Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/594/177/660/
Timestamp: 2020-04-03 08:44:34
Document Index: 718154964

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1702', '§ 1346', '§ 1702', '§ 1346', '§ 2680', '§ 1346']

Dsi Corp., a California Corporation, Sanford B. Weiss,woodland Development Company, a Joint Venture, Andterra Linda Meadows, a Partnership,plaintiffs- Appellants, v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (of the Unitedstates of America), Defendant-appellee, 594 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1979 › Dsi Corp., a California Corporation, Sanford B. Weiss,woodland Development Company, a Joint Venture,...
Dsi Corp., a California Corporation, Sanford B. Weiss,woodland Development Company, a Joint Venture, Andterra Linda Meadows, a Partnership,plaintiffs- Appellants, v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (of the Unitedstates of America), Defendant-appellee, 594 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1979)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 594 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1979) Jan. 19, 1979. Rehearing Denied April 16, 1979
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee on causes of action one and three through six and dismissed without prejudice cause of action two. The court grounded its actions on several bases. First, the court held that to the extent that the action sounded in contract, it had no jurisdiction under § 1702 because recovery from the public treasury of over $10,000 may not be had in a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2). Second, the court ruled that § 1702 did not confer jurisdiction over tort causes because of the exclusive remedy provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2679(a). In addition, the court found that even if brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the action would be barred by the "discretionary function" exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Finally, the court concluded that appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the undisputed facts and the written agreements between the parties.
Foreclosure proceedings were instituted by the Government on April 29, 1969. In United States v. Woodland Development Co., No. C-51248 (N.D. Cal., April 29, 1969), the court granted the Government possession of The Park Lane and all property on the premises. The Government assumed management of the property as mortgagee-in-possession and has applied all net income to the note assigned by Fidelity Bank. A final disposition of the Woodland foreclosure action has not yet been reached.
The causes pressed by appellants sound in both tort and contract. For reasons which will become apparent, before analyzing either aspect of the causes we must make the determination of whether this suit is against the Secretary or against the United States. Two decisions of the Supreme Court, Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S. Ct. 999, 10 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1963) and Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S. Ct. 1009, 91 L. Ed. 1209 (1947), have established the rule that where recovery has to be made from the treasury, a suit is actually against the United States. If recovery may be had from separate funds within the possession and control of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, then this suit is in fact against the Secretary. See Federal Housing Administration, Region 4 v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 60 S. Ct. 488, 84 L. Ed. 724 (1940).
Contract actions against the United States are governed by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2), 1491. The Tucker Act includes both a waiver of sovereign immunity and a grant of jurisdiction. The grant of jurisdiction is, however, conditional. Suits seeking recovery of less than $10,000 may be brought in either the district courts or the Court of Claims but suits for over $10,000 may be entertained only by the Court of Claims. Because recovery of over $10,000 is being sought by appellants, to the extent that their actions are based upon contract, the district court was correct in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction.