Source: https://jmpattorney.blogspot.com/2017/04/
Timestamp: 2019-02-22 19:35:58
Document Index: 557272701

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 191', 'art 5', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 75', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 75', '§ 76', '§ 75', '§ 76', '§ 77', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 1240', '§ 468', '§ 118', '§ 468', '§ 468', '§ 468', '§ 118']

A Lawyer's Blog - Jon Michael Probstein, Esq.: April 2017
"NOTICE TO SENIOR CITIZENS: RESIDENTIAL LEASE TERMINATIONSECTION 227-a OF THE REAL PROPERTY LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ALLOWS FOR THE TERMINATION OF A RESIDENTIAL LEASE BY SENIOR CITIZENS MOVING TO A RESIDENCE OF A FAMILY MEMBER OR ENTERING CERTAIN HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, ADULT CARE FACILITIES OR HOUSING PROJECTS.
Who is eligible? Any lessee or tenant who is age sixty-two years or older, or who will attain such age during the term of the lease or rental agreement, or a spouse of such person residing with him or her.
What kind of facilities does this law apply to? This law will apply if the senior citizen is relocating to: A. An adult care facility; B. A residential health care facility; C. Subsidized low income housing; D. Senior citizen housing; or E. A residence of a family member.
What are the responsibilities of the rental property owner? When the tenant gives notice of his or her opportunity to move into one of the above facilities the landlord must allow: A. for the termination of the lease or rental agreement, and B. the release of the tenant from any liability to pay rent or other payments in lieu of rent from the termination of the lease in accordance with section 227-a of the real property law, to the time of the original termination date, and C. to adjust any payments made in advance or payments which have accrued by the terms of such lease or rental agreement.
How do you terminate the lease? If the tenant can move into one of the specified facilities, he or she must terminate the lease or agreement in writing no earlier than thirty days after the date on which the next rental payment (after the notice is delivered) is due and payable. The notice is deemed delivered five days after being mailed. The written notice must include documentation of admission or pending admission to one of the above mentioned facilities. For example: Mail the notice: May 5th Notice received: May 10th Next rental payment due: June 1st Termination effective: July 1st
Will the landlord face penalties if he or she does not comply? Yes, according to section 227-a of the real property law, if anyone interferes with the removal of your property from the premises they will be guilty of a misdemeanor and will be either imprisoned for up to one year or fined up to $1000.00 or both."
Labels: Landlord Tenant Law, leases, Senior Citizen, Termination
COMMISSIONED SALESPERSONS - WRITING REQUIRED WHETHER EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
N.Y. Labor Law § 191(c) requires that agreements with commissioned sales workers be in writing and signed by the employer and the employee.
"c. Commission salespersons.--A commission salesperson shall be paid the wages, salary, drawing account, commissions and all other monies earned or payable in accordance with the agreed terms of employment, but not less frequently than once in each month and not later than the last day of the month following the month in which they are earned; provided, however, that if monthly or more frequent payment of wages, salary, drawing accounts or commissions are substantial, then additional compensation earned, including but not limited to extra or incentive earnings, bonuses and special payments, may be paid less frequently than once in each month, but in no event later than the time provided in the employment agreement or compensation plan. The employer shall furnish a commission salesperson, upon written request, a statement of earnings paid or due and unpaid. The agreed terms of employment shall be reduced to writing, signed by both the employer and the commission salesperson, kept on file by the employer for a period not less than three years and made available to the commissioner upon request. Such writing shall include a description of how wages, salary, drawing account, commissions and all other monies earned and payable shall be calculated. Where the writing provides for a recoverable draw, the frequency of reconciliation shall be included. Such writing shall also provide details pertinent to payment of wages, salary, drawing account, commissions and all other monies earned and payable in the case of termination of employment by either party. The failure of an employer to produce such written terms of employment, upon request of the commissioner, shall give rise to a presumption that the terms of employment that the commissioned salesperson has presented are the agreed terms of employment."
