Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/756/842/162316/
Timestamp: 2020-02-25 13:16:40
Document Index: 739672252

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 258', '§ 257', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 4654', '§ 4654', '§ 258', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 2412', '§ 4654', '§ 4654']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. 640.00 Acres of Land, More or Less, in the County of Dade,state of Florida; and Virginia Land Company, Andunknown Owners, et al., Defendants-appellants, 756 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 1985 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. 640.00 Acres of Land, More or Less, in the County o...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. 640.00 Acres of Land, More or Less, in the County of Dade,state of Florida; and Virginia Land Company, Andunknown Owners, et al., Defendants-appellants, 756 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1985)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 756 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1985) April 3, 1985
Of the various methods of condemnation available to the federal government,2 two are most common. The more expeditious of these two methods is that prescribed by the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258a. Under this statute, the government obtains immediate title to the land upon the filing of a declaration of taking and the deposit into the court registry of the estimated just compensation. If just compensation as judicially determined is found to be greater than the deposit, the government must deposit the difference, with interest on the difference from the date of possession. The more frequently invoked method, however, is the so-called "straight condemnation" method, prescribed by 40 U.S.C. § 257. Under this statute, the government simply files a complaint in condemnation. Title does not pass at that time and no money is deposited into the court. Once the complaint is filed, the matter proceeds to trial to determine the amount of compensation due the landowner. Upon resolution of the compensation issue, the government has the option of either purchasing the property at the adjudicated price or dismissing the condemnation action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A(i) (3).
This appeal involves the "straight condemnation" method. On October 11, 1974, Congress authorized and established the Big Cypress National Preserve by enactment of Pub. L. No. 93-440, 88 Stat. 1255, and the government became committed to the project on that date. The Park Service, on March 20, 1978, obtained an appraisal of the subject property in the amount of $240,000 ($375 per acre). By letter dated April 11, 1978, the agency made an offer in the amount of the appraisal to the landowner. By letter dated June 13, 1978, the landowner rejected the offer, and made no counteroffer.
Because the negotiations had proven unsatisfactory, the United States initiated "straight condemnation" proceedings by filing a complaint in condemnation on behalf of the Park Service on November 27, 1978. The valuation trial was set before a commission appointed pursuant to Rule 71A(h), Fed. R. Civ. P., on March 9, 1981. On November 20, 1980, the government requested an updated appraisal by its contract appraiser for purposes of trial, since in "straight" condemnation proceedings value is fixed as of the date of trial. The government received an appraisal in the amount of $256,000 ($400 per acre) on January 16, 1981.
On October 29, 1981, defendants moved the district court to award attorneys' fees, costs and litigation expenses pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). On March 10, 1982, the United States deposited $368,000 plus $28,935 in interest pursuant to the order for just compensation as of October 21, 1981. On March 22, 1982, the district court denied the motion for attorneys' fees holding the Act not to apply to land condemnation cases. This appeal followed.
Despite the conclusion suggested by these tools of statutory construction, the government argues that application of the "substantial re-enactment" doctrine indicates that landowners cannot be "prevailing parties" under the EAJA. This doctrine provides that where the pre-amendment words of an amended section of a statute reappear in the amended version of the statute, the words ordinarily shall continue to be construed in the amended version as they were construed in the pre-amendment version.11 The government's reliance on the "substantial re-enactment" doctrine is premised on the fact that before 28 U.S.C. § 2412 was amended by the EAJA, it permitted an award of costs, but not fees or expenses, in government suits. Under this prior version of Sec. 2412, the government asserts that courts uniformly considered the government the only possible prevailing party in a condemnation proceeding. Thus, the government contends that the substantial re-enactment doctrine requires courts to interpret amended Sec. 2412 in the same manner.
We reject the government's attempt to apply the "substantial re-enactment" doctrine under the circumstances of this case. While former Sec. 2412 may not have contemplated landowners in condemnation cases, the legislative history, as discussed above, reveals that Congress understood the EAJA to permit fee awards in condemnation cases. Thus, Congress employed the same language, but it is clear that a different meaning was to attach.12 Indeed, it seems likely that Congress had other fee shifting statutes in mind, not prior Sec. 2412, when it enacted the EAJA13 ; the "prevailing party" language is not unique to the EAJA, and courts have looked to other fee shifting statutes, rather than the prior version of Sec. 2412, for guidance in construing the EAJA.14 In any event, the prior construction was neither widespread nor long-standing, which weakens any inference that Congress knew of those prior interpretations of Sec. 2412 when it enacted the EAJA.15 Thus, we reject the government's reliance on the substantial re-enactment doctrine and hold that, under proper circumstances, a landowner in a condemnation case may be a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA.
