Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102775/new-york-times-co-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-08-16 02:11:28
Document Index: 718329570

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 793', '§ 160', '§ 45', '§ 8', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 798', '§ 783']

New York Times Co Vs United States - Citation 102775 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
New York Times Co. Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/102775
Case Number 403 U.S. 713
new york times co. v. united states - 403 u.s. 713 (1971) u.s. supreme court new york times co. v. united states, 403 u.s. 713 (1971) new york times co. v. united states no. 1873 argued june 26, 1971 decided june 30, 1971 * 403 u.s. 713 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus the united states, which brought these actions to enjoin publication in the new york times and in the washington post of certain classified material, has not met the "heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a [prior] restraint." no. 1873, 44 f.2d 544, reversed and remanded; no. 1885, ___ u.s.app.d.c. ___, 446 f.2d 1327, affirmed. page 403 u. s. 714 per.....
New York Times Co. v. United States - 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
U.S. Supreme Court New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
Decided June 30, 1971 *
"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 , 372 U. S. 70 (1963); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). The Government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 , 402 U. S. 419 (1971). The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in the New York Times case, and the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in the Washington Post case, held that the Government had not met that burden. We agree.
In seeking injunctions against these newspapers, and in its presentation to the Court, the Executive Branch seems to have forgotten the essential purpose and history of the First Amendment. When the Constitution was adopted, many people strongly opposed it because the document contained no Bill of Rights to safeguard certain basic freedoms. [ Footnote 1 ] They especially feared that the
"The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments, and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable. [ Footnote 2 ]"
say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that 'no law' does not mean 'no law,' and I would seek to persuade the Court that that is true. . . . [T]here are other parts of the Constitution that grant powers and responsibilities to the Executive, and . . . the First Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the Executive to function or to protect the security of the United States. [ Footnote 3 ]"
"[t]he authority of the Executive Department to protect the nation against publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the national security stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Commander-in-Chief. [ Footnote 4 ]"
In other words, we are asked to hold that, despite the First Amendment's emphatic command, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the Judiciary can make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging freedom of the press in the name of "national security." The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. Instead, it makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that the courts should take it upon themselves to "make" a law abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security, even when the representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a law. [ Footnote 5 ] See concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS,
post at 403 U. S. 721 -722. To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make "secure." No one can read the history of the adoption of the First Amendment without being convinced beyond any doubt that it was injunctions like those sought here that Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time.
assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. [ Footnote 6 ]"
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 , 299 U. S. 365 .
It should be noted at the outset that the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall male no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." That leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
Section 798, relating to cryptography, applies to whoever: "communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available . . . or publishes " the described material. [ Footnote 2/2 ] (Emphasis added.)
The power to wage war is "the power to wage war successfully." See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 , 320 U. S. 93 . But the war power stems from a declaration of war. The Constitution by Art. I, § 8, gives Congress, not the President, power "[t]o declare War." Nowhere are presidential wars authorized. We need not decide, therefore, what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have.
These disclosures [ Footnote 2/3 ] may have a serious impact. But that is no basis for sanctioning a previous restraint on
the press. As stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 , 283 U. S. 719 -720:
As we stated only the other day in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 , 402 U. S. 419 , "[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a "heavy presumption" against its constitutional validity."
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 , repudiated that expansive doctrine in no uncertain terms.
Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public questions, there should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 , 376 U. S. 269 -270.
See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 , 343 U. S. 267 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK), 284 (my dissenting opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 508 (my dissenting opinion which MR. JUSTICE BLACK joined); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 , 354 U. S. 339 (separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK which I joined); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 , 376 U. S. 293 (concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK which I joined); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 , 379 U. S. 80 (my concurring opinion which MR. JUSTICE BLACK joined).
may result. * Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be overridden. Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise only when the Nation "is at war," Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 , 249 U. S. 52 (1919), during which times
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 , 283 U. S. 716 (1931). Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Government presented or even alleged that publication of items from or based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event of that nature. "[T]he chief purpose of [the First Amendment's] guaranty [is] to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Near v. Minnesota, supra, at 283 U. S. 713 . Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
* Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), and similar cases regarding temporary restraints of allegedly obscene materials are not in point. For those cases rest upon the proposition that "obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press." Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 481 (1957). Here there is no question but that the material sought to be suppressed is within the protection of the First Amendment; the only question is whether, notwithstanding that fact, its publication may be enjoined for a time because of the presence of an overwhelming national interest. Similarly, copyright cases have no pertinence here: the Government is not asserting an interest in the particular form of words chosen in the documents, but is seeking to suppress the ideas expressed therein. And the copyright laws, of course, protect only the form of expression, and not the ideas expressed.
