Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103042/united-states-vs-biswell
Timestamp: 2017-12-15 21:42:25
Document Index: 226956509

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 923', '§ 923', '§ 923', '§ 923', '§ 923', '§ 923', '§ 7342', '§ 922', '§ 921', '§ 923']

United States Vs Biswell - Citation 103042 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Biswell - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/103042
Case Number 406 U.S. 311
Respondent Biswell
.....books, and requested entry into a locked gun storeroom. respondent asked whether the agent had a search warrant, and the investigator told him that he did not, but that § 923(g) authorized such inspections. respondent was given a copy of the section to read, and he replied, "well, that's what it says, so i guess it's okay." respondent unlocked the storeroom, and the agent found and seized two sawed-off rifles which respondent was not licensed to possess. he was indicted and convicted for dealing in firearms without page 406 u. s. 313 having paid the required special occupational tax. [ footnote 2 ] the court of appeals reversed, however, holding that § 923(g) was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment because it authorized warrantless searches of business.....
United States v. Biswell - 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
Warrantless search of locked storeroom during business hours as part of inspection procedure authorized by § 923(g) of the Gun Control Act of 1968, which resulted in the seizure of unlicensed firearm from a dealer federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons held not violative of Fourth Amendment. Pp. 406 U. S. 311 -317.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 406 U. S. 317 . DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 406 U. S. 317 .
such premises. [ Footnote 1 ]"
18 U.S.C. § 923(g). Respondent, a pawn shop operator who was federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons, was visited one afternoon by a city policeman and a Federal Treasury agent who identified himself, inspected respondent's books, and requested entry into a locked gun storeroom. Respondent asked whether the agent had a search warrant, and the investigator told him that he did not, but that § 923(g) authorized such inspections. Respondent was given a copy of the section to read, and he replied, "Well, that's what it says, so I guess it's okay." Respondent unlocked the storeroom, and the agent found and seized two sawed-off rifles which respondent was not licensed to possess. He was indicted and convicted for dealing in firearms without
having paid the required special occupational tax. [ Footnote 2 ] The Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that § 923(g) was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it authorized warrantless searches of business premises, and that respondent's ostensible consent to the search was invalid under Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 (1968). The Court of Appeals concluded that the sawed-off rifles, having been illegally seized, were inadmissible in evidence. 442 F.2d 1189 (CA10 1971). We granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 983 (1971), and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, we had no occasion in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), to consider the reach of the Fourth Amendment with respect to various federal regulatory statutes. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970), we dealt with the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections of federally licensed dealers in alcoholic beverages. There, federal inspectors, without a warrant
and without the owner's permission, had forcibly entered a locked storeroom and seized illegal liquor. Emphasizing the historically broad authority of the Government to regulate the liquor industry and the approval of similar inspection laws of this kind in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), [ Footnote 3 ] we concluded that Congress had ample power "to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand." 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 76 . We found, however, that Congress had not expressly provided for forcible entry in the absence of a warrant, and had, instead, given Government agents a remedy by making it a criminal offense to refuse admission to the inspectors under 26 U.S.C. § 7342.
Here, the search was not accompanied by any unauthorized force, and, if the target of the inspection had been a federally licensed liquor dealer, it is clear under Colonnade that the Fourth Amendment would not bar a seizure of illicit liquor. When the officers asked to inspect respondent's locked storeroom, they were merely asserting their statutory right, and respondent was on
notice as to their identity and the legal basis for their action. Respondent's submission to lawful authority and his decision to step aside and permit the inspection rather than face a criminal prosecution [ Footnote 4 ] is analogous to a householder's acquiescence in a search pursuant to a warrant when the alternative is a possible criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible entry. In neither case does the lawfulness of the search depend on consent; in both, there is lawful authority independent of the will of the householder who might, other things being equal, prefer no search at all. In this context, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 (1968), is inapposite, since there the police relied on a warrant that was never shown to be valid; because their demand for entry was not pursuant to lawful authority, the acquiescence of the householder was held an involuntary consent. In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent, but on the authority of a valid statute.
We think a like result is required in the present case, which involves a similar inspection system aimed at federally licensed dealers in firearms. Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is governmental control of the liquor industry, but close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders. See Congressional Findings and Declaration, Note preceding 18 U.S.C. § 922. Large interests are at stake, and inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme, since it assures that weapons are distributed through regular channels and in
It is also plain that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection. Each licensee is annually furnished with a revised compilation of ordinances that describe his obligations and define the inspector's authority. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(19). The dealer is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.
116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 623 -624 (footnote omitted).
Had I been a member of the Court when Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970), was decided, I would have joined the respective dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black and of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 79 and 397 U. S. 77 . I therefore concur in the result here.
As Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the three-judge panel in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said, the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g), has a provision for inspection that is "almost identical" with the one in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 .
In Colonnade, we agreed that "Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand." 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 76 . But we also said:
Id. at 397 U. S. 77 . Here, the statute authorizing inspection is virtually identical to the one we considered in Colonnade. The conclusion necessarily follows that Congress, as in Colonnade, has here "selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without a warrant." Ibid.
In my view, a search conducted over the objection of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is "forcible," whether or not violent means are used to effect
the search. In this case, the owner withdrew his objection upon being shown a copy of the statute authorizing inspection, saying: "If that is the law, I guess it is all right." If we apply the test of "consent" that we used in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 , we would affirm this judgment, * for, as MR. JUSTICE STEWART, speaking for the Court in Bumper, said:
Id. at 391 U. S. 548 -550.