Source: http://marylandcourts.blogspot.com/2007/01/
Timestamp: 2018-01-16 07:43:26
Document Index: 607126034

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2000', '§1981', '§1341', '§901', '§19', '§9', '§2000', '§1']

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Decided January 26, 2007. Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake. (Not approved for publication)
Atkins, a Maryland resident of Native American national origin, filed suit against Winchester (his former employer), Weyerhaeuser Company (Winchester's parent company) and three manager/supervisors, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. §1981. All defendants moved to dismiss Atkins' amended complaint, raising both procedural and substantive arguments in support of their motions.
Atkins alleged that for years he had been subjected to daily racial harassment and that the manager/supervisors witnessed or knew of the harassment, but did nothing to prevent it. He also alleged that he was subjected to adverse actions on account of his national origin or in retaliation for asserting his civil rights. The alleged adverse actions included being called into a supervisor's office, being disciplined when a non-Native American peer was not, and ultimately being discharged.
Procedural Arguments: Atkins did not oppose Weyerhaeuser's motion, and the court dismissed all claims against Weyerhaeuser. In doing so, the court noted that Atkins did not adequately allege that Weyerhaeuser was his employer, stating that without "allegations of common management, interrelation of operations, centralized control, or degree of financial control, the mere fact of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to sustain" an action for discrimination.
Winchester argued that the Charge of Discrimination that Atkins filed with the EEOC lacked sufficient detail to be effective and that Atkins did not provide sufficient detail until after the 300 days for filing a charge had passed. The court pointed out that the "function of a charge is to initiate the investigatory and conciliatory procedures contemplated by Title VII." Here, the initial charge contained enough information for EEOC to begin its investigation. Moreover, EEOC regulations provide that later amendments to a charge relate back to the date of initial filing.
The manager/supervisors alleged that they were not properly served within the 120-day window provided by F.R.C.P. 4(m). Process was served on a co-worker and not on the individual defendants. The defendants, however, had actual knowledge of the suit and did not assert that they were prejudiced in any way by the failure to serve them individually. For that reason, the court liberally construed the rules and declined to dismiss the suit.
Substantive Arguments: Winchester challenged Atkins' claims of disparate treatment, retaliation and harassment/hostile work environment. The court found that neither being called into a meeting with a supervisor about allegations of discrimination nor a counseling session with a supervisor arose to the level of an adverse employment action sufficient to support a claim of discrimination. Termination of employment, however, clearly was such an adverse action. As for retaliation, Atkins failed to plead sufficient facts showing that his protected activity was the cause of his termination, and too much time passed between the activity and his dismissal to establish a causal connection without such specifics. On the harassment/hostile work environment claims, the allegations that the manager/supervisors witnessed the acts harassment and that Atkins had made complaints about the acts were sufficient to impose liability on his employer.
Because Title VII does not authorize claims against individuals, the Title VII claims against the individual defendants were dismissed. In addition, the court dismissed all of the Section 1981 claims against the individual defendants, except the claims against the manager/supervisor who fired Atkins. In reaching this result, the court reasoned that the acts attributed to the other manager/supervisors did not rise to the level of adverse employment actions, but that termination of employment did. In addition, the court ruled that allegations that the manager/supervisors failed to investigate or to prevent harassment by Atkins' co-workers were not sufficient to impose liability under Section 1981.
The memorandum is available in PDF The order is also available in PDF
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Labels: eeoc, employment discrimination, Judge Blake Catherine, Title VII
Filed January 26, 2007. Opinion by Judge Sally D. Adkins.
Issue: Are "no acceptance" and “no consideration” viable defenses to enforcement of an arbitration clause contained in a bank's depositary agreement?
Held: No. A depositor who signs a signature card or other agreement adopting the terms of a separate agreement containing an arbitration clause is bound by that arbitration clause. Judgment of the circuit court affirmed.
