Source: http://openjurist.org/480/us/531
Timestamp: 2015-07-31 03:22:42
Document Index: 547666525

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 1001', '§ 810', '§ 1331', '§ 810', '§ 3120', '§ 810', '§ 3120', '§ 810', '§ 4', '§ 1603', '§ 810', '§ 4', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 1332']

480 US 531 Amoco Production Company v. Village of Gambell Alaska P Hodel | OpenJurist
480 U.S. 531 - Amoco Production Company v. Village of Gambell Alaska P Hodel Home
480 US 531 Amoco Production Company v. Village of Gambell Alaska P Hodel 480 U.S. 531
107 S.Ct. 1396
94 L.Ed.2d 542
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, et al., Petitioners,v.VILLAGE OF GAMBELL, ALASKA, et al. Donald P. HODEL, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Petitioner, v. VILLAGE OF GAMBELL et al.
Nos. 85-1239 and 85-1406.
Section 810(a) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) provides, inter alia, that, before allowing the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands that would significantly restrict Alaskan Natives' use of those lands for subsistence, the head of the federal agency having primary jurisdiction over the lands must give notice, conduct a hearing, and determine that the restriction of subsistence uses is necessary and that reasonable steps will be taken to minimize adverse impacts. Petitioner Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) granted oil and gas leases to petitioner oil companies off the Alaska coast under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). Claiming that the Secretary had failed to comply with § 810(a), respondents, two Alaska Native villages and a Native organization, sought injunctions to, inter alia, prohibit exploratory drilling under the leases. The District Court held that ANILCA applies to the OCS. It denied respondents' motions for preliminary injunctions, ruling that, although respondents had established a strong likelihood of success on the merits, injunctive relief was inappropriate because the balance of irreparable harm did not favor them, and the public interest favored continued oil exploration, which would not cause the type of harm—a restriction in subsistence uses or resources—that ANILCA was designed to prevent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that ANILCA applies to the OCS but reversed the District Court's denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held, inter alia, that irreparable damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed action, and that injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy for a violation of an environmental statute absent rare or unusual circumstances.
1. The Court of Appeals' direction of a preliminary injunction conflicted with Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91, and was in error. Section 810(a)'s purpose is to protect subsistence resources from unnecessary destruction, not to prohibit all federal land uses that would adversely affect such resources, and there is no clear indication in ANILCA that Congress intended to limit district courts' traditional equitable discretion by requiring them to issue injunctions in all cases. The Court of Appeals erroneously focused on § 810's procedure rather than on its underlying substantive policy of preservation of subsistence resources. The District Court's decision does not undermine that policy, since it was based on findings that exploration activities would not significantly restrict subsistence uses, and that the Secretary can control the offshore-leasing process even after exploration is completed, which findings the Court of Appeals did not dispute. Instead, that court stated and relied on a presumption of irreparable harm which is contrary to traditional equitable principles, has no basis in ANILCA, and is unnecessary to fully protect the environment. Furthermore, the balance of harms favors the District Court's ruling since the oil company petitioners had committed approximately $70 million to exploration which would have been lost had the preliminary injunction been issued. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the public interest favored injunctive relief because the interests served by ANILCA supersede all others is not supported by the statutory language, which merely declares that preservation of subsistence resources is a public interest that should be reconciled with competing interests where possible. Pp. 541-546.
(a) By ANILCA's plain language, § 810(a) applies only to federal lands within the State of Alaska's boundaries, since the Act defines "public lands" to mean federal lands situated "in Alaska," which phrase has a precise geographic/political meaning that can be delineated with exactitude to include coastal waters to a point three miles from the coastline, where the OCS commences. Pp. 546-548.
(b) Nothing in the language or structure of ANILCA compels this Court to deviate from the plain meaning of "Alaska." Title VIII's subsistence-protection provisions constitute just 1 of ANILCA's 15 Titles, none of the rest of which has any express or implied applicability to the OCS, and all but 2 of which utilize the same definition of "public lands" as Title VIII. Moreover, § 1001(a) of the Act contains the lone express reference to the OCS which is intended to establish that section's inapplicability to the OCS. Furthermore, § 810(a) itself suggests that it does not apply to the OCS when it refers to "the Federal agency having primary jurisdiction," since no federal agency has "primary jurisdiction" over the OCS. Pp. 548-552.
774 F.2d 1414 (CA9 1985), reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which STEVENS and SCALIA, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. ----.
Habicht, II, Washington, D.C., for petitioner, Secretary of the Interior.
E. Edward Bruce, Washington, D.C., for petitioners, Amoco Production Company, et al.
Donald S. Cooper, Anchorage, Alaska, for respondents.
Petitioner Secretary of the Interior granted oil and gas leases to petitioner oil companies in the Norton Sound (Lease Sale 57) and Navarin Basin (Lease Sale 83) areas of the Bering Sea under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 67 Stat. 462, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit directed the entry of a preliminary injunction against all activity in connection with the leases because it concluded that it was likely that the Secretary had failed to comply with § 810 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 94 Stat. 2371, 16 U.S.C. § 3120, prior to issuing the leases. We granted certiorari, 476 U.S. 1157, 106 S.Ct. 2274, 90 L.Ed.2d 717, and we now reverse.1
* When the Secretary of the Interior proposed Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lease Sale 57, the Alaska Native villages of Gambell and Stebbins sought to enjoin him from proceeding with the sale, claiming that it would adversely affect their aboriginal rights to hunt and fish on the OCS and that the Secretary had failed to comply with ANILCA § 810(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a), which provides protection for natural resources used for subsistence in Alaska.2 The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary and oil company intervenors, holding that the villagers had no aboriginal rights on the OCS and that ANILCA did not apply to the OCS.3
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling on aboriginal rights, although on different grounds, and reversed the ruling on the scope of ANILCA § 810. People of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572 (1984) (Gambell I ). With respect to the claim of aboriginal rights, the court assumed without deciding that the villagers once had aboriginal rights to hunt and fish in the Norton Sound,4 but concluded that these rights had been extinguished by § 4(b) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 85 Stat. 690, 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b). That section provides:
The Court of Appeals construed the phrase "in Alaska" to mean "the geographic region, including the contiguous continental shelf and the waters above it, and not merely the area within the strict legal boundaries of the State of Alaska." 746 F.2d, at 575. Finding the phrase ambiguous, the court examined the legislative history and concluded that Congress wrote the extinguishment provision broadly "to accomplish a complete and final settlement of aboriginal claims and avoid further litigation of such claims." Ibid. The court then concluded that ANILCA § 810 had the same geographical scope as ANCSA § 4(b):
"[The villages] make a compelling argument that the provisions of Title VIII of [ANILCA] protecting subsistence uses were intended to have the same territorial scope as provisions of the earlier Claims Settlement Act extinguishing Native hunting and fishing rights. The two statutory provisions are clearly related. When Congress adopted the Claims Settlement Act it was aware that extinguishing Native rights might threaten subsistence hunting and fishing by Alaska Natives. . . . It is a reasonable assumption that Congress intended the preference and procedural protections for subsistence uses mandated by Title VIII of [ANILCA] to be co-extensive with the extinguishment of aboriginal rights that made those measures necessary." 746 F.2d, at 579-580.
The court found support for this view in ANILCA's legislative history. But, according to the Court of Appeals, "[t]he most compelling reason for resolving the ambiguous language of Title VIII in favor of coverage of outer continental shelf lands and waters is that Title VIII was adopted to benefit the Natives." Id., at 581. The court acknowledged the familiar rule of statutory construction that doubtful expressions must be resolved in favor of Indians. See Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, 39 S.Ct. 40, 41-42, 63 L.Ed. 138 (1918). It then remanded to the District Court the questions whether the Secretary had substantially complied with ANILCA § 810 in the course of complying with other environmental statutes,5 and if not, whether the leases should be voided.
In compliance with the Court of Appeals' decision, the Secretary prepared a postsale evaluation of possible impacts on subsistence uses from Lease Sale 57.6 The Secretary found that the execution of the leases, which permitted lessees to conduct only limited preliminary activities on the OCS, had not and would not significantly restrict subsistence uses. He further found that the exploration stage activities, including seismic activities and exploratory drilling, that had occurred in Norton Sound had not significantly restricted subsistence uses and were not likely to do so in the future. Finally, he found that, if development and production activities were ever conducted, which was not likely, they might, in the event of a major oilspill, significantly restrict subsistence uses for limited periods in limited areas.7
In April 1985, the villages sought a preliminary injunction in the District Court against exploratory activities in Norton Sound. At the same time, the village of Gambell, joined by Nunam Kitlutsisti, an organization of Yukon Delta Natives, filed a complaint seeking to void Lease Sale 83 and to enjoin imminent exploratory drilling in the Navarin Basin. The District Court consolidated the motions for preliminary injunctions and denied them. It found that respondents had established a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Although the Secretary, in the EIS's for the Five Year Leasing Plan and for the Norton Sound and Navarin Basin Lease Sales, had evaluated in some detail the effect of OCS oil and gas development on subsistence resources and had considered alternatives which would reduce or eliminate the impact on these resources, the Secretary failed to comply with ANILCA because "he did not have the policy precepts of ANILCA in mind at the time of evaluation." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-1239, pp. 57a-58a. And with respect to the postsale evaluation for Lease Sale 57, the District Court concluded that because development and production activities, if they ever occurred, could significantly restrict subsistence uses in certain areas, the Secretary was required to conduct the hearing and make the findings required by §§ 810(a)(1)-(3) prior to conducting the lease sale. Nevertheless, the court concluded that injunctive relief was not appropriate based on the following findings:
"(1) That delay in the exploration of the OCS may cause irreparable harm to this nation's quest for new oil resources and energy independence. Expedited exploration as a policy is stated in OCSLA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3);
Respondents appealed from the District Court's denial of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit reversed. People of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414 (1985) (Gambell II ). The court, agreeing that the villages had established a strong likelihood of success on the merits, concluded that the District Court had not properly balanced irreparable harm and had not properly evaluated the public interest. Relying on its earlier decision in Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (1984), the court stated: " 'Irreparable damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed action.' " 774 F.2d, at 1423. It ruled that "injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy for a violation of an environmental statute absent rare or unusual circumstances." Ibid. "Unusual circumstances" are those in which an injunction would interfere with a long-term contractual relationship, Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677 (CA9 1984), or would result in irreparable harm to the environment, American Motorcyclist Assn. v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 966 (CA9 1983). 774 F.2d, at 1423-1425. The court found no such circumstances in the instant case. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the policy declared in OCSLA to expedite exploration of the OCS had been superseded by ANILCA's policy to preserve the subsistence culture of Alaska Natives. Finally, the court rejected arguments that it was improper to apply Gambell I retroactively to Lease Sale 83.
Petitioners assert that the Ninth Circuit erred in directing the grant of a preliminary injunction. We addressed a similar contention in Weinberger v. Romero