Source: https://pt.b-ok.org/book/902093/1411e3
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 12:34:25
Document Index: 549477580

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 4', 'art 5', 'art 3', 'art 3']

Architect's Legal Handbook, Eighth Edition | Anthony Speaight | download
Principal Architect's Legal Handbook, Eighth Edition
The Architect's Legal Handbook is the established leading textbook on law for architectural students and most widely used reference on the law for architects in practice.This eighth edition includes all the latest developments in the law that effect an architect's work. A key addition is a greatly expanded section on adjudication - a topic that has become hugely important in the last few years. The book also builds on the comprehensive coverage of all UK law, with editors for Scotland and Northern Ireland expanding their sections. *The most important legal book for student and professional architects.*Newly expanded chapter on Adjudication, reflecting recent developments.*Comprehensive update of all topics provide the reader with an essential reference.
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Magdalena Nowicka, Maria Rovisco
Gregory Stone QC (Consultant Editor)
First published 1973 by the Architectural Press Ltd
Copyright © 2004, Elsevier Ltd.
Except Chapter 23 © Sir Desmond Heap. All rights reserved.
ISBN 0 7506 6130 5
Visit our website at www.architecturalpress.com
4 The legal systems of the United Kingdom
Alaxander Hickey
8 Exclusion clauses, UCTA, and the Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999
8 Inducing breach of contract/wrongful inference
2 The extent and meaning of ‘land’ and instrusions upon it
8 Business tenancies – architects’ offices
1 Law and Scotland
3 Courts and the legal profession
4 Branches of the law
Angus Stewart QC
2 Title to heritage and title conditions
3 Other restrictions on heritable property
4 Sale of land and buildings
7 Introduction to Northern Ireland’s legal system
Jonathan L. Dunlop and Brian Sherrad
2 Northern Ireland’s constitutional history
3 The courts and the judiciary
7 Contract law in Northern Ireland
8 Law of tort in Northern Ireland
9 Northern Ireland land law
The law of building contracts
8 Introduction to building contracts
1 The nature of building contracts
2 History of the Joint Contracts Tribunal
3 The JCT family of forms
4 Building contracts in Scotland
5 Building contracts in Northern Ireland
9 The JCT Standard Form of Building Contract,
Part 1 Conditions: General
2 Clause 1: Interpretation, definitions, etc.
3 Clause 2: Contractor’s obligations
4 Clause 3: Contract sum – additions or deductions –
adjustment – interim certificates
5 Clause 4: Architect’s/contract administrator’s instructions
6 Clause 5: Contract documents – other documents –
7 Clause 6: Statutory obligations, notices, fees and charges
8 Clause 6A: Provisions for use where the Appendix
states that all the CDM Regulations apply
9 Clause 7: Levels and setting out of the works
10 Clause 8: Work, materials and goods
11 Clause 9: Royalties and patent rights
12 Clause 10: Person-in-charge
13 Clause 11: Access for architect to the works
14 Clause 12: Clerk of works
15 Clause 13: Variations and provisional sums
16 Clause 13a: Variation instruction – contractor’s
quotation in compliance with the instruction
Clause 16: Materials and goods unfixed or off-site
Clause 20: Injury to persons and property and
indemnity to employer
Clause 21: Insurance against injury to person or property
Clause 22 to 22FC: Insurance of the works
Clause 23: Date of possession, completion and
Clause 24: Damages for non-completion
Clause 25: Extension of time
Clause 26: Loss and expense caused by matters
materially affecting regular progress of the works
Clause 27: Determination by employer
Clause 28: Determination by contractor
Clause 28A: Determination by employer or contractor
Clause 29: Works by employer or person employed
or engaged by the employer
Clause 30: Certificates and payments
Clause 31: ICTA 1988 – statutory tax deduction
Clause 34: Antiquities
Part 2 Conditions: Nominated sub-contractors and
Clause 35: Nominated sub-contractors
Clause 36: Nominated suppliers
Part 3 Conditions: Fluctuations
Clauses 37 to 40
Part 4 Conditions: Settlement of disputes –
adjudication – arbitration – litigation
Clauses 41A, 41B, 41C
Part 5 Conditions: Performance specified work
10 Other standard forms of building contract
2 JCT documents for entering into nominated sub-contracts
3 The Nominated Sub-Contract Conditions (NSC/C
1998 edition)
4 JCT Standard Form of Domestic Sub-Contract
2002 (DSC)
5 JCT Intermediate Form of Building Contract (IFC 98)
6 JCT Minor Works Agreement 1998 (MW 98)
7 JCT Building Contract for a Homeowner/Occupier 2002
a Jobbing Character (JA/C 90)
9 JCT Standard Form of Measured Term Contract 1998
10 JCT Standard Form of Building Contract with
Contractor’s Design 1998 (CD 98)
11 JCT 98 Contractor’s Designed Portion
Supplement 1998 (CDPS 98)
12 JCT Major Project form 2003 (MPF)
13 JCT Standard Form of Management Contract 998
edition (MC 98)
15 ACA Form of Building Agreement 1982
(third edition 1998)
16 The NEC Engineering and Construction Contract
11 Contractor and sub-contractor collateral warranties
3 Why have collateral warranties become so important?
4 Who needs the benefit of collateral warranties
5 Who should provide collateral warranties?
6 Standard forms of collateral warranty
7 Key clauses of the JCT Standard Forms of
Main Contractor Warranty
8 Key Clauses of Third Party Rights schedule in JCT
Major Project Form 2003 edition
12 Payment rules
To which Contracts does the Act apply?
Contracts excluded from the payment provisions
The payment provisions in detail
The right to suspend performance for non-payment
‘Pay when paid’ clause
4 Litigation in Northern Ireland
compared to litigation in court
9 Who decides if the tribunal has jurisdiction?
10 The composition of the arbitration tribune
12 The qualification of arbitrators
19 Definition of the issues
26 Arbitration procedures found in construction
27 The role of the courts in arbitrate proceedings
28 Powers to enforce the arbitration agreement –
‘staying’ of court proceedings in favour of arbitration
15 Adjudication
Andrew Bartlett QC and Kim Franklin
1 The nature of adjudication
3 Compliance with section 108
4 Existence of dispute
5 Notice of adjudication
6 Adjudicator’s powers and duties
Adjudicators immunity
Effect of adjudicator’s decision
Adjudicator’s powers and duties
Enforcement of adjudicator’s decisions
Challenging the adjudicator’s decision or jurisdiction
Effect of defences and cross-claims not considered
Where adjudicator’s decision final
Practical importance of jurisdictional issues
Initial jurisdiction: the 10 conditions
Straying from the confines of the dispute
Unreasonableness or bad faith
17 Building dispute resolution in Scotland
18 Building dispute resolution in Northern Ireland
Brian Speers and Ferguson Bell
3 Other forms of dispute resolution
Statutory framework and regulation
19 Statutory authorities in England and Wales
20 Statutory authorities in Scotland
21 Construction Legislation in England Wales
1 Building Acts and Regulators
3 Control of building work other than by the
4 Exemptions form control
5 Other controls under the Building Act
22 Construction regulations in Scotland
2 Building (Scotland) Acts 1959 and 1970
3 Building Standards (Scotland) Regulations
and subsequent amendments 1993–2002
4 Other national legislation affecting building
23 Planning law in England and Wales
2 Local planning authorities; or who is to deal
with planning applications?
3 The meaning of development
6 Urban Development Corporations; enterprise zones;
24 Planning law in Scotland
7 Enterprise zones and simplified planning zones
25 Planning law in Northern Ireland
2 Who is to deal with planning applications?
26 Party walls
27 European Union law affecting architects
His Honour Judge Andrew Geddes and Clare Potter
4 Technical harmonization and standards
5 Right of establishment and freedom to provide
services – the Architects Directive 85/384 EEC
6 The product Liability Directive 85/374 IEEC and
7 Safety and health at work
28 Health and safety law affecting architects
4 Summary and practical considerations
5 Health and safety law in Scotland
6 Health and safety law in Northern Ireland
29 Legal organization of architects’ offices
5 Standard Forms of Agreement for the Appointment
Kim Franklin and Rachel Toulson
2 Liability for breach of contract
3 Liability for the tort of negligence
4 Liability in contract and in tort compared and contrasted
5 Statutory liability
6 Measure of damages
7 When liability is barred by lapse of time
8 Liability in Scots law
Clive Thorne and Amanda Telfer
1 The basic rules of copyright
2 Protection under the Copyright,
Exceptions from infringement of architects’ copyright
Law of copyright in Scotland
Law of copyright in Northern Ireland
1 Sources and institutions
2 The contract of employment
3 Equal Opportunities
5 Collective labour relations law
7 Employment law in Scotland
2 Conflicts of laws
3 FIDIC (Federation Internationale des
Ingenieurs Conseils)
2 ARB Code of Conduct and Practice
3 The RIBA Code of Professional Conduct
4 Statement of Professional Conduct of the Royal
Incorporation of Architects in Scotland (RIAS)
5 Statement on Professional Conduct of the
The aim of this book remains to provide within the compass of a single volume a statement of the law relevant to an architect in practice.
particular field. Our authors come from a range of backgrounds –
judges, barristers, solicitors, architects, and building control officers.
Many contributors carry on responsibility for a chapter from edition
to edition. A few, though, are on the occasion of each new edition
unable to continue, sometimes for the most illustrious of reasons.
For this 8th edition we welcome several new lawyer and architect
authors: Christopher Miers RIBA, chairman of the Society of
Construction Law; Oliver Palmer FRIBA, who was responsible for
recasting the Building Regulations; Ruth Downing, a barrister
expert in employment law; James Leabeater, barrister; Melanie
Willems, of the international law firm Lovells; and Sarah Lupton
RIBA, of the University of Wales.
The book covers the law of the whole of the United Kingdom. In space
terms the law of England and Wales occupies pride of place. But Scots
law is also covered in respect of the many areas of law where it is
different. In addition Northern Ireland’s law is also explained in areas
where it diverges from English law. Some fields of law, such as EU
law, are common for the whole of the United Kingdom.
I am grateful to Angus Stewart QC, of the Scots Bar, who has advised
me as to Scottish authors, and to Sir Richard McLaughlin, now a
High Court judge in Northern Ireland, who marshalled the team of
authors from Northern Ireland.
Although the pace of change of substantive law has slightly slowed,
the years since the last edition have seen a complete revolution in
the manner in which disputes are resolved. Formerly if someone
wanted to make a claim against another person he went to court or,
if there was an arbitration agreement, the dispute was arbitrated.
The pace was measured, the emphasis on ensuring that each side
had a fair chance to put its case. Today a number of quite new
procedures have to be considered. The first step is to serve requisite
pieces of paper, of which a prime example is the withholding notice
required for some purposes by the Housing Grants Construction
and Regeneration Act. Next might come the whirlwind process of a
28-day adjudication. A party dissatisfied with the adjudicator’s
decision may then refuse to pay and fight the enforcement process
in the Technology and Construction Court. Whether enforced or
not, the adjudication decision is of only ‘temporary finality’ and the
whole issue can be refought in litigation or arbitration. But by now,
if not before, the parties will probably try to reach a mutually
acceptable outcome by mediation. The importance of all these procedures is such that there is now a distinct section of the book
devoted to them – Part 3: Dispute Resolution. This contains a full
chapter devoted to adjudication with its rapidly growing case-law.
There is a completely new chapter on mediation. There are also new
chapters on dispute resolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
This book is not intended to turn architects into fully fledged legal
advisers. What we hope is that it will identify for architects the
legal issues affecting their work, and alert them to the circumstances in which legal advice is necessary. Unrealistic as many of
judges expect architects either to know a good deal of law themselves, or else regularly to call on legal advice. In Robert Morgan v
The Court of Appeal said he would have been ‘fireproof’ if he had
4 Pump Court, Temple
Building Employer’s Confederation
Extracts from the JCT documentation are reproduced by kind permission of the copyrights owners, The Joint Contracts Tribunal
Law at Oxford Brookes University for compiling the Bibliography,
and Ben Hughes, barrister for compiling the Table of Statutes and
Statutory Instruments, and the Table of Cases.
Information provided in this document its provided ‘as is’ without
warranty of any kind, either express or implied. Every effort has
been made to ensure accuracy and conformance to standards
accepted at the time of publication. The reader is advised to
Anthony Speaight, QC – Barrister, of 4 Pump Court, Temple,
London. Bencher of Middle Temple. Co-author of The Law of
Defective Premises. Co-editor of Butterworths Professional
Negligence Service. Past member of the Council of the Society of
Construction Law. Chairman of the Editorial Board of Counsel,
journal of the Bar of England and Wales (1990–4). Chairman of the
Bar Council’s Access to the Bar Committee. Specialises in construction contract and professional negligence work.
Gregory Stone, QC – Barrister, of 4–5 Gray’s Inn Square, Gray’s
Inn; co-author of The Law of Defective Premises; contributor of
articles on legal topics to the Architect’s Journal; educated in
England and France; did postgraduate work in Economics, and
worked as Chief Economist to a merchant bank before coming to
the Bar; now specializes in planning, administrative and local
Contributors – England & Wales
Muhammed Haque (BA Oxon) – Graduated in Engineering
Science before being called to the Bar. He practises from Crown
Office Chambers, 2 Crown Office Row, London and specializes in
construction litigation, including the professional negligence of
architects, engineers and surveyors. He is an Editor of Emden’s
Andrew Bartlett, QC, Chartered Arbitrator – practises from
Crown Office Chambers at 1 Paper Buildings, London both as
counsel and as arbitrator in professional negligence, construction
and insurance. He is the General Editor of Emden’s Construction
Law and author of numerous articles in legal journals.
Graham Brown, ARB, RIBA, ACArch, FCIArb – Architect,
Project Manager, Contract and Practice Consultant, Arbitrator and
Mediator; Director of Tindall Brown Architects and Project
Managers; Visiting lecturer at schools of architecture in UK and
overseas; Part 3 Examiner for Architects Registration Board and
Architectural Association; Architectural Practice NVQ test assessor
and verifier; Formerly Principal Lecturer in Law and Management
and Director of Professional Training at Partsmouth School of
Martin Dixon – Fellow and Senior University Lecturer in Law,
Queens’ College, Cambridge. Visiting Professor of Law, City
University, London. Sometime Legal Officer to the United Nations
in Vienna. He has written extensively on Land Law, including
co-authorship of Ruoff & Roper, The Law of Registered
Richard Dyton, LLB, MSc, AKC – Solicitor, Partner at Simmons &
Simmons; specialist advice to architects and engineers; negotiation
and conclusion of international commercial agreements; author of
Eurolegislation in Building Maintenance and Preservation (2nd
edn) and EC Legislation affecting the Practice of UK Architects
and Engineers. Winner: Legal Business Construction Law Team of
the Year (1999)
Kim Franklin, FCIArb – Chartered Arbitrator, Barrister’ practises
from Crown Office Chambers at 2 Crown Office Row, Temple,
London, as counsel, arbitrator and adjudicator in construction
disputes. She is joint editor of Construction Law Journal, a contributing author of The Legal Obligations of the Architect and a
regular columnist for the Architect’s Journal.
He practises from 4–5 Gray’s Inn Square where he specializes in
Town & Country Planning, Local Government and Judicial Review.
He has extensive experience both of planning inquiries and Local
Andrew Geddes, MA (Oxon) – Called to the Bar in 1972; while at
the Bar he specialized in EEC law writing extensively on that topic
in the specialist press. Publications include: Product and Service
Liability in the EEC, Protection of Individual Rights under EC Law
and Public and Utility Procurement. He was appointed a circuit
judge in March 1994 and authorized to sit as a High Court Judge in
Alexander Hickey MA (Oxon) – Alexander is a barrister practising
from 4 Pump Court, Temple one of the leading set of chambers in
the construction and commercial field. Alexander specialises in construction, engineering, computer and technology disputes, as well
as professional negligence claims against architects and other construction professionals.
Ann Minogue is a partner in the Construction and Engineering
group at Linklaters, solicitors. She specialises in non-contentious
construction work on real estate projects particularly acting for a
number of key developers. In addition, she has been involved in the
procurement of a number of major Arts’ Projects. She has a regular
column in Building Magazine, sits on the membership committee
of the British Counsel for Offices and the Construction Committee
at the British Property Federation. She is also a member of the Next
Steps’ Forum chaired by Sir Michael Latham. She is a council
member at City University.
Vincent Moran, MA (Cantab) – Barrister and member of Gray’s
Inn. He specializes in professional negligence, including architects’ and surveyors’ negligence. He went to the Bar after studying
History at Clare College, Cambridge and working for an American
Matthew Needham-Laing, RIBA, LLB, MSc, ACIArb – Architect,
Solicitor and accredited Adjudicator, Mathew is a Partner in Fenwick
Elliot LLP, solicitors specialising in construction and engineering
law, acting for architects, employers, contractors and sub-contractors
in adjudication, arbitration and litigation, as well as negotiating
drafting profession appointments and construction conracts.
Graham North, MRICS, MCIArb – Chartered Building Surveyor
and Partner of Anstey Horne & Co., specialises in party wall matters
and boundary issues generally; past Chairman of the Boundaries &
Party Walls Practice Panel of the RICS and Building Surveyors’
Division of the City of London Branch of the RICS. Editor of the
Party Wall Surveyors’ Manual. He Lectures regularly to the property
profession and for RICS and RIBA Branches.
Clare Potter, MA (Oxon) – Solicitor; Partner in the EC &
Competition Group of Simmons & Simmons. She has extensive
experience of advising on all aspects of EC and competition law
with particular experience of advising utilities and utility regulators
and has had periods of secondment to the European Commission
and the Department of Trade and Industry.
James Leabeater – Barrister, practises from 4 Pump Court, Temple,
London, in construction, professional negligence and insurance law.
Clive Thorne – Partner at Denton Hall and Head of the Intellectual
Property Litigation Group. He has wide experience of all aspects of
Intellectual Property law. He has written widely in numerous publications and is co-author of Intellectual Property – the New Law
and The User’s Guide to Copyright. He is also admitted as a solicitor in Hong Kong where he practised in the 1980s and a barrister and
solicitor in Victoria, Australia. He is a Fellow of the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators.
Contributors – Scotland
Angus Stewart, QC – Advocate, practising from Parliament
House, High Street, Edinburgh; Chairman Faculty of Advocates
Committee on Human Rights; formerly Keeper of the Advocates
Library Chairman of the Scottish Council of Law Reporting;
standing junior counsel to the Department of the Environment in
Scotland, 1983–1988; recent publications include articles on local
government, civil procedure and professional negligence; litigation
specialist with interests in administrative law, construction, contract, land law and negligence.
Peter Franklin, MSc, FCIOB – Building Control and Fire Safety
Consultant. Formerly Senior Building Adviser at the Scottish Office
involved with building control legislation including acting as an
assessor to BSAC. Served on many BSI committees, working parties,
official inquiries, etc and Consultant on Scottish Fire Safety codes
for hospitals, historic buildings and prisons.
Peter McCormack, MA (Oxon), LIB (Edin) – Advocate; previously
consultant with Arthur Andersen & Co Management Consultancy
Division, London; tutor in Mercantile and Commercial Law,
University of Edinburgh, 1991–93; called to the Scottish Bar in
Steven L. Stuart – Advocate; member of the Scottish Planning,
Local Government and Environmental Bar Group; formerly
Lecturer in Private Law at the University of Dundee; co-author of
Scottish Civic Government Licensing Law. He has appeared in a
number of major public enquiries in Scotland.
Jonathan L. Dunlop – Barrister in practice at the Northern Ireland
Bar with experience in the fields of contract law, company law,
insolvency and planning law. He is currently the Northern Ireland
Law Reporter for the Irish Times.
William Orbinson – Northern Irish Barrister who specializes in
Planning and Environmental Law, acting primarily for developers
and public bodies in planning appeals and inquiries. One of only
three N.I. lawyers to hold the Law Society/Royal Town Planning
Institute Joint Planning Examination and to qualify as a Legal
Associate of the RTPI, Mr Orbinson is also an Affiliate of the Irish
Planning Institute and of the Royal Society of Ulster Architects,
and the sole N.I. Associate of the Planning and Environment Bar
Association: The Specialist Bar Association for Planning, the
Environment and Local Government. A founding member and past
Chair of EPLANI: The Environmental & Planning Law
Association for Northern Ireland, he has also served on the local
branch Executive of the RPTI and on the Architecture & Planning
and Housing Committees of the Royal Society of Ulster Architects.
Mr. Orbinson is the author of most of the leading publications on
the Northern Irish planning system, and a contributor on planning
and architecturally-related issues to Planning magazine and
Perspective, the journal of the Royal Society of Ulster Architects.
Brian Sherrard – Barrister; formerly lecturer in property law at the
Queen’s University of Belfast, he is now the principal legal assistant
to the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.
Arbitration – partner at Lovells in the Projects Engineering and
Construction group in London. She focuses on contentious construction and engineering matters and has been involved in a number of
significant projects, domestically and internationally. Her experience
includes UK dispute resolution, international and domestic arbitration, and many forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution, including
mediation and expert determination.
Christopher Miers – BA, DipArch, MSc(Constr.Law), RIBA,
FCIArb, MAE. Charted Architect, Chartered Arbitrator and CEDR
Accredited Mediator. Member of Council and past Chairman of the
Society of Construction Law (1995); member of Board of Editors
of the Construction and Engineering Law Journal (1997-). Director
of Probyn Miers architects. In addition to his continuing architectural practice Christopher is widely appoited as an adjudicator,
arbitrator, expert witness and mediator.
Brain H. Speers LLB MCIArb – Solicitor with the Belfast firm of
Carnson Morrow Graham, 20 May Street, Belfast whose practice
includes construction disputes, arbitration and adjudication. He has
a particular interest in mediation and provides a course of approval
training to lawyers and surveyors.
Ferguson Bell LLB (Construction Law) FRICS FCIArb MAE –
Belfast based Chartered Surveyor practising mainly as an Arbitrator,
Adjudicator, Mediator and Expert Witness in the field of construction
Disptues.
Robert White – Barrister at 4-5 Gray’s Inn Square, the celebrated
public law set of Chambers. He was called to the Bar in 1993,
and specializes in Planning, Local Government and Compulsory
Purchase Law.
Oliver Palmer – AA Dipl, FRIBA, FRSA, MRICS – Architect,
principal in private practice 1956–75; RIBA Prize Winner 1974;
DOE (now ODPM) Building Regulations Division (Technical
Secretary of the Building Regulations Advisory Committee, recasting The Building Regulations) 1975–87; Head of the European
Branch of the Construction Directorate 1987–1992; Consultant to
the Commission of the European Communities 1992–94. Member
or Chairman of BSI, CEN and EC committees. Lecturer. Publications
include HomeBuilder (HMSO).
Sarah Lupton MA, DipArch, LLM, FCIArb is a senior lecturer at
the Welsh School of Architecture and a partner in Lupton Stellakis.
She is a member of the RIBA Disciplinary Committee, the RIBA
President’s Advisory Committee on Arbitration and the CIC
Liability Committee. She is a member of the RIBA panel of adjudicators, and has acted as expert witness in relation to construction
disputes and ARB disciplinary proceedings. She is author of
Architects Guide to Adjudication, Architects Guide to Arbitration,
and a series of guides to standard forms of building contract,
including Guide to JCT98. She is also the co-author of two books
in the Through the Legislation Maze series, co-editor of that series
and editor of the Architects’s Job Book and Architect’s Handbook of
Kim Franklin, FCIArb – Chartered Arbitrator, Barrister, practises
from Crown Office Chambers, 2 Crown Office Row, Temple, London,
as counsel, arbitrator and adjudicator in construction disputes. She
is joint editor of Construction Law Journal, a contributing author of
The Legal Obligations of the Architect and a regular columnist for
the Architect’s Journal.