Facts: The court-appointed guardian of the property of a minor opened a bank account and deposited funds for the benefit of the minor. To open the account, the guardian signed a document that referred to and incorporated the terms of a depositary agreement containing a mandatory arbitration clause. The guardian did not sign the depositary agreement separately. The guardian then allegedly defalcated portions of the fund. The guardian was replaced by a substitute guardian who sued the first guardian and the bank in circuit court.
The bank moved to enforce the mandatory arbitration clause and asked that the litigation be stayed or dismissed. The plaintiff opposed the motion, raising as grounds 1) no acceptance of the clause, and 2) no consideration given for the clause. The circuit court enforced the arbitration agreement and stayed the litigation. The plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals identified and discussed a line of precedent establishing the principle that a depositor who accepts the terms of a separate deposit agreement by executing a signature card or other agreement is bound by the terms of the deposit agreement, even if the deposit agreement is not separately executed. The Court held that the guardian was bound by the terms of the second agreement, and that the substitute guardian was bound by the acts of her predecessor. The Court rejected the argument that, to be enforceable, the arbitration clause must be specifically referenced in the agreement signed by the depositor.
The plaintiff argued, alternatively, that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration, because it remained subject to unilateral modification by the bank under the terms of the depositary agreement. The plaintiff argued that the bank's unilateral right to change the terms meant it could "opt out" of arbitration at its discretion. This rendered the mutual promise of arbitration "illusory," and thus inadequate as consideration for a binding agreement. The Court held that the bank's agreement to provide 30-days notice of any change to the agreement meant that the bank was bound to the terms for at least 30 days. The Court held that this was sufficient consideration to support a binding agreement to arbitrate.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court.
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Labels: arbitration, banks, deposit agreement, Judge Adkins Sally
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Decided January 22, 2007--Memorandum Opinion by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow (not approved for publication)
Debtor initially filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2001 which was ultimately converted to Chapter 13 in 2002. At the time the Chapter 13 plan was confirmed, Debtor owned two residential properties. The plan called for Debtor to retain both properties while making payments to her creditors; however, in 2003, Debtor consented to sell one of the properties, the proceeds of which would be partially retained by Debtor, partially paid to Trustee for the benefit of the creditors, and partially remitted to Debtor’s former spouse who had been co-owner before the sale. In August 2005, a motion to dismiss by Trustee was pending because Debtor did not stay current on payments agreed to in a modified plan from 2004 reducing her monthly payment. Debtor moved to sell the second residential property and in October 2005 the bankruptcy court ordered that all net sale proceeds be paid directly to Trustee and disbursed to pay creditors, up to the amount required to pay all claims against Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
After completion of sale and Trustee’s distribution of proceeds, Debtor filed a motion contesting whether Trustee had the right to retain all proceeds of the sale. The bankruptcy court denied this motion in September 2006. Debtor filed a notice of appeal and filed an emergency motion in the bankruptcy court to stay the disbursement of the sale proceeds, which motion was denied September 29, 2006. On or about September 30, 2006, Trustee disbursed all remaining funds in the bankruptcy estate pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s Orders. Trustee filed a notice of plan completion in the bankruptcy court on October 5, 2006, and the bankruptcy court granted Debtor a discharge the next day.
On Debtor’s appeal, Trustee argued for dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of equitable mootness, definining mootness as when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. To survive an assertion that a claim is moot, a party must have suffered an actual injury that can be redressed by favorable judicial decision. Even the availability of a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent a case from being moot. Since Trustee paid out all the proceeds of the sale pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s Orders, and no creditors were parties to the appeal, it would be impossible to fashion any relief for Debtor even if she prevailed in the appeal because the nonparty creditors could not be ordered to return funds they had received. Consequently, the action was moot.
Debtor argued that the case was not moot because if she were to prevail on appeal, she could attempt to enforce a money judgment against Trustee for the distributed funds. The Court found that Debtor could not recover funds from Trustee personally because Trustee never held the proceeds from the sale for her own use and Trustee indicated that the funds were distributed pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s Orders.
