Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/603
Timestamp: 2018-01-17 09:24:36
Document Index: 801494246

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 716', '§ 15', '§ 724', '§ 860', '§ 1']

AMERICAN LITHOGRAPHIC COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. EMIL WERCKMEISTER. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
AMERICAN LITHOGRAPHIC COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. EMIL WERCKMEISTER.
221 U.S. 603 (31 S.Ct. 676, 55 L.Ed. 873)
Argued: April 10, 1911.
The cases of American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 52 L. ed. 208, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 595, and Werckmeister v. American Tobacco Co. 207 U. S. 375, 52 L. ed. 254, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124, related to the same copyrighted painting that is involved here. In the first case there was a recovery in an action in the nature of replevin of 1196 sheets containing copies. The second action was brought to recover the money penalties for the sheets seized in the former action. The question was whether there could be two actions against the same party; one for the seizure of the sheets forfeited and another for the penalties, and it was held 'that the statute contemplated but a single action in which the offender should be brought into court, the plates and sheets seized and adjudicated to the owner of the copyright, and the penalty, provided for by the statute, recovered.' See Hills & Co. v. Hoover, 220 U. S. 334, 335, 55 L. ed. , 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 402. These decisions did not involve the determination that an action could not be brought to enforce the forfeiture prescribed by the statute in a case of the sale of copies of a copyrighted painting where there was no finding in possession, and hence no proceeding to forfeit copies so found. Here, there is no attempt to recover in a second action penalties which should have been embraced in a former action; and the recovery is based simply upon the forfeiture incurred by sales of the prohibited copies.
Under § 14 of the judiciary act of 1789 1 Stat. at L. 81, chap. 20 (U. S. Rev. Stat. § 716, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 580), power was conferred upon the Federal courts to issue all writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the practice and usages of law. This comprehended the authority to issue subpoenas duces tecum, for 'the right to resort to means competent to compel the production of written, as well as oral, testimony, seems essential to the very existence and constitution of a court of common law.' Amey v. Long, 9 East. p. 484. Section 724, which was originally § 15 of the judiciary act of 1789, was to meet the difficulty arising out of the rules relating to parties at common law, and to provide, by motion, a substitute quoad hoc for a bill of discovery in aid of a legal action. Carpenter v. Winn, decided this day. 221 U. S. 533, 55 L. ed. , 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 683.
It was not the purpose of § 724 to interpose an obstacle to the exercise of the general power of the court with respect to the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum, and that was not its effect. The barrier, in the case of parties, existed independently of the provisions of the section, and by these it was sought to mitigate the resulting inconvenience. When, however, the rule as to parties was changed, it followed that the obstacle was removed, and by virtue of the general authority of the court, subpoenas duces tecum may run to parties as well as to others,leaving those who are subpoenaed to attack the process if of improper scope or lacking in definiteness, or to assert against its compulsion whatever privileges they may enjoy. See Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. pp. 203, 204, Fed. Cas. No. 9,448; Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S. 92, 50 L. ed. 673, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358.
It is insisted that the evidence was inadmissible under § 860 of the Revised Statutes. This ground, although it had been relied upon earlier in the trial, was not included in the objectionas it was formally stated at lengthwhen the books were finally produced and the entries offered. But, apart from this, the statute did not afford a sufficient basis for objection.
Section 860since repealed by the act of May 7, 1910, chap. 216 (36 Stat. at L. 352),was a re-enactment of § 1 of the act of February 25, 1868, chap. 13 (15 Stat. at L. 37), and provided:
In the present case, the question, therefore, must be whether, under the 4th and 5th Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, the defendant company, as it contends, was entitled to object to the admission in evidence of the entries from its books. As to this, we need only refer to the recent decisions of this court. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Nelson v. United States, supra; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 348, 349, 53 L. ed. 543, 544, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Wilson v. United States, decided May 15, 1911 221 U. S. 361, 55 L. ed. , 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 538.
CHARLES R. HEIKE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.