Source: https://namiblii.org/na/judgment/supreme-court/2013/3
Timestamp: 2020-04-10 02:55:30
Document Index: 392893840

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 12', 'Art 26', 'Arts 5', 'art 1', 'Art 11', 'Art 12', 'Art 12', 'Art 22', 'Art 12', 'Art 79', 'Art 12', 'Art 12', 'Art 12', 'Art 12', 'in fine']

Attorney-General of Namibia v Minister of Justice and Others (P.12/2009) [2013] NASC 3 (04 April 2013); | Namibia Legal Information Institute
Coram:	SHIVUTE, CJ, MARITZ, JA and STRYDOM, AJA
Heard on:	09 July 2010
'1.	Whether or not sections 245 and 332(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977, as amended, are unconstitutional on the contended grounds that the impugned provisions:
(iv)	further infringe any general right to silence an accused may have under Art 12 of the Constitution.
(b)	subsection (3)(a) to the extent that the law in question imposes upon any person charged with a criminal offence the burden of proving particular facts.'
(a)	In the determination of their civil rights and obligations or any criminal charges against them, all persons shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial and competent Court or Tribunal established by law: provided that such Court or Tribunal may exclude the press and/or the public from all or any part of the trial for reasons of morals, the public order or national security, as is necessary in a democratic society.
(2)	No persons shall be liable to be tried, convicted or punished again for any criminal offence for which they have already been convicted or acquitted according to law: provided that nothing in this Sub-Art shall be construed as changing the provisions of the common law defences of “previous acquittal” and “previous conviction”.
(3)	No persons shall be tried or convicted for any criminal offence or on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time when it was committed, nor shall a penalty be imposed exceeding that which was applicable at the time when the offence was committed.’
'Article 24	Derogation
(2)	Where any persons are detained by virtue of such authorisation as is referred to in Sub-Art (1) hereof, the following provisions shall apply:
(a)	they shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case not more than five (5) days after the commencement of their detention, be furnished with a statement in writing in a language that they understand specifying in detail the grounds upon which they are detained and, at their request, this statement shall be read to them;
(b)	not more than fourteen (14) days after the commencement of their detention, a notification shall be published in the Gazette stating that they have been detained and giving particulars of the provision of law under which their detention is authorised;
(c)	not more than one (1) month after the commencement of their detention and thereafter during their detention at intervals of not more than three (3) months, their cases shall be reviewed by the Advisory Board referred to in Art 26 (5)(c) hereof, which shall order their release from detention if it is satisfied that it is not reasonably necessary for the purposes of the emergency to continue the detention of such persons;
(d)	they shall be afforded such opportunity for the making of representations as may be desirable or expedient in the circumstances, having regard to the public interest and the interests of the detained persons.
(3)	Nothing contained in this Art shall permit a derogation from or suspension of the fundamental rights or freedoms referred to in Arts 5, 6. 8, 9, 10, 12, 14,15,18,19 and 21(1)(a) (b), (c) and (e) hereof, or the denial of access by any persons to legal practitioners or a Court of law.'
Against the backdrop of the need to comply with the Convention on Human Rights and not to infringe the Human Rights Act, 1998 recent case law of the courts in England and Wales also shows a trend to uphold reverse onus provisions within certain limits. The approach is summarised in Phipson on Evidence 17thed (Sweet & Maxwell 2010), by Malek (ed) at 6-36, where the learned editor, having distilled the principles to be applied from leading decisions of the House of Lords, described the position in the following terms:
'Evidence on charge of which false representation is element
The successful prosecution of the crime of fraud would normally require, amongst others, proof by the State beyond reasonable doubt that the accused made a misrepresentation knowing it to be false.33 The enactment of the presumption has been substantiated on the basis that it deals with matters that are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused and that proving the state of mind of the accused in the context of a false representation is much more difficult than in other cases34. The effect of the section is that, in a prosecution where an accused charged with a crime in which knowledge of the falsity of the representation is an element, the presumption becomes operative once the State has proved that the accused had made the false representation. The onus is then on the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that he or she did not know at the time that the representation was false.35 The principal basis on which the presumption is being challenged is that, in the absence of such proof by the accused to discharge the onus on him or her and in the circumstances where the probabilities are, for example even, the court would be obliged to convict ‘notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt regarding the state of mind of the accused.’36 Whether the statutory reverse onus presumption created by s. 245 falls within the ambit of permissible limitations on the constitutional presumption of innocence is what must be considered next.
