Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/312711792/Melendres-1658-P-Opp-to-MC-Motion-for-Reconsideration
Timestamp: 2019-01-23 03:47:29
Document Index: 451477752

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 1983', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 1983', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 12', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Melendres #1658 P Opp to MC Motion for Reconsideration | United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit | Precedent
Melendres #1658 P Opp to MC Motion for Reconsideration
03/23/2016	1658 ECF 1658	RESPONSE in Opposition re: 1652 MOTION for Reconsideration re: 1630 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Manuel de Jesus Ortega Melendres, Velia Meraz, Manuel Nieto, Jr, David Rodriguez, Jessica Quitugua Rodriguez, Somos America. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Morin, Michelle) (Entered: 03/23/2016) D.ariz._2-07-Cv-02513_
Melendres #1658 P Opp to MC Motion for Reconsidera...
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 1 of 16
MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA’S
OF COURT’S FEBRUARY 26, 2016
ORDER OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR
OF LAW TO ARIZONA SUPREME
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 2 of 16
Michelle L Morin (Pro Hac Vice)
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 3 of 16
Factual and Procedural Background................................................................................1
The County’s Motion for Reconsideration Should Be Denied .......................................3
The County Failed to Exercise Reasonable Diligence Since April 2015,
and Filed Its Motion Late ....................................................................................3
The Ninth Circuit Has Decided the County’s Status as the Proper Jural
Entity in the Case, and this Court Cannot Reconsider the Ninth
Circuit’s Decision ................................................................................................4
The County’s Motion for Certification to the Arizona Supreme Court Should
Be Denied Because the Arizona Intermediate Appellate Courts Have Issued
Decisions That Are Controlling Precedent ......................................................................5
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................9
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 4 of 16
Braillard v. Maricopa Cty.,
232 P.3d 1263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) ............................................................................6, 7, 8
County. of Los Angeles, Cal. v. Goldstein,
134 S. Ct. 906 (2014) ............................................................................................................9
Flanders v. Maricopa Cty.,
54 P.3d 837 (Ariz. App. 2002) ......................................................................................4, 6, 8
Goldstein v. City of Long Beach,
715 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................9
Guillory v. Greenlee Cty.,
No. CV05-352TUC DCB, 2006 WL 2816600 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2006) .............................8
Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
993 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Ariz. 2014) ...................................................................................6
Lovejoy v. Arpaio,
No. CV09-1912PHX-NVW, 2010 WL 466010 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2010) ............................8
Maricopa County, Arizona v. Melendres,
136 S.Ct. 799 (2016) .............................................................................................................4
McMillian v. Monroe Cty.,
520 U.S. 781 (1997) ..............................................................................................................8
Melendres et al. v. Maricopa County et al.,
__ F.3d __, No. 15-15996, 2016 WL 860355 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2016) ......................4, 5, 7, 8
784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................1, 4, 5, 7
Mora v. Arpaio,
No. CV-09-1719-PHX-DGC, 2011 WL 1562443 (D. Ariz. Apr. 25, 2011) .........................8
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc.,
841 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................................3
Puente Arizona v. Arpaio,
76 F. Supp 3d 833 (D. Ariz. 2015) ........................................................................................8
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 5 of 16
No. CV-14-01356-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 1432674 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2015) ......................8
Smalley v. Contino,
No. CV12-2524-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 858103 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2013)..............................8
United States v. Maricopa Cty., Ariz.,
915 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Ariz. 2012) ...................................................................................8
United States v. Rezzonico,
32 F.Supp.2d 1112 (D. Ariz. 1998) .......................................................................................3
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .....................................................................................................................6, 9
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-201(A)(6) ...................................................................................................7
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-251(1) ........................................................................................................6
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-251(25) ......................................................................................................7
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-251(26) ......................................................................................................7
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-253 .............................................................................................................6
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-444(A) .......................................................................................................7
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1861 .......................................................................................................5, 9
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) ................................................................................................................7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 ..........................................................................................................................3
Local Rule 7.2(g) .........................................................................................................................3
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 6 of 16
Plaintiffs respectfully oppose Maricopa County’s (“the County’s”) motion for
reconsideration, and the County’s alternative motion to certify this question to the
Arizona Supreme Court (Doc. 1652). The County fails to demonstrate that the
requirements for either reconsideration or certification are met here, and its repeated
attempts to avoid responsibility for the actions of its chief law enforcement policymaker,
Sheriff Arpaio, fly in the face of the decisions of this Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court. They are inconsistent with Arizona state court
precedents. They also contradict the County’s own representations in its contract with
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement to begin immigration enforcement
under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Exhibit A. The
County’s insistence upon repeatedly raising the issue of its status as a jural entity against
which suits against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) must be brought—
an issue that has been settled many times over in both Arizona and federal courts—has
wasted the time of both the parties and the Court. Reconsideration or certification at this
late stage, when the County could have requested either long ago, would only result in
more waste, contrary to law. The motion should be denied.
