Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/444/651/340959/
Timestamp: 2019-10-20 21:07:54
Document Index: 574626481

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 3731', '§ 3', '§ 2516', '§ 2510', '§ 3731', '§ 14']

United States of America, Petitioner, v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division and Honorable Damon J. Keith, Respondent, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1971 › United States of America, Petitioner, v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mi...
United States of America, Petitioner, v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division and Honorable Damon J. Keith, Respondent, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971) April 8, 1971
Certiorari Granted June 21, 1971
"1 .It is important to note at this point that although he was overheard, defendant Plamondon was not the object of the surveillance. This distinction apparently went unnoticed by respondent for he stated in his decision ordering disclosure that the Attorney General `had authorized and deemed necessary the wire tapping of certain of defendant Plamondon's conversations.' * * *
Preliminary to answering this question, there is a challenge to our jurisdiction. It is claimed that mandamus is not an appropriate form of action in which to review the question just posed in the context of the instant case. It is clear that the District Court order under attack is a pretrial order interlocutory in nature, and hence, not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964) which conveys appellate power to this court to review only "final" orders of the District Courts. Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 49 S. Ct. 118, 73 L. Ed. 275 (1929). Nor is the order here under attack subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964), which grants appellate power to this court in certain limited classes of interlocutory orders, nor under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. V, 1965-69), which deals specifically with criminal appeals.1
See also Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 53 S. Ct. 129, 77 L. Ed. 283 (1932); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 77 S. Ct. 309, 1 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1957); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-98, 88 S. Ct. 269, 19 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1967).
"I agree that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which should not be issued except in extraordinary circumstances. And I also realize that sometimes the granting of mandamus may bring about the review of a case as would an appeal. Yet this does not deprive a court of its power to issue the writ. Where there are extraordinary circumstances, mandamus may be used to review an interlocutory order which is by no means `final' and thus appealable under federal statutes." Will v. United States, supra 389 U.S. at 108, 88 S. Ct. at 280.
If this were not enough to occasion our deciding this case on the merits rather than on procedural grounds, it also clearly appears that the issue posed here is a basic issue which has never been decided at the appellate level by any court. It has been decided favorably to the government's position by two District Courts and adversely to the government by two others.2 The Courts of Appeals have the power to review by mandamus "an issue of first impression," Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110, 85 S. Ct. 234, 13 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1964), involving a "basic and undecided problem." Id. at 110, 85 S. Ct. 234.
"The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions in Olmstead [v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944] and Goldman [v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S. Ct. 993, 86 L. Ed. 1322], and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful `notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 [46 S. Ct. 4, 6, 70 L. Ed. 145], for the Constitution requires `that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer * * * be interposed between the citizen and the police * * *.' Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-482 [83 S. Ct. 407, 414, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441]. `Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,' United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 [72 S. Ct. 93, 95, 96 L. Ed. 59] and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment18 — subject only to a few specifically
"18.See, e. g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-499 [78 S. Ct. 1253, 1256-1257, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514]; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 [80 S. Ct. 1431, 1436, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688]; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-615 [81 S. Ct. 776, 778, 779, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828]; Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-487 [84 S. Ct. 889, 891-892, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856].
"19.See e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 [45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 286, 69 L. Ed. 543]; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-456 [69 S. Ct. 191, 192-194, 93 L. Ed. 153]; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-177 [69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-1312, 93 L. Ed. 1879]; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 [87 S. Ct. 788, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730]; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 [87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645-1647, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782].
"20.In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 [46 S. Ct. 4, 5, 70 L. Ed. 145], the Court stated: `The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.'
Whatever one's view of `the long-standing practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the accused found upon arrest,' United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 [70 S. Ct. 430, 433, 94 L. Ed. 653]; cf. id., at 71-79 [70 S. Ct. at 437-441] (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), the concept of an `incidental' search cannot readily be extended to include surreptitious surveillance of an individual either immediately before, or immediately after, his arrest.
"21.Although ` [t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others,' Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 [87 S. Ct. 1642, 1646, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782], there seems little likelihood that electronic surveillance would be a realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency.
"22.A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements, Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 [66 S. Ct. 1277, 90 L. Ed. 1477], but of course `the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect.' Lopez v. United States. 373 U.S. 427, 463 [83 S. Ct. 1381, 1401, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462] (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan)."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-358, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514-515 (1967). (Footnotes in quotation.)
Decision of six of the cases relied upon is based upon the war powers or foreign relations powers of the presidency — Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109, 68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. Ed. 568 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-320, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 S. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726 (1918); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 23 L. Ed. 605 (1875). None of these cases are criminal cases. None of them involve the Fourth Amendment. None of them involved wiretapping. These cases we deem totally inapplicable to the instant case where the Attorney General has certified that we deal with a domestic security problem.
