Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/375543293/O-Brien-Answer-to-Rule-to-Show-Cause
Timestamp: 2019-10-20 04:39:21
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O'Brien Answer to Rule to Show Cause | Judiciaries | Judge
Cook County Judge Jessica Sarong O'Brien was convicted of bank and mail fraud. Under state law, she should lose her license and step down from the bench, but she has refused. In this court filing, she explains her position.
saveSave O&amp;#39;Brien Answer to Rule to Show Cause For Later
Lazatin vs Campos
Agnew v. Hendry, 4th Cir. (1996)
M.R. 029233
) Supreme Court No. M.R. 029233
JESSICA ARONG O’BRIEN ) Commission No. 18 PR0010
Respondent No. 6255568,
RESPONDENT JESSICA ARONG O’BRIEN’S
ANSWER TO RULE TO SHOW CAUSE
Respondent Jessica Arong O’Brien, by her attorneys, HINSHAW &
CULBERTSON LLP, and in response to this Court’s order to show cause why
she should not be suspended from the practice of law until further order of the
Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 774 and why she should not be enjoined
from acting as a judge until further order of the Court, states as follows:
This Court has ordered Respondent to show cause why she should not be
suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately and until further
ordered pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 774, and why she should not be
enjoined from acting as a judge until further order of the Court. Respondent was
licensed by this Court to practice law on November 5, 1998. (Administrator’s
Petition for Interim Suspension “Pet.” ¶ 1) Respondent also currently holds the
office of Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, having been elected to that
SUPREME COURT CLERK 301448454v1 1007761
SUBMITTED - 823423 - Hinshaw Culbertson LLP - 4/3/2018 4:50 PM
M.R.029233
office on November 6, 2012. Her current term expires in December 2018. At issue
before this Court is the fact that Respondent has been found guilty by a jury in
Federal Court of mail fraud and bank fraud.
On February 15, 2018, following a trial in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, a jury found Respondent guilty of bank fraud
and mail fraud related to loans she had obtained between 2004 and 2006 for her
investment properties, which she ultimately sold in 2007. (Pet., ¶¶ 3‐5) Prior to
this verdict, Respondent had entered a “not guilty” plea on all charges. (Id. ¶ 4)
Following the close of the government’s case on February 13, 2018, Respondent
moved for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”)
29. The court took the motion under advisement and specifically deferred
making his ruling until after the jury returned its verdict. To date, the judge’s
ruling is still pending, along with Respondent’s motion for directed verdict made
at the close of the defense’s case in chief, which was renewed at the conclusion of
the government’s rebuttal arguments. The only motion that the court ruled on
was the defense’s oral motion for a mistrial, which the court denied without
prejudice as it was made after the jury had begun deliberating. After the jury
rendered its guilty verdict, Respondent’s attorney also made an oral motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court then again took the motion
301448454v1 1007761
under advisement and deferred making its ruling, presumably until after written
motions are filed.
The District Court has entered a briefing schedule giving Respondent
until May 14, 2018, to file post‐trial motions. (Minute order, Ex. A) Respondent
intends to file a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to FRCP 29(a) by that
date. She is currently scheduled to be sentenced on July 6, 2018. (Pet. ¶ 5)
The Administrator’s Petition for Interim Suspension (“Petition”) asks this
Court to suspend Respondent from the practice of law under Supreme Court
Rule 774(a)(1) and enjoin her from serving as a judge “pursuant to this Court’s
inherent administrative authority over the judiciary.” (Pet., ¶ 6) The
Administrator argues that the guilty verdict “reflects adversely upon her fitness
to practice law” and that an order enjoining her from acting as a judge “is
required for the purpose of protecting the public, the integrity of the legal
profession and the judiciary, and the administration of justice.” (Id. ¶ 21)
Respondent recognizes that, under the circumstances, before the court of
public opinion the Administrator’s arguments seem compelling. But before this
Court, Respondent respectfully requests this Court to deny the Administrator’s
Petition by adhering to the limits the Illinois Constitution places on this Court’s
ability to discipline members of the judiciary and the protection the due process
clause provides to Respondent to challenge the charges against her.
There are three reasons why this Court should deny the Administrator’s
First, as a judge, the Illinois Constitution already prohibits Respondent
from the practice of law. As a result, the relief the Administrator requests under
Rule 774(a)(1) would have no effect.
Second, this Court lacks the power to enjoin a sitting judge from office.
