Source: https://www.profinfo.pl/sklep/panstwo-i-prawo,7255,r,2018,nr,5.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-15 13:08:58
Document Index: 797295241

Matched Legal Cases: ['de lege ferenda', 'de lege ferenda', 'de lege ferenda', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 10', 'Art. 173']

Państwo i Prawo - Nr 5/2018 [867] (Druk, PDF) - Profinfo.pl
Kod towaru: PIP-6500 201805
TREŚĆ ZESZYTU 5/2018 „PAŃSTWA I PRAWA”
Dr Krzysztof Kaleta, Uniwersytet Warszawski
Legitymizacja sądownictwa konstytucyjnego w świetle teorii demokracji | str. 3
Dr hab. Monika Florczak-Wątor, Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie
Co wymaga zmiany w procedurze wyboru sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w Polsce? | str. 22
Prof. dr hab. Anna Młynarska-Sobaczewska, Instytut
Prof. dr hab. Anna Młynarska-Sobaczewska, Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Wybór sędziów konstytucyjnych jako element legitymizacji sądu konstytucyjnego | str. 43
Dr Tomasz Warczok, Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. KEN w Krakowie
Sakralizacja i profanacja. Trybunał Konstytucyjny jako struktura mityczna | str. 63
Mgr Łukasz Bojarski, Warszawa
Pod społeczną kontrolą. Dziesięć lat Obywatelskiego Monitoringu Kandydatów na sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego | str. 75
Dr Damian Tokarczyk, Uniwersytet Warszawski
Sprawstwo pośrednie de lege ferenda | str. 92
Dr hab. Witold Płowiec, Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Konstytucyjne standardy procedury wyboru sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego | str. 104
DEBATY PAŃSTWA I PRAWA
Prawne i pozaprawne uwarunkowania obsady składu personalnego sądów konstytucyjnych w wybranych państwach europejskich (Jakub Karczewski) | str. 120
Populizm penalny, red. Jan Widacki (rec. Monika Płatek) | str. 127
Vittoria Barsotti, Paolo G. Carozza, Marta Cartabia, Andrea Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context (rec. Anna Michalak) | str. 130
Glosa do wyroku WSA w Poznaniu z 8.03.2017 r., II SA/Po 1034/16 (oczywista niekonstytucyjność jako przesłanka odmowy stosowania ustawy przez sąd) | str. 132
BIBLIOGRAFIA PRAWNICZA | str. 141
Legitimacy of constitutional review in the context of theories of democracy
La justice constitutionnelle et la théorie de démocratie
Monika Florczak-Wątor, Maciej Pach
What needs to change in the procedure of election
What needs to change in the procedure of election of Constitutional Tribunal justices in Poland?
Qu’est-ce qu’il faut changer dans la procédure d’élection des juges de Tribunal constitutionnel en Pologne?
Constitutional Judges appointing as legitimating factor of constitutional courts
L’élection des juges constitutionnels en tant qu’un élément de la légitimité de la cour constitutionnelle
Hanna Dębska, Tomasz Warczok
Sacralisation and profanation. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal as a mythical structure
La sacralisation et la profanation. Le Tribunal constitutionnel en tant qu’une structure mythique
Under social control. Ten years of the Civic Monitoring of Candidates for Justices of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal
Sous le contrôle sociale. Dix ans du Monitoring civique des candidats à la fonction des juges de Tribunal constitutionnel
Indirect agency: what the law should be?
La perpétration indirecte de lege ferenda
ANALYSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL CASE LAW - ANALYSE DE LA JURISPRUDENCE DU TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTIONNEL
The constitutional standards in the election of Polish Constitutional Tribunal justices
Les standards constitutionnels de la procédure d’élection des juges du Tribunal constitutionnel
„STATE AND LAW” DEBATES – DEBATS DE « L’ETAT ET LE DROIT »
Legal and non-legal conditions of the personnel composition of constitutional courts in selected European countries
Les conditions légales et extra-légales d’élection des juges des cours constitutionnelles dans les états européens choisis (Jakub Karczewski)
Criminal populism,
Le populisme pénal, éd. Jan Widacki (Monika Płatek)
Vittoria Barsotti, Paolo G. Carozza, Marta Cartabia, Andrea Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context,
La justice constitutionnelle italienne dans le contexte global (Anna Michalak)
This paper discusses the issue of legitimacy of constitutional review in a constitutional democracy. The author deliberates the role of a constitutional court in three models of democracy: procedural democracy (founded on the majority rule and primacy of public autonomy), substantive democracy (based on protection of substantial values related to private autonomy) and deliberative democracy (accentuating close interaction between public and private autonomy, as well as the role of discourse in determining the meaning of constitutional principles). According to this author, substantive theories of democracy - which presume a strong position of the constitutional court – are usually underpinned by a certain form of moral realism within the meaning of fundamental rights and constitutional values. Procedural and deliberative concepts are closer to a constructivist approach. Proponents of procedural theories prefer informal (non-legalistic) reasoning conducted within the representative bodies in the matter of fundamental rights. At the same time, the explicit affirmation of the majority rule expressed within procedural theories stems from the assumption that consensus is impossible in axiological disputes– which is an assumption contrary to the one expressed by proponents of deliberative theories. The latter are distinguished by the assumption that formulating a democratic will is not based either on the majority rule or on conformity with a priori principles, but on complex social interactions aimed at transforming preferences through discourse.
