Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/spruance-v-commission-judicial-qualifications-30312
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Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications - 13 Cal.3d 778 - Tue, 03/25/1975 | California Supreme Court Resources
Home > Opinions > Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications
Citation 13 Cal.3d 778
Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications , 13 Cal.3d 778
In Bank. (Opinion by The Court.) [13 Cal.3d 779]
The Commission on Judicial Qualifications (hereinafter the Commission) has recommended the removal from office of Judge William D. Spruance of the Municipal Court for the San Leandro-Hayward Judicial District of Alameda County. fn. 1 Pursuant to rule 920 of the California Rules of Court, fn. 2 Judge Spruance has petitioned this court [13 Cal.3d 783] to modify or reject the Commission's recommendation. In discharging our solemn constitutional duties in this matter we have independently reviewed the entire record and have adopted with some modifications the findings of the Commission, as set forth seriatim hereinafter. We conclude that petitioner has engaged in inexcusable and reprehensible conduct constituting in some instances "wilful misconduct in office" (hereinafter wilful misconduct) and in other instances "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute" (hereinafter prejudicial conduct). We accordingly adopt and hereby effectuate the Commission's recommendation of removal.
After considering the masters' report (rule 912), written objections [13 Cal.3d 784] thereto (rule 913), which were filed only by the examiners, and oral arguments (rule 914), the Commission, on July 16, 1974, issued its own findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendation. (Rules 918 and 919.) By unanimous vote (save for a seven-to-two vote as to count I-A) the Commission adopted the masters' findings of fact concerning the eleven specifications found proven by the masters. The Commission unanimously concluded that these proven specifications constituted wilful misconduct. The Commission dismissed the five charges the masters found not proven, fn. 4 as well as the three charges which had been stricken. The Commission made no findings concerning mitigation. By a five-to-four vote the Commission recommended to this court that petitioner be removed from office. (Rule 917.) Petitioner was thereby disqualified from acting as a judge for as long as the Commission's recommendation of removal remained pending before this court. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (a).)
Following the procedure set forth in Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270 [110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1], we granted a writ of review to examine the Commission's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of removal. Since the ultimate, dispositive decision to censure or remove a judge has been entrusted to this court, we felt it our responsibility "in exercising that authority ... [to] make our own, independent evaluation of the record evidence adduced below." (Id., at p. 276.) [1] In fulfilling that responsibility, we have examined in full detail the record of proceedings below and find in accordance with the Commission that the 11 specifications of misconduct not stricken or dismissed below fn. 5 have been proven by "clear and convincing evidence" sufficient to sustain them "to [13 Cal.3d 785] a reasonable certainty." (See Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 275.) [13 Cal.3d 786]
Count I generally charged petitioner with having conducted his court in a bizarre and unjudicial manner. In particular, he was alleged to have treated attorneys in a cavalier, rude and improper manner. Count I-E charged that petitioner had subjected an attorney to improper cross-examination when the attorney took the stand in support of his motion to disqualify petitioner (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6), and had improperly levied "witness fees" against the attorney as a condition to petitioner's disqualification of himself. fn. 6 In count I-F petitioner was charged with [13 Cal.3d 787] having demeaned a deputy district attorney in open court and having placed him under restraint, because the deputy had appealed petitioner's disposition of another case. fn. 7 Count I also set forth proven specifications [13 Cal.3d 788] of petitioner's treatment of litigants in a cavalier, rude and improper manner. Thus, in count I-A, petitioner was alleged to have expressed his disbelief in the testimony of a defendant by having created a sound [13 Cal.3d 789] commonly referred to as a "raspberry" fn. 8 and in count I-B, petitioner was charged with having made a vulgar gesture (giving the "finger" or digitus impudicus) in reprimanding a defendant for coming in late in a traffic matter. fn. 9
Count II generally alleged that petitioner's judicial conduct was subject to the improper influence of his business relations and social friendships. In counts II-A and II-B, petitioner was charged with having approached a deputy district attorney, as well as that deputy's superior, in an attempt to influence the disposition of a case pending against a friend. fn. 10 In count II-C, it was charged that petitioner had attempted to [13 Cal.3d 790] coerce a deputy district attorney into accepting a negotiated plea and, upon his refusal to accept, petitioner had suppressed the evidence and had acquitted the defendant, who was the son of a friend and political supporter. fn. 11 In count II-E, petitioner was charged with having caused a defendant cited for engaging in a speed contest (Veh. Code, § 23109, subd. (a)) to appear before him rather than in the department in which the defendant had been directed to appear. When the defendant, who was the nephew of a friend and political supporter, appeared before petitioner, the charge against the defendant was reduced to illegal parking (Veh. Code, § 22502) without notice to or an appearance by the [13 Cal.3d 791] district attorney. fn. 12 And finally, in count II-F it was alleged that petitioner had improperly transferred to his own court the file in a felony-assault [13 Cal.3d 792] case involving the same defendant as in count II-E, whereupon petitioner had ordered the defendant released on his own recognizance [13 Cal.3d 793] so as to prevent the defendant from being booked and interrogated by the police pursuant to the execution of an outstanding warrant for his arrest. fn. 13 [13 Cal.3d 794]