Debtor relied on an unpublished opinion, Walker v. Grigsby, No. AW-06-62, slip op. at 4 (D.Md. April 11, 2006), in which the court concluded that an appeal by a debtor’s attorney contesting an order granting him only part of his requested fee was not constitutionally moot. Because the Debtor and Trustee remained parties to the case and at least one creditor continued to be subject to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, the court reasoned that the attorney might have the ability to seek payment, if he succeeded on appeal, from the Debtor, the Trustee, or other creditors. The instant case, however, differs in that the Trustee alleged she had paid out all available funds to nonparty creditors pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s Orders.
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Labels: attorneys' fees, bankruptcy, bankruptcy discharge, federal jurisdiction, Judge Chasanow Deborah, mootness, subject matter jurisdiction
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Decided December 13, 2006 – Opinion of Judge Susan K. Gauvey
Plaintiff had sued the named Defendant in the above caption above and multiple other defendants and filed a Second Amended Complaint in that case ("the 2004 case"), one of defendants (an attorney, "Rombro") had obtained a dismissal of all counts against him. Plaintiff subsequently filed a new complaint against Rombro ("the 2006 case"), for which Rombro intended to seek a dismissal or summary judgment due to collateral estoppel or res judicata. The general subject matter of both suits was Plaintiff's claims of tortuous and contractual harm arising out of Plaintiff's claims of security interests in certain merchant accounts of one of the Defendants.
After Rombro's dismissal from the 2004 case but before service of process on Rombro of the 2006 case Complaint, Plaintiff sought to depose Rombro as a non-party witness regarding the 2004 case, and Rombro sought a protective order against such deposition, on the grounds that it was inter alia, a mere "fishing expedition" and an attempt to "sidestep" the terms of his dismissal as a defendant from the 2004 case.
After a teleconference with counsel, the Court held that Rombro had not met the burden of "good cause" to merit a general protective order against a non-party witness deposition under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), noting that the burden was a high burden, that protective orders were to be granted sparingly and cautiously and that Rombro was likely to have considerable information relevant to the 2004 case. The Court passed an order allowing the deposition to proceed but set conditions and limits as to its promptness and duration.
The full opinion and order are available in PDF.
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Labels: civil procedure, criminal discovery, deposition, federal civil procedure, Judge Gauvey Susan, protective order
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Signed December 21, 2006 -- Opinion by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication)
Kent, a telecommunications operator with the Maryland Transportation Authority ("MTA"), fell and injured her knee in 2004, and requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). To supplement the supporting materials submitted by Kent, MTA required Kent to submit to two examinations by their physicians. Kent sued MTA, alleging damages and losses sustained as a result of breaches by MTA of the FMLA statute, and specifically being required to undergo two examinations and not being provided timely notifications by MTA.
On consideration of MTA's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court found that Kent had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Per the court, Kent did not allege that she had failed to receive time off to which she was entitled, but rather only that she was forced to see two doctors to qualify for the time off, and the statute explicitly allows for such second opinions. Further, though noting that the notifications provided by MTA fell short of what the FMLA contemplates, the court found no prejudice to Kent from the failure of timely notice, and dismissed the case.
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Labels: Family and Medical Leave Act, federal civil procedure, Judge Blake Catherine
Decided January 17, 2007--Opinion by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication)
Plaintiff, TTI, a Maryland corporation, is a manufacturer of tobacco flavors and products. Taiga, a Belgium corporation, agreed to serve as the exclusive European agent for TTI's tobacco flavors. Ronald Whitehead, TTI's former president, sat on the board of directors for both Taiga and TTI. In its Complaint, TTI alleges Taiga committed numerous breaches of contract and agent's duty. TTI further asserts Whitehead had knowledge of these breaches and aided Taiga in their concealment, thereby acting as Taiga's agent and in breach of his duty of loyalty owed to TTI.
