Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/10-13567/10-13567-2012-03-23.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 20:16:13
Document Index: 403701773

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 790', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 790', '§ 790', '§ 790', '§ 1983', '§ 790']

United States v. Lewis :: Eleventh Circuit :: US Courts of Appeals Cases :: US Federal Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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Justia.com Opinion Summary: In this interlocutory appeal, the government appealed from a district court order granting defendant's motion to suppress a firearm discovered after he and three associates were briefly detained by law enforcement officers at night in a parking lot. The district court granted the motion to suppress the firearm, holding that the detention of defendant was unreasonable and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed and remanded because under the peculiar facts of the case and the danger extant, it was reasonable for the officers to make a split-second decision to briefly detain all four individuals as they investigated possible violations of Florida's concealed-weapons laws.Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by Email
No. 10-13567
D.C. Docket No. 6:10-cr-00016-MSS-KRS-1
OMAR ONEIL LEWIS,
a.k.a. Paul Campbell,
a.k.a. Kevin Ellis, et al.,
In this interlocutory appeal, the government appeals from a district court
order granting defendant Omar Lewisâ��s motion to suppress a firearm discovered
after he and three associates were briefly detained by law enforcement officers at
night in a parking lot in Orange County, Florida. What began as a consensual
encounter between the officers and the four men quickly evolved into an
investigatory detention and then into a probable cause arrest after one of the
associates admitted to carrying a concealed firearm on his person and another
admitted to having a firearm in a backpack found in the open trunk of a nearby car.
The officers briefly detained all of them while further investigating possible
criminal activity, and discovered a firearm on the ground near where the defendant
had been seated.
The district court granted the motion to suppress the firearm, holding that
the detention of Lewis was unreasonable and therefore violated the Fourth
Amendment. We reverse and remand because under the peculiar facts of the case
and the danger extant, it was reasonable for the officers to make a split-second
decision to briefly detain all four individuals as they investigated possible
violations of Floridaâ��s concealed-weapons laws.
We take the facts essentially from the district courtâ��s order granting Lewisâ��s
suppression motion and from the transcript of the suppression hearing, accepting
the trial judgeâ��s findings of fact. On the night of February 6, 2009, Deputy Noel
Bojko was in uniform and on patrol with his field training officer, Deputy Scott
Stiles. The two deputies were patrolling the Pine Hills area of Orange County,
Florida. Around 8:50 p.m., the deputies entered the parking lot of the Seawinds
restaurant, which was open for business at the time. No one disputes that the
Seawinds restaurant is in a â��high crime areaâ�� that is a â��hotbedâ�� of drug and gun
As the deputies entered the parking lot, they observed four males standing
in between two parked vehicles, one with a trunk open. The cars were parked
perpendicular to the marked parking spaces in the crowded lot. At the suppression
hearing, Deputy Bojko testified that the four men â��were just hanging out in
between the two cars,â�� and that â��[t]hey were moving around computer equipment
in the . . . open trunkâ�� of one of the cars. Both Deputies Bojko and Stiles observed
that the men were just standing in the Seawinds parking lot and that there was no
basis to conclude that the men were involved in the commission of a robbery, drug
dealing, or any other crime.
The deputies did not immediately detain the four men, but instead
approached them and engaged in a wholly consensual encounter. Deputy Bojko
asked â��how you guys doingâ�� and tried â��to start a casual conversation.â�� Deputy
Stiles similarly testified that the deputies introduced themselves and said, â��Hey,
gentlemen, how is it going.â�� According to the officers, the four men responded
that â��they were just hanging out in the parking lot.â��
Apparently the very next question asked by Deputy Bojko was whether any
of the men were carrying guns. Two of the four men, Carlos Evans and Charles
McRae, each responded affirmatively. The other two men, including Lewis, said
nothing in response to the deputyâ��s question. Evans told the officers that he had a
handgun in a backpack in the open trunk of a car parked nearby, and McRae told
the officer that he was carrying a handgun on his person, in his waistband. Deputy
Bojko could see the top of the backpack in the open car trunk. There was no
indication or testimony that McRae made any attempt to reach for the firearm or
made any other sudden movements.
The deputies did not ask any followup questions, such as whether McRae or
Evans had a valid permit for the firearms. Rather, the officers immediately drew
their weapons and ordered all four men to sit down on the ground and show their
hands. There is no dispute that at this point, the consensual encounter had been
transformed into an investigatory stop, and that the four men were not free to
Three of the four men complied immediately. Lewis, however, took some
ten seconds to comply. During those ten seconds, Lewis walked a few steps away
from the other men. Lewis briefly had his back turned to the officers and moved
away from the trunks of the parked cars and towards the front of one of the
vehicles. At some point after Lewis sat down, Deputy Bojko ordered him to slide
over to the other three men, and he complied.
Around this time, Corporal Steven Scott Jenny, who knew that the deputies
were headed to the Seawinds restaurant, arrived on the scene. He saw all four men
sitting on the ground. Corporal Jenny testified at the suppression hearing that his
attention was immediately drawn to Lewis, who â��looked extremely nervous,
wouldnâ��t sit still, wouldnâ��t keep his hands in one position where we could see
them. His hands were moving to his sides, towards his pockets, towards his back.
