Source: http://openjurist.org/162/f3d/396/united-states-v-sanders
Timestamp: 2013-12-10 18:19:20
Document Index: 115574438

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3']

162 F3d 396 United States v. Sanders | OpenJurist
162 F. 3d 396 - United States v. Sanders	Home162 f3d 396 united states v. sanders
162 F3d 396 United States v. Sanders 162 F.3d 396
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Keidronn SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 97-6095.
Argued July 22, 1998.Decided Dec. 7, 1998.
Thomas W. Watson, Assistant Federal Public Defender (argued and briefed), Nashville, Tennessee, for Defendant-Appellant.
Sunny A.M. Koshy (argued and briefed), Office of U.S. Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: KENNEDY and RYAN, Circuit Judges; BORMAN, District Judge.*
BORMAN, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RYAN, J., joined. KENNEDY, J. (pp. 403-05), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Defendant Kiedronn Sanders appeals from the district court sentence that imposed two upward adjustments under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, § 2K2.1(b)(5) unlawful possession of firearms,1 and § 3C1.1 obstruction of justice.2
Defendant was charged in a superceding indictment on January 15, 1997 with three counts of firearms offenses:
Count 1. stealing firearms from a licensed firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(u), 924(i)(1), and 2.
Count 2. knowingly transporting stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(i), 924(a)(2), and 2.
Count 3. being a convicted felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
On April 17, 1997, Defendant Sanders plead guilty to counts 2 and 3, pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement. Pursuant to both his Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, and U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.3 which deals with relevant conduct, his conduct in stealing the firearms was to be utilized in determining his proper offense level under the Guidelines.3 In addition, the Government Brief on Appeal acknowledges that other offenses such as the theft of the firearms, were properly included in the relevant conduct calculations for the instant offense:
The United States agrees with the defendant's position that the burglary and other theft offenses the defendant committed at Household Pawn Shop would be included in the relevant conduct of the two counts to which the defendant pleaded guilty.
Gov't Brief on Appeal, P.12, n. 3.
Over Defendants objections, the district court at the sentencing hearing imposed two upward adjustments to the offense level calculations:
1. a four level increase for possession of firearms in connection with another felony, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(5). (App.P.36)
2. a two level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1. (App.P.10)
The district court sentenced Defendant Sanders to a 96 month term of incarceration on each count, sentences to run concurrently.4
Defendant Sanders contends that the district court improperly increased his offense level under each of the two aforementioned guideline provisions. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the four level upward increase under § 2K2.1(b), AFFIRM the upward two level adjustment under § 3C1.1, and REMAND to the district court for resentencing.
First Issue: 4 Level Increase--Guideline § 2K2.1 (b)(5)
Defendant Sanders joined with co-conspirators to burglarize the Household Pawn Shop which sold firearms, electronics and other items in Nashville, Tennessee. Sanders, thereafter, placed some of the stolen firearms and electronics in his car and, accompanied by Jonathan Daviss, drove north toward Detroit, Michigan.
In Lima, Ohio, an Ohio State Trooper pulled him over for traffic violations. Special Agent Todd Henry described the subsequent happenings in Lima, Ohio, as follows:
After observing marijuana in plain view, the Ohio state troopers conducted a search of the vehicle and recovered 73 handguns and rifles, three black powder weapons, electronics equipment and burglary tools.
Appendix P. 107. (Transcript of Plea Proceeding, April 17, 1997).
At the sentencing hearing, FBI Special Agent Terry Haverson testified that all of the firearms and electronics items seized from Sanders were stolen at the same time. App. p. 131.
The Government acknowledges this issue to be whether the § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement applies "when the other felony offense occurs contemporaneously with the firearms offense." Government Brief on Appeal, P.iv.Second Issue: 2 Level Increase--Guideline § 3C1.1
At his plea hearing, Defendant Sanders denied that he had joined with other conspirators to enter the pawnshop to commit the burglary. The relevant testimony at the plea hearing is as follows:
Court: And do you further understand that if you do not speak the truth, if you lie or make a false statement here in court, you can be punished as provided by law?
App. P.66.
Sanders: So they approached me and asked me what am I going to do if I help them do something. Meaning the rest of those goods that they had already gotten because their car was already full and they wanted to unload their car and go back there [to the pawn shop].... I also helped load them things up.
Court: What things?
Sanders: Firearms and electronics.
App. P.99. (emphasis added).
I pulled up, threw the stuff in the car, loaded up and pulled out and left.
App. P.100.
Court: Then what happened?
Sanders: Well, we made all the way to Ohio and a trooper pulled behind us, for about a mile, and pulled me over.
Court: Alright. Is there anything else to this?
App. P.102.
The two issues on appeal involve a legal interpretation of guideline terms--"another felony offense," and "obstruction of justice"--and are therefore reviewed de novo.
In United States v. Hayes, 135 F.3d 435, 437 (6th Cir.1998) the Sixth Circuit stated:
We review de novo a district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines when the application involves mixed questions of law and fact. See U.S. v. Mills, 1 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir.1993).
The Sixth Circuit has stated that "the question as to whether defendants' conduct constitutes obstruction of justice, 'turn