Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20120710_0009346.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-07-26 08:45:26
Document Index: 1922205

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 636', '§ 1915', '§ 2254', '§ 1983', '§ 211', '§ 1983']

| Matthew J. Monaco, Jr. v. Steve Moore
Matthew J. Monaco, Jr. v. Steve Moore
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se. Although plaintiff has filed a petition, purportedly pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, plaintiff's allegations indicate that this action should proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. See docket # 4.
Although plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the court will not assess a filing fee at this time, as plaintiff evidently intended to proceed in this action as a petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because of the significant differences between the filing fee for a habeas petitioner ($5.00) and for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ($350.00), the court will await an amended complaint in accordance with this order before assessing the appropriate filing fee.
Plaintiff alleges that he is a pretrial detainee whose Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated at San Joaquin County Jail. Plaintiff contends that he was arrested by the Stockton Police Department for violating Cal. Penal Code § 211 (robbery) and placed in San Joaquin County Jail on September 28, 2011. Without violating a jail rule or policy or having had a hearing, he claims he was placed for administrative purposes in administrative segregation (ad seg) on October 1, 2011 until January of 2012, without notice and without being informed as to the reason. He also alleges that he was again placed in ad seg on or about February 2012, without violation of any rule and without written notice or a hearing. Plaintiff alleges it is a common place for jail officials to place inmates in ad seg without written notice or a hearing. Plaintiff alleges a supporting affidavit is attached but the court cannot locate such document. Petition [Complaint], pp. 4-5.
Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for several reasons. In the first place, plaintiff has failed to use the appropriate vehicle for a challenge to the conditions of his confinement, i.e., he has failed to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In the second place, having failed to use the appropriate form for filing a civil rights action, plaintiff also fails to set forth the relief he seeks, which violates Rule 8(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Third, simply alleging his placement in administrative segregation without a hearing is not enough to implicate the Due Process Clause. Because "under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law," the Supreme Court has determined that "the proper inquiry is whether" the conditions complained of "amount to punishment of the detainee." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). "[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punishment.'" Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984) quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S. Ct. at 1874. Disciplinary segregation cannot be imposed for a pretrial detainee's violation of jail rules without a hearing, Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996), and the due process that is required is set forth by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963. Mitchell, 75 F.3d at 525. Detainees may, however, "be segregated for administrative or security reasons with less procedural due process...." Henderson v. City and County of San Francisco, 2006 WL 3507944*14 (N.D. Cal. 2006). "[M]aintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S. Ct. at 1878. Thus, if a pretrial detainee is subjected to administrative segregation for administrative and security reasons, and not as punishment, he is entitled to procedural due process only if: (1) there is a state statute or regulation that narrowly restricts the power of jail officials to impose administrative segregation and (2) the segregation at issue amounts to "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." See [Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d] at 523 (quoting and applying Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), to procedural due process claim by pretrial detainee where deprivation at issue is not imposed as punishment).
Abenth v. Palmer, 1999 WL 118003 *2 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Here, plaintiff has specifically alleged that he was placed in ad seg for "an administrative reason" and not for his having violated any rule; therefore, on the face of it, plaintiff has not alleged that the placement was imposed as a punishment. The "petition" will be dismissed for ...