Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95440/philippides-vs-day
Timestamp: 2016-12-07 20:58:32
Document Index: 359408567

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 34', '§ 34', '§ 19', '§ 34', '§ 25', '§ 25', '§ 34', '§ 14', '§ 28', '§ 15', '§ 34', '§ 14']

Philippides Vs Day - Citation 95440 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Philippides Vs. Day - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/95440CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-23-1931Case Number283 U.S. 48AppellantPhilippidesRespondentDayExcerpt:.....and after a hearing was ordered to be deported to greece on the ground that he had remained in the united states for a longer time than permitted under the immigration act of 1924 or the regulations made under it. he is a native of greece, shipped from that country as a seaman, and arrived at new york on september 10, 1925, when he deserted, and has remained in this country ever since -- that is, for more than three years before the arrest. he sued out a writ of habeas corpus, setting up the immigration act of february 5, 1917, c. 29, § 34, 39 stat. 874, 896, as a statute of limitations entitling him to remain. the writ was ordered to be dismissed by the district court and the order was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit. 37 f.2d 1015, citing
united..... Judgment:
Philippides v. Day - 283 U.S. 48 (1931)
An alien who arrived in this country as a seaman after the effective date of the Immigration Act of 1924, and deserted, and who remained here longer than permitted by the regulations under that Act, may be deported after, as well as within, the three years after entry. P.
283 U. S. 50
The petitioner was arrested in New York on December 19, 1928, and after a hearing was ordered to be deported to Greece on the ground that he had remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted under the Immigration Act of 1924 or the regulations made under it. He is a native of Greece, shipped from that country as a seaman, and arrived at New York on September 10, 1925, when he deserted, and has remained in this country ever since -- that is, for more than three years before the arrest. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus, setting up the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, § 34, 39 Stat. 874, 896, as a statute of limitations entitling him to remain. The writ was ordered to be dismissed by the district court and the order was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 37 F.2d 1015, citing
United States ex rel. Piccolella v. Commissioner of Immigration,
36 F.2d 1022, which in turn cites
United States ex rel. Rios v. Day,
24 F.2d 654. A contrary decision was reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Carr, Director of Immigration v. Zaja,
37 F.2d 1016, and writs of certiorari were granted by this Court.
is to be deported in the same manner as provided for in §§ 19, 20, of the Immigration Act of 1917. It is argued elaborately for the petitioner and is conceded by the government, that § 34 of the earlier act is not repealed by the later one.
§ 25 of the latter. For the purposes of this case, we may assume this to be true, and that, in accordance with this § 25, the earlier Act § 34 is in force, if not inapplicable. But we cannot accept the conclusion that deserting alien seamen are thereby made a favored class to be retained in this country when other aliens would be compelled to leave. "Any alien" in § 14 of the Act of 1924 includes alien seamen on its face and by the definition in § 28,
It is obvious that the petitioner, whether he entered rightfully or wrongfully, remained in the United States longer than he was permitted to by the law. He deserted after the Act of 1924 was in effect. The regulations under §§ 15 and 19 of the Act of 1924 allowed only sixty days to alien seamen permitted to enter. If he entered without permission, he was not entitled to more. It seems to us too clear to need argument that the limitation of three years in § 34 of the Act of 1917 does not override or qualify the clear and definite terms of § 14 of the Act of 1924. Those terms must prevail.
Zurbrick v. Trafficoff,
38 F.2d 811;
United States ex rel. Cateches v. Day,
45 F.2d 142.