Source: http://la.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20171121_0001410.ELA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-12-18 22:29:44
Document Index: 84718095

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 504', '§ 504', '§ 504', '§ 5', '§ 12132', '§ 504', '§ 504', '§ 35', '§ 504', '§ 12133', '§ 12132', '§ 12133', '§ 12133', '§ 1', '§ 12111', '§ 12182', '§12132']

AMENDED ORDER AND REASONS [1]
LANCE M. AFRICK, UNITED STA'TES DISTRICT JUDGE
When Nelson and Lazaro Arce decided to challenge the Louisiana criminal justice system's treatment of the deaf, the Court doubts that they anticipated having to navigate through two of the murkiest waters in American law: federalism and separation of powers. Yet this case raises weighty questions about the federal government's authority to endow private citizens with the power to haul a State into federal court without its consent, and about the powers of executive branch agencies to authoritatively interpret federal statutes-and thus requires nothing less than a deep plunge into both pools.
The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“Louisiana”), moves for dismissal of Lazaro Arce's claims against it on the ground that neither Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“Title II”) nor § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504”) provides a cause of action based on associational discrimination.[2] Louisiana also requests dismissal of plaintiffs' Title II claim on behalf of Nelson as barred by sovereign immunity-a request that the Court construes as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.[3] See Cantu Serv., Inc. v. Roberie, 535 Fed. App'x 342, 346 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs oppose both moves.[4]
According to plaintiffs, Nelson Arce (“Nelson”) was a deaf individual whose “express, preferred, and most effective means of communication” was American Sign Language (“ASL”).[5] Nelson's proficiency in written English was allegedly “limited.”[6]Lazaro Arce (“Lazaro”) is Nelson's father.[7]
On February 9, 2015, Judge Michael Mentz of the Twenty Fourth Judicial District Court in Jefferson Parish[8] sentenced Nelson to two years of active probation and two years of inactive probation for a drug-related offense.[9] As a condition of his probation, Judge Mentz ordered Nelson to enter and complete a Louisiana-approved in-house substance abuse treatment program, and required Nelson to meet regularly with his probation officer.[10]
Plaintiffs allege that Nelson's probation officer was aware that Nelson required a sign language interpreter to effectively communicate, but never provided an ASL interpreter during her meetings with Nelson.[11] Despite Nelson and Lazaro's alleged “repeated requests” for a qualified interpreter-one who could translate legal terminology and concepts[12]-the probation officer relied on Lazaro to interpret for Nelson.[13]
Because his probation officer did not provide a qualified interpreter at their meetings, Nelson was allegedly unaware of the full terms and conditions of his probation. Thus, he did not know that “leaving [Louisiana] to attend drug treatment as ordered by [Judge Mentz] was a violation of his probation.”[14]
When Nelson's probation officer learned that Nelson had enrolled in a California-based in-patient drug treatment program, she filed a motion to revoke Nelson's probation.[15] Judge Mentz granted the motion and sentenced Nelson to 90 days in the Jefferson Parish Correction Center (“JPCC”).[16] Nelson was then incarcerated at JPCC from December 8, 2015, until March 7, 2016, during which time JPCC inmates were allegedly entitled to two thirty-minute telephone conversations per day.[17] JPCC did not have video phones, but did have a teletypewriter (“TTY”), [18]which is a device that enables deaf individuals to communicate by telephone.[19]
According to plaintiffs, JPCC officials either denied Nelson access to the TTY machine or provided him access only once per day on a number of occasions.[20] All the while, other JPCC inmates regularly received two thirty-minute telephone conversations per day.[21]
Further, JPCC officials allegedly penalized Nelson twice during his incarceration for violating the rules contained in “The Inmate Handbook” (“Handbook”), which details the behavioral expectations for inmates incarcerated at JPCC.[22] Despite an alleged request by Lazaro that a qualified interpreter communicate the Handbook's contents to Nelson in ASL, Nelson never received an ASL interpretation of the Handbook and thus did not understand the Handbook's rules and regulations.[23] Plaintiffs allege that Nelson never learned which rule he violated on one of the occasions that he was punished.[24]
Nelson was released from JPCC on March 7, 2016, and resumed meeting with his probation officer.[25] Nelson's probation officer continued to attempt to communicate with Nelson either through Lazaro's interpretations or written English.[26] The probation officer allegedly suggested that it was Nelson's responsibility to secure a qualified interpreter for their meetings if he wanted one.[27]
In response to these events, Nelson and Lazaro brought this lawsuit against numerous defendants, including Louisiana, alleging violations of Title II and § 504, and seeking both injunctive relief and money damages. Since Nelson and Lazaro's initiation of the case, the Court has dismissed the claims against Jefferson Parish, [28]as well as the claims for injunctive relief.[29] Moreover, in light of Nelson's death on May 9, 2017, [30] the Court permitted Ana Christine Shelton (“Shelton”) to be substituted in Nelson's place in her capacity as the natural tutrix of Nelson's two surviving minor children and as the administratrix of Nelson's estate.[31]
Louisiana moves for dismissal of plaintiffs' Title II claims on the basis of sovereign immunity.[32] Moreover, Louisiana moves for judgment on the pleadings as to all of Lazaro's claims.[33]
Sovereign immunity operates as “a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power.” Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). However, unlike other aspects of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity is waivable: “a State may consent to suit against it in federal court.”[34] Id. at 99.
