Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/1999/17235.html
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State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong :: 1999 :: Wisconsin Supreme Court Decisions :: Wisconsin Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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State v. Tonnie D. ArmstrongDownload as PDF
97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR
State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Tonnie D. Armstrong, Defendant-Appellant. ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS January 21, 1999 September 17, 1998
Circuit Racine Emmanuel Vuvunas
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by
Steven A. Koch and Seymour, Kremer, Nommensen, Morrissy & Koch, Elkhorn, and oral argument by Steven A. Koch.
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, assistant attorney general.
Nos. 97-0925-CR, 97-0926-CR STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Tonnie D. Armstrong, Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Racine County, Emmanuel J. Vuvunas, Circuit Court Judge. ¶1 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. Affirmed.
These cases are before the court
on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) homicide 809.61 (1995-96).1 Tonnie D. Police officers investigating at a the
("Armstrong")
county jail, where Armstrong was serving time for an unrelated offense. the Armstrong made oral statements incriminating himself in At the end of the interview, the officers
administered the Miranda warnings2 to Armstrong for the first time. About two hours later, they presented Armstrong with a written statement memorializing the earlier unwarned statements. Armstrong
reviewed and altered the written statement, and after the officers
Unless otherwise noted, all Statutes are to the 1995-96 version.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1
read the Miranda warnings a second time, Armstrong initialed and signed it. ¶2 State Based on Armstrong's oral and written statements, the Armstrong with first-degree intentional homicide,
theft from a person, and bail jumping.
Before trial, Armstrong
filed a motion challenging the admissibility of his statements. Following Circuit Court Judge Emmanuel J. Vuvunas' ruling that the oral and written statements were admissible, Armstrong entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to second-degree reckless homicide, offender.3 theft from a person, and bail jumping as a habitual
Armstrong was convicted of all charges and was sentenced Armstrong appealed the
to a total of twenty-six years in prison.
portion of the final order which denied his motion challenging the admissibility of the statements, and the court of appeals certified the matter to this court. ¶3 appeal. This court is confronted with two primary issues on this First, we must determine the admissibility of the oral which Armstrong made before receiving his Miranda
statements warnings. statement
Second, we must decide the admissibility of the written which reiterated Armstrong's earlier unwarned oral
statements and which Armstrong signed after receiving his Miranda
Armstrong also agreed to probation revocation and resentencing for his conviction in case number 97-0925-CR of theft from a person. Case number 97-0925-CR is now the companion case to the main case before us, case number 97-0926-CR.
warnings and after signing a form stating that he understood and waived his rights.4 ¶4 were Upon review, we conclude that Armstrong's oral statements because Armstrong made the statements during
custodial interrogation and before the administration of Miranda warnings. However, the circuit court properly ruled that
Armstrong's written statement was admissible pursuant to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). In light of our ruling that
The court of appeals set forth the following issues when it certified Armstrong's appeal to this court: 1. Who has the burden of proof on a Miranda custody question? 2. On the issue of custody, is the language of Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), to be read literally or limited as indicated by other federal and state cases? More specifically, is Schimmel v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 287, 294, 267 N.W.2d 271, 274 (1978), overruled on other grounds by Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980) (where it appears the court accepted the State's concession that a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda by being an inmate in the Wisconsin prison system) still the law in Wisconsin? 3. On the issue of interrogation, should the language of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), be read as broadly as it appears, or should Wisconsin follow the lead of some of the federal cases and other states which look to the totality of the circumstances to see if a Miranda-type interrogation occurred? 4. In light of the above, is the holding of State v. Ambrosia, 208 Wis. 2d 269, 560 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1997), a proper application of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)? Certification by Court of Appeals at 1-2(footnote omitted). will answer these issues in the course of this opinion. We
Armstrong's written statement was admissible, we conclude that the circuit court's decision to admit the oral statements constituted harmless error. court. I. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit
¶5 made by
admissibility two meetings
statements police
officers on July 31, 1995.
On that day, Armstrong was serving
time at the Racine County Jail as a result of his conviction in an earlier case, case number 97-0925-CR. The conviction arose
out of an incident on May 9, 1995, in which Armstrong snatched a woman's purse. Armstrong pled guilty to theft from a person and
was convicted on June 1, 1995.5 ¶6 From June 1, 1995, until his sentencing hearing on The circuit court, Armstrong's As a
July 13, 1995, Armstrong was free on bond. Judge Emmanuel J. Vuvunas presiding,
sentence and placed him on probation for three years.
condition of the probation, Armstrong was required to serve four months in the Racine County Jail. ¶7 On the morning of June 29, 1995, Detective Steve Mich
of the City of Racine Police Department discovered the body of Donald Thomas. Thomas’ body was lying on the floor of the An
bookstore he owned, and his wallet and keys were missing.
