Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/479/238/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-05-23 12:45:30
Document Index: 279870105

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 441', '§ 437', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 431', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 304', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 441', '§ 610', '§ 441', '§ 434', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 434', '§ 434', '§ 434', '§ 434', '§ 434', '§ 434', '§ 434', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 434', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 316', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 9012', '§ 9012', '§ 441']

FEC v. Mass. Cit. for Life (full text) :: 479 U.S. 238 (1986) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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FEC v. Mass. Cit. for Life 479 U.S. 238 (1986)
U.S. Supreme CourtFEC v. Mass. Cit. for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986)Federal Election Commission v.Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.No. 85-701Argued October 7, 1986Decided December 15, 1986479 U.S. 238APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
Section 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibits corporations from using treasury funds to make an expenditure "in connection with" any federal election, and requires that any expenditure for such purpose be financed by voluntary contributions to a separate segregated fund. Appellee is a nonprofit, nonstock corporation, whose purpose is to foster respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn, through educational, political, and other forms of activities. To further this purpose, it has published a newsletter that has been distributed to contributors and to noncontributors who have expressed support for the organization. In September, 1978, appellee prepared and distributed a "Special Edition" exhorting readers to vote "pro-life" in the upcoming primary elections in Massachusetts, listing the candidates for each state and federal office in every voting district in the State, and identifying each one as either supporting or opposing appellee's views. While some 400 candidates were listed, the photographs of only 13 were featured, all of whom were identified as favoring appellee's views. The publication was prepared by a staff that had prepared no regular newsletter, was distributed to a much larger audience than that of the regular newsletter, most of whom were members of the general public, and was financed by money taken from appellee's general treasury funds. A complaint was filed with appellant Federal Election Commission (FEC) alleging that the "Special Edition" violated § 316 as representing an expenditure of funds from a corporate treasury to distribute to the general public a campaign flyer on behalf of certain political candidates. After the FEC determined that there was probable cause to believe that appellee had violated the statute, the FEC filed a complaint in Federal District Court, seeking a civil penalty and other relief. The District Court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, holding that § 316 did not apply to appellee, but that, if it did it, was unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals held that the statute applied to appellee and, as so applied, was unconstitutional. Page 479 U. S. 239
2. Section 316's restriction of independent spending is unconstitutional as applied to appellee, for it infringes protected speech without a compelling justification for such infringement. The concern underlying the regulation of corporate political activity -- that organizations that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace -- is absent with regard to appellee. Appellee was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. It has no shareholders or other persons having a claim on its assets or earnings, but obtains its funds from persons who make contributions to further the organization's political purposes. It was not established by a business corporation or a labor union, and its policy is not to accept contributions from such entities. Pp. 479 U. S. 256-265. Page 479 U. S. 240
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, an opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-B and III-C, in which MARSHALL, POWELL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-A, in which MARSHALL, POWELL, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 479 U. S. 265. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 479 U. S. 266. WHITE, J., filed a separate statement, post, p. 479 U. S. 271. Page 479 U. S. 241
"To foster respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn, through educational, political and other forms of activities and in Page 479 U. S. 242 addition to engage in any other lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized . . . ."
MCFL began publishing a newsletter in January, 1973. It was distributed as a matter of course to contributors, and, when funds permitted, to noncontributors who had expressed support for the organization. The total distribution of any one issue has never exceeded 6,000. The newsletter was published irregularly from 1973 through 1978: three times in 1973, five times in 1974, eight times in 1975, eight times in 1976, five times in 1977, and four times in 1978. Id. at 88. Page 479 U. S. 243 Each of the newsletters bore a masthead identifying it as the "Massachusetts Citizens for Life Newsletter," as well as a volume and issue number. The publication typically contained appeals for volunteers and contributions and information on MCFL activities, as well as on matters such as the results of hearings on bills and constitutional amendments, the status of particular legislation, and the outcome of referenda, court decisions, and administrative hearings. Newsletter recipients were usually urged to contact the relevant decisionmakers and express their opinion.
