Source: https://casetext.com/case/knoetze-v-united-states-dept-of-state
Timestamp: 2019-03-25 01:54:28
Document Index: 735539394

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1182', '§ 1201', '§ 1151', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', 'art, 311', '§ 1201', '§ 1182', '§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 1', '§ 1503', '§ 1182']

Knoetze v. United States, Dept. of State, 634 F.2d 207 | Casetext
Knoetze v. United States, Dept. of State
634 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1981)
Knoetzev.United States, Dept. of State
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Unit BJan 12, 1981
Peter Nimkoff, Spec. Asst. U.S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
The trial court has extensively described the facts and procedural history of this case. Knoetze v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.Fla. 1979). We summarize them as follows.
Knoetze, a world-class boxer and former policeman from South Africa, came to the United States on a non-immigrant visa to take part in a prize fight. Knoetze then discovered through the news media that his visa had been revoked. The Secretary of State revoked his visa after concluding that Knoetze was convicted in South Africa of a crime corresponding to an American felony involving moral turpitude. The Immigration and Nationality Act renders such foreign convicts ineligible for a visa of entry into our country. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9).
(9) Aliens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) . . . . Any alien who would be excludable because of the conviction of a misdemeanor classifiable as a petty offense under the provisions of section 1(3) of Title 18, by reason of the punishment actually imposed, or who would be excludable as one who admits the commission of an offense that is classifiable as a misdemeanor under the provisions of section 1(2) of Title 18, by reason of the punishment which might have been imposed upon him, may be granted a visa and admitted to the United States if otherwise admissible . . . .
Knoetze received a preliminary injunction against deportation and competed in the prize fight. He also applied for an H — class visa, which would have permitted him to work in this country. The Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) denied this application because of the Secretary's act of revocation.
Knoetze argues that § 1201(i) merely confers revocation power prior to an alien's entry into the United States. He makes three supporting arguments. First, the overall statute to which this section belongs addresses the procedures for the issuance of visas to foreigners seeking initial entry. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151- 1230. The language of § 1201(i) itself, after authorizing visa revocation, goes on to treat the liabilities of a transportation company that brings aliens into the country after the revocation of their visas.
After the issuance of a visa or other documentation to any alien, the consular officer or the Secretary of State may at any time, in his discretion, revoke such visa or other documentation. Notice of such revocation shall be communicated to the Attorney General, and such revocation shall invalidate the visa or other documentation from the date of issuance; Provided, That carriers or transportation companies, and masters, commanding officers, agents, owners, charterers, or consignees, shall not be penalized under section 1323(b) of this title for action taken in reliance on such visas or other documentation, unless they received due notice of such revocation prior to the alien's embarkation.
We accept the argument of the government that § 1201(i) means exactly what it says: the Secretary may revoke an alien's visa "at any time." We reject Knoetze's invitation to limit this clear and broad language. We must assume that Congress used the unambiguous words "at any time" as they are commonly understood, even if a different interpretation would yield a result we would prefer. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 61 S.Ct. 102, 85 L.Ed. 40 (1940); United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979). Moreover, we accord considerable deference to the interpretation of § 1201(i) by the Department of State, the agency empowered by Congress to administer the issuance and revocation of visas. E. I. duPont de Nemours Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 97 S.Ct. 2229, 53 L.Ed.2d 100 (1977). We hold that Congress has conferred upon the Secretary the authority to revoke the visa of an alien "at any time," even after he has entered our country.
The American consul in South Africa issued Knoetze a visa because it believed that his offense fell within the misdemeanor petty offense exception of this Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9). The Secretary later concluded that Knoetze's conviction corresponded to a conviction for a felony involving moral turpitude. Because South African law differs greatly from American law, the Secretary compared the South African crime of "Attempting to Obstruct or Impede the Process of Justice" to the federal crime of "Influencing or Injuring an Officer, Juror or Witness," 18 U.S.C. § 1503. The acts prohibited by § 1503 constitute a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 1(1). The misdemeanor petty offense exception is therefore inapplicable. The fraudulent acts prohibited by § 1503 also indicate moral turpitude: "fraud has consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of moral turpitude." Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 229, 71 S.Ct. 703, 706, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951). The Secretary thus concluded that Knoetze was ineligible for a visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9).
Whoever corruptly . . . endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in any court of the United States or before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate . . . or corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
We must now determine whether the revocation of Knoetze's visa without notice complied with the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Fifth amendment protection extends to all persons, including aliens, within the borders of the United States. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953). Yet fifth amendment protection attaches only when the federal government seeks to deny a liberty or property interest. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Downing v. Williams, 624 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1980).