Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/120/623/578451/
Timestamp: 2019-10-13 21:04:34
Document Index: 394515524

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4332', '§ 1502', '§ 1491', '§ 702', '§ 704', '§ 706', '§ 4', '§ 138', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 1501', '§ 1501', '§ 1501', '§ 470', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 230', '§ 230', '§ 325', '§ 325', '§ 706']

Sierra Club; Citizens for Buckeye Basin Parks, Inc.;friends of Mulberry Park; Rick B. Van Landingham, Iii;gene Cook; Sandy James; Robert Wayne James; Helen Martin;henry Martin; Emilie Martin; Edward Knapp; Anthony P.urbanski; Jeannine Urbanski; Maryann Hollaway; Marahollaway, Plaintiffs--appellants, v. Rodney Slater, Secretary, United States Department Oftransportation; Robert D. Bush, Executive Director,advisory Council on Historic Preservation; Fred J. Hempel,division Administrator, Federal Highway Administration; W.ray Luce, Director, Ohio Historical Preservation Office;jerry Wray, Director, Ohio Department of Transportation;william Knight, Director, Toledo Metro Area Council Ofgovernments; Carleton S. Finkbeiner, Mayor, City Oftoledo; Donald Schregardus Director, Ohio Environmentalprotection Agency; Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Departmentof the Army Corps of Engineers, Defendants--appellees, 120 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1997 › Sierra Club; Citizens for Buckeye Basin Parks, Inc.;friends of Mulberry Park; Rick B. Van Landingham...
Sierra Club; Citizens for Buckeye Basin Parks, Inc.;friends of Mulberry Park; Rick B. Van Landingham, Iii;gene Cook; Sandy James; Robert Wayne James; Helen Martin;henry Martin; Emilie Martin; Edward Knapp; Anthony P.urbanski; Jeannine Urbanski; Maryann Hollaway; Marahollaway, Plaintiffs--appellants, v. Rodney Slater, Secretary, United States Department Oftransportation; Robert D. Bush, Executive Director,advisory Council on Historic Preservation; Fred J. Hempel,division Administrator, Federal Highway Administration; W.ray Luce, Director, Ohio Historical Preservation Office;jerry Wray, Director, Ohio Department of Transportation;william Knight, Director, Toledo Metro Area Council Ofgovernments; Carleton S. Finkbeiner, Mayor, City Oftoledo; Donald Schregardus Director, Ohio Environmentalprotection Agency; Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Departmentof the Army Corps of Engineers, Defendants--appellees, 120 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 1997)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 120 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 1997) Argued Jan. 27, 1997. Decided Aug. 6, 1997. Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 15, 1997
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that because NEPA contains no statute of limitations, and because NEPA creates an equitable remedy, the only applicable time limitation is that imposed by the doctrine of laches. They argue, in the alternative, that even if a six-year limitations period applies, it should not be "mechanically" enforced. They also take the position, without citation to authority, that there was no final agency action until 1995, at which time the FHWA authorized ODOT to proceed using federal funds, because only then did the project "bec [o]me irrevocable." Finally, they assert, the ROD issued in 1984 was not a final agency action, or rather, it somehow became un-final by virtue of the fact that it was later necessary to evaluate the necessity for a supplemental EIS.
Whether the district court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law for plenary review by this court. See Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1991).
Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA requires that federal agencies prepare a detailed EIS for every "major Federal action [ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1-.25.
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 1858, 104 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1989) (citation omitted). NEPA itself does not contain a statute of limitations, see Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 617 (10th Cir. 1987), and many courts, including this one, have routinely applied the laches doctrine when faced with timeliness challenges to NEPA actions, see Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1182 (6th Cir. 1972). These courts have never, however, explicitly addressed the issue of whether NEPA suits are subject to some other time limitation, such as the general six-year statute of limitations of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, which contains the following general six-year statute of limitations:
As we have said, NEPA does not authorize a private right of action. See Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1988). The Administrative Procedures Act, however, provides for judicial review of agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 702. We have long recognized that federal courts have jurisdiction over NEPA challenges pursuant to the APA, see Environmental Defense Fund, 468 F.2d at 1171, and so have many other courts, see, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Sierra Club, 857 F.2d at 1315.
Like NEPA, the APA does not contain a specific limitations period. See Sierra Club, 857 F.2d at 1315. Numerous courts have held, however, that a complaint under the APA for review of an agency action is a "civil action" within the meaning of section 2401(a). See, e.g., Wind River, 946 F.2d at 712. These courts have held that the six-year statute of limitations in section 2401(a), therefore, applies to the APA. See Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. Babbitt, 40 F.3d 442, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Sierra Club, 857 F.2d at 1315.
