Source: https://lundinonchapter13.com/Content/Section/98.1
Timestamp: 2019-08-23 08:41:07
Document Index: 458864507

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 98', '§ 98', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 523', '§ 707', '§ 101', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 101', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 341', '§ 471', '§ 94', '§ 485', '§ 96', '§ 486', '§ 97', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 523', '§ 346', '§ 158', '§ 523', '§ 159', '§ 523', '§ 1328', '§ 353', '§ 160', '§ 95', '§ 379', '§ 36', '§ 92', '§ 101', '§ 468', '§ 92', '§ 101', '§ 379', '§ 36', '§ 92', '§ 470', '§ 93', '§ 1325', '§ 473', '§ 94', '§ 380', '§ 36', '§ 379', '§ 36', '§ 400', '§ 43', '§ 1325', '§ 101', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 101', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 1325', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 1325', '§ 1322', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 1325', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707']

§ 98.1 Additional Expenses or Adjustments to CMI
Cite as: Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 98.1, at ¶ ____, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited __________).
For Chapter 13 debtors with current monthly income (CMI) greater than applicable median family income,1 “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—”2 are determined “in accordance with subparagraph (A) and (B) of § 707(b)(2).”3 The 10 classes of monthly expenses,4 average monthly payments on account of secured debts5 and payment of all priority debts6 are included in “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—” by subparagraph (A) of § 707(b)(2). To complete the determination of “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—”, it is necessary to also consider subparagraph (B):
(B)(i) In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special circumstances that [sic] justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative.
(iv) The presumption of abuse may only be rebutted if the additional expenses or adjustments to income referred to in clause (i) cause the product of the debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A) when multiplied by 60 to be less than the lesser of—
(I) 25 percent of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims, or $6,000, whichever is greater; or
(II) $10,000.7
As with all of § 707(b)(2), the statutory directive in § 1325(b)(3) to determine “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—” “in accordance with” subparagraph (B) requires the exercise of much judgment. Large parts of this section relate to the “abuse” test and the “presumption of abuse” applicable only in Chapter 7 cases. For example, the calculation in clause (iv) of § 707(b)(2)(B) has no application in the § 1325(b)(3) context.
What subparagraph (B) does contribute to the calculation of “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—” is that the debtor can demonstrate “special circumstances” that “justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income.”8 To justify additional expenses or adjustments of CMI, the debtor must “itemize each additional expense or adjustment of income” and provide documentation and a detailed explanation of reasonableness and necessity.9 The debtor must “attest under oath” to the accuracy of information provided to demonstrate the additional expenses or adjustments of income, and these must be additional expenses or adjustments of CMI for which “there is no reasonable alternative.”10
The examples of special circumstances in the statute are a serious medical condition or active duty in the armed forces. Other candidates for special circumstances are limited only by life itself. Debtors with lost jobs, domestic relations problems, children in trouble, natural disasters, car wrecks—it is likely that Chapter 13 practitioners will litigate the meaning of special circumstances for decades.
A few general thoughts might be tossed into this vacuum. “Special circumstances” is not as harshly worded as barriers and exceptions elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code. For example, a debtor seeking to discharge a student loan under § 523(a)(8) must prove that excepting the debt from discharge would impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.11 Special circumstances doesn’t sound as demanding or difficult as an undue hardship. For purposes of a hardship discharge before the completion of payments in a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor must prove “circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable.”12 Special circumstances seems not to require that sort of assessment of responsibility. Congress could have but didn’t choose a familiar standard to raise a bar to additional expenses or adjustments of CMI.
It is important to notice that special circumstances can justify either “additional expenses” or “adjustments of current monthly income.” Expenses included in “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended—” for a Chapter 13 debtor with CMI greater than applicable median family income are detailed in many classes and categories in § 707(b)(2)(A).13 CMI is defined separately in § 101(10A).14 The expenses described in § 707(b)(2)(A) are not actual expenses in the sense of a real-life budget for a Chapter 13 debtor and the debtor’s family. Rather, § 707(b)(2)(A) is a mathematical construct that contains numbers with no certain relationship to the actual expenses of a debtor in a Chapter 13 case. CMI is not the debtor’s actual income at the petition, at confirmation or at any important moment during the Chapter 13 case.15
This means there will be many Chapter 13 cases in which the debtor’s actual circumstances are badly represented by the numbers generated by the mathematical formula in § 707(b)(2)(A). As the divergence between reality and formula becomes greater, Chapter 13 debtors will assert special circumstances to justify adjustments of expenses or of CMI.
Examples are easy. CMI is based on a static historical average of the debtor’s income during the six months before the month in which the Chapter 13 case was filed.16 When the imperative of a foreclosure sale or other event pushes the debtor into a Chapter 13 case a month or two into a period of unemployment, the mathematical calculation in § 101(10A) will bear no useful relationship to the debtor’s actual income. Is it a special circumstance that there is no reality to the CMI calculation?
Some Chapter 13 debtors are religious and religiously contribute to their churches. Is it a special circumstance that Congress neglected to include an expense deduction for tithing for Chapter 13 debtors with CMI greater than applicable median family income?17
A married debtor with a spouse who has dependents by a former marriage may have substantial expenses that were neglected by the drafters of § 707(b)(2)(A).18 Is it a special circumstance that the debtor’s spouse has expenses for the care and support of the spouse’s separate dependents?
In a volunteer army, how is a call to active duty different from an employer’s choice to close a plant or to outsource the debtor’s job? This is not to belittle the serious financial consequences of a call to active duty in the military; it is simply to make the point that “special circumstances” have little to recommend as a standard for allowing additional expenses or adjustments of CMI.
The drafters of Official Form B22C treated special circumstances with a blind eye. The phrase “special circumstances” appears nowhere in the form or instructions. At Line 59 there is a blank space in which the debtor is instructed to “list and describe any monthly expenses not otherwise stated in this form . . . that you contend should be an additional deduction from your current monthly income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).”19 This space appears after the calculation of disposable income at Line 58 and does not cite subparagraph (B) of § 707(b)(2). There is no mention anywhere in Official Form B22C of adjustments to CMI justified by special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B).
Debtors with special circumstances are forced to modify Official Form B22C. Additional expenses might be listed at Line 59 consistent with the instructions, but the total of additional expenses would then need to be carried earlier in the form to be a deduction in Part IV. Adjustments to CMI justified by special circumstances must appear much earlier in Official Form B22C—somewhere in Part I—the “report of income.”20 Adjustments to CMI could change the determination whether the debtor has CMI over or under applicable median family income. This calculation must be made in Part I of Official Form B22C—long before the complicated expense calculations that are required only of debtors with CMI greater than applicable median family income.