He was scooting his body around.â�� Their concern heightened by Lewisâ��s
behavior, the officers examined the ground where Lewis was previously seated
and saw a semi-automatic pistol underneath a vehicle. After observing the
firearm, the officers had the four men lie prone and handcuffed all of them. The
officers did not observe Lewis with the firearm on his person, nor did they observe
Lewis discard the weapon. Corporal Jenny concluded, however, that Lewis was
the only one of the men who was in a position to be able to discard the weapon in
At that point, Lewis was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed
firearm in violation of Florida law. Subsequent testing found Lewisâ��s DNA on the
gun. The weapon was later determined to be registered to McRae. The officers
searched Lewis incident to his arrest and discovered the car keys to a white
Honda, which was also parked in the Seawinds parking lot. The Honda contained
an empty gun box that the officers concluded was used to house the firearm the
officers had discovered under the car.
McRae and Evans were not arrested or charged. McRae produced a valid
concealed-weapons permit at the scene. Evans, who had indicated that he had a
gun in the backpack, did not have a permit but was also released. The third
individual, Carlos Bayes, was released as well. Lewis was the only individual
arrested and charged following these events.
On January 27, 2010, a federal grand jury sitting in the Middle District of
Florida indicted Lewis for one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by an
illegal alien, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(2).1 Lewis
The district court observed that Lewis was charged with carrying a concealed firearm in
violation of Florida law under Fla. Stat. Â§ 790.01(2). While that is the crime for which he was
initially arrested and charged, Lewis was later prosecuted under the federal alien-in-possession
moved to suppress the seized firearm, arguing that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion sufficient to detain him for further investigation under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and, therefore, that their subsequent seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment. In response, the government claimed that the officers engaged Lewis
in a consensual encounter that appropriately evolved into a Terry detention, which
in turn was transformed into a probable cause arrest after the discovery of the
discarded handgun near the area where Lewis, and Lewis alone, had been sitting.
The government urged that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers
reasonably suspected criminal activity and that the brief detention of all four
individuals was performed for legitimate reasons of safety.
The district court conducted a suppression hearing, at which Deputies Bojko
and Stiles and Corporal Jenny were the only witnesses called. At the conclusion
of the witnessesâ�� testimony, the district court deferred ruling, ordering the parties
to provide supplemental briefing on two questions: â��whether the admission that
you have a weapon youâ��re entitled to have on you is a basis for a . . . Terry stop,â��
and, â��if so, whether it is a basis to stop not only you by that admission, but
everybody who is standing with you.â��
Thereafter, the district court granted Lewisâ��s motion and suppressed the
firearm. The district court determined that the Terry stop was unlawful as to any
of the four individuals, even concerning the two men (McRae and Evans) who had
admitted to possessing firearms. The court concluded that the officers lacked any
particularized and objective suspicion that any of the four men had been engaged
in, or were about to engage in criminal activity at the time the officers ordered the
men to the ground. The record showed, the court said, that when the officers
conducted the stop the four men were engaged in non-criminal activities: standing
by a car; looking in the trunk of a car; talking to each other in association;
standing in the parking lot of a restaurant while it was open for business; failing to
park their cars in designated parking spaces in a crowded private parking lot; and
lawfully possessing firearms. None of these activities, the trial court asserted,
whether taken alone or in concert, established a reasonable basis to stop any of the
men. The court reasoned that mere gun possession did not justify a Terry stop,
because it was neither per se unlawful to possess a handgun nor illegal to admit to
carrying one, and because the police had no reason to believe that McRae did not
have a concealed-weapons permit for the firearm. Moreover, the restaurant and
the surrounding neighborhoodâ��s â��designationâ�� as a high-crime area could not
transform an unlawful detention into a reasonable Terry stop. Finally, the district
court concluded there was no evidence or reasonable suspicion that the defendant
Lewis had engaged in any criminal activity, and, therefore, there was no basis for
detaining him under Terry v. Ohio.
This timely interlocutory appeal followed; we have jurisdiction under Title
18 U.S.C. Â§ 3731.2
A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact.
United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009). â��Because
rulings on motions to suppress involve mixed questions of fact and law, we review
the district courtâ��s factual findings for clear error, and its application of the law to
the facts de novo.â�� United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000)).
â��Further, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below.â�� Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, we afford substantial
deference to the factfinderâ��s credibility determinations, both explicit and implicit.
United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Title 18 U.S.C. Â§ 3731 provides in relevant part:
order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence . . . in a criminal
proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the
verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney
certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and
that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
The Fourth Amendment provides that â��[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.â�� U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is by now axiomatic that a court must
examine the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether a search or
seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Samson v. California, 547
U.S. 843, 848 (2006). Under the Supreme Courtâ��s seminal decision in Terry v.
Ohio, â��law enforcement officers may seize a suspect for a brief, investigatory . . .
stop where (1) the officers have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was
involved in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity, and (2) the stop â��was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place.â��â�� Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 30).
â��While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the
Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for
making the stop.â�� Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion need not involve the observation
of illegal conduct, but does require â��more than just a hunch.â�� United States v.
Lee, 68 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989)).
