Source: http://www.narf.org/icwa/state/illinois/case/hd.html
Timestamp: 2014-04-21 15:12:24
Document Index: 48653402

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1901', '§ 1901', '§ 1902', '§ 1911', '§ 1911', '§ 1912', '§ 1903']

Native American Rights Fund, A Practical Guide to the Indian Child Welfare Act, STATE of Illinois, In re H.D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ebony Britt, Respondent-Appellant). ICWA Guide Online | Illinois Cases Federal Resources | Resources by State | Cases A-Z (Cite as: 343 Ill.App.3d 483, 797 N.E.2d 1112, 278 Ill.Dec. 194)
re H.D., a Minor (The People of the State of
Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
Ebony Britt, Respondent-Appellant).
4-03-0206.
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was not applicable in proceeding
to terminate parental rights; although mother stated her belief that
grandfather of child's father was Indian, no information was given
that child was member of Indian tribe or was eligible
for membership in Indian tribe and biological child of Indian
tribe member, and neither mother nor child's father presented evidence
to support a finding that child was "Indian child" or
part of Indian tribe. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
et seq., 25 U.S.C.A § 1901
et seq.; S.H.A. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b).
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) seeks to provide Native American
ability to preserve their culture and identity by granting tribal
courts either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over child custody and
adoption matters involving an "Indian child." Indian Child Welfare Act
Indian Affairs, trial court in parental rights termination proceeding must
determine if child is "Indian child" within meaning of Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply in a
parental rights termination proceeding unless it is established that the
minor is an "Indian child." Indian Child Welfare Act of
forfeited argument on appeal that state's petition to terminate parental
rights was defective because it did not clearly and obviously
state that mother could permanently lose her parental rights, where
mother did not object to the wording of state's petition
at trial court level or allow trial court to remedy
alleged defect. S.H.A. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b); 735 ILCS 5/2-612(c).
petition to terminate parental rights was not defective on ground
that it did not state that mother could permanently lose
her parental rights; language of statute requiring petition to "clearly
and obviously" state parents could "permanently" lose their parental rights
did not apply, mother received oral and written admonishments that
her parental rights could be terminated in the trial court's
orders on first appearance, temporary custody, and adjudicatory matters, and
thus, mother received more than adequate notice throughout proceedings that
her parental rights could be terminated. S.H.A. 705
ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b), 2-13.
construing a statute, a court should presume that the General
Assembly did not intend an absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice.
evidence supported trial court's finding of unfitness in proceeding to
terminate parental rights; trial court found mother unfit based on
failure to make reasonable efforts and reasonable progress, and, although
state acknowledged court considered evidence outside applicable time frame in
regard to mother's reasonable efforts, record indicated court focused its
reasonable progress ruling on evidence of mother's conduct during applicable
time frame, and any one ground of unfitness, properly proven,
was sufficient to find parent unfit. S.H.A. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b).
termination of parental rights is a serious matter, state must
prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence in a proceeding
reviewing court accords great deference to a trial court's finding
of parental unfitness in a proceeding to terminate parental rights,
and such a finding will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
grounds for unfitness are independent, a trial court's judgment may
be affirmed if evidence supports finding of unfitness on any
one of the alleged statutory grounds, in a proceeding to
evidence supported trial court's finding that it was in child's
best interest that mother's parental rights be terminated; best-interest report
indicated child had been in foster care with her biological
grandmother and resided in safe, stable home, and child's foster
parents were willing to provide her with permanency, and trial
court found mother had "a persistent pattern of minimizing incidents
in regard to violence," as well as "a persistent pattern
of nondisclosure," which could put child at risk of harm.
S.H.A. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b).
will not lightly terminate parental rights because of the fundamental
importance inherent in those rights.
a trial court finds parent unfit in a proceeding to
terminate parental rights, parent's rights must yield to child's best
trial court's finding that termination of parental rights is in
a child's best interest will not be reversed on appeal
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence;
a determination is deemed to be "against the manifest weight
of the evidence" only if the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based
on the evidence presented. **1114
Daniel B. Kennedy (Court-appointed), Champaign, for Ebony Britt.
