Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/611/296/276886/
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 00:59:29
Document Index: 764180744

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1064', '§ 1065', '§ 102', '§ 12']

Anti-monopoly, Inc., Plaintiff-appellant, v. General Mills Fun Group et al., Defendants-appellees, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1979 › Anti-monopoly, Inc., Plaintiff-appellant, v. General Mills Fun Group et al., Defendants-appellees
Anti-monopoly, Inc., Plaintiff-appellant, v. General Mills Fun Group et al., Defendants-appellees, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979)
The United States encourages invention and development of new products, ideas, and systems by granting, pursuant to the patent laws, limited monopolies over the manufacture and sale of such products. See U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 1 Et seq. But patent protection is a sharply confined exception to a general "principle of free competition in business ideas and intellectual creations." 1 J. McCarthy Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 1:1 at 2 (1973).1 Thus, when a patent expires, the idea, system, or product passes into the public domain and may be freely copied, so long as the copyist uses reasonable care to prevent the public from misidentifying his product as that of the original producer. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 117-19, 59 S. Ct. 109, 83 L. Ed. 73 (1938); Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 381, 30 S. Ct. 298, 54 L. Ed. 525 (1910); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185-86, 16 S. Ct. 1002, 41 L. Ed. 118 (1896).
The genericness doctrine in trademark law is designed to prevent such anti-competitive misuse of trademarks. At its simplest, the doctrine states that when a trademark primarily denotes a product, not the product's producer, the trademark is lost. As we have stated, "one competitor will not be permitted to impoverish the language of commerce by preventing his fellows from fairly describing their own goods." Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 916, 91 S. Ct. 174, 27 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1970). Thus, the Lanham Act, enacted in 1947, provides for the cancellation of a trademark if "at any time (it) becomes the common descriptive name of an article or substance." 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c). Further, "no incontestable right shall be acquired in a mark which is the common descriptive name of any article or substance, patented or otherwise." 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4). Courts equate "common descriptive name," as used in the statute, with the shorthand expression "generic term." See, e. g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
The operation of genericness doctrine is well illustrated by the Shredded Wheat case, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., supra, 305 U.S. 111, 59 S. Ct. 109, 83 L. Ed. 73. National Biscuit, and its predecessor, Perky, the inventor of a product which it called "Shredded Wheat," had enjoyed a patent on the manufacture of the so-named shredded, pillow-shaped, wheat biscuits from 1895 to 1912. After the patent expired, Kellogg began to manufacture an identical biscuit which it also called "Shredded Wheat." National obtained an injunction from a district court prohibiting Kellogg's use of the trade name "Shredded Wheat." The Supreme Court reversed. It stated that once the patent on "Shredded Wheat" had expired, the right to make the product passed into the public domain. 305 U.S. at 118, 59 S. Ct. 109. It said further: "As Kellogg Company had the right to make the article, it had, also, the right to use the term by which the public knows it." Id. at 116-17, 59 S. Ct. at 113.
National contended that even if the public did use the term "Shredded Wheat" generically, to denote an article, National nevertheless had "the exclusive right to the name 'Shredded Wheat,' because those words (had) acquired the 'secondary meaning' of shredded wheat made at Niagara Falls by (National's) predecessor." Id. at 118, 59 S. Ct. at 113. The Court rejected this argument, saying:
Id. at 118-19, 59 S. Ct. at 113-14 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 122, 59 S. Ct. at 115 (footnote omitted).
The genericness doctrine has undergone little change since the Shredded Wheat case.3 Thus, the MONOPOLY trademark is valid only if "the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer." Id. at 118, 59 S. Ct. at 113. Even if only one producer Parker Brothers has ever made the MONOPOLY game, so that the public necessarily associates the product with that particular producer, the trademark is invalid unless source identification is its primary significance. Id.
A genus, in contrast to a species, is a product category including essentially interchangeable4 goods made by unique producers. To the extent the goods within the genus differ, their distinguishing characteristics are primarily source-particular, E. g., price, quality, and advertising jingle. When, in the consumers' minds, the characteristics which distinguish a particular product are no longer primarily source-particular, that product becomes its own genus, and its name becomes a generic name. See Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 372, 131 F.2d 446, 447 (D.C. Cir.), Cert. denied, 318 U.S. 782, 63 S. Ct. 856, 87 L. Ed. 1149 (1942). See also DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601, 57 S. Ct. 194, 81 L. Ed. 443 (1936), 304 U.S. 575, 58 S. Ct. 1047, 82 L. Ed. 1539 (1938); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
On at least two occasions courts have invalidated a trademarked name of a game on genericness grounds. In Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing & Lithographing Co., 47 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D. Wis. 1942), Aff'd, 142 F.2d 707, 709 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735, 65 S. Ct. 75, 89 L. Ed. 589 (1944),5 the court, applying the "primary significance" test, found:
In Golomb v. Wadsworth, 592 F.2d 1184, 201 U.S.P.Q. 200, 201 (Cust. & Pat.App.1979), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in affirming the cancellation of the trademarked names POLYOMINOES and PENTOMINOES for domino-like game pieces, quoted from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's decision as follows: "these terms . . . have become words of art in the field of mathematical puzzles and Do not and cannot serve to designate origin in anyone producing and selling a game which involves finding ways to fit together various shapes or configurations composed of numbers of connected squares." (Emphasis in original.) These decisions illustrate that when members of the consuming public use a game name to denote the game itself, and not its producer, the trademark is generic and, therefore, invalid.6 B. The District Court's Findings
In view of our remand on the invalidity issue, we also remand the question whether, if the MONOPOLY mark is valid, Anti-Monopoly's use thereof constitutes an infringement. The considerations affecting a determination of infringement are: the similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning of the marks, the strength or weakness of the marks, the proximity or similarity of the goods, evidence of actual confusion, the marketing channels used to market the goods, the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, the alleged infringer's intent in selecting the mark, and the likelihood of expansion of product lines. E. g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); J.B. Williams Co. v. LeContee Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913, 96 S. Ct. 1110, 47 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1976); HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, supra, 504 F.2d at 717.