While this Court has the authority to discipline an attorney from the practice of
law, Article VI, Section 15 of the Illinois Constitution vests the sole authority for
investigation and discipline of a judge with the Judicial Inquiry Board and the
Illinois Courts Commission. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 15. By accepting the
Administrator’s argument, this Court would be claiming shared power to
discipline a judge with the Courts Commission—a power the 1970 Constitutional
Convention explicitly declined to give this Court.
Third, Respondent should be afforded the opportunity to exhaust her due
process rights. Though she has been found guilty by a jury, she has not been
convicted of the crimes with which she has been charged. The federal court
proceedings have not yet concluded. Respondent still has the opportunity to be
acquitted. This Court should not make a ruling related to Respondent’s law
license or her ability to hold the office prior to the District Court’s final
I. Suspending Respondent under Rule 774 would serve no purpose as
the Illinois Constitution already prohibits Respondent from the
The Administrator’s Petition first asks this Court to suspend Respondent
from the practice of law until further order of the Court pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 774. (Pet. ¶ 21) Rule 774(a) states, relevant to the case here, that
during a pendency of a criminal indictment, the Court, on the Administrator’s
petition for a rule to show cause, may suspend an attorney from the practice of
law until further order of the Court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 774(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 2018). Rule
774(a)(1) states that the Administrator’s petition shall allege that, “the attorney
has been formally charged with the commission of a crime which involves moral
turpitude or reflects adversely upon [her] fitness to practice law, and there appears
to be persuasive evidence to support the charge[.]” Id. (emphasis added).
Respondent does not contest she has been charged with the commission of a
crime of moral turpitude, or that, under the Rule, the Administrator has
submitted evidence supporting the criminal charges via the jury’s verdict. This
Court should deny the Administrator’s request, however, because the
Administrator cannot establish that the criminal charges against Respondent
reflect adversely upon her fitness to practice law. As a judge, the Illinois
Constitution already prohibits her from practicing law.
Article VI, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution establishes prohibited
activities for Illinois Judges. It states as follows.
Judges and Associate Judges shall devote full time to judicial
duties. They shall not practice law, hold a position of profit, hold
office under the United States or this State or unit of local
government or school district or in a political party. Service in the
State militia or armed forces of the United States for periods of time
permitted by rule of the Supreme Court shall not disqualify a
person from serving as a Judge or Associate Judge.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 13.
The first activity the Constitution prohibits a judge from doing is
practicing law. Rule 774 provides the Administrator with a mechanism to ask
this Court to “suspend an attorney from the practice of law until further order of
the court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 774(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 2018) (emphasis added). Under the
Constitution, however, Respondent is already prohibited from the practice of
law. As a result, an interm suspension would be without substantive effect.
Furthermore, the purpose of Rule 774 is not implicated by the facts
pertaining to Respondent. Rule 774(d) states that, this “[C]ourt may make such
orders and impose such conditions of the interim suspension as it deems
necessary to protect the interests of the public and the orderly administration of
justice[.]” Ill. S. Ct. R. 774(d) (eff. Feb. 1, 2018). In this case, it is unnecessary to
suspend Respondent from the practice of law to protect the interest of the public
because the Constitution already prohibits her from practicing law. Accordingly,
this Court should deny the Administrator’s request under Rule 774(a)(1).
II. This Court lacks the constitutional authority to enjoin Respondent
from judicial office.
The real purpose behind the Administrator’s Petition is not to suspend
Respondent from the practice of law, but rather to have this Court issue an order
enjoining Respondent from exercising her judicial office. The Administrator cites
to Article VI, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution, noting it requires all judges to
be “licensed attorney[s]‐at‐law of this State” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 11). (Pet. ¶
19) The Administrator then argues, “[i]n order to promote public confidence in
the administration of justice, Respondent should not only be suspended from the
practice of law based upon her fraudulent conduct, she should also be enjoined,
based upon that same conduct, from serving as a judge and from taking any
action as a judge—administrative or otherwise.” (Id.)
