Source: http://www.maw-law.com/author/marie-andreemaw-law-com/
Timestamp: 2017-09-24 10:06:37
Document Index: 761114293

Matched Legal Cases: ['CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', '§ 79', '§ 80', '§ 68', '§ 68', '§ 41', '§ 45', '§ 32', '§ 43', '§ 32', '§ 34', '§ 53', 'CJEU ', '§ 51', '§ 57', '§ 58', '§ 60', '§ 65', '§ 86', '§ 88', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', '§ 47', 'CJEU ', '§ 51', 'CJEU ', '§ 52', 'CJEU ', '§ 52', 'CJEU ']

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August 18, 2017 · by marie-andree@maw-law.com ·
Prince has been the defendant in several high profile cases in the Second Circuit (see here and here). He famously won the Second Circuit Cariou v. Prince case (see here), where the Court of Appeals found that Prince’s use of Patrick Cariou’s photographs to create his thirty paintings and collages featured in his Canal Zone exhibition was fair use, as it was transformative. Photographer Donald Graham filed a copyright infringement suit against Prince in 2016 (see here and here), claiming that Prince’s use without permission of Graham’s Rastafarian Smoking a Joint photograph, to create an Untitled (Portrait) featured in Prince’s New Portraits exhibition, was copyright infringement. Prince claims it is fair use.
Judge Stein noted that, because the fair use defense is fact-related, discovery will be necessary to conduct the fair use inquiry. Therefore, the case cannot be dismissed and will have to go forward. Judge Stein quoted the Second Circuit in Cariou v. Prince, which stated that finding whether a particular use is fair or not requires “an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry.”
Prince used Graham’s work almost in its entirety, when he printed and exhibited the original work as originally cropped and posted on Instagram, without Graham’s permission, by another Instagram user, then reposted by yet another user and finally reposted by Prince on his own Instagram account. Prince added the nonsensical comment “ReCanal Zinian da lam jam,” followed by an emoji. Is this add-on enough to make Prince’s work transformative enough to be found fair use?
Prince argued that the use was transformative as it added new messages such as “a commentary on the power of social media to broadly disseminate others work, an endorsement of social media’s ability to generate[ ] discussion of art,”or a “condemnation of the vanity of social media.”
Judge Stein was not convinced, finding “evident” that Prince’s work is not “so aesthetically different”from the original work and thus not transformative enough. Untitled (Portrait) does not manifest “an entirely different aesthetic” from the original work, as required under Cariou. Unlike the works featured in the Canal Zone exhibition, Untitled (Portrait) does not render the original work, according to Judge Stein, “barely recognizable” as Princes works did in Cariou.
“[t]he primary image in both works is the photograph itself… Untitled simply reproduces the entirety of Graham’s photograph – with some de minimis cropping – “ in the frame of an Instagram post, along with a cryptic comment written by Prince… There is no question that, notwithstanding Prince’s additions, Graham’s unobstructed and unaltered photograph is the dominant image in Untitled.”
Judge Stein concluded that “[b]ecause Prince’s Untitled is not transformative as a matter of law, the Court cannot determine on a motion to dismiss that a “reasonable viewer” would conclude that Prince’s alterations imbued the original work “with new expression, meaning, or message,” quoting the U.S. Supreme Court Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music 1994 case.
Given Prince’s use of essentially the entirety of Grahamâ’s photograph, defendants will not be able to establish that Untitled is a transformative work without substantial evidentiary support. This evidence may include art criticism, such as the articles accompanying defendant’s briefing, which the Court may not consider in the context of this motion.”
Image is courtesy of Gryffindor under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license.
Filed Under: Fair Use · Tagged: Art Law, Fair Use, Prince
August 8, 2017 · by marie-andree@maw-law.com ·
New York State has a statutory right to publicity, New York Civil Rights Law 50 and 51. It protects the right of publicity of a “person, firm or corporation” in order to prevent “uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade”of “the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person.”
