Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/814/655/336053/
Timestamp: 2020-02-24 10:52:04
Document Index: 40354065

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3237', '§ 843', '§ 3238', '§ 3237', '§ 843', '§ 3238']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Elijio Briceno, Appellant, 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1987 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Elijio Briceno, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Elijio Briceno, Appellant, 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987) Argued Nov. 13, 1986. Decided March 12, 1987
Appellant contends that under Article III, Section II of the United States Constitution, Amendment VI to that Constitution, Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 3237(a) and 3238, and Rule 18 of the Fed. R. Crim. P. he must be tried in the district of South Florida where he was first arrested.1 Appellant contends that venue in the Eastern District of North Carolina was manufactured by Agent Ridler in an effort to have the case prosecuted in a district considered to be more friendly to the position of the United States than is the Southern District of Florida.
Appellant contends that the telephone communications by and between the DEA agents, himself and his brother and nephew were not such contacts with the Eastern District of North Carolina as would support venue. In making this argument appellant relies upon our holding in United States v. Levy Auto Parts of Canada, 787 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1986). We do not find that Levy Auto Parts of Canada requires that venue in the present action is only proper in the Southern District of Florida. Levy involved a conspiracy originating outside the United States. The purpose of the conspiracy was to violate the Arms Export Control Act in procuring for exportation M60 tank engines by use of false certificates showing the destination of the engines to be Pakistan, when the engines were, under the conspiracy, to be delivered to Iran. One of the conspirators was arrested at Dulles International Airport in the Eastern District of Virginia and was indicted in that district with another alleged coconspirator, who resided in the District of Columbia. The Levy defendants contended that venue should have been laid in the Western District of Michigan because of an allegation in overt acts numbers 25 and 26 alleging that price information on the engines was requested and sent from the Western District of Michigan. Our court held that the district court erred in speculating that venue in the case might have been laid in the Western District of Michigan and in dismissing the indictment for lack of venue, because there was insufficient basis for a conclusion that venue under 18 U.S.C. 3238 in the Eastern District of Virginia was improper. The court held that the allegations contained in overt acts 25 and 26 were surplusage and were unnecessary, insubstantial and insignificant. However, in the present case the telephone calls to and from Elijio Briceno, his co-conspirators and the DEA agents are not simply overt acts of the two conspiracy counts, but make up eighteen substantive counts in the indictment of using a telephone in furtherance of a felony under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
As early as 1912 the Supreme Court decided that overt acts performed in one district by one of the parties, who had conspired in another district, gave jurisdiction to the court in the district where the overt act was performed. Hyde & Schneider v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). See also United States v. Anderson, 611 F.2d 504, 509 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1978).
The making and receiving of telephone calls within a district, which calls are overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy, is sufficient to establish jurisdiction for the prosecution of the conspiracy in such district. United States v. Whitaker, 372 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Pa. 1974) aff'd without opinion 503 F.2d 1400 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975). See also United States v. Spiro, 385 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Strickland, 493 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 801 (1974); United States v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 508 (11th Cir. 1982). Appellant argues that the DEA agent deliberately set out to manufacture jurisdiction in the Eastern District of North Carolina by giving him a telephone number to call in Wilmington, North Carolina. This argument might be appealing if all of the calls had been from the agent in the Eastern District of North Carolina to Briceno and his co-conspirators outside the district and outside the United States, but there were calls from the appellant outside the district to the telephone within the district, and tapes of all the telephone conversations show that such calls were in furtherance of the conspiracy to import controlled substances into the United States. The telephone call of February 26, 1985, from Elijio Briceno to the Wilmington telephone number is particularly important because in this call Briceno advised Agent Ridler that Briceno had access to cocaine. The trial court found as a fact that these calls were in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Appellant asserts that under 18 U.S.C. § 3238 he should have been tried in the Southern District of Florida where he was first arrested. The clear language of the statute does not support this contention. Section 3238 covers "all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district ...". To give the court jurisdiction under this Section, the offense must be committed out of the jurisdiction of any district or state. The present facts show that overt acts and substantive offenses were committed in the Eastern District of North Carolina and 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) applies.
Appellant contends that there was not sufficient admissible evidence to support his convictions as to the conspiracy to import marijuana in excess of one thousand pounds, the conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and the various counts of using a communications facility in furtherance of a felony. A guilty verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, taking a view of all of the evidence most favorable to the prosecution. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). The defendant was indicted on charges of conspiracy to import controlled substances into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. 963, and with using a communication facility in furtherance of a felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The essential elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the government on the conspiracy count are: (1) that two or more persons came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and (2) that the defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy. United States v. Sanchez, 722 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, --U.S. -- () . The essential elements required to be proved under 21 U.S.C. 843(b) are: (1) that the defendant used a communication facility, in this case a telephone, (2) that he used the telephone to facilitate the commission of a felony, and (3) that he did so knowingly and intentionally.
Appellant asserts that the court committed prejudicial error in allowing the admission of out of court declarations of alleged co-conspirators without first finding as a fact and concluding as a matter of law by a fair preponderance of independent evidence that appellant was a member of the conspiracy and participated therein. Defendant claims that this failure of the trial court violated his VI Amendment right to confrontation of the witnesses against him. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) (E) provides that a statement by a co-conspirator or a party during the course and in the furtherance of a conspiracy is not hearsay. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) the Supreme Court held that the introduction of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant did not violate the confrontation clause of the VI Amendment if (1) the government establishes that the declarant is unavailable and (2) the statements to be admitted bear sufficient indicia of reliability. The court held that reliability could be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In United States v. Chindawongse, 771 F.2d 840, (4th Cir. 1985) we concluded that evidence admitted under Rule 801(d) (2) (E) had sufficient indicia of reliability and guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the confrontation clause.
In United States v. Hines, 717 F.2d 1481 (4th Cir. 1983) we found that the admissibility of out of court statements by co-conspirators made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy were admissible under the above hearsay exception, but their admissibility was dependent upon the existence of substantial evidence of the conspiracy other than the statement itself. In Hines we also held that the trial judge retained the option to admit conditionally the declarations of co-conspirators before the conspiracy had been independently established, subject to the subsequent proof of the conspiracy by other evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 3238 offenses not committed in any district.