Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/454/201
Timestamp: 2015-08-31 23:14:43
Document Index: 491983404

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5010', '§ 5011', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5011', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5006', '§ 5015', '§ 5015', '§ 5011', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5023', '§ 5023', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010']

George A. RALSTON, Warden, Petitioner, v. John Carroll ROBINSON. | LII / Legal Information Institute
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454 U.S. 201 (102 S.Ct. 233, 70 L.Ed.2d 345)
George A. RALSTON, Warden, Petitioner, v. John Carroll ROBINSON.
[HTML] dissent, STEVENS, BRENNAN, O'CONNOR
[HTML] See 455 U.S. 929, 102 S.Ct. 1293.
Syllabus Respondent, when 17 years old, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA), 18 U.S.C. 5010(c). Subsequently, while incarcerated, he was found guilty of assaulting a federal officer, and the District Court imposed an adult sentence to be served consecutively to the YCA sentence, finding that respondent would not benefit from any further treatment under the YCA. Later, while still incarcerated, respondent pleaded guilty to another charge of assaulting a federal officer, and the District Court sentenced him to a further adult sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence he was then serving. The Bureau of Prisons then classified respondent as an adult offender, and accordingly, since that time, he has not been segregated from adult prisoners and has not been offered the YCA rehabilitative treatment that the initial trial court recommended. After exhausting his administrative remedies, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus. The District Court granted the writ, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the YCA forbids the reevaluation of a YCA sentence by a second judge, even if the second judge makes a finding that further YCA treatment would not benefit the offender.
(b) The language of § 5010(c) authorizing a court to "sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision" pursuant to the YCA, and of § 5011 providing that "committed youth offenders . . . shall undergo treatment in institutions . . . that will provide the essential varieties of treatment" and that "such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders," does not prohibit any modification of the basic terms of a YCA sentence before its expiration. That is, such language does not require the judge to make an irrevocable determination of segregation or treatment needs, nor preclude a subsequent judge from redetermining those needs in light of intervening events. Pp. 210-211.
(d) The purposes of the YCA, as revealed in its structure and legislative history, compel the conclusion that a court faced with a choice of sentences for a youth offender still serving a YCA term is not deprived of the option of finding no further benefit in YCA treatment for the remainder of the term. Such history and structure also demonstrate Congress' intent that a courtbut not prison officialsmay require a youth offender to serve the remainder of a YCA sentence as an adult after the offender has received a consecutive adult term. When Congress withdrew from prison officials some of their traditional authority to adjust conditions of confinement, it could not have intended that no one exercise that authority, the only reasonable conclusion being that Congress reposed that authority in the court. Pp. 213-217.
We granted certiorari in this case, 452 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 3107, 69 L.Ed.2d 970 (1981), to decide whether a youth offender who is sentenced to a consecutive adult term of imprisonment while serving a sentence imposed under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA), 18 U.S.C. 5005 et seq., must receive YCA treatment for the remainder of his youth sentence. The Courts of Appeals are in conflict on this issue.
* In 1974 respondent, who was 17 years old, pleaded guilty to a charge of second-degree murder and was sentenced to a 10-year term of imprisonment under the YCA, § 5010(c). The sentencing judge recommended that he be placed at the Kennedy Youth Center in Morgantown, W. Va.; that he not be released until he had attained at least an eighth-grade level of education and had successfully completed a trade of his own choosing; and that he participate in intensive, individual therapy on a weekly basis and undergo a complete psychological reevaluation before being returned to the community. The sentence, like all YCA sentences, contemplated that the respondent be segregated from adult offenders. See 18 U.S.C. 5011.
Respondent's subsequent conduct has not been exemplary. In 1975, while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) at Ashland, Ky., respondent was found guilty of assaulting a federal officer by use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111 and 1114. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky imposed an additional 10-year adult sentence and stated in its commitment order: "The Court finds that the defendant will not benefit any further under the provisions of the YCA and declines to sentence under said act." After receiving a presentence report, the judge reduced the sentence to 66 months, to be served consecutively to the YCA sentence. The judge also recommended that respondent be transferred from the Kentucky institution "to a facility providing greater security."
After the second adult sentence, the Bureau of Prisons classified respondent as an adult offender. Accordingly, at least since that time,
respondent has not been segregated from the adult prisoners, and has not been offered the YCA rehabilitative treatment that the initial trial court recommended. The Bureau of Prisons acted pursuant to a written policy when it classified respondent as an adult. In implementing the YCA's treatment and segregation requirements, the Bureau narrowly defines a "YCA Inmate" as "any inmate sentenced under 18 USC 5010(b), (c), or (e) who is not also sentenced to a concurrent or consecutive adult term, whether state or federal." Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 5215.2, p. 1 (Dec. 12, 1978) (emphasis added).
"To accomplish this objective, federal district judges were given two new alternatives to add to the array of sentencing options previously available to them . . .: first, they were enabled to commit an eligible offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment under the Act. 18 U.S.C. 5010(b) and (c). Second, if they believed an offender did not need commitment, they were authorized to place him on probation under the Act. 18 U.S.C. 5010(a). If the sentencing court chose the first alternative, the youth offender would be committed to the program of treatment created by the Act." Id., at 433, 94 S.Ct., at 3048.
The need to segregate youth from adult criminals drew special attention in the legislative history. Proponents of the statute criticized the practice of "herding youth with maturity, the novice with the sophisticate, the impressionable with the hardened, and . . . subjecting youth offenders to the evil influences of older criminals and their teaching of criminal techniques. . . ." H.R.Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1950); see 96 Cong.Rec. 15036 (1950), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1950, pp. 3983, 3985. This concern was expressed in the statutory requirement that offenders receiving youth sentences be segregated from adults. 18 U.S.C. 5011.
More generally, "the panoply of treatment options available under the Act is but further evidence that the YCA program was intended to be sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all but the 'incorrigible' youth." Dorszynski, supra, at 449, 94 S.Ct., at 3055 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (footnote omitted).
The YCA allocates responsibility for determining essential treatment conditions in an unusual way. Under traditional sentencing statutes, prison officials exercise almost unlimited discretion in imposing the security and treatment conditions that they believe appropriate. The YCA is different. By determining that the youth offender should be sentenced under the YCA, the trial court in effect decides two essential conditions of confinement: the Bureau of Prisons must comply with both the segregation and treatment requirements of the YCA. 18 U.S.C. 5011. See Brown v. Carlson, 431 F.Supp. 755, 765 (WD Wis. 1977); Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 43-44 (1949) (statement of Judge Parker) (hereinafter 1949 Senate Hearings); Report to the Judicial Conference of the Committee on Punishment for Crime 8-9 (1942). The Bureau retains significant discretion in determining the conditions of confinement, see infra, at 211, but its discretion is limited by these requirements.
This unusual responsibility for treatment conditions demands that the sentencing judge thoroughly understand all available facts relevant to the offender's treatment needs. Thus, the statute provides the trial court with the opportunity to obtain an extremely comprehensive presentence report, 18 U.S.C. 5010(e). See S.Rep. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1949); 1949 Senate Hearings, at 18-19 (statement of Chief Judge Laws); Hearings on H.R. 2139 and H.R. 2140 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 63-64 (1943) (statement of Judge Laws). With this framework in mind, we will review the parties' statutory arguments.
Respondent asserts that the express language of the YCA prohibits any modification of the basic terms of a YCA sentence before its expiration. Respondent first points to § 5010(c), which authorizes a court to "sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period beyond six years that may be authorized by law for the offense . . . or until discharged by the United States Parole Commission." Respondent also relies on § 5011, which provides that "committed youth offenders . . . shall undergo treatment in institutions . . . that will provide the essential varieties of treatment," and that "insofar as practical, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders, and classes of committed youth offenders shall be segregated according to their needs for treatment" (emphasis added). From this language, respondent argues that the essential segregation and treatment requirements of the initial YCA sentence cannot be modified before the sentence expires.
