Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/749/338/359437/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 04:46:09
Document Index: 267975453

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1951', '§ 2', '§ 1512', '§ 3161', '§ 3164', '§ 3161', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 1512', '§ 1512', '§ 1512', '§ 1503', '§ 3161', '§ 3164']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Wayne Scaife (83-5666), Terrence Vessells (83-5717),defendants-appellants, 749 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1985 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Wayne Scaife (83-5666), Terrence Vessells (83-5717)...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Wayne Scaife (83-5666), Terrence Vessells (83-5717),defendants-appellants, 749 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1985)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 749 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1985) Argued Aug. 2, 1984. Decided Nov. 29, 1984. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 21, 1985
Terrence Vessells and Wayne Scaife appeal their criminal convictions resulting from a jury trial. Both were convicted of conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count I), and of aiding and abetting the unlawful possession of firearms during the commission of a felony, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c) (2) (Count II). Moreover, Vessells was convicted of knowingly attempting to use intimidation or physical force with intent to cause a person to be absent from an official proceeding to which such person had been summoned and to hinder, delay or prevent communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (Count III). Vessells raises ten assignments of error, five of which are also asserted by Scaife. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the convictions of both defendants on Count II and affirm the other convictions.
The seventy day time limit of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1) applies to both defendants. In addition, the ninety day time limit of 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) applies to Vessells because he remained incarcerated before trial. The defendants contend that these time periods ceased running on July 11, 1983 when the trial started rather than on June 30, 1983 when the jury was selected.
The 1983 calendar reveals that June 30 was the seventy-ninth day after April 12, the date of the indictment. The seventy day limit was not exceeded, however, because the record discloses more than a sufficient number of automatically excludable days under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1) (E), (F) and (J). In addition, the seventy day limit was not exceeded as to Scaife because he and his attorney both signed a written waiver of the statutory right to a speedy trial. Contrary to Scaife's assertion, nothing in the record supports the contention that the district court refused to accept the waiver. Moreover, the ninety day limit was not exceeded as to Vessells because June 30 was the eighty-ninth day after April 2, the date of Vessells' arrest. Further, had the ninety day limit been exceeded, Vessells' remedy would have been release rather than dismissal of the indictment. See United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Krohn, 558 F.2d 390, 393 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 868, 98 S. Ct. 207, 54 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1977); United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1976).4
In Hatcher, this court held that a Rule 14 severance motion preserves a Rule 8(b) misjoinder objection provided that the motion notified the district court that the indictment alleged a crime or crimes with which one of the defendants was not connected. Id. at 441. Vessells' severance motion satisfied this standard (app. at 394). On the other hand, this court held in United States v. Williams, 711 F.2d 748, 751 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 433, 78 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1983), that a Rule 14 severance motion does not preserve a Rule 8 misjoinder objection for appeal. The Williams panel followed decisions of other circuits in an attempt to avoid an intercircuit conflict. Williams, 711 F.2d at 751. Other circuits have indeed held that a Rule 14 severance motion does not preserve a Rule 8 misjoinder objection. See United States v. Drum, 733 F.2d 1503, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1294 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853, 103 S. Ct. 119, 74 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1982); United States v. Barbosa, 666 F.2d 704, 707 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1200 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S. Ct. 1481, 67 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1981). This panel must choose between two conflicting decisions of this court. We agree with the Williams panel that intercircuit conflicts are to be avoided if possible. Consequently, we follow the Williams decision and hold that Vessells' misjoinder argument has not been preserved for appeal.
Having thoroughly reviewed the portions of the record submitted by the parties and the tape recordings that we requested on our own motion, see infra, we hold as to Vessells that there is no substantial risk that the jury was unable to separate the evidence on Count III from the evidence on Counts I and II.5 The most significant evidence on Counts I and II was: (1) the testimony of witnesses Stidman, Johnson, Jones, Armstrong and FBI Agent Young and (2) the tape recordings bearing exhibit numbers 9 and 9A. In contrast, the most damaging evidence on Count III was the testimony of Willie Moore and the tape recordings bearing exhibit numbers 11 and 12. Although the testimony of FBI Agents Young and Johnson touched on all three counts, we are convinced that it was readily apparent to the jury which count or counts this testimony was relevant to at a given moment. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vessells' severance motion.
We hold likewise as to Scaife. Scaife's major argument is that the evidence concerning Count III, under which only Vessells was charged, was so inflammatory that separate trials were necessary. Although we agree with Scaife that Moore's testimony and Exhibits 11 and 12 clearly showed that Vessells contemplated either killing or doing serious bodily injury to Stidman, the fact remains that neither Moore's testimony nor Exhibits 11 and 12 mentioned Scaife. Furthermore, the district court instructed the jury that "Mr. Scaife is not charged with this crime [violating Sec. 1512], and therefore should not be considered in connection with Count 3." Although afforded an opportunity to do so before the jury retired, Scaife did not request an instruction that the evidence presented by the government in order to prove Count III could not be considered by the jury in reaching its verdict as to Scaife on Counts I and II.6
The remaining challenges to the district court's pre-trial rulings are raised solely by Vessells. First, the district court refused to suppress the .380 automatic pistol found behind the seat of Vessells' truck at the time of his arrest. The court ruled correctly. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle may be searched when a custodial arrest is made.
Second, Vessells contends that the FBI coerced Willie Moore and Charles Stidman into permitting the telephone conversations of April 1 and April 2 to be recorded. Moore and Stidman are said to have been coerced because they needed help in connection with charges pending against them.7 We disagree. Both Moore and Stidman testified that they freely consented to recording the conversations. The record is devoid of evidence to the contrary. Moreover, even if the authorities promised to help Moore and Stidman in consideration for their cooperation, this court has held that consent to have conversations recorded is not vitiated by governmental promises of leniency. See United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 30-31 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 95 S. Ct. 2654, 45 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1975).
Both defendants challenge certain rulings made by the district court during trial. First, the defendants contend that the district court should have directed an acquittal because the government never established venue.8 A defendant must, of course, be tried in the state or district where the crime was committed. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 634, 81 S. Ct. 358, 360, 5 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1961). Although venue generally is not a factual element of a crime, it nevertheless is an essential part of the government's case. United States v. Branan, 457 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir. 1972). If the government does not establish venue and the defendant objects at trial, then an appellate court must reverse the conviction. Id.
The Western District of Tennessee was a proper venue for the conspiracy count because Johnson and Hosea Moore entered the conspiracy there.9 Moreover, several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were performed in the Western District of Tennessee. These included various conversations between Johnson, Jones, Armstrong and Hosea Moore in Memphis in preparation for the robbery and the rendezvous at Stidman's house in order to load guns in Jones' car before leaving for Helena, Arkansas. The Western District of Tennessee was a proper venue for Count II because the alleged unlawful carrying of firearms began in Memphis. Finally, the Western District of Tennessee was a proper venue for Count III because that is the district where the court and the grand jury were located. See United States v. O'Donnell, 510 F.2d 1190, 1192-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001, 95 S. Ct. 2400, 44 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1975).
The defendants' next assignment of error is that the district court should not have permitted the jury to replay Exhibits 9, 9A and 34 during deliberations. Before discussing this claim, additional facts must be stated. Both Exhibits 9 and 9A (the Jones body tape) had been admitted into evidence during trial (app. at 92-93). Although the tape bearing exhibit number 34 had been used during rebuttal to impeach Vessells' testimony, it had not been formally introduced as an exhibit. The record reveals that the government played part of the tape during rebuttal and that the defendants then insisted upon playing the entire tape to the jury. Vessells' attorney stipulated to the authenticity of the tape (app. at 365). During deliberations, the jury requested that Exhibits 9, 9A and the rebuttal tape be sent to the jury room. When the defendants objected that the rebuttal tape had not been made an exhibit,10 the district court stated:
The Court: Well, it ought to have been. What is the next number, Ginny?
A district court has broad discretion to permit a jury to take to the jury room any tape recordings that have been admitted as exhibits during trial. See United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 379 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 1304, 79 L. Ed. 2d 703 (1984); United States v. Samples, 713 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1983). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Exhibits 9 and 9A to go to the jury room.
The district court's decision respecting Exhibit 34 is more troublesome. Since that tape had not been admitted as an exhibit before the case went to the jury, we disregard the district court's action of belatedly assigning the tape an exhibit number. Allowing the jury to take the tape to the jury room was error. This error was harmless, however. A proper foundation had been laid for the tape and the defendants did not question the tape's authenticity or accuracy. Indeed, the defendants insisted upon playing the entire tape to the jury during rebuttal. Since the defendants have not even attempted to show prejudice, this technical error was harmless. See United States v. Shafer, 445 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986, 92 S. Ct. 448, 30 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1971). Cf. United States v. Larson, 722 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 1688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1984) (transcripts); United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 1982) (transcripts).
Regarding Count I, the defendants also assert that the government produced insufficient evidence of the impact of their actions upon interstate commerce in order to support the convictions for conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act. This court has repeatedly held, however, that only a de minimus impact upon interstate commerce need be shown in Hobbs Act prosecutions. See United States v. Hollis, 725 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062, 98 S. Ct. 1235, 55 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1978). The government clearly met that burden here. The owner of the general store testified that his store sold produce and hardware obtained from Clarksdale, Mississippi and sold meat and dry goods obtained from Memphis, Tennessee. The Clarksdale and Memphis items comprised twenty percent of the store's inventory. Furthermore, some of the store's customers were from outside of Arkansas. Thus, the government adequately demonstrated that the general store was involved in interstate commerce.
