Source: http://mcarney@nycourts.gov/courts/ad2/decisionsofinterest2008.shtml
Timestamp: 2015-09-02 16:59:32
Document Index: 288067261

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 393', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 396', '§ 396', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 396', '§ 396', '§ 396', '§ 1333', '§ 30509', '§ 30509', '§ 277', '§ 73']

Justice Thomas A. Dickerson
Mr. James Edward Pelzer, Clerk of the Court
Ms. Karen Tommer, Supervisor of Decision Department
Mr. Jonathan Glenn, Principal Law Clerk to Justice Dickerson
Mr. Lawrence A. Goldberg, Principal Appellate Court Attorney
Justice Mark Dillon
Justice Cheryl Chambers
Ms. Barbara Gonzo
The Following Case Summaries May Not Be
Cited As Authority
Accidents; All-Terrain Vehicle; Suitability As Affirmative Element Of General Obligations Law 9-103;
Morales v Coram Materials Corp. (51 AD3d 86 [Dillon, opinion; Ritter, Santucci, Miller, concur]).
The plaintiff was injured while driving an all-terrain vehicle (hereinafter ATV) in a gravel pit owned and maintained by the defendant, Coram Materials Corp. As he was descending a gravel mound, he drove the ATV into a gap in the mound from which a large chunk of gravel had been removed, causing the plaintiff to fall head over heels from his ATV.
General Obligations Law § 9-103 is the "recreational use" statute that immunizes property owners from actions by persons who are injured while engaging in recreational activities. The statute has two expressed elements: (1) the plaintiff's activity must fall within a defined recreational activity such as hunting, fishing, skiing, etc., an enumeration that encompasses the operation of an ATV and (2) the defendant must be the property owner. If the defendant establishes that he or she has satisfied these two elements, he or she owes no duty to recreational users of the subject property to maintain that property or warn of defects in that property. In addition to the expressed elements of the statute, courts have added a third element, namely, that 3) the property be "suitable" for recreational use.
Here, the defendant Coram Materials Corp. was awarded summary judgment on the ground that it owned property that was being used for recreational purposes by the plaintiff and that it was therefore immune from liability under General Obligations Law § 9-103. The defendant submitted prima facie proof of its ownership of the property and of the plaintiff's recreational use. The defendant's only proof as to the "suitability" of the property was an attorney's affirmation in support of the motion that was conclusory, and certain unsworn information, offered for the first time in reply, that the gravel pit had been used by operators of ATVs on many prior occasions.
This Court reversed the trial court's order awarding summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the defendant failed to establish the element of suitability in the initial moving papers. The attorney's conclusory affirmation was not sufficient evidence, nor was the material offered for the first time in reply.
This opinion is noteworthy as it clarifies that "suitability" is an affirmative element of General Obligations Law § 9-103 which a defendant must address and establish in the initial submissions to meet the prima facie burden of proof on a motion summary judgment. Suitability depends on a number of factors discussed in detail in the opinion and, in that regard, this Court was guided by cases from the Court of Appeals, as well as its own precedent. This Court expressly declined to follow a Fourth Department case addressing the element of suitability (see Pulis v T.H. Kinsella, Inc., 204 AD2d 976).
Accidents; Motorcycle Collided With Truck; Leg Amputated; Jury Verdict; Motion Seeking Collateral Source Hearing
Firmes v Chase Manhattan Auto. Finance Corp. (50 AD3d 18 [Dillon, opinion; Crane, Ritter, Carni, concur])
The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident, and his leg was amputated as a result. The jury found that one of the defendants was 90% at fault and that the plaintiff was 10% at fault in the happening of the accident. Damages, after certain post-trial reductions imposed by the trial court, were fixed by the jury in the sum of $400,000 for past medical expenses, $65,000 for past lost earnings, $2,200,000 for past pain and suffering, $2,872,400 for future medical expenses, $660,000 for future lost earnings over 33 years, and $5,200,000 for future pain and suffering/loss of enjoyment of life over a projected 50.1 years of future life expectancy. On appeal, this Court reduced the award for past pain and suffering to $1,500,000 and the award for future medical expenses to $1,500,000, and otherwise left the verdict intact.
The Court determined, as a matter of first impression, that the burden of proof at a collateral source hearing is that of "reasonable certainty" as to the amount of collateral source payments made to a plaintiff that should reduce a jury's award, and the correspondence of those payments to items of damages awarded by a jury. In this instance, the trial court denied the defendants' post-trial motion for a collateral source set-off hearing, on the ground that the defendants' proof in the motion failed to satisfy the reasonable certainty standard.
On appeal, this Court held that the standard applicable to whether a defendant is entitled to a collateral source hearing should necessarily be lower than the ultimate evidentiary standard applied at the hearing itself. This Court defined the motion standard, for the first time in case law, as "some competent evidence from available sources that the defendant's economic loss may in the past have been, or may in the future be, replaced, or the plaintiff indemnified, from collateral sources." In the opinion, this Court discussed the discovery mechanisms that are available to defendants to aid them in meeting that motion burden and establish their entitlement to a post-trial collateral source hearing, such as the written demand for collateral source information, depositions, demands for record authorizations, notices to admit, subpoenaed trial records, and trial testimony elicited outside the presence of a jury.
In this case, the trial court denied the defendants' motion for a collateral source hearing on the ground that it had already signed the judgment and because the motion proof failed to rise to the level of "reasonable certainty". On appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court should have granted the defendant a collateral source hearing because 1) the parties had agreed at the conclusion of the trial that collateral source issues would be addressed in post-trial motions, 2) the court's judgment was premature, as it had not yet made its mandatory periodic payment determinations under CPLR article 50-B, and 3) the plaintiff had stonewalled collateral source discovery and had twice made efforts to enter premature judgments. Moreover, this Court stated that the "reasonable certainty" standard, while applicable at hearings, is not applicable to the motion merely seeking the hearing.
Class Actions; Gift Cards; Breach Of Contract; Breach Of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing; Violation Of General Business Law § 349
Lonner v Simon Prop. Group, Inc. (57 AD3d 100 [Dickerson, opinion; Spolzino, Skelos, Florio, concur])The plaintiff commenced this consumer class action challenging, inter alia, a $2.50 monthly dormancy fee imposed by the defendant in conjunction with its promotion and sale of a plastic gift card, as well as the allegedly improper manner in which such fees are disclosed. The card in question was a prepaid, stored value card, designated as a Visa card, which could be used everywhere Visa is accepted. The card was programmed to hold a balance that was stored on it at the time of purchase. Each time the card was used, the amount of the transaction was deducted from the available balance. The card resembled a standard credit-card-sized plastic card.
There was a magnetic strip on the back of the card, below which it stated, in relevant part, as follows: “An administrative fee of $2.50 per month will be deducted from your balance beginning with the seventh month from the month of card purchase.” Once the card was activated, it was to be placed in a cardboard sleeve, which was styled as a cardboard folding ‘book’ with the sleeve at the top, into which the card is inserted, along with five additional folding double-sided ‘pages’ which were attached to the sleeve. On the front five ‘pages,’ general information about the card and its use was included, and the cardholder agreement and terms and conditions were printed on the back five ‘pages.’ The plaintiff alleged that the five ‘pages’ on the back of the Card sleeve that contained the terms and conditions of the Card, including the dormancy fees, were in small print, in fonts materially less than that required pursuant to CPLR 4544, and that they were concealed and in violation of General Business Law § 349.
The original complaint set forth three causes of action sounding in breach of contract, encompassing claims based upon a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a violation of General Business Law § 349, and unjust enrichment, and sought damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint.
The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by federal law. On appeal, this Court reversed the Supreme Court’s determination that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by federal law, and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with Goldman v Simon Prop. Group, Inc. (31 AD3d 382, 383).
On remittal, the plaintiff subsequently filed an amended class action complaint on behalf of a class of consumers who had purchased the defendant’s card. The factual allegations in the amended complaint were substantially similar to those in the original complaint.
The defendant again moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint. The Supreme Court denied those branches of the defendant’s motion which were to dismiss the first (breach of contract) and second (violation of General Business Law § 349) causes of action of the amended complaint. This Court affirmed.
Class Actions; Gift Cards; Preemption By Federal Law; No Private Right Of Action Under General Business Law § 393-I; CPLR 4544 Applies To Business Gifts; Breach Of Contract; Violation Of General Business Law § 349; Unjust Enrichment; Money Had And Received; Injunctive Relief Goldman v Simon Prop. Group, Inc. (58 AD3d 208 [Dickerson, opinion; Skelos, Riter, McCarthy, concur]).
The legality of plastic gift cards has been addressed by this Court previously in Lonner v Simon Property Group, Inc., 57 AD3d 100 [discussed above] and in Llanos v Shell Oil Co., 55 AD3d 796 [a class of consumers challenged the imposition of dormancy fees of $1.75 per month, setting forth four causes of action seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and violation of General Business Law § 349. Within the context of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint as preempted by General Business Law § 396-i and pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), this Court found that the claims of the Llanos plaintiff were not preempted by General Business Law § 396-i and remitted the matter for consideration of the merits of each cause of action]. The instant action which, like the Lonner action, challenged the imposition of a dormancy fee of $2.50 per month and alleged, inter alia, that the defendant “began to automatically deduct $2.50 per month as Dormancy Fees beginning the seventh month after the purchase of the Gift Card held by plaintiff without proper notice to plaintiff,” that the card did not place the user on notice of the deduction of the dormancy fees, that the card “was deceptive in its failure to provide reasonable notice of the deductions of Dormancy Fees,” and that the defendant’s “sale, distribution, and marketing of the Gift Cards without providing proper notice of the deductions of Dormancy Fees was deceptive and materially misleading.”
Initially, the defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint. On appeal, this Court reversed the Supreme Court’s determination that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by federal law (see Goldman v Simon Prop. Group, Inc., 31 AD3d 382, 383). Accordingly, this Court remitted the matter for a determination of the merits of each cause of action. The plaintiff filed an amended class action complaint, which identified the card as a gift certificate, alleged that the plaintiff received the card from her employer on or about April 2003, that the card was sold at malls and through the internet, and that the “wrongful acts” of the defendant were consumer oriented and affected thousands of its customers. The amended complaint set forth five causes of action, which sought to recover damages for breach of contract (encompassing a claim based upon a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing), violation of General Business Law §§ 349 and 396-i, and unjust enrichment, and to recover money had and received. The amended complaint also sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining and restraining the defendant from “further applying and implementing the policies and acts complained of.”
The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint. The Supreme Court granted those branches of the motion which were to dismiss the General Business Law § 349 cause of action for failing to articulate the necessary elements of that cause of action and the General Business Law § 396-i claim because the statute applied to gift cards that were issued after October 18, 2004, and, thus, did not apply to the plaintiff’s card which was issued in April 2003. The Supreme Court noted that the amended complaint did not indicate that the card was a “gift certificate” or “store credit” within the meaning of General Business Law § 396-i before the 2004 amendment. Further, the Supreme Court determined that the “cause of action seeking the declaratory and injunctive relief sought is not appropriate in this case.” However, the Supreme Court ruled that the causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and to recover money had and received, were viable.
This Court held that there was no private right of action under General Business Law § 396-i, and that CPLR 4544 applies to business gifts which involve a consumer transaction. This Court also restored claims for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment and allowed the plaintiffs to plead unjust enrichment and money had and received as alternative claims to the breach of contract cause of action.
Class Actions; Durable Medical Equipment Providers; Systematic And Unauthorized Reduction Of Reimbursement For Medical Equipment And Supplies; Class Certification Denied; Inadequate Class Representative Globe Surgical Supply v GEICO Ins. Co. (59 AD3d 129 [Dickerson, opinion; Spolzino, Florio, Miller, concur]).
A class of durable medical equipment (hereinafter DME) providers alleged that GEICO “violated the regulations promulgated by the New York State Insurance Department . . . pursuant to the no-fault provisions of the Insurance Law, by systematically reducing its reimbursement for medical equipment and supplies . . . based on what it deemed to be ‘the prevailing rate in the geographic location of the provider’ or ‘the reasonable and customary rate for the item billed.’” In denying certification, the Supreme Court found that Globe failed to establish adequacy of representation as class representative since, inter alia, GEICO had asserted a counterclaim and, as a result, Globe may have become “preoccupied with defenses unique to it.”
However, this Court found that all of the other prerequisites to class certification set forth in CPLR 901(a) and 902 had been met, including numerosity [“the proposed class herein, is, at a minimum, between 10 and 100 DME providers”], predominance of common questions of law or fact [“a prima facie case can be easily made out by the class members and that proof of documented costs is not a requirement ...This is true, given that GEICO did not seek verification of the documented costs for the invoices submitted”], typicality [“Typical claims are those that arise from the same facts and circumstances as the claims of the class members”], adequacy of class counsel [“There is no question that Globe’s counsel is highly competent in prosecuting class actions”], superiority [“However, the availability of an arbitration alternative does not mean such a proceeding is superior to a class action which, through the aggregation of many similar claims, provides an incentive to the legal profession to expend the resources necessary to fully litigate often complex cases such as the instant matter”], and manageability [“Moreover, as with the requirements of CPLR(a)(2), referable to the issues of liability and damages calculations, the prosecution of this proposed class action is fairly straightforward and quite manageable”](see Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 901.20-901.27, 902)
This Court thus denied Globe’s motion for class certification, but did so without prejudice to renewal upon obtaining an adequate class representative.
Consumer Law; Purchase Of Defective Point Of Sale Computer System; No Cause Of Action For Breach Of Contract Or Breach Of Implied Or Express Warranty; Digital License Agreement Disclaiming Liability Unenforceable
Jesmer v Retail Magic, Inc. (55 AD3d 171 [Dickerson, opinion; Mastro, Rivera, Balkin, concur]).
This Court held that, in the absence of privity, the end user of a computer system, who purchased the computer system not from the manufacturer but from an authorized dealer, has no cause of action against the manufacturer sounding in breach of contract or breach of implied warranty. Because the end user sought to recover for economic loss only, and because she was not in privity with the manufacturer, she could not recover for economic losses from the manufacturer on a theory of breach of implied warranty. This Court also determined that the end user did not have a cause of action based on breach of express warranties contained in a digital licensing agreement (hereinafter DLA), because she did not personally accept, agree to, or rely on the provisions of the DLA. The Court found that there was no evidence that the party which purportedly assented to the DLA was the end user’s agent for any purpose. The Court also found that, in the absence of any words or conduct from the manufacturer, communicated to the end user, which would give rise to the appearance and belief that the authorized dealer possessed the authority to enter into a transaction on the manufacturer’s behalf, no apparent agency relationship existed between the manufacturer and its authorized dealer.
However, this Court further held that the end user may maintain a cause of action against the manufacturer to recover damages for breach of express warranties contained in a product and service brochure, a written price quote, and the seller’s distribution agreement. This Court stated that the DLA’s limitations and disclaimers did not supersede any express warranties contained in the literature about the computer system, as such express warranties are not barred by any general disclaimers of warranty that accompany the sale of the product. Additionally, this Court concluded that the manufacturer could not invoke the provisions contained in the DLA to limit or restrict any express warranties made in the brochure, the price quote, and the seller’s distribution agreement, because the end user did not assent to the DLA, and it was thus not binding on her. While the fact that she did not read the DLA may not have been dispositive, she must have been afforded the opportunity to view and assent to the DLA to be bound thereby. Moreover, the Court noted that, in this case, the very nature of the computer system implied performance over an extended period of time.
Court Of Claims; Claim By Criminal Defendant Alleging Negligent Act Of Court Employee Caused Her To Be Adjudicated As A Second Felony Offender Based On A Nonexistent Conviction; Ministerial Act; Superseding Causation Lapidus v State of New York(57 AD3d 83 [Eng, opinion; Spolzino, Covello, Dickerson, concur]).
At issue in this case was whether the State could be held liable for allegedly negligent acts committed by court employees in the course of performing ministerial duties. Specifically at issue were matters pertaining to proximate cause and superseding causation. The claimant alleged that negligent acts by court employees caused her to be wrongfully adjudicated as a second felony offender based on a nonexistent conviction. The claimant alleged that this wrongful adjudication resulted in her being sentenced as a second felony offender, and that her sentence was further improperly enhanced when the sentence for the nonexistent conviction was added consecutively to her sentence as a second felony offender.
Preliminarily, this Court determined that the state employees’ acts at issue were ministerial in nature. Therefore, the State could not be shielded from liability for the negligent performance of these duties. Accordingly, this Court proceeded to consideration of the elements of a negligence claim.
This Court concluded that there was ample authority for imposing a duty of care, and hence liability, on the State for its employees’ negligent performance of ministerial acts. In response to the claimant’s assertion that her failure to contest the predicate felony statement filed against her did not constitute an intervening, superseding event which disrupted the causal link between the alleged negligence of the court employees and her injury, this Court acknowledged that “[t]he concept of proximate cause, or more appropriately legal cause, has proven to be an elusive one, incapable of being precisely defined to cover all situations” (Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308, 314). The Court further held that, while foreseeability is often pertinent to whether a duty exists, it also plays a role in the doctrine of superseding causation. An intervening act, by either the plaintiff or a third party, may, in some circumstances, sever the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, relieving the defendant of liability. “In such a case, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence . . . If the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct, it may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal nexus” (Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d at 315). Ordinarily, such questions are for the finder of fact.
This Court stated that, to constitute a superseding event severing the causal connection between the defendant's alleged negligence and the plaintiff's injury, the intervening act “must be a new and independent force,” which was not “set in motion by the defendant's own wrongful acts” (Campbell v Cluster Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 247 AD2d 353, 354). Further, for the plaintiff's conduct to constitute a superseding cause, the plaintiff's “negligence must be more than mere contributory negligence, which would be relevant in apportioning culpable conduct. Rather, such conduct, in addition to being unforeseeable, must rise to such a level of culpability as to replace the defendant's negligence as the legal cause of the accident” (Mesick v State of New York, 118 AD2d 214, 218).
Applying these principles, this Court determined that the claimant's failure to controvert her status as a second felony offender was not, as a matter of law, such an intervening, superseding act, and distinguished this case from situations in which the alleged intervening act, as a matter of law, was independent of and divorced from the original negligence. Rather, the conduct alleged to be an intervening act flowed from the original alleged negligence of the court employee, which was further tainted the alleged subsequent negligent preparation of a duplicate commitment order, leading to the adverse and improper recalculation of the claimant’s sentence.
CPLR 327; Forum Non Conveniens; Judiciary Act of 1789 (28 USC 1333[1]); Cruise Ship Passenger Contract Forum Selection Clause Enforced; Contract May Not Divest Court Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Lischinskaya v Carnival Corp. (56 AD3d 116 [Spolzino, opinion; Santucci, Angiolillo, Carni, concur]).
This Court enforced a forum selection clause in a cruise ship contract of passage that limited an injured passenger to suit in federal court, where such jurisdiction was available, and allowed a state court action only where it was not. In so ruling, this Court held that the clause violated neither the Saving to Suitors Clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (28 USC § 1333[1]) nor 46 USC § 30509, which governs clauses in maritime contracts that purport to limit liability.
This Court observed that the validity of the terms of a contract for a cruise turn on federal principles of maritime law. In deciding such issues, New York courts must look to the decisions of the Federal courts to define the liabilities of ship owners for maritime torts, and must ignore conflicting decisions of New York courts and State statutes.
Applying federal maritime principles, forum selection clauses in cruise ship contracts are generally enforceable, provided that the terms have been reasonably communicated to the passenger and do not violate notions of “fundamental fairness,” either because the passenger's assent was the result of fraud or overreaching or the forum restriction is inconvenient. This Court determined that the situation here fell within the class of cases in which a forum selection clause is enforceable since, among other things, the plaintiff had ample opportunity to review the ticket, the front portion of the ticket explicitly directed passengers’ attention to a page containing “important limitations,” those limitations included the forum selection clause, and the forum selected was not inconvenient.
The Saving to Suitors Clause preserves the jurisdiction of state courts to entertain in personam maritime causes of action, provided that they apply federal maritime law. It does not purport to limit the right of a party to agree that he or she will not litigate in a particular forum that has jurisdiction. Since a cruise ship passenger is otherwise competent to bargain away the choice of forum, and the forum selection clause at issue was not otherwise unenforceable, the Saving to Suitors Clause did not bar dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. The forum selection clause also did not violate 46 USC § 30509, since that statute “allows for judicial resolution of claims” and does not "purport to limit [Carnival's] liability for negligence" (Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v Shute, 499 US 585, 596-597).
Nonetheless, this Court held that the forum selection clause did not divest the Supreme Court of subject matter jurisdiction or foreclose, solely on that ground, that court's consideration of the plaintiff’s request for equitable relief. This Court wrote that this argument has been properly rejected as "hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction" (M/S Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US 1, 12), and that a court may not be divested of subject matter jurisdiction by contract. As a court of original, unlimited, and unqualified jurisdiction, the Supreme Court could not be divested of its jurisdiction in this manner. This Court further stated that, since the Supreme Court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction, it had the authority to consider the availability of equitable relief pursuant to CPLR 327, which sets forth the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s retention of such authority, dismissal based on enforcement of the forum selection clause was not discretionary, but was the required result of the enforcement of the terms of the contract. Therefore, discretionary considerations such as the impact of the dismissal on the plaintiff and whether fatality to the plaintiff's claims can be avoided, which are legitimate inquiries in the context CPLR 327, are irrelevant here. Rather, the dismissal is analogous to dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction, where such considerations play no role. Thus, even though the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, it could not, under the circumstances of this case, grant discretionary relief pursuant to CPLR 327.
