Source: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2003/12/03/03-29597/hazardous-materials-revisions-to-incident-reporting-requirements-and-the-hazardous-materials
Timestamp: 2018-03-21 13:22:44
Document Index: 303944099

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u2009171', 'arts 171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', 'art 6', 'art 6', 'art 7', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009174', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u2009171', '§\u20095125', 'arts 631', 'art 171', 'art 172', 'art 173', '§\u2009173', '§\u2009171', 'art 1', 'arts 171']

A Rule by the Research and Special Programs Administration on 12/03/2003
68 FR 67745
67745-67773 (29 pages)
03-29597
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/03-29597 https://www.federalregister.gov/d/03-29597
Start Preamble Start Printed Page 67746
Compliance Date: Only the revised DOT Form F 5800.1 (01-2004) specified in this final rule will be accepted for incidents occurring on, or after July 1, 2004. Filers must use the previous DOT Form F 5800.1 (Rev 6/89) form for all incidents up to, and including June 30, 2004.
T. Glenn Foster, (202) 366-8553, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, Research and Special Programs Administration or Kevin Coburn, (202) 366-4555, Office of Hazardous Materials Planning & Analysis, Research and Special Programs Administration.
Quality data that supports causal, trend, and risk analysis is fundamental to an effective safety program. The importance of data to the hazardous materials transportation safety program was highlighted in both a Department-wide initiative (ONE DOT Flagship Initiative on Hazardous Materials Handling/Incidents; “HazMat Flagship”) which began in 1999 and a Department-wide Hazardous Materials Program Evaluation (HMPE) completed in 2000. The HazMat Flagship Initiative identified a set of new and ongoing actions relating to hazardous materials transportation that have the greatest potential impact on safety and program operation and that benefit from a cooperative approach. The HMPE used a multi-modal team to conduct a Department-wide program evaluation to document and assess the effectiveness of the Department's hazardous materials transportation safety program. The team's final report can be found at: http://hazmat.dot.gov/​hmpe.htm.
Both the HazMat Flagship initiative and the HMPE emphasized the need to obtain more accurate and complete data on incidents. The hazardous materials transportation safety program relies on DOT Form F 5800.1, Hazardous Materials Incident Report, to gather basic information on incidents that occur during transportation and that meet specified criteria in § 171.16 of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180). The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA, we) last revised this form in 1989. In 2001, we received approximately 17,500 incident reports. RSPA uses the data and information reported by carriers to:
(2) NTSB recommendation R-89-52 suggests implementing regulations to ensure that there is formal feedback Start Printed Page 67747from carriers to shippers when an incident has occurred.
(3) NTSB recommendation H-99-58 asks RSPA to establish a specific time period for reporting incidents meeting criteria in § 171.15 (telephonic notification).
As a result of a meeting between DOT and members of several trade associations concerning hazardous materials incident reporting, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) sponsored a workgroup with segments of the transportation community to discuss the DOT Form F 5800.1 and the reporting requirements of §§ 171.15 and 171.16. The workgroup meetings were held during the winter of 1997-98. Participants included representatives from all four transportation modes, RSPA, shippers, container manufacturers, and labor. The workgroup submitted recommendations to RSPA. We developed questions based on input from these meetings, the DOT modal agencies, other concerned individuals, and on our own initiative.
On March 23, 1999, we published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM; 64 FR 13943) that asked a series of questions regarding the need to change current reporting requirements or the incident report form. We received approximately 40 comments from industry associations, State and local governments, non-profit associations, and carriers. Based on these comments, we developed proposed regulatory language and published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM; 66 FR 35155) on July 3, 2001. We identified ten general issues in the NPRM, which are reviewed in Section III of this document. RSPA received over 30 comments on the NPRM. RSPA's decisions on the proposals of the NPRM and review of these comments are discussed in Section III, below.
In the NPRM, RSPA proposed changes on the following ten issues. In this final rule, we discuss comments submitted to the docket, concerns raised by Start Printed Page 67748commenters, and our decisions on each issue below:
The form layout should be more compact than the version in the NPRM, but attention should still be paid to font size.
The form should avoid the use of shaded regions, as these interfere with faxing.
The form should explicitly identify the form and/or series number of the accompanying instructions, as well as URL information for instructions available online.
Any such online instructions should contain links to the sections of the CFR cited, and should also contain links to definitions.
There were no major issues or concerns with the graphics or other visual cues.
Infrequent filers were concerned that the conditions for form filing were not presented all in one place. They suggested a different grouping of instructions, something along the lines of a “Who—Why—When?” section. Infrequent filers preferred a format similar to a flowchart (perhaps on a separate instruction page or worksheet) to walk them through the incident characteristics and help them arrive at a filing decision.
The second focus group meeting took place on November 22, 2002, with a morning session attended by seven experienced filers and an afternoon session attended by six less experienced filers.[1] The full QED report can be found in the Docket. Some of the comments received from this group included:
In general, participants reacted very positively to the new electronic form. Participants appreciated having direct access to the instructions for completing the form in an electronic version.
Replace the numeric values and alpha codes with check-boxes.
Change the wording for the entry of failure codes for packaging from “Enter up to 3 Codes” to “Enter up to 3 sets of Codes.” They also suggested that a vertical line be drawn between each grouping of “What Failed How Failed Cause(s) of Failure.”
Air carriers indicated that for a hazardous material incident involving passenger baggage, there should be an ability to indicate the type of bag containing the item involved in the release, as well as any packaging within the bag.
Language should be changed in Part 6 from “Describe the package failure” to something else since the report may not be in response to the failure of a package but due to some other hazardous material incident.
Participants indicated that they would like the ability to save templates. These templates could be linked to a company- or location-specific password, and would store information such as reporting entity address, mode, and Start Printed Page 67749possibly even material information (for single-material handlers). Alternatively, some participants indicated that they would like to be able to host versions of these forms (with company-specific information already filled in) on their own intranets and post the reports to DOT databases from their own systems.
Participants would like to enter the UN number of the hazardous material, and have a scripted lookup function enter everything else into the various fields from a table.
Provide additional “skip patterns” and validation logic—for example, if the release is caused by a “puncture,” the program should make “shell thickness” a required data field and not allow the form to be saved or submitted if it is incomplete. Participants also mentioned that they would like relevant previous responses to gray out everything not applicable after item 23, and that item 23 itself should be linked to the response to 1(b). Similarly on item 27, if there are no fatalities, the numbers could be greyed out and “tab” could skip to the next valid item.
Add ability to upload supplementary documentation/pictures, etc. on the part 6 page using an interface not unlike that for adding attachments to Web-based mail.
Part 7 might be better as a dropdown box, since filers will probably supply a response that can be autocoded this way. This might save DOT time in having to back-code responses that fall into regular patterns such as “enhanced training, accelerated repair schedule,” etc.
Participants stated that default values would be a good idea for the form. Having a default value for “unknown” might make it easier for DOT to identify missings/unknowns/not applicables, a frequent source of problems in data analysis from survey research.
Measurement units entered throughout the form should be confined to a standard list and should exist in fields separate from the quantities field.
In this final rule, we are adopting the proposal to eliminate the separate telephonic notification requirement to FAA for air shipments and to require all air carriers to report incidents subject to § 171.15(a) to the National Response Center (NRC). NRC would then make any subsequent notifications. NRC personnel are specifically trained on which notification requirements pertain to which entities, thus, this change should result in more accurate notification to parties with a need to know.
Only a few commenters addressed the one-call issue. In its comment, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) supported streamlining the calling process, but emphasized the need to alert state officials via 911. RSPA recognizes the difference between contacting emergency response officials and incident reporting to DOT. As the CHP states, “* * * it is the local emergency response agency(s) who Start Printed Page 67750handle the entire incident and nearly every instance bears the initial response burden and often the greatest opportunity to mitigate the adverse consequences.” We reiterate that the one-call for reporting to the NRC is for incident reporting. In the case of any incident involving hazardous materials that requires immediate emergency response, the local authorities should be immediately notified. In addition, adoption of this requirement does not relieve a person from reporting discrepancies of hazardous material shipments transported by air. Discrepancies are those air shipments involving hazardous materials which are improperly described, certified, labeled, marked, or packaged, in a manner not ascertainable when accepted. Section 175.31 of the HMR requires, as soon as practical, a person to report by telephone to the nearest FAA Security Field Office a discrepancy relative to the shipment of a hazardous material following the shipment's acceptance for transportation aboard an aircraft.
