Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=2655
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 00:58:49
Document Index: 257785949

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 133', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 133', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 14']

BIHARI LAL BATRA versus THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER & ORS
1965 AIR 134	1964 SCR (7) 192
BIHARI LAL BATRA V. THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER & ORS [1964] RD-SC 71 (12 March 1964)
12/03/1964 AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION: 1965 AIR 134	1964 SCR (7) 192
Evacuee	property-Land allotted to a refugee in urban area- Allotment is invalid	under the rules-Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955, Rule 2(h).
The father of the appellant owned considerable	agricultural property in Pakistan and he with the members of his family moved over to India on partition. The	appellant's father had some unsatisfied claim for allotment and on December 29.
1955 he was allotted some plots in Urban area within a certain	municipality.	The appellant's father died in	1952 and the allotment made was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of his father. On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to the appellant by the Managing Officer.
When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands, disputes were	raised by respondents Nos. 4 and 5. These respondents moved the Assistant Settlement Commissioner	for cancellation of the allotment on the	ground	that these disputed plots	were within an "urban area"	within	the meaning	of r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons,	Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 and, therefore, the allotment to the	appellant was	contrary to law. The Assistant Settlement Commissioner accepted the contention of the	res- pondents and allowed the appeal and cancelled the allotment.
The appellant	then applied to the Chief Settlement	Com- missioner in revision.	He rejected the petition. Then	the appellant moved a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of	the Constitution before the High Court. This petition was	also dismissed. the	High Court granted certificate	of fitness under Art. 133 of the Constitution and hence the appeal.
Held:(i) Where an order making an allotment was set aside by the Assistant Commissioner or Settlement Commissioner	the title which was obtained on the basis of the continuance of that sanad or order also fell with it.
Shri Mithoo Shahani v. Union of India, [1964] 7 S.C.R.	103, relied on.
(ii)The	contention of the appellant that r. 2(h) of	the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955, was unconstitutional as contravening Art. 14 of	the Constitution must fail. This contention is based on	the basis of the proviso to Rule 2(h). Rule 2(h)	was framed under s. 40 of the Act. This rule along with	other rules came into force on May 21, 1955. The allotment was made to the appellant on December 29, 1955 and the Sanad was issued two days later. In other words the allotment in favour of the appellant was after the rule came into force and was not one "already made" as stated in the proviso to r. 2(h).
Therefore, if on the date of the allotment the land was in an urban area, the allotment would be governed by the	main para of the definition and the proviso, had no application.
193 The discrimination is said to consist in the	rule having drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into force, for determining whether the allotment was valid or	not.
Such a contention is patently self-contradictory. Every law must have a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule which seeks to change the law can be held invalid	for the mere reason that it effects an alternation in the	law.
It is sometimes possible to plead injustice in a rule which is made to operate with retrospective effect, but to	say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid because thereby	a difference	is made between	the past and	the future, is one which cannot be accepted.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 543 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgement and order dated November 26,	1959 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 678 1957.
Bishan Narain and N. N. Keswani, for the appellant.
B. K.	Khanna and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondent	Nos.
D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 4.
R. V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for respondent No.
March 12, 1964.	The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fitness granted under Art. 133 by the High Court of Punjab against the order of that Court dismissing the appellant's petition to it under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The point in controversy lies within a narrow	compass	and hence of the voluminous facts we propose to set out	only those which are relevant for appreciating the	contentions urged before us. The father of the appellant	owned	con- siderable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with	the members of his family moved over to India on partition.	The appellant's father was allotted a considerable extent of land in village Kharar, District Ambala, but	we are	not concerned with that. He had still some unsatisfied claim for allotment and on December 29, 1955 he was	allotted by the Managing Officer on quasi-permanent tenure Khasra Nos.
880, 881 and 882 which were within the municipal area of Kharar	with the regularity of which allotment	alone	this appeal	is concerned.	It may be mentioned that	the appellant's father had died in 1952 and the allotment	made was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of	his father.	On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to the appellant on December 31, 1955 by the Managing Officer.
When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands, disputes were raised by respondent& L/P (D) ISCI-7 .....
194 Nos. 4	and 5. They were not displaced persons but	they claimed	that they had been in possession of this property from a	long anterior date from which they could not be disturbed and	also that the property	could	not be	the subject	of a valid allotment.	These respondents moved	the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for cancellation of	the allotment and	this appeal was allowed by the	officer	who found that the land comprised in these three khasra numbers were within an " urban area" within the meaning of r.
