Source: https://trellis.law/ca/issue-type/strict-liability-for-new-construction-453
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 00:56:55
Document Index: 706235570

Matched Legal Cases: ['§473', '§473', '§ 832', '§ 832', '§ 896', '§3479']

What is Strict Liability for New Construction?
“A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater hazards if defective.” (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62; McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1978) 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1012.)
The cases imposing strict liability had “usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff.” (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 63.) The justification for departing from warranty theory and for establishing a doctrine of strict liability in tort was the recognition that the liability was imposed by law and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own liability for defective products. (Id.)
“The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. Strict liability, however, was never intended to make the manufacturer or distributor of a product its insurer. From its inception, strict liability has never been, and is not now, absolute liability.” (Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 994.)
“[T]he builder or seller of new construction--—not unlike the manufacturer or merchandiser of personalty--makes implied representations, ordinarily indispensable to the sale, that the builder has used reasonable skill and judgment in constructing the building. On the other hand, the purchaser does not usually possess the knowledge of the builder and is unable to fully examine a completed house and its components without disturbing the finished product.” (Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 374, 379.) “[B]uilders and sellers of new construction should be held to what is impliedly represented--that the completed structure was designed and constructed in a reasonably workmanlike manner.” (Id. at p. 380.)
In the context of mass-produced homes, the courts have extended the concept of strict liability to allow purchasers to sue developer/sellers under the theory of strict liability. (Jimenez v. Super. Ct. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 454.) “One may not be held liable for manufacturing homes or selling lots under the doctrine of strict liability unless one can be deemed a ‘mass producer’ of such homes.” (Fleck v. Bollinger Home Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 926, 934; Garcia v. Becker Bros. Steel Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 474, 482; Oliver v. Super. Ct. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 86, 89; Hyman v. Gordon (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 769, 773–774.)
There is “no talismanic number of properties” establishing a business as a mass producer of homes. (Fleck, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 935.) Whether a residence “falls within the category of a mass-produced home is a question which must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” (Oliver v. Super. Ct. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 86, 89; KB Home v. Super. Ct. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1079.) It has been held that a seller appearing to be engaged in the manufacturing and selling of products as part of its full-time commercial activity is not an occasional seller, even where the product at issue was custom made or of a kind not typically produced by defendant. (Rawlings v. D. M. Oliver, Inc. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 890, 897-898; Hyman, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d at pp. 773–774.)
The doctrine of strict liability has been extended to retailers, distributors, suppliers and “other entities in the chain of distribution of a product that causes harm to a person or to property other than the product itself.” (Johnson v. United States Steel Corporation (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 22, 31; Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 344.) It has been held that “strict liability may attach even if the defendant did not have actual possession of the defective product or control over the manner in which the product was designed or manufactured.” (Bay Summit Community Assn. v. Shell Oil Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 762, 774.) Strict liability also applies where a nonmanufacturing party is “outside the vertical chain of distribution” of the product, but still played an integral role in the “producing and marketing enterprise” of a defective product and profited from the product’s placement in the stream of commerce. (Arriaga v. CitiCapital Commercial Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1535.) Such imposition of liability supports the overall policy that liability attaches to an entity that was instrumental in placing a defective product on the market, regardless of fault. (Id.)
To sufficiently allege strict liability, plaintiff must allege that defendant “produced, manufactured, sold, or was in some way responsible for the product.” (Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 868, 874.) Strict liability applies where plaintiff proves that it was injured while using the instrumentality in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture, of which plaintiff was not aware and which made the instrumentality unsafe for its intended use. (Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.)
“The imposition of strict liability depends on whether the facts establish a sufficient causative relationship or connection between the defendant and the product so as to establish that the policies underlying the strict liability doctrine are satisfied. Specifically, a defendant involved in the marketing/distribution process has been held strictly liable if three factors are present:
the defendant received a direct financial benefit from its activities and from the sale of the product;
the defendant's role was integral to the business enterprise such that the defendant's conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the product to the initial consumer market; and
the defendant had control over, or a substantial ability to influence, the manufacturing or distribution process.”
(Bay Summit Community Assn. v. Shell Oil Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 762, 776; Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711, 725.)
The strict liability doctrine achieves its goals by “reliev[ing] an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action.” (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 431; Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 119.)
While the injured plaintiff is not required to prove the manufacturer is negligent, he must prove the manufacturer is at fault; the plaintiff must show that the product was in some way defective. (Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 251.) While the operative term “defect” is not capable of precise definition, and is concededly an amorphous and elusive concept, it does not require proof that the defective design renders the product “unreasonably dangerous” to the unsuspecting customer. (Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 133; Buccery v. General Motors Corp. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 533, 544.)
Strict liability may be invoked for three types of injury-producing defects:
a manufacturing defect, where the product deviates from the manufacturer's intended result;
a design defect, where the product either fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in a reasonably foreseeable manner, or when the risk of danger inherent in the design outweighs the benefits of the challenged design; and
a "warning" defect, where the product lacks adequate instructions or warnings as to risks of harm.
(Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 428-430.)
In evaluating the adequacy of a product's design pursuant to these standards, a jury may consider, among other relevant factors:
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design;
the likelihood that such danger would occur;
the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design;
the financial cost of an improved design; and
the adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would result from an alternative design.
(Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d 413, 431; Horn v. General Motors Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 359, 367; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 842, 854.)
Useful Rulings on Strict Liability for New Construction
Nick Bellasis, et al. v. Fresno Land Company, et al.
Motions: Defendant Agate Holding’s demurrer to First Amended Complaint; Defendant Paramount Home’s demurrer to First Amended ComplaintTentative Ruling:To overrule Defendant Agate Holding’s special demurrer; to sustain, with leave to amend, the general demurrer regarding Plaintiff Michelle’s standing; and to overrule the general demurrer for failure to state sufficient facts to state a cause of act...
..l be liberally construed[…]; that any mere ground of special demurrer for uncertainty will be resolved in support of the complaint and the demurrer overruled, when the necessary facts are shown to exist, although inaccurate...
Estate of Estanislao Jose Ramos vs Mohamed Amer et al
Nature of Proceedings: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, First Amended ComplaintCase: Estate of Estanislao Jose Ramos, et al, v. Mohamed Samir Amer, et al.,Case #1401551, Judge SterneHearing Date: June 23, 2014Matter: Motion for Judgment on the PleadingsTentative Ruling:The court grants in part and denies in part defendant Melchiori Construction Company's motion for judgment on the pleadings....
..Caroline Marguerite Amer located at 877 Sand Point Road in Carpinteria. The plaintiffs in this action are the Estate of Estanislao Jose Ramos, by and through his successor in interest, M...
Bellasis, et al. v. Fresno Land Company, et al.
Motion: Defendant Fresno Land Company’s Motion for SummaryAdjudication of Plaintiffs’ First Cause of ActionTentative Ruling:To deny. (Code Civ. Proc. §473c(f)(1).)Explanation:Summary AdjudicationThe summary judgment procedure, “is drastic and should be used with caution. Summary judgment is properly granted only when the evidence in support of the moving party establishes that there is no issue of...
..riable issue of material fact. If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal...
Mata v. Johnstone Contracting, Inc., et al.
Motion: Defendant Johnston Contracting, Inc.’s Demurrer to ComplaintTentative Ruling:To overrule general demurrer to entire complaint based on statute of limitations. To sustain demurrer to sixth cause of action without leave to amend.Explanation:Meet and ConferDefendant Johnston’s counsel consciously elected not to engage in the meet and confer process required by Code of Civil Procedure section...
..of Civil Procedure section 337.15. The Legislature's enactment of section 337.15 established the “general rule that no action for latent construction defects may be commenced more than 10 years after ‘subs...
2435 Golden Gate Road LLC vs Storm and Storm etc
Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer/Motion Strike Demurrer and Motion to StrikeRULING: Defendant’s demurrer to the first, sixth, and eighth causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, and strict liability is sustained. Defendant’s motion to strike portions of the complaint is granted as set forth herein. As to both the demurrer and motion to strike, plaintiff is granted ten days’ leave to amend.BA...
..s, who agreed to be responsible to plaintiff for the day-to-day management and disbursement of the loan funds during the construction of the residence. In 2007, after the residence was partially built, the Rasmussens defaulted on their loan, at which time plaintiff foreclosed...
Motion: Defendant Paramount Home Development’s motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of actionTentative Ruling:To deny. (Code Civ. Proc. §473c(f)(1).)Explanation:Summary AdjudicationThe summary judgment procedure, “is drastic and should be used with caution. Summary judgment is properly granted only when the evidence in support of the moving party establishes that...
..onexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co....
Rulings on Strict Liability for New Construction
Ex Parte (16)
Motion Hearing (Civil) (18)
Teri L. Jackson (100)
Los Angeles County, CA (112)
San Diego County, CA (82)
San Francisco County, CA (124)
., supra, 269 Cal.App.2d 224 did not support the imposition of strict liability on one who engaged in the occasional construction and sale of residences. Similarly, there is a reluctance to impose strict liability in the commercial context. In Becker v. IRM Corp. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 454, the California Supreme Court expanded the applicability of strict liability as enunciated in Greenman v.
Bollinger Home Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 926, 934 [defendant must be “mass producer” of homes to be subject to strict liability]; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227 [strict liability applicable in context of builders of mass-produced homes].) A lot developer that cuts, grades, fills, and compacts sites for sale to the public as residential lots may be sued on strict liability grounds for defective lots. (Blackhawk Corp. v. Gotham Ins.
Judge Alan Simpson
HARDIMAN CONSTRUCTION/TRENCHLESS TITAN AND CHARLES J. PETKOVICH, ET AL
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION — MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [PLTF] HARDIMAN CONSTRUCTION/TRENCHLESS TITAN RULING Cross Defendants Hardiman Construction/Trenchless Titan, er a]. ﬁled this motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the second cause of action in the cross-complaint alleging strict liability against all cross-defendants. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.
Second Cause of Action, Count 1: Strict Liability: Melchiori also seeks judgment on the pleadings with respect to the strict liability cause of action, contending that a contractor for a custom-built home cannot be strictly liable. �The doctrine of strict products liability imposes strict liability in tort on all of the participants in the chain of distribution of a defective product.� Bostick v. Flex Equipment Co., Inc., 147 Cal.App.4th 80, 88 (2007).
Plaintiff has cited no authority, and the court is aware of none, that a general contractor, like Storm, who performs only construction and installation on a residential improvement can be held strictly liable in tort for construction defects. Defendant’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action for strict liability is therefore sustained. 2.
“The imposition of strict liability depends on whether the facts establish a sufficient causative relationship or connection between the defendant and the product so as to establish that the policies underlying the strict liability doctrine are satisfied.
The first cause of action fails because the residential standards only apply to new or original construction and the allegations in the FAC make clear that the construction involved in this case is neither new nor original. The third cause of action fails because strict liability only applies to mass-produced homes and the construction involved in this case did not involve mass-produced homes.
Cross-defendants contend that strict liability is not applicable in the context of a commercial construction project. They rely on Appalachian Ins. Co. v.
ROZO, ET AL. V. REPUBLIC COMPANIES, ET AL
Eighth Cause of Action (Strict Liability) Contrary to Defendants’ contention, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the elements of a strict liability claim for defects in design and manufacturing against Republic. (CACI no. 1200.) Defendants fail to point to any authority that require strict liability claims be pled with specificity. The demurrer as to the eighth cause of action is overruled as to Republic. MOTION TO STRIKE In light of the ruling on the Demurrer, the motion to strike is moot.
CARROLL CLINE ET AL VS. ASBESTOS CORPORATION LIMITED ET AL
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Albay Construction Companys Notice Of Motion And Motion For Summary Judgement, Or In The Alternatice Summary Adjudication On Asbestos Law and Motion Calendar for Wednesday, January 15, 2014 in Department 503 at 9:30 a.m., Line 1. Defendant Albay Construction Company?s motion for summary judgment is denied and its alternate motion for summary adjudication of plaintiffs? strict liability and false representation causes of action is off calendar.
IN RE THE ESTATE OF SHERRY ANN LEDFORD, DECEASED
Therefore, the court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the property sold was not “new” and the principles of strict liability, as referred to in Civil Code Sections 895, et seq., do not apply.