On October 30, 2003, we published a final rule under Docket HM-223 (68 FR 61906). Among other issues, the final rule clarifies the applicability of the HMR to specific functions and activities, including loading, unloading, and storage operations. Consistent with the Federal hazardous materials transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.), the final rule defines “transportation” to mean the movement of property and loading, unloading, or storage incidental to the movement. Transportation in commerce begins when a carrier takes physical possession of a hazardous material for the purpose of transporting it and continues until delivery of the package to its consignee or destination as evidenced by the shipping documentation under which the hazardous material is moving. The final rule defines “loading incidental to movement” to mean the loading by carrier personnel or in the presence of carrier personnel of packaged or containerized hazardous material onto a transport vehicle, aircraft, or vessel; for a bulk packaging, “loading incidental to movement” means the filling of the packaging with a hazardous material by carrier personnel or in the presence of carrier personnel. The final rule defines “unloading incidental to movement” to mean the removal of a packaged or containerized hazardous material from a transport vehicle, aircraft, or vessel or the emptying of a hazardous material from a bulk packaging after the hazardous material has been delivered to the consignee and prior to the delivering carrier's departure from the consignee facility or premises. Under the final rule, “storage incidental to movement” means storage by any person of a transport vehicle, freight container, or package containing a hazardous material between the time that a carrier takes physical possession of the hazardous material until the package containing the hazardous material is physically delivered to the destination indicated on a shipping document.
This final rule requires reporting of incidents under §§ 171.15 of 171.16 that occur during the time that the material is in transportation. Consistent with the definitions adopted in HM-223, incidents that occur during loading operations conducted by carrier personnel or in the presence of carrier personnel must be reported, as must incidents that occur during unloading operations conducted prior to a carrier's departure from the consignee's premises. Hazardous materials incidents Start Printed Page 67751that occur during loading operations conducted by a shipper prior to a carrier's arrival at its facility to pick up the hazardous material or during unloading operations conducted by consignee personnel after the hazardous material has been delivered and the carrier has departed the premises are not required to be reported under §§ 171.15 and 171.16. Note in this regard that the HM-223 final rule changes the applicability of the HMR to rail tank car unloading operations conducted by consignee personnel, which are currently subject to the provisions of § 174.67. Under HM-223, such rail tank car unloading operations are not transportation functions and, thus, are not subject to incident reporting requirements.
Other commenters opposed the requirement in total. In addition to Docket HM-223 concerns, the Fertilizer Institute (TFI) and The National Propane Gas Association (NPGA) “* * * contend that this change will increase the burden on industry.” Additionally, they claim the “* * * change will decrease the efficiency of RSPA's data collection” because it is possible that more than one person will report the same incident. The Petroleum Marketers Association of America (PMMA) sees an increase in burden for industry and RSPA by “* * * requiring procedural changes, additional training, and time” for industry and the confusion caused by duplicative reporting will “* * * decrease the efficiency of RSPA's data collection efforts and will not benefit its risk assessment.”
RSPA already receives duplicate reports and currently has a system for identifying duplicative reporting, thus the impact to RSPA should be minimal. In our Regulatory Evaluation, available in the HM-229 Docket (RSPA-99-5013-87), we discuss the additional cost to industry by adopting this proposal. We anticipate a minimal increase in the number of reports concerning incidents that occur during loading and unloading because these activities are already reported by carriers. Given the volume of handlings, however, we conservatively estimate a 2% increase in the number of reports concerning incidents that occur during loading and unloading.
RSPA also expects an increase in the number of reported incidents occurring in facilities where hazardous materials are stored incidental to transportation. An RSPA study conducted in 1998 estimates that many of the 800,000 daily shipments of hazardous materials involve consolidations, intermodal or intramodal transfers and in-transit storage, resulting in 1.2 million daily hazardous materials movements. We estimate that extending reporting requirements to in-transit storage facilities will increase the overall total number of reports by 10%.
The intent of this rule change is to collect spill information on incidents that occur while the hazardous material is in transportation. Since RSPA has jurisdiction over hazardous materials in transportation, excluding reporting on incidents that occur during in-transit storage creates an incomplete data set of hazardous materials incidents. In the past, RSPA has discovered such incidents only from sources such as press reports of the most serious incidents. The information will provide a more complete picture of incidents occurring throughout the transportation system.
In this final rule, we are requiring each person in physical control of a hazardous material while it is in transportation in commerce to report any incident that occurs while the material is in that person's possession. For example, an in-transit storage facility owner would have to report any event that meets the provisions of §§ 171.15 or 171.16 and that occurs during the time that a hazardous material is stored in transportation. Consistent with the definitions adopted in the HM-223 final rule, storage incidental to movement is storage by any person of a transport vehicle, freight container, or package containing a hazardous material between the time that a carrier takes physical possession of the hazardous material until the package containing the hazardous material is physically delivered to the destination indicated on a shipping document. Reports of incidents or releases that occur during incidental storage will provide more accurate and complete information regarding hazardous materials incidents.
In addition, we are revising § 171.21 to require the person responsible for reporting the incident, rather than the “carrier,” to make available all records and information pertaining to the incident.
As proposed in the NPRM, an incident meeting all of the following criteria would not be required to be reported:
(1) The shipment has not been offered for transportation or transported by air;
(5) Each package has a capacity of less than 20 liters (5.2 gallons) for liquids or less than 30 kg (66 pounds) for solids;
(6) The total aggregate release is less than 20 liters (5.2 gallons) for liquids or less than 30 kgs (66 pounds) for solids; and
In the NPRM, we proposed to except small spills of low hazard materials from the reporting requirements. We wanted to require that an aggregate spill of 20 liters (5.2 gallons) or over for liquids or 30 kg (66 pounds) or over for solids of otherwise excepted hazardous materials be reported. For example, if twelve 5-gallon containers of a flammable liquid hazardous material in PG III are spilled, no incident report would be required unless the aggregate amount released from the twelve containers of the hazardous material is at least 5.2 gallons or one of the conditions in § 171.15(a) is met. Based on reports received over the past five years, we expect that the proposed exceptions would result in a sizeable net reduction of the total number of incident reports filed each year.
Most commenters agreed with the proposed new exceptions and suggested that we include additional reporting exceptions. The Reusable Industrial Packaging Association (RIPA) suggested that non-bulk packagings and IBCs containing residues should not be reported if a spill of the residue occurs. Safety-Kleen requested that hazardous wastes be included in the reporting exceptions. RSPA does not agree with either commenter. Since this information is used to determine the effectiveness of packagings, excluding packagings larger than what was proposed, even if they only contain a residue of a hazardous material, leaves out incidents we wish to include in our data set. In addition, hazardous wastes are generally not included in most exceptions, even if the regulations for materials only meeting the definition of a hazardous waste and no other hazard class are relatively minimal.
Some commenters were against expanding the reporting exceptions or noted that we risk limiting the data we collect concerning spills. Chevron/Phillips warns “* * * the inclusion of many of the exceptions noted in HM229 [sic] may further reduce data that can be used to further risk management efforts.” The International Brotherhood Start Printed Page 67752of Teamsters “* * * fears that RSPA will be relinquishing its authority to collect information about hazardous materials releases that can, and often do, lead to workers being exposed to hazardous materials.”
These expanded exceptions, as noted by several commenters, actually reduce some of the exceptions for paint and paint-related materials, and for limited quantities in Packing Group II. The Glidden Company calculates “* * * the significant increase in reporting will require * * * an additional 175 to 180 reports per year.” BASF states “* * * this proposed change will significantly increase the burden on the paint manufacturing industry * * *” and DuPont adds that the change “* * * would escalate the cost with no corresponding increase in safety.” Indeed, the exceptions presented in this final rule eliminate exceptions based on specific shipping names for paint and batteries. Instead, the exceptions in this final rule are based on the hazards the materials pose and quantities of those materials.
The original exceptions to spill reporting were implemented under Docket HM-36A (45 FR 73682) in 1980, before Packing Groups for materials were developed in Docket HM-181 (55 FR 57402 and 56 FR 66124). When Packing Groups were incorporated into the regulations, we did not revise § 171.16 to update the reporting exceptions in light of the Packing Group changes. In 1996, under a broad regulatory review, exceptions for limited quantities of Packing Group II and III materials were added under Docket HM-222B (61 FR 27166), but we did not conduct a thorough review of incident reporting, and the basis for reporting exceptions.
In reviewing the reporting requirements and the exceptions to reporting, we have determined that the data needs for releases of small amounts of low-hazard materials is low. We now have ample data from incidents over the past 20 years involving small releases of Packing Group III hazardous materials in small quantities to warrant a reporting exception. However, we have determined that incidents involving Packing Group II materials warrant reporting, even in these smaller quantities. These materials pose a greater hazard than Packing Group III materials, so packaging failures and other incidents will continue to be required to be reported in order to monitor and improve regulations. Thus, we have adopted the proposed exceptions published in the NPRM.
In addition, we are clarifying that the incident report requirements do not apply to minimal amounts of hazardous materials escaping: (1) Due to disconnecting a loading or unloading line or from the operation of venting devices (for which venting is authorized); or (2) from the manual operation of seals in equipment such as pumps, compressors, and valves during the normal course of transportation if the release does not trigger any of the provisions for a telephonic notification described in § 171.15 of this subpart and does not result in property damage.
Under current § 171.15 requirements, one of the criteria that triggers the requirement for immediate notification is property damage that exceeds $50,000. RSPA proposed removing this requirement. There were not many comments on this point. The CHP supported the proposal because “quite often the true total costs associated with an incident will not be determined for a substantial period of time following an incident.” We agree and are removing the monetary criterion.
We proposed to clarify the requirements for “immediate notification” by specifying that telephonic notification must be made as soon as practicable following the occurrence of an incident and in all instances within 12 hours after an event requiring notification. This revision also responds to NTSB recommendation H-99-58 to provide a specific time period to report an incident by telephone. NTSB recommended that a 2-hour time frame was preferable. Commenters note the difficulties in complying with a 2-hour response time. The Conference on Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles, Inc. notes that “* * * immediate reporting requirements should focus on obtaining response services that are required to gain control of an incident.”
RSPA understands contacting emergency response entities may be of primary concern immediately following an incident; however, notification of federal authorities through the NRC is also essential. The NTSB comments that railroads, under 49 CFR 840.3, are required to provide telephonic notification to NRC within 2 hours in the event of an accident resulting in a fatality, release of hazardous materials, or evacuation of the public, and within 4 hours after an accident resulting in damages exceeding certain limits. RSPA understands the circumstances involving remote highway incidents may be more difficult to address in the constrained time frame. We do not want to detract from the immediate emergency response efforts focused on amelioration of a spill, therefore we have clarified the requirements of “immediate” telephonic notification to be as soon as practical but no later than 12 hours after the occurrence of any incident.
In the NPRM, we proposed to require updates to the incident report form within one year under the following conditions:
(2) There was a misidentification of the hazardous material or package information on the incident report;
RSPA received several comments on updating reports. UPS commented that the requirement would be a “* * * substantial burden for any carrier such as UPS * * *” because it would have to monitor thousands of incidents per year to determine if any developments trigger an update. In addition, it noted that the requirement would “* * * require a submitter to constantly update an incident report for one-year [sic] following its submission.” Farmland Industries, Inc. mentions that if RSPA removes “* * * cost as a requirement for telephonic reporting, consideration should be given to removing updated costs from an incident.”
DuPont does not support the proposal to update the report, even though the actual number of updates would be small. It does not believe “* * * that a majority of the hazardous materials incidents reported would require updating because the quantities released are minimal.” DuPont thinks the number of reports that would require updating are so minimal and “* * * question if the small percentage that would qualify warrant a regulatory requirement for updating the reports.”
Other entities supported an updating requirement, with caveats. The Norfolk Southern Railway Company does not oppose the proposal, but feels the requirement to update based on a change of $25,000 in the costs of the incident would “* * * serve no real purpose” and would be burdensome to industry. Ashland, Inc. suggests that the costs requirement for updating the report be a $250,000 change and only if the cost changes by more than 10%. The F5800.1 Task Force also suggested including a 10% threshold.
We believe that substantive changes to the outcome of an incident should be Start Printed Page 67753updated to ensure the accuracy and quality of the data we collect. Updated information provides a more meaningful approach to causal, trend, or risk assessment analysis. We are adopting the proposal to require updated incident reports for up to one year after the date of an incident for the following: (1) Death resulting from injuries caused by a hazardous material; (2) corrections to the identification of the hazardous material or package information; and (3) certain updated damage costs as additional information becomes available. Cost information would be updated when: (1) costs not known at the time the report was filed became known; or (2) original damage/cost estimates were revised by more than $25,000 or 10% of the original estimate, whichever is greater. In some cases, certain costs (such as decontamination and cleanup) may not be known within 30 days of the incident's occurrence, and would not be included in the initial incident report. In other cases, some costs (such as property damage) may be significantly higher than the original estimate. We estimate that about 800 incidents reported each year would require an update.
CHP mentions that updating the report should be streamlined for more accurate reporting. It is possible that in the future, with the advent of electronic data management systems, performing an update to the form may not require the re-submission of the DOT Form F 5800.1 form. Until that time, we will retain the current requirements for submitting updates.
In the NPRM, we proposed to require certain incidents involving bulk packagings that do not result in release of a hazardous material to be reported. We stated that such information could provide a broader base for risk management in more critical transportation situations and that additional information could be used to gauge the performance and integrity of certain packagings. This proposal was in response to NTSB recommendation H-92-6, which requested that DOT implement a program to collect information necessary to identify patterns of cargo tank equipment failure, including the reporting of all accidents involving a DOT specification cargo tank. This request stems from the February 4, 1992 special investigation report on cargo tank rollover protection (PB92-917002). NTSB examined seven highway accidents in which cargo tanks overturned and hazardous materials were released through damaged closures or fittings on top of the tanks; none of the cargo tank shells had been breached. Among its conclusions were the following:
* There is inadequate information about the forces that can be encountered in a rollover accident and the extent to which rollover protection devices for cargo tanks can reasonably be designed to withstand these forces because neither the RSPA, the FHWA [Federal Highway Administration, now Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, or FMCSA], nor the industry has provided engineering modeling or other analysis to determine the magnitude of forces acting upon a cargo tank under different accident conditions, and
* The FHWA [now FMCSA] and the RSPA accident data bases are not adequate to identify important trends of potential problems related to the design and construction of bulk liquid cargo tanks.
Subsequently, in its report, NTSB recommends that RSPA “implement, in cooperation with the FMCSA, a program to collect information necessary to identify patterns of cargo tank equipment failures, including the reporting of all accidents involving a Department of Transportation specification cargo tank.” In an effort to minimize duplicative reporting of much of the same information, discussions with FMCSA and RSPA resulted in agreement that the F 5800.1 form would be suitable and appropriate to collect this type of information.
Most commenters oppose data collection for an incident that does not result in a release of hazardous materials. Commenters cite a number of reasons, the main ones being an increase in burden, an ambiguity in when a report was required, and the limited usefulness of the data collected under this proposal. The commenters made it clear that specific guidelines would be required to avoid what the National Tank Truck Carriers (NTTC) describe is a possible “compliance trap” due to varying definitions of “damage” from company to company and inspector to inspector. This point was raised numerous times. Utility Solid Waste Activities Group comments “* * * that a specific definition of ‘damage’ is needed to evaluate the impact of this proposal.” PMMA adds “* * * the language of the proposed rule is vague.” TFI and NPGA argue not only that the requirement “* * * is vague and fails to give regulated parties the requisite certainty to enable compliance” but also that the proposal “* * * does not accomplish the desired goals of NTSB Recommendation H-92-6.” The last comment seems to contradict NTSB's opinion, as NTSB was one of only two commenters agreeing with the proposal. The other was the Nuclear Energy Institute.
