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Online Library of Liberty - XIII.: Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime War. - The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences concerning the Laws and Usages of War
Front Page Titles (by Subject) XIII.: Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime War. - The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences concerning the Laws and Usages of War	Return to Title Page for The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences concerning the Laws and Usages of WarThe Online Library of LibertyA project of Liberty Fund, Inc.
Search this Title:Also in the Library:Collection: Primary SourcesSubject Area: LawSubject Area: War and PeaceTopic: The Laws of WarXIII.: Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime War. - A. Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences concerning the Laws and Usages of War [1909]Edition used:The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences concerning the Laws and Usages of War. Texts of Conventions with Commentaries, by A. Pearce Higgins, LL.D. (Cambridge University Press, 1909).
Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime War.
Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Allemagne, Roi de Prusse; &c.1
En vue de diminuer les divergences d’opinion qui, en cas de guerre maritime, existent encore au sujet des rapports entre les Puissances neutres et les Puissances belligérantes, et de prévenir les difficultés auxquelles ces divergences pourraient donner lieu;
Considérant que, si l’on ne peut concerter dès maintenant des stipulations s’étendant à toutes les circonstances qui peuvent se présenter dans la pratique, il y a néanmoins une utilité incontestable à établir, dans la mesure du possible, des règles communes pour le cas où malheureusement la guerre viendrait à éclater;
Considérant qu’il est désirable que les Puissances édictent des prescriptions précises pour régler les conséquences de l’état de neutralité qu’elles auraient adopté;
Considérant que c’est, pour les Puissances neutres, un devoir reconnu d’appliquer impartialement aux divers belligérants les règles adoptées par elles;
Considérant que, dans cet ordre d’idées, ces règles ne devraient pas, en principe, être changées, au cours de la guerre, par une Puissance neutre, sauf dans le cas où l’expérience acquise en démontrerait la nécessité pour la sauvegarde de ses droits;
Sont convenus d’observer les règles communes suivantes qui ne sauraient, d’ailleurs, porter aucune atteinte aux stipulations des traités généraux existants, et ont nommé pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:
Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War.
His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; &c.1
With the view of harmonizing the divergent views which, in the event of naval war, still exist as to the relations between neutral Powers and belligerent Powers, and of providing for the difficulties to which such divergence of views might give rise;
Seeing that even if it is not possible at present to concert measures applicable to all circumstances which may arise in practice, there is nevertheless an undeniable advantage in framing, as far as may be possible, rules of general application to meet the case where war has unfortunately broken out;
Seeing that in cases not covered by the present Convention, account must be taken of the general principles of the law of nations;
Seeing that it is desirable that the Powers should issue specific enactments regulating the consequences of the status of neutrality whenever adopted by them;
Seeing that there is a recognized obligation on neutral Powers to apply to the several belligerents impartially the rules adopted by them; and
Seeing that it is in conformity with these ideas that these rules should not, in principle, be altered, in the course of the war, by a neutral Power, except in a case where experience has shown the necessity for such change for the protection of the rights of that Power;
Have agreed to observe the following common rules, which cannot, however, modify provisions of existing general Treaties, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:
Les belligérants sont tenus de respecter les droits souverains des Puissances neutres et de s’abstenir, dans le territoire ou les eaux neutres, de tous actes qui constitueraient de la part des Puissances qui les toléreraient un manquement à leur neutralité.
(Cp. 5 H. C. 1907, Art. 1.)
Tous actes d’hostilité, y compris la capture et l’exercice du droit de visite, commis par des vaisseaux de guerre belligérants dans les eaux territoriales d’une Puissance neutre, constituent une violation de la neutralité et sont strictement interdits.
Any act of hostility, including therein capture and the exercise of the right of search, committed by belligerent war-ships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, constitutes a violation of neutrality and is strictly forbidden.
Quand un navire a été capturé dans les eaux territoriales d’une Puissance neutre, cette Puissance doit, si la prise est encore dans sa juridiction, user des moyens dont elle dispose pour que la prise soit relâchée avec ses officiers et son équipage, et pour que l’équipage mis à bord par le capteur soit interné.
Si la prise est hors de la juridiction de la Puissance neutre, le Gouvernement capteur, sur la demande de celleci, doit relâcher la prise avec ses officiers et son équipage.
When a ship has been captured in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, such Power must, if the prize is still within its jurisdiction, employ the means at its disposal to release the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew.
If the prize is not within the jurisdiction of the neutral Power, the captor Government, on the demand of that Power, must liberate the prize with its officers and crew.
(Cp. 12 H. C. 1907, Art. 3.)
Il est interdit aux belligérants de faire des ports et des eaux neutres la base d’opérations navales contre leurs adversaires, notamment d’y installer des stations radio-télégraphiques ou tout appareil destiné à servir comme moyen de communication avec des forces belligérantes sur terre ou sur mer.
Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus intended to serve as a means of communication with the belligerent forces on land or sea.
(Cp. 5 H. C. 1907, Art. 3 (a).)
La remise, à quelque titre que ce soit, faite directement ou indirectement par une Puissance neutre à une Puissance belligérante, de vaisseaux de guerre, de munitions, ou d’un matériel de guerre quelconque, est interdite.
Une Puissance neutre n’est pas tenue d’empêcher l’exportation ou le transit, pour le compte de l’un ou de l’autre des belligérants, d’armes, de munitions, et, en général, de tout ce qui peut être utile à une armée ou à une flotte.
A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, on behalf of either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.
(Cp. 5 H. C. 1907, Art. 7.)
Un Gouvernement neutre est tenu d’user des moyens dont il dispose pour empêcher dans sa juridiction l’équipement ou l’armement de tout navire, qu’il a des motifs raisonnables de croire destiné à croiser ou à concourir à des opérations hostiles contre une Puissance avec laquelle il est en paix. Il est aussi tenu d’user de la même surveillance pour empêcher le départ hors de sa juridiction de tout navire destiné à croiser ou à concourir à des opérations hostiles, et qui aurait été, dans la dite juridiction, adapté en tout ou en partie à des usages de guerre.
A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which has been adapted in whole or in part within the said jurisdiction to warlike use.
Une Puissance neutre doit appliquer également aux deux belligérants les conditions, restrictions, ou interdictions, édictées par elle pour ce qui concerne l’admission dans ses ports, rades, ou eaux territoriales, des navires de guerre belligérants ou de leurs prises.
Toutefois, une Puissance neutre peut interdire l’accès de ses ports et de ses rades au navire belligérant qui aurait négligé de se conformer aux ordres et prescriptions édictés par elle ou qui aurait violé la neutralité.
A neutral Power must apply impartially to the two belligerents the conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions issued by it in regard to the admission into its ports, roadsteads or territorial waters, of belligerent war-ships or of their prizes.
La neutralité d’une Puissance n’est pas compromise par le simple passage dans ses eaux territoriales des navires de guerre et des prises des belligérants.
A défaut d’autres dispositions spéciales de la législation de la Puissance neutre, il est interdit aux navires de guerre des belligérants de demeurer dans les ports et rades ou dans les eaux territoriales de la dite Puissance, pendant plus de vingt-quatre heures, sauf dans les cas prévus par la présente Convention.
In default of special provisions to the contrary in the laws of a neutral Power, war-ships of the belligerent are forbidden to remain in the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power for more than twenty-four hours, except in the cases covered by the present Convention.
Si une Puissance avisée de l’ouverture des hostilités apprend qu’un navire de guerre d’un belligérant se trouve dans un de ses ports et rades ou dans ses eaux territoriales, elle doit notifier au dit navire qu’il devra partir dans les vingt-quatre heures ou dans le délai prescrit par la loi locale.
If a Power which has been informed of the outbreak of hostilities learns that a war-ship of a belligerent is in one of its ports or roadsteads, or in its territorial waters, it must notify the said ship to depart within twenty-four hours or within the time prescribed by the local law.
Un navire de guerre belligérant ne peut prolonger son séjour dans un port neutre au delà de la durée légale que pour cause d’avaries ou à raison de l’état de la mer. Il devra partir dès que la cause du retard aura cessé.
Les règles sur la limitation du séjour dans les ports, rades et eaux neutres, ne s’appliquent pas aux navires de guerre exclusivement affectés à une mission religieuse, scientifique ou philanthropique.
A belligerent war-ship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port beyond the time permitted except on account of damage or stress of weather. It must depart as soon as the cause of the delay is at an end.
The regulations as to the length of time which such vessels may remain in neutral ports, roadsteads, or waters, do not apply to war-ships devoted exclusively to religious, scientific, or philanthropic purposes.
A défaut d’autres dispositions spéciales de la législation de la Puissance neutre, le nombre maximum des navires de guerre d’un belligérant qui pourront se trouver en même temps dans un de ses ports ou rades, sera de trois.
In default of special provisions to the contrary in the laws of a neutral Power, the maximum number of war-ships belonging to a belligerent which may be in one of the ports or roadsteads of that Power simultaneously shall be three.
Lorsque des navires de guerre des deux parties belligérantes se trouvent simultanément dans un port ou une rade neutres, il doit s’écouler au moins vingt-quatre heures entre le départ du navire d’un belligérant et le départ du navire de l’autre.
L’ordre des départs est déterminé par l’ordre des arrivées, à moins que le navire arrivé le premier ne soit dans le cas où la prolongation de la durée légale du séjour est admise.
Un navire de guerre belligérant ne peut quitter un port ou une rade neutres moins de vingt-quatre heures après le départ d’un navire de commerce portant le pavillon de son adversaire.
A belligerent war-ship may not leave a neutral port or roadstead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant-ship flying the flag of its adversary.
