Source: https://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/egmr/08/43547-08.php
Timestamp: 2018-11-19 05:14:31
Document Index: 195469105

Matched Legal Cases: ['EGMR', 'EGMR', 'EGMR', 'EGMR', 'EGMR', '§ 173', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', '§ 2', '§ 41', '§ 38', '§ 36', '§ 2', '§ 68', '§ 52', '§ 90', '§ 77', '§ 52', '§ 75', '§ 86', '§ 45', '§ 123', '§ 116', '§ 2']

EGMR Nr. 43547/08 - 12. April 2011 (Stübing v. Deutschland) · hrr-strafrecht.de
EGMR Nr. 43547/08 - 12. April 2011 (Stübing v. Deutschland) [= HRRS 2012 Nr. 434]
EGMR Nr. 43547/08:
HRRS-Nummer: HRRS 2012 Nr. 434
Zitiervorschlag: EGMR, Nr. 43547/08, Urteil v. 12.04.2011, HRRS 2012 Nr. 434
EGMR Nr. 43547/08 (5. Kammer) - Urteil vom 12. April 2011 (Stübing v. Deutschland)
Zulässigkeit der Strafbarkeit des Geschwisterinzests nach dem Recht auf Achtung der Familie und des Privatlebens (Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht; Recht auf sexuelle Selbstbestimmung; Rechtsgutsschutz und Schutz von Moralvorstellungen; pressing social need; Verhältnismäßigkeit).
1. Die deutsche Strafbarkeit des Geschwisterinzests gemäß § 173 Abs. 2 Satz 2 StGB verstößt für den „Leipziger Inzestfall“, in dem das Gericht von einer Abhängigkeit der jüngeren, persönlichkeitsgestörten Schwester gegenüber dem verurteilten älteren Bruder ausging, nicht gegen Art. 8 EMRK.
2. Eine Bestrafung, die in Art. 8 EMRK eingreift, setzt die Rechtfertigung durch ein zwingendes gesellschaftliches Bedürfnis voraus. Wenn ein besonders bedeutsamer Aspekt des Privatlebens oder der eigenen Identität betroffen ist, genießen die Vertragsstaaten der EMRK in der Regel nur einen geringen Beurteilungsspielraum. Wenn die Vertragsstaaten etwa in das Sexualleben eines Bürgers eingreifen wollen, müssen sie besonders überzeugende Gründe zur Rechtfertigung anführen. Allerdings ist der Beurteilungsspielraum auch hier weiter zu bemessen, wenn zur rechtlichen Behandlung einer Fallkonstellation kein europäischer Grundkonsens besteht. Dies gilt besonders, wenn - wie zum Beispiel bei der Behandlung des Inzests - moralische oder ethische Fragen auf dem Spiel stehen.
16. The legislator had pursued objectives that were not constitutionally objectionable and that, in any event, in their totality legitimised the limitation on the right to sexual self-determination. The primary ground for punishment was the protection of marriage and the family. Empirical studies had showed that the legislature was not overstepping its margin of appreciation when assuming that incestuous relationships between siblings could seriously damage the family and society as a whole. Incestuous relationships resulted in overlapping familial relationships and social roles and, thus, could damage the structural system of family life. The overlapping of roles did not correspond with the image of a family as defined by the Basic Law. It seemed clear, and did not appear to be farfetched to assume, that the children of an incestuous relationship might have significant difficulties in finding their place within the family structure and in building a trusting relationship with their closest caregivers. The function of the family, which was of primary importance for the community, would be decisively damaged if the required family structures were shaken by incestuous relationships.
23. Judge Hassemer attached a dissenting opinion which was based on the following considerations. Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code was incompatible with the principle of proportionality. The provision did not pursue a legitimate aim. From the outset, considerations of eugenic aspects were not a valid objective for a criminal law provision. Likewise, neither the wording of the provision nor the statutory context indicated that the provision was aimed at protecting sexual self-determination. Lastly, the prohibition on sibling incest was not justified by the protection of marriage and the family, as it only prohibited the act of sexual intercourse, but did not prohibit any other sexual acts between siblings or sexual intercourse between siblings of the same sex or between relatives who were not bloodrelated. If the criminal provision were actually aimed at protecting the family from sexual acts, it would also extend to these acts that were likewise damaging to the family. The evidence seemed to indicate that the provision as set out did not protect any specific rights, but was solely aimed at moral conceptions. However, it was not a legitimate aim for a criminal provision to build or maintain common moral standards.
36. The reasons adduced by the Federal Constitutional Court had not sufficed to assume the existence of a pressing social need justifying the applicant’s conviction in this individual case. The criminal liability imposed on incest was not suited to protect society as a whole from genetic diseases, as scientific research had demonstrated that incestuous relationships did not lead to a spreading of genetic diseases within society. Furthermore, other individuals, who ran a much higher risk of transferring genetic defects - such as women past the age of forty or known carriers of a genetic defect - were not forbidden to procreate. The eugenic motivation had its roots in the racist ideology of National Socialism. Neither could the ban be justified by relying on the interests of potential offspring, as it was impossible to assess the interest of potential offspring in not being born.
38. Contrary to the Government’s submissions, incest between siblings was not liable to jeopardise or destroy the family unit, but had to be regarded as a symptom of already existing chaotic and dysfunctional family structures. In the instant case, the applicant had been separated from his family of origin as a young child. As the siblings had not been raised together, the biological inhibition against incest could not have developed. There were no other existing family members who could have been harmed by the incest - on the contrary, the incestuous relationship created a new family unit which had not existed before. Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court had failed to take into account the fact that the family relationship between the applicant and his biological sister had been dissolved by the former’s adoption and by their long-standing separation.
39. Neither was the imposition of criminal liability suited to protect the interests of prospective offspring, as incest between siblings - in contrast with incest between parent and descendant - did not lead to overlapping family roles.
40. The applicant’s conviction had not been suited to protect his sister’s right to sexual self-determination. There was no indication that Section 173 of the Criminal Code was aimed at protecting the weaker party in a relationship. On the contrary, such cases fell within the range of criminal provisions protecting sexual self-determination. In the instant case, the sexual intercourse had been consensual and there had been no indication of any form of sexual abuse. The courts had not considered the case in question to be an impairment of the applicant’s sister’s right of sexual selfdetermination. Neither had the applicant taken advantage of a stronger position, which was demonstrated by the fact that his sister had also been found to be guilty. It followed that she could not be regarded as having been the victim of a punishable act.
55. The Court does not exclude that the applicant’s criminal conviction had an impact on his family life and, possibly, attracted protection under Article 8 of the Convention, as he was forbidden to have sexual intercourse with the mother of his four children. In any event, it is common ground between the parties that the applicant’s criminal conviction interfered with his right to respect for his private life, which includes his sexual life (see Dudgeon, cited above, § 41 and Norris, cited above, § 38; also compare Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, 19 February 1997, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997I). The Court considers that there is no reason to hold otherwise and endorses this assessment. The applicant’s criminal conviction thus interfered with the applicant’s right to respect, at least, for his private life.
56. An interference with the exercise of the right to respect for an applicant’s private life will not be compatible with Article 8 § 2 unless it is “in accordance with the law”, has an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under that paragraph and is “necessary in a democratic society” for the aforesaid aim or aims (see, among many other authorities, Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 68, ECHR 2002III).
59. The Court reiterates that a number of factors must be taken into account when determining the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the State when determining any case under Article 8 of the Convention. Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will normally be restricted (see, for example, Dudgeon, cited above, § 52; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 90, ECHR 2002-VI; and Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 77, ECHR 2007IV). Accordingly, the Court has found that there must exist particularly serious reasons before interference on the part of public authorities concerning a most intimate aspect of private life, such as the manifestation of a person’s sexuality, can be legitimate for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (see Dudgeon and Norris, both cited above, §§ 52 and 46, respectively).
61. Applying the principles set out above to the instant case, the Court observes that there is no consensus between the member States as to whether the consensual commitment of sexual acts between adult siblings should be criminally sanctioned (see paragraphs 28-30, above). Still, a majority of altogether twenty-four out of the forty-four States reviewed provide for criminal liability. The Court further notes that all the legal systems, including those which do not impose criminal liability, prohibit siblings from getting married. Thus, a broad consensus transpires that sexual relationships between siblings are neither accepted by the legal order nor by society as a whole. Conversely, there is no sufficient empirical support for the assumption of a general trend towards a decriminalisation of such acts. The Court further considers that the instant case concerns a question about the requirements of morals. It follows from the above principles that the domestic authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining how to confront incestuous relationships between consenting adults, notwithstanding the fact that this decision concerns an intimate aspect of an individual’s private life.
62. The Court reiterates that in cases arising from individual applications it is not the Court’s task to examine domestic legislation in the abstract. Rather, it must examine the manner in which the relevant legislation was applied to the applicant in the particular circumstances of the individual case (see Pretty, cited above, § 75, ECHR 2002III; Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], no. 31871/96, § 86, ECHR 2003-VIII; and Zaunegger v. Germany, no. 22028/04, § 45, 3 December 2009). Furthermore, it is not the Court’s task to rule on the degree of individual guilt or to determine the appropriate sentence of an offender, those being matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national criminal courts (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 123, ECHR 2010..., and Önery?ld?z v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 116, ECHR 2004XII). The Court will therefore limit its examination to the question of whether the applicant’s criminal conviction in this individual case corresponded to a pressing social need, as required by Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.
63. The Court observes that the Federal Constitutional Court, having analysed the arguments put forward in favour of and against criminal liability and relying on an expert opinion, concluded that the imposition of criminal liability was justified by a combination of objectives, including the protection of the family, self-determination and public health, set against the background of a common conviction that incest should be subject to criminal liability. The Federal Constitutional Court considered that sexual relationships between siblings could seriously damage family structures and, as a consequence, society as a whole. According to the court, criminal liability was further justified by reference to the protection of sexual selfdetermination. By addressing specific situations arising from the interdependence and closeness of family relationships, section 173 of the Criminal Code could avoid difficulties in the classification of, and defence against, transgressions of sexual self-determination in that context.
Externe Fundstellen: NJW 2013, 215