Source: https://www.thefire.org/first-amendment-library/decision/illinois-state-board-of-elections-v-socialist-workers-party-et-al/
Timestamp: 2020-07-11 18:26:08
Document Index: 580230228

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2403', '§ 10', '§ 7', '§ 6', '§ 1', 'Art. 3', '§ 5']

ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS v. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY et al. - FIRE
FIRE > ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS v. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY et al.
Warren Burger Harry Blackmun William Rehnquist John Stevens
Argued November 6, 1978.
Because they had received less than 5% of the votes cast in the last mayoral election, the Socialist Workers Party and United States Labor Party were new political parties as defined in the Illinois statute. See n. 1, supra. Along with Gerald Rose, a candidate unaffiliated with any party, they were therefore subject to the signature requirements and filing deadlines specified in the election calendar. On January 24, 1977, the Socialist Workers Party and two voters who supported its candidate for Mayor brought this action against the Chicago Board and the State Board to enjoin enforcement of the signature requirements and filing deadlines for new parties.[5] One week later, Gerald Rose, the United States Labor Party, and four voters sued the Chicago Board, challenging the restrictions on new parties and independent candidates. The State Board intervened as a defendant pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403, and the District Court consolidated the two cases for trial.
Plaintiff-appellees contended at trial that the discrepancy between the requirements for state and city elections violated the Equal Protection Clause. They argued further that the restrictions on independent candidates and new parties were unconstitutionally burdensome in the context of a special election because of the short time for collection of signatures between notice of the election and the filing deadline. The *179 Chicago Board’s primary response was that the decision in Jackson v. Ogilvie, 325 F. Supp. 864 (ND Ill.), summarily aff’d, 403 U. S. 925 (1971), upholding Illinois’ 5% signature requirement, foreclosed the constitutional challenge in this case.[6]
In an opinion issued on March 14, 1977, the District Court determined that Jackson addressed neither the circumstances of a special election nor the disparity between state and city signature requirements at issue here. Socialist Workers Party v. Chicago Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 433 F. Supp. 11, 16-17, 19. On the merits of appellees’ equal protection challenge, the court found
“[no] rational reason why a petition with identical signatures can satisfy the legitimate state interests for restricting ballot access in state elections, and yet fail to do the same in a lesser unit. Lendall v. Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 951 (ED Ark. 1977). Any greater requirement than 25,000 signatures cannot be said to be the least drastic means of accomplishing the state’s goals, and must be found to unduly impinge [on] the constitutional rights of independents, new political parties, and their adherents.” Id., at 20 (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, the District Court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the 5% provision insofar as it mandated more than 25,000 signatures, the number required for statewide elections. The court also declined to dismiss appellees’ claim *180 that the April 4 filing deadline coupled with the signature requirement impermissibly burdened First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but it postponed a decision on this issue pending submission of additional evidence to justify the selection of that date.
The State Board, but not the Chicago Board, appealed from both the March 14 order and the March 17 order. In a per curiam decision rendered six months after the election, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted the opinion of the District Court. 566 F. 2d 586, 587 (1977). Also, with respect to the March 17 order, the Court of Appeals dismissed as moot the State Board’s contention that the Chicago Board lacked authority to conclude a settlement agreement without prior state approval. In so ruling, the court noted that the settlement order applied only to the June 7 election, which had long passed, and held that the question of the Chicago Board’s authority for its actions was not “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” id., at 588, quoting DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 318-319 (1974).
We noted probable jurisdiction, 435 U. S. 994 (1978), and we now affirm.
Appellant argues here, as it did below, that this Court’s summary affirmance of Jackson v. Ogilvie, supra, is dispositive of the equal protection challenge here. In analyzing this contention, we note at the outset that summary affirmances have considerably less precedential value than an opinion on *181 the merits. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974). As MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER observed in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 392 (1975) (concurring opinion), “upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary review, the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmances may appear to have established.” See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 14 (1976).
“It must also be remembered that it is even more difficult for an independent candidate to obtain signatures than *182 it would be for an independent party. Yet a whole new State political party needs only 25,000 signatures throughout the entire State for state officers. (Section 10-2), while a single independent candidate for only the office of Mayor of Chicago, needs almost 60,000 signatures. This also is an invidious discrimination against one seeking the office of Mayor of Chicago.” Memorandum of Law, App. to Juris. Statement in Jackson v. Ogilvie, O. T. 1970, No. 70-1341, p. B-23.[7]
The District Court in Jackson, however, framed the equal protection issue before it as “whether [the 5% signature] requirement operates to discriminate against the plaintiff by depriving him of a right granted to candidates of established political parties.” 325 F. Supp., at 868. The jurisdictional statement posed the question in similar terms. Juris. Statement in Jackson v. Ogilvie, O. T. 1970, No. 70-1341, pp. 14-15. Although the jurisdictional statement alluded to the State’s memorandum, id., at 15, and incorporated it as a separate appendix, id., at B-21—B-24, at no point did it directly address the question now before us.
