Source: http://fhi.rg.mpg.de/2015-12-gagliardi/?l=en
Timestamp: 2017-03-23 08:19:11
Document Index: 578454701

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 233', 'art. 10', '§ 5', '§1', 'art. 1493', 'art. 1494', 'art. 886', 'art. 887', 'art. 233', 'art. 590']

MULTIPLE FORCED HEIRS AND THE ACTION FOR UNDUTIFUL WILL IN ROMAN LAW: CLASSICAL AND BYZANTINE TEXTS - FHI
3. A different solution to the problem of inheritance
increase and a new interpretation of the classical texts.
4. Paul. l.s. de
inoff. testam. D. 5.2.23.2 and a
relevant Byzantine text.
5. Ulp. 14 ad ed. D. 5.2.8.8 and a
1. This is the text of the conference presented at the Centre for Legal History of the University of Edinburgh on May 8th 2015. The fundamental
In classical Roman law, the testator’s children, parents, brothers and sisters that did
not receive from him in his Last Will and Testament (herein “will”) at least one fourth of
the share of inheritance due to them based on intestate succession (
) would have been able to file the action for undutiful will
inofficiosi
testamentary heirs. With this action they would have been able to obtain the entire share
of inheritance due to them
must clarify that these heirs, which we can call “forced heirs”, or “compulsory heirs”, or
“heirs with legal rights”
, would have been able to file
to obtain the entire share of
inheritance due to them
they were completely disinherited or alloted a part of the estate inferior to the
by the decedent’s will.
2. Hereafter we will always call the “fourth of the share of inheritance due to a person based on intestate succession” quarta debitae portionis (using a
3. These English expressions cannot be found in rules of law of common law systems, where “legal rights” out of a deceased person’s estate do not
Justinian intervened in this complex of rules in 528 (C. 3.28.30), introducing the
implendam
. He decided that the forced heir that was not completely
disinherited, but that had received less than the
, could have contested the will not to obtain the intestate
share due to him
, but only to
obtain that which was missing from the
; only the heir that did not receive anything
could have acted, as in the past, by means of
to obtain the entire share due
4. Iust. C. 3.28.30 pr. a. 528 (and 31, for oral testament) and Inst. 2.18.3. In Justinianic law and language the quarta debitae portionis has become
either according to the procedure of
(and thus before a praetor during the
phase and before the
phase), or according to
Having received less than the
not bring automatic victory to the forced heirs in the
lawsuits. On
the contrary, each forced heir had to demonstrate in contrast to the testamentary heir
that there were no subsistent valid reasons for his disinheritance
. If he was not able to demonstrate such, he lost.
5. In Nov. 18, Justinian would have given a complete list of cases in which the disinheritance of forefathers and descendants would have been valid.
When there was only one forced heir that had successfully brought
against the sole extraneous testamentary heir, the
will was completely rescinded and the entire intestate succession was opened
6. It goes without saying that because the outcome was that described, the testamentary heir had to be extraneous. If it had been the other way
There were different consequences when there were numerous testamentary heirs and/or
numerous heirs with legal rights as the joinder of parties did not exist in these
7. As we have maintained in L. Gagliardi, La divisione in consilia del collegio centumvirale e la basilica Iulia, in BIDR 101-102 (1998-1999, publ. 2005), 385
For that reason, when there was hypothetically one forced heir against various extraneous
testamentary heirs (A versus B
petitioner could have achieved rescission of the entire will (and the opening of the
intestate succession to his advantage) only if he had sued and defeated in court each of
the various testamentary heirs. Otherwise (if, for example, he had sued and defeated one
or two of various testamentary heirs), there would have been competition between intestate
and testamentary succession (partial rescission of will).
Greater problems were created if there were various heirs with legal rights and only one
extraneous testamentary heir (A
B) and the problems multiplied even more so if there were also numerous extraneous
testamentary heirs (A
We will consider here the case A
versus B. In this circumstance each disinherited co-heir with legal rights would have had
to act in court for the share due to him. If he asked for more (
), he would be met
with disadvantageous consequences, which meant losing the case in the regime of
until Justinian,
and gave rise to compensatory obligations in the
Justinianic time
8. The rule is documented in Gai 4.53-60 for the formulary procedure and it seems convincing that it could be valid also for the legis actiones.
9. Consult. 5.7; Zeno C. 3.10.1 (with Bas. 7.6.21); Inst. 4.6.24, 4.13.10; Iust. C. 3.10.2. Analytic treatise of this topic in G. Provera, La pluris petitio
We can imagine, for example, that two
, had been disinherited and
that the extraneous B was constituted testamentary heir.
separately against B, it was possible that A
could win and
could lose. In that case the will would have been
rescinded only
and there would have been competition of
intestate and testamentary succession.
Each forced heir had five years from the time of acceptance of inheritance by the
testamentary heir
10. This was the opinion of Ulp. 14 ad ed. D. 5.2.8.17. For Mod. l.s. de inoff. testam. D. 5.2.9 the term began from the time
Given that each forced heir could act autonomously, if the two hypothetical forced heirs
did not agree to act in court simultaneously, it was possible that one co-heir could file
while the other waited to file it at a later time.
