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NORSOK Safety.pdf | Fire Sprinkler System | Safety
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Safety design of offshore installations for petroleum production (Norwegian Offshore Sector)
Ex Heb Dev Plan Concept
Regenerative Feed-water Heaters _ Power4you
Automatic Sprinkler Systems (1)
2 Crude storage 11.LIVING QUARTERS (NORMATIVE) ANNEX J . 12.7 Topside/floater interface 12 NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS 12.4 System requirements. Jan. 3.PROTECTION OF PRESSURE VESSELS AND PROCESS PIPING AGAINST FIRE (NORMATIVE) 55 ANNEX H .FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM (NORMATIVE) ANNEX I .1 General 11.1 Fire and Explosion strategy (FES) 10.FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET (INFORMATIVE) ANNEX K .NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS (INFORMATIVE) 57 62 63 64 NORSOK standard Page 2 of 66 .7 Active Fire Protection 10.INFORMATIVE REFERENCES (INFORMATIVE) ANNEX B . DRILLING AND STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 11.3 Layout 11.3 Requirements for passive fire protection of equipment.6 Emergency re-positioning 11. 2000 26 26 27 27 27 28 28 31 32 32 33 33 33 34 34 34 34 34 35 35 36 37 38 39 42 44 48 10. 10. piping and secondary structures. FES 10.1 General 12. management and documentation.MISCELLANIOUS SAFETY EQUIPMENT (NORMATIVE) ANNEX D . 11 SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING PRODUCTION.3 Design principles 12.2 Safety evaluation. ANNEX A .4 Fire technical requirements relating to materials 10.FIRE AND GAS DETECTION (NORMATIVE) ANNEX G .6 Storage and handling of explosives 10.5 Passive fire protection 10.LAYOUT (NORMATIVE) ANNEX E .2 General requirements to fireprotection.4 Turret 11.EVACUATION (NORMATIVE) ANNEX C .Technical Safety S-001 Rev.8 Explosion protection.PRESSURE RELIEF (NORMATIVE) ANNEX F .5 Drainage/Ballast water systems 11.
Where relevant. Subject to implementation into international standards. to develop standards that ensure adequate safety. J. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this standard is to present the principles and requirements for safety design of offshore installations for production of petroleum. The NORSOK standards make extensive references to international standards. The NORSOK standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry as a part of the NORSOK initiative and supported by OLF (The Norwegian Oil Industry Association) and TBL (Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries). the NORSOK standard will be withdrawn. NORSOK standards are administered and issued by NTS (Norwegian Technology Standards Institution). the contents of a NORSOK standard will be used to provide input to the international standardisation process. value adding and cost effectiveness and thus are used in existing and future petroleum industry developments. ISO 13702 presents the general experiences and requirements from the International offshore industry and NORSOK S-001 adds the specific requirements/experiences from the Norwegian operators. e. 3.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. The purpose of NORSOK standards is to contribute to meet the NORSOK goals. Therefore ISO 13702 and NORSOK S-001 have to be read and understood in conjunction with each other. F. E. and K are for information only.g. reduce cost and lead time and eliminate unnecessary activities in offshore field developments and operations. C. 2000 FOREWORD NORSOK (The competitive standing of the Norwegian offshore sector) is the industry initiative to add value. Annexes A. G. Jan. NORSOK standard Page 3 of 66 . Annexes B. H and I form a normat6ive part of this standard. D.
specification for fire type-testing requirements Guidelines for the Development and Application of HSE Management System. Requirements to Working environment are described in NORSOK S-002 2 NORMATIVE REFERENCES The following standards include provisions. Electric apparatus for explosive gas atmosphere. Part 7 area classification Flame spread. This standard will further have to be applied together with NORSOK standards for working environment and environmental care.Part 10 Classification of hazardous areas. fixed platforms. Where applicable this standard may also be used for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units. Electric apparatus for explosive gas atmosphere. Forskrift om kontinentalsokkelflygning – ervervsmessig luftfart til og fra helikopterdekk på faste og flyttbare innretninger til havs. constitute provisions of this NORSOK standard. Jan. semisubmersibles and vessels. which. These methodologies are clarified and detailed in S-001 chapter 4. surface materials and floorings Analysis. International Civil Aviation Organisation Bestemmelser for Sivil Luftfart 5-1.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. design. Installations intended for short term exploration drilling. API 6FA API RP 521 BS 6755 E&P Forum ICAO BSL 5-1 Fire tests for valves Guide for pressure-relieving and depressuring systems Testing of valves. environment and material assets. Latest issue of the references shall be used unless otherwise agreed. shuttle of crude to harbour and general service are not covered by this standard.Part 13 Construction and use of rooms or buildings protected by pressurisation. The principles and requirements for safety evaluation and safety management are described in ISO 13702 Chapter 4 while the objectives and functional requirements to installation layout are described in chapter 5.Electrical installations. 2000 1 SCOPE This NORSOK standard for Technical Safety describes the principles and requirements for the development of the safety design for offshore production installations. 3. Mobile and fixed offshore units. installation and testing of basic surface safety systems for offshore production platforms. This Standard together with ISO 13702 " Control and mitigation of fires and explosionsrequirements and guidelines" defines the required standard for implementation of technologies and emergency preparedness to establish and maintain an adequate level of safety for personnel. Requirements to Risk and Emergency Preparedness Analyses are described in NORSOK Z-013 and are referenced concerning required input to the design process. Other recognised standards may be used provided it can be shown that they meet or exceed the requirements of the standards referenced below. through references in this text. Page 4 of 66 IEC 60079-10 IEC 60079-13 IEC 61892-7 IMO Resolution A653 ISO 10418 NORSOK standard .
training. or damage to environment or assets.and high-expansion foam systems National Fire Protection Association part 13 Installation of sprinkler systems National Fire Protection Association part 14 Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems National Fire Protection Association part 16 Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems and Foam-Water Spray Systems Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps National Fire Protection Association part 72 National Fire Alarm Code Living quarters area Architectural components and equipment HVAC (Heating. National Fire Protection Association part 11 Standard for medium. Regularity. based on the activity’s dimensioning NORSOK standard Page 5 of 66 . Process Design Working Environment Environmental Care Safety equipment data sheets Telecom Subsystems Risk and emergency preparedness analysis. 3. ventilation and air conditioning) Safety and Automation Systems (SAS) Piping Design. Layout and Stress Analysis Surface Preparation and Protective Coating.1 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS Definition Acceptance Criteria for risk Criteria that are used to express a risk level that is considered acceptable for the activity in question. Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installationsControl and mitigation of fires and explosions — Requirements and guidelines.Reaction to fire .physical (procedures. inspection. Barriers may be physical. Fire tests .Technical Safety S-001 Rev. physical or casual. Barrier A measure which reduces the probability of realising a hazards potential for harm and of reducing its consequences. protective devices shields. Jan. Accidental event Event or chain of events that may cause loss of life. 2000 (Replaces API RP14 C). Defined situations of A selection of possible events that the emergency preparedness in the hazard and accident (DFU) activity should be able to handle.Rate of heat release from building products. health. whether material. management & reliability technology ISO 13702 ISO 5660 NFPA 11A NFPA 13 NFPA 14 NFPA 16 NFPA 20 NFPA 72 NORSOK C-001 NORSOK C-002 NORSOK H-001 NORSOK I-CR-002 NORSOK L-002 NORSOK M-501 NORSOK P-001 NORSOK S-002 NORSOK S-003 NORSOK S-011 NORSOK T-100 NORSOK Z-013 NORSOK Z-016 3 3. drills) Can Verbal form used for statements of possibility and capability. limited to the high level expressions of risk. segregation etc) or non . (materials.
fuel pipes/tanks and control systems. i. dimensioning and use of installations and the activity at large. Potential for human injury. risers. The pressure generated by violent combustion of a flammable gas or mist which generates pressure effects due to confinement of the combustion induced flow and/or the acceleration of the flame front by obstacles in the flame front. boundaries and exclusions defining the performance of the product. Explosion which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria represents an unacceptable risk. water inlets with filters. Page 6 of 66 Dimensional explosion Dimensional Fire Dimensioning accidental events (DUH) Dimensioning accidental load (DUL) Dimensioning explosion Dimensioning fire Emergency lighting Emergency power system Emergency service areas Explosion load External communication Systems Fire load Fire pump system Functional specification Hazard NORSOK standard . A fire which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria represents an unacceptable risk. Jan.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. and which consequently serves as a basis for design and operation of installations and for the implementation of the relevant activity in general. process conditions. This includes generators. process or service. fire pumps.e. which supplies water for fire-fighting system. accumulators etc. power sources. The most severe accidental load that the function or system shall be able to withstand during a required period of time. Systems which ensure necessary communication to and from the installation. Lighting which will ensure adequate light conditions on the installation in the event of failure of the main power supply. hydraulic pumps. including materials in walls. System to ensure continuos power supply to important equipment in the event of failure of the main power supply. The total system. The total quantity of heat released in the case of complete combustion of all combustible materials in an area. Accidental events that serve as the basis for layout. damage to property or a combination of these. damage to the environment. in order to meet the defined risk acceptance criteria Explosion. power transmissions. As defined in ISO 13879 and 13880: Document that specifies the requirements expressed by features. in order to meet the defined risk acceptance criteria. and which consequently serves as a basis for design and operation of installations and for the implementation of relevant activity in general. Safe areas by location where the emergency equipment such as fire pumps emergency generators are located. which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria represents an unacceptable risk and which consequently. serves as a basis for design and operation of installations and for the implementation of relevant activity in general. 3. decks and ceiling. A fire which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria represents an unacceptable risk. control panels. characteristics. 2000 accidental situations associated with a temporary increase of risk and less extensive accidental events. and which consequently serves as a basis for design and operation of installations and for the implementation of the relevant activity in general.
Verbal form used to indicate that among several possibilities one is recommended as particularly suitable. Work area or work place that is not permanently or intermittently manned. Work area or work place manned at least 8 hours a day for at least 50 per cent of the installation’s operation time. Jan. and which possesses adequate competence and experience within that field. The hazards register also provides references to more detailed information relevant to a particular hazard. the Norwegian initiative to reduce cost on offshore projects. Norsk Sokkels Konkurranseposisjon. A document providing a brief. without mentioning or excluding others. 3. or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required. Verbal form used to indicate requirements strictly to be followed in order to conform to the standard and from which no deviation is permitted. 2000 Process whereby the results of hazard analyses are considered against either judgement. unless accepted by all involved parties. but complete. maintenance or other work is planned to last at least two hours a day for at least 50 per cent of the installation’s operation time. Work area or work place where inspection. overview of the identified hazards and the measures necessary to manage them. A place provided where personnel can take refuge for a predetermined period whilst investigations. NORSOK standard Page 7 of 66 . the Competitive standing of the Norwegian Offshore Sector. standards. Where this is not unambiguous. Shall mean normative (a requirement) in the application of NORSOK Standards. the definition in this standard shall be used. emergency response and evacuation pre-planning are undertaken. Verbal form used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the standard. Hazard assessment Hazards Register Informative references Intermittently manned Internal communication Systems May Normally not manned Normative references NORSOK Permanently manned Recognised institution Shall Should Temporary Refuge (TR) All terms and phrases within the scope of this standard shall be regarded as defined in the regulations and international codes and standards referred to in this document. or criteria which have been developed as basis for decision making. Shall mean informative in the application of NORSOK Standards. An institution which is internationally and/or nationally recognised within a professional field. Systems which ensure that messages can be communicated to and from various areas on the installation.Technical Safety S-001 Rev.
Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Bonn RP Recommended practice SAS Safety and Automation Systems TR Temporary Refuge UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply UV Ultra Violet VDU Visual Display Unit NORSOK standard Page 8 of 66 . Safety and Environment HVAC Heating.. Jan. Ventilation and Air Conditioning IEC International Electrotechnical Commission IMO International maritime organisation IP Institute of Petroleum (UK) IR Infra Red KO Knock Out LEL Lower Explosion Limit LQ Living Quarter MOB Man Over Board MSF Module support frame NFPA National Fire Protection Association (US) NNMI Normally Not Manned Installations NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate PA Public Address PCDA Process control and data acquisition PCS Process Control System PSD Process Shut Down RAL Deutches Institut fur Gutesicherung und Kennzeichnung e.V. 2000 3.2 Abbreviations AFFF Aqueous film forming foam API American Petroleum Institute (US) APS Abandon Platform Shutdown ASC Area safety charts BOP Blow Out Preventer CCR Central Control Room CFD Computerised flow dynamic DAL Design Accidental Load DHSV Down Hole Safety Valve DUH Dimensioning Accidental Event DUL Dimensioning Accidental Load EERS Evacuation. Escape and Rescue Strategy (ISO 13702) ESD Emergency Shut Down ESDV Emergency Shut Down Valve F&G Fire and Gas FES Fire Explosion Strategy (ISO 13702) FPDS Fire protection data sheet HAZID Hazard identification HAZOP Hzard and operability HC Hydrocarbons HSE Health. 3.