In the governmental structure created by our Constitution, the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two related areas of national defense and international relations. This power, largely unchecked by the Legislative [ Footnote 3/1 ] and Judicial [ Footnote 3/2 ] branches, has been pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age. For better or for worse, the simple fact is that a
I think there can be but one answer to this dilemma, if dilemma it be. The responsibility must be where the power is. [ Footnote 3/3 ] If the Constitution gives the Executive
See Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103 ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304 ; cf. Mora v. McNamara, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 387 F.2d 862, cert. denied, 389 U. S. 934 .
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304 , 299 U. S. 320 .
enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system. I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations. [ Footnote 4/1 ] Nor, after examining the materials the Government characterizes as the most sensitive and destructive, can I deny that revelation of these documents will do substantial damage to public interests. Indeed, I am confident that their disclosure will have that result. But I nevertheless agree that the United States has not satisfied the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases, at least in the absence of express and appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these.
The Government's position is simply stated: the responsibility of the Executive for the conduct of the foreign affairs and for the security of the Nation is so basic that the President is entitled to an injunction against publication of a newspaper story whenever he can convince a court that the information to be revealed threatens "grave and irreparable" injury to the public interest; [ Footnote 4/2 ] and the injunction should issue whether or not the material to be published is classified, whether or not publication would be lawful under relevant criminal statutes enacted by Congress, and regardless of the circumstances by which the newspaper came into possession of the information. At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the press. Much of the difficulty inheres in the "grave and irreparable danger" standard suggested by the United States. If the United States were to have judgment under such a standard in these cases, our decision would be of little guidance to other courts in other cases, for the material at issue here would not be available from the Court's opinion or from public records, nor would it be published by the press. Indeed, even today, where we hold that the United States has not met its burden, the material remains sealed in court records and it is
1917, Congress eliminated from the bill a provision that would have given the President broad powers in time of war to proscribe, under threat of criminal penalty, the publication of various categories of information related to the national defense. [ Footnote 4/3 ] Congress at that time was unwilling to clothe the President with such far-reaching powers to monitor the press, and those opposed to this part of the legislation assumed that a necessary concomitant of such power was the power to "filter out the news to the people through some man." 55 Cong.Rec. 2008 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst). However, these same members of Congress appeared to have little doubt that newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they insisted on publishing information of the type Congress had itself determined should not be revealed. Senator Ashurst, for example, was quite sure that the editor of such a newspaper
Id. at 2009. [ Footnote 4/4 ]
The Criminal Code contains numerous provisions potentially relevant to these cases. Section 797 [ Footnote 4/5 ] makes it a crime to publish certain photographs or drawings of military installations. Section 798, [ Footnote 4/6 ] also in precise language, proscribes knowing and willful publication of any classified information concerning the cryptographic systems
or communication intelligence activities of the United States, as well as any information obtained from communication intelligence operations. [ Footnote 4/7 ] If any of the material here at issue is of this nature, the newspapers are presumably now on full notice of the position of the United States, and must face the consequences if they
The same would be true under those sections of the Criminal Code casting a wider net to protect the national defense. Section 793(e) [ Footnote 4/8 ] makes it a criminal act for any unauthorized possessor of a document "relating to the national defense" either (1) willfully to communicate or cause to be communicated that document to any person not entitled to receive it or (2) willfully to retain the document and fail to deliver it to an officer of the United States entitled to receive it. The subsection was added in 1950 because preexisting law provided no
penalty for the unauthorized possessor unless demand for the documents was made. [ Footnote 4/9 ]
S.Rep. No. 2369, pt. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1950). Of course, in the cases before us, the unpublished documents have been demanded by the United States, and their import has been made known at least to counsel for the newspapers involved. In Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19 , 312 U. S. 28 (1941), the words "national defense" as used in a predecessor of § 793 were held by a unanimous Court to have "a well understood connotation" -- a "generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness" -- and to be "sufficiently definite to apprise the public of prohibited activities"
and to be consonant with due process. 312 U.S. at 312 U. S. 28 . Also, as construed by the Court in Gorin, information "connected with the national defense" is obviously not limited to that threatening "grave and irreparable" injury to the United States. [ Footnote 4/10 ]
It is thus clear that Congress has addressed itself to the problems of protecting the security of the country and the national defense from unauthorized disclosure of potentially damaging information. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 , 343 U. S. 585 -586 (1952); see also id. at 343 U. S. 593 -628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It has not, however, authorized the injunctive remedy against threatened publication. It has apparently been satisfied to rely on criminal sanctions and their deterrent effect on the responsible, as well as the irresponsible, press. I am not, of course, saying that either of these newspapers has yet committed a crime, or that either would commit a crime if it published all the material now in its possession. That matter must await resolution in the context of a criminal proceeding if one is instituted by the United States. In that event, the issue of guilt or innocence would be determined by procedures and standards quite different from those that have purported to govern these injunctive proceedings.
