Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98997/weber-vs-anheuser-busch-inc
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Weber Vs Anheuser Busch Inc - Citation 98997 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Weber Vs. Anheuser-busch, Inc. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98997CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-28-1955Case Number348 U.S. 468AppellantWeberRespondentAnheuser-busch, Inc.Excerpt:
weber v. anheuser-busch, inc. - 348 u.s. 468 (1955)
in a dispute between two unions over work being performed for respondent, each claiming the work for its own members, one union went on strike. respondent filed with the national labor relations board a charge of an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(4)(d) of the taft-hartley act against the striking union, but the board held that no "dispute" existed within the meaning of that subsection and quashed the notice of a hearing. respondent filed a..... Judgment:
the state court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct of the union, since its jurisdiction had been preempted by the authority vested in the National Labor Relations Board. Pp.
348 U. S. 469
(a) Whether the Board's finding that no violation of § 8(b)(4)(D) was involved necessarily encompassed a ruling on the other subsections was a question for the Board to pass upon in the first instance. Pp.
348 U. S. 477
(b) Congress has sufficiently expressed its purpose to bring the conduct here in controversy within federal control and to exclude state prohibition, even though that with which the federal law is concerned as a matter of labor relations be related by the State to the more inclusive area of restraint of trade. Pp.
(c) Where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may reasonably be deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, a state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance. P.
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
The State Supreme Court affirmed a permanent injunction issued by a lower state court against petitioner. 364 Mo. 573, 265 S.W.2d 325. This Court granted. certiorari. 348 U.S. 808.
348 U. S. 482
On April 8, 1952, the day after the strike was called, respondent filed a charge of an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(4)(D) of the Taft-Hartley Act against the IAM. [
of work by respondent to its own employees, and as to work assigned by respondent's contractors, (1) the IAM had made no demand on those contractors to give their work to IAM labor, and (2) no millwright work performed by respondent's contractors at that time was in fact being performed by other than IAM labor.
District No. 9, International Association of Machinists,
101 N.L.R.B. 346.
In the meantime, on April 19, 1952, after it had filed the charge with the Board but before the Board had acted upon it, respondent sought an injunction against the IAM in the State Circuit Court in St. Louis. In its complaint, respondent alleged that the strike constituted "a secondary boycott under the common law of the State of Missouri," and also was in violation of Subsections (A), (B) and (D) of § 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act [
of § 303(a)(1), (2) and (4) of that same Act. [
] A temporary injunction issued. On April 30, respondent amended its complaint with the additional claim that the IAM's conduct constituted an illegal conspiracy in restraint of
1. The Court has ruled that a State may not prohibit the exercise of rights which the federal Acts protect. Thus, in
, the State enjoined a labor union from functioning until it had complied with certain statutory requirements. The injunction was invalidated on the ground that the Wagner Act included a "federally established right to collective bargaining" with which the injunction conflicted.
, involved the strike vote provisions of a state act which prohibited the calling of a strike until a specific statutory procedure had been followed. The state act was held to conflict not only with the procedure and other requirements of the Taft-Hartley strike provisions, but also with the protection afforded by § 7 of that Act. [
Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
, the state court issued an injunction under a statute which made it a misdemeanor to interrupt by strike any essential public utility services. It was held that the state statute was invalid in that it denied a right
which Congress had guaranteed under § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act -- the right to strike peacefully to enforce union demands for wages, hours and working conditions. Last Term, the Court noted in
2. A State may not enjoin under its own labor statute conduct which has been made an "unfair labor practice" under the federal statutes. Such was the holding in the
The Court pointed out that exclusive primary jurisdiction to pass on the union's picketing is delegated by the Taft-Hartley Act to the National Labor Relations Board.
See also Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
338 U.S. 953,
346 U.S. 933. And in
, a picket line established at retail stores to induce the organization of a manufacturer's employees was enjoined by the State as contrary to its public policy. [
This Court granted a limited certiorari which assumed that exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter was in the National Labor Relations Board. [
] The Board was allowed to obtain an injunction against enforcement of the conflicting state court injunction.
3. The federal Board's machinery for dealing with certification problems also carries implications of exclusiveness. Thus, a State may not certify a union as the collective bargaining agent for employees where the federal Board, if called upon, would use its own certification procedure.
La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
. The same result is reached even if the federal Board has refused certification, if the employer is subject to the Board's jurisdiction.
, involved recurrent, unannounced work stoppages. The Court upheld the state injunction on the ground that such conduct was neither prohibited nor protected by the Taft-Hartley Act, and thus was open to state control.
The Court allowed a State to forbid enforcement of a "maintenance of membership" clause in a contract between employer and union in
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
, was an action for damages based on violent conduct, which the state court found to be a common law tort. While assuming that an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act was involved, this Court sustained the state judgment on the theory that there was no compensatory relief under the federal Act, and no federal administrative relief with which the state remedy conflicted.
