Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/281/66/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-01-28 10:49:31
Document Index: 668365855

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 266', '§ 77', '§ 77', '§ 51', '§ 77', '§ 77', '§ 21']

3. The proposition that, although the fees are not per se disproportionate to the privilege of operating over all the highways of the state, owners are entitled to licenses limiting the operation of their motor vehicles to a few highways which they wish to use (e.g., to streets in particular cities) upon payment of correspondingly reduced fees, is not supported by any constitutional principle. P. 281 U. S. 72. chanrobles.com-red
Appeals from decrees of the district court of three judges dissolving temporary injunctions and dismissing the bills in two suits against California officials, to enjoin them from enforcing provisions cf the state Motor Vehicle Act with respect to the imposition and collection of certain registration fees for motor vehicles. chanrobles.com-red
These are appeals under § 266 of the Judicial Code from final decrees of district courts of three judges for the Northern District of California. Each, on motion to dismiss the complaint, dissolved a temporary injunction, dismissed the complaint, and upheld the constitutionality of § 77(b) and (c) of the Motor Vehicle Act of California, 1923 California Statutes, c. 266, as amended, 1927 California Statutes, c. 844. Section 36(a) requires every motor vehicle operated upon the public highways of the state to be registered. Under § 77(a), an annual fee of $3 is exacted for the registration of all motor vehicles. By subsections (b) and (c), printed in the margin so far as relevant, [Footnote 1] a graduated license or registration fee, payable chanrobles.com-red
Under §§ 51 and 153(c), operation of a motor vehicle for which the registration fees have not been paid is a chanrobles.com-red
The petitioners in both suits are owners of motor vehicles of various types, described in § 77(b) or (c), which petitioners in No. 86 operate exclusively over highways within the limits of incorporated cities, and which petitioners in No. 267 operate over highways principally within but partly without city limits. Both complaints assail the validity of the act under the Constitution of California and the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The bill in No. 86 was filed December 29, 1928. Its allegations, admitted by the motion to dismiss, are that the petitioners will be required to pay license fees for the ensuing year on or before January 31, 1929, in order to use their motor vehicles upon streets of incorporated cities, and to avoid the destruction of their business and irreparable loss by the seizure and sale of their motor vehicles and the imposition of the penalties of the act, which respondent threatens to enforce. See Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140.
Petitioners insist that the registration fees imposed by § 77(b) and (c) are, in effect, tolls for the use of the highways chanrobles.com-red
This argument is based upon cases in this Court arising not under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the commerce clause of the Constitution, where the tax assailed was levied by a state on interstate carriers and purported to be exacted for their use of the state highways. In such cases, this Court must ascertain whether a forbidden burden is imposed on interstate commerce. For that purpose, it may inquire whether the tax bears some reasonable relation to the use of the state facilities by the carrier. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 276 U. S. 246; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 619; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160; Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554.
But we are now concerned only with the use of motor cars in intrastate commerce, and, in any case, not the precise name which may be given to the money payment demanded, but its effect upon the persons paying it, is of importance in determining whether the Constitution is infringed. Whatever other descriptive term may be applied to the present registration fees, they are exactions, made in the exercise of the state taxing power, for the privilege of operating specified classes of motor vehicles over public highways, and expended for state purposes. Such fees, if covered into the state treasury and used for public purposes, as are general taxes, obviously would not offend against the due process clause. Nor can we see that they do so the more because the state has designated the particular public purposes for chanrobles.com-red
which they may be used. There is nothing in the federal Constitution which requires a state to apply such fees for the benefit of those who pay them. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 169 U. S. 280.
The objection that the petitioners should not be required to pay the challenged fees because they are already paying the city license tax is but the familiar one, often rejected, that a state may not, by different statutes, impose two taxes upon the same subject matter, although, concededly, the total tax, if imposed by a single taxing statute, would not transgress the due process clause. See Swiss Corp. v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407, 273 U. S. 413; St. Louis, Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 235 U. S. 367-368; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 252 U. S. 58; Ft. Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532, 251 U. S. 533.
Only a word need be said of petitioner's contention that the exemption of all vehicles weighing less than 3,000 pounds, although their loaded weight may be much more than vehicles not exempt, infringes the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the similar § 21 of article 1 of the state constitution. [Footnote 2] That the legislature chanrobles.com-red
may graduate the fees according to the propensities of the vehicles to injure or to destroy the public highways, and may exempt those with respect to which this tendency is slight or nonexistent, cannot be doubted. We may not assume that vehicles weighing less than 3,000 pounds, with loads which they usually carry, are not of this class, or that vehicles weighing more than 3,000 pounds with their accustomed burden added do not have this tendency. It is for the legislature to draw the line between the two classes. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 170 U. S. 300-301; Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329, 184 U. S. 331; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 223 U. S. 62; Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322; Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122, 254 U. S. 125; Franchise Motor Freight Assn. v. Seavey, 196 Cal. 77, 81; In re Schmolke, 199 Cal. 42, 48, 248 P. 244. Cf. Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, 221 U. S. 484; Packard v. Banton, supra; Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 280 U. S. 123.
The present registration fees cannot be said to be tolls in the commonly accepted sense of a proprietor's charge for the passage over a highway or bridge, exacted when and as the privilege of passage is exercised. See Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 119 U. S. 548; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288, 123 U. S. 293; St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S. 92, 148 U. S. 97. The fact that registration fees are imposed generally upon all residents who use motor vehicles within the state, without reference to any chanrobles.com-red