As an initial matter, the officersâ�� actions in approaching the four men late in
the evening of February 6, 2009 and asking them questions did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment at all. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01
(2002); Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186. â��There is nothing in the Constitution which
prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.â�� Jordan,
635 F.3d at 1186 (quoting United States v. Franklin, 323 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th
Cir. 2003)); see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (â��[A] seizure does
not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.â��). There is no dispute in this case that, during the initial consensual
encounter, the four men, including Lewis, were free â��to disregard the police and
go about [their] business.â�� California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991).
Plainly, what elevated the encounter from a consensual one into an
investigatory detention implicating the Fourth Amendment was the officers
drawing their weapons and ordering the men to sit on the ground, in response to
McRaeâ��s and Evansâ��s admissions that each of them possessed a firearm. In our
view, determining whether the officersâ�� detention of Lewis violated the Fourth
Amendment requires that we engage in a two-part inquiry: first, whether McRaeâ��s
admission to carrying a concealed firearm on his person provided the officers with
reasonable suspicion to briefly detain him under Terry; and second, if so, whether
it was reasonable under all of the circumstances for the officers to detain the
defendant Lewis and the others as well.
As we see it, the district court made two fundamental and related legal
errors in concluding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain any of
the four men. First, the district court suggested that since the officers had no
reason to suspect that McRae did not have a valid concealed-weapons permit, his
admission to carrying a concealed weapon did not provide any reasonable
suspicion about anything. And second, as an important part of its reasonable
suspicion calculus, the district court relied on the officersâ�� knowledge, drawn only
after the unfolding detention, that McRaeâ��s firearm possession was lawful.
Based on McRaeâ��s admission that he was carrying a handgun in his
waistband, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that McRae was
committing a crime under Florida law -- carrying a concealed weapon.3 Under
There is no indication in the record that the officers themselves ever clearly articulated
this suspected crime as the basis for the detention. However, a police officerâ��s subjective
motivations for conducting a stop have no bearing on the objective inquiry into whether the stop
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13
(1996) (rejecting argument that â��an officerâ��s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment,â�� and observing that the Court has â��repeatedly held and asserted
the contraryâ��).
Florida law, â��[a] person who carries a concealed firearm on or about his person
commits a felony of the third degree.â�� Fla. Stat. Â§ 790.01(2).4 Notably, the
possession of a valid permit for a concealed weapon is not related to the elements
of the crime, but rather is an affirmative defense. Fla. Stat. Â§ 790.01(3); Watt v.
State, 31 So. 3d 238, 241-42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
Moreover, because reasonable suspicion analysis is not concerned with
â��hard certainties, but with probabilities,â�� United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
418 (1981), McRaeâ��s admission to carrying a concealed weapon was sufficient to
justify briefly stopping him before inquiring further about whether he had an
affirmative defense in the form of a valid concealed-weapons permit. The
Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that, although an individual may
ultimately be engaged in conduct that is perfectly lawful -- as turned out to be the
case with McRae -- officers may â��detain the individual[] to resolve the
ambiguity.â�� Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30); see also
It is not altogether clear under Florida law whether Evans, who only admitted to having
a firearm secured in a nearby backpack in the open trunk of a car, had a firearm â��on or about his
personâ�� under the Florida concealed-weapons statute. Fla. Stat. Â§ 790.01(2). But we need not
determine whether the officers had reasonable suspicion that Evans was in violation of Florida
law. The ultimate question of whether the detention of Lewis was reasonable does not turn on
whether the officers had reason to believe that both McRae and Evans, or just McRae alone,
violated Floridaâ��s concealed-weapons statute. For our purposes, itâ��s enough that the deputies had
reason to believe that McRae had violated the penal statute, and, as we explain infra at 16-25,
that the deputies also had reason to believe that both McRae and Evans were armed with
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (â��A determination that
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent
conduct.â��); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (â��The Fourth
Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of
information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders
and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.â��). As the Court put it in
Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. Indeed,
the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection with more drastic
police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause to believe
they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry
stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to
briefly investigate further.
528 U.S. at 126.
The district court erroneously turned this inquiry on its head by relying on
the fact that McRaeâ��s firearm possession ultimately turned out to be lawful. But
the officers did not know that McRae lawfully possessed his firearm at the time of
the detention. And it is by now well-settled law that the reasonable suspicion
inquiry focuses on the information available to the officers at the time of the stop - here, when the officers pulled their guns and ordered the four men to the ground
-- not information that the officers might later discover. United States v. Smith,
201 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000) (â��In deciding whether the detaining officers
had reasonable suspicion, we look at the totality of the circumstances known to the
detaining officers at the time of the detention.â��) (emphasis added); United States v.
Cruz, 909 F.2d 422, 424 (11th Cir. 1989) (â��To determine whether a stop is
reasonable, we look at the totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time
of the stop.â��) (emphasis added).
In short, the district court erred in concluding that the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop of any of the four men, even
McRae. Indeed, during the course of the suppression hearing, Lewisâ��s attorney
conceded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of
McRae and Evans. In response to the district courtâ��s question, â��once they stopped
these four individuals and they said, â��Do you have weapons on you,â�� two of them
confirmed that they did have weapons. Was that at that time a basis for them to
conduct a Terry stop?â�� Lewisâ��s counsel replied, â��As to those two individuals, yes.
But not as to my client, Your Honor.â��
That, of course, is not the end of the inquiry. McRae was never arrested and
is not a party to this case. Thus, we are obliged to answer whether it was also
reasonable under the circumstances for the officers to detain the defendant Lewis
as well as McRae.
Again, in determining whether a Terry stop is justified, â��the totality of the
circumstances -- the whole picture -- must be taken into account.â�� Cortez, 449
U.S. at 417. â��Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.â�� Id. at 417-18; see Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318,
1341 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984, 988 (11th Cir. 1984).
As a general matter, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity must attach to the
particular person stopped. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (â��[A]n assessment of the
whole picture . . . must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being
stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.â��).
But, as the Supreme Court has also made crystal clear, individualized
suspicion is not an absolute prerequisite for every constitutional search or seizure.
Samson, 547 U.S. at 855 n.4. â��The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.â�� Id. Thus, in Samson the Court
specifically observed that â��while this Courtâ��s jurisprudence has often recognized
that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure, we have
also recognized that the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
such suspicion.â�� Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (â��â��[T]he test of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application,â�� [and therefore] its proper application requires careful attention to the
facts and circumstances of each particular case . . . .â��) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
We begin with this observation: under controlling law the officers could
lawfully detain McRae in order to inquire further into a possible concealedweapons violation. The central question then boils down to whether it was also
reasonable under the circumstances for the officers to briefly detain all four
individuals for reasons of safety, having been told by McRae and Evans that each
of them was armed (McRae carrying a weapon on his person, and Evans having
ready access to one in a nearby open trunk), but absent any particularized
reasonable suspicion concerning Lewis.
We answer that question in the affirmative. The officers faced substantial,
immediate danger when confronted with the known possession of two firearms.
Case precedent from both the Supreme Court and this Circuit has established that,
for safety reasons, officers may, in some circumstances, briefly detain individuals
about whom they have no individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
in the course of conducting a valid Terry stop as to other related individuals.
Thus, in Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), the Supreme Court held that,
in the context of a traffic stop,5 an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle
even though the driver is the only person the officer reasonably suspected of
committing a traffic infraction. Id. at 408. The relevant inquiry for
reasonableness purposes â��depends on a balance between the public interest and the
individualâ��s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.â�� Id. at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that
the â��weightyâ�� interest in officer safety was a powerful justification for the practice
of ordering a passenger out of the vehicle (plainly a detention, albeit a brief one),
which outweighed the more limited intrusion on the passenger. Id. at 412-13.
In Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2000), a panel of this Court
considered, in the qualified immunity context of a Â§ 1983 suit, whether an officer,
who conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle, lawfully searched not only the driver,
but also the two passengers. One of the defendant passengers consented to the
search, but only after the officer told him, â��[i]f you donâ��t want to be searched, start
Although the instant case did not involve a traffic stop, cases involving traffic stops are
nonetheless relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of investigatory detentions more generally.
See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (â��â��[M]ost traffic stops,â�� this Court has
observed, â��resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in
Terry.â��â�� (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n.29 (1984)).
walking.â�� Id. at 1297. That defendant argued that the statement was coercive, but
we concluded on appeal that even if that were the case, the statementâ��s
â��impropriety . . . [was] not plain.â�� Id. The reason for this was that â��a police
officer performing his lawful duties may direct and control -- to some extent -- the
movements and location of persons nearby, even persons that the officer may have
no reason to suspect of wrongdoing.â�� Id. (citing Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415). As the
Supreme Court has later stated, it is â��reasonable for passengers to expect that a
police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people
move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety.â�� Brendlin v. California,
551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007) (emphasis added) (holding that a passenger has standing
to challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop because the passenger is also
seized from the moment a vehicle is stopped).
More significantly, our decision in United States v. Clark, 337 F.3d 1282
(11th Cir. 2003), is analogous to the instant case. Clark also involved a brief
detention of an individual in the absence of any particularized, reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. An Atlanta police officer was patrolling alone in a
high crime area at night. Id. at 1283. He saw two men wrestling and fighting in
the middle of the street. Id. Nearby, an automobile was parked on the wrong side
of the street with its lights on, a door open, and the engine running. Id. A third
person, the defendant, was watching the fight from the sidewalk. Id. The officer
broke up the fight, confirmed that the vehicle belonged to one of the two fighters,
and ordered everyone (including the defendant) into the car while he called for
backup and investigated further. Id. The defendant had informed the officer prior
to the detention that he had been a passenger in the vehicle and was associated
with the two men. Id. The officer testified that he ordered the defendant â��to
reenter the vehicle because he was â��part of the scene.â��â�� Id.
After the defendant was detained by the officer who ordered him into the
car, the events that followed led to the discovery of a handgun in the car and the
subsequent arrest of the defendant. Id. The officerâ��s backup arrived on the scene
and saw the defendant â��fumbling around under the seat.â�� Id. The defendant was
ordered to put his hands on the dashboard, and when one of the officers opened
the passenger door to remove the defendant from the vehicle, a .40 caliber
handgun fell onto the street. Id. The defendant was then arrested.
On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded that the brief detention of the
defendant (against whom there was no particularized suspicion and who was
simply standing on the sidewalk when the officer encountered him) was lawful
and reasonable under the circumstances in order to protect the officerâ��s safety
â��while he conducted an investigation of reasonably suspicious violent conduct that
occurred in his presence.â�� Id. at 1285. Notwithstanding the fact that the officers
never stopped any vehicle, we found the case analogous to the earlier cases of
Wilson and Hudson, id. at 1286-87, concluding that, under the circumstances, the
officer could briefly detain the defendant by ordering him into the vehicle in order
to control the situation, even absent any individualized suspicion, essentially for
the same reasons that the officer in Wilson could order the defendant passenger
out of the vehicle, id. at 1285, 1288. Moreover, we stressed that â��the â��risk of
harmâ�� to officers is â��minimizedâ�� when police officers â��exercise unquestioned
command of the situation.â��â�� Id. at 1288 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 702-03 (1981)). Indeed, citing our earlier decision in Hudson, we observed
that the prior panel â��reasoned that an officer may â��controlâ�� persons not suspected
of wrongdoing if they are near a street encounter with persons reasonably
suspected of criminal activity.â�� Id. We also emphasized that the encounter took
place in a high crime area at night and that the defendant was associated with the
individuals about whom the officers had reasonable suspicion. Id.
The brief detention of Lewis in this case served exactly the same safety
purposes discussed in Clark and in the traffic stop cases of Wilson and Hudson -to control the movements of nearby associates and exercise command over the
situation once the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that
warranted further investigation. Once the officers had that reasonable suspicion,
they were not obliged to let three of the four associated individuals walk about
freely while they investigated McRae, in light of the officersâ�� powerful concern for
their own safety. Clark, 337 F.3d at 1288.6
The reasonableness of the officersâ�� conduct under the totality of the
circumstances was heightened greatly by the admitted presence of two firearms,
which posed a serious risk to the safety of the officers as well as the other
individuals present in the crowded parking lot.7 See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,
This conclusion is consonant with Terry and its progeny. Courts applying Terry have
long-determined that officers may take a number of actions to increase their safety and minimize
the risk of harm when they are conducting lawful searches and seizures. Thus, for example, the
Supreme Court has held that officers executing a search warrant may lawfully detain the
occupants of the premises, Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05, and that an officer making an in-home
arrest may conduct a limited protective sweep of the premises when the officer â��possesses a
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene,â�� Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337
(1990); United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1224 (11th Cir. 2010).
Both officers specifically testified about the serious danger posed by the presence of at
least two firearms. Deputy Bojko was asked at the suppression hearing why the officers drew
their weapons and briefly detained all four individuals:
A. I needed to get the subjects under control, especially since firearms were
involved for my safety and the safety of my field training officer.
Q. Why do you ask the question [whether the individuals had any weapons on
A. To find out if they do, because Iâ��m worried about my safety and other officer
272 (2000) (â��Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify
unusual precautions. Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed
criminals pose to public safety; Terryâ��s rule, which permits protective police
searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion . . . responds to this very concern.â��)
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977)
(per curiam) (observing that armed suspects â��pose[] a serious and present danger
to the safety of the officerâ��); United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 624 (11th Cir.
1995) (â��Law enforcement officers are at greatest risk when dealing with
potentially armed individuals because they are the first to confront this perilous
and unpredictable situation.â��). McRae had a firearm on his person, and Evans
A. Yes maâ��am. Two of them said they were armed.
A. One said, â��I have on in my waistband,â�� and the other one said, â��I got one in
the trunk.â��
A. Because I donâ��t want to get in a gun fight. I donâ��t want to get shot. I donâ��t
want my partner to get shot.
A. Yes, maâ��am.
indicated that there was another handgun in the nearby open car trunk, well within
the reach of all four individuals at the time the officers drew their weapons.
Indeed, the known presence of firearms made the reasonableness of the brief
detention in this case even more compelling than in Clark, where the officer
simply saw two individuals wrestling in the street and had no reason to believe
that there were any firearms or other weapons present at the scene, let alone a
firearm in a backpack in an open trunk right near where all of the individuals were
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Terry itself, a brief stop-and-frisk is
permissible, even absent probable cause to arrest, â��for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual.â�� 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). In fact, the very
Our dissenting colleague suggests that the officers were limited on these facts to
stopping and patting down only McRae and Evans to ensure their safety. The other two
individuals apparently would have been free to mill about, walk away, or perhaps even grab the
firearm from the open trunk of a nearby vehicle as the officers briefly investigated possible
concealed weapons violations. The only other alternative available to the officers would have
been simply to shrug their shoulders and walk away from further inquiry into possible serious
violations of Florida law. This they were not obliged to do. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145.
Mindful of the important and often difficult balance between the public interest and the
individualâ��s right â��to personal security free from arbitrary interference,â�� we are satisfied that the
â��weightyâ�� interest in officer safety was a powerful justification for briefly detaining all four
individuals. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411-12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, as we see it, the officersâ�� split-second decision to briefly detain the
defendant as well was altogether reasonable and fully consonant with the command of the Fourth
rationale underpinning Terry -- the protection of officer safety and the safety of
others nearby, especially from the dangers posed by firearms -- is presented by the
facts of this case. We add that the detention took place at night in a high crime
area, which, while surely not dispositive, is still another relevant consideration in
the Terry calculus. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; United States v. Gordon, 231
F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir. 2000). And we further emphasize that, as in Clark,
the defendant here was not some â��unrelated bystander,â�� Clark, 337 F.3d at 1288,
but rather â��an associate of [the] persons being investigated for criminal activities,â��
In short, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officers
were entitled to control the scene and exercise command over the situation in the
course of briefly detaining McRae for further investigation. A brief detention of
all four associated individuals was reasonable, in light of the substantial risks to
the officersâ�� safety. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district courtâ��s order granting
Lewisâ��s motion to suppress, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent
I agree with the majority that the district court erroneously considered
information unavailable to the officers at the time of the stop at issue.
Furthermore, I do not dispute that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain
McRae to investigate whether he illegally possessed a concealed weapon in
violation of Florida law. I do not, however, join the majority in finding that the
stop of Lewis was proper.
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we proceed against the background
that â��[a] search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.â�� City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (emphasis added). Consistent with this general requirement,
the Supreme Court has â��recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual
rule does not apply.â�� Id. Those exceptions are justified for situations in which the
public interest outweighs â��â��the individualâ��s right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.â��â�� Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411
(1997) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam)).
However, none of those exceptions apply here,1 and the â��reasonablenessâ�� inquiry
For example, the Court has approved of suspicionless seizures in the context of certain
police checkpoints, see, e.g., Mich. Depâ��t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453â��55 (1990);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566â��67 (1976), but those cases have rightfully
does not justify ignoring the reasonable suspicion requirement in situations where
officers claim a generalized concern for safety.2
Although the majority holds that this stop was reasonable under the
circumstances, it does so without meaningfully balancing the competing public
and private interests at issue. In ignoring this balance, the majority has essentially
found that a broad assertion of officer safety necessarily trumps the private right of
individual liberty and therefore justifies a warrantless stop. I emphasize that I
fully appreciate the high value we place on officer safety, which typically leads us
to defer to an experienced officerâ��s judgment about how to control the scene of an
investigation. However, I am not aware of any court that has held that concerns
for officer safety justify every intrusion on individual liberty. See Edmond, 531
U.S. at 42 (â��[T]he gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions
not been proffered as an appropriate parallel to the detention at issue here.
The district court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing and considered â��all
relevant findingsâ�� and â��evidence of recordâ�� in its order suppressing the firearm. Dist. Ct. Order
at 1. These considerations certainly included the officersâ�� testimony regarding the threat they
perceived based on the behavior of the four men. Notably, though, the district court did not find
any fact to substantiate the officersâ�� â��hunch,â�� see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), that
Lewis could also be carrying a firearm and therefore present a â��substantial, immediate dangerâ�� to
their safety. Given our obligation to review the facts and testimony in the light most favorable to
Lewis, United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000), we would not ordinarily
credit the officersâ�� testimony in a manner inconsistent with the district courtâ��s order, see United
States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (noting that, even in the
absence of â��detailed findings of fact,â�� we credit the lower courtâ��s credibility determinations that
are implicit in its ruling).
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given
purpose.â��).
To the contrary, Lewis had a weighty interest in his own personal liberty at
the time of the stop equivalent to that of any other individual detained in an onthe-street encounter under Terry. And we have recognized that the Supreme Court
long ago established the appropriate balance between the public and private
interests that permits a stop in this context: the existence of reasonable suspicion
based on â��specific and articulable facts.â�� See United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d
1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1990) (â��In justifying [a Terry stop], the â��reasonablenessâ��
standard requires that a police officer â��be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.â��â�� (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968))). I do not
find that reasonable suspicion justified Lewisâ��s detention.
In lieu of conducting its own balance of the interests, the majority
mistakenly analogizes the stop of Lewis to the limited control that an officer can
exercise over the passenger of a vehicle whose driver is under investigation for
illegal activity. In the cases cited by the majority, the prolonged detentions were
deemed reasonable because of the preexisting restriction on the passengerâ��s
liberty. I do not read the combination of Wilson, Hudson, and Clark to establish a
broad officer-safety exception to the requirement of reasonable suspicion; I
understand these cases to support a common-sense principle that, because a
vehicleâ��s passengers are seized once their driver has been detainedâ��that is, they
have no real alternative but to await the conclusion of the investigationâ��an
officerâ��s direction of their movement is not sufficiently burdensome to violate the
passengersâ�� Fourth Amendment rights. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327
(2009) (â��For the duration of a traffic stop, . . . a police officer effectively seizes
â��everyone in the vehicle,â�� the driver and all passengers.â�� (quoting Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007))).
In Maryland v. Wilson, the Court found it reasonable for an officer to order
a passenger out of a stopped vehicle, even when no reasonable suspicion existed
that the passenger was involved in any unlawful conduct. See 519 U.S. at 414â��15.
