Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca6/c763775/united-states-v-maurice-williams-96-3546-marshon-mays-96-3558
Timestamp: 2020-01-22 07:40:15
Document Index: 111622362

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

united-states-v-maurice-williams-96-3546-marshon-mays-96-3558, Sixth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
* Defendant Maurice Williams first argues that the two-level enhancement under the guidelines for possession of a firearm pursuant to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.S.G.) § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1995) was erroneous, based substantially on the fact that his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) gun count was dismissed in the wake of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995). A district court's finding that the defendant possessed the firearm during the drug crime is a factual finding subject to review for clear error. United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1133 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 993, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1997).
Bailey clarified the term "use" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) in the phrase "uses or carries." The guideline enhancement, however, specifically refers only to "possession" (construed as actual or constructive possession). This court has held that acquittal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) "does not necessarily preclude a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)" not only because of the different terminology but also in part because the burden of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt, as at trial. United States v. McCall, 85 F.3d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.1996); see also Elder, 90 F.3d at 1133; United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 652 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933, 111 S. Ct. 2055, 114 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1991). In other words, Bailey has little to say about the appropriateness of a guidelines enhancement for possession.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 commentary, applic. note 3; see also United States v. Moreno, 899 F.2d 465, 470 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 948, 112 S. Ct. 1504, 117 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1992); United States v. Cochran, 14 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir.1994). In order for the enhancement to apply, the government must establish that (1) the defendant actually or constructively possessed the weapon, and (2) such possession was during the commission of the offense. United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 858, 117 S. Ct. 158, 136 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1996). "Constructive possession of an item is the ownership, or dominion or control over the item itself, or dominion over the premises where the item is located." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, if it is reasonably foreseeable to a defendant that his co-conspirator possesses a gun, constructive possession is attributable to him as well. However "[w]e are not willing to indulge the fiction that a firearm's presence always will be foreseeable to persons participating in illegal drug transactions.... [A]t a minimum, we require that there be objective evidence that the defendant knew the weapon was present, or at least knew it was reasonably probable that his coconspirator would be armed." Cochran, 14 F.3d at 1133.
Defendant Marshon Mays first argues that the 100:1 sentencing ratio for crack versus powder cocaine is unconstitutional, but then admits that this circuit has consistently denied the unconstitutionality of the crack-powder ratio. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1488 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 858, 117 S. Ct. 158, 136 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1996); United States v. Tinker, 985 F.2d 241, 242 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1040, 113 S. Ct. 1872, 123 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1993). See also United States v. Gaines, 122 F.3d 324, 329-30 (6th Cir.) (holding that district court did not have authority to depart based on Sentencing Commission's proposal to eliminate the 100:1 ratio, because Congress affirmatively rejected that proposal), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S. Ct. 396, 139 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1997). We are bound by these circuit precedents.
Mays's second argument is that the government did not prove that the substance he distributed was the crack form of cocaine base. Because Mays did not object to the drug's characterization as crack at his plea hearing or sentencing, this court reviews the issue for plain error. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1277, 1281 (6th Cir.1987) ("Plain errors are limited to those harmful ones that are so rank that they should have been apparent to the trial judge without objection, or that strike at the fundamental fairness, honesty, or public reputation of the trial."), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1034, 108 S. Ct. 2019, 100 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1988). The government bears the burden of proving the substance was crack by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 982 (6th Cir.1998).
The district court did not commit plain error. The government relies on three unpublished opinions in the circuit which involved similar facts and upheld the sentencing for crack cocaine under the guidelines, the most similar of which is United States v. West, No. 96-3595, 1997 WL 640133 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S. Ct. 1092, 140 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1998). West held that the use of the term "crack" in the indictment, at the change of plea hearing, and in the uncontested facts of the presentence report, was enough to affirm the district court's decision that the government had proved the substance was crack by a preponderance of the evidence. In a recent published opinion, Jones, 159 F.3d 969, mentioned above, the defendant argued that the government needed to prove that the substance involved was processed using sodium bicarbonate. A panel of this court disagreed, citing a note to the drug quantity table in the Sentencing Guidelines that defines "crack" as "the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(n.D). Noting the term "usually," the panel concluded that the government did not have to prove the use of sodium bicarbonate, and on the facts before it, affirmed the district court's factual finding that the substance was crack.
In Mays's case, the term "crack" was used in the indictment, at the plea hearing, and in the uncontested facts of the presentence report. Mays pleaded guilty to the charge and did not contest the use of the term "crack" at any stage below. This distinguishes him from the defendants in United States v. James, 78 F.3d 851 (3d Cir.) (term "crack" only mentioned by counsel for the government, but not in the written documents and not by defendant), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 128, 136 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1996), and United States v. Johnson, 976 F. Supp. 284, 291 (D.Del.1997) ("Johnson consistently and unequivocally reserved his right to contest the Government's position that the cocaine base is crack for sentencing."), on which he relies. The district court's finding that a preponderance of the evidence proved the substance to be crack was not plain error.
