Source: https://casetext.com/case/murphy-v-state-615
Timestamp: 2019-01-20 13:21:16
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Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592 | Casetext
112 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasJun 25, 2003
…Sitting en banc, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") unanimously affirmed the conviction and death…
…We have held that the term "probability" as used in the future dangerousness special issue need not be…
holding evidence sufficient where rational jury could have concluded venue proper
Summary of this case from Thierry v. State
holding that trial court satisfies section 6 when it dictates its findings and conclusions to court reporter and they are made part of reporter&apos;s record
holding that analysis based upon appellant&apos;s rights under the Sixth Amendment cannot be further argued under article 1, section 10 of the Texas Constitution without an explanation as to how the two provisions provide different protections
Summary of this case from Buckhout v. State
Adam L. Seidel, Dallas, for Appellant.
Lisa Braxton Smith, Asst. DA, Dallas, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
Appellant was convicted in June 2001 of capital murder. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a). Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, §§ 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Art. 37.071 § 2(g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.071 § 2(h). Appellant raises twenty points of error. We affirm.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to articles refer to those in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
A trial court has broad discretion over voir dire, including the propriety of particular questions. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). A trial court's discretion is abused only when a proper question about a proper area of inquiry is prohibited. Id.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the questions. Appellant did not state how "victim character testimony" would be defined nor did he state whether or not venirepersons would be informed of this area of law before being asked such questions. Cf. Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 29 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (stating venireperson not shown biased or prejudiced against the law unless the law is first explained to them). A proper explanation of the law is essential before asking a question upon which a challenge for cause due to bias against the law might be based. See id. Prospective jurors would need to be informed that the standard of proof by which the State must prove its case remains constant; it may not be increased or reduced depending upon the presentation of a certain type of evidence. In addition, because the standard of proof by which the State must prove its case is not affected by the presentation of any certain type of evidence, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the questions would be confusing or misleading. Point of error one is overruled.
In his second point of error, appellant asserts the same argument he made in point of error one under Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. However, because appellant does not argue that the Texas Constitution provides, or should provide, greater or different protection than its federal counterpart, appellant's point of error is inadequately briefed. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Point of error two is overruled.
In his third and fourth points of error, appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by granting the State's challenge for cause against venireperson Alena Treat, in violation of Article 35.16 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court granted the State's challenge for cause against Treat on the ground that she would require proof of another murder or attempted murder before finding appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that would pose a continuing threat to society. Appellant relies on the reasoning in Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 859 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), and cites Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1969), to argue that Treat's views about the death penalty would not have prevented or substantially impaired her ability to follow the court's instructions or the law and her juror's oath.
In Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 941 (1993), the venireperson was challenged for cause on the ground that she would consider imposing capital punishment for serial murderers only. We said that "[b]ecause our law does not categorically reserve capital punishment only for those who have murdered before, neither may individual jurors in a capital murder case." We accordingly held that under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's challenge for cause. Id. at 201.
In Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 811 (Tex.Crim.App.) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043 (1996), two venirepersons were challenged for cause by the State. Venireperson Terrell testified that even if she believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the State had proved future dangerousness, she would not answer the issue affirmatively unless the State also presented evidence that the defendant had a prior felony conviction. Id. Venireperson Adams testified that even if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would be a future danger, he would nevertheless require evidence that the defendant would kill another human being before he would answer the issue affirmatively. The defendant conceded that under Fuller, the venirepersons were properly challenged, but argued that Fuller had been overturned by Garrett. A plurality of the Court disagreed, holding that Fuller controlled and Garrett was distinguishable. Id. at 811.
A year later, a majority of the Court in Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 129 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1065 (2002), reaffirmed the reasoning in Garrett, holding that:
In so holding, the Court in Howard noted the existence of other circumstances that justified the challenges against the venirepersons at issue in Fuller and Rachal. Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 128 (referring to venireperson's tendency to "pay heed to his own conception of what the law ought to be rather than follow the legal criteria" as justifying challenges for cause). Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 128. In addition, the venireperson in Fuller was not fully questioned so that it was "impossible to tell whether her own personal preference or bias would likely prevent her from following the law." Id. at n. 2.
Id. Thus, under Howard, it is plain that prospective jurors may form their own definitions of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and they are not challengeable for cause based upon the type and amount of evidence they require to reach that level of confidence. Id. at 127. Only if the venireperson would refuse to answer the issue "yes" unless a certain type of evidence is presented, even if the other evidence presented were sufficient to convince them of the special issue beyond a reasonable doubt, would the venireperson be challengeable for cause. Id. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge for cause against Treat. Treat was entitled to determine for herself what future dangerousness meant to her. That she would require a murder or attempted murder did not render her challengeable for cause. Id.
But Treat's exclusion from the jury may not necessarily be cause for reversal. See Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (stating that except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by United States Supreme Court as "structural," no error is categorically immune to harmless error analysis). Appellant claims Treat's erroneous exclusion violates Article 35.16, Witherspoon, and the Fourteenth Amendment. As to appellant's Article 35.16 claim, appellant must show that the erroneously granted challenge for cause deprived him of a lawfully constituted jury. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 749 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 289 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 956 (1999); Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 394 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998), cert. denied, 582 U.S. 985 (1999). He has made no such showing here. Point of error three is overruled.
Witherspoon error, however, is not subject to a harm analysis under Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 391. We stated in Jones that, "[o]nly in very limited circumstances, when a juror is erroneously excluded because of general opposition to the death penalty (" Witherspoon" error), does the exclusion of a juror by an unintentional mistake amount to a constitutional violation." Id. Under Witherspoon, a venireperson would be excluded "only where they made it unmistakably clear they would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty, or where their attitude would preclude them from making an impartial determination of guilt or innocence." Drinkard v. State, 776 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), the Supreme Court abandoned Witherspoon's substantive standard and its burden of proof requirement. Id. Wainwright reaffirmed the Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), standard for determining when a veniremember may be excluded for cause due to his or her views on capital punishment, holding that the critical inquiry is "whether a juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Id. (discussing Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424).
Treat was excluded in this case because her own definition of the phrase "criminal acts of violence" would require evidence that appellant committed or attempted to commit other murders. While the phrase at issue is embedded within our capital death penalty provision which itself is continually assessed for its ability to hold up against federal constitutional standards, the wrongful elimination of a juror for establishing her own definition of that phrase does not implicate Witherspoon/ Wainwright. Treat harbored no general opposition to the death penalty. She was not excluded because her views on capital punishment in general would prevent or impair her performance. Point of error four is overruled.
In points of error five through eight, appellant claims the trial court erred by denying appellant's challenges for cause against four venirepersons. Appellant claims these venirepersons were all biased against the law and therefore his challenges for cause should have been granted.
We assume, without deciding, that appellant preserved his complaints for review.
Appellant failed to demonstrate that Mays was first informed that he would be required to take an oath that in the case of any conflict between the tenets of Mays' religion and the law on which Mays would be instructed, Mays would be required to follow the law. In the absence of a showing that Mays was fully informed as to the applicable law, appellant has failed to show that Mays was biased or prejudiced against the law. See Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 29 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995).
Appellant relies on Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), in which the Court reversed a conviction based upon an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause against a venireperson who equated the term "probability" with "possibility." We held:
[The venireperson's] answers during his voir dire indicate that he understood "probability" as any percent possibility rather than as a "likelihood" or "good chance[.]" In its usual acceptation, a "probability" is something more than a "possibility." As this Court stated in Smith, 779 S.W.2d 417, 421, in which we relied on Cuevas[v. State, 742 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987)], "we know that the second special issue calls for proof of more than a bare chance of future violence." Requiring more than a mere possibility that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence and would constitute a continuing threat to society prevents the freakish and wanton assessment of the death penalty.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). We have repeatedly stated that "[i]f counsel's reasons for his conduct do not appear in the record and there is at least the possibility that the conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to counsel's decisions and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal." Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
In his tenth point of error, appellant claims this appeal should be abated until the trial court files findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Article 38.22. Appellant filed pretrial motions seeking suppression of his oral and written statements on the ground that they were involuntarily made. The trial court held a hearing outside the jury's presence, but did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the admissibility of the statements. However, at the close of the hearing, the trial court dictated its findings and conclusions into the record. A trial court satisfies the requirements of Article 38.22 when it dictates its findings and conclusions to the court reporter, and they are transcribed and made a part of the statement of facts, filed with the district clerk and made a part of the appellate record. Parr v. State, 658 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); see also Andrade v. State, 6 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (following Parr); Lee v. State, 964 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd) (following Parr); Amunson v. State, 928 S.W.2d 601, 608 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, pet. ref'd) (following Parr). That has been done in this case. Point of error ten is overruled.
