Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140131_0000750.PA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-21 13:36:40
Document Index: 424043284

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2511']

| [U] In re Adoption of E.J.D.
[U] In re Adoption of E.J.D.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF E.J.D. APPEAL OF: M.R.D., MOTHERv.IN RE: ADOPTION OF E.J.D. APPEAL OF: F.B., FATHER
Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2013, In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Orphans' Court Division, at No. 2013-A0008. BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT and PLATT [*] , JJ.
M.R.D. ("Mother") and F.B. ("Father") appeal from the orders entered on July 3, 2013, in the Orphan's Court Division of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.[1] These orders granted the petitions filed by the Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth ("OCY") to involuntarily terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights to their son, ("E.J.D." or "Child"), who was born in August of 2010, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). We affirm.
E.J.D. was first taken into care by the Bucks County Office of Children and Youth on June 10, 2011. On July 5, 2011, the Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth took custody of E.J.D., who was then approximately 11 months old, and placed him in a foster home. N.T. 3/8/2013, pp. 55-57. Later that month, both birth mother and birth father were arrested. Birth Mother was arrested on July 13, 2011, and remained incarcerated until February 29, 2012. Birth mother was again arrested on May 2, 2012, and incarcerated again until November 7, 2012. At that time, through the Behavioral Health Court, she was released to reside at the Pennsylvania Institute for Community Living [PICL], still under [trial court] supervision. N.T. 3/8/2013, p. 60. Birth father was also arrested in July of 2011, and remained incarcerated until November 30, 2011. N.T. p. 72.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/13, at 5.
On January 11, 2013, OCY filed a petition seeking the involuntary termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights to Child. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition on March 8, 2013. At the hearing, OCY presented the testimony of Child's foster mother, J.W., Cathy Milliman, the caseworker assigned to the case, Thomas Watkins, Mother's probation officer between December of 2008 and May of 2012, and Julia Solomon, the ongoing caseworker assigned to the case. N.T., 3/8/13, at 5, 19-20, 44, and 53-55. Mother presented the testimony of Kendrick Peer Mugnier, a licensed counselor who is the associate director of Pennsylvania Institute for Community Living ("PICL"). Id. at 131. Both Mother and Father, represented by separate counsel, testified on their own behalf.
The trial court found the following facts concerning Child:
E.J.D. is a child with significant special needs. According to his foster mother, E.J.D. qualifies for Early Intervention services and suffers from a speech delay, a gross motor delay, and has received speech therapy, occupational therapy, physical therapy and play therapy. His speech has improved markedly but he still receives physical therapy and occupational therapy, and is delayed in gross motor skills such as walking, running, jumping and climbing. He has issues with balance and also has a vision issue. His foster mother has taken him to numerous medical visits, including with a neurologist, developmental pediatricians, geneticist, ophthalmologist, as well as arranging for the various therapies mentioned and seeking Early Intervention services. N.T. March 8, 2013, pp. 5-13.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/13, at 4.
The trial court found the following facts concerning Mother:
Birth mother has a history of drug and alcohol abuse, including dependency on cocaine and a mental health diagnosis of bi-polar disorder. N.T. 3/8/2013, p. 45. Thomas Watkins, her probation officer from December 2008 through May 2012, testified that in April through June 2011, when E.J.D. was under one year old, he received "reports that she was living out of her car. There were several incidents with the police." Mt. [sic] Watkins confirmed that she was arrested on July 13, 2011. During the period that he was her probation officer, he stated that "[s]he had [a] period where she did very badly and periods where she did good. Between the three and a half years, she was arrested eight times by different police departments." N.T. 3/8/2013, p. 45.
As a result of these lengthy incarcerations, birth mother did not have visits with E.J.D. from the time Montgomery County OCY took custody of E.J.D. on July 5, 2011, until she attended one visit on April 26, 2012. The next visit for birth mother was scheduled for May 3, 2012, but birth mother was arrested on May 2, 2012, and did not attend this visit. During this period, although she was required to inform OCY of her release from prison and her address, she did not contact her caseworker for over a month following her first release from prison, February 29, 2012. N.T. 3/8/2013, p. 61. On August 31, 2012, the caseworker brought E.J.D. to the Montgomery County Correctional Facility for a visit with birth mother and birth mother asked that he not be brought to see her again at the prison. N.T. 3/8/2013, p. 67. Thus, from July 5, 2011, until November 16, 2012, birth mother had only two visits with E.J.D.
