Source: http://environmentalappealscourt.blogspot.com/2009/09/
Timestamp: 2020-05-29 03:31:39
Document Index: 391251433

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 13', 'Case No: 08', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 130', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 303']

Environmental - Appeals Court: 09/01/2009 - 10/01/2009
Provincial Government of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc.
Sep 29: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 07-16306. In the case, which does involve environmental issues, but is more related to international law and legal jurisdiction issues, the Ninth Circuit says, under the act of state doctrine, “the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdiction shall be deemed valid.” W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990). Founded on international law, the doctrine also serves as a basis for federal-question jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s complaint challenges the validity of a foreign state’s conduct.
The Appeals Court said, "We consider here whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this suit, based upon the act of state doctrine, such that removal from state to federal court was proper. Because none of the referenced conduct by the foreign sovereign -- in this case, the Philippine government -- is essential to any of the plaintiff’s causes of action, we reverse the district court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction under the act of state doctrine."
The Provincial Government of Marinduque (the Province) sued Placer Dome Corporation in 2005 in Nevada state court for alleged human health, ecological, and economic damages caused by the company’s mining operations on Marinduque, an island province of the Republic of the Philippines. According to the complaint, Placer Dome severely polluted the lands and waters of Marinduque for some thirty years, caused two cataclysmic environmental disasters, poisoned the islanders by contaminating their food and water sources, and then left the province without cleaning up the mess -- all in violation of Philippine law.
Immediately after the Province filed suit, Placer Dome removed the case to federal district court for the District of Nevada on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. Specifically, Placer Dome contended that the case “tender[ed] questions of international law and foreign relations.” The Province moved for an order requiring Placer Dome to show cause why the action should not be remanded to the state court due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the Province’s motion, holding that federal-question jurisdiction existed under the act of state doctrine of the federal common law. Placer Dome moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The district court granted limited discovery on personal jurisdiction. Before discovery was concluded, in March 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., announcing that district courts have latitude to rule on the threshold issue of forum non conveniens before definitively ascertaining subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007). The district court stayed jurisdictional discovery, and ordered briefing on the issue of forum non conveniens. Invoking Sinochem, the district court dismissed the matter on forum non conveniens grounds in favor of a Canadian forum.
In its final conclusion the Appeals Court said, "The Province’s complaint does not present a federal question based upon the act of state doctrine. The district court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this suit and removal from state court was improper. We reverse, vacate the forum non conveniens dismissal, and remand with instructions to remand to the state court."
Labels: 9th Circuit, International, Jurisdiction
Sep 24: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, Case Nos. 07-3341 & 08-1691. Cleve-Allan George and Dylan C. Starnes appeal from judgments of conviction and sentence entered against them following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands. Although these appeals have not been formally consolidated, the Appeals Court resolved them together because they arise from a common set of facts. The Appeals Court affirmed the judgments.
Virgin Islands Housing Authority (VIHA) received a Federal grant for asbestos cleanup to be “performed in strict accordance with all federal, state and local regulations and ordinances” and eventually awarded a demolition contract to Alvin Williams Trucking & Equipment Rental, Inc. That company, with the consent of VIHA, subcontracted the asbestos abatement portion of the project to the Virgin Islands Asbestos Removal Company (VIARCO), a company owned by George. VIARCO had “joined forces” with Environmental Contracting Company (ECC), a company run by Starnes.
Among other violations, a “pressure washer” was used to dislodge asbestos-containing materials from the site’s structures. The Appeals Court said, this removal method, although time-efficient, generated a substantial amount of debris-filled wastewater, which the crew pumped into toilets and bathtubs. But those fixtures rapidly clogged, causing wastewater to pour out and accumulate on the buildings’ balconies. In response, George constructed a drainage system out of PVC pipes, which permitted the wastewater to flow off the balconies and down to the ground. When the wastewater evaporated, it left a dusty white residue clinging to the facades of the buildings and the surrounding sidewalks and grass.
