Source: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dalehite_v._United_States/Opinion_of_the_Court
Timestamp: 2014-03-10 23:01:59
Document Index: 702733302

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 831', '§ 831', 'art 401', '§ 1651', '§ 1651', '§ 1651', '§ 1651', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2674', '§ 2674', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 2680', '§ 2680']

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Dalehite v. United States/Opinion of the Court
< Dalehite v. United States
Dalehite v. United States by Stanley Forman Reed
908842Dalehite v. United States — Opinion of the CourtStanley Forman Reed
Argued: April 6, 7 and 8, 1953. --- Decided: June 8, 1953
The suits were filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2678, 2680, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-2678, 2680. That Act waived sovereign immunity from suit for certain specified torts of federal employees. It did not assure injured persons damages for all injuries caused by such employees.
Suing under this grant of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs claimed negligence, substantially on the part of the entire body of federal officials and employees involved in a program of production of the material-Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate (FGAN hereafter)-in which the original fire occurred and which exploded. This fertilizer had been produced and distributed at the instance, according to the specifications and under the control of the United States.
The adaptability of the material for use in agriculture had been recognized long prior to 1947. The Government's interest in the matter began in 1943 when the TVA, acting under its statutory delegation to undertake experiments and 'manufacture' fertilizer, 48 Stat. 61, 16 U.S.C. § 831d, 16 U.S.C.A. § 831d first began production for commercial purposes. [1] TVA used plaint facilities formerly used for production of ammonium nitrate for explosives. In the year 1943, the War Production Board, responsible for the production and allocation of war materials, Exec. Order 9024, January 16, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg. 329, U.S.Code Cong.Service, 1942, p. 49, instituted a program of yearly production of 30,000 tons a month of FGAN for private domestic agricultural use through plants no longer required for ammunition production. Administration was to be carried on through the Army's Bureau of Ordnance. The TVA specifications were followed and advice given by its experts. This early production for domestic use furnished a test for manufacture and utility of FGAN.
The particular FGAN involved at Texas City came to be produced for foreign use for these reasons: Following the World War II hostilities, the United States' obligations as an occupying power, [2] and the danger of internal unrest, forced this Government to deal with the problem of feeding the populations of Germany, Japan and Korea. Direct shipment of foodstuffs was impractical; available fertilizer was in short supply, and requirements from the United States were estimated at about 800,000 tons. However, some 15 ordnance plants had been deactivated and turned over to the War Assets Administration, 44 CFR, Part 401, for disposal. Under-Secretary of War Royall suggested in May of 1946, and Secretary Patterson agreed, that these be used for production of fertilizer needed for export. [3] The Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 58 Stat. 785, 50 U.S.C.App. § 1651 et seq. (1944 ed.) § 1651(c), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1651 et seq., 1651(c), acting under the power delegated by the President in Exec.Order 9347, May 27, 1943, 8 Fed.Reg. 7207, U.S.Code Cong.Service, 1943, p. 5-48, and Exec.Order 9488, October 3, 1944, 9 Fed.Reg. 12145, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1651 note, ordered the plants into operation. Cabinet approval followed. The War Department allocated funds from its appropriations for 'Supplies' and 'Military Posts' for 1946; direct appropriations for relief in the occupied areas were made by Congress in the following year. [4] The Army's Chief of Ordnance was delegated the responsibility for carrying out the plan, and was authorized particularly to enter into cost-plus fixed fees contracts with private companies for the operation of the plants' facilities. , he in turn appointed the Field Director of Ammunition Plants (FDAP) to administer the program. Thereafter the Department entered into a number of contracts with private firms including the du Pont Co. and Hercules Powder Co.-to 'operate the installations * * * described herein for the graining of ammonium nitrate (fertilizer grade),' but subjecting 'the work to be done by the Contractor * * * to the general supervision, direction, control and approval of the Contracting Officer.' A detailed set of specifications was drawn up and sent to each plant which included 'FDAP Specifications for Products' and a similar TVA paper. Army personnel were appointed for each plant. These were responsible for the application of these specifications, liaison with supply officials, and satisfaction of production schedules, pursuant to an Army Standard Operating Procedure. , beyond this, operations were controlled by the administering corporation which supplied the personnel and production experience required. [5]
By April 15, 1947, following three weeks warehouse storage at Texas City on orders of the French Council, some 1,850 tons of the FGAN thus resold had been loaded on the French Government-owned steamship Grandcamp, and some 1,000 tons on the privately-owned High Flyer by independent stevedores hired by the French. [6] The Grandcamp carried in addition a substantial cargo of explosives, and the High Flyer 2,000 tons of sulphur at the time. At about 8:15 a.m. of the next day smoke was sighted in the Grandcamp hold and all efforts to halt the fire were unavailing. [7] Both ships exploded and much of the city was leveled and many people killed.