It is to be believed that in this case the first brother that acted, had to limit himself
to act for his own share of intestate inheritance (
), bearing in mind the existence of the co-heir that could
have acted in turn at a later time within the prescription period.
adcrescendi
(“inheritance increase”): ancient texts and modern theories.
It could also happen that a co-heir with legal rights (in our example, one of two
brothers) vouched not to intend to ever file
We ask ourselves if, in that case, the brother that acted could benefit from the
(inheritance increase), claiming the share of his brother that had
repudiated the
. The intention to repudiate the
repudiantis
. (Conclusive evidence was equivalent to an expressed testament,
like, for example, to accept a bequest inferior to the
11. See Paul. 2 quaest. D. 5.2.17 pr. In Byzantine Greek, the expression used is ῥεπουδιατεύοντος ψυχή: see the Schol. 1 ad Bas. 39.1.14.
12. See Marcell. 3 dig. D. 5.2.10.1, Mod. l.s. de praescr. D. 5.2.12 pr., Tryph. 17 disp. D. 5.2.22 pr., Paul. 1 d. i. fisci D.
The disinherited co-heir petitioner had to know if he benefited from the inheritance
increase, because he would be met with the disadvantageous consequences of the
event he erroneously believed he benefited from it and acted in court with such a
The classical sources seem to give contradictory answers to the query posed.
According to Pasquale Voci
, and adhered to by various scholars
, there would have been a
on the subject between Paul on one side and
Papinian (whose opinion is adhered to by Ulpian) on the other. Paul’s opinion would be
attested by Paul.
. D. 5.2.23.2 (and would be confirmed by Paul.
. D. 5.2.17 pr.); Papinian and Ulpian’s opinion would
instead be attested by Ulp. 14
. D. 5.2.8.8.
13. P. Voci, Diritto ereditario romano, II2, Parte speciale. Successione ab intestato. Successione testamentaria, Milano 1963, 693 ff. Before him already E. Renier, Étude sur l’histoire
14. M. Marrone, Querela inofficiosi testamenti, Palermo 1962, 91, 106 ff.; L. Di Lella, Querela inofficiosi testamenti. Contributo allo studio della successione necessaria, Napoli 1972, 197
According to Voci, the
would have been relevant for Paul, but not for Papinian (and for Ulpian). In his opinion,
Papinian (and Ulpian) thought that if only one of the two disinherited sons had legally
, in any case he would only have been able to
obtain the share of inheritance due to him
, even if the other disinherited son had repudiated the
It seems Paul, instead, would have
acknowledged the right to inheritance increase.
Other authors have held that all the classical jurists did admit the inheritance increase
if a co-heir had repudiated the
and that contrasts, that
appear among the jurists, depend on Justinianic interpolations
15. G. La Pira, La successione ereditaria intestata e contro il testamento in diritto romano, Firenze 1930, 453-458; J. Ribas-Alba, Una pretendida controversia entre Papiniano-Ulpiano y
A different solution to the problem of inheritance
We intend here to offer a different interpretation. We too believe that Paul acknowledged
the inheritance increase in the event a co-heir with legal rights repudiated the
, but we do not share the notion that the other two jurists
If one reads Ulpian’s passage in which the right to inheritance increase is denied, one
can note that it is not said that the brother that did not file
had repudiated it
interpret the passage in the sense that he did not file the lawsuit without repudiating
it, and that he might have been waiting to possibly sue in the future.
16. This had in fact been observed in 1873 by Charles Parmentier, Droit romain. De la querela inofficiosi testamenti. Droit français. De la réserve des ascendants,
But there is more. This interpretation, which could only be speculative, indeed seems to
find confirmation in two Byzantine
relative to the two
passages corresponding to the cited
In the cases that we will consider, we are dealing with
works of sixth-century Byzantine jurists, making it possible they might have commented on
original works of the ancient
fragments were taken. In our cases, we are dealing with
that, following Heimbach
, we can presume
come from the Ἴνδιξ of Stephanos.
17. C.G.E. Heimbach, Manuale Basilicorum, in Id., Basilicorum Libri LX, VI, Prolegomena et Manuale Basilicorum continens, Lipsiae 1870, 217 ff., part. 233.
. D. 5.2.23.2 and a
First, let us read Paul.
. D. 5.2.23.2:
Si duo
exheredati
et ambo de
adcrescit
If two sons have been disinherited and both have brought an action for undutiful
will and one later has decided not to proceed, his share is added to that of the
other. It will be the same even if he has been barred because of a time limit.
This fragment considered two cases.
The first was that of two brothers disinherited by their father. Both had begun
, but one of the two had abandoned it (he had therefore
repudiated it). The brother that continued the action could enforce the right to
inheritance increase during the trial
18. Cf. also U. Zilletti, Studi, cit., 157.
In the second case, one co-heir acted while the prescription period had already expired
for the other. Even in this case there was inheritance increase
. It is interesting to consider
how it is possible that the prescription period had expired only for one of the co-heirs
and not for both.
19. The same solution, about inheritance increase, can be found in the other quoted passage by Paul, 2 quaest. D. 5.2.17 pr., which here it is
to Bas. 39.1.19, the Schol. 5 Scheltema
(= 2 Hb.) furnishes interesting
information. I report the text, dividing it in two segments:
20. BS 2325-20.
A - Προβαίνει καὶ τοῦτον εἰπεῖν τὸν θεματισμόν, ὅτι δύο παίδων ὄντων ἐξνερεδάτων
οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν ἐκίνησε πενταετίας ἐντός·ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ῥᾳθυμήσας, ὁ δὲ ῥeïpublícae
cau͂sa ἢ καθ’ ἑτέραν περίστασιν ἀπολιμπανόμενος, εἰ καὶ παρῆλθεν ἡ πενταετία κινεῖ·
e̓x magna γὰρ et iusta cau͂sa καὶ μετὰ πενταετίαν ἡ δεϊνοφικίοσο κινεῖται.
A - He proceeds to describe also this case in which neither of the two
disinherited brothers had brought the action in five years; but one because he did not
want to do it, and the other because he was absent
or for some other reason. And even
though the five years had passed, he sues in court;
ex magna et
, indeed, the
is exercised even after
B - Τοῦτο δὲ σημείωσαι, ὅτι μόνον τότε ὁ ἐξνερεδάτος παῖς πάρτεμ ποιεῖ, ὅτε
ἐφησυχάζει μέν, δύναται δέ, εἰ θελήσει, κινεῖν, οὐ μὴν ἔνθα ἰδικῶς ἀπετάξατο τῇ μέμψει
ἢ ἐτελεύτησεν ἢ ἀπεκλείσθη τῷ χρόνῳ.
B - Observe that the disinherited son really only has to be considered when and
namely he omits to bring about legal action – even if he can, if he wants – and
certainly not when he has expressly renounced the action, or died, or was barred by
relates to the second of the two cases in the
passage by Paul D. 5.2.23.2 and explains how it is possible that the right to action might
be barred for one of the two co-heirs with legal rights and not for the other whilst the
prescription period was the same for both.
It seems to belong to the
group, as can be gathered from the fact that it adds supplemental information to that
inferable from the passage from the
, and precisely credits
Paul ("He – i.e.: Paul – proceeds to describe also this case"), at least in segment A.
The case was reconstructed like this: neither of the two disinherited sons had acted
within the five years. However one of the two did not act by choice, and the other because
he had been absent
this case, the second forced heir had the right to be reinstated in terms of action, even
though the five-year prescription period had already passed, and he benefited from the
inheritance increase.
then closes with segment B, which contains a very
significant normative recap.
wrote that, ultimately, in any case in
which there were two disinherited children, one “counted” (πάρτεμ ποιεῖν is the expression
used in Greek) with regard to the other that filed
first still had the possibility to file a lawsuit on his own in the future. “To count”
means that he must be “considered,” and thus there could not be an inheritance increase.
Instead, this would not have happened if the first brother were no longer able to act,
either because he had expressly renounced the action, or perhaps he had died, or maybe
because the prescription period had expired. In that case he did not “count,” and could
therefore be excluded, meaning the inheritance increase could take place.
We do not know if the content of segment B was also, like the content of segment A, in
the original jurist’s text, or if it was added by the author of the
If the first hypothesis is true, it may be deduced that Paul’s text said the inheritance
increase had a place only if the
had been renounced and not
Ulp. 14
. D. 5.2.8.8 and a
Now we will introduce the reading of Ulp. 14
. D. 5.2.8.8,
dividing it into three segments:
excludendam
querellam
I – Since a quarter of the share due is enough to prevent a complaint,
exheredatus
II - we shall have to consider whether a disinherited person who does not complain
counts, for example, if two sons have been disinherited. In fact, he certainly will
count, as Papinian said in a reply; and if I bring an allegation of undutifulness, I
should claim not the whole inheritance, but only half of it.
puta, ex
III – Accordingly, if there are grandchildren by two sons, several by one, let us
say three, but only one from the other, a gift of an eighth prevents the only child
from bringing a complaint and a gift of one twenty-fourth any one of the
The first segment comes from a principle: the forced heir that had received the
could not file
. This is clear, we have no doubt about
After the expression of this general rule, we would expect that the fragment would focus
on a case surrounding the question of whether or not a certain subject had received the
and whether or not he could file
Surprisingly, however, the second segment considered a hypothesis that was totally
independent from the principle: that is, that there were two sons, that we will call
“Primo” and “Secondo”,
, and one testamentary
. Since the brother Secondo
did not proceed with the
, it was questioned whether or not
Primo benefited from the inheritance increase. Papinian answered that Primo had to
consider his brother, Secondo, who
, and did not benefit from the inheritance increase.
21. One might recognize a relationship between the first two segments if one believes that Secondo received the quarta debitae portionis (one eighth) and Primo asked
In the end, the third and last segment considered that the testator’s two sons had
predeceased him and one son left one child and the other had left three children. It was
asked what might be the minimum share of the inheritable estate (or
) that each of the four grandchildren would have
had to receive per testament from the forebearer in order to exclude the action for
undutiful will. The third segment connects well with the first. But the second does
So, this passage poses two problems for us.
The first problem is that it appears to give a solution in opposition to that of Paul on
the subject of inheritance increase. In other words, it seems to validate Voci’s theory on
the jurisprudential
Nevertheless we must note that it is never mentioned in this passage that the brother
Secondo had repudiated the
. One can therefore believe that
this is the reason for which Primo had limited himself in court to claiming only his share
The second problem is that the second segment of the passage does not appear to be even
minimally related to the first, while the third is. It also has some problems in grammar;
the subjects change. So, it is clear that the hand of the Compilers has brought at least
some changes. But which ones?
We hold it to be true that the
(= 16 Hb.) to Bas. 39.1.8
preserves the segment of what ought to be the richest original Ulpianic passage while, on
the one hand, allowing us to confirm the solution to the first problem posed from the
latin passage that we have just now touched on, while, on the other hand, offering the
solution to the second problem on a silver platter.
22. BS 2308-30.
23. On this scholion see also P. Pescani, Le Palingenesiae e gli antichi prudentes, in Studi in onore di Cesare Sanfilippo, IV, Milano 1983, 581 ff.,
Let us report the text of the
, dividing it in six
A - Ἐπειδὴ φθάσαντες εἴπομεν τὸ νόμιμον τῷ παιδὶ καταλιμπανόμενον ἀποκλείειν
τοῦτον τῆς μέμψεως, ἄξιον ἐντεῦθεν ζητῆσαί τε καὶ μαθεῖν, εἰ ἄρα ὁ ἐξνερεδάτος παῖς
ἐφησυχάζων párτεμ ποιεῖ τῷ ἀδελφῷ.
A - After it is said above that the reserved share of the estate
(τὸ νόμιμον) left to a son excludes him from the
, it is consequently opportune to examine and
understand if the disinherited son, that cannot file
must be considered by his brother.
B - Τί δὲ τοῦτο ἔστι, μάθε σαφέστερον. Δύο τις ἔχων παῖδας ἐξωτικὸν μὲν ἐνεστήσατο
κληρονόμον, ἐξνερεδάτους δὲ τοὺς παῖδας πεποίηκε,
καὶ θατέρῳ μὲν τῶν παίδων τὸ η´. τῆς οἰκείας περιουσίας καταλέλοιπε μέρος, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ τῶν παίδων
. Ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν παῖς, ᾧ μηδὲν καταλέλοιπεν ὁ πατήρ, ἐφησύχασεν,
οὐ ῥεπουδιατεύων
μέντοι τὴν μέμψιν
· βούλεται δὲ ὁ ἕτερος τῶν παίδων ὁ τὸ η´. μέρος ἔχων παρὰ γνώμην τοῦ
τεστάτορος ἕτερον η´. ἔχειν λέγων, ὅτι ὁ ἐξνερεδάτος μου ἀδελφὸς οἷα δὴ γεγονὼς
ἐξνερεδάτος καὶ ἐφησυχάζων τετελευτηκέναι δοκεῖ, καὶ μόνος εἰμὶ τοῦ κατοιχομένου παῖς.
Μόνον δέ με ὄντα δίκαιόν ἐστι, φησί, τὸ νόμιμον ἔχειν ποστημόριον.
B - What this might be, you learn more clearly. A fellow, that had two sons,
constituted an extraneous heir and disinherited his sons,
son an eighth of his estate and the other nothing
. The son that was left
nothing by his father kept quiet
without, however, repudiating
. Rather the other
son, that had received his eighth of the estate, against the will of the testator
wants another eighth of the estate too, affirming: «my disinherited brother, given
that he was disinherited and stays silent, appears dead, so I prove to be the
decedent’s only son.» And adds: « it’s right that I have the reserved share of the
estate that is due to me considering the fact that I am the only existing son.»
C - Ταῦτα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ δικαιολογουμένου
φησὶν ὁ Παππιανὸς πάρτεμ ποιεῖν πἐκείνῳ τὸν ἐφησυχάζοντα, μὴ ῥεπουδιατεύοντος μέντοι ψυχῇ ἀδελφόν
, τουτέστι μέρος ἔχειν σὺν ἐκείνῳ δοκεῖν, καὶ μὴ
νομίζεσθαι μόνον εἶναι τὸν νῦν ἐπιφυόμενον παῖδα μηδὲ ὀφείλειν τέλειον κομίζεσθαι τὸ
νόμιμον ποστημόριον·
C - In the matter of he who says such and affirms having this right,
confirms that he must consider
the brother that stays silent if he does not have
: that is to say, in other words, (Papinian confirms) that
(the brother) appears to have a share with him (= other than him), and it is not
possible to maintain that only that son exists, who has until now come forth, nor may
he claim the entire reserved share of the estate;
D - pártem δὲ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν τῷ ἀδελφῷ
τοσοῦτον, ὅτι ἔνθα μηδὲν αὐτῷ κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ τεστάτορος καταλέλειπται
, καὶ ἁρμόττει δεϊνοφφικίοσο ἐπὶ καταλύσει τῆς
διαθήκης, ἐφησυχάζει δὲ θάτερος τούτων, κινῶν ὁ ἕτερος οὐ πᾶσαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος
καταλύσει τὴν διαθήκην.