RSPA believes there is a need to collect this information as recommended by NTSB. The potential burden on operators is offset by the safety information that will be provided. For example, such reporting can provide information concerning packaging integrity, particularly the circumstances under which a packaging is able to withstand a collision or accident without releasing its contents. The incident data base is expanded to include “near miss” or “close call” incidents which, because of the quantity and type of hazardous materials present, have the potential for significant consequences.
Additionally, collecting this information allows for examination of the circumstances (packaging, procedures, training) to determine if there may be ways to avoid the actual set of incidents that pose the greatest risk. This information also provides an indication of a packaging's ability to survive forces encountered in the transportation environment. Finally, this data would provide “success stories” and illustrations of a packagings robustness. The converse is also true. If most times that a packaging is in an accident and its damage results in a hazardous materials release, it may point to the inadequacy of the packaging requirements. Accurate data will prevent safety gaps as well as aid in determining how to allocate limited funds of the regulated community to provide the greatest safety benefits.
However, RSPA also agrees with some of the concerns of the commenters. For example, the ONEDO-Nalco Company argues that smaller bulk packagings, such as IBCs, are handled, loaded, and unloaded more frequently than larger containers so that minor damage “* * * is relatively common.” TFI and NPGA noted that the NTSB recommendation focused only on cargo tanks, while RSPA's proposal expanded the concept to other bulk packagings. Therefore, in this final rule, RSPA is adopting the proposal only in regards to reporting damage to specification cargo tanks over a 1000-gallon capacity. In addition, we clarify what is reportable damage. Structural damage is damage considered Start Printed Page 67754serious enough to bring into question the integrity of the cargo tank. A cargo tank that requires subsequent replacement or repair due to the damage sustained in the accident for other than cosmetic reasons falls into this category. Lading retention system consists of the basic containment (e.g., tank) and any associated appurtenances or equipment (e.g., piping and valves) that, if seriously damaged, could result in the release of the contents of the cargo tank. Examples of when an incident report is required and when one is not required follow. If there is doubt, the incident should be reported.
Serious damage that, if worse, could have resulted in the loss of the contents of the cargo tank. Damage to outlet lines that contain hazardous materials during transportation are in this category Serious damage that, even if worse, would not have resulted in the loss of the contents of the cargo tank. Damage to outlet lines that are normally not charged during transportation are in this category.
Cargo tank damage that requires professional inspection or recertification to ensure it is capable of meeting requirements. Minor damage that obviously will not affect continuation of the cargo tank in service.
RSPA may address this issue in a future rulemaking if it determines that data needs require additional information for other bulk packagings. For instance, it is our understanding that AAR maintains extensive accident data that could be correlated to damage and releases. Access to this data or reports based on the data may negate future need for its collection via DOT F 5800.1. We will explore options in this area with the rail industry. In addition, information on damage to certified cargo tanks of 1000 gallons or more capacity that do not result in a release will be analyzed over the next several years to determine its usefulness in practice and if further rulemaking is needed.
Reducing undeclared shipments of hazardous materials is a high priority of the Department. Undeclared shipments are apt to be in substandard packages and undermine hazard communication that is vital in an emergency. Undeclared shipments, particularly when offered for transportation or transported by air, pose a significant safety problem because of the potential for improper packing, handling, and failure to communicate the hazard. Emergency responders and transportation workers are unaware of the presence of undeclared hazardous materials. Certain hazardous materials that are forbidden for air transportation may make their way onto a passenger-carrying or cargo-only aircraft, and may inadvertently be handled in an unsafe manner by transportation workers. In a hazardous material release from an undeclared shipment, the crew does not know what the hazardous material is, or what response measures to take.
Commenters agreed that undeclared shipments posed a great danger, however, many commenters did not support this proposal. While VOHMA agrees that undeclared shipments are “* * * one of our most significant problems,” it notes that carriers “* * * lack the resources to remove such seals, unpack the container to inspect the cargo within * * *” VOHMA also notes in its comments that “[t]he carrier should not be held responsible by the regulations for declaring dangerous cargoes * * *” Others supported the concern that this could put the carriers in a difficult position of being responsible to ensure that all shipments were prepared properly. Some commenters state that a reporting requirement specific to undeclared hazardous materials would expose their companies to undue liability and possible enforcement actions for accepting an undeclared shipment. Other commenters state that this requirement would place carriers in an enforcement role.
A number of commenters, including the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), CHP, and the NTSB support reporting undeclared shipments when discovered in transportation. ALPA states this problem is “* * * one of, if not the greatest potential risks to passengers, aircraft, and crew.”
We believe that information on undeclared shipments should be collected and that the incident report form is the most accessible method for collecting such data. Requiring reports of undeclared hazardous materials discovered in transportation can help in several ways. For example, problem shippers can be identified, and outreach and enforcement can be used to reduce the chance of recurrence. In addition, reporting can also help define the extent of the problem, establish trends, and help gauge the effectiveness of efforts to reduce undeclared shipments. Such a requirement is consistent with the current emphasis by the Department on this area. Accordingly, RSPA is adopting, as proposed, the requirement to submit an incident report when an undeclared shipment of hazardous materials is discovered. This requirement applies to parties who are likely to discover undeclared shipments and who will benefit greatly from a reduction of such shipments, which is a goal of this rulemaking.
RSPA is sensitive to problems noted by commenters concerning the amount of information that is considered sufficient to give a person (other than the original offeror) actual or constructive knowledge of the presence of a hazardous material. In a separate proceeding (Docket No. RSPA-01-10380), RSPA is formulating additional guidance on the factors that enforcement agencies consider relevant to a determination whether a carrier knew or should have known that an “undeclared” shipment contained a hazardous material, based on comments submitted in writing and at a June 19, 2002 public meeting.
This rule does not change the “knowingly” standard for civil penalty liability in 49 U.S.C. 5123, nor does it create any increased duty to examine all packages for the presence of hazardous material or affect the responsibility of a carrier or other person to refuse to transport a package that it knows or should know contains a hazardous material. The requirement to report the discovery of an undeclared hazardous material is not intended to create a “compliance trap.” Enforcement action is focused on the person who initially offered the undeclared hazardous material for shipment, not the person who subsequently received a shipment that was not properly marked, labeled, placarded, and described on shipping papers. In addition, there is no basis for Start Printed Page 67755enforcement action against a person who accepted or handled an undeclared hazardous material when it had no reason to know of the presence of the hazardous material.
We proposed to require the person responsible for completing an incident report to provide a copy of the report to the shipper whose packages were the subject of the report. This proposal responded to NTSB Recommendation R-89-52, that recommends requiring carriers reporting hazardous materials incidents under the provisions of § 171.16 to notify shippers whose hazardous materials shipments are involved. NTSB is concerned that shippers are not receiving information about packages that are prone to failure during transportation.
Some commenters who supported the proposal cited the importance this information could provide for the shipper in identifying problem packagings or methods. The Glidden Company indicated notification would provide it “* * * with valuable information into possible reasons how and why packages are damaged in transport.” This reasoning is echoed by BASF who stated that the notification would “* * * provide valuable information into possible reasons for package failure or damage during transport,” and also by Utility Solid Waste Activities Group who expressed “* * * such notification could provide a strong safety incentive and would help prevent additional incidents where the offeror's packaging is at fault.”
Many other commenters opposed the proposal for a number of different reasons. One commenter stated that the incident report may not be forwarded to the appropriate company or person within that company, essentially eliminating the opportunity for corrective action. The Air Transport Association (ATA) stated that if there is a shipper's name and address on the shipping paper, it may not be the location from which the material was originally shipped. In addition, as VOHMA noted, “Often, the carrier accepts the freight container from [a] forwarder listing that party as the shipper of record or consignor” thus, making the original shipper impossible to find by the reporter of the incident. NTTC observed that carriers may not know the identity of the true shipper of a given product due to the intervention of forwarders, brokers, and third party logistics providers.
Other commenters stated that the reports were an increased burden for the reporter and many reports may be of little or no interest to shippers. Safety-Kleen asserted that “* * * the majority of hazardous waste generators do not want to be notified when small amounts of material have leaked * * this [proposal] places an unfair burden on the hazardous waste carriers.”
