Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/328/85/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-08-24 04:42:33
Document Index: 684047240

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 905', '§ 189', '§ 933', '§ 902', '§ 5', '§ 458', '§ 688']

SEAS SHIPPING CO., INC. V. SIERACKI, 328 U. S. 85 - Volume 328 - 1946 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 328 > SEAS SHIPPING CO., INC. V. SIERACKI, 328 U. S. 85 (1946) > Full Text
SEAS SHIPPING CO., INC. V. SIERACKI, 328 U. S. 85 (1946)
Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)
1. A shipowner's obligation of seaworthiness, traditionally owed by shipowners to seamen, extends to a stevedore who was injured while aboard and loading the ship, although employed by an independent stevedoring contractor engaged by the owner to load the ship. Pp. 328 U. S. 89-100.
(a) The obligation is essentially a species of liability without fault, and is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character. Pp. 328 U. S. 90-94.
(b) It is not confined to seamen who perform the ship's service under immediate hire of the owner, but extends to those who render it with his consent or by his arrangement. Pp. 328 U. S. 95-97.
(c) For purposes of the liability, a stevedore is a seaman, because he is doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards, and he is entitled to a seaman's traditional protection. P. 328 U. S. 99.
2. By giving longshoremen the rights of compensation afforded by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and making them exclusive as against the employer, Congress has not withdrawn from longshoremen the protections gained under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 or other protections relating to personal injury available to them under general maritime law. P. 328 U. S. 100.
(a) The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act did not purport to make the stevedore's remedy for compensation against his employer exclusive of remedies against others, and it expressly reserved to the stevedore a right of election to proceed against third parties responsible for his injury. P. 328 U. S. 101.
(b) It did not nullify any right of a stevedore against the owner of the ship, except possibly when he is hired by the owner. P. 328 U. S. 102.
3. A right peculiar to the law of admiralty may be enforced either by a suit in admiralty or by one on the law side of the court. P. 328 U. S. 88.
4. The liability of a shipowner for failure to maintain a seaworthy vessel rests upon an entirely different basis from the liability of contractors and subcontractors who built the ship. Therefore, the shipowner would not be jointly liable with the builders, but would be liable severally. P. 328 U. S. 89.
5. When one of several defendants in a suit brings the cause here on certiorari and the others are not named as respondents or served in accordance with Rule 38(3), this Court is precluded from making any determination concerning the rights or liabilities of the other defendants. P. 328 U. S. 89.
A stevedore employed by an independent stevedoring company sued a shipowner, the contractor who built the ship, and a subcontractor for injuries sustained while working aboard the ship as a result of a latent defect in a part of the ship. The District Court gave judgment against the contractor and subcontractor, but in favor of the shipowner. 57 F.Supp. 724. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as to the shipowner. 149 F.2d 98. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U.S. 700. Affirmed, p. 328 U. S. 103.
He sued petitioner and two other companies. These were the Bethlehem Steel Company, to which the Maritime Commission had awarded the contract for constructing the ship, and Bethlehem Sparrow's Point, Inc., which had built part of the ship under agreement with the steel company. The District Court found that the shackle had broken as the result of a defect which has occurred in its forging. The Bethlehem companies had purchased this equipment from another concern. Nevertheless, the court held they were negligent in not having tested it adequately before installing it. But the court considered petitioner to be under no such obligation to test, [Footnote 1] and therefore not negligent. Accordingly, it gave judgment against the two Bethlehem companies, but in favor of petitioner. 57 F.Supp. 724.
that it was not negligent, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that respondent should recover for the ship's lack of seaworthiness. [Footnote 2] The opinion emphasized that the decision was novel, noting "statements and assumptions each way." [Footnote 3] Because of the novelty and importance of the question, we granted certiorari. [Footnote 4] 326 U.S. 700.
Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255, 259 U. S. 259; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 317 U. S. 243-244; Rhones v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 37 F.Supp. 616. [Footnote 5]
Equally unavailable is the contention concerning the secondary character of petitioner's liability. That liability, if it exists, not only sounds in tort, [Footnote 6] but rests upon an entirely different basis from that upon which recovery has been had against the Bethlehem companies. Such a liability therefore would be not joint, but several, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals obviously went on this view. Moreover the contention necessarily affects the Bethlehem companies, at any rate in relation to possible claim of indemnity by petitioner. They have not been named as respondents here or served in accordance with Rule 38(3). Consequently we are precluded from making any determination concerning their rights or liabilities with relation either to petitioner or to respondent.
