Source: http://www.lareau-law.ca/Motive.html
Timestamp: 2018-08-20 12:23:46+00:00
Document Index: 124826326

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 33', '§ 34', 'art. 121', '§ 46', '§ 211', '§ 46', '§ 211', 'art. 46', 'art. 211', '§ 46', '§ 211', '§ 152', "l'article 92", "l'article 92", '§ 212', '§ 211', '§ 119', 'art, 2']

Bibliography on motives in Criminal Law / Bibliographie sur les mobiles - motifs en droit pénal
Key Words: bibliography on motive in criminal law, cause, emotion, intention, motivation, motive, motives, sentiments, volitions, will, // mobile, mobiles, motif, motifs, motivation,
updated and corrections / mise à jour et corrections: 11 November 2013
Selected Bibliography on Motive
in Criminal Law (with some elements of
Bibliographie choisie sur le mobile/motif
en droit pénal (avec des éléments de
See also the following bibliographies / Voir aussi les bibliographies suivantes:
• Mens rea in Canadian Law / Mens rea en droit canadien
AL QUDAH, Mouaid, Individual Autonomy as a Basis for Criminal Complicity in New South Wales and Jordan: A Comparative Study, dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Western Sydney School of Law, 2005, xi, 281 p., and see "Motive" at pp. 72-76; available at http://library.uws.edu.au/adt-NUWS/public/adt-NUWS20060705.145513/ (accessed on 2 April 2008);
AJZEN, Icek and Martin Fishbein, Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, c1980, x, 278 p., ISBN: 0139364439; does not deal with law or philosophy but social learning theory; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT General, BF 323 .C5 A37 1980;
ALSTON, William, "Motives and Motivation" in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York: Macmillan, 1967, vol. 5, pp. 399-409; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT General, B 41 .E5;
AMERICAN RE-INSURANCE COMPANY, A guide to Arson investigation : motive, means & opportunity / Motive, means & opportunity, [s.l.] : American Re-Insurance Company, c1996, 197, 47 p.; available at http://www.amre.com/content/rl/arson.pdf (accessed on 21 July 2005);
A. Classification of Motivations of Arsonists
B. Implications for Arson Investigators
C. Arson-For-Profit Cases
2. Investigating"
ANCEL, Marc, La défense sociale nouvelle : un mouvement de politique criminelle humaniste, 3e éd. entièrement rév., Paris : Cujas, 1981, 381 p., (Collection; Publications du Centre d'études de défense sociale de l'Institut de droit comparé de l'Université de Paris Ii associé au C.N.R.S.; volume 1); copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa, K5015.4 A53 1981; also available in English/aussi publié en anglais: ANCEL, Marc, Social defense : the future of penal reform / Marc Ancel ; [translation by Thorsten Sellin ; edited and revised by Edward M. Wise] with a foreword by Norval Morris, Littleton, CO : F.B. Rothman, 1987, xix, 314 p. (series; Publications of the Comparative Criminal Law Project; vol. 16); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5015.4 A5313 1987;
"On ne s'étonera pas davantage de voir la doctrine nouvelle remettre en question la théorie traditionnelle de l'intention, envisagée comme la simple connaissance par l'agent de la violation de la règle légale. [...] cette doctrine [...] ne se ramène pas à autre chose qu'à l'obligation d'obéir à la loi, jointe à une présomption irréfragable que chacun connaît effectivement la règle légale.
À la vérité, cette théorie a eu surtout l'intérêt de permettre au droit pénal néo-classique de ne pas tenir compte des motifs, c'est-à-dire de ces raisons personnelles qui eussent introduit dans l'étude et dans le jugement de l'infraction un élément subjectif dont se défiait la doctrine traditionnelle. Par les mobiles, c'est en réalité toute la personnalité consciente du délinquant qui risquait de pénétrer dans ce droit pénal abstrait dont on voulait qu'il ne connût que le délit. Le théoricien néo-classique entend renvoyer au criminologue le problème épineux et complexe du 'passage à l'acte'. L'effort de la défense sociale, réalisé déjà par la plupart des législations positives modernes, consiste ici à tenir compte, à côté de la fiction juridique, d'un élément de réalité humaine. Il est significatif de noter que le doit pénal moderne signale précisément par l'importance de plus en plus considérable qu'il accorde à la prise en considération du mobile, à côté de l'intention criminelle entendue au sens traditionnel du mot. Ici encore, les faits -- législatifs et jurisprudentiels -- témoignent d'une incontestable 'révolte contre le Code'." (pp. 208-209; note omise)
ARDAL, Pall S., "Motives, Intention and Responsibility", (1965) 15 The Philosophical Quarterly 146-154; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT, Periodicals, B1 .P49;
ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT des amis de la culture juridique française, Journées nationales (3rd : 1998 : Limoges, France), La motivation. Tome III / Limoges - 1998 : actes du colloque, Paris : Libraririe Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 2000, xvii, 121 p. (Collection; Travaux de l'Association Henri Capitant. Journées nationales; tome 3), ISBN: 227501859X; copie à l'Université de Montréal, AFD J86 t.003 2000; titre noté dans ma recherche mais livre pas encore consulté;
ASTON, A.H., Notes, "Motive as an essential element of the crime of false imprisonment", (1933-34) 38 Dickinson Law Review 184-191;
AUSTIN, John, 1805-1880, Lectures on Jurisprudence or The Philosophy of Positive Law, vol. 1, 3rd ed., London: John Murray, 1869; research note: see the text on the internet, Gallica site, Bibliothèque nationale de France at http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N093942
" 'To will,' is to wish or desire certain of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them. A 'determination of the will,' or a 'volition,' is a wish or desire of the sort. A 'motive determining the will,' is a wish not a volition, but suggesting a wish which is. The wish styled a 'motive,' is not immediately followed by its appropriate object: But the bodily movement which is the appropriate object of the volition, seems to the party a certain or probable mean for attaining the something which is the appropriate object of the motive. In case that something be wished as a mean to an ulterior object, the wish of the ulterior object is a motive to a motive; as the wish of the intervening mean is a motive to the volition.
The bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are the only human acts, strictly and properly so called. For events which are not willed, are not acts; and the bodily movements in question are the only events which we will. They are the only objects which follow our desires, without the intervention of means.
But, as I observed in my last Lecture, most of the names which seem to be names of acts, are names of acts strickly and properly so called, coupled with more or fewer of their consequences.
And as the names of acts comprise certain of their consequences, so it is said that those consequences are willed, although they are only intended. In the case which I have just supposed, it would be said that I willed the consequences of my voluntary muscular movements, as well as the movements themselves." (Lecture XIX, "Intention", 1869 edition, p. 432)
AUSTRALIA, Australian Government, Australian Institute of Criminology, Crimes Facts Info, No. 110, Motives for Homicide, 8 November 2005, ISSN: 1445-7288; available at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/cfi/cfi110.html (accessed on 12 March 2006);
"The motive is the alleged primary causal factor that precedes and often leads to the events, the outcome of which is the death of the victim/s. Excluding cases with no apparent motive, female victims of homicide are overwhelmingly most likely to have been killed as a result of a domestic argument and/or the breakdown of a relationship. Male victims are more likely than female victims to have been killed where motives were linked to revenge, money/drugs, and alcohol related arguments."
AUSTRALIA, Queensland Criminal Code Act, 1899 , subsections 22(2) and (3):
" Intention--motive
(2) Unless the intention to cause a particular result is expressly declared to be an element of the offence constituted, in whole or in part, by an act or omission, the result intended to be caused by an act or intention is immaterial.
(3) Unless otherwise declared, the motive by which a person is induced to do or omit to do an act, or to form an intention, is immaterial so far as regards criminal responsibility."
AUTRICHE, Code pénal autrichien, article 33, chiffre 5 et article 34, alinéa 1, chiffre 3, traduction de Yvonne Marx et de Pierre Chenut dans Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., aux pp. 10-160 (pour le code), et pp. 27-28 pour le les articles 33 et 34 (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx; tome 5); note: la numérotation a été corrigée:
"Titre Quatre - MESURE DE LA PEINE [...]
ARTICLE 33. - Il y a circonstance aggravante notamment si le coupable [...]
5. s'il a agi pour des motifs particulièrement répréhensibles [...];
Circonstances atténuantes spéciales
ARTICLE 34(1) -- Il y a circonstance atténuante spéciale, notamment si le coupable [...]
3. s'il a commis l'acte pour des motifs honorables [...]"
[German text / texte allemand]
"Vierter Abschnitt - Strafbemessung [...]
§ 33 Besondere Erschwerungsgründe
Ein Erschwerungsgrund ist es insbesondere, wenn der Täter [...]
§ 34 Besondere Milderungsgründe
(1) Ein Milderungsgrund ist es insbesondere, wenn der Täter [...]
3. die Tat aus achtenswerten Beweggründen begangen hat [...]."
BASSIOUNI, M. Cherif, "Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition -- A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem", (1969-70) 19 DePaul Law Review 217-269;
BATTISTINI, Patrice (membre du CERDACC), "La bonne intention en matière d'homicide involontaire ou l'appréhension du mobile par le Code pénal", Journal des Accidents et des Catastrophes -- JAC 19 (une publication du CERDACC); visionné le 12 mars 2005, à http://www.iutcolmar.uha.fr/internet/Recherche/JCERDACC.nsf/0/f0b278f487663a5ac1256b11002d3aed?OpenDocument (accessed on 12 March 2005);
"En résumé, comme on a pu le voir l'affirmation selon laquelle le mobile est juridiquement indifférent en droit pénal est partiellement erroné. En effet, cette affirmation doit être nuancée dans la mesure où le mobile peut être un élément constitutif et une circonstance aggravante de l'infraction. De plus, il peut être pris en compte par les juridictions lors du prononcé de la peine ( parfois même, devant une Cour d'assises, il peut aboutir à l'acquittement de l'accusé, notamment en matière de crime passionnel). Toutefois, l'influence du mobile sur le droit pénal doit être relativisée. D'une part car le principe reste l'indifférence du mobile en ce qui concerne l'incrimination. Il ne peut être pris en compte si un texte d'incrimination en fait une condition spécifique. D'autre part, force est de constater qu'en réalité la prise en compte du mobile ne peut concerner que les infractions intentionnelles. De part leur nature même les fautes non-intentionnelles sont difficilement conciliables avec un mobile. Etant la résultante d'une faute caractérisée par une mise en danger, une imprudence voire une violation des règles, il y aurait contradiction à vouloir y intégrer la notion de mobile qui se définie comme étant les raisons qui ont conduit à l'infraction. Dès lors que le comportement est le fruit d'une faute et non d'une volonté, il n'y a aucune raison profonde qui a pu pousser à de tels agissements et qui puisse être appréhendée par le droit pénal. En effet, l'agent n'avait aucune raison profonde d'agir. Dès lors, il y a incompatibilité entre mobile, au sens du droit pénal (car si on définit le mobile comme étant la cause du omportement, on ne peut qu'admettre que tout comportement trouve sa source dans une cause, mais toutes n'ont pas un motif profondément délictuel ou frauduleux) et infraction non-intentionnelle."
BEIGNIER, Bernard, L'honneur et le droit [...] préface de Jean Foyer, Paris: Libraririe Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1995, xii, 660 p., voir "Le crime excusé" aux pp. 575-613 (Collection; Bibliothèque de droit privé, tome 234), ISBN: 227500338X; copie à la bibliothèque de droit, Université d'Ottawa, FTX General, KJV 442 .B52 v.234 1995;
BENTHAM, Jeremy, 1748-1832, An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation, New York: Hafner Press, 1948, lii, 378 p. (series; The Hafner Library of Classics; number 6); reprint of the 1823 edition; research note: various editions at, http://books.google.com/books?q=editions:0_fUeLPiJ46UHGPOWlt&id=ZWcAAAAAMAAJ; also at the Gallica site, Bibliothèque nationale de France at http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N093974
"Motive refers necessarily to action. It is a pleasure, pain, or other event, that prompts to action. Motive then, in one sense of the word, must be previous to such event. But, for a man to be governed by any motive, he must in every case look beyond that event that is called his action; he must look to the consequences of it: and it is only in this way that the idea of pleasure, of pain, or of any other event, can give birth to it. He must look, therefore, in every case, to some event posterior to the act in contemplation: an event which as yet exists not, but stands only in prospect." (Chapter X, Of Motives, at p. 99 of the Haffner Press, suprao)
___________Theory of Legislation...translated from the French of Etienne Dumont by R. Hildreth, London : Trubner, 1876, 472 p.; copy at the law library, University of Ottawa, FTX General, K 334 .B4513 1876; for various editions, see http://books.google.com/books?q=editions:0yQbZEivfcc1uklLXfUNUBm&id=Jj8uAAAAIAAJ (accessed on 5 Apeil 2009);
"Motives are commonly spoken of as good or bad. This is an error. Every motive, in the final analysis, is the perspective of a pleasure to be procured, or of a pain to be avoided. Now the same motive, which in certain cases leads to the performance of an action esteemed good, or indifferent, may lead in other cases to an action reputed to be bad. A beggar steals a loaf; another person buys one; a third works, that he may get the means to buy. The motive which actuates all three, is one and the same, to wit, the physical pain of hunger" (Chapter VIII, "The Influence of Motives upon the greatness of Alarm", p. 253).
"...we may classify them according according to the tendency which they seem to have to unite or to disunite the interests of the individual and of the community. Upon this plan, motives may be distinguished into four classes,--the purely social motive, benevolence; semi-social motives, the love of reputation, the desire of friendship, religion; anti-social motives, antipathy in all its branches; personal motives, pleasures of sense, love of power, pecuniary interest, the desire of self-preservation.
The personal motives are the most eminently useful, the only ones whose action can never be suspended, because nature has intrusted to them the preservation of individuals. They are the great wheels of society; but their movements must be regulated, moderated, and maintained in a right direction, by motives drawn from the two first classes.
It must not be forgotten that even the anti-social motives--necessary, to a certain degree, for the defence of the individual--may, and often do, procure useful actions, actions absolutely necessary to the existence of society; for example, the denouncement and prosecution of criminals." (p. 254)
___________ Traité des preuves judiciaires : ouvrage extrait des manuscrits de M. Jérémie Bentham ; Par Ét. Dumont, Paris : Bossange Frères, 1823, 2 volumes;
(vérifiés le 5 avril 2009);
- vol. 1, http://books.google.com/books?id=5UUUAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=subject:%22Evidence+(Law)%22&lr=lang_fr&as_drrb_is=b&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=12&as_maxy_is=1957&as_brr=3&as_pt=ALLTYPES#PPP7,M1 et voir par exemple "motifs" aux pp. 380-382;
- vol. 2, http://books.google.com/books?id=AkYUAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:0Xxk7_QnhOaaocf;
BERMAN, Mitchell, N., The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, (1998) 65 University of Chicago Law Review 795-878; copy at the law library, Ottawa University, FTX Periodicals, KF 175 .U55;
BINDER, Guyora, "Meaning and Motive in the Law - Review Essay [of] Judging Evil : Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter. By Samuel H. Pillsbury. New York and London: New York University Press, October 1998", (1998) 3 Criminal Law Forum 755-774; available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/3(2)/Binder.pdf
___________"The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent", (2002) 6 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 1-96; available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/6/1/binder.pdf (accessed on 31 December 2003);
BOED, Roman, "Current Developments in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda", (2002) 2 International Criminal Law Review 283-295;
"The Appeals Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana made an additional contribution to clarifying the law in the area of mens rea by declaring that 'personal motive does not exclude criminal responsibility'.47 Ruzindana submitted that some evidence showed that he had acted with a personal motive and contended that a person who is motivated by a personal goal is not guilty of genocide but of an ordinary crime.48 The decisive matter is not one of motive, but of intent. That is to say, as the Chamber indicated, criminal responsibility for the crime of genocide attaches if the genocidal acts were committed with the requisite intent, regardless of any personal motive, such as, for example, financial gain or vengeance.49"
(p. 289; notes omitted)
BONNET, L., Le mobile, élément constitutif du délit, spécialement dans les lois nouvelles, thèse Montpellier, 1934; titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non consultée;
BORDEN, Leon, Intent and motive, 1940, 25 p.; note: Harvard Law School third year paper; copy at Harvard University Library; title noted in my research but not consulted yet;
BOROWITZ, Albert, "Terrorism for Self-Glorification: The Herostratos Syndrome", (2005) 29(2) Legal Studies Forum 1001-1008; available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/lpop/etext/lsf/29-2/terrorism.html (accessed on 15 ecember 2005);
BRANTLEY, Alan C. and Robert H. Kosky, "Serial Murder in the Netherlands. A Look at Motivation, Behavior, and Characteristics", (January 2005) 74(1) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 26-32; available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2005/jan05leb.pdf (accessed on 15 September 2005);
BRYDEN, David P. and Maren M. Grier, "The Search for Rapists' Real Motives", (winter 2011) 101(1) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 171 to approx 278;
BURRILL, Alexander M. (Alexander Mansfield), 1807-1869, A treatise on the nature, principles, and rules of circumstantial evidence : especially that of the presumptive kind in criminal cases, New York : Baker, Voorhis, 1868, xxi, 796 p., and see "Motives to the commission of crime", at pp. 281-328; available at http://books.google.com/books?id=ADk-AAAAIAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=intitle:criminal&lr=lang_en&as_drrb_is=b&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=12&as_maxy_is=1957&as_brr=3&as_pt=ALLTYPES&source=gbs_summary_r&cad=0#PPR1,M1 (accessed on 5 April 2009);
BUTTERFOSS, Edwin J., "Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine", (1990-91) 79 The Kentucky Law Journal 1-60;
CAILLE, Catherine, "Le motif légitime en droit pénal", (1998) Revue pénitentiaire et de droit pénal 194-207, voir aux pp. 198-199 où la bonne distinction entre le "motif" et le "mobile" est expliquée; copie à la bibliothèque de droit, Université d'Ottawa, FTX Periodiques, KJJ 0 .R487;
CALVERY HANSON, Linda S. and Craig Dennis, "Revisiting Excessive Violence in the Professional Sports Arena: Changes in the Past Twenty Years?", (1996) 6 Seton Hall Journal of Sport and Entertainement Law 127-166, and see "The Causes and Motivating Forces", at pp. 136-139;
CAMPBELL, John H. and Don DeNevi, eds., Profilers : leading investigators take you inside the criminal mind, Amherst, N.Y. : Prometheus Books, 2004, 377, ISBN: 1591022665; title noted in my research but book not consulted; no copy in the Ottawa area libraries covered by the AMICUS catalogue of Library and Archives Canada (verification of 15 December 2005);
- Criminal profiling from crime scene analysis / John E. Douglas ... et al.;
- Offender profiles / Robert K Ressler ... et al.;
- Sexual homicide / Ann W. Burgess ... et al.;
- Murderers who rape and mutilate / Robert K. Ressler ... et al.;
- Men who murdered / Robert K. Ressler et al.;
- Split reality of murder /Robert K. Ressler and Ann W. Burgess;
- Classifying sexual homicide crime scenes / Robert K. Ressler and Ann W. Burgess;
- Crime scene and profile characteristics of organized and disorganized murderers -- Interviewing techniques for homicide investigations -- Crime problems / Robert R. Hazelwood and John E. Douglas;
- Rape and rape-murder / Robert K, Kessler, Ann W. Burgess, John E. Douglas;
- How to interview a cannibal / by Robert K. Ressler;
- Profiling autoerotic fatalities cases -- Painting psychological profiles / by Russell E.Vorpagel;
- Using a forensic linguistic approach to track the Unabomber / by James R. Fitzgerald;
- Criminal profiling / by Mary Ellen O'Toole;
- Assaultative eye injury and enucleation / by Alexander 0. Bukhanovsky ... [et al.];
- A multi-disciplinary approach to solving cold cases / By Michael R. King;
- Sexual homicide of elderly women / by Mark E. Safarik and John Jarvis and Kathleen Nussbaum;
- Geographic profiling update / by D. Kim Rossmo;
- Nonfamily child abductors who murder their victims / by Kristen R. Beyer and James O. Beasley;
- Lethal predators / by Frank M. Ochberg ...[et al.];
- Fire, filicide, and finding felons / by Timothy G. Huff.
CANDEUB, Adam, Comments, “Motive Crimes and Other Minds”, (1994) 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2071-2123;
CARLTON, Eric, Treason Meaning and Motives, Brookfield (Vermont): Ashgate, 1998, vi, 258 p., ISBN: 1859283713; title noted in my research but book not consulted as no copy of it is found in the Ottawa area libraries covered by the Amicus catalogue of Library and Archives Canada (verfication of 29 July 2005)
This book is an historical and comparative study of treason, whose aim is to clarify and categorize the diverse and often mixed - even confused - motives which underlie treason, both at its conspiracy and implementation stages." (source: http://search.barnesandnoble.com/bookSearch/isbnInquiry.asp?r=1&isbn=1859283713, accessed on 29 July 2005)
CAROSELLA, Ann Marie, Effects of foreseeability and intentionality on sanction assignment motives and severity, Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, June 1992, v, 157 leaves;
CHAN, Wendy, 1966-, Women, murder, and justice, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, [England] ; New York : Palgrave, 2001, x, 244 p., ISBN: 0333760786; see "Motives and homicide" at pp. 59 to approx. 78; title noted in my research but book not consulted; no copy of this new book in the Ottawa area libraries;
CHAZAL, Jean, Essai sur la notion de mobile et de but en droit pénal, Lyon: impr. de Bosc frères et Riou, 1929, 140 p.; thèse de doctorat en droit, Université de Lyon, Faculté de droit, 1929; titre de thèse noté pendant mes recherches mais thèse non encore consultée;
CHIU, Helen M., "The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law", St. John's University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-007, February 2005, 77 p.; avakilable at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=663515 (accessed on 20 April 2005); with the same title in (2005) 8(2) Buffalo Criminal Law Forum 653-729; the article in the Buffalo Criminal Law Forum will eventualy be available in a few months at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclr.htm#issues (6 July 2005);
This article builds on recent discussions amongst criminal law scholars on the role that motive should play in the criminal law. It advocates for greater consideration of a defendant’s motive in all critical decisions of the criminal justice process and offers concrete guidelines. Unlike many other articles that focus on euthanasia or hate crime, this one takes on the simple street sale of drugs and an unusual defense known as the agency defense to demonstrate how the criminal law can better accommodate motive. Created to avoid the harsh jail terms imposed on convicted drug dealers, the agency defense pretends that steerers who steer customers to drug dealers are the purchasing agents of the customers. As agents, they avoid criminal liability for the sale of drugs. Steerers, though, are not agents; instead, they are commonly drug addicts themselves who support their addictions by working as steerers. Instead of using a legal fiction like agency, this article proposes that the criminal law honestly and directly accommodate the true motive of steerers to satisfy their drug addictions. Addiction is admittedly problematic as a motive because of its low provability and low moral potency. One acceptable accommodation may be to mandate that judges simply consider whether drug offenders suffer from addictions in determining the appropriate sentence. Aside from this consideration, not every defendant will warrant an actual reduction in sentence. That would be up to the discretion of the judge." (Source: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=663515, accessed on 20 April 2005)
CIOCLEI, Valerian, Le mobile dans la conduite criminelle, Thèse de doctorat, droit privé, Montpellier 1, 1999, 383 feuilles; dir. de thèse: Christine Lazergues; voir le résumé au Catalogue Abes;
COLEMAN, James William, "Competition and Motivation to White-Collar Crime", in Neal Shover and John Paul Wright, eds., Crimes of privilege : readings in white-collar crime, New York : Oxford University Press, 2001, xiii, 433 p., at pp. 341-358 (series; Readings in crime and punishment), ISBN: 0195136217, 0195136211 and 0195136209; copy at Ottawa University, MRT General: HV 6768 .C75 2001;
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Parliamentary Assembly, "Recommendation 1426 (1999), European democracies facing up terrorism",
[On the definition of terrorism]
"The Assembly considers an act of terrorism to be "any offence committed by individuals or groups resorting to violence or threatening to use violence against a
country, its institutions, its population in general or specific individuals which, being motivated by separatist aspirations, extremist ideological conceptions,
fanaticism or irrational and subjective factors, is intended to create a climate of terror among official authorities, certain individuals or groups in society,
or the general public". (available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta99/EREC1426.htm, accessed on 16 May 2007)
CORNAZ, Olivier, "Intention, dessein, mobile (quelques réflexions sur le système du Code pénal suisse)" JdT = Journal des tribunaux 106, (publication suisse) 1958 IV 66 (74); note de recherche: titre noté dans ma recherche mais non consulté; je ne crois pas que les bibliothèques canadiennes possèdent une copie de cette publication;
COSS, Graeme, "Provocative reforms: A comparative critique", (June 2006) 30(3) Criminal Law Journal 138-150; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735 Location, FTX Periodicals;
"Together with the Dobashs, leading researchers such as Polk, Wilson and Daly, and others have identified similar crucial distinguishing features with respect to homicidal violence: that men kill in revenge, out of jealousy, for honour, as the climax in a chain of violence, for profit, even for sport; when women kill it is mostly as a form of self-preservation (or protection of children) in response to violence inflicted upon them." (p. 139; 2 notes omitted)
COUAPEL, Jean-Claude, L'intérêt du mobile en droit pénal, thèse de doctorat 3e cycle, droit pénal, Université de Poitiers, 1980, 213 feuilles; directeur de thèse: Pierre Couvrat, voir le Catalogue Abes; titre de thèse noté dans ma recherche mais thèse pas encore consultée;
____________ L'intérêt du mobile en criminologie et en droit pénal, thèse de doctorat d'État, droit pénal, Université de Poitiers, 1982, 428 feuilles; directeur de thèse: Pierre Couvrat, voir le Catalogue Abes; titre de thèse noté dans ma recherche mais thèse pas encore consultée;
CROCKER, Lawrence, "Justification and Bad Motives", (2008) 6 Ohio Journal of Criminal Law 277-297; available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/Articles/Volume6_1/Crocker-PDF.pdf (accessed on 23 December 2008);
CROMBAG, Hans, Eric Rassin, and Robert Horselenberg, "On Vengeance", (December 2003) 9(4) Psychology, Crime and Law 333-344;
DAGGE, Henry, Considerations on criminal law, London : printed for T. Cadell, 1772, xxxii, 434 p.;.
"Of the Source of Crimes.
The particular Sources of Crimes are pride, envy, ambition, lust, avarice, hatred, revenge, and every other selfish affection indulged to excess: and these passions will operate with greater or less force, in proportion as the objects which excite them are more or less considerable." (p. 155)
DARESTE de la Chavanne, Rodolphe, 1824-1911, La science du droit en Grèce - Platon, Aristote, Théophraste, Paris: Librarie du Recueil Général des lois et des arrêts, 1893, 319 p.; réimpression: Amsterdam: Éditions Rodopi, 1968; copie aux universités Ottawa, St-Paul, et à la Cour suprême du Canada (KL 4121 D 37 1968);
"L'acte volontaire est celui que l'on fait sciemment, et sans y être contraint. Parmi les actes volontaires il y en a qui sont en outre prémédités. L'intention est alors fondée sur un motif, d'où la nécessité d'étudier les divers motifs des actions humaines1.
1 [Aristote] Rhét., 1, 10. Les actes volontaires non pr/m/dit/s sont dits passionnels [...]." (p. 202)
DECKER, Scott H., "Deviant Homicide: A New Look at the Role of Motives and Victim-Offender Relationships", (November 1996) 33(4) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 427-449;
DELTEL, Guy, De la considération du but de l'agent comme élément de la responsabilité pénale, Toulouse : Impr. régionale, 1930, 177 p.; note: thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris, 1930; ma recherche a indiqué qu'aucune bibliothèque canadienne ne possède ce livre;
DESPORTES, Frédéric et Francis Le Gunehec, "Responsabilité pénale. Élément moral de l'infraction [art. 121-3]" Juris-Classeur pénal code, Paris: Éditions du Juris-Classeur, cet article particulier est daté 1995, 12 p., voir la partie intitulée "Prise en compte des mobiles : dol aggravé" aux pp. 7-8, cette partie étant elle-même sous-divisée en deux parties: "Principe de l'indifférence des mobiles" et "prise en compte des mobiles par le législateur"; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, bibliothèque de droit, Réserve, KJV 7979 .J87, volume 1; un excellent traitement du sujet;
DIB, Pedro, Essai sur une théorie des mobiles en droit civil hanafite, Beyrouth, Imprimerie catholique, 1952, vii, 417 p.; copie à la Library of Congress, selon le catalogue informatisé; titre de thèse noté dans ma recherche mais pas encore consulté;
DILLOF, Anthony M., "Putting Hate in Its Place: The Codification of Bias Crime Laws in a Model Penal Code", (2000) 4(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 341-397; available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/4(1)/dillofpdf.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2006);
DOUGLAS, John E. and Mark Olshaker, 1951-, The anatomy of motive : the FBI's legendary mindhunter explores the key to understanding and catching violent criminals, New York : Scribner, c1999, 320 p., ISBN: 0684845989;
I've found that investigators and others in and around law enforcement frequently confuse the terms "motive" and "intent." Intent refers simply to the deliberateness of the act -- conciously choosing to commit the crime. Motive is the offender's reason for setting the fire, and there are seven basic arson motives that we encounter frequently: fraud; pyromania; crime concealment; vanity; spite or revenge; civil disorder; political or revolutionary activity; and the simple mischief of juveniles and adolescents playing with fire.[p. 66]
As we've noted, there is an all too common tendency to confuse intent with motive. All intent refers to is the willfulness of the action. [p. 120]
DUFF, Antony, Philosophy and the Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, [vii], 261 p., see "Principle and Contradiction in the Criminal Law : Motives and Criminal Liability" at pp. 156-204, ISBN: 0521550440; also with the same title in / aussi avec le même titre dans : Toronto : Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1997 (series; Legal Theory Workshop Series ; WS 1996-97 -(6)), see the University of Toronto Catalogue;
DUFFIELD, Grace and Peter Grabosky, "The Psychology of Fraud", Australian Institute of Criminology -- Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, March 2001, 6 p., number 199, ISBN: 0642242240; available at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/ti199.pdf (accessed on 29 July 2006);
"Article 82.- General Extenuating Circumstances.
(b) when the criminal was prompted by an honourable and disinterested motive or by a high religious, moral or civil conviction; ..."
"Article 84.- General Aggravating Circumstances.
(1) The Court shall increase the penalty as provided by law (Art. 183) in the following cases;
(a) when the criminal acted with treachery, with perfidy, with a base motive such as envy, hatred, greed, with a deliberate intent to injure or do wrong, or with special
perversity or cruelty;..."
FELSON, Richard B. and Marvin Krohn, "Motives for Rape", (August 1990) 27(3) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 222-242;
FERGUSON, Christopher,Diana E. White, Stacey Cherry, Marta Lorenz, Zhara Bhimani, "Defining and classifying serial murder in the context of perpetrator motives", (2003) 31 Journal of Criminal Justice 287-292;
FINE, Seth Aaron, "Do not blur self-defence and revenge", (1993) 8 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 299-301;
"Fear can be a proper basis for self-defence, but fear and hatred can equally be excellent motives for murder." (p. 300; please read the all context of the article)
FISSE, Brent, "The Duality of Corporate and Individual Criminal Liability" in Ellen Hochstedler, ed., in cooperation with the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Corporations as Criminals, Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, c1984, 168 p., at pp. 69-84, and see "Corporate Profit Motive", at pp. 72-73 (series; perspectives in criminal justice; volume 6), ISBN: 0803921586 and 0803921594 (pbk.);
FITZGERALD, P.J. (Patrick John), Criminal Law and Punishment, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962, xi, 279 p., on motives, see pp. 120-121 (series; Clarendon Law Series); copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, KD 7869 .F5 1962;
"...we must note first that the common assertion that the law takes no account of motives is untrue. It is indeed natural that a system of law should be relunctant to allow its rules to be broken with impunity for good motives. ... The relevance of the accused's motive, however, comes to the fore when sentence is about to be passed. ... Where the definition of an offence includes words like 'fraudulently' or 'unlawfully', certain motives may operate to negative these words and so defeat the charge. If a man intentionally kills a dangerous criminal, this will not be murder if the criminal is a felon and is trying to escape from custody, and if there is no other way of keeping him in custody; for in such a case the killing is not unlawful. Even apart from such offences, which contain words connected with motives, the accused's motive is in any case of relevance if he can raise a general defence such as necessity or duress." (pp. 120-121)
FLETCHER, George P., Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978, xxviii, 898 p., see "motive" in the index; reprint in: Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, ISBN: 0195136950;
"It is not the absence of self-defense that inculpates someone for an intentional killing or battery. Rather it is the presence of self-defense that provides a good reason for violating the norm against killing and assaulting other human beings. The consensus of Western legal systems is that actors may avail themselves of justifications only if they act with a justificatory intent" (p. 557)
"...we have yet to account for the rule that in cases of alleged justification, the actor must at least be cognizant of the justificatory circumstances. There might be a stronger and weaker version of the rule; the stronger version would require that the actor be motivated exclusively by the justificatory criteria; the weaker version, that he merely be aware of them." (p. 559)
FLORIAN, E., "Une étude comparative de la notion de mobile dans la législation pénale de plusieurs pays" (1896) 56 Archivio giuridico; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article pas encore consulté; il s'agit d'une revue juridique italienne dont voici l'existence: vol. 1 (1868) au vol. 58 (1897), Bologna : [Direzione dell'Archivio giuridico], 1868-1897 (Bologna : Tipi Fava e Garagnani Descrizione fisica:58 v.); je n'ai trouvé aucune copie de cette revue juridique au Canada;
FOLINO, Jorge Oscar, "Sexual Homicides and Their Classification According to Motivation: A Report from Argentina", (2000) 44(6) International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 740-750; copy at Ottawa University, HV 9261 .J6 Location: MRT Periodicals; also sons' limited;
"Among true cases of sexual homicide, there are different motivations, which are often difficult to ascertain. Many factors, such as displaced anger, hidden sexual fantasies, cultural patterns, mental handicap, or toxic substance abuse among others, may make the task of determining true motivations difficult. It is hoped that this report will illustrate the problem and stimulate further
searches for true motivations in cases of sexual homicide. ....
There are various classifications of sexual homicides, but all of them have certain limitations. The following, for example, is one widely known taxonomy (Malmquist, 1996): rape killings, sexual lust (or sadistic) killings, and killings after a sexual act to destroy evidence.
According to the above classification, in the case of homicide during the commission of rape, sex, not death, is the primary motivation. In the sexual lust killing, killing is the main motive, part of a sexual ritual in which fantasy plays a large role. In this type of killing, sexual penetration may or may not take place. Killing after a sexual act to destroy evidence is not considered sexual homicide, although one may theorise that during the process of destroying the evidence, sexual actions perpetrated by the offender may be concealed." (pp. 740-741) ....
"Sexual killing may be considered the most extreme expression of sexual deviation. It may stem from permissive cultural patterns related to violence and manifest itself in the subduing of the alter ego in persons who demonstrate particular personality traits. Our experience did not show any association between mental illness (psychosis) and sexual killings."(p. 750)
FOLSON, Charles F., "The case of Marie Jeanneret", (1908) 42 American Law Review 801-819;
"Of the three assigned chief causes of premeditated crime, pleasure, greed and intoxication, perhaps it is not altogether an accident that pleasure has been placed first. The whole world amuses itself, when it is not shocked or horrified, with the different and often inconsistent ways in which people seek the gratification of their instincts or emotions, their senses or passions, and at the queer sacrifices which they make of time, money or conscience to carry out their desires. The unusual or unnatural sources of pleasure, especially such as involve injury, pain, suffering or distress, whether given or received, have constituted a study of profound interest to the philosophers and moralists from Plato to Stanley Hall.
In a scholarly and interesting monograph, Die Wonne des Leids, the first edition of which, published in Vienna, was confiscated by the censor of the press as prejudicial to the public morals, Zimmerman relates briefly the story of Marie Jeanneret, a nurse who found her pleasure in poisoning, mostly with atropin, nearly thirty people, of whom six and perhaps eight died." (p. 801; 1 note omitted)
FOSTER, Michael, Sir, 1689-1763, A report of some proceedings on the commission of Oyer and terminer and goal delivery; for the trial of the rebels in the year 1746 in the county of Surry, and of crown cases. To which are added discourses upon a few branches of the crown law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1762, 412 p.; reprint in : Abingdon (Oxon): Professional Books Limited, 1982, ISBN: 0862051363;
"In the Case of an Appeal of Death, which was antiently the ordinary Method of Prosecution, the Term Malice is not, as I remember, made use of as descriptive of the Offence of Murder in Contradiction to simple Felonious Homicide. The Precedents charge that the Fact was done Nequitèr and in Feloniâ, which fully taketh in the Legal Sense of the word Malice. The Words per Malitiam and Malitiose our oldest Writers do indeed frequently use in some other cases; and They constantly mean an Action flowing from a wicked and Corrupt Motive, a Thing done Malo Animo, Mâla Conscienta, As They express themselves." (p. 256)
"I have always thought Rowly's Case a very extraordinary one [12. Rep. 87.], as it is Reported by Coke, from whom Hale cites it [1. Hale 453.] The Son fights with another Boy and is beaten; He runs Home to his Father all bloody; the Father takes a Staff, runs three Quarters of a Mile, and beats the other Boy, who dieth of this Beating. This is said to have been ruled Manslaughter, because done in sudden Heat and Passion.
SURELY the Provocation was not very grievous. The Boy had fought with one who happened to be an Overmatch for him, and was worsted; a Disaster slight enough, and very frequent among Boys.
IF upon this Provocation the Father, after running three Quarters of a Mile, had set his Strength against the Child, had dispatched him with an Hedgestake or any other deadly Weapon, or by repeated Blows with his Cudgel, it must, in My Opinion, have been Murder; since Any of these Circumstances would have been a plain Indication of the Malitia, the Mischievious Vindictive Motive before explained. But with regard to these Circumstances, with what weapon or to what Degree the Child was beaten, Coke is totally silent." (pp. 294-295)
GANI, Miriam and Simon Bronitt, "The Boundaries of Criminal Responsibility: Disentangling Fault and Motive", (July 2008) 20(3) Legal date 1-3;
GARÇON, Émile, 1851-1922, Le droit pénal, origines, évolution, état actuel, Paris : Payot, 1922, 160 p.;
"La morale, les religions, le droit criminel sont les trois principaux moyens employés pour déterminer et préciser ces règles essentielles au maintien de la discipline sociale et pour établir les sanctions sans lesquelles elles seraient sans force. L'une de ces sanctions se trouve d'abord dans la conscience humaine qui, guidée par une sorte d'instinct social, honore ceux qui vivent selon les lois, et frappe de réprobation les indisciplinés qui prétendent s'en affranchir. On a pu nier que la morale de l'honneur fut suffisante pour courber les volontés malfaisantes, mais on ne saurait méconnaître que le désir d'acquérir l'estime des autres et la crainte de l'infâmie, soient parmi les plus puissants mobiles qui gouvernent la conduite pratique des hommes. [...]" (pp. 5-6)
GARDNER WICHMANN, Lucinda, "The rape shield provision: an exclusion for motive and bias", (1990-91) 42 South Carolina Law Review 68-73;
"In State v. Finley the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court misapplied the Rape Shield Provision'69 when it refused to allow a defendant to testify about the complainant's prior sexual conduct with a third party.'7Ã¸ The supreme court's opinion in Finley narrows the scope of the Rape Shield Provision to allow a criminal defendant to introduce evidence of the complainant's sexual behavior when it relates to the complainant's possible motives and biases in bringing the charge." (p. 68; footnotes omitted)
GAROFALO, Raffaele, barone, 1851-1934, La criminologie, 5e éd. ent. ref. et augm., Paris : Alcan, 1905, xv, 479 p. (Collection; Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine); copie à l'Université de Montréal, 364/G237c;
___________ Criminology. Translated by Robert Wyness Millar. With an introd. by E. Ray Stevens, Montclair, N.J., Patterson Smith, 1968 [c1914], xl, 478 p., (series; Patterson Smith reprint series in criminology, law enforcement, and social problems. Publication no. 12); copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, HV 6038 .G35 1968;
GARVEY, Stephen P., "Passion's Puzzle", (2004-2005) 90 Iowa Law Review 1677-1745, and see "Worthy Motives", at pp. 1693-1695;
GASSIN, Raymond, Criminologie, 4e édition, Paris: Dalloz, 1998, xi, 705 p. (Collection; précis; droit privé), ISBN: 2247032125;
"Quant à la notion de motivation3 (ou de mobile), on entend par là l'impulsion qui pousse un individu à agir dans un but déterminé (la haine, l'amour, la passion politique…). Ainsi définie, la motivation se compose de deux éléments: un dynamisme, une force d'une part; une orientation du comportement dans un sens déterminé d'autre part. Cette notion est très importante dans l'explication criminologique: 'Le mobile, disait Gide, est l'anse par laquelle on saisit le criminel.'
3. Cf. R.S. PETERS, Le concept de motivation, éd. E.S.F., 1973" (p. 77)
GELLMAN, Susan, "Hate Crime Laws are Thought Crime Laws", 1992 & 1993 Annual Survey of American Law, New York City: Oceana Publications for New York University School of Law, 1994, at pp. 509-531, see "A Due Process Concern: Vagueness in Mixed Motive Cases" at pp. 513-514 and "The First Amendment and Punishment of Motive" at pp. 514-517, ISBN: 037912618; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF178 A56;
GERMANY/ALLEMAGNE, German Penal Code / Code pénal allemand / Strafgesetzbuch (StGB);
"§ 46. Principles for the determination of punishment
(1) The guilt of the offender is the basis for the determination of the punishment. Consideration must be given to the anticipated effect of punishment on the future life of the offender in society.
(2) In making its determination, a court shall take into account all the circumstances, both mitigating and aggravating. In doing so, the following factors shall be examined:
the motives and aims of the offender;
the state of mind which may be inferred from the crime, and the exercise of volition involved
the extent of breach of duty;
the manner of perpetration and the wrongfully caused effects of the act;
the prior life of the offender, his individual and economic circumstances, as well as
his conduct after the crime, especially his attempts to make restitution.
(3) Circumstances which already represent the statutory constituent elements of the crime may not be taken into account."
"Section Sixteen - Crimes against Life
§ 211. Murder ...
(2) A murderer is anyone who kills a human being:
from a lust to kill, to satisfy his sex drive, from covetousness or other base motives;
treacherously ot cruelly or by means endangering the community or for the purpose of making possible or concealing the commission of another crime."
[The Penal code of the Federal Republic of Germany [of 1975], Translated by Joseph J. Darby With an Introduction by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Littleton (Colorado): F.B. Rothman and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, xxvi, 257 p., pp. 64-65 for § 46 and at p. 176 for § 211 (series; The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes; vol. 28), ISBN: 0837700485; Research Note/Note de recherche: available on the internet /disponible sur l'internet Buffalo Criminal Law Center (and click on "Criminal Law Resources on the Internet")]
Principes régissant le calcul de la peine
(1) La culpabilité de l'auteur est le fondement du calcul de la peine. Les effets de la peine sur la vie future de l'auteur en société, auxquels on peut s'attendre, doivent être pris en considération.
(2) Lorsqu'il calcule la peine, le tribunal prend en considération les circonstances favorables et défavorables à l'auteur, les unes par rapport aux autres. Entrent en ligne de compte à cet égard notamment :
- les mobiles et les buts recherchés par l'auteur;
- l'état d'esprit que dénote l'acte délictueux et la volonté qu'il traduit;
- le degré du manquement à ses obligations;
- le mode d'exécution et les effets repréhensibles résultant de l'infraction;
- les antécédents de l'auteur, sa situation personnelle et pécuniaire, ainsi que
- son comportement après l'acte, et plus spécialement ses effiorts pour réparer le dommage.
(3) Les situations, qui font déjà partie de la définition légale de l'infraction ne doivent pas être prises en considération."
"Titre Seize - Des infractions contre la vie
Assassinat [...]
(2) Est assassin celui qui tue un être humain par envie de tuer, pour assouvrir son instinct sexuel, par cupidité ou pour d'autres motifs vils, sournoisement ou cruellement, ou par des moyens constituant un danger public, ou pour permettre la commission d'une autre infraction, ou pour la dissimuler."
[Traduction de Pierre Franck et d'Agnès Guérin-Salem, sous la direction d'Yvonne Marx dans Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., aux pp. 317-565 (pour le code pénal allemand), et plus spécifiquement à la p. 346 pour l'art. 46 et à la p. 473, pour l'art. 211, alinéa 2 (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx; tome 5).
"§ 46. Grundsätze der Strafzumessung. (1) Die Schuld des Täters ist Grundlage für die Zumessung der Strafe. Die Wirkungen, die von der Strafe für das künftige Leben des Täters in der Gesellschaft zu erwarten sind, sind zu berücksichtigen.
"Sechzehnter Abschnitt: Straftaten gegen das Leben
§ 211. Mord. ...
[available on the internet at http://www.bib.uni-mannheim.de/bib/jura/gesetze/stgb-inh.shtml;
___________The German draft penal code E 1962. With an introd. by Eduard Dreher. Translated by Neville Ross, South Hackensack (New Jersey): F. B. Rothman, 1966, xiii, 253 p. (series; The American series of foreign penal codes; vol.11); copy at the Supreme Court of Canada Library, Ottawa, K 5001 A63; this code is a draft never enacted by Germany;
CRIMES AGAINST PHYSICAL INVIOLABILITY ...
§ 152 Consent.
If the victim consents to the physical harm, the act shall be unlawful only if, notwithstanding the consent, it is blameworthy under the circumstances, particularly with reference to the motives and the objects of the perpetrator and victim, as well as of the means used and of the foreseeable scope of injury." (p. 94)
GISEL-BUGNION, Monique, L'individualisation d'une peine mesurée sur la culpabilité, Genève: Librairie de l'Université Georg et Cie, 1978, 215, [3] p., voir le chapitre 5, "Les mobiles", aux pp. 98-106 (Collection; Mémoires publiés par la Faculté de droit de Genève, numéro 56), ISBN: 2825700401; copie à la bibliothèque de droit, Université d'Ottawa, FTX General, KKW 4012 .G57 1978;
GOLDEN, HUEY L., "Knowledge, Intent, System, and Motive: A Much Needed Return to the Requirement of Independent Relevance", (1994-95) 55 Louisiana Law Review 179-216;
"In the case of motive, the issue is the why of the crime. In this case, the defendant denies she has committed the crime. By the introduction of evidence which provides a motive, the prosecution is able to establish the defendant was more likely to have committed the crime than a person without a similar motive. For example, if the defendant is on trial for murder, and it is discovered that the victim was blackmailing the defendant for embezzlement, then the presentation of this other crimes evidence would tend to establish a motive for commission of the murder.
As can be seen from the foregoing example, the relationship between the other act and the crime for which the defendant is charged must be singularly interwoven. A general motive, such as greed or lust, shared by all with similar drives, is insufficient. For if the motive of greed were sufficient to establish the independent relevance required by Article 404(B), any time a person is charged with doing something criminal to acquire a pecuniary gain, then any act in which he has evinced a similar state of mind would be admissible. So, too, would any lustful act be admissible against a defendant charged with a sexual crime. There should be more. There should be some connexity between this defendant and this crime. It should be some motive sufficiently unique that it points unerringly at this defendant." (pp. 206-207; notes omitted)
GORR, Michael, "Motives and Rightness", (1999) 27(3-4) Philosophia - Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 581-598; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT Periodicals, B 1 .P457;
GREAT BRITAIN, Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, Seventh Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, London: W. Clowes and Sons, 1843, iv, 293 p.; also published in Parliamentary Papers, (1843), vol. 19, p. 1, command number 448; also published in Irish University Series of British Parliamentary Papers, Reports from the Commission on the Criminal Law with Appendixes and Index 1843-45, Legal Administration Law 4, Shannon (Ireland): Irish University Press, 1971, ISBN 0716511401;
"The motive by which an offender was influenced, as distinguished from his intention, is never material to an offence. If the prohibited act be done, and be done with the intention by law essential to the offence, it is complete, without reference either to any ulterior intention or to the motive which gave birth to the intention.
