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William Harris v. Jo Anne B Barnhart - PDF EBook Free Download
William Harris v. Jo Anne B Barnhart
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 1 of 37 Page ID #:65 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALI...
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 1 of 37 Page ID #:65
) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner) of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) )
No. CV 05-02673-SS MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
William Harris (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) brings this action seeking
to overturn the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (hereinafter the “Commissioner” or the “Agency”) denying
his application for Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter “SSI”).
Alternatively, he asks for a remand.
consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Court on the parties’ Joint Stipulation filed on February 14, 2006.
On May 12, 2005, the parties
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 2 of 37 Page ID #:66
(Joint Stipulation (“JS”) at 1-15).
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
On February 7, 2003, Plaintiff protectively filed an application
for SSI benefits. (Administrative Record (hereinafter “AR”) 70-75). He
claimed that he became unable to work on June 23, 2002 due to vision and
hearing conditions; speech and mental problems; and injuries to the
head, neck, arms, legs.
(AR 79).
11 The Agency denied Plaintiff’s application on June 13, 2003.1
56-59).
Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”).
before ALJ Robert Evans was conducted on September 21, 2004.
denying Plaintiff benefits.
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review and the ALJ’s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff subsequently filed his Complaint on April 14, 2005.
(AR 60-61).
A hearing (AR 25-
Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified on his own (AR 29-44). (AR 44-53).
A vocational expert (hereinafter “VE”) also On November 24, 2004, the ALJ issued a decision (AR 11-19).
On February 18, 2005, the
(AR 5-7).
This being a prototype case, the next level of review was before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 14, 55, 58). 2
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 3 of 37 Page ID #:67
Plaintiff was born on June 6, 1956 and was forty-eight years old at
equivalency diploma (G.E.D.) and his past work experience includes
employment as a house painter, a heavy equipment operator and an
automobile mechanic. (AR 15, 29-34, 80, 85). Plaintiff alleges that he
became disabled on June 23, 2002 due to numerous ailments including
vertigo, poor vision, headaches, mental impairments, and pain in his
(AR 15; 29; 71).
left leg, left wrist, neck and lower back.
He has a high school
(AR 29, 38, 40, 71, 79).
11 In his daily activities questionnaire, Plaintiff asserted that he
lived alone in his van.
(AR 104).
He stated that he tries to “stay out
of the van as much as possible” due to fear of being “closed in.”
“fear of people.”
able to prepare his own meals and perform household chores.
Plaintiff also stated that he did not shop often because of his (AR 106).
However, Plaintiff also stated that he was (AR 106).
Plaintiff testified that his ailments arose after being assaulted
(AR 34).
Among his numerous ailments, Plaintiff
stated that his vertigo and the leg pain (i.e., “from the knee down”)
were his most severe disabilities.
“foot is asleep and [his] toes are tingling”).
Plaintiff alleged that, due to the pain in his left wrist, he did not
has caused him to fall down, resulting in further injury to his (AR 36-37).
He also alleged that his leg “gets numb” (i.e., his
(AR 42).
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use his left hand often because he “[did not] trust it.”2
interfered with his concentration.
headaches compounded his vision problems, causing him to see “spots” and
“flashes.”
(AR 37-38).
(AR 38).
He testified that the
(AR 38-39).
As for his mental impairments, Plaintiff testified that he had
auditory hallucinations, short-term memory impairment, claustrophobia
(AR 29, 40-42). (AR 42).
He commented that he “get[s] real
fidgety” around people.
Plaintiff stated that he did not seek
treatment for his hallucinations because he was not insured.
(AR 41).
Plaintiff opined that he was only able to walk for about 100 feet
continuously sit for more than thirty minutes.
addition, Plaintiff testified that he was able to lift and carry only “a
alleged fifteen
(AR 42-43).
(AR 43).
Treating Physicians’ Evaluation
23 Plaintiff
Medical Center (hereinafter “Harbor”) from June 23, 2002 to September
Plaintiff’s left wrist was fractured during the assault.
38). 4
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 5 of 37 Page ID #:69
28, 2002.3
from St. Mary’s Hospital to the emergency department at Harbor for
further evaluations of the head injury suffered during the assault. (AR
130). The record indicates that Plaintiff suffered injuries to his head
and extremities, including his left knee and left wrist.
120, 128-30, 132-33, 138).
be suffering postconcussive syndrome or intoxication and/or withdrawal.
(AR 130).
he asserted that he did not currently use drugs.
(AR 113-46).
On June 23, 2002, Plaintiff was transferred
(AR 115-18,
The physician also noted that Plaintiff may
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s social history was noted, in which
that he tested positive for amphetamines.4
“drugs”), 130).
(AR 116 (notation following
12 Multiple CT scans of the head and an EEG of the brain were
conducted, all returning with normal results.5
There was no evidence of intraparenchymal hemorrhage but minimal scalp
swelling was present in the mid-frontal region. (AR 145). Furthermore,
a CT scan of Plaintiff’s left knee was performed due to his complaints
(AR 122).
(AR 122, 143, 145).
The doctor opined that the pain was the result of
Plaintiff therapists.