Rachel Toulson MA (Cantab) – Barrister and member of the Inher
Temple. She practices from Crown Office Chambers at 2 Crown
Office Row, London in common law and commercial litigation,
including professional negligence and construction.
Amanda Telfer – Solicitor at Denton Wilde Sapte, a leading international law firm. She has worked on a wide variety of contentious
and non-contentious UK nd international intellectual property
work, specifically for media and technology clients. She specialises
in IP and media litigation, including copyright, passing off, trade
marks, design rights, database rights, confidentiality/contract, defamation, data protection and domain name disputes.
Professional Practice at Mackintosh School of Architecture. Project
experience includes sports centres, health care, competition-winning
commercial developments and Listed Building renovation. He is a
part-time lecturer at the Mackintosh School of Architecture, has
contributed to the RIBA Part III examination and has acted as a
Council member of the RIAS. Using his legal training he has also
undertaken planning appeals and Public Inquiries and as an Expert
Witness has considerable court experience in contract and negligence claims.
Contributors – Northern Ireland
Ruth Downing – Barrister called to the Bar in 1978 – specialises
in employment law with interest particularly in equal opportunities
and personal injury litigation.
Gordon Gibb, B Arch Dip Arch (Glas), LLM, RIBA, ARIAS –
Director, Gibb Architects Ltd., based in Glasgow. Director of
J. Ronald McDaniel Dip Arch (Sheff), FRIBA – Formerly Hon.
Vice-President, Member of Council and Convenor of the
Constitution Committee of the Royal Society of Ulster Architects.
Trustee of the Architects Benevolent Society in London. Formerly
Chief Architect of the DHSS, Northern Ireland.
1.01 The well-worn maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse
applies with equal force to everyone, including architects. Everyone
offers has a responsibility to society in general and to his clients in
particular to know the law.
1.02 Architects like other professional people, have a duty to
acquire a working knowledge of the law as it affects their professional work. In the case of an architect the relevant fields of law are
notably those of contract, especially the standard forms of building
the areas of law which affect him or her personally. When can he be
sued? How can he sue for his fees? When is copyright in his drawings protected? How should he insure? What is the legal relationship between him and his employer, or between him and his
to know enough law to be aware of the circumstances in which specialist legal advice is needed. He should then advise his client
to obtain legal advice. Alternatively, he should himself instruct a
barrister directly.
The legal system – rules of society
1.03 People living in all types of community have one thing in
common: mutually agreed rules of conduct appropriate to their way
of life, with explicit consequences for failure to observe the rules.
This is what law is about. The more varied the activities and the more
complex the social structure, the greater is the need for everyone to
be aware of the part he or she must play in formulating and observing the rules. In highly developed communities these rules have
grown into a complex body of law. In the United Kingdom the law
is continually developing and being modified as personal rights and
social responsibilities are re-interpreted.
The English ‘common law’ system
1.04 There are two principal legal systems in the western world.
founded on written codes. The other is usually known as the common
law system. This originated in England during the Middle Ages.
Today it is the basis of law in Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and almost all former British territories. It
is even the basis of law in the United States of America. The international character of English law is not often appreciated by nonlawyers, but is sufficiently alive for cases from other common law
jurisdictions to guide English courts on those occasions, which are
admittedly rare, when English case law is silent on a point. The
courts of other common law more frequently follow English decisions. A Commonwealth Law Conference held every three years, at
which the leading lawyers from remarkably diverse national backgrounds discuss legal issues together, serves to reinforce the bonds
of the common law world.
2.01 English law may be conveniently divided into two main parts –
2.02 Common law – the unwritten law – includes the early customary laws assembled and formulated by judges, with modifications of the old law of equity (paragraph 3.09). Common law
therefore means all other than enacted law (paragraph 2.06), and
rules derived solely from custom and precedent are rules of common
law. It is the unwritten law of the land because there is no official
codification of it.
2.03 The basis of all legal argument and decision in the English
courts is founded upon the application of rules announced in earlier
decisions and is called stare decisis (let the decision stand). From
this has evolved the doctrine of judicial precedent, now a fundamental characteristic of common law.
2.04 Two factors contributed to the important position that the
doctrine of judicial precedent holds today: the Judicature Acts
(paragraph 3.12) and the creation of the Council of Law Reporting,
which is responsible for issuing authoritative reports which are
scrutinized and revised by judges and which contain a summary of
arguments by counsel and of the judgments given. It is essential for
the operation of a system of law based on previous cases that wellauthenticated records of arguments and decisions be available to all
courts and everyone required to advise on the law.
2.05 Legally, the most important part of a judgment is that where the
judge explains the principles on which he has based his decision.
A judgment is an authoritative lecture on a branch of the law; it
includes a ratio decidendi (the statement of grounds for the decision)
and one or more obiter dicta (things said by the way, often not
directly relevant to the matters at issue). It is the ratio decidendi
which creates precedents for the future. Such precedents are binding on every court with jurisdiction inferior to the court which gave
the decision; even courts of equal or superior jurisdiction seldom
fail to follow an earlier decision. Until recently even the House of
Lords which has been the highest English Court, regarded themselves as bound by their own decisions. The House of Lords now
regards itself as free to depart from its previous decisions, but has
done so on only a handful of occasions. One of the few occasions
was the overruling of Anns v Merton [1978] AC728 by Murphy v
Brentwood [1991] AC398 – a saga well known to architects, and
described in Chapter 3 of this book.
2.06 Legislation – the written or enacted law – comprises the
statutes, Acts and edicts of the sovereign and his advisers. Although
historically enacted law is more recent than common law because
remains on the statute books. If an Act of Parliament conflicts with
2.07 All legislation must derive its authority directly or indirectly
emergency the Crown can still legislate by Royal Proclamation. In its
statutes, Parliament usually lays down general principles, and in
most legislation Parliament delegates authority for carrying out the
provisions of statutes to non-parliamentary bodies. Subordinate
Council (made by the government of the day – in theory by the sovereign in Council), regulations, statutory instruments or orders
2.10 In 1950, a number of western European countries adopted a
Freedoms (now invariably referred as the European Convention on
Human Rights). It was a symbolic response both to the horrors of
Nazism in the recent past and to the curtailment of freedom in the
communist states of eastern Europe. A novel feature of this Convention was the creation of a European Court of Human Rights
Court in which individual citizens could present grievances against
their governments. For many years the Convention and the Court
had no standing within the United Kingdom beyond the fact that
the United Kingdom government had by a treaty undertaken to
accept them. Enthusiasts for the Convention saw it as potentially
something which might play a role similar to that of the United
States constitution. But this scenario faced a number of problems.
Firstly, the process of European integration has not, or at any rate
has not yet, reached the point where United Kingdom domestic law is
subject to a European federal law. Secondly, any form of entrenchment of fundamental rights in the United Kingdom is hard to reconcile with the democratic doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament,
of which a facet is the principle that no parliament can bind its successor. Eventually, a mechanism was adopted in the Human Rights
Act 1998, whereby the Convention is accorded some standing in
English law, without derogating from the supremacy of Parliament.
This has been achieved by enacting that legislation should, so far as
possible, be interpreted in accordance with Convention rights. If
this is impossible, a court may make a declaration of incompatibility. Despite the interest which has been generated by the Human
Rights Act, and the fact that it has been cited in a significant number of cases in recent years, it has had little practical impact on the
actual decisions of English courts: it has almost always been held,
sometimes after prolonged argument, that existing English law is,
in fact, compliant with Convention rights.
2.08 The courts are required to interpret Acts in accord with the
validity of the enactment. Rules have been established to help them
interpret ambiguities: there is a presumption that Parliament in legislative matters does not make mistakes, but in general this principle
does not apply to statutory instruments unless the governing Act
says anything to the contrary. The courts may decide whether rules
or orders are made within the powers delegated to the authorised
body ordered to make them, or whether they are ultra vires (outside
the body’s power). By-laws must not only be intra vires but also
3.01 One cannot understand English law without an awareness of
its history. The seeds of custom and rules planted in Anglo-Saxon
and earlier times have developed and grown gradually into a
modern system of law. The Normans interfered little with common
practices they found, and almost imperceptibly integrated them
with their own mode of life. William I did not regard himself as a
conqueror, but claimed to have come by invitation as the lawful
successor of Edward the Confessor – whose laws he promised to
re-establish and enforce.
