Source: http://openjurist.org/165/f3d/248
Timestamp: 2015-09-05 16:31:18
Document Index: 745131563

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 2255', '§ 1291', '§ 2254']

165 F3d 248 United States v. R Sanders | OpenJurist
165 F. 3d 248 - United States v. R Sanders Home
165 F3d 248 United States v. R Sanders 165 F.3d 248
UNITED STATES of Americav.Cyrus R. SANDERS, Appellant.
No. 98-7273.
Argued Nov. 17, 1998.Decided Jan. 21, 1999.
Kyle W. Rude (Argued), Williamsport, PA, for Appellant.
David M. Barasch, U.S. Attorney, Theodore B. Smith, III (Argued) Asst. U.S. Attorney, Dennis C. Pfannenschmidt, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellee.
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, and McLAUGHLIN, District Judge*
Prior to its amendment effective September 13, 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) made it unlawful "for any person to ... sell[ ] or dispose of any stolen firearm ... which has been shipped or transported in [interstate commerce], knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm ... was stolen." 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(j) (West 1976) and Historical and Statutory Notes to 1990 Amendment (West Supp.1998). Appellant Cyrus Sanders, Jr. was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for violations of this provision upon entering a plea of guilty to charges of trafficking and conspiring to traffic in stolen firearms. It is undisputed that the transactions for which Sanders was convicted involved the sale and disposal of firearms that had entered the stream of interstate commerce prior to their theft, but not thereafter.
Sanders now appeals the District Court's denial of his motion to set aside, correct, or vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Appellant claims that his counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty to the trafficking charges inasmuch as the applicable version of § 922(j) did not prohibit his particular conduct. We are thus called upon to determine whether § 922(j), prior to its amendment in 1994, was intended to apply to transactions in stolen firearms where the weapons moved in interstate commerce only prior to being stolen. We conclude that it was. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's order.
On January 24, 1996, a federal grand jury in Pennsylvania returned a four-count indictment against Sanders charging him with conspiracy to possess a firearm as a convicted felon and to traffic in stolen firearms [Count I], possession of a firearm by a convicted felon [Count II], trafficking in stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) [Count III], and retaliating against a witness [Count IV]. The government alleged that, between September 1990 and April 1994, Sanders conspired with two other individuals to burglarize several residences in remote locations. Once inside the residences, Sanders and his cohorts would steal items with potential resale value, including firearms. Other firearms were obtained by providing false information to legitimate gun dealers. In all, a total of forty-four guns ultimately were attributed to Sanders. These firearms were sold to private individuals and legitimate dealers, often at gun shows. All of the firearms at issue were disposed of in Pennsylvania and never entered interstate commerce after Sanders came into possession of them.
The scheme finally ended after one of Sanders's fellow conspirators was arrested and began cooperating with law enforcement officials. Following his own indictment, Sanders agreed to plead guilty to the charges of trafficking and conspiring to traffic in stolen firearms on the advice of his attorney. In exchange for his plea, the remaining charges against him were dismissed. The District Court subsequently sentenced Sanders to a seventy-month term of incarceration.
On January 14, 1998 Sanders filed a motion to set aside, correct, or vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Sanders claims that he committed no violation of the law with respect to the trafficking charges set forth in Counts I and III and, therefore, his attorney was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty to those charges. More specifically, Sanders contends that the version of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) in effect at the time of his conduct required that the firearms which are the subject of the trafficking offense enter interstate commerce as stolen firearms, i.e., after being stolen. Sanders further claims that he was prejudiced by his counsel's ineffectiveness. He theorizes that, if he had been able to successfully challenge the trafficking charges under Counts I and III, he might have had an additional "bargaining chip" with which to negotiate a better plea offer.
We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and § 1291. United States v. Cleary, 46 F.3d 307, 309 (3d Cir.1995). Because our disposition of this appeal ultimately turns on an interpretation of statutory law, we apply a plenary standard of review. See Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328 (3d Cir.1998) (legal component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the habeas context is subject to plenary review) (addressing claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
Initially, we must address the government's argument that Sanders has procedurally defaulted his present claim by failing to raise it either in the District Court or on direct appeal. "Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct rev