Source: https://elr.info/sites/default/files/litigation/18.21220.htm
Timestamp: 2019-11-18 08:58:05
Document Index: 31998712

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9601', '§ 9658', '§ 9658', 'art, 324', '§ 162', '§ 449', '§ 131', '§ 71', '§ 113', '§ 9613', '§ 203', '§ 5524', '§ 9607', '§ 9601']

18 ELR 21220 -- Merry v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
18 ELR 21220 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1988 | All rights reserved
No. 86-1673 (684 F. Supp. 852, 27 ERC 1787) (M.D. Pa. April 29, 1988)
The court holds that plaintiffs' tort claims arising out of contamination of their water supplies are not barred by Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations, and their pre-1986 causes of action for response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and liability Act (CERCLA) are not barred by laches. The court first holds that there is insufficient evidence to determine if plaintiffs' trespass and nuisance claims [18 ELR 21221] are barred; more information is needed to determine whether there was one continuing harm or a series of discrete harms. The court next holds that plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability claims are not barred, because, it is unclear when plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known about the contamination and that it was caused by the conduct of others. Finally, the court holds that plaintiffs' claims for CERCLA response costs are not barred by laches. CERCLA's statute of limitations is not applicable because it was enacted in 1986, after the contamination of plaintiffs' wells occurred. Since a CERCLA cost recovery action is equitable in nature, it is inappropriate to use an analogous state or federal statute. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was commenced no more than approximately three years after plaintiffs learned of the contamination, which is insufficient to invoke laches.
[Related decisions in this litigation are published at 18 ELR 21215 and 21218.]
Counsel are listed at 18 ELR 21218.
[18 ELR 21221]
Before the court is Westinghouse'smotion for partial summary judgment alleging that certain plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Westinghouse contends that response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq, incurred more than two years prior to the dates the plaintiffs became parties to this action are not recoverable. Westinghouse also asserts that all the non-minor plaintiffs' state law claims are barred by Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations because the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the cause of their alleged harm more than two years before they filed suit.
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9658, provides that for actions brought under state law for damages caused by exposure to hazardous substances, the state statute of limitations begins to run at the later of the date specified by state law or "the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages . . . were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned." 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A).[1] In this case, those dates are the same.
The "discovery rule" is such an exception, and arises from the inability of the injured, despite the exercise of due diligence, to know of the injury or its cause. . . . The salient point giving rise to the equitable application of the exception of the discovery rule is the inability, despite the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff, to know of the injury. A court presented with an assertion of applicability of the "discovery rule" must, before applying the exception of the rule, address the ability of the damaged party, exercising reasonable diligence, to ascertain the fact of a cause of action.
Pocono International Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 503 Pa. 80, 85, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983). "Where [the discovery] rule is applied, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered his injury, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered his injury." Larthey, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. at , 532 A.2d at 458 (quoting Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 324 Pa.Superior Ct. 123, 135-36, 471 A.2d 493, 500 (1984)).
[A] plaintiff need not have gained "finite knowledge of all operative facts" in order for the statute to run, but rather . . . only in cases of "blameless ignorance," to wit, in cases where the exercise of due diligence on the part of the plaintiff would not have determined the fact of a cause of action, is the discovery rule to be applied.
Nothing in the discovery rule provides for the tolling of the statute until the responsible party is identified. The burden is on the injured party, once he discovers the cause of his injury, to make that determination within the statutory period. "[A]n allegation of mere difficulty in identifying defendants [is] not sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations. . . ." Cathcart, 324 Pa.Superior Ct. at 139, 471 A.2d at 501.
(b) Continuing trespass. The actor's failure to remove from land in the possession of another a thing which he has tortiously . . . placed on the land constitutes a continuing trespass for the entire time during which the thing is on the land and . . . confers on the possessor of the land an option to maintain a succession [18 ELR 21222] of actions based on a theory of continuing trespass or to treat the continuance of the thing on the land as an aggravation of the original trespass.
