Source: http://openjurist.org/388/f2d/434
Timestamp: 2013-05-20 17:04:08
Document Index: 689926097

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 182', '§ 1304', '§ 3', '§ 10', '§ 183', '§ 1304', '§ 1304', '§ 3', '§ 1304']

388 F2d 434 Federazione Italiana Dei Corsorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania De Vapores S a | OpenJurist
388 F. 2d 434 - Federazione Italiana Dei Corsorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania De Vapores S a	Home388 f2d 434 federazione italiana dei corsorzi agrari v. mandask compania de vapores s a
388 F2d 434 Federazione Italiana Dei Corsorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania De Vapores S a 388 F.2d 434
FEDERAZIONE ITALIANA DEI CORSORZI AGRARI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees and Appellants,v.MANDASK COMPANIA DE VAPORES, S. A., Defendant-Appellant and Appellee.
Docket 31131.
Argued October 25, 1967.
Edward L. Smith, New York City (Kirlin, Campbell & Keating, Walter P. Hickey, and David A. Nourse, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees and appellants.
David C. Wood, New York City (Hill, Betts, Yamaoka, Freehill & Longcope, Eugene F. Gilligan, and Francis L. Gannon, New York City, on the brief), for defendant-appellant and appellee.
This action to recover for the loss of a cargo of soybean oil was originally tried before the late Judge Archie O. Dawson, who entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs but limited liability.1 On appeal, this court reversed and remanded because the findings of fact did not make clear apparent inconsistencies between the issue of defendant's due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy and the issue of limitation of liability2 nor were those two issues discussed in the opinion at all.
At the second trial the shipowner defendant denied unseaworthiness, claimed due diligence in its effort to assure seaworthiness of the vessel when it broke ground to put to sea and claimed that any liability should be limited. In addition, as it did in the first trial the defendant relied principally upon the defense of fire, not caused by the design or neglect of the owner, as provided in the fire statute, 46 U.S.C. § 182, and in the fire exception of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (b) (1958). Judge Croake concluded that the fire had nothing to do with the loss of the vessel and cargo, that the ship was unseaworthy, that the owner had not shown due diligence in making the ship seaworthy, and he denied limitation of liability.3 We affirm.
It is not disputed that the cargo was delivered to the carrier in good order and that subsequently it was entirely lost when the ship sank in fair weather and calm seas. Under these circumstances it is presumed that the loss was occasioned by the unseaworthiness of the Perama. Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 62 S.Ct. 156, 86 L.Ed. 89 (1941); South, Inc. v. Moran Towing and Transportation Co., 360 F.2d 1002 (2 Cir. 1966); Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426 (2 Cir. 1962). The defendant-appellant could therefore escape liability only by sustaining the burden of proving one of its defenses4 which were that the facts brought the case within the fire exception under the COGSA or the provisions of the fire statute, or that it had exercised due diligence to make the Perama seaworthy before she broke ground and put to sea, or that it was entitled to limitation of liability.
The trial court in its opinion discussed the evidence and found facts from which it concluded that the Perama was lost because of her unseaworthy condition. There was sufficient evidence to support the findings and the conclusion logically followed. There is certainly no basis for a holding of clear error. The appellant argues that cracks in the hull could come only from brittle steel, that the evidence demonstrated that there was no brittle steel whatever in the Perama and that therefore any cracks which appeared could have been caused only by fire and explosion. But the appellant failed to prove that fire and explosion had anything to do with cracking the steel plates and the proposition that, absent some outside force as a procuring cause, no steel plates of pre-World War II riveted ships could crack is, of course, entirely untenable in view of the many cases in which cracks appeared in steel plates in such vessels. The appellant never offered proof of the chemical composition or other intrinsic characteristics of the hull plates of the Perama, but it asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in stating that the tanker's "pre-war plating was presumably of pre-war sensitivity and susceptibility to brittle fracture. * * *" This amounts to no more than a criticism of the use of words. For want of a better one the court mentioned a brittle fracture as distinct from ductile crack, i. e., one resulting from bending or drawing out the steel. There was little or no evidence that the cracks observed were ductile cracks and the court was not wrong in finding, in effect, that they were non-ductile. What such cracks should be called — whether brittle cracks or fractures or ordinary fissures — should not be determinative of this case. Even if the court were wrong in calling them brittle cracks, it would not change the result. The undisputed facts are that after the first voyage cracks appeared in some of the transverse bulkheads and had to be repaired at the Todd Shipyard; on the day of the sinking cracks appeared in the hull and a bulkhead in the engine room and in the hull in the pump room. A crack had also been observed in a deck plate in the after part of the ship.
