Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/20/570.html
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 16:44:09
Document Index: 464208427

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 801', '§ 801', '§ 803', '§ 13', '§ 402', '§ 3600', '§ 402', '§ 11662']

Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co. :: :: California Court of Appeal Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. App. 3d › Volume 20 › Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.
Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.
Although plaintiffs' complaint, as amended, raised issues of negligence, breaches of warranties and strict liability, plaintiffs abandoned the first two theories and proceeded solely on the theory of strict liability in tort. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 57 [27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049].)
Brown-Bevis filed a cross-complaint against Charles J. Rounds Company (Rounds) and Allied Insurance Company (Allied), fn. 1 Rounds' workmen's compensation insurance carrier, whereby it sought to reduce plaintiffs' recoveries of damages, if any, by the amounts of compensation benefits paid [20 Cal. App. 3d 576] to them by Allied; additionally, Brown cross-complained against American, seeking to be indemnified by American from plaintiffs' claims for damages. Thereafter, Allied filed a complaint-in-intervention against American and Brown-Bevis seeking recovery of compensation benefits paid. Ultimately, it, too, based its claim for damages solely upon the theory of strict liability in tort.
[1] In its appeal, American first contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment against it. This requires a summary of the pertinent evidence, ignoring conflicting evidence unfavorable to the judgment and indulging all reasonable inferences favoring it. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal. 2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 183].)
After the sale was made, the crane was delivered by American in March 1963 to Brown's yard in Los Angeles where it was partially assembled by [20 Cal. App. 3d 577] Brown personnel, then transferred to Rounds' field yard where assembly was completed by Brown and Rounds' workmen. Rounds used it initially to lift cement pipe, thereafter moving it to the Beverly Hills storm drain job where Rounds had dug a trench in which to construct a storm drain. Walls of the trench were shored by sinking "H-beam" pilings vertically in the ground along the trench walls. After the cement conduit of the storm drain was poured and hardened, the trench was back-filled with dirt and the crane was then used to pull out the pilings.
Griffin was aware that Rounds constructed storm drains and planned to use the crane to withdraw pilings embedded in the ground. He had seen cranes operated and had, himself, been a crane operator; he knew when he negotiated sale of the crane that its operator would rely on the crane's tipping capacity in removing pilings embedded in the ground, and that the operator would detect tipping capacity by the "seat-of-the-pants" approach. [20 Cal. App. 3d 578] He testified "that all boom-type mobile cranes are designed and manufactured with a tipping capacity."
At no time did the crane's wheels start to come off the ground or did [20 Cal. App. 3d 579] its undercarriage move. Its tipping point had not been reached, but "I didn't think I was very far from it." After the four-to-five-minute interval, Lewis received another signal to raise the boom. He started to boom up. Almost immediately a loud noise was heard. The wheels of the crane were still on the ground at that time. Lewis saw something coming at him and "the next thing I know I was on the ground." A "pendant" on the left side of the boom had broken and the boom and its suspension system fell and injured the two plaintiffs. At the time this occurred, the 70-foot boom of the crane had formed an angle of about 30ø with the ground.
[3] Res ipsa loquitur has no application to strict liability in tort. (Tresham v. Ford Motor Co. (1969) 275 Cal. App. 2d 403 [79 Cal. Rptr. 883]; McCurter v. Norton Co. (1968) 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 407, 408 [69 [20 Cal. App. 3d 580] Cal.Rptr. 493].) [2b] From this, appellant American argues that there is no evidence from which to find that the furnishing of the 1 1/8" pendant infers the presence of a "defect." Plaintiffs called no expert witnesses to express an opinion on this, or any other point respecting liability.
Rebutting American's contention is the fact that American, through its regional sales manager, Griffin, was familiar with Rounds' intended operations and also was familiar with crane operators' allegedly customary techniques. Griffin testified in response to questions: "Q. ... it is your assumption that attempting to dislodge tight piling that wouldn't budge or come loose shouldn't harm the crane; correct? A. This is correct. Q. Because the crane would attain tip condition before a failure would occur? A. Yes." American knew that in pulling embedded pilings from the ground an unknown weight, or resistance, would be encountered and that a crane operator frequently does not use a chart under such circumstances; instead, he relies upon tipping capacity, which he determines "by the seat of his pants." This, according to Griffin, was customary. To say that American sold the crane but did not intend such use is to ignore the evidence. [20 Cal. App. 3d 581]
In making this argument appellant ignores the fact the pendant failed before the tipping capacity of the crane was reached. Thus, as stated by one witness, "You don't know what anything weighs ... the safety factor ... on your crane is that it will tip before it will come unglued." Breaking of the 1 1/8" pendant before tipping capacity was reached thus supports an inference that a proximate cause of the accident was the use of this pendant. [6] As stated in Elmore v. American Motors Corp. (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 578, 583-584 [75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84]: "... a plaintiff is entitled to establish the existence of the defect and the defendants' responsibility for it by circumstantial evidence. ... No reason appears why the same rule should not apply where the plaintiff is seeking to prove that the defect caused his injuries." (Also see: Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 407.) [20 Cal. App. 3d 582]
The court inspected the report, concluded it was confidential and precluded counsel from perusing it, also ruling that it could not be used in examining the witness. The witness was then called to testify in open court. He testified that he recalled investigating the accident but that testifying to any details would require that he first refresh his memory by reviewing [20 Cal. App. 3d 583] his report. On objection by respondents, the court then ruled that the report could not be so used. No more questions were asked of the witness.
While an opinion may, under Evidence Code section 801, be based upon information which is inadmissible hearsay, still the information must be "of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion. ..." (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) Nowhere in the report are any facts surrounding the accident stated or is anything reported to support the opinions mentioned. [8] Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b) permits an expert to base his opinion on "reliable matter" (Law Revision Commission comment to Evid. Code, § 801) whether or not admissible, but not upon unreliable matter. A court "may, and upon objection shall, exclude testimony in the form of an opinion that is based in whole or in significant part on matter that is not a proper basis for such an opinion ...." (Evid. Code, § 803.)
[7b] Having ourselves reviewed the report as requested, we find nothing in it that, if reviewed by the witness, would have refreshed his memory as to admissible matter. Accordingly, if the court erroneously ruled the report was confidential, such ruling is not shown to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13, i.e., to have been prejudicial.
[9a] Appellant American submitted an instruction fn. 6 which the trial court modified and gave as follows: "If you find that a party to this action violated either Section 3999 or Section 4010 of the Safety Orders just read [20 Cal. App. 3d 584] to you, fn. 7 [t]his could be a basis upon which you might determine that the crane was not being used in the manner and for the purpose for which it was designed and intended to be used." It is contended the instruction should have been read as submitted. (See fn. 6.)
Admittedly, the instruction was intended to paraphrase BAJI (4th ed.) Instruction No. 149 Rev. or 149A (both now No. 3.45 in BAJI, 5th ed.) dealing with the subject of negligence based upon violation of a statute, ordinance or safety order. Appellant seems to argue the instruction was proper as proposed, since violation of the safety orders would constitute contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs. [10] However, the form of contributory negligence which constitutes a defense to strict liability is limited to that "which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk." (Rest.2d Torts, § 402A, com. n; Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. (1971) 15 Cal. App. 3d 462, 470 [93 Cal. Rptr. 270]; Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co. (1968) 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 243 [71 Cal. Rptr. 306].) [9b] There was no evidence bringing any plaintiff within the principle thus expressed.
[11] Finally, American contends the trial court erred when it permitted the intervening compensation insurance carrier, Allied, to go to the jury under the theory of strict liability in tort. As we read its briefs, American's [20 Cal. App. 3d 585] contention is two-fold: (1) an employer fn. 8 who is at fault (negligent) should not be entitled to recover from one who is made liable without fault (negligence) pursuant to strict liability theories, and (2) in any event, a compensation insurer's loss is a "commercial" loss and not recoverable under strict liability, according to the rule of Seely v. White Motor Co. (1965) 63 Cal. 2d 9 [45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145].
First, an employer's obligation to pay compensation benefits to an employee may arise without negligence on the employer's part. (Lab. Code, § 3600.) Thus, the fact an employer (insurer) has paid, or is obligated to pay, benefits to an employee does not establish any fault. We are given no authority and we see no reason why an employer cannot proceed against a third party on the basis that such party also is liable without fault (i.e., negligence). Under such a theory, ordinary contributory negligence of the injured party is no defense to the claims he asserts (Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., supra, 265 Cal.App.2d 228) and contributory negligence of his employer should be no defense against the employer's claims. (See dissent, Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at pp. 471-473.)
Second, the damage recoverable by the employer is not that type of "commercial" loss prohibited under Seely v. White Motor Co., supra, 63 Cal. 2d 9. In that case loss of profit, or "economic expectations," was held not recoverable by a primary tortfeasee proceeding under the theory of strict liability. Personal injuries and property damage, however, were not excluded. Thus, in a personal injury case, the injured plaintiff can recover for loss of earning capacity, lost earnings and medical expenses relating to his disability and injuries. So far as we can see, an employer obliged to pay medical expenses and disability benefits should likewise be able to recover them. We are cited to no contrary authority.
[12a] On its own motion, the trial court instructed the jury that: "if ... there was a defect and ... that defect was created in the manufacture or design of the crane ... while it was in the hands of American ... then Brown-Bevis ... under the law is also liable." This was an extemporaneous, oral embellishment which the court added to its instruction given in the language of BAJI No. 53, and immediately following [20 Cal. App. 3d 586] it. Brown-Bevis contends this was prejudicial error in that, under the evidence, it was entitled to separate consideration.
