Source: http://caccp.blogspot.com/2016/02/
Timestamp: 2017-08-19 03:35:20
Document Index: 561539168

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 473', '§ 473', '§ 473', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 218', '§ 218', '§ 218']

111 North Hill Street: February 2016
Posted by Michael Shipley at 3:17 PM No comments:
Martin Posts & Assocs. v. Corsair, LLC, No. B263198 (D2d2 Jan 28, 2016)
Defendant in this case got defaulted for failing to answer. Six weeks after judgment was entered, it filed a motion for mandatory relief from default under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b), attaching a declaration from its attorney taking the blame for the default. The declaration admitted that the failure to answer was at the feet of the attorney, but did not explain why the attorney neglected to file an answer. The trial court granted relief and the court of appeal here affirms.
Looking to the text of § 473(b), the Court holds that the declaration in support of a mandatory default motion must contain an admission by the attorney of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. And based on the case law and purpose of the rule, it must further contain facts sufficient to show that it was the attorney, not the client, who was sufficiently the cause of the default. (There’s split of authority about mixed fault between attorney and client.) But as the court explains, the statute is concerned with “who is to blame, not why.” Unlike discretionary relief from default (also, somewhat confusingly, addressed in § 473(b), mandatory relief applies to both excusable and inexcusable conduct. So—provided the admission of fault and causation elements are satisfied—the attorney need not provide any detail in his or her explanation of why the mistake was made.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 4:22 PM No comments:
Labels: 473(b), attorney declaration, california code of civil procedure, cossair, mandatory relief, martin posts
Karnazes v. Ares, No. B246308 (D2d2 Jan. 27, 2016)
The relevant part of this case action involves a pro per suing her opponent’s attorney for acting on behalf of her client. As to those claims, an anti-SLAPP motion was brought and granted. Plaintiff now appeals. She raises five grounds, which the court dispenses with in a short opinion.
Labels: 3.1326, 3.670, 425.16, 425.17, anti-SLAPP, ares, california code of civil procedure, california rules of court, illegal as a matter of law, karnazes, venue
Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court, No. E063757 (D4d2 Jan. 26, 2016).
If you are going to put a lis pendens on somebody’s property, you had better comply with the statutory service requirements under Code of Civil Procedure § 405.22, including service on everyone with an interest in the property and everyone in the action. And then you need to provide a proof of service. Under § 405.23, a lis pendens is “void and invalid” and subject to expungement if the service rules are not followed. Plaintiff didn’t follow the service rules in this case—no proof of service—which merits a peremptory writ requiring the trial court to expunge the lis pendens.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 5:31 PM No comments:
Labels: 405.22, 405.23, california code of civil procedure, lis pendens, palma, rey sanchez investments, superior court, writ review
USS Posco Indus. v. Case, No. A140457 (D1d1 Jan. 26, 2016)
Labor Code § 218.5 permits a prevailing party to recover its fees in certain wage cases. While the case was pending, the Legislature amended § 218.5. Prior to the amendment, it was a pure loser-pays statute—the prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant, was simply entitled to a fee award. But under the amendment, the defendant can now recover fees only if the court finds the action was brought in bad faith. Citing retroactivity concerns, the trial court applied the old rule and gave defendant its fees.
But according to the court here, that was error. While there was no evidence that the Legislature intended the amendment to work retroactively, California courts treat cost- and fee-shifting statutes as procedural, not substantive. Procedural changes are essentially prospective—they apply only to procedural events as they occur, even if the facts of the case pre-date the change. Since, as the cases reason, the new rules apply only to litigation events occurring after the change, there are no perceived retroactivity concerns. Thus, the court here should have applied the new version of § 218.5, and in the absence of a bad faith finding, it should not have awarded fees to Defendant.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 1:03 PM No comments:
Labels: attorney fees, case, fee-shifting, retroactivity, uss posco
Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. B247672 (D2d7, as modified Feb. 8, 2016)
This is an automotive products liability case mostly about when plaintiffs can admit evidence of industry custom to show a defect under the risk-benefit test. (The answer, according to the court, is sometimes, parting ways with other courts that have said always and never.) The court also, however, briefly tackles two points of procedural interest.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 9:53 AM No comments:
Labels: 1400, 352, authentication, california evidence code, closing arguments, kim, new trial, toyota motor corp
So I just moved, we are expecting a second daughter in May, and I have spent the last month pulling all-nighters in expedited preliminary injunction proceedings. Which is all a way to say that I’ve fallen really behind on posts here.
Labels: 1775.7, 583.310, 663a, 708.030, 8.891, 904.1, class certification, collections, creditor discovery, five-year rule, judgment debtors, leave to amend, mediation, motion to vacate, notice of appeal, notice of mailing