To allow any man to substitute for law his own notions of right, would be in effect to subvert the law. To investigate the real motive in each case would be impracticable, and even if that could be done, a man's private opinion could not possibly be allowed to weigh against the authority of the law." (p. 29 of the Report = p. 41, vol. 4 in the Irish University Series)
GREEF, Étienne de, 1898-, Amour et crimes d'amour, Bruxelles : C. Dessart, [1973], 322 p.; (Collection; Psychologie et sciences humaines; vol. 46), ISBN: 28700090005; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, BF 575 .L8D43 1973;
GREENAWALT, Kent, "Reflections on Justifications for Defining Crimes by the Category of the Victim", 1992 & 1993 Annual Survey of American Law, New York City: Oceana Publications for New York University School of Law, 1994, at pp.617-628, see "Motivations and Intentions" at pp. 620-627; ISBN: 037912618 ; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF178 A56;
HALL, Jerome, 1901-, General principles of criminal law, 2nd ed., Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, c1960, xii, 642 p.;
"Thus it must be concluded that Salmond and his followers also obscured the meaning of mens rea. In a formal way they recognized the difference between asking what a person did, i.e. to ascertain whether he acted, and why he acted that way. But they did not adhere to the ordinary and legal difference between these ideas. For when they asked 'why did a person do a particular act'? they proceeded to answer it in terms of an objective which he sought, an intention oriented towards the future, a purpose, which they called 'motive'. The ambiguity of 'why' implemented their predilection.
'Motive' may also mean cause, in a scientific sense; and this is the meaning psychiatrists prefer. But the ordinary, traditional and legal meaning of 'motive' is the reason or ground of any given conduct. The reference of 'motive', in this sense, is to the actor, whereas intention is directed outside him. It is doubtful whether one is responsible for his motives; but the crucial point for legal purposes is that action involves a choice. The motive may be good or bad but, in either case, it is distinguished from the intentioanlity of the action." (pp. 89-90)
HAMILTON, Richard, "How to Get Real about Rape: Evolutionary Psychology, Coercion and Consent", (2002/2003) 6(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 79-91, see "Mistakes about motives" at pp. 87-91; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, periodicals;
HÄRING, Bernhard, 1912-, The law of Christ; moral theology for priests and laity / Translated by Edwin G. Kaiser, vol. 1, Westminster(Md.): Newman Press, 1961, xxxi, 615, and see, in particular, "The Moral Motive", at pp. 309-322; note: translation of Das Gesetz Christi;
"The concepts intention and motive are almost equivalent. But intention looks to goal or end and the advantage it offers, whereas motive is concerned with motivation or the reason why one acts. However, the most basic motivation is the good viewed as end or goal (not merely as purpose)." (p. 202)
HARNO, Albert J., "Rationale of a Criminal Code", (1936-37) 85 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 549-563, and see "Motive", at pp. 555-557;
"We must, indeed, give weight to a factor in the study of behavior which the law has long neglected, and not only neglected but consistently and expressly shunted aside. In order to interpret particular individual conduct we must have knowledge of the motives underlying the given act. It is a curious comment on legal learning that judges and lawmakers have so long resisted consideration of what is essentially the determining factor in human behavior -- that they have taken the position that motive is of no consequence in the criminal law. Actually this element has slipped in, often vicariously when it was called something else, and at times sub rosa when it was said that something made the jury go awry; but never has it received the august approval of the law. And yet what is it that determines human conduct? What is it that determines character? Why do some men kill, steal, rape and commit perjury? Why do others refrain from such conduct? When we have the answer to these questions we are on our way to understanding character and to understanding why society needs protection from some individuals and not from others. From the point of view of the danger they hold for society, it is far more important to determine why men have committed offenses than to determine that they did commit them." (p. 556)
HEINE, Günter and Hans Vest, "Murder/Wilful Killing", in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., Substantive and procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law. The Experience of International and National Courts", vol. I, Commentary, The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000, xvi,705 p., at pp. 175-195; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5000 S83 2000, v. 1;
"Attributes of the perpetrator...
...Sometimes a general clause (on contemptuous motives, that is, motives of the lowest ethical level) can be found, although usually the motivations, such as bloodthirstiness, greediness, racial, religious or political hatred, rowdyism, callousness or sexual motives are specified.40 Murder is deemed to have been committed if these motivations are based on a corresponding mental state.41...
40 See P.C., Art 211(1); P.C. Poland, Art. 148, sec. 2(3); P.C. Portugal, Art. 132(2)(c), (d), (g); P.C. Argentina, Art. 80(4); P.C. Brazil, Art. 121, sec. 2(1), (2); P.C. Columbia, Art. 324(4). See also P.C. Switzerlan, Art. 112.
41 See Federal Court of Switzerland, BGE 117 IV 390-391, 118 IV 125; Federal Court of Germany, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 216 (1985); id. at 343 (1993); Heine, supra note 16, [G. HEINE, TÖTUNG AUS 'NIEDRIGEN BEWEGGRÜNDEN' ...(Berlin 1987)]at 45 et seq., 222 et seq., 252 et seq." (p. 181)
HERMAN, Barbara, "Motives" in Lawrence Becker and Charlotte B. Becker, 1944-, eds., Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd ed., New York and London: Routledge, 2001, vol. 2, at pp. 1185-1188, ISBN: 0415936721 (for the set of 3 volumes); copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, Floor 2 Reference, BJ63.E45 2001;
HERZOG, S., "The Effect of Motive on Public Perceptions of the Seriousness of Murder in Israel", (2004) 44(5) British Journal of Criminology 771-782;
HESSICK, Carissa Byrne, "Motive's Role in Criminal Punishment", 69 p., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921111 (accessed on 18 August 2006); (2006) 80 Southern California Law Review 89-150; available at http://law.usc.edu/students/orgs/lawreview/documents/Hessick_Carissa_80_1.pdf (accessed on 26 February 2008);
HITCHLER, Walter Harrison, "Motive as an Essential Element of Crime", (1930-31) 35 Dickinson Law Review 105-118; copy at the University of Ottawa, law library, FTX Periodicals, KFP 69 .F67;
HOLMES, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law, Boston Little Brown, 56th printing (first published in 1881), xvi, 422 p.;
"The law of manslaughter contains another doctrine which should be referred to in order to complete the understanding of the general principles of the criminal law. This doctrine is, that provocation may reduce an offence which would otherwise have been murder to manslaughter. According to current morality, a man is not so much to blame for an act done under the disturbance of great excitement, caused by a wrong done to himself, as when he is calm. The law is made to govern men through their motives, and it must, therefore, take their mental constitution into account.
It might be urged, on the other side, that, if the object of punishment is prevention, the heaviest punishment should be threatened where the strongest motive is needed to restrain; and primitive legislation seems sometimes to have gone on that principle. But if any threat will restrain a man in a passion, a threat of less than death will be sufficient, and therefore the extreme penalty has been thought excessive." (pp. 60-61)
HORDER, Jeremy, "On the Irrelevance of Motive in Criminal Law", in Jeremy Horder, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, [ix], 270 p., Essay 9 at pp. 173-191, ISBN: 0198268580; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K235 093 2000;
HOROSZOWSKI, Paul, "Homicide of Passion and its Motives" in International Symposium on Victimology (1st : 1973 : Jerusalem) and, Israel Drapkin and Emilio Viano, eds., Victimology: A New Focus, volume 4, Violence and Its Victims, Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, 1975, xx, 211 p. at pp. 3-23, ISBN: 0669957526 (for vol. 4) and 066995778X (for the set of five volumes); copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, HV 6030 .I54 1973 v. 4;
"From a detailed semantical and psychological analysis it follows that we have to differentiate between the direct purpose of our action and the 'motive' for it. The decision to act in a particular way is called by the legislator 'criminal intent'; it is something other than motive, which indicates a kind of causal factor for the decision. The term motive has the most ambiguous meanings in psychology, as well as in other branches of science, and in common use. After a thorough, multilateral analysis I defined motive as an idea (or thought of a given state of facts -- in the past, present or future) under the influence of which we make our decision to act in a given way. The motive -- based on right, or illusionary perceptions of facts, and other correct or incorrect mental processes -- is only one of the many more of less conscious, temporary or permanent psychic factors (related to our personality features) which influence our behavior. It is neither the only nor the most important causative factor, especially in cases of homicide of passion. As it is commonly accepted by behavioral sciences, our intellectual processes (to which the motives belong, according to the above indicated definition) would be inefficient without the stimulating power of the emotion, which is the incentive or the impulsion of our decision. The impulsion is, therefore, the emotion which accompanies the motive in the process of making the decision." (p. 4; note omitted)
HOWARD, Colin, 1928-, Criminal Law, 4th ed., Sydney : Law Book Co., 1982, lxi, 452 p., ISBN: 0455204578 and 0455204586 (pbk.);
"Intention is relevant in the criminal law as a matter to be proved if the definition of any offence in question so requires. Motive is not usually inluded in the definition of an offence and therefore rarely has to be proved as an end in itself. ...
The difficulty is that we tend to call a given purpose either an intention or a motive according to the context. The choice seems to depend on whether the purpose in question is an end in itself or only a means to another end. In the former case we call it a motive and in the latter an intention. ...
It is apparent that each intention after the first one can be referred to either as an intention or as a motive for the intention before. ...
The only analytical conclusion at which it seems possible to arrive is that there is no factual difference at all between intention and motive, the distinction being a linguistic convenience only." (pp. 352-353)
HUSAK, Douglas N., "Motives in Criminal Liability", (Winter/Spring 1989) 8(1) Criminal Justice Ethics 3-14; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa; reprinted in part in Richard Singer and Martin Gardner, eds.: Crimes and punishments: cases, materials, and readings in criminal laws, 2nd ed., [Burr Ridge, Ill.] : M. Bender/Irwin, c1996, various pagings, ISBN: 0256196842;
____________Philosophy of Criminal Law, Totowa, N.J. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1987, xi, 266 p., see "The Irrelevance of Motive" at pp, 143-148, ISBN: ISBN: 0847675505 and 0847675637 (pbk.);
Hyam v DPP, [1975] 55 (H.L.); Lord Hailsham stated:
"The motive for murder...may be jealousy, fear, hatred, desire for money, perverted lust, or even, as in so-called ‘mercy killings’, compassion or love. In this sense, motive is entirely distinct from intention or purpose. It is the emotion which gives rise to the intention and it is the latter and not the former which converts an actus reus into a criminal act." (p. 73)
INDIA, Indian Law Commissioners, A Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, and published by Command of the Governor General of India in Council -- Reprinted from the Calcutta Edition, London: Pelham Richardson, 1838, viii, 138 p., reprint in Birmingham (Ala.): Legal Classics Library, c1987; and in Union (New Jersey): The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2002, ISBN: 158477018X; the Indian Law Commissioners were: Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay, 1800-1859, J.M. MacLeod, G.W. Anderson and F. Millett; also available as command number 673, in British Sessional [Parliamentary] Papers (1837-1838) XLI, 463-587; the British Parliamentary Papers have been reproduced on microcard; copy at Carleton University, Ottawa; research note: the "Notes [on the Indian Penal Code by the Indian Law Commissioners]" are also found in Miscellaneous Works of Lord Macaulay edited by his sister Lady Trevelyan, in Five Volumes, vol. IV, New York: Harper, 1880, 669 p., pp. 177-327;
"295. Volontary culpable homicide is 'murder' unless it be of one of the three mitigated descriptions hereinafter enumerated; That is to say,
Thirdly, Voluntary culpable homicide in defence." (p. 39; emphasis in bold added)
"NOTE M.
ON OFFENCES AGAINST THE BODY. ...
"The second mitigated form of voluntary culpable homicide is that to which we have given the name of voluntary culpable homicide by consent. It appears to us that this description of homicide ought to be punished, but that it ought not to be punished so severely as murder. We have elsewhere given our reasons for thinking that this description of homicide ought to be punished*.
Our reasons for not punishing it so severely as murder are these: In the first place, the motives which prompt men to the commission of this offence are generally far more respectable than those which prompt men to the commission of murder. Sometimes it is the effect of a strong sense of religious duty, sometimes of a strong sense of honor, not unfrequently of humanity. The soldier, who, at the entreaty of a wonded comrade, puts that camrade out of pain; the friend who supplies laudanum to a person suffering the tourment of a lingering disease; the freedman who in ancient times held out the sword that his master might fall on it; the high-born native of India who stabs the females of his family at their own entreaty in order to save them from the licentiousss of a band of marauders, would, except in Christian societies, scarcely be thought culpable, and even in Christian societies would not be regarded by the public, and ought not to be treated by the law, as assassins.
Again, this crime is by no means productive of so much evil to the community as murder. One evil ingredient of the utmost importance is altogether wanting to the offence of voluntary culpable homicide by consent. It does not produce general insecurity. It does not spread terror through society. When we punish murder with such signal severity, we have two ends in view. One end is, that people may not be murdered. Another end is, that people may not live in constant dread of being murdered. This second end is, perhaps, the more important of the two. For if assassination were left unpunished, the number of persons assassinated would probably bear a very small proportion to the whole population; but the life of every human being would be passed in constant anxiety and alarm. This property of the offence of murder is not found in the offence of voluntary culpable homicide by consent. Every man who has not given his consent to be put to death is perfectly certain that this latter offence cannot at present be committed on him, and that it never will be committed unless he shall first be convinced that it is his interest to consent to it. We know that two or three midnight assassinations are sufficient to keep a city of a million of inhabitants in a state of consternation during several weeks, and to cause every private family to lay in arms and watchmen's rattles. No number of suicides, or of homicides committed with the unexorted consent of the person killed, could possibly produce such alarm among the survivors.
The distinction between murder and voluntary culpable homicide by consent has never, as far as we are aware, been recognized by any code in the distinct manner in which we propose to recognize it; but it may be traced in the laws of many countries, and often, when neglected by those who have framed the laws, it has had a great effect on the decisions of the tribunals, and particularly on the decisions of tribunals popularly composed. It may be proper to observe that the burning of a Hindoo widow by her own consent, though it is now, as it ought to be, an offence by the regulations of every Presidency, is in no Presidency punished as murder.
*see Note B. (p. 109)
IRELAND, Law Reform Commission, Report on sentencing, Dublin : The Commission, [1996], xi, 84 p. (series; LRC, ISSN 1391-3132 53-1996); copy at the libary of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 384 ZC6 R46 LRC 53;
"SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS...
7. Sentencing guidelines should identify the following aggravating and mitigating factors:
Aggravating factors....
(9) Whether the offence was committed for pleasure or excitement ......
(12) Any other circumstances which:
(a) increase the harm caused or risked by the offender, or
(b) increase the culpability of the offender for the offence
(2) Whether the offender was provoked;
(3) Whether the offence was committed on impulse, or the offender showed no sustained motivation to break the law.....
(5) Whether the offence was occasioned as a result of strong temptation;
(6) Whether the offender was motivated by strong compassion or human sympathy......
(11) Any other circumstances which:
(a) reduce the harm caused or risked by the offender, or
(b) reduce the culpability of the offender for the offence" (pp. 66-69)
JEANNERET, Yvan, La violation des devoirs en cas d'accident. Analyse critique de l'article 92 LCR, Genève : Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2002, 295 p. (Collection; Genevoise), ISBN: 3-719021580; note: Thèse, Genève, Univ., n° 741, 2001; l'article 92, alinéa 1 de la Loi fédérale sur la circulation routière du 19 décembre 1958 (RS 741.01) se lit: "Celui qui, lors d'un accident, aura violé les devoirs que lui impose la présente loi sera puni des arrêts ou de l'amende."; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, KKW 4384 .J425 2002;
"La distinction entre la négligence conciente et le dol éventuel sera souvent malaisée; la différence se situe sur le plan de la volonté et non de la conscience, puisque l'auteur prévoit dans les deux cas de figure la possibilité que les conséquences se produisent, mais dans le cas du dol éventuel l'auteur, en l'acceptant pour le cas où il se produit, veut le résultat, tandis qu'il escompte qu'il ne se produira pas dans le cas de la négligence consciente469. [...
