Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103723/faa-administrator-vs-robertson
Timestamp: 2016-12-09 08:18:58
Document Index: 544665528

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1104', '§ 552', '§ 601', '§ 1421', '§ 1104', '§ 1504', '§ 1104', '§ 552', '§ 1002', '§ 1104', '§ 1504', '§ 1306', '§ 1306', '§ 122', '§ 122', '§ 1666', '§ 674', '§ 6104', '§ 78', '§ 3']

Faa Administrator Vs Robertson - Citation 103723 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Faa Administrator Vs. Robertson - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/103723CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-24-1975Case Number422 U.S. 255AppellantFaa AdministratorRespondentRobertsonExcerpt:
respondents requested the federal aviation administration (faa) to make available systems worthiness analysis program (swap) reports which consist of the faa's analyses of the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines. section 1104 of the federal aviation act of 1958 permits the faa administrator, upon receiving an objection to public disclosure of..... Judgment:
Respondents requested the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to make available Systems Worthiness Analysis Program (SWAP) Reports which consist of the FAA's analyses of the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines. Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 permits the FAA Administrator, upon receiving an objection to public disclosure of information in a report, to withhold disclosure when, in his judgment, it would adversely affect the objecting party's interest and is not required in the public's interest. The Administrator declined to make the reports available upon receiving an objection from the Air Transport Association, which claimed that confidentiality was necessary to the effectiveness of the program. Respondents sued in the District Court seeking,
the requested documents. The District Court held that the documents were "as a matter of law, public and non-exempt" within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court "insofar as appellants rely upon Exemption (3)" of the FOIA.
The SWAP Reports are exempt from public disclosure under Exemption 3 of the FOIA as being "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." Pp.
422 U. S. 261
(b) The broad discretion vested by Congress in the FAA under § 1104 to withhold information from the public is not necessarily inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting the FOIA to replace the broad standard of the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act. Congress could appropriately conclude that the public interest in air transport safety was better served by guaranteeing confidentiality of information necessary to secure from the airlines the maximum amount of information relevant to safety, and Congress' wisdom in striking such a balance is not open to judicial scrutiny. Pp.
422 U. S. 266
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined,
422 U. S. 268
. DOUGLAS and BRENNAN, JJ., filed a dissenting statement,
] in this case in order to determine whether Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), [
] permits nondisclosure
to respondents of certain reports in the files of the Federal Aviation Administration. This exemption provides that material need not be disclosed if "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." The reports are known as Systems Worthiness Analysis Program (SWAP) Reports. [
] They consist of analyses made by representatives of the FAA concerning the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines. Oversight and regulation of air travel safety is the responsibility of the FAA, § 601 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 775, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1421. The FAA claims the documents are protected from disclosure
by virtue of § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1504. [
The facts of the case, in its present posture, [
] are quite simple. During the summer of 1970, in connection with a study of airline safety being conducted by them, the respondents, associated with the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, requested that the FAA make available certain SWAP Reports. The FAA declined to produce the documents. In accordance with established procedures adopted by the FAA, the respondents then filed timely notice of administrative appeal in August, 1970. Several months later, while this administrative appeal was pending, the Air Transport Association, on behalf of its airline
members, requested that the FAA make no public disclosure of the SWAP Reports. The Association noted that, in a prior memorandum of its own staff, the FAA had pointed out that "
[t]he SWAP Program requires a cooperative effort on both the part of the company and FAA if it is to work effectively,'" and argued that
Respondents then sued in the District Court, seeking,
the requested documents. The District Court held that
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court "insofar as appellants rely upon Exemption (3)," but remanded the case for consideration of other exemptions which the FAA might wish to assert. 162 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 498 F.2d 1031 (1974). Examining first what it felt was the ordinary meaning of the language of Exemption 3, the Court of Appeals held that its language required the exempting statute relied on to specify or categorize the particular documents it authorizes to be withheld. Because § 1104 delegated "broad discretionary authority" under a "public interest" standard, it was held not within the scope of Exemption 3. The Court of Appeals distinguished this Court's decision in
(1973), on the ground that the exemption involved in that case was construed to be a specific reference by Congress to a definite class of documents, namely those that must be kept secret "
This case involves no constitutional claims, no issues regarding the nature or scope of "executive privilege," but simply the scope and meaning of one of the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
410 U. S. 94
(STEWART, J., concurring). The Act has two aspects. In one, it seeks to open public records to greater public access; in the other, it seeks to preserve the confidentiality undeniably essential in certain areas of Government operations. It is axiomatic that all parts of an Act, "if at all possible, are to be given effect."