This holding was based on the reality that the passengers were already detained
â��by virtue of the stop of the vehicle.â�� Id. at 414. In evaluating reasonableness, the
Court explained that the additional intrusion on the passenger in light of this
preexisting detention was â��minimalâ�� and, therefore, outweighed by the
governmentâ��s heavy interest in the safety of its officers. Id. at 413, 415. In other
words, because the detention of the vehicle prevented the passenger from leaving,
it was reasonable to direct the passenger to a location where he would not pose a
risk to the officer during the ensuing investigation.
Similarly, in Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2000), we analyzed
the appropriateness of an officerâ��s behavior in directing car passengers after a
valid underlying vehicle stop. There, we seized upon Wilson to explain that â��a
police officer performing his lawful duties may direct and controlâ��to some
extentâ��the movements and location of persons nearby, even persons that the
officer may have no reason to suspect of wrongdoing.â�� Id. at 1297. Again, the
officer in Hudson exerted control of the situation only after the vehicle had been
pulled over, thereby detaining the driver and all passengers. See id. at 1295â��96.
Thus, like in Wilson, any additional intrusion on Hudson was negligible in light of
the preexisting, justified detainment of the vehicle and its passengers. And, in
Hudson, the officer actually offered to allow the passenger to walk away from the
scene, id. at 1292, which is precisely what Lewis was prevented from doing here.
For similar reasons, the majorityâ��s analogy to United States v. Clark, 337
F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), is misplaced. The issue confronted in Clark was
â��whether a law-enforcement officer may briefly detain and order a passenger to
reenter an automobile to protect the officerâ��s safety while the officer investigates a
crime committed in his presence by two associates of the passenger.â�� Id. at 1282.3
Essentially, the court faced Wilson in reverse, as the officer ordered a carâ��s
occupants to re-enter (rather than exit) the vehicle pending investigation of the
driverâ��s observed illegal conduct. Id. at 1283. Here again, when the officer seized
the vehicleâ��s driver, Clark was temporarily incapable of leaving that specific
situation by reason of investigation of the driver. Consistent with Wilson and
Hudson, the officer could reasonably direct Clark back inside the car because the
intrusion on his personal liberty was minimalâ��he admittedly arrived in that
vehicle and would presumably be leaving in it as well. See id. (recalling the fact
that the officer directed Clarkâ��s movement only after being advised that Clark had
been a passenger in the vehicle).
Also significant in Clark was the credible threat of violence facing the
officer, which bore on the reasonableness of the detainment. The officer in Clark
approached a situation in which he plainly observed violence and other illegal
activity. Id. at 1287 (noting the totality of the circumstances, which included
Likewise, the analysis of controlling law in Clark focused on vehicle-detention cases
and did not ever imply that the officers conducted a Terry stop, which is at issue here. The
majority highlights the Supreme Courtâ��s comment in Berkemer v. McCarty that â��most traffic
stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry.â�� 468
U.S. 420, 439 n.29 (1984). But to say that Terry principles instruct a vehicle stop is not to imply
the converse. The vehicle-seizure cases are premised on a de minimis interest in the passengerâ��s
personal liberty, and no part of a typical Terry stop serves to similarly minimize an individualâ��s
interest in being free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement.
observation of a physical confrontation and an illegally parked car on the street).
And he confronted this violent situation alone. Id. Far from that scenario, the two
officers who stopped Lewis here could not identify any behavior to suggest that
any of the four men ultimately detained were committing any violent crimes or
planned to do anything but cooperate.
In sum, the intrusion on Lewisâ��s personal liberty far exceeded the de
minimis detention held reasonable in Wilson, Hudson, and Clark. Because Lewis
was not â��already stoppedâ�� as a result of the consensual encounter with police, see
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414, this court is obligated to analyze whether reasonable
suspicion justified detention of Lewis, see Tapia, 912 F.2d at 1370.
In an â��on-the-street encounter,â�� a Terry stop is lawful â��when the police
officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has
committed a criminal offense.â�� Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added).
Florida law does not appear to criminalize the act of standing in close proximity to
an individual who carries a concealed weapon.4 The proper inquiry thus becomes
â��Further, pursuant to the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, it is not
per se unlawful to possess a firearm, nor is it illegal to admit to carrying a firearm. Additionally,
in the State of Florida, pursuant to Fla. Stat. Â§ 790.01(2), it is not illegal for a person to carry a
concealed weapon, provided he is also in possession of a valid state issued carrying permit, as
was the case with Mr. McRae.â�� Dist. Ct. Order at 8.
whether reasonable suspicion that one individual in a group unlawfully possesses
a concealed weapon can be imputed to another member of the group who has
exercised his right not to engage police in a consensual encounter. My sense is
As the majority recounts, the officers approached Lewis and his three
companions and engaged them in a valid, consensual encounter. See United States
v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 356
(2011). At that point, Lewis and the others could have ignored the police entirely
and continued conducting their lawful business in the parking lot.5 See Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497â��98 (1983) (plurality opinion). The only intervening fact
between the consensual encounter and the stop of Lewis was the voluntary,
affirmative responses of Evans and McRae when asked whether any person in the
group possessed a firearm. The suspected possession offenses on behalf of other
persons, however, did not implicate Lewis in the commission of any crime, and it
therefore could not serve as a basis to draw weapons on the entire group otherwise
lawfully present in the parking lot.
