Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/435/267/95544/
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 21:22:10
Document Index: 316943002

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1985', '§ 7321']

Michael L. Shakman and Paul M. Lurie, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. the Democratic Organization of Cook County et al., Defendants-appellees, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1970 › Michael L. Shakman and Paul M. Lurie, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. the Democratic Organization of Cook...
Michael L. Shakman and Paul M. Lurie, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. the Democratic Organization of Cook County et al., Defendants-appellees, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970)
Rehearings Denied December 18, 1970
Raymond F. Simon, Corp. Counsel, Marvin E. Aspen, Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Daniel P. Coman, Atty., George J. Schaller, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees City of Chicago, Richard J. Daley and Marshall Korshak; Edmund Hatfield, Daniel Pascale, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of counsel.
Jurisdiction is claimed under 28 U.S. C. § 1331, of a controversy arising under the constitution, and a jurisdictional amount is alleged. Jurisdiction is also claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) of an action to redress the deprivation under color of state law, of rights secured by the constitution. Assuming justiciability, the existence of jurisdiction, at least under § 1343(3), is clear.2
One of the reasons given by the district court for dismissing the complaint is that plaintiffs lack standing to seek redress for the injury to the rights of the DPEs resulting from the alleged coercion. Plaintiffs point out that there are decisions permitting vicarious vindication of constitutional rights for reasons of policy.3 But here, in any event, plaintiffs are seeking redress for injuries to their own interests and the interests of others similarly situated. Assuming the truth of plaintiffs' averments, and assuming that interests of theirs which are allegedly injured are rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal constitution, their standing to bring a § 1983 or § 1985 action is apparent.4
The interests of candidates in official treatment free from intentional or purposeful discrimination are entitled to constitutional protection.7 "Where discrimination is sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights."8
We acknowledge that the decisions just referred to involved mechanical aspects of the election process: e. g., the right to cast a vote, a candidate's place on the ballot, and equal size in districts entitled to a representative. The interest in an equal chance and an equal voice is allegedly impaired in the case before us by the misuse of official power over public employees so as to create a substantial, perhaps massive, political effort in favor of the ins and against the outs. We conclude that these interests are entitled to constitutional protection from injury of the nature alleged as well as from injury resulting from inequality in election procedure.
"In the instance of non-justiciability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded."10
"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."11
We do not view possible difficulties of the sort just mentioned as demonstrating "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the case or as requiring, at the pleading stage, a decision that plaintiffs' claim is not justiciable.
I would sustain the district court's dismissal of the complaint, but on a ground different from those assigned by the district judge. In my opinion this case presents a nonjusticiable controversy in the sense that it involves a "political question" — one that should be dealt with by the state legislature and not by the courts.
A distinction should be drawn in this area between the rights of voters and candidates for public office to be given equal treatment by the state in the "mechanical aspects of the election process," to use Judge Fairchild's apt phrase, and remedies for alleged abuses of the persuasion or electioneering aspects of the process. For example, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962), it was held that the citizens of a state suffer a "debasement of their votes" and thereby a denial of equal protection of the laws when the state legislature refuses or fails to allocate its legislative representation on an equal basis among the voters of the state. In Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a state may not discriminate against the residents of the more populous sections of a state in favor of the less populous by requiring a rigid, arbitrary number of signatures from each county on petitions for independent candidates for political office. In Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969), this court had before it a case concerning an arbitrary and discriminatory procedure adopted by the Illinois Electoral Board in the placement on the ballot of candidates to a state constitutional convention. All three cases, which are illustrative of the decisions in this area, dealt with procedures enacted by state legislatures relating to the democratic elective process directed to attain representative government.
In the instant case we are not asked to apply the equal protection test to a legislative enactment governing the elective process or even to a deviation from such an enactment by those statutorily charged to carry out its mandate. Rather, we are asked to go one step further and hold that the conduct of a public official is constitutionally proscribed when he allegedly requires employees whom he appoints and can summarily discharge to contribute money and "public" time to the candidacy of those favored by him.
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court recognized that there may be areas of activity relating to the elective process that are not justiciable because of the "inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration." The Court then set forth the applicable test: "In the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded." 369 U.S. at 198, 82 S. Ct. at 700. When this test is applied to the claims made by plaintiffs, it is apparent that the instant case should be classified as nonjusticiable. Assuming proof of the claims, it is not difficult to contemplate the problems facing the district court in molding a proper remedy and, perhaps more important, with its enforcement.
I agree with the observation made by defendants that the relief requested is tantamount to asking the court to enlarge the Federal Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321 et seq., to encompass the political activity of local government employees. Whether coverage should be extended to such employees as a matter of public policy is not the question. The question is whether a federal court should attempt to formulate "judicially discoverable and manageable standards,"1 relating to such activity and whether it should be called on to mold a piecemeal remedy by injunctive decree.
Cf. Moore v. Ogilvie (1969), 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1
See Bell v. Hood (1946), 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed. 939; Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663
Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663
See Doremus v. Board of Education (1952), 342 U.S. 429, 434, 72 S. Ct. 394, 96 L. Ed. 475
See 2A Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 8.13, pp. 1695-1700
Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L. Ed. 497. See Weisberg v. Powell (7th Cir., 1969), 417 F.2d 388, 392
321 U.S. 11, 64 S. Ct. at 402
Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663; Gray v. Sanders (1963), 372 U.S. 368, 83 S. Ct. 801, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821; Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 565, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506; Carrington v. Rash (1965), 380 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 775, 13 L. Ed. 2d 675; Williams v. Rhodes (1968), 393 U.S. 23, 89 S. Ct. 5, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24; Avery v. Midland County (1968), 390 U.S. 474, 88 S. Ct. 1114, 20 L. Ed. 2d 45; Moore v. Ogilvie (1969), 394 U.S. 814, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1; Hadley v. Junior College District (1970), 397 U.S. 50, 90 S. Ct. 791, 25 L. Ed. 2d 45
Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663
Ibid. p. 217, 82 S. Ct. at p. 710