Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/156/277/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 19:07:32
Document Index: 465001645

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 716', '§ 17', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 6', '§ 5', '§ 914', '§ 69', '§ 1017']

HUDSON V. PARKER, 156 U. S. 277 - Volume 156 - 1895 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 156 > HUDSON V. PARKER, 156 U. S. 277 (1895) > Full Text
By express acts of Congress beginning with the first organization of the judicial system of the United States, this Court and the circuit and district courts are empowered to issue all writs not specially provided for by statute which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, 82; Rev.Stat. § 716; Stockton v. Bishop, 2 How. 74; Hardeman v. Anderson, 4 How. 640; Ex Parte Milwaukee R. Co., 5 Wall. 188. Under the first Judiciary Act this Court had power "to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business," in all the courts of the United States. Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83. And successive statutes recognized its power to make rules, not inconsistent with the laws of the United States, prescribing the forms of writs and other process at common law, as well as in equity or admiralty, in those courts. Acts of May 8, 1792, c. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276; May 19, 1828, c. 68, §§ 1, 3, 4 Stat. 281; Act of August 23, 1842, c. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 518; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 23 U. S. 27-29; Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329, 34 U. S. 360; Ward v. Chamberlain, 2 Black 430, 67 U. S. 436. Since the Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, indeed, the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in actions at law in the circuit and district courts of the United States are required to conform as near as may be to those existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state within which they are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding. 17 Stat. 197; Rev.Stat. § 914. But this act does not include the manner of bringing cases from a lower court of the United States to this Court. Chateaugay Co., Petitioner, 128 U. S. 544; Fishburn v. Chicago &c. Railway,
This Court cannot, indeed, by rule, enlarge or restrict its own inherent jurisdiction and powers, or those of the other courts of the United States or of a justice or judge of either, under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Poultney v. La Fayette, 12 Pet. 472; The St.Lawrence, 1 Black 522, 66 U. S. 526; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 88 U. S. 576, 88 U. S. 579. Nor has it assumed to do so.
Recurring once more to Rule 36 and to the decision in Claasen's Case, which were considered and promulgated together, and mutually serve to explain each other, the matter stands thus: the first paragraph of the rule, embracing all cases, civil or criminal, of which this Court has appellate jurisdiction under the act of 1891, provides that the writ of error may be allowed in term time or vacation, "and the proper security be taken," the citation signed, and a supersedeas granted, "by any justice of this Court." In Claasen's Case, it was held that in the case of an infamous crime, the writ of
Under the Act of March 3, 1879, c. 176, upon writs of error from the circuit court to review judgments of the district court upon convictions in criminal cases, the Justice of this Court assigned to the circuit or the circuit judge -- that it to say, any member of the appellate court except the district judge, presumably the judge who rendered the judgment below -- might allow the writ to operate as a supersedeas and might take bail for the defendant's appearance in the circuit court. 20 Stat. 354; United States v. Whittier, 13 F. 534. And upon a writ of error from this Court to the highest court of a state to review a decision against a right claimed under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and which lies both in criminal and civil cases and operates as a supersedeas under the same circumstances in the one as in the other, bail may be taken pending the writ of error; but, because of the relation between the two governments, in
the court of the state only, it being enacted by the Act of July 13, 1866, c. 184, § 69, in accordance with the practice previously prevailing in some states, that the plaintiff in error, if charged with an offense bailable by the laws of the state, should not be released from custody until final judgment upon the writ of error, "or until a bond, with sufficient sureties, in a reasonable sum, as ordered and approved by the state court, shall be given," or, if the offense was not so bailable, until such final judgment. 14 Stat. 172; Rev.Stat. § 1017; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 31 U. S. 537, 31 U. S. 562, 31 U. S. 567; Bryan v. Bates, 12 Allen 201. By these statutes, bail after conviction was provided for in every class of writs of error pending in the courts of the United States in cases of bailable offenses, for when they were enacted, no writ of error lay from this Court to the circuit court or district court in any criminal case.
Although that act expressly recognized the power of this Court to make rules regulating the proceedings upon writs of error in capital cases, yet, as by its terms the writ was to be allowed as of right, without requiring any security, and was of itself to operate as a stay of proceedings, no rule upon the subject was considered necessary, and none was made by this Court. It can hardly be doubted, however, that Congress intended that the allowance of the writ of error and stay of
Upon a writ of error in a civil case, the requisite security is ordinarily taken by the justice or judge who allows the writ and signs the citation. Jerome v. McCarter, 21 Wall. 17. But where the bond taken is insufficient in law, this Court, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction as a court of error, may direct that the writ be dismissed unless the plaintiff in error gives security sufficient in this respect, to be taken and approved by any justice or judge who is authorized to allow the writ of error and citation. Catlett v. Brodie, 9 Wheat. 553, 22 U. S. 555; O'Reilly v. Edrington, 96 U. S. 724.
The discretion of a judge, indeed, in a matter entrusted by law to his judicial determination cannot be controlled by writ of mandamus. But if he declines to exercise his discretion, or to act at all, when it is his duty to do so, a writ of mandamus may be issued to compel him to act. For instance, a writ of mandamus will lie to compel a judge to settle and sign a bill of exceptions, although not to control his discretion as to the frame of the bill. Ex Parte Bradstreet, 4 Pet. 102; Ex Parte
Page 156 U. S. 289
Crane, 5 Pet. 190; Chateaugay Co., Petitioner, 128 U. S. 544, 128 U. S. 557. See also Ex Parte Morgan, 114 U. S. 174; Ex Parte Parker, 120 U. S. 737; Ex Parte Parker, 131 U. S. 221; Virginia v. Paul, 148 U. S. 107, 148 U. S. 123-124.
There have been five separate enactments of Congress in reference to the letting to bail and the review of judgments in criminal cases: First. For bail before trial. Secs. 1014-1016 Rev.Stat. These sections name the judicial officers by whom bail may be taken. Second. In respect to judgments in criminal cases in the state courts brought here on error. Sec. 1017, Rev.Stat. In this section there is
Where the later of two acts upon limited partnerships omitted the infliction, prescribed by the earlier, of a penalty for the omission of certain matters required by both, the court
Neither can I gather from the legislation authorizing bail before trial, or that provision for bail in cases brought to this Court from conviction in state tribunals, or that authorizing bail in cases taken from the district to the circuit court, the evidence of a settled policy on the part of Congress that bail should be allowed in all cases, capital or otherwise, brought here on error from a final judgment of the circuit or district court. Indeed, with reference to this matter of policy, it was well said in Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 107, 72 U. S. 111:
It is idle to say that there is no difference between the supersedeas of a judgment and the letting to bail. When a sentence of death is stayed by this Court, it does not follow as a matter of course that the party sentenced is to be discharged from custody, and permitted to go where he pleases, and the same is true in case of a sentence to confinement and hard labor in the penitentiary. The stay of execution simply prevents the hanging or the removal of the party to the penitentiary. But it is unnecessary, in view of the language of this Court, to make any argument to show that the two things are different. In
In United States v. Simmons, 47 F. 723, Judge Benedict says: