Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/351/536/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-04-05 09:18:28
Document Index: 211195795

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 851', '§ 3', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 3', '§ 12', '§ 3', '§ 3']

3. This depends on the meaning of the term "national security," as used in the 1950 Act. Pp. 351 U. S. 542-544. chanrobles.com-red
96 U.S.App.D.C. 379, 226 F.2d 337, reversed and remanded. chanrobles.com-red
This case presents the question of the meaning of the term "national security" as used in the Act of August 26, 1950, giving to the heads of certain departments and agencies of the Government summary suspension and unreviewable dismissal powers over their civilian employees, when deemed necessary "in the interest of the national security of the United States." [Footnote 1] chanrobles.com-red
Petitioner, a preference-eligible veteran under § 2 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 851, held a position in the classified civil service as a food and drug inspector for the New York chanrobles.com-red
Petitioner thereafter brought an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that his discharge was invalid and that the Civil Service Commission had improperly refused to entertain his appeal, and an order requiring his reinstatement in his former position. The District Court granted the respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint. 125 F.Supp. 284. The chanrobles.com-red
The Act was expressly made applicable only to the Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, Defense, Army, chanrobles.com-red
The Act authorizes dismissals only upon a determination by the Secretary that the dismissal is "necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security." That determination requires an evaluation of the risk of injury to the "national security" that the employee's retention would create, which, in turn, would seem necessarily to be a function not only of the character of the employee and the likelihood of his misconducting himself, but also of the nature of the position he occupies and its relationship to the "national security." That is, it must be determined whether the position is one in which the employee's misconduct would affect the "national security." That, of course, would not be necessary if "national security" were chanrobles.com-red
In interpreting the 1950 Act, it is important to note that that Act is not the only, nor even the primary, source of authority to dismiss Government employees. The general personnel laws -- the Lloyd-LaFollette [Footnote 4] and Veterans' Preference Acts [Footnote 5] -- authorize dismissals for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service," and the ground which we conclude was the basis for petitioner's discharge here -- a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty -- was recognized as a "cause" for dismissal under those procedures as early as 1942. [Footnote 6] Indeed, the President's so-called Loyalty Program, Exec.Order No. 9835, 12 Fed.Reg.1935, which prescribed an absolute standard of loyalty to be met by all employees regardless of position, had been established pursuant to that general authority three years prior to the 1950 Act, and remained in chanrobles.com-red
effect for nearly three years after its passage. [Footnote 7] Thus, there was no want of substantive authority to dismiss employees on loyalty grounds, and the question for decision here is not whether an employee can be dismissed on such grounds, but only the extent to which the summary procedures authorized by the 1950 Act are available in such a case.
Virtually conclusive of this narrow meaning of "national security" is the fact that, had Congress intended the term in a sense broad enough to include all activities of the Government, it would have granted the power to terminate employment "in the interest of the national security" to all agencies of the Government. Instead, Congress specified 11 named agencies to which the Act should apply, the character of which reveals, without doubt, a purpose to single out those agencies which are directly concerned with the national defense and which have custody over information the compromise of which might endanger the country's security, the so-called "sensitive" agencies. Thus, of the 11 named agencies, 8 are concerned with military operations or weapons development, and the other 3, with international chanrobles.com-red
The limitation of the Act to the enumerated agencies is particularly significant in the light of the fact that Exec.Order No. 9835, establishing the Loyalty Program, was in full effect at the time of the consideration and passage of the Act. In that Order, the President had expressed his view that it was of "vital importance" that all employees of the Government be of "complete and unswerving loyalty" and had prescribed a minimum loyalty standard to be applied to all employees under the normal civil service procedures. Had Congress considered the objective of insuring the "unswerving loyalty" of all employees, regardless of position, as a matter of "national security" to be effectuated by the summary procedures authorized by the Act, rather than simply a desirable personnel policy to be implemented under the normal civil service procedures, it surely would not chanrobles.com-red
We can find no justification for rejecting this implication of the limited purpose of the Act or for inferring the unlimited power contended for by the Government. Where applicable, the Act authorizes the agency head summarily to suspend an employee pending investigation and, after charges and a hearing, finally to terminate his employment, such termination not being subject to appeal. There is an obvious justification for the summary suspension power where the employee occupies a "sensitive" position in which he could cause serious damage to the national security during the delay incident to an investigation and the preparation of charges. Likewise, there is a reasonable basis for the view that an agency head who must bear the responsibility for the protection of classified information committed to his custody should have the final say in deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access to such information. On the other hand, it is difficult to justify summary suspensions and unreviewable dismissals on loyalty grounds of employees who are not in "sensitive" positions, and who are thus not situated where they could bring about any discernible adverse effects on the Nation's security. In the absence of an immediate threat of harm to the "national security," the normal dismissal procedures seem fully adequate, and the justification for summary powers disappears. Indeed, in view of the stigma attached to persons dismissed on loyalty grounds, the need for procedural safeguards seems even greater than in other cases, and we will not lightly assume that Congress intended to take away those safeguards in the absence of chanrobles.com-red
Moreover, if Congress intended the term to have such a broad meaning that all positions in the Government could be said to be affected with the "national security," the result would be that the 1950 Act, though in form but an exception to the general personnel laws, could be utilized effectively to supersede those laws. For why could it not be said that national security in that sense requires not merely loyal and trustworthy employees, but also those that are industrious and efficient? The relationship of the job to the national security being the same, its demonstrated inadequate performance because chanrobles.com-red
"Insofar as the [addition of § 3] is concerned, it was recognized by all witnesses that there were other sensitive areas within the various departments of the Government which are now, or might in the future become, deeply involved in national security. . . . In view . . . of the fact that there are now and will be in the future other sensitive areas of equal importance to the national security, it is believed that the President should have authority to make a finding concerning such areas and, by Executive action, place those areas under the authorities contained in this act. [Footnote 9]"
The committee reports on H.R. 7439 in the next Congress similarly referred to the bill as granting the dismissal power only to the heads of the "sensitive" agencies. [Footnote 11] While these references relate primarily to the agencies to be covered by the Act, rather than to the exercise of the power within an agency, the standard for both is the same -- in the "interests of the national security" -- and the statements thus clearly indicate the restricted sense in which "national security" was used. In short, "national security" is affected only by "sensitive" activities. chanrobles.com-red
enough evidence against him. If that person is not in a sensitive job, it is not of any further concern to us. We are willing to take the view that, while we might have misgivings about his loyalty, he cannot prejudice our security because he does not have access to any of the classified or top secret material. [Footnote 15]"
The Secretary's action in dismissing the petitioner was expressly taken pursuant to Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed.Reg. 2489, [Footnote 16] promulgated in April, 1953, to provide uniform standards and procedures for the exercise by agency heads of the suspension and dismissal powers under the 1950 Act. That Order prescribes as the standard for dismissal, and the dismissal notice given to petitioner contained, a determination by the Secretary that the employee's retention in employment "is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security." [Footnote 17] chanrobles.com-red
Despite this verbal formula, however, it is our view that the Executive Order does not, in fact, require the agency head to make any determination whatever on the relationship of the employee's retention to the "national security" if the charges against him are within the categories of the charges against petitioner -- that is, charges which reflect on the employee's loyalty. Rather, as we read the Order, it enjoins upon the agency heads the duty of discharging any employee of doubtful loyalty irrespective of the character of his job and its relationship to the "national security." That is, the Executive Order deems an adverse determination as to loyalty to satisfy the requirements of the statute, without more.
The opening preamble to the Order recites, among other things, that "the interests of the national security require" that "all" Government employees be persons "of complete and unswerving loyalty." It would seem to follow that an employee's retention cannot be "clearly consistent" with the "interests of the national security" as thus defined unless he is "clearly" loyal -- that is unless there is no doubt as to his loyalty. And § 8(a) indicates that that is, in fact, what was intended by the Order. That section provides that the investigation of an employee pursuant to the Order shall be designed to develop information "as to whether . . . [his employment] is chanrobles.com-red
clearly consistent with the interests of the national security," and prescribes certain categories of facts to which "such" information shall relate. The first category, § 8(a)(1), includes nonloyalty-oriented facts which, in general, might reflect upon the employee's reliability, trustworthiness, or susceptibility to coercion, such as dishonesty, drunkenness, sexual perversion, mental defects, or other reasons to believe that he is subject to influence or coercion. Section 8(a)(1) expressly provides, however, that such facts are relevant only "depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security." The remaining categories include facts which, in general, reflect upon the employee's "loyalty," such as acts of espionage, advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government, sympathetic association with persons who so advocate, or sympathetic association with subversive organizations. § 8(a)(2)-(8). Significantly, there is wholly absent from these categories -- under which the charges against petitioner were expressly framed -- any qualification making their relevance dependent upon the relationship of the employee's position to the national security. The inference we draw is that, in such cases, the relationship to the national security is irrelevant, and that an adverse "loyalty" determination is sufficient ex proprio vigore to require discharge.
