Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/379/134/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-12-16 01:41:30
Document Index: 286321439

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 402', '§ 403', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 412', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 103', '§ 101', '§ 403']

This case raises important questions concerning the powers of the Secretary of Labor and federal courts to protect rights of employees guaranteed by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. [Footnote 1]
"the right of members of defendant District No. 1, NMEBA, to nominate candidates in elections of defendant, which right is guaranteed to each member of defendant, and to each plaintiff, by Section 101(a)(1) of the LMRDA. . . . [Footnote 2]"
It was alleged that § 102 of Title I of the Act gave the District Court jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. [Footnote 3] The union bylaws complained chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of deprived a member of the right to nominate anyone for office but himself. The national constitution, in turn, provided that no member could be eligible for nomination or election to a full-time elective office unless he had been a member of the national union for five years and had served 180 days or more of sea time in each of two of the preceding three years on vessels covered by collective bargaining agreements with the national or its subsidiary bodies. On the basis of these allegations, respondents asked that the union be enjoined from preparing for or conducting any election until it revised its system of elections so as to afford each of its members a fair opportunity to nominate any persons "meeting fair and reasonable eligibility requirements for any or all offices to be filled by such election." [Footnote 4]
The union moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (1) the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (2) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court dismissed for want of "jurisdiction," [Footnote 5] holding that the alleged conduct of the union, even if true, failed to show a denial of the equal rights of all members of the union to vote for or nominate candidates guaranteed by § 101(a)(1) of Title I of the Act, so as to give the District Court jurisdiction of the controversy under § 102. The allegations, said the court, showed, at most, imposition of qualifications of eligibility for nomination and election so restrictive that they might violate § 401(e) of Title IV by denying members a reasonable opportunity to nominate and vote for candidates. [Footnote 6] The District chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Court further held that it could not exercise jurisdiction to protect § 401(e) rights, because § 402(a) [Footnote 7] of Title IV provides a remedy, declared by § 403 to be "exclusive," authorizing members to vindicate such rights by challenging elections after they have been held, [Footnote 8] and then only by (1) first exhausting all remedies available with the union, (2) filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who (3) may, after investigating the violation alleged in the complaint, bring suit in a United States district court to attack the validity of the election. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "the complaint alleged a violation of § 101(a)(1), and that federal jurisdiction existed under § 102." 324 F.2d 486, 487. [Footnote 9] Because of the importance of the questions presented and conflicting views in the courts of appeals and the district courts, [Footnote 10] we granted certiorari. 375 U.S. 991 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Plainly, this is no more than a command that members and classes of members shall not be discriminated against in their right to nominate and vote. And Congress carefully prescribed that even this right against discrimination is "subject to reasonable rules and regulations" by the union. The complaining union members here have not been discriminated against in any way, and have been denied no privilege or right to vote or nominate which the union has granted to others. They have, indeed, taken full advantage of the uniform rule limiting nominations by nominating themselves for office. [Footnote 11] It is true that they were denied their request to be candidates, but that denial was not a discrimination against their right to nominate, since the same qualifications were required equally of all members. Whether the eligibility requirements set by the union's constitution and bylaws were reasonable and valid is a question separate and distinct from whether the right to nominate on an equal basis given by § 101(a)(1) was violated. The District Court therefore was without jurisdiction to grant the relief requested here, unless, as the Court of Appeals held, the "combined effect of the eligibility requirements and the restriction to self-nomination" is to be considered in determining whether § 101(a)(1) has been violated. [Footnote 12]
We hold that possible violations of Title IV of the Act regarding eligibility are not relevant in determining whether or not a district court has jurisdiction under chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
§ 102 of Title I of the Act. Title IV sets up a statutory scheme governing the election of union officers, fixing the terms during which they hold office, requiring that elections be by secret ballot, regulating the handling of campaign literature, requiring a reasonable opportunity for the nomination of candidates, authorizing unions to fix "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed" for candidates, and attempting to guarantee fair union elections in which all the members are allowed to participate. Section 402 of Title IV, as has been pointed out, sets up an exclusive method for protecting Title IV rights, by permitting an individual member to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor challenging the validity of any election because of violations of Title IV. Upon complaint, the Secretary investigates, and, if he finds probable cause to believe that Title IV has been violated, he may file suit in the appropriate district court. It is apparent that Congress decided to utilize the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary of Labor in order best to serve the public interest. Cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 359 U. S. 242. In so doing, Congress, with one exception not here relevant, [Footnote 13] decided not to permit individuals to block or delay union elections by filing federal court suits for violations of Title IV. Reliance on the discretion of the Secretary is in harmony with the general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies, and, where that fails, to utilize the agencies of Government most familiar with union problems to aid in bringing about a settlement through discussion before resort to the courts. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
While both courts below referred to the question before us as "jurisdictional," it is obvious that the courts differed as to whether the facts alleged in the complaint stated a "cause of action," thereby raising some of the same problems discussed in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678. That question need not concern us here, however.