Any debtor claiming special circumstances must jump through all the hoops with respect to documentation, a detailed explanation and a statement under oath of the accuracy of information provided to demonstrate additional expense or adjustments to CMI. Interim Rule 4002(b)(2)(C) states that “documentation of monthly expenses claimed by the debtor when required by § 707(b)(2)(A) or (B)” shall be brought to the meeting of creditors under § 341 and made available to the trustee.21 If a medical condition is the basis for the claim of special circumstances, the debtor should consider bringing written proof from a doctor, from hospitals and the like. A letter of termination from an employer would be a helpful start to document special circumstances involving job loss or loss of income.
4 See § 471.1 [ Big Picture: Too Many Issues ] § 94.1 Big Picture: Too Many Issues.
5 See § 485.1 [ Average Monthly Payments on Account of Secured Debts ] § 96.1 Average Monthly Payments on Account of Secured Debts.
6 See § 486.1 [ Total Priority Debts and Divide by 60 ] § 97.1 Total Priority Debts and Divide by 60.
7 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B).
8 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
9 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii).
10 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i), (iii).
11 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), discussed in §§ 346.1 [ Student Loans ] § 158.2 Student Loans and 553.1 [ Student Loans: § 523(a)(8) ] § 159.6 Student Loans: § 523(a)(8).
12 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1), discussed in § 353.1 [ Circumstances for Which the Debtor Should Not Justly Be Held Accountable ] § 160.3 Circumstances for Which the Debtor Should Not Justly Be Held Accountable.
13 See discussion beginning at § 95.1 In General.
14 See §§ 379.1 [ Form B22C: Statement of Current Monthly Income ] § 36.19 Form 122C-1: Statement of Current Monthly Income and 468.1 [ Current Monthly Income: The Baseline ] § 92.3 Current Monthly Income: The Baseline.
15 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A), discussed in § 468.1 [ Current Monthly Income: The Baseline ] § 92.3 Current Monthly Income: The Baseline.
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A), discussed in §§ 379.1 [ Form B22C: Statement of Current Monthly Income ] § 36.19 Form 122C-1: Statement of Current Monthly Income and 468.1 [ Current Monthly Income: The Baseline ] § 92.3 Current Monthly Income: The Baseline.
17 See § 470.1 [ Section 1325(b)(2)(A) and (B): “Amounts Reasonably Necessary to Be Expended—” When CMI Is Less Than Applicable Median Family Income ] § 93.1 Section 1325(b)(2)(A) and (B): “Amounts Reasonably Necessary to Be Expended—” When CMI Is Less Than Median Family Income. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii), which allows charitable contributions up to 15% of gross income for a debtor with CMI less than applicable median family income.
18 See § 473.1 [ Accounting for Spouses ] § 94.3 Accounting for Spouses.
19 Line 59 of Official Form B22C, discussed further in § 380.1 [ Form B22C: Disposable Income Calculation ] § 36.21 Form 122C-2: Disposable Income Calculation.
20 See § 379.1 [ Form B22C: Statement of Current Monthly Income ] § 36.19 Form 122C-1: Statement of Current Monthly Income.
21 Interim Bankr. R. 4002(b)(2)(C), discussed in § 400.1 [ New Debtor Duties at the Meeting of Creditors ] § 43.2 Debtor Duties at Meeting of Creditors after BAPCPA.
Hamilton v. Lanning, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 177 L. Ed. 2d 23 (June 7, 2010), aff'g 545 F.3d 1269, 1282 (10th Cir. Nov. 13, 2008) (Murphy, Brorby, Tymkovich) ("[W]e hold that, as to the income side of the § 1325(b)(1)(B) inquiry, the starting point for calculating a Chapter 13 debtor's 'projected disposable income' is presumed to be the debtor's 'current monthly income,' as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)(i), subject to a showing of a substantial change in circumstances."), aff'g, 380 B.R. 17, 25 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Dec. 13, 2007) (Bohanon, McNiff, Thurman) (By analogy to § 707(b)(2)(B), to determine projected disposable income, special circumstances can be proven to support departure from B22C calculation. "Where it is shown that Form B22C disposable income fails accurately to predict a debtor's actual ability to fund a plan, that figure may be subject to modification. This position is both analogous to, and consistent with BAPCPA amendments to section 707 . . . . Given section 707's similar use of Form B22C, we look to that section for guidance in considering a Chapter 13 debtor's claim that a substantial circumstance justifies a similar deviation from Form B22C. Therefore, parties contending that a debtor's Form B22C disposable income figure does not accurately project the debtor's future ability to fund a plan must present documentation similar to that required by section 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) in support of their claim. . . . [D]eviation from the Form B22C determination of disposable income will be the exception rather than the rule."), aff'g, 2007 WL 1451999 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 15, 2007) (unpublished) (Karlin).).
Babin v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 383 B.R. 729 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. Mar. 14, 2008) (Schermer, Federman, McDonald) (Arguably in dicta, although a debtor with CMI greater than applicable median family income cannot claim a transportation ownership expense deduction for a car owned free of debt, "§ 707(b)(2)(B) allows above-median debtors to claim additional expenses based on 'special circumstances.' Demonstrating to the court that a debtor will soon need a new car may, in some instances, constitute such 'special circumstances.'"), rev'g, 373 B.R. 638 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2007).).
In re Groth, No. 17-30264-GMH, 2018 WL 3583041, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. July 25, 2018) (Halfenger) (Homeowners’ association dues are not a “special circumstance” for purposes of § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) and cannot be deducted as an expense by debtor with CMI greater than applicable median family income. Decision does not reveal whether debtor took Local Standards Housing and Utilities deduction and does not discuss that condo fees and homeowners’ association dues are an element of the Local Standards. “Groth’s need to pay homeowners’-association dues is an unlikely candidate for special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). . . . [H]omeowners’-association dues aren’t special, unique, or atypical. As Groth acknowledges, homeowners’-association dues are indistinguishable for purposes of expense deductions from condominium-association dues. . . . Groth’s need to pay homeowners’-association dues is thus not a special circumstance, especially one on par with a serious medical condition or active military duty.”).
