Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/563/757/31656/
Timestamp: 2019-11-17 10:31:07
Document Index: 700692740

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 951', '§ 951', '§ 1983', '§ 25', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Richard Franklin Miller et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Dale Carson, Etc., et al., Defendants,louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections,defendant-appellant,t. Edward Austin, Amicus Curiae, 563 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1977 › Richard Franklin Miller et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Dale Carson, Etc., et al., Defendants,louie...
Richard Franklin Miller et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Dale Carson, Etc., et al., Defendants,louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections,defendant-appellant,t. Edward Austin, Amicus Curiae, 563 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 563 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977) Nov. 23, 1977
On October 25, 1974, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment contending that the Secretary had failed to promulgate rules, as directed under § 951.23 Fla.Stat. (1973),3 prescribing jail standards for (a) the maximum number of prisoners subject to detention per unit of floor space within the facility; (b) the quantity, quality, and diversity of food served; and (c) the confinement of prisoners by classification. On November 8, 1974, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion, and made specific findings as to the unsanitary, overcrowded, and dangerous conditions in the jail and the lack of provision for confinement of prisoners by classifications. 392 F. Supp. 515; 401 F. Supp. 835. The court also found that Fla.Stat. § 951.23, authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation to adopt rules and regulations prescribing standards for the operation of detention facilities, imposed mandatory duties on the Secretary. The court enjoined the defendant from further violation of the statute and directed him to promulgate regulations that would comply with it. On February 5, 1975, the defendant, in response to the order, filed suggested regulations. On February 20 the plaintiffs filed an objection contending that the contents of the defendant's response did not comply with the terms of the court's order. After a hearing, the court found the proposed regulations inadequate and entered its order of October 28, 1975, again requiring the defendant to conform to the statute and to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations. The defendant Wainwright appeals from this order. He did not appeal from the original order of November 8, 1974.
Conditions in the Duval County Jail were so deplorable that the district court, among other conclusions, held that the detainees were subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The facts are set out fully in the district court's opinions. 401 F. Supp. 835; 392 F. Supp. 515. They require but a brief summary here. The majority of persons held in the jail were detainees who were imprisoned not because of crimes they had committed but to assure their presence at trial. Many inmates, most of whom must be presumed innocent, were placed in holding cells, some of which were without water or toilet facilities, for up to eight days without bedding or a change of clothes. These cells were often so crowded that the inmates had to eat while standing because there was no room to sit. Sinks and commodes were filthy throughout the jail. Sometimes vomitus, urine, and feces were on the floor of the cells. Lighting and ventilation were poor. Medical care was grossly inadequate. Designed for 432 inmates, the jail usually held more than 100 over the stated maximum. Inmates were segregated racially in the holding cells. Pretrial detainees and juveniles were housed with convicted felons (some of them violent), mental cases, homosexuals, inmates with syphilis and gonorrhea. The court found: "In summary, the overall environment of the inmate housing areas of the Duval County Jail gives one the psychological feeling of being really trapped in a dungeon."
For a federal court to have the power to hear a state claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, the court must have before it a substantial federal claim, and the state and federal claims must "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact". United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 1966, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 227-28. In addition, the federal and state claims must be such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding". Id. 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 228.
Wainwright contends that the plaintiffs' claims against the state officials are based solely on state law and are distinct from any federal claim against county officials. We find that the claims against the defendant Wainwright relate both to federal and state law. And the federal claim against him is substantial.7 The fact that Wainwright shares responsibility for the operation of the jail with county officials does not relieve him of liability cognizable under § 1983 because of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Rhem v. Malcolm, S.D.N.Y. 1974, 371 F. Supp. 594, 635-36, modified, 2 Cir. 1974, 507 F.2d 333, opinion after remand, 2 Cir. 1975, 527 F.2d 1041, 1042 n.2, state officials were held liable along with local officials for constitutional deprivations in the Manhattan House of Detention. New York law gave them the responsibility to inspect local jails, aid in their administration, and close unsafe jails. See also Gates v. Collier, 5 Cir. 1974, 501 F.2d 1291 (upholding injunctive relief against the Governor of Mississippi and the State Penitentiary Board as well as the prison warden); United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 2 Cir. 1975, 510 F.2d 583, 589 (holding the New York State Corrections Commissioner liable for money damages along with the prison warden when the former was "chargeable with knowledge" of the cruel and unusual punishment of one prisoner). To hold this claim against Wainwright insubstantial we would have to say that the state did not give him enough power to remedy the unconstitutional conditions imposed on inmates of the Duval Jail. The broad language of the Florida statute and its obviously remedial objectives prevent our construing his statutory responsibility so narrowly.8
We find also that the state and federal claims here are such that the plaintiffs would be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding and that they meet the Gibbs test that there be a common nucleus of operative fact. Once federal constitutional violations were established, as they were here, the basic question in the federal claim was the extent of Wainwright's duty under federal law; in the state claim, his duty under the Florida statute. These two questions are similar. Many of the matters made subject to Wainwright's regulation have also been the source of federal constitutional litigation. See, e. g., Gates v. Collier, N.D. Miss. 1972, 349 F. Supp. 881, 887-88, aff'd, 5 Cir. 1974, 501 F.2d 1291 (medical attention, maintenance of physical facilities); Taylor v. Sterrett, 5 Cir. 1974, 499 F.2d 367, 368-69, cert. denied, 1975, 420 U.S. 983, 95 S. Ct. 1414, 43 L. Ed. 2d 665 (modes of disciplinary treatment). The plaintiffs would hardly have been expected to litigate the requirements of state law in one proceeding and the requirements of federal law on the same matter in another. Not only would a parallel state court trial have been duplicative, it would have been meaningless if a federal court had found that the Constitution required a higher duty of Wainwright.
Here, as in Gibbs and Taylor, the judicial power to hear a pendent claim results when the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact", and the claims are such that the court "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding". Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S. Ct. at 1138.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725-26, 86 S. Ct. at 1139.
WHETHER THE RULE PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 951.23(2) (b), FLORIDA STATUTES.
Fla.Stat. § 25.031 (1974); Fla.App. Rules 4.61. See, e. g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 1974, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S. Ct. 1741, 40 L. Ed. 2d 215; Martinez v. Rodriquez, 5 Cir. 1968, 394 F.2d 156, opinion on certification, Fla.1968, 215 So. 2d 305
Wainwright correctly contends that the violation of state law by a state official, without more, is not a violation of the federal right to procedural due process. Screws v. United States, 1945, 325 U.S. 91, 108-09, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495; McDowell v. Texas, 5 Cir. en banc 1972, 465 F.2d 1342. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 becomes applicable only when someone violates a "specific constitutional guarantee" under color of state law. Paul v. Davis, 1976, 424 U.S. 693, 700, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 413. But when a state official's violation of state law causes the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a federal cause of action arises under § 1983. Shields v. Hopper, 5 Cir. 1975, 519 F.2d 1131 (dictum)
That the abuse of authority alleged here is a dereliction of duty rather than affirmative act makes no difference. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was partly aimed at constitutional deprivation through abuse and nonuse of authority by state officials. See Developments in the Law Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1153-54 (1977):