Source: http://azizlaw.blogspot.com/2018/02/syarifah-nooraffyzza-binti-wan-hosen-v.html
Timestamp: 2018-12-16 15:19:22
Document Index: 25019369

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art. 121', 'art. 121', 'art.121', 'art. 121']

EDU-kasi: Syarifah Nooraffyzza Binti Wan Hosen v Director of Jabatan Agama Islam Sarawak and 3 Others
Civil Appeal No. Q-01(A)-45-02/2015;
Date of Judgment: 07 July 2017;
Source: Federal Court Registry
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA HOLDEN IN KUCHING, SARAWAK
SYARIFAH NOORAFFYZZA BINTI WAN HOSEN (WNKP 821109-13-5522) ... APPELLANT
3. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL REGISTRATION MALAYSIA
4. STATE GOVERNMENT OF SARAWAK ... RESPONDENTS
Syarifah Nooraffyzza Binti Wan Hosen (WNKP 821109-13-5522) ... Applicant
4. State Government of Sarawak ... Defendants)
QUORUM: MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH, JCA; VERNON ONG LAM KIAT, JCA; ABDUL KARIM ABDUL JALIL, JCA
[4] The essential facts which are relevant and germane for disposal of this instant appeal may be shortly stated as follows -
(c) On 26.7.2011, the appellant went to the National Registration Department, Kuching to apply for change of her name in her NRIC. The National Registration Department informed her by letter that she has to first obtain the letter of release from Islam from the 1strespondent’s office.
(d) On 3.8.2011, the appellant wrote a letter to the 1st respondent’s office for the letter of release from Islam. The appellant did not receive any reply from the 1st respondent.
(f) The appellant then filed an application for ex parte leave to move for judicial review against the respondents and sought the following reliefs -
(h) Being dissatisfied with the said order, the appellant appealed to this Court. Hence, this appeal before us.
[5] The principal reason for the dismissal of the appellant’s application was on jurisdictional ground. The learned judge reasoned as follows -
(i) Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489;
The Federal Court in its latest decision in Hj Raimi's case have decided, following that of Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489; [1999] 2 CLJ 5 held that the issue of whether a person is a Muslim or not falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court because 'since matters on conversion to Islam come under the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court by implication conversion out of Islam should also fall under the jurisdiction of the same courts' (per Mohd Dzaiddin FCJ in Soon Singh's case).
The argument of the applicant that the Majlis Agama Islam Sarawak Ordinance does not provide for renunciation of Islam; only conversion under s 68 and s 69 thereof and therefore the applicant can seek recourse from the civil courts, cannot in the face of the words underlined above be accepted as even the various State Enactment in Peninsular Malaysia mentioned in His Lordship's judgment also do not have a specific provision on the renouncement.”.
[6] Concerning the appellant’s assertion that art. 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution was enacted without the consent of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah and Sarawak, the learned judge stated at page 7 of the Grounds of Judgment as follows -
“[8] As for the argument of the applicant that art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution was made without the consent of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah and Sarawak, the same argument was taken up before David Wong Dak Wah J (as His Lordship then was) in Robert Linggi v The Government of Malaysia [2011] 2 MLJ 741; [2011] 7 CLJ 373 and in a supplementary judgment appearing at p 764 (MLJ); p 398 (CLJ) thereof, His Lordship has reproduced the letters of consent from the Yang di Pertua Negeri of both states which clearly show that such a concurrence was in fact obtained before the amendment to art 121 was made and that includes the introduction of art 121(1A). Coming as it were from the judgment of the court of not just competent jurisdiction but also from the same part of Malaysia, I have no doubt on the veracity of what is reproduced in that judgment.”.
[7] The learned judge then concluded that -
“[10] ... Unless and until the applicant obtains her letter of release from Islam, the 3rd respondent cannot be compelled by mandamus to effect the change that she wanted. The first respondent in turn cannot be compelled to issue the letter of release by me because I do not have the jurisdiction over matters of apostasy which is the sole province of the Syariah Courts as have been decided by the Federal Court cases I have listed above. In arriving at this decision I am fully aware of the guarantee on the freedom of religion in the Federal Constitution and that I had taken an oath of office to uphold its provisions. I have been reminded of the sanctity of the relevant provisions by the applicant's counsel but I believe I am not committing a sacrilege of that oath in this case because in the exercise of my duties I am also dictated by doctrines and conventions. The application for leave is therefore dismissed but with no order as to cost as graciously agreed by the respondents’ counsel.”.