The record indicates that Plaintiff informed the UCLA emergency department that he is a “former” speed user. (AR 130). Additionally, the record contains conflicting information as to whether he uses alcohol. Plaintiff denied consuming alcohol to Dr. Murphy, (AR 130), while to another physician he admitted to doing so. (AR 136). Still, Harbor’s laboratory report indicates that Plaintiff tested positive for less than 5 mg/dL of ethanol. (AR 142).
CT scans were conducted twice at Harbor, on June 23, 2002 and on June 24, 2002. (AR 122). The record also indicates that a CT scan was performed at St. Mary’s, which similarly displayed normal results. (AR 130). 5
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 6 of 37 Page ID #:70
determined that Plaintiff had reduced language skills (i.e., auditory
processing and word retrieval deficiencies).
understandable.6
cognition was “automatic” and therefore appropriate.7
Plaintiff’s (AR 131).
(AR 131).
Ms. Graham assessed that Plaintiff’s She opined that
Plaintiff’s prognosis was “good to reach [the] premorbid level of
12 Rodica Gudea, a physical therapist, conducted an evaluation on
(AR 121, 125).
Ms. Gudea determined that Plaintiff had
passive range of motion in both of his lower extremities.
She also noted Plaintiff’s complaints concerning lower back pain, which
derived from his necessity to limp, due to the pain in his legs.8
scheduled for August 20, 2002.
2002, Ms. Gudea noted that progress had not been made and that Plaintiff
(AR 125).
Plaintiff missed his next physical therapy session that was (AR 119).
Thereafter, on September 12,
Problems with his denture bridge may have contributed to Plaintiff’s speech distortions. (AR 135). 7
Plaintiff was assessed a cognition rating of level 7 (out of eight levels). Level 7 is assessed to a person whose cognition is deemed “automatic-appropriate” while level 8 is for one whose cognition is “purposeful-appropriate.” (AR 131). 8
Plaintiff complained that he now felt pain in both of his legs. (AR 125). This was probably due to Plaintiff’s need to overcompensate with his right leg. 6
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 7 of 37 Page ID #:71
would be discharged because “[patient] declines to cont. intervention.”
(AR 119).
On September 28, 2002, Plaintiff returned to Harbor, complaining of
pain in his left wrist.
(AR 115-18).
He asserted that the pain arose
after his cast fell off.
returned negative, but the treating physician noted that Plaintiff had
a limited range of motion in his left wrist.
the physician commented that though Plaintiff’s cast fell off five days
prior to this current visit, Plaintiff did not seek recasting as
instructed by the orthopedic physicians.
(AR 116, 118).
The x-rays on the wrist
(AR 115-16).
(AR 116).
14 Dr. Salvatore Danna was Plaintiff’s treating physician from October
28, 2002 to July 22, 2004.
(AR 197-209).
treatment, Dr. Danna noted Plaintiff’s complaints of dizziness.
198-99, 205-08).
had mood swings and was feeling depressed. (AR 207-08). Thereafter, an
EEG and MRI of Plaintiff’s brain were performed on June 25, 2003 and
November 8, 2003, respectively.
with normal results.
Dr. Danna also diagnosed Plaintiff with high blood
(AR 208).
On April 15, 2003, Dr. Danna noted that Plaintiff
(AR 203, 206).
Both tests returned
On September 24, 2003, Dr. Danna commented that though arthritis
was forming in the site of Plaintiff’s wrist fracture, Plaintiff “ha[d]
done remarkably well in the past few months.”
(AR 204).
Dr. Danna own
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 8 of 37 Page ID #:72
ambulating continuously throughout the day.”
commented that Plaintiff continues to have stiffness and incoordination
in the left wrist.
be able function as “an active person...and perform whatever labor he
can[,]” for the weakness and incoordination of the wrist were mild. (AR
Dr. Danna
However, he opined that Plaintiff should
7 On December 12, 2003, Dr. Danna diagnosed Plaintiff with cervical
strain, vertigo and head trauma.
(AR 198).
Then, on July 22, 2004, he
diagnosed Plaintiff with lumbar disk disease.
indicates that Dr. Danna planned to inject Plaintiff’s L5 nerve root
analgesics), due to Plaintiff’s complaints of lumbar disk disease and
(AR 198, 202).
17 Plaintiff underwent multiple consultative examinations.
14, 2003, Dr. John Sedgh conducted an internal medicine evaluation. (AR
147-53). He commented that Plaintiff was well-developed, well-nourished
and in no acute distress.
Sedgh determined Plaintiff’s grip strength to be 110 pounds of force for
his right hand and ninety pounds of force for his left hand.
Dr. Sedgh opined that Plaintiff’s grip was normal.
found no evidence of synovial thickening or deformities in Plaintiff’s
(AR 148).
Using the Jamar dynamometer, Dr.
(AR 150).
(AR 148). He also
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 9 of 37 Page ID #:73
Furthermore, the range of motion of Plaintiff’s
wrists was within normal limits.9
Dr. Sedgh noted that the range of motion of Plaintiff’s lumbar
spine was limited, with the flexion of 20/90 degrees and extension and
lateral flexion of 15/30 degrees. (AR 149; 151). X-rays of Plaintiff’s
lumbosacral spine showed spondylosis, but there was no evidence of
compression or other fractures and the pedicles were intact.10 (AR 153).