[A] continuing trespass must be distinguished from a trespass that effects a permanent change in the condition of the land. The latter, while resulting in a continuing harm, does not subject the trespasser to liability for a continuing trespass. See, Restatement, Torts, § 162, Comment (d). If a nuisance at the time of creation is a permanent one, the consequences of which in the normal course of things will continue indefinitely, there can be but a single action therefor to recover past and future damages and the statute of limitations runs against such cause of action from the time it first occurred, or at least from the date it should reasonably have been discovered. See, 3 Cooley, Torts, § 449 (4th ed. 1955); 34 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 131 (1941); 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 71, 119 (1954); Baugh v. Bergdoll, 227 Pa. 420, 76 A. 207 (1910).
Thus, the issue of whether the statute of limitations is tolled turns on whether the injuries in this case are of a permanent nature, or conversely, can be characterized as separate and recurrent injuries. That question cannot be resolved based on the materials submitted by the parties because factual issues not addressed by the parties must be decided. Most importantly, we must know the nature and properties of the toxic substances found in the plaintiffs' wells and whether Westinghouse improperly disposed of chemicals after November 25, 1984. Accordingly, the court will deny Westinghouse's motion for summary judgment on the trespass and nuisance claims but will allow it to reassert its position when the factual record becomes more fully developed.
Prior to the enactment of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.L. 99-499, § 113, 100 Stat. 1647, CERCLA contained no explicit statute of limitations for actions to recover response costs. Section 113 of SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), effective October 17, 1986, established the following limitations periods for such actions:
An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in section 9607 of this title must be commenced --
(A) for a removal action, within 3 years after completion of the removal action, except that such cost recovery action must be brought within 6 years after a determination to grant a wavier under section 9604(c)(1)(C) of this title for continued response action; and
Westinghouse argues that the plaintiffs' causes of action for the recovery of response costs incurred before October 17, 1986 are not covered by section 113 because those actions accrued before section 113 was effective. Instead, the controlling statute of limitations for those claims is the one that was in effect at the time the costs were incurred. Westinghouse claims that since pre-SARA CERCLA lacked a limitations provision for actions to recover response costs, the court should utilize the most analogous state statute, which in this case is Pennsylvania's two year statute governing trespass actions.[3] As a result, Westinghouse contends, the plaintiffs' claims for response costs incurred before November 26, 1984 are barred.[4]
In the absence of an express statute of limitations, the general rule in an ordinary damage action would be to seek an analogous state or federal statute. Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed. 2d 476 (1983). However, a CERCLA cost reimbursement action is not a damage action but rather an equitable action for restitution. United States v. Dickerson, 640 F.Supp. 448 (D.Md.1986); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. [18 ELR 21223] 162 (D.Mo.1985); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.Supp. 898 (D.N.H.1985) (citing seven cases).[5] "When bringing a section 107 claim, a plaintiff seeks 'the return of monies spent on behalf of others' legal obligation to clean up hazardous waste.'" Violet v. Picillo, 648 F.Supp. 1283, 1294 (D.R.I.1986) (quoting Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 205). Where a claim essentially is equitable in nature, the doctrine of laches rather than an analogous federal or state statute of limitations is applied. Mottolo (citing Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-96, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584-85, 90 L.Ed. 743, 746-47 (1946)).
1. Although this provision was added to CERCLA by section 203(a) of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.L. 99-499, § 203(a), 100 Stat. 1695, section 203(b) provided that it was effective with respect to actions brought after December 11, 1980.
2. Those plaintiffs are:
P. Breighner
C. Bridendolph
P. Bridendolph
K. Tomassini
L. Bridendolph
W. Harness
V. Harness
E. Kriel
H. LeClair
H. Colgan
S. Colgan
W. Coston
H. Gastley
M. Gastley
C. Gastley
D. Gulden
R. Gulden
K. Gulden
W. Toddes
C. Toddes
Jo. Coleman
Al. Coleman
Su. Coleman
An. Coleman
Ja. Coleman
3. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524. See section A of this memorandum, supra.
4. As to the nineteen plaintiffs added to this action by stipulation on May 5, 1987, Westinghouse claims that response costs incurred before May 5, 1985may not be recovered. Because of the manner in which we will resolve the statute of limitations question, we need not address that contention.
5. These cases all involved actions by the United States to recover response costs under section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The fact that the instant case has been initiated by private plaintiffs does not change the import of those decisions. Section 107 provides in relevant part as follows:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
Section 101(25) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25), equates "response" with "removal" and "remedial action." Thus sections 107(a)(4)(A) and (B) provide for similar, if not identical, relief whether the plaintiff is the government or a private citizen.