We believe that some type of shipper notification is incorporated into most standard business practices to account for shipment tracking, product loss, or damage reporting by carriers and consignees, and may be replicated by the proposed notification. The comments of several shippers supported this view. For example, Norfolk Southern Railway Company stated it “* * * already voluntarily provides copies to its shippers * * *” and that “* * * reports are sent to the shippers at the same time they are submitted to RSPA.” Chevron/Phillips noted that companies “* * * already support this activity and have detailed reporting requirements in contracts and service agreements.”
We agree with NTSB and others that there are benefits to shippers being made aware of incidents involving their packages; however, for the reasons discussed above we believe it is not appropriate to impose the burden of notification on incident reporters. We believe that RSPA, along with FAA, FMCSA, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) can do a better job of ensuring appropriate corrective action by selective notification of shippers and others, as warranted by analysis of incidents, and by working towards making incident report information generally available on RSPA's website. Notification from DOT would carry more weight and prompt a more immediate response from shippers. Also, enhanced analysis of incidents, as enabled by this final rule, will allow us to better identify problems involving packagings, including those problems that may occur at different locations of a company, or among different companies.
How incident data can be analyzed was demonstrated in 2001, when the Intermodal Hazardous Materials Program (IHMP) office reviewed incident data for companies whose shipments were involved in a high proportion of incidents relative to other shippers. Incident data from January 1998 to October 2000 served as a basis of the review. The analysis of this data revealed that a large number of incidents reported by carriers during this 34-month period involved shipments from a small number (less than 40) companies. The IHMP Director sent letters to these companies, informing them of their incidents and detailing the results of the IHMP incident analysis. Each letter included information on the numbers of yearly incidents, reporting carriers, types of commodities and packages involved, locations where the shipments originated, reported incident casual factors, and reported monetary damages.
The IHMP letters generated significant positive feedback from shippers and heightened their awareness to potential internal problem areas. Several companies expressed appreciation to DOT for notifying them about these incidents. Some shippers stated that they were unaware of these incidents, others that they had received only partial notifications from their carriers, and others were surprised to discover that summary incident data was readily available on RSPA's Office of Hazardous Materials Safety website. Where appropriate, shippers took action to reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence of incidents.
RSPA believes that this type of review and contact by DOT better serves the affected parties. We anticipate conducting ongoing analyses to detect problems, and are working closely with the modal administrations to improve analysis and information sharing capabilities.
The modal administrations will have access to incident data and information and may conduct similar reviews if they elect to do so. RSPA has provided FAA's Office of Internal Security and Hazardous Materials an electronic summary of all hazardous materials incidents reported since 1993. As FAA special agents conduct hazmat shipper inspections and shipper outreach visits, they will individually review a summary of relevant incident histories with each shipper. FAA and RSPA will develop a system to electronically share information concerning incidents, discrepancies, inspections, enforcement, exemptions, and registrations. This will assist in the identification and analysis of problems and trends related to transportation of hazardous materials and will be used to notify shippers, or others, when problems become evident. Until this system is developed and implemented, FAA will provide copies of incidents related to the air mode to the relevant shippers.
As previously indicated, summaries of incident information are currently available to all shippers and carriers at our website. Increasing awareness of this option and increasing ease of data access are additional avenues we will explore to ensure shippers are aware of Start Printed Page 67756incidents involving materials they have offered for transportation.
RSPA received several comments concerning the availability of completed incident report forms through the internet via RSPA's website. Several commenters voiced concern about this issue, mainly citing privacy concerns. Currently, any completed incident report is considered a public document and available through RSPA. Making these public documents available through the internet would meet initiatives in the government to facilitate information collection through electronic means. However, any information that is currently withheld under existing law would remain withheld if incident reports are made available through the internet. RSPA will be reviewing this issue in the future; however, no additional rulemaking action is necessary to make these documents electronically available.
We are adopting a new definition in § 171.8 for “unintentional release”. We are revising the definition for “undeclared hazardous material shipment” for further clarification.
We are removing the requirement in § 171.16 to attach a hazardous waste manifest to the incident report form when a release involves a hazardous waste. The revised incident report form requires the hazardous waste manifest number to be reported and provides a field for entering the number. Through this reference, we will be able to access the hazardous waste manifest, if needed, through the appropriate officials. In addition, we are removing the requirements for: (1) An estimate of the quantity of waste removed from the scene; (2) the name and address of the facility to which it was taken; and (3) the manner of disposition of any removed waste. This information is already available as a result of EPA's hazardous waste manifest regulations; thus, continued reporting of this information to RSPA is unnecessary. Removing these requirements eliminates reporting information that is obtainable through other sources. Therefore, RSPA has adopted these amendments as proposed.
This final rule requires that an incident report must be retained for two years at either the reporter's principal place of business or another record retention site provided the report is available at the reporter's principal place of business within 24 hours of request. We are adopting this amendment as proposed, which removes the requirement to seek an approval to store the report at a place other than the reporter's principal place of business. Adopting this proposal will provide flexibility in maintaining records without the need for an approval from DOT. In addition, this allows electronic versions to be retained, even though the server the document is located on is outside the principal place of business.
In the NPRM, we asked a series of questions concerning fatalities that may occur at registered cargo tank repair facilities during cargo tank inspection and repair operations. Such fatalities generally result because hazardous materials residue in the cargo tank is not removed before work is done on the tank. We did not propose any changes specific to this issue in the NPRM, but asked for comments to assist us in determining whether we should propose to collect information concerning such accidents in a future rulemaking. Most of the commenters that addressed this issue, including NTTC and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, supported collecting data on these accidents. One commenter, Farmland Industries, suggested that RSPA does not have the authority to require reporting of incidents that are not related to the actual transportation of a hazardous material.
On December 29, 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) for the purpose of assuring safe and healthy workplaces. Under the OSH Act, every employer engaged in a business affecting commerce has a general duty to furnish each of its employees a workplace free from recognized hazards causing, or likely to cause, death or serious physical harm. In addition, employers are required to comply with all safety and health standards issued under the OSH Act that are applicable to working conditions involved in their businesses. In accordance with OSHA standards, cargo tank repair facilities must report accidents to OSHA or to a state agency responsible for occupational safety and health, if appropriate. OSHA data for the period 1985-1997 indicate that there were 17 fatalities during the period resulting from repair work performed on cargo tanks. The OHSA incident reports clearly conclude that the cause of these incidents was a failure to comply with existing OSHA and/or HMR requirements. Because OSHA already collects fairly detailed reports concerning accidents at cargo tank repair facilities, we do not believe that imposing an additional reporting requirement is necessary or appropriate.
We were contacted by a state official who requested that we require incidents meeting the immediate notification criteria in § 171.15 to be reported to the State in which the incident occurred. We disagree. A State may require immediate, oral accident/incident reports for local emergency response purposes. Further, any State may request that NRC notify it of incidents occurring within the State.
The following are the major changes to the current HMR reporting requirements and to DOT Form F 5800.1 that we are making in this final rule:
(1) Reporting of incidents involving a specification cargo tank with a capacity of 1,000 gallons or greater that receives structural damage that may adversely affect the cargo tanks's ability to retain lading even when no hazardous material in released.
(6) Restructuring the form to utilize failure codes to obtain information on packaging failures.
This final rule is not a significant regulatory action under Section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, was not reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. This rule is not a significant regulatory action under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the Department of Transportation (44 FR 11034). A regulatory evaluation that considers various regulatory alternatives is available for review in the public docket.
The costs of these regulations identified in the regulatory evaluation Start Printed Page 67757are attributed to: (1) Expansion of reporting requirements to persons other than a carrier in possession of a hazardous material during transportation; (2) implementation of a requirement to update incident reports under certain conditions; and (3) expansion of reporting requirements to incidents involving cargo tanks where no hazardous material is released. Reductions in the total costs associated with incident reporting requirements are attributed to implementation of an electronic filing option and expansion of current exceptions to the reporting requirements. The expected reductions in total costs generally offset the anticipated cost increases; thus, the requirements of the final rule should result in only minimal increased costs of compliance.