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning,
Accord, Kokoszka v. Belford,
We have construed the Freedom of Information Act recently in
Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft & Engineering Corp.,
EPA v. Mink, supra.
the Court set out the general nature and purpose of the Act, recognizing, as did the Senate committee report, that it is not "
an easy task to balance the opposing interests . . .'" and "`provid[e] a workable formula which encompasses, balances,
and protects all interests. . . .'" 410 U.S. at
, quoting from S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). Nothing in the Act or its legislative history gives any intimation that all information in all agencies and in all circumstances is to be open to public inspection. Because it considered the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 238, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964 ed.), inadequate, Congress sought to permit access to certain kinds of official information which it thought had unnecessarily been withheld and, by the creation of nine explicitly exclusive exemptions, to provide a more workable and balanced formula that would make available information that ought to be public and, at the same time, protect certain information where confidentiality was necessary to protect legitimate governmental functions that would be impaired by disclosure. The exemptions provided by the Act, one of which we deal with here, represent the congressional judgment as to certain kinds of "information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidential, if it so chooses," 410 U.S. at
. The language of Exemption 3 contains no "built-in" standard as in the case of some of the other exemptions. The variety of constructions given its language by the Courts of Appeals [
] is ample evidence
that the relevant portions of the exemption are unclear and ambiguous, compelling resort to the legislative history.
See United States v. Donruss Co.,
That history must be read in light of the legislation in existence when the Act was passed; that history reveals "clear evidence that Congress was aware of the necessity to deal expressly with inconsistent laws."
419 U. S. 129
(1974). Congress was aware, as it undertook a painstaking review, during several sessions, of the right of the public to information concerning the public business; it was aware that it was acting not only against the backdrop of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act,
but also on the basis of a significant number of earlier congressional decisions that confidentiality was essential in certain departments and agencies in order to protect the public interest. No distinction seems to have been made on
the basis of the standards articulated in the exempting statute or on the degree of discretion which it vested in a particular Government officer. When the continued vitality of these specialized exempting statutes was raised by the views of various agencies, [
] the members of the committee consistently expressed the clear intention that these statutes would remain unaffected by the new Act. During the 1963 hearings, for example, Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee stated:
"It should be made clear that this bill in no way limits statutes specifically written with the congressional intent of curtailing the flow of information as a supplement necessary to the proper functioning of certain agencies. [
Indeed, some provisions [
] of bills which were not enacted could well have been construed as repealing all earlier legislation, [
] but such provisions were not included in the bill that was finally enacted. More specifically, when the Civil Aeronautics Board brought § 1104 to the attention of both the House and Senate hearings of 1965, and expressed the agency interpretation that the provision was encompassed within Exemption 3, [
] no question was
"nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records.
These would not be modified
by the public records provisions of S. 1160."
The respondents can prevail only if the Act is to be read as repealing by implication all existing statutes "which restrict public access to specific Government records."
The term "specific" as there used cannot be read as meaning that the exemption applies only to documents specified,
by naming them precisely or by describing the category in which they fall. To require this interpretation would be to ask of Congress a virtually impossible task. Such a construction would also imply that Congress had undertaken to reassess every delegation of authority to withhold information which it had made before the passage of this legislation -- a task which the legislative history shows it clearly did not undertake.
Earlier this Term, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the Court in the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra,
noted that "repeals by implication are disfavored,"
419 U. S. 133
, and that, when courts are confronted with statutes "
capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.'"
-134, quoting
(1974). As we have noted, here, as in the
there is "clear evidence that Congress was aware of the necessity to deal expressly with inconsistent laws," 419 U.S. at
. To spell out repeal by implication of a multitude of statutes enacted over a long period of time, each of which was separately weighed and considered by Congress to meet an identified need, would be a more unreasonable step by a court than to do so with respect to a single statute such as was involved in the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra.
Congress' response was to permit the numerous laws then extant allowing confidentiality to stand; it is not for us to override that legislative choice.