Feudal system and land law
2.09 Since 1 January 1973 there has been an additional source of
law: that is the law of the European Community. By accession treaty
Her Majesty’s Government undertook that the United Kingdom
would accept the obligations of membership of the three original
European Communities, that is, the Coal and Steel Community, the
Economic Community and the Atomic Energy Community. That
commitment was honoured by the enactment of the European
Communities Act 1972. Section 2(1) of the 1972 Act provided that
all directly applicable provisions of the treaties establishing the
European Communities should become part of English law; so,
too, would all existing and future Community secondary legislation. Since the terms of the treaties are in the main in very general
terms, most detailed Community policy is embodied in secondary
legislation. Most major decisions are taken in the form of ‘directives’,
which require member states to achieve stated results but leave it to
the member state to choose the form and method of implementation.
Other Community decisions, known as ‘regulations’, have direct
In consequence, there is today an ever-growing corpus of
European Union decisions incorporated into English law. This
topic is discussed more fully in Chapter 27.
3.02 The Domesday Book (1086), assembled mainly by itinerant
the Domesday survey. Consequently, in England feudal law was not
solely a law for the knights and bishops of the realm, nor of some
parts of the country alone: it affected every person and every holding of land. It became part of the common law of England.
3.03 To the knowledge acquired from Domesday, the Normans
applied their administrative skills; they established within the framework of the feudal system new rules for ownership of land, new
obligations of loyalty to the administration under the Crown, and
reorganized arrangements for control of the people and for hearing
and judgment of their disputes. These were the true origins of our
3.04 Ultimate ownership of land in England is still, in theory, in the
Crown. The lord as ‘landowner’ merely held an ‘estate’ or ‘interest’
in the land, directly or indirectly, as tenant from the king. A person
holding an estate of the Crown could, in turn, grant it to another
person, but the ownership still remained in the Crown. The tenant’s
‘interest’ may have been of long or short duration and as varied as
the kinds of services that might be given in return for the ‘estate’.
In other words, many different estates and interests in land existed.
Tenure and estate are distinct. ‘Tenure’ refers to the relation of the
landlord to his overlord, at its highest level to the king. ‘Estate’ refers
to the duration of his interest in the land, and has nothing whatever
to do with the common use of the word.
classed as ‘personal’ rather than ‘real’ property because in early times
it was not possible to recover a leasehold interest by ‘real’ actions for
the return of the thing (res). In common law a dispossessed owner
of freehold land could bring an action for recovery of possession,
and an order would be made for the return to him of his land. For the
recovery of personal (tangible or movable) articles his remedy was
limited to a personal action in which the defendant had the option
of either returning the property or paying its value.
Possession not ownership
Beginnings of common law
3.05 English law as a result has never used the concept of ownership of land but instead has concentrated on the fact of ‘possession’, mainly because ownership can refer to so many things and is
ill-fitted to anything so permanent and immovable as a piece of
3.07 Foundations of both the common law and the courts of justice
were laid by Henry II (1154–1189). In his reign the ‘king’s justice’
began to be administered not only in the King’s Court – the Curia
Regis – where the sovereign usually sat in person and which
accompanied him on his travels about the country, but also by justices given commissions of assize directing them to administer the
royal justice systematically in local courts throughout the whole
kingdom. In these courts it was their duty to hear civil actions
which previously had been referred to the central administration at
Westminster. It was the judges of assize who created the common
law. On completion of their circuits and their return to Westminster
they discussed their experiences and judgments given in the light of
local customs and systems of law. Thus a single system common
to all was evolved; judge-made in the sense that it was brought
3.06 Law makes a distinction between ‘real’ and ‘personal’ property. The former are interests in land other than leasehold interests;
the latter includes leasehold interests and applies to movable property (personal property and chattels). A leasehold interest in land is
together and stated authoritatively by judges, but it grew from the
people in that it was drawn directly from their ancient customs and
3.08 Under the able guidance of Edward I (1272–1307) many
reforms were made, notably in procedures and mainly in the interest
of the subject as against the royal officials and the law began to take
its characteristic shape. Three great common law courts became
established at Westminster:
1 The King’s Bench, broadly for cases in which the Crown had
2 Common pleas, for cases between subject and subject.
3 Exchequer, for those having a fiscal or financial aspect.
However, as administered in these courts, the common law was
limited in its ability to meet every case. This led to the establishment of the principles of equity.
rules of both systems were to be applied by all courts. If they were
in conflict, equity was to prevail.
3.13 The main object of the Judicature Act 1873 was an attempt to
solve the problems of delay and procedural confusion in the existing court system by setting up a Supreme Court. This consisted of
Common Law and Equity. As a matter of convenience cases
concerned primarily with common law questions being heard in
Admiralty Division with the three classes indicated by its title.
3.09 In the Middle Ages the common law courts failed to give
unsuitable or because the law was defective in that no remedy existed.
For instance, the common law did not recognize trusts and at that
time there was no way of compelling a trustee to carry out his obligations. Therefore disappointed and disgruntled litigants exercised
their rights of appeal to the king – the ‘fountain of all justice’. In due
course, the king, through his Chancellor (keeper of his conscience,
because he was also a bishop and his confessor), set up a social
Court of Chancery to deal with them.
3.10 During the early history of the Court of Chancery, equity had no
binding rules. A Chancellor approached his task in a different manner from the common law judges; he gave judgment when he was
satisfied in his own mind that a wrong had been done, and he would
order that the wrong be made good. Thus the defendant could clear
his own conscience at the same time. The remedy for refusal was
invariably to be imprisoned until he came to see the error of his ways
and agree with the court’s ruling. It was not long before a set of
general rules emerged in the Chancery Courts which hardened into
law and became a regular part of the law of the land. There is, however, another and even more fundamental aspect of equity. Though
it developed in the Court of Chancery as a body of law with defined
rules, its ideal from earliest times was the simple belief in moral
justice, fairness, and equality of treatment for all, as opposed to the
strict letter of the law. Equity in that sense has remained to this day
a basic principle of English justice.
3.11 Up to the end of the fifteenth century the Chancellor had generally been a bishop, but after the Reformation the position came to
be held by professional lawyers (of whom the first was Sir Thomas
More) under whom the rules of equity became almost as rigid as
those of common law; and the existence of separate courts administering the two different sets of rules led to serious delays and conflicts. By the end of the eighteenth century the courts and their
procedures had reached an almost unbelievable state of confusion,
mainly due to lack of coordination of the highly technical processes
and overlapping jurisdiction. Charles Dickens describes without
much exaggeration something of the troubles of a litigant in Chancery
in the case of ‘Jarndyce v Jarndyce’ (Bleak House).
3.14 By the Courts Act 1971 there was a modest re-organisation of
the divisions of the High Court. A Family Division was created to
handle child cases as well as divorce and matrimonial property disputes, and the Crown Court was created in place of a confusing array
of different criminal courts. During the last decades of the twentiethcentury the work of the County Courts was progressively extended,
with the financial limit if their jurisdiction being progressively
lifted. The present court arrangements in England are more fully
discussed in Chapter 13 on Litigation.
4 The legal systems of the
4.01 Within the United Kingdom there are two traditions of law
and three principal legal jurisdictions. English law prevails in the
jurisdiction which is constituted by England and Wales. The English
common law system is also the basis of the law in Northern Ireland,
but Northern Ireland has its own statutory provisions and also its
own courts. Scotland has not only its own courts, but also its own law
and legal traditions. It had its own system at the time of the Union
in 1707, and always retained them.