In re Brown, 500 B.R. 255, 261-70 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2013) (Barrett) ($100,000 student loan debt is not "special circumstance" for § 707(b)(2)(B) purposes; evidence that daughter was "special needs" child satisfied special circumstances to allow private school tuition in excess of $1,775 allowed by § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). "Courts are split on whether student loan payments constitute 'special circumstances.' The first line of cases apply a narrow interpretation of the statutory language and hold that student loans do not qualify as a 'special circumstance' as they are not unforeseeable, unavoidable, or beyond a debtor's control. . . . A second approach . . . holds that student loans qualify as 'special circumstances' because public policy encourages pursuit of higher education and student loans are non-dischargeable so a debtor has no realistic option other than to pay the student loans during the bankruptcy. . . . A third approach is to examine the motivation and reasons the debtor acquired the student loan. . . . I reject the notion that just because a student loan debt is non-dischargeable makes it a 'special circumstance.' . . . There may be instances where a student loan constitutes a 'special circumstance.' . . . There is nothing unique or special about Debtor's student loans. She obtained her loans to better herself and to obtain promotions, but that does not make the loans special or unique. . . . [P]ursuit of higher education is admirable, it is not a special circumstance . . . . Debtor's daughter has been diagnosed with ADHD and other auditory and speech disorders. Her daughter has been attending private school since first grade where a special plan is in place designed to specifically address her needs. . . . Based on the specific facts of this case, . . . the documented third-party reports and assessments of her daughter's special needs for the smaller class size and the specialized attention, I find Debtor has established that the excess expense is 'reasonable and necessary' and therefore Debtor is entitled to the full deduction for private school tuition. . . . Debtor's daughter has special needs that require specialized attention. This is not the case where a parent just desires to send their child to private schools." Debtor allowed to pay $3,150 per year for private school, an amount in excess of the $1,775 allowable deduction under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV).).
In re Konowicz, 470 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 17, 2012) (Kaplan) (Debtor may establish special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B) to depart from Local Standards housing allowance, but debtor failed to do so when monthly mortgage payment is $5,857.13 and Local Standards housing allowance was $1,125. "[T]he Debtor has not alleged any such special circumstances which support the excessive housing expenses; by way of illustration and not intended as an exhaustive list, the Debtor does not contend that retention of his home is reasonably necessary to address the needs of small children, elderly or ill parents, anticipated sale of the home, special education requirements, limited avoidability of comparable housing, or commuting hardships.").
In re Crow, No. 11-19074-B-13, 2012 WL 8255519 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012) (unpublished) (Lee) (That debtor lives in and commutes from a "rural area" is not a special circumstance sufficient to justify additional expenses for transportation and pet care.).
In re Mansfield, No. 11-28949 EEB, 2012 WL 877105, at *4 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 15, 2012) (unpublished) (Brown) ($250 per month of additional home maintenance expense is not categorically excluded from "special circumstances" in § 707(b)(2)(B)(i), but debtor failed to prove that additional home maintenance expenses were special enough. "[T]he 'special circumstance' must involve some type of exigency or basic necessity. . . . [A] 'special circumstance' is not one that is common to most debtors. . . . Home maintenance and repair costs . . . are common to all homeowner debtors. This is not to say that a debtor could never demonstrate 'special circumstances' for additional deductions for home repairs. . . . In this case, the Debtor has made an insufficient showing that the additional $250 she wishes to deduct qualifies as a special circumstance. . . . She has not provided any evidence that [her home] requires immediate repairs in order to provide basic shelter. . . . [S]he has not demonstrated that the present condition of her home is such that she has a 'special' need for an additional allowance for home maintenance.").
In re Lang, No. 11-21088, 2012 WL 478203, at *3 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Feb. 14, 2012) (McNiff) ("The privilege of providing their daughter a vehicle or paying for a vehicle that is not titled in their name should not be allowed when it is to the detriment of the Debtors' creditors. The court denies the special circumstance deduction.").
In re Davis, No. 10-47600 (DML), 2011 WL 5884015, at *5-*8 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2011) (Lynn) (Special circumstances are decided on a case-by-case basis, and bankruptcy courts have discretion to allow additional expenses as special circumstances notwithstanding the absence of extraordinary circumstances; circumstances that would not ordinarily be considered by the IRS may justify an additional expense if documentation is proper, there is no reasonable alternative and the deduction is necessary and reasonable. "[Section] § 707(b)(2)(B) leaves discretion with the court to account for differences between individual debtors. The focus must be on whether the debtor is, of necessity, in a different situation than the typical debtor addressed by the IRS guidelines. . . . The court therefore rejects the reading of those courts which have followed an unnecessarily rigid definition of the term 'special' . . . . [T]he court may examine what the IRS would have considered a normal or average expense . . . . [T]he court may look to a debtor's circumstances to determine if they differ from that of a hypothetical typical person the IRS would consider . . . . [T]he court may consider whether a debtor has a reasonable alternative to incurring the expense or could feasibly lower the amount of the expense. . . . [T]he court may view a debtor's situation holistically . . . . The $50.00 dry cleaning expense does not relate to a special circumstance. . . . The $60.00 expense for maintaining the home warranty does not relate to a special circumstance. . . . The $50.00 expense to maintain Debtors' pool relates to a special circumstance. . . . Pool maintenance is not provided for in the Local Standards for Housing and Utilities. It is arguably a luxury expense that relatively few incur and therefore it would not be included in the IRS guidelines. But if the pool is not maintained it could become a safety and sanitation hazard. . . . The $300.00 expense for savings relates, at least in part, to special circumstances of Debtors. The set-aside in Debtors' schedules is to cover future expenses incurred for treatment of Ms. Davis's malignant melanoma . . . . The savings set-aside for Ms. Davis's business travel expenses relates in part to a special circumstance. . . . It reflects a temporary cash-flow need of Debtors to cover Ms. Davis's business expenses until she is reimbursed. . . . Ms. Davis does not have any real alternative . . . . The $140.00 expense for maintenance of the septic tank relates to a special circumstance. Debtors live in a rural location where there is no sewer service. . . . While septic cleaning is specifically included in the Local Standards, Debtors reside in Tarrant County, a largely urban county where most residents have access to sewer service, and do not incur an expense to maintain a septic system. Debtors' situation thus differs from that of the average resident of Tarrant County upon which the Local Standards are based. . . . The $40.00 expense for trash disposal service relates to a special circumstance. Given Debtors' rural location, they must pay significantly more for trash service than in an urban location. . . . The $100.00 expense for yard maintenance relates to a special circumstance. . . . [T]he tract on which their home sits is significantly larger than the average lot in Tarrant County and . . . the cost of maintenance is greater for that reason. . . . Letting the lawn become overgrown is not a reasonable alternative.").
In re Morgantini, No. 10-61077-B-13, 2011 WL 10676928 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (unpublished) (Lee) (Debtors failed to prove "special circumstances" to justify expenses in excess of amounts allowed by National Standards and Local Standards with respect to food eaten at restaurants, tree trimming, lawn service and cellular phone service.).
In re Wiley, No. 10-19988-B-13, 2011 WL 10656548 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (unpublished) (Lee) (Debtors failed to prove special circumstances to support expense deductions in excess of National Standards and Local Standards for lawn service, swimming pool maintenance and family cellular phone service.).
