Source: https://medotcom.wordpress.com/your-tax-money/eff-analysis-of-the-provisions-of-the-usa-patriot-act/
Timestamp: 2017-06-28 09:02:01
Document Index: 286182112

Matched Legal Cases: ['§212', '§210', '§802', '§2331', '§2331', '§2332', '§2332', '§803', '§503', '§1822', '§201', '§213', '§216', '§3121', '§222', '§212', '§218', '§1804', '§203', '§401', '§203', '§2517', '§206', '§1805', '§217', '§2510', '§2712', '§505', '§1030', '§1030', '§1030', '§814', '§814', '§2332', '§805']

EFF Analysis Of The Provisions Of The USA PATRIOT Act | meDOTcom – Weblog
That Relate To Online Activities (October 31, 2001)
Yet even just considering the surveillance and online provisions of PATRIOT, it is a large and complex law that had over four different names and several versions in the five weeks between the introduction of its first predecessor and its final passage into law. While containing some sections that seem appropriate — providing for victims of the September 11 attacks, increasing translation facilities and increasing forensic cybercrime capabilities — it seems clear that the vast majority of the sections included were not carefully studied by Congress, nor was sufficient time taken to debate it or to hear testimony from experts outside of law enforcement in the fields where it makes major changes. This concern is amplified because several of the key procedural processes applicable to any other proposed laws, including inter-agency review, the normal committee and hearing processes and thorough voting, were suspended for this bill.
The EFF’s chief concerns with PATRIOT include:
Expanded Surveillance With Reduced Checks and Balances. PATRIOT expands all four traditional tools of surveillance used by law enforcement — wiretaps, search warrants, pen/trap orders and subpoenas. Their counterparts under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that allow spying in the U.S. by foreign intelligence agencies have similarly been expanded. This means:
Be careful what you read on the Internet. The government may now monitor the online activities of innocent Americans, and perhaps even track what Web sites you read, by merely telling a judge anywhere in the U.S. that the spying could lead to information that is “relevant” to an ongoing criminal investigation. The person spied on does not have to be the target of the investigation. This application must be granted and the government is not obligated to report to the court or tell the person spied upon what it has done.
Nationwide roving wiretaps. FBI and CIA can now go from phone to phone, computer to computer without demonstrating that each is being used by a suspect or target of an order, or even specifically identifying the person targeted. The government may now serve a single Title III wiretap, FISA wiretap or pen/trap order on any person or entity nationwide, regardless of whether that person or entity is named in the order. The government need not make any showing to a court that the particular information or communication to be acquired is relevant to a criminal investigation. In the pen/trap or FISA situations, they do not even have to report where they served the order or what information they received. The EFF believes that the opportunities for abuse of these broad new powers are immense. For pen/trap orders, while ISPs or others who are not specifically named in the order do have the legal right to request certification from the Attorney General’s office that the order applies to them, they have no right to request such confirmation from a court.
ISPs hand over more user information. The law makes two changes to increase how much information the government may obtain about users from their ISPs or others who handle or store their online communications. First it allows ISPs to voluntarily hand over all “non-content” information to law enforcement with no need for any court order or subpoena. §212. Second, it expands the records that the government may seek with a simple subpoena (no court review required) to include records of session times and durations, temporarily assigned network (I.P.) addresses, and means and source of payments, including credit card or bank account numbers. §§210, 211.
New definitions of terrorism expand scope of surveillance. One new definition of terrorism and three expansions of previous definitions also expand the scope of surveillance. PATRIOT §802’s definition of “domestic terrorism” (amending 18 USC §2331) raises concerns about legitimate protest activity being prosecuted as terrorism, especially if violence erupts, while additions to three existing definitions of terrorism (int’l terrorism per 18 USC §2331, terrorism transcending national borders per 18 USC §2332b, and federal terrorism per amended 18 USC §2332b(g)(5)(B)) expose more people to surveillance (and potential “harboring” and “material support” liability, §§803, 805).
Adding samples to DNA database for those convicted of “any crime of violence.” §503. This provision allows collection of DNA for terrorists, but then inexplicably also allows collection for the broad, non-terrorist category of “any crime of violence.”
General Expansion of FISA Authority. FISA authority to spy on Americans or foreign persons in the U.S. (and those who communicate with them) increased from situations where obtaining foreign intelligence information is “the” purpose of the surveillance to anytime that it is “a significant purpose” of the surveillance.