Risk and emergency preparedness analysis shall be carried out with the objective to identify the hazards. when relevant. 4. execution and use of risk and emergency preparedness analysis. Timing.2 Risk reduction principles The probability reducing measures shall be given priority over consequence reducing measures. Jan.g. leading to leaks and releases of hazardous substances. scope and method of risk and emergency preparedness analysis shall allow for the analysis to be both a tool for decision making as well as. their frequency. e. a verification of acceptance criteria being met through implementation of technical and operational safety requirements. e. by elimination of complexity that may lead to human failure • Failure mechanisms. maintainability and recognisability e. not necessarily achieved through a standard design. ignitions or mechanisms reducing the reliability and survivability of barriers and safety systems. Therefore a fit for purpose approach shall be performed through consideration of possible Hazards and Hazardous events in the design. 3. This program shall among other issues address the follow up and closing of specific safety problem areas. • Escalation prevention. environmental conditions. whereas the project risk acceptance criteria are reflecting the maximum risk level. This process shall be documented. operational aspects. in a Hazards Register. This is because the safety level depends on several factors. partly outside the range of standardisation.4).g. Safety objectives established by operator/project other than those specified by this NORSOK standard and ISO 13702 shall be identified and expressed in the form of design objectivesand performance standards (See 4. by safety barriers • Experience retention from operational reliability and incident databases. comprehensibility. Safety and Environmental Program (HSE) shall be developed according to the E&P forum guideline: “Guidelines for the Development and Application of HSE Management Systems”. The FES shall reflect the mitigating and consequence reduction measures to be implemented. listed in order of priority: • Inherent safety • Simplicity. E. MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION 4.g. These shall be developed specifically for each development or modification project. NORSOK standard Page 9 of 66 .3 Analyses and optimisation The design principles presented in clauses 5 to 12 reflect a normally adequate standard for safe design.g. 4. and new technology. causes and consequeces and to verify that the risk acceptance criteria are met.g. e. Ambient conditions (normal operations or emergencies) shall be clearly defined and included in requirements to equipment and systems covered by this standard. 2000 4 SAFETY EVALUATION. The incorporation of this overall principle in the design calls for consideration of the following. detailed layout and arrangement.1 General A Health. The Hazards and Hazardous events shall be systematically identified and updated regularly along with the development of the project. NORSOK Z-013 states the requirements on the planning.Technical Safety S-001 Rev.
Escape and Rescue strategy). Safety arrangements drawings as follows: . EERS (Evacuation. Performance Standard for Safety systems. Jan.Active fire protection Safety interface documents shall be produced where relevant to demonstrate how these safety requirements are met. Cost/benefit evaluation should be applied to study different design alternatives. 4. 3. 8.Escape ways. Documentation should be produced as follows. 3. .schedule of sources . Fire and gas detection arrangements. standards and norms as required by the internal control system and to document the basis and assumptions for Risk and Emergency preparedness evaluations.4 Documentation The safety design shall be documented to present how the design fulfils regulations.8. 7. e.Fixed platform and mobile offshore units. See Note 1 Design accidental load requirements Documented sectionalisation of the process plant including categorization and location of ESD and PSD valves. 4. . e.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. 5. The effects from fires and explosions on operation and stability on ESD. Fire & Gas detection and PA/alarm systems are typical examples of targets for such analysis. Reliability/sensitivity/availability/vulnerability analyses for safety systems 10. 6. 2000 A vulnerability/availability analysis shall be carried out to ensure that safety critical systems and functions maintain their integrity and perform their duty during credible accident scenarios for the time period their functions are required.Fixed platform and storage units .Passive fire and blast protection. See NORSOK Z-013 and NORSOK Z-016. modifications and development of the facility. Further. HSE program FES (Fire and Explosion Strategy). but with the necessary additions where this is considered necessary the particular needs of each project.3. Safety evaluations as required by this standard shall be documented. means of evacuation .g. the project documentation provides the basis and necessary information for safe operation. HAZOP according to ISO 10418 shall be used as a tool in the system optimisation process to achieve system safety and operability. drilling rig or accommodation rig. muster areas.Miscellaneous safety equipment. .Area classification.g. Fire Protection Data Sheets / Area Safety Charts 9. between: .Different contractors. 1. 2. The documentation may be one or several documents. NORSOK standard Page 10 of 66 . See NORSOK Z-013 Clause 5.
2000 Note 1 Performance standard for Safety systems shall define the functional and specific requirements for the design of the ESD/PSD/F&G systems. In addition to the requirements in the referred standards the following requirements shall apply: All evacuation equipment shall be type approved according to SOLAS and national maritime regulatory requirements. 5.g. Bridge to neighbouring installation Number. The minimum number of free fall lifeboats for fixed installations available during a dimensional accidental event shall be corresponding to the maximum number of personnel (100%) on board plus one additional boat.1 Introduction An EERS shall be developed for the installation based on ISO 13702 Chapter 4/Annex B 12 and Emergency preparedness analyses as described in NORSOK Z-013. and emergency preparedness analysis. Escape chute with life raft. size and location of evacuation means shall be established based on manning.2 Evacuation The requirements relating to safe evacuation will be met by using a combination of means of evacuation according to current practice i. If there is an additional lifeboat located in an area on the installation other than the main evacuation area. The EERS for the installation will define and document the adequate strategy and requirements to escape evacuation and rescue installations and equipment. The time for evacuation. as the additional lifeboat required NORSOK standard Page 11 of 66 . The layout of presentation mimics and monitors in the Central Control Room shall consider management of emergency situations. - - See Annex B for details relating to evacuation principles.e. 3. firewater system. Free fall lifeboats. Jan.: a) b) c) d) Helicopter. designed accordingly. The design of the facilities shall consider and cater for an effective execution of the Emergency Preparedness activities. Further it will be presented how these systems is meant to work together to minimize escalation and consequences of mishaps and accidents.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. risk exposure of escape routes towards main shelter area). radiation shields etc. Latter is meant to provide escape for the damage control team. 5 EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 5. this lifeboat shall not be counted. risk analyses (e. HVAC and isolation of ignition sources. together with the required search and rescue operations shall be established and the escape routes and other facilities as firewalls.
plus the significant dynamic heel in the same weather and accidental condition. Other combinations will be acceptable as proven by the emergency preparedness analyses. • Routing of liquid piping of any kind is not allowed through electrical. instrument and control room • Routing of hydrocarbon piping within emergency service areas shall be limited to diesel fuel supply lines for the emergency services themselves. • The wellhead area should be located and designed so as to allow for external fire fighting assistance. The distance between lifeboats and escape chute shall be large enough to ensure that a dropped boat will not hit a lowered escape chute.3 Rescue Generally the installation shall be covered by one Man Overboard Boats (MOB`s). 5. The manning to be considered shall comprise all personnel on board. 2000 The number of free fall lifeboats for floating installations shall correspond to the maximum number of people onboard and be available in design weather conditions and with dimensional accidental heel angels. Good access to areas and equipment shall be ensured in order to achieve effective manual fire fighting both from the installation and by external assistance. This one should be evaluated for use together with the one on the stand by vessel. Utilisation of the deck crane to lift the MOB on to the installation shall be evaluated. • Routing of hydrocarbon piping is not allowed in the living quarter areas. Jan.1 General requirements Reference is given to clauses 5. 3. The functional requirements for time from man overboard alaram until being seaborn shall be defined by the emergency preparedness analyses. with a preference to open naturally ventilated areas. By lowering the chute. • Routing of hydrocarbon piping to. including day visitors.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. One flange connection can be arranged in each fuel line to combustion engines in utility the area. The main principles for layouts are listed below. • Allow for identification of the blowing well in a possible blow out situation. orientation and location of equipment and functions. The total life raft capacity at escape chutes shall as a minimum correspond to the total number of personnel (100%) on board as documented in the EERS and according to the emergency preparedness analyses. the utility area shall be minimised and flanges avoided. or through. 6 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT 6. • The use of explosion panels and weather protection shields shall be kept to a minimum. • The utility area should serve as a barrier between hazardous areas and LQ/emergency service areas. For detailed recommendations related to safety equipment see Annex C. 7 and 13 in ISO 13702 for layout. For further details see Annex D. Where such arrangements are likely to cause an unacceptable working environment special solutions such as erection of temporary shields for maintenance operations should be considered. The life raft and boarding rafts shall be lowered together with the chute. NORSOK standard Page 12 of 66 . the boarding chute shall automatically inflate.
2000 • Where explosions panels. Where certified safe type apparatus is not available. the possible utilisation of fire fighting vessels during emergencies should be considered. All electrical equipment in naturally ventilated areas shall be certified safe type apparatus. A strategy for active control of possible smoke from fire in living quarters. 6.g.4 HVAC Natural ventilation and open modules shall be preferred and the effect of natural ventilation shall be assessed and documented. 6. escape of flammable substances during maintenance and workover operations.1. and minimum 3 m from any zones 2 boundary. Marking shall show the preferred direction of escape. continuous or periodic venting. ref.3 Escape routes The escape routes and the temporary refuge shall be in accordance with ISO 13702 clause 14. i. For design principles related to pressurisation of rooms. The classification of hazardous areas shall be based on events and situations associated with normal platform operations.1 Area classification 6. NORSOK H-001 HVAC. 3. e. For large manned installations the escape route system and the temporary refuge (TR) shall be available for at least 1 hour. NORSOK standard Page 13 of 66 . the apparatus shall be electrically isolated on single gas detection or confirmed gas detection dependent on the importance of the equipment. two parallel 100mm wide yellow lines shall be painted indicating the width of the escape route. Jan.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. walls or shields are provided. Escape routes on decks shall be provided with a non-skid. oil resistant coating in the “safety yellow colour” RAL 1023. Gases with molecular weight between 21 and 35 shall be regarded as both heavier and lighter than air (molecular weight air = 29). is made to IEC 60079-13 and IEC-61892-7. at least one route of escape from each area not directly affected by the event shall be available. On deck grating. is made to IEC 60079-13. as far as practicable away from possible HC leakage sources. small leaks from flanges and gaskets. All air inlets shall be located in non-hazardous areas.2 Area Classification The definition of hazardous areas shall be in accordance with IEC 60079-10 and IEC 61892-7. Simulation studies or wind tunnel tests should be used for location of main HVAC air inlets to ensure operation of HVAC systems serving quarters and emergency equipment rooms to be minimal affected by smoke and escaped gases from incidents onboard. including signs. Guidelines for the design of escape routes are listed in Annex B. Ref. See Annex D Layout. 6. TR and other mechanically ventilated areas shall be developed and included in the design of HVAC system. For arrangement and protection of non-hazardous rooms with access to hazardous areas. ref. Escape routes shall be well marked. alarms and disconnection upon loss of pressurisation. evaporation from open handling systems.e.
2000 6. pig launchers and receivers and equipment shall be protected from external impact. The helicopter deck should be provided with an AFFF system (Pop-up. NORSOK standard Page 14 of 66 . communication equipment. as an area containing equipment and systems required during emergency conditions. This shall be ensured through the following principles: 1. The equipment necessary during evacuation is of particular importance.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. ballast system and position keeping system. The helicopter deck should have 3 access ways. Details regarding drain system on helicopter deck are covered in Annex D. from dropped objects or missiles due to disintegration of rotating machinery or as found required through analysis. The turbulence effects from wind across and around the installation as well as influence from turbine exhausts and flare/vent shall be considered. Low-pressure equipment containing large amount of liquids should be located and arranged so that exposure to jet fires is minimised. Safedeck or similar). (Ref. If jet fire exposure can not be eliminated. ref. 3. Simulation studies or wind tunnel tests shall be performed during design of new installations or modifications of existing ones. (Approximately 1500 to 1200 mm below the level of the helicopter deck) The helicopter deck surface shall be self-draining type. The system shall be activated and deactivated from the helicopter deck control room.g. Process piping. The arrangement shall be evaluated with the assistance of an experienced helicopter pilot.5 Helicopter deck The helicopter deck is subject to approval by the national civil aviation administration. 3. the need for passive fire protection shall be evaluated. e.65. The friction coefficient on a wet deck shall be minimum 0. emergency generators and emergency power distribution systems. The system shall be functioning according to specification within 20 seconds after activation. 6. emergency ventilation. BSL D 51. 120 degrees). ISO 13702). suitable for use by trolleys. Liquid vessels should be located lower than gas equipment.7.6 Emergency service areas An emergency service area is defined. safety and automation system. The location and protection of these systems as well as system design shall secure operations during and after an emergency condition.7 Process area Fire and explosion evaluations shall be made along with the development of the lay out to minimise the built in escalation potential. Equipment and piping containing high-pressure gas should be located in the upper decks above the Module Support Frame or main hull. This includes firewater systems. A continuous walkway around the helicopter deck edge at a level below helicopter deck surface should be provided. The system shall be protected against unplanned activation. 6. sufficiently separated from each other (one pr. 2. Jan.
or one gas riser together with several oil risers: passive fire protection. such as control panels and hydraulic systems and their related signal paths. 6. NORSOK standard Page 15 of 66 . work over and/or production shall be evaluated in detail taking into account operational procedures to ensure an acceptable safety level of the operation of the installation. • Subsea barriers. and be separated from utility and processing areas in order to minimise the consequences from a blow out. A flare/vent study is required.4 Flaring) will be within acceptance limits in all areas of the installation. 2000 The flare system shall be protected from fire and explosion loads so that its integrity is maintained until the process plant has been depressurised. naturally ventilated areas. structures such as cranes and towers. clause E. with due regard to exposure of operators. • Flanges and instrument connections on the riser side of the ESDV shall not be used on fixed risers. electrical and mechanical equipment and piping.8 Riser area For all hydrocarbon risers. Particular attention should be paid to crane and drill tower wires/structures and personnel in exposed areas. For flexible risers special considerations have to be made. The following means of protection shall be considered: • For two or more gas risers. and to facilitate control of a blow out on the installation. cold vent Flare booms and flare towers shall be located and designed with due attention to all relevant flaring rates and wind conditions to ensure that the heat radiation level (ref.10 Drilling and wellhead area The drilling and well head areas shall be located with maximum distance to the living quarters and areas with emergency equipment and functions. • Utilisation factor 6. flare tower. Annex E. and with hatches directed away from equipment and structures. at the periphery of the platform. protection from external impact such as ship collisions and drifting objects shall be evaluated. Possible collapse of the derrick shall be evaluated. Jan. Consideration shall be given to the protection of well and BOP equipment. Locating the risers behind main support structures or dedicated protection structures may be required to mitigate the risk. • Pig launchers and receivers: location in open. Further the design of the cold vent systems shall cater for heat loads caused by a possible ignition of the discharge.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. 3. The flare flame or hot gases shall not represent a hazard due to increased surface temperature in exposed areas. Simultaneous drilling. identifying the potential effects in all exposed areas. 6. The well heads shall be located as high as practicable and above the main support frame or main hull in order to minimise exposure from a well head fire.9 Flare boom. • ESDV's: location in open naturally ventilated areas as close to the sea as practicable to minimise exposure of the risers from topside accidental events.
