Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150219_0000179.WPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-02-25 05:27:22
Document Index: 60719288

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3161', '§ 472', '§ 3161', '§ 161', '§3161', '§ 3161']

| United States v. Espin
United States v. Espin
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.VIRGILIO F. ESPIN, Defendant
Pending before the Court is the United States' Motion to Set Trial Date [ECF#30]. By way of this Motion, the government requests that this Court: (1) enter an order setting a trial date at the earliest possible date and (2) enter an order excluding, from the calculation of the running of the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.) the period of time "from Defendant's arrest on October 8, 2014 on charges in Florida, up to and including February 9, 2015, the date of his next appearance in the Western District of Florida. Motion, pp. 2-3.
Defendant Virgilio Espin was indicted in this Court for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 472 and 2 on May 23, 2014. He was arrested in the Southern District of Florida, where he resides, on July 28, 2014 and on July 29, 2014 he appeared before a magistrate judge in the Southern District of Florida ("S.D. Fla."), who released him on bond.
Defendant originally was scheduled to be arraigned in this Court on August 21, 2014. A Superseding Indictment was filed against him on August 12, 2014. Defendant's arraignment was rescheduled to August 20, 2014. On that date, Defendant waived his personal appearance at the arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty, and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions to October 6, 2014, which was granted by Magistrate Judge Eddy. At the time Magistrate Judge Eddy granted the motion, she also ordered that the extension of time caused by the continuance was deemed to be excludable delay under the Speedy Trial Act: "[specifically, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant to a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(a), since, for the reasons stated in defendant's motion, the failure to grant such a continuance would deny counsel for the defendant reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence 18U.S.C. § 161(h)(7)(B)(iv)." August 20, 2014 Order, p. 2 [ECF #21].
No pre-trial motions were filed by Defendant or the United States by Oct. 6, 2014. On October 8, 2014, Defendant was arrested in Florida on state drug charges and appeared before a state court judge on the charges.[1]
On October 15, 2014, the United States Pretrial Services Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania filed a "Petition for Action on Conditions of Pretrial Release" ("the Petition") [ECF #26]. In the Petition, the Pretrial Services Office stated that: (1) "[o]n October 8, 2014, the defendant was arrested in Broward County Florida and charged with Delivery of Cannabis and Unlawful Use of a Communication Device. A preliminary hearing in this matter, captioned at 14-238938, is pending at this time." The Petition further stated "[t]he defendant is currently in custody at the Broward County Jail" and requested that the Court order "an arrest warrant be issued and lodged as a detainer in the Broward County Jail pending a bond revocation hearing before the court." On October 20, 2014, the Court so ordered [ECF #28] and on October 21, 2014, a Warrant for Arrest was issued by this Court [ECF #29].
It does not appear that the Warrant for Arrest was lodged as a detainer in the Broward County Jail. Instead, the USMS in Florida arrested Defendant at his home on December 16, 2014 and he appeared before a magistrate judge in the Southern District of Florida on December 18, 2104. Defendant was again released on bond and told to report to this Court for an initial appearance on January 12, 2015.
This Court was not informed that Defendant had been arrested in Florida, appeared before the federal court in the Southern District of Florida, and released on bond. It also was not informed that the court in the Southern District of Florida had told Defendant to appear before this Court on January 12, 2015 for an initial appearance.
An initial appearance was never scheduled in this Court. In the days prior to January 12, 2015, the Court was notified by one of the attorneys in this case of the need to schedule a hearing on the Petition. On January 12, 2015, the Court ordered that a hearing on the Petition be held on February 9, 2015. Defendant appeared on February 9, 2015 as ordered, the hearing on the Petition was held and this Court determined that it was not going to revoke Defendant's bond.
First, to the extent the Government moves for an Order setting a trial date at the earliest possible date, we will grant its request.
Turning next to its motion for an Order excluding, from the calculation of the running of the Speedy Trial Act (18U.S.C.§3161et seq.) the period of time "from Defendant's arrest on October 8, 2014 on charges in Florida, up to and including February 9, 2015, the date of his next appearance in the Western District of Florida, we will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.
The Speedy Trial Act provides that "[i]n any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). There are certain "periods of delay" which "shall be ...