Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/529/89/
Timestamp: 2019-06-16 03:41:57
Document Index: 286581146

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3703', '§ 3703', '§ 3703', '§ 1228', '§ 317', '§ 2701', '§ 2702', '§ 2718', '§ 317', '§ 317', '§ 3703', '§ 1228', '§ 317', '§ 6101']

United States v. Locke :: 529 U.S. 89 (2000) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 529 › United States v. Locke
*Together with No. 98-1706, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, Governor of Washington, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
(b) In Ray, the Court held that the PWSA and Coast Guard regulations promulgated under that Act pre-empted Washington's pilotage requirement, limitation on tanker size, and tanker design and construction rules. The Ray Court's interpretation of the PWSA is correct and controlling here. Its basic analytic structure explains why federal preemption analysis applies to the challenged regulations and allows scope and due recognition for the traditional authority of the States and localities to regulate some matters of local concern. In narrowing the preemptive effect given the PWSA in Ray, the Ninth Circuit placed more weight on OPA's saving clauses than they can bear. Like Title I of OPA, in which they are found, the saving clauses are limited to regulations governing liability and compensation for oil pollution, and do not extend to rules regulating vessel operation, design, or manning. Thus, the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and its regulations is not affected by OPA, and Ray's holding survives OPA's enactment undiminished. The Ray Court's prefatory observation that an "assumption" that the States' historic police powers were not to be superseded by federal law unless that was the clear and manifest congressional purpose does not mean that a presumption against pre-emption aids the Court's analysis here. An assumption of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence. The Ray Court held, among other things, that Con-
(c) The field pre-emption rule surrounding PWSA Title II and 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a) and the superseding effect of additional federal statutes are illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington's tanker regulations, the attempted reach of which is well demonstrated by the briefs and record. First, the imposition of a series of training requirements on a tanker's crew does not address matters unique to Washington waters, but imposes requirements that control the staffing, operation, and manning of a tanker outside of those waters. The training and drill requirements pertain to "operation" and "personnel qualifications" and so are pre-empted by § 3703(a). That training is a field reserved to the Federal Government is further confirmed by the circumstance that the STCW Convention addresses crew "training" and "qualification" requirements, and that the United States has enacted crew training regulations. Second, the imposition of English language proficiency requirements on a tanker's crew is not limited to governing local traffic or local peculiarities. It is pre-empted by § 3703(a) as a "personnel qualification" and by 33 U. S. C. § 1228(a)(7), which requires that any vessel operating in United States waters have at least one
David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States in No. 98-1701. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Michael Jay Singer, H. Thomas Byron III, David R. Andrews, Judith Miller, Nancy E. McFadden, Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, James S. Carmichael, Malcolm J. Williams, Jr., and Paul M. Wasserman. C. Jonathan Benner argued the
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht and J. Matthew Rodriquez, Assistant Attorneys General, Dennis M. Eagan and Michael W Neville, Deputy Attorneys General, Maya B. Kara, Acting Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Charlie Condon of South Carolina, and Jan Graham of Utah; for San Juan County, Washington, et al. by Randall K. Gaylord and Karen
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Government of Canada by Margaret K. Pfeiffer; for the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations et al. by Bryan P. Coluccio; for the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association by Sam D. Delich and James B. Nebel; for the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council by Avrum M. Gross and Susan A. Burke; and for the Puget Sound Steamship Operators Association et al. by Richard W Buchanan and Robert W Nolting.
In addition to holding some of our vital waters, Washington is the site of major installations for the Nation's oil industry and the destination or shipping point for huge volumes of oil and its end products. Refineries and product terminals are located adjacent to Puget Sound in ports including Cherry Point, Ferndale, Tacoma, and Anacortes. Canadian refineries are found near Vancouver on Burrard Inlet and the lower Fraser River. Crude oil is transported by sea to
The District Court rejected all of lntertanko's arguments and upheld the state regulations. International Assn. of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (WD Wash. 1996). The appeal followed, and at that stage the United States intervened on lntertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the State could enforce its laws, save the one requiring the vessels to install certain navigation and towing equipment. 148 F.3d 1053 (1998). The Court of Appeals reasoned that this requirement, found in WAC § 317-21-265, was "virtually identical to" requirements declared pre-empted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978). 148 F. 3d, at 1066. Over Judge Graber's dissent, the Court of Appeals denied petitions for rehearing en banco 159 F.3d 1220 (1998). Judge Graber, although unwilling, without further analysis, to conclude that the panel reached the wrong result, argued that the opinion was "incorrect in two exceptionally important respects: (1) The opinion places too much weight on two clauses in Title I of OPA 90 [The Oil Pollution Act of 1990]
The Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 (1852), stated that there would be instances in which state regulation of maritime commerce is inappropriate even absent the exercise of federal authority, although in the case before it the Court found the challenged state regulations were permitted in light of local needs and conditions. Where Congress had acted, however, the Court had little difficulty in finding state vessel requirements were pre-
The Tank Vessel Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1889, enacted specific requirements for operation of covered vessels. The Act provided that "[i]n order to secure effective provisions against the hazards of life and property," additional federal rules could be adopted with respect to the "design and construction, alteration, or repair of such vessels," "the operation of such vessels," and "the requirements of the manning of such vessels and the duties and qualifications of the officers and crews thereof." The purpose of the Act was to establish "a reasonable and uniform set of rules and regulations concerning ... vessels carrying the type of cargo deemed dangerous." H. R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936). The Tank Vessel Act was the primary source for regulating
The OPA contains nine titles, two having the most significance for these cases. Title I is captioned "Oil Pollution Liability, and Compensation" and adds extensive new provisions to the United States Code. See 104 Stat. 2375, 33 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Title I imposes liability (for both removal costs and damages) on parties re-
Illustrative of treaties and agreements to which the United States is a party are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 32 U. S. T. 47, T. 1. A. S. No. 9700, the International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, S. Exec. Doc. C, 93-1, 12 1. L. M. 1319, as amended by 1978 Protocol, S. Exec. Doc. C, 96-1, 17
Our conclusion is fortified by Congress' decision to limit the saving clauses by the same key words it used in declaring the scope of Title I of OP A. Title I of OP A permits recovery of damages involving vessels "from which oil is discharged, or which pos[e] the substantial threat of a discharge of oil." 33 U. S. C. § 2702(a). The saving clauses, in parallel manner, permit States to impose liability or requirements "relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil." § 2718(c). In its titles following Title I, OPA addresses matters including licensing and certificates of registry, 104 Stat.
Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined respects the established federal-state balance in matters of maritime commerce between the subjects as to which the States retain concurrent powers and those over which the federal authority displaces state control. We have upheld state laws imposing liability for pollution caused by oil spills. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U. S., at 325. Our view of OPA's saving clauses preserves this important role for the States, which is unchallenged here. We think it quite unlikely that Congress would use a means so indirect as the saving clauses in Title I of OPA to upset the settled division of authority by allowing States to impose additional unique substantive regulation on the atsea conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law. See, e. g., Morales
Ray quoted but a fragment of a much longer paragraph found in Rice. The quoted fragment is followed by extensive and careful qualifications to show the different ap-
The state laws now in question bear upon national and international maritime commerce, and in this area there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers. Rather, we must ask whether the local laws in question are consistent with the federal statutory structure, which has as one of its objectives a uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce. No artificial presumption aids us in determining the scope of appropriate local regulation under the PWSA, which, as we discuss below, does preserve, in Title I of that Act, the historic role of the States to regulate local ports and waters
As Ray itself made apparent, the States may enforce rules governed by Title I of the PWSA unless they run counter to an exercise of federal authority. The analysis under Title I of the PWSA, then, is one of conflict pre-emption, which occurs "when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress.'" California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 100-101 (1989) (citations omitted). In this context, Coast Guard regulations are to be given pre-
While Ray explained that Congress, in Title I of the PWSA, preserved state authority to regulate the peculiarities of local waters if there was no conflict with federal regulatory determinations, the Court further held that Congress, in Title II of the PWSA, mandated federal rules on the subjects or matters there specified, demanding uniformity. Id., at 168 ("Title II leaves no room for the States to impose different or stricter design requirements than those which Congress has enacted with the hope of having them internationally adopted or has accepted as the result of international accord. A state law in this area ... would frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform, international standards"). Title II requires the Coast Guard to impose national regulations governing the general seaworthiness of tankers and their crews. Id., at 160. Under Ray's inter-
The existence of some overlapping coverage between the two titles of the PWSA may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict preemption principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II. The Ray Court acknowledged the difficulty, but declined to resolve every question by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. We follow the same approach, and conflict pre-emption under
First, Washington imposes a series of training requirements on a tanker's crew. WAC § 317-21-230; see also Appendix, infra, at 118. A covered vessel is required to certify
The second Washington rule we find pre-empted is WAC § 317-21-250; see also Appendix, infra, at 119. Washington imposes English language proficiency requirements on a tanker's crew. This requirement will dictate how a tanker operator staffs the vessel even from the outset of the voyage, when the vessel may be thousands of miles from Puget Sound. It is not limited to governing local traffic or local peculiarities. The State's attempted rule is a "personnel qualification" pre-empted by § 3703(a) of Title II. In addition, there is another federal statute, 33 U. S. C. § 1228(a)(7), on the subject. It provides: "[N]o vessel ... shall operate in the navigable waters of the United States ... , if such vessel ... while underway, does not have at least one licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge
For example, the record before us reveals that a fourth state rule cannot stand in light of other sources of federal regulation of the same subject. Washington requires vessels that ultimately reach its waters to report certain marine casualties. WAC § 317-21-130; see also Appendix, infra, at 117-118. The requirement applies to incidents (defined as a "collision," "allision," "near-miss incident," "marine casualty" of listed kinds, "accidental or intentional grounding," "failure of the propulsion or primary steering systems,"
We hold that Congress intended that the Coast Guard regulations be the sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations with respect to the matters covered by the challenged state statute. Under 46 U. S. C. § 6101, the Coast Guard "shall
We have determined that Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, English language skills, training, and casualty reporting are preempted. Petitioners make substantial arguments that the remaining regulations are pre-empted as well. It is preferable that the remaining claims be considered by the Court of Appeals or by the District Court within the framework we have discussed. The United States did not participate in
"1. Event Reporting-WAC 317-21-130. Requires operators to report all events such as collisions, allisions and near-miss incidents for the five years preceding filing of a
"8. Personnel Policies-Training-WAC 317-21-230. Requires operators to provide a comprehensive training program for personnel that goes beyond that necessary to obtain a license or merchant marine document, and which includes instructions on a number of specific procedures.