Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/18449203/Reply-Brief-to-Fifth-Circuit-U-S-Court-of-Appeals-Davidson-v-Grossman
Timestamp: 2017-02-23 10:38:28
Document Index: 697941812

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3564', '§ 1965', '§ 1983', '§ 1985', '§ 1983', '§ 1985', '§ 1962', '§1983', '§1985', '§1983', '§1985', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 27', '§ 3564', '§1331', '§1964', '§ 1962', '§1503', '§1510', '§1511', '§1512', '§1513', '§1951', '§1952', '§201', '§ 1952', '§ 201', '§ 1951', '§ 1512', '§ 1513', '§ 1983', '§ 1985']

Reply Brief to Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals (Davidson v. Grossman) | Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations Act | Lawsuit
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _______________________________________________________
ROBERT M. DAVIDSON; VANESSA E. KOMAR Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. JAY GROSSMAN; EUDICE GROSSMAN; GAYLE F. PETRILLO; CHARLES OTT; JOANNE C. WRAY; KENT J. THIRY; JOSEPH C. MELLO; MICHAEL J. MEEHAN; BRUCE R. HEURLIN; ANTHONY P. TARTAGLIA; DVA RENAL HEALTHCARE INC; ALBANY MEDICAL COLLEGE; VIVRA HOLDINGS INC; GAMBRO HEALTHCARE INC; DAVITA INC; SEPRACOR INC Defendants - Appellees _______________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division _______________________________________________________________ REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS ROBERT M. DAVIDSON VANESSA E. KOMAR _______________________________________________________________
ROBERT M. DAVIDSON & VANESSA E. KOMAR For U.S. Postal Service delivery: P.O. BOX 1785 KILGORE, TX 75663
For Express/Overnight delivery:
1009 N. 4 th Street, Suite B LONGVIEW, TEXAS 75601 (903)758-1900
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................ii ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES..........................................................1 I. Statute of Limations...........................................................................1 II. Res Judicata......................................................................................11. III. Standing............................................................................................19 Summary and Conclusion.......................................................................26
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Agro Dutch Industries Limited v. United States, Case 05-1288 (Fed Cir. 2006) 12 Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1991, 1994 (2006) Bankers Trust Co. V. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096. Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2003) Berry v. Board of Sup’s of L.S.U. (5th Cir. 1983) 715.F.2d 971 (Berry) 26 19 7 2
Caldwell v. Palmetto Savings Bank of South Carolina, 811 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1987) 19 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3564 (2d ed. 1984) 15
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 2000) 21 Hayes v. the United States, Case 06-254 L (Fed. Cl. 2007) Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1993) Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1168 (5th Cir. 1981) 5 8 14
League of Women Voters of Ohio, et al v. J Kenneth Blackwell, et al, Case 3:05cv-07309-JGC (N.D. Ohio, 2006) 7 McDuffie v. Estelle, 935 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1991) 14
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3rd Cir. 1994) 8 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979) 12
Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3rd Cir. 1997)
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S.393, 402 (2003) 21 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) 15
Tolbert v. State of Ohio Dept. Of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 940 (6th Cir. 1999) 7 Wells v. United States, Case 04-5127 (Fed. Cir. 2005 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S.___(2007) 5 23
STATUTES 18 U.S.C. § 1965 18 U.S.C. 1962 42 U.S.C. 1983 42 U.S.C. 1985 Prescription Drug User Fee Act
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES I. Statute of Limitations Davidsons have recently discovered, and will provide at trial, a series of fax and mail communications related to this lawsuit between Meehan (in Tucson, AZ) and the Davidsons (in Corpus Christi, TX) between October 1999 and May 2000. These communications include letters on Meehan & Associates letterhead sent by Meehan to the Davidsons in Corpus Christi, TX dated October 14, 1999, November 30, 1999, December 9, 1999, December 31, 1999, January 4, 2000, January 31, 2000, February 8, 2000, February 29, 2000, March 2, 2000, April 5, 2000, April 7, 2000, and May 3, 2000. Meehan perjured himself to the District Court (Houston) to conceal these material jurisdictional facts. See Meehan’s affidavit (filed on May 7, 2007) at CA5 920-923, especially ¶ 6 found at CA5 922, where it states, “None of the events related to this matter took place in Texas. I represented Dr. Davidson in Arizona State Court in 2001-2002. I was permitted to withdraw as Dr. Davidson’s counsel by order of an Arizona state court on January 22, 2002. I have had no communications with Dr. Davidsons since that time.” This Court is referred to CA5 1624-1625 for a copy of the retainer agreement between Davidsons and Meehan dated October 13, 1999. The object of Meehan’s perjury was to conceal material jurisdictional facts from the Honorable U.S. District Judge Nancy F. Atlas prior to entry of summary judgment (Final Order). The object
of Meehan’s perjury was to conceal the existence of the mail communications related to this lawsuit sent on Meehan & Associates letterhead by Meehan (in Tucson, AZ) to the Davidsons (in Corpus Christi, TX), which include communications which took place between October 1999 and May 2000. This willful perjury alone should suffice to toll the statute of limitations with respect to the State Actors (Meehan, Heurlin, and the Grossmans) in this lawsuit and warrants punitive sanctions by this Court. Davidsons’ claims are not time-barred. Their current claims relate-back to the date plaintiffs first filed similar claims in the Arizona U.S. District Court. The 4-year RICO statute of limitations is tolled for the RICO anchor counts under federal equitable tolling and equitable estoppel principles. The “borrowed” Texas statute of limitations for the § 1983 and § 1985 count is tolled under Texas tolling rules. The limitations period for bringing Davidsons’ § 1983 and § 1985 claim is tolled under the continuing violation doctrine. See Berry v. Board of Sup’s of L.S.U. (5th Cir. 1983) 715.F.2d 971 (Berry). The Berry test has been widely adopted by the federal courts. Davidsons have produced evidence of violations within the limitation period that support tolling under this theory (Document #79 with affidavit and exhibits). Meehan and others willfully misled Davidsons and maliciously prevented them from asserting their rights. Davidsons’ Section 1983 claim is suseptible to being broken down into a series
of independent and distinct events or wrongs, each having its own associated damages. Davidsons’ RICO counts demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity which caused a continuing series of separate injuries. The nexus between the Section 1983 injury, the RICO injury, and the pendent state law injury is found in the Minute Entry Order of November 24, 2004, in the Arizona State Action, found at CA5 15331534, and 1711-1713 of Davidsons’ Consolidated Response. This exhibit is particularly important to this lawsuit because it provides a very direct link between Grossmans’ violations of the substantive RICO statute [18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)] alleged in Count One of the Amended Complaint before this Court, and injury to Davidsons’ business and property. Davidsons have provided this Court with ample evidence (see filed Document #83 with affidavit and exhibits) that they have been reasonably diligent in investigating and discovering their injuries. Davidsons have provided this Court with evidence that they did not sleep on their rights, but rather actively pursued their claims before the statute of limitations had run. Motion for Judicial Notice of Document #83 and #84 under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d) and 201(f) is pending before this Court. The factual allegations in this action are sufficient to toll the limitations period for the anchor RICO counts and the §1983 and §1985 counts. The District Court
(Houston) has simply elected to ignore the allegations found in Counts Three, Four, and Seven of the Amended Complaint, despite the District Court’s explicit assertion that “The Court carefully reviewed the full record in this case.” See CA5 1838. See CA5 788-906 for Davidsons’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the U.S. Supreme Court, filed on July 18, 2006, petition denied on November 27, 2006. See also the affidavit (CA5 1532-1533) and exhibits (CA5 1534-1803, especially those found at CA5 1535-1657 and 1711-1713) filed in support of Davidsons’ Consolidated Response (CA5 1498-1804). The affidavits and exhibits found at CA5 54-102, 155-299, 314-482, 555-716, 788-906, 967-1057, 1066-1143, 1149-1478, and 1532-1803, represent competent summary judgment evidence which was sufficient to toll the limitations period to bringing this lawsuit, including evidence of separate injuries and of violations within the limitation period. The affidavit and exhibits in Davidsons’ Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment found at CA5 1872-1903 provides yet additional competent evidence, in support of vacating the summary judgment (Final Order). The affidavits and exhibits submitted to the District Court (Houston) with Document #79 and Document #83, provides even more competent evidence, in support of vacating the summary judgment (Final Order). The affidavits and exhibits attached to Document #79 and #83 provide this Court
with considerable documentary evidence of Davidsons’ extraordinary diligence in seeking discovery and legal redress for their substantial injuries (injuries in fact) to business and property. These exhibits provide this Court with considerable competent documentary evidence of continuing violations in Texas and Appellants’ injuries in Texas. It is not surprising that the Defendants continue to blatantly deny that the “effects” of their misconduct have not been “felt” by Davidsons here in Texas...they’ve gotten away with it for very a long time. However, the quality and quantity of this evidence (Document #79) bespeaks the reality that the concerted acts of certain non-forum defendants have been continuously targeted at Davidsons here in Texas. The continuing claim doctrine applies to Davidsons’ claim because the outcome of Davidsons’ initial federal claim (Arizona) for money damages against Vivra Inc and others was dismissal with prejudice under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris. In his dismissal, the Honorable U.S. District Judge Frank R. Zapata stated inter alia, “There shall be no further filings in this action.” See CA5 973-976, 969-972, and 977-981.
Thus, there is no doubt that Davidsons were absolutely prevented from ever refiling in Arizona.
See Hayes v. the United States, Case 06-254 L (Fed. Cl. 2007); Wells v. United States, Case 04-5127 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The District Court (Arizona), in dismissing Davidsons’ initial federal claim
(Arizona) against Meehan, by inference, must have considered this filing to be a “lawsuit within a lawsuit”, and thus his dismissal under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, should be considered to also have been with prejudice to refiling while there were ongoing Arizona state court proceedings. This Court should know that Davidsons’ initial federal claim against Meehan included an application to stay the federal action against Meehan and preserve Davidsons’ right to a federal forum. The District Court (Arizona), however, dismissed their federal action against Meehan for money damages, rather than stay the federal proceedings. Davidsons provided the District Court (Houston) with a “mountain” of competent summary judgment evidence to support tolling the limitations period for filing their civil RICO and §1983 and §1985 action (Houston), none of which appears to have been considered by District Court (Houston), despite the District Court’s explicit admission that “The Court carefully reviewed the full record in this case.” Underline, boldface, and italics have been added for emphasis. See CA5 1838. This admission by the District Court unequivocally establishes that the Final Order represents summary judgment. There is, therefore, no doubt that the rules laid down in federal rule 56 apply to this Court’s review of the Final Order. From the actual text of the Final Order it is not at all clear whether the District Court ever considered whether a continuing violation exists or whether such a
continuing violation, if it does exist, is sufficient to toll the limitations period for this lawsuit. Davidsons have provided the District Court (Houston) with considerable competent summary judgment evidence that Davidsons are suffering continuing present adverse effects by reason of decisions in the State Action. Texas tolling rules do not conflict with federal law and policy. In fact, Texas tolling rules support § 1983's policies of compensation and deterrence. If a violation is continuing, the statute of limitations [in § 1983 actions] poses no bar. Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2003). A violation is continuing if: (1) the defendants’ wrongful conduct continues; (2) the injuries to the plaintiffs continue to accrue; and (3) further injuries to the plaintiffs were avoidable if the defendants had at any time ceased their wrongful conduct. Tolbert v. State of Ohio Dept. Of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 940 (6th Cir. 1999). Davidsons allege, and provided evidence in support, of injuries in the past, present, and potentially in the future. These injuries are the direct result of defendants’ conduct and, consequently, would not have occurred absent that conduct. Thus, the violations Davidsons allege are continuing and the statute of limitations poses no bar to Davidsons’ suit. League of Women Voters of Ohio, et al v. J Kenneth Blackwell, et al, Case 3:05-cv-07309JGC (N.D. Ohio, 2006). Davidsons’ Amended Complaint quite clearly requested federal equitable tolling.
See Amended Complaint at ¶s 89 and 90 (at CA5 553 and 554). Federal courts may toll statutes of limitations for federal laws where the plaintiff “in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights”. Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3rd Cir. 1997), citing Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3rd Cir. 1994). Davidsons have been prevented and impaired from asserting their federal rights in an extraordinary way. Davidsons sought vindication in both federal (Arizona, New York, and Texas) and state courts (Arizona). Equitable tolling is appropriate in three general scenarios: (1) where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances, or (3) where the plaintiff aserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum. See Oshiver, 38 F3d at 1387. Davidsons are concerned in this case with all three scenarios. The “adopted” state [tolling] rule operates “as a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired.” Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1993). Davidsons have alleged and provided competent summary judgment evidence that there was multiple acts of willful concerted misconduct intended to conceal the RICO conspiracy by the State Actors (including Grossmans, Heurlin, Meehan) in the
Arizona state action, by the Magellan defendants’ legal counsel in the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding (In re: Magellan Health Services Inc), by the Davita/Vivra/Gambro defendants (including Thiry, Mello, Ott, Petrillo), and defendant Wray (who signed a waiver of service, but never appeared before the District Court), which were directly targeted at the Davidsons, which warrants tolling under federal equitable estoppel law. Davidsons have provided evidence of a fiduciary relationship between the Davidsons and certain of the Defendants which created a duty to disclose certain information to the Davidsons. Davidsons detrimentally-relied upon these fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions. Davidsons have provided evidence of actual damages by reason of this misconduct. Davidsons have provided competent evidence with particularity that Meehan engaged in fraudulent conduct “above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff’s claim is filed.” For equitable estoppel to apply, certain Defendants must have reasonably induced Davidsons to refrain from exercising their rights. See ¶ 59 of the Amended Complaint found at CA5 550, where it states, “Yet, QBSL and MJM agreed with each other to continue to refuse to bring Arizona fraud, Arizona RICO, and federal RICO actions, on behalf of their then clients, the Davidsons, despite repeated requests by the Davidsons to bring such actions.”
The District Court erred by not applying federal equitable tolling doctrine (both equitable tolling and equitable estoppel) to Davidsons’ federal claims prior to making any decisions on the merits of Davidsons’ case. Davidsons’ federal lawsuits (Davidson et al v. Vivra Inc, et al, filed on February 19, 2003, and Davidson et al v. Meehan, et al, filed on November 20, 2003) were both timely-filed in the U.S. District Court in Tucson, AZ. The defendants (both named and unnamed) to the lawsuit at bar before this Court on Appeal (from U.S. District Court, Houston, TX) were thus put on notice quite some time ago that they may need to defend. See CA5 1149 and 11531478 for a true and correct copy of the RICO Case Statement filed in the U.S. District Court, Arizona District, on March 11, 2003. See especially CA5 1153 and 1154 for evidence that Vivra Holdings Inc, Gambro Healthcare Inc, Albany Medical College, Jay Grossman, Eudice Grossman, Gayle F. Petrillo, Charles W. Ott, and an undetermined number of presently unknown defendants, were named Defendants in the U.S. District Court, Arizona District (Case No. 03CV110-TUC-FRZ). These defendants would not have been prejudiced, if the District Court (Houston) applied federal tolling law to toll the limitations period for filing the lawsuit at bar (U.S. District Court, Houston, TX). See CA5 1202 and 1203 for allegations with respect to the ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY memo, the Employee Handbook, and Defendants Grossman, Petrillo, Ott, and an undetermined number of presently unknown
defendants. See CA5 1160, 1161, 1162, 1253, 1249, 1254 with respect to defendants Thiry, Mello, and Tartaglia, who then (March 11, 2003) were presently unknown defendants (directors and high managerial agents of the enterprise). Both Arizona federal lawsuits were dismissed under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, in favor on ongoing state court proceedings. Davidsons, however, reserved their right to return to a federal forum once there were no ongoing Arizona state court proceedings. Of particular note, this Court should know that the final Order (file
stamped on November 24, 2003) of the District Court (Tucson, AZ), states, “There shall be no further filings in this action.” See CA5 973-976, 969-972, and 977-981. Davidsons were expressly prohibited from ever refiling in Arizona. Importantly, Davidsons could not refile in Texas
as long as there was an ongoing Arizona state court proceeding, or risk yet further dismissals under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Because tolling under the federal continuing violation doctrine, Texas tolling rule, and federal equitable estoppel, are available on the facts of this case, the trial court’s dismissal of Davidsons’ Amended Complaint should be reversed with respect to all counts and all of the parties. II. Res Judicata Davidsons lacked incentive to appeal the erroneous ground from the District Court judgment (Dallas) premised on alternative grounds. The Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 27, comment i, notes that it is of “critical importance” that the “losing party, although entitled to appeal from both determinations, might be dissuaded from doing so because of the likelihood that at least one of them would be upheld and the other not even reached” and “[i]f a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone.” The rationale behind the Restatement focuses on the fairness factor set out by Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979). “The trial court’s discussion of the merits was not an alternative ground for decision in the case, and it was reasonable for [Agro Dutch] not to treat it in that manner, and not to present a full argument on the merits to this court. While we recognize that treating the court’s judgment as a disposition on the merits would save the time and expense that would result from a remand, we think it would be procedurally irregular for us to leapfrog the trial court’s jurisdictional dismissal and go directly to the merits of the underlying dispute. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.” Agro Dutch Industries Limited v. United States, Case 05-1288 (Fed Cir. 2006). Davidsons admit that at the Dallas hearing, they had the strong impression that the District Court’s discussion of the merits was not an alternative ground for decision in the
case. The District Court (Dallas) never requested Davidsons to argue pattern; expressly cut-off Davidsons’ rebuttal to alleged lack of 9(b) particularity; and gave no full and fair opportunity to rebut her matter-of-fact remark that “...the alleged fraud with respect to the initial hiring does not constitute a predicate act under the RICO statute. There is essentionally a single act in connection with the hiring of Dr. Davidson. In the Court’s view that does not establish a predicate act under RICO.” The District Judge (Dallas) appeared to have prejudged that point. Davidsons specifically dispute the “spin” that Appellees’ counsel for the Davita/Vivra/Gambro Defendants have given to the District Judge’s discussion of the merits of the fraudulent hiring claim. To wit, Appellees’ use of the words “pattern of activity” are their [Appellees’ counsel’s] words, not those of the District Judge’s. There was never any real discussion of pattern (relatedness and continuity) at the Dallas hearing. See pages 20 and 22 of the Brief of Appellees Petrillo, Ott, Thiry, Mello, DVA Renal, Vivra Holdings, Gambro, and Davita. See CA5 223 of the Dallas hearing. This Court is referred to CA5 54-102, 165-170, 401-402, 1028-1035, 1353-1354, 1452-1468, 1471-1473, 1477-1478, 1648-1649, 1877-1897, 1899-1903 for a demonstration of pattern of fraudulent hiring inducements, retention inducements, and lulling inducements. The District Court (Dallas) expressly stated that the Court never reached the
12(b)(6) issues raised at the Dallas hearing. Thus, the alleged “holdings” by the District Court (Dallas) upon which the District Court (Houston) depended for making its res judicata (and collateral estoppel) pronouncements, were actually dictum, i.e., advisory (conditional) opinions which federal courts are prohibited from rendering, not holdings. Of course, the distinction between dictum and holding in the final Order by the District Court (Dallas) is critical to the appeal presently before this Court. Dictum by the District Court (Dallas) with respect to Rule 12(b)(6) issues should be afforded no preclusive effect upon subsequent legal proceedings in the District Court (Houston). See Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1168 (5th Cir. 1981). (“[A]n immaterial issue may not have been afforded the same careful deliberation and analysis as an issue necessary to the judgment...[and] a decision on an immaterial issue provides the losing party with no incentive to contest an erroneous decision by appeal.”). For collateral estoppel to apply, a court must decide whether “(i) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior litigation, (ii) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation was a critical, necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action, and (iii) special circumstances exist which would render preclusion inappropriate or unfair.” McDuffie v. Estelle, 935 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1991). Although an issue has been fully litigated, the prior judgment will not act as collateral
estoppel if the issue was not necessary to the rendering of the prior judgment. Hicks, 662 F.2d at 1168. Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold matter that we are obligated to address at the outset. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” This requirement of substantiality or nonfrivolousness of the federal question refers “to whether there is any legal substance to the position the plaintiff is presenting.” Federal Practice and Procedure § 3564 (2d ed. 1984). The United States Supreme Court has rejected the practice of assuming “hypothetical jurisdiction” and resolving a case on the merits. Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). In the lawsuit at bar, the District Court (both Dallas and Houston) proceeded to adjudicate the merits of this case without properly analyzing whether it had either subject matter or personal jurisdiction. The District Court (Houston) has mistakenly attributed holding status to dictum in the Order of dismissal in the District Court (Dallas). Importantly, Davidsons’ lawsuit does not sound solely in fraud. Davidsons have alleged a pattern of racketeering activity in which the concealment
of fraud provided the motive, and the predicate acts upon which Davidsons’ Article III standing depends (at least in part) include extortion, obstruction of justice, retaliation against a victim, witness, or informant, and bribery. These non-fraud based predicate acts are not held to the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b). Bribery is a predicate act of racketeering under the RICO statute. The User Fees under the PDUFA are bribes. By delaying the publication of the FDA Tucson, AZ EIR of 5/5-6/28/99, the PDUFA II substantially delayed the time at which Plaintiffs could begin to seek a legal remedy against Defendants. This “delay” was intentional and directly targeted at the Plaintiffs. It was readily foreseeable that this “delay” would result in wasted legal expenses, loss of current employment, loss of prospective legitimate employment opportunities, and damage to Davidsons’ reputation. Appellants were deprived of their fundamental right to equality of treatment before the law under the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Appellants have alleged and provided evidence that the FDA’s acts were motivated by impermissible considerations (bribery of FDA by Sepracor) and their desire to prevent Davidson’s exercise of his fundamental right to equality of treatment before the law. The “delay” and extraordinary process faced by Davidson in his interaction with FDA violated Davidson’s equal protection rights. Appellants have alleged interference with a fundamental right by FDA and Sepracor Inc, motivated by
bribery. The FDA treated Davidson differently from other similarly situated clinical research subinvestigators because Davidson exercised his right to equality of treatment before the law by “blowing the whistle” on Grossman for patient safety concerns. See ¶s 8.82 and 8.84 of the Amended Complaint at CA5 536. The selective treatment of Davidson by FDA and Sepracor was based on impermissible considerations (bribery of FDA by Sepracor) and to inhibit and punish Davidson’s exercise of his Ninth Amendment fundamental right to equality of treatment before the law. See Document #45 at CA5 1006 where it states,“This inspection report was delayed due to a PDUFA report.” Appellants’ incorporate here by reference all of the relevant arguments and authorities found in Document #16 captioned Plaintiffs’ Response to Albany Medical College and Anthony P. Tartaglia’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(B) and Incorporated Brief in Support found at CA5 305-315, Document #45 captioned Plaintiffs’ Answer to Motion of Defendants Jay Grossman, Eudice Grossman, and Bruce R. Heurlin to Dismiss Amended Complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(B) found at CA5 950-968, Document #47 captioned Plaintiffs’ Answer to Sepracor Inc’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim found at CA5 1059-1067, Document #56 captioned Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Response found at CA5 1498-1530, and Document #71 captioned Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment under FRCP 59(E) and
Memorandum in Support found at CA5 1849-1873. Davidsons have alleged and provided considerable competent summary judgment evidence that provides a prima facie basis for the assertion that Sepracor, Davita, DVA Renal, and Gambro, have continuous and systematic contacts with Texas. This Court is urged to take notice of the actual admission by the Davita and Vivra Defendants of their provision of hemodialysis services to Texas citizens at page 18 of the Reply Brief of Petrillo, Ott, Thiry, Mello, DVA Renal, Vivra Holdings, Gambro, and Davita. See the affidavit and exhibits attached to both the Complaint and the Amended Complaint in this lawsuit. Federal jurisdiction by this Court over the three substantive RICO anchor counts (Counts One, Two, and Three) is found in 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 18 U.S.C. §1964( c). At least as to the RICO anchor counts (one, two, and three) of the Amended Complaint, Sepracor, Heurlin, Grossmans (both Jay and Eudice), and the Davita/Vivra defendants, waived any objection to personal jurisdiction of the District Court. This assertion of waiver of personal jurisdiction is based upon close examination of the motions to dismiss submitted by these Defendants in the District Court and the reply briefs submitted by these Defendants to this Court. Davidsons incorporate here by reference all of the arguments as to statement of a claim under 12(b)(6), personal jurisdiction under 12(b)(2), venue under 12(b)(3),
and article III standing under 12(b)(1), found in the argument and authorities of the Consolidated Response found at CA5 1507-1525, and the affidavit and exhibits found at CA5. Davidsons (appearing without the benefit of counsel) never knowingly waived their numerous objections to the defendants multiple 12(b) motions to dismiss. These objections (with supporting affidavits and exhibits) are found in Davidsons’ filed Responses to each of the individual motions to dismiss, Consolidated Response, Motion to Amend or Alter, Objection to Motion to Post Bond, and Motion for Indicative Ruling. Davidsons never knowingly waived the jurisdictional statement found in the Amended Complaint at ¶s 1 and 2 of the Amended Complaint, wherein Davidsons unequivocally asserted the nationwide service of process created by the RICO statute, sections 1965(b) and/or (d). Caldwell v. Palmetto Savings Bank of South Carolina, 811 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1987). This Court implicitly recognized that RICO creates nationwide service of process. Id at 918. III. Standing Through no fault of their own, Davidsons were handed a judgment against them, in favor of Jay Grossman and Eudice Grossman, for 7.8 million dollars at 10% per annum by the Arizona state court proceedings. Through no fault of their own, Davidsons have suffered a continuing series of separate injuries. Bankers Trust Co., 859 F.2d 1096.
Plaintiffs’ federal Constitutional injury in the State Action can be fairly traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Plaintiffs are suffering continuing present adverse effects (continuous constitutional violation and continuous jeopardy) by reason of decisions in the State Action. See CA5 967, 1026, 1027, 1149, 1386, 1397-1417, and 1451. See also CA5 1532-1533, 1594-1609, 1611-1634, 1711-1713, and 1872-1873, for additional injuries that are fairly traceable to the challenged actions of the Defendants. Davidsons call the attention of this Court to CA5 1533-1534, and 1711-1713, for the affidavit and exhibit to Davidsons’ Consolidated Response, the Minute Entry Order of November 24, 2004, in the Arizona State Action. This exhibit is particularly important to this lawsuit because it provides a very direct link between Grossmans’ violations of the substantive RICO statute [18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)] alleged in Count One of the Amended Complaint before this Court, and injury to Davidsons’ business and property. Attention is called to CA5 1711 where it states, “Plaintiffs seek an award of damages for financial losses incurred in connection with the sale of Dr. Grossman’s medical practice and the stock purchase and sale of Vivra stock, ...”. Attention is also called to CA5 1712 where it states, “Plaintiffs are also awarded the sum of $2,493,921.00 for the losses in connection with the sale of Dr. Grossman’s medical practice and the stock purchase and sale,...”. See also ¶ 6, 8.14, and 8.28 of
the Amended Complaint, found at CA5 521, 523-524, and 528. Davidsons have provided competent summary judgment evidence that they have a sufficient personal stake, having sustained injury in fact, and invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 2000). See also Davidsons’ Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment at CA5 1852. Davidsons allege that, “Robert M. Davidson was directly injured by reason of the assault and battery (in the workplace on May 11, 1999), serial acts of extortion (Hobbs Act extortion), pattern of retaliation in the workplace, serial obstructions of justice, fraudulent hiring inducements, fraudulent retention of employment, and fraudulent “lulling” inducements, which were directly targeted at Robert M Davidson.” Davidsons incorporate here by reference all of the argument and authorities found at CA5 1853-1857 under the heading Manifest Injustice. Sepracor Inc alleged failure to state a claim and moved the District Court for dismissal of the Amended Complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6) in Case 4:07-cv-00471. This Court is urged to see Plaintiffs’ Motion for Joinder of U.S. Food & Drug Administration and the District Court’s Order (denial), found at CA5 765-771, as these filings may be material to standing, the declaratory relief sought by Count Five, and issues raised in Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. This Court is also urged to see the Sealed Order (Document #67) entered on June 18, 2007, as this Sealed