In re Dittrich, No. 11-42382, 2011 WL 3471090, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2011) (Lynch) (Debtor with CMI greater than applicable median family income can only take $200 high-mileage older vehicle additional expense deduction by establishing special circumstances; debtor failed to jump through hoops in § 707(b)(2)(B). "To show special circumstances, a debtor must itemize each additional expense and provide supporting documentation. . . . The debtor must prove a 'detailed explanation' of why the additional expense is 'necessary and reasonable.' . . . The debtor must attest under oath that both the itemization and explanation are accurate. . . . [T]he debtor must show there is 'no reasonable alternative' to the additional expense. . . . Here, Debtor has failed to fulfill any of these conditions.").
In re Johnson, 446 B.R. 921, 925 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 11, 2011) (Kelley) (Student loan was not special circumstance under § 707(b)(2)(B). Special circumstances require fact-specific inquiry. Debt was for legal education. Debtor argued that she sought career change due to long struggle with weight, which led her to believe that she would not be able to continue career as nurse. That situation did not rise to level of severity required by statute. Debtor did not document special circumstance with medical proof. Voluntary career enhancement does not justify deducting student loan debt. "Since the Debtor has not demonstrated that the student loans were incurred as a result of a serious medical condition, employer closing, or other similar 'special' situation, the Debtor's student loans do not qualify as special circumstances, and may not be deducted as such on her Form B22C.").
In re Moore, 446 B.R. 458, 464 n.4 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2011) (Tallman) (Applying Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 177 L. Ed. 2d 23 (June 7, 2010), debtor with CMI greater than applicable median family income properly excluded from CMI and from projected disposable income $50,000 student loan payment by Army during six months before petition; $50,000 payment is a changed circumstance, not a special circumstance, for purposes of § 707(b)(2)(B). When a "changed circumstance" occurs for Lanning purposes, the debtor should file an amended Form B22C reflecting the circumstances at the time of confirmation. "In this case . . . the Trustee accounted for the Debtor's changed circumstances by including a special circumstances deduction on line 57. Such a deduction is not an appropriate use of line 57. A 'changed circumstance' under Lanning is not necessarily a 'special circumstance' on line 57, the latter of which must meet the requirements of § 707(b)(2)(B)." A "special circumstances" deduction of $2,385 per month for tax consequences of the payoff of the $50,000 student loan by the Army is disallowed because it double accounts for that liability and the debtor did not provide itemized documentation or a detailed explanation that no reasonable alternative existed as required by § 707(b)(2)(B). Instead, debtor properly accounted for the extra tax liability by including an additional monthly amount for prepetition tax liability at Lines 30 and 49.).
In re Steele, No. 09-21218, 2010 WL 4791837, at *1-*2 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Nov. 18, 2010) (McNiff) ($490-per-month student loan expense fails special circumstances test in § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) when debtors fail to document or detail reasonableness and necessity of student loan payment. "The Debtors did not provide any documentation for the student loan expense nor give a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make the student loan payment a necessary and reasonable expense. The Court only knows the amount of the monthly payment, the length of the payments and the purpose of the student loans.").
In re Barbutes, 436 B.R. 518, 524-28 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2010) (Paine) ("Special circumstances" additional deductions allowed by § 707(b)(2)(B) include home maintenance expenses, voluntary contributions to a "Sidecar IRA" and, in an alternative holding, swimming pool maintenance. "[T]he procedural requirements were met as the home maintenance expenses were earnestly and comprehensively documented, and testified to under oath . . . . [N]othing in § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) absolutely requires that a 'special circumstance' arise as the result of an event beyond the debtor's reasonable control. Thus, the Court will not read into § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) an involuntariness prerequisite. At the very least, however, it may be safely stated that a debtor who requests a finding of 'special circumstances' seeks preferential treatment over other similarly situated debtors. . . . [I]t follows that, where the circumstances are not involuntary, the 'special circumstances' contemplated by § 707(b)(2)(B) must be highly unusual , and of the type not normally encountered by most debtors. . . . [T]here are special circumstances that justify the debtors' additional expenses of home maintenance. These debtors are working full time . . . . Mr. Barbutes is working two jobs. They are providing housing, as any parent would do, for their daughter and Navy veteran disabled son-in-law while they get on their feet. . . . Their house, built in the 1970's has declined and requires some serious, and very well-documented, maintenance expenses in order to provide basic shelter for the debtors (and their daughter and son-in-law). . . . [T]he uniqueness of these debtors' situation allows the $454.50 expense adjustment for home maintenance as a special circumstance pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). . . . Section 541(b)(7) excludes from 'property of the estate' only those specific employer benefit plans listed in the statute, and unfortunately for the debtors does not include their voluntary Roth IRA contributions. While the court cannot allow the deduction as a qualified retirement plan, it can allow the IRA contributions as a 'special circumstance' pursuant to § 707(b)(2)[(B)](ii). Mr. Barbutes is 52 years old and has a limited amount of years he is employable in his profession as a pilot. Mrs. Barbutes already suffers from chronic back pain as a result of her work as a hygienist and is also likely limited in her employment life span. Today's America, which promotes not relying solely on Social Security requires some retirement savings. For these debtors, the court finds the Roth IRA contributions are allowed as a special circumstance for which there is no reasonable alternative. . . . Mr. Barbutes' testimony was credible and uncontroverted as to both necessity of the pool upkeep and the use of the pool to treat Mrs. Barbutes' chronic back problems. Even if the court were not inclined to allow this expense as a § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) expense, the court would nonetheless allow this expense as part of the 'special circumstances' maintenance expense allowed above. The pool is part of the real property and failing to maintain the pool would only further devalue the real property and defeat allowing the deferred maintenance that is needed on this house.").
In re Sanchez, No. 09-36815 ABC, 2010 WL 2163536 (Bankr. D. Colo. May 26, 2010) (unpublished) (Campbell) (In anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton v. Lanning, No. 08-998, 2010 WL 2243704 (June 7, 2010), bankruptcy court declines to decide whether "special circumstances" support reduction in CMI to reflect that debtor quit second job just before filing Chapter 13 petition and has less income going forward.).
In re Cram, No. 08-20022-TLM, 2009 WL 1188513 (Bankr. D. Idaho Apr. 24, 2009) (Myers) (Without discussion, not a "special circumstance" that debtor received 401(k) distribution within six-month calculation period for CMI.).
In re Brandon, No. 08-91100, 2008 WL 5235354, at *2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008) (Fines) (Neither fuel expenses in excess of transportation allowance nor excessive overtime during CMI calculation period are "special circumstances" for purposes of § 707(b)(2)(B). "Congress intended for 'special circumstances' to be truly extraordinary. High gasoline prices do not appear to meet the standard set forth by Congress . . . . [T]he extra overtime pay claimed by the Debtor as a 'special circumstance' is not an allowable deduction in determining 'projected disposable income.'".).
