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ENGLE V. ISAAC, 456 U. S. 107 (1982) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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Subscribe to Cases that cite 456 U. S. 107 U.S. Supreme CourtEngle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982)Engle v. IsaacNo. 80-1430Argued December 8, 1981Decided April 5, 1982*456 U.S. 107CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
These cases present the question whether respondents, who were convicted after separate trials on unrelated charges in Ohio state courts, and who failed to comply with Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 mandating contemporaneous objections to jury instructions, may challenge the constitutionality of those instructions in federal habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A provision of Ohio's Criminal Code (§ 2901.05(A)), effective January 1, 1974, placed the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution and provided that "[t]he burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the accused." Until 1976, most Ohio courts assumed that the statute did not change Ohio's traditional rule requiring defendants to carry the burden of proving the affirmative defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In 1976, however, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88, held that the statute placed only the burden of production, not persuasion, on the defendant, and that, once the defendant produced some evidence of self-defense, the prosecutor had to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondents' trials occurred after § 2901.05(A)'s effective date, but before the decision in Robinson, and none of the respondents objected to the trial court's jury instruction that the respondent bore the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The appropriate Ohio Courts of Appeal affirmed the homicide convictions of respondents Hughes and Bell before the decision in Robinson, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to review their convictions. Neither of these respondents challenged the self-defense instruction in their appeals. On respondent Isaac's appeal of his assault conviction to the intermediate appellate court, he relied upon the intervening decision in Robinson to challenge the self-defense instruction given at his trial. The court rejected the challenge as having been waived by Isaac's failure to comply with Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, and the Ohio Supreme chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 108
(a) While the writ of habeas corpus is a bulwark against convictions that violate "fundamental fairness," it undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation. Liberal allowance of the writ also degrades the prominence of the trial, and costs society the right to punish admitted offenders. Moreover, the writ imposes special costs on the federal system, frustrating both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. These costs are particularly high when a trial default has barred a prisoner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in the state courts, and thus, as held in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, a state prisoner, chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 109
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 456 U. S. 136. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 456 U. S. 137. chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 110
Respondents' claims rest in part on recent changes in Ohio criminal law. For over a century, the Ohio courts required criminal defendants to carry the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Seliskar, 35 Ohio St.2d 95, 298 N.E.2d 582 (1973); Szalkai v. State, 96 Ohio St. 36, 117 N.E. 12 (1917); Silvus v. State, 22 Ohio St. 90 (1872). A new criminal code, effective January chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 111
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (1975). For more than two years after its enactment, most Ohio courts assumed that this section worked no change in Ohio's traditional burden of proof rules. [Footnote 2] In 1976, however, the Ohio Supreme Court construed the statute to place only the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, on the defendant. Once the defendant produces some evidence of self-defense, the state court ruled, the prosecutor must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (syllabus by the court). [Footnote 3] The present actions arose because Ohio tried and convicted respondents after the effective date of chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 112
On December 16, 1974, an Ohio grand jury indicted respondent Hughes for aggravated murder. [Footnote 5] At trial, the State showed that, in the presence of seven witnesses, Hughes shot and killed a man who was keeping company with his former girlfriend. Prosecution witnesses testified that the victim was unarmed, and had just attempted to shake hands with Hughes. Hughes, however, claimed that he acted in self-defense. His testimony suggested that he feared the victim, a larger man, because he had touched his pocket while approaching Hughes. The trial court instructed the jury that Hughes bore the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Counsel for Hughes did not specifically object to this instruction. [Footnote 6] chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 113
Bell defended on the ground that he had acted in self-defense. He testified that, as he approached two of the men, the bartender shouted: "He's got a gun" or "Watch out, he's got a gun." At this warning, Bell started shooting. As in Hughes' case, the trial court instructed the jury that Bell had the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Bell did not object to this instruction, and the jury chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 114
Respondent Isaac was tried in September, 1975, for felonious assault. [Footnote 12] The State showed that Isaac had severely beaten his former wife's boyfriend. Isaac claimed that the boyfriend punched him first, and that he acted solely in self-defense. Without objection from Isaac, the court instructed the jury that Isaac carried the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury acquitted Isaac of felonious assault, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. [Footnote 13] chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 115
