Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/111/633/630881/
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 17:30:28
Document Index: 540862656

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 500', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 1802', '§ 1802', '§ 203', '§ 500', '§ 500', '§ 500', '§ 500', '§ 1802', '§ 500', '§ 653', '§ 652', '§ 500', '§ 500']

Adelaida Torres-lopez; Guadalupe Montez-torres; Mariamontez-torres; Ramon Montez-torres; Juan Arias-ayala;moises Cristobal-hernandez; Sabino Estrada-olvera; Rosariogil-armenta; Alberto Hernandez-chavez; Heribertohernandez-perez; Baltazar Pizano-cadeza; J. Jesussanchez-castaneda; Guillermo Urias-bero, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Robert May; Bear Creek Farms, a Partnership; Tee Peefarms, Inc.; Gcp Farms, Inc.; May Farms, Inc.,defendants-appellees, 111 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1997 › Adelaida Torres-lopez; Guadalupe Montez-torres; Mariamontez-torres; Ramon Montez-torres; Juan Arias-...
Adelaida Torres-lopez; Guadalupe Montez-torres; Mariamontez-torres; Ramon Montez-torres; Juan Arias-ayala;moises Cristobal-hernandez; Sabino Estrada-olvera; Rosariogil-armenta; Alberto Hernandez-chavez; Heribertohernandez-perez; Baltazar Pizano-cadeza; J. Jesussanchez-castaneda; Guillermo Urias-bero, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Robert May; Bear Creek Farms, a Partnership; Tee Peefarms, Inc.; Gcp Farms, Inc.; May Farms, Inc.,defendants-appellees, 111 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1997)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 111 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1997) Argued and Submitted Jan. 8, 1997. Decided April 9, 1997
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that Bear Creek Farms was not a joint employer of the farmworkers within the meaning of the FLSA and AWPA. In arriving at this conclusion, the district court considered the five regulatory factors set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h) (4) (ii). These regulatory factors relate to whether an alleged joint employer exerts control over workers and their wages. The district court also considered non-regulatory factors applied in judicial interpretations of the FLSA found in federal case law. These non-regulatory factors relate to whether a farmworker is economically dependent on the alleged joint employer. The district court therefore granted summary judgment on the FLSA and AWPA claims, ruling that Bear Creek Farms was not a joint employer of the farmworkers.
Whether an entity is a "joint employer" under the FLSA and AWPA is a question of law. Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1983); Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 929 (11th Cir. 1996). We review questions of law de novo. United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 343 (9th Cir. 1996).
The FLSA broadly defines the "employer-employee relationship [s]" subject to its reach. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728, 67 S. Ct. 1473, 1475, 91 L. Ed. 1772 (1947). " 'Employ' includes to suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). " 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer...." Id. § 203(d). The FLSA's definition of employee has been called the " 'broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act.' " United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n. 3, 65 S. Ct. 295, 296 n. 3, 89 L. Ed. 301 (1945) (quoting 81 Cong.Rec. 7,657 (1938) (statement of Sen. Black)).
The FLSA, however, did not adequately address the specific problems faced by farmworkers. In 1963, Congress passed the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act ("FLCRA"), Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920 (1963), in an attempt to alleviate the widespread suffering of farmworkers by regulating farm labor contractors. Farm labor contractors are individuals or entities that provide agricultural workers to employers. By 1974, Congress recognized that the FLCRA's focus on regulating farm labor contractors had failed to achieve the desired protections for farmworkers. As made clear in the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare's Report on the FLCRA, " [n]oncompliance by those whose activities the [FLCRA] were intended to regulate has become the rule rather than the exception.... It is quite evident that the [FLCRA] in its present form provides no real deterrent to violations." S.Rep. No. 93-1206, at 3 (1974). Accordingly, Congress amended the FLCRA in 1974 to create a private cause of action for farmworkers and to broaden the definition of "farm labor contractor" to include growers in certain circumstances. Pub. L. No. 93-518, 88 Stat. 1652 (1974).
Under the AWPA, the term "agricultural employer" means "any person who owns or operates a farm, ranch, processing establishment, cannery, gin, packing shed or nursery, or who produces or conditions seed, and who either recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker." 29 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (emphasis added). The term "employ" has the same meaning under the AWPA as under the FLSA. Id. § 1802(5). The term includes "to suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Furthermore, the regulations implementing the AWPA provide that " ' [j]oint employment' under the [FLSA] is 'joint employment' under the [AWPA]." 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h) (4).
This court has recognized that the concept of joint employment should be defined expansively under the FLSA--and therefore under the AWPA as well. See Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting in joint employment case that " [c]ourts have adopted an expansive interpretation of the definitions of 'employer' and 'employee' under the FLSA, in order to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the Act"). To determine if a joint employment relationship exists, this court has applied an "economic reality" test. Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); Real, 603 F.2d at 754. A court should consider all those factors which are "relevant to [the] particular situation" in evaluating the "economic reality" of an alleged joint employment relationship under the FLSA. Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470.