Prison officials do have a significant degree of discretionary authority under the YCA relevant to the treatment of youth offenders. The Bureau is responsible for studying the treatment needs of committed youth offenders, 18 U.S.C. 5014, and for confining offenders and affording treatment "under such conditions as the Director of the Bureau believes best designed for the protection of the public." 18 U.S.C. 5015(a)(3). It may commit or transfer offenders to any appropriate agency or institution, 18 U.S.C. 5015(a)(2) and (b), and may provide treatment in a wide variety of institutional settings. 18 U.S.C. 5011. Moreover, it has authority to recommend conditional release and otherwise to consult with the United States Parole Commission in the implementation of the YCA. 18 U.S.C. 5014, 5015(a)(1), 5016, 5017.
However, the statute does not give the Bureau any discretion to modify the basic terms of treatment that a judge imposes under §§ 5010 and 5011. When a judge imposes a youth sentence under the YCA, the sentence commits the youth to the custody of the Attorney General "for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter." 18 U.S.C. 5010(b) and (c). Section 5011 provides two elements of mandatory treatment: first, youths must undergo treatment in an appropriate institution that will "provide the essential varieties of treatment"; second, "insofar as practical, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders, and classes of committed youth offenders shall be segregated according to their needs for treatment." These two elements of the program are statutorily mandated, and the discretion of the Bureau is limited to the flexible discharge of its responsibilities within these two broad constraints.
Even if the Bureau asserted only the right to treat YCA offenders as adults in accordance with its Policy Statement, see supra, at 205, this assertion of power is much too broad. The policy would treat any youth offender with an adult consecutive sentence as an adulteven if 15 years of his YCA sentence remained and the adult sentence were only for 1 year. It is unreasonable, indeed callous, to assume that such an offender could not receive any further benefit from YCA treatment. This example underscores the importance of leaving such decisions to the sound discretion of a federal sentencing judge, rather than to prison officials. The fatal defect in petitioner's argument is that it permits prison officials to make a determinationwhether a YCA offender will benefit from YCA treatmentthat the statute commits to the sentencing judge.
Our review of the legislative history reveals no explicit discussion of the trial court's options in sentencing a youth who commits a crime while serving a YCA sentence; Congress apparently did not consider this specific problem. But Congress did understand that the original treatment imposed by the sentencing judge might fail, and that protective as well as rehabilitative purposes might justify a lengthy confinement under § 5010(c). In commenting on that section, the House Report states: "This affords opportunity for the sentencing court to avail itself of the provisions of this bill and at the same time insure protection of the public if efforts at rehabilitation fail." H.R.Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1950), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1950, p. 3986.
The history and structure of the YCA discussed above, supra, at 206-210, demonstrate Congress' intent that a courtbut not prison officialsmay require a youth offender to serve the remainder of a YCA sentence as an adult after the offender has received a consecutive adult term. First, the YCA prescribes certain basic elements of treatment, segregation from adults and individualized rehabilitative programs, as part of a YCA sentence. Second, sponsors of the Act repeatedly stated that its purpose was to prevent youths from becoming recidivists, and to insulate them from the insidious influence of more experienced adult criminals. Housing incorrigible youths with youths who show promise of rehabilitation would not serve this purpose. Third, the decision whether to employ the unique treatment methods of the YCA is exclusively committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge, rather than to prison officials. If segregation of a particular class of youths from adults would be futile, that is a decision to be made by a court, not by prison authorities.
For example, the statute permits a court to sentence a defendant to an adult term if he commits an adult offense after receiving a suspended sentence and probation under § 5010(a).
If respondent had been sentenced initially to probation under § 5010(a) and had been subsequently convicted of criminal assault, the court could have imposed an adult sentence for the original crime, for the assault, or for both, to begin immediately. In fact, respondent committed his second crime while incarcerated. It hardly seems logical to prohibit an immediate modification of respondent's treatment conditions simply because he originally received the harsher sentence of YCA incarceration.
