Source: https://cybersec.org/?cat=25
Timestamp: 2018-01-20 21:02:06
Document Index: 209896981

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 44', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 57', '§ 57', '§ 57', '§ 104', '§ 104', '§ 104', '§ 107', '§ 230']

8 Nov 2016 By Vladislav Horohorin Leave a Comment
Filed Under: Blog, Cybercrime, News Tagged With: submitted an amicus curiae brief which requested that the U.S. Supreme Court not accept certiorari in the case Cable News Network, the U.S. Department of Justice
16 Aug 2016 By Vladislav Horohorin Leave a Comment
Filed Under: Blog, Cybercrime, News Tagged With: a crucial ingredient, Minnesota Court of Appeals, the private information
Tiffany v. eBay: eBay’s Notice and Takedown System and Trademark Law
12 Dec 2015 By Vladislav Horohorin Leave a Comment
The suit between Tiffany and eBay is providing a serious test of eBay’s “Notice and Takedown” model for avoiding contributory infringement liability for counterfeiting and other trademark misuse by sellers on its site. (Fn1) In this suit, Tiffany seeks to hold eBay liable for contributory and direct infringement, false advertising and trademark dilution for its involvement in the sale of counterfeit Tiffany merchandise on its site.
According to eBay, more than 100 million listing appear on eBay at any one time, and approximately 6 million new listings are posted each day. However, a certain percentage of these listings are for counterfeit goods. Tiffany alone reported 20,915 infringing listings to eBay in 2003, 45,242 in 2004, 59,012 in 2005 and 134,779 in 2006. According to Tiffany, 30% or more of Tiffany jewelry list on the site at any time can safely be deemed to be counterfeit.
Selling counterfeit trademarked merchandise constitutes trademark infringement. It also downgrades the confidence of consumers in the integrity of the source of those goods. eBay does not take possession of, and hence never sees, the goods sold on its site, so to combat the sale of counterfeit goods on its site, eBay has employed an ever-expanding arsenal of computer-based defenses. Chief among these is its “notice and takedown” system — its VeRO program. Under this system, a trademark, copyright or patent rights owner who sees an infringing item on the site can report the listing to eBay by submitting a Notice of Claimed Infringement (NOCI).
eBay’s NOCI form is its Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) takedown notice form — which eBay has converted for use for all forms of alleged intellectual property rights infringement. The form requires that the rights owner submit all of the elements required for a DMCA notice (Fn2): (i) the identity of the alleged rights owner, (ii) the identity of the specific eBay listing numbers where the infringing material is located, (iii) the type of infringement, and (iv) the required DMCA statements that the complaining party has a good faith belief that the use on eBay is unauthorized and that the complaining party is authorized to act for the rights owner. For an overview of the VeRO program and to obtain a NOCI form, see http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html.
Upon receiving a NOCI, eBay verifies that the NOCI contains the necessary information and appears accurate, and then removes the reported listing. At the time of the Tiffany v. eBay trial (2008), 75% of reported listings were removed within 4 hours. After removing a listing, eBay also attempts to prevent or to undo any actual sale. If the listing is removed before a sale has occurred, eBay cancels all bids and notifies the seller and bidder that the listing has been removed. If a sale has already occurred, eBay cancels the transaction retroactively, removes the listing and informs the parties that the listing has been removed and that the transaction should not be completed. eBay also refunds all associated fees. eBay also reviews the seller’s account and may suspend the seller. (Fn3)
In addition to its NOCI system, eBay also uses what it terms a “sophisticated fraud engine,” on which it spend more than $5 million annually to maintain and enhance. This search engine “uses more than 13,000 different search rules to locate potentially infringing or problematic activity. For example, it searches for listings that explicitly offer “knock-off,” “replica,” or “faux” merchandise. eBay also suspends sellers for repeat violations, conducts periodic “clean-up” reviews of listings and warns sellers against listing counterfeit goods. (Fn4)
Filed Under: Blog, Cybercrime, News Tagged With: Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), other trademark misuse, sophisticated fraud engine
What is the US SAFE WEB Act and what does it mean for you?
