Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/42/463/604237/
Timestamp: 2017-09-23 09:26:24
Document Index: 638704704

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 844', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 1956', '§ 841', '§ 844', '§ 841']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Marco A. Lopez, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Jimmy Don Winemiller, Jr., Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Keith Gunter, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Barbara Whitehead, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Doyen Floyd Whitehead, Appellant, 42 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1994 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Marco A. Lopez, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee,...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Marco A. Lopez, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Jimmy Don Winemiller, Jr., Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Keith Gunter, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Barbara Whitehead, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Doyen Floyd Whitehead, Appellant, 42 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1994)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 42 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1994)
Submitted Sept. 12, 1994. Decided Dec. 14, 1994
Marco A. Lopez, Jimmy Don Winemiller, Jr., Keith Gunter, Barbara Whitehead and Doyen Floyd Whitehead appeal their convictions for various drug-related offenses. Winemiller and Gunter also appeal their sentences. We affirm all convictions and sentences, except for Winemiller's conviction for possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). As to that conviction, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment and resentencing for possession of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844.
Relevant to this appeal, an indictment charged all appellants and J.D. with conspiracy to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 846. The indictment also charged J.D., Barbara and Lopez with possession with the intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1); Barbara and Doyen with conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1), 371; and Winemiller with possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1).
We first address Doyen's argument that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion to sever his trial from that of Barbara. We agree with the government that Doyen has not preserved the issue for review. Before trial, his counsel told the court that Barbara would testify for Doyen, but if she did not he would renew his motion for severance. Barbara did not testify and counsel did not renew his motion. In a somewhat similar situation, this court has held that counsel failed to preserve the claim for appellate review. United States v. Munoz, 894 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 909, 110 S. Ct. 1934, 109 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1990). In any event, Doyen's argument is without merit. He has not demonstrated prejudice from the failure to sever.
We next turn to appellants' sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges. Barbara, Doyen, Lopez, Gunter and Winemiller argue there was insufficient evidence supporting their conspiracy convictions; Barbara also claims insufficient evidence in regard to her possession conviction. They assert that the basis for the jury verdicts was Jones' testimony and that his testimony was incredible because he was a paid informant, had been granted immunity, had trouble remembering some dates, and psychological testing indicated that he had a poor memory. However, the jury was aware of these things, and it was for the jury, not this court, to weigh Jones' credibility. See United States v. Turk, 21 F.3d 309, 312 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1994). Moreover, as the court noted in denying the motions for judgments of acquittal, although Jones' testimony had some inconsistencies, his testimony "was not so incredible when weighed with other corroborating evidence produced by the government." See United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1992).
There also is no merit to Barbara and Doyen's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their money laundering convictions. They argue that the government failed to produce any evidence that the money they spent was linked to drug proceeds. "Although the government did not directly prove that the money [they] used ... came from drug sales, it was reasonable for the jury to infer this from the evidence." United States v. Turner, 975 F.2d 490, 497 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1053, 122 L. Ed. 2d 360 (1993).
We disagree with the government. It is true that " 'intent to distribute may be established by circumstantial evidence [,]' " including such things, as quantity, purity and presence of firearms, cash, packaging material, or other distribution paraphernalia. United States v. Peters, 912 F.2d 208, 211 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Hollman, 541 F.2d 196, 199 (8th Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1094, 111 S. Ct. 981, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1991). Moreover, we recognize that " ' [i]ntent to distribute may be inferred solely from the possession of large quantities of narcotics.' " United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1476 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Schubel, 912 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 1990)). However, " ' [p]roof of possession of a small amount of a controlled substance, standing alone, is an insufficient basis from which an intent to distribute may be inferred.' " United States v. Franklin, 728 F.2d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1978)). "The underlying theme of such cases is that the defendant possessed a quantity which was more than he would possess for his own use." United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir. 1985). For example, in United States v. Rodriguez-Sanchez, 23 F.3d 1488, 1491 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1994), the court noted that a reasonable inference of intent to distribute could be drawn from possession of 294 grams of methamphetamine containing 113 grams of pure methamphetamine. The court calculated that it would take the defendant, who claimed he used two grams a week, a little less than three years to consume that quantity of methamphetamine. Id.
Assuming, without deciding, that intent can also be inferred solely from the purity of a drug, we do not believe that 47% pure, standing alone, is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Winemiller intended to distribute the methamphetamine. Moreover, even if evidence of weight was before the jury,1 "the facts here [do not] bring into play the doctrine that possession of large quantities of drugs justifies the inference that the drugs are for distribution and not for personal use." United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 862 (1st Cir. 1989). Although Bryant testified that a four-gram quantity was not for personal use, he admitted that personal use varied among individuals and that his opinion was based on a comparison to a $25.00 quarter-gram unit, which was the starting dose for methamphetamine sold on the street. This case is unlike Ojeda, 23 F.3d at 1476, in which this court held that an inference of intent to distribute could be drawn from possession of 7.1 kilograms of 88 to 91% pure methamphetamine, or even like Schubel, 912 F.2d at 956, in which we held an inference of intent could be drawn from possession of approximately 50 grams of methamphetamine.