The basis for Plaintiff's motion to seal is a post-employment agreement between TTI and Whitehead, which states in relevant part: "Neither of the parties shall publish or make any comments about the other that are disparaging." Without admitting that its allegations in the Complaint violate this agreement, TTI has moved to seal the record in order to protect itself from the possibility of contract liability.
The Court denied TTI's motion, stating that:
The common law presumes a general right to inspect and copy all judicial records and documents, although this can be rebutted if "countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access." Under this common law balancing analysis, the Fourth Circuit has found sealing appropriate "only in unusual circumstances." TTI bears the burden of showing that its fear of contract liability outweighs the strong presumption of public access.
Case law makes clear that courts have a duty to protect the public interest even in private civil cases. Moreover, the already strong presumption of access is further strengthened when a document directly affects an adjudication, such as a complaint in a motion to dismiss proceeding, as is the case here.
TTI has presented no compelling reason or unusual circumstance justifying its motion to seal. Instead, TTI seeks protection from the possibility that any disparaging statements concerning its former president contained in the Complaint might constitute a breach of contract. This is not sufficient to outweigh the common law’s strong presumption in favor of open access. Consequently, the plaintiff's motion to seal will be denied.
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Labels: federal civil procedure, Judge Blake Catherine, motion to seal
Decided January 17, 2006-Opinion by Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, in which Judge M. Blane Michael joined. Judge William B. Traxler, Jr., dissented.
(Note: Currently, Maryland Courts Watcher does not regularly cover Fourth Circuit decisions. We have made an exception in this case due to the public interest in this case.)
On January 12, 2006, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, which requires employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees to spend at least 8% of their total payrolls on employees' health insurance costs or pay the amount their spending falls short to the State of Maryland. Resulting from a nationwide campaign to force Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., to increase health insurance benefits for its 16,000 Maryland employees, the Act's minimum spending provision was crafted to cover just Wal-Mart. The Retail Industry Leaders Association, of which Wal-Mart is a member, brought suit against James D. Fielder, Jr., the Maryland Secretary of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, to declare that the Act is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and to enjoin the Act's enforcement. On crossmotions for summary judgment, the District Court entered judgment declaring that the Act is preempted by ERISA and therefore not enforceable, and this appeal followed.
Because Maryland's Fair Share Health Care Fund Act effectively requires employers in Maryland covered by the Act to restructure their employee health insurance plans, it conflicts with ERISA's goal of permitting uniform nationwide administration of these plans. The Court concluded therefore that the Maryland Act is preempted by ERISA and it affirmed the District Court's judgment.
The Court rejected Maryland's attack on the Retail Industry Leaders Association's assertion of "associational standing" to enforce the rights of its members (See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977) (authorizing the standing of an association when (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit)) and ripeness. It also turned aside a jurisdictional attack based upon the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §1341. Maryland characterized the Fair Share Act as a state law that imposes a tax on employers. The Court concluded that the Fair Share Act constitutes a "healthcare regulation," rather than a "tax."
In dissent, Judge Traxler argued that:
[B]ecause the Act does not force a covered employer to make a choice that impacts an employee benefit plan. An employer can comply with the Act either by paying assessments into the special fund or by increasing spending on employee health insurance. The Act expresses no preference for one method of Medicaid support or the other. As a result, the Act is not preempted by ERISA.
Maryland is being buffeted by escalating Medicaid costs. The [Maryland] Act is a permissible response to the problem. Because a covered employer has the option to comply with the Act by paying an assessment — a means that is not connected to an ERISA plan — I would hold that the Act is not preempted.
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Labels: ERISA, federal preemption, Judge Niemeyer Paul, Judge Traxler William, standing
Filed January 16, 2007 –Opinion by Judge J. Frederick Motz (not approved for publication)
In an action arising from an accident in 2002, in which Plaintiff Conyers was severely burned while cooking dinner in the Army housing assigned to his family, the Plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against the United States. The United States moved to dismiss, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
The Court noted that the Defendant may have had knowledge of a potentially dangerous condition (the absence of a fire extinguisher) and it was at least arguably foreseeable that the lack of an available fire extinguisher in the apartment would make the consequences of a cooking fire more serious. The Court found lacking, however, any allegation that Defendant retained control over the apartment in which Plaintiff and his wife lived. Thus the Court found no basis under Maryland law for a finding that Defendant owed any duty to Plaintiff to provide him with a fire extinguisher. Having found that Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiff, the Court held that the Plaintiff's claim therefore failed as a matter of law.
