Source: https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/category/workers-compensation/page/2/
Timestamp: 2020-02-25 19:00:40
Document Index: 394827106

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 15', '§ 25', '§ 114', '§ 114', '§ 220']

Workers' Compensation Archives - Page 2 of 24 - New York Appellate Digest
METHODS FOR DETERMINING WEEKLY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR SHORT-TERM EMPLOYMENT EXPLAINED, MATTER REMITTED FOR THE GATHERING OF EVIDENCE AND RE-CALCULATION (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the benefits to be provided to the injured worker, based upon only 78 days of employment may have been wrongly calculated and remitted the matter:
Following a hearing, a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (hereinafter WCLJ) established claimant’s average weekly wage as $933.14, which was arrived at by dividing his total earnings ($12,130.76) by the number of weeks worked (13). The employer and its workers’ compensation carrier (hereinafter collectively referred to as the carrier) sought administrative review. Upon that review, the Workers’ Compensation Board determined that claimant’s average weekly wage should have been calculated pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 (3), using a 200 multiplier, and that, so calculated, claimant’s average weekly wage was $598.15. * * *
Under Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 (2), the average annual earnings of a six-day worker is 300 “times the average daily wage or salary . . . which an employee of the same class working substantially the whole of such immediately preceding year in the same or in a similar employment in the same or a neighboring place shall have earned in such employment during the days when so employed.” The carrier did not submit payroll records for similar employees or otherwise assert that such records were unavailable … . In the absence of such information, we cannot determine whether the Board properly rejected the method set forth in Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 (2) before resorting to Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 (3) to calculate claimant’s average weekly wage. Matter of Molina v Icon Parking LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 07467, Third Dept 10-17-19
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AMENDMENT OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW TO REMOVE THE REQUIREMENT THAT A CLAIMANT DEMONSTRATE ATTACHMENT TO THE LABOR MARKET TO BE ENTITLED TO PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO CLAIMANT (SECOND DEPT).
The Third Department determined claimant was deemed to have involuntarily retired and no longer attached to the labor market in August 2015, well before the amendment of the Workers’ Compensation Law which removed the requirement that a claimant demonstrate attachment to the labor market to be entitled to permanent partial disability payments. The amendment did not apply to claimant retroactively:
… [T]he amendment states, in pertinent part, that in some cases of permanent partial disability, “[c]ompensation . . . shall be payable during the continuance of such permanent partial disability, without the necessity for the claimant who is entitled to benefits at the time of classification to demonstrate ongoing attachment to the labor market” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [3] [w] … ). In sum, the amendment relieves some claimants who have been classified as permanently partially disabled of the burden of having to demonstrate ongoing attachment to the labor market in order to continue to receive wage replacement benefits … . * * *
… [C]laimant was classified as permanently partially disabled in July 2014, and proceedings were conducted before the WCLJ in August 2014 on the issues of claimant’s labor market attachment and voluntary withdrawal. The WLCJ concluded that claimant did not voluntarily retire and was not attached to the labor market, and the Board affirmed the WCLJ’s decision in August 2015. … [T]he Board’s August 2015 decision was issued well before the effective date of the amendment and, as such, this is not a situation in which retroactive application of the amendment is appropriate. Given that the Board declined to apply the amendment retroactively so as to relieve claimant of his obligation to demonstrate ongoing attachment to the labor market in order to continue to receive permanent partial disability benefits, we decline to disturb the Board’s decision. Matter of Pryer v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 2019 NY Slip Op 06561, Third Dept 9-12-19
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The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined that the Special Fund remained liable for death benefits if the matter had been transferred to the Special Fund before the 2014 closure of the fund. Here the asbestosis case was transferred to the Special Fund in 2011 and the claimant died in 2017:
… [T]he imposition of liability on the Special Fund in this case is not precluded by the statutory amendment [closing the Special Fund], given that liability was transferred to the Special Fund in December 2011, well before the January 1, 2014 closure date. The record does not indicate any violation of the plain language of the statutory sentence at issue. Indeed, the record does not contain a copy of any application by the employer for transfer of liability of a claim to the Special Fund, nor any indication that such an application was filed after January 1, 2014. Thus, the record does not support a finding of a violation of the statute prohibiting the Board from accepting, after the cut-off date, any application by an employer or carrier for transfer of liability of a claim to the Special Fund (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1-a]).
This conclusion is supported by our decision in Matter of Misquitta v Getty Petroleum (150 AD3d 1363[2017]), which involved a factual situation similar to that presented here. In Misquitta, the decedent had an established workers’ compensation claim that had been transferred to the Special Fund prior to his death and, after his death, his widow filed a claim for workers’ compensation death benefits. While acknowledging that the consequential death claim was separate and distinct from the decedent’s original claim, this Court ruled that “where . . . liability for a claim has already been transferred from the carrier to the Special Fund and the employee thereafter dies for reasons causally related to the original claim, the Special Fund remains liable for the claim for death benefits” … . Matter of Verneau v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 05369, Third Dept 7-3-19
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INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION CAN NOT BE RELIED UPON TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE, THE APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ON THE JOB INJURY CASE ON THE GROUND THAT APPELLANT WAS PLAINTIFF’S GENERAL EMPLOYER AND PLAINTIFF’S ONLY REMEDY WAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department determined that information provided for the first time in a reply affidavit could not be relied upon to sustain a movant’s prima facie burden for a summary judgment motion. The plaintiff, who was injured on the job, alleged he was hired by the defendant Bright Star Messenger Service, LLC (hereinafter the appellant). In its motion for summary judgment the appellant alleged it was plaintiff’s general employer and plaintiff’s only remedy was Workers’ Compensation. But included in appellant’s papers was plaintiff’s claim for Worker’s Compensation benefits which listed plaintiff’s employer as “Bright Star Courier.” Therefore the appellant failed to make out a prima facie case that it was plaintiff’s employer. The appellant then submitted a reply affidavit stating that Bright Star Courier had changed its name to Bright Star Messenger Center, LLC prior to the accident:
… Contrary to the appellant’s contention, it failed to make a prima facie showing that it was the plaintiff’s general employer. The appellant submitted the affidavit of a representative of the appellant, who stated that the plaintiff was employed by the appellant on the date of the accident, and that the appellant had procured workers’ compensation insurance for the plaintiff. However, the appellant also submitted Workers’ Compensation Board records showing that the plaintiff had filed a claim for benefits that listed the plaintiff’s employer as “Bright Star Courier.” Under these circumstances, the appellant failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it was the plaintiff’s general employer … . While the appellant submitted a reply affidavit from its representative averring that Bright Star Courier had changed its name to Bright Star Messenger Center, LLC, prior to the accident, a party cannot sustain its prima facie burden by relying on evidence submitted for the first time in its reply papers … . The appellant’s failure to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law required the denial of its motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers … . Matthews v Bright Star Messenger Ctr., LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 04375, Second Dept 6-5-19
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CLAIMANT’S CONVICTION FOR THE UNLAWFUL MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHETAMINES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROOF THAT CLAIMANT PERFORMED WORK OR MADE FALSE STATEMENTS REGARDING WORK SUCH THAT CLAIMANT SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM RECEIVING BENEFITS UPON RELEASE FROM PRISON (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department determined that claimant’s conviction for the unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine did not constitute work within the meaning of Workers’ Compensation Law 114-a. Therefore, claimant did not perform any work or make any false statements regarding work which would disqualify him from receiving benefits upon release from prison:
Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a (1) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f for the purpose of obtaining compensation . . ., or for the purpose of influencing any determination regarding any such payment, a claimant knowingly makes a false statement or representation as to a material fact, such person shall be disqualified from receiving any compensation directly attributable to such false statement or representation.” “In making such a determination, the Board is the sole arbiter of witness credibility and its determination as to whether a claimant violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence” … .
To be guilty of unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the third degree, a person must possess, at the same time and location, “[t]wo or more items of laboratory equipment and two or more precursors, chemical reagents or solvents in any combination,” with the intent to use such products to unlawfully manufacture, prepare, or produce methamphetamine, or knowing that another intends to do so (Penal Law § 220.73 [1]). The elements of the crime do not require that any work be performed. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the conviction alone is insufficient to establish any work activity by claimant or that he received any type of remuneration … . Matter of Stone v Saulsbury/Federal Signal, 2019 NY Slip Op 04250, Third Dept 5-30-19
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INJURY CAUSED BY THE INHALATION OF ASPERGILLUS FUNGUS PROPERLY DEEMED A COMPENSABLE ACCIDENTAL INJURY ENTITLING CLAIMANT TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department determined injury from the inhalation of aspergillus fungus was properly classified as an accidental injury entitling claimant to workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant was exposed to the fungus at work and suffers from allergic bronchopulmonary aspergillosis:
“To be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law, an accidental injury must arise both out of and in the course of employment” … . “Notably, this is a factual issue for the Board to resolve, and its determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence” … . “To establish an accidental work-related condition that developed over time, rather than from a sudden event, [a] claimant [is] required to demonstrate by competent medical evidence that his or her condition resulted from unusual environmental conditions or events assignable to something extraordinary” … . “[T]he concept of time-definiteness required of an accident can be thought of as applying to either the cause or the result, . . . and it is not decisive that a claimant is unable to pinpoint the exact date on which the incident occurred” … . Matter of Connolly v Covanta Energy Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 04244, Third Dept 5-30-19
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