BAJI instruction No. 53, given on request of both defendants, had told the jury that each defendant is entitled to a separate defense and if one is liable the other is not necessarily also liable. Since it would be impossible to determine which of these two instructions the jury followed, reversible error could result if the first instruction was erroneous. (Sebrell v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp. (1948) 31 Cal. 2d 813, 817-818 [192 P.2d 898]; Starr v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp. (1921) 187 Cal. 270, 280 [201 P. 599]; Lewis v. Franklin (1958) 161 Cal. App. 2d 177, 185 [326 P.2d 625].)
Brown reasons there was evidence that it did not know, and reasonably could not have anticipated, the true purpose for which the crane "was designed and intended [by American] to be used" as required under California cases dealing with the doctrine of strict liability in tort (Thomas v. General Motors Corp. (1970) 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 90-92 [91 Cal. Rptr. 301]; Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1969), 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 340-341 [79 Cal. Rptr. 194]; Oakes v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. (1969) 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 649 [77 Cal.Rptr. 709]) for which reason it was entitled to have its liability, if any, separately judged.
First, we dispose of one preliminary point. Brown argues that it was not a "seller" of the crane, only accomplishing necessary paper work, the "sale" being negotiated and consummated by American. Such a distinction is here irrelevant in the light of the evidence. (Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., supra, 265 Cal.App.2d at pp. 250-254; and see same title (1971) 15 Cal. App. 3d 137, 139-140 [92 Cal. Rptr. 809].) [20 Cal. App. 3d 587]
There was evidence that after the crane was sold, delivered to and used by Rounds, but before the accident, a Brown employee, sent to make repairs, observed how Rounds was using the crane. [13b] Under the precepts of strict liability it is the information available to the retail seller at the time of sale, however, that is relevant to determining if he reasonably should have anticipated some particular manner of use of the product sold. Knowledge of a different manner of use, acquired after a sale, is not relevant. Although so-called "products liability" may be based upon theories of negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability in tort we deal here only with the latter doctrine. [20 Cal. App. 3d 588]
[12c] The foregoing evidence tended to establish that Rounds' employees did not use the crane in the manner which Brown intended or reasonably could anticipate. Use of the crane in the manner Brown believed it would be used might not, under the evidence, have resulted in an accident. [13c] The rule has been stated this way (Rest.2d Torts, p. 351, § 402A, com. h): "A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling ...."
It is important to remember that this kind of liability is not based upon fault. The retailer may be, and usually is, wholly innocent of any fault or wrongdoing. In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262 [37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168], and again in Elmore v. American Motors Corp. (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 578, 587 [75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84], the Supreme Court stated the reasons for holding the retailer strictly liable in a case of this kind. The majority decision in this case cannot be reconciled with that reasoning.
The explanations of strict liability in the Restatement, and in the BAJI instructions, do not recognize any separate retailer's defense of the kind [20 Cal. App. 3d 589] asserted here. Both authorities explain the defective condition of the product in terms of the expectation of the user, not the knowledge or intent of the seller.
The majority opinion seems to claim support from the sentence in Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1969) 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 340 [79 Cal. Rptr. 194], which says, "The ultimate test is whether the article was being used in a way which the seller should have reasonably anticipated." Assuming that that dictum is a correct statement of law, it does not support the decision here. In the case at bench the retailer should have anticipated that the crane would be used for the purpose which was both the intention of the manufacturer and the expectation of the user, even though the retailer may have been unaware of what that purpose was. The verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiff against the manufacturer necessarily includes a finding that the crane was unsafe for the use which they intended. That finding necessarily results in liability upon the retailer.
FN 1. Pacific Employers Insurance Company originally was named but Allied Insurance Company was substituted in its place for all proceedings.
FN 2. MacWhyte was granted a nonsuit and is not involved in these appeals.
FN 3. At the time of this trial, Labor Code section 6319, read: "No officer or employee of the division shall divulge to any person not connected with the administration of this part any confidential information concerning the failure to keep any place of employment safe of concerning the violation of any order, rule, or regulation issued by the board or division. Violation of this section is a misdemeanor." The section was modified effective in 1970, but the modification is inapplicable to our case.
FN 4. No other reference is given. The opinion is not published in the collected Opinions of the Attorney General.
FN 5. Whether such a report was or still is privileged, and whether this manner of asserting and establishing any privilege is sufficient, are matters we need not decide, although we observe all are open to some question.
FN 6. As submitted, the instruction read: "If you find that a party to this action violated either Section 3999 or Section 4010 of the Safety Orders just read to you, you will find that such violation constituted failure on the part of said party to use the crane in question for the purpose for which it was designed and intended to be used."
FN 7. The court had read safety orders:
FN 8. "Employer" includes insurer under Labor Code section 3850. Also, a compensation insurer is subrogated to an employer's rights. (Ins. Code, § 11662.)