As the district court stated in its suppression order, testimony at the evidentiary hearing
established that â��the men were just standing in the Seawinds restaurant parking lot and that there
was no basis for the officers to conclude that the men were involved in the commission of a
robbery, drug dealing, or any other crime.â�� Dist. Ct. Order at 3.
We have previously held that illegal activity combined with suspicion that a
suspect carries a concealed weapon provides reasonable suspicion to justify a
Terry stop to search for weapons. See United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302,
1307 (11th Cir. 2002). We have similarly held that â��[a] personâ��s proximity to a
person whom officers have probable cause to believe is committing a crime may
be considered as a factor in assessing reasonable suspicion.â�� United States v.
Gonzalez, 70 F.3d 1236, 1238 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (emphasis added).6
We have never, though, extended this reasoning to impute an officerâ��s reasonable
suspicion of one individual to an associate who is in the vicinity and engaged in
purely lawful activity. See United States v. Afandor, 567 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th
Cir. 1978) (â��Lest there be any doubt, we state here that â��reasonable suspicionâ��
must be specifically directed to the person to be searched. . . . [T]he [F]ourth
[A]mendment does not permit any automatic or casual transference of
â��suspicion.â��â��). And there is good reason for this court not to do so, as the
piggybacking of reasonable suspicion, especially in a circumstance where the
possible offense is of singular possession, is too attenuated to pass muster under
the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th
This reasoning is also consistent with the vehicular-seizure cases, where detention of
the driver renders the detention of the vehicleâ��s occupants reasonable. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at
413â��14; Hudson, 231 F.3d at 1295â��97; Clark, 337 F.3d at 1288.
Cir. 2007) (â��â��[R]easonable suspicionâ�� must be more than â��an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch.â��â�� (quoting United States v. Powell, 222 F.3d
913, 917 (11th Cir. 2000))).
As the district court explained, â��the deputies specifically testified that they
did not have any evidence that [Lewis] had participated in a robbery or had been
selling drugs or was in any other way engaged in or about to be engaged in the
commission of a crime.â�� Dist. Ct. Order at 10. The only â��specific and articulableâ��
facts the Government offers to establish reasonable suspicion involve Lewisâ��s
conduct after the police officers had effectuated the stop. The district court found
that after the police drew their guns, Lewis was nervously looking about.7 Furtive
behavior occurring after the stop, however, cannot retroactively justify the stop for
which the officers otherwise had no indicia of illegal activity. See United States v.
Cruz, 909 F.2d 422, 424 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (explaining that we
consider the â��totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the stopâ��).
Based on the circumstances, precedent provides that the appropriate scope
The district court found the following as part of the totality of the circumstances at the
time of the stop: â��standing by a car; looking in the trunk of a car; talking to each other in
association; standing in a parking lot of a restaurant while it was open for business; [and] failing
to park their cars in designated parking spaces in a crowded private parking lot.â�� Dist. Ct. Order
at 8. Although the district court improperly considered that the two individuals possessing
firearms did so lawfully, that circumstance was wholly inapplicable to Lewis, who never
volunteered to the officers that he possessed a weapon.
of the detention here would have been a pat down of the armed individuals to
ensure the safety of the officers. See Hunter, 291 F.3d at 1307 (â��An officer who
has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaged in illegal activity and is
armed with a concealed weapon is justified in conducting a limited search for
weapons.â�� (emphasis added)).8 The officers would likewise act reasonably if they
were to ask the two men not suspected of any illegal activity to walk a safe
distance away from the scene. See Hudson, 231 F.3d at 1292. And any escalation
of the situation would justify appropriate measures to respond to evolving
circumstances. However, the response here, in light of the actual facts and not a
scenario the majority conceives, exceeded the valid scope of a stop under Terry,
which permits an officer â��for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing ofâ�� persons deemed
â��armed and presently dangerousâ�� in order to â��discover weapons which might be
To undermine this well-settled legal principle, the majority, in footnote 8, divines an
entirely new scenarioâ��one far removed from the situation presented â��on these factsâ��â��where
Lewis could wander about the scene of the investigation, grabbing at firearms and potentially
assaulting police officers. I have neither stated nor implied that the scope of detention under
Terry immunizes Lewis from all police interference for the entire duration of the investigation
regardless of his behavior, and I respectfully disagree with the majorityâ��s characterization of this
point. I simply recognize that based on precedent, Terry does not permit the stop of an individual
for whom the officers cannot articulate reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Adding the
circumstances proposed by the majority leads to a result based on possibilities rather than the
â��totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the stop.â�� Cruz, 909 F.2d at 424
used to assault him.â�� 392 U.S. at 30. No case law from this circuit has interpreted
Terry to permit more intrusive detentions than a pat down for weapons of those
reasonably suspected of criminal activity, and the majorityâ��s unsupported criticism
of this established principle contravenes precedent without explanation.
As a result of the foregoing, I do not find the broad â��reasonablenessâ��
standard, or the cases cited by the majority, to be instructive to the proper
resolution of this case. Nor can I identify any â��specific and articulable factsâ�� that
would give rise to the inference that Lewis was engaged in criminal activity.
Because the officers had no legal justification for their course of behavior, I would
affirm the district courtâ��s order suppressing the firearm at issue here.