John C. Piland, Champaign County State's Attorney, Urbana, Norbert J.
Goetten, Director, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Jason P. Young,
Staff Attorney, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.
In April 2001, the State filed a petition for adjudication
of wardship with respect to H.D., the minor child of
Jeffrey Dillon and respondent, Ebony Britt. In July 2001, the
trial court adjudicated H.D. a ward of the court and
ordered custody and guardianship placed with the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS). In June 2002, the State
filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent
and Dillon. In January 2003, the trial court found the
parents unfit. In February 2003, the court found it in
H.D.'s **1115
best interest that parental rights be terminated. Dillon is not
a party to this appeal.
On appeal, respondent argues (1) the trial court's findings should
be invalidated because of violations of the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901
through 1923 (2000)), (2) the State's petition to terminate parental
state that respondent could permanently lose her parental rights, (3)
the trial court erred in considering evidence outside the permissible
time frames, and (4) the court's best-interest finding was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
of wardship,
alleging H.D., born November 30, 1999, was a neglected minor
pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000)) because
her mother exposed her to an injurious environment due to
inadequate supervision. At the shelter-care hearing, the trial court asked
respondent if H.D. had "any American/Indian blood in her." Respondent
indicated that the grandfather of H.D.'s father was "Indian," but
she did not know what tribe. The court ordered the
State to notify tribal authorities. The court also entered a
temporary custody order, finding probable cause to believe H.D. was
a neglected minor. The court ordered temporary custody of H.D.
be placed with DCFS.
In its June 2001 adjudicatory order, the trial court found
H.D. neglected by reason of lack of supervision. In its
July 2001 dispositional order, the court found respondent to be
unfit, made H.D. a ward of the court, and granted
custody and guardianship to DCFS.
In June 2002, the State filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights. The State alleged respondent was an unfit
person because she (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal
of H.D. (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2002)) and (2) failed
to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor
within the initial nine-month period of the adjudication of neglect
(July 11, 2001, through April 11, 2002) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii)
(West 2002)).
In October 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the motion to terminate parental rights. Respondent testified she started
using marijuana when she was 12 years old but stopped
using in July 2002. She also stated she attended treatment
and counseling "sporadically."
Donna Wilson, a counselor with the Prairie Center Health Systems,
testified DCFS referred respondent to her. Respondent told Wilson she
could not commit to any regular treatment that would be
on a regular basis because she was depressed. Wilson canceled
the counseling relationship because of respondent's lack of attendance and
Rose Adkisson, a counselor, testified she worked with respondent between
April 2001 and May 2002. She stated she wanted to
address respondent's issues with anger and depression. Adkisson noted respondent
failed to attend her weekly counseling sessions on numerous occasions,
and thus respondent did not successfully complete counseling with her.
Macey Ingram, a DCFS investigator and former caseworker, testified she
participated in setting forth goals in respondent's client service plans.
Ingram stated respondent was cooperating with substance-*487
abuse treatment between December 2001 and March 2002, but "her
attendance wasn't as good as it had been."
**1116
Jennifer Gerrib, a child-welfare specialist with Lutheran Social Services, testified
she took over casework responsibilities in this case in
March 2002. She stated a goal of respondent's service plan
was to successfully complete substance-abuse treatment. Respondent did not provide
any proof to Gerrib that she completed substance-abuse counseling.
In December 2002, the trial court resumed the hearing to
receive evidence of whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs had
been contacted regarding this case pursuant to the ICWA. Following
arguments, the court ordered DCFS to notify the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and continued the matter.
In January 2003, the trial court found the State had
come into compliance with the ICWA by way of notice
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the lack of
any helpful information from H.D.'s father. Thereafter, the court found
both respondent and H.D.'s father unfit by clear and convincing
evidence. Specifically, the court noted respondent's issues centered on substance
abuse, her extreme anger, homelessness, and unemployment. The court found
respondent still needed to deal with those issues, had not
established stability as to employment or residency, refused to commit
to substance-abuse treatment on a regular basis, tested positive for
cannabis in April and May 2002, and failed to address
her anger problem.
