Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19781204-823978
Timestamp: 2017-04-27 20:57:01+00:00
Document Index: 268579314

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 33", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 26", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 35", "l'article 33", "l'article 26", "l'article 33", "l'article 33", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 27"]

X. v. PAYS-BAS
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8239/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-12-04;8239.78 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : X. v. PAYS-BASTexte : APPLICATIQN/REQUETE NÂ° 8239/78 X . v/the NETHERLANDS X . c/PAYS-BA S DECISION of 4 December1978 on the admissibiiity Ã´f the application DÃCISIQN du 4 dÃ©cembre 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Article 6 paregraph 2 of the Convention : Obliging the driver of a motor vehicle suspected of being under the influence of alcohol to submit to a bloodtest, is not contrary to the princip/e of presumption of innocence. Article 8 of the Convention : Insofar as the obligation imposed on the driver of a motor vehicle to submit to a bloodtest when he is suspected of being under the influence of alcohol constitutes an interference with the right to respect for private life, this interference is justified as being necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others .
Article 6, paragraphe 2, de la Convention : N'est pas contraire au principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence l'obligation faite Ã un conducteur de vÃ©hicule Ã moteur de se soumettre Ã un examen du sang lorsqu'il est soupÃ§onnÃ© d'Ã©briÃ©tÃ© . Article 8 de la Convention : Dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'obligation faire Ã un conducteur de vÃ©hicule Ã moteur de se soumettre Ã un examen du sang lorsqu'!l est soupÃ§onnÃ© d'Ã©briÃ©tÃ© porte atteinte au droit au respect de sa vie privÃ©e, elle constitue une ingÃ©rence justifiÃ©e comme nÃ©cessaire A la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui .
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits (English : see p . 7871 Alors qu'il conduisait un vÃ©hicule Ã moteur, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© invitÃ© Ã s'arrÃªter par la police de La Haye, qui le soupÃ§onnait d'Ãªtre en Ã©tat d'Ã©briÃ©tÃ© . AprÃ¨s un test d'haleine positif . le requÃ©rant fut priÃ© de se soumettre Ã une prise de sang, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 33.a, paragraphe 3, du code d e _1gq_
la circulation routiÃ©re . ll refusa, tout en reconnaissant avoir consommÃ© une grande quantitÃ© d'alcoo% Traduit devant le tribunal d'arrondissement de La Haye, le requÃ©rant fut condamnÃ© Ã deux semaines d'emprisonnement et six mois de retrait du permis de conduire, avec sursts . L'artic/e 35, paragraphe 1, du code de la circulation routiÃ©re Ã©rige en effet en infraction le refus de subir une prise de sang en pareille circonstance . Les recours du requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©s .
EN DROIT Le requÃ©rant se plaint que l'application qui lui a Ã©tÃ© faite des dispositions nÃ©erlandaises punissant le refus de se soumettre Ã une prise de sang (articles 33 .a, paragraphe 3, et 35, paragraphe 1, du code de la circulation routiÃ©rel est contraire au principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence Ã©noncÃ© Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 2, de la Convention, dans la mesure oÃ¹ ces dispositions obligent une personne soupÃ§onnÃ©e d'avoir conduit un vÃ©hicule en Ã©tat d'Ã©briÃ©tÃ© Ã fournir une preuve de sa culpabilitÃ© . La Commission a estimÃ©, par le passÃ©, qu'une fois une situation de fait Ã©tablie par le ministÃ©re public, la possibilitÃ© ofterte Ã l'accusÃ© de prouver un Ã©lÃ©ment qui le disculpe n'Ã©quivaut pas Ã Ã©tablir une prÃ©somption de culpabilitÃ© contraire Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 2 (Req . NÂ° 5124/71, Recueil 42, p . 135) . En l'espÃ©ce, toutefois, la situation dans laquelle s'est trouvÃ© le requÃ©rant Ã©tait diffÃ©rente . En ettet, un examen du sang, si le rÃ©sultat est positif, peut aboutir Ã une condamnation pour le dÃ©lit prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26, paragraphe 2, du code de la circulation routiÃ©re nÃ©erlandais . Toutefois, ce mÃ©me examen, s'il est nÃ©gatif, peut disculper le prÃ©venu . Il s'agit donc d'un moyen de preuve qui peut Ãªtre soit favorable soit dÃ©favorable au prÃ©venu . La Commission estime justifiÃ© que le ministÃ©re public, pour s'acquitter de sa tÃ¢che, puisse prendre certaines mesures affectant la personne qu'il soupÃ§onne d'une infraction . Elle relÃ©ve que l'article 5, paragraphe 1 .c, de la Convention permet mÃªme, en pareil cas, une privation de libertÃ© . Elle peut admettre, a fortiori, une intervention banale telle qu'une prise de sang . Par ailleurs, la Commission a dÃ©jÃ eu l'occasion de dire que l'obligation faite Ã un accusÃ© de se soumettre Ã un examen mÃ©dical ne saurait, en ellemÃ©me, Ãªtre contraire Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 2, de la Convention IRequÃ©te NÂ° 986/61, Annuaire 5, pp . 193, 199) .
