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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 302', '§ 7607', '§ 110', '§ 111', '§ 111', '§ 110', '§ 7501', '§ 173', '§ 172', '§ 111', '§ 302', '§ 111', '§ 173', '§ 110', '§ 51', '§ 172', '§ 173']

Chevron U S a Inc Vs Nrdc - Citation 105649 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Chevron U.S.A., Inc. Vs. Nrdc - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/105649CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-25-1984Case Number467 U.S. 837AppellantChevron U.S.A., Inc.RespondentNrdcExcerpt:
chevron u.s.a., inc. v. nrdc - 467 u.s. 837 (1984)
the clean air act amendments of 1977 impose certain requirements on states that have not achieved the national air quality standards established by the environmental protection agency (epa) pursuant to earlier legislation, including the requirement that such "nonattainment" states establish a permit program regulating "new or modified major stationary sources" of..... Judgment:
The EPA's plantwide definition is a permissible construction of the statutory term "stationary source." Pp.
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Pp.
(b) Examination of the legislation and its history supports the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Congress did not have a specific intention as to the applicability of the "bubble concept" in these cases. Pp.
467 U. S. 845
(c) The legislative history of the portion of the 1977 Amendments dealing with nonattainment areas plainly discloses that, in the permit program, Congress sought to accommodate the conflict between the economic interest in permitting capital improvements to continue and the environmental interest in improving air quality. Pp.
467 U. S. 851
(d) Prior to the 1977 Amendments, the EPA had used a plantwide definition of the term "source," but in 1980, the EPA ultimately adopted a regulation that, in essence, applied the basic reasoning of the Court of Appeals here, precluding use of the "bubble concept" in nonattainment States' programs designed to enhance air quality. However, when a new administration took office in 1981, the EPA, in promulgating the regulations involved here, reevaluated the various arguments that had been advanced in connection with the proper definition of the term "source" and concluded that the term should be given the plantwide definition in nonattainment areas. Pp.
467 U. S. 853
(e) Parsing the general terms in the text of the amended Clean Air Act -- particularly the provisions of §§ 302(j) and 111(a)(3) pertaining to the definition of "source" -- does not reveal any actual intent of Congress as to the issue in these cases. To the extent any congressional "intent" can be discerned from the statutory language, it would appear that the listing of overlapping, illustrative terms was intended to enlarge, rather than to confine, the scope of the EPA's power to regulate particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the Clean Air Act. Similarly, the legislative history is consistent with the view that the EPA should have broad discretion in implementing the policies of the 1977 Amendments. The plantwide definition is fully consistent with the policy of allowing reasonable economic growth, and the EPA has advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion that the regulations serve environmental objectives as well. The fact that the EPA has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term "source" does not lead to the conclusion that no deference should be accorded the EPA's interpretation of the statute. An agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. Policy arguments concerning the "bubble concept" should be addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges. The EPA's interpretation of the statute here represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests, and is entitled to deference. Pp.
467 U. S. 859
to States that had not achieved the national air quality standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to earlier legislation. The amended Clean Air Act required these "nonattainment" States to establish a permit program regulating "new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution. Generally, a permit may not be issued for a new or modified major stationary source unless several stringent conditions are met. [
] The EPA regulation promulgated to implement this permit requirement allows a State to adopt a plantwide definition of the term "stationary source." [
] Under this definition, an existing plant that contains several pollution-emitting devices may install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions from the plant. The question presented by these cases is whether EPA's decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single "bubble" is based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term "stationary source."
14, 1981. 46 Fed.Reg. 50766. Respondents [
] filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). [
] The Court of Appeals set aside the regulations.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch,
222 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 685 F.2d 718 (1982).
The court observed that the relevant part of the amended Clean Air Act "does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a
stationary source, to which the permit program . . . should apply," and further stated that the precise issue was not "squarely addressed in the legislative history."
at 273, 685 F.2d at 723. In light of its conclusion that the legislative history bearing on the question was "at best contradictory," it reasoned that "the purposes of the nonattainment program should guide our decision here."
at 276, n. 39, 685 F.2d at 726, n. 39. [
] Based on two of its precedents concerning the applicability of the bubble concept to certain Clean Air Act programs, [
] the court stated that the bubble concept was "mandatory" in programs designed merely to maintain existing air quality, but held that it was "inappropriate" in programs enacted to improve air quality.
at 276, 685 F.2d at 726. Since the purpose of the permit
program its "
" in the court's view -- was to improve air quality, the court held that the bubble concept was inapplicable in these cases under its prior precedents.
It therefore set aside the regulations embodying the bubble concept as contrary to law. We granted certiorari to review that judgment, 461 U.S. 956 (1983), and we now reverse.
The basic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the term "stationary source" when it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded that definition. Respondents do not defend the legal reasoning of the Court of Appeals. [
] Nevertheless, since this Court reviews judgments, not opinions, [
] we must determine whether the Court of Appeals' legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment on the validity of the regulations.
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. [
] If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, [
] as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. [
415 U. S. 231
(1974). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. [
] Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit, rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. [
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, [
] and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations
See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
Republic Aviation Corp. v.
367 U. S. 382
Accord, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, ante
In the 1950's and the 1960's, Congress enacted a series of statutes designed to encourage and to assist the States in curtailing air pollution.
See generally Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
421 U. S. 63
-64 (1975). The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub.L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, "sharply increased federal authority and responsibility
in the continuing effort to combat air pollution," 421 U.S. at
421 U. S. 64
, but continued to assign "primary responsibility for assuring air quality" to the several States, 84 Stat. 1678. Section 109 of the 1970 Amendments directed the EPA to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS's) [
] and § 110 directed the States to develop plans (SIP's) to implement the standards within specified deadlines. In addition, § 111 provided that major new sources of pollution would be required to conform to technology-based performance standards; the EPA was directed to publish a list of categories of sources of pollution and to establish new source performance standards (NSPS) for each. Section 111(e) prohibited the operation of any new source in violation of a performance standard.
84 Stat. 1683. In the 1970 Amendments, that definition was not only applicable to the NSPS program required by § 111, but also was made applicable to a requirement of § 110 that each state implementation plan contain a procedure for reviewing the location of any proposed new source and preventing its construction if it would preclude the attainment or maintenance of national air quality standards. [
for various categories of equipment. In one of its programs, the EPA used a plantwide definition of the term "stationary source." In 1974, it issued NSPS's for the nonferrous smelting industry that provided that the standards would not apply to the modification of major smelting units if their increased emissions were offset by reductions in other portions of the same plant. [
The 1970 legislation provided for the attainment of primary NAAQS's by 1975. In many areas of the country, particularly the most industrialized States, the statutory goals were not attained. [
] In 1976, the 94th Congress was confronted with this fundamental problem, as well as many others respecting pollution control. As always in this area, the legislative struggle was basically between interests seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests advancing the economic concern that strict schemes would retard industrial development with attendant social costs. The 94th Congress, confronting these competing interests, was unable to agree on what response was in the public interest: legislative proposals to deal with nonattainment failed to command the necessary consensus. [
In light of this situation, the EPA published an Emissions Offset Interpretative Ruling in December, 1976,
41 Fed.Reg. 55524, to "fill the gap," as respondents put it, until Congress acted. The Ruling stated that it was intended to
at 55524-55525. In general, the Ruling provided that
at 55525. The Ruling gave primary emphasis to the rapid attainment of the statute's environmental goals. [
] Consistent with that emphasis, the construction of every new source in nonattainment areas had to meet the "lowest achievable emission rate" under the current state of the art for that type of facility.
The 1976 Ruling did not, however, explicitly adopt or reject the "bubble concept." [
745-751 (Part D of Title I of the amended Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508) -- expressly deals with nonattainment areas. The focal point of this controversy is one phrase in that portion of the Amendments. [
Basically, the statute required each State in a nonattainment area to prepare and obtain approval of a new SIP by July 1, 1979. In the interim, those States were required to comply with the EPA's interpretative Ruling of December 21, 1976. 91 Stat. 745. The deadline for attainment of the primary NAAQS's was extended until December 31, 1982, and in some cases until December 31, 1987, but the SIP's were required to contain a number of provisions designed to achieve the goals as expeditiously as possible. [
at 747. Before issuing a permit, § 173 requires (1) the state agency to determine that there will be sufficient emissions reductions in the region to offset the emissions from the new source and also to allow for reasonable further progress toward attainment, or that the increased emissions will not exceed an allowance for growth established pursuant to § 172(b)(5); (2) the applicant to certify that his other sources in the State are in compliance with the SIP, (3) the agency to determine that the applicable SIP is otherwise being implemented, and (4) the proposed source to comply with the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER). [
H.R.Rep. No. 95-294, p. 211 (1977). [
This description of a case-by-case approach to plant additions, which emphasizes the net consequences of the construction or modification of a new source as well as its impact on the overall achievement of the national standards, was not, however, addressed to the precise issue raised by these cases.
In April, and again in September, 1979, the EPA published additional comments in which it indicated that revised SIP's could adopt the plantwide definition of source in nonattainment areas in certain circumstances.
at 20372, 20379, 51924, 51951, 51958. On the latter occasion, the EPA made a formal rulemaking proposal that would have permitted the use of the "bubble concept" for new installations within a plant as well as for modifications of existing units. It explained:
"ii. Part D SIPs that do not meet the requirements specified must limit use of the bubble by including a definition of 'installation' as an identifiable piece of process equipment. [
at 51925. [
] The EPA's summary of its proposed Ruling discloses a flexible, rather than rigid, definition of the term "source" to implement various policies and programs:
at 51934.
In August, 1980, however, the EPA adopted a regulation that, in essence, applied the basic reasoning of the Court of Appeals in these cases. The EPA took particular note of the two then-recent Court of Appeals decisions, which had created the bright-line rule that the "bubble concept" should be employed in a program designed to maintain air quality, but not in one designed to enhance air quality. Relying heavily on those cases, [
] EPA adopted a dual definition of "source" for nonattainment areas that required a permit whenever a change in either the entire plant, or one of its components, would result in a significant increase in emissions even if the increase was completely offset by reductions elsewhere in the plant. The EPA expressed the opinion that this interpretation was "more consistent with congressional intent" than the plantwide definition because it "would bring in more sources or modifications for review," 45 Fed.Reg. 52697 (1980), but its primary legal analysis was predicated on the two Court of Appeals decisions.
In explaining its conclusion, the EPA first noted that the definitional issue was not squarely addressed in either the statute or its legislative history, and therefore that the issue involved an agency "judgment as how to best carry out the Act."
It then set forth several reasons for concluding that the plantwide definition was more appropriate. It pointed out that the dual definition "can act as a disincentive to new investment and modernization by discouraging modifications to existing facilities" and
Moreover, the new definition
Finally, the agency explained that additional requirements that remained in place would accomplish the fundamental purposes of achieving attainment with NAAQS's as expeditiously as possible. [
] These conclusions were expressed
in a proposed rulemaking in August, 1981, that was formally promulgated in October.
at 50766.
In this Court, respondents expressly reject the basic rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision. That court viewed the statutory definition of the term "source" as sufficiently flexible to cover either a plantwide definition, a narrower definition covering each unit within a plant, or a dual definition that could apply to both the entire "bubble" and its components. It interpreted the policies of the statute, however, to mandate the plantwide definition in programs designed to maintain clean air and to forbid it in programs designed to improve air quality. Respondents place a fundamentally different construction on the statute. They contend that the text of the Act requires the EPA to use a dual definition -- if either a component of a plant, or the plant as a whole, emits over 100 tons of pollutant, it is a major stationary source. They thus contend that the EPA rules adopted in 1980, insofar as they apply to the maintenance of the quality of clean air, as well as the 1981 rules which apply to nonattainment areas, violate the statute. [
The definition of the term "stationary source" in § 111(a)(3) refers to "any building, structure, facility, or installation" which emits air pollution.
