Source: http://openjurist.org/294/f3d/1186
Timestamp: 2014-09-17 05:38:58
Document Index: 575669688

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

294 F3d 1186 Cortez v. County of Los Angeles | OpenJurist
294 F. 3d 1186 - Cortez v. County of Los Angeles	Home294 f3d 1186 cortez v. county of los angeles
294 F3d 1186 Cortez v. County of Los Angeles 294 F.3d 1186
Moreno Avalos CORTEZ; Mauricio Robert Avalos; Terry Leach; Lydia Avalos; Guillermo Avalos; Kathy Granillo, Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 00-56781.
Filed June 27, 2002.
David J. Wilson (argued) and Julie Fleming, Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellant.
Barry S. Zelner (argued) and Charles L. Fonarow, Zelner & Karpel, Beverly Hills, California, for the plaintiffs-appellees.
The issue in this case is whether the actions of a California sheriff are attributable to the county for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997), we have had several occasions to address this question and have invariably answered it in the affirmative. Consistent with Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir.2001), we hold that the Los Angeles County Sheriff ("Sheriff") acts as the final policymaker for the County of Los Angeles ("County") in establishing and implementing policies and procedures for the safekeeping of inmates in the county jail. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's denial of the County's motion to dismiss and hold that the County is subject to § 1983 liability as a "person" acting under color of state law.
On July 25, 1999, Mauricio Avalos ("Avalos") was beaten to death by five of his cell mates while incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Jail. Avalos was originally assigned to a cell in the general population awaiting trial for armed robbery. However, he was subsequently transferred to a special gang unit when prison officials learned that he had a tattoo associated with a particular gang.
Although Avalos had previously associated with members of a gang, he disavowed any relationship with the gang prior to his incarceration. Upon being transferred to the gang unit, Avalos immediately became a target of threats and assaults by other inmates. According to the complaint, both Avalos and his family notified jail officials that he feared an attack and requested a transfer to another jail cell.1 However, Avalos remained in the gang unit where he was subsequently attacked and beaten by his cell mates on July 25, 1999. Avalos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the attack.
On May 4, 2000, Avalos' heirs ("Appellees") commenced this action against the County in the Superior Court of the State of California. Appellees allege, among other claims, that the Sheriff deprived Avalos of his constitutional rights guaranteed under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments in violation of § 1983 by failing to provide a safe jail cell for him and by placing him in close proximity to gang members who threatened and ultimately took his life.
On August 7, 2000, the County removed the action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The County then moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that it was not liable for the Sheriff's actions because the Sheriff was acting on behalf of the State in setting policies for the operation of the county jails. As a state actor, the County argued, the Sheriff was immune from § 1983 liability under the Eleventh Amendment.
The District Court denied the County's motion to dismiss. The Court found that the Sheriff was acting on behalf of the County in placing Avalos in the gang unit of the jail because the decision was made pursuant to the Sheriff's function as manager of the county jail. The Court reasoned that the Sheriff is a county officer under state law, and that the State does not oversee his management of the county jail. Thus, the Sheriff was acting on behalf of the county in implementing procedures for the keeping of prisoners and the operation of the jail. The Court concluded that the County could be held liable for the Sheriff's actions under § 1983 because he was acting as the county's final policymaker in deciding where in the jail to keep Avalos. This timely interlocutory appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction to entertain the County's interlocutory appeal from the District Court's denial of its motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993). We review de novo the District Court's refusal to grant the County immunity from this § 1983 action. Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.1999).
Section 1983 provides a method by which individuals can sue for violations of their federal rights. One of the requisite elements for stating a claim under § 1983 is that the violation was committed by a "person" acting under color of state