In February 2003, the trial court held the best-interest hearing.
Following the presentation of witnesses and counsels' arguments, the court
found it in H.D.'s best interest that respondent's parental rights
be terminated, as well as those of H.D.'s father. This
Congress enacted the ICWA to "protect
establishment of minimum [f]ederal standards for the removal of Indian
Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs." 25 U.S.C. § 1902
The foundation of the ICWA centers on the provisions relating to *488 jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 104 L.Ed.2d 29, 38 (1989). "The ICWA seeks to provide Native American tribes with the ability to preserve their culture and identity by granting tribal courts either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over child custody and adoption matters involving an 'Indian child.' " In re M.S., 302 Ill.App.3d 998, 1001, 235 Ill.Dec. 969, 706 N.E.2d 524, 527 (1999), citing In re Adoption of S.S., 167 Ill.2d 250, 257, 212 Ill.Dec. 590, 657 N.E.2d 935, 940 (1995). Under section 1911(b) of the ICWA, the state court and tribal court have concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving foster-care placement or termination of parental rights as to an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child's tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b) (2000); In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 203-04, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1043 (2001). The state court must transfer the proceedings to the tribal court upon the petition of either parent, an Indian custodian, or the Indian child's tribe, **1117 ***199 unless good cause to the contrary, objection by either parent, or declination of jurisdiction by the tribal court. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2000).
The ICWA further provides that "[i]n any involuntary proceeding in a [s]tate court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster[-]care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe * * * of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention." 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2000). The ICWA defines "Indian child" as "any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2000). A violation of section 1911 or 1912 of the ICWA may warrant invalidation of the child custody proceedings. C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 204, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d at 1043. "In
the absence of a conclusive finding of the child's eligibility
in a particular tribe, either by that tribe or by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the trial court must determine
if the child is an 'Indian child.' [Citation.] In fact,
the court must initially determine if a child is an
'Indian child' within the meaning of the ICWA. [Citation.]" M.S.,
302 Ill.App.3d at 1001, 235 Ill.Dec. 969, 706 N.E.2d at
In the case sub judice, the trial court did not make a determination as to whether H.D. was an "Indian child." Instead, the court assumed the ICWA applied and ordered notice to be given to tribal authorities. However, the ICWA does not apply unless it is established that the minor is an "Indian child." In re Stiarwalt, 190 Ill.App.3d 547, 551, 137 Ill.Dec. 420, 546 N.E.2d 44, 47-48 (1989), citing In re Appeal in Maricopa *489 County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 136 Ariz. 528, 531, 667 P.2d 228, 231 (1983). The trial court should not assume the ICWA applies without establishing whether the minor is an "Indian child," and this court must therefore determine whether the ICWA applies here. See Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. at 532, 667 P.2d at 232. "The
proper course of action in the initial proceedings below would
have been for the trial court to explicitly enter findings
regarding the status of the child as an Indian or
non-Indian as early in the custody proceedings as possible. [Citation.]
The trial court should not have assumed throughout the proceedings
below that the ICWA applied without ascertaining with proof and
on the record that (1) the child is enrolled in
a tribe or that (2) the child is a biological
child of an Indian who is a member of a
tribe and that the child is eligible for membership in
the tribe as well." Maricopa
136 Ariz. at 532, 667 P.2d at 232.
In response to a question by the trial court, respondent
stated her belief that the grandfather of H.D.'s father was
Indian, but she did not know what tribe. No information
was given that H.D. was a member of an Indian
tribe or was eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and the biological child of an Indian tribe member. See
Stiarwalt,
190 Ill.App.3d at 551, 137 Ill.Dec. 420, 546 N.E.2d at
48 (the ICWA "does not apply merely because the children
are 'Indian,' but applies only where there is proof that
an Indian tribe, as defined by the [ICWA]"). The State
contacted the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which indicated the scant
amount of information on any Native American status of H.D.