D – and (Papinian confirms again) that he (
who remains silent) must be considered by his brother,
nothing has been left to the latter
(i.e. the brother that intends to act in
court) for will of the testator and he is due the
the testament, if one of these two remains silent, the other one that acts may rescind
the testament, not in its entirety but in part.
E - Συνελόντα τοίνυν εἰπεῖν ὁ ἐξνερεδάτος παῖς
κἂν ἐφησυχάζῃ, μὴ ῥεπουδιατεύοντος
μέντοι ψυχῇ, πάρτεμ δοκεῖ ποιεῖν
ἐκείνοις, οἷς ἅμα αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς ἀναπληρώσεως ἁρμόττει
δίκαιον ἢ ἐπὶ καταλύσει τῆς διαθήκης ἡ μέμψις. Ἀνάγνωθι τὸ ιζ´. διγ. τοῦ παρόντος
E - Simply put, the disinherited son,
, must be considered
by those who, together with him, are due
the right to either reinstate the reserved share of the estate or file
to rescind the testament. See
F - Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰ παῖδας ἔχων ἐξνερεδάτους ὁ τεστάτωρ ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὴν
ἰδίαν διαθήκην. Τί δέ, ὅτι ἀπὸ δύο προτελευτησάντων παίδων ἔχων ἐγγόνους, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ
ἑνὸς ἕνα καὶ μόνον, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου δύο ἢ καὶ τρεῖς, βούλεται αὐτοὺς ἀποκλεῖσαι τῆς
μέμψεως; Πόσον ἄρα τῆς αὐτοῦ περιουσίας τούτοις καταλιμπάνειν μέρος ὀφείλει; Τοῦτο δὲ
ἡ ἐξ ἀδιαθέτου κανονίζει σοι κλῆσις. Εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, πῶς ἤμελλον οὗτοι κληρονομεῖν ἐξ
ἀδιαθέτου καλούμενοι δηλονότι i̓nstiprés, τουτέστι κατὰ τὰς ῥίζας. Καὶ ὁ μὲν εἷς
ἔγγονος, ὃς ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐτέχθη υἱοῦ, ἓξ ἐλάμβανεν οὐγκίας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου τεχθέντες,
ὅσοι δ’ ἂν εἶεν, τὰς ἑτέρας ἕξ. ’In<sti>près γάρ, ὡς εἶπον, κληρονομοῦσιν οἱ ἐκ
διαφόρων παίδων τεχθέντες ἔγγονοι. Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν ἑνὶ ἐγγόνῳ μίαν ἥμισυ καταλιμπάνων ὁ
πάππος οὐγκίαν, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις τρισὶν οὖσιν ἀπὸ ἡμιουγκίου (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τῶν
ἐξ ἀδιαθέτου τὸ δ´.), τὴν οἰκείαν ἀσφαλίζεται διαθήκην.
F - What has been said holds for the case that the testator who has children and
has dinsiherited them in his will. What can be said, instead, if, having grandchildren
from the two predeceased sons – only one grandchild from one son; two or even three
from the other son – the testator wants to exclude them from the
? What share of his estate must he leave them? This is clarified by the
laws on intestate succession. Tell me effectively in which way it was forseen that
these subjects would be heirs in intestate succession: certainly
, or representation. And (so) the grandchild born from
one son received six twelfths, while the grandchildren born from the other son the
remaining six. Indeed, as I said, the grandchildren born from different sons inherit
. Consequently, if the grandfather left the first
grandchild an eighth and the other three grandchildren a twenty-fourth (which would
be, indeed, a fourth of what they would be due
), he would render the will valid.
Segment A also begins with the principle that receiving the
. – in Justinianic
law – the reserved share of the estate, τὸ νόμιμον) blocks one from being able to file the
action for undutiful will.
But one ought to note: after this was said, segment B describes a case that has
The case was this. A
had constituted a heir who was
an extraneous to the family, disinheriting his two sons, Primo and Secondo, and leaving
(perhaps with
bequest) an eighth of his estate, that is the equivalent of his
, to Primo (as the words written in bold in
section B demonstrate).
Primo had petitioned while Secondo had not, without however developing – the
specifies –
(oὐ ῥεπουδιατεύων μέντοι τὴν μέμψιν: see the underlined words of
The argument that Primo had presented to the court was that since Secondo had not acted,
it was as if he did not exist in nature and therefore should not have to be considered.
Hence, Primo asserted in court that it was not true that he was due only an eighth of the
estate (or half of a fourth), but he sustained that he was due a fourth of the entire
estate (claiming Secondo’s eighth too). One must incidentally observe that the action that
Primo brought, which is referred to in the
, was not the
(to which it is to be believed it was actually referred to in
Ulpian’s original text), but rather the Justinianic
. An update of
the classical action therefore intervened in time, updating it in the corresponding
Byzantine law. But this particularity does not prevent the comprehension of what was the
original content of the Ulpianic text.