There could be no question of petitioner's liability for respondent's injuries, incurred as they were here, if he had been in petitioner's employ, rather than hired by the stevedoring company. That an owner is liable to indemnify a seaman for an injury caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel or its appurtenant appliances and equipment has been settled law in this country ever since The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 321 U. S. 99, and authorities cited. And the liability applies as well when the ship is moored at a dock as when it is at sea. See, e.g., The Edith Godden, 23 F. 43; Johnson & Co. v. Johansen, 86 F. 886; The Waco, 3 F.2d 476.
The origins are perhaps unascertainable. [Footnote 7] But that fact, in itself, may be some evidence that contract alone is neither the sole source of the liability nor its ultimate boundary. For to assume this would be at once to project ideas of contract backward into centuries governed more largely than our own by notions of status, [Footnote 8] and to exclude from the protection all who do the work of the sea without benefit of contract with the owner. It may be doubted, for example, that he has ever been able to escape liability to impressed seamen, in whose cases to speak of "contract" would only rationalize a responsibility imposed regardless of consensual relationship. And it would hardly seem consistent with the obligation's benevolent purposes [Footnote 9]
It is true that the liability for unseaworthiness is often said to be an incident of the seaman's contract. But, in all instances which have come to our attention, this has been in situations where such a contract existed. [Footnote 10] Necessarily,
in such a setting, the statement could have no reference to any issue over liability in the absence of such a contractual relation. Its function, rather, has been to refute other suggested restrictions which might be held to apply on the facts. Most often, perhaps, these have been limitations arising from the erroneous idea that the liability is founded in negligence, and therefore may be defeated by the common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., supra; cf. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255.
owner regardless of his fault. [Footnote 11] Those risks are avoidable by the owner to the extent that they may result from negligence. And, beyond this, he is in position, as the worker is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping community which receives the service, and should bear its cost.
These and other considerations arising from the hazards which maritime service places upon men who perform it, rather than any consensual basis of responsibility, have been the paramount influences dictating the shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness, as well as its absolute character. It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to other well known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., supra; 234 U. S. S. 95� Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52; Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, supra.@ It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy.
On principle, we agree with the Court of Appeals that this policy is not confined to seamen who perform the ship's service under immediate hire to the owner, but extends to those who render it with his consent or by his arrangement. All the considerations which gave birth to the liability and have shaped its absolute character dictate that the owner should not be free to nullify it by parcelling out his operations to intermediary employers whose sole business is to take over portions of the ship's work or by other devices which would strip the men performing its service of their historic protection. The risks themselves arise from and are incident in fact to the service, not merely to the contract pursuant to which it is done. The brunt of loss cast upon the worker and his dependents is the same, and is as inevitable, whether his pay comes directly from the shipowner or only indirectly through another with whom he arranges to have it done. The latter ordinarily has neither right nor opportunity to discover or remove the cause of the peril, and it is doubtful, therefore, that he owes to his employees, with respect to these hazards, the employer's ordinary duty to furnish a safe place to work, unless perhaps in cases where the perils are obvious or his own action creates them. [Footnote 12] If not, no
Accordingly, we think the Court of Appeals correctly held that the liability arises as an incident not merely of the seaman's contract, but of performing the ship's service with the owner's consent. For this view, in addition to the stated considerations of principle, the court rightly found support in the trend and policy of this Court's decisions, especially in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, and Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U. S. 234.
