Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/89881/hyde-vs-shine
Timestamp: 2016-12-02 18:07:26
Document Index: 253948074

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1014', '§ 5440', '§ 1014', '§ 5440', '§ 731', '§ 1014', '§ 5440', '§ 1014', '§ 260']

Hyde Vs Shine - Citation 89881 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Hyde Vs. Shine - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/89881CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMay-29-1905Case Number199 U.S. 62AppellantHydeRespondentShineExcerpt:
hyde v. shine - 199 u.s. 62 (1905)
section 1014, rev.stat., authorizes a removal from a judicial district in a state to the district of columbia.
benson v. henkel,
198 u. s. 1
while this court does not approve the practice of..... Judgment:
While this Court does not approve the practice of indicting citizens in courts far distant from their residence if they can be tried in courts of their own jurisdiction, § 1014, Rev.Stat., contains no discrimination based upon
On the facts in this case, the indictment, which charges a completed conspiracy to defraud the United States by means of obtaining state lands through sales to fictitious persons and then exchanging them for land of the United States under the forest reserve acts,
sufficient notwithstanding that the state received full compensation for the lands.
A patent to a fictitious person is in legal effect no more than a declaration that the government thereby conveys the property to no one, and in such a case, the doctrine that a subsequent
purchaser is protected does not apply.
While a federal court on habeas corpus may order the petitioner's discharge if there is an entire lack of evidence to support the accusation, where a
case is made by the indictment, and the commissioner receives evidence on petitioner's behalf, it is for him to determine whether probable cause existed, and the court will not weigh the evidence on habeas corpus.
The proceedings which culminated in the arrest and remanding of the appellant originated in an indictment found in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the appellant
and John A. Benson, Henry P. Dimond, and Joost H. Schneider, charging them with a conspiracy, under Rev.Stat. § 5440, "to defraud the United States out of the possession and use of, and the title to, divers large tracts of the public lands of the United States." All of the defendants except Schneider are residents of San Francisco, California. Upon a complaint made, based upon such indictment, before a United States commissioner for the Northern District of California, Hyde was arrested under Rev.Stat. § 1014, taken before a commissioner, and held to bail to answer the indictment in the sum of $50,000, and in default thereof was committed to the custody of the defendant, Shine, to await the order of the district judge for his removal to the District of Columbia, or until he should be discharged by due course of law. Upon such order of removal being issued,
132 F. 545, appellant presented his petition to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, praying for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, and for his discharge from imprisonment, which were denied, and this appeal taken.
1. The first assignment is practically disposed of by the recent case of
, in which one of the codefendants of the petitioner in this case, who had been arrested in Brooklyn, was held to be properly removed to the
2. The second assignment, that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia had no jurisdiction of the alleged offense, is based upon the proposition that the conspiracy, if any existed, was entered into either in the Northern District of California or the District of Oregon, and that nothing but overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy were done in the District of Columbia. Granting that the gravamen of the offense is the conspiracy, and that, at common law, it was neither necessary to aver nor prove an overt act,
2 B. & Ald. 205;
Bannon v. United States,
156 U. S. 464
156 U. S. 468
, an overt act is necessary, under Rev.Stat. § 5440, to complete the offense. The language of the section is,
It was aptly said by Mr. Justice Woods in
, that the offense consisted in the conspiracy, and that the overt act afforded a
locus penitentiae,
so that, before the act done, either one or all of the parties may abandon their design and thus avoid the penalty prescribed by the statute. As the indictment in this case charges that the conspiracy was entered into in the City of Washington, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether an indictment will lie within the jurisdiction where the overt act was committed, though there are many authorities to that effect.
King v. Brisac,
4 East 164;
People v. Mather,
4 Wend. 229;
Commonwealth v. Gillespie,
7 S. & R. 469;
Noyes v. State,
41 N.J.L. 418;
Commonwealth v. Corlies,
3 Brews. 575.
We have ourselves decided that, if the conspiracy be entered into within the jurisdiction of the trial court, the indictment will lie there though the overt act is shown to have been committed
in another jurisdiction or even in a foreign country.
Dealy v. United States,
152 U. S. 539
4 East 164; Rev.Stat. § 731.
Although it involves a seeming hardship to commit an accused person in San Francisco for trial in the District of Columbia, the terms of Rev.Stat. § 1014 are as applicable to such a case as they would be if the arrest were made in Baltimore.