In a footnote, the Court thanked the attorney it had appointed, James S. Zavakos, for the highly professional services he rendered to the Plaintiff and to the court. Although the Plaintiff originally instituted this action pro se, the Court appointed Mr. Zavakos to represent the Plaintiff because of the extremely unfortunate nature of the accident, the extent of the injuries the Plaintiff sustained, and the closeness of the legal issues.
The full opinion is available in PDF. The order appears here.
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Labels: Judge Motz J. Frederick, negligence, pleadings, torts
Decided January 16, 2007—Opinion by Judge Lynne Battaglia, dissent by Chief Judge Robert Bell.
Petitioner, George Junior Spry, sought review following the affirmance by the Court of Special Appeals of his conviction for failure to obey a police officer's reasonable and lawful order to prevent a disturbance to the public peace, in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3) of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002). Spry was convicted after he had been arrested pursuant to a warrant secured on the day following the disturbance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a police officer does not have to arrest an individual immediately after the first disobedience of a lawful order made to prevent a disturbance to the public peace to initiate prosecution under Section 10-201 (c)(3).
Chief Judge Bell dissented. In Judge Bell's view, the object of the statute is the prevention of a disturbance of the public peace, and when the arrest is made both the threat to the public peace and the willful failure to obey the order made in pursuance of abating it must still persist. Judge Bell considers that the offense was not committed where the defendant complies and there is no threat to the public peace. The record showed that the petitioner complied with the officer's order, albeit belatedly and accompanied by profanity and a disrespectful attitude. Judge Bell opined that the use of profanity and the failure to show what an officer may regard as proper respect are not the elements of the offense, and thus can not, and should not, be the basis for his conviction.
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Labels: criminal law, Judge Battaglia Lynne, Judge Bell Robert
Decided January 6, 2007—Opinion by Judge Irma Raker
The appellant, Christopher Hill, was injured when a load of plywood dropped on him from a forklift while he was working on a pier in Baltimore. Hill filed a state common law negligence action against the forklift operator, appellee Daniel Knapp. On the primary issue of whether the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. §§901-950), preempts a state tort claim for damages by a longshoreman against a co-employee in the “twilight zone,” the Court of Appeals held that the federal act preempts such a claim.
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Labels: federal preemption, Judge Raker Irma, longshoremen, workers' compensation
Filed January 16, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene
Richard Mundey, Jr., age 21, was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by his friend, Amber Burgess. As a result of Amber's negligent operation of her automobile a collision occurred and Mundey suffered serious physical injuries which exceeded $20,000.00, the maximum amount of liability coverage on the vehicle in which he was a passenger. At the time of the collision, Mundey resided temporarily in the home of his grandmother and was not permitted to reside in the home of his parents. Mundey sought a declaration that he was covered under his parents' automobile liability insurance policy for payment of his damages pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured motorist provision of that policy.
In affirming the decision in the Court of Special Appeals, the Court held that Mundey was not entitled to recover under his parents' uninsured motorist endorsement because, at the time of the collision, he was not a resident of their household or otherwise insured under the automobile liability policy in question. In addition, the Court held that consistent with Md. Code (1997, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §19-509 of the Insurance Article, Mundey was not a "clause 1 insured" under his parents' automobile liability policy at the time of the accident.
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Labels: automobile insurance, Judge Greene Clayton, uninsured motorist coverage
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Filed January 12, 2007--Opinion by Judge Glen T. Harrell, Jr. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Dale R. Cathell
Maternal grandparents established significant relationship with the grandchildren while their daughter and first grandchild resided with them and after the daughter married and moved away. This substantial relationship encompassed the child that had resided under their roof, as well as two grandchildren born after their daughter moved away.
