Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/449/682/521033/
Timestamp: 2020-08-07 05:07:13
Document Index: 798150814

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', 'art, 343']

David Gene Morris, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Christy Powell, et al., Defendants-appellees, 449 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2006) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 2006 › David Gene Morris, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Christy Powell, et al., Defendants-appellees
David Gene Morris, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Christy Powell, et al., Defendants-appellees, 449 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2006)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 449 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2006) May 15, 2006
The defendants' first motion for summary judgment was denied on March 28, 2003. The district court found that disputed issues of material fact existed as to whether the transfer of Morris to different work assignments, and eventually to another prison, was a retaliatory response to his complaints against Powell. The defendants' motion for reconsideration was denied, and an appeal to this court followed. We remanded for consideration of whether an inmate's retaliation claim must allege more than a de minimis adverse act. Morris v. Powell, 114 Fed.Appx. 629 (5th Cir. 2004).
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as does a district court. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 106 F.3d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that there is no issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Martinez v. Bally's La., Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2001).
A prison official may not retaliate against or harass an inmate for complaining through proper channels about a guard's misconduct. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995). "To prevail on a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant's intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation." McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998).
We must interpret the third prong of this test. The state argues that the district court correctly determined that acts of retaliation so inconsequential as to be considered de minimis do not satisfy the "retaliatory adverse act" requirement. Morris argues that any act of retaliation, however minor, is an actionable violation of an inmate's constitutional rights. He cites Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that a violation of constitutional rights is never de minimis. The question, however, is not whether the violation of Morris's constitutional rights was de minimis, but whether any violation occurred at all. To establish a constitutional violation, an inmate must show that he suffered a qualifying adverse retaliatory act. If the retaliation alleged by Morris does not pass this bar, he has suffered no constitutional injury.
In Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1999), we affirmed the dismissal of a claim alleging that the inmate had been restricted to five hours a week in the law library in retaliation for filing grievances. Although retaliatory intent was properly alleged, the inmate's claim failed because the retaliatory adverse acts did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Similarly, in Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1986), we upheld a dismissal, writing that "a single incident, involving a minor sanction, is insufficient to prove [retaliatory] harassment." Thus, without explicitly applying a de minimis test, this court has refused to recognize retaliation claims based only on allegations of insignificant retaliatory acts.1
When confronted with more serious allegations of retaliation, however, we have not hesitated to recognize the legitimacy of an inmate's claim. In Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 2003), we reversed summary judgment dismissing a retaliation claim where the alleged adverse act was twenty-seven days of commissary and cell restrictions. Although we declined to adopt such a test, we noted that "the penalties imposed on Hart do not qualify as `de minimis' under various standards cited by other circuits."
Likewise, in Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1992), we held that retaliation in the form of transferring the inmate to a more violent section of the prison was sufficient to support a retaliation claim. In Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1248 (5th Cir. 1989), we overturned summary judgment where an inmate alleged that he had been transferred to a less desirable job within the prison in retaliation for filing grievances. The inmate, who had worked in a light labor job, was moved for forty-seven days to a job that subjected him to extreme hardship and serious health risks.2
As we acknowledged in Hart, other circuits have provided persuasive guidance on the quantum of retaliation necessary to support an inmate's § 1983 claim.3 The District of Columbia Circuit has held that an inmate's retaliation claim must allege adverse acts that "would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities." Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 574, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 140 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1998). That reasoning was left undisturbed when the Supreme Court vacated the decision. The Court wrote: "The reason why such retaliation (for the exercise of First Amendment rights) offends the Constitution is that it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n. 10, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 140 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1998). See also Hartman v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, at ___, 126 S. Ct. 1695, at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 2006 WL 1082843, at *4 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2006). The Sixth Circuit later held that the D.C. Circuit's Crawford-El standard "is the appropriate standard by which to determine what type of action is sufficiently adverse to be cognizable in a retaliation claim under § 1983." Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 397 (6th Cir. 1999).
In adopting this standard, the Sixth and D.C. Circuits based their reasoning on the Seventh Circuit's rejection, in the employment retaliation context, of de minimis retaliation claims: "It would trivialize the First Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from that exercise. . . ." Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit has employed a similar de minimis standard, asking whether the retaliation alleged by an inmate rose to the level of that which would deter the exercise of a constitutional right. See Davidson v. Chestnut, 193 F.3d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1999).
The de minimis standard enunciated by our sister circuits is consistent with this court's precedent. The standard achieves the proper balance between the need to recognize valid retaliation claims and the danger of "federal courts embroil [ing] themselves in every disciplinary act that occurs in state penal institutions." Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. The purpose of allowing inmate retaliation claims under § 1983 is to ensure that prisoners are not unduly discouraged from exercising constitutional rights. See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 588 n. 10, 118 S. Ct. 1584. Some acts, though maybe motivated by retaliatory intent, are so de minimis that they would not deter the ordinary person from further exercise of his rights. Such acts do not rise to the level of constitutional violations and cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim.
We disagree. Transfer to a more dangerous prison is a much more serious retaliatory act than what has been considered de minimis in other circuits. We have held that transfer to a more dangerous section of the same prison is a sufficiently adverse retaliatory act to support a § 1983 claim. See Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1992). There is no doubt that transfer to a more dangerous prison as a penalty for the exercise of constitutional rights has the potential to deter the inmate from the future exercise of those rights. Accordingly, Morris's prison transfer claim meets the de minimis threshold, and summary judgment should not have been granted on that claim.
The defendants assert qualified immunity. The initial two-part inquiry facing a court deciding a qualified immunity claim is (1) whether the violation of a constitutional right been alleged and, if so, (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). These defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the job transfer claim because there is no cognizable constitutional violation. On the prison transfer claim, however, the violation of a constitutional right has been properly alleged. Any further inquiry into the qualified immunity issue is not properly before this court. If the defendants wish to establish qualified immunity as to the prison transfer claim, they must ask the district court for a ruling.
In the context of claims by state employees alleging retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights, we require "more than a trivial [retaliatory] act to establish constitutional harm."Pierce v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, Institutional Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1994). Although the law on inmates' retaliation claims follows a different line of cases, we note that to uphold inmate retaliation claims in cases where only trivial retaliation is alleged, as Morris urges, would effectively elevate the constitutional rights of inmates over those of government employees.
The Jackson court described the job to which the inmate in that case was moved in retaliation for writing grievance letters:
See Hart, 343 F.3d at 764 (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 396 (6th Cir. 1999)).