Source: http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2001/appendices/mbt_nat_leg.html
Timestamp: 2019-05-22 15:10:37
Document Index: 58413031

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 2', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 9', 'Art. 4', 'art 1']

THE MINE BAN TREATY AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION
Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC - www.vertic.org), London[6]
OVERALL STATUS OF ARTICLE 9 IMPLEMENTATION
OPERATIVE CLAUSES ON PROHIBITION
ARTICLE 3 INVENTORIES
JOINT FORCES EXCEPTIONS
GUIDELINES FOR OTTAWA MBT PROVISIONS
Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) obliges each state party to take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any prohibited activity by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. This study assesses the extent to which these obligations have been carried out to date,[7] compares how states parties have framed their legislative, administrative and other measures (including their comparative strengths and weaknesses), suggests best practice where appropriate, and proposes measures to enhance implementation of Article 9.
States Parties that have enacted domestic enabling legislation as of 1 June 2001[8]
In the third year since the MBT entered into force, the number of States that have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, Article 9, is increasing, albeit gradually. As of June 2001, thirty States – more than a quarter of States Parties – had enacted some sort of domestic enabling legislation.
States parties can be divided into three groups with regard to the implementation of national implementation legislation. The first group of states claim that legislation they passed before the treaty entered into force for them has the effect of implementing the treaty’s provisions. This group of states includes Austria, Belgium, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, and Switzerland.[10]
The second group of States Parties includes those that have passed implementing legislation, or passed amendments to existing laws, since the treaty entered into force. These legislative measures are either designed to specifically implement the treaty’s provisions, or have the effect of implementing the treaty by enacting prohibitions and sanctions for a range of weapons including antipersonnel (AP) mines.
The third and, sadly, the largest, group of States Parties covers those that have not enacted any implementing legislation. In many cases, the delay in enacting legislation is due to limited resources, or the presence of other more pressing domestic issues. Some States may feel that legislation is unnecessary, as no landmine-related activities have ever taken place within their borders. This position is unsatisfactory, since enacting penal sanctions for treaty violations is a mandatory obligation for states parties. Also, there is no guarantee that prohibited activities will not occur in such states in the future. Moreover, without legislation that has extraterritorial coverage, there is nothing to stop nationals from these countries carrying out prohibited AP mine activities in other states that are not party to the MBT.[11]
Of the eighty-six States Parties without implementing legislation,[12] some are relatively close to adopting legislation, with a bill at the drafting, debating or development stage;[13] the remainder have still to begin a legislative process. Some states, including Ecuador, Fiji, Mexico, Panama, Portugal, and Venezuela, have a provision in their constitution that makes treaties self-enacting upon ratification or accession. Hence the MBT is considered by them to be in force domestically even though no legislation has yet been passed to implement the treaty as a whole or to implement specific measures such as penal sanctions. Other States, such as Andorra and Denmark, have passed administrative orders or formed commissions or agencies to meet their obligations under Article 9 of the MBT, yet these measures do not put in place the penal sanctions required by that article. Meanwhile, Jordan, Peru, Thailand, and Tunisia have statutes applying to broad categories of weapons[14], such as explosive devices, which predate the MBT. These pre-existing statutes may not implement the treaty as effectively as specific statutes passed after entry into force.
Although the Mine Ban Treaty obliges States Parties to implement the treaty domestically, the extent to which they have done so deserves close examination. This applies especially to aspects such as the implementation of penal sanctions, which must be done whether or not national law allows for international treaties to be self-enacting on ratification.[15] While the provisions of the text have been broadly implemented, precise enactment varies considerably. Some states have left out some elements of the treaty in their legislation. Some have been reluctant to go beyond the MBT’s basic provisions, while others have gone well beyond them.
Article 2 of the MBT provides definitions, including that of an AP mine, which ideally should be reproduced in domestic legislation and regulations.[16] In fact, many States have either reproduced sections of the treaty language verbatim in their legislation, or attached the treaty as a schedule to their legislation[17]. Others have amended the treaty model to create their own definition in a way that may, or may not, extend or limit the treaty definition.[18] Finally, a number of States have effectively extended the scope of the treaty as it applies to them by adopting a broader definition than is contained in MBT Article 2.[19]
The manner in which States have approached the definition reveals three issues of concern. First, the treaty’s definition of AP mine excludes anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and allows the use of anti-handling devices on the latter. Most states have underlined this distinction: the British definition, for example, makes a point of outlawing only AP mines designed as such.[20] Ireland, on the other hand, voluntarily opted for a definition that bans not just AP mines, but all landmines.[21]
The second issue concerns advances in mine technology beyond the use of explosives. Virtually all the acts examined use the MBT’s term “exploded” or “detonated”, which covers explosive substances only. The exception is Italy, which adds the phrase “cause an explosion or release of disabling substances,” thereby prohibiting devices that employ alternatives to explosives such as gas or other incapacitating substances.[22] This is particularly prudent as Italian companies were major producers of new landmine technologies and the government needed to ensure that such firms did not attempt to remain in the AP mine market by developing new technologies.
The third issue raised is the distinction between “designed” and “adapted.” The MBT uses the former, and most states have entrenched this definition in their statutes. However, other explosive devices not designed as AP mines, such as grenades, may be adapted to serve as AP mines; only when so adapted are these weapons illegal. Several States, including Italy and Canada, have included in their definition of AP mine any device that is so adapted or altered,[23] thereby extending the MBT definition.
The MBT’s general provisions banning AP mines are contained in Article 1. While most states have adopted these provisions wholesale, many have neglected to provide measures to prevent individuals and industry using loopholes to circumvent these provisions. Three significant aspects must be considered in this regard, especially in this era of globalization, where the porousness of national boundaries, the free movement of individuals and capital and the trans- and multi-national character of industry can make enforcement of domestic law difficult.
The first issue is that of extraterritoriality. Ideally national legislation should prohibit violation of the MBT by nationals not only inside, but also outside their country of origin. It should also prohibit legal persons registered in a state party, such as manufacturing firms, from setting up AP mine production facilities in non-states parties. In the words of McGrath and Robertson, “the nexus for the criminal sanction is the citizenship of the person breaching the prohibition, not the location of the prohibited activity.”[24] An example of an effective piece of legislation in this respect is the British Act, in which Section 3 imposes prohibitions on British nationals even if the activity is conducted outside the UK.[25]
Loosely related to this extraterritoriality clause and equally important is a provision preventing nationals from contracting the production of AP mines to nationals of non-states parties. Without provisions preventing such activity, a manufacturer may legitimately remain in the AP mine business by simply contracting production to a company in a non-party State and ensuring that it is staffed entirely with locals. Again, the Italian and British acts are commendable in this regard. The latter’s Section 2(3) prohibits nationals making arrangements with other persons to acquire or transfer APMs. Section 4 of Trinidad & Tobago’s act applies to conduct within the country or elsewhere.
Finally, there is the issue of a ban on technology transfers to prevent indigenous firms selling technology rights offshore. Both the Spanish and the Czech acts include a provision for this.[26] By far the strictest in this respect is the Italian statute, which bans the transfer of patents, technology and even intellectual property rights.[27] Most other statutes, including, surprisingly, those of France and Canada, contain operative clauses that cover only the use, development, stockpiling and transfer of the devices themselves.
No law can be truly enforceable without provisions to punish violators. Article 9 of the MBT requires States Parties to implement penal sanctions, in addition to other appropriate legal and administrative measures, to prevent violations of the operative clause. The actual degree of maximum possible punishment written into national legislation varies considerably, as shown below.
Fine US$
Chapter V, Section 17
10 years (double for repeat offenders)
Section 185a (1)
Section 160/A (1)
Explosives Order
Decreto AN. No. 2454
4 years for possession or transfer
10 years to Life for use
Penal Code (Amended 1998), Ch. 22, Section 6b
Noteworthy is the legislation of Cambodia, a State that has witnessed first-hand the effects of the widespread use of AP mines. Its legislation provides far greater penalties for transferring AP mines than for their possession and use, implying that the former poses a greater threat to the ban.[28]
Article 3 of the MBT allows States Parties to retain or transfer supplies of AP mines for “the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques.” The provisions of Article 3 are entrenched in most statutes. The Spanish Act permits mines to be retained, but not exceeding the “absolute minimum number necessary” for purposes permitted by the treaty.[29] The vast majority of the statutes do likewise.[30] The Japanese law establishes a regulatory system, whereby “permitted possessors” may stockpile landmines for “purposes approved in the treaty,” and no limitation is specified.[31]
The exact number retained by each State Party deserves attention. A number of States Parties, including Austria, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden have relinquished possession of AP mines outright and therefore will not retain any for any purpose.[32] Only France and Italy have set voluntary inventory ceilings in legislation – 5,000 and 8,000 units respectively.[33]
Precisely what constitutes the minimum number necessary may be open to conjecture. The Article 7 reports deposited with the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs may mitigate uncertainty about the actual number retained by each country. For instance Canada’s report indicates which types of AP mines have been retained and for what purpose.[34] Such reports do not, however, end conjecture about what the minimum number should be. Reported stockpiles retained under the Article 3 exception range from 129 to 16,550 units.[35] The larger stockpiles are retained by States that conduct considerable research into AP mine detection and clearance technologies, as in the case of Britain’s Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA).[36] Australia, responding to pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) regarding the size of its retained stockpile, published a training needs analysis which explained that it required sufficient supplies to allow each demining engineer to destroy at least one device during training, a figure amounting to 600 units per year.[37]
According to Article 7 reports, several States appear to have retained somewhat excessive inventories. Ecuador recorded 16,000, while Croatia, a severely mine-affected country, planned to retain 17,500 units under the control of two government ministries[38] (although Croatia has since pledged to reduce this amount).[39] NGOs can play a useful role in exposing States Parties that retain excessively large inventories under the Article 3 exception provisions. Progress can be made at reducing such inventories to more acceptable levels. In addition to the Australian case, Italy originally set a ceiling of 10,000 in its 1997 law, then subsequently reduced this to 8,000 in a 1998 amendment.[40]
An exception not contained in the MBT, but which appears in the national legislation of a number of States Parties, is the participation of the armed forces in joint military operations with non-party States that continue to use AP mines. This is a particular concern for states with binding alliance commitments. For example, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) must maintain joint force interoperability and integrated command structures with the United States, despite that country not being a party to the MBT. These and other States have clauses in their national legislation to protect their military personnel from prosecution when conducting military activities that could be construed as AP mine-related. For example, Italy, a major contributor to NATO peace support operations and standing rapid reaction formations, allows for participation in such operations provided the activities involved are in compliance with the MBT.[41] The Canadian act specifies that participation must not “amount to active assistance.”[42] Other States Parties use broadly similar language.
By far the most controversial is the British act, which was the culmination of intense debate over the use of AP mines by the army for defensive purposes.[43] Britain has always taken pride in its active participation within NATO’s integrated command structure,[44] routinely takes a major role in multinational military exercises, earmarks division-strength contributions to standing rapid reaction formations, and often provides the commander for multinational forces such as the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Section 5 of the Act[45] provides a defense for military personnel for any treaty prohibited conduct performed either during the planning of, or in the course of, joint operations with non-States Parties.[46] The only exception to this defence is the actual laying of mines, which is clearly prohibited.[47] Therefore, arguably, activities such as the possession and transferring of AP mines, and even the encouragement of military personnel of non-States Parties to use AP mines, is legal for British forces in specific situations. In fact, the legislation makes a point of stating that the only legal laying of mines under the treaty is that conducted by the armed forces of a non-State Party.[48]
NGOs have expressed concern that the act permits, for all intents and purposes, activities that would be in non-compliance with the MBT. In response, the British government has given an assurance that its military rules of engagement prohibit these other activities, and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries have explained that Section 5 was included to ensure full British participation in the command and planning of multilateral military operations without amounting to use or assistance under the treaty.[49]
Despite the impressive speed by which States signed and ratified the MBT, the rate at which States have enacted national legislation has been decidedly slow. Generally, the manner in which States have enacted legislation has been impressive. While some States have simply adhered to the letter of the treaty, others have surpassed its provisions. Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom have taken exemplary positions on some issues, but not necessarily on others.
Propensity towards full compliance with Article 9 reflects States’ national stance with regard to landmines and other humanitarian issues, including the extent to which it is mine-affected, the degree to which it was involved in manufacturing AP mines, domestic interest in the landmine issue, and international involvements such as alliance obligations or trade linkages. The extent to which a country has implemented Article 9 tends, in sum, to be an indicator (although not always) of its political support for the AP mine ban. Since Cambodia is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, the outlawing of AP mines is high on its domestic political agenda. Stigmatised by the extent of its involvement in AP mine production, Italy has adopted a strong position regarding development and technology transfer and the bulk of its legislation is directed against domestic manufacturers. The UK has to deal with manufacturers, and strive to maintain its place in NATO. Canada, whose government championed the process leading to the MBT, felt obliged to set an example with model legislation, yet it too has had to find a way to maintain its commitments to its continental neighbor. In sum, no one piece of legislation is “perfect” in both avoiding all loopholes and going beyond the terms of the MBT.
There is still much to be done to implement Article 9. Three-quarters of all States Parties have yet to pass legislation. For example, although Chad has now ratified, its enacting legislation has taken secondary place to mine action, especially clearance and training.[50] Those States that are close to enactment still have work to do. While South Africa’s constitution does permit the treaties it signs to be self-enacting, it is nonetheless drafting legislation.
This study has revealed a number of issues that deserve attention by States Parties considering national implementing legislation and regulation. These are summarized in the table above,[51] which builds on the national legislation information kit produced by the ICRC.[52] If States Parties adopting MBT legislation or regulations heed the lessons of those States Parties that have gone before them, domestic implementation of the MBT will amply fulfill the promise of its signing and ratification.
Treaty provision details
Reference to model legislation
Art. 2, Definitions
Defines an APM as a device designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.
Does not include AVMs.
Does not include anti-handling devices.
“Exploded” loophole. Ensure against the release of substances that will incapacitate, injure or kill without exploding.
“Adaptation” loophole. Legislation could include a provision to cover alterations or modifications of other weapons or devices.
Anti-Handling devices should include wording that refers to “design to be exploded by the contact of a person”.
New Zealand, Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998, Section 3.
Italy, Law No. 374 of 29 October 1997 “Provisions prohibiting antipersonnel mines” published in the Official Gazette no.256 of 3 November 1997, Section 2(1).
United Kingdom, Landmines Act 1998, Section 1.
Art. 1, General Obligations
Operative clauses prohibiting states parties from use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer of APMs directly or indirectly.
Extraterritoriality provision: should apply to nationals both within and outside the territory of jurisdiction.
Arrangements provision: must apply to nationals making arrangements to do any prohibited mine-related activities.
Ban on technology transfer: must include the transfer of patents, technology and intellectual property rights.
United Kingdom, Landmines Act 1998, Section 2.
Czech Republic, Act. 305 of 18 Nov 99, Section 1(3).
Art. 3, Inventories
Allows states to retain or transfer the minimum number possible of APMs for development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction techniques.
Ideally should include a voluntary inventory ceiling using a predetermined number that constitutes the absolute minimum number required for these purposes.
France, Loi. No. 98-564 tendant à l’élimination des mines antipersonnel, 8 July 1998, Article 3.
Italy, Law No. 374 (1997), Section 5(1); Law No.106 (1999), Article 4(1).
Art. 9, Penal Provisions
Obligates states to take all legal, administrative and other measures, including penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress non-compliance.
Ideally should include both a fine and a maximum imprisonment.
Should include appropriate penalties, possibly on a graduated penalty system.
Cambodia, Royal No. ns/rkt/0295/16 Law on the Ban of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Articles 6-9.
Canada, Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act, A-11-5 (1997, c.33), Section 21.
[6] This paper was prepared by Laurence Baxter and Angela Woodward, with Trevor Findlay.
[7] As of 1 June 2001.
[8] Source: MBT Article 7 reports, Form A, available at: <domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>; Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, 2000, available at: <www.icrc.org>.
[9] The Law of Explosive Materials (1953) regulating the use, production, trading and storage of explosives, including AP mines, currently serves as MBT implementing legislation in Jordan.
[10] Form A of the MBT Article 7 report for each of these States lists implementing legislation passed before the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999; see: <domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>.
[11] For a more detailed discussion on these reasons, see Joe McGrath and David Robertson, “Monitoring the Landmine Convention: Ratification and National Implementation Legislation,” VERTIC Research Report No. 5, September 1999, pp. 23-24.
[12] As of 1 June 2001.
[13] This group of States includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chad, Croatia, Holy See, Iceland, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and South Africa. Source: Landmine Monitor country and regional researchers. See reports on these countries in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[14] Form A of the MBT Article 7 report for each of these states; available at: <domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>.
[15] This distinction and its implications have been discussed in detail elsewhere. See Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), “Landmines in International Law: Ratification and National Implementation.” in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 1037-1046; and McGrath and Robertson, op. cit., pp. 11-25.
[16] MBT Article 2(1) “‘Anti-personnel mine’ means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.”
[17] For example Canada (Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act 1997) and New Zealand (Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998). When the text of a treaty is attached to legislation in this manner it may be used by the state’s judiciary to help interpret unclear or ambiguous provisions in the legislation.
[18] Austria, Federal Law on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, published 10 January 1997 in Federal Law Gazette, Section 1 [unofficial translation]. Trinidad & Tobago cites the MBT directly – see Act No. 48 of 2000, An Act to give effect to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction in Trinidad and Tobago, assented to on 28 September 2000, Section 2.
[19] Ireland, Explosives (Landmines) Order 1996, 12 June 1996, Section 3(2) “In this Article ‘land mine’ means any munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or any other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence or proximity of, or contact with, a person or vehicle.”[emphasis added]. Interestingly, the extended definition in the recently passed Zimbabwe legislation, which includes mines detonated by a vehicle, will be revised in a proposed amendment bill to limit the application to AP mines. The Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act 2001 definition in section 2(1) “anti-personnel mine means a mine that is designed, altered or intended to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person, animal or vehicle” will be amended to “contact of a person or animal” in the General Laws Amendment Bill. Source: Law official, Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Harare.
[20] United Kingdom, Landmines Act 1998, Section 1, in force 28 July 1998.
[21] Explosives (Land Mines) Order 1996 Section 3(2) “In this Article “land mine” means any munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence or proximity of, or contact with, a person or vehicle”. [emphasis added].
[22] Italy, Law No. 374, Provisions prohibiting antipersonnel mines, published in The Official Gazette No. 256 of 3 Nov 1997. Section 2(1) [official translation]. In force with amendments in Law No. 106 of 26 March 1999 [unofficial translation].
[23] Ibid., and Canada, Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act 1997, in force 1 March 1999, section 2. The Canadian legislation refers to a mine “that is designed, altered or intended to be exploded”.
[24] McGrath and Robertson, op. cit., p. 23.
[25] United Kingdom, Landmines Act 1998, Section 3(1)-(6). For another example, see Trinidad & Tobago, An Act to give effect to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction in Trinidad and Tobago (2000). Section 5(1) of the Act states that, “Section 4 applies to conduct in Trinidad and Tobago or elsewhere;” Section 4 contains the Act’s prohibitions. For a closer analysis, see McGrath and Robertson, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
[26] Spain, Ley 33/1998, de 5 de octobre, de prohibición total de minas antipersonal y armas de efecto similar, Art. 4 [In original Spanish]; Czech Republic, Act 305 of 18 Nov 1999 on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfers of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction, and an amendment to Act No. 140/1961, Criminal Code, as amended, Part One, Section 1(3) [Unofficial translation].
