Source: http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/circt/2ndamsteve.html
Timestamp: 2018-10-18 04:04:40
Document Index: 641694052

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 220', '§ 220', '§ 220', '§ 220', '§ 220', '§ 220']

American Stevedoring Ltd. v. Marinelli (2d Cir. 2001)
(Argued: March 12, 2001 Decided: April 26, 2001 )
Docket No. 00-4180
AMERICAN STEVEDORING LIMITED,
VICTOR MARINELLI, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
SOTOMAYOR and JACOBS, Circuit Judges, and BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*
On March 16, 1997, after engaging in a dispute with some of the workers, Marinelli experienced chest pain, took several nitroglycerin tablets, and passed out, striking his head as he fell. Marinelli was taken to a hospital where he underwent a cardiac catheterization. Marinelli was discharged on March 18, 1997, and thereafter treated with medication. It is undisputed that Marinelli suffered from pre-existing coronary artery disease, had previously undergone a coronary bypass procedure in 1989, and had been suffering from chest pain for three years before the incident occurred. After March 16, 1997, Marinelli also began treatment for psychological symptoms.
An initial hearing on Marinelli's LHWCA claim was held on April 23, 1998. In an Interim Decision and Order on Jurisdiction entered June 29, 1998, the ALJ found that an employer-employee relationship existed between ASL and Marinelli. The ALJ further found that Marinelli's shop steward duties were an integral and essential part of ASL's stevedoring business, and therefore held that Marinelli was a covered maritime employee under Section 2(3) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
In order to qualify for permanent total disability benefits to be paid by ASL under the LHWCA, Marinelli was required to demonstrate that (i) he was engaged in "maritime employment," 33 U.S.C. § 902(3); (ii) an employer- employee relationship existed between him and ASL, id. §§ 902(2), 902(3), 902(4); (iii) his injury was causally related to his employment, id. § 902(2); and (iv) his injury rendered him permanently and totally unable to perform his job, id. §§ 902(10), 908(a).
Section 2(3) of the Act defines a covered "employee" as "any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and ship-breaker." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). An employee is engaged in maritime employment as long as some portion of his job activities constitutes covered employment. See Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 275-76 (1977). Maritime employment is not limited to the occupations specifically enumerated in Section 2(3), but also encompasses any employment that is "an integral or essential part of loading or unloading a vessel." Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 45 (1989).
Implicitly invoking Schwalb's "integral or essential" test, the ALJ concluded that Marinelli's performance of his shop steward duties was "an integral part of and essential to [ASL's] maritime business." The ALJ based this conclusion on findings that Marinelli (i) represented the interests of both ASL and the union members, and (ii) "facilitated the day- to-day operation of [ASL's] business so as to remove interpersonal obstacles which might otherwise obstruct such ongoing operations."
removed from coverage if they also have duties not integrally connected with the loading or unloading functions. . . . When machinery breaks down or becomes clogged or fouled because of the lack of cleaning, the loading process stops until the difficulty is cured. It is irrelevant that an employee's contribution to the loading process is not continuous or that repair or maintenance is not always needed.
The Schwalb court also stated that "[i]t makes no difference that the particular kind of repair work [the workers were] doing . . . might be done by railroad employees wherever railroad cars are unloaded." Id. at 48. This reasoning applies equally to defeat ASL's third claim that Marinelli's work as a shop steward was not particular to the stevedoring industry. It makes no difference that the particular kind of shop steward work Marinelli performed might have been performed by a shop steward at a tire plant in Kansas.4
II. Employer-Employee Relationship
For a claim to be compensable under the Act, the injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2). Therefore, an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the claimant must exist at the time of the injury. See Fitzgerald v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., BRB No. 00-0724, 2001 WL 94757, at *4 (B.R.B. Jan. 31, 2001) (en banc) (citing Clauss v. Washington Post Co., 13 B.R.B.S. 525 (1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Under the Act, "employee" is defined as "any person engaged in maritime employment," and "employer" is defined as "an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment." 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 902(4).
Premise 1:ASL was an employer under the Act because, as a stevedoring company, it employed individuals "employed in maritime employment."
Premise 2:Marinelli was "employed in maritime employment."
Conclusion:Therefore, ASL was Marinelli's employer under the Act.
This reasoning clearly begs the question of who was Marinelli's employer. The ALJ's conclusion follows from the premises only if one assumes that Marinelli's only possible statutory employer was ASL. As ASL points out, however, the union may have been Marinelli's statutory employer. ASL contended that the union was Marinelli's statutory employer because the union - rather than ASL - controlled his activities. The ALJ rejected this contention:
[T]hat [Marinelli's] job duties may be under the control of the union has no bearing upon whether he is an `employee' of [ASL] under the Act. Such traditional control consideration [sic] indeed begs the question whether [Marinelli] is an `employee' under the Act, and [ASL's] reliance upon decisions reached in ["borrowed employee" cases] is therefore misplaced. In these cases, the issue was which of several entities was the employer responsible for benefits, and not, as here, whether [Marinelli] was an `employee' under the Act.6
B. The Board's Analysis
has applied three tests to determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists within the meaning of the Act: (1) the relative nature of the work, (2) the right to control details of the work, and (3) . . . Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 220, subsection 2, which encompasses factors set forth in each of the other two tests. The administrative law judge should apply whichever test is best suited to the facts of the particular case. Where the administrative law judge's application of one test is affirmable, the Board need not address the administrative law judge's application of the other tests.
The Board's surmise that the ALJ relied on the "method of payment of wages" factor listed in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) is dubious. Section 220(2)(g) concerns "the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job." The ALJ, however, did not focus on whether ASL paid Marinelli by the hour or by the job. Rather, the ALJ based his conclusion that ASL was Marinelli's employer on the fact that ASL paid his wages. Furthermore, Section 220(1) defines an employee as "a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control." § 220(1) (emphasis added). The various factors listed in Section 220(2) - including the "method of payment" factor - thus are factors that are considered in determining whether the worker is subject to the other's control or right to control. § 220(2). It is thus difficult to square the Board's finding that the ALJ was relying on the "method of payment" factor with the ALJ's claim that the issue of whether ASL controlled Marinelli's job duties was irrelevant.8
C. The "Relative Nature of the Work" Test
Despite the aforementioned flaws in the respective analyses of the ALJ and the Board, these analyses correctly downplayed the issue of "which entity, employer or the union, controlled the details of [Marinelli's] work." Marinelli, 2000 WL 1133566, at *3. This control factor is not "suited to the facts of th[is] particular case," id., because it was inherent in Marinelli's position as a shop steward - a position created by agreement between ASL and the union - that neither party exercised control over the details of his work. As the ALJ found, based on substantial evidence, it was Marinelli's job to mediate disputes between ASL and the union, and he sometimes sided with ASL, other times with the union. Marinelli could not have performed this role if he had been under the detailed control of either entity.9
Applying this test to the present case, it is evident that Marinelli's shop steward position did not constitute a calling or enterprise separate from ASL's stevedoring operation. On the contrary, the position existed solely by agreement of ASL and the union. As ASL's owner testified, other non- union stevedoring operations are conducted without the benefit of this position. Nor was Marinelli's position one that could be expected to carry its own accident insurance. Indeed, ASL's owner testified that ASL deducted sums from Marinelli's paychecks for disability benefits. See also Carle v. Georgetown Builders, Inc., BRB No. 83-1618, 1986 WL 66425, at *3 (B.R.B. Nov. 28, 1986) (finding employer-employee relationship because, inter alia, claimant did not carry his own accident burden). Turning to the relationship between Marinelli's work and ASL's regular business, we have noted in the preceding section that Marinelli's shop steward duties were a regular part of ASL's regular stevedoring work. Marinelli held the position continuously from 1986 or 1987 until March 16, 1997, a period of time that is sufficient to amount to hiring of continuing services. Furthermore, the fact emphasized by the ALJ, ASL's payment of Marinelli's wages, also supports a finding that ASL was Marinelli's employer. See Oilfield, 625 F.2d at 1255 (under "relative nature of the work" test, finding employer- employee relationship because, inter alia, entity paid claimant's salary); Carle, 1986 WL 66425, at *3 (same). In sum, viewed through the lens of the "relative nature of the work" test, the ALJ's determination that an employer-employee relationship existed between ASL and Marinelli was supported by substantial evidence.
This conclusion is not disturbed by the fact that ASL exercised no control over the details of Marinelli's work. As indicated above, this fact does not count against a finding that ASL was his employer because it was inherent in the very nature of Marinelli's shop steward position - a position created by the CBA - that Marinelli operated independently of both ASL and the union. See Oilfield, 625 F.2d at 1256 (stating that entity's lack of control over claimant did not count against finding that entity was claimant's employer because "[t]he nature of [claimant's] job virtually prohibits a supervisor from controlling the details of the work").
D. The "Borrowed Employee" Test
III. Causation and Permanent Total Disability
After finding that Marinelli had established a prima facie case of causation and that ASL had rebutted this case, the ALJ proceeded to step three and concluded that Marinelli was "unable and disabled from performance of [his] job." The ALJ based this conclusion on findings that (i) Marinelli "suffered angina due to . . . job stress on March 16, 19[9]7," (ii) "a return to [his] job would subject him to continued aggravation of his underlying heart impairment by exposure to conditions likely to cause insufficient blood flow to his heart," and (iii) Marinelli had a well-founded fear that "further performance of his job would result in psychological (depression/anxiety) and physical (coronary damage) consequences of intolerable dimension." The Board concluded that these findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the ALJ's award of permanent total disability benefits. Marinelli, 2000 WL 1133566, at *6-*7.
On appeal, ASL raises four challenges to this conclusion. First, ASL contends that the ALJ "failed to make findings of fact as to exactly what the March 16, 1997 injury was." The record belies this contention. As noted, the ALJ explicitly found that Marinelli "suffered angina due to the job stress on March 16, 19[9]7." The ALJ based this finding on a statement to this effect in the medical report of Marinelli's treating physician, Dr. Konka.
Second, ASL, citing Director v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., (Carmines), 138 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1998), argues that Dr. Konka's medical report "is not substantial evidence" because it is "an unexplained conclusory opinion, not stated with a reasonable degree of medical certainty." This argument is without substance. Carmines states that "[t]he ALJ may not merely credulously accept the assertions of the parties or their representatives, but must examine the logic of their conclusions and evaluate the evidence upon which their conclusions are based." Id. Here, the ALJ did more than merely credulously accept Dr. Konka's report. The ALJ noted that Dr. Konka was Marinelli's treating cardiac surgeon, that he had performed several coronary procedures on Marinelli, and that he was intimately familiar with Marinelli's cardiac state.
Third, ASL contends that the ALJ's stated reason for disregarding the testimony of ASL's expert, Dr. Israel, that Marinelli did not suffer an angina attack on March 16, 1997, was based on an erroneous reading of the record. The ALJ found that "Dr. Israel's basis for concluding that the March 16, 1997 pain was non-anginal (i.e., the catheterization results of March 16, 19[9]7 indicating `not enough coronary blockage to cause chest pain') lacks full creditability [sic] since he fails to indicate exactly what degree of blockage may result in angina." ASL claims that Dr. Israel provided this information because, in his written report submitted to the ALJ, he stated that the catheterization "showed no areas of myocardium at risk (no stenosis greater than or equal to 50%)." This objection is unpersuasive. The ALJ cannot fairly be faulted for failing to interpret Dr. Israel's statement that 50% or greater narrowing of cardiac passages is needed for there to be "myocardium risk" to mean that 50% or greater blockage is the minimum needed for angina. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the ALJ had erroneously disregarded Dr. Israel's statement about the 50% blockage standard, the error was harmless because the ALJ discounted Dr. Israel's opinion that Marinelli did not suffer an angina attack on March 16, 1997 for several other reasons - not the least of which was that this opinion was inconsistent with the opinion of Dr. Konka, who, according to the ALJ, "performed the catheterization and was thus in a much better position than Dr. Israel to interpret the results thereof in terms of degree of blockage." Indeed, as Marinelli points out, the page of Carmines cited by ASL actually undermines ASL's argument, because it states that "the testimony of a non-examining, non-treating physician should be discounted and is not substantial evidence if it is totally contradicted by other evidence in the record." Carmines, 139 F.3d at 140 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).13
ASL contends that, "[w]hile the deference entitlement is generally true, the courts have recognized that a litigation position, which is not contained in regulations, is not entitled to deference." Because, as explained below, we have no occasion to consider whether the Director's positions in this litigation should be given deference, see infra note 3, we do not address ASL's contention.
Schwalb also emphasized that "[t]he determinative consideration is that the ship loading process could not continue unless [the equipment on which the employees worked] was operating properly." Id. Because the hearing testimony revealed that Marinelli resolved disputes that had the potential to interrupt loading and unloading operations and that Marinelli had the authority to order a work stoppage, the ALJ could have found that "the ship loading process could not continue unless" Marinelli properly performed his duties.
For the same reason, we do not reach ASL's objection to the Director's reliance on Sanders v. Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co., BRB Nos. 85- 329, 85-329A, 1989 WL 245268 (B.R.B. July 31, 1989).
We also note the following inconsistency in the Board's analysis of the employer-employee issue: On the one hand, the Board claims that the instant case "does not concern . . . whether [Marinelli] is an independent contractor," yet, on the other hand (as noted), the Board contends that the ALJ relied on two factors listed in Restatement (Second) of Ageny § 220(2) - factors which courts are to consider when determining whether a worker is an independent contractor. Marinelli, 2000 WL 1133566, at *3.
As noted, Section 220 is designed to determine whether the worker is "subject to [an entity's] control or right to control." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(1). Section 220(2)(a) concerns "the extent of control which . . . the master may exercise over the details of the work." Id. § 220(2)(a).
Therefore, we need not address the Director's proposed rule that "the payroll employer should be foreclosed from asserting that it is not liable because it had `lent' the worker to someone else unless it has joined the asserted borrowing employer in the proceeding on the claim" because this rule presupposes application of the "borrowed employee" test.