Source: http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2011_11_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2018-05-25 01:12:59
Document Index: 393873440

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 19', 'Art. 20', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 2200', 'art 19', 'Art 20', 'art 21', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 20', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 1910', 'Art. 1910', 'Art. 1191']

Insurance Case Digest: Valenzuela v. CA (1990)
G.R. No. 83122 October 19, 1990
Lessons Applicable: Effect of Non-Payment (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Art. 19,Art. 20,Art. 21, Art. 2200 of the new Civil Code;Section 77 of the Insurance Code
Valenzuela, General Agent of Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc authorized to sell in behalf of Philamgen solicited marine insurance from Delta Motors, Inc. amounting to P4.4M entitling him to a 32% commission or P1.6M
1976-1978: premium payments of P1,946,886 were paid directly to Philamgen. Philamgen wanted a 50% share of Valenzuela's commission but Valenzuela refused.
Because of his refusal, the officers of Philamgen reversed his commission due him, placed agency transactions on a cash and carry basis thus removing the 60-day credit for premiums due, threatened to cancel policies issued by his agency and leaked out the news that he has substantial accounts with Philamgen.
December 27, 1978: His agency with Philamgen was terminated
Valenzuela sought relief from the RTC
RTC: favored Valenzuela with reinstatement, commission with interest, monthly compensatory damages, moral damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit
CA modified by holding Philamgen and Valenzuela jointly and severally liable for the premium
ISSUE: W/N Valuenuela should be NOT be held liable since non-payment of the premium renders the policy invalid
HELD: YES. petition is GRANTED. RTC reinstated with modification that upon satisfaction of the judgment, contractual relationship is terminated
The principal may not defeat the agent's right to indemnification by a termination of the contract of agency. Where the principal terminates or repudiates the agent's employment in violation of the contract of employment and without cause ... the agent is entitled to receive either the amount of net losses caused and gains prevented by the breach, or the reasonable value of the services rendered. Thus, the agent is entitled to prospective profits which he would have made except for such wrongful termination provided that such profits are not conjectural, or speculative but are capable of determination upon some fairly reliable basis.
If a principal violates a contractual or quasi-contractual duty which he owes his agent, the agent may as a rule bring an appropriate action for the breach of that duty. The agent may in a proper case maintain an action at law for compensation or damages
question of whether or not the agency agreement is coupled with interest is helpful to the petitioners' cause but is not the primary and compelling reason
Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the remedy for the non-payment of premiums is to put an end to and render the insurance policy not binding
unless premium is paid, an insurance contract does not take effect
since admittedly the premiums have not been paid, the policies issued have lapsed
to sue Valenzuela for the unpaid premiums would be the height of injustice and unfair dealing
Under Article 2200 of the new Civil Code, "indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain."
Labels: 1990, art 19, Art 20, art 21, Case Digest, effect of non payment, G.R. No. 83122, insurance, insurance case digest, insurance code, Juris Doctor, October 19, valenzuela v ca
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 83122
ARTURO P. VALENZUELA and HOSPITALITA N. VALENZUELA, petitioners,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO M. ARAGON, ROBERT E. PARNELL, CARLOS K. CATOLICO and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Albino B. Achas for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondents.
This is a petition for review of the January 29, 1988 decision of the Court of Appeals and the April 27, 1988 resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, which decision and resolution reversed the decision dated June 23,1986 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 121126 upholding the petitioners' causes of action and granting all the reliefs prayed for in their complaint against private respondents.
Petitioner Arturo P. Valenzuela (Valenzuela for short) is a General Agent of private respondent Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc. (Philamgen for short) since 1965. As such, he was authorized to solicit and sell in behalf of Philamgen all kinds of non-life insurance, and in consideration of services rendered was entitled to receive the full agent's commission of 32.5% from Philamgen under the scheduled commission rates (Exhibits "A" and "1"). From 1973 to 1975, Valenzuela solicited marine insurance from one of his clients, the Delta Motors, Inc. (Division of Electronics Airconditioning and Refrigeration) in the amount of P4.4 Million from which he was entitled to a commission of 32% (Exhibit "B"). However, Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6 Million from the P4.4 Million insurance coverage of the Delta Motors. During the period 1976 to 1978, premium payments amounting to P1,946,886.00 were paid directly to Philamgen and Valenzuela's commission to which he is entitled amounted to P632,737.00.
In 1977, Philamgen started to become interested in and expressed its intent to share in the commission due Valenzuela (Exhibits "III" and "III-1") on a fifty-fifty basis (Exhibit "C"). Valenzuela refused (Exhibit "D").
On February 8, 1978 Philamgen and its President, Bienvenido M. Aragon insisted on the sharing of the commission with Valenzuela (Exhibit E). This was followed by another sharing proposal dated June 1, 1978. On June 16,1978, Valenzuela firmly reiterated his objection to the proposals of respondents stating that: "It is with great reluctance that I have to decline upon request to signify my conformity to your alternative proposal regarding the payment of the commission due me. However, I have no choice for to do otherwise would be violative of the Agency Agreement executed between our goodselves." (Exhibit B-1)
Because of the refusal of Valenzuela, Philamgen and its officers, namely: Bienvenido Aragon, Carlos Catolico and Robert E. Parnell took drastic action against Valenzuela. They: (a) reversed the commission due him by not crediting in his account the commission earned from the Delta Motors, Inc. insurance (Exhibit "J" and "2"); (b) placed agency transactions on a cash and carry basis; (c) threatened the cancellation of policies issued by his agency (Exhibits "H" to "H-2"); and (d) started to leak out news that Valenzuela has a substantial account with Philamgen. All of these acts resulted in the decline of his business as insurance agent (Exhibits "N", "O", "K" and "K-8"). Then on December 27, 1978, Philamgen terminated the General Agency Agreement of Valenzuela (Exhibit "J", pp. 1-3, Decision Trial Court dated June 23, 1986, Civil Case No. 121126, Annex I, Petition).
The petitioners sought relief by filing the complaint against the private respondents in the court a quo (Complaint of January 24, 1979, Annex "F" Petition). After due proceedings, the trial court found:
Defendants tried to justify the termination of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela as one of defendant PHILAMGEN's General Agent by making it appear that plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela has a substantial account with defendant PHILAMGEN particularly Delta Motors, Inc.'s Account, thereby prejudicing defendant PHILAMGEN's interest (Exhibits 6,"11","11- "12- A"and"13-A").
Defendants also invoked the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Article 1868) and the provisions of the General Agency Agreement as their basis for terminating plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela as one of their General Agents.
That defendants' position could have been justified had the termination of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela was (sic) based solely on the provisions of the Civil Code and the conditions of the General Agency Agreement. But the records will show that the principal cause of the termination of the plaintiff as General Agent of defendant PHILAMGEN was his refusal to share his Delta commission.
That it should be noted that there were several attempts made by defendant Bienvenido M. Aragon to share with the Delta commission of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela. He had persistently pursued the sharing scheme to the point of terminating plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela, and to make matters worse, defendants made it appear that plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela had substantial accounts with defendant PHILAMGEN.
