Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98699/carlson-vs-landon
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Document Index: 6103562

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 20', '§ 23', '§ 20', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 20', '§ 137', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 22', '§ 137', '§ 3143', '§ 23', '§ 3481', '§ 2248', '§ 2246']

Carlson Vs Landon - Citation 98699 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Carlson Vs. Landon - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98699
Case Number 342 U.S. 524
Respondent Landon
carlson v. landon - 342 u.s. 524 (1952) u.s. supreme court carlson v. landon, 342 u.s. 524 (1952) carlson v. landon no. 35 argued november 26, 1951 decided march 10, 1952 * 342 u.s. 524 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus 1. under § 20(a) of the immigration act, as amended by § 23 of the internal security act, the attorney general may, in his discretion, hold in custody without bail, pending determination as to their deportability, aliens who are members of the communist party of the united states when there is reasonable cause to believe that their release on bail would endanger the safety and welfare of the united states. pp. 342 u. s. 526 -547. 2. the.....
Carlson v. Landon - 342 U.S. 524 (1952)
U.S. Supreme Court Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)
1. Under § 20(a) of the Immigration Act, as amended by § 23 of the Internal Security Act, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, hold in custody without bail, pending determination as to their deportability, aliens who are members of the Communist Party of the United States when there is reasonable cause to believe that their release on bail would endanger the safety and welfare of the United States. Pp. 342 U. S. 526 -547.
2. The lack of a clause in the Constitution specifically empowering such action does not render Congress impotent to require the expulsion of resident alien Communists. Pp. 342 U. S. 533 -537.
(a) So long as aliens fail to obtain and maintain citizenship by naturalization, they remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders. P. 342 U. S. 534 .
(b) The doctrines and practices of Communism teach the use of force to achieve political control clearly enough to give constitutional basis, according to any theory of reasonableness or arbitrariness, for Congress to expel known alien Communists. Pp. 342 U. S. 534 -536.
(a) The refusal of bail in these cases was not arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of power, and did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 342 U. S. 537 -542.
(1) The discretion as to bail vested in the Attorney General by the Internal Security Act was broad enough to justify petitioners' detention without bail as a menace to the public interest. Pp. 342 U. S. 537 -541.
(2) There is no denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment in the detention of alien Communists without bail, pending determination of deportability, where there is reasonable cause to believe that their release on bail would endanger the safety and welfare of the United States. Pp. 342 U. S. 541 -542.
(b) The delegation to the Attorney General of discretionary authority to detain such aliens without bail pending deportation hearings does not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power or violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because the statute contains definite legislative standards for deportation and such authority is to be exercised within the framework of the Subversive Activities Control Act to guard against Communist activities pending deportation hearings. Pp. 342 U. S. 542 -544.
(c) The Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed in the circumstances of these cases. Pp. 342 U. S. 544 -546.
Held: he must be released unless, within a reasonable time, in the discretion of the court, he is rearrested under a new warrant. Pp. 342 U. S. 531 , 342 U. S. 546 -547.
hearings. 94 F.Supp. 18. The Court of Appeals reversed. 186 F.2d 183. On rehearing and after introduction of certain evidence, the district court again sustained petitioners' detention without bail. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 187 F.2d 991. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 807. Affirmed, p. 342 U. S. 547 .
No. 136. In a habeas corpus proceeding, the district court sustained detention of respondent without bail pending determination of deportability. The Court of Appeals reversed. 187 F.2d 802. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 810. Judgment vacated and cause remanded, p. 342 U. S. 547 .
These cases present a narrow question with several related issues. May the Attorney General, as the executive head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, [ Footnote 1 ] after taking into custody active alien communists on warrants, [ Footnote 2 ] charging either membership in a group that advocates
the overthrow by force of this Government [ Footnote 3 ] or inclusion in any prohibited classes of aliens, [ Footnote 4 ] continue them in custody without bail at his discretion pending determination as to their deportability, under § 23 of the
Internal Security Act? [ Footnote 5 ] Differing views of the Courts of Appeals led us to grant certiorari. 342 U.S. 807.