In re Martellaro, 404 B.R. 548, 562 (Bankr. D. Mont. Dec. 5, 2008) (Kirscher) (Continuing payment of nondischargeable student loan is not a special circumstance for purposes of additional expense deduction allowed by § 707(b)(2)(B). "[T]he Debtor failed to satisfy her burden of proof under § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) & (ii) because she failed to provide any documentation of her student loan expenses and her explanation of the special circumstances falls short of showing such expenses are necessary and reasonable, or for which no alternative exists. The Court finds that student loan debt among bankruptcy debtors is a common and ordinary circumstance, not a 'special' circumstance.").
In re Hilton, 395 B.R. 433 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2008) (McGarity) (Although adjustment for special circumstances allowed by § 707(b)(2)(B) applies only to expense side of projected disposable income test, when debtor's income goes down and no plan can be confirmed based on mechanical calculation of CMI, "least flawed" approach is to allow debtor to prove that CMI calculation is an unreasonable platform for projecting disposable income.).
In re O'Connor, No. 08-60641-13, 2008 WL 4516374, at *10-*11 (Bankr. D. Mont. Sept. 30, 2008) (Kirscher) (Debtors failed to document special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B) to justify: expenses for an adult nephew living with debtors; taxes and insurance that were not included in mortgage payment; $200 per month for telecommunication expenses above amount included in Local Standards for housing and utilities; education expenses for 12-year-old nephew living with debtors. "In considering special circumstances this Court looks directly to § 707(b)(2)(B) . . . requiring itemized documentation of expenses and a detained [sic] explanation of the 'special circumstances' that justify the additional expenses for which no reasonable alternative exists. . . . Debtors offered no documentation of their expenses to support their adult nephew, and no detailed explanation of the special circumstances which make such expenses necessary and reasonable. . . . [N]othing in § 707(b)(2) authorizes these Debtors to claim expenses for their nondependent adult nephew who happened to be living in their home on the date of filing.").
In re Williams, 394 B.R. 550 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2008) (Brown) (Special circumstances exception in § 707(b)(2)(B) is available only to debtors to demonstrate departure from income or expense calculation of disposable income on Form B22C. "Section 1325 expressly incorporates the 'special circumstances' exception found in § 707(b)(2)(B). . . . This language allows for adjustments to either the income or the expense side of the equation. . . . Congress has left the door open to a Chapter 13 debtor to demonstrate the necessity of an adjustment to the Form 22C calculation due to either a change in income or a need for additional expenses. . . . This Court does not find support in either § 707(b)(2)(B) or § 1325(b)(3) for the proposition that a trustee or a creditor may invoke the special circumstances exception.").
In re Raulerson, 395 B.R. 157 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2008) (Funk) (Expense side of projected disposable income calculation is determined using § 707(b)(2) as reflected on Form B22C, but debtor can demonstrate special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B)(i); when debtors did not provide itemized documentation or any detailed explanation of special circumstances, expenses cannot exceed those permitted by Form B22C.).
In re Schley, No. 08-26146-svk, 2008 WL 3895562 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2008) (Kelley) (Seasonal employment is not a special circumstance for purposes of adjusting CMI or disposable income. Joint debtors filed petition in June and both had six months of income notwithstanding that one debtor was employed by school system and only paid nine months of the year. "[T]he fact that § 707(b)(2)(B) defines 'special circumstances' as those for which there is 'no reasonable alternative' militates against the Debtors' argument. . . . The Debtor could reasonably be expected to work a summer job, for example, in order to supplement her income. . . . [T]he Debtors have not filed any affidavit or declaration to support their claim of 'special circumstances.' . . . While the Court will not foreclose a debtor from one day demonstrating that seasonal income together with other factors qualify as 'special circumstances,' the Debtors have not carried their burden of proving special circumstances in this case.").
In re Kaufman, No. 08-60501-13, 2008 WL 3878005, at *6-*7 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 21, 2008) (Kirscher) (Debtors failed to demonstrate special circumstances to justify $2,000 per month rent when Local Standards Housing allowance was $989. "In considering special circumstances, this Court looks directly to § 707(b)(2)(B), . . . requiring itemized documentation of expenses and a detailed explanation of the 'special circumstances' that justify the additional expenses for which no reasonable alternative exists. . . . The Internal Revenue Service Housing and Utilities Standards for mortgage and rent expense is $989.00, which amount is $1,011.00 less than Debtors' monthly rent payment of $2,000. . . . [Section] 707(b)(2)(B) specifically requires that debtors provide documentation of their expense or adjustment. . . . Pamela testified that Debtors' monthly rent under their new lease agreement is $2,000.00. . . . Debtors, by not introducing their lease agreement into evidence, failed to provide appropriate 'documentation' of their monthly rental expense . . . . This Court does not take lightly the IRS National and Local Standards for housing, which are adjusted on not only a state by state basis, but also on an individual county basis. . . . [T]hey want to keep their children in their same schools. While, such a desire is admirable, Debtors offered no extenuating circumstance that would justify doubling the IRS housing standard. . . . Debtors do not allege that one of their children has special needs that are being met in a particular school. . . . Debtors' children are attending public schools and . . . receive substantially the same education no matter where Debtors live in Billings.").
In re Zahringer, No. 07-30217, 2008 WL 2245864, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 30, 2008) (McGarity) (Small student loan that debtor would pay in full in three months is not a special circumstance for § 707(b)(2)(B) purposes. "[T]he evidence falls short of demonstrating that the expense is necessary and reasonable and that 'there is no reasonable alternative.' The loans were taken out by the debtor for higher education expenses during the early-1990s, making them very old, long-term obligations, not 'special circumstances.' . . . [T]he debtor . . . has not addressed the possibility of budgetary cutbacks to help meet this small, nondischargeable debt.").
In re Parulan, 387 B.R. 168 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2008) (Mitchell) (Debtor failed to satisfy procedural or substantive requirements for special circumstances reduction of CMI when debtor produced neither documents nor convincing testimony that reduction in overtime income was likely. "[T]he debtor is required (1) to itemize additional expenses or adjustments; (2) to provide documentation of additional expenses or adjustments; (3) to provide a detailed explanation of the special circumstances . . . and (4) to give oral testimony under oath . . . . Neither the statute nor the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure prescribe what form the itemization must take, but at the very least it should be set forth in a written response to the motion to dismiss . . . or in a written response to the objection . . . . In this case, the debtor did not file a written response . . . . Nor . . . did she even offer as a hearing exhibit anything that might reasonably be construed as an itemization. . . . It is true that she did provide testimony under oath attesting to the loss of overtime—thereby satisfying the requirement in § 707(b)(2)(B)(iii) . . . but merely offering testimony without satisfying the predicate requirements of an itemization and documentation in § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) does not comport with the statute. . . . [I]t seems clear that Congress intended 'to set this bar extremely high' . . . . [T]he limited evidence before the court fails to establish that the reduction in available overtime is likely to be permanent, let alone that it is 'uncommon,' 'unusual,' or 'exception.' . . . [T]he debtor did not provide any evidence to show that there was no reasonable alternative (such as taking on a second job) to mitigate any loss of take-home pay resulting from a reduction or elimination of overtime.").
