Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/519/479/85704/
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 21:31:31
Document Index: 582697968

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1362', '§ 1331', '§ 1362', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1362', '§ 1362', '§ 1362', '§ 1362', '§ 1362', '§ 1331']

The Mescalero Apache Tribe, an Indian Tribe, Appellant, v. Joe R. Martinez, D/b/a Marco Construction Company, Andwisconsin Surety Corporation, a Wisconsincorporation, Appellees, 519 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1975) :: Justia
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The Mescalero Apache Tribe, an Indian Tribe, Appellant, v. Joe R. Martinez, D/b/a Marco Construction Company, Andwisconsin Surety Corporation, a Wisconsincorporation, Appellees, 519 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1975)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 519 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1975)
Argued March 28, 1975. Decided July 9, 1975
It is noted that both § 1362 and § 1331 require that the matter in controversy be one arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Though the Supreme Court has not as yet definitively considered the "arising under" language in § 1362, this same language as it appears in § 1331(a) has been the subject of much legal writing. It has been suggested that the proper test under § 1331 for finding original federal jurisdiction is that there be a "substantial claim founded directly upon federal law."1 In deciding whether the matter in controversy involves such a claim, only the complaint should be examined, and, indeed, only those parts of the complaint directly and necessarily relating to the plaintiff's cause of action should be considered. Any statements in the complaint which go beyond a statement of the plaintiff's claim and anticipate or reply to a probable defense are to be disregarded. The repeated enunciation of the foregoing general principles has given rise to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule for determining federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. See, for example, Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S. Ct. 96, 81 L. Ed. 70 (1936), and Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 34 S. Ct. 724, 58 L. Ed. 1218 (1914).
Just what the Tribe feels should be the limits of this broader approach to § 1362 is not entirely clear. Others have suggested that in determining whether there be a federal question under § 1362, courts should not be limited to a consideration of the necessary elements of the complaint, but should consider all pleadings, depositions, and the like. Even if the broader approach be followed in the instant case, there would still be no federal question presented. Going beyond the limitations of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, there is still nothing whatsoever in the instant case to suggest that we have anything here but a simple breach of contract case. A breach of contract claim has been held not to be a matter in controversy arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, and hence not posing a federal question. Adelt v. Richmond School District, 439 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Enterprise Electric Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 353 F. Supp. 991 (D.C.Mont.1973), where a federal district court was held not to have jurisdiction to hear an action wherein an Indian tribe was sued for monies allegedly due under a contract for electrical work. Accordingly, we find no jurisdiction under § 1362, under either the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, or the broader approach.
In thus arguing, the Apache Tribe relies on some legislative history, which they deem helpful to their cause. Of course legislative history cannot overrule the clear and unequivocal language of a statute. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974). Reliance is also placed by the Tribe on three cases out of the Ninth Circuit: Moses v. Kinnear, 490 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1973); Fort Mojave Tribe v. Lafollette, 478 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973); and Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Arizona Sand and Rock Company, 353 F. Supp. 1098 (D.C.Ariz.1972).
Salt River also apparently involves an alleged trespass to Indian land. However, it is quite true that in Salt River there appears certain language supportive of the position advanced here by the Apache Tribe. The court in Salt River flatly stated that "under § 1362 any case which might have been brought by the United States is deemed to be one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States if it is brought on behalf of an Indian tribe by their own attorneys." In thus holding the Arizona district court relied on Judge Lumbard's dissent in Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. County of Oneida, New York, 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 661, 94 S. Ct. 772, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1974). In our view the Arizona court overextended Judge Lombard's dissent.
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 165, 168 (1953)
In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 94 S. Ct. 772, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1974), the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider the contention that the "arising under" language in § 1362 should be "expanded" beyond what judicial interpretations of that language have allowed under § 1331. See footnote 16, p. 682, 94 S. Ct. 772