Source: https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/02/08/insulting-a-politician-right-after-her-death-does-the-echr-protect-the-reputation-of-the-deceased/
Timestamp: 2019-01-16 10:13:30
Document Index: 628000632

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§32', '§ 41', '§ 44', '§ 45', '§36', '§ 44', '§ 45', '§ 46']

Insulting a politician right after her death: Does the ECHR protect the reputation of the deceased? | Strasbourg Observers
HomeInsulting a politician right after her death: Does the ECHR protect the reputation of the deceased?
Recalling the principles established in its case law, the Court states in Genner: “there is no doubt that Article 10 § 2 enables the reputation of others – that is to say, of all individuals – to be protected” (§32, emphasis added). In this case “the interference did pursue the aim of the protection of “the reputation or rights of others”, namely those of L.P. and the close members of her family ‒ in particular her husband.” (§ 41, emphasis added). The Court further regards the applicant’s statement as “likely to cause considerable damage to the late Minister’s reputation” (§ 44, emphasis added) and as “an attack on the core of personality rights” (§ 45, emphasis added). So, what do all these references to the late Minister’s reputation mean? Is the Court abandoning the principle that personal rights covered by article 8 ECHR can only be enjoyed by living persons?
As a matter of relevant principles established by its case-law, the Court recalled in Genner that: “regardless of the forcefulness of political struggles, it is legitimate to try to ensure that they abide by a minimum degree of moderation and propriety” […] “If the sole intent of a particular form of expression is to insult a person, an appropriate sanction would not, in principle, constitute a violation of Article 10 of the Convention” (§36 emphasis added). It is interesting to observe that the “minimum degree of moderation and propriety” requirement had so far been applied in relation to “content [that] is such as to stir up violence and hatred,” (non-protected speech) as the Court found in Sürek v. Turkey (No 1) and (more debatably) in Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France. Yet, no similar finding of incitement to violence or hatred was made in Genner. Also worth noting is the Court’s reference to the legitimacy of sanctions imposed upon the expression of insults, which is a standard developed in the context of attacks on the judiciary, where a specific justification for sanctions exists. In fact, it is the special position of the judiciary as guarantor of the administration of justice which explains the need to protect the public confidence in their work against “unfounded attacks.”[4] In providing this special protection, the Court had previously also taken into account the difficulties that judges may have in replying to criticism, given their duties of discretion.[5] One may thus ask how helpful standards articulated under such different circumstances are to those prevailing in Genner v. Austria?
Having said this, what is clear is that both the timing and offensive nature of the applicant’s statement in the face of the family´s grief were determinant. As to the timing, the Court holds that this “intensified the impact of the words used … [which were] published within the immediate period of her family’s grief and was likely to cause considerable damage to the late Minister’s reputation.”(§ 44) As to the content, it adds: “The statement was an expression of satisfaction with the sudden death of L.P […] To express insult on the day after the death of the insulted person contradicts elementary decency and respect to human beings [references omitted] and is an attack on the core of personality rights” (§ 45). Thus, unlike cases such as John Anthony Mizzi v. Malta; Editions Plon v. France and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France where the lapse of time between the death of a politician/civil servant and the publication of offensive statements/photographs was assessed from the viewpoint of the damage caused to close relatives, in Genner such assessment remained rather focused on the late Minister’s reputation. Of note, the applicant’s apology to L.P’s family, published in a newspaper, was accorded little weight. Finally, the Court considered that the applicant’s serious offensive comparisons to the Nazis lacked a “particularly solid factual basis” (§ 46, emphasis added), which suggests that a “sufficient factual basis” for value judgments was not enough.
[2] On the relevance of identifying “genuine conflicts of rights” see Smet, Stijn (2014) Resolving conflicts between human rights: a legal theoretical analysis in the context of the ECHR (Doctoral dissertation) Ghent University, Faculty of Law, Ghent, Belgium, pp. 83-98.
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3 thoughts on “Insulting a politician right after her death: Does the ECHR protect the reputation of the deceased?”
Insulting a politician right after her death: Does the ECHR protect the reputation of the deceased? – Valeska David | Inforrm's Blog says:
[…] could not claim a violation of the latter’s article 8’s rights since they are non-transferable.[1] Less than two years later, however, the recent judgment in Genner v. Austria (Application no. […]
The European Court & Defamation of the Dead: searching for clarity | Strasbourg Observers says:
[…] deceased person (Madaus v. Germany, para. 15; Genner v. Austria, para. 45). This has given rise to calls for the European Court to clarify whether the Convention protects the reputation of the deceased, or whether it only protects the […]
Case Law, Strasbourg: MAC TV v Slovakia, Defamation of the dead, searching for clarity – Jonathan McCully | Inforrm's Blog says: