Canada, Application de la loi et
responsabilité criminelle: livre blanc, juin 2000,
[Ottawa; Department of Justice Canada], 2000, 10, 4 p.; notes:
déposé à la Chambres des communes, le 19 septembre
2000, Document parlementaire no 362-23; disponible à web.archive.org/web/20020102033655/http://canada.justice.gc.ca/fr/cons/alrc.html
(site visité le 14 juillet 2006; web archive);
Canada, December 1990], 137 p., and see "Protection of persons acting
under legal authority" at pp. 73-75; available at my Digital Library
CANADA, Parliament, House of Commons, Minutes of
11 Issues; note
Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Sollicitor General;
Commission recommended inclusion in the General Part of a provision
stating that no one should be liable for performing an act required or
authorized by law or for using force in doing so.206 This is consistent with the existing law.207 The Commission also suggested that no one should be entiled under this
provision to use force causing serious harm or death. If there
was a danger to personal safety, the defence of self-defence would
apply. The Sub-Committee
endorses the improvements on the law in this area recommended by the
recommended that no police officer be liable for using reasonable force
to arrest a fleeing suspect or offender.208 The Sub-Committee is aware that this issue is currently under study by
the Minister of Justice. As such, at present the Sub-Committee is relunctant
to suggest any changes to the existing law on the degree of force
available to police officers in apprehending fleeing suspects or
206 Report 31,
Recommendation 3(13), at 38.
207 Criminal Code, s.
208 Ibid.,
Recommendation 3(13)(b), at 39." (First
Recodifying the General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada, p.73)
personnes exerçant des pouvoirs légaux
La Commisison de
réforme du droit recommande d'inclure dans la Partie
générale une disposition prévoyant que nul n'est
responsable s'il accomplit un acte exigé ou permis par une loi
ou si, à cette fin, il emploie la force206. Cela serait conforme au droit actuel.207 La Commission propose aussi que nul ne puisse, en vertu de cette
disposition, employer la force dans le dessein de causer la mort ou un
préjudice corporel grave. Si la sécurité
personnelle était en jeu, l'intéressé pourra
invoquer la légitime défense. Le Sous-comité appuie les
améliorations législatives que recommande dans ce domaine
la Commission de réforme du droit.
recommande aussi de ne pas tenir responsable l'agent de paix qui
emploie la force raisonnablement nécessaire pour arrêter
un suspect ou un contrevenant ou pour empêcher sa fuite208. Le Sous-comité sait que le ministre de la Justice étudie
présentement cette question. Voilà pourquoi
actuellement le Sous-comité
répugne à proposer toute modification aux dispositions
concernant la force que les agents de la paix peuvent employer pour
arrêter des suspects ou des contrevenants qui tentent de leur
échapper. [...]
206 Rapport 31, recommandation 3(13)
à la p. 43.
207 Par. 25(1) du Code criminel.
208 Rapport 31,
recommandation 3(13)b) à la p. 43." (Principes de
du Code criminel du Canada, p. 78)
80 p., and see "Clause 3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under Legal
Authority" at pp.62-67; Research Note: this report is cited in
Canada], décembre 1987, vii, 88 p., et voir "Paragraphe
3(13) -- Protection des personnes exerçant des pouvoirs
légaux", aux pp.
67-73; Notes de
[Excerpt from the Working Group's
report dealing with "Clause 3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under
Legal Authority" of the Law Reform
Commission of Canada Draft Code contained in their report 30, see LAW
REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Recodifying Criminal Law: Volume I,
1986, infra] "Recommendations
1. The present law on lawful
authority, including sections 25-27 of the Criminal Code and the
relevant common law, needs attention and simplification, and should be
recodified (unanimous).
2. Clause 3(13) should be rejected as not representing a satisfactory
solution to the problems posed by sections 25 to 27 of the present Criminal Code or to the
other policy issues raised (unanimous).
3. Further work should be done towards resolving the policy
issues raised (unanimous)." (p. 67)
of Police Chiefs, 1987, 112 p., see "Section 23: Protection of Persons
Acting under Statute", at p. 37-40; note: the comments are on the
legislative draft found at the end of the report and not on the
recommendation itself; this paper is part of the papers of
CANADA, House of Commons, Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the
Solicitor General, 1992-1993; it was obtained in December 1998 from the
Clerk of the Sranding Committee on Justice and Human Rights;
pp. 233-252, paper number 232, 20 p., and see p. 17 on section 370; to
situate Cockburn's letter, see François Lareau, "Notes on the
okControlled Drugs and Substances Act,
Statutes of Canada 2006, chapter 19, section 55; available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/C-38.8///en;
disponible en français: Loi
réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances, Lois
du Canada, 2006, chapitre 19, article 55; disponible à http://lois.justice.gc.ca/fr/ShowFullDoc/cs/C-38.8///fr
(Police Enforcement) Regulations, SOR/97-234, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cr/SOR-97-234//20071129/en?command=home&caller=
SI&search_type=all&shorttitle=controlled%20drugs&day=29&month=11&year=2007&search_domain=cr&showall=L&statuteyear=all&lengthannual=50&length=50
(accessed on 29 November 2007); the concept of exemption is
used; also available in French/aussi
disponible en français : Règlement sur l'exécution
policière de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et
autres substances, DORS/97-234, disponible à http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/ShowFullDoc/cr/DORS-97-234//20071129/fr?command=home&caller=SI&search_type=all&shorttitle=controlled%20drugs&day=29&month=
11&year=2007&search_domain=cr&showall=L&statuteyear=all&lengthannual=50&length=50 (vérifié le 29 novembre 2007);
Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1998, lv, 1458 p., voir
"L'obéissance aux lois" aux pp.1080-1082, ISBN: 2894512589;
COUGHLAN, Steve, "Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law", (2007)
47(2) Criminal Reports (6th) 266-270;
Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, Statutes of
2000, chapter 24, section 13, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ (accessed on 5 October 2007) / Loi sur les crimes contre
et les crimes de guerre, Lois du Canada, 2000, chapitre 24, article
13, disponible à http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/home
"Conflict with internal law
13. Despite section 15 of the Criminal Code, it
a justification, excuse or defence with respect to an offence under any
of sections 4 to 7 that the offence was committed in obedience to or in
conformity with the law in force at the time and in the place of its
commission." ---------- "Incompatibilité avec le droit interne 13. Par dérogation à l'article 15 du Code
ne constitue pas une justification, une excuse ou un moyen de
à l'égard d'une infraction visée à l'un des
articles 4 à 7 le fait que l'infraction ait été
en exécution du droit en vigueur au moment et au lieu de la
ou en conformité avec ce droit." The Criminal Code, 1892,
Victoria (1892), chapter 29 and see the comments of Martin in The Criminal Code of Canada with
Annotations and Notes by J.C. Martin, infra, on the sections of the Code
that were replaced in 1955 by section 25; see also the comments by
Stuart,Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed., infra; the 1892 code is available
at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; Code criminel, 1892; 55-56
Victoria (1892), chapitre 29, disponible à ma
Criminal Code, R.S. 1985, c. C-46, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ (accessed on 5 October 2007); also published in French/aussi
en français: Code criminel, L.R. 1985, ch. C-46,
disponible à http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/home
"Obedience to de facto law
15. No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or
omission in obedience to the laws for the time being made and enforced
by persons in de facto possession of the
sovereign power in and over the place where the act or omission occurs."
"Protection of persons acting under authority
25. (1) Every one who is
required or authorized by law to do anything in the administration or
(a) as a private
(b) as a peace officer
or public officer,
(c) in aid of a peace
officer or public officer, or
(d) by virtue of his
if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in doing what he is
required or authorized to do and in using as much force as is necessary
Where a person is required or authorized by law to execute a process or
to carry out a sentence, that person or any person who assists him is,
if that person acts in good faith, justified in executing the process
or in carrying out the sentence notwithstanding that the process or
sentence is defective or that it was issued or imposed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a person is not justified for the
purposes of subsection (1) in using force that is intended or is likely
to cause death or grievous bodily harm unless the person believes on
reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the self-preservation of
the person or the preservation of any one under that person’s
protection from death or grievous bodily harm.
A peace officer, and every person lawfully assisting the peace officer,
is justified in using force that is intended or is likely to cause
death or grievous bodily harm to a person to be arrested, if
(a) the peace officer
is proceeding lawfully to arrest, with or without warrant, the person
to be arrested;
(b) the offence for
which the person is to be arrested is one for which that person may be
arrested without warrant;
(c) the person to be
arrested takes flight to avoid arrest;
the peace officer or other person using the force believes on
reasonable grounds that the force is necessary for the purpose of
protecting the peace officer, the person lawfully assisting the peace
officer or any other person from imminent or future death or grievous
(e) the flight cannot
be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner.
A peace officer is justified in using force that is intended or is
likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm against an inmate who is
escaping from a penitentiary within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of
the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, if
the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that any of the
inmates of the penitentiary poses a threat of death or grievous bodily
harm to the peace officer or any other person; and
(b) the escape cannot
be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner."
"Defence [to child pornography]
163. (6) No person shall be
convicted of an offence under this section if the act that is alleged
to constitute the offence
(a) has a legitimate
purpose related to the administration of justice or to science,
medicine, education or art; and
(b) does not pose an
undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen years.
For greater certainty, for the purposes of this section, it is a
question of law whether any written material, visual representation or
audio recording advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person
under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this
"Obéissance aux lois de facto
15. Nul ne peut être déclaré coupable d’une infraction
à l’égard d’un acte
ou d’une omission en exécution des lois alors
édictées et appliquées
par les personnes possédant de facto
le pouvoir souverain dans et sur le lieu où se produit l’acte ou
l’omission."