Not only that, defendants have also started (a) to treat separately the Delta Commission of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela, (b) to reverse the Delta commission due plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela by not crediting or applying said commission earned to the account of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela, (c) placed plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela's agency transactions on a "cash and carry basis", (d) sending threats to cancel existing policies issued by plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela's agency, (e) to divert plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela's insurance business to other agencies, and (f) to spread wild and malicious rumors that plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela has substantial account with defendant PHILAMGEN to force plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela into agreeing with the sharing of his Delta commission." (pp. 9-10, Decision, Annex 1, Petition).
These acts of harrassment done by defendants on plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela to force him to agree to the sharing of his Delta commission, which culminated in the termination of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela as one of defendant PHILAMGEN's General Agent, do not justify said termination of the General Agency Agreement entered into by defendant PHILAMGEN and plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela.
That since defendants are not justified in the termination of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela as one of their General Agents, defendants shall be liable for the resulting damage and loss of business of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela. (Arts. 2199/2200, Civil Code of the Philippines). (Ibid, p. 11)
The court accordingly rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendants ordering the latter to reinstate plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela as its General Agent, and to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
1. The amount of five hundred twenty-one thousand nine hundred sixty four and 16/100 pesos (P521,964.16) representing plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela's Delta Commission with interest at the legal rate from the time of the filing of the complaint, which amount shall be adjusted in accordance with Article 1250 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
2. The amount of seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) per month as compensatory damages from 1980 until such time that defendant Philamgen shall reinstate plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela as one of its general agents;
3. The amount of three hundred fifty thousand pesos (P350,000.00) for each plaintiff as moral damages;
4. The amount of seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as and for attorney's fees;
5. Costs of the suit. (Ibid., P. 12)
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Bienvenido Aragon, Robert E. Parnell, Carlos K. Catolico and PHILAMGEN respondents herein, and defendants-appellants below, interposed an appeal on the following:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF ARTURO P. VALENZUELA HAD NO OUTSTANDING ACCOUNT WITH DEFENDANT PHILAMGEN AT THE TIME OF THE TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF ARTURO P. VALENZUELA IS ENTITLED TO THE FULL COMMISSION OF 32.5% ON THE DELTA ACCOUNT.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TERMINATION OF PLAINTIFF ARTURO P. VALENZUELA WAS NOT JUSTIFIED AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE FOR ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT PHILAMGEN WAS PROPER, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES EVEN AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS WHO ARE MERE CORPORATE AGENTS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF ARTURO P. VALENZUELA WAS PROPER, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF HOSPITALITA VALENZUELA, WHO, NOT BEING THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS NOT TO OBTAIN RELIEF.
On January 29, 1988, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the appealed case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified accordingly and judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
1. Plaintiff-appellee Valenzuela to pay defendant-appellant Philamgen the sum of one million nine hundred thirty two thousand five hundred thirty-two pesos and seventeen centavos (P1,902,532.17), with legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
2. Both plaintiff-appellees to pay jointly and severally defendants-appellants the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as and by way of attorney's fees.
No pronouncement is made as to costs. (p. 44, Rollo)
There is in this instance irreconcilable divergence in the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, vis-a-vis those of the trial court particularly on the pivotal issue whether or not Philamgen and/or its officers can be held liable for damages due to the termination of the General Agency Agreement it entered into with the petitioners. In its questioned decision the Court of Appeals observed that:
In any event the principal's power to revoke an agency at will is so pervasive, that the Supreme Court has consistently held that termination may be effected even if the principal acts in bad faith, subject only to the principal's liability for damages (Danon v. Antonio A. Brimo & Co., 42 Phil. 133; Reyes v. Mosqueda, 53 O.G. 2158 and Infante V. Cunanan, 93 Phil. 691, cited in Paras, Vol. V, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated [1986] 696).
The lower court, however, thought the termination of Valenzuela as General Agent improper because the record will show the principal cause of the termination of the plaintiff as General Agent of defendant Philamgen was his refusal to share his Delta commission. (Decision, p. 9; p. 13, Rollo, 41)
Because of the conflicting conclusions, this Court deemed it necessary in the interest of substantial justice to scrutinize the evidence and records of the cases. While it is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court, there are however certain exceptions to the rule which this Court has recognized and accepted, among which, are when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts and when the findings of the appellate court, are contrary to those of the trial court (Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 236 [1987]); Guita v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 576 [1986]). Where the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on record (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 222 [1984]; Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 597 [1987]; Maclan v. Santos, 156 SCRA 542 [1987]). When the conclusion of the Court of Appeals is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, or when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, or when there is grave abuse of discretion, or when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, and when the findings of facts are conflict the exception also applies (Malaysian Airline System Bernad v. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 321 [1987]).
After a painstaking review of the entire records of the case and the findings of facts of both the court a quo and respondent appellate court, we are constrained to affirm the trial court's findings and rule for the petitioners.
We agree with the court a quo that the principal cause of the termination of Valenzuela as General Agent of Philamgen arose from his refusal to share his Delta commission. The records sustain the conclusions of the trial court on the apparent bad faith of the private respondents in terminating the General Agency Agreement of petitioners. It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of a trial judge are entitled to great weight (People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 22 [1984]) and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine the evidence as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying (Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., 136 SCRA 365 [1985]; People v. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 25 [1987]; and Baliwag Trans., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 82 [1987]). In the case at bar, the records show that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence and there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb them (Mendoza v. Court of Appeals. 156 SCRA 597 [1987]).
As early as September 30,1977, Philamgen told the petitioners of its desire to share the Delta Commission with them. It stated that should Delta back out from the agreement, the petitioners would be charged interests through a reduced commission after full payment by Delta.
On January 23, 1978 Philamgen proposed reducing the petitioners' commissions by 50% thus giving them an agent's commission of 16.25%. On February 8, 1978, Philamgen insisted on the reduction scheme followed on June 1, 1978 by still another insistence on reducing commissions and proposing two alternative schemes for reduction. There were other pressures. Demands to settle accounts, to confer and thresh out differences regarding the petitioners' income and the threat to terminate the agency followed. The petitioners were told that the Delta commissions would not be credited to their account (Exhibit "J"). They were informed that the Valenzuela agency would be placed on a cash and carry basis thus removing the 60-day credit for premiums due. (TSN., March 26, 1979, pp. 54-57). Existing policies were threatened to be cancelled (Exhibits "H" and "14"; TSN., March 26, 1979, pp. 29-30). The Valenzuela business was threatened with diversion to other agencies. (Exhibit "NNN"). Rumors were also spread about alleged accounts of the Valenzuela agency (TSN., January 25, 1980, p. 41). The petitioners consistently opposed the pressures to hand over the agency or half of their commissions and for a treatment of the Delta account distinct from other accounts. The pressures and demands, however, continued until the agency agreement itself was finally terminated.
It is also evident from the records that the agency involving petitioner and private respondent is one "coupled with an interest," and, therefore, should not be freely revocable at the unilateral will of the latter.
In the insurance business in the Philippines, the most difficult and frustrating period is the solicitation and persuasion of the prospective clients to buy insurance policies. Normally, agents would encounter much embarrassment, difficulties, and oftentimes frustrations in the solicitation and procurement of the insurance policies. To sell policies, an agent exerts great effort, patience, perseverance, ingenuity, tact, imagination, time and money. In the case of Valenzuela, he was able to build up an Agency from scratch in 1965 to a highly productive enterprise with gross billings of about Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) premiums per annum. The records sustain the finding that the private respondent started to covet a share of the insurance business that Valenzuela had built up, developed and nurtured to profitability through over thirteen (13) years of patient work and perseverance. When Valenzuela refused to share his commission in the Delta account, the boom suddenly fell on him.
The private respondents by the simple expedient of terminating the General Agency Agreement appropriated the entire insurance business of Valenzuela. With the termination of the General Agency Agreement, Valenzuela would no longer be entitled to commission on the renewal of insurance policies of clients sourced from his agency. Worse, despite the termination of the agency, Philamgen continued to hold Valenzuela jointly and severally liable with the insured for unpaid premiums. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Valenzuela had an interest in the continuation of the agency when it was unceremoniously terminated not only because of the commissions he should continue to receive from the insurance business he has solicited and procured but also for the fact that by the very acts of the respondents, he was made liable to Philamgen in the event the insured fail to pay the premiums due. They are estopped by their own positive averments and claims for damages. Therefore, the respondents cannot state that the agency relationship between Valenzuela and Philamgen is not coupled with interest. "There may be cases in which an agent has been induced to assume a responsibility or incur a liability, in reliance upon the continuance of the authority under such circumstances that, if the authority be withdrawn, the agent will be exposed to personal loss or liability" (See MEC 569 p. 406).
Furthermore, there is an exception to the principle that an agency is revocable at will and that is when the agency has been given not only for the interest of the principal but for the interest of third persons or for the mutual interest of the principal and the agent. In these cases, it is evident that the agency ceases to be freely revocable by the sole will of the principal (See Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 56 ed., Vol. IV p. 350). The following citations are apropos:
The principal may not defeat the agent's right to indemnification by a termination of the contract of agency (Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co. 185 NC 479, 117 SE 706, 32 ALR 196).
Where the principal terminates or repudiates the agent's employment in violation of the contract of employment and without cause ... the agent is entitled to receive either the amount of net losses caused and gains prevented by the breach, or the reasonable value of the services rendered. Thus, the agent is entitled to prospective profits which he would have made except for such wrongful termination provided that such profits are not conjectural, or speculative but are capable of determination upon some fairly reliable basis. And a principal's revocation of the agency agreement made to avoid payment of compensation for a result which he has actually accomplished (Hildendorf v. Hague, 293 NW 2d 272; Newhall v. Journal Printing Co., 105 Minn 44,117 NW 228; Gaylen Machinery Corp. v. Pitman-Moore Co. [C.A. 2 NY] 273 F 2d 340)
If a principal violates a contractual or quasi-contractual duty which he owes his agent, the agent may as a rule bring an appropriate action for the breach of that duty. The agent may in a proper case maintain an action at law for compensation or damages ... A wrongfully discharged agent has a right of action for damages and in such action the measure and element of damages are controlled generally by the rules governing any other action for the employer's breach of an employment contract. (Riggs v. Lindsay, 11 US 500, 3L Ed 419; Tiffin Glass Co. v. Stoehr, 54 Ohio 157, 43 NE 2798)
At any rate, the question of whether or not the agency agreement is coupled with interest is helpful to the petitioners' cause but is not the primary and compelling reason. For the pivotal factor rendering Philamgen and the other private respondents liable in damages is that the termination by them of the General Agency Agreement was tainted with bad faith. Hence, if a principal acts in bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency, then he is liable in damages. This is in accordance with the precepts in Human Relations enshrined in our Civil Code that "every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith: (Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same (Art. 20, id). "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages" (Art. 21, id.).
As to the issue of whether or not the petitioners are liable to Philamgen for the unpaid and uncollected premiums which the respondent court ordered Valenzuela to pay Philamgen the amount of One Million Nine Hundred Thirty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Two and 17/100 Pesos (P1,932,532,17) with legal interest thereon until fully paid (Decision-January 20, 1988, p. 16; Petition, Annex "A"), we rule that the respondent court erred in holding Valenzuela liable. We find no factual and legal basis for the award. Under Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the remedy for the non-payment of premiums is to put an end to and render the insurance policy not binding —
Sec. 77 ... [N]otwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of insurance is valid and binding unless and until the premiums thereof have been paid except in the case of a life or industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision applies (P.D. 612, as amended otherwise known as the Insurance Code of 1974)
In Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. v. Woodworks, Inc. (92 SCRA 419 [1979]) we held that the non-payment of premium does not merely suspend but puts an end to an insurance contract since the time of the payment is peculiarly of the essence of the contract. And in Arce v. The Capital Insurance and Surety Co. Inc. (117 SCRA 63, [1982]), we reiterated the rule that unless premium is paid, an insurance contract does not take effect. Thus:
It is to be noted that Delgado (Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Delgado, 9 SCRA 177 [1963] was decided in the light of the Insurance Act before Sec. 72 was amended by the underscored portion. Supra. Prior to the Amendment, an insurance contract was effective even if the premium had not been paid so that an insurer was obligated to pay indemnity in case of loss and correlatively he had also the right to sue for payment of the premium. But the amendment to Sec. 72 has radically changed the legal regime in that unless the premium is paid there is no insurance. " (Arce v. Capitol Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., 117 SCRA 66; Emphasis supplied)
In Philippine Phoenix Surety case, we held:
Moreover, an insurer cannot treat a contract as valid for the purpose of collecting premiums and invalid for the purpose of indemnity. (Citing Insurance Law and Practice by John Alan Appleman, Vol. 15, p. 331; Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing findings are buttressed by Section 776 of the insurance Code (Presidential Decree No. 612, promulgated on December 18, 1974), which now provides that no contract of Insurance by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary (Ibid., 92 SCRA 425)
Perforce, since admittedly the premiums have not been paid, the policies issued have lapsed. The insurance coverage did not go into effect or did not continue and the obligation of Philamgen as insurer ceased. Hence, for Philamgen which had no more liability under the lapsed and inexistent policies to demand, much less sue Valenzuela for the unpaid premiums would be the height of injustice and unfair dealing. In this instance, with the lapsing of the policies through the nonpayment of premiums by the insured there were no more insurance contracts to speak of. As this Court held in the Philippine Phoenix Surety case, supra "the non-payment of premiums does not merely suspend but puts an end to an insurance contract since the time of the payment is peculiarly of the essence of the contract."
The respondent appellate court also seriously erred in according undue reliance to the report of Banaria and Banaria and Company, auditors, that as of December 31, 1978, Valenzuela owed Philamgen P1,528,698.40. This audit report of Banaria was commissioned by Philamgen after Valenzuela was almost through with the presentation of his evidence. In essence, the Banaria report started with an unconfirmed and unaudited beginning balance of account of P1,758,185.43 as of August 20, 1976. But even with that unaudited and unconfirmed beginning balance of P1,758,185.43, Banaria still came up with the amount of P3,865.49 as Valenzuela's balance as of December 1978 with Philamgen (Exh. "38-A-3"). In fact, as of December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, Valenzuela had no unpaid account with Philamgen (Ref: Annexes "D", "D-1", "E", Petitioner's Memorandum). But even disregarding these annexes which are records of Philamgen and addressed to Valenzuela in due course of business, the facts show that as of July 1977, the beginning balance of Valenzuela's account with Philamgen amounted to P744,159.80. This was confirmed by Philamgen itself not only once but four (4) times on different occasions, as shown by the records.
On April 3,1978, Philamgen sent Valenzuela a statement of account with a beginning balance of P744,159-80 as of July 1977.
On May 23, 1978, another statement of account with exactly the same beginning balance was sent to Valenzuela.
On November 17, 1978, Philamgen sent still another statement of account with P744,159.80 as the beginning balance.
And on December 20, 1978, a statement of account with exactly the same figure was sent to Valenzuela.
It was only after the filing of the complaint that a radically different statement of accounts surfaced in court. Certainly, Philamgen's own statements made by its own accountants over a long period of time and covering examinations made on four different occasions must prevail over unconfirmed and unaudited statements made to support a position made in the course of defending against a lawsuit.
It is not correct to say that Valenzuela should have presented its own records to refute the unconfirmed and unaudited finding of the Banaria auditor. The records of Philamgen itself are the best refutation against figures made as an afterthought in the course of litigation. Moreover, Valenzuela asked for a meeting where the figures would be reconciled. Philamgen refused to meet with him and, instead, terminated the agency agreement.
After off-setting the amount of P744,159.80, beginning balance as of July 1977, by way of credits representing the commission due from Delta and other accounts, Valenzuela had overpaid Philamgen the amount of P530,040.37 as of November 30, 1978. Philamgen cannot later be heard to complain that it committed a mistake in its computation. The alleged error may be given credence if committed only once. But as earlier stated, the reconciliation of accounts was arrived at four (4) times on different occasions where Philamgen was duly represented by its account executives. On the basis of these admissions and representations, Philamgen cannot later on assume a different posture and claim that it was mistaken in its representation with respect to the correct beginning balance as of July 1977 amounting to P744,159.80. The Banaria audit report commissioned by Philamgen is unreliable since its results are admittedly based on an unconfirmed and unaudited beginning balance of P1,758,185.43 as of August 20,1976.
As so aptly stated by the trial court in its decision:
Defendants also conducted an audit of accounts of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela after the controversy has started. In fact, after hearing plaintiffs have already rested their case.
The results of said audit were presented in Court to show plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela's accountability to defendant PHILAMGEN. However, the auditor, when presented as witness in this case testified that the beginning balance of their audit report was based on an unaudited amount of P1,758,185.43 (Exhibit 46-A) as of August 20, 1976, which was unverified and merely supplied by the officers of defendant PHILAMGEN.
Even defendants very own Exhibit 38- A-3, showed that plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela's balance as of 1978 amounted to only P3,865.59, not P826,128.46 as stated in defendant Bienvenido M. Aragon's letter dated December 20,1978 (Exhibit 14) or P1,528,698.40 as reflected in defendant's Exhibit 46 (Audit Report of Banaria dated December 24, 1980).
These glaring discrepancy (sic) in the accountability of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela to defendant PHILAMGEN only lends credence to the claim of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela that he has no outstanding account with defendant PHILAMGEN when the latter, thru defendant Bienvenido M. Aragon, terminated the General Agency Agreement entered into by plaintiff (Exhibit A) effective January 31, 1979 (see Exhibits "2" and "2-A"). Plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela has shown that as of October 31, 1978, he has overpaid defendant PHILAMGEN in the amount of P53,040.37 (Exhibit "EEE", which computation was based on defendant PHILAMGEN's balance of P744,159.80 furnished on several occasions to plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela by defendant PHILAMGEN (Exhibits H-1, VV, VV-1, WW, WW-1 , YY , YY-2 , ZZ and , ZZ-2).
Prescinding from the foregoing, and considering that the private respondents terminated Valenzuela with evident mala fide it necessarily follows that the former are liable in damages. Respondent Philamgen has been appropriating for itself all these years the gross billings and income that it unceremoniously took away from the petitioners. The preponderance of the authorities sustain the preposition that a principal can be held liable for damages in cases of unjust termination of agency. In Danon v. Brimo, 42 Phil. 133 [1921]), this Court ruled that where no time for the continuance of the contract is fixed by its terms, either party is at liberty to terminate it at will, subject only to the ordinary requirements of good faith. The right of the principal to terminate his authority is absolute and unrestricted, except only that he may not do so in bad faith.
The trial court in its decision awarded to Valenzuela the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000,00) per month as compensatory damages from June 1980 until its decision becomes final and executory. This award is justified in the light of the evidence extant on record (Exhibits "N", "N-10", "0", "0-1", "P" and "P-1") showing that the average gross premium collection monthly of Valenzuela over a period of four (4) months from December 1978 to February 1979, amounted to over P300,000.00 from which he is entitled to a commission of P100,000.00 more or less per month. Moreover, his annual sales production amounted to P2,500,000.00 from where he was given 32.5% commissions. Under Article 2200 of the new Civil Code, "indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain."
The circumstances of the case, however, require that the contractual relationship between the parties shall be terminated upon the satisfaction of the judgment. No more claims arising from or as a result of the agency shall be entertained by the courts after that date.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The impugned decision of January 29, 1988 and resolution of April 27, 1988 of respondent court are hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court dated January 23, 1986 in Civil Case No. 121126 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATIONS that the amount of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR AND 16/100 PESOS (P521,964.16) representing the petitioners Delta commission shall earn only legal interests without any adjustments under Article 1250 of the Civil Code and that the contractual relationship between Arturo P. Valenzuela and Philippine American General Insurance Company shall be deemed terminated upon the satisfaction of the judgment as modified.
Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), took no part
Labels: G.R. No. 83122, insurance, Juris Doctor, jurisprudence, THIRD DIVISION
Insurance Case Digst: Sales de Gonzaga v. Crown Life Insurance Co. (1952)
G.R. No. L-4197 March 20, 1952
Laws Applicable:
September 26, 1939: Crown Life Insurance Co. whose home office is based in Toronto, Canada issued to Ramon Gonzaga through its branch office in Manila a 20-year endowment policy for P15,000 which had an annual premium of P591.
Payment was only until September 6, 1941 because of the outbreak of the war since Crown is an enemy corp. order to be closed during the Japanese occupation. However, despite that it offered a privilege to accept premium payments in the place of its employee in Ermita but of which Gonzaga did not avail.
Through the automatic premium loan clause, it continued until June 12, 1943
May 1, 1945: It reopened but still Gonzaga did not pay although there was a reinstatement clause providing certain conditions within three years from the date of lapse on application of the insured
ISSUE: W/N Gonzaga's widow can claim despite the absence of premium payment during the outbreak of the war
Non-payment at the day involves absolute forfeiture is such be the terms of the contract
There is no duty when the law forbids and there is no obligation without corresponding right enjoyed by another
opening of an interim office partook of the nature of the privilege to the policy holders to keep their policies operative rather than a duty to them under the contract
Labels: 1952, Case Digest, effect of non payment, G.R. No. L-4197, insurance, insurance case digest, March 20, Sales de Gonzaga v Crown Life Insurance Co
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-4197
FIDELA SALES DE GONZAGA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE CROWN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
This is one more case wherein the question of the effects of war in a pre-war insurance contracts is presented.
Reduced to their absolute essentials, the facts are that, on September 26, 1939 the Crown Life Insurance Co., whose home office is in Toronto, Canada, issued to Ramon Gonzaga through its branch office in Manila a 20-year endowment policy for P15,000. The insured paid in due time the agreed yearly premium, which was P591.00, for three consecutive years, the last payment having been effected on September 6, 1941. On account of the outbreak of war, no premiums were paid after that date, although the policy was continued in force up to June 12, 1943, under its automatic premium loan clause.
Ramon Gonzaga died on June 27, 1945 from an accident. Unsuccessful in her attempt to collect the amount of the policy his widow and the beneficiary named in the policy began this suit on December 18, 1947. The defendant set up the defense that the policy had lapsed by non-payment of the stipulated premiums of the stipulated dates. And the trial court in a carefully written decision ruled against the plaintiff.
Since this action was decided by the court below, several cases analogous to this one in its main characteristics have come up before this Court. (Paz Lopez de Constantino vs. Asia Life Insurance Company,1 G.R. No. L-1669; Agustina Peralta vs. Asia Life Insurance Company,2 G.R. No. L-1670; James McGuire vs. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co;3 G. R. No. L-3581; National Leather Co; Inc. vs. The United States Life Insurance Co.,4 G.R. No. L-2668; Victoria Hidalgo Vda. de Carrero, et al., vs. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.,5 G. R. No. L-3032; and West Coast Life Insurance Co. vs. Patricio H. Gubagaras,6 G. R. No. L-2810) In Paz Lopez de Constantinos. Asia Life Insurance Company, G. R. No. L-1669, the leading case, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Bengzon, adopted this doctrine:
The case, therefore, is one in which time is material and of the essence of the contract. Non-payment at the day involves absolute forfeiture is such be the terms of the contract, as is the case here. Courts cannot with safety vary the stipulation of the parties by introducing equities for the relief of the insured against their own negligence.
The aforecited decisions are decisive of the proposition that non-payment of premiums by reason of war puts an end to the contract.
There is, however, one aspect of the case at bar not raised before and upon which the plaintiff rest her case in the alternative.
In its answer, the defendant alleged that "through its General Agents, Hanson, Orth and Stevenson, Inc., it had its offices open in the city of Manila during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines." Taking advantage of this allegation, and ignoring her own in her complaint - that "for the whole duration of the (war) and from thence to sometime thereafter, that is, in October, 1945, . . . defendant closed its business in the Islands, and had absolutely no agency or representative here to represent it, with authority to collect premiums from the Insured." - the plaintiff asserts that it was the defendant's duty to notify her husbands of its postal address during the war, and that its failure to do so excused deliquency in the payment of the premiums. The plaintiff cites the provision of the contract which states that "all premiums subsequent to the first year are payable to the Company's authorized cashier at the place stated in the fourth page hereof, or at such other place instead thereof as may be designated from time to time by noticed to the Company mailed to the Insured at his last known post office address."
The evidence on this feature of the case reveals that, the defendant being an enemy corporation, its offices, which were housed at the Chaco building when the hostilities broke out, were ordered closed by the Japanese Military authorities in January 1942, and the officers of Hanson, Orth and Stevenson, Inc., defendants general agents, being American citizens, were entered. In addition, on August 25 the Japanese administration issued "Instruction No. 71" by which enemy alien insurance companies were expressly prohibited from doing business.
But before that instruction was promulgated Hanson, Orth and Stevenson, had opened in the house of one of their Filipino employees on Gonzales Street in Ermita an office with skeleton force, all Filipinos, for the purpose of receiving premiums from their policy holders; and notwithstanding the prohibition that office was not closed.
In the face of the Japanese Military decrees, which found sanctions in international law, the failure of the defendant or its Filipino employees to advise the insured of the defendant's new address did not work as a forfeiture of the right to have the premiums satisfied promptly. While clandestine transactions between the parties during the war might be binding, it was not obligatory on the insurer, and it was well-nigh risky for its employees, to send out notices to its widely scattered policy holders, what with the postal service under the control and administration of the ruthless occupants.
There is no duty when the law forbids; and there is no obligation without corresponding right enjoyed by another. The insured had no right to demand that the defendant maintain an office during the war, and the defendant was not obligated to do so. Had the defendant not opened any office at all during the occupation and stopped receiving premiums absolutely, the plaintiff's position would not have been any better or worse for the closing and suspension of the defendant's business. Had the plaintiff's husband actually tendered his premiums and the defendant's employees rejected them, he could not have insisted on the payment as a matter of right. Stated otherwise, the defendant's opening of an interim office partook of the nature of the privilege to the policy holders to keep their policies operative rather than a duty to them under the contract.
Of this privilege, incidentally, Gonzaga could have taken advantage if he was really intent on preserving his policy. Uncontroverted or admitted is the fact that the defendant's agent, through whom he had been insured, lived in Malabon, Rizal, and was his close acquaintance; and so were some of the defendant's Filipino employees who handled the insurance business of Hanson, Orth and Stevenson during the occupation. And Gonzaga admittedly come to Manila on a visit every now and then, and could have, without difficulty, contacted any of those people.
For another thing, the policy carried a clause providing for its reinstatement under certain conditions within three years from the date of lapse on application of the insured. The present policy lapsed on June 12, 1943, the Company's Manila branch was reopened on May 1, 1945 and resumed regular business through the same general agents at the Wilson Building on Juan Luna Street, Manila and Ramon Gonzaga died on June 27, 1945. It is undoubted that Gonzaga knew all that. It is not denied that he was an employee in the United States Navy, that the united States Navy had an office in the same Wilson Building, and that he came at least twice a month to that office for his salary.
Both in law and in reason, the action was properly dismissed and the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
1 47 Off. Gaz. Supp. 12, p. 428.
2 87 Phil. 248.
3 87 Phil. 370.
4 87 Phil. 410; 48 Off. Gaz. 142.
5 87 Phil. 460.