Reverse onus presumptions and evidential presumptions are not necessarily unconstitutional. This much is clear from decisions in this jurisdiction such as, for example, Freiremar, Van den Berg and S v Shikunga1997 NR 156 (SC). The same approach is also evident from judgments in other jurisdictions within the region, such as inChogugudza, Meakerand Zumacases. It has become necessary to consider these cases in some detail. The Freiremar-matter concerned the constitutionality of the proviso to s 17 of the Sea Fisheries Act, 58 of 1973,37 that provided as follows:
Drawing from Canadian cases considering the general limitation clause in art 1 when applied to the presumption of innocence in Art 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Strydom JP observed that the fact that a reverse onus is placed on an accused does not necessarily make the reverse onus provision unconstitutional. Much will depend on whether the provision in question satisfies the 'rational connection' test. Expanding on the application of the rational connection test in cases applied by the High Court of Namibia, Strydom JP stated38 that:
In Van den Berg’s-case the High Court grappled with the question whether the reverse onus provision in s 35A of the Diamond Industry Protection Proclamation, 1967, violated the presumption of innocence Art 12(1)(d) of the Constitution. Paragraph (b) of the section provided that if ‘the person charged contends that any article or substance, the subject of the charge is not a rough and uncut diamond, the burden of proving that...such article or substance is not a rough or uncut diamond...shall lie upon the person charged.’ After an extensive analysis of relevant Canadian, United States and Namibian authorities as to presumptions imposing burden of proof on an accused and a comparative examination of Art 12(1)(d), the Court extracted guidelines to be applied in determining the constitutionality of the reverse onus provision and concluded39 that the impugned presumption could not survive the rational connection test because it failed to mount the first leg, i.e. because there was no provision for a fact to be proved by the State with which the presumed fact could be connected. It held that the provision placed the onus squarely on the accused to prove the absence of an element of the offence: the element being that the diamonds bought, sold or possessed were rough and uncut. The Court thereafter proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the presumption in paragraph (a) of the section which placed a burden on the person charged to prove that he or she was the holder of a licence, permit or authority or was otherwise entitled or authorised to be in possession of, or authorised to buy, receive, sell, offer for sale, deal in, barter, pledge or otherwise dispose of or deliver, or to import or export any diamond. Applying the guidelines earlier referred to, the Court concluded that the reverse onus presumption in para (a) of the section was constitutional.
'(a)	The presumption must not place the entire onus on the accused. There is always an onus on the State to bring the accused within the general framework of a statute or regulation before any onus can be placed upon the accused for his defence.
(b)	The presumption may relate to a state of mind, that is, mensrea, where the element of the crime is a fact exclusively or particularly within the knowledge of the accused.
(c)	A presumption will be regarded a reasonable if it places an onus upon the accused where proof by the prosecution of such a specific fact is a matter of impossibility or difficulty; whereas such fact is well known to the accused;
(d)	The presumption must not be irrebuttable.40' (Reference to authorities omitted)
Meaker’s-case concerned the question whether the presumption contained in s 130 of the South African Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989 offended the presumption of innocence provided for by s 35(3)(h) of that country's Constitution. In the judgment rendered by Cameron J (Mailula J concurring), the court held that whether s 130 infringed the Constitution and, if so, whether it was justified, depended largely on facts concerning the social milieu which gave rise to the legislation. The relevance of the evidence which the parties had tendered was confined to assisting the court in what is in essence a common sense analysis of s 130 and in answering the question whether its application was reasonably justified. As to the question whether the section in question was constitutional, the court held further that it was not difficult to conclude that s 130 offended against the right to be presumed innocent as provided for by s 35(3)(h) of the South African Constitution. Regarding the issue of whether s 130 was saved by the provisions of s 36 of that country's Constitution, the Court distilled41 the following principles from Constitutional Court decisions on reverse onus provisions:
The Zuma-matter, concerned the constitutionality of s 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. Writing for the unanimous South African Constitutional Court, Kentridge AJ embarked upon a survey of case law of other jurisdictions in open and democratic societies and came to the conclusion that 'reverse onus provisions were by no means uncommon and were not necessarily unconstitutional'.42 He went on to state that reverse onus provisions in South African statute law were also not uncommon.43 I pause to observe that on this score, and as previously alluded to, the position in Namibia is no different. Kentridge AJ recognised that the prosecution authorities in appropriate cases may require reasonable presumptions to assist them in the execution of the important task of prosecution so as to meet the ‘pressing social need for the effective prosecution of crime’. I respectfully share this view. Kentridge AJ, explained the various types of presumptions and the scope of the judgment in theZuma-matter44 as follows:
‘The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and human dignity of any and every person accused by the State of criminal conduct. An individual charged with a criminal offence faces grave social and personal consequences, including potential loss of physical liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracism from the community, as well as other social, psychological and economic harms. In light of the gravity of these consequences, the presumption of innocence is crucial. It ensures that until the State proves an accused’s guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, he or she is innocent. This is essential in a society committed to fairness and social justice.’45
In Coetzee the South African Constitutional Court found, unanimously and as previously mentioned, that s 245 was in conflict with the long-established rule of the common law that the burden of proof had always been on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that to that extent the provision had infringed the presumption of innocence entrenched in s 25(3)(c) of the South African Interim Constitution.46
