Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2004/95243.html
Timestamp: 2019-06-26 05:43:28
Document Index: 79185651

Matched Legal Cases: ['§86', '§1', '§86', '§86', '§86', '§821', '§88', '§821', '§39', '§821', '§821', '§821', '§834', '§834', '§927', '§927', '§790', '§821', '§821', '§826', '§827', '§828', '§829', '§821', '§921', '§927', '§821', '§821', '§41', '§824', '§824', '§824', '§42', '§44', '§44', '§33', '§33', '§821', '§821', '§821', '§821', '§8', '§6']

City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. :: 2004 :: Supreme Court of Illinois Decisions :: Illinois Case Law :: Illinois Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Illinois Case Law › Supreme Court of Illinois Decisions › 2004 › City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
"There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all people, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition." W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §86, at 616 (5th ed. 1984).
"that class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use by a person of his own property, real or personal, or from his own improper, indecent or unlawful personal conduct, working an obstruction of, or injury to, a right of another or of the public. *** It is a part of the great social compact to which every person is a party, a fundamental and essential principle in every civilized community, that every person yields a portion of his right of absolute dominion ***." H. Wood, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances §1, at 1-3 (3d ed. 1893).
The promulgation of the Restatement of Torts in 1939 was the first "significant attempt to determine some limits to the types of tort liability" associated with nuisance. W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §86, at 617 (5th ed. 1984). Two lines of development in the case law were noted, one "narrowly restricted to the invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land," which has come to be known as private nuisance; the other "extending to virtually any form of annoyance or inconvenience interfering with common public rights," which is known as public nuisance. W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984). While private nuisance is "a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land," public nuisance is "a species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at large." W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984).
With regard to public nuisance, section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states: "(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B (1979). Thus, it is generally recognized that:
A public nuisance has been defined as " 'the doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public.' " Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (1981), quoting W. Prosser, Torts §88, at 583 n.29 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, the first element that must be alleged to state a claim for public nuisance is the existence of a right common to the general public. Such rights include the rights of public health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, and public convenience. Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B(2)(a) (1979).
"The interference with a public right is the sine qua non of a cause of action for public nuisance. However, not all interferences with public rights are public nuisances. The nuisance must affect an interest common to the general public, must produce a common injury, or be dangerous or injurious to the general public, or it must be harmful to the public health, or prevent the public from a peaceful use of their land and the public streets, or there must be some direct encroachment on public property." 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances §39 (2002).
"A public right is one common to all members of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment g, at 92 (1979).
Leaving aside for a moment the costs incurred by plaintiffs, which we determine, below, are not recoverable as damages, we query whether the public right asserted by plaintiffs is merely an assertion, on behalf of the entire community, of the individual right not to be assaulted. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment g, at 92 (1979) (a public right is "not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted"). We are also reluctant to recognize a public right so broad and undefined that the presence of any potentially dangerous instrumentality in the community could be deemed to threaten it.
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right." (Emphases added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B(2) (1979).
Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, the lawful production and sale of a nondefective product is per se reasonable and, thus, cannot result in liability for creation of a public nuisance. The appellate court responded to this argument by citing section 834 of the Restatement: " 'One is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he carries on the activity but also when he participates to a substantial extent to carrying it on.' " 337 Ill. App. 3d at 15, quoting City of Bloomington, Indiana v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §834 (1979). The appellate court also noted that a federal court deciding a case of first impression under Illinois law had previously declined to impose public nuisance liability against a gun manufacturer in the absence of state decisional law. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 14, citing Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., No. 96-C-3664 (N.D. Ill. March 20, 1998). Then, relying on City of Cincinnati, the appellate court rejected defendants' argument. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in City of Cincinnati, allowed a public nuisance claim against a similar group of defendants to stand, holding that, "under the Restatement's broad definition, a public-nuisance action can be maintained for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design, manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interfere[ ] with a right common to the general public." City of Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 520, 768 N.E.2d at 1142.
Plaintiffs' novel application of the cause of action of public nuisance renders authorities such as the Restatement less than helpful in answering this question. Section 834, for example, focuses primarily on private nuisance and its common law basis tied to a defendant's use of land and the resulting invasion a plaintiff's property rights. The "Scope Note" preceding section 834 states that the defendant's activity "may be the direct cause of the invasion or it may create a physical condition that ultimately results in the invasion." (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts §834 (1979). All of the illustrations that follow section 834 involve invasions of property rights caused by the defendant's use of land and are clearly predicated on a view of nuisance as a physical condition brought about by the wrongful use of real property.