6 Oct. 10, 1950.
Labels: 1952, en banc, G.R. No. L-4197, insurance, March 20
Insurance Case Digest: Areola v. CA (1994)
G.R. No. 95641 September 22, 1994
Lessons Applicable: Binding Effect of Payment (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Art. 1910,Article 1191
December 17, 1984: Prudential Guarantee And Assurance, Inc. issued collector's provisional receipt amounting to P1,609.65
June 29, 1985: 7 months after the issuance of petitioner Santos Areola's Personal Accident Insurance Policy, Prudential Guarantee And Assurance, Inc. unilaterally cancelled it for failing to pay his premiums through its manager Teofilo M. Malapit
Shocked by the cancellation of the policy, Santos approached Carlito Ang, agent of Prudential and demanded the issuance of an official receipt. Ang told Santos that it was a mistake and assured its rectification.
July 15, 1985: Santos demanded the same terms and same rate increase as when he paid the provincial receipt but Malapit insisted that the partial payment he made was exhausted and that he should pay the balance or his policy will cease to operate
July 25, 1985 : Assistant Vice-President Mariano M. Ampil III apologized
August 6, 1985 had filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages before the lower court
August 13, 1985: Santos received through Carlito Ang the leeter of Assistant Vice-President Mariano M. Ampil III finding error on their part since premiums were not remitted Malapit, proposed to extend its lifetime to December 17, 1985
RTC: favored Santos - Prudential in Bad Faith
CA: Reversed - not motivated by negligence, malice or bad faith in cancelling subject policy
ISSUE: W/N the Areolas can file against damages despite the effort to rectify the cancellation
HELD: YES. RTC reinstated
Malapit's fraudulent act of misappropriating the premiums paid is beyond doubt directly imputable to Prudential
Subsequent reinstatement could not possibly absolve Prudential there being an obvious breach of contract
a contract of insurance creates reciprocal obligations for both insurer and insured
choice between fulfillment or rescission of the obligation in case one of the obligors fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him
entitles the injured party to payment of damages, regardless of whether he demands fulfillment or rescission of the obligation
Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind, or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.
Labels: 1994, Areola v CA, Art. 1910, Article 1191, binding effect of payment, Case Digest, G.R. No. 95641, insurance, insurance case digest, Juris Doctor, September 22
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 95641
SANTOS B. AREOLA and LYDIA D. AREOLA, petitioners-appellants,
COURT OF APPEALS and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC., respondents-appellees.
Gutierrez, Cortes & Gonzales for petitioners.
Bengzon, Bengzon, Baraan & Fernandez Law Offices for private respondent.
On June 29, 1985, seven months after the issuance of petitioner Santos Areola's Personal Accident Insurance Policy No. PA-20015, respondent insurance company unilaterally cancelled the same since company records revealed that petitioner-insured failed to pay his premiums.
On August 3, 1985, respondent insurance company offered to reinstate same policy it had previously cancelled and even proposed to extend its lifetime to December 17, 1985, upon a finding that the cancellation was erroneous and that the premiums were paid in full by petitioner-insured but were not remitted by Teofilo M. Malapit, respondent insurance company's branch manager.
These, in brief, are the material facts that gave rise to the action for damages due to breach of contract instituted by petitioner-insured before
Branch 40 RTC, Dagupan City against respondent insurance company.
There are two issues for resolution in this case:
(1) Did the erroneous act of cancelling subject insurance policy entitle petitioner-insured to payment of damages?
(2) Did the subsequent act of reinstating the wrongfully cancelled insurance policy by respondent insurance company, in an effort to rectify such error, obliterate whatever liability for damages it may have to bear, thus absolving it therefrom?
From the factual findings of the trial court, it appears that petitioner-insured, Santos Areola, a lawyer from Dagupan City, bought, through
the Baguio City branch of Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Prudential), a personal accident insurance policy covering the one-year period between noon of November 28, 1984 and noon of November 28, 1985. 1 Under the terms of the statement of account issued by respondent insurance company, petitioner-insured was supposed to pay the total amount of P1,609.65 which included the premium of P1,470.00, documentary stamp of P110.25 and 2% premium tax of P29.40. 2 At the lower left-hand corner of the statement of account, the following is legibly printed:
This Statement of Account must not be considered a receipt. Official Receipt will be issued to you upon payment of this account.
If payment is made to our representative, demand for a Provisional Receipt and if our Official Receipts is (sic) not received by you within 7 days please notify us.
If payment is made to our office, demand for an OFFICIAL RECEIPT.
On December 17, 1984, respondent insurance company issued collector's provisional receipt No. 9300 to petitioner-insured for the amount of P1,609.65 3 On the lower portion of the receipt the following is written in capital letters:
Note: This collector's provisional receipt will be confirmed by our official receipt. If our official receipt is not received by you within 7 days, please notify us. 4
On June 29, 1985, respondent insurance company, through its Baguio City manager, Teofilo M. Malapit, sent petitioner-insured Endorsement
No. BG-002/85 which "cancelled flat" Policy No. PA BG-20015 "for non-payment of premium effective as of inception dated." 5 The same endorsement also credited "a return premium of P1,609.65 plus documentary stamps and premium tax" to the account of the insured.
Shocked by the cancellation of the policy, petitioner-insured confronted Carlito Ang, agent of respondent insurance company, and demanded the issuance of an official receipt. Ang told petitioner-insured that the cancellation of the policy was a mistake but he would personally see to its rectification. However, petitioner-insured failed to receive any official receipt from Prudential.
Hence, on July 15, 1985, petitioner-insured sent respondent insurance company a letter demanding that he be insured under the same terms and conditions as those contained in Policy No. PA-BG-20015 commencing upon its receipt of his letter, or that the current commercial rate of increase on the payment he had made under provisional receipt No. 9300 be returned within five days. 6 Areola also warned that should his demands be unsatisfied, he would sue for damages.
On July 17, 1985, he received a letter from production manager Malapit informing him that the "partial payment" of P1,000.00 he had made on the policy had been "exhausted pursuant to the provisions of the Short Period Rate Scale" printed at the back of the policy. Malapit warned Areola that should be fail to pay the balance, the company's liability would cease to operate. 7
In reply to the petitioner-insured's letter of July 15, 1985, respondent insurance company, through its Assistant Vice-President Mariano M. Ampil III, wrote Areola a letter dated July 25, 1985 stating that the company was verifying whether the payment had in fact been issued therefor. Ampil emphasized that the official receipt should have been issued seven days from the issuance of the provisional receipt but because no official receipt had been issued in Areola's name, there was reason to believe that no payment had been made. Apologizing for the inconvenience, Ampil expressed the company's concern by agreeing "to hold you cover (sic) under the terms of the referenced policy until such time that this matter is cleared." 8
On August 3, 1985, Ampil wrote Areola another letter confirming that the amount of P1,609.65 covered by provisional receipt No. 9300 was in fact received by Prudential on December 17, 1984. Hence, Ampil informed
Areola that Prudential was "amenable to extending PGA-PA-BG-20015 up to December 17, 1985 or one year from the date when payment was received." Apologizing again for the inconvenience caused Areola, Ampil exhorted him to indicate his conformity to the proposal by signing on the space provided for in the letter. 9
The letter was personally delivered by Carlito Ang to Areola on
August 13, 1985 10 but unfortunately, Areola and his wife, Lydia, as early as August 6, 1985 had filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages before the lower court.