While it is difficult to estimate the net benefit resulting from this rulemaking, we believe that the revisions to the incident reporting requirements will greatly enhance our ability to develop strategies to reduce the risks associated with the transportation of hazardous materials. The non-quantifiable benefit of increased safety through reducing the incidence of undeclared shipments is expected to be far greater than the negligible cost increase to the regulated community.
(5) The design, manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance, recondition, repair, or testing of a package or container represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material.
This final rule addresses covered subject item number 4 above and preempts state, local, and Indian tribe requirements not meeting the “substantively the same” standard. This final rule is necessary to increase the usefulness of data collected for risk analysis and management by government and industry and, where possible, provide relief from regulatory requirements.
Federal hazardous materials transportation law provides at § 5125(b)(2) that, if we issue a regulation concerning any of the covered subjects, we must determine and publish in the Federal Register the effective date of Federal preemption. The preemption date of this rule is January 1, 2004.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an agency to review regulations to assess their impact on small entities unless the agency determines a rule is not expected to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. Based on the assessment in the final regulatory evaluation, I hereby certify that, while the final rule applies to a substantial number of small entities, there will not be a significant economic impact on those small entities. A detailed Regulatory Evaluation is available in the Docket.
Potentially affected small entities. The revisions in this final rule will apply to persons in physical control of a hazardous material during transportation in commerce. Such persons primarily include motor carriers, air carriers, vessel operators, rail carriers, temporary storage facilities, and intermodal transfer facilities. Unless alternative definitions have been established by the agency in consultation with the Small Business Administration, the definition of “small business” has the same meaning as under the Small Business Act (15 CFR Parts 631-657c). Therefore, since no such special definition has been established, RSPA employs the thresholds (published in 13 CFR 121.201) of 1,500 employees for air carriers (NAICS Subgroup 481), 500 employees for rail carriers (NAICS Subgroup 482), 500 employees for vessel operators (NAICS Subgroup 483), $18.5 million in revenues for motor carriers (NAICS Subgroup 484), and $18.5 million in revenues for warehousing and storage companies (NAICS Subgroup 493). Of the approximately 116,000 entities to which the proposals in this final rule would apply (104,000 of which are motor carriers), we estimate that about 90 percent are small entities. Based on historical data, we estimate approximately 17,810 annual responses.
Potential cost impacts. The revision to expand reporting requirements to any person in physical possession of a hazardous material while it is being transported in commerce will primarily affect storage and in-transit storage facilities. We estimate there are approximately 6,500 warehousing and storage entities subject to this requirement which will incur the total increased compliance costs of about $84,000. We estimate that expanding the reporting requirements will increase the number of incident reports submitted each year by about 11.45 percent of the 17,810 total annual responses, or approximately 2,180 reports. Taken on a one-to-one report to entity ratio, we estimate a cost of approximately $39/year/company.
The revision to require updating of incident reports under certain conditions applies to all persons subject to the HMR incident reporting regulations. We estimate that this final rule will result in about 800 additional updates to reports each year for a total annual cost of $4,800. Taken on a one-to-one report to entity ratio, we estimate a cost of $6.00/year/company.Start Printed Page 67758
The revision to require reporting of certain incidents involving cargo tanks that do not result in a release of hazardous materials will apply to about 104,000 motor carriers. We estimate that this revision will result in about an increase of about 16 percent of the 17,810 total annual responses, or approximately 2,975 additional incident reports each year. On a one-to-one report/entity basis, motor carriers will incur increased compliance costs of approximately $114,240 or about $38/year/company.
The revision to require reporting of undeclared shipments of hazardous materials discovered during transportation will apply to all persons subject to the HMR incident reporting regulations. We estimate that this final rule will result in an increase of approximately 8 percent of the 17,810 incidents reports submitted each year, or approximately 1,500 reports. Taken on a one-to-one report/entity ratio, we estimate the corresponding increased compliance costs of $57,600 to be approximately $38/year/company.
Potential cost savings. The revision in the final rule that will permit electronic filing of incident reports and expand the current exceptions from incident reporting requirements will offset the increased compliance costs described above. The potential savings attributable to the revisions to the final rule total about $276,000. The additional potential costs attributable to the revisions to the final rule total about $275,712, for a net savings of approximately $300.
Consideration of alternate proposals for small businesses. The Regulatory Flexibility Act suggests that it may be possible to establish exceptions and differing compliance standards for small businesses and still meet the objectives of the applicable regulatory statutes. However, given the large numbers of small businesses, as defined for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, in hazardous materials transportation, we do not believe that it would be possible to establish such differing standards and still accomplish the objectives of federal hazardous materials transportation law. The information provided in hazardous materials incident reports serves as the basis for critical RSPA safety functions, including identification of safety problems, regulations development, training programs, outreach efforts, and enforcement strategies. The risks posed by a hazardous material offered for transportation or transported by a small entity are the same as the risks posed by the same hazardous material when offered for transportation or transported by a large entity. Thus, it is entirely reasonable and appropriate for the HMR incident reporting requirements to apply equally to any person who offers for transportation or transports hazardous materials in commerce.
Conclusion. Based on the above analysis, we certify that while the revisions in this final rule will affect a significant number of small businesses or other small entities, there will be no substantial economic impact on these small businesses.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no person is required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations requires that RSPA provide interested members of the public and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information collection and recordkeeping requests. RSPA has a current information collection approval under OMB No. 2137-0039, Hazardous Materials Incident Reports.
The average number of incident reports RSPA received for the years 1997—2000 is about 17,300, and for the years 1995—2000 is about 16,000. Our regulatory evaluation for this final rule uses a base number of 17,000 annual incident reports.
As a result of this final rule, there was a modest increase in annual burden and costs. OMB approved this information collection as proposed under this rule on August 30, 2001. The following figures are based on receiving 17,000 incident reports per year and only include estimates for written incident reports:
Requests for a copy of the information collection should be directed to Deborah Boothe or T. Glenn Foster, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards (DHM-10), Research and Special Programs Administration, Room 8102, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590-0001, Telephone (202) 366-8553.
This final rule imposes no mandates and thus does not impose unfunded mandates under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It would not result in costs of $100 million or more to either state, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or to the private sector.
The revisions in this final rule will increase the quality of data collected on hazardous materials spills, increasing our ability to evaluate potential packaging problems that result in releases to the environment. Thus, the revisions should produce a small net benefit to the environment by improving the data sources used in regulatory development. Therefore, we find that there are no significant environmental impacts associated with this final rule.
In consideration of the foregoing, we are amending 49 CFR part 171 as follows:
Undeclared hazardous material means a hazardous material that is (1) subject to any of the hazard communication requirements in subparts C (Shipping Papers), D (Marking), E (Labeling), and F (Placarding) of Part 172 of this subchapter, or an alternative marking requirement in Part 173 of this subchapter (such as §§ 173.4(a)(10) and 173.6(c)), and (2) offered for transportation in commerce without any clear indication of the presence of the hazardous material in or on at least one of the following: an accompanying shipping paper, the outer package, the transport vehicle or freight container, or another written statement by the person Start Printed Page 67759offering the hazardous material for transportation.
(1) Submit a written Hazardous Materials Incident Report to the Information Systems Manager, DHM-63, Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, Washington, DC 20590-0001. Submit an electronic Hazardous Material Incident Report to the Information System Manager, DHM-63, Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, Washington, DC 20590-0001 at http://hazmat.dot.gov;​
(iii) Connection or disconnection of loading or unloading lines, provided Start Printed Page 67760that the release does not result in property damage.
(ii) Each package has a capacity of less than 20 liters (5.2 gallons) for liquids or less than 30 kg (66 pounds) for solids;
(a) A shipper, carrier, package owner, package manufacturer or certifier, repair facility, or person reporting an incident under the provisions of § 171.16 must:
Issued in Washington, DC on November 19, 2003 under the authority delegated in 49 CFR Part 1.
Start Printed Page 67764
The Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180) require that certain types of incidents be reported to the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). Section 171.15 of the HMR requires an immediate telephonic report (within 12 hours) of certain types of hazardous materials incidents and a follow-up written report. Section 171.16 requires a written report for certain types of hazardous materials incidents within 30 days. Each type of report is explained below.
Undeclared hazardous material-a hazardous material that is:
(2) Offered for transportation in commerce without any clear indication of the presence of the hazardous material in or on at least one of the following: an accompanying shipping paper, the outer package, the transport vehicle or freight container, or another written statement by the person offering the hazardous material for transportation.
Unintentional release—the escape of a hazardous material from a package on an occasion not anticipated or planned. This includes releases resulting from collision, package failures, human error, criminal activity, negligence, improper packing, or unusual conditions such as the operation of pressure relief devices as a result of over-pressurization, overfill, or fire exposure. It does not include releases, such as venting of packages, where allowed, and the operational discharge of contents from packages.Start Printed Page 67766
Serious damage that, if worse, could have resulted in the loss of the contents of the cargo tank. Damage to outlet lines that contain hazardous materials during transportation is in this category Serious damage that, even if worse, would not have resulted in the loss of the contents of the cargo tank. Damage to outlet lines that are normally not charged during transportation is in this category
The material is properly classed as an ORM-D, or a Packing Group III material in Class or Division 3, 4, 5, 6.1, 8, or 9;
Revised estimates of damages, losses, and related costs result in a change of $25,000 or more, or 10% of the original cost estimates, whichever is greater, even if the original estimate was under $500.Start Printed Page 67767
(2) Information Systems Manager, U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, DHM-63, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Instructions for Form DOT F 5800.1:
(3) This is to report: Check the box that describes why you are filling out this form. This will normally be “A) A hazardous material incident.” If you are reporting an undeclared shipment with no release, check the corresponding box, “B).” If you are reporting an incident involving a cargo tank motor vehicle containing a hazardous material that received structural damage to the lading retention system that may affect its ability to retain lading but does not release a hazardous material, check that appropriate box, “C).”
(24) Packaging Type: Check the box that corresponds to the type of packaging involved in the incident. If more than one packaging type was involved in an incident, reproduce Part III of the form and fill out this section for each of the packaging types. For example, if three different packaging types were involved in an incident, fill out a separate Part III for each packaging type. If the type of packaging is not represented, check the “Other” box and enter a brief Start Printed Page 67768description such as “non-specification bulk bin.”
(25) Enter the appropriate failure codes (found at the end of the instructions): Enter the codes that describe what failed on the packaging, how the packaging failed, and the cause(s) of the failure. Be sure to enter the codes from the list that corresponds to the particular packaging types checked above (#24). Enter the most important failure point in line 1. If there is a second failure point, enter in line 2. If there are more than two failure points, provide additional information in this format in Part VI. The following explains the content of each line: What Failed: You can enter up to 2 “What Failed” codes to describe the part of the packaging that fails and was the immediate cause of the release. Often, on a simple packaging, only one code will be required. On more complex packaging, additional entries will help identify where that failure occurred. The first entry should designate the specific point of failure, followed by entries that help identify where that failure occurred. For instance, a deteriorated gasket on a pipe flange on the liquid line would have failure code 121 for gasket entered first and failure code 118 for flange entered second.
How Failed: Enter the “Failure” code that describes how the corresponding part of the packaging failed. The primary way the packaging failed should be entered first. Cause(s) of Failure: Enter the “Cause of Failure” code that describes what caused the corresponding part of the packaging to fail in the way it did. The most probable or fundamental cause of failure should be entered first.
1 = Drum A = Steel 1 = Non-removable
2 = Wooden Barrel B = Aluminum 2 = Removable
3 = Jerrican C = Natural Wood
4 = Box D = Plywood
5 = Bag F = Reconstituted Wood
6 = Composite Packaging G = Fiberboard
7 = Pressure receptacle H = Plastic
1 = Bottle A = Metal (any type)
2 = Can B = Glass, porcelain, or stoneware
3 = Box C = Plastic
4 = Bag D = Fiberboard or cardboard
5 = Cylinder E = Wood (any type)
(28) Provide package construction and test information, as appropriate: In the case of Non-bulk packagings or IBCs enter the name of the packaging manufacturer or the symbol of the manufacturer only if complete identification markings were not provided in #26b. Enter the date of manufacture and the serial number, if applicable. Enter the last test date if the packaging requires periodic testing. Also include the design pressure, shell thickness, head thickness, and service pressure if the failed packagings are of the type indicated in parenthesis after each question. If the packaging contained a valve, or other device that failed and resulted in a hazardous material release, enter the valve or device type, manufacturer, and model number.
(32) Damages: You are required to provide information on estimated damages if your damages exceed $500.00. This figure includes the cost of the material lost, property damage, vehicle damage, response costs, and clean-up costs. If you do not know Start Printed Page 67769these amounts at the time you complete the report, or the actual costs are revised by more than $25,000, you must submit a follow-up report after you determine the amounts. The following definitions explain each of the costs:
Response Cost: Enter the total value of response costs. Response costs are those costs incurred immediately after the incident, and include local emergency response from police and fire departments and emergency response teams, as well as costs incurred by the responsible party. Response costs also include costs to contain the hazardous material released. Remediation/Cleanup Cost: Enter the total value of the cost to cleanup and remediate the site. Cleanup costs are those costs incurred to collect, transport, and ultimately dispose of all material collected during the response phase. Remediation costs are those costs incurred to restore the incident scene to its pre-incident state, and could include excavation, disposal and replacement of contaminated soil, pumping, treatment and re-injection of contaminated groundwater, or absorption and disposal of hazardous material released into surface water.
Hospitalized means admitted to a medical facility, not treated and released from a facility, such as a hospital emergency room, where the person was never admitted to the hospital proper. Non-hospitalized individuals are those who may have received attention from medical personnel on-site or at a facility (including hospital emergency room), but were not admitted to a medical facility. Indicate the number of injured employees, emergency responders (firefighters, police, medics, etc.) and members of the general public.