Rather, this case is similar to United States v. White, 969 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Franklin, 728 F.2d at 998-1001. In White, this court found that 7.54 grams of cocaine, which would make 75 to 80 dosage units, was insufficient, standing alone, to support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, even though "as little as five grams has been held to be a distributable amount." 969 F.2d at 684 (quotation omitted). In Franklin, this court found that 35 grams of 42% pure cocaine, standing alone, was insufficient evidence from which a jury could infer intent to distribute. 728 F.2d at 1000. This case is also similar to United States v. Stephens, 23 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 522, 130 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1994), in which the court held that 5.9 grams of crack cocaine "could not single-handedly support an inference of intent to distribute, even when combined with [expert] testimony that ... five grams of crack would be the most an addict would buy for personal use." Id. at 557.
In this case, we conclude that the government failed to produce sufficient additional evidence from which a jury could draw a reasonable inference that Winemiller intended to distribute the methamphetamine. As in Franklin and Stephens, the drug was not packaged for resale, and the government did not introduce evidence of a large amount of unexplained cash or other distribution paraphernalia. We are aware that a rifle and a shotgun were found in the trunk of Winemiller's car and that because a firearm is " 'generally considered a tool of the trade for drug dealers, [it] is also evidence of intent to distribute.' " White, 969 F.2d at 684 (quoting Schubel, 912 F.2d at 956). However, giving the government "the benefit of any reasonable inference [ ] drawn from the evidence [,]" as we must, United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d at 1475 (quotation omitted), we do not believe a reasonable jury could infer that the unloaded rifle and shotgun found in the trunk of the car along with camping gear, which included duck calls and waders, were "tools" of the drug trade.2 Indeed, the searching officer testified that the rifle was sitting "on top of all kinds of camping gear as if [Winemiller] was out camping or hunting with the weapon." We note that Winemiller's Presentence Report (PSR) did not recommend a firearm enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1, most likely because note 3 expressly provides that an "enhancement would [not] be applied if the defendant, arrested at his residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in his closet." See United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1990) (firearm enhancement inapplicable where unloaded hunting rifle found in son's room).
Because the jury found Winemiller guilty of possession with the intent to deliver, the jury "necessarily found all the elements of simple possession in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844." Franklin, 728 F.2d at 1000-01. We thus "reverse and remand for the entry of judgment accordingly and for resentencing on this lesser included offense." Id. at 1001.
Winemiller challenges the district court's quantity findings. We first note that although we reverse Winemiller's conviction for possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, we need not remand for resentencing on the marijuana count. The methamphetamine count did not affect the Guideline range for the marijuana count. See United States v. McKnight, 17 F.3d 1139, 1147 (8th Cir.) (remand for resentencing unnecessary where a vacated conviction "had no effect on the determination of ... Guidelines ranges"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 275, 130 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1994).
As to the marijuana count, Winemiller argues that the district court erred in holding him accountable for the 765.22 kilograms of marijuana seized in the raid. We agree with the government that Winemiller has waived this argument. After the court announced its finding, Winemiller's counsel told the court that he had "no argument with the Court assessing less than a thousand kilos," noting that the quantity finding put Winemiller below the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (vii). "Having failed to object to the [court's] quantity determination ... at the sentencing hearing, [Winemiller] cannot be heard to complain now, absent plain error which is not present here." United States v. Karam, 37 F.3d 1280, 1285 (8th Cir. 1994).
As to the vacated methamphetamine conviction, we believe the district court must resentence Winemiller on simple possession only. Section 3D1.2 expressly excludes grouping a simple possession offense with a conspiracy offense. The section, however, provides that " [e]xclusion of an offense from grouping under this subsection does not necessarily preclude grouping under another subsection." We will not address Winemiller's suggestion that the district court improperly grouped the offenses, but on remand he is free to raise the issue.
Because on remand the quantity of methamphetamine might be relevant, we will address Winemiller's argument that the district court erred in finding that he possessed 4.1 grams of methamphetamine. Winemiller contends that the finding is unsupported because of the lack of trial testimony as to weight. It is true that although the court mentioned that the methamphetamine weighed 4.1 grams, the court did not make an express finding. In any event, Winemiller's argument is without merit. At sentencing Winemiller stipulated that the chemist would have testified that the methamphetamine weighed 4.1 grams. While, in this case, quantity was relevant at trial as circumstantial evidence of intent, it was not an element of the offense of possession with the intent to deliver or simple possession. See United States v. Mabry, 3 F.3d 244, 250 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S. Ct. 1403, 128 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1994). For sentencing purposes, the court, not the jury, determines quantity. United States v. Abanatha, 999 F.2d 1246, 1251 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S. Ct. 1549, 128 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1994).
Gunter, who was sentenced to 65 months, challenges the district court's finding that he be held accountable for 323.09 kilograms of marijuana arising from a July 1992 Dallas, Texas transaction. Contrary to his suggestion, the court did not violate his due process rights by basing the finding on evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, rather than at trial. See United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 422-27 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1420, 122 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1993). Nor do we find any error in the court's finding.