Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/414-u-s-453-606796194
Timestamp: 2020-08-14 05:51:42
Document Index: 621959300

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 501', '§ 404', '§ 564', '§ 307', '§ 547', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307']

414 U.S. 453 (1974), 72-1289, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 606796194
414 U.S. 453 (1974), 72-1289, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers
Docket Nº: No. 72-1289
Citation: 414 U.S. 453, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646
Party Name: National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers
Case Date: January 09, 1974
414 U.S. 453 (1974)
94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646
Held: Section 307(a), in light of its express language, and the legislative history of that provision and of the Act as a whole, provides the exclusive remedies for breaches of any duties or obligations imposed by the Act, and no additional private cause of action to enforce compliance with the Act can properly be inferred. Pp. 455-465.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 465. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 466. POWELL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
After the enactment of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act), 84 Stat. 1327, 45 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., Central contracted with Amtrak for the latter to assume Central's inter-city rail passenger service responsibilities.1 Southern has not entered into any contract with Amtrak. The train discontinuances that precipitated this action were announced by Amtrak pursuant to § 404(b)(2) of the Amtrak Act, 45 U.S.C. § 564(b)(2).2 The gravamen of the respondent's complaint
was that these discontinuances are not authorized by, and, in fact, are prohibited by, the Amtrak Act.3 The District Court concluded that the respondent lacks standing under § 307 of the Amtrak Act, 4a U.S.C. § 547, and accordingly dismissed the action. [94 S.Ct. 692] The Court of Appeals reversed, and held that the respondent has standing and that § 307 does not otherwise bar such a suit by a private party who is allegedly aggrieved.4 We granted certiorari to decide whether such a private cause of action can be maintained in light of § 307(a) of the Amtrak Act. 411 U.S. 981 (1973).
In this Court and in the Court of Appeals, the parties have approached the question from several perspectives. The issue has been variously stated to be whether the Amtrak Act can be read to create a private right of action to enforce compliance with its provisions; whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under the terms of
If the Corporation or any railroad engages in or adheres to any action, practice, or policy inconsistent with the policies and purposes of this chapter, obstructs or interferes with any activities authorized by this chapter, refuses, fails, or neglects to discharge its duties and responsibilities under this chapter, or threatens any such violation, obstruction, interference, refusal, failure, or neglect, the district court of the United States for any district in which the Corporation or other person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction, except as otherwise prohibited by law, upon petition of the Attorney General of the United States or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any employee affected
thereby, including duly authorized employee representatives, to grant such equitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or terminate any violation, conduct, or threat.
Section 307 authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to sue the corporation or any railroad to prevent acts of omission or commission [94 S.Ct. 693] in violation of this legislation. In the case of labor agreements, individual employees or duly authorized employee representatives may sue for equitable relief.
In light of the language and legislative history of § 307(a), we read it as creating a public cause of action, maintainable by the Attorney General, to enforce the duties and responsibilities imposed by the Act. The only private cause of action created by that provision, however, is explicitly limited to "a case involving a labor agreement." Thus, no authority for the action the respondent has brought can be found in the language of § 307(a). The argument is made, however, that § 307(a) serves only to authorize certain suits against Amtrak, and that it should not be read to preclude other. private causes of action for the enforcement of obligations imposed by the Act. The respondent claims that railroad passengers are the intended beneficiaries of the Act, and that the courts should therefore imply a private cause of action whereby they can enforce compliance with the Act's provisions. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-432 (1964). It goes without saying,
A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that, when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies. "When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). This principle of statutory construction reflects an ancient maxim -- expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since the Act creates a public cause of action for the enforcement of its provisions and a private cause of action only under very limited circumstances, this maxim would clearly compel the conclusion that the remedies created in § 307(a) are the exclusive means to enforce the duties and obligations imposed by the Act. But even the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent. Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). Accordingly, we turn to the legislative history of § 307(a).
upon petition of the Attorney General of the United States or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any individual affected thereby. . . .5
At the hearings of the House
any person adversely affected or aggrieved thereby, including the representatives of the employees of any...
99 U.S. 402 (1879), Union Pac. R. Co. v. U.s.