Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2003_documents/03me41Ade.htm
Timestamp: 2013-05-18 16:37:26
Document Index: 426619833

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2902', '§ 2902', '§ 2903', '§ 56', '§ 2902', '§\n2902', '§ 2902']

Revised: May
Panel: CLIFFORD
and RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
[¶1] Terri Despres appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court (York
County, Brennan, J.) granting David
Moyer's motion for a partial summary judgment and granting his motion to report
the case to this Court to decide:
the foreign object exception to the statute of limitations set forth in 24
M.R.S.A. § 2902[1]
works to circumvent the usual three year statute of limitations when the
foreign object in question was not placed in the patient by the physician sued.
Despres asserts there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Moyer, an oral surgeon, placed in
her body the foreign object that was later removed from her sinus; and that
being so, we should vacate the partial summary judgment and not decide the
reported question. Moyer moves to
dismiss Despres's appeal. We
consolidated the Superior Court's order of report and Despres's appeal, along
with Moyer's motion to dismiss, and we affirm the partial summary judgment
entered by the Superior Court and proceed to answer the reported question.
[¶2] We agree with Moyer's assertion that
there is no genuine issue of material fact in this case because Despres's
statements in her response to Moyer's statement of material facts do not supply
references to competent evidence to controvert Moyer's assertion that: (1) he
did not put anything into Despres's sinus, and (2) no item originating with
Moyer migrated into Despres's sinus. Because we agree that Despres's statement, asserting that she did not
put anything into her sinus, is insufficient to controvert Moyer's material
facts, we find no genuine issue of material fact and therefore affirm the
Superior Court's grant of a partial summary judgment to Moyer. We address the reported question and
conclude that the foreign object exception to the statute of limitations set
forth in 24 M.R.S.A. § 2902 does not work to circumvent the usual
three-year statute of limitations when the foreign matter at issue was not
placed in the patient by the physician sued.
[¶3] The parties agree that on July 31,
1996, Dr. Jay Beauchemin extracted a molar from Despres's upper right jaw. A fistula or hole developed between the
socket from which the tooth was extracted and Despres's sinus. Despres also developed a dry
socket. Beauchemin treated Despres
for her dry socket and fistula until August 29, 1996, when he referred her to
Moyer for further treatment. Moyer
first saw Despres on September 3, 1996.
[¶4] The parties disagree as to what
happened next. On September 9,
1996, Moyer removed material from Despres's sinus. Despres contends that, as Moyer's contemporaneous notes
indicate, he removed five pieces of gauze, including a dry socket dressing. Moyer asserts that he removed four
pieces of "gauze," which were actually elongated, twisted, rolled pieces of
toilet paper or tissue paper, and one dry socket dressing. Moyer states that the dry socket
dressing he removed from Despres's sinus was not the type used in his office
and he does not know from where it, or any of the "gauze," came. He states that after he cleaned
Despres's tooth socket, he inserted into it a fully intact piece of the
specific type of radiopaque dry socket dressing used in his office. [¶5] When Despres returned the next day, however, the dressing appeared to be
gone and a Panorex x-ray failed to reveal any dressing in her sinus. After Moyer cleaned and examined the
tooth socket, he closed the fistula. On September 16 and 19, Moyer replaced some of the sutures inserted on
[¶6] The parties agree that Moyer continued to treat Despres until her last
office visit on October 24, 1996; he then referred Despres for further
treatment to Dr. Paul Kluger, an ear, nose, and throat specialist, whom she
first saw on November 4, 1996; on November 8, Despres had a CT scan of her
sinus; and on December 10, 1996, Kluger performed a surgical procedure on
Despres's sinus and removed gauze and other material from her right maxillary
[¶7] Exactly three years after the surgery performed by Kluger, on December
10, 1999, Despres filed a notice of claim against Moyer for professional
negligence, pursuant to 24 M.R.S.A. § 2903 (2000). Moyer moved for a summary judgment, which the Superior Court
denied. He then filed a motion for
reconsideration or, in the alternative, a motion to report the case to this
Court. After a hearing, the
Superior Court granted the summary judgment "to the extent that [the court]
finds that Respondent did not place anything in Claimant's sinus and the matter
subsequently removed from Claimant's sinus did not originate with the
Respondent." The court also
granted Moyer's motion pursuant to M.R. App. P. 24(c) to report the case to us
to resolve the above legal issue. [¶8] Despres appealed and Moyer moved to
dismiss her appeal as interlocutory.
