Source: http://ipbiz.blogspot.com/2013/01/
Timestamp: 2018-01-20 08:46:28
Document Index: 170232823

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 112', '§ 103', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§41', '§ 103', '§ 103']

IPBiz: January 2013
Consistent with our institutional responsibility as well as Federal regulation this web page will set the record straight regarding the background, the allegations, and the University’s investigation and findings.
The Federal regulation link is to 42 CFR 93:
from a post by Jonathan Feldman on Blackberry/RIM :
￼￼￼￼Ex parte Yen discusses product by process issues, and cites In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695 (CAFC 1985) and In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799.
In Ex parte GUDRUN CLAUS-HERZ
KSR is cited as to predictable results:
As to ranges:
A prima facie case of obviousness exists where the claimed ranges “overlap or lie inside ranges disclosed in the prior art.” In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 267 (CCPA 1976); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
“[A] prior art reference that discloses a range encompassing a somewhat narrower claimed range is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.” In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Appellant Coleman wins obviousness reversal in food bar case
From Ex parte Coleman:
KSR was cited in a way to "cut back" on obviousness:
During examination, the Examiner bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
Appellants win:
Appellants argue, and we agree, that the Examiner has not adequately explained why one skilled in the art would modify the food bar of Manning to incorporate water-soluble dietary fibers in each of the components of the food bar. App. Br. 12-14. The Examiner has not adequately explained why the redistribution of water-soluble dietary fibers would lead to any organoleptic property that would offset the fibers’ off taste because, as argued by Appellants, the off flavors would still exist whether or not the fibers are in one layer or in multiple layers. Id. at 13. Thus, the Examiner’s proposed modification does not solve the problem of the fibers’ off taste.
KSR was cited as to hindsight:
Here, the Examiner’s proposed modification appears premised on using Appellants’ claimed invention as a road map rather than an articulated reasoning based on teachings derived from the applied references’ disclosures. The fact finder must be aware “of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. at 421(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (warning against a “temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue”)); see In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The mere fact that the prior art may be modified in the manner suggested by the Examiner does not make the modification obvious unless the prior art suggested the desirability of the modification.”).
No unexpected results found in Ex parte Dagle
A microchannel reactor is involved: In addition, the heat exchange capacity of the microchannel reactor permits a contact time of less than about 0.3 seconds, thereby reducing the formation of undesirable chemical products that “can result from secondary reactions or slow parallel reactions” (id. at col. 4, ll. 18-23).
The examiner is reversed in Ex parte Dow
Of note are the footnotes:
From Ex parte Beyda
Appellant lost on double-patenting. The Federal Circuit stated the appropriate procedure for a double-patenting rejection as follows: “we start by examining the claims of the . . . patent, and by assessing the prior art references in order to ascertain whether the PTO made out a prima facie case of obviousness.” In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 895-96 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also In re Aldrich, 398 F.2d 855, 863 (CCPA 1968) (examining a secondary reference for its teachings in a double patenting rejection).
Of different solutions: Prior art does not teach away from claimed subject matter merely by disclosing a different solution to a similar problem unless the prior art also criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the solution claimed. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We find that Doss and Horvitz propose different solutions to similar problems in the same field of predicting user availability.
From Ex parte Rits
That is, Appellants have not factually responded to the Examiner specific citations to the references nor to the reasons why the Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to combine the references. Arguments of counsel and discussions of caselaw, standing alone, cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. (In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139- 40 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Attorney argument is not evidence. (In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974)). Lawyer’s arguments and conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative value. (In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
KSR is cited in Ex parte Yoon but only for a general statement about obviousness.
In an account relating to Cissy Houston discussing her daughter Whitney (Nippy) Houston with Oprah Winfrey:
The parent [Cissy] claims she taught the megastar [Whitney] everything she knows and the family used to joke that she stole everything about her singing style from her mother.
She continued to Oprah: ‘I made her what she was. She had been watching me in sessions and onstage for years, picking up pacing, breathing, and microphone techniques, and then adding her own little nuances, too.
'My son Michael used to joke with me about Nippy’s technique—“ Ma,” he’d say, “Nippy should be in jail for stealing all your riffs and everything. You should sue her.”’
From within the post:
The move comes despite concerns from lawmakers on both sides of the aisle about a Chinese firm taking over a company -- and technology -- that U.S. taxpayers helped fund through $249 million in grants.