Dans les ports et rades neutres, les navires de guerre belligérants ne peuvent réparer leurs avaries que dans la mesure indispensable à la sécurité de leur navigation et non pas accroître, d’une manière quelconque, leur force militaire. L’autorité neutre constatera la nature des réparations à effectuer, qui devront être exécutées le plus rapidement possible.
In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent war-ships may only carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy, and may not add in any manner whatever to their fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral Power shall decide what repairs are necessary, and these must be carried out with the least possible delay.
Belligerent war-ships may not make use of neutral ports, roadsteads and territorial waters for replenishing or increasing their supplies of war material or their armament, or for completing their crews.
Art. 191 .
Ces navires ne peuvent, de même, prendre du combustible que pour gagner le port le plus proche de leur propre pays. Ils peuvent, d’ailleurs, prendre le combustible nécessaire pour compléter le plein de leurs soutes proprement dites, quand ils se trouvent dans les pays neutres qui ont adopté ce mode de détermination du combustible à fournir.
Si, d’après la loi de la Puissance neutre, les navires ne reçoivent du charbon que vingt-quatre heures après leur arrivée, la durée légale de leur séjour est prolongée de vingt-quatre heures.
Similarly these vessels may only ship sufficient fuel to enable them to reach the nearest port in their own country. They may, on the other hand, fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel, in neutral countries which have adopted this method of determining the amount of fuel to be supplied.
If, in accordance with the law of the neutral Power, the ships are only supplied with coal twenty-four hours after their arrival, the permissible duration of their stay is extended by twenty-four hours.
Les navires de guerre belligérants qui ont pris du combustible dans le port d’une Puissance neutre ne peuvent renouveler leur approvisionnement qu’après trois mois dans un port de la même Puissance.
Une prise ne peut être amenée dans un port neutre que pour cause d’innavigabilité, de mauvais état de la mer, de manque de combustible ou de provisions.
Elle doit repartir aussitôt que la cause qui en a justifié l’entrée a cessé. Si elle ne le fait pas, la Puissance neutre doit lui notifier l’ordre de partir immédiatement; au cas où elle ne s’y conformerait pas, la Puissance neutre doit user des moyens dont elle dispose pour la relâcher avec ses officiers et son équipage et interner l’équipage mis à bord par le capteur.
La Puissance neutre doit, de même, relâcher la prise qui aurait été amenée en dehors des conditions prévues par l’Article 21.
Une Puissance neutre peut permettre l’accès de ses ports et rades aux prises escortées ou non, lorsqu’elles y sont amenées pour être laissées sous séquestre en attendant la décision du tribunal des prises. Elle peut faire conduire la prise dans un autre de ses ports.
Si la prise est escortée par un navire de guerre, les officiers et les hommes mis à bord par le capteur sont autorisés à passer sur le navire d’escorte.
Si, malgré la notification de l’autorité neutre, un navire de guerre belligérant ne quitte pas un port dans lequel il n’a pas le droit de rester, la Puissance neutre a le droit de prendre les mesures qu’elle pourra juger nécessaires pour rendre le navire incapable de prendre la mer pendant la durée de la guerre et le commandant du navire doit faciliter l’exécution de ces mesures.
Lorsqu’un navire belligérant est retenu par une Puissance neutre, les officiers et l’équipage sont également retenus.
Les officiers et l’équipage ainsi retenus peuvent être laissés dans le navire ou logés, soit sur un autre navire, soit à terre, et ils peuvent être assujettis aux mesures restrictives qu’il paraîtrait nécessaire de leur imposer. Toutefois, on devra toujours laisser sur le navire les hommes nécessaires à son entretien.
Les officiers peuvent être laissés libres en prenant l’engagement sur parole de ne pas quitter le territoire neutre sans autorisation.
If, notwithstanding the notification of the neutral Power, a belligerent ship of war does not leave a port where it is not entitled to remain, the neutral Power is entitled to take such measures as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of putting to sea so long as the war lasts, and the commanding officer of the ship must facilitate the execution of such measures.
The officers and crew so detained may be left in the ship or kept either on another vessel or on land, and may be subjected to such measures of restriction as it may appear necessary to impose upon them. A sufficient number of men must, however, be always left on board for looking after the vessel.
(Cp. 5 H. C. 1907, Art. 11, par. 3.)
Une Puissance neutre est tenue d’exercer la surveillance, que comportent les moyens dont elle dispose, pour empêcher dans ses ports ou rades et dans ses eaux toute violation des dispositions qui précèdent.
A neutral Power is bound to exercise such vigilance as the means at its disposal permit to prevent any violation of the provisions of the above Articles occurring in its ports or roadsteads or in its waters.
L’exercice par une Puissance neutre des droits définis par la présente Convention ne peut jamais être considéré comme un acte peu amical par l’un ou par l’autre belligérant qui a accepté les articles qui s’y réfèrent.
The exercise by a neutral Power of the rights laid down in the present Convention can never be considered as an unfriendly act by either belligerent who has accepted the Articles relating thereto.
(Cp. 5 H. C. 1907, Art. 10.)
Les Puissances contractantes se communiqueront réciproquement, en temps utile, toutes les lois, ordonnances et autres dispositions réglant chez elles le régime des navires de guerre belligérants dans leurs ports et leurs eaux, au moyen d’une notification adressée au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et transmise immédiatement par celui-ci aux autres Puissances contractantes.
The Contracting Powers shall communicate to each other in due course all statutes, orders, and other enactments regulating in their respective countries the situation of belligerent war-ships in their ports and waters, by means of a communication addressed to the Government of the Netherlands, and forwarded immediately by that Government to the other Contracting Powers.
The provisions of the present Convention are only applicable to the Contracting Powers, and only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.
Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l’alinéa précédent, ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immédiatement remise par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix, ainsi qu’aux autres Puissances qui auront adhéré à la Convention. Dans les cas visés par l’alinéa précédent, le dit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.
A duly certified copy of the procès-verbal relating to the first deposit of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and of the instruments of ratification, shall be immediately sent by the Netherland Government, through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as well as to the other Powers which have acceded to the Convention. The said Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, inform them at the same time of the date on which it received the notification.
La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l’acte d’adhésion, qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.
La présente Convention produira effet pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt des ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement ou qui adhéreront, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhésion aura été reçue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.
The present Convention shall take effect, in the case of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of the ratifications, sixty days after the date of the procès-verbal recording such deposit, and, in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently or which shall accede, sixty days after the notification of their ratification or of their accession has been received by the Netherland Government.
The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the notifying Power, and only on the expiry of one year after the notification has reached the Netherland Government.
Un registre tenu par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères des Pays-Bas indiquera la date du dépôt de ratifications effectué en vertu de l’article 29, alinéas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date à laquelle auront été reçues les notifications d’adhésion (article 30, alinéa 2) ou de dénonciation (article 32, alinéa 1).
Fait à La Haye, le 18 Octobre, 1907, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances qui ont été conviées à la Deuxième Conférence de la Paix.
A register kept by the Netherland Ministry for Foreign Affairs shall record the date of the deposit of ratifications effected in virtue of Article 29, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the date on which the notifications of accession (Article 30, paragraph 2) or of denunciation (Article 32, paragraph 1) have been received.
Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent, through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers which have been invited to the Second Peace Conference.
Convention No. 13. The rights and duties of neutral Powers in maritime war1 .
The second Vœu adopted by the First Peace Conference was that “the question of the rights and duties of neutrals may be inserted in the programme of a Conference in the near future2 .” The Circular of Count Benckendorff of the 3rd April, 1906, suggested among topics for the consideration of the Conference the “Elaboration of a Convention relative to the laws and usages of naval warfare concerning...the rights and duties of neutrals at sea, among others...the regulations to be applied to belligerent vessels in neutral ports3 .”
The preamble to the Declaration of Paris bore witness to the fact that maritime law in time of war had long been the subject of deplorable disputes, and much of the time of the Second Conference was spent in endeavouring to clear up the uncertainty of the law and duties of states in such matters which give rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents, differences which may occasion and have occasioned serious difficulties and even conflicts4 .
Development of law of neutrality.The development of the law of neutrality during the 19th century reveals changes in the attitudes of the Powers towards neutral rights. During the Napoleonic wars belligerent rights were predominant, but the long peace which was broken by the Crimean War terminating with the Treaty and Declaration of Paris of 1856 marked a movement in the direction of greater recognition of the rights of neutrals. The relinquishment of privateering, and the protection accorded to neutral goods under an enemy flag and enemy goods under a neutral flag were acknowledgments of neutral rights. The Neutrality Regulations of Great Britain in 1862 limiting the amount of coal and the frequency of supplies to belligerent ships marked an important stage in the development of the position of neutrals. Important questions affecting neutrals were raised during the course of the Spanish-American and Boer wars, and more especially during the Russo-Japanese war. Meantime the political situation was undergoing a change; states which formerly viewed maritime questions chiefly from the standpoint of neutrals were themselves becoming naval Powers and beginning to take a different attitude. There was a noticeable reluctance on the part of some of these during the last-mentioned war to refrain from speaking distinctly as to certain acts which prima facie seemed to conflict with the duty of neutrals, or to do anything which might hinder their Governments in the event of war doing all that expediency might in unforeseen circumstances dictate1 . This is also noticeable in the attitude of certain Powers in the discussions which resulted in the preparation of the Convention now under consideration.
Proposals at the Conference.The subject of the rights and duties of neutrals at sea, and the regulations to be applied to belligerent vessels in neutral ports was assigned to the Second Sub-Committee of the Third Committee under the presidency of Count Tornielli (Italy), M. Renault being the Reporter.