29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h) (4) (ii).
(1) whether the work was a "specialty job on the production line," Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S. Ct. at 1477;
(4) whether the employees had a "business organization that could or did shift as a unit from one [worksite] to another," Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S. Ct. at 1477;
In the instant case, the district court relied heavily on the five regulatory factors listed in 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h) (4) (ii). The district court ruled that most of the non-regulatory factors were not helpful because "those factors simply reflect the fact and nature of [Bear Creek Farms'] business and/or indicate that plaintiffs had an employment relationship with someone, without indicating with whom that relationship existed." Torres-Lopez v. May, No. 94-851 ST, slip op. at 37 (D. Or. Oct. 17, 1995) ("District Court Opinion").5
To the contrary, the non-regulatory factors play an important role in revealing the economic reality of the farmworkers' alleged employment relationship with Bear Creek Farms. For example, a grower's ownership of farmland is relevant "for the obvious reason that without the land, the worker might not have work, and because a business that owns or controls the worksite will likely be able to prevent labor law violations, even if it delegates hiring and supervisory responsibilities to labor contractors." Antenor, 88 F.3d at 937 (citing Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1969)). Similarly, the grower's investment in "equipment and facilities" is probative of the "workers' economic dependence on the person who supplies the equipment or facilities." Id. Finally, considering whether the farmworkers perform "a line-job integral to [the grower's] business" is relevant "because a worker who performs a routine task that is a normal and integral phase of the grower's production is likely to be dependent on the grower's overall production process." Id. (citing Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S. Ct. at 1477).
In emphasizing the regulatory factors, the district court followed Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994) (involving farmworkers' FLSA and AWPA claims against farm labor contractor and grower). Aimable is not persuasive authority, however, because it misconstrued the importance of the non-regulatory factors. For example, Aimable excluded the non-regulatory factor of "investment in equipment and facilities" from its analysis of an alleged employment relationship because use of that factor did not show whether the farmworkers were more dependent on the grower or the farm labor contractor. Id. at 443.
In so concluding, the Aimable court ignored a fundamental principle behind the joint employment doctrine: that a worker may be employed by more than one entity at the same time. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 500.20(h) (4) (i); Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1469. The issue is not whether a farmworker is more dependent upon the farm labor contractor or the grower. Rather, the inquiry must focus on the economic reality of the particular relationship between the farmworker and the alleged joint employer. See Antenor, 88 F.3d at 932 (" [T]he question in 'joint employment' cases is not whether the worker is more economically dependent on the independent contractor or the grower, with the winner avoiding responsibility as an employer.").
The district court misconstrued congressional intent. Congress expressly incorporated the FLSA definition of "employ" into the AWPA. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(5). As already explained, the FLSA definition of employment is broad. Congress presumably knew what it was doing when it chose to borrow this concept from the FLSA. Furthermore, the Department of Labor indicated at oral argument that a proper interpretation of the AWPA would result in many instances where growers would be liable for violations of the AWPA.6 3. Applying the joint employment test to Bear Creek Farms
The district court did not attribute much significance to the above facts because it concluded that any control exercised by Bear Creek Farms was exercised indirectly. The regulations expressly state, however, that indirect control as well as direct control can demonstrate a joint employment relationship. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h) (4) (ii) (listing one of the regulatory factors as " [t]he degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work") (emphasis added); see also Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The fact that [the grower] effected the supervision by speaking to the crew leaders, who in turn spoke to the harvest workers, rather than speaking directly to the harvest workers does not negate a degree of apparent on-the-job control over the harvest workers.").7
All but one of the eight non-regulatory factors that we identified in Part B.2 point to a conclusion that the farmworkers were employees of Bear Creek Farms for purposes of the FLSA and AWPA. First, the farmworkers' task of picking cucumbers is analogous to a "specialty job on the production line," Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S. Ct. at 1477. The farmworkers' only function was to pick cucumbers according to standard industry practice. What they did constituted one small step in the sequence of steps taken by Bear Creek Farms to grow the cucumbers and prepare them for processing at the cannery.
Fourth, the farmworkers did not have a "business organization that could or did shift as a unit from one [farm] to another," Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S. Ct. at 1477. Rather, individual farmworkers, would learn by word of mouth that the cucumbers were ready for picking and find their own way to the cucumber field. Ag-Labor then selected the farmworkers from the labor pool that showed up.
The farmworkers also allege violations of the Oregon minimum wage law, Or.Rev.Stat. § 653.010-.300, and Oregon law concerning the payment of wages, Or.Rev.Stat. § 652.110-.250. The district court concluded that the definition of the term "employ" for the Oregon labor laws in question "is the same as under the FLSA and 'includes to suffer or permit to work.' " District Court Opinion at 41. The district court reasoned that "federal regulations and case law interpreting the meaning of 'employ' under the FLSA are persuasive authority when considering whether an employment relationship exists for purposes of ORS Chapters 652 and 653." Id. at 41-42 (citing Northwest Advancement v. Bureau of Labor, 96 Or.App. 133, 772 P.2d 934, 937, rev. denied, 308 Or. 315, 779 P.2d 618 (Or.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932, 110 S. Ct. 2172, 109 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1990)).