3. The third assignment -- that the indictment charges no offense against the United States -- requires a statement of its substance. As it contains forty-two different counts and covers some ninety-four pages of printed matter, a consideration of each count would unnecessarily prolong this opinion. The conspiracy charged embraced certain false practices by the defendants whereby school lands were to be obtained fraudulently from the States of California and Oregon by Hyde and Benson (1) in the names of fictitious persons and (2) in the names of persons not qualified to purchase the same, whereby the said Hyde and Benson were to cause and require such school lands to be relinquished by means of false and forged relinquishments, assignments, and conveyances to the United States in exchange for public lands, to be selected, and for titles thereto by patents to be obtained by and on behalf of the said Hyde and Benson. A further element of the conspiracy
"That in cases in which a tract covered by an unperfected
claim or by a patent is included within the limits of a public forest reservation, the settler or owner thereof may, if he desires to do so, relinquish the tract to the government, and may select in lieu thereof a tract of vacant land open to settlement, not exceeding in area the tract covered by his claim or patent, and no charge shall be made in such cases for making the entry of record or issuing the patent to cover the tract selected."
It seems that both of these states had passed laws by which any citizen of the United States resident in such state, or any person who had declared his intention to become a citizen, might acquire from such states a section or half section of such lands at $1.25 per acre. They were required to make application to the land offices of the state and to make the necessary affidavits to show that they were qualified to purchase them, and that they were purchasing them for their own use or benefit, and had not sold or agreed to sell the same. Doubtless the intention was that the sale should be made to persons who desired to settle upon the lands, but there was
While it is doubtless true that, by means of these corrupt and fraudulent practices, Hyde and Benson may have obtained titles to these lands, it does not follow that the states might not have disaffirmed such titles and recovered the lands. In this particular, the case is covered by that of
. Nor does it follow that, when subsequent conveyances were made to the United States of these lands under the Act of June 4, 1897, a good title was vested in the grantee. In the
case, it was held that a patent issued to a fictitious person conveys no title which can be transferred to a person subsequently purchasing in good faith from a supposed owner. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Field observed:
supposed patentees. A patent to a fictitious person is, in legal effect, no more than a declaration that the government thereby conveys the property to no one. There is in such case no room for the application of the doctrine that a subsequent
purchaser is protected. A subsequent purchaser is bound to know whether there was in fact a patentee -- a person once in being, and not a mere myth -- and he will always be presumed to take his conveyance upon the knowledge of the truth in this respect. To the application of this doctrine of a
purchaser there must be a genuine instrument, having a legal existence, as well as one appearing on its face to pass the title. It cannot arise on a forged instrument or one executed to fictitious parties -- that is, to no parties at all, however much deceived thereby the purchaser may be."
The same argument applies to the United States, whose lands have been procured in plain violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the statute, and by a further step in the same fraudulent
scheme. By the Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 36, it is provided that, in any case in which a tract covered by an unperfected
claim or by a patent is included within the limits of a public forest reservation, the settler or owner thereof may, if he desires to do so, relinquish the tract to the government, etc. The privilege of the act is therefore reserved to a settler or owner, and as there is no claim that Hyde was a settler upon the lands, it only remains to consider whether he was an "owner" within the act. Although the word "owner" has a variety of meanings, and may under certain circumstances include an equitable as well as a legal ownership, or even a right of present use and possession, it implies something more than a bare legal title, and we know of no authority for saying that a person in possession of land under a void deed can be regarded as the owner thereof. Ownership may not imply a perfect title, but it implies something more than the possession of land under a title which is void, and when the government holds out to owners of lands an inducement to relinquish such lands in exchange for others, it implies that the persons with whom it is dealing, if not the owners in fee simple, are at least
owners, with authority to dispose of and vest a good title thereto. We are clear that the defendant does not fall within this category, and that the United States may justly claim to have been defrauded out of the land patented to him.
Johnson v. Crookshanks,
21 Or. 339;
Directors &c.; v. Abila,
106 Cal. 355.
Whatever may be the rule in equity as to the necessity of proving an actual loss or damage to the plaintiff, we think a case is made out under this statute by proof of a conspiracy to defraud, and the commission of an overt act, notwithstanding the United States may have received a consideration for the lands, and suffered no pecuniary loss.
MacLaren v. Cochran,
44 Minn. 255. The law punishes the false practices by which the lands were obtained, and the question whether the government stands in the position of a
Even if the United States were in a position to claim the rights of a
purchaser to the state lands, the methods by which these lands were acquired from the states, and the lands in exchange therefor procured from the United States would be nonetheless a fraud of which the latter might take advantage in a criminal prosecution. The indictment under § 5440 charges a conspiracy to defraud the United States out of the possession, use of, and title thereto of divers large tracts of public lands, and if the title to these lands were obtained by fraudulent practices and in pursuance of a fraudulent design, it is nonetheless within the statute, though the United States might succeed in defeating a recovery of the state lands by setting up the rights of a
purchaser. Under the circumstances, it cannot be doubted that the United States might maintain a bill to cancel the patents to the exchanged lands procured by these fraudulent means notwithstanding their title to the forest reserve lands might be good.
