Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/126/400/497933/
Timestamp: 2019-11-13 14:13:34
Document Index: 523863673

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 22', '§ 421', '§ 431', '§ 428', '§ 431', '§ 431', '§ 431', '§ 372', '§ 428']

George T. Whalen and Elizabeth M. Whalen, Individually Andas Parents and Legal Guardians of Michael W.whalen, an Infant, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. the County of Fulton; the Fulton County Department Ofsocial Services; Jeanne D. Johannes, Individually and Inher Official Capacity; John Rogers, Individually and in Hisofficial Capacity; Malinda Argotsinger, Individually and Inher Official Capacity; Karen Glover, Individually and Inher Official Capacity; Judith Vanheusen, Individually Andin Her Official Capacity; the County of Montgomery; Themontgomery County Department of Social Services; Robert L.reidy, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Mollyjohnson, Individually and in Her Official Capacity; Andcynthia Hallam, Individually and in Her Official Capacity,defendants-appellees, 126 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1997 › George T. Whalen and Elizabeth M. Whalen, Individually Andas Parents and Legal Guardians of Michael...
George T. Whalen and Elizabeth M. Whalen, Individually Andas Parents and Legal Guardians of Michael W.whalen, an Infant, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. the County of Fulton; the Fulton County Department Ofsocial Services; Jeanne D. Johannes, Individually and Inher Official Capacity; John Rogers, Individually and in Hisofficial Capacity; Malinda Argotsinger, Individually and Inher Official Capacity; Karen Glover, Individually and Inher Official Capacity; Judith Vanheusen, Individually Andin Her Official Capacity; the County of Montgomery; Themontgomery County Department of Social Services; Robert L.reidy, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Mollyjohnson, Individually and in Her Official Capacity; Andcynthia Hallam, Individually and in Her Official Capacity,defendants-appellees, 126 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 1997)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 126 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 1997) Argued May 19, 1997. Decided Oct. 2, 1997
Adoptive parents George and Elizabeth Whalen (the "Whalens"), and their adopted child Michael Whalen ("Michael") (collectively "plaintiffs") appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., District Judge) granting the motion of county departments of social services and several individual county officials (collectively "defendants"), for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiffs' second amended complaint. In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to facilitate visitation and contact between Michael and his biological sibling during a period when both children were in the defendants' custody.
The facts pertaining to this appeal are detailed in the district court's opinion granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, Whalen v. County of Fulton, 941 F. Supp. 290, 292-93 (N.D.N.Y.1996) ("Whalen II "), and in our prior opinion, dismissing for lack of jurisdiction defendants' interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity, Whalen v. County of Fulton, 19 F.3d 828, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Whalen I "), familiarity with which is assumed.
In May 1996, the defendants again moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) on the grounds that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On September 26, 1996, the district court granted defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety. Whalen II, 941 F. Supp. at 300. On October 25, 1996, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, limited to the following: Michael appeals the dismissal of his (1) First Amendment right of freedom of intimate association claim; (2) Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process claims; and (3) state law (a) intentional interference with custody and visitation claim; (b) negligent interference with custody and visitation claim; and (c) negligent infliction of emotional distress claim as against the Montgomery County defendants. The Whalens and Michael appeal the dismissal of (1) their First Amendment right of access to the courts claim; and (2) the dismissal of their state common law fraud claim against the Montgomery County defendants.
We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo. See Johnson v. United States, 123 F.3d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir. 1993). "In assessing the record, all ambiguities and reasonable inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Vona v. County of Niagara, 119 F.3d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1997).
The individual defendants argue that they are immune from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. That doctrine shields public officials from liability "insofar as their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would not have known,' Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982), or insofar as 'it [is] objectively reasonable for them to believe that their acts d [o] not violate those rights,' Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1994)." Simms v. Village of Albion, 115 F.3d 1098, 1106 (2d Cir. 1997); see Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Whalens' cause of action for interference with their right of access to the courts is premised on the claimed liberty interest in adoptive parents to adopt or live with the biological sibling of their adoptive child. We find no case that would lead us to conclude that such a right exists, much less that it is "clearly established." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844-47, 97 S. Ct. 2094, 2109-11, 53 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1977), which noted that foster families have, at best, a limited liberty interest in remaining together, is not to the contrary. That case does not create a "clearly established" right to form a relationship with the younger sibling of an adopted child when the adoptive parents have never lived with the younger child. See Whalen I, 19 F.3d at 831-32 (Walker, J., dissenting).
Citing to Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982), and Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1989), plaintiffs argue that Michael has a clearly established liberty interest in associating with his biological sister. Appellants' Reply Brief 6-9. In Rivera, this court held that the State of Connecticut violated the due process rights of an adult woman who, over a period of six years, had been both the custodial relative and foster parent to her two half-siblings when it removed the children from her home. 696 F.2d at 1024-26. In Johnson, the district court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims alleging that defendants' practice of placing siblings in separate foster homes and denying them the opportunity to visit one another violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 721 F. Supp. at 1005-10.
Our qualified immunity analysis disposes of plaintiffs' claims against only the individual defendants. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1409, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1980). We now turn to the claims asserted against the municipal defendants. To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994).