To aid the reader in selecting candidates, the flyer listed the candidates for each state and federal office in every voting district in Massachusetts, and identified each one as either supporting or opposing what MCFL regarded as the correct position on three issues. A "y" indicated that a candidate supported the MCFL view on a particular issue, and an "n" indicated that the candidate opposed it. An asterisk was placed next to the names of those incumbents who had made Page 479 U. S. 244 a
A complaint was filed with the Commission alleging that the "Special Edition" was a violation of § 441b. The complaint maintained that the Edition represented an expenditure of funds from a corporate treasury to distribute to the general public a campaign flyer on behalf of certain political candidates. The FEC found reason to believe that such a Page 479 U. S. 245 violation had occurred, initiated an investigation, and determined that probable cause existed to believe that MCFL had violated the Act. After conciliation efforts failed, the Commission filed a complaint in the District Court under § 437g(a)(6)(A), seeking a civil penalty and other appropriate relief.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the "Special Edition" is not outside the reach of § 441b. First, we find no merit in appellee's contention that preparation and distribution of the "Special Edition" does not fall within that section's definition of "expenditure." Section 441b(b)(2) defines "contribution or expenditure" as the provision of various things of value "to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election . . ." (emphasis added). MCFL contends that, since it supplied nothing to any candidate or organization, the publication is not within § 441b. However, the general definitions section of the Act contains a broader definition of "expenditure," including within that term the provision of anything of value Page 479 U. S. 246 made "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office. . . ." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Since the language of the statute does not alone resolve the issue, we must look to the legislative history of § 441b to determine the scope of the term "expenditure." [Footnote 3]
That history clearly confirms that § 441b was meant to proscribe expenditures in connection with an election. We have exhaustively recounted the legislative history of the predecessors of this section in prior decisions. See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 407 U. S. 402-409 (1972); United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 352 U. S. 570-587 (1957). This history makes clear that Congress has long regarded it as insufficient merely to restrict payments made directly to candidates or campaign organizations. The first explicit expression of this came in 1947, when Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 ed.), the criminal statute prohibiting corporate contributions and expenditures to candidates. The statute, as amended, forbade any corporation or labor organization to make a "contribution or expenditure in connection with any election . . ." for federal office. The 1946 Report of the House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Page 479 U. S. 247 Expenditures explained the rationale for the amendment, noting that it would undermine the basic objective of § 610
The Federal Election Campaign Act enacted the prohibition now found in § 441b. This portion of the Act simply ratified the existing understanding of the scope of § 610. See Page 479 U. S. 248 Pipefitters, supra, at 407 U. S. 410-411. Representative Hansen, the sponsor of the provision, declared:
Appellee next argues that the definition of an expenditure under § 441b necessarily incorporates the requirement that a communication "expressly advocate" the election of candidates, and that its "Special Edition" does not constitute express advocacy. The argument relies on the portion of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), that upheld the disclosure requirement for expenditures by individuals other than candidates and by groups other than political committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(c). There, in order to avoid problems of overbreadth, the Court held that the term "expenditure" encompassed "only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified Page 479 U. S. 249 candidate." 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 80 (footnote omitted). The rationale for this holding was:
Buckley adopted the "express advocacy" requirement to distinguish discussion of issues and candidates from more pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons. We therefore concluded in that case that a finding of "express advocacy" depended upon the use of language such as "vote for," "elect," "support," etc., Buckley, supra, at 424 U. S. 44, n. 52. Just such an exhortation appears in the "Special Edition." The publication not only urges voters to vote for "pro-life" candidates, but also identifies and provides photographs of specific candidates fitting that description. The Edition cannot be regarded as a mere discussion of public issues that by their nature raise the names of certain politicians. Rather, it provides, in effect, an explicit directive: vote for these (named) candidates. The fact that this message is marginally less direct than "Vote for Smith" does not change its essential nature. The Edition goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral advocacy. The disclaimer of endorsement cannot negate this fact. The "Special Edition" thus falls Page 479 U. S. 250 squarely within § 441b, for it represents express advocacy of the election of particular candidates distributed to members of the general public.
H.R.Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 4 (1974). We need not decide whether the regular MCFL newsletter is exempt under this provision, because, even assuming that it is, the "Special Edition" cannot be considered comparable to any single issue of the newsletter. It was not published through the facilities of the regular newsletter, but by a staff which prepared no previous or subsequent newsletters. It was not distributed to the newsletter's regular audience, but to a group 20 times the size of that audience, most of whom were members of the public who had never received the newsletter. No characteristic of the Edition associated it in any way with the normal MCFL publication. The MCFL Page 479 U. S. 251 masthead did not appear on the flyer, and, despite an apparent belated attempt to make it appear otherwise, the Edition contained no volume and issue number identifying it as one in a continuing series of issues.
Independent expenditures constitute expression "at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.'" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 393 U. S. 32 (1968)). See also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U. S. 480, 470 U. S. 493 (1985) (NCPAC) (independent expenditures "produce speech at the core of the First Amendment"). We must therefore Page 479 U. S. 252 determine whether the prohibition of § 441b burdens political speech, and, if so, whether such a burden is justified by a compelling state interest. Buckley, supra, at 424 U. S. 44-45.
If it were not incorporated, MCFL's obligations under the Act would be those specified by § 434(c), the section that prescribes the duties of "[e]very person (other than a political committee)." [Footnote 6] Section 434(c) provides that any such person that during a year makes independent expenditures exceeding $250 must: (1) identify all contributors who contribute in a given year over $200 in the aggregate in funds to influence elections, § 434(c)(1); (2) disclose the name and address of recipients of independent expenditures exceeding $200 in the aggregate, along with an indication of whether the money was used to support or oppose a particular candidate, § 434(c)(2)(A); and (3) identify any persons who make contributions over $200 that are earmarked for the purpose of furthering independent expenditures, § 434(c)(2)(C). All unincorporated organizations whose major purpose is not campaign advocacy, but who occasionally make independent expenditures on behalf of candidates, are subject only to these regulations. Page 479 U. S. 253
Under § 434, MCFL must file either monthly reports with the FEC or reports on the following schedule: quarterly reports during election years, a preelection report no later than the 12th day before an election, a post-election report within 30 days after an election, and reports every 6 months during nonelection years, §§ 434(a)(4)(A),(B). These reports must contain information regarding the amount of cash on Page 479 U. S. 254 hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identification of each political committee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making contributions, and any persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200; the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by 12 different categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggregating over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation. § 434(b). In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its separate segregated fund only from its "members," §§ 441b(b)(4)(A), (C), which does not include those persons who have merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization in the past. See FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S. 197, 459 U. S. 204 (1982).
It is evident from this survey that MCFL is subject to more extensive requirements and more stringent restrictions than it would be if it were not incorporated. These additional regulations may create a disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech. Detailed recordkeeping and disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint a treasurer and custodian of the records, impose administrative costs that many small entities may be unable to bear. [Footnote 7] Furthermore, such duties require a far more complex Page 479 U. S. 255 and formalized organization than many small groups could manage. Restriction of solicitation of contributions to "members" vastly reduces the sources of funding for organizations with either few or no formal members, directly limiting the ability of such organizations to engage in core political speech. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, as in this case, an incorporated group of like-minded persons might seek donations to support the dissemination of their political ideas and their occasional endorsement of political candidates, by means of garage sales, bake sales, and raffles. Such persons might well be turned away by the prospect of complying with all the requirements imposed by the Act. Faced with the need to assume a more sophisticated organizational form, to adopt specific accounting procedures, to file periodic detailed reports, and to monitor garage sales lest nonmembers take a fancy to the merchandise on display, it would not be surprising if at least some groups decided that the contemplated political activity was simply not worth it. [Footnote 8]
Thus, while § 441b does not remove all opportunities for independent spending by organizations such as MCFL, the avenue it leaves open is more burdensome than the one it forecloses. The fact that the statute's practical effect may be to discourage protected speech is sufficient to characterize § 441b as an infringement on First Amendment activities. In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), for instance, we held that the absence of certain procedural safeguards rendered unconstitutional a State's film censorship program. Such procedures were necessary, we said, because, as a practical matter, without them "it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor's determination." Id. at 380 U. S. 59. Page 479 U. S. 256 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), reviewed a state program under which taxpayers applying for a certain tax exemption bore the burden of proving that they did not advocate the overthrow of the United States, and would not support a foreign government against this country. We noted:
When a statutory provision burdens First Amendment rights, it must be justified by a compelling state interest. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 31; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 371 U. S. 438 (1963). The FEC first insists that justification for § 441b's expenditure restriction is provided by this Court's acknowledgment that "the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation." National Right to Work Committee, supra, at 459 U. S. 209-210. The Commission thus relies on the long history of regulation of corporate political activity as support for the application of § 441b to MCFL. Evaluation of the Commission's Page 479 U. S. 257 argument requires close examination of the underlying rationale for this long-standing regulation.
Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace. Political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources. See NCPAC, supra, (invalidating Page 479 U. S. 258 limits on independent spending by political committees); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 39-51 (striking down expenditure limits in 1971 Campaign Act). Relative availability of funds is, after all, a rough barometer of public support. The resources in the treasury of a business corporation, however, are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.
