Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/361/849/582008/
Timestamp: 2018-10-22 21:21:01
Document Index: 220927931

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2253', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

Thomas Joe Miller-el, Petitioner-appellant, v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-appellee, 361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2004) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 2004 › Thomas Joe Miller-el, Petitioner-appellant, v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal J...
Thomas Joe Miller-el, Petitioner-appellant, v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-appellee, 361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2004)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2004)
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED James William Marcus (argued), Texas Defender Service, Houston, TX, Andrew A. Hammel, Law Office of Adrienne Urrutia, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.
The state indicted Miller-El for capital murder. He pleaded not guilty, and jury selection took place during five weeks in February and March 1986. When voir dire had been concluded, Miller-El moved to strike the jury on the grounds that the prosecution had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding blacks through the use of peremptory challenges. Miller-El's trial occurred before the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). Therefore, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965), was then the controlling precedent. As Swain required, Miller-El sought to show that the prosecution's conduct was part of a larger pattern of discrimination aimed at excluding blacks from jury service. In a pretrial hearing held on March 12, 1986, Miller-El presented evidence in support of his motion. The trial judge, however, found "no evidence ... that indicated any systematic exclusion of blacks as a matter of policy by the District Attorney's office; while it may have been done by individual prosecutors in individual cases." The state court then denied Miller-El's motion to strike the jury. Twelve days later, the jury found Miller-El guilty; and the trial court sentenced him to death.
Miller-El appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. While the appeal was pending, on April 30, 1986, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Batson v. Kentucky and established a three-part process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor used peremptory challenges in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. 1712. First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Id. at 96-97, 106 S. Ct. 1712. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Id. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct. 1712. Third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S. Ct. 1712.
After acknowledging Miller-El had established an inference of purposeful discrimination, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for new findings in light of Batson. Miller-El v. State, 748 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) (en banc). A post-trial hearing was held on May 10, 1988. There, the original trial court admitted all the evidence presented at the Swain hearing and further evidence and testimony from the attorneys in the original trial.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Miller-El's appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Miller-El v. Texas, 510 U.S. 831, 114 S. Ct. 100, 126 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1993). Miller-El's state habeas proceedings fared no better, and he was denied relief by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Miller-El filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 The federal magistrate judge who considered the merits of the Batson claim recommended, in deference to the state court's acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors, that Miller-El be denied relief. The United States district court adopted the recommendation. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, Miller-El sought a COA from the district court, and the application was denied. Miller-El renewed his request to this Court, and we also denied a COA. Miller-El appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted. 534 U.S. 1122, 122 S. Ct. 981, 151 L. Ed. 2d 963 (2002). In an opinion issued on February 25, 2003, the Supreme Court concluded based on a "threshold examination" of the record, that the federal district court's rejection of Miller-El's Batson claim was "debatable" and thus we had erred in not granting COA on Miller-El's Batson claim. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 347-48, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). The Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to determine whether Miller-El can "demonstrate that [the] state court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1), and that the corresponding factual determination was `objectively unreasonable' in light of the record before the court." Id. at 348, 123 S. Ct. 1029. We granted COA for precisely that determination. Miller-El v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Claims of racial discrimination in jury selection are evaluated according to the framework established in Batson v. Kentucky, which requires a three-step analysis that shifts the burden of production between the parties. 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. 1712. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Id. at 96-97, 106 S. Ct. 1712. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral explanation for striking the venire member in question. Id. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct. 1712. Third, the defendant again has the burden, this time of proving purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S. Ct. 1712. Under Batson, the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the state's peremptory challenges are attributable to a discriminatory purpose lies with and never shifts from the defendant. Id. at 94 n. 18, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (citing Tex. Dep't of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981)); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995).
Under the current scheme for habeas review in federal court, which was substantially updated in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1) requires that we "presum [e]" the state court's findings of fact "to be correct" unless Miller-El can rebut the presumption "by clear and convincing evidence."2 As the Supreme Court has stated, the state court's finding at step three of Miller-El's Batson claim was a finding of fact and therefore subject to § 2254(e) (1)'s presumption of correctness. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991), for the proposition that the determination made at step three of Batson is a "`pure issue of fact' accorded significant deference").
We follow the lead of the Supreme Court in utilizing their decisions in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991), and Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995), to guide our decision regarding the trial court's finding of no purposeful discrimination at step three in this Batson claim. These Supreme Court opinions state that the critical question in determining whether a prisoner has proved purposeful discrimination at step three is the persuasiveness and credibility of the prosecutor's justification for his peremptory strike. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. 1769; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-65, 111 S. Ct. 1859. Further, these cases, applying a standard of review even less deferential to the trial court's finding than we are required to apply under AEDPA, articulate that deference is necessary because the reviewing court is not as well positioned as the trial court to make credibility determinations, and once the trial court has made a credibility determination concerning the prosecutor's state of mind regarding the peremptory strikes, the step three determination under Batson has been decided. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (8) and stating that the standard of review for a federal habeas claim required that the factual findings of the state court be presumed to be correct, and "may be set aside, absent procedural error, only if they are `not fairly supported by the record'"); Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 366-67, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (applying, on direct review of a state court's factual findings, a "clearly erroneous" standard).