Four proposals were handed in to the Sub-Committee: (1) A Japanese draft defining the position of belligerent ships in neutral waters (seven Articles)2 , (2) a Spanish draft on the same subject (five Articles)3 , (3) a British draft for a Convention concerning the rights and duties of neutral states in maritime warfare (thirty-two Articles)4 , (4) a Russian draft defining the position of belligerent war-ships in neutral ports (seven Articles)5 . The British draft was the most elaborate, and was a general statement of neutral rights and duties, and the Committee not feeling itself bound by the strict terms of its instructions took into consideration not only the position of belligerent war-ships in neutral ports but the wider question of neutral rights and duties.
The Questionnaire.A Questionnaire consisting of 17 questions was prepared on the basis of the four drafts6 , and was discussed on the 27th and 30th July and 1st August7 . Copies of the Three Rules of the Treaty of Washington, 1871, and of Chapter vii. of the Italian Code for the Merchant Navy, 1877, were circulated among the Committee.
The Questionnaire related to the following matters, each question being accompanied by the answers provided by the several drafts. (1) Is there a general principle underlying the whole question? (2) What are the rights of neutral states as regards the entry of belligerent ships of war into their ports? (3) To what extent should ships of war be prohibited from using neutral ports or territorial waters, in regard to places of observation, assembling, passage, base of warlike operations, establishment of Prize Courts, military objects of every kind? (4) If a prize is taken in neutral waters what are the rights and duties of the neutral state, (a) if the prize is still within its jurisdiction, (b) if it has left it? (5) Should the period of stay of belligerent ships of war in neutral waters be limited? (6) If the principle of a limitation is admitted, what exceptions should be made? In respect of stress of weather (l’état de la mer)? In respect of repairs? (7) What is the position of a belligerent war-ship which has taken refuge in a neutral port to escape the pursuit of the enemy? (8) What rule should be applied in case ships of both belligerents are in a neutral port simultaneously? How should the order of departure be fixed? (9) Is it necessary to distinguish between single ships and groups of ships? (10) Is any special rule required for ships accompanied by prizes? (11) Can belligerent war-ships effect repairs in a neutral port? (12) What amount of provisions and coal may they take on board? (13) Should a second supply be allowed in the same neutral country unless there is reason to fix some definite period? (14) Should special provision be made for war-ships proceeding to the seat of war or being in proximity to the zone of hostilities? (15) How should belligerent war-ships be dealt with for not conforming to the rules as to the duration and conditions of their stay in neutral ports and waters? (16) What is the duty of neutral states to ensure respect for the rules adopted? (17) Should the same rules be adopted for territorial waters as for neutral ports? (This last question was added at the request of the Norwegian delegate1 .)
The discussions on these questions were lengthy and detailed, and it was recognised that the need for their solution had been emphasized by the occurrences during the Russo-Japanese war, but the methods of the solution proposed differed widely. On the one hand the British proposals, supported generally by the United States and Japan, put great restrictions on the use of neutral ports, whereas other Powers were for leaving the greatest latitude to neutrals. This difference of standpoint was not derived solely from theoretical conceptions, but from political interests and geographical conditions, which rendered the conciliation of the opposing views particularly difficult1 .
It is the duty of a neutral to take no part in hostilities, to remain absolutely impartial and not to render aid to either belligerent. The admission of belligerent vessels of war into neutral ports and harbours and their passage through territorial waters have long been recognised as standing on a different footing from the admission or passage of troops. In the case of land warfare international practice has decided against it2 , in the case of naval warfare it is permitted. International law however requires that what a neutral allows to one belligerent he must allow to the other. The entrance and length of stay of belligerent ships of war in neutral ports are favours which neutral states may withhold or grant conditionally, and during the Russo-Japanese war Norway, Sweden and Denmark closed certain of their ports to all belligerent war-ships (except in cases of distress)3 . The rules which neutrals intend to observe during a war in respect to the conditions of admission of belligerent war-ships are usually notified shortly after the commencement of a war by a Declaration of Neutrality, but it has been the practice of some states not to issue any special rules for the stay of belligerent war-ships in their ports. The Declarations of Neutrality lay down different rules, and the same neutral in the course of a war sometimes changes the conditions of admission. The problem in all cases is, as M. Renault states in his Report, to reconcile the neutral right to give asylum to foreign ships with the duty of abstaining from all participation in hostilities4 . States desire definite rules elaborated before the outbreak of war, the observance of which will be a good defence to recriminations made by either of the belligerents. It was the realisation of this principle, even though it led to an “all round agreement to fetter sovereign power to the extent of making application of some principle obligatory5 ,” that was desirable. It will be seen from an examination of the contents of this Convention how far this is carried out.
The Questionnaire reserved several points in the British draft which dealt more particularly with the rights and duties of neutrals, and, in the course of the discussion, the Sub-Committee added others bearing on the same subject. These were sent to an Examining Committee together with the other draft Articles dealing with the regulations for belligerent ships in neutral waters; the British draft was taken as the basis of the draft Convention which was prepared and submitted to the Examining Committee on the 11th, 12th and 28th September1 . It was further discussed at a full meeting of the Third Committee on the 4th October2 , and after various amendments had been made during the course of the discussion it was adopted at the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Conference on the 9th October, 19073 .
Governing principle.The fundamental principle enunciated in Article 1 is the obligation incumbent on belligerent states to respect the sovereign rights of neutral Powers. This right of sovereignty is one springing from the nature of states, but one which is liable to be infringed in time of war. The principle is therefore safeguarded at the commencement of this Convention as also in Article 1 of 5 H. C. 1907. Neutral territory and territorial waters are inviolable, and belligerents must abstain from committing acts therein in violation of neutrality. Article 1 is taken almost verbatim from Article 2 of the British draft and occasioned no discussion4 . If a violation of neutrality occurs it is a neutral’s duty to take steps to obtain redress, especially where the other belligerent is injuriously affected, but this is not definitely stated in the Convention.
Article 2 follows from the first Article. Every act of hostility, every operation of naval warfare, and in, particular capture of ships and the exercise of the right of visit within neutral waters are forbidden, the more serious act being placed first. It is unnecessary to enter into details of the cases in British and American Prize Courts in which captures in neutral waters have been set aside. The principle has received general recognition for over a century5 .
Ship captured in territorial waters.Article 3 deals with the case where a violation of neutrality has been committed and a vessel has been captured by a belligerent in the territorial waters of a neutral state. Two cases are considered in this Article:—(a) where the prize is still within neutral jurisdiction, (b) where it is not. This Article gave rise to considerable discussion6 . Article 28 of the British draft was as follows: “Where a prize has been captured in territorial waters in violation of neutrality, the neutral Power shall, if the prize is still within its jurisdiction, release it, as well as the officers and crew, and intern the prize crew put on board by the captor: if the prize has left the neutral jurisdiction, the neutral Power shall address a protest to the belligerent Government, asking for the release of the prize with its officers and crew, and the belligerent shall take means for this purpose1 .” Article 3 of the Convention is based on this Article with important omissions. The neutral Power is to employ the means at its disposal for the release of the prize if within its jurisdiction: this expression was substituted for the British as it was understood that the neutral Power may not always have the necessary means.
As regards the second case, the British draft proposed, as stated above, that the neutral should demand the release of the prize, but it was pointed out in Committee by Admiral Siegel (Germany) that Article 3 of Convention 12 allows such a case to be brought before the International Prize Court where the neutral has not made a diplomatic remonstrance and demand. Doubt was expressed as to the mode of procedure to be adopted where a neutral state was not a party to the Prize Court Convention. M. Renault stated that in such case the neutral state would proceed by way of diplomatic request: but if it was a party to the Convention there were two courses open, either the diplomatic request by the state, or an appeal to the International Prize Court. The neutral has a choice, “Even in cases where it does not wish to pursue a diplomatic request strictly speaking, it will notify the fact to the state of the captor who will possibly release the prize himself to avoid further difficulties, diplomatic or judicial2 .” In view of the divergencies of opinion M. Tcharykow (Russia) moved the suppression of the 2nd paragraph but this was not carried3 ; the amendment proposed by Count Tornielli to render optional the claim of the neutral Power, which now appears in the text, was adopted by nine to four and finally adopted unanimously at the meeting of the Examining Committee on 28th September, when Sir Ernest Satow, who had maintained the view of the British draft, reserved his vote4 . The difficulty in arriving at a solution was due to the Article in the Prize Court Convention already mentioned; the duty of the neutral Power, not a party to the Convention, to demand reparation for the violation of its neutrality by diplomatic representations was not disputed but is not expressly stated in the Convention. Cases of this nature have not infrequently arisen. The capture of the General Armstrong, an American privateer, by a British squadron in the neutral Portuguese harbour of Fayal in 1814 led to a long dispute between the United States and Portugal and was finally submitted to the arbitration of Prince Louis Napoleon, then President of the French Republic, who in 1852 decided against the United States on the ground that the American ship did not apply “from the beginning for the intervention of the neutral sovereign1 .” The case of the Florida, a Confederate ship, which was captured in 1864 in the territorial waters of Brazil by the Federal cruiser Wachusett, is another instance of a neutral state at once demanding reparation, which was given by the United States Government2 . The most recent case on this subject is the Ryeshitelni which occurred during the Russo-Japanese war. This ship, a Russian destroyer, took refuge in Chefoo harbour and was captured there by the Japanese destroyers Asashiwo and Kasumi. The vacillating policy of China, the neutral Power, in enforcing her neutral rights and compelling disarmament, appears to have caused the Japanese to take the matter into their own hands, and Japan was guilty of a violation of Chinese neutrality (Chefoo being outside the region of the war). The circumstances do not however seem to warrant a severe condemnation of the action of the commanders of the Japanese torpedo-boats. Japan made no reparation to China, though that Power demanded the restoration of the Ryeshitelni, and lodged a protest against the violation of her neutrality3 .
