Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/490/569/1905317/
Timestamp: 2019-12-10 09:32:57
Document Index: 74880186

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 3260', '§ 3279', '§ 23', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 2284', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973']

State of Miss. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979) :: Justia
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State of Miss. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979)
US District Court for the District of Columbia - 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979)
490 F. Supp. 569 (1979)
*570 Jerris Leonard, Washington, D. C., for State of Mississippi, plaintiff.
Jeremy I. Schwartz, Civ. Rights Div., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for United States of America and Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States, individually and in his official capacity, defendants.
Frank R. Parker, Jackson, Miss., Richard S. Kohn, Washington, D. C., for Aaron E. Henry, Henry J. Kirksey, Mrs. Mary High-tower, Johnnie E. Walls, Jr., Charles Victor McTeer, Fred L. Banks, Jr., David Jordan, James G. Winfield, Bennie G. Thompson and Barney Schoby, defendants-intervenors.
*571 Before WILKEY, Circuit Judge, and PRATT and GREENE, District Judges.
1. In 1965, private plaintiffs filed a complaint entitled Connor v. Johnson in the Southern District of Mississippi (hereinafter referred to as "the Connor Court") challenging the constitutionality of Mississippi's 1962 legislative reapportionment plan for the Mississippi Legislature. The 1962 plan, as well as successive legislative attempts to redistrict Mississippi's legislature for the 1967 and 1971 elections, were held unconstitutional by the District Court. Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.Miss.), supplemented in 330 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.Miss. 1971); Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.Miss.1967); Connor v. Johnson, 256 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.Miss.1966). Consequently, court-ordered plans were implemented for the 1967 and 1971 elections.
2. In April, 1975, the Mississippi Legislature again attempted a reapportionment plan. The 1975 plan, although approved by the District Court, was declared ineffective by the Supreme Court until precleared pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656, 95 S. Ct. 2003, 44 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1975). The Court's decision was without prejudice to a ruling by the Connor Court ordering the 1975 plan into effect if no other plan was formulated in time for the 1975 elections. Id. at 656-57, 95 S. Ct. at 2003.
5. On November 18, 1976, the Connor Court formulated an apportionment plan to take effect for the 1979 quadrennial election. Connor v. Finch, 419 F. Supp. 1072, 1089 (S.D.Miss.), supplemented in 422 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.Miss.1976) (hereinafter referred to as the "1976 court-ordered plan").
6. On May 31, 1977, the Supreme Court held that the 1976 court-ordered plan was unconstitutional on malapportionment grounds and returned the matter to the District Court with instructions to draft a new plan for the 1979 elections. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 97 S. Ct. 1828, 52 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1977). The Court cautioned the District Court on remand to draw legislative districts that were reasonably contiguous and compact or to explain precisely why, in a particular instance, that goal could not be accomplished. Id. at 425-26, 97 S. Ct. at 1839-1840.
7. On August 2, 1977, the Connor Court directed the parties and invited the Mississippi *572 Legislature to file proposed plans for its consideration.
15. The Joint Committee developed a computer data base for the plan derived from 1970 census data acquired from the Bureau of the Census. The Joint Committee chose 1970 census data because it provided neutral data considered to be as accurate *573 as possible, available for the entire state, collected by similar methodology throughout the state, available for geographic areas within counties as well as for whole counties in the state, and easily replicated and verified for any given district or area.
24. In June, 1978, the District Court in Connor directed the parties to confer for the purposes of arriving at a settlement of the Connor v. Finch litigation pending in the Southern District of Mississippi. The Joint Committee participated in these negotiations. In response to the objections to the statutory plan by the Connor plaintiffs, the boundaries of a number of districts in the plan were altered by the staff of the Joint Committee and a settlement proposal was submitted to the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee then informally polled the members of the Mississippi Legislature (the Legislature not being in session) to determine whether this settlement proposal was acceptable. In August, 1978, a majority of both houses of the Mississippi Legislature by a vote of 80 to 13 in the House and 26 to 7 in the Senate voted in favor of accepting the Connor settlement plan as an *574 alternative to the statutory plan. After this poll, the Joint Committee accepted the settlement plan and recommended to the defendants in Connor that they enter into a consent decree incorporating this settlement proposal.
25. On June 1, 1978, the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, submitted the statutory plan to the Attorney General of the United States for federal preclearance pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. By letter of July 31, 1978, the Attorney General, by his designated agent Drew S. Days, III, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, rendered a timely objection pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act stating that "we have been unable to conclude that the submitted plans for the Mississippi Senate and House of Representatives do not have the purpose or effect of abridging the right to vote because of race or color." Letter from Drew S. Days, III, to Mississippi Attorney General A. F. Summer, July 31, 1978.
28. On March 26, 1979, the Supreme Court, upon a motion to seek a writ of mandamus, instructed the Connor court to issue a reapportionment plan forthwith, in accordance with its previous mandate in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 97 S. Ct. 1828, 52 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1977).
29. On April 13, 1979, the Southern District of Mississippi issued a final judgment in Connor v. Finch and adopted a slightly modified version of the settlement plan previously submitted to the court by the parties. It is undisputed that the resulting court-ordered plan is not substantially different from the settlement plan from which it was drawn.[1]
30. Pursuant to its Constitution, Mississippi has maintained a bicameral legislature made up of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Members of each branch are elected guadrennially. The Constitution of Mississippi requires that the Senate consist of no less than 45 but no more than 55 *575 members. Similarly, the Mississippi Constitution requires that the House consist of no more than 122 members. The Senate currently consists of 52 members and the House consists of 122.
31. Any registered voter in Mississippi can have his or her name placed upon the ballot as an independent candidate in the general election for the Mississippi Legislature by presenting a petition to the appropriate body designated in the statute signed by 50 registered voters 60 days before the quadrennial general election. Miss.Code Ann. § 3260 (1942). To be elected, a candidate thus nominated needs only a plurality in a general election, Miss.Code Ann. § 3279 (1942 & Supp.1978) as amended by H.B. 44 (Chapter 429, Mississippi Laws 1978). A candidate for party nomination, on the other hand, must win a majority of the votes cast in order to win the nomination of his party. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-3-69 (1972).
33. Mississippi has in the past used such devices as the literacy test, the poll tax and the white primary to exclude its black citizens from participation in the electoral process. Indeed, until passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, use of racially discriminatory tests and devices effectively excluded black people in Mississippi from exercise of the franchise. Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206 (N.D.Miss.1975) (three-judge court) (per curiam); United States v. State of Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 983, 987 (S.D.Miss.1964), rev'd and remanded, 380 U.S. 128, 85 S. Ct. 808, 13 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1965).
37. Recent legislative reapportionments in Mississippi have failed to meet constitutional requirements and have been marked by the racially discriminatory use of multi-member districts. Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 92 S. Ct. 656, 30 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1972); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 91 S. Ct. 1760, 29 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1971). Such uses of multi-member districts have, in the past, tended to submerge black population concentrations in heavily white concentrations.
*576 41. The maximum deviation of S.B. 3098 is 11.39 percent. The maximum deviation of H.B. 1491 is 10.8 percent. These are consistent with the broader tolerances allowed legislatures, but not courts, in fashioning apportionment plans.[2]
1975        H.B.       1975       S.B.
Plan        1491       Plan       3098
(No. of     (No. of    (No. of    (No. of
Dists       Dists      Dists      Dists
% Range     House)     House)     Senate)    Senate)
40-100%      40          38         14         16
45-100%      30          30         12         14
50-100%      22          26          8         10
55-100%      11          20          1          7
60-100%       4          14          0          2
65-100%       3           7          0          0
70-100%       3           3          0          0
75-100%       2           0          0          0
80-100%       1           0          0          0
86-100%       0           0          0          0
Connor           State's
Settlement       Statutory
Plan          Plan (Exs.
(Ex. P-35)       P-4A, 4B)
Districts             49               46
Districts             39               36
Districts             34               30
65% +                 18               15
60%-65%                5                6
55%-60%                5                5
50%-55%                6                4
Districts             28               26
65% +                 9                7
60%-65%                   6               7
55%-60%                   7               6
50%-55%                   6               6
Districts                15              16
65% +                     3               4
60%-65%                   4               3
55%-60%                   5               5
50%-55%                   3               4
Districts                11              10
65% +                     1               0
60%-65%                   0               2
55%-60%                   6               5
50%-55%                   4               3
47. Defendant and defendant-intervenors object, in particular, to the redistricting in the statutory plan of the following counties:[3]
*578 (b) Hinds County
Defendants and intervenors object to the statutory plan's redistricting of Adams County because the only majority black supervisor's district is split between two districts. The black voting strength in north Adams is allegedly diluted by excluding the majority black airport precinct from the north Adams district and by pairing north Adams and north Natchez with heavily white precincts. In the settlement plan, the two legislative districts that bisect Adams County leave the only black supervisor's district intact and entirely within the same legislative district, i. e., district 95.
In a memorandum to the Legislative Committee on Reapportionment written by an associate of defendant-intervenors' counsel on behalf of Representative Buckley (hereinafter referred to as the "Barber Memorandum"),[4] Buckley requested a slight shift in the configuration of district 95. In response to Buckley's request, the Committee increased the black VAP in that district, but did not realize that intervenors would not be satisfied unless the Morgantown precinct were eliminated. The resulting increase of five percent in the black VAP of Adams County by excluding the Morgantown precinct, however, would be at the expense of diluting neighboring districts.
*579 (e) Marshall County
Defendants and intervenors contend that the statutory plan splits the heavy black *580 concentration in north Greenville and north Washington County between two long, narrow districts, which stretch south for more than 60 miles. The resulting district 22 is majority white, and district 23, although majority black, is alleged to be so diluted that black voters are denied representation of their choice. The settlement plan creates a district that preserves much of the black population in urban Greenville intact within one district. Defendants and intervenors argue that although the settlement plan's district is only about 2 percentage points greater in black majority VAP, it provides black voters with a much better opportunity to elect a candidate because it comprises an urban area where blacks are generally better organized and more politically aware. Intervenor's expert testified that any district drawn in this area would look suspicious because of the small population in the rural areas. The drafters of the statutory plans attempted to draw a more compact plan than the predecessor 1975 plan. The resulting change increases the black VAP in one district by 1.42 percent. We find that the changes in the settlement plan are not significantly different from those created by the statutory plan or ameliorative of the problem of formulating compact districts in the area.
49. The evidence demonstrates that differences in black voting strength provided in the statutory plan and in the Connor settlement plan are insubstantial. The statutory plan covering both the Senate and the House contains three (3) less black majority voting districts.[5] Since there are 174 districts in the Mississippi Legislature this is an overall difference of 1.7 percent (1.7%). For the Senate, the statutory plan contains one (1) more black majority district than the Connor settlement plan. More important, both plans provide the same number (16) of black, VAP majority districts with a population of 60 percent or more (see Finding 36 for the significance of this fact and Table in Finding 46 for critical figures). When compared to the settlement plan adopted by the Connor Court on April 13, 1979, the legislative plan is not retrogressive in overall black voting strength and does not have the effect of abridging or denying the right to vote of any citizen of Mississippi on account of race.
1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1974 & Supp. V 1975).
2. This Court has been properly convened as a court of three judges. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c *581 (1974 & Supp. V 1975) (hereinafter "section 5"); 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976).
3. All the requirements for a Rules 23(a) and 23(b) (2) defendant class action on behalf of the intervenors are met. The defendant class is defined as all black citizens and black registered voters in Mississippi qualified to vote in state legislative elections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) & 23(b) (2).
4. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1974), was enacted to insure the protection of rights guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment and "to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315, 86 S. Ct. 803, 812, 15 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1966).
5. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was intended to insure that the gains thus far achieved in minority political participation would not be emasculated or destroyed through new discriminatory procedures and techniques. S.Rep. No. 94-295, at 19, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p. 774.
7. Under section 5, Mississippi may not enforce or implement any change in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting" unless such change has either been approved by the Attorney General, or unless Mississippi obtains a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that such change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1974 & Supp. V 1975).
8. The reapportionment plan adopted by the Mississippi Legislature in 1978 regular session, approved by the Governor on April 12, 1978, and the changes resulting therefrom are within the scope of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1974 & Supp. V 1975); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526,, 531-35, 93 S. Ct. 1702, 1706-1708, 36 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1973); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 138, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1362, 47 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1976).
9. In an action for declaratory judgment under section 5, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538, 93 S. Ct. 1702, 1709, 36 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328, 86 S. Ct. 803, 818, 15 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1966).
10. Plaintiff's burden in a suit for declaratory relief under section 5 is to demonstrate that the reapportionment plan described in S.B. 3098 and H.B. 1491 do not lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities, or that the proposed change fairly reflects the strength of black voting power as it exists. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 139 n. 11, 141, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1363, 47 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1976); Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 362, 95 S. Ct. 2296, 2299, 45 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1975).
11. Mississippi, in meeting its burden of proof, must demonstrate that a racially discriminatory purpose was not among the factors that motivated it in devising its reapportionment plan. Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 362, 95 S. Ct. 2296, 2299, 45 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1975).
12. A discriminatory purpose need not be express, but may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976).
13. Black voting strength is impermissibly diluted when, designedly or otherwise, an apportionment scheme under the circumstances of a particular case would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial elements of the voting population. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 1294, 16 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439, 85 S. Ct. 498, 501, 13 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1965).
14. In a single-member districting plan, black voting strength may be unconstitutionally and impermissibly diluted, minimized, and cancelled out (1) when heavy black population concentrations are *582 unnecessarily fragmented and dispersed, and (2) when black population concentrations to deny black voters the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 421-25, 97 S. Ct. 1828, 1837-1839, 52 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1977); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Mississippi, 554 F.2d 139, 149 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98 S. Ct. 512, 54 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1977); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, Anderson County, Texas, 505 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore v. Leflore County Board of Election Commissioners, 502 F.2d 621, 622-24 (5th Cir. 1974); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96, 109 (M.D.Ala.1965) (three-judge court).
15. No state or political subdivision is required to search for ways to maximize the number of black voting age population districts. Likewise, no racial group has a constitutional or statutory right to an apportionment structure designed to maximize its political strength. Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-72, 95 S. Ct. 2296, 2303-2304, 45 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1975); Gilbert v. Sterrett, 509 F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir. 1975); Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago, 503 F.2d 912, 920 (7th Cir. 1974); Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1973); Howard v. Adams County Board of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1972).
16. A legislative reapportionment plan that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise cannot have "the effect" of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of section 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates as to violate the Constitution. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1363, 47 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1976).
17. Although reapportionment plans, which are formulated with less concern for statistical accuracy and the one-person-one-vote concept, may provide a greater number of black majority districts, departure from equal protection one-person-one-vote strictures cannot be required or justified simply as an affirmative act to maximize black voting strength. See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2751, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328-30, 93 S. Ct. 979, 986-987, 35 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1973); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790-93, 93 S. Ct. 2348, 2352-2353, 37 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1973.)
18. Beer commands comparison with a preexisting plan to determine "whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change affecting voting . . ." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1363, 47 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1976).
19. The settlement plan, adopted by the Connor Court on April 13, 1979, must now be considered the preexisting plan and the benchmark with which to compare the statutory plan.[6]
20. When compared with the Connor Settlement Plan, and taking into account the totality of criteria governing the formulation of the statutory plan and its alternatives, we conclude that the slight differences are not of such significance to find that the statutory plan is retrogressive with respect to black voting strength in Mississippi as it exists today. The proof in this case demonstrates that H.B. 1491 and S.B. 3098 would not lead to a retrogression in the current position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise and therefore do not have the "effect of denying or abridging *583 the right to vote on account of race or color." This conclusion to disregard insignificant differences is further supported by the fact that legislative reapportionment is the preferred vehicle for reapportionment, as is reflected by the broader tolerances which are allowed to legislatures, but not to courts, in the matter of deviations from uniform population requirements. As the Supreme Court recently stated, "The Court has repeatedly held that redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal Courts should make every effort not to pre-empt." Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539, 98 S. Ct. 2493, 2497, 57 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1978).
21. Legislative reapportionment plans must be scrutinized to determine if they were enacted with the prohibited "purpose" of denying or abridging black voting strength. The prohibited "purpose" of section 5 may be described as the sort of invidious discriminatory purpose that would support a challenge to official action as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. A law neutral on its face and serving legitimate state ends cannot be held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause without proof of discriminatory purpose. Accordingly, in examining the statutory plan, proof of discriminatory racial purpose is necessary for a finding of the "purpose" proscribed in section 5. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2047-2051, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976).
22. Mississippi's evidence demonstrates that the principal actors in the development of S.B. 3098 and H.B. 1491 acted with a benign purpose.[7] Defendants concede they have no evidence to the contrary and are unable to name anyone they contend acted with improper purpose. Defendant-intervenors, likewise, have failed to introduce such evidence.
23. Defendants and defendant-intervenors have suggested that incumbency concerns in the fashioning of the legislature's plans resulted in an impermissibly racially-discriminatory purpose. It is not improper, however, for a legislative body to consider incumbency in fashioning a reapportionment plan, nor does it demonstrate invidiousness, especially here where the evidence shows incumbency concerns were not permitted to encroach upon configurations designed to recognize and protect black voting strength. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797, 93 S. Ct. 2348, 2355, 37 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n. 16, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 1295, 16 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1966).
26. Since the statutory plan is upheld, it shall supersede the Connor Court plan of April 13, 1979. Per curiam opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Connor v. Coleman, 440 U.S. 612, 99 S. Ct. 1523, 59 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1979).
[1] The court-ordered plan of April 13, 1979, while not in existence at the time this Court heard this case, is a matter of judicial notice. Throughout these Findings of Fact and Conclusions, it is treated as substantially identical to the settlement plan and has been so conceded by all parties. Defendant United States' letter to the Court of April 17, 1979 ("Substantially the same as the settlement plan"); Defendant-intervenors supplemental memorandum of April 27, 1979 ("The court-ordered plan of April 13, 1979 orders the settlement plan into effect `with three minor changes' which do not affect `any of the majority black districts in the settlement plan.'").
[2] Comparison of total deviations from population equality of the statutory plan with the settlement plan.
Senate      House
State's Statutory Plan     11.39%     10.08%
Connor Settlement Plan     11.39%      9.94%
[3] We note that several of the defendant-intervenors find themselves in districts more heavily black under the Connor Settlement Plan than under the statutory plans. This fact, in addition to defendant-intervenors' preference for reapportionment by Court decree rather than reapportionment by the legislature, may largely provide the explanation for their intervention in this litigation. (See testimony of Aaron Henry, Tr. pp. 801-02).
SENATE               HOUSE
NAME                   COUNTY        POP.       VAP       POP.        VAP
Aaron Henry            Coahoma       Same      Same       Same       Same
Henry Kirksey          Hinds         65.44     62.93      Same       Same
Bennie Thompson        Hinds         42.01     35.41      46.30      39.21
Barney Schoby          Adams         Same      Same       63.23      60.63
David Jordan           Leflore       Same      Same       42.89      37.72
Fred Banks             Hinds         65.44     62.93      Same       Same
Henry Kirksey          Hinds         72.33                Same       Same
Bennie Thompson        Hinds         49.71                66.79      59.02
Barney Schoby          Adams         Same      Same       69.40      66.45
David Jordan           Leflore       Same      Same       75.77      71.72
Fred Banks             Hinds         72.33                Same       Same
[4] The vast majority of the suggestions contained in the Barber Memorandum was incorporated in the statutory plan. See plaintiff's reply brief, pp. 43-45 for detail.
[5] In these three districts, the black majority is less than 60 percent VAP. As "influence districts," they, standing alone, do not represent a significant difference, according to the Assistant Attorney General of the United States for Civil Rights, such as to suggest an improper purpose under section 5. (Days' depo., Pltf's Ex. 25, Tr. pp. 112-115).
[6] When compared with the 1975 plan, S.B. 3098 and H.B. 1491 constitute a clear enhancement of the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise because S.B. 3098 and H.B. 1491 have a greater number of black voting age majority districts than did the 1975 plan and they provide higher percentages of black voting strength in those districts than did the 1975 plan. Moreover, the statutory plan is the first plan to utilize single-member districts only and avoids the diluting effect of multi-member districts.
[7] The basic configuration of the statutory plan was complete in December, 1977, well prior to the submission to the Connor Court of various alternative plans, which culminated in the settlement plan adopted by the Connor Court on April 13, 1979.