Also note for sales representatives who are not employees there is Labor Law 191-b:
"1. When a principal contracts with a sales representative to solicit wholesale orders within this state, the contract shall be in writing and shall set forth the method by which the commission is to be computed and paid.
2. The principal shall provide each sales representative with a signed copy of the contract. The principal shall obtain a signed receipt for the contract from each sales representative.
3. A sales representative during the course of the contract, shall be paid the earned commission and all other monies earned or payable in accordance with the agreed terms of the contract, but not later than five business days after the commission has become earned."
Of course, the status of a sales representative as an independent contractor is a complex matter that depends on a number of factors.
See https://labor.ny.gov/legal/counsel/pdf/payment-of-commissions-frequently-asked-questions.pdf
Labels: Commission, Employee, Independent Contractor, Labor Law, Written Agreement
Of course, not all litigation is frivolous. Some, such as court action to protect a child or prosecute a crime, is completely just and proper. However when legal arguments are not supported by the applicable laws, or are based on false testimony, or have been commenced simply to cause distress, harm or fear to the other party, the litigation is effectively a form of abuse attempted via the legal system. Small claims court is the "people's court" allowing litigants to bring an action without the need for counsel. But sometimes, counsel should be consulted to at least consider the merits of bring an action and maybe to tell the client that the proceeding might be considered frivolous.
This case was decided on April 14 - OMWATHATH v. MOOTOOSAMMY, 2017 NY Slip Op 50500 - NY: Appellate Term, 2nd Dept. 2017:
"Plaintiff commenced a Civil Court action against defendant, his former tenant, to recover unpaid use and occupancy, and defendant interposed a counterclaim for harassment. Plaintiff also commenced a separate small claims action to recover for damage that was allegedly done to the door of his apartment by defendant. The actions were consolidated by the Civil Court. At a nonjury trial, defendant testified that any rent arrears had been waived by plaintiff in a so-ordered stipulation in a proceeding brought in the Housing Part, and introduced into evidence a copy of the stipulation and a receipt stating that defendant had moved out of the apartment, "giving it back in good condition," and was returning the keys. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal by plaintiff, following the trial, the Civil Court dismissed the complaint and the cause of action that had been asserted in the small claims action.
The Civil Court's determination is supported by the proof at trial. Plaintiff did not deny that he had signed the receipt proffered at trial stating that defendant vacated the premises and that the premises was in "good condition." Moreover, a review of the record establishes that plaintiff did not even allege that defendant damaged his door, much less establish the damages he allegedly sustained for the door's damage. In addition, the Civil Court could credit defendant's testimony that he timely vacated but was unable to contact plaintiff to return the keys until two days later."
Labels: appeals, Appearing Pro Se, FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS, LITIGATION, Small Claims
JURISDICTION IN FAMILY COURT - WHEN CHILD NOT ALWAYS IN NY
MATTER OF BURDICK v. Boehm, 2017 NY Slip Op 2107 - NY: Appellate Div., 3rd Dept. 2017:
"Petitioner (hereinafter the father) and respondent (hereinafter the mother) are the parents of a son (born in 2006), born in New York. In 2014, Family Court issued an order, on the parties' consent, granting the father's petition to modify a prior custody and visitation order, and awarded the parties joint custody of the child with placement with the mother effective June 25, 2014. The 2014 order granted the father visitation with the child during summer vacations and school breaks of three consecutive days or more and as the parties mutually agree. The father apparently remained in New York while the mother and child have lived in Illinois and then Wisconsin with various relatives[1]. In May 2016, the father commenced this modification proceeding seeking sole custody of the child, alleging that, among other things, the mother lacks stable housing and is a substance abuser, and that the child has been living with either his maternal grandmother or great-grandmother since March 2016. Prior to a response by the mother, Family Court sua sponte dismissed the petition, finding that New York does not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the child's custody pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (see Domestic Relations Law art 5-A). The father appeals.[2]
We reverse. A New York court that has previously made a child custody determination "has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until . . . a court of this state determines that neither the child [nor] the child and one parent . . . have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships" (Domestic Relations Law § 76 — a [1] [a]; see Matter of Wengenroth v McGuire, 127 AD3d 1278, 1280 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 913 [2015]). In dismissing the petition, Family Court relied upon the fact that the child and the mother had not resided in New York for over two years and that the "events which [the father] asserts in support of his petition occurred in Wisconsin." However, the father, who shares joint custody of the child pursuant to the 2014 order and has apparently lived continuously in New York since before the 2014 custody order was issued, alleges in an affidavit in support of his petition that the child spent the prior summer — from June 22, 2015 to August 22, 2015 — with him in New York pursuant to the 2014 order[3] (see Matter of Belcher v Lawrence, 98 AD3d 197, 200-201 [2012]; compare Matter of Wengenroth, 127 AD3d at 1280; Matter of Zippo v Zippo, 41 AD3d 915, 916 [2007]). The allegations in the petition, while somewhat confusing, further suggest that the child lived in New York from his birth until June 2014 and for a period of several months in early 2016, and that the child has a half sibling living with the father with whom he is bonded. According to the father, the child has his own room, a bank account, a YMCA membership and many familial and social relationships in New York.