Following a family disagreement between the grandparents and husband on how the husband should act toward his dying mother, the daughter and her husband cut off all visitation. Grandparents brought an action for visitation in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County under the Grandparent Visitation Statute (GPS), found at Md. Fam.Law Code Ann.§9-102. The trial judge established a rolling schedule of four-hour visits every 45 days and quarterly overnight visits. The trial court also directed that the parents and grandparents attend at least four joint, professional counseling sessions to discuss issues relating to the visitation. After an unsuccessful bid for a new trial, the Koshkos appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment, Koshko v. Haining, 168 Md.App. 556, 897 A.2d 866 (2006), holding that the GVS was neither facially unconstitutional nor unconstitutional as applied to the Koshkos. The intermediate appellate court rejected the argument that the GVS violated the Koshkos' fundamental right to parent, as articulated in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (plurality), simply because it lacked an express presumption that parental decisions are in the best interests of children. Under the principle of constitutional avoidance, the court interpreted the GVS to contain such a presumption. Upholding the trial court's order of visitation The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the parents' position that there must be a threshold finding of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances as a predicate to the statutorily-imposed best interests of the child inquiry.
The Koshkos petitioned the Court of Appeals, which granted a writ of certiorari to consider the Koshkos' substantive due process challenge to the GVS.
The natural parents' decisions regarding the care, custody and upbringing of their minor children are presumptively correct which can only be overcome by a threshold showing of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demonstrating current or future detriment to the child, absent visitation from his or her grandparents, as a prerequisite to application of the best interests analysis, overruling the portions of Fairbanks, Maner, Beckman, Herrick and Wolinski that are inconsistent with the ruling.
While less of an intrusion than custody, parents in a visitation case have a fundamental constitutional right to parent their children which is only rebutted by a showing of unfitness or exceptional circumstances.
In deciding the issue of fundamental constitutional rights afforded to parents the court stated that visitation was a temporary form of custody.
Because of the fundamental constitutional right afforded to parents, the proper standard in reviewing the constitutionality of the GVS is strict scrutiny.
Under the principal of constitutional avoidance, The GPS as interpreted and glossed by the Court of Appeals was not facially unconstitutional because of the requirement of a threshold finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demonstrating the detriment that has or will be imposed on the children absent visitation by their grandparents before the best interests analysis may be engaged.
In applying the strict scrutiny standard the Court held that the GVS was unconstitutional as applied.
In affected cases pending at the time this opinion was filed, where appropriate, courts may allow amendments to pleadings or the presentation of additional evidence in light of the holdings announced here. In cases filed after this opinion, the petitioners, in order to avert or overcome a motion to dismiss their petition, must allege a sufficient factual predicate in the petition so as to present a prima facie case of unfitness or exceptional circumstances, as well as invoking the best interest standard.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Eldridge agreed that the GVS was not facially unconstitutional, but argued that the Court placed a great deal of reliance on Justice O'Connor's opinion in Troxel, which was not the opinion of the Supreme Court and did not appear to reflect the views of a majority of the Supreme Court.
Full opinion PDF.
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Labels: 14th Amendment, fundamental rights of parents, grandparent visitation, Judge Cathell Dale, Judge Harrell Glenn
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Decided January 11, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Dale Cathell.
In a case involving a suit by a senior official of the Maryland Department of the Environment for wrongful termination by Governor Robert Ehrlich upon the beginning of his term as Governor in January 2002, the Court of Appeals held that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate under the extraordinary circumstance of a discovery order being directed to a Governor of Maryland when the collateral order doctrine’s four-part test is met, namely, when:
the interlocutory order sought to be reviewed:
(1) conclusively determines the disputed question,
(2) resolves an important issue,
(3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and
(4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.
