Source: https://casetext.com/case/aiyadurai-v-i-n-s
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 12:48:28
Document Index: 723122524

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1182', '§ 656', '§ 244', '§ 1254', '§ 3', '§ 245', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 245', '§ 1105', '§ 1105']

Aiyadurai v. I. N. S, 683 F.2d 1195 | Casetext
Aiyadurai v. I. N. S
683 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982)
Aiyaduraiv.I. N. S
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth CircuitJul 28, 1982
Lauri Steven Filppu, Robert Kendall, Jr., Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
Appeal from the Deportation Proceedings.
Before BRIGHT and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges, and HARRIS, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable Oren Harris, United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern and Western District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
On December 25, 1975, while employed by the Minnetonka Montessori School, Aiyadurai filed an application for adjustment of status with the Service accompanied by a sixth-preference visa petition. The Service advised her that the visa petition had to be supported by an alien employment certification (labor certification) from the Department of Labor (the Department). Application for the labor certification was then filed on Aiyadurai's behalf by Minnetonka Montessori. On October 16, 1976, the Department of Labor denied the application; that decision was not appealed.
In the cases of aliens seeking to enter the United States to perform skilled or unskilled labor, the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Secretary of State and Attorney General (a) whether there are sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified and available in the United States at the places of destination of the aliens; and (b) whether the aliens' employment will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States who are similarly employed. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14), 20 C.F.R. § 656. Without an approved labor certification, an alien immigrant, who is not exempt therefrom, cannot achieve permanent resident in the United States.
At the deportation hearing on February 17, 1977, while represented by counsel, Aiyadurai admitted her deportability as an overstay visitor and was granted the privilege of voluntary departure within ninety days under § 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e). Aiyadurai waived her right to an administrative appeal from the deportation order to the BIA. Prior to the expiration date, Aiyadurai requested and received two extensions of her voluntary departure date to February 1, 1979.
See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b).
From the record it appears that the first extension was granted so that Aiyadurai could complete the school year. The second extension was due to consideration of a private bill that had been presented to Congress on her behalf. On March 8, 1978, Congress took adverse action on the private bill.
Aiyadurai filed a motion to reopen on March 2, 1979. However, in March 1981 the motion was denied, without a hearing, based on a finding by the immigration judge that she was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status by reason of § 245(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c), as amended by Pub.L. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (effective January 1, 1977), which provides in relevant part, "[t]he provisions of this section [§ 1255, Adjustment of Status] shall not be applicable to . . . (2) an alien . . . who hereafter continues in or accepts unauthorized employment prior to filing an application for adjustment of status." It was undisputed that Aiyadurai's employment with Edina Montessori constituted unauthorized work within the meaning of the statute.
The immigration judge also found that the July 18, 1977, instruction of the Deputy Commissioner of the Service whereby nunc pro tunc authorization to accept employment was granted to an alien who was the beneficiary of a visa petition filed before January 10, 1977, and who could have properly filed an application for adjustment of status pursuant to the simultaneous filing provisions then in effect, 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2), did not encompass Aiyadurai's application because she was not the beneficiary of a visa filed before January 10, 1977.
54 Interpreter Releases 29 (July 21, 1977).
Furthermore, even if Aiyadurai had exhausted her administrative remedies, we could not now review the deportation proceedings. This court does have authority to review both final deportation orders, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, and denials of motions to reopen deportation proceedings, see, e.g., Te Kuei Liu v. INS, 645 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1981). There is, however, a time limit applicable to our power of review. "[A] petition for review may be filed not later than six months from the date of the final deportation order." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1). In the present case Aiyadurai's petition for review was filed within six months of the order denying the motion to reopen deportation proceedings, but the motion to reopen the deportation proceedings was not filed within six months of the deportation order. Therefore, the only question before this court is the propriety of the denial of the motion to reopen. See Vergel v. INS, 536 F.2d 755, 757 (8th Cir. 1976).
There is no requirement in the Act that an alien be warned by the Service of the consequences of a change in the law in which the alien is seeking a benefit. "[I]t is not the failure to do something which may lead to estoppel against the government agency; the conduct complained about must be an affirmative act." Oki v. INS, 598 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), citing United States v. Ruby, 588 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 2838, 61 L.Ed.2d 284 (1979); Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1975) (banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976). The failure of the immigration judge to advise Aiyadurai that she should not work at a time when she admitted deportability, was granted the privilege of extending her voluntary departure date so that she could complete the school year and waived her right to appeal the finding of deportability is clearly not affirmative misconduct as to give rise to an estoppel against the government. See Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488.
Aiyadurai next argues that the Service should be estopped based on the Department's alleged negligence in withholding her labor certification. She asserts that her argument is supported by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sun Il Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) ( Yoo). We disagree. In Yoo, the Service allowed the petitioner to file a new application for permanent resident status after the petitioner had cleared up certain of the Service's misapprehensions regarding his eligibility. Although it was certain that petitioner was eligible when he filed his new application, the Service delayed a decision on the application for one year. During the delay, new regulations made the petitioner ineligible again. The court estopped the Service from applying the new regulations because there was no justification for the delay. In so ruling the court stressed that there was no more affirmative action that Yoo could have taken, id. at 1328 n. 4, and that the Service had Yoo's application, which clearly showed his eligibility, before it for a period of time prior to the enactment of new regulations. In contrast, in the present case Aiyadurai had not exhausted her administrative or judicial remedies regarding the denial of labor certification prior to the enactment of the unauthorized work bar. Her first labor certification was denied on October 16, 1975; no appeal was taken. Her second labor certification was denied on November 1, 1976. Aiyadurai did not appeal this decision until after she received an order to show cause regarding her deportability. Finally, on August 2, 1978, one and one-half years after she had been found deportable, Aiyadurai sought judicial review of the denial of labor certification. Meanwhile, the unauthorized work bar had been adopted in October 1976, to be effective January 1, 1977. Consequently, in contrast to Yoo, the Service did not have Aiyadurai's application before it prior to the enactment of the regulations which made her ineligible for adjustment of status. We conclude that the fact there was more affirmative action that Aiyadurai could have taken distinguishes the present case from Yoo.