Family Court "should have given the parties an opportunity to present evidence as to whether the child[ ] has maintained a significant connection with New York, and whether substantial evidence is available in New York concerning the child['s] `care, protection, training, and personal relationships'" (Pyronneau v Pyronneau, 130 AD3d 707, 708 [2015], quoting Domestic Relations Law § 76 — a [1] [a]). Given due process concerns, sua sponte dismissal of pleadings is to be used sparingly in the absence of extraordinary circumstances (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Pabon, 138 AD3d 1217, 1219 [2016]; Maynard v Maynard, 138 AD3d 794, 794 [2016]). Crediting the father's factual allegations at this early juncture,[4] as we must, we find that the child continues to have significant connections to New York (see Matter of Seminara v Seminara, 111 AD3d 949, 950-951 [2013]; Matter of Mercado v Frye, 104 AD3d 1340, 1341 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 859 [2013]; Matter of Belcher v Lawrence, 98 AD3d at 200-201; Matter of Hissam v Mancini, 80 AD3d 802, 803 [2011], lv dismissed and denied 16 NY3d 870 [2011]; Matter of Sutton v Sutton, 74 AD3d 1838, 1839 [2010]; see also Vernon v Vernon, 100 NY2d 960, 972 [2003]). That is, while significant evidence concerning the child's current "care, protection, training, and personal relationships" (Domestic Relations Law § 76-a [1] [a]) may be in Wisconsin, the same may ultimately be said about New York, which retains significant connections with the father and the child. Family Court, which presided over the 2014 proceedings involving this child, is presumably more familiar with the parties than Wisconsin courts would be (see Matter of Snow v Elmer, 143 AD3d 1217, 1219 [2016]), and the testimony of the mother, grandmother and other relevant Wisconsin witnesses could be presented "by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means" (Domestic Relations Law § 75-j [2]; see Matter of Snow v Elmer, 143 AD3d at 1219). Thus, we find that Family Court erred in summarily concluding that it was divested of its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to determine custody pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 76-a (1) (a), and it should not have dismissed the petition on this ground at this early stage and on this limited record.
[2] The mother has not submitted a brief or letter on appeal although contacted and requested to do so.
[3] The father's brief on appeal represents that the child also spent the summer of 2016 with him in New York.
[4] On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a), the facts as alleged in the petition are accepted as true (see Matter of Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Likewise here, where the petition was dismissed without a motion, sua sponte, Family Court was bound to credit the father's allegations in his petition."
