Source: http://updates.mwbllp.com/2014_04_13_archive.html
Timestamp: 2017-04-29 17:23:09
Document Index: 761958525

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 506', '§ 1325', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 1325', '§ 1325', '§ 1325', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 506', '§ 17200', '§ 338', '§ 17200', '§ 17208', '§1692', '§1692', '§1692']

Financial Services Law Developments: 4/13/14 - 4/20/14
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts recently affirmed a summary judgment ruling In favor of a MERS mortgagee, holding that the MERS mortgage was superior to the plaintiff second-lien holder’s non-MERS mortgage because the MERS mortgage was recorded first. In so ruling, the Court held that a mortgage and note can be “split” if the mortgagee holds both the note and mortgage prior to initiating foreclosure. Additionally, the Court held that, if the note and mortgage are held separately, the holder of the mortgage holds the mortgage in trust for the purchaser of the note. The Court further ruled that only a party or an intended beneficiary may assert a breach of the pooling and servicing agreement, and that MERS has the authority to make a valid mortgage assignment. A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion On May 10, 2006, Borrower purchased real property (the “property”) with a $344,000.00 promissory note provided by a MERS member lender (“Lender”). The loan was secured by a mortgage that identified MERS as the mortgagee and nominee (the “First Mortgage”). Borrower subsequently obtained another loan and granted the plaintiff in this action a non-MERS mortgage to secure the subsequent loan (the “Second Mortgage”). Subsequently, MERS assigned the First Mortgage to the defendant bank (“Defendant”). Borrower defaulted on the First Mortgage and Defendant sent him a notice of intention to foreclose. Plaintiff commenced the instant action arguing the Second Mortgage was superior to the First Mortgage. Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing the First Mortgage was superior. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion and Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, Plaintiff argued Defendant’s mortgage was void “because a mortgage cannot be separated from the promissory note it secures, and MERS did not hold the note secured by the first mortgage.” The Court rejected this argument, holding that a mortgage and the note secured thereby can be “split” as long as the mortgagee holds the note and mortgage prior to initiating foreclosure. Eaton v. Federal Natl. Mort. Assn, 462 Mass. 569, 576, 583-584 (2012). The Court also held that when “the mortgage and the note are held separately, the holder of the mortgage holds the mortgage in trust for the purchaser of the note.” Id. Plaintiff next argued MERS’ assignment of the First Mortgage was invalid. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the assignment “conflicted with a certain pooling and servicing agreement among Lender and various other lenders and with various obligations that flow from that agreement under New York and federal law.” The Court rejected this argument ruling Plaintiff had no standing to challenge the pooling and servicing agreement because Plaintiff was neither a party nor an intended beneficiary of that agreement. The Appellate Court also rejected Plaintiff’s contention that MERS does not have the authority to make a valid mortgage assignment. Furthermore, the Court held that, even if the assignment were invalid, it would not affect the priority of the First Mortgage over the Second Mortgage. Thus, the Court held that “any invalidity in the assignment from MERS to Defendant could not have affected the relative priority of the first mortgage as against the second the mortgage.” Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s granting of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Ralph T. Wutscher McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP The Loop Center Building 105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60602 Direct: (312) 551-9320 Fax: (312) 284-4751 Mobile: (312) 493-0874 Email: RWutscher@mwbllp.com Admitted to practice law in Illinois McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP CALIFORNIA | FLORIDA | ILLINOIS | INDIANA | WASHINGTON, D. C. www.mwbllp.com NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you. Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.mwbllp.com Posted by
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2)’s replacement valuation standard applies even when a Chapter 13 debtor surrenders property in a proposed plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C). A copy of the opinion is available at: http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201313013.pdf In July 2007, a consumer (“Debtor”) purchased a recreational vehicle and entered into a loan agreement secured by the collateral. Debtor later filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The owner of the loan agreement (“Creditor”) filed a proof of secured clam in the amount of the outstanding payoff balance due at the petition date. Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan proposed to surrender the vehicle in full satisfaction of Creditor’s claim. Creditor objected to the confirmation of Debtors’ plan, arguing that the valuation standard for a surrendered vehicle should be based on its foreclosure value. Debtor argued that the valuation standard should be based on the vehicle’s replacement value pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2). Therefore, if the vehicle’s replacement value exceeded the debt, his surrender of the collateral would satisfy both his debt and Creditor’s claim under Chapter 13 plan. The bankruptcy court held that § 506(a)(2) required valuation based on the collateral’s replacement value as set forth by the statute. Creditor appealed the decision with the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court decision. On appeal, the issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether § 506(a)(2)’s replacement value standard applies when a Chapter 13 debtor surrenders collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C). As you may recall, under § 1325(a)(5), a chapter 13 plan’s treatment of an “allowed secured claim” can be confirmed if: (1) debtor retains the collateral and makes payments to creditor, or (2) debtor surrenders the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A)-(C). The term “allowed secured claims” refers to § 506(a). This provision bifurcates a secured creditor’s allowed claim into secured and unsecured portions based on the underlying collateral’s value: An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on the property in which the estate has an interest … is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property … and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest … is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the purposed disposition or use of such property. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006). In other words, where a debtor proposes to surrender collateral to satisfy a claim – such as here – it is to the creditor’s advantage to find the lowest valuation model in order to recover as much of the “deficiency” as possible as an unsecured claim the debtor’s plan. In this this case, Creditor relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1993), which held that a foreclosure value is the proper standard where the debtor propose to retain collateral in a chapter 13 plan. The problem, however, is that Rash predates BAPCPA which added § 506(a)(2). Section 506(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that: If the debtor is an individual in a case under chapter 7 or 13, such value with respect to personal property securing an allowed claim shall be determined based on the replacement value of such property… 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2006). The Eleventh Circuit found that § 506(a)(2) applied to this case by its plain terms because Debtor is an individual in a Chapter 13 case. Although Creditor attempted to argue § 506(a)(2) only applies to cases where the debtor retains collateral, not where it surrenders, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the contention because no much limitation exists in the statute. Creditor also suggested that it would be improper to conduct any valuation at all, because Rash did not state that a court may pre-determine the value of surrendered vehicles under § 506(a). However, this argument was flatly rejected because Creditor conceded that § 506(a)(1) bifurcation applied, and such bifurcation is premised on valuation of the collateral. Creditor further argued that applying § 506(a)(2) in the surrender context would be absurd because it would create a windfall and allow debtors to surrender collateral potentially in full satisfaction of a debt. The Eleventh Circuit was not convinced, because surrender would satisfy Creditor’s secured claim, not the entire debt. As the Court noted, the Creditor would still have an unsecured claim to the extent the debt exceeds the collateral’s judicially determined replacement value. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Creditor’s argument that applying § 506(a)(2) would eliminate Creditor’s contract and state law rights to liquidate and pursue an unsecured claim for deficiency. As explained by the Court, “state law does not govern if the Bankruptcy Code requires a different result.” Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court. Ralph T. Wutscher McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP The Loop Center Building 105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60602 Direct: (312) 551-9320 Fax: (312) 284-4751 Mobile: (312) 493-0874 Email: RWutscher@mwbllp.com Admitted to practice law in Illinois McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP CALIFORNIA | FLORIDA | ILLINOIS | INDIANA | WASHINGTON, D. C. www.mwbllp.com NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you. Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.mwbllp.com Posted by
The Illinois Supreme Court recently affirmed a trial court ruling that the recording and publishing provisions of the Illinois anti-eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) and (3), violated the First Amendment because it burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve a legitimate state interest. In so ruling, the Court held that the recording provision, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), was overbroad as it criminalized the recording of any conversation even those conversations where no privacy interests were implicated. As to the publishing provision, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3), the Court held this provisions was overbroad because it criminalized the publication of any recording made on a cellphone or other such device. A copy of the opinion is available at: https://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2014/114852.pdf Defendant was charged with computer tampering in a separate and unrelated case. On June 18, 2008, Defendant was to be arraigned. However, the docket, the court call sheet and the judge’s half sheet indicated Defendant was not present in court and the arraignment did not take place. Defendant proceeded to obtain the court transcript for June 18, 2008 which stated Defendant was present and arraigned. Defendant attempted to persuade the court reporter to change the transcript on the ground that it was incorrect, but had no success. The court reporter referred Defendant to the Assistant Administrator of the Cook County’s Reporter’s Office, Criminal Division (“Administrator”). The Administrator informed Defendant that any dispute over the accuracy of a transcript had to be taken up with the Judge. Defendant recorded three subsequent telephone conversations with the Administrator, without informing Administrator the conversations were being recorded. Defendant then posted the recordings and their transcripts on her website. Defendant was charged with 3 counts of eavesdropping under 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), and three counts of using or divulging information obtained through the use of an eavesdropping device under 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3). 