Source: https://casetext.com/case/jacobsen-v-nyc-health-hospitals-corp
Timestamp: 2020-02-18 14:12:44
Document Index: 470591533

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 296', '§ 292', '§ 292', '§ 8', '§ 7401', '§ 11', '§ 296', '§ 292', '§ 8', '§ 292']

Jacobsen v. N.Y.C. Health & Hospitals Corp., 948 N.Y.S.2d 586 | Casetext
Jacobsen v. N.Y.C. Health & Hospitals Corp.
Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting in part, affirmed Supreme Court's…
Warner v. Gen. Counsel
Executive Law § 296 (1) (a); Executive Law § 292 (21) (c). "To state a prima facie case of employment…
Full title:William JACOBSEN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND…
Date published: Jul 10, 2012
948 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
97 A.D.3d 428
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 5478
McCallion & Associates, LLP, New York (Kenneth F. McCallion of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Elizabeth S. Natrella of counsel), for respondent.
TOM, J.P., CATTERSON, DeGRASSE, RICHTER, MANZANET–DANIELS, JJ.
Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action for wrongful termination because of a disability. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's termination was proper insofar as he was unable to perform an essential function of his position—namely, visiting construction sites to inspect the progress of construction. The motion court properly granted summary judgment, finding that plaintiff's job, by his own admission, required him to spend substantial time at construction sites. The motion court further concluded that since plaintiff's own doctor determined that he could not spend time in the field, the inevitable conclusion was that he could never return to his duties.
The majority and the dissent agree on the basic law applicableto this case. To state a prima facie case of employment discrimination due to a disability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered from a disability and that the disability caused the behavior for which he or she was terminated ( Matter of McEniry v. Landi, 84 N.Y.2d 554, 558, 620 N.Y.S.2d 328, 644 N.E.2d 1019 [1994] ). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer, here HHC, to show that the disability prevented plaintiff “from performing the duties of the job in a reasonable manner or that the employee's termination was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” ( id.). HHC met its burden by establishing that at the time of termination, plaintiff was unable to perform the duties of his job because of his lung condition and that no reasonable accommodation was available.
Under the Executive Law, a “reasonable accommodation” is defined as “actions taken by [an] employer which permit an employee ... with a disability to perform in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held ... provided, however, that such actions do not impose an undue hardship on the business” ( Pimentel v. Citibank, N.A., 29 A.D.3d 141, 145, 811 N.Y.S.2d 381 [2006],quotingExecutive Law § 292[21–e], lv. denied7 N.Y.3d 707, 821 N.Y.S.2d 813, 854 N.E.2d 1277 [2006] ). Under the City's Human Rights Law, an employer “shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job” (Administrative Code § 8–107[15][a] ). An employer is not required to find another job for the employee, create a new job, or create a light-duty version of the current job ( Pimentel, 29 A.D.3d at 148, 811 N.Y.S.2d 381).
Under both New York's Executive Law and the City's Administrative Code, an employer is required to perform an individualassessment of an employee prior to terminating him ( Bellamy v. City of New York, 14 A.D.3d 462, 788 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2005] ). This assessment must be part of a “good faith interactive process” ( Phillips v. City of New York, 66 A.D.3d 170, 175, 884 N.Y.S.2d 369 [2009] ). Contrary to the dissent's finding, the record shows that HHC engaged in an interactive process. HHC sought clarification from Dr. Skloot regarding plaintiff's medical condition and his ability to perform his job. Indeed, they kept plaintiff's job open during two separate medical leaves, during which time HHC was in communication with plaintiff and his doctor. HHC provided Dr. Skloot with plaintiff's job description and made her aware that plaintiff was required to spend a portion of his time in the field at construction sites. It was only after plaintiff's doctor and plaintiff himself confirmed that he could no longer work at construction sites that HHC terminated him.
The motion court also properly dismissed plaintiff's claim of gross negligence since the action was not commenced until more than three years after the claim accrued ( seeMcKinney's Uncons. Laws of N.Y. § 7401[2] ). Plaintiff's argument that the claim accrued on the date of his termination is without merit since the claim for gross negligence arose from personal injuries caused by alleged exposure to asbestos and not from his termination. In any event, plaintiff's action is barred by operation of the Workers' Compensation Law ( see Acevedo v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 189 A.D.2d 497, 596 N.Y.S.2d 68 [1993],lv. dismissed82 N.Y.2d 748, 602 N.Y.S.2d 806, 622 N.E.2d 307 [1993];Workers' Compensation Law § 11).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing. All concur except MANZANET–DANIELS, J. who dissents in part in a memorandum as follows:
MANZANET–DANIELS, J. (dissenting in part).