469 Killias, page 47 no 325; Logoz, page 92 et 93; ce dernier auteur fait une distinction entre les motivations de l'auteur dans son choix, l'égoïsme lorsqu'l agit pas [sic] dol éventuel, la légèreté lorsqu'il agit par négligence consciente." (pp. 173-174)
JENKINS, John S., "Motives and Intention", (1965) 15 The Philosophical Quarterly 155-164; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT, Periodicals, B1 .P49;
JESSE, F. Tennyson (Fryniwyd Tennyson), 1888-1958, Murder and its motives, London : Harrap, 1952, 240 p. (series; Dolphin book; C386); aucune copie dans les bibliothèques de la région d'Ottawa; titre noté dans ma recherche mais livre non consulté; copy at McGill University, Humanities and Social Sciences Library (McLennan/Redpath), HV6515;J4;1952 mcl;
JESSUP, Etan H., "Environmental crimes and corporate liability: The evolution of the prosecution of 'Green' crimes by Corporate Entities", (1998-99) 33 New England Law Review 721-742; copy at Ottawa University, KFM 2469 .N49 Location: FTX Periodicals;
"Motive is an important factor that prosecutors consider when deciding to bring a criminal case. "If the violator was clearly motivated by economic gain, or by malevolent purpose, the violation will more likely be seen as the proper subject of criminal prosecution."66 Motive relates to the idea that accidental violations generally will not be prosecuted..67 ....
66. Levin, Strike Force, supra note 46, at 50 [46. Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts Environmental Strike Force, 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47,47 (1994) [hereinafter Levin, Strike Force].
67. See id." (p. 729)
JOSSERAND, Louis, 1868-1941, Essais de téléologie juridique. II. Les mobiles dans les actes juridiques du droit privé, Paris, Dalloz, 1928, ii, 426 p., voir les pp. i-ii, 1-28 et la Table des matières; réinpression dans: Paris : Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1984, ISBN: 2222033918; copie à l'Université de Montréal, JEFD/J84m; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KJV 336 J67 1928;
KAUFMAN, Whitley R.P., "Motive, Intention and Morality in the Criminal Law", (2003) 28(2) Criminal Justice Review 317-335;
A remarkably persistent dispute in the criminal law concerns the relevance of a defendant's motive to his or her criminal liability. Specifically, the issue is whether a good or permissible motive should exculpate someone who has committed a criminal act. According to the orthodox rule, the defendant's motive is strickly irrelevant to liability. Recently, though, there has been a barrage of criticism aimed at this doctrine. Critics charge that the doctrine is not only false -- judges do regularly consider motive -- but also morally inexcusable, because a permissible motive ought to lessen the blameworthiness of the defendant. The present article defends the orthodox doctrine. It is argued both that it is factually accurate as a description of how judges behave but also, more importantly, that there is a sound moral basis for the doctrine that motives are irelevant with respect to criminal liability. Critics have mischaracterized the role that motive plays in moral theory and practice, and careful attention to the significance of motive demonstrates that the orthodox criminal law doctrine is quite in line with our moral practices." (p. 317)
"Philosophers have long argued over the morality of lying and deceit. In general, the strongest voices of morality have unequivocally frowned upon lying. Immanuel Kant, Saint Augustine, and Saint Thomas Aquinas all declared that lies and deceitfulness were wrong,52 and that their consequences manifest themselves in the next life. St. Augustine, while declaring all lies as morally wrong, classified lies into eight categories.53 One category specifically described the 'type of lie which is harmful to no one and beneficial to the extent that it protects someone from physical defilement...'54 For St. Augustine, 'the motive of the deception helped determine its gravity.'55 The gravity of the lie came to bear only when the soul ascended to judgment in heaven. ....
52. See generally Christopher J. Shine, Note, Deception and Lawyers: Away from a Dogmatic Principle and Toward a Moral Understanding of Deception, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722 (1989); Steven H. Resnicoff, Lying and Lawyering: ContrastingAmerican and Jewish Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 937 (2002).
53. SAINT AUGUSTINE, TREATISE ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 86-87 (Fathers of the Church 1952).
55. Shine, supra note 52, at 741." (p. 311)
KHAN, Louis, Étude sur le délit et la peine en droit canon, Paris et Nancy: Librairie Administrative Berger-Levrault, 1898, xv, 173 p. (Collection; Bibliothèque de la conférence Rogéville - Études spéciales d'histoire du droit); St-Paul University in Ottawa has a copy;
KENNY, Anthony John Patrick, 1931-, Action, Emotion & Will, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; and New York: Humanities Press, 1963, 245 p., see Chapter 4, "Motives" at pp. 76-99 (series; Studies in philosophical psychology); copy at St Paul University of Ottawa, BF 531 K45A38 1963;
KOCSIS, Richard N., "Arson: Exploring Motives and Possible Solutions", Australian Institute of Criminology -- Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, February 2002, 6 p., number 236, ISBN: 0642242763; available at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/ti236.pdf (accessed on 29 July 2006);
LAINGUI, André, La responsabilté pénale dans l'ancien droit: XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970, xii, 367 p. (Collection; Bibliothèque d'histoire du droit et droit romain, t. 17);
"Tandis que la légitime défense efface le crime, la provocation détermine une excuse et laisse subsister l'acte criminel dont la gravité seule se trouve atténuée.
La provocation suppose un délit commis par un auteur responsable, mu par une intention coupable. Cependant, les anciens auteurs opposaient aux crimes 'commis par dol', les crimes 'commis dans un premier mouvement', mêlant ainsi, au sein de la notion de dol, les mobiles et les motifs. Ils considéraient que le crime commis par dol était l'effet des passions les plus froides, en même temps que les plus méprisables : la haine, la cupidité, tandis que le crime commis dans un premier mouvement était 'celui qui se commet sans prémédiation et dans la chaleur d'une passion violente come de la colère, de la douleur, de l'amour ou de l'ivresse, ce qui s'entend lorsque ces passions sont portées à un tel excès qu'on peut dire qu'elles ne laissent pas une entière liberté d'esprit dans celui qu'elles possèdent, et qu'il n'y a lieu de présumer qu'il n'aurait point commis le crime, s'il n'avait été dans cet état' (180). [...]
(180) MUYART DE VOUGLANS, Lois criminelles, p. 13 et p. 14. Cf. TIRAQUEAU, op. cit., cause 1, no 2: Quae ob ira, aliasque animi pertubationes, quaecumque necessario, vel natura hominibus accidunt, injuriam quidem faciunt, sed nondum idcirco sunt injusti, vel pravi." (p. 295)
LAWRENCE, Roy, Motive and Intention: An Essay in the Appreciation of Mind, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, xiv, 132 p. (series; Northwestern University publications in analytical philosophy), ISBN: 0810103761; copy at St-Paul University, Ottawa, BD 450 L39M6 1972; copy also at the University of Ottawa, MRT General, BD 450 .L36 1972;
LEFERENZ, Heinz, "The Personality of the Criminal with Regard to the Assessment of Punishment and Measures for Security and Reform", (1973) 8 Law and State 57-74;
LEONARD, David P., "Character and motive in evidence law", (2000-2001) 34 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 439-536; available at http://llr.lls.edu/volumes/v34-issue2/leonardevidence.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2008);
LIPPMAN, Matthew R., "Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defences to Violation of Human Rights", (1996-97) 15 Dickinson Journal of Internial Law 1-111, and see "Good Motive", at pp. 91-99;
LOESCH, Martin C., "Motive Testimony and a Civil Disobedience Justification", (1990-91) 5 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy1069-1119;
"For persons who engage in civil disobedience, this structure causes a conflict. Most civil disobedients will admit all the elements of their offense; they want to argue, however, that they should not be punished for their act because either their moral obligation is sufficiently weighty or their reason for acting as they have justifies what they did. I will argue that civil disobedients should, under certain conditions, be allowed to present their motive to the jury. Because criminal law does not now recognize the relevance of motive, we must amend ourcriminal law statutes to make this possible. The amendment I propose would operate as a 'justification' for civil disobedience. I will describe it in more detail later.
If it is true that motive is the primary characteristic that distinguishes civil disobedients from criminals, then a bar on admission of motive testimony precludes civil disobedients from making the very arguments with which the community, represented by the jury, should be concerned. If we allow civil disobedients to make motive arguments to the jury, we then make it possible for the proper representatives of the conscience of the community to assess whether the defendant's claim of moral obligation is one which the community is prepared to accept." (pp. 1101-1102; three notes omitted)
MACAULAY, Lord T.B. [Thomas Babington], 1800-1859, J.M. MacLeod, G.W. Anderson and F. Millett., "Notes [on the Indian Penal Code by the Indian Law Commissioners]", in Miscellaneous Works of Lord Macaulay edited by his sister Lady Trevelyan, in Five Volumes, vol. IV, New York: Harper, 1880, 669 p., pp. 177-327; these notes are part of the "Introductory Report upon the Indian Penal Code - To The Right Honorable George Lord Auckland, C.G.C.B. Governor-General of India in Council" at pp. 161-177;
"The second mitigated form of voluntary culpable homicide is that to which we have given the name of voluntary culpable homicide by consent. It appears to us that this description of homicide ought to be punished, but that it ought not to be punished so severely as murder. We have elsewhere given our reasons for thinking that this description of homicde ought to be punished*.
*See Note (B)". (p. 263)
MANN, Coramae Rickey, “Female Murderers and Their Motives: A Tale of Two Cities” in Emilio C. Viano, ed., Intimate Violence: interdisciplinary perspectives, Washington: Hemisphere Pub. Corp., 1992, xxiii, 293 p., at pp. 73-81, ISBN: 1560322446; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT, HQ 809 .I58 1992;
MARGULIES, Martin B., "Intent, Motive, and the R.A.V. Decision", (Summer/Fall 1992) 11 Criminal Justice Ethics 42-46; copy at the library of the Suprme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
MAZUR-HART, Helen L., Comment, "Racial and Religious Intimidation: An Analysis of Oregon's 1981 Law", (1982) 18 Willamette Law Review 197-218;
MAZZETTI, Carole, Les motivations en droit pénal, thèse de doctorat, Nice, 1997, 446 p.; dir. de thèse: Roger Bernardini; voir le sommaire à http://www.sudoc.abes.fr/cgi-bin/nph-wwwredir/www.sudoc.abes.fr:56716/ (catalogue Abes);
McCOY, Scott D., "The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes Statutes: Their Interaction and Conflict", (2000-2001) 22 Cardozo Law Review 629-663; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
McSHERRY, Bernadette, "Terrorism Offences in the Criminal Code: Broadening the Boundaries of Australian Criminal Laws", (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 354-372, and see "Broadening the Boundaries of Fault: Motive as a Fault Element of Serious Crimes", at pp. 359-364;
MILLER, Jeremy M., "Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law", (2001-2002) 29 Western State University Law Review 21-56, and see "A Third and telling Quagmire: Modernity, Mens Rea Does Not Require Evil Motives", at pp. 36-37;
MIMIN, Pierre, "L'intention et le mobile", in La chambre criminelle et sa jurisprudence : recueil d'études en hommage à la mémoire de Maurice Patin [1895-1962], Président de la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation, Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1965, 772 p., aux pp. 113-128; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX General, KJV 7979 .C474 1965;
MOLINIER, Victor, 1799-1887, "Jérémie Bentham considéré comme moraliste et comme légiste (Fragment d'un traité indédit de droit naturel)", (octobre 1836 - mars 1837) Revue de législation et de jurisprudence 209-229; pdf et internet complétés le 15 juin 2007;
MOREAU, Paul, (de Tours), De l'homicide commis par les enfants, Paris : Asselin et Cie, 1882, 196 p.; disponible à http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k768571/f7.image.r=.langEN (vérifié le 7 juillet 2011); voir la table des matières pour la multitude de motifs pour les homicides;
MORRIS, Herbert, ed., Freedom and Responsibility, Stanford (California): Stanford California Press, 1961, v, 547 p., see his chapter 4 on intention and motive and his bibliography on the same subject at pp. 533-535;
MORSCH, James, Comment, "The Problem of Motive in Hate Crimes: the Argument Against Presumptions of Racial Motivation", (1991-92) 82 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 659-689;
MOWAH, Ronald Rae, Morbid Jealously and Murder: a psychiatric study of morbidly jealous murderers at Broadmoor, London : Tavistock Publications, 1966, xii, 131 p., (series; International library of criminology, delinquency and deviant social behaviour; Edward Glover, Hermann Mannheim and Emanuel Miller; editors; number 11); copy at Ottawa University, HV 6515 .M67 1966 MRT; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
"There is little doubt that morbid jealousy provides a motive for murder. But to accept so simple a conception of motive is to have an abbreviatesd vision of the complexity of human motivation and behaviour. Motive, to the psychiatrist, means all the mental events leading up to the resultant behaviour pattern. The mental events include not only those which are the subject of conscious awareness -- personality reactions, reactions to circumstances -- but also those of which the subject may be unaware -- unconscious motivations in the Freudian sense. To say, then, that the delusional jealousy is the motive may be to overstress the particuclar mental event. Nevertheless delusions of infidelity once established, together with loss of inhibition due to the morbid process, may be among the dominating factors in the motivation to violent action, and may approximate to the commonly held concept of motive.
Surprisingly little has been written in the psychiatric literature on delusional motives to murder or even on the motives of insane murderers in general. ..." (p. 32)
MUELLER, Abby, "Can Motive Matter? A Constitutional and Criminal Law Analysis of Motive in Hate Crime Legislation", (1992-93) 61 UMKC Law Review 619-633;
MURPHY, Jeffrie G., "Bias Crimes: What do Haters Deserve?", (Summer/Fall 1992) 11(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 20-23; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
MURPHY, Jeffrie G., and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy, 1988, see pp. 97 and 99 for sure, brownse rest, index;
NCJRS (National Criminal Justice Reference Service), "In the Spotlight -- Hate Crimes -- Publications"; available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/Hate_Crimes/publications.html (accessed on 12 March 2006);
NESTLER, Cornelius, "Sentencing in Germany", (2003-2004) 7 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 109-138;
"The motives by which sentencing is driven in Germany are primarily retribution, deterrence, a little bit of rehabilitation, and a lot of pragmatism." (p. 127)
NOBLE, Robert R., Evaluating the Motivations of Criminal Behavior, Ph.D. thesis, The University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 1951, 82 p.; title noted in my research but not consulted yet;
NORRIE, Alan W. (Alan William), 1953-, Crime, reason, and history : a critical introduction to criminal law, London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, c1993, xx, 279 p., see Chapter 3, "Motive and Intention" at pp. 36-58 (series; Law in context), ISBN: 0297821504;
___________"Legal and Moral Judgment in the 'General Part' " in Peter Rush, Shaun McVeigh, 1947-, and Alison Young, 1962-, eds., Criminal Law Doctrine, Aldershot (England) and Brookfield (Vermont, USA): Ashgate, 1997, xi, 222 p., at pp. 1-27, see in that article, the part "Law's Scelerosis of Judgment: the Separation of Motive and Intention" at pp. 8-12; ISBN:1855219697; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K 5018 C75 1997;
OBOTE-ODORA, Alex, "Complicity in genocide as understood through the ICTR experience", (2002) 2(4) International Criminal Law Review 375-408, and see "Motive is not an element of complicity", at pp. 388-389; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
"National criminal law systems rarely require proof of motive as an element of a crime. Under ordinary circumstances, a motive requirement tends to unnecessarily narrow the crime, and therefore allows individuals who have intentionally committed the prohibited act to escape conviction. This is not to suggest that motive is irrelevant. On the contrary, evidence of motive or lack of it may be relevant to the outcome of a trial. If an accused, for example, can prove lack of motive for committing a given crime, this may influence the Judge's assessment of the incriminating facts; especially if the evidence relied on by the prosecutor is circumstantial. In any event, Judges often take motive into account when assessing the appropriate penalty once the perpetrator's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (p. 388; 1 footnote omitted)
OGINO, Hiroyuki, "Augustine on Christian Justification of Violence", in Ludger Kühnhardt and Mamoru Takayama, eds., Menschenrechte, Kulturen und Gewalt: Ansätze einer interkulturellen Ethik, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005, 474 p., at pp. 25-44, (series; Schriften des Zentrum für Uropäische Integrationsforschung, Center for European Integration Studies der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitäts Bonn; volume 64, ISBN: 3832910387; available at http://www.cecs.acu.edu.au/wprpspapers/Ogino.pdf (accessed on 5 February 2006); useful for researchers;
"According to Aquinas, in order for a war to be just, three things are necessary ...