4.02 The one unifying feature of the legal system of the United
Kingdom has been the House of Lords which is the supreme court
of appeal for all three jurisdictions. It usually has 12 judges, of
whom two are by tradition always Scots, and one has recently been
from Northern Ireland. They are officially known as lords of appeal
in ordinary, and usually referred to as law lords. In 2003, the
Government published proposals for a new Supreme Court for the
United Kingdom. Whereas the present law lords are all peers with
full membership of the upper chamber of Parliament, the proposal
is that the judges of the new Supreme Court should have no connection with the legislature. At the time of going to press, the
government’s bill to establish this new court had been referred to
4.03 This edition of this book covers the law in the whole of the
United Kingdom. There are certain separate chapters dealing with
Scotland and Northern Ireland. In other instances, there are sections at the end of chapters written by English law authors, explaining whether, and to what extent, there are differences in Scotland
3.12 Nineteenth-century England was dominated by a spirit of
reform, which extended from slavery to local government. The law
and the courts did not escape reform, and the climax came with the
passing of the Judicature Acts of 1873 (and much additional and
amending legislation in the years that followed) whereby the whole
court system was thoroughly reorganized and simplified, by the
establishment of a single Supreme Court. The Act also brought to
an end the separation of common law and equity; they were not
amalgamated and their rules remained the same, but henceforth the
5.01 There are five main sections of the book:
1 In the first section the reader is offered the general principles of
the law. This introductory chapter is immediately followed by
chapters setting out the principles of the two areas of English
law of the greatest importance to architects, namely contract and
tort. A third area of basic English law of relevance to architects,
namely land law, is also covered in an early chapter. There are
separate chapters providing an introduction to Scots law and to
Northern Ireland’s legal system.
2 The next main section of the book deals with what is almost certainly the legal subject of greatest day-to-day importance to
architects, namely building contracts. This section begins with a
general introduction. There is a full commentary on the most
important of all standard forms, namely the JCT standard form,
1998 edition, in which the text of every single clause is reproduced. In the next chapter there is a full discussion of nominated
sub-contracting under the current JCT documents, and a briefer
discussion of some of the other principal standard forms used
on building contracts.
3 The third section deals with dispute resolution. The normal
bound by the decision of a private dispute resolution mechanism: for many years arbitration was the most common mode of
determining construction disputes. Today, however, the most
common method is adjudication, which means a quick decision
which is binding for only a temporary period. By legislation in
1996 a right to adjudication is now compulsory in almost all
construction contracts. Such is the attraction of a quick decision
that not only is adjudication today being used with great
frequency, but hardly ever are adjudicator’s decisions being
challenged in subsequent litigation of arbitration. Of growing
popularity, too, is mediation, which refers to consensual meetings
by parties with a neutral facilitator: the success rate in achieving
a settlement at mediations is very high. Separate chapters deal
with each of these methods of dispute resolution.
4 The fourth section is concerned with the statutory and regulatory
framework. Statutory authorities are described. There follow
chapters on statutory regulations in the fields of planning, construction regulations, and health and safety regulations. The
chapter on European Union law as it affects architects is also
5 The final section of the book concerns the architect in practice. It
begins with the law affecting the legal organisation of an architect’s office. It covers the contracts which architects make with
their own clients for the provision of their professional services,
and contracts which architects enter with non-clients to provide
them with a cause of action against the architect if his professional work was faulty. The next chapter deals with the liability
of architects when faulty professional services are alleged. That
is followed by the chapter on professional indemnity insurance
to cover architects against such risks. An architect’s copyright in
his own drawings is dealt with in the chapter on the distinct area
of the law of copyright. The ever-changing field of employment
law, which affects every architect who employs staff, is the subject of a separate chapter. The chapter on international work does
not, by its very nature, deal with English or Scots law, and so in
architects who undertake work abroad, and fits more logically
of contract: to show both how it relates to other areas of the law, and
to describe the general principles on which the English law of contract operates. Although most of the examples are from areas with
which architects will be familiar, the principles they illustrate are
for the most part general. Other sections of this book deal in detail
with specific areas of the law of contract and their own special
rules. The general rules described in this chapter may on occasion
seem trite and hardly worth stating. Yet it is often with the most
fundamental – and apparently simple – principles of law that the
most difficult problems arise. Just as it is important to get the foundations of a building right, so also it is necessary to understand the
basic rules of contract law, without which detailed knowledge of
any particular standard form of contract is of little use. This chapter condenses into a few pages of material which if fully discussed
would fill many long books. The treatment is necessarily selective
The parties to a civil action are known as ‘claimant’ (until recently the
claimant was called ‘plaintiff’) and ‘defendant’ and the former claims
a remedy for the acts or omissions of the latter. The difference,
then, is that unlike criminal law (which is concerned with punishment) the civil law is about providing remedies – the law tries to put
things ‘back to rights’ as best it can. The remedies available are various: the court may award ‘damages’ as a means of compensating
the loss suffered by the claimant, or it may declare what the rights
of the parties are, or, in certain circumstances, it will order a party
to do or to refrain from doing something.
In certain factual contexts they can overlap, and in recent years
their overlap has caused the courts great problems, but they are
conceptually quite distinct, and it is important to understand the
2.03 A claimant will sue a defendant in contract or tort when he
objects to something the defendant has done or failed to do.
defendant – indeed may very well not know the defendant – before
the objectionable act or omission occurs. For example: the defendant
carelessly runs the claimant over; the defendant’s bonfire smoke
ruins the claimant’s washing; the defendant tramples across the
claimant’s field; the defendant writes a scurrilous article about the
claimant in the local newspaper. All these wrongs are torts, indeed
the label ‘tort’ is an archaic word for ‘wrong’. Each of the torts listed
above have particular labels, respectively negligence, nuisance,
trespass and defamation. It is because the acts of the defendant have
brought him into contact or proximity with the claimant the law of
torts may impose a liability on the defendant. The law of torts is
a contract, so that before the objectionable event occurs the parties
have agreed what their legal obligations to one another shall be in
certain defined circumstances. So, for instance, if the claimant
engages the defendant plumber to install a new sink, and it leaks, or
retains the defendant architect to design a house which falls down,
or employs the defendant builder to build a house and it is not ready
on time, the extent of the defendant’s liability in a contract claim
will depend on the terms and conditions of the contract between
them. Of course, there may, in some circumstances, be an identical
or similar liability in tort as well for the two are not mutually exclusive. But the conceptual distinction is quite clear.
that they have made. That legal relationship creates rights and obligations between the parties and binds only between those who are
privy to the contract, and not other people who are not parties (often
described in law books as ‘strangers’ or by the misnomer ‘third
parties’) even though those people may be affected by the contract
directly or indirectly. The doctrine of privity of contract is examined in more detail later in this chapter. Usually the agreement will
contain a promise or set of promises that each party has made to the
other: this is known as a bilateral contract because each party promises to do something. For example, X promises to build a house for Y
and Y promises to pay X for doing so. Sometimes only one party
will make a promise to do something if the other party actually
does something stipulated by the former. For example, X promises
to pay £100 if Y completes and returns a marketing questionnaire
to X. Such a contract is known as an unilateral contract because the
promise is one-sided. Although X has promised to pay in the stipulated circumstances, Y is under no obligation to complete and
return the marketing questionnaire but if he does the court or arbitral
tribunal will recognize a binding agreement that X will pay him
£100. In building projects during negotiations for the award of a
formal contract one sometimes finds so-called letters of intent
expressed in terms such as these: ‘Please proceed with the works
and if no formal contract is concluded we will pay you your costs
and expenses that you have incurred.’ It is often not appreciated that
a letter in such terms can create a unilateral contract which the
court will enforce, albeit not the formal contract which the parties
had hoped to finalize. And although one often talks of a ‘written’ or
‘formal’ contract it is not really the piece of paper which itself is the
contract – the piece of paper merely records what the terms of the
contract are. For most types of contract there is no requirement for
a written document at all and an oral contract is just as binding in
law, although in practice when there is a dispute proving later what
was orally agreed at the outset is more difficult. That difficulty is
avoided if there is documentary evidence of what was agreed.
