Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/559/975/436565/
Timestamp: 2019-06-26 12:10:37
Document Index: 396548319

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3504', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1963', '§ 1963', '§ 3504', '§ 1963', '§ 1963', '§ 3563']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Bernard G. Rubin, Defendant-appellant, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1977 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Bernard G. Rubin, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Bernard G. Rubin, Defendant-appellant, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977)
Sept. 22, 1977. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 2, 1977
Before GOLDBERG and HILL, Circuit Judges and KERR* , District Judge.
In United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2136, 45 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1975), the Supreme Court reiterated the governing principles:
See also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418-19, 77 S. Ct. 963, 1 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1957). In Hale, the Court concluded that a defendant's silence in the circumstances following arrest and Miranda warnings lacked the requisite inconsistency with his exculpatory trial testimony and that such silence was therefore inadmissible for impeachment purposes. More recently the Court has held that the impeachment use of a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence violated the due process clause. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976).
Grunewald v. United States, supra, precludes any suggestion that silence before the grand jury is more probative than silence following arrest. In the circumstances of Grunewald, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the argument that the defendant's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury had "involved such inconsistency with any of his trial testimony as to permit its use against him for impeachment purposes." 353 U.S. at 419, 77 S. Ct. at 981.
Id. at 422-23, 77 S. Ct. at 983 (citation omitted).
The Court also emphasized that the grand jury had considered the defendant a potential target for indictment at the time of his appearance. Therefore "it was quite natural for him to fear that he was being asked questions for the very purpose of providing evidence against himself," and "quite consistent with innocence for him to refuse to provide evidence which could be used by the Government in building its incriminating chain." Id. at 423, 77 S. Ct. at 983.
Both the general nature of grand jury proceedings and the particular situation of the defendant thus fed the Court's conclusion that his invocation of the privilege had been "wholly consistent with innocence" and consequently inadmissible to impeach the defendant's exculpatory trial testimony. See id. at 421-22, 77 S. Ct. 963. Given the risk that the jury had drawn an inference of guilt from the exercise of the privilege, the Court found the error in admitting the evidence for impeachment purposes prejudicial. See, id. at 423-24, 77 S. Ct. 963.
The government bears the burden of establishing the threshold inconsistency necessary to admit impeachment evidence. See United States v. Hale, supra, 95 S. Ct. at 2136. So long as a grand jury witness has properly invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, the "insoluble ambiguity" of his silence, see Doyle, supra, 96 S. Ct. at 2244, precludes demonstration of that requisite inconsistency. Accordingly, the predicate for impeachment use of Wells' and Gordon's grand jury silence was lacking.
See also United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950, 96 S. Ct. 1724, 48 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1976); United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994, 1004-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S. Ct. 96, 30 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1971).2
Certainly the Doyle Court reaffirmed the recognition in Hale of the inherent ambiguity of post-arrest silence. However, the Court expressly noted that its consideration of the lack of probative value of the Ohio defendants' silence was unnecessary to its constitutional holding. Id. 96 S. Ct. at 2444-45 n. 8. Rather, that holding followed from the fundamental unfairness of employing a person's invocation of the right against self-incrimination to his disadvantage as he stands trial.
Id. 96 S. Ct. at 2245.5
That same unfairness may be present whenever the government attempts to exploit a proper invocation of the privilege, whether or not preceded by explicit warnings of the right to remain silent. Thus, whatever the ultimate validity of the proposition that Miranda -type warnings are required in the grand jury room, see United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 97 S. Ct. 1814, 52 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1977); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 97 S. Ct. 1823, 52 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S. Ct. 1768, 48 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1976), the factors found constitutionally intolerable in Doyle might be thought to extend to a defendant's silence in the face of grand jury questioning.
We need not resolve this question today. A defendant cannot complain where the prosecutorial abuse is of another's exercise of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.6 That privilege is a personal one. It is established that a defendant may not object to the violation of another person's privilege. See Doyle, supra, 96 S. Ct. at 2248 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and cases cited. Thus a defendant cannot complain of any Doyle -type unfairness that might be seen in impeachment of a defense witness by a prior refusal to testify before a grand jury.7
Because we have found the error in impeaching Wells and Gordon by their grand jury silence to be nonconstitutional, the strict guidelines set out in Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1977), for testing the harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt of a Doyle violation are inapplicable. Rather we must apply the test of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946):
See United States v. Constant, 501 F.2d 1284, 1289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910, 95 S. Ct. 830, 42 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1975).8
Oft times the alleged heinousness of a crime provides the judicial vehicle for a finding of harmless error. That factor, however, is never an appropriate consideration. Here, in reading and examining the record, we have attempted to strain out the quality of the alleged crime and to confine our attention to the residue of its basic factual underpinnings. The nature of the crime has not entered our evaluation of the evidence, which we find to be overwhelmingly convictive. Cognizant that "harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results", Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), we are nevertheless convinced that the improper impeachment of Wells and Gordon tainted appellant's trial at most to such a marginal extent that the judgment must be affirmed under the above standard.
Appellant also claims that the trial court improperly handled his suggestion that government agents had conducted illegal electronic surveillance of his office. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1), a defendant by asserting a claim of such surveillance requires the government to affirm or deny its occurrence.12
The language of § 1962(c) is less than pellucid, and appellant's attempt to illumine has appeal. The "Statement of Findings and Purpose" that introduces the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 contains some suggestion that Congress primarily concerned itself with the use of racketeering activity to gain and maintain positions in legitimate business and labor organizations. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), reprinted in (1970) U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News 1073. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized the importance to a § 1962(c) prosecution of establishing a substantial nexus between the prohibited activity and the conduct of the enterprise's affairs in United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975). On the other hand, one court has found the statute satisfied by two or more offenses committed in the course of employment with the relevant enterprises, so long as the offenses are themselves related. See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd. 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
As a criminal statute, § 1963 "must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411, 93 S. Ct. 1007, 1015, 35 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1973). This canon has particular application to forfeiture statutes. See Baca v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1964). Indeed, the forfeiture of a portion of an individual's property as a consequence of a criminal conviction was unknown to the federal criminal law until the passage of § 1963.15 Such a penal foray bespeaks a need for circumspection.
This holding of course does not apply to the type of situation discussed in United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1975), and noted in Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 96 S. Ct. at 2245 n. 11, in which the defendant (here, a defense witness) has conveyed the impression that he affirmatively cooperated with the government in all matters relating to the case
The Court went on to quote with approval from Justice White's concurrence in the judgment in United States v. Hale, supra, 95 S. Ct. at 2139. "Surely Hale was not informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be used against him at trial." Doyle, supra, 96 S. Ct. at 2245
18 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1) reads in full as follows:
Unlike in rem forfeiture proceedings against contraband or articles put to unlawful use, § 1963 operates against the person of the defendant and includes within the punishment for his crime forfeiture of a portion of his estate. Such a provision, while known to the common law of England and the colonies, is foreign to the federal criminal law. The 91st Congress recognized that, in passing § 1963, it was partially repealing a statute passed by the First Congress, which in its present form provides that: "No conviction or judgment shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate." 18 U.S.C. § 3563. See United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976); S.Rep. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969), hereinafter S.Rep.); 116 Cong.Rec. 35205, 35208 (remarks of Rep. Mirka, Rep. Ryan)