Originally developed by NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratories, the technology behind the ultra-light lithium-ion phosphate batteries being bought will play a major role in modernizing the way electricity is generated and distributed. The new tech could also be used in key military operations and to power satellites and unmanned military drones.
The appellants lost in Allergan v. Barr/ Teva/ Sandoz
The only claim term disputed before the district court was –N(R4)2 as used in claim 5, on which asserted claim 10 depends. The parties disagree whether or not –N(R4)2 requires identical R4 substituents. If it does, bimatoprost’s use of nonidentical R4 substituents— hydrogen (H) and an ethyl group (CH2CH3)—would fall outside the protection of the ’819 patent.
Allergan got the nod at district court:
it ultimately found that Allergan had acted as its own lexicographer by defining –N(R4)2 to permit nonidentical R4 elements. Therefore, the district court held that, as used in the ’819 patent, the –N(R4)2 limitation did not require the R4 substituents to be identical. Allergan, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d at 726-27.
Reasoning by the district court had to be explained:
Barr and Sandoz nevertheless focus on the district court’s preliminary conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of –N(R4)2 required identical R4 elements. However, this preliminary conclusion was based on ex- trinsic evidence, such as expert testimony that “[t]he (X)y nomenclature” was “commonly used” to represent identi- cal substituents, Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 725, which failed to consider the –N(R4)2 term as it was used in the ’819 patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (“Properly viewed, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.”) (emphasis added).
***The CAFC was oblique on "what" was going on as to the -N(R4)2 business.
One thinks back to Pfizer v. Ranbaxy, 457 F.3d 1284, 79 USPQ2d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Ranbaxy argued, and won on, failure to comply with
35 USC § 112, paragraph 4:
“Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.”
If -N(R4)2 were construed according to the customary usage (both R4 entities the same), then dependent claim 10 (in allowing R4 to be different) is broader in scope than claim 5.
Also, with claim 5 referencing a "formula", dependent claims 6-10, speaking of a "compound" lack antecedent basis.
Claim 5, in pertinent part: A method of treating ocular hypertension or glaucoma which comprises applying to the eye an amount sufficient to treat ocular hypertension or glaucoma of the formula ##STR16##
Claim 6, in pertinent part: The method of claim 5 wherein said compound
The feature which ran till 7:30pm (eastern) was the interview with both President Obama and Secretary Clinton.
Clinton: We live in a very dangerous and very complicated world. (..) I'm older than the President and I remember speeches of Eisenhower. (...) It's not always easy to perceive exactly what must be done.
Obama: There are transitions and transformations that are happening across the world.
...Find opportunities where our involvement can make a difference and be opportunistic about it.
Second up, an interview with Travis Tygart done by Scott Pelley. The first text concerned the definition of cheater. Tygart of USADA, 1000 pages of evidence, in a report, a reasoned decision. Tygart talked about Armstrong's access to special information. Armstrong said he did not dope in 2009 and 2010. There is an issue of statute of limitations. The term "omertà" arose. Parts of this scheme were run like the Mafia. Hamilton: "People were afraid of Lance Armstrong."
Why did DoJ drop of the case? A Swiss lab director (Saugie) was told by UCI to meet with Armstrong and Johan Berneil and to describe testing. Oprah asked Armstrong about the 2001 test. Tygart talked about involvement of Armstrong with UCI. Tygart talked about a potential donation to USADA. Lance wants to make a financial donation to USADA. Influence and intimidation. Christian Van DeVeld. If he didn't dope, he'd be off the team. Frankie Andrieu was kicked off the team. Levi Leipheimer. Text: Run don't walk. Anonymous threats against Tygart. Putting a bullet in his head. Livestrong Foundation lobbied against USADA.
Armstrong is faced with a lawsuit brought by Floyd Landis, which has a potential liability of $90 million.
Armstrong has a deadline of Feb. 6, 2013 to respond to USADA.
"Cheat your way to the top, and if you get to be big, you could be too big to be accountable."
Ex parte Braeken, 54 USPq2d 1110 (BPAI 1999) , is cited in Ex parte Hochsmann .
In Ex parte NAGAZUMI, the appellant lost: We affirm the stated rejection for substantially the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Answer.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
An appellant may attempt to overcome an examiner’s obviousness rejection on appeal to the Board by submitting arguments and/or evidence to show that the examiner made an error in either (1) an underlying finding of fact upon which the final conclusion of obviousness was based, or (2) the reasoning used to reach the legal conclusion of obviousness. Similarly, the applicant may submit evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness [(internal citation omitted)].
To overcome obviousness
In this regard, the burden of production rests with Appellants to establish that the reported tests provide results that are unexpected, that the comparisons are with the closest prior art, and that the showing is commensurate in scope with the claimed subject matter. See In re Klosak, 455 F.2d 1077, 1080 (CCPA 1972).
Appellants have not proffered any persuasive scientific explanation articulating why the reported results for the limited examples presented would have been logically expected to accrue over the extensive scope of the representative claim 20 subject matter so as to discharge Appellants’ burden of establishing unexpected results that are reasonably commensurate in scope with the claimed subject matter (Ans. 12-14; see generally Br.). See In re Dill, 604 F.2d 1356, 1361 (CCPA 1979).
Board reaches back to in Ex parte Rogers to 1876 case
The Board in Ex parte Rogers cites the 1876 base of Dunbar v. Myers snd refers to writings of Thomas Jefferson.
The Board decision in MINISTRY OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, TRINIDAD, W.I. v. TREVOR KING was an appeal from re-examination 95/000,255, with the requestor Ministry of Legal Affairs, Trinidad, West Indies. The Board affirmed obviousness rejections.
Claim 1 from US 6,750,386 begins:
A cycle of fifths steel pan device comprising:
a first series of musical instruments bonded in a 360 degree circumference (...)
KSR was invoked:
Argument (b) is unsupported by objective evidence of record and is therefore merely conclusory. Attorney argument does not take the place of evidence where evidence is required. Even so, Appellant has not explained why a need to “remake the pan” would have rendered the modification unobvious nor that the modifications would have been so extensive as to require more than the “ordinary creativity” possessed by the person of ordinary skill. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
CAFC in Hall v. Bed Bath and Beyond mainly reverses SDNY; BB&B loses
The CAFC case Hall v Bed Bath and Beyond comes out badly for Bed Bath and Beyond.
One gets the gist of matter early on:
On March 20, 2009, while the ’439 patent application was pending, Mr. Hall contacted Bed Bath & Beyond (“BB&B”) to discuss whether BB&B would provide retail sales of the Tote Towel. At a business meeting, Mr. Hall left samples of his packaged Tote Towel with BB&B. Both the package and the towel were marked “patent pending.” BB&B then, through a supplier West Point Home, Inc., had copies of the Hall towel manufactured in Pakistan, for retail sale by BB&B. The patent duly issued, and Mr. Hall sued BB&B, West Point Home, and several executives of BB&B, for patent in- fringement, for unfair competition under the Lanham Act, and for misappropriation under New York statutory and common law.
We conclude that the counts of patent infringement, unfair competition, and misappropriation were not subject to dismissal on the pleadings, but affirm the district court’s dismissal of the counts against the BB&B executives who had been sued in their personal capacity
The term "common sense" appears
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The first year Civ Pro case of Conley v. Gibson appears:
The district court stated that the complaint should have included answers to questions such as: “What is it about Plaintiff’s towel that he claims is ‘new, original and ornamental,’ meriting the protection of a design patent?” Order at 16. The Federal Rules, and the Court in Twombly and Iqbal, do not so require. In Twombly the Court stated that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Here the defendants never stated that they were not apprised of Hall’s infringement claim and its grounds.
As to design patents
In addition, the district court erred in its view of design patent law, for, as confirmed in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), infringement of a design patent is based on the design as a whole, not on any “points of novelty.” As stated in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1993), “[i]n conducting [infringement] analysis the patented design is viewed in its entirety, as it is claimed.” See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (infringement is determined by visual comparison of the pictured design and the accused article).
False advertising arose
The Second Circuit has explained that “the text of the Lanham Act makes it clear that a false advertising claim can properly be brought against a defendant who misrepresents the quality of its own goods as well.” Société Des Hotels Meridien v. LaSalle Hotel Operating P’ship, L.P., 380 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2004). (...)
Precedent guides that if BB&B’s advertising state- ment is literally false, it may be actionable “without reference to the advertisement’s impact on the buying public.” Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 112 (quoting McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991)). If the statement is not literally false but is merely misleading, remedy may still be available, but the evidentiary burden is higher. In Tiffany the court ex- plained that to prevail on a likelihood-of-confusion theory based on false advertising, the plaintiff must demonstrate through “extrinsic evidence” that a “statistically significant” portion of the consumer base would be confused.
