Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180601_0000738.NIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-07-17 09:47:39
Document Index: 362603653

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 404', 'art, 297', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 404']

CHARLES D. COPELAND, JR., Plaintiff,
This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff Charles D. Copeland, Jr. on March 29, 2017, and on an Opening Brief [DE 16], filed by Plaintiff on September 11, 2017. Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the June 11, 2015 decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying him disability insurance benefits and either award benefits or remand for a new hearing. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff's request for remand for a new hearing.
On June 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability. Plaintiff has amended his alleged onset date of disability to June 10, 2013. The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. On May 29, 2015, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Laurie Wardell. Present at the hearing were Plaintiff, his attorney, and an impartial vocational expert. The ALJ issued a written decision on June 11, 2015, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled based on the following findings:
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 10, 2013, the amended alleged onset date.
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; status post lumbar fusion; history of left shoulder surgery; calcaneal spurs to the feet; obesity; and anxiety.
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds or more than occasionally climb ramps and stairs, kneel, stoop, crouch or crawl. He can balance on even and dry surfaces but not on wet or uneven surfaces. He can have no exposure to vibration or hazards such as unprotected heights or dangerous, moving mechanical parts. The claimant is limited to simple, routine tasks.
7. The claimant was born [in 1970] and was 43 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the amended alleged disability onset date. The claimant subsequently changed age category to a younger individual age 45-49.
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 10, 2013, the amended alleged onset date of disability[, ] through the date of this decision.
(AR 28-39).
Plaintiff then sought review before the Agency's Appeals Council, which denied his request on January 23, 2017, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. In denying Plaintiff's request, the Appeals Council determined that new evidence submitted to it was not relevant to the time period at issue in the ALJ's decision. On March 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case.
At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate her analysis of the evidence in order to allow the reviewing court to trace the path of her reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must “‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion' so that [a reviewing court] may assess the validity of the agency's final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see also O'Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge' between the evidence and [the] conclusions.”); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ's analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he suffers from a “disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant's impairment must not only prevent him from doing his previous work, but considering his age, education, and work experience, it must also prevent him from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that exists in significant numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)-(f).
In this appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to Plaintiff's treating physicians, inadequately considered Plaintiff's obesity, and erroneously determined Plaintiff's subjective symptoms and further argues that the Appeals Council erred in considering new evidence submitted to it not related to the time period covered by the ALJ's decision.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Under what is known as the &ldquo;treating physician rule, &rdquo; the opinion of a treating physician on the nature and severity of an impairment is given controlling weight if it &ldquo;is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.&rdquo; Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. &sect; 404.1527(c)(2). When an ALJ does not give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician, she must weigh the opinion in accordance with the factors in 20 C.F.R. &sect; 404.1527. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (“When we do not give the treating source's opinion controlling weight, we apply the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(2)(I) and (c)(2)(ii) of this section, as well as the factors ...