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Timestamp: 2018-09-24 03:01:11
Document Index: 512858628

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 2', 'art 3', 'art 1', 'art 3', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 4', 'art 8', 'art 3', 'art 3', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 2', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1']

BSI-DSZ-CC for. tru/cos tacho v1.1. from. Trueb AG - PDF
BSI-DSZ-CC for. tru/cos tacho v1.1. from. Trueb AG
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1 BSI-DSZ-CC for tru/cos tacho v1.1 from Trueb AG
2 BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach , D Bonn Phone +49 (0) , Fax +49 (0) , Infoline +49 (0) Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.72
3 BSI-DSZ-CC Tachograph Card tru/cos tacho v1.1 from PP Conformance: Functionality: Assurance: Trueb AG Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Smart Card (Tachograph Card), Version 1.02, 15 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement for components up to EAL 4 The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 and according to Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1360/2002 Annex 1(B) adapting to Council Regulation (EC) No. 3821/85 amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 432/2004 of 5 March 2004, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 68/2009 of 23 January 2009, Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1266/2009 of 16 December 2009 on recording equipment in road transport. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 28 June 2013 For the Federal Office for Information Security for components up to EAL 4 Bernd Kowalski Head of Department L.S. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee D Bonn - Postfach D Bonn Phone +49 (0) Fax +49 (0) Infoline +49 (0)
6 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC Contents A Certification Specifications of the Certification Procedure Recognition Agreements Performance of Evaluation and Certification Validity of the Certification Result Publication...9 B Certification Results Executive Summary Identification of the TOE Security Policy Assumptions and Clarification of Scope Architectural Information Documentation IT Product Testing Evaluated Configuration Results of the Evaluation Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE Security Target Definitions Bibliography...23 C Excerpts from the Criteria...25 CC Part 1:...25 CC Part 3:...26 D Annexes / 38
7 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report A Certification 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: BSIG 2 BSI Certification Ordinance 3 BSI Schedule of Costs 4 Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) DIN EN standard BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3] Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version [1] Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2] BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 2 Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined. It includes assurance levels beyond EAL 4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. 2 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p / 38
8 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. 2.2 International Recognition of CC Certificates (CCRA) An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. This evaluation contains the components ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant. 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product tru/cos tacho v1.1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC were re-used. The evaluation of the product tru/cos tacho v1.1 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25 June TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Trueb AG. The product was developed by: Trueb AG. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 6 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 38
9 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report 4 Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 5 Publication The product tru/cos tacho v1.1 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 7 Trueb AG Hintere Bahnhofstrasse Aarau Schweiz 9 / 38
12 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Tachograph Card product tru/cos tacho v1.1 provided by Trueb AG, based on the hardware platform SLE78CFX2000P from Infineon Technologies AG (Certificate-ID: BSI-DSZ-CC , [12]). The Tachograph Card is configured and implemented as a driver card, workshop card, control card or company card in accordance with the Tachograph Card specification documents [14] to [18] and conforms with the following standards: ISO/IEC 7810 Identification cards Physical characteristics ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards - Integrated circuits with contacts: Part 1: Physical characteristics Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols Part 4: Inter-industry commands for interchange Part 8: Security related inter-industry commands ISO/IEC Identification cards Test methods This Tachograph Card is intended to be used in the Digital Tachograph Systems which contain additionally Motion Sensors and Vehicle Units as recording equipment. The main security features of the TOE are as specified in the Tachograph Card specification [17]: The TOE must preserve card identification data and cardholder identification data stored during the card personalisation process. The TOE must preserve user data stored in the card by Vehicle Units. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Smart Card (Tachograph Card), Version 1.02, 15 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP [8]. The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionalities: Identifier SF.PERSO SF.MUT_AUTH SF.VERIFY SF.SM SF.CERT Addressed issue Card Personalisation Mutual Authentication PIN Verification Secure Messaging Certificate Verification and Unwrapping 12 / 38
13 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report Identifier SF.SIG SF.HASH SF.SES_KEY SF.ACC SF.INTEGRITY SF.SELFTEST SF.DATA_ERASURE SF.HW_PROTECTION SF.SW_PROTECTION Addressed issue Digital Signature Creation and Verification Hash Calculation Session Key Generation and Limit of Use Access Control Mechanism Data Integrity Checks Self Test Erasure of Data after Usage Hardware Protection Mechanisms Software Protection Mechanisms Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3. This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Tachograph Card as driver card, workshop card, control card respective company card. The different configurations of the TOE are described in detail in the Tachograph Card specification [16] and in the guidance documents [9], [10] and [11]. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2 Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: tru/cos tacho v1.1 The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: 13 / 38
