Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62001CJ0224
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 13:46:22
Document Index: 380410291

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 48', 'Art. 39', 'Art. 7', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3']

Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich.
Equal treatment - Remuneration of university professors - Indirect discrimination - Length-of-service increment - Liability of a Member State for damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which it is responsible - Infringements attributable to a national court.
Case C-224/01.
Case C-224/01
(Reference for a preliminary rulingfrom the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Austria))
«(Equal treatment – Remuneration of university professors – Indirect discrimination – Length-of-service increment – Liability of a Member State for damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which it is responsible – Infringements attributable to a national court)»
Opinion of Advocate General Léger delivered on 8 April 2003
Community law – Rights conferred on individuals – Infringement by a Member State – Obligation to make good damage caused to individuals – Infringement attributable to a supreme court – No effect – Court competent to decide a case relating to such compensation – Application of national law
Community law – Rights conferred on individuals – Infringement by a Member State – Obligation to make good damage caused to individuals – Conditions in the event of infringement attributable to a supreme court – Manifest character of the infringement – Criteria
Freedom of movement for persons – Workers – Equal treatment – Remuneration of university professors – Indirect discrimination – Length-of-service increment which takes into account only the length of service in the universities of the Member State concerned – Not permissible – Whether justifiable – No justification
(EC Treaty, Art. 48 (now, after amendment, Art. 39 EC); Council Regulation No 1612/68, Art. 7(1))
Community law – Infringement by a Member State – Obligation to make good damage caused to individuals – Infringement attributable to a supreme court – Particular circumstances – Lack of manifest character of the infringement
The principle that Member States are obliged to make good damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which they are responsible is also applicable when the alleged infringement stems from a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance. That principle, inherent in the system of the Treaty, applies to any case in which a Member State breaches Community law, whichever is the authority of the Member State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach. It is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the court competent to adjudicate on disputes relating to such reparation. Subject to the reservation that it is for the Member States to ensure in each case that those rights are effectively protected, it is not for the Court to become involved in resolving questions of jurisdiction to which the classification of certain legal situations based on Community law may give rise in the national judicial system. see paras 30-31, 33, 46-47, 50, operative part 1
Member States are obliged to make good damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which they are responsible where the rule of Community law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct causal link between that breach and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties. In order to determine whether the infringement is sufficiently serious when the infringement at issue stems from a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance, the competent national court must, taking into account the specific nature of the judicial function and the legitimate requirement of legal certainty, determine whether that infringement is manifest. In particular, the national court must take account of all the factors which characterise the situation put before it. Those factors include, in particular, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed, whether the infringement was intentional, whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the position taken, where applicable, by a Community institution and non-compliance by the court in question with its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC. In any event, an infringement of Community law will be sufficiently serious where the decision concerned was made in manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the matter. see paras 51-56, operative part 1
Article 48 of the Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 39 EC) and Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community are to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the grant by a Member State qua employer, of a special length-of-service increment to university professors which secures a financial benefit in addition to basic salary, the amount of which is already dependent on length of service, and which a university professor receives if he has carried on that profession for at least 15 years with a university in that Member State and if, furthermore, he has been in receipt for at least four years of the normal length-of-service increment. As it precludes, for the purpose of the grant of the special length-of-service increment for which it provides, any possibility of taking into account periods of activity completed by a university professor in another Member State, such a regime is clearly likely to impede freedom of movement for workers. Although it cannot be excluded that an objective of rewarding workers' loyalty to their employers in the context of policy concerning research or university education constitutes a pressing public-interest reason, the obstacle which such a measure entails clearly cannot be justified in the light of such an objective. see paras 70-72, 83, operative part 2
An infringement of Community law does not have the requisite manifest character for liability under Community law to be incurred by a Member State for a decision of one of its courts adjudicating at last instance when, firstly, Community law does not expressly cover the issue of law in question, there is no answer to be found in the Court's case-law and the answer is not obvious and secondly, the infringement is not deliberate in nature but results from the incorrect reading of a judgment of the Court. see paras 122-123, 126, operative part 3
((Equal treatment – Remuneration of university professors – Indirect discrimination – Length-of-service increment – Liability of a Member State for damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which it is responsible – Infringements attributable to a national court))
Mr Köbler, by A. König, Rechtsanwalt,
the Republic of Austria, by M. Windisch, acting as Agent,
the German Government, by A. Dittrich and W.-D. Plessing, acting as Agents,
the French Government, by R. Abraham and G. de Bergues, and by C. Isidoro, acting as Agents,
the United Kingdom Government, by J.E. Collins, acting as Agent, and D. Andersen QC and M. Hoskins, Barrister,
Article 48(3) of the Gehaltsgesetz 1956 (law on salaries of 1956, BGBl. 1956/54), as amended in 1997 (BGBl. I, 1997/109) (hereinafter the GG), provides: In so far as may be necessary in order to secure the services of a scientific expert or an artist from the country or from abroad, the Federal President may grant a basic salary higher than that provided for in Article 48(2) on appointment to a post as a university professor (Article 21 of the Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Universitäten (Federal law on the organisation of universities), BGBl. 1993/805, hereinafter the UOG 1993) or as an ordinary professor of universities or of an institution of higher education.