FISA detour around federal domestic surveillance limitations; domestic detour around FISA limitations. Domestic surveillance limits can be skirted by the Attorney General, for instance, by obtaining a FISA wiretap against a U.S. person where “probable cause” does not exist, but when the person is suspected to be an agent of a foreign government. The information can then be shared with the FBI. The reverse is also true.
That ISPs and others served with “roving” wiretaps and other Orders that do not specify them as recipients require the Attorney General to certify that the order properly applies to them.
U.S. law has provided four basic mechanisms for surveillance on people living in the United States: interception orders authorizing the interception of communications; search warrants authorizing the search of physical premises and seizure of tangible things like books or other evidence; “pen register” and “trap-and-trace device” orders (pen/trap orders), which authorize the collection of telephone numbers dialed to and from a particular communications device; and subpoenas compelling the production of tangible things, including records. Each mechanism has its own proof standards and procedures based on the Constitution, statutes, or both.
U.S. law also provides two separate “tracks” with differing proof standards and procedures for each of these mechanisms depending upon whether surveillance is done by domestic law enforcement or foreign intelligence. All of these have been expanded by PATRIOT.
Where foreign intelligence surveillance is concerned, however, the standard of proof and procedures for each mechanism has been different. One key difference is that foreign intelligence surveillance is not based on the concept of criminality. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the key issue is whether the intended surveillance target is an “agent of a foreign power” or a “foreign power.” Only if the target is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien must the government show probable cause of criminality.
Second, FISA allows a secret court to authorize U.S. intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance using each of the four basic mechanisms listed above. For instance, FISA interception orders involving U.S. persons are issued by the secret court based on an application from the Attorney General stating reasons to believe that the surveillance target is an agent of a foreign power or a foreign power, certifying that “the purpose” of the surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence information, and several other facts and representations. The secret court’s role here, however, is quite limited: it is not supposed to “second-guess” the government’s certifications or representations. (Unsurprisingly, the secret FISA court has only denied one application in its over twenty-year existence.) Moreover, unlike ordinary interception orders, FISA does not require reports to the court about what the surveillance found; no reports of what is being sought or what information is retrieved are ever available to the public. Thus, the secret court’s only practical accountability is in a district court when a surveillance target is prosecuted and seeks to suppress the fruits of FISA surveillance.
FISA’s requirements are even weaker if the electronic surveillance is directed solely at means of communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers and when it is unlikely that communications to which a U.S. person is a party will be intercepted; in such cases, surveillance may proceed for up to a year without a court order.
1. Intercept Orders.Title III (named after the relevant section of the original legislation, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968) surveillance is a traditional wiretap that allows the police to bug rooms, listen to telephone conversations, or get content of electronic communications in real time.
Obtained after law enforcement makes a showing to a court that there is “probable cause” to believe that the target of the surveillance committed one of a special list of severe crimes.
1. FISA Intercept Orders. Secret Court. No public information about what surveillance requested or what surveillance actually occurs, except for a raw annual report of number of requests made and number granted (the secret court has only refused one request).
Previous standard was certification by Attorney General that “the purpose” of an order is a suspicion that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
2. Pen/Trap.Pen/Trap surveillance was based upon the physical wiring of the telephone system. It allowed law enforcement to obtain the telephone numbers of all calls made to or from a specific phone.
Allowed upon a “certification” to the court that the information is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.
2. FISA Pen/Trap.Previous FISA pen/trap law required not only showing of relevance but also showing that the communications device had been used to contact an “agent of a foreign power.”While this exceeds the showing under the ordinary pen/trap statute, such a showing had the function of protecting U.S. persons against FISA pen/trap surveillance.
3. Physical search warrantsJudicial finding of probable cause of criminality; return on warrant.Previously, agents were required at the time of the search or soon thereafter to notify person whose premises were searched that search occurred, usually by leaving copy of warrant.
PATRIOT makes it easier to obtain surreptitious or “sneak-and-peek” warrants under which notice can be delayed.
3. FISA Physical search warrantsSee FISA 50 USC §1822. PATRIOT extends duration of physical searches.Under previous FISA, Attorney General (without court order) could authorize physical searches for up to one year of premises used exclusively by a foreign power if unlikely that U.S. person will be searched; minimization required. A.G. could authorize such searches up to 45 days after judicial finding of probable cause that U.S. target is or is an agent of a foreign power; minimization required, and investigation may not be based solely on First Amendment-protected activities.