For 26 years, plaintiff worked out of HHC's central office at 346 Broadway in Manhattan. While there, he worked principally in the office and made site visits, on average, once or twice per week. In August 2005, plaintiff's assignment was changed from the Bellevue Network to the Queens Hospital Network, whose main hospital was undergoing major renovation, including asbestos abatement. Plaintiff had an office at Queens Hospital Center, and visited construction sites on a daily basis. Plaintiff testified that at no time prior to his transfer, nor at any time thereafter, was he provided with respiratory equipment by his employer. He testified that he had been provided with a “dust mask” at Queens Hospital, but explained that a dust mask is insufficient protection since, unlike a respirator, it is not specifically designed to filter particulates. He testified that he had requested a respirator from Anita O'Brien, his supervisor at the time, but that such request was never granted.
Plaintiff served first as a health facilities manager, and later as a network manager. He testified that his duties remained the same, despite the change in job title.
Plaintiff testified that construction was also ongoing in his office at Queens Hospital, explaining that HHC was installing a refrigeration air conditioning system for the building.
On March 27, 2006, plaintiff returned to work, and while he believed, based on his doctor's note, that he would be returning to the central office and only occasionally visiting construction sites, he was sent back to Queens Hospital to the same network manager position he had occupied before his medical leave. Plaintiff testified that he complained about the dust to his supervisor at Queens Hospital on several occasions from March to May 2006, and requested a respirator as a reasonable accommodation.Plaintiff testified that in March 2006 he was capable of performing his job out of the central office. When required to visit construction sites, he could do so with proper respiratory protection.
Defendant moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, finding that “[p]laintiff's own medical evidence, from his doctor's letter, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the plaintiff cannot, for medical reasons, spend any time at a construction site, and therefor [ sic ], can never return to his old duties. By the plaintiff's own evidence, he has not been discriminated against.” I disagree. Plaintiff's submissions raise triable issues of fact. Plaintiff testified that he was capable of performing his job during the spring of 2006. His doctor's letter granting medical clearance stated that plaintiff was capable of performing his job so long as his exposure to construction dust was limited. Defendant asserts that plaintiff was unable to visit construction sites, but plaintiff testified that he could visit sites so long as he was provided with proper respiratory protection. Thus, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiff was capable of performing the essential functions of his job.
A triable issue of fact also exists as to whether defendant made a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff's disability. Under the State Human Rights Law, an employer is obligated to “provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of an employee ... in connection with a job or occupation sought or held” (Executive Law § 296[3][a]; Pimentel v. Citibank, N.A., 29 A.D.3d 141, 145, 811 N.Y.S.2d 381 [2006],lv. denied7 N.Y.3d 707, 821 N.Y.S.2d 813, 854 N.E.2d 1277 [2006] ). “Reasonable accommodation” is defined as actions taken by an employer which “permit an employee ... with a disability to perform in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held ... provided, however, that such actions do not impose an undue hardship on the business” (Executive Law § 292[21–e] ). Similarly, the City's Human Rights Law requires that an employer “shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job” (Administrative Code § 8–107[15][a] ).
Under the Executive Law, “reasonable accommodation” includes, but is not limited to, “provision of an accessible worksite, acquisition or modification of equipment, support services for persons with impaired hearing or vision, job restructuring and modified work schedules” (Executive Law § 292[21–e] ). The Division of Human Rights also recognizes that “reasonable accommodation” may include “reassignment to an available position” (9 NYCRR 466.11[a][1], [2] ).
Plaintiff testified that he complained to his supervisor about airborne dust several times during the March 2006 through May 2006 time frame, and that he specifically requested respiratory protection. He requested reassignment when his supervisor failed to grant his request. As plaintiff notes, defendant could have accommodated his disability by (1) reassigning him to the central office, where, for more than 20 years, he performed field visits on a once a week basis; or (2) assigning him to the Queens Hospital construction site with the requisite respiratory equipment to prevent further exacerbation of his condition. Defendant did neither. Indeed, there is no evidence that defendant engaged in a good faith interactive process to assess the needs of plaintiff and the reasonableness of the accommodation requested, the first step in providing a reasonable accommodation ( see Phillips v. City of New York, 66 A.D.3d 170, 176, 884 N.Y.S.2d 369 [2009] ). We have stated that the failure to consider the requested accommodation by engaging in an individualized, interactive process is a violation of the State and City statutes ( id.).