Source: https://openjurist.org/240/f3d/174/melody-edwardsen-phillips-v-saratoga-harness-racing-inc
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 12:53:15
Document Index: 758587232

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1166', '§ 1166', '§ 1166', '§ 1166', '§ 1166', '§ 1166', '§ 1163', '§ 1163']

240 F3d 174 Melody Edwardsen Phillips v. Saratoga Harness Racing Inc | OpenJurist
240 F. 3d 174 - Melody Edwardsen Phillips v. Saratoga Harness Racing Inc
240 F3d 174 Melody Edwardsen Phillips v. Saratoga Harness Racing Inc
240 F.3d 174 (2nd Cir. 2001)
MELODY EDWARDSEN PHILLIPS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
SARATOGA HARNESS RACING, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Docket No. 00-7518
The district court was surely correct here when it wrote, "[i]n the realm of ERISA suits... the factual setting for this case may even pass as sensational and riveting." Phillips v. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 127, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(3). The employee's notice to the employer then obligates the employer to notify the beneficiary being terminated. COBRA states:
29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4)(B).
What little case law exists on the subject points to this conclusion.2 Commenting on the notice requirements of COBRA, the Eighth Circuit wrote, "[u]nder COBRA, if the notice of the divorce is given to the employer by the covered employee, the plan administrator is required to provide the qualified beneficiary with notice of her rights to continue coverage." Lincoln Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Nebraska, 963 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4)(B)); see also Zemko v. Muntz Industries, Inc., No. 94 C 761, 1997 WL 158318, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1997) ("Upon receiving such notification [of a qualifying event] from the covered employee, the administrator must notify the qualified beneficiary of the right to elect continuation coverage." (emphasis added) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4)(B)). The unifying thread running through the cited cases is the notion that the notice of a qualifying event is the dispositive factor in determining whether an employer's COBRA obligations have attached.
This interpretation is entirely consistent with the portions of COBRA detailing the respective notice requirements of the covered employee and the employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1166. COBRA requires that, "the administrator shall notify... in the case of [a divorce] where the covered employee notifies the administrator..., any qualified beneficiary with respect to such event, of such beneficiary's rights under this subsection." 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Once one unwinds the convoluted syntax, it is clear an employer's obligation to tell the beneficiary of his rights to continuation coverage is triggered when the covered employee notifies the administrator that the divorce has been granted.
This interpretation makes practical sense as well. A cursory examination of § 1163 reveals that whether or not a "qualifying event" has occurred (such as a "divorce or legal separation"; "becoming entitled to benefits under title XVIII of the Social Security Act"; or "[a] dependent child ceasing to be a dependent child") often requires a legal determination. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(3)-(5). Employers are rarely competent to make these legal determinations. Mindful of the Supreme Court's warning that "interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available," Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982), we conclude that public policy is best served by relieving health plan administrators of the responsibility for making legal judgments.