Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/156958387/050404turquie-Alm-Bvp
Timestamp: 2017-03-22 23:48:28
Document Index: 547305231

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1', '§ 2', '§ 3', 'art 2', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 12', '§ 4', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§4', '§4', '§ 19', '§4', '§ 17', '§4', '§4', '§4', '§4', 'arti 1996']

050404turquie Alm Bvp | Turkey | Enlargement Of The European Union
BrowseInterestsStay InformedCareerPersonal GrowthFiction & BiographiesHealth & FitnessLifestyleCultureBrowse byBooksAudiobooksNews & MagazinesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoinTURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SPECIFIC ENLARGEMENTAnnabelle Littoz-Monnet Beatriz Villanueva Penas1
Turkey has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate to EU membership since 1999. The European Council of December 2004 finally scheduled to open negotiations in view of Turkish accession to the EU on 3rd October 20052. The December decision provoked intense reactions all across political forces as well as among European citizens. The debate over Turkey’s accession has been a far more intense one than that which surrounded the start of negotiations with the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) in 1998. Irrational reactions from the public opinion in EU Members States – or real response to the specificities of the Turkish enlargement? After presenting a brief history of the EU-Turkish relationship (§1) and examining whether the Turkish enlargement bears either political, economic, geopolitical or cultural particularities (§ 2), this paper explores the grounds on which the European Commission recommended the opening of the negotiations (§ 3). Finally, in light of the specificities of the Turkish enlargement highlighted in part 2, the implications of the Council Decision to open negotiations in view of Turkey’s accession to the EU are discussed (§ 4).
Annabelle LITTOZ-MONNET and Beatriz VILLANUEVA PENAS are researchers at the Royal Institute of International Relations in Brussels. The present comments are personal and cannot be attributed to the institutions to which the authors belong. 2 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 16/17 December 2004.
The Commission rejected Turkey’s application in 1989.
1.1. in the establishment of a customs union between the parties.3. and granted Turkey a long list of agricultural concessions.
1. essentially based on increased economic and trade relations between the EU and Turkey.
1. became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952 and an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992.
Ever since its foundation in 1923. are presented here. It adhered to the Council of Europe in 1949. with consideration of eventual Turkish membership of the EEC4. Relations were gradually normalised after the restoration of a civilian government in 1983. the Commission explicitly endorsed Turkey’s eligibility for membership. 1973 and 1977 respectively. Turkey applied for full membership to the EEC. when the EEC and Turkey signed an Additional Protocol5.1. However. the Community decided to freeze its relations with Turkey and block the signing of the fourth Financial Protocol. 6 The EC immediately dropped all tariffs and quotas on Turkish industrial goods. Turkey’s relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC) began in 1959.
In 1987. The collapse of the democratic regime meant that there was no further chance for Turkey to be accepted as a candidate for full-membership status in the foreseeable future. three Financial Protocols allocating funds for the economic development of Turkey were signed in 1964. the so-called “Ankara Agreement”3. The major phases of this relationship. was signed in 1963 and came into force in 1964.
The Turkish military regime: the freezing of the EU-Turkish relationship
Following the military coup in Turkey in 1980. the Republic of Turkey has remained closely aligned with the West. L 293. In order to achieve the objectives of the Association Agreement. on the basis of its economic instability and its human rights record.2. The Additional Protocol established a timetable of technical measures to be taken in order to attain the objective of the Customs Union within a period of 22 years6.
OJ 1964. The Association did not gain any substantial form before 1970. An Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey. which came into force in 1973. The Association Council was set up by the Agreement in order to take decisions on developing the relationship and settle disputes. 5 OJ 1972. The Association Agreement envisaged a “stage by stage” integration process culminating.
HISTORY OF EU-TURKISH RELATIONS
The decision to open negotiations in view of Turkey’s accession to the EU followed a nearly 50 years long history of various forms of “partnerships” between Turkey and the EU. with Turkey’s application for associate membership of the EEC. with a couple of exceptions. providing the successful completion of the preparatory and transitional stages. L 217.
ibidem. the Council of the EU adopted the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership as a key element of the existing “European Strategy for Turkey”14.
