Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20010523_0000011.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-02-28 03:20:49
Document Index: 406372610

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5101', '§ 5101', '§ 5125', '§ 5103', '§ 172', '§ 5125', '§ 360']

| WAERING v. BASF CORP.
WAERING v. BASF CORP.
PAUL F. WAERING AND DARIA A. WAERING, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFFS,v.BASF CORPORATION, AND GOLDEN DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, DEFENDANTS, V. STERLING LOGISTICS CORPORATION D/B/A STERLING QUALITY LOGISTICS AND QUALITY LOGISTICS SPECIALISTS, ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS.
This personal injury action arose from Plaintiff Paul Waering's
inadvertent exposure to potassium metabisulfite and includes claims of
negligence, strict products liability and loss of consortium. Presently
before the court are the separate motions for summary judgment of
Defendant BASF Corporation ("BASF"), Defendant Golden Distribution
Company ("Golden") and Third-Party Defendant Sterling Logistics
Corporation ("Sterling"). (Docs. 55, 53, 64.) Because the court
concludes that the Wearings' common law claims are not preempted by the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Authorization Act of 1994,
49 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq., and that genuine issues of material fact
exist as to whether BASF was negligent or should be held strictly
liable, BASF's motion for summary judgment will be denied. However, in
light of the paucity of evidence in the record against either Golden or
Sterling, the court will grant summary judgment to these two parties.
Plaintiff Paul Waering was and remains employed as a forklift operator
at Casket Shells, Inc. in Eynon, Pennsylvania. On the morning of
December 10, 1998, Waering met a Golden tractor-trailer at the Casket
Shells loading area for the purpose of unloading copper sheets from the
truck. Though the driver of the truck presented Waering with a shipment
manifest indicating that Casket Shells was to receive two crates of
copper sheets, Waering alleges that he was not warned either by the
paperwork he was shown or by the truck's driver that the truck also
contained a shipment of potassium metabisulfite manufactured by BASF. As
it turned out, Golden had picked up the potassium metabisulfite at a
Sterling warehouse in Illinois for delivery to a BASF customer in New
Jersey. The potassium metabisulfite was contained in bags piled on two
pallets situated towards the front of the trailer, and was to be delivered
to New Jersey as soon as Casket Shells unloaded its copper sheets.
Waering has offered the following account of his exposure to the
potassium metabisulfite. After the truck was properly positioned in the
open air unloading area, Waering drove his forklift into the truck to
remove the first crate of copper, located in the rear of the truck
approximately seven feet from the doors. While in the truck, he noticed a
foreign taste in his mouth and a strange odor which he could only
describe as "like nothing I'd ever smelled before." From his seat on the
forklift Waering could see over the one foot high crate to the second
crate, which lay two or three feet further from the truck doors. He also
observed the pallets of bagged potassium metabisulfite a few feet beyond
the second crate. The white bags, which were piled three or four feet
high and partially covered in shrink wrap, did not appear to be damaged.
Upon removing the first crate, Wearing mentioned to the driver that
there was a strange smell in the truck. The driver agreed that the truck
had a strange smell. Waering believes — though he is unsure — that
he also asked the driver about the cause of the smell. Regardless of
whether Wearing inquired, the driver did not provide any further
information, and Waering did not ask to see any written information
concerning the contents of the white bags. Instead, Waering re-entered
the truck to retrieve the second crate of copper.
As Waering was backing out of the truck with the second crate, his nose
began to run. He deposited the crate, signed the shipment manifest, and
went to a restroom to blow his nose. Immediately after blowing his
nose, Waering was overcome by a fit of coughing which increased in
intensity until his coworkers became alarmed and rushed him to a
hospital. He was successfully treated at the hospital and released later
that morning. However, Waering alleges that he has permanently
contracted asthma as a result of his exposure.
The Waerings filed the original complaint in this action on June 3,
1999. The following claims form the heart of their lawsuit: 1) that BASF
negligently packaged the potassium metabisulfite for shipping; 2) that
Golden acted negligently in shipping the chemical; 3) that both
defendants negligently failed to warn Waering of the risk of harm from
exposure to the substance; and 4) that both defendants are strictly
liable for supplying a product which was defective and unreasonably
dangerous due to poor packaging and inadequate warnings. On December
10, 1999, this court granted Golden's motion to dismiss the products
liability claim against it, finding that Golden was not a "seller" of the
potassium metabisulfite under Pennsylvania law and thus not subject to
strict liability for the harm the chemical may have caused. (Doc. 23.)
The Waerings filed an amended complaint on December 20, 1999, (Doc. 24),
and this court granted Golden's motion to join warehouser Sterling as a
third-party defendant on February 24, 2000, (Doc. 39). BASF, Golden and
Sterling subsequently filed separate motions for summary judgement,
arguing that the Waerings' negligence and strict liability claims are
preempted by federal law and that the evidence in the record is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. (Docs. 55, 53,
64.) Defendants' summary judgment motions are now ripe for disposition
A party is entitled to summary judgment if "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together
with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Where there is no material fact in
dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law under the uncontested facts. On the other
hand, where the parties dispute facts material to the lawsuit, the moving
party must establish that the factual dispute is not genuine, that is,
that the evidence adduced by the parties is such that no reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party under the governing
evidentiary standard. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248-53, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
BASF, Golden and Sterling first argue that the Waerings' common law
claims are preempted by the federal Hazardous Materials Transportation
Authorization Act of 1994, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. and
sometimes referred to as the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
(HMTA). The HMTA expressly preempts any state law "about" the subject of
"packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking and placarding of
hazardous material" which "is not substantively the same as a provision
of this [Act] or a regulation proscribed under this [Act]."
49 U.S.C. § 5125(b)(1)(B). The Act authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation to designate materials as hazardous and to promulgate
regulations governing their safe transportation. See 49 U.S.C. § 5103.
Because potassium metabisulfite is not listed on the
Transportation's Hazardous Materials List, see 49 C.F.R. § 172.101,
Defendants argue that common law claims springing from improper packing,
handling or labeling of potassium metabisulfite would place requirements
on regulated parties different from those imposed under the HMTA.
Therefore, the argument goes, such common law claims are preempted by
§ 5125.
The Supremacy Clause of Article IV of the Constitution operates to make
any state law that conflicts with federal law "without effect." Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2128, 68 L.Ed.2d 576
(1981). In deciding whether a state law has been preempted by federal
law, the touchstone of the court's analysis is the purpose and intent of
Congress. Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct.
219, 222, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). However, where Congress has enacted a
provision which expressly addresses the preemption of state law, the court
need not look beyond the language of that provision to ascertain
Congress' intent. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517,
112 S.Ct. 2608, 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992).
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d
700 (1996), the Supreme Court considered whether the preemption provision
of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) preempted common law
negligence and strict liability claims arising from the malfunction of
the plaintiff's pacemaker. That provision expressly preempts any state
"requirement" established "with respect to a device" which differs from a
federal requirement, though it grants the Food and Drug Administration
the discretion to exempt certain state requirements from preemption. See
21 U.S.C. § 360k. Critical to the Medtronic court's analysis was the
fact that the federal regulations in question were general in nature and
did not reflect a decision by the federal government as to the specifics
of how pacemakers should be labeled or manufactured. 518 U.S. at 494-95,
501, 116 S.Ct. at 2254, 2258. Further, the plaintiffs' claims in
Medtronic were not founded on state requirements specifically aimed at
the manufacture and labeling of medical devices, but on the general
common law doctrines of negligence and strict liability, doctrines not
limited to the medical device context nor developed "with respect to"
medical devices. Id. The high court reasoned:
The legal duty that is the predicate for the
[plaintiffs'] negligent manufacturing claim is the
general duty of every manufacturer to use due care to
avoid foreseeable dangers in its products. Similarly,
the predicate for the failure to warn claim is the
general duty to inform users and purchasers of
potentially dangerous items of the risks involved in
their use. These general obligations are no more
threat to federal requirements than would be a
state-law duty to comply with local fire prevention
regulations and zoning codes, or to use due care in
the training and supervision of a work force. These
state requirements therefore escape preemption, not
because the source of the duty is a judge — made common
law rule, ...