Order may be material to standing. This Court is urged to see the Schematic found at CA5 480-482. See Document #38 at CA5 775-780. Denial of Appellants’ Ninth Amendment fundamental right to equality of treatment before the law, has been alleged. Selective enforcement has been alleged. Invidious discrimination has been alleged. As applied to the Appellants, the PDUFA is repugnant to the U.S. Constitution under Fifth Amendment Equal Protection. Because Davidsons’ claims involve a fundamental right (equality of treatment before the law), their federal equal protection claims are subject to de novo review. See ¶s 6, 8.14, 8.28, 8.66, 8.67, 8.102, 10, 18, 19, 31, and 35, of the Amended Complaint (Document #19). This Court is especially referred to Document #57 at CA5 1711-1713 for a true and correct of the Minute Entry Order of November 24, 2004, where it states, “Plaintiffs seek an award of damages for financial losses incurred in connection with the sale of Dr Grossman’s medical practice and the stock purchase and sale of Vivra stock,...” and “Plaintiffs are also awarded the sum of $2,493,921.00 for the losses in connection with the sale of Dr Grossman’s medical practice and the stock purchase and sale,...” The linkage of Grossmans’ violations of the substantive RICO statute 18 USC Section 1962 (b), ( c), and (d), and the injury to Davidsons’ business and property, is thus very direct. Appellants were directly in the headlights of Grossmans’ unlawful acts, not the United States. See Document #71 “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment”at CA5 1854, where it states,
“Plaintiffs seek for this court to avoid a manifest injustice by altering or amending the “Final Order” and the “Memorandum and Order” under FRCP 59(e). This court is referred to filed Document #45 at page 11 of 26, at lines 109, where it states, “Grossman’s stock options and stock ownership in “Vivra” was used [as] a measure of Grossmans’ alleged damages against Robert Davidson and Vanessa Komar in the default Judgment in the State Action. Vanessa Komar was a named Defendant in the Arizona State Action. How Vanessa Komar was ever alleged to have defamed Jay Grossman and caused intentional infliction of emotional distress to Jay Grossman and Eudice Grossman is incomprehensible. Would not an attorney [of] even minimal competence have moved for her dismissal for failure to state a claim against Vanessa Komar? This goes to willful attorney misconduct by MJM” Contrary to footnote 3 at page 5 of the “Memorandum and Order”, Vanessa Komar was never employed by “Vivra” and Vanessa Komar was never a nurse at “Vivra”.” This lawsuit is distinguished from Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S.___(2007), by (inter alia) the fact that Davidsons do not seek damages from the federal government or from any officials of the federal government. This lawsuit is also distinguished from Wilkie in that certain acts alleged qualify as predicate offenses for a RICO suit because they are “capable of being generically classified as extortionate.” Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S.393, 402 (2003). The conduct alleged fits the traditional definition of extortion. The term “extortion” in the Hobbs Act is contrued by its common law meaning. This Court should know that Davidsons alleged specific violations of 18 U.S.C. §1503, §1510, §1511, §1512, §1513, §1951, §1952, and §201, in a pattern of racketeering activity, as early as February 19, 2003, in the U.S. District Court, Arizona District. These Defendants (both the named and unnamed “presently unknown” Defendants on February 19, 2003) in the lawsuit at bar were undeniably
placed on notice that they may have to one day defend in this lawsuit. See ¶s 8.338.35 and 8.38 of the Amended Complaint found at CA5 529-530. Defendants Albany Medical College (“AMC”) and Tartaglia have once again, in their Reply Brief, created a “pregnant” construct which does not correspond to the reality. There was never any dichotomy between the Arizona scheme and the New York scheme. There was always just a single scheme: to conceal ongoing parallel schemes of serial related clinical research frauds and insurance frauds. This is the argument upon AMC and Tartaglia base their assertion that Davidsons have failed to establish patten of racketeering activity. In Reply to this false assertion, Davidsons incorporate here by reference the arguments, affidavits, and exhibits found in filed Document #16 at CA5 305-483. This Court is urged to see the arguments made at CA5 312 and the schematic found at CA5 480-482. This Court is urged to see the affidavit and exhibits included in the Amended Complaint found at CA5 555-717, especially those found at CA5 562-572, 583, 585-587, 589-612, 644-647 which provide competent summary judgment evidence “plausibly” suggesting inter alia the existence of a conspiracy, enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. This evidence also plausibly suggests violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 and 18 U.S.C. § 201 by AMC and Tartaglia in Albany, NY, and provides probable cause to proceed with discovery.
