Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/09-3023/09-3023-2011-07-01-opinion-2011-07-01.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-25 13:57:36
Document Index: 258350564

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 207', '§ 31502', '§ 31502', '§ 31502', '§ 213', '§ 231', '§ 782']

Johnson v. Hix Wrecker Serv., Inc.l :: Seventh Circuit :: US Courts of Appeals Cases :: US Federal Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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Johnson v. Hix Wrecker Serv., Inc.l
Justia.com Opinion Summary: The tow truck driver sued his former employer for failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). The district court held that the driver was not entitled to overtime pay because he was subject to the motor carrier exemption to the FLSA. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Employers subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation under the Motor Carrier Act. 49 U.S.C. 31502 are exempt from the overtime requirement, but an affidavit provided by the employer did not show that the company engaged in interstate commerce within a reasonable period of time prior to the time during which it claims the exemption. The use of the word "routinely" was too vague.Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by Email
No. 09-3023
B OBBY J. JOHNSON, JR.,
H IX W RECKER S ERVICE, INC., et al.,
for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:08-cv-00050-WTL-JMS— William T. Lawrence, Judge.
A RGUED N OVEMBER 3, 2010—D ECIDED JULY 1, 2011
Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
and P ALLMEYER, District Judge. 
W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Bobby Johnson, Jr. claims that
his former employer, Hix Wrecker Service, did not pay him
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”). The district court granted summary judg-
The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting
ment in favor of Hix Wrecker, finding that Johnson was not
entitled to overtime pay because he was subject to the
motor carrier exemption to the FLSA. However, Hix
Wrecker did not meet its burden of proof on the issue
of whether the motor carrier exemption applied to Johnson. The evidence it presented did not establish as a matter
of law that Johnson was exempt. Therefore, we reverse.
Hix Wrecker is an Indianapolis business that transports
personal and commercial motor vehicles that have been
stranded, impounded, wrecked, or abandoned. Since 1973,
Hix Wrecker has had a common carrier certificate of
authority from the Department of Transportation. The
certificate allows Hix Wrecker to transport property in
Johnson worked for Hix Wrecker as a tow truck driver
for about four months, from June 9, 2006 or June 12, 2006,
until October 22, 2006. In 2008, Johnson sued Hix Wrecker,
its owners, Mr. James Hix and Mrs. Ova Hix, and
its corporate secretary, Ms. Gail Neil. Johnson alleged that
during the time that he worked for Hix Wrecker he was
not paid overtime wages in violation of the FLSA. For
its part, Hix Wrecker admitted that Johnson worked twelvehour work shifts, but maintained that Johnson was
not entitled to overtime.
In the district court, the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment. Hix Wrecker claimed that Johnson
was subject to the motor carrier exemption to the FLSA,
which, when certain conditions are met, exempts the
employees of motor carriers that engage in interstate
commerce from the maximum hours and overtime provisions of the FLSA. In his cross motion, Johnson argued that
he was not subject to the exemption, and that Mr. Hix,
Mrs. Hix, and Ms. Neil were “employers” under the
FLSA and were therefore individually liable for his
unpaid wages. The district court granted the defendants’
motion and denied Johnson’s. This appeal followed.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Ellis v. DHL Express Inc. (USA), 633 F.3d 522,
525 (7th Cir. 2011). Because the FLSA is a remedial act,
exemptions from its coverage are narrowly construed
against employers. Klein v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Med. Ctr., 990 F.2d 279, 282 (7th Cir. 1999).
The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime (one-anda-half times the hourly wage) to employees who work more
than forty hours a week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Ordinarily,
the employees of a motor carrier that engages wholly
in intrastate commerce are subject to the Secretary of
Labor’s jurisdiction, and consequently to the overtime
and maximum hours provisions of the FLSA. See Reich v.
Am. Driver Serv., Inc., 33 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1994);
see generally Goldberg v. Faber Indus., Inc., 291 F.2d 232, 23435 (7th Cir. 1961). In contrast, the employees of a motor
carrier that engages in interstate commerce may come
under the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction under
the Motor Carrier Act. 49 U.S.C. § 31502. Under § 31502(b),
the Secretary of Transportation, rather than the Secretary
of Labor, has the power to prescribe these employees’
qualifications and maximum hours of service. Employees
subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction
under § 31502 are exempt from the FLSA’s maximum hour
and overtime provisions pursuant to the FLSA’s motor
carrier exemption. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). The motor
carrier has the burden to show that an employee is exempt.
Klein, 990 F.2d at 283.