Plaintiffs rely on and incorporate the factual background set forth in their
opposition to the County’s Motion for Recognition, Doc. 1344 at 1-4. Since that
opposition was filed, this Court has continued to conduct hearings on the civil contempt
charges against defendants Sheriff Arpaio and others. The evidentiary hearing on
liability for civil contempt has concluded.
In light of the County’s untimely motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs offer
additional background regarding the issue of the County’s role in these proceedings.
First, on April 21, 2015, shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on April 15,
2015, Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Melendres II”), the
Court ordered the County to be made a party to the lawsuit, pursuant to the Ninth
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 7 of 16
Circuit’s ruling, and denied the County’s request to stay the case. Exhibit B, Apr. 21,
2015 Tr., at 10, 33-38. On April 21, 2015, the Court also orally ruled that Sheriff
Arpaio’s counsel “has adequately represented and does now represent the interests of the
County.” Id. at 71-72. Then, at a May 8, 2015 status conference, the County’s counsel
again appeared to represent the County’s interests, alongside counsel that had thus far
represented MCSO and counsel for Sheriff Arpaio. Exhibit C, May 8, 2015 Tr., at 5, 13,
15-17. On July 20, 2015, the County again appeared through its own, separate counsel.
At that hearing, the Court noted that “Maricopa requested the Ninth Circuit to reconsider
its ruling [referring to the County’s petition for rehearing en banc] and it didn’t do it, so
you’re on the hook for whatever Sheriff Arpaio may have done that’s wrong,” and
further noted that this Court is “bound by . . . the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.”
Exhibit D, July 20, 2015 Tr. at 27-28. Counsel for the County agreed. Id. at 28; see also
id. at 53-56. The County filed no motion to reconsider, nor any motion for certification
to the Arizona Supreme Court, following the July 20, 2015 hearing. Nor did the County
file a motion to reconsider or any motion for certification after the July 31, 2015 hearing,
at which the issue of the County’s rights as a party were again discussed. Exhibit E, July
31, 2015 Tr. at 57-60.
The issue of the County’s status was subsequently raised in hearings on August
28, 2015 and on September 4, 2015, shortly after the County filed its motion for rights as
a party litigant on August 28, 2015. Doc. 1272; Exhibit F, Aug. 28, 2015 Tr.; Exhibit G,
Sept. 4, 2015 Tr. As indicated in the Court’s February 26, 2016 Order, the Court
effectively ruled on the County’s motion orally several times: first, at the September 4,
2015 hearing, Exhibit G, Tr. at 47-48; then again on September 24, 2015, Exhibit H, Tr.
at 1048, again on September 25, 2015, Exhibit I, Tr. at 1480-82, September 30, 2015,
Exhibit J, Tr. at 1829-30, and on October 2, 2015, Exhibit K, Tr. at 2261. At the October
2, 2015 hearing, the Court overruled the County’s objection to the Court’s
characterization of Defendants’ documents as “Maricopa County” documents. The
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 8 of 16
County filed no motion to reconsider after any of those hearings or rulings, nor did it ask
the Court to certify any issue to the Arizona Supreme Court.
The County’s Motion for Reconsideration Should Be Denied
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(g), a motion for reconsideration must be filed within
fourteen days of the challenged order, and will be denied “absent a showing of manifest
error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to
[the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv. 7.2(g). Motions for
reconsideration are disfavored and are not the place for parties to raise new points absent
from their original briefs and arguments. See Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood
Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor should such motions ask the
Court to “rethink what the court has already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” See
United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quoting Above the
Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)).