Labels: child custody, Family Court, Jurisdiction, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
Labels: Kendra's Law
CHILD CUSTODY - TO BE ABLE TO MODIFY OUT OF STATE CUSTODY ORDER
MATTER OF INTRIAGO v. DIAZ-GARCIA, 2017 NY Slip Op 1357 - NY: Appellate Div., 2nd Dept. 2017:
"The subject child was born in 2007 and, on May 26, 2009, the Court of Common Pleas, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, issued a custody order granting the mother primary physical custody and the father partial custody and visitation. Sometime after May 26, 2009, but before April 1, 2015, both parties relocated to New York. On April 1, 2015, the mother moved to New Jersey, but the subject child stayed with the father in New York until early June 2015. On November 9, 2015, the father commenced this proceeding in the Family Court, Kings County, to modify the Pennsylvania custody order. Based upon the mother's April 1, 2015, move to New Jersey, the Family Court found that the subject child's home state was New Jersey and dismissed the father's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The father appeals.
Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Domestic Relation Law article 5-A; hereinafter UCCJEA), a court of this state may modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state if the court has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Domestic Relations Law § 76(1)(a) or (b), and, inter alia, "the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state" (Domestic Relations Law § 76-b[2]). A court has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 76(1)(a) if "this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state" (emphasis added). Under the UCCJEA, the definition of "home state" includes, in relevant part, "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. . . . A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period" (Domestic Relations Law § 75-a[7]).
Here, the Family Court erred in determining that New Jersey was the child's home state based upon the mother's April 1, 2015, move to New Jersey, since the child resided with the father in New York until early June 2015, and the father commenced this proceeding less than six months later, on November 9, 2015. Therefore, the child did not live with the mother in New Jersey for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of the proceeding. Domestic Relations Law § 76(1)(a) permits New York courts to exercise jurisdiction if, inter alia, New York "was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding." However, as the record does not disclose the date the child moved to New York, we cannot determine whether the child resided in New York for a period of six consecutive months prior to June 2015, so as to establish this state as his home state (see Domestic Relations Law § 75-a[7]) for purposes of Domestic Relation Law § 76(1)(a). Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Family Court, Kings County, for further proceedings to determine whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to modify the Pennsylvania custody order.
Contrary to the father's contention, registration of the Pennsylvania custody order in New York pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 77-d was not sufficient to confer exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over this custody matter pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 76-a (see Schroeder v Schroeder, 658 NW2d 909, 912 [Minn Ct App]; Jamil v Jahan, 280 Mich App 92, 102, 760 NW2d 266, 272).
In light of the foregoing, the attorney for the child's alternative contention that New Jersey would be a more convenient forum (see Domestic Relations Law § 76-f) is premature."
Labels: child custody, Modification, out of state order
Labels: Board of Directors, Co-Ops
Labels: Child Support, Income, separation agreements
Labels: Employee, Employer liability, Misconduct
Posted by Jon Michael Probstein at 11:27 AM 0 comments Links to this post
Labels: divorce, Mediation, separation agreements, Spousal Maintenance, unconscionability
Matter of Cluff, 2017 NY Slip Op 1753 - NY: Appellate Div., 3rd Dept. 2017:
"Amanda Lynn Cluff was admitted to practice by this Court in 2012 and has previously listed a business address in Brielle, New Jersey with the Office of Court Administration (hereinafter OCA). By affidavit sworn to June 16, 2016, Cluff seeks leave to resign from the New York bar for nondisciplinary reasons (see Uniform Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.22 [a]). The Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department (hereinafter AGC) opposes the application by correspondence from its Chief Attorney.
Inasmuch as Cluff is ineligible for nondisciplinary resignation, her application for that relief must be denied. According to OCA records, and as is emphasized by AGC, Cluff is presently delinquent in her New York attorney registration requirements, having failed to register for the 2016-2017 biennial period (see Judiciary Law § 468-a; Rules of the Chief Admin of Cts [22 NYCRR] § 118.1). It is beyond cavil that the failure to duly register constitutes "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" (Judiciary Law § 468-a [5]) and, therefore, attorney misconduct (see Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 8.4 [d]; see also Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a, 113 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2014]; Matter of Arms, 251 AD2d 743, 743-744 [1998]; Matter of Ryan, 238 AD2d 713, 713-714 [1997]; Matter of Farley, 205 AD2d 874, 874-875 [1994]). Accordingly, Cluff's failure to duly register is a bar to her nondisciplinary resignation, and her application must be denied (see Matter of Frank, 146 AD3d 1228, 1228-1229 [2017]). Further, any future application by Cluff must be supported by proof of her full satisfaction of the requirements of Judiciary Law § 468-a and Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) § 118.1 (see id.)."