Ten months after Isaac's trial, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Robinson, supra. In his appeal to the Pickaway County Court of Appeals, [Footnote 14] Isaac relied upon Robinson to challenge the burden of proof instructions given at his trial. The court rejected this challenge because Isaac had failed to object to the jury instructions during trial, as required by Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. [Footnote 15] This default waived Isaac's claim. State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N.E.2d 379 (1960); State v. Slone, 45 Ohio App.2d 24, 340 N.E.2d 413 (1975). chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 116
All three respondents unsuccessfully sought writs of habeas corpus from Federal District Courts. Hughes' petition alleged that the State had violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to prove guilt "as to each and every essential element of the offense charged" and by failing to "so instruct" the jury. The District Judge rejected this claim, finding that Ohio law does not consider absence of self-defense an element of aggravated murder or voluntary manslaughter. Although the self-defense instructions at Hughes' trial might have violated § 2901.05(A), they did not violate the Federal Constitution. Alternatively, the District Judge held that Hughes had waived his constitutional claim by failing to comply with Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule. Since Hughes offered no explanation for his failure to object, and showed no actual prejudice, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), barred him from asserting the claim. Hughes v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C 77-156A (ND Ohio, June 26, 1979). chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 117
Isaac's habeas petition was more complex than those submitted by Hughes and Bell. He urged that the Ohio Supreme Court had "refuse[d] to give relief [to him], despite its own pronouncement" that State v. Robinson would apply retroactively. In addition, he declared broadly that the Ohio court's ruling was "contrary to the Supreme Court of the United States in regard to proving self-defense." The District Court determined that Isaac had waived any constitutional chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 118
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed all three District Court orders. In Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (1980), a majority of the en banc court ruled that Wainwright v. Sykes did not preclude consideration of Isaac's constitutional claims. At the time of Isaac's trial, the court noted, Ohio had consistently required defendants to prove affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. The futility of objecting to this established practice supplied adequate cause for Isaac's waiver. Prejudice, the second prerequisite for excusing a procedural default, was "clear," since the burden of proof is a critical element of factfinding and since Isaac had made a substantial issue of self-defense. 646 F.2d 1134.
A majority of the court also believed that the instructions given at Isaac's trial violated due process. Four judges thought that § 2901.05(A) defined the absence of self-defense as an element of felonious and aggravated assault. While the State did not have to define its crimes in this manner, "due process require[d] it to meet the burden that it chose to assume." 646 F.2d 1135. A fifth judge believed that, even absent § 2901.05(A), the Due Process Clause would compel the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense, because that defense negates criminal intent, an essential element of aggravated and felonious assault. A sixth judge agreed that Ohio had violated Isaac's due process rights, but would have concentrated on the State's arbitrary refusal to extend the retroactive benefits of State v. Robinson, to Isaac. [Footnote 17] chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 119
First, respondents argue that § 2901.05, which governs the burden of proof in all criminal trials, implicitly designated absence of self-defense an element of the crimes charged against them. Since Ohio defined its crimes in this manner, respondents contend, our opinions in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975); and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977), required the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. A plurality of the en banc Sixth Circuit seemed to accept this argument in Isaac's appeal, finding that due process required the State "to meet the burden that it chose to assume." 646 F.2d 1135. chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 120
A careful review of our prior decisions reveals that this claim is without merit. [Footnote 19] Our opinions suggest that the prosecution's constitutional duty to negate affirmative defenses may depend, at least in part, on the manner in which the State defines the charged crime. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, with Patterson v. New York, supra. These decisions, however, do not suggest that, whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably defined that circumstance as an element of the crime. [Footnote 20] A State may want to assume the burden of disproving an affirmative defense without also designating absence of the defense an element of the crime. The Due Process Clause does not mandate that, when a State treats absence of an affirmative defense as an "element" of the crime for one purpose, it must do so for all purposes. The structure of Ohio's Code suggests simply that the State decided to assist defendants by requiring the prosecution to disprove certain affirmative defenses. Absent concrete evidence that the Ohio Legislature or courts understood § 2901.05(A) to go further than this, we decline to accept respondents' construction of state law. While they chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 121
Respondents also allege that, even without considering § 2901.05, Ohio could not constitutionally shift the burden of proving self-defense to them. All of the crimes charged against them require a showing of purposeful or knowing behavior. These terms, according to respondents, imply a degree of culpability that is absent when a person acts in self-defense. See Committee Comment to Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.21 (1975) ("generally, an offense is not committed unless a person . . . has a certain guilty state of mind at the time of his act or failure [to act]"); State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio App.2d 284, 28287, 290 N.E.2d 921, 923 (1972) ("one who kills in self-defense does so without the mens rea that otherwise would render him culpable of the homicide"). In addition, Ohio punishes only actions that are voluntary, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.21(A)(1) (1975), and unlawful, State v. Simon, No. 6262, p. 13 (Ct.App. Montgomery County, Ohio, Jan. 16, 1980), modified on reconsideration (Jan. 22, 1980). Self-defense, respondents urge, negates these elements of criminal behavior. Therefore, once the defendant raises the possibility of self-defense, respondents contend that the chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 122
This argument states a colorable constitutional claim. Several courts have applied our Mullaney and Patterson opinions to charge the prosecution with the constitutional duty of proving absence of self-defense. [Footnote 23] Most of these decisions adopt respondents' reasoning that due process commands the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense if that defense negates an element, such as purposeful conduct, of the charged crime. While other courts have rejected this type of claim, [Footnote 24] the controversy suggests that respondents' second argument states at least a plausible constitutional claim. We proceed, therefore, to determine whether respondents chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 123
preserved this claim before the state courts and, if not, to inquire whether the principles articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), bar consideration of the claim in a federal habeas proceeding. [Footnote 25] chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 124
None of the respondents challenged the constitutionality of the self-defense instruction at trial. [Footnote 26] They thus violated Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, which requires contemporaneous chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 125
objections to jury instructions. Failure to comply with Rule 30 is adequate, under Ohio law, to bar appellate consideration of an objection. See, e.g., State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977); State v. Gordon, 28 Ohio St.2d 45, 276 N.E.2d 243 (1971). The Ohio Supreme Court has enforced this bar against the very due process argument raised here. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 364 N.E.2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part and remanded, 438 U.S. 911 (1978). [Footnote 27] We must determine, therefore, whether respondents may litigate, in a federal habeas proceeding, a constitutional claim that they forfeited before the state courts. [Footnote 28] chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 126
We have always recognized, however, that the Great Writ entails significant costs. [Footnote 31] Collateral review of a conviction chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 127
We must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders. Passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 128
In Wainwright v. Sykes, we recognized that these costs are particularly high when a trial default has barred a prisoner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in the state courts. In that situation, the trial court has had no opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retrials. The defendant's counsel, for whatever reasons, has detracted from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 129
We do not believe, however, that the principles of Sykes lend themselves to this limitation. The costs outlined above do not depend upon the type of claim raised by the prisoner. While the nature of a constitutional claim may affect the calculation of cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the need to make that threshold showing. We reaffirm, therefore, that any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the federal courthouse after a state procedural default must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice before obtaining relief. chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 130
Respondents' claim, however, is not simply one of futility. They further allege that, at the time they were tried, they could not know that Ohio's self-defense instructions raised chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 131
Id. at 397 U. S. 364. During the five years following this decision, [Footnote 39] dozens of defendants relied upon this language to challenge chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 132
the constitutionality of rules requiring them to bear a burden of proof. [Footnote 40] In most of these cases, the defendants' claims countered well-established principles of law. Nevertheless, chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 133
We do not suggest that every astute counsel would have relied upon Winship to assert the unconstitutionality of a rule saddling criminal defendants with the burden of proving an affirmative defense. Every trial presents a myriad of possible claims. Counsel might have overlooked or chosen to chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 134
Respondents, finally, urge that we should replace or supplement the cause-and-prejudice standard with a plain error inquiry. We rejected this argument when pressed by a federal prisoner, see United States v. Frady, post, p. 456 U. S. 152, and find it no more compelling here. The federal courts apply a plain error rule for direct review of federal convictions. Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 52(b). Federal habeas challenges to state convictions, however, entail greater finality problems and special comity concerns. We remain convinced that the burden of justifying federal habeas relief for state prisoners chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 135
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs in the result. chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 136
App. to Pet. for Cert. A41. Similarly, all but one of the Sixth Circuit Judges who considered Isaac's case en banc thought that Isaac raised more claims than the one isolated by JUSTICE BRENNAN. Even the panel opinion invoked by JUSTICE BRENNAN, post at 456 U. S. 142, n. 10, rejected the notion that Isaac presented only one claim. 646 F.2d 1127. Isaac's own brief to this Court, finally, recites a long list of claims. Although he alludes to the argument featured by JUSTICE BRENNAN, he also maintains that his jury was misinstructed "[a]s a matter of federal constitutional law," Brief for Respondent Isaac 15, and that Mullaney v. Wilbur and Hankerson v. North Carolina control his claims. Brief for Respondent Isaac 2, 3, 13-15. Under these circumstances, it is incomprehensible that JUSTICE BRENNAN construes Isaac's habeas petition to raise but a single claim.
398 F.2d 122. See also Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U. S. 253 (1968) (vacating and remanding lower court decision for reconsideration in light of Stump); State v. Nales, 28 Conn.Supp. 28, 248 A.2d 242 (1968) (holding that due process forbids requiring defendant to prove "lawful excuse" for possession of housebreaking tools).
