Source: https://casetext.com/case/thompson-v-sanborn
Timestamp: 2019-05-23 11:19:50
Document Index: 498188696

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1985', '§ 1985', '§ 1985', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Thompson v. Sanborn, 568 F. Supp. 385 | Casetext
Thompson v. Sanborn
568 F. Supp. 385 (D.N.H. 1983)
Thompsonv.Sanborn
United States District Court, D. New HampshireJul 22, 1983
Thomas H. Trunzo, Jr., Lebanon, N.H., for plaintiff.
Finally, there exist certain pendant state claims arising from the actions of the defendants — assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, negligence and gross negligence. Since these state claims are derived from the exact same circumstances as the federal claims, it is clear that the requisite "common nucleus of operative fact exists", and the court shall, except as hereinafter noted, also consider those state claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1965).
The language of § 1985(3) requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges or immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1799, 49 L.Ed.2d 338 (1970) (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent circuit court decisions have reiterated the necessity of a racial or class-based discriminatory animus behind a conspiracy to state a cause of action under § 1985(3). Bailey v. California, 564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977); Ledwith v. Douglas, 568 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1978); Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453 (D.C.Ga. 1972), aff'd 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973). The plaintiff has never alleged nor, given the facts as set forth in the complaint, could he allege that the transgressions against him were motivated by either race or class. Lacking such rudimentary elements, the cause of action under § 1985 is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Next, the defendants collectively seek dismissal on the grounds that no violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and consequently no violation of § 1983, occurred. As support for this contention, the defendants rely on Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1978).
The plaintiff in Baker brought a § 1983 action against county officials for false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although he was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant, the plaintiff alleged that his imprisonment for three days — despite repeated protests of his innocence due to a case of mistaken identity — was a violation of § 1983. Deferring on the question of whether the prison officials' negligence in not properly ascertaining the identity of their prisoner was cognizable under § 1983, the court said that the threshold requirement of a constitutional violation was not met. Since the fourteenth amendment "protects only against deprivations of liberty accomplished `without due process of law'", Id. at 145, 99 S.Ct. at 2695, the court found the plaintiff's attacks on his jailors to be without merit.
Absent an attack on the validity of the of the warrant, under which he was arrested, respondent's complaint is simply that despite his protests of mistaken identity, he was detained in the Potter County Jail . . . Respondent was indeed deprived of his liberty for a period of days, but it was pursuant to a warrant conforming, for purposes of our decision, to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Notwithstanding the defendants' rather liberal interpretation of Baker that "an innocent person has no right not to be arrested", Defendants' Memorandum of Law, June 6, 1983, p. 3, Baker is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Baker, the mere fact of confinement was the gravamen of the complaint. Here there is more; for, not only does the plaintiff allege violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights — allegations not present in Baker and which must be construed favorably here, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1973) — but in addition the plaintiff seeks redress for the very means by which his confinement was procured. In a case similar in some respects to the present one, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Baker. Since its remarks are particularly apposite, they merit a quote at length:
Whitley v. Seibel, 613 F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1980).
In their essentials, the plaintiff's charges against Defendant Sanborn amount to harassment. Sanborn is said to have precipitated the stop-payment of a $50.00 check issued to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff cashed in one Frederick Aldrich's store. Aldrich then brought a small claims action in Bethlehem Municipal Court — again at the prompting of Defendant Sanborn. Plaintiff was issued notice of the action pursuant to New Hampshire RSA Chapter 503, and was directed to appear in court on October 19, 1982. The notice provided only that default would result in judgment and costs rendered against the plaintiff. There was no notice of a possible arrest, nor could there have been. RSA 503:7.
