Source: http://openjurist.org/641/f2d/553/no-79-1735
Timestamp: 2017-04-26 06:31:35
Document Index: 146583106

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 160', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12']

641 F2d 553 No 79-1735 | OpenJurist
641 F. 2d 553 - No 79-1735 HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 641 F.2d.
641 F2d 553 No 79-1735 641 F.2d 553
106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525, 90 Lab.Cas. P 12,540
KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, Petitioner,v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent,andI. B. E. W. Locals 412, 1464, and 1613, Intervenor-Respondent.
Submitted March 13, 1980.Decided Feb. 4, 1981.
This action is before the court pursuant to § 10(e), (f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (hereinafter the Act), authorizing judicial review of final orders of the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter the Board). Kansas City Power & Light Co. (hereinafter the employer) petitions for review of the final order of the Board in Kansas City Power & Light Co., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1979), finding that the employer violated § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the Act. The Board has cross-petitioned for enforcement.
The unions filed unfair labor practice charges, alleging that the employer's treatment of the probationary employees violated § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the Act. The employer justified its conduct by relying on the collective bargaining agreement provision requiring six months continuous service4 as a probationary employee, its policy and past practice of requiring those probationary employees with interruptions in their probationary periods to begin anew, and the absence of discrimination because all probationary employees were required to start all over. The Board affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that the employer's conduct was "inherently destructive" of employee rights and, even absent a showing of antiunion motivation, a violation of the Act under the standards set forth in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 1797-98, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1967), and further that the employer failed to establish "legitimate and substantial business justifications" for its conduct.
In this petition to set aside the Board's order, the employer argues that (1) its conduct was not discriminatory and therefore could not constitute a violation of § 8(a)(3); and (2) its conduct was not "inherently destructive" of employee rights and therefore, in the absence of any affirmative showing of antiunion motivation, could not constitute a violation of § 8(a)(3) and § 8(a) (1).
Our review of the Board's decision is quite limited. If the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence and represent a correct application of the law, the order will be enforced. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); e. g., The PaintSmiths, Inc. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1326, 1329 (8th Cir. 1980), citing Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 1939, 40 L.Ed.2d 288 (1974).
First, the employer argues that because all the probationary employees were treated alike, its conduct was not discriminatory and therefore could not constitute a violation of § 8(a)(3). Discrimination is an essential element of a § 8(a)(3) violation. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).5 This argument is clearly without merit. In NLRB v. Jemco, Inc., 465 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 911, 34 L.Ed.2d 690 (1973), the employer refused to pay accrued vacation benefits and argued, as the employer does in the present case, that no finding of discrimination, and thus no violation of § 8(a)(3), was possible where all the striking employees had been treated alike. The court rejected the employer's argument:
Although we are not referred to, nor do we find, any cases involving Section 8(a)(3) discrimination where all employees alike were denied an employment benefit, we do not believe that unequal treatment of different classes of employees is a prerequisite to finding a Section 8(a)(3) violation where all employees engaged in a concerted activity. The interpretation of Section 8(a) (3) which the Company urges us to adopt would lead to the somewhat absurd result that an employer could never be found in violation of that Section so long as he was careful to treat all employees alike, no matter how destructive of employee rights his conduct may be. The Section 8(a)(3) discrimination in the present case lies in the employment benefit afforded to all employees prior to their engaging in a concerted activity and the benefit which was denied to all employees after they engaged in such activity.
Id. 465 F.2d at 1152 (emphasis added; footnote omitted); accord, NLRB v. Borden, Inc., 600 F.2d 313, 320-21 (1st Cir. 1979); Allied Industrial Workers Local 289 v. NLRB, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 121, 476 F.2d 868, 877 (1973) ("A practice applied uniformly to all employees may be discriminatory and violate the Act just as a discriminatory practice may be held to be perfectly innocuous."). In other words, "(t)he fact that an employer stigmatizes striking employees while leaving nonstrikers untouched may be an indication of the employer's hostility toward the Union, but such disparity of treatment is not necessary to find a section 8(a)(3) and (1) violation." NLRB v. Borden, Inc., supra, 600 F.2d at 320.