"Protection des personnes autorisées
25. (1) Quiconque est, par la
loi, obligé ou autorisé à faire quoi que ce soit
dans l’application ou l’exécution de la loi :
a) soit à titre
b) soit à titre
d’agent de la paix ou de fonctionnaire public;
c) soit pour venir en
aide à un agent de la paix ou à un fonctionnaire public;
d) soit en raison de
s’il agit en s’appuyant sur des motifs raisonnables, fondé
ce qu’il lui est enjoint ou permis de faire et fondé à
employer la
force nécessaire pour cette fin.
Lorsqu’une personne est, par la loi, obligée ou autorisée
à exécuter un
acte judiciaire ou une sentence, cette personne ou toute personne qui
l’assiste est, si elle agit de bonne foi, fondée à
exécuter l’acte
judiciaire ou la sentence, même si ceux-ci sont défectueux
délivrés sans juridiction ou au-delà de la
Quand une personne n'est pas protégée
Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), une personne n’est pas
justifiée, pour l’application du paragraphe (1), d’employer la
avec l’intention de causer, ou de nature à causer la mort ou des
lésions corporelles graves, à moins qu’elle n’estime,
raisonnables, que cette force est nécessaire afin de se
elle-même ou de protéger toute autre personne sous sa
contre la mort ou contre des lésions corporelles graves.
L’agent de la paix, ainsi que toute personne qui l’aide
légalement, est
fondé à employer contre une personne à
arrêter une force qui est soit
susceptible de causer la mort de celle-ci ou des lésions
graves, soit employée dans l’intention de les causer, si les
a) il procède
légalement à l’arrestation avec ou sans mandat;
b) il s’agit d’une
infraction pour laquelle cette personne peut être
arrêtée sans mandat;
c) cette personne
s’enfuit afin d’éviter l’arrestation;
lui-même ou la personne qui emploie la force estiment, pour des
raisonnables, cette force nécessaire pour leur propre protection
celle de toute autre personne contre la mort ou des lésions
graves — imminentes ou futures;
e) la fuite ne peut
être empêchée par des moyens raisonnables d’une
façon moins violente.
Usage de la force en cas d'évasion d'un
L’agent de la paix est fondé à employer contre un
détenu qui tente de
s’évader d’un pénitencier — au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de
la Loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en
— une force qui est soit susceptible de causer la mort de celui-ci ou
des lésions corporelles graves, soit employée dans
l’intention de les
causer, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :
il estime, pour des motifs raisonnables, que ce détenu ou tout
détenu représente une menace de mort ou de lésions
corporelles graves
pour lui-même ou toute autre personne;
b) l’évasion ne
peut être empêchée par des moyens raisonnables d’une
façon moins violente."
Moyen de défense [pornographie
juvénile]
(6) Nul ne peut être
déclaré coupable d’une infraction au présent
article si les actes qui constitueraient l’infraction :
a) ont un but
légitime lié à l’administration de la justice,
à la science, à la médecine, à
l’éducation ou aux arts;
b) ne posent pas de
risque indu pour les personnes âgées de moins de dix-huit
Il est entendu, pour l’application du présent article, que la
de savoir si un écrit, une représentation ou un
préconise ou conseille une activité sexuelle avec une
moins de dix-huit ans qui constituerait une infraction à la
loi constitue une question de droit."
codes annotés utilisés par les practiciens
pp. 169- 378; available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; The Criminal Code of Canada with
Annotations and Notes by J.C. Martin, Q.C., Toronto: Cartwright
& Sons, 1955, lxxxiii, 1206 p.; see pp. 72-100 on s. 25 which
appeared for the first time in the 1955 "new" criminal code; Mr. J.C.
Martin was counsel to the Royal Commission to Revise the Criminal Code,
1947-1952; "[Comments on s. 25]
This section embodies the former s. 23-27, 29-32, and 41-45.
It has been observed that the criminal law could be enforced on no
basis than a presumption that it is known to everyone. It is
equally true that it could not be enforced on any other basis than the
state owes protection to those to whom it entrusts the duty of
enforcing it. It is an old maxim of law that 'Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur et omne
per quod pervenitur ad illud'. When anything is commanded,
everything by which it can be accomplished is also commanded, or in
other words, what the law requires it justifies.
It may be said in favour of the retention of these sections that, since
they largely embody the common law, they are useful in formulating the
rules of law applicable to particular cases and so serve the purpose of
a code. However, in Canada, it was necessary to read them in the
light of s. 646 et seq.,
which had no counterpart in the E.D.C. [English Draft Code]. Partly for that reason, partly because the cases almost invariably
return to the common law, and partly in keeping with the general scheme
of the revision as already mentioned, there has been a good deal of
consolidation. In the result, and in accord with the principles
stated at the beginning of this note s. 25 covers the former ss. 23 to
27, 29, 30 to 37, 39, and 11 to 45." (pp. 72, 74 and 79) Eccles v. Bourque, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739,
(1974) 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129;
"It is the submission of counsel for
the respondents that a person who is by s. 450 authorized to make an
arrest is, by s. 25, authorized by law to commit a trespass with or
without force in the accomplishment of that arrest, provided he acts on
reasonable and probable grounds. I cannot agree with the
submission. Section 25 does not have such amplitude. The
section merely affords justification to a person for doing what he is
required or authorized by law to do in the administration or
enforcement of the law, if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds,
and for using force for that purpose. The question which must be
answered in this case, then, is whether the respondents were required
or authorized by law to commit a trespass; and not, as their counsel
contends, whether they were required or authorized to make an
arrest. If they were authorized by law to commit a trespass, the
authority for it must be found in the common law for there is nothing
in the Criminal Code." (Mr. Justice Disckson, pp. 130-131 (C.C.C.))
Eccles v. Bourque, (1974) 14 C.C.C. (2d) 279
(B.C. C.A.);
"...it cannot fairly be said that a
person who is authorized to make an arrest is, because of s. 25,
authorized by law to commit a trespass with or without the use of
force. In other words, wherever the Criminal Code confers a power
to do a specific thing, s. 25 does not confer a power to do any and
every thing that may assist or advance the exercise of the power. The purpose of s. 25(1) is twofold; it absolves of blame anyone who
does something that he is required or authorized by law to do, and it
empowers such person to use as much force as is necessary for the
purpose of doing it." (Mr. Justice Robertson)
FERGUSON, Gerry and Greg Allen, "Undercover Police Activities:
International and Canadian Perspectives" , in The International Centre
for Criminal law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, Promoting Criminal Justice Reform : A
Collection of Papers from the Canada-China Cooperation Symposium,
Vancouver: The International Centre for Criminal law Reform and
Criminal Justice Policy, 2007, [viii], 482 p., at pp. 361-383,
ISBN: 978-0-973043259; available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/Promoting%20Criminal%20Justice%20Reform%20070607.pdf
FONTANA, James A. and David Keeshan, The Law of Search and
in Canada, 6th ed., Markham (Ontario)L LexisNexis Butterworth,
2005, lxxxviii,
906 p.; copy at the Library of the Suorme Court of Canada, KF9630 F66
table of contents available at http://www.lexisnexis.ca/bookstore/bookinfo.php?pid=25
(accessed on 18 October 2007);
1982, xi, 457 p., et voir "L'exécution de la loi" aux pp.
268-275 et en plus "L'obéissance à la loi de facto ou
ultra vires" aux pp. 276-277;
GABIAS, Maurice, et al., Droit pénal
et pouvoirs policiers: Droit pénal III, 5e
Mont-Royal (Québec): Modulo Éditeur, 2005, xvi,
512 p. ISBN: 2895930325;
voir à propos de ce livre, http://www.modulogriffon.com/catalogue/livres/livre533.html (vérifié le 18 octobre 2007);
GRANT, Isabel, 1957-, Dorothy Chunn, 1943-, and Christine Boyle,
1949-, The Law of Homicide, Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell,
see "Protection of Persons Acting under Authority - (a) The Armed
at pp. 6-77 to 6-80, ISBN: 0459552562 (pbk.); there is also a
edition which is updated, ISBN: 045955244;
KOURI, Robert P. et Suzanne Philips-Nootens, L'intégrité de la personne
2005, xxxv, 738 p., et vor en particulier "Le traitement
imposé" aux pp. 356-358 (traitement et vaccination obligatoires;
traitent de la loi provinciale et fédérale), ISBN:
2894518986; voir la table des
KREMNITZER, Mordechai, Doron Menashe and Khalid Ghanayim, "The Use of
Lethal Force by Police", (September 2007) 53(1) The Criminal Law Quarterly 67-97;
LAFRENIÈRE, Gérald, "Police Powers and Drug-Related
prepared for the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs", Ottawa:
of Parliament, Law and Government Division, 6 March 2001, v, 88 p., and
see, in particular, "Illegal Activities" at pp. 82-87; available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ille-e/library-e/powers-e.pdf
(accessed on 3 September 2005); also published in French / aussi
en français, Lafrenière, Gérald, "Les pouvoirs
de la police et les infractions liées à la drogue.
pour le comité sénatorial spécial sur les drogues
illicites", Ottawa: Bibliothèque du Parlement, Division du droit
et du gouvernement, 6 mars 2001, et voir la partie "Les
illégales"; disponible à http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-f/ille-F/library-f/powers-f.htm
(visionné le 3 septembre 2005);
LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Arrest, Ottawa: Law
Reform Commission of Canada, 1986,
[viii], 65 p., (series;
Report; 29), ISBN: 0662544757, available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;
DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, L'arrestation,
Ottawa: Commission de réforme
du droit du Canada, 1986, [viii], 71 p.(Collection; Rapport; 29), ISBN:
0662544757;
"Work in Progress related to Arrest ...
The degree of force which can be employed in
effecting an arrest is part of the larger question of the use of force
generally by persons authorized to take actions in the administration
or the enforcement of the law. This topic is addressed in our
Working Paper 29 entitled The
General Part: Liability and Defences. While the original
proposals made in that Working Paper may have to be modified slightly
to take into account the particular problems of arrest, these matters
are the subject of a separate process of consultation and will not be
dealt in this Report.
