Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/355/570/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-09-30 20:24:11
Document Index: 734975545

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3731', '§ 1621', '§ 1621', '§ 1621', '§ 1815', '§ 5392', '§ 1815', '§ 1824']

United States v. Hvass :: 355 U.S. 570 (1958) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› United States v. Hvass
United States v. Hvass 355 U.S. 570 (1958)
U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570 (1958)United States v. HvassNo. 92Argued January 27, 1958Decided March 3, 1958355 U.S. 570APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1. When a Federal District Court dismisses an indictment on the ground that it does not allege a violation of the statute upon which it was founded, not merely because of some deficiency in pleading, but with respect to the substance of the charge, that is necessarily a construction of the statute, and a direct appeal to this Court lies under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Pp. 355 U. S. 573-574.
2. A willfully false statement of a material fact, made by an attorney under oath during a Federal District Court's examination into his fitness to practice before it, constitutes perjury within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 when the examination was made under a local rule of the District Court specifically authorizing such examination under oath, since such an examination is a "case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered" within the meaning of the statute. Pp. 355 U. S. 574-577.
(a) The phrase "a law of the United States," as used in the perjury statute, is not limited to statutes, but includes as well rules and regulations which have been lawfully authorized and have a clear legislative base, and also decisional law. P. 355 U. S. 575.
(b) There can be no doubt that the District Court was lawfully authorized to prescribe its local rules and that they have a clear legislative base. Pp. 355 U. S. 575-577.
147 F.Supp. 594 reversed and remanded. Page 355 U. S. 571
The question for decision is whether a willfully false statement of a material fact, made by an attorney under oath during the District Court's examination, under its local rule, into his fitness to practice before it, constitutes perjury within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1621. [Footnote 1]
"Provided further that, where the action is one to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in Iowa by one who at the time was a resident of Iowa . . . , the Court may, on its own motion or on motion of a member of the bar of either District, Page 355 U. S. 572 before permitting a nonresident attorney to participate in the case, require a satisfactory showing that the connection of the said attorney [with the case] was not occasioned or brought about in violation of the standards of conduct specified in Rule 8 hereof. [Footnote 2] The court, as a part of said showing, may require the plaintiff and the said attorney to appear and be examined under oath."
On March 20, 1956, a four-count indictment was returned against appellee in the same District Court. Each count charged that appellee, while under oath as a witness Page 355 U. S. 573 at the hearing of October 12, 1955, "unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly, and contrary to [his] oath, [stated] material matters which he did not believe to be true" (in particulars set forth in each count), "in violation of Section 1621, Title 18 United States Code." Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment for failure of any of the counts to state an offense against the United States. The court, [Footnote 3] after full hearing upon the motion, concluded
This indictment was founded on the federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621. The District Court dismissed the indictment not because of any deficiency in pleading or procedure, but solely because it held that Rule 3 "is not such a law of the United States as was intended by Congress to support an indictment for perjury." It thus dismissed the indictment upon its construction of the federal Page 355 U. S. 574 perjury statute. In these circumstances, the question of our jurisdiction is settled by United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 308 U. S. 193:
United States v. Borden Co., supra, at 308 U. S. 193.
United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374, 346 U. S. 376. Only the first element of perjury is involved here, because the District Court's dismissal of the indictment was upon the sole ground that "Rule 3 . . . is not such a law of the United States as was intended by Congress to support an indictment for perjury." Therefore, the only question open here is whether the admission hearing, held under the District Court's Rule 3, and at which appellee testified under Page 355 U. S. 575 oath, was a "case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered" within the meaning of that clause as used in the perjury statute. We think it was.
The phrase "a law of the United States," as used in the perjury statute, is not limited to statutes, but includes as well Rules and Regulations which have been lawfully authorized and have a clear legislative base (United States v. Smull, 236 U. S. 405; Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211; Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236; Lilly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 317 U. S. 481), and also decisional law. Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139. And see Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 1815, 1816, 1824. [Footnote 4]
"In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel, as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."
These statutes and Rule 83 leave no room to doubt that the District Court was lawfully authorized to prescribe its Page 355 U. S. 576 local rules and that they have a clear legislative base. Whether or not its Rule 3 is invalid for any reason -- which, as stated, is a question not before us -- it was prescribed pursuant to statutory authority, and expressly provides that, under the conditions specified, the court may require the "attorney to appear and be examined under oath."
Rule 3 had at least as clear a legislative base as did the Regulations involved in Caha v. United States, supra, and United States v. Smull, supra. In the Caha case, defendant was indicted under the federal perjury statute -- then in precisely the same terms as it is now -- and charged with perjury through the making of a false affidavit to officials of the Land Office of the Department of the Interior in respect of a contest, then pending in the Land Office, over the validity of a homestead entry. The defendant was convicted, and, on appeal, contended that no statute authorized such a contest, and that therefore it could not "be said that the oath was taken in a case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered.'" By statute, Congress had authorized the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, "to enforce and carry into execution, by appropriate regulations, every part of the [laws relating to public lands]." Pursuant to that authority, the Commissioner adopted rules of practice including an express provision
"We have, therefore, a general grant of authority to the land department to prescribe appropriate regulations for the disposition of the public land. . . . Clearly, then . . . , the local land officers in hearing and deciding upon a contest with respect Page 355 U. S. 577 to a homestead entry, constituted a competent tribunal, and the contest so pending before them was a case in which the laws of the United States authorized an oath to be administered."
Id. at 152 U. S. 218. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Smull case involved very similar facts. The District Court sustained a demurrer to the indictment, "ruling that the affidavit was not within the statute defining perjury." The Government brought the case here under the Criminal Appeals Act. This Court reversed, saying:
"The charge of crime must have clear legislative basis. . . . This statute [the perjury statute, in precisely the same terms as the present one] takes the place of the similar provision of § 5392 of the Revised Statutes, which, in turn, was a substitute for a number of statutes in regard to perjury, and was phrased so as to embrace all cases of false swearing, whether in a court of justice or before administrative officers acting within their powers. . . . It cannot be doubted that a charge of perjury may be based upon [the perjury statute] where the affidavit is required either expressly by an act of Congress, or by an authorized regulation of the General Land Office, and is known by the affiant to be false in a material statement. . . . [W]hen, by a valid regulation, the Department requires that an affidavit shall be made before an officer otherwise competent, that officer is authorized to administer the oath within the meaning of [the perjury statute]. The false swearing is made a crime, not by the Department, but by Congress; the statute, not the Department, fixes the penalty. [Footnote 5]"
Id. at 236 U. S. 408-409. Page 355 U. S. 578
The author there shows that the requirement that a witness must take an oath before giving testimony goes back to early civilizations and has a long history at common law (§ 1815), and that for centuries Anglo-American law has remained faithful to the precept that, "for all testimonial statements made in court, the oath is a requisite." § 1824.
These cases, as well as United States v. Morehead, 243 U. S. 607, show that the perjury statute covers ex parte proceedings or investigations, as well as ordinary adversary suits and proceedings.