Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/469/189
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 02:05:02
Document Index: 104089339

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 14', '§ 2', '§ 33', '§ 32', '§ 15', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 33', '§ 15', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 15', '§ 33', '§ 15', '§ 33', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 22', '§ 14', '§ 33', '§ 12', '§ 13', '§ 22', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 34', '§ 37', '§ 11', '§ 2', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 34', '§ 35', '§ 37', '§ 33', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 33', '§ 3', '§ 45', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 14', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 37', '§ 1526']

PARK 'N FLY, INC., Petitioner, v. DOLLAR PARK AND FLY, INC. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
469 U.S. 189 (105 S.Ct. 658, 83 L.Ed.2d 582)
* Petitioner operates long-term parking lots near airports. After starting business in St. Louis in 1967, petitioner subsequently opened facilities in Cleveland, Houston, Boston, Memphis, and San Francisco. Petitioner applied in 1969 to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) to register a service mark consisting of the logo of an airplane and the words "Park 'N Fly."1 The registration issued in August 1971. Nearly six years later, petitioner filed an affidavit with the Patent Office to establish the incontestable status of the mark.2 As required by § 15 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 433, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1065, the affidavit stated that the mark had been registered and in continuous use for five consecutive years, that there had been no final adverse decision to petitioner's claim of ownership or right to registration, and that no proceedings involving such rights were pending. Incontestable status provides, subject to the provisions of § 15 and § 33(b) of the Lanham Act, "conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark. . . ." § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. 1115(b).
Respondent also provides long-term airport parking services, but only has operations in Portland, Oregon. Respondent calls its business "Dollar Park and Fly." Petitioner filed this infringement action in 1978 in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon and requested the court permanently to enjoin respondent from using the words "Park and Fly" in connection with its business. Respondent counterclaimed and sought cancellation of petitioner's mark on the grounds that it is a generic term. See § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 1064(c). Respondent also argued that petitioner's mark is unenforceable because it is merely descriptive. See § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e). As two additional defenses, respondent maintained that it is in privity with a Seattle corporation that has used the expression "Park and Fly" since a date prior to the registration of petitioner's mark, see § 33(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(5), and that it has not infringed because there is no likelihood of confusion. See § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. 1114(1).
Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 in order to provide national protection for trademarks used in interstate and foreign commerce. S.Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1946). Previous federal legislation, such as the Federal Trademark Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 724, reflected the view that protection of trademarks was a matter of state concern and that the right to a mark depended solely on the common law. S.Rep. No. 1333, at 5. Consequently, rights to trademarks were uncertain and subject to variation in different parts of the country. Because trademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of product quality, Congress determined that "a sound public policy requires that trademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given them." Id., at 6. Among the new protections created by the Lanham Act were the statutory provisions that allow a federally registered mark to become incontestable. §§ 15, 33(b), 15 U.S.C. 1065, 1115(b).
The provisions of the Lanham Act concerning registration and incontestability distinguish a mark that is "the common descriptive name of an article or substance" from a mark that is "merely descriptive." §§ 2(e), 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), 1064(c). Marks that constitute a common descriptive name are referred to as generic. A generic term is one that refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (CA2 1976). Generic terms are not registrable, and a registered mark may be canceled at any time on the grounds that it has become generic. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 1052, 1064(c). A "merely descriptive" mark, in contrast, describes the qualities or characteristics of a good or service, and this type of mark may be registered only if the registrant shows that it has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., it "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." §§ 2(e), (f), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), (f).