Defendant Sanborn has, in turn, moved to dismiss the claim against him. Defendant Sanborn submits that he was acting pursuant to the prima facie valid warrant issued by Judge Greenlaw and is therefore shielded from suit by the same cloak of absolute immunity worn by the Judge. The defendant does not, and indeed cannot, raise the defense of qualified immunity in his motion. "An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset . . . The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at trial." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419, 96 S.Ct. 984, 989, n. 13, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 n. 13 (1975). As support for his contention, Defendant Sanborn draws the court's attention to Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1980) and Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709 (1st Cir. 1954). In Slotnick, a defendant county sheriff delivered the plaintiff to a state hospital pursuant to a judge's order which was allegedly part of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights. The court found that the sheriff was vicariously protected from suit by the immunity of the judge under whose orders he acted, 632 F.2d at 166. Similarly, in Dunn, two law enforcement officers were sued on the basis of insufficient notice and service, which the plaintiff alleged resulted in an unfair trial. Finding that "[T]he control of the trial was exclusively within the province of the court", the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding that, as quasi-judicial officers, the defendants enjoyed the same absolute immunity as the judge would in such a case. 116 F.2d at 710, 711.
The immunities of state officials recognized for the purposes of § 1983 are the same as those recognized at common law. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 662, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1421, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). In Dennis v. Sparks — also a 1983 suit — the Supreme Court found "[n]othing indicating that, historically judicial immunity insulated from damages those private persons who corruptly conspire with the judge." 449 U.S. at 29, 101 S.Ct. at 187. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision allowing a § 1983 action to proceed against the remaining non-official defendants even though the action against the judge had been dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity. While the facts of Dennis v. Sparks admittedly differ from those in this case, the principle enunciated in Dennis v. Sparks that a co-conspirator cannot hide in a judge's absolute immunity is a fortiori true here, where Defendant Sanborn's conduct is uncontestedly under color of state law, and where Defendant Sanborn acted independently from Judge Greenlaw.
In her motion to dismiss, Defendant Maguire asserts that she is absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 insofar as she was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Unlike the defense of Defendant Sanborn, Defendant Maguire relies upon the position that she occupies as bail commissioner for her immunity. It is the very function of her office that endows her with quasi-judicial immunity. Defendant Sanborn, in contrast, sought immunity solely on the basis that he acted pursuant to judicial order. As a quasi-judicial officer, the analysis of Defendant Maguire's motion is therefore a different one. See, e.g. Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455 (3rd Cir. 1969).
The immunity of judges from suit is well established. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1966). Absolute judicial immunity is founded upon the principle that "A judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 347, 355, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). Thus, a judicial officer will be deprived of immunity from suit only when acting in "clear absence of all jurisdiction". Id. at 351, 20 L.Ed. 646. This phrase refers to jurisdiction over the subject matter in question, and does not include acts done in error, maliciously, or in excess of authority. Id.
Judicial immunity "extends to other officers of government, whose duties are related to the judicial process." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1338, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1958). Thus court clerks, Slotnick v. Garfinkle, supra, parole board and probation officers, Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1968), court appointed medical examiners, Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), court reporters, Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969), and others performing quasi-judicial functions have been held absolutely immune from suit.
597:15 Appointment The Superior Court may appoint . . . commissioners authorized to fix and receive bail in criminal cases . . .
597:18 Powers On application of a person who is arrested for a bailable offense, at any time before his arraignment therefore, any commissioner may fix the amount of and receive bail in the same manner as the court might do . . .
Since it is apparent that this statute does indeed confer quasi-judicial powers on Bail Commissioner Maguire, the only question is whether she can be said to have acted so utterly without jurisdiction as to usurp powers that did not properly belong to her, and thereby forfeited the immunity afforded her by virtue of her function. As was previously noted, the phrase "without jurisdiction" is one with a rather narrow meaning. It literally means lacking in authority over the subject matter of the action. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). Bradley v. Fisher, supra. Without a doubt, Defendant Maguire had authority to fix and receive bail and that is precisely what she did in this instance. That the plaintiff's "offense", being a civil matter, was not a bailable offense is perhaps sufficient to regard Defendant Maguire's actions as grossly erroneous, negligent and far in excess of her jurisdiction, but it does not suffice to strip her from her immunity from suit under § 1983.