Only Michael appeals from the dismissal of his freedom of association, substantive due process, and procedural due process causes of action. These causes of action are grounded in a claim that an adopted child has a constitutional right to visit with and be placed with his biological sibling. We agree with the district court that, even if such constitutional rights were to exist, Michael did not allege facts sufficient to state any deprivation of them. See Whalen II, 941 F. Supp. at 297.
The plaintiffs assert that the regulations allow the defendants to forego facilitating visitation and contact only if defendants document their efforts. While the regulations do require documentation and there is a question of fact as to whether such documentation occurred in this case, the failure to document does not give rise to a cause of action on Michael's behalf based on a constitutional violation. See van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (fact that agency official's conduct--that is, ordering x-rays to gather evidence of child abuse when x-ray was not medically necessary--"exceeded the scope of the pertinent state statute does not necessarily mean that a constitutional right was impaired"); cf. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n. 12, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 3019 n. 12, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1984) ("Neither federal nor state officials lose their immunity by violating the clear command of a statute or regulation--of federal or of state law--unless that statute or regulation provides the basis for the cause of action sued upon.").
All plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their causes of action for interference with their right of access to the courts. The constitutional right of access is violated where government officials obstruct legitimate efforts to seek judicial redress. See Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 1986) (" [T]he Constitution protects causes of action from arbitrary interference" by government officials.); see, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir. 1984) (police conspiracy to cover up facts of victim's fatal shooting violated right of access). " [W]hen government officials thwart vindication of a claim by violating basic principles that enable civil claimants to assert their rights effectively," an unconstitutional deprivation of a cause of action occurs. Barrett, 798 F.2d at 575.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants, by concealing the fact that Elizabeth had been placed into foster care in October 1989, prevented them from bringing, (1) pursuant to N.Y. Soc. Serv. §§ 22, 372-b(1) (a),1 and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 421.18(h),2 a request for an administrative hearing to compel defendants to promote contact and visitation between Michael and Elizabeth as allegedly required by state regulations, and (2) a timely custody action for Elizabeth. Appellants' Opening Brief 32. The Whalens claim that they would have discovered as early as October 1989 that Elizabeth had been removed from the home of her biological parents and could have petitioned for visitation before June 1991, when they actually filed their petition for visitation, if the defendants had complied with the appropriate regulations. As mentioned earlier, these regulations require the authorized agencies to facilitate contact and visitation between Elizabeth and Michael unless they document the reasons why such contact would not be in the best interest of either child. The Whalens acknowledge that the earliest that they could have petitioned for custody of Elizabeth was in June 1991, when Elizabeth's biological parents surrendered their parental rights, and that they did in fact petition for custody in June; however, they contend that their right to petition the courts for custody was effectively undermined by the defendants' failure to disclose that from October 1989 Elizabeth was in the custody of the FCDSS. They claim that if they had been told this, they would have requested visitation with Elizabeth earlier. This, in turn, would have prevented the development of the psychological bond between Elizabeth and the Waites that was ultimately the basis for the Fulton County Family Court's decision to award permanent custody to the Waites. The plaintiffs cite Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1983), which held that state officials who intentionally delayed a murder investigation may be liable to the victim's family for depriving them of the opportunity to bring a timely wrongful death action against the murderer.
The district court rejected plaintiffs' claims, finding that the state regulations imposed no duty on defendants to provide the Whalens or Michael with information regarding Elizabeth's placement in foster care in October 1989. See Whalen II, 941 F. Supp. at 296-97. We agree.
Plaintiffs point to several state regulations pertaining to provision of adoptive services, none of which require that the Whalens be informed that Elizabeth was taken into the custody of the FCDSS in October 1989. For example, neither 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 431.10(c)3 nor 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 428.6(b) (6) (v)4 requires, much less "unambiguously" requires, Appellants' Opening Brief 33, defendants to inform the Whalens of Elizabeth's October 1989 placement in foster care.
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 431.10. The Whalens admit that in April 1989, before Michael was placed with them, they were informed of Elizabeth's existence and that she remained in the custody of her biological parents. Nothing in 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 431.10 or any other agency regulation cited by plaintiffs imposes on the agencies a continuing duty to inform the Whalens of Elizabeth's subsequent placement in foster care; nor do the Whalens contend that it does. Instead, they claim that the defendants violated 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 431.10(e), requiring facilitation of contact and visitation between the children. However, as we have explained earlier, the regulation's requirements are subject to the best interests of the children. Nothing in Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1981), which held that an agency can be liable for its continued failure to adequately supervise placement of a foster child where state regulation mandated that the agency report suspicions of child abuse, compels a different result. The Whalens failed to produce any evidence that the defendants interfered with their right of access to the courts. There being no duty to facilitate visits and contacts between Michael and Elizabeth when the defendants determined it was not in the children's best interest, the Whalens have failed to state a claim based on any alleged "cover up" designed to delay or forestall efforts to visit.
We also agree with the district court that even if Michael had a constitutional right to visitation with Elizabeth, "that right existed whether Elizabeth was in foster care or not. Nothing in the defendants' conduct interfered with Michael's ability to enforce that right in court." Whalen II, 941 F. Supp. at 298.
N.Y. Soc. Serv. § 372-b(1) (a) provides, in relevant part, that " [a] prospective adoptive parent shall have a right to a fair hearing ... concerning the failure of a social services official to provide adoption services...."
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 428.6(b) (6) (v) provides that " [t]he initial assessment and service plan shall include ... for children in foster care ... an estimate of the anticipated duration of placement...."