Assembly Bill A08155, introduced on May 31, 2017, proposed to establish a right of publicity for both living and deceased individuals. It also proposed that an individual’s name, voice, signature and likeness would be a freely transferable and descendible personal property, making the right of publicity a property right more than a privacy right, as it is now.
Readers of the blog may remember that Lindsay Lohan claimed that flashing the V sign was part of her persona and was thus protected by New York right of publicity law. She was unsuccessful as the scope of New York’s ight of publicity law is narrow.
The bill would have considerably expanded the scope of the law, as it would have also have protected the â€œlikenessâ€ of an individual, which it defined as â€œan image, digital replica, photograph, painting, sketching, model, diagram, or other recognizable representation of an individual’s face or body, and includes a characteristic.â€
The bill defined the â€œcharacteristic” of an individual as â€œa distinctive appearance, gesture or manne “ So, Lindsay Lohan’s V sign could arguably be protected would the bill been enacted.
The geographic scope of the statute would also have been considerably extended. The bill would have protected the right of publicity of a deceased individual, for forty years after the death of the individual, and this”regardless of whether the law of the domicile, residence or citizenship of the individual at the time of death or otherwise recognizes a similar or identical property right.” This could be interpreted as meaning that the law would have applied to virtually anyone in the world.
The bill considered the likeness to be personal property, freely transferable
“A living or deceased individual’s name, voice, signature and likeness, individually and collectively known as his or her right of publicity, is personal property, freely transferable or descendible, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of any trust or testamentary instrument.”
If an individual would have transferred his right of publicity, there could have been a risk of losing control over the use of one’s likeness, even for unsavory use, unless the contract transferring such rights would have been carefully written to protect the individual against such occurrence. One can imagine that a young, talented and beautiful, but nevertheless impecunious individual could have signed up his right of publicity in exchange for money badly needed at the time. Â
New York State, unlike California, does not recognize that deceased individuals have a right to publicity and the bill would have provided such right. The bill detailed at length how such right would have vested to the heirs, whether by will or, in the absence of a will, under the laws of intestate succession. The bill also specified that the rights thus inherited could have been â€œfreely transferable or descendible by any subsequent owner of the deceased individual’s right to publicity.”
Such rights would not have “render[d] invalid or unenforceable any contract entered into by a deceased individual during his or her lifetime by which the deceased individual assigned the rights, in whole or in part, to use his or her right of publicity.”
“used in connection with news, public affairs or sports broadcast, including the promotion of and advertising for a public affairs or sports broadcast, an account of public interest or a political campaign;a play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, visual work, work of art, audiovisual work, radio or television program if it is fictional or nonfictional entertainment, or a dramatic, literary or musical work; a work of political, public interest or newsworthy value including a comment, criticism, parody, satire or a transformative creation of a work of authorship; or an advertisement or commercial announcement for any [news, public affairs or sports broadcast, including the promotion of and advertising for a public affairs or sports broadcast, an account of public interest or a political campaign].
The Authors Guild expressed its â€œgrave concernsâ€ about the bill, in a letter to three members of the New York legislature, as it â€œhas the potential to cause great harm to our society’s knowledge-base and to stifle speech, as it would make it difficult for authors to write without restraint about public figures, who may threaten to file a right of publicity suit to stifle speech critical of them.
A work thus exempted “that includes a commercial use and replicates the professional performance or activities rendered by an individual” would not have been exempt “where the replication is inextricably intertwined with the right of publicity of such individual,”subject, however, to the First Amendment and section eight of article one of the New York state constitution protecting freedom of expression. What does”inextricably intertwined” mean? Your guess is as good as mine…
Owners or employees of any medium used for advertising which would have published or disseminated an individual’s right of publicity would not have been liable unless established that â€œthey knew the unauthorized use was prohibited by [the New York statutory right of publicity]. Would owners and employees only benefited from this immunity if they did not know the use to be unauthorized and that such unauthorized use was prohibited by law, or would the knowledge that the use was unauthorized been enough? It is difficult to say.
