Source: http://openjurist.org/301/f3d/309
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 13:33:55
Document Index: 84770368

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 922', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 924', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 924', '§ 3156', '§ 540', '§ 13726', '§ 2', '§ 4']

301 F3d 309 United States v. Charles | OpenJurist
301 F. 3d 309 - United States v. Charles	Home301 f3d 309 united states v. charles
301 F3d 309 United States v. Charles 301 F.3d 309
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Joseph Clifton CHARLES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 01-10113.
We granted rehearing en banc in this sentencing appeal in order to determine whether theft of a motor vehicle is a crime of violence under United States Sentencing Guideline ("U.S.S.G.") § 4B1.2(a)(2), requiring the enhanced sentence imposed on Charles. We hold that simple automobile theft is not a crime of violence. We therefore VACATE Charles' sentence and REMAND for re-sentencing.
* The defendant, Joseph Clifton Charles, pled guilty in this case to possession of a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 Earlier, in July 1997, Charles had been convicted of one count of motor vehicle theft. The question therefore is what kind of sentence is appropriate for the instant firearm conviction in the light of his previous conviction for automobile theft.
For offenses involving the unlawful possession of a firearm, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6) provides a base offense level of 14 if the defendant is a "prohibited person," in this case, a felon. However, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4) provides for an increased base offense level of 20 if the defendant had one prior felony conviction of a "crime of violence," as defined in § 4B1.2(a). The district court determined that theft of a vehicle is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), basing its conclusion on a determination that the controlling precedent was United States v. Jackson, 220 F.3d 635, 639 (5th Cir.2000). There we held that unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is indeed a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2). Thus, in sentencing Charles, the district court began with a base offense level of 20 and reduced the offense level by 3 for acceptance of responsibility, to level 17. Based on Charles' criminal history category of five, the district court sentenced Charles to 51 months' imprisonment, a three-year term of supervised release, and a mandatory special assessment of $100. Charles filed a timely notice of appeal of his sentence.
The outcome of this appeal depends on whether simple motor vehicle theft is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). We should note at the outset, however, that this question has been confused because of the differing definitions of "crime of violence" that appear in 18 U.S.C. § 16 ("the statute") and the definition promulgated under § 4B1.2(a) of the sentencing guidelines, which applies specifically to firearms offenses.2 While § 16(a) and § 4B1.2(a)(1) are virtually identical, § 16(b) and § 4B1.2(a)(2) are clearly different.3 Section 16(b) applies to the use of force against person and property, whereas § 4B1.2(a)(2) only applies to conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person.4 Other differences include: § 16(b) focuses on a risk of physical force, whereas § 4B1.2(a)(2) focuses on a risk of physical injury; § 16(b) requires a "substantial risk," whereas § 4B1.2(a) requires a "serious potential risk"; and § 16(b) focuses on the "nature" of the felony, whereas § 4B1.2(a)(2) focuses on "conduct." See Jackson, 220 F.3d at 637; United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 925-26 (5th Cir.2001).
Nevertheless, in the past we have used § 16(b) cases to interpret § 4B1.2(a)(2) cases, and vice-versa. For example, in Jackson, in which we held that unauthorized use of a vehicle ("UUV") is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), we noted that "[w]e are not unsympathetic to Jackson's argument that UUV is not what one might typically consider a `crime of violence,' [but] we do not write on a clean slate...." Jackson, 220 F.3d at 639. We looked for guidance to United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 85 (1999), an immigration case, in which we held that UUV is a crime of violence under § 16. Other cases in this circuit, however, have made clear that § 16 and § 4B1.2(a) are different, and that what qualifies as a crime of violence under one does not necessarily qualify under the other.5 To the extent that our prior cases have conflated the § 16(b) and § 4B1.2(a)(2) definitions of "crime of violence," they are overruled.
In determining whether simple motor vehicle theft is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), we are bound to follow each sentencing guideline and accompanying policy statements. See United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167 (5th Cir.2002) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) and Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 199-201, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992)). Further, the guidelines' commentary is given controlling weight if it is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guidelines. See id. (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993)). We review the district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Deavours, 219 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir.2000).
As noted previously, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 sets forth base offense levels for crimes involving the unlawful possession of a fire-arm, and applies an enhanced base offense level of 20 if the defendant has a previous felony conviction for a "crime of violence." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Application Note 5 to § 2K2.1 refers to § 4B1.2(a) and its Application Note 1 for the definition of "crime of violence." Section 4B1.2(a) defines "crime of violence" as:
We must decide whether simple motor vehicle theft, under Texas law, falls under this definition, that is, whether, by its nature, it "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." In Texas, theft is defined as "unlawfully appropriat[ing] property with intent to deprive the owner of property." Tex. Pen.Code § 31.03(a). "Appropriation of property is unlawful if: (1) it is without the owner's effective consent; (2) the property is stolen and the actor appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another; or (3) property in the custody of any law enforcement agency was explicitly represented by any law enforcement agent to the actor as being stolen and the actor appropriates the property believing it was stolen by another." Tex. Penal Code § 31.03(b). Charles' indictment from his motor vehicle theft offense charges that he:
In United States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.1992), we held that, in determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 or § 4B1.1, we can consider only "conduct `set forth in the count of which defendant was convicted,'" and not the other facts of the case. Id. at 254 (citation omitted). This principle is confirmed by Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2, which states that "[o]ther offenses are included as `crimes of violence' if ... the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted ... by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Based on the language in § 4B1.2(a)(2) and in Application Note 1, we hold that a crime is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2) only if, from the face of the indictment, the crime charged or the conduct charged presents a serious potential risk of injury to a person. Injury to another need not be a certain result, but it must be clear from the indictment that the crime itself or the conduct specifically charged posed this serious potential risk.
