Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-1st-circuit/1708033.html
Timestamp: 2019-06-20 12:13:40
Document Index: 527349609

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 287', '§ 287', '§ 1226', '§ 1357', '§ 1357', '§ 287', '§ 1357', '§ 2', '§ 287']

MORALES v. CHADBOURNE | FindLaw
Before HOWARD, Chief Judge, LIPEZ and BARRON, Circuit Judges. Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, with whom J. Max Weintraub, Aaron S. Goldsmith, and William C. Peachey were on brief, for appellants. Katherine Desormeau, with whom R. Orion Danjuma, Omar C. Jadwat, Mark W. Freel, Mackenzie Mango, and Lena Graber were on brief, for appellee.
The second incident, and the basis for this action, occurred in May 2009. On May 1, 2009, Morales was arrested while playing with her children in her front yard by the Rhode Island State Police on a warrant for criminal charges relating to alleged misrepresentations in a state benefits application.1 She was transported to the police station, where a state police officer asked her where she was born and whether she was “legal.” Morales responded that she was born in Guatemala and that she was a U.S. citizen. Morales was then transported to the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institutions (“ACI”), where she was booked into custody.
On May 4, 2009, ICE faxed an immigration detainer form to the ACI. The detainer incorrectly identified Morales as an alien whose nationality was Guatemalan, and stated that an “[i]nvestigation has been initiated to determine whether [Morales] is subject to removal from the United States.” The detainer further informed the ACI that “[f]ederal regulations (8 C.F.R. § 287.7) require that you detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours ․ to provide adequate time for DHS to assume custody of the alien.” The detainer was issued by Donaghy, an ICE agent based in ICE's Rhode Island Office. Donaghy was supervised by Riccio, the Resident–Agent–in–Charge of the Rhode Island office, and Chadbourne, the Field Office Director of the Boston Field Office, which has responsibility over ICE operations in Rhode Island.
Before the detainer was issued, no ICE official interviewed Morales to ask whether she was a U.S. citizen, nor did anyone request documentation from her relating to her citizenship. ICE officials also failed to search federal immigration databases2 to obtain a copy of her citizenship application or certificate of naturalization.
A. Claims Against Donaghy1. Fourth Amendment Claim
A government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, “at the time of the challenged conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would ․ underst[and] that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, –––U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). There does not need to be a case exactly on point, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”).
In Brignoni–Ponce, the Supreme Court applied this well-established principle to determine what standard of proof, if any, an immigration officer must apply to stop and detain individuals to investigate their immigration status. See 422 U.S. at 880–82. In that case, the government argued that, within 100 miles of the border, it had “authority to stop moving vehicles and question the occupants about their citizenship, even when its officers have no reason to believe that the occupants are aliens or that other aliens may be concealed in the vehicle.” Id. at 877. The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument. The Court stated that, just as in the criminal context, an immigration officer “must have a reasonable suspicion” to justify briefly stopping individuals to question them “about their citizenship and immigration status ․ but any further detention ․ must be based on ․ probable cause. ” Id. at 881–82 (emphasis added) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29); see also id. at 884 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment ․ forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.”).
Guided by this Supreme Court precedent, we have also required that immigration officers have reasonable suspicion to briefly stop individuals to question them regarding their immigration status and probable cause for any further arrest and detention. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez-de Jesus, 85 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996) (recognizing that Brignoni–Ponce stands for “the principle that an individual may not be [briefly] detained for questioning about citizenship absent reasonable suspicion that the person is an illegal alien”); Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 69 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that detention to inquire about an individual's immigration status is “a seizure and implicate[s] the [F]ourth [A]mendment” (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216–17, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)); Navia–Duran v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 568 F.2d 803, 809 n. 7 (1st Cir.1977) (recognizing that an immigration arrest and detention needs to be “supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion”).
It was thus clearly established well before Morales was detained in 2009 that immigration stops and arrests were subject to the same Fourth Amendment requirements that apply to other stops and arrests—reasonable suspicion for a brief stop, and probable cause for any further arrest and detention. Moreover, there could be no question in 2009 that detention authorized by an immigration detainer would require more than just reasonable suspicion. Although the line between an arrest that requires probable cause and a temporary detention for interrogation which does not is not always clear, pre–2009 cases did clearly show that 48 hours of imprisonment—which is what the detainer requests, see 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)—falls well on the arrest side of the divide. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90–minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanarez v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult[ ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”).
This clear law establishing that the Constitution requires probable cause for the immigration detention that a detainer requests is further reinforced by cases interpreting the statute authorizing immigration detainers. Under federal law, immigration officers may arrest and detain an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” if a “warrant [is] issued by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Statutory authority for warrantless enforcement actions, including the issuance of detainers, is provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1357. Without a warrant, immigration officers are authorized to arrest an alien only if they have “reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” Id. § 1357(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) (“An arrest shall be made only when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in the United States.” (emphasis added)). The provision specifies that in order to issue a detainer for aliens who have violated controlled substances laws, immigration officers require a “reason to believe that the alien may not have been lawfully admitted to the United States or otherwise is not lawfully present in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)(1) (emphasis added).
Based on the “robust consensus of cases [and] persuasive authority” discussed above, al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2084, it is beyond debate that an immigration officer in 2009 would need probable cause to arrest and detain individuals for the purpose of investigating their immigration status.
First, we pause to note the reason why there were likely no cases in 2009 directly addressing immigration detainers. The government had conceded for years that a detainer must be supported by probable cause. For example, in 1985, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stipulated that a detainer “may only be authorized ․ when the officer has determined that there is probable cause․” Cervantez v. Whitfield, 776 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir.1985). Because the government had agreed that the issuance of a detainer required probable cause, there was never any case or controversy requiring a court to make a determination on this issue. See Cnty. Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir.2002) (“The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction only over live cases or controversies.” (citing U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.)). A ruling in favor of Donaghy would create a perverse incentive that would allow the government to avoid liability by conceding an issue for decades and subsequently arguing that the law was not clearly established on that issue because there were no cases directly on point.3
As to Donaghy's latter point, while a detainer is distinct from an arrest, it nevertheless results in the detention of an individual. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. Morales alleges that after her criminal custody had terminated, she was detained for 24 additional hours based solely on the detainer issued by Donaghy. Because Morales was kept in custody for a new purpose after she was entitled to release, she was subjected to a new seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes—one that must be supported by a new probable cause justification. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407–08, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005); Arizona v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2509, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (“[D]elay[ing] the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status ․ would raise constitutional concerns.”).
Moreover, although Morales continued to be detained by ACI officials, and not by Donaghy himself, it was also clearly established that a law enforcement officer is “responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)); see also id. at 344–45 (holding that “an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest” can be held liable for the arrest where “the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable”); Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 228 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that an officer who knowingly processed an invalid warrant could be held liable for the subsequent unlawful arrest). The natural consequence of Donaghy issuing the detainer was that Morales would be detained for up to 48 hours. Donaghy cannot argue otherwise. The detainer he issued, on its face, instructed ACI officials to “detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours.”
Donaghy's argument implies that a reasonable officer in 2009 could have issued an immigration detainer against an individual for any reason—or no reason whatsoever. Notably, Donaghy does not argue that reasonable suspicion or some other lower evidentiary standard applied to detainers in 2009. Instead, he contends that it was not clearly established that the Fourth Amendment would apply at all. Donaghy states that “a reasonable officer in 2009 could have thought that the constitutional standards ․ were not applicable to the issuance of the detainer.” Id. at 27. This unprecedented proposition is contradicted by longstanding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214–15 (“Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed ‘arrests' or ‘investigatory detentions.’ ”). Donaghy's contention simply has no support in our case law. To the contrary, the law was clearly established that Donaghy required probable cause to detain Morales pursuant to an immigration detainer. Cf. Suboh v. Dist. Attorney's Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 94 (1st Cir.2002) (“We have no doubt that there is a clearly established constitutional right at stake, although we have found no case exactly on all fours with the facts of this case.”).