It is well seen how it might be possible to put the examined case in relation with the
underlying principle, that receipt of the
excluded possibility to bring the action for undutiful will: the
relationship exists in the fact that Primo had not been totally disinherited by his
father, but he had received an eighth of the estate. If that eighth of the estate had been
, he would not have
been able to file any petition to challenge the will’s validity. But Primo claimed that
his brother, Secondo,
therefore believed to be able to file rightly the
to recognize his right to a fourth
of the inheritable estate (two eighths).
The jurist’s solution is reached in segment C. The
attributes Papinian with the response that, in a case like this one being examined, if
Secondo stayed silent without
, he had to be considered by his brother, Primo (see the underlined
words). And, therefore, Primo would not have been able to sue to obtain the distributive
share due to his brother.
From this it can be deduced
that Papinian also held that if Secondo had instead manifested such
, Primo could have rightfully claimed his brother’s share in court. Ulpian
shared Papinian’s opinion.
This segment is important for our thesis as it proves that not just Paul – as believed by
Voci – but also Papinian, followed by Ulpian, allowed
. So, no
existed between jurists.
We come to examine segment D of the
. Compared to segment
B, this one considered and confronted a
case: one in
which both brothers (Primo and Secondo) had been
disinherited by their
(see the words in bold).
The difference between the case described in segment B and that considered in segment D
is evident: in segment B, Primo had obtained an eighth of the estate; in segment D, he had
not been alloted anything. Moreover, it ought to be noted that the question revolved
around the fact that if, for Justinianic/Byzantine law, Primo could file not the simple
to challenge the validity of the entire
Papinian’s solution was that if, of the two disinherited brothers, Primo had filed
Secondo had remained silent (but evidently without
), Primo would have
been able to claim only his share (
24. As it has been clearly said before, describing the case in B and in C.
Segment E of the
articulated the legal principle that was
the basis of the solution given for the two
fragments B and D. We note that Papinian’s response was integrated with Justinianic law
(with the reference to the
The last segment, F, finally and more broadly corresponds to the third segment of
Ulpian’s passage.
In drafting the text D. 5.2.8.8, the Justinianic Compilers, if what we have inferred from
Sch. 18 is correct, perform a drastic reduction of the original text, eliminating an
entire case (that of the brother that had received an eighth of the estate, which he
believed did not represent his
leaving only the case of the two totally disinherited brothers.
But in this way the second segment of D. 5.2.8.8 ceases to correspond with the first
segment of the same passage.
Why did the Compilers eliminate this case? Because dealing with it, in 533, would have
meant having to talk about – as happened in the
which, although it had already existed for five years by that time, Justinian and
Tribonian chose never to mention it in the
25. Instead, it is notable that the Basilicorum scholia do not consider neither Nov. 18 pr.-2 (which, in 536 brought the portio legitima to a third
The examination of the passages from the
Basilicorum
, which have been considered, allow us to draw two
conclusions: one limited to a specific subject of Roman law and the other more
First of all, thanks to the
demonstrate that, contrary to what is held true by current mainstream doctrine on the
, all jurists
agreed on one point: if there were multiple forced heirs, the others benefited from an
inheritance increase only if one of these repudiated the
otherwise there could be no increase.
The second conclusion is broader. In relation to the texts specifically examined, we can
generally reaffirm a fact that, while not shared by everyone, is well noted in the
Romanistic doctrine: some
provide a wealth of information and allow scholars to make out the original
texts of the classical authors upon which the Justinianic Compilers were based, permitting
them to perceive in which way the compilers sometimes brutally worked on the texts that
they found themselves handling.
This is the text of the conference presented at the Centre for Legal History of the
University of Edinburgh on May 8th 2015. The fundamental
footnotes have been added. The author thanks very warmly his colleague Dr. Paul J. du
Plessis for the invitation and all the participants at the conference for their very
useful comments. English translations of the passages of the Digest are by Tom Kinsey, published in The Digest of
Justinian, Latin Text edited by T. Mommsen with the
aid of P. Krueger, English Translation edited by A. Watson, I, Philadelphia 1985. English translations of the Basilicorum scholia are by the author of
this article. A slightly different Spanish version of this paper has been published in
the Seminarios Complutenses de Derecho Romano 28 (2015), 381-396, with the title Querela inofficiosi testamenti con pluralidad de herederos forzosos (derecho romano y bizantino).	2
Hereafter we will always call the “fourth of the share of inheritance due to a person
based on intestate succession” quarta debitae portionis (using a technical Roman expression attested for example in Ulp. 14
ad ed. D. 5.2.8.8, commented herafter; the quarta debitae portionis is also called
portio debita).