As to Count II, the defendants argue that the district court erred in instructing the jury that the firearms were carried unlawfully rather than submitting that question to the jury. We agree with the defendants. In order to procure a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2), or under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for aiding and abetting that offense, the government must demonstrate that firearms were carried unlawfully under a federal, state or local law; mere possession of a firearm while committing a felony is insufficient. United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 107-08 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v. Garcia, 555 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1977). Moreover, the statute in question must be presented to the jury so that it may decide whether the firearms were carried unlawfully. Nigro, 727 F.2d at 108; Garcia, 555 F.2d at 712. Unless a defendant stipulates that firearms were carried unlawfully under federal, state or local law, a district court should not give an instruction that effectively takes this question away from the jury.
Vessells has misconstrued the knowledge requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. Subsection (a) of that provision requires the government to prove knowing use of, or a knowing attempt to use, intimidation or physical force. Willie Moore's testimony, Exhibits 11 and 12 and Vessells' armed presence at the rendezvous site in Tunica, Mississippi collectively demonstrate that Vessells knowingly attempted to use intimidation or physical force against Stidman. Vessells clearly intended to prevent Stidman from either giving information to law enforcement officers or testifying in grand jury or other official proceedings. Furthermore, the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d) indicates that the government was not required to prove that grand jury proceedings were pending at the time of the offense. Nor was the government required to prove that Vessells knew that a federal grand jury and federal law enforcement officers were involved. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e) (1) and (2). United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1974), cited by Vessells, is distinguishable on the ground that it involved a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 rather than under Sec. 1512. We conclude that the government produced sufficient evidence to support Vessells' conviction on Count III.11
Assuming arguendo that such an agreement would not transgress the Hobbs Act, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing a new trial or an evidentiary hearing. The district court's decision not to grant a new trial is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 966 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S. Ct. 2124, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1304 (1983). To obtain a new trial, a defendant must satisfy four criteria. The evidence: (1) must have been discovered after trial, (2) must not have been discoverable earlier in the exercise of due diligence, (3) must be material and not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (4) must be likely to produce an acquittal if the case were retried. Id. We address only the latter requirement.
The Honorable David D. Dowd, Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation
The robbers were to place tape over the eyes and mouths of the people in the store
Although there was evidence that a .38 caliber pistol had been transported from Memphis to Ferguson, that gun was not recovered
Since the first appearances had occurred earlier, the date of the indictment was the relevant date for purposes of the seventy day time limit of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1). Since the day that the indictment was filed was excludable, c.f. United States v. Richmond, 735 F.2d 208, 211 (6th Cir. 1984) (if the first appearance occurs after the indictment is filed, the day of the first appearance is excludable), the first countable day under the seventy day time limit was April 13, 1983
The cited cases were decided when 18 U.S.C. § 3164 was an interim rule. In 1979, Congress deleted those parts of Sec. 3164 that had rendered it only an interim rule
The record submitted by the parties contains no direct proof of inability to separate the evidence, such as questions by the jury to the court during deliberations indicating confusion
We do not address the issue of whether it would have been reversible error for the district court to have refused such a request
Stidman had been charged in connection with the unsuccessful robbery. Moore was facing state charges in an unrelated case
The government argues that the defendants have raised this argument for the first time on appeal. We disagree. The record reveals that the defendants specifically objected to the quantum of proof on the venue issue (app. at 375)
Jones and Armstrong may not be counted among those who entered the conspiracy in the Western District of Tennessee because they were government informers. See United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 536 (6th Cir. 1984)
Vessells contends that the district court responded to the jury's request in secret proceedings. This argument is completely frivolous. The district court informed counsel for both sides of the jury's request and defense counsel were afforded a full opportunity to object to sending the tapes to the jury room. Defense counsel exercised this prerogative. The district court scrupulously complied with the requirements of Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39, 95 S. Ct. 2091, 2094, 45 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1975)
Vessells also contends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that a knowing attempted use of "intimidation or physical force" must be shown. Although that is how Sec. 1512(a) reads, the indictment alleged a knowing attempted use of "intimidation and physical force." This court recently rejected the same argument in United States v. Murph, 707 F.2d 895 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 145, 78 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1983). The court held that where a statute is written in the disjunctive and the indictment is in the conjunctive, the government's case may be proven, and the jury may be instructed, in the disjunctive