The Congress has authorized a strain of prior restraints against private parties in certain instances. The National Labor Relations Board routinely issues cease and desist orders against employers who it finds have threatened or coerced employees in the exercise of protected rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to impose cease and desist orders against unfair methods of competition. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). Such orders can, and quite often do, restrict what may be spoken or written under certain circumstances. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575 , 395 U. S. 616 -620 (1969). Article I, § 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to secure the "exclusive right" of authors to their writings, and no one denies that a newspaper can properly be enjoined from publishing the copyrighted works of another. See Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Co., 249 U. S. 100 (1919). Newspapers do themselves rely from time to time on the copyright as a means of protecting their accounts of important events. However, those enjoined under the statutes relating to the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission are private parties, not the press, and, when the press is enjoined under the copyright laws, the complainant is a private copyright holder enforcing a private right. These situations are quite distinct from the Government's request for an injunction against publishing information about the affairs of government, a request admittedly not based on any statute.
is guilty of an offense punishable by 10 years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both. It should also be noted that 18 U.S.C. § 793(g), added in 1950 ( see 64 Stat. 1004; S.Rep. No. 239, pt. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1950)), provides that,
It seems clear from the foregoing, contrary to the intimations of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in this case, that, in prosecuting for communicating or withholding a "document," as contrasted with similar action with respect to "information," the Government need not prove an intent to injure the United States or to benefit a foreign nation, but only willful and knowing conduct. The District Court relied on Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19 (1941). But that case arose under other parts of the predecessor to § 793, see 312 U.S. at 312 U. S. 21 -22 -- parts that imposed different intent standards not repeated in § 793(d) or § 793(e). Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a), (b), and (c). Also, from the face of subsection (e) and from the context of the Act of which it was a part, it seems undeniable that a newspaper, as well as others unconnected with the Government, are vulnerable to prosecution under § 793(e) if they communicate or withhold the materials covered by that section. The District Court ruled that "communication" did not reach publication by a newspaper of documents relating to the national defense. I intimate no views on the correctness of that conclusion. But neither communication nor publication is necessary to violate the subsection.
In these cases, there is no problem concerning the President's power to classify information as "secret" or "top secret." Congress has specifically recognized Presidential authority, which has been formally exercised in Exec.Order 10501 (1953), to classify documents and information. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 798; 50 U.S.C. § 783. [ Footnote 5/1 ] Nor is there any issue here regarding the President's power as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief to protect national security by disciplining employees who disclose information and by taking precautions to prevent leaks.
The problem here is whether, in these particular cases, the Executive Branch has authority to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the courts to protect what it believes to be the national interest. See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 , 158 U. S. 584 (1895). The Government argues that, in addition to the inherent power of any government to protect itself, the President's power to conduct foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief give him authority to impose censorship on the press to protect his ability to deal effectively with foreign nations and to conduct the military affairs of the country. Of course, it is beyond cavil that the President has broad powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 , 320 U. S. 93 (1943); United States v. Curtiss
Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936). [ Footnote 5/2 ] And, in some situations, it may be that, under whatever inherent powers the Government may have, as well as the implicit authority derived from the President's mandate to conduct foreign affairs and to act as Commander in Chief, there is a basis for the invocation of the equity jurisdiction of this Court as an aid to prevent the publication of material damaging to "national security," however that term may be defined.