11 Dec 2015 By Vladislav Horohorin Leave a Comment
The FTC issued a press release announcing that a federal court had ordered “key players in an international spam ring to give up $3.7 million that they made by sending out illegal email messages pitching bogus hoodia weight-loss products and a ‘human growth hormone’ pill.” The FTC claimed that this was the first case in which the FTC used the US SAFE WEB Act.
The US SAFE WEB Act was a Sen. John McCain-sponsored bill that was enacted in December 2006 and codified as portions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45, 46, 56 and 57-57c. With some exceptions, the US SAFE WEB Act does not create new areas of prohibited conduct for which a person could be subject to criminal or civil liability. Rather, it primarily provides the FTC with new powers to cooperate with foreign law enforcement agencies and new protections for persons who voluntarily provide information to aid FTC investigations.
For example, the Act permits the FTC to provide investigative assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies, including conducting investigations to collect information and evidence for these foreign agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 46(j). It also authorizes the FTC to spend funds for the costs of multilateral cooperative law enforcement groups. 15 U.S.C. § 46(l). This would seem to permit the FTC and foreign governments to create super-police agencies which could cooperate to gather information around the globe. However, the original Act limited these funds to $100,000 and specified that they had to be spent for the costs of five specific international groups. So while the concept of international policing agencies seems exciting, at least as of December 2006, Congress intended these to be quite modest efforts.
The Act permits the FTC to share investigative materials, such as documents, written reports or answers to questions and transcripts of oral testimony with foreign law enforcement agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(6). However, the foreign government has to show that the materials are to be used to investigate or enforce foreign laws prohibiting fraudulent or deceptive commercial practices that are “substantially similar” to the practices prohibited by U.S. law.
The Act also contains secrecy provisions, so that the FTC does not have to disclose information provided by foreign sources under FOIA or other provisions of U.S. law. 15 U.S.C.§ 57b-2(f). The bill provides that the FTC was subject to the Right To Financial Privacy Act. However, it also specifies procedures under which disclosures mandated under the Right To Financial Privacy Act can be delayed or prohibited if it would jeopardize an FTC investigation. 15 U.S.C. § 57(b)-2a.
Filed Under: Blog, Cybercrime Tagged With: an FTC investigation, Financial Privacy Act, The FTC, US SAFE WEB Act
Federal Government Puts Baby Teeth into Enforcement of Criminal Copyright Infringement Laws
10 Dec 2015 By Vladislav Horohorin Leave a Comment
A number of press reports have given the impression that the Colorado District Court’s ruling in Golan v. Holder (fn1) means that that Federal laws reviving expired copyrights violate First Amendment protections on free speech. The actual ruling is far narrower.
On remand, the District Court first found that since Section 104A was content-neutral, it was subject to what is commonly-referred to as “intermediate scrutiny” under the First Amendment. (fn8) Under this test, a statute can only be sustained: (1) if it furthers an important or substantial government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (2) if the restriction is no greater than necessary to further that interest. (fn9)
The U.S. government claimed that the primary interests advanced by Section 104A were compliance with the Berne Convention and correction of historic inequities imposed on foreign authors. The Court rejected both of these rationales.
The parties agreed that the Berne Convention required restoration of the rights of foreign authors. However, the Court found that Section 104A was not narrowly tailored to meet this interest, because “the government could have complied with Berne while providing significantly stronger protection for the First Amendment interests of reliance parties like the Plaintiffs here.”