Article 50a(1) of the GG is worded as follows: A university professor (Article 21 of the UOG 1993) or an ordinary professor at a university or an institution of higher education who has completed 15 years service in that capacity in Austrian universities or institutions of higher education and who for four years has been in receipt of the length-of-service increment provided for in Article 50(4) shall be eligible, with effect from the date on which those two conditions are fulfilled, for a special length-of-service increment to be taken into account in the calculation of his retirement pension the amount of which shall correspond to that of the length-of-service increment provided for in Article 50(4).
By letter of 28 February 1996, Mr Köbler applied under Article 50a of the GG for the special length-of-service increment for university professors. He claimed that, although he had not completed 15 years' service as a professor at Austrian universities, he had completed the requisite length of service if the duration of his service in universities of other Member States of the European Community were taken into consideration. He claimed that the condition of completion of 15 years service solely in Austrian universities ─ with no account being taken of periods of service in universities in other Member States ─ amounted to indirect discrimination unjustified under Community law.
That judgment of 24 June 1998 states in particular: ... In its order for reference of 22 October 1997 [in Case C-382/97] the Verwaltungsgerichtshof took the view that the special length-of-service increment for ordinary university professors is in the nature of neither a loyalty bonus nor a reward, but is rather a component of salary under the system of career advancement.That interpretation of the law, which is not binding on the parties to proceedings before the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, cannot be upheld....It is thus clear that the special length-of-service increment under Paragraph 50a of the 1956 salary law is unrelated to the market value assessment to be undertaken in the course of the appointment procedure, but, rather, its purpose must be seen as the provision of a positive incentive to academics in a very mobile labour market to spend their career in Austrian universities. It cannot therefore be a component of salary as such and, because of its function as a loyalty bonus, requires a certain length of service as an ordinary university professor at Austrian universities as a precondition for eligibility. The treatment of the special length-of-service increment as a component of monthly earnings and the consequent permanent character of the loyalty bonus do not essentially preclude the above interpretation.Since, in Austria, ─ in so far as this is of relevance in the present case ─ the legal personality of the universities is vested in the Federal State alone, the rules in Paragraph 50a of the 1956 salary law apply to only one employer ─ in contrast to the situation in Germany contemplated in the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-15/96 Kalliope Schöning-Kougebetopoulou [1998] ECR I-47. Previous periods of service are taken into account in reckoning length of service, as the plaintiff demands, in the course of the assessment of market value in the appointment procedure. There is no provision for any further account to be taken of such previous periods of service in the special length-of-service increment even for Austrian academics who resume teaching in Austria after spending time working abroad and such provision would not be consistent with the notion of rewarding many years' loyalty to an employer deemed by the Court of Justice to justify a rule which in itself breaches the prohibition on discrimination.As the claim which the complainant seeks to assert here is for a special length of service increment under Paragraph 50a of the 1956 salary law which is a statutory loyalty bonus and as such is recognised by the Court of Justice as justification for legislation conflicting with the prohibition on discrimination, the complaint based on breach of that prohibition on discrimination is unfounded; it should be dismissed ...
