Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/c778720/united-states-v-walter-cortes/
Timestamp: 2020-05-26 03:27:43
Document Index: 156690611

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 922', '§ 40302', '§ 13981', '§ 40302', '§ 844', '§ 2119', '§ 1202', '§ 1202']

United States v. Walter Cortes, Ninth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
United States v. Walter Cortes , 299 F.3d 1030 ( 2002 )
Congress enacted this statute pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which allows Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Cortes argues that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority by enacting a statute to govern carjacking — a purely local offense, having nothing whatsoever to do with interstate commerce. To support his contention, Cortes relies upon the Supreme Court's recent decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2000); and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 (2000).
In Lopez, the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), which made it a federal crime "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows ... is a school zone." 514 U.S. at 551, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (citation omitted). After extensively surveying the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate: (1) "the channels of interstate commerce;" (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities;" and (3) "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. at 558-59, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (citation omitted). The relevant category in Lopez was Congress's ability to regulate gun possession as an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. The Court noted that the gun possession statute was not limited to any "discrete set of firearm possessions ... [with] an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 562, 115 S. Ct. 1624. It "contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the [conduct] in question affect[ed] interstate commerce."1 Id. at 561, 115 S. Ct. 1624. Nor was the gun possession statute defensible as "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity." Id. at 561, 115 S. Ct. 1624.
In addition, the Court noted that Congress made no legislative findings when enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act. Id. at 563, 115 S. Ct. 1624. Although congressional findings are not normally necessary, they would have enabled the Court to "evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye." Id.
The Supreme Court concluded that the gun possession statute was merely "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise." Id. at 561, 115 S. Ct. 1624. The statute neither regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirement that the gun possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. Thus, the Court invalidated the statute as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authority. Id.
In Morrison, the Court invalidated § 40302 of the Violence Against Women's Act ("VAWA"), 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which created federal civil liability for the commission of a gender-motivated crime. As in Lopez, the Court found important that gender-motivated crime was not economic in nature. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11, 120 S. Ct. 1740. Moreover, § 40302 contained no express jurisdictional element which would limit its reach to a discrete set of gender motivated violence cases that had an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 613, 120 S. Ct. 1740.
Unlike the statute in Lopez, however, VAWA was supported by congressional findings regarding the "serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families." Id. at 614, 120 S. Ct. 1740. Congress found that gender-motivated violence affected interstate commerce "`by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce ... by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.'" Id. at 615, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)).
In Jones, the Court similarly approached the constitutionality of the federal arson statute, which made it a federal crime to damage "by means of fire or an explosive ... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Jones claimed that firebombing an owner-occupied, private residence did not fall within the ambit of the statute because the residence was not "used in" any activity affecting interstate commerce. Jones, 529 U.S. at 850, 120 S. Ct. 1904. The government urged that the private residence was "used in" three activities "affecting commerce." Id. at 854, 120 S. Ct. 1904. The homeowner (1) mortgaged and (2) insured the property through out-of-state entities, and (3) the home received natural gas from interstate sources. Id. at 855, 120 S. Ct. 1904.
The Court noted that "[p]ractically every building in our cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed with supplies that have moved in interstate commerce, served by utilities that have an interstate connection, financed or insured by enterprises that do business across state lines, or bear some other trace of interstate commerce." Id. at 857, 120 S. Ct. 1904. Rather than expose every "building in the land" to the wrath of the arson statute, however, the Court narrowly interpreted the jurisdictional element to encompass only property actively employed for commercial purposes; a "passive, passing, or past connection" to interstate commerce was not sufficient. Id. at 855, 120 S. Ct. 1904. By construing the arson statute narrowly, the Court said it was avoiding the constitutional question that would arise from reading the statute to reach any residence with such an attenuated connection with interstate commerce. Id. at 858, 120 S. Ct. 1904.
At bottom, the statutes in Lopez and Morrison were criminal statutes having nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise. Congress rationalized its Commerce Clause authority to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act and VAWA based solely on the notion that violent crime generally impacts employment, production, transit, and consumption, and thereby substantially affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, however, condemned the idea that Congress could rely on such generalized "costs of crime" for the power to regulate "not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, 115 S. Ct. 1624. The Court required a closer nexus between the criminalized conduct and interstate commerce.
