Source: http://openjurist.org/print/206956
Timestamp: 2014-12-20 18:15:17
Document Index: 173477517

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 843', '§ 841', '§ 843', '§ 846']

594 F2d 1330 United States v. Watson
594 F2d 1330 United States v. Watson 594 F.2d 1330
4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1440
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Earl WATSON, Tony Maxwell and Mae Lillian Brown,Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 77-1575 to 77-1577.
Feb. 15, 1979.Rehearing Denied April 27, 1979.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 1, 1979.
Joel L. Wohlgemuth of Prichard, Norman, Reed & Wohlgemuth, Tulsa, Okl., for defendants-appellants.
Kenneth P. Snoke, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tulsa, Okl. (Hubert H. Bryant, U. S. Atty., Tulsa, Okl., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendants-appellants Watson, Maxwell, and Brown have taken these timely direct appeals from convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 846, conspiracy to commit offenses defined in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),1 (distributing or possessing with intent to distribute, etc., a controlled substance) and in 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), (use of a communication facility to facilitate the commission of offenses defined in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1))2 and from convictions of each appellant of a substantive offense under § 843(b) of such use of a telephone. Appellants' major contentions are that tape recordings of intercepted telephone conversations and transcripts thereof were improperly permitted to be used against them, that there was insufficient proof to support their convictions, and that there was, in any event, no single conspiracy proved as charged. Several other arguments are also made, and we will discuss all those having some substance.
The indictment charged fifteen individuals, including appellants, with conspiracy knowingly and intentionally to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin and cocaine, and to use a telephone to facilitate commission of such offenses. In addition, appellants were each charged with one count of knowingly and intentionally using a communications facility, I. e., a telephone, to facilitate the accomplishment of and to accomplish the possession with intent to distribute and the distribution of heroin and cocaine. The conspiracy involved a California supplier, "Pete" Anderson, a Tulsa wholesaler, John Thompson, assisted by one Karen Brooks, and several retailers or street dealers, including appellants Watson, Maxwell, and Brown.
Appellants claim there was insufficient evidence in this case to support their convictions. Viewing all the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government, as we must, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; United States v. Krohn, 573 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir.), Cert. denied sub nomine Hahn v. United States, 436 U.S. 949, 98 S.Ct. 2857, 56 L.Ed.2d 792; United States v. Twilligear, 460 F.2d 79, 81-82 (10th Cir.), we must disagree with this contention. Yet, since appellants have challenged the admission in evidence of certain tape recordings of telephone intercepts, and since without those recordings the evidence might not support the adverse jury verdicts rendered, we turn first to a consideration of the various issues involving the use of those tapes.
* Appellants Brown and Watson strenuously argue that there was error in not suppressing tape recordings of certain intercepted telephone communications, in not suppressing transcripts of certain intercepted phone communications, and in permitting transcripts of the tape recordings of the telephone conversations to be used by the jurors.2a
The admission of tape recordings in evidence is subject to the rules of evidence generally. This means that a proper foundation must be laid for their admission, and that they must be relevant and not privileged. In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that the original tape recordings be used, if possible,3 Rule 1002, and that when telephone conversations are involved, evidence be offered as to the correct telephone number, Rule 901(b)(6).4 Appellants here make several specific challenges to the foundation laid for playing of the tapes which we will consider.
First, appellant Brown argues that there was improper and inadequate identification of the speakers on certain tapes for which agent Bell provided the voice identification. This challenge is based on the claim that agent Bell did not have sufficient opportunity to become acquainted with appellant Brown's voice in order to authenticate tapes introduced at trial. Furthermore, it is claimed that agent Bell's familiarity with Brown's voice was developed after the conversations in question transpired.
Rule 901(b)(5), F.R.E., provides one example of acceptable voice identification as follows:
(5) Voice identification. Identification of voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice At any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. (emphasis added).
As the Rule plainly says, familiarity with another's voice may be acquired either before or after the particular speaking which is the subject of the identification. United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1277 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2971, 53 L.Ed.2d 1091. Thus, the fact that Bell did not speak with appellant Brown until after the date of the telephone intercept did not prevent him from authenticating Brown's voice on a tape introduced at trial. See, E. g., United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir.), Cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 1783, 32 L.Ed.2d 136. Furthermore, we find that the record reflects that Bell had ample time in which to become acquainted with Brown's voice. He had face-to-face conversations with her on three occasions, and one of these conversations extended over half an hour. (II R. 216-17; IV R. 440). Any doubts about Bell's powers of recall were properly questions for the jury to determine. See United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 865 (3d Cir.); United States v. Rizzo, 492 F.2d 443, 448 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 417 U.S. 944, 94 S.Ct. 3069, 41 L.Ed.2d 665. We reject appellant Brown's argument based on United States v. McKeever, 169 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.), Rev'd on other grounds,271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.), that the court improperly gave the authentication question to the jury. The trial judge properly took evidence on the threshold question whether Bell had Any basis for identifying the voice and then left all questions of weight and credibility for the jury.
Second, all appellants challenge the use of the tapes on the ground of unintelligibility. Where a tape recording is objected to as unintelligible or inaudible, its admissibility is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir.); United States v. Jones, 540 F.2d 465, 470 (10th Cir.), Cert. denied,429 U.S. 1101, 97 S.Ct. 1125, 51 L.Ed.2d 551; United States v. Hodges, 480 F.2d 229, 233-34 (10th Cir.). Unless the unintelligible portions are so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy, it may be admitted. United States v. Jones, supra, 540 F.2d at 470. The trial judge held a pre-trial hearing5 at which he considered the issue of intelligibility and exercised his discretion on this issue. From our independent hearing of the tapes we conclude that there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion and no substantial unintelligibility productive of untrustworthiness.
Third, appellants argue that it was prejudicial error to provide the jury with transcripts of the tapes during the playing of the tapes. See generally United States v. Gerry, 515 F.2d 130, 143-44 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (use of transcripts upheld because trial judge had difficulty understanding them). Proof was offered of accuracy of the transcripts at a pre-trial hearing,6 and the court permitted their use during the playing of the tapes to permit clear identification of the voices.7 The trial judge, however, did not admit the transcripts in evidence. Instead he gave a limiting instruction, which he repeated several times during the trial, instructing the jury to use the transcripts only to assist them in listening to the tapes and not to consider the transcripts as evidence. In the sound discretion of the trial judge, which was properly exercised here, such limited use of transcripts is permissible. See United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134, 1141 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied,421 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1948, 44 L.Ed.2d 448; United States v. McMillan,508 F.2d 101, 105 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct. 1577, 43 L.Ed.2d 782.
We have considered all the contentions regarding the playing of the tapes and the use of the transcripts and are satisfied there was no reversible error. Our hearing of the tapes persuades us that they are substantially accurate and intelligible and that the transcripts are substantially accurate as well. Therefore, with respect to the rights of these three appellants there was no prejudicial error and no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the procedure followed regarding the tapes and the transcripts.8
With respect to their convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 846, all three appellants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. More specifically, appellants contend that the evidence fell far short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that each of them had the deliberate, knowing and specific intent to join the conspiracy charged; and that, while viewed in the light most favorable to the government the evidence showed several telephone conversations with Thompson, that proof alone was insufficient to connect appellants with the conspiracy charged. (Brief for the Appellants, Proposition VI, pp. 31, 37-38).
The basic rule for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction challenged on appeal is stated by Judge Hill in United States v. Twilligear, 460 F.2d 79, 81-82 (10th Cir.):
This court is bound to view the evidence presented in the trial court in the light most favorable to the government to ascertain if there is sufficient substantial proof, direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, from which a jury might find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Of course, guilt is individual and personal, even as regards conspiracies, and is not a matter of mass application. United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir.). And we agree that proof of the existence of a buyer-seller relationship, without more, is inadequate to tie the buyer to a larger conspiracy such as is charged here. See United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1123 (2d Cir.); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1342 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439. Moreover for a single act to be sufficient to draw an actor within the ambit of a conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws, there must be independent evidence tending to prove that the defendant had some knowledge of the broader conspiracy, or the single act must be one from which such knowledge may be inferred. United States v. Sperling, supra, 506 F.2d at 1342. For the inference of intent to join a conspiracy to be made from proof of a single act, it must be such as to show the actor's knowledge of the existence and scope of the conspiracy, and his belief that the benefit to be derived from his actions depends on the success of the acts of others. United States v. Perry,550 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir.).
A primary government witness was Karen Brooks, an indicted coconspirator. She had waived a jury and was awaiting trial and cooperated with the government in giving her testimony. On cross-examination she stated that it was her understanding that the charges might be dismissed against her or that she might receive probation if she testified. She said this was what her attorney hoped would happen. If she had not had that impression, she admitted she probably would not have testified against the defendants. (III R. 310-315).
Brooks testified that she had known John Hubert Thompson ("J.T."), the Tulsa wholesaler in this drug operation, for nine months. She distributed heroin and cocaine for him and had a telephone installed at his residence in her name. When business was good, Brooks would normally sell "pretty close" to $2,000 worth of heroin and cocaine in a day in quantities priced at $50. (Id. at 289). She worked as a street dealer, turning over the bulk of her proceeds to Thompson, but when he was away she would handle larger transactions for him. She testified that she knew "Pete" Anderson, the California supplier, and that Thompson got his "dope" through Anderson. (Id. at 303). She referred to various street dealers in her testimony, including all three of the appellants.
Brooks testified that she knew Watson and could identify him; that she had been present when Thompson sold heroin to Watson; that she had delivered heroin to Watson for Thompson and that once Watson told her he had several people waiting in the car for "dope." She knew Watson was a user of drugs himself. Brooks further testified that she knew Maxwell; that if she ran out of heroin or cocaine, she would refer her customers to him; that she sold heroin to Maxwell when Thompson was away; and that Maxwell distributed drugs. Brooks also testified that she knew appellant Bro