(3) Thirdly, the belligerents should have a rightful intention such as the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Aquinas quotes also from Augustine with a mistaken title (De verbis domini): True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evildoers, and of uplifting the good (cf. De CivitateDei, 19.12, PL 41, 637). To the contrary, it may happen for war to be unlawful through a wicked intention. Augustine says (Contra Faustum, 22.74): The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpeaceful and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.
The title of the article (S.Th. 2-2, q.40, a.1) is "Whether it is always sinful to wage war?"..."
OLUSANYA, Olaoluwa, Sentencing war crimes against humanity under the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Groningen: Europa Law Pub., 2005, x, 170 p., and see "The Discrinatory Motive v. Non-discriminatory Motive", at pp. 104-109, ISBN: 9076871426; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, KZ1203 .A12 048 2005;
O'SULLIVAN, Patrick Neil, Intentions, motives and human action : an argument for free will, [St. Lucia]: University of Queensland Press, [1977], [iv], 144 p., University Saint Paul Library, Ottawa, General collection, BJ 1561 O88I58 1977; philosophy;
PARACHINI, John V., "Comparing motives and outcomes of mass casualty terrorism involving conventional and unconventional weapons", (September/October 2001) 24 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 389-406;
PAUI, E. Raymond, "The Origin and Rise of Moral Liability in Anglo-Saxon Criminal Law", (1936) 15 Oregon Law Review 93-117;
"St. Augustine...had laid down the doctrine that an evil motive makes the evil act, and a good motive the good act." (p. 110)
PAYNE, Brian K., Incarcerating White-Collar Offenders, Springfield (Illinois): Charles C. Thomas, 2003, xvii, 174 p., see Chapter 2, "Motivations for White-Collar Crime", at pp. 25-55, ISBN: 0398073449 and 0398073457 (pbk.); copy at Ottawa University, MRT General, HV 6768 .P39 2003;
"Routine activity theory was developed by Cohen and Felson (1979) in the late 1970s [L.E. Cohen and M. Felson, "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities Approach", (1979) 44 American Sociological Review 588-608]. The theory posits that crime occurs when three elements are present: 1) a suitable target, 2) the absence of a capable guardian, and 3) a motivated offender. ...
Cohen and Felson (1979) never directly considered what the term "motivated offender" means in regard to white-collar crime. Using the white-collar crime literature and several prominent criminological theories, however, a number of possible motivations become apparent and are addressed in the following section. The motivations to be considered include the following:
• Weak bonds with society
• Personality flaws
• Denials" (pp. 27 and 30)
PERKINS, Rollin M., "A Rationale of Mens Rea", (1939) 52 Harvard Law Review 905-928, see "motive" at pp. 921-923;
PICKEL, Kerri L., "The Effects of Motive Information and Crime Unusualness on Jurors' Judgments in Insanity Cases", (1998) 22(5) Law and Human Behavior 571-584;
PILLSBURY, Samuel H., "Evil and the Law of Murder", (1990-91) U.C. Davis law Review 437-488; important contribution;
"The most serious form of ~ should be defined as follows:
Aggravated murder is the deliberate and purposeful killing of
another for evil reasons; that is, for power, profit, pleasure, out
of hatred based on sex, race or ethnicity, or for any other reason
which demonstrates a conscious rejection of basic morality.  ...
Aggravated murder also requires an evil motive Ä a nonmoralor immoral reason for killing. By motive I mean the primary inspiration for the defendant's criminal act. An evil motive usually involves the promotion of selfish concerns. Examples of such motives include killing another person for money, killinganother to ensure freedom from prosecution for a crime, or a killing in which the murderer takes pleasure in the victim's suffering and death. A killing motivated by racial, ethnic, or other group-based hatred also satisfies the evil motive requirement. Inall of these instances the murderer has no good reason to fear or hate the victim and has resolved to kill because of a nonmoral or immoral motivation." (pp. 480-481)
PLOSCOWE, M., "An Examination of Some Dispositions Relating to Motives and Character in Modern European Penal Codes", (1930-31) 21 Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology 26-40; copy at the law library, University of Ottawa, FTX Periodicals, HV 6001 .J633; copy also at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Periodicals, Ottawa; also with the same title in (1930) 10 Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 321-328;
"The reasons why motives demand for themselves a place in the modern penal law are not far to seek. Though an act may be the external expression of a human will, the will itself is very often determined as the result of the struggle of motives in favor of acting and against acting within the individual. And it is said that it is not the fact of a particular act being committed, which holds its author up to popular esteem or condemnation. It is the motives impelling the commission of the act which are the bases of the popular judgment. Thus public opinion makes a difference betwen the individual who committed an infraction with robbery as a motive and the individual who kills to avenge his sullied honor. If the motives followed by an individual appear honorable he is treated with leniency irrespective of the technical definition of his particular infraction. Moreover, such popular judgments finding their lodgement in the jury, express themselves often by an acquittal where the motives appear honorable and a conviction in the contrary case." (p. 27)
"A wealthy usurer may not be impressed very much with the threat of a three months or six months imprisonment, but the prospect of having to suffer a heavy fine in addition may have a much weightier influence" (p. 32)
PRADEL, Jean, Histoire des doctrines pénales, deuxième édition corrigée, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, 126 p. (Collection; "que sais-je"; numéro 2484), ISBN: 2130432735;
"Le second souffle: F. Gramatica et M. Ancel. --
Jusqu'à présent, le criminel était quasiment sacrifié sur l'autel de l'intérêt général. Là-dessus, survint le second conflit mondial au cours duquel le mépris de l'homme parvint à des sommets jamais atteints. Aussi, dès la fin des combats, et comme par réaction, une aspiration à un certain humanisme se fit sentir de tous côtés. Le courant de défense sociale fut naturellement porté à s'y intéresser.
M. Ancel, au contraire, entend conserver le cadre du droit pénal: point de mesures ante delictum ni de sentences indéterminées prononcées par le juge. Il désire seulement abandonner les 'fictions juridiques' comme la présomption de connaissance de la loi, le rejet du mobile, la théorie du délit impossible. C'est ce qu'il appelle la 'déjudiciarisation' du droit pénal." (pp. 93-94, 1 note d'omise)
PROSECUTOR v. ZEJNIL DELALIC, ZDRAVKO MUCIC also known as "PAVO", HAZIM DELIC, ESAD LANDZO also known as "ZENGA", United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, (IT-96-21), 16 November 1996, Part V of the judgment)
Motives for the Commission of Offences
1235. Generally, motive is not an essential ingredient of liability for the commission of an offence. It is to some extent a necessary factor in the determination of sentence after guilt has been established. The offences charged are violations of international humanitarian law. It is, therefore, essential to consider the motives of the accused. The motive for committing an act which results in the offence charged may constitute aggravation or mitigation of the appropriate sentence. For instance,
where the accused is found to have committed the offence charged with cold, calculated premeditation, suggestive of revenge against the individual victim or group to which the victim belongs, such circumstances necessitate the imposition of aggravated punishment. On the other hand, if the accused is found to have committed the offence charged reluctantly and under the influence of group pressure and, in addition, demonstrated compassion towards the victim or the group to which the victim
belongs, these are certainly mitigating factors which the Trial Chamber will take into consideration in the determination of the appropriate sentence." (Part V of the Judgment, available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/cel-tj981116e-5.htm and http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/part5.htm, accessed on 3 November 2004);
PY, Bruno, Recherches sur les justifications pénales de l'activité médicale, thèse de doctorat en droit (Doctorat Nouveau Régime, Droit privé), Université de Nancy II, Faculté de droit, de Sciences économiques et de Gestion, 1993, 571 p., voir "Distinctions entre but, intention et mobile", aux pp. 158-161; disponible à http://www.iscrimed.com/these1_py.htm (visionné le 19 juillet 2003);
Recent Cases, "CRIMINAL LAW — WILLFUL BLINDNESS — NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT MOTIVE IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS. — United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2007) (No. 07-5762), (2008) 45 Harvard Law Review (2008) 1245-1252; available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/feb08/recentcases/us_v_heredia.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2008);
REIX, Marie, Le motif légitime en droit pénal: contribution à la théorie générale de la justification, thèse de doctorat en droit, Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV, École doctorale de Droit (E.D. 41), 2012, 635 p. (source: http://www.theses.fr/en/2012BOR40055, site visité le 11 novembre 2013);
Dans la plupart des disciplines juridiques, le motif légitime se présente comme un standard de justification des actes. Il fait obstacle à l’application de la norme, en fondant un droit ou en exonérant d’un devoir. Le droit pénal se montre réticent à l’endroit de cette notion floue qui connaît pourtant un essor sans précédent. Afin de justifier la marge d’appréciation laissée au juge, le motif légitime est généralement conçu comme un mobile, ce qui accentue la confusion entre les causes objectives et subjectives d’irresponsabilité. L’insuffisance de l’approche formelle du mécanisme justificatif explique sa subjectivation progressive. L’analyse du motif légitime suppose de revisiter la théorie de la justification à travers une conception substantielle de l’illicéité, apte à unifier son régime. L’étude de la finalité justificative du motif légitime permet de mieux comprendre la souplesse de ses conditions de mise en œuvre. Le motif légitime renverse la présomption d’illicéité fondant la responsabilité. Le jugement de valeur porté sur l’infraction est la raison d’être du reproche social. Elle se distingue de son attribution à l’auteur qui relève d’un jugement de réalité sur sa volonté. Le motif légitime procède des circonstances extérieures à l’infraction autorisant la vérification concrète de son illicéité. La nature objective du motif légitime est conforme à son effet exonératoire de responsabilité opérant in rem et non in personam. Ses conditions d’application semblent, en revanche, doublement dérogatoires au droit commun de la justification, tant à l’égard de ses critères larges que de son domaine étroit. Il est cantonné à des infractions de risque abstrait pour des valeurs secondaires dont la présomption d’illicéité est artificielle. Le prévenu doit rapporter la preuve de la légitimité concrète de son acte, alors que la légitimité abstraite de la répression est sujette à caution. L’expansion de ce domaine dérogatoire de la répression révèle l’insuffisant contrôle de sa nécessité abstraite. En tout état de cause, la mention spéciale du motif légitime est inutile car toute infraction en fait implicitement réserve, en sorte qu’il se conçoit comme un standard général de justification. Il confère au juge la libre appréciation de la nécessité concrète de la répression, au regard du contexte de chaque espèce qui échappe par nature à la loi ne pouvant régler a priori tous les conflits de valeurs. La justification a postériori des infractions socialement nécessaires ou insignifiantes renforce l’autorité de la loi en garantissant une application conforme à sa finalité de protection des valeurs. (source: http://www.theses.fr/en/2012BOR40055,
site visité le 11 novembre 2013)
In many legal disciplines, the legitimate reason is a model of justification of acts. The legitimate reason prevents the enforcement of the law, either by creating a right or by exempting someone from a duty. Despite an unprecedented boom, criminal law is hesitant about this vague notion. In order to justify judges' assessment margin, the legitimate reason is commonly considered as a motive. This accentuates the confusion between objective and subjective causes of irresponsibility. The formal approach of the justificatory process is inadequate, making the process increasingly biased. The analysis of the legitimate reason requires a re-examination of the justification theory using a solid understanding of unlawfulness which can help standardize its implementation. The study of the legitimate reason’s justificatory function allows a better understanding of the flexibility of its implementation requirements. The legitimate reason reverses the presumption of unlawfulness on which liability is based. The cause of liability is conditioned by the value judgment made about the offence, whereas the judgment of the reality of the offender’s intention is the condition of his imputation. The legitimate reason stems from circumstances that are external to the offence, and which enable the review of its lawfulness. The objective nature of the legitimate reason is aligned with the fact that it exempts from liability in rem and not in personam. However, the requirements for its application seem exceptional to the common law of justification in two regards: its broad criteria and its narrow field. It is limited to offences of abstract risk that protect secondary values for which the presumption of unlawfulness is artificial. The defendant must prove the legitimacy of his act whereas the abstract legitimacy of the suppression is unconfirmed. The expansion of this dispensatory field of suppression reveals an inadequate control of its abstract necessity. In any case, bringing up legitimate reason is useless as it is implicit to any offence and is considered as a general model of justification. It leaves the judge free to assess the necessity of the penalty on a case by case basis, as the law, by nature, cannot resolve all value conflicts. The post facto justification of socially necessary offences or even trivial offences reinforces the authority of the law by ensuring an enforcement that is aligned with the law's aim of protecting values.
(source: http://www.theses.fr/en/2012BOR40055, site visité le 11 novembre 2013))
RENTELN, Alison Dundes, The cultural defense, Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. DESCRIPTION: viii, 404 p. , see on motives,
pp. 189-192, ISBN: 0195154029; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5455 R46 2004; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, K 5455 .R46 2004;
"…retributivists all agree on the idea of proportionality.
It is this idea that provides the justification for a cultural defense. A defendant whose act is culturally motivated is less blameworthy, and, therfore, he deserves a lesser punishment. To see why this is so, we must consider the relevance of motive to criminal liability. ..." (pp. 188-189; two notes omitted)
RIGAUD, C., De l'influence du motif en matière criminelle, Paris: A Rousseau, 1898, 122 p.; thèse, Université de Paris, Faculté de droit et des sciences économiques; titre noté dans mes recherches mais livre non consulté; aucune copie dans les bibliothèques du Canada comprises dans le catalogue AMICUS (vérification du 4 août 2006);
ROB, Samuel J., "A question of "intent" -- intent and motive distinguished", (August 1994) Army Lawyer 27-34; copy available at https://134.11.61.26/CD2/Publications/JA/TAL/TAL%2027-50-261%2019940801.pdf (accessed on 13 September 2005);
ROBINSON, Paul H., "Hate Crimes: Crimes of Motive, Character, or Group Terror?", 1992 & 1993 Annual Survey of American Law, New York City: Oceana Publications for New York University School of Law, 1994, at pp. 605-616, ISBN: 037912618; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF178 A56;
ROSENFELD, Ernest, traduction de J. Ogereau, "IV. La Péninsule ibérique. 1. L'Espagne" dans Franz von Liszt et l'Association internationale de droit pénal, [sous la direction de], La législation pénale comparée, 1er volume: Le droit criminel des États européens, Berlin: Otto Liebmann, Paris: Pedone; Rome: Loescher et Lisbonne: Ferin, 1894, xxvi, 706 p. aux pp. 139-192; un seul volume publié; livre rare; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa;
"C'est sur cette base que naquirent dans les années 1256 à 1265 (le 20 août) les Siete Partidas qui en fixant les résultats de la science du droit romain telle qu'elle existait alors, représentent une rupture avec le passé visigoth, et sont d'une importance capitale pour le développement de la jurisprudence criminelle en Espagne.
Les Siete Partidas peuvent ëtre considérées comme le premier code montrant une tendance indéniable vers la formation dela partie générale du droit pénal (Tit. VII, 31. Des peines).1) Mais il y a naturellement encore beaucoup de questions, telles que l'illégalité, la culpabilité, la complicité qui ne sont qu'indiquées, ou qui ne sont traitées qu'au point de vue de la casuistique, et en particulier en matière de meurtres (VII, 8).
Dans la peine on distingue deux éléments: l'un émendant, rapportant un bien à la personne lésée -- la réparation (pecho); et l'autre pénal proprement dit, occasionnant un mal au coupable -- la correction (escarmiento).
