Source: https://m.openjurist.org/973/f2d/490/harvis-v-roadway-express-inc
Timestamp: 2019-11-12 01:47:14
Document Index: 384188443

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 101', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 402', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981']

973 F2d 490 Harvis v. Roadway Express Inc | OpenJurist
973 F. 2d 490 - Harvis v. Roadway Express Inc
973 F2d 490 Harvis v. Roadway Express Inc
973 F.2d 490
61 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 91, 59 Empl.
Prac. Dec. P 41,699
James T. HARVIS, Jr., Plaintiff,
Maurice Rivers and Robert C. Davison, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Denied Oct. 13, 1992.
In this race discrimination case, the appellants originally claimed they were discharged because of racial discrimination and now state that the claim was also for retaliatory discharge for winning a grievance, exercised for racial reasons. The claim was dismissed by the district court based upon the United States Supreme Court ruling in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). On appeal, appellants argue that the district court misapplied Patterson, but that even if their claim had been properly dismissed, this court should reinstate their claim by retroactively applying to this case the new Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA of 1991), Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which explicitly enacted the interpretation of § 1981 rejected in Patterson. We reverse on the grounds that the district court misapplied Patterson to dismiss appellants' retaliatory discharge claim. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the race discrimination in firing claim, and hold that the CRA of 1991 should be not applied retroactively to this case.
The district court then separated Harvis's case, which went to trial and ended in a jury verdict on the § 1981 claim for Roadway. The district court ordered judgment against Harvis on his § 1981 and Title VII claims. Harvis's appeal to this court was denied and the trial court's judgment affirmed. Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 923 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.1991).
On June 15, 1989, shortly after Harvis's verdict and before appellants went to trial, the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), which held that the right to make contracts protected by § 1981 does not apply to conditions of employment, but only covers discrimination in the formation of the employment contract or the right to enforce the contract. The district court, while holding that Patterson was not retroactive with respect to Harvis's jury verdict, held it did have retroactive effect on the untried and pending § 1981 claims of Rivers and Davison. The district court concluded that appellants' claims were for discriminatory discharge and thus, based on Patterson, could not be maintained under § 1981. Rivers and Davison argued that their claims were not simply for discriminatory discharge, but rather for retaliation for their success in enforcing contract rights in a grievance hearing. However, the district court held that these were only basic breach of contract claims, and not claims based on the right to enforce contracts, which would fall under § 1981. After dismissing the § 1981 claims, the district court held a bench trial on plaintiffs' Title VII claims and ruled in favor of Roadway, holding that Rivers and Davison failed to establish that their discharge from employment was based upon their race.
The Patterson court limited the scope of § 1981 actions by holding that § 1981 does not apply to discrimination in conditions of employment, but only prohibits discrimination in the formation of the employment contract or the right to enforce the contract. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176, 109 S.Ct. at 2372. Thus, under Patterson, § 1981 "covers only conduct at the initial formation of the contract and conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract obligations through legal process." Id. at 179, 109 S.Ct. at 2374.
While Patterson did not directly address the issue of whether § 1981 applied to discriminatory discharges, this court, along with a majority of other courts, has held that claims of discriminatory discharge are no longer cognizable under § 1981 because discharge does not involve contract formation. See Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2889, 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991); Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2917, 115 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991). The plaintiffs, below and on appeal, argue that theirs were not discriminatory discharge claims, but rather, claims of retaliatory discharge where plaintiffs were punished for attempting to enforce their contract rights to be treated equally with white people. The district court rejected this claim as "bootstrapping" and held that this was solely a discriminatory discharge case.
Before deciding whether or not Patterson was correctly applied, we must first address whether the district court was correct in retroactively applying Patterson to the claims of Rivers and Davison. Our circuit has twice held that Patterson does apply retroactively to pending cases. In Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., supra, we applied Patterson retroactively to a pending discriminatory discharge case based on three factors used to determine whether an exception mandating non-retroactivity exists, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Under these factors, a decision will not be applied retroactively if, first, it
Id. at 106, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (citations omitted). The second retroactivity factor is the "prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355. Finally, the third factor involves weighing "the inequity imposed by retroactive application" to avoid "injustice or hardship." Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355.
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177-78, 109 S.Ct. at 2373.
However, the prohibited conduct of impairing the ability to enforce contract rights is exactly what appellants are complaining about here. Rivers and Davison were punished, they contend, for trying to utilize the established legal process for their grievances. The fact that Roadway allowed formal "access" to legal process does not imply that it could never be impairing the employee's "ability to enforce through legal process." An employer's intimidation and punishment conducted inside formal legal process may impair an employee's contract rights just as much as intimidation and punishment conducted outside formal legal process. See Carter v. South Central Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2916, 115 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1991) (court emphasized that the alleged conduct must have impaired the plaintiff's ability to enforce contractual rights either through court or otherwise on the basis of race).