"And so an injury to a stevedore comes within the classification of a marine tort. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52. It seems, therefore, that, when a man is performing a function essential to maritime service on board a ship, the fortuitous circumstances of his employment by the shipowner or a stevedoring contractor should not determine the measure of his rights. This is the very basis on which the Jones Act [Footnote 13] was held applicable to give redress to an injured stevedore in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty. . . ."
in Imbrovek [Footnote 14] that stevedores injured while working aboard the ship, though not employed by its owner, are within the traditional protections afforded to seamen by admiralty, and that "the fortuitous circumstance" of their employment by one other than the owner to do the ship's work not only did not remove them from those protections, but brought their employers within the protection of the liability to supply them. [Footnote 15]
The same underlying considerations were controlling in the Haverty decision, although the liability asserted arose under an Act of Congress and the Court cast its ruling in terms of legislative intent. The only fulcrum for its action was the statute's undefined use of the term "seamen" in conferring the right of recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the employer's negligence. 41 Stat. 988, 1007. Recognizing that, for most purposes, "stevedores are not seamen,'" [Footnote 16] and relying upon Imbrovek,
Running through all of these cases, therefore, to sustain the stevedore's recovery is a common core of policy which has been controlling, although the specific issue has varied from a question of admiralty jurisdiction to one of coverage under statutory liability within the admiralty field. It is that, for injuries incurred while working on board the ship in navigable waters, the stevedore is entitled to the seaman's traditional and statutory protections, regardless of the fact that he is employed immediately by another than the owner. [Footnote 17] For these purposes, he is, in short, a seaman because he is doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards. Moreover, to make the policy effective, his employer is brought within the liability which is peculiar to the employment relation to the extent that, and because, he also undertakes the service of the ship.
It would be anomalous if such a policy, effective to control such issues, were less effective when the question is simply whether the stevedore is entitled to the traditional securities afforded by the law of the sea to men who do the ship's work. Nor does it follow from the fact that the stevedore gains protections against his employer appropriate to the employment relation as such that he loses, or never acquires against the shipowner, the protections, not peculiar to that relation, which the law imposes as incidental to the performance of that service. Among these is the obligation of seaworthiness. It is peculiarly and exclusively the obligation of the owner. It is one he cannot delegate. [Footnote 18] By the same token, it is one he cannot contract away as to any workman within the scope of its policy. As we have said, he is at liberty to conduct his business by securing the advantages of specialization in labor and skill brought about by modern divisions of labor. He is not at liberty, by doing this, to discard his traditional responsibilities. That the law permits him to substitute others for responsibilities peculiar to the employment relation does not mean that he can thus escape the duty it imposes of more general scope. To allow this would be, in substantial effect, to convert the ancient liability for maritime tort into a purely contractual responsibility. This we are not free to do.
This view cannot be accepted. Apart from the fact that the Uravic decision was rendered by a unanimous Court some three years after the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act was adopted, with a like result in Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U. S. 635, [Footnote 19] the compelling answer is that Congress, by that Act, not only did not purport to make the stevedore's remedy for compensation against his employer exclusive of remedies against others. It expressly reserved to the stevedore a right of election to proceed against third persons responsible for his injury, [Footnote 20] and, in case of his election to receive compensation, it provided for assignment of his rights against third persons to his employer, binding the latter to remit to him any
excess of the recovery over the compensation, expenses of recovery, etc. [Footnote 21]
We may take it, therefore, that Congress intended the remedy of compensation to be exclusive as against the employer. See Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., ante, p. 328 U. S. 1; 33 U.S.C. § 905. But we cannot assume, in face of the Act's explicit provisions, that it intended this remedy to nullify or affect others against third persons. Exactly the opposite is true. The legislation therefore did not nullify any right of the longshoreman against the owner of the ship, except possibly in the instance, presumably rare, where he may be hired by the owner. The statute had no purpose or effect to alter the stevedore's rights as against any but his employer alone. Beyond that consequence, moreover, we think it had none to alter either the basic policy or the rationalization of the Haverty decision. Because the recovery under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was limited to the employer, the necessary effect of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, likewise so limited, was to substitute its remedy for that provided under the preexisting legislation and the Haverty decision's construction of it. There was none to nullify the basic and generally applicable policy of that decision, or to affect the validity of its foundations in other applications.
This does not mean that, where suit is brought at law, the court is restricted to the enforcement of common law rights. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 247 U. S. 384; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 264 U. S. 387-388; Panama Refining Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557, 271 U. S. 560-561, "When a cause of action in admiralty is asserted in a court of law, its substance is unchanged." Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, 111 F.2d 263, 266.
Cf. text infra; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U. S. 367; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52.
The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110, 298 U. S. 121, note 2; Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 321 U. S. 99; cf. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158.
"With the advent of steam navigation, however, it was realized, at least in this country, that 'maintenance and cure' did not afford to injured seamen adequate compensation in all cases for injuries sustained. Vessels were no longer the simple sailing ships, of whose seaworthiness the sailor was an adequate judge, but were full of complicated and dangerous machinery, the operation of which required the use of many and varied appliances and a high degree of technical knowledge. The seaworthiness of the vessel could be ascertained only upon an examination of this machinery and appliances by skilled experts. It was accordingly held that the duty of the vessel and her owners to the seaman, in this new age of navigation, extended beyond mere 'maintenance and cure,' which had been sufficient in the simple age of sailing ships; that the owners owed to the seamen the duty of furnishing a seaworthy vessel and safe and proper appliances in good order and condition, and that, for failure to discharge such duty, there was liability on the part of the vessel and her owners to a seaman suffering injury as a result thereof. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 189 U. S. 175. . . . In The Edith Godden, 23 F. 43, 46, which dealt with the case of a seaman injured by a defective derrick, Judge Addison Brown pointed out that, in dealing with injuries sustained by the use of modern appliances"
See, in addition to the cited opinion of Judge Brown, his opinion in The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390. See also Storgard v. France & Canada S.S. Corp., 263 F. 545, 547, 548; The H. A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708, 711.
In all of the cases cited or found, except perhaps the stevedore cases cited in note 3 where the cause of action has been based upon unseaworthiness, there was a contract. The "implied warranty" on the part of a shipowner that a ship is seaworthy has been read not only into contracts made with seamen, Hamilton v. United States, 268 F. 15, 21, but also into contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, Bradley Fertilizer Co. v. The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U. S. 199, 153 U. S. 210-211, although this liability has been modified by the Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445, 46 U.S.C. §§ 189-195, and, in rare instances, perhaps also into contracts with passengers, cf. Muise v. Gorton-Pew Vessels Co., 1938 A.M.C. 714, 718; Rainey v. New York & P. S.S. Co., 216 F. 449, 453; Robinson, Admiralty (1939) 306, note 109.
Contributory negligence has never been a defense in suits brought by seamen to recover for injuries due to a ship's unseaworthiness, but has been applied merely in mitigation of damages. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U. S. 424, 305 U. S. 429; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110, 298 U. S. 122, and cases cited. And, in The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1, the Court held that in a suit for personal injuries brought in admiralty by a stevedore the admiralty rule of divided damages was applicable. It was said in The Arizona v. Anelich, at 298 U. S. 122-123, with respect to the defense of assumption of risk:
As to the fellow servant rule, see Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 321 U. S. 100-103; The Frank and Willie, 45 F. 494, 495, 496.
In Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, the stevedoring company was held liable to its employee for negligence in failing to furnish a safe place to work. This consisted in its failure to secure properly a beam which supported hatch covers removed by it in the loading process. The libelant joined the shipowner with the stevedoring contractor, both being represented by the same proctors and advocates. The stevedoring company acquitted the shipowner and the libel was dismissed as to it. The case, in view of these circumstances, is not authority for the view that the stevedoring company is liable to the stevedore, under the employer's obligation to furnish a safe working place, for the hazards secured against by the shipowner's obligation of seaworthiness. It holds only that the stevedoring company is liable for its own negligence.
234 U. S. 234 U.S. 52, 234 U. S. 61-62.
It is in relation to liability for personal injury or death arising in the course of his employment aboard the ship that the policy of our law has been most favorable to the stevedore's claims. Whether or not that policy has been influenced by the vicissitudes experienced in finding protection for him as a result of the Jensen decision, 244 U. S. 205; Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, 317 U. S. 252-253, the reasons underlying the policy are perhaps more nearly identical in this application, as between seamen and longshoremen than those supporting other rights of the seaman, such as that to maintenance and cure.
In this case, we are not concerned with the question whether the same policy extends to injuries incurred ashore by a stevedore engaged in the same work -- a matter which is relevant, however, in Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., ante, p. 328 U. S. 1. Cf. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36.