I. Facts. -- The four petitioners in case No. 35 were arrested under warrants, issued after the enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950, charging each with being an alien who was a member of the Communist Party of the United States. [ Footnote 6 ] The warrants directed that they be held in custody [ Footnote 7 ] pending determination
of deportability. [ Footnote 8 ] Petitions for habeas corpus were promptly filed alleging that the detention without bond was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment [ Footnote 9 ] and the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that § 20 of the Immigration Act, as amended, was also unconstitutional. See note 5 supra. The allegation appears below. [ Footnote 10 ]
their integration into community life through marriage and family connections, and their meticulous adherence to the terms of previous bail, allowed under a former warrant charging deportability. See note 8 supra. On consideration of these undenied allegations, the trial court determined that the Director had not been shown to have abused his discretion. [ Footnote 11 ] This order was reversed on the ground that the Director
"must state some fact upon which a reasonable person could logically conclude that the denial of bail is required to protect the country or to secure the alleged alien's presence for deportation should an order to that effect be the result of the hearing. [ Footnote 12 ]"
On rehearing, the Director made allegation, supported by affidavits, that the Service's dossier of each petitioner contained evidence indicating to him that each was, at the time of arrest, a member of the Communist Party of the United States, and had, since 1930, participated, or was then actively participating, in the Party's indoctrination of others to the prejudice of the public interest. There was no denial of these allegations by any of the petitioners, except Hyun, or any assertion that any of them had completely severed all Communist affiliations or connections. [ Footnote 13 ] As to Hyun, the denial was formal, and did not include any affidavit denying the facts stated in the Director's affidavit. As the allegations are set out by the Court of Appeals in the carefully detailed opinion of Circuit Judge Stephens, we refrain from any further restatement
here. [ Footnote 14 ] The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's determination that there was substantial evidence to support the discretion exercised in denying bail.
Respondent Zydok, in case No. 136, was arrested in August, 1949, under a recent warrant charging that he was subject to deportation as an alien with membership in an organization advocating the violent overthrow of the Government. Act of October 16, 1918, as amended, 8 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 137. At that time, he was released on $2,000 bail. Later, a deportation hearing was held by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, but this Court's decision in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 , necessitated a second deportation hearing.
that there had been no abuse of administrative discretion in refusing bail and denied the petition for habeas corpus, 94 F.Supp. 338. [ Footnote 15 ]
That court agreed that the District Court was correct in finding that Zydok was a member of the Communist Party, and had been, in 1949, the financial secretary of its Hamtramck Division. The respondent's testimony justifies the District Court's finding set out in the margin. [ Footnote 16 ] The record shows other information in the files of the Attorney General, such as attendance at closed meetings of the Party and the Michigan State Convention. The opinion succinctly sets out the facts concerning respondent's integration into American life. We adopt that statement. [ Footnote 17 ] It was said:
and proper decision in view of all the attending circumstances. The Styria v. Morgan, 186 U. S. 1 , 186 U. S. 9 . There are many circumstances which involve decision."
The basis for the deportation of presently undesirable aliens resident in the United States is not questioned, and requires no reexamination. When legally admitted, they have come at the Nation's invitation, as visitors or permanent residents, to share with us the opportunities and satisfactions of our land. As such visitors and foreign nationals, they are entitled, in their persons and effects, to the protection of our laws. So long, however, as aliens fail to obtain and maintain citizenship by naturalization, they remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders. [ Footnote 18 ]
Changes in world politics and in our internal economy bring legislative adjustments affecting the rights of various classes of aliens to admission and deportation. [ Footnote 19 ] The
passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 marked such a change of attitude toward alien members of the Communist Party of the United States. Theretofore, there was a provision for the deportation of alien anarchists and other aliens who are or were members of organizations devoted to the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States, but the Internal Security Act made Communist membership alone of aliens a sufficient ground for deportation. [ Footnote 20 ] The reasons for the exercise of power are summarized in Title I of the Internal Security Act. It is sufficient here to print § 2(15). [ Footnote 21 ] We have no doubt that the doctrines and practices of
Communism clearly enough teach the use of force to achieve political control to give constitutional basis, according to any theory of reasonableness or arbitrariness, for Congress to expel known alien communists under its power to regulate the exclusion, admission and expulsion of aliens. [ Footnote 22 ] Congress had before it evidence of resident aliens' leadership in communist domestic activities sufficient to furnish reasonable ground for action against alien resident Communists. The bar against the admission of Communists cannot be differentiated as a matter of power from that against anarchists upheld unanimously half a century ago in the exclusion of Turner. [ Footnote 23 ] Since
"[i]t is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful, [ Footnote 24 ]"