Image of eggs is courtesy of Flickr user Karen Roe under aÂ CC BY 2.0 license.
Filed Under: New York Law, Right of Publicity, Uncategorized · Tagged: New York Right of Publicity, Right of Publicity
La rénumération d’un gérant d’une société à responsabilité limitée est due tant qu’aucune décision la révoquant n’est intervenue.
July 2, 2017 · by marie-andree@maw-law.com ·
Un associé et co-gérant d’une société d’exercice libéral à responsabilité limitée (Selarl) de médecins avait cédé ses parts en septembre 2006 à la Selarl et cessé son activité médicale dans cette Selarl. Notons qu’une Selarl est une Sarl (société à responsabilité limitée). L’ancien associé assigna la Selarl en paiement des indemnités de gérance perçues par ses coassociés en janvier et février 2006, soit 8.000 euros chacun. La Selarl fut condamnée par le tribunal de grande instance de Brest à payer 12.000 euros à l’ancien associé, qui fut néanmoins débouté de sa demande de prise en charge des cotisations sociales …read more
Filed Under: Cyber High and Law ·
Is Adidas too Agressive At Enforcing its Trademarks?
June 30, 2017 · by marie-andree@maw-law.com ·
The scope of the three-stripe trademark
What exactly do the Adidas trademarks protect? Are all three stripes claimed by Adidas under the trademark? Are all stripes on shoes and clothing, regardless of the number of stripes, claimed by Adidas?
A need to police the mark
These cease and desist letters illustrate what trademark owner must do to avoid losing their rights through failure to control use. Section 45 of the Trademark Act states that a mark is abandoned when “any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to… lose its significance as a mark.” This includes failing to adequately police the mark against third-party use. Also, the three-stripe mark is famous, thus making trademark dilution another concern for Adidas. In fact, even just the appearance of dilution is a concern, since trademark owners only need to prove a likelihood of dilution, not actual dilution, after the enactment of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. Adidas does not want its three stripes to strike out. But is it the general public which ends up losing?
This post has been first published on the TTLF Newsletter on Transatlantic Antitrust and IPR Developments published by the Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum
Filed Under: Trademark, TTLF Newsletter, Uncategorized · Tagged: Fashion Law, trademarks
June 25, 2017 · by marie-andree@maw-law.com ·
The European Union law and the French law of comparative advertising
Article 6 of Directive 2005/29 defines a misleading commercial action as one which “contains false information and is therefore untruthful or in any way… deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer… or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.” Article 2(b) of Directive 2006/114/EC defines “misleading advertising” as “any advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the persons to whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and which, by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect their economic behavior or which, for those reasons injures or is likely to injure a competitor.”
Article 4 of Directive 2006/114/EC allows comparative advertising if it is not misleading, Article 4(a), and if it “objectively compares one or more material, relevant, verifiable and representative features of those goods and services, which may include price,” Article 4(c). Similarly, French law authorizes comparative advertising if it is not misleading or likely to deceive, Article L. 121-8 of the Consumer Code, in force when the suit against Carrefour was filed.[1] Both articles recite the termsof Directive 2006/114/EC.
Is comparative advertising only legal if it compares prices of products sold in shops of similar sizes?
The CJEU synthesized the questions of the Paris Court of Appeals as: whether Article 4(a) and 4(c) must be interpreted as saying that an advertisement comparing the prices of products sold in shops of different sizes is unlawful?
The information of the difference in shops ‘sizes and format must be clear
Such advertising is misleading unless the customer is informed that the prices compared concerns shops of different sizes and formats (at 36). Such information must “clearly” provided, in the advertisement itself (at 38).
[1] Article L. 121-8 of the Consumer Code has since been abrogated and replaced, without any changes, by Article L. 122-1 of the Consumer Code.
