Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/128/271/525186/
Timestamp: 2019-05-23 23:19:29
Document Index: 486521343

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 160', '§ 158']

National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Hi-tech Cable Corporation, a Subsidiary of Southwirecompany, Respondent, 128 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1997 › National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Hi-tech Cable Corporation, a Subsidiary of Southwirec...
National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Hi-tech Cable Corporation, a Subsidiary of Southwirecompany, Respondent, 128 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1997)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 128 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1997)
This case is the most recent of several disputes that arose between the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 1510 ("Union") and respondent, Hi-Tech, at the latter's Starkville, Mississippi facility. The Union filed a series of charges against Hi-Tech between March and September 1993, alleging several violations of the NLRA. On August 10, 1995, the Board issued an order finding that Hi-Tech had engaged in several unfair labor practices in violation of §§ 8(a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act.2 The Board predicated its decision on several factual and legal findings that are set forth below. These findings are the subject of our review.
On January 10, 1993, three days after Hi-Tech began to comply with the Board's 1992 order, Jimmy Jones applied for a job with the Company. The Board found that Hi-Tech declined to offer employment to Jones because he expressed pro-Union sentiments in response to questioning from Jim French, the Company manager who interviewed him. The Board also found that during the interview, French violated § 8(a) (1) by stating that the Union was ineffective in securing benefits for affiliated employees.7
Also in January 1993, Hi-Tech hired William Scott as a temporary employee. Hi-Tech laid him off in March 1993, citing lack of work as its justification. The Board, however, found that Hi-Tech, in violation of §§ 8(a) (3) and (1), dismissed Scott because of his pro-union sympathies. Specifically, the Board concluded that the company informed Scott of his termination on March 29 because he wore a pro-union t-shirt to work that same day.
In April 1993, Vernita Robinson received the employee of the month award. Both the ALJ and the Board found that manager Gerri Tate approached Robinson a day or two before she received the award to discuss a pro-union button she had attached to her clothing. They further found that Tate unequivocally implied, in violation of § 8(a) (1), that some benefit would accrue to Robinson if she removed the button and supported a pending decertification effort. Robinson indicated her willingness to cooperate, and received the award a day or two later.
In early February 1993, anti-Union employees circulated a decertification petition. Forty-two employees signed decertification cards between February 11 and March 7, the period during which Hi-Tech was in compliance with the Board's 1992 order. In May 1993, Hi-Tech received decertification cards signed by 117 of its 203 Union-represented employees. Based on its belief that the Union no longer enjoyed majority support, the Company withdrew recognition from the Union. Shortly thereafter, Hi-Tech ceased processing grievances, and on June 3, 1993, announced a wage increase.8 The Board concluded that Hi-Tech violated §§ 8(a) (5) and (1) by wrongfully withdrawing recognition from the Union. In particular, the Board found that the decertification cards upon which the Company relied were tainted by the unfair labor practices it had identified.
The Board found that Hi-Tech violated §§ 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) and (5))11 by failing to bargain with the Union in good faith about its proposed no-tobacco usage policy. Accordingly, the Board ordered that Hi-Tech do the following: (1) cease and desist from unilaterally implementing a no-tobacco usage policy; (2) recognize the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for all employees in the appropriate unit, and, on request, bargain in good faith with the Union about the usage of tobacco; and (3) rescind, on request by the Union, the no-tobacco usage policy it implemented on March 29, 1993.
The Board found that Jim French and other Company officials violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act by stating to an applicant and an employee that union representation was an impediment to the receipt of better benefits.20 In turn, the Board concluded that this conduct away from the bargaining table reflected the Company's unwillingness to bargain in good faith over tobacco use. We find no basis for such a conclusion. Principally, we find no evidence of a nexus between these unlawful statements and the Company's conduct at the bargaining table.21 The statements referred neither to the collective bargaining process nor the specific issue of tobacco use at the facility. In Chevron Oil Co. v. NLRB,22 we held that a company official's unlawful, away-from-the-table statements that employees would secure greater benefits without union representative did not justify an inference that the company engaged in bad faith bargaining.23 In reaching that conclusion, we noted that the statements were made in isolation and at a time when the company and the union were at a virtual standstill in negotiations.24 In this respect, Chevron is similar to the case at bar. We adopt its reasoning here, and decline to infer bad faith from the statements identified by the Board.
Both parties were entitled to remain entrenched in their respective positions; neither was forced to capitulate to the other.26 We hold that there is not substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that Hi-Tech violated § 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain in good faith over the no-tobacco rule.
In July 1992, the Union filed separate charges against the Company alleging various violations of §§ 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) of the Act. On September 10, 1992, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that required the Company to post a remedial notice stating that it would not (1) discriminatorily enforce its no solicitation rule by prohibiting Union solicitations and permitting non-Union solicitation; (2) promise to improve benefits if the employees rejected the Union; (3) inform employees that retaining the Union was futile; (4) solicit support for a decertification effort; or (5) violate the employees' § 7 rights in any other respect
§ 158(a) (5): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees."
§ 158(a) (1): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
29 U.S.C. § 160(f). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951)
United Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 862 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 1989)
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1996)
White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
Chevron Oil Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1067, 1072 (5th Cir. 1971); Coastal Electric Cooperative, Inc., 1993 WL 243860 at 10 (N.L.R.B.)
See NLRB v. American Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-404, 72 S. Ct. 824, 828-829, 96 L. Ed. 1027 (1952)
Huck Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 693 F.2d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982)
Id.; See also P.R.C. Recording Co. v. NLRB, 836 F.2d 289, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1987)
Id. at 554. See also NLRB v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 906 F.2d 1007, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1990); Pittsburgh & New England Trucking, 249 NLRB 833, 836 (1980)
Columbia Portland Cement Co. v. NLRB, 979 F.2d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 1992)