Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/522/1144/184113/
Timestamp: 2019-05-21 06:56:25
Document Index: 25956222

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 198310', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1']

Erwine Laverne and Estelle Laverne, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Howard J. Corning, Jr., Mayor, et al., Defendants-appellees, 522 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1975) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1975 › Erwine Laverne and Estelle Laverne, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Howard J. Corning, Jr., Mayor, et al.,...
Erwine Laverne and Estelle Laverne, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Howard J. Corning, Jr., Mayor, et al., Defendants-appellees, 522 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1975)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 522 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1975)
Argued April 30, 1975. Decided July 3, 1975
Erwine Laverne was convicted of violating the Village ordinance. He received a six months' suspended jail sentence,5 and his case came up before the New York Court of Appeals. In a 4-3 decision that court reversed the conviction on the ground that the various warrantless inspections of the Laverne premises violated the Fourth Amendment. People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452, 200 N.E.2d 441 (1964). The Court of Appeals found that the inspections were made for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a criminal prosecution and thereby distinguished Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S. Ct. 804, 3 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1959) (subsequently overruled in Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)), which had upheld warrantless inspections of dwellings for the purpose of administrative or civil enforcement of a city health code.
Any discussion of the good-faith defense more recently referred to by the Supreme Court as a "qualified immunity" available to governmental officials in § 198310 actions for damages must start with the case of Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967). There police officers had arrested the plaintiffs under a breach of the peace statute subsequently held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524, 85 S. Ct. 1327, 14 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1965). The plaintiffs had initially been convicted before a police justice but in a trial de novo received a directed verdict of acquittal. The plaintiffs then brought a § 1983 damage action against, among others, the police officers who had arrested them. The complaint also alleged common law false arrest and imprisonment. The court of appeals decided that the police would be liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional arrest even if they acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a statute later held unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed on this issue, holding "that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under § 1983." 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S. Ct. at 1219. The Court observed that "a police officer (should not be) charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law." Id.
More recently in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974), a § 1983 action against the Governor of Ohio and various personnel connected with the Ohio National Guard arising out of the May 1970 shootings at Kent State University, the Supreme Court held that a qualified immunity existed for the defendant governmental officials. The Court described the immunity essentially in terms of a good-faith defense:
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement in the area occurred this Term in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S. Ct. 992, 43 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1975). There the Court upheld a good-faith immunity for school administrators and school board members charged with expelling the petitioners, high school students accused of "spiking" the punch at a meeting of a school extracurricular organization, without affording them due process of law.
First of all, we are not persuaded that trespass is as close an analogy as the plaintiffs contend. The essence of the plaintiffs' claim is the right to be free of unlawful searches or seizures, and this goes beyond a person's interest in the exclusive possession and quiet enjoyment of land, which is the interest protected by the common law action for trespass.13 And certainly the damages sought in this case differ markedly from the injury to property normally recoverable in a trespass action.14 No monetary claim is brought for damage to land or injuries to persons occurring during the inspections. Any damages resulted more from the necessity of defending the subsequent legal actions brought by the Village against the Lavernes. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has sanctioned analogies to the common law in § 1983 actions where appropriate, e. g. Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S. Ct. 1213; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492, (1961),15 "the common law is not an infallible guide." Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309, 1314 (2d Cir. 1974), citing, Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231-33, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970) (separate opinion of Justice Brennan).16 And, most importantly, the considerations which prompted the Supreme Court to find a qualified immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, and Wood v. Strickland, supra, dictate that the same defense should be available here. The qualified immunity is based on the common-sense rationale that the public interest requires that public officials be able to carry out their discretionary duties and act decisively without the intimidation that would result if good-faith errors in judgment were later to subject them to liability for damages:
Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. at 241-42, 94 S. Ct. at 1689 (footnote omitted), quoted in, Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U.S. at 308, 95 S. Ct. 992. The defendants in this case were faced with what appeared to be a violation of a Village zoning ordinance which it was their duty to enforce. That their actions would later be declared unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals was, as determined by the jury, not an event which they could reasonably foresee, and they should not be subjected to damage liability because they were not omniscient predictors of the uncertain course of constitutional law. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, supra, 456 F.2d at 1348; see Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 555, 87 S. Ct. 1213.
The remaining prong of the plaintiffs' argument can be disposed of quickly. They seek to distinguish Pierson, Scheuer, Wood, and Bivens on the ground that those cases involved officials required under the circumstances to think and act quickly. In Pierson and Bivens law enforcement officers, who often do not have time to reflect before making an arrest, were involved. In Scheuer, the executive officials were confronted with what appeared to them to be an immediate threat to public order. And the Supreme Court in Wood emphasized that school officials often have a need for prompt action when faced with student behavior threatening disruption. 420 U.S. at 308, 95 S. Ct. 992. In contrast, the Lavernes posed no immediate threat to the public safety, and in fact neither the Building Inspector nor the Board of Trustees acted with great promptness. However, we do not think this distinction advanced by the plaintiffs withstands scrutiny. Wood, despite language in the opinion, was not a case in which school officials were under pressure to make an immediate decision. The students responsible for spiking the punch were first questioned about it ten days later. A meeting of the school board was held that night, but another meeting to consider the matter was held two weeks later. 420 U.S. at 308, 95 S. Ct. 992. Nevertheless, the Court held that the school officials had a qualified immunity. Likewise, the Village officials involved in this case undoubtedly in some circumstances are faced with the need for prompt action. The fact that particular circumstances in this case did not call for quick decision does not abolish the immunity altogether. See, for example, Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309, 1313 (2d Cir. 1974), in which this court upheld the good-faith defense of a deputy sheriff who performed the purely ministerial act of serving a writ of attachment. The speed with which the officials were required to act is rather an ingredient for consideration by the jury in determining the reasonableness of the good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the action taken. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. at 247-48, 94 S. Ct. 1683. The jury in this case was properly instructed by the district court that good faith has both a subjective and an objective element. Not only must the defendants have acted believing that the inspections were lawful but also this belief must have been a reasonable one in light of the circumstances. This instruction allowed for consideration of the timing of the events in question.
Judge Tenney's decision is reported at 316 F. Supp. 629
Such a private right of action was found by the Supreme Court to exist in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971)
Judge Tenney's order is reported at 354 F. Supp. 1402
Judge Knapp's order is reported at 376 F. Supp. 836
See F. Harper & F. James, Supra note 11, at § 1.1. Judge Tenney recognized the difference in applying to this case New York's six-year statute of limitations for liability created by statute rather than the three-year period for injury to property. 316 F. Supp. at 634-35
See also, e. g., Pritchard v. Perry, 508 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1975); Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973); Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953, 93 S. Ct. 3023, 37 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1973)