the fact that petitioners, and respondent Zydok, were made deportable after entry is immaterial. They are deported for what they are now, not for what they were. [ Footnote 25 ] Otherwise, when an alien once legally became a denizen of this country, he could not be deported
for any reason of which he had not been forewarned at the time of entry. Mankind is not vouchsafed sufficient foresight to justify requiring a country to permit its continuous occupation in peace or war by legally admitted aliens, even though they never violate the laws in effect at their entry. The protection of citizenship is open to those who qualify for its privileges. The lack of a clause in the Constitution specifically empowering such action has never been held to render Congress impotent to deal as a sovereign with resident aliens. [ Footnote 26 ]
III. Constitutionality. -- A. Arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion. -- The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the political branches of government, the legislative and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, "with such opportunity for judicial review of their action as congress may see fit to authorize or permit." This power is, of course, subject to judicial intervention under the "paramount law of the constitution." [ Footnote 27 ]
Deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and has never been held to be punishment. No jury sits. No judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution. [ Footnote 28 ] Since deportation is a particularly drastic remedy where aliens have
become absorbed into our community life, [ Footnote 29 ] congress has been careful to provide for full hearing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service before deportation. Such legislative provision requires that those charged with that responsibility exercise it in a manner consistent with due process. [ Footnote 30 ] Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise, aliens arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation proceedings. Of course, purpose to injure could not be imputed generally to all aliens subject to deportation, so discretion was placed by the 1950 Act in the Attorney General to detain aliens without bail, as set out in note 5 supra. [ Footnote 31 ]
intended to clarify the procedure in dealing with deportees and to "expressly authorize the Attorney General, in his discretion, to hold arrested aliens in custody." [ Footnote 32 ] The need for clarification arose from varying interpretations of the authority to grant bail under the former bail provision. Note 31 supra. In Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F.2d 422, 424, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had held that, by the earlier provision,
In the later case of United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F.2d 747, the same court applied its Zapp opinion to explain that the Service's discretion as to bail was not untrammeled, but subject to judicial review. [ Footnote 33 ] It
The Government does not urge that the Attorney General's discretion is not subject to any judicial review, but merely that his discretion can be overturned only on a showing of clear abuse. [ Footnote 34 ] We proceed on the basis suggested by the Government. It is first to be observed that the language of the reports is emphatic in explaining Congress' intention to make the Attorney General's exercise of discretion presumptively correct, and unassailable except for abuse. We think the discretion reposed in the Attorney General is at least as great as that found by the Second Circuit in the Potash case, supra, to be in him under the former bail provision. It can only be
The four petitioners in the Carlson case were active in Communist work. In the Zydok case, the only evidence is membership in the Party, attendance at closed sessions, and the holding of the office of financial secretary of its Hamtramck Division. This evidence goes beyond unexplained membership, and shows a degree, minor perhaps in Zydok's case, of participation in Communist activities. As the purpose of the Internal Security Act to deport all alien Communists as a menace to the security of the United States is established by the Internal Security Act itself, Title I, § 2, we conclude that the discretion as to bail in the Attorney General was certainly broad enough to justify his detention to all these parties without bail as a menace to the public interest. As all alien Communists are deportable, like Anarchists, because of Congress' understanding of their attitude toward the use of force and violence in such a constitutional democracy as ours to accomplish their political aims, evidence of membership plus personal activity in supporting and extending the Party's philosophy concerning violence gives adequate ground for detention. It cannot be expected that the Government should be required in addition to show specific acts of sabotage or incitement to subversive action. Such an exercise of discretion is well within that heretofore approved in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537 , 338 U. S. 541 . [ Footnote 35 ] There is no
B. Delegation of Legislative Power. -- This leaves for consideration the constitutionality of this delegation of authority. We consider first the objection to the alleged unbridled delegation of legislative power in that the Attorney General is left without standards to determine when to admit to bail and when to detain. It is familiar law that, in such an examination, the entire Act is to be looked at, and the meaning of the words determined by their surroundings and connections. Congress can only legislate so far as is reasonable and practicable, and must leave to executive officers the authority to accomplish its purpose. [ Footnote 36 ] Congress need not make specific standards for each subsidiary executive action in carrying out a policy. [ Footnote 37 ] The bail provision applies to many
classes of deportable aliens other than those named in the classes listed in § 22 of the Internal Security Act. See note 4 supra. [ Footnote 38 ] A wide range of discretion in the Attorney General as to bail is required to meet the varying situations arising from the many aliens in this country. [ Footnote 39 ]
The policy and standards as to what aliens are subject to deportation are, in general, clear and definite. 8 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 155. Specifically, when dealing with alien Communists, as in these cases, the legislative standard for deportation is definite. See notes 3 and | 3 and S. 524fn4|>4, supra. In carrying out that policy, the Attorney General is not left with untrammeled discretion as to bail. Courts review his determination. Hearings are had, and he must justify his refusal of bail by reference to the legislative scheme to eradicate the evils of Communist activity. The legislative judgment of evils calling for the 1950 Ă 3 and S. 544Ă amendments to deportation legislation is set out in the introductory sections of the Subversive Activities Control Act. [ Footnote 40 ] So far as pertinent to these proceedings, the new legislation was designed to eliminate the subversive activities of resident aliens who seek to inculcate the doctrine of force and violence into the political philosophy of the American people. To this end, provision was made for the detention and deportation of certain noncitizens, including members of the Communist Party. When, in the judgment of the Attorney General, an alien Communist may so conduct himself pending deportation hearings as to aid in carrying out the objectives of the world communist movement, that alien may be detained. Compare Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 , and Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 , 321 U. S. 515 . This is a permissible delegation of legislative power, because the executive judgment is limited by adequate standards. The authority to detain without bail is to be exercised within the framework of the Subversive Activities Control Act to guard against Communist activities pending deportation hearings. Cf. Mabler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 , 264 U. S. 40 . We do not see that such discretion violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
criminal offenses. Obviously the cases cited by the applicants for habeas corpus fail flatly to support this argument. [ Footnote 41 ] We have found none that do.
The bail clause was lifted, with slight changes, from the English Bill of Rights Act. [ Footnote 42 ] In England, that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, [ Footnote 43 ] but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated any different concept. [ Footnote 44 ] The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus, in criminal cases, bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. [ Footnote 45 ] Indeed,
IV. Rearrest. -- Finally, respondent Zydok argues that his rearrest on the outstanding warrant, after he had once been released on bail, was improper. The inquiry on habeas corpus is limited to the propriety of Zydok's present detention. McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131 , 293 U. S. 136 . While the Attorney General has made a satisfactory showing that he has good cause for detaining Zydok without bail, no order based on a new warrant has been entered. [ Footnote 46 ] Zydok did not allow the proceedings to run along, but objected promptly by habeas corpus to detention under the warrant. It has been said that the rule in criminal cases is that a warrant, once executed, is exhausted. [ Footnote 47 ] This guards against precipitate rearrest. Where, however, the rearrest comes after the discovery of error in release, a new warrant is not necessarily required. [ Footnote 48 ] State cases have held that an escaped person, or one who secured his
release by trick, may be rearrested without a new warrant. [ Footnote 49 ] Although a warrant for rearrest is required by statute, when a convicted person is paroled, his status on violation of the parole is the same as that of an escaped prisoner. [ Footnote 50 ] When a prisoner is out on bond, he is still under court control, though the bounds of his confinement are enlarged. His bondsmen are his jailers. [ Footnote 51 ] While the bailsmen may arrest without warrant, the court proceeds under bench warrant to retake a prisoner. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3143.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in the Zydok case will be vacated, and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, with directions to order the release of the respondent Zydok unless, within a reasonable time, in the discretion of the court, he is rearrested under a new warrant. [ Footnote 52 ]
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 , 142 U. S. 659 ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 , 149 U. S. 707 ; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585 ; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 , 259 U. S. 280 ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 , 299 U. S. 318 ; Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 521 , 338 U. S. 528 ; III Hackworth's Digest of International Law 725 (1942).
Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279 ; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurring at 320 U. S. 165 .
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585 , 228 U. S. 591 ; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 , 259 U. S. 280 .
Mabler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 , 264 U. S. 39 :
See also Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 521 , 338 U. S. 530 . Compare Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 .
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 , 299 U. S. 318 .
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 , 149 U. S. 713 -715, 149 U. S. 728 ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 , 142 U. S. 659 ; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 , 189 U. S. 97 ; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 ; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 , 163 U. S. 231 .
A claim of citizenship has protection. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 .
Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279 , 194 U. S. 290 -291; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 , 226 U. S. 275 ; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585 , 228 U. S. 591 ; Mabler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 .
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6 , 333 U. S. 10 ; Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223 , 341 U. S. 231 .
