Source: https://de.scribd.com/document/369541067/Answer-Brief-of-Perry
Timestamp: 2019-05-27 00:45:56
Document Index: 444374385

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 473', '§ 473', '§ 473', '§ 473', '§\n907', '§ 1983']

Answer Brief of Perry | State Court (United States) | Lawsuit
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Case No. 17-­‐‑55404
JEFFREY GRAY THOMAS,
LAURIE ZELON; DENNIS PERLUSS; HUGH JOHN GIBSON;
HOPE PARK 2001-­‐‑02910056 LLC;
ROSARIO PERRY; NORMAN SOLOMON,
Case No. 2:16-­‐‑cv-­‐‑06544-­‐‑JAK-­‐‑AJW
John A. Kronstadt, United States District Judge, Presiding
BRIEF OF APPELLEE ROSARIO PERRY
ROSARIO PERRY, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
Rosario Perry (SBN 55061)
Steven Coard (SBN 277540)
312 Pico Blvd.
Telephone: 310 394-­‐‑9831
Attorney for Defendant and Appellee
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
III. THOMAS’S CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST PERRY UNDER FRCP 12(b)(6) 12
IV. CONCLUSION 16
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Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986).………………………..page 13
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)……..……………………………….page 12
Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1965)…………….........page 13
Haldane v. Ruppe, 435 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1970)………………………….page 13
Moore v. Brewster, 96 F. 3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996)…………………..page 13
Mullis v. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385 1394 (9th Cir.
1987)……………………………………………………………………..…page 13
Reddy v. Superior & Mun. Court of Cal., No. SA CV 97-­‐‑923 AHS (SH), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24102, (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 1998)…………………………...page 15
42 U.S.C. § 1983…………………………………………………...……..pages 12-­‐‑15
Rules 12(b)(6)………………………………………………………...........page 12
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Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellant Jeffrey Gray Thomas (Thomas), an attorney, was
sanctioned $58,650 by the California Court of Appeal, for what the court
described as “frivolous” and “outrageous” conduct “intended to harass an
opposing party.” The California Court of Appeal also ordered the clerk of the
court to report the matter to the State Bar of California. Thomas then filed a
convoluted lawsuit against the justices who had sanctioned him, and against
the opposing counsel and opposing parties that were involved in Thomas’s
frivolous appeal. Thomas’s lawsuit alleged that these parties and attorneys
“conspired” to deprive Thomas of his civil rights. The lawsuit also included
two state claims against opposing counsel and opposing parties for good
measure. The federal district court dismissed the entire lawsuit against all
parties, pursuant to the Rooker-­‐‑Feldman doctrine.
Appellee Rosario Perry (“Perry”) was one of the parties in Thomas’s
frivolous appeal, and is one of the defendants in this federal lawsuit. The
other appellees in the instant appeal before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,
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have thoroughly briefed and discussed the facts of the case, and have
thoroughly analyzed the law, and their arguments apply with equal force to
Perry. Indeed, the legal and factual basis for Perry’s inclusion as a defendant
in Thomas’s Complaint is vague and unintelligible, apart from the allegation
that Perry “conspired” to “support” the motion for sanctions against Thomas,
whatever that means. In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, Perry
will not further belabor and regurgitate the points set forth by the other non-­‐‑
judicial appellees, who stand in the same position as Perry, nor will Perry
repeat the arguments set forth by the Judicial appellees. Perry will instead
add only one particular issue to the legal discussion.
As set out in the April 27, 2015 opinion of the state Court of Appeal the
underlying state court action was an interpleader proceeding. 1130 LLC filed
that interpleader proceeding in the state trial court (Los Angeles County
Superior Court Case # BC466413) to resolve competing claims to the proceeds
of sale of property located at 1130 South Hope Street, in downtown Los
Angeles. ER 126. The defendants named in the interpleader complaint were
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Hope Park, Norman Solomon, Ray Haiem (Mr. Thomas’s client in the trial
court and state court appellate proceedings), Rosario Perry, Rosario Perry’s
law offices and certain other defendants later dismissed by plaintiff.
Mr. Haiem filed a cross-­‐‑complaint in the interpleader proceedings. By
October 3, 2012 Mr. Thomas had substituted in as Mr. Thomas’s counsel (ER
127). Mr. Haiem was ordered several times to complete service of that cross-­‐‑
complaint on all named cross-­‐‑defendants but failed to do so (ER 127-­‐‑128). On
November 9, 2012 the state trial court dismissed Mr. Haiem’s cross-­‐‑complaint
for failure to complete that service on all cross-­‐‑defendants (ER 128). Mr.
