Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2014cv00050/832798/25
Timestamp: 2017-03-26 07:35:15
Document Index: 666099188

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 278', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404']

ORDER, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed; the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly; the judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court for Burrell v. Colvin :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
ORDER, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed; the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly; the judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court. Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 9/22/15. (REW)
Adrian Burrell,
No. CV-14-00050-PHX-JAT
Plaintiff Adrian Burrell appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s (the
“Commissioner”) denial of disability benefits. The Court now rules on her appeal. (Doc.
On February 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging a disability onset date of
January 23, 2010. (R. 239). The Commissioner denied benefits on June 17, 2010, (R.
150), and Plaintiff requested reconsideration, (R. 154). Plaintiff was again denied on
December 30, 2010, (R. 155), and she appealed.
On July 9, 2012, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Patricia A. Bucci held a
hearing on Plaintiff’s claim. (R. 50-79). At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her disability
onset date to March 1, 2010. (R. 54). Following the ALJ’s unfavorable decision, (R. 18-
38), Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council. After the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, (R. 1), Plaintiff filed an appeal with this Court. (Docs. 1,
18). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly develop the record, improperly
discounted the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, and improperly rejected
Plaintiff’s subjectively-reported symptoms. (Doc. 18 at 7, 11, 19).
The Court will briefly summarize the major points of Plaintiff’s medical history,
which is more thoroughly recounted in the administrative record. Plaintiff has been
diagnosed with headaches, hypertension, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
status post laminectomy of a cervical spine tumor, a history of seizure disorder, chronic
opiate dependence, incontinence, depression, and obesity. (R. 380, 394, 400, 429, 483).
In February 2009, Plaintiff suffered a seizure possibly related to a long-standing cervical
spine tumor. (R. 379). In March 2009, Plaintiff underwent surgery to remove the spine
tumor. (R. 369). Following surgery, Plaintiff did not experience any more seizures but
had paresthesias in her left arm and leg, and some decreased function in her left hand
with fine motor activity. (R. 363). Also in March 2009, Plaintiff underwent an MRI and
was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease at the L3-L4 through L5-S1 levels with
“left neural foraminal disc protrusion vs. small extrusion abutting the existing left L4
nerve root.” (R. 385).
show, among other things, that she is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The
Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is:
under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to
do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national
evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157
F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the sequential
process will end the inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden
of proof at the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the final step.
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The five steps are as follows:
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be considered severe, the impairment must “significantly
limit[] [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §
before proceeding to the next step, the ALJ will make a finding regarding the claimant's
case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). A claimant's “residual functional capacity” is the
most she can still do despite all her impairments, including those that are not severe, and
any related symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
with the physical and mental demands of [the claimant's] past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform the kind of work she previously did, the
404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant's
“residual functional capacity” and her “age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can perform other work, she is not disabled. If the
claimant cannot perform other work, she will be found disabled. As previously noted, the
Commissioner has the burden of proving that the claimant can perform other work.
consider all evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §
party reporting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 06-3p.
The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process using Plaintiff’s
amended alleged onset date of March 1, 2010. (R. 24). The ALJ found in step one of the
sequential evaluation process that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since her amended alleged onset date. (R. 24). The ALJ then found Plaintiff to have the
following severe impairments: headaches, hypertension, status post laminectomy at C3-
C4 of the cervical spine with resection of a benign tumor, history of seizure disorder,
history of incontinence, and obesity. (R. 24). Under step three, the ALJ noted that none of
these impairments met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments that would
result in a finding of disability. (R. 27). The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) was the ability to “perform range [sic] of light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant can never climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds. She must avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous
machinery with moving mechanical parts.” (R. 27). Under step four, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past work as a receptionist, file clerk, and
manicurist. (R. 32). The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 33).
may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal
error. Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla
but less than a preponderance. Substantial evidence is
relevant evidence, which considering the record as a whole, a
reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Where the evidence is susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s
decision, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld.
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). This is because “[t]he trier of fact and not the reviewing court must
resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d
1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). Under this standard, the Court will uphold the ALJ’s findings
if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record. Batson v. Comm’r of the
Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the Court must consider
the entire record as a whole and cannot affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of
supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to adequately develop the record
because the ALJ did not permit Plaintiff to obtain testimony from nonexamining
physician Dr. Ostrowski. (Doc. 18 at 8-9). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s refusal to
present Dr. Ostrowski for testimony at the hearing prevented Plaintiff from discovering
whether he has had his medical license suspended (which would disqualify him from
being an acceptable medical source) or the nature and scope of his training in assessing
work ability. (Id. at 10).
“In Social Security cases, the ALJ has a special duty to develop the record fully
and fairly and to ensure that the claimant's interests are considered, even when the
claimant is represented by counsel.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir.
2001). “An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is
ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of
the evidence.” Id. at 459-60.
Plaintiff has not identified any ambiguity or inadequacy in the evidence sufficient
to justify her request to call Dr. Ostrowski as a witness. Plaintiff asserts in her reply brief
that because Dr. Ostrowski relied upon Dr. Prieve to formulate his opinion, and Dr.
Prieve is not an acceptable medical source, it was relevant to the reliability of Dr.
Ostrowki’s opinion for Plaintiff to call Dr. Ostrowski as a witness. (Doc. 23 at 3-4).
Calling a witness to testify at a hearing is always relevant to the weight to be given to that
witness’s opinion. But relevance is not the test for whether an ALJ should have further
developed the record. Plaintiff does not explain how the record is inadequate or
ambiguous; rather, Plaintiff’s complaint seems to be that because Dr. Ostrowski’s
opinion is not entitled to significant weight, the ALJ erred in relying upon it to reject the
opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. This argument is one that Plaintiff
appropriately makes elsewhere in the briefing, and the Court is well-equipped on the
present administrative record to address it. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in failing to
The Opinions of Treating Physicians
arise between a treating physician’s medical opinion and other evidence in the claimant's
record. A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight when it is “well-
supported by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. On the other hand, if a treating
evidence in the record,” then it should not be given controlling weight. Orn, 495 F.3d at
Substantial evidence that contradicts a treating physician’s opinion may be either
(1) an examining physician’s opinion or (2) a nonexamining physician’s opinion
combined with other evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995).
Cir. 1984); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Discounting of a Treating Physician’s Opinion
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; SSR 96-2p at 4. These factors include (1) the
length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and
extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which the opinion is supported by
relevant medical evidence; (4) the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole; and
(5) whether the physician is a specialist giving an opinion within his specialty. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c).
convincing” reasons. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). If a
treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another physician’s opinion, then the ALJ
may reject the treating physician’s opinion if there are “specific and legitimate reasons
that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at
Opinions on Disability
necessarily lead to a finding of disability. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 753
(9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a treating physician’s opinion of disability).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of her treating physicians,
Dr. Riley and Dr. Saperstein. (Doc. 18 at 13-19).
Dr. Riley was Plaintiff’s treating physician who opined on March 31, 2012 that
Plaintiff could not work full-time on a consistent basis. (R. 494). Dr. Riley opined that in
an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff could sit for less than two hours, stand/walk for less than
two hours, carry less than ten pounds, and lift less than ten pounds. (R. 494). Dr. Riley
noted that Plaintiff takes narcotics for pain on an almost daily basis and listed the
symptoms limiting Plaintiff’s ability to work as pain based on frequent migraines,
numbness, “ischemic attacks vs. stroke,” and a spinal cord tumor. (R. 495). Dr. Riley
opined that these symptoms severely limited Plaintiff’s ability to work. (R. 495).
The ALJ discounted Dr. Riley’s opinion and gave it neither controlling weight nor
deference. (R. 31-32). The ALJ was therefore required to find Dr. Riley’s opinion not
only inconsistent with other evidence in the record, but also to provide specific and
legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ concluded
that Dr. Riley’s opinion was inconsistent with Dr. Riley’s own treatment notes (including
referrals to other specialists) as well as the other objective evidence of record. (R. 31-32).
The ALJ cited the treatment records of Plaintiff’s urologist, who found no
significant problems other than nocturnal enuresis and mild stress urinary incontinence.
(R. 399, 401). On a physical examination, Plaintiff had normal exam of her spine and
heart. (R. 400-01). The ALJ also cited the records of Plaintiff’s cardiologist, who also
saw Plaintiff on referral from Dr. Riley. (R. 32). These records show that after Plaintiff
suffered a transient ischemic attack, she had unremarkable cardiac testing, preserved
ejection fraction, and no evidence of significant physical abnormalities. (R. 407, 410).