Back in first year property at the University of Chicago, a visiting professor asked the rhetorical question of "why" squatters could not benefit from adverse possession.
In the news in January 2013:
from post Man Squatting in $2.5M Mansion Attempts 'Adverse Possession'
CBS presents "Person of Interest" on Thursday nights. The show depicts resolution of potential crimes by information technology analysis of video cam outputs.
On Thursday, January 24, 2013, CBS KYW did an exclusive story on the breaking of the gruesome murder case of 35-year-old Dr. Melissa Ketunuti, who was strangled, with her body set on fire. High resolution video from a store near Ketunuti's home captured Jason Smith of Levittown following the doctor and later leaving the vicinity of the doctor's home. See Cops: Argument With Exterminator Led To Murder Of CHOP Doctor . Real life emulating art?
KYW noted Jason Smith had received favorable reviews on Angie's List.
Also, Todd Quinones did a story (with video by Jose Mora; Barbara Lou Jeffries) on a streaker hanging onto a SEPTA bus. The streaker went after one of the video takers and was video'd by the other.
Also on surveillance cameras:
from Texting Woman Falls Into Icy Canal
Ex parte JOHANNESSON
Accordingly, the claim requirement of a sensor that includes two different regions that measure different information about an object with different resolutions is a combination of familiar elements from Leonard and Eberhard respectively that would have yielded predictable results. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
The appellant won a reversal of obviousness rejections in Ex parte CHRISTISON .
The dispositive issue before us is whether the Examiner has erred in
determining that the combination of Aoki and Takada teaches or would have suggested “one of said barrel and said mount comprising a polycarbonate material and the other of said barrel and said mount comprising a liquid crystal polymer (LCP) material, said LCP material being self-lubricating so that the interface between said mount and said barrel is lubricated” (claim 19, emphasis added).
The bottom line in Soverain v. Newegg was that Newegg wins:
The claims in suit of the ’314 and ’492 patents are invalid for obviousness over the CompuServe Mall system. The claims of the ’639 patent are invalid for obvi- ousness over Johnson in view of additional prior art, and the other evidence presented. The judgments of validity are reversed, and therefore the judgments of infringement and damages are vacated.
Newegg did lose on its jury trial argument:
Newegg argues that it was wrongfully deprived of a jury determination of the question of obviousness, pointing to the extensive testimony on this issue at trial. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 “allows the trial court to remove cases or issues from the jury’s con- sideration ‘when the facts are sufficiently clear that the law requires a particular result,’” Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 448 (2000) (quoting Wright & Miller, Feder- al Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 1995)). The Court has explained that the purpose of Rule 50 is “to speed litigation and avoid unnecessary retrials.” Neeley v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 326 (1967).
In passing, an Inventio case was cited:
Inventio AG v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 2011-1615, 2012 WL 5907489, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 27, 2012) (non-precedential) (reversing judgment of nonobvi- ousness when patent was “a clear example of a ‘combination of familiar elements according to known methods [yielding] no more than . . . predictable results.’” (citations omitted)).
Also, precedent does not require “expert” opinions on matters of law. In Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 871 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1991) this court observed that “[a]n expert’s opinion on the ultimate legal conclusion is neither required nor indeed ‘evidence’ at all.” Avia Group Int’l v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“an expert’s opinion on the legal conclusion of obviousness is neither necessary nor controlling”).
We conclude that the prior art CompuServe Mall system, by clear and convincing evidence, rendered obvi- ous the “shopping cart” claims: claims 34 and 51 of the ’314 patent and claim 17 of the ’482 patent. These claims are invalid; the district court’s contrary ruling is reversed.
PTO Br. 24. We observe that Rexnord was not the appel- lant before the Board, and that the premise is an incorrect statement of the appellate process. On judicial review, the correctness of the decision appealed from can be defended by the appellee on any ground that is supported by the record, whether or not the appellant raised the argument. See Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957) (“A successful party in the District Court may sustain its judgment on any ground that finds support in the record.”); Glaxo Group Ltd. v. TorPharm, Inc., 153 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“an appellate court may affirm a judgment of a district court on any ground the
law and the record will support so long as that ground would not expand the relief granted”); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 822 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Ap- pellees always have the right to assert alternative grounds for affirming the judgment that are supported by the record.”); Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 807 F.2d 964, 969 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“a court of appeals may affirm the judgment of a district court on any ground, including grounds not relied upon by the district court”).
