Source: http://allthingspros.blogspot.com/2011_06_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2015-07-30 01:57:54
Document Index: 124936922

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 119', '§ 102', 'application No. 601170', 'application No. 601170', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 119', '§ 119', '§ 1', '§ 119', '§ 119', '§ 103']

Takeaway: In considering the meaning of "planar", the BPAI adopted the Examiner's interpretation ("flat") rather than the Applicant's interpretation ("thin"). The Board found that the specification did not support the interpretation "thin." The Applicant did not address the dictionary definition used by the Examiner, nor did the Applicant provide his own definition. Details:
(Emphasis added.) Independent claims 48 and 62 both included the "substantially planar plate" limitation. The Examiner rejected claims 48 and 62 as anticipated by Gaspari (plate 11 and cutting edge 14, 14a):
The term "planar" is defined as "Of or relating to a plane; (having parts) situated in or forming a plane or (esp. parallel) planes; flat, two-dimensional" Oxford English Dictionary (definition adj. 1.). However, appellant's die includes a plate with a thickness and a planar surface. Hence, appellant's die is not two-dimensional. The die of Gaspari is relatively flat and contains a planar surface as is in appellant's die. It is noted that the term "planar" is not specifically define to preclude a plate having different thickness than the preferred embodiment set forth in the appellant's written description. The Applicant responded in the Reply Brief:
The Board therefore adopted the ordinary and customary meaning offered by the Examiner. Under this meaning, "substantially planar plate" read on Gaspari's plate, so the Board affirmed the anticipation rejection. My two cents: The Applicant was definitely stuck on "planar." All the originally filed claims used the term, the term wasn't amended during prosecution, and the specification consistently used "planar" in referring to the surface. The Applicant offered no definition to support his interpretation of "planar" as "thin," but instead referred to a "non-limiting example" from the spec. That simply won't do. Non-limiting is, well, non-limiting. If you want the limitation to be interpreted as "thin" then either make sure the word you use connotes "thin" or amend to include "thin."
Finally, why didn't the Applicant argue over the claim term "plate" ?? I don't know what the definition of "plate" is – I'm sure there are many – but that word sure connotes "thin" to me more than "planar" does. 5 comments:
Takeaway: The BPAI reversed several rejections based on the Examiner's unreasonable interpretation of "permanently secured" as "the user can choose not to remove it". (Ex parte Bivens.) Details:
The Examiner used a similar interpretation in another anticipation rejection, finding that a clip-on vent member as disclosed in the Moser reference "is permanent if left on the bottle by the user." In the Appeal Brief, the Applicant argued that the Examiner had used an unreasonable interpretation of "permanently secured." With respect to the Goff reference, the Applicant argued:
[T]he spout attachment of Goff is by design removable. In no sense can it be said that a spout attachment that is designed to be removable satisfies the claim limitation that the vent member be permanently secured to the body. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that "permanent" would be construed by one of ordinary skill in the art to include an element that was designed to be removed. The Applicant made a similar argument with respect to the Moser reference, noting that Moser did not anticipate because it described a vent device "which can be easily attached to and removed from the bottle." In the Answer, the Examiner maintained his position and further explained that "the term 'permanent' is broad and does not impart any structure over the attachment taught by Goff, i.e, one can choose to keep the attachment between the bottle and the vent permanently."
The Applicant was left with reversals of two dependent claims, however. So the Applicant should get a patent out of it. 5 comments:
I'm always suspicious of explicit motivations to combine, because Examiners often take them out of context. References disclose lots of features, and lots of benefits. Don't assume that the cited benefit is actually produced by the feature you're claiming. Read the reference carefully and decide for yourself. 15 comments:
Takeaway: The Federal Circuit doesn't reverse many BPAI decisions, but last week's In re Klein decision reversed all five obviousness rejections. The Federal Circuit based its reversal solely on the Board's findings that five references were analogous art as compared to the claimed invention. The court concluded that none of the Board's findings of analogous art were supported by the evidence, and so remanded the application back to the BPAI for further proceedings. Details:
a divider movably held by said receiving means for forming a compartment within said container, wherein said compartment has a volume that is proportionately less than
a volume of said container, by a ratio established for the formulation of sugar-water nectar for humming-birds, orioles or butterflies, wherein said compartment is adapted to receive sugar, and wherein removal of said divider from said receiving means allows mixing
of said sugar and water to occur to provide said sugar-water nectar.
Examiner made five different obviousness rejections. Each rejection relied on a single reference for the container, receiving means and divider, with a statement in the Applicant's background providing the specific sugar-water ratios. The Board explicitly found, based on a statement in the application background, that the problem addressed by the invention was "making a nectar feeder with a movable divider to prepare different ratios of sugar and water for different animals." Three of the references were drawers, and the remaining two were bottles. The Board also found that each of the five references disclosed a container with movable dividers "for the purpose of keeping two or more things separate." The Board then summarily concluded that each reference was "reasonably pertinent" to the inventor's problem, and thus each reference did qualify as analogous art. On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the applicant argued that the Board's findings that the references were "reasonably pertinent" to the inventor's problem were nothing more than conclusory statements, unsupported by evidence.
The Federal Circuit agreed. The first three references were not analogous since: [t]he purpose of each of Roberts, O’Connor, or Kirkman is to separate solid objects. An inventor considering the problem of “making a nectar feeder with a movable divider to prepare different ratios of sugar and water for different animals,” would not have been motivated to consider any of these references when making his invention, particularly since none of these three references shows a partitioned container that is adapted to receive water or contain it long enough to be able to prepare different ratios in the different compartments.
The remaining two references involved fluid containers, but were still not analogous because they failed to "address multiple ratios and did not have a "movable divider" as claimed. My two cents: Don't get too excited and think that the standard for analogous art has been tightened. The reversal here was a result of a single fatal mistake by the BPAI: adopting a narrow problem statement from the background. You simply can't sweep in dividable drawers one you limit yourself to this narrow problem. In fact, you can't even sweep in fluid containers if they don't have movable dividers.
In the Solicitor's Brief to the Federal Circuit, the PTO attempted to fix this deficiency in the Board's decision by arguing that the problem was really a "compartment separation problem." The Federal Circuit said that administrative law prohibited the PTO from changing its position like this. I have no idea why the Board went with such a narrow problem statement. The Applicant acknowledged, in his BPAI Appeal Brief, a slightly broader version: "making it convenient to prepare a fixed ratio formulation of food or feed".
Another very puzzling aspect of the Board's decision is that they considered only the "pertinent to the inventor's problem" prong of the non-analogous arts test. The Applicant argued that the references were not in the same field as the invention, but the Board completely ignored this prong. [And as a result, the Federal Circuit didn't consider this on appeal.] Are the references analogous under the "same field" prong? Depends on what the "field" of the invention is. Bird feeders? Animal feeders? Feeders? Containers for liquid? Containers with partitions? Containers with moveable partitions?
Takeaway: On appeal, the Applicant argued that a foreign filing could be used to show constructive to practice in a swear behind declaration. The BPAI said that the foreign filing was constructive reduction to practice only if the US filing occurred less than a year after the foreign filing, citing In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1983). If the US filing took place more than one year after the foreign filing, § 119(a) does not allow the foreign application to be used as constructive reduction to practice. Details:
The technology in the application on appeal related to color bar codes. In the first Office Action, the Examiner rejected the independent claims as being anticipated by Ackley under § 102(e). The Applicant responded by attempting to swear behind Ackley, by showing conception before Ackley's filing date coupled with diligence from conception to the filing of Applicant's provisional (to which priority was claimed). Specifically, the Applicant submitted evidence of conception in the form of Applicant's corresponding Japanese patent application, and a certified English translation thereof. As for diligence, the inventor's declaration included statements about preparation of the provisional application, spanning the time frame starting immediately before Ackely's filing date up to the filing of the provisional.
As stated in the Declaration of Takahlro Saito, during the period of time from just before October 18, 1999 to December 15, 1999, Mr. Saito has been working with Mr. Tetsuo Wada of Ehara Patent Office to modify and finalize the specification for the base U.S. provisional application No. 601170,815. Mr. Saito exchanged opinions with Mr. Wada and modified the specification numerous times during that period of time, while both Mr. Saito and Mr. Wada fulfilled other work related duties. Exhibit C is a draft specification dated December 10, 1999, which is a modified version of the disclosure shown in Exhibit A and was finished five days before filing the provisional application No. 601170,815. As shown and evidenced above, Mr. Saito and his patent attorney(s) had worked on the present invention with due diligence from just before October 18, 1999 (the 102(e) date of Ackley) to December 15, 1999 (the date of constructive reduction to practice). The Examiner maintained the rejection in a Final Office Action, explaining that the evidence was insufficient to show diligence. Specifically, the Examiner indicated that:
In the Appeal Brief, the Applicant argued that Arkley was not prior art because the inventor "constructively reduced the claimed invention of the present application to practice by filing in Japan on November 28, 1997 before the § 102(e) date of Ackley." The Applicant also noted that although the Japanese application did publish, this was not a § 102(b) bar since the US provisional was filed less than one year before the publication. The Examiner's Answer maintained that Arkley was prior art. The Examiner interpreted the Applicant's reference to the Japanese filing as reliance on a foreign priority date. The Examiner then cited Stevens v. Tamai (Fed. Cir 2004) for the rule that Section 119(a) prohibits reliance on a foreign filing for priority when the foreign filing is more than a year before the US filing, as was the case here. The Examiner further explained:
The Board decision first focused on "reduction to practice" in the first prong of § 1.131(b): Thus, under the first prong of 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b), Appellant has to establish reduction to practice prior to the effective date of the 102 (e) reference. Appellant’s declaration and arguments assume that to show reduction to practice as encompassed by “filing of the application” recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(b) includes filing an application for the same invention in a foreign country.
