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Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp. :: 305 U.S. 315 (1938) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp.
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp. 305 U.S. 315 (1938)
U.S. Supreme CourtArmstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938)Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp.No. 51Argued November 7, 8, 1938Decided December 5, 1938305 U.S. 315CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
(6) Having in Nu-Enamel a registered mark which had acquired a secondary meaning as indicating its products exclusively, plaintiff was entitled to protection against the unfair use of the words Page 305 U. S. 316 of the mark by a competitor seeking to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiff, and had a cause of action against such a one either for infringement of the mark or for unfair competition. P. 305 U. S. 335.
Certiorari, post, p. 580, to review the reversal of a decree dismissing for want of equity a bill for an injunction and other relief. Page 305 U. S. 320
"that the name 'Nu-Enamel' has come to mean and is understood to mean, throughout the United States, including the Illinois and the City Page 305 U. S. 321 of Chicago, the plaintiff and plaintiff's products only, and the word 'Nu-Enamel' is a mark by which the goods of the plaintiff are distinguished from other goods of the same class;"
"5. 'Nu' was commonly used in the paint and other industries in combination with other words as a misspelling or phonetic spelling of 'new' to designate brands and kinds of enamel, paint, and other commodities before plaintiff and its predecessors adopted the name 'Nu-Enamel.' "Page 305 U. S. 322
Federal Trade-Mark Act of 1920. The registration of "Nu-Enamel" does not create any substantive rights in the registrant. [Footnote 2] Trademarks registered under the 1920 Page 305 U. S. 323 act may be attacked collaterally. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 71 F.2d 662, 666.
On its face, the act shows it was enacted to enable American and foreign users of trademarks to register them in accordance with the provisions of the convention for the protection of trademarks and commercial names, signed at Buenos Aires in 1910. In addition, § 1, paragraph (b), provides, without limitation to the export trade, for the registration of marks not registerable under § 5 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, after one year's use in interstate or foreign commerce. This enables the (b) marks to be registered abroad. Page 305 U. S. 324
While the Act of 1920 does not vest any new substantive rights, it does create remedies in the Federal courts for protecting the registrations, and authorizes triple damages for infringement. [Footnote 5] As a consequence of these remedial provisions, when a suit is begun for infringement, bottomed upon registration under the 1920 act, the district courts of the United States have jurisdiction. Unless plainly unsubstantial, the allegation of registration under the act is sufficient to give jurisdiction of the merits. In this case, the trial court concluded that the invalidity of the trademark divested it of jurisdiction over unfair competition. This was erroneous. [Footnote 6] Once properly obtained, jurisdiction of the one cause of action, the alleged infringement of the trademark, persists to deal with all grounds supporting it, including unfair competition Page 305 U. S. 325 with the marked article. [Footnote 7] The cause of action is the interference with the exclusive right to use the mark "Nu-Enamel." If it is a properly registered trademark, a ground to support the cause of action is violation of the Trade-Mark Act. If it is not a properly registered trademark, the ground is unfair competition at common law. The facts supporting a suit for infringement and one for unfair competition are substantially the same. They constitute and make plain the wrong complained of -- the violation of the right to exclusive use.
In the Oursler case, there was a valid copyright which was held not infringed. Here, the trial court determined the trademark was invalid. The Oursler case held that, where the causes of action are different, the determination that the federal cause fails calls for dismissal. [Footnote 8] But where there is only one cause of action, we do not consider that the holding of the invalidity furnishes any basis for a distinction between this and the Oursler case. Registration of "Nu-Enamel" furnished a substantial ground for federal jurisdiction. That jurisdiction should be continued to determine, on substantially the same facts, the issue of unfair competition. [Footnote 9] Page 305 U. S. 326
Registration of Descriptive Mark under 1920 Trade-Mark Act. Even though, under the facts alleged and the admission that respondent's mark has acquired a secondary meaning, the Federal courts have jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner is chargeable with unfair competition, it becomes necessary to determine whether registration of "Nu-Enamel" is permissible or impermissible under the Act of 1920 in order that it may be known whether § 4, the basis of the prayer in the bill for triple damages, is applicable. [Footnote 10] Section 1(b) of the 1920 act permits registration of the marks used for one year in interstate commerce which were not registerable under the Act of 1905 "except those specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 5" of the Act of 1905. That section is set out below. [Footnote 11] The point raised is whether the phrase Page 305 U. S. 327 "except those specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 5" of the 1905 act is effective to bar not only marks contra bonos mores under (a) and marks infra dignitatem under (b), but also the following provisos, particularly the one concerned with descriptive words or devices. Page 305 U. S. 328
It seems clear that the mark "Nu-Enamel" is descriptive of a type of paint long familiar to manufacturers, [Footnote 12] with the addition of the adjective new, phonetically spelled or misspelled. Obviously this slight variation from the orthographic normal is not unusual. Numerous Page 305 U. S. 329 illustrations of such use by paint and varnish manufacturers are given by petitioner in its answer. The trademark is registered by the Nu-Enamel Corporation for a variety of products from enamels through paint brushes to glue, solder, and tack rags. It is quite true that the mark is not descriptive as applied to many of respondent's products, but the use by petitioner, the Armstrong Company, of which the Nu-Enamel Corporation complains is the use of "Nu-Enamel" or "Nu-Beauty Enamel." This use, Armstrong answers and the evidence supports the assertion, is confined to the enamels. We must therefore consider the case as though the only products of Nu-Enamel Corporation were enamels. As applied to them it is descriptive.