Additionally, Dr. Sedgh found no evidence of muscle spasm or paraspinal
tenderness, and the straight-leg-raising test was negative.
He also determined that Plaintiff’s knees were normal, with no evidence
of inflamation or deformities and the range of motion within normal
(AR 149).
Moreover, Dr. Sedgh found that Plaintiff’s gait was (AR 151).
Dr. Sedgh also conducted a neurological examination, which revealed
that Plaintiff’s motor strength in all of his extremities was normal
(i.e., 5/5).
cerebellar functioning (i.e., coordination) were intact.
also determined that Plaintiff’s sensations and vision were grossly
intact.11
In addition, Dr. Sedgh noted that Plaintiff’s (AR 150).
Dr. Sedgh also found that Plaintiff had full range of motion of the neck. (AR 151). 10
The x-rays also revealed that Plaintiff had atherosclerosis of the abdominal aorta. (AR 153). 11
The visual acuity test revealed that Plaintiff had a corrected vision (i.e., with glasses) of 20/25 when examining both of his eyes together and each eye separately. (AR 152). 9
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Thereafter, Dr. Sedgh opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry
twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; could stand and
walk for six hours and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; and
did not have any postural, manipulative or environmental limitations.
(AR 151).
evaluation and a mental status examination (hereinafter “MSE”) was
administered. (AR 178-82). Dr. Aguilar noted that Plaintiff was alert,
well-developed, well-nourished and in no acute distress.
Plaintiff denied alcohol or drug abuse.
oriented to time, place, person and situation; had normal fund of
knowledge, memory, concentration, calculation, abstraction, insight and
judgment; and did not have disorganized thinking or looseness of
Plaintiff’s mood during the examination was noted as being sad and
“poor to disturbed” sleep, poor appetite and occasional anxiety.
(AR 179-80).
(AR 179).
Though he denied having mood swings,
Dr. Aguilar also recorded that Plaintiff had (AR
20 Dr. Aguilar noted that Plaintiff denied having hallucinations or
delusions, or experiencing suicidal or homicidal ideation.
(AR 178,
180). Plaintiff also denied any prior psychiatric hospitalization. (AR
of living in the streets.”
He stated that he was “stressed because he [was] [o]n the verge (AR 178).
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 11 of 37 Page ID #:75
Thereafter, Dr. Aguilar assessed Plaintiff’s Global Assessment of
Function (hereinafter “GAF”) at 62.12
with adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features and posttraumatic
instructions; could make judgments on simple work-related decisions;
would have mild difficulty interacting appropriately with the public,
coworkers and supervisors; could comply with job rules such as safety
and attendance; could respond to changes in the routine work setting;
and would have mild difficulty responding appropriately to work pressure
in a usual work setting.
prognosis was fair.
(AR 180).
He diagnosed Plaintiff
Dr. Aguilar opined that Plaintiff could carry
He concluded that Plaintiff’s
(AR 183-92).
She noted Plaintiff’s complaints of weakness
in his left arm, vertigo, short-term memory impairment, coordination
impairment and fear of being around people.
recorded Plaintiff’s statement that he takes daily walks for about
twenty (20) miles in order to relieve stress.
Dr. Maze commented that Plaintiff appeared tense and gave poor eye
(AR 184).
Dr. Maze also
A GAF score is the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of functioning. It is rated with respect only to psychological, social and occupational functioning, without regard to impairments in functioning due to physical or environmental limitations. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter “DSM IV”). A GAF of 61-70 denotes “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationship).” See DSM IV at 34. 11
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 12 of 37 Page ID #:76
(AR 185).
However, Plaintiff was oriented to person, place
and time, and his attention and concentration were not impaired.
A motor examination of Plaintiff’s extremities revealed essentially
extremities (i.e., left hip flexion, left leg extension, left leg
flexion, left foot dorsiflexion, left foot eversion and left foot
inversion) were assessed a rating of 5-/5, while his other extremities
(i.e., both deltoids, both biceps, both triceps, both wrist extensions,
right hip flexion, right extension, right leg flexion, right foot
dorsiflexion, right foot eversion and right foot inversion) were given
Plaintiff’s grip strength was assessed at 75/75/75 for his right hand
and 90/90/90 for his left hand.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s lower left
In addition, using the Jamar dynamometer,
A sensory examination revealed that Plaintiff’s sensations were
intact to light touch, pinprick, temperature and vibration throughout
Plaintiff’s upper and lower extremities.
recorded that the cerebellar functioning of Plaintiff’s left side was
mildly impaired. (AR 186). Specifically, the finger-nose-finger, rapid
alternating movements and rhythmic-toe-tapping tests were performed with
slight coarse slowness on Plaintiff’s left side.
also noted that Plaintiff ambulated with a slight widened base and was
unsteady while performing a tandem walk.
(AR 186).
However, Dr. Maze
Dr. Maze diagnosed Plaintiff with post-head trauma and opined that Plaintiff had “some slight focal findings.” 12
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 13 of 37 Page ID #:77
that “the CT scan did not reveal significant abnormalities after [the]
carry twenty-five pounds occasionally and frequently; could stand and/or
walk for about six hours and sit for an unlimited time period in an
eight-hour workday; had no limitations in pushing and/or pulling; could
occasionally; could kneel, crouch, crawl and stoop frequently; and had
no manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental limitations.