Haiem then filed several motions to amend his (now non-­‐‑existent) cross-­‐‑
complaint, all of which were denied. (ER128-­‐‑130). On February 11, 2013, 1130
LLC dismissed Mr. Haiem as a defendant in the interpleader proceedings (ER
130). As a result he was no longer a party to those proceedings.
The state trial court then on May 22, 2013 held a hearing on the issue of
distribution of the remaining funds which had been interpleaded and made
orders relating to distribution of the remaining funds which had been
interpleaded, allocating them to Hope Park and to Rosario Perry (ER 107-­‐‑108).
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That order was made over the vociferous objection of Mr. Thomas, on behalf
On May 14, 2013, more than six months after the state trial court had
dismissed Mr. Haiem’s cross-­‐‑complaint for failure to complete service, Mr.
Thomas filed a motion under California Code of Civil Procedure § 473, asking
that the court vacate its November 9, 2013 order dismissing Mr. Haiem’s
cross-­‐‑complaint. That motion was heard on December 4, 2013 (ER 131). Hope
Park pointed out that Code of Civil Procedure § 473 stated and states that an
application for relief under that code section was required to be made
“..within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the
judgment, dismissal, order or proceeding was taken” and that this time limit
was jurisdictional. At that December 4, 2013 hearing the trial court denied
Mr. Haiem’s motion on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction to grant the
motion, because it had not been filed within the six month jurisdictional time
limit of Code of Civil Procedure § 473 (ER 131-­‐‑132) i.e. had not been filed
within six months after November 9, 2012.
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On January 31, 2014 Mr. Thomas, as Mr. Haiem’s lawyer, filed a Notice
of Appeal stating that the appeal was taken as to orders filed on “12/4/13 and
5/22/13 (taken together)” and as to orders filed on “2/1/13 and 3/29/13 and
12/4/13 (taken together)” (ER 132). Hope Park moved to dismiss the appeal
as to the order made on February 1, 2013 on grounds it was untimely and as to
the order made on May 22, 2013 on the ground that Mr. Haiem was by that
time not a party to the trial court proceedings and so had no standing to
appeal the order made that date (ER 132). Both motions were granted (ER
132). The appeal filed on January 31, 2014 of the March 29, 2013 order was
likewise untimely, so that the only validly appealable order was the order
made on December 4, 2013 (ER 132).
The state Court of Appeal in its opinion dated April 27, 2015 affirmed
the ruling of the trial court (ER 125-­‐‑146). It noted that California case law is
very clear that the six month period for seeking relief under section 473 is
jurisdictional, and that the trigger date for the CCP § 473 “six month period”
is triggered by entry of the order in question rather than by service of notice of
entry. (ER 134-­‐‑135.) The Court of Appeal also rejected as without any basis the
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argument made by Mr. Thomas argument that the six month period should be
extended by the five-­‐‑day mail period under Code of Civil Procedure section
1013. (ER 136-­‐‑137.)
On October 24, 2014 (i.e. while that state court appeal was pending, and
almost six months before oral argument on that appeal took place) Hope Park
filed its motion for sanctions against Mr. Thomas and Mr. Haiem (ER 118).
On November 6, 2014 the state Court of Appeal ordered that “Respondents'ʹ
motion for sanctions will be considered in conjunction with the appeal.” (ER
118-­‐‑119). On March 9, 2015 the state Court of Appeal further ordered (ER 120)
“Good cause appearing, appellant Ray Haiem and his attorney Jeffrey
G. Thomas are hereby ordered to show cause before this court, when the
matter is on calendar for oral argument, why monetary sanctions should
not be imposed for prosecuting a frivolous appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., §
907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a); see In re Marriage of Flaherty
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650-­‐‑651.) Pursuant to California Rules of Court,
rule 8.276(d), appellant and counsel may serve and file a written
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opposition within 10 calendar days of the date of this order. Oral
argument on the issue of sanctions and the amount, if any, of sanctions,
will be held at the time of oral argument on the merits of the appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(e).)”
Oral argument took place on April 9, 2015 (ER 121). That date was close
to six months from the date that Hope Park had served its motion for
sanctions (October 24, 2014) and more than five months after the state Court
of Appeal had ordered that
“Respondents'ʹ motion for sanctions will be considered in conjunction
with the appeal.” (ER 118-­‐‑119).
