Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/461/1100/400378/
Timestamp: 2020-08-14 06:24:09
Document Index: 525904784

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 3323', '§ 137', '§ 332', '§ 455']

Utah-idaho Sugar Company, a Utah Corporation, Petitioner, v. the Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge of the Unitedstates District Court for the District of Utah, Respondent, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1972 › Utah-idaho Sugar Company, a Utah Corporation, Petitioner, v. the Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief J...
Utah-idaho Sugar Company, a Utah Corporation, Petitioner, v. the Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge of the Unitedstates District Court for the District of Utah, Respondent, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972) June 5, 1972. Rehearing Denied July 11, 1972
This controversy had its beginning prior to January 20, 1958. On that date, due to disagreement among the judges, the Tenth Circuit Council entered its order promulgating rules for the District Court for the District of Utah relative to the division of business and the assignment of cases. There was a specific finding that the judges of the District of Utah, Chief Judge Ritter and Judge Christensen, were unable to agree on assignments, necessitating intervention of the Judicial Council pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 137, which provides that if the district judges in any district are unable to agree on the adoption of rules or assignments of cases and division of business, the Judicial Council shall make the necessary orders. In substance, these imposed rules required an equal and random division of civil cases and prescribed a system which balanced and apportioned the criminal, bankruptcy, immigration and naturalization cases. The rules so promulgated were subject to modification by an order signed by both active judges, and a slight change was brought about through this procedure on May 3, 1962.1
By its order dated December 20, 1971, the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 332, declared that its January 20, 1958 order was to be reaffirmed and continued in effect and directed that the cases which had been assigned to Judge Christensen were to be assigned to Judge Anderson. It was further directed that Chief Judge Ritter vacate his orders of October 4, 1971 and November 24, 1971, purporting to assign to himself cases which had been pending in the court of Judge Christensen. It was further ordered that Chief Judge Ritter vacate his several orders unilaterally entered with respect to cases assigned to Judge Anderson unless the latter agreed to the assignment.
Chief Judge Ritter's position here is that the Judicial Council's order 1) ceased to be effective when Judge Christensen took senior status, and in any event 2) did not cover this contingency and that therefore he, as Chief Judge, had the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 137 to reassign Judge Christensen's cases as he saw fit. This paragraph provides:
Furthermore, under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 137,2 it is unquestioned that the division of the court's business in a multi-judge district is the responsibility of the judges and not the responsibility of the chief judge acting unilaterally. The latter's duty is to insure that the agreed upon rules are enforced and are administered so as to carry out their purposes, but it is not his duty to promulgate rules without the approval of his fellow judges, and when he does so over the objection of his colleagues the Council must act in order to protect the independence and integrity of each judge in the district; the Council is under this condition authorized to prescribe the rules of the court in those instances when the judges cannot agree. The Council also has broad powers under 28 U.S.C. § 3323 in seeing that the district court's business is conducted effectively, expeditiously and in a manner that inspires public confidence.
Chief Judge Ritter has requested that all of the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit withdraw from the decision in this case on the basis that they have an interest in the outcome. This contention must be rejected and this request denied. To accede to this request would amount to surrendering the duties of the individual judges as members of the Judicial Council and as judges of this court. As members of the Judicial Council there is a duty to govern, and certainly the statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 137, 28 U.S.C. § 332 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, do not contemplate that the judges when acting in a particular case in which the Council's orders are questioned must disqualify themselves. Such a ruling would render the Council's activity in pursuance of its responsibility wholly ineffective. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of U. S., 398 U.S. 74, 123-129, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 1674-1677, 26 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1970) (concurring opinion of Justice Harlan).