Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/308/133/559128/
Timestamp: 2020-07-06 04:04:11
Document Index: 493732857

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2253', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 3231', '§ 844', '§ 2255', '§ 1341', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 2255']

Fred Awon, Petitioner, Appellant, v. United States, Respondent, Appellee, 308 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2002) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 2002 › Fred Awon, Petitioner, Appellant, v. United States, Respondent, Appellee
Fred Awon, Petitioner, Appellant, v. United States, Respondent, Appellee, 308 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2002)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 308 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2002) Heard March 6, 2002
The jury found Awon guilty of all counts. James St. Louis was acquitted of the first four counts, those related to the September 16, 1994, fire, and found guilty of the remaining four counts. Awon was sentenced to a 153-month term of imprisonment, which represented a downward departure from the applicable guideline sentencing range of 198 to 217 months. Awon was also ordered to pay restitution to the Scottsdale Insurance Company in the amount of $95,788.36. This court affirmed his conviction on February 2, 1998. United States v. Awon, 135 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1998).
The district court's order denying the two motions was filed on July 10, 2000. Awon filed a notice of appeal on August 11, 2000. This court held the appeal in abeyance pending the issuance of a certificate of appealability for an appeal of the denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2). On January 3, 2001, the district court ordered a certificate of appealability.
Awon failed to file a timely appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Consequently, that appeal must be dismissed. United States v. Rapoport, 159 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that compliance with time limits set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) is mandatory and jurisdictional).
The new trial motion, brought pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, was denied on July 10, 2000, the day the district court also denied Awon's motion to vacate sentence, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Although Awon cited the same grounds for both motions, they are subject to different time limitations for the filing of a notice of appeal. Unless the district court grants an extension of time, which it did not do here, a party must appeal within ten days from the denial of a motion for a new trial made pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) (1) (A); United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1989). Awon filed his notice of appeal well out of time, on August 11, 2000, thirty days after the court's order denying the new trial motion.
The only appeal properly before us is from the denial of Awon's motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The issues, as identified in the certificate of appealability, are whether to vacate Awon's sentence because of the alleged newly discovered evidence in the five affidavits and whether the district court lacked jurisdiction under the federal arson statute. Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 236 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1086, 120 S. Ct. 1717, 146 L. Ed. 2d 640 (2000).
On an appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion, we review the district court's legal determinations de novo and the court's factual findings for clear error. Familia-Consoro v. United States, 160 F.3d 761, 764-65 (1st Cir. 1998).
We quickly eliminate Awon's and Roberto's affidavits because they do not meet the standard for "newly discovered evidence." United States v. Desir, 273 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2001). This court has held that a defendant seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must prove four elements: (1) the newly discovered evidence was unknown or unavailable at the time of trial; (2) the defendant was duly diligent in trying to discover it; (3) the evidence was material; and (4) the evidence was such that it would probably result in an acquittal upon retrial. Id. Awon failed to prove that the information was either unknown or unavailable at the time of trial.
The "new" information in Awon's affidavit, James St. Louis's confession to Awon that he was solely responsible for the second fire, was plainly available at the time of trial. United States v. Levy-Cordero, 156 F.3d 244, 248 (1st Cir. 1998). In the affidavit itself Awon asserts that on the day after that fire James St. Louis had confessed committing the arson to him. Why Awon did not reveal the confession at trial but instead suggested that Joaquim had set the second fire is best known to him. In any event, the concealed confession of his co-defendant cannot be deemed "newly discovered."
Roberto's testimony was also available at the time of trial. Awon argues that he had no reason to suspect that Roberto had information germane to his defense and thus cannot be penalized for failing to unearth and present Roberto's testimony. A defendant, however, must have been duly diligent in attempting to procure exculpatory evidence prior to trial. United States v. Conley, 249 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2001). Simply because it may not have occurred to Awon and his counsel that Roberto had information regarding the crime that does not mean they were duly diligent on the facts of this case. Roberto was known to Awon as the brother of Joaquim and Jorge, the government's primary witnesses, both of whom were implicated in the crime. Roberto and his sister, Helena Neves, were interviewed by the police during the investigation. Indeed, it was Helena Neves, who was dating James St. Louis, who contacted the police and informed them that St. Louis and Jorge were involved in the arson. Moreover, the credibility of Roberto's affidavit was severely undermined, insofar as it related to conversations with Joaquim, by Joaquim's later repudiation of his own affidavit and testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Similarly, Roberto's averments that he and his family were threatened by the police were neutralized by the affidavits of Detective Thomas Enos and Special Agent Thomas Wlodyka. Enos and Wlodyka, the officers primarily responsible for investigating the arson, denied that they had threatened Roberto, or his family, with adverse consequences if they did not implicate Awon.
On the other hand, James St. Louis's averments in his affidavit may indeed be deemed "newly discovered." United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060, 1066 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that, in the context of a Rule 33 motion, a co-defendant's post-trial willingness to testify may be "newly discovered" if he had invoked 5th Amendment privilege at trial). But like the district court, we view James St. Louis's affidavit as lacking in credibility for reasons apparent on its face and from the record. Id. The trial court described James St. Louis's affidavit as incredible on its face. St. Louis averred that he had conceived, planned, and committed the arson on his own based upon his unverified hope that Awon, who had complained about the Ames Street property, would "take care of" him in the future. He further stated that, although unemployed at the time and notoriously short on cash, he had paid Awon $2,000 for the car and paid Joaquim $2,100 for his part in the arson. By the time of his affidavit St. Louis had nothing to lose by exonerating Awon. He had already been convicted and sentenced. He was in a position to say whatever he thought might help Awon, "even to the point of pinning all the guilt on [himself], knowing [he was] safe" from any increased punishment for the transaction. United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 171 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 1992)). We accept the court's finding that St. Louis's affidavit was not credible.