467 U. S. 846
. This definition is applicable only to the NSPS program by the express terms of the statute; the text of the statute does not make this definition
applicable to the permit program. Petitioners therefore maintain that there is no statutory language even relevant to ascertaining the meaning of stationary source in the permit program aside from § 302(j), which defines the term "major stationary source."
. We disagree with petitioners on this point.
Respondents recognize that, and hence point to § 111(a)(3). Although the definition in that section is not literally applicable to the permit program, it sheds as much light on the meaning of the word "source" as anything in the statute. [
] As respondents point out, use of the words "building, structure, facility, or installation," as the definition of source, could be read to impose the permit conditions on an individual building that is a part of a plant. [
] A "word may have a character of its own not to be submerged by its association."
We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress. [
Based on our examination of the legislative history, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is unilluminating. The general remarks pointed to by respondents "were obviously not made with this narrow issue in mind, and they cannot be said to demonstrate a Congressional desire. . . ."
-169 (1945). Respondents' argument based on the legislative history relies heavily on Senator Muskie's observation that a new source is subject to the LAER requirement. [
] But the full statement is ambiguous, and, like the text of § 173 itself, this comment does not tell us what a new source is, much less that it is to have an inflexible definition. We find that the legislative history as a whole is silent on the precise issue before us. It is, however, consistent with the view that the EPA should have broad discretion in implementing the policies of the 1977 Amendments.
More importantly, that history plainly identifies the policy concerns that motivated the enactment; the plantwide definition is fully consistent with one of those concerns -- the allowance of reasonable economic growth -- and, whether or not we believe it most effectively implements the other, we must recognize that the EPA has advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion that the regulations serve the environmental objectives as well.
467 U. S. 857
-859, and n. 29;
467 U. S. 855
, n. 27. Indeed, its reasoning is supported by the public record developed in the rulemaking process, [
] as well as by certain private studies. [
The arguments over policy that are advanced in the parties' briefs create the impression that respondents are now waging in a judicial forum a specific policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agency and in the 32 jurisdictions opting for the "bubble concept," but one which was never waged in the Congress. Such policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges. [
In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests, and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, [
] the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, [
] and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies. [
] Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges -- who have no constituency -- have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
* Together with No. 82-1247,
American Iron & Steel Institute et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.;
and No. 82-1591,
Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection. Agency v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.,
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
204 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 636 F.2d 323 (1979);
ASARCO Inc. v. EPA,
188 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 578 F.2d 319 (1978).
Respondents argued below that EPA's plantwide definition of "stationary source" is contrary to the terms, legislative history, and purposes of the amended Clear Air Act. The court below rejected respondents' arguments based on the language and legislative history of the Act. It did agree with respondents contention that the regulations were inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, but did not adopt the construction of the statute advanced by respondents here. Respondents rely on the arguments rejected by the Court of Appeals in support of the judgment, and may rely on any ground that finds support in the record.
See Ryerson v. United States,
282 U. S. 533
E.g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories,
351 U. S. 292
351 U. S. 297
J. E. Riley Investment Co. v. Commissioner,
311 U. S. 59
25 U. S. 120
6 Wheat. 598,
19 U. S. 603
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction, and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U. S. 374
(1896). If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law, and must be given effect.
R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 174-175 (1921).
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
See, e.g., United States v. Morton, ante
467 U. S. 834
-426 (1977);
-237(1936).
E.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang,
450 U. S. 144
Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., ante
467 U. S. 389
Blum. v. Bacon,
Union Electric Co. v. EPA,
427 U. S. 246
427 U. S. 256
-627 (1971);
113 U. S. 570
-571 (1885);
§§ 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(a)(4).