The District Court sentenced Starnes to thirty-three months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $1,600. While noting the government’s position that George’s acts were more egregious than those of Starnes, the District Court nonetheless imposed on George the same sentence that it had imposed on Starnes.
The Appeals Court said, "Both defendants also argue, albeit somewhat perfunctorily, that the District Court committed significant procedural error by failing to give meaningful consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We disagree. While a sentencing court must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, it does not have to discuss and make findings as to each factor so long as the record otherwise makes clear that it took the factors into account."
Labels: 3rd Circuit, Remediation, Toxics
Sep 22: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Case Nos. 08-2311 & 082312. The Appeals Court explained that Malcolm Moulton challenges the district court’s approval of a settlement agreement arising from a class action filed by the neighbors of a steel mill owned by United States Steel Corporation. A group of other class members, led by Ron Anderson, join Moulton’s objections, and separately challenge the district court’s management of the opt-out process and its handling of attorney Donnelly Hadden’s attempts to represent them. We affirm, except with respect to the district court’s approval of the attorney’s fee award, which we vacate and remand for further explanation.
In 2003, U.S. Steel purchased a steel mill bordering Ecorse and River Rouge, Michigan. At the time, the mill’s pollution-control equipment was in disrepair. After purchasing the mill, the company spent $65 million to upgrade the old pollution-control equipment and to buy new equipment. About a year after the purchase, several residents of Ecorse and River Rouge filed a class-action lawsuit against the company. The plaintiffs raised several tort and statutory claims, all to the effect that the mill wrongfully discharged harmful “metal-like dust and flakes” that settled on their real and personal property.
The case basically involves class action procedures and the conduct of attorney Hadden. In part, the Appeals Court rules, "At no point has Hadden offered evidence on the record that the 34 “missing” opt-out forms were mailed to Class Counsel. Lacking any evidence that these class members opted out, Hadden cannot demonstrate that an error occurred, much less that the district court abused its discretion by not correcting it. . . We also reject Hadden’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by not accepting opt-out forms that Hadden signed, purportedly at his clients’ request. We have serious doubts at the outset whether these clients requested that Hadden sign their form, or if they merely failed to respond to Hadden’s letter -- triggering Hadden’s 'automatic' opt out on his terms. Even setting this skepticism aside, we find none of his arguments persuasive. . .
"The Michigan Constitution’s guarantee of 'the right to prosecute . . . [a] suit . . . by an attorney,' Mich. Const. Art. I, § 13, does not save his argument. The Hadden clients who opted out of the suit had an attorney: Hadden. And those who remained in the class were adequately represented by court-approved Class Counsel."
Labels: 6th Circuit, Air, Attorney Fees
Sep 14: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 07-16423. The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD), the Western Land Exchange Project, and the Sierra Club (collectively, Appellants) sued Asarco LLC (Asarco), a mining company, and the Department of Interior and the Bureau of Land Management (collectively, BLM). Appellants contend that the BLM’s approval of a land exchange violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Mining Law of 1872. If the proposed exchange occurs, Asarco would take fee simple ownership of the land. In that event, Asarco’s use of the land would not be subject to the requirements of the Mining Law of 1872. If the proposed exchange does not occur, the land will continue to be owned by the United States. In that event, Asarco would not be permitted to conduct mining operations on the land unless it complies with the Mining Law of 1872.
Specifically, Asarco could not conduct a new mining operation on the land without first submitting a Mining Plan of Operations (MPO) to the BLM. The MPO would have to include detailed information about the operations, management, monitoring, and environmental impacts of the proposed mining activities. The BLM would then have to approve the MPO before the new mining could proceed.
As part of the process of approving the land exchange, the BLM prepared a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) pursuant to NEPA. In the FEIS, the BLM assumed that Asarco would carry out mining operations on the land in the same manner whether or not the land exchange occurred. Because of this assumption, the FEIS contains no comparative analysis of the environmental consequences for the different alternatives proposed. The BLM made the same assumption in its Record of Decision (ROD) approving the land exchange. The ROD, like the FEIS, contains no analysis of how the environmental consequences -- and the implications for the public interest -- would differ depending on whether the proposed land exchange occurs.
