Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190626_0001686.SGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-02-25 13:40:32
Document Index: 644272164

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 499', '§ 362', '§ 1404', '§ 1391', '§ 1406', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1404']

FindACase™ | BW Orchards, LLC v. Spiech Farms Georgia, LLC
BW Orchards, LLC v. Spiech Farms Georgia, LLC
BW ORCHARDS, LLC, C&D, FUEHRING FARMS, INC., GOLDEN HART FRUIT FARMS, LLC, GREEN VENTURES, LLC, HERRYGERS FARMS, LLC, JAMES JENSEN d/b/a JENSEN FARMS, LAKESHORE FARMS, INC., LK VANSICKLE FARMS, LLC, MALBURG ACRES, LLC, RANDY A. FEDO d/b/a RAN-MARK CO., PAUL OOMEN d/b/a PAUL OOMEN & SONS, SLOCUM FARMS, LLC, VILLADSEN TREE FARMS, INC., and PRODUCE PAY, INC., Plaintiffs,
SPIECH FARMS GEORGIA, LLC, and TIMOTHY M. SPIECH, BRADLEY A. SPIECH, ROBIN L. SPIECH, STEVEN M. SPIECH, and EVA M. STONE, individually, Defendants.
Before the Court are Defendants Robin L. Spiech's and Steven M. Spiech's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, and, in the Alternative, Motion to Transfer Venue, dkt. no. 25, and Defendants Timothy M. Spiech's, Bradley A. Spiech's, and Eva M. Stone's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, and, in the Alternative, Motion to Transfer Venue, dkt. no. 28. These motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motions to Dismiss are DENIED and Defendant's Motions to Transfer Venue are GRANTED.
This case involves Plaintiffs' BW Orchards, LLC, Fuehring Farms, Inc., Golden Hart Fruit Farms, LLC, Green Ventures, LLC, Herrygers Farms, LLC, James Jensen d/b/a Jensen Farms, Lakeshore Farms, Inc., LK Vansickle Farms, LLC, Malburg Acres, LCC, Randy A. Fedo d/b/a Ran-Mark Co., Paul Oomen d/b/a Paul Oomen & Sons, Slocum Farms, LLC, Villadsen Tree Farms, Inc., (collectively "Growers") and Produce Pay, Inc. ("Produce Pay") (all together "Plaintiffs") claims against Defendants Spiech Farms Georgia, LLC ("Spiech Georgia"), Timothy M. Spiech, Bradley A. Spiech, Robin L. Spiech, Steven M. Spiech, and Eva M. Stone stemming from Defendants' alleged failure to pay under agreements to sell or buy produce. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege in their First Amended Complaint (hereinafter "the Complaint"), dkt. no. 11, that Growers had . entered into various agreements with non-party Spiech Farms, LLC ("Spiech Michigan")-a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Paw Paw, Michigan-under which Spiech Michigan would purchase produce, namely asparagus, from Growers. Dkt. No. 11 ¶¶ 21, 44-69. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Produce Pay entered into a "Distribution Agreement," under which Spiech Michigan agreed to sell and Produce Pay agreed to purchase certain produce, specifically grapes and blueberries, for the express purpose of Spiech Michigan selling such Produce to purchasers on commission on behalf of Produce Pay. Id. ¶¶ 106-122. At all relevant times, Spiech Michigan was the parent company of Spiech Georgia, and Timothy, Bradley, Robin, and Steven Spiech, as well as Eva Stone, were members of both Spiech Michigan and Spiech Georgia. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Spiech Georgia is a Georgia limited liability company with its principal place of business in Baxley and Brunswick, Georgia, where it grew certain produce, specifically blueberries. Id. ¶ 21.