Therefore, Donaghy would like us to grant him qualified immunity based on his own version of the facts, even though the district court did not accept Donaghy's version of the facts. He fails to understand that in exercising our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, we are required to “take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319.
Because Donaghy's argument clearly rests on factual grounds and does not present a pure issue of law, his appeal on this ground “must be dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction.”4 Goguen, 780 F.3d at 438; see also Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317 (stating that “an interlocutory appeal ․ makes unwise use of appellate courts' time” when it “forc[es] them to decide in the context of a less developed record, an issue very similar to one they may well decide anyway later, on a record that will permit a better decision”).
Donaghy's contention misses the point. His argument that he only relied “in part” on Morales's foreign birth is based entirely on his self-serving declarations. Donaghy requests that we reject the district court's “finding that he issued the ICE detainer solely because Ms. Morales was born in a foreign country,” Appellants' Br. at 33, based on his declarations even though the district court did not credit those declarations in denying Donaghy's motion for summary judgment. We simply do not have appellate jurisdiction to entertain Donaghy's argument at this time. See Escorio, 764 F.3d at 111 (stating that “we have no basis on which to exercise jurisdiction” because “nowhere in the defendants' brief does there appear any developed argument that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment even if the district court's conclusions about the record were correct” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Morales alleges that ICE supervisors Chadbourne and Riccio violated her Fourth Amendment rights because they knew or were deliberately indifferent to the fact that their subordinates routinely issued immigration detainers against naturalized U.S. citizens without probable cause, and formulated or condoned policies permitting the issuance of detainers without probable cause. Defendants argue that Morales has failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly state a supervisory liability claim.
Morales alleges that ICE agents in Rhode Island maintained a practice of “routinely collaborat[ing]” with state law enforcement authorities “to issue and enforce detainers against U.S. citizens, particularly naturalized U.S. citizens, ․ without sufficient investigation into their citizenship or immigration status and without probable cause to believe that they are non-citizens subject to removal and detention.” Compl. ¶ 67. The complaint further alleges that when an individual is arrested at the ACI and “provide[s] a foreign country of birth, has a foreign-sounding last name, speaks English with an accent, and/or appears to be Hispanic,” ICE agents “often fail sufficiently to investigate the arrestee's citizenship or immigration background before issuing an immigration detainer ․ without probable cause to believe that the individual is a noncitizen subject to detention and removal by ICE.” Id. ¶¶ 69–70.
The complaint further alleges that Chadbourne and Riccio, as the heads of the ICE Boston Field Office and Rhode Island sub-office, “knew or should have known that their subordinates, including Defendant Donaghy, regularly ․ issued immigration detainers against individuals such as Ms. Morales, without conducting sufficient investigation and without probable cause to believe that the subject of the immigration detainer was a non-citizen subject to removal and detention.” Id. ¶ 81. The complaint adds that Chadbourne and Riccio “formulated, implemented, encouraged, or willfully ignored [ICE's] policies and customs [in Rhode Island] with deliberate indifference to the high risk of violating Ms. Morales's constitutional rights” and failed to “change[ ] these harmful policies and customs” although they “had the power and the authority to change [them] by, for instance, training officers such as Defendant Donaghy to perform an adequate investigation into individuals' citizenship and immigration status before issuing detainers.” Id. ¶¶ 84–85.