The differences between the two constitutions in the formulation of the right to a fair trial and the other constituent rights relating thereto as emphasised by him in argument are apparent and duly noted. They are by and large the result of different constitutional mechanisms employed to protect the substance of those rights: The South African Constitution, for example, has an extensive general limitation clause equally applicable to the individual rights protected in their Constitution’s Bill of Rights47, unlike the Namibian Constitution which, in addition to certain limitations of general application mentioned in Art 22, authorises the further limitation only in respect of some of the rights and freedoms and, in most such instances, defines the permissible ambit of such limitations differently and with due regard to the specific right or freedom in question. Mr Gauntlett went on to argue that where Art 12(1)(f) of the Constitution provides that 'no person shall be compelled to give testimony against themselves,' it does not in principle preclude a rebuttal presumption of knowledge or a presumption that merely places an evidentiary burden on an accused person and it is not unconstitutional to discharge a purely evidentiary burden. He contended that a statutory provision that imposes an evidentiary burden does not violate the presumption of innocence because there is no possibility of being convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Counsel accordingly submitted that the presumption deals with matters that are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. The accused is in the best position to explain why he or she did not know that the presentation was false. The section requires of him or her to advance facts to which he or she has easy access and which would be unreasonable to expect of the prosecution to disprove. There is also a logical connection between the facts which the State is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt and the presumed fact.
The majority nevertheless found that the Legislature was 'fully entitled to place a positive duty on directors and to make omission to discharge that duty an offence'.48 The majority was concerned about the manner that positive duty had been placed on directors, pointing out the effect of merely changing the form of the provision to require the accused, rather than the prosecution, to prove elements which are essential to the guilt or innocence of the accused person.49
In a minority judgment, Kentridge AJ took a different approach. He commenced his judgment by examining the nature of the provision and, in line with the views of the learned authors De Wet and Swanepoel,50 stated that the subsection does not create a new type of offence, but 'undoubtedly creates a new form of liability for the offence of another.'51 He opined that it was clear from the language of the subsection that it was the intention of the legislature to create a new form of vicarious liability. Kentridge AJ went on to say that though vicarious criminal liability was unknown to the Roman-Dutch common law, it was a common phenomenon in modern statute law world-wide informed by the complexities of societies as consequences of industrialisation and modernisation. In the light of these developments, it became necessary and imperative to embark upon measures aimed at controlling, in the public interest, the conduct of corporations involved in these activities.52Kentridge AJ expressed the view that the legislature did not create an absolute vicarious liability in s 332(5). Instead, it chose to mitigate what would have been the harshness of the provision, by allowing an accused falling within its reach to escape liability upon proof on a balance of probabilities of the two exempting factors, namely 'that he did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he could not have prevented it'.53 The learned Acting Justice went on to observe that it cannot be said in the circumstances that by rendering the impact of the section less severe than it would have otherwise been, the Legislature was thereby rendering a trial under the subsection less fair than it would otherwise have been.54 Although he would have considered the analysis he offered about the nature and scope of the subsection to be 'a complete answer' to the attack based on the ground of a fair trial provision in the South African Interim Constitution, he nevertheless found it necessary to deal with the other contention of the applicants in that case, i.e. that whatever the position might have had been, the effect of the subsection was to permit the conviction of an accused person notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt as to their guilt, which would in turn offend the presumption of innocence.55Kentridge AJ indentified the object of the provision to be as follows:
He rejected the contention that the subsection created a new offence, or a new criminal liability, an essential element of which is that an accused must have participated in the commission of the offence and must have been able to prevent its commission. He reasoned instead that the clause in fact did not constitute an element which the prosecution must negative, 'but in terms creates an exemption or excuse which the accused may prove by way of defence'. All that needs to be charged and proved is that the accused was a director or servant of a corporate body that was liable to be prosecuted for a specific offence. It is then left for the accused to bring himself or herself within the permitted defence.56Kentridge AJ next dealt with the alternative submissions informed by Canadian jurisprudence, namely that once a criminal statute contained a reverse onus provision requiring the accused to provide proof of some fact in order to escape conviction, it mattered not whether that onus related to an essential element of the offence or to a defence by way of excuse or one by way of exemption. In either case, so the argument went, the presumption of innocence was destroyed and the fairness of the trial impaired. The learned Acting Justice observed in this regard that even judges of the Canadian Supreme Court themselves pointed out that the protections to be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights are to be interpreted and applied according to the context in which they may arise and not in the abstract.57 After a careful analysis of certain of the Canadian authorities relied upon for the contentions, Kentridge AJ concluded that those cases were decided in a completely different statutory context. Although they dealt with offences of strict liability, they did not directly deal with a provision imposing a vicarious liability such as the subsection.58 They did not therefore support the contentions made by counsel. Kentridge AJ also pointed out that the burden of proof imposed by s 332(5) is substantially less than in some of statutes considered in certain of the Canadian authorities relied upon for the proposition under consideration.