Finally petitioner was charged in the single specification of count V with having consistently appointed two attorneys in criminal cases in which the defendant was either not entitled to counsel at public expense or the public defender had not been requested to represent them. fn. 15 [13 Cal.3d 795]
We turn now to the question whether the conduct which we have found as a fact to have occurred is conduct for which discipline may constitutionally be imposed. Other than for habitual intemperance or wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, the Constitution provides that a judge may be censured or removed from the bench only for wilful misconduct or prejudicial conduct. (See fn. 1, supra.) We first sought to give meaning to these standards of conduct in Geiler. [2] We explained that the more serious charge, "wilful misconduct," is reserved for unjudicial conduct committed in bad faith by a judge acting in his judicial capacity. (10 Cal.3d at pp. 283-284.) The term "bad faith" implies that the judge "intentionally committed acts which he knew or should have known were beyond his lawful power." (10 [13 Cal.3d 796] Cal.3d at p. 286.) As so used, "bad faith" entails actual malice as the motivation for a judge's acting ultra vires. The requisite intent must exceed mere volition; negligence alone, if not so gross as to call its genuineness into question, falls short of "bad faith." "Bad faith" also encompasses acts within the lawful power of a judge which nevertheless are committed for a corrupt purpose, i.e., for any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties. In sum, "bad faith" is quintessentially a concept of specific intent, requiring consciousness of purpose as an antecedent to a judge's acting maliciously or corruptly.
[4] We examine first the proven specifications of count I. At the outset we refer to the third canon of the California Code of Judicial Conduct (see fn. 17, supra), which provides in pertinent part that "[a] [13 Cal.3d 797] judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction and control." (Canon 3A(3).)
Except for petitioner's vulgar "finger" gesture (count I-B; see fn. 9, supra) the proven specifications of count I show that petitioner engaged in a pervasive course of conduct of acting vindictively toward recalcitrant attorneys. With regard to petitioner's conduct toward Mr. Gianunzio (count I-E; see fn. 6, supra), it goes without saying that as a judge, petitioner should have known the proper method for handling a motion for disqualification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6.) We have previously noted in connection with similar misconduct that "the rule has developed that, once an affidavit of prejudice has been filed under section 170.6, the court has no jurisdiction to hold further proceedings in the matter except to inquire into the timeliness of the affidavit or its technical sufficiency under the statute. ... When the affidavit is timely and properly made, immediate disqualification is mandatory. ... As this court has noted in respect to the exercise of contempt powers, '[a] judge should bear in mind that he is engaged, not so much in vindicating his own character, as in promoting the respect due to the administration of the laws. ...'" (McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [116 Cal.Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268].) Clearly, petitioner abused his judicial authority and acted out of revenge and hostility. Petitioner's treatment of Mr. Behrendt regarding the Peluso case (count I-F; see fn. 7, supra) was also an abuse of judicial authority and clearly motivated by feelings of animosity. Similarly, petitioner's contemptuous "raspberry" (count I-A; see fn. 8, supra) was a deliberate and malicious attempt to prejudice the defendant's case, motivated by petitioner's anger toward the deputy public defender. Because petitioner acted in bad faith in exceeding the bounds of his lawful power, we find each of these incidents to have been wilful misconduct.
[6] We examine next the proven specifications of count II, referring again to one of the canons of the California Code of Judicial Conduct: [13 Cal.3d 798] "A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. ..." (Cal. Code of Jud. Conduct, supra, Canon 2B.) The proven specifications of count II show a flagrant disregard for this canon. In each of the incidents, petitioner intentionally used the prestige or authority of his judicial office to effect or influence the disposition of a criminal case for a personal reason unconnected with the merits of the case, to wit, petitioner's desire to help friends and political supporters. Petitioner was thus acting in bad faith in attempting to influence the disposition of the Alchian case (counts II-A and II-B; see fn. 10, supra) which was not before him in any judicial capacity; in dismissing the Goulardt case (count II-C; see fn. 11, supra); in improperly assuming jurisdiction and acting without notice to the district attorney in the Leines traffic case (count II-E; see fn. 12, supra); as well as in improperly assuming jurisdiction and releasing Leines on his own recognizance in the assault case (count II-F; see fn. 13, supra). As to the Goulardt case, there are additional grounds for the conclusion that petitioner acted in bad faith. In another instance of the course of conduct involved in count I, petitioner's handling of the Goulardt case was motivated not only by political favoritism but also by a desire to punish the deputy district attorney for his refusal to accept petitioner's suggestion of a negotiated plea. We have no recourse but to conclude that each of the proven specifications of count II constituted wilful misconduct, save only with respect to our finding concerning petitioner's use of an obscenity when talking on the telephone with a deputy district attorney (finding No. 8, count II-F; see fn. 13, supra). For the reasons expressed above regarding the "finger" gesture (count I-B; see fn. 9, supra), we conclude that petitioner's injudicious comment constituted prejudicial conduct. In McCartney we established that the muttering of profanity need not necessarily be deemed serious enough to warrant removal or censure. It should be noted, however, that the conduct there in issue, although unbecoming and injudicious, was not intended to be heard and was "not directed as a reprimand to court personnel, attorneys or any other specific individuals." (McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 535.)