The County Failed to Exercise Reasonable Diligence Since April
2015, and Filed Its Motion Late
The County filed the present motion for reconsideration on March 14, 2016—
seventeen days after the Court’s February 26, 2016 Order. The County thus failed to
comply with the 14-day deadline to file a motion to reconsider under Local Rule 7.2(g).
Plaintiffs are unaware of any local or federal rule authorizing an extension of that
deadline. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 (directing computation of time by counting every
day, including weekends and holidays).
But the County’s tardiness goes beyond the failure to comply with L.R. 7.2(g).
As the Court’s February 26, 2016 Order points out, this Court repeatedly “has ruled on
this motion both orally and in practicality as this case has proceeded.” Doc. 1630 at 1.
The County has known of the Court’s position on the County’s status as the proper jural
entity against which suits against the MCSO must be brought since April 15, 2015, as
the Court has simply been following the Ninth Circuit’s instruction ever since its
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 9 of 16
issuance. Melendres II, 784 F.3d at 1260. The County has had ample opportunity to raise
every possible aspect of its argument at hearings since that time. Supra 1-3. Each time,
this Court correctly complied with the Ninth Circuit’s binding ruling on the matter.
Nothing about the February 26, 2016 Order changed the County’s status, the Court’s
prior rulings, or the relevant law. Anything that could be argued by the County now
could and should have been brought to the Court’s attention earlier. Accordingly, the
motion for reconsideration is untimely and should be denied on this basis.
The Ninth Circuit Has Decided the County’s Status as the Proper
Jural Entity in the Case, and this Court Cannot Reconsider the
The Motion for Reconsideration should also be denied because the County’s
status as the proper jural entity in this case was decided by the Ninth Circuit in
Melendres II, 784 F.3d at 1260, and reaffirmed in Melendres et al. v. Maricopa County
et al., __ F.3d __, No. 15-15996, 2016 WL 860355 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2016) (“Melendres
III”). Melendres II and Melendres III are the law of this case. The Ninth Circuit has
already turned back the County’s attempts to relitigate this issue, when it denied the
County’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and En Banc Determination of the Melendres II
decision, see Order, No. 13-16285 (9th Cir. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 87, and when it
rejected the County’s separate appeal in Melendres III. In the latter decision, it found
that “Arizona state law makes clear that Sheriff Arpaio’s law-enforcement acts
constitute Maricopa County policy since he ‘has final policymaking authority.’” Id. at *4
(citing Flanders v. Maricopa Cty., 54 P.3d 837, 847 (Ariz. App. 2002)). The County
raised the same issue in its unsuccessful petition for certiorari as to Melendres II. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving the Ninth Circuit’s binding decision in place.
See Maricopa County, Arizona v. Melendres, 136 S.Ct. 799 (2016). This Court’s
February 26 Order correctly followed the Ninth Circuit, and of course this Court cannot
“reconsider” the Ninth Circuit’s binding ruling.
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 10 of 16
The County’s assertion that it has sought to be dismissed from this proceeding,
Doc. 1652 at 9, provides no basis to reconsider the February 26, 2016 Order, both
because the County has never filed a written motion to dismiss, and because, to the
extent any oral motions to dismiss were made, they were properly denied in light of the
Ninth Circuit’s binding decision in Melendres II. The County has not met its burden of
showing “manifest error” by this Court in its February 26 Order, nor any ground on
which to reconsider it.1
As noted above, the County is bound, as a matter of law, by the judgments of
this Court and of the Ninth Circuit against the Sheriff in his official capacity, and thus its
interests are aligned with the Sheriff’s in this litigation. Moreover, the County has failed
to identify any actual divergence of interest between the County and the Sheriff in this
litigation. The comments and questions cited by the County, Doc. 1652 at 4-5, do not
even raise justiciable issues or represent the denial of anything that the County wanted.
In the future, the Court can consider the merits of each County request on a situation-by-
situation basis, just as it has been doing.
