Source: https://patents.google.com/patent/US20050083199?oq=6008737
Timestamp: 2018-02-21 19:58:36
Document Index: 286773119

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'arts 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508', 'art 1508']

US20050083199A1 - System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology - Google Patents
US20050083199A1
US20050083199A1 US10971878 US97187804A US2005083199A1 US 20050083199 A1 US20050083199 A1 US 20050083199A1 US 10971878 US10971878 US 10971878 US 97187804 A US97187804 A US 97187804A US 2005083199 A1 US2005083199 A1 US 2005083199A1
US10971878
US7129886B2 (en )
This application is a continuation application of pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/632,425, filed Aug. 1, 2003, which is a continuation application of U.S. Pat. No. 6,614,384 which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 60/232,562, filed on Sep. 14, 2000.
FIGS. 21 a-21 b illustrates a flowchart of the basic steps of a third embodiment of the preferred method in accordance with the present invention.
For analysis purposes, it is convenient to model pulse waveforms in an ideal manner. For example, the transmitted waveform produced by supplying a step function into an ultra-wideband antenna may be modeled as a Gaussian monocycle. A Gaussian monocycle (normalized to a peak value of 1) may be described by: f mono ⁡ ( t ) = e ⁢ ( t σ ) ⁢ ⅇ - t 2 2 ⁢ σ 2
The signal of an uncoded, unmodulated pulse train may be expressed: s ⁡ ( t ) = ( - 1 ) f ⁢ a ⁢ ∑ j ⁢ ω ⁡ ( ct - jT f , b )
where j is the index of a pulse within a pulse train, (−1)f is polarity (±), a is pulse amplitude, b is pulse type, c is pulse width, ω(t,b) is the normalized pulse waveform, and Tf is pulse repetition time.
The energy spectrum of a pulse train signal over a frequency bandwidth of interest may be determined by summing the phasors of the pulses at each frequency, using the following equation: A ⁡ ( ω ) = | ∑ i = 1 n ⁢ ⅇ j ⁢ ⁢ Δ ⁢ ⁢ t n |
where A(ω) is the amplitude of the spectral response at a given frequency . . ω. is the frequency being analyzed (2πf), At is the relative time delay of each pulse from the start of time period, and n is the total number of pulses in the pulse train.
Coding methods for specifying temporal and non-temporal pulse characteristics are described in commonly owned, co-pending applications titled “A Method and Apparatus for Positioning Pulses in Time,” application Ser. No. 09/592,249, and “A Method for Specifying Non-Temporal Pulse Characteristics,” application Ser. No. 09/592,250, now abandoned, both filed Jun. 12, 2000, and both of which are incorporated herein by reference.
Typically, a code consists of a number of code elements having integer or floating-point values. A code element value may specify a single pulse characteristic or may be subdivided into multiple components, each specifying a different pulse characteristic. Code element or code component values typically map to a pulse characteristic value layout that may be fixed or non-fixed and may involve value ranges, discrete values, or a combination of value ranges and discrete values. A value range layout specifies a range of values that is divided into components that are each subdivided into subcomponents, which can be further subdivided, as desired. In contrast, a discrete value layout involves uniformly or non-uniformly distributed discrete values. A non-fixed layout (also referred to as a delta layout) involves delta values relative to some reference value. Fixed and non-fixed layouts, and approaches for mapping code element/component values, are described in co-owned, co-pending applications, titled “Method for Specifying Pulse Characteristics using Codes,” application Ser. No. 09/592,290, now abandoned, and “A Method and Apparatus for Mapping Pulses to a Non-Fixed Layout,” application Ser. No. 09/591,691, now abandoned, both filed on Jun. 12, 2000, both of which are incorporated herein by reference.