CPLR 3025(b),(d); Statute Of Limitations Defense May Be Asserted For First Time In An Answer Served Pursuant To CPLR 3025(d) And Responsive To An Amended Complaint Served Pursuant To CPLR 3025(b) Mendrzycki v Cricchio (58 AD3d 171 [McCarthy, opinion; Prudenti, Fisher, Dickerson, concur]).
A defendant may assert an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations for the first time in an answer served pursuant to CPLR 3025(d), where that answer was responsive to an amended complaint served pursuant to CPLR 3025(b). Accordingly, that affirmative defense is not waived even though it was not pleaded in the original answer to the initial complaint. This result is required since the pleading in controversy constitutes an original answer to the amended complaint.
In the instant matter, the plaintiff’s decedent commenced the instant action against several defendants December 22, 2003, to recover damages for medical malpractice based on failure to diagnose her colon cancer. In their separate answers, none of the defendants raised an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations.
The plaintiff’s decedent died in April 2004 from colon cancer, and the plaintiff, as administrator of the decedent’s estate, was substituted for her. In November 2004, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve an amended complaint, and thereafter the plaintiff served an amended complaint which differed from the original complaint only in its caption and in the assertion of a new cause of action sounding in wrongful death. In response to the amended complaint, the defendants' answers, for the first time, each asserted an affirmative defense to the cause of action sounding in medical malpractice, based on the statute of limitations.
CPLR 3211(e) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny objection or defense based upon a ground set forth in paragraphs one, three, four, five and six of subdivision (a) is waived unless raised either by [a pre-answer motion to dismiss] or in the responsive pleading.” Here, because the doctors' statute of limitations affirmative defense was raised in responsive pleadings submitted pursuant to CPLR 3025(d), the affirmative defense was not waived. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “there shall be an answer or reply to an amended or supplemental pleading if an answer or reply is required to the pleading being amended or supplemented” (CPLR 3025[d]). Although CPLR 3025(d) is silent as to whether new affirmative defenses may be raised in an answer served under this subdivision, significantly, an amended complaint is deemed to supersede an original complaint and, thus, a defendant's original answer has no effect. As such, an answer to an amended complaint served pursuant to CPLR 3025(d) is in fact an original answer to the amended complaint, and thus, affirmative defenses raised in that answer are not limited to those asserted in the original answer.
This Court acknowledged that plaintiffs may claim undue prejudice and surprise from the application of this rule. However, the primary focus is the effect of the amended complaint served by the plaintiff rather than the effect of the subsequent answer. Since an amended complaint supplants the original complaint, it would unduly prejudice a defendant if it were bound by an original answer when the original complaint has no legal effect.
By way of contrast, this Court observed that a supplemental complaint (which was not at issue here), does not supersede the original complaint, but is in addition to it. In such circumstances, the original answer remains in effect, such that a defendant could not assert a new affirmative defense in its answer to the supplemental complaint unless it is responsive to the new matter alleged.
CPLR 3103(a); A Cat Taken From Home Of Plaintiff May Be The Same As A Cat Adopted From Warwick Animal Shelter; Plaintiff Seeks Identity Of Donor Or Adoptive Owner; Protective Order Granted; Policy To Protect Animal Adoptive System Feger v Warwick Animal Shelter (59 AD3d 68 [Leventhal, opinion; Mastro, Balkin, concur; Spolzino concurs in part, dissents in part]).
The plaintiff alleged that her cat, “Kisses,” had been taken from her home by an unidentified individual. Approximately 10 days later, she saw a photograph of a cat, “Lucy,” on the website of the Warwick Animal Shelter. The plaintiff claimed that “Lucy” was, in fact, “Kisses.” The plaintiff contacted the shelter, but learned that “Lucy” had been adopted. The shelter refused to disclose the identity of the donor or adoptive owner. After the plaintiff commenced this action, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for a protective order to prevent disclosure of the identities of the donor and adoptive owner.
A majority of this Court observed that, while CPLR 3101(a) requires “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action,” CPLR 3103(a) authorizes the court to “make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device,” and affirmed the order of the Supreme Court granting the defendants’ motion for a protective order. In making the determination that disclosure was not warranted in this matter, this Court employed the test of “usefulness and reason” (Scalone v Phelps Mem. Hosp. Ctr., 184 AD2d 65, 70), balancing the importance to the plaintiff's claim of the information sought versus the consequences of disclosure, while recognizing its broad discretion to deny demands it deems unduly burdensome or that seek irrelevant or improper information.
The record failed to establish that the identity of the adoptive owner was material and necessary to the plaintiff’s claim. The majority concluded that public policy considerations supported this determination, and agreed with the Supreme Court that disclosure of the adoptive owner’s identity would undermine the animal adoption system and create a disincentive for would-be adopters, as it would establish the possibility that they may be subject to harassment or intimidation by prior putative owners. The majority also noted that, absent alternatives to adoption, animals would be euthanized. Thus, the Court concluded that the protection of the identities of adoptive owners would promote the adoption of animals and prevent the needless euthanizing of otherwise healthy animals.