In a split decision, the Appeals Court ruled, "Because the BLM has conducted no comparative analysis, we hold that it has not “taken a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of its proposed action” in violation of NEPA, Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998), and that its approval of the proposed land exchange was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of FLPMA. Webb v. Lujan, 960 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1992). We reverse the decision of the district court approving the actions of the BLM."
In a lengthy and harshly critical dissenting opinion, Justice Tallman said, "It has been said that the life of a canary in a coal mine can be described in three words: short but meaningful. So too apparently was the life of our decision in Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). . . Having carefully reviewed and evaluated the record, I staunchly disagree with the majority’s conclusion . . .
"This attempt to regulate agency action by judicial fiat quite clearly exceeds our authority. . . In sum, the majority’s creation of the novel quasi-MPO requirement grossly oversteps our role in reviewing agency action and is irreconcilable with our precedent. Indeed, it signals a return to the type of overly zealous scrutiny applied in Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005), which we expressly overruled in Lands Council. See 537 F.3d at 990. . .
"Today’s opinion embodies the type of judicial meddling in agency action that we intended to put to rest in Lands Council. Its implications are far-reaching and severe. In order to achieve a particular result, my colleagues set the stage for a catastrophic collapse of the mine shaft timbers of deferential administrative law. For these reasons, I dissent. Has anyone seen the canary?"
Taylor McKinnon, public lands campaigns director with CBD said, “At stake in today’s decision were habitats for desert bighorn sheep, endangered desert tortoise habitat, and other threatened and endangered species. This is a victory for them -- a victory that will save lives.” CBD said the proposed exchange would have given Asarco 10,976 acres of public lands in exchange for 7,300 acres of the company’s private holdings, and would have facilitated the expansion of Asarco’s Ray Mine, an open-pit copper mine located 65 miles east of Phoenix and 50 miles north of Tucson. By gaining private ownership of the land, Asarco would no longer be subject to Federal planning, reclamation, and bonding requirements designed to minimize and mitigate the environmental impacts of hard-rock mining operations.
Access the complete opinion and dissent (click here). Access a release from CBD (click here).
Posted by JPMcJ at 5:04 PM 0 comments Links to this post
Sep 10: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, Case No: 08-2152. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that approval by the U.S. EPA of the State of Iowa’s 2004 “§ 303(d) lists” violated several aspects of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The district court dismissed the complaint and the Appeals Court affirmed the district court decision.
In part the Appeals Court ruled, "We disagree with Plaintiffs’ contention that when a state uses a non-compliant variation of approved water quality standards in drafting its § 303(d) list, the ultimate, EPA-approved list must be invalidated in its entirety even if the EPA applied the correct water quality standards rather than the non-compliant variation. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 912 n.14 (11th Cir 2007) (rejecting a similar argument where the court concluded that the record showed the EPA applied the approved standards rather than the challenged variation); see also 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(2) (establishing a time frame for the EPA to develop § 303(d) list if it disapproves the state’s draft list). However, if the EPA were to itself apply the unapproved state modification, the resulting § 303(d) list would be undermined. Florida Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby v. EPA, 386 F.3d 1070, 1090–91 (11th Cir. 2004) (FPIRGCL) (remanding for additional review where the court concluded that the record showed that the EPA applied the challenged variation rather than the standards as approved)."
Second, Plaintiffs contended that the EPA impermissibly accepted Iowa’s distinction between “evaluated” and “monitored” waters and its position that waters evaluated, but not monitored, need not be placed on the § 303(d) list. The Appeals Court said, "The EPA maintains that it reviewed all 'evaluated' waters consistent with federal regulations, ignoring Iowa’s distinction. As with the Credible Data Law, Plaintiffs’ only evidence that the EPA adopted Iowa’s distinction is the fact that the EPA only added four of the 'evaluated' waters back to the § 303(d) list. Plaintiffs argue that '[w]e must assume' that the EPA approved of Iowa’s distinction. The burden of proof lies with Plaintiffs, however, and Plaintiffs cannot meet that burden through unsupported assumptions."