Prize Courts on neutral territory.Article 4 forbids the establishment by belligerents of Prize Courts in neutral territory or waters. This rule has long been recognised as a rule of international law towards the establishment of which the action of the United States in 1793 contributed in a great degree4 . The words “by a belligerent” were inserted to exclude the case of the International Prize Court which will sit in a neutral territory5 .
The British, Japanese and Russian drafts all contained Articles embodying the principle enunciated in Article 5, the latter part of which is also similar to Article 3 (a) of 5 H. C. 1907.Neutral territory as base of belligerent operations. The second rule of the Treaty of Washington, 1871, stated this principle from the standpoint of a neutral’s duty: “A neutral government is bound...Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms or recruitment of men.”
Supply of instruments of warfare by neutrals.Article 6 enacts the principle of the second part of the second rule of the Treaty of Washington. Article 3 of the British draft referred only to “sale” by a neutral, the word supply (remise) has a wider import. Sir Ernest Satow proposed to add a second paragraph prohibiting belligerents from revictualling their auxiliary ships in neutral waters. The British delegate contended that while it was allowable for belligerents to purchase food for their crews, the revictualling of belligerent auxiliaries constituted an operation of war. This was opposed by the Russian delegate. This proposal was carried by small majorities but ultimately withdrawn, though its disappearance was understood not to be taken as an acceptance of the whole of the draft by the British or Russian delegates1 . The supply either directly or indirectly by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power of war-ships, munitions or material of war which had in practice been long forbidden is now definitely prohibited as a rule of law. The sale by auction of Government stores, such as took place in the United States in 1870, during the Franco-German War, is not likely to occur in the future2 . If a purchase of ships of war from a state has been concluded before the purchasing state becomes a belligerent, it will be the neutral’s duty to decline to deliver until the restoration of peace3 .
Export of arms etc. from neutral states.The supply directly or indirectly by a neutral Power of war-ships and weapons of war is prohibited by Article 6; Article 7, however, recognises that the furnishing of munitions of war etc. by private persons is to be treated differently. Such goods when shipped by a private person are susceptible of capture as contraband; such contraband trade is not internationally unlawful, though in some systems of national law it may involve punishment and, as is frequently pointed out in Neutrality Declarations, is always liable to belligerent capture. A neutral state may forbid its subjects to trade in articles of the class referred to in Article 7, but it is under no international duty to do so. “The supply of materials of war, such as arms and ammunition, to either party to an armed conflict, although neutral governments are not obliged to prevent it, constitutes, on the part of the individuals who engage in it, a participation in hostilities, and as such is confessedly an unneutral act. Should the government of the individual itself supply such articles it would clearly depart from its position of neutrality. The private citizen undertakes the business at his own risk, and against this risk his government cannot assure him protection without making itself a party to his unneutral act1 .”
Fitting out or arming of ships in neutral jurisdiction.The first rule of the Treaty of Washington, 1871, is as follows: “A neutral Government is bound; first, to use due diligence2 to prevent the fitting out, arming or equipping within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable grounds to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace; and also to use the like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction to warlike use.” Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the British draft reproduced these rules with certain additions3 . Article 8 of the Convention also reproduces this rule with two small but important variations. “The expression ‘due diligence’ which has become celebrated by its obscurity since it was solemnly interpreted has been omitted4 ”; and the Article says in the first place the neutral is “bound to employ the means at its disposal...” and in the second “to employ the same vigilance” to prevent the acts enumerated in the latter part of the Article.
During the discussions on this subject on the 30th July the Brazilian delegate (Captain Burlamaqui de Moura) proposed to insert an Article providing that war-ships in the course of construction in the ship-building yards of a neutral country may be supplied with all their armament to the officers and crew appointed to receive them, when they have been ordered six months before the declaration of the war1 . The discussion on this proposal took place on the 1st August, when the Brazilian delegate supported his motion by reference to the French Instructions of the 26th April, 1898, on the occasion of the Spanish-American war (Rev. Gén. de Droit Inter. Vol. v. docum. p. 29). It was opposed by the Argentine delegate (M. Drago)2 and rejected by the Examining Committee on the 26th August3 . The subject was again introduced by M. Ruy Barbosa at the full meeting of the Third Committee on the 4th October, but no amendment was moved4 . The British practice is opposed to the Brazilian proposal, and on the outbreak of the Spanish-American war, the British Government prevented the Amazonas, renamed by the United States the Somers, and the Almirante Abreu, two ships building in English ship-building yards which the United States had purchased from Brazil before the commencement of the war, from leaving the country5 .
This Article now converts into a rule of international law the first rule of the Treaty of Washington, but there still remains the difficulty of interpreting the phrase “any vessel intended to cruise or carry on hostile operations” or “which has been adapted in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use6 .” Great Britain has by the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, made it a criminal offence to build, equip, dispatch or issue or deliver a commission to any ship with intent or knowledge, or with reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the naval or military service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state (Sec. 8). The United States Neutrality Acts of 1794 and 1818, on which the British Statute of 1819 was modelled, contain similar provisions7 .
Neutral’s impartiality of treatment.The principle of Article 9, which lays on neutrals the duty of impartial treatment to both belligerents, met with no difficulty in acceptance but the form in which it should be stated occasioned some discussion8 . The British delegate proposed that a neutral Power may, if it thinks necessary, forbid all access to its ports or certain of them or the passage of its territorial waters to war-ships or prizes of the belligerents. The first draft stated that “A neutral state may allow under definite conditions, and even forbid, if it deems it necessary, access to its ports or certain of its ports by war-ships and prizes of the belligerents, etc.” The Japanese delegate contended that this suggested that neutral ports would be freely open to belligerent war-ships, whereas the increasing tendency of writers was to recognise that it was a duty for neutrals to admit them only in cases of distress, etc. The wording of the draft was slightly changed and finally adopted in the present form1 . The first paragraph, therefore, lays down the general rule that where a neutral admits belligerent war-ships to its ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, impartial treatment must be given to both; but adds in the second paragraph that one of the belligerents, by failure to conform to the orders and regulations of the neutral or through violation of its neutrality, may forfeit this claim to equal treatment. “The right of a state to forbid in a general way access to its ports by the belligerents is not in question in Article 9, and follows from its right of issuing general regulations and prohibitions2 .”
Passage of belligerent ships through territorial waters.Article 10 provides that a Power’s neutrality is not compromised by the mere passage through its territorial waters of belligerent war-ships or prizes. “Article 32 of the British draft said ‘no provisions contained in the preceding Articles shall be interpreted so as to prohibit the innocent passage (le passage simple) of neutral waters in time of war by a war-ship or auxiliary ship of a belligerent.’ This might have been understood to mean that a neutral had not the right to forbid war-ships from passing through its waters, and it has been previously explained that according to the meaning of the British proposal this innocent passage must be distinguished from access or stay in neutral waters.
“On the 27th July, the first delegate of Sweden, referring to Article 30 of the British draft recognising that a neutral state has the right to forbid in whole or in part access to its ports and territorial waters, had called attention to the special condition of straits which might be situated within the area of territorial waters and suggested the addition of the rule voted by the ‘Institut de Droit International’ in 1894: ‘Straits which form a channel from one open sea to another can never be closed3 .’ ”
The Danish delegate made a proposition in a similar sense to that of the Swedish delegate. He said that to accord to belligerents the right of innocent passage through territorial waters, but to authorise neutrals to prohibit their entry was to take away with one hand what was given with the other. The laying of mines by neutrals being under consideration by another Committee, he would therefore merely draw attention to the connection between the two subjects and the consequent interest which there was in not limiting by the Convention the exercise of the sovereign rights of the neutral over his territorial waters, in such a way as to deprive him of one of the most effective means for maintaining the provisions of the same Convention1 .
The question was discussed by the Examining Committee but no resolutions were passed on these points. From the opinions expressed there it appeared to be the general feeling that a neutral state could forbid even the innocent passage through parts of its territorial waters so far as it was necessary to maintain its neutrality, but that this prohibition could not extend to straits uniting two open seas2 .
Article 10 leaves these questions unsettled, they remain “sous l’empire du droit des gens général.” All that it provides is that a state’s neutrality is not compromised by the passage through its territorial waters of belligerent ships of war3 .
Admiral Sperry on behalf of the United States declared that he could not accept this Article by reason of the political considerations involved in the question of the passage through territorial waters.
At the meeting of the Sub-Committee on the 30th July Turkhan Pascha made the following declaration: “The Ottoman Delegation thinks it its duty to declare that under the exceptional condition created for the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus by the treaties in force, these straits, which are an integral part of Turkish territory, can in no case be brought within Article 32 of the British proposals. The Imperial Government could undertake no engagement whatever tending to limit its undoubted rights over these straits.”
M. Tsudzuki also declared that the Japanese Government could undertake no engagement concerning the straits which separate the numerous islands or islets which compose the Japanese Empire and which are simply integral parts of the Empire1 .
Employment of neutral pilots.The 11th Article provides that a neutral Power may allow belligerent war-ships to employ its licensed pilots. It is not bound to provide them, but there are many cases where if a neutral allows belligerents to enter its territorial waters, it requires the employment of its pilots; under this Article no breach of neutrality is committed by granting leave to employ them. “The term ‘brevetés’ is used not ‘autorisés’ to indicate that it is a case of official pilots, not of pilots who might be authorised in each particular case” (M. Renault’s Report). This permission does not appear to extend to piloting belligerents in the open sea. “Great Britain prohibited her pilots, during the Franco-German War in 1870, from conducting German and French men-of-war outside the maritime belt, the case of vessels in distress excepted2 .”
Duration of stay of belligerents in neutral ports.The question of the length of stay allowed to belligerent ships in neutral ports occasioned the greatest difficulty. The account of the discussion is clearly summarised by M. Renault in his Report to the Conference3 . Two proposals were before the Committee: (a) the Russian which allowed the neutral state to fix the period of stay allowed to belligerent ships of war4 , and (b) the British, Spanish and Japanese which laid down the general rule that such vessels should remain in neutral ports for twenty-four hours only save in exceptional circumstances5 . By way of compromise Count Tornielli suggested the rule in the form of the present Article. The right of the neutral Power to fix the length of stay is affirmed, but in case it shall not have exercised the right, the period is fixed at 24 hours. This was accepted by the delegates of Great Britain and Japan but opposed by Germany and Russia. The German delegate proposed to distinguish according as the neutral ports were more or less distant from the theatre of war, allowing a definite period to be fixed for the former but not for the latter. This was opposed by Sir Ernest Satow and M. Tsudzuki, chiefly on the ground of the difficulty in defining the expression “theatre of war.” Different states, said Sir Ernest Satow, would interpret the expression in different ways; furthermore, under modern circumstances the theatre of war would be quickly changed, less than a week enabling a fleet to pass from European to American waters; it would be a great responsibility for neutral Powers to have to modify their regulations from time to time according to the varying changes of the war1 . The Dutch delegate also opposed the German amendment which was ultimately rejected by 7 to 4, with 3 abstentions2 . The German delegate then moved the suppression of the whole Article but only received the support of one Power, Russia.
The twenty-four hours rule of stay has therefore been accepted as the general rule in the absence of any special regulations to the contrary.
This Article cannot be said to settle the question, but it is something to have the twenty-four hours rule of stay recognised as the normal period allowed: it affords support to a weak neutral state desirous of asserting its neutrality. The twenty-four hours rule of stay though adopted by Great Britain, the United States and other naval Powers, has never been accepted by France, Germany and Russia. The alleged abuse of the hospitality of neutral waters by Russian ships during the Russo-Japanese war called forth protests from Japan, “but the Instructions of the French Minister of Marine expressly stated that ‘the duration of sojourn in French ports of belligerents unaccompanied by a prize has not been limited by any special provision3 .’ ” The twenty-four hours rule of stay will in future apply in the absence of “any special provision to the contrary,” and by Article 27 the contracting Powers undertake to notify to the Netherland Government for communication to the other contracting Powers any orders and enactments regulating the situation of belligerent war-ships in their ports and waters. The power of a neutral state to accommodate its friends is not taken away but the neutral will, in order to avoid the application of the twenty-four hours rule of stay, have to make another rule which may one day tell against it, unless it is conceived in extremely wide terms. The object of placing a limitation on the sojourn of belligerent ships in neutral waters is chiefly to prevent such places from being made the base of belligerent operations. Nothing is said in this Article of the reasons for the stay of belligerent war-ships; it makes no distinction between entry to escape the perils of the sea or the enemy, or to take on board stores; these matters are referred to subsequently.
Article 13 is closely connected with the preceding Article, the provisions of which are to apply to belligerent war-ships which happen to be in neutral ports on the outbreak of hostilities. It must be read in connection with Article 24. The proposal to differentiate as regards ports in proximity to the theatre of war was again made by the German delegate in connection with this Article but, after the failure of the attempt in regard to Article 12, it was withdrawn1 . A case similar to that contemplated by this Article occurred at the commencement of the Russo-Japanese war. The Russian gun-boat Manjur was lying in the neutral harbour of Shanghai when war broke out. The Japanese Consul drew the attention of the Chinese Government to the position of the ship, and the Tao-tai of Shanghai ordered the commander of the Manjur to leave as soon as possible. He refused; a Japanese cruiser was lying off the mouth of the river. Further parleying ensued, and the Chinese Government again ordered him to leave within 24 hours. The weakness of the neutral Government caused a further delay, and Japan refrained from taking extreme measures, but continued to protest against the presence of the Russian gun-boat in port. Negotiations were carried on between Russia and China on the one hand, and China and Japan on the other, from the middle of February, 1904, until the end of March when the gun-boat was dismantled to the satisfaction of the commander of the Japanese cruiser Akitsushima2 .
Lengthened stay of belligerent war-ships in special cases.Whether the duration of stay is fixed at 24 hours or longer, it is recognised that exceptional circumstances permit a prolongation of the specified time. Article 14 deals with these cases. The proposals for exemption from the general rule were as follows: “stress of weather” (Japanese draft, Article 2), “damage, stress of weather or other force majeure” (Spanish draft, Article 3), “stress of weather, the absence of provisions or damage preventing ships from taking the sea” (Russian draft, Article 5). All three agreed in the exemption due to stress of weather; the question as to the extent of the damage for which a belligerent war-ship should be entitled to exceed the regular period of stay was raised by the Japanese delegate who desired a definite time to be fixed; this was rejected and the question remains open. The length of time will vary with the condition of the ship and the facilities for repair afforded by the port.
The second paragraph of this Article is in accordance with the spirit of 10 H. C. 1907, Article 1, and 11 H. C. 1907, Article 4, and occasioned no discussion.
Number of belligerent war-ships in a neutral port.The Japanese draft (Article 3) proposed that not more than three belligerent ships belonging to the same state or its allies should anchor at the same time in the same port or waters of the same neutral state1 . This was supported by the British delegate. The number was taken as being that usually allowed in time of peace. The German delegate remarked that some states had probably not fixed any number for visits in time of peace and suggested that the number should be left to the determination of the neutral. The question was re-opened at the meeting of the Committee on the 28th September2 , when the Russian delegate pointed out that a first-class battle-ship was nearly always accompanied by other smaller ships, and suggested that, while the principle was maintained, the neutral should be allowed to give special permission to more than three. This was objected to as increasing a neutral’s difficulties; ultimately the compromise suggested by the Swedish delegate was adopted which now forms Article 15, and fixes the maximum number of one belligerent’s war-ships in a neutral port or roadsteads at one time at three in default of special provisions to the contrary3 .
Order of departure from neutral ports.Article 16 settles the order of departure from a neutral port when ships of the two belligerents are both there simultaneously. This Article unlike the foregoing takes into account the presence of belligerent merchant-ships in a neutral port. The twenty-four hours rule of departure which was recognised as established by custom is adopted in the first paragraph. The order of departure occasioned some discussion. Four proposals were made: (a) that the order should be settled by the neutral, (b) that priority of demand should be taken into consideration, (c) that the weakest ship should leave first, (d) that the order of arrival should determine the order of departure. The last was finally adopted, except where the ship which arrives first is entitled to an extension of its stay4 . The twenty-four hours interval was also adopted in the third paragraph of this Article where a belligerent war-ship and a merchant-ship of its enemy are in the same neutral port simultaneously; the former may not leave until twenty-four hours after the latter, but the converse does not hold good. The merchant-ship may, if it desires, leave within less than twenty-four hours after a war-ship of the other belligerent.
The rule of the twenty-four hours interval is probably a hundred years older than the rule of the twenty-four hours stay1 . It was adopted to prevent a belligerent ship from using neutral waters as a “trap for an enemy of inferior strength2 .” The possibility of evasion of the rule was shown in December, 1861, when the United States corvette Tuscarora for several weeks prevented the Confederate cruiser Nashville from leaving Southampton3 . The British Government thereupon in January, 1862, laid down the twenty-four hours rule of stay. The “Institut de Droit International” in 1898 proposed to extend the twenty-four hours interval to the case of a belligerent merchant-ship and an enemy man-of-war, and also “in accordance,” as Dr Westlake states, “as may be believed with general practice” proposed that the order of arrival of the vessels should determine the order of departure, unless the first to arrive did not wish to exercise the right of departing first4 . Article 16 now lays down a general rule of twenty-four hours interval, and settles the order of departure without any saving clause “in default of special provisions to the contrary.”
Repairs in neutral ports and roadsteads.Article 17 is closely connected with Article 15 and provides that only such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render belligerent ships seaworthy may be executed in neutral ports, and that no increase may be made to their fighting force. These provisions were contained in both the British and Japanese drafts and are statements of the generally recognised law on this matter. The neutral decides what repairs are necessary and these must be executed as quickly as possible. The British draft (Art. 19) proposed that a neutral should not knowingly permit a war-ship to repair damage caused in battle5 , and a Portuguese amendment was to the same effect. This was, however, abandoned as there was a feeling that it would sometimes be difficult to decide on the cause of damage6 . It is not difficult for the neutral to fix the amount of repairs necessary to enable a ship to keep the seas, but no addition may be made to her armament. To put a ship in a condition to undertake offensive operations is clearly to aid her country in its war. “The principle,” says Hall, “is obvious, its application is susceptible of much variation; and in the treatment of ships, as in all other matters in which the neutral holds the delicate scales between two belligerents, a tendency towards the enforcement of a harsher rule becomes more defined with each successive war1 .” Cases which occurred during the Russo-Japanese war afford striking evidence of this. Several Russian ships took refuge in the German harbour of Tsing-tau near Kiao-chau Bay after the battle of the 10th August, 1904. The Czarewitch and some destroyers being in an unseaworthy condition were not allowed to repair, but, together with their crews, were kept until the termination of the war. Similar treatment was accorded to the Diana in the French harbour of Saigon. The Russian cruisers Askold and Grosovoi which put into Shanghai in a damaged condition were ultimately dismantled and their crews interned by the Chinese authorities. The Lena put into San Francisco on the 11th September, 1904, in need of repairs; the United States authorities estimated they would take six weeks to execute in order to make her seaworthy, and on the request of the commander the United States authorities disarmed her and interned her crew. After the great naval engagement in the Straits of Korea on the 27th May, 1905, three Russian cruisers the Aurora, Oleg and Zamtchug (Jemtchug) put into Manilla in a damaged condition with wounded men on board. The Russian admiral asked for permission to repair, but this was ultimately refused and the ships were ordered to leave within 24 hours or to be interned, on the ground that time cannot be given for the repair of injuries received in battle2 .
