Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104458/lorillard-vs-pons
Timestamp: 2017-10-18 03:59:02
Document Index: 591805655

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 621', '§ 1292', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 216', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 49', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 626', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 2000', '§ 626']

Lorillard Vs Pons - Citation 104458 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Lorillard Vs. Pons - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104458
Case Number 434 U.S. 575
Appellant Lorillard
Respondent Pons
.....one of the parties, since, although the adea contains no provision expressly granting a right to jury trial in such cases, the adea's structure demonstrates a congressional intent to grant such a right. pp. 434 u. s. 577 -585. (a) the directive of § 7(b) of the adea that the act be enforced in accordance with the "powers, remedies, and procedures " of the fair labor standards act (flsa) is a significant indication of congress' intent. long before the adea was enacted, courts had uniformly interpreted the flsa to afford a right to jury trial in private actions pursuant to that act. congress can be presumed to have been aware of that interpretation, and, by incorporating certain remedial and procedural provisions of the flsa into the adea, congress demonstrated its.....
Lorillard v. Pons - 434 U.S. 575 (1978)
U.S. Supreme Court Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978)
In a private civil action for lost wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), a trial by jury is available where sought by one of the parties, since, although the ADEA contains no provision expressly granting a right to jury trial in such cases, the ADEA's structure demonstrates a congressional intent to grant such a right. Pp. 434 U. S. 577 -585.
(a) The directive of § 7(b) of the ADEA that the Act be enforced in accordance with the "powers, remedies, and procedures " of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a significant indication of Congress' intent. Long before the ADEA was enacted, courts had uniformly interpreted the FLSA to afford a right to jury trial in private actions pursuant to that Act. Congress can be presumed to have been aware of that interpretation, and, by incorporating certain remedial and procedural provisions of the FLSA into the ADEA, Congress demonstrated its intention to afford a right to jury trial. Pp. 434 U. S. 581 -582.
(b) By directing in § 7(b) of the ADEA that actions for lost wages be treated as actions for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation under the FLSA, Congress dictated that the jury trial right then available to enforce that FLSA liability would also be available in private actions under the ADEA. This conclusion is supported by the language of § 7(b) empowering a court to grant " legal or equitable relief" and of § 7(c) authorizing individuals to bring actions for " legal or equitable relief." It can be inferred that Congress knew the significance of the term "legal," and that, by providing specifically for "legal" relief, it intended that there would be a jury trial on demand to enforce liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation. Pp. 434 U. S. 582 -583.
backpay is a matter of equitable discretion. It appears, moreover, that Congress rejected the course of adopting Title VII procedures for ADEA actions in favor of incorporating the FLSA procedures. Pp. 434 U. S. 583 -585.
This case presents the question whether there is a right to a jury trial in private civil actions for lost wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 88 Stat. 74, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Respondent commenced this action against petitioner, her former employer, alleging that she had been discharged because of her age in violation of the ADEA. She sought reinstatement, lost wages, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Respondent demanded a jury trial on all issues of fact; petitioner moved to strike the demand. The District Court granted the motion to strike, but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed the appeal and vacated the trial court's order, ruling that the ADEA and the Seventh Amendment [ Footnote 1 ]
afford respondent the right to a jury trial on her claim for lost wages, 549 F.2d 50, 952-53 (1977). [ Footnote 2 ] We granted certiorari, 433 U.S. 907 (1977), to resolve the conflict in the Circuits [ Footnote 3 ] on this important issue in the administration of the ADEA. We now affirm.
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363 , 402 U. S. 369 (1971), quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 , 285 U. S. 62 (1932). Accord, Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U. S. 363 , 416 U. S. 365 (1974). Because we find the statutory issue dispositive, we need not address the constitutional issue.