The County’s Motion for Certification to the Arizona Supreme Court
Should Be Denied Because the Arizona Intermediate Appellate Courts
Have Issued Decisions That Are Controlling Precedent
Arizona’s certification statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1861, states that the
Arizona Supreme Court can answer questions certified to it by a United States district
The County argues that Melendres II essentially said that “if the County is a party,
the sheriff is not needed,” and that therefore “if the Sheriff is a party to the litigation,
the County is not needed.” Doc. 1652 at 9. In suggesting that this Court might consider
the issue of the Sheriff’s dismissal, Melendres II in fact did not say anything about the
County not being needed. In any case, as Melendres III subsequently observed, “at this
juncture it appears that . . . a dismissal [of the Sheriff] may be unwarranted given the
County’s suggestion that it cannot exercise control over Sheriff Arpaio.” Melendres
III, 2016 WL 860355 at n. 1.
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 11 of 16
court if there is a pending issue of Arizona law as to which there is no controlling
precedent in decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court or intermediate appellate courts,
and if the Arizona state law question “may be determinative of the cause then pending in
the certifying court.” See also Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F.
Supp. 2d 1042, 1083 (D. Ariz. 2014). This Court should decline the motion for
certification because these prerequisites are not met.
The Arizona appellate courts have already decided the issue of whether Sheriff
Arpaio speaks for the County on law enforcement matters, and therefore of whether
Maricopa County is the appropriate jural entity to sue for acts of the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office. It is not “an open question of Arizona law.” Dkt. 1652 at 9.
The Arizona Court of Appeals in 2010 rejected the claim that MCSO was a
jural entity distinct from Maricopa County and indicated that the County could be sued
in its stead. Braillard v. Maricopa Cty., 232 P.3d 1263, 1269, 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2010). Before that, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded in Flanders v. Maricopa
Cty., 54 P.3d 837, 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) that Sheriff Arpaio is a final policymaker
for Maricopa County for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability in a case relating to jail
conditions. Braillard and Flanders are controlling precedents of an Arizona appellate
The Arizona statutes reinforce this conclusion, as numerous statutory provisions
indicate that under Arizona law, the Sheriff acts for the County and is subject to the
County’s authority and supervision in myriad ways. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-253
(County’s Board of Supervisors retains the power to require reports from county
officers, including the Sheriff, and to remove and replace them for failure to perform
that duty); id. § 11-251(1) (the County, through the Board of Supervisors, may
“[s]upervise the official conduct of all county officers and officers of all districts and
other subdivisions of the county charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping,
managing or disbursing the public revenues, see that such officers faithfully perform
their duties and direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and, when necessary, require the
officers to renew their official bonds, make reports and present their books and
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 12 of 16
The Ninth Circuit has found those Arizona appellate court decisions controlling,
not just in its April 2015 Melendres II decision ordering the County’s rejoinder as a
party, but also in its more recent decision in Melendres III, in which it dismissed as
untimely the County’s attempted appeal of, inter alia, the same 2013 orders that had
already been largely affirmed in Melendres II. The Ninth Circuit held in Melendres III
that, “by filing its notice of appeal on May 15, 2015, Maricopa County’s appeal does not
come close to complying with the thirty-day deadline” of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), and
that the County’s appeal should therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at *3.
Melendres III stated that “[b]ecause of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in
Braillard, it became necessary that the County be rejoined as a defendant.” Id.
Melendres III also stated that:
[U]nder the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
“[i]f the sheriff’s actions constitute county ‘policy,’ then the county is
liable for them.” McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 783 (1997)
(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
Arizona state law makes clear that Sheriff Arpaio’s law-enforcement
acts constitute Maricopa County policy since he “has final policymaking
authority.” Flanders v. Maricopa Cty., 54 P.3d 837, 847 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002); see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11- 441(A) (requiring the sheriff to
“[p]reserve the peace,” “[a]rrest . . . all persons who attempt to commit
or who have committed a public offense,” and “[p]revent and suppress
all affrays, breaches of the peace, riots and insurrections which may
come to the knowledge of the sheriff”).
accounts for inspection”); id. § 11-201(A)(6) (the county determines the budget of the
Sheriff); id. § 11-444(A) (the county need provide only for “actual and necessary
expenses incurred by the sheriff in pursuit of criminals, for transacting all civil or
criminal business and for service of all process and notices”); id. § 11-251(25) (the
county may “[a]uthorize the sheriff to offer a reward . . . for information leading to the
arrest and conviction of persons charged with crime”); id. § 11-251(26) (the county
may “[c]ontract for the transportation of insane persons to the state hospital or direct
the sheriff to transport such persons”).