Moreover, "[i]n addition to the recognized immunity enjoyed by judicial and quasi-judicial officers, . . . there exists an equally well-grounded principle that any public official acting pursuant to court directive is also immune from suit." Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d at 460. In view of the fact that there is evidence that Defendant Maguire was following what appears to be Judge Greenlaw's instructions in setting bail, see Exhibit B of defendant's motion of March 17, 1983, it would be manifestly unfair to subject Defendant Maguire to suit in a matter over which she had no discretion — quasi-judicial immunity notwithstanding.
Having thus disposed of the Federal claim against Defendant Maguire, the court sees no reason to retain jurisdiction of the state law cause of action against her. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218. Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth and Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 1980).
The Town of Bethlehem ("Bethlehem") has also been named as a defendant in this suit. The point of departure for § 1983 actions against municipalities is Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), which held that local governmental bodies are persons for purposes of § 1983, and are thus civilly liable for damages or injunctive relief.
Defendant Bethlehem has moved to dismiss the action against it, asserting that the plaintiff's cause of action rests upon the theory of respondeat superior — a doctrine which was expressly prohibited by Monell as a basis for municipal liability under § 1983. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611.
The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the actions taken by Defendant Sanborn "resulted from and were taken pursuant to a defacto policy of the Town of Bethlehem"; that this de facto policy "has been known to the selectmen and policy-making officers of the Town of Bethlehem for a substantial period of time"; and that the Town has "not taken steps to terminate . . . discipline . . . supervise . . . train" Defendant Sanborn with regard to the alleged unconstitutional practices. Instead, it is alleged, the officials of the Town have "sanctioned" and shown "deliberate indifference" to these practices.
Despite the fact that "custom" is a word subject to a certain amount of vagary, it cannot be so misused as to include so singular and isolated an action as the plaintiff has alleged in this case. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1613-1614, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), which the court made use of in Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, 98 S.Ct. at 2018, "custom" was used in the context of "persistent and wide spread practices" which were "permanent and well-settled". Though the plaintiff has alleged in a conclusory fashion that Defendant Sanborn was acting pursuant to a de facto policy of the Town of Bethlehem, there are no factual allegations which would support such a claim. On the contrary, the facts seem to suggest that the actions of the Town, if indeed there were any, related entirely to this plaintiff and only to these circumstances. Beyond the bare allegations, there is nothing to suggest that Bethlehem systematically or repetitively engaged in or conspired in such conduct. Far from being "persistent and widespread", the practices of Bethlehem with regard to the plaintiff focussed on victimizing him alone. Absent such a larger pattern of conduct on the part of the municipality, visiting liability on Bethlehem for this single occurrence — however reprehensible it may have been — would be tantamount to invoking the doctrine of respondeat superior. Acquiescence in Defendant Sanborn's conduct in this isolated incident is not the act of the abstract "person" known as the Town of Bethlehem. That entity owes its existence to the cumulative behavior of its laws and traditions which transcend the discrete actions of its individual officials. Hence, the strict requirement of Monell that an official custom be present before it can be said that the municipality itself has acted.
This court is well aware of the relatively light burden placed upon a complaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss. It is the standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) that . . .
Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1122 (1st Cir. 1976).
Moreover, several well-reasoned opinions exist which lend support to this court's order. Not only are pleadings insufficient which merely allege conclusions without factual support, Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 581 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1135, 99 S.Ct. 1058, 59 L.Ed.2d 97 (1979), but in addition it has been held that " Monell implicitly requires that if municipal liability is to be premised upon an unarticulated governmental policy, custom or practice, such custom, policy or practice must be evidenced by more than a single wrongful act." Rivera v. Farrell, 538 F. Supp. 291 N.D.Illinois; Giarrusso v. City of Chicago, 539 F. Supp. 690 (N.D.Illinois 1982). Municipal policy simply cannot be inferred from a single incident of illegality. See generally Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980), citing Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (D.Conn. 1978); Schramm v. Krischell, 84 F.R.D. 294 (D.Conn. 1979); Randle v. Gokey, 469 F. Supp. 452 (N.D.Ohio 1979); Cf. Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1982). Defendant Bethlehem's motion to dismiss is granted.