This case requires us to consider the effect of the incontestability provisions of the Lanham Act in the context of an infringement action defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive. Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982). With respect to incontestable trade or service marks, § 33(b) of the Lanham Act states that "registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark" subject to the conditions of § 15 and certain enumerated defenses.3 Section 15 incorporates by reference subsections (c) and (e) of § 14, 15 U.S.C. 1064. An incontestable mark that becomes generic may be canceled at any time pursuant to § 14(c). That section also allows cancellation of an incontestable mark at any time if it has been abandoned, if it is being used to misrepresent the source of the goods or services in connection with which it is used, or if it was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of § 4, 15 U.S.C. 1054, or §§ 2(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. 1052(a)-(c).4
One searches the language of the Lanham Act in vain to find any support for the offensive/defensive distinction applied by the Court of Appeals. The statute nowhere distinguishes between a registrant's offensive and defensive use of an incontestable mark. On the contrary, § 33(b)'s declaration that the registrant has an "exclusive right" to use the mark indicates that incontestable status may be used to enjoin infringement by others. A conclusion that such infringement cannot be enjoined renders meaningless the "exclusive right" recognized by the statute. Moreover, the language in three of the defenses enumerated in § 33(b) clearly contemplates the use of incontestability in infringement actions by plaintiffs. See §§ 33(b)(4)-(6), 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4)-(6).
The language of the Lanham Act also refutes any conclusion that an incontestable mark may be challenged as merely descriptive. A mark that is merely descriptive of an applicant's goods or services is not registrable unless the mark has secondary meaning. Before a mark achieves incontestable status, registration provides prima facie evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce. § 33(a), 15 U.S.C. 1115(a). The Lanham Act expressly provides that before a mark becomes incontestable an opposing party may prove any legal or equitable defense which might have been asserted if the mark had not been registered. Ibid. Thus, § 33(a) would have allowed respondent to challenge petitioner's mark as merely descriptive if the mark had not become incontestable. With respect to incontestable marks, however, § 33(b) provides that registration is conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark, subject to the conditions of § 15 and the seven defenses enumerated in § 33(b) itself. Mere descriptiveness is not recognized by either § 15 or § 33(b) as a basis for challenging an incontestable mark.
The Court of Appeals in discussing the offensive/defensive distinction observed that incontestability protects a registrant against cancellation of his mark. 718 F.2d, at 331. This observation is incorrect with respect to marks that become generic or which otherwise may be canceled at any time pursuant to §§ 14(c) and (e). Moreover, as applied to marks that are merely descriptive, the approach of the Court of Appeals makes incontestable status superfluous. Without regard to its incontestable status, a mark that has been registered five years is protected from cancellation except on the grounds stated in §§ 14(c) and (e). Pursuant to § 14, a mark may be canceled on the grounds that it is merely descriptive only if the petition to cancel is filed within five years of the date of registration. § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. 1064(a). The approach adopted by the Court of Appeals implies that incontestability adds nothing to the protections against cancellation already provided in § 14. The decision below not only lacks support in the words of the statute; it effectively emasculates § 33(b) under the circumstances of this case.
These arguments are unpersuasive. Representative Lanham's remarks, if read in context, clearly refer to the effect of the defenses enumerated in § 33(b).6 There is no question that the Lanham Act altered existing law concerning trademark rights in several respects. For example, § 22, 15 U.S.C. 1072, provides for constructive notice of registration and modifies the common-law rule that allowed acquisition of concurrent rights by users in distinct geographic areas if the subsequent user adopted the mark without knowledge of prior use. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415-416, 36 S.Ct. 357, 361, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1916) (describing pre-Lanham Act law). Similarly, § 14 cuts off certain grounds for cancellation five years after registration and thereby modifies the previous rule that the validity of a trademark could be attacked at any time. See White House Milk Products Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 27 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1194, 111 F.2d 490 (1940). Most significantly, Representative Lanham himself observed that incontestability was one of "the valuable new rights created by the act." 92 Cong.Rec. 7524 (1946).