The Board found that the Applicant had not established reduction to practice. The Japanese filing did not qualify as constructive reduction to practice per se because the phrase "the application" in § 1.131(b) refers to a US application, not to a foreign application. The case law nonetheless allows constructive reduction to practice through a foreign filing – but only if that foreign filing met the requirements of § 119(a). (See In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). But here the Applicant waited more than a year after the Japanese filing to file the US provisional application, and thus did not comply with § 119(a). Having found no reduction to practice under the first prong of § 1.131(b), the Board turned to the second prong, which requires conception plus diligence. The Board acknowledged that the Japanese filing might be enough to show conception. However, the Board summarily stated that the Applicant had not provided "sufficient evidence" of due diligence during the required period (one day before the reference filing date to the filing of the Applicant's provisional). Therefore, the reference was not disqualified as prior art, and the prior art rejections were affirmed. My two cents: The Applicant made a mistake in not making an argument on diligence using the originally submitted declaration. The Examiner said the diligence period was 2 years but the correct period was only 2 months. It's true that conception before the reference date must be shown. But the diligence period does not start at conception. The diligence period instead starts immediately before the reference date. (MPEP 715.07.)
That is, unexplained gaps between conception and the reference date are allowed – just not unexpected gaps between the reference date and reduction to practice (actual or constructive).
Since the earlier "diligence" declaration was already in the record, the Applicant should have argued conception plus diligence as an alternative
to the argument made (constructive reduction to practice).
I wondered at first why the Board even brought up the point that a foreign filing can be used to show constructive reduction to practice, as long as the filing meets § 119(a). After all, if you meet § 119(a), you can go with a straight claim to foreign priority, in which case you don't need a swear behind. After reading the fine print in the decision, it appears to me that constructive reduction through a foreign filing could be useful if you forget to claim priority and it's too late to fix the priority claim through a petition. 4 comments:
Takeaway: In Ex parte Greve, the Applicant presented technical reasons why a POSITA would not combine the references. The Applicant concluded the argument by explaining that because the reference didn't mention a claimed feature, a POSITA would understand that the feature should be avoided. "Therefore, Gross et al. clearly teaches away from the presently claimed invention." The Board affirmed the obviousness rejection, stating that "silence in one reference as to what another teaches is not 'teaching away'. " Details:
The Examiner rejected as obvious over a combination of three references.The Examiner found that Greve taught a composition including (c) and a sympathomimetic in the claimed range, though not one of the two specific compounds named in (a). Moreover, Castellano taught a composition including (b) and one of the specific compounds named in (a). Furthermore, Gross taught (c) and (b). Finally, each of the compositions found in the references was described as a treatment for rhinitis or a rhinological condition. The Examiner found that the references themselves provided the motivation to combine:
[T]he prior art documents do not teach the use of the compositions described therein each for the same purpose. Rather, each reference has its own technical solution for its own specific object, each being readily distinguishable and different, respectively, from the others. Thus, it is not believed to be obvious in any way that the ordinarily skilled person would take a combination of these documents into consideration in coming up with the present claims. The Applicant buttressed this argument by submitting an expert declaration which explained why a POSITA would not modify Gross to add sympathomimetic [a] (the compound missing from Gross).
To bring this clearly to the point, if the addition of a vasoconstrictor [such as a sympathomimetic] would be evident with respect to why is the complete document silent to do so? The answer for this is quite simple. The use of a vasoconstricting agent is to be completely avoided in Gross al. since it would even intensify the drying out. Therefore, Gross et al. clearly teach away from the present claimed invention as is and would be consequently not considered relevant or obvious by the ordinarily skilled person in the way alleged by the Examiner in this Action. (Emphasis added.) The Board found the "teaching away" argument was misplaced: The fact that one reference is silent as to what another reference teaches is not a “teaching away” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art's mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any … alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.…”).
[T]he surprisingly found synergism is mainly based on the fact that the combination of the hyaluronic acid, on the one hand, and the pantothenol and/or pantothenic acid component, on the other hand, leads to a significant diminishing of the side-effects induced by the vasoconstrictor [such as a sympathomimetic]. However, the Board found the evidence to be unpersuasive: Dr. Greve provides no evidence that the result is “unexpected.” See In re Klosak, 455 F.2d
The Board appeared to ignore reasons why a POSITA would not combine the references – reasons presented in the form of expert evidence -- simply because the Applicant mischaracterized this as "teaching away." The Board should have instead weighed the expert evidence (pointing away from a combination) against the teachings of the references themselves (pointing toward a combination) to decide on obviousness/non-obviousness. This case highlights the danger of improperly characterizing arguments. The Board should have looked beyond the label the Applicant put on the argument – but you should make their job easy, not hard.