In re Louviere, 389 B.R. 502 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2008) (Parker) (Special circumstances in § 707(b)(2)(B) only permit adjustment to expenses in a Chapter 13 case. "While § 707(b)(2)(B) contemplates the possibility of the existence of 'special circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative,' thereby allowing a Chapter 7 debtor to document a downward adjustment to income which can erase the presumption of abuse if that adjustment carries the ultimate calculation below the threshold amount, that authority to adjust 'current monthly income' due to changed circumstances is not actually incorporated into Chapter 13. . . . [Section] 707(b)(2)(A) and (B) are incorporated into the disposable income calculation only for a limited purpose—to determine the '[a]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2).' . . . [W]hile Chapter 7 provides for an adjustment to income in its application of the means test, no such adjustment to CMI is available to the Chapter 13 incarnation.").
In re Ovalle, No. 07-12886-B-13, 2008 WL 926080, at *3-*4 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008) (unpublished) (Lee) (Debtor failed to justify additional expenses under § 707(b)(2)(B) by failing to produce documentation that food and clothing expenses exceeded IRS standard, that continuing education and records storage required additional expenses and that transportation exceeded IRS standards. "One of the consequences of BAPCPA is that it imposes a significant 'record keeping' burden on those who come to the bankruptcy court for relief. . . . This is especially true where it appears that the debtor may need to rely on 'special circumstances' pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(B)[.]").
In re Crego, 387 B.R. 225 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2008) (Kelley) ("Debtors' separation and post-petition divorce demonstrates [sic] special circumstances . . . . [T]hey are unable to live amicably together and have provided proof that they have filed for divorce. There is no suggestion that the Debtors' separate living situation is a scheme . . . . [M]arital separation is a special circumstance that justifies additional expenses and the downward adjustment of disposable income. . . . [N]othing in the Code requires that special circumstances are beyond the debtor's control. . . . [T]he expenses of the separate household must be 'reasonable.' . . . Their 'special circumstances' expenses will be limited to the amounts provided in the National and Local Standards.").
In re Phillips, 382 B.R. 153 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2008) (Feeney) (Citing In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2007), applicable National Standards and Local Standards expenses are allowed absent evidence of changed circumstances. "'[C]ourts must consider changes in circumstances, both increases and decreases to income and expenses, to a debtor's financial situation, being always guided by the allowed methodology set forth in the means test.' . . . Where an above-median income debtor is concerned, the debtor (or other party-in-interest) must demonstrate either a change or reasonably anticipated change in the debtor's income using the methodology set forth in § 1325(b)(2) or a change in the circumstances giving rise to the applicable expense figures dictated by the Local and National Standards (or a change in actual expenses for those types of expenses falling under the Other Applicable Expenses category in the Financial Analysis Handbook) if he wishes to prove that his future income is any different from his current income. In the absence of such evidence, the disposable income figure listed on the debtor's Official Form [B]22C will serve as the only evidence of the debtor's disposable income and will therefore dictate the amount of funds to be committed to unsecured creditors under the debtor's plan of repayment.'").
In re Jones, No. BK07-81646, 2007 WL 4893472, at *2 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 14, 2007) (unpublished) (Saladino) (One-time reimbursement of moving expenses is not income for § 101(10A)(A) purposes; but, if that conclusion is incorrect, debtors are entitled to special circumstances exception in § 707(b)(2)(B). "[I]f the Trustee is correct that the expense reimbursement should technically be included in light of the broad definition of current monthly income, I agree with Debtors that the special circumstances exception of § 707(b)(2)(B) should apply and that they should be entitled to offset their moving expenses against the reimbursement.").
In re Stubbs, No. 07-61165-13, 2007 WL 4287579, at *4-*5 (Bankr. D. Mont. Dec. 6, 2007) (Kirscher) (Actual rent that exceeds Local Standard for housing allowance by $129 per month is special circumstance allowed as additional expense deduction by § 707(b)(2)(B). Debtor showed excess rent at Line 29 on Official Form B22C. "[Section] 707(b)(2)(B) . . . is applicable in determining amounts reasonably necessary to be expended by the plain language of § 1325(b)(3), and so the Court will apply that test to Todd's $129.00 adjustment for housing. . . . In considering special circumstances, this Court looks directly to § 707(b)(2)(B), as specifically authorized by § 1325(b)(3), requiring itemized documentation of expenses and a detailed explanation of the 'special circumstances' that justify the additional expenses for which there is no reasonable alternative. . . . Todd's inability to find a suitable home to rent for less than $1,200.00 is the type of special circumstance contemplated by § 707(b)(2)(A) [sic] in that it appears from Todd's testimony that the IRS standards do not accurately depict the cost of living in either Bozeman or Gallatin County.").
In re Ross, 376 B.R. 599, 603 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2007) (Squires) ("According to the Debtor, a Chapter 13 debtor should be permitted to rebut the presumption of payment that arises in the B22C Form. . . . The function of § 707(b)(2)(B) in the context of a Chapter 13 case is to provide for special circumstances that justify expenses that were not previously deducted on the B22C Form. Line 59 of the B22C Form provides a category for these additional expenses. Thus, the Court finds that the reference to § 707(b)(2)(B) in § 1325(b)(3) is for the purpose of justifying additional deductions, not to rebut a presumption of abuse.").
In re Crabtree, No. 07-60543-13, 2007 WL 3024030, at *5-*6 (Bankr. D. Mont. Oct. 12, 2007) (Debtors still married but living in separate households with no chance of reconciliation proved special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B) justifying additional $600 per month of rent for separate apartment. "In considering special circumstances, this Court looks directly to § 707(b)(2)(B), as specifically authorized by § 1325(b)(3) . . . . Debtors have appropriately itemized the expense; namely the $600.00 per month rent payment that David pays. . . . Debtors have documented the adjustment. . . . [A] copy of David's lease agreement was entered into evidence . . . . Debtors' irreconcilable differences in their marriage make it reasonable for Debtors to live in separate homes. . . . [M]aintaining separate homes under the facts of this case is the type of special circumstance contemplated by § 707(b)(2)[(B)].").
In re Sadler, 378 B.R. 780 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2007) (Special circumstance of $880 per month for transportation expenses is rejected because debtors failed to provide documentary evidence required by § 707(b)(2)(B). Debtors testified that their employment required long commutes and 10 tanks of gas each month. "The Debtors have failed in this instance to demonstrate the existence of special circumstances which warrant the approval of this additional expense. . . . Debtors have failed to provide the statutorily-mandated documentary evidence necessary to demonstrate special circumstances in the requested amounts. . . . [T]hey absolutely failed to provide any documentary evidence of their actual costs of insurance, licensing fees, repairs, and maintenance.").
