Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20161222_0001352.NIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-08-18 18:13:22
Document Index: 133251372

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2113', '§924', '§2255', '§924', '§2255', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§ 924']

Albert Sanders (“Sanders”) is currently serving a sentence for armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2113(a) and (d) and for using a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) He now moves this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence under the §924(c) charge in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) [DE 51]. The Government opposes Sanders's petition asserting that Sanders's 924(c) conviction is unaffected by the decision in Johnson. For the following reasons, Sanders's Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 will be DENIED.
As noted above, Sanders was convicted of armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, (hereinafter, “the §924(c) conviction”). His motion challenges only the §924(c) conviction asserting that armed bank robbery is not a “crime of violence” and that Johnson, which changed the definition of a crime of violence as that term is applied for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B), determined that armed bank robbery could not be a predicate offense for a §924(c) conviction under that statute's residual clause.
The problem for Sanders in the present instance is that he is not a proper test case for the Court to determine whether Johnson invalidates §924(c)(3)(B). Indeed, this Court need not assess the validity of §924(c)(3)(B) in light of Johnson because, even assuming Johnson would invalidate it, this Circuit clearly defines “bank robbery” as qualifying under the “force clause.”
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Federal law defines bank robbery as the taking &ldquo;by force and violence, or by intimidation, &rdquo; of bank property &ldquo;from the person or presence of another.&rdquo; 18 U.S.C. &sect;2113(a). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has defined intimidation as the threatened use of force. United States v. Jones,932 F.2d 624, 625 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, because the &ldquo;force clause&rdquo; encompasses crimes that have &ldquo;as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, &rdquo; 18 U.S.C. &sect;924(c)(3)(A), the classification of federal bank robbery as a crime of violence is unaffected by Johnson even if Johnson is ultimately found to invalidate the residual clause of &sect;924(c)(3)(B).[1] Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has expressly confirmed this conclusion. In United States v. Armour, 2016 WL 6440383 at *2 (7th Cir. November 1, 2016), the court held that the Johnson decision was inapplicable to a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), “because the federal crime of ...