407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 423-424 (quoting 117 Cong.Rec. 43381 (1971)). [Footnote 11] See also Automobile Workers, supra, at 352 U. S. 582 Page 479 U. S. 259 (Congress added proscription on expenditures to Corrupt Practices Act "to protect the political process from what it deemed to be the corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated power"). The expenditure restrictions of § 441b are thus meant to ensure that competition among actors in the political arena is truly competition among ideas.
National Right to Work Committee does not support the inclusion of MCFL within § 441b's restriction on direct independent spending. That case upheld the application to a nonprofit corporation of a different provision of § 441b: the limitation on who can be solicited for contributions to a political committee. However, the political activity at issue in that case was contributions, as the committee had been established for the purpose of making direct contributions to political candidates. 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 200. We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling Page 479 U. S. 260 justification than restrictions on independent spending. NCPAC, 470 U. S. 480 (1985); California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 453 U. S. 194, 453 U. S. 196-197 (1981); Buckley, supra, at 424 U. S. 20-22.
This rationale for regulation is not compelling with respect to independent expenditures by appellee. Individuals who contribute to appellee are fully aware of its political purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they support Page 479 U. S. 261 those purposes. It is true that a contributor may not be aware of the exact use to which his or her money ultimately may be put, or the specific candidate that it may be used to support. However, individuals contribute to a political organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a more effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their own personal direction. Any contribution therefore necessarily involves at least some degree of delegation of authority to use such funds in a manner that best serves the shared political purposes of the organization and contributor. In addition, an individual desiring more direct control over the use of his or her money can simply earmark the contribution for a specific purpose, an option whose availability does not depend on the applicability of § 441b. Cf. § 434(c)(2)(C) (entities other than political committees must disclose names of those persons making earmarked contributions over $200). Finally, a contributor dissatisfied with how funds are used can simply stop contributing.
It is true that National Right to Work Committee, supra, held that the goal of protecting minority interests justified solicitation restrictions on a nonprofit corporation operating a political committee established to make direct contributions to candidates. As we have noted above, however, the Government enjoys greater latitude in limiting contributions Page 479 U. S. 262 than in regulating independent expenditures. Supra at 479 U. S. 259-260. Given a contributor's awareness of the political activity of appellee, as well as the readily available remedy of refusing further donations, the interest protecting contributors is simply insufficient to support § 441b's restriction on the independent spending of MCFL.
Furthermore, should MCFL's independent spending become so extensive that the organization's major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation would be classified as a political committee. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 79. As such, it would automatically be subject to the obligations and restrictions applicable to those groups whose primary objective is to influence political campaigns. In sum, there is no need for the sake of disclosure to treat MCFL any differently than other organizations that only occasionally engage in independent spending on behalf of candidates. Page 479 U. S. 263
Our conclusion is that § 441b's Page 479 U. S. 264 restriction of independent spending is unconstitutional as applied to MCFL, for it infringes protected speech without a compelling justification for such infringement. We acknowledge the legitimacy of Congress' concern that organizations that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace.
It may be that the class of organizations affected by our holding today will be small. That prospect, however, does not diminish the significance of the rights at stake. Freedom of speech plays a fundamental role in a democracy; as this Court has said, freedom of thought and speech "is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 302 U. S. 327 (1937). Our pursuit of other governmental ends, however, may tempt us to accept in small increments a loss that would Page 479 U. S. 265 be unthinkable if inflicted all at once. For this reason, we must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as we are against its sweeping restriction. Where at all possible, government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation. In enacting the provision at issue in this case, Congress has chosen too blunt an instrument for such a delicate task.
