Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140827_0000942.SCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-04-25 22:33:14
Document Index: 256467419

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1914', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

| Cavalier v. County of San Diego
Cavalier v. County of San Diego
MARCOS CAVALIER, Booking #12506195, Plaintiff,v.COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; WILLIAM GORE, Sheriff; SGT. KAMOSS, Deputy Sheriff; LT. MONTGOMERY, Lt. Sheriff; BABCOCK #0106, Deputy Sheriff; EDGE #4706, Deputy Sheriff; LUSARDI, #0159, Deputy Sheriff; MARTINEZ, #3156, Deputy Sheriff; SOBASZEK, #3209, Deputy Sheriff; TALAMANTEZ, # 6351, Deputy Sheriff; J. NAVARRO, #4431, Deputy Sheriff; SPALSBURY, #0508, Deputy Sheriff; and GONZALEZ #0109, Deputy Sheriff, Defendants.
Marcos Cavalier ("Plaintiff"), who is currently incarcerated at the George Bailey Detention Facility ("GBDF") in San Diego, California, [1] and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint ("Compl.") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc No. 1). Plaintiff claims the County of San Diego, its Sheriff, and numerous San Diego County Sheriff's Department Deputies, violated his constitutional rights at GBDF on May 31, 2014, during a strip search. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 4-9, 13, 15. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants denied him due process during a disciplinary hearing related to the May 31, 2014 incident, id. at 10-11, refused to provide him with medical and mental health care afterward, id. at 14, and denied him due process during prior disciplinary hearings which had resulted in his "complete isolation in solitary confinement for 17 months." Id. at 11-12.
All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).[2] An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's trust account statement, as well as the attached prison certificate issued by a Sheriff's Department Deputy at GBDF verifying his available balances, and has determined that while Plaintiff has had $65 in average monthly balances and deposits in his account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, he had an available balance of only $.37 in his account at the time of filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee."); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.").
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2) and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). In addition, courts "have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Brretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court may not, however, "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff's pleading is sufficient to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).[3] Therefore, the Court will direct U.S. Marshal service on Plaintiff's behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases."); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) ("[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.").