Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/810/533/355917/
Timestamp: 2019-07-22 12:17:43
Document Index: 260537745

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1445', '§ 1292', '§ 1445', '§ 51', '§ 2410', '§ 1444', '§ 1332', '§ 1441', '§ 1441', '§ 688', '§ 1441']

Norris Lirette, Plaintiff-appellant, v. N.l. Sperry Sun, Inc. and Quarles Drilling Company,defendants-appellees, 810 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1987 › Norris Lirette, Plaintiff-appellant, v. N.l. Sperry Sun, Inc. and Quarles Drilling Company,defendant...
Norris Lirette, Plaintiff-appellant, v. N.l. Sperry Sun, Inc. and Quarles Drilling Company,defendants-appellees, 810 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1987)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 810 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1987)
Feb. 23, 1987. Rehearing Granted March 2, 1987. *
The principal issue in this case is whether a plaintiff's federal court conduct can waive the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) barring removal of the Jones Act action he filed in state court. Gamble v. Central of Georgia Railway, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973), which construes Sec. 1445(a) in strict jurisdictional terms, binds us to hold that it cannot. Since the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate its judgment and direct that the action be remanded to state court.
Both defendants separately moved for summary judgment. The district court originally denied the motions, pending the outcome of this court's en banc consideration of Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Following our decision in Barrett, the court concluded that Lirette was not a Jones Act seaman. The court dismissed the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims against Sperry Sun, but reserved any claims against Quarles under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
Lirette initially petitioned this court for leave to appeal the district court's order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Although we dismissed Lirette's petition for jurisdictional reasons, we construed it as a notice of appeal.1 In so doing, we noted that the defendants had removed Lirette's Jones Act claim from state court and that Jones Act claims filed originally in state court are not removable. Therefore, we sua sponte raised the possibility that the district court may have lacked subject matter jurisdiction and asked the parties to submit memoranda on the issue.
28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) provides: "a civil action in any State court against a railroad or its receivers or trustees, arising under [the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60,] may not be removed to any district court of the United States." The Jones Act incorporates the general provisions of the FELA, including Sec. 1445(a).2 Accordingly, a Jones Act claim filed in state court may not be removed to federal court. Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1952).
While Quarles correctly asserts that a district court may pierce a plaintiff's pleadings to determine whether removal is proper, see, e.g., Keating v. Shell Chemical Co., 610 F.2d 328, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1980) (district court pierced pleadings to determine that joinder of nondiverse defendants was fraudulent), it does not follow that a finding made on summary judgment serves the same purpose. On summary judgment, a court may consider not only the pleadings, but also depositions, affidavits, and admissions. To determine whether a Jones Act claim was alleged in state court, on the other hand, we are limited to a review of the plaintiff's pleadings. Addison v. Gulf Coast Contracting Services, 744 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Preston v. Grant Advertising, Inc., 375 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1967)). We decline to treat the district court's finding that Lirette was not a seaman as the equivalent of a finding of fraudulent joinder.
The resolution of this dispute turns on the meaning of the declaration in Sec. 1445(a) that FELA claims cannot be removed. If this provision is construed merely to grant Jones Act plaintiffs a personal privilege to select the forum in which their claim may be brought, the mandate of Sec. 1445(a) that FELA claims not be removed should not be treated as a jurisdictional bar. On the other hand, if Sec. 1445(a) signifies a congressional intent to deny subject matter jurisdiction to district courts to entertain Jones Act and FELA claims originally brought in state court, such a denial of jurisdiction cannot be waived by plaintiff's failure to object. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18, 71 S. Ct. 534, 542, 95 L. Ed. 702 (1951).
Both defendants contend that improper removal under Sec. 1445(a) does not affect the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. Quarles argues that removal in contravention of Sec. 1445(a) is akin to a procedural defect, which may be waived by a plaintiff's failure to object to removal. See Mackay v. Uinta Development Co., 229 U.S. 173, 33 S. Ct. 638, 57 L. Ed. 1138 (1913). Sperry Sun asserts that Sec. 1445(a) merely confers a personal privilege on an FELA or Jones Act plaintiff to select a state forum and thus does not limit a district court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Carpenter v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 109 F.2d 375, 379-80 (6th Cir. 1940).3 Both defendants stress that when an action is improperly removed, the case is tried on the merits without objection, and the court enters a final judgment, "the issue in subsequent proceedings is not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court." Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 92 S. Ct. 1344, 31 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972).
