Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/774/838/10673/
Timestamp: 2020-07-09 03:13:34
Document Index: 305462700

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 241', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1341', '§ 2', '§ 241', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', 'art.4']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Edward Howard and Thomas Cusack, Defendants-appellants, 774 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Edward Howard and Thomas Cusack, Defendants-appellants, 774 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1985)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 774 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1985) Argued April 24, 1985. Decided Oct. 9, 1985. Rehearing Denied Nov. 8, 1985 in No. 84-2668
The defendants were charged in a thirty-three count indictment with offenses including conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 371 (1982), voting more than once in an election held in part for the purpose of electing a member of the United States House of Representatives in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e) (1982), giving false information to establish eligibility to vote in such an election in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1982), committing mail fraud in connection with the mailing of absentee ballots in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), and aiding and abetting others in the commission of these offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Cusack was charged along with Howard in all of the counts except those relating to mail fraud and to false registration and voting by two particular individuals, Jerome and William Sufranski. Howard was ultimately convicted on twenty-three counts of the indictment after the jury returned guilty verdicts on all but the eight mail fraud counts and the judge directed a verdict of acquittal on two other counts. Cusack, on the other hand, was convicted pursuant to jury verdicts of guilty on fourteen counts of the indictment, but acquitted pursuant to not guilty verdicts on seven other counts. Howard was sentenced to five years probation, with the first nine months to be served in a work-release program. Cusack was also sentenced to five years probation, but with the first six months to be served in a work-release program.
The most serious defects alleged by the defendants relate to counts one and two of the indictment, the conspiracy counts. The defendants initially contend that count one, which charges a conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of qualified voters, is defective because it alleges in part a violation of a right that the defendants claim is not recognized by the United States Constitution: the right to vote in state and local elections free from vote fraud by persons acting under color of state law. The defendants further argue that both counts one and two are invalid because each is based on a general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 371 respectively, that they characterize as pre-empted by the more specific prohibitions concerning vote fraud embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1973. We need not discuss these arguments here, however, because this court recently rejected such arguments under essentially identical circumstances in United States v. Olinger, 759 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1985). The defendants have not suggested any basis for distinguishing Olinger, nor can we discern any. That decision accordingly controls our disposition here.
The defendant Howard's additional challenges to the indictment require only brief discussion. The summary assertion that various counts of the indictment are multiplicitous is plainly without merit, since each count, although related to the other counts, charges a separate offense requiring proof of a fact that the other counts do not. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S. Ct. 1345, 63 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1980). Howard's technical objections to count three of the indictment likewise do not state sufficient grounds for reversal of his conviction on this count. Howard points out for the first time on appeal that count three charges the defendants with voting "approximately twenty-two ballots as described in paragraphs 18 through 24 of Count One," although count one actually contains only twenty-three paragraphs and lists fewer than twenty-two ballots as having been voted. In light of Howard's failure to raise this objection below, his conviction must be affirmed unless the count "is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted." United States v. Watkins, 709 F.2d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Knippenberg, 502 F.2d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1974)). Even assuming that count three is defective in some sense, it is clearly not so defective as to require reversal under this standard.
Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on various specific counts of the indictment. In mounting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendants bear a "heavy burden," United States v. Garcia, 562 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1977), for we may sustain such a challenge only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no rational juror could have found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Touloumis, 771 F.2d 235, 238 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084, 1087 (7th Cir. 1983). After reviewing the extensive record developed over the course of the defendants' ten-day trial, we find the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdicts as to all of the counts on which the defendants were convicted, and find the defendants' arguments to the contrary to be without merit.
Cusack also contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he violated 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c), which in pertinent part prohibits a person from:
knowingly or wilfully giv [ing] false information as to his ... address ... for the purpose of establishing his eligibility to register or vote.... Provided, however, that this provision shall be applicable only to general, special, or primary elections held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any candidate for the office of ... Member of the United States House of Representatives....
Despite its superficial appeal, Cusack's argument is ultimately unconvincing. First, while expressly limiting its applicability to elections that at least in part involve a contest for federal office, the language of section 1973i(c) does not require the government to prove that the prohibited conduct had an actual or potential impact on the result of the federal contest. In fact, Cusack's conduct falls squarely within the express terms of the statute. See United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir. 1975) (evidence that defendant knowingly completed ballot application using address at which he no longer lived in order to qualify to vote in one precinct when he actually lived in another precinct established section 1973i(c) violation). Second, the legislative history of the section, which was passed as part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, evinces a congressional purpose "of providing a statute with 'extraordinary scope and sweep' with which to stop illegal voting practices." United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585, 617 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See United States v. Malmay, 671 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1982) (reviewing legislative history); United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. at 613-18 (same).