Birth mother had eight visits with E.J.D. between November 16, 2012 and March 12, 2013. The OCY caseworker testified that birth mother was nervous at these visits, and that E.J.D. appeared, at times, apprehensive. Given the lengthy period of separation between the birth mother and E.J.D., with only one visit between July 5, 2011 and August 31, 2012, none of the caseworkers observed a strong emotional bond between the birth mother and the child, even after visits resumed in late 2012.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/13, at 4-6.
The trial court found the following facts concerning Father.
Birth father attended no visits from the time E.J.D. was placed in care until the end of 2011, during most of which time [F]ather was incarcerated. However, from January 12, 2012 through July 19, 2012, [F]ather regularly attended bi-weekly visits. N.T. 93. From July 2012 through December 2012, birth father missed five of ten visits. N.T. 94. From December 20, 2012 through February 28, 2013, [F]ather missed four of six visit [sic] scheduled.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/13, at 6.
On July 3, 2013, the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to Child, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on July 25, 2013. On July 30, 2013, Father filed his notice of appeal. The trial court appointed new counsel to represent Father on July 30, 2013. On August 14, 2013, Father's new counsel filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).[2]
1. [Whether] the lower court erred in its order of July 3, 2013 in terminating the parental rights of [Mother] because the appellant, [Mother], did substantially cooperate and comply with the demands of Petitioner, the Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth?
2. [Whether] the lower court erred in its order of July 3, 2013 in terminating the parental rights of [Mother] because the Appellant, [Mother], did make substantial and successful efforts while in prison and in a residential treatment facility to improve herself as a person and as a parent[?]
3. [Whether] the lower court erred in its order of July 3, 2013 in terminating the parental rights of [Mother] because the Office of Children and Youth did not show competent evidence establishing Appellant, [Mother], evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to [Child][?]
4. [Whether] the lower court erred in its order of July 3, 2013 in terminating the parental rights of [Mother] because the Office of Children and Youth did not show competent evidence establishing Appellant, [Mother], neglected or refused to remedy the conditions which cause the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence[?]
A. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its discretion when it terminated parental rights of a [sic] Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) when Father, after a period of incarceration, has taken steps to remedy his incapacity including steady employment, housing, transportation and involvement with his minor son?
B. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its discretion when it terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) because Montgomery County Children & Youth Services cannot satisfy [§] 2511(a)(8) that [] the child has been removed from the care of the parent who did not have care of the child for a period of at least six months?
Father's Brief, at 8 (unnumbered pages).
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567, ] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009). Moreover, we have explained that the standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as "testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing" as to enable the fact-finder to come to a clear conviction, "without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2003)). This Court may affirm the decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we will focus on section 2511(a)(2). Section 2511 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) General rule. The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(b) Other considerations. The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
Birth mother's goals, as identified by OCY, included recovery from substance abuse, mental health treatment, and obtaining safe and stable housing. Through her participation in Behavioral Health Court[, ] birth mother was referred to the Pennsylvania Institute for Community Living (PICL)[, ] where birth mother is in a residential treatment program customized for her dual diagnosis of mental health issues and substance abuse. This program cannot accommodate a child living with her. Therefore, birth mother does not yet have a home to which she can bring E.J.D. Birth mother presented a letter from the Honorable Joseph Smyth of the Behavioral Health Court, which states that the [PICL] is an 18-month residential treatment program, where she receives treatment for both her mental health diagnosis and her substance abuse issues. If she were to remain at PICL for the full 18 months, she would reside there until April of 2014, although it is possible that a participant may be released early if they have made sufficient progress and have appropriate housing. Exhibit M-1. Kendrick Peer Mungier, [sic] director of PICL, testified that residents generally complete the program in 12 to 18 months, and that as of March 8, 2013, birth mother was in the second phase of the program of four phases. N.T. 134-135. Both the letter from Judge Smyth in the Behavioral Health Court, and the letter of [Case Management Supervisor] Doug Black, Jr., introduced as Exhibit M-1, indicate that birth mother is making significant progress and highly motivated, and trying to identify housing for when she leaves the program.
Birth father's goals included attendance at anger management classes. He repeatedly resisted attending anger management classes. Eventually he did attend classes, but he continued to have confrontational conversations with the OCY caseworker. "Yelling and being very argumentative with me, refusing to listen to what I have to say, you know, just continually argument [sic], not listening at all, certainly also bringing in personal insults to the conversation." N.T. p. 81. The caseworker testified that birth father was generally uncooperative with her in terms of providing information regarding his mother's mental health, which was relevant because he proposed living in his mother's home as a home appropriate for E.J.D., and also with respect to obtaining and providing to OCY a psychological evaluation.
