Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19980108_42103.NJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-09 02:05:07
Document Index: 602147689

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 11', '§ 23', '§ 9', '§ 102', '§ 804', '§ 74', '§ 74']

| Heuer v. Heuer
PATRICIA A. HEUER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,v.GILBERT J. HEUER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. On appeal from the Superior Court, Chancery Division.
Argued September 22, 1997 --
The historical context in which plaintiff sought the Alabama divorce is important. She sought a foreign divorce in 1968, which was approximately three years before the New Jersey Legislature enacted our no-fault divorce law, the Divorce Reform Act of 1971, L. 1971, c. 212, 2. Our Divorce Act prior to the 1971 amendments restricted the dissolution of marriage to three postnuptial causes: adultery, willful desertion for at least two years, and extreme cruelty. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2 to -3, since amended, L. 1971, c. 212, § 2, § 3; L. 1971, c. 217, § 11. The Divorce Reform Act of 1971 reduced the required time for desertion to one year, modified the nature of the proofs required, and added five additional grounds: eighteen months separation, voluntary habitual abuse of alcohol or any narcotic drug, twenty-four or more consecutive months of institutionalization for mental illness, imprisonment for eighteen or more consecutive months, and "[d]eviant sexual conduct voluntarily performed by the defendant without the consent of the plaintiff." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2.
Plaintiff's statement that she sought an Alabama divorce because it was too difficult to readily obtain one in New Jersey is reflective of the strict legislative policy at the time. The policy was so strict that the Legislature directed that if an inhabitant of this State obtained a divorce or an annulment in another state or country based on a cause that occurred in New Jersey, or for a cause that was not cognizable in New Jersey, such a judgment would be accorded no force or effect in this State. L. 1948, c. 320, § 23, p. 1290-91; repealed by L. 1971, c. 212, § 9. That strict policy was implemented through our decisions. Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J. 531, 535-36 (1949); Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 118 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 287 (1964); State v. Najjar, 1 N.J. Super. 208, 212-14 (App. Div.), aff'd, 2 N.J. 208 (1949). Thus, the type of foreign divorce that plaintiff thought she obtained prior to 1971 was deemed offensive to our public policy and statute at that time. Full faith and credit need not be accorded a judgment of another jurisdiction when the court issuing the judgment lacked the jurisdictional prerequisite of domicile. Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 391-92 (1951); Peff v. Peff, 2 N.J. 513, 521-22 (1949). Furthermore, only a putative judgment was obtained in Alabama. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 102, 110 (1971).
Notwithstanding the legislative policy that predated the Divorce Reform Act of 1971, it would be "an overstatement to imply that courts even under prior laws were insensitive to equitable concerns or did not, within the constraints of the matrimonial statutes, conscientiously undertake to balance the equities as between parties." Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 91 (1979). Although the Divorce Reform Act of 1971 has virtually eliminated the need for residents of New Jersey to seek foreign divorces, those amendments have not addressed the human and legal problems that would result if those ancient foreign divorces are found to be invalid many years later. Consequently, our decision in this case is informed by the liberalization of our laws governing the dissolution of marriage and equitable principles that have moved to the forefront in the last twenty-six years.
In the present case, it is virtually undisputed that plaintiff's first divorce was invalid independent of the domiciliary question. The Alabama Judge who signed the divorce decree was later indicted for granting fraudulent divorces. *fn1 Furthermore, defendant produced a record of a search for the years 1960 through 1969 by the Alabama Department of Public Health, Center for Health Statistics, Office of Vital Records, which uncovered no record of divorce for Kenneth and Patricia McDougall. For those reasons, even if plaintiff had been properly domiciled in Alabama, the decree would be invalid. Indeed, plaintiff concedes, based on the scandals concerning divorces at the time she procured her divorce, she may have been the victim of fraud. She denies, however, that she knowingly participated in a fraud. Assuming the trial court is correct in holding that the Alabama divorce was fraudulently issued, or that our now repealed nullifying statute was applicable to plaintiff's purported 1968 Alabama divorce, the real question is whether defendant should be estopped from denying the validity of his marriage to plaintiff.
Defendant's arguments implicate both the law of divorces and of annulments. We have recognized that irrespective of the factual context in which the issue may arise, the last of two or more marriages is presumptively valid. The presumption of validity may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there was a prior marriage, (2) the prior marriage was valid, and (3) the prior marriage was not terminated by death or divorce before the latest marriage. [Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 538 (1982).]