The majority also considered the role of companion animals in society and the protections they are afforded under the laws of this State, opining that the recognition of companion animals as a special category of property is consistent with the laws of the State and the underlying policy inherent in these laws to protect the welfare of animals. The majority concluded that it would be contrary to these principles to cause the needless euthanasia of animals by discouraging animal adoptions, which would likely result if a protective order were to be denied in similar circumstances.
With regard to the identity of the donor, the majority determined that, since the plaintiff alleged the shelter was aware that the cat was wrongfully taken from her, a reasonable resolution would be to allow the plaintiff to ascertain if the donor was, as alleged, employed by or affiliated with the shelter, or employed by a specified law firm. If so, then the donor’s identity should be disclosed. Otherwise, disclosure would not be warranted.
Justice Spolzino concurred that the protective order was properly issued with respect to the identity of the adoptive owner. However, he did not agree that the identity of the donor was immaterial or should be protected as a matter of public policy. He stated that this Court’s role in this case was merely to employ the rules applicable to disclosure pursuant to CPLR article 31. Justice Spolzino emphasized that the circumstances by which the cat came to the shelter were relevant to resolution of the dispute. He further asserted that, even if the public policy upon which the majority predicated its determination—that an individual who finds a stray or abandoned animal will be less likely to surrender it to a shelter because his or her identity may be disclosed—were properly recognized, it would not apply here, where the plaintiff alleged that an individual unlawfully took her pet.
CPLR 3211(b); Defense Of Failure To State A Cause Of Action Pursuant To CPLR 3211(a)(7) Unnecessary And “Harmless Surplusage”; Motion To Strike Defense Should Be Denied Butler v Catinella (58 AD3d 145 [Rivera, opinion; Lifson, Florio, Chambers, concur]).
In this case, this Court, upon reconsideration of its prior determinations that the defense of failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) may not properly be interposed in an answer, determined that it may properly be interposed. In several previous cases, this Court had stated that this defense may not be included in the answer, but must be raised by appropriate motion. Here, this Court held that those cases did not articulate the correct legal standard and no longer reflected the jurisprudence of the Second Judicial Department.
It appears that the rule prohibiting the defense from being interposed in an answer originated in the statutory language of the 1877 Code of Civil Procedure, a predecessor to the modern CPLR. The Code of Civil Procedure provided that a defendant may demur to the complaint where, inter alia, the objection “[t]hat the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” appeared upon the face of the complaint. Consistent therewith, in a 1921 case, this Court held that this defense “cannot be taken by answer,” and that, if the complaint is deficient on its face, that defect “should be taken by demurrer.”
In 1920 the Civil Practice Act abolished demurrer. Civil Practice Act § 277 stated that an objection to a pleading based on a defect allegedly appearing on the face of the pleading “may be taken by motion or by the answering pleading.” In 1921 that section was amended, inter alia, by deleting the phrase “or by the answering pleading.” Thus, an objection to a pleading had to be asserted by motion, and could not be advanced in an answer.
The CPLR was enacted in 1962 and became effective on September 1, 1963, replacing the former Civil Practice Act and the Rules of Civil Practice. CPLR 3211(e) now provides, in relevant part, that “[a]t any time before service of the responsive pleading is required, a party may move on one or more of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a), and no more than one such motion shall be permitted.” Since the initial enactment of the CPLR, and continuing to the present version, CPLR 3211(e) provides that a “motion based upon a ground specified” in CPLR 3211(a)(7), namely, that “the pleading fails to state a cause of action,” may be made at any subsequent time “or [raised] in a later pleading, if one is permitted.” Accordingly, this Court's prior pronouncement that “a defense that a complaint does not state a cause of action cannot be interposed in an answer but must be raised by appropriate motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)” runs afoul of the clear language of CPLR 3211(e).
Additionally, this Court agreed with the holdings of the Appellate Division, First Department, and Appellate Division, Third Department, that pleading the defense of failure to state a cause of action is unnecessary, constitutes “harmless surplusage,” and that a motion by the plaintiff to strike the defense should be denied. This Court agreed with those tribunals that no motion by the plaintiff lies under CPLR 3211(b) to strike this defense, as this amounts to an endeavor by the plaintiff to test the sufficiency of his or her own claim. This Court found the positions taken by those Courts to be well-grounded and sound. Accordingly, this Court concurred with their rationale and adopted it as this Court's rule of law. To the extent that this Court’s prior cases held differently, they are no longer be followed.
CPLR 3211(e); Comparison to CPLR 3025(b). Janssen v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 59 AD3d 15 [Rivera, opinion; Santucci, Dickerson, Belen, concur]).
Despite the recent amendment to CPLR 3211(e), which deleted reference to a “motion to replead,” such a motion is nonetheless still cognizable and available to a plaintiff, even though such a motion is, in essence, nothing more than a “poor substitute” for and an “arcane alternative” to a motion for leave to amend a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3025(b). The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for sexual discrimination. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. In an order dated September 7, 2006, the Supreme Court granted those branches of the defendants’ motion was were to dismiss the first and part of the second causes of action. By notice of motion dated March 1, 2007, the plaintiff moved for leave to amend the complaint. The Supreme Court treated the plaintiff's motion as, in effect, one to replead under CPLR 3211(e), and granted the motion.
