Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/19962453944FSupp1509_12273
Timestamp: 2014-09-01 13:42:29
Document Index: 3132793

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 210', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 25', '§ 25']

PATTERSON v. AUGAT WIRING SYSTEMS, INC. | Leagle.com Home
Citing Case PATTERSON v. AUGAT WIRING SYSTEMS, INC.Civil Action No. 96-A-218-N. 944 F.Supp. 1509 (1996) Cheryl Denise PATTERSON, Plaintiff,
AUGAT WIRING SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Defendants.
October 28, 1996. M. Wayne Sabel, Mark W. Sabel, Jr., Sabel & Sabel, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Cheryl Denise Patterson.Edgar W. Ennis, Jr., W. Melvin Haas, III, William M. Clifton, III, Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Harper, Macon, GA, for Augat Wiring Systems, Inc.Joseph (Jay) Brady Lewis, Montgomery, AL, for Edwin Sweeney.W. Melvin Haas, III, William M. Clifton, III, Haynesworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Harper, Macon, GA, for George Kohlman, Jack Foster, Ken Thomas, and Steve Abelman. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
FootNotes1. No Count Seven exists due to typographical error in the Plaintiff's Complaint.2. Augat's contention that the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert Title VII and § 1981 claims on behalf of third parties, contained in Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Five was conceded by the Plaintiff in her Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Defendant Augat's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, at 16.3. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.4. In the Reply Brief in Support of Defendant Augat's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, at 4, Augat concedes that the "Plaintiff's § 1981 claim may proceed so long as it is narrowed to a claim for retaliatory discharge."5. Section 210 defines the term "make and enforce contracts" to include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship," H.R.Rep. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630, and § 210 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).6. In Cabiness, the plaintiff brought claims of retaliation, hostile environment, and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment against her former employer under Title VII and § 1981. Although the district court did not expressly state that these claims were actionable under § 1981, the court analyzed these claims under § 1981. The court ultimately granted summary judgment because the plaintiff "presented no evidence or argument in support of these claims." 859 F.Supp. at 588.7. In its Brief in Support of its Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and in its Reply Brief, Augat misstates that participation, authorization, or ratification constitutes vicarious, rather than direct, liability.8. In Alabama, the torts of outrage, outrageous conduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are the same cause of action. See Stewart v. Matthews Indus., Inc., 644 So.2d 915, 918 (Ala.1994). This court considers the proper name of the tort to be "outrageous conduct."9. In Busby, the court did not need to reach the issue of whether there was a factual issue as to whether supervisor was liable for outrageous conduct. The supervisor had died and was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff. However, the court noted that "there was evidence tending to support the plaintiffs' claims against [the supervisor]." Busby, 551 So.2d at 324.10. In support of its Motion, Augat cites Alabama Supreme Court cases that state that "`A plaintiff suing a co-employee must show facts tending to prove that the co-employee set out purposefully, intentionally, or by design to injure someone; a showing of mere negligence is not enough.'" Weaver v. Frazer, 576 So.2d 200, 202 (Ala.1991) (quoting Bean v. Craig, 557 So.2d 1249, 1252 (Ala.1990)). As a result of these cases, Augat reasons that because negligent supervision or retention claims are, by definition, claims of negligence, such claims are barred by § 25-5-53 of the AWCA.
Although, initially, the Plaintiff did bring claims of negligent supervision and retention against Augat and defendants Kohlman, Foster, Thomas, and Abelman, all claims against the latter four defendants were voluntarily dismissed. Not surprisingly, at no time has the Plaintiff ever brought claims against Sweeney for negligent supervision or retention because such claims would allege that Sweeney negligently supervised and retained himself. Thus, the Plaintiff only brings claims for negligent supervision and retention against Augat, an employer, and not against any co-employees. Accordingly, § 25-5-53 does not bar the Plaintiff's negligent supervision and retention claims solely because such claims are based upon a theory of negligence. Comment