Source: https://asci.uvm.edu/equine/law/cases/cruel/slaughterhouse.htm
Timestamp: 2018-01-20 17:04:26
Document Index: 651714328

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 149', '§ 149', '§ 433', '§ 433', '§ 433', '§ 678', '§ 601', '§ 678', '§ 598', '§ 75', '§ 1', '§ 8']

Empacadoras de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry
2007 WL 122005
The Texas Attorney General informed the owners of two of the three plants in the United States that slaughters horses (The third is in Illinois.) that Texas is one of the few states that prohibits their activities. This case addresses whether or not that was a correct interpretation of the law. The Fifth Circuit held that there was no federal impediment to the operation of Tex. Agric. Code Ann. § § 149.001-.007 (Vernon 2004) ("Chapter 149”). freeing the Texas prosecutor to proceed against the slaughterhouses who admit that without the federal laws they are in violation of Chapter 149.
The lone cowboy riding his horse on a Texas trail is a cinematic icon. Not once in memory did the cowboy eat his horse,
Though thieves would occasionally eat the cowboy's horse. See, e.g., Seven Men From Now (Batjac Productions 1956).
but film is an imperfect mirror for reality.
We VACATE the district court's permanent injunction barring the prosecution of slaughterhouses for processing, selling and transporting horsemeat for human consumption. We hold that Texas Agriculture Code Chapter 149 has not been repealed or preempted by federal law. Tex. Agric. Code Ann. § § 149.001-.007 (Vernon 2004) ("Chapter 149"). We also find that, as applicable to the parties' activities before us, Chapter 149 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Appellees are three slaughterhouses ("the slaughterhouses") that process and sell horsemeat. While the horse byproducts go to various uses--including animal feed, fertilizer and baseball leathers--a substantial majority of the horsemeat is sold and shipped abroad for human consumption. None of the meat is sold domestically for human consumption.
Before we can consider potential constitutional infirmities in Chapter 149, we must determine whether it is in force. If it has been repealed then we need not address the constitutional concerns the statute raises. See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 661-62, 98 S.Ct. 1338, 55 L.Ed.2d 614 (1978). While it is generally preferable to avoid such constitutional issues, courts "cannot press statutory construction 'to the point of disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question." United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985), quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379, 53 S.Ct. 620, 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933).
The better reading is that the TMPIA is indifferent as to which meats are legal for public sale, but provides general regulations that may be applied to those that are. Just as it did not legalize the sale of all exotic animals for human consumption, it does not legalize the sale of horsemeat by repealing Chapter 149's unanmbiguous language to the contrary. It does not reach the high standard of irreconcilability required for an implicit repeal.
Furthermore, that a horse "meat food product" is "capable of use as human food" does not mean the product can be legally sold for human consumption. The Act explicitly defines "capable of use as human food" as "not naturally inedible by humans." Id. at § 433.003(2). It does not imply that all edible meats are legal for sale as human food, as evidenced by other provisions in the Act that specifically deal with "meat food products" that are "not intended for use as human food." See, e.g., id. at § 433.029(b).
One could argue that, because the commissioner is only allowed to inspect slaughterhouses where products are processed for human consumption, see Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 433.029, the very inclusion of horsemeat in the TMPIA means that it is being treated as legal for human consumption. There is some merit to that point, but we are convinced otherwise for two reasons.
Human brains are "not naturally inedible by humans," but that does not mean the TMPIA authorizes roadside vendors to start selling them.
In Fleming Foods, the Texas Supreme Court faced a similar question, asking, "What effect should be given to clear, unambiguous statutes that were drafted by the Legislative Council as part of the codification process but that depart from prior law?" 6 S.W.3d at 283. The court emphasized a need for clarity in finding that "the codifications enacted by the Legislature are the law of this State," and that when "specific provisions of a 'nonsubstantive' codification and the code as a whole are direct, unambiguous, and cannot be reconciled with prior law, the codification ... must be given effect." Id. at 286.
Fleming Foods indicates that codifications--even if labeled "nonsubstantive"--are legislative enactments that must be given full effect, and such codifications may repeal and prevail over prior laws.
This case is distinguishable from Fleming Foods, since that case dealt with a conflict between a statute and its own subsequent codification. But the language and rationale of that case provide strong support here, since clarity and ease of interpretation both militate in favor of a simple rule that the statute last codified controls. While the rule that the most recent substantive enactment controls might seem equally easy to apply, it requires much more historical research into a statute's origins and deciphering which provisions of a statute are substantive versus mere nonsubstantive codifications. Fleming Foods guides us against such a convoluted method of statutory interpretation.
The complicated and convoluted statutory history raised by the parties here demonstrates how difficult it would be to implement a contrary rule.