I join Parts I, II, III-B, and III-C, and I concur in the Court's judgment that § 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (Act), 2 U.S.C. § 441b, is unconstitutional as applied to the conduct of appellee Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), at issue in this case. I write separately, however, because I am concerned that the Court's discussion of the Act's disclosure requirements may be read as moving away from the teaching of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); see ante at 479 U. S. 254-255. In Buckley, the Court was concerned not only with the chilling effect of reporting and disclosure requirements on an organization's contributors, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 66-68, but also with the potential burden of disclosure requirements on a group's own speech. Id. at 424 U. S. 74-82. The Buckley Court concluded that disclosure of a group's independent campaign expenditures serves the important governmental interest of "shed[ding] the light of publicity" on campaign financing, thereby helping voters to evaluate the constituencies of those who seek federal office. Id. at 424 U. S. 81. As a result, the burden of disclosing independent expenditures generally is "a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to public view." Id. at 424 U. S. 82. Page 479 U. S. 266
In FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S. 197, 459 U. S. 209-210 (1982) (NRWC), the Court unanimously endorsed the "legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation." I continue to believe that this judgment, as reflected in 2 U.S.C. § 441b, is constitutionally sound and entitled to substantial deference, and therefore dissent from the Court's decision to "second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared." Id. at 459 U. S. 210. Though I agree that the expenditures in this case violated the terms of § 441b, and accordingly join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, I cannot accept the conclusion that the statutory provisions are unconstitutional Page 479 U. S. 267 as applied to appellee Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL).
The Court, rejecting the "teachings of our earlier decisions," NRWC, supra, at 459 U. S. 210, and the judgment of Congress, [Footnote 2/1] confidently concludes that these dangers are not Page 479 U. S. 268 present here. "Groups such as MCFL," the Court assures us, do not pose "the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes." Ante at 479 U. S. 259. Because MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, we are told, the money it spends -- at least in the form of independent expenditures -- reflects the political ideas for which it stands without the threat or appearance of corruption. Ante at 479 U. S. 258-260. Nor does the Court find any need to protect the interests of contributors to MCFL by requiring the establishment of a separate segregated fund for its political expenditures. Individual contributors can simply withhold their contributions if they disagree with the corporation's choices; those who continue to give will be protected by requiring notice to them that their money might be used for political purposes. Ante at 479 U. S. 261-262.
I do not dispute that the threat from corporate political activity will vary depending on the particular characteristics of a given corporation; it is obvious that large and successful corporations with resources to fund a political war chest constitute a more potent threat to the political process than less successful business corporations or nonprofit corporations. It may also be that those supporting some nonbusiness corporations will identify with the corporations' political views more frequently than the average shareholder of General Motors would support the political activities of that corporation. These distinctions among corporations, however, are "distinctions in degree" that do not amount to "differences in kind." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 424 U. S. 30 (1976) (per curiam). Cf. NCPAC, supra, at 470 U. S. 498-499. As such, they are more properly drawn by the Legislature than by the Judiciary. See Buckley, supra, at 30. Congress expressed its judgment in § 441b that the threat posed by corporate political activity warrants a prophylactic measure applicable to all Page 479 U. S. 269 groups that organize in the corporate form. Our previous cases have expressed a reluctance to fine-tune such judgments; I would adhere to that counsel here.
The distinction between corporate and noncorporate activity was not diminished in NCPAC, supra, where we found fatally overbroad the $1,000 limitation in 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) on independent expenditures by "political committees." Our conclusion rested in part on the fact that § 9012(f) regulated Page 479 U. S. 270 not only corporations, but rather "indiscriminately lump[ed] with corporations any committee, association or organization.'" NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 470 U. S. 500. NCPAC accordingly continued to recognize what had been, until today, an acceptable distinction, grounded in the judgment of the political branch, between political activity by corporate actors and that by organizations not benefiting from "the corporate shield which the State [has] granted to corporations as a form of quid pro quo" for various regulations. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 454 U. S. 300 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). [Footnote 2/2]
The Court explains the decisions in NRWC and NCPAC by reference to another distinction found in our decisions -- that between contributions and independent expenditures. See Buckley, supra, at 424 U. S. 19-23. This is admittedly a distinction between the facts of NRWC and those of NCPAC, but it does not warrant a different result in view of our longstanding approval of limitations on corporate spending and of the type of regulation involved here. The distinction between contributions and independent expenditures is not a line separating black from white. The statute here -- though involving independent expenditures -- is not nearly so drastic as the "wholesale restriction of clearly protected conduct" at issue in NCPAC, supra, at 470 U. S. 501. It regulates instead the form of otherwise unregulated spending. A separate segregated fund formed by MCFL may use contributions it receives, without limit, on political expenditures. [Footnote 2/3] As the Court correctly Page 479 U. S. 271 notes, the regulation of § 441b is not without burdens, but it remains wholly different in character from that which we condemned in NCPAC. In these circumstances, I would defer to the congressional judgment that corporations are a distinct category with respect to which this sort of regulation is constitutionally permissible. [Footnote 2/4]