Other minor objections are taken to the indictment: that no description is given of the lands out of which the defendants are alleged to have conspired to defraud the government,
152 U. S. 543
; that it is uncertain in its allegations as to the means to be used to carry out the alleged conspiracy; that the names representing the fictitious persons and of those not qualified to purchase, through whom the fraud was effected, are not given; that the allegations of the indictment are indefinite and inconsistent; that the conclusion is improper, etc.
It is sufficient to say of these objections that they are proper to be considered by the trial court, and that we do not feel called upon to express our own opinion in regard to them. Criticisms of this character are completely covered by the recent decision of this Court in
28 U. S. 206
, in both of which the petitioners sought
4. The fourth assignment -- that there was no probable cause for believing the petitioner guilty of the offense charged and that the writ of certiorari should have been issued to bring the record before the court -- is based upon that clause of § 1014 which requires that proceedings for the removal of persons from one district to another shall be "agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state," and section 1487 of the Code of California is cited to the effect that the petitioner shall be discharged where he has been committed upon a criminal charge without reasonable or probable cause. Certain cases are also cited from the Supreme Court of California to the effect that it is the right of the prisoner to have the court consider the question of probable cause upon the writ of habeas corpus.
1 Cal. 9;
Ex Parte Palmer,
86 Cal. 631;
Ex Parte Walpole,
85 Cal. 362.
But see, contra, Ex Parte Long,
114 Cal. 159.
In the federal courts, however, it is well settled that, upon habeas corpus, the court will not weigh the evidence, although, if there is an entire lack of evidence to support the accusation, the court may order his discharge. In this case, however, the production of the indictment made at least a
case against the accused, and if the commissioner received evidence on his behalf, it was for him to say whether, upon the whole testimony, there was proof of probable cause.
167 U. S. 104
. The requirement that the usual mode of process adopted in the state shall be pursued refers to the proceedings for the
While the circuit court may have had power to issue a writ of certiorari auxiliary to the writ of habeas corpus,
5 Blatchf. 303;
4 Cranch 100; Church on Habeas Corpus, § 260, it was under no obligation to do so, and its refusal cannot be assigned as error. Certiorari is a discretionary writ, and is often denied where the power to issue it is unquestionable.
People ex Rel. Church v. Allegany County,
15 Wend. 206;
People ex Rel. Vanderbilt v. Stilwell,
19 N.Y. 531;
Rowe v. Rowe,
28 Mich. 353. Petitions for habeas corpus are frequently accompanied by applications for certiorari as ancillary thereto, and both are awarded or denied together. Appellant had nothing to complain of in the denial of the writ, and his petition should have set forth the evidence relied upon to show a want of probable cause.
Terlinden v. Ames,
184 U. S. 279
168 U. S. 128
I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court in this case, and wish simply to state the grounds of my dissent, without any attempt to do more. The indictment avers that the
conspiracy was entered into in Washington, District of Columbia, on December 30, 1901, and the opinion holds, in substance (and rightly, as I think), that it is essential to aver its formation in the District in order to give the courts therein jurisdiction of the offense. The indictment constitutes
evidence of probable cause, but evidence may be given to rebut it. It is averred in the application for the writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, in the case of Hyde, that the evidence taken before the commissioner showed indisputably that the petitioner was never in the District of Columbia except upon one occasion in 1901, and then only for about six hours, and that he was not then guilty of any of the offenses charged in the indictment, and, in the case of Dimond, it was said the evidence showed that the transactions complained of as a conspiracy occurred in California or Oregon, of which former state the defendant was, and had been for twenty years, a resident. In other words, it was claimed that the evidence before the commissioner showed conclusively and without contradiction that there was no probable cause to believe the defendants guilty of any offense as charged in the indictment. The writ of certiorari was called for in order that this evidence might be brought before the circuit judge, so that he could see from it that there was affirmative and conclusive proof of the absence of probable cause. The applications for the writs of habeas corpus and of certiorari were both denied. The opinion of the circuit judge, delivered upon refusing the writs, shows that the question of the want of probable cause to believe defendants guilty, based upon the absence of both defendants from the District of Columbia at the time of the alleged formation of the conspiracy, was not touched upon by him, but the objections considered were those based upon the charge contained in the indictment and whether it charged an offense under the laws of the United States. This Court now holds that the refusal of the judge to grant the writ of certiorari was within his discretion.
I think this is not the case for the application of the rule
The expense to a defendant in his necessary preparation for trial, and in procuring the attendance of witnesses in his behalf from such a distance, must necessarily be enormous, and in many, if not in most, cases, utterly beyond the ability of a defendant to pay. The enforcement of the criminal law should not be made oppressive in such cases, and therefore, when it