Filed Under: Antitrust, EU Antitrust, TTLF Newsletter ·
Paris Court of Appeals: Photograph of Jimi Hendrix is original and thus protected by French copyright
June 23, 2017 · by marie-andree@maw-law.com ·
The Paris Court of appeals has just published a decision which should be of interest to photographers anxious to defend their rights in France.
The Paris civil lower court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) had found in May 2015 that a photograph of Jimi Hendrix taken in February 1967 by British photographer Gered Mankowitz was not protected by French copyright (droit d’auteur) because it was not an original work of art. The court reasoned that the photographer had not shown which elements of the work protected by copyright were an imprint of his personality (traduire sa personnalité).
The photograph at stake represents Jimi Hendrix, facing the photographer, eyes slightly closed, arms crossed in front of the body, exhaling cigarette smoke. It was chosen by a French e-cigarette company to be featured in its advertising campaign, inside its two stores and online, without seeking permission of the author or the owner of the copyright, Bowstir Ltd, the company to which Mr. Mankowitz had assigned his patrimonial rights to the photography. Both filed suit in France. Bowstir claimed copyright infringement and Mr. Mankowitz claimed droit moral infringement, but they lost because they had not been able to prove, according to the Paris lower court, that the photograph was original enough.
The Court was not convinced that the photographer had indeed explained “who is the author of the choices relating to the pose of the subject, his costume and his general attitude.” For the Tribunal de Grande Instance, there was “nothing to enable the judge and the defendants to understand whether these elements, which are essential criteria in appreciating the original characteristics being claimed, the framing, the black and white, the clear décor meant to highlight the subject, and the lighting which is banal for [such a portrait photograph], are the fruit of a reflection of the author of the photograph or of his subject, and whether the work bears the imprint of the personality of Mr. Gered Mankowitz or Jimi Hendrix.”
The Tribunal de Grande Instance had cited at length the European Court of Justice Eva Maria P. v. Standard Verlags GmbH case:
“As stated in recital 17 in the preamble to Directive 93/98, an intellectual creation is an author’s own if it reflects the author’s personality. That is the case if the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices… As regards a portrait photograph, the photographer can make free and creative choices in several ways and at various points in its production. In the preparation phase, the photographer can choose the background, the subject’s pose and the lighting. When taking a portrait photograph, he can choose the framing, the angle of view and the atmosphere created. Finally, when selecting the snapshot, the photographer may choose from a variety of developing techniques the one he wishes to adopt or, where appropriate, use computer software. By making those various choices, the author of a portrait photograph can stamp the work created with his ‘personal touch’. Consequently, as regards a portrait photograph, the freedom available to the author to exercise his creative abilities will not necessarily be minor or even non-existent.”
On June 13, 2017, the Paris Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Mr. Mankowitz, finding that the Jimi Hendrix photograph was indeed protected by copyright.
The Paris Court of Appeals did not spend much time explaining why the photograph is indeed original and thus protected by the droit d’auteur.
“…the appellants argue that it was Mr. Mankowitz who organized the session at which the photograph in question was taken… who guided and directed Jimi Hendrix during the shooting, and asked him to take the pose reproduced in the photograph in question; they indicate that Mr. Mankowitz chose to take the photograph in black and white in order to give him more attitude and give him the image of a serious musician and that the photographer opted for a Hasselblad camera 500c with a 50mm Distagon lens in order to bring a wide-angle touch to the portrait without creating any distortion; they also state that Mr. Mankowitz chose the decor, the lighting, the angle of view and the frame…
That these elements, added to the fact, uncontested and established by evidence, that Mr. Mankowitz, an internationally recognized photographer, notably for having been the photographer of the Rolling Stones, whose photographs enjoy a high reputation, establish that the photograph at stake is the result of free and creative choices made by the photographer which reflect the expression of his personality.”
Take – away: photographers defending their copyright in France should be ready to provide the court with a description of their creative process.
Filed Under: Copyright ·
April 7, 2017 · by marie-andree@maw-law.com ·
Readers of this blog may remember that this case is about whether cheerleading uniforms can be protected by copyright. Both parties are creating and selling cheerleading uniforms. Varsity Brands has registered some 200 copyrights for two-dimensional designs appearing on the surface of their uniforms and other garments. It sued Star Athletica for copyright infringement, claiming that its competitor had copied five of its designs protected by copyright. The Western District Court of Tennessee granted summary judgment to Star Athletica, reasoning the designs could not be protectable by copyright, as they could not be separated from the utilitarian function of the uniforms. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding Varsity’s designs to be copyrightable graphic works. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The second part of the new test requires that the design must be able to exist apart from the utilitarian aspect of the article, as its own pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work. If it can’t, then it is one of the useful article’s utilitarian aspects. Thus, the design itselfcannot be itself a useful article (p. 7).
R.I.P. conceptual separability test. Justice Thomas explains it is no longer needed, as “[c]onceptual separability applies if the feature physically could not be removed from the useful article… Because separability does not require the underlying useful article to remain, the physical-conceptual distinction is unnecessary” (p.15).
Filed Under: Copyright · Tagged: Conceptual Separability, Fashion Law, Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands
After Many Twists and Turns, the CJEU held that the Rubik’s Cube Trademark is Invalid
March 23, 2017 · by marie-andree@maw-law.com ·
The First Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held on 10 November 2016, that the famous Rubik’s cube cannot be registered as a three-dimensional trademark because its shape performs the technical function of the goods, a three-dimensional puzzle. The case is Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG v. EUIPO, C-30/15 P.
The validity of the Rubik’s cube trade mark was challenged by a competitor
British company Seven Towns Ltd., acting on behalf of Rubik’s Brand Ltd., filed in April 1996 an application for registration of a Community trade mark at the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM), now named the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), for a three-dimensional sign, the famous Rubik’s cube. The mark was registered in April 1999 and renewed in November 2006.
A few days later, competitor Simba Toys applied to have the trade mark declared invalid under Council Regulation 40/94, which has been repealed and was replaced by Council Regulation 207/2009. The CJEU considered the case to be still governed by Council Regulation 40/94. Articles 1 to 36 are the same in both Regulations, and so the case is relevant under current EU trademark law.
Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Council Regulation 40/94 prevents registration as a trademark of a sign, such as the Rubik’s cube product, “which consists exclusively of… the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result.” The CJEU had held in the 2002 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd. that a sign consisting exclusively of the shape of a product cannot be registered as a trademark if the essential functional features of the shape are attributable only to a technical result (Philips § 79 and § 80).
Simba Toys argued that the Rubik’s cube mark should be declared invalid under the grounds [absolute ground for refusal] that the mark is the shape of the goods necessary to achieve a technical result. According to Simba, the Rubik’s cube black lines are attributable to technical functions of the three-dimensional puzzle.
The OHIM dismissed Simba’s application for a declaration of invalidity and the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM affirmed the dismissal in September 2009, reasoning that the shape of the trade mark does not result from the nature of the Rubik’s cube itself. On 25 November 2014, the General Court dismissed the action for annulment as unfounded. Simba appealed to the CJEU.
What are the essential characteristics of the Rubik’s cube trade mark?
The essential characteristics of three-dimensional signs are the most important elements of the signs, Lego Juris v. OHIM, C-48/09, § 68 and 69. They must be properly identified by the competent trademark registration authority, Lego Juris v. Ohim § 68, which must then determine whether the essential characteristics all perform the technical function of the goods (General Court § 41). The General Court identified the essential characteristics of the Rubik’s cube trademark is a “cubic grid structure,” that is the cube itself and the grid structure appearing on each of its surfaces (General Court § 45). Simba did not challenge this finding on appeal at the CJEU.
Do the essential characteristics of Rubik’s cube perform the technical function of the goods?