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), Chadbourne and Riccio contend that Morales's allegations are conclusory and fail to establish an affirmative link between Donaghy's behavior and their action or inaction. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, had not alleged a plausible supervisory liability claim against Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See 556 U.S. at 680–82. Iqbal alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” him to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Id. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court rejected “[t]hese bare assertions” as conclusory because they “amount to nothing more than ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim .” Id. at 681 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
We reject Chadbourne and Riccio's argument because, unlike the conclusory allegations in Iqbal, the allegations in Morales's complaint are based on factual assertions that establish the affirmative link necessary to sufficiently plead a supervisory liability claim. Morales alleges that, as a U.S. citizen, she has been detained pursuant to an immigration detainer “on at least two separate occasions” in July 2004 and May 2009. Compl. ¶¶ 11–13. Furthermore, during the second encounter, Morales informed ICE agents that “she had been erroneously detained by ICE on a previous occasion ․ and that she was afraid that it may happen again.” Id. ¶ 61. The ICE agents “reinforced [her] fear, stating that it could happen again in the future” even though they had just verified she was a U.S. citizen. Id. The agents “never told Morales that ICE would correct the problem or take any steps to ensure that she would not be subject to wrongful detention again in the future.” Id. Finally, after Morales's release, Joan Mathieu, an immigration attorney, contacted ICE's Rhode Island office to learn more about why an immigration detainer had been issued against Morales. Id. ¶ 66. An ICE agent told Mathieu that “the erroneous detention of U.S. citizens” pursuant to immigration detainers “happens not infrequently.” Id. The agent added that “ICE routinely issues detainers” against naturalized U.S. citizens and that “if Ms. Morales is arrested again, ICE will likely put a detainer on her.” Id.
Based on these detailed allegations—combined with the previously highlighted allegations discussing Chadbourne and Riccio's specific roles—and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Morales (which we must do at the motion to dismiss stage), it is plausible that Chadbourne and Riccio either formulated and implemented a policy of issuing detainers against naturalized U.S. citizens without probable cause or were deliberately indifferent to the fact that their subordinates were issuing detainers against naturalized U .S. citizens without probable cause. Thus, Morales has sufficiently alleged that Chadbourne and Riccio, through their action or inaction, permitted their subordinates, including Donaghy, to issue detainers without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.5
1. According to the complaint, Morales's criminal charges have been resolved and she remains on probation.
2. Donaghy claims in declarations attached to his motion for summary judgment and reply brief filed in the district court that he did search federal government databases when investigating Morales's immigration status. The district court, however, did not rely on those declarations in deciding Donaghy's motion. We, therefore, recite Morales's version of the facts. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319.
3. In recent years, the government has begun contesting whether a detainer needs probable cause, and courts have uniformly held that probable cause is required. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Osterberg, No. 8:13CV65, 2014 WL 3784141, at *6 (D.Neb. July 31, 2014); Gonzales v. ICE, No. 13–04416, Dkt. 42, at *12 (C.D.Cal. July 28, 2014); Miranda–Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9–11 (D.Or. Apr.11, 2014); Uroza v. Salt Lake Cnty., No. 2:11CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at *6 (D.Utah Feb.21, 2013); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10–cv–06815, 2012 WL 1080020, at *10, *13 (E.D.Pa. Mar.30, 2012) rev'd on other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir.2014).
4. Donaghy does not make any argument that probable cause existed even on the facts that the district court assumed to be true.
5. We also find that this Fourth Amendment right was “clearly established” in 2009. Santana, 342 F.3d at 23. As explained above, the law was clearly established in 2009 that an immigration officer needed probable cause to issue a detainer. Furthermore, the law was also clearly established that a supervisor may be held liable for unconstitutional actions of a subordinate if he “supervises, trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may contribute to a civil rights deprivation.” Camilo–Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1999). A supervisor may also be held liable for “formulating a policy, or engaging in a custom, that leads to the challenged occurrence.” Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir.1994). Although there were no specific cases in 2009 directly addressing a supervisor's liability with regard to the issuance of immigration detainers, it is beyond debate that a supervisor who either authorized or was deliberately indifferent to his subordinate's issuance of a detainer without probable cause could be held liable for violating the Fourth Amendment. See Hall, 817 F.2d at 925 (“The fact that no court had put these pieces together in the precise manner we do today does not absolve defendants of liability.”).