See 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) to (g) inclusive. As to the right of election and the right to receive compensation or the amount of the recovery against third persons, whichever is greater, see Chapman v. Hoage, 296 U. S. 526, 296 U. S. 529; Marlin v. Cardillo, 68 App.D.C. 201, 95 F.2d 112; Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d 127; The Pacific Pine, 31 F.2d 152; Cupo v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 56 F.Supp. 45.
The statute did not cover members of a crew of a vessel, thereby saving to them their preexisting rights under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). See South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, 309 U. S. 256-257.
The liability of a vessel or its owner to members of the crew, as an insurer of seaworthiness of the vessel and its tackle, was not recognized by the maritime law of England until established by statute. Merchants Shipping Act, 39 & 40 Vict. c. 80, § 5; 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, § 458. In this country, the right of the seaman to demand, in addition to maintenance and cure, indemnity for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness was first recognized by this Court in The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158. In later cases, it has been established that due diligence of the owner does not relieve him from this obligation. See The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110, 298 U. S. 121; Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U. S. 424, 305 U. S. 429, 305 U. S. 432; Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 321 U. S. 100, and cases cited; The Neptuno, 30 F. 925; The Frank and Willie, 45 F. 494; The Julia Fowler, 49 F. 277; cf. The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U. S. 199, 153 U. S. 210.
For these reasons, the seaman has been given a special status in the maritime law as the ward of the admiralty, entitled to special protection of the law not extended to land employees. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 165 U. S. 282-283; The Arizona v. Anelich, supra, 298 U. S. 122-123; Calmar
S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525; Socony Vacuum Co. v. Smith, supra, 305 U. S. 430; Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U. S. 724. See also Judge Addison Brown in The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390, 394, et seq. Justice Story said in Reed v. Canfield, Fed.Cas.No.11,641, 1 Sumn.195, 199:
harbor workers any of the special rights or privileges conferred on seamen by the maritime law. In fact, Congress, by the Longshoremen's Act, cut off from longshoremen and harbor workers the right extended to them by judicial construction of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50; Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U. S. 234, to enjoy the same right of recovery from the vessel or owner as seamen for negligent injuries sustained while working on navigable waters. Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., ante, p. 328 U. S. 1. While the Act gave to longshoremen and stevedores a right to compensation against their employer, it neither conferred upon nor withheld from them any rights of recovery for such injuries against third persons. It can hardly be said that the failure of Congress thus to enlarge the rights of longshoremen, so as to make them comparable to those of seamen, is a recognition of existing rights against third persons arising from the warranty of seaworthiness which no court has ever recognized * and which grows out of a status which longshoremen have never occupied.
inflicted without his fault. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251. It has left them free to pursue their remedy for injuries resulting from negligence of third parties, including in this case the vessel and the furnishers of the defective shackle. Where the injury occurs on land, they are free to pursue the remedy afforded by local law. State Industrial Commission of New York v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263; Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179; Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., ante, p. 328 U. S. 1. There would seem to be no occasion for us to be more generous than Congress has been by presenting to them paid up accident insurance policies at the expense of a vessel by which they have not been employed, and which has not failed in any duty of due care toward them. Apparently, under the decision now rendered, the maritime worker employed by a vessel on navigable waters, but not a member of the crew, would enjoy rights of recovery not accorded to members of the crew. For he would be entitled to indemnity upon the warranty of unseaworthiness as are members of the crew, and also to the benefits of the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Act from which members of the crew are excluded. See South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, supra, 309 U. S. 255-256.
* The two cases relied upon by the Circuit Court of Appeals do not lend support to its decision. In Cassil v. United States Emergency Fleet Corp., 289 F. 774, recovery was sought on the ground that the vessel was negligent, and the Court merely said that there could be no claim against the vessel unless it was unseaworthy. The court seems to have assumed that a recovery for unseaworthiness could be had only if negligence was shown. See cases cited in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 321 U. S. 100. In W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining & Molasses Co. v. Stoffel, 41 F.2d 651, a longshoreman was allowed recovery on the ground of negligence of one of the ship's employees.
Powered by Justia US Supreme Court Center: SEAS SHIPPING CO., INC. V. SIERACKI, 328 U. S. 85 (1946)