Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-birdwell
Timestamp: 2019-12-10 23:21:01
Document Index: 484286566

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2113', '§ 4205', '§ 2255', 'art. 51']

U.S. v. Birdwell, 887 F.2d 643 | Casetext
U.S. v. Birdwell
887 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1989)
U.S.v.Birdwell
Typical of the first pattern is Brunelle v. United States, 864 F.2d 64, 65 (8th Cir. 1988), where despite an…
Such a plea is also necessarily subject to collateral attack under § 2255. "A guilty plea, if induced by…
No. 88-4652. Summary Calendar.
November 8, 1989. Rehearing Denied December 5, 1989.
David Andrew Birdwell moved to vacate his guilty plea conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming that his plea agreement was breached and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed his petition. We affirm the dismissal on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but for the reasons assigned vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact on the plea agreement issue.
On July 30, 1985 Birdwell and his attorney agreed to and signed a Memorandum of Understanding which incorporated the terms of a plea agreement between Birdwell and the federal prosecutor. Birdwell agreed to waive indictment and accept a charge via information, and to waive venue and plead guilty under Fed.R.Crim.P. 20 to federal bank robbery charges, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). In return, the federal prosecutor agreed to recommend a 20-year sentence. The Memorandum included more, however. Albeit with a notation that it was not intended to be binding on state authorities, the Memorandum incorporated a letter from the district attorney of Smith County, Texas, extending to Birdwell an opportunity to plead guilty to the sole state charge of aggravated kidnapping, in connection with the bank robbery, for which he would receive a prison term no greater than and to run concurrent with the 20-year federal sentence.
After receiving an extended statement by Birdwell, and comments by his counsel, the court examined Birdwell about the offense and his past record, as reflected in his written confession and in the presentence investigation which had, by agreement, been prepared in advance of the plea. The court then sentenced Birdwell to 20 years imprisonment, doing so pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2). There was no appeal of either the conviction or sentence or of a subsequent denial of a motion for modification of sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35.
As a statement of law, Birdwell's first contention has validity. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), the Supreme Court held that if a prisoner's guilty plea is based "in any significant degree" on a prosecutor's promise which reasonably may be said to be part of the consideration for the agreement, that promise must be fulfilled. 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499. The breaking of such a promise may be grounds for vacating a conviction or granting other relief under section 2255. See Smith v. Blackburn, 785 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kerdachi, 756 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1985).
We cannot make that factual determination on the record before us, nor should we make that factual assessment in the first instance. That determination must be made by the district court. Under the mandate of section 2255, the district court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law unless the motion, files, and record "conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Friedman v. United States, 588 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1979).
Fuller factual development of the record is necessary, and it is possible that an evidentiary hearing will be required. When a petitioner's habeas claim is based on an unkept promise in a plea agreement, and his petition contains "specific factual allegations, not directly contradicted in the record, of circumstances undermining his plea," an evidentiary hearing is warranted. United States v. Dabdoub-Diaz, 599 F.2d 96, 100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878, 100 S.Ct. 164, 62 L.Ed.2d 107 (1979). See United States v. Raetzsch, 781 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fuller, 769 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1985).
The case before us presents such a situation. The state offer/promise was an essential element of Birdwell's guilty plea. The record before us reflects that the two state criminal charges against Birdwell were lodged pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Birdwell appears to have agreed to the transfer to Texas from federal custody for the purpose of the disposition of the state charges. Counsel was appointed to represent Birdwell in the state proceedings and he filed motions seeking dismissal of the state charges. The state authorities apparently considered counsel's action to be a breach of the state component of the federal plea agreement, freeing the state to prosecute both charges. Birdwell and his state-appointed counsel apparently considered that the delay in attempting to arrange for and effectuating Birdwell's transfer from federal to state custody to dispose of the state charges constituted a breach by the state of the agreement, at least to the extent of authorizing Birdwell's motions to dismiss for violation of the state's Speedy Trial Act (later held invalid under the state constitution) and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Tex. Code Crim.Proc. art. 51.14). A resolution of this basic dispute — who breached what and when, and the consequences of that breach or breaches — cannot be made on the record before us. More is needed.