Source: http://www.flra.gov/decisions/v44/44-068.html
Timestamp: 2014-03-07 17:53:08
Document Index: 524294054

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 1', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', 'art 2424', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 5009', '§ 8109', '§ 8109', '§ 8101']

44:0821(68)NG - - SEIU, Local 200-B and VAMC, Syracuse, NY - - 1992 FLRAdec NG - - v44 p821 | FLRA.GOV
Authority Chairman and Members Find Types of Cases, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Office of the General Counsel Regional Offices, Guidances, Policies, Manuals, ULP Process, Forms, Representation, ADR Services, and Training.Federal Service Impasses Panel Find Jurisdiction, Statute, Work Schedules Act, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Solicitor, Administrative Law Judges, IG & Others Find General Information about these Offices and Contact Information.training & alternative dispute resolutionFind FLRA Training Information and ADR Services. 44:0821(68)NG - - SEIU, Local 200-B and VAMC, Syracuse, NY - - 1992 FLRAdec NG - - v44 p821 [ v44 p821 ] 44:0821(68)NG
The decision of the Authority follows: 44 FLRA No. 68 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 200-B (Union) and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER SYRACUSE, NEW YORK (Agency) 0-NG-1895 DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY
ISSUES April 16, 1992 Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
Relations Statute (the Statute). The appeal concerns the negotiability of six
proposals regarding a parking facility at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center
in Syracuse, New York. Proposal 1 states that parking fees will not exceed $2.00 per month per
employee or carpool. Proposal 2 allows employees who are on regular rotating
shifts and who carpool to pay $2.00 per month and to use the same key card on
any shift. Proposal 3 provides that security guards will not be responsible for
ticket distribution or cashier duties at the parking garage. Proposal 4 states
that employees using the garage on a daily basis will pay no more than $1.00
per day. Proposal 5 relates to the use of a key card. Proposal 6 requires the
Agency to reimburse all parking fees collected from employees before
negotiations with the Union began. For the following reasons, we find that Proposals 1, 2 and 4 are
negotiable because they do not interfere with management's right to determine
its budget under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute. Proposal 3 is nonnegotiable
section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. Proposal 5 is negotiable because it is
not inconsistent with any law, rule or regulation. Proposal 6 is nonnegotiable
because it is inconsistent with law under section 7117(a)(1) of the
Statute. II. Procedural Issues The Agency claims that the petition for review is deficient because it
was not timely served on the Agency head. According to the Agency, its
allegation of nonnegotiability was served on the Union on November 7, 1990,
and, under the Authority's Rules and Regulations, the petition for review had
to be served on all parties, including the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, on or
before November 26, 1990. The Agency argues, therefore, that the petition for
review was filed beyond the time limit set forth in section 2424.3 of the Rules
and Regulations and should be dismissed. Under section 2424.4(b) of the Rules and Regulations, a petition for
review must be served on an agency head and on the principal agency bargaining
representative. Section 2429.27(c) of the Rules and Regulations requires that a
signed and dated statement of service be included with a petition for review.
The record reveals that the Union's petition was filed with the Authority on
November 15, 1990. On November 27, 1990, the Authority advised the Union that
the petition was procedurally deficient because it did not include a signed
statement of service showing service on the Agency head or a designee. In
accordance with section 2424.4(c)(1) of the Rules and Regulations, the Union
was given an opportunity to correct the deficiency by filing a statement of
service with the Authority not later than December 10, 1990, showing service of
the petition on the Agency's principal bargaining representative. The Union
complied with the Authority's order on December 3, 1990, by filing the
requisite statement of service. Because the Union timely cured the deficiencies
in its petition, as ordered by the Authority, we deny the Agency's motion to
dismiss. See National Association of Government Employees, Local
R1-25 and Veterans Administration Medical Center, Brockton, Massachusetts,
23 FLRA 266 (1986). The Agency also contends that the Union's initial failure to serve the
petition on the Agency head prejudiced the Agency and made it impossible for
the Agency to respond in a timely fashion. We disagree. Under section 2424.6(a)
of the Rules and Regulations, an agency's statement of position must be filed
with the Authority within 30 days after the date of receipt of a petition for
review by an agency head. Where a petition contains procedural deficiencies, an
agency ordinarily has 30 days to file its statement of position from the date
it received the perfected petition. Here, as noted, the Union timely cured the
deficiencies in its petition. Thereafter, the Agency requested and was granted
a 9-day extension of time to file its statement of position. The Authority's
records reveal that the Agency timely filed its statement of position.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Union's initial failure to serve the Agency
head with a copy of the petition did not prejudice the Agency and that the
Agency had sufficient time to file and, in fact, did timely file its statement
of position. See American Federation of Government Employees, Local
1513 and U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Oak
Harbor, Washington, 41 FLRA 589, 591 (1991). III. Background By statute, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (Secretary or VA) is
authorized to acquire, construct or alter parking facilities to accommodate
vehicles at Department of Veterans Affairs medical centers (VAMCs). 38
U.S.C.A. § 8109 (1991) (the parking law).(1) More
specifically, section 8109(d)(1) requires the Secretary to collect parking fees
at each VAMC where parking facilities are acquired, constructed or altered
after September 30, 1986, at a cost exceeding $500,000. The Secretary must
prescribe a fee schedule that is "reasonable under the circumstances." 38
U.S.C.A. § 8109(d)(2). The fees collected at these parking facilities are
to be deposited into a revolving fund created by the parking law to offset the
costs of acquisition, construction and alteration,(2) of parking
facilities at VAMCs. 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109(h). The revolving fund also may be
supplemented with congressional appropriations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109(g).