(AR 193-96).
Dr. Maze opined that Plaintiff could lift and/or
scaffolds)
She reasoned that Plaintiff had exertional and postural
limitations due to mild ataxia of the lower extremities.
(AR 194).
(hereinafter “RFC”) assessment was completed by Dr. Wilson, a state
Disability Determination Service (hereinafter “DDS”) physician.
154-62).
twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; could stand and/or
walk for about six hours and sit for about six hours in an eight-hour
workday; had no limitations in pushing and/or pulling; could never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds; could occasionally climb ramps or stairs;
could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; had no
manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations; and must avoid
concentrated exposures to heights (but otherwise had no environmental
Dr. Wilson opined that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry
(AR 155-58).
RFC is “what [one] can still do despite [his] limitations” and represents an “assessment based upon all of the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). 13
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On June 2, 2003, Dr. Mendelsohn completed a psychiatric review
technique form but could not make an assessment, due to insufficient
and argumentative during two prior psychiatric examinations, and thus
the evaluations could not be conducted.
commented that Plaintiff was diagnosed with postconcussive syndrome but
his mental state was cleared while he was at Harbor.
Mendelsohn also noted that Plaintiff was suspected of possible substance
intoxication or withdrawal.
(AR 163-77).
However, he noted that Plaintiff was very agitated
(AR 175; 177).
(AR 175).
Vocational Expert’s Testimony
Ms. Jeannie Metildi testified at the hearing as a VE.
(AR 25-26,
44-53).
She asserted that Plaintiff’s past positions as a house
painter, a heavy equipment operator and an automobile mechanic required
medium exertion and were considered to be skilled.
posed several hypotheticals to Ms. Metildi, including one involving an
individual of the same age, education and vocational background as
occasionally; could stand or walk for six hours and sit unlimitedly in
an eight-hour workday; could occasionally but not frequently climb
stairs and ramps, balance, crouch, crawl, stoop and kneel; could never
climb ladders or ropes; and could never work on scaffolds or other
unprotected heights.
the VE indicated that the individual could not understand, remember or
execution short, simple and detailed instructions; could make judgments
on simple work-related decisions; could not understand and follow
complex instructions; had mild difficulty interacting appropriately with
(AR 44-46).
(AR 44).
Furthermore, the question posed to
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 15 of 37 Page ID #:79
the public, coworkers or supervisors; could comply with job rules such
as safety and attendance; could respond to changes in the work setting;
and had mild difficulty responding appropriately to work pressures in a
usual work setting.
(AR 46-47).
Ms. Metildi opined that although the individual could not perform
Plaintiff’s past relevant work, the individual could perform certain
inspector/hand packager.
including (AR 47).
Ms. Metildi acknowledged that these
jobs required Reasoning Level 2 within the DOT’s scale of General
Education Development (hereinafter “GED”), whereby one must be able to
apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved
concept of “detailed” did not require an individual to understand
detailed instructions and perform semiskilled work.
she testified that these jobs were unskilled, simple work, where an
individual did not have to make any difficult decisions.
Furthermore, Ms. Metildi stated that she had observed many packaging
jobs and that they did not involve “detailed” instructions.
(AR 49-50, 52).
However, she asserted that the DOT’s
(AR 50).
(AR 51).
(AR 53).
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents him
from engaging in substantial gainful activity14 and that is expected to
Substantial gainful activity means work that involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties, and is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910. 15
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 16 of 37 Page ID #:80
result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve
incapable of performing the work he previously performed and incapable
of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in
Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 The impairment must render the claimant
so, the claimant is found not disabled.
to step five.
Is the claimant able to do any other work?
claimant is found disabled. If so, the claimant is found
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 17 of 37 Page ID #:81
Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d
949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99); 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) - 404.1520(f)(1) & 416.920(b) - 416.920(f)(1).
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and
the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five.
F.3d at 953-54 (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098).
ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the
record at every step of the inquiry.
Id. at 954.
If, at step four, the
claimant meets his burden of establishing an inability to perform past
work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform some
other work that exists in “significant numbers” in the national economy,
taking into account the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f)(1), 416.920(f)(1).
by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the Grids”).
F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100-01).
When a claimant has both exertional (strength-related) and nonexertional
limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the
testimony of a vocational expert.
(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir.
Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; The Commissioner may do so
Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 18 of 37 Page ID #:82
At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset of
posttraumatic stress disorder, left knee and left wrist arthritis,
lumbar spondylosis and atherosclerosis.15
(AR 18).
At the second step, the ALJ determined that
These impairments,
in combination, were deemed to be “severe.”
step, the ALJ found that the impairments did not meet or medically equal
any of the impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to
perform any of his past relevant work.
based on the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a
significant range of light work.
could lift twenty-five pounds occasionally and frequently; stand, walk
and sit without limitations; climb and balance occasionally; and kneel,
crouch, crawl and stoop frequently.16
This determination was
Specifically, Plaintiff
In addition, Plaintiff
The ALJ mistakenly states that Plaintiff had right knee and right wrist arthritis. (AR 18). However, the record shows that the ailments concerned Plaintiff’s left knee and left wrist. (AR 29, 38, 40, 115-18, 130, 147, 204). 16
In addition, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was a “younger” individual between the ages of forty-five and forty-nine, had a high school (or high school equivalent) education and had no transferable skills from any past relevant work and/or transferability of skills was not an issue in this case. (AR 19). 18
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 19 of 37 Page ID #:83
could perform simple, repetitive tasks; could make simple judgments;
would have mild difficulty interacting with others; could comply with
job safety and attendance rules; could respond to changes in the routine
work setting; and would have mild difficultly responding to pressures in
(AR 18-19).