[7] We also find petitioner's conduct regarding his own traffic citation (count III; see fn. 14, supra) to have been wilful misconduct. Inasmuch as the judicial district's practices allowed petitioner to be assigned automatically and ministerially to traffic school, we can only [13 Cal.3d 799] conclude that petitioner acted in bad faith in circumventing proper legal procedure to have his citation dismissed as well as in thereafter concealing the fact that he had received preferential treatment.
[9] We come now to our most important responsibility, fn. 18 the decision of the ultimate question whether a judge, whose conduct has [13 Cal.3d 800] been found to be either wilful misconduct or prejudicial conduct, fn. 19 should be censured or removed from the bench. (See fn. 1, supra.)
Petitioner also argues that he was inexperienced and that he had no idea that he was acting improperly because "no one complained." Although petitioner was "green" as a judge, he had 20 years of [13 Cal.3d 801] experience as a criminal attorney, practicing in many courts. Furthermore, he had many reference works at his disposal to answer most questions as to proper courtroom procedure. (E.g., Misdemeanor Procedure Bench Book, supra. See also the recently prepared Cal. Municipal Justice Courts Manual, supra.) Finally, the evidence is clear and convincing that when attorneys did object, petitioner retaliated. Thus, his vengefulness went beyond mere ignorance of proper procedures. In the Fusilero case, the deputy public defender's objection resulted in his client getting petitioner's "raspberry." Petitioner was "provoked" by Deputy District Attorney Behrendt's erroneous affidavit filed for an appeal taken in another matter and put him in the jury box, notwithstanding the deputy objected and wanted his status clarified. We can accept the earlier error as justification for petitioner's "close scrutiny" of the search warrant application, even though the deputy district attorney merely participated in the preparation of the warrant and was not the affiant, but not as justification for restraining the deputy unlawfully. In the Goulardt matter, when Deputy District Attorney Hutchins objected, petitioner claimed he was being placed "in a box" and would have to do something he did not wish to do. And, in the Leines felony-assault matter, to Deputy District Attorney Nicholson's objection, petitioner responded with an obscenity.
To be sure, if petitioner's giving the "finger" to a defendant and his use of an obscenity during a telephone conversation with a deputy district attorney were the only charges brought against him, censure would be the appropriate discipline, since we find little risk of the recurrence of such conduct. We are persuaded to accept petitioner's explanation that in both incidents he was provoked, but that in any event, he realized how inappropriate his actions were and would not permit their recurrence. [13 Cal.3d 802]
However, we feel that justice will best be served by allowing petitioner [13 Cal.3d 803] to resume the practice of law. fn. 21 We note that his long career as a lawyer was unblemished and that, as a practicing attorney, he will not have available that authority which he abused as a judge. We therefore further order that despite his removal from judicial office, William D. Spruance shall, if otherwise qualified, be permitted to practice law in the State of California. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d).).
­FN 1. The California Constitution, article VI, section 8, provides in pertinent part: "The Commission on Judicial Qualifications consists of 2 judges of courts of appeal, 2 judges of superior courts, and one judge of a municipal court, each appointed by the Supreme Court; 2 members of the State Bar who have practiced law in this State for 10 years, appointed by its governing body; and 2 citizens who are not judges, retired judges, or members of the State Bar, appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership concurring. All terms are 4 years."
­FN 2. All references herein to specific rules are to the California Rules of Court. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (e).)
­FN 3. The special masters so appointed were Alvin E. Weinberger, retired Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (presiding master); Albert A. Axelrod, retired Judge of the Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco; and Sidney Feinberg, Judge of the Municipal Court for the Palo Alto-Mountain View Judicial District of Santa Clara County.
­FN 4. The first part of count II-D, which overlaps part of count I-F, was considered and determined by the masters as a part of count I-F. The remaining allegations of count II-D were found to be not proven. The Commission, combining both counts, made findings pertaining solely to the charges involving count I-F. In the absence of any additional findings, we deem the remaining aspects of count II-D to have been impliedly dismissed by the Commission.
