Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100217/smith-vs-evening-news-association
Timestamp: 2018-03-22 23:31:17
Document Index: 593122078

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 301', '§ 301']

Smith Vs Evening News Association - Citation 100217 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Smith Vs. Evening News Association - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/100217
Case Number 371 U.S. 195
Respondent Evening News Association
.....act makes an unfair labor practice and which § 10(b) and (c) subject to the jurisdiction of the labor board with power after hearings to award "back pay." it is true that there have been expressions in recent cases which indicate that a suit for the violation of a collective bargaining contract may be brought in a state or federal court even though the conduct objected to was also arguably an unfair labor practice within the labor board's jurisdiction. [ footnote 2/1 ] it seems clear to me that these expressions of page 371 u. s. 202 opinion were not necessary to the decisions in those cases, [ footnote 2/2 ] and that neither these prior decisions nor § 301 of the labor management relations act requires us to hold that either employers or unions can be made to.....
Smith v. Evening News Association - 371 U.S. 195 (1962)
U.S. Supreme Court Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195 (1962)
Held: the suit could be maintained by an individual employee, and the state court's jurisdiction was not preempted under the rule of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 . Pp. 371 U. S. 195 -201.
Wayne County, Michigan. [ Footnote 1 ] The complaint stated that, in December, 1955, and January, 1956, other employees of respondent, belonging to another union, were on strike, and respondent did not permit petitioner and his assignors to report to their regular shifts, although they were ready, able and available for work. [ Footnote 2 ] During the same period, however, employees of the editorial, advertising and business departments, not covered by collective bargaining agreements, were permitted to report for work and were paid full wages even though there was no work available. Respondent's refusal to pay full wages to petitioner and his assignors while paying the nonunion employees, the complaint asserted, violated a clause in the contract providing that "there shall be no discrimination against any employee because of his membership or activity in the Guild."
The trial court sustained respondent's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the allegations, if true, would make out an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, and hence the subject matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, 362 Mich. 350, 106 N.W.2d 785, relying upon San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 , and like preemption cases. [ Footnote 3 ] Certiorari was granted, 369 U.S. 827, after the decisions of this Court in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 , and Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 .
Lucas Flour and Dowd Box, as well as the later Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 , were suits upon collective bargaining contracts brought or held to arise under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, [ Footnote 4 ] and, in these cases, the jurisdiction of the courts was sustained although it was seriously urged that the conduct involved was arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. In Lucas Flour as well as in Atkinson, the Court expressly refused to apply the preemption doctrine of the Garmon case, and we likewise reject that doctrine here, where the alleged conduct of the employer, not only arguably, but concededly, is an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. [ Footnote 5 ] The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive, and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301. If, as respondent strongly urges, there are situations in which serious problems will arise from both the courts and the Board having jurisdiction over acts
which amount to an unfair labor practice, we shall face those cases when they arise. This is not one of them, in our view, and the National Labor Relations Board is in accord. [ Footnote 6 ]
We are left with respondent's claim that the predicate for escaping the Garmon rule is not present here, because this action by an employee to collect wages in the form of damages is not among those "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . ," as provided in § 301. There is support for respondent's position in decisions of the Courts of Appeals, [ Footnote 7 ] and, in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U. S. 437 , a majority of the Court, in three separate opinions, concluded that § 301 did not give the federal courts jurisdiction over a suit brought by a union to enforce employee rights which were variously characterized as "peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject matter", "uniquely personal" and arising "from separate hiring contracts between the employer and each employee." Id. at 348 U. S. 460 -461, 348 U. S. 464 .
However, subsequent decisions here have removed the underpinnings of Westinghouse, and its holding is no longer authoritative as a precedent. Three of the Justices in that case were driven to their conclusion because, in their view, § 301 was procedural only, not substantive, and therefore grave constitutional questions would be raised if § 301 was held to extend to the controversy there involved. [ Footnote 8 ] However, the same three Justices observed that if, contrary to their belief,
Id. at 348 U. S. 442 . Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 , of course, has long since settled that § 301 has substantive content, and that Congress has directed the courts to formulate and apply federal law to suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts. There is no constitutional difficulty, and § 301 is not to be given a narrow reading. Id. at 348 U. S. 456 , 348 U. S. 457 . Section 301 has been applied to suits to compel arbitration of such individual grievances as rates of pay, hours of work and wrongful discharge, Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, supra; General Electric Co. v. Local 205, 353 U. S. 547 ; to obtain specific enforcement of an arbitrator's award ordering reinstatement and back pay to individual employees, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593 ; to recover wage increases in a contest over the validity of the collective bargaining contract, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra; and to suits against individual union members for violation of a
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., supra, at 369 U. S. 103 .
We conclude that petitioner's action arises under § 301, and is not preempted under the Garmon rule. [ Footnote 9 ] The judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
There was no grievance arbitration procedure in this contract which had to be exhausted before recourse could be had to the courts. Compare Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 ; Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U. S. 254 .
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 ; Weber v. Anheuser Busch, 348 U. S. 468 .
I would affirm the Michigan Supreme Court's holding that Michigan courts are without jurisdiction to entertain suits by employees against their employers for damages measured by "back pay" based on discrimination, which discrimination § 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act makes an unfair labor practice and which § 10(b) and (c) subject to the jurisdiction of the Labor Board with power after hearings to award "back pay." It is true that there have been expressions in recent cases which indicate that a suit for the violation of a collective bargaining contract may be brought in a state or federal court even though the conduct objected to was also arguably an unfair labor practice within the Labor Board's jurisdiction. [ Footnote 2/1 ] It seems clear to me that these expressions of
opinion were not necessary to the decisions in those cases, [ Footnote 2/2 ] and that neither these prior decisions nor § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act requires us to hold that either employers or unions can be made to defend themselves against governmental regulation and sanctions of the same type for the same conduct by both courts and the Labor Board. Such duplication of governmental supervision over industrial relationships is bound to create the same undesirable confusion, conflicts, and burdensome proceedings that the National Labor Relations Act was designed to prevent, as we have interpreted that Act in prior cases like San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959).
In contrast, the statute of limitations in Michigan governing breach of contract suits like this is six years. [ Footnote 2/3 ] The Court's holding thus opens up a way to
defeat the congressional plan, adopted over vigorous minority objection, to expedite industrial peace by requiring that both the complaining party and the Board act promptly in the initiation of unfair labor practice proceedings. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Instead, by permitting suits like this one to be filed, it is now not only possible but highly probable that unfair labor practice disputes will hang on like festering sores that grow worse and worse with the years. [ Footnote 2/5 ] Of course, this Court could later, by another major statutory surgical operation, apply the six-months Labor Board statute of limitations to actions for breach of collective bargaining contracts under § 301. But if such drastic changes are to be wrought in the Act that Congress passed, it seems important to me that this Court should wait for Congress to perform that operation.
Atkinson v. Sinclair Rfg. Co., 370 U. S. 238 , 370 U. S. 245 , n. 5 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 , 369 U. S. 101 , n. 9 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 , 368 U. S. 513 (1962).