En outre, la Commission constate que le taux d'alcoolÃ©mie est, en soi, un Ã©lÃ©ment matÃ©riel du dÃ©lit prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26, paragraphe 2, du code de l a - 185-
circulation routiÃ©re nÃ©erlandais . En effet, aussi longtemps qu'il n'est pas scientifiquement Ã©tabli que la dose d'alcool dans le sang dÃ©passe 0,005 grammÃ© par millilitre, le dÃ©lit figurant Ã l'article 26, paragraphe 2 et sanctionnÃ© par l'article 35, paragraphe 1, n'est pas Ã©tabli . . . La Commission constate que l'examen du sang est entourÃ© d'un certain nombre de garanties excluant tout arbitraire ou abus . Ainsi l'article 33 .a ne vise que la personne qui est soupÃ§onnÃ©e d'avoir commis l'infraction prÃ©vue Ã l'article 26 . Pour Ã©tablir cette qualitÃ©, l'article 33, paragraphe 4 prÃ©voit un test de l'haleine . En outre, l'ordre de faire subir Ã une personne un examen du sang ne peut Ã©maner que du procureur du roi, son adjoint ou un autre fonctionnaire de police dÃ©signÃ© Ã cet effet . Le dÃ©cret d'application de cette lÃ©gislation prÃ©cise, par ailleurs, que le prÃ©lÃ¨vement du sang ne peut Ãªtre effectuÃ© que par un mÃ©decin agrÃ©Ã©, qui, aux termes de l'article 33 .a, paragraphe 4 peut refuser de procÃ©der Ã l'examen pour des raisons exceptionnelles d'ordre mÃ©dical . On ne saÃ¹rait s'arrÃªter au fait que l'examen a lieu avant une accusation formelle . En'effet, le p_rÃ©lÃ©vement du sang n'est utile que lorsqu'il est effectuÃ© immÃ©diatement . La Commission remarque en outre que l'examen du sang est un e niesure courammÃ©nt . prescrite dans les Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe, en matiÃ©re de circulation routiÃ¨re . Dans le cas d'espÃ©ce, lerequÃ©rant a admis avoir consommÃ© une grand e quantitÃ© d'alcool . Cet aveu, aux yeux de la Commission, ne saurait rendre l'examen superflu, puisque, ainsi qu'il a Ã©tÃ© indiquÃ© ci-dessus, le taux d'alcool dans le sang est un Ã©lÃ©ment constitutif du dÃ©lit . La Commission a Ã©galement examinÃ© la requÃªte sous l'angle de l'article 8 de la Convention, qui garantit, entre autres, Ã toute personne le droit au respect de sa vie privÃ©e . Une atteinte Ã l'intÃ©gritÃ© physique contre le grÃ© de l'intÃ©ressÃ© peul, mÃªme si elle est minime, soulevÃ©r des problÃ©mes sous l'angle de cet article . La Commission estime cependant que la question de savoir si l'examen du sang est admissible, sous l'angle de l'article 8, ne peutÃ©tre considÃ©rÃ©e indÃ©pendamment de l'objet de la loi qui l'impose . Lorsque leprojet de loi fut prÃ©sentÃ© au Parlement il fut reconnu qu'i l comportait un Ã©lÃ©ment de contrainte . Toutefois, le Ministre de la Justice dÃ©clara que dans un cas oÃ¹ de s intÃ©rÃªts vitaux sont en jeu et oÃ¹ aucune alternative n'existe, il faut exceptionnellement admettre une telle contrainte . La Commission estime donc que les dispositions lÃ©gales nÃ©erlandaises en la matiÃ©re sont inspirÃ©es par le souci et la nÃ©cessitÃ© de protÃ©ger la sociÃ©tÃ© et plus particuliÃ©rement la sÃ©curitÃ© routiÃ¨re et la santÃ© d'autrui .-186
Par consÃ©quent, pour aulant que l'examen obligatoire du sang puisse Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme portant atteinte Ã la vie privÃ©e au sens de l'article 8, paragraphe 1, il peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection du droit des tiers, au sens du paragraphe 2 dudit article . L'examen de la requÃªte ne permet donc de dÃ©celer aucune apparence de violation des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention . Il s'ensuit que l'ensemble de la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commission DÃCLARE LA REQUETE IRRECEVABLE .