14 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW/SW Initialised module with hardware for contact-based interface. This part of the TOE consists of: Hardware platform: SLE78CFX2000P with its specific IC Dedicated Software and with cryptographic libraries from Infineon Technologies AG IC Embedded Software: Tachograph Operating System (implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the IC) Tachograph Application (as initialisation table and already installed on the TOE) 2 SW Master Embedding Key (MEK): 3DES key which is unique for each tru/cos tacho v1.1 personalisation agency 3 DOC tru/cos tacho v1.1 Initialization Manual (AGD_PRE) [9] 4 DOC tru/cos tacho v1.1 Personalisation Manual (AGD_OPE.Perso) [10] 5 DOC tru/cos tacho v1.1 Enduser Manual (AGD_OPE.Enduser) [11] SLE78CFX2000P (M7892 B11) with ROM mask and initialisation file, for identification data see below The IC with its Dedicated Software and with the Embedded Software are providing self-protection mechanisms, ensuring confidentiality and integrity during delivery. The delivery does not need additional security measures and can be considered as normal transport. --- Item in electronic form, secured against disclosure and modification. Version 1.10, Version 1.10, Version 1.01, Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE Document in electronic form. Document in electronic form. Document in electronic form. To verify that the user has the correct Tachograph Card, it can be identified by the following means as described in the guidance document for the personalisation agent [10], chapter 3.2 and in the guidance document for the end user [11], chapter 2: The verification of the correct Tachograph Card has to be checked using the GET DATA command which returns the following data: The Mask Name equals: The Mask Version equals: 11 The Loaded Modules equal: 00 The Chip Name equals: 534C The current life cycle phase equals: 04 (during personalisation phase) or 05 (for end usage phase) The ROM EDC matches: A5F7 (this information is not available for the end user) 14 / 38
15 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report In addition, the Tachograph Card can be identified by the ATR Historical Bytes set during the initialisation process. With the ATR, the personalisation agent can check the values of the Equipment Type, Country Personalizer ID, Product Type and Profile ID that were set during the initialisation. The value for the Equipment Type are set to: 00 = COMPLETE APPLICATION command has not been executed 01 = Driver card 02 = Workshop card 03 = Control card 04 = Company card The end user can identify the type of the personalised Tachograph Card by the command sequence as described in [11], chapter 2.2: 1. RESET 2. # SELECT MF/DF.TACHOGRAPH 00 A4 04 0C 06 FF F 3. # SELECT EF.APPLICATION ID 00 A4 02 0C A 4. # READ BINARY 00 B The READ BINARY command response can be used to identify the type of the Tachograph Card: 01 = Driver card 02 = Workshop card 03 = Control card 04 = Company card For the evaluation process the whole life cycle of the TOE was considered during the evaluation as far as the developer/manufacturer of the TOE is directly involved. The module initialisation as part of phase 5 of the TOE's life cycle belongs to the TOE development in the sense of the CC. The TOE is delivered as an initialised module, i.e. it contains all software and at least the data structures as defined in the Tachograph Card specifications [14] to [18], but isn t embedded in a plastic card and isn t personalised yet. The TOE can be delivered as already configured initialised module, i.e. as initialised driver card, workshop card, control card respective company card. Alternatively, the TOE can be delivered as initialised module without card configuration, and prior to the personalisation of the product the personalisation agent has to choose and set up the concrete card configuration (by calling the command COMPLETE APPLICATION). 3 Security Policy The TOE will be used as Tachograph Card and is implemented as the composition of an IC with appropriate Smart Card Embedded Software. A Tachograph Card is intended to be 15 / 38
16 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC used in the Digital Tachograph Systems which contain additionally Motion Sensors and Vehicle Units as recording equipment. The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the Digital Tachograph System related issues as outlined in the following. The main security features of the TOE are as specified in the Tachograph Card specification [17]: The TOE must preserve card identification data and cardholder identification data stored during the card personalisation process. The TOE must preserve user data stored in the card by Vehicle Units. The main security features stated above are provided by the following major security services: User and Vehicle Unit identification and authentication. Access control to functions and stored data. Accountability of stored data. Audit of events and faults. Accuracy of stored data. Reliability of services. Data exchange with a Vehicle Unit and export of data to a non-vehicle Unit. Cryptographic support for identification and authentication and data exchange as well as for key generation and distribution in corresponding case according to [18], chapter Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE Environment. The following topics are of relevance: OE.Personalisation_Phase: Secure Handling of Data in Personalisation Phase. OE.Tachograph_Components: Implementation of Tachograph Components. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter Architectural Information The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit with its IC Dedicated Software and IC Embedded Software. The latter part contains in particular the Tachograph Card Operating System (realised as native implementation) and the Tachograph Application with its dedicated file system, access rules and cryptographic data for the respective Tachograph Card type. According to the TOE design and the TOE's global architectural structure the security functionality of the TOE is enforced by the following subsystems: 16 / 38
17 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report Tachograph Application Layer (card type specific file structure, access rules and cryptographic data, as accessible in the TOE's life cycle phase 7). Tachograph Card Operating System: S.APP_Level (initialisation, personalisation and end usage phase commands). S.Core_Level (IC platform independent operating system parts). S.HAL_Level (IC platform dependent operating system parts). IC Infineon SLE78CFX2000P with its specific IC Dedicated Software and cryptographic libraries. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the underlying IC see the evaluation documentation under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC [12]. 6 Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 7 IT Product Testing The developer tested all TOE security functionality either on real cards or with emulator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby, a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs, was tested and all functionality was tested with valid and invalid inputs. The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product tru/cos tacho v1.1 on the IC Infineon SLE78CFX2000P. All four possible configurations (driver card, company card, control card and workshop card) were tested appropriately. The testing comprises tests in different life cycle states (personalisation, end usage) and with different protocols (T=0 and T=1). The tests of the Tachograph Card product tru/cos tacho v1.1 are based on the comprehensive Collis Tachograph Card test tools. Thereby different Collis test tools are used for testing of functional requirements given in the Tachograph Card specifications [14] to [18] to ensure that a European Digital Tachograph Card is personalised correctly and correct file structure and data are given and to test the T=0 and T=1 protocols. Furthermore, additional test cases are implemented to cover test aspects such as emulator tests, test in the personalisation phase and test power-loss resistance of the Tachograph Card Operating System. Repetition of developer tests was performed during the independent evaluator tests. Since much of the security functionality can be tested by APDU command sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality. Furthermore, penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for that security functionality where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered 17 / 38
18 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC testing APDU commands related to Key Management and Crypto Functions, testing APDU commands related to NVM Management and File System, testing APDU commands related to Security Management, testing APDU commands related to Secure Messaging, penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE, source code analysis performed by the evaluators, side channel analysis for cryptographic implementations, fault injection attacks (laser attacks), testing APDU commands for the initialisation, personalisation and usage phase, testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms. The evaluators tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during their penetration testing. The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results. 8 Evaluated Configuration The TOE tru/cos tacho v1.1 was evaluated in all of its four configurations as described in the Security Target [6]: Driver card, Control card, Company card, Workshop card. 9 Results of the Evaluation 9.1 CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: Application of CC to Integrated Circuits. Smart Card evaluation guidance. Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards. Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware [12], [13]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation. 18 / 38
19 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of true random number generators. (See [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, AIS 32, AIS 34, AIS 36, AIS 38.) For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]). Refer to BSI-DSZ-CC [12]. To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite evaluation [13] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top. The IC Infineon SLE78CFX2000P with its specific IC Dedicated Software and cryptographic libraries from Infineon Technologies AG was certified under BSI-DSZ-CC [12]. As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report). The components ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC [24], re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the following aspects: Change of the underlying IC to the IC Infineon SLE78CFX2000P with its specific IC Dedicated Software and cryptographic libraries from Infineon Technologies AG as certified under BSI-DSZ-CC [12]. Bugfixing related to the TOE's functionality. Integration of existing patch code into the ROM mask. Adaptation of the access rules for the file system in the TOE's personalisation phase. Update of user guidance documentation due to TOE changes and for editorial corrections. The evaluation has confirmed: PP Conformance: for the Functionality: Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Smart Card (Tachograph Card), Version 1.02, 15 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP [8] PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. 19 / 38
20 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC Results of cryptographic assessment The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE tru/cos tacho v1.1 to enforce its security policy: Algorithm Bit Length Purpose Security Functionality (Portion of the TSF) Standard of Implementation Standard of Usage Triple DES (3DES) in CBC mode 128 (112 effective) Encryption / decryption SF.SM FIPS PUB 81 [23] Tachograph Card Specifications [14]-[18] Retail-MAC 128 (112 effective) Generation / verification of message authentication code SF.SM ANSI X9.19 [19] Tachograph Card Specifications [14]-[18] RSA 1024 Encryption / decryption / signature creation / signature verification SF.MUT_AUTH, SF.SIG RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [20] Tachograph Card Specifications [14]-[18] RSA 1024 Certificate verification SHA Hash value calculation SF.CERT ISO/IEC [22] Tachograph Card Specifications [14]-[18] SF.HASH FIPS PUB [21] Tachograph Card Specifications [14]-[18] Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to the Tachograph Card specifications [14] to [18], the algorithms mentioned in table 3 above are considered in the framework of the Digital Tachograph Systems as to be suitable for the calculation of hash values, the creation and verification of digital signatures, the verification of certificates, the authentication protocols and the establishment and execution of a trusted channel between the TOE and the external world. For this reason, an explicit validity period of each algorithm is not defined. 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. 20 / 38