Grubbs instructs us that a case improperly removed to federal court not be remanded to state court after the entry of judgment if the district court would have had jurisdiction had the case originally been brought in that court. However, Lirette relies on Gamble v. Central of Georgia Railway, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973), to support his argument that the provision of Sec. 1445(a) expressly prohibiting the removal of FELA actions divests a district court of subject matter jurisdiction over FELA and Jones Act claims filed initially in state court. In terms too plain to permit distinction, Gamble holds that federal courts are without jurisdiction over FELA suits filed in state court:
We are also cognizant of the fact that in reaching the jurisdictional issue, the Gamble panel did not consider or distinguish Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedents which hold that defects in removal may be waived in cases which could have been brought originally in federal court. In Grubbs, 405 U.S. 699, 92 S. Ct. 1344, 31 L. Ed. 2d 612, for example, New York plaintiffs sued a Texas defendant in Texas state court. The defendant interpleaded the United States as a party defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 2410 for the purpose of determining the priority of judgment liens. The United States removed the entire case to United States district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1444, authorizing removal by the United States of an action brought under Sec. 2410. The plaintiffs obtained a $20,000 judgment against the defendant. It was later determined on appeal that joinder of the United States was "spurious" and that Sec. 1444 removal was therefore not available. The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the validity of the removal procedure could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 700, 92 S. Ct. at 1346. The remaining parties were diverse and the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional minimum provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Since the case could have been brought originally in United States district court, the court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction. The parties were held to have waived any right to object to the improper removal procedure.
This court has also focused on the question of whether an improperly removed case could have been brought originally in federal court. See, e.g., Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1148 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1985) (removal based on diversity improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) because defendant was a citizen of the state in which action was brought); McKenzie v. United States, 678 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1982) (under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) a plaintiff may not remove to federal court, only a defendant may do so). We have consistently held that a procedural defect in removal does not defeat a district court's subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dukes v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 770 F.2d 545, 547-48 (5th Cir. 1985) (failure to file a copy of the removal petition with state court clerk).
The difficulty for this limited proposition is that here, there was no separate and independent claim. Rather, there is but a single wrongful invasion of a single primary right. The Jones Act claim for negligence, the unseaworthiness claim and the claim for vessel negligence do not constitute separate and independent claims or causes of action for purposes of Sec. 1441(c). See Pate, 193 F.2d at 500-02. Defendants nonetheless contend that a different rule should apply because the Jones Act employer and the vessel owner are not the same party. The fact that separate legal theories are alleged against different defendants is not a valid basis for distinction. If the plaintiff alleges and seeks relief for a single wrong we look only to see whether there was a "wrongful invasion of a single primary right." Addison, 744 F.2d at 500 (citing Finn, 341 U.S. at 13-14, 71 S. Ct. at 540).
The district court certified the decision under Sec. 1292(b) and granted Lirette an extension of time for filing a petition. Lirette then filed his petition more than ten days after the court's order. We held that the district court lacked authority to extend the ten-day filing period and that this court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant a discretionary appeal. However, because the district court had entered a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), which is appealable as a matter of right, we construed Lirette's petition as a notice of appeal
46 U.S.C. § 688 provides:
This Circuit is apparently alone in its view that the Sec. 1445(a) designation of nonremovable actions deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over a FELA or Jones Act claim instituted in state court. See 14A C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d, Sec. 3729, at 487-93 (1985). Professor Wright takes the position that the bar to removal in this context may be waived. Id. at 488-89 & n. 30 (citing Carpenter, 109 F.2d at 379-80). But see 2 M. Norris, The Law of Seamen, Sec. 30.26 (4th ed. 1985), which suggests that the Sec. 1445(a) limitation on removal is jurisdictional. Norris reads Sec. 1445(a) as an exception to the general removal provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed...."). See id. at 418-19