Since no individual acts of negligence could be shown, the suits for damages that resulted necessarily predicated government liability on the participation of the United States in the manufacture and the transportation of FGAN. Following the disaster of course, no one could fail to be impressed with the blunt fact that FGAN would explode. In sum petitioners charged that the Federal Government had brought liability on itself for the catastrophe by using a material in fertilizer which had been used as an ingredient of explosives for so long that industry knowledge gave notice that other combinations of ammounium nitrate with other material might explode. The negligence charged was that the United States, without definitive investigation of FGAN properties, shipped or permitted shipment to a congested area without warning of the possibility of explosion under certain conditions. The District Court accepted this theory. His judgment was based on a series of findings of causal negligence which, for our purposes, can be roughly divided into three kinds-those which held that the Government had been careless in drafting and adopting the fertilizer export plan as a whole, those which found specific negligence in various phases of the manufacturing process and those which emphasized official dereliction of duty in failing to police the shipboard loading. The Court of Appeals en banc unanimously reversed, but since only three of the six judges explicitly rejected the bulk of these findings, we shall consider the case as one in which they come to us unimpaired. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498, 503, 71 S.Ct. 453, 456, 95 L.Ed. 479; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746. Even assuming their correctness arguendo, though, it is our judgment that they do not establish a case within the Act. [8] This is for the reason that as a matter of law the facts found cannot give the District Court jurisdiction of the cause under the Tort Claims Act.
I. The Federal Tort Claims Act was passed by the Seventy-ninth Congress in 1946 as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 60 Stat. 842, after nearly thirty years of congressional consideration. It was the offspring of a feeling that the Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work. And the private bill device was notoriously clumsy. [9] Some simplified recovery procedure for the mass of claims was imperative. This Act was Congress' solution, affording instead easy and simple access to the federal courts for torts within its scope. [10]
Earlier tort claims bills considered by Congress contained reservations from the abdication of sovereign immunity. Prior to 1942 these exceptions were couched in terms of specific spheres of federal activity, such as postal service, the activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the collection of taxes. [11] In 1942, however, the Seventy-seventh Congress drafted a two-fold elimination of claims based on the execution of a regulation or statute or on the exercise of a discretionary function. The language of the bills then introduced in both the House and Senate in fact, was identical with that of § 2680(a) as adopted. [12] The exception was drafted as a clarifying amendment to the House bill to assure protection for the Government against tort liability for errors in administration or in the exercise of discretionary functions. [13] An Assistant Attorney General, appearing before the Committee especially for that purpose, [14] explained it as avoiding 'any possibility that the act may be construed to authorize damage suits against the Government growing out of a legally authorized activity,' merely because 'the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious.' It was not 'intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort. The same holds true of other administrative action not of a regulatory nature, such as the expenditure of Federal Funds, the execution of a Federal project and the like.' [15] Referring to a prior bill which had not contained the 'discretionary function' exemption, the House Committee on the Judiciary was advised that 'the cases embraced within (the new) subsection would have been exempted from (the prior) bill by judicial construction. It is not probable that the courts would extend a Tort Claims Act into the realm of the validity of legislation or discretionary administrative action, but H.R. 6463 makes this specific.' [16]
The legislative history indicates that while Congress desired to waive the Government's immunity from actions for injuries to person and property occasioned by the tortious conduct of its agents acting within their scope of business, [17] it was not contemplated that the Government should be subject to liability arising from acts of a governmental nature or function. [18] Section 2680(a) draws this distinction. Uppermost in the collective mind of Congress were the ordinary common-law torts. [19] Of these, the example which is reiterated in the course of the repeated proposals for submitting the United States to tort liability, is 'negligence in the operation of vehicles.' [20] On the other hand the Committee's reports explain the boundaries of the sovereign immunity waived, as defined by this § 2680 exception, with one paragraph which appears time and again after 1942, and in the House Report of the Congress that adopted in § 2680(a) the limitation in the language proposed for the 77th Congress. [21] It was adopted by the Committee in almost the language of the Assistant Attorney General's explanation. This paragraph characterizes the general exemption as 'a highly important exception, intended to preclude any possibility that the bill might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of authorized activity, such as a flood control or irrigation project, where no negligence on the part of any government agent is shown, and the only ground for the suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious. * * * The bill is not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity of or provide a remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently performed and involving an abuse of discretion.'