Steel Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 474, 482 [occasional seller not subject to strict liability for sale of defective product]; Oliver v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 86, 89 [strict liability appropriate only to mass produced homes]; Hyman v. Gordon (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 769, 773–774 [strict liability doctrine applies to seller engaged in business of selling such a product, rather than occasional seller who is not engaged in that activity as part of its business]; Kriegler v.
JACK OLSON VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B/P)AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS ET AL
Defendant Albay Construction Co.?s motion for summary judgment is denied and its alternate motion for summary adjudication is denied as to negligence and punitive damages and off calendar as to strict liability. As to negligence, defendant failed to sustain its burden of production that plaintiffs do not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence that Mr. Olson was exposed to asbestos-containing products attributable to defendant. Mr. Olson?s deposition testimony and plaintiffs? responses to defendant?
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT V CALIFORNIA RESOURCES
App. 1995), aff'd as modified, 552 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. 1996) ["Absent a statute imposing strict liability, we hold that the 'responsible corporate officer' doctrine does not apply in this case."; State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc. (Minn. App. 1995) 532 N.W.2d 610, 612-14 [The "responsible corporate officer doctrine" is not applicable where the statute at issue does not impose strict liability.].)
“Strict liability is not absolute liability.” (Id.) “Strict product liability seeks to hold manufacturers (and others in the stream of commerce) accountable when there is something wrong with the product.” (Id.) “[T]he term defect as utilized in the strict liability context is neither self-defining nor susceptible to a single definition applicable in all contexts.” (Id.) “Three general types of defects have been discerned: manufacturing defects, warning defects, and design defects.” (Id. at 32.)
ROBERT ROSS ET AL VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS
Even if the court considers the documents related to the construction of the Sacramento Convention Center (defendant?s Exhibit M), when read in conjunction with Mr. Ross? deposition testimony, they merely create a triable issue whether defendant was present. Plaintiffs have dismissed their strict liability cause of action. If a hearing is requested, it will be at 9:45a.m. A court reporter will not be provided by the court.
TAYLOR KOROBOW VS. SUSAN HARDIN ET AL
PLAINTIFF TAYLOR KOROBOW'S Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint IS DENIED AS TO DEFENDANT DOUGLAS ROSS CONSTRUCTION ("D.R.C."). THE COURT HAS GRANTED D.R.C.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE AMENDMENT, THEREFORE, APPEARS TO BE UNTIMELY. ALSO PLAINTIFF FAILS TO EXPLAIN THE DELAY IN SEEKING TO AMEND. FINALLY, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD A GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO STRICT LIABILITY WHERE ANOTHER PARTY IS THE ADMITTED DEVELOPER. =(302/PJM/VC)
DISCOVER BANK V. SHERRY VATTUONE
Signum’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action for strict liability – product defect on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Signum correctly argues the strict liability claim does not lie against a design professional such as an architect. (See, e.g., Murphy v. E. R. Squibb & Sons (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672, 677 [strict liability does not apply to those who sell their services]; Pancoast v.
MADFI LLC VS DKN HOTEL LLC [E-FILE]
s demurrer to Amended Complaint is sustained as to the strict liability [CC § 832] cause of action and overruled as to all other causes of action. Strict Liability Alliance's demurrer is sustained. Plaintiff brings this cause of action pursuant to CC § 832.
CHU V. BROOKFIELD WOODBURY II, LLC
The 1st and 2nd causes of action, Strict Liability and Negligence, are preempted pursuant to the provisions of Civ.Code § 896 (“The Right to Repair Act”). The 3rd cause of action (Nuisance) is not preempted by the Act as same is premised on an alleged violation of statute, Civ.Code §3479. Plaintiff seeks recovery in nuisance for the alleged defective construction and design of a residence and accompanying structures. (Complaint ¶27).
ABIKHZER VS OWENS
"a duty owed to the underlying plaintiff ([citations])," vicarious liability, or strict liability. (BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 848, 852.) Cross-Complainants do not attempt to allege strict liability. That being said, Cross-Complainants have alleged sufficient facts to support a duty owed by Porat to Plaintiff, and Porat's breach of that duty.
., Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligent Misrepresentation, Breach of Express Warranty, Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability and Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness. Starline brings this motion as to the strict liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and implied warranty causes of action.