Source: http://allthingspros.blogspot.com/2011_07_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2015-04-27 00:14:42
Document Index: 793002072

Matched Legal Cases: ['arts 21', '§ 2173', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§101', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§ 2107', '§ 2107', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 1']

Takeaway: In Ex parte Boucherie, the Applicant claimed a method of manufacturing a plunger for a medical syringe. A claim on appeal included the limitation "said piston body ... being formed such that the front side and side wall thereof are free of any flash lines and/or gate points for the plastic." The Examiner used an anticipatory reference that disclosed a syringe manufacturing process. The Examiner also found that the "formed free of flash lines" limitation was disclosed by a drawing of the final product, which did not show flash lines. The Board reversed the anticipation rejection, finding that "there are a number of reasons why the flash lines and gate point formed in the gasket during the Fig. 2(a)-(c) molding process might not be illustrated in the syringe shown in Fig. 1, though actually present in the final molded product." Details:
The application on appeal related to a method for manufacturing plungers for medical syringes. 1. Method for manufacturing plungers for medical syringes, said plunger comprising at least two parts including a longitudinal plunger body made of plastic and a piston body provided at a front end of the plunger body, which piston body comprises a plastic which is softer than the plastic of the plunger body, wherein said plunger, or at least a part of the plunger, is formed by first manufacturing the piston body and then the plunger body, or at least a part of the plunger body, by means of injection moulding, and
wherein the plunger body, or said part of the plunger body, is injected against the piston body, said piston body having a front side and a side wall and being formed such that the front side and side wall thereof are free of any flash lines and/or gate points for the plastic.
(Emphasis added.) The term "flash lines," also known as flashing, refers to the excess bits of plastic produced by the molding process. As explained in the specification, this excess plastic is especially undesirable for a medical syringe, since the material "may come off and thus end up in the reservoir of the syringe, and thus also in the medical liquid to be injected." The Examiner rejected the independent claims as being anticipated by various references. One of the references was a Japanese patent publication, Chiba, which disclosed a method of manufacturing a syringe. The Examiner asserted that manufactured syringe was shown in Fig. 1 of Chiba as having no flash lines or gate points and thus met the claim limitation highlighted above.
As can be seen in Figs. 2(a)-(c) of the Chiba publication, the front side and the sidewalls of the gasket 6 include a gate point for the thermoplastic elastomer and flash lines, respectively. For clarification, the flash lines are formed on the side wall of the gasket 6 along the split between the molds 21a, 21b. This is due to the fact that some of the thermoplastic elastomer material injected to form the gasket 6 will fill in the gaps defined by the split between the two mold parts 21a, 21b, no matter how small the gaps are.In the annotated Fig. 2(c) below, the flash lines are drawn in red.
(Emphasis added.)The Applicant filed a Reply Brief to contest these findings. First, the Applicant repeated the explanation of how the manufacturing process discussed in the text of Chiba and illustrated in Figs. 2(a) - (c) of Chiba would produce flash lines and gate points. The Applicant then explained why it was inappropriate to rely on the final product shown in Chiba's Fig. 1 for the claimed process limitation:
(Emphasis added.) The Applicant appealed a final Office Action rejecting the independent claims as being anticipated. In the Appeal Brief, the Applicant argued that the reference did not teach "the display of scheduled time as free time." According to the Applicant, the reference merely taught that a portion of a scheduled time period appeared as free time.
[FN1] See MPEP § 2173.05(h), “Alternative Limitations” and Markush-style claiming. The Board went further to find that the reference also taught both alternatives:
We broadly but reasonably construe the claimed “scheduled meetings” as reading on any designated slot in a calendar of scheduled meetings, as the actual subject matter of the designated happening is a non-functional limitation in the claim (see below). Given this construction, we find Srimuang discloses that employee A has indicated that 8:00 AM and 4:00 PM are free time slots, as shown in Fig. 2. The Applicant filed a Request for Rehearing, arguing that "no species of a rule is specified [in the claim] using Markush phraseology. Rather, a binary choice is presented that a rule specifies 'whether to' do one action, 'or whether to' do another action."