In its Answer, respondent insurance company admitted that the cancellation of petitioner-insured's policy was due to the failure of Malapit to turn over the premiums collected, for which reason no official receipt was issued to him. However, it argued that, by acknowledging the inconvenience caused on petitioner-insured and after taking steps to rectify its omission by reinstating the cancelled policy prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent insurance company had complied with its obligation under the contract. Hence, it concluded that petitioner-insured no longer has a cause of action against it. It insists that it cannot be held liable for damages arising from breach of contract, having demonstrated fully well its fulfillment of its obligation.
The trial court, on June 30, 1987, rendered a judgment in favor of petitioner-insured, ordering respondent insurance company to pay the former the following:
a) P1,703.65 as actual damages;
b) P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
2. To pay to the plaintiff, as and for attorney's fees the amount of P10,000.00; and
In its decision, the court below declared that respondent insurance company acted in bad faith in unilaterally cancelling subject insurance policy, having done so only after seven months from the time that it had taken force and effect and despite the fact of full payment of premiums and other charges on the issued insurance policy. Cancellation from the date of the policy's inception, explained the lower court, meant that the protection sought by petitioner-insured from the risks insured against was never extended by respondent insurance company. Had the insured met an accident at the time, the insurance company would certainly have disclaimed any liability because technically, the petitioner could not have been considered insured. Consequently, the trial court held that there was breach of contract on the part of respondent insurance company, entitling petitioner-insured to an award of the damages prayed for.
This ruling was challenged on appeal by respondent insurance company, denying bad faith on its part in unilaterally cancelling subject insurance policy.
After consideration of the appeal, the appellate court issued a reversal of the decision of the trial court, convinced that the latter had erred in finding respondent insurance company in bad faith for the cancellation of petitioner-insured's policy. According to the Court of Appeals, respondent insurance company was not motivated by negligence, malice or bad faith in cancelling subject policy. Rather, the cancellation of the insurance policy was based on what the existing records showed, i.e., absence of an official receipt issued to petitioner-insured confirming payment of premiums. Bad faith, said the Court of Appeals, is some motive of self-interest or ill-will; a furtive design of ulterior purpose, proof of which must be established convincingly. On the contrary, it further observed, the following acts indicate that respondent insurance company did not act precipitately or willfully to inflict a wrong on petitioner-insured:
(a) the investigation conducted by Alfredo Bustamante to verify if petitioner-insured had indeed paid the premium; (b) the letter of August 3, 1985 confirming that the premium had been paid on December 17, 1984; (c) the reinstatement of the policy with a proposal to extend its effective period to December 17, 1985; and (d) respondent insurance company's apologies for the "inconvenience" caused upon petitioner-insured. The appellate court added that respondent insurance company even relieved Malapit, its Baguio City manager, of his job by forcing him to resign.
Petitioner-insured moved for the reconsideration of the said decision which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on these arguments:
Respondent Court of Appeals is guilty of grave abuse of discretion and committed a serious and reversible error in not holding Respondent Prudential liable for the cancellation of the insurance contract which was admittedly caused by the fraudulent acts and bad faith of its own officers.
Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error and abused its discretion in ruling that the defenses of good faith and honest mistake can co-exist with the admitted fraudulent acts and evident bad faith.
Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in not finding that even without considering the fraudulent acts of its own officer in misappropriating the premium payment, the act itself in cancelling the insurance policy was done with bad faith and/or gross negligence and wanton attitude amounting to bad faith, because among others, it was
Mr. Malapit — the person who committed the fraud — who sent and signed the notice of cancellation.
Respondent Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance contrary to law and applicable decision of the Supreme Court when it refused to award damages in favor of herein Petitioner-Appellants.
It is petitioner-insured's submission that the fraudulent act of Malapit, manager of respondent insurance company's branch office in Baguio, in misappropriating his premium payments is the proximate cause of the cancellation of the insurance policy. Petitioner-insured theorized that Malapit's act of signing and even sending the notice of cancellation himself, notwithstanding his personal knowledge of petitioner-insured's full payment of premiums, further reinforces the allegation of bad faith. Such fraudulent act committed by Malapit, argued petitioner-insured, is attributable to respondent insurance company, an artificial corporate being which can act only through its officers or employees. Malapit's actuation, concludes petitioner-insured, is therefore not separate and distinct from that of respondent-insurance company, contrary to the view held by the Court of Appeals. It must, therefore, bear the consequences of the erroneous cancellation of subject insurance policy caused by the non-remittance by its own employee of the premiums paid. Subsequent reinstatement, according to petitioner-insured, could not possibly absolve respondent insurance company from liability, there being an obvious breach of contract. After all, reasoned out petitioner-insured, damage had already been inflicted on him and no amount of rectification could remedy the same.
Respondent insurance company, on the other hand, argues that where reinstatement, the equitable relief sought by petitioner-insured was granted at an opportune moment, i.e. prior to the filing of the complaint, petitioner-insured is left without a cause of action on which to predicate his claim for damages. Reinstatement, it further explained, effectively restored petitioner-insured to all his rights under the policy. Hence, whatever cause of action there might have been against it, no longer exists and the consequent award of damages ordered by the lower court in unsustainable.
We uphold petitioner-insured's submission. Malapit's fraudulent act of misappropriating the premiums paid by petitioner-insured is beyond doubt directly imputable to respondent insurance company. A corporation, such as respondent insurance company, acts solely thru its employees. The latters' acts are considered as its own for which it can be held to account. 11 The facts are clear as to the relationship between private respondent insurance company and Malapit. As admitted by private respondent insurance company in its answer, 12 Malapit was the manager of its Baguio branch. It is beyond doubt that he represented its interest and acted in its behalf. His act of receiving the premiums collected is well within the province of his authority. Thus, his receipt of said premiums is receipt by private respondent insurance company who, by provision of law, particularly under Article 1910 of the Civil Code, is bound by the acts of its agent.
Article 1910 thus reads:
Malapit's failure to remit the premiums he received cannot constitute a defense for private respondent insurance company; no exoneration from liability could result therefrom. The fact that private respondent insurance company was itself defrauded due to the anomalies that took place in its Baguio branch office, such as the non-accrual of said premiums to its account, does not free the same from its obligation to petitioner Areola. As held in Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals 13 citing the ruling in McIntosh v. Dakota Trust Co.: 14
A bank is liable for wrongful acts of its officers done in the interests of the bank or in the course of dealings of the officers in their representative capacity but not for acts outside the scope of their authority. A bank holding out its officers and agent as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds they may thus be enabled to perpetrate in the apparent scope of their employment; nor will it be permitted to shirk its responsibility for such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. Accordingly, a banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the representation is made in the course of its business by an agent acting within the general scope of his authority even though, in the particular case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other person, for his own ultimate benefit.