The Court of Appeals further held that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City had abused its discretion when, in the course of resolving a complex and extended discovery dispute between the parties, it ordered expanded in camera review with the active participation of the attorney for the Plaintiff of documents protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine and when it actively solicited by its draft of a solicitation letter the consent of 341 former executive-branch employees of the State of Maryland to the release of employment and other documents that the Circuit Court itself had held to be irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence in this case.
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Labels: abuse of discretion, attorney-client privilege, civil appellate procedure, criminal discovery, interlocutory appeal, Judge Cathell Dale, privilege, work-product privilege, wrongful discharge
Decided December 29, 2006--Opinion by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication)
Pro se complaint against Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce alleging discrimination based on race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq.
The Plaintiff alleged a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that: 1) the conduct in question was unwelcome, 2) the harassment was based on race, 3) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment, and 4) that some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer. The Court dismissed this claim because the Plaintiff did not allege that her harassment was based on race, and because her alleged harassment was not sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment.
The Plaintiff did allege that her supervisor made alleged statements that she did not like Mexicans and did not want the Plaintiff to speak Spanish. However, these incidents occurred in 1998 or 1999. The Plaintiff did not contact an EEO counselor about the events until six or seven years later. She was required to contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of an alleged discriminatory act. Thus, her claim was time-barred.
While a claim alleging a hostile work environment claim will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice, the supervisor's statements are not properly linked to the other, timely acts of discrimination and harassment alleged by the Plaintiff for several reasons:
[The supervisor] allegedly told [the Plaintiff] that she didn't like Mexicans in 1998-1999, and [the Plaintiff] did not begin to suffer the alleged harassment from co-workers until 2003. In the time period between 1999 and 2003, [the Plaintiff] alleges no harassment occurred. Second, [the supervisor's] harassment occurred while she was supervising [the Plaintiff] in CTMS, while [the Plaintiff's] co-workers allegedly harassed her while she was working in SASB. Although [the Plaintiff] directly worked with [the supervisor] in CTMS, [the supervisor] was not [the Plaintiff's] direct supervisor while [she] worked in SASB, and [the Plaintiff] does not allege that she worked on a regular basis with [the supervisor] in SASB. Third, there is no allegation that [the supervisor's] statements are related in any way to [the Plaintiff's] co-workers' harassment. . . .Thus, [the supervisor's] 1998-1999 statements are not part of the same "unlawful employment practice" alleged against [the] co-workers, and are time-barred.
The claim was dismissed without leave to amend.
The full opinion is available in PDF. The order is available here.
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Labels: eeoc, employment discrimination, federal employment law, Judge Blake Catherine
The Maryland Courts Information Office has issued a press release as follows:
The Judiciary is collaborating on this effort with the Maryland State Police, Maryland Transportation Authority, Maryland Department of Transportation, Maryland Defense Council, Maryland Trial Lawyers Association, Office of the Public Defender, Maryland State's Attorney's Association, Motor Vehicle Administration, and the Maryland State Bar Association.
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Decided January 10, 2007--Opinion by Judge Lynne A. Battaglia, with Judges Dale R. Cathell and Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. joining in the judgment only.
In November 2000, the Mayor of the City of Frederick entered into an agreement ("November Agreement") with Property Owners wherein the Property Owners would dedicate to the City for no charge "any and all rights-of-way needed for the upgrade and widening of Gas House Pike along the frontage of the Property," which was to be made "free and clear of all liens and/or encumbrances." It is unclear from the Agreement whether the conveyance was fee-simple or merely encumbered the land with a thoroughfare for the use of the public. The Property Owners also agreed to give their consent and sign all necessary documents to subject the properties to a "Tax Increment Financing District" (TIF) to enable the City to finance the completion of Monocacy Boulevard, with the caveat that the Property Owners shall have no additional tax assessment or liability as a result of the TIF.