This omission disposes of appellant’s argument. As we stated in Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 176 (1977), the precedential effect of a summary affirmance can extend no farther than “the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” A summary disposition affirms *183 only the judgment of the court below, ibid., quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, supra, at 391-392 (BURGER, C. J., concurring), and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., supra, at 14; McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm’n, 424 U. S. 645, 646 (1976) (per curiam). Questions which “merely lurk in the record,” Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925), are not resolved, and no resolution of them may be inferred. Assuming that the State’s memorandum in Jackson can be read as advancing the issue presented here, see n. 7., supra, the issue was by no means adequately presented to and necessarily decided by this Court. Jackson therefore has no effect on the constitutional claim advanced by appellees.
In determining whether the Illinois signature requirements for new parties and independent candidates as applied in the city of Chicago violate the Equal Protection Clause, we must examine the character of the classification in question, the importance of the individual interests at stake, and the state interests asserted in support of the classification. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 253-254 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 335 (1972); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U. S. 621, 626 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30 (1968).
Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.” Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 30. The freedom to associate as a political party, a right we have recognized as fundamental, see 393 U. S., at 30-31, has diminished practical value if the party can be kept off the ballot. Access restrictions also implicate the right to vote because, absent recourse to referendums, “voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both.” Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709, 716 (1974). By limiting the choices available to voters, the State impairs the voters’ ability to express their political preferences. And for reasons too self-evident to warrant amplification here, we have often reiterated that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 17 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964); Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 336.
When such vital individual rights are at stake, a State must establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 780-781 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 736 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 31. To be sure, the Court has previously acknowledged that States have a *185 legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot. In Lubin v. Panish, supra, at 715, we observed:
Similarly, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 145 (1972) (footnote omitted), the Court expressed concern for the States’ need to assure that the winner of an election “is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting, without the expense and burden of runoff elections.” Consequently, we have upheld properly drawn statutes that require a preliminary showing of a “significant modicum of support” before a candidate or party may appear on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431, 442 (1971); see, e. g., American Party of Texas v. White, supra.
However, our previous opinions have also emphasized that “even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty,” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 58-59 (1973), and we have required that States adopt the least drastic means to achieve their ends. Lubin v. Panish, supra, at 716; Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 31-33. This requirement is particularly important where restrictions on access to the ballot are involved. The States’ interest in screening out frivolous candidates must be considered in light of the significant role that third parties have played in the political development of the Nation. Abolitionists, Progressives, and Populists have undeniably had influence, if not always electoral *186 success. As the records of such parties demonstrate, an election campaign is a means of disseminating ideas as well as attaining political office. See A. Bickel, Reform and Continuity 79-80 (1971); W. Binkley, American Political Parties 181-205 (3d ed. 1959); H. Penniman, Sait’s American Political Parties and Elections 223-239 (5th ed. 1952). Overbroad restrictions on ballot access jeopardize this form of political expression.
The signature requirements for independent candidates and new political parties seeking offices in Chicago are plainly not the least restrictive means of protecting the State’s objectives. The Illinois Legislature has determined that its interest in avoiding overloaded ballots in statewide elections is served by the 25,000-signature requirement. Yet appellant has advanced no reason, much less a compelling one, why the State needs a more stringent requirement for Chicago. At oral argument, appellant explained that the signature provisions for statewide elections originally reflected a different approach than those for elections in political subdivisions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-37. Not only were independent candidates and new political parties in state elections required to obtain 25,000 signatures, but those signatures also had to meet standards pertaining to geographic distribution. By comparison, candidates and parties in city elections had only to obtain signatures from a flat percentage of the qualified voters. In Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), this Court struck down on equal protection grounds Illinois’ requirement that the nominating petition of a candidate for statewide office include the signatures of at least 200 qualified voters from at least 50 counties. Following Moore, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invalidated a provision in the amended statute which specified that no more than 13,000 signatures on a new party’s petition for statewide elections could come from any one county. Communist Party of Illinois v. State Board of Elections, 518 F. 2d 517, cert. denied, *187 423 U. S. 986 (1975). Thus, appellant noted, the invalidation of the geographic constraints has tied the requirements for both city and state candidates solely to a population standard, giving rise to the anomaly at issue here.
Appellant finally challenges the Court of Appeals’ disposition of its appeal from the March 17 settlement order. The court dismissed as moot appellant’s claim that the Chicago Board lacked authority to conclude a settlement agreement without the State’s consent. In appellant’s view, the court erred in not placing this claim within the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911).
In Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975), we elaborated on this exception, holding that a case is not moot when:
Although the first branch of the test is satisfied here, appellant has presented no evidence creating a reasonable expectation that the Chicago Board will repeat its purportedly unauthorized actions in subsequent elections. Appellant’s conclusory assertions that the actions are capable of repetition *188 are not sufficient to satisfy the Weinstein test, particularly since appellant does not contend that the Chicago Board has ever attempted previously to conclude litigation without its approval. The Chicago Board’s entry into a settlement agreement reflected neither a policy it had determined to continue, cf. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 165 n. 6 (1977), nor even a consistent pattern of behavior, cf. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1978). And the Chicago Board’s action patently was not a matter of statutory prescription, as was the case in other election decisions on which appellant relies, e. g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S., at 737 n. 8; Moore v. Ogilvie, supra, at 816. We therefore find that appellant’s challenge was properly dismissed as moot.
Although I join the Court’s opinion and its strict-scrutiny approach for election cases, I add these comments to record purposefully, and perhaps somewhat belatedly, my unrelieved discomfort with what seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as tests such easy phrases as “compelling [state] interest” and “least drastic [or restrictive] means.” See, ante, at 184, 185, and 186. I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a “compelling state interest” is. If it means “convincingly controlling,” or “incapable of being overcome” upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all. And, for me, “least drastic means” is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less “drastic” or a little less “restrictive” in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to *189 vote to strike legislation down. This is reminiscent of the Court’s indulgence, a few decades ago, in substantive due process in the economic area as a means of nullification.
Nonetheless, I am not sure that the disparity evidences a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The constitutional requirement that Illinois govern impartially would be implicated by a rule that discriminates, for example, between Socialists and Republicans or between Catholics and Protestants. But I question whether it has any application to rules prescribing different qualifications for different political offices. Rather than deciding that question, I would simply hold that legislation imposing a significant interference with access to the ballot must rest on a rational predicate. This legislative remnant is without any such support. It is either a product of a malfunction of the legislative process or merely a by-product of this Court’s decision in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, see post, at 190-191 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). In either event, I believe it has deprived appellees of their liberty without the “due process of lawmaking” that the *190 Fourteenth Amendment requires. Cf. Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73, 98 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
In 1968, Illinois had a coherent set of petition requirements for obtaining a place on the ballot. In order to appear on the ballot in a county or city election, it was necessary for independent candidates and new political parties to obtain voter signatures equal in number to 5% of the voters who voted in the political subdivision at the last general election. Requirements for statewide office put greater emphasis on geographical balance: Independent candidates and new political parties needed 25,000 signatures, and at least 200 signatures had to be obtained from each of 50 counties within the State. Thus, a candidate for statewide office at that time could get on the ballot with fewer signatures than a candidate for office in Cook County, but he was also subject to special restrictions. It was reasonable for Illinois to conclude that this scheme best vindicated its interest in “protect[ing] the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.” Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 145 (1972). Cook County is not Illinois, and all the State asked was that candidates and political parties interested in statewide office produce this minimal evidence of statewide support.
In 1969, this Court held that the 200 voters per county requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause because different *191 counties had different populations. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969). That decision led to a holding by the Seventh Circuit that the statute, as amended by the legislature after Moore to place a 13,000-signature limit on new political party signatures from any one county, was likewise a denial of equal protection. Communist Party of Illinois v. State Board of Elections, 518 F. 2d 517 (CA7), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 986 (1975).
“A political party which, at the last general election for State and county officers, polled for its candidate for Governor more than 5% of the entire vote cast for Governor, is hereby declared to be an `established political party’ as to the State and as to any district or political subdivision thereof.
“A political party which, at the last election in any congressional district, legislative district, county, township, school district, park district, municipality or other district or political subdivision of the State, polled more than 5% of the entire vote cast within such congressional district, legislative district, county, township, school district, park district, municipality, or political subdivision of the State, where such district, political subdivision or municipality, as the case may be, has voted as a unit for the election of officers to serve the respective territorial area of such district, political subdivision or municipality, is hereby declared to be an `established political party’ within the meaning of this Article as to such district, political subdivision or municipality.”
Individuals desiring to form a new political party throughout the State must file with the State Board of Elections a petition that, inter alia, is “signed by not less than 25,000 qualified voters.” In Communist Party of Illinois v. State Board of Elections, 518 F. 2d 517 (CA7), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 986 (1975), the Court of Appeals held unconstitutional the proviso in this section requiring “that no more than 13,000 signatures from the same county may be counted toward the required total of 25,000 signatures.” Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 46, § 10-2 (Supp. 1978).
“Nominations of independent candidates for public office within any district or political subdivision less than the State, may be made by nomination papers signed in the aggregate for each candidate by qualified voters of such district, or political division, equaling not less than 5% nor more than 8% (or 50 more than the minimum, whichever is greater) of the number of persons, who voted at the next preceding general election in such district or political sub-division in which such district or political sub-division voted as a unit for the election of officers to serve its respective territorial area.”
[5] The Chicago Board is responsible for accepting nominating petitions for candidates and preparing the ballots for special elections. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 46, §§ 7-60, 7-62, 10-6 (Supp. 1978). It also has “charge of and make[s] provisions for all elections, general, special, local, municipal, state and county, and all others of every description to be held in such city or any part thereof, at any time.” § 6-26 (Supp. 1978). The State Board exercises “general supervision over the administration of the registration and election laws throughout the State.” § 1A-1 (Supp. 1978); Ill. Const., Art. 3, § 5.
[6] Although the State Board was afforded notice and an opportunity to participate in the District Court proceedings, only the Chicago Board appeared for argument on plaintiff-appellees’ motion for a permanent injunction. After the court entered the injunction, the State Board moved to vacate the decision, advancing many of the grounds previously asserted by the Chicago Board.