Source: http://openjurist.org/569/f2d/1268/united-states-v-thies
Timestamp: 2017-08-18 22:09:20
Document Index: 697878947

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 2315', '§ 659', '§ 77', '§ 2315', '§ 2315']

569 F2d 1268 United States v. Thies | OpenJurist
569 F. 2d 1268 - United States v. Thies
569 F2d 1268 United States v. Thies
569 F.2d 1268
45 A.L.R.Fed. 519
Winthrop Drake THIES, Appellant.
Lewis MARCUS, Appellant.
Nos. 77-1334, 77-1388.
Thus, in Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 96 S.Ct. 498, 46 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), the Supreme Court analyzed the manifest purpose of Congress in enacting the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), and found that a broad regulatory function was intended. The Court's opinion contrasted the language used in the Act with that used in others, including the one at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 2315, commenting: "Statutes other than the Gun Control Act similarly utilize restrictive language when only direct interstate commerce is to be reached, see, e. g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 1084, 1201, 1231, 1951, 1952, 2313, 2315, and 2421, and 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)." 423 U.S. at 217, 96 S.Ct. at 501.
On a more restrictive note, in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), the Court discussed congressional reluctance to "define as a federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States" and stated: "(W)e will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal legislation." 404 U.S. at 349, 92 S.Ct. at 523.
In United States v. Rocco, 99 F.Supp. 746 (W.D.Pa.1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927, 72 S.Ct. 761, 96 L.Ed. 1338 (1952), bonds which had been stolen some four years previously were found to still constitute interstate commerce for purposes of § 2315. In McNally v. Hill, 69 F.2d 38 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238 (1934), in the course of analyzing a predecessor statute with the identical interstate commerce wording, this court said the mere fact that a journey between states had come to an end does not necessarily end the interstate character of the transaction. The stolen article having come to rest may still be so closely related to interstate commerce as to remain a part of it.
The conspiracy count must fall as well. Having charged that the conspiracy was to violate Title 18 U.S.C. § 2315 by selling securities constituting interstate commerce, the burden was on the government to prove that fact. Having failed to establish an essential element of the conspiracy, the prosecution cannot sustain the conviction. United States v. Pepe, 512 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839, 94 S.Ct. 90, 38 L.Ed.2d 75 (1973).