Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/195/56/556633/
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 06:14:18
Document Index: 4170020

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 244', '§ 1254', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 106', '§ 1105', '§ 1105', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 244', '§ 1252', '§ 309', '§ 244', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 244', '§ 309', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 308', '§ 240', '§ 1229', '§ 304', '§ 240', '§ 106', '§ 306', '§ 1252']

Javier Bernal-vallejo, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 195 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 1999) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1999 › Javier Bernal-vallejo, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent
Javier Bernal-vallejo, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 195 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 1999)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 195 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 1999)
Submitted October 5, 1999Decided November 2, 1999
Javier Bernal-Vallejo ("Bernal") has been ordered deported and petitions for judicial review of that order. Whether this court has jurisdiction over his petition is a matter affected by one provision of the transitional rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (IIRIRA). That provision, IIRIRA § 309(c) (4) (E), says that "there shall be no appeal of any discretionary decision under section . . . 244 [and other enumerated sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act]."
We hold that whether § 309(c) (4) (E) precludes jurisdiction depends on the precise grounds upon which the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals rests and the precise nature of the claims made in the petition. That is, in general terms, § 309(c) (4) (E) precludes the exercise of jurisdiction only where: (1) the agency decision as to which review is sought is a "decision under" one of the enumerated sections, and (2) the agency decision rests on a ground that is committed to agency discretion. Conversely, § 309(c) (4) (E) does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction where the decision is not a "decision under" an enumerated section or where the ground on which the decision rests is not one committed to agency discretion. Some components of decisions made under the enumerated sections are not committed to agency discretion but are instead determinations of objective facts. Where the decision rests on these latter grounds, review is not precluded by § 309(c) (4) (E). We reject the Immigration and Naturalization Service's position that any decision related to a final order under one of the enumerated sections is within the scope of § 309(c) (4) (E)'s prohibition of judicial review. Even if this section does not preclude review, though, other doctrines may.
In Bernal's case, we conclude that § 309(c) (4) (E) precludes jurisdiction over his claim that the BIA erred in finding under the Immigration and Naturalization Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (repealed 1996), that he had not demonstrated extreme hardship, a qualification for a suspension of deportation. We further conclude that the section does not preclude jurisdiction over his constitutional due process argument, but that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to that argument. We dismiss the petition.
Deportation proceedings commenced with an Order to Show Cause on September 18, 1995, more than four years ago. Bernal conceded deportability. On October 9, 1996, an Immigration Judge found Bernal deportable, denied his application for suspension from deportation, but granted his request for voluntary departure. He appealed, and the BIA issued a decision on January 25, 1999, dismissing his appeal. In order to establish eligibility for suspension of deportation, an alien must meet three statutory requirements. See INA § 244.1 The applicant must have been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of at least seven years. See id. § 244(a) (1). Once that is established, the applicant must show that he is a person of good moral character and was so throughout the seven years. See id. Finally, the applicant must show that deportation would be an extreme hardship to himself or a parent,spouse, or child who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. See id. Once the three eligibility criteria have been met, relief is available at the Attorney General's discretion, see id. § 244(a), with the applicant bearing the burden of showing that he warrants relief. See Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 497 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the alien bears the burden of demonstrating that he merits the favorable exercise of discretion to suspend deportation); see also Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the alien "bears the burden of proving eligibility for asylum and for withholding of deportation").
The IJ in this instance did not base her decision on the objective factual determinations of whether there had been seven years of residence or whether Bernal had a lawful resident parent, spouse, or child for whom his deportation might cause hardship. It was undisputed that Bernal had been in the United States for seven years and that he had no such relatives. Indeed, the IJ found that he was not barred by the good moral character requirement. Her decision turned on her judgment that he had not established extreme hardship and that even if he had, it would be a "very close call" whether discretion should be exercised to suspend deportation. The BIA affirmed on the ground that Bernal had not shown extreme hardship within the meaning of INA § 244(a) (1).
The arguments on appeal focus on whether § 309(c) (4) (E) precludes jurisdiction. Before reaching this question, there is a preliminary question of the source of any jurisdiction, even were § 309(c) (4) (E) preclusion not to apply. See Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1140 (1999). Jurisdiction here arises under INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), as amended by IIRIRA.2 The parties agree that this case is governed by the IIRIRA transitional rules because Bernal was placed in deportation proceedings before April 1, 1997, and the final order of deportation was issued after October 31, 1996. The INS agrees that this court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) of this timely filed petition for review unless IIRIRA § 309(c) (4) (E) precludes review. The exact basis for the denial of suspension of deportation and the nature of the challenge to that denial are important to the issue of whether § 309(c) (4) (E) precludes jurisdiction.
There is no dispute that the first criteria under § 309(c) (4) (E) is met: the decision from which Bernal appeals is a "decision under" one of the sections enumerated in § 309(c) (4) (E), specifically, § 244. See Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 943 (1999) (stating that jurisdictional restrictions in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) apply only to "three discrete actions the Attorney General may take: her decision or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
We turn to the second criteria: whether the decision turns on a matter committed to agency discretion. The INS argues broadly that any order denying discretionary motions seeking the underlying relief identified in § 309(c) (4) (E), such as adjustment of status or suspension of deportation under INA § 244, is within the jurisdictional prohibition of the section. We disagree and think the statute requires a more nuanced interpretation.
Section 309(c) (4) (E) does not bar all appeals from final orders in the types of cases described by the referenced statutory sections, but only bars appeals of "discretionary" decisions made under those sections. This language contrasts with IIRIRA § 309(c) (4) (G), which does preclude "appeals" in cases of aliens who are inadmissible or deportable because they committed certain felonies. Compare id. § 309(c) (4) (E) ("[T]here shall be no appeal of any discretionary decision under [various sections of the INA] . . . ."), with id. § 309(c) (4) (G) ("[T]here shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissable or deportable by reason of having committed [certain criminal offenses] . . . ."), and Ruckbi v. INS, 159 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing absolute bar to any review by the courts of appeals in cases falling under § 309(c) (4) (G)). The question then becomes one of what is meant by the term "discretionary decision." It is clear that some aspects of a decision by the BIA as to whether suspension of deportation should be granted require objective factual determinations and that Congress gave the agency no discretion as to these determinations, while other aspects of the decision are discretionary.
One non-discretionary aspect of the § 244 determination is whether the minimum residency period has been met. We agree with Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1997), which held that review of a determination regarding the minimum residency period requirement is not precluded by § 309(c) (4) (E).3 As Kalaw points out, the determination of whether the seven year continuous presence requirement has been met is subject to legal standards that guide the inquiry. See id. at 1151; see also Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1963) (describing factors to consider in determining whether presence in the United States has been continuous). Further, this court has viewed such determinations as factual, subject to review under the substantial evidence standard rather than the abuse of discretion standard. See Meguenine v. INS, 139 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1998) (reviewing BIA's determination that alien was ineligible for asylum and withholding of deportation under "substantial evidence" standard).
The good moral character determination, the second eligibility factor, may involve either a non-discretionary question of fact or a discretionary determination. That is because a finding of lack of good moral character is required, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), for aliens belonging to certain per se categories. For example, those convicted of aggravated felonies are per se considered to lack good moral character. See id. § 1101(f) (8). The BIA may not grant suspension of deportation or voluntary departure to someone within these per se categories, and so the agency lacks discretion. Thus, if a BIA decision turned on a dispute about whether the applicant fit into one of the per se categories, § 309(c) (4) (E) would not bar this court's review. If, however, the determination of lack of good moral character was not based on the per se categories, then judicial review would be barred, for that determination would be a discretionary one.
Here, the denial of Bernal's application was based on a determination that he would not suffer extreme hardship if deported, the third eligibility requirement for suspension of deportation. This raises the question of whether the "extreme hardship" determination is a discretionary decision barred from judicial review by § 309(c) (4) (E). We hold that it is, and, thus, that we have no jurisdiction over Bernal's claim, on that ground, that the INS erred in denying him suspension of deportation. We join the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in so holding. See Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1012-13 (5th Cir. 1999) (determining that the extreme hardship determination is discretionary and unreviewable under IIRIRA § 309(c) (4) (E)); Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152 (same). This is consistent with pre-IIRIRA law that had recognized that extreme hardship determinations were within the discretion of the BIA. See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 & n.5 (1981) ("[The] Attorney General['s] . . . construction and application of [the extreme hardship] standard should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute."); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 40 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that the INS has "considerable discretion" in defining extreme hardship and reviewing the extreme hardship determination for abuse of discretion); Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1983) ("The determination of 'extreme hardship' is committed to the sound discretion of the Attorney General.").
We hold that § 309(c) (4) (E) does not remove jurisdiction to review Bernal's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel amounting to a due process violation. This due process argument5 does not involve a matter that Congress committed to agency discretion. Accord Antonio-Cruz v. INS, 147 F.3d 1129, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 309(c) (4) (E) does not preclude review of a due process claim).
INA § 244 applies to this case even though § 244 has been repealed by IIRIRA § 308(b) (7). The new version is INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, and "suspension of deportation" is now referred to as "cancellation of removal." See IIRIRA § 304(a) (placing this form of relief in INA § 240A).
INA § 106 has been repealed by IIRIRA § 306(b) (1) and replaced with a judicial review provision codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252.