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that even relying on the approved water quality standards was in error because Iowa was in the process of revising its water quality standards. The EPA counters that applicable water quality standards remain in effect until the new standards are approved. The Appeals Court said, "As Plaintiffs have pointed to no authority to the contrary, and any
improper delay in the promulgation of the revised standards is not directly at issue in the case before us, we defer to the EPA’s reasonable application of its own regulations. . ."
Posted by JPMcJ at 5:07 PM 0 comments Links to this post
Sep 9: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Case No. 08-2582. As explained by the Appeals Court, the cultural and religious traditions of the Forest County Potawatomi Community (the Community) often require the use of pure natural resources derived from a clean environment. Many years ago, the Community became alarmed by increasing pollution levels in its lakes, wetlands, and forests. To remedy this problem, it submitted a request to U.S. EPA) to redesignate certain tribal lands from Class II to Class I status under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program of the Clean Air Act (the Act). This would have the effect of imposing stricter air quality controls on emitting sources in and around the Community’s redesignated lands.
After nearly fifteen years of administrative proceedings and dispute resolution efforts between the Community and neighboring Wisconsin (which were successful) and Michigan (which were not), the EPA promulgated a final ruling redesignating the Community’s lands to Class I status [See WIMS 4/29/08]. It also issued two companion announcements concluding dispute resolution proceedings with Wisconsin and Michigan. Michigan seeks review of these three final administrative rulings. It asserts that the EPA pursued the redesignation in an improper manner and, as a result, needlessly complicated Michigan’s air quality control programs.
The Appeals Court said, "Because Michigan lacks standing to pursue these claims, we dismiss its petition for review." The Appeals Court stated further in its conclusion, "The Community has waited over fifteen years for finality on the redesignation of its lands. Michigan’s challenge to the EPA’s redesignation actions raises some important issues about the PSD program’s regulatory structure, but Michigan has failed to allege a cognizable injury in fact and thus lacks standing to pursue this case. As a result, the Community need not wait any longer. We dismiss the petition for review."
Access the complete opinion (click here). Access a 6/30/08 release from MDEQ (click here). Access the Dispute Resolution FR announcement (click here). Access the Final Rule FR announcement (click here). Access EPA's docket for this action with complete background information (click here). [Please Note: The 7th circuit has a temporary web hyperlink nomenclature system. If the link does not work click on this link and enter the case number above (click here).]
Labels: 7th Circuit, Air, Standing
Aug 31: In the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Case No. 07-5243. As explained by the Appeals Court, the Coalition on West Valley Nuclear Wastes, et al contend that the United States Department of Energy (DOE, & Secy. Chu) violated both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the terms of a 1987 settlement between the Coalition and the DOE by issuing an environmental impact statement concerning waste management activities at the West Valley Project site, a portion of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center, that did not address long-term closure issues regarding the rest of the Center. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DOE on all claims and the Appeals Court affirmed the decision.
On one of the main issues of contention, the Appeals Court said, "The DOE’s final Record of Decision on the Waste Management EIS indicates that its waste management actions entail shipping certain kinds of waste off-site and storing high-level waste at the West Valley site until it can be shipped to a geologic repository. . . As the district court found, removing the waste from the site has “independent utility,” for instance in storing the waste more safely, regardless of whether the Center as a whole is closed or decommissioned. Appellants have failed to present any evidence that would suggest that dealing in a more permanent fashion with waste that is currently left on the Project site somehow depends on closing the entire Center for its justification. Thus, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the waste management actions are not “connected” to the closure actions. . . We also perceive no basis in the record for concluding that the actions are either cumulative in character, yielding cumulative environmental impacts that should be discussed in the same EIS . . . or that they are so similar that the 'best way to assess adequately the combined impacts . . . is to treat them in a single impact statement' . . ."
Labels: 2nd Circuit, Haz Waste, Nuclear