101 Air Inlet 301 Abraded 501 Abrasion
102 Auxiliary Valve 302 Bent 502 Broken Component or Device
103 Basic Material 303 Burst or Ruptured 503 Commodity Self-ignition
104 Body 304 Cracked 504 Commodity Polymerization
105 Bolts or Nuts 305 Crushed 505 Conveyer or Material Handling Equipment Mishap
106 Bottom Outlet Valve 306 Failed to Operate 506 Corrosion—Exterior
Start Printed Page 67770
107 Check Valve 307 Gouged or Cut 507 Corrosion—Interior
108 Chime 308 Leaked 508 Defective Component or Device
109 Closure (e.g., Cap, Top, or Plug) 309 Punctured 509 Derailment
110 Cover 310 Ripped or Torn 510 Deterioration or Aging
111 Cylinder Neck or Shoulder 311 Structural 511 Dropped
112 Cylinder Sidewall—Near Base 312 Torn Off or Damaged 512 Fire, Temperature, or Heat
113 Cylinder Sidewall—Other 313 Vented 513 Forklift Accident
114 Cylinder Valve 514 Freezing
115 Discharge Valve or Coupling 515 Human Error
116 Excess Flow Valve 516 Impact with Sharp or Protruding Object (e.g., nails)
117 Fill Hole 517 Improper Preparation for Transportation
118 Flange 518 Inadequate Accident Damage Protection
119 Frangible Disc 519 Inadequate Blocking and Bracing
120 Fusible Pressure Relief Device or Element 520 Inadequate Maintenance
121 Gasket 521 Inadequate Preparation for Transportation
122 Gauging Device 522 Inadequate Procedures
123 Heater Coil 523 Inadequate Training
124 High Level Sensor 524 Incompatible Product
125 Hose 525 Incorrectly Sized Component or Device
126 Hose Adaptor or Coupling 526 Loose Closure, Component, or Device
127 Inlet (Loading) Valve 527 Misaligned Material, Component, or Device
128 Inner Packaging 528 Missing Component or Device
129 Inner Receptacle 529 Overfilled
130 Lifting Feature 530 Over-pressurized
131 Lifting Lug 531 Rollover Accident
132 Liner 532 Stub Sill Separation from Tank (Tank Cars)
133 Liquid Line 533 Threads Worn or Cross Threaded
134 Liquid Valve 534 Too Much Weight on Package
135 Loading or Unloading Lines 535 Valve Open
136 Locking Bar 536 Vandalism
137 Manway or Dome Cover 537 Vehicular Crash or Accident Damage
138 Mounting Studs 538 Water Damage
139 O-Ring or Seals
140 Outer Frame
141 Piping or Fittings
142 Piping Shear Section
143 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Non-Reclosing
144 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Reclosing
145 Remote Control Device
146 Sample Line
147 Stub Sill (Tank Car)
148 Sump
149 Tank Head
150 Tank Shell
151 Thermometer Well
152 Threaded Connection
153 Vacuum Relief Valve
154 Valve Body
155 Valve Seat
156 Valve Spring
157 Valve Stem
158 Vapor Valve
159 Vent
160 Washout
161 Weld or Seam
103 Basic Material 111 Cylinder Neck or Shoulder
104 Body 112 Cylinder Sidewall—Near Base
Start Printed Page 67771
105 Bolts or Nuts 113 Cylinder Sidewall—Other
108 Chime 114 Cylinder Valve
109 Closure (e.g., Cap, Top, or Plug) 119 Frangible Disc
110 Cover 120 Fusible Pressure Relief Device or Element
119 Frangible Disc 122 Gauging Device
120 Fusible Pressure Relief Device or Element 132 Liner
121 Gasket 143 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Non-Reclosing
125 Hose 144 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Reclosing
128 Inner Packaging 161 Weld or Seam
129 Inner Receptacle
130 Lifting Feature Code How Failed
132 Liner 301 Abraded
140 Outer Frame 303 Burst or Ruptured
143 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Non-Reclosing 304 Cracked
144 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Reclosing 306 Failed to Operate
161 Weld or Seam 307 Gouged or Cut
308 Leaked
309 Punctured
313 Vented
Code How Failed
301 Abraded
302 Bent
303 Burst or Ruptured Code Causes of Failure
304 Cracked 501 Abrasion
305 Crushed 502 Broken Component or Device
306 Failed to Operate 503 Commodity Self-ignition
307 Gouged or Cut 504 Commodity Polymerization
308 Leaked 505 Conveyer or Material Handling Equipment Mishap
309 Punctured 506 Corrosion—Exterior
310 Ripped or Torn 507 Corrosion—Interior
311 Structural 508 Defective Component or Device
312 Torn Off or Damaged 510 Deterioration or Aging
313 Vented 512 Fire, Temperature, or Heat
513 Forklift Accident
514 Freezing
515 Human Error
516 Impact with Sharp or Protruding Object (e.g., nails)
Code Cause(s) of Failure
501 Abrasion 517 Improper Preparation for Transportation
503 Commodity Self-ignition 519 Inadequate Blocking and Bracing
504 Commodity Polymerization 520 Inadequate Maintenance
505 Conveyer or Material Handling Equipment Mishap 521 Inadequate Preparation for Transportation
506 Corrosion—Exterior 522 Inadequate Procedures
507 Corrosion—Interior 523 Inadequate Training
508 Defective Component or Device 524 Incompatible Product
510 Deterioration or Aging 525 Incorrectly Sized Component or Device
511 Dropped 526 Loose Closure, Component, or Device
513 Forklift Accident 527 Misaligned Material, Component, or Device
514 Freezing 528 Missing Component or Device
515 Human Error 529 Overfilled
516 Impact with Sharp or Protruding Object (e.g., nails) 530 Over-pressurized
517 Improper Preparation for Transportation 535 Valve Open
521 Inadequate Preparation for Transportation 536 Vandalism
522 Inadequate Procedures 537 Vehicular Crash or Accident Damage
523 Inadequate Training
529 Overfilled
530 Overpressur­ized
534 Too Much Weight on Package
535 Valve Open
536 Vandalism
537 Vehicular Crash or Accident Damage
538 Water Damage
105 Bolts or Nuts 101 Air Inlet
106 Bottom Outlet Valve 105 Bolts or Nuts
107 Check Valve 106 Bottom Outlet Valve
108 Chime 107 Check Valve
109 Closure (e.g., Cap, Top, or Plug) 110 Cover
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110 Cover 115 Discharge Valve or Coupling
119 Frangible Disc 116 Excess Flow Valve
120 Fusible Pressure Relief Device or Element 117 Fill Hole
121 Gasket 118 Flange
122 Gauging Device 119 Frangible Disc
125 Hose 120 Fusible Pressure Relief Device or Element
127 Inlet (Loading) Valve 121 Gasket
131 Lifting Lug 122 Gauging Device
132 Liner 123 Heater Coil
135 Loading or Unloading Lines 124 High Level Sensor
137 Manway or Dome Cover 125 Hose
140 Outer Frame 126 Hose Adaptor or Coupling
141 Piping or Fittings 127 Inlet (Loading) Valve
143 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Non-Reclosing 131 Lifting Lug
144 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Reclosing 132 Liner
152 Threaded Connection 133 Liquid Line
153 Vacuum Relief Valve 134 Liquid Valve
161 Weld or Seam 135 Loading or Unloading Lines
136 Locking Bar
137 Manway or Dome Cover
Code How Failed 138 Mounting Studs
301 Abraded 139 O-Ring or Seals
302 Bent 141 Piping or Fittings
303 Burst or Ruptured 142 Piping Shear Section
304 Cracked 143 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Non-Reclosing
305 Crushed 144 Pressure Relief Valve or Device—Reclosing
306 Failed to Operate 145 Remote Control Device
307 Gouged or Cut 146 Sample Line
308 Leaked 147 Stub Sill (Tank Car)
309 Punctured 148 Sump
310 Ripped or Torn 149 Tank Head
312 Torn Off or Damaged 150 Tank Shell
313 Vented 151 Thermometer Well
Code Cause(s) of Failure 153 Vacuum Relief Valve
501 Abrasion 154 Valve Body
502 Broken Component or Device 155 Valve Seat
503 Commodity Self-ignition 156 Valve Spring
504 Commodity Polymerization 157 Valve Stem
505 Conveyer or Material Handling Equipment Mishap 158 Vapor Valve
506 Corrosion—Exterior 159 Vent
507 Corrosion—Interior 160 Washout
508 Defective Component or Device 161 Weld or Seam
509 Derailment
510 Deterioration or Aging Code How Failed
511 Dropped 301 Abraded
512 Fire, Temperature, or Heat 302 Bent
514 Freezing 303 Burst or Ruptured
515 Human Error 304 Cracked
517 Improper Preparation for Transportation 305 Crushed
520 Inadequate Maintenance 306 Failed to Operate
521 Inadequate Preparation for Transportation 307 Gouged or Cut
522 Inadequate Procedures 308 Leaked
523 Inadequate Training 309 Punctured
524 Incompatible Product 310 Ripped or Torn
525 Incorrectly Sized Component or Device 311 Structural
526 Loose Closure, Component, or Device 312 Torn Off or Damaged
527 Misaligned Material, Component, or Device 313 Vented
528 Missing Component or Device
529 Overfilled Code Cause(s) of Failure
530 Overpressur­ized 501 Abrasion
531 Rollover Accident 502 Broken Component or Device
536 Vandalism 503 Commodity Self-ignition
537 Vehicular Crash or Accident Damage 504 Commodity Polymerization
505 Conveyer or Material Handling Equipment Mishap
506 Corrosion—Exterior
507 Corrosion—Interior
508 Defective Component or Device
510 Deterioration or Aging
511 Dropped
512 Fire, Temperature, or Heat
517 Improper Preparation for Transportation
518 Inadequate Accident Damage Protection
519 Inadequate Blocking and Bracing
520 Inadequate Maintenance
521 Inadequate Preparation for Transportation
522 Inadequate Procedures
524 Incompatible Product
525 Incorrectly Sized Component or Device
526 Loose Closure, Component, or Device
527 Misaligned Material, Component, or Device
531 Rollover Accident
532 Stub Sill Separation from Tank (Tank Cars)
533 Threads Worn or Cross Threaded
1. Other scheduled attendees of both sessions experienced work-related emergencies or had other difficulties that prevented them from participating in the focus group.
[FR Doc. 03-29597 Filed 12-2-03; 8:45 am]