This Court stated that the Supreme Court apparently elected to treat the motion as one for leave to replead under the incorrect premise that a motion for leave to amend a complaint is not permitted with regard to previously dismissed causes of action. In any event, because the Supreme Court framed its analysis in the context of CPLR 3211(e), and the defendants' contentions addressed that section, this Court focused on that characterization of the motion.
This Court noted that the former version of CPLR 3211(e) imposed three requirements: First, the party seeking leave to replead "was directed to state that request in the opposition papers to the motion to dismiss. Second, the court was not authorized to grant such leave unless it was satisfied that the party had good ground to support the cause of action or defense. Finally, the court was authorized to require an evidentiary showing before granting leave to replead" (Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 3211.32 [2d ed]). This version of the statute was in direct conflict with the Court of Appeals’ holding in Rovello v Orofino Realty Co. (40 NY2d 633). To resolve this conflict, in 2005, the Chief Administrative Judge introduced a bill to amend CPLR 3211(e).
CPLR 3211(e) was amended, and the amendment eliminated the three requirements set forth above. However, the amendment left several unanswered questions. First, did the Legislature, in amending the statute, eliminate a motion for leave to replead? The language pertaining to such motions was removed from the body of CPLR 3211(e), and the only reference to such motions appears in the heading or title of that subsection. Absent any indication that the Legislature intended to do away with such motions, this Court refused to presume such intent.
Second, what standard should be applied on a motion for leave to replead? This Court held that the same standard as governs motions for leave to amend pursuant to CPLR 3025 should apply to motions to replead, namely, that motions for leave to amend pleadings should be freely granted absent prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, unless the proposed amendment is devoid of merit or palpably insufficient. Here, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion.
Third, should any time limitation be required upon which to move for leave to replead? The defendants asserted that the Legislature inadvertently removed restrictions limiting the time in which a party could move for leave to replead. They urged this Court to impose a 30-day limitation akin to that governing motions for leave to reargue. However, this Court observed that CPLR 3211(e), as amended, did not set forth any time limitation. This Court further observed that “[A] court cannot amend a statute by inserting words that are not there, nor will a court read into a statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to enact" (Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382, 394). "[T]he judicial function is to interpret, declare, and enforce the law, not to make it, and it is not for the courts to correct supposed errors, omissions or defects in legislation" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 73, at 147-148). Accordingly, this Court refused to insert any time limitation, since to do so would result in a judicially “crafted" statute.
This Court stated that issues raised by this appeal demanded remedial action since the motion to replead could be deemed obsolete in light of CPLR 3025(b). However, whether to impose a time limitation and other concerns raised in this appeal were matters for the Legislature. Thus, this Court urged the Legislature to act without delay in addressing the matters and concerns raised in this appeal.
CPLR 7511; New York City Transit Authority Charged Employee, A Subway Conductor, With Verbally Abusing And Assaulting A Customer; Review Of Arbitration Decision Sustaining Assault Charge And Reducing Penalty From Dismissal To Reinstatement Without Back Pay; Arbitrator Exceeded Authority In Reducing Penalty
Matter of Transport Workers Union, Local 100 v New York City Tr. Auth. (57 AD3d 684 [Miller, opinion; Dillon, Angiolillo, concur; McCarthy, dissents, in which Spolzino joins])
This Court ruled that an arbitrator exceeded his authority in reducing the penalty of dismissal from public employment where a public employee committed an on-the-job felony assault, where the collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter CBA) between the employer and the employee’s union specified dismissal as the appropriate penalty in such a case, subject to exceptions that this Court found were not applicable here.
In this matter, the New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA) charged an employee subway conductor with verbally abusing and assaulting a customer. The employee was suspended, and the NYCTA sought his dismissal. The employee, who had 21 years of service with the NYCTA, had a prior disciplinary history which included, inter alia, a five-day suspension in 1991 arising from an altercation with a customer.
Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the CBA between the NYCTA and the employee's union, disciplinary step hearings were held. The charges were sustained, and the penalty of dismissal was upheld. According to the CBA, the next step in the review process was to be arbitration. The relevant provision of the CBA read, in part,
“If there is presented to the [arbitrator] for decision any charge which, if proved in Court, would constitute a felony, or any charge involving assault . . . the question to be determined by the [arbitrator] shall be with respect to the fact of such conduct. Where such charge is sustained by the [arbitrator], the action by the Authority, based thereon, shall be affirmed and sustained by the [arbitrator] except if there is presented to the [arbitrator] credible evidence that the action by the Authority is clearly excessive in light of the employee's record and past precedent in similar cases. It is understood by the parties that this exception will be used rarely and only to prevent a clear injustice."
The arbitrator sustained the assault charge, but reduced the penalty to reinstatement without back pay. He found that the employee was a long-term employee with no disciplinary action in the last 11 years of his service, and concluded that this case was "worthy of the exception" allowed by the CBA. This Court vacated the so much of the arbitrator’s determination as reduced the penalty.
Where parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, judicial review of the arbitration award is governed by CPLR 7511. An arbitration award may be vacated where, inter alia, the arbitrator exceeded his or her power. An excess of power within the meaning of CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) occurs "only where the arbitrator's award violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power" (Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers' Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 332, 336).
The majority observed that, where an arbitrator sustains an underlying charge of assault against a NYCTA employee, the CBA directs the arbitrator to uphold the NYCTA's imposition of discipline unless credible evidence demonstrates that it is clearly excessive in light of the employee's record and past precedent in similar cases. Noting that this exception is to be used by an arbitrator "rarely and only to prevent a clear injustice," the majority concluded that the arbitrator focused largely on issues that were relevant only to the question of whether the underlying offenses occurred. However, having found that an assault did occur, that point of distinction should have been rendered irrelevant. Furthermore, nowhere in the "discussion and analysis" section of his opinion did the arbitrator use the words "clearly excessive" (except in quoting the CBA), or otherwise indicate why the dismissal was a "clear injustice." The majority concluded that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in reducing the penalty, and that the Supreme Court properly granted the petition to vacate that portion of the award.
The dissenters concluded that the arbitrator did not act in excess of his authority in reducing the penalty. They observed that, here, the arbitrator determined that the "credible evidence" demonstrated that dismissal was "clearly excessive" in light of the employee's service record and the past precedent, and thus the circumstances warranted invocation of the "rare[ ]" exception "to prevent a clear injustice."
Criminal Law; District Attorney May Not Delegate The Prosecution Of A Criminal Case To An Attorney Retained By The Complaining Witness Matter of Sedore v Epstein (56 AD3d 60 [Spolzino, opinion; Florio, Angiolillo, Dickerson, concur]).
A District Attorney may not delegate the prosecution of a criminal action to an attorney retained by the complaining witness since such a delegation is improper, and the defendant in such a criminal action may properly seek relief in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of prohibition against the judge before whom the criminal action is commenced.
In reaching this conclusion, this Court explained that the real issue before it was not the conduct of the Town Justice in proceeding to trial, but rather the action of the District Attorney in delegating the authority to prosecute to an attorney retained by the complainant. This Court observed that prohibition may be invoked where a prosecutor threatens to act beyond his or her authority, precisely the petitioner’s contention here. Further, this Court observed that the District Attorney’s motion to intervene had been granted. Accordingly, this Court stated that, if the petitioner could satisfy the third element of a prohibition claim by demonstrating that she had a clear legal right to the relief requested, and the discretionary factors weighed in her favor, prohibition would lie.
This Court observed that the practice of private prosecution has largely been eliminated or limited. In New York, the authority to prosecute a criminal offense generally rests with the District Attorney in each county. A District Attorney does have the authority to delegate prosecution to assistants and to certain public officials. Additionally, when a District Attorney is unable to appear or is disqualified, the District Attorney of another county or a private attorney may be appointed to undertake the duties of the prosecutor. When the Governor deems it appropriate, the Governor may designate the Attorney General to prosecute in place of the District Attorney. However, none of these circumstances were presented here. Rather, the delegee was an attorney retained by the complainant for the sole purpose of prosecuting the petitioner.
This Court observed that there was no statutory authority for such a delegation. This Court then considered the unique role of the public prosecutor. The prosecutor is not the representative of an ordinary party to a dispute, but of a sovereignty charged with governing impartially; the duty of the District Attorney is not merely to obtain convictions, but to see that justice is done. This Court emphasized that the prosecutor’s obligations flow to the public. Thus, the conflict in permitting the prosecutor to be paid by the complainant is apparent.
While the Code of Professional Responsibility permits an attorney, with the client's consent, to accept payment from a third party, this Court observed that this rule did not contemplate the unique role of the public prosecutor. This Court again emphasized the public prosecutor’s role as representing the public interest, stated that a private attorney delegated to prosecute a criminal offense should be as disinterested as the public prosecutor, and concluded that "[t]he administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also be beyond the suspicion of reproach" (People v Savvides, 1 NY2d 554, 556). Thus, this Court stated that, even assuming that the District Attorney could consent on behalf of the public to an arrangement whereby an attorney retained by the complainant prosecutes a criminal offense, the conflict is not resolved.
This Court determined that the prosecution of a criminal offense is a public function, not a private one, and that prosecution of a criminal complaint by an attorney retained by the complainant is simply inconsistent with the principles concerning the role of the public prosecutor. This Court further concluded that, weighing the equitable factors that must be considered, a remedy in the nature of prohibition was appropriate. However, this Court recognized that the authority to prosecute may properly be delegated by the District Attorney to certain other public officials, and, accordingly, this Court modified the Supreme Court’s order to reflect that possibility.
Criminal Law; New Trial Ordered; Solicitation Of “Hit Men” To Kill Two Witnesses; Conspiracy In The Second Degree; Criminal Solicitation In The Second Degree; Trial Errors People v Kass (59 AD3d 77 [Fisher, opinion; Prudenti, McCarthy, concur; Dillon dissents, in which Skelos joins])
While incarcerated awaiting trial on an embezzlement charge, the defendant allegedly asked a fellow inmate to introduce him to people who, for money, would be willing to kill two witnesses. The fellow inmate turned out to be an informant, and two individuals posing as “hit men” were actually undercover police officers. On appeal from the judgment of conviction of conspiracy in the second degree and criminal solicitation in the second degree, a majority of this Court found that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial by a combination of errors, and thus revered the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial.
To convict the defendant of conspiracy in the second degree and criminal solicitation in the second degree, the People were required to prove, inter alia, that the defendant intended that the targets be killed. The majority characterized communications between the defendant and the detectives posing as “hit men” as consistent with the defendant’s claim that he was merely pretending to go along with the “hit men” out of fear of the informant, secure in the knowledge that, so long as he made no payments to the “killers,” no action would be taken.
Although the evidence was not legally insuf