As the United States magistrate judge found, there was considerable evidence that the Dallas County District Attorney's office had an unofficial policy of excluding blacks from jury service and that this evidence was disturbing. The district court accepted this finding. But both the magistrate and district court noted that the historical evidence, however disturbing, is not determinative of whether there was purposeful discrimination in the selection of Miller-El's jury. We also note that the apparent culture of discrimination that existed in the past in the Dallas County District Attorney's Office and the individual discriminatory practices that may have been practiced during the time of Miller-El's jury selection by some prosecutors are deplorable. The Supreme Court stated that proof "that the culture of the District Attorney's Office in the past was suffused with bias against African-Americans in jury selection" is "relevant to the extent it casts doubt on the legitimacy of the motives underlying the State's actions" in Miller-El's case. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 347, 123 S. Ct. 1029. In this case, however, the relevancy of this evidence is less significant because Miller-El has already met the burden under the first step of Batson and now must prove actual pretext in his case. This historical evidence is relevant to the extent that it could undermine the credibility of the prosecutors' race-neutral reasons. Here, however, as explained below the race-neutral reasons are solidly supported by the record and in accordance with the prosecutors' legitimate efforts to get a jury of individuals open to imposing the death penalty. The state court, in the best position to make a factual credibility determination, heard the historical evidence and determined the prosecutors' race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes to be genuine. Under our standard of review, we must presume this specific determination is correct and accordingly the general historical evidence does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination in Miller-El's jury selection was incorrect.
Venire member Joe Warren answered questions during voir dire in a noncommital manner and indicated ambivalence about the death penalty and his ability to impose it. He stated, "there are some cases where I would agree [with the death penalty], you know, and there are others that I don't." When the prosecution described the crimes defined as capital murder under Texas law and asked whether Warren felt the death penalty could be an appropriate punishment for such crimes, he responded, "Well, there again, I would say it depends on the case and the circumstances involved at the time." When asked whether the death penalty serves a purpose, Warren answered, "Yes and no. Sometimes I think it does and sometimes I think it don't. Sometimes you have mixed feelings about things like that." When asked whether he could make a decision between a life sentence and a death sentence, Warren answered, "I think I could." When questioned about his ability to answer the future dangerousness special issue question, Warren responded, "I suppose there's always a chance, but there again, you never know." Finally, Warren stated, "Well, it [']s just like I said you know. There are cases, I mean, personally, that I feel I wouldn't want to personally be, you know, involved with it if I had a choice." The prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Warren. Miller-El's counsel did not object to the peremptory strike against Warren contemporaneous to the strike, therefore the prosecution did not give its race-neutral reasons at voir dire. At the Batson hearing, the prosecutor cited Warren's hesitation about imposing the death penalty and his inconsistent responses during voir dire as the reasons for striking him. The prosecutor also noted that Warren was struck relatively early in the jury selection process when the state had ten challenges remaining before exercising one to remove Warren. The prosecutor noted at the Batson hearing that an attorney's strategy regarding the use of peremptory challenges necessarily changes as jury selection progresses and peremptory challenges either remain unused or get used more rapidly. In fact, the prosecutor on cross-examination at the Batson hearing admitted that he would have struck non-black jurors Sandra Hearn and Fernando Gutierrez, who also gave somewhat ambivalent answers regarding the death penalty, before Warren, had they come up earlier in the process.
The jury questionnaire asked two questions directly relevant to the death penalty. Question 56 asked, "Do you believe in the death penalty?" Venire members could circle "yes" or "no," and then they were asked to " [p]lease explain your answer." Question 58 allowed venire members to circle "yes" or "no" in answering the following question: "Do you have any moral, religious, or personal beliefs that would prevent you from returning a verdict which would ultimately result in the execution of another human being?"
Although Miller-El raised four issues, the petition has been narrowed down by the Supreme Court to only the jury selection claim premised on Batson. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 329, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003).
The language of § 2254(e) (1) could not be clearer:
With the exception of black venire members Joe Warren and Paul Bailey, the prosecution set forth its race-neutral reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges immediately after exercising the strikes. At the subsequent Batson hearing the court took judicial notice of that prior testimony in the voir dire record. Miller-El has not based his claim on the prosecution striking Bailey.
Woods' questionnaire did not clearly indicate his views on the death penalty and thus he received the graphic script, but on voir dire he indicated that he fully supported the death penalty, the state believed him to be an excellent juror and he was in fact seated on Miller-El's jury.
Jeanette Butler's juror questionnaire is not contained in the record, however, at voir dire she stated that she was unwilling to impose the death penalty. Butler was ultimately removed for cause.