[¶9] Before we consider the reported
question, we must consider whether the court's grant of a summary judgment was
proper. If there are factual
circumstances that are unresolved, it is premature for us to answer the
reported question.
[¶10] We review a grant of a summary judgment de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment has been entered to determine whether the parties' statements of material fact and the record evidence they reference reveal a genuine issue of material fact. Bay View Bank, N.A., v. The Highland Golf Mortgagees Realty Trust, 2002 ME 178, ¶ 9, 814 A.2d 449, 451-52. "A genuine issue exists when sufficient evidence requires a factfinder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." MP Assocs. v. Liberty, 2001 ME 22, ¶ 12, 771 A.2d 1040, 1044. "A material fact is one having the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Id. [¶11] We review the trial court decision for errors of law. Petillo v. City of Portland, 657 A.2d 325, 326 (Me. 1995). The opposing party to a summary judgment motion is given the benefit of "any inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence." Jenness v. Nickerson, 637 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Me. 1994) (quoting 2 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 56.4 at 39 (2d ed. 1970)); see also, Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 9, 784 A.2d 18, 22 ("When facts or reasonable inferences are in dispute on a material point, summary judgment may not be entered."). The summary judgment process "is not a substitute for trial. If material facts are disputed, the dispute must be resolved through fact-finding, even though the nonmoving party's likelihood of success is small." Id. ¶ 7.
[¶12] While the statements of material facts
and the responses thereto reveal differences of opinion as to what happened or might have happened, Despres
has not produced admissible evidence to support her contention that genuine
issues of material fact exist as
to whether Moyer placed anything in her that could have migrated into her
sinus. We therefore affirm the
summary judgment. B. Reported
[¶13] M.R. App. P. Rule 24(c), provides the
criteria necessary for the trial court to report a case to this Court:
If the trial court is of the
opinion that a question of law involved in an interlocutory order or ruling
made by it ought to be determined by the Law Court before any further
proceedings are taken, it may on motion of the aggrieved party report the case
to the Law Court for that purpose and stay all further proceedings except such
as are necessary to preserve the rights of the parties without making any
decision therein.
[¶14] We have discretion as to whether to
accept or reject a report, see Toussaint v. Perreault, 388 A.2d 918, 920 (Me. 1978) ("A report under Rule
72(c)[2]
does not automatically require the Law Court to decide the issue reported."); Laverdiere
v. Marden, 333 A.2d 701, 702 (Me. 1975),
and we observe guidelines in exercising that discretion, see, e.g.,
Morris v. Sloan, 1997 ME 179, ¶ 7, 698 A.2d
1038, 1040-41; Cobb v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 A.2d 38, 40 (Me. 1995); Knox v. Combined Ins. Co., 542 A.2d 363, 365 (Me. 1988); and Touissaint, 388 A.2d at 920. "The question of law reported must be of sufficient
importance and doubt to justify
the report." Toussaint, 388 A.2d at 920. We do not accept a report if the question raised on report
"might not have to be decided at all because of other possible dispositions," Morris, 1997 ME 179, ¶ 7, 698 A.2d at 1041. We have rejected reports when the issue
is not novel, when it can be resolved by applying well established rules of
law, and when it does not require statutory interpretation. See
Toussaint, 388 A.2d at 920. [¶15] This case meets all the M.R. App. R. 24(c) requirements for a Law Court
report and meets all of the other legal mandates. It raises an issue of first impression in Maine, and at the
same time, one capable of frequent repetition. As the Superior Court noted, 24 M.R.S.A. § 2902 does not
specifically address the legal question at issue here, yet it is a question
relevant to "all medical malpractice cases alleging the foreign object
exception, and potentially all in which foreign matter of any type is
involved"; therefore, it is "of sufficient doubt and importance to justify
reporting it" to us for resolution. As such, we find that the reported question is properly before us.
[¶16] Because this is an issue of first
impression in Maine, we look for guidance to the plain language of the statute,
McKeeman v. Cianbro Corp., 2002 ME 144,
¶ 7, 804 A.2d 406, 408; legislative intent; related Maine cases, Moholland
v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2000
ME 26, ¶ 6, 746 A.2d 362, 364; and case law from other jurisdictions,
Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 49,
770 A.2d 592, 609. [¶17] The plain language of 24 M.R.S.A. §
2902[3]
does not explicitly define "leave," and the legislative debate during the statute's enactment provides no clear
guidance, other than revealing the Legislature's determination to rein in
rising medical malpractice claims and their resulting impact on insurance
premiums to doctors and hospitals. 2 Legis. Rec. 1163-67 (1986).
