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Schlesinger Vs Reservists Committee - Citation 103467 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Schlesinger Vs. Reservists Committee - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/103467
Case Number 418 U.S. 208
Respondent Reservists Committee
schlesinger v. reservists committee - 418 u.s. 208 (1974) u.s. supreme court schlesinger v. reservists committee, 418 u.s. 208 (1974) schlesinger v. reservists committee to stop the war no. 72-1188 argued january 14, 1974 decided june 25, 1974 418 u.s. 208 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit syllabus respondents -- an association of present and former members of the armed forces reserve opposing united states involvement in vietnam, and five association members who were united states citizens and taxpayers -- brought a class action on behalf, inter alia, of all united states citizens and taxpayers against petitioners, the secretary of defense and the three.....
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee - 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
U.S. Supreme Court Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
1. Respondents had no standing to sue as citizens, since the claimed nonobservance of the Incompatibility Clause which they assert deprives citizens of the faithful discharge of the legislative duties of reservist Members of Congress implicates only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance, and is thus merely an abstract injury, rather than the concrete injury that is essential to satisfy Art. III's "case or controversy" requirement. Pp. 418 U. S. 216 -227.
2. Respondents also lacked standing to sue as taxpayers, since they failed to establish the required "logical nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 , 392 U. S. 102 . Pp. 418 U. S. 227 -228.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 418 U. S. 228 . DOUGLAS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 418 U. S. 229 . BRENNAN, J., post, p. 418 U. S. 235 , and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 418 U. S. 238 , filed dissenting opinions.
Respondents, the Reservists Committee to Stop the War and certain named members thereof, [ Footnote 1 ] challenged the Reserve membership of Members of Congress [ Footnote 2 ] as being
As relevant here, citizens and taxpayers were alleged in respondents' complaint to have suffered injury because Members of Congress holding a Reserve position in the Executive Branch were said to be subject to the possibility of undue influence by the Executive Branch, [ Footnote 3 ] in violation of the concept of the independence of Congress implicit in Art. I of the Constitution. Reserve membership was also said to place upon Members of Congress possible inconsistent obligations which might cause them to violate their duty faithfully to perform as reservists or as Members of Congress. Reserve membership by Members of Congress thus, according to respondents' complaint,
to rest exclusively with Congress, not the courts, under Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 , 395 U. S. 550 (1969).
In response to petitioners' contention that the Incompatibility Clause sets forth a qualification only for Membership in the Congress, which Congress alone might judge, the District Court characterized the issue as whether respondents presented a nonjusticiable "political question," resolution of which by the text of the Constitution was committed to the Congress under Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 217 (1962). The court held that the failure of the Executive Branch to remove reservist Members of Congress from their Reserve positions was justiciable.
Having resolved the issues of standing and political question in favor of respondents, the District Court held on the merits that a commission in the Reserves is an "Office under the United States" within the meaning of the Incompatibility Clause. On the basis of the foregoing, the court, in its final order, granted partial summary judgment for respondents by declaring that the Incompatibility Clause renders a Member of Congress ineligible, during his continuance in office, to hold a Reserve "commission"; the court denied such parts of respondents' motion for summary judgment which sought a permanent injunction and relief in the nature of mandamus. [ Footnote 4 ] 323 F.Supp. at 843.
In Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 392 U. S. 95 , the Court noted that the concept of justiciability, which expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts by the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III, embodies both the standing and political question doctrines upon which petitioners in part rely. Each of these doctrines poses a distinct and separate limitation, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 512 ; Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 198 , so that either the absence of standing or the presence of a political question suffices to prevent the power of the federal judiciary from being invoked by the complaining party. The more sensitive and complex task of determining whether a particular issue presents a political question causes courts, as did the District Court here, to turn initially, although not invariably, [ Footnote 5 ] to the question of standing to sue. In light of the District Court's action, we turn to petitioners' contention that respondents lacked standing to bring the suit. Our conclusion that the District Court erred in holding that respondents had standing to sue as United States citizens,
The District Court considered standing as to each of the four capacities in which respondents brought suit; it rejected standing as to three of the four, holding that respondents could sue only as citizens. The Court of Appeals' judgment of affirmance, based solely upon the opinion of the District Court, did not alter the District Court's ruling on standing. The standing question presented in the petition for certiorari is addressed to the District Court's holding on citizen standing and seeks to add the question whether respondents also had standing as taxpayers. [ Footnote 6 ] Respondents do not contend that the District Court erred in denying standing to them in the other two capacities in which they sought to proceed, i.e., as opponents of American military involvement in Vietnam, and as reservists. We therefore proceed to consideration of respondents' standing only as citizens and taxpayers.