From the Wall Street Journal on 3 October 2012:
In a statement posted on its website Wednesday, the FDA said it started receiving reports from patients who were experiencing reduced efficacy after being switched from Wellbutrin XL 300 mg to its generic counterparts. The agency said the problems appear to be associated with the Impax/Teva product.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration said Wednesday the product, Budeprion XL 300 milligrams, which is manufactured by Impax Laboratories Inc. and marketed by Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., "is not therapeutically equivalent to Wellbutrin XL 300 mg" or the extended-release version of Wellbutrin.
In a post titled A Drug Recall That Should Frighten Us All About The FDA
Brian Williams seemed dopey and disoriented on NBC Nightly News with Lester Holt on Sunday, January 20, 2013.
"No two of these speeches are different, no two presidential administrations are different...." And on Obama's second term: "...second terms are for legacies, second terms can be fraught and problematic...."
Earlier Brian had mentioned an intelligent man talking to him about the second inaugural to the effect the highs won't be as high, the lows won't be as low. Inspection of the internet finds that quote, elsewhere: Terri Weijohn said, because with direct sales, "The highs are not going to be as high and the lows aren't going to be as low."
Speaking of copying, Brian talked about known copyist Kearns-Goodwin. "We're going to have Doris Kearns-Goodwin on hand tomorrow who wrote the book just in case...."
Meanwhile, Lester did no better, identifying Stan Musial as the shortstop for the St. Louis Cardinals. Musial was not a shortstop. There are very few lefthanded shortstops!
The News ended with an interview with Dr. Terence Roberts, one of the Little Rock Nine.
Separately, Pasadenan Dr. Terence Roberts, One of the Little Rock Nine, Inspires Students
See http://video.msnbc.msn.com/nightly-news/50529129/#50529244
posted by Lawrence B. Ebert at 3:42 PM 0 comments
See the Boston Globe post You patented it, you own it? Not so fast including the text:
Patents become no more than a starting point for negotiation. A patent is a document that gives its holder an opportunity to bargain, a seat at the table—not an absolute right to everything that springs from an idea.
A patent right is a right to exclude others, not a right to make something. A patent gives the owner a right to negotiate with others.
Plagiarism by Bedminster, NJ Superintendent of Schools
See the post School board: We're satisfied superintendent accused of plagiarism 'understands her mistake' concerning Bedminster Superintendent of Schools Carolyn R. Koos.
IPBiz has followed various stories relating to the intellectual property of Bimbo Bakers, who own, among other things, the rights in Thomas' English Muffins.
Now, there's a problem with the bagels.
See the story from WINK News in Ft. Myers, FL Publix recalls bagels that may contain metal. Possibly included are certain lots of Thomas Cinnamon Raisin Bagels
and Thomas Plain Bagels.
More related to IP, see
AP runs Bimbo story . From within the IPBiz post: n all, the Mexican company has 35 bakeries in the USA turning out national brands such as Entenmann's pastries, Boboli pizza crusts and Thomas' English Muffins to regional brands such as Brownberry bread and Mrs. Baird's snack cakes. About 43% of Bimbo's 2009 sales were in the USA.
From the wrap: In a story about the expansion of the Panama Canal, [William] Booth [of the Washington Post] took lines from the journal Environmental Health Perspectives, an ethical breach he called a "very serious lapse" but said in a public apology, released by the Post, that it was accidental.
As usual, an assertion of inadvertent plagiarism.
The author of the material copied by Booth was Andrea Hricko.
UPDATE. See also
from within Ex parte VAN BERKEL
“[A] machine is a ‘concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.’ This ‘includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.’” Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh’g denied en banc, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 70 (2008)).
Nehls is quoted:
In a precedential Opinion, an expanded Board panel held that nonfunctional descriptive material (sequence data) did not distinguish the claimed computer-based system from a prior art system that was the same except for its sequence data. See Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1887-88 (BPAI 2008) (precedential).3 It follows that Appellants have not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as being anticipated by Erdogan.
See also Ex parte Mathias, 84 USPQ2d 1276, 1279 (BPAI 2005) (informative), aff’d 191 Fed. Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating if a claimed phrase cannot alter how the process steps are to be performed to achieve the utility of the invention or merely states an intended use or purpose for the data, it is not entitled to patentable weight)
from Ex part SHEPHERD
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc). “[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. (citations omitted). One shows possession “by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc. that fully set forth the claimed invention.” Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, we find that at least Appellants’ Fig. 2 sufficiently describes the use of a “normal” browser prior to transitioning to a secure browser and then returning control back to the original browser (i.e., the normal browser).