At no time during the period between notice of motion for sanctions and
oral argument on same (or even after that point) did Mr. Thomas file any
opposition to the motion for sanctions or the order to show cause. The state
Court of Appeal issued its opinion and order some weeks later, on April 27,
2015. (ER 125-­‐‑146). It ordered Mr. Thomas (but not his client) to pay $58,650
to Hope Park (ER 146) as sanctions for bringing a frivolous appeal motivated
by a desire to harass Hope Park. The appellate court found that "ʺThomas’s
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approach toward this appeal and his unprofessional and at times outrageous
conduct toward counsel for Hope Park show not only that this appeal was
frivolous but that it was intended to harass Hope Park and to drive up its
litigation costs."ʺ (ER 139-­‐‑146.) The Court of Appeal found that Mr. Thomas’s
appeal demonstrated a “high degree of objective frivolousness"ʺ (ER 144) and
that it was prosecuted for an improper motive-­‐‑-­‐‑to harass Hope Park and to
increase its litigation costs. (ER 143.)
Mr. Thomas thereafter sought a rehearing in the Court of Appeal and
review by the California Supreme Court (ER 121). On May 15, 2015, his
Petition for a Rehearing was denied (ER 121). His Petition for Review in the
California Supreme Court was rejected as untimely. (AOB 23).
Mr. Thomas then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. That Petition was “rejected because the petition lacked an
order of the state supreme court denying review on the merits."ʺ (AOB 23.)
On August 31, 2016, Mr. Thomas filed the underlying federal district
court complaint against Honorable Laurie Zelon and Honorable Dennis
Perluss (two of the three Justices of the appellate panel which had
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unanimously issued the sanctions order), and against Hope Park, Norman
Solomon and Rosario Perry – ER 212-­‐‑302.
His major contention appears to be that 1130 LLC, which was the
plaintiff in the underlying interpleader proceedings, was a "ʺzombie"ʺ plaintiff
i.e. he asserts that 1130 LLC did not exist at the time that the state court action
was filed, and that as a result the state courts, including the state Court of
Appeal, had no power to enter any of the orders which they made, including
the order awarding sanctions against him.
Mr. Thomas’s complaint classifies the named defendants into two
classes: (a) judicial defendants and (b) conspiring defendants. His complaint
then asserts claims under 42 USC § 1983 based on claims of (1) denial of
substantive due process; (2) denial of access to the courts; (3) denial of the
right to free speech; (4) denial of equal protection; and (5) taking property
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (ER 212-­‐‑302).
His complaint further makes state law claims for unfair and fraudulent
business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code
section 17200 against defendants Gibson, Perry, Solomon, and Hope Park and
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makes state law claims seeking asking that the sanctions order of the state
Court of Appeal be declared void and that the federal courts issue an order
enjoining enforcement of the sanctions order (ER 212-­‐‑302).
Defendants Zelon, Perluss, Perry and Gibson responded to the federal
court complaint by filing motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-­‐‑Feldman doctrine and that the
Noerr-­‐‑Pennington doctrine and (in the case of Perry and Gibson) that California
Civil Code section 47(b) barred the action (see ER 318 item 37). Defendant
Gibson also filed a special motion to strike under California'ʹs anti-­‐‑SLAPP
The state Court of Appeal had already determined in its judgment, now
long since final, that Mr. Thomas’s conduct revealed “Thomas’s intent to
harass Hope Park and to drive up its costs in the hope of a settlement.”
(Opinion page 19, ER 299).
On January 17, 2017, Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Wistrich issued his 17-­‐‑
page Report and Recommendation to grant the motions to dismiss – ER 192-­‐‑
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211. The Report and Recommendation concluded that the Rooker-­‐‑Feldman
doctrine barred subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Thomas’s federal claims
against all defendants. Magistrate Judge Wistrich concluded that the Rooker-­‐‑
Feldman doctrine applied because Mr. Thomas’s claims amounted to an
impermissible collateral attack on the prior state Court of Appeal decision and
the District Court complaint was a "ʺde facto appeal"ʺ forbidden by the Rooker
Feldman doctrine. Given that conclusion the Magistrate Judge in his report also
recommended that supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff'ʹs state law claims
Judge Kronstadt accepted the Report and Recommendation and on
February 9, 2017 entered judgment dismissing the complaint without
prejudice (ER 3). Mr. Thomas had in fact filed timely objections to the Report
of Magistrate Judge Wistrich. Hence Judge Kronstadt, realizing that Mr.
Thomas had filed timely objections, reviewed the entire record in the case,
including the Report and Recommendations of Magistrate-­‐‑Judge Wistrich,
and issued an amended order on February 23, 2017, which again accepted the
Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Wistrich (ER 2).
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III. THOMAS’S CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST PERRY UNDER FRCP 12(b)(6)
Quite apart from the fatal jurisdictional problems with Thomas’s
lawsuit, the five civil rights claims fail to state a cause of action against Perry.
As the California Court of Appeal justices that were sued by Thomas are
protected by immunity, there can be no state action by Perry, and thus no
section 1983 liability for Perry under the Civil Rights act of 1871. This issue
was briefed by Perry below in Perry’s Motion to Dismiss, but the trial court
did not need to reach this issue, because the trial court dismissed the entire
action against Perry on jurisdictional grounds.
All five Section 1983 claims against Perry fail to state a cause action
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The five claims
for damages under Section 1983 against the justices would fail because the
defendant justices are absolutely immune from suits for money damages for
acts performed in their official capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.
Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (per curiam); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27,
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101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075
(9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
Additionally, "ʺ[t]he judicial or quasi-­‐‑judicial immunity available to
[judicial] officers is not limited to immunity from damages, but extends to
actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief."ʺ Moore v.
Brewster, 96 F. 3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting Mullis v. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486
U.S. 1040, 108 S. Ct. 2031, 100 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1988).
Thomas makes no factual allegation supporting any contention that
Perry was a state actor, or that he acted under color of law, so all of Perry’s
alleged liability under Section 1983 hinges on the alleged “conspiracy” with
the justices from Court of Appeal to have sanctions entered against Plaintiff.
(Complaint ¶¶ 13, 25 & 38).
But with the elimination of the defendant justices from this case due to
their immunity, plaintiff'ʹs conspiracy claims against Perry could not stand
independently under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Haldane v. Chagnon, 345
F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Haldane v. Ruppe, 435 F.2d 647 (9th Cir.
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1970). Perry is not alleged to be a state officer acting under color of law, and
he did not act in conspiracy with any state officers (i.e., the justices) against
whom plaintiff Thomas could state a valid claim, due to their immunity. (Id.)
With the justices removed from the equation, all that Thomas’s
Complaint (and the exhibits attached to his complaint) allege is that
Defendant Perry was an opposing litigant in Thomas’s frivolous appeal, and
that Perry “agreed to support” a successful motion for sanctions against
Thomas based on that frivolous appeal. Thomas cites no case in which a
litigant’s conduct in resisting an appeal, and then “agreeing to support” a
motion for sanctions against the attorney prosecuting that frivolous appeal,
has been held to convert that litigant into a “state actor” for the purposes of a
Indeed, holding that Perry was a “state actor” for the purposes of
section 1983 liability would render all litigants in the United States “state
actors” for the purposes of section 1983 liability. Perry is not alleged to be a
state officer acting under color of law—it is undisputed that he was merely a
party in an interpleader action-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑and he did not act in conspiracy with any
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state officers (i.e., the justices) against whom plaintiff Thomas could state a
valid claim. The untenable nature of Plaintiff’s section 1983 conspiracy claims
were also discussed extensively by the Central District of California in Reddy
v. Superior & Mun. Court of Cal., No. SA CV 97-­‐‑923 AHS (SH), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24102, at * 11-­‐‑13 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 1998). The five Section 1983 claims
against Rosario Perry must fail for failure to state a cause of action, and must
be dismissed in any event, regardless of the jurisdictional problems with those
The trial court’s order dismissing Thomas’s action should be affirmed.
DATE: January 16, 2018 /s/ Rosario Perry
Attorney for Defendant and Appellees
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CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 27(d)(2)(A) AND NINTH CIRCUIT RULE 27-­‐‑
In compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(d)(2)(A) and
Ninth Circuit Rule 27-­‐‑1(1)(d), I certify that this brief of Rosario Perry was
prepared in a proportionally spaced 14-­‐‑point font, that the brief was produced
using a word processing program (Microsoft Word), and that the WordCount
feature of that program stated that the brief contains 3,675 words.
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DOCKET NO. 17-­‐‑55404
the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by
using the appellate CM/ECF system on January _17_, 2018.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served
I further certify my understanding that appellant Jeffrey Gray Thomas is
not registered as a CM/ECF user. I have mailed the foregoing document to Mr.
Thomas at his address stated below by First-­‐‑Class Mail, postage prepaid
Jeffrey G. Thomas Esq.
201 Wilshire Boulevard, Second Floor
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