The essence of the trial court's decision is that the extensive replacement of plates by welding in the hull of a riveted ship, including the replacement of all of the "H" or the "wind and water" strakes, adjacent to cargo spaces, with welded plates, set up stresses within the hull between the fixed and rigid areas of welded plates and the less rigid riveted areas which resulted in cracking in various parts of the hull and the internal structures. Just when and where such stresses in the hull will produce cracks — whether near to or distant from the place of repair — cannot usually be determined, but the substitution of large areas in a riveted hull with welded plates is likely to cause cracks. The court, in effect, found that this is what happened in the present case. The evidence of what was observed to have happened and expert opinion support this conclusion. We find no error in it.
The appellant claims that in any event it cannot be held liable for the loss because it exercised due diligence to make the Perama seaworthy.5 In seeking to fulfill its burden of proof of this defense, it produced evidence to show that it had fully complied with the recommendations of the American Bureau of Shipping to make the vessel seaworthy and that it contracted to have the work done by a reputable shipyard, Alabama Shipyard & Dry Dock Company. The appellees, on the other hand, argue that the sole function of the American Bureau of Shipping was to advise as to the work needed to make the vessel comply with the Bureau's own classification rules and to inspect to see that the work required was performed. The trial court held that the responsibility for exercising due diligence in making the ship seaworthy could not be delegated to others, that the appellant had present, and in charge of the repairs, fully authorized representatives who acted as and for the corporation,6 that it offered no satisfactory or persuasive explanation for the deficiencies in the repair work which made the ship crack-prone, and that the appellant had therefore failed in its burden of proving due diligence. General Motors Corp. v. The Olancho, 115 F.Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y.1953), affirmed on opinion below 220 F.2d 278 (2 Cir. 1955); Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty (1957) § 3-27, p. 129.
The appellant, in describing the repair work done by the Alabama yard, said that internally the cargo tank bulkheads and framing were almost entirely renewed. After the first voyage, however, cracks appeared in the transverse bulkheads of several of her cargo tanks and had to be repaired at the Todd Shipyard at New Orleans. Although these were small, they should at least have put the appellant on notice that some stress or strain was causing cracks in newly repaired bulkheads which the appellant considered to have been of the highest quality of material and workmanship. But there is nothing to indicate that any special effort was made to investigate or determine the cause of these cracks in the newly installed steel plates. We see no reason to reverse the trial court's conclusion that the appellant failed to sustain its burden of showing due diligence. Ionion Steamship Co. of Athens v. United Distillers of America, Inc., 236 F.2d 78, 83-84 (5th Cir. 1956).
The trial court also denied limitation of liability. It found, as above stated, that because of a lack of due diligence on the part of the appellant the Perama was sent to sea in an unseaworthy condition. This alone is a sufficient basis for denying limitation of liability. The Perama left port in a condition within the basic sense of unseaworthiness as her vulnerability to cracks in her hull exposed her to the grave risk of sinking. The corporate owner's duty to make the vessel seaworthy, at least to the point of providing it with sufficient integrity to meet the ordinary perils of the sea, is not delegable to anyone. Under the circumstances of this case the appellant is held to have knowledge and privity as a matter of law. States Steamship Company v. United States, 259 F.2d 458 (9 Cir. 1958); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Charleston Lighterage & Transfer Co., 193 F.2d 539 (4 Cir. 1952); Gilmore & Black, supra, § 10-24, pp. 701, 702.
The judgment below in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees, from which the defendant-appellant appealed, is affirmed.
The appellees have cross-appealed from the district court's order referring the case to a commissioner to compute damages. No reason is given in the court's order or in a memorandum to show why the reference was necessary. Inasmuch as exhibits were put in evidence by stipulation showing the sale price of the cargo, the freight for transportation from Baton Rouge to Genoa and the insurance paid by the shipper, there appear to be no exceptional conditions which would call for such a reference. Rule 53(b), F.R.Civ.P. The district court's order appointing a commissioner to ascertain damages is therefore reversed, and it is directed to enter judgment for $4,623,053.70 with interest at 6% per annum from January 25, 1967 and costs in favor of the appellees and against the appellant.
1965 AMC 982
342 F.2d 215 (2 Cir. 1965)
46 U.S.C. § 183
COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(1) and § 1304(2) (q); Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty (1957), § 3-43, p. 162
46 U.S.C. § 1304(1)
The representatives of the defendant-appellee corporation, who were present at the Alabama Shipyard a substantial part of the time during which the repairs of which they were in charge were being made, were sufficiently high in the managerial hierarchy of the appellant so that their general and detailed knowledge and their close privity to the repair project was imputed to the corporation. Mr. Stavraka, a surveyor, was engaged by the appellant to represent it and supervise the repair work. His testimony disclosed that he had a great range of authority and had a great deal to do with the extent and nature of the repairs made. Mr. Sideratos, the appellant's president, frequently visited the Alabama yard and was constantly consulted and kept fully advised of the plans and how they were being carried out. Plenary authority, similar to that given Mr. Stavraka, was given Mr. Kanapaus, the marine surveyor who represented the appellant for the repairs made at the Todd Shipyard at New Orleans. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410, 63 S.Ct. 291, 87 L.Ed. 363 (1942)
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