Consequently, respondent insurance company is liable by way of damages for the fraudulent acts committed by Malapit that gave occasion to the erroneous cancellation of subject insurance policy. Its earlier act of reinstating the insurance policy can not obliterate the injury inflicted on petitioner-insured. Respondent company should be reminded that a contract of insurance creates reciprocal obligations for both insurer and insured. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause and in which each party is both a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. 15
Under the circumstances of instant case, the relationship as creditor and debtor between the parties arose from a common cause: i.e., by reason of their agreement to enter into a contract of insurance under whose terms, respondent insurance company promised to extend protection to petitioner-insured against the risk insured for a consideration in the form of premiums to be paid by the latter. Under the law governing reciprocal obligations, particularly the second paragraph of Article 1191, 16 the injured party, petitioner-insured in this case, is given a choice between fulfillment or rescission of the obligation in case one of the obligors, such as respondent insurance company, fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him. However, said article entitles the injured party to payment of damages, regardless of whether he demands fulfillment or rescission of the obligation. Untenable then is reinstatement insurance company's argument, namely, that reinstatement being equivalent to fulfillment of its obligation, divests petitioner-insured of a rightful claim for payment of damages. Such a claim finds no support in our laws on obligations and contracts.
The nature of damages to be awarded, however, would be in the form of nominal damages 17 contrary to that granted by the court below. Although the erroneous cancellation of the insurance policy constituted a breach of contract, private respondent insurance company, within a reasonable time took steps to rectify the wrong committed by reinstating the insurance policy of petitioner. Moreover, no actual or substantial damage or injury was inflicted on petitioner Areola at the time the insurance policy was cancelled. Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind, or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16902 on May 31, 1990, REVERSED. The decision of Branch 40, RTC Dagupan City, in Civil Case No. D-7972 rendered on June 30, 1987 is hereby REINSTATED subject to the following modifications: (a) that nominal damages amounting to P30,000.00 be awarded petitioner in lieu of the damages adjudicated by court a quo; and (b) that in the satisfaction of the damages awarded therein, respondent insurance company is ORDERED to pay the legal rate of interest computed from date of filing of complaint until final payment thereof.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
1 Exh. "A."
2 Exh. "B."
3 Exh. "C."
4 Exh. "2."
5 Exh. "D."
6 Exh. "F."
7 Exh. "E."
8 Exh. "G."
9 Exh. "H."
10 Notation on upper right hand corner of Exh. "H."
11 Radio Communications of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-44748, August 29, 1986, 143 SCRA 657.
13 G.R. No. 108957, June 14, 1993, 223 SCRA 350.
14 52 ND 752, 204 NW 818, 40 ALR 1021.
15 Tolentino, Arturo, Civil Code of the Philippines Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. IV, p. 175.
16 Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have the thing, in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
17 Article 2221 (Civil Code) — Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
18 Algarra v. Sandejas, No. 8385, March 24, 1914, 27 Phil. 284.
Labels: 1994, G.R. No. 95641, insurance, Juris Doctor, jurisprudence, September 22, THIRD DIVISION
Insurance Case Digst: Sales de Gonzaga v. Crown Li...
Insurance Notes Outline Part Two (Premium)
Insurance Case Digest: Bachrach v. British America...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-5715
Insurance Case Digest: Tai Tong Chuache & Co. v. I...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-55397
Insurance Case Digest: Cha v. CA (1997)
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 124520
Insurance Case Digest: Garcia v. Hongkong Fire & M...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 20341
Insurance Case Digest: Sharuff & Co. v. Baloise Fi...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 44119
Insurance Case Digest: Lopez v. Del Rosario and Qu...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-19189
Insurance Case Digest: Palileo v. Cosio (1955)
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-7667
Insurance Case Digest: Saura Import & Export Co., ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-15184
Insurance Case Digest: San Miguel Brewery v. Law U...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-14300
Insurance Case Digest: Lampano v. Jose (1915)
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-9401
Insurance Case Digest: Ong Lim Sing v. FEB Leasing...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 168115
Insurance Case Digest: Gaisano Cagayan, Inc. v. In...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 147839
Insurance Case Digest: Filipino Merchants Insuranc...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 85141
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Delfin Lim, et al.,...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-22554
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Rodrigo Concepcion ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 120706
Torts and Damages Case Digest: St. Louis Realty Co...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-46061
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Cornelio Amaro, et ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-14986
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Singapore Airlines ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-47739
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Ernesto Medina et a...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-59825
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Rafael Patricio v. ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-51832
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Grand Union Superma...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-48250
Torts and Damages Case Digest: So Ping Bun v. Cour...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 120554
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Gilchrist v. Cuddy ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-9356
Insurance Case Digest: CCC Insurance Corp. v. CA (...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-25920
Insurance Case Digest: Tanco Jr. v. Philippine Gua...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-17312
Insurance Case Digest: Commissioner of Internal Re...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 119176
Insurance Case Digest: De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-21574
Insurance Case Digest: Pineda v. CA (1993)
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 105562
Insurance Case Digest: Gallardo v. Morales (1960)
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-12189
P.D. 1529
R.A. 8799 SRC
Insurance Case Digest: South Sea Surety and Insura...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 102253
Insurance Case Digest: Malayan Insurance Co., Inc....
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-67835
Insurance Case Digest: Philippine Health-Care Prov...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 171052
Transportation Case Digest: Servando v. Philippine...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-36481-2
Transportation Case Digest: Sweet Lines, Inc. v. T...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-37750
Transportation Case Digest: Samar Mining Co., Inc....
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-28673
Transportation Case Digest: Magellan Mfg. Marketin...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 95529
Insurance Case Digest: Aisporna v. CA (1982)
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-39419
Insurance Case Digest: Malayan Insurance Co, Inc. ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-59919
Insurance Case Digest: Villanueva v. Oro (1948)
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 131621
Conflicts of Law Case Digest: Northwest Orient Air...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 112573
Conflict of Laws Digest: Phil. Export and Foreign ...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 140047
Conflict of Laws Digest: Bank of America v. CA (20...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 120135
Conflicts of Law Review Notes Outline
Conflict of Laws Reviewer: Conflicts of Law Review...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-2227
Insurance Case Digest: Philippine American Life In...
Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-54216
Insurance Case Digest: Nario v. Philippine America...
Sushi Bella: The Most Gorgeous Modern Japanese Fusions I've Ever Seen (Don Pedro Makati) - When you hear *Sushi Bella*, it has a beautiful ring to it right? It's probably because of the movie *Twilight*! [image: sushi bella] No but really... ...
Keesh Wellness Spa: Relaxing Collagen Facial and Body Massage (Maginhawa Diliman Quezon City) - Friends and family have long telling me to slow down and relax a bit. Being a workaholic, I have found it difficult to allocate for pampering time. Fortu...