In the present case all the employees went on strike. The employer therefore could not have discriminated against striking employees and in favor of nonstriking employees. However, as discussed above, disparity in treatment between strikers and nonstrikers is not necessary to finding a § 8(a)(3) violation. Id. Where all the employees engage in a concerted activity, the requisite disparity is between the treatment of all employees before and after the concerted activity. NLRB v. Jemco, Inc., supra, 465 F.2d at 1152. Here, the requisite discrimination lies in the disparity of treatment of probationary employees with breaks in service before and after the strike. The General Counsel presented evidence that before the strike three probationary employees were not required to begin their probationary periods anew even though absent from work between two to ten weeks. We conclude that the Board's finding of discriminatory treatment is supported by substantial evidence.
Next, the employer argues that its treatment of the probationary employees was not "inherently destructive" of important employee rights and was justified by "legitimate and substantial" business justifications. Therefore, the employer argues that absent an affirmative showing of antiunion motivation, its conduct could not constitute a violation of § 8(a)(3) and § 8(a)(1). See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., supra, 388 U.S. at 33-34, 87 S.Ct. 1197-98; NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1145-46, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963); see generally Christensen & Svanoe, Motive & Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court & the Fictive Formality, 77 Yale L.J. 1269 (1969).
The employer's argument is based upon the distinction drawn in Great Dane between discriminatory conduct which is "inherently destructive" of important employee rights and discriminatory conduct which has a "comparatively slight" adverse effect on employee rights. 388 U.S. at 34, 87 S.Ct. at 1797-98. As outlined in the familiar but somewhat enigmatic passage in Great Dane :
388 U.S. at 34, 87 S.Ct. at 1797-98 (emphasis in original; footnotes added).
"Finding a § 8(a)(3) violation normally requires an affirmative showing that the employer's discriminatory conduct was motivated by an antiunion purpose. But when an employer's conduct is characterized as 'inherently destructive,' 'unlawful motivation is presumed to exist.' " Loomis Courier Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1979) (other citations omitted), citing Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, the characterization of discriminatory conduct as either "inherently destructive" or having a "comparatively slight" adverse effect is critical because that characterization determines which party has the benefit of a presumption of lawful or unlawful motivation, once a showing of "legitimate and substantial business justification" has been made. "Inherently destructive" discriminatory conduct bears "its own indicia of intent" and thus relieves the General Counsel of the difficult task of proving unlawful motivation. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, 373 U.S. at 231, 83 S.Ct. at 1147. Even if the employer establishes a "legitimate and substantial business justification" for "inherently destructive" conduct, the presumption of unlawful motivation remains, leaving to the Board the "delicate task" of balancing conflicting legitimate interests in light of the Act and its policy. E. g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., supra, 388 U.S. at 33-34, 87 S.Ct. at 1197-98; NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, 373 U.S. at 228-29, 83 S.Ct. at 1145-46; Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1144 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (express reference to balancing respective interests in order to draw correct inference about real motive of employer), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 3069, 57 L.Ed.2d 1121 (1978); Kaiser Engineers v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1976) (express reference to balancing). Discriminatory conduct which has only a "comparatively slight" adverse effect on employee rights similarly raises a presumption of unlawful motive. However, if rebutted by a showing of "legitimate and substantial business justification," the presumption of unlawful motive disappears, the conduct in question is prima facie lawful, and the General Counsel must affirmatively prove unlawful motive. E. g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., supra, 388 U.S. at 34, 87 S.Ct. at 1797-98; Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. NLRB, supra, 557 F.2d at 1144 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court has yet to clearly define the phrase "inherently destructive."8 This Circuit in Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, agreeing that the phrase was not easily susceptible of precise definition, acknowledged that "actions creating visible and continuing obstacles to the future exercise of employee rights" are "inherently destructive." 486 F.2d at 845, citing Case Note, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 680, 686 (1972); accord, Loomis Courier Service, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 595 F.2d at 495, citing Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976) (conduct with far-reaching effects which would hinder future bargaining or conduct which discriminates solely upon the basis of participation in strikes or union activity is inherently destructive); Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. NLRB, supra, 557 F.2d at 1144 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) ("inherently destructive" describes conduct that thwarts the basic policies of the Act and frustrates the process of collective bargaining or the future of unionization, but not conduct merely influencing workers' ability to maintain their bargaining demands); Kaiser Engineers v. NLRB, supra, 538 F.2d at 1386 (discriminatory conduct which is directly related to protected activity is inherently destructive, citing Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1968)).
While there is much to be said for the Board's characterization of the employer's treatment of the probationary employees as "inherently destructive," it is unnecessary here for us to decide whether the employer's conduct was "inherently destructive" or whether its effect was "comparatively slight" since in either event the result is the same. The employer's conduct was directly related to the probationary employees' participation in a lawful economic strike, a protected activity under the Act. E. g., NLRB v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 603 F.2d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 584 F.2d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 1978) (§ 8(a)(1) violation); NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835, 840-42 (5th Cir. 1978); Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850, 93 S.Ct. 58, 34 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972), citing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, 373 U.S. at 233, 83 S.Ct. at 1148; cf. System Council T-4 v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 815, 819 n.7 (7th Cir. 1971) (adjustment of net credit service dates, as distinguished from seniority, to account for strike time found to have "comparatively slight" adverse effect on employee rights within context of Great Dane), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1059, 92 S.Ct. 740, 30 L.Ed.2d 747 (1972); Tex-Tan Welhausen Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1969) (benefit adjustment for strike absence), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 819, 90 S.Ct. 1516, 25 L.Ed.2d 805 (1970). Such conduct, when considered from a common sense point of view, is bound to have a discouraging effect on present and future concerted activities, particularly upon the probationary employees' support of the unions. The inevitable consequence of the application of the employer's policy with regard to absences during the probationary period is that probationary employees can strike for one week, or possibly at most for one month,9 without jeopardizing their accrued probationary service. Such an action creates an obstacle of some dimension to the future exercise of employee rights. Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, supra, 486 F.2d at 845.
Under section 8(a)(3) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1148, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963), the Supreme Court held that discouraging membership in a labor organization under section 8(a)(3) includes discouraging participation in concerted activities, such as a legitimate strike
Modern labor law cases, that is, post-Radio Officers Union cases, emphasize unlawful or antiunion motivation. "The statutory language 'discrimination ... to ... discourage' means that the finding of a violation normally turns on whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by an antiunion purpose." NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., supra, 388 U.S. at 33, 87 S.Ct. at 1797, citing American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965). See generally 3 T. Kheel, Labor Law § 12.02 (1980); Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference & Discrimination under the NLRA: The Legacy of American Ship & Great Dane, 70 Colum.L.Rev. 81(1970); Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8a1 & 3 of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs & Tails, 52 Cornell L.Q. 491, 504-06 (1967) (explaining use of words "motive" and "intent" in Supreme Court opinions); Note, Proving an 8a3 Violation: The Changing Standard, 114 U.Pa.L.Rev. 866 (1966). But see 3 T. Kheel, Labor Law, supra, § 12.02 (discussing the "varient view"); Christensen & Svanoe, Motive & Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court & the Fictive Formality, 77 Yale L.J. 1269 (1968) (emphasizing discrimination, irrelevance of intent or motive); Note, Discrimination & the NLRB: The Scope of Board Power under 8a3 & 8b2, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 124 (1964)
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, 373 U.S. at 228-29, 83 S.Ct. at 1145-46 (emphasis in original; citation and footnotes omitted); see, e. g., Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1144 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (discussing balancing of employee and employer interests), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 3069, 57 L.Ed.2d 1121 (1978); Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The ultimate problem is the balancing of conflicting legitimate interests.").
In Great Dane the Court describes "inherently destructive" conduct as "conduct (which) carries with it 'unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended' and thus bears 'its own indicia of intent.' " 388 U.S. at 33, 87 S.Ct. at 1797, citing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, 373 U.S. at 228, 231, 83 S.Ct. at 1145-47; see generally 3 T. Kheel, Labor Law, supra note 6, § 12.02
This position comes close to an argument that the probationary employees' right to strike was waived by the collective bargaining agreement, specifically by the provision defining probationary employees as individuals with less than six months continuous service. However, although the right to strike may be waived by appropriate provisions in a collective bargaining agreement, such a waiver of a protected right must be expressed in clear and unmistakable language. E. g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280, 76 S.Ct. 349, 357, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956)