Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20071212_0001794.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-22 11:53:42
Document Index: 739682039

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2244', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244']

Jose Camilo filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) challenging a conviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County, accompanied by several exhibits from the state court record.*fn1 Having screened the Petition for dismissal pursuant to Habeas Rule 4, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4, the Court orders Petitioner to show cause why the Petition should not be summarily dismissed as untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
Petitioner did not file his second state petition for post-conviction relief in the Law Division until 2003. (Pet. ¶ 11.b.3.) On July 30, 2003, the Law Division denied relief. (Id. ¶ 11.b.8.) The Appellate Division affirmed the order denying relief, and on June 23, 2003, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. See State v. Camilo, 177 N.J. 224 (2003) (table).
Petitioner filed a third petition for post-conviction relief in 2005. (Pet. ¶ 11.c.3.) The Law Division again denied post-conviction relief on April 20, 2006. (Id. ¶ 11.c.8.) Petitioner appealed, and the Appellate Division summarily affirmed by order filed January 8, 2007. See State v. Camilo, Docket No. A-5164-05T1 order (N.J. Super., App. Div., Jan. 8, 2007). On June 1, 2007, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. See State v. Camilo, 192 N.J. 69 (2007) (table).
Petitioner executed the § 2254 Petition, which is now before this Court, on August 28, 2007, and handed it to prison officials for mailing to the Clerk of the Court on September 1, 2007. (Pet. p. 16.) The Clerk initially received it on September 7, 2007. See Camilo v. Powers, Civil No. 07-4307 (DMC) (D. N.J. filed Sept. 7, 2007). In response to this Court's Mason Order, Petitioner notified the Clerk that he desired to withdraw the Petition and file one all-inclusive § 2254 petition, and this Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice on October 23, 2007. By letter to the Clerk dated November 10, 2007, Petitioner re-submitted the identical Petition to the Court as his one all-inclusive Petition, and the Clerk docketed it as a new matter. See Camilo v. Powers, Civil No. 07-5479 (FSH) (D. N.J. filed Nov. 14, 2007). The Petition raises three grounds:
Ground One: THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED A RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS REPRESENTED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THAT IS WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO EFFECTIVELY REPRESENT DURING SEPARATE BUT CRUCIAL STAGES OF TRIAL. AND COUNSEL WAS FURTHERMORE INEFFECTIVE, BY FAILING TO DISCLOSE, THROUGH TRANSLATOR THAT A TENTATIVE PLEA OFFER PROPOSED BY THE STATE WOULD ESSENTIALLY ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY FOR A CONSECUTIVE APPLICATION AT TIME OF SENTENCE. Ground Two: THE PETITIONER COMPLAINS THAT (HIS) DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, AS PROTECTED BY THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, WERE VIOLATED WHEN TRIAL COURT PERMITTED AN INVOLUNTARY STATEMENT TO BE ENTERED IN THE RECORD FOR JURY CONSIDERATION.
Dismissal without the filing of an answer or the State court record is warranted "if it appears on the face of the petition that petitioner is not entitled to relief." Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025 (1989); see also McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856.*fn2
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which provides that "[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period runs from the latest of (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8-9 (citations omitted). A post-conviction relief application remains pending in state court until "the state courts have finally resolved an application for state post[-]conviction relief [but] § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1-year limitations period during the pendency of a petition for certiorari." Lawrence v. Florida, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1083 (2007).
The AEDPA statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. See Miller, 145 F.3d at 618. "Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The Third Circuit instructs that equitable tolling is appropriate when "the principles of equity would make the rigid application of a limitation period unfair, such as when a state prisoner faces extraordinary circumstances that prevent him from filing a timely habeas petition and the prisoner has exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to investigate and bring his claims." LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275-276 (3d Cir. 2005). Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient. Id.; Merritt, 326 F.3d at 168; Miller, 145 F.3d at 618-19; Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.1999). Nor is attorney error. See Lawrence v. Florida, U.S. 127 S.Ct. at 1085 ("Attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the post-conviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel").*fn3
In this case, the applicable limitations provision is § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner's judgment of conviction was filed on September 15, 1982. (Pet. ¶ 2.b.) The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the conviction on January 31, 1986, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on May 20, 1986. (Id. ¶ 9.d & g.); State v. Camilo, 104 N.J. 397 (1986) (table). Because the conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA on April 24, 1996, the one-year limitations period began on April 24, 1996. See Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2003); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 2001); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). Absent statutory or equitable tolling, the limitations period ran for 365 days and expired on April 23, 1997. Id.
According to the facts set forth in the Petition, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). He filed his first state petition for post-conviction relief in 1992, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on January 27, 1994, before the one-year statute of limitations began to run on April 24, 1996. See State v. Camilo, 135 N.J. 304 (1994) (table). Thus, the first post-conviction petition did not equitably toll the limitations period, which had not yet begun. Because Petitioner did not file his second state petition for post-conviction relief until 2003, over five years after the one-year statute of limitations expired on
April 23, 1997, there was no statutory tolling of the limitations period.*fn4 Unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the Petition would appear to be time barred.
The Court will give Petitioner an opportunity to file a written response showing why the Petition should not be summarily dismissed as time barred. See United States v. Bendolph, 409
F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (federal court hearing habeas petition has power to raise limitations period sua sponte).
Based on the foregoing, the Court orders Petitioner to show why the Petition should not be summarily dismissed as time barred.