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 13 of 16
The Ninth Circuit has thus already recognized, in this very case, that controlling
Arizona appellate court precedents preclude the contention that the County now again
attempts to raise in this Court in the context of the present motion. The County’s
repeated and wasteful refusal to acknowledge the controlling import of Braillard and
Flanders (let alone the Ninth Circuit’s explicit finding of that controlling import in light
of McMillian) may approach vexatiousness. “There is a ‘point of time when litigation
shall be at an end.’” Melendres III at *5 (citing Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S.
257, 264 (1978)). As to this issue, that time has come.3
On top of all that, the County’s own 2007 Section 287(g) Memorandum of
Agreement (“MOA”) with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement confirms that
the Sheriff acts for the County. See Exhibit A. The MOA “constitutes an agreement
between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Maricopa County, a political
The County’s intransigence is only accentuated by the fact that other district court
judges, in cases also involving the County, have also reached the same conclusion.
See, e.g., United States v. Maricopa County, et al., No. CV-12-00981 (D. Ariz. June
15, 2015), ECF No. 379 at 16-20 (concluding that the Board of Supervisors is charged
with supervising the Sheriff); Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 76 F. Supp. 3d 833, 868 (D.
Ariz. 2015) (“Flanders compels the conclusion that Sheriff Arpaio is the final
policymaker for [Maricopa] County on law enforcement matters.”); Puente Arizona v.
Arpaio, No. CV-14-01356-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 1432674, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27,
2015) (Maricopa County is liable for the Sheriff’s law-enforcement decisions);
Smalley v. Contino, No. CV12-2524-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 858103, at *5 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 7, 2013) (same); United States v. Maricopa Cty., Ariz., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1073,
1084 (D. Ariz. 2012) (same); Mora v. Arpaio, No. CV-09-1719-PHX-DGC, 2011 WL
1562443, at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 25, 2011) (same); Lovejoy v. Arpaio, No. CV091912PHX-NVW, 2010 WL 466010, at *13 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2010) (same); Guillory
v. Greenlee Cty., No. CV05-352TUC DCB, 2006 WL 2816600, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. Sept.
28, 2006) (Greenlee County is liable for its Sheriff’s law-enforcement decisions).
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 14 of 16
subdivision of the State of Arizona.” Id. at ORT 000014 (emphasis added). Neither
Sheriff Arpaio, nor MCSO, nor the State of Arizona is itself a party to the contract. Id.
Sheriff Arpaio signed the MOA on behalf of Maricopa County, as its Sheriff—not on
behalf of the State. Id. at ORT 000023. The acting chair and clerk of the County’s Board
of Supervisors and a Deputy County Attorney added their own signatures, id. at ORT
000023-24, thereby in effect agreeing that the Sheriff and MCSO act and speak for the
County on issues relating to law enforcement and, specifically, immigration
For all these reasons, there is no absence of controlling Arizona appellate court
authority here, and no basis under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1861 for the Arizona Supreme
Court to answer the question that the County asked this Court to certify.4
For these, and for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the County’s
Motion for Recognition, the Motion for Reconsideration or Certification should be
The analysis of Arizona state law for purposes of this case must of course take place
in the overall context of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. “Though [a federal court]
must look at the relevant state law and state courts’ characterizations of that law” to
determine whether an official acts for the County or the State in any given set of
circumstances, “the final determination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal law
statutory interpretation question; no deference is due to the ultimate conclusion of the
[state] court that the provisions, taken as a whole, indicate the [official] was a state
actor under Section 1983 for any particular function.” Goldstein v. City of Long Beach,
715 F.3d 750, 760-61 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. denied sub nom. County. of Los Angeles,
Cal. v. Goldstein, 134 S. Ct. 906 (2014). Thus, this Court defers to the Ninth Circuit’s
binding rulings, which are articulations of federal law that are based on that Court’s
interpretations of the relevant state law authorities.
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 15 of 16
By: /s/ Michelle L. Morin
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1658 Filed 03/23/16 Page 16 of 16
I hereby certify that on March 23, 2016, I electronically transmitted the attached
document to the Clerk’s office using the CM/ECF System for filing. Notice of this
filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing
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