In addition, Congress may abrogate State sovereign immunity when exercising at least some of its constitutional powers. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress has the power to abrogate State sovereign immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); but see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that Congress does not have the power to abrogate State sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause). Abrogation requires “an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to ‘overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.'” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. “A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985), superseded by An Act to Extend and Improve the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 (1986). If Congress wants to subject the several States to federal jurisdiction, then “it must do so specifically.”[35] Id.
Thus, a court first subjects a plaintiff's allegations to the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Id. at 498. Where the allegations state a claim under Title II, but not under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court must then consider whether Congress's abrogation of State sovereign immunity in a particular case exhibits “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”[36] City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997); see also Wells v. Thaler, 460 Fed. App'x 303, 311 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
The Court will first consider “which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II.”[37] Hale, 642 F.3d at 498 (quoting Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a general matter, a viable Title II requires a plaintiff to allege “(1) that he has a qualifying disability; (2) that he is being denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such discrimination is by reason of his disability.” Id. at 499; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
As far as which aspects of Louisiana's alleged conduct toward Nelson violated Title II for purposes of the Georgia analysis, the parties are in unison: the decision by Nelson's probation officer not to procure the services of a qualified ASL interpreter for her meetings with Nelson.[38] When it comes to which aspects of Louisiana's alleged conduct toward Lazaro violated Title II, however, the parties could not be farther apart.
Lazaro-who is not deaf or otherwise alleged to have a “qualifying disability”- offers a theory of Title II (and § 504) liability based on the concept of associational discrimination. In a nutshell, Lazaro alleges that Louisiana discriminated against him on the basis of his association with Nelson and because of Nelson's “qualifying disability.”[39]
For its part, Louisiana argues that Title II (and § 504) does not permit associational discrimination claims, relying almost exclusively on a recent opinion out of the Northern District of Georgia.[40] Acknowledging that a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General to implement Title II recognizes such claims, [41]see 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g), Louisiana contends that the regulation is unlawful.[42]Finally, in the alternative, Louisiana argues that Lazaro has failed to state a claim of associational discrimination against Louisiana under Title II (or § 504).[43]
Where, as here, an executive agency's regulation interpreting a federal statute is called into question, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to analyze the interpretation's permissibility through the lens of what may amount to administrative law's most consequential-and controversial[44]-doctrine: Chevron.
Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), a court confronts two questions when reviewing an agency's regulation implementing a statute that it administers.[45] 467 U.S. at 842. “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43.
Title II further provides that its “remedies, procedures, and rights” are available to “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of” Title II's nondiscrimination provision. Id. § 12133. Of course, only discrimination by a public entity against a “qualified individual with a disability” may result in a violation of said provision. Id. § 12132; see Lightbourn v. Cty. of El Paso, Tex., 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1997) (interpreting Title II's nondiscrimination provision to require Title II plaintiffs to demonstrate, among other things, “that they are qualified individuals within the meaning of” Title II). Thus, a nondisabled person-who is textually foreclosed from personally experiencing a form of discrimination that violates Title II's nondiscrimination provision-would seem equally foreclosed from pursuing Title II's “remedies, procedures, and rights.”[46] 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
Notwithstanding, a number of circuits have interpreted Title II to permit at least some organizations (or their operators) that experience discrimination by public entities due to their association with “qualifying individual[s] with a disability” to seek redress under Title II. See Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 47 (2d. Cir. 1997) (concluding that a drug- and alcohol-rehabilitation treatment center has standing to sue under Title II), recognized as superseded on other grounds, Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001); Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405-07 (3rd Cir. 2005) (same for the operator of a methadone clinic); A Helping Hand, 515 F.3d at 363 (same for the operator of a methadone clinic); see also MX Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 2002) (adopting the relevant reasoning in Innovative Health as “persuasive” in the context of an entity seeking to open a methadone clinic). In reaching this conclusion, these courts-like plaintiffs[47]-hone in on the phrase “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, ” with a particular emphasis on “any person.” 42 U.S.C. § 12133; see also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person' and ‘whoever' include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals . . . .”).
Looking beyond the four corners of Title II's text, some circuits have also considered Title II's legislative history as relevant to interpreting the statute's scope. See, e.g., Innovative Health, 117 F.3d at 47; A Helping Hand, 515 F.3d at 364. This nontextual evidence suggests that at least some of the legislators involved in drafting Title II intended that Title II cover all forms of discrimination prohibited under Titles I and III of the ADA. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), at 84 (May 15, 1990). Titles I and III's nondiscrimination provision-both of which prohibit discrimination against individuals “on the basis of disability, ” as opposed to individuals “with a disability”- each explicitly prohibit discrimination by association.[48] See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a), (b)(4) (Title I); id. § 12182(a), (b)(1)(E) (Title III); cf. Id. §12132 (Title II).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;That is because &ldquo;Congress has instructed courts that &lsquo;nothing in [the ADA] shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V [i.e., &sect; 504] of the Rehabilitation Act . . . or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.&#39;&rdquo; Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C. &sect; 12201(a)) (alterations in original). Thus, &ldquo;the ADA actually prohibits courts from construing Title II to apply a lesser standard than&rdquo; &sect; 504 and regulations promulgated to implement it. Id. at 228 (emphasis added). If &sect; 504 permits individual associational discrimination claims, then Title II must also permit such claims, the plain text of Title II notwithstanding.[49]Cf. ...