Source: https://m.openjurist.org/684/f2d/1020/kenosha-auto-transport-corporation-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 14:30:51
Document Index: 124356138

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10922', '§ 10922', '§ 10101', '§ 307', '§ 10922', '§ 10922', '§ 10101']

684 F2d 1020 Kenosha Auto Transport Corporation v. United States | OpenJurist
684 F. 2d 1020 - Kenosha Auto Transport Corporation v. United States
684 F2d 1020 Kenosha Auto Transport Corporation v. United States
684 F.2d 1020
221 U.S.App.D.C. 498
KENOSHA AUTO TRANSPORT CORPORATION and Boat Transit, Inc., Petitioners,
Recreational Products Transport, Inc. of Mendon, Ma., Intervenor.
No. 81-1368.
C. The Hearing on the Application
An important preliminary determination is that of which law governs in this case. Recreational's application was filed on April 17, 1979, at a time when the old law, 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (Supp. III 1979),11 was in effect. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.L.No.96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) became effective on July 1, 1980.12 The hearing by the ALJ began on July 8, 1980 and his decision (App. 231-37.) was rendered on October 10, 1980.
The question might be raised of which law this court should apply upon review. Courts of appeal generally apply the law in force at the time of their decisions. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 387, 95 S.Ct. 533, 538, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975); Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412, 414, 92 S.Ct. 574, 575, 30 L.Ed.2d 567 (1972); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 201, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 281-82, 89 S.Ct. 518, 525-526, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969); United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602, 604, 80 S.Ct. 924, 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 982 (1960). In many instances this might produce a different result, but not so here because the Commission in 1979 was already interpreting the old law in a manner that essentially comported with and certainly foreshadowed the standards adopted in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. The statutory entry standards contained in the new law were less rigorous than even the liberalized entry standards the Commission had been applying under the old law.
H.R.Rep.No.1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) (hereinafter House Report ).
For some time it has been recognized that today's thriving trucking industry no longer requires the protection from competition that was warranted in earlier years. In fact, the courts in P. C. White Truck Line, Inc. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 1326 (D.C.Cir.1977), and in Trans-American Van Service, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.Supp. 308 (N.D.Tex.1976), stated that "the Commission was required to consider '... the contribution that increased competition might make to the public weal.' P. C. White, supra, 551 F.2d at 1329." 44 Fed.Reg. 60297 (Oct. 19, 1979). All this brought about Ex Parte No. MC-121, 44 Fed.Reg. 60296-60300 (Oct. 19, 1979); and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.L.No.96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980); with its new "Motor Carrier Entry Policy," 94 Stat. 794-796, see 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922 (1982 Supp.); its change in the National Transportation Policy concerning motor carriers, 94 Stat. 794, see 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101(a) (1982 Supp.); and its removal of certain restrictions, 94 Stat. 796-797. See generally House Report, supra at 12-17.
S.Rep.No.641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980) (hereinafter Senate Report ). It thus seems clear that the Policy Statement in Ex Parte No. MC-121 was endorsed by Congress when it passed the 1980 Act.13
B. The House Committee Report
(T)he Committee does not intend to restrict the Commission in which factors it can consider in determining whether the proposed service is responsive to a public demand or need. These factors include the following: a need or demand for new services, innovative quality or price options, increased competition, greater fuel efficiency, improved service for small communities, improved opportunities for minorities, and any other benefits that would serve a useful public purpose. This is consistent with the Commission's consideration of the National Transportation Policy, including any of the applicable factors listed in section 10101(a)(7)(A) through (H).
Under new section 10922(b)(1), once the applicant has made a prima facie showing that the proposed service would serve a useful public purpose, the burden of proof would shift to persons opposing issuance of the certificate to show that the proposed service is inconsistent with the public convenience and necessity. In other words, it creates a presumption that the grant of the application is consistent with the public convenience and necessity if the applicant demonstrates that the proposed service will serve a useful public purpose.
Similarly, when an applicant for a certificate seeks new authority to provide transportation to many localities in a large geographical area, we have not traditionally required that it demonstrate a specific need for service to each point. There is no requirement that data on public need and benefit be gathered for every village and hamlet in the area of proposed operations before a certificate of such encompassing scope be awarded. May Trucking Co. v. United States, 593 F.2d 1349, 1353 (D.C.Cir.1979). See also Miller Transporters, Inc. v. United States, 594 F.2d 463, 466-467 (5th Cir. 1979). All that is required is that applicant submit evidence which is sufficiently representative of the transportation needs of the shipping public in the relevant market to enable us to make an informed determination of the public interest in a given case.
The Commission's grant of nationwide authority was also grounded on the ALJ's determination that the protestants "failed to demonstrate a justification for any regulatory protection from any competition likely to emanate from the applicant's operations." (App. 236.) It is on this point of the impact of competition on existing service-which is closely tied to eased entry-that the Commission's position had most significantly changed in interpreting the old law-even before Ex Parte No. MC-121 was formally adopted. The Commission and the courts were interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act to encourage new competition in the trucking industry before Recreational filed its application for common carrier authority. This court in May Trucking Co. v. United States, 593 F.2d 1349, 1356 (D.C.Cir.1979), stated that "(i)njury to existing carriers through competition becomes relevant only when there is corresponding injury to the public. Congress designed the Interstate Commerce Act to benefit the people, not to create protected monopolies for those who profess to serve the public." We further observed in May that the loss of customers which is frequently associated with competition ordinarily serves to promote rather than injure the public interest. Id. Relying upon our statements in May, the ALJ here specifically found that the protestants had not shown "that diversion of traffic or revenues from protestants operations would amount to injury to the public." (App. 236.) We have found no evidence in the record that would cause us to dispute that finding.
49 U.S.C. § 307 (1976) was revised and recodified as part of the Act of October 17, 1978, Pub.L.No.95-473, § 10922, 92 Stat. 1409 (1978). The recodified provision stated:
49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(b)(1)-(2) (1982 Supp.) (emphasis added).
49 U.S.C.A. § 10101(a)(7) (1982 Supp.).