Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/409/765/120542/
Timestamp: 2019-11-19 08:03:35
Document Index: 461557771

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 411', '§ 101', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 101', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 8', 'art 356', '§ 9']

National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Sucrest Corporation and Sugar Workers Council of North America, I. L. A., Afl-cio, Respondents, 409 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1969) :: Justia
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National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Sucrest Corporation and Sugar Workers Council of North America, I. L. A., Afl-cio, Respondents, 409 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1969)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 409 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1969) Argued October 30, 1968
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Allison W. Brown, Jr., Washington, D. C. (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel and Iran D. Lanoff, Atty., NLRB, on the brief), for petitioner.
As a result of prior litigation in this court, King v. Randazzo, 346 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1965), it is settled that the Sugar Council assessments, because they were specifically authorized by a special convention of the Council, did not violate § 101(a) (3) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (3). This determination, resting solely and explicitly on an application of the terms of § 101(a) (3),2 in no way forecloses a finding that the successful attempt to collect the dues by threatening to discharge delinquents violated § 8(a) (3) and § 8(b) (2) of the NLRA. These provisions have a scope independent of § 101(a) (3), and in the current context provide added protection for individual workers against the coercive potential of joint action by management and labor.
The exception provided in § 8(a) (3) for union security clauses confers upon a § 9(a) representative great power over the members of its bargaining unit, a power which carries with it the danger that the rights of dissenting workers within a unit may be disregarded. The courts have provided some protection against such abuses by implying a duty upon unions to represent fairly all employees within their bargaining unit, and creating a judicial remedy for employees alleging a violation of this duty. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1967); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181, 87 S. Ct. 2001, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1123 (1967). But here we deal with the even more fundamental safeguard of employee rights which is contained in § 8(a) (3) itself: before a union may be invested with the coercive power inherent in a security clause it must be "designated or selected," under § 9(a), as a bargaining representative "by the majority of the employees" in an appropriate unit. For this safeguard to be effective the Board and the courts must confer § 9(a) status only when the majority of a unit has freely and unambiguously accepted a union as its representative. An especially close scrutiny of the facts is called for in cases such as the one before us, where the unit's members twice explicitly rejected a union and its claim to § 9(a) status rests upon a later alleged indirect and implied designation by the membership.
It is irrelevant that the I.L.A., under its internal rules, may be able to impose the Council upon its locals as a coordinating body. These internal rules cannot broaden the scope of the § 8(a) (3) proviso; the sanction of discharge may be invoked only on behalf of a union which has been properly designated as a bargaining representative. See Dickey v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 652, 655-656 (6th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898, 904-905 (6th Cir. 1956), affirmed in relevant part 356 U.S. 342, 350, 78 S. Ct. 718, 2 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1958); cf. NLRB v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 276 F.2d 865, 873 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 879, 81 S. Ct. 168, 5 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1960).
Despite the absence of an explicit designation by the membership of Local 1476 the Council could have achieved § 9(a) status by acting as a bargaining representative during contract negotiations, provided that the final contract was ratified by the membership with full knowledge of the Council's representative role. See NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898, 904-905 (6th Cir. 1956). The evidence in support of such a showing in this case, however, is insufficient to overcome the presumption against such an indirect designation of the Council which arises from the two explicit votes in opposition to the Council by Local 1476. Compare Dickey v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 1954), with NLRB v. Franks Bros. Co., 137 F.2d 989, 992 (1st Cir. 1943), aff'd 321 U.S. 702, 64 S. Ct. 817, 88 L. Ed. 435 (1944).