• A weight control database shall be maintained to ensure that jacket or hull loads do not exceed their design weight limit.g. flare headers. Ship collision: The possibility of collisions caused by merchant vessels and the need for adequate sea traffic surveillance system shall be evaluated.1 Design accidental loads Accidental loads shall be identified and taken into account in the structural design. The endurance shall not be less than 1 hour. 2000 7 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO STRUCTURAL DESIGN 7. damage to structural elements (damaged condition) or extreme temperatures. 3. based on estimated weight.6. fire ring main. • Dropped objects: Protection of structure to be dimensioned for falling container. For supply vessels operating alongside the installation. ship collision or others. e. from risers or from the sea surface in case of large oil releases to the sea or in case of sub sea gas releases. Jan. as identified by risk analyses. For blow-out/fire on sea concerning floating installations. pipes etc. • • - • Heat loads caused by jet fires or pool fires on the installation or adjacent installation. • Design accidental loads shall be specified in the design accidental load specification. See clause 10. a collision load of 14MJ shall be assumed. vulnerability and criticality of the exposed areas. e. Explosion loads acting on support of pressure vessels. The probability. NORSOK standard Page 16 of 66 . probable drop height. Explosion loads: Explosion loads affecting main structures Explosion loads affecting secondary structures. FLACS. shall be considered. . Fixed installations shall be protected against fire on sea. Explosion loads shall be established by use of recognized computer models.8. Relevant loads are: • Impact loads caused by dropped object.g. • Loads caused by extreme weather. magnitude and potential consequences of identified loads shall be assessed and analysed.Fire: Installations that can be exposed to a dimensioning fire on the sea shall be able to withstand this for a time period sufficient for safe evacuation of the installation. earthquake.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. walls acting as barriers between main areas. ESD valves etc. see clause 11.
Jan. The APS and ESD system shall be separate from the PSD . the two levels of protection shall operate on functionally different basis.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. 3.e. • Process shutdown (PSD). components shall move to. manufactured. The systems shall be designed to avoid cascading effects due to partial shutdown within PSD. As far as possible. I. This principle shall apply to operational errors as well as equipment failure. but shall always include shutdowns on lower levels. Duplication of identical safety devices given different set points does not satisfy the requirement of two levels of protection. control and monitoring. The PSD system shall automatically detect abnormal operating conditions within systems or equipment and initiate actions so that uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons is prevented. Process and auxiliary facilities shall be designed such that no single failure during operations can lead to unacceptable hazardous situations.3 Process safety Two levels of protection according to ISO 10418 shall control abnormal operating conditions leading to potential hydrocarbon release: • Primary level of protection. The safety shutdown system shall be logically divided into three main levels of shutdown: • Abandon platform shutdown (APS). 2000 8 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY FACILITIES 8. The system philosophy shall ensure that the fail safe principle is applied.system For more details reference is given to clause 9.3 Emergency shutdown. shutdown signals should trip all affected systems so that a new abnormality is not developed as a result of the initial trip action. and shall act as a safety barrier in case of malfunction or maloperation of these systems and equipment. or stay in the predetermined safest position upon loss of signal or power. 8. 8.2 Safety shutdown systems A safety shutdown system shall be independent of and in addition to other systems and equipment used for normal operation. i.1 General requirements Process and auxiliary systems shall be designed.e. NORSOK standard Page 17 of 66 . • Secondary level of protection. equipped and installed in such a way that the installations can be operated and maintained safely. Basic system philosophy is that a signal on a certain level should never initiate shutdowns or actions on higher levels. • Emergency shutdown (ESD).
The alarm presentation in CCR should in addition to screens (VDUs) be given on a simple fire and gas mimic. Pressure relief and depressurising of hydrocarbon systems is covered in Annex E.and gas detectors shall be based on defined scenarios. Local F&G display and status facilities shall be provided in the drilling area incorporating F&G monitoring of the drilling facilities. 9 REQUIREMENTS TO SAFETY AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 9. NORSOK standard Page 18 of 66 . can be carried out without disabling the system. The line of actions performed by personnel and automatic safety system during emergencies shall be automatically recorded to the extent it can ease investigations and experience retention after any incident. simulations and actual tests.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. 3. and may vary from equipment shutdown with minimum effect on the production rate. The location of fire . 2000 The degree and extent of a PSD situation will depend on type of abnormality.2 Fire and Gas detection 9. 9. The F&G system shall be designed so that maintenance. Jan. Further details regarding screen presentation is found in NORSOK I-CR-002 Safety and Automation Systems (SAS). function testing etc. With the installation divided into fire areas the design of the F&G system shall presume that each fire area shall be covered by a sufficient number of detectors suitable for detection of probable fires or accidental releases of toxic or flammable gases in the area.2. The gas detection system shall have detectors for hydrogen sulphide in relevant areas on installations where such gas can occur.1 General All F&G detection system display and information facilities shall be centralised. normally the central control room Loop faults and -supervision shall be identified according to NFPA 72. to a total process shutdown.1 General requirements The general requirements to safety and communication systems shall be in accordance with ISO 13702 clause 10 and 14. Detail requirements for F & G system is incorporated in Annex F. and located in a continuously manned area.
2000 9.3 Emergency shutdown 9. For drilling operations see clause 9. the process control function shall be performed completely separate from the ESD functions. NORSOK standard Page 19 of 66 . 3. the valve shall be fire tested in accordance with API 6FA or BS 6755. which could adversely affect valve performance. Emergency shutdown valves that may be exposed to fire shall preferably have metal to metal seats. The ESD hierarchy shall be kept simple with respect to sub-levels. Consideration shall be given to interrelations between fields and installations interconnected e. Instrument tubing from accumulators and hydraulic oil return lines should be protected from mechanical damage. The ESD principle hierarchy presented in figure 9. local to the valve resetting of emergency shutdown valves shall be possible.1 shall be applied for complex installations and used as guidance for simpler installations.3. by pipelines or control systems.4. The installation shall be analysed to identify potential hazardous conditions and their consequences. If other seats are used. Valve leak testing procedures with acceptance criteria shall be developed. This to ease understanding and future updating. An evaluation shall be carried out to determine which system design will represent the highest availability during an emergency shutdown. The design of the emergency shutdown system shall be such as to allow extensive function testing to be carried out without interrupting the operations.2. Due consideration shall be given to the event sequence in relation to the overall installation safety. The critical operating parameters shall be selected and emergency shutdown logic developed. Jan. the signal from the emergency shutdown system shall be conducted to the actuator or to a hydraulic/pneumatic control valve for the actuator separate from the process safety system.g.3. In the detail assessments of ESD philosophy.3. The accumulator capacity should be adequate for at least three operations (close-openclose). If hydraulic or pneumatic accumulators are used to move emergency shutdown valves to safe position. actions associated with time delays in the achievement of a state of no escalation potential shall be identified and the implications on ESD philosophy determined. 9. Pneumatic and hydraulic tubing shall be capable of resisting loads from fire and explosion until they have completed the shut down sequence. only manual.2 ESD valves ESD-valves shall be located and arranged in such a way that the exposure from fires and explosions is minimised.Technical Safety S-001 Rev.1 General References are given to ISO 13702 clause 6. On installations that are normally manned. as advised from the control centre. they should be positioned as close to the valve as possible to ensure the best possible availability. Three main shutdown levels shall be included. Spring return type of valves shall be used when required size is available. The location of ESD valves shall be determined based on the FES. If an ESD valve is connected to the PCS system. see clause 8. If an emergency shutdown valve is used as process safety valve.
The valve shall fail to safe position. Jan.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Usually closed position. NORSOK standard Page 20 of 66 . 3. 2000 Further the following functional requirements apply to ESD valves: • • Local position indicators shall be installed and end position indications presented in the control room through the PSD system.
3. or automatic) Shutdown of: ! Fuel gas supply PSD Figure 9. Low-low instrument air pressure (PALL) Low-low hydraulic pressure (PALL) Isolate all ign.or wellhead fire) ! Riser ESDV s ! Depressurisation (man. Drum LAHH ind.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Manual Push Button Gas/Water heat exchanger tube rupture Fire detection in a hazardous area ! ! Isolate non-Ex equ. communication ! Emergency generator ! Bilge/Ballast pumps Gas detected at local HVAC intake Manual Push Button Gas detected in a non-hazarea ESD1 Shutdown of: ! Main generator ! All non-ex equip. 2000 Manual Push Button APS Activation of: ! DHSV s ! Automatic depressurisation Timerbased shutdown of: ! F&G System ! PA System ! ESD and PSD Systems ! UPS System ! Radio/ext. in area Shutdown fans/heaters and close dampers Start of: ! Emergency generator Gas detected a hazardous area ESD2 Manual Push button K.O. ventilated areas Activation of: ! DHSV (upon riser. Jan. Sources in nat.1 Emergency Shutdown Principle Hierarchy NORSOK standard Page 21 of 66 .
Technical Safety S-001 Rev. shall be left live after APS. 3. process etc. By any other ESD.3 Facilities for Manual Shutdown Manual APS stations shall be located at a few strategic positions such as: • Muster areas • Lifeboat stations • Helicopter deck • CCR • Bridge connections. but give alarm to the responsible drilling personnel. The adverse effects of automatic shutdowns shall be thoroughly evaluated for each case of automatic action that are accepted. A timer shall be provided to allow for systems to remain in operation until evacuation is completed. • Equipment in the living quarter connected to the main power supply. except for burning on the burner boom. Equipment left live in the ESD I situation shall be certified for operation in zone 1 areas. wellheads. which shall be stopped automatically.g. • Emergency generator. Fire or gas detected in rooms critical for the drilling and work-over operations as well as loss of air flow into these rooms shall not give an automatic shutdown.3.1) NORSOK standard Page 22 of 66 .4 Ignition source control Equipment left live after initiation of APS shall be certified for operation in zone 1 areas. • Emergency switch gear. drilling. • Equipment in CCR required for the control of the ESD I situation. (See figure 9. "Low gas alarm" . the drilling and work-over operations shall not be automatically affected. 2000 9.1. Supply of back-up power to the drilling plant in case of main power generation shutdown shall be subject to evaluation. This includes temporary equipment e.4 Shutdown of drilling and work-over operations Shutdowns of drilling and work-over operations should only be manually activated. • Critical equipment for internal/external communication in the living quarter.g. 9. • The need for ESD stations in other rooms and areas shall be evaluated. Only equipment required for the safety operations. 9. Jan. see figure 9. Emergency equipment in LQ and other areas may be left live subject to special considerations. which is located in rooms continuously manned or monitored in emergency situations. Such equipment shall be easily isolated manually from the manned area/room. Manual ESD stations shall be located in essential areas such as: • Exits from areas with hydrocarbon piping and equipment e. combustion engines and electrical sockets including welding sockets. and non.3. Examples of equipment that can be accepted without certification for zone 1 areas are the following equipment located inside or in the vicinity of the Living Quarter.detection anywhere on the installation shall isolate all high-risk ignition sources located in naturally ventilated areas.Ex equipment operated under hot work permit.
2000 Confirmed gas detection at HVAC air intake to local electrical/instrument rooms or emergency generator room shall close inlet dampers.1.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Location. number. The alarm signals shall be in accordance with table 9. Alarm voice communication shall be heard in a surrounding noise level up to 83 dB. 9.5. For zoning of alarms. NORSOK standard Page 23 of 66 . no hot conductors shall be found outside their feeding switchboards when isolated. 3. An audible alarm signal shall always be followed by an announcement on the Public Address system. shut down fan(s). shut down heater(s) and isolate all nonEx equipment inside the respective room.2 found in Annex F. type and effect from alarm systems/equipment/signal shall be easily recognised in any area where distribution of the alarm is required. Audible alarms and messages shall be recognisable in the muster areas even if initiation of the safety systems or the accident itself increases the background noise level.5 Alarm and communication system The objective of the alarm and communication system is to warn and guide personnel as quickly as possible in the event of a hazardous or emergency situation. In areas with noise levels of 85 dB and above the audible alarm shall be supplemented by light signals.1 and F. For above mentioned circuits. Jan. see table F.
Note 3. e. Note 2. Note 1 Frequencies for the different alarms are found in NORSOK T-100 Telecom Subsystems. 3. H2S. local alarm may suffice. on. capable of supplying the consumers with emergency power for at least 18 hours. 3. Indicates Prepare to abandon installation Alarm Type Muster Alarm General Alarm Toxic Gas Alarm Note 1. 0. In addition to automatic starting provisions a manual starting and testing device shall be provided. Local red light at entrance. Local alarm in rooms protected by CO2 or other gases with lethal concentrations. 9.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. The emergency generator shall be exclusively dedicated for supply of emergency power during emergency mode of operation.g. The system shall be designed to give appropriate access priorities. Yellow flashing light or rotating visual lamp Intermittent audible signal of constant frequency. 1 sec. Start and monitoring of the emergency power system shall be possible from the CCR where a matrix panel or dedicated VDU picture shall display the status of the generator.1 sec off). 2000 Table 9. NORSOK standard Page 24 of 66 . The emergency generator system shall be self-contained. Inert gas protected rooms/areas. Important announcement to follow on PA system Notes 1.1 Alarm signals. Radio signal transmission for internal communication shall be catered for allowing communication to and from every location on the installation. Pre warning before release to be considered in inert gas protected rooms. off). Arrangements for black start shall be provided. Gas released. Yellow flashing or rotating visual lamp Local red light at entrance. Jan.1 sec. 2. (1 sec. on. Fire or gas leak or other serious situations Toxic gas.6 Emergency power The emergency power shall be supplied from a diesel engine driven emergency generator. At small local occurrences. Local high freq. tone in room/area and in adjacent room/area providing access. Yellow flashing or rotating visual lamp Intermittent audible signal (0.5. Two level audible tone on PA system. Pre-warning signal shall be used in and at doors to rooms protected by gasses that could be lethal. Alert Signal Continuous audible signal of variable frequency. Gas released.