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 ; Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103 .
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 ; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 , 204 U. S. 386 ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 , 293 U. S. 421 :
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 23 U. S. 43 -48; St. Louis, I.M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 , 210 U. S. 286 ; Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 , 234 U. S. 486 -489; Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245 , 332 U. S. 249 . See Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 , 321 U. S. 424 -425:
See United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149 , 263 U. S. 158 , and cases there cited; Mabler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 , 264 U. S. 45 . These cases had valid orders entered subsequent to an invalid arrest.
Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S. 193 , 263 U. S. 196 .
Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 83 U. S. 371 .
See Dowd v. Cook, 340 U. S. 206 ; Mabler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 , 264 U. S. 45 .
Party, and therefore dangerous to the Nation because of the possibility of their "indoctrination of others." Underlying this harsh holding are past decisions of this Court declaring that Congress may constitutionally direct the summary deportation of aliens for any reason it sees fit. I agree with MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, for the reasons he gives in his dissenting opinion in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 , 342 U. S. 598 , that these prior declarations should now be reconsidered and rejected. This would dispose of these cases. But the Court today not only adheres to, but greatly expands, the constitutional doctrine of the former cases. The Court also relies on the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, for its holding. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER presents strong arguments for construing the Act so as to reach an opposite result. But, even if authorized by that Act, as the majority holds, the denial of a right to bail under the circumstances of these cases strikes me as a shocking disregard of the following provisions of the Bill of Rights: Eighth Amendment's ban against excessive bail; [ Footnote 2/1 ] First Amendment's ban against abridgment of thought, speech and press; [ Footnote 2/2 ] Fifth Amendment's ban against depriving a person of liberty without due process of law. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Before a detailed discussion of my several grounds of dissent, it is necessary to state the facts and the precise issues the records present.
Attorney General, directed that they be held in prison without bail. Of necessity, consideration of these deportation proceedings by bureaus and courts may last for years. Carlson's has already dragged on for over four years. Moreover, even deportation orders at the end of such proceedings might not end their indeterminate jail sentences, since the foreign countries to which they are ordered might refuse to admit them. Such refusals have prevented deportation in thousands of cases. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Thus, denial of bail may well be the equivalent of a life sentence, at least for Zydok, 56 years old, and Carlisle, whose health is bad. Such has become the fate of ordinary family people selected and classified, on secret information, as "dangerous" by Washington bureau agents.
"I am not going to turn these people loose if they are Communists, any more than I would turn loose a deadly germ in this community. If that is my duty let the Circuit Court say so, and assume that burden. [ Footnote 2/5 ]"
And the Solicitor General has admitted here that "the only evidence advanced to support their detention without bail was that they had been active in the Communist movement." The majority here also appears to rest on the same basis. It must, unless it is now drawing inferences that some might flee and be unavailable for deportation. As the Government admits, there is not a vestige of support for such an inference. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Besides, an alien
The stark fact is that, if Congress can authorize imprisonment of "alien Communists" because dangerous, it can authorize imprisonment of citizen "Communists" on the same ground. And while this particular bureau campaign to fill the jails is said to be aimed at "dangerous" alien Communists only, peaceful citizens may be ensnared in the process. For the bureau agent is not required to prove that a person he throws in jail is an alien, or a Communist, or "dangerous." The agent need only declare he has reason to believe that such is the case. The agent may be, and here apparently was, acting on the rankest hearsay evidence. The secret sources of his "information" may have been spies and informers, a class not usually rated as the most reliable by people who have had experience with them. [ Footnote 2/7 ] In this record, the nearest approach to any identifiable source of information is that some of the jailed persons had admitted past membership in organizations listed by the Attorney General as "Communist," or "Communist
front." These listings are made by the Attorney General ex parte on secret dossiers containing statements from sources that the Attorney General refuses to reveal. A majority of this Court has held that such listings are illegal. Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 . This alone should be enough to reverse the judgments in No. 35. My own judgment is that Congress has not authorized the Bureau of Immigration to hold people in jail without bond solely because it believes them "dangerous." Nor do I think that Congress has power to grant any such authority, even if it had attempted to do so.
clear and convincing evidence. And their refusal to incriminate themselves by denying the immigration officer's suspicions was accepted as sufficient proof to keep them behind the jail doors. I think that condemning people to jail is a job for the judiciary in accordance with procedural "due process of law." [ Footnote 2/8 ] To farm out this responsibility to the police and prosecuting attorneys is a judicial abdication in which I will have no part.
Third. As previously pointed out, the basis of holding these people in jail is a fear that they may indoctrinate people with Communist beliefs. To put people in jail for fear of their talk seems to me to be an abridgment of speech in flat violation of the First Amendment. I have to admit, however, that this is a logical application of recent cases watering down constitutional liberty of speech. [ Footnote 2/9 ] I also realize that many believe that Communists and "fellow travelers" should not be accorded any of the First Amendment's protections. My belief is that we must have freedom of speech, press, and religion for all, or we may eventually have it for none. I further believe that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe in any governmental system, discuss all governmental affairs, and argue for desired changes in the existing order. This freedom is too dangerous for bad, tyrannical governments to permit. But those who wrote and adopted our First Amendment weighed those dangers against the dangers of censorship, and deliberately chose the First Amendment's unequivocal command that freedom of assembly, petition, speech, and press shall not be abridged. I happen to believe this was a wise choice, and that our free way of life enlists such respect and love that
all cases . . . ," and (2) "in criminal cases, bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death." As to (1): the Eighth Amendment is in the American Bill of Rights of 1789, not the English Bill of Rights of 1689. And it is well known that our Bill of Rights was written and adopted to guarantee Americans greater freedom than had been enjoyed by their ancestors who had been driven from Europe by persecution. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 , 314 U. S. 264 -265. As to (2): it is true, bail has frequently been denied in this country "when the punishment may be death." I fail to see where the Court's analogy between deportation and the death penalty advances its argument, unless it is also analogizing the offense of indoctrinating talk to the crime of first degree murder.
See, e.g., American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 .
The controlling questions in this case are: what standards of discretion does the Internal Security Act of 1950 [ Footnote 3/1 ] impose upon the Attorney General in granting or denying bail to persons arrested for deportation proceedings, and has the Attorney General here observed those standards? The Government concedes that Congress made reviewable the discretion of the Attorney General on the bail question. This subjection of the Attorney General's action to judicial scrutiny is not to be formally or lightly exercised. The bill which ultimately became § 23 of the Internal Security Act was initially passed by the House with a provision making absolute and unreviewable the Attorney General's action. [ Footnote 3/2 ] The bill as enacted, however, omitted the finality clause; the Attorney General's authority was thus defined:
(3) be released on conditional parole. [ Footnote 3/3 ]"
Before the passage of the Act, Congress had before it conflicting views of Courts of Appeals: according to Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F.2d 422, bail was a matter of the alien's right; the Second Circuit ruled that it was a matter within the Attorney General's discretion subject to judicial review. United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F.2d 747. [ Footnote 3/4 ] Congress chose the latter view. It deserves emphasis that it was discretion that was given the Attorney General, not power to decide arbitrarily. [ Footnote 3/5 ]
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 , 342 U. S. 4 -6.
342 U.S. at 342 U. S. 7 -9 (concurring opinion).
"Discretion is only to be respected when it is conscious of the traditions which surround it and of the limits which an informed conscience sets to its exercise. [ Footnote 3/6 ]"
If these aliens, instead of awaiting deportation proceedings, were held for trial under a Smith Act indictment, they could not be denied bail merely because of the indictment. Stack v. Boyle, supra. Membership in the Communist Party -- the charge which is the foundation for the deportation proceedings -- is surely not as great a danger as a leading share in a conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the Government by force, which was the essence of the indictment in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 . And the opportunity for "the unhampered preparation of a defense" is quite as important to the alien arrested for deportation proceedings as it is to the Smith Act defendant. We would hesitate to impute to Congress, in the absence of some more explicit command, an intent to make bail more readily available to those held on a serious criminal charge than to those awaiting proceedings to determine the question of deportability. Congress made no such distinction. Instead, it cast the Attorney General's authority in terms descriptive of the
But it is argued that, since an introductory section of the Internal Security Act makes a "legislative finding" of the threat represented by the Party, [ Footnote 3/7 ] Congress intended membership in the Communist Party alone to serve as a reasonable basis for believing individual aliens too dangerous to leave at large. Such an interpretation renders meaningless the discretion granted the Attorney General wherever the deportation charge is membership in the Communist Party. The argument means that he may exercise discretion as to bail only to deny bail. Congress did not write such a Hobson's choice into law. True, the bail provisions apply to deportation proceedings brought on other grounds. However, the absorbing concern of Congress in the Internal Security Act was with the problem of the Communist Party; that Act, for the first time, explicitly made membership in the Communist Party a ground for deportation. [ Footnote 3/8 ] It puts Congress in a stultifying position to suggest that it gave with one hand only to take away with the other.
September 22, 1950, intervened between the original grant of bail and the subsequent rearrest and detention of the aliens. The only change in that Act relevant to these deportation proceedings was the provision making membership in the Communist Party specifically a basis for deportation. [ Footnote 3/9 ] New warrants charging membership in the Communist Party at some time after entry were served on the rearrested aliens in Los Angeles, though not on Zydok in Detroit. The immigration authorities were, by the Act, relieved of proving -- in order to make a prima facie case -- that the Communist Party is an "organization . . . that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches . . . the overthrow by force or violence of the Government." [ Footnote 3/10 ] But, in the circumstances of today, a legislative definition of the Communist Party as an organization advocating violent overthrow of government made little difference in the required proof. [ Footnote 3/11 ] At any rate, a complete answer is that nowhere -- either in his returns to the writs of habeas corpus or elsewhere -- has the Attorney General made any assertion that the Internal Security Act eased the proof of deportability, indicating by his silence that such a factor did not influence his judgment. [ Footnote 3/12 ] The returns in the Los Angeles cases supported the denial of bail solely by the statement,
The insubstantiality of the evidence for showing any danger in freeing each individual alien on bail raises ample doubt whether the Attorney General exercised a discretion as instructed by statute. In Zydok's case, the claim is that he had been a member of the Communist Party and financial secretary of a Hamtramck, Michigan, section in 1949, a year before his rearrest and denial of bail on October 23, 1950. From Zydok's failure to deny present membership during his testimony, the District Court drew the conclusion that he was "knowingly and willfully participating in the Communist movement." This was clearly a violation of Zydok's privilege against self-incrimination, which he many times claimed. [ Footnote 3/13 ] But assuming that the Attorney General had evidence before him that Zydok was at present a member of the Communist Party, that alone is insufficient to show danger in freeing him on bail during the deportation proceeding. To deny bail, the Attorney General should have a reasonable basis for believing that the circumstances attending Zydok present too hazardous a risk in leaving him at large.
There is also no evidence on the activities of the other four aliens that is more recent than 1949 -- a year before the issuance of the relevant warrants for deportation and the denials of bail here under review -- with the exception of a newspaper article by Carlson published in late 1950. In fact, in the case of Carlisle and Stevenson, the Government had no evidence of activity or membership in the Communist Party more recent than the 1930's. Since all these aliens, when previously arrested, were released on bail, we cannot escape the conclusion that the Attorney General, after the enactment of the Internal Security Act, did not deny bail from an individualized estimate of "the danger to the public safety of [each person's] presence within the community." [ Footnote 3/14 ]
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 , 341 U. S. 510 -511, and the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 , 339 U. S. 422 .
See 20 Stat. 30, 18 U.S.C. § 3481; Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 , 149 U. S. 66 . See also Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159 .
"In his petition for the writ, Young alleged facts indicating that, if released, he would be available for any further proceedings at which his presence would be required. The return to the writ, however, contained allegations which, if accepted, established a reasonable foundation for the denial of bail by the Attorney General. Thus, the return, in addition to containing allegations of membership in the Communist party, alleged that Young had once before escaped from custody during earlier proceedings; that he had previously attempted to enter the United States by furnishing a false identity and with a fraudulent passport, and that, during his present detention, he refused to answer questions relating to prior identification, places of residence, employment and home life. Section 2248 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2248, requires that the facts alleged in the return be taken as true unless impeached, and Young, in his traverse to the return, did not refute those statements, nor did he, in his motion for reargument, make any offer to prove the contrary, nor did he assert new facts, which under 28 U.S.C. § 2246 could have been accomplished by affidavit. As the Supreme Court has recently said in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 , 342 U. S. 4 :"
No. 136, was arrested for present Communist Party membership, but no charge has been made that he has been guilty of any seditious conduct or that he has committed any overt act endangering our national security. If the Constitution does not permit expulsion of these aliens for their past actions or present expressions unaccompanied by conduct -- and I do not think it does * -- then they are illegally detained and should be set free, making the issue of bail meaningless.
* See my dissents in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 , 341 U. S. 584 -589; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 , 342 U. S. 598 .