Application Note 1, by requiring that other crimes must "by [their] nature" present a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another," calls for a categorical inclusion or exclusion of crimes and/or conduct. Simple motor vehicle theft does not, by its nature, present this risk. It therefore is not a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2).
For the reasons we have thus explained, we overrule our holding in United States v. Jackson, 220 F.3d 635 (5th Cir.2000). Further, we limit our holding in United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 85 (1999) to its property aspects and to § 16 cases. We therefore REVERSE the judgment, VACATE the sentence, and REMAND this case for re-sentencing in the light of this opinion.
Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce. Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) provides for a penalty of up to ten years for this offense. In October 1997, Charles had pled guilty to the felony offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon on a licensed premises, and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment
Although § 16 has general application under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, in which Congress created the Sentencing Commission and authorized it to promulgate sentencing guidelines,see United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir.1992) (citing S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1983), in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486), and although the Sentencing Commission has promulgated a different definition of "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2(a), no one in this appeal has raised the issue of whether the Sentencing Commission has the authority to depart from § 16. Consequently this is not an issue in this case. Nevertheless, we should observe that the Third Circuit has concluded that the Sentencing Commission has the power to adopt a different definition of "crime of violence" from that in § 16. See Parson, 955 F.2d at 866.
This difference is also true of § 16(a) and § 4B1.2(a)(1)
See, e.g., United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 925-26 (5th Cir.2001).
Common sense is the key to applying the "otherwise involves conduct" portion of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(2). Along that line, I concur in the following standard set by the majority:
Based on the language in § 4B1.2(a)(2) and in [its] Application Note 1, we hold that a crime is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2) only if, from the face of the indictment, the crime charged or the conduct charged presents a serious potential risk of injury to a person. Injury to another need not be a certain result, but it must be clear from the indictment that the crime itself or the conduct specifically charged posed this serious potential risk.
The operative phrase in § 4B1.2(a)(2) — "otherwise involves conduct that [by its nature, app. n. 1] presents a serious potential risk of injury to another" (emphasis added)—contains, for purposes of probabilities, a somewhat unusual use of the word "serious". Of course, "potential" is understood as "possible"; "risk", as "chance". 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2310, 2609 (1993). But, what does "serious" add to the mix?
"Serious" does not modify "injury", as in "serious bodily injury". See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 app. n. 1(i) (2001). Instead, it modifies "potential risk": "serious potential risk". As so employed, "serious" means "of significant degree or amount, worthy of consideration". Id. at 2785. It does not mean that injury to another is probable. At bottom, § 4B1.2(a)(2) calls for the application of common sense.
Therefore, for Charles' car theft to constitute a crime of violence, there must have been a "significant possible chance" of injury to a person when, as detailed in the conduct charged in his indictment, Charles "unlawfully appropriate[d] ... an automobile ... and intentionally operate[d] it". (Emphasis added.) In the light of this charged conduct, and contrary to the majority's apparent view, far more is at stake than "simple car theft". For example, because the charged conduct included Charles' operating the stolen vehicle, the theft took on an additional, dangerous characteristic: the unauthorized operation of the vehicle.
There are, in fact, eight different definitions of the term "crime of violence" in the United States Code and the United States Sentencing Guidelines. These different definitions can be located at the following citations: 18 U.S.C. § 16, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(D)(3), 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4), Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(f)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 540A(c), 42 U.S.C. § 13726(a)(1), U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, application notes (B)(ii) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). There are a variety of common elements in each of these definitions, but they each have differing words and phrases. I can see no rational justification for a defined term such as "crime of violence," which is used as frequently as the term "crime of violence" is used, to have this many different meanings. I can see no rational justification for a prior conviction being categorized as a "crime of violence" under one of these definitions but not under another. Finally, I can see no rational justification for some of these definitions being closed-ended and self-contained; and others of these definitions have catch-all clauses which invite speculation and differing results depending upon who (prosecutor, defense counsel, probation officer, or judge) is making the interpretive call which these catch-all provisions require. In my view, the level of ambiguity generated by these varying definitions is totally unacceptable in a criminal justice system that claims to be based on due process. In my view, blame for this state of disarray falls squarely on the shoulders of the Congress (specifically the Judiciary Committees of the House and the Senate) and on the Sentencing Commission and its staff. It is not the task of the Judicial Branch to say which of these varying definitions the Congress intended to be controlling; nor is it the task of the Judicial Branch to make specific what Congress has failed to specify.
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