Source: http://openjurist.org/252/f3d/741/united-states-of-america-v-michael-j-bowler
Timestamp: 2015-07-30 20:28:07
Document Index: 579401448

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

252 F3d 741 United States of America v. Michael J Bowler - | OpenJurist
252 F. 3d 741 - United States of America v. Michael J Bowler - Home
252 F3d 741 United States of America v. Michael J Bowler - 252 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2001)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff - Appelleev.MICHAEL J BOWLER Defendant - Appellant
No. 99-31370
Defendant-Appellant Michael J. Bowler appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
On November 17, 1994, Defendant-Appellant Michael J. Bowler was charged in a fifteen-count superseding indictment with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 371, and fourteen substantive counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1341.1 The charges against Bowler arose out of his management of Pelican State Mutual Insurance Company ("Pelican") and its subsidiary Magnolia Fire and Casualty Insurance Company ("Magnolia") from August 1986 to August 1992. The indictment alleged that Bowler "devised and intended to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud," that as part of that scheme Bowler created the false impression that Pelican was solvent in order to obtain money and benefits for his personal use, and that he used the United States Postal Service to execute the scheme.
On July 7, 1995, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and four of the substantive counts of mail fraud, including, inter alia, mailing Pelican's 1991 Annual Statement on March 16, 1992; mailing Pelican's March 31, 1992 Quarterly Statement on May 14, 1992; and mailing the 1991 Annual Statements of Pelican and Magnolia on May 22, 1992 ("Count Fifteen"). On January 29, 1996, Bowler was sentenced to terms of sixty months imprisonment for the conspiracy count and three of the substantive mail fraud counts, to be served concurrently, and to one term of eighteen months on Count Fifteen, to be served consecutively. He was also required to pay $100,000 in restitution and ordered to be placed on a three-year term of supervised release following his term of imprisonment.
On May 28, 1997, this court affirmed the judgment of the district court. Bowler's petition for rehearing was denied, and this court issued its mandate on February 26, 1998. On October 5, 1998, Bowler's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.
Bowler, proceeding pro se, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion2 (the "§ 2255 motion") on April 19, 1999, and a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 ("Rule 33 motion") on May 10, 1999, in district court. In his Rule 33 motion, Bowler alleged that the final accounting of the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association ("LIGA")3 through March 1999 established that Pelican was not insolvent, and therefore, he should not have been convicted of scheming to cover up Pelican's insolvency.
The parties filed a series of pleadings in district court regarding Bowler's Rule 33 motion. The government argued that Bowler's motion was untimely because it was not filed within three years of the jury verdict, as required by the present version of Rule 33, nor did the motion fit within any of the exceptions to the three-year time limit. Alternatively, the government argued that even if the Rule 33 motion was timely, the new evidence did not meet the standard necessary to warrant a new trial.
Bowler countered that the present version of Rule 33, which became effective December 1, 1998, did not apply to his case and that, under the prior version of Rule 33, which allowed a motion for a new trial to be filed within two years of final judgment, his Rule 33 motion was timely. Additionally, he asserted that the evidence did meet the requirements necessary for the granting of a new trial.
On November 24, 1999, the district court declined to pass on the procedural bars raised by the government, and, instead, denied both the § 2255 motion and the Rule 33 motion on the merits. On December 8, 1999, Bowler filed a notice of appeal and a motion for a certificate of appealability ("COA") on the denial of his § 2255 and Rule 33 motions. On December 15, 1999, the district court denied Bowler's COA, and Bowler subsequently sought a COA from this court. On June 20, 2000, this court denied Bowler's COA request, holding that Bowler had failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. This court also noted, however, that no COA was required for an appeal of the denial of a Rule 33 motion, stating that "[s]hould Bowler wish to continue the appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, he is directed to discuss in his brief whether the motion was timely under Rule 33."
Bowler appeals from the district court's denial of his Rule 33 motion.4
II. TIMELINESS OF BOWLER'S RULE 33 MOTION
As a threshold issue, we must address the timeliness of Bowler's Rule 33 motion, which turns on whether the amended version of Rule 33, effective December 1, 1998, or the pre-amendment version of Rule 33 is applicable to the present case. We do so because the time limits of Rule 33 are jurisdictional. See United States v. Brown, 587 F.2d 187, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Lussier, 219 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Bramlett, 116 F.3d 1403, 1405 (11th Cir. 1997); Harrison v. United States, 191 F.2d 874, 875-76 (5th Cir. 1951). "Jurisdiction is a question of law which we review de novo." Groome Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2000).
We pause briefly to explain why this inquiry (i.e., which version of Rule 33 applies) is significant in this case. The current Rule 33 provides in relevant part: "A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made only within three years after the verdict or finding of guilty." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. The jury verdict was entered against Bowler on July 7, 1995, but he did not file his Rule 33 motion until May 10, 1999, almost four years later. Under the current Rule 33, Bowler's Rule 33 motion would be untimely, and we would not have jurisdiction to hear it.
However, the Rule 33 in effect prior to December 1, 1998 provided in relevant part: "A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (1998) (amended 1998). Importantly, final judgment is measured from the date the appellate court issues its mandate. See United States v. Granza, 427 F.2d 184, 185 n.3 (5th Cir. 1970) ("When a conviction is appealed, a motion for a new trial may only be made before or within two years after the issuance of the mandate of affirmance by the appellate court."). This court issued its mandate on February 26, 1998, and Bowler filed his Rule 33 motion on May 10, 1999. Because his Rule 33 motion was filed within the two-year limit, if the pre-amendment version of Rule 33 applies, Bowler's Rule 33 motion is timely, and we have jurisdiction to hear it.