Under the APA, a right of action accrues at the time of "final agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 704. In determining whether a particular agency action is final, " [t]he core question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties." Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773, 120 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1992). Although this court has never addressed the question, it appears well-established that a final EIS or the ROD issued thereon constitute the "final agency action" for purposes of the APA. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Harrell, 52 F.3d 1499, 1504 (9th Cir. 1995); Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989).
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, raised in Count II of their complaint, that the defendants should have supplemented the EIS. When reviewing an administrative agency's final decision under the APA, we review the district court's summary judgment decision de novo, while "applying the appropriate standard of review to the agency's decision." Schuck v. Frank, 27 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1994). Here, the appropriate standard of review is that we set aside the agency determination only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 375, 109 S. Ct. at 1860; Communities, Inc. v. Busey, 956 F.2d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 1992); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) & (D).
The Supreme Court dealt extensively with supplemental environmental impact statements and the standards governing them in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 104 L. Ed. 2d 377. The Court initially observed that " [t]he subject of postdecision supplemental environmental impact statements is not expressly addressed in NEPA," but that regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality "impose a duty on all federal agencies to prepare supplements to either draft or final EIS's if there 'are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.' " Id. at 370, 372, 109 S. Ct. at 1857, 1858 (citations omitted). The Court wrote as follows with regard to the standard governing an agency's decision whether to perform a supplemental EIS:
[A]n agency need not supplement an EIS every time new information comes to light after the EIS is finalized. To require otherwise would render agency decisionmaking intractable, always awaiting updated information only to find the new information outdated by the time a decision is made. On the other hand, ... NEPA does require that agencies take a "hard look" at the environmental effects of their planned action, even after a proposal has received initial approval. Application of the "rule of reason" thus turns on the value of the new information to the still pending decisionmaking process. In this respect the decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS is similar to the decision whether to prepare an EIS in the first instance: If there remains "major Federal actio [n]" to occur, and if the new information is sufficient to show that the remaining action will "affec [t] the quality of the human environment" in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered, a supplemental EIS must be prepared.
Id. at 373-74, 109 S. Ct. at 1859 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The Court further held that the agency's decision about the significance of any effect on the environment was "a classic example of a factual dispute the resolution of which implicates substantial agency expertise." Id. at 376, 109 S. Ct. at 1860. The Court pointed out that in the case before it, the arguments for setting aside the decision not to issue a supplemental EIS were, essentially, that the "expert review of the new information was incomplete, inconclusive, or inaccurate." Id. at 376-77, 109 S. Ct. at 1861. As such,
Id. at 377, 109 S. Ct. at 1861 (footnote and citations omitted).
Id. at 378, 109 S. Ct. at 1861 (citation omitted).
The plaintiffs argued below that the Secretary of Transportation failed to determine whether there were feasible prudent alternatives before taking certain properties required for this Project that are known as so-called § 4(f) properties. Section 4(f) property is a "public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance, ... or any land from an historic site of national, State, or local significance." 23 U.S.C. § 138. Part of the plaintiffs' claims in this regard related to the initial determination ratified in the 1984 ROD that there was no feasible and prudent alternative to taking the wetlands and other § 4(f) properties affected by the Project. The district court concluded that these claims were time-barred. See Sierra Club, 915 F. Supp. at 1396. The plaintiffs also argued, however, that in conducting the subsequent reevaluation, the defendants erroneously decided in 1995 that no new § 4(f) sites were involved. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that dozens of § 4(f) properties were simply ignored in the reevaluation process, contrary to the district court's finding.
The necessity for preparing an EIS is a decision that is the responsibility of the agency in question. See Park County, 817 F.2d at 621. The applicable regulations require that, " [i]n determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement [,] the Federal agency shall ... prepare an environmental assessment." 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b)-(c); see Sierra Club, 857 F.2d at 1312. Thus, agencies first prepare an "environmental assessment" (EA) in order to determine whether the project's effect on the environment will be significant enough to warrant a more detailed "environmental impact statement." 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b)-(c). If the agency decides that an environmental impact statement is unnecessary, then it prepares a "finding of no significant impact," or FONSI. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e). " 'An EA allows the agency to consider environmental concerns, while reserving agency resources to prepare full EIS's for appropriate cases. If a finding of no significant impact is made after analyzing the EA, then preparation of an EIS is unnecessary.' " Park County, 817 F.2d at 621 (quoting Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). This court will overturn an agency decision not to issue an environmental impact statement only if it is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See Crounse Corp. v. ICC, 781 F.2d 1176, 1193 (6th Cir. 1986).
16 U.S.C. § 470f. The regulations of the Corps provide that " [i]n processing a permit application, the district engineer will generally accept ... the Federal agency's or Federal lead agency's compliance with the requirements of the NHPA." 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. C2(c).