During trial, the court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury. An employee of the Dallas County Sheriff's Department testified that pursuant to the customary practice of the Dallas County Jail in the case of an attempted suicide in jail, the cell is considered a crime scene and all evidence is confiscated. Both prosecutors in appellant's case testified that they reviewed the seized papers, but only one of the prosecutors testified that he reviewed portions of the three pages purportedly written to appellant's attorneys. At the top of Defense Exhibit 6A, is written, "Michael Jane (Sorry if I've offended you by using your 1st names)." It was signed on the back, "Sincerely, Jim Ed." The prosecutor agreed that he knew appellant's attorneys were Michael Byck and Jane Little, and that Jim Ed was a name appellant was known to go by. Defense Exhibit 6B, began "Questions for my lawyers" and was followed by six numbered paragraphs, and signed at the bottom by "Jim." Defense Exhibit 6C, stated on the back: "To my lawyers! Please help me with the problems I'm having, the staff sees me only as a monster." The other side began its narrative writing, "Michael. . . ." Substantively, they pertain almost exclusively to appellant's desire to contact a psychiatrist to prescribe medication to stop his hallucinations and prevent him from "losing his mind." The prosecutor who reviewed the papers testified that he did not use any information contained in them in his prosecution of appellant. The trial court concluded that if there was any error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court did find, however, that Defense Exhibits 6A, 6B and 6C were attorney-client privileged, but questioned whether they were located "in a secure and confidential place."
The State's intrusion into the attorney-client relationship violates a defendant's constitutional right to counsel when the defendant is prejudiced by the violation. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1981); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 555-59 (1977). The federal circuit courts of appeals are split on the issue of whether prejudice is presumed or must be proven. Compare Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 494-95 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that possession by government of confidential information is presumed detrimental to defendant), vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (1983); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3rd Cir. 1978) (holding prejudice need not be shown) with United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1043 (2nd Cir. 1979) (holding defendants failed to show prejudice); United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding showing of prejudice required), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1181 (2001); United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586-87 (6th Cir.) (holding appellants failed to show prejudice), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984). Even where a presumption is applied, some courts allow it to be rebutted. Briggs, 698 F.2d at 495 n. 29 (noting government free to rebut presumption).
In our view, calling for a showing of prejudice is the better rule in light of the wide variety of circumstances under which the privilege might be breached. Moreover, such rule is consistent with our own case law. See Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (only errors that Supreme Court has designated as "structural" are categorically immune from harmless error analysis).
Q. [Defense attorney] Can you point out — outside of these letters that you said that you reviewed, can you point out to any place in your investigation that made mention of hallucinations?
(3) if a person receives an injury in one county and dies in another by reason of such injury, in the county where the injury was received or where the death occurred, or in the county where the dead body is found, or (4) in the county in which the kidnapping offense was committed, or in any county through, into, or out of which the person kidnapped may have been taken.
Soliz v. State, 97 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (footnotes omitted). While some of the special venue statutes expressly apply to identifiable penal code offenses, other special venue provisions apply by virtue of the particular facts of the case rather than the specifically charged offense. Compare Art. 13.12 (applicable to false imprisonment and kidnapping prosecution); Art. 13.13 (applicable to prosecution of criminal conspiracy); Art. 13.14 (applicable when prosecuting bigamy) with Art. 13.01 (applicable to "offenses committed wholly or in part outside this State"); Art. 13.04 (applicable to "offenses committed on the boundaries of two or more counties, or within four hundred yards thereof"); Art. 13.06 (applicable to offenses committed on rivers or streams); Art. 13.07 (applicable in case in which victim receives injury in one county and dies in another). There is no special venue statute expressly applicable to the prosecution of a capital murder. Nor is there any statute providing that in capital murder cases, venue occurs only where the homicide takes place. Any number of the special venue provisions may apply to a given capital murder case, depending upon its facts.
In the instant case, the victim was last seen alive in Collin County. In his confession, appellant stated that he was drinking at a bar called Bleachers. There was evidence that Bleachers Sports Grill is a bar located in Dallas County. According to his confession, appellant left Bleachers and hitched a ride with the victim "on the road beside Bleachers on [his] way to 635." Detective Myers testified that the area from Bleachers to 635 is located in Dallas County. Appellant's confession further states that appellant and the victim were driving toward 635 when he asked the victim to stop and get into the trunk, and he then shot her. The admission suggests that this occurred somewhere in the same area as the abduction — between Bleachers and 635, within Dallas County. Appellant thereafter drove around in the victim's car to various locations in Collin and Dallas Counties, using the victim's credit cards and attempting to use her ATM card. The medical examiner testified that although the gunshot wound was fatal, the victim could have lived for several minutes or longer after the shooting. The victim's body was discovered in a creek in Van Zandt County. Finally, the evidence showed that at the time of the offense, appellant's residence was in Dallas County.