II. Turning to the interpretation of the Act, our reasoning as to its applicability to this disaster starts from the accepted jurisprudential principle that no action lies against the United States unless the legislature has authorized it. [22] The language of the Act makes the United States liable 'respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances'. 28 U.S.C. § 2674, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674. This statute is another example of the progressive relaxation by legislative enactments of the rigor of the immunity rule. Through such statutes that change the law, organized government expresses the social purposes that motivate its legislation. Of course, these modifications are entitled to a construction that will accomplish their aim, [23] that is, one that will carry out the legislative purpose of allowing suits against the Government for negligence with due regard for the statutory exceptions to that policy. In interpreting the exceptions to the generality of the grant, courts include only those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception. [24] They cannot do less since petitioners obtain their 'right to sue from Congress (and they) necessarily must take (that right) subject to such restrictions as have been imposed.' Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 251, 60 S.Ct. 488, 493, 84 L.Ed. 724.
So, our decisions have interpreted the Acr to require clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity to give jurisdiction for tort actions. [25] Where jurisdiction was clear, though, we have allowed recovery despite arguable procedural objections. [26]
One only need read § 2680 in its entirety to conclude that Congress exercised care to protect the Government from claims, however negligently caused, that affected the governmental functions. Negligence in administering the Alien Property Act, or establishing a quarantine, assault, libel, fiscal operations, etc., were barred. An analysis of § 2680(a), the exception with which we are concerned, emphasizes the congressional purpose to except the acts here charged as negligence from the authorization to sue. [27] It will be noted from the form of the section, see 346 U.S. 18, 73 S.Ct. 959, supra, that there are two phrases describing the excepted acts of government employees. The first deals with acts or omissions of government employees, exercising due care in carrying out statutes or regulations whether valid or not. It bars tests by tort action of the legality of statutes and regulations. The second is applicable in this case. It excepts acts of discretion in the performance of governmental functions or duty 'whether or not the discretion involved be abused.' Not only agencies of government are covered but all employees exercising discretion. [28] It is clear that the just-quoted clause as to abuse connotes both negligence and wrongful acts in the exercise of the discretion because the Act itself covers only 'negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee', 'within the scope of his office' 'where the United States, if a private person, would be liable'. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b). The exercise of discretion could not be abused without negligence or a wrongful act. The Committee reports, note 19, supra, show this. They say § 2680(a) is to preclude action for 'abuse of discretionary authority-whether or not negligence is alleged to have been involved.' They speak of excepting a 'remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently performed and involving an abuse of discretion.' [29]
So we know that the draftsmen did not intend it to relieve the Government from liability for such common-law torts as an automobile collision caused by the negligence of an employee, see 346 U.S. 28, 73 S.Ct. 964, supra, of the administering agency. We know it was intended to cover more than the administration of a statute or regulation because it appears disjunctively in the second phrase of the section. The 'discretion' protected by the section is not that of the judge-a power to decide within the limits of positive rules of law subject to judicial review. It is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law. [30]
It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where discretion ends. It is enough to hold, as we do, that the 'discretionary function or duty' that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. [31] Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when a subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal step, each action or nonaction being directed by the superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion. [32]
We turn, therefore, to the specific acts of negligence charged in the manufacture. Each was in accordance with, and done under, specifications and directions as to how the FGAN was produced at the plants. The basic 'Plan' was drafted by the office of the Field Director of Ammunitions Plants in June, 1946, prior to beginning production. [33] It was drawn up in the light of prior experience by private enterprise and the TVA. In fact it was, as we have pointed out, based on the latter agency's engineering techniques, and specifically adopted the TVA process description and specifications. [34] This Plan was distributed to the various plants at the inception of the program.
Besides its general condemnation of the manufacture of FGAN, the District Court cited four specific acts of negligence in manufacture. [35] Each of these acts looked upon as negligence was directed by this Plan. Applicable excepts follow. Bagging temperature was fixed. [36] The type of bagging [37] and the labeling thereof [38] were also established. The PRP coating, too, was included in the specifications. [39] The acts found to have been negligence were thus performed under the direction of a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation of plan-making authority from the apex of the Executive Department. The establishment of this Plan, delegated to the Field Director's Office, supra, 346 U.S. 20, 73 S.Ct. 960, clearly required the exercise of expert judgment.
And, assuming that high bagging temperatures in fact obtained as the District Court found, the decision to bag at the temperature fixed was also within the exception. Maximum bagging temperatures were first established under the TVA specifications. That they were the product of an exercise of judgment, requiring consideration of a vast spectrum of factors, including some which touched directly the feasibility of the fertilizer export program, is clear. For instance, it appears several times in the record that the question of bagging temperatures was discussed by