As both the defendants and the district court have observed, however, numerous cases have held that it is not necessary to have a final, detailed mitigation plan prior to approval of a § 404 permit; instead, a permit conditioned on future implementation of a mitigation plan complies with the dictates of the Clean Water Act. See Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb's History, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 1996); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Whistler, 27 F.3d 1341, 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1994); Holy Cross Wilderness Fund v. Madigan, 960 F.2d 1515, 1528-29 (10th Cir. 1992); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 825-26, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1986). And the plaintiffs are simply incorrect when they assert that the § 404 permit was predicated merely on vague mitigation goals rather than on a sufficiently detailed plan; the mitigation plan relied on by the Corps here, was, in fact, quite specific. Again, therefore, we reject the plaintiffs' argument.
Applicable regulations provide that the Corps may not issue a § 404 permit if "there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse environmental consequences." 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). The definition of "practicable" allows the taking into consideration of "overall project purposes." Id. at § 230.10(a) (2)
The plaintiffs are correct that regulations require that the Corps refer, in its public notice, to a requirement that the Project receive water quality certification from the relevant state agency. See 33 C.F.R. § 325.3(a) (8). The purpose of the certification is to notify the state agency--here, Ohio EPA--of the need for its certification. In addressing and rejecting the plaintiffs' argument below, however, the district court noted the absence of any prejudice resulting from the apparent failure here:
[T]he Corps failed to refer in their public notice to the requirement that the Project receive water quality certification from OEPA, such reference being required by 33 C.F.R. § 325.3(a) (8). The Defendants concede that the required reference was omitted from the notice, but argue that the error was harmless, since OEPA in fact received notice that its certification would be requested.... [Thus, t]his notice requirement to OEPA was functionally satisfied. Plaintiffs have suggested no credible reason why omission of the reference to OEPA would affect the public's review of the proposal, or in any way change the comments made by them to the Corps. Therefore, the Court finds this omission to be harmless error.
This court reviews a district court's decision with respect to discovery matters using an abuse of discretion standard. See Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1465 (6th Cir. 1991). While this court has held that " 'summary judgment should not ordinarily be granted before discovery has been completed.' " Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted), a plaintiff complaining that a district court granted summary judgment without allowing adequate discovery must, at a minimum, be able to show that he could obtain information through discovery that would disclose material facts, see Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1989). Here, the plaintiffs have failed to make the slightest effort to explain what information they hoped to be able to uncover during the Leite deposition, or how the deposition would have aided their opposition to summary judgment. Without this type of explanation, we are simply unable to conclude that the district court's limitations on the discovery process constituted an abuse of discretion.
The plaintiffs filed a motion below requesting that the district court supplement the administrative record with other records related to the Project. In ruling on the motion, the district court noted that the plaintiffs "ha [d] provided a proffer of exhibits containing most of the items Plaintiffs seek to have admitted." Sierra Club, 915 F. Supp. at 1387-88. The defendants objected to supplementation on the ground that "the items proffered by Plaintiffs are not properly part of the record, and are irrelevant to the Court's review of the agencies' determinations," and that supplementation "w [ould] serve only to delay resolution of the case." Id. at 1388. The district court nonetheless granted the plaintiffs' motion in part, limiting supplementation to the items that had already been proffered:
The plaintiffs now assert that " [s]pace prohibits detailing the supplementations sought," but contend that " [a] reviewing court may consider evidence outside the record." With no further argument, and no attempt to address the district court's reasoning, they conclude that, therefore, supplementation was wrongly denied.
The APA requires courts to "review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party." 5 U.S.C. § 706. As a general matter, "courts confine their review to the 'administrative record,' " which "includes all materials 'compiled' by the agency [ ] that were 'before the agency at the time the decision was made.' " James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 737, 136 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1997). Several reasons justify supplementation of the administrative record, such as when an agency deliberately or negligently excludes certain documents, or when the court needs certain " 'background information' in order to determine whether the agency considered all of the relevant factors." Id. (citation omitted); see United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1428 (6th Cir. 1991). Courts have suggested that in order to justify supplementation, a plaintiff must make a " 'strong showing' of bad faith." James Madison, 82 F.3d at 1095.
After concluding its exhaustive analysis leading to a grant of summary judgment on behalf of the defendants, the district court noted that " [a]ll other currently pending motions," which included the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, would be "denied as moot." Sierra Club, 915 F. Supp. at 1399. We are now left with the plaintiffs' final argument, that their motion for summary judgment was not moot. As best as we can understand, the plaintiffs contend that because they sought summary judgment based on information developed during the course of this litigation and because the motion was "timely filed," therefore, the district court should have addressed the motion on the merits. It is quite evident, however, that the district court could not have granted summary judgment both to the defendants and to the plaintiffs. Since it concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment, therefore, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment no longer presented a justiciable controversy. In other words, it was moot.