Généralement il n'y aura jamais de peine s'il n'existe pas de culpabilité, et c'est la malice plus tenace qui forme le motif pour frapper le récidiviste d'une peine plus forte." (pp. 148-150)
SALMOND, John, 1862-1924, Jurisprudence, 7 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1924, xviii, 580 p.; copy at the law library, University of Ottawa, FTX General, K 230 .S3 1924:
"The wrongdoer's immediate intent, if he has one, is his purpose to commit the wrong; his ulterior intent, or motive, is his purpose in committing it. Every wrongful act may may raise two distinct questions with respect to the intent of the doer. The first of these is: How did he do the act - intentionally or accidently? The second is: If he did it intentionally, why did he do it? The first is an inquiry into his immediate intent; the second is concerned with his ulterior intent, or motive." (p. 398)
SARTRE, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980, L'être et le néant : essai d'ontologie phénoménologique, Paris : Gallimard, 1943, 692 p. (Collection; bibliothèque des idées); copie à la bibliothèque de l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, B 819 .S27 1971; aussi publié en anglais / also published in English, Being and Nothingness : an essay on phenomenological ontology ...translated and with an introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, New York : Washington Square Press, 1956, 812 p., copy at the Ottawa University library, MRT General, B 819 .S2713;
"On entend ordinairement par motif la raison d'un acte; c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des considérations rationnelles qui le justifient. Si le gouvernement décide une conversion des rentes, il donnera ses motifs: diminution de la dette publique, assainissement de la Trésorerie. C'est également par des motifs que les historiens ont coutume d'expliquer les actes des ministres ou des monarques; à une déclaration de guerre, on cherchera des motifs: l'occasion est propice, le pays attaqué est décomposé par les troubles intérieurs, il est temps de mettre fin à un conflit économique qui risque de s'éterniser. [...] Nous appellerons donc motif la saisie objective d'une situation déterminée en tant que cette situation se révèle, à la lumière d'une certaine fin, comme pouvant servir de moyen pour atteindre cette fin.
Le mobile, au contraire, est considéré ordinairement comme un fait subjectif. C'est l'ensemble des désirs, des émotions et des passions qui me poussent à accomplir un certain acte. (Quatrième Partie, "Avoir, faire et être", Chapitre Premier "Être et faire: la liberté", aux pp. 500-501; note: je ne cite ici qu'une très petite partie pertinente).
"Generally by cause we mean the reason for the act; that is, the ensemble of rational considerations which jusify it. If the government decides on a conversion of Government bonds, it will give the causes for its act: the lessening of the national debt, the rehabilitation of the Treasury. Similarly it is by causes that historians are accustomed to explain the acts of ministers or monarchs; they will seek the causes for a declaration of war: the occasion is propitious, the attacked country is disorganized because of internal troubles; it is time to pur an end to an economic conflict which is in danger of lasting interminably. ... We shall therefore use the term cause for the objective apprehension of a determined situation as this situation is revealed in the light of a certain end as being able to serve as the means for attaining this end.
The motive, on the contrary, is generally considered as a subjective fact. It is the ensemble of the desires, emotions, and passions which urge me to accomplish a certain act." (Part Four, "Having, Doing, and Being", Chapter One, "Being and Doing: Freedom", at pp. 575-576; note: only a very small relevant part is cited here)
SASSOLI, Marco and Laura M. Olson, "International humanitarian law -- 1949 Geneva Conventions -- international criminal law -- conflict in Bosnia and Heizegovina -- distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts -- concept of protected persons -- participation in international crimes --crimes against humanity -- motives --discriminatory intent. PROSECUTOR V. TADIC (JUDGEMENT). Case No. IT-94-1-A, 38 ILM 1518 (1999). International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, July15, 1999", (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 571-578;
"The appeals chamber held that the necessary elements of crimes against humanity are that the accused's actions must be linked geographically and temporallywith the armed conflict, that those actions 'comprise part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population, and that the accused must have known that his actions fit into such a pattern.17 The individual motives of the accused for committing any particular acts are irrelevant. Taking advantage of a regime's attack on the civilian population to harm someone for reasons unrelated to the regime's policies does not imply that such acts are unrelated to the armed conflict. In support of its analysis, the appeals chamber cited precedents from World War II18 and stated that one need not even ask what are 'purely personal motives'; they 'do not acquire any relevance' for establishing commission of the crime and are even 'generally irrelevant in criminal law.'19 The appeals chamber did acknowledge, however, that motives are relevant at the sentencing stage.
Finally, the appeals chamber held that a discriminatory intent is necessary only for "persecution" crimes against humanity, not for all of the crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute." (p. 574, notes omitted)
___________"The judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Case", (2000) number 839 International Review of the Red Cross 733-769;
SAUL, Ben, "Attempts to Define 'Terrorism' in International Law", (May 2005) 52(1) Netherlands International Law Review 57-83;
"The repeated and industrious attempts by the international community to generically define terrorism over the past 80 years indicate the normative importance of generic definition to the international community. In contrast to the objective enumeration of offences in sectoral anti-terrorism treaties, generic definition can capture, and condemn, the motive elements which distinguish terrorism from ordinary crime. Reference to political motives helps to conceptually distinguish international terrorism from transnational organized crime, which is motivated by ‘?nancial or material benefit’ rather than political aims. Generic definition avoids the rigidity of enumerative definitions, which may not coverever-changing terrorist methods.
The principal disadvantage of generic definition is the dif?culty and subjectivity of proving motive elements, such as an aim to intimidate or compel, or a political motive. Generic definitions are wider and more ambiguous than enumerative ones, although all definitions generalize, and the problem is lessened by combining generic and enumerative features in a single definition. Combined definitions are narrower than enumerative ones – since listed offences only amount to terrorism when they also satisfy a motive element – and are the most likely type of definition to satisfy the principle of legality, or
specificity, in criminal offences." (pp. 82-83; notes omitted)
___________"The Curious Element of Motive in Definitions of Terrorism : Essential Ingredient -- Or Criminalising Thought?", in A. Lynch, E. MacDonald, & G. Williams, eds., Law and Liberty in the War on Terror, pp. 28-38, Federation Press, Sydney, 2007, pp. 28-38; also Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 08/123; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1291571 (accessed on 31 October 2008);
___________"Reasons for Defining and Criminalizing "Terrorism" in International Law", (2006) 6 Mexican Yearbook of International Law 419-460; Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 08/121; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1291567 (accessed on 31 March 2008);
SCHABAS, William A., 1950-, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2000, xvi, 624 p., see "Motive" at pp. 245-256, ISBN: 0521782627 and 0521787904 (pbk.); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Ottawa, K5302 S33 2000;
SCHAWARTZ, Linta Linzer and Natalie K. Isser, Child Homicide: parents Who Kill, Boca Raton, FL : CRC/Taylor & Francis, c2007, 297 p., and see Chapter 3, "Motives for Murder", at pp. 41 to 60; ISBN: 0849393663; limited preview available at http://books.google.com/books?id=28iUGYknQ-IC&pg=PA115&dq=codification+%22criminal+law%22+date:2006
-2009&lr=&as_brr=3&ei=vWc5SPCJOZ2yjAGq7OiOBg&sig=yQD0YtS6hxapTj8W7nkxC3wClF8#PPA47,M1 and http://books.google.com/books?id=28iUGYknQ-IC&dq=codification+%22criminal+law%22+date:2006-2009&lr=&as_brr=3&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0 (accessed on 25 May 2008);
SEVEN CAPITAL SINS / SEPT PÉCHÉS CAPITAUX; note de recherche: les hommes verteux commettent-ils des crimes?
Pride / L'orgueil
Avarice -- Greed / L'avarice
Wrath -- Anger / La colère
Sloth / La paresse
SHIVELY, Michael, Study of Literature and Legislation on Hate Crime in America, prepared for Bernie Auchter, National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2005, v, 141 p.; available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/210300.pdf (accessed on 12 June 2006);
SISTARE, C.T., "Agent Motives and the Criminal Law", (1987) 13 Social Theory and Practice 303-326;
SOOTHILL, Keith and Elizabeth Ackerley, "Kidnapping: a criminal profile of persons convicted 1979-2001", (2006) Behavioral Sciences & the Law
STEPHEN, James Fitzjames, 1829-1894, A General View of the Criminl Law of England, 1st ed., London and Cambridge: MacMillan, 1863, xii, 499 p;
"The consideration that sanity of behaviour depends on a generic resemblance to the conduct of other men, solves some difficulties which are often raised on the question of motive. It is constantly said, both by judges and by counsel, that the proof, or absence of proof of motive, is an unimportant matter in a criminal trial, because the motives of men are so various as to defy calculation. This is true; but it does not follow that the question whether the act was done without any such motive as acts on the bulk of mankind, is immaterial or insoluble. There are motives for all acts, even the maddest, and it is frequently impossible to assign them specifically; but is is generally possible to form an opinion whether a given act was done from some unknown mad motive, or from some unknown sane motive. Two men who have always lived on apparently affectionate terms with their wives, kill them. One does so by poison, secretly procured and administered. The other, without provocation or warning, starts up at a dinner-table, in the presence of twenty people, and stabs his wife. The motives of each are, and may remain for ever, absolutely unknown; but the circumstances of the two cases are primâ facie evidence (liable, of course, to be enforced or rebutted by other circumstances) that the one man had some common unknown motive--such as ill-will, jealousy, or the like, and that the other acted in consequence of some motive supplied by disease, such as a sudden insane impulse, the existence of which, if believed by the jury, would have an important bearing on the guilt of the prisoner." (pp. 88-89)
___________A History of the Criminal Law of England, London, MacMillan, 1883, 3 volumes;
"I have already pointed out the place which intention occupies in voluntary action. It is the result of deliberation upon motives, and is the object aimed at by the action caused or accompanied by the act of volition." (vol. 2, p. 110)
"...it will often be argued that a prisoner ought to be acquitted of wounding a policeman with intent to do him grievous bodily harm, because his intention was not to hurt the policeman, but only to escape from his pursuit. This particular argument was so common that to inflict grievous bodily harm with intent to resist lawful apprehension is now a specific statutory offence; but, if the difference between motive and intention were properly understood, it would be seen that when a man stabs a police constable in order to escape, the wish to resist lawful apprehension is the motive, and stabbing the policeman the intention, and nothing can be more illogical than to argue that a man did not entertain a given intention because he had a motive for entaining it. The supposition that the presence of an ulterior intention takes away the primary immediate intention is a fallacy of the same sort." (vol. 2, pp. 111-112)
"The motive prompting the act [for murder] ought not, I think, to be embodied in the definition, because the attempt to do so must infallibly lead to inextricable confusion, and probably to legal fictions like those from which our own law has not yet worked itself clear, but it must always affect the moral guilt of the offence itself. It is impossible not to recognise a difference in guilt between the man who deliberately poisons another in order to rob him and a man who shoots another in a duel in which he risks his own life upon equal terms, and to which the person killed has provoked him by cruel injuries, for which the law gives no remedy. Each, however, kills intentionnaly and unlawfully." (vol. 3, p.84)
"It is a matter of considerable difficulty to enumerate all the circumstances which affect the guilt of such an offence as murder; but after much consideration and observation I have made a collection of such cases which I think is nearly, it is difficult to say that it would be altogether, complete. They are as follows: --
5. Cases in which the motives of the offender are compassion, despair, or the like. A mother, deserted by her husband and unable to provide for her child, drowns it. A physician administers deadly poison to a person dying of hydrophobia, in order to shorten his agonies." (vol. 3, pp. 85-86)
"...their [Burchell and Hunt] categorical statement ...that 'the unlawfulness of an act is always judged objectively', i.e. without reference to the actor's state of mind. Although this is generally true, it has long been acknowledged that 'subjective' factors, such as motive, intention, mental attitude, may play a role in determining the unlawfulness of an act. 'Subjective justification', or conversely 'subjective unlawfulness', has almost achieved the status of a 'doctrine' in the modern science of criminal law. It is submitted that there are several instances in our law where the actor's state of mind is thus relevant. Examples: in theft or malicious injury to property the motive of the actor may be decisive in determining whether he is a criminal, or an innocent negotiorum gestor (cf. De Wet and Swanepoel, 2nd ed., p. 64); in extortion the intention to profit may be a factor in determining whether the threat was improper, and therefore illegal (cf. M. L. Benade (1953) 16 T.H.R.- H.R.150); the motive to heal an ailing person may make the difference between aggravated assault and a (lawful) medical operation." (p. 476)
SULLAWAY, Megan, "Psychological Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws", (2004) 10(3) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 250-293;
SUTHERLAND, Edwin H., Donald R. Cressey and David F. Luckenbill, Principles of Criminology, 11th ed., New York: General Hall, 1992, viii, 696 p. (series; The Reynolds Series in Sociology), ISBN: 0930390709 (cloth) and 0930390695 (paper); copy at Ottawa University, MRT General, HV6025 .S83;
...motive and intention are confused in many court decisions. In the crime of libel, for example, motive is explicitly considered. In many states, one cannot publish truthful but damaging statements about another unless the motive for such publication is good. Similarly, criminal conspiracy frequently involves consideration and evaluation of a defendant's motives as well as intention. In most instances, however, motivation is taken into account only in the administration of criminal law, particularly in deciding the severity of the punishment that a criminal should receive." (p. 8)
SUTHERLAND, N.S., "Motives as Explanations", (1959) 68 Mind 145-159; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT, Periodicals, B1.M65; philosophical content;
SUISSE, Code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937, articles 63, 64, 112 et 114;
Le juge fixera la peine d’après la culpabilité du délinquant, en tenant compte des mobiles, des antécédents et de la situation personnelle de ce dernier."
2. Atténuation de la peine.
Le juge pourra atténuer la peine:
lorsque le coupable aura agi
en cédant à un mobile honorable,
dans une détresse profonde,
sous l’impression d’une menace grave,
sous l’ascendant d’une personne à laquelle il doit obéissance ou de laquelle il dépend;
lorsqu’il aura été induit en tentation grave par la conduite de la victime;
lorsqu’il aura été entraîné par la colère ou par une douleur violente, produites par une provocation injuste ou une offense imméritée;
lorsqu’il aura manifesté par des actes un repentir sincère, notamment lorsqu’il aura réparé le dommage autant qu’on pouvait l’attendre de lui;
lorsqu’un temps relativement long se sera écoulé depuis l’infraction et que le délinquant se sera bien comporté pendant ce temps;
lorsque l’auteur était âgé de 18 à 20 ans et ne possédait pas encore pleinement la faculté d’apprécier le caractère illicite de son acte."
Si le délinquant a tué avec une absence particulière de scrupules, notamment si son mobile, son but ou sa façon d’agir est particulièrement odieux, il sera puni de la réclusion à vie ou de la réclusion pour dix ans au moins."
[Translation by François Lareau]
Art. 114. Assassination
If the accused killed with a particular absence of scruples, notably if his motive, purpose or manner of acting is particularly odious, he will be punished by reclusion for life ou for reclusion for ten years at least.
Celui qui, cédant à un mobile honorable, notamment à la pitié, aura donné la mort à une personne sur la demande sérieuse et instante de celle-ci sera puni de l’emprisonnement."
Art. 114. Murder at the request of the victim
The person, who having given in to a honourable motive, notably pity, has given death to a person at that person's serious and pressing request will be punished by imprisonment.
TADROS, Victor, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2011; see "Wrongdoing and Motivation" at pp. 139-168; noted in my research but pages not consulted yet (7 January 2012);
TAHON, R., «Le mobile en droit pénal belge», (1948-49) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 101-113;
TARDE, Gabriel, 1843-1904, "Les crimes de haine", (1894) 9 Archives d'anthropologie criminelle de criminologie et de psychologie normale et pathologique 241-254; disponible à http://www.hstl.crhst.cnrs.fr/research/aci/criminocorpus/aac/ice/ice_book_detail.php?lang=fr&type=img&bdd=crhst_arch&table=criminocorpus_aac&bookId=9&typeofbookId=1&num=0&&nump=10 (site visité le 2 janvier 2007);
___________La philosophie pénale, Lyon: A. Storck et Paris: G. Masson, 1890, 566 p., voir les pp. 456-464; disponible à http://www.uqac.uquebec.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_sciences_sociales/ (visionné le 14 septembre 2005); livre aussi publié en anglais/book also published in English, Penal philosophy, by Gabriel Tarde. Translated by Rapelje Howell. With an editorial pref. by Edward Lindsey and an introd. by Robert H. Gault, Montclair, N.J., Patterson Smith, 1968 [c1912], xxxii, 581 p. (series; Patterson Smith reprint series in criminology, law enforcement, and social problems; Publication number 16), copy at Ottawa University, FTX General HV 6035 .T33 1968;
"Comment se fait-il que l'idée si simple et si rationnelle de proportionner la gravité des meurtres moins au degré de prévoyance et de réflexion qui s'y rencontre qu'à la nature des passions et des appétits qui ont poussé le meurtrier à réfléchir et à prévoir, ne se soit présentée à aucun législateur moderne? Comment se fait-il que le meurtre prémédité ait paru à tous synonyme de meurtre exécuté de sang-froid, -- comme si la passion la plus profonde n'était pas précisément la plus calculée et la plus propre à nourrir de longs desseins, -- et que le meurtre non prémédité ait paru à tous nécessairement commis dans un accès de fureur excusable, comme si, le voleur surpris, qui tue à contre-coeur et sans l'avoir voulu d'avance, était mû par la haine, la jalousie ou le fanatisme?" (p. 457)
TISSOT, J., Le droit pénal étudié dans ses principes dans les usages et les lois des différents peuples du monde, Paris: Cotillon, Librairie-Éditeur, 1860, 2 tomes (tome 1: lv, 420 p.) et (tome 2: 673, [1] p.); copie à la Bibliothèque nationale, Ottawa, Ontario;
"Quoiqu'on ait dit avec une apparence de sagesse que ce n'est point la colère qui excuse, mais son juste motif 1, cela n'est vrai que pour les faits justificatifs, pour les excuses préemptoires. La justice du motif rend les moyens légitimes, lors surtout qu'ils sont proportionnés à la fin qu'on avait le droit d'atteindre, et qu'ils sont ou reconnus par la loi, ou abandonnés à la conscience publique et à celle des juges. Ainsi celui qui, dans un mouvement de colère, repoussant une attaque soudaine, sérieuse, défendant sa vie qu'il croit en péril, tue son agresseur, celui-là n'est point coupable : le motif de sa colère est superflue; il aurait tué de sang-froid son agresseur, s'il n'avait pas cru pouvoir autrement sauver sa propre vie, qu'il ne serait pas moins irréprochable.
1FARINACIUS, quaest. 91, no 13." (tome 1, p. 68)
TOULEMON, André, Le progrès des institutions pénales (Essai de sociologie criminelle), Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1928, 249 p., voir le Chapitre V (deuxième partie), "Réformes" aux pp. 108-109;
Il nous semble qu'une des réformes les plus souhaitables, pour marquer un pas en avant dans les progrès du droit pénal, consisterait à imposer au juge criminel -- magistrat ou juré -- l'obligation de préciser le motif auquel a obéi l'auteur du crime ou du délit: cupidité, vanité, haine, vengeance, passion sexuelle, jalousie. Par le seul fait qu'il serait obligé d'indiquer avec précision un motif dans les attendus de son jugement, le juge ou le juré serait contraint à une recherche psychologique qui l'engagerait à se rendre un compte exact du degré de culpabilité et par suite de proportionner, aussi justement que possible la peine à la perversité du criminel.
Dans le même ordre d'idées, une autre réforme consisterait à qualifier le délit non point par le fait extérieur qui n'a pas toujours de rapport avec la culpabilité, mais par le mobile qui en est le sûr et l'incontestable indice; pour le vol, par exemple, ce ne serait pas le fait tout extérieur de l'escalade ou de l'effraction qui aggraverait le délit, mais le motif qui a inspiré le voleur; il est, en effet, inadmissible qu'un vol de pain commis par un malheureux poussé par la faim, soit réprimé plus sévèrement s'il est accompli avec effraction, que le vol d'un bijou pris à l'étalage dans un but de cupidité ou de vanité.
De même en matière d'homicide; si l'on s'inspirait de ce juste principe, la culpabilité ne devrait pas être établie d'après la préméditation, mais d'après la nature du motif qui a poussé le meurtrier; nous avons signalé comment le jury qui reflète l'opinion montre une indulgence toujours plus grande aux criminels par amour ou aux autres crimes passionnels. Est-il pourtant un crime plus longuement prémédité que celui d'un des amants qui ont décidé de se tuer ensemble et dont un seul a survécu?
En Angleterre, il y a aggravation du crime lorsqu'il est perpétré par le criminel en poursuivant un but délictueux; en ceci la loi anglaise est très juste: la préméditation ne révèle pas un indice de plus grande culpabilité; c'est la pensée inspiratrice du crime qui en fait, pour la plus grande part, la perversité.
Et, ainsi, nous voilà ramenés par l'indication de ces réformes à la confirmation de notre thèse: ce n'est pas en pesant l'acte lui-même, ni même les conséquences qu'il a entraînées, ou encore les moyens employés pour l'accomplir, que le droit pénal se perfectionne et s'épure; c'est en recherchant l'intention du criminel, son but, sa volonté, sa pensée intime, qu'il se rapproche de la justice absolue, idéal inaccessible mais que la société à mesure qu'elle s'affine, a toujours cependant le devoir de poursuivre." (pp. 108-109)
TRIBE, Laurence H., "The mystery of motive, private and public: some notes inspired by the problems of hate crime and animal sacrifice", [1993] The Supreme Court Review 1-36;
TROUSSE, P.-E., Études et documents, "Le mobile justificatif", (1962-63) 43 Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 418-436;
UHRICH, Craig L., "Hate Crime Legislation: A Policy Analysis", (1999) 36 Houston Law Review 1467-1529;
ULLMAN, Walter, The Medieval Idea of Law As Represented by Lucas De Penna. A Study in Fourteenth-Century Legal Scholarship by Walter Ullman with an Introduction by Harold Dexter Hazeltine, New York: Barnes & Noble; London: Methuen, 1969 (reprint of the 1949 edition), xxxix, 220 p.; copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT General, K445 .U437 1946A;
[p. 145] "Lucas's thesis that the internal attitude is the sole constituent of crime is best illustrated by his treatment of actions against the 'bannitus' -- that is, a person who is outlawed as a consequence of some crime.3 The common view was that the killing the 'bannitus' was legally permissible.4 The jurists found the juristic justification in the dictum of Roman law that 'juris executio non habet injuriam'.5 They argued consequently that, since the law itself permitted the killing of a 'bannitus', the perpetrator could not be punished for his action, which in itself is within the province of lawful acts. Lucas is not satisfied with this objective orientation.
It is quite true, he affirms, that from the objective point of view the action of the killer was not forbidden. But it is not the wrongful act which constitutes crime, nor can, on the other hand, the performance of a legally permissible act to be the sole reason for impunity, unless the agent acted 'ex zelo justitiae'. If his action had sprung 'ex odio et fonte nequitiae', he is liable to be punished, even though he committed an act which, at first sight, seems legally permissible. In other words, only those individuals are entitled to kill the 'bannitus' who are impelled by the same motive as that which underlies the law wherefrom the right (to kill the 'bannitus') is derived. Those individusls act, so to speak, on behalf of the law; and this function makes it imperative that they pursue the right with an intention corresponding to that of the law -- that is a 'zelus justitiae'. In default of this motive, killing a 'bannitus' is simply murder. The generally entertained view declared, however, that the intention of the killer is of no concern to the judge: killing a 'bannitus' was considered lawful without taking into consideration the motive which impelled the killer. Albericus de Rosciate refers to the common doctrine and practice, and writes that the killing of a 'bannitus' is not punishable, no matter what reasons motivated the perpetrator: 'Vidi servari et statutum (scil. statutum municipale) interpretari, et qualitercumque et quomodocumque sit interfectus bannitus, impunitum sit''.6
3 Albericus de Rosciate in his Dictionarium said that just as excommunication excludes the member from the Church, in the same way the ban excludes man from civil society: 'Bannitus suam civitatem amittit...sicut excommunicatio dejicit a communione ecclesiae...sic et bannum dejicit a communione publica'.
4 Many municipal statutes expressly declared killing a 'bannitus' lawful, see the statutes referred to by Dahm, Strafrecht Italiens, p. 99.
5 See the detailed report of Lucas in his commentary on C. XII, 53, I, no. 62; cf. also my references in Revue d'Histoire du Droit, loc. cit., pp. 52-53.
6 Albericus de Rosciate, De statutis, lib. IV, 20, no. 4; see also Bartolus in his lecture on D. 48, 5, 22, no. 2, and Baldus, Consilia, IIII, 9, no. 3.
[p. 146] Thus Lucas's view of crime is subjectively orientated. The lawful or unlawful character of the external act is not a sufficient basis upon which to estimate its criminal character. The decisive element is the individual's intention. This is certainly a very advanced view of the Schuldprinzip.1 ...
1 It is interesting to note that modern German penal science, before it became the instrument of politics, arrived at very similar conceptions through the theory of the subjektiven Unrechtselemente. See Mezger, Strafrecht, 2nd ed., p. 170: 'Aeusserlich gleiches Tun kann das eine Mal seinem Tun verknüpft, je nach der seelischen Lage oder Einstellung, in der er die Handlung vollzieht'. The German, however, thought that this recognition is a very modern acquisition, see Mezger, loc. cit., p. 168: this theory 'gehört erst der neuesten Zeit an. Die ersten Anregungen hat H.A. Fischer (1911) gegeben.' See also infra, p. 155."
URMSON, J.O., "Motive and Causes" in Alan R. White, ed., The Philosophy of Action, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, [4], 172 p. at pp. 153-165 (series; Oxford Readings in Philosophy); copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT, BD 450 .W49; previously published in (1952) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 26, suppl. 1 at pp. 179-194;
WALTERS, Mark, "Hate crimes in Australia: Introducing punishment enhancers", (August 2005) 29(4) Criminal Law Journal 201-216;
WASIK, Martin, "Mens Rea, Motive and the Problem of 'Dishonesty' in the Law of Theft", [1979] Criminal Law Review 543-557;
WEBER, Helmut, "Emotional Excesses as Elements of Law", Paper delivered on 10 December 1999 at the Centre for British Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin Conference: "Representations of Emotional Excess“, Humboldt-Universiutät Zu Berlin, Centre for British Studies, Großbritannien-Zentrum, Working Paper sereies; available at http://www2.hu-berlin.de/gbz/downloads/pdf/WPS_Weber_Emotional.pdf (accessed on 20 May 2006);
"Criminal Law: Homicide
Let us begin with the most drastic example, homicide. In German criminal law, the intentional killing of another person is called Totschlag and, according to § 212 of the criminal code, is to be punished with a prison sentence of, depending on the circumstances, five years up to life imprisonment. There is, however, another section of the criminal code dealing with forms of intentional homicide under the heading of Mord, which carries a mandatory life sentence. What distinguishes Mord from Totschlag? § 211 of the criminal code lists a number of additional criteria for Mord. Some of these criteria refer to the way the crime was committed: for example by cruel means or in a way dangerous to public safety. Other criteria relate to motivation, like killing in order to commit some other crime, killing out of avarice or, as it is worded in the criminal code, "sonst aus niedrigen Beweggründen", which might be translated as "for other base motives."
a) Jealousy as Aggravating Factor
In an important decision in 1952, the German Federal Appeal Court, the Bundesgerichtshof, ruled that jealousy can be such a base motive. The facts of the case were that a man loved a woman, but the woman did not love the man. He planned to kill her, and eventually did so, because he loved her too much, viz, "weil wenn er sie nicht haben könne, sie auch kein anderer haben solle" ("[...] if he could not have her, no other man should have her)."12 Thus, in the given circumstances love, an excess of selfish love, amounted in the circumstances to an aggravating factor, leading to a Mord verdict.
12. BGHSt 3, 180, 183 (Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen = Federal Appeal Court Decisions, Criminal Cases, vol 3, p. 183)."
WESTERMARCK, Edward, 1862-1939, The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, 2nd ed., London: Macmillam, 1912-1917, 2 volumes, see volume 1, Chapter XI, "Motives" at pp. 283-302; this book has been translated in French /ce livre a été traduit en français: L'origine et le développement des idées morales, Paris, Payot, 1928, 2 volumes;
"The will acts under a variety of motives, some very complex. The motive varies with the man, what is strong with one being weak with another. The gratification of passion is a responsible motive; and so also is the general intent to violate the law, fall the consequences on whom they may. And the law is, that no matter what may be the motives leading to a particular act, if the act be illegal, it is indictable, notwitstanding that some or more of these motives may be meritorious. Thus the motive of promoting ultimate public good is no defence to an indictment for nuisance; intending to instruct the public is no defence to an indictment for libel; the motive of returning the goods is no defence to an indictment for embezzlement, or for larceny, nor is the motive of giving away the goods to another; scientific enthusiasm is no defence to an indictment for disinterring a corpse; the motive of notifying of a fire is no defence to an indictment for arson; the motive of ridding the community of a bad man is no defence to an indictment for homicide; the motive of paying a debt with the proceeds is no defence to forgery. No matter what other motives, good or bad, coöperated [sic], if the intent to do the particular unlawful act is either proved or implied, the offence, if committed, is complete. If the law were otherwise, there would be few convictions of crime, for there are few crimes in which extraneous motives are not mixed with the particular evil motive." (vol. 1, § 119, pp. 146-147; notes omitted)
WHEELER, Stanton, "The Problem of White-Collar Crime Motivation", in Kip Schlegel and David Weisburd, eds., White Collar Crime Reconsidered, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992, xv, 384 p., at pp. 108-123, ISBN: 1555531415; notes; "Papers originally presented at a conference held at Indiana University in May 1990"; copy at Ottawa University, MRT General: HV 6769 .W485 1992; for the table of contents, see the Catalogue of Columbia University, PEGASUS, at http://pegasus.law.columbia.edu/;
WILLIAMS, Glanville, 1911-, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed., London: Stevens, 1961, liv, 929 p., see "Intention and motive" at pp. 48-50 and "Good motive" at pp. 748-750;
"The word 'motive' has two related meanings. (1) It sometimes refers to the emotion prompting an act, e.g., 'D killed P, his wife's lover, from a motive of jealousy.' (2) It sometimes means a kind of intention, e.g., 'D killed P with the motive (intention, desire) of stopping him from paying attentions to D's wife.'
In the second sense, which is the one in which the term is used in criminal law, motive is ulterior intention--the intention with which an intentional act is done (or, more clearly, the intention with which an intentional consequence is brought about). Intention, when distinguished from motive, relates to the means, motive to the end; yet the end may be the means to another end, and the word 'intention' is appropriate to such medial end. ... In criminal law, it is generally convenient to use the term 'intention' with reference to intention as to the constituents of the actus reus, and the term 'motive' with reference to the intention with which those constituents were brought about.
The definition of some crimes involves an intention to commit another crime." (p. 48)
WOLFGANG, Marvin E., 1924-, Patterns in Criminal Homicide, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958, xiv, 413 p., see "Motives" at pp. 185-199; reprint in: Montclair, N.J. : Patterson Smith, 1975, (series; Patterson Smith series in criminology, law enforcement, and social problems; publication no. 211), ISBN: 0875852114; notes: An Analysis of all criminal homicides listed by police in Philadelphia between Jan. 1, 1948, and Dec. 31, 1952; copy at University of Ottawa, HV 6534 .P5W6 1975 MRT;
YOTOPOULOS-MARANGOPOULOS, Alice, Les mobiles du délit: Étude de Criminologie et de Droit Pénal, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1973, xvi, 350 p. (Collection; Bibliothèque de sciences criminelles, sous la direction de G. Stefani et G. Levasseur, Professeurs à la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Économiques de Paris; tome XVII); copie à la bubliothèque de droit de l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX Général, KJV 7972.3 .B52 V.17 1973; contribution majeure au sujet;
"[...] les mobiles coïncident en partie, c'est-à-dire en tant que contenu de la représentation, avec le but final, lorsqu'ils sont conscients, mais ils diffèrent toujours du but par rapport à la charge affective, laquelle caractérise exclusivement les mobiles. C'est que les mobiles conscients sont des phénomènes se rapportant à la sphère affective (c'est le cas de tous les mobiles); toutefois ils comportent un important élément noétique [intellectuel] (dont sont privés les mobiles inconscients), élément qu'ils ont en commun avec le but final" (p. 25)"
"[...] le point de départ de toute activité criminelle est un état de tension dû à une frustation. Il en résulte chez l'agent un besoin de remédier à cette situation, d'opérer le changement de cet état désagréable en un état agréable; c'est ainsi que naît le mobile." (p. 29)
"Une fois le mobile apparu, il sera suivi, dans le psychisme de l'auteur, d'élaborations ultérieures : tout d'abord, le changement visé (but final) sera déterminé avec exactitude; ensuite, il s'agira de préciser l'acte par lequel ce changement sera opéré; enfin, il ne restera plus au coupable qu'à vouloir ou à admettre cet acte qu'il considère désormais comme nécessaire (dol)." (p. 30)
ZAILBERT, Leo, "Punishment and Revenge", (2006) 25 Law and Philosophy 81-118;