[27] Italian Law No. 374, Section 1(1)-(3) respectively.
[28] Cambodia, Royal Decree No. ns/rkt/0295/16 Law on the Ban of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Ch. 3.
[29] Spain, Ley 33/1998, de 5 de octobre, de prohibición total de minas antipersonal de minas antipersonal y armas de efecto similar, Artículo 5, “La cantidad de tales minas no deberá exceder la cantidad mínima absolutamente necesaria para realizar los propósitos mencionados más arriba.”
[30] Examples include Austria [Section 3], Cambodia [Article 3], Canada [Section 10], Czech Republic [Section 3(2)], Mali [Article 3], New Zealand [Section 8(a)], Trinidad & Tobago [Section 8], United Kingdom [Section 4(2)] and Zimbabwe [Section 7].
[31] Japan, Law No. 116, A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Landmines and the Regulation, etc. of their Possession, 30 September 1998, Articles 4 and 7(1) [Official translation].
[32] The latest Article 7 reports submitted by these states indicate nil inventories under Form D: APMs Retained or Transferred. See especially Article 7 Reports for: Austria, 1 January-31 December 2000; Norway, 23 August 1999-22 Aug 2000; and Sweden, 1 Sep 1999-1 April 2000, available at: <domino.un.org/Ottawa.nsf>. In New Zealand’s case, although Section 8(a) of the legislation allows the retention of Article 3 inventories, their latest Article 7 Report (for the period 27 December 1999-31 December 2000) indicates that no such stockpiles were retained. The New Zealand Government document Anti-Personnel Mines Retained for Training, presented at the Second Meeting of States Parties (APLC/MSP.2/2000/INF.2), details its satisfactory use of simulator mines for training purposes.
[33] France, Loi. No. 98-564 tendant à l’élimination des mines antipersonnel, 8 July 1998, Article 3 [in original French]. The number of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3 by Italy may be reduced still further by proposed amendment legislation.
[34] See Article 7 report for Canada for the period 15 March 2000-15 February 2001, Form D.
[35] Article 7 report, Form D, Part 1 (mines retained for development and training) for Ireland (reporting period 16 August 1999-14 April 2000) and Brazil (reporting period March 2000-March 2001), respectively.
[36] Conversation with a Landmine Action researcher.
[37] See Landmine Monitor 2000, pp. 375-376.
[38] See Ecuador, Article 7 report for the period July 2000-March 2001; and Croatia, Article 7 report for July 1999: 13,100 for Ministry of Defence plus 4,400 for Ministry of Interior.
[39] See the report on Croatia in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[40] Italy, Law No. 374 (1997), Section 5(1) [Official translation]; Law No. 106 (1999), Article 4(1) [unofficial translation].
[41] Italian Law No. 106 (1999), Article 5(1) [unofficial translation].
[42] Canada, Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act 1997, Section 6(3)(d).
[43] For a full discussion on this debate, see Landmine Monitor 1999, pp. 676-678; Landmine Monitor 2000, pp. 745-746.
[44] See for example, United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No. 2: Multinational Defence Co-operation, MoD Director-General Corporate Communications, February 2001, pp. 3-5.
[45] Landmines Act 1998 (United Kingdom), entered into 28 July 1998.
[46] Section 5(1)(a) Landmines Act 1998 (United Kingdom).
[47] Section 5(1)(b) Landmines Act 1998 (United Kingdom).
[48] Section 5(5) Landmines Act 1998 (United Kingdom).
[49] See for example, statement by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to the House of Commons, Hansard, 10 July 1998, cols. 1347 and 1348.
[50] Source: discussion with Landmine Monitor country researcher for Chad.
[51] Guidelines for Ottawa MBT Provisions.
[52] See Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines, the International Committee of the Red Cross with the support of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Government of Belgium, ICRC, Geneva: May 2001.