Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19810908_0040231.C07.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-11 00:50:48
Document Index: 525010487

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2041', '§ 49', '§ 653', '§ 2050', '§ 2050', '§ 2050', '§ 2050', '§ 2050']

decided: September 8, 1981.
GUADALUPE F. ALVAREZ, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, CROSS-APPELLEES,v.JOAN OF ARC, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, CROSS-APPELLANT .
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 78 C 1250 -- Robert D. Morgan, Judge .
Before Cummings, Chief Judge, Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge,*fn* and Bauer, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Guadalupe Alvarez and all other members of the plaintiff class*fn1 are Spanish-speaking migrant farmworkers. In April 1978 they traveled from Texas to Illinois to work for defendant Joan of Arc, Inc. (sometimes "Company") harvesting asparagus. Plaintiffs claim that Joan of Arc violated the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act ("FLCRA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041 et seq., the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 49 et seq., and Illinois contract law. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs on only one of plaintiffs' three counts. It is from this judgment which plaintiffs appeal and Joan of Arc cross-appeals. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm.*fn2
Joan of Arc is a corporation doing business in Princeville, Illinois, growing, harvesting, and canning vegetables. The Company employs migrant seasonal workers as needed. Joan of Arc obtains some of its workers through participation in the Interstate Recruitment System established by the Wagner-Peyser Act. Pursuant to the requirements of that Act, defendant filed a clearance order with the Illinois State Employment Service in February 1978 specifying, inter alia, the number of workers needed, the period of employment, and the type of work to be done. See 20 C.F.R. § 653.108(c)(2) & (d).
"Defendant's clearance order accurately represented that its housing facilities had been approved in 1977 and that approval for the 1978 season would be obtained. It did not represent that no problems would arise during the period of occupancy, nor that on any particular day during the period of occupancy an investigator would find every facet of its facilities in perfect order. Its good faith effort to correct deficiencies as the same came to its attention should not be penalized."*fn3
Since the farm laborers in this case alleged damages for violations of various provisions of the FLCRA and the district judge found merit in their claim that Joan of Arc failed to register as a farm labor contractor, they were persons "claiming to be aggrieved" within § 2050a(a) and therefore had standing to sue. Since he also justifiably found that Joan of Arc's violation of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act was merely "a harmless technical violation" (App. 17), Judge Morgan was plainly entitled to award each class member liquidated damages below the statutory maximum $500 apiece. This would be absolutely clear if the penultimate comma were absent from § 2050a(b), supra, p. 5. We should not let that solecism interfere with the Congressional intent. As shown in the pertinent Senate Report, the court is to "award (liquidated) damages up to $500 for each violation * * *."*fn4
The fallacy inherent in the Espinoza construction of § 2050a(b) becomes patent through a simple example: if each member of the class suffered only $10 in actual damages, the district court could nevertheless award each class member $500 in liquidated damages! Moreover, even though the district judge characterized defendant's violation as "intentional" (App.17) as required by the opening clause of § 2050a(b), the record offers no support for a specific intent finding and Judge Morgan found defendant not "culpable" (ibid.). In fact, as noted, the district judge properly characterized the violation as a "harmless technical" one*fn5 and consequently in the absence of actual damages he awarded only $100 to each of the estimated 300-320*fn6 in the class. On the other hand the award would have been at least $150,000 to plaintiffs under the obligatory $500 per person Espinoza rule, again illustrating that properly construed, the statutory language really means "up to $500 for each violation" instead of $500.
Although no specific intent of defendant to violate the FLCRA was found, the term "intentional" in Section 2050a(b) means conscious or deliberate and does not require a specific intent to violate the law. De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 68, 79 (C.D.Ill.1981). The record supports the district court's finding of an intentional violation in that sense.
Therefore we hold that an award of liquidated damages in the present case was authorized by § 2050a(b) and that the amount thereof was within the latitude accorded to the district court by that provision.*fn7