Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=3444
Timestamp: 2020-06-04 16:32:07
Document Index: 195306185

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.166', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 133', 'Application No. 1003', 'Art.\t166', 'Art.166', 'Application No. 1003', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 166']

ISHWARLAL GIRDHARLAL JOSHI versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR
1968 AIR 870	1968 SCR (2) 267
ISHWARLAL GIRDHARLAL JOSHI V. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR [1967] RD-SC 261 (16 November 1967)
CITATION: 1968 AIR 870	1968 SCR (2) 267
R	1970 SC1102	(14) RF	1977 SC 183	(35,36) R	1980 SC 91	(17)
Constitution of India, 1950, Art.166 and Rules of Business, rr.7, 10, 13 and 15-Notifications under Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894) Whether could be signed by an Under Secretary- Formation of opinion regarding urgency and nature of	land- Whether	could be delegated to Secretary-Standing Orders, if necessary-Arable land, meaning
By a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act issued	on March 10, 1965 the	respondent State Government notified that certain lands were needed for a public purpose, namely,	the construction of the State capital, that the Government was satisfied that they were 'arable lands'	and further	directed, under s. 17(4) of the Act, that as	the acquisition of	the lands was urgently necessary,	the provisions of	s. 5A	would not apply. Thereafter, a notification was issued under s. 6 containing a direction under s. 17(1) of the Act enabling the Collector to	take possession of all the arable lands on the expiry of 15	days from the publication of the notice under s. 9(1) of the Act.
Both Notifications were signed by an Under Secretary of	the respondent-Government.
The petitioners challenged the notifications in	writ petitions under Art. 226. In the original affidavits, the petitioners merely asserted that the Government had not	made up its mind regarding the acquired lands as to	urgency and that the lands were not arable. The parties filed a number of affidavits	at various stages of the bearing,	the Government in	order	to establish that everything	was regularly done, while	the petitioners alleged infractions. In one	of the affidavits on behalf of the Government it was stated that file Minister-in-charge	gave oral instructions to the Secretary that he or his under- secretaries may take action under s. 17(1) and (4) of the Act according to law, that the Secretary was satisfied regarding urgency and gave instructions to the Under Secretary to	take the necessary action.	The High Court after considering the affidavits, dismissed the petitions.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that: (i) only a Secretary could sign the notifications and that the	Under Secretary who signed the notification under s. 6 was not duly authorised to	do so; (ii) that there was no	formation of opinion	by the Government as regards urgency	or that the lands were arable; (iii) that this function could not be delegated to the Secretary and even if it could be delegated, a general oral instruction given by the Minister was not according to the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Business; (iv) that since the lands in question were	under cultivation, they were not waste or arable lands; and (v) that sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 17 of the Act were violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
(1) The word 'Secretary' is not defined	in the Land Acquisition Act or the General Clauses Act so as to exclude Additional, Joint, Deputy, Under or Assistant	Secretaries.
On the other hand r.13 of the Rules of Business framed	under Art. 166 of the Constitution specifically places a 268 Secretary, Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Assistant	Secretary on equality for authentication of orders	and instruments of Government.	The Under Secretary was, therefore, competent to sign the notifications. [273F;
274E] Even if he did not possess the power as a	Secretary he would have been competent as an officer 'duly	authorised', within the meaning of s. 6 of the Act, by virtue of r. 13 of the Rules of Business. [274F] (ii) Under Art. 166 of the Constitution the validity of the notification could not be called in question on the ground	that it was not an order made by the Governor, because, as required by the Article the executive action of the Government was expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor and the order was authenticated in the manner required by r. 13 of the Rules of Business.	In addition, there is also the presumption of regularity of official acts.
Therefore, the bare assertion that Government had not formed an opinion could not raise an issue. The Government was not called upon to answer the affidavit of the petitioners	and the Government need not have undertaken the burden of showing the regularity of their action.[275 E--G; 278 D, F] (iii) Rules 7, 10, 13 and 15 of the Rules of Business specifically allow conferral of powers on Secretaries and the determination	of the Secretary becomes the	determination of the Government.	There	is nothing in the Rules or instructions which prescribes that the authority must be in writing	or by Standing Orders. Under Paragraph 3 of the instructions issued by the Governor under r. 15 of the	Rules of Business, Standing Orders are necessary for the disposal of cases in the department, and a case is defined as	'the papers under consideration and all previous papers and	notes put in connection therewith to	enable	the question raised to be disposed of'. Paragraph 4, on the other	hand refers to "matters or classes of matters". Therefore, paragraph 3 only refers to the disposal of cases and not to matters arising	In a case, regarding which under paragraph 4, the Minister may arrange with the Secretary whether they are to be brought to his personal notice or not.The matters in the present case were the application of s. 17(1) and (4), to the acquisition of waste and Arabic lands and the Minister	could leave this matter to	his Secretary	as he	did.For	this purpose, Standing Orders were not	necessary and	oral instructions would be sufficient.The Secretaries concerned were given the jurisdiction to take action on behalf of Government and they satisfied themselves about the need for acquisition under s. 6, the urgency of the matter and the existence of waste and arable lands for the application of sub-ss.	(1) and (4) of s. 17.Therefore, on a review of the affidavits, the provisions of the Act and the Business	Rules and Instructions, the directions under sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 17 were not invalid. [280 D--G; 281 C--D; 282 E--G] Shayamaghana Ray v. State, A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 200, referred to.
(iv) Arable land under the Act is not only land capable of cultivation but also land actually under cultivation. The words 'compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land' in s. 17(3), show that the land may have	crops or he	fallow and the crops can only	be on	arable	land.
because. if crops could grow or were actually grown the	land Would hardly he waste land [286 A--B, E] Baldeo Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.	A.I.R.	1965 All Smt. Lakshmi Devi Ors. v. State of Bihar' & Ors. A.I.R.
Appeals	from the judgment and order dated December 2, 5, 12 and 13, 1966	of the Gujarat High Court in Special	Civil Applications Nos 1003, 1177, 1178, 1183, 1186, 1195, 1197 to 1202, 1205 to 1210, 1220 to 1222, 1244, 1275,	1374,	1377, 1380, 1387, 1389 of 1965, 68 to 70, 72 to 74, 76, 77, 80, 83, 84, 166, 183, 393, 399, 547, 554, 790 of 1966,	1187,	1188, 1233 of 1965, 75, 154, 202, 402, 403 of 1966, and 1179,	1184 and 1185 of 1965.
S, K. Dholakia and Vineet Kumar, for the appellants (in C.
As. Nos. 915 to 967 and 1042 to 1044 of 1967).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J.--On March 10, 1965, the Government of Gujarat notified under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act	that certain	lands were needed for a public purpose, namely, the construction of the capital of the State at Gandhinagar and that Government was satisfied that they	were 'arable lands'.
Government further directed under s. 17(4) of the Act that as the acquisition of the said lands was urgently necessary the provisions of s. 5A of the Act shall not apply in respect of the lands.A list of	the lands was appended to	the notification.This notification	was followed by another on JuLy 31, 1965 under s. 6 of the' Land Acquisition Act and it contained a direction under s. 17 (1) of the Act, enabling the Collector,	on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice under s. 9 (1) of the Act, to	take possession of	all arable lands specified in	the earlier notification. Both notifications were signed by L.P. Raval, Under Secretary to Government and were shown to be by order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat.
Numerous	petitions were filed in the High Court of Gujarat	under Art. 226 of the Constitution by the owners of the lands Sup, C. I,/68-3 270 affected by the notifications to challenge the	validity of the acquisition. One such petition was numbered Petition No.
1003 of 1965 and it was typical of all the	others.	The facts in all the petitions were the same, save the details of the lands, and as the contentions were also the same, the High Court pronounced	a common judgment applicable to	all, on December 2/5, 1966 and dismissed them. The	High Court, however, granted a certificate under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution and the present appeals	have been brought.
Civil Appeal No. 883 of 1967 arises from the Special	Civil Application No. 1003/65 and the other appeals	are in the other petitions. This judgment will accordingly dispose of all the appeals.
Before we consider the arguments we may see the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The scheme of the Act, which entered into force almost seventy-five years	ago, is by	now familiar to lawyers and courts and it is not necessary to refer in detail to it.	The High Court has painstakingly analysed	the provisions	already. We	shall refer in passing to what is material	to the discussion, Acquisition of land under the Act originarily begins with a preliminary inquiry. Government notifies first under s. 4 that 'land in	any locality is needed or is likely to be needed' for a public purpose. Public notices are also given.
This enables the officers of Government to enter upon	lands to survey them and also enables persons interested to object to the acquisition generally	and also particularly in accordance with the provisions of s. 5A of the	Act.	After the objections have been considered	and Government has satisfied itself on the report or reports of the Collector that a particular land is needed, a	second	notification is issued under s. 6 that a particular land is needed for the public purpose.	This declaration is conclusive evidence that the land is so needed and Government then proceeds to acquire the land. The procedure is detailed in the sections	that follow.	Under s. 9 (1 ) the Collector causes public notices to be given that Government intends to take possession of the lands and that claim to compensation for all	interests in lands shall be made to him. Then commence proceedings for the fixation of compensation with the details of	which procedure we are not	presently concerned.	When	these proceedings are completed the Collector makes his award about the true area, the compensation to	be allowed and the apportionment of that compensation among persons known or believed to be interested. When the Collector has made his award (which is made conclusive for certain purposes) s. 16 enables	him to take possession of the lands and the	lands vest absolutely in Government free from all	encumbrances.
The is provided in s. 17. Under this procedure Government in cases award.	There is a shorter procedure for cases of urgency and it is provided in s. 17. Under this procedure Government in cases 271 of urgency, is enabled inter alia to omit the application of s. 5A and to notify the lands under s. 6 at any time	after the publication of the notification under s.	4(1).	Under sub-s. (1) of s. 17, Government can direct the Collector, though	no award has been made, to take possession of any waste or arable lands needed for the public purpose, on the expiration of	fifteen days from the	publication of the notice	under s. 9. Under Sub-s.(4) of the	same section Government may direct that in the case of any land to	which in its opinion the proviSiOns of the first sub-section are applicable, the provisions of s. 5A shall not apply and if it so directs a declaration may be made under s. 6 in respect of that land at any time after the notification under	s. 4 (1) has been published. It will therefore, be noticed that the shorter procedure has been followed here. Before we refer to the	grounds on which the action of Government is challenged we may read ss. 4(1) 6(1) omitting the proviso, and s.17. Although we are principally	concerned with the first and fourth sub-section of the last section we shall be required to refer to the remaining sub-sections, and we shall read the section as a whole:
"4(1) Whenever	it appears to appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published	in the Official Gazette, and the Collector	shall	cause public notice of the substance	of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality.
6(1) Subject to the provisions of Part V/I of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after	considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section	(2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration	shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized	to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of	any land covered by the same	notification under section 4, sub-section' ( 1 ), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (whenever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2).
17(1) In cases of urgency,	whenever the appropriate Government	so directs,	the Collector, though no such award has been	made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), 272 take possession of any waste Or	arable	land needed for public purposes or for a Company.
(2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or	other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to	acquire	the immediate	possession of	any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or that station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, the Collector	may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned	in sub-section (1) and with the previous	sanction of	the	appropriate Government, enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon	vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances:
Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or	part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours' notice of his intention so to do or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience.
(3) In every case under either of the preceding	sub-sections the Collector shall at the time	of taking possession offer to the persons	interested compensation for	the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for	any other damage sustained by	them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24; and, in case s uch offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and the amount of such	other damage shall be allowed for in awarding	compensation for the	land under the provisions herein contained.
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the	appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may	be made under section	6 in respect of the land at 273 any time after the publication of	the notification under section 4, sub-section (1) In	the High Court sub-ss. (1 ) and (4) of s. 17 of the Act were assailed under Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.This argument was placed at the	forefront.In this Court this submission was relegated to the	end.
Apparently not	much faith was reposed in its	potency. The other arguments urged before the High Court and found against the appellants, were	pressed	with vigour upon us.These arguments concern the issue of notifications	invoking the shorter	procedure and those notifications are questioned.
These arguments involve the validity of the notifications as (a) unauthorised by Government, (b) without formation of the necessary opinion on relevant matters, and (c) on erroneous assumption of facts.The first ground, when amplified, is that D.P. Raval, Under Secretary, who signed the	notifications under s. 6 was not duly authorised to do so under the Act and the notifications were, therefore, invalid and of no effect.
Raval's authority to issue the notification under s. 6 is questioned on	the wording of the latter portion of	that section where it is mentioned that "the declaration shah be made under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or some officer duly authorised to certify its orders."	The argument is without substance	The word 'Secretary' is	not defined	either in the Land Acquisition Act or	the General Clauses	Act so as to exclude	Additional, Joint, Deputy, Under or Assistant Secretaries. If this were	established, then it might	be said that	the word was	intended to designate only	the head of	the secretarial department concerned with	land acquisition. No	such indication is available from any source. Nor was it necessary to invest any particular Secretary specially under the Act for no such requirement can be spelled out from the words relied upon.
On the other hand, the business of Government is regulated by the	Rules	of Business made under Art.	166 of	the Constitution. How those Rules operate will be	more fully considered presently when we deal with the second point.
For the present it is sufficient to point	out a	few provisions of the Rules, Rule 7 provides:
"7. Each Department	of the Secretariat shall consist	of the	Secretary to	the Government, who shall be the 274 official head of that Department	and of	such other officers and servants subordinate to him as the State Government may determine :-- Provided that- (a) more than one Department may be placed in charge of the same Secretary;
(b) the work of a Department may be divided between two or more Secretaries." If this Rule stood by itself, it might have been necessary to place on record evidence to establish that the work of	this Department was	divided among the Secretaries and how, but Rules 13 and 15 additionally provide:
"13.Every order or	instrument of	the Government of the State shall be signed either by a Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a joint Secretary,	a Deputy Secretary, an	Under Secretary	or an AssiStant Secretary or such other officer as may be specially empowered in that behalf and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such	order or instrument." "15.These rules may	to such extent as necessary be supplemented by instructions to be issued by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister," Rule 13 specifically places all Secretaries on equality for authentication of orders and instruments of Government and Rule 15 further authorises supplemental	instructions which as we shall presently see were	in fact issued.Thus Raval was competent to sign the declaration as a Secretary.It is not necessary to consider whether he can be treated as an officer 'duly authorised' because he already had authority by virtue	of his office and rule 13 of the Rules	of Business contemplates officers other than Secretaries. But if he did not possess the power as a Secretary he would undoubtedly have been competent as an officer duly authorised by virtue of rule 13 of the Rules of Business and that is all that s. 6 requires. No further special authorisation under the Act was necessary.