'The presumption does not have the effect of requiring the accused unfairly to discharge a major ingredient of the offence for no reason at all. A strong suspicion will have been created on the facts proved by the State from which a permissible inference could be drawn... The accused is simply called upon to reveal something peculiarly within his knowledge...This seems to me essentially an exercise in common sense.'59
Kentridge AJ observed in Coetzee60 that s 332(5) has been part of South African statute law since 1939. The learned Justice decisively commented on what is expected of those that take positions of control of corporations and remarked as follows:
Although the expression may well be severable, regard being had to the test for severability as endorsed by this Court in the Cultura 2000-case,61 the application before the Court only requires of it to provide answers to the questions posed regarding the constitutionality of the impugned provisions. The terms of the referral under Art 79 and the nature of the relief prayed for in the Notice of Motion do not require of the Court to excise any phrases or provisions from the impugned sections or, for that matter, to strike any of the sections which offends the Constitution. I assume that the relief prayed for has been deliberately cast in that form to allow accused persons and institutions of State alike to take such further action, based on the determination of the issues by this Court as they may be allowed or advised to take. For these reasons I conclude that the reverse onus presumptions created by the impugned provisions exceed the scope of limitations authorised in respect of the right to be presumed innocent under Art 12(1)(d). In as much as the presumption of innocence is also a necessary and inseparable component of the overarching right to a fair trial in the determination of criminal charges against accused persons protected by Art 12(1)(a), it follows that the latter right is also unconstitutionally diminished as a result. In view of the conclusion which I have reached, it is not necessary to elaborate on the question whether the impugned sections also infringe accused persons’ right not to be compelled to give testimony against themselves as protected under Art 12(1)(f) or other rights or privileges associated with it. Suffice it to say that if the onus contemplated in s 245 would have been evidential in nature and the expression ‘or servant’ would have been omitted in s 332(5), the effect of the ameliorated presumptive provisions in the impugned sections would not have unconstitutionally diminished any of the rights protected under Art 12.
(a)	the provisions of s 245 cast a mandatory legal onus on an accused person, charged with an offence of which a false representation is an element, to prove on a balance of probabilities that he or she did not know that the representation was false once the State has proved that he or she had made the false representation;
(b)	a servant of a corporate body is in terms of s 332(5) deemed to be guilty of an offence committed for which the corporate body is or was liable to be prosecuted, unless he or she proves on a balance of probabilities that he or she did not take part in the commission of the offence and could not have prevented it
33S v Nakare 1992 NR 99 (HC) at 100H
34 id. par 14
35S v Van Niekerk 1981 (3) SA 787 (T) at 790A-B
36Coetzee at par 5
37 Replaced by the Sea Fisheries Act 29 of 1992, which was in turn replaced by the Marine Resources Act 27 of 2000
38 At 26B-D
39At 66H
40 At 33C in fine-34C
41 At 75f-i
42 At 653D-E
44 At 662E-I
45 At 212-13
46 At par 8
47See; S 36 of the South African Constitution.
48 At 547F
49 At 547G
50 De Wet and Swanepoel Strafreg 4th ed. at 61 note 83
51 At 561E-F
52 At 561G-562A
53 At 563B-D
55 At 563D-E
56 At 564A-B
57 At 565C-D
58 At 566I-567B
59 At 35E-F
60 At 573D-E
61At 346D-E where it held as follows ‘The test to be applied is set out as follows in the judgment of Centlivres CJ in the case of Johannesburg City Council v Chesterfield House (Pty) Ltd 1952 (3) SA 809 (A) (at 822C-F):
S v Nghixulifwa (CC 02/2014) NAHCMD 326 (17 October 2018);