would lead it to not intervene **1118
in the case or be able to make any confirmation
as to H.D.'s status as an "Indian child." As neither
respondent nor H.D.'s father presented evidence to support a finding
that H.D. was an "Indian child" or a part of
an Indian tribe, the ICWA does not apply in this
case. See S.S.,
167 Ill.2d at 265, 212 Ill.Dec. 590, 657 N.E.2d at
943 (Heiple, J., concurring) (where the minor children had no
and were never part of an Indian cultural setting or
resided on a reservation, no justification for applying the ICWA
The State's Petition To Terminate Parental Rights
Initially, the State argues respondent forfeited her argument on this
issue by failing to object to the alleged error at
the trial court level. The principles of forfeiture apply to
proceedings conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. See In
re E.M.,
295 Ill.App.3d *490
220, 225, 229 Ill.Dec. 658, 692 N.E.2d 431, 434 (1998).
Further, appeals from final judgments under the Juvenile Court Act
are governed by the civil rules of procedure. 134 Ill.2d
R. 660(b). Section 2-612(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that "[a]ll defects in pleadings, either in form or
substance, not objected to in the trial court are waived."
735 ILCS 5/2- 612 (c) (West 2002). Here, respondent did
not object to the wording of the State's petition to
terminate her parental rights at the trial court level or
allow the trial court to remedy the alleged defect. Thus,
respondent has forfeited her argument on appeal.
Even if we were to conclude respondent properly preserved her argument for review, reversal is not warranted. Respondent argues the State's motion to terminate her parental rights was defective because it did not "clearly and obviously" state she could "permanently" lose her parental rights. In support of her argument, respondent cites the Second District's decision in In re Andrea D., 336 Ill.App.3d 335, 270 Ill.Dec. 719, 783 N.E.2d 681 (2003), remanded with directions to vacate and reconsider, 204 Ill.2d 655, 273 Ill.Dec. 403, 789 N.E.2d 303 (2003) (nonprecedential supervisory order). In that case, the State's petition to terminate the respondent's parental rights included a prayer for relief requesting parental rights be "terminated," and that the guardianship administrator be granted the power to consent to the minor's adoption with the consent binding on the parents. Andrea D., 336 Ill.App.3d at 338, 270 Ill.Dec. 719, 783 N.E.2d at 684. It is unclear whether the State's amended motion for termination of parental rights was included in its petition for adjudication of abuse or neglect. The respondent argued the State's petition was defective because the language did not include an explicit request for "permanent" termination of his parental rights, as he alleged was required by section 2-13(4) of the Juvenile Court Act. Andrea D., 336 Ill.App.3d at 338, 270 Ill.Dec. 719, 783 N.E.2d at 684.
Section 2-13(4) of the Juvenile Court Act provides: "If
termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of
with power to consent to adoption of the minor under
[s]ection 2-29 is sought, the petition shall so state. If
the petition includes this request, the prayer for relief shall
clearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose
their rights as a parent at this hearing. In
addition to the foregoing, the petitioner, by motion, may request
the termination **1119
of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of the
person with power to consent to adoption of the minor
under [s]ection 2- 29 at any time after the entry
of a dispositional order under [s]ection 2- 22." 705 ILCS
405/2-13(4) (West 2002).
In its interpretation of section 2-13(4), the Second District *491
determined the statute required the State's petition to " 'clearly
and obviously' state that the parents could 'permanently' lose their
parental rights at the hearing" for the petition to be
valid. Andrea
336 Ill.App.3d at 339, 270 Ill.Dec. 719, 783 N.E.2d at
684-85. Without the word " permanently" in the petition, the
Second District concluded the State's petition was defective on its
face and reversed the trial court's judgment. Andrea
685. Respondent argues the State's motion in this case must
meet the same fate as that in Andrea
We disagree. We question the merits of respondent's argument that
a prayer for relief requesting the termination of parental rights
does not adequately convey that parental rights could be "permanently"
we note the supreme court has directed the Second District
to vacate its judgment in Andrea
and reconsider its decision. Our holding, however, is based on
our conclusion that the State's motion seeking a finding of
unfitness and termination of respondent's parental rights was not governed
by section 2-13(4) of the Juvenile Court Act.
Section 2-13(2) of the Juvenile Court Act provides the State's
petition must allege the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent
and, inter
set forth any factual allegations. 705 ILCS 405/2-13(2) (West 2002).
