Source: https://scoirl.wordpress.com/category/eu-law/
Timestamp: 2017-10-19 03:38:11
Document Index: 471437207

Matched Legal Cases: ['CJEU ', 'Art. 37', 'Art. 37', 'art 3', 'art 3', 'art 3', 'art 3']

EU Law | SCOIRLBLOG
All posts in category EU Law
Here, dismissing Ogieriakhi’s appeal, the Supreme Court held:
113. In summary, the appellant has undoubtedly been injured by the mistaken interpretation of the relevant EU law on the part of the Minister. He lost his employment and was threatened with deportation. Both of these events are likely to have caused him distress. However, the right to damages as a remedy for breach of European Union law requires him to demonstrate, not just that an error of law caused his loss, but that the error of law concerned was inexcusable. In the circumstances of this case I consider that it was not, and that no right of his under the national legal order has been infringed such as to give rise to a right to damages. I would dismiss the appeal.
Ogieriakhi applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal the COA decision. In this determination (Ogieriakhi v Minister for Justice), the Court granted leave on five questions:
O’Malley Iseult J wrote the judgment for a unanimous five judge panel of the Court.
On the first question, O’Malley J states that “good faith and honest misapprehension cannot be sufficient to excuse the State from liability in an appropriate case”[101]. On whether the Minister’s breaches of EU law give rise to a remedy under domestic law, she states:
As already stated, the sole reason for the loss of the appellant’s employment was the incorrect interpretation of EU law by the Minister. Domestic law undoubtedly gives an individual in this position a right to apply to the courts for enforcement of the correct interpretation of that law. The national courts also have jurisdiction to determine whether, as a matter of EU law, damages can be awarded under EU law criteria. What cannot be done is to find a free-standing right to damages under national law where the Francovich criteria are not satisfied, if the wrong done is a wrong under EU law. The latter is a separate legal order, with autonomous concepts that must be applied uniformly throughout the Union (see Dias and Ziolkowski, referred to above, on the question whether rights of residence conferred by national law could confer rights under EU law). In the circumstances of this case it was the sole source of the rights claimed by the appellant. It does not give rise to separate rights under domestic law.
And on the question of mitigation of loss she states:
106. … In my view the date of that refusal was the cut-off point for the assessment of loss – to rule otherwise was, in effect, to hold the State liable for the financial failure of the business, since it is inconceivable that a court could have awarded six years loss of earnings if in fact he had earned a larger income during that time.
Posted in EU Law
https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2017/07/16/ogieriakhi-v-minister-for-justice-no-right-to-damages-where-mistaken-interpretation-of-eu-law-was-not-inexcusable/
MJELR v Equality Tribunal: Supreme Court to make reference to CJEU on Tribunal’s jurisdiction under EU law
Here, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v The Workplace Relations Commission and Others, the Supreme Court determined to make a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The question relates to whether EU law requires that the Equality Tribunal must have jurisdiction to hear a complaint where the remedy sought is the disapplication of secondary legislation but where the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to commence such proceedings under national law.
In 2005 one of the notice parties was refused entry to train as a member of the Gardai on grounds of age, the upper age limit being 35. He lodged a complaint with the Equality Tribunal under the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2004, which implemented Council Directive 2000/78/EC. The Minister sought to have the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to disapply a statutory instrument determined as a preliminary issue. The Tribunal refused and set a date for hearing. The Minister issued judicial review proceedings on that decision in the High Court.
Charleton J (here) upheld the Minister’s complaint. He found that the Tribunal, a body created by statute, did not have jurisdiction to disapply the legislation and therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint. The correct procedure would have been for the complaint to be transferred to the High Court. The Tribunal member appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.
Clarke J wrote the judgment for the five judge panel. He drew attention to the source of the power of tribunals, Art. 37.1 of the Constitution:
He stated that “ a significant power to disapply duly enacted legislation could not be described as a limited power in the sense in which that term is used in Art. 37.1” [5.8]. He determined that jurisdiction on employment matters must therefore be divided between the Tribunal and the High Court, but that this was consistent with the EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
However Clarke J determined that there is a question of whether EU law requires that the Tribunal must have jurisdiction to embark on hearings of the nature of the underlying case here. The Court will refer a question to the CJEU. The wording of the question is not recorded in the judgment.
by scoirlblog on June 18, 2017 • Permalink
Posted by scoirlblog on June 18, 2017
https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2017/06/18/mjelr-v-equality-tribunal-supreme-court-to-make-reference-to-cjeu-on-tribunals-jurisdiction-under-eu-law/
Here, the Court issued a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice on whether the Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland is an emanation of the State as per the test in Foster and Others v British Gas plc (Case C-188/89).