The dissent echoes arguments made by opponents of the Lanham Act that the incontestable status of a descriptive mark might take from the public domain language that is merely descriptive. Post, at 214-216. As we have explained, Congress has already addressed concerns to prevent the "commercial monopolization," post, at 214, of descriptive language. The Lanham Act allows a mark to be challenged at any time if it becomes generic, and, under certain circumstances, permits the nontrademark use of descriptive terms contained in an incontestable mark. Finally, if "monopolization" of an incontestable mark threatens economic competition, § 33(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(7), provides a defense on the grounds that the mark is being used to violate federal antitrust laws. At bottom, the dissent simply disagrees with the balance struck by Congress in determining the protection to be given to incontestable marks.
More generally, respondent is simply wrong to suggest that third parties do not have an opportunity to challenge applications for trademark registration. If the Patent Office examiner determines that an applicant appears to be entitled to registration, the mark is published in the Official Gazette. § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. 1062(a). Within 30 days of publication, any person who believes that he would be damaged by registration of the mark may file an opposition. § 13, 15 U.S.C. 1063. Registration of a mark provides constructive notice throughout the United States of the registrant's claim to ownership. § 22, 15 U.S.C. 1072. Within five years of registration, any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by registration may seek to cancel a mark. § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. 1064(a). A mark may be canceled at any time for certain specified grounds, including that it was obtained fraudulently or has become generic. § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 1064(c).
The Lanham Act, as the dissent notes, post, at 217, authorizes courts to grant injunctions "according to principles of equity." § 34, 15 U.S.C. 1116. Neither respondent nor the opinion of the Court of Appeals relies on this provision to support the holding below. Whatever the precise boundaries of the courts' equitable power, we do not believe that it encompasses a substantive challenge to the validity of an incontestable mark on the grounds that it lacks secondary meaning. To conclude otherwise would expand the meaning of "equity" to the point of vitiating the more specific provisions of the Lanham Act.7 Similarly, the power of the courts to cancel registrations and "to otherwise rectify the register," § 37, 15 U.S.C. 1119, must be subject to the specific provisions concerning incontestability. In effect, both respondent and the dissent argue that these provisions offer insufficient protection against improper registration of a merely descriptive mark, and therefore the validity of petitioner's mark may be challenged notwithstanding its incontestable status. Our responsibility, however, is not to evaluate the wisdom of the legislative determinations reflected in the statute, but instead to construe and apply the provisions that Congress enacted.
John Morrell, the judicial authority providing the most direct support for the decision below, was subsequently overruled in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (CA7), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 91, 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976). In Union Carbide the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that its earlier decision in John Morrell was unsupported by the language or legislative history of the Lanham Act and had been based on a misreading of Rand McNally. 531 F.2d, at 373, 377. A registrant may rely on the incontestable status of the mark in an infringement action, Union Carbide concluded, and a " 'defendant faced with an incontestable registered mark cannot defend by claiming that the mark is invalid because it is descriptive.' " Id., at 377 (quoting 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11.16, p. 377 (1st ed. 1973)).
The mark "Park 'N Fly" is at best merely descriptive in the context of airport parking.3 Section 2 of the Lanham Act plainly prohibits the registration of such a mark unless the applicant proves to the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office that the mark "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce," or to use the accepted shorthand, that it has acquired a "secondary meaning." See 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), (f). Petitioner never submitted any such proof to the Commissioner, or indeed to the District Court in this case. Thus, the registration plainly violated the Act.
The legislative history of the incontestability provisions indicates that Congress did not intend to prevent the use of mere descriptiveness as a substantive defense to a claim of infringement if the mark has not acquired secondary meaning. The testimony in the Committee hearings concerning the public interest in preventing the grant of monopoly privileges in the use of merely descriptive phrases expressly relied on the administrative practice that was incorporated into § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. 1052(f),10 as a protection against the improper registration of merely descriptive marks. Thus, Dr. Karl Pohl testified:
On the basis of the record in this case, it is reasonable to infer that the operators of parking lots in the vicinity of airports may make use of the words "park and fly" simply because those words provide a ready description of their businesses, rather than because of any desire to exploit petitioner's goodwill.20 There is a well-recognized public interest in prohibiting the commercial monopolization of phrases such as "park and fly." When a business claims the exclusive right to use words or phrases that are a part of our common vocabulary, this Court should not depart from the statutorily mandated authority to "rectify the register," 15 U.S.C. 1119, absent a clear congressional mandate. Language, even in a commercial context, properly belongs to the public unless Congress instructs otherwise.21 In this case we have no such instruction; in fact, the opposite command guides our actions: Congress' clear insistence that a merely descriptive mark, such as "Park 'N Fly" in the context of airport parking, remain in the public domain unless secondary meaning is proved.
After the right to use a registered mark has become incontestable, § 33(b) provides that "the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark." 15 U.S.C. 1115(b). Read in isolation, this provision surely does lend support to the Court's holding. Indeed, an isolated and literal reading of this language would seem to foreclose any nonstatutory defense to an action to enjoin the infringement of an incontestable mark. The Court, however, wisely refuses to adopt any such rigid interpretation of § 33(b).22
An examination of other provisions of the Act plainly demonstrates that no right to injunctive relief against infringement automatically follows from the achievement of incontestable status. Thus, § 34 states that courts with proper jurisdiction "shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable." 15 U.S.C. 1116. If a registrant establishes the violation of any right, § 35 additionally emphasizes that any recovery shall be "subject to the principles of equity." 15 U.S.C. 1117. These sections are in addition to the broad power that § 37 grants to courts in "any action involving a registered mark" to "determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations, in whole or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action." 15 U.S.C. 1119. Moreover, it is well established that injunctions do not issue as a matter of course,23 and that "the essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity,"24 particularly when an important public interest is involved.25
In exercising its broad power to do equity, the federal courts certainly can take into account the tension between the apparent meaning of § 33(b) and the plain command in §§ 2(e), (f) of the Act prohibiting the registration of a merely descriptive mark without any proof of secondary meaning. Because it would be "demonstrably at odds with the intent of Congress"26 to grant incontestable status to a mark that was not eligible for registration in the first place, the Court is surely authorized to require compliance with § 2(f) before granting relief on the basis of § 33(b).27
The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., generally applies the same principles concerning registration and protection to both trade and service marks. See § 3, 15 U.S.C. 1053. The Lanham Act defines a trademark to include "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." § 45, 15 U.S.C. 1127. A service mark is "a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services of others." Ibid.
Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. 1115(b), provides:
Section 33(b) enumerates seven categories of defenses to an action to enforce an incontestable mark. See 15 U.S.C. 1115(b), quoted ante, at 193, n. 3. In addition, a defendant is free to argue that a mark should never have become incontestable for any of the four reasons enumerated in § 15. 15 U.S.C. 1065. Moreover, § 15 expressly provides that an incontestable mark may be challenged on any of the grounds set forth in subsections (c) and (e) of § 14, 15 U.S.C. 1064, and those sections, in turn, incorporate the objections to registrability that are defined in §§ 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), (b), and (c).
As I have already noted, § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), expressly prohibits the registration of a merely descriptive mark. The exception from that prohibition, which petitioner did not satisfy in processing its application, reads as follows:
§ 37, 15 U.S.C. 1119.
Moreover, even if the owner of a registered mark may not enjoin infringement, it is not true that the registration has become "meaningless." See ante, at 196. A registration may be used to prevent the importation of goods bearing infringing marks into this country. See 15 U.S.C. 1124, 19 U.S.C. § 1526, and 19 U.S.C. 1337(a). Additionally, registration in this country is a prerequisite to registration in some foreign countries. A. Seidel, What the General Practitioner Should Know About Trademarks and Copyrights 26 (4th ed. 1979); E. Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 58 (2d ed. 1968). Further, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in an opinion recognizing that Congress had expressed its desire that scandalous matter not be registered, wrote the following regarding the benefits of registration:
FMC CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Cynthia Ann HOLLIDAY.