In re Reis, 377 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 18, 2007) (Special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B) can affect both CMI and expenses, can only be invoked by debtor and must exist prior to or at petition. "The Special Circumstances provision allows for the modification of both CMI and expenses provided that a special circumstance can be proven which necessitates the alteration. . . . Congress intended that the only party who may invoke the Special Circumstances provision is the debtor. . . . If the presumption of abuse arises as of the filing of the petition, then it logically follows that in order to rebut that presumption the special circumstances necessary for rebuttal must also exist prior to or on the petition date. . . . To hold otherwise would allow abuse to exist on the petition date so long as it was remedied prior to the granting of a discharge and that would clearly go against Congress's intent to have abuse determined via § 707(b)(2)(A)'s snapshot taken as of the petition date.").
In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1, 17-18 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2007) (Arguably in dicta, special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B) apply only to expenses and do not adjust CMI in a Chapter 13 case. "Section 1325(b)(3), which governs the calculation of '[a]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended under [§ 1325(b)(2)],' provides that such expenses 'shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2)' . . . . But this incorporation of the 'special circumstances' exception only applies to the expense side of the 'disposable income' equation. Nothing in § 1325(b)(2), or § 1325(b) in general, permits a court to consider 'special circumstances' that would lead to 'adjustments of current monthly income' as contemplated by § 707(b)(2)(B). This discrepancy permits two possible inferences regarding [sic] for a debtor whose declining income is a 'special circumstance' under § 707(b)(2)(B)(I). Either Congress intended to make it harder for such a debtor to submit a confirmable plan of repayment in chapter 13 than to qualify for chapter 7 relief . . . or Congress recognized that the projection of the debtor's income for purposes of § 1325(b)(1) would already take into account 'special circumstances' warranting 'adjustment of current monthly income' because the projection would be a forecast of the debtor's future income, not a calculation based on his past income.").
In re Knight, 370 B.R. 429, 434-36, 437-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 27, 2007) (Maintaining payments on long-term, nondischargeable student loan may be a special circumstance under § 707(b)(2)(B) for a Chapter 13 debtor with CMI greater than applicable median family income. Plan proposed to maintain contractual payments of $455 per month on long-term, nondischargeable student loans and to pay $400 per month for pro rata distribution to unsecured creditors. Result would be a pro rata distribution of 43% under the plan. If student loan debt was included in unsecured debt, unsecured creditors would be paid approximately 48%. Court first determined that long-term treatment of nondischargeable student loan under § 1325(b)(5) was payment applied to unsecured creditors for purposes of § 1325(b)(1)(B). Discrimination that resulted was de minimis for purposes of § 1322(b)(1) and thus not unfair. "[T]he plain language of § 1325(b)(3) incorporates § 707(b)(2)(B) in toto . . . . Because the determinative outcome of the means test calculations and of the disposable income calculations are [sic] similar in purpose and effect, subparagraph (B) should have an effect in a chapter 13 case similar to its effect in a chapter 7 case. . . . Section 707(b)(2)(B) requires consideration of expenditures that fall outside the permissible numbers and categories set forth in IRS standards as incorporated in subparagraph (A) if the expenditures are the result of 'special circumstances.'" Although student loan payments are a category of Other Necessary Expenses allowed by the IRS, because student loans are "payments for debts," § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) excludes student loan from deduction. With respect to § 707(b)(2)(B): "[Projected disposable income] for purposes of § 1325(b) may be adjusted downward to account for expenditures required by 'special circumstances' . . . . Although Congress . . . identified 'serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces' as two instances that may constitute special circumstances, the term itself is not exclusive to those factors, nor do they serve as a benchmark for defining special circumstances. . . . [T]he term 'special circumstances' requires 'a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry into whether the debtor has a "meaningful ability" to pay his or her debts in light of an additional expense or adjustment to income not otherwise reflected in the means test calculation.' . . . A special circumstance is one that, if the debtor is not permitted to adjust her income or expenses accordingly, results in a demonstrable economic unfairness prejudicial to the debtor. In the context of chapter 7, . . . courts have found that a student loan payment may be a special circumstance. . . . This Court likewise concludes that a student loan payment may qualify as a 'special circumstance' warranting inclusion as an expense and deduction from a debtor's projected disposable income. . . . A debtor's desire to continue to make payments on long-term, nondischargeable student debt represents neither a lifestyle choice nor a use of discretionary income that should be directed in a different way. A debtor in such circumstances has no realistic choice, and the required payments do not in any true sense represent discretionary income. . . . Making chapter 13 work requires that a debtor with substantial, long-term, nondischargeable student loan obligations be able to deal with those obligations in a reasonable way in a chapter 13 case. . . . [T]he existence of long-term, nondischargeable student loans may constitute a 'special circumstance' requiring the continuation of regular payments as expenditures for which there is no reasonable alternative within the meaning of § 707(b)(2)(B). Clauses (ii) and (iii) of § 707(b)(2)(B) require the debtor to document and explain the expenditures for student loan payments.").
In re Moore, 367 B.R. 721, 726-27 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 13, 2007) (Debtors who lost a job and moved after petition may be able to prove special circumstances under §§ 1325(b)(3) and 707(b)(2)(B) to adjust CMI and expenses. "Current Monthly Income is simply a starting point. . . . Section 1325(b)(3)'s incorporation of § 707(b)(2)(B) provides the Court with the ability to adjust both CMI and expenses. . . . [T]he Court may consider a debtor's special circumstances in deviating from the formulaic determination under § 1325(b)(3). Incorporation of § 707(b)(2) in this manner imparts to this Court considerable discretion . . . . Debtors must prove special circumstances to support their amended plan payment. . . . Debtors must document, explain, and attest to any special circumstances which would justify a requested adjustment to their CMI for purposes of calculating their disposable income.").
In re Miller, 361 B.R. 224, 235 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan. 18, 2007) ("Courts that turn to Schedules I and J to calculate disposable income also fail to recognize that Congress tied the calculation of disposable income for above-median income debtors not only to § 707(b)(2)(A) under the means test, but also to § 707(b)(2)(B). Under § 707(b)(2)(B), the court may consider special circumstances that make 'such expenses or adjustments to income necessary and reasonable.' If special circumstances necessitate a deviation from Form B22C, those circumstances can be raised under § 707(b)(2)(B) without turning to Schedules I and J.").