Such an adult sentence would commence at the time that it was imposed and would modify the YCA treatment that the offender would otherwise receive for the remainder of his term. Finally, every offender sentenced under the YCA must be released conditionally two years prior to the termination of his sentence. 18 U.S.C. 5017. However, if the offender violates the terms of this conditional release by committing a crime, the conditional release may be revoked and an adult sentence may immediately be imposed, notwithstanding the fact that the youth sentence has not yet expired. Respondent concedes as much, since he does not challenge the commencement of his adult term in January 1982, even though two years of his youth sentence will still remain.
We therefore conclude that a judge who sentences a youth offender to a consecutive adult term may require that the offender also serve the remainder of his youth sentence as an adult. Only this interpretation can give meaning to both the language and the underlying purposes of the YCA. "We cannot, in the absence of an unmistakable directive, construe the Act in a manner which runs counter to the broad goals which Congress intended it to effectuate." FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349, 88 S.Ct. 904, 908, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1968). Accordingly, we hold that a judge may modify the essential terms of treatment of a continuing YCA sentence if he finds that such treatment would not benefit the offender further.
In conclusion, we are convinced that Congress did not intend that a person who commits serious crimes while serving a YCA sentence should automatically receive treatment that has proved futile. On the other hand, Congress carefully designed this statute to require a sentencing judge, rather than the Bureau of Prisons, to evaluate whether the basic elements of treatment segregation from adults and individualized programsare appropriate and consistent with YCA policies over time. Our interpretation comports with the overriding legislative purpose that "once a person is committed for treatment under the Act, the execution of sentence is to fit the person, not the crime." Dorszynski, 418 U.S., at 434, 94 S.Ct., at 3048.
Respondent pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in 1974. The court sentenced him to 10 years of custody under the YCA. In 1975 respondent was convicted of assaulting a federal guard with a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to a consecutive 10-year term. The District Court found "that the respondent will not benefit any further under the provisions of the Youth Offenders Act and declined to sentence under said act." After it received a report from the Bureau of Prisons, however, the court took two additional actions. It reduced respondent's sentence to five and one-half years, and it recommendedbut did not orderthat respondent "be transferred from the Federal Youth Center . . . to a facility providing greater security." In 1977 respondent again was convicted of assaulting a federal guard. He again was given consecutive adult sentencing. Two courts thus certified that respondent had shown an incorrigibility and capacity for violence that warrants adult treatment.
In my view, certainly under these circumstances, the Director had the authority to treat the respondent as an adult offender. The YCA directs that youth offenders are to "undergo treatment in institutions of maximum security, medium security, or minimum security types. . . ." 18 U.S.C. 5011. " 'Treatment' means corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting the antisocial tendencies of youth offenders. . . ." § 5006(f). The Director, inter alia, may "order the committed youth offender confined and afforded treatment under such conditions as he believes best designed for the protection of the public." § 5015(a)(3) (emphasis added). "The Director may transfer at any time a committed youth offender from one agency or institution to any other agency or institution." § 5015(b) (emphasis added). "Insofar as practical, . . . youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders. . . ." § 5011 (emphasis added).
Thus, the express language of YCA vests broad discretion in the Director. It contains no mandatory directions that youth segregation must continue indefinitely no matter how clearly appropriate adult treatment may be. The statutory emphasis instead is on flexibility and individualized treatment. See 18 U.S.C. 5005, 5014, 5016, 5017, 5018, and 5020. The YCA does require youth offenders to be separated from adult offenders, but this command is qualified by the phrase "insofar as practical." We need not in this case consider the limits on the discretion thus conferred. This is an easy case in view of respondent's convictions as an adult offender and the findings of the federal courts. In these circumstances the Director plainly had the authorityindeed the dutyto transfer respondent from the Federal Youth Center to a "facility providing greater security." We properly defer to the Director's judgment that continued segregation from adult offenders is no longer "practical" under such circumstances. Even in the absence of subsequent felony convictions, there could be occasions when, because of a youth offender's incorrigibility and threat to the safety of others, it would be highly impractical to continue his segregation in a youth center. As we are not confronted with such a situation in this case, I would limit our decision to the record before us and defer to another day a general discussion of the Director's authority.
"The distinction that the court during the same term may amend a sentence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not so as to increase it," United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307, 51 S.Ct. 113, 114, 75 L.Ed. 354, has been recognized by this Court over and over again.
Nor can we "assume Congress to have intended such a departure from well-established doctrine without a clear expression to disavow it." Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3052, 41 L.Ed.2d 855. It is undisputed that the Youth Corrections Act contains no such clear expression of congressional intent. Indeed, the Court's opinion repeatedly confirms this proposition.
The Court's novel holding is supported by nothing more than inferences drawn from the "history and structure of the YCA." See ante, at 214. Manifestly, such inferences are insufficient to justify a judicial rewriting of what "has been accurately described as the most comprehensive federal statute concerned with sentencing." Dorszynski, supra, at 432, 94 S.Ct. at 3047.
The Court's first argument rests on the premise that Congress did not intend either that corrigible youth offenders be housed with incorrigible youth offenders or that futile YCA treatment be continued. The Court reasons that continued YCA treatment is in derogation of such congressional intent whenever a youth offender, while serving his YCA sentence, commits another crime sufficiently serious to convince the second sentencing judge that the youth will no longer benefit from YCA treatment. Ante, at 214-215. All of this may well be true, but it does not follow that the second sentencing judge may impose a consecutive adult sentence and also confine the offender as an adult under the unexpired YCA sentence. A much less drastic solution will accomplish the objectives ascribed to Congress. The second judge simply may impose a concurrent adult sentence and thereby end the offender's YCA treatment.
I do not disagree with the Court that the imposition of a YCA sentence does not entitle an offender to YCA treatment for the full length of that sentence no matter what crimes he commits in the interim, or that respondent could have been subjected to immediate adult confinement in each of the Court's examples. I do not agree, however, that a second judge may impose adult treatment on an offender who continues to be incarcerated not on the basis of a subsequent adult sentence but on the basis of the original YCA sentence. None of the Court's examples poses that situation; hence there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended that any authority, even a court, may increase the severity of a sentence after that sentence has become final. In fact, as the Court points out in a footnote, the only statutory authorization for a judicial modification of a YCA sentence permits "a judge to reduce the severity of the terms of commitment in light of changed circumstances." Ante, at 215, n. 7 (emphasis in original); see 18 U.S.C. 5021, 5023.
Not only did Congress not intend the result reached by the Court today, there is good reason to believe that Congress intended just the opposite.
Indeed, § 5010(b) authorizes a district court to impose a longer YCA sentence (up to six years) than would be authorized if the offender were sentenced as an adult. The federal courts unanimously have upheld § 5010(b) against constitutional challenges on the reasoning early expressed by THE CHIEF JUSTICE when a Circuit Judge and often quoted thereafter:
"The basic theory of that Act is rehabilitative and in a sense this rehabilitation may be regarded as comprising the quid pro quo for a longer confinement but under different conditions and terms than a defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison. . . . The Youth Corrections Act 'provides for and affords youthful offenders, in the discretion of the judge, not heavier penalties and punishment than are imposed upon adult offenders, but the opportunity to escape from the physical and psychological shocks and traumas attendant upon serving an ordinary penal sentence while obtaining the benefits of corrective treatment, looking to rehabilitation and social redemption and restoration.' " Carter v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 125, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (1962) (quoting Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467, 472 (CA5 1958)).
It is of no consequence that respondent was sentenced not under § 5010(b), but under § 5010(c), for the same quid pro quo theory that justifies longer YCA terms than maximum adult terms for a given offense also justifies YCA terms within the statutory adult maximum but longer than an adult would generally receive. See Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1365 (CA10 1981); United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 111 (CA3 1978). It is no coincidence that the Youth Corrections Act vests broad authority in the district judge to impose lengthy YCA sentences and also vests broad authority in prison officials to order early releases of youth offenders from their YCA sentences.