Some of Crenshaw's accusations are technical deviations from Rule 11, but do not "affect substantial rights" and are thus harmless. These include the fact that the U.S. Attorney stated the potential sentence as a "mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, 5 years possible to a maximum of 40 years," J.A. at 451-52 (Tr. Plea Hr'g at 6-7), the fact that the district court failed to inquire into discussions between Crenshaw or his lawyer and the United States Attorney, and the fact that the district court said that it would "probably" send the defendant to prison if the guilty plea was accepted. J.A. at 453 (Tr. Plea Hr'g at 8). As to the first point, the district court restated the sentencing range afterwards, and it was written clearly in Paragraph Two of the plea agreement that Crenshaw signed. J.A. at 441. As to the second issue, the purpose of inquiring into discussions between the parties is to determine the nature of the plea agreement, a fact that is patently clear when the written document is signed. Last, the use of the word "probably" did not taint the plea agreement. The district court asked most of the usual questions during the plea colloquy, which substantially complied with the dictates of Rule 11. There is no indication that Crenshaw was confused or misled as to the nature of the proceedings, and any deviations amounted to harmless error. See, e.g., United States v. Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1178-80 (6th Cir.1994) (failure to notify defendant of mandatory minimum deemed harmless error), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S. Ct. 909, 130 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1995); United States v. Stead, 746 F.2d 355, 356-57 (6th Cir.1984) (failure to inform defendant of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to be free from self-incrimination deemed harmless error), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1030, 105 S. Ct. 1403, 84 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1985).
Second, Giles argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer withdrew most of the objections to the presentence report ("PSR")--specifically the one about the quantity of drugs for which Giles was responsible--at the sentencing hearing. Normally this court would not hear an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal; "[i]f the parties have adequately developed the record, however, the court can elect to hear the issue on direct appeal." United States v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 833 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1136, 116 S. Ct. 965, 133 L. Ed. 2d 886 (1996). Both sides have addressed the issue in their briefs, and Giles has new counsel on appeal, so we turn to the merits.
Although the lack of a sufficient factual basis for a plea can never be harmless error, see United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 114-15 (6th Cir.1995), this court has noted that " '[w]here the crime is easily understood, several courts have held that a reading of the indictment, or even a summary of the charges in the indictment and an admission by the defendant, is sufficient to establish a factual basis under Rule 11.' " United States v. Edgecomb, 910 F.2d 1309, 1313 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Van Buren, 804 F.2d 888, 892 (6th Cir.1986)). In Edgecomb, the court did little more than recite the count in the indictment and ask the defendants if they understood the charges against them, and the government read the facts constituting the conspiracy in that case. Such was held to be a sufficient factual basis under Rule 11. Id. In another Sixth Circuit case, the court noted that "Rule 11(f) does not provide any guidance concerning the steps a district court should take to ensure that a factual basis exists." United States v. Baez, 87 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 973, 117 S. Ct. 405, 136 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1996). There, "the court relied on the fact that the interpreter read the entire plea agreement to Baez before he signed it, and on Baez's one word affirmations that he had read and agreed with the paragraphs setting forth the factual basis for the plea." Id. Returning to Crump, then, and taking all the facts and circumstances of the plea hearing together, rather than focusing on the isolated few facts mentioned right before the acceptance of Crump's plea, we conclude that there was a sufficient factual basis for Crump's plea in this case. It was May 1994 before federal agents got involved in the investigation, which is why the specific instances cited by the federal agent on the stand were from that year. Evidence of Crump's substantial involvement in drug distribution during the years alleged in the indictment, however, was not lacking.
Defendant Wesley Moore argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him new counsel when requested. Moore was indicted in March and requested new counsel by letter on September 11, 1996, two weeks prior to trial. The district court held a hearing on the issue on September 18, 1996. A defendant is required to show good cause for a request to substitute counsel and to do so in a timely manner. A reviewing court takes several factors into account: timeliness of the motion; adequacy of the district court's inquiry into the matter; the extent of the conflict between the attorney and client and whether it resulted in a total lack of communication; and a balancing of these factors with "the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice." United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 148 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 n. 8 (6th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 975, 117 S. Ct. 411, 136 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1996).
DocketNumber： 96-3558
Citation Numbers： 176 F.3d 301
Modified Date： 2/6/2017
United States v. Larry Edward Stead , 746 F.2d 355 ( 1984 )
United States v. James Van Buren , 804 F.2d 888 ( 1986 )
United States v. Willie Joseph Causey, Jr. , 834 F.2d 1277 ( 1988 )
United States v. Robert E. Iles, Sr. , 906 F.2d 1122 ( 1990 )
United States v. Jeffrey Wayne Duncan , 918 F.2d 647 ( 1990 )
United States v. Billy Joe Cochran , 14 F.3d 1128 ( 1994 )
United States v. Alan Louis Bashara , 27 F.3d 1174 ( 1994 )
United States v. Robert Daniel Johnson , 46 F.3d 19 ( 1995 )
United States v. Ernest Glenn Pierce, Sr. (94-5841) and ... , 62 F.3d 818 ( 1995 )
United States v. Keith James , 78 F.3d 851 ( 1996 )
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United States v. Marrero , 651 F.3d 453 ( 2011 )
United States v. David Stafford , 258 F.3d 465 ( 2001 )
United States v. Curtis N. Mack , 258 F.3d 548 ( 2001 )
United States v. James G. Robertson , 260 F.3d 500 ( 2001 )
United States v. Nekis Atwater , 272 F.3d 511 ( 2001 )
United States v. Jesus Garcia-Meza , 315 F.3d 683 ( 2003 )
United States v. Anna Trujillo , 376 F.3d 593 ( 2004 )
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