Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99391/mckinney-vs-missouri-kansas-texas-r-co
Timestamp: 2018-01-20 05:35:39
Document Index: 180949087

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 459', '§ 153', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9']

Mckinney Vs Missouri Kansas Texas R Co - Citation 99391 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Mckinney Vs. Missouri-kansas-texas R. Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/99391
Case Number 357 U.S. 265
Respondent Missouri-kansas-texas R. Co.
.....to the procedure set forth in rule 10 of the collective bargaining agreement, bulletined two group 1 positions to be filled. on september 8, 1952, the group 1 position of bill clerk was bulletined, and a nonemployee assigned to it on september 15. on september 10, 1952, the group 1 position of assistant cashier was bulletined, and a nonemployee assigned to it on september 22. petitioner was separated from the military service on september 25, 1952, and, on october 1 applied for reemployment with respondent. he was placed in the group 1 position of assistant cashier with a group 1 seniority date of october 7, 1952. subsequently this position was abolished, and petitioner reduced to a group 2 position. respondent refused to allow petitioner to exercise claimed seniority rights to.....
McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. - 357 U.S. 265 (1958)
U.S. Supreme Court McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 357 U.S. 265 (1958)
Under § 9 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, petitioner, who had been promoted by respondent railroad to an advanced position upon his return from military service, though, under the collective bargaining agreement between his union and the railroad, such promotion depended on fitness and ability, was not entitled to seniority in his new position from the date he would have had the opportunity to qualify for it had he remained in the continuous employment of the railroad. Pp. 357 U. S. 266 -274.
(a) Before bringing suit under § 9(d) of the Act, petitioner was not obliged to pursue remedies possibly available under the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement or before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Pp. 357 U. S. 268 -270.
(b) Since promotion to the higher position in this case was not automatic, but was dependent on fitness and ability, petitioner received a promotion which was not required under the Act, and respondent was not obliged to give him a seniority date earlier than that to which any employee similarly promoted would have been entitled. Pp. 357 U. S. 270 -273.
(c) Because his complaint was dismissed and he had no opportunity to prove that, by custom and practice under the collective bargaining agreement, he would necessarily have been promoted to the new position had he remained continuously in respondent's employ, petitioner is granted leave to amend his complaint to allege, if such be the fact, that, in actual practice under the collective bargaining agreement, his promotion was automatic. Pp. 357 U. S. 273 -274.
In the District Court, petitioner contended that the group 1 seniority date assigned him on reemployment, October 7, 1952, was erroneous, and that, under § 9 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, supra, he was entitled to a seniority date of September 8 or September 10, 1952, the dates on which, if he had then been employed by respondent, he could have applied for the
The Court of Appeals correctly held that petitioner was not obliged, before bringing suit in the District Court under § 9(d) of the Act, 62 Stat. 616, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. (Supp. V) § 459(d), to pursue remedies possibly available under the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement or before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. See 48 Stat. 1189-1193, 45 U.S.C. § 153. The rights petitioner asserts are rights created by federal statute, even though their determination may necessarily involve interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Although the statute does not itself create a seniority system, but accepts that set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, it requires the application of the principles of that system in a manner that will not deprive the veteran of the benefits, in terms of restoration to position and advancement in status, for which Congress has provided. Petitioner sues not simply as an employee under a collective
For the effective protection of these distinctively federal rights, Congress provided in § 9(d) [ Footnote 1 ] of the Act that, if any employer fails to comply with the provisions of the statute, the District Court, upon the filing of a petition by a person entitled to the benefits of the Act, has jurisdiction to compel compliance and to compensate for loss of wages. The court is enjoined to order speedy hearing
Section 9 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, on which petitioner relies, requires that a returning veteran who has been separated from the service under the conditions set forth in the statute be restored by his employer to his former position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay. He is not to be disadvantaged by serving his country. Section 9(c) (1) states that he shall be restored "without loss of seniority." [ Footnote 2 ]
In Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275 , 328 U. S. 284 -285, and Oakley v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 338 U. S. 278 , 338 U. S. 283 , the same provision in an earlier Act was interpreted to mean that a returning veteran does not step back at the exact point he left his employment, but rather is entitled to
338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 283 . This interpretation is now embodied in § 9(c)(2) of the present Act. [ Footnote 3 ]
However, § 9(c) does not guarantee the returning serviceman a perfect reproduction of the civilian employment that might have been his if he had not been called to the colors. Much there is that might have flowed from experience, effort, or chance to which he cannot lay claim under the statute. Section 9(c) does not assure him that
Thus, on application for reemployment, a veteran is not entitled to demand that he be assigned a position higher than that he formerly held when promotion to such a position depends, not simply on seniority or some other form of automatic progression, but on the exercise of discretion on the part of the employer. On his return from service, petitioner in the present case could not have demanded under the statute that respondent place him in any group 1 position. Promotion to a group 1 position from group 2, in which petitioner had formerly been employed, is not dependent simply on seniority. Under Rule 1(3)(A) of the collective bargaining agreement, it is dependent on fitness and ability and the exercise of a discriminating managerial choice. Collective bargaining agreements that include such familiar provisions are presupposed by the statute, and it is in their context that it must be placed. See Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 , 337 U. S. 527 . Petitioner was not entitled to a group 1 position simply because, in his absence, it had been bulletined, and, if he had then been employed, he might have applied for it, and respondent might have found that he possessed the requisite fitness and ability. The statute does not envisage overriding an employer's discretionary choice by any such mandatory promotion.
Petitioner argues that, because the complaint was summarily dismissed on motion, he did not have the opportunity to prove that, by custom and practice under the collective bargaining agreement, he would necessarily have been assigned to the group 1 position of bill clerk or assistant cashier had he remained continuously in respondent's employ. He states that interpretation and practice by the parties to an agreement are frequently the most reliable bases for determining rights claimed to