In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494, 501-02 (Bankr. D. Utah Jan. 9, 2007) (Debtor with CMI greater than applicable median family income who has experienced job loss and has actual income less than CMI fails to establish special circumstances for purposes of § 707(b)(2)(B). "[Section] 1325(b)(3)'s incorporation of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of § 707(b)(2) does provide courts with a very limited ability to adjust both income and expenses under § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) based on a showing of 'special circumstances' . . . . Mr. Hanks presented credible testimony regarding his job loss, employment search efforts, and the relative income at his new employment. But unfortunately, none of these things rises to the level of 'special circumstances . . . for which there is no reasonable alternative' as contemplated by the statute. The statutory examples of serious medical conditions and active military service, although not exhaustive, are instructive of the kinds of 'special circumstances' that would justify deviations from Form B22C . . . . '[R]easonable alternatives' may . . . exist in the form of a second job or overtime work . . . a reduction in actual expenses, assistance from family, or the like.").
In re Tuss, 360 B.R. 684, 699-701 (Bankr. D. Mont. Jan. 5, 2007) ($261.85 for food, clothing and personal care caused by employment away from home not a "special circumstance" sufficient to depart from expense deductions allowed by § 707(b)(2)(A). "A specific subsection exists allowing debtors to rebut the presumption of abuse 'by demonstrating special circumstances . . .' . . . . This subsection is applicable in determining amounts reasonably necessary to be expended by the plain language of § 1325(b)(3) . . . . This Court declines to adopt the separate and parallel analysis described in [In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006)], where the court presumed the number from Form B22C is the debtor's '"projected disposable income" unless the debtor can show that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred . . .' This Court finds no statutory authority for the Jass court's 'substantial change in circumstances' exception . . . . Debtor's evidence of special circumstance falls well short of satisfying § 707(b)(2)(B) such as serious medical condition or call to active duty. . . . Debtor failed to satisfy the element of showing that no reasonable alternative exists, and [the court concludes] that he failed to show that the additional expenses are necessary for him to produce income or for his health and welfare. . . . If Tuss prepared his own meals while on the road in a similar manner to how he eats at home, he would have no need to incur the expense of eating at fast food restaurants . . . . Section 707(b)(2)(B)'s 'special circumstances' contemplates circumstances beyond a debtor's reasonable control . . . . '[S]pecial circumstances' does not include a debtor's desire to eat out at restaurants when working away from home.").
In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234, 249-51 (Bankr. D. Mont. Nov. 16, 2006) (Debtors failed to demonstrate special circumstances to justify upward departure from Local Standards for Transportation. IRS specified $420 per month for transportation. Debtors proved actual transportation expenses in excess of $600. "A specific subsection exists allowing debtors to rebut the presumption of abuse 'by demonstrating special circumstances' . . . . This subsection is applicable in determining amounts reasonably necessary to be expended by the plain language of § 1325(b)(3) . . . . This Court finds no statutory authorization for the [In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006),] court's 'substantial change in circumstances' exception to the means test . . . . In considering special circumstances, this Court looks directly to § 707(b)(2)(B), as specifically authorized by § 1325(b)(3), requiring itemized documentation of expenses and a detai[l]ed explanation of the 'special circumstances' that justify the additional expenses for which there is no reasonable alternative. . . . Debtors' evidence of special circumstances falls well short of satisfying § 707(b)(2)(B), such as serious medical condition or call to active duty. . . . Debtors contend that they must commute . . . to work, but they failed to show why they could not reduce or eliminate their commutes by relocating their residence. Section 707(b)(2)(B)'s 'special circumstances' contemplates circumstances beyond a debtor's reasonable control . . . . '[S]pecial circumstances' does not include debtor's desire to remain living wherever they choose, even when their place of employment changes or requires a long commute. . . . Other alternatives to long distance commuting, such as car pooling or public transportation, may be available.").
In re Sparks, 360 B.R. 224, 230 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2006) (Additional apartment rent of $203 per month and transportation expenses of $405 per month are not "special circumstances" for purposes of § 707(b)(2)(B). Debtor explained that actual monthly rent is $203 higher than Form B22C allowance because he is bound by an apartment lease. Actual transportation expenses, including auto insurance and 40-mile-per-day round trip to employment, were $195 per month higher than IRS allowance. "While the use of § 707(b)(2) standards in calculating a higher income debtor's disposable income in Chapter 13 includes the opportunity to establish the existence of 'special circumstances,' this exclusion is not . . . flexible . . . . [T]he availability of these expense increases is considerably more restrictive than proving that a particular expense was 'reasonably necessary' . . . . [Section 707](b)(2)(B)(i) specifically mentions a serious medical condition or a call to active duty into the military . . . . [T]hey depict the type of unanticipated development which leaves a debtor with no reasonable alternative . . . . This exception is not available to justify the approval of expenses incurred merely at a debtor's discretion, the impact of which can be minimized, if not eliminated, through careful consideration of the remedies available to debtors . . . . [T]his exception to the parameters of acceptable expenses must be strictly construed to allow only those expenses which are truly unavoidable to the debtor. It should be strictly construed so as to coerce the higher income debtor in a Chapter 3 proceeding to adjust his living expenditures to an acceptable level. . . . Debtor has not shown that he lacks any reasonable alternative to the option of incurring these expenses on a monthly basis.").
In re Wayman, 351 B.R. 808, 811 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (Even if premature withdrawal from IRA within six months of petition was income for CMI purposes, amount should not have been included in calculation of disposable income because this would be a special circumstance not likely to repeat during Chapter 13 plan. "[P]rojected disposable income may vary from the disposable income calculation if 'the debtor can show that there has been a substantial change in circumstances such that the numbers contained in Form B22C are not commensurate with a fair projection of the debtor's budget in the future.' . . . That is exactly the scenario presented in this case since it is uncontested that the Debtor would not have realized such income during the pendency of the plan and any realistic projection of disposable income would not have included sums which the Debtor would never actually procure in the post-petition period.").
In re Demonica, 345 B.R. 895 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 31, 2006) (Expense deduction for payment of mortgage in excess of amount allowed by Local Standard cannot be "special circumstances" deduction under § 707(b)(2)(B) because debtor failed to itemize, document and provide detailed explanation.).
In re Renicker, 342 B.R. 304, 310 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. May 15, 2006) (Debtors with CMI greater than applicable median family income who have expenses that exceed IRS Standards under § 707(b)2)(A) can document special circumstances under § 707(b)(2)(B); failure to provide documentation is fatal. Debtors moved from Missouri to Colorado just before Chapter 13 petition. Rent for home in Colorado exceeded IRS housing allowance. "Under § 707(b)(2)(B), . . . stripped of its references to the presumption of abuse . . . debtors who demonstrate 'special circumstances' may deduct 'additional expenses . . . for which there is no reasonable alternative.' In order to demonstrate special circumstances, a debtor must itemize each additional expense, provide 'documentation' for such expense, and provide 'a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make such expenses . . . necessary and reasonable.' . . . [T]he Debtors' failure to submit any documentation in support of their extraordinary expenses relieves the Court from having to develop, possibly from whole cloth, a detailed definition of 'special circumstances,' or to distinguish between 'reasonably necessary' and 'necessary and reasonable.'").