324 F.2d 489. (Emphasis supplied.)
This case marks the first interpretation by this Court of the significant changes wrought by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 increasing federal supervision of internal union affairs. At issue are subtle questions concerning the interplay between Title I and Title IV of that Act. In part, both seem to deal with the same subject matter: Title I guarantees "equal rights and privileges . . . to nominate candidates"; Title IV provides that "a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates." Where the two Titles of the legislation differ most substantially is in the remedies they provide. If a Title I right is at issue, the allegedly aggrieved union member has direct, virtually immediate recourse to a federal court to obtain an adjudication of his claim, and an injunction if his complaint has merit. 73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1958 ed., Supp. V). Vindication of claims under Title IV may be much more onerous. Federal court suits can be chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At the time this case was brought, District 1 of the National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association (NMEBA) had two rules of direct relevance here governing selection of candidates for election to union office. One rule, of long standing in the union, prescribed that self-nomination was the only manner by which a name could be placed before the membership for election to union office. The second rule, adopted seven months before this election was scheduled to occur, severely limited eligibility for office by requiring that prospective officers must have belonged to the national union for five years and served 180 or more days of sea duty in each of two years during the three-year period before the election. [Footnote 2/1] According to the three union members who brought this action, the combination of these rules unreasonably limited their right to nominate. They alleged that, except for those members of the union who fulfilled the strict eligibility requirements, the self-nomination rule emptied of all meaning the equal right to nominate. To be sure, the "right to nominate" continued, but, they say, for the countless union members rendered ineligible for office by the new sea-duty rule, the privilege of turning in one's name for prospective candidacy was meaningless.
The Court precludes the District Court from asserting jurisdiction over this complaint by focusing on the fact chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
that one of the imposed restrictions speaks in terms of eligibility. And since these are "possible violations of Title IV of the Act regarding eligibility," they "are not relevant in determining whether or not a district court has jurisdiction under § 102 of Title I of the Act." By this reasoning, the Court forecloses early adjudication of claims concerning participation in the election process. But there are occasions when eligibility provisions can infringe upon the right to nominate. Had the NMEBA issued a regulation that only Jesse Calhoon was eligible for office, no one could place great store on the right to self-nomination left to the rest of the membership. This Court long ago recognized the subtle ways by which election rights can be removed through discrimination at a less visible stage of the political process. The decisions in the Texas Primary Cases were founded on the belief that the equal right to vote was impaired where discrimination existed in the method of nomination. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299. No less is the equal right to nominate infringed where onerous burdens drastically limit the candidates available for nomination. In scrutinizing devices designed to erode the franchise, the Court has shown impatience with arguments founded in the form of the device. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 364 U. S. 345. If Congress has told the courts to protect a union member from infringement of his equal right to nominate, the courts should do so whether such discrimination is sophisticated or simple-minded. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 307 U. S. 275.
After today, simply by framing its discriminatory rules in terms of eligibility, a union can immunize itself from pre-election attack in a federal court even though it makes deep incursions on the equal right of its members to nominate, to vote, and to participate in the union's internal affairs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
II Leg.Hist., chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, the Court finds a "general congressional policy" to avoid judicial resolution of internal union disputes. That policy, the Court says, was designed to limit the power of individuals to block and delay elections by seeking injunctive relief. Such an appraisal might have been accurate before the addition of Title I, but it does not explain the emphasis on prompt judicial remedies there provided. In addition to the injunctive relief authorized by § 102 [Footnote 2/2] and the saving provisions of § 103, [Footnote 2/3] § 101(a)(4) modifies the traditional requirement of exhausting internal remedies before resort to litigation. [Footnote 2/4] Even § 403 is not conclusive on the elimination of pre-election remedies. [Footnote 2/5] At the least, state-court actions chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
may be brought in advance of an election to "enforce the constitution and bylaws." And, as to federal courts, it is certainly arguable that recourse through the Secretary of Labor is the exclusive remedy only after the election has been held. [Footnote 2/6] By reading Title I rights so narrowly, and by construing Title IV to foreclose absolutely pre-election litigation in the federal courts, the Court sharply reduces meaningful protection for many of the rights which Congress was so assiduous to create. [Footnote 2/7] By so simplifying the tangled provisions of the Act, the Court renders it virtually impossible for the aggrieved union member to gain a hearing when it is most necessary -- when there is still an opportunity to make the union's rules comport with the requirements of the Act.
My difference with the Court does not reach to the disposition of this particular case. Whether stated in terms chanroblesvirtualawlibrary