Although Appellant's claim 1 is not a Markush claim per se, the claim clearly defines each free time rule using alternative language ("or"). Appellant's arguments appear to impute that each free time rule should be read with conjunctive prongs. (Request 2-3). We particularly note that none of Appellant's claims on appeal recite the argued "binary choice" language. (Request 3, ¶ 1, l.7). We will not endeavor to read such argued limitations into the claim. Moreover, Appellant could have amended his claims during prosecution to recite "and" instead of "or" (cf: "binary choice") to clarify the meaning and intended scope of the disputed claim term "free time rule." However, Appellant chose not to do so. Postscript: After appeal, the Applicant filed an RCE with these claim amendments:
a set of free time rules, each of said free time rules specifying whether as a binary choice to configure at least one of said scheduled meetings for display in a groupware client either as free time, or whether to configure said at least one of said scheduled meetings for display in a groupware client as busy time; The Examiner then rejected under 112 First Written Description, noting that "the limitation 'binary choice' is not supported by applicant's original specification."
The Applicant responded by referring to a paragraph in the spec and asserting that the paragraph "describes with clarity a binary choice of exposing a meeting as free or busy time." The Examiner then withdrew the Written Description rejection. My two cents: I wish I knew a bulletproof way to claim options, since options are a common pattern in software patents. I've encountered more than a few Examiners who insist that any use of the term "or" invokes the Markush rule "only need to find one of them in the reference." I was disappointed to see the Board also apply this simplistic analysis. Maybe there are better ways to express the option pattern in this claim, but on balance, the better interpretation is that the claim requires a system that supports both options.
The Applicant's attempt to clarify by amending after appeal ran into trouble with Written Description. Originally I wondered if the Examiner was thinking that "binary choice" specifically limits to two options, where the spec described two options but probably didn't strictly limit the number of options to two. I would probably have left out "binary" for this reason. But apparently that wasn't the real issue, since the Examiner withdrew the rejection. I really question the wisdom of appealing again, because the Board explicitly found that the reference taught both options, based on their construction of "scheduled meetings." I don't see that the Applicants have addressed this issue going up to the next appeal.
It's possible that the Applicants will get lucky and the Examiner will cave before it gets to the Board. At this time, the Applicant has filed an Appeal Brief, but the Examiner hasn't filed the Answer. The Applicant argued that the Examiner has not explained how the reference teaches the "binary choice" language. Perhaps the Examiner won't recall the Board's earlier claim construction, or will somehow think that "binary choice" makes the Board's construction of "scheduled meetings" irrelevant. 11 comments:
Takeaway: The BPAI reversed a § 112 First Paragraph Enablement rejection in a computer software application because the Examiner's rationale for the Enablement rejection related to lack of utility under § 101. The BPAI agreed that an Enablement rejection appropriately accompanied a lack of utility rejection under In re Kirk. However, here the outstanding § 101 rejection involved the non-statutory subject matter prong of § 101 rather than the lack of utility prong. Details:
Ex parte Sun Appeal 2009008503; Appl. No. 11/171,388; Tech. Center 2100
in response to user input, linking information displayed in the information space to a particular hypothesis and its state; and if a particular hypothesis stands rejected or confirmed, generating, in the hypothesis space, a description of the state of the hypothesis as rejected or confirmed.
A first Office Action (issued in 2006) included a § 101 non-statutory subject matter rejection and a § 112 First Paragraph Enablement rejection, but no prior art rejections. In explaining the § 101 rejection, the Examiner asserted that "none of the claims are limited to practical applications," citing AT&T v. Excel Communcations, Inc. Furthermore, according to the Examiner, MPEP 21071.01 directed that an Enablement rejection should accompany a § 101 rejection: Courts have also cast the 35 U.S.C. 101/ 35 U.S.C. 112 relationship such that 35 U.S.C. 112 presupposes compliance with 35 U.S.C. 101. See In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200-1201, 26 USPQ2d 1600, 1603 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The how to use prong of section 112 incorporates as a matter of law the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101 that the specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility for the invention. ... If the application fails as a matter of fact to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101, then the application also fails as a matter of law to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to use the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112."); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 942, 153 USPQ 48, 53 (CCPA 1967) ("Necessarily, compliance with § 112 requires a description of how to use presently useful inventions, otherwise an applicant would anomalously be required to teach how to use a useless invention."). (MPEP 21071.01.)
The Examiner maintained both rejections in the Answer, and explained that the Enablement rejection was appropriate because ... current case law (and accordingly, the MPEP [Manual of Patent Examining Procedure]) require such a rejection if a §101 rejection is given because when Applicant has not in fact disclosed the practical application for the invention, as a matter of law there is no way Applicant could have disclosed how to practice the undisclosed practical application.
(Emphasis in original.) The application did not reach the BPAI until 2011. The Board affirmed the § 101 rejection under Bilski v. Kappos, finding that the method claims were not tied to a particular machine and also failed to transform an article to a different state or thing. However, the Board reversed the § 112 First Paragraph Enablement rejection, finding that the Examiner had confused a § 101 Non-Statutory Subject Matter rejection with a § 101 Lack of Utility rejection:
The Examiner’s statement of the rejection of claims 1-25 under § 112, first paragraph appears to be couched in terms of the claims lacking enablement. However, the Examiner offers no analysis with respect to how the disclosure fails to enable the subject matter, other than reference to MPEP § 2107.01(IV) and In re Kirk, 376 F. 2d 936, 942 (CCPA 1967). See Ans. 10. MPEP § 2107.01(IV) and In re Kirk relate the statutory grounds of § 101 and § 112, first paragraph to a rejection for lack of utility. Although the Examiner rejects the claims under § 101 as being directed to nonstatutory subject matter, the Examiner does not show that the claims are deficient under the utility prong of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, as the § 112 rejection appears to be based solely on a § 101 “lack of utility” rejection that has not been made, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. My two cents: I admit I've sometimes used the phrase "utility rejection" when I really mean a § 101 non-statutory subject matter rejection. I further admit that this usage is sloppy and incorrect. But I do know the difference between a non-statutory subject matter rejection – quite common in computer cases – and a rejection for lack of utility (sometimes referred to as a "specific utility" rejection) – which typically occurs in in a biotech case and is almost never appropriate in a computer case. So if an Examiner relied on In re Kirk to throw in an Enablement rejection in a computer case, I'm confident I'd know something was very wrong. I found three other applications where this same Examiner has made this type of inappropriate Enablement rejection in the past few years. In two of them, the issue went to appeal and the BPAI reversed (Ex parte Mitchell and Ex parte Griffith). In the third, the Examiner withdrew the Enablement rejection in the Answer without comment (Ex parte Aklilu).
Takeaway: The BPAI found that the Applicant's evidence of unexpected results was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness because the expert declaration failed to state the results were unexpected. Arguments in the Appeal Brief did characterize the results as unexpected, but the Board pointed out that "attorney argument is not evidence." (Ex parte Uchida, Appeal 2011000486.) Details:
The Board found that the claim language "to about 40 μm" was broad enough to encompass the 50 μm particle in one of the references. The Board also found that the evidence of secondary considerations was flawed: Although the Uchida [expert] Declaration shows that 1 micron particles produce a slightly higher maximal temperature than 50 micron particles, neither the Specification nor the Declaration states that this result was unexpected. Cf. In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen an applicant demonstrates substantially improved results . . . and states that the results were unexpected, this should suffice to establish unexpected results in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”). Here, the only characterization of the results as unexpected is in the Appeal Brief, and attorney argument is not evidence.
(Emphasis added.) The Board also criticized the evidence as not being commensurate with the claim scope. "[T]he claims encompass a particle size range of about 1 μm to about 40 μm, and the evidence shows results only at the lower limit of the claimed range."
In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185, 1189 (CCPA 1978) (“[O]bjective evidence of non-obviousness must be commensurate in scope with the claims…”). Estee Lauder, Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1997)("However, arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the record.").
Also be aware that specific types of secondary considerations (e.g., commercial success, unexpected results, etc.) have other requirements. So look up the relevant case law and make sure your evidence complies. For example, the Board didn't mention this in Uchida, but the unexpected results doctrine requires that the results be unexpected as compared to the closest prior art. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991)(“[W]hen unexpected results are used as evidence of nonobviousness, the results must be shown to be unexpected compared with the closest prior art.”).
secondary considerations,
Takeaway: A patentee filed a reissue in order to remove a terminal disclaimer. The patentee appealed the Examiner's decision that removal of a terminal disclaimer is not an error correctable by reissue. The BPAI, in an expanded seven-judge panel, held that reissue cannot be used to remove a terminal disclaimer because the patent's term is fixed at issue. (Ex parte Yamazaki.)
