Source: https://casetext.com/case/machesky-v-bizzell
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 05:21:53
Document Index: 18061336

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2283', '§ 1979', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 1983', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 1983', '§ 2283', '§ 1983', '§ 2283']

Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 | Casetext Search + Citator
Machesky v. Bizzell
Wallace v. Brewer
28 U.S.C. § 2283. Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699, 704 (5 Cir. 1969); see Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d…
Sheridan v. Garrison
Appellants are asking for an injunction under the Civil Rights Statute, Rev.Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §…
Full title:Father Nathaniel MACHESKY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Honorable…
Date published: Jul 18, 1969
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969)
holding public interest in First Amendment even greater than that in United States' property rights, therefore extending Leiter to hold that "where important public rights to full dissemination of expression on public issues are abridged by state court proceedings, the principles of comity embodied in § 2283 must yield"
Summary of this case from In re B-727 Aircraft Serial No. 21010
June 5, 1969. Rehearing Denied and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 18, 1969.
Elliott C. Lichtman, L.A. Aschenbrenner, Lawrence D. Ross, Jackson, Miss., Jonathan Shapiro, New York City, for appellants.
This appeal involves First Amendment rights. Suit was filed in the state court to enjoin the picketing and boycotting activities of appellants. They, in turn, sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal court. The federal district court denied relief and dismissed the complaint. The district court's reasoning was based on the facts that the same controversy had first been submitted to the state court, and that the state court had assumed jurisdiction, held an evidentiary hearing and enjoined appellants. These facts led the court to the view that its injunctive prerogative was inhibited by Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283, in that this was "* * * not the rare case * * * for utilization of a federal injunction to vindicate a clear constitutional right." The court was of the further view that declaratory relief was not required by the holding of Zwickler v. Koota, 1967, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444. This appeal followed. We reverse for further proceedings for the reasons to be set out and within stated limits.
"6. Threatening, intimidating, coercing, or using force or violence upon any person or persons so as to dissuade such person or persons from entering or trading in the business establishments of any of said Complainants in the said City of Greenwood."
The boycott itself was not enjoined. On July 20, 1968 the state court denied a request to modify the injunction except to the extent that the proscription against loitering and congregating was limited to the main business area. Paragraph 1 of the injunction was made more restrictive by deleting the language "in any organized form whatsoever." The court denied a request to permit picketing in front of public buildings near the business area for the purpose of publicizing grievances against the city and the county as opposed to grievances against the merchants.
The prayer of appellants in the federal court was for a declaration of their federal rights and an order vacating the state court injunction, or in the alternative, that the bounds of the state court injunction be limited. On August 13, 1968, the district court dismissed the complaint. Machesky v. Bizzell, N.D. Miss., 1968, 288 F. Supp. 295.
We begin by eliminating two questions. One is whether Title 42, § 1983, constitutes an express exception to § 2283. The other is whether the rationale of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 1965, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22, is applicable to carve out an exception to § 2283.
The Dombrowski decision sheds light on both questions. First, Dombrowski, although involving First Amendment rights, is distinguishable from the instant case in that here state proceedings had already been initiated at the time the appellants first came into the district court. In footnote 2 in Dombrowski, the Supreme Court made this distinction clear: "This statute [ 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283] and its predecessors do not preclude injunctions against the institution of state court proceedings, but only bar stays of suits already instituted." Thus Dombrowski in and of itself is not controlling here. The federal action having been first in time, the court went on to state in the same footnote: "We therefore find it unnecessary to resolve the question whether suits under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1958 ed.) come under the `expressly authorized' exception to § 2283." This latter question has subsequently been described by the court as being open. Cameron v. Johnson, 1965, 381 U.S. 741, 85 S.Ct. 1751, 14 L.Ed.2d 715, and Cameron v. Johnson, 1968, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182, footnote 3. In any event, we do not reach the § 1983 question since we find decision proper on a narrower approach.
The authorities simply equate § 2283 with the comity principle in a context of the equity powers of the court. See Smith v. Apple, 1924, 264 U.S. 274, 279, 44 S.Ct. 311, 68 L.Ed. 678, 681. Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 1943, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324, on the comity limitation under general equity powers. See also T. Smith Son, Inc. v. Williams, 5 Cir., 1960, 275 F.2d 397; Dilworth v. Riner, 5 Cir., 1965, 343 F.2d 226. This approach was well-recognized by the district court in this case. Machesky v. Bizzell, 288 F. Supp. at 302.
Private rights, on the other hand, as we here use the term are those relating to the citizen in his capacity as one of the governed, i.e., his subjectivity to criminal laws and governmental regulation and his rights to governmental protection for his purely private affairs such as contract and tort. Thus this decision does not reach the criminal defendant seeking to enjoin state criminal prosecutions not related to these public or governing rights secured by the First Amendment. Cf. Stefanelli v. Minard, 1951, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L. Ed. 138, which forecloses the use of the federal injunctive powers in connection with private rights of this type.
This is not to say that the district court is to act as an appellate court or an overlord over the state court. It is to say that there is concurrent jurisdiction in the federal court over the same subject matter and that the federal court must act where public rights springing from the First Amendment are violated even though that violation be at the hands of a state court. The action of the federal court must be limited to intruding only to the extent that the state court order impinges on the First Amendment rights involved. The state court, no less than a state or a municipality, is not immune from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Art. VI, Cl. 2, Constitution. See Davis v. Francois, supra, for an approach to the overbreadth of the state court order. Cf. also Kelly v. Page, supra.
In Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5 Cir. 1969), the Fifth Circuit found Dombrowski applicable to plaintiffs' challenge of a state court injunction which enjoined their picketing activities.
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regarding picketing
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