Pursuant to the parking law, the VA promulgated regulations for
determining parking fees at VAMCs. The regulations provide that "[a]ll parking
fees shall be set at a rate which shall be equivalent to one-half of the
appropriate fair rental value . . . for the use of equivalent commercial space
in the vicinity of the medical facility . . . ." 53 Fed. Reg. 25,490 (July 7,
1988), codified at 38 C.F.R. § 1.303(b) (1991). On or about April 1, 1990, the Agency began operating a parking garage
at its VAMC in Syracuse, New York. The parking garage was constructed at a cost
of $7.8 million. Following VA regulations, the Agency contracted for a survey
of commercial parking rates in the immediate area of the Syracuse VAMC. The
survey showed that the fair rental value for garage parking in the vicinity of
the Syracuse VAMC was $55.00 per month; $4.50 per day; and $1.50 per hour.
Pursuant to this survey, the Secretary set the parking rates at the Syracuse
VAMC at $27.50 per month; $2.25 per day; and $0.75 per hour. Subsequently, the Union requested to bargain on six proposals related
to parking at the Syracuse VAMC. The Agency responded that the establishment of
parking fees was governed by law and that the proposals were not negotiable.
The Union then filed the instant petition for review. IV. Proposals 1, 2 and 4 Proposal 1 Parking fees will not exceed $2.00 per month per employee or
carpool. Proposal 2 Employees on regular rotating shifts who carpool will pay $2.00 per month and can use the same card key on any shift. Proposal 4 Employees using the garage on a daily basis will pay no more than one
dollar per day. A. Positions of the Parties 1. Agency The Agency argues that the proposals interfere with management's right
to determine its budget under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute. According to
the Agency, parking at the Syracuse VAMC is governed by 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109
and is "self-financing and separate from the normal budgetary process."
Statement of Position at 9. The Agency further contends that because the
acquisition, construction and alteration of parking garages commenced after
September 30, 1986, must be financed through the revolving fund, section 8109
"transforms the revolving fund into the VA's budget for such parking
facilities." Id. at 12. The Agency also states that the only funds
available for maintaining other VAMC garages that have free or low-cost parking
fees are the fees collected pursuant to the parking law. The Agency claims that
the Union's proposals for low-cost parking would result in an annual loss of
$127,502 to the revolving fund. As a consequence, the Agency argues that the
condition of parking garages will deteriorate. To avoid such deterioration, the
Agency adds that it would have to make separate requests to Congress for
appropriations to maintain the parking garages. The Agency asserts that
requesting additional appropriations from Congress contradicts the intent of
Congress "to make the construction, acquisition and maintenance of VA parking
garages self-financing[,]" and would shift the financial burden to the
taxpayer. Id. at 14. Additionally, the Agency asserts that the Secretary's duty to charge
parking fees is mandatory under 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109 and that the Secretary
has sole authority to determine the fee structure. Therefore, the Agency claims
that management's right to determine its budget in this case is protected under
Federal labor law and is expressly placed within the Secretary's sole authority
by section 8109. The Agency argues that any proposals which interfere with the
Agency's "duty to ensure adequate financial support of its parking facilities
are unlawful." Id. at 17. With respect to its assertion that the proposals interfere with the
Agency's right to determine its budget, the Agency contends that the test for
determining whether a proposal interferes with that right, as established in
Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 2 FLRA 604 (1980), aff'd
as to other matters sub nom. Department of Defense v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982)
(Wright-Patterson), does not apply in this case. The Agency claims that
the Wright-Patterson test applies only to proposals requiring
expenditures from the budget and does not contemplate proposals affecting the
revenue-raising ability of the Agency. Consequently, the Agency argues that the
Authority should not apply Wright-Patterson in this case. However, the Agency further argues that if the Authority applies
Wright-Patterson, the proposals nonetheless fail to satisfy the test.
The Agency claims, first, that the proposals prescribe a particular amount to
be allocated to the budget. The Agency states that the established fee of
$27.50 per month would provide $137,000 annually to the revolving fund, whereas
the Union's proposed fee of $2.00 per month would provide only $10,008.
Therefore, the Agency claims that the proposals will effectively prescribe the
use of $127,502 annually in Agency funds for expenditures relating to VAMC
parking facilities. Because the amount generated for the revolving fund under
the proposals would be less than the amount generated by the fees set by the
Agency, the Agency claims that it will be forced to use existing monies in the
revolving fund to finance projects that otherwise would be funded from the
parking fees. The Agency also claims that the proposals will result in significant
and unavoidable costs that are not offset by compensating benefits. The Agency
asserts that adoption of the proposals would significantly reduce the revenue
generated for the revolving fund, which supports 172 VAMCs. The Agency states
that as of September 30, 1990, the revolving fund contained $280,738 and that
the amount generated by the Union's proposals would only increase the fund to
$290,746. In contrast, the fees set by the Agency would increase the revolving
fund to $418,358. Consequently, the Agency states that the reduced revenue
would create additional expenses for the Agency and "not result in any
compensating monetary benefits to the VA." Statement of Position at 20. The Agency also objects to the burden placed on agencies to disprove
monetary benefits of proposals and to establish that increased costs of
proposals will not be offset by intangible factors. Alternatively, the Agency
claims that no intangible benefits will accrue if employees are charged lower
parking fees. Rather, the Agency notes that employees have monthly parking fees
automatically deducted from their paychecks and claims that if the employees
are charged the fees set by the Secretary, the employees will have improved
attendance and productivity because they "will be less likely to forfeit their
investment . . . ." Id. at 23. 2. Union The Union acknowledges that conditions of employment that are
specifically provided for by Federal statute are excluded from negotiation.
However, the Union claims that the establishment of particular parking fees is
not specifically provided for by 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109. Rather, the Union
argues that section 8109 leaves the establishment of parking fees to the
discretion of the Secretary and, therefore, that the Agency should be required
to bargain over those fees. The Union argues that, to be relieved of its
obligation to bargain, the Agency must demonstrate that the regulation setting
the proposed fees is an Agency regulation for which there is a compelling need.
According to the Union, the Agency has not shown that the regulation meets any
of the criteria for establishing a compelling need set forth in part 2424.11 of
the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Union also asserts that Congress did not intend that the parking
fees collected and deposited in the revolving fund would be the sole source of
revenue to finance the construction and maintenance of parking garages at
VAMCs. The Union notes that the Agency may request appropriations from Congress
to finance parking garage construction and maintenance costs. The Union further
argues that it is highly unlikely that a Federal agency would "select low paid
[F]ederal health care employees to take substantial cuts in pay to finance
[F]ederal capital expenditures." Response at 6. Finally, contrary to the Agency's contention that the proposals would
result in significant and unavoidable costs that are not offset by compensating
benefits, the Union argues that excessive parking fees are "counter-productive
to the mission of the Agency." Id. at 7. The Union claims that the
Agency's parking fee does not consider the low salaries of the employees, the
lack of public transportation in Syracuse, the existence of a nearby private
hospital that offers free parking to its employees, or the fact that no parking
fees have been charged in the past. The Union also asserts that parking fees
may increase recruiting costs to the Agency, result in lower morale among the
employees, and cause higher turnover. In this connection, the Union notes a
decision of the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) adopting a union proposal
to retain free parking at a VAMC parking facility. Department of Veterans
Affairs, Washington, D.C. and National VA Council, American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO Case Nos. 90 FSIP 32, 90 FSIP 37 (March 30,
1990). In that decision, the FSIP found that the savings to employees resulting
from free parking and the consequent benefits to employee morale outweighed the
loss of fees to the VA. B. Analysis and Conclusions For the following reasons, we conclude that Proposals 1, 2 and 4 are
negotiable and do not interfere with the Agency's right to determine its budget
under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute. Initially, we note the Agency's contention that because, by law, the
Secretary is obligated to charge fees, the Secretary has the sole authority to
determine the fee structure. We disagree. In our view, section 8109 does not
mandate that the Secretary set a specific fee at VAMC parking facilities
covered by the parking law. Rather, the statute gives the Secretary discretion
"to establish fees which . . . are reasonable under the circumstances." 38
U.S.C.A. § 8109(d)(2). In the absence of any evidence in the statute that
the Secretary's discretion in this regard was intended to be exclusive and
unfettered, Authority precedent establishes that the Secretary may exercise
this discretion through the collective bargaining process. See,
for example, National Association of Government Employees,
Local R14-52 and U.S. Department of the Army, Red River Army Depot, Texarkana,
Texas, 41 FLRA 1057, 1062 (1991), petition for review filed sub nom.