[8] At the outset, perhaps it would be useful to state briefly principles applicable for granting leave for judicial review. The Federal Court had elaborated and reiterated the test for granting leave in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 CLJ 478 as follows -
“... without the need to go into depth of the abundant authorities, suffice if we state that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though i.e, unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged.”.
[9] In Mkini Dotcom Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v Chief Judge of Malaya & Ors [2015] MLJU 1271, it was held that -
[10] In Tuan Hj. Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442, the Supreme Court approved the following guidelines stated in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Rukshanda Begum [1990] COD 107 -
“thus: leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting leave the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to application though i.e. unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review no success may be envisaged.”
[12] Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that leave to move for judicial review ought to be granted to the appellant as it is clear that there is point for further investigation on a full inter parties basis with necessary evidence on the facts and argument on the law.
[20] To put our discussion in its proper perspective, perhaps it would be useful at the outset to note that Malaysia has a unique system of legal pluralism. Two sets of law coexist: civil law (common law) and syariah law and there is a dual court system comprising the Civil Courts and the Syariah Courts. The latter have jurisdiction to apply syariah law to Muslims and Civil Courts have jurisdiction to apply civil law to Muslims and non-Muslims.
[21] The Federal Constitution was amended in 1988 to clarify the distribution of jurisdiction between Civil Courts and Syariah Courts. According to Farid Sufian Shuaib, in an article entitled: “Constitutional Restatement of Parallel Jurisdiction between Civil Courts and Syariah Courts in Malaysia: Twenty Years on (1980 - 2008) [2008]” 5 MLJ xxxiii pp xxxiii-l -
“The Federal Constitution of Malaysia has restated under art. 121(1A) that Syariah Courts - as the courts that administer Islamic law - have exclusive jurisdiction over matters under their jurisdiction. The premise of the restatement is to give effect to a pluralistic law and court system as it existed in Malaysia...”.
[22] It would appear that there are two different interpretations of art. 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution resulting from 1988 amendment - the parallel and hierarchical interpretations. According to parallel interpretation, Syariah Courts and Civil Courts form two separate courts system. Syariah Courts are not inferior to the Civil Courts. In the case of Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101 (FC), Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ (as he then was) explained:
[23] According to the hierarchical interpretation, Syariah Courts, as state courts, are inferior to the Civil Courts. In the case of Dato’ Kadar Shah bin Tun Sulaiman v Datin Fauziah binti Haron [2008] 7 MLJ 779, Mohd Hishamudin J (as he then was) said -
[24] The view that art.121(1d) of the Federal Constitution does not exclude the supervisory review power of the High Court is supported by several commentators, such as Andrew Harding (Law, Government and the Constitution of Malaysia, 136 - 7 (1996), Thio Li-Ann (in an essay in “Constitutional Landmarks in Malaysia: The first 50 Years”, 197 at 202).
[25] We are of the view that Syariah Courts and Civil Courts form two separate legal system. We agree with the view expressed by Salbiah Ahmed in her article entitled: “Islam in Malaysia: Constitutional and Human Rights Perspectives”, Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 2, No. 1 (2005), when she assets that -
“State Syariah Courts are not courts inferior to the federal courts as the term “inferior court” is understood in terms of appeal and judicial review by superior courts over inferior courts. The State Syariah Courts are in a separate hierarchy to that of the federal civil courts. There is no right of appeal from the State Syariah courts to the federal civil courts. There is no power of judicial review by the federal high court over the State Syariah Courts.”
[26] In the same vein, in Kamariah bte Ali lwn Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan, Malaysia dan satu lagi [2002] 3 MLJ 657, Abdul Hamid Mohamed JCA (as he then was) said:
“... bukanlah dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah ini untuk mengkaji semula keputusan-keputusan mahkamah syariah yang terletak dalam sistem berlainan itu. Mahkamah ini mesti menerima Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah itu telahpun membuat keputusan fakta itu, mengikut hokum syarak dan mahkamah ini tidak berkuasa campur tangan dalam keputusan itu dan menggubahnya, membatalkannya, mengisytiharkan ia tidak sah atau tidak menghiraukan dan membebaskan perayu-perayu...”.
[30] In Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Wilayah Persekutuan dan Lain-lain [2007] 4 MLJ 585, Richard Malanjum Chief Judge (Sabah & Sarawak) in his dissenting judgment said -
The Federal Constitution, Ninth Schedule List II - State List, specifically gives powers to state legislatures to constitute Muslim courts and when constituted, ‘shall have jurisdiction only over persons professing the Muslim religion and in respect only of any of the matter included in this paragraph’.
Therefore, a Syariah Court derives its jurisdiction under a state law, (for Federal Territories - Act of Parliament) over any matter specified in the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution.