­FN 5. Among the arguments addressed to the court in this case is one of first impression which we feel should be answered directly. The examiners have argued that the dismissal by the Commission of certain of the specifications of misconduct by petitioner should not necessarily be accorded conclusive effect. The examiners contend that two of the dismissed specifications (counts I-G and I-I) were proven by clear and convincing evidence and constitute conduct for which the Constitution authorizes the imposition of discipline (see Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 283-284) notwithstanding the fact that the Commission, in stating that the specifications were "not sustained," chose not to issue any findings of fact and conclusions of law. The examiners maintain that because we have undertaken to review the record ourselves and to adopt our own findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is within our power to find proven any of the charges lodged against petitioner upon which evidence was received regardless of the Commission's disposition of such charges. We emphatically disagree.
The Constitution clearly makes our power to discipline a judge for misconduct "contingent on the Commission having so recommended." (Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 276; Cal.Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (c) [see fn. 1, supra].) It would be entirely inconsistent with this constitutional division of functions for us to consider in passing on the Commission's recommendation any allegations of prejudicial conduct or wilful misconduct other than those which formed the basis of that recommendation. Unlike our statutory and inherent constitutional powers to control the professional conduct of members of the bar (see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6107; In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243, 253-254 [272 P.2d 768]), our shared constitutional power to censure or remove a judge for misconduct does not permit us to impose such discipline on our own motion. (Cf. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 276.)
­FN 6. Our findings for count I-E are as follows:
­FN 7. Our findings for count I-F are as follows:
­FN 8. Our findings for count I-A are as follows:
­FN 9. Our findings for count I-B are as follows:
­FN 10. Our findings for counts II-A and II-B are as follows:
­FN 11. Our findings for count II-C are as follows:
­FN 12. Our findings for count II-E are as follows:
­FN 13. Our findings for count II-F are as follows:
­FN 14. Our findings for count III are as follows:
­FN 15. Our findings for count V are as follows:
­FN 16. The masters found six specifications of misconduct to constitute both wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct. Because "prejudicial conduct" is a "lesser included offense" of "wilful misconduct" the masters' additional findings that each of the six charges constituted prejudicial conduct were superfluous.
­FN 17. In Geiler we said: "The first two canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct proposed in 1972 by the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct emphasize the importance of appraising alleged judicial misconduct objectively rather than subjectively. Canon One declares: 'a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.' The accompanying text adds: 'A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.' Canon Two speaks for itself: 'A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.' (Italics added.)" (10 Cal.3d at pp. 281-282.)
­FN 18. Under the controlling principles of Geiler, it is our findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which we make our determination of the ultimate action to be taken. (Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 276.) Although we give great weight to the masters' findings of fact (id., at pp. 275-276), the conclusions of law and the ultimate sanction are solely within our province and domain; we do not defer to either the masters or the Commission in deciding these matters. Language to the contrary in McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 12 Cal.3d at page 540 is no longer to be regarded as controlling.
­FN 19. As we noted in Geiler, "[i]t should be emphasized that our characterization of one ground for imposing discipline as more or less serious than the other does not imply that in a given case we would regard the ultimate sanction of removal as unjustified solely for 'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.'" (Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 284, fn. 11.)
­FN 20. In McCartney we were concerned merely with "modes of proper judicial behavior necessarily learned only by judicial experience." (McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 539.) Here, we are concerned with the basic respect for our institutions of justice which should be a fundamental concern of every judge and attorney.
­FN 21. Judge Geiler was also permitted to practice law despite his removal from the bench. We noted that his unjudicial conduct did not amount to moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption (cf. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106), but that his removal was required "more by the high standards of judicial office than by his personal failings." (Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 287.) We wish to point out that the misconduct here involved is more serious with regard to petitioner's qualifications to practice law. By allowing petitioner to resume the practice of law we do not mean to intimate that petitioner's pattern of conduct of bringing improper influences to bear upon the judicial office is more proper for an attorney than a judge. Were the conduct here involved committed by an attorney, although we do not perceive that the attorney would be subject to so severe a sanction as disbarment, he would certainly be subject to public reproval or other appropriate discipline.
Tue, 03/25/1975 13 Cal.3d 778 Review - Criminal Appeal Opinion issued
1 WILLIAM D. SPRUANCE, a Judge of the Municipal Court, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS (Respondent)
2 WILLIAM D. SPRUANCE, a Judge of the Municipal Court (Petitioner)
Mar 25 1975 Guilty
SCOCAL, Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications , 13 Cal.3d 778 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/spruance-v-commission-judicial-qualifications-30312) (last visited Tuesday August 4, 2020).