These cases are of unequal value as precedents. In the case of the ships taking refuge within “the theatre of war,” their internment was probably no disadvantage to Russia, as had repairs been allowed, all or most of the ships must have been captured or sunk by the Japanese who had secured complete command of the sea. The Russian Government does not appear to have made representations to any of the interning Powers, and in the case of the Lena, the commander asked for internment, while in the case of the ships in Manilla and Batavia the Russian Government chose internment as an alternative to quitting. The distinction said to have been drawn by the American Secretary of War between the disablement of a vessel caused by a storm or by an explosion or other accident on board, on the one hand, and the damage suffered in battle, on the other1 , was the distinction proposed to be made by the British draft. There is nothing in Article 17 to prevent a neutral state from making such a distinction if it allows a belligerent to execute repairs in its ports or roadsteads.
It will also be noticed that this Article does not refer to repairs in territorial waters, only in ports and roadsteads; the reason given by Count Tornielli being that it is probably difficult for ships to effect repairs in the former, and further that the control of neutrals over repairs executed under such conditions would not be possible2 .
Increase of armament in neutral waters.Article 18 enacts the substance of the second half of the second Rule of the Treaty of Washington of 1871, the first half having been already embodied in Article 5. The addition of the words “territorial waters” to the Rule was moved by Sir Ernest Satow and is justified by the reason that the Rule of the Treaty of Washington spoke of neutral duties, whereas this Article is a prohibition to belligerents3 .
Supply of provisions and fuel to belligerent war-ships in neutral ports.Article 19 deals with a question, which together with that of the period of stay of belligerent war-ships occasioned the chief difficulties. What amount of provisions and fuel may be taken on board by belligerent war-ships in neutral ports? The first paragraph allows belligerent war-ships to re-victual in neutral ports or roadsteads only to complete their supplies up to the amount usual in time of peace. This occasioned no difficulty. The British rule as laid down in the Instructions of 1904 is that a belligerent war-ship may take in “provisions and such other things as may be necessary for the subsistence of her crew.” The amount will be in the discretion of the neutral.
The second paragraph deals with the supply of fuel and gave rise to lengthy discussions. The British proposal (Article 17) said that the quantity of provisions or fuel (munitions, vivres ou combustibles) taken on board in neutral jurisdiction should in no case exceed that which was necessary to enable it to reach the nearest port of its own country; the Japanese proposal added “or some nearer neutral destination1 ”; the Spanish proposal was to the same effect. On the other hand it was contended by Germany, France and Russia that belligerents should be allowed to take in enough fuel to complete their normal supply in time of peace. These two alternatives were considered by the Examining Committee on the 11th and 12th September, 19072 , and again at the full meeting of the Third Committee on the 4th October, 19073 . Admiral Siegel (Germany) contended that there was a great difficulty in arriving at the quantity of fuel necessary to take a ship to its nearest home port. It was necessary to ascertain what was the nearest port, what was its distance, the most economical speed, which would necessarily vary with the quality of the coal supplied, the state of the boilers, etc., the condition of the weather and a consequent lengthening of the voyage. These were burdens which should not be placed on neutrals4 . In support of the British proposal, Sir Ernest Satow argued that a neutral had no right to give assistance to a belligerent to reach his adversary; that the only reason why coal should be given to a belligerent ship was to prevent it from becoming a helpless derelict on the ocean; sufficient should therefore be given to enable it to preserve its existence, and this was the origin of the rule of the nearest home port, a rule which had been accepted by nearly all states which had issued rules on the subject5 . The Japanese delegate preferred the suppression of the provisions relating to coal in the Article to the acceptance of the German proposal but this was rejected by 10 to 4. The Russian proposal combined both tests as alternatives as stated in the second paragraph and this was carried in the Examining Committee by 11 votes, with 3 abstentions6 .
The third paragraph of the original draft stated that “re-victualling and coaling do not give a right to prolong the legal length of stay (la durée légale du séjour).” The German delegate objected to the last words as impliedly recognising the twenty-four hours rule and at the full meeting of the Third Committee on the 4th October the Russian delegate proposed its suppression, but was opposed by the Japanese delegate7 on the ground that its suppression would introduce an element of uncertainty into Article 12 so as to completely change its nature: that Article was a compromise. Neutrals would have to resort to severe measures of surveillance to see that belligerents did not make use of the re-victualling permission unduly to prolong their stay. Sir Ernest Satow supported M. Tsudzuki’s arguments. The Russian amendment was however carried by 27 to 5 (Great Britain, Japan, China, Spain and Portugal); 9 states (including the United States) abstained from voting1 .
A legitimate extension of stay is recognised in the third paragraph in countries where ships of war are not supplied with coal within 24 hours of their arrival, as is the case in Italy.
This Article completely fails to satisfy the requirements of Powers which set a high standard of neutrality, and desire strictly to maintain the rule that neutrals must abstain from rendering assistance to the belligerents. National interests were in this case the determining factor. Great Britain, with coaling stations all over the world, and therefore in war-time independent to a large extent of neutrals, was unable to get other Powers not so situated to take the same view of neutral obligations. International law is not an abstraction irrespective of politico-geographical considerations; it is the reflection of the life of the society of states. The British and Japanese proposals are logical deductions from admitted principles and have been tested by experience, but the majority of states have not up to the present found it expedient to admit them. In the first serious attempt to reach an agreement on such highly controversial matters as those under consideration, it is not astonishing that unanimity was not reached. The standard set by this Article falls far short of that of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, and this Article has not been accepted by Great Britain and Japan: the United States have not signed the Convention. To permit more fuel and supplies “to be obtained than can, in a reasonably liberal sense of the word, be called necessary for reaching a place of safety is to provide the belligerent with means of aggressive action: and consequently to violate the essential principles of neutrality2 .”
Three months rule.Article 20 is closely connected with the preceding Article. Whichever of the standards laid down therein is adopted, within what length of time may a ship return for another supply of provisions or fuel? The British and Spanish drafts both fixed the time at three months, the one viewing it from the neutral, the other from the belligerent standpoint. This period was fixed by Great Britain during the American Civil War; but as the conditions of navigation have totally changed since then it was urged that time and distance should both be taken into consideration, 1000 miles being suggested by a technical Committee to which this and other questions were referred. No agreement was however reached on this point and the proposal as it stands in Article 20 was adopted. The Russian delegate returned to this subject at the meeting on the 28th September and quoting from the British Foreign Office Instructions of February, 1904, desired the addition of the words “without special permission” to the rule prohibiting belligerent war-ships from receiving supplies from the same neutral Power within the succeeding three months, but this was rejected and the Article was finally adopted as worded in the Convention1 .
Sir Ernest Satow proposed to insert after Article 20 a provision forbidding a neutral from knowingly allowing a belligerent war-ship to take on board provisions or fuel in order to go forth to encounter the enemy or to undertake operations of war (Art. 16 of British draft). The Japanese draft (Art. 5) contained a similar proposal. Spain was the only other Power which supported this proposal which was defeated by 8 to 32 .
Belligerent prizes in neutral ports.Articles 21-23 deal with the position of prizes in neutral ports3 . Some countries entirely exclude them, in others they are placed on the same footing as belligerent war-ships (cp. Article 6 of the Convention of Constantinople, 1888, with regard to the Suez Canal). The rule adopted by Article 21 allows them to be brought in only on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather or want of fuel or provisions. They must leave as soon as the reason for entry is removed, and failure to comply with the neutral’s orders to leave authorises that Power to employ the means at its disposal to release the prize with its officers and crew and to intern the prize crew. Article 21 deals with the case of a prize brought within neutral jurisdiction in a regular manner. Article 22 provides for the case where one has come in under circumstances other than those contemplated in the preceding Article. The neutral Power is to release it with its officers and crew and intern the prize crew.
The object of Article 23 is “to render rarer, or to prevent the destruction of prizes” (M. Renault), and provides that a neutral Power may allow prizes to enter its ports and roadsteads when they are brought in to be sequestrated pending the decision of a Prize Court. The connection of this subject with the destruction of neutral prizes, which was under the consideration of the Fourth Committee, caused the Third and Fourth Committees to hold a joint meeting on the 10th September under the presidency of M. de Martens4 , when Sir Ernest Satow formulated objections against this Article. He pointed out that it made no distinction between enemy and neutral prizes. International law allowed a belligerent to sink enemy prizes, the capture of which made them the property of the captor, and therefore enabled him to deal with them at his pleasure; to allow a belligerent to take a prize into a neutral port was to accord him the power of making use of the port to his peculiar advantage. The adoption of the Article would imply the abandonment of the British position which was that neutral prizes must either be taken into the captor’s ports or released. There was nothing in the Article to ensure the prevention of the destruction of neutral prizes for it was by no means certain that neutrals would allow them to be brought into their ports, and there were often cases where, even if the permission were granted, belligerents could not avail themselves of it. There would, furthermore, be a danger to the neutral in admitting prizes into its ports, a belligerent would not view it with indifference and complications would ensue; the neutral, it was true, had the option of closing his ports, but it might be difficult to exercise it1 . Sir Ernest Satow’s speech failed to convince the Committee and the Article was carried by 9 votes to 2 (Great Britain and Japan) with 5 abstentions. At the meeting of the Examining Committee on the 28th September several Powers which previously voted for this Article spoke against its retention, and at the full meeting of the Third Committee on the 4th October its suppression was moved by the Swedish delegate (M. de Hammarskjöld) on the ground that certain states had only consented to assume the onerous responsibility it imposed on them for the purpose of enabling an agreement to be reached regarding the destruction of neutral prizes; that agreement not having been obtained the raison d’être of the Article failed. The Article was however maintained by 29 to 7 (Denmark, Spain, Great Britain, Japan, Norway, Portugal and Sweden) with 6 abstentions (the United States, China, Cuba, Luxemburg, Persia and Switzerland)2 .