The gravamen of Plaintiffs' ninety-one-page Complaint is that Spiech Michigan failed to pay Growers under their respective agreements to sell produce and failed to pay Produce Pay for the produce sold to third-parties under the distribution agreement. Id. ¶¶ 32-43. The Complaint avers that Spiech Michigan, through the individual member Defendants, instead funneled money, including money earned from selling produce under the distribution agreement with Produce Pay, to Spiech Georgia to hide and shield that money from Plaintiffs and from Spiech Michigan's bankruptcy. Id. ¶¶ 40-43. The Complaint alleges that Defendants then used that money to fund blueberry farming operations in Georgia. Id. ¶ 41. Based on these facts Plaintiffs allege claims against Defendants for Failure to Pay Promptly (Count I), Making False or Misleading Statements (Count II), Unfair Trade Practice for Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count III), and Unfair Trade Practice for Breach of Express or Implied Duties (Count IV) all under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (``PACA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 499, and state law claims of Conspiracy to Defraud (Count V), Fraud (Count VI), Breach of Duty to Corporate Creditors (Count VII), Intentional Interference With a Contract (Count VIII), Conversion (Count IX), Unjust Enrichment (Count X), Negligence (Count XI), Common Enterprise Liability (Count XII), and Piercing the Corporate Veil: Alter-Ego Liability (Counts XIII-XVII). Id. ¶¶ 126-547.
Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on January 14, 2019, in the Southern District of Georgia. Dkt. No. 1. But, prior to that filing, on November 22, 2017, Spiech Michigan filed for bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan. See In re Spiech Farms, LLC, No. 17-05398 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. November 11, 2017), Dkt. No. 1. Those proceedings are still ongoing, and Plaintiffs are involved in that bankruptcy litigation. Id. After Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this Court, Spiech Michigan filed a Motion for Contempt against Plaintiffs in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan on March 11, 2019, arguing that Plaintiffs' Complaint in this case violates the Bankruptcy Court's automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (3) and that it seeks improper collateral review of the orders of the Bankruptcy Court. Id. at Dkt. No. 611. That motion is still pending before the Bankruptcy Court. On that same day, March 11, 2019, Defendants filed their respective Motions to Dismiss for Improper Venue or in the Alternative, Motions to Transfer Venue, dkt. nos. 25, 28, presently before this Court.
Defendants move this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for improper venue. Dkt. Nos. 25, 28. Alternatively, if the Court determines that venue in this District is proper, Defendants request that the Court nevertheless transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Under Rule 12 (b)(3), a party may assert improper venue as a defense to a claim for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). When a defendant objects to venue, ``[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that venue in the forum is proper." Pinson v. Rumsfeld, 192 Fed.Appx. 811, 817 (11th Cir. 2006). In considering a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(3), a court accepts the facts in the plaintiff's complaint as true. Simbaqueba v. U.S. Dep't of Def., No. CV 309-066, 2010 WL 2990042, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 28, 2010) . "However, when a Rule 12(b) (3)' motion is predicated upon key issues of fact, the court may consider matters outside the pleadings." Id. (citing Curry v. Gonzales, No. 105-2710, 2006 WL 3191178, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 31, 2006)). Where conflicts exist between the allegations in the complaint and the evidence outside of the pleadings, the court ``must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the plaintiff." Wai v. Rainbow Holdings, 315 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2004); see also Simbaqueba, 2010 WL 2990042, at *2.
In diversity cases such as this one, venue is determined in accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that a civil action may be brought in:
A court presiding over a case ``laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
In this case, Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that venue is proper in the Southern District of Georgia under § 1391(b)(2). Looking to the sections of § 1391(b), subsection (b) (1) is inapplicable because it is undisputed that not all of the Defendants are residents of Georgia in this case. Moreover, subsection (b) (3) is inapplicable because the Court finds that venue is also proper in the Western District of Michigan. Although Plaintiffs attempt to argue that the Western District of Michigan would not have jurisdiction over all of the parties or claims in this case, Plaintiffs fail to support that argument with any substantive reasons. Because the individual member Defendants conducted business as part of Spiech Michigan and Spiech Georgia in Michigan (let alone a few of them being residents of Michigan), the Court sees no reason why the Western District of Michigan would not have personal jurisdiction under a minimum contacts theory. The same is true for Spiech Georgia that, according to the facts alleged in the Complaint, did business in Michigan through working with, or as a part of, Spiech Michigan and sent produce to Michigan. As for subject matter jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction exists for the PACA claims and supplemental jurisdiction covers the state law claims. Thus, the Court sees no basis for concluding that a federal court in the Western District of Michigan would not have jurisdiction over all of the parties or claims in Plaintiff's Complaint.