Finally, the affidavits of Jorge and Joaquim Neves were discredited by Joaquim's additional testimony at the evidentiary hearing repudiating his own affidavit as well as other considerations. A repudiated recantation is not substantive evidence, and can be used at a new trial only to cross-examine the witness. United States v. Glantz, 884 F.2d 1483, 1486 (1st Cir. 1989). The affidavits alone cannot serve to establish Awon's innocence nor, given that they were later repudiated, are they a credible basis for expecting Jorge and Joaquim to testify differently at a new trial than previously.
The district court supportably found that Joaquim's testimony at the trial, and at the evidentiary hearing recanting his affidavit, was credible. As noted, we review the district court's factual determinations for clear error. Our deference is even greater where, as here, the factual findings are based on credibility determinations. United States v. Rostoff, 164 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 1999). In such cases, "error is seldom considered `clear' unless the credibility assessments were based on testimony which was inherently implausible, internally inconsistent, or critically impeached." Keller v. United States, 38 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1994). Joaquim's description of the events leading up to the submission of his affidavit was plausible and unrefuted. We find no error.
Contrary to Awon's assertion, this case does not involve subject matter jurisdiction and therefore had to be raised on direct appeal. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case by virtue of the fact that Awon was charged with an offense against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231.6 The interstate commerce aspect of this case arises as an element of the section 844(i) offense. The statute requires the government to prove, inter alia, that the property involved in the arson was "used in interstate or foreign commerce or in an activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." If that element is not satisfied then Awon is not guilty; but the court is not by the failure of proof on that element deprived of judicial jurisdiction. See United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1246 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding section 844(i) as constitutional after Lopez); accord United States v. Tush, 287 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 12, 2002) (No. 02-5940) ("The interstate commerce element of § 844(i) `is not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case.'"); United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1165 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).
Awon, on appeal, attempts to argue that his procedural default should be excused because he is "actually innocent" because the evidence was insufficient to show that the interstate commerce element had been met under Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 (2000).7 We reject Awon's actual innocence argument, which suffers from a number of problems. First, his petition under § 2255 makes no claim at all of actual innocence; the government, with justification, says the claim is forfeit. Even if it had not been forfeit, it is doomed. The assertion of actual innocence to excuse a procedural default does not permit a reviewing court to simply dive into defaulted questions of the sufficiency of evidence.
The actual innocence exception is quite narrow and seldom used. Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200, 210 (1st Cir. 1999). It is reserved for the extraordinary cases of "fundamentally unjust incarceration." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320-21, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995).
Even if we hypothesized that this question was correctly characterized as one of factual innocence and not legal insufficiency, see Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992), this had none of the hallmarks of the usual actual innocence claim. There is no credible argument that the so-called new evidence affects the interstate commerce nexus, so this is not a situation of an actual innocence claim predicated on new evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S. Ct. 851. Nor is this a death case in which there is a constitutional violation which has probably resulted in the imposition of a death sentence of one who is actually innocent. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 411 n. 6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 103 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1989). And even if we were to consider the claim of insufficiency, it is frivolous under Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 105 S. Ct. 2455, 85 L. Ed. 2d 829 (1985) and United States v. Medeiros, 897 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1990).
We note at the start that, even if Awon's assertion were meritorious, vacating his conviction on Count V would not affect his sentence. Awon received a total term of imprisonment of 153 months. For his conviction under Count V, the district court imposed a 33 month term of imprisonment to be served concurrently with the 33 month sentence he received for his conviction under Count I. Thus, vacating his conviction and sentence pursuant to Count V would not lower his current sentence. In addition, his conviction for mail fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Counts VI, and VII) and his conviction for use of fire to commit a felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) (1) and (2) (Count VIII) were not dependent upon his conviction of arson pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). As a result, if his conviction under Count V is vacated, his conviction under the remaining counts and his subsequent sentence is unaffected. Thus, regardless of the outcome of our analysis, Awon's 153 month sentence will remain intact
We note that Awon had ample opportunity to address the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the building's connection with interstate commerce. In fact, prior to trial, Awon filed a motion to dismiss the arson counts arguing that the Ames Street property did not have a sufficient connection with interstate commerce as required by 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). In his pretrial motion he initiated a peremptory strike at the government's evidence. The district court denied the motion. The question of whether the property was used in interstate commerce was presented to the jury as an element of the offense. The district court instructed the jury that the government had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the property "was used in or affected interstate or foreign commerce" and defined those terms commensurate with the applicable case law. Awon did not appeal from the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss, neither did he object to nor appeal from the jury instructions nor appeal from his conviction under Count V. He only raised the issue again on February 1, 1999, when he filed his motion for a new trial and his motion pursuant to § 2255. In its decision denying these motions, the district court stated, without discussion, that Awon's argument concerning the jurisdiction of the court was "unconvincing."Awon v. United States, Civil Action No. 99-10207-GAO, slip op. at 7 n. 3 (D. Mass. July 1, 2000) (citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 (2000)).