Indeed, the usual (though not always the inflexible) rule is that the
written document containing the agreed terms will be decisive evidence of the contract whatever the parties have said previously: this
is sometimes called the ‘four corners’ rule.
seal at the end of the document where the parties sign, or there is
some mark representing a seal. But any contract may be made under
seal, and the seal provides the consideration for the contract (see
below). The most important consequence, and often the reason why
parties choose this method of contracting is that the limitation
period for making a claim pursuant to a contract under seal is twelve
years instead of the usual six (see paragraphs 14.01–14.02).
will look for three essential things: first, the intention of the parties
‘quid pro quo’ meaning ‘something for something else’. In a unilateral contract the ‘something else’ is the performance by the party
who wants to receive the promised benefit. In a bilateral contract
other party. The court has defined consideration like this:
promise thus given for value is enforceable’ (Dunlop v Selfridge
[1951] AC 847 855).
Third Parties) Act 1999. That Act made sweeping changes to the
doctrine of privity of contract, and consequently it will affect
the closely related doctrine of consideration. The changes brought
about by that Act will no doubt take many years to work themselves
out. However, while it is all but certain that the doctrine of consideration will remain as a fundamental ingredient to the formation of
a contract between parties, the doctrine is unlikely to survive in the
long term as a means of preventing ‘strangers’ to the contract from
seeking to enforce that contract where it benefits them.
5.03 Although consideration must be given for value this simply
means that there must be some intrinsic value no matter how small: a
peppercorn rent for a property, for instance, is good consideration.
The value of the consideration can be quite disproportionate to the
other half of the bargain which it supports. In Midland Bank Trust
Company v Green [1980] Ch 590, a farm worth £40 000 was sold by
a husband to his wife for just £500. £500 was good consideration.
The court will not interfere with the level of consideration because to
do so would be to adjudicate on the question of whether it was a good
or bad deal for one of the parties. The commercial aspects of a contract, the bargain, is best left for the parties to decide.
probably be disappointed, for the law will not enforce a promise if
the parties did not intend their promises to be legally binding.
Bargains struck on terms that ‘if you sell that car, I’ll eat my hat’ are
not seriously considered to be legally binding. Similarly one hears
of people making a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ where honour dictates
the actions between the parties along the lines of ‘I’ll see you right,
if there is anything you need, it will be done’. However, a moral
obligation is not enough.
5.01 It is convenient to deal with consideration next. A simple oneway promise – ‘I’ll paint your ceiling’ – without more is not a contract, because there is neither any element of bargain nor anything
done in return. Again a contingent promise such as ‘I will pay you
£100 if it rains on Tuesday’ is not a contract. In such a case the person receiving the windfall of £100 did nothing to deserve or earn
the money. It is important to distinguish this situation from a unilateral contract where there is a one-way promise but something is
done in return. In the examples given above X completed and
in return for the wall has not been given by B. B has done nothing to
earn or deserve A’s promise to build the wall so the court will not
assist B in enforcing the promise. Another way of looking at this situation is to say that it is only when a party provides consideration
that he is drawn into ‘privity of contract’. It has been debated for
centuries whether privity of contract and consideration are really the
same thing or two sides of the same coin. At the very least it can be
said that consideration is the touchstone for privity of contract for
without consideration there can be no contract at all. Even if A and
B had signed a piece of paper recording the ‘agreement’ between
themselves, although they could say they are parties or privy to the
arrangement, they do not enjoy privity of a (legally enforceable)
contract. In the situation above, it might be that a contract was actually reached between A and C because each of them provided consideration which drew A and C into privity of contract. But the other
essential requirements for a contract would need to be met before it
could be said that there was a contract between them.
5.05 The effect of this rule is that if A does not build the wall, or
does so but bodges the job, B has no right of recourse against A in
contract. (He might, in certain circumstances, be able to sue A in
tort if A bodged the building of the wall so that it collapsed and
injured someone or if it damaged B’s other property. This is no
comfort to a peeved B who has no wall at all, or a badly built wall.)
With the advent of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999,
however, so long as a contract exists between A and C, B would
probably be able to sue A on the basis that a contract between A and
C was for B’s benefit even though B provided no consideration. B’s
position is, of course, not changed by the Act if no contract exists
5.06 On the other hand if A promises to build the wall if B will pay
£1000 to C (a local charity) and if B either pays C or promises A
that he will pay C, B will have given consideration for A’s promise.
A contract will exist between A and B on these facts and B will be
able to enforce A’s promise. The difference between this situation and
the former is that B has earned the right to enforce the agreement
even though A does not directly benefit from B’s consideration. C,
however, is not a party to that contract and under the previous law C
would have no right of recourse against B (or A) if B does not pay
£1000 because C did not provide consideration. Now, C would be
likely to use the 1999 Act to seek to enforce the contract by arguing
that contractual promise to pay £1000 was for its benefit.
which has already been performed cannot provide consideration to
support a contract subsequently entered into. Suppose A gives B
£1000 at Christmas, and at Easter B agrees to build a wall for B ‘in
consideration of the £1000’. A cannot sue B if he does not build the
wall, for there is no element of bargain, and no consideration supports the promise to build the wall. Also a past agreement to do
something cannot usually be used as consideration for a new
promise. However, in an unusual case, Williams & Roffey Bros. &
Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 512, a main contractor
had contracted to complete the building of some housing units by a
certain time but it became clear that he was unlikely to do so because
the sub-contractors were in financial difficulties and the main contractor was potentially exposed to liability for liquidated damages
in his contract with the employer. The main contractor promised to
pay the sub-contractors more money to ensure completion on time.
The Court of Appeal held that that promise was enforceable because
the main contractor’s promise to pay more to ensure completion on
time was supported by consideration from the sub-contractors. This
was because the main contractor received the practical benefit of
ensuring that he would not be penalized and that the work would
continue (even though the sub-contractors were already contractually bound to do the work by that time).
5.08 As between the parties and a contract consideration rarely
consideration is: very often in the contracts architects deal with, the
consideration for providing works or services will be the fee to be
paid for them. But on the rare occasions when consideration is
lacking the consequences can be critical for the aggrieved party,
6.01 The existence of agreement between the parties to a contract is
in practice the most troublesome of the three essential ingredients.
6.02 The inverted commas around ‘agreement’ are intentional. The
law of contract does not peer into the minds of contracting parties
to see what they really intended to contract to do; it contents itself
with taking an objective view and, on the basis of what the parties
have said and done, and the surrounding context in which they did
so, the courts decide what the parties should be taken to have
intended. The court asks whether, in the eyes of the law, they should
be considered to have been in agreement.
6.03 To perform this somewhat artificial task the courts use a set
formula or analytical framework which can be thought of as the
6.04 An offer is a promise, made by the offeror, to be bound by a contract if the offeree accepts the terms of the offer. The offer matures
into a contract when it is accepted by the other party.
6.05 The offer can be made to just one person (the usual case) or it
can be made to a group of people, or even to the world at large. The
case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] 2 QB 484,
[1893] 1 QB 256 is an example of an offer to all the world. The
defendant company manufactured a device called a carbolic smoke
ball, which was intended to prevent its users from catching flu.
They advertised it with the promise that they would pay £100 to
anybody who used the smoke ball three times a day as directed and
still caught flu. The unfortunate claimant caught flu despite using
the smoke ball, and not unnaturally felt she was entitled to the £100
offered. The Court of Appeal held that the company’s advertisement constituted an offer to contract, and by purchasing the smoke
ball the claimant had accepted the offer, so that a contract was created.
Accordingly the claimant successfully extracted her £100 from the
6.06 Not all pre-contractual negotiations are offers to contract. In
deals of any complexity there will often be a lot of exploratory
negotiation before the shape of the final contract begins to emerge,
and it is not until a late stage that there will be a formal offer to contract by one party to the other.
