Source: http://openjurist.org/434/f3d/627/sukwanputra-v-gonzales
Timestamp: 2014-08-01 08:06:22
Document Index: 162185383

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1003', '§ 1252', '§ 1158', '§ 1158', '§ 1158', '§ 1158', '§ 1158', '§ 1158']

434 F3d 627 Sukwanputra v. Gonzales | OpenJurist
434 F. 3d 627 - Sukwanputra v. Gonzales	Home434 f3d 627 sukwanputra v. gonzales
434 F3d 627 Sukwanputra v. Gonzales 434 F.3d 627
Ellyana SUKWANPUTRA; Yulius Sukwanputra, Petitionersv.Alberto GONZALES, Attorney General United States of America* Respondent.
No. 04-3336.
Argued October 18, 2005.
Filed January 19, 2006.
Joseph C. Hohenstein, (Argued), Orlow and Orlow, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioners.
Jonathan Potter, (Argued), United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC, Stephen A. Sherman, United States Department of Justice, Tax Division, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Before SCIRICA, Chief Judge, VAN ANTWERPEN and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
Ellyana Sukwanputra and her husband, Yulius Sukwanputra,1 are natives and citizens of Indonesia. Petitioner claims persecution in Indonesia on account of her Chinese ethnicity and Catholic religion. In support, she relates numerous incidents of persecution spanning a twenty year period from her childhood until the late 1990s. Three of the incidents are relevant to our decision, which we discuss below.
On August 5, 2005, the BIA entered its order affirming and adopting the IJ's decision. The BIA rejected petitioner's claim that the IJ exhibited bias violating their due process rights. The BIA concluded that while some of the IJ's statements were "injudicious," there was insufficient evidence to show that the IJ's conduct prevented petitioner from fully presenting her evidence.
The BIA's jurisdiction arose under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA's final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
Insofar as the BIA adopted the findings of the IJ, we must review the decision of the IJ. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir.2001) ("When the BIA defers to an IJ, a reviewing court must, as a matter of logic, review the IJ's decision to assess whether the BIA's decision to defer was appropriate."). As to matters which the BIA issued its own opinion and did not summarily adopt the findings of the IJ, we must review the decision of the BIA. Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir.2005).
Petitioners argue that one-year statutory period of limitations for filing an asylum application provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)2 violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the Due Process Clause, and that the judicial review bar provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), which precludes judicial review of determinations of the Attorney General made under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2), also violates the Due Process Clause. We consider each of these arguments below, under a de novo review. Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595-96 (3d Cir. 2003).
Citing to the Supremacy Clause, petitioners argue that the one-year statutory period of limitations provided in § 1158(a)(2) conflicts with Article 34 of 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1951 Convention"). By acceding to the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1967 Protocol"), the United States agreed to comply with the substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984). However, Article 34 is not self-executing. See Stevic, 467 U.S. at 428 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 2489. As such, Article 34 provides no enforceable rights beyond those granted by the INA. See id; Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir.2005). Accordingly, the one-year statutory period provided in § 1158(a)(2) for filing an asylum application does not violate the Supremacy Clause.3
Petitioners' claim that the statutory period of limitations provided in § 1158(a)(2) violates the Due Process Clause is also unavailing. Although the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to the "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238-239 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)), "it d[oes] not violate due process for Congress to impose a reasonable limitations period upon the filing of naturalization petitions." INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 885, 108 S.Ct. 2210, 100 L.Ed.2d 882 (1988). The state "may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication, be they statutes of limitations . . . [a]nd . . . certainly accords due process when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural or evidentiary rule." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted) (emphasis in original).