The average output signal-to-noise ratio of the impulse radio may be calculated for randomly selected time-hopping codes as a function of the number of active users, Nu, as: SNR out ⁡ ( N u ) = ( N s ⁢ A 1 ⁢ m p ) 2 σ rec 2 + N s ⁢ σ a 2 ⁢ ∑ k = 2 N u ⁢ A k 2
where Ns is the number of pulses integrated per bit of information, Ak models the attenuation of transmitter k's signal over the propagation path to the receiver, and σrec 2 is the variance of the receiver noise component at the pulse train integrator output. The monocycle waveform-dependent parameters mp and σa 2 are given by m p = ∫ - ∞ ∞ ⁢ ω ⁡ ( t ) ⁡ [ ω ⁡ ( t ) - ω ⁡ ( t - δ ) ] ⁢ ⅆ t and σ a 2 = T f - 1 ⁢ ∫ - ∞ ∞ ⁢ [ ∫ - ∞ ∞ ⁢ ω ⁡ ( t - s ) ⁢ υ ⁡ ( t ) ⁢ ⅆ t ] 2 ⁢ ⅆ s ,
where ω(t) is the monocycle waveform, u(t)=ω(t)−ω(t-δ) is the template signal waveform, δ is the time shift between the monocycle waveform and the template signal waveform, Tf is the pulse repetition time, and s is signal.
For greater elaboration of mitigating interference in impulse radio systems, see the patent application titled “Method for Mitigating Effects of Interference in Impulse Radio Communication,” application Ser. No. 09/587,033, filed Jun. 02, 2000, assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference.
In another approach, a receiver obtains a template pulse train and a received impulse radio signal. The receiver compares the template pulse train and the received impulse radio signal. The system performs a threshold check on the comparison result. If the comparison result passes the threshold check, the system locks on the received impulse radio signal. The system may also perform a quick check, a synchronization check, and/or a command check of the impulse radio signal. For greater elaboration of this approach, see the patent application titled “Method and System for Fast Acquisition of Ultra Wideband Signals,” application Ser. No. 09/538,292, filed Mar. 29, 2000, now U.S. Pat. No. 6,556,621, assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference.
The receiving impulse radio unit 900 includes a processor 1408 that compares the first waveform 1502 and the second waveform 1504 to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 and the second waveform 1504 caused by an intruder 1102 entering the protection zone 1104. To illustrate this change between waveforms reference is made to FIGS. 15 a and 15 b, where there are illustrated two exemplary waveforms 1502 and 1504 that could be generated by the receiving impulse radio unit 900. The first waveform 1502 has an initial wavefront 1503 representative of the first received impulse radio pulses of the impulse radio signal 1402. Likewise, the second waveform 1504 generated after the first waveform 1502 has an initial wavefront 1506 representative of the first received impulse radio pulse of the subsequently received impulse radio signal 1402. In addition, the second waveform 1504 has a multipath reflection part 1508 caused by the intruder 1102 that was absent in the first waveform 1502 but present in the second waveform 1504. This multipath reflection part 1508 is caused by the reception of the impulse radio signal 1402 that bounced off the intruder 1102 and passed over the indirect path 1406 between the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000 and the receiving impulse radio unit 900. The distance “d” between the intruder 1102 and the receiving impulse radio unit 900 can be calculated knowing the elapsed time “t” between the initial wavefront 1506 and the multipath reflection part 1508 of the second waveform 1504. Once the distance “d” is calculated, the intruder 1102 could be in one of many places indicated by the ellipse shown in FIG. 14 (shown are two possible positions of the intruder 1102).
At step 1608, the processor 1408 within the receiving impulse radio unit 900 operates to compare the first waveform 1502 and the second waveform 1504 to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 and the second waveform 1504 caused by an intruder 1102 entering the protection zone 1104. In the present example, there is a change between the first waveform 1502 and the second waveform 1504 because an intruder 1102 was not present when the first waveform 1502 was generated but the intruder 1102 was present when the second waveform 1504 was generated by the receiving impulse radio unit 900 (see FIGS. 15 a-15 b). This change is noticeable due to the presence of the multipath reflection part 1508 caused by the intruder 1102. Of course, the receiving impulse radio unit 900 may generate many second waveforms in which there is no difference or very little difference with a first waveform because an intruder 1102 was not present. If an intruder 1102 is not present in the protection zone 1104 then the method 1600 returns to and repeats steps 1606 and 1608 until an intruder 1102 is determined to be present in the protection zone 1104.
At step 1610, if the intruder 1102 is determined to be in the protection zone 1104, the processor 1408 could then calculate the difference “d” between the direct path between the transmitter 1000 and receiver 900 and the indirect path 1402 by knowing the elapsed time “t” between the initial wavefront 1506 and the multipath reflection part 1508 of the second waveform 1504 (see FIG. 15 b). For instance, the distance “d” can be calculated to be 0.984 feet for each nanosecond in the elapsed time “t” between the initial wavefront 1506 and the multipath reflection part 1508 of the second waveform 1504 (see FIG. 15 b). In this embodiment, the intruder 1102 could be in one of many places indicated by the ellipse shown in FIG. 14 (shown are two possible positions of the intruder 1102). Reference is made to the second embodiment of the intrusion detection system 1100′ which can determine the real location of the intruder 1102.
Each of the receiving impulse radio units 900 a′, 900 b′ and 900 c′ includes a processor 1408′ that respectively compares the first waveform 1502 a′, 1502 b′ and 1502 c′ and the second waveform 1504 a′, 1504 b′ and 1504 c′ to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 a′, 1502 b′ and 1502 c′ and the second waveform 1504 a′, 1504 b′ and 1504 c′ caused by an intruder 1102′ entering the protection zone 1104′. To illustrate this change between waveforms reference is made to FIGS. 18 a and 18 b, where there are respectively illustrated exemplary first waveforms 1502 a′, 1502 b′, 1502 c′ and exemplary second waveforms 1504 a′, 1504 b′ and 1504 c′ that could be generated by the receiving impulse radio units 900 a′, 900 b′ and 900 c′. For instance, the receiving impulse radio unit 900 a′ would generate the first waveform 1502 a′ and the second waveform 1504 a′. Each first waveform 1502 a′, 1502 b′ and 1502 c′ has an initial wavefront 1503 a′, 1503 b′ and 1503 c′ representative of the first received impulse radio pulses of the impulse radio signal 1402′. Likewise, each second waveform 1504 a′, 1504 b′ and 1504 c′ has an initial wavefront 1506 a′, 1506 b′ and 1506 c′ representative of the first received impulse radio pulses in the subsequently received impulse radio signal 1402′. In addition, the second waveforms 1504 a′, 1504 b′ and 1504 c′ each have a multipath reflection part 1508 a′, 1508 b′ and 1508 c′ caused by the intruder 1102′ that was absent in the first waveforms 1502 a′, 1502 b′ and 1502 c′ but present in the second waveforms 1504 a′, 1504 b′ and 1504 c′. These multipath reflection parts 1508 a′, 1508 b′ and 1508 c′ are caused by the reception of the impulse radio signals 1402′ that bounced off the intruder 1102′ and passed over the indirect path 1406 a′, 1406 b′ and 1406 c′ between the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000 and the receiving impulse radio units 900 a′, 900 b′ and 900 c′. The distances “d1”, “d2” and “d3” which are the differences between the direct paths 1402′ and indirect paths 1406 a′, 1406 b′ and 1406 c′ can be calculated knowing the elapsed time “t1”, “t2” and “t3” between the initial wavefront 1506 a′, 1506 b′ and 1506 c′ and the multipath reflection part 1508 a′, 1508 b′ and 1508 c′ of the second waveforms 1504 a′, 1504 b′ and 1504 c′.
Referring to FIGS. 19 a-19 b, there is a flowchart illustrating the basic steps of a second embodiment of the preferred method 1600′ of the present invention. Beginning at step 1902, the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000′ operates to transmit the impulse radio signal 1402′. At this time, the impulse radio signal 1402′ is made up of impulse radio pulses that are transmitted within and through a protection zone 1104′that does not have an intruder 1102′.