Item 1 and 3 above do not apply to emergency generator(s) supplying firepump(s) The following equipment/systems should be supplied from the emergency generators. Compressor for instrument air. equipment for emergency power supply is appropriately located and preferably in separate rooms. ISO 13702. overspeeding. The emergency power generation and distribution shall be separated from normal power generation and distribution to the extent that a local fire cannot put both systems out of operation. Fire waters and foams systems (when emergency generators supply fire water/foam pumps. Other active fire protection systems. HVAC smoke ventilation system. 3. Lubrication oil pumps and ventilation fans required for run down of turbines and generators after a shut down Drilling systems (often by separate drilling back-up generator). An uninterrupted power supply (UPS) for emergency equipment and systems shall be installed.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. 2. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Safety and Automation System (SAS) Diesel transfer systems. Emergency lighting. Jan. ref. 4. as required by FES. One deck crane. emergency batteries shall be located in separate rooms in non-hazardous areas except for sealed batteries can be located within emergency switchgear rooms. Sea water utility pumps. Purging systems. 2000 The prime mover for emergency generators can be stopped automatically in the event of: 1.icing systems. the requirements for such systems apply to emergency generators). NORSOK standard Page 25 of 66 . De . 3. PSD system. chargers etc. Bilge pumps. Process control system. Compressors for smoke diver bottles. Emergency batteries shall have a capacity to supply emergency power for a minimum period of 30 minutes. Communication systems. shall be located in separate rooms in non-hazardous areas. emergency generators with distribution boards. 3. The following principles shall be the basis for arrangement/layout of emergency power systems 1. loss of lubricating oil pressure 4. Helicopter landing equipment. gas detection in ventilation air inlet 2. The emergency power distribution system shall be sufficiently protected against fire and explosion to operate during an emergency situation until safe evacuation has been performed. Charging of UPS. table C1. prime movers of emergency equipment with associated equipment shall be located in separate rooms in non-hazardous areas.
1 Fire and Explosion strategy (FES) The FES shall be established together with the lay out and later updated and detailed together with the development of the installation concept. Evacuation equipment. the combustion air inlet is separated from the ventilation air inlet of the room. IMO MODU CODE. Active and passive fire protection shall be arranged to ensure that a fire is prevented from spreading to other areas within a specified period of time and to protect load carrying structure against critical NORSOK standard Page 26 of 66 . The FES shall consider the fire and explosion hazards and describe how the installation will deal with the consequences of these hazards. Safe areas. Chapter 5 provides additional useful guidance. 5.7 Communication through signs and markings Means of communication through signs and markings shall include: a. 10 REQUIREMENTS TO EXPLOSION AND FIRE PROTECTION 10. 8. Jan.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Signs showing the way to or marking the location of the following: 1. exhaust pipes from prime movers of emergency equipment should neither emit sparks nor have a surface temperature which exceeds the ignition temperature of the gas mixture which is produced or stored on the installation. reflection materials/light surfaces that can be recognised visually or by touching. e. Recognised standard for the design of signs is to be found in Norsk Standard (Norwegian Standard) NS-ISO 6309. fuel for prime movers should not represent an explosion hazard under anticipated operating conditions. which shall be efficiently communicated to all personnel on the installation. 2000 5. An emergency preparedness station bill. c. 4.g. Marking by painting. b. FES The specific requirements for fire protection are described in ISO 13702 clause 11 and Annex A and Annex B 8. 3. Safety and first aid equipment 3. 2. Emergency preparedness equipment.2 General requirements to fireprotection. 7. combustion air for prime movers of emergency equipment is supplied from non-hazardous areas. Further the FES will describe the optimisation of passive and active fire protection on one hand and lay out considerations like location of equipment/valves and separation distances on the other. The requirements for the development of a FES are defined below and in ISO 13702 clause 4. Evacuation routes. 6. Muster stations Text on signs shall be both in English and Norwegian. a characteristic roughness. 6. 9. 10.
A procedure for evaluation of protection of pressure vessels and process piping is included in Annex G. If fire technical calculations indicate that the outer surfaces of living quarters in the event of a dimensioning fire may be subjected to a heat flux exceeding 100 kW/m2. In addition. the properties of the product with regard to flame spread shall be considered. such materials shall have limited flame spread properties. Materials used in the living quarters should to the extent possible be non-combustible. 10. Possible failure of the firewater systems and its effect shall be considered. If surface treatment of paint or other coating is used. 2000 heat loads. wall and roof finishes shall pass the fire test requirements in IMO Resolution A 653 (flame spread). 10. as a rule be non-combustible.4 Fire technical requirements relating to materials Materials on the installation shall. Other means to limit the consequences of liquid fires are bunds and drains. the materials shall comply with the requirements of ISO 5660 (smoke and ignition properties). 10. Shielding of escape-routes and evacuation stations shall be as required to ensure escape from all areas and evacuation from the installation Necessary input will be provided by the risk and emergency preparedness analyses) The fire loads to be considered within an area may be limited through location of ESD or PSD valves. Saddles and secondary structures supporting HC pressure vessels shall be passive fire protected to avoid failure during the defined fire-scenarios. 3. piping and secondary structures.3 Requirements for passive fire protection of equipment.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Floor. An evaluation shall therefore be made regarding location and categorisation of these valves.4. An assessment shall be made of the toxicity of gases emitted in the event of a fire. the required time period before impairment shall be defined. Jan. Fire partitions exposed to hydrocarbon fires shall be rated according to an H-class. Documentation shall be available to support the basis for the decision regarding selection of materials.5 Passive fire protection For separation between main fire areas reference is made to ISO 13702 table C. For Major Hazards like riser fires or burning blow outs. they shall be fitted with fire divisions of minimum class H-60. NORSOK standard Page 27 of 66 . See ISO 13702 Clause 12. low smoke development and heat generation. If it is justified from a safety point of view to make use of materials that do not meet the requirements to non combustibility. A corresponding evaluation shall also be carried out with regard to textiles. Fire protection data sheets shall document the fire protection design / area safety charts see Annex J. Living quarters shall be designed and protected so as to ensure that the safety functions they are designed for can be maintained during a dimensioning accidental event.
g. e. See Annex I for details relating to Living Quarters. The fire water system shall be operable at all times including periods of maintenance and shall ensure adequate supply of water for fire fighting.7. Jan. 10.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. The system shall be designed and calibrated such that deluge nozzles will receive water not later than 30 seconds after a confirmed fire signal has been given. for ventilation ducts. beams as well as windows and doors in fire divisions.6 Storage and handling of explosives Explosive commodities shall be stored and handled such that the risk of fire or explosion is minimised. Fire protection materials used in outdoor areas shall comply with NORSOK M-501 Surface Preparation and Protective Coating. Design according to the latest edition of NFPA is the minimum requirement if no requirements are given in this standard. piping. For definition of fire area see ISO 13702. Incompatible explosives shall be separately stored. The capacity and efficiency of the system shall be verified through realistic full scale testing during commissioning. Storage locations shall be clearly marked and located in areas free of ignition sources. Firefighting systems other than fire water systems are covered in ISO 13702. See Annex H. All explosives shall be separated from other goods. 10. Penetrations. NORSOK standard Page 28 of 66 . shall not reduce the strength or the fire integrity of such divisions. 3.1 General Fixed fire-fighting systems shall be installed in areas representing a major fire risk.7 Active Fire Protection 10. The storage location shall be easy accessible with deck cranes for dropping of explosives into the sea if required. cables. For the fire water system the fail-safe principles shall apply. and particularly cover equipment containing significant quantities of hydrocarbons. 2000 Windows in H partitions shall be avoided.
clause 10.1 Firewater system principles. Ref.2 Prime Mover and FireWater Pumps. 3.1 GENERATION UNITS FOAM /PUMP DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT PRESSURE MAINTAINANCE MANUAL EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM F&G / CONTROL SYSTEM OVER BOARD DUMP/TEST LINE DRAIN Fig 10. The following principles shall be the basis for prime mover and firewater pump system design: . 2000 FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM DEDICATED FIRE PUMPS DEDICATED POWER Fig.2. Compensating measures in NORSOK standard Page 29 of 66 . 10. Jan.Measures to compensate for possible shut downs in the system due to maintenance shall be defined and documented as a part of the design.In normal mode the minimum capacity for the system is two separate and independent systems. unless other solutions are evaluated to present similar or increased safety level. Each pump system shall have the capacity to supply 100% of the largest fire water demand.Consideration shall be given to two separate modes. each with 100% capacity . normal mode and maintenance mode . It is recommended that each pump system consist of 2x50% pump units.NFPA 20 shall be followed . Offshore installations shall be provided with two independent prime mover and firewater pump systems. The water application rates to the various areas and equipment shall be as follows: Wellhead area Manifolds located on FPSO turrets Area for circulation and treatment of mud Processing area Surface of pressure vessels and tanks containing combustibles 20 l/min m2 20 l/min m2 10 l/min m2 10 l/min m2 10 l/min m2 Other water application rates shall be according to ISO 13702 Annex H. 10.7.Technical Safety S-001 Rev.
3. Simple reset of the systems shall be possible. the reliability of the firewater system shall be equal to an independent system. Dimensioning flow of the fire water pump duty points (100 %) shall include a contingency margin covering: Hydraulic imbalance. Manual start Start called for Common alarm. gas type IIA. Provisions for testing of the fire pumps shall be part of the design. Automatic stop can however be accepted if this is documented safer than if the pumps continue to run. All fire water pumps and foam pumps on duty shall start upon confirmed fire detection. Automatic stop of diesel operated fire pumps shall normally only be permitted due to overspeeding. and temperature class T3. Fire pump systems shall be independent of other systems. NORSOK standard Page 30 of 66 . Shadow areas requiring additional nozzles Two hydrants. This may have implications on system design. Firewater/foam pump running Firewater/foam ring main pressure. All active fire protection field equipment shall be certified for operation in Zone 1. The combustion air inlet shall be equipped with a damper initiated by over speed due to entrance of gas. CCR shall be provided with a fire water/foam pump panel with the following control and monitoring capabilities: • • • • • • • Selection of fire water/foam pumps for standby/duty. If other system designs are chosen. not generate requirements to system design. Freeze protection Cooling of the pump and other emergency units. including measurement of capacities and pressures. Exceptions from this are the diesel engines. The system shall take into account fail to start of a fire pump. Failure of the overspeed securing device should not cause the prime mover for fire pumps to stop.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Fire water pumps with a capacity above 2500 m3/h (each) shall be avoided. Jan. 2000 - “light”(maximum 24 h limit of duration) maintenance mode will however. Overlap of spray zones of deluge and sprinkler nozzles. Firewater/foam pumps unavailable warning. It shall be possible to operate diesel engines when ventilation to the room has been shut off. electric generators and motors which shall be located in rooms located safe by location and which are not likely to be affected by accidental gas releases. .
The following requirements apply: a) Fire pump systems are connected to the fire main in such way that damage in one area will not cause loss of all the fire water supply. 10. explosion etc. such as start of deluge on confirmed gasdetection. fire. It shall be possible to manually activate deluge skids locally. A procedure for the determination of the dimensioning explosion load is included in 10.8 Explosion protection. and be protected against external forces. 3. clause 13. b) fire main and supply shall be routed outside areas where it could be exposed to damage.4 Deluge systems Deluge valves should be of a type which regulates the downstream pressure and which is not sensitive to pressure surges in the ring main. 2000 10.5 Fireman’s equipment For details regarding fireman’s equipment see Annex C. d) Firewater rings main with branch pipes are at all times filled with water.1 General An explosion protection strategy shall be established with the objective of minimising the explosion risk through -preventing explosions to occur -minimising the explosion pressure. Deluge valves shall be provided with manual bypass including flow restriction to match flow through the valve. (Annex H Fire fighting system has not considered use of deluge for explosion suppression) Reference is given to ISO 13702.8. shall be evaluated and considered for implementation. from CCR or release stations located along the escape ways outside the fire area itself.7. 10. The deluge valve skid shall include isolation valves down stream and upstream. e) Each fire water pump (related to100% capacity) shall be connected to the ring main by dedicated headers with isolation valve between the headers.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. c) Shut-off valves and cross connections on the fire main shall be included to enable isolation of parts of the fire water ring main and to ensure supply to consumers from two different sections of the ring main. Jan. falling loads.8.2 NORSOK standard Page 31 of 66 .3 Fire Ring Main. an isolation valve shall be provided downstream the test branch-off point. 10.e. Deluge valves shall be provided with a dump line for full capacity testing without wetting the protected area.. such as environment. i. -controlling the consequences of explosions Mitigating measures to reduce possible explosion overpressures.7. 10.7.
1 General This clause contains additional safety design principles related to floating production/ drilling/storage installations. DRILLING AND STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 11.8.Global collapse of the structure .11.Deformation of decks leading to unacceptable damage to equipment . Other issues covered by these standard. emergency preparedness analysis and fire risk analysis.Rupture or unacceptable deformation of explosion barriers . time and area distribution. External blast effects outside of primary explosion area shall be considered. clauses 1-10 shall be applied as relevant.3 . In particular the call for automatic shutdown upon detection of hazardous situations needs to be considered in light of the possible adverse effects. Such consequences may be: .Unacceptable damage to safety equipment or systems that shall function after the explosion The definition of the dimensioning explosion load shall describe the necessary dynamics in the load with regard to pressure. The risk analysis. If this leads to unrealistically high loads.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. NORSOK standard Page 32 of 66 . taking the special aspects related to the floating installation into consideration. 11 SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING PRODUCTION.g. Prior to assessing the explosion loads the consequences of an explosion considered unacceptable to the installation shall be established. Items covered by clauses 11. clause 4. Calculation of explosion overpressures related to the scenarios shall be performed with an advanced explosion simulator e. Jan. The explosion load shall be determined based on a conservative selection of a defined number of scenarios. 3.9 are related to special design solutions and should be applied accordingly. ref. 2000 10.Deformation of hydrocarbon containing equipment leading to an unacceptable escalation of the accident . 5 and 10 shall be performed. FLACS. a probability distribution of explosion loads shall be established based on a probabilistic selection of scenarios taking into account the factors that influence the types and probabilities of scenarios like -layout -leak conditions -cloud formation conditions -ignition conditions.2 Procedure for establishing the dimensioning explosion loads The first step should be to establish a criterion for selecting the dimensioning explosion load.
