Source: https://openjurist.org/943/f2d/51/90/5914/90/5911
Timestamp: 2018-03-22 19:56:13
Document Index: 222567791

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1401', '§ 300', '§ 3', '§ 300', '§ 1415', '§ 300', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 300', '§ 1414', '§ 1414', '§ 1414', '§ 300', '§ 1415']

943 F2d 51 Eva v. Brock | OpenJurist
943 F. 2d 51 - Eva v. Brock
943 F2d 51 Eva v. Brock
EVA N. and Timothy H. by Eva N., His Next Friend,
John BROCK, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
Nos. 90-5911, 90-5914.
The "centerpiece of the [Education Act's] education delivery system" is the "individualized educational program." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). In Kentucky, such a program is developed for each handicapped child by a local "admissions and release committee" comprised of the child's parents, teacher, and various education professionals. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (1990); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344 (1990); 707 Ky.Admin.Regs. 1:051, § 3 (1988). Each individualized educational program--IEP for short--must, among other things, set out the child's current educational performance, establish goals for improvement, and describe the specific instruction and services to be provided the child in pursuit of those goals. 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (1990).
If any party is dissatisfied with the IEP, the Education Act requires the state to provide "an impartial due process hearing." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1990); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1990); 707 Ky.Admin.Regs. 1:060 (1988). In Kentucky such hearings are conducted by a hearings officer with a right of appeal to the Kentucky Exceptional Children Appeals Board pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1990) (see 707 Ky.Admin.Regs. 1:080 (1988)). Review of Appeals Board decisions may be obtained in federal district courts. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (1990); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (1990).
The district court (Bertlesman, J.) separated the "individual issues" pertaining to the school's suitability for Timmy from the "institutional issues" pertaining to the admissions criteria. The institutional issues were tried to the bench, with the result summarized above. See Eva N. v. Brock, 741 F.Supp. 626 (E.D.Ky.1990). This appeal and cross appeal followed.
Timmy's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies does not prevent us from reaching the merits. Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is normally required before a party may take an Education Act dispute to the district court, see Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir.1989), exhaustion is not required if resort to administrative proceedings would be futile. Kerr Center Parents Association v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir.1990). The attorney general's determination that the hearings officer could not grant the relief Timmy requested brings this case within the futility exception.
The "manner" in which the state agency provides special education services to children with disabilities under § 1414(d) must be determined under procedures consistent with the subchapter in which § 1414(d) is found. This subchapter includes § 1414(a)(5), which provides statutory authority for the committees that devise IEPs (See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.343 and 300.344 (1990)). It also includes §§ 1415(b), (c), and (e), which provide for administrative and judicial review of IEPs. Section 1414(d) does not allow a state to circumvent these statutory procedures. The constraints that the subchapter places on the power of the state may be unwise, but unless the state is prepared to forego federal funding--which it remains free to do, of course--relief can only be obtained through Congress.
"may require that some children be placed at [Kentucky School for the Blind], who do not meet its criteria, if such placement is the only way an appropriate IEP can be designed for them." Eva N., 741 F.Supp. at 634 (emphasis supplied).
A state may not make classifications on the basis of handicap unless the classifications are rationally related to a legitimate state goal. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-46 (1985). We have said that a state may not create an "irrebutable presumption which has no reasonable relation to fact." Kelm v. Carlson, 473 F.2d 1267, 1270 (6th Cir.1973). Under the district court's order, the admissions criteria raise no irrebutable presumptions; the criteria may be considered in determining whether a child can benefit from placement at the Kentucky School for the Blind, but they are not controlling.