Thus, Appellants’ arguments do not take into account what the collective teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art and are therefore ineffective to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)(“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”) (citations omitted, emphasis added). This reasoning is applicable here and Appellants have failed to rebut the collective teachings.
Although the written description rejection was reversed, the ultimate finding of non-patentability was affirmed.
From Ex parte MILOSAVLJEVIC
The claim concerned:
A method for using a desktop including a display for forecasting a likelihood that a customer’s assets held in a plurality of different types of customer accounts at retirement meet in-retirement goals, including, but not limited to, an annual income withdrawal goal, an estate goal, and a years in retirement goal ...
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11-20, 36, 39-41, and 43-48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Corrin (US 2002/0035527 A1, pub. Mar. 21, 2002) in view of Tracey Longo, The First Cut Is The Cheapest: Retirement distributions can come from many sources IRAs, 401(k)s, and so on. Knowing where to start can prolong earnings growth, Financial Planning. New York, 1-4 (Apr. 1, 1999) (hereinafter “Longo”).
As to descriptive material:
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) need not give patentable weight to descriptive material absent a new and unobvious functional relationship between the descriptive material and the substrate. See In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1983; In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); and In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11-20,
36, 39-41, and 43-48 is AFFIRMED.
This decision contains several new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
from within Ex parte WARBURTON
On naked assertions:
Although Appellant points out what claims 3, 4 and 6 recite and assert that the references do not teach those limitations (id. at 12-13), such conclusions are not considered a separate argument for patentability. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Dependent claims 3, 4 and 6 therefore stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Concerning burden switching [as in In re Best]:
Obviousness analysis permits an examiner to rely upon “common sense” or the knowledge of the skilled artisan to bridge gaps in prior art’s explicit teachings. KSR Int'l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 167 L.Ed.2d 705 (2007) (“Common sense teaches ... that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”). The examiner’s reasoning “may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to a person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion.” Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
...size of an article under consideration which is not a matter of invention,” citing In re Rose, 220 F.2d 459 (CCPA 1955).
from within Ex parte Hara
“Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).
Keller is also cited:
We do not find Appellant’s arguments to be persuasive. In particular, we observe that Appellant attacks the cited references in isolation. (Appeal Brief 11-26; Reply Brief 1-10). Appellant’s arguments do not take into account what the collective teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art and are therefore ineffective to rebut the Examiner's prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)(“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” (Emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
Ex parte Dacosta includes references to cases which might lead one not to include prior art in a background section.
HOWEVER, 102(b) prior art is usually readily identifiable, and admitting the obvious is not such a big deal. Making a clear distinction from prior art is usually helpful in moving prosecution along.
Constant v. Advanced Microdevices, 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (CAFC 1988)
In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 571 n.5 (CCPA 1975)
Note from stratfordpub Obviousness Standard for Patents [by Paul Davis, Scott Szala] :
the AIA legislatively overrules the Nomiya line of cases, wherein admissions can make prior art out of non‐prior art. See In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 571 (CCPA 1975). Thus, admissions should remain as non‐statutory prior art.
Separately, on a "noticed fact"
MPEP 2144.03(C)
37 CFR 1.111(b)
Note from wikipedia: There is a popular misconception that the ships were burned rather than sunk. This misconception has been attributed to the reference made by Cervantes de Salazar in 1546 as to Cortés burning his ships.
Also: Tariq ibn Ziyad
posted by Lawrence B. Ebert at 3:29 PM 0 comments
The removal of Hoy’s strips 58, 60 creates a first opening capable of article removal when utilized with articles of appropriately configured sizes and shapes. See Ans. 4. The burden shifted to Appellants to show that removal of Hoy’s strips 58, 60 would not necessarily create a first opening that would allow for article removal. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (once the Examiner finds that the prior art structure would be capable of performing all of the functions claimed, the burden shifts to the applicant to show that this is not the case). Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive (...)
[the examiner]concludes that “adding [the divider pad] would have been obvious because the selection of a known material based upon its suitability for the intended use is a design consideration within the skill of the art.” Id. (citing In re Leshin, 227 F.2d 197 (CCPA 1960)).