The ALJ did not accept the consultative examiner’s assessment
conducted by the internist, but instead gave Plaintiff “the benefit of
adopt[ed]
capacity assessment of the examining neurologist.”
(AR 15).
the ALJ did not fully credit Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his
limitations because they were not totally credible.
13 At the fifth step, based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the VE’s testimony,
inspector/hand packager or office helper. (AR 19). Thus, Plaintiff was
not disabled at any time through the date of the decision.
19 STANDARD OF REVIEW
Commissioner’s decision when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error
or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)). 19
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 20 of 37 Page ID #:84
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.”
112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)).
reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; Smolen, 80
F.3d at 1279).
finding, the court must “‘consider the record as a whole, weighing both
[Commissioner’s] conclusion.’”
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. Chater, It is “relevant evidence which a
Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (citing Penny
v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)).
reasonably support either affirming or reversing that conclusion, the
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred for four reasons.17
he claims that the ALJ’s nondisability finding was not supported by
substantial evidence. (JS at 3). Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
failed to properly reject Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (JS at 4).
Third, he alleges that the ALJ failed to develop the record.
Plaintiff retained the ability to perform the alternate occupations
(JS at 5,
Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in finding that
The first three issues were raised under a single argument which questioned whether the ALJ’s nondisability finding was supported by substantial evidence. (JS at 2). 20
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 21 of 37 Page ID #:85
identified by the VE.
(JS at 10).
The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s
The ALJ’s RFC Finding Was Supported By Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by
substantial evidence. (JS at 3). He contends that the medical evidence
of record supports a more restrictive RFC than that found by the ALJ.
(JS at 3).
In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider whether a
claimant’s impairments may disable him to such an extent that he is
unable to perform available work.
Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997).
RFC determination based upon medical information in the record plus all
other record evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); see Andrews v. Shalala,
53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; Light v. Soc. The ALJ must make the
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could lift twenty-five pounds
occasionally and frequently; stand, walk and sit without limitations;
climb and balance occasionally; and kneel, crouch, crawl and stoop
difficulty interacting with others; could comply with job safety and
attendance rules; could respond to changes in the routine work setting;
(AR 19). tasks;
In addition, Plaintiff could perform simple,
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The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s physical RFC based on a neurological
examination conducted by Dr. Maze, who opined that Plaintiff had some
“slight focal findings.”
cerebellar functioning of Plaintiff’s left side was slightly impaired,
Plaintiff’s right side was normal.
examination testing the strength of Plaintiff’s extremities did not
reveal any significant impairment. (AR 185). Furthermore, CT scans and
EEGs of the brain returned with normal results.
203, 206).
(AR 15, 186).
Specifically, though the
In addition, a motor
(AR 122, 143, 145, 183,
In regard to Plaintiff’s left wrist, Dr. Danna opined that the
weakness and incoordination in the left wrist were mild.
(AR 15, 204).
Furthermore, using the Jamar dynamometer, Plaintiff’s grip strength was
assessed at 75/75/75 for his right hand and 90/90/90 for his left hand.
The ALJ also noted Dr. Sedgh’s record that Plaintiff had a limited
range of motion in his lumbar spine (i.e., flexion was 20/90 degrees,
extension and lateral flexion was 15/30 degrees and straight-leg-raising
test was negative).
spine revealed spondylosis, but the intervertebral disc spaces were not
significantly compromised and there was no evidence of compression or
other fracture.
(AR 15, 149).
In addition, x-rays of the lumbar
(AR 153).
In determining Plaintiff’s mental RFC, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff
did not take any psychiatric drugs, has never been psychiatrically
hospitalized, did not have suicidal or homicidal ideation, and did not
have any hallucinations.
(AR 16, 178-79). 22
The ALJ also noted the MSE
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 23 of 37 Page ID #:87
administered by Dr. Aguilar, which revealed that Plaintiff was alert and
oriented; had normal speech rate, tone, fund of knowledge, memory,
concentration, calculation, abstraction, insight and judgment; and did
not have disorganized thinking or looseness of association.
alleged physical and mental impairments support the ALJ’s RFC finding.
As such, no remand is required.
(AR 16,
The ALJ Properly Rejected Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony As Not Credible
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints were not credible.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to make an “explicit, full and
detailed” finding as to credibility, supported by specific, cogent
reasons for the disbelief.18 (JS at 5-6). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
improperly isolated parts of the record to support his nondisability
demonstrates the significant limitations in his ability to stand and
walk for prolonged periods.
(JS at 5).
(JS at 4).
He contends that close scrutiny of the record
In the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff initially argued that the “ALJ may not reject [Plaintiff’s] subjective allegations solely on the lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the severity of the alleged symptoms.” (JS at 4). Defendant then responded that the ALJ also considered inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony. (JS at 8). Plaintiff now contends that the ALJ erred because the “ALJ’s sole reason for rejecting [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints was that his activities were incompatible with these complaints.” (JS at 9). Plaintiff is essentially acknowledging that the ALJ based his credibility determination on at least two different reasons. However, as will be discussed below, the ALJ provided numerous other reasons in discrediting Plaintiff’s complaints. 23
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Generally, a claimant’s credibility becomes important at the stage
where the ALJ assesses RFC because the claimant’s subjective statements
Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Social
Security Ruling 96-7p).
testimony regarding his limitations if the ALJ makes specific findings
stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so.
at 1283-84 (citing Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993);
see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended)
(explaining that unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the
claimant is malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s
testimony must be “clear and convincing”).
plaintiff’s testimony if he makes an explicit credibility finding that
is “supported by a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief.”
v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations
However, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s
See Smolen, 80 F.3d
The ALJ may reject a
Although the absence of objective medical findings to support the
complaints, it has been recognized as one valid consideration.
Wainwright v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 939 F.2d 680, 682 (9th
claimant’s subjective complaints include the following: (1) ordinary
techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation
for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms and
other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2)
unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to
follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily
Other factors that the ALJ may use to discredit a
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 25 of 37 Page ID #:89
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278
F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (listing factors including: (1) the
claimant's reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies either in
the claimant's testimony or between his testimony and his conduct; (3)
the claimant’s daily activities; (4) the claimant’s work record; and (5)
testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature,
severity and effect of the symptoms of which the claimant complains)
(citing Light, 119 F.3d at 792).
Plaintiff testified that the vertigo and the leg pain were his most
severe disabilities. (AR 34). He asserted that he experienced episodes
of dizziness, which caused him to fall down “quite a bit.”
He also alleged that his leg felt numb.
Plaintiff testified that he did not use his left hand due to the pain
and lack of strength in his wrist.
experienced pain in his lower back.
alleged that he suffered from constant headaches, which interfered with
his concentration. (AR 37-38). He stated that the headaches compounded
his vision problems, causing him to see “spots” and “flashes.”
(AR 38). (AR 40).
(AR 36-37). In addition,
He also stated that he Furthermore, Plaintiff
(AR 38-
In regard to his mental impairments, Plaintiff testified that he
experienced auditory hallucinations of “the Lord” speaking to him.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserted that he had claustrophobia, as he felt
uneasy in rooms without windows and “real fidgety” around people.
He also stated that “he forget[s] things real eas[ily].”
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 26 of 37 Page ID #:90
Plaintiff estimated that he was able to walk for about 100 feet
addition, Plaintiff alleged that he was able to lift and carry about “a
The ALJ cited several reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding his mental limitations.19 (AR 16). For example, the ALJ found
that the psychiatric examinations were not consistent with the degree of
mental illness expressed by Plaintiff.
an MSE and found that Plaintiff was alert, well-developed, well-
Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning and sensorium were normal and his
reality contact (i.e., hallucinations, confusion, etc.) was similarly
(AR 16).
Dr. Aguilar conducted
One of the reasons for the ALJ’s discrediting Plaintiff’s allegation of disabling mental illness was based on Plaintiff’s failure to seek mental health treatment at a free or low-cost clinic. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. However, Plaintiff’s failure to receive mental health treatment is not a substantial basis upon which to reject a claim of mental disability. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1124 (6th Cir. 1989) (questioning practice of chastising an individual with a mental impairment for his exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation)). Nevertheless, as will be elaborated below, the ALJ provided other sufficient grounds for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. Therefore, to the extent the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s failure to seek mental health treatment was error, it was harmless error. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1990) (harmless error rule applies to review of administrative decisions regarding disability); Booz v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1984) (same). 26
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that his prognosis was fair.
could understand, remember and carry out short, simple and detailed
instructions; could make judgment on simple work-related decisions;
coworkers and supervisors; could comply with job rules, such as safety
and would have mild difficulty responding appropriate to work pressure
psychiatric evaluation was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s assertions that
he could not concentrate, had poor short-term memory and experienced
ALJ may consider testimony from physicians concerning the nature,
severity and effect of the symptoms of which a claimant complains when
rejecting subjective testimony). This was a specific, cogent reason for
discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.
She assessed Plaintiff’s GAF at 62 and opined (AR 180).
She concluded that Plaintiff
The ALJ correctly found that the
See Light, 119 F.3d at 792 (holding that an
Additionally, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements
regarding the existence of his auditory hallucinations.
(AR 16); see
hallucinations at the hearing, he denied any history of such illness
during his psychiatric examination, held less than four months prior to
the hearing.20
Though Plaintiff complained of auditory
(AR 25, 29, 40, 178, 180).
Furthermore, although
At the hearing, Plaintiff asserted that he started to experience auditory hallucinations “[r]oughly about when [he] was in the hospital” (i.e., after the assault in June 2002). (AR 41). 27
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Plaintiff asserts to have complained of his auditory hallucinations to
Dr. Danna, the record does not indicate such a complaint.21
subjective allegations.
(AR 198-
This was a legitimate reason for discrediting Plaintiff’s
The ALJ also discredited Plaintiff’s subjective allegations because
Plaintiff’s conduct during the hearing was not consistent with a
disabling mental illness.