That the mark is descriptive of paint enamels does not bar it from registration as to them under the 1920 act. This has been the construction of the Patent Office. [Footnote 13] To Page 305 U. S. 330 construe (b) of the 1920 act to bar names, descriptive marks. and merely geographical terms would make the subsection useless. The obvious purpose of its inclusion was to widen the eligibility of marks. A dictum has expressed [Footnote 14] a view contrary to that of the Patent Office.
This administrative interpretation, contemporary with the legislation, and the legislative history, have weight Page 305 U. S. 331 "when choice is nicely balanced." [Footnote 15] We construe section 1(b) of the 1920 act to be applicable to the categories expressed in § 5 of the Act of 1905 under (a) and (b), including the first proviso but not to include the other provisos of (b). This conclusion is fortified by the addition Page 305 U. S. 332 of the proviso to § 1(b) of the 1920 act, relating to identical trademarks. The proviso in § 5(b) of the 1905 act refusing registration to identical marks in much the same language was construed in Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461, as not permitting the registration of such marks when used for ten years under the fourth -- now fifth -- proviso of that section. We think that Congress, in adopting the corresponding proviso in subsection (b) of the 1920 act, must be taken to have adopted the accepted construction of the similar proviso of the 1905 act. If the language of the 1920 act had been intended to exclude from registration all the classes excluded by the provisos of section five of the 1905 act, it would have been unnecessary to include this proviso. [Footnote 16]
This Court has had several occasions within the last few years to construe statutes in which conflicts between Page 305 U. S. 333 reasonable intention and literal meaning occurred. We have refused to nullify statutes, however hard or unexpected the particular effect, where unambiguous language called for a logical and sensible result. [Footnote 17] Any other course would be properly condemned as judicial legislation. However, to construe statutes so as to avoid results glaringly absurd has long been a judicial function. [Footnote 18] Where, as here, the language is susceptible of a construction which preserves the usefulness of the section, the judicial duty rests upon this Court to give expression to the intendment of the law.
The 1920 act omits the quoted portion of § 16 as to the effect of registration as prima facie evidence of ownership. Under § 1, the register includes all marks communicated to the Commissioner of Patents by the international bureaus provided for by the Buenos Aires convention of 1910 Page 305 U. S. 334 and all other marks not registerable under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, with the exceptions discussed in the preceding section of this opinion, in bona fide use by the proprietor thereof for one year in commerce other than intrastate. Section 4, [Footnote 20] which protects the trademark, is substantially the same as § 16 of the 1905 act, except for the omission of the prima facie presumption of ownership. It is the owner who has the rights of action under this act, unaided by any presumption from registration. The owner, on the other hand, is not limited in any way by the Act, as § 23 of the Act of 1905 is made specifically applicable. This section preserves the legal and equitable remedies to an aggrieved owner. The Committee on Patents in the Senate was quite positive that the effect of the act on domestic rights was nil. [Footnote 21] The registrant acquires, by the acceptance of his mark under the 1920 act, the right to proceed in the Federal courts against infringers, and to recover triple damages if he can establish his ownership of the trademark at common law.
"Nu-Enamel" is descriptive of the enamels in issue. The use on the numerous other articles of respondent's manufacture, in its advertising, on store window valances, on electric and other displays, and as the name of many stores and the sign of several thousand dealers, justify petitioner's concession that the name means respondent, and respondent's products, only, and the word distinguishes Page 305 U. S. 335 its goods from others of the same class. But a mark which is descriptive is not a good trademark at common law. [Footnote 22]
It was said in Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., [Footnote 23] that names registered under the last proviso of § 5 of the 1905 act became technical trademarks upon valid registration under that act. Assuming that descriptive terms in this respect would be analogous to proper names, there are clear distinctions between the acts. The 1920 act does not define "trademark" to include any mark registered under its terms, as does § 29 of the 1905 act. Remedies are afforded registrants under the 1920 act, but these remedies are for "owners," and actual and exclusive use, short of a secondary meaning, [Footnote 24] does not qualify a registrant under the 1920 act as an owner. That ownership must be established by proof. [Footnote 25] Unless this ownership is established, no rights of action under the 1920 act for infringement exist. Here, we have a secondary meaning to the descriptive term "Nu-Enamel." This establishes, entirely apart from any trademark act, the common law right of the Nu-Enamel Corporation to be free from the competitive use of these words as a trademark or tradename. [Footnote 26] As was pointed out in the Davids Co. case, in considering the ten-year clause of the 1905 act, this right of freedom does not confer a monopoly on the use of the words. It is a mere protection against their unfair use as a trademark or tradename by a competitor seeking Page 305 U. S. 336 to palm off his products as those of the original user of the tradename. This right to protection from such use belongs to the user of a mark which has acquired a secondary meaning. He is, in this sense, the owner of the mark. We agree with the conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals that infringement is shown.
"* * * *" After discussion of other matters: