Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/551/06-340/index.php
Timestamp: 2018-12-13 06:18:03
Document Index: 455783548

Matched Legal Cases: ['§7', '§402', '§7', '§402', '§402', '§7', '§7', '§7', '§402', '§7']

National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions - On-Line> Volume 551 > National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife
2. Because §7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy duty covers only discretionary agency actions, it does not attach to actions (like the NPDES permitting transfer authorization) that an agency is required by statute to undertake once certain specified triggering events have occurred. Pp. 14–25..
(a) At first glance the legislative commands here are irreconcilable. Section 402(b)’s “shall approve” language is mandatory and its list exclusive; if the nine specified criteria are satisfied, the EPA does not have the discretion to deny a transfer application. Section 7(a)(2)’s similarly imperative language would literally add a tenth criterion to §402(b). Pp. 14–15..
(b) While a later enacted statute (such as the ESA) can sometimes operate to amend or even repeal an earlier statutory provision (such as the CWA), “repeals by implication are not favored” and will not be presumed unless the legislature’s intention “to repeal [is] clear and manifest.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 267. Statutory repeal will not be inferred “unless the later statute ‘ “expressly contradict[s] the original act” ’ or such a construction ‘ “is absolutely necessary [to give the later statute’s words] any meaning at all.” ’ ” Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U. S. 535, 548. Otherwise, “a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanowith a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanowith a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153. The Ninth Circuit’s reading of §7(a)(2) would effectively repeal §402(b)’s mandate that the EPA “shall” issue a permit whenever all nine exclusive statutory prerequisites are met. Section 402(b) does not just set minimum requirements; it affirmatively mandates a transfer’s approval, thus operating as a ceiling as well as a floor. By adding an additional criterion, the Ninth Circuit raises that floor and alters the statute’s command. Read broadly, the Ninth Circuit’s construction would also partially override every federal statute mandating agency action by subjecting such action to the further condition that it not jeopardize listed species. Pp. 15–17..
(c) Title 50 CFR §402.03, promulgated by the NMFS and FWS and applying §7(a)(2) “to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control” (emphasis added), harmonizes the CWA and ESA by giving effect to the ESA’s no-jeopardy mandate whenever an agency has discretion to do so, but not when the agency is forbidden from considering such extrastatutory factors. The Court owes “some degree of deference to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation” of the ESA, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 703. Deference is not due if Congress has made its intent “clear” in the statutory text, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842, but “if the statute is silent or ambiguous … the question … is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,” id., at 843. Because the “meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident … in context,” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132, §7(a)(2) must be read against the statutory backdrop of the many mandatory agency directives whose operation it would implicitly abrogate or repeal were it construed as broadly as the Ninth Circuit did below. Such a reading leaves a fundamental ambiguity. An agency cannot simultaneously obey the differing mandates of ESA §7(a)(2) and CWA §402(b), and consequently the statutory language—read in light of the canon against implied repeals—does not itself provide clear guidance as to which command must give way. Thus, it is appropriate to look to the implementing agency’s expert interpretation, which harmonizes the statutes by applying §7(a)(2) to guide agencies’ existing discretionary authority, but not reading it to override express statutory mandates. This interpretation is reasonable in light of the statute’s text and the overall statutory scheme and is therefore entitled to Chevron deference. The regulation’s focus on “discretionary” actions accords with the commonsense conclusion that, when an agency is required to do something by statute, it simply lacks the power to “insure” that such action will not jeopardize listed species. The basic principle of Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752—that an agency cannot be considered the legal “cause” of an action that it has no statutory discretion not to take, id., at 770—supports the reasonableness of the FWS’s interpretation. Pp. 17–22..
(d) Respondents’ contrary position is not supported by TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, which had no occasion to answer the question presented in these cases. Pp. 22–24..
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion.