Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v42/42-018.html
Timestamp: 2017-06-28 14:07:23
Document Index: 649724025

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 610', '§ 5596', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 6101', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 5596', '§ 610']

42:0222(18)AR - - Justice, INS and AFGE, National INS Council - - 1991 FLRAdec AR - - v42 p222 | FLRA
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[ v42 p222 ] 42:0222(18)AR
42 FLRA No. 18
0-AR-2051
award of Arbitrator Leroy R. Smith filed by the Agency under
The Union filed a grievance to protest the Agency's change
in shifts and assignment of overtime on Sundays. The
Arbitrator found that the Agency's action violated the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. The Arbitrator ordered that
the two employees affected be given backpay for lost overtime.
The Agency filed exceptions alleging that the award
violates its right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B)
of the Statute and is contrary to 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(a) and
(b). The Agency also claims that the award is contrary to the
Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596. For the following reasons, we
will deny the Agency's exceptions.
The Union filed a grievance over changes made by the
Agency on November 26, 1989, in the assignment of overtime for
Sunday work at the Lynden, Washington port of entry. Prior to
that date, all Sunday overtime work had been assigned to the
two full-time permanent immigration inspectors at Lynden, with
each inspector working two consecutive 8-hour shifts totaling
16 hours of duty. For that work, each inspector had received
pay at the double time rate, which amounted to 4 days' pay for
each double shift worked on Sunday.
On November 26, 1989, the Agency changed the Sunday
schedule by establishing three shifts and assigning one
full-time inspector to work from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and
the other full-time inspector to work from 4:00 p.m. until
midnight. A third, overlapping shift was established to cover
the period from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., the busiest part of
the day. The Agency assigned a part-time permanent or
part-time temporary inspector to the third shift. Because of
the change, the two full-time inspectors were deprived of 8
hours of overtime each at the double-time rate, which was
equivalent to 16 hours of pay.
The Agency stated that it changed the scheduling of Sunday
overtime because a random audit had disclosed that the two
full-time inspectors were being paid overtime in such amounts
that they were approaching the maximum legal limit of $25,000
in overtime payments per year. The Union filed a grievance
alleging that the Agency's actions violated the collective
bargaining agreement provision requiring that permanent
inspectors be given the first opportunity to work overtime
before overtime was offered to part-time and seasonal
employees. The grievance was not resolved and was submitted to
arbitration. The parties were unable to agree on an issue and
Did the Agency violate the Agreement when it
changed the assignment of Sunday work for
Immigration Inspectors?
The Union argued before the Arbitrator that the
Agency's action violated Article 27 of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, which provides that
"[o]vertime assignments will be distributed and rotated fairly and equitably among eligible employees." Id. at 4. The Union also contended that the Agency violated Section
2978, paragraph 6 of the Agency's Administrative Manual,
which provides as follows: 6. Assignment of Duties Compensable Under the
a. Full-Time immigration officers. Any
full-time immigration officer in grade GS-12
or below . . . may be assigned to
inspectional work for which overtime or
Sunday or holiday extra compensation is
Regional commissioners or district directors
shall so arrange the basic workweeks of
immigration officers as to avoid inspectional
overtime assignments insofar as is possible
consistent with due enforcement of the
immigration laws and the convenience of
travellers. Duties for which extra
compensations are due shall be rotated in a
fair manner among full-time immigration
officers . . . . The "when actually
employed" immigration officers on a
prescheduled basic 40-hour workweek and the
part-time immigration officers engaged in
inspection of arriving passengers and crews
or in other duties, may be assigned duties
for which extra compensations are due only
when those full-time immigration officers
previously cited in this paragraph, are not
b. Part-Time Immigration Officers. Part-time
immigration officers engaged in inspection of
arriving passengers and crews or in other
duties, whose hours or days of work are less
than the prescribed hours or days of work for
full-time employees . . . may be assigned
duties for which extra compensations are due
when full-time and "when actually employed"
officers on a pre-scheduled basic 40-hour
workweek are not available. . . .
The Union contended that any changes in overtime
schedules should have been negotiated before being
implemented. The Agency denied that it had violated the
agreement and asserted to the Arbitrator that it was
properly exercising its right to assign work to employees. The Agency contended that it had acted in accordance with a
past practice under which it routinely made scheduling
changes without notifying the Union.
The Arbitrator found that the Agency acted within its
authority when it changed the number of shifts for Sunday
work from four to three and changed the number of
inspectors from two at all times to two during the busiest
hours of the day and only one in the early morning and late
evening. He found that no past practice had been
established under which there would always be two
inspectors on duty at all times.
However, the Arbitrator found that the Agency's right
to assign overtime work to part-time and seasonal (when
actually employed (WAE)) inspectors was limited by Section
2978, paragraph 6 of the Administrative Manual, which the
Arbitrator found to be incorporated "by reference" into the
parties' agreement. Id. at 8. He ruled that the language
of the Manual was "clear and unambiguous[,]" and that the
language "limits the assignment of extra compensation work
to WAE and part-time employees to times when full-time
[immigration inspectors] are not available." Id. at 7-8,
emphasis in original. He also found that there was a
practice at the Lynden port of entry to assign overtime
work to full-time employees rather than part-time and WAE
employees and that "this practice must be continued until
changed by the parties in bargaining." Id. at 8.
The Arbitrator concluded that although the Agency had
the right to determine the number of employees needed to
perform work and to make work assignments, its right to
make Sunday overtime work assignments to other than
full-time employees when full-time employees are available
was restricted by the Administrative Manual and by the
agreement. The Arbitrator made the following award:
The [Agency] violated the Agreement when it
changed the work assignment for Sunday work at
the Lynden port of entry in November, 1989.
The [Agency] is ordered to pay each of the
inspectors for earning [sic] lost due to the
change in overtime assignment for Sunday work. Such backpay is not to exceed the statutory
overtime cap.
As requested at the hearing the [A]rbitrator
will retain jurisdiction over the case for the
limited purpose of assisting the parties in the
implementation of this award should it be
The Agency contends that the award is contrary to 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(a) and (b), a Government-wide
regulation.(*) The Agency contends that management was
required under that regulation to make the changes that it
made in the scheduling of Sunday overtime, once it had
determined the need for those changes, in order to carry
out its functions and to avoid increased costs. The Agency
maintains that it is required by the regulation to make the
most efficient use of its workforce and that if it had
continued to use the two full-time inspectors for all
Sunday work, they would exceed the legal limit on overtime
payments and become unavailable for overtime work for the
remainder of the year. The Agency also asserts that
assignment of all Sunday overtime to the two full-time inspectors
"raised serious questions regarding their safety
and alertness and increased costs to the
[A]gency in a situation where the [Agency] had
determined that lower graded (and therefore
lower paid) part-time Inspectors could perform
the required work as well as a full-time
Inspector." Exceptions at 13. The Agency also contends that the award is
contrary to management's rights to direct
employees and to assign work under section
7106(a)(2) of the Statute. The Agency maintains
that if the two full-time inspectors continued
to receive all Sunday overtime assignments, they
would exceed the legal limit of $25,000 before
the end of the fiscal year and would not be
available for any other overtime work after that
and, consequently, the award would deprive
management of the right to assign overtime work
to full-time inspectors in the future. The
Agency asserts that this case is controlled by
International Plate Printers, Die Stampers and
Engravers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local
2 and Department of the Treasury, Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, Washington, D.C., 25
FLRA 113 (1987) (Provision 15) (Department of
the Treasury), in which the Authority held that
a provision that directly interfered with the
exercise of management rights under section
7106(a)(2) of the Statute could not constitute a
procedure under section 7106(b)(2) and, further,
that the provision in that case excessively
interfered with management's rights and could
not constitute an appropriate arrangement under
The Agency denies that the Arbitrator's award
constitutes the enforcement of an appropriate
arrangement for employees adversely affected by
the exercise of management's rights under the
Authority's decision in Department of the
Treasury, U.S. Customs Service and National
Treasury Employees Union, 37 FLRA 309 (1990)
(Customs Service). Citing International
Local 726 and Naval Air Rework Facility, North
Island, San Diego, California, 31 FLRA 158, 169
(1988), the Agency claims that the provision in
this case is not an arrangement. The Agency
asserts that the Arbitrator's award interferes
with and abrogates the right to assign work.
Finally, the Agency contends that the award
is contrary to the Back Pay Act because it fails
to provide a finding that the two full-time
inspectors would have been assigned and worked a
specific, determinable number of hours if the
Agency had not changed the Sunday schedule and
The Union maintains that the grievance
concerns the matter of overtime distribution and
not the assignment of work. The Union points
out that the Arbitrator recognized the Agency's
right to create new shifts and contends that the
award properly focuses on the Agency's
obligation to abide by Agency regulations and
the parties' agreement when assigning overtime. The Union maintains that the Arbitrator's award
"merely requires the [Agency] to adhere to its
own regulations in assigning officers to
overtime shifts, and restores the old practice
regarding assignment of full-time officers
pending a negotiated change in the regulations
permitting the use of part-timers on the same
basis as full-time permanent officers." Opposition at 12. The Union maintains that the
issue should be decided in accordance with the
Authority's decision in Customs Service because
it concerns the application of a collective
bargaining provision agreed to by the Agency.
The Union denies that the Arbitrator based
his award of backpay on conjecture as to how
much overtime the two full-time inspectors would
have worked and asserts that the Arbitrator's
award of backpay is not deficient under the Back
A. The Award Is Not Contrary to 5 C.F.R. § 610.121
We conclude that the award is not contrary to
5 C.F.R. § 610.121. The Agency asserts that the
award is deficient on that basis because it
deprives the Agency of the right to make changes
in the scheduling of Sunday shifts which it
believes is necessary in order to avoid having
the two full-time inspectors reach the legal
maximum limit for overtime. We disagree with
the Agency's assertion.
The issue decided by the Arbitrator concerned
the assignment of overtime, not the
establishment of shifts. The Arbitrator applied
the Agency Administrative Manual provision that
had been incorporated by reference into the
parties' collective bargaining agreement and
found that the change in Sunday shift
assignments violated the requirement that
overtime work must be assigned to full-time
inspectors when they were available. The
Arbitrator did not rule that the Agency could
not establish a third shift, as the Agency
contends. To the contrary, the Arbitrator
plainly stated that the Agency "has the right to
determine the number of shifts to be worked on
Sundays and the scheduling of these shifts." Award at 7. The Arbitrator held, however, that
the Agency's rights in that area were restricted
by the Administrative Manual and the parties'
The Agency's reliance on 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(a)(1) is misplaced. That provision
implements 5 U.S.C. § 6101(a)(3)(A), which
requires that an agency must schedule employees'
tours of duty not less than 7 days in advance,
except when the head of an agency determines
that the Agency would be seriously handicapped
in carrying out its functions or that costs
would be substantially increased. See National
Weather Service Employees Organization and U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, National Weather
Service, 37 FLRA 392, 399-400 (1990). The
regulation requires that management provide
employees with at least 7 days' advance notice
of any change in work schedules unless adherence
to that requirement would seriously handicap the
agency in performing its functions or would
substantially increase costs. The Agency has
not demonstrated that the Arbitrator's award
enforcing the negotiated overtime assignment
provisions conflicts with 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(a)(1).
The Agency claims that a change in the Sunday
shifts was mandated by 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(b). Section 610.121(b)(1) requires that agencies: (1) schedule employees' work so as to accomplish
the agency's mission, and (2) schedule
administrative workweeks to correspond with
actual work requirements. The Authority has
held that 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(b) is qualified by
5 C.F.R. § 610.121(a), which directs agency
heads to establish conventional workweek
schedules except upon a determination that the
agency would be seriously handicapped in
carrying out its functions or that costs would
be substantially increased. See U.S. Department
of the Navy, Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and
Philadelphia Metal Trades Council, 39 FLRA 590,
604 (1991). We find nothing in 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(b) that requires the Agency to make a
change in shifts in this case and find nothing
in the Arbitrator's enforcement of the parties'
agreement that conflicts with that regulation. We find that the Agency's exceptions constitute
nothing more than disagreement with the
Arbitrator's reasoning and conclusions and his
interpretation and application of the parties'
agreement. Such contentions provide no basis
for finding an award deficient. See U.S. Army
Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia
23604-5353 and Local R4-6, National Association
of Government Employees, 32 FLRA 1250 (1988).
We conclude, therefore, that the Agency's
exceptions fail to show that the award is
contrary to 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 and provide no
basis for finding the award deficient under
section 7122(a) of the Statute. B. The Award Is Not Contrary to Section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute In Customs Service, we reexamined our
approach to cases in which an agency contends
that an arbitrator's award enforcing a provision
of the parties' collective bargaining agreement
is contrary to management's rights under section
7106(a). We held that when an agency makes such
a contention we will examine, as appropriate,
the provision enforced by the arbitrator to
determine: (1) if it constitutes an arrangement
for employees adversely affected by the exercise
of management's rights; and (2) if, as
interpreted by the arbitrator, it abrogates the
exercise of a management right. We explained
that if it is evident that the provision
constitutes an arrangement and, as interpreted
by the arbitrator does not abrogate management's
rights, the provision is within the range of
matters that can be bargained under the Statute. Accordingly, we held that we will not find that
such an award is contrary to law and we will
deny the exception. We also held that if the
arbitrator's interpretation does result in an
abrogation of management's rights under section
7106(a), the award will be found deficient as
contrary to law, but the contractual provision,
susceptible to a different and sustainable
interpretation by a different arbitrator, will
not be affected. In this case, the Agency has not established
that the Arbitrator's award is contrary to
section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute. Instead, the Arbitrator has enforced a provision
that constitutes an arrangement for employees
adversely affected by the exercise of
management's right to assign overtime work to be
performed on Sundays.
The Arbitrator found that the Administrative
Manual provisions incorporated by reference into
the parties' agreement provided the basis for
the assignment of employees to overtime work on
Sunday. He found that the Agency violated the
requirement contained in Section 2978 of the
Administrative Manual that overtime be given to
full-time inspectors, if they were available. We conclude that the Arbitrator merely enforced
that provision of the Administrative Manual and
the parties' agreement and that that provision
constituted an arrangement for full-time inspectors who were available to work Sunday
overtime by giving them the first opportunity to
work such overtime. By directing the Agency to
assign Sunday overtime work to available
full-time inspectors unless and until the
parties negotiated a different arrangement
regarding the assignment of overtime, the
Arbitrator enforced an arrangement for full-time
employees who are adversely affected by the
exercise of the Agency's right to assign work. The arrangement provided the benefit of extra
compensation to those full-time inspectors who
were available to work the extra shifts on
Sunday. Further, we find that the Administrative
Manual provision enforced by the Arbitrator does
not abrogate the Agency's right to assign work
to employees on Sundays. In Customs Service,
the Authority held that an award "abrogates" a
management right when the award "precludes an
agency from exercising" that right. Customs
Service, 37 FLRA at 314. The Arbitrator's award
in this case does not preclude the Agency from
exercising its right to assign overtime work on
Sundays. Rather, the award only requires the
Agency to comply with Section 2978 of the
Administrative Manual, incorporated in the
parties' agreement, which provides for the
assignment of overtime work to full-time
inspectors when they are available.
We find no merit in the Agency's argument
that it will be deprived of the right to assign
full-time inspectors as a result of the award
because the full-time inspectors will reach the
legal limit on overtime pay before the end of
the fiscal year. The legal limit imposed on the
payment of overtime is a matter that is separate
and apart from the provision in the parties'
agreement governing the assignment of overtime
that was applied by the Arbitrator. If, at some
point during the fiscal year, the full-time
inspectors reach the legal limit on payment of
overtime and cannot be assigned further
overtime, that is the result of the law limiting
overtime payments, not the result of the
The Agency's reliance on Department of the
Treasury is misplaced. In that case, the
Authority applied the test set forth in National
Association of Government Employees, Local
R14-87 and Kansas Army National Guard, 21 FLRA
24 (1986) and found that an agreement provision
did not constitute an appropriate arrangement
because it excessively interfered with
management's rights under section 7106(a)(2) of
the Statute. See Department of the Treasury, 25
FLRA at 120. We have since held that, in light
of Customs Service, the decision in Department
of the Treasury is not controlling in cases
such as the present case. See U.S. Department
of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and
Printing, Washington, D.C. and Washington Plate
Printers Union, Local No. 2, International Plate
Printers, Die Stampers and Engravers, 41 FLRA
860, 874 (1991).