3 These English
expressions cannot be found in rules of law of common law systems, where “legal
rights” out of a deceased person’s estate do not exist (as opposed to civil law
systems). The expression “forced heirs” is found in the Louisiana
Constitution (1974), art. 10, § 5 (Amended by Acts 1995, No. 1321, §1): “The legislature shall provide for the classification of descendants,
of the first degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced heirs. The
legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants of any age who, because of
mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their
persons or administering their estates. The amount of the forced portion reserved to
heirs and the grounds for disinherison
shall also be provided by law. Trusts may be authorized by law and the forced
portion may be placed in trust”. The art. 1493 (Forced heirs; representation of
forced heirs) of the Louisiana Civil Code (1825, 1870 and
following revisions) provides: “Forced heirs are descendants of the
first degree who, at the time of the death of the decedent, are twenty-three years
of age or younger or descendants of the first degree of any age who, because of
mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently incapable of taking care of
their persons or administering their estates at the time of the death of the
decedent”. And art. 1494 (Forced heir entitled to legitime; exception)
explicitly states: “A forced heir may not be deprived of the portion
of the decedent's estate reserved to him by law, called the legitime, unless the decedent has just cause to disinherit
him”. Before the Amendment Acts of 1995, No. 1321, all the descendants of the
first degree had legal rights on the inheritance of the deceased person, without age
limits. For the rich debate on the rules on forced heirs in Louisiana, especially
after the Amendment Acts of 1995, see K.J. Miller, The New Forced Heirship Law, Its Implementing Legislation, and Major
Substantive Policy Changes of the Louisiana State Law Institute's Proposed
Comprehensive Revision of the Successions and Donations Laws, in Tulane Law Review 71 (1996), 223 ff.; K. Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship
Changes: The Regrettable “Revolution” Completed, in Louisiana
Law Review 57 (1996), 55 ff.; K. Venturatos Lorio, Forced
Heirship: The Citadel Has Fallen -- Or Has It?, in Louisiana
Bar Journal 44 (1996), 16 ff.; T. York, Protecting Minor Children from Parental Disinheritance: A Proposal for
Awarding a Compulsory Share of the Parental Estate, in Law
Review of Michigan State University - Detroit College of Law (1997), 861 ff.;
K. Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic or
Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century?, in Louisiana Law
Review 63 (2002), 1 ff.; R.J. Scalise Jr., Rethinking the Doctrine of
Nullity, in Louisiana Law Review 74 (2014), 663 ff. On
the Louisiana Civil Codes, A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana (1999), in Civil
Law Commentaries 1 (2008), 1 ff.; A. Parise, Private Law in Louisiana: An Account of Civil Codes, Heritage, and Law
Reform, in J.C. Rivera (ed.), The
Scope and Structure of Civil Codes, Dordrecht 2013, 429 ff. The expression
“compulsory heirs” can be found in The Civil Code of the
Philippines (Republic Act No. 386, June 18, 1949), whose art. 886 provides:
“Legitime is that part of the testator's
property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs”. And art. 887 states: “The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate children and
descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default
of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged
natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate
children referred to in Article 287. Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5
are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another. In
all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father
or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the
extent established by this Code”. See E. Pineda, Succession and Prescription, Quezon City 2009, 236 ff. Finally,
the expression “heirs with legal rights” can be taken from the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, 36: “«legal rights» means
jus relicti, jus relictae, and legitim”. The legal rights in force, which apply whether the
estate is testate or intestate, are those which can be claimed only from the moveable
estate of a deceased person. These are jus relicti (the right of the surviving husband), or jus relictae (right of the surviving wife)
and legitim or bairn’s part (the right of the children). For recent discussions about
reform of these legal rights, see Scottish Law Commission
Promoting Law Reform, Report on Succession Laid before the
Scottish Parliament by the Scottish Ministers under section 3(2) of the Law
Commissions Act 1965, Edinburgh 2009.	4 Iust. C. 3.28.30 pr. a. 528 (and 31, for oral
testament) and Inst. 2.18.3. In Justinianic law and language
the quarta debitae portionis has become the
(fundamental, on this topic, A. Sanguinetti, Dalla querela alla portio legitima. Aspetti della successione necessaria nell’epoca tardo imperiale e giustinianea, Milano 1996). In Byzantine Greek texts it is called τὸ
νόμιμον.	5 In Nov. 18, Justinian would have given a complete list of cases in
which the disinheritance of forefathers and descendants would have been
valid.	6 It goes without saying that because the outcome was
that described, the testamentary heir had to be extraneous. If it had been the other
way around, with a forced heir of equal status to the petitioner, the petitioner would
have had to claim just half of the estate in court with the actio.	7 As we have maintained in L. Gagliardi, La divisione in consilia del collegio centumvirale e la basilica Iulia, in BIDR 101-102 (1998-1999, publ. 2005), 385
ff.	8 The rule is documented in Gai 4.53-60 for the
formulary procedure and it seems convincing that it could be valid also for the legis actiones.	9
Consult. 5.7; Zeno C. 3.10.1 (with Bas. 7.6.21); Inst. 4.6.24, 4.13.10; Iust. C. 3.10.2. Analytic treatise of this
topic in G. Provera, La pluris petitio nel processo romano,
II, La cognitio extra
ordinem, Torino 1960, 87 ff.; U. Zilletti, Studi sul processo civile giustinianeo, Milano 1965, 152 ff.; F.