In these cases, we are not faced with a situation where Congress has failed to provide the Executive with broad power to protect the Nation from disclosure of damaging state secrets. Congress has, on several occasions, given extensive consideration to the problem of protecting the military and strategic secrets of the United States. This consideration has resulted in the enactment of statutes making it a crime to receive, disclose, communicate, withhold, and publish certain documents, photographs, instruments, appliances, and information. The bulk of these statutes is found in chapter 37 of U.S.C. Title 18, entitled Espionage and Censorship. [ Footnote 5/3 ] In that chapter,
The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First Amendment; they denominate this right as the public "right to know"; by implication, the Times asserts a sole trusteeship of that right by virtue of its journalistic "scoop." The right is asserted as an absolute. Of course, the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute, as Justice Holmes so long ago pointed out in his aphorism concerning the right to shout "fire" in a crowded theater if there was no fire. There are other exceptions, some of which Chief Justice Hughes mentioned by way of example in Near v. Minnesota. There are no doubt other exceptions no one has had occasion to describe or discuss. Conceivably, such exceptions may be lurking in these cases and, would have been flushed had they been properly considered in the trial courts, free from unwarranted deadlines and frenetic pressures. An issue of this importance should be tried and heard in a judicial atmosphere conducive to thoughtful, reflective deliberation, especially when haste, in terms of hours, is unwarranted in light of the long period the Times, by its own choice, deferred publication. [ Footnote 6/1 ]
the area of disagreement as to what was and was not publishable, leaving the remainder to be resolved in orderly litigation, if necessary. To me, it is hardly believable that a newspaper long regarded as a great institution in American life would fail to perform one of the basic and simple duties of every citizen with respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property or secret government documents. That duty, I had thought -- perhaps naively -- was to report forthwith, to responsible public officers. This duty rests on taxi drivers, Justices, and the New York Times. The course followed by the Times, whether so calculated or not, removed any possibility of orderly litigation of the issue. If the action of the judges up to now has been correct, that result is sheer happenstance. [ Footnote 6/2 ]
were not familiar with them. This Court is in no better posture. I agree generally with MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, but I am not prepared to reach the merits. [ Footnote 6/3 ]
[ Footnote 6/1 ]
[ Footnote 6/2 ]
[ Footnote 6/3 ]
These cases forcefully call to mind the wise admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 , 193 U. S. 400 -401 (1904):
2. Whether the First Amendment permits the federal courts to enjoin publication of stories which would present a serious threat to national security. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 , 283 U. S. 716 (1931) (dictum).
These are difficult questions of fact, of law, and of judgment; the potential consequences of erroneous decision are enormous. The time which has been available to us, to the lower courts, * and to the parties has been wholly inadequate for giving these cases the kind of consideration they deserve. It is a reflection on the stability of the judicial process that these great issues -- as important as any that have arisen during my time on the Court -- should have been decided under the pressures engendered by the torrent of publicity that has attended these litigations from their inception.
10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800). From that time, shortly after the founding of the Nation, to this, there has been no substantial challenge to this description of the scope of executive power. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304 , 299 U. S. 319 -321 (1936), collecting authorities.
The power to evaluate the "pernicious influence" of premature disclosure is not, however, lodged in the Executive alone. I agree that, in performance of its duty to protect the values of the First Amendment against political pressures, the judiciary must review the initial Executive determination to the point of satisfying itself that the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the President's foreign relations power. Constitutional considerations forbid "a complete abandonment of judicial control." Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 , 345 U. S. 8 (1953). Moreover, the judiciary may properly insist that the determination that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security be made by the head of the Executive Department concerned -- here, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense -- after actual personal consideration by that officer. This safeguard is required in the analogous area of executive claims of privilege for secrets of state. See id. at 345 U. S. 8 and n. 20; Duncan v. Cammell, Laird Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 638 (House of Lords).
Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 103 , 333 U. S. 111 (1948) (Jackson, J.).
Northen Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 , 193 U. S. 400 -401 (1904). The present cases, if not great, are at least unusual in their posture and implications, and the Holmes observation certainly has pertinent application.
The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution. Article II of the great document vests in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct of foreign affairs, and places in that branch the responsibility for the Nation's safety. Each provision of the Constitution is important, and I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions. First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court. See, for example, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 , 283 U. S. 708 (1931), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 , 249 U. S. 52 (1919). What is needed here is a weighing, upon properly developed standards, of the broad right of the press to print and of the very narrow right of the Government to prevent. Such standards are not yet developed. The parties here are in disagreement as to what those standards should be. But even the newspapers concede that there are situations where restraint is in order and is constitutional. Mr. Justice Holmes gave us a suggestion when he said in Schenck,
249 U.S. at 249 U. S. 52 .