3 Layout The following additional requirements shall apply concerning the layout of floating installations: • Vital control functions. • Process decks and relevant parts of the floater deck shall be arranged with the aim of minimising the risk of large pool fires on decks and tank tops.2 Crude storage Crude storage tanks. • The effects of “green sea” on deck shall be carefully evaluated and means of protection arranged. suitability for operation in hazardous area shall be ensured. • Crane coverage and lay down areas shall be arranged to promote safe operations of the cranes and to minimise the risk of dropped objects. 11. Main principles for such tanks are described below: • Large crude storage tanks shall be provided with an adequate and safe vent system.The explosion venting is sufficient to prevent unacceptable overpressure. flare or reclaiming system. Location of the premises themselves as well as their ventilation intakes shall take into account the prevailing wind directions. turret areas and piping shall be designed to minimise the risk of jet fires towards tank tops. • Location of crude pumps shall be made based on a hazard evaluation for operation and maintenance of the pumps. shall be subject to special safety considerations in light of their fire and explosion potential.The fire loads do not cause structural collapse.g. Anchor handling winches should be located in open areas or in an enclosed non-hazardous area. e. NORSOK standard Page 33 of 66 . Such enclosed premises shall have over pressure ventilation. equipment that can represent and ignition source should be located as far as possible upwind of potensial leak sources. e. 2. with air taken from and exhausted to a non-hazardous area.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. The turret arrangement design shall aim at achieving open naturally ventilated areas and minimising explosion pressure. Where winches are arranged on the deck below Riser Termination and ESD valves. 2000 11.g. the deck separating the areas shall be solid and gas tight. . 11. • On floating installation that will be turned up against the wind. Seawater spraying (deluge) for spark suppression may be applied to equipment that is exposed to seawater under normal operations. considerations shall be made to environmental effects caused by close location to the sea and necessary protection arranged. and gases shall be routed to either cold vent. Equipment that can be ignition sources.4 Turret The following design principles apply to turret design: 1. • When fire and gas detectors are located. Submersed pumps should be preferred. electric equipment should not be arranged in the moon pool area. 3. maritime control/bridge. Jan. • The turret shall be located and arranged to minimise probability and consequences of escalation of fires/explosions to/from neighbouring areas. Enclosed mechanically ventilated areas shall be restricted to containers or small rooms with control and special equipment that requires special protection or cannot be located in outdoor environment. If located in hazardous area. • Process areas. and in particular large tanks. process control and special emergency preparedness functions. should be arranged in one common control centre for the entire installation. • Hydrocarbon pressure vessels and heavy duty equipment shall not be located within main hull structure unless it is verified that: .
The need for well maintenance and reservoir stimulation has to be estimated for each location.5 Drainage/Ballast water systems These systems on floating installations shall be designed to operate satisfactorily for all sea states in which the installation is intended to be operable. Important factors in this evaluation are number and types of risers. 5. Decks above moon pool where hydrocarbons leaks may occur shall have an adequate drain routed to a collection tank. Necessary pumps and valve control of the ballasting system shall be fed from the emergency power system during shut down of main power. 7.1 General A "Normally Not Manned Installation" (NNMI) is an installation which can be left unmanned and still maintain its intended principal function through remote control from a distant location.g. or as specified based on risk analyses. This section outlines the safety design principles for the design of a NNMI and has been written for a minimum wellhead platform. 12 NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS 12. 4. the riser connector and first ESD valve shall be protected by passive means. Risers shall be protected against damage from wires and chains used for mooring. Routing of risers within conductors is one acceptable design principle. 3. Arrangements that provide both protections against such loads as well as fire protection are preferred.7 Topside/floater interface All interfaces between the typical maritime floater technology and offshore petroleum technology shall be clarified at an early stage of the design process. These operations are manned and will require people to be on board while performing the work. 11. For protection of other parts of the structure. e. sub sea ESDV and mooring arrangement. Jan.6 Emergency re-positioning The need for quick re-positioning of the installation in case of specific emergency situations shall be evaluated. Drainage systems for the process systems shall be designed to operate satisfactory for all sea states in which the process system is intended to be operable. and be monitored during the project to ensure compatibility with lifetime operational requirements. refer to other relevant parts of this standard. riser pressures. 11. NORSOK standard Page 34 of 66 . within the turret and between turret and ship. At riser termination end. Production or export/gas injection risers shall be protected against fires in the turret by passive means. Anchor moored or dynamically positioned installations located above well(s) shall be able to move 150 m from the normal position in 10 minutes. The use of flexible hose connections for well stream transfer. Fire protection of the turret can be arranged by fixed or oscillating fire monitors located on the ship. on gantry structure. should be minimised.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. but the requirements apply in principle to other NNMI such as riser and pipeline compressor platforms. 11. 2000 3. 6.
12. An emergency preparedness analyses has to be performed to identify the requirements for emergency planning covering: • • • • • • • Need for standby vessels when manned. . but Annex K lists the minimum requirements for a simple NNMI. • Helicopter shuttling and need for personnel to stay overnight. Means of evacuation Shelter. A fire/explosion wall will normally be required to protect the shelter area and the escape function adequately. The standard will focus on principle evaluations and decisions to be made to achieve an adequate safety level and not on detailed design solutions. Search and rescue Need for lifeboats. The installation will have a sheltered area with resting facilities. For installations allowing personnel to stay overnight careful evaluations have to be made regarding the quartering and safety facilities. a production manifold. a test separator and a pig launcher. This clause is limited to the specification of the principle requirements for NNMI.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Simple. Therefore this standard does not establish requirements for such installations. including standards referred to. The installation may be equipped with christmas trees. The design of the NNMI shall be documented according to the principles laid down in this standard. Time to evacuate.2 Safety evaluation. 3. Jan. management and documentation. ship traffic. Operations and maintenance philosophies for a NNMI are important to be able to establish the required manning onboard and are necessary to be able to develop the safety requirements. • Weather conditions for boarding and departing of the installation. 12. The design decisions have to be documented based on these methodologies and standards. This will have to be done on a case by case basis. reliable and sturdy concepts for the purpose of minimising maintenance activities on the installation shall be emphasised through system design and reliability requirements. The following activities related to manned operations onboard shall be established: • Drilling/well operations onboard • Simultaneous activities. which is not designed for any overnight stay of personnel. NORSOK standard Page 35 of 66 . Risk acceptance criteria have to be established. Call for helicopter. a test manifold. manning and helicopter shuttling. 2000 Dependent on the hours to be spent onboard a decision have to be made regarding possible limited or temporary facilities for personnel to remain onboard for a defined period of time. environmental conditions. The risk evaluations shall take into consideration drilling and process data.3 Design principles The NNMI wellhead installation will typically be designed with a well head area and manifolds on the well head side of the installation and a utility/shelter area to the opposite side.
. Jan. The safety system requirements for a NNMI shall be carefully developed based on the hazard identification and risk analyses performed. boarding procedures (boarding zone. 12. Requirements for possible quartering facilities have to identified based on the manning requirements taking into account the following: .Start-up following shutdown. NORSOK standard Page 36 of 66 . firewater may be provided by alternative means as long as an acceptable reliability is proven. 2000 The main power source may be diesel generators onboard the NNMI or cables from neighbouring. Emergency power may be by batteries only.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. The need for firewater shall be evaluated and installed if a significant risk reducing effect can be documented. To ensure simplicity. The requirements to the support structure concerning resistance to impact from ship collisions shall be developed based on an individual evaluation of each concept. This evaluation shall take into consideration the types of vessel expected to be in the vicinity of the installation.4 System requirements. Access to the installation will normally be by helicopter. anchoring philosophy etc.Scheduled maintenance jobs. 3. call frequency. weather restrictions. a closed drain system. loading requirements.) and the layout and arrangement of the installation. and a utility drain system and seawater pump.Well monitoring and maintenance. . The auxiliary systems may further consist of a methanol system.
ceiling and deck finish materials.Elements of building construction. 1989 Functional safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic SafetyRelated Systems. A. Part 15. 2000 ANNEX A .INFORMATIVE REFERENCES (INFORMATIVE) 1989 MODU CODE IEC 61508 International Maritime Organization .653 IP Part 15 ISO 15544 ISO 3008 ISO 3009 ISO 834 NFPA 15 NT Fire 021 NORSOK standard Page 37 of 66 . Fire-resistance tests on door and shutter assemblies. Jan. Institute of Petroleum: Model code of safe practice. National Fire Protection Association part 15 Standard for water spray fixed systems for fire protection Insulation of Steel Structures: Fire protection. Fire-resistance tests on glazed elements. Recommendation on improved fire test procedures for surface flammability of bulkhead. Fire-resistance tests.Technical Safety S-001 Rev.Code for the construction and equipment of mobile offshore drilling units. Until the International Standard becomes available the Draft International Standard (FDIS) applies. 3. IMO Res. Area Classification code for petroleum installations. Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations – Requirements and guidelines for emergency response.
One additional evacuation system in the opposite end of the installation should be considered if escape to the bridge is impossible in dimensional accident scenarios. For installations connected by bridge to other installations and/or floating accommodation installations. 2000 ANNEX B .EVACUATION (NORMATIVE) An EERS covering the operational phase should be developed at an early stage of the conceptual phase.4 m2 per lifeboat seat. Area allocation: 0. Jan. the primary means of evacuation should be the bridge. • • • NORSOK standard Page 38 of 66 . For scenarios where the possibility for gas/smoke on the helicopter deck is within acceptable limits.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. The emergency preparedness assessment shall be applied to identify any need for additional evacuation means and the optimum location of these. One additional evacuation system in the far end of the installation should be considered if escape to the main evacuation area is impossible. Escape chute with rafts should be used as a secondary mean of evacuation in the main evacuation area. helicopter may be considered as the primary means of evacuation. 3. The plan shall be in accordance with clause 14 in ISO 13702. The plan shall take into account the following evacuation principles: • • • The muster area and the access to the evacuation station should be arranged and protected in order to evacuate the actual number of personnel in an organised and efficient way.
C. -Main power should be provided for charging of lifeboat batteries. 2000 ANNEX C . Winches for recovery should be fed by main power. It should be possible to launch and recover the MOB in 5 meters significant wave height. It should be possible to reach the MOB from two cranes. The MOB shall have a minimum speed of 25 knots in calm sea with 3 men onboard. NORSOK standard Page 39 of 66 . 3. The installation shall be provided with a basket suitable for transport of personnel and another for transport of injured personnel.2 Escape chutes -Shall be readily available and easy to operate with clear operating instructions located on the wall inside the container. -Access ways should be provided with anti-skid coating -Cabinet housing should be arranged for winches and consoles -Heaters should be provided for electric motors for the winches. -Recovery from sea shall be possible in up to 2 m wave height. -Winch for recovery should be fed by main power. The external equipment including the engine exhaust system shall not act as ignition sources. -The hoisting speed for recovery should be minimum 3 m/min.MISCELLANIOUS SAFETY EQUIPMENT (NORMATIVE) C.1 Lifeboats -Should be designed for 10 minutes running in a gas cloud or fire on sea. C. Jan. The MOB shall be visible from the crane cabins during handling.3 Man overboard boat and personnel basket The MOB shall have a fixed lifting frame with one point suspension for handling by cranes.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. The disconnection point should be in the vicinity of the lifeboat and disconnection shall be automatic when dropping or lowering the lifeboat. -Removal of life rafts for re-certification shall be possible without affecting the suspension system including lifting wire.
Technical Safety S-001 Rev. NORSOK standard Page 40 of 66 .1 pair of night glasses (for intallations with moon pool work) C. water from a sprinkler. It is assumed that these radio sets shall not be able to become an ignition source.3 life jackets . Jan.g.1 standard size waterproof torch . 3.4 Man overboard related equipment. Each set of fireman equipment should contain at least 4 portable radio sets for internal communication. 2000 C. so that access to all equipment will not be blocked in the event of a fire in one area.1 VHF radio with suitable charger .5 Fireman's equipment Fireman equipment should be stored in sets at not less than two locations separated from each other. including the need for internal communication. e.1 divers mask with breathing tube .1 divers knife .1 pair of flippers . during identified fire scenarios.6 survival suits . and that they operate in the UHF frequency range in private channels assigned by the National Telecommunications Authority with regard to application for use of private frequencies in the UHF frequency range. The equipment shall be suitable for the tasks of the fire teams.1 mini size water proof torch and one 6 kg lead belt .1 thermal protection blanket ./ deluge system. The content of the cabinet should include: .1 x 20 litres diesel can .4 swimsuits of wet suit type . Installations should have suitable equipment for refilling breathing apparatus. It should be ensured that the radio sets are suitable for the environmental loads to which they may be subjected during an accidental event.2 bags. without their functioning being impaired.30 m lifeline . At least two of the breathing apparatus should be equipped with radio sets. each containing . The number of sets of fireman equipment required and the contents of each set must be assessed. Replacement of the breathing air in all compressed air bottles shall be carried out at regular intervals to ensure that the air is pure and has an oxygen content above 20 volume percent. or they operate in the international UHF frequency range for on board communication. One watertight cabinet for storage of gear of the MOB crew should be installed in the vicinity of the MOB.
one basket type stretcher . The following list is considering typical areas and is not to be interpreted as a complete list replacing the need for the evaluation. workshops. C.one scoop type stretcher .6 Safety Showers and Eyebaths Strategic locations shall be identified through a separate evaluation considering the chemicals handled and spillage that may occur. Jan.g. e. paint store.8 Lifebuoys Life buoys shall be located at regular intervals along the periphery of the lower levels of the installation. 2000 C. C. drill floor and other areas where cut injuries are likely to occur. shale shaker room.4 vacuum wrapped blankets . galley. -The following areas should be equipped with both Safety Showers and eyebaths -methanol pump and injection area -chemical injection pump and injection area -production lab -tote tank area -process utility area -The following areas should be provided with eyebaths -workshops -cementer room.7 Safety Stations and First aid kits Safety Station Cabinets An adequate number of cabinets shall be provided. NORSOK standard Page 41 of 66 . They should contain: . First aid kits An adequate number of first aid kits shall be provided at suitable locations. sack storage room -drill floor -mudpit area -battery room.9 Safety Equipment Data Sheets Safety Equipment Data Sheets are included in NORSOK S-011. 3. and mud lab The following areas should be provided with safety showers: -process areas -drilling areas C.one first aid kit The cabinets shall be painted Green (RAL 6002).Technical Safety S-001 Rev.