Many motor carriers engage in both interstate and
intrastate commerce, but a motor carrier employee cannot
be subject to the jurisdiction of both the Secretary of Labor
and the Secretary of Transportation simultaneously.
See Reich, 33 F.3d at 1155-56. An employee comes within
the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction so long as
the employee is “subject, at any time, to be[ing] assigned
to interstate trips.” Goldberg, 291 F.2d at 235. A minor
involvement in interstate commerce as a regular part of
an employee’s duties subjects that employee to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction. See Reich, 33 F.3d
at 1155-56 (citing Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 432-35
(1947)). However, an employee’s minor involvement
does not necessarily subject that employee to the Secretary
of Transportation’s jurisdiction indefinitely. Id.
The Department of Transportation has promulgated a
notice of interpretation through the Federal Highway
Administration clarifying the extent of the Secretary of
Transportation’s jurisdiction over motor carrier employees.1
See 46 Fed. Reg. 37,902. The notice of interpretation provides as follows:
[For an employee to fall under the Secretary of
Transportation’s jurisdiction] . . . the carrier must
be shown to have engaged in interstate commerce
within a reasonable period of time prior to the
time at which jurisdiction is in question. The
carrier’s involvement in interstate commerce must
be established by some concrete evidence such
as an actual trip in interstate commerce or proof,
in the case of a “for hire” carrier, that interstate
business has been solicited. If jurisdiction is
claimed over a driver who has not driven in
interstate commerce, evidence must be presented
that the carrier has engaged in interstate commerce and that the driver could reasonably have
been expected to make one of the carrier’s interstate runs. Satisfactory evidence would be statements from drivers and carriers, and any employment agreements.
The notice of interpretation further provides that
“evidence of driving in interstate commerce or being
“[T]he agency with whose interpretation [the FLSA’s motor
carrier exemption, 29 U.S.C. § 231(b)(1)] is concerned is . . . the
Department of Transportation.” Benson v. Universal Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 675 F.2d 783, 785 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing Levinson v.
Spector Motor Co., 330 U.S. 649 (1947)).
subject to being used in interstate commerce should be
accepted as proof that the driver is subject to [the Secretary
of Transportation's jurisdiction] for a 4-month period from
the date of proof.” Id. The Federal Highway Administration
considers the four-month period to be “reasonable
because it avoids both the too strict, week-by-week approach and the situation where a driver could be used or
be subject to being used [in interstate commerce only]
once and yet remain subject to [the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction] for an unlimited time.” 2 Id.
In support of its motion for summary judgment seeking
to establish that Johnson was exempt, Hix Wrecker submitted an affidavit from Ms. Neil, a Motor Carrier Detail
report from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administra-
The Department of Labor recently acknowledged the Department of Transportation’s “four-month” rule. See Field Assistance
Bulletin 2010-2, November 4, 2010 (explaining that the “ ‘four
month’ rule stems from the Department of Transportation’s . . .
interpretation of the Motor Carrier Act . . . conferring that
agency jurisdiction over . . . employees for a four-month period
beginning with the date they could have been called upon
to, or actually did, engage in . . . interstate activities [and]
triggering the overtime pay exemption for that period”). The
Department of Labor has also promulgated interpretive regulations which, consistent with the Department of Transportation’s notice of interpretation, provide, “in the case of an employee of a private carrier whose job does not require him to
engage regularly in exempt . . . activities . . . and whose engagement in such activities occurs sporadically or occasionally . . .
the exemption will apply to him only in those workweeks
when he engages in such activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(4).
tion, and a Company Snapshot for Hix Wrecker from the
same agency. The latter two exhibits were included to
show that Hix Wrecker had a common carrier certificate
from the Department of Transportation, but otherwise,
Hix Wrecker relied solely on Ms. Neil’s affidavit, which
1. Hix Wrecker has held a common-carrier certificate of authority issued by the Department of
Transportation which allows it to transport property for hire in interstate commerce since August,
8. Hix Wrecker routinely provides out of state
wrecker services for [several named customers].
9. All wrecker Hix Wrecker drivers are subject to
being assigned to out of state wrecker service runs
either as a driver, or as helper to an [sic] driver to
facilitate safe retrieval operations based upon their
availability at the time the run is assigned and the
type of truck required for the service to the customer.
10. Bobby J. Johnson, Jr. was subject to being
assigned an out of state wrecker service run at all
times during his employment with Hix Wrecker.
The district court concluded that Ms. Neil’s affidavit was
sufficient to establish as a matter of law that the motor
carrier exemption applied to Johnson during his employment. We disagree.