A similar situation exists with respect to the
Special Part of the criminal law dealing with the definition of
particular offences. Clearly the extent to which police officers
or others may interfere with the liberty of individuals by means of
arrest will be determined in part by the kinds of conduct that the law
defines as 'criminal'". (p. 14) [note: compare with Williams, infra]
The General Part -- Liability and
"Advancement of Justice" at pp. 111-119 and "Lawful
Assistance" at pp. 119-(series;
"DRAFT LEGISLATION
16. (1) Subject to the
provisions of this section, every one required or authorized by law to
do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law is, if
acting on reasonable grounds, justified in doing it and in
using no more force than necessary for that pourpose.
(2) Without restricting the generality
of subsection (1), every one is justified in
(a) effecting lawful arrest,
(b) preventing offences endangering
life, bodily integrity, property or state security, and
(c) using no more force than necessary
Justification concerning defective
(3) Every one required or authorized
by law to execute a process or
carry out a sentence is, if acting in good faith, justified under this
section despite defect or lack of jurisdiction concerning such process
Restriction on degree of force
(4) No one is justified by this
section in using force which he knows
is likely to cause serious bodily harm except when necessary
(a) to protect himself or those under
his protection from death or bodily harm,
(b) to prevent the commission of an
offence likely to cause immediate and serious injury,
(c) to overcome resistance to arrest,
or to prevent escape by flight from arrest, for an offence endangering
life, bodily integrity or state security,
(d) to prevent the escape of, or to
recapture, a person believed to be lawfully detained or imprisoned for
an offence endangering life, bodily integrity or state security." (pp.
17. The justifications
provided by sections 13-16 [Self-defence, Protection of movable
property; Protection of Immovable property; Law enforcement] above are
available to every one in good faith assisting, or acting under the
authority of, persons acting under these sections." (p. 119)
[xiii],117 p., and see "Clause 3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under
Legal Authority", at pp. 36-37 (series;
Report; 30), ISBN: 0662547322; note the change made between
report 30 and 31 for clause 3(13); available at my Digital
Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;
"3(13) Protection of Persons Acting
(a) General Rule. No one is liable for:
(i) using such force as is reasonably
necessary to prevent a crime likely to cause death, serious harm to the
person or serious damage to property;
(ii) using such force as is reasonably
necessary to effect an arrest authorized by law; or
(iii) performing an act required
or authorized by or under federal or provincial statute or for
using such force as is reasonably necessary to do so.
(b) Exception. This clause does not apply to anyone who purposely
kills or seriously harms another person except where reasonably
necessary to arrest, to prevent the escape of, or to recapture one who
is dangerous to life." (p. 36)
[16], 213 p., see "Clause 3(13) Protection of Persons Acting
uner Legal Authority" at pp. 38-40
Report; 31), ISBN: 0662547578; note the change made between
du rapport no 30), Ottawa: Commission de réforme
du droit du Canada, 1987, [16], 233 p., et voir le paragraphe 3(13)
Protection des personnes exerçant des pouvoirs légaux",
aux pp. 43-45 (Collection; rapport; 31), ISBN:
"3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under Legal Authority.
(a) General Rule. No one is liable for performing an act required
using such force, short of force meant to cause death or serious harm
to another person, as is reasonably necessary to do so and is
(b) Force Used by Peace Officers. No peace officer is liable for
using such force as is reasonably necessary and is reasonable in the
circumstances to arrest, recapture or prevent the escape of a suspect
or offender." (pp. 38-39)
"3(13) Protection des personnes exerçant des pouvoirs
(a) Règle générale. N'ul n'est responsable
s'il accomplit un acte exigé ou permis par une loi
fédérale ou provinciale, ou si, à cette fin, il
emploie la force qui est raisonnablement nécessaire et qui est
raisonnable dans les circonstances mais sans avoir le dessein de causer
la mort ou un préjudice corporel grave à autrui;
(b) Emploi de la force par les agents de la paix. N'est pas
responsable l'agent de la paix qui emploie la force qui est
raisonnablement nécessaire et qui est raisonnable dans les
circonstances pour arrêter un suspect ou un contrevenant, pour
empêcher sa fuite ou pour le reprendre." (p. 43)
LÉTOURNEAU, Gilles, "La nécessité de
réformer législativement les pouvoirs de police
et la procédure pénale", (1991) 32(1) Les Cahiers de Droit 87-102;
NARVEY, Kenneth M., "The Excuse of 'Obedience
to De Facto' - a Study
of Section 15 of the present Criminal Code and of Section 68 of the
Revision of the Criminal Code, With Special Reference to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity Committed Inside and Outside Canada", Montreal,
May 30, 1989, 84 p.; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada Library KF
9235 N37
PUE, W. Wesley, Trespass and
Expressive Rights, 2005, 77 p., available
at http://www.ipperwashinquiry.ca/policy_part/research/pdf/Pue.pdf (accessed on 26 March 2006); this is a research paper
commissioned by the Ipperwash Inquiry, The Ipperwash Inquiry was created by the Government of
Ontario in November 2003, under the Public Inquiries Act. The Commissioner was the Honourable Sidney B. Linden. The final
report was published in May 2007;
R. v. Campbell, [1973] 2 W.W.W. 246
(Alberta District Court)
"[comments on s. 15 of the Criminal
Law, in obiter]
I understand s. 15 is in the Code for one purpose, and one purpose
and that is to create a defence, on a criminal charge, for a person who
has obeyed a law, or order, made by a person who, in some place and
time, had some physical control over some portion of Canada, and
purported to exercise a sovereign power which the Government of Canada
did not recognize. In short, the section is intended to protect
persons who have been subjected to the exercise of power by an enemy
alien in our society, or some group inside our society which has
achieved, momentarily or otherwise, de facto sovereignty, such as a
R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 Supreme Court Reports/Rapports
de la Cour suprême du Canada 701; available at / disponible
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1994/vol1/
(accessed on 24 August 2005); official text of the judgment in
and French versions/ texte officiel du jugement en version anglaise et
française; Judgment of Cory, J.
"Section 25 of the Code provides the accused with a
the use of as much force as is necessary to do anything in the
or enforcement of a law, notwithstanding that the law is defective."
825) ...... "The peace officer defence [s. 25 of the Code], set out above,
to the defence of obedience to military orders." (p. 826) ...... "Whether obedience to superior orders can shield an offender
a concern of legal writers for centuries." (p. 828) ......
"Hence, Canadian courts have the discretion to convict a
war crime or a crime against humanity notwithstanding the existence of
laws in the country where the offence was committed which justified or
even required such conduct. The defence of obedience to de facto
not the same as obedience to superior orders. Although at times, the
orders which a soldier receives may become part of the domestic
system, this would not change the nature of the order as far as the
was concerned. He or she would still be obliged to follow the order
it were manifestly unlawful. Thus, the removal of the automatic right
claim obedience to de facto law does not affect the defence of
to superior orders." (pp. 840-841) ...... "Section 25 is akin to the defence of mistake of fact. Unless,
is manifestly illegal, the police officer must obey and implement that
law. Police officers cannot be expected to undertake a comprehensive
analysis of every order or law that they are charged with enforcing
taking action. Therefore, if it turns out that they have followed an
order they may plead the peace officer defence just as the military
may properly put forward the defence of obedience to superior orders under certain limited conditions. The qualification is that
the military officer must act in good faith and must have reasonable
for believing that the actions taken were justified. An officer acting
pursuant to a manifestly unlawful order or law would not be able to
his or her actions on the grounds they were justified under s. 25 of
Criminal Code. In the case at bar, the trial judge
instructed the jury that if the law was manifestly illegal, in the
that its provisions were such that it had the factual qualities of a
against humanity or a war crime, then the accused could not rely on the
peace officer defence under s. 25 of the Code. The written instructions
provided to the jury make it clear that the peace officer defence would
not be available if a reasonable person in the accused's position would
know that his or her actions had the factual quality of a crime against humanity or a war
crime. The peace officer defence would be available only if the law or
orders were not manifestly illegal and if the accused honestly, and on
reasonable grounds, believed his actions to be justified." (p. 842)
------ Judgement du juge Cory "L'article 25 du Code permet à l'accusé de
justifier l'utilisation
de toute la force nécessaire pour faire quoi que ce soit dans
ou l'exécution de la loi, même si celle-ci est
défectueuse."
(p. 825) ...... "Le moyen de défense de l'agent de la paix [art. 25 du Code
criminel], énoncé ci-dessus, est semblable au moyen
défense fondé sur l'obéissance à des ordres
militaires." (p. 826) ......
" Les tribunaux canadiens ont donc le pouvoir
de déclarer une personne coupable d'un crime de guerre ou d'un
contre l'humanité nonobstant l'existence, dans le pays où
l'infraction a été commise, de lois justifiant ou
exigeant un pareil comportement. Le moyen de défense
l'obéissance à la loi de facto n'est pas identique
celui fondé sur l'obéissance aux ordres d'un
Bien qu'à certains moments les ordres émanant d'un
puissent devenir partie d'un régime juridique interne, cela ne
pas la nature de l'ordre pour le soldat. Il serait toujours
d'obéir à l'ordre à moins que celui-ci ne soit
illégal. Par conséquent, la suppression du droit
d'invoquer l'obéissance à la loi de facto n'a aucun effet
sur le moyen de défense fondé sur l'obéissance aux
ordres d'un supérieur." (pp. 840-841) ...... "L'article 25 s'apparente à la défense de
fait. À moins que la loi ne soit manifestement illégale,
le policier doit y obéir et la faire respecter. On ne peut
à ce que les policiers entreprennent, avant d'agir, une analyse
juridique exhaustive de tous les ordres ou lois qu'ils sont tenus de
respecter. Par conséquent, s'il appert qu'ils ont
un ordre illégal, ils peuvent invoquer le moyen de
de l'agent de la paix de la même manière que le militaire
peut à juste titre invoquer le moyen de défense
sur l'obéissance aux ordres d'un supérieur dans certaines
conditions restreintes. La réserve tient à ce que le
doit agir de bonne foi et avoir des motifs raisonnables de croire que
mesures prises étaient justifiées. L'agent qui agit
à un ordre ou une loi manifestement illégal ne serait pas
en mesure de se défendre en faisant valoir que ses actes
justifiés aux termes de l'art. 25 du Code criminel. En l'espèce, le juge du
a clairement indiqué au jury que, si la loi était
illégale puisque, du fait de ses dispositions, elle
les qualités factuelles du crime contre l'humanité ou du
crime de guerre, l'accusé ne pouvait invoquer le moyen de
de l'agent de la paix prévu à l'art. 25 du Code. Les
écrites fournies au jury confirment que le moyen de
de l'agent de la paix ne pouvait être invoqué si,
dans la situation de l'accusé, une personne raisonnable aurait
que ses actes avaient la qualité factuelle du crime contre
ou du crime de guerre. L'accusé ne pourrait invoquer le moyen de
défense de l'agent de la paix que si la loi ou les ordres
pas manifestement illégaux et que si, s'appuyant sur des motifs
raisonnables, il croyait sincèrement ses actes
justifiés."