U.S. Department of the Army, Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas v.
FLRA, No. 91-1472 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 1991). See also
Veterans Canteen Service, Lexington, Kentucky, 44 FLRA 162 (1992). We also reject the Agency's argument that requesting additional
appropriations for expenses relating to VAMC parking garages would be
inconsistent with congressional intent that the acquisition, construction, and
maintenance of parking garages be self-financing. The Agency itself notes, in
this regard, that if the revolving fund contains insufficient funds, the Agency
may request appropriations from Congress for construction and maintenance
expenses. Additionally, we note that while the Secretary, by regulation, has
established that parking fees shall be set at one-half the fair rental value of
equivalent commercial space in the vicinity of VAMCs, the Agency makes no
argument that the regulation is a Government-wide regulation or an agency
regulation for which there is a compelling need. Therefore, we need not address
the Union's arguments that no compelling need exists for the regulation. With respect to its budget argument, we reject the Agency's contention
that the test set forth in Wright-Patterson is inapplicable to this case
because the revolving fund is a revenue-raising mechanism. In our view, the
budget test is as applicable in this circumstance as it is with regard to
bargaining proposals involving nonappropriated fund activities, which also are
revenue-raising entities. See, for example, National
Association of Government Employees, Local R4-26 and U.S. Department of the Air
Force, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, 40 FLRA 118, 126 (1991)
(Langley Air Force Base) (agency explains that nonappropriated fund
instrumentality system is self-financing); American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1857 and U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Logistics
Center, Sacramento, California, 36 FLRA 894 (1990). Therefore, we find no
basis on which to distinguish this case from Wright-Patterson, as
suggested by the Agency. Turning to Wright-Patterson, we note that in that decision the
Authority established two separate tests for determining whether a proposal
interferes with management's right to determine its budget. Under the first
test, an agency must demonstrate that the proposal prescribes the particular
programs or operations the agency will include in its budget or prescribes the
amount to be allocated in the budget for them. The second test requires that an
agency substantially demonstrate that the proposal entails an increase in costs
that is significant and unavoidable and is not offset by compensating benefits.
In applying these tests to the facts of this case, we find that the Agency has
not established that the proposals interfere with the Agency's right to
determine its budget. 1. The Agency Has Not Satisfied the First Budget Test
The first budget test is a narrow one. It withdraws from bargaining
only those proposals addressed to the budget per se, not those
that would result in expenditures by an agency and, consequently, merely have
some effect on the budget process. See Tidewater Virginia Federal
Employees Metal Trades Council and U.S. Department of the Navy, Norfolk Naval
Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia, 37 FLRA 938, 947 (1990). Proposals that
simply have cost ramifications cannot be said to inject a union directly into
the budget formulation process that is protected from bargaining under the
first budget test. Id. The proposals in this case do not involve the Union in the budgetary
process itself but are limited to requiring the Agency to make reduced rate
parking available to employees who park in the Syracuse VAMC garage. The
proposals neither prescribe a program or operation to be included in the
Agency's budget nor an amount to be included in the Agency's budget. The
proposals leave to the Agency the judgment as to how to accommodate the fees
established by the proposals relative to the construction and maintenance costs
at various VAMC parking facilities. For example, section 8109(g) of the parking
law authorizes the use of appropriated funds to finance the construction,
alteration, and acquisition of parking garages in addition to the parking fees
established and collected under section 8109(c). As previously noted, the
Agency concedes that, if the revolving fund contains insufficient funds, the
Agency may request appropriations from Congress for construction and alteration
expenses. In sum, we find that, under the first budget test, the proposals do not
7106(a)(1) of the Statute. 2. The Agency Has Not Satisfied the Second Budget
Test As stated above, a proposal may also be found nonnegotiable if it
results in a significant and unavoidable increase in costs that is not offset
by compensating benefits.(3) The mere fact
that a proposal may increase costs, however, is not sufficient to establish
that it is a significant amount for purposes of the budget test. See
Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641, 653 (1990). The Agency
asserts that implementing the Union's reduced parking fees will create
additional operating expenses for the Agency that are not offset by
compensating benefits and will generate reduced revenues for the revolving
fund. We find that the Agency has failed to satisfy the second budget test.
