Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/331/132/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-07-19 14:36:24
Document Index: 547263412

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 47', '§ 212', '§ 266', '§ 380', '§ 266', '§ 266']

AYRSHIRE COLLIERIES CORP V. UNITED STATES, 331 U. S. 132 - Volume 331 - 1947 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 331 > AYRSHIRE COLLIERIES CORP V. UNITED STATES, 331 U. S. 132 (1947) > Full Text
The complaints requested that the court convene a specially constituted court of three judges, as required by the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 220, 28 U.S.C. § 47, to hear the motions "for a temporary or interlocutory injunction and for final hearing in this proceeding." Circuit Judge Evans and District
This requirement, of course, is necessarily technical. It is not a broad social measure to be construed with liberality. It is a technical rule of procedure, to be applied as such. See Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 312 U. S. 250-
It is significant that this Act makes no provision for a quorum of less than three judges. Two judges of a three-judge circuit court of appeals, on the other hand, ordinarily constitute a statutory quorum for the hearing and determination of cases. [Footnote 4] 28 U.S.C. § 212. The absence of such a quorum provision as to three-judge district courts is a strong corroborating indication that participation by all three judges is necessary to render a valid decision.
It is suggested, however, that the three-judge requirement applies only to applications for interlocutory injunctions
against the enforcement of Interstate Commerce Commission orders, and, since the decision in this case was one denying a permanent injunction, no complaint can be made that the decision was rendered by less than three judges. Reference is made in this respect to § 266 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 380, which deals with injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes or state administrative orders on the ground of unconstitutionality of the statute involved. Prior to 1925, that section indicated that a three-judge court was necessary only to pass upon applications for interlocutory injunctions. A single judge had jurisdiction to hear the cause on final hearing and to grant or deny a permanent injunction, thereby permitting him to reconsider and decide questions already passed upon by the three judges on the application for an interlocutory injunction. To end that anomalous situation, an amendment was added by the Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 938, to the effect that "The requirement respecting the presence of three judges shall also apply to the final hearing in such suit in the district court." The problem then arose as to whether the words "such suit" in this amendment referred only to a suit in which an interlocutory injunction was in fact sought, or to a suit in which it might have been, but was not, requested. A series of decisions by this Court has made it clear that the former interpretation is the correct one. A three-judge court must be convened for final hearings on applications for permanent injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes only where an interlocutory injunction has been sought and pressed to a hearing. Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 272 U. S. 317; Smith v. Wilson, 273 U. S. 388; Public Service Commission v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 289 U. S. 67; McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419. Where an interlocutory injunction is not
Unlike § 266 of the Judicial Code, there is no reference here to "such suit" -- to a suit where an interlocutory injunction is sought and pressed. Rather, there is an unambiguous reference to the final hearing of "any suit" brought to enjoin the enforcement of a Commission order. That can only mean any suit seeking permanent relief, regardless of whether interlocutory relief is also requested. And, since "the same requirement as to judges" is to apply to the final hearing of any suit, three judges must hear and determine the matter.
Time and again, this Court has referred to the three-judge court requirement under this Act without making the distinction which has been made under § 266 of the Judicial Code. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U. S. 377, 258 U. S. 381-382; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 781, 279 U. S. 784-785; United States v. Griffin, supra, 303 U. S. 232-233. Indeed, without passing upon the precise problem, this Court has affirmed judgments of three-judge district courts which had granted permanent injunctions in cases where no interlocutory injunctions had been sought or pressed. See, e.g., United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105. And see Hudson & Manhattan R. Co. v. United States, 28 F.Supp. 137, 140.
The language and background of the Act, which have been augmented by the consistent understanding of this Court, [Footnote 5] thus combine to require the use of a three-judge district court in all cases in which a permanent or interlocutory injunction is sought against the enforcement of a Commission order. It matters not in a particular case whether an interlocutory injunction is requested or whether, if such relief is asked, the application is pressed to a hearing. This Act seeks to guard against more than an improvident issuance of interlocutory injunctions by single judges; it also seeks to prevent single judges from
In Ohio v. United States, 6 F.Supp. 386, aff'd, 392 U. S. 392 U.S. 498, a case under the Urgent Deficiencies Act was argued before a court of three judges, all of whom participated in the discussions leading to a determination of the case. One of the judges died before the decision was announced. An opinion written by the judge who died was found among his papers after his death, and was published as the opinion of the court, concurred in by the other two judges. The opinion had been written pursuant to an arrangement made at a prior conference of the three judges. The findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were filed some time after the opinion, were signed only by the two surviving judges. The matter, however, was not raised by the parties on appeal, and was not considered or decided by this Court. The mere fact that the case was entertained by this Court is no basis for considering it as authoritative on the jurisdictional issue, it being the firm policy of this Court not to recognize the exercise of jurisdiction as precedent where the issue was ignored. United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 7 U. S. 172; Snow v. United States, 118 U. S. 346, 118 U. S. 354-355; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, 146 U. S. 87; Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U. S. 225, 191 U. S. 236; Arant v. Lane, 245 U. S. 166, 245 U. S. 170.