This Court is urged to see CA5 611-612 for competent summary judgment evidence that plausibly suggests that clinical research coordinator, Donald R. Jones, was victim of Jay Grossman’s violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, § 1512, and § 1513, at Albany Medical College, in Albany, NY. This misconduct is virtually identical (similar motive, method, and victim) to the misconduct by Grossman alleged by Davidson (and others) to have occurred in Tucson, AZ. See CA5 54-102, 155-156, 1149-1150, 1303-1305, 1342, 1353-1354, 1363,1385-1389, 1391-1393, 1395-1396, 1421-1422, 1444-1445, 1460, 1532-1533, 1648-1649, 1872-1873, 1877-1894, and 1901-1903. The constitutionality of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1 is material to Davidsons’ Article III standing and the question of whether Appellants stated claims under the civil RICO statute (18 U.S.C. 1964 ( c)) and under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985) against Michael J. Meehan (“Meehan”), Bruce R. Heurlin (“Heurlin”), Jay Grossman (“J. Grossman”), and Eudice Grossman (“E. Grossman”). The constitutionality of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (“PDUFA”) is material to Appellants’ Article III standing and the question of whether Appellants stated claims under the civil RICO statute (18 U.S.C. 1964 ( c)) for violations of 18 U.S.C. 1962 (b), ( c), and (d) against each of the defendants in this lawsuit. For reasons already discussed at length, Rooker-Feldman and res judicata are
inapplicable to these claims. Davidsons incorporate here by reference the argument found at CA5 1499-1501 and at CA5 1502-1507. Based on Justice Thomas’ well-reasoned dissenting opinion, in the Anza case, Plaintiffs do not conclude that the holdings of this Court, in the cases referenced at CA5 1509-1511 and CA5 1852-1853, have been or will be overturned by the Supreme Court. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1991, 1994 (2006). Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion in Anza appears to lend considerable support for “target wing” types of injured Plaintiffs, maintaining their standing to bring civil RICO complaints. This lawsuit is distinguished from the Anza case by the serial fraudulent hiring, retention, and lulling inducements, which were directly targeted at Davidson and relied upon by Davidson. A number of Davidson’s injuries (assault, battery, extortion, constitutional violation) preceded injury to the United States, making Davidson the directly injured party, not the United States. A number of Davidson’s injuries (predicate act injuries, substantive RICO injuries, enterprise injuries, and conspiracy injuries) occurred concomitantly with injury to the United States, making both Davidson and the United States directly injured parties. There is no conceptual difficulty with the view that injuries can occur in parallel, as well as in series. If they occur in parallel, there can be more than one directly injured party. Summary and Conclusion
Davidsons have provided this Court with a strong basis (tolling, dictum/holding, and standing arguments) for vacating the District Court’s Final Order and remanding this lawsuit for jury trial on the merits as to all of the Counts and all of the Parties. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, on this 2nd Day of January 2008, by /s/ Robert M. Davidson /s/ Vanessa E. Komar
_____________________ and ________________________
P.O. Box 1785 Kilgore, TX 75663 (903) 235-0731 P.O. Box 1785 Kilgore, TX 75663 (903) 235-0731
Sign up to vote on this titleUsefulNot usefulReply Brief to Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals (Davidson v. Grossman) by Robert Davidson, M.D., Ph.D.0.0 (0)EmbedDownloadDescriptionAppellants' Reply Brief in U.S. Court of Appeals Case No. 07-20650.Appellants' Reply Brief in U.S. Court of Appeals Case No. 07-20650.Interests: Types, Government & PoliticsRead on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Copyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)Download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentShow moreShow less
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