Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99602/farmers-educ-co-op-union-vs-wday-inc
Timestamp: 2016-10-22 09:56:06
Document Index: 399224305

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 18', '§ 7', '§ 15', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 15', '§ 11', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 202', '§ 401']

Farmers Educ and Co Op Union Vs Wday Inc - Citation 99602 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union Vs. Wday, Inc. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/99602CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-29-1959Case Number360 U.S. 525AppellantFarmers Educ. and Co-op. UnionRespondentWday, Inc.Excerpt:
farmers educ. & co-op. union v. wday, inc. - 360 u.s. 525 (1959)
section 315(a) of the federal communications act of 1934 provides, in effect, that, if anyone licensed to operate a radio broadcasting station shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for public office to broadcast over such station, he shall "afford equal opportunities" to all other such candidates for that office, and "shall have no power of censorship" over the material.....Judgment:
1. Such a licensee may not delete material from a candidate's radio speech on the ground that such material may be defamatory. Pp.
360 U. S. 527
2. Regardless of state law, such a licensee is not liable for defamatory statements made in a speech broadcast over his station by a candidate for public office under § 315(a). Pp.
360 U. S. 531
"(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station:
That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. [
defamatory statements from political broadcasts, [
] subsequent judicial interpretations of § 315 have, with considerable uniformity, recognized that an individual licensee has no such power. [
] And while, for some years, the Federal Communications Commission's views on this matter were not clearly articulated, [
] since 1948, it has continuously held that licensees cannot remove allegedly libelous matter from speeches by candidates. [
] Similarly, the legislative history of the measure, both prior to its first enactment in 1927 and subsequently, shows a deep hostility to censorship either by the Commission or by a licensee. [
first, emphatically forbidden the Commission to exercise any power of censorship over radio communication. [
] It is in line with this same tradition that the individual licensee has consistently been denied "power of censorship" in the vital area of political broadcasts.
Petitioner alternatively argues that § 315 does not grant a station immunity from liability for defamatory statements made during a political broadcast, even though the section prohibits the station from censoring allegedly libelous matter. Again, we cannot agree. For, under this interpretation, unless a licensee refuses to permit any candidate to talk at all, the section would sanction the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps criminal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of the licensee. Accordingly, judicial interpretations reaching the issue have found an immunity implicit in the section. [
] And, in all those cases concluding that a licensee had no immunity, § 315 had been construed -- improperly, as we hold -- to permit a station to censor potentially actionable material. [
] In no case has a court even implied that the licensee would not be rendered immune were it denied the power to censor libelous material.
should "be deemed a common carrier in interstate commerce . . . ," and could not discriminate against other political candidates or censor material broadcast by them. [
] In the Senate, Senator Dill -- the bill's floor manager -- introduced an amendment to this provision which, among other things, specifically granted a station immunity from civil and criminal liability for "any uncensored utterances thus broadcast." [
] The amendment was adopted by the Senate, but its provision expressly granting immunity was removed by the Conference Committee without any explanation. [
] Section 18 was incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934 with no explanatory discussion. Subsequently, a great deal of pressure built up for legislation to remove all possible doubt as to broadcasters' liability for libel either by granting them a power to censor libelous statements or by providing an express legislative immunity. Many legislative proposals were made to accomplish these purposes, [
] but no legislation providing either was ever enacted. Thus, whatever adverse inference may be drawn from the failure of Congress to legislate an express immunity is offset by its refusal to permit stations to avoid liability by censoring broadcasts. And more than balancing any adverse inferences drawn from congressional failure
to legislate an express immunity is the fact that the Federal Communications Commission -- the body entrusted with administering the provisions of the Act -- has long interpreted § 315 as granting stations an immunity. [
] Not only has this interpretation been adhered to despite many subsequent legislative proposals to modify § 315, but, with full knowledge of the Commission's interpretation, Congress has since made significant additions to that section without amending it to depart from the Commission's view. [
] In light of this contradictory legislative background, we do not feel compelled to reach a result which seems so in conflict with traditional concepts of fairness.
