Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103108/trbovich-vs-united-mine-workers
Timestamp: 2016-12-06 14:53:54
Document Index: 633086359

Matched Legal Cases: ['art,\n404', '§ 402', '§ 482', '§ 403', '§ 483', '§ 403']

Trbovich Vs United Mine Workers - Citation 103108 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Trbovich Vs. United Mine Workers - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/103108CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJan-17-1972Case Number404 U.S. 528AppellantTrbovichRespondentUnited Mine WorkersExcerpt:.....complaint about the performance of the secretary, who protects not only the rights of individual union members, but also the public interest in free and democratic union elections, two functions that may not always dictate the same approach to the conduct of the litigation. pp.
404 u. s. 537
marshall, j., delivered the opinion of the court in which burger, c.j., and brennan, stewart, white, and blackmun, jj., joined. douglas, j, filed an opinion dissenting in part,
404 u. s. 539
mr. justice marshall delivered the opinion of the..... Judgment:
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers - 404 U.S. 528 (1972)
1. There is nothing in the language of Title IV of the Act or its legislative history to bar intervention by a union member in a post-election enforcement suit, so long as that intervention is limited to claims of illegality presented by the Secretary's complaint. Pp.
404 U. S. 530
2. Intervention under Rule 24(a) is warranted for this petitioner, as he may have a valid complaint about the performance of the Secretary, who protects not only the rights of individual union members, but also the public interest in free and democratic union elections, two functions that may not always dictate the same approach to the conduct of the litigation. Pp.
The Secretary of Labor instituted this action under § 402(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b), to set aside an election of officers of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), held on December 9, 1969. He alleged that the election was held in a manner that violated the LMRDA in numerous respects, [
] and he sought an order requiring a new election to be held under his supervision.
the election, [
] (2) to seek certain specific safeguards with respect to any new election that may be ordered, [
] and (3) to present evidence and argument in support of the Secretary's challenge to the election. The District Court denied his motion for leave to intervene, on the ground that the LMRDA expressly stripped union members of any right to challenge a union election in the courts, and gave that right exclusively to the Secretary.
Hodgson v. United Mine Workers,
51 F.R.D. 270 (1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District Court opinion, 77 L.R.R.M. 2496 (CADC 1971). We granted certiorari to determine whether the LMRDA imposes a bar to intervention by union members under Rule 24, in a suit initiated by the Secretary.
p. 880. [
] We conclude that it does not, and we remand the case to the District Court with directions to permit intervention.
The LMRDA was the first major attempt of Congress to regulate the internal affairs of labor unions. [
] Having conferred substantial power on labor organizations, Congress
The critical statutory provision for present purposes is § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483, making suit by the Secretary the "exclusive" post-election remedy for a violation of Title IV. This Court has held that § 403 prohibits union members from initiating a private suit to set aside an election.
(1964). But in this case, petitioner seeks only to participate in a pending suit that is plainly authorized by the statute; it cannot be said that his claim is
The enforcement provisions of Title IV originated in a bill introduced by Senator John Kennedy in 1958. That bill, S. 3751, provided for suit by the Secretary as the exclusive remedy for violation of the rules relating to union elections. Senator Kennedy described the bill as a "modest proposal," one which would protect union members "without undue interference in the internal affairs of what I believe are essentially private institution -- that is, American trade unions." 104 Cong.Rec. 7954. The Senate passed an expanded version of the bill, S. 3974, which retained the original enforcement scheme, and reflected a continuing legislative interest in minimizing judicial interference with union elections.
S.Rep. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-15 (1958). That bill was defeated in the House of Representatives, 104 Cong.Rec. 18288, but essentially the same enforcement scheme was retained the following year in S. 1555, the Kennedy-Ervin bill, which was ultimately passed by both Houses and enacted into law.
In the Senate, the principal advocate of a provision authorizing individual union members to bring suit was Senator Barry Goldwater. He introduced a bill, S. 748, endorsed by the Administration, that would have authorized both the Secretary and the members to file suit to enforce the rules relating to union elections. [
] During
Hearings on S. 505
before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 567 (1959);
at 578-579 (analysis of S. 748 by Arthur J. Goldberg, then special counsel to the AFL-CIO). Multiple
litigation and unnecessary harassment, then, were seen as the principal evils of the provision for member suits. And it was precisely those evils that the draftsmen of the Kennedy-Ervin bill sought to avoid. According to Professor Archibald Cox, who was a principal consultant to the draftsmen, the Kennedy proposal made suit by the Secretary the exclusive post-election remedy in order to "centralize control of the proceedings," to adjudicate the validity of an election "once and for all in one forum," and to avoid "unnecessary harassment of the union, on one side, and . . . friendly suits aimed at foreclosing the Secretary's action, on the other."