Arguably, this inference can be avoided on the ground that § 8(a) relates only to the scope of information to be developed in the investigation, and not to the evaluation of it by the agency head. That is, while loyalty information is to be developed in all cases regardless of the nature of the employment, that does not mean that the agency head should not consider the nature of the employment in determining whether the derogatory information is sufficient to make the employee's continued employment not "clearly consistent" with the "national security." No doubt that is true to the extent chanrobles.com-red
Other provisions of the Order confirm the inferences that may be drawn from § 8(a). Thus, § 3(b) directs each agency head to designate as "sensitive" those positions in this agency "the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security." By definition, therefore, some employees are admittedly not in a position to bring about such an effect. Nevertheless, the Order makes this distinction relevant only for purposes of determining the scope of the investigation to the conducted, not for purposes of limiting the dismissal power to such "sensitive" positions. Section 3(a) is more explicit. That provides that the appointment of all employees shall be made subject to an investigation the scope of which shall depend upon the degree of adverse effect on the national security the occupant of the position could bring about, but which "in no event" is to be less than a prescribed minimum. But the sole purpose of such an investigation is to provide a basis for a "clearly consistent" determination. Thus, the requirement of a minimum investigation of all persons appointed implies chanrobles.com-red
Confirmation of this reading of the Order is found in its history. Exec. Order No. 9835, supra, as amended by Exec.Order No. 10241, 16 Fed.Reg. 3690, had established the Loyalty Program under which all employees, regardless of their positions, were made subject to discharge if there was a "reasonable doubt" as to their loyalty. That Order was expressly revoked by § 12 of the present Executive Order. There is no indication, however, that it was intended thereby to limit the scope of the persons subject to a loyalty standard. And any such implication is negatived by the remarkable similarity in the preambles to the two Orders and in the kinds of information considered to be relevant to the ultimate determinations. [Footnote 18] In short, all employees, were still to be subject to at least a minimum loyalty standard, though under chanrobles.com-red
From the Secretary's determination that petitioner's employment was not "clearly consistent with the interests of national security," therefore, it may be assumed only that the Secretary found the charges to be true and that they created a reasonable doubt as to petitioner's loyalty. No other subsidiary finding may be inferred, however, for, under the Executive Order as we have interpreted it, no chanrobles.com-red
other finding was required to support the Secretary's action. [Footnote 19]
From our holdings (1) that not all positions in the Government are affected with the "national security" as that term is used in the 1950 Act, and (2) that no determination has been made that petitioner's position was one in which he could adversely affect the "national security," it necessarily follows that petitioner's discharge was not authorized by the 1950 Act. In reaching this conclusion, we are not confronted with the problem of reviewing the Secretary's exercise of discretion, since the basis for our decision is simply that the standard prescribed by the Executive Order and applied by the Secretary is not in conformity with the Act. [Footnote 20] Since petitioner's discharge chanrobles.com-red
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the chanrobles.com-red
United States (5 U.S.C. 631); the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403; 5 U.S.C. 632, et seq.); section 9A of the act of August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1148 (5 U.S.C. 118j); and the act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (5 U.S.C. 22-1, et seq.), and as President of the United States, and deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SEC. 3. (a) The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investigation. The scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security, but in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check (including a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and written inquiries to appropriate local law enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person under investigation: Provided, that, upon request of the head of the department or agency concerned, the Civil Service Commission may, in its discretion, authorize such less chanrobles.com-red
SEC. 4. The head of each department and agency shall review, or cause to be reviewed, the cases of all civilian officers and employees with respect to whom there has chanrobles.com-red
SEC. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or terminated under the authority granted to heads of departments chanrobles.com-red
(5) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, chanrobles.com-red
SEC. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby revoked. For the purposes described in section 11 hereof, the Loyalty Review Board and the regional loyalty boards of the Civil Service Commission shall continue to exist and function for a period of one hundred and twenty days from the effective date chanrobles.com-red
Petitioner, a food and drug inspector employed in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was charged with having "established and . . . continued a close association with individuals reliably reported to be Communists." It was further charged that he had "maintained a continued and sympathetic association with the Nature Friends of America, which organization" is on the Attorney General's list, and, "by [his] own admission, donated funds" to that group, contributed services to it and attended social gatherings of the same. Petitioner did not answer the charges, but replied that they constituted an invasion of his private rights of association. chanrobles.com-red
Although the Court assumes the validity of the President's action under § 3 extending the coverage of the Act to all Government agencies, the reasoning of the opinion makes that extension a fortiori unauthorized. The limitation the Court imposes deprives the extension of any force, despite the fact that § 3 has no limiting words whatever. And this is done in the face of legislative history chanrobles.com-red
The President believed that the national security required the extension of the coverage of the Act to all employees. That was his judgment, not ours. He was given that power, not us. By this action, the Court so interprets the Act as to intrude itself into presidential policymaking. The Court should not do this, especially here, where Congress has ratified the President's action. As required by the Act, the Executive Order was reported to the Congress, and, soon thereafter, it came up for discussion and action in both the House and the Senate. It was the sense of the Congress at that time that the Order properly carried out the standards of the Act, and was in all respects an expression of the congressional will. 99 Cong.Rec. 4511-4543, 5818-5990. In addition, Congress has made appropriations each subsequent year for investigations, etc., under its provisions. This in itself "stands as confirmation and ratification of the action of the Chief chanrobles.com-red
Executive." Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U. S. 111, 331 U. S. 116.
There is still another reason why we should sustain the President's Executive Order. By striking it down, the Court raises a question as to the constitutional power of the President to authorize dismissal of executive employees whose further employment he believes to be inconsistent with national security. This power might arise from the grant of executive power in Article II of the Constitution, and not from the Congress. The opinion of the majority avoids this important point which must be faced by any decision holding an Executive Order inoperative. 351 U. S. 338, not to create them.