Source: https://openjurist.org/282/f3d/623
Timestamp: 2018-03-25 05:35:13
Document Index: 575941687

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 1291', '§ 201', '§ 1546', '§ 1001', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201']

282 F3d 623 United States v. Leyva | OpenJurist
282 F. 3d 623 - United States v. Leyva
282 F3d 623 United States v. Leyva
282 F.3d 623
Ralph LEYVA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 99-50793.
Filed February 25, 2002.
Ralph Leyva ("Leyva"), a former asylum officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), appeals his conviction and sentence for bribery and immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(2)(A) and (B), 1546, and 1001. Leyva argues that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that § 201(b)(2)(B) requires a public official to have used his official position in the commission of a fraud. He also argues that insufficient evidence supported his convictions; the prosecutor made impermissible comments during closing argument; and the district court erred in refusing to grant a downward departure during sentencing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
A grand jury indicted Leyva on two counts of bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) and (B), two counts of immigration document fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1546, and one count of causing a false statement to be made to the INS, 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Following trial, the jury found Leyva guilty on all five counts. Leyva's principal contention on appeal is that the district court erroneously rejected his proposed jury instructions on count two, which charged Leyva with violating § 201(b)(2)(B) by submitting Boza's falsified asylum and employment authorization applications in return for cash and services.
We review de novo the rejection of a defendant's jury instruction based on a question of law. United States v. Eshkol, 108 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.1997). Whether § 201(b)(2)(B) requires a defendant to use his official position in the commission of a fraud is a question of law.
Subsection 201(b)(2)(B) makes it unlawful for any
public official ... [to] directly or indirectly, corruptly demand[], seek[], receive[], accept[], or agree[] to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States.
Leyva argues that because § 201 criminalizes bribery of public officials, the term "corruptly" in § 201(b)(2)(B) must refer to the use of an official position. Without such a meaning, he contends, the subsection would become a general prohibition on fraud rather than on bribery. It is undisputed that the act of submitting Boza's applications to the INS did not involve use of Leyva's official position as an asylum officer.
The district court did not err in rejecting these instructions because Leyva's proposed "use of official position" condition is supported by neither the text of the statute nor case law. Under the rules of statutory construction, "[t]he plain meaning of the statute controls, and courts will look no further, unless its application leads to unreasonable or impracticable results." United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir.1999).
Here, the plain language of § 201(b)(2)(B) requires only that the public official accept a thing of value in exchange for perpetrating a fraud. The absence of any official act requirement is particularly pointed in light of explicit "official act" or "official duty" language in other subsections of § 201. See § 201(a)(3) (defining "official act"); § 201(b)(1)(A) (prohibiting paying an official "with intent to influence any official act"); § 201(b)(2)(A) (prohibiting an official from accepting payment in return for "the performance of any official act"); § 201(b)(1)(C) and (2)(C) (prohibiting giving or receiving value to induce acts in violation of the "lawful" or "official" duty of a public official); see also Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). Although the plain meaning of § 201(b)(2)(B) may not square with Leyva's personal understanding of bribery, application of the subsection as it stands does not lead to an unreasonable or impracticable result. We therefore hold that the use of an official position is not an element of the offense under § 201(b)(2)(B).
Moreover, the district court properly instructed the jury that, under § 201(b)(2)(B),
These instructions accord with our decision in United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir.1978),1 in which we explained that the term "corruptly" under the bribery sections of § 201 refers to the defendant's intent to be influenced to perform an act in return for financial gain. Id. at 995-96.
We find the remainder of Leyva's claims on appeal to be meritless. Because the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the elements of § 201(b)(2)(B), we affirm the conviction and sentence.
Although theStrand decision refers to official acts and duties, that case involved § 201(c)(3) (currently § 201(b)(2)(C)), which specifically prohibits an officer from accepting payment "in return for a violation of his official duty." Id. at 995.