Source: https://casetext.com/case/sierra-club-v-abston-const-co-inc
Timestamp: 2019-02-23 13:39:21
Document Index: 297821296

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1362', '§ 1251', '§ 1251', '§ 1314', '§ 434', '§ 1362', '§ 1362', '§ 502', '§ 1362']

Sierra Club v. Abston Const. Co., Inc, 620 F.2d 41 | Casetext
620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980)
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Sierra Clubv.Abston Const. Co., Inc.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth CircuitJun 23, 1980
…Kinder Morgan does not assert that the pollutants found in the creeks and wetlands have an independent or…
…U.S. v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979). "Nothing in the Act relieves" defendants…
holding that natural flow of "[g]ravity ... resulting in a discharge into a navigable body of water, may be part of a point source discharge if the [polluter] at least initially collected or channeled the water and other materials"
holding that surface runoff from rainfall collected and channeled by coal miners in connection with mining activities is point source pollution
Summary of this case from Tri-Realty Co. v. Ursinus Coll.
holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where additional findings of fact were necessary to determine whether defendants&apos; discharges occurred via point sources or nonpoint sources
…620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980). However, the court left “for another day” the question of whether, and under…
…620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980)). "Unlike collected rainfall runoff," the court explained, "water discharged…
Edward Still, Birmingham, Ala., Ralph I. Knowles, University, Ala., John D. Hoffman, San Francisco, Cal., for Sierra Club.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., State of Alabama, James R. Cooper, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., H. H. Caddell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., for State of Alabama.
Michael A. McCord, Atty., Sanford Sagalkin, Edmund B. Clark, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for United States.
Lloyd S. Guerci, Dept. of Justice, Alan W. Eckert, Deputy Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae.
Defendants Abston Construction Co., Mitchell Neely, Inc., Kellerman Mining Co. and The Drummond Co. [hereinafter miners] operate coal mines near Daniel Creek, a tributary of the Black Warrior River, in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. They each employ the strip mining technique, whereby rock material above the coal — the overburden — is removed, thereby exposing the coal that is close to the land surface. When the overburden is removed, it is pushed aside, and forms "spoil piles." During the mining operations, and thereafter if the land is not reclaimed by replacing the overburden, the spoil piles are highly erodible. Rainwater runoff or water draining from within the mined pit at times carried the material to adjacent streams, causing siltation and acid deposits. In an effort to halt runoff, the miners here occasionally constructed "sediment basins," which were designed to catch the runoff before it reached the creek. Their efforts were not always successful. Rainfall some times caused the basins to overflow, again depositing silt and acid materials into Daniel Creek.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14). Nonpoint sources, on the other hand, are not due to be controlled. See S.Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News, pp. 3668, 3744.
The 1972 legislation was designed to eliminate "discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters" of the United States by 1985. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1). Under this mandate the Environmental Protection Agency was directed to promulgate regulations governing point source discharges. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251, 1314(b). The miners argue that Congress, in section 304(e)(2)(B) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(f)(2)(B), intended that mining activities not be subject to the Act's effluent limitations, but that the Environmental Protection Agency only study and propose methods of controlling pollution resulting from mining. The Government points out, however, that an amendment, proposed in the House of Representatives to provide a regulatory program specifically covering coal miners, was withdrawn because it appeared to be duplicative. See Environmental Policy Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 530-35 (Comm. Print, Senate Committee on Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1973). The EPA has been held to be precluded from exempting from the Act's permit requirements two other categories of pollution originally designated for further study, agricultural and silvicultural activities. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
We agree with the Government's argument. Gravity flow, resulting in a discharge into a navigable body of water, may be part of a point source discharge if the miner at least initially collected or channeled the water and other materials. A point source of pollution may also be present where miners design spoil piles from discarded overburden such that, during periods of precipitation, erosion of spoil pile walls results in discharges into a navigable body of water by means of ditches, gullies and similar conveyances, even if the miners have done nothing beyond the mere collection of rock and other materials. The ultimate question is whether pollutants were discharged from "discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance[s]" either by gravitational or nongravitational means. Nothing in the Act relieves miners from liability simply because the operators did not actually construct those conveyances, so long as they are reasonably likely to be the means by which pollutants are ultimately deposited into a navigable body of water. Conveyances of pollution formed either as a result of natural erosion or by material means, and which constitute a component of a mine drainage system, may fit the statutory definition and thereby subject the operators to liability under the Act.
The cases which were not decided until after the district court decision tend to support the view adopted here. In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Association, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 1011, 62 L.Ed.2d 750 (1980), 17 coal producers, among others, challenged regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Act, claiming the regulations could have been interpreted to apply to surface runoff that does not fit within the point source statutory definition. Specifically, the regulations covered "discharges which are pumped, siphoned or drained from coal storage." 40 C.F.R. § 434.20 (1979); 604 F.2d at 250. The Fourth Circuit, noting only that the definition of point source "excludes unchanneled and uncollected surface waters," Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir. 1976), refused to overturn the regulations on their face, delaying consideration of the issue "in the absence of a full factual background." 604 F.2d at 249-50.
The undisputed facts demonstrate the combination of sumps, ditches, hoses and pumps is a circulating or drainage system to serve this mining operation.
Despite the large capacity (168,000 gallons for the reserve sump) we view this operation as a closed circulating system to serve the gold extraction process with no discharge. When it fails because of flaws in the construction or inadequate size to handle the fluids utilized, with resulting discharge, whether from a fissure in the dirt berm or overflow of a wall, the escape of liquid from the confined system is from a point source. Although the source of the excess liquid is rainfall or snow melt, this is not the kind of general runoff considered to be from nonpoint sources under the [Act].
The court also rejected defendant's contention that the Act covers only the intentional discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. Section 1362(12), the court noted, "defines discharge of pollutants as ` any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.'" Id. (court's emphasis). Thus, the court held that even unintentional discharges of pollutants from a mine system designed to catch runoff during periods of excess melting met the statutory definition of a point source.
Under the view of the law adopted here, there remain genuine issues of material fact. Viewed in a light most favorable to Sierra Club, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), the affidavits and depositions considered by the district court indicate that significant amounts of dirt, sand and other solid particles were transported from the spoil banks by rainwater to Daniel Creek. Earl Bailey, a Sierra Club vice president and a professor at the University of Alabama, testified by affidavit that he observed
[T]hat's just the general type dam section that is put into the small drainage course with a standpipe and an emergency spillway.
Thus, additional findings are necessary to determine the precise nature of spoil basins constructed by defendant Drummond. In light of Hicks's statement that a "standpipe and an emergency spillway" were constructed to guard against spoil basin overflow, we note that a "pipe" from which pollutants are discharged may be a point source of pollution. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14). This design could likewise fit under the Earth Sciences finding that "the escape of liquid from [a] confined system is from a point source," 599 F.2d at 374, since the affidavits and depositions suggest that water and other materials escaped from the mines and sediment basins, eventually finding their way to Daniel Creek. Furthermore, factual findings are lacking insofar as the sediment basins and other devices may be characterized as encompassing "container[s], . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14).
While defendants have denied taking any direct action resulting in the discharge of pollutants into Daniel Creek, Bailey described "[m]ine spoil pushed into Daniel Creek so as to block the waterway." Even under the district court's requirement that the alleged polluters take some "affirmative act" before a finding of point source pollution is warranted, the activity described by Bailey suggests a discharge of pollutants into the creek. In considering this issue, the district court should deem controlling § 502(12) of the Act, which, as pointed out by the Earth Sciences court, defines discharge as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters . . . ." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(12).