The Court of Appeals ultimately held that this plantwide approach was prohibited by the 1970 Act,
see ASARCO Inc.,
188 U.S.App.D.C. at 83-84, 578 F.2d at 325-327. This decision was rendered after enactment of the 1977 Amendments, and hence the standard was in effect when Congress enacted the 1977 Amendments.
Report of the National Commission on Air Quality, To Breathe Clean Air, 3.3-20 through 3.3-33 (1981).
"The above exemption is permitted under the SIP because, to be approved under Part D, plan revisions due by January, 1979, must contain adopted measures assuring that reasonable further progress will be made. Furthermore, in most circumstances, the measures adopted by January, 1979, must be sufficient to actually provide for attainment of the standards by the dates required under the Act, and in all circumstances measures adopted by 1982 must provide for attainment.
Section 172 of the Act and 43 F R 21673-21677 (May 19, 1978). Also, Congress intended under Section 173 of the Act that States would have some latitude to depart from the strict requirements of this Ruling when the State plan is revised and is being carried out in accordance with Part D. Under a Part D plan, therefore, there is less need to subject a modification of an existing facility to LAER and other stringent requirements if the modification is accompanied by sufficient intrasource offsets so that there is no net increase in emissions."
at 51926. Later in that Ruling, the EPA added:
"However, EPA believes that complete Part D SIPs, which contain adopted and enforceable requirements sufficient to assure attainment, may apply the approach proposed above for PSD, with plant-wide review but no review of individual pieces of equipment. Use of only a plant-wide definition of source will permit plant-wide offsets for avoiding NSR of new or modified pieces of equipment. However, this is only appropriate once a SIP is adopted that will assure the reductions in existing emissions necessary for attainment.
44 FR 3276 col. 3 (January 16, 1979). If the level of emissions allowed in the SIP is low enough to assure reasonable further progress and attainment, new construction or modifications with enough offset credit to prevent an emission increase should not jeopardize attainment."
at 51933.
at 51932.
"The dual definition also is consistent with
held that EPA had broad discretion to define the constituent terms of 'source' so as best to effectuate the purposes of the statute. Different definitions of 'source' can therefore be used for different sections of the statute. . . ."
taken together, suggest that there is a distinction between Clean Air Act programs designed to enhance air quality and those designed only to maintain air quality. . . ."
"Promulgation of the dual definition follows the mandate of
which held that, while EPA could not define 'source' as a combination of sources, EPA had broad discretion to define 'building,' 'structure,' 'facility,' and 'installation' so as to best accomplish the purposes of the Act."
"What EPA may not do, however, is define all four terms to mean
plants. In the 1980 PSD rules, EPA did just that. EPA compounded the mistake in the 1981 rules here under review, in which it abandoned the dual definition."
Since the regulations give the States the option to define an individual unit as a source,
40 CFR § 51.18(j)(1) (1983), petitioners do not dispute that the terms can be read as respondents suggest.
. We note that Senator Muskie as not critical of the EPA's use of the "bubble concept" in one NSPS program prior to the 1977 amendments.
for example, the statement of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, pointing out that denying a source owner flexibility in selecting options made it "simpler and cheaper to operate old, more polluting sources than to trade up. . . ." App. 128-129.
Respondents point out if a brand new factory that will emit over 100 tons of pollutants is constructed in a nonattainment area, that plant must obtain a permit pursuant to § 172(b)(6), and, in order to do so, it must satisfy the § 173 conditions, including the LAER requirement. Respondents argue if an old plant containing several large emitting units is to be modernized by the replacement of one or more units emitting over 100 tons of pollutant with a new unit emitting less -- but still more than 100 tons -- the result should be no different simply because "it happens to be built not at a new site, but within a
preexisting plant.
" Brief for Respondents 4.
See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., ante
467 U. S. 390
See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, ante
-700;