Labels: Attorneys, Registration
"Dear Valued Attorneys,
Thank you so much for coming out this past Saturday to extend your services to our Veterans! We truly appreciate all of your time that you were able to dedicate to helping serve those who have served us. We know that the Veterans were so thankful for your consultation and advice. Thank you, and we look forward to seeing you at our next Clinic this coming fall semester.
We truly appreciate your time and effort,
The Hofstra Veterans Law Executive Board and Members"
222 E. 12 REALTY v. SO, 2017 NY Slip Op 27000 - NY: Appellate Term, 1st Dept. 2017:
There was a dissent and here it is in part:
"Moreover, any alleged breach by tenant was de minimus, given that the first inspection was not an issue (and, therefore, presumably, plaintiff was in compliance with the parties's stipulation during the first six (6) months of the one (1) year probationary period), tenant cooperated with APS with the initial organization of his unit, and provided proof that he in fact remedied any clutter condition, quickly after the second inspection. Any breach was particularly de minimus, especially when weighed against landlord's eight (8) immediately hazardous violations and 16 hazardous violations placed on the building and landlord's own actions causing any alleged breach by tenant, because of its construction, which indisputably caused flooding and dust to accumulate in So's unit, and landlord's requiring the immediate removal of tenant's possessions from his long-term storage area in the basement, causing tenant to temporarily store some additional possessions in his unit just prior to the second inspection, and for which, tenant, nonetheless, received no building violations on his apartment, unlike landlord's 24 immediately hazardous/hazardous building violations.
In any event, even if it was determined that tenant breached the stipulation, as this court recently acknowledged, pursuant to RPAPL 753 (4)[7], tenant must be afforded a post-judgment opportunity to cure (see Roger Morris Apt. Corp. v Varela, 2016 NY Slip Op 51697[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2016], citing Cutler v North Shore Towers Assoc., 125 AD2d 532 [1st Dept 1986]), and/or the lower court should have, at the very least, have considered tenant's evidence, which showed that he had in fact cured any alleged aggravated conditions, which were caused by landlord's actions, prior to the hearing. Such statute, which provides for the automatic granting of "a ten day stay of issuance of the warrant, during which time the respondent may correct such breach" was enacted to "permit tenants to remain in possession by curing [a] violation after the rights of the parties have been adjudicated" (Post v 120 E. End Ave. Corp., 62 NY2d 19, 27 [1984]. Significantly, "RPAPL 753 (4) is procedural and remedial in nature and ... [is to] be liberally construed to spread its beneficial effects as widely as possible" (id.; see also Lincoln Terrace Assoc. v Snow, 1983 NY Misc LEXIS 4233 [App Term, 1st Dept 1983]["[RPAPL 753 (4)], remedial in nature, should be broadly applied wherever possible to avoid needless and unwarranted forfeitures of dwelling spaces"]). Indeed, RPAPL 753 (4) has been applied where, as here, there has been a nuisance adjudication based on excessive clutter (see 4G Realty v Vitulli, 2 Misc 3d 29 [App Term, 2d Dept 2003]).
An opportunity to cure is particularly warranted in this case, given tenant's age (65 years old), his long-term (38 year) rent stabilized tenancy, the de minimus nature of the alleged breach, his efforts at mitigating any alleged condition prior to the hearing, and the undisputed need for and prior involvement of Adult Protective Services (APS)[8] (see Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v Birnbaum, 2002 NY Slip Op 50646[U][App Term, 2d and 11th Jud Dist][where tenant failed to timely comply with the terms of settlement by curing cluttered condition, execution of warrant was permanently stayed since proof established that tenant cured the cluttered condition, prior to entry of the final judgment]. The evidence produced at the hearing falls short of establishing a breach of the stipulation sufficient to warrant a forfeiture of this 35 year rent stabilized tenancy. "It is a well-settled principle of equity that courts do not look favorably upon the forfeiture of leases" (2246 Holding Corp. v. Nolasco, 52 AD3d 377 [1st Dept 2008][citations omitted]; see also Dino Realty Corp. v. Khan, 46 Misc 3d 71 [App Term 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014][stating that "the law abhors forfeiture of leases" and that "it is the policy of New York State to prevent unnecessary evictions, particularly of rent-stabilized tenants" [internal citations omitted]).