In accordance with this congressional intent, courts have applied section 1973i(c) very broadly to any conduct that might tend to corrupt the federal aspect of an election, rejecting various attempts to limit the statute's scope. For example, this court in United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1972), upheld the defendants' convictions for paying persons to register as voters in violation of the section's prohibitions on vote-buying despite the defendants' objection that the pertinent registrations applied to all elections in Illinois, rather than solely to federal elections. Several other courts have held that the section extends to a scheme to buy votes in a joint state/federal election even when the intended and likely effect of the scheme is limited solely to state or local candidates on the ballot. See United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 943 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Mason, 673 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Malmay, 671 F.2d at 875. Finally, a federal district court has held that the section prohibits false voter registrations even when they were not made during a federal election year. United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. at 616.2 In line with these authorities, we hold that the evidence of Cusack's use of a false address to register for and vote in an election in which a federal contest was on the ballot was sufficient to establish a violation of section 1973i(c) regardless of whether he would have been qualified to vote in that contest if he had properly registered and voted using his actual address.3
As a number of courts have held in affirming the admission of summary charts in tax-evasion cases, the decision of whether to admit such summary charts is within the trial court's discretion, and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 735 F.2d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Keltner, 675 F.2d 602, 605-06 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832, 103 S. Ct. 71, 74 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1982). We find no abuse in this case. The chart accurately reflected the evidence that was introduced at trial. Indeed, when the evidence failed to disclose the identity of the person who forged the application, the chart so stated. The defendants' strongest objection to the chart relates to the color-coding, which the defendants argue impermissibly suggested their guilt in connection with any ballot application that was forged with the name of a voter who resided on one of the streets that they were responsible for canvassing. The defendants' trial counsel, however, expressly stated to the court below that they had no objection to the color-coding of the chart. In this situation, we find no reversible error in the admission of the summary chart.4
Both defendants also object to, and claim prejudice from, the government's cross-examination of Howard concerning false statements that he made on two employment applications in 1974 and 1975. Howard had answered "no" to a question on each of these applications asking whether he had ever before been convicted or fined, imprisoned, or placed on probation, excluding minor traffic violations. In fact, as the government informed the judge at a conference prior to cross-examination, Howard had three prior convictions. The judge ruled that the government could ask Howard whether he had lied on the employment applications for impeachment purposes under Rule 608(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,5 but held the convictions themselves inadmissible. Accordingly, the judge strongly and repeatedly cautioned the government against alluding to the convictions themselves in the course of its cross-examination. When asked on cross-examination whether he had lied on the applications, Howard stated that he had not, explaining that he had been told that the applications did not require him to mention anything that had occurred ten years earlier. Howard did not elaborate on what had occurred ten years prior to his filling out the applications and, pursuant to the court's instructions, the prosecutor did not in any way reveal Howard's prior convictions to the jury.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing this cross-examination under Rule 608(b) (1). Howard placed his credibility in issue when he chose to testify. United States v. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847, 856 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 211, 83 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1984). Rule 608(b) (1) authorizes the impeachment of a witness with prior conduct that is probative of his truthfulness or untruthfulness, id., and Howard's honesty or lack thereof on the employment applications was plainly probative in this sense. Moreover, the trial judge allowed no extrinsic evidence of the prior convictions to be introduced notwithstanding Howard's responses on cross-examination, see United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 864, 872-73 (7th Cir. 1984), and meticulously and effectively admonished the prosecutor so as to limit any potential prejudice to the defendants from the questioning. We thus find no error in allowing this cross-examination.
The court below held Espina's statements admissible under Rule 804(b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,6 the residual exception to the hearsay rule. Recognizing "that in applying this exception the district court has a considerable measure of discretion," Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1979), we affirm the district court's ruling. First, and most importantly, the statements possess the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" required for admission under the Rule. See United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016, 103 S. Ct. 375, 74 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1982). The statements were made by a seemingly disinterested witness under circumstances that created no apparent motive to lie. See id.; Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d at 292. In fact, Espina spontaneously volunteered at the very beginning of the interview with the F.B.I. agent that Howard had placed the name-tag on the door after the agent asked him simply whether he knew a family by the name of Sufranski. The event described in the statements--Howard's act of placing the tag on the door--was directly observed by Espina, and was not so complex as to raise any serious questions concerning Espina's ability to perceive, remember, or recount it. Moreover, Espina made essentially the same statement not only once, but twice, and the latter time before both a person who identified himself as a private detective and a court reporter who transcribed the interview. While these statements, unlike those we held admissible in Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 588, were not made under oath, we conclude that the other circumstances in this case render them equally reliable.