Venue will stand if it is sufficient under any one of the venue provisions the jury was instructed upon. Cf. Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (holding that in capital murder case, evidence must be sufficient to prove one of disjunctively alleged underlying offenses); Brooks, 990 S.W.2d at 384 (stating that when jury returns general guilty verdict on indictment disjunctively charging alternative theories of committing same offense, verdict stands if evidence supports any of theories charged). Article 13.19 provides that if an offense is committed within the state but "cannot readily be determined within which county or counties the commission took place," trial can be held in the county in which the defendant resides, the county where he is apprehended, or the county to which he is extradited. This provision was made a part of the trial court's charge. Given the difficulty of determining exactly where the offense occurred, a rational jury could have relied on this provision and concluded venue was proper in Dallas County, the county of appellant's residence. Point of error twelve is overruled.
Detective Stanton testified that he put together a lineup of six photos, including appellant's picture, for Wilhelm to view. He told Wilhelm that the suspect might or might not be in the lineup, and that it wasn't necessary for her to choose anyone. He testified that when Wilhelm viewed photo number five, appellant's photo, she stopped and there was a visible change in her demeanor. Stanton stated that Wilhelm said, "oh my God, I'm — I'm virtually sure . . ." and that her voice was quivering. Stanton asked her if she was sure and she said she was as sure as she could be after this amount of time. Although appellant now asserts a number of reasons why the photo lineup was not reliable, at trial he objected solely on the ground that the photo lineup appeared to be made up of individuals of "different races."
In his fourteenth point of error, appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a jury instruction that would have required the jury to consider extraneous offenses only for the purpose of determining the future dangerousness special issue. This argument has been addressed and rejected previously. Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 478 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Point of error fourteen is overruled.
In point of error fifteen, appellant claims the trial court erred at punishment in failing to submit to the jury definitions of the terms "probability," "criminal acts of violence," and "continuing threat to society." Appellant argues that without definitions for these critical terms, the statutory aggravating circumstances are not adequately narrowed, and the jury's verdict is not rationally reviewable. This Court has repeatedly held that these terms are not unconstitutionally vague and the jury is presumed to understand them without an instruction. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 757 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 572 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1070 (2000). Point of error fifteen is overruled.
In his sixteenth point of error, appellant claims the Texas death penalty scheme violated his rights against cruel and unusual punishment and to due process of law under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by requiring at least ten votes for the jury to return a negative answer to the future dangerousness special issue and to return an affirmative answer on the mitigation issue. We have addressed this issue and upheld this scheme as constitutional. Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 536-37 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (citing numerous cases in support), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1102 (2000). Point of error sixteen is overruled.
In point of error seventeen, appellant claims the Texas death penalty scheme denied appellant due process of law, in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because of the impossibility of simultaneously restricting the jury's discretion to impose the death penalty while also allowing the jury unlimited discretion to consider all evidence mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty. Appellant relies solely on Justice Blackmun's dissent from the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). We have addressed and rejected identical claims. Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 575. Point of error seventeen is overruled.
In point of error eighteen, appellant makes the same claim under Article I, sections 13 and 19 of the Texas Constitution, that he asserts in point of error seventeen. Because appellant does not argue that the Texas Constitution provides or should provide any different or greater protection in this regard, appellant fails to adequately brief this claim. Tex.R.App. Proc. 38.1(h). Point of error eighteen is overruled.
In a capital murder trial in which the state seeks the death penalty, Texas law requires jurors to determine whether "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. . . ." Only if all jurors believe that the defendant will continue to be a danger can the trial court assess the death penalty. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc., art. 37.071, §§ 2(b)(1) and 2(d)(2). Thus, it is imperative that jurors understand the difference between "probable" and possible."
In Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), this Court stated that a prospective juror who cannot distinguish between probable and possible is properly challengeable for cause and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying such a challenge. Too, the legislature was very specific when it promulgated the procedures for assessing the death penalty, and this Court is bound by those procedures. The legislature required "probability," and so must this Court.
In this case, two jurors appear from the record to be unable to distinguish "probability" and "possibility." Brooks stated that the probability is "`a chance,'" while Williams "continued to reiterate that she believed probability and possibility mean the same thing." Murphy v. State, slip op. at 10, supra. Under Hughes, both Brooks and Williams were properly challengeable, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's challenges to them.