The only interest all citizens share in the claim advanced by respondents is one which presents injury in the abstract. Respondents seek to have the Judicial Branch compel the Executive Branch to act in conformity with the Incompatibility Clause, an interest shared by all citizens. The very language of respondents' complaint, supra at 418 U. S. 212 , reveals that it is nothing more than a matter of speculation whether the claimed nonobservance of that Clause deprives citizens of the faithful discharge of the legislative duties of reservist Members of Congress. And that claimed nonobservance, standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance, and that is an abstract injury. [ Footnote 7 ] The Court has previously declined to treat "generalized grievances" about the conduct of Government as a basis for taxpayer standing. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 106 . We consider now whether a citizen has standing to sue under such a generalized complaint.
Id. at 369 U. S. 204 . Although dealing with a case of claimed taxpayer standing, Flast v. Cohen, supra, gave further meaning to the need for a "personal stake" in noting that it was meant to assure that the complainant seeking to adjudicate his claim was the "proper party" to present the claim "in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 100 , 392 U. S. 101 . In the circumstances of Flast, the Court held that the taxpayer-complainant before it had established a relationship between his status as a taxpayer and his claim under the Taxing and Spending Clause sufficient to give assurance
Id. at 392 U. S. 106 . While Flast noted that the "case or controversy" limitation on the federal judicial power found in Art. III is a "blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations," id. at 392 U. S. 97 , the Court, subsequently, in the context of judicial review of regulatory agency action, held that whatever else the "case or controversy" requirement embodied, its essence is a requirement of "injury in fact." Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 , 397 U. S. 152 (1970). Although we there noted that the categories of judicially cognizable injury were being broadened, id. at 397 U. S. 154 , we have more recently stressed that the broadening of categories "is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury."
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 , 405 U. S. 738 (1972). And, in defining the nature of that injury, we have only recently stated flatly: "Abstract injury is not enough." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 , 414 U. S. 494 (1974).
302 U.S. at 634. [ Footnote 8 ]
The Court has today recognized the continued vitality of Levitt, [ Footnote 9 ] United States v. Richardson, ante, at 418 U. S. 176 -179; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1 , 408 U. S. 13 (1972). We reaffirm Levitt in holding that standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here, which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution. It adds the essential dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining party have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful. This personal stake is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance. Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the judicial process, for a court must rely on the parties' treatment of the facts and claims before it to develop its rules of law. [ Footnote 10 ] Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court, aided by parties who argue within the context, is capable of making decisions.
McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151 , 235 U. S. 164 (1914). Second, the discrete factual context within which the concrete injury occurred or is threatened insures the framing of relief no broader than required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling would be applied. This is especially important when the relief sought produces a confrontation with one of the coordinate branches of the Government; here, the relief sought would, in practical effect, bring about conflict with two coordinate branches.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 11 ] Our conclusion that there is no citizen standing here, apart from being in accord with all other federal courts of appeals that have considered the question, until the
Court of Appeals' holding now under review, [ Footnote 12 ] is also consistent with the recent holdings of this Court. It is one thing for a court to hear an individual's complaint that certain specific government action will cause that person private competitive injury, Association of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970), or a complaint that individual enjoyment of certain natural resources has been impaired by such action, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669 , 412 U. S. 687 (1973), but it is another matter to allow a citizen to call on the courts to resolve abstract questions. [ Footnote 13 ] The former provides the setting for a focused consideration of a concrete injury. In the latter, although allegations assert an arguable conflict with some limitation of the Constitution, it can be only a matter of speculation whether the claimed violation has caused concrete injury to the particular complainant.
