Source: http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=Q84L46W2PA31641
Timestamp: 2019-01-22 22:43:15
Document Index: 729438208

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 111', '§ 2113', '§ 111', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

Contents: Syllabus Brennan, J., Lead Opinion Blackmun, J., Concurring Stewart, J., Dissenting Rehnquist, J., Dissenting Citations
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), "[w]hoever -- (1) uses a firearm to commit any [federal] felony . . or (2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any [federal] felony," is subject to a term of imprisonment in addition to that provided for the felony in question. In Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, which involved both § 924(c)(1) and a felony proscribed by a statute that itself authorizes an enhanced penalty if a dangerous weapon is used, the Court held that Congress did not intend to authorize the imposition of enhanced punishments for a single criminal transaction under both 924(c)(1) and the enhancement provision for the predicate felony. The Court today concludes that Congress not only did not intend to authorize the imposition of double enhancement, but also did not intend § 924(c)(1) to apply at all to a felony proscribed by a statute with its own enhancement provision. I disagree. It is my view that § 924(c)(1) was intended to apply to all federal felonies, though subject to the limitation in Simpson against double enhancement.
Before the enactment of § 924(c), earlier Congresses had already authorized enhanced penalties for using a dangerous weapon in the commission of certain especially serious federal felonies, including assault on a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111, and bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),(d). Those enhancement provisions authorize terms of imprisonment of (1) not more than an additional seven years under § 111, and (2) not more than an additional five years under §§ 2113(a)(d). Neither provision requires a mandatory minimum additional sentence or authorizes increased additional sentences for recidivists.
[f]or the sake of legislative history, it should be noted that my [bill] is not intended to apply to title 18, sections 111, 112, or 113, which already define the penalties for the use of a firearm in assaulting officials, with sections 2113 or 2114 concerning armed robberies of the mail or banks, with section 2231 concerning armed assaults upon process servers or with chapter 44 which defines other firearm felonies.
The issue here is not that of double punishment, but instead whether the Government may obtain enhancement of punishment under § 924(C)(1), rather than under the enhancement provision for the predicate felony. The Court today concludes that Congress did not intend § 924(C)(1) to apply at all to a predicate felony proscribed by a statute with its own enhancement provision. It is thus the Court’s view that the Government may obtain an enhanced sentence only under the enhancement provision for the underlying felony itself.
Although this conclusion finds support in certain passages in Simpson and in the literal terms of Representative Poff’s statement on the House floor, it is not supported by the actual holding in Simpson, the language of the statute itself, or a fair appraisal of the intent of Congress in enacting § 924(C). In Simpson, the Court decided only that,
in a prosecution growing out of a single transaction of bank robbery with firearms, a defendant may not be sentenced [to enhanced punishments] under both § 2113(d) and § 924(c).
435 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added). The Court did not decide whether § 924(c)(1) is available as an alternative enhancement provision. On this latter question, the statutory language is unambiguous, for § 924(c)(1) provides, by its terms, for an enhanced penalty for "[w]hoever . . . uses a firearm to commit any [federal] felony." (Emphasis added.)
It is my view, in sum, that § 924(c)(1) applies to all federal felonies, though subject to the limitation in Simpson against double punishment. Under this reading of the statute the Government may obtain an enhanced sentence under either § 924(c)(1) or the enhancement provision for the predicate felony, but not under both.
Title: Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980)
Chicago: Stewart, "Stewart, J., Dissenting," Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980) in 446 U.S. 398 446 U.S. 414–446 U.S. 417. Original Sources, accessed January 22, 2019, http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=Q84L46W2PA31641.
MLA: Stewart. "Stewart, J., Dissenting." Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), in 446 U.S. 398, pp. 446 U.S. 414–446 U.S. 417. Original Sources. 22 Jan. 2019. www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=Q84L46W2PA31641.
Harvard: Stewart, 'Stewart, J., Dissenting' in Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980). cited in 1980, 446 U.S. 398, pp.446 U.S. 414–446 U.S. 417. Original Sources, retrieved 22 January 2019, from http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=Q84L46W2PA31641.