• Location of vent points. − Flotel or other installations linked by bridge/walk way. This as the area classification reflects normal conditions onboard. Required width of escape routes shall emphasise easy transport of injured personnel on stretcher in addition to the no. • There shall be at least two exits to escape routes from permanently or intermittently manned area outside quarters and offices. as it gives requirements to: • Location of ventilation air inlets and outlets. which may be a result of material weakness.1 Area classification "Catastrophic" events such as pipe rupture or vessel burst. 3. − Boat landings (not normally manned installations) − Helicopter deck. − Lifeboats and life rafts-stations.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. and may impose stricter requirements to arrangements and equipment than defined by the area classification alone. Other general principles are listed below. • Location and use of ignition sources. shall not be regarded as giving rise to a higher classification. collision or sabotage.2 m for doors) in width.LAYOUT (NORMATIVE) The following aspects to be checked and evaluated as a part of the layout design D. − Temporary refuge. • Location of emergency equipment.3 m in height (2050 mm for doors).9 m for doors) and 2. design error. leading in different escape directions. off persons onboard during hook-up /installation and commissioning activities offshore. • Drainage connections between areas D. • The installation shall be equipped with at least one escape route running from far end and into living quarter. The quality of this route shall be such that: − Personnel shall be able to use this route for a period of time sufficiently long to perform a NORSOK standard Page 42 of 66 .2 Escape routes The dimension of escape routes shall be minimum 1m width (0. • Location and design of doors and other connections between areas. The area classification is an important part of the basis for layout. 2000 ANNEX D . "Catastrophic" events shall be reflected in the risk analysis.5 m (1. falling loads. • The escape route network shall lead to safe areas and facilities as follows: − Living quarters. • Selection of equipment.and maintenance procedures in hazardous areas. • Operational. • Location of combustion air inlets and exhaust outlets for internal combustion engines and fired units. • Ventilation system requirements. Escape routes intended for use by more than 50 persons shall be extended to 1. Jan.
ventilation. excessive hot air nor unacceptable heat flux. Escape routes shall be arranged from the drill floor to adjacent modules and also down the substructure. the doors shall be provided with panic bars. Lifts shall not be considered as a part of escape ways. − When personnel is moving along this route the possibility of being hit by falling objects or hot liquids shall be well within the acceptable. Doors should normally open in the escape direction. The escape routes within the living quarter should be provided with low level directional lighting. etc.. Escape routes shall be part of the daily used transport. escape routes minimum 5 Lux. where more than 15 persons may be assembled should have at least 2 exit doors. Jan.g. Escape from legs/shafts/columns of an installation shall be considered separately. A dead end corridor of more than 5 m length is not acceptable.. Where appropriate. it shall be possible to escape from the lift and the hoist way with the lift at any elevation. Stairways included in escape routes shall be designed to allow for transport of injured personnel on stretcher. protection. Escape routes in all areas outside the living quarter shall be marked by yellow painting (RAL 1021). recreation room in L. If use of lift is necessary to ensure adequate and effective escape. Escape routes shall be provided with adequate emergency lighting. For all areas where there is a risk of congestion and panic. smoke. Emergency stations shall have minimum 15 Lux. concerning transport of injured personnel on stretchers. showing correct escape direction. Escape routes and emergency stations shall be illuminated. 2000 • • • • • • • • • • • complete evacuation of the installation plus a safety margin of 50%. 3) are in the area on short time basis.Q. power supply. However. Other enclosed and regularly manned utility and process areas should be considered separately. but shall not block the outside escape route. Internal room arrangement should be evaluated for possible blocking of exits following an accident as well as external blockage. If such power is required the power supply should be local. main escape routes should be provided on the outside along the periphery of the installation. It shall be possible to escape from a drilling area without running through a well head area. NORSOK standard Page 43 of 66 . hydraulic or pneumatic power.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. − Personnel shall be able to use this route without being subject neither to toxic fumes. e.and passageways. Escape routes leading to a higher or lower level should be provided by stairways. Any dining room. the lift system shall satisfy special requirements. The number of these stairways shall be assessed based on the platform size. Protection of these escape routes from radiation heat should be considered. 3. Opening of doors should not require electric. Vertical ladders can be used in areas where the work is of such a nature that only a few persons (max. configuration of areas and equipment layout.
For gas segments.2 Depressurisation Fast depressurisation shall be the mean of protection which should be utilised to its full potential for the installation concept. vibrations and noise that may occur as a result of gas expansion.g. A cold vent system may be permitted in cases when this cannot cause damage or injury to people. toxic or corrosive gases should preferably be burned in a flare to prevent the causing damage or injury to people. such system may be omitted. 2000 ANNEX E . Active and passive fire protection is to be considered to function as supplement to depressurisation. Depressurisation systems may also be required for systems which are unable to contain flammable or toxic materials by passive means alone. Location of segment (enclosed or open area). centrifugal compressor's dependence on seal oil systems). 3. Examples of such installations may be wellhead platforms with small quantities of gas and subsea installations. etc.0 ton. The material properties at actual temperatures and pressures during depressurisation. Depressurisation systems are required in addition to pressure relief facilities because of the loss of material strength during a fire. risk of segment being exposed to a fire. The design procedure is outlined in Annex G The depressurising. Loss of the active method of containment will require depressurisation to prevent escape of the material concerned (e. the environment or to assets and financial interests. a choice may be made between a centralised or local vent. the environment or to assets and financial interests. The design of the gas release system shall take into account low temperatures. Jan. This may call for a detailed study of each ESD segment in particular. shall be applied the following way: NORSOK standard Page 44 of 66 . E. should be considered. When necessary. manually or automatic.1 General Installations for production of hydrocarbons will normally require a gas release system. active or passive protective measures shall together ensure that a pressure vessel/piping segment does not rupture at a stage where this may escalate the fire scenario beyond the control of the protective systems and arrangement. should be equipped with a depressurising system. Based on risk evaluations. the maximum containment should be set lower than 1. Inflammable. the discharge point should be fitted with a flame control device. consequence of rupture.Technical Safety S-001 Rev.0 ton of produced hydrocarbons (liquid and/or gaseous) or unprocessed crude. If inflammable and toxic gases can be conducted away from the installation safely without the use of gas release system. which during shut down contains more than 1.PRESSURE RELIEF (NORMATIVE) E. if necessary to prevent any resulting unacceptable events (rupture or explosion of pressure vessels/piping). steel thickness. The discharge location must not represent any unacceptable risk. All pressure vessels and piping segments.
for sub sea flow lines and inter field pipelines.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. pressure rating and applied fire protection. drum liquid containment capacity should be based on the largest foreseeable liquid condensation rate for a period of at least 20 minutes. • Automatic depressurisation sequence is considered initiated immediately after detection of initial fire or gas. drums shall be sized for two criteria: • Disengagement of entrained liquid droplets. As a minimum. The particle size should be less than 400 microns. In addition the knockout drum should provide capacity for 90 seconds of liquid carry over from the largest source (assuming overfilled vessel). E.O. Vents which are not suitable for routing to flare (e.3 Relief and venting The release of hydrocarbons from relief and depressurisation systems shall be routed through a closed system terminating at a liquid's disengagement vessel and with the liquid free gas being safely flared. Environmental care. 2000 • Manual field depressurisation sequence is considered initiated after 3 minutes from detection of initial fire or gas. The ability to maintain integrity when exposed to the fire loads depends on selection of material. NORSOK standard Page 45 of 66 . e. Progressive release of inventories from process piping and pressure vessels that can cause significant escalation of a fire shall be avoided. NORSOK S-003. This should be evaluated for each case. wall thickness.4 Flaring The need for flaring should be minimised from an environment point of view. drums) is of particular importance. Flare K.O. E.g.g. the piping system and the pressure vessels shall maintain their integrity during depressurisation. API RP 521 should be used as guidance in the design of depressurisation systems. for small and normally not manned installations local venting may be found acceptable. The depressurising system itself (blow down valves. In case of vertical flare tower using subsonic flare burner the droplet size should be less than 300 microns. is avoided. Longer periods may be required. e. • Containment of liquid carryover. branch piping and headers and K. Jan. Calculations shall be performed to determine the levels of radiation on all areas of the platform for critical flare conditions. Local venting of hazardous gases shall not be permitted unless it can be done without hazard to the personnel or the platform.O. This period should provide realistic time to identify a problem and allow for operator intervention. The objective is to avoid condensate dropping from flare. The criteria for droplet removal will depend on the flare concept. due to backpressure) should be terminated outside the platform perimeter in such a way that accumulation of gases due to "dead pockets" etc. 3.g. Ref. The K.
e. • Max. • A pilot should be arranged. whichever is the lowest. 3. Jan.5 Cold Flare In systems were the relieved gas during normal operation is routed back to the processing system. Unless otherwise accepted by 2 the responsible for helicopter operations. • Radiation levels shall be calculated./replacement frequency. depressurization shall not depend upon instrumentation and control valves. E. the following principles should be adhered to: • The diversion of relieved gas under emergency conditions. • Heat loads on steel. 2000 Flare radiation calculations should account for variations in flaring quantities and wind conditions. A rupture disk should be installed in parallel with control valves. max. A 2/3 voting system may be considered. that will not harm the structure or equipment can be accepted.9 kW/m is allowed on helicopter deck. etc. • It should be possible to test the entire control loop for both response time and set point calibration without routing the gas to flare or isolate the rupture disk function. • Flare radiation shall not cause temperatures in areas classified as hazardous above 200oC or above the ignition temperature of the actual gas.or aluminium structures shall not give temperatures that results in loss of structural integrity. e.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. the radiation/temperatures on the helicopter deck shall not become intolerable to personnel or limit the necessary helicopter operations. Such deviations shall be documented. consideration should also be given to the radiation level on the helicopter deck.. CCR should be alarmed.g. 1. heat loads from flare on structures and equipment not designed for high heat loads should be limited to meet the requirements below. NORSOK standard Page 46 of 66 . see E4. during emergency flaring conditions. For permissible radiation levels. • A robust and reliable system with back-up capacity should be provided for flare ignition.e. Higher exposure for short times. provision of local radiation shields. Maximum heat loads from flares on open areas where personnel may be present and on locations where structures and equipment are exposed should be as follows: • Permissible radiation levels to personnel should follow radiation levels as given in API RP 521. Based on a case to case evaluation of protective clothing. • A reliable system for detection of “gas to flare “ should be provided. • The heat loads from planned continuous flaring conditions on areas where personnel are supposed to perform work tasks lasting for two hours or more the working environment requirements for exposed areas should be considered and ample protection provided as required. • Heat loads on Ex-rated electrical equipment and instrumentation should not give temperatures exceeding 40oC. • Heat loads on wires or limit switches in drill tower and cranes should be limited depending on type of lubrication and inspection. Protection of exposed areas may be necessary to meet these requirements. i. Such deviations shall be documented. the limits for acceptable heat loads can be adjusted as applicable. • For long periods of flaring (continuous flaring).g. • The loop including control valves should have rapid response.
For permissible radiation levels. Jan. 3. Open drainage systems from areas where there is no pollution. i. the possibility of an unintended ignition shall be taken into account in the design and dimensioning of the cold vent.e.7 Drainage systems The platform should be equipped with the following drainage systems: • One closed drainage system.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. 2000 E. Further. • Where applicable.g. • One open drainage system from non-hazardous areas. The drainage system form helicopter deck shall be capable of draining helicopter fuel from a crashed helicopter and AFFF from the fire fighting system and two monitors. rain water drain from roofs and helicopter deck could be routed directly to the sea. E. Reference to ISO 13702 clause 8. NORSOK standard Page 47 of 66 . The drainage system together with the deck itself should be provided with de-icing facilities. a separate mud drainage system should be provided covering the drill floor and mud treatment areas. see E4 The need for extinguishing ignited cold vent should be considered. e. ignition of foreseen gas rates should not give unacceptable heat loads or other consequences on the installation. • One open drainage system from hazardous areas.6 Cold vent The design of cold vents shall be based on dispersion calculations to prove that the foreseen gas rates can be released without creating explosive air/gas mixtures on the installation or in its vicinity.
