Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/257/200/625386/
Timestamp: 2019-06-27 10:22:44
Document Index: 528855880

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 237', '§ 1227', '§ 16', '§ 1101', '§ 1192', '§ 1192', '§ 1227', '§ 1101', '§ 16', '§ 1192', '§ 1101', '§ 16', '§ 1252', '§ 1101', '§ 16', '§ 1101', '§ 16', '§ 1192', '§ 16', '§ 1192', '§ 1192', '§ 1192', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 101', '§ 1192', '§ 16', '§ 1101', '§ 1229', '§ 1193', '§ 16', '§ 1192', '§ 16', '§ 1101', '§ 1227']

Thomas Anthony Dalton, Petitioner, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States; Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondents, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 2001 › Thomas Anthony Dalton, Petitioner, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States; Immigrat...
Thomas Anthony Dalton, Petitioner, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States; Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondents, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001)
Argued: January 26, 2001Decided: July 20, 2001
Vacated. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States under § 237(a) (2) (A) (iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA"), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii) (2000), as an alien convicted of an "aggravated felony" based upon his New York State felony conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated ("DWI").1 Petitioner claims that his conviction does not amount to a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2000), as is required by the definition of "aggravated felony" provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (F) (2000).
Thomas Anthony Dalton, a native and citizen of Canada, has been living continuously in the United States as a lawful permanent resident since 1958, before he was one year old. His parents and siblings reside in the United States as well. Dalton has been convicted several times under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law ("NYVTL") § 1192.3 for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He pleaded guilty to his most recent DWI offense on January 15, 1998, and due to two previous convictions within ten years preceding the third, his crime and sentence were enhanced under NYVTL § 1192.1(c) (ii) to become a class D felony with an accompanying 1½ to 4½ years' imprisonment term.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii), " [a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable." An "aggravated felony" is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (F) as "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18...) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." A "crime of violence," in turn, is a term of art defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 as:(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
During two telephonic removal hearings, Dalton admitted that he was convicted under NYVTL § 1192.3, but denied the ground for removal, namely, that he had committed an "aggravated felony" as defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (F) or a "crime of violence" as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
As an initial matter, we note that the scope of our review in this case is limited jurisdictionally under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (C) (2000), which precludes judicial review of final orders of removal against aliens who are removable by reason of having committed, inter alia, an aggravated felony. We do retain jurisdiction, however, to review the question whether, as a matter of law, Dalton committed an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (F), as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16. See Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2000).
We also note that while we apply Chevron deference, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), to the BIA's interpretation of the INA, we review de novo its interpretation of federal or state criminal statutes. See Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, because the INA defines an "aggravated felony" in § 1101(a) (43) (F) by reference to a "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16, we review de novo the question whether NYVTL § 1192.3 constitutes a "crime of violence" that, in turn, constitutes a deportable "aggravated felony" under the INA.
Under the language of the statute, a § 16(b) "crime of violence" is analyzed "by its nature." We believe that this language compels an analysis that is focused on the intrinsic nature of the offense rather than on the factual circumstances surrounding any particular violation. See United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)); United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1312 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 140-41 (8th Cir. 1992). Under this approach, commonly referred to as the "categorical approach" to criminal statutory interpretation, "the singular circumstances of an individual petitioner's crimes should not be considered, and only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant [.]" Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d at 270 (Calabresi, J., dissenting); see also Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
In this Circuit, we have long endorsed categorical analyses of criminal statutes in the context of deportation orders for crimes of moral turpitude. See United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939). Our decisions in this area stand for the proposition that the offense, judged from an abstracted perspective, must inherently involve moral turpitude; in other words, any conduct falling within the purview of the statute must by its nature entail moral turpitude. See id. (holding that because defendant could be convicted under relevant statute for crimes not involving moral turpitude, statute could not form basis for order of deportation based upon commission of crime of moral turpitude); see also United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1933) (finding that conviction for second degree assault did not "inherent [ly]" involve moral turpitude because statute could encompass crimes that both did and did not involve moral turpitude); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022, 1022-23 (2d Cir. 1931) ("When by its definition [a statute] does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, the alien cannot be deported because in the particular instance his conduct was immoral."). More recently, we have reaffirmed this approach in Michel v. INS, where we stated that " [a]s a general rule, if a statute encompasses both acts that do and do not involve moral turpitude, the BIA cannot sustain a deportability finding [predicated on moral turpitude, based] on that statute." 206 F.3d at 263 (quoting Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 1996)).
NYVTL § 1192.3 provides, in its entirety, that " [n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." Recently, in People v. Prescott, 722 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. 2001), the New York Court of Appeals clarified the nature of the state DWI offense and the breadth of the statute. The Prescott Court held that attempted DWI was not a legally cognizable offense distinct from the substantive crime because the crime of attempt is already encompassed within NYVTL § 1192.3. See id. at 782. The court stressed that:
[T]he breadth of conduct prohibited by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, as interpreted by our courts, is sweeping. Our courts have long recognized that the definition of operation is broader than that of driving and that "' [a] person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of [the statute] when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle [.]'"
The United States Sentencing Guidelines recognized the difference between "use of force" and "injury" when it broadened the scope of its definition for "crimes of violence" under the career offender provision in § 4B1.2(a) (2). Before 1989, § 4B1.2(a) (2) referred to 18 U.S.C. § 16 for its definition of a "crime of violence." See Parson, 955 F.2d at 864. In 1989, the Sentencing Guidelines removed the reference to § 16 and instead defined a "crime of violence" by its resultant injury rather than by the use of force. See id. The current version of § 4B1.2(a) (2) provides:
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2) (2000). We agree with the Fifth Circuit that this change counsels against interpreting "risk of the use of physical force" and "risk of injury" the same way. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 926.
We have considered Dalton's arguments that under our recent decision in St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406 (2d. Cir. 2000) aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2271, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2001), he is eligible for a cancellation of removal and that INA § 101(a) (43) violates his due process rights. We find these arguments to be without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a felony DWI conviction under NYVTL § 1192.3 does not amount to a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C § 16(b) for purposes of defining an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (F). Accordingly, we vacate the deportation order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.10
Certain lawful permanent residents subject to deportation may seek discretionary cancellation of their order of removal. However, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (3) (2000), permanent residents convicted of any aggravated felony are expressly excepted from this group.
A felony DWI offense in New York requires two previous DWI convictions within the preceding ten years. Because many first-and second-time DWI convictions arise from guilty pleas, the record before the IJ will often be very spare and difficult to develop. See NYVTL § 1193(c) (ii).
In Tapia Garcia, the Tenth Circuit addressed the same question under Iowa law, but applied Chevron deference to affirm the BIA's deportation order. See 237 F.3d at 1220. Taking a categorical approach, the Tapia Garcia court declined to differentiate "risk of injury" from "use of force," reasoning that although the phrases "differ [] slightly..., the well-documented danger inherent in drunk driving supports the conclusion that a DUI offense may also constitute a crime of violence under § 16(b) [.]" Id. at 1223.
Unlike the majority, I believe that New York's felony DWI statute, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 1192.3, 1193.1(c), creates a "crime of violence" as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and therefore I believe that Dalton was convicted of an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (F) that properly renders him subject to deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii).