Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/486/592/case.html
Timestamp: 2014-04-16 10:17:47
Document Index: 567239402

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 701', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 706', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102']

Webster v. Doe - 486 U.S. 592 (1988) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Webster v. Doe - 486 U.S. 592 (1988)
Case	U.S. Supreme CourtWebster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988)Webster v. DoeNo. 86-1294Argued January 12, 1988Decided June 15, 1988486 U.S. 592CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
1. Title 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review under the APA of the CIA Director's termination decisions under § 102(c) of the NSA. Section 701(a)(2) applies where a statute is drawn in such broad terms that, in a given case, there is no law to apply, and the court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. In allowing termination whenever the Director "shall deem [it] necessary or advisable," and not simply when the dismissal is necessary or advisable, § 102(c) fairly exudes deference to the Director, and forecloses the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review for assessing a termination decision short of permitting cross-examination of the Director. That § 102(c)'s implementation was "committed to agency Page 486 U. S. 593 discretion by law" is also strongly suggested by the overall structure of the NSA, which vests in the Director very broad authority to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Section 102(c) is an integral part of that structure, because the CIA's efficacy, and the Nation's security, depend in large measure on the reliability and trustworthiness of CIA employees. Pp. 486 U. S. 599-601.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which O'CONNOR, J., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 486 U. S. 605. SCALIA, Page 486 U. S. 594 J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 486 U. S. 606. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Respondent John Doe was first employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency) in 1973 as a clerk typist. He received periodic fitness reports that consistently rated him as an excellent or outstanding employee. By 1977, respondent had been promoted to a position as a covert electronics technician. Page 486 U. S. 595
Respondent then filed an action against petitioner in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Page 486 U. S. 596 Respondent's amended complaint asserted a variety of statutory and constitutional claims against the Director. [Footnote 2] Respondent alleged that the Director's decision to terminate his employment violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, because it was arbitrary and capricious, represented an abuse of discretion, and was reached without observing the procedures required by law and CIA regulations. [Footnote 3] He also complained that the Director's termination of his employment deprived him of constitutionally protected rights to property, liberty, and privacy in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Finally, he asserted that his dismissal transgressed the procedural due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Respondent requested a declaratory judgment that the Director had violated the APA and the Constitution, and asked the District Court for an injunction ordering petitioner to reinstate him to the position he held with the CIA prior to his dismissal. As an alternative remedy, he suggested that he be returned to paid administrative leave and that petitioner be ordered to reevaluate respondent's employment termination and provide a statement Page 486 U. S. 597 of the reasons for any adverse final determination. Respondent sought no monetary damages in his amended complaint.
The District Court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, and granted respondent's motion for partial summary judgment. The court determined that the APA provided judicial review of petitioner's termination decisions made under § 102(c) of the NSA, and found that respondent had been unlawfully discharged because the CIA had not followed the procedures described in its own regulations. The District Court declined, however, to address respondent's constitutional claims. Respondent was ordered reinstated to administrative Page 486 U. S. 598 leave status, and the Agency was instructed to reconsider his case using procedures that would supply him with the reasons supporting any termination decision and provide him with an opportunity to respond.
The Court of Appeals went on to hold that respondent must demonstrate that the Director's action was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of his power to discharge employees under § 102(c). [Footnote 5] Because the record below was unclear on certain points critical to respondent's claim for relief, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to District Court for a determination of the reason for the Director's termination of respondent. [Footnote 6] We granted certiorari to decide the question Page 486 U. S. 599 whether the Director's decision to discharge a CIA employee under § 102(c) of the NSA is judicially reviewable under the APA.
We further explained what it means for an action to be "committed to agency discretion by law" in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985). Heckler required the Court to determi