"The related presumption in favor of the validity of prior divorces is akin to estoppel to deny the validity of a prior divorce. Kazin v. Kazin, supra, 81 N.J. at 96. Both principles recognize the reality of the increasing rate of divorce and remarriage. The law no longer insists on confining people in the grave of a dead marriage. Id. at 98. Modern matrimonial law has relaxed the requirement for divorce and granted greater freedom to individuals in the pursuit of marital happiness." [Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 538.]
Justice Handler's Concurring opinion in Newburgh expanded on that notion when he observed that "[f]airness and equity may demand that, after the passage of so many years and the absence of any showing of knowingly wrongful conduct on the procuring party's part, such long-settled matters should now be beyond attack." Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 550-51 (Handler, J., Concurring). Principles of equity must be applied in light of the totality of the circumstances.
The social and legal problems caused by the so-called "quickie" foreign divorces are not new. Nearly half a century ago, this Court in Tonti held that although a wife's Mexican divorce from a previous spouse was void, the later husband was not entitled to challenge that divorce because he had known of the circumstances under which the divorce was procured. Tonti, supra, 1 N.J. at 536. Nevertheless, the Court denied the wife's claim for alimony and support because she failed to prove the validity of her present marriage. The results in that case were driven by legislative nullification of such extraterritorial divorces. After the Divorce Reform Act of 1971 was adopted, this Court rejected the underpinning for Tonti in Kazin, supra, 81 N.J. at 92. The decision in Kazin was substantially influenced by the fact that by that time the Legislature had essentially overruled Tonti because "[t]he previous statute negating foreign divorces based on jurisdictional and substantive grounds inconsistent with our own . . . [had been] repealed." Ibid.
Although the presumption of validity and estoppel are closely related, we decline to apply the presumption of validity standard in this case. Based on the special facts in this case, that approach does not adequately address the consequences of a successful, belated attack on an ancient foreign divorce decree such as the putative decree involved here. Since that putative decree was issued, there have been two marriages and the birth of at least one child. Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that she would not willingly commit bigamy, a violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:92-1, repealed and replaced by N.J.S.A. 2C:24-1, or illegitimatize her children, Sparks v. Ross, 72 N.J. Eq. 762, 765 (Ch. Div. 1907), aff'd, 75 N.J. Eq. 550, 552 (E & A 1909). In a case such as this, claims for alimony and equitable distribution must of necessity be decided based on the facts and principles of equity. The standard for determining the legal effect of a successful attack on an ancient divorce should also be resolved by application of equitable principles that focus on the actual conduct of the parties. We believe that approach is conducive toward reaching the fair, sound, and correct Disposition. Consequently, we adopt the equitable doctrine of estoppel to determine the legal effect of a successful attack on an ancient divorce. In all other respects, we reaffirm Newburgh.
". . .`the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed . . . as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse . . . .'" [Highway Trailer Co. v. Donna Motor Lines, Inc., 46 N.J. 442, 449, cert. denied sub nom., Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Highway Trailer Co., 385 U.S. 834, 87 S. Ct. 77, 17 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1966) (quoting 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 804 (5th ed. 1941)).]
The doctrine is "designed to prevent a party's disavowal of previous conduct if such repudiation `would not be responsive to the demands of Justice and good conscience'." Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979) (quoting West Jersey Title, etc. Co. v. Industrial Trust Co., 27 N.J. 144, 153 (1958)).
There are two basic forms of estoppel. "True estoppel" is used to define the situation in which "`one party induces another to rely to his [or her] damage upon certain representations.'" Kazin, supra, 81 N.J. at 94 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 74, cmt. b (1971)). "Quasi-estoppel" describes a situation in which "an individual is not permitted to `blow both hot and cold,' taking a position inconsistent with prior conduct, if this would injure another, regardless of whether that person has actually relied thereon." Ibid. (quoting Brown v. Brown, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238, 244-45 (Ct. App. 1969)).
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 74 (1971), relied on by this Court in Kazin, is helpful in deciding when to invoke the doctrine. It provides: "A person may be precluded from attacking the validity of a foreign divorce decree if, under the circumstances, it would be inequitable for him to do so." One of the comments to that rule explains that "[s]uch inequity may exist when action has been taken in reliance on the divorce or expectations are based on it or when the attack on the divorce is inconsistent with the earlier conduct of the attacking party." Id. at cmt. b. Thus, the Restatement embraces both "true estoppel" and "quasi-estoppel." "Estoppel may arise by silence or omission where one is under a duty to speak or act." Carlsen, supra, 80 N.J. at 341. The party seeking to invoke the doctrine has the burden of proving that the other party should be estopped. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 541; Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J. Super. 584, 593 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 6 N.J. 1 (1950).