Summary of the facts The applicant, who was driving a motor vehicle was stopped by the po/ice in The Hague, as he was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol. After a positive breathalyzer test the applicant was requested to submit to a bloodtest, in accordance with Sectioh 33 .a, paragraph 3 of the Netherlands Road Traffic Code . He refused, while at the same time admirring that he had consumed a large amount of alcohol . Brought before the Regional Court of The Hague rhe applicant was convicted and was given a suspended sentence of two months imprisonmenr and had his driver's licence withdrawn for six months . Section 35, paragraph 7 of the Road Traffic Code makes it a criminal offence to refuse to submit to a blood test in these circumstances . The applicant's appeals were dismissed.
(TRANSLATION) THE LA W The applicant complains that the use made, in his case, of the Netherlands regulations punishing the refusal to submit to a bloodtest fArticles 33 .a, paragraph 3, and 35, paragraph 1 of the Road Traffic Code) i s
inconsistent with the principle of presumption of innocence, insofar as these regulations oblige a person suspected of having driven a motor vehicle under the influence of drink to provide proof of his guilt . The Commission has ruled in the past that, once a de facto situation has been found to exist by the prosecutor, the possibility offered the accused of adducing evidence to the contrary does not constitute a presumption of guilt in contravention of Article 6, paragraph 2 IApplication No . 5124/71, Collection 42, p . 135) . In the present instance, however, the situation in which the applicant found himself was different . A bloodtest, if positive, can lead to a conviction for the offence referred to in Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Netherlands Road Traffic Code . At the same time, the test, if negative, can clear the accused . This is therefore a method of proof which can work to the advantage or disadvantage of the accused . The Commission thinks it reasonable that the authorities, in pursuanc e of their task, should be able to take certain measures affecting the person whom they suspect of an offence . It points out that Article 5, paragraph t .c of the Convention even permits detention on remand in such cases . Therefore, a fortiori, it will tolerate minor interferences such as a bloodiest . Moreover, the Commission has already had occasion to state that requiring an accused person to undergo a medical examination is not, in itself, inconsistent with Article .6 .paragraph 2 of the Convention (Application No . 986/61, Yearbook 5, pp . 193, 199) . The Commission also notes that the alcohol content of the bloodstream is, in itself, a material proot of the offence defined in Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Netherlands Road Traffic Code . In fact, until it has been scientifically shown that the level of alcohol in the bloodstream exceeds 0 .005 grams per millilitre, there is no proof that the offence defined in Article 26, paragraph 2, and sanctioned by Article 35, paragraph 1 has been committed . The Commission notes that various guarantees are provided against arbitrary or imporper use of the bloodtest . Thus Article 33 .a refers only to the person suspected of having committed the offence defined in Article 26 . Article 33, paragraph 4, provides for use of the breathalyzer to establish that there are in fact grounds for suspicion . Moreover, a bloodtest may only be ordered by the Public Prosecutor, his deputy or another police official authorised to do so . The enabling decree accompanying this legislation also stipulates that the bloodtest may only be performed by an approved doctor, who may, under Article 33 .a, paragraph 4, refuse to carry out the test for exceptional reasons of a medical character .
No objection can be raised to the fact that the test was carried out before a formal charge was made . In fact, the test is only of use when carried out immediately . The Commission also notes that bloodtests are commonly used in Council of Europe member states in connection with traffic legislation . In the present instance, the applicant admitted to having consumed considerable quantities of alcohol . This admission was not, in the Commission's view, sufficient to make the test superfluous, since, as pointed out above, the blood/alcohol count is one of the proofs that an offence has been committed The Commission also considered the application with reference to Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees eve ry one the right to respect for his private life . Physical interference, even minimum physical interference, with a person against his will may raise problems in connection with this article . The Commission considers, however, that one cannot consider whether bloodtests are admissible under Article 8 without considering the purpose of the law which imposes them . When the Bill in question was put before Parliament, it was recognised that it included an element of constraint . Nonetheless, the Minister of Justice stated that, in cases where vital interests are at stake and no alternatives exist, such constraint must, exceptionally, be tolerated . The Commission therefore considers that Netherlands legislation on this point is inspired by the desire and need to protect society and, more particularly, road safety and the health of other people . Thus, while compulso ry bloodtesting may be seen as constituting a violation of private life within the meaning of Article 8, paragraph 1, it may also be seen as necessary for protection of the rights of others, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of the same article . Examination of the application does not therefore suggest that any violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention has in fact taken place . It follows that the whole application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Convention .
- 189 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 04/12/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page