In asking this Court to enjoin Respondent from serving as a judge, the
Administrator thus asks this Court to use its power to regulate attorney law
licenses to deprive Respondent of a qualification of judicial office, thereby
allowing this Court to enjoin Respondent from serving as a judge. In order to
grant the relief the Administrator requests, this Court would have to assume
powers to discipline the judiciary that the Illinois Constitution does not provide
The Constitution provides the process for disciplining judges in Article IV,
Section 15. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 15. Section 15 creates the Judicial Inquiry
Board and the Courts Commission. The Board is given the power to investigate
conduct of Judges and Associate Judges and the power to file complaints against
Judges and Associate Judges with the Courts Commission. Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, § 15(c). The Constitution provides that, “[t]he Commission shall be convened
permanently to hear complaints filed by the Judicial Inquiry Board” and it shall
have the authority “to remove from office, suspend without pay, censure or
reprimand a Judge or Associate Judge for willful misconduct in office, persistent
failure to perform his or her duties, or other conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into disrepute[.]” Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, § 15(e) (emphasis added).
The Administrator asks this Court to enjoin Respondent from judicial
office for the “purpose of protecting the public, the integrity of the legal
profession and the judiciary, and the administration of justice.” (Pet. ¶ 21) Article
VI, Section 15, however, establishes that the Courts Commission, not this Court,
is granted the power to discipline a judicial officer. In fact, the 1970
Constitutional Convention explicitly declined to give this Court the power to
a. Judicial discipline prior to the 1970 Constitution.
Under the 1870 Constitution, judicial discipline rested with the legislature.
Frank Greenberg, The Illinois Two‐Tier Judicial Disciplinary System: Five Years and
Counting, 54 Chi. Kent. L. Rev. 69, 70 (1977). The legislature had the power to
remove a judge from office through either the impeachment process or by
concurrent resolution. Ill. Const 1870, art. IV, §§ 24, 30. Despite this power, the
legislature had not sought removal of a judge through the impeachment process
since 1832. William T. Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and the Evolution of the
Illinois Courts Commission 1964‐1970, 1969 U. Ill. L. F. 442, 450‐51 (1969). The
legislature never used the concurrent resolution process to remove a judge from
office. Id. at 451.
In 1962, an amendment to the 1870 Constitution was adopted to
modernize the judicial branch, including the process of judicial discipline. The
1962 judicial article created a Courts Commission to hear complaints against
judges and determine the appropriate discipline. Greenburg, at 70. The
commission was not a permanent body; it could only be called into action by the
Chief Justice through order of the Court, or at the request of the Senate. Id.
In 1970, the system of judicial discipline fundamentally changed when the
Constitutional Convention determined judicial discipline should be fully
independent from the judiciary. Ruben Cohn, The Illinois Judicial Department –
Changes Effected by Constitution of 1970, 1971 U. Ill. L.F. 355, 384 (“The purpose of
these proposed changes was to eliminate Supreme Court influence in the
investigative and prosecuting functions of the commission.”) The delegates of the
Constitutional Convention believed an independent system for judicial discipline
was necessary in the wake of a 1969 scandal that undermined the public trust in
b. The Scandal of 1969.
In June 1969, a motion was filed in this Court to investigate the integrity of
its decision in People v. Issacs, 37 Ill. 2d 205 (1967). Braithwaite, at 458. The
motion, filed by the chair of a group called “Citizens’ Committee to Clean Up the
Courts,” alleged that Chief Justice Roy J. Solfisburg, Jr. and Justice Ray I.
Klingbiel acted with “undue influence and appearance of impropriety”
regarding the Issacs decision. Id. Most damning, the motion accused Justice
Klingbiel of accepting 100 shares of stock from the defendant in Issacs through a
third party while the decision was pending before the Court. Id. Both justices had
voted to affirm the dismissal of the indictment against the defendant. Id.
Complicating the allegations was the fact that Justice Klingbiel was the
chairman of the Courts Commission. Id. This led to the Court’s decision to
appoint an ad hoc body, named “The Special Commission in Relation to No.
39797” rather than convene the Courts Commission to investigate the allegations.
In response to these allegations, the House of Representatives created a
special committee to investigate the alleged misconduct as well. See generally,
Kenneth A. Manaster, Illinois Justice: The Scandal of 1969 and the Rise of John Paul
Stevens, The University of Chicago Press, Ltd. (2001). The House special
committee, however, was halted after the Circuit Court of Cook County issued a
permanent injunction against the committee on separation of powers grounds, a
decision that was affirmed by this Court in Cusack v. Howeltt, 44 Ill. 2d 233 (1969).
Cohn, The Illinois Judicial Department – Changes Effected by Constitution of 1970,
1971 U. Ill. L.F. 355, 381.
After an investigation, the Court’s special commission recommended that
Justice Klingbiel and Chief Justice Solfisburg resign from the bench. Id. The
Justices ultimately resigned. Id. But the scandal, as well as the issues in Cusack,
led to then Governor Ogilvie issuing a widely publicized address to the Illinois
Judicial Conference on September 4, 1969, where he proclaimed a “crisis in
confidence” in the court system. Id.
c. The 1970 Constitutional Convention.
Even though the Court’s special commission thoroughly investigated the
1969 allegations and ultimately recommended the Justices resign, the scandal,
which received national press coverage, made the issue of judicial discipline a
surprising focus of the judicial article going into the 1970 Constitutional
Convention. Id. To address the dissatisfaction with the current system, the
Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Association submitted a joint
proposal to the 1970 Constitutional Convention that suggested the creation of an
independent disciplinary commission consisting of four lawyers and three non‐
lawyers that would have the power to investigate charges, conduct hearings, and
impose sanctions, totally without input from the judiciary. Id.
The Majority Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Constitutional Convention did not adopt all of the bar associations’
recommendations, but did state that, “[p]ublic confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the judicial system is a factor absolutely central to a free society…
[T]here has been a serious erosion of public confidence in our courts…The
restoration of that confidence is a categorical imperative.” 6 Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention, Report on Proceedings 860. The Majority issued a
proposal that would become Article VI, Section 15. Cohn at 387.
Urging the Convention to reject the Majority Proposal, the members of
this Court sought to refute a major premise of the proposal, namely that judges
could not effectively judge judges. Cohn at 387. Justice Walter V. Schaefer issued
a statement stating, “[t]he only rational justification for elaborate provisions
concerning the policing of the judicial system is that judges are venal beyond
other men, and for that reason they cannot be trusted to determine when
disciplinary action should be taken[.]” Id. Despite Justice Schaefer’s objection, the
Convention adopted the Majority Proposal. Id.
In this context, it is clear the framers of the 1970 Constitution granted the
authority to discipline a judge solely with the Courts Commission. See, 6 Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention, Report on Proceedings 1090 (Delegate
Rachunas, “The proposed two‐step procedure, which is innovative, accomplishes
a desired balance between public assurance that there is an effective and
responsible independent agency to investigate complaints about the judges and
the assurance to the judges that they will not be prey for irresponsible charges
and complaints and that fair hearings will be accorded to them.”). The delegates
explicitly chose to place the system for judicial discipline in a commission that is
fully independent from the judicial branch. See, 6 Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention, Report on Proceedings 1091 (Delegate Linn, “While I personally
have great confidence in the courts…[we] have indicated what position we take
and why we do on other grounds, of course, because we felt there should be a
division.”).
While there is no question that this Court, today, could fairly determine
discipline in this case, the issue before the Court is not whether it is capable of
doing so, but whether it has the power to do so. As the above demonstrates, the
Constitution was clearly designed to give the Courts Commission, not this Court,
the power to discipline judges.
Until the Administrator filed his petition against Respondent, this was not
a contested issue. Respondent has failed to find a case since the adoption of the
1970 Constitution where this Court has sought to assert the power to discipline a
judge. The seminal case of this Court’s power vis‐a‐vis the Courts Commission
was in People ex. rel. Harrod v. Illinois Court Commission, 69 Ill. 2d 445 (1977). In
that case, this Court found it has the power to review interpretations of law made
by the Courts Commission through the Court’s mandamus review, but it also
found it could not review determinations of fact. 69 Ill. 2d 445 (1977). In Harrod,
the Court acknowledged, “[t]he function of the Commission is one of fact
finding” and that “this court is without authority to review the correctness of the
Commission’s orders.” Id. at 473. However, it found a Commission’s order void
because the Commission disciplined a judge for issuing usual orders in criminal
matters by applying its own independent interpretation of what the law
permitted the judge to do. Id. The Court found the Commission lacks the power
to interpret law, only to apply facts to law previously determined by Illinois
Courts. Id. But nowhere in Harrod did this Court suggest it too had the authority
to discipline a judge.
The Administrator has not cited to any authority to establish under the
1970 Constitution this Court may enjoin Respondent from judicial office. The
most relevant precedent cited by the Administrator is not on point. The
Administrator cites In re Crawford to support his contention that this Court can
discipline a judge. (Pet. ¶ 18) In Crawford, however, the facts were quite different
from this case. The respondent in that case was not a sitting judge, but a
candidate for judge. While a candidate, and also a law clerk for the Circuit Court
of Cook County, she donned a sitting judge’s robes, took the bench, and heard
cases on that judge’s call. At the time, the respondent was unopposed on the
ballot for election for judge. Prior to the respondent assuming office, this Court
suspended her license under Rule 774 and enjoined her from taking the judicial
oath of office or assuming office until further order of the Court. In re Crawford,
M.R. 28341, 2016 PR 00115 (October 31, 2016).
Crawford demonstrates only that this Court has the power to prevent an
attorney from taking judicial office, but it does not demonstrate the Court has the
power to discipline a sitting judge. In Crawford, the respondent had not yet
assumed judicial office even though she was unopposed on the ballot. This Court
has the power to suspend her license as an attorney, thereby depriving her of the
law license qualification required to assume judicial office by Article VI, Section
13. This Court was thus well within its authority to impose the discipline in
Crawford. In this case, however, Respondent is currently a sitting judge. Crawford
is therefore not on point and does not support the Administrator’s contention
that this Court can enjoin Respondent from her judicial office.
Though not cited by the Administrator, this Court has found that it may
discipline retired judges for misconduct that occurred while in office. In In re
Witt, 145 Ill. 2d 380 (1991), this Court suspended a retired judge from the practice
of law for six months for failing to properly disclose a loan on a Statement of
Economic interest he submitted as a sitting judge. Id. at 403. In reaching its
determination, this Court addressed the subject matter jurisdiction issues the
respondent raised regarding whether the ARDC had authority to conduct a
disciplinary proceeding on charges of misconduct by judges. Id. at 393. The Court
found the ARDC did have the authority to proceed in Witt, in reliance on In re
McGarry, 380 Ill. 359 (1942). Id. Citing to McGarry, the Witt Court stated,
“[m]embers of the bar sitting as judges are, in the first instance,
attorneys. McGarry teaches that judicial robes have no power to shield a judge
against discipline for conduct which falls outside of the scope of his or her duties
in administering the law.” Id. at 394.
In McGarry, this Court determined whether it could discipline a judge, as
From a review of the authorities in which a judge was a respondent
in a proceeding to deprive him of his license as an attorney at law
we find an application of the cases sustains the following
principles: An attorney at law while holding the office of judge may
be disciplined for acts of immorality, dishonesty, fraud or crime
and his license taken away, and the fact of his holding a judicial
office at the time does not render him immune from punishment,
but on the other hand the weight of authority holds that the
erroneous exercise of judicial discretion in the performance of a
duty or executing a constitutional mandate may not, in the absence
of showing such acts constitute fraud, crime or dishonesty, be made
the basis of such a proceeding.
In re McGarry, 380 Ill. 359, 369‐70 (1942).
Relying on McGarry, the Court in Witt found “[t]he mere fact that an
attorney puts on the judicial robes does not immunize him from discipline for
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” In re Witt, 145 Ill. 2d at 394.
Witt, however, did not state that this Court had the power to discipline a
judge post 1970, only that it could discipline a retired judge for unethical conduct
committed while sitting as a judge, because a judge is an attorney in the first
instance. McGarry does suggest that prior to the adoption of the 1970
Constitution this Court may have had the power to discipline judges through
their law licenses.
The 1970 Constitution, however, clearly provides that the Courts
Commission, through a complaint filed by the Judicial Inquiry Board, has the
sole power to suspend a judge. This Court may discipline a lawyer prior to
becoming a judge; it may discipline a retired judge as an attorney for conduct
committed as a judge; but the power to discipline a sitting judge rests with the
Courts Commission.
The Administrator’s request to “enjoin” Respondent is no different from a
suspension. The Administrator asks this Court to ignore Article VI, Section 15,
however, and to assume new powers. What would happen if this Court were to
assume such power? In the future, does the Court enjoin a judge upon
indictment, rather than a guilty finding? Does the Court enjoin a judge if accused
of the appearance of impropriety without an indictment? Is this Court permitted
to enjoin a judge upon a charge of poor temperament in order to protect “the
public, the integrity of the legal profession and the judiciary, and the
administration of justice”? (Pet. ¶ 21) Does the ARDC take over the role of the
Judicial Inquiry Board and bring all claims about judges to this Court? What are
the limits of this Court’s ability to suspend or remove a judge from office if this
Court were to grant the Administrator’s Petition? Simply put, if the
Constitutional limits are disregarded in this case, there are none.
