Source: https://www.incadat.com/en/case/1020
Timestamp: 2018-12-14 07:17:03+00:00
Document Index: 178264903

Matched Legal Cases: ["l'article 13", "l'article 13", "l'article 11", "l'article 15", "l'article 15", "l'article 3"]

INCADAT | Re F. (A Child) [2009] EWCA Civ 416
Re F. (A Child) [2009] EWCA Civ 416
HC/E/UKe 1020
Thorpe, Wilson and Elias L.JJ.
Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2) | Procedural Matters
Appeal dismissed, return refused
3 13(2) 15
Re W. (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 538; Re L. [2000] 2 FLR 334; Re D. (A Child) [2006] UKHL 51.
Summary available in EN | FR
The child, a boy, was aged eight at the date of the alleged wrongful removal. He was born in Poland to Polish parents and had always lived in Poland. The parents divorced in 2006 and thereafter proceedings were commenced in Poland in respect of the child, resulting in an order dated July 2007, granting the father alternate weekend staying contact with the child.
In August 2007 the mother unilaterally removed the child to Wales, where her then Polish boyfriend was living. The father claimed that he did not know the child's whereabouts until April 2008. Return proceedings were issued in June 2008. Delays followed largely as a result of the obtaining of expert evidence on Polish custody law.
Appeal dismissed and return refused; the removal was wrongful but the child objected to going back, was of sufficient age and maturity, and the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion in upholding the child's objections.
The child was interviewed by a court appointed expert who concluded that he objected to a return and that he had a level of maturity in advance of his chronological age. The father did not challenge this evidence and it was therefore accepted that the court could consider whether to exercise its discretion to refuse a summary return.
In the exercise of this discretion the trial judge noted that the boy was Polish, that Polish remained his first language as well as of his mother and that his entire life had been in Poland until the age of eight. He held that it was far from self-evident that it would be in the child's best interests to remain long-term in Wales.
However, the relevant question was whether it was in his welfare to return forthwith to Poland, or, to remain where he was pending a substantive decision as to his future, whether that was taken in Poland pursuant to Article 11 of Brussels II a Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003) or in England and Wales.
The trial judge concluded that insofar as his short-term welfare was concerned, the child's views were consonant with his own best interests. He had been living in Wales for 18 months, he was settled there and had friends and his entire maternal family had relocated there. Notwithstanding the policy of the Convention, the trial judge held that it would not be in the best interests of the child to return forthwith.
The Court of Appeal held that there was no basis on which to challenge the decision of the trial judge.
Challenging an Article 13 Non-Return Decision in a EU Case:
Thorpe L.J. suggested that in an intra-European Union Convention case, where a summary return was refused on the basis of one of the Article 13 exceptions, the left behind parent would be strategically wiser to pursue the procedure within Article 11(6)-(8) of the Brussels II a Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003), rather than initiating an appeal in the requested State.
Expert Evidence and the European Judicial Network:
Thorpe L.J. further drew attention to the difficulties which had been encountered in this case regarding the obtaining of expert evidence on Polish law. Initially a joint expert had been appointed, who concluded that the father had not been exercising rights of custody at the time of the removal.
The father was subsequently permitted to appoint his own expert, and a Polish court ruled that he had been exercising rights of custody. At trial, under cross examination, the original expert changed his testimony and agreed that the father had been exercising rights of custody on the relevant date.
Thorpe L.J. noted that difficulties equally existed with the Article 15 mechanism within the Convention. He then suggested that greater recourse could be made to the European Judicial Network, through the International Family Law Office in London.
Pragmatic advice could be offered as to the best route to follow in a particular case: whether to go for a single joint expert, an Article 15 declaration or whether to obtain an opinion from the liaison judge as to the law of his own country, an opinion that would not be binding but which would perhaps help the parties and the trial court to see the weight, or want of weight, in the challenge to the plaintiff's ability to cross the Article 3 threshold.
L'enfant, un garçon, était âgé de huit ans au moment du déplacement dont le caractère illicite était allégué. Il était né en Pologne de parents polonais et y avait toujours vécu. Les parents divorcèrent en 2006 et une procédure relative à l'enfant fut alors introduite en Pologne résultant dans la délivrance d'une ordonnance datée de juillet 2007, accordant au père un droit d'hébergement alterné le week-end avec l'enfant.
En août 2007, la mère déplaça unilatéralement l'enfant au Pays de Galles, où vivait son petit ami polonais d'alors. Le père a indiqué qu'il n'avait pas eu connaissance du lieu où se trouvait l'enfant jusqu'en avril 2008. Une procédure de retour fut introduite en juin 2008. Des retards s'ensuivirent, causés en grande partie par l'obtention d'avis d'experts sur le droit de garde polonais.
Recours rejeté et retour refusé ; le déplacement était illicite mais l'enfant s'est opposé au retour, il était d'âge et de maturité suffisants et le juge de première instance avait correctement utilisé son pouvoir discrétionnaire en prenant en compte les objections de l'enfant.
Contester une décision de non-retour dans le cadre de l'article 13 pour une affaire entre États de l'UE :
Lord Justice Thorpe suggéra que dans une affaire relative à la Convention et interne à l'Union européenne dans laquelle un retour sommaire était refusé sur la base d'une des exceptions de l'article 13, le parent privé de son enfant aurait stratégiquement intérêt à poursuivre la procédure dans le cadre de l'article 11(6)-(8) du règlement Bruxelles II bis (Règlement du Conseil (CE) No 2201/2003 du 27 novembre 2003) plutôt que d'interjeter appel dans l'État requis.
Avis d'experts et Réseau judiciaire européen:
Lord Justice Thorpe mit de plus l'accent sur les difficultés rencontrées dans cette affaire pour l'obtention d'avis d'experts en droit polonais. Au départ, un expert commun avait été nommé, qui a conclu que le père n'exerçait pas de droit de garde au moment du déplacement.
Le père fut ensuite autorisé à nommer son propre expert et un tribunal polonais jugea qu'il avait bien exercé un droit de garde. Lors du procès, pendant le contre interrogatoire, le premier expert modifia son témoignage et convint que le père avait exercé un droit de garde à la date en question.
Lord Justice Thorpe nota que le mécanisme de l'article 15 dans le cadre de la Convention présenta également des difficultés. Il suggéra ensuite qu'il soit plus souvent fait appel au Réseau judiciaire européen par l'intermédiaire du Bureau du droit international de la famille (International Family Law Office) à Londres.
Des conseils pragmatiques pourraient être donnés sur la meilleure voie à suivre dans un cas particulier : opter pour un expert commun unique, une déclaration selon l'article 15 ou obtenir une opinion du juge de liaison sur le droit de son pays, une opinion qui ne serait pas contraignante mais qui aiderait peut-être les parties et le tribunal de première instance à mesurer le poids ou l'absence de poids de la mise en cause de la capacité du plaignant à dépasser le seuil de l'article 3.