FIRE AND GAS DETECTION (NORMATIVE) Only essential information shall be shown on the mimic.Ventilation air flow patterns. . the ventilation fan in question shall be stopped. air flow patterns. gas detection at air inlets of mechanically ventilated areas may be omitted. .g. alternatively in the duct as close to the duct opening as possible. 2000 ANNEX F .HVAC intakes or ducts shall be monitored by an adequate number of gas detectors. . i.Leakage sources within the area. The size of the intake.On installations where the sources of leakage of flammable or toxic gases are concentrated in a small area. on mobile installations. Jan. The surface temperature of the heating element shall not exceed the auto.Borders between non-hazardous and hazardous areas. . except for areas or equipment where more detailed alarm identification is appropriate. NORSOK standard Page 48 of 66 .1 Gas detector layout and alarm initiation The following principles shall apply concerning detector layout and alarm initiation: • Location. Voting. The use of line detectors is regarded as equal to the use of IR point detectors. fire area status. voting philosophy. F. the flow patterns around the opening should be determined to achieve an optimum position of the detectors. Cloud size of the minimal leakage to be detected • HVAC .Critical reaction time/detector response time. type and number of gas detectors shall take into account: . e.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Detection principles.g. ensuring fast response under various wind directions/orientations as well as for possible leak positions. and that there are gas detectors located in all areas classified as Zone 1 or Zone 2. . The total response time from gas at intake to shutdown of the intake shall be determined by the transport time of gas from intake to location of shutoff dampers and HVAC units.Size of the area. .Wind-direction and velocity. ignition temperature of any gas present in the area. Criticality of the area with regard to safety.Gas density relative to air. . Detectors in ducts should be positioned as near as practical to the centre of the duct where the air velocity is greatest and where the response time to gas ingress is consequently most rapid. In such cases it is however required that the ventilation systems are shut down automatically in the event of gas detection.Gas detectors should be located at HVAC outlets from hazardous areas. etc. all intake dampers shall be closed and the heating element shut off. should be evaluated when deciding number of detectors. . 3. .: • In or at ventilation inlets/outlets. • Inside critical equipment enclosures.If gas is detected at ventilation air inlets.e. e. At large intakes. if applied.Gas detectors in HVAC supply should be located at the air intake. .
office and in drillers cabin. Definition should be based upon whether a voting philosophy has been applied. n>2" logic shall be applied. .Alarms should be automatically initiated upon confirmed low level alarm according to Table F.1 Automatic hydrocarbon gas alarm in area.“Confirmed gas” is activation of alarm from two detectors .With voting philosophy applied. For detection of internal leakage within gas turbine hoods an alarm level of 5% LEL is recommended. • Alarm on gas detection . 2000 One of the following two philosophies should be chosen: Voting philosophy: .“Low alarm” is activation of low alarm from one detector.Technical Safety • S-001 Rev. - Single philosophy: Each project shall define alarm set point(s).1.Two alarm levels shall be used. . low alarm and high alarm. Process Quarter utility area area CCR Confirmed gas detected at: HVAC intake LQ Non-hazardous utility area HVAC/air intakes Process area incl.“Confirmed gas” is activation of high alarm from one detector. .“Low alarm” is activation of alarm from one detector . HVAC Any single detector low alarm level Drilling area Drill control cabin/office X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X detector in drilling area Any gas alarm shall be presented in CCR. ventilation conditions within the area and the events to be detected (minor or middle sized leakage or “catastrophic” events). For alarms from detectors located in drilling areas the information presented in CCR shall be mirrored in drilling contr. 3. In any case. high alarm level shall not be set to values above 30% LEL. . Automatic alarm in area Living Non-haz. NORSOK standard Page 49 of 66 .Initiation of automatic alarm is activated by alarm from one detector. Jan. Table F. HVAC outlets Drilling area incl. a "2-out-of-n.One alarm level shall be used. .Initiation of automatic alarm is activated by low alarm from one detector . For outdoor areas an alarm level of 20% LEL is recommended.
the line detector set point should be adjustable from 0.5 to 8 LEL meter. Location of all smoke detectors shall be verified by smoke tests.2 Fire detector layout and alarm initiation • Fire detector type: The selection of fire detectors shall be based upon an evaluation of the nature of the fire to be detected and the operational conditions that may exist. F.0 and 2. • Hydrogen sulphide gas . . Line detectors could be used in combination with point detectors for limiting the total number of detectors.An alarm (light and sound signal) should be activated both in CCR and locally in the event of a concentration of hydrogen sulphide of 6 PPM. Fire detection in Living Quarters and office areas shall be based on addressable optical smoke detectors with alarm to CCR.0 LEL meter. . Recommended set point is between 1. . Early warning smoke detection systems. Jan.8 % obscuration per meter. Early warning smoke detectors should have a sensitivity of approx. adjustment and cleaning.Switch board and electrical rooms.It must be ensured that the control centre receives warning well in advance of the concentration reaching dangerous levels.Line detectors should be easily accessible via ladders and/or access platforms for maintenance. For electrical rooms where all fire extinguishing is based on manual intervention. Such rooms will typically be: . 3. sensitive to small concentration of combustion products.4 – 0. 2000 • Line gas detectors .Line detectors are preferred where the layout enables good coverage by such detectors. Early warning smoke detectors should be used together with optical smoke detectors of standard sensitivity setting.Detectors should operate in the range of 0-50 PPM. As a minimum. facilities for total electrical isolation of any of these rooms shall be provided either outside the room and / or in CCR. .Central control room. shall be considered in rooms containing live electrical equipment subject to manual intervention and fire fighting. . As a minimum multi IR or dual IR/UV flame detectors should be used for fire detection in process areas.Instrument room. 0.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. For areas containing alcoholic substances. Care should be taken when locating detectors to avoid interference by for instance steam generated in bathrooms. NORSOK standard Page 50 of 66 . For smaller areas typical location should be at HVAC extract. flame detectors shall be able to detect alcohol fires in addition to hydrocarbon fires.
Table F. • Manual detection: Manual fire alarm buttons shall be provided at strategic locations. Jan. office and in drillers cabin.g. e. These buttons may be used for other accidents or situations where the attention of CCR is required in accordance with established operational procedures.2 Automatic alarms upon fire detection.g.4 meter above floor level and there should not be more than 30 meter walking distance to a manual fire alarm button from any point on the installation. 2000 Heat detectors should be used in enclosed areas where a significant and rapid temperature rise can be expected. fire stations. For alarms from detectors located in drilling areas the information presented in CCR should be mirrored in drilling contr. Manual fire alarm buttons should be mounted at a height of 1. Automatic alarm upon confirmed fire detection CCR Living Non-haz. exits from process areas. . • Single philosophy: Alarm on fire detection: Alarms should be automatically initiated upon confirmed fire according to Table F. Process Drilling Quarter utility area area area Confirmed fire detected at: LQ Non-hazardous utility area Well head area Single loop Confirmed Wellhead or Process area Confirmed drilling area Any single Detector Drill control cabin/office X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X detector in drilling area Any fire alarm shall be presented in CCR. • One of the following two philosophies should be chosen: Voting philosophy: .Confirmed fire is alarm from two detectors of same type within an area. Alarms in other areas to be manually initiated from CCR. escape routes.Technical Safety S-001 Rev.With voting philosophy " 2-out-of-n n>2 logic shall be used.Confirmed fire is alarm from one detector within the area. in combination with smoke detectors. In this case automatic start of fire pumps may not be implemented.2. . NORSOK standard Page 51 of 66 . e. Automatic start of fire pumps upon manual fire alarm may be considered. 3.
The following should be considered for achieving the efficiency of firewater: • Spray of deluge water from nozzles from below.1 Type of fire Pool fire (crude) open or enclosed area fuel controlled Note 1 Pool fire enclosed area ventilation controlled Note 1 Jet fire Heat flux values. the heat flux loads should be considered comparable to jet fire loads. 3. Fuel composition. ventilation controlled. from both sides and from above. Special considerations should be done for heavy crude fields. Step 2. Effect of firewater. Identification of fire types and duration. Heat flux values for the next step are then selected from the following table: Table G.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Jan. 2000 ANNEX G . • Pool fires in enclosed areas. • Coverage of fire detectors that ensures immediate detection of small fires in all parts of the fire area. In areas with unprocessed crude or crude in the first or second stage of separation. • Jet fires. The initial step is to decide on the characteristics of fire the pressure vessel/piping can be exposed to including the duration of the fire. Step 3. • Spray nozzle location ensuring that water spray projection covers all surfaces of the protected equipment/piping. Initial heat flux density Average load 100 kW/m2 Initial heat flux density Max. • Operational procedures ensuring high availability of these systems. NORSOK standard Page 55 of 66 . fuel controlled. point loads 150 kW/m2 200 kW/m2 250 kW/m2 130 kW/m2 Note 1.PROTECTION OF PRESSURE VESSELS AND PROCESS PIPING AGAINST FIRE (NORMATIVE) The design procedure includes the following principal step: Step 1. mass. Water applied for controlling the fire and cooling of pressure vessels and piping is very effective when evenly distributed over the exposed areas. • Supply of deluge water to a module arranged so that accidents can not damage the supply. mass rate and duration as applicable and ventilation conditions should be determined: Types of fire: • Pool fires in open or enclosed areas.
5 barg) or the potential leakage of hydrocarbon is low (less than 1 ton) in the pressure vessels and piping when the rupture occurs. establishing internal pressure fluctuation. If a rupture of pressure vessels and piping occurs as a result of a combination of excessive heat load and internal pressure. Jan.g. i. the risk acceptance criteria are not met. 2000 Alternatively. e. This can be: • Change from manual to automatic depressurising. Where rupture can not be accepted. an acceptance of the situation will have to be judged based on the risk analyses. Step 5. the provision of additional protective systems and arrangements shall be implemented. Step 4.). point loads shall be applied in cases where local damage is critical. heat loads could be based on a detailed evaluation/simulation of the credible fire scenarios. as a function of time. Depressurising / rupture calculations.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. and identify time to rupture if this will occur. Residual quantities. wall thickness etc.g.2. e.e. for the integrity of a pressure vessel shell or of critical structural elements. for boil off in pressure vessels. NORSOK standard Page 56 of 66 . • Modifications to the general arrangements that have an impact on the time to rupture. Determine whether rupture will occur during depressurising. Simplified evaluations can be made when the pressures are considered low (< 4. The max. clause E. Evaluation of failure mode. The average heat flux density shall be applied where the global load over an area is dimensioning. wall material temperature and residual strength. 2 or 3 as applicable. • Modifications to pressure vessel /piping design (material. The effect of manual versus automatic initiation is specified in Annex E. Perform depressurising calculations for each major pressure vessel and piping segment. • Modifications to depressurising system (increase its capacity) • Application of passive protection that will reduce the heat loads to the exposed pressure vessels/piping. escalation potentials both within the area and towards adjacent areas shall be taken into account. The procedure will then have to be repeated from step 1. 3. Application of qualified predicting tools for calculation of heat loads may be an integral part of the evaluation.
• Stopping the fire water diesel engines shall only be possible local to the engines. • Cooling of the engine room shall be by an air/fire water-cooling unit powered directly from the diesel engine. The valve shall be able to regulate from zero flow up to 150% capacity and shall be of low noise design. NORSOK standard Page 57 of 66 .Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Fire Water and Jockey Pumps The fire water pumps and up. Each engine shall have two independent starting systems • The start batteries for the fire water diesels and the batteries for the diesel control system shall be located within the same room as the diesels. • The fire water system shall be pressurised in the standby mode. • A manual isolation switch/valve between the starter motor and the start battery/air bank shall be provided per starter motor. • Each diesel engine shall have its own dedicated day tank sufficient for 18 hours continuous full power operation. • Possible water hammer effects shall be considered. • In case of gas in air intake to the fire water engine room. 2000 ANNEX H . The pressure source shall have the capacity of flow through frost protection bleed lines plus two hydrants. the room shall be automatically closed and the cooling air shall be taken from the engine room itself. • Fire resistant cables shall be used between firewater generator and motor. Fire Water Pump Control • Each fire water pump shall be fitted with a minimum flow control valve. Jan. • It shall be possible to start the fire water system even if no other systems on the platform are operational. • A test valve for the fire water pumps shall be installed to enable checking of the fire pump curve up to 150% of design flow rate. • The fire water diesel start batteries shall be charged by the fire diesel generator while running in addition to the main power.and downstream piping shall be completely filled with water at all times. 3.FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM (NORMATIVE) H.1 Fire Water Drivers and Pumps Diesel Engines and generators • Diesel engines providing power to more than 100% of the design firewater capacity shall not be located within the same room.
Valves and Nozzles General • It shall be possible to start the fire water pump system without delay and without causing unacceptable pressure surges. • The deluge and monitor skid cabinets shall have doors with sufficient stopper arrangements to prevent a personnel risk associated with the cabinet doors in strong winds. • There shall be a minimum of two pressure transmitters in the Fire Water Ring main providing the low-pressure start signal to the firewater pump diesels. 3. The connections shall be easy accessible from deck level and have one drain box located below the connection. • Deluge control valves shall be automatically activated by the F&G logic.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Valves • Sprinkler valves shall be provided with full capacity manual by-pass • The arrangement of the isolation valves shall be such that not more than 50% of the fire water to water hoses and hydrants for one area. • Control valves for sprinkler and deluge systems shall be located outside the area they protect. • Sprinkler systems shall have a test and flush connection in the far end of the piping system and at the sprinkler valve(s). monitor and sprinkler control valves shall only be possible local to the valves. • The deluge system shall comply with NFPA 16. monitors and sprinklers shall be fitted with a test line with 100 % capacity. • All deluge valves.2 Fire Water Piping. • For manned installations resetting of deluge. etc. • The sprinkler system shall comply with NFPA 13. Deluge Foam . clause 8 and L-002 clause 4. The skids shall withstand the applicable explosion loads. 2000 H. The weep holes shall be considered in the firewater demand calculations. A pressure surge study shall be performed.Water System. NORSOK standard Page 58 of 66 . Fire Water Piping • For general piping requirements. • Adequate venting facilities with valves shall be provided for wet pipe sprinklers. Jan.) • The fire water piping system shall be fitted with sufficient number of high point vents to achieve the following: • Efficient frost protection at all locations. Sprinkler Systems. is effected if one segment of the fire water ring main is taken out of service. pressurised overhead tanks. • All valves (> 1") shall be painted red and provided with a car-sealing system. soft closing minimum flow valves.7. • The FireWater Ring main shall be equipped with two points (min 6”) for connection to external water supply for commissioning. (SOLAS international shore couplings should be used. reference is made to NORSOK P-001. • Deluge. Means that may be considered for eliminating pressure surge problems are pressure vacuum valves. • The system design shall allow for complete system flushing in commissioning and operation. • Efficient removal of all entrained air pockets in the water. • All low points in piping downstream deluge and monitor skids shall be equipped with 3 mm weep wholes to prevent pockets of water to be entrained. monitor and sprinkler valves shall fail in last position upon loss of signal from F&G logic.
• It shall be possible to reach any area where a fire may occur on the installation with at least two water jets from monitors or hoses. should be given when positioning the sprinkler heads. i. monitor and sprinkler valves shall be fitted to provide confirmed flow signal to CCR. monitor and sprinkler systems shall trigger alarm in CCR. Nozzles and sprinklers. The monitor nozzles shall be of the constant flow type.e. When monitor valves are opened manually and local to the monitor. • The sprinkler heads should be of the frangible bulb type. Due consideration to overlap. • Nozzles for area coverage on fully open process and drilling areas shall only be the high velocity types. • The maximum reaction force on the hose nozzle where only one person is supposed to operate the hose shall not be more than 25 KP. in general areas. • The sprinkler heads should be located in positions which ensures an application rate of not less than 6 l/min/m2 at all times over the nominal areas protected by the sprinklers. NORSOK standard Page 59 of 66 . Fixed firewater monitors with the possibility of foam mixing at predetermined ratio should in general be used for areas with a high fire potential and which are not protected by fixed deluge systems Water monitors shall be sized to discharge at least 120 m3/h at a nozzle pressure of 7 barg. H.4 Hydrants and Hose Reels General • Hydrants and hose cabinets shall comply with NFPA 14. . Quick operating isolation valves shall be provided for each hydrant.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. the vertical distance between nozzle and floor shall be considered to ensure adequate cooling effect. a signal shall automatically be given to the F&G logic and to the starter logic for the fire water pumps. However. same flow at fog and at jet spray.400 in the vertical and it shall be possible to manually lock them in any position. a higher temperature limit should be selected for areas where high ambient temperatures might be expected. • All deluge and sprinkler nozzles shall have “Factory Mutual” approval. Jan. The fire water monitors are flanged directly on the feed pipe. 2000 • • Activation of deluge. obstructions. The spray angle shall be easily adjusted when in operation and return to maximum spray angle after use. A considerable reaction force from the monitors will normally require a pipe support immediately below the flange. • When arranging deluge nozzles. Standpipe and Hose System. etc. Pressure transducers downstream deluge.3 • • • • Monitors • Automatic drain facilities shall be provided for each fire water monitor. set to burst at 68oC. All monitors shall be adjustable through 3600 in the horizontal plane and + 600. H. 3.
capacity approx. 8 m3/hr. The foam pumps shall be equipped with minimum flow control and pump testing facilities. each having a capacity for 30 minutes supply to the largest fire area. 1 • within all other areas 25 meters of 1 /4" bore hose with auto-to-fog nozzle. but it shall also be possible to run the pumps from main power through the emergency switchboard in order to run/test pump without starting the fire water diesel generator. 15 meter in length with instantaneous connection joints to hydrants and nozzles. alternatively to one tank with capacity for 60 minutes.5 Foam System General • Foam supply shall be provided for all areas where hydrocarbon or alcohol pool fires are likely to occur. Foam Pumps • For centralised foam systems there shall be 2x100% foam pumps. Foam Extinguishing System. capacity approximately 15 m3/h • • • • H.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. 2000 Hydrants and Hose Reels • One cabinet shall be provided per hydrant. 3. 1). Non collapsible hose reels shall have: • Within living quarter 25 meters of 1” bore hose with auto-to-fog nozzle. • Two auto to fog nozzles with pistol grip. All hydrants shall have two outlets fitted with 1½" quick connections of a standard approved type throughout all areas (NOR No. Jan. The hydrants shall be located in weather resistant cabinets fitted with heating units where required. is to be considered as normal duty for the pumps. • In a centralised foam system a jockey pump shall be provided and powered from emergency power • Each of the foam pumps shall be connected to one foam supply tank. The pumps shall be powered from the fire water diesel generators. NORSOK standard Page 60 of 66 . The cabinets shall be designed for bolting to the deck. • Both foam pumps shall be in stand-by mode and start simultaneously with the fire water diesel drivers. • Filling of foam to the supply tanks shall be performed from tote tanks in the lay down area. • For the foam pumps all scenarios from minimum to maximum flow. • The foam system shall comply with NFPA 11. • Two sets of connecting key. • The cabinet incorporated in each hydrant shall consist of: 4 off 1 1/2 inch fire hoses of an approved fire-resistant type. Capacity minimum 20 m3/hr with 2 hoses and a nozzle hooked up.
Foam capacity shall correspond to 10 minutes operation at full monitor design capacity. draining of the foam concentrate tanks shall not be made to the open deck drain. • When in operation the foam supply shall have an operation pressure of at least 2 bar above the firewater pressure to prevent reverse flow. 3. • Monitors and hydrants on helicopter deck shall be equipped with foam for > 10 minutes continuous service. Jan. 2000 Foam Control and Piping • If a centralised foam system is selected. • The pressure in the foam ring main shall be presented in CCR.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. the foam ring main shall be provided with isolation valves. • Foam shall be injected downstream deluge and monitor control valves to prevent ingress of foam into the fire water system. • For a centralised foam system a balanced foam proportioners shall be used. NORSOK standard Page 61 of 66 . • To avoid foaming and contamination.
j) there are no windows in walls facing processing area etc. If a suspended ceiling design is continuous between Class A division and meets the requirements of Class B-15.LIVING QUARTERS (NORMATIVE) The living quarters shall be designed and protected so that: a) each floor is separated by decks that meet the requirements of Class A-60. it is sufficient that the walls of the staircase at one of the floors meet the requirements of Class A-60. 3. which meet the requirements to Class B-0. g) walls in corridors extend from deck to deck and meet the requirements of Class B-30. i) draught stoppers are installed above suspended ceilings. c) all shafts interconnecting floors are built to Class A-60. Joints between the deck and the outer wall shall have a minimum fire resistance of 60 minutes. transformers etc. 2000 ANNEX I . The distance between draught stoppers should not exceed 14 meters. Jan. rooms for electrical equipment such as major distribution panels. The main structures supporting/stabilising the decks shall have a fire resistance of 60 minutes according to a standard fire test or approved calculation. For stairs connecting two floors only. and rooms for water heating are separated. walls in corridors may be terminated at the ceiling. f) all walls and doors where Class A fire division are not required meet the requirements of Class B15. e) work spaces.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. individually or in sections. b) all staircases meet the requirements of Class A-60. h) suspended ceilings meet the requirements of Class B-0. from the rest of the living quarters by fire divisions of at least Class A-0. k) fire doors are installed in corridors to the extent necessary. laboratories. d) kitchen and dining room are separated from the rest of the living quarters by Class A-60 fire divisions. l) additional principles and requirements relating to Living Quarters are included in NORSOK C001/002 NORSOK standard Page 62 of 66 .
INTAKE HC GAS AT BOUNDARY . CO2 CHEMICALS METHANOL GLYCOL FUEL OIL / DIESEL LUBRICANTS ELECTRICAL OTHER COMBUSTIBLES RADIOACTIVE EXPLOSIVES HYDROGEN GAS FIRE AND GAS DETECTION HC GAS IN AREA . FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET / AREA SAFETY CHART SDS-001 Rev. April 1999 Page 1 of 1 Rev.POINT OR BEAM HC GAS IN HVAC INTAKE HC GAS IN COMBUSTION INTAKE HC GAS IN COMB. Jan.) HOSE REEL (LOW CAP.POINT OR BEAM TOXIC GAS IN AREA SMOKE IN AREA SMOKE IN HVAC INTAKE EARLY SMOKE HEAT IN AREA FLAME IN AREA MANUAL CALL POINT (MCP) MANUAL CO 2 RELEASE MANUAL RELEASE WATER (MRW) AREA RESET ESD PUSHBUTTON MANUAL ELECTRICAL ISOLATION (MEI) FIRE & BLAST PROTECTION AREA DELUGE EQUIPMENT DELUGE AFFF SPRINKLER WATERMIST MONITORS HYDRANT CO2 HOSE REEL (HIGH CAP. 3. NON-HAZARDOUS BY VENT. Doc. 3. no. 3. 2000 ANNEX J .Technical Safety S-001 Rev. April 1999 Package no. AREA CLASSIFICATIONS ZONE 1 ZONE 2 NON-HAZARDOUS BY LOCAT.) DUAL AGENT HOSE REEL (DAHR) WHEELED PORTABLE EXTINGUISHER CO2 PORTABLE POWDER PORTABLE WATER PORTABLE GASEOUS EXT.FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET (INFORMATIVE) SDS-001 Fire protection data sheet NORSOK S-001 Rev. VENTILATION NATURAL MECHANICAL OVERPRESSURE UNDERPRESSURE OCCUPANCY PERMANENT INTERMITTENT NORMALY NONE NONE WALLS / FLOOR / CEILING NONE: WIND SHIELD: HEAT SHIELD: STEEL WALLS: FIRE PARTITIONS: EXPL. RATE 10 l/min/m2 20 l/min/m2 1 0/0 54 m3/hr 2 x 20 m3/hr 13 m3/hr 8 m3/hr BC CO2 NOTES: O U T P U T S I G N A L S INPUT SIGNALS FIRE ZONE: AREA: AREA SAFETY CHARTS FOR: DESCRIPTION: NORSOK standard Page 63 of 66 . PANELS: SUSPENDED: FALSE: N S E W FLOOR CEILING HAZARDS CRUDE OIL CONDENSATE LIQUID LIGHTER HYDROCARBON GAS HEAVIER HYDROCARBON GAS TOXIC GAS H2S./VENT.
to which the systems are expected to be exposed. Jan. In addition to local operation. shutdown and maintenance of the wells.NORMALLY NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS (INFORMATIVE) K.1 General requirements This Annex outlines detailed recommendations to a simple NNMI. NORSOK standard Page 64 of 66 .Technical Safety S-001 Rev. The main power source should be a battery pack with recharging by a small diesel generator or by a power cable from the service installation. Blocking of remote start-up of production should be possible while the installation is manned. Piping systems designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and temperature. which is manned only during daylight and under weather conditions that allow safe access and departure by boat or helicopter. 3. production manifold and a removable spool for pigging. A simple NNMI considered in this annex will typically be arranged with means of access from the sea. an access deck for the christmas trees and a helicopter deck. additional recommendations should be considered to achieve an adequate level of safety. or where personnel will stay onboard for shorter periods. need not be provided with full flow pressure relief valves. When manned.2 K. K. wing control valves may be controlled from the remote control centre.2. No facilities are provided for overnight stay. The process equipment typically includes christmas trees.2 Piping systems and pressure vessels Piping systems and pressure vessels should be designed to minimise the instrumentation and control equipment.1 Production systems Well head system The well head system should be designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and temperature occurring during operation. allowing remote shutdown and restart of the production. K.2. For more complex installations. manual shutdown of the installation should be possible locally as well as from remote control point. 2000 ANNEX K .
A possible time delay in shutdown due to a link failure should not exceed 10 min. The emergency shutdown signal from the remote control centre should be by a fail-safe signal (e.2 Life-saving appliances Adequate life saving appliances for the crew that comes on board should be available. K.Technical Safety S-001 Rev. Vent pipes from systems containing hydrocarbons should be terminated at a minimum of 3 m above or outside decks. 3.g.4 Risers Production and lift gas risers should be equipped with a riser emergency shutdown valve. K. but other arrangements such as a combination of MOB /lifeboat may be used. On risers for stable fluids.2. The shelter should provide for protection of personnel until evacuation can be performed. but if required. An evacuations chute with rafts should be considered to achieve the required redundancy of the evacuation means. should be provided with adequate flame arrestors.1 Auxiliary systems Safety systems Escape routes/Shelter Engines should be avoided. be certified for operation in hazardous areas. This is to be decided based on the emergency preparedness analyses. If the platform is provided with a boat landing for personnel transfer a secondary escape route to the landing should be established if it makes a contribution to the evacuation options in an emergency situation.2.3.3.3 Emergency shut-down Provisions should be made for emergency shutdown and operational shutdown of the installation to be made both locally at the installation and at the remote control centre. omission of riser emergency shutdown valves may be considered. by means of a radio link) which on disconnection shuts down the normally not manned installation. (Ref EERS) Installation of at least one free fall lifeboat is recommended. The location of vent pipe termination should take into account helicopter operations. Jan. which may be depressurised from the main installation. Primary protection of personnel should be quick and effective evacuation. but may be done from the remote CCR when the NNMI is unmanned if adequate means to evaluate the situation onboard from the CCR is provided. 2000 K. Reset of the ESD valves should be made at the valve itself. The consequences of ignited vent pipes should be considered. Escape routes to the shelter should be established.3.5 K.3 Drain and vent systems Manual depressurisation of all pressurised systems should be possible from the platform when it is manned. Vents on atmospheric vessels. NORSOK standard Page 65 of 66 . K. K.3 K. which are not dimensioned to withstand a full inside explosion pressure.2.
3. The helicopter deck should as a minimum be equipped with a dual agent extinguisher system based on 250-kg dry powder and 250 l premixed foam.Technical Safety S-001 Rev.5 Fire and gas detection Fire detection should be provided and automatic shutdown initiated upon confirmed signal. If portable detectors with built-in alarm functions are used. an APS signal should be operable. NORSOK standard Page 66 of 66 .3.) a built in fire fighting system is recommended. Jan.3.4 Communication Voice communication between the installation and the remote control centre and directly between the installation and standby vessel should be possible when the installation is manned. On regularly operated decks (this means when shuttling have to be done for temporary periods. If voice communication is based on portable radios. K. The emergency shut down system should be separate from PSD and PCDA.3.3. Portable gas detectors may provide the alarm. K.6 Alarm systems Upon gas detection an audible alarm should be activated. 2000 Emergency shutdown of the remote control centre or plant should result in operational shutdown of the not normally manned installation. K. The emergency shutdown system should be in operation when the installation is unmanned.7 K. The reliability of the communication links for the emergency and control systems between the CCR on the main installation and the NNMI should be documented.3. which can be perceived by all on board. When the installation is manned. Gas detectors with shut down functions should be in operation when personnel is onboard the installation. It should not be possible to inhibit a local emergency shutdown system from the remote control centre.8 Emergency power Helicopter deck An emergency power supply should be provided with a capacity of minimum four hours. a minimum of two radios should be available on the satellite installation. K. the crew should place these in fixtures on approved locations when ascending the installation.
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