In January 1996, Farrell was injured in a motor accident while she was a passenger in the rear of a van which was not fitted with seats. Whitty was the driver, and there was no dispute regarding his liability for Farrell’s injuries. However, Whitty did not have insurance to cover passengers travelling in the rear of his van, and he did not have the means to compensate Farrell for her injuries.
The Second Council Directive 84/5/ EEC of 30 December 1983 required Member States to set up or authorise a body to provide compensation for damage to property or personal injuries caused by unidentified or uninsured vehicles. In Ireland that body is the MIBI. The Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 extended the obligations of such bodies to compensate all passengers travelling in uninsured vehicles. In Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty & Ors (Case C-356/05) [2007] ECR I-03036 the ECJ held that Ireland had failed to properly transpose the Third Directive into law. Farrell has been paid compensation. The issue still in dispute is whether the State or the MIBI is liable for that payment (and there are a number of other similar cases).
In the High Court (here) Birmingham J held that the MIBI was an emanation of the State and was therefore liable for the payment of compensation to Farrell. In support of that conclusion he cited the reasoning of the Advocate General and the submission of the Commission in Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty & Ors that the MIBI is an emanation of the State [7.2] as set out in the ECJ decision in Foster v British Gas Plc (Case 188/89) [1990] ECR I-3313:
20. It follows from the foregoing that a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals is included in any event among the bodies against which the provisions of a Directive capable of having direct effect may be relied upon.
The MIBI appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.
CharletonJ wrote the judgment for the Court. He determined that the Court would make a reference to the ECJ on the issue. Clarke J and Laffoy J
1. Is the test in Foster and Others v British Gas plc (Case C-188/89) as set out at para 20 onthe question of what is an emanation of the state to be read on the basis that the elements of the test are to be applied
2. To the extent that separate matters referred to in Foster and Others v British Gas plc (Case C-188/89) may, alternatively, be considered to be factors which would properly be taken into account in reaching an overall assessment,is there a fundamental principle underlying the separate factors identified in that decision which a court should apply in reasoning an assessment as to whether a specified body is an emanation of the State?
3. Is it sufficient that a broad measure of responsibility has been transferred to a body by a member state for the ostensible purpose of meeting obligations under European law for that body to be an emanation of the member state or is it necessary, in addition, that such a body additionally have (a) special powers or (b) operate under direct control or supervision of the member state?
by scoirlblog on May 30, 2015 • Permalink
Tagged Emanation of the State
Posted by scoirlblog on May 30, 2015
https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2015/05/30/farrell-v-whitty-court-makes-preliminary-reference-t-ecj-on-whether-mibi-is-an-emanation-of-the-state/
Minister for Justice v Strzelecki: Court rejects narrow interpretation of “surrender” in the European Arrest Warrant Act
Where a person has been surrendered under a European arrest warrant and the issuing state seeks consent to prosecute the suspect on additional charges to those for which the surrender was granted, the issuing state is in effect seeking to have the terms of surrender amended to include permission to prosecute on additional charges. Therefore s 37 of Part 3 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, which provides the grounds under which the courts must prohibit surrender, is applicable (judgment).
In July 2102 the High Court made an order under the 2003 Act surrendering Strzelecki to the Republic of Poland. In December 2012 Poland requested permission, under s 27 of the 2003 Act, to prosecute him for two additional charges. In the High Court, Strzelecki objected to the application based on human and fundamental rights issues: s 37 of Part 3 of the 2003 Act provides grounds under which the courts must prohibit surrender (where surrender would be incompatible with the State’s obligations under the ECHR, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Constitution, etc,). The High Court held that, as he had already been surrendered to Poland, and as Poland is a signature to the ECHR and a member of the EU, Strzelecki could not raise the issues which Part 3 of the 2003 Act list as grounds to prohibit surrender. Strzelecki appealed that finding to the Supreme Court.
Sections 22(7) and (8) of the 2003 Act:
(7) The High Court may, in relation to a person who has been surrendered to an issuing state under this Act, consent to –
(8) The High Court shall not give its consent under subsection (7) if the offence concerned is an offence for which a person could not by virtue of Part 3 be surrendered under this Act.
Denham CJ, with whom the other four justices concurred, held that the High Court had erred in excluding Strzelecki from raising fundamental rights issues. An application to prosecute on additional charges is a request that the consent to surrender include prosecution for those additional offences. Therefore s 37 of the 2003 Act is applicable [35]. That means that he can raise issues of human and fundamental rights. However, the European arrest warrant procedure is based on mutual respect between Member States, and, as the relevant case law establishes, the High Court may determine that the courts of the requesting state may be better placed to adjudicate on those issues.
by scoirlblog on March 1, 2015 • Permalink
Tagged European Arrest Warrant, Human rights
Posted by scoirlblog on March 1, 2015
https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2015/03/01/minister-for-justice-v-strzelecki-court-rejects-narrow-interpretation-of-surrender-in-the-european-arrest-warrant-act/