720 ILCS 5/14-2 states: (a) A person commits eavesdropping when he: (1) Knowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation or intercepts, retains, or transcribes electronic communication unless he does so (A) with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation or electronic communication or (B) in accordance with Article 108A or Article 108B of the “Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963”, approved August 14, 1963, as amended; or . . .(3) Uses or divulges, except as authorized by this Article or by Article 108A or 108B of the “Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963”, approved August 14, 1963, as amended, any information which he knows or reasonably should know was obtained through the use of an eavesdropping device. Defendant moved to declare the eavesdropping statute unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment and Due Process clauses. The trial court agreed, and declared the eavesdropping statute unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. Specifically, the trial court held “the statute appears to be vague, restrictive, and makes innocent conduct subject to prosecution.” Moreover, the trial court determined the eavesdropping statute “lacks a culpable mental state, subjects wholly innocent conduct to prosecution and violates substantive due process.” The State appealed and the Illinois Supreme Court granted review. On appeal, the State argued the eavesdropping statute did not violate the Due Process clause on its face because “it does contain a culpable mental state requiring both knowledge and intent.” The State also argued the eavesdropping statute is constitutional as applied to the defendant because “she admits having recorded and divulged the contents of the conversation knowingly and intentionally.” Further, the State claimed the eavesdropping statute did not raise a First Amendment issue. However, the State argued, even if the Court determined there was a First Amendment issue, the eavesdropping statute was constitutional as it is a “content-neutral restriction on the time, place, and manner of the exercise of first amendment rights and that it is narrowly tailored.” The Illinois Supreme Court first examined whether the eavesdropping statute invoked any First Amendment considerations. The Court found it implicated First Amendment issues and the trial court properly considered them in determining the eavesdropping statute was unconstitutional. Thus, the Court held the First Amendment was “sufficiently implicated by the circuit court’s ruling to permit consideration of defendant’s First Amendment argument.” The Court proceeded to determine the proper level of scrutiny to apply to its Constitutional analysis of the eavesdropping statute. Defendant argued it was subject to intermediate scrutiny and the State conceded the issue. The Illinois Supreme Court next examined if the eavesdropping statute violated the First Amendment. The Court noted the eavesdropping statute will be upheld under the first amendment if it “advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not substantially burden more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broadcast System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 520 U.S. 180, 189, (1997); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). The Court found the eavesdropping statute “criminalized the recording of conversations that cannot be deemed private.” The Court thus determined the eavesdropping statute was too broad, as it made it a felony to record any conversation even those where no privacy interests were implicated. Thus, the Court held the recording provision “burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to serve a legitimate state interest in protecting conversational privacy” and found it unconstitutional. Defendant also argued the publishing provision was unconstitutional. The publishing provision made it a crime to publish any “recording made on a cellphone or other such device, regardless of consent.” The Illinois Supreme Court determined the publishing provision was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment. The Court based its ruling on Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), which held that “under the First Amendment, the state may not bar the disclosure of information regarding a matter of public importance when the information was illegally intercepted by another party who provided it to the disclosing party.” The Court stated it did not matter that the contents of Defendant’s recorded conversations were not a matter of public importance as Defendant’s recordings “cannot be characterized as illegally obtained.” Thus, the Court held that Defendant “cannot be constitutionally prosecuted for divulging the contents of the conversations she recorded, just as the media defendants in Bartnicki could not be prosecuted for disclosing recorded communications.” The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and held the recording and publishing provisions of the eavesdropping statute were unconstitutional. Ralph T. Wutscher McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP The Loop Center Building 105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60602 Direct: (312) 551-9320 Fax: (312) 284-4751 Mobile: (312) 493-0874 Email: RWutscher@mwbllp.com Admitted to practice law in Illinois McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP CALIFORNIA | FLORIDA | ILLINOIS | INDIANA | WASHINGTON, D. C. www.mwbllp.com NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you. Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.mwbllp.com Posted by
The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, recently affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging fraudulent statements relating to the value of the house securing the mortgage loan at issue, in supposed violation of California’s unfair competition law under Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (“UCL”), holding that forecasts of future events are not actionable in fraud. A copy of the opinion is available at: http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H038713.PDF In 2000, the borrowers (“Borrowers”) obtained a $280,000 mortgage loan on their home. In 2002, the Borrowers refinanced the loan, this time borrowing $386,000. In 2005, the Borrowers refinanced again and borrowed $496,000 under a negative amortization loan. According to the Borrowers, they relied on a $620,000 appraisal of the property in connection with the 2005 loan. However, they later discovered that their home was valued between $350,000 and $400,000 when they were seeking another refinance in 2010. After defaulting on loan payments, the Borrowers sued their lender (“Bank”) for fraud and UCL violations, alleging that Bank personnel made two false representations: 1. “The current market value of the real property was $620,000 and appreciating;” and 2. “By refinancing with the ARM loan being offered to [Borrowers], [Borrowers] could bring the early monthly payments down, obtain several years of appreciation to the value of the home, and sell or refinance the home at an appreciated value before having to pay the then due principal of $620,00 and before having to pay the much higher monthly payments.” The trial court sustained Bank’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the fraud and UCL claims were untimely and inadequately pled. On appeal, the Appellate Court first considered whether forecasts of future events may be actionable as misrepresentations. The Borrowers cited Bily Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 408, which recognized that in certain circumstances a representation made by someone possessing superior knowledge or expertise may be regarded as fact. Bily involved a fraud claim rooted in an opinion paragraph in an accounting firm’s audit report, and the appellate court in Bily held that the statements referred to a discrete period covered by the audit; it was making no prediction of the business’s future performance. In contrast, the Bank’s alleged statements here were predictions of future events. The Appellate Court also considered Finch v. McKee (1936) 18 Cal.App.2d 90, which rejected as inactionable a vendor’s statements that a building was constructed “earthquake proof.” The court in Finch reasoned that it is impossible to predict destructive forces of nature and such statements were pure speculations upon which no purchaser had a right to rely. Agreeing with the reasoning in Finch, the Appellate Court held that the Bank’s alleged statements of future events were not actionable in fraud as a matter of law. The Court then considered whether the fair market appraisal representations were sufficient to maintain a cause of action for fraud. Because the Borrowers failed to allege with specificity or provide any documents to support their allegations, such as a copy of the appraisal, the allegations failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements necessary to maintain a claim for fraudulent concealment. Moreover, the Appellate Court agreed that the claim is time barred. As you may recall, the statute of limitations for fraud is three years. CCP § 338(d). However, the limitations period may be tolled until a plaintiff discovers or has reason to discover the fraud. Id. Borrowers alleged that the misrepresentations on which their fraud claim was based occurred in July 2005. They filed their lawsuit six years later in July 2011. Borrowers merely alleged that the fraud was not discovered until 2010, but the Court noted that they did not explain how they made their discovery or how they determined that the 2005 appraisal was a misrepresentation. Thus, even if the Borrowers had pled their claim for fraud with specificity, the claim is still deficient because the claim is untimely. Similarly, the Appellate Court also held that Borrowers’ allegations were also insufficient to maintain a claim under the UCL. As you may recall, California’s unfair competition law prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The Borrowers alleged that Bank violated the UCL in three ways: (1) the two misrepresentations regarding the value of the home and ability to refinance in the future; (2) colluding with others in the housing industry to inflate the value of real estate to entice borrowers into “top loaded” loans and later refusing to refinancing based on the true value of the homes; and (3) misstating that the Borrowers will pay 1% interest on the loan documents. The Appellate Court held that the allegations regarding the value of the home and ability to refinance in the future failed to state a claim due to lack of specificity, in the same way the fraud claim based on the same misrepresentations were deficient. The allegations of supposed collusion with others in the housing industry to inflate the value of real estate to entice borrowers into “top loaded” loans, and later refusing to refinancing based on the true value of the homes, also failed because judicially noticed loan documents contradict Borrowers’ allegations. The Borrowers did not borrow money to purchase their home, but instead they took out an additional $216,000 over two refinances. Lastly, as to the alleged misstatement in the loan documents that the Borrowers will pay 1% interest, the Borrowers admitted they were aware of the negative amortization terms of their loan and accepted those terms in reliance on representations that their home would continue to appreciate. Thus, their alleged injury did not result from the face of the loan document. As another point, the Court noted that the UCL claim is time barred. The statute of limitations for a UCL violation is four years. See Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. The Appellate Court held that the Borrowers failed to plead facts to toll the limitations period, and like the fraud claim, the UCL claim based on events at loan origination fails as untimely. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. Ralph T. Wutscher McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP The Loop Center Building 105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60602 Direct: (312) 551-9320 Fax: (312) 284-4751 Mobile: (312) 493-0874 Email: RWutscher@mwbllp.com Admitted to practice law in Illinois McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP CALIFORNIA | FLORIDA | ILLINOIS | INDIANA | WASHINGTON, D. C. www.mwbllp.com NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you. Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.mwbllp.com Posted by