Is the case-law of the Court of Justice to the effect that it is immaterial as regards State liability for a breach of Community law which institution of a Member State is responsible for that breach (see Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029) also applicable when the conduct of an institution purportedly contrary to Community law is a decision of a supreme court of a Member State, such as, as in this case, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof?
If the answer to Question 1 is yes: Is the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which it is for the legal system of each Member State to determine which court or tribunal has jurisdiction to hear disputes involving individual rights derived from Community law (see inter alia Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961) also applicable when the conduct of an institution purportedly contrary to Community law is a judgment of a supreme court of a Member State, such as, in this case, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof?
If the answer to Question 2 is yes: Does the legal interpretation given in the abovementioned judgment of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, according to which the special length-of-service increment is a form of loyalty bonus, breach a rule of directly applicable Community law, in particular the prohibition on indirect discrimination in Article 48 [of the Treaty] and the relevant settled case-law of the Court of Justice?
If the answer to Question 3 is yes: Is this rule of directly applicable Community law such as to create a subjective right for the applicant in the main proceedings?
If the answer to Question 4 is yes: Does the Court ... have sufficient information in the content of the order for reference to enable it to rule itself as to whether the Verwaltungsgerichtshof in the circumstances of the main proceedings described has clearly and significantly exceeded the discretion available to it, or is it for the referring Austrian court to answer that question?
In that connection the German and Netherlands Governments claim that there is a sufficiently serious breach for the purposes of that judgment only if a judicial decision disregarded the applicable Community law in a particularly serious and manifest way. According to the German Government, breach of a rule of law by a court is particularly serious and manifest only where the interpretation or non-application of Community law is, first, objectively indefensible and, secondly, must be subjectively regarded as intentional. Such restrictive criteria are justified in order to safeguard both the principle of res judicata and the independence of the judiciary. Moreover, a restrictive regime of State liability for damage caused by mistaken judicial decisions is in keeping, in the German Government's view, with a general principle common to the laws of the Member States as laid down in Article 288 EC.
The Commission submits that a limitation of State liability on account of judicial decisions exists in all the Member States and is necessary in order to safeguard the authority of res judicata of final decisions and thus the stability of the law. For that reason it advocates that the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of Community law should be recognised only where the national court is manifestly abusing its power or discernibly disregarding the meaning and scope of Community law. In the present case, the alleged fault by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof is excusable and that fact is one of the criteria enabling it to be concluded that there has not been a sufficiently serious breach of the law (Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-5123, paragraph 43).
For their part the Republic of Austria and the Austrian Government (hereinafter together referred to as the Republic of Austria), and the French and United Kingdom Governments, maintain that the liability of a Member State cannot be incurred in the case of a breach of Community law attributable to a court. They rely on arguments based on res judicata, the principle of legal certainty, the independence of the judiciary, the judiciary's place in the Community legal order and the comparison with procedures available before the Court to render the Community liable under Article 288 EC.
The United Kingdom Government states that, as a matter of principle and save where a judicial act infringes a fundamental right protected by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( the ECHR), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, no action in damages can be brought against the Crown in respect of judicial decisions. It adds that the principle on which the principle of State liability is based, namely that rights conferred by Community rules must be effectively protected, is far from being absolute and cites in that regard the application of fixed limitation periods. That principle would be capable of founding a remedy in damages against the State only in rare cases and in respect of certain strictly defined national judicial decisions. The advantage to be gained from acknowledging that damages may be obtained in respect of judicial decisions is therefore correspondingly small. The United Kingdom Government considers that that advantage must be weighed against certain powerful policy concerns.
In that regard it cites, first, the principles of legal certainty and res judicata. The law discourages re-litigation of judicial decisions except by means of an appeal. That is both to protect the interests of the successful party and to further the public interest in legal certainty. The Court has in the past shown itself willing to limit the principle of effective protection in order to uphold the basic principles of the national judicial system, such as the principle of legal certainty and acceptance of res judicata, which is an expression of that principle (judgment in Eco Swiss, cited above, paragraphs 43 to 48). Acknowledgment of State liability for a mistake by the judiciary would throw the law into confusion and would leave the litigating parties perpetually uncertain as to where they stood.