4. Subpoenas for stored information.Many statutes authorize subpoenas; grand juries may issue subpoenas as well. EFF’s main concern here has been for stored electronic information, including e-mail communications and subscriber or transactional records held by ISPs. Subpoenas in this area are governed by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
4. FISA subpoenasPreviously, FISA authorized collection of business records in very limited situations, mainly records relating to common carriers, vehicles or travel, and only via court order.PATRIOT permits any “tangible things,” including business records, to be obtained via a subpoena.
PATRIOT removes many of the checks and balances that prevented both police and the foreign intelligence agencies from improperly conducting surveillance on U.S. citizens who are not involved in criminal or terrorist activity. For Internet users, it opens the door for widespread surveillance of web surfing, e-mails and peer-to-peer systems. In addition, the protections against the misuse of these authorities — by the foreign intelligence agencies to spy on U.S. citizens and by law enforcement to use foreign intelligence authority to exceed their domestic surveillance authority — have been greatly reduced.
PATRIOT §201 adds terrorism offenses, which is probably redundant since the list already included most if not all terrorist acts — e.g., murder, hijacking, kidnapping, etc.
2. “Sneak-and-peek” warrants greatly expanded.
PATRIOT §213 allows delayed notification of a search for “a reasonable period” that can be “extended for good cause shown” to a court for any wire or electronic communication or tangible property. This is problematic because notice to a searched person is a key component of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
PATRIOT §216 modifies 18 USC §3121(c) to expressly include routing and addressing information, thus expressly including e-mail and electronic communications. “Contents” of communications are excluded, but there remain serious questions about the treatment of Web “addresses” and other URLs that identify particular content.
Pen/trap orders can now apply even to those not named in an order (nationwide). Previously, pen/trap orders were limited by a court’s jurisdiction, so they had to be installed within the judicial district. Now, a court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing use anywhere within the U.S. if that court has jurisdiction over crime being investigated and the attorney for the U.S. Government has certified that information “likely to be obtained” is “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.” The order applies to any provider “whose assistance may facilitate the execution of the order, ” whether or not within the jurisdiction of the issuing court. But if the entity is not named, it may require that the U.S. attorney provide written or electronic certification that the order applies to the person or entity being served.
If a government agency uses its own technology (e.g., Carnivore) to conduct pen/trap surveillance, then an “audit trail” is required, e.g., 30 day report back to court. There is no mandate that the served entity’s equipment facilitate the surveillance. §222 (prevents CALEA application here).
PATRIOT §212 expands “emergency” voluntary disclosure to government of both content and customer records if there is reason to believe that there exists immediate danger of death or serious physical injury (The Homeland Security Act further expanded this exception for cases where there is a good faith basis to believe the same).
Previously, the Cable Act had mandated strong privacy protection for customer records of cable providers; PATRIOT overrides these protections for customer records related to telecommunications services. This is not a major change because several courts have already held that these privacy protections don’t apply for telecommunications services.
Under PATRIOT §218, foreign intelligence gathering now only needs to be “a significant purpose” rather than “the purpose” of FISA surveillance (edits to 50 USC §1804(a)(7)(b), and 1823 (a)(7)(B)). The FISA court only looks to see that the required certifications are present in the application and are not “clearly erroneous”. Courts have said that it is not their function to “second guess” the certifications.
PATRIOT §203(a) amends Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 so that grand jury information can now be disclosed to intelligence services when “matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence per 50 USC §401a or foreign intelligence information” (defined below).
This is a new category of information that can be disclosed to foreign intelligence agents. It includes any information, whether or not concerning a U.S. person, that “relates” to the ability of the U.S. to protect against an actual or potential attack, sabotage or international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, as well as any information, whether or not concerning a U.S. Person, that “relates” to the national defense or security or the conduct of foreign affairs.
PATRIOT §203(b) amends 18 USC §2517, allowing disclosure of the contents of wiretaps or evidence derived therefrom to any other government official, including intelligence, national defense and national security, “to the extent such contents include foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or foreign intelligence information” (defined above).
1. Intercept orders: adds “roving wiretap” authority to FISA.
PATRIOT §206 amends 50 USC §1805. FISA court now may authorize intercepts on any phones or computers that the target may use. The foreign intelligence authorities can require anyone to help them wiretap. Previously they could only serve such orders on common carriers, landlords, or other specified persons. Now they can serve them on anyone and the Order does not have to specify the name of the person required to assist. Such roving wiretap authority raises serious Fourth Amendment problems because it relaxes the “particularity” requirements of the Warrant Clause. Such authority already exists under Title III.
1. New surveillance of communications “relevant” to computer trespasser investigation
PATRIOT §217 changes 18 USC §2510, adding another area where any government employee, not just law enforcement, may conduct content surveillance of U.S. persons. This is when a computer owner and operator “authorizes” surveillance and a law enforcement agent “has reasonable grounds to believe contents of communication will be relevant” to investigating computer trespass and does not acquire anyone else’s communications. This section authorizes interception of messages suspected of being sent through a computer without “authorization.”
The term “authorization” is not defined, giving the owner/operator of protected computer and the government agent great discretion.
BUT this does not include someone who is known to have an existing contractual relationship to access all or part of the computer. According to DOJ, ISP customers who send spam in violation of ISP’s terms of service would not be trespassers.
Allows §2712 civil actions with a $10,000 recovery limit, but only for willful disclosures. [It’s a $10K statutory damages minimum (“actual damages, but not less than $10,000, whichever amount is greater.”)]
Upon written application to a court the Attorney General may require an educational agency to collect educational records “relevant” to an authorized investigation of a listed terrorist offense or “domestic or international terrorist offense.” If the application is correct and satisfies the low pen/trap �relevance” standard, the court shall grant the order.
PATRIOT §505 authorizes issuance of �National Security Letters,” administrative subpoenas for certain phone billing records, bank records, credit records on the same showing as for FISA pen/trap (but no court order).
The CFAA provides for civil and criminal liability for acts exceeding the “authority” to access or use a computer connected to the Internet. It is used to prosecute those engaging in computer graffiti, website defacement and more serious computer intrusion and damage. It has also been applied in civil cases to spammers and those sending unwanted bots to gather information from the websites of others. PATRIOT makes several changes to this law, none of which seems aimed at preventing or prosecuting terrorist offenses — which are separately defined and already include the use of computers to commit terrorism. An earlier version of the bill would have made many violations of the statute “terrorist” offenses. After outcry from EFF members and many others, most (but not all, see below) of the offenses under §1030 were removed from the “terrorist” definition. However, the penalties and scope of §1030 were instead greatly expanded. The changes include:
Adds an “attempt to commit an offense” under §1030 to the list of illegal activities with the same penalties as an offense. §814.
“Loss” under the statute now expressly includes time spent responding and assessing damage, restoring data, program, system or information, any revenue lost, cost incurred or other consequential damages. §814.
B. Computer Crimes under CFAA Defined as “Terrorist Offenses”
As far as the investigation has revealed so far, computer crime played no role in the September 11, 2001 attacks or in any previous terrorist attacks suffered by the United States. Computer crime, especially when it results in danger to lives, is a serious offense, but PATRIOT adds it to the list of “terrorist offenses.” Although it is obviously possible that a computer crime in the future could be part of a terrorist offense, the definition of “terrorism” already includes murder, hijacking, kidnapping and similar crimes that would be the result of a “cyber-terrorist” attack. Yet without explanation, early versions of PATRIOT included even low-level computer intrusion and web defacement as “terrorist offenses.” The final bill was not so draconian, but still includes the following (among others unrelated to computer crime) as “terrorist offenses” under 18 USC §2332b(g)(5)(B):
Section 806 regarding assets “of any individual, entity or organization engaged in planning or perpetrating any act of domestic or international terrorism,” and all assets “affording any person a source of influence over any such entity or organization.”
PATRIOT §805 amends 18 USC 2339A. Material support for terrorists now includes “expert advice or assistance”; e.g., biochemist’s advice on how to increase lethality of biological agents.
Previously, 2339A included “training”; statute requires “knowing or intending that they [material support or resources] are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation . . .. [of, inter alia, 2332b]” — so this requires knowing or intentional facilitation.
Under 2339A a facilitator may be culpable whether or not the underlying offense is committed; also, scienter does not require “specific intent to commit the underlying action,” but only knowledge that material support or resources “are to be used” for a specified offense — however, normally this is interpreted to mean that the facilitator be “aware that that result is practically certain to follow from his conduct.'” If a facilitator was virtually certain that particular recipients would in fact use the provided resources to commit a terrorist crime, it would be immaterial whether the facilitator knew precisely when or where the criminal conduct would occur.