Similarly, the assertion in manufacturer defendants' brief that a " 'product which has caused injury cannot be classified as a nuisance to hold liable the manufacturer or seller for the product's injurious effects' " (quoting 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability §927, at 105 (1997)) is not entirely helpful when a public nuisance is alleged. The cited authority also states that:
"Because a seller in a commercial transaction relinquishes ownership and control of its products when they are sold, it lacks the legal right to abate whatever hazards its products may pose. Under these circumstances, the purchaser's proper remedies are products liability actions for negligence or breach of warranty rather than a nuisance action." 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability §927, at 106 (1997).
A Florida statute expressly reserves the field of regulation of firearms and ammunition to the state legislature (Fla. Stat. §790.33 (1999)). In Illinois, cities and counties are free to impose gun regulations within certain limits (see 720 ILCS 5/47-5 (West 2002)). Nevertheless, we agree with defendants that the Florida court's observation is worthy of consideration.
"If a defendant's conduct in interfering with a public right does not come within one of the traditional categories of the common law crime of public nuisance or is not prohibited by a legislative act, the court is acting without an established and recognized standard." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment e, at 90 (1979).
In such cases, the Restatement warns, the analysis set forth in sections 826 to 831 becomes more significant. Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment e, at 90 (1979). These sections define factors that should be considered by a court when determining whether an intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable. Restatement (Second) of Torts §826 (unreasonableness of intentional invasion), §827 (gravity of harm), §828 (Utility of Conduct), §§829 through 831 (gravity versus utility) (1979).
Because these factors are intended to apply to intentional conduct affecting the use and enjoyment of land, they are not directly applicable to the novel claim made by plaintiffs. Thus, if we were to engage in the balancing of harm versus utility that the plaintiffs urge, we would be "acting without an established and recognized standard" (Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment e, at 90 (1979)). In addition, although courts frequently weigh such factors in other contexts, an analysis of the harm caused by firearms versus their utility is better suited to legislative fact-finding and policymaking than to judicial assessment.
As to the argument that comprehensive regulation of the firearms industry cautions against judicial involvement, the appellate court commented that defendant's alleged fostering of an underground handgun market is "not [a] lawful action." 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13. The appellate court acknowledged that "comprehensive legislation of a certain activity causes courts to exercise judicial restraint in declaring an activity to be a public nuisance if it complies with the regulations." 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13. However, the court found such restraint unjustified in the present case because " ' "there is generally no regulation of the quantity, frequency, or purpose of firearm purchases or sales[,] nor is there any national registration of purchasers of firearms. Multiple sales and even straw purchases are generally not unlawful and are not significantly regulated." ' " 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13, quoting Young, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 967, quoting D. Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 Conn. L. Rev. at 1183. Again, this conclusion is taken from a law review article written by one of plaintiffs' attorneys and, as such, is entitled to little, if any, consideration by this court. In addition, we find the appellate court's conclusion regarding the regulation of firearms purchases to be inaccurate. State and federal regulation of handgun sales is extensive. See 18 U.S.C. §921 et seq. (2000) (Gun Control Act); 430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 2002) (Firearm Owners Identification Card Act). Indeed, the second amended complaint acknowledges that the "State of Illinois is a high regulation state."
Plaintiffs respond that the federal Gun Control Act expressly provides that it does not preempt state or local laws. 18 U.S.C. §927 (2000). They also call our attention to Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483 (1984), in which this court rejected the argument that state laws regulating firearms are so comprehensive that they evince a legislative intent to preclude municipalities from imposing other restrictions of firearms.
"[I]f there has been established a comprehensive set of legislative acts or administrative regulations governing the details of a particular kind of conduct, the courts are slow to declare an activity to be a public nuisance if it complies with the regulations. *** The variety and complexity of a problem and of the interests involved and the feeling that the particular decision should be a part of an overall plan prepared with a knowledge of matters not presented to the court and of interests not represented before it, may also promote judicial restraint and a readiness to leave the question to an administrative agency if there is one capable of handling it appropriately." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment f, at 91-92 (1979).
In addition, defendants call our attention to a comment to section 821B of the Restatement: "Although it would be a nuisance at common law, conduct that is fully authorized by statute, ordinance or administrative regulation does not subject the actor to tort liability." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment f, at 91 (1979).
The second requirement, legal cause, is established only if the defendant's conduct is " 'so closely tied to the plaintiff's injury that he should be held legally responsible for it.' " Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 558 (2002), quoting McCraw v. Cegielski, 287 Ill. App. 3d 871, 873 (1996). The question is one of policy-How far should a defendant's legal responsibility extend for conduct that did, in fact, cause the harm? Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d at 558. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) ("As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy"). The proper inquiry regarding legal cause involves an assessment of foreseeability, in which we ask whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456.
