Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/92738/neilson-vs-rhine-shipping-co
Timestamp: 2017-02-23 23:43:21
Document Index: 80476279

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 237', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 237', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 4532', '§ 10', '§ 3']

Neilson Vs Rhine Shipping Co - Citation 92738 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Neilson Vs. Rhine Shipping Co. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/92738CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnDec-23-1918Case Number248 U.S. 205AppellantNeilsonRespondentRhine Shipping Co.Excerpt:.....advance notes, the consul was acting in accordance with § 237 of the consular regulations of the united states. when the bark arrived at new york, the libelants were paid the wages earned, less the $25 advanced. they now seek to recover the sum thus deducted by virtue of the terms of § 10(a), c. 121, act june 26, 1884, 23 stat. 55, as amended by act march 4, 1915, c. 153, § 11, 38 stat. 1168, entitled an "act to promote the welfare of american seamen in the merchant marine of the united states" upon the theory that such advances are unlawful and of no effect.
the facts in relation to the case of the barkentine
differ from the above only in respect of the fact that the advance notes are not in evidence, but are noted on the articles.
the district court decided..... Judgment:
Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Co. - 248 U.S. 205 (1918)
Section 11 of the Seaman's Act of 1915, c. 153, 38 Stat. 1164, construed as not prohibiting advance payment of wages when made by an American vessel to secure seamen in a foreign port. P.
248 U. S. 212
Sandlerg v. McDonald, ante,
In the first case, Paul Neilson and nine other seamen sue for the recovery of wages claimed to be due them from the bark
It appears that they shipped on the American bark
at Buenos Ayres, October 7, 1916, for a voyage to New York at the rate of $25 per month. It is stipulated that the shipping of seamen on sailing vessels at Buenos Ayres is controlled by certain shipping masters, to one of whom the libelants, in accordance
with the usual custom and as a means of securing employment, signed a receipt or advance note for one month's wages. These advance notes were presented to the American Vice-Consul at Buenos Ayres before the libelants signed the articles, were by him noted on the articles, and, in the presence of the libelants, directed to be paid on account of the wages of the respective libelants. It was further stipulated that, in directing the master of the
to honor such advance notes, the Consul was acting in accordance with § 237 of the Consular Regulations of the United States. When the bark arrived at New York, the libelants were paid the wages earned, less the $25 advanced. They now seek to recover the sum thus deducted by virtue of the terms of § 10(a), c. 121, Act June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 55, as amended by Act March 4, 1915, c. 153, § 11, 38 Stat. 1168, entitled an "Act to promote the welfare of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States" upon the theory that such advances are unlawful and of no effect.
The section of the statute is the same as that involved in the case of
The Talus (Sandberg v. McDonald), ante,
. The difference is that the advances were made by the master of an American vessel in a South American port, whereas in
the advancements were made to foreign seamen in a British port. The same general consideration as to the interpretation of the statute which controlled in the decision of the case of
are applicable here, and need not be repeated.
These cases were submitted with Nos. 361 [
Dillon v. Strathern S.S. Co., ante,
] and 392 [
Sandberg v. McDonald, ante,
], and, like them, are proceedings in admiralty under the Seamen's Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 1165-1168.
The facts are set out in the opinion of the Court. In these cases, as in others, we are constrained to dissent. The principle of decision should be, we think, that declared in our dissent in
The Talus, ante,
. The facts of these cases put more tension upon it -- that is, an adhesion to the words of the statute as determinative of its purpose, rather than some of its consequences. We have here the somewhat appealing force of a picture
"237. Advances to Seamen Shipped in Foreign Ports. -- The shipment of seamen in foreign ports cannot be considered as within the intention, and hence not within the proper construction of the act referred to in the next preceding paragraph [inserted in the margin].
The final clause of the act, which declares that this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to those of the United States, and that, in case of violation, a clearance shall be refused them, is a clear indication that Congress did not in this section refer to the shipment of seamen in foreign ports, but had in view acts done in the United States alone. The provision of the statute as to payment of advance wages is not intended to apply to seamen shipped in foreign ports. In the settlement of wages due seamen in such cases, therefore, consular officers will take into account what has been paid in advance. 22 F. 734. "
"236. No Advance Wages. -- Except in case of whaling vessels, it is not lawful to pay any seaman wages before leaving the port at which such seaman may be engaged in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages to any other person, or to pay to anyone except an officer authorized by Act of Congress to collect fees for such service any remuneration for the shipment of a seaman. If any such advance wages or remuneration shall have been paid or contracted for the Consul, in making up the account of wages due the seaman upon his discharge, will disregard such advance payment or agreement and award to the seaman the amount to which he would be entitled if no such payment or agreement had been made. Nor should Consuls permit the statute to be evaded indirectly, as by part payment in advance and then stating rate of wages too small. Rev.Stats. §§ 4532, 4533; 23 Stat.L. 55, § 10; 24
80, § 3; 27 F. 764."