To be sure, we may determine whether a given fact comes within the letter or spirit of each regulatory or non-regulatory factor by examining "logically determinable or empirically observable facts."2 In this respect, we must ensure logical soundness by vigorous fealty to concepts of analogy. Analogy is the quintessential method of comparison in which we carefully examine the quality of positive and negative resemblances in the facts and apply these resemblances to the controlling standard. Only when it is impossible to use the logical method of analogy should resort be made to personal "value judgments which are derived from practical standards or ... views"3 ; "what Holmes called his 'can't helps', his ultimate convictions or values."4
See Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (naming the first six non-regulatory factors); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S. Ct. 1473, 91 L. Ed. 1772 (1947) (discussing the latter two factors).7
Bear Creek controlled the workers to a certain extent because, as the grower, it determined when the harvest would occur. But Bear Creek did not exercise control over any individual Appellants. Bear Creek controlled how many workers would be needed at a given time by staggering the planting dates of the cucumbers. It also determined when to start the harvest, and it sometimes called off the harvest on a particular day because of a shortage of bins. However, Bear Creek did not otherwise determine how many workers would pick on a particular day, or the specific days or hours the workers would pick. It did not specify which workers would do the picking, nor did it require a specific routine or picking speed. Bear Creek gave only general instructions to Ag-Labor as to when to begin harvesting and what fields to harvest. On balance, the negative resemblances regarding control and supervision of the workers outnumber the positive resemblances. Cf. Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996) (joint employment existed where the growers told the FLC how many workers to bring each day, the growers determined the precise moment when picking would commence and the growers had the ability to assign work to specific workers). Accordingly, this factor suggests that Bear Creek was not the Appellants' joint employer.
Bear Creek never exercised any supervision, either direct or indirect, over the Appellants. Bear Creek's representative, Robert May, was present at the cucumber farm regularly--he did most of the driving of the trucks from the fields to the cannery. May testified in his deposition that he might have looked over the vines if he had to go into the field for some other purpose, such as irrigation, but he never had any problems with the Appellants' work and he never complained to anyone from Ag-Labor after he went through the field. Nor did anyone else from Bear Creek ever walk the fields to check Ag-Labor's work. This factor suggests that Bear Creek was not a joint employer. Compare Antenor, 88 F.3d at 935 (joint employment existed where growers supervised the pickers' work by communicating with the workers and their supervisors on a daily basis) with Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 F.3d 434, 441 (11th Cir. 1994) (no joint employment where grower made only "infrequent assertions of minimal oversight").
The court's reasoning here conflicts with Supreme Court and this court's teachings, as well as case law from other circuits. The Supreme Court has found evidence of a joint employment relationship where workers performed a discrete task in a larger production process. Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S. Ct. at 1477 ("boners" hired by an independent contractor were employees of the slaughterhouse where they worked). Our court and other courts of appeals have applied the same reasoning to agricultural workers. See, e.g., Real, 603 F.2d 748; Antenor, 88 F.3d at 937.
The district court found this factor not helpful in the agricultural context because harvesting always occurs on the property where the crops are located. I believe the district court erred in its application of this factor. It is true that in all cases involving agricultural workers the grower is likely to have the only ownership interest in the property where the work occurs. But this is not a valid reason for disregarding this factor. On the contrary, the ownership of the property is relevant "for the obvious reason that ... a business that owns or controls the work site will likely be able to prevent labor law violations, even if it delegates hiring and supervisory responsibilities to labor contractors." Antenor, 88 F.3d at 937 (citing Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1969)).
This factor suggests Bear Creek was a joint employer. According to Rodriguez's affidavit, there was little negotiation involved in the oral contract between Bear Creek and Ag-Labor, and the 50% split was standard in the cucumber harvesting industry. In Rutherford, the Court found that such an arrangement supported a finding of joint employment. Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S. Ct. at 1476.
The regulations cite to Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S. Ct. 1473, 91 L. Ed. 1772 (1947); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 65 S. Ct. 295, 89 L. Ed. 301 (1945); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979); Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Company, Inc., 527 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826, 97 S. Ct. 82, 50 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1976); Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1975); Hodgson v. Okada, 472 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819, 94 S. Ct. 43, 38 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1973); and Mitchell v. Hertzke, 234 F.2d 183 (10th Cir. 1956)
At oral argument, counsel for the Department of Labor expressed the Department's view that many courts had been overly restrictive in defining the concept of "joint employer" by emphasizing the regulatory factors found in 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h) (4) (ii). Those factors concern the degree of control a putative employer has over an employee
Although Hodgson is an out-of-circuit case, it is persuasive authority because the federal regulations implementing the AWPA cite to it. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h) (4) (ii)