Appellants contend that the instant case is distinguishable from the facts of In re Leshin. Reply Br. 7-8. In particular, Appellants contend that “the question [in the present case] is not the selection of a known material [as in Leshin, but] rather . . . whether it would have been obvious to add the claimed additional structure to the Hoy carton.” Id. The reasoning to support a conclusion of obviousness may, in appropriate circumstances, properly come from legal precedent established by prior case law. See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990). However, we find that the facts in the prior legal decision of Leshin are not sufficiently similar to the instant case to support the Examiner’s sole reliance on legal precedent in making a conclusion of obviousness. “The key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious.” See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
from WINK News on a story from Punta Gorda, FL on 16 Jan 2013
On June 30, 1993, officers responded to the 3700 block of Whippoorwill Blvd. for a report of a missing 64-year-old woman. Frances Hendrickson was last seen by a neighbor driving her 1987 light blue colored Buick station wagon.
Approximately two years ago, the case was reopened using sonar to search City canals for the missing woman's vehicle. Detectives teamed up with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Sarasota County Sheriff's Office, and the Lee County Sheriff's Office in the effort. Earlier today, using a new advanced sonar technology, a light blue colored station wagon was discovered in a canal behind the intersection of Whippoorwill Blvd. and Eider Street, just blocks from the missing woman's home. This area was previously searched by air and water numerous times. The Punta Gorda Police Dive Team has secured the location.
Within Ex part BAUMGARTNER, General Electric overcame the Examiner's rejections but got new rejections courtesy of KSR.
Of KSR
“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. As noted by the Court in KSR, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” 550 U.S. at 421. (...) Applying the KSR standard of obviousness to the findings of fact, we conclude that the person of ordinary creativity would have predictably combined the load detecting circuit for detecting contact with the skin of Akisada with the ultrasonic transducer of Emery since Emery is interested in “determining if a probe is coupled to a body to be imaged” (Emery, col. 6, ll. 31-32; FF 10). Such a combination is merely a “predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Of written description
[T]he hallmark of written description is disclosure.... [T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
While the Examiner is correct that the specific language of the claims was not disclosed ipsis verbis in the Specification, ipsis verbis support is not required. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Zletz is cited
With regard to claims 8 and 10, we interpret these claims to require that the physical sensor is turned on using a manual power switch, but the claims do not require that the switch solely function to turn on the physical sensor, but may be a switch which activates the entire ultrasound system. See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[D]uring patent prosecution when claims can be amended, ambiguities should be recognized, scope and breadth of language explored, and clarification imposed.”).
relationships between the various components which are clearly depicted in those drawings. See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir 1991). The Examiner merely relies on Figure 2 for its description of the relative sizes and relationships among the three chambers shown in the figure. The Examiner does not rely on “precise proportions” shown in Becker’s Figure 2. Instead, the Examiner finds that the figure discloses a middle chamber that is shorter than the side chambers. We agree that Becker’s Figure 2 discloses this relationship to a skilled artisan, and thus the Examiner’s reliance on the figure is permitted. In re Aslanian, 590 F.2d 911, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1148 (emphasis in original). A Trex employee carefully measured Zagelmeyer’s Figure 3, which illustrated a plank with a convex top surface. The Trex employee used those measurements to generate a computer model of the plank to establish that the plank had a relevant thickness ratio of 1:39 or 1:37. Id. Based on the computer model, the district court concluded that Zagelmeyer anticipated claim 18. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court because “the district court erred in determining invalidity based on evidence improperly derived from a patent drawing” in violation of the principles of Hockerson and In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124, 1127 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (rejecting PTO’s reliance on drawings not to scale to find that prior art taught “chime length of roughly 1⁄2 to 1 inch for a whiskey barrel”). Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1149.
Appellants correctly point out that Becker contains no written description of the length of chamber 16 in comparison to the lengths of chambers 12, 14. Reply Br. 7. We further agree with Appellants that Becker fails to disclose that its Figures are drawn to scale. Id. The Examiner thus relies solely upon Becker’s Figure 1 for his finding that Becker teaches the length relationships of independent claims 18 and 20. In doing so, the Examiner errs in the same way that the district court erred in Nystrom. Therefore, we reverse the rejection of claims 18-20 under § 103(a) as obvious over Becker.
Separately, of the appellants trying to import limitations from the specification into the claims -->
in the claims themselves.” Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Therefore, we decline to import this range of ratios from the Specification into claims 1, 12, and 21.