[31] In our view, the interpretation that reflects the state of the law today is that the Syariah Court and not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to deal with the issue of conversion out of Islam. The constitutional and jurisdictional issues as to whether the Syariah Court has jurisdiction to deal with the questions of apostasy was clarified by Mohamad Dzaiddin FCJ (as he then was) in the case of Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh (supra) wherein His Lordship said -
“... it does seem inevitable that since matters on conversion to Islam come under the jurisdiction of the syariah courts, by implication conversion out of Islam should also fall under the jurisdiction of the same courts.”.
[32] In Lina Joy (supra), the majority opinion affirmed the implied jurisdiction approach taken in Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh (supra). Ahmad Fairuz C.J said -
“... the case of Soon Singh clearly showed that the apostate matter was within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. Item I, Second list, Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution showed that the Islamic law was one of the matters that was in item I and when read together with case of Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polsi Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992]1 MLJ 1 thus it was obvious that the apostasy matter relating to Islamic law and it was clear that it was within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.”.
[33] The learned C.J added that requiring apostates to go through the Syariah Court system in order convert is not an infringement of the individual’s constitutional right because “((i)f a person professes and practices Islam, it would definitely mean that he must comply with Islamic law which has prescribed the way to embrace Islam and converting out of Islam” (at [17.2]). According to the Chief Justice, “one cannot renounce or embrace a religion at one’s own whims and facies” (at [14]).
[34] Recently, in Hj. Raimi bin Abdullah (supra), Arifin Zakaria C.J in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court said -
“[21] Thus, in James v Government of Malaysia [2012] 1 MLJ 721 and Lina Joy lwn Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain [2007] 4 MLJ 585, it was held that apostasy was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.
[22] Premised on the above authorities, it is settled law that the question of whether a person is a Muslim or not is a matter falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. On the facts in the present case, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff's parents converted to Islam in 1983 together with the plaintiff and her siblings. This is supported by the statutory declaration of the late father referred to earlier.”.
[35] We are not persuaded that the decision in Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh should be distinguished from the present case as that case was with regard to Kedah State laws and only applicable to the State of Kedah. In our view, Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh had interpreted the provision of art. 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution and therefore applicable to all states in Malaysia. At page 489, Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ (as he then was) stated -
[36] It is clear, therefore, that our apex court had consistently and repeatedly held that jurisdiction of the Syariah Court regarding apostasy need not be expressly laid out in the state laws. We are in full agreement in the decision of this Court in Jenny bin Peter @ Nur Muzahlifah Abdullah v Director of Jabatan Agama Islam Sarawak & Ors & Anoter Appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1132, wherein the Court stated -
“Although the Sarawak Syariah Courts Ordinance 2001 did not provide for the conversion in or out of Islam, Part VIII of the Majlis Islam Sarawak Ordinance 2001 provides for conversion to the religion of Islam. In this regard it is pertinent to highlight the majority judgment in Lina Joy (supra) at pg 616, which affirmed the decision of the Federal Court in Soon Singh:
“15.5... adalah sejajar dengan logik untuk Mahkamah Syariah, yang telah dengan jelasnya diberi bidang kuasa untuk mengadili perkara-perkara yang berkaitan dengan pemelukan agama Islam adalah, secara implikasi perlu, juga mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mengadili perkara-perkara yang berkaitan dengan keluarnya seorang Muslim dari agama Islam atau kemurtadan.”.
[39] For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the conclusion of the learned judge that the appellant’s application for leave to move for judicial review against the respondents ought to be dismissed as the matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Syariah Court and not the Civil High Court. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs. Deposit was refunded. So ordered.
For the Appellant: Baru Bian (Chua Kuan Ching and Joshua Parir Baru with him), Baru Bian Advocates, No: 6, 2nd Floor, Lot 5430, Block G, RH Plaza, Jalan Lapangan Terbang, 93350 Kuching, Sarawak
For the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents: Saferi bin Ali, State Legal Officer, State Attorney-General’s Chambers, 15th & 16th Floor, Wisma Bapa Malaysia, Petra Jaya, 93502 Kuching, Sarawak
For the 3rd Respondent: Shamsul Bolhassan, Senior Federal Counsel, State Attorney-General’s Chambers, 15th & 16th Floor, Wisma Bapa Malaysia, Petra Jaya, 93502 Kuching, Sarawak
https://www.aseanlip.com/malaysia/disputeresolution/judgments/syarifah-nooraffyzza-binti-wan-hosen-v-director-of-jabatan-agama-islam-sarawak-and-3-others/AL17741
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