As noted earlier, the Agency states that as of September 30, 1990, the
revolving fund contained $280,738 in parking fees, which the Agency terms the
relevant budget for assessing the negotiability of the proposals. According to
the Agency, its proposed parking fee structure would add $137,000 annually to
the revolving fund, based on the use of 417 parking spaces at VAMC Syracuse,
raising the total amount in the revolving fund, as of that date, to $418,358.
By contrast, the Agency claims that, under the Union's proposals, parking fees
would contribute only $10,008 to the revolving fund, bringing the total amount
in the fund to $290,746. The Agency argues that the difference in the
contribution to the revolving fund of $127,502 is a significant proportion of
the revolving fund. The Agency states that the fund must support 172 VAMCs and
that, as a result of the proposals, only $290,746 would be available for
operations at all the VAMC parking facilities. It is clear that, under the Union's proposals, the amount of revenue
generated for the revolving fund would be less than the amount generated under
the Agency's fee structure. However, we do not view the diminution in
contributions to the revolving fund as presenting the type of significant costs
that would render the proposals nonnegotiable. The Agency argues that, under
section 8109(h)(3)(A) of the parking law, only money from the revolving fund
may be used to construct, acquire or alter parking garages. However, based on
the information provided in the record, it does not appear that sufficient
funds could be generated for the revolving fund for these purposes based solely
on the fees charged for parking. In this regard, we note that the imposition of
fees is not mandatory at all VAMC parking facilities. Rather, fees are
mandatory at those facilities that were constructed after September 30, 1986,
at a cost exceeding $500,000, or acquired by lease at a cost exceeding
$100,000, and at those facilities involving alteration at a cost exceeding
$500,000. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109(d). The imposition of fees at
other facilities is discretionary. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109(e). In
fact, the Agency states that, at present, there are only 5 parking garages out
of 172 facilities at which it has implemented parking fees. The Agency also
states that the construction cost of the parking garage at the Syracuse
facility was $7.8 million. Under these circumstances, it is not clear that an
additional $127,502 in the revolving fund would be a significant factor in
supporting the construction, acquisition or alteration of parking facilities at
any one of the VAMCs, let alone all 172 VAMCs, as argued by the Agency. Rather,
that amount is relatively modest when compared with the construction costs at a
single parking facility. Therefore, not only has the Agency failed to establish
that the increase in costs would be significant, but the available evidence
suggests the contrary. Having found that the proposals would not result in significant and
unavoidable costs, it is unnecessary to address whether there are offsetting
compensating benefits. See Langley Air Force Base, 40 FLRA at
133-34 (in light of finding that proposals did not entail significant increase
in costs, there was no need to address whether costs of proposals were
unavoidable or were not offset by compensating benefits). For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Proposals 1, 2 and 4
do not interfere with the Agency's right to determine its budget under section
7106(a) of the Statute. We note also that Proposal 2, in addition to
establishing a parking fee for carpools, also provides that employees on
regular rotating shifts who carpool can use the same card key on any shift.
Although the Union did not provide any explanation as to the meaning of this
portion of the proposal, it appears that it is designed to accomodate employees
who work on rotating shifts and who would be able to use the same card on each
shift, rather than having to obtain a different card for each shift. As the
Agency did not make any arguments regarding this part of Proposal 2, and as it
does not appear to be contrary to any law, rule or regulation, we find that
Proposal 2 is negotiable in its entirety. In reaching our conclusion that Proposals 1, 2 and 4 are negotiable, we
note that a finding of negotiability means only that a proposal is within the
duty to bargain and could legally be implemented. A party is not bound to
accept the proposal of another party but is free to reject it or seek to modify
it during the bargaining process. An agency has no obligation to abandon what
it believes to be the best interests of the agency merely because it must
negotiate on a proposal. Should the parties be unable to reach agreement, their
concerns can be presented to the FSIP in a proceeding pursuant to section 7119
of the Statute. See National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 83 and
(1990). V. Proposal 3 Security guards will not be responsible for cashiering or ticket
distribution duties related to the parking garage. A. Positions of the Parties 1. Agency The Agency contends that Proposal 3 interferes with management's right
to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute because it would
prohibit the Agency from assigning various duties to security guards. The
Agency argues that the Authority has held nonnegotiable proposals that prevent
an agency from requiring employees to perform certain duties when those duties
are not within the employees' regular field of work or are not appropriate to
the employees' positions. The Agency asserts, although neither conceding nor
denying that it anticipates assigning cashiering and ticket distribution duties
to the security guards, that because the proposal would preempt the Agency's
ability to assign certain duties to the security guards, it interferes with
management's right to assign work. 2. Union The Union argues that the proposal is negotiable because assigning
cashiering duties to security guards will have an adverse effect on the health
and safety of the employees. The Union asserts that there are high levels of
violent outbreaks in emergency rooms and psychiatric wards and that if security
guards are assigned to cashiering duties in the parking garage they will spend
less time patrolling the VAMC, "leav{ing} staff and lone security officers in