Sitzia, Su una costituzione di Giustiniano in
tema di sportulae, in BIDR 75 (1972), 221 ff.; G. Provera, Lezioni sul processo civile giustinianeo, Torino 1989, 225 f.; G. Luchetti, La legislazione imperiale nelle Istituzioni di Giustiniano, Milano 1996, 523 f.	10 This was the opinion of Ulp.
14 ad ed. D. 5.2.8.17. For Mod. l.s. de inoff. testam. D. 5.2.9 the term began from the time of the decedent’s
death. Ulpian’s opinion is adopted by Iust. C. 3.28.36.2 a. 531.	11 See Paul. 2
quaest. D. 5.2.17 pr. In Byzantine Greek, the expression used
is ῥεπουδιατεύοντος ψυχή: see the Schol. 1 ad Bas.
39.1.14.	12 See Marcell. 3
dig. D. 5.2.10.1, Mod. l.s. de praescr. D. 5.2.12 pr., Tryph. 17 disp. D. 5.2.22 pr., Paul. 1 d. i. fisci D. 34.9.5
pr. (and cf. also Paul. l.s. de septemvir. iud. D.
5.2.31.3-4). For other cases of conclusive evidence, see Paul. l.s. de inoff. testam. D. 5.2.23.1-2, eod. 32
pr., Schol. 5 Scheltema (= 2 Hb.) ad Bas.
39.1.19.	13 P. Voci, Diritto ereditario romano, II2, Parte speciale. Successione ab intestato. Successione testamentaria, Milano 1963, 693 ff.
Before him already E. Renier, Étude sur
l’histoire de la querela inofficiosi en droit romain, Liège 1942,
120.	14 M. Marrone, Querela inofficiosi testamenti, Palermo 1962, 91, 106 ff.; L. Di
Querela inofficiosi testamenti. Contributo allo studio della successione necessaria, Napoli 1972, 197 ff.; R. Fercia, Querela inofficiosi testamenti e iudicatum: problemi e prospettive tra II e III secolo, in Diritto@Storia. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Giuridiche e Tradizione Romana
11 (2013), 3 f., nt. 18 ff.	15 G. La Pira,
La successione ereditaria intestata e contro il testamento in diritto romano, Firenze 1930,
453-458; J. Ribas-Alba, Una pretendida controversia entre Papiniano-Ulpiano y Paulo: en torno a D.5.2.19 (Paulo
2 quaest.) y una hypótesis sobre la legítima, in Iura 39 (1988), 75 ff.	16 This had in
fact been observed in 1873 by Charles Parmentier, Droit romain. De la querela inofficiosi testamenti. Droit français. De la réserve
des ascendants, thèse pour le doctorat, Paris 1873, 83, but his observation has
not been taken into consideration by more recent authors.	17
C.G.E. Heimbach, Manuale Basilicorum, in Id., Basilicorum Libri LX, VI, Prolegomena et Manuale Basilicorum continens, Lipsiae 1870, 217 ff., part. 233.	18 Cf. also
U. Zilletti, Studi, cit., 157.	19 The same solution, about inheritance increase, can be found in
the other quoted passage by Paul, 2 quaest. D. 5.2.17 pr.,
which here it is not necessary to examinate.	20
BS 2325-20.	21 One might recognize a relationship
between the first two segments if one believes that Secondo received the quarta debitae portionis (one eighth) and Primo asked if
he could consider his brother as having disavowed his inheritance, and for that reason
he would be able to hence deprive him of his share. However, believing that Secondo
had repudiated for having accepted the quarta debitae portionis would be unreasonable and would have created a series of problems
for Secondo, which the text does not suggest (he would have been excluded from his
father’s estate without being able to defend himself). It is impossible that Primo had
received an eighth of the estate as, in that case, he would have had to, if anything,
file (for the Justinianic law) the actio ad implendam legitimam and not the
action for undutiful will, which is a matter of the fragment. I further develop some
observations on this point later in the text.	22
BS 2308-30.	23 On this scholion see also P.
Pescani, Le Palingenesiae e gli antichi prudentes, in Studi in
onore di Cesare Sanfilippo, IV, Milano 1983, 581 ff., part. 590 f.	24 As it has been
clearly said before, describing the case in B and in C.	25 Instead, it is notable that the Basilicorum
scholia do not consider neither Nov. 18 pr.-2 (which, in 536
brought the portio legitima to a third of the share ab intestato for up to four children and half if there were more than four
children) nor Nov. 115 (which, in 542, rendered it necessary that descendants and
parents be constituted heirs in wills). I indicate that the ancient scholion probabily originated prior to 536.	Aufsatz vom 11. Dezember 2015
Erstveröffentlichung11. Dezember 2015
Lorenzo Gagliardi, MULTIPLE FORCED HEIRS AND THE ACTION FOR UNDUTIFUL WILL IN ROMAN LAW: CLASSICAL AND BYZANTINE TEXTS (11. Dezember 2015), in forum historiae iuris, http://www.forhistiur.de/2015-12-gagliardi/ Mail