To overcome these rather obvious difficulties Mr. B. Sen raised the second point which was that the provisions of the Act require Government to form an opinion and this function cannot	be delegated to the Secretaries and even if it	could be delegated, strict compliance with Rules of Business	and the instructions issued under Rule 15	was necessary. He submits that there was no formation of the necessary opinion in the case before action under s. 17(1) or (4) was taken.
To understand this argument 275 provision on the subject.To	begin with Art.166 of the Constitution provides.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed	in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such	manner	as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the	validity of an	order or instrument which is so authenticated	shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or	instrument made or executed by the Governor.
(3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient	transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is	by or	under	this Constitution required	to act in	his discretion." It is obvious that the executive action of the Government was in fact expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor, and that the orders were authenticated in the manner required by rule 13 of the Rules of Business already	quoted.	The validity of the order could not, of course, be called in question that it was not an order made by the Governor.	Had the Government	sheltered itself behind the constitutional curtain, it is a little doubtful the appellants could	have successfully pierced this barrier by merely stating that the Government had not passed the orders or made the necessary determination without alleging definite facts.	In addition to the constitutional provision there is also the presumption of regularity	of official acts. Orders of Government, whether at ministerial or gubernatorial level, are all issued in the same form and the constitutional protection as well as the presumption both cover the case.
But, as it happens frequently,	Government tried to establish that everything was regular.	A batch of counter affidavits was filed on behalf of Government to show how the matter	was dealt with from stage to stage and the appellant filed affidavits in rejoinder and were not slow to point out infractions or supposed infractions. As they sought to do this on facts furnished by the 276 affidavits on behalf of Government we may say a word	about those affidavits.
No	less than eight affidavits were filed by Government and five affidavits including one supporting	the petition were filed by the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1003 of 1965. Other affidavits on behalf of the	other petitioners repeated the allegations.	The affidavits	filed with the petitions had averted only that Government had not 'made	up its mind	regarding acquired lands', that the satisfaction was 'mala fide' and 'colourable' and that the gap of time between the two notifications itself showed	that there was no urgency.	The affidavits also raised the	issue that the lands were not 'arable lands'. Government apparently took up the challenge and flied affidavit after affidavit.
The first affidavit was filed by L. P. Raval, Under Secretary (Oct. l, 1965) that	the lands were arable lands' and Government had formed the opinion about urgency, and further that the determination of these two matters by Government was not justiciable. This was followed by an affidavit by	the Executive Engineer (Oct. 8, 1965) who stated that the master plan was ready which involved 12 villages including Pethapur where these lands are situated. The lands were involved in the construction of main roads and the laying out of sectors.
He explained the delay between the two notices on the ground that survey had to be done and that took time but reaffirmed that the matter was	urgent. The	appellants promptly questioned the	formation of	opinion by alleging	'that Government had not formed the opinion and that the affidavit of Raval did not establish this. In reply another Under Secretary (Nimbalkar) filed an affidavit (Nov. 8 1965)	that Jayaraman, Deputy Secretary was 'subjectively satisfied' that the lands were 'arable lands' and that there	was urgency	and asserted	that both matters were for	the subjective determination of Government and thus not open to question in a court of law. This was followed	by another affidavit in rejoinder from the appellants (November 24, 1965) 'that Jayaraman had not personally filed any affidavit and therefore it was not clear who had made the subjective determination regarding the matters disputed and the public purpose. Raval 'then swore another affidaVit (August, 1966) giving	details	of the urgency and stated that he	had considered the need for issuing the notification under s. 4 and that 'it was decided' to apply s. 17(4). He also stated that the notification under s. 6 and the application of s.
17(1 ) was considered first by him and then by Jayaraman and they had agreed to issue the notification and apply	s.
17(1).	Another affidavit ill rejoinder was filed during the hearing (December 2, 1966) that neither Raval nor Jayaraman had stated that they had satisfied themselves about- s.
17(4) nor had	Raval or Jayaraman stated that they	were authorised by the State Government 277 or by the Rules of Business or by any special order to	form the said opinion. A number of affidavits were then	fled.
".....for the purpose of urgently acquiring the lands for the Capital Project, I had	given instructions initially to Shri S.M. Dudam	and subsequently to Shri A.S. Gill after he became the Secretary of the Revenue Department, and had made arrangements with them, during	their respective tenures as	Secretaries of	the Revenue Department, to take necessary action for urgent acquisition of lands for the Capital Project and had also instructed them that	they or the concerned Deputy Secretaries or	Under Secretaries in the Revenue Department	may, without bringing	the cases to	my personal notice and without referring such cases to me, issue notifications under sections 4 and 6 o/the Land Acquisition	Act and may	apply urgency clause under section 17(1) and (4) of the said Act as the case may be wherever it was possible to invoke the urgency clause according to law." S.M. Dudani who was Secretary 'till April 2, 1965 and	A.S.
Gill who followed him swore two affidavits. Their purport was almost the same A.S. Gill said:
".....Shri Utsavbhai S. Parikh,	the Hon'ble Minister	for the Revenue Department for the purpose	acquiring lands urgently for	the Capital Project had given instructions to me and had	made arrangements with	me to take necessary	action	for urgent acquisition of lands for the Capital Project and had	also instructed me that myself or the concerned Deputy Secretaries or the Under-Secretaries in the Revenue Department may, without bringing the cases to his personal notice	and without referring	such	cases	to him, issue notifications under sections 4 and 6 of	the said Act and may apply urgency clause under sections 17(1) and (4) of the said Act, as the case may	be, wherever it was	possible to invoke the urgency clause according to law.
I	had given instruction to the concerned Deputy secretaries and the under Secretaries of the Revenue Department	to take necessary actions under sections 4 and 6 of the said Act and to apply the urgency clause wherever it was possible according to law." The appellants	then filed a last affidavit in rejoinder denying	the power of the Minister to delegate by	oral instructions his own 278 power to the Secretary and questioned the sub-delegation to the Deputy and Under Secretaries.
It	would thus appear that the controversy got enlarged as time passed and Government undertook more and more burden although there was hardly any attempt by the appellants to support	their assertions by mentioning any facts. The	High Court noticed in its judgment that there was really nothing in the	original affidavit supporting	the petition which Government need have answered and yet it allowed affidavits to be filed during the hearing and even in the midst of	the pronouncement of the judgment.	Each affidavit on the	side of Government itself enabled the appellants to enlarge their allegations and to take up new stands.	This unusual course appears	to have been	permitted from a desire to be	just and fair but was hardly proper and the High	Court ought really	to have stemmed the flow of affidavits, keeping	the appellants to their burden and the Government to its burden, if any.	The Government also did not leave the appellants to their burden which would have been heavy in view of	the presumption and the provisions of Art. 166(2) already mentioned.
The	High Court having before it allegations, counter allegations and denials dealt first with the legal side of the matter. Then it readily accepted the affidavits on	the side of Government. If it had reversed its approach it	need not have embarked upon (what was perhaps unnecessary) an analysis of the many principles on which onus is distributed between	rival	parties and the tests on which subjective opinion as distinguished from an opinion aS to the existence of a fact, is held open to review in a court of law.	As stated	already there is a strong presumption of regularity of official acts and added thereto	is the	prohibition contained in Art. 166(2). Government was not called	upon to answer the kind of affidavit which was filed with	the petition because bare denial that Government had not formed an opinion could not raise an issue.	Even if Government under	advice offered to disclose how the matter was dealt with, the issue did	not change and	it was	only this.
Whether	any one at all formed an opinion and	if he	did whether	he had the necessary authority to do	so.The	High Court having accepted	the affidavits that	Raval	and Jayaraman had	formed	the necessary	opinion was	only required to see if they	had the competence.The High Court after dealing with many matters held that they had.
Mr. B. Sen has, therefore, very rightly confined himself to this aspect of the case. and has questioned	the competence of Raval and Jayaraman to act for the Government.
His contention	is that the procedure followed by	the Minister-in-Charge offended the Rules of Business	and therefore the necessary satis- 279 faction	or the opinion of Government was wanting in	the case. In support he has relied upon Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji(1). Mr. Sen's argument proceeds like this:
Under the	Rules of Business (Rule 4) the	business of Government is to be transacted in the Department specified in the First Schedule and item No. 15 covers the topic of acquisition of property and	the principles on which compensation is to be determined and it is assigned to	the Revenue	Department. Each Department	of the	Secretariat consists of a Secretary to the Government (Rule 7) but	the work may be divided between two or more Secretaries.	The Minister-in-Charge is primarily responsible for the disposal of the business appertaining to the Department	(Rule	10).
Therefore only	'the Minister	for Revenue could decide questions. Referring to the oral instructions said to	have been given by the Minister, Mr. Sen refers to	the instructions issued by the Governor under Rule 15 and draws attention to paragraph 3 of the instructions which reads:
"3. Except as otherwise provided in these Instructions, cases shall ordinarily	be disposed of by, or under the authority of	the Minister-in-Charge, who	may by means	of standing	orders, give such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in	the Department.	Copies	of such standin g orders shall be sent to the Governor and the Chief Minister." He contends that a general instruction of the type mentioned by the Minister in his affidavit could only be given as a standing order	of which a copy had to be sent to	the Governor and the Chief Minister and, therefore, the	oral instructions had no validity in law.	He submits in	the alternative that at least an order in writing ought to	have been passed.
Mr.	S.V. Gupta in reply contends that this overlooks the opening words of Rule 10 which are "without prejudice to the provisions of rule 7," indicating that the business of land acquisition is to be transacted in the Revenue Department (Rule 4) by the Secretary to the Department (Rule 7 read	with Rule 10) although the Minister is primarily responsible for the disposal of the business. He then draws attention to the provisions of Rule 13 where a Secretary is equated to Additional,	Joint,	Deputy, Under and Assistant Secretaries for certain purposes and	the definition of Secretary in paragraph (1 )(vii) which includes	these other functionaries for 'the purpose of the Instructions.	Mr.
Gupte next reads with paragraph 3	the provisions	of paragraphs 4 and 5 which provide:
280 "4. Each Minister shall arrange	with the Secretary of the Department what matters or classes of matters are to be brought to his personal notice." "5.Except	as otherwise provided	in these Instructions cases shall be submitted by the Secretary in the Department to which the case belongs to the Minister-in-charge." Mr. Gupta contends that there is nothing in the Rules or Instructions that oral instructions,	if clearly issued, cannot	confer on the Secretaries the power to	make determinations	and submits that Standing Orders refer to all cases generally and oral instructions ,can be issued in certain particular contingencies and this was done as stated in the affidavits of the Minister, A.S. Gill and S.M. Dudani which have been accepted. He contends that there is no sub- delegation because Rule 7(b) covers this case.
In our	judgment the argument	of Mr. Gupte	is valid.There is nothing in the Rules or	Instructions which prescribes that the authority must be in writing or by Standing Orders. Standing 'Orders are necessary for	the disposal of cases in the Department (paragraph 3) and	this applies	to cases generally.	Paragraph 4, on the other hand, refers to "matters or classes of matters" and that is not a "case" but a "matter" in a case.	The definition of case in the Instructions is:
"Case includes	the papers under consideration and all previous	papers	and notes put in connection therewith to enable the question raised to be disposed of", but this definition is excluded by the context.Although	the case belongs to a Department [paragraph 2(i)],the word	case in paragraph 3 obviously refers to the disposal of cases and not to matters arising in a	case regarding which	the Minister may arrange with the Secretary whether they are to be brought to his personal notice or not. The matters	here were application of s. 17(1) and (4) to the acquisition of waste and arable lands and the Minister could	leave	this matter	to his	Secretaries as he did.	For this purpose Standing Orders were not only not necessary but would be inappropriate.
Reliance was placed upon the decision of	the Orissa High Court in Shayamaghana Ray v. State(1) that Rules 15 must prevail over the instructions. But	'that	Rule itself provides that the Rule may be supplemented by	instructions and the	power so conferred was available in paragraph 4 to provide that the 'Minister may arrange with the Secretary of his Department what ,(1) A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 230.
281 matters	or classes of matters are to be brought to	Iris personal notice. This dispenses with the taking of orders of the Minister each time.
Mr.Sen then refers to the words of ss.4, 6 and 17(1) and (4) which are different.In s.4 the words are	whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that	land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed' while in s.6 the words are 'when the appropriate Government is satisfied' and in	s. 17(4) the words are 'in	the opinion of the appropriate Government'. He contends that some difference must be made between them and when sub-ss. (1 ) and (4) of s.17 require, a direction from the appropriate Government the determination must be by the Minister himself.If the sections stood by themselves this argument would be unanswerable but we have the Rules of	Business which specifically	allow conferral of powers on Secretaries and the determination of the Secretary becomes	the	determination	of Government.Mr.Sen's reference to Emperor v.Shibnath Banerji's case(1) is not apposite because the circumstances there	were different.That case arose from petitions under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking directions in the nature of habeas corpus on behalf of certain pensons	detained in pursuance of orders made under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules 1939. It appears that detentions were dealt with in Bengal in	the Home Department and the Home Minister Bengal,	in the Bengal Legislative Assembly in answer to interpellations, slated that he had directed that on receipt of the	report of arrest under Rule 129 (Defence of	India Rules 1939) together with a recommendation by the police for detention under Rule 26, orders of detention	under	Rule 26(1) (b) should at once be issued as a matter of course subject to review by	Government on	receipt of further details. As Lord Thankerton pointed out tthat clearly	meant the substitution of the recommendation by the police in place of the recommendation of the Governor prescribed by Rule 26 and equally rendered any order under r. 26 in conformity with the Home Minister direction, to which their Lordships referred as the routine order, ab initio void and invalid as not being in conformity with	the requirements of r.	26.
Further	Mr. Porter, the Additional Home Secretary, in an affidavit regarding Shibnath Banerji stated:
"10. Shibnath Banerji: He was arrested by the Police under r. 129, Defence of India Rules on 20th October 1942. On 27th October 1942, I considered the materials before me and in accordance with the general order of Government directed the issue of an order of detention under r.26(1)(b) Defence of India Rules.On receipt of fuller materials the	case was later submitted for consideration of	the Honourable 282 Home Minister, Bengal, from whom no order directing	withdrawal or modification of	the order of detention was received." "Their Lordships are unable to read	Mr.
Porter's	state- ment that he had considered the materials before him as involving anything more than he has considered the report of	the arrest and the recommendation of the police to see if there was material sufficient to justify the issue of an rder under the routine order. It cannot mean that, in spite of	the direction of the Home Minister in the routine order, he considered the materials before	so as to satisfy himself, independently of	the police recommendation that an order under r.26 should be issued. That would	not be in accordance with the requirement of the routine order that-the	police	having	recommended it--the order of detention should be issued as a matter of course.
The	position in the present case is different. If	Mr.
Porter	had sworn the affidavit that he had considered	the need for detention, quite apart from the routine order,	the result might have been different because of the orders being in the name of the Governor and by his order.	In any	case Mr. Porter admitted that he had not considered the matter.
In our	case the Secretaries	concerned were given	the jurisdiction to take action on behalf	of Government	and satisfied themselves about the need for acquisition under s.
6, the urgency of the matter and the existence of waste	and arable	lands for the application of sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 17. In view of the Rules of Business and the Instructions their determination became the determination of Government and no exception could be taken. Of course, if Government had relied upon the provisions of Art. 166(2) and	the presumption of regularity of official acts, all this enquiry would have become unnecessary since the appellants had	not originally pleaded any fact.s leading to any enquiry.
However, on a	review of the affidavits the provisions of the Act and the Business Rules and instructions we	are satisfied that the directions under sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 17 were not invalid.
This brings us to the contention that since the lands in question were	under cultivation, they did not constitute 'waste	or arable lands' because by arable land is meant land capable of being ploughed or fit for village and not land actually Cultivated. The High Court has rejected	this contention disagreeing	with a decision of the	Bombay	High Court reported in Sadruddin Sideman v.
283 J.H. Patwardhan(1). Mr. Sen has adopted the judgment of the Bombay High. Court as part of his argument. Mr. Gupte in his reply has ruled upon Guntur Ramalakhsmana and Others v.
Government of Andhra. Pradesh and another(2),	Baldeo	Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others(3) and	Smt.
Lakshmi Devi & others v. The State of Bihar and others(4) and the reasons given in the judgment under appeal. We	shall first deal with the three rulings from Andhra Pradesh, Allahabad and	Patna High Courts. The first	contains no discussion and may not be referred to here. In the case from Allahabad reference is made	to s. 17 ( 3 )	of the Act (already quoted) in which there is a provision that standing crops must be compensated for and it is inferred that by 'arable	lands' must	be meant not	only land fit	for cultivation but also land actually under cultivation. In the case from Patna reference is made to Halsbury's Laws of England (II Edn.) Vol. 14 p. 633 paragraph 1187, where arable land is shown as including untilled land.
In the case from Bombay relied upon by Mr. Sen three different reasons were given.	First	several	dictionaries were referred to and reliance was placed upon the Oxford Dictionary in preference to Webster's	particularly because the Oxford Dictionary did not mention land	under actual cultivation as	one of the meanings	although Webster's Dictionary did. The learned Judges	next referred to the etymology of the word 'arable' and finally to the dicta of Judges in Palmer v. McCormick(5) and 'Simmons v. Norton(6).
Support	was then found for the view in s. 17(3) of the	Act, the mention	of compensation for standing	crops notwithstanding.
There is no definition of the word 'arable' in	the original Land	Acquisition Act.A local	amendment includes garden lands in the expression.	Now lands are of different kinds:	there	is waste-land	desert-land, pasture-land, meadow	land,	grass-land wood-land,	marshy-land, hilly land, etc. and arable land. The Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning	of 'arable' as. capable of being ploughed; fit	for village; opposed to pasture-land or wood land and gives the root as arablis in	Latin.	The learned Judges	have unfortunately not given sufficient attention to the kinds of land and the contrast mentioned with the meaning. Waste-land comes from the Latin vastitas or vastus (empty, desolate, without trees or grass or buildings). It was always usual to contrast vastus with incultus (uncultivated) as in the phrase 'to lay waste' (agrivastate)..A meadow or pasture-land is pratum	and arable is arvum and Cicero spoke 'of prata et arva (meadow and arable (1) A.I.R. 1965 Bom. 224. (2) A.I.R. 1967 A.P. 280.
284 lands).	Grass-land is not meadow or pasture-land and in Latin is known as campus as for example the well-known Campus Marflus at Rome, where the comitia (assembly of	the Roman people ) used to meet. Woodlands is silvae, nemora or saltus.
We have given these roots became a great deal depends on the distinctions thus visible in understanding the judicial decisions of English and Irish Courts.	Lands described in different combinations of words such as waste and arable or arable	and pasture or pasture and	woodland emphasise different aspects of land. In many cases the	change	from one kind of use to another was held to be waste. It is in this sense that Coke on Littleton 53b	(quoted in Oxford Dictionary) said that the conversion of meadow into arable or arable into wood is waste but 2 Roll. Ab. 815 said	that 'if meadows be sometimes arable, and sometimes meadow, and sometimes pasture, then the ploughing of them is not waste.' In Lord Darey	v. Askwith (Heb. 234) it is laid down as "generally true that the lessee hath no power to change	the nature	of the thing demised: he cannot turn	meadow	into arable,	nor stub a wood to make it pasture, nor dry up an ancient pool or piscary, nor suffer ground to be surrounded, nor decay the	pale of a park "It was thus in Simons v.
Norton(1) which was	an action of waste for ploughing ancient meadow that Tindal C.J. made the observations which are relied upon in the Bombay case. He observed:
"It	is clearly established	by several authorities, that ploughing meadow land is waste.......In	grants,land often passes specifically, as meadow, pasture, arable, or by other descriptions. Ploughing meadowland is also	esteemed waste on another account;
namely, that in ancient meadow, years, perhaps ages, must elapse before the	sod can be restored	to the state in which it was before ploughing. The law, therefore, considers	the conversion of pasture into arable as prima facie injurious to the landlord on those	two grounds at least." Similarly, the observations of	Chatterton V.C. in Palmer v. McCormick(2) and of Fitzgibbon J. in the same	case cannot	lead to any conclusion that 'arable land' means	only land capable of cultivation and not land actually cultivated.
Tiffs was also a case of' alleged waste. Chatterton	V.C.
"arable' does not	mean land actually ploughed up or in tillage but land capable or fit to be so: for ought I know	this land, though properly designated arable in 1821, may even then have been in process of acquiring (1) 131 E.R. 249. (2) 1890 25 Ir. Rep, 110.
285 the character of ancient pasture, which process have commenced, and been going on	for sometime." Mr.	Justice Fitzgibbon observed that because the	laud was not .in grass for 20 years the defendant could treat it as arable. 'that is. cultivable by	him. The contrast between	grass-land and arable is thus established but it does not rule out that arable land does not include	land actually cultivated. As a matter of fact the passage	from Chatterton V.C. is correctly understood in Stroude's	not only land actually ploughed upon in tillage but also I	and capable or fit to be so. In tiffs connects it is useful to see that in the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923 (13 and 14 Geo. 5 c.9) 'arable land' is defined as not including land in grass, and in the second schedule to the Agriculture Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo. 6 c. 48) special direction may be given by the	Minister requiring the ploughing up of any	land consisting of permanent pasture, and the land is deemed	'to be arable land and to have been arable land at all material times.	It is thus clear that by arable land is meant	not only laud capable of cultivation but also actually cultivated. It is not arable not because it is cultivated demonstrates its nature as arable land.
All	this discussion by us was necessary to	dispel	the inferences drawn from dictionaries and repons of cases	from England and Ireland, but 'the safest guide, as	always, is the statute itself which is being considered. In	this connection we may first turn to the Land Acquisition Act of stood:
In cases of urgency, whenever the Local Government so directs. the Collector (though no such reference has	been directed or award made) may, on the expiration	of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in	the first paragraph of section nine, take	possession of	any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company.
Such land	shall thereupon vest	absolutely in	the Government free from all encumbrances.
The	Collector shall offer to the	persons	interested compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land; and in case such offer is	not accepted,	the, value of such	crops and trees shall	be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained." LISup.CI./68 4 286 It will be noticed that compensation was then	payable for standing crops and trees (if any). There can be no question of crops on waste land for the crops can only be on arable lands became if crops could grow or were actually grown	the land would hardly be waste.The words in	parenthesis obviously indicate that land may have crops or be fallow and compensation was payable crops if there were crops.
Turning now to the section as it is today it will be noticed that the first sub-section corresponds to the first and second paragraphs of s. 17 of the Act of	1870 taken together. The third paragraph of the former Act corresponds to the third	sub-section of 'the	present. Act.	The difference in language in the third sub-section necessary because	the provisions of sub-section (3) are now intended to apply also to the second sub-section of the present	Act 'which is new.	Hence the opening words 'in every case under either of the preceding sub-sections' which means all cases arising either under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2).	The words in parenthes is (if any) in relation to the first	sub-section continue to have the same force and no other, as they	had previously. The learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay did not give sufficient consideration to the fact that	the opening	words "in every case under either of the preceding sub-sections" do not play and more part than	to indicate that what follows applies equally to cases under sub-s.(1) and sub-s. (2). They ought to have read the	words	that follow	the opening words in relation to sub-s. (1) and if they had so read them, there would have been no difficulty in seeing the force of the words in parenthesis (if any) or why crops are mentioned when the words of the	sub-section are waste and arable.The quotation from Roger's	Agriculture and Prices quoted in the Oxford Dictionary-"half the arable estate,	as a	rule, lay in fallow",gives a clue to	the meaning of the words 'if any'.	In our judgment, therefore, the conclusion of the Bombay High Court was erroneous	and the judgment under appeal is right on this point.
Finally there remains	the question	of	the constitutionality of sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 17. On	this point very little was said and it is sufficient to say	that the High Court judgment under appeal adequately answers	all objections.
In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed.We, however,think that this is a proper case in	which there should be no order about costs and direct accordingly.