In the field of matrimonial jurisprudence, the doctrine of unclean hands may be considered simultaneously with estoppel to help ensure Justice and to protect the integrity of the courts. Untermann v. Untermann, 19 N.J. 507, 517 (1955). The equitable maxim "[a party] who comes into equity must be with clean hands" has limitations.
It does not repel all sinners from courts of equity, nor does it apply to every unconscientious act or inequitable conduct on the part of the complainants. The inequity which deprives a suitor of a right to Justice in a court of equity is not general iniquitous conduct unconnected with the act of the defendant which the complaining party states as his ground or cause of action; but it must be evil practice or wrong conduct in the particular matter or transaction in respect to which judicial protection or redress is sought. [Neubeck v. Neubeck, 94 N.J. Eq. 167, 170 (E & A 1922).]
That maxim is discretionary on the part of a court. "It is the effect of the inequitable conduct on the total transaction which is determinative whether the maxim shall or shall not be applied." Untermann, supra, 19 N.J. at 518. "Equities arise and stem from facts which call for relief from the strict legal effects of given situations." Ibid. The record in this case discloses no basis to apply the maxim to plaintiff. She acted in good faith when she sought an Alabama divorce, when she married defendant, and when she consented to his adoption of her daughter.
Defendant's assertion that his marriage to plaintiff is invalid is totally inconsistent with cohabiting together as husband and wife for an extended period. He seeks to injure plaintiff by depriving her of alimony and equitable distribution under the statutory scheme set forth at N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. As the Court observed in Newburgh, "[u]nder certain circumstances, one who enters into and accepts the benefits of a marriage may be equitably estopped" from later denying its validity. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 539. This is a case in which quasi-estoppel applies, and it does not require proof that defendant somehow participated in the Alabama proceedings.
The trial court accepted, as it was obligated to do, that defendant was aware of plaintiff's divorce from Kenneth McDougall at the time of their marriage in 1984. Plaintiff and defendant participated in a ceremonial marriage and cohabited together until December 1994, according to plaintiff. They built a house together, and defendant adopted plaintiff's daughter from her second marriage in 1993, some seven years after he learned of the Alabama divorce in 1987. At no time did defendant either suggest that plaintiff should take any additional action respecting the putative Alabama divorce, or seek to legally attack his marriage to plaintiff prior to filing an answer and counterclaim to plaintiff's complaint in 1995. He continued in the relationship as husband and wife for over seven years after, by his own admission, he knew about the Alabama proceedings without questioning the validity of the putative Alabama divorce. "Matrimonial suits . . . ought not be permitted to take on the aspects of a game wherein wits . . . and finesse prevail over elemental right and Justice." Shepherd v. Ward, 5 N.J. 92, 111 (1950). Thus, in the eyes of the world, they were husband and wife financially, socially, and legally for purposes of alimony, equitable distribution, and marital torts.
The attack on the validity of the marriage is for the sole purpose of avoiding alimony and equitable distribution under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and decisional law interpreting that statute. In other words, defendant seeks to use the invalidity of the putative Alabama decree to injure plaintiff financially. His current position is inconsistent with his prior indifference while holding himself out to the world as plaintiff's husband. Under principles of quasi-estoppel, defendant cannot be permitted to blow both hot and cold. Raspa v. Raspa, 207 N.J. Super. 371, 381 (Ch. Div. 1985). There is no evidential material showing that plaintiff was anything but a victim of fraud in the Alabama proceedings. She retained the services of an Alabama attorney, *fn2 and she gave sworn testimony before a Judge in Alabama in what appeared to her to have been a courtroom.
Factors to be considered when determining whether quasi-estoppel has been satisfied are: (1) the length of time the parties were married, (2) the acts undertaken by the parties that indicate they held themselves out as husband and wife, and (3) the good faith of the party who procured the first divorce. Here, the parties had been married for twelve years before the validity of the marriage was challenged, and only then was it challenged in defense to plaintiff's divorce complaint. They held themselves out to the public as husband and wife for at least eleven years preceding the filing of the complaint. Plaintiff was financially dependent on defendant.
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly precluded spouses from obtaining annulments by invoking invalid divorces they did not help to procure and did not know were defective at the time of their marriage. See Poor v. Poor, 409 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1980); Zirkalos v. Zirkalos, 40 N.W.2d 313 (Mich. 1949); Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 590 A.2d 297 (Pa. 1991). Those decisions support our Disposition that a spouse may not annul a marriage by invoking an invalid foreign divorce after becoming aware of that foreign divorce and yet continuing to live together as husband and wife for a number of years. Defendant cannot be allowed to disavow his actions over eleven years if he knew about the Alabama proceedings when he married plaintiff, or for the eight to nine years beginning in 1987. Either period satisfies the standard we here articulate.