Appellants' claims are similar to those in Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne National Lab., 760 F.Supp. 1310, 1318 (N.D.Ill.1991), where plaintiffs were permitted to proceed to trial on their § 1981 claims that "defendants specifically retaliated against them for pursuing (or intending to pursue) their contract claims in the internal grievance forum." Id. at 1318 (emphasis in original). We do not agree with appellee's argument that Von Zuckerstein is distinguishable because it involved an employer who impaired or impeded the plaintiffs from using the available legal process to enforce a specific anti-discrimination contract right. However, § 1981 speaks of the right to "enforce contracts," which includes any contract rights, not just anti-discrimination contract rights. The key here is that plaintiffs were impaired from enforcing contract rights, not the kind of contract right they were impaired from enforcing. Just because Rivers and Davison were allowed to use the available legal process does not mean the employer did not discriminate against them through retaliation for the very act of using that legal process. Retaliation is defined more broadly than mere access to legal process. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 111 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1306, 113 L.Ed.2d 241 (1991), held that retaliation "is a common method of deterrence." We hold that appellants have articulated this essential element of § 1981, that their ability to enforce claimed contract rights was impaired because of their race.
A similar situation existed in Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990), where Lytle, a Black machinist for a subsidiary of Household Manufacturing, was dismissed for unexcused absences. Lytle filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging that he had been treated differently than white employees who missed work. He then brought discriminatory discharge and retaliation claims under § 1981 and Title VII. The district court dismissed Lytle's § 1981 claims, concluding that Title VII provided the exclusive remedy for his racial discharge and retaliation claims. At a bench trial on the Title VII claims, the district court dismissed Lytle's discriminatory discharge claims pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., and granted defendants summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court's findings with respect to Title VII claims collaterally estopped Lytle from litigating his § 1981 claims because the elements of a cause of action under § 1981 are identical to those under Title VII. Lytle, 494 U.S. at 549, 110 S.Ct. at 1335; see also Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 756 F.Supp. 1547, 1555 (M.D.Ga.1991). The Supreme Court reversed, based on plaintiff's seventh amendment right to trial by jury in "suits at common law," noting that:
Lytle, 494 U.S. at 550, 110 S.Ct. at 1335 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court distinguished the Lytle situation, where the equitable and legal claims were brought together, from the situation in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), where the Supreme Court held that "an equitable determination can have collateral-estoppel effect in subsequent legal action and that this estoppel does not violate the Seventh Amendment." Lytle, 494 U.S. at 550-51, 110 S.Ct. at 1336 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 335, 99 S.Ct. at 653) (emphasis added).
We find that our situation falls squarely under the Lytle precedent and hold that collateral estoppel does not preclude relitigation of issues decided by the district court in its bench trial resolution of the equitable claims of Rivers and Davison under Title VII. As in Lytle, the purposes served by collateral estoppel do not justify applying the doctrine in this case. Id. 494 U.S. at 553, 110 S.Ct. at 1337. Collateral estoppel is designed to protect parties from multiple lawsuits and potentially inconsistent decisions, as well as to conserve judicial resources. Ibid. Although remanding for further proceedings certainly will expend greater judicial resources, such litigation is essential in preserving Rivers's and Davison's seventh amendment rights to a jury trial.
Pub.L. 102-166, § 101(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
Both this Circuit and the Eighth Circuit have addressed whether this act should apply retroactively to § 1981 claims that were pending on appeal at the time of enactment. Both circuits have ruled that the CRA of 1991 does not apply retroactively. Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.1992); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.1992).
Both Vogel and Fray examine the history of judicial treatment of retroactivity as applied to new legislation. Building upon both Roman civil law and English common law, up to 1969 it was a well-established principle in American jurisprudence that legislation must be applied only prospectively unless the legislature specifically decreed a retroactive application. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1374. However, in Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969), and in Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a new statute must be retroactively applied to a case that was pending on appeal at enactment "unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016.
Later, in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988), the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires the result." Id. at 208, 109 S.Ct. at 471. While the Supreme Court acknowledged this tension in the case law in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990), the court did not have to resolve the issue, as congressional intent was found to be clear in that case.
Given these conflicting rules of construction, both the Vogel and Fray courts examined the language and legislative history of the CRA of 1991 and concluded that it should not be applied retroactively. For example, § 402 of Pub.L. 102-166 states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, this Act and the Amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment." While appellants argue that this indicates retroactivity, the Vogel court correctly noted that this language could mean that the Act applies to pending cases or it could mean it should be applied only to conduct occurring as of that date of enactment. Vogel, 959 F.2d at 597-98.
Vogel, 959 F.2d at 598, citing United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (6th Cir.1991).
I concur with the majority opinion in full, except that which is listed in part III. It is my opinion that Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), does not permit a claim for retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 under the facts of this case. It may be that Patterson precludes any retaliatory claims under § 1981, but this court need not go that far.
The majority relies upon the decisions in McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1306, 113 L.Ed.2d 241 (1991); and Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 760 F.Supp. 1310 (N.D.Ill.1991). However, McKnight did not hold that § 1981 allows a claim for retaliation. Instead, it assumed that it was so actionable "provided that the retaliation had a racial motivation." McKnight, 908 F.2d at 111. Then, the court went on to find that the plaintiff in that case "might be guilty of violating section 1981." Id. at 112 (emphasis added). It further stated that the question need not be pursued, "because General Motors did not interfere with contractual entitlements." Id.
Instead, I would follow the decision in Carter v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2916, 115 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1991), which held that § 1981 no longer extends to retaliatory termination. Although that case is somewhat different from this one, in that the plaintiff asserted that he was retaliated against because of filing a charge with the EEOC, which was a statutory right, not a contractual right, nevertheless, the court stated:
Id. at 840-841. Accord Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470, 472-473 (9th Cir.1989), cited with approval in Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2917, 115 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991), for the proposition that retaliatory discharge claim is conduct not cognizable under § 1981.