Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2015cv00236/907557/117
Timestamp: 2017-03-23 16:28:33
Document Index: 668950207

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1320', '§ 164', '§ 164', '§ 164', '§ 164', '§ 290', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 290', '§ 2', '§ 32']

ORDER granting 107 Motion for Protective Order Precluding Disclosure of the Treatment Records Mailed to the Court by St for Cherry et al v. United States of America et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Cherry et al v. United States of America et al
ORDER granting 107 Motion for Protective Order Precluding Disclosure of the Treatment Records Mailed to the Court by St. Luke's Behavior Health Center. See order for details. Signed by Senior Judge Paul G Rosenblatt on 8/31/2016.(LMR)
Lawrence N. Cherry, et al.,
No. CV-15-00236-PHX-PGR
Pending before the Court is the United States’ Motion for Protective Order
Precluding Disclosure of the Treatment Records Mailed to the Court by St. Luke’s
Behavior Health Center (Doc. 107). Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the
Court finds that the motion should be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1)(A).
This is a medical malpractice action filed against the United States pursuant
to the Federal Tort Claims stemming from treatment plaintiff Lawrence Cherry
received through the Department of Veterans Affairs. Non-party Steven Carbonniere
is a physician assistant employed by the VA who was involved in the plaintiff’s
treatment between January 13, 2010 and February 11, 2011. During his deposition
on August 28, 2015, Mr. Carbonniere testified that he had undergone a five-day
inpatient detoxification program at St. Luke’s Behavior Health Center (“St. Luke’s”)
in September 2011 for opioid dependence stemming from his chronic back pain. He
further testified that he had been abusing narcotics for maybe six or eight months
prior to September 2011, but that it didn’t become a complusive problem until the
summer of 2011, that he had written narcotic prescriptions for himself using fictitious
names somewhere in the area of January or March 2011 through the late summer
of 2011, and that he was taking oxycodone on a daily basis for probably four or five
months prior to entering the St. Luke’s program. In a declaration, Mr. Carbonniere
stated while at St. Luke’s he underwent a medically assisted detoxification using
methadone and participated in counseling involving both individual and group
During Mr. Carbonniere’s deposition, the plaintiffs’ counsel asked him to
release his St. Luke’s medical records and he refused. Three months later, on
November 24, 2015, the plaintiffs’ counsel sent a medical authorization form for Mr.
Carbonniere’s St. Luke’s records to the United States Attorney’s Office, which that
office forwarded to Mr. Carbonniere on November 30, 2015. In a declaration, Mr.
Carbonniere stated that he did not sign the release form because he wanted to
maintain the confidentiality of his St. Luke’s records. Seven month later, on June 22,
2016, the plaintiffs’ counsel, without notice to Mr. Carbonniere, sent a subpoena to
St. Luke’s for “all records concerning the treatment” of Mr. Carbonniere by St. Luke’s
“and any other professionals to whom your facility referred him or from whom you
received records.”1 The plaintiffs’ counsel gave St. Luke’s until July 13, 2016 in
The subpoena stated that the produced records should include:
Copies of complete chart, progress notes and interview notes,
discharge summaries, counseling records, patient substance
abuse history, medication logs, orders, mental health treatment
which to produce Mr. Carbonniere’s medical records. Rather than producing the
records to the plaintiffs’ counsel, St. Luke’s, without notifying Mr. Carbonniere, sent
the records directly to the undersigned Judge, with the notation that it had informed
counsel for both sides that it was doing so because “Pt auth not available.” In its
cover letter, dated July 12, 2016, St. Luke’s stated that Mr. Carbonniere’s records
were being sent to the undersigned Judge under seal “as we have not received
authorization from the patient, nor a court order to disclose them to the court.”
The Court concludes that the United States’ motion should be granted
because the plaintiffs’ subpoena to St. Luke’s was untimely. Pursuant to the Court’s
amendment (Doc. 63), entered on November 17, 2015, to the Scheduling Order
(Doc. 37), the deadline to complete all fact discovery was July 1, 2016. The
Scheduling Order provided in relevant part that “[d]iscovery which cannot be timely
responded to prior to the discovery deadline will be met with disfavor, and could
result in denial of an extension, exclusion of evidence, or the imposition of other
Carbonniere’s treatment at St. Luke’s no later than August 28, 2015, the plaintiffs’
subpoena to St. Luke’s for his medical records was not issued until June 24, 2016,
just six days before the fact discovery deadline, and had a return date of July 13,
2016, which was twelve days after the discovery deadline. The plaintiffs did not
Notwithstanding that the plaintiffs’ counsel knew about Mr.
records, substance abuse treatment, and/or videotaped
interviews, written documents submitted by patient, laboratory
tests, etc., whether in electronic or other format;
Billing records and Explanation of Benefits including list of all
healthcare provider and all other related billing/payment
records[.]
seek an extension of the fact discovery deadline and have not provided any
explanation as to why they could not have timely sought the St. Luke’s records.
The Court further, and more importantly, concludes that the United States’
motion should be granted because the plaintiff’s subpoena to St. Luke’s was not
sought or issued in compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., and the pertinent
regulations promulgated pursuant to HIPAA.
HIPAA governs the dissemination of protected health information, and its
regulations place strict limitations on the ability of heath care providers to release a
patient’s medical records or discuss the patient’s medical history without the express
consent of the patient. The relevant regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e), which
provides for disclosures during judicial and administrative procedures, applies to
medical information sought during discovery. Briefly stated, this regulation provides
in relevant part that, in the absence of a court order authorizing the disclosure or the
submission to the court of a request for a qualified protective order covering the
disclosure, neither of which is present here, a patient’s records can only be disclosed
by a healthcare provider in response to a subpoena or discovery request when (1)
that request is accompanied by a written statement by the requesting party
satisfactorily assuring the provider that the requesting party has made a good faith
attempt to provide written notice to the patient, that the notice included sufficient
information about the litigation underlying the request to permit the patient to raise
an objection to the court, that the time for the patient to raise an objection to the
court has elapsed, and that no objection was filed or that any filed objection had
been resolved by the court and the records being sought are consistent with the
court’s resolution, § 164.512(e)(ii-iii), or (2) in the absence of the receipt of a
satisfactory assurance from the requesting party, that the medical care provider has
made the required reasonable effort to notify the patient about the discovery request
or has sought to obtain a qualified protective order. § 164.512(e)(vi). A review of the
subpoena-related documents submitted to the Court by St. Luke’s and the parties,
which include St. Luke’s cover letter to the Court confirming that it had not received
any authorization from Mr. Carbonniere for the disclosure of his records nor any
court order authorizing their disclosure, and Mr. Carbonniere’s declaration stating
that neither the plaintiffs’ counsel nor St. Luke’s contacted him to indicate that his
records were being sought via subpoena or that they were going to be released to
the Court, persuade the Court that Mr. Carbonniere’s records cannot be disclosed
to the plaintiffs because the regulatory requirements of § 164.512(e) were not met.
The United States argues for the first time in its reply that Mr. Carbonniere’s
substance abuse treatment records are also protected from disclosure under the
Public Health Service Act “(PHSA”), 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a) and its accompanying
regulations.2 The United States asserts that St. Luke’s is a “federally assisted
program” for purposes of the PHSA pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 because it
Section 290dd-2(a) provides that
[r]ecords of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any
patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of
any program or activity relating to substance abuse education,
prevention, training, treatment, rehabilitation, or research, which is
conducted, regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted by any
department or agency of the United States shall, except as provided in
subsection (e) of this section, be confidential and be disclosed only for
the purposes and under the circumstances expressly authorized under
conducts methadone maintenance treatment programs, and pursuant to 42 C.F.R.
§ 2.12(b) because it is licensed to dispense controlled substances as part of its
treatment programs as established by its DEA registration number as a Narcotic
Treatment Program. Assuming that St. Luke’s falls within the purview of the PHSA,
which appears to be the case, then in the absence of Mr. Carbonniere’s consent,
the disclosure of his medical records to the plaintiffs is only permissible “[i]f
authorized by an appropriate order of a court of competent jurisdiction granted after
application showing good cause therefor, including the need to advert a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily harm.” § 290dd-2(b)(2)(C). Nothing in the record of
this action establishes that the plaintiffs made any effort to comply with the PHSA,
or its relevant regulation governing the application for a court order of disclosure, 42
C.F.R. § 2.64, before sending its subpoena to St. Luke’s.
The United States primarily argues that the involuntary disclosure of Mr.
Carbonniere’s medical records from St. Luke’s is barred by the federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Court agrees with the United States that this
privilege constitutes yet another reason to grant its Rule 26(c) motion.
First, the Court is unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ contention that the United
States does not have standing to assert the privilege on behalf of Mr. Carbonniere.
As a party to this action, the United States has the right to move for a protective
order pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1) on the ground that the medical records sought by the
plaintiffs are privileged and thus outside the scope of discovery permitted by Rule
26(b)(1).
Second, the Court disagrees with the plaintiffs’ contention that Mr.
Carbonniere’s records do not fall within the scope of the privilege. The Supreme
Court has recognized an absolute psychotherapist-patient privilege for confidential
communications made to licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers
in the course of psychotherapy diagnosis and treatment. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518
U.S.1, 15 (1996).3 The Ninth Circuit has expanded this privilege to cover confidential
communications made to unlicensed counselors and representatives involved in
psychotherapeutic treatment undertaken through employee assistance programs.
Oleszko v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, 243 F.3d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir.
2001). Mr. Carbonniere has stated in a declaration that his treatment at St. Luke’s
included participation in individual and group counseling for his addiction, and the
Court’s in camera review of the medical records confirm that Mr. Carbonniere
underwent psychotherapy-related treatment at St. Luke’s.
Third, the Court also disagrees with the plaintiffs’ contention that Mr.
Carbonniere waived his psychotherapist-patient privilege by testifying at his
deposition that he had undergone a detoxification program at St. Luke’s for his
opiate addiction. No legally sufficient waiver has been established by the plaintiffs
since nothing in the submitted portions of Mr. Carbonniere’s deposition show that he
testified about any confidential communications he had with St. Luke’s personnel
that were made during the course of his treatment at St. Luke’s.
Although the Court agrees with the United States that Mr. Carbonniere’s
medical records from St. Luke’s cannot be produced to the plaintiffs, or to anyone
else, the Court cannot agree with the United States’ request in its motion that the
records either be returned to St. Luke’s or be destroyed by the Court. Since the
As the Supreme Court noted in Jaffe, Arizona has a similar statutory
privilege barring the disclosure of confidential communications made to a licensed
“behavior health professional” absent the waiver of the privilege by the client. A.R.S.
§ 32-3283.
undersigned Judge has reviewed the records in camera, the Court must retain the
records for any future appellate review. To that end, the Court will place the records
in a sealed envelope and will have the Clerk of the Court file that envelope under
seal. The actual medical records will not be viewed by any Clerk’s Office personnel.
IT IS ORDERED that the United States’ Motion for Protective Order
Behavior Health Center (Doc. 107) is granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1)(A)
and that the Court forbids the disclosure of the medical records of non-party Steven
Carbonniere submitted to the Court by St. Luke’s Behavior Health Center pursuant
to the plaintiffs’ subpoena duces tecum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the medical records of non-party Steven
Carbonniere submitted to the Court by St. Luke’s Behavior Health Center are to be
placed in a sealed envelope and that envelope, which is not to be opened for
docketing purposes, shall be filed by the Clerk of the Court UNDER SEAL.