Source: http://ia.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190906_0000599.NIA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-10-17 22:36:25
Document Index: 191644227

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 401', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 353', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 353', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 390', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 377', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 433', '§ 405']

Plaintiff Ricky Thomas, Jr., seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying his application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Act). Thomas argues that (1) the ALJ's step five determination is not supported by substantial evidence, (2) the ALJ did not provide good reasons for rejecting the opinions of mental health treatment providers and consultative examiners and (3) the case should be remanded because the ALJ's appointment was unconstitutional. For the reasons discussed herein, the Commissioner's decision will be reversed and this case will be remanded for further proceedings.
Thomas was born on March 29, 1977, and was 35 years old on the amended alleged disability onset date. He has a high school education and previously worked as a customer service representative, furniture mover and in security. Thomas' impairments include disorder of the spine, obesity, degenerative joint disease of the right ankle and “Achilles tenodinitis [sic], anxiety, PTSD, depressive disorder NOS, diabetes, peripheral neuropathy [and] hypertension.” Doc. No. 11 at 2.
Thomas filed his application for DIB on September 29, 2014, and for SSI on December 8, 2016, alleging an onset date of February 15, 2013, which he later amended to September 23, 2014. After his claim was denied initially and on reconsideration, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Raymond L. Souza conducted a hearing on March 7, 2017. After Thomas was sent to physical and psychiatric consultative examinations, the ALJ conducted a second hearing on August 11, 2017. During the second hearing, Thomas testified that nothing had changed with his physical or mental health condition. AR 31. The ALJ denied Thomas' claim on September 8, 2017. Thomas submitted a timely request for review by the Appeals Council, which was denied on April 17, 2018. Thomas then filed a complaint (Doc. No. 4) in this court, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. The issues are fully briefed and ready for decision.
A disability is defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), accord 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. A claimant has a disability when, due to his physical or mental impairments, the claimant “is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). If the claimant is able to do work which exists in the national economy but is unemployed because of inability to get work, lack of opportunities in the local area, economic conditions, employer hiring practices or other factors, the ALJ will still find the claimant not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(c)(1)-(8).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Act, the Commissioner follows the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. Id. § 404.1520; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA), then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial” work activity involves physical or mental activities. “Gainful” activity is work done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the Commissioner looks to see “whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a).
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as having “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. Id. § 404.1521(b)(1)(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at Step Two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on her ability to work.” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Fourth, if the claimant's impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and the demands of her past relevant work. If the claimant cannot do her past relevant work, then she is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4). Past relevant work is any work the claimant has done in the 15 years prior to their application, that was substantial gainful activity and lasted long enough for the claimant to learn how to do it. Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). “RFC is a medical question defined wholly in terms of the claimant's physical ability to perform exertional tasks or, in other words, what the claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental limitations.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The claimant is responsible for providing the evidence the Commissioner will use to determine claimant's RFC, but the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant's “complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant's] own medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. Id. If a claimant retains enough RFC to perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant's RFC as determined in Step Four will not allow the claimant to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant's RFC as determined at Step Four, and his or her age, education, and work experience. See Bladow v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 356, 358-59 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000). The Commissioner must show not only that the claimant's RFC will allow him to make the adjustment to other work, but also that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make the adjustment, then the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). At Step Five, the Commissioner has the responsibility of developing the claimant's complete medical history before making a determination about the existence of a disability. Id. § 404.145(a)(3). The burden of persuasion to prove disability remains on the claimant. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004).
If after these five steps the ALJ has determined the claimant is disabled, but there is medical evidence of substance use disorders, the ALJ must decide if that substance use is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C). The ALJ must then evaluate the extent of the claimant's limitations without the substance use. Id. If the limitations would not be disabling, then the disorder is a contributing factor material to determining disability and the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535.
The ALJ found that Thomas last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2014 and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 23, 2014. AR 12. He found that Thomas suffered from the following severe impairments: “disorder of the spine, obesity, degenerative joint disease of the right ankle and Achilles tenodinitis [sic], anxiety, PTSD, depressive disorder NOS, diabetes, peripheral neuropathy [and] hypertension” but found they did not meet or medically equal the severity of listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926. AR 12-13.
Therefore, at step four the ALJ found Thomas had a residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
[P]erform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except he must have the option to set or stand alternatively at will provided that he would not be off task more than 8% of the work period. He can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds and occasionally climb stairs/ramps, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. He can frequently handle (gross manipulation) and finger (fine manipulation) bilaterally. He should have no exposure to extreme cold, excessive vibration, hazardous machinery, or unprotected heights. He is able to remember, understand and carry out simple and routine instructions and tasks consistent with SVP levels 1 and 2 type jobs. He should have no strict production quotas with an emphasis on per shift rather than per hour basis.
AR 15. The ALJ found based on that RFC that Thomas could not perform any past relevant work. AR 18. However, he found that based on Thomas' age, education, work experience and RFC there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Thomas can perform. AR 19. The ALJ relied on the testimony of the vocational expert (VE) to support that finding. AR 19-20. The ALJ concluded that Thomas was not under a disability, as defined in the Act at any time from the amended alleged onset date through the date of his decision. AR 20.
The Commissioner's decision must be affirmed “if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis, 353 F.3d at 645. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explains the standard as “something less than the weight of the evidence and [that] allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal.” Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec&#39;y of Health & Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). The court, however, does not &ldquo;reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ, &rdquo; Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v. Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)). Nor does the court &ldquo;review the factual record de novo.&rdquo; Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1994)). Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the court finds it &ldquo;possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner&#39;s findings, [the court] must affirm the [Commissioner&#39;s] denial of benefits.&rdquo; Kluesner, 607 F.3d at 536 (quoting Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008)). This is true even in cases where the court &ldquo;might have weighed the evidence differently.&rdquo; Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939 (quoting Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court may not reverse the Commissioner's decision “merely because ...