(pp. 842-843) R. c. Trottier, 2002 CanLII 41589
"Radiocommunication Act (subsection 4(1) and paragraph 9(1)(b)) Exemption Order (Security,
Safety and International Relations), No. 2008-1", SOR/2008-292; here
the exemption approach is used, available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2008/20081029/pdf/g2-14222.pdf (accessed on 29 October 2008) / "Décret d'exemption de
l'application de la Loi sur la radiocommunication (paragraphe 4(1) et
alinéa 9(1)b) --
sécurité et relations internationales) no
2008-1" , DORS/2008-292, disponible à http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2008/20081029/pdf/g2-14222.pdf (vérifié le 23
octobre 2008);
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE -- RCMP LEARNING, available at http://www.rcmp-learning.org/
(accessed on 2 December 2007); information
on the French version/informations sur la version française, GENDARMERIE
ROYALE DU CANADA, , disponible à http://www.rcmp-learning.org/
(vérifié le 2 décembre 2007);
SCOTT, Ian D., "Legal
Framework of use of Force by Police in Ontario", (February 2008) 53(3)
The Criminal Law Quarterly 331-359;
Fitzjames, Sir, 1829-1894, A
Punishments), 4th ed., London: Macmillan, 1887, xl, 441, and
see article 201, "Lawful Force", at pp. 145-146; pdf
conversion completed on 17 August 2006;
- i-xl and 1-29 (Cover page; Table of cases; Table of statutes; List of Abbreviations;
- 366-441 (Appendix of
Notes, Index).
STRIBOPOULOS, James, "In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court,
Police Powers and the Charter", (2005) 31 Queen's Law Journal
1-74; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1582979
(accessed on 3 April 2010);
STUART, Don, 1943-, "Annotation: R. v. Finta
(4th) 265 (S.C.C.)" (1994) 28 C.R. [Criminal Reports]
Research Note by François Lareau: The article deals
in part with s. 25 of the Criminal Code and obedience of
orders. The
Finta decision is available at R.
v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 ( http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1994/vol1/html/1994scr1_0701.html
). Note de recherche par François Lareau: Cet
discute notamment de l'art. 25 du Code criminel et de
aux ordres supérieurs. L'arrêt Finta est
c. Finta, [1994] 1 R.C.S. 701 (http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/fr/pub/1994/vol1/html/1994rcs1_0701.html);
__________Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed., Scarborough
(Ontario): Carswell, 2001, liv, 733 p., and see "Protection of Persons
Administering and Enforcing the Law", at pp. 497-502, ISBN: 0459261703
and 0459261118 (pbk.); there is now a 5th ed.: 5th
"This [subsection 25(1)] is a thoroughly perplexing provision. If
someone is acting pursuant to a legal power to enforce the law his
conduct is justified. There is no need for a provision that he is
justified if he acts on 'reasonable grounds'. The provision only
covers new ground in providingf that, if he acts on reasonable grounds,
he will be justified in using 'as much force as is necessary'.
Section 25(1) appeared for the first time in the
amalgamation of 1955. It was said to embody previous law. This is inaccurate. What the drafters did, in their sincere to
amalgamate and simplify, was to confuse the distinct issues of powers
of arrest and justifications. The typical formula for arrest
powers was, at the time, 'reasonable and probable grounds'. This
was taken out of context and inserted in a section addressed to the
question of whether it was justified for those enforcing the law to use
force. The 1955 amalgamation replaced a general justification
clause that had been in our Code since 1892, reading as follows:
31. Every one justified or protected from criminal responsibility
in executing any sentence, warrant or process, or in making any arrest,
and every one lawfully assisting him, is justified, or protected from
criminal responsibility, as the case may be, in using such force as may
be necessary to overcome any force used in resisting such execution or
arrest, unless the sentence, process or warrant can be executed or the
arrest effected by reasonable means in a less violent manner." (p. 498)
THOMSON, Claude R
., Liability
of members of the R.C.M.P. to prosecution and conviction under
Canadian law : immunity and defences, Commission of Inquiry
Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Toronto : [s.n., 1980?], vi, 70 leaves in
various foliations.; copy at Sécurité publique et
civile Canada, Bibliothèque et Centre d'information/Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Library and Information
Centre; HV 7641.A8 T4;
VIAU, Louise,
"Le contrôle pénal de la police", (1989) 23(2-3) La Revue Juridique Thémis
363-386;
ALBANIA, Criminal Code of the
Republic of Albania, available at at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/0f/55/d46a10bcf55b80aae189eb6840b4.htm (accessed on 18 July 2006); also available at available at http://pbosnia.kentlaw.edu/resources/legal/albania/crim_code.htm (accessed on 18 July 2006);
21 Exercising a Right or fulfilling a duty
A person bears no criminal
responsibility if he acts to exercise rights or fulfill duties
determined by law or an order ruled by a competent authority, unless
the order is obviously unlawful.
When the criminal act is committed as
a result of an unlawful order, then the person who has given such an
order shall be held responsible."
ALGÉRIE, Code
pénal, disponible à http://www.droit.mjustice.dz/code_penal.pdf
(consulté le 20 octobre 2007);
"Les faits justificatifs
Art. 39. -- Il n'y a pas d'infraction
1o Lorsque le fait était
ordonné par la loi ou autorisé par la loi."
(site visité le 13 mai 2007); "ART. 124.
III. — Dommage causé par l'exercice d'un droit.
Quiconque exerce d'une manière légale un droit qui lui
appartient est, d'après les lois pénales, aussi bien que
d'après les lois
civiles, irresponsable du dommage qui peut en résulter (1).
(1) Pour que l'acte
ue donne lieu à aucune peine, il faut : 1° l'existence d'un
droit; 2°
l'exercice régulier de ce droit. Alors s'applique l'adage : qui
jure suo utitur,
neminem lœdit."
AMELUNG, Knut, "Obedience to Superior Order and Corporal Punishment
as an Educational Method", (Winter-Spring 1996) 30(1-2) Israel Law Review 154-160, and see
"Acts authorized by law as mentioned in article 49, section 1", at pp.
154-156; see text in ISRAEL, infra,
where section 49 is numbered as 39M;
authorized by law as mentioned in article 49, section 1
Initially, a German
scholar would be tempted to view the provision on article 49, section
1, as redundant. From a German point of view, it is evident that
someone, who is authorized by law to act in a certain way, does not do
so unlawfully. One of the first principles German students learn
in their criminal law lectures, is that every act permitted by statute
is in effect the justification of what is by definition a criminal
offence. This is derived from a principle, which we call 'unity
of law'. This means that there may not be any contradictions in
the law, and that an act permitted by it cannot also be forbidden by
examination, however, one could say that the provision in article 49,
section 1, serves to fulfill some functional aspects.
provision reads that there is no criminal liability if an act is
authorized by 'law', rather than by 'statute'. As I interpret it,
this means that justification may also be a function of precedent and
customary law. This corresponds to the German experience. ..." (pp. 154-155)
Revised Comments), Part I - General Provisions §3.01 to
Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1985, xl, 506 p., see
3.03 Execution of Public Duty", at pp. 22-30;
Subsection (1) [of section 3.03] provides the
general justification for conduct required ir authorized by public or
General Principle. This section recognuzes the
unquestionable principle that conduct in the execution of public duty
should be justifiable even though otherwise within the ambit of the
criminal law. Some formulation is necessary to give a defense to
the policeman who exceeds posted speed limits in apprehending a
fugitive, the marshall who trespasses to execute a warrant, the sheriff
who seizes property to satisfy the judgment of a court, and so
on. Because public duties of immense variety can be found in the
statutory and common law of every state, in a section like this it
would be unwieldy to attempt a complete catalogue giving attention to
the precise contours of each public responsibility. Subsection
(1) adopts the safer course of incorporating by reference the law that
defines the duty in question, and of providing a defense to a criminal
charge if that law requires or authorises the particular conduct." (pp.
23-24) ___________Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft,
"Section 3.03 Execution of Public
(2) of this Section, conduct is justifiable when it is required or
defining the duties or functions of a public officer or
the assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his
(b) the law governing the execution of legal
(c) the judgment or order of a competent court or
(d) the law governing the armed services or the
lawful conduct of war; or
(e) any other provision of law imposing a public
(a) the use of force upon or toward the person of another
for any of the purposes dealt with in such sections; and
(b) the use of deadly force for any purpose, unless
the use of such force is otherwise expressly authorized by law. or
occurs in the lawful conduct of war.
(3) The justification afforded by Subsection (1) of this Section
(a) when the actor reasonably believes
his conduct to be required
or authorized by the judgment or direction of a competent court or
tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal process, notwithstanding
lack of jurisdiction of the court or defect in the legal process; and
(b) when the actor believes his conduct to be required
or authorized to assist a public officer in the performance of his
duties, notwithstanding that the officer exceeded his legal authority." (pp. 46-47)
___________ Model Penal Code: Tentative Draft No. 8,
The American Law Institute, 1958, [vi], 139 p., see "Section 3.03
Execution of Public Duty" at pp.10-11;
"Sect 43
A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the conduct
for the offence is justified or excused under a law."
