Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1582260.html
Timestamp: 2019-07-17 05:37:59
Document Index: 428672385

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1252', '§ 1003', '§ 3', '§ 1229', '§ 1229', '§ 1240']

Before BETTY B. FLETCHER, STEPHEN REINHARDT and KIM McLANE WARDLAW, Circuit Judges. Irving Joseph Gonzalez, Irving Joseph Gonzalez P.A., for petitioner. Rachel Louise Browning and Eric Warren Marsteller, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for respondent.
Jose Raul Meza–Vallejos, a native and citizen of Peru, seeks review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen. After entering a final order of removal against Meza–Vallejos, the BIA granted him a sixty-day period of voluntary departure. The sixtieth day fell on a Saturday. Meza–Vallejos did not depart. Rather, on the following business day-a Monday-he filed his motion to reopen. The BIA denied the motion on the ground that Meza–Vallejos had failed to voluntarily depart and was thus statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status for a period of ten years.
In his application, Meza–Vallejos alleged that he had been a member of “an underground student organization” during his years as a university student in Peru, and that the organization “advocated student rights and against all communism and totalitarianism.” He further alleged that he had been “threatened by members of the guerrilla [sic] while at the University for promoting student elections,” and that he thought he “would be killed by the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso” (the Shining Path)1 if he was returned to Peru.
We held that “where the deadline for filing a motion to reconsider falls on the same day as the expiration of the voluntary departure period, the proper solution is to apply the same rule to both thirty-day periods.” Id. at 1204. We explained that we were “not extending the voluntary departure time period in contravention of INS regulations,” but rather were “simply determining which date should be counted as the thirtieth day.” Id. at n.18 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Meza–Vallejos timely filed this petition for review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen, relying heavily on Azarte and Barroso. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir.2008); Socop–Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Ontiveros–Lopez v. INS, 213 F.3d 1121, 1124(9th Cir.2000). The BIA's determination of purely legal questions, however, is reviewed de novo. See, e.g ., Minasyan v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.2009); Alali–Amin v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir.2008).
can leave the United States in accordance with the voluntary departure order; but, pursuant to regulation, the motion to reopen will be deemed withdrawn. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d); see also 23 Fed.Reg. 9115, 9118, final rule codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1958). Alternatively, if the alien wishes to pursue reopening and remains in the United States to do so, he or she risks expiration of the statutory period and ineligibility for adjustment of status, the underlying relief sought. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(2000 ed., Supp. V).
In response, the government contends that the BIA may properly deny a motion to reopen if such motion is filed after the expiration of a petitioner's voluntary departure period. See, e.g., Granados–Oseguera v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“There is no dispute that Oseguera's motion to reopen was filed after the period for voluntary departure had elapsed. Accordingly, the BIA was not simply correct to deny the motion; it was compelled to do so by the operation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)․”). The government further asserts that, here, the petitioner filed his motion to reopen on the sixty-second day following the BIA's grant of voluntary departure. The government argues that neither Azarte nor Barroso are apposite, since in both those cases the petitioner moved for relief before the expiration of his voluntary departure period. Although the government's brief, filed in 2007, does not discuss Dada, that case may be distinguished for the same reason. See Dada, 554 U.S. at 6–7(“Two days before the expiration of [petitioner's voluntary departure period], petitioner sought to withdraw his request for voluntary departure. At the same time he filed with the BIA a motion to reopen removal proceedings ․“ (emphasis added)).
The threshold question before us, therefore, is whether Meza–Vallejos's period of voluntary departure expired on Saturday, July 16(the sixtieth day following the BIA's final order) or if, instead, this period expired on Monday, July 18, coinciding with his filing of a renewed motion to reopen with the Board.
Again, the government's position is not unreasonable. We could certainly hold, as the BIA did, that those in Meza–Vallejos's position must file their motions to reopen on the last business day of their voluntary departure period, even if that falls on the fifty-eighth or fifty-ninth day of that period. Logically, there are only two solutions to the problem of a voluntary departure period that ends on a weekend: either shorten the period (which the BIA would have us do) or lengthen it (as Meza–Vallejos urges).6
A hypothetical illustrates what is at stake. A native and citizen of Tunisia—perhaps a former high-ranking government official—is granted a voluntary departure period which expires on a Sunday. He has purchased a flight back to Tunisia and intends to depart the United States on that day. The day before his flight, a Saturday, there is a coup d'etat in Tunisia, resulting in a fundamental change in the government of that country. Our immigrant would like to file a timely motion to reopen or reconsider relating to a previous application for adjustment of status on the basis of these new developments, but he cannot do so until Monday. Adopting the government's position, as advanced in this case, would bar such immigrants from relief on the theory that they overstayed their period of voluntary departure and are thus statutorily ineligible for adjustment. Such a result seems arbitrary and manifestly unjust. Cf. Sherwood Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 113 F.2d 162, 163–64 (D.C.Cir.1940) (extending a deadline from Sunday to Monday is the “common-law rule” and “has the support ․ of controlling authority, as well as of tradition, fairness and convenience.”).
4. Following Dada, the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) issued a rule that provides that”[t]he filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider prior to the expiration of the period allowed for voluntary departure has the effect of automatically terminating the grant of voluntary departure, and accordingly does not toll, stay, or extend the period allowed for voluntary departure .” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(e)(1). This rule applies only prospectively, however. Whether, and how, Dada applies retroactively remains an open question. In Nevarez Nevarez, we remanded this question to the BIA to decide in the first instance. 572 F.3d at 610; see id. at 609(“The Court did not consider how its opinion [in Dada ] would apply to aliens in circuits like ours whose voluntary departure had been automatically stayed during the pendency of their motions to reopen.”). On remand, the BIA concluded that, since the petitioners “were unaware that they had a unilateral right to withdraw their request for voluntary departure,” the BIA would “deem the filing of their motion to reopen, followed by their election to remain to pursue that motion, as an expression of their desire to exercise their unilateral right to withdraw their request for voluntary departure.” See http:// dojvll.gtwy.dcn/Biadec/4872406.pdf (Mar. 12, 2010).
5. Under Rule 26(a), Saturdays and Sundays are counted within the relevant period, unless the last day of said period falls on a Saturday or Sunday. See FED. R. APP. P. 26(a)(1)(c)(“include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”).
6. This may be a problem of limited duration. It may be that the BIA will permit electronic filing in the future, presenting the possibility that motions might be “filed” on weekend days.