Decided January 11, 2011 During prosecution of the '991 Patent, the Applicant filed a terminal disclaimer to overcome double patenting rejection. Later in prosecution, the Applicant filed a § 1.181 Petition to Withdraw Terminal Disclaimer after amending such that the claims were no longer subject to the double patenting rejection. Before the petition was decided, Applicant received a Notice of Allowance and paid the issue fee. After the '991 Patent issued, the PTO dismissed the petition, stating that the "USPTO will not remove a recorded terminal disclaimer once a patent issues," and also stating that reissue is not available to nullify a terminal disclaimer. Before the expiration of '991 Patent, the Applicant filed a reissue. The reissue declaration referred to several errors related to the Petition to Withdraw Terminal Disclaimer. The Examiner rejected the claims during reissue as having a defective declaration, stating that nullification of a terminal disclaimer is not an error correctable in reissue. The Applicant appealed the Examiner's rejection.
My two cents: Most BPAI decisions affect only the Applicant/Patentee. This one affects every patent that includes a terminal disclaimer. Let's hope this patentee has enough at stake to appeal to the Federal Circuit. The patentee did file a Request for Rehearing by the BPAI. It's possible the BPAI will change its mind -- two judges in the expanded panel of seven did file a concurrence which disagreed with the broad holding. I expect this decision to be marked Precedential, or at least Informative.
At oral arguments before the BPAI, one of the judges asked about the Petition to Withdraw Terminal Disclaimer that was filed during prosecution of the original patent, then commented that "I'm more concerned with the issue that we are not the proper place to be with this issue before the Director." I'm not sure where the judge was going with this. Any remedies related the petition (filed in 1999) have long since expired. Perhaps that was the judge's point: it was a petitionable issue and you failed to handle it in the appropriate manner. Though the appropriate manner – Withdraw from Issue and/or ask the PTO to hold the issuance until the petition was decided (suspension of rules?) – isn't very satisfactory either. This case, like Frye, is yet another fine example how appeals and petitions don't play together very well. If you want more details about how the Board interpreted the reissue statute, you'll have to read the decision yourself. I blogged about this one because I think it's an important decision, but arguments about statutory construction don't interest me too much.
Takeaway: The Examiner objected to originally filed drawings in the first Office Action on the merits (mailed in 2004), and the Applicant is still fighting the very same objection in 2011 – even after winning at the BPAI on the prior art rejections! What's worse, the Applicant is now caught between inconsistent direction from the PTO: the BPAI Decision said to petition the objections and the Petition Decision said to appeal the objections. The Applicant has now filed a Renewed Petition which explains this inconsistency. If the Applicant loses this time, the only recourse is to file a suit in district court. (Application of Frye, Appl. 10/790,923.) Details:
(Emphasis added.) The originally filed spec referred to a midsole, but did not use a reference number. So the Applicant responded by amending the spec and drawings to add reference number 829. The drawing amendment looked like this:
The Applicant filed an RCE with claim amendments to address prior art rejections and also argued against the new matter objection. The Applicant addressed the second drawing objection ("824 points to the forefoot") by explaining that line 824 had been "repositioned so that it coincides with the midpoint of the sole." The Applicant traversed the new matter objection by pointing to specific sections of the specification to show support for "midsole." The Examiner maintained all three objections. Later in prosecution, the Applicant argued that a midsole is known to a POSITA and is thus not new matter:
Moreover, midsoles are well known by those of skill in the art
as shown in the various prior art documents submitted by Applicant and cited by the Examiner and as taken by the Examiner as Official Notice, in the Office Action. No unusual features have been attributed to the midsole provided in FIGURE 14 and described in Applicant's specification.
The Examiner did not respond to this particular argument. The Applicant filed seven more responses and amendments dealing with prior art rejections before appealing, but no progress was made on the objections. In addition to the prior art rejections, the Appeal Brief addressed the drawing and new matter objections (repeating the arguments already on record).