The legislative history in the House of Representatives provides even less support for the Secretary's position. The House initially rejected the Senate bill and passed an alternative authorizing only union members, and not the Secretary, to bring suit to enforce the election title of the bill. H.R. 8342,
H.R.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-17 (1959). Even Senator Goldwater, the leading advocate of member suits, thought the House bill inferior to the Senate bill in this regard, because the matter of election violations was too important to be left exclusively to the vagaries of private enforcement. 105 Cong.Rec. 16489 (comparison of House and Senate bills by Sen. Goldwater). The Conference Committee and the House ultimately adopted the Senate's enforcement
provisions, thereby affirming the need for public enforcement of Title IV.
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1959). That action, however, can in no sense be read as a rejection of all forms of private participation in enforcement litigation, since the House at no time considered the possibility that union members might assist the Secretary, rather than displace him.
Intervention by union members in a pending enforcement suit, unlike initiation of a separate suit, subjects the union to relatively little additional burden. [
] The principal intrusion on internal union affairs has already been accomplished, in that the union has already been summoned into court to defend the legality of its election. Intervention in the suit by union members will not subject the union to burdensome multiple litigation, nor will it compel the union to respond to a new and potentially groundless suit. Thus, at least insofar
The question is closer with respect to petitioner's attempt to add to the Secretary's complaint two additional grounds for setting aside the union election. These are claims that the Secretary has presumably determined to be without merit. Hence, to require the union to respond to these claims would be to circumvent the screening function assigned by statute to the Secretary. We recognize that it is less burdensome for the union to respond to new claims in the context of the pending suit than it would be to respond to a new and independent complaint. Nevertheless, we think Congress intended to insulate the union from any complaint that did not appear meritorious to both a complaining member and the Secretary. Accordingly, we hold that, in a post-election enforcement suit, Title IV imposes no bar to intervention by a union member so long as that intervention is limited to the claims of illegality presented by the Secretary's complaint. [
intervene under the terms of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 24(a). Rule 24(a)(2) gives one a right to intervene if (1) he claims a sufficient interest in the proceedings, and (2) that interest is not "adequately represented by existing parties." [
The Secretary does not contend that petitioner's interest in this litigation is insufficient; he argues, rather, that any interest petitioner has is adequately represented by the Secretary. The court below did not reach this question, in light of its threshold determination that Rule 24 had no application to the case. Nevertheless, we think it clear that, in this case, there is sufficient doubt about the adequacy of representation to warrant intervention. [
Wirtz v. Local 1, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn.,
(1968). Both functions are important, and they may not always dictate precisely the same approach to the conduct of the litigation. Even if the Secretary is performing his duties, broadly conceived, as well as can be expected, the union member may have a valid complaint about the performance of "his lawyer." Such a complaint, filed by the member who initiated the entire enforcement proceeding, should be regarded as sufficient to warrant relief in the form of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2).
The complaint alleged that the Union violated the Act by,
failing to use secret ballots, permitting campaigning at the polls, denying candidates the right to have observers at polling places and at the counting of ballots, subjecting members to reprisals in connection with their election activities, failing to conduct elections in some locals, and using union assets to promote the candidacy of the incumbents.
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 851 (1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819 (1960).
Preexisting state remedies presented the additional problem, not relevant here, of multiple litigation that was not only inconvenient as a matter of procedure, but also in conflict as a matter of substance, for the state remedies related to state-defined rights that were not always identical to the new rights defined in the LMRDA. The debates reflect great concern with the proper relationship between state and federal remedies, and much less concern with the relationship between private and public enforcement.
S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-22, 101-104 (1959) (majority and minority views); Hearings on H.R. 3540
before a Joint Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, p. 1611 (1959) (analysis of S. 1555 by Sen. Goldwater), reprinted at 105 Cong.Rec. 10102.
For the origins and development of the procedural device of intervention,
Moore & Levi, Federal Intervention, 45 Yale L.J. 565 (1936), 47 Yale L.J. 898 (1938); Developments in the Law -- Multi-party Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 874, 897-906, 988-992 (1958). The distinction between intervention and initiation is thoughtfully discussed in Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 721, 726-729 (1968).
This limitation, however, applies only to the claimed grounds for setting aside the old election, and not to the proposed terms of any new one that may be ordered. For if the court finds merit in the Secretary's complaint and sets the election aside, then the statute requires the court to direct a new election in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the union and the requirements of Title IV. Since the court is not limited in this regard to consideration of remedies proposed by the Secretary, there is no reason to prevent the intervenors from assisting the court in fashioning a suitable remedial order.
Cf. Hodgson v. Steelworkers,
403 U. S. 333
403 U. S. 344
The requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest "may be" inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as minimal.
3B J. Moore, Federal Practice Ĺš24.09 1[4] (1969).
for setting aside the disputed election. In my view, the limited intervention granted by the majority serves neither the purpose of the liberalizing 1966 amendments to Rule 24 nor the twin purposes of Title IV -- to preserve unions from a multiplicity of frivolous election challenges and also to centralize in a single proceeding such litigation as might be warranted with respect to a single election
Here, the Secretary has served his screening function. He has decided that petitioner's election challenge is meritorious. The Court concedes, moreover, that the burden on the union to defend against the additional claims would not be particularly burdensome, compared to the onus of an independent action.
. These claims relate squarely to the election whose legality the union must defend. I would permit them to be heard.