Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/739/755/453787/
Timestamp: 2019-10-22 08:46:01
Document Index: 612226623

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1973', '§ 1988', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1988', '§ 1973', '§ 2000', '§ 1988', '§ 2000', '§ 1988']

Gilberto Gerena-valentin, in His Former Capacity As New Yorkcity Councilman And, Individually, As an Eligible Voter, Andon Behalf of All Puerto Ricans and Other Hispanic Voters Innew York Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Edward I. Koch, As Mayor of the City of New York, City Ofnew York, Thomas Cuite, As Majority Leader and Vicechairman, and the Chairman of the Committee on Rulesprivileges and Elections of the Council of the City of Newyork, Council of the City of New York, Melvin Markus, Aschairman of the Redistricting Commission Appointed by Thecouncil of the City of New York, Board of Elections of Thecity of New York, Stanley Schlein, Attorney, Office of Themajority Leader, the Council of the City of New York,stanley Friedman, As Chairman of the Executive Committee Ofthe Democratic County Committee of Bronx County, Defendants-appellees, 739 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1984 › Gilberto Gerena-valentin, in His Former Capacity As New Yorkcity Councilman And, Individually, As an...
Gilberto Gerena-valentin, in His Former Capacity As New Yorkcity Councilman And, Individually, As an Eligible Voter, Andon Behalf of All Puerto Ricans and Other Hispanic Voters Innew York Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Edward I. Koch, As Mayor of the City of New York, City Ofnew York, Thomas Cuite, As Majority Leader and Vicechairman, and the Chairman of the Committee on Rulesprivileges and Elections of the Council of the City of Newyork, Council of the City of New York, Melvin Markus, Aschairman of the Redistricting Commission Appointed by Thecouncil of the City of New York, Board of Elections of Thecity of New York, Stanley Schlein, Attorney, Office of Themajority Leader, the Council of the City of New York,stanley Friedman, As Chairman of the Executive Committee Ofthe Democratic County Committee of Bronx County, Defendants-appellees, 739 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1984)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 739 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1984) Submitted March 2, 1984. Decided July 3, 1984
Gilberto Gerena-Valentin appeals from Judge Duffy's order denying his motion for attorney's fees under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l (e) and awarding attorney's fees to defendants Friedman and Schlein under the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We affirm.
This appeal arises out of a challenge under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq., to New York City's 1981 redistricting plan. The plan, based on the 1980 census, redrew council district lines, thereby changing 300 of the City's 3000 election districts. The plan increased the number of council seats from 33 to 35 while retaining two at-large council seats for each of the City's five boroughs. However, the City failed to preclear the plan with the Justice Department even though preclearance was required under the Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
On September 2, 1981, Gerena-Valentin, an incumbent Councilman from the Bronx, commenced the instant action in the Southern District of New York. Gerena-Valentin brought his suit as a class action on behalf of New York City's Puerto Rican and other Hispanic voters and alleged that the City had violated Sections 5 and 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c and b(e), by failing to preclear the redistricting plan and to provide adequate bilingual assistance to Hispanic voters. Gerena-Valentin's Section 5 claims were virtually identical to the claims asserted in Herron's amended complaint. By the time Gerena-Valentin filed his complaint, the City had conceded in Andrews v. Koch that the plan was subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and that preclearance could not be obtained before the primary election. Gerena-Valentin nevertheless sought to enjoin the primary election and general election pending preclearance.
The three-judge district court enjoined the September 10th primary. Herron v. Koch, 523 F. Supp. 167 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1981) (per curiam). The court's opinion referred to and resolved Gerena-Valentin's Section 5 claim along with Herron's and Andrews' claims. The opinion neither discussed nor relied on any theories argued by Kaimowitz. On September 9th, Messrs. Wooten, Kaimowitz and Sperduto all opposed the City's motion for a stay of the injunction before Justice Marshall, who denied the stay.
On January 13, 1981, Judge Neaher awarded over $160,000 in fees and expenses to Andrews' counsel. 554 F. Supp. 1099. He declined to award fees to Herron's counsel on the grounds that "his attorney performed no services of value to the prosecution of this case." Id. at 1102. Meanwhile, on September 9, 1981, Judge Duffy held a hearing on the remaining counts of Gerena-Valentin's complaint, including the claims against Friedman and Schlein and the claims relating to bilingual assistance under Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act. Friedman and Schlein defended with affidavits and a copy of a state referee's report recommending that Gerena-Valentin be kept off the ballot. Gerena-Valentin offered only argument of counsel in support of his claim. Judge Duffy declined to order the City to place Gerena-Valentin's name on the ballot and dismissed counts 2 through 6 of Gerena-Valentin's complaint. Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 523 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In that opinion, Judge Duffy noted that Gerena-Valentin was removed from the ballot after 4,616 out of 5,860 signatures on his petition were invalidated by the Board of Elections in circumstances suggestive of election fraud. Id. at 177.
On July 29, 1982, PRLDEF moved for attorney's fees solely for its prosecution of Gerena-Valentin's Section 5 claim. Judge Duffy denied the motion after applying the two-part test set forth in our decision in Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1982). Judge Duffy found that Gerena-Valentin was "a late comer to this litigation and not a moving force behind the issuance of the injunction." Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 554 F. Supp. 1017, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Accordingly, he held that Gerena-Valentin need not "be compensated along with the catalysts." Id.
Judge Duffy granted attorney's fees to defendants Friedman and Schlein under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 on the grounds that Gerena-Valentin's complaint as to them had "no basis in law or fact." 554 F. Supp. at 1021.
Attorney's fees are available under the Voting Rights Act to the prevailing party in any "action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment." 42 U.S.C. § 1973l (e). See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 966, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam). To justify an award of such fees, the prevailing party must show a causal connection between the relief obtained and the litigation in which fees are sought. Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1982); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978). A causal connection exists if the plaintiff's lawsuit was "a catalytic, necessary, or substantial factor in attaining the relief." Commissioners Court of Medina County, Texas v. United States, 683 F.2d 435, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The inquiry into causality is largely factual, Posada v. Lamb County, Texas, 716 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 1983), and the findings of a district court on these matters will be set aside only if clearly erroneous. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1792, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948). In cases where several parties seek similar relief, the district court will normally be in the best position to determine whether a particular lawsuit was a "significant catalyst" in bringing about the relief sought.
In the instant controversy, an injunction did issue against the City's redistricting plan and the plan was substantially modified. Judge Duffy, however, concluded in effect that Gerena-Valentin's efforts were not a catalytic or substantial factor behind these favorable results. The judge found as a fact that Gerena-Valentin's complaint "merely aped the model provided [weeks earlier] by Herron and Andrews." Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 554 F. Supp. at 1020. In addition, Gerena-Valentin's counsel made no appreciable contribution at oral argument on the motion for a preliminary injunction.
We cannot say that Judge Duffy's decision was clearly erroneous.1 While there is no first-in-time rule governing the award of counsel fees where multiple litigation is brought, a duplicative action which contributes virtually nothing to the ultimate result cannot justify an award of counsel fees. The purpose of such awards is to "encourage the redress of civil rights violations." Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F.2d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 1980). Where that goal is fully achieved by a single well-managed action, an award of compensation to latecomers who add nothing of value would encourage the bringing of superfluous litigation solely for an award of fees.
Since Gerena-Valentin's role was limited to the bringing of a repetitive action and the offering of inconsequential legal arguments in seeking an injunction, it was not error to deny counsel fees. Gerena-Valentin's counsel asserts that he worked extensively with Herron's counsel in preparing the amended complaint and motion for injunctive relief in Herron v. Koch. If so, and if the Herron litigation was a catalytic factor leading to the favorable results, Gerena-Valentin's counsel would have been entitled to fees in that action. However, Judge Neaher denied an award to Herron's counsel because they "performed no services of value to the prosecution of this case." 554 F. Supp. at 1102.
Our analysis begins with the statutory language. Section 1973l (e) of the Voting Rights Act provides that "In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court ... may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee." The word "proceeding" is used throughout the Voting Rights Act interchangeably with the word "action" in contexts plainly indicating an intent to refer to litigation, e.g., Sec. 1973c (referring to actions for declaratory judgments as "proceedings"); Sec. 1973j (f) (referring to certain actions by the Attorney General for providing relief and to criminal actions under the Act as "proceedings"); Sec. 1973l (referring to actions for declaratory judgments as "proceedings"); compare New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 2029, 64 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1980). There is thus little or no textual warrant for a construction of the fee awards provision which applies it to lobbying in preclearance reviews not in aid of catalytic litigation.
This case differs from New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, supra (attorney's fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) for time spent in certain administrative proceedings necessary to the litigation). In New York Gaslight, the plaintiff was required by statute to exhaust state and local administrative remedies before resorting to litigation. Compensation for time spent exhausting those remedies was thus appropriate. In the instant case, however, as in Blow v. Lascaris, 523 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.N.Y.1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam), no such statutory exhaustion requirement exists. We therefore conclude that Gerena-Valentin is not entitled to an award of fees for work done in the preclearance review.
Judge Duffy awarded Friedman and Schlein, prevailing defendants, attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 on the grounds that Gerena-Valentin's complaint as to them had "no basis in law or fact," at 1021. The general rule is that, in the absence of a statutory provision authorizing the award of attorney's fees to defendants, such fees may be awarded only upon a showing of improper purpose or bad faith, as well as lack of merit. PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 898 (2d Cir. 1983). However, defendants in civil rights cases are entitled to fees under Section 1988 upon a showing that the complaint is frivolous without regard to the state of mind of either the plaintiff or his or her counsel. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978). This is such a case.
" [P]rivate attorneys' general" should not be deterred from bringing meritorious actions ... by the prospect of having to pay their opponent's counsel fees .... However, such a party, if unsuccessful, should be assessed his opponent's fee where ... his suit was frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes .... These provisions thus deter frivolous suits by authorizing an award of attorney's fees against a party shown to have litigated in "bad faith" ....
The Senate Report also indicates that fees should be awarded under Section 1973l (e) by the standards used under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) and Sec. 2000e-5(k). Id. at 807-808. That Act and Section 1973l (e) and the more recently adopted Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, all contain virtually identical statutory language. The legislative history to both Section 1973l (e) and Section 1988 indicate that they were intended to create consistency in fee award standards in civil rights cases. 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 809-10; S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5908-12. The legislative history of each Act is thus relevant to the construction of the others.