21 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report 11 Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. 12 Definitions 12.1 Acronyms APDU AIS ATR BSI BSIG CCRA CC CEM DES 3DES EAL EEPROM ETR IC IT ITSEF MAC NVM PP ROM SAR SFP SFR ST TOE TSF 12.2 Glossary Application Protocol Data Unit Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme Answer To Reset Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Data Encryption Standard Triple DES Evaluation Assurance Level Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory Evaluation Technical Report Integrated Circuit Information Technology Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility Message Authentication Code Non-Volatile Memory Protection Profile Read Only Memory Security Assurance Requirement Security Function Policy Security Functional Requirement Security Target Target of Evaluation TOE Security Functionality Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package. 21 / 38
22 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC. Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts. Informal - Expressed in natural language. Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations. Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type. Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE. Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics. Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects. Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance. TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs. 22 / 38
23 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report 13 Bibliography [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012 Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012 Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012 [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE 8 [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also in the BSI Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0889, tru/cos tacho v1.1 Security Target, Version 1.13, 24 June 2013, Trueb AG [7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), Product: tru/cos tacho v1.1, Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0889, Version 3, Date: 24 June 2013, Evaluation Facility: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [8] Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Smart Card (Tachograph Card), Version 1.02, 15 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP , Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [9] tru/cos tacho v1.1 Initialization Manual (AGD_PRE), Version 1.10, 22 April 2013, Trueb AG [10] tru/cos tacho v1.1 Personalisation Manual (AGD_OPE.Perso), Version 1.10, 23 May 2013, Trueb AG [11] tru/cos tacho v1.1 Enduser Manual (AGD_OPE.Enduser), Version 1.01, 15 March 2013, Trueb AG [12] Certification Report for BSI-DSZ-CC for Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v , EC v , SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) from Infineon Technologies AG, 11 September 2012, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 8 specifically AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document AIS 26, Version 8, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document AIS 31, Version 2.1, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1) AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results 23 / 38
24 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC [13] ETR for composition according to AIS 36, M7892 B11, BSI-DSZ-CC-0782, Version 2, 11 September 2012, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH [14] Annex I(B) of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1360/2002 Requirements for construction, testing, installation and inspection, , adapting to Council Regulation (EC) No. 3821/85 amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 432/2004 of 5 March 2004, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 68/2009 of 23 January 2009, Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1266/2009 of 16 December 2009 and corrigendum dated as of (OJ L 71) [15] Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1360/2002 of 13 June 2002 adapting for the seventh time to technical progress Council Regulation (EC) No. 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport, Official Journal of the European Communities L 71-86, [16] Appendix 2 of Annex I(B) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 (refer to [14]) Tachograph Cards Specification [17] Appendix 10 of Annex I(B) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 (refer to [14]) Generic Security Targets [18] Appendix 11 of Annex I(B) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 (refer to [14]) Common Security Mechanisms [19] ANSI X9.19, Financial Institution Retail Message Authentication, 1986 [20] RFC 3447, J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", February 2003 [21] FIPS PUB 180-3, Secure Hash Standard, 2008 [22] ISO/IEC :2010 Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message recovery -- Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms [23] FIPS PUB 81, DES Modes of Operation, 1996 [24] Certification Report for BSI-DSZ-CC for tru/cos tacho v1.0 from Trueb AG, 28 August 2012, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 24 / 38
27 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report Assurance Class Assurance Components ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims Class ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition Security assurance components (chapter 7) The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components. Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family. Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components. The following table shows the assurance class decomposition. Assurance Class ADV: Development Assurance Components ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation 27 / 38
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