At step 1916, the processor 1408 a′ within the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a′ operates to compare the first waveform 1502 a′ and the second waveform 1504 a′ to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 a′ and the second waveform 1504 a′ caused by an intruder 1102′ entering the protection zone 1104′. In the present example, there is a change between the first waveform 1502 a′ and the second waveform 1504 a′ because an intruder 1102′ was not present when the first waveform 1502 a′ was generated but the intruder 1102′ was present when the second waveform 1504 a′ was generated by the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a′ (see FIGS. 18 a-18 b). This change is noticeable due to the presence of the multipath reflection part 1508 a′ caused by the intruder 1102′. Of course, the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a′ may generate many second waveforms at step 1910 in which there is no difference or very little difference with a first waveform because an intruder 1102′ was not present. If an intruder 1102′ is not present in the protection zone 1104′ then the method 1600′ returns to and repeats steps 1910 and 1916 until an intruder 1102′ is determined to be present in the protection zone 1104′.
At step 1918, if the intruder 1102′ is determined to be in the protection zone 1104′, the processor 1408 a′ could then calculate the distance “d1” between direct and indirect paths by knowing the elapsed time “t1” between the initial wavefront 1506 a′ and the multipath reflection part 1508 a′ of the second waveform 1504 a′ (see FIG. 18 b). For instance, the distance “d1” can be calculated to be 0.984 feet for each nanosecond in the elapsed time “t1” between the initial wavefront 1506 a′ and the multipath reflection part 1508 a′ of the second waveform 1504 a′ (see FIG. 18 b).
At step 1920, the processor 1408 b′ within the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b′ operates to compare the first waveform 1502 b′ and the second waveform 1504 b′ to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 b′ and the second waveform 1504 b′ caused by an intruder 1102′ entering the protection zone 1104′. In the present example, there is a change between the first waveform 1502 b′ and the second waveform 1504 b′ because an intruder 1102′ was not present when the first waveform 1502 b′ was generated but the intruder 1102′ was present when the second waveform 1504 b′ was generated by the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b′ (see FIGS. 18 a-18 b). This change is noticeable due to the presence of the multipath reflection part 1508 b′ caused by the intruder 1102′. Of course, the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b′ may generate many second waveforms at step 1912 in which there is no difference or very little difference with a first waveform because an intruder 1102′ was not present. If an intruder 1102′ is not present in the protection zone 1104′ then the method 1600′ returns to and repeats steps 1912 and 1920 until an intruder 1102′ is determined to be present in the protection zone 1104′.
At step 1924, the processor 1408 c′ within the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c′ operates to compare the first waveform 1502 c′ and the second waveform 1504 c′ to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 c′ and the second waveform 1504 c′ caused by an intruder 1102′ entering the protection zone 1104′. In the present example, there is a change between the first waveform 1502 c′ and the second waveform 1504 c′ because an intruder 1102′ was not present when the first waveform 1502 c′ was generated but the intruder 1102′ was present when the second waveform 1504 c′ was generated by the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c′ (see FIGS. 18 a-18 b). This change is noticeable due to the presence of the multipath reflection part 1508 c′ caused by the intruder 1102′. Of course, the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c′ may generate many second waveforms at step 1914 in which there is no difference or very little difference with a first waveform because an intruder 1102′ was not present. If an intruder 1102′ is not present in the protection zone 1104′ then the method 1600′ returns to and repeats steps 1914 and 1924 until an intruder 1102′ is determined to be present in the protection zone 1104′.
At step 1926, if the intruder 1102′ is determined to be in the protection zone 1104′, the processor 1408 c′ could then calculate the distance “d3” between direct and indirect paths by knowing the elapsed time “t3” between the initial wavefront 1506 c′ and the multipath reflection part 1508 c′ of the second waveform 1504 c′ (see FIG. 18 b). For instance, the distance “d3” can be calculated to be 0.984 feet for each nanosecond in the elapsed time “t3” between the initial wavefront 1506 c′ and the multipath reflection part 1508 c′ of the second waveform 1504 c′ (see FIG. 18 b).
Each receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″, 900 b″ and 900 c″ receives the first impulse radio signal 1402″ and generates a first waveform 1502 a″, 1502 b″ and 1502 c″ (similar to the first waveforms 1502 a′, 1502 b′ and 1502 c′ shown in FIG. 18 a). Each of the first waveforms 1502 a″, 1502 b″ and 1502 c″ is a time domain representation of the actual distortion of the transmitted Gaussian waveform after being filtered by the environment around the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000″ and each receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″, 900 b″ and 900 c″. In other words, each first waveform 1502 a″, 1502 b″ and 1502 c″ corresponds to the received impulse shape of the impulse radio signal 1402″ that is received by each receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″, 900 b″ and 900 c″ when there is no intruder 1102″ located in or near the protection zone 1104 c″.
Referring to FIGS. 21 a-21 b, there is a flowchart illustrating the basic steps of a third embodiment of the preferred method 1600″ of the present invention. Beginning at step 2101, prior to arming the intrusion detection system 1100″, the system is put into a “learning mode”. During the “learning mode”, the test subject 2002″ traverses the perimeter 2204″ of the protection zone 1104 c″ to be protected and the intrusion detection system 1100″ would track the test subject 2002″ and build a two and possibly three-dimensional representation of the shape of the protection zone 1104 c″. The intrusion detection system 1100″ can track the test subject 2002″ in the same manner the intrusion detection system 1100′ would track an intruder 1104′ in the second embodiment.
At step 2104, the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″ operates to receive the impulse radio signal 1402″ and generate the first waveform 1502 a″. Again, the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″ receives the impulse radio signal 1402″ and generates a first waveform 1502 a″ (e.g., see first waveform 1502 a′ in FIG. 19 a) that is a time domain representation of the actual distortion of the transmitted Gaussian waveform after being filtered by the environment around the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000″ and the receiving impulse radio units 900 a″, 900 b″ and 900 c″. At this time, the first waveform 1502 a″ corresponds to the received impulse shape of the impulse radio signal 1402″ that is received by the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″ when there is no intruder 1102″ located in or near the protection zone 1104 c″.
At step 2106, the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b″ operates to receive the impulse radio signal 1402″ and generate the first waveform 1502 b″. Again, the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b″ receives the impulse radio signal 1402″ and generates a first waveform 1502 b″ (e.g., see first waveform 1502 b′ in FIG. 18 a) that is a time domain representation of the actual distortion of the transmitted Gaussian waveform after being filtered by the environment around the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000″ and the receiving impulse radio units 900 a″, 900 b″ and 900 c″. At this time, the first waveform 1502 b″ corresponds to the received impulse shape of the impulse radio signal 1402″ that is received by the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b″ when there is no intruder 1102″ located in or near the protection zone 1104 c″.
At step 2108, the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c″operates to receive the impulse radio signal 1402″ and generate the first waveform 1502 c″. Again, the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c″ receives the impulse radio signal 1402″ and generates a first waveform 1502 c″ (e.g., see first waveform 1502 c′ in FIG. 18 a) that is a time domain representation of the actual distortion of the transmitted Gaussian waveform after being filtered by the environment around the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000″ and the receiving impulse radio units 900 a″, 900 b″ and 900 c″. At this time, the first waveform 1502 c″ corresponds to the received impulse shape of the impulse radio signal 1402″ that is received by the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c″ when there is no intruder 1102″ located in or near the protection zone 1104 c″. It should be understood that steps 2104, 2106 and 2108 can take place in any order depending on the locations of the receiving impulse radio units 900 a″, 900 b″ and 900 c″ with respect to the location of the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000″.
At step 2116, the processor 1408 a″ within the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″ operates to compare the first waveform 1502 a″ and the second waveform 1504 a″ to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 a″ and the second waveform 1504 a″ caused by an intruder 1102″ coming near or entering the protection zone 1104 c″. In the present example, there is a change between the first waveform 1502 a″ and the second waveform 1504 a″ because an intruder 1102″ was not present when the first waveform 1502 a″ was generated but the intruder 1102″ was present when the second waveform 1504 a″ was generated by the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″ (e.g., see first waveform 1502 a′ and second waveform 1504 a′ in FIGS. 18 a-18 b). This change is noticeable due to the presence of the multipath reflection part 1508 a″ caused by the intruder 1102″. Of course, the first receiving impulse radio unit 900 a″ may generate many second waveforms at step 2110 in which there is no difference or very little difference with a first waveform because an intruder 1102″ was not present. If an intruder 1102″ is not within or near the protection zone 1104 c″ then the method 1600″ returns to and repeats steps 2110 and 2116 until an intruder 1102″ is determined to be within or near the protection zone 1104 c″.
At step 2118, if the intruder 1102″ is determined to be within or near the protection zone 1104 c″, the processor 1408 a″ could then calculate the distance “d1” between direct and indirect paths by knowing the elapsed time “t1” between the initial wavefront 1506 a″ and the multipath reflection part 1508 a″ of the second waveform 1504 a″ (e.g., see second waveform 1504 a′ in FIG. 18 b). For instance, the distance “d1”can be calculated to be 0.984 feet for each nanosecond in the elapsed time “t1” between the initial wavefront 1506 a″ and the multipath reflection part 1508 a″ of the second waveform 1504 a″ (e.g., see second waveform 1504 a′ in FIG. 18 b). Again, a determination as to whether the intruder 1104″ is actually inside the specially shaped protection zone 1104 c″ is made later at step 2130 by the processor 1802″ associated with the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000″.
At step 2120, the processor 1408 b″ within the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b″ operates to compare the first waveform 1502 b″ and the second waveform 1504 b″ to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 b″ and the second waveform 1504 b″ caused by an intruder 1102″ coming near or entering the protection zone 1104 c″. In the present example, there is a change between the first waveform 1502 b″ and the second waveform 1504 b″ because an intruder 1102″ was not present when the first waveform 1502 b″ was generated but the intruder 1102″ was present when the second waveform 1504 b″ was generated by the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b″ (e.g., see first waveform 1502 b′ and second waveform 1504 b′ in FIGS. 18 a-18 b). This change is noticeable due to the presence of the multipath reflection part 1508 b″ caused by the intruder 1102″. Of course, the second receiving impulse radio unit 900 b″ may generate many second waveforms at step 2112 in which there is no difference or very little difference with a first waveform because an intruder 1102″ was not present. If an intruder 1102″ is not within or near the protection zone 1104 c″ then the method 1600″ returns to and repeats steps 2112 and 2120 until an intruder 1102″ is determined to be within or near the protection zone 1104 c″.
At step 2122, if the intruder 1102″ is determined to be within or near the protection zone 1104 c″, the processor 1408 b″ could then calculate the distance “d2” between direct and indirect paths by knowing the elapsed time “t2” between the initial wavefront 1506 b″ and the multipath reflection part 1508 b″ of the second waveform 1504 b″ (e.g., see second waveform 1504 b′ in FIG. 18 b) . For instance, the distance “d2” can be calculated to be 0.984 feet for each nanosecond in the elapsed time “t2” between the initial wavefront 1506 b″ and the multipath reflection part 1508 b″ of the second waveform 1504 b″ (e.g., see second waveform 1504 b′ in FIG. 18 b). Again, a determination as to whether the intruder 1104″ is actually inside the specially shaped protection zone 1104 c″ is made later at step 2030 by the processor 1802″ associated with the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000″.
At step 2124, the processor 1408 c″ within the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c″ operates to compare the first waveform 1502 c″ and the second waveform 1504 c″ to determine whether there is a change between the first waveform 1502 c″ and the second waveform 1504 c″ caused by an intruder 1102″ coming near or entering the protection zone 1104 c″. In the present example, there is a change between the first waveform 1502 c″ and the second waveform 1504 c″ because an intruder 1102″ was not present when the first waveform 1502 c″ was generated but the intruder 1102″ was present when the second waveform 1504 c″ was generated by the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c″ (e.g., see first waveform 1502 c′ and second waveform 1504 c′ in FIGS. 18 a-18 b). This change is noticeable due to the presence of the multipath reflection part 1508 c″ caused by the intruder 1102″. Of course, the third receiving impulse radio unit 900 c″ may generate many second waveforms at step 2314 in which there is no difference or very little difference with a first waveform because an intruder 1102″ was not present. If an intruder 1102″ is not within or near the protection zone 1104 c″ then the method 1600″ returns to and repeats steps 2114 and 2124 until an intruder 1102″ is determined to be within or near the protection zone 1104 c″.