eminent danger . . . ." Response at 9. B. Analysis and Conclusions For the following reasons, we conclude that the proposal directly and
excessively interferes with the Agency's right to assign work. The right to
assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute encompasses the right to
determine the particular duties to be assigned, when work assignments will
occur, and to whom or what position the duties will be assigned. See
Service, 37 FLRA 392, 399 (1990). By expressly precluding the Agency from
assigning cashiering or ticket distribution duties to security guards, Proposal
3 directly interferes with management's right to assign work. This does not end our inquiry, however. Although the Union did not
specifically state that its proposal was intended as an arrangement, where, as
here, a proposal is clearly designed to offer benefits or protections to
employees adversely affected by the exercise of a management right, we will
assess whether the proposal constitutes a negotiable appropriate arrangement
under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. See Federal Professional
Nurses Association, Local 2707 and U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Division of Federal Employee Occupational Health, Region III, 43
FLRA 385, 393 (1991). To determine whether a proposal constitutes an
appropriate arrangement, we must decide whether the proposal is intended as an
right, and whether the proposal is appropriate because it does not excessively
interfere with the exercise of a management right. See National
Guard, 21 FLRA 24, 31-33 (1986). For the reasons set forth below, we
conclude that the proposal excessively interferes with the exercise of
management's right to assign work. The Union states that the proposal will enable the security guards to
devote their time to patrolling the VAMC to ensure the safety of employees,
including security officers on lone patrol. We find that the proposal thus
right to assign work. We further find, after balancing the competing interests of the Agency
in being able to assign work and the safety considerations as they relate to
employees, that the proposal would excessively interfere with the exercise of
management's right to assign work. In terms of the benefits that would be
afforded to employees under the proposal, it is clear that security guards who
may be assigned cashiering and/or ticket distribution duties in the parking
garage will not be available to patrol the VAMC on a full-time basis. Thus,
there would be an effect on the security guards' ability to assist employees
and staff personnel with volatile situations that may occur in the emergency
rooms and psychiatric wards. At the same time, however, the Union's proposal would impose an
absolute restriction on the Agency's ability to assign certain duties to the
security guards. We view this intrusion on the exercise of management's right
as outweighing the benefits inuring to employees. In this regard, there is no
evidence in the record that security guards would spend such an inordinate
amount of time on cashiering and ticket distribution duties, if so assigned,
that the amount of time available to perform patrol and other security-related
duties would be significantly reduced. We note that if security guards are
assigned to perform cashiering or ticket distribution duties, and such duties
are performed in or around the parking garage, it is possible that the presence
of the guards would enhance the safety of those using the parking garage.
Accordingly, on balance, we conclude that the proposal, which would totally
prevent the Agency from assigning certain duties to security guards,
excessively interferes with the Agency's right to assign work, and is
nonnegotiable. See National Federation of Federal Employees, Local
1482 and U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Mapping Agency, Louisville,
Kentucky, 39 FLRA 1169, 1180-82 (1991), vacated and remanded as to other
matters sub nom. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Mapping Agency,
Louisville, Kentucky v. FLRA, No. 91-1217 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 28, 1992)
(proposal that would completely prohibit management from assigning certain
tasks to unit employees found to excessively interfere with management's right
to assign work). Compare Overseas Education Association and
Department of Defense Dependents Schools, 39 FLRA 153, 164-65 (1991)
(proposal requiring agency to make every reasonable effort to assign lunchroom
monitoring duties to aides rather than to teachers found to constitute a
negotiable appropriate arrangement). VI. Proposal 5 Multiple cars may be registered to one key card but only one card is
applicable to any one parking slot at a given time. A. Analysis and Conclusions By its plain wording, the proposal would allow more than one vehicle to
be registered to a key card, although that card could only be used with one
parking space at any given time. The Union did not explain the meaning of the
proposal nor did the Agency make any specific arguments regarding Proposal 5 in
its statement of position. Rather, in its allegation of nonnegotiability with
regard to all six proposals, the Agency responded, generally, that parking fees
at VAMC Syracuse are governed by law and that the Agency's obligation to
bargain was limited to impact and implementation matters. In our view, the proposal does not appear to be contrary to any law,
rule or regulation. Rather, the proposal appears to contemplate that the holder
of a key card, either a single employee or a carpool, could drive different
vehicles to work on different days. The proposal simply permits more than one
vehicle to be registered to a key card and acknowledges that only one parking
space is available per key card. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
Proposal 5 is negotiable. VII. Proposal 6 All fees collected from bargaining unit members that were charged
without first negotiating with the Union will be reimbursed. A. Positions of the Parties 1. Agency The Agency contends that requiring the Agency to reimburse parking fees
already paid is nonnegotiable because it is contrary to 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109(d)(1)(A). The Agency argues that "{s}ection [8109] states that the
Secretary shall collect parking fees" and, therefore, that that section
leaves no discretion to the Secretary to reimburse fees paid prior to
bargaining with the Union. Statement of Position at 26 (emphasis in original).