1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding an ALJ’s reliance on observations of
the claimant at the hearing proper when the claimant’s symptoms were
inconsistent with the medical evidence and other behavior the claimant
exhibited at the hearing).
from constant headaches, which interfered with his concentration, he was
able to sit through the hearing and participate in answering questions.
(AR 16); see Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d
Though Plaintiff alleged that he suffered
Furthermore, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s complaints of physical
complaints and his activities. (AR 16); see Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59.
In his decision, the ALJ noted the inconsistency of reported symptoms by stating that Plaintiff complained of his psychological symptoms only once. (AR 18). It appears that the ALJ is crediting Plaintiff’s assertion that he complained of auditory hallucinations to Dr. Danna. In addition, Plaintiff complained of depression only once to Dr. Danna, despite at least fifteen visits. (AR 16). However, Plaintiff has complained of mood swings twice. (AR 207-08). One of these complaints was made on the same day that he complained of his depression. (AR 207). In addition, the record indicates that Plaintiff had previously been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (i.e., the record for the first day of treatment from Dr. Danna contains the following: “s/p post trauma stress synd.”). (AR 208). 28
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Despite Plaintiff’s testimony that he could only walk 100 feet and stand
for less than fifteen or thirty minutes, he reported to Dr. Maze that he
walked twenty miles per day in an effort to relieve stress.
This admission to Dr. Maze strongly suggests that Plaintiff was not
severely limited in his ability to walk or stand.
September 24, 2003, Dr. Danna, the treating physician, noted that
Plaintiff had been doing “remarkably well in the past few months” and
was “ambulating continuously throughout the day.”
properly relied on this evidence to conclude that Plaintiff’s assertions
In addition, on
about his ability to walk were not credible.
The ALJ made an explicit credibility finding that is supported by
specific, cogent reasons for the disbelief, as the ALJ has provided
numerous reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations.
Accordingly, the ALJ properly rejected Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
as not credible.
F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If the ALJ’s credibility finding is
supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the Court] may not
engage in second-guessing.”).
See Rashad, 903 F.2d at 1231; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278
The ALJ Satisfied His Duty To Develop The Record
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ has an affirmative obligation to
seek out an explanation for the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s
complaints and his daily activities before using them to discredit him.
(AR 5, 9).
to develop the record, the Court rejects this claim.
As the ALJ here met his obligations and satisfied his duty
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 30 of 37 Page ID #:94
The ALJ has an affirmative duty to fully and fairly develop the
record in a social security case.
1150 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the ALJ’s duty to conduct an appropriate
inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.
also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (duty not
triggered where the ALJ did not make a finding that the medical report
was inadequate to make a disability determination); Mayes v. Massanari,
276 F.3d 453 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that an ALJ’s duty to
develop the record is triggered by ambiguous or inadequate evidence in
the record).
Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,
solely that
Here, the ALJ fulfilled his duty to fully and fairly develop the
The agency sought all of Plaintiff’s treating records.
hearing, Plaintiff was questioned about his physical and mental ailments
and their impact on his daily life.
was asked about his education and past work history.
(AR 29-34).
Plaintiff underwent multiple consultative examinations.
The ALJ then
further developed the record by calling a VE to testify and answer
several hypothetical questions. (AR 44-53).
(AR 29, 36-44).
Plaintiff does not point to any true ambiguity in the record.
the extent there were inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ
would have required the ALJ to do more.
history and the consultative examinations sufficed to present a full and
There was no uncertainty in the record that
Plaintiff’s past medical
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 31 of 37 Page ID #:95
clear picture of Plaintiff’s impairments.
required to further develop the record.
Accordingly, the ALJ was not
The ALJ Properly Concluded That Plaintiff Could Perform The Alternative Occupations Identified By The VE
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that he retained
the ability to perform the alternative work identified by the VE.
at 10). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the VE’s testimony deviated
from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (hereinafter “DOT”) without
providing legally sufficient reasons. (JS at 11). The Court disagrees.
At step five of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ has the burden
to prove that the claimant is able to make an adjustment to other work.
Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54.
rely on the VE’s testimony that contradicts the DOT if the record
contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation.22
Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995).
In making his assessments, the ALJ may
According to DOT codes 559.687-074 and 239.567-010, the occupations
of an inspector/hand packager and office helper require Reasoning Level
2 (out of a six-point scale), where the claimant must have the mental
capacity to perform the following:
DOT classifications provide a rebuttable presumption regarding certain jobs and require that the ALJ take notice of the DOT’s classifications. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(2)-(5)(e). 31
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Apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but
uninvolved written or oral instructions.
involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized
(JS, Exhs. 2, 3) (emphasis added).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was limited to performing “simple,
repetitive” tasks. (AR 18). Plaintiff therefore contends that the VE’s
testimony that Plaintiff possessed Reasoning Level 2 deviated from the
“detailed” instructions.23
the VE may deviate from the DOT.
did not articulate sufficient bases for the deviation.
(JS at 10-11).
Plaintiff acknowledges that
However, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (JS at 11).
Here, the deviation alleged by Plaintiff does not exist because the
reasoning level required of an inspector/hand packager and office helper
is consistent with Plaintiff’s RFC to perform “simple, repetitive”
Reasoning Level 2, the second lowest level of reasoning development.