At step 2126, if the intruder 1102″ is determined to be within or near the protection zone 1104 c″, the processor 1408 c″ could then calculate the distance “d3” between direct and indirect paths by knowing the elapsed time “t3” between the initial wavefront 1506 c″ and the multipath reflection part 1508 c″ of the second waveform 1504 c″ (e.g., see second waveform 1504 c′ in FIG. 18 b). For instance, the distance “d3” can be calculated to be 0.984 feet for each nanosecond in the elapsed time “t3” between the initial wavefront 1506 c″ and the multipath reflection part 1508 c″ of the second waveform 1504 c″ (e.g., see second waveform 1504 c′ in FIG. 18 b). Again, a determination as to whether the intruder 1104″ is actually inside the specially shaped protection zone 1104 c″ is made later at step 2030 by the processor 1802″ associated with the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000″.
Referring to FIG. 22, there is illustrated a diagram of the intrusion detection system 1100, 1100′ and 1100″ that uses one or more directive antennas 2202. As shown, the transmitting impulse radio unit 1000, 1000′ and 1000″ (only one shown) can use the directive antenna 2202 (only one shown) to transmit the impulse radio signal in a predetermined direction such that radar is sensitive in a particular area 2204 (see solid line) and not sensitive in another area 2206 (see dashed line). In particular, the intrusion detection system 1100, 1100′ and 1100″ that uses an directive antenna 2202 can make the radar sensitive in a particular area 2204 to detect a person 2208 or a dangerous animal 2210 that is not supposed to be located in that area 2204 and at the same time the directive antenna 2202 does not make the radar sensitive in another area 2206 in which the dangerous animal 2210 is suppose to be located. It should be understood that the directive antenna 2202 can take many different forms including, for example, a 180 directive antenna and a 90° directive antenna. Moreover, it should also be understood that a directional antenna 2202 could be placed at the receiving impulse radio unit 900, 900′ and 900″ or at both the receiving and transmitting impulse radio units.
generating a plurality of waveforms, each of the plurality of waveforms indicating a multipath structure of
a propagation channel of the corresponding one of the transmitted plurality of UWB signals; and
18. A system for detecting an object, comprising:
a processor for generating a first waveform that indicates a multipath structure of a propagation channel of a transmitted first UWB signal;
said processor for generating a second waveform that indicates a multipath structure of a propagation channel of a transmitted second UWB signal; and
said processor for comparing the first waveform and the second waveform to detect said object.
19. The system of claim 18, wherein said object is detected based upon a change between the first waveform and the second waveform caused by said object.
21. The security system of claim 20, wherein said object is detected based upon a change between the first waveform and the second waveform caused by said object.
22. The security system of claim 20, further comprising:
23. The security system of claim 20, wherein said processor sounds an alarm upon detection of said object.
24. The security system of claim 20, wherein said first receiving impulse radio unit is an ultra-wideband scanning receiver.
25. The security system of claim 20, wherein said transmitting impulse radio unit further includes at least one directive antenna.
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US23256200 true 2000-09-14 2000-09-14
US09952206 US6614384B2 (en) 2000-09-14 2001-09-14 System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology
US10632425 US6822604B2 (en) 2000-09-14 2003-08-01 System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology
US10971878 US7129886B2 (en) 2000-09-14 2004-10-22 System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology
US11554025 US7541968B2 (en) 2000-09-14 2006-10-29 System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology
US20050083199A1 true true US20050083199A1 (en) 2005-04-21
US7129886B2 US7129886B2 (en) 2006-10-31
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US09952206 Active US6614384B2 (en) 2000-09-14 2001-09-14 System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology
US10632425 Active US6822604B2 (en) 2000-09-14 2003-08-01 System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology
US10971878 Active US7129886B2 (en) 2000-09-14 2004-10-22 System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology
US11554025 Active 2025-06-19 US7541968B2 (en) 2000-09-14 2006-10-29 System and method for detecting an intruder using impulse radio technology
US (4) US6614384B2 (en)
WO (1) WO2002023218A3 (en)
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Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:HALL, DAVID J;YANO, SCOTT M;SCHANTZ, HANS G;SIGNING DATES FROM 20011127 TO 20011130;REEL/FRAME:044644/0354