Section 2-13(3) states the petition must allege it is in
the minor's best interest that he be adjudged a ward
of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2- 13(3) (West 2002). If
the termination of parental rights is sought, along with the
appointment of a guardian with the power to consent to
adoption under section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act, the
petition is required to so state. 705 ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West
2002). If this relief is requested, the petition must "clearly
and obviously" state the parents could "permanently" lose their parental
rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West 2002). In addition, the petitioner
may file a similar motion seeking termination and the appointment
of a guardian "at any time after the entry of
a dispositional order under [s]ection 2-22." 705 ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West
In our view, section 2-13 was meant to apply when
the State files a single petition, asking the trial court
to adjudicate the minor abused, neglected, or dependent,
as well as seeking to terminate parental rights and the
the minor's adoption under section 2-29. The requirement that the
petition's prayer for relief "clearly and obviously" state the parents
could "permanently" lose their parental rights is not found in
section 2-29, which allows for petitions to terminate parental rights
and consent to the minor's adoption separate and apart from
proceedings where the trial court has adjudicated the minor abused,
neglected, or dependent and held dispositional hearings. Section 2-13(4)'s *492
requirement that the prayer for relief notify the parents of
the possible permanent loss of their parental rights is necessary
and warranted in a situation where the State alleges neglect
and seeks termination in a more expedited fashion and in
the same petition. In this case, however, the State proceeded
in a separate and distinct manner pursuant to section 2-29,
a less expedient fashion with multiple hearings and motions resulting
in a lesser need for the notice required by section
2-13(4). Therefore, we find the required **1120
notice in section 2-13(4) does not apply in this case,
and the State's motion was not facially defective. Moreover, we
need not address what language is required in the State's
prayer for relief when the State files a single petition,
asking the trial court to adjudicate a minor abused or
neglected, as well as seeking to terminate parental rights, because
that issue is not presently before this court.
In construing a statute, a court should presume that the General Assembly "did not intend an absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice." People v. Shanklin, 329 Ill.App.3d 1144, 1146, 264 Ill.Dec. 45, 769 N.E.2d 547, 548- 49 (2002). Section 1-5(3) of the Juvenile Court Act requires the trial court to admonish parents in cases such as the one before us that they risk termination of their parental rights if they fail to comply with various conditions. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(3) (West 2002); In re Kenneth F., 332 Ill.App.3d 674, 680, 266 Ill.Dec. 189, 773 N.E.2d 1259, 1264 (2002) (section 1- 5(3) acts as a safeguard to a parent's due process rights inherent in their fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children). In this case, respondent received oral and written admonishments that her parental rights could be terminated in the trial court's orders on first appearance, temporary custody, and adjudicatory matters. With this in mind, reversing a trial court's judgment to terminate parental rights based solely on the State's failure to use the word "permanently" in its motion, as respondent argues, would lead to unjust results. Respondent received more than adequate notice throughout the proceedings that her parental rights could be terminated, and "[a]n error that prejudices no one should not prevent children, who are the objects of these proceedings, from attaining some level of stability in their lives." Kenneth F., 332 Ill.App.3d at 679-80, 266 Ill.Dec. 189, 773 N.E.2d at 1264. Therefore, as the statutory language found in section 2-13(4) was not required in these proceedings, the wording of the State's motion does not warrant reversal of the trial court's judgment.
The Trial Court's Consideration of Evidence
Respondent argues the trial court erred in considering evidence outside the permissible time frames set forth in the Juvenile Court *493 Act. Because termination of parental rights is a serious matter, the State must prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re M.H., 196 Ill.2d 356, 365, 256 Ill.Dec. 297, 751 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (2001). A reviewing court accords great deference to a trial court's finding of parental unfitness, and such a finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Tinya W., 328 Ill.App.3d 405, 408, 262 Ill.Dec. 606, 765 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (2002). As the grounds for unfitness are independent, the trial court's judgment may be affirmed if the evidence supports the finding of unfitness on any one of the alleged statutory grounds. In re E.O., 311 Ill.App.3d 720, 726, 244 Ill.Dec. 165, 724 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (2000).