As the then Director of the Bureau of Prisons explained before the Senate Subcommittee studying the proposed Youth Corrections Act in 1949, the imposition of ordinary adult-length sentences on youth offenders was completely unrelated to the rehabilitative effort; the sentences were either far too long or far too short.
The humanitarian objectives of the Youth Corrections Act do not justify fundamental unfairness.
would be unnecessary if the Court declined to enlarge upon the statute that Congress has written. If an amendment to the statute is needed to deal with a problem that Congress did not foresee, it is Congressnot this Courtthat must perform that task.
I do not purport to know whether YCA treatment is effective for youthful offenders in general, or would serve any useful purpose for this particular offender.
No such question is relevant to the legal issue raised by this case. The only question presented is whether a federal judge confronted with the task of sentencing an inmate for an offense committed while he is serving a sentence for an earlier crime may not only impose the punishment authorized by law for the later offense but may also take it upon himself to enhance the earlier sentence as well. The answer to that question seems so obvious to me that I shall not further belabor it.
In other circumstances, the YCA contemplates reevaluation of the initial sentencea judge may reduce the severity of the terms of commitment in light of changed circumstances. The YCA does not disturb "the power of any court to suspend the imposition or execution of any sentence and place a youth offender on probation." 18 U.S.C. 5023. The YCA also permits a court to unconditionally discharge a youth on probation prior to the expiration of the probationary period and to issue a certificate to that effect. 18 U.S.C. 5021. See Thompson v. Carlson, 624 F.2d, at 421.
By virtue of § 5023(a), the YCA incorporates 18 U.S.C. 3653. Under the latter section, if a court has suspended the imposition of sentence and placed an offender on probation, the court, after revoking probation, may impose any sentence that it might have imposed originally. See generally Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 551, 98 S.Ct. 849, 854, 55 L.Ed.2d 14 (1978) (§ 5023(a) "preserve[s] to sentencing judges their powers under the general probation statute when sentencing youth offenders to probation under § 5010(a)"). Section 5010(a) also authorizes the court to impose a YCA sentence but suspend its execution. If such an offender commits a crime while on probation, the court may require him to begin serving the YCA sentence immediately, or the court may impose an adult sentence for the second crime.
The dissenting opinion asserts that our interpretation of congressional intent is inconsistent with the common-law rule that " 'a punishment already partly suffered be not increased.' " Post, at 223. That common-law rule simply does not apply when Congress has provided a court with the power to modify a sentence in light of changed circumstances. For example, a court may impose a suspended sentence and probation, under the general probation statute or under the YCA. 18 U.S.C. 3651 et seq., § 5010. If the defendant violates the terms of his probation, the court may "increase" the punishment by requiring him to serve the initial sentence. Here, the statute permits a judge to modify the conditions of a YCA sentence if the offender is convicted of a subsequent adult crime and if further YCA treatment would be futile. In each case, the sentencing statute invests the court with the power to modify conditions in light of the subsequent offense.
The dissent insists that the quid pro quo argument applies even to a sentence under § 5010(c), because such a sentence is "longer than an adult would generally receive." Post, at 231. Whether respondent's sentence was longer than he would have received as an adult is speculationas is the suggestion that respondent might not have pleaded guilty had he known that the YCA conditions of his unexpired term could be converted to adult conditions if he were later to commit an adult crime and if the second judge were to find that further YCA treatment would be futile.
Petitioner objects to that alternative solution because, with consecutive sentences, the judge can impose a harsher sentence. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 48. I am confident, however, that the maximum sentences authorized for serious crimes (or even less serious crimes) are sufficiently high to satisfy this objection. Title 18 U.S.C. 111, under which respondent in 1975 was convicted and sentenced to 51/2 years' imprisonment, authorizes as a penalty a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 10 years, or both. Even if these statutory maximums were inadequate, as this Court stated in response to a youth offender's claim that his sentence was too harsh, " 'the remedy must be afforded by act of Congress, not by judicial legislation under the guise of construction,' [Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306], since '[w]hatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment . . . [t]hese are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.' [Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1285, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405]." Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 442, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3052, 41 L.Ed.2d 855.
See 18 U.S.C. 5010, 5017.