Accordingly, I would reverse, or, at minimum, remand for consideration of whether landlord caused the alleged breach by depriving tenant of the basement storage space and/or by landlord's construction causing dust and flooding of tenant's apartment[9], and whether tenant cured any alleged condition, prior to the hearing, and/or, nevertheless, qualified for a stay, pursuant to RPAPL 753(4)."
Labels: Hoarding, Landlord Tenant Law
"Landlord commenced this nuisance holdover proceeding upon allegations that garbage and other debris were "crammed from floor to ceiling" in tenant's single room occupancy (SRO) unit, creating a health, fire and safety hazard to other tenants. The proceeding was settled by a two-attorney, so-ordered stipulation that provided for a 10-month probationary period, during which tenant would refrain from "maintaining the subject premises in an unsanitary and unsafe manner" by "cramming" such "garbage, trash, boxes and bags[]" as listed in the "termination notice." The stipulation provided for specified inspection dates of the premises and enabled landlord, upon an alleged breach, to move to restore the proceeding for "an immediate hearing" on the "sole issue of whether the nuisance conditions exist." The stipulation further provided that if the court found that the nuisance conditions were present, landlord would be entitled to a possessory judgment and issuance of the warrant "with no further stays."
Upon a scheduled inspection of tenant's unit, landlord moved to restore the case, claiming that tenant breached the stipulation. Following a hearing, Civil Court concluded that "the evidence shows that the condition of the subject premises" was in a "nuisance condition, depicting an undue accumulation of items such as boxes and garbage bags," and that tenant was therefore in breach of the stipulation. The Court awarded landlord a possessory judgment with no stay of issuance of the warrant "[a]s the stipulation does not allow for a stay."
The stipulation, properly construed by Civil Court under settled contract principles (see Hotel Cameron, Inc. v Purcell, 35 AD3d 153, 155 [2006]) according to the plain meaning of its terms (see Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]), reveals that its aim was to cure the "Collyer"-type condition in tenant's residential unit. Civil Court's determination that tenant breached the stipulation rested upon a fair interpretation of the evidence, including (1) the credited testimony of landlord's employee who inspected tenant's room on one of the scheduled inspection dates during the probationary period and (2) date-stamped photographs depicting the overwhelming accumulation of papers, refuse and debris stacked throughout the unit on the inspection date (see Hotel Cameron, Inc. v Purcell, 35 AD3d at 155; see also Cabrini Terrace Joint Venture v O'Brien, 71 AD3d 486 [2010], lv dismissed 15 NY3d 888 [2010]). Given the court's fully-supported findings, and affording proper effect to the plain terms of the stipulation, which expressly provided for "no further stays," Civil Court properly declined to stay execution of the warrant (see 565 Tenants Corp. v Adams, 54 AD3d 602 [2008]; 521 East 72nd St. Realty Co., LLC v Borovicka, 26 Misc 3d 139 [A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50244[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2010]).
We also note that efforts were previously taken to assist tenant in curing the condition so that he could avoid eviction. Adult Protective Services conducted a deep cleaning of the unit prior to execution of the probationary stipulation, but tenant has obviously been unable to maintain the premises, as required, on a long-term basis. "Evidently, the problem has not been solved, and cannot be solved with a directive [to cure the condition]" (Zipper v Haroldon Ct. Condominium, 39 AD3d 325, 326 [2007]; see Cabrini Terrace Joint Venture v O'Brien, 71 AD3d at 486; Matter of Chi—Am Realty, LLC v Guddahl, 33 AD3d 911 [2006])."
Tomorrow - the dissent.