Finally, the several considerations advanced by the District Court in support of respondents' standing as citizens do not militate against our conclusion that it was error to grant standing to respondents as citizens. First, the District Court acknowledged that any injury resulting from the reservist status of Members of Congress was hypothetical, but stressed that the Incompatibility Clause was designed to prohibit such potential for injury. [ Footnote 14 ] 323 F.Supp. at 840. This rationale fails, however, to compensate for the respondents' failure to present a claim under that Clause which alleges concrete injury. The claims of respondents here, like the claim under the Ineligibility Clause in Levitt, supra, would require courts to deal with a difficult and sensitive issue of constitutional adjudication on the complaint of one who does not allege "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 204 . To support standing there must be concrete injury in a form which assures "the necessary specificity" called for by Flast, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 106 , and "that concrete adverseness . . . upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 204 .
Standing was thus found by premature evaluation of the merits of respondents' complaint. [ Footnote 15 ]
The District Court next acknowledged this Court's longstanding reluctance to entertain "generalized grievances about the conduct of government," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 106 , but distinguished respondents' complaint from such grievances by characterizing the Incompatibility Clause as "precise [and] self-operative." 323 F.Supp. at 840. Even accepting that characterization of the Clause, it is not an adequate substitute for the judicially cognizable injury not present here. Moreover, that characterization rested, as did the preceding characterization, on an interpretation of the Clause by way of the Court's preliminary appraisal of the merits of respondents' claim before standing was found. In any event, the Ineligibility Clause involved in Levitt, supra, is no less specific or less "precise [and] self-operative" than the Incompatibility Clause.
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 , 342 U. S. 435 (1952). This same theme a to the inadequacy of motivation to support standing is suggested in the Court's opinion in Sierra Club, supra:
405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 739 . Respondents' motivation has indeed brought them sharply into conflict with petitioners, but, as the Court has noted, motivation is not a substitute for the actual injury needed by the courts and adversaries to focus litigation efforts and judicial decisionmaking. Moreover, the evaluation of the quality of the presentation on the merits was a retrospective judgment that could have properly been arrived at only after standing had been found so as to permit the court to consider the merits. A logical corollary to this approach would be the manifestly untenable view that the inadequacy of the presentation on the merits would be an appropriate basis for denying standing.
was meant to serve the interests of all. Such a generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a "case or controversy" appropriate for judicial resolution. [ Footnote 16 ] The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.
Closely linked to the idea that generalized citizen interest is a sufficient basis for standing was the District Court's observation that it was not irrelevant that, if respondents could not obtain judicial review of petitioners' action, "then, as a practical matter, no one can." Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes. The assumption that, if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing is not a reason to find standing. See United States v. Richardson, ante at 418 U. S. 179 .
nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated," 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 102 . In Flast, the Court determined that the taxpayer demonstrated such a "logical nexus" because, (1) he challenged the exercise of "congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8 . . ." and (2) "the challenged enactment exceed[ed] specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power" under Art. I, § 8. Id. at 102-103.
Here, the District Court, applying the Flast holding, denied respondents' standing as taxpayers for failure to satisfy the nexus test. We agree with that conclusion, since respondents did not challenge an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve status. [ Footnote 17 ]
That court thus held in effect that, if no justiciable question is presented, no one has standing. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1152 (1973). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 , 405 U. S. 731 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 , 392 U. S. 100 (1968).
The Court cited a number of cases in support of its holding, nearly all of which contained language similar to that quoted in the text. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 , 262 U. S. 488 (1923) (insufficient for a party to show "merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally"); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126 , 258 U. S. 129 -130 (1922) ("Plaintiff has only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted. Obviously this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit"); Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405 , 179 U. S. 406 (1900) ("even in a proceeding which he prosecutes for the benefit of the public . . . , [the plaintiff] must generally aver an injury peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens"). See also Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475 , 189 U. S. 486 (1903) (Holmes, J.) ("The plaintiff alleges that the whole registration scheme of the Alabama constitution is a fraud upon the Constitution of the United States, and asks us to declare it void. But, of course, he could not maintain a bill for a mere declaration in the air"). Cf. Newman v. Frizzell, 238 U. S. 537 , 238 U. S. 550 (1915).
The Court has also recently cited with approval two of the principal cases relied upon in Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, was used for support in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 , 414 U. S. 494 (1974), as was Fairchild v. Hughes, supra, used in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 208 (1962).
We have expressed apprehension about claims of standing based on "mere interest in a problem.'" See, e.g., Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 739 . Earlier cases of the Court evidenced comparable concern. See, e.g., Newman v. Frizzell, 238 U.S. at 238 U. S. 552 n. 8.