The SWAP is set forth in the Federal Aviation Administration's Systemworthiness Analysis Program Handbook, 8000.3B (reprinted Nov.1970) (App. 44-111). A revised version of the SWAP Handbook is contained in FAA Order 8000.3C, Apr. 14, 1972. (With subsequent changes.)
affidavit of FAA Administrator Shaffer, App. 40.
"Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of information contained in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or of information obtained by the Board or the Administrator, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, stating the grounds for such objection. Whenever such objection is made, the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld from public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public. The Board or Administrator shall be responsible for classified information in accordance with appropriate law:
That nothing in this section shall authorize the withholding of information by the Board or Administrator from the duly authorized committees of the Congress."
Evans v. Department of Transportation,
446 F.2d 821 (CA5 1971), the court held that 49 U.S.C. § 1504, the FAA statute in question here, was within the scope of Exemption 3. 446 F.2d at 824. The same Court of Appeals, however, in an unpublished opinion,
Serchuk v. Weinberger,
affirmance reported at 493 F.2d 663 (1974), followed the Third Circuit in
Stretch v. Weinberger,
495 F.2d 639 (1974), in holding that 53 Stat. 1398, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) -- requiring the confidentiality of all material obtained by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare "except as the Secretary . . . may by regulations prescribe" -- was not within the scope of Exemption 3 because it neither "identifies some class or category of items that Congress considers appropriate for exemption," 495 F.2d at 640, nor at least
Accord, Schechter v. Weinberger,
165 U.S.App. D.C. 236, 238, 506 F.2d 1275, 1277 (1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing his prior dissenting opinion in the same case, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 498 F.2d 1015 (1974)). In
California v. Weinberger,
505 F.2d 767 (1974), the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result in regard to 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) on the ground that the general nondisclosure mandate constituted "words of congressional exemption," 505 F.2d at 768, and thus the material was "specifically exempted . . . by statute." The Secretary merely had the authority "to relax the absolute prohibition established by Congress."
Cf. Sears v. Gottschalk,
502 F.2d 122 (CA4 1974), finding sufficient specificity in the term "[a]pplications for patents" of 35 U.S.C. § 122 and in Rules 14(a) and (b) of the Patent Office to satisfy even the objections of the Stretch court and to bring 35 U.S.C. § 122 within the scope of Exemption 3.
Hearings on S. 1666 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1963) (statement of Senator Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee and sponsor of § 1666, which was not changed, in pertinent part, in the final enactment).
Hearings on H.R. 5012
before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965) (statement of Rep. Moss, Subcommittee Chairman).
at 3: "All laws or part of laws inconsistent with the amendment made by the first section of this Act are hereby repealed."
at 14, 20, 53.
Hearings on S. 1160
before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 366 (1965). The statute's predecessor (49 U.S.C. § 674) also was specifically listed on an exhibit of "exempt statutes" submitted during the 1958 Hearing on S. 921 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 985-987, 997. Subsequent lists -- specifically not claiming to be exhaustive -- include similar statutes.
House Committee on Government Operations, Federal Statutes on the Availability of Information, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 213, 209 (Comm.Print Mar.1960), listing 26 U.S.C. § 6104(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 78x(b).
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3A.18 (1970 Supp.).
So it is here. The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in order to impose objective and easily applicable statutory disclosure standards in place of relatively amorphous standards such as the "public interest," behind which the most self-serving motives for nondisclosure of information could be concealed.
S.Rep. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). But it seems equally clear that Congress intended to leave largely undisturbed existing statutes dealing with the disclosure of information by specific agencies.
H.R.Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966).
Simply stated, the respondents' position is that to allow administrative discretion under a general "public interest" standard to determine whether information shall be disclosed to the public is inconsistent with the general thrust of the Freedom of Information Act. For this Court to accept that position, it must accept its inevitable corollary: that, by enacting the Freedom of Information Act, Congress intended to repeal, by implication alone, those statutes that make disclosure a matter of agency discretion. [
] It simply is impossible fairly to discern any such intention on the part of Congress. There is no evidence of such an intention in either the statutory language or the legislative history, and there are strong intimations to the contrary.
422 U. S. 263
"to be determined in a district court's
inquiry is the factual existence of such a statute, regardless of how unwise, self-protective, or inadvertent the enactment might be. [
410 U. S. 95
n. (STEWART, J., concurring).