The statements also satisfy the materiality requirement of the Rule, since they are clearly relevant in showing Howard's connection to the Sufranskis' acts of false registration and voting. Further, despite Howard's speculation that the government might have turned up additional evidence by examining the name-tag itself for Howard's fingerprints or handwriting, we find that Espina's statements were "more probative on the point for which [they were] offered than any other evidence which the proponent [could] procure through reasonable efforts," as the Rule requires. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b) (5). As we noted in Boulahanis, the Rule "does not require that hearsay evidence be essential in order that it be admissible," but instead " [i]t is enough that it is the most probative evidence reasonably available on a material issue in the case." 677 F.2d at 589. Regardless of whether the government could or could not procure fingerprints or other evidence from the tag itself, Espina's statements constituted the only available direct proof that Howard placed the tag on the door. Finally, in light of the factors discussed above, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the general interests of justice were best served by the admission of the statements. See Huff, 609 F.2d at 295.
The statements likewise meet the requirements for admission under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2538-39, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 589. The government obviously demonstrated the unavailability of Espina as a witness, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S. Ct. at 2538, and further made a strong "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" concerning the statements, id. at 66. In sum, after considering Espina's statements in the context in which they were made, "we are satisfied that there are present in this case sufficient badges of trustworthiness to meet the tests of Rule 804(b) (5) and of the Sixth Amendment." United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S. Ct. 2124, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1303 (1983).
As this court has consistently emphasized, " [s]ince an appellate court must give great deference to the trial judge who saw and heard the evidence, we will reverse a determination by a trial judge that the probative value of the proffered evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact only for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Touloumis, 771 F.2d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1985). See, e.g., Crawford v. Edmonson, 764 F.2d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pizarro, 756 F.2d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Medina, 755 F.2d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir. 1985). The trial record reveals that the court below carefully considered both the probative value and the potential for prejudice inherent in the conversations. The court ultimately found that the jury could reasonably conclude from these conversations that Howard was telling Watson to remain silent in order to protect himself, a conclusion that would of course be probative in this case. In light of the many nuances and levels of meaning contained in a telephone conversation, we cannot conclude that the conversations between Howard and Watson were not probative in this sense. Although the issue is sufficiently close that the court in its discretion might have decided to exclude the tapes because of their potential for prejudice, see United States v. Barletta, 652 F.2d 218, 220 (1st Cir. 1981), we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit them.
The Supreme Court issued a stern warning against these kinds of inflammatory arguments in a case decided just last term, United States v. Young, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). In Young, the Court stressed the duty of both prosecutors and defense counsel to refrain from, among other things, engaging in personal attacks on opposing counsel. Id. at 1042-44. The Court also clarified that a prosecutor is not given license to make otherwise improper arguments merely because defense counsel provoked such a response. Id. at 1044-45. The preferred practice is instead for the prosecutor to "object [ ] to the defense counsel's improper statements with a request that the court give a timely warning and curative instruction to the jury." Id. at 1045. The Court likewise noted the trial judge's independent "responsibility to maintain decorum in keeping with the nature of the proceeding," id. at 1044, and explained that the judge in some cases might act sua sponte by convening a bench conference after the conclusion of an argument, or even by interrupting an argument and admonishing counsel under certain circumstances, id. at 1045-46.
A recognition that the prosecution committed error in addressing the jury, and that this error would not be excused by defense counsel's prior misconduct, nevertheless would not mandate reversal of the defendants' convictions. In evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this court has consistently employed "the well-settled standard of review that we are to consider the prosecutor's conduct not in isolation, but in the context of the trial as a whole, to determine if such conduct was 'so inflammatory and prejudicial to the defendant ... as to deprive him of a fair trial.' " United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 809 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965, 104 S. Ct. 403, 78 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1983)). See, e.g., United States v. Touloumis, 771 F.2d 235, 243 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Carter, 720 F.2d 941, 950 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Reagan, 694 F.2d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 1982). Applying this standard,8 we conclude that the statements by the prosecution during closing arguments did not deny the defendants a fair trial in the context of this case.