Plaintiff assumes that the capacity to carry out “detailed” instructions
exceeds that of one who can perform “simple, repetitive” tasks.
Plaintiff first errs by misreading the DOT’s definition of
Plaintiff contends that he has the mental capability commensurate with Reasoning Level 1, which requires the ability to apply commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions and deal with standardized situations with occasional or no variables in or from these situations encountered on the job. (JS at 10). 32
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limitations, as introduced by the ALJ, can perform tasks commensurate
with Reasoning Level 2.
In his hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE, Ms. Metildi, whether an
individual possessing Plaintiff’s limitations (e.g., one who “[could
not]. . . carry[]out short, simple, and detailed instructions,” “could
make judgments on simple work[-]related decisions” and “would probably
not be able to understand and follow complex instructions”) could
perform other work.24
Ms. Metildi testified that such an
individual could perform the occupation of an inspector/hand packager or
office helper.
(AR 47-48).
The ALJ then asked whether these jobs could be performed by the
instructions. (AR 50). Ms. Metildi responded by stating that the DOT’s
meaning of “detailed” was different from that of the Social Security
pertained to work that was complex and semi-skilled.
Conversely, the DOT’s definition concerned work that was “standardized,
uninvolved, [and] not complicated.”
stated that the occupations of an inspector/hand packager and office
helper were “unskilled[,]” “simple[,] repetitive jobs” and that they
“[would] not vary very much at all.”
that she had personally witnessed many packaging jobs across numerous
“detailed”
The Social Security’s definition of “detailed”
(AR 18, 50, 52).
Furthermore, Ms. Metildi
She concluded by stating
In proffering the hypothetical, the ALJ used the term “detailed instructions” consistent with the Social Security regulations’ definition of “detailed,” which means complex. (AR 47, 50). Therefore, the hypothetical concerned an individual who could not carry out complex instructions but could carry out simple, repetitive tasks. 33
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 34 of 37 Page ID #:98
factories and did not understand why “the DOT [] describ[ed] [those
jobs] as detailed.”
these jobs (i.e., those involving the ability to carry out “detailed”
instructions according to the DOT) were consistent with the ability to
perform “simple, repetitive” tasks.
capable of performing simple, repetitive tasks, the VE testified that
she believed he could perform the occupations of an inspector/hand
packager or office helper. (AR 47-53). Thereafter, the ALJ adopted Ms.
Metildi’s testimony.
Accordingly, Ms. Metildi opined that
(AR 50-53).
As Plaintiff was
Plaintiff also fails to account for the qualifier that the DOT
places on the term “detailed” as also being “uninvolved.” (JS, Exhs. 2,
instructions and reinforces the notion that such a requirement is not as
rigorous as Plaintiff alleges.
The requirement of being able to carry out instructions that are but
uninvolved”
Although the Ninth Circuit has never reached this issue, other
courts have found that a job requiring Reasoning Level 2 is not
necessarily inconsistent with a limitation to doing “simple, repetitive
(stating that Reasoning Level 2 appears more consistent with claimant’s
RFC to “simple and routine work tasks”); Meissl v. Barnhart, 403 F.
Supp. 2d 981, 983-85 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that Reasoning Level 2
jobs are consistent with the ALJ’s limitation to simple, repetitive
tasks); Flaherty v. Halter, 182 F. Supp. 2d 824, 850 (D. Minn. 2001)
(holding that DOT’s Reasoning Level 2 requirement did not conflict with
the ALJ’s limitation to “simple, routine, repetitive, concrete, tangible
See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005)
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 35 of 37 Page ID #:99
tasks[,]” as the DOT “specifically caveats that the instructions would
be uninvolved-that is, not a high level of reasoning”).
similarly found Plaintiff’s RFC to be limited to “simple, repetitive”
tasks and determined that Plaintiff could perform other work that
required Reasoning Level 2. (AR 18-19).
Here, the ALJ
Furthermore, Ms. Metildi unequivocally testified that Reasoning
Level 2 was consistent with the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could
This was based on her
expertise as a VE and her observations visiting “many factories and
see[ing] many packaging jobs[.]”
acknowledged in Johnson v. Shalala that relying on a VE’s testimony that
a particular claimant can perform a particular work “seems an eminently
appropriate use of the vocational expert’s knowledge and experience.”
Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435.
of reasoning required by the occupations of an inspector/hand packager
and office helper, the Court finds that the VE’s testimony did not
deviate from the DOT.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has
Given the VE’s testimony on the minimal level
Even if Ms. Metildi’s testimony had deviated from the DOT, the
As stated above, Ms. Metildi
explained that she had personally observed these occupations being
performed and knows that the work is simple and repetitive.
Metildi’s testimony as to how this work is actually performed would
constitute persuasive evidence to support the deviation.
60 F.3d at 1435.
error was therefore harmless.
F.2d at 1380-81.
Because the outcome would have been the same, any See Curry, 925 F.2d at 1131; Booz, 734
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supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standards.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff retained the
ability to perform other work as an inspector/hand packager or office
Id. (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097).
Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be
entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this
this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.
The Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of
/s/ ______________________________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 36
Case 2:05-cv-02673-SS Document 17 Filed 08/31/06 Page 37 of 37 Page ID #:101
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