Therefore, Plaintiffs are left with relying on § 1391(b)(2), and they meet their burden under that section by showing that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in their Complaint occurred in the Southern District of Georgia. It is important to note that Plaintiffs are not required to show that a majority of the events occurred in the Southern District of Georgia; rather, they only need to show that a substantial part of the events occurred here. Morgan v. N. MS Med. Ctr., Inc., 403 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1123 (S.D. Ala. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. N. Mississippi Med. Ctr., Inc., 225 Fed.Appx. 828 (11th Cir. 2007). (``[T]he question confronting the undersigned is not whether the lion's share of the events at issue occurred in the Southern District of Alabama, nor is it the relative magnitude and significance of the events occurring in this judicial district as compared to those in the Northern District of Mississippi. Instead, the question is simply whether `a substantial part' of the events transpired here."). Here, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Defendants, instead of paying Plaintiffs money owed to them under the various agreements that the parties had, funneled money to Spiech Georgia-which is located in the Southern District of Georgia-to hide that money from Plaintiffs. See Dkt. No. 11 ¶¶ 41-43. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants did this while fraudulently misleading the Plaintiffs and reassuring them that Defendants would pay, when really Defendants were just trying to buy time before filing bankruptcy and hiding the money from that bankruptcy by funneling it to Spiech Georgia. See id. ¶¶ 41-43, 312-313. Plaintiffs allege that instead of paying them, Defendants used the money sent to Spiech Georgia to fund Spiech Georgia's operations, including purchasing equipment, funding labor operations, and conducting other activities. See id. ¶¶ 41-43, 319-320.
At a minimum, these facts form a substantial part of the events that are the basis for certain counts in the Complaint, such as Count IX for conversion and Count X for unjust enrichment, in that by Defendants funneling money to Spiech Georgia, Spiech Georgia unlawfully converted funds that were owed to Plaintiffs and were unjustly enriched by receiving those funds. Moreover, the basis for many of Plaintiffs' other claims is that instead of paying Plaintiffs for the money that they were owed, Defendants sent that money to Spiech Georgia to hide it, and Spiech Georgia used that money to fund its operations. Thus, at least for some counts in the Complaint, a "substantial part of the events . . . giving rise" to those counts occurred in the Southern District of Georgia. Although a majority of the facts that make up this case may not have occurred here, for the purposes of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that at least a substantial part of those facts occurred in this District. As such, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Turning to the second issue of transferring venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that a district court may transfer a civil action ``to any other district or division where it might have been brought," when it is ``for the convenience of parties and witnesses" and ``in the interest of justice." District courts are vested with broad discretion in weighing conflicting arguments regarding a venue transfer. See England v. ITT Thompson Indus. Inc., 856 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988) . Courts traditionally afford considerable deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum, disturbing it only where it is ``clearly outweighed by other considerations." Robinson v. Giamarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir. 1981)). Thus, a party who moves to transfer venue pursuant to Section 1404(a) bears the burden of establishing ``that the balance of convenience and justice `weighs heavily in favor of the transfer.'" Duckworth v. Med. Electro-Therapeutics, Inc., 768 F.Supp. 822, 831 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (quoting Elec. Transaction Network v. Katz, 734 F.Supp. 492, 501 (N.D.Ga. 1989)).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;``The question of whether a transfer is appropriate depends upon two inquires: (1) whether the action might have been brought in the proposed transferee court, and (2) whether [certain] convenience factors are present to justify the transfer." Greely v. Lazer Spot, Inc., No. CV 411-096, 2012 WL 170154, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012) (citing Mason v. Smithkline Beecham ...