The article provides an analysis of the current legal provisions regulating the election of Constitutional Tribunal justices in Poland. According to the authors, in principle, the constitutional regulation does not need to be amended, perhaps apart from a clarification of the condition that justices should be elected from ‘amongst persons distinguished by their knowledge of the law’, especially by underlining that this condition encompasses also broad knowledge of the constitutional law. Nevertheless, the basic problems result from the drawbacks of the Act on the Status of Justices of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Standing Orders of the Sejm. As the authors demonstrate, the key elements of the election procedure should be regulated by the statute and not by the Standing Orders of the Sejm. Their de lege ferenda postulates concerning the election of constitutional justices in Poland include: four years of prohibition of standing as a candidate for election to the Constitutional Tribunal for persons who held political functions and for members of political parties, an establishment of the mechanism of preselection or selection of candidates and of the obligation to announce a bid for a seat in the Constitutional Tribunal at least three or four months before the term of office of the predecessor expires. The implementation of these ideas would strengthen the prestige of the Constitutional Tribunal.
The article discusses the assumptions relating to the legitimizing function of the election of constitutional court justices; in particular due to vesting them with a democratic mandate granted by the parliament or other political bodies (the president). These assumptions are inherently inconsistent with the assumption of the most professional competencies and impartiality of constitutional court justices. The article proposes an alternative way of seeking the legitimacy of constitutional court’s status and activities - by the court’s participation in the deliberations relating to public values and public reasons.
The aim of this article is to present the processes related to Poland’s recent constitutional crises. More specifically, it outlines the problem of delegitimisation of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. To achieve this, the authors distance themselves from the narrow legal approaches that focus on the analysis of the legal status and emphasise the symbolic dimension of social practices, including legal practices. From this perspective, the article shows how the position of the Constitutional Tribunal has already changed in the structure of discourse. It also proves that this change brings a considerable damage to its social legitimacy. The presented findings show that the legal order is just as much an institutional order, as it is an order of – emotionally and morally saturated – symbols.
Since 2006, a coalition of civil society organizations (the „Coalition”) has monitored the Parliament’s elections of justices of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The Coalition representatives believe that elections to one of the key public bodies in Poland should not take place without civic scrutiny, that the public has the right to know the candidates’ ethical and professional qualifications. However, in reality the selection procedures that would guarantee that have not been established, the information about the candidates is often very limited, the time between the nomination and the appointment has in practice been extremely short (even a few days, or just one day in two cases), which does not permit either holding a public debate or making an informed choice between them. The article presents the activities undertaken by the Coalition to advance an informed, fair, and transparent election process. It describes the lessons learned, the general findings, and recommendations. These activities are divided into two categories: monitoring of the official parliamentary proceedings in the election process and own activities, including independent research, collection and publication of information about the candidates, organising public hearings of the candidates.
This paper is an attempt to reopen the discussion about the need to introduce into the Polish legal order the conception of indirect agency. The introduction into the 1969 Penal Code and then to the 1997 Penal Code of forms of agency other than perpetrating an act (directing and recommending), which are close to indirect agency, while extending the notion of individual agency to cover only the perpetration of a criminal act with the participation of another person, who, however, does not have an arrangement with the perpetrator, makes one question the coherence of Art. 18 of the Penal Code. Supplementing the formal and objective view of individual agency with elements known from the theory of control over the act make it a vital need to consider the need to remodel the provisions of Chapter II PC towards modifying the assumptions of the theory of participation. Moreover, it is necessary because Polish criminal law scholars and case law have rejected the basic tenets of the so-called Polish theory of forms of participation in an offence, developed by J. Makarewicz.
In its existing case law, the Constitutional Tribunal has not provided an overall concept of the constitutional standards in the election of the Tribunal justices, because it has only been able to decide on those elements of the procedure that have been challenged.
Recreating the constitutional standards in the election of the Tribunal justices, the Tribunal took into account the principles that define the position of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in the system of government: the principle of separation of powers, and checks and balances between them (Art. 10 of the Constitution) and their cooperation (Preamble to the Constitution), and the principle of the Tribunal’s autonomy and independence from other authorities (Art. 173 of the Constitution).
The Tribunal has so far referred to 1) the requirements for candidates for justices; 2) the deadline for submitting candidates for justices and the entities authorized to submit these candidates in the context of the chapter regulating the selection of justices between the statute and the Standing Orders of the Sejm; 3) the Parliament’s obligation to choose a justice in the same term in which a post is vacated; 4) the obligation to take an oath before the President and the deadline by which the oath has to be taken in the context of the President’s involvement in the election of justices; 5) the beginning of the term of office of a justice of the Constitutional Tribunal.