Armstrong was originally charged with strong armed robbery. The charge was later amended to theft from a person in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a),(3)(d)2.
autopsy suggested that Thomas had died of asphyxiation and had probably been choked. ¶8 been in Police investigators soon learned that Armstrong had Thomas' bookstore the night before Thomas’ body was
Detective Mich and another officer went to the Racine
County Jail on July 31, 1995, to speak with Armstrong about the homicide. The officers met with Armstrong at about 2:15 p.m. in
an interview room in the jail’s main level intake area. ¶9 Detective Mich began by telling Armstrong that the
officers were there to talk to him about the death of Donald Thomas. the Neither officer read Armstrong his Miranda warnings at of the interview. received According from an to the of officers, Thomas'
bookstore had caused them to believe that Armstrong may have witnessed something which would assist them in their
Detective Mich later testified that the officers
did not suspect Armstrong of involvement in the crime when they went to talk with him. ¶10 Armstrong proceeded to tell the officers that he was
present when Thomas died and that he and Thomas had argued that
The bookstore employee told police that Armstrong was in Thomas' bookstore on June 29, 1995, the night before Thomas' body was found there. According to the employee, Armstrong left the store about a half hour before the employee left at 1:30 a.m., at which time Thomas was still alive.
night.7
Armstrong admitted that he had choked Thomas with both
hands for about ten seconds, stopped, and then grabbed him by the front of his shirt and shook him until Thomas went limp and fell to the floor. Armstrong also recounted his actions after
Thomas died, including his removal of Thomas' wallet and keys and exit from the bookstore. At some point, Armstrong drew the
officers a map showing where he disposed of the wallet and keys.8 ¶11 During the interview, Mich the officers asked that he Armstrong did not
questions. believe some
about which route he took home from the store and his version of the events which transpired inside the store. According to
Detective Mich, the first moment at which he began to suspect that Armstrong might have been involved in Thomas' death was when Armstrong told him that he and Thomas had argued and that he had placed his hands on Thomas.9
Detective Mich testified at the preliminary hearing that Armstrong told him that the argument ensued over a debt allegedly owed by Armstrong to Thomas. Detective Mich stated that he and Armstrong together estimated the amount of the debt to be around $100. See Prelim. Hearing Tr., Sept. 8, 1995 at 13-14 (No. 970926-CR). The motion hearing testimony is somewhat unclear as to precisely when the map was drawn. The circuit court concluded that the map was drawn partly before and partly after Armstrong was read the Miranda warnings at the first interview. See Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 19 (No. 97-0926-CR).
See Motion Hearing Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 41-42 (No. 97-0926-
At about 3:00 p.m., the officers administered Miranda Detective Mich read
warnings to Armstrong for the first time.10
the warnings directly from a “Notification and Waiver of Rights” form. Armstrong signed the top portion of the form, which set However, he refused to sign
forth the text of the warnings.11
the waiver of rights printed on the bottom part of the form.12 ¶13 Nevertheless, Armstrong told the officers that he The
understood the Miranda warnings and would speak with them.
only conversation after the warnings, however, consisted of a brief discussion of whether Armstrong would accompany the It
officers on their attempt to locate Thomas' wallet and keys. was decided that Armstrong would remain at the jail.
finished constructing the map and the officers left, taking the map with them.
Detective Mich testified at the motion hearing that he read Armstrong his rights at this point in the interview "[b]ecause I believed him now." See Motion Hearing Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 24 (No. 97-0926-CR).
Armstrong does not challenge the substance of the warnings. The bottom portion of the form read,
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made against me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me. According to Detective Mich, the officers did not press Armstrong to sign this bottom portion of the form, in part because they felt that they had finished the interview. See Motion Hearing Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 24-25 (No. 97-0926-CR).
¶14 hour.
