Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/588-f-2d-319-594799142
Timestamp: 2020-08-06 13:33:13
Document Index: 256329979

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 2671', '§ 2402', '§ 1346', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 37']

588 F.2d 319 (2nd Cir. 1978), 935, Birnbaum v. United States - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 594799142
Docket Nº: 935, 976, 977, Dockets 77-6175, 77-6181, 77-6183.
Party Name: 201 U.S.P.Q. 623 Norman BIRNBAUM, B. Leonard Avery and Mary Rule MacMillen, Plaintiffs- Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.
Case Date: November 09, 1978
588 F.2d 319 (2nd Cir. 1978)
201 U.S.P.Q. 623
Melvin L. Wulf, New York City (Clark, Wulf & Levine, New York City, Burt Neuborne,
NYU School of Law, New York City, Richard W. Zacks, Providence, R. I., and Joel M. Gora, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees Avery and MacMillen.
For twenty years (from approximately 1953 to 1973), the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") covertly opened first class mail which American citizens sent to, or received from, the Soviet Union. Letters destined for the U.S.S.R., or originating there, were selected by agents in New York, photocopied, and then returned to postal authorities for ultimate delivery. Selection criteria were employed, but some letters were chosen at random. During the existence of the project over 215,000 pieces of mail were inspected and copied in this fashion. 1
Norman Birnbaum, Mary Rule MacMillen and B. Leonard Avery, whose mail was opened and copied, separately sued the United States for compensatory damages, invoking the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the district courts (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)) under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 ("the Act"). 2 In the cases of Birnbaum and MacMillen, the opened letters had been intercepted en route to the U.S.S.R., in 1970 and 1973, respectively. Avery's letter had been opened in 1968, while arriving in the United States from the Soviet Union. 3
The three cases were consolidated in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Judge). Although an advisory jury was empanelled, the District Judge, as required, tried the case himself, 28 U.S.C. § 2402, and found that the United States was liable to each plaintiff individually for damages in the amount of $1,000. The United States was also required to send a letter of apology to each plaintiff. 4 436 F.Supp. 967, 989-90 (1977). From this judgment the United States appeals.
Before the Act was passed in 1946, the United States, as sovereign, possessed complete immunity against suit for torts committed
by its agents and employees. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950); See Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 131, 39 S.Ct. 56, 63 L.Ed. 162 (1918); Hill v. United States, 149 U.S. 593, 598, 13 S.Ct. 1011, 37 L.Ed. 862 (1893). The only redress was by private bill in the Congress. The purpose of the Act was generally to waive the sovereign immunity of the United States for torts of its employees committed within the scope of their employment, if such torts committed in the employ of a private person would have given rise to liability under state law, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Thus, recovery under the Act could only be predicated upon such a state tort cause of action. 5 Moreover, in groping for a formula that would eliminate the nuisance of private bills and yet interfere only minimally with government functions, Congress created statutory exceptions to the general waiver of immunity in the Act. Three of these are arguably applicable here: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), excluding certain specified torts from the ambit of the Act; (2) § 2680(b), exempting from the Act any liability for loss or miscarriage of mail; (3) § 2680(a), creating an exemption from liability for acts done pursuant to a discretionary function. If the claims in suit fall within one of the statutory exceptions, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Myers & Myers, Inc. v. U. S. Postal Service, 527 F.2d 1252, 1255 (2d Cir. 1975); Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1392 & n. 1 (3d Cir. 1972); Morris v. United States, 521 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1975).
The District Court, therefore, had jurisdiction of the subject matter only (1) if there was a "personal injury" as defined by state law, 6 and (2) if the acts causing the "personal injury" would give rise to liability under state law if executed by an employee of a private person.
Although upon the consolidated trial it appeared that no plaintiff was touched physically or harmed financially, and that the sole damage claim was mental suffering, New York recognizes as "personal injury" mental suffering that results from a known category of tort. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958); Halio v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dept. 1961); See also N.Y. Gen. Con. Law § 37-a (McKinney). 7
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another .... or
appropriation of the other's name or likeness .... or
unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life . . . or
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public. . . .
Moreover, the court in Roberson rested its decision on the lack of...