Additionally, the Agency claims that section 8109 requires the Secretary to
establish fee schedules that are reasonable under the circumstances, and that
the Agency's regulations provide that the parking fees at VAMCs will be set at
one-half of the fair rental value for the use of equivalent commercial space in
the vicinity. Following these requirements, the Agency argues that the fees set
by the Secretary are "reasonable to adequately subsidize" the revolving fund.
Id. at 27. The Agency also argues that reimbursing fees already paid would, in
effect, require the Agency to provide free parking to employees for the period
of time between the opening of the garage and the implementation of the
proposal. The Agency assumes that because the proposal makes no provision for
the deduction of any fee that eventually might be set from the amount to be
reimbursed, such fees would not be deducted. Therefore, the Agency concludes
that it will have provided employees with free parking, contrary to the
requirement in section 8109 that the Secretary collect parking fees. Finally, the Agency asserts that Proposal 6 is nonnegotiable because
there is no statute authorizing any funds to reimburse employees for parking
fees already paid. According to the Agency, the Authority has held that
proposals requiring an Agency to obligate funds that have not been appropriated
for the proposed purpose are unlawful unless the Agency has specific authority
to obligate funds in advance of appropriations. Because the revolving fund is
committed to the acquisition, construction and maintenance of parking garages,
the Agency argues that there are no funds specifically authorized to reimburse
employees for parking fees. 2. Union The Union argues that the establishment of parking fees is not
specifically provided for by Federal law, and that section 8109 leaves the
establishment of those fees to the discretion of the Secretary. The Union
maintains that the Agency should have bargained with the Union before imposing
parking fees. As the Agency did not bargain over the parking fees, the Union
claims that all the parking fees collected by the Agency should be refunded to
bargaining unit employees and that interest on such amounts should also be
paid. The Union argues that such a remedy is not unreasonable because the
Agency failed to meet its obligation to bargain and collected the parking fees
unlawfully.(4) B. Analysis and Conclusions The Union clearly states that Proposal 6 would require the Agency to
reimburse all parking fees collected from bargaining unit employees and to pay
interest on the monies returned. We find that the proposal is inconsistent with
38 U.S.C.A. § 8109(c)(3) and, therefore, that it is outside the duty to
bargain under section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute. Under section 8109(c)(3), the Secretary is required to collect fees for
parking at the Agency's parking garage. By requiring that all fees be
reimbursed, the proposal would have the effect of providing free parking. As
such, the proposal is inconsistent with law. We note that there is nothing in
the proposal to suggest that it would require only reimbursement of the
difference between the fees actually charged and the fees that ultimately would
be negotiated. To the contrary, the Union's position is that all monies would
have to be returned to employees. For this reason, the proposal is
distinguishable from the arbitral remedy that was sustained by the Authority in
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Atlanta, Georgia and
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2102, 44 FLRA No. 37
(1992). That case involved an interpretation of a portion of the VA parking
regulation that establishes how the Secretary will survey comparable commercial
parking rates in order to determine the fee structure for VAMC parking garages.
The Authority upheld the arbitrator's finding that the establishment of parking
rates at the particular VAMC was not in accordance with the regulation. The
Authority also sustained the award insofar as it directed the imposition of
fees in accordance with the regulation and the reimbursement of fees to
employees, under prescribed conditions, if the fees that should have been
charged were lower than the fees actually charged. Having found that Proposal 6 is inconsistent with Federal law, we need
not address whether the proposal is an appropriate arrangement under section
7106(b)(3). Section 7106(b)(3) applies to the exercise of management's rights
under section 7106 of the Statute and does not make negotiable a matter that,
as here, is inconsistent with law under section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute.
See National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1214 and
Hospital, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 40 FLRA 1181, 1196-97 (1991).