___________ Commonwealth Attorney's General in association with the
Code: A Guide for Practitioners, March 2002, 369 p., see "Lawful
at pp. 232-233, ISBN: 0642210349; available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/criminaljusticeHome.nsf/AllDocs/RWP1E51ED9C5B665D5FCA256BDB00227895?OpenDocument
__________Northern Territory, Criminal
Code Act,
and see the elaborate provisions on this subject, available at http://notes.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislat/legislat.nsf/d989974724db65b1482561cf0017cbd2/844dc0b3481cda42692572e200029226?OpenDocument
___________Queensland, Criminal Code Act 1899, see
31 (Justification and excuse—compulsion); available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/C/CriminCode.pdf
(accessed on 30 August 2005);
"31 Justification and excuse—compulsion
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act or
omission, if
the person does or omits to do the act under any of the following
that is to say— (a) in execution of the law; (b) in obedience to the order of a competent authority which
he or she is bound by law to obey, unless the order is manifestly
unlawful; (c) when the act is reasonably necessary in order to resist
actual and unlawful violence threatened to the person, or to another
in the person’s presence; (d) when—
(i) the person does or omits to do the act in order
himself or herself or another person, or his or her property or the
of another person, from serious harm or detriment threatened to be
by some person in a position to carry out the threat; and (ii) the person doing the act or making the omission reasonably
he or she or the other person is unable otherwise to escape the
out of the threat; and (iii) doing the act or making the omission is reasonably proportionate
to the harm or detriment threatened.
(2) However, this protection does not extend to an act or omission
would constitute the crime of murder, or any of the crimes defined in sections 81(2) and 82, or an offence of which
bodily harm to the person of another, or an intention to cause such harm, is an element, nor to a person who has
by entering into an unlawful association or conspiracy rendered himself or herself liable to have such threats
made to the person.
(3) Whether an order is or is not manifestly unlawful is a
of law." (emphasis in bold added)
___________Review Committee, Review of Commonwealth Criminal
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990, see
"Lawful Authority" at pp. 155-159 (Chairman: Sir Harry Gibbs), ISBN:
"The Review Committee considers that
for the sake of completeness it would be desirable to include in the
proposed consolidating law a provision to the effect that a person does
not commit an offence by doing any act required or authorised by any
law of the Commonwealth. It is intended that such a provision
should refer only to statute laws (and subordinate legislation
thereunder)." (p. 158)
___________Western Australia, Criminal Code,
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/cc94/
A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission
does or omits to do the act under any of the following circumstances,
is to say — (1) In execution of the law;
(2) In obedience to the order of a competent authority which
by law to obey, unless the order is manifestly unlawful; (3) When the act is reasonably necessary in order to resist
unlawful violence threatened to him, or to another person in his
presence; (4) When he does or omits to do the act in order to save
immediate death or grievous bodily harm threatened to be inflicted upon
him by some person actually present and in a position to execute the
and believing himself to be unable otherwise to escape the carrying of
the threats into execution;
But this protection does not extend to an act or omission which
would constitute an offence punishable with strict security life
or an offence of which grievous bodily harm to the person of another,
an intention to cause such harm, is an element, nor to a person who
by entering into an unlawful association or conspiracy, rendered
liable to have such threats made to him. Whether an order is or is not manifestly unlawful is a
l'homme et du citoyen [...]
XVI. Il est permis à tout homme de repousser la force par
la force, à moins qu'elle ne soit employée en vertu de la
loi" (voir les pp. 30 et 33)"
p., ISBN: 070211345X (hardcover) and 0702113468 (softcover); "Authority
Acts which would
otherwise be criminal are justified if done within the limits of
authority conferred by law. Where the right or duty to act
proceeds from the State the authority is public, otherwise it is
private [e.g. lawful correction of children].
private authority is relied upon, the accused's act will be justified
only if it was in fact authorized by law. If no such authority
existed his act will be unlawful...." (p. 359)
CANALS, Jose M. and Henry Dahl, translated by, "Standard Penal
Law 263-288, and see article 15; available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/Latspc.htm;
note de recherche: pour une traduction
No crime is committed by those who act
a legal duty or in the lawful exercise of a right."
CHILI, Codigo Penal,
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20020305071522/http://www.viajuridica.cl/index.asp?art=81&dc=38449
(accessed on 20 October 2007);
Están exentos de responsabilidad criminal: ...
10. El que obra
en cumplimiento de un deber o en el ejercicio legítimo de un
derecho, autoridad, oficio o cargo."
CLIVE, Eric (from CBE, Edinburgh), Pamela Ferguson (from Dundee),
see s. 22, "Lawful authority", at pp. 59-63; available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/cp_criminal_code.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2007);
(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if the acts in question are
justified by lawful authority.
(a) it is required by an enactment or
(b) an enactment or rule of law confers
a right to do it or authorises it; or
(c) it is done in the proper exercise
of a responsibility or authority conferred by an enactment or rule of
(3) The following are, in particular, regarded as having lawful
authority to act in the proper exercise of their role or functions⎯
(a) judges, officers of court, members
of the armed forces, police officers and prison officers;
(b) members of the public assisting
police officers in the exercise of their functions or exercising any
lawful power of arrest or responsibility to prevent crime;
(c) parents or guardians having
(d) teachers and others having the
lawful care or control of a child or young person; and
(e) guardians, relatives and others
having the care of, or a legitimate role in relation to the welfare of,
an adult with incapacity within the meaning of the Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (asp 4).
(a) the use of force which is excessive
(b) the infliction of torture, inhuman
or degrading treatment or corporal punishment; or
(c) any violence, abuse, or
maltreatment by those exercising the responsibilities or roles
mentioned in subsection (3)(c)(d) or (e).
(5) In deciding whether an act is done in the proper exercise of a
responsibility, authority, role or function, account can be taken of
superior orders which are not manifestly unlawful." CORNELIS, Ludo and Pierre Van Ommeslaghe, "Les 'faits
justificatifs'
In memoriam Jean Limpens : Studiedagen
Gent, 23-24 maart 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Journées
et voir "L'ordre de ou la permission de la loi", aux pp. 280-281
(series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12),
Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12), ISBN:
9063212879;
copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; droit
(accessed on 26 September 2007); "Lawful Use of Force
There shall be no criminal offense
when an authorized person uses force
socialistes", in Journées d'études sur le droit de la
xxvii, 311 p., at pp. 251-264, et voir "Ordre de la loi ou sa
-- Commandement de l'autorité légitime", aux pp.
General Part,
(Colorado): Fred B. Rothman, 1997, xxiv, 521 p., and see Section 6.04
"Acts Done Pursuant to Law; Acts Performed in the Course of Lawful
Pursuits", at pp. 92-97 (Series;
of the Comparative Criminal Law Project, vol. 19);
"The Penal Code of Japan contains
certain general provisions governing grounds excluding illegality,
embodied in Article 35:
An act done in accordance with laws or
ordinances or in the course of lawful pursuits is not punishable." (p.
DINSTEIN, Yoram, "Defences", in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald
2000, xvi,705 p., at pp. 367-388, and see "Obedience to National Law"
at pp. 382-383, ISBN: 9041111336; copy at the Library of the Supreme
of Canada, K5000 S83 2000, v. 1;388; "Obedience to national legal norms
must be distinguished from obedience to superior orders. Superior
orders may be illegal from the perspective of national law as much as
international law. Should that be the case, no clash between the
two legal systems would be generated by the illegal orders. But
when a national law decrees the commission of acts constituting
international offences, the cardinal question is that of the
relationship between international and national law.
When international law directly imposes penal obligations on
individuals, any provisions of national law colliding head-on with such
obligations are annulled by international law. In the words of an
American military tribunal, in 1948, in the German High Command trial:
'International Common Law must be superior to and, where it conflicts
with, take precedence over National Law or directives issued by any
national governmental authority. A directive to violate
International Criminal Common Law is therefore void and can afford no
protection to one who violates such law in reliance on such a directive.68'
" (p. 382)
68 German High Command Trial, 15 I.L.R. 376, 396 (United States
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 1948).
___________"International Criminal Law", (1985) 20
206-242, and see "Obedience to
National Law", at pp. 239-240; ENGLAND AND WALES, The Law Commission, Codification of
1985, vi, 246 p. (series; Law Com. No. 143), ISBN: 0102270856;
"Act authorised by law.
48. -- (1) A person does not
commit an offence by doing an act which, in the circumstances which
exist or which he believes to exist, he is authorised to do by --
(a) the judgment or order of a
competent court or tribunal; or
execution of legal process; or
(c) the law governing the
armed forces or the lawful conduct of war; or
(d) the law defining the
duties or functions of a public officer or the assistance to be
rendered to such an officer in the performance of his duties; or
(e) any other rule of law
imposing a public duty.
(2) In this section 'armed forces' means any of the naval, military or
air forces of the Crown.
Act justified or excused by law.
49. -- (1) A person does not
commit an offence by doing an act which is justified or excused by --
(b) any rule of the common law, except insofar as the rule is
inconsistent with this or any other enactment.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall limit any power of the courts to
determine the existence, extent or application of any rule of the
common law referred to in subsection (1) and continuing to apply after
the commencement of this Act." (p. 197)
Clause 48: Acts authorised by law
It [clause 48] contains nothing which would not fall within the more
general provision of clause 49 but its inclusion is justified on the
ground that the Code should be as informative as possible and, where
there are established particular rules, it should spell them out. ...
The clause is based on section 3.03 of the American Model Penal
Code. Its substance appears to be uncontroversial, indeed largely
self-evident. If the defendant is authorised to do an act by any
rule of law, it cannot be an offence for him to do it. It will,
however, be necessary to refer to the particular branch of the law
mentioned in order to determine whether the particular act is or is not
authorised. ...