Nor is it within our competence now to determine whether the conduct in controversy is subject to the authority of Subsections (A) or (B). Under the Board's decisions, for example, it may become pertinent whether this is eventually deemed primary pressure, directed at respondent to force insertion of the disputed clause in its contract with the IAM, rather than secondary pressure, aimed at subcontractors to force them to use IAM labor. [
] We are not now ruling on that distinction. However, the point is pertinent to our discussion, because, even if it were clear that no unfair labor practices were involved, it would not necessarily follow that the State was free to issue its injunction. If this conduct does not fall within the prohibitions of § 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, it may fall
Respondent itself alleged that the union conduct it was seeking to stop came within the prohibitions of the federal Act, and yet it disregarded the Board and obtained relief from a state court. It is perfectly clear that, had respondent gone first to a federal court instead of the state court, the federal court would have declined jurisdiction, at least as to the unfair labor practices, on the ground that exclusive primary jurisdiction was in the Board. [
] As pointed out in the
case, 346 U.S. at
The Missouri Supreme Court oversimplified the factual situation when it called this merely a "jurisdictional quarrel between two rival labor unions." A jurisdictional dispute and a secondary boycott are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as respondent itself showed by alleging,
that this was a secondary boycott prohibited by Missouri common law. Even the Board has not always been consistent in its interpretations of the various subsections of § 8(b)(4).
Respondent argues that Missouri is not prohibiting the IAM's conduct for any reason having to do with labor relations, but rather because that conduct is in contravention of a state law which deals generally with restraint of trade. It distinguishes
on the ground that there, the State and Congress were both attempting to regulate labor relations as such.
We do not think this distinction is decisive. In
the emphasis was not on two conflicting labor statutes, but rather on two similar remedies, one state and one federal, brought to bear on precisely the same conduct.
Capital Service, Inc. v.Labor Board, supra,
we did not stop to inquire just what category of "public policy" the union's conduct allegedly violated. Our approach was emphasized in
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., supra,
where the violent conduct was reached by a remedy having no parallel in, and not in conflict with, any remedy afforded by the federal Act.
Moreover, we must not forget that this case is not clearly one of "unfair labor practices." Certainly, if the conduct is eventually found by the National Labor Relations Board to be protected by the Taft-Hartley Act, the State cannot be heard to say that it is enjoining that conduct for reasons other than those having to do with labor relations. In
Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra,
the statute was directed at the preservation of public utility services and not at maintenance of sound labor relations, but the State's injunction was reversed. Controlling and therefore superseding federal power cannot be curtailed by the State, even though the ground of intervention be different than that on which federal supremacy has been exercised.
By the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power over industrial relations given by the Commerce Clause. Congress formulated a code whereby it outlawed some aspects of labor activities and left others free for the operation of economic forces. As to both categories, the areas that have been preempted by federal authority, and thereby withdrawn from state power, are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and bounds. Obvious conflict, actual or potential, leads to easy judicial exclusion of state action. Such was the situation in
Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra.
But, as the opinion in that case recalled, the Labor Management Relations Act "leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much." 346 U.S. at
. This penumbral area can be rendered progressively
We realize that it is not easy for a state court to decide, merely on the basis of a complaint and answer, whether the subject matter is the concern exclusively of the federal Board and withdrawn from the State. This is particularly true in a case like this, where the rulings of the Board are not wholly consistent on the meaning of the sections outlawing "unfair labor practices," and where the area of free "concerted activities" has not been clearly bounded. But where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance. [
The Missouri Supreme Court stated that "the transportation into and out of the plant was stopped
because it endangered their (presumably the pickets") lives and limbs;' . . .
265 S.W.2d 330. We do not read this as an unambiguous determination that the IAM's conduct amounted to the kind of mass picketing and overt threats of violence which, under the
case, gives the state court jurisdiction. It does not preclude the conclusion that the transportation was stopped for fear of crossing an otherwise peaceful picket line. In any event, the state injunction enjoined all picketing.
61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D). The subsection is quoted in
"an unlawful conspiracy combination and agreement, contrary to the common law of the California and contrary to the provisions of the Cartwright Act (Stats.1907, p. 1835, Ch. 530), now constituting Chapter 2 of Part 2, Division 7, of the Business and Professions Code, sections 16720,
to create and carry out restrictions in trade and commerce and to prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transporting, selling and purchasing of bakery products as hereinafter set forth."
The state court, however, reasoned that primary picketing was as much a combination in restraint of trade as secondary picketing, and primary picketing had been held legal by numerous state decisions. The court instead enjoined the conduct on the ground that "secondary picketing is contrary to the public policy of this state. . . ."
Capital Service, Inc. v. Bakery Drivers Local Union,
Civil No. 595892, Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles.
"In view of the fact that exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter was in the National Labor Relations Board,
, could the Federal District Court, on application of the Board, enjoin Petitioners from enforcing an injunction already obtained from the State court?"
Cf., e.g., Reilly Cartage Co.,
110 N.L.R.B., No. 233;
84 N.L.R.B. 315;
84 N.L.R.B. 360,
reversed sub nom. International Rice Milling Co. v. Labor Board,
183 F.2d 21,
U.S. 665.
See, e.g., Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union,
167 F.2d 183, 188-190;
Bakery & Confectionery Workers' International Union v. National Biscuit Co.,
177 F.2d 684;
see also Garner v. Teamsters Union,
The Missouri Supreme Court relied upon
, for the proposition that a state court retains jurisdiction over this type of suit. But
was concerned solely with whether the State's injunction against picketing violated the Fourteenth Amendment. No question of federal preemption was before the Court; accordingly, it was not dealt with in the opinion.