2(h)	of the Displaced Persons	Compensation	and Rehabilitation	Rules,	1955 and consequently that	the allotment to the appellant was contrary to law.	He, therefore, cancelled	the allotment. The appellant thereafter applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner in revision and not being successful there moved the High Court by a, petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution..
As stated earlier, this petition was dismissed and it is the correctness of	this dismissal that is	challenged in	the appeal before us.
Mr. Bishan Narain, learned Counsel for the appellant urged in the main two contentions in support of the appeal.	The first was (1) that after the Managing	Officer granted a sanad on December 31, 1955 in the name of the President of India,	the appellant obtained an indefeasible title to	the property and that this title could not be displaced except on grounds contained in the sanad itself even in the event of the	order	of allotment being set aside on appeal or revision. We	have considered this point in	Shri Mithoo Shahani and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors.(1) which was pronounced on	March 10, 1964 and for	the reasons there stated this submission has to be rejected.
The second point that he urged was, and this was in fact the main contention raised before the High Court, that rule 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation	and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 was unconstitutional as contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution and	so the	original allotment to	the appellant must be held to be lawful. We consider that there is no substance in this argument. In fact, we are unable to appreciate the	ground	on which the contention is being urged.	Section 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 enables the Central Government by Notification in the Official Gazette to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, and in particular on an elaborately enumerated list	of matters. It was	not suggested that the rules of 1955 were not competently made under s. 40.	These rules were published on May 21,	1955 when they came into force. Rule 2(h) the validity of which is impugned in these proceedings is a rule containing	the definitions. Rule 2(h) reads, to extract what is material:
(1) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 103.
195 "2. In	these rules, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) to (g)..................................
(h) 'Urban area' means any area within	the limits of a	corporation, a municipal committee,	a notified area committee, a town area committee,	a small	town committee, a cantonment or any other area notified as	such by the Central Government from time to time;
Provided that in the case of the	quasi-perma- nent allotment of rural	agricultural lands already made in	the States of	Punjab	and Patiala and East Punjab	States	Union,	the limits of an urban area shall	be as	they existed on the 15th August, 1947." The words 'of rural agricultural lands' occurring in	the proviso to this rule were replaced by an amending Notifica- tion of 1957	by the words 'in rural area', but	this amendment is obviously of no significance. "Rural area" is defined by rule 2(f) to mean 'any area which is not an urban area'.
Pausing here, it would be useful to state two matters which are not in dispute: (1) that the allotment to the appellant was made on December 29, 1955, the sanad being	issued	two days later. It was therefore an allotment which was	made after May 21, 1955 when the rules came into force; (2)	the other matter is that Khasra Nos. 880, 881 and 882	were included in urban limits on February 10, 1951 by	the municipal area	of Kharar being extended to	cover these plots.	It would, therefore, be obvious that on the	date when the allotment was made, the allotted land was in an "urban	area" and therefore it could not have been validly allotted.
We must confess our inability to comprehend what precisely was the discrimination which the rule enacted which rendered it unconstitutional as violative of Art. 14. So far as we could understand the submission, the unreasonable discri- mination was said to exist because of the operation of	the proviso. Under the proviso in regard to quasipermanent allotments 'already made, i.e. made before May 21, 1955 in the States of Punjab and PEPSU, the test of what was to be considered an "urban area" was to be determined on the basis of the state of circumstances which obtained on 15th August, 1947.	The allotment in favour of the appellant was after the rules came into force and was not one "already made".
Therefore if on the date of the allotment the land was in an urban area, the allotment would be governed by the main para of the definition and so could not have been validly	made and that was the reason why it was set L, P(D) 1 SCI-, (a)..
196 aside.	The discrimination is said to consist in the	rule having	drawn a dividing line at the date when it came	into force, or determining whether the allotment was valid or not. It is the discrimination that is said to be involved in this prospective operation of the rule that we find it difficult to appreciate. It is possible that	before	the rules were framed the land now in dispute could have	been allotted, but because of this it is not possible to suggest that the rule altering the law in this respect which ex concessis is within the rule-making power under the Act, is invalid. Such a contention is patently	self-contradictory.
Every law must have a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule which seeks to change the law can be held invalid for the	mere reason that it	effects an alteration An the law.	It is sometimes possible to plead injustice it',	a rule which	is made to operate	with retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid because thereby a difference is made between the past and the future, is one which we	are unable to follow.
There are no merits in this appeal which fails and is	dis- missed with costs.