In this case, the State's two grounds of unfitness alleged
respondent (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that were the basis for the removal of H.D.
from her and (2) failed to make reasonable progress toward
the return of H.D. within the initial nine-month period of
the adjudication of neglect (July 11, 2001, through April 11,
2002). The trial court
found respondent unfit under both counts. In its ruling, the
court indicated its consideration of respondent's positive drug test in
May 2002 and its relevance to the reasonable efforts count.
The court **1121
stated it could not consider the same information as to
the reasonable progress count.
re Brianna B.,
334 Ill.App.3d 651, 658, 268 Ill.Dec. 458, 778 N.E.2d 724,
731 (2002), this court held that "[w]hen making a determination
of a parent's unfitness on the basis of failure to
make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the
basis for removal of the child, the court may not
consider any evidence beyond the statutorily prescribed nine months from
the date of the adjudication of neglect." Here, the State
acknowledges the trial court considered evidence outside the applicable time
frame in regard to respondent's reasonable efforts. However, the court
was clear in stating it could not consider the same
information as to the reasonable progress allegation. Thus, the record
indicates the court focused its reasonable progress ruling on the
evidence of respondent's conduct during the applicable time frame, and
any one ground of unfitness, "properly proven," is sufficient to
find a parent unfit. In
re C.W.,
199 Ill.2d 198, 210, 262 Ill.Dec. 802, 766 N.E.2d 1105,
1113 (2002). As respondent does not contest the sufficiency of
the court's ruling on the reasonable progress count, and as
each count is independent of the other, we find remand
The Trial Court's Best-Interest Finding
Respondent argues the trial court's best-interest finding was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Courts will not lightly terminate parental rights because of the *494 fundamental importance inherent in those rights. M.H., 196 Ill.2d at 363, 256 Ill.Dec. 297, 751 N.E.2d at 1140. Once the trial court finds the parent unfit, "the parent's rights must yield to the child's best interest." In re Tashika F., 333 Ill.App.3d 165, 170, 266 Ill.Dec. 742, 775 N.E.2d 304, 307 (2002). A trial court's finding that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interest will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.F., 326 Ill.App.3d 1110, 1115-16, 261 Ill.Dec. 132, 762 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2002). A determination is deemed to be against the manifest weight of the evidence "only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident [citation] or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented [citation]." In re D.F., 201 Ill.2d 476, 498, 268 Ill.Dec. 7, 777 N.E.2d 930, 942-43 (2002).
In this case, the best-interest report indicated H.D. had been
in foster care with her biological grandmother since April 2001.
The report stated H.D. resided in a safe, stable home,
and her foster parents were willing to provide her with
the permanency she needs. On the other hand, Vicki Moss,
respondent's addiction
counselor, testified that although respondent had good participation in treatment
and good progress as to her goals, she could not
predict whether respondent would be successfully discharged from her program
within a reasonable time period. The trial court found respondent
had "a persistent pattern of minimizing incidents in regard to
violence," as well as "a persistent pattern of nondisclosure," which
could put H.D. at risk of harm. The court also
heard evidence of possible safety concerns for H.D. pertaining to
respondent's new paramour and her poor judgment in her personal
relationships. The court noted H.D. "deserve[d] to have an assurance
of stability," and the evidence presented did not indicate respondent
could provide that stability in the foreseeable future. The court
be terminated, and we conclude that finding was not **1122
I agree the language used in the State's petition was
sufficient to provide notice to respondent that the State sought
to permanently terminate her parental rights. I disagree the notice
provision of section *495
2-13(4), requiring that the prayer for relief "clearly and obviously
state that the parents could permanently lose their rights as
a parent" (705 ILCS 405/2- 13(4) (West 2002)), applies only
to original petitions seeking to terminate parental rights, not to
after-filed petitions. Such a holding is not required by the
language of the Juvenile Court Act and serves only to
further complicate an area of the law which is already
difficult. Even without section 2- 13(4), every petition for termination
of parental rights should make it clear whether the parents
could permanently lose their parental rights.
343 Ill.App.3d 483, 797 N.E.2d 1112, 278 Ill.Dec. 194