[I]f property owners who recover more than the government offers as just compensation in condemnation cases are not considered prevailing parties for purposes of Sec. 2412(d), the EAJA would essentially have no effect in condemnation actions. Unless property owners who win more money as just compensation can be prevailing parties, the only property owners who could qualify for prevailing party status would be those property owners who successfully challenge the government's authority to condemn or if condemnation proceedings against their property are abandoned, which was precisely the situation that existed under 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a), before the enactment of the EAJA. Such a narrow interpretation of "prevailing party" precludes application of Sec. 2412(d) to condemnation actions, contrary to Congressional intent.
For condemnation cases in this circuit we apply a test from the Hensley teaching: Did the landowner succeed in achieving some benefit as a consequence of litigating the valuation issue with the government? If the government's pre-litigation offer is enhanced by more than a trivial or inconsequential amount, then the landowner has prevailed. We reach this conclusion because of the very close relationship between the decisional process in determining whether a landowner was a "prevailing party" and whether the government was "substantially justified" in not settling the valuation without litigation. (See Part III infra) . Since the only issue in these cases is the value of the land, a comparison of the government's pre-litigation offer to the amount awarded influences the decisional process in determining both whether the landowner "prevailed" and whether the government was "substantially justified."
Because existing law provides automatically for the award of attorney fees to a condemnee in certain limited situations (such as where the government is unable to condemn the property or abandons the proceeding),18 the government argues that, in view of the saving clause, existing statutory authority limits a landowner's recovery in condemnation cases. Interpreting the EAJA to permit fee awards in condemnation cases other than those contemplated by existing law, the government argues, would "modify" or "supersede" that provision in contravention of the saving clause. We reject this argument, however, and agree with the Fifth Circuit that "the Act ... supplements and does not impermissibly replace or supersede, the pre-existing award provision of 42 U.S.C. § 4654, for award of landowner litigation expenses in the limited situations where the United States cannot acquire or chooses to abandon the land."19 Therefore, the saving clause does not preclude the EAJA from applying to a condemnation proceeding such as the one involved here.
While the conclusions we have reached thus far are our own, the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions have been instructive. The government argues that we should not be persuaded by those Circuit decisions because those cases involved condemnation under the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258a, while the instant case is a "straight" condemnation under Sec. 257. As already noted, a Sec. 257 proceeding differs from a Sec. 258a proceeding in that the government deposits no funds until after just compensation is determined and can dismiss the case at any time until payment is made, including after the amount of compensation is fixed.20 The United States, however, cannot dismiss the complaint with impunity. Even before Congress enacted the EAJA, courts were required to award "reasonable attorney ... fees, actually incurred because of the condemnation proceeding, if--... (2) the proceeding is abandoned by the United States."21 Thus, with respect to Sec. 257 straight condemnation cases, the EAJA would come into play only in those instances where, as here, the amount of just compensation is in dispute and the government exercises its option to purchase the property for the adjudicated amount. This scenario is effectively the same as the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Sec. 258a cases: in either instance, the government acquires the land for an amount of money greater than it offered to the condemnee, and the condemnee is forced to incur attorneys' fees to achieve that result. Therefore, we extend the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' reasoning and hold that the EAJA is applicable in Sec. 257 straight condemnation proceedings.22
Under S. 265, fees will be awarded unless the Government can show that its action was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. This standard balances the constitutional obligation of the executive branch to see that the laws are faithfully executed against the public interest in encouraging parties to vindicate their rights. Unlike the dual standards under the Civil Rights Acts developed in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 [88 S. Ct. 964, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263] (1968) (prevailing plaintiffs should ordinarily recover their attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render an award unjust) and in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 421 [98 S. Ct. 694, 700, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648] (1978) (prevailing defendants should recover fees only upon a finding that a plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation), the standard in S. 265 is tailored to cover both prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants in general litigation against the Government.