Neurological findings of Plaintiff’s cranial nerves were normal. (R. 407). Plaintiff was
advised to undergo further testing if her shortness of breath persisted or worsened, (R.
408), but there is no evidence in the record that she did so. Dr. Saperstein, Plaintiff’s
neurologist, noted in 2011 that Plaintiff’s symptoms were improving, with only one
episode of bedwetting from September 2010 through January 2011. (R. 492). Although
Plaintiff still had some weakness on the left side of her body, Dr. Saperstein noted that
Plaintiff’s psychologist had inquired about the possibility of Plaintiff driving again
because it had been more than three months since she had a seizure (apparently the
minimum time period under Arizona law). (R. 491). Dr. Saperstein reduced Plaintiff’s
medication level. (R. 491). Dr. Saperstein previously identified Plaintiff’s left-side
weakness as “stable.” (R. 444). The ALJ also cited Dr. Riley’s notes indicating normal
neurological findings. (R. 424, 484). Dr. Riley recommended massage therapy to manage
Plaintiff’s left-side spasms. (R. 484).
The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Riley’s
opinion. The ALJ specifically pointed out evidence in the treatment notes of Dr. Riley, as
well as in the notes of specialists to which Dr. Riley had referred Plaintiff, that does not
support Dr. Riley’s restrictive functional capacity assessment. See (R. 495).
Dr. Saperstein, Plaintiff’s treating neurologist, opined in March 2012 that Plaintiff
is “completely disabled,” remarking that Plaintiff “experiences seizures,” is “unsteady,”
and has numbness and weakness on her left side. (R. 490). Dr. Saperstein completed three
functional capacity assessments of Plaintiff, one in September 2010 and two in March
2010. In the first assessment, Dr. Saperstein did not complete the form and did not
indicate whether Plaintiff was capable of full-time work. (R. 318). Nevertheless, Dr.
Saperstein opined that in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff was capable of sitting less than
two hours, standing/walking less than two hours, lifting less than ten pounds, and
carrying less than ten pounds. (R. 318). He opined that Plaintiff suffered medication-
related side effects that were moderately severe and symptoms of pain, dizziness,
weakness, and “incoordination” that further limited Plaintiff’s ability to work. (R. 319).
In the first of Dr. Saperstein’s two additional capacity assessments, Dr. Saperstein
opined that Plaintiff suffered from seizures, weakness, imbalance, and pain but did not
complete the portion of the form that asked for the frequency of headaches or seizures.
(R. 496). Dr. Saperstein reported Plaintiff experiencing weakness, pain, and imbalance
“every day” lasting three hours of more, and assessed a severe restriction on Plaintiff’s
capabilities. (R. 496). In the second assessment, which was completed on the same date,
Dr. Saperstein opined that Plaintiff could not perform full-time work based on
“weakness, imbalance, pain.” (R. 497). Dr. Saperstein listed Plaintiff’s medication-
related impairments as “moderately severe” but did not complete the portion of the form
asking for the identity of the medication. (R. 497). Dr. Saperstein did not complete the
portion of the form asking if any symptoms other than those listed above further impaired
Plaintiff’s ability to work, but he nonetheless completed the second subpart to that
question, which asked to rate the extent the additional symptoms further limited work
ability. (R. 498). He answered that with “severe.” (R. 498).
The ALJ discounted Dr. Saperstein’s opinion because it was inconsistent with both
his own treatment notes as well as the treatment notes of other treating physicians. (R.
31). The ALJ specifically cited treatment notes “showing normal gait, intact sensation,
normal muscle mass and tone, good blood pressure levels with preserved ejection
fraction, no seizure activity since February 2009, a positive response to analgesic
medication, and ‘mild’ urinary incontinence.” (R. 31). The Court has already addressed
some of these treatment notes in its discussion of Dr. Riley, supra, and will not repeat
those even though they are equally applicable to Dr. Saperstein. The most significant of
the treatment notes cited by the ALJ is the fact that the record shows Plaintiff had a single
seizure in February 2009 and no seizures since that date. (R. 442). This contradicts Dr.
Saperstein’s assessment that Plaintiff suffered from seizures, (R. 496), and his opinion to
the Commissioner that Plaintiff “experiences seizures,” (R. 490). This impairs Dr.
Saperstein’s credibility to the extent that his credibility was not already impaired by his
incomplete and contradictory answers on his functional assessments.
The ALJ also correctly pointed out that Dr. Saperstein’s treatment notes contradict
his functional assessment. Dr. Saperstein noted “non-organic” features to his
examinations of Plaintiff, indicating a psychological component affecting the results of
the examination. (R. 442, 446). On one occasion, Dr. Saperstein noted that the “jerkiness
and giveaway on testing is not an organic feature.” (R. 446). He noted a “very bizarre
gait” that was “narrow based and has a sort of ‘prancing’ character,” yet Plaintiff was
unsteady standing with her feet together and her eyes open, gyrating and having astasia-
abasia. (R. 446). Dr. Saperstein characterized Plaintiff’s motor control issues as odd and
contradictory. (R. 446). Dr. Saperstein also noted with respect to Plaintiff’s single seizure
that it was “suspicious for a nonorganic process” for Plaintiff to have been in a highly-
functional state for two weeks but not remember anything afterward. (R. 446). Dr.
Saperstein noted that Plaintiff did not appear to have any peripheral nervous system
lesion. (R. 446). On a later occasion, Dr. Saperstein concluded that most of Plaintiff’s
problems were related to depression and side effects from medications. (R. 442). Dr.
Saperstein also evaluated Plaintiff’s gait as “unremarkable” on another occasion. (R.
Thus, because the ALJ gave specific and legitimate citations to the portions of the
record contradicting Dr. Saperstein’s functional capacity assessment, the ALJ did not err
in rejecting Dr. Saperstein’s opinion.
Dr. Oskowski
After the ALJ determined that the opinions of Dr. Riley and Dr. Saperstein were
not given significant weight, the ALJ ascribed significant weight to the opinion of Dr.
Oskowski, a nonexamining physician. (R. 32). Plaintiff argues that Dr. Oskowski’s
opinion is not entitled to significant weight. (Doc. 18 at 13). Her first argument is that Dr.
Oskowski relied upon the medical opinion of Dr. Prieve, a source that the ALJ properly
found to be not an acceptable medical source and thus entitled to no weight. (Id.); (R. 32).
Although Dr. Prieve was not an acceptable medical source, this fact does not
undermine the reliability of the balance of Dr. Oskowski’s opinion. Dr. Oskowski
reviewed Plaintiff’s entire medical file, including the records of her treating physicians.
(R. 139-42). Dr. Oskowski concluded from the record that Plaintiff could lift and carry
fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently, standing and walking for
six hours in an eight-hour workday. (R. 145). The ALJ found Dr. Oskowski’s opinion to
be consistent with Plaintiff’s “remote history of one seizure episode and treatment notes
showing intact sensation, normal muscle mass and tone, good blood pressure levels, a
positive response to analgesic medication, ‘mild’ urinary incontinence, and astasia-abasia
gait behaviors.” (R. 32).
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Oskowski’s opinion is not credible as a matter of law
because it found “no substantial change in circumstance” since the Plaintiff’s previous
RFC. (Doc. 18 at 13); (R. 146). Plaintiff filed a prior application for disability benefits,
and in the present case the ALJ noted in her decision that Plaintiff had shown “changed
circumstances” since the first application. (R. 21). But it does not follow that Dr.
Oskowski’s opinion conflicted with the ALJ. Dr. Oskowski made his comment in the
RFC section of his findings; therefore, a rational interpretation of his comment is that he
found no changed circumstances with respect to Plaintiff’s functional capacity, not that
he found no changed circumstances in the record evidence as a whole. This is an entirely
proper interpretation, and “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s decision must be
upheld.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding Dr. Oskowski’s opinion to be entitled
to significant weight.
Plaintiff’s Reported Symptoms
An ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to determine
whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or
symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035–36.
First, as a threshold matter, “the ALJ must determine whether
the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected
to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Id. at 1036
(quoting Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 344). The claimant is not
required to show objective medical evidence of the pain itself
or of a causal relationship between the impairment and the
symptom. Smolen, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).
Instead, the claimant must only show that an objectively
verifiable impairment “could reasonably be expected” to
produce the claimed pain. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036
(quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282); see also SSR 96–7p at 2;
Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1160–61 (“reasonable inference, not a
medically proven phenomenon”). If the claimant fails this
threshold test, then the ALJ may reject the claimant’s
subjective complaints. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281 (citing
Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986) (reaffirmed
in Bunnell, 947 F.2d 341))
Second, if the claimant meets the first test, then “the
ALJ ‘may not discredit a claimant’s testimony of pain and
deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain
alleged by the claimant is not supported by objective medical
evidence.’” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749–750 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346–47). Rather, “unless
an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative
evidence thereof,” the ALJ may only find the claimant not
credible by making specific findings supported by the record
that provide clear and convincing reasons to explain his
credibility evaluation. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883 (citing
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283–84 (“Once a claimant meets [step
one] and there is no affirmative evidence suggesting she is
malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony
regarding the severity of her symptoms only if he makes
specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for
doing so.”)); see also, e.g., Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (if
the ALJ has found no evidence of malingering, then the ALJ
may reject the claimant’s testimony “only by offering
specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so”).
Trembulak v. Colvin, No. CV-12-02420-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 523007, at *8–9 (D. Ariz.
Feb. 10, 2014).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to point to specific findings showing clear
and convincing reasons to discredit Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Doc. 18 at 23-24).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms she reported, but found Plaintiff’s
testimony regarding the extent of her symptoms to be not credible. (R. 30).
Plaintiff noted in her description of her daily activities that she bathes in the
evenings, sometimes needs assistance getting dressed if she is going out, watches TV,
sometimes picks up her room and makes her bed, sometimes does her own laundry,
prepares her own meals, helps with general cleaning, makes phone calls, and leaves the
house two to three times per week. (R. 450). She does not drive or shop at stores, but
takes care of three dogs and a cat and does light yard work. (R. 450). The ALJ noted that
these activities conflict with her testimony at the hearing, where Plaintiff testified that she
showered only every five to seven days and lived in her pajamas. (R. 64). The ALJ also
noted that this testimony was inconsistent with Dr. Rabara’s observations that Plaintiff
was well-groomed, had neatly applied makeup, and had clean hands with manicured and
painted fingernails. (R. 25, 450).
With respect to Plaintiff’s complaints of headache pain, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff’s treatment history is limited. The records show Plaintiff was advised to get
massage therapy for a muscle tension headache, (R. 484), and reported relief with
analgesic medication, (R. 483). With respect to Plaintiff’s allegations of left-sided
weakness and numbness, the ALJ pointed out that these allegations are not supported by
objective medical evidence, with Dr. Saperstein concluding that Plaintiff’s gait
disturbance was of psychological origin. (R. 442, 446). The ALJ also cited treatment
records showing an unremarkable gait, normal muscle mass, and stable left-sided
paresthesias. (R. 29, 400, 416-17, 444). Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s recent
treatment records show intact sensation and normal neurological findings. (R. 29, 500).
The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling back pain, concluding
that these complaints were contradicted by her conservative treatments of medication, (R.
500), and by the normal muscle mass and tone of her spine, (R. 400). Furthermore, the
ALJ found Plaintiff’s complaints of incontinence to not be as severe as alleged because
she needed protective undergarments only during the night. (R. 30, 58). Finally, although
Plaintiff alleged having memory issues and side effects from medication, (R. 344), an
examining clinical psychologist found Plaintiff to be “bright and articulate with high
average intellect and memory” and with “no evidence for any cognitive deficits.” (R.
453). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not credible as to her limitations. (R. 31).
With respect to each of the areas for which the ALJ found Plaintiff’s self-reported
symptoms to be not credible, the ALJ made specific findings with citations to the record
that provided clear and convincing reasons explaining the ALJ’s credibility
determination. The ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff to be not credible in the severity of
her symptoms based on Plaintiff’s own description of her daily activities and limitations.1
The ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff to be not disabled.
In reviewing the record and the ALJ’s decision, the Court observed that the ALJ
misstated the record when she remarked that there was no evidence that Plaintiff’s
headaches have worsened since last working. (R. 28). Plaintiff testified at the hearing that
her headaches have worsened, although it is unclear from the transcript as to whether this
is since the headaches first began in puberty or since Plaintiff was working. (R. 57). Even
if the ALJ erred on this point, this error “does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s
ultimate [credibility] conclusion” and therefore is harmless error not warranting reversal.
Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162.