6.07 Easy to confuse with an offer to contract is an invitation to treat.
An invitation to treat is an offer to consider accepting an offer to
contract from the other party. Most advertisements ‘offering’ goods
for sale, and also the goods lying on a supermarket shelf with their
price labels, are merely invitations to treat. When the prospective
purchaser proffers the appropriate sum to the cashier at the desk it
is the customer who is making the offer, which can be accepted or
rejected by the cashier. It will by now be obvious that the dividing
line between an invitation to treat and an offer to contract can be
very fine but the distinction is important.
known to the offeror. Silence is not sufficient to accept an offer
accepted – in this example – by the vendor’s action in sending the
6.09 An acceptance must be unequivocal and it must be a complete acceptance of every term of the offer. ‘I accept your terms
but only if I can have 42 days to pay instead of 28’ will not be
an acceptance, for it purports to vary the terms of the offer. It is a
counter-offer, which itself will have to be accepted by the seller.
And such a counter-offer will destroy the original offer which it
rejects, and which can therefore no longer be accepted. In the old
case of Hyde v Wrench [1840] 3 Beav 334, the defendant Wrench
offered to sell some land to the plaintiff for £1000. On 8 June Hyde
said he would pay £950. On 27 June Wrench refused to sell for £950
and on 29 June Hyde said he would pay £1000 after all. Wrench
refused to sell. It was held that there was no contract. Hyde’s counteroffer on 8 June had destroyed the initial offer of £1000 and by 29
June it was too late for Hyde to change his mind.
6.16 If there are long-drawn-out negotiations as to quantities, prices
and so on, all on business stationery containing standard terms, the
problems are compounded, and the result, best found by working
backwards and identifying the last communication on standard
terms, is rather artificial and is rather a matter of luck.
6.10 Sometimes an offer will specify a particular method of acceptance. For instance, A will ask B to signal his acceptance by signing a
copy letter and returning it within 21 days. Ordinarily B can only
acceptance will suffice if it is clear that both parties understood that
6.11 An offer can be withdrawn or revoked up until such time as it
is accepted. An acceptance is of course final – otherwise people
would constantly be pulling out of contracts because they had had
afterthoughts. Since an offer can be both revoked by its maker and
destroyed by a counter-offer, yet matures into a contract when it is
accepted, it can be crucial to decide when these events occur.
6.12 An acceptance is generally effective when it is received by the
offeror. But if the acceptance is made by posting a letter then the
acceptance takes effect when the letter is posted. But revocation by
post takes effect when the letter is received by the offeree. The
working of these rules is neatly exemplified by the case of Byrne v
on 8 October the defendants had thought better of their offer and sent
a letter revoking it. This second letter did not reach the claimants
until 20 October. There was a binding contract because the acceptance took effect before the revocation. The result would have been
the same even if the acceptance had been by letter and the letter had
arrived with the defendants after 20 October.
seem rather irrelevant to modern commercial transactions. But there
is one context in which they regularly appear: the so-called ‘battle
of the forms’ which takes place when two contracting parties both
deal on their own standard terms of business, typically appearing
on the reverse of their estimates, orders, invoices and other business
his standard terms and conditions on the reverse, and a note saying
that all business is done on his standard terms. The purchaser sends
back an order purporting to accept the estimate, but on the back of
his acceptance are his standard terms, which are doubtless more
favourable to him than the vendor’s. The vendor sends the goods,
and the purchaser pays for them. Is there a contract, and if there is,
whose standard terms is it on?
6.15 The purchaser’s ‘acceptance’ and order is not a true acceptance, because it does not accept all the terms of the vendor’s offer,
since it purports to substitute the purchaser’s standard terms. So the
purchaser’s order is in legal terms a counter-offer, and this is
mechanical analysis of offer and acceptance, looking at the negotiations as a whole (see especially Lord Denning in Butler Machine Tool
Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 401 at
405) but this approach has not found universal judicial acceptance,
and it seems that whatever the artificiality of a strict analysis in terms
of offer and acceptance it is difficult to find an alternative approach
which is workable in all cases. However, in many construction and
commercial cases in which protracted and complex negotiations result
in a situation considered to be binding by the parties, pinpointing a
defining moment when an offer and an acceptance was made ignores
the modern commercial reality. In such cases, the court and arbitral
tribunal tends to adopt an approach suitable to the needs of the business community and will look over the whole course of the negotiations to see whether the parties have agreed on all the essential terms.
If they have the court or arbitral tribunal will usually find that there is
a contract despite the difficulty of the legal analysis.
6.18 This topic leads on naturally to the next. Once it is established
that a contract exists, what are its terms?
7.01 The most obvious terms of a contract are those which the parties expressly agreed. In cases where there is an oral contract there
may be conflicting evidence as to what actually was said and agreed,
but with the written contracts with which architects will most often
deal, construing the express terms is usually less problematic: just
read the document evidencing the contract. The ‘four corners rule’
restricts attention to within the four corners of the document, and
even if the written terms misstate the intention of one of the parties –
perhaps that party had not read the document carefully before
signing it – he will be bound by what is recorded save in exceptional circumstances. This is another manifestation of the objective
approach of English contract law discussed above.
7.02 It should be noted at this stage that things said or written prior
to making a contract may affect the parties’ legal obligations to one
another even though they are not terms of the contract. This matter
is discussed in the section on misrepresentation.
7.03 Implied terms are likely to catch out the unwary. There are
three types of implied term: those implied by statute, those implied
by custom, and those implied by the court.
7.04 With unfortunate frequency contracting parties discover too
late that their contract has failed to provide for the events which
find the term there. Obviously one cannot have an implied term
which in inconsistent with the express terms.
will be reasonably fit for habitation at the commencement of the
7.06 More frequently there will be no authority on the particular type
of term which it is sought to imply. The courts have developed an
approach to these problems, based on an early formulation in the case
of The Moorcock [1889] 14 PD 64. There the owner of the ship The
Moorcock had contracted with the defendants to discharge his ship at
their jetty on the Thames. Both parties must have realized that the ship
would ground at low tide; in the event it not only grounded but, settling on a ridge of hard ground, it was damaged. The plaintiff owners said that the defendants should be taken to have given a warranty
that they would take reasonable care to ensure that the river bottom
was safe for the vessel – and the Court of Appeal agreed. Bowen LJ
explained: ‘the law[raises] an implication from the presumed intention of the parties, with the object of giving to the transaction such
efficacy as both parties must have intended it should have’.
This is called the ‘business efficacy’ test; but it is clear that the
term must be necessary for business efficacy, rather than be simply
a term which makes better sense of the contract if it is included
than if it is not. In Shirlow v Southern Foundries [1939] 2 KB 206
at 227, Mackinnon LJ expressed the test in terms of the ‘officious
bystander’ which provides a readily memorable – if not always easy
applicable – formulation of the rule:
bargain an officious bystander were to suggest some express
The officious bystander test is obviously difficult to pass. Both parties must have taken the term as ‘obvious’. The ploy of trying to
persuade a court that a term should be read into the contract in
proper time to define contractual terms is before the contract is
7.07 Sometimes parties will argue for an implied term to fill in the
gaps in an otherwise incomplete agreement or in situations where the
parties have opposing arguments as to what was in fact agreed. In
those situations the court is likely to say that there was no contract
and it is not the court’s role to make the contract for the parties.
are fairly straightforward, but of course they have to be read in their
context to see their precise effect (see Extracts 2.1 and 2.2).
quality or fitness for purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale.
meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all
the other relevant circumstances.
aspects of the quality of goods –
(a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question
the goods were previously sold by a credit-broker to the seller, to that
credit-broker,
reasonably fit for that purpose, whether or not that is a purpose for which
that the buyer does not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him to rely, on the
skill or judgement of the seller or credit-broker.
7.08 The custom of a particular type of business is relevant in construing the express terms of a contract and may on occasion be sufficient to imply into a contract a term which apparently is not there
at all. In Hutton v Warren [1836] 1 M & W 466, a lease was held to
include a term effecting the local custom that when the tenant’s
tenancy came to an end he would be entitled to a sum representing
the seed and labour put into the arable land. There are other
examples from the law of marine insurance, many of which are now
crystallized in statute law, but
consistently with the tenor of the document as a whole.’ (London
Export v Jubilee Coffee [1958] 2 All ER 411, at 420.)
but custom as a guide in construing terms of a contract continues to
be of some importance.
may automaticall