Under Article 4 of Regulation 40/94 and Regulation 207/2009, any sign capable of being represented graphically can be a trade mark, unless, under article 7(1)(e)(ii) of both Regulations, the sign consists exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result.
Article 7(1) grounds for refusal to register a mark must be interpreted in light of the public interest underlying them. The public interest underlying Article 7(1)(e)(ii) is to prevent the use of trademark law to obtain a monopoly on technical solutions or the functional characteristics of a product (General Court § 32, citing Lego Juris v. OHIM, § 43). Advocate General Szpunar explained further in his Opinion that allowing such marks to be registered would give the registrant “an unfair competitive advantage” and thus trade mark law cannot be used “in order to perpetuate, indefinitely, exclusive rights relating to technical solutions” (AG Szpunar Opinion § 32 and § 34).
For the General Court, Article 7(1)(e)(ii) applies only if the essential characteristics of the mark perform the technical functions of the goods “and have been chosen to perform that function.” It does not apply if these characteristics are the result of that function (General Court § 53). Simba argued in front of the CJEU that the General Court erred in this interpretation of Article 7(1)(e)(ii).
Simba claimed that the black lines of the cube performed a technical function (General Court § 51). But the General Court found that an objective observer is not able to infer by looking at the graphic representation of the Rubik’s cube mark that the black lines are rotatable (General Court § 57). The General Court held that Simba’s “line of argument… [was] essentially based on knowledge of the rotating capability of the vertical and horizontal lattices of the Rubik’s cube. However, it [was] clear that that capability cannot result from the black lines in themselves or, more generally, from the grid structure which appears on each surface of the cube… but at most from [an invisible] mechanism internal to that cube” (General Court § 58). Therefore, the grid structure on each surface of the cube “d[id] not perform, or are not even suggestive of, any technical function” (General Court § 60). The General Court concluded that registering the Rubik’s cube shape did not create a monopoly on a technical solution and mechanical puzzles competitors could also incorporate movable or rotatable elements (General Court § 65).
But, for AG Szpunar, the General Court erred in its analysis as it should have taken into account the function of the Rubik’s cube, which is a three-dimensional puzzle consisting of movable elements. He noted that in both the Philips and the Lego Juris cases, the competent authorities had analyzed the shape of the goods using additional information other than the graphic representation (AG Szpunar Opinion § 86). While the competent authority does not have to concern itself with hidden characteristics, it must nevertheless analyze “the characteristics of the shape arising from the graphic representation from the point of view of the function of the goods concerned” (AG Szpunar Opinion § 88).
The CJEU followed its AG’s Opinion on this point and found that the General Court should have defined the technical function of the actual goods, namely, the three-dimensional puzzle, and it should have taken this into account when assessing the functionality of the essential characteristics of that sign (CJEU § 47). The General Court “interpreted the criteria for assessing Article 7(1)(e)(ii) . . . too narrowly”(CJEU § 51) and should have taken into account the technical function of the goods represented by the sign when examining the functionality of the essential characteristics of that sign (CJEU § 52). Failing to do so would have allowed the trademark owner to broaden the scope of trademark protection to cover any three dimensional puzzles with elements in the shape of a cube (CJEU § 52).
This case confirms, after Pi-Design AG v. Bodum, that the CJEU takes the view that the essential characteristics of a trade mark must not be assessed solely by the competent authority based on visually analyzing the mark as filed, but that the authority must also identify the essential characteristics of a sign, in addition to the graphic representation and any other descriptions filed at the time of the application for registration. This is necessary to protect the public interest underlying Article 7(1)(e)(ii), which is to ensure that economic operators cannot improperly appropriate for themselves a mark which incorporates a technical solution.
The image is courtesy of Flickr user Robin under a CC BY 2.0 license.
This article was first published on the TTLF Newsletter on Transatlantic Antitrust and IPR Developments published by the Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum
Filed Under: EU Trademarks, TTLF Newsletter · Tagged: CJEU, EU trademarks, Rubik;s cube