For both parents, a significant requirement is learning about, understanding, and being able to meet E.J.D.'s very significant special needs. OCY Caseworker Julia Solomon testified that birth father has not made much progress on this goal, as he attended an Early Intervention meeting [relating] to E.J.D., and "he basically argued with everything they said about [E.J.D.'s] needs and what was necessary for them. . . . He was continually minimizing E.J.D.'s needs to me in conversations, multiple conversations regarding his needs, what therapies are necessary, everything that's going on with them, and he's continued to say he will be fine in a couple of months, you know, I don't see any problem, people are overreacting. . . ." N.T.[, ] pp. 88-90.
Both birth father and birth mother testified that they are making significant progress and earnestly seek to parent E.J.D. Each of them expresses love and affection for E.J.D. Each of them made efforts to address some of the requirements of OCY in order to attempt to be reunified with E.J.D. Birth mother, for example, has taken parenting classes, including a class specifically for parents with mental illness. N.T. 119. To her very great credit, birth mother has entered a program to maintain recovery from substance abuse and to address her mental health needs and prepare herself for independent living. As she herself testified, she has come a long way and now, through Behavioral Health Court and PICL[, ] has been given a great opportunity to turn her life around.
Yet it is impossible to escape the conclusion that for a period of over two years, neither parent has been able to provide a stable, safe, nurturing home for E.J.D. For a critical period from June 2011 until January 2012, neither parent had any visits with E.J.D. For a time during the first half of 2012, birth father's visits were consistent, but later they became inconsistent. Because of her lengthy periods of incarceration, and her failure to contact OCY promptly when she was released, birth mother had only three visits with E.J.D. over nearly 18 months between July 2011 and December 1, 2012. Neither parent has provided for E.J.D. financially, and neither has provided a home for him, nor is either of them currently prepared to provide a home for him.
Although birth father did not test positive for drug use, his behavior with OCY caseworkers was, at times, aggressive and confrontational, and many months passed during which he did not provide OCY with a completed psychological evaluation or provide proof that he complied with its recommendations. He suggested that a home with his mother would be a suitable home for him and E.J.D., but did not reveal to OCY his mother's mental health issues, and did not provide adequate information to OCY to permit the agency to evaluate the home.
Most significantly, neither parent has maintained a strong parental bond with E.J.D., and neither parent is fully prepared to understand and meet all of E.J.D.'s many special needs.
Overall, these facts indicated to me by clear and convincing evidence that OCY has met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence grounds for terminating the parental rights of both birth mother and birth father, . . . under section 2511(a)(2). . . . Because both birth mother and birth father lack the capability at this time to provide a stable, safe home for E.J.D., and to meet all of his special needs, OCY has established by clear and convincing evidence the incapacity to parent under section 2511(a)(2). In this case, each of these birth parents have an opportunity to continue to progress and improve their situations and in the future may make fine parents to another child. However, E.J.D. has now been in foster care for more than two years and it is not reasonable for him to be expected to wait still longer for the possibility that either of these parents may make more progress and become ready and able to parent him.
OCY has also established the [sic] some of the conditions that led to the removal of E.J.D. from the home continue to exist. Although birth mother's substance abuse and mental health issues are now being treated and she is making significant progress toward her goal of independent living, she has not yet achieved this goal and is not yet able to provide a safe and stable home for E.J.D. Moreover, neither she nor birth father has provided for E.J.D. and been consistent in visits and in maintaining a healthy parent[-]child relationship with E.J.D. Birth father has not fully addressed his anger issues that led, in part, to the altercation that resulted in E.J.D. being placed in foster care. Therefore, the conditions that led to his placement in foster care continue to exist. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/13, at 6-10.
The focus is on whether the parent utilized resources available, including during periods when [the parent] was in prison, to maintain a relationship with his or her child. An incarcerated parent is expected to utilize all available resources to foster a continuing close relationship with his or her children. In the Interest of A.P., 692 A.2d 240, 245 (Pa.Super. 1997). In summary, it is not enough that the birth parents now state that the [sic] are improving their lives and are now ready to begin to parent E.J.D. He has needed parents all along and these birth parents have been inconsistent and incapable of providing for him.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/13, at 11.
Our Supreme Court, in its plurality decision in R.I.S., stated that the incarceration of a parent, standing alone, cannot constitute proper grounds for the termination of that parent's rights to his child. R.I.S., 36 A.3d at 574. Thereafter, in In re Adoption of S.P., the Supreme Court reiterated that "a parent has an affirmative duty to love, protect and support his child and to make an effort to maintain communication and association with that child." In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (quoting McCray, 331 A.2d at 655). Also in In re Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court revisited its decision in In re R.I.S. and stated:
[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of providing "essential parental care, control or subsistence" and the length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether "the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent . . . ."
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830.
As the Supreme Court definitively ruled in In re Adoption of S.P., the trial court may examine the effect of a parent's incarceration in ruling on a termination petition. Herein, the trial court appropriately considered the incarcerations of Mother and Father in addressing the evidence offered to support the termination of their parental rights. The trial court also considered that, even when not incarcerated, both parents had failed to provide Child with the essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and conditions, and that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parents.
"Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities." In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted). "[A] parent's vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court could have properly refused to consider the parents' indication that they wished an opportunity to improve their parenting in the future.
As we discern competent evidence in the record supporting the credibility and weight assessments of the trial court, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father under section 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826–827.
Next, although neither Mother nor Father specifically challenged the trial court's findings under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), we will address this issue nonetheless and review whether the requirements of section 2511(b) have been met. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (addressing section 2511(b) where the parent did not challenge the trial court's findings relative to that subsection). We note that the focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under section 2511(b), the focus is on the child. Id. at 1008.
In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include "[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability." In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child's "needs and welfare" requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The "utmost attention" should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Here, the trial court found the following regarding the bond between Child and his birth parents and his bond with his foster parents.
OCY Caseworker Cathy Milliman testified that birth mother and E.J.D. do not have a bond, stating "I don't think at this point [E.J.D.] really recognizes who mom is, because for a big part of his life she wasn't there. Although I did witness her getting him to call her "mommy" one day. He repeated it after her. He doesn't have any anxiety about leaving. He doesn't have any anxiety about coming. He is pretty easy going." N.T. 3/8/2013, p. 24. Ms. Milliman also stated that E.J.D. "enjoys playing with [birth mother] for an hour when she visits, but he doesn't have a relationship with her like a mother to a child." N.T. 3/8/2013, p. 28. Julia Solomon testified that she has not observed a "typical father-and-son bond between" birth father and E.J.D.
N.T. 3/28/2013, p. 96. The caseworker also testified that E.J.D. would not suffer irreparable harm if the parental rights of either of his birth parents was terminated. See N.T. p. 96-97.
Ms. Milliman testified that E.J.D. is very comfortable in the foster home. He "fits in." He's part of the family. He plays with the two other children in the home. . . . He turns to [the foster parents] for comfort and support." N.T. 3/8/2013, p. 24.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/13, at 8.
At this point, I am bound to consider the best interests of the child, E.J.D. Section 2511(b) of the Adoption [A]ct requires the [c]ourt to give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The health and safety of the child supercedes [sic] all other considerations. In considering the child's needs and welfare, a court must consider the role of the parental bond in the child's life. I am required by prior case decisions to fully consider whether a parental bond exists to such an extent that severing this natural relationship would be contrary to the needs and welfare of the child. In this case, the testimony clearly established that, although there is affection and each parent cares for and plays with the child, the birth parents have not maintained sufficient and consistent contact and there is no parental bond between the child and either birth parent.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed the delicate balance between preserving the family unit and preventing a state of constant uncertainty and limbo for a child who has no reasonable prospects for returning home to the care of his or her natural parent. In such a case, our Supreme Court has said:
The policy of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect, where, as here, disruption of the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it without serious emotional harm to the child. . . . the issue is not whether the state should intrude to disrupt an ongoing family relationship, but where [sic] the state should seek to preserve in law a relationship that no longer exists in fact, with the result that the child is consigned indefinitely to the limbo of foster care or the impersonal care of institutions.
In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, at 348-49, 383 A.2d 1228 at 1241 (1978).
In this case, these birth parents have not provided a home, have not met E.J.D.'s needs, and have not maintained a consistent and strong parent[-]child relationship. Their desire to start over at this time is insufficient to meet E.J.D.'s needs for consistent and reliable love, affection and responsibility. [The trial court] concludes that the emotional needs and welfare of E.J.D. can best be met be [sic] termination of the parental rights of both birth parents, and that E.J.D. will not suffer a detriment as a result of termination of the parental rights of his birth parents.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/13, at 11-12.
As illustrated in the foregoing, the record reflects that the trial court appropriately considered Child's best interests and conducted a bond-effect analysis in deciding whether to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father, and we affirm the court's decision as to section 2511(b).
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the record supports the credibility and weight assessment of the trial court. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826–827. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), and we affirm the orders entered on July 3, 2013.