In consideration for the Property Owners’ dedications and agreement to the TIF, the contract provided that the Properties and Property Owners would be subject to a "deferred contribution special assessment" of $1.00 per square foot of each building to be constructed to be paid once to the City "upon application to the City for the Shell Construction Permit for such building." The contract was signed by a representative of each of the Property Owners and by Mayor James Grimes for the City of Frederick.
In October 2002, the City of Frederick passed Ordinance G-02-19, §1, which titled Chapter 11 of the City Code, a reserved chapter, "Fees," and levied impact fees for the first time in the City for the purpose of requiring that new residential, commercial, institutional and industrial development pay for its appropriate share of capital improvements to the city’s water and sewer treatment and distribution systems through the imposition of water and sewer impact fees which will be used to finance, defray and reimburse the city for all or a portion of the costs of capital improvements to the city’s water and sewer treatment and distribution systems. Another fee imposed by the new chapter was the "Park Facilities development impact fee," which states in relevant part, "Any person who undertakes a residential development project shall pay a park facilities development impact fee and shall not receive a building permit until such park facilities development impact fee is paid."
In June 2004, then Mayor Jennifer Dougherty and the Property Owners entered into a second agreement entitled "Agreement to Defer Public Improvements" ("Deferral Agreement"), granting the Property Owners an exception to the Subdivision Regulations of the City of Frederick which required installation and acceptance of necessary public improvements prior to the final approval of subdivision plats.
In October 2004 and again in March 2005, applications were submitted for shell construction permits along with payment of the $1.00 per square foot for each proposed structure, as required by both the November and the Deferral Agreements. The City denied the applications, stating that "in addition to the $1.00 per square foot fee, all impact fees must be paid prior to the issuance of any of the aforementioned building permits," to include payment of water, sewer and park fees. Consequently, a complaint for a writ of mandamus and specific performance was filed against the City requesting they be directed to issue shell construction permits based on the municipality being bound by its contracts. The City responded, in part, that the Agreements only exempted the property from regulatory fees, not water, sewer and park facility impact fees, and that even if the Agreements did exempt the Property Owners from those fees, because they constitute taxes, they can only be waived by the Maryland General Assembly and therefore, without such authorization, the waiver was ultra vires and not enforceable.
Upon timely appeal of a finding for the Property Owners, the City maintained that the legislative body of the municipality must enact ordinances in order to establish impact fees and that the two Agreements were not legislatively authorized, but instead constituted private agreements between the Property Owners and the two mayors. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court holding that Section 2 of Article 23A and Section 7 of Article II of the City of Frederick Charter mandate that all fees imposed by the City, and any waiver thereof, must be authorized by ordinance, and because no ordinance authorizing either the November or the Deferral Agreement was enacted, both contracts were ultra vires and therefore void ab initio.
Before the Court of Appeals, the Property Owners contended that the Mayor possesses the executive power to purchase or condemn property, such as the rights-of-way at issue in this case, and as an executive act, no ordinance or legislative act was required in order for the City to enter into the Agreements. The Agreements represented nothing more than the implementation of an already authorized and existing public project and, as such, constituted executive, not legislative, actions, which the Mayor, as the chief executive officer of the City, possessed the requisite authority to do on behalf of the City. Conversely, the City maintained, in part, that before any fee can be imposed by the municipality, it must be legislatively authorized. The waiver of fees is a corollary to the imposition of fees, so it, too, would require legislative authorization.
The Court held that neither the Mayor who signed the November Agreement, nor the Mayor who signed the Deferral Agreement, possessed the requisite authority to create a special fee or to waive impact fees; those actions required legislative authority, which was never obtained. A municipality is not bound by those actions which transcend its authority and the authority of those allegedly acting on its behalf; those actions are ultra vires and unenforceable.
Judges Cathell and Harrell join in the judgment only consistent with their position in J.P. Delphey L.P. v. Mayor and City of Frederick.
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Labels: executive power, impact fees, Judge Battaglia Lynne, land use, legislative authority, maryland constitutional law, real estate, regulatory fees, ultra vires, void ab initio
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