The bill that was ultimately enacted is something of a hybrid, reflecting, on the one hand, Congress' desire to use an existing statutory scheme and a bureaucracy with which employers and employees would be familiar and, on the other hand, its dissatisfaction with some elements of each of the preexisting schemes. [ Footnote 4 ] Pursuant to § 7(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 626(b), violations of the ADEA generally are to be treated as violations of the FLSA. "Amounts owing . . . as a result of a violation" of the ADEA are to be treated as "unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation" under the FLSA and the rights created by the ADEA are to be "enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies and procedures" of specified sections of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). [ Footnote 5 ]
Following the model of the FLSA, the ADEA establishes two primary enforcement mechanisms. Under the FLSA provisions incorporated in § 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), the Secretary of Labor may bring suit on behalf of an aggrieved individual for injunctive and monetary relief. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The incorporated FLSA provisions, together with § 7(c) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), in addition authorize private civil actions for "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of" the ADEA. [ Footnote 6 ] Although not required by the
Looking first to the procedural provisions of the statute, we find a significant indication of Congress' intent in its directive that the ADEA be enforced in accordance with the "powers, remedies, and procedures " of the FLSA. § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (emphasis added). Long before Congress enacted the ADEA, it was well established that there was a right to a jury trial in private actions pursuant to the FLSA. Indeed, every court to consider the issue had so held. [ Footnote 7 ] Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 , 422 U. S. 414 n. 8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin
Co., 340 U. S. 361 , 340 U. S. 366 (1951); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140 , 252 U. S. 147 (1920); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49.09 and cases cited (4th ed.1973). So too, where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.
"in any action brought to enforce" the Act. § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, while incorporating into the ADEA the FLSA provisions authorizing awards of liquidated damages, Congress altered the circumstances under which such awards would be available in ADEA actions by mandating that such damages be awarded only where the violation of the ADEA is willful. [ Footnote 8 ] Finally,
Congress expressly declined to incorporate into the ADEA the criminal penalties established for violations of the FLSA. [ Footnote 9 ]
113 Cong.Rec. 31254 (1967). [ Footnote 10 ] And by directing that actions for lost wages under the ADEA be treated as actions for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation under the FLSA, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), Congress dictated that the jury trial right then available to
This inference is buttressed by an examination of the language Congress chose to describe the available remedies under the ADEA. Section 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), empowers a court to grant "legal or equitable relief," and § 7(c), 2 U.S.C. § 626(c), authorizes individuals to bring actions for " legal or equitable relief" (emphases added). The word "legal" is a term of art: in cases in which legal relief is available and legal rights are determined, the Seventh Amendment provides a right to jury trial. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189 , 415 U. S. 195 -196 (1974).
Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 , 221 U. S. 59 (1911). See Gilbert v. United States, 370 U. S. 650 , 370 U. S. 655 (1962); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147 , 107 U. S. 152 (1883). We can infer, therefore, that, by providing specifically for "legal" relief, Congress knew the significance of the term "legal," and intended that there would be a jury trial on demand to "enforc[e] . . . liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation." § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). [ Footnote 11 ]
available under Title VII as a matter of either statutory or constitutional right. See Curtis v. Loether, supra at 415 U. S. 197 . However, after examining the provisions of Title VII, we find petitioner's argument by analogy to Title VII unavailing. There are important similarities between the two statutes, to be sure, both in their aims -- the elimination of discrimination from the workplace -- and in their substantive prohibitions. In fact, the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII. [ Footnote 12 ] But in deciding whether a statutory right to jury trial exists, it is the remedial and procedural provisions of the two laws that are crucial, and there we find significant differences.
Looking first to the statutory language defining the relief available, we note that Congress specifically provided for both "legal or equitable relief" in the ADEA, but did not authorize "legal" relief in so many words under Title VII. Compare § 7(b), 2 U.S.C. § 626(b), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(g) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Similarly, the ADEA incorporates the FLSA provision that employers "shall be liable" for amounts deemed unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation, while under Title VII, the availability of backpay is a matter of equitable discretion, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. at 422 U. S. 421 . [ Footnote 13 ] Finally, rather than adopting the procedures of Title VII for ADEA actions, Congress rejected that course
in favor of incorporating the FLSA procedures even while adopting Title VII's substantive prohibitions. Thus, even if petitioner is correct that Congress did not intend there to be jury trials under Title VII, that fact sheds no light on congressional intent under the ADEA. Petitioner's reliance on Title VII, therefore, is misplaced. [ Footnote 14 ]
Section 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), does not specify which of the listed categories of relief are legal and which are equitable. However, since it is clear that judgments compelling "employment, reinstatement or promotion" are equitable, see 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice Ĺš 38.21 (1977), Congress must have meant the phrase "legal relief" to refer to judgments "enforcing . . . liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation."
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 421 , we nonetheless have recognized that, under Title VII, some discretion exists.