Section 824, however, does not address the element of proximate cause. Instead, it deals with the type of conduct essential to liability for public or private nuisance. An actor will be held liable for a nuisance if his conduct consists of: "(a) an act; or (b) a failure to act under circumstances in which the actor is under a duty to take positive action to prevent or abate the interference" that constitutes the nuisance. Restatement (Second) of Torts §824 (1979). In the "ordinary case," comment b instructs, liability for nuisance "arises because one person's acts set in motion a force or chain of events resulting in the invasion." Restatement (Second) of Torts §824, Comment b (1979). Further, "[s]o far as the actor's liability is concerned, it is immaterial whether he does the acts solely in the pursuit of his own interests or whether he is acting for another, gratuitously, under contract or as the other's servant or agent. It is enough that his acts are a legal cause of the invasion." (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts §824, Comment b (1979). Thus, section 824 and comment b do not provide the answer to the question of whether the alleged conduct of defendants constitutes a legal cause of the claimed nuisance. Rather, comment b merely poses the question-Is the conduct of these defendants a legal cause of the alleged interference with a public right? The answer to this question must be found elsewhere.
In Galman, this court was urged to abandon this approach and to apply the proximate cause standard of Lee to all cases involving a question of proximate cause, even those in which the immediate cause of the injury is the subsequent, independent act of a third person. See, e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §42, at 278 (" 'Cause' and 'condition' still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited"). Rather than abandon our long-standing framework for the analysis of proximate cause, we instead harmonized our precedents with the proximate cause test articulated in Lee. See Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 257-58. See also Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 259 (2004) (restating the applicability of cause versus condition analysis to a special subset of proximate cause cases involving injuries caused by the intervening acts of third parties).
A familiar treatise on torts warns that "[i]t must be remembered that the mere fact that misconduct on the part of another might be foreseen is not of itself sufficient to place the responsibility upon the defendant." W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §44, at 305 (5th ed. 1984). Further, "[e]ven though the intervening cause may be regarded as foreseeable, the defendant is not liable unless the defendant's conduct has created or increased an unreasonable risk of harm through its intervention." W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §44, at 305 (5th ed. 1984). These comments, contained in the section of the treatise discussing intervening causes, refer the reader to the earlier discussion of the standard of conduct: "Under all ordinary and normal circumstances, in the absence of any reason to expect the contrary, the actor may reasonably proceed upon the assumption that others will obey the criminal law. W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §33, at 201 (5th ed. 1984). In "other situations," however, the actor may have a duty of care for the protection of others. Such situations include situations in which the actor has a special responsibility for the protection of the plaintiff, perhaps arising by contract or founded upon a special relationship between the two, and where there is "an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct brought about by the defendant." W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §33, at 201-03 (5th ed. 1984).
An award of damages in an action for nuisance is "retroactive, applying to past conduct," and is proper if "it is unreasonable to engage in the conduct without paying for the harm done." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment i (1979). Under section 821(C) of the Restatement, a plaintiff may recover damages in an individual action for public nuisance only if he "suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of interference." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C(1) (1979). The ability of an individual plaintiff to recover damages in a public nuisance suit is the result of "a tort remedy [having] been engrafted onto a crime," the tort remedy being damages for trespass and the crime being the common law crime of public nuisance. Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C, Comment a (1979). No mention is made in section 821C or the comments that follow of the ability of a public official or entity to recover damages in an action for public nuisance brought on behalf of the general public.
In sum, this court has never before been asked to determine whether the Moorman doctrine bars a claim for solely economic damages incurred by a city when it brings a claim of public nuisance on behalf of the general public, in the absence of physical harm to city property or other direct injury. The Restatement appears to limit recovery of economic damages in public nuisance suits to individual plaintiffs so affected by the public nuisance that they have standing to bring the action. Restatement (Second) of Torts §821(C)(1) (1979). We need not decide in the present case whether we agree with this approach, which has been adopted in other jurisdictions (One Meridian Plaza, 820 F. Supp. at 1481; Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher, 387 Mass. 889, 897, 444 N.E.2d 368, 373 (1983) (individual plaintiff who suffered no damage to property may recover solely economic damages in public nuisance claim for obstruction of public way by demonstrating "special pecuniary harm," not common to the general public)), because the plaintiffs here are public entities. In Chicago Flood, this court concluded that there is no reason to treat claims of private nuisance differently from other torts. In re Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d at 207. In the end, we see no reason to treat claims of public nuisance differently than claims of private nuisance. The Moorman doctrine does not permit an award of solely economic damages to the plaintiff public entities in this public nuisance action.
Similarly, because this case has been resolved on other grounds, we have not considered defendants' arguments that dismissal of this action is warranted on the basis the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs would violate the commerce and due process clauses of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 3; amends. V, XIV) and the state constitutional provision addressing the powers of home rule units (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6). Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 271 (2004).