A review of the record indicates that the drawing objection and claim rejection are directed to the same issues. ... [T]he correctness of the examiner's drawing objection, resting on the lack of clarity of the claimed the location of point 824 of midsole, is dependent on the correctness' of the examiner's 35 USC 112 first paragraph rejection of claims based on the original specification. It is the policy of the USPTO in appropriate circumstances to decline to rule on a petitionable issue, when, as here, that an issue is also determinative of a rejection, and as such, is appropriate for consideration on appeal to the BP AI. In this case, the issue in the objection and rejection, as here, additionally and necessarily requires the exercise of technical skill and legal judgment in order to evaluate the facts presented, the issue is properly decided on the merits, and is properly reviewed on appeal, not petition. Under the circumstances, it is believed that the issues presented under the claim rejections and drawing objection in the instant case require the same review by the BPAI. Thus, this issue is appealable and should not be decided by petition.(Emphasis added.) On July 5, 2011, the Applicant filed Renewed Petition explaining that the Petition Decision was inconsistent with the BPAI's decision:
My two cents: Petitions are generally useless to Applicants because a petition doesn't stop the 6-month statutory clock and petition decisions often take months if not years. Not true here, as the decision took only about 6 weeks. This case highlights a second problem with the petition process – the confusion between issues that are appealable and issues that are petitionable, which can catch the Applicant in "an endless loop" between the two entities. Technically, there is no endless loop. Technically, the BPAI decision and the Petition decision are not inconsistent, because they were deciding two different issues. The Petition considered an enablement rejection that wasn't present when the Applicant petitioned, because the landscape changed between the time the petition was filed and the time the petition was decided. That is, the Applicant petitioned the new matter and drawing objections (Office Action mailed September 22, 2010), but by the time the petition was decided the new matter objection had disappeared in favor of an enablement rejection (Office Action mailed April 21, 2011).
Maybe the Applicant was hoping that the objections would simply go away. I have seen a number of cases go to the Board with objections present, and when the BPAI decided in the Applicant's favor, the Examiner issued a Notice of Allowance. That is, the objection simply disappeared with no comment. But as this case shows, you're in trouble if the Examiner maintains the objection even when the claims are otherwise allowable. So after what happened here in Frye, perhaps Applicants should consider filing petitions more often, at least when it's clear that the Examiner is entrenched in his position. I also wonder if the Applicant dodged a bullet here by waiting so long to file the petition. Rule 1.181 says that petitions that are not "filed within two months of the mailing date of the action or notice from
which relief is requested may be dismissed as untimely." It's not clear to me whether the action from which relief is requested is the very first Office Action in which the objection is raised, or whether it's the latest action maintaining the objection. I'd like it to be the latter, since that's more lenient for Applicants. Yet if the two month time period renews every time you get an Office Action, I don't really see the point of a two month time period, since that would allow me to wait (almost) indefinitely to file a petition. It would have been nice if the Examiner had issued an enablement rejection from the start rather than new matter. The Board would have decided the issue, and that would be that. On the other hand, the Applicant did amend the spec, so this might be one of rare cases where a new matter objection is appropriate. This case illustrates why you don't want to amend the spec to add literal support for your claims: it's easier to appeal an enablement rejection than to petition a new matter rejection. 15 comments:
[T]he claimed article must be distinguished structurally over the prior art and not merely in the manner it is used. ... Appellant argues that additional structure (e.g. a housing) shown in this [brochure] eliminates the possibility of reflection outside of the optics. However, use of any additional structure is not seen to negate the fact that the structural features of the claimed axicon are met by Wrobel. The Board agreed with the Examiner. The Board found that Wrobels' conical surface is reflective ("in accordance with physical principles"), and that "there is no structural difference between optical element 10a of Wrobel and the axicon defined by claim 6."
The Board discounted Applicant's evidence completely, commenting as follows: First, it is not at all clear that the MEL 80 Excimer Laser described in the brochure of Exhibit A corresponds to the apparatus of Wrobel, as Appellant asserts (App. Br. 6). The brochure of Exhibit A is devoid of any patent markings, and does not show the optical system in any detail. For example, Exhibit A does not show a system such as that shown in Fig. 3a of Wrobel. We also note that page 13 of Exhibit A states "[n]ot for sale in the United States." Therefore, we do not find Exhibit A to be probative of the issues presented here.
The Board discounted the evidence on substantive grounds, but could have dismissed it on procedural grounds. The rules are clear that you can't include evidence in an Appeal Brief. In cases like this, where the Applicant doesn't realize the evidence is needed until a Final rejection, the rules allow for introducing evidence in an After Final response or even after Notice of Appeal, as long as you show good cause. However, if the Examiner chooses not to enter the evidence, the Board simply won't consider it, and you're forced to fight the issue of non-entry with a petition. For an example of a multiple reference 102 in a litigation context, see my post "Public use anticipation allows multiple references that explain how single system functions".