Source: http://openjurist.org/439/us/463
Timestamp: 2014-11-25 23:44:01
Document Index: 461843616

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6']

439 US 463 Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation | OpenJurist
439 U.S. 463 - Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation	Home439 us 463 washington v. confederated bands and tribes of yakima indian nation
We are unable to find the procedural mandate missing from the main clause of § 6 in the language of the proviso. That language in the abstract could be read to suggest that constitutional amendment is a condition precedent to a valid assumption of jurisdiction by disclaimer States. When examined in its context, however, it cannot fairly be read to impose such a condition. Two considerations prevent this reading. First, it is doubtful that Congress—in order to compel disclaimer States to amend their constitutions by popular vote—would have done so in a provision the first clause of which consents to that procedure "where necessary" and the proviso to which indicates that the procedure is to be followed if "appropriate." Second, the reference to popular amendatory action in the proviso is not framed as a description of the procedure the States must follow to assume jurisdiction, but instead is written as a condition to the effectiveness of "the provisions of" Pub.L. 280. When it is recalled that the only substantive provisions of the Act—other than those arguably to be found in § 7—accomplish an immediate transfer of jurisdiction to specifically named States, it seems most likely that the proviso was included to ensure that § 6 would not be construed to effect an immediate transfer to the disclaimer group of option States. The main clause removes a federal-law barrier to any new state jurisdiction over Indian country. The proviso suggests that disclaimer States are not automatically to receive jurisdiction by virtue of that removal. Without the proviso, in the event that state constitutional amendment were not found "necessary,"29 § 6 could be construed as effecting an immediate cession. Congress clearly wanted all the option States to "obligate and bind" themselves to assume the jurisdiction offered in Pub.L. 280.30 To be sure, constitutional amendment was referred to as the process by which this might be accomplished in disclaimer States. But, given the distinction that Congress clearly drew between those States and automatic-transfer States, this reference can hardly be construed to require that process.
Before turning to the legislative history, which, as we shall see, accords with this interpretation of § 6, we address the argument that popular amendatory action, if not a requirement of Pub.L. 280, is mandated by the legislation admitting Washington to the Union. This argument requires that two assumptions be made. The first is that § 6 eliminated some but preserved other Enabling Act barriers to a State's assertion of jurisdiction over Indian country. The second is that the phrase "where necessary" in the main clause of § 6 was intended to refer to those federal-law barriers that had been preserved. Only if each of these premises is accepted does the Enabling Act have any possible application.
Since we find the first premise impossible to accept, we proceed no further. Admitting legislation is, to be sure, the only source of law mentioned in the main clause of § 6 and might therefore be looked to as a referent for the phrase "where necessary" in the clause. This reading, however, is not tenable. It supplies