use of station facilities. [
] We have no means of knowing to what extent insurance is available to broadcasting stations, or what it would cost them. Moreover, since § 315 expressly prohibits stations from charging political candidates higher rates than they charge for comparable time used for other purposes, any cost of insurance would probably have to be absorbed by the stations themselves. Petitioner's reliance on the stations' freedom from obligation "to allow use of its station by any such candidate" seems equally misplaced. While denying all candidates us of stations would protect broadcasters from liability, it would also effectively withdraw political discussion from the air. Instead, the thrust of § 315 is to facilitate political debate over radio and television. Recognizing this, the Communications Commission considers the carrying of political broadcasts a public service criterion to be considered both in license renewal proceedings and in comparative contests for a radio or television construction permit. [
] Certainly Congress knew the obvious -- that, if a licensee could protect
himself from liability in no other way but by refusing to broadcast candidates' speeches, the necessary effect would be to hamper the congressional plan to develop broadcasting as a political outlet, rather than to foster it. [
We are aware that causes of action for libel are widely recognized throughout the States. But we have not hesitated to abrogate state law where satisfied that its enforcement would stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." [
] Here, petitioner is asking us to attribute to § 315 a meaning which would either frustrate the underlying purposes for which it was enacted or, alternatively, impose unreasonable burdens on the parties governed by that legislation. In the absence of clear expression by Congress, we will not assume that it desired such a result. Agreeing with the state courts of North Dakota that § 315 grants a licensee an immunity from liability for libelous material it broadcasts, we merely read § 315 in accordance with what we believe to be its underlying purpose.
§ 18, of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1170.
Sorensen v. Wood,
123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82. Following this decision the case was remanded for a new trial. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Nebraska. Appeal to this Court was dismissed
sub nom. KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen,
290 U.S. 599, because, as the records of this Court disclose, the Supreme Court of Nebraska's holding had been based on adequate state grounds, namely, that the case had become moot through settlement.
See Lamb v. Sutton,
164 F.Supp. 928;
Yates v. Associated Broadcasters, Inc.,
7 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 2088;
Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc.,
89 F.Supp. 740,
186 F.2d 1;
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.,
142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440;
Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co.,
179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985.
But see Daniell v. Voice of New Hampshire, Inc.,
10 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 2045;
Houston Post Co. v. United States,
79 F.Supp. 199.
See In re Bellingham Broadcasting Co.,
8 F.C.C. 159, 172.
In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co.,
12 F.C.C. 1069;
In re WDSU Broadcasting Corp.,
7 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 769; Public Notice (FCC 54-1155), Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates For Public Office, 19 Fed.Reg. 5948, 5951; Public Notice (FCC 58-936), Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates For Public Office, 23 Fed.Reg. 7817, 7820-7821.
S.Rep. No. 1567, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1948), where, discussing S. 1333, the Committee Report stated:
H.R.Rep. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (minority views); S.Rep. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4; 67 Cong.Rec. 5480, 5484, 12356; 78 Cong.Rec. 10991-10992; Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1 and S. 1754, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 121, 125-134; Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on H.R. 7716, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 9-13; Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-68, 943-945."
Lamb v. Sutton; Yates v. Associated Broadcasters, Inc.; Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., supra,
Cf. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc.; Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., supra,
H.R. 9230, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 7, 9, 10, 11; S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 15; 98 Cong.Rec. 7401.
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on H.R. 7716, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, 9-11; Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2910, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 63-67; Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-68, 162-163, 362-381, 943-945; Hearings before Select Committee of the House to Investigate the FCC, pursuant to H.Res. No. 691, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-109.
only two of the five Commissioners participating in the decision expressly concluded that § 315 barred state prosecutions for libel. Two of the others expressed no view on the subject. And one dissented. The Commission's 1948 report to Congress stated, however, that the Commission had interpreted § 315 to grant a federal immunity. 14 F.C.C.Ann.Rep. 28 (1948). And, in
released November 26, 1951, a majority of the Commission affirmed the Commission's
decision. 7 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 769.
24 F.C.C.Ann.Rep. 123 (1958);
Lamb v. Sutton, supra,
164 F.Supp. at 932-933;
Daniell v. Voice of New Hampshire, Inc., supra,
at 2047;
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., supra,
142 Conn. at 619, 116 A.2d at 446.
The Commission's position with respect to § 315 was not only reported to Congress in an Annual Report of the Commission, 14 F.C.C.Ann.Rep. 28 (1948), but it was made the subject of a special investigation by a Select Committee of the House expressly constituted for that purpose.
H.R.Rep. No. 2461, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
See also In re WDSU Broadcasting Corp., supra,
at 772-773.
H.R.Rep. No. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21. For examples of legislative proposals to modify § 315,
S. 2539, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 4814, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
In re City of Jacksonville,
12 Pike and Fisher Radio Reg. 113, 125-126, 180 i-j;
In re Loyola University,
12 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 1017, 1099.
See also In re Homer P. Rainey,
11 F.C.C. 898.
F.C.C. Report, In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 1 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg., pt. 3, 91:201.
statement of Senator Fess, 67 Cong.Rec. 12356.
330 U. S. 773
Hill v. State of Florida,
California v. Taylor,
The language of § 315 of the Federal Communications Act, "such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section," [
] and the legislative history of this provision call for the conclusion reached in
namely, that WDAY could not have lawfully deleted from
Because I believe that agreement with the Court's conclusion involves either disregard of the legislative and administrative history of § 315 or departure from the principles which have governed this Court in determining when state law must give way to overriding federal law, I dissent from
and therefore from its judgment.
An administrative agency cannot, of course, determine the constitutional issue whether a federal statute has displaced state law, certainly not by way of determining what Congress has, in fact, done.
12 F.C.C. 1069, the case in which the Federal Communications Commission first held that stations could not censor, the Federal Communications Commission's dictum that stations would not be liable was not a relevant administrative interpretation of the meaning of § 315, but was a finding that the States were preempted from this area. It was said not that the broadcasters operating under § 315 had a federally created defense, but that the state libel laws had been supplanted.
But suppose that, even as to preemption, we are to assume that Congress should be said to defer to consistent administrative interpretation. There was no such consistency here in the FCC. The Commission has never issued a regulation, nor held in an adjudicatory proceeding that there is immunity. Dictum in the
case was affirmatively embraced by only two of the five Commissioners who presided. Since
the Commission has referred to its language in that case in increasingly tentative fashion. In
7 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 769, 770, the FCC said of its dictum in
"We said in the
case that, in our view, the station was relieved from liability, but that, whether or not this was the case, the fact remained that a licensee is prohibited from censoring material broadcast under the provisions of § 315."
Port Huron Bctg. Co.,
4 R.R. 1, the Commission expressed an opinion that licensees not directly participating in the libel might be absolved from any liability they might otherwise incur under state law, because of the operation of section 315, which precludes them from preventing a candidate's utterances."
23 Fed.Reg. 7820. Thus, the FCC has demonstrated apparent waning confidence in its
dictum -- from "[t]he conclusion is inescapable" to "in our view, the station was relieved
Even if the FCC's position were of a type to which the principle of deference or acquiescence were applicable, even if that position were longer held than just the past decade, and were taken with more confidence than was true here, the history of congressional dealings with the question of liability of stations for libel would not support a conclusion that Congress had acquiesced in such a ruling. For, when the last congressional discussion of an immunity provision took place in 1952, the Conference Committee, in reporting out the revised version of § 315, stated it had rejected a House immunity provision [
H.R.Rep.No. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21. This language negates, rather than supports, the conclusion that Congress, in failing to enact proposed immunity measures, was in fact acquiescing in the
dictum. [
For these many reasons, a conclusion that, in failing to change § 315 after the
decision, Congress, by its inaction effected the preemption which the Commission had found is an assumption wholly unsupported in fact. The attempt to use congressional acquiescence to support the constitutional ruling of supersession of state law raises political stalemate and legislative indecision [
] to the level of constitutional declaration. As we should go slow to read into what Congress has said the negation of state power unless it speaks explicitly or there is obvious collision, we should even less willingly find such negation in what Congress has frankly refused to say.
The Court proceeds not only from an insupportable finding that Congress acquiesced in the Commission's
opinion. It also relies upon a determination that North Dakota's libel law could not constitutionally be applied to WDAY in this case, since the State's libel
The nature of the conflict which necessitates striking down state law has been considered in numerous decisions of this Court. In the much-cited case of
It is to be noted initially that since defamation is generally regarded as an intentional tort, it is a solid likelihood that the North Dakota courts would conclude that WDAY's compelled broadcast of Townley's speech lacked the necessary intent to communicate the defamation, and that therefore WDAY's conduct was not tortious, or, if
tortious, that WDAY was privileged. [
] In no case has any state court held a station liable on finding that the station could not censor. Some forty States have enacted statutes granting various degrees of privilege. [
In two States, exercising the flexibility of common law principles, the courts have extended a defense of privilege to broadcasters compelled to carry broadcasts by § 315. [
] Thus, the largely abstract assumption on the basis of which the Court makes such heavy inroad on state laws -- that broadcasters will be held without having committed a volitional act -- may be entirely contradicted by experience.
We have held that the Communications Act does not govern relations between stations and third persons.
Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,
we have permitted a state court to award damages for breach of a contract despite the fact that that breach was ordered by the FCC as a condition for renewal of a license.
Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Carroll,
. If North Dakota were to rule that its libel law applies to broadcasts made under compulsion of § 315, it would rule that broadcasters are liable without fault. There is nothing in such liability which conflicts with the necessity of broadcasting imposed by § 315. If Congress came to fear impairment of its policy on political broadcasts, Congress could act to alter the condition which it has created by declining to legislate immunity. There may be a burden, even unfairness, to the stations. But there may be unfairness too, after all, in depriving a defamed individual of recovery against the agency by which the defamatory communication was magnified in its deleterious effect on his ability to earn a livelihood. Adjustment of what is fair to all should be done by a congressional change in the federal law, or, in the absence of such enactment, by state law, through legislation or common law rulings that the stations are partially or totally immune. Again, allocation of risk of loss through defamation does not necessarily imply the duty not to defame. The application of libel laws by North Dakota to WDAY merely means that, since the harm could no more have been avoided by the person defamed than by WDAY, in balancing these conflicting undesirables, the risk of loss should fall upon WDAY. Whether or not this would be a wise decision, it would not conflict with § 315's compulsion to broadcast speeches by opposing candidates for office.
In discussing in the Federalist Papers the respective areas of federal and state constitutional powers, Hamilton wrote that state powers would be superseded by federal authority if continued authority in the States would be "absolutely and totally
98 Cong.Rec. 7401-7416.
The situation would not have appeared to Congress to be one in which acquiescence was a meaningful concept. Immediately after
the decision was criticized as being without statutory basis.
79 F.Supp. 199. In discussing the
decision before a House Committee, FCC Chairman Coy insisted that that decision "only represents the views of the Commission," and that he did not think "his decision clarifies it as far as the industry is concerned." Hearings before House Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications Commission, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14. After
had been argued, but before the decision, a bill, S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 15, granting immunity was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, S.Rep. No. 1567, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, but was never enacted. Every indication is persuasive that the question was regarded as open and highly debatable.
Both before and after Port Huron, bills to permit censorship or grant total or partial immunity have been introduced.
H.R. 9230, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 3038, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., § 11; S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 15; H.R. 3595, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 15; H.R. 6949, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., § 202; H.R. 5470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 2539, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 7062, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 7756, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 1208, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 4814, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1437, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., § 401. The congressional declination to act partakes not of satisfaction with the
decision, but of indecision about the propriety and constitutionality of the alternative solutions to the broadcasters' plea of unfairness.
Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 875, 907-910; Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 727.