In its entirety, the first interview lasted about an
Afterward, the officers left the jail and drove to the
place depicted on the map, where they located Thomas' wallet and keys. Detective Mich returned to the police department and
reduced Armstrong's oral statements to writing in a document he labeled, "Sworn Affidavit." statement was based It is undisputed that this written on Armstrong's previous oral
statements. ¶15 The officers returned to the jail at about 5:10 p.m.
the same day, July 31, 1995, with the written statement, which they presented to Armstrong. and made some changes in it.13 Mich administered the Miranda Armstrong reviewed the statement When he was finished, Detective warnings for the second time,
reading them from another copy of the “Notification and Waiver of Rights” form. and This time, Armstrong signed both of the top
Armstrong then returned to the written statement prepared by Detective Mich, initialed each change he had made, and signed
Armstrong made the following changes in the statement: (1) replaced “three or four” with “one” in the phrase, “I had watched three or four peep shows”; (2) replaced "and" in the phrase "and I told him that I would start paying" with an illegible word ("him" refers to Donald Thomas); (3) replaced “I knew he was dead” with “He was unconscious” (“he” refers to Thomas); and (4) crossed out the sentence, “I knew he had a bad heart” (again, “he” refers to Thomas). Armstrong later testified that the written statement was accurate and was the same as the statements he had made earlier. See Motion Hearing Tr., Jan. 19, 1996 at 70-72 (No. 97-0926-CR).
Nothing further occurred in this second meeting
between the officers and Armstrong.14 ¶16 In an information filed October 5, 1995, the State
charged Armstrong with first-degree intentional homicide, theft from a person, and bail jumping, all as a habitual offender.15 Armstrong filed a pre-trial motion on November 15, 1995,
challenging the admissibility of his oral statements and the written statement. ¶17 Hearings on the motion were held on January 19, 1996, The circuit court, Judge Emmanuel J.
and February 2, 1996.
Vuvunas presiding, ruled that the statements Armstrong made at the first and second interviews were admissible. began by stating that he found the police Judge Vuvunas to be
"credible" and that he believed them when they said that they did not think Armstrong was a suspect at the start of the first
Police officers met with Armstrong for a third time on August 2, 1995. At that meeting, Armstrong was asked whether he wanted a lawyer, and he gave a general reply along the lines of "maybe I should." The circuit court ruled that this statement was inadmissible because the officer had not either clarified it or attempted to obtain a waiver of Armstrong's right to an attorney. The State does not challenge that ruling, and the third meeting is not otherwise relevant to this appeal. More specifically, Armstrong was charged with homicide under Wis. Stat. § 940.01, theft from a person in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a),(3)(d)2, and bail jumping under Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b). Armstrong was charged with all three offenses as a habitual offender pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62 because he committed the three offenses within five years of his conviction of theft from a person in case number 97-0925-CR. The habitual offender statute increases the maximum term of imprisonment for crimes committed by persons who have been convicted of certain other crimes within the previous five years. See Wis. Stat. § 939.62.
interview. CR).
Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 18 (No. 97-0926-
In regard to the oral statements, Judge Vuvunas ruled, I'm satisfied that when the officer realized that [Armstrong] was, in fact, making statements that might be incriminating, they gave him his rights. He did not – he did acknowledge . . . the fact that his rights were given. He did not sign the waiver. I don't find that to be telling here. I believe the officers that even though he said he didn't want to sign the waiver, but he did want to continue talking, and did it's clear that he was talking and drawing and doing things both before this, these rights were given[,] and after, . . . so I find that they did comply with Miranda . . . once they were appraised and knew that he, in fact, was a suspect in this matter, and that the statements made on that occasion were voluntary by Mr. Armstrong.
97-0926-CR). oral
statements were admissible.
¶18 The court also ruled that Armstrong's written statement The court reasoned that Armstrong had made the
statement after receiving his Miranda warnings at the first meeting about two hours earlier. The court found that Armstrong
"understood what he was doing, that he understood the warnings of Miranda and was making a statement voluntarily." Tr., Feb. 2, 1996 at 19 (No. 97-0926-CR). Motion Hearing
Armstrong’s a plea
agreement.16
Pursuant to the agreement, Armstrong pled guilty to
second-degree reckless homicide, theft from a person, and bail jumping as a habitual offender.17 In addition, Armstrong agreed
to refuse the probation which was imposed upon him and to be resentenced for his conviction of theft from a person in case number 97-0925-CR. Armstrong was convicted of all three
charges, and on April 11, 1996, was sentenced to a total of twenty-six years in prison.18 the final order in which Armstrong appealed the portion of the court denied his motions
challenging the admissibility of the statements. appeals certified the matter to this court.
The parties entered the agreement during the hearing. Apparently, the parties had made alternative plea agreements and the choice of agreement was dependent on the circuit court's ruling on the motion. The record contains no amended information,