Lamm v. Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202, 1204 (CA10 1971); Pietsch v. President of United States, 434 F.2d 861, 863 (CA2 1970) (Clark, J.); Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171, 174 (CA5 1969) (citing Levitt, supra ); Velyel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236, 239 (CA10 1969); Pauling v. McElroy, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 374, 278 F.2d 252, 254 (1960); cf. Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d 94, 97 (CA2 1971). And aside from the decision under review, the only other opinion that appears to have ruled otherwise is Atlee v. Laird, 339 F.Supp. 1347 (ED Pa.1972), which relied upon the decision of the District Court here. Id. at 1357 n. 8.
In Baker v. Carr, the Court cited with approval the early case of Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33 (1885), where it was held that a federal court can adjudge rights only "in actual controversies." Id. at 113 U. S. 39 .
The District Court made analogy to conflict of interest statutes which, it said, are directed at avoiding circumstances of potential, not actual, impropriety. We have no doubt that, if the Congress enacted a statute creating such a legal right, the requisite injury for standing would be found in an invasion of that right. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 493 n. 2; Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614 , 410 U. S. 617 n. 3 (1973); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 , 397 U. S. 154 (1970). But to satisfy the Art. III prerequisite, the complaining party would still be required to allege a specific invasion of the right suffered by him. Standing could not be found -- as it is not here -- in a citizen who alleged no more than the right of all other citizens to have government conducted without what he perceived, without himself having suffered concrete harm, to be proscribed conflicts of interest.
Looking "to the substantive issues" which Flast stated to be both "appropriate and necessary" in relation to taxpayer standing was for the express purpose of determining "whether there is a logical nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 102 . This step is not appropriate on a claim of citizen standing, since the Flast nexus test is not applicable where the taxing and spending power is not challenged. Hence, there was no occasion for the District Court or the Court of Appeals to reach or evaluate what it saw as the merits of respondents' complaint.
As noted earlier, supra at 418 U. S. 211 , respondents requested the District Court to compel petitioners to seek to reclaim Reserve pay received by reservist Members of Congress. Such relief would follow from the invalidity of Executive action in paying persons who could not lawfully have been reservists, not from the invalidity of the statutes authorizing pay to those who lawfully were Reservists.
I agree with the Court that the respondents lack standing to sue either as citizens or taxpayers in this case. Here, unlike United States v. Richardson, ante, p. 418 U. S. 166 , the respondents do not allege that the petitioners have refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed upon
them by the Constitution. Nor can there be taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 , since there is simply no challenge to an exercise of the taxing and spending power.
The Court's judgment in this case is wholly consistent with United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669 . Standing is not today found wanting because an injury has been suffered by many, but rather because none of the respondents has alleged the sort of direct, palpable injury required for standing under Art. III. Like the plaintiff in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 , the respondents seek only to air what we described in Flast as "generalized grievances about the conduct of government." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 106 . Our prior cases make clear that such abstract allegations cannot suffice to confer Art. III standing, and I therefore join the opinion and judgment of the Court.
Our leading case is Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 , decided in 1923, where a taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of an Act of Congress that gave grants
Id. at 262 U. S. 487 -488. That ruling had in it an admixture of the "political question" because, said the Court, the only occasion when the federal court may act is when a federal law results in "some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue." Id. at 262 U. S. 488 . When that element is lacking, judicial intrusion would trespass on powers granted another department of Government.
Id. at 262 U. S. 488 -489.
In 1968 -- 45 years after Frothingham -- that case was revisited in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 , where federal taxpayers sued to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds under an Act of Congress granting financial aid to religious schools. The Court held that those taxpayers did have "standing" to sue for two reasons. First, because they challenged the exercise of congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, not the incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. Second, because the challenged enactment exceeded the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power. See 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 102 -104. Therefore, the Court concluded that the taxpayer had "the requisite personal stake," id. at 392 U. S. 101 , in the litigation to have "standing" to sue, and the Court went on to hold that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment "operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 104 .