Generally concerning presidential power in domestic affairs the government cites two other civil cases. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092 (1895); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.), 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
As for In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 658, 34 L. Ed. 55 (1890), we thank the government for calling to our attention this fascinating story of the problems of the judiciary in an earlier day. But the holding that the President has a right under Article II, § 3 to appoint a Deputy Marshal to protect the threatened life of a Supreme Court Justice is hardly precedent for this case.
The point at which the claim of broad inherent power of the presidency in domestic affairs actually came to decision is found in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952). There President Truman's seizure of the steel mills to avoid a nationwide steel strike was defended as within his inherent power as Chief Executive charged with seeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." The Supreme Court squarely rejected the inherent power doctrine in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, from which we quote the controlling language:
"The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra at 587-589, 72 S. Ct. at 866.
"23.Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case." Katz v. United States, supra at 358 n. 23, 88 S. Ct. at 515.
Essentially, the government rests its case upon the inherent powers of the President as Chief of State to defend the existence of the State. We have already shown that this very claim was rejected by the Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed 1153 (1952), and we shall not repeat its holding here.
Obviously, even in very recent days, as we shall see, this has not always been the case. And the history of English-speaking peoples (to say nothing of others) is replete with answers. See e. g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029 (1765). In Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1708, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1127 (1961), the opinion for the United States Supreme Court summarized the long history of the English striving for freedom of expression and press and noted:
"Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power." Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra at 724, 81 S. Ct. at 1712.
The Court also pointed out that as early as the 1760's Lord Camden had denounced a "`discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.' Id., 1167 [Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How.St.Tr. 1153]." Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra at 729, 81 S. Ct. at 1714.
"This history was, of course, part of the intellectual matrix within which our own constitutional fabric was shaped. The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression. For the serious hazard of suppression of innocent expression inhered in the discretion confided in the officers authorized to exercise the power." Id. at 729, 81 S. Ct. at 1715.
If there be a need for increased security in the presentation of certain applications for search warrant in the federal court, these are administrative problems amenable to solution through the Chief Justice of the United States and the United States Judicial Conference and its affiliated judicial organizations. The inclination of the judiciary to meet the practical problems of enforcement in this area is evidenced in the specific holding of this court and the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S. Ct. 429, 17 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1966), and in the dictum in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), upon which the search warrant terms of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act § 2516 were largely based. Congress clearly conceived situations so delicate that, for example, the Attorney General might seek his warrant for a search from the Chief Judge of the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Supp. V, 1965-69). So do we. But what we cannot conceive is that in the midst of the turmoil of the present day, the courts of the United States should suspend an important principle of the Constitution. The very nature of our government requires us to defend our nation with the tools which a free society has created and proclaimed and which, indeed, are justification for its existence.
The last issue argued (this one by the government) concerns the order of disclosure of the overheard conversations. In effect the government contends that even though the District Judge found the interceptions to have been illegal, he should have determined in camera that they were not relevant to this case, and hence, not subject to disclosure. This very issue has been recently decided by the United States Supreme Court in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S. Ct. 961, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969). In this case the opinion of the Court said:
" [I]f the hearings are to be more than a formality and petitioners not left entirely to reliance on government testimony, there should be turned over to them the records of those overheard conversations which the Government was not entitled to use in building its case against them." Alderman v. United States, supra at 182-183, 89 S. Ct. at 971 (Footnotes omitted.)
"Here the defendant was entitled to see a transcript of his own conversations and nothing else. He had no right to rummage in government files." Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317, 89 S. Ct. 1099, 1101, 22 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1968).
We cannot agree with the dissent that Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 313-315, 89 S. Ct. 1163, 22 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1969), in any way weakened the disclosure requirement of Alderman. The full text of Justice Stewart's opinion makes it clear that the "preliminary determination" with which he was concerned was whether or not "any of the surveillances did violate the Fourth Amendment." This determination Justice Stewart held could be made by in camera inspection — as has been done in this case both by the District Judge and this court.
We believe that the Supreme Court has held that a defendant whose personal conversations have been illegally recorded is entitled to transcripts of the illegally recorded material without regard to whether a judge on inspection in camera might or might not be able to find relevancy. Nonetheless, we have considered remand of this case to the District Judge for an expression on the relevancy issue so as to have a complete appellate record. On inspection of the sealed exhibit in this case, however, we cannot (and we do not believe the District Judge could) ascertain with any certainty whether or not the government had derived prosecutorial benefits from this illegal search to which benefits defendant would have the right to object at trial under the doctrine of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
In my opinion, the interpretation of the District Court ws erroneous. In decisions subequent to Alderman, the Supreme Court clarified any ambiguity which might theretofore have existed by holding that an adversary proceeding and full disclosure are not required for resolution of every issue raised by electronic surveillance. In Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S. Ct. 1163, 22 L. Ed. 2d 297, Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, stated:
"Moreover, we did not in Alderman, Butenko, or Ivanov and we do not today, specify the procedure that the District Courts are to follow in making this preliminary determination. We have nowhere indicated that this determination cannot appropriately be made in ex parte, in camera proceedings. `Nothing in Alderman v. United States, Ivanov v. United States, or Butenko v. United States, ante, [394 U. S.] p. 165 [89 S. Ct. 961, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176], requires an adversary proceeding and full disclosure for resolution of every issue raised by an electronic surveillance.' Taglianetti v. United States, post, [394 U.S.] p. 316 [89 S. Ct. 1099, 22 L. Ed. 2d 302]." (394 U.S. at 314, 89 S. Ct. at 1165)
"Determination of this case requires that we balance the rights of the defendant and the national interest. The Attorney General, who acts here for the President and Commander-in-Chief, has submitted his affidavit that the fifth wiretap was maintained `for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information' and the Attorney General opposed disclosure at the hearing because `it would prejudice the national interest to disclose particular facts concerning this surveillance other than to the court.' The fifth log was submitted by the Government for an in camera examination by the Court, which has been made both here and in the District Court. The rights of defendant and the national interest have thus been properly safeguarded. Further judicial inquiry would be improper and should not occur. It would be `intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret.' Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S. Ct. 431, 436, 92 L. Ed. 568 (1948). We, therefore, discern no constitutional prohibition against the fifth wiretap." (430 F.2d at 171)
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Clay as to the fifth log (issue number 2 in the Supreme Court) and granted certiorari only on issue number 4 relating to the validity of Clay's claim to exemption from the draft as a conscientious objector. 400 U.S. 990, 91 S. Ct. 457, 27 L. Ed. 2d 438.
In my opinion, the Supreme Court in declining to rule on the constitutional issue merely followed "the traditional practice of this Court of refusing to decide constitutional questions when the record discloses other grounds of decision, whether or not they have been properly raised before us by the parties." Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77, 78, 76 S. Ct. 131, 132, 100 L. Ed. 60 (1955).
In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. Ed. 568 (1948), the Court considered the powers of the President in foreign relations in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Jackson, stating:
"The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry." (333 U.S. at 111, 68 S. Ct. at 436)
The power of the President to order electronic surveillance in national security cases has been upheld in United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1970); and United States v. Dellinger, Crim. No. 69-180, N.D. Ill., 1970. It was denied in United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, C.D. Cal. 1970.
"In joining the Court's opinion, I note the Court's acknowledgment that there are circumstances in which it is reasonable to search without a warrant. In this connection, in footnote 23 the Court points out that today's decision does not reach national security cases. Wiretapping to protect the security of the Nation has been authorized by successive Presidents. The present Administration would apparently save national security cases from restrictions against wiretapping. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 112-118 [87 S. Ct. 1873, 1911-1914, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040] (1967) (White, J., dissenting). We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable."
Justices Douglas and Brennan expressed contrary views, 389 U.S. at 359-360, 88 S. Ct. 507. The Supreme Court has not decided the issue. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 314, 89 S. Ct. 1163, 22 L. Ed. 2d 297.
I regard as inapposite the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952), which involved seizure by the President of private property in order to prevent a strike which he thought would seriously affect the economy of the country. The protection of the Government against attacks designed to overthrow it by force and violence involves an entirely different matter.
CONFIDENTIAL May 21, 1940
/s/ TOM C. CLARK Attorney General. July 17, 1947*
The amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, approved January 2, 1971, is by its terms inapplicable to this case. Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14, 84 Stat. 1880 (Jan. 2, 1971)
United States v. Dellinger, et al., Criminal No. 69-180 (U.S.D.C.N.D. Ill. E.D.) decided February 20, 1970; United States v. O'Neal, Criminal KC-CR. 1204 (U.S. D.C.D.Kansas) decided September 1, 1970; United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (U.S.D.C.C.D.California) decided January 8, 1971; and the instant case, respectively
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S. Ct. 429, 17 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1966); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873. 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)
If the President was in possession of facts establishing probable cause he might never need to investigate. Even the Secretary of Labor may investigate a labor union without having probable cause. Goldberg v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 293 F.2d 807 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938, 82 S. Ct. 379, 7 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1961).