Finally, the government argues that because the district court entered judgment on May 29, 1981, this case was not "pending" on October 1, 1981, as is required by EAJA, and, therefore, the Act is inapplicable. The very nature of a straight condemnation proceeding, however, belies the government's position. " [T]he United States may dismiss a [straight] condemnation suit at any time before 'compensation has been determined and paid ....' "24 In the instant case, the government did not deposit any funds in the court's registry until March 10, 1982. Thus, for purposes of the EAJA, this case was pending as of October 1, 1981.
In a "straight" condemnation under 40 U.S.C.A. Sec. 257, the government files a complaint in condemnation, but neither takes title to the land nor deposits any money with the district court. The complaint informs the landowner of the government's desire to take title to the land, and requests the court to make a determination of the just rate of compensation for the land. In some cases the court may determine that the land is not subject to condemnation; in most cases it simply determines the appropriate compensation. Until the actual taking of the property, the government may discontinue or abandon the proceeding since determination of the award is an offer subject to acceptance by the government, giving the government the opportunity to determine whether the valuation makes the cost of the public project financially feasible. A Section 257 condemnation proceeding is merely a means by which the sovereign may find out what a piece of property will cost. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231, 84 L. Ed. 240 (1939); United States v. 2,175.68 Acres of Land, 696 F.2d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599, 602-03, 67 S. Ct. 606, 608, 91 L. Ed. 532 (1947).
This interpretation of "prevailing party" is, moreover, the only one which is consistent with 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4654, the pre-existing statute governing the award of attorney's fees in "straight" condemnation cases. That provision states that a landowner may recover costs and litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, in condemnation cases in which the government's power to take the land is denied or in which the government abandons the condemnation proceeding. The majority contests the charge of inconsistency, stating that its interpretation of "prevailing party" under the EAJA only "supplements" the awards available under Section 4654. But there is no doubt that the majority's position is inconsistent insofar as it alters the congressional judgment implicit in Section 4654 as to when a landowner may be said to have prevailed in a "straight" condemnation proceeding. See United States v. 329.73 Acres, Grenada and Yalobusha Ctys, 704 F.2d 800, 816 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rubin, J., dissenting). Such interference with the pre-existing statutory scheme, which is proscribed by the "saving" and "exceptions" clauses of the EAJA, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2412(d) (1) (A), can be avoided by the recognition that, when the government takes title to land following a "straight" condemnation proceeding, it "prevails" under the EAJA as well as under Section 4654.
Pub. L. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412, 80 Stat. 308
The Supreme Court in Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2190-91, 81 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6-7 (1984), identified four distinct methods
United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land, 751 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1984)
United States v. 101.80 Acres of Land, 716 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1983)
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A) (1982)
Matthews v. United States, 713 F.2d 677, 683-684 (11th Cir. 1983)
Scarborough v. OPM, 723 F.2d 801, 812 (11th Cir. 1984)
In discussing the "prevailing party" requirement, a House Report stated that " [i]t is the committee's intention that the interpretation of the term in S. 265 be consistent with the law that has developed under existing [fee shifting] statutes." H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4953, 4990
E.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, 735 F.2d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 1984) (referring to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988)
461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 46 (1983) quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978). Although the Hensley case involved an action for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court stated that " [t]he standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party.' " 103 S. Ct. at 1939 n. 7. See also National Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, (looking to Sec. 1988 cases for guidance in determining "prevailing party" status under the EAJA); 735 F.2d at 1279
Pub. L. No. 96-481, Sec. 206, 94 Stat. 2321, 2330 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 note (Supp.1980))
42 U.S.C. § 4654(a). This provision is discussed at Part C, infra
42 U.S.C. § 4654(a)
Our circuit has discussed the "substantially justified" requirement in other contexts, which are not helpful in condemnation cases. See Matthews v. United States, 713 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1983); Martin v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1984) (vacated by order of court granting rehearing en banc, 733 F.2d 1502); Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1984). The Eighth Circuit in 341.45 Acres, supra, 751 F.2d at 940-41 concludes that the government is substantially justified if its offer is based upon and consistent with its expert witnesses' appraisals and the government was not guilty of abusive conduct
Kirby Forest, supra note 2, at 2195 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A(i) (emphasis supplied))