Additionally, in light of our conclusion, we need not address the Agency's
additional contention regarding the use of appropriated funds. VIII. Order The Agency shall, upon request, or as otherwise agreed to by the
parties, bargain on Proposals 1, 2, 4 and 5.(5) The petition for
review as to Proposals 3 and 6 is dismissed. APPENDIX The relevant provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 8109 provide: (c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, each
employee, visitor, and other individual having business at a medical facility
for which parking fees have been established under subsection (d) or (e) of
this section shall be charged the applicable parking fee for the use of a
parking facility at such medical facility. (2) A parking fee shall not be charged under this subsection for the
accommodation of any vehicle used to transport to or from a medical
facility-- (A) a veteran or eligible person in connection with such veteran or
eligible person seeking examination or treatment; or (B) a volunteer worker (as determined in accordance with regulations
which the Secretary shall prescribe) in connection with such worker performing
services for the benefit of veterans receiving care at a medical
facility. (3) The Secretary shall collect (or provide for the collection of)
parking fees charged under this subsection. (d)(1) For each medical facility where funds from the revolving fund
described in subsection (h) of this section are expended for-- (A) a garage constructed or acquired by the Department at a cost
exceeding $500,000 (or, in the case of acquisition by lease, $100,000 per
year); or (B) a project for the alteration of a garage at a cost exceeding
$500,000, the Secretary shall prescribe a schedule of parking fees to be charged
at all parking facilities used in connection with such medical facility. (2) The parking fee schedule prescribed for a medical facility referred
to in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be designed to establish fees
which the Secretary determines are reasonable under the circumstances. (e) The Secretary may prescribe a schedule of parking fees for the
parking facilities at any medical facility not referred to in subsection (d) of
this section. Any such schedule shall be designed to establish fees which the
Secretary determines to be reasonable under the circumstances and shall cover
all parking facilities used in connection with such medical facility. (f) The Secretary may contract (by lease or otherwise) for the
operation of parking facilities at medical facilities under such terms and
conditions as the Secretary prescribes and may do so without regard to laws
requiring full and open competition. (g) Subject to subsections (h) and (i) of this section, there are
authorized to be appropriated such amounts as are necessary to finance (in
whole or in part) the construction, alteration, and acquisition (including site
acquisition) of parking facilities at medical facilities. (h)(1) Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (g) of this section
and parking fees collected under subsection (c) of this section shall be
administered as a revolving fund and shall be available without fiscal year
limitation. (2) The revolving fund shall be deposited in a checking account with
the Treasurer of the United States. (3)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, no
funds other than funds from the revolving fund may be expended for the
construction, alteration, or acquisition (including site acquisition) of a
garage at a medical facility after September 30, 1986. (B) Subparagraph (A) of this paragraph does not apply to the use of
funds for investigations and studies, surveys, designs, plans, working
drawings, specifications, and similar actions not directly involved in the
physical construction of a structure. (i)(1) The expenditure of funds from the revolving fund may be made
only for the construction, alteration, and acquisition (including site
acquisition) of parking facilities at medical facilities and may be made only
as provided for in appropriation Acts. (2) For the purpose of section 8104(a)(2) of this title, a bill,
resolution, or amendment which provides that funds in the revolving fund
(including any funds proposed in such bill, resolution, or amendment to be
appropriated to the revolving fund) may be expended for a project involving a
total expenditure of more than $2,000,000 for the construction, alteration, or
acquisition (including site acquisition) of a parking facility or facilities at
a medical facility shall be considered to be a bill, resolution, or amendment
making an appropriation which may be expended for a major medical facility
project. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) 1. The statute establishing the parking law, which was
originally codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5009, is now codified at 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 8109 (West 1991), Pub. L. 102-40, 105 Stat. 238, 239 (May 7, 1991). For
decision-making purposes, all references to the provisions of the parking law
have been renumbered accordingly. Additionally, the relevant text of 38
U.S.C.A. § 8109 appears in an Appendix to this decision.
2. 38 U.S.C.A. § 8101(1) defines the term "alter" as
"repair, remodel, improve, or extend such medical facility." Section 8101(3),
in turn, defines "medical facility" to include garages and parking facilities.
Based on these definitions, and the parties' contentions addressed below, the
term alteration obviously encompasses the maintenance of parking facilities for
such items as repairs.
3. We express no view on the continued viability of the
test should include monetary benefits only. See, for example,
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, 37 FLRA 938, 949 n.2 (1990). However, we find
that the Agency has failed to satisfy either of the tests set forth in
4. We note, in this connection, the Union's statement in
its petition that no unfair labor practice charge was outstanding when it filed
5. In finding those proposals to be negotiable, we make no