[¶18] We have held that "[T]he surgeon bears
the responsibility for exercising the ultimate control, in a supervisory sense
at the very least, for placing objects in and removing them from the patient's
body during surgery." Myrick v.
James, 444 A.2d 987, 995 (Me. 1982)
(citations omitted). [¶19] Courts in other jurisdictions have
refused to grant the foreign object exception to circumvent the statute of
limitations where the physician sued did not introduce the foreign objects into
the patient. See, e.g., Dalbey
v. Banks, 264 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. 1980); Clark
v. Mem'l Hosp. of Bainbridge, 243 S.E.2d
695, 696 (Ga. 1978); Garrett v. Brooklyn Hosp., 471 N.Y.S.2d 621, 622 (N.Y.App. Div. 1984); and Soto
v. Greenpoint Hosp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).[4] Although these cases involve foreign
matter introduced in accidents rather than medical procedures, they are
sufficiently analogous to provide guidance. See also, Chisolm
v. N.Y. Hosp., 694 N.Y.S. 2d 561, 564-65
(1999), aff'd, 2003 N.Y. App.
Div. LEXIS 3542. Compare
Ivey v. Scoggins, 295 S.E. 2d 164, 165-66
(1982) (holding that the foreign object exception applies where a single
physician placed and left a foreign object in the patient's body during
treatment; physician may be charged with actual knowledge). But see Miller v. Jacoby, 33 P.3d 68, 72 (Wash. 2001) (holding that
professional negligence case may proceed against a doctor for leaving in a
patient's body part of a Penrose drain that a previous doctor had intentionally
placed there for a medical purpose; court opined that drain part became a
foreign object when second doctor, who had been alerted to presence of whole
Penrose drain, inadvertently left part of it in surgical patient). [¶20] Moyer persuades us that in cases such
as this, legislative intent and applicable case law indicate that rather than
expanding the foreign object exception to cover instances in which a patient or
a third party, including a previous doctor, inserted foreign matter into the
patient, we should construe the exception narrowly. In such instances, the usual three-year statute of limitations
in section 2902, not the discovery rule applicable to the foreign object
exception, governs the patient's allegations that a physician's surgery,
diagnosis, or treatment was negligent. If we applied the foreign object exception to such instances, as Moyer
notes, "the exception to the statute would necessarily expand such that it
would threaten to swallow the rule in all cases involving 'foreign matter,'
[¶21] We conclude, therefore, that one can
only "leave" a foreign object that one has inserted, and that if a physician
has not inserted the foreign object in question, the exception to the statute
does not apply. This is not to say
that a physician incurs no liability for having failed to remove an object the
physician did not insert but should have removed; it is only to say that the
foreign object exception to the statute of limitations does not apply to such
cases. Moyer cannot be charged
with the same responsibility for an object in Despres's sinus as the physician
or dentist who may have initially placed the object in her body. As Moyer contends, "[A]ny alleged
failure on [his] part to detect additional debris is founded upon a claim for
negligent diagnosis or surgery [i.e. an inadequate "cleanout"] of Claimant's
sinus cavity, and not upon the introduction of a foreign object into
Claimant's" body.
[¶22] Accordingly, in the posture of this
case, we conclude that when the foreign object did not originate with the
physician being sued, the foreign object exception to the usual three-year
statute of limitations does not apply. The
and remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. __________________________
[1] Section 2902
reads in relevant part:
professional negligence shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of
action accrues. For the purposes
of this section, a cause of action accrues on the date of the act or omission
giving rise to the injury . . . . This section does not apply where the cause
of action is based upon the leaving of a foreign object in the body, in which
case the cause of action shall accrue when the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered the harm. For the purposes of this section, the term "foreign object"
does not include a chemical compound, prosthetic aid or object intentionally
implanted or permitted to remain in the patient's body as a part of the health
care or professional services.
24 M.R.S.A. § 2902 (2000). [2]
The text of M.R. Civ. P. Rule 72(c) was abrogated effective December 31, 2001. Appeals filed on or after January 1, 2001 are governed by M.R. App. P. Rule 24 "tracks very closely M.R. Civ. P. 72 . . . ." M.R. App. P. Advisory Notes � 2001.