The Report points out that neutral states are left free to admit prizes or not. Article 23 only says that their neutrality is not compromised if they do admit them and keep them; they can make such arrangements as regards their conservation as they think fit, and remove them to the port most convenient to themselves. The Prize Court referred to in this Article is the National Prize Court of the captor, not the International Prize Court3 .
Great Britain and Japan who throughout opposed this Article have reserved it on signing the Convention.
Refusal of belligerent war-ships to quit neutral ports.Article 24 enacts a generally recognised rule of international law by providing that if a belligerent war-ship does not leave a neutral port after notification by the neutral Power, such Power is entitled to take such measures as it considers necessary to render it incapable of putting to sea during the continuation of the war, and the commander of the ship is to facilitate the execution of such measures. The Article however is not mandatory in form. The only divergence of opinion was with reference to the treatment of the officers and crew: they are to be detained, not interned; but a sufficient number must be left on board to look after the vessel. This provision was inserted on the proposition of Count Tornielli, but objected to by Great Britain and Japan who preferred to leave the matter to the neutral1 . The last paragraph relating to the position of officers is similar to 5 H. C. 1907, Art. 11, par. 32 .
Neutral vigilance.The third Rule of the Treaty of Washington was as follows: “A neutral government is bound:...Thirdly, To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.” Article 25 embodies this principle, which met with no opposition. The words “due diligence,” the meaning of which occasioned such divergent interpretations, are replaced by “such vigilance as the means at its disposal permit.” This formula was suggested by the delegates of Holland and Belgium in the place of “all needful diligence” which the Committee had originally proposed3 . The change of phrase is happy and will, it is hoped, occasion no difficulty in its interpretation. By this Article the incorporation of the principles of the Three Rules of the Treaty of Washington into a great International Act is completed.
Japanese proposal regarding more stringent neutrality regulations.The Japanese delegate proposed the following: “A neutral state, if it deems it necessary for the better safeguarding of its neutrality, is free to maintain or establish stricter rules than those provided by the present Convention4 .” The Report states that the need for this Article was doubted as the basis of the Convention is the sovereignty of the neutral state. Various Articles reserve the right to the neutral Power to issue more stringent rules, e.g. Articles 9, 12, 15 and 23. The only thing required is that a neutral should accord the same treatment to both belligerents. The proposal was rejected by 10 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions. At the second reading of the Draft Convention the Japanese delegate accepted the withdrawal of his Article, with the reserve that Japan will always deem itself entitled to maintain the interpretation which he had given.
Article 26 embodies a proposal of the Russian delegate stating that the exercise by a neutral Power of the rights laid down in the Convention [including presumedly the right of issuing more stringent regulations than those expressed therein] can under no circumstances be considered as an unfriendly act by either belligerent who has accepted the Articles referring thereto. It is well that this principle should clearly be laid down as it affords assistance to neutrals availing themselves of the provisions of the Convention.
Communication of neutral regulations.Article 27 which has already been referred to was proposed by the Russian delegate at the termination of the discussion of the Draft Convention. Various Articles refer to regulations, laws, ordinances etc., to be issued by the contracting parties, the advisability of these being brought to the notice of the latter was recognised and this Article was adopted without any opposition.
The preamble.The Convention is, like the other Conventions, preceded by a preamble, the acceptance of which was not effected till several explanations had been made by the Reporter, which are for the most part embodied in the Report1 . The third paragraph refers to the impossibility of concerting measures applicable to all circumstances which may arise; this it is pointed out does not leave such cases to the arbitrary will of the parties; account must be taken of the general principles of the law of nations, e.g. the expression “territorial waters” is nowhere defined. In paragraph 5, the desirability of Powers issuing “prescriptions précises” is referred to, and in Article 27 the duty of mutual communication of these “prescriptions” is enjoined. The word is a general one allowing each Government to make use of the form best suited to its constitutional institutions. The seventh paragraph states that the rules which neutrals have issued should not, in principle, be changed during the war except in cases where experience has shown the necessity of such change for the protection of the Power making it. The presence of belligerent war-ships in certain of its ports may be found to cause inconvenience to the neutral Power, they may be forbidden to enter, or their length of stay shortened. The first draft only provided for the issue by neutrals of more rigorous measures; the existing form resulted from an adverse vote. Sir Ernest Satow stated that he could not conceive cases where it would be necessary to take less rigorous measures, but the Russian delegate (M. Tcharykow) thought the eventuality possible. Sir Ernest Satow and M. Tsudzuki, after the vote, asked that it should be mentioned that in their opinion cases could not be conceived where a neutral state would be obliged to take less rigorous measures in the course of the war for the preservation of its rights, whilst the English doctrine had always recognised that neutrals had the right, for this purpose, to lay down more rigorous measures1 . This accords with the Japanese reservation already mentioned.
At the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Conference on the 9th October, 1907, various reservations were made. Sir Edward Fry for Great Britain made a reservation on the whole Convention, the Greek, Japanese, Spanish and United States delegates did the same. The Persian, Siamese, Turkish, German, Russian and Dominican delegates made reservations on several Articles. Great Britain, the United States, Cuba, Spain, Greece, Japan and Portugal abstained from voting; the states previously mentioned voted with reservations.
Signatory Powers and reservations.The following states have not signed this Convention: the United States of America, China, Cuba, Spain and Nicaragua. The following states made reservations on signing:Germany, Articles 11, 12, 13 and 20.Dominican Republic, Article 12.Great Britain, Articles 19 and 23.Japan, Articles 19 and 23.Persia, Articles 12, 19 and 21.Siam, Articles 12, 19 and 23.Turkey under reserve of the Declaration as regards the Bosphorus and Dardanelles already mentioned.
The value of the Convention.The foregoing Convention was formulated after a long and laborious examination of various drafts, and of the rules of neutrality adopted in different countries, rules which were found to be often contradictory. The subject of neutrality was “a welter of Interessenfragen,” and the attempt to harmonise the conflicting elements was as Count Tornielli stated a “work of an order almost exclusively diplomatic.” Compromise is the leading feature of the whole Convention. “The conciliation of interests can only be the result of mutual renunciations obtained by the conviction of acquiring equivalent advantages.” The Convention is clearly only the beginning of a Code of neutrality. “We do not flatter ourselves,” said Count Tornielli, “that our work is complete or perfect. We leave to our successors the task of revising it1 .” It is, however, of importance that so much was accomplished. The absolute duty of respect for neutral territory has been almost unanimously accepted. The twenty-four hours rule of stay, and the twenty-four hours interval have been generally accepted, but neutrals may increase these periods by special enactment. The adoption of these rules will afford considerable assistance in the future to a weak neutral. The three months interval of taking in supplies and fuel in the same neutral country has also been adopted, and there is no proviso for special regulations to the contrary. A neutral is also strengthened in his duty to dismantle belligerent ships failing to leave his ports after due notice. The Three Rules of the Treaty of Washington with wise modifications have now received almost universal acceptance.
The defects are however striking, viewing the Convention from a scientific standpoint. The rules laid down are nearly all accompanied by provisoes enabling them to be excluded by a neutral strong enough and sufficiently interested to do so. The rights of neutrals are asserted, but their duties are not sufficiently emphasised. A neutral Power may allow belligerents to remain in his ports for an unlimited period, and he may allow prizes to be brought within his ports for the purpose of awaiting the decision of a Prize Court—a provision which in effect may nullify the prohibition to bring them in except on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather or want of fuel or provisions. A friendly neutral Power in the neighbourhood of a great trade route may thus afford most valuable assistance to a belligerent, by enabling him quickly to disembarrass himself of his captures, leave them in safe keeping, and again sally forth to prey on the commerce of his adversary. A neutral may also allow belligerent ships to take in enough coal to fill their ordinary bunkers, irrespective of the distance they may be from ports of their own country or the objects for which the supply is taken on board2 . Clearly there will be work for the next Conference to revise the labours of its predecessor in these and other respects.
[1 ]On signing this Convention Great Britain made reservations in regard to Articles 19 and 23. (Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1908).)
[1 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), pp. 51, 223; La Deux. Confér. T. i. pp. 282, 295; T. iii. pp. 460-518, 569-652, 695-735; Livre Jaune, p. 91; Sir T. Barclay, Problems of international law and diplomacy, etc. pp. 83, 89, 160; E. J. Benton, International law and diplomacy of the Spanish-American War, Chap. vii.; Bonfils-Fauchille, Droit international (5th ed.), Book v. Chap. i.; C. Dupuis, Le droit de la guerre maritime, Chap. xii.;Edinburgh Review, Jan. 1908, pp. 239-242; W. E. Hall, International Law, Part iv. Chap. iii.; A. S. Hershey, International law and diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, Chap. vii.; T. E. Holland, Neutral duties in a maritime war, as illustrated by recent events; C. C. Hyde, The Hague Convention respecting the rights of neutral Powers in naval war, Am. Journ. of Int. Law, Vol. ii. p. 507; T. J. Lawrence, War and neutrality in the far East, Chap. vi.; Idem, International Law, Part iv. Chaps. ii. and iii.; Idem, International problems and Hague Conferences, p. 127; E. Lémonon, La seconde Conférence de la Paix, pp. 555-603; J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. vii. pp. 859-1109; L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. ii. §§ 313-319, 329-335, 342-8, 357-363; J. B. Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Vol. i. pp. 620-648; S. Takahashi, International Law applied to the Russo-Japanese War, Part iv. Chaps. i., ii. and iii.; J. Westlake, War, Chap. viii. and pp. 327-331; Idem, Quarterly Review, Jan. 1908, pp. 247-9.
