Source: https://openjurist.org/245/f3d/126/united-states-of-america-v-george-cox
Timestamp: 2020-01-21 12:13:52
Document Index: 449254490

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 3553', '§ 4', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 3742']

245 F3d 126 United States of America v. George Cox | OpenJurist
245 F. 3d 126 - United States of America v. George Cox
245 F3d 126 United States of America v. George Cox
245 F.3d 126 (2nd Cir. 2001)
GEORGE COX, a/k/a "Albert L. Rand," Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 99-1418
Cox was sentenced for the federal embezzlement conviction on June 25, 1999. The District Court placed Cox in Criminal History Category II, based on the inclusion of two New Jersey state court convictions-a 1995 misdemeanor conviction for assault on a police officer and the 1998 state charge of possession of a controlled dangerous substance to which Cox had already pleaded guilty on March 1, 1999, but had not yet been sentenced. The District Court assigned one criminal history point for the 1995 conviction, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(c) and 4A1.2(e)(2), and one criminal history point for the 1999 drug conviction for which Cox had not yet been sentenced, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(4). While Cox's counsel objected to inclusion of the 1995 misdemeanor conviction when calculating his criminal history, he did not object to the inclusion of the 1999 conviction. Based on his placement in Criminal History Category II, the applicable imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines was 27 to 33 months. The District Court sentenced Cox to 33 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to the VA for the full amount that he embezzled.
As noted in the Sentencing Guidelines, consideration of a defendant's criminal history "is directly relevant" to the four purposes of sentencing set forth by statute: (1) "to reflect the seriousness of the offense... and to provide just punishment for the offense;" (2) "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;" (3) "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;" and (4) "to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner." U.S.S.G. ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt.; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's criminal history category is calculated with reference to the number and length of the defendant's "prior sentence[s]," a term defined to include "any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a).
These passages in the Sentencing Guidelines make clear that "[w]hen a state court vacates a defendant's prior state conviction," in certain circumstances, "the sentence resulting from that conviction may not influence the defendant's criminal history score under the Guidelines." United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 1991). As the Ninth Circuit has discussed, this proposition makes perfect sense:
As indicated above, the government urges us not to consider Cox's claims on direct appeal, but instead to require him to assert those claims in a § 2255 petition. Especially coming from the government, this argument strikes a somewhat dissonant chord, since the government often reminds us that "in order to preserve the finality of criminal sentences and effect the efficient allocation of judicial resources," petitioners must show "a complete miscarriage of justice" in order to raise and have considered, on § 2255 review, nonconstitutional and nonjurisdictional sentencing issues that were not raised on direct appeal. Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see, e.g., Werber v. United States, 149 F.3d 172, 177 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998). Since Cox has successfully avoided the prospect of procedural bar by raising his sentencing claim on direct appeal, it would be inappropriate now to hold that we shall not consider that claim, though straightforward and rather easily resolved upon additional fact-finding, until he reasserts that identical claim yet again in a § 2255 petition. Such a disposition not only would have the potential to cause considerable confusion for defendants-who might infer from that conclusion, against the grain of much habeas and § 2255 jurisprudence, a preference to have sentencing claims raised and addressed in postconviction proceedings, rather than on direct appeal-but in addition, given the restrictions on the filing of second or successive habeas and § 2255 petitions placed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, might effectively "force the appellant to use up his only [§ 2255] petition" to raise a straightforward claim that easily may be resolved upon further, but rather limited, fact-finding. United States v. Leone, 215 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 2000) (exercising discretion to remand to district court for further fact-finding in order to address defendant's ineffective assistance claim); cf. Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (AEDPA restrictions on second or successive petitions "bring[] into play new considerations" mandating changes to prior district court practice of construing prisoners' motions as § 2255 petitions, which "may result [under AEDPA] in a disastrous deprivation of a future opportunity to have a well-justified grievance adjudicated").
As with Cox's sentencing claim, the government concedes that under Leone we may remand to the District Court for necessary fact-finding under the circumstances presented here. See Leone, 215 F.3d at 256; United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1417-18 (2d Cir. 1993). We therefore exercise our discretion and remand to the District Court to determine the precise circumstances surrounding Cox's guilty plea to the 1999 state drug charges, including the role of counsel in advising him to do so, "rather than to dismiss the appeal and force the appellant to use up his only [§ 2255] petition." Leone, 215 F.3d at 257. Should the District Court find that Cox's lawyer rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance, it should fashion a remedy specifically tailored to that error, in order "as much as possible [to] restore[] the defendant to the circumstances that would have existed had there been no constitutional error."2 United States v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2000).
As Cox correctly notes, he is not precluded on account of his guilty plea from appealing his sentence, since the sentence actually imposed is greater than the time period specified at the time the plea was taken. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(1).