Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19800630_0040525.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-17 01:27:46
Document Index: 752708704

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 901', '§ 921', '§ 902', '§ 725', '§ 932', '§ 921', '§ 20']

| Director v. North American Coal Corp.
Director v. North American Coal Corp.
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, PETITIONERv.NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORP., EMPLOYER, AND KENNETH M. TRUITT, CLAIMANT, RESPONDENTS
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (BRB Nos. 77-644 BLA and 77-644 BLA-A)
Before Rosenn and Higginbotham, Circuit Judges, and Layton,*fn* District Judge.
In this case we are asked to construe provisions of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1976) (amended 1978) (the Act).*fn1 These provisions make mine operators liable for the total disability of their employees due to Black Lung disease which arose during their employment. Because we conclude that the only argument raised by the petitioners in this appeal was not presented to or considered below by the Benefits Review Board (the Board), we will dismiss the appeal.
ARGUMENTS RAISED BELOW
Truitt originally applied to the Director for disability benefits on October 29, 1974.*fn2 The Director preliminarily determined that Truitt was eligible for benefits for total disability resulting from "complicated pneumoconiosis," the most severe stage of Black Lung disease under the classification system established under the program. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) (1976). He also identified North American as the employer liable for payment of Truitt's claim pursuant to the Act and its administrative regulations.
These provisions provide for disability benefits for miners "totally disabled" by pneumoconiosis. A miner is totally disabled "when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time." 30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1976) (amended 1978).*fn3 Normally, the determination of whether a miner is totally disabled from the disease requires a factual inquiry into the effects of the disease. In cases where the miner is suffering from "complicated pneumoconiosis," however, the Act establishes an "irrebuttable presumption" under Section 921(c)(3) (1976) that he is totally disabled and deserving of benefits, regardless of whether he continues to work.*fn4 See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. 1, 23-24, 96 S. Ct. 2882, 2896, 49 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of presumption).
The Act and its regulations also identify the employer liable for payment of these benefits, defined as the "responsible operator." The operator "with whom the miner had the most recent periods of cumulative employment of not less than one year . . . shall, if financially responsible, be deemed to be the responsible operator." 20 C.F.R. § 725.311(c)(1) (1974).*fn5 The disability must have arisen during the miner's employment for the operator, however, because the Act provides that in a case such as this
30 U.S.C. § 932(c) (1976) (amended 1978) (emphasis added).*fn6 North American challenged its responsibility to Truitt under these provisions and requested a hearing.
the condition of pneumoconiosis is progressive and can get worse even though a person has complicated pneumoconiosis. It's not a category that's (a) medically sealed entity and the Claimant's condition can be contributed to significantly by employment even subsequent to the time that he had complicated pneumoconiosis.
On August 6, 1977, North American informed the Hearing Officer that the February 13, 1970 x-ray had been discovered and had been read as indicating complicated pneumoconiosis.*fn7 This evidence proved critical, for on September 28, 1977, the Hearing Officer, apparently rejecting his prior legal analysis, decided that North American could not be the "responsible operator." He adopted the reasoning advanced by North American and held that the February 13, 1970 x-ray established an irrebuttable presumption that Truitt was totally disabled.
In essence, the Director is arguing that the Section (921(c)(3)) irrebuttable presumption has been rebutted by the fact of the claimant's continued employment with the employer. This assertion is clearly erroneous. Once the existence of complicated pneumoconiosis is established, the claimant is irrebuttably presumed totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3); Nemec v. Lehigh Valley Anthracite, Inc., 7 BRBS 661, BRB No. 77-156 BLA (Jan. 25, 1978). One may not rebut an irrebuttable presumption. Although it has been recognized that the Section (921(c)(3)) presumption is a harsh remedy from the viewpoint of the one opposing entitlement, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this presumption while noting that its underlying purpose and rationale is not only to provide compensation for the claimant's economic loss but also to provide deferred compensation for the loss of health of the miner and the suffering caused his dependents as a result of this loss of health. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 ("96 S. Ct. 2882, 49 L. Ed. 2d 752) (1976). . . . Thus, it has been held that a claimant may properly be found entitled to black lung benefits beginning with the month in which complicated pneumoconiosis was diagnosed even though he continued to be employed as a miner in the interim.
The Director made one final argument when he subsequently petitioned the Board to reconsider the case and allow a remand. He contended that he should be allowed to introduce evidence on North American's potential liability as a "successor operator." Memorandum in Support of Director's Motion for Reconsideration, reprinted in App., at 215. Evidence in the record suggested that North American might have taken over the mine from Truitt's previous employer who would have been liable under the Act. The regulations provided for liability for a successor employer where the successor had assumed substantially all the assets of the mine.*fn8 The Board denied the request for a remand to introduce evidence on this issue on the ground that the Director had had ample opportunity below to submit evidence on successor liability.
It is generally recognized that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies a court should not consider an argument which has not been raised in the agency proceedings which preceded the appeal, absent unusual circumstances. As the Supreme Court announced over thirty years ago in Unemployment Compensation Commission of Territory of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155, 67 S. Ct. 245, 251, 91 L. Ed. 136 (1946):
The rationale behind this doctrine, as expressed in United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S. Ct. 67, 69, 97 L. Ed. 54 (1952), is that "simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice." Such restraint is particularly important in a case such as this where appellants have proffered an argument with far-reaching implications for liability under the Act without benefit of the agency's expert evaluation. See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 20.06 (1958 and 1976 Supp.). Thus, this court in Sea-Land Service v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 552 F.2d 985, 987-88 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977), has similarly refused to consider an argument made in an appeal brought from the Board because the argument had not been made to the Board.