Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/397/564/
Timestamp: 2018-06-23 12:32:44
Document Index: 448023393

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 27', '§ 123', '§ 123', '§ 123', '§ 123', '§ 123', '§ 123', '§ 121', '§ 121']

Donald BACHELLAR et al., Petitioners, v. State of MARYLAND. | LII / Legal Information Institute
Donald BACHELLAR et al., Petitioners, v. State of MARYLAND.
397 U.S. 564 (90 S.Ct. 1312, 25 L.Ed.2d 570)
A jury in Baltimore City Criminal Court convicted petitioners of violating Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 123 (1967 Repl. Vol.), 1 which prohibits 'acting in a disorderly manner to the disturbance of the public peace, upon any public street * * * in any (Maryland) city * * *.' 2 The prosecution arose out of a demonstration protesting the Vietnam war which was staged between 3 and shortly after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of March 28, 1966, in front of a United States Army recruiting station located on a downtown Baltimore street. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected petitioners' contention that their conduct was constitutionally protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and affirmed their convictions. 3 Md.App. 626, 240 A.2d 623 (1968). The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied certiorari in an unreported order. We granted certiorari, 396 U.S. 816, 90 S.Ct. 109, 24 L.Ed.2d 68 (1969). We reverse.
The trial judge instructed the jury that there were alternative grounds upon which petitioners might be found guilty of violating § 123. The judge charged, first, that a guilty verdict might be returned if the jury found that petitioners had engaged in 'the doing or saving or both of that which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area.' The judge also told the jury that '(a) refusal to obey a policeman's command to move on when not to do so may endanger the public peace, may amount to disorderly conduct.' 3 So instructed, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty against each of the petitioners.
We turn now to the events that occurred shortly before and after 5 o'clock. The petitioners had left the marchers after half past 3 to enter the recruiting station. There they had attempted to persuade the sergeant in charge to permit them to display their antiwar materials in the station or in its window fronting on the sidewalk. The sergeant had told them that Army regulations forbade him to grant such permission. The six thereupon staged a sit-in on chairs and a couch in the station. 4 A few minutes before 5 o'clock the sergeant asked them to leave, as he wanted to close the station for the day. When petitioners refused, the sergeant called on United States marshals who were present in the station to remove them. After deputizing several police officers to help, the marshals undertook to eject the petitioners. 5
There is irreconcilable conflict in the evidence as to what next occurred. The prosecution's witnesses testified that the marshals and the police officers 'escorted' the petitioners outside, and that the petitioners thereupon sat or lay down, 'blocking free passage of the sidewalk.' The police lieutenant in charge stated that he then took over and three times ordered the petitioners to get up and leave. He testified that when they remained sitting or lying down, he had each of them picked up bodily and removed to a patrol wagon. In sharp contrast, defense witnesses said that each petitioner was thrown bodily out the door of the station and landed on his back, that petitioners were not positioned so as to block the sidewalk completely, and that no police command was given to them to move away; on the contrary, that as some of them struggled to get to their feet, they were held down by the police officers until they were picked up and thrown into the patrol wagon. The evidence is clear, however, that while petitioners were on the sidewalk, they began to sing 'We Shall Overcome' and that they were surrounded by other demonstrators carrying antiwar placards. Thus, petitioners remained obvious participants in the demonstration even after their expulsion from the recruiting station. 6 A crowd of 50150 people, including the demonstrators, was in the area during this period.
On this evidence, in light of the instructions given by the trial judge, the jury could have rested its verdict on any of a number of grounds. The jurors may have found that petitioners refused 'to obey a policeman's command to move on when not to do so (might have endangered) the public peace.' Or they may have relied on a finding that petitioners deliberately obstructed the sidewalk, thus offending, disturbing, and inciting the bystanders. 7 Or the jurors may have credited petitioners' testimony that they were thrown to the sidewalk by the police and held there, and yet still have found them guilty of violating § 123 because their anti-Vietnam protest amounted to 'the doing or saying * * * of that which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area.' Thus, on this record, we find that petitioners may have been found guilty of violating § 123 simply because they advocated unpopular ideas. Since conviction on this ground would violate the Constitution, it is our duty to set aside petitioners' convictions.
On this record, if the jury believed the State's evidence, petitioners' convictions could constitutionally have rested on a finding that they sat or lay across a public sidewalk with the intent of fully blocking passage along it, or that they refused to obey police commands to stop obstructing the sidewalk in this manner and move on. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (I), supra, 379 U.S. at 554555, 85 S.Ct., at 464465; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 9091, 86 S.Ct. 211, 213214, 15 L.Ed.2d 176 (1965). It is impossible to say, however, that either of these grounds was the basis for the verdict. On the contrary, so far as we can tell, it is equally likely that the verdict resulted 'merely because (petitioners' views about Vietnam were) themselves offensive to some of their hearers.' Street v. New York, supra, 394 U.S., at 592, 89 S.Ct. at 1366. Thus, since petitioners' convictions may have rested on an unconstitutional ground, they must be set aside.
Both elements of the instruction were based on the Maryland Court of Appeals' construction of § 123 in Drews v. Maryland, 224 Md. 186, 192, 167 A.2d 341, 343344 (1961), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 378 U.S. 547, 84 S.Ct. 1900, 12 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1964), reaffirmed on remand, 236 Md. 349, 204 A.2d 64 (1964), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 381 U.S. 421, 85 S.Ct. 1576, 14 L.Ed.2d 693 (1965). The instruction was 'that disorderly conduct is the doing or saying or both of that which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area. It is conduct of such nature as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness it and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment because of it. A refusal to obey a policeman's command to move on when not to do so may endanger the public peace, may amount to disorderly conduct.'
Maryland states in its brief, at 4142, that '(o)bstructing the sidewalk had the legal effect under these circumstances of not only constituting a violation of * * * § 123 * * * but also of Article 27, § 121 of the Maryland Code, obstructing free passage.' Had the State wished to ensure a jury finding on the obstruction question, it could have prosecuted petitioners under § 121, which specifically punishes '(a)ny person who shall wilfully obstruct or hinder the free passage of persons passing along or by any public street or highway * * *.'