First, as the Court has repeatedly held, the principle of liability on the part of a Member State for damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State is responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty (Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others[1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 35; Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 31; Case C-392/93 British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-1631, paragraph 38; Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, paragraph 24; Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others[1996] ECR I-4845, paragraph 20, Case C-127/95 Norbrook Laboratories [1998] ECR I-1531, paragraph 106 and Haim, cited above, paragraph 26).
The Court has also held that that principle applies to any case in which a Member State breaches Community law, whichever is the authority of the Member State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 32; Case C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099, paragraph 62 and Haim, cited above, paragraph 27).
In international law a State which incurs liability for breach of an international commitment is viewed as a single entity, irrespective of whether the breach which gave rise to the damage is attributable to the legislature, the judiciary or the executive. That principle must apply a fortiori in the Community legal order since all State authorities, including the legislature, are bound in performing their tasks to comply with the rules laid down by Community law which directly govern the situation of individuals ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 34).
According to settled case-law, in the absence of Community legislation, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State to designate the competent courts and lay down the detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings intended fully to safeguard the rights which individuals derive from Community law (see the judgments in Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, paragraph 13; Case 68/79 Just [1980] ECR 501, paragraph 25; Frankovich and Others, cited above, paragraph 42, and Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECRI-4599, paragraph 12).
As to the conditions to be satisfied for a Member State to be required to make reparation for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State is responsible, the Court has held that these are threefold: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation incumbent on the State and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties ( Haim, cited above, paragraph 36).
Subject to the existence of a right to obtain reparation which is founded directly on Community law where the conditions mentioned above are met, it is on the basis of rules of national law on liability that the State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused, with the proviso that the conditions for reparation of loss and damage laid down by the national legislation must not be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and must not be so framed as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation ( Francovich and Others, paragraphs 41 to 43 and Norbrook Laboratories, paragraph 111).
Moreover, the Commission claims that, even if the special length-of-service increment at issue in the main proceedings is to be regarded as a loyalty bonus, it cannot justify an impediment to freedom of movement for workers. It considers that, in principle, Community law does not preclude an employer from seeking to retain qualified employees by offering increases in salary or bonuses to its staff depending on length of service in the undertaking. None the less, the loyalty bonus provided for in Article 50a of the GG is to be distinguished from bonuses which produce their effects solely within the undertaking inasmuch as it operates at the level of the Member State concerned to the exclusion of the other Member States and thus directly affects freedom of movement of teachers. Moreover, the Austrian universities are not only in competition with the establishments of the other Member States but also amongst themselves. Yet, the provision mentioned does not produce effects in regard to the latter type of competition.
It is clear from the case-law of the Court that it is, in principle, for the national courts to apply the criteria for establishing the liability of Member States for damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 58), in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Court for the application of those criteria ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraphs 55 to 57; British Telecommunications, cited above, paragraph 411; Joined Cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit and Others [1996] ECR I-5063, paragraph 49, and Konle, cited above, paragraph 58).
The Verwaltungsgerichtshof states in that order, inter alia, that in order to decide the issue pending before it: it is essential to know whether it is contrary to Community law under Article 48 of the EC Treaty ... for the Austrian legislature to make the grant of the special length-of-service increment for ordinary university professors, which is in the nature of neither a loyalty bonus nor a reward, but is rather a component of salary under the advancement system, dependent on 15 years service at an Austrian university.
In its judgment of 24 June 1998 the Verwaltungsgerichtshof held that, in its order for reference of 22 October 1997, it had taken the view that the special length of service increment for ordinary university professors is in the nature neither of a loyalty bonus nor of a reward, and that that interpretation of the law, which is not binding on the parties to proceedings before the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, cannot be upheld. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof then comes to the conclusion that that benefit is in fact a loyalty bonus.
Article 48 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 39 EC) and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community are to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the grant, under conditions such as those laid down in Article 50a of the Gehaltsgesetz 1956 (law on salaries of 1956), as amended in 1997, of a special length-of-service increment which, according to the interpretation of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) in its judgment of 24 June 1998, constitutes a loyalty bonus.
An infringement of Community law, such as that stemming in the circumstances of the main proceedings from the judgment of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof of 24 June 1998, does not have the requisite manifest character for liability under Community law to be incurred by a Member State for a decision of one of its courts adjudicating at last instance.