Here, by contrast, the carjacking statute criminalizes illegal activity that directly affects interstate commerce. At the outset, we note that unlike the statutes in Lopez and Morrison, the carjacking statute was enacted as "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S. Ct. 1624. Specifically, it was the lead provision in the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-519 (the "Act"). The Act struck at the burgeoning interstate trade in stolen vehicles and parts. In addition to making carjacking a federal crime, the Act increased penalties for importing and exporting stolen cars; criminalized the operation of chop shops; provided federal funds for anti-car theft organizations; developed a national system for combating title fraud; and increased inspection at border checkpoints.
We are not bound by Congress's findings concerning carjacking's effect on interstate commerce. As the Supreme Court observed "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not make it so." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614, 120 S. Ct. 1740. Rather, whether a particular activity affects interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate it is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n. 2, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)).
In this case, however, we credit Congress's extensive findings which demonstrate exactly how carjacking, as a criminal enterprise, directly and substantially affects interstate commerce. Absent from Congress's findings are the attenuated and inchoate costs of crime condemned in Lopez and Morrison. Indeed, to make the connection between carjacking and interstate commerce, we need not "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S. Ct. 1624. Instead, Congress transparently demonstrated that carjacking substantially affects the interstate commerce markets in automobiles, automobile parts, and automobile insurance.
Here, we decide whether a class of activity, i.e., carjacking, substantially affects interstate commerce such that Congress may regulate it. Our inquiry closely parallels the Supreme Court's inquiries in Lopez and Morrison: whether Congress could regulate certain gun possessions or gender-motivated crimes. Because we decide that carjacking does substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress may regulate it in its entirety. That a particular instance of carjacking may have a de minimis effect on interstate commerce is of no consequence. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n. 27, 88 S. Ct. 2017, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1968)).
That the carjacking statute contains an express jurisdictional element which limits its reach to vehicles that have been "transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce" reinforces our conviction that the carjackings targeted by 18 U.S.C. § 2119 substantially affect interstate commerce. As Lopez recognized, such jurisdictional elements "ensure, through case-by-case inquiry that the[criminalized conduct] in question affects interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S. Ct. 1624. Cortes contends, however, that this particular jurisdictional element does not have a sufficiently close nexus with active interstate commerce, as it encompasses every car in the land based solely on past interstate activity.
Addressing a nearly identical jurisdictional element in Scarborough v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether proof that an illegally possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the nexus between possession of the firearm and commerce.2 431 U.S. 563, 564, 97 S. Ct. 1963, 52 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1977). The Court answered affirmatively; if the government proved that Scarborough's firearms had at some time traveled in interstate commerce, a sufficiently close nexus between possession of the firearms and commerce was established.3
A statute with an express jurisdictional element, former 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), made it a crime for a felon to "receive, posses[s], or transport in commerce or affecting commerce... any firearm."United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971). In Bass, the Court read the "in commerce or affecting commerce" jurisdictional element to apply to all three antecedent offenses; thus avoiding the question whether Congress could constitutionally punish the "mere possession" of firearms. Id. at 339 n. 4, 347, 92 S. Ct. 515. In Lopez, the Court strongly implied that § 1202(a)'s jurisdictional element immunized it from successful constitutional challenge. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62, 115 S. Ct. 1624.
The vitality ofScarborough engenders significant debate. See United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir.1995) (following Scarborough after Lopez); United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554-55 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (adhering to Scarborough but doubting its continued vitality and expecting reversal); see also Brent E. Newton, Felons, Firearms, and Federalism: Reconsidering Scarborough in Light of Lopez, 3 J.App. Prac. & Process 671, 683-84 (2001) (doubting whether Scarborough remains good law after Lopez). Until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise, however, we follow Scarborough unwaveringly.
DocketNumber： 01-50352
Citation Numbers： 299 F.3d 1030
Modified Date： 7/23/2018
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