In my opinion, the Court's preoccupation with procedural hurdles is more likely to complicate than to simplify the processing of habeas corpus petitions by federal judges. [Footnote 2/1] In chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 137
Today's decision is a conspicuous exercise in judicial activism -- particularly so since it takes the form of disregard of precedent scarcely a month old. In its eagerness to expatiate upon the "significant costs" of the Great Writ, ante at 456 U. S. 126-128, and to apply "the principles articulated in 433 U. S. 123, to the cases before us, the Court demonstrably misreads and reshapes the habeas claim of at least one of the state prisoners involved in this action. Respondent Isaac presented exactly one claim in his habeas petition. That claim did not even chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 138
exist until after Isaac was denied relief on his last direct appeal. As a result, Isaac could not have "preserved" his claim in the state courts: he simply committed no "procedural default," and the Court is thus clearly wrong to apply Sykes to his claim in order to relegate it to the dustbin. Moreover, the Court does so by ignoring the holding only last month in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982): namely, that a habeas petition that contains any unexhausted claims must be dismissed by the habeas court. The Court then compounds its error when it attempts to articulate the "principles" of Sykes: in purporting to give content to the "cause" standard announced in that case, the Court defines "cause" in a way supported neither by Sykes@ nor by common sense. I dissent from both of these errors, which are discussed in turn below.
Respondent Isaac was indicted in May, 1975; he was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced during the following September. [Footnote 3/1] While his conviction was on appeal in the Ohio Court of Appeals, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (July 1976), which construed Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (effective Jan. 1, 1974) to require the prosecution to bear the burden of persuasion, beyond a reasonable doubt, with respect to an affirmative defense of self-defense raised by the defendant. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Isaac's conviction in February, 1977. [Footnote 3/2] The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Isaac's appeal in July, 1977. [Footnote 3/3] On the same day, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354. That case declared Robinson retroactive to the effective date of § 2901.05(A), but only partially: it held that, in order to gain the retroactive benefits of the Robinson chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 139
Isaac's memorandum in support of his habeas petition made it plain that his claim was that Humphries' selective retroactive application of the Robinson rule denied him due process of law. [Footnote 3/6] It is obvious, of course, that it was simply impossible chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 140
"the federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts. . . . Only if the state courts have had the first Page 456 U. S. 141
My second conclusion is that Isaac simply committed no "procedural default" in failing to raise at trial or on direct appeal the claim that appears in his habeas petition. That claim did not exist at any time during Isaac's trial or direct appeal. Thus, the essential factual predicate for an application of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), is completely chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 142
My last conclusion is that the Court is so intent upon applying Sykes to Isaac's case that it plays Procrustes with his claim. In order to bring Isaac's claim within the ambit of Sykes, the Court first characterizes his petition as "complex," ante at 456 U. S. 117, and "confused," ante at 456 U. S. 124, n. 25. [Footnote 3/11] Then, chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 143
Ante at 456 U. S. 123. Unsurprisingly, the Court's bottom line is that Isaac's fictive claim is indeed barred by Sykes. In short, the Court reshapes respondent Isaac's actual claim into a form that enables it to foreclose all federal review, when, as plainly pleaded, the claim was unexhausted, thus calling for the dismissal of Isaac's petition chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 144
According to the Court, "cause" is not demonstrated when the Court "cannot say that [habeas petitioners] lacked the chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 145
"(4) The Fay v. Noia rule "may encourage sandbagging' on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off." 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 89." "(5) A contemporaneous objection rule 'encourages the result that [criminal trials] be as free of error as possible.' Id. at 433 U. S. 90."
"the Great Writ entails significant Page 456 U. S. 147
In a similar vein, we are told, ante at 456 U. S. 127, that "[w]e must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders." I, for one, will acknowledge nothing of the sort. Respondents were all convicted after trials in which they allege that the burden of proof respecting their affirmative defenses was imposed upon them in an unconstitutional manner. Thus, they are not "admitted" offenders at all: if they had been tried with the assertedly proper allocation of the burden of proof, then they might very well have been acquitted. Further, it is sheer demagoguery to blame the "offender" for the logistical and temporal difficulties arising from retrial: if the writ of habeas chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 148
433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 91. Today's decision, with its unvarnished hostility to the assertion of federal constitutional claims, starkly reveals the emptiness of that promise. chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 149
"If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk Page 456 U. S. 150
407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 204 (emphasis added). [Footnote 3/15] In sum, this Court has heretofore adhered to the principle that, "[i]n the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself," because "the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 441 U. S. 423-424 (1979). In the chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 151
It does bear some resemblance to Isaac's claim as construed by the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals en banc below. 646 F.2d 1133-1136. But the plurality's construction as simply incorrect, and this Court should correct such errors, not perpetuate them.
@ 17 U. S. 415 (1819).