"no Person holding any Office [ Footnote 2/1 ] under the United
Article I, § 6, cl. 2, is often referred to as the Incompatibility Clause. At the 1783 convention, some proposed that Members of Congress be allowed to serve in the Executive Branch, [ Footnote 2/2 ] others were opposed; Mason apparently represented the majority view when he insisted that "ineligibility will keep out corruption, by excluding office-hunters." [ Footnote 2/3 ] Article I, § 6, cl. 2, like the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, "was designed as a specific bulwark against such potential abuses . . . and . . . operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon" such expenditures. Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 392 U. S. 104 .
The interest of citizens in guarantees written in the Constitution seems obvious. Who other than citizens has a better right to have the Incompatibility Clause enforced? It is their interests that the Incompatibility Clause was designed to protect. The Executive Branch under our regime is not a fiefdom or principality competing with the Legislative as another center of power. It operates within a constitutional framework, and it is that constitutional framework that these citizens want to keep intact. That is, in my view, their rightful concern. We have insisted that more than generalized grievances of a citizen be shown, that he must have a "personal stake in the outcome," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 . But that "personal stake" need not be a monetary one. In Baker v. Carr, it was the right to vote, an important badge of citizenship. The "personal stake" in the present case is keeping the Incompatibility Clause an operative force in the Government by freeing the entanglement of the federal bureaucracy with the Legislative Branch.
The interest of the citizen in this constitutional question is, of course, common to all citizens. But as we said in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669 , 412 U. S. 687 -688,
The "standing" of a plaintiff to be heard on a claim of invasion of his alleged legally protected right is established, in my view, by his good faith allegation that " the challenged action has caused him injury in fact.'" Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 , 397 U. S. 167 -168 (1970) (concurring in the result and dissenting). The Court's further inquiry, in each of these cases, into the connection between "the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question," Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 , 397 U. S. 153 (1970), and the "interest sought to be protected by the complainant," ibid., is relevant not to "standing," but, if at all, only to such limitations on exercise of the judicial function as justiciability, see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), or reviewability, see, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 , 387 U. S. 140 (1967).
with regard to either of these requirements, it is open to him to move for summary judgment and compel respondents to establish their position. See Barlow, supra, at 397 U. S. 175 . More stringent requirements, such as the Court's demand that these respondents satisfy Flast's "nexus" requirement, are not appropriate issues for resolution under the rubric of "standing." Since I would find the injury-in-fact requirement met by respondents' taxpayer allegation, I have no occasion to reach the question whether respondent Reservists Committee and its members' allegations of injury to their interests as citizen would be sufficient to confer standing under the circumstances of this case.
" Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 (1962). In other words, when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue, and not whether the issue itself is justiciable."
Id. at 392 U. S. 99 -100.
The two-pronged test fashioned by Flast was not a qualification upon these general principles, but was fashioned solely as a determinant of standing of plaintiffs alleging only injury as taxpayers who challenge alleged violations of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. See Barlow v. Collins, supra, at 397 U. S. 170 -172. The extension of that test to the very different challenges here only produces the confusion evidenced by the differing views of the Flast test expressed in the several opinions filed today in these cases. Outside its proper sphere, as my Brother POWELL soundly observes, that test is not "a reliable indicator of when a federal taxpayer has standing." United States v. Richardson, ante, at 418 U. S. 180 . We avoid that confusion if, as I said in Barlow, supra, at 397 U. S. 176 , we recognize:
* [This opinion applies also to No. 72-885, United States et al. v. Richardson, ante, p. 418 U. S. 166 .]
I agree with my Brother DOUGLAS that respondents have standing as citizens to bring this action. I cannot accept the majority's characterization of respondents' complaint as alleging only "injury in the abstract" and " generalized grievances' about the conduct of the Government."
Ante at 418 U. S. 217 . According to their complaint, respondents are present and former members of the various Armed Forces Reserves
Respondents nevertheless had a right under the First Amendment to attempt to persuade Congressmen to end the war in Vietnam. And respondents have alleged a right, under the Incompatibility Clause, to have their arguments considered by Congressmen not subject to a conflict of interest by virtue of their positions in the Armed Forces Reserves. Respondents' complaint therefore states, in my view, a claim of direct and concrete injury to a judicially cognizable interest. It is a sad commentary on our priorities that a litigant who contends that a violation of a federal statute has interfered with his aesthetic appreciation of natural resources can have that claim heard by a federal court, see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669 , 412 U. S. 687 (1973), while one who contends that a violation of a specific provision of the United