First, notwithstanding its conclusion that improper prosecutorial arguments are not justified by the fact that they were made in response to similarly inappropriate arguments by defense counsel, the Court in Young did recognize the relevance of defense counsel's conduct in assessing the likely prejudice resulting from improper comments by the prosecutor. 105 S. Ct. at 1045. Noting its prior decision in Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S. Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1958), which pointed to the fact that the prosecutorial comments at issue were invited by defense counsel in concluding that the comments did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, the Court in Young explained:
105 S. Ct. at 1045. Prior decisions of this court have also consistently recognized the significance of whether a particular prosecutorial remark was invited by defense counsel in assessing that remark on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 876 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 688-89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1139, 102 S. Ct. 2972, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1359 (1982). When thus considered in light of defense counsel's prior statements, comments by the prosecutors in this case such as that quoted above did not render the defendants' trial fundamentally unfair. Cf. United States v. West, 670 F.2d at 689 (similar government response placing weight and prestige of United States Attorney's Office behind its case not reversible error because it was "invited and within the bounds of proper argument").
Second, the trial judge mitigated the impact of any improper prosecutorial arguments in this case, whether or not provoked by defense counsel, by repeatedly cautioning the jury both during the arguments themselves and in the final jury instructions to consider the attorneys' statements in closing arguments only to the extent that they were supported by the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d at 811; United States v. Reagan, 694 F.2d at 1080; United States v. Allain, 671 F.2d 248, 253 (7th Cir. 1982). The judge also sustained a defense objection and instructed the jury to disregard one of the prosecutorial remarks that the defendants most vigorously object to on appeal: the statement that the jury should "show" the defendants "that this is one vote count they can't rig, one jury they can't fix, one set of laws they can't bend." Given the trial judge's admonitions, we do not believe that the prosecution's closing arguments in this case so distracted the jury from its proper task as to prejudice the defendants.
With regard to the unique obligations of the prosecution, see Young, 105 S. Ct. at 1043 n. 6, we have often warned in the past, and reiterate here: "Failure of Government counsel to observe proper standards in their closing arguments has resulted, all too frequently, in this court's devoting substantial time to reviewing the record to determine the probable effect of the improper argument. It may well in some case result in a reversal which could have been avoided by adherence to proper standards." United States v. Falk, 605 F.2d 1005, 1013 n. 13 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903, 100 S. Ct. 1079, 63 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1980). See United States v. Carter, 720 F.2d 951 n. 10; United States v. Allain, 671 F.2d at 254; United States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 96, 50 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1976). We expect that in the future the government will avoid such problems as occurred in this case by responding to improper comments by defense counsel with a prompt objection addressed to the trial judge, rather than with similar inappropriate arguments addressed to the jury.III.
The court in Cianciulli reached this result by concluding that the language of section 1973i(c) limiting its applicability to federal elections does not govern voter registration, but rather governs only the actual voting process. 482 F. Supp. at 616. We need not embrace this interpretation in the present case, however, since Cusack's registration occurred in an election year and was connected to the partially federal election in November
The Supreme Court's decision in Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 14 S. Ct. 924, 38 L. Ed. 725 (1894), relied upon heavily by Cusack, does not mandate a different result. The Court in Blitz held that, under an earlier vote fraud statute that was similar but not identical to section 1973i(c), a defendant could not be convicted of falsely voting in the name of another person where the indictment failed to allege that he actually voted for a federal candidate in the joint federal/state election at issue. Id. at 315, 14 S. Ct. at 927
The defendants argue that the chart was inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 1006, which allows the admission of charts summarizing the contents of "voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot conveniently be examined in court." Regardless of whether the chart fell within the precise confines of this Rule, the trial court nevertheless had discretion to permit the government to use it as a "pedagogical device [ ] to summarize or organize testimony or documents which have themselves been admitted in evidence." 5 Weinstein's Evidence p 1006, at 1006-15 (1983). We note, however, that when a trial court authorizes the use of such charts as a teaching device rather than as substantive evidence under Rule 1006, the preferred practice would be for the court to give a limiting instruction regarding this purpose. Id. at 1006-15 to 1006-16. Accord United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 563-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946, 99 S. Ct. 2168, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1979)
Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) (1).
Fed.R.Evid. 804(b) (5).
We note that a number of the prosecutors' remarks that the defendants object to on appeal--including the remarks quoted in the text above--are subject to review only for "plain error" in light of defense counsel's failure to object to these comments at trial. United States v. Young, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1046 (1985); United States v. Carter, 720 F.2d 941, 950 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 688 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1139, 102 S. Ct. 2972, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1359 (1982); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). As the Supreme Court stressed in holding that a prosecutor's improper closing argument did not constitute plain error in Young, the plain error doctrine applies only to the most egregious and prejudicial of errors. 105 S. Ct. at 1046-47. Since we hold that the prosecutors' comments in this case did not in any event deny the defendants a fair trial, we will not divide the comments for purposes of our analysis according to whether they are reviewable under a normal or plain error standard