Reliance parties are persons who have used a foreign work that was in the public domain, and continue to use it after that work is “restored” under Section 104A. (fn10) Section 104A provides that reliance parties may continue to use restored works for 12 months after receiving a notice of intent to enforce a restored copyright without being subject to suit for infringement, and may continue to use to use a restored work for the duration of the copyright if they pay “reasonable compensation” to the copyright owner. (fn11)
The Court found that these protections for reliance interests were not the broadest permissible under the Berne Convention. Rather, it found that Congress could have permitted reliance users to simply continue using restored works as they had prior to restoration. The Court concluded that Section 104A simply was “not tied to the Government’s interest in complying with the Berne Convention.” (fn12) Since Section 104A did not advance a substantial government interest, it could not withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
The Court also rejected the notion that there was any need to correct inequities for foreign authors. Rather, it found there were no such inequities, because U.S. law imposed the same requirements on all authors, whether foreign or domestic, to obtain copyright protection. Moreover, it also found that Section 104A created inequities, by permitting foreign authors to relieve themselves of failure to comply with formalities required for copyright protection, while denying this right to U.S. authors. (fn13)
The District Court’s decision did not go as far as the plaintiffs had wanted. The plaintiffs had argued that Congress simply has no power to restore copyrights to works in the public domain “at all.” Doubtless, this issue will resurface if the District Court opinion is appealed. No notice of appeal appears to have been filed as of the date of this report.
David D. Johnson is a business lawyer whose practice focuses on litigation and other issues relating to digital media and consumer electronics companies. David can be contacted at (310) 785-5371 or DJohnson@jmbm.com.
Fn1 United States District Court, District of Colorado, 01-cv-01854-LTB (April 3, 2009), 2009 WL 928327 (2009).
Fn2 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(8).
Fn3 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007).
Fn4 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003).
Fn5 Golan v. Ashcroft, 537 F.3d at 1187.
Fn6 Id. at 1189.
Fn7 Id. The Tenth Circuit also attempted to determine if Congress had ever previously permitted works in the public domain to be copyrighted, but ultimately concluded that Congress’s historical practice was uncertain.
Fn8 Opinion at 6-7.
Fn9 Opinion at 7, citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1996).
Fn10 17 U.S.C. § 104A(g)(4).
Fn11 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d).
Fn12 Opinion at 15.
Fn13 Opinion at 19.
Filed Under: Blog, Cybercrime, News Tagged With: brainchild of Stanford Law professor, Colorado Federal Court, U.S. Supreme Court
Filed Under: Blog, Cybercrime, News Tagged With: child, Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, COPPA, social networking site., Sony BMG Music
Sony BMG v. Tenenbaum: Judge Provide Outlines of Possible Fair Use Defense for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
27 Nov 2015 By Vladislav Horohorin Leave a Comment
Participants in the P2P world have long hoped that courts would recognize that at least some forms of file sharing constitute fair use. In a recent opinion in the Tenenbaum file-sharing case, Judge Gernter of the District of Massachusetts enumerated several unauthorized uses of copyrighted music thinks might constitute a fair use — including file-sharing under certain limited circumstances. While Judge Gertner’s opinions have limited precedential value, they may point to some pathways to legitimacy for the oft-maligned P2P industry.
Joel Tenenbaum was a sophomore at a small college in Baltimore. Like many other students, he used a number of music file-sharing services, including Kazaa, through which he shared songs with other users. In 2007, he was sued by Sony BMG and other recordings company for copyright infringement for sharing 30 songs. One of the defenses that Tenenbaum raised was fair use — a defense which the Judge Gertner rejected in July 2009, shortly before the commencement of trial. As is well-known, trial did not turn out well for Tenenbaum, who was found liable for infringement and statutory damages of $675,000.
On December 7, 2009, Judge Gertner issued a lengthy opinion that provided the full justification for her earlier rejection of Tenenbaum’s fair use defense. See Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, D. Mass., Memorandum and Order (Dec. 7, 2009). Judge Gertner began by agreeing with Tenenbaum that the Copyright Code does provide for a fair use defense that applies to all forms of copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Judge Gertner noted that the fair use defense was developed by judges “who recognized that the monopoly rights protected by copyright were not absolute.” Where a use did not injure the market for the original work, and advanced a public purpose, such as education or artistic innovation, it could be considered “fair” and not infringing.
When Congress codified the fair use doctrine in Section 107, it set out a list of four, non-exhaustive, factors that a court is require to determine whether a use is fair. These include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is commercial or for nonprofit educational purposes, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Courts have added several additional factors.
Purpose and character: Judge Gertner found that the key issue was whether the defendant’s use of a work was “accompanied by any public benefit or transformative purpose.” Tenenbaum argued that file-sharing provides a public benefit by increasing access to copyrighted works. Judge Gertner found that this public benefit was not sufficient, since “nearly every unauthorized reproduction or distribution increases access.” For file-sharing to constitute a transformative use, it would need an effect similar to that held fair in the Betamax case — permitting the use of a work in new way, rather than merely providing users with free copies of works that they could otherwise purchase.
Filed Under: Blog, News Tagged With: 2009, Joel Tenenbaum was a sophomore at a small college in Baltimore., Judge Gertner issued a lengthy opinion that provided the full justification for her earlier rejection of T, On December 7, Participants in the P2P world have long hoped that courts would recognize that at least some forms of file sharing constitute fair
Circuits Shift Away from Finding that the Communications Decency Act Provides Broad “Immunity” from Liability for Third-Party Content to Digital Media Providers
14 Nov 2015 By Vladislav Horohorin Leave a Comment
Sometimes a shift in label can signal a shift in policy. A recent shift by the Ninth Circuit away from the use of the term “immunity” when describing the effect of the Communications Decency Act appears to signal such a change.
In earlier cases, the Ninth Circuit frequently referred to the Communications Decency Act as providing “immunity” to internet service providers who publish third-party material. See, e.g., Batzel v Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003). Many other circuits followed this characterization. The exception was the Seventh Circuit, which pointed out that the operative language, in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), did not use the word “immunity”, but merely provided an exclusion from liability by means of a definition — by defining an internet service provider as not a “publisher or speaker” in certain contexts. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
The Seventh Circuit’s approach is not to assume that an internet service provider (ISP) receives blanket immunity for third party content, but to ask whether the suit in question is seeking to treat the ISP as a publisher or speaker. See Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2008). If the theory of liability is something other than that the ISP is publishing or speaking the words in question, liability may be imposed. For example, the Seventh Circuit stated that Section 230(c)(1) would not “help people steal music or other material in copyright.” Id. at 670. (Fn1) The Communications Decency Act would not protect such activities as aiding, abetting, inducing or encouraging, or conspiracy with, a third party to place illegal content on a site. Id. at 671-72.
In earlier decisions, the Ninth Circuit has not been adverse to finding against Communications Decency Act immunity for internet service providers. However, it generally did so by finding that the ISP was itself a co-provider of the illegal content. This was the approach in Batzel v. Smith and Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com. (Fn2)
While the Ninth Circuit probably has not abandoned this approach, in Barnes v. Yahoo, the Ninth Circuit has now also adopted the Seventh Circuit’s “definitional” method for analyzing the scope of the Communications Decency Act. Barnes v. Yahoo, 2009 WL 1232367 * 3-4. This enabled the Ninth Circuit, in Barnes, to find against CDA protection for third-party content, because it was able to characterize the cause of action as something other than holding an ISP liable for speaking or publishing third party content — in this case, breaking a promise regarding third party content.
Looking at typical cases in which the Communications Decency Act has been applied (defamation, fraud, obscenity, assault/harassment), the “definitional” approach to the scope of the CDA would seem to move the debate to determining the kinds of acts by an ISP that rise to the level of encouraging illegal behavior. Given the fact-intensive nature of this determination, the outcome of many cases currently in the works should be interesting.
Filed Under: Blog, Cybercrime, News Tagged With: "immunity" to internet service, Communications Decency Act