It would be impossible to produce a definitive list of public
duties. Hence the need for paragraph (c). Thi is, however,
confined to public duties and would not extend to a mere contractual
Clause 49: Acts justified or excused
Preservation of defences. The principal purpose of this clause is that ...of preserving and
allowing the possibility of the continuing development of defences at
common law. The provision is necessary to take account od such common
law rights as those of the parent or schoolteacher to detain or
chastise a child; that of a doctor to render aid to, or practise
surgery on, an unconcious patient...
Clause 49(1). Paragraph
(a) is included for the sake of completeness. If a statutory
provision justifies or excuses the doing of any act, it is plain that
the act does not amount to an offence...
Clause 49(2). This
subsection has effect in relation to any rule of the common law,
justifying or excusing an act, which is not inconsistent with the Code
or any other Act and which therefore continues in force after the
enactment of the Code. The subsection preserves any power which
the courts now have to determine the existence, extent and application
of any such rule. ...
The preservation of the common law defence must necessarily preserve
the power of the courts to determine its limits, perhaps by deciding
that it extends more widely than has hitherto been supposed. It
would be impossible, however, to limit the power of the court to
extending the ambit of a defence. They might decide that the
ambit is narrower than previously stated. ....It certainly leaves open
the possibility of some extension by the courts of potential criminal
liability; but that is a price which must be paid for the preservation
of common law defences." (pp. 128-129; notes omitted)
___________ The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for
"Acts justified or excused by law.
45. A person does not commit an
offence by doing an act which is justified or excused by --
(b) any 'enforceable Community right' as defined in section 2(1) of the
European Communities Act 1972; or
(c) any rule of the common law continuing to apply by virtue of section
4(4)." (p. 62)
"Clause 45...Defence provided by an enactment...The
self-evident proposition that, if a statutory provision justifies or
excuses the doing of any act, that act does not amount to an offence is
stated by paragraph(a) for the sake of completeness. ...." (p. 234)
68.-Acts Required or Authorized by Law.
Acts required or authorized by law do not constitute a crime and are
not punishable; in particular:
(a) acts in respect of public, State or military duties done within the
limits permitted by law;
(b) acts reasonably done in exercising
the right of correction or discipline; or
(c) acts done in the exercise of
private rights recognized by law, where the conditions and limits of
the exercise of such rights are not exceeded."
FRANCE, Code pénal,
art. 122-4;
"Article 122-4 N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui accomplit un
prescrit ou autorisé par des dispositions législatives ou
N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui
accomplit un acte commandé par l'autorité
légitime, sauf si cet acte
est manifestement illégal." (http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/ListeCodes?heure=170046560981&lalangue=FR,
site visité le 3 août 2006)
A person is not criminally liable who performs an act prescribed or
authorised by legislative or regulatory provisions.
liable who performs an action commanded by a lawful authority, unless
the action is manifestly unlawful." (http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_penal_textan.htm,
accessed on 3 August 2006) GRAVEN, Philippe, L'infraction pénale punissable,
p., ISBN: 3727209836; "N'imposant aucune obligation, ne
conférant aucun droit, l'art. 32 [du Code pénal suisse, maintenat
remplaçé par l'art. 14, voir Suisse infra]. n'a qu'une valeur
déclarative. Dans la mesure où il se borne à
reconnaître l'existence de justifications extra-pénales et
à rappeler ainsi, notamment aux magistrats non professionnels,
l'unité de l'ordre juridique, il est superflu, et l'art. 15 de
l'AP 1985, même s'il en élimine certaines imperfections,
aurait donc pu s'abstenir de le reprendre." (p. 111, édition de
GREEN, L. C. (Leslie Claude), 1920-, "Legal Issues in the
Trial", (1962-63) 37 Tulane Law Review 641-684, and see
"Ungerichtes
Recht", at pp. 680-684;
"It is true that in the common law the
idea of a law which runs counter to a higher natural law being invalid
is not acceptable,177 although in McCall v. McDowall178
it was conceded that an order -- law--might be 'so palpably
atrocious...that one ought instinctively feel that it ought not be
obeyed.' On the Continent, however, and particularly in Germany
since 1945, it is accepted that legislator's law might have to give way
before universally recognized principles of law. Even Dr.
Servatius accepted that 'not everything which a legislator decides is
law. The power of legislation has its limits.'179 In fact, the present German position, as expressed in the decisions of
the Bundesgerichtshof, has
been summarized as dollows: 'Basically, the law required to be known is
positive law...but that law is assumed to incorporate a minimum
standard of morality and to be valid only to the extent that it
conforms to certain basic conceptions of justice prevailing among
civilized nations.'180
177 See Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 185 (Library
of Ideas ed. 1945).
178 1 Abb. 212 (N.Y. 1887).
179 Rosenne, 6,000,000 Accusers: Israel's Case Against Eichmann
297 (1961).
180 Ryu & Silving, Error
Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421, 463 (1956).
The legal philosopher who has done most to propagate the idea of ungerichtes Recht is Radbruch:
'Preference must be given to positive law, duly enacted and supported
by the authority of effective state power, even where the contents of
such law are unjust and do not respond to demands of social utility,
unless the contrast between the positive enactment and justice reaches
so intolerable a degree that the enactment, being 'wrong law,' must
yield to justice...Where justice is not even sought, where equality
which constitutes the core of justice is conciously denied in enacting
positive law, there the statute is not merely wrong law; rather, it is
not law at all.'181
Radbruch's views, and the acceptance of them by the German courts, have
been adversely criticised by, for example, Hart.182
181 Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie 335, 347 (1950).
182 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 593, 618-21 (1958)." (pp. 681-682) INDIA, Indian Law Commissioners, A Penal Code
London: Pelham Richardson, 1838, viii, 138 p.,and see p. 7; reprint in Birmingham
The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2002, ISBN: 158477018X; India, Indian Penal Code,
"76. Act done by a person bound, or by
mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by
reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in
good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.
(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer,
in conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
(b) A, an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered by that Court to
arrest Y, and, after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has
Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially
in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he
believes to be, given to him by law.
Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the
judgment or order of, a Court of Justice; if done whilst such judgment
or order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may
have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the
person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such
79. Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing
himself justified, by law
Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by
law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a
mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law,
A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise,
to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of the power which
the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers in the fact,
seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has
committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in
Paragraph 39 - There is no crime if the act occurs in performance of a
duty prescribed by the Code.
Paragraph 40 - There is no crime if the act is committed by a public
official or agent in the following circumstances:
(1) If he commits the act in good
faith in the performance of his legal duty or if he considers that
carrying it out is within his jurisdiction.
(2) If he commits the act in
performance of an order from a superior which he is obliged to obey or
which he feels he is obliged to obey. It must be established in these
circumstances that the belief of the offender in the legitimacy of the
act is reasonable and that he committed the act only after taking
suitable precautions. Moreover, there is no penalty in the second
instance if the Code does not afford the official an opportunity to
question the order issued to him.
if the act is committed while exercising a legal right. The following
are considered to be in exercise of a legal right:
husband, the disciplining by
parents and teachers of children under their authority within certain
limits prescribed by law or by custom.
(3) An act of violence during the course of a sporting event when the
rules of that sport have been complied with:
(4) An act of violence committed against any person caught in the act
IRELAND, The Law Reform Commission, Report -- Defences in Criminal Law,
Dublin: The Law Reform Commission, 2009, xix, 226 p., and see Chapter 3
"Public Defence", at pp. 77-105 (series; report; LRC 95-2009),
ISSN: 1393-3132; available at http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/rDefencesinCriminalLaw.pdf
ISRAEL, Unofficial English Translation "
"Penal Law--Draft Proposal and New Code", (Winter-Spring 1996) 30(1-2) Israel Law Review
5-27, available
at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/israeli.htm (accessed on 25 October 2007); see comments by AMELUNG,
supra; "34M. A person shall bear no criminal
liability for an act done
by him under any one of the following:
(1) he is bound or authorized to do it
(2) he does it on the order of a competent authority while bound
under law to obey such authority, save where the order is manifestly
(3) where the act requires consent under law - he does it while
having reason to assume that it must be done without delay to
save a person's life or bodily integrity, or in order to prevent
serious injury to a person's health and, in the circumstances
of the case, the doer of the act is unable to obtain consent;
(4) he does it with consent in the course of a medical intervention
or treatment designed to benefit the patient or another person;
(5) he does it in the course of a sports activity, or a game,
not contrary to law and according to the accepted rules of such
activity or game." (emphasis added; we have used here the text of the
of the Buffalo Criminal Law center; in the enacted New Penal code of
the State of Israel, the section number is not 34M but 49).
249 p., see articles 51 and 55, (series; American series of foreign
"Article 51. Exercise of a Right or Performance of a
The exercise of a right or performance of a duty imposed by law or by
lawful order of the public authorities shall preclude punishability.
If an act
constituting an offense is
committed by order of the authorities, the public officer who has
issued the order shall be liable for the offense.
order shall also be liable for the offense, except where, owing to
error of fact, he believed he was obeying a lawful order.
One who carries out
order shall not be punishable when the law does not permit him to
question the lawfulnesss of the order.
When, in committing any of the acts designated in
[Exercise of a Right or Performance of a Duty], 52 [Lawful Defense], 53
[Lawful Use of Arms] and 54, the limits prescribed by law or by order
of the authorities or imposed by necessity are negligently exceeded,
the provisions of law relating to crimes of negligence shall apply, if
the act is designated by law as a crime or negligence." (pp. 17-18)
"Art. 51 - Esercizio di un diritto
o adempimento di un dovere
L'esercizio di un diritto o l'adempimento di un dovere imposto da una norma giuridica o da un ordine legittimo della pubblica Autorit&agrave;, esclude la punibilit&agrave;.   Se un fatto costituente reato &egrave; commesso per ordine dell'Autorit&agrave;, del reato risponde il pubblico ufficiale che ha dato l'ordine.    Risponde del reato altres&igrave; chi ha eseguito l'ordine, salvo che, per errore di fatto, abbia ritenuto di obbedire a un ordine legittimo.   Non &egrave; punibile chi esegue l'ordine illegittimo, quando la legge non gli consente alcun sindacato sulla legittimit&agrave; dell'ordine.......
Quando, nel commettere alcuno dei fatti preveduti dagli
[Esercizio di un diritto o adempimentodi un dovere], 52 [Difesa
legittima], 53 [Uso legittima delle armi] e 54, si eccedono
colposamente i limiti stabiliti dalla legge o dall'ordine
ovvero imposti dalla necessità, si applicano le disposizioni
concernenti i delitti colposi, se il fatto è preveduto dalla
delitto colposo." (http://www.usl4.toscana.it/dp/isll/lex/cp_l1.htm#L1t3c1,
accessed on 3 August 2006)
"ART. 51 -- Exercise d'un droit ou
accomplissement d'un devoir. --
L'exercise d'un droit ou l'accomplissement d'un devoir, imposé
règle juridique ou par ordre légitime de
l'Autorité publique, n'est pas
Si un fait, constituant une infraction, est commis
l'Autorité publique, le fonctionnaire public qui l'a
ordonné en répond
toujours. Celui qui a exécuté l'ordre
répond aussi de l'infraction, à moins
que, par suite d'une erreur de fait, il n'ait cru obéir à
N'est pas punissable celui qui exécute un
ordre illégitime, lorsque
la loi ne lui accorde aucun moyen de se rendre compte de la
ART. 55. -- Excès non
intentionnel (colposo). --
Lorsque, en commettant l'un des faits prévus
par les articles 51
[Exercise d'un droit ou accomplisement d'un devoir], 52
[Légitime
défense], 53 [Usage légitime des armes] et 54, on
intention les limites établies par la loi, ou par l'ordre de
l'Autorité, ou imposées par la nécessité,
on applique les dispositions
concernant les délits non intentionnels, si le fait est
prévu par la
loi comme délit non intentionnel." (Code pénal
871-1014, aux pp. 881-882 (Nouvelle Collection du Comité de
JAPAN, Penal Code in
available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PC.pdf (accessed on 29 September 2007);
"Article 35. (Justifiable Acts)
An act performed in accordance with
laws and regulations or in the pursuit of lawful business is not
JOH, Elizabeth E., "Breaking the Law to Enforce it: Undercover
Participation in Crime" (July 2, 2009), Stanford Law Review, Vol. 62,
available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1429162,
accessed on 29 September 2009;
JOLOWICZ, J.A., "Grounds of Justification -- English Law",
xxvii, 311 p., at pp. 223-248, and see "Legal Duty and Authority:
Authority", at pp. 232-234 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor
Rechtsvergelijking; 12), (Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de
comparé; 12), ISBN: 9063212879; copy at the Library of the
Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; civil law but useful for
JURIS PEDIA, "Ordre de la loi", disponible à http://fr.jurispedia.org/index.php/Ordre_de_la_loi_(fr)
(vérifié le 18 mai 2009);
KILLIAS, Martin, Précis de droit pénal
de droit Staempfli), ISBN: 3727209895; "L'illicéité
comme élément constitutif non écrit
constitue un ensemble. Quoique subdivisé en plusieurs
branches, le droit cherche à assurer une harmonie entre
celles-ci et les règles qu'elles contiennent. Il n'est
donc pas concevable que soit punisable un acte licite (rechtsmässig), voire
commandé par une autre loi. Par exemple, un témoin
ne peut pas d'une part être obligé de dire tout ce qui est
pertinent et véridique et d'autre part être tenu de garder
le secret sur certains faits: il faut donc prévoir une
procédure permettant de le délier de son secret; dans la
mesure où l'obligation de garder le secret subsiste, le
témoin ne peut pas être sanctionné pour son refus
de dévoiler ces mêmes faits; s'il est délié
de son secret, il ne commet aucune violation de son devoir de
discrétion (art. 320 ou 321 CP) s'il dépose à
propose de ce qui est pertinent et vériddique.
Tout acte n'est
donc punissable que s'il est illicite (rechtswidrig);
s'il est licite -- peu importe en vertu de quelle loi ou de quel
principe -- il ne peut pas être punissable. L'illicéité (die Rechtswidrigkeit)
représente ainsi un élément constitutif non
écrit de toutes les infractions, à l'instar du rapport de
causalité en matière de délits matériels
qui sont aussi des délits de lésion. Étant
donné que cela paraît si fondamental et trivial, le
législateur s'est abstenu de le répéter dans la
définition de chaque infraction. Il a
préféré mettre dans la partie
générale du Code (art. 32 C.P.) [voir Suisse, infra] une réserve
qui rappelle qu'aucun acte n'est punissable s'il est licite.
Lors de l'examen de la punissabilité d'un acte quelconque, il
faut donc toujours se demander s'il n'est pas licite en vertu d'une
réglementation concernant peut-être un autre domaine
juridique." (p. 93)
Justifications", at pp. 2-167 to 2-192, and for "LEGAL DUTY AND LAWFUL
AUTHORITY", pp.
2-181 to 2-186 and 2-192, Tübingen: Mohr J.C.B (Paul
useful for researchers; LASSERRE, M.
MONGOLIA, Criminal Code,
at http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/432_tmpphpqd46LN.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2007);
41. Inflicting Harm to the Offender in the Course of Arrest
41.1. Inflicting harm to the offender
or fugitive convict aimed at suppression of the possibility to commit a
new crime, delivering him/her to the state authorities in the course
ofapprehension
by the victim or another person shall not constitute a crime."
"Article 44. Fulfilling orders and
44.1. Causing harm to the rights and interests protected by this Code
in the course of fulfilling mandatory orders or decrees shall not
constitute a crime. The person giving an illegal order or decree shall
be subject to criminal liability for the harm caused.
44.2. A person causing harm to others’ rights and interests protected
by this Code by fulfilling a knowingly illegal order or decree shall be
subject to criminal liability. A person who fails to fulfill a
knowingly illegal order or decree shall not be subject to criminal
MASCALA, Corinne, "Ordre de la loi (Art. 122-4)", 2002, 19 p., in
Juris-Classeur pénal, Paris: Éditions du
Juris-Classeur,
vol. 1, copie à l'Université d'Ottawa,
de droit, FTX, General, KJV 7979 .J87 v. 1;
droit et de jurisprudence, 1972, iii, 190 p., voir "L'exercice du
droit" aux pp. 45-46 et "L'accomplissement du devoir" aux pp.
47-50 (collection; Les grands systemes de droit pénal contemporains;
5); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX General, FTX
General: KMC 974 .M67 1972; "L'EXERCICE DU DROIT
42. -- Source de la justification
En tout cas la justification de
l'infraction commise dans l'exercice d'un droit est une chose
communément admise et n'a pas besoin de texte. La loi ne
peut autoriser un acte et le punir en même temps; c'est dans ce
sens que l'article 186/1 du Code libanais, l'article 185/1 du Code
syrien et l'article 62/1 du Code jordanien se sont exprimés en
disposant que : 'L'acte autorisé par la loi n'est pas
punissable.' " (pp. 45-46) "L'ACCOMPLISSEMENT DU DEVOIR
46. -- L'ordre de la loi et le commandement de l'autorité
constituent deux causes indépendantes." (pp. 47-48)
Code, Translated by Louise Rayar and Stafford Wadsworth in
collaboration with Mona Cheung, Gudule Geelen, Marjolein Heesbeen,
Lensing, Instructions by Grat Van Den Heuvel and Hans Lensing,
Littleton (Colorado): Rothman, 1997, xxiii, 277 p., (The American
series of penal codes; vol. 30), ISBN: 0837700507; copy at the Library
of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5001 A63 no. 30;
A person who commits an offense in
carrying out a legal requirement is not criminally liable." (p. 73)
PORTUGAL, Penal Code -- General Part in English,
available at http://www.verbojuridico.net/download/portuguesepenalcode.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2007); and for the Codigo de Processo Penal, available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20031208174840/http://www.cea.ucp.pt/lei/penal/penalind.htm
(accessed on 11 June 2004 and on 19 October 2007 for web archive);
1- The act is not criminally
punishable when its unlawfulness is
2- Namely, the act is not unlawful
c) In fulfilment of a duty imposed by
law or by an authority legitimate
d) With the consent of the holder of
the harmed legal interest."
31º Exclusão da ilicitude
1 O facto não é punível quando a sua ilicitude
for excluída pela ordem jurídica considerada na sua
2 Nomeadamente, não é
ilícito o facto praticado:
c) No cumprimento de um dever imposto
por lei ou por ordem legítima da autoridade; ou
d) Com o consentimento do titular do
interesse jurídico lesado."
and Manuel Valenzuela Bejas, Le
1983, 159 p., et voir sur l'article 15 du Code pénal type, les
pp. 61-63, ISBN: 2233001184; note: for an English version of section
15, see CANALS, supra;
"ARTICLE 15. -- Ne commet pas de délit celui qui
agirait dans l'accomplissement d'un devoir légal ou dans
l'exercice légitime d'un droit.
a) L'analyse de la législation. Comme on a pu s'en rendre compte, la totalité des codes
pénaux latino-américains prévoient d'une
manière ou de l'autre cette cause de justification, qui provient
du Code pénal espagnol de 1848-1850.
L'opinion dominante des auteurs latino-américains est
également claire à ce sujet et la plupart l'incluent
expressément dans leurs oeuvres.
Nous estimons cependant que cette cause de justification n'ajoute
absolument rien, qu'elle pose simplement l'un des aspects fondamentaux
de l'antijuridicité, c'est-à-dire que dans
l'ordonnancement juridique il y a aussi des règles permissives,
qui prévalent sur les règles exceptionnelles que sont les
règles prohibitives (ou impératives), et que de telles
règles permissives se trouvent naturellement dans tout
l'ordonnancement. Ce qui est normal et ordinaire c'est la
règle permissive, et il ne suffit pas qu'il n'existe pas de
norme permissive pour être dans la sphère de
l'interdiction, il faut qu'il y ait en outre une règle
prohibitive expresse (ou une règle impérative).
En réalité, si cette disposition avait une fonction, ce
serait simplement de clarifier le principe d'antijuridicité, qui
n'a pas réellement besoin d'une déclaration
légale, et qui est donc superflue. D'autre part,
elle ne peut en aucun cas être estimée comme une cause
spéciale de justification. On poiurrait bien dire que sa
présence dans le code pénal a un sens pédagogique,
mais cela est équivoque, car cela tend à faire croire que
l'antijuridicité et les causes de justification sont
établies par le code pénal, alors qu'en
réalité c'est un code des prohibitions et des ordres
prohibitifs. Il est d'ailleurs si évident que ce principe
ne constitue pas une cause de justification spécifique que,
lorsque les auteurs veulent en faire usage, il leur faut de toute
nécessité avoir recours à des causes de
justification qui se trouvent dans d'autres branches du droit.
b) L'analyse du contenu des principes.
1. L'accomplissement d'un devoir
légal. Accomplit un devoir légal celui qui
exécute ce que la loi ordonne. [...]
2. L'exercice légitime d'un
droit. On souligne dans ce cas la légitimité de
l'exercice, ce qui en fin de compte vient accentuer davantage le
caractère général et déclaratoire de cette
disposition, car ladite légitimité ne peut
s'apprécier que par rapoport à une cause concrète
et à la forme dans laquelle elle est réglementée."
ROMANIA, Penal Code,
"Order of the law and command
of legitimate authority
Art.24 – (1) The commission of an
act incumbent upon one or
authorised by the law shall not be considered an offence if it has been
executed according to the conditions provided in the law.
(2) The accomplishment of an act
ordained by the legitimate
authority shall not be an offence if the order is given in the form
provided in the law and it is not obviously illegal."
ROUQUETTE, Théophile, Des excuses légales et des faits
justificatifs en matière criminelle, Toulouse: Bonnal et
Gibrac, 1866; disponible à http://books.google.com/books?vid=HARVARD32044103179586&printsec=titlepage#PPP5,M1
SCOTLAND, A Draft
Criminal Code for
Scotland with commentary, see CLIVE, supra;
SNYMAN, C.R., A Draft Criminal Code for South Africa with a
Commentary, Cape Town: Juta, 1995, xl, 133 p., ISBN: 0702133345;
"Execution of public duty
2.8 Conduct is not unlawful if it is authorized by
competent court or tribunal;
execution of a legal process;
(c) the law defining the
duties or functions of a public officer or the assistanece to be
rendered to such officer in the performance of his duties;
(d) the law governing the
armed services or the lawful conduct of war; or
(e) any other provisions of a
law which impose a public duty." (p. 5)
Law", in Journées d'études sur le droit de la
xxvii, 311 p., at pp. 207-221, and see "Statutory Authority", at
p. 213 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12),
(Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12),
9063212879; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9
I56 1987; civil law but useful for researchers;
SUISSE, Code pénal; disponible à http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/3/311.0.fr.pdf
(vérifié le 16 octobre 2007); note de recherche: le code pénal suisse contient
des nouvelles dispositions dans sa Partie générale
adoptées en
2007; l'art. 14 a remplaçé l'art. 32;
3. Actes licites et culpabilité.
autorisés par la loi
manière licite, même si l’acte est punissable en vertu du
présent code ou d’une autre loi."
"[Ancien] Art. 32
8. Actes lcites.
Loi, devoir de fonction ou de
Ne constitue pas une infraction l'acte
ordonné par la loi, ou par un devoir de fonction ou de
profession; il en est de même de l'acte que la loi déclare
permis ou non punissable."
_____________"Message concernant la modification du Code
pénal suisse
(dispositions générales, entrée en vigueur et
pénal) et du code pénal militaire ainsi qu'une loi
fédérale régissant la condition pénale des mineurs du
21 septembre 1998", dans FF (Feuille
199 II, pp. 1787-2221; disponible à http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/strafgesetzbuch_allg.Par.0005.File.tmp/bot-stgb-at-f.pdf (consulté le 21 octobre 2007); contribution
"212.31
Loi (art. 14)
Comme l'article 32 CP se borne à rappeler l'unité
en prévoyant que le comportement ordonné ou
déclaré permis par la loi
ne constitue pas une infraction, la commission d'experts proposait de
le biffer. Beaucoup de participants à la procédure de
consultation ont
toutefois vivement critiqué cette proposition au motif que
CP assurait une certaine sécurité juridique. Aussi,
vous proposons-nous de maintenir cette norme avec quelques
formelles. Le nouvel article 14 P limite les sources de justification
l'obligation légale (Gesetzespflicht) et à l'autorisation
(Gesetzeserlaubnis). Il ne mentionne plus le devoir de fonction
(Amtspflicht) ni le devoir professionnel (Berufspflicht), qui ne
constituent pas, de l'avis unanime de la doctrine, une source
justificative autonome. La mention du devoir de fonction et du devoir
professionnel ne peut dès lors qu'induire en erreur en faisant
que l'accomplissement de ces devoirs peut justifier une infraction
s'il ne s'appuie pas sur une loi. Le projet supprime par ailleurs la
mention du droit en vigueur assimilant l'acte non punissable (straflos)
à un acte licite. Cette assimilation constitue en effet une
car, si les actes licites ne sont assurément pas punissables, il
existe des actes
illicites qui ne peuvent pas être punis pour des motifs
l'illicéité de l'acte en cause. Ainsi, l'infraction
commise par un
irresponsable est un acte illicite qui ne sera pas puni, car son auteur
n'est pas coupable". (notes omises)
TUNISIE, Code pénal, disponible à http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/cp/menu.html
(vérifié le 20 octobre 2007);
"Article 42. Note
par la loi n° 2005-46 du 6 juin 2005 portant approbation de la
réorganisation de quelques dispositions du code pénal et
leur rédaction.- N'est pas punissable, celui
qui a commis le fait en vertu d'une disposition de la loi ou d'un ordre
de l'autorité compétente.
N'est pas punissable, celui qui a commis un fait en vertu d'une
disposition de la loi ou d'un ordre de l'autorité
compétente."
UNITED KINGDOM, Her Majesty's Commissioners for Revising and
the Criminal Law, Second Report of
Her Majesty's Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal
Law, London: Her Majesty Stationery Office, 1846, 75 p. (series; c.
published in British Parliamentary
Papers (1846), vol. 24, pp. 107-182; and in Irish University
Administration Criminal Law, Dublin: Shannon University Press,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, The National Commision on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft
November of 1970" (source: Hollis catalogue, Harvard University);
research note: a copy of the Final
Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
with the proposed criminal code is available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/codein.htm
(accessed on 25 October 2007); "§ 601. Justification
(1) Defense. Except as otherwise expressly provided,
justification or excuse under this Chapter is a defense.
§ 602. Execution of Public Duty
(1) Authorized by Law. Conduct engaged in by a public servant in
the course of his official duties is justified when it is required or
authorized by law." (Study Draft,
pp. 38-39) VAN GERVEN, Walter, Jeremy and Pierre Larouche, Cases,
National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Oxford, Hart
Publishing, 2000, xcix, 969 p., see Chapter 3, "Liability for One's Own
Conduct", part 3.2.4, "Grounds of Justification", sub-part sub-part
3.2.4.A, "Statutory Duty, Authority or Permission", (series: Common Law
of Europe Casebooks series), ISBN: 1841131393; available at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/casebooks/tort.php
(accessed on 6 February 2006); and see also "Grounds of justification"
(Comparative overview discussion) at pp. 356-357; civil law (tort law)
but very useful for
researchers; "copy at the Library of the Supreme Court
of Canada, KJC1640 T672 2000;
WILLIAMS, Glanville, 1911-1997, Textbook of Criminal Law,
2nd ed., London :
1983, xlvii, 1007 p., ISBN: 0420468501 and 0420468609 (pbk.);
"PUBLIC AUTHORITY: POWERS OF ARREST
The powers of interference with persons and property
possesses by public officials (and by private individuals on public
grounds) are extremely numerous. The rest of this chapter is
concerned only with the right to use force to prevent crime or effect
an arrest. We begin with arrest, but with a prefatory remark.
The law of arrest has for centuries been an Augean
stable, because of its neglect by the Home Office. New statutory
powers of arrest are continually being added, but they vary vastly in
their details and are obscure on many points. Despite the practical importance of the
subject we can deal with it only in outline, because not only is it
complicated but it is not wholly relevant to a book on the substantive
criminal law. It comes within our purview for two reasons.
First, a valid
arrest is a justification on the charge of an offence like assault and
false imprisonment, which would otherwise be regarded as being
committed against the person arrested. An illegal arrest, in contrast is not,
properly speaking, an arrest at all; it can be called an 'arrest' only
when the word is used in invisible quotation marks. An illegal
'arrest' is no more an arrest than an illegal 'marriage' is a
marriage. It is a false imprisonment, and frequently involves an
Secondly, certain offences connected with the
administration of justice involve proof that the defendant was
resisting or escaping from arrest or other unlawful detention, or
helping someone else to do. These offences are escape, rescue,
assault with intent to resist arrest, wounding with intent to resist
lawful apprehension, and (where a question of arrest is involved)
assaulting an officer in the execution of his duty.
the law governing the validity of an arrest enters into the substantive
law. Nevertheless, it belongs primarily to criminal procedure. For this reason the following relatively brief statement of the law is
reduced for the most part, to the gabble of small print, and the reader
is left to decide whether he wishes to include it within his present
study." (pp. 485-486; notes omitted; emphasis in bold added) [compare with Law Reform Commission of Canada, Arrest, supra]