Accordingly, we conclude that the Agency has
failed to show that the award is contrary to
section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute. C. The Award Is Not Contrary to the Back Pay
We conclude that the Agency has failed to
establish that the award is contrary to the Back
Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596.
Under the Back Pay Act, an award of backpay
is authorized only when the grievant has been
affected by an unjustified or unwarranted agency
personnel action that has resulted in the
withdrawal or reduction of all or part of the
grievant's pay, allowances, or differentials. Accordingly, the Authority has advised that, in
order to award backpay, an arbitrator must find
that: (1) the aggrieved employee was affected
by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel
action; (2) the personnel action directly
resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of the
grievant's pay, allowances, or differentials;
and (3) but for such action, the grievant
otherwise would not have suffered the withdrawal
or reduction. See American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 31 and U.S.
Cleveland, Ohio, 41 FLRA 514, 517 (1991) (VA
In this case, the Arbitrator made the
required findings for an award of backpay. The
Arbitrator specifically found that the Agency
violated the Administrative Manual provision,
incorporated in the parties' agreement,
governing the assignment of overtime. Violation
of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes
an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action
under the Back Pay Act. Where it is established
that employees entitled to overtime under a
collective bargaining agreement do not receive
that overtime because of a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement by an agency,
those employees can be found to be entitled to
compensation for the lost overtime. See Federal
Employees Metal Trades Council and U.S.
Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 39 FLRA 3
(1991). Further, the Arbitrator found that the two
full-time employees lost overtime pay when the
Agency assigned a part-time employee to the
newly-established third shift on Sundays and
reduced the overtime assignments of the
full-time employees from 16 hours to 8 hours. The Arbitrator effectively found that, because
of the Agency's unwarranted and unjustified
personnel action, the grievants were deprived of
overtime compensation that they would have
received if the Agency had not failed to comply
with the overtime provisions of the agreement. Although the Arbitrator did not state
specifically that the loss of overtime
compensation would not have occurred "but for"
the violation of the agreement, he made the
required finding of a causal connection by
stating that "the full-time permanent inspectors
are entitled to back pay for the earnings they
lost when they were denied the Sunday work." Award at 9; see also, VA Cleveland, 41 FLRA at
514 (the requirement of a "but for" finding
under the Back Pay Act does not require the
specific recitation of certain words and
phrases, such as "but for," but rather a finding
of a direct causal relationship between an
agency's improper actions and an adverse affect
on an employee).
We find no merit in the Agency's contentions
that the award is contrary to the Back Pay Act
because the Arbitrator could not determine the
amount of overtime the two full-time employees
would have worked if the Agency had not changed
their overtime assignments in violation of the
Administrative Manual and agreement. The
Arbitrator did not find that the grievants had
merely an expectation of overtime work. Rather,
he found that the Agency's practice of assigning
Sunday overtime work to full-time inspectors
when they are available "must be continued until
changed by the parties in bargaining." Award at
8. He stated that because the two full-time
inspectors were available for Sunday work, "they
should have been given the work assignment." Id. That finding constitutes an explicit
determination that the two full-time inspectors
would have received the Sunday overtime work
assignments if the Agency had not violated the
parties' agreement. Compare U.S. Department of
the Navy, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long Beach,
California and Federal Employees Metal Trades
Council, 34 FLRA 311, 313 (1990) (a finding of a
violation of a collective bargaining agreement
coupled with only an "expectation" by a grievant
of the receipt of pay, allowances, and
differentials is not a sufficient basis for an
award of backpay). We note that the award
recognizes that the two employees will not be
entitled to overtime once they reach the maximum
legal limit of $25,000 in overtime pay.
Relevant provisions of 5 C.F.R. § 610.121,
"Establishment of work schedules," provide:
(a) Except when the head of an agency
determines that the agency would be seriously
handicapped in carrying out its functions or
that costs would be substantially increased, he
or she shall provide that--
(1) Assignments to tours of duty are
scheduled in advance of the administrative
workweek over periods of not less than 1 week[.]
(b)(1) The head of an agency shall schedule
the work of his or her employees to accomplish
the mission of the agency. The head of an
agency shall schedule an employee's regularly
scheduled administrative workweek so that it
corresponds with the employee's actual work
requirements. . . . .