[2 ]See ante, p. 69.
[3 ]See ante, p. 55.
[4 ]See preamble to Declaration of Paris, ante, p. 1.
[1 ]On this subject see Sir J. Macdonell in The Nineteenth Century and after, July, 1904, p. 148.
[2 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 700.
[3 ]Ibid. p. 701.
[4 ]Ibid. p. 695.
[5 ]Ibid. p. 702.
[6 ]Ibid. p. 703.
[7 ]Ibid. pp. 569-618.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 713.
[1 ]Livre Jaune, p. 91.
[2 ]See 5 H. C. 1907, Articles 2 and 5 (ante, p. 282).
[3 ]T. J. Lawrence, War and Neutrality, p. 133; A. S. Hershey, International Law, etc. p. 89 n.
[4 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 297.
[5 ]Edinburgh Review, Jan. 1908, p. 241.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. pp. 619-652.
[2 ]Ibid. T. iii. pp. 460-485.
[3 ]Ibid. T. i. p. 285.
[4 ]Ibid. T. i. pp. 297-8; T. iii. p. 622. M. Renault’s Report is contained in Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), pp. 233-256; La Deux. Confér. T. i. pp. 295-326; T. iii. pp. 486-514.
[5 ]See The Anna (5 C. Rob. 373), The Anne (3 Wheaton, 435), The Eliza Ann (1 Dod. 244), The Florida (101 U.S. 37).
[6 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. pp. 622-4.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 698.
[2 ]Ibid. T. i. p. 299.
[3 ]Ibid. T. iii. p. 623.
[4 ]Ibid. p. 644.
[1 ]T. J. Lawrence, International Law, p. 540; W. E. Hall, International Law, p. 624. This decision is however adversely criticised by several writers of authority; see Dana’s note to § 208 of Wheaton’s International Law; J. B. Scott, op. cit. Vol. i. p. 236.
[2 ]T. J. Lawrence, op. cit. p. 515; W. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 620. See also the case of the Chesapeake captured by a United States cruiser in the territorial waters of Nova Scotia, W. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 620.
[3 ]T. J. Lawrence, War and Neutrality, pp. 291-4; A. S. Hershey, op. cit. pp. 258-263; L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. ii. p. 343; S. Takahashi, op. cit. pp. 437-444; Professor Westlake (War, p. 210) says of the action of the Japanese, “it seems to us impossible to assert that the Japanese exceeded their rights in this, although it was an extreme exercise of them.”
[4 ]T. J. Lawrence, International Law, pp. 399, 481.
[5 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 300.
[1 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 238; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 301.
[2 ]See T. E. Holland, Neutral duties in a maritime war, Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. ii. p. 2.
[3 ]For alleged attempt of Russia to purchase war vessels from the Argentine Republic during the Russo-Japanese war, see S. Takahashi, op. cit. p. 486.
[1 ]J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. vii. p. 748-9. As to the question raised by the purchase by Russia of ships during the Russo-Japanese war from the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American Companies which are subsidised by the German Government see L. Oppenheim, op. cit. Vol. ii. p. 344, and S. Takahashi, op. cit. pp. 485-9. T. E. Holland, op. cit. p. 2.
[2 ]See on this T. J. Lawrence, Int. Law, §§ 259, 263.
[3 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 695.
[4 ]Report by M. Renault, La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 302.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 302; T. iii. p. 597.
[2 ]Ibid. T. iii. p. 614.
[3 ]Ibid. T. i. p. 302.
[4 ]Ibid. T. iii. pp. 468-474.
[5 ]J. B. Moore, op. cit. Vol. vii. p. 861; E. J. Benton. op. cit. p. 182.
[6 ]For the three different constructions put upon these words by the British and United States Governments, and the award of the Arbitrators in the Geneva Arbitration, see T. J. Lawrence, Inter. Law, § 263; also W. E. Hall, op. cit. pp. 613-4.
[7 ]Revised Statutes, § 5289. For interpretation of this section by the U.S. Courts during the Spanish-American war see E. J. Benton, op. cit. pp. 46-58. See also J. B. Moore, op. cit. Vol. vii. § 1320.
[8 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 303.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 303; T. iii. p. 626.
[2 ]Reply of M. Renault to Sir Ernest Satow, Ibid. T. iii. p. 626. For the general prohibition of the Scandinavian States in the Russo-Japanese war see ante, p. 460.
[3 ]Report of M. Renault, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 240; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 304.
[1 ]See ante, p. 340.
[2 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 240; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 305.
[3 ]As will be gathered from the account given by the Report of the discussion on the “right of innocent passage” there is no unanimity among states on this important subject; le droit des gens général is not clear, as will be seen from the following statement of Professor Oppenheim: “The right of foreign States for their men-of-war to pass unhindered through the maritime belt is not generally recognised. Although many writers assert the existence of such a right, many others emphatically deny it...it may safely be stated, that...it is now a customary rule of International Law that the right of passage through such parts of the maritime belt as form part of the highway for international traffic cannot be denied to foreign men-of-war” (International Law, Vol. i. pp. 243-4). See also on this subject W. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 159; T. J. Lawrence, Intern. Law, p. 178; J. Westlake, Peace, p. 192; Wheaton’s International Law (Atlay’s edition), § 190; F. Despagnet, Droit international, § 417; Bonfils-Fauchille, Droit international, § 507; H. Taylor, International Law, § 232.
[1 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), pp. 240-1; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 305.
[2 ]L. Oppenheim, op. cit. Vol. ii. § 353.
[3 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), pp. 241-3; La Deux. Confér. T. i. pp. 306-9.
[4 ]Ibid. T. iii. p. 702.
[5 ]Ibid. p. 696 (British Articles 11 and 12), p. 701 (Spanish Article 3), p. 700 (Japanese Article 2).
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. pp. 627-8.
[2 ]The following states voted against, Great Britain, the United States of America, Spain, Italy, Japan, Holland and Turkey; for, Germany, Brazil, France and Russia; abstained, Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Ibid. T. i. p. 308; T. iii. p. 629).
[3 ]A. S. Hershey, op. cit. p. 189. In the Spanish-American war, 1898, France made no specific limit to the length of stay of a belligerent war-ship, unless accompanied by prizes, when the twenty-four hours rule was applied. E. J. Benton, op. cit. p. 187.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 311.
[2 ]S. Takahashi, op. cit. pp. 418-429; T. J. Lawrence, War and Neutrality, pp. 137-9; A. S. Hershey, op. cit. p. 188.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 700.
[2 ]Ibid. p. 648.
[3 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 312; T. iii. pp. 648-9.
[4 ]Ibid. T. i. p. 313.
[1 ]It is referred to as a rule of the law of nations in a letter from a French Captain to the Governor of Cadiz in 1759 (J. Westlake, War, p. 207). The rule of the 24 hours stay was first introduced by Great Britain in the Neutrality Regulations of 1862.
[2 ]W. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 627.
[3 ]W. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 628; T. J. Lawrence, Inter. Law, p. 510.
[4 ]J. Westlake, War, p. 207; Annuaire, Vol. xvii. p. 286.
[5 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 697.
[6 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 248; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 315.
[1 ]Inter. Law, p. 627.
[2 ]See on this subject A. S. Hershey, op. cit. pp. 204-210; S. Takahashi, op. cit. p. 447 (war-ships at Kiao-chau), p. 453 (Diana), p. 429 (Askold and Grosovoi), p. 452 (war-ships at Manilla), p. 455 (Lena), p. 457 (Terek). The latter ship was interned at Batavia, as under the Dutch neutrality regulations the amount of coal she was able to take on board within the 24 hours was insufficient for her requirements. See also J. B. Moore, op. cit. Vol. vii. § 1316.
[1 ]J. B. Moore, op. cit. Vol. vii. p. 995.
[2 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 631.
[3 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 248; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 315; T. iii. p. 632.
[1 ]This proposal was in accordance with the British regulation of 1904.
[2 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. pp. 632-6.
[3 ]Ibid. pp. 478-481.
[4 ]Ibid. p. 633.
[5 ]Ibid. p. 633.
[6 ]Ibid. p. 635.
[7 ]Ibid. p. 479.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 480.
[2 ]W. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 607.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 319; T. iii. p. 650.
[2 ]Ibid. p. 636. During the Russo-Japanese war the Governor of Malta issued a proclamation refusing hospitality to belligerent ships “proceeding to the seat of war” or proceeding to search for contraband.
[3 ]See on this subject W. E. Hall, op. cit. pp. 609-610.
[4 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. pp. 1068-70.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 1069.
[2 ]Ibid. pp. 481-2.
[3 ]Ibid. T. i. p. 321.
[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. pp. 322-3.
[2 ]For instances of ships and crews so detained see ante, p. 474.
[3 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 639.
[4 ]Ibid. T. i. p. 323; T. iii. pp. 639, 728.
[1 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 256; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 325.
[1 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 256; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 326.
[1 ]See speech of Count Tornielli at the Meeting of the Third Committee on the 4th Oct. 1907. (La Deux. Confér. T. iii. pp. 484-5.)
[2 ]The permission to belligerent vessels compléter le plein de leurs soutes proprement dites, is in effect a permission to allow an increase in the defensive power of the ship, as the main belt of the armour of warships is often backed up by the coal bunkers.