The FMIA contains an express preemption clause, stating that requirements "with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any establishment at which inspection is provided ... which are in addition to, or different than those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State." 21 U.S.C. § 678. It further prohibits states from imposing different "[m]arking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements." Id.
This preemption clause expressly limits states in their ability to govern meat inspection and labeling requirements. It in no way limits states in their ability to regulate what types of meat may be sold for human consumption in the first place.
As in the TMPIA, the FMIA only states that horsemeat is "capable of use as human food" which applies to any meat unless it is "naturally inedible by humans," denatured, or otherwise identified to deter its use as human food. 21 U.S.C. § 601(j)-(k). It in no way suggests that horsemeat must be legalized for human consumption. This is a less important observation to this analysis than it was to the repeal analysis above, since even if the FMIA implicitly recognizes the legality of selling horsemeat for human consumption, that does not necessarily preclude a state from prohibiting it unless Congress additionally intended to preempt such legislation.
We cannot read this as expressly preempting Texas's prohibition on horsemeat for human consumption. With little explanation, the district court found, "Preventing slaughterhouses ... from selling or possessing horsemeat for human consumption ... is an attempt by Texas to regulate the premises, facilities and operations of [the] slaughterhouses." Summary Judgment Order at 18. But the FMIA's preemption clause is more naturally read as being concerned with the methods, standards of quality, and packaging that slaughterhouses use, matters Chapter 149 is entirely unconcerned with. Chapter 149 does not infringe upon the territory preserved for the federal government by the FMIA's preemption clause.
[8] Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field of meat commerce under the FMIA. Field preemption requires a clear congressional intent. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. It occurs when a federal statute's scope "indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively." Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995).
The FMIA specifically indicates that it did not intend to preempt the field of meat commerce entirely, stating that it "shall not preclude any State ... from making requirements or taking other action, consistent with this chapter, with respect to any other matters regulated under this chapter." 21 U.S.C. § 678. Furthermore, the FMIA contains a narrow inspection and labeling preemption clause, and "Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992).
The Act's title refers specifically to meat inspection, rather than a more comprehensive scheme of meat regulation. The need for uniform meat packaging, inspection and labeling regulations is strong, lest meat providers be forced to master various separate operating techniques to abide by conflicting state laws. There is no similar need for uniformity with regard to what types of meat states permit to be sold, especially when considering that horsemeat is only produced for human consumption domestically in Texas and Illinois, and several states have already banned its commercial use for human consumption.
See Cal.Penal Code § 598c ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for any person to possess, to import into or export from the state, or to sell, buy, give away, hold, or accept any horse with the intent of killing, or having another kill, that horse, if that person knows or should have known that any part of that horse will be used for human consumption."); Miss.Code Ann. § 75-33-3 ("The term 'food unfit for human consumption' shall be construed to include meat and meat-food products of horses and mules."); 63 Okl. Stat. Ann. § 1-1136 ("It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer or exhibit for sale ... any quantity of horsemeat for human consumption."); see also 2005-2006 Legislative Review, 12 Animal L. 277, 281 (2006) (counting five states as having enacted such prohibitive legislation).
The final challenge the slaughterhouses raise is that Chapter 149 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. We note at the outset that this case was brought by two slaughterhouses that operate their horsemeat businesses within Texas, and a third that operates in Mexico but transfers and sells horsemeat directly in Texas. This case does not implicate the Foreign Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause states, in part, that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. While it is not a stand-alone clause, this portion of the Commerce Clause is often referred to independently as the Foreign Commerce Clause.
as statutes placing import and export restrictions do, see, e.g., South-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984), or in the way restrictions on products "used constantly and exclusively ... in foreign commerce" would. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 99 S.Ct. 1813, 60 L.Ed.2d 336 (1979). The slaughterhouses here face potential prosecution for sales and activity that take place directly in Texas.
We do not address the potential application of Chapter 149 to an entity that merely transports horsemeat through Texas but engages in no other commercial activity within the State, as Empacadora speculates it may do one day. That hypothetical situation is not before us. While prosecuting such a company would raise unique dormant Commerce Clause concerns--specifically with regard to the Foreign Commerce Clause--none of the slaughterhouses fit that description, nor does there appear to be any company that merely transports horsemeat through Texas.
The only American producer of horsemeat for human consumption outside of Texas operates in Illinois. It is not a party to this case and there is no record as to its exportation routes.
The alternative measures the district court suggests are not as effective. The district court pointed to several other measures that Texas already has in place, including "support[ing] equine research at its agricultural universities," "encourag[ing] the humane treatment of horses," "regulat[ing] and licens[ing] veterinary care for equines," and "legaliz[ing] parimutuel betting on horse races." Id. at 14-15. The district court concluded that "[t]he fact that Texas does all these things and more provides ample evidence that Texas is able to 'preserve horses' without severely or significantly burdening interstate commerce." Id. at 15.