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, supra, 599 F.2d at 348. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820, 82 S. Ct. 36, 7 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1961); Habitat Design Holdings, Ltd. v. Habitat, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 327, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), Aff'd as modified, 573 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1978) (memo.); Bass Buster, Inc. v. Gapen Mfg. Co., 420 F. Supp. 144, 160 (W.D. Mo. 1976). See also A. T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972). Cf. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 799-802 (9th Cir. 1970) (court states that "(n)umerous factors can and often do play a role in the determination of likelihood of confusion," Id. at 800, but focuses analysis on evidence of actual confusion, and similarity of the marks in question).
Obviously, we cannot adequately review the district court's determinations, particularly as to the "similarity of meaning" and "competition" factors, without benefit of a finding whether the primary significance of MONOPOLY is to denote the name of a unique game, or instead the game's source. We do point out, however, that even if the district judge should decide that MONOPOLY is generic, it must be established, consistent with the decision in the Shredded Wheat case, that Anti-Monopoly is taking "reasonable care to inform the public of the source of its product." Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., supra, 305 U.S. at 119, 59 S. Ct. at 114. This issue is similar to the determinations required in finding infringement, and there is substantial evidence in the record bearing thereon. If the district court decides reasonable source-distinguishing steps are not being taken, it may enjoin the sale of "Anti-Monopoly" except upon its compliance with appropriate conditions. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
Anti-Monopoly apparently also contends that the district court erred in denying it a jury trial because legal issues remain to be litigated in a related antitrust action which involves the earlier-severed legal claims. We disagree. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S. Ct. 948, 3 L. Ed. 2d 988 (1959), upon which Anti-Monopoly relies heavily, held "that where both legal and equitable issues are Presented in a single case, 'only under the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.' " Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73, 82 S. Ct. 894, 897, 8 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1962) (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, supra, 359 U.S. at 510-11, 79 S. Ct. 948). No legal issues remained to be tried in the district court in the matter which is now before us. The first district judge plainly erred in concluding that questions relating to the validity of the MONOPOLY trademark raised legal issues, although both parties sought only equitable relief. See Shubin v. United States Dist. Court, 313 F.2d 250, 251 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 373 U.S. 936, 83 S. Ct. 1539, 10 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1963); Robine v. Apco, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 512, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), Aff'd, 386 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1967). That being so, the order, vacating the earlier grant of a jury trial to Anti-Monopoly, was properly entered. Cf. Daly v. Volpe, 376 F. Supp. 987, 994 (W.D. Wash. 1974), Aff'd, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975).
The copyright laws are not involved in this case because business ideas, such as a game concept, cannot be copyrighted, See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L. Ed. 841 (1880). This copyright rule is analogous to the genericness doctrine of trademark law, however, in that it is designed to prevent extension of product monopolization beyond the 17 years protected by a patent. Id. at 102-03
See, e. g., Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1332 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070, 98 S. Ct. 1252, 55 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1978); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1963); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910, 83 S. Ct. 253, 9 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1962); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 666 (7th Cir. 1955); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 748-49 (S.D. Iowa 1961)
Drawing upon antitrust law, Professor McCarthy has suggested that a genus or product category can be defined as including commodities for which " 'there is a cross-elasticity of demand,' " I. e., that are " 'reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purpose.' " 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:8 at 418 (1973) (quoting United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-95, 76 S. Ct. 994, 100 L. Ed. 1264 (1956)). If used, cross-elasticity of demand analysis, like the genus-species distinction itself, should focus upon consumer perception of product interchangeability
A prior case concerning the PARCHEESI mark, Selchow v. Chaffee & Selchow Mfg. Co., 132 F. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1904), Appeal dismissed, 140 F. 989 (2d Cir. 1905), is also instructive. There, the court declared the PARCHEESI mark invalid because it already signified the name of a game in the Indian language when registered as a mark in the United States
In a third case, H. B. Chaffee Mfg. Co. v. Selchow, 131 F. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1904), Aff'd, 135 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1905), the court held that when the inventor of a card game "Flinch" failed to trademark its name, no one else could, by simply manufacturing the selling "Flinch" for a long period, obtain that name as a trademark. Id. at 545. The court stated:
Various other courts have mentioned, without deciding, the question whether the name of a game is a generic term. See, e. g., Selchow & Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 580 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The extent to which (SCRABBLE) has come into general use to describe a game or games rather than their origin or source of supply is fairly open to proof" ; thus, plaintiff, owner of SCRABBLE mark, was entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent the mark's dilution, pending judicial resolution of SCRABBLE's validity as a trademark); Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1186, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding consideration for settlement agreement in possibility, strongly intimated by the district judge, that game name CARROM invalid); Application of Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 614-17, 45 CCPA 923, Cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840, 79 S. Ct. 63, 3 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1958) (holding a book title generic, because as the book's name it performs a product-denoting, not source-denoting function; observing that Patent Office may be registering names of games erroneously; and stating that if trademarked name of game is its only possible descriptive name, mark is generic).