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit approved of a debt collector’s use of the words “within 30 days of receiving this notice” in its dunning letter, as opposed to the words “within thirty days after receipt of the notice” as stated in 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3). In so ruling, the Court held that a debt collector can use the words “after” and “of” interchangeably in its notice under 15 U.S.C. §1692g. The Court further held a debt collector is not required to specifically state the exact date the 30 day time period to dispute a debt begins. A copy of the opinion is available at: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/14a0054p-06.pdf Defendant Debt Collector (“Debt Collector”) sent Plaintiff Debtor (“Plaintiff”) correspondence concerning a debt owed by Plaintiff. The letter stated that Debt Collector “would assume the validity of a debt unless he disputed it within 30 days of receiving this notice.” Plaintiff filed suit against Debt Collector alleging Debt Collector failed to comply with the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged Debt Collector failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3) (“section 1692”). As you will recall, section 1692 states that a collector must notify the individual that it will assume the validity of the debt unless he disputes “within thirty days after receipt of the notice.” Plaintiff claimed Defendant’s use of the word “of” in the notice instead of the word “after” was a violation of the FDCPA. Defendant moved for a judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appeals. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit examined whether the use of the word “of” instead of “after” was a violation of section 1692. The Court held Defendant’s failure to use the word “after” made no difference in interpreting the letter sent to Plaintiff and therefore, no FDCPA violation occurred. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held that a debt collector “need not parrot the Act to comply with it” as a “statement works with enough clarity to convey the required information to a reasonable but unsophisticated consumer.” The Court determined the correspondence at issue informed Plaintiff “that he had thirty days to dispute the debt, that the clock would start running when he received the letter, and that if he did not act the collector would assume the debt’s validity.” The Court examined whether the use of the word “of” instead of “after” makes any difference in interpreting when the 30 day time limit began. The Court determined that “it makes no difference that the letter said ‘within 30 days of receiving this notice’ rather than ‘within 30 days after receiving this notice.’” The use of the words “of” and “after” can be used “interchangeably in this setting and indeed in most settings.” Plaintiff argued the phrase “within thirty days of receiving this notice” suggests the time period to dispute the debt began the instant the debtor received the letter while the phrase “within thirty days after receiving this notice” infers the time period began running the day after receiving the notice. The Sixth Circuit noted that Plaintiff had an argument that the day the letter is received is not included in the 30 day time limit as the law “doth reject all fractions and divisions of a day.” However, the Court still held that the use of the word “of” does not mislead the recipient as to when the time frame to dispute the debt begins to run. The Court explained that neither the words “of” or “after” clarify when the time limit to dispute the debt begins the day the debtor receives the letter or the next day. Therefore, the Court held that Debt Collector “spoke with enough clarity to comply with the Act.” The Court also examined whether a debt collector is required to send correspondence clarifying the exact day the time period began to run. The Sixth Circuit held that a debt collector is not required to specifically state the day the letter is received is not included in the 30 day time period. The Court explained a debt collector “complies with the law so long as it effectively conveys information specified in the statutory text” and the text at issue “says nothing about whether the day of receipt counts.” Thus, Debt Collector was not required to specifically state the day on which the 30 day time period begins to run. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling granting Debt Collector’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Ralph T. Wutscher McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP The Loop Center Building 105 W. Madison Street, 18th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60602 Direct: (312) 551-9320 Fax: (312) 284-4751 Mobile: (312) 493-0874 Email: RWutscher@mwbllp.com Admitted to practice law in Illinois McGinnis Wutscher Beiramee LLP CALIFORNIA | FLORIDA | ILLINOIS | INDIANA | WASHINGTON, D. C. www.mwbllp.com NOTICE: We do not send unsolicited emails. If you received this email in error, or if you wish to be removed from our update distribution list, please simply reply to this email and state your intention. Thank you. Our updates are available on the internet, in searchable format, at: http://updates.mwbllp.com Posted by