III. This Court should afford Respondent the opportunity to exhaust her
due process because she has a vested property right in her office.
Based on the reasons above, this Court should find it lacks the authority to
enjoin Respondent from judicial office. Should the Court find it has the power to
impose discipline on a judge, it should consider Respondent’s fundamental due
process rights. Notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, Respondent maintains her
innocence. She is on a briefing schedule to file motions that, if granted, would
exonerate her of the alleged crimes.
Respondent has a vested property right in her office during the term she
was elected to serve. This Court has found that, “an elected officer shall serve for
a certain number of years and shall be removed only upon certain events are akin
to circumstances that create property rights in public employment because they
give rise to an understanding or an expectation that that person will serve for the
given length of time and will be removed for only the stated reasons.” East St.
Louis Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist. No. 189 Fin. Oversight
Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 418 (1997). Although the right to serve for a certain period
of years is not absolute, the elected official must be afforded due process before
he or she is deprived of their property interest in office for failure to adhere to
the established expectations. Id.
In determining what process is due, the fundamental requirement of due
process is that an individual is given the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 419‐20. This Court has found that school
board members were entitled to notice and a pre‐termination hearing before
being removed from office because “such a hearing would minimize the risk of
unfair or mistaken deprivation of their protected rights by enabling them to
contest the State’s basis for depriving them of those rights.” Id.
Respondent was elected to office in 2012. Article VI, section 10 of the
Illinois Constitution establishes that her term of office as a circuit judge shall be
for six years. This constitutional expectation created a property right in her
judicial office, and she must be afforded due process before she is deprived of
Respondent is currently pursuing post‐trial remedies in the federal court.
The process she is due is clearly set forth in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. At this time, there is no final judgment, and Respondent still has the
opportunity to be found innocent under those Rules. See, Berman v. United States,
302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (holding, ”[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means
sentence. The sentence is the judgment.”) This Court should allow Respondent to
exhaust her due process rights before making any determinations related to her
law license or judicial office. For this additional reason, the petition should be
WHEREFORE, Respondent Jessica Arong O’Brien respectfully requests
this Court deny the Administrator’s Petition for Interim Suspension Pursuant to
Rule 774.
By: /s/ Thomas P. McGarry
tmcgarry@hinshawlaw.com
Thomas P. McGarry 3128079
Adam R. Vaught 6287595
Chicago, IL 60601‐1081
312‐704‐3000
Firm No. 90384
JESSICA ARONG O’BRIEN )
) Commission No. 18PR0010
Respondent No. 6255568 )
I, Thomas P. McGarry, one of the attorneys for Respondent, Jessica Arong
OʹBrien, certify that I electronically filed the foregoing Respondent Jessica Arong
OʹBrienʹs Answer to Rule to Show Cause with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, on the 3rd day of April, 2018.
In addition, I have served counsel of record by sending a copy thereof by email
and/or hand delivery on the 3rd day of April, 2018, before 5:00 p.m., to all counsel of
record listed below.
Scott Renfroe Kenneth G. Jablonski
Counsel for the Administrator Clerk of the Commission
Attorney Registration and Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission Disciplinary Commission
One Prudential Plaza One Prudential Plaza
130 East Randolph Drive, Suite 1500 130 East Randolph Drive, Suite 1500
Chicago, IL 60601 Chicago, IL 60601
tel 312‐565‐2600 tel 312‐565‐2600
srenfrow@iardc.org kgjablonski@iardc.org
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to § 1‐109 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1‐109), the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in
BY: /s/Thomas P. McGarry
222 North LaSalle, Suite 300 E-FILED
Chicago, IL 60601 4/3/2018 4:50 PM
Tel 312‐704‐3506 SUPREME COURT CLERK
301460691V1 1007761
Case: 1:17-cr-00239 Document #: 252 Filed: 03/14/18 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:3732
FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.2.1
v. Case No.: 1:17−cr−00239
Jessica Arong O'Brien, et al.
This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, March 14, 2018:
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Defendant's motion for
leave to file an appearance and for an extension of time to file post−trial motions [248] is
granted as to Jessica Arong O'Brien. Attorney Steven Greenberg is granted leave to file an
appearance on behalf of defendant O'Brien. Motion hearing held on 3/14/2018.
Defendant's post−trial motions are to be filed by 5/14/2018. The government's response is
due by 6/4/2018. Defendant's reply is due by 6/18/2018. The 3/15/2018 status date is
vacated. Mailed notice (srn, )
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