A party opposing summary judgment does not have to
rebut factual propositions on which the movant bears the
burden of proof and that the movant has not properly
supported in the first instance. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1986); Reserve Supply Corp. v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 42 (7th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that when the moving party has the burden
of proof on an issue it must show that the evidence on that
issue is so one-sided that it must prevail as a matter of law);
In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Assuming
[the movant had] the burden of proof on [the issue on
which it sought summary judgment, it] had the burden of
supporting [its] motions with credible . . . evidence that
would entitle [it] to a directed verdict if not controverted
at trial.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Neil’s affidavit does not show that Hix Wrecker
engaged in interstate commerce within a “reasonable
period of time” prior to the time during which it claims the
exemption for Johnson. Cf. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,902. And the
affidavit does not establish that Johnson was subject to
being used in interstate commerce during a four-month
period or during any other “reasonable period of time.”
Cf. id. Ms. Neil’s affidavit only states that Hix Wrecker
“routinely” provides out-of-state services for its customers.
In using the word “routinely,” Ms. Neil could have meant
every day, but she also could have meant some other time
period, such as every six months or every year. The affidavit is simply too vague for a court to determine whether
the period Ms. Neil had in mind was “reasonable,”
as contemplated by the Department of Transportation’s
notice of interpretation. Ms. Neil’s statement that Johnson
was subject to being assigned to an out-of-state wrecker
service run at all times during his employment with Hix
Wrecker does not cure this deficiency. Ms. Neil provides no
additional details regarding when (or if) Johnson was
actually assigned to out-of-state runs, or regarding Hix
Wrecker’s practices. Instead, she merely recites (nearly
verbatim) the rule that an employee is exempt so long
as the employee is “subject, at any time, to be[ing] assigned
to interstate trips . . . .” See Goldberg, 291 F.2d at 235.
The point of requiring a motor carrier to show that
it regularly engages in interstate commerce is to prevent
employers from circumventing the maximum hours
provisions of the FLSA by claiming that their employees
are used in interstate commerce even though the likelihood
of an employee being sent on an interstate run is remote.
See 46 Fed. Reg. 37,902; see also Goldberg, 291 F.2d at 235.
If the burden of proof on the question of whether he
was exempt had been Johnson’s, Ms. Neil’s affidavit,
combined with Johnson’s failure to adduce evidence on
this issue,3 may have sufficed for the district court to
conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact
Johnson submitted an affidavit stating that he did not have
a Class A drivers’ license, which entitles a person to drive
certain kinds of commercial vehicles, during his employment
with Hix Wrecker, and that he “do[es] not recall any other tow
truck driver who did not have a Class A license being sent on
an out-of-state-trip” during his tenure there. The district court
found, and we agree, that it would not be reasonable to draw
the inference that only Class A drivers were subject to being
assigned to interstate jobs from what Johnson “recalls” happened during his short time with Hix Wrecker.
for trial. But Hix Wrecker cannot carry the day on
the question of whether Johnson is exempt, a point on
which it bears the burden of proof, with only an inconclusive and ambiguous affidavit. To allow it to do so would
make it too easy for employers to get around the maximum
hours provisions of the FLSA. Because Hix Wrecker did not
establish as a matter of law that Johnson was exempt, we
reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in the defendants’ favor.
Johnson also contends that the district court erred in
denying his cross motion for summary judgment on the
issue of whether he was exempt. Hix Wrecker responds that
whether Johnson was entitled to summary judgment is not
properly before us because the issue became moot when the
district court entered summary judgment in its favor. But
the district court expressly denied Johnson’s motion on the
issue of whether he was exempt. See Johnson v. Hix Wrecker
Service, No. 1:08-cv-50-WTL-JMS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60868, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2009) (denying Johnson’s
cross motion for summary judgment with regard to his
FLSA claim because the court had concluded in its
previous order that Johnson was exempt). The issue is
therefore not moot.
We find that although Ms. Neil’s affidavit did not
establish as a matter of law that Johnson was exempt, it
does raise genuine issues of material fact regarding how
often Hix Wrecker engaged in interstate commerce when it
employed Johnson and whether Johnson was subject to
being sent on interstate runs. We therefore affirm the denial
of Johnson’s cross motion for summary judgment. Stockwell
v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 907 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“[W]e may affirm on any ground supported by the record,
so long as it has been adequately presented below.”).
Lastly, Johnson argues that the district court erred in
not finding that he was entitled to summary judgment on
his claim that Mr. Hix, Mrs. Hix, and Ms. Neil
were “employers” under the FLSA, and that they were
therefore personally liable for unpaid wages. The district
court did not address this issue because it found
that Johnson was exempt. We will not decide it either since
the district court needs to consider it first.
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and this
case is R EMANDED for further proceedings consistent