The Helsinki decision
After EU Heads of the State declined again to grant candidate status to Turkey at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. which entered into force in 1996. L 85. the Customs Union Joint Committee. The launch of the Customs Union. was set. including economic ones. giving details of Turkey’s commitments with regard to achieving the Copenhagen criteria and adopting the acquis. A consultation body. was an important step in Turkey’s progress towards becoming a more competitive economy. It fixed the priorities on which accession preparations had to concentrate in light of the Copenhagen political and economic criteria and the implementation of the acquis communautaire. 21/22 June 1993. In December 2002 the Copenhagen European Council concluded that “if the European Council in December 2004. whose application was to be assessed on the basis of the same criteria as other candidate States.Further progress was achieved in 1995. 9 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council. Turkey’s Accession Partnership was complemented by Turkey’s own National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). when the Association Council adopted the agreement creating the EC-Turkey Customs Union7.
1. 10/11 December 1999. the Helsinki European Council of 1999 finally agreed on the candidate status of Turkey8. 12 See the Commission Communication “European strategy for Turkey. 11 See § 3 for a more detailed presentation of the Copenhagen criteria. L 35. the EU would
OJ 1996.
1. 13 See § 12 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council. The Programme was welcomed by the Turkish government. Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council. which allowed Turkey preferential access to the single market. The EC-Turkey Customs Union was the EC's first substantial functioning customs union with a third state. with particular emphasis on the political criteria and the issue of human rights. 10 § 4 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council states that “the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhaguen criteria is the basis for the accession to the Union”. On the basis of the proposals already laid down by the Commission in March 199812.5. Compliance with the political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of the accession negotiations10. on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission.
.4. The purpose of the Accession Partnership was to assist the Turkish authorities in their efforts to meet the accession criteria. These criteria are the “political” criteria set at the Copenhagen European Council in June 19939 – namely that that the candidate country achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy. the Helsinki Council adopted the “European Strategy for Turkey”.
The Accession Partnership
In March 2001. 14 OJ 2001. [decided] that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. is necessary for accession to the Union11. designed to stimulate and support reforms in Turkey during the pre-accession phase13. COM(98) 124 final. the rule of law. while compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey was accepted in principle as a candidate State for membership.
EU leaders agreed to extend and deepen co-operation within the framework of the EC-Turkey Customs Union and provide Turkey with increased pre-accession financial assistance. Turkey has a predominantly Muslim population.
A Strategic Enlargement
Turkey’s EU membership has been justified by a nearly exclusive reference to strategic considerations. 17 COM (2004) 656. The Union wants to further integrate Turkey into the European structures. The way towards Turkish accession is peppered with hurdles that were not experienced by the EU with other enlargements. SPECIFICITIES OF THE TURKISH ENLARGEMENT The long-lasting debate over Turkey’s accession has been a far more intense one than that which surrounded the start of the negotiations with the accession countries of CEECs in 1998. By contrast. the Commission points to Turkey’s capacity “to contribute to regional and international stability”. Conversely. But Turkey is only one country. the EU has been discussing the accession of a country that has different religious and cultural characteristics (§2.
2. Bogazici University.
2.1. 18 Commission staff working document.3) and by an unstable economic situation (§2. the Middle East and the Caucasus19. in economic terms. In the meantime. the potential of economic or identity related advantages that may be tied to the Turkish enlargement have been barely discussed by EU (and US) policy makers. The EU could have a pacifying influence in Southern Caucasus. For the first time. Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective. Turkey is also characterised by its difficulties to comply with the democratic and human rights standards as defined in the Copenhagen criteria (§2. the Commission presented the 2004 regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession. respecting the rule of law and human rights.5). 19 In a speech on ‘The Enlargement process and Turkey's place in this Process’. and the political impact of its accession would therefore be quite different (§2. in which it recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey17. In its October 2004 Report focusing on the issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective”18. L 145. At first sight. the advantages that were brought to the fore by policy-makers and the media with regard to the Turkish enlargement are also unprecedented: Turkish membership has been analysed essentially in geopolitical strategic terms (§2. 12/13 December 2002. Turkey’s role can indeed be significant in terms of providing stability in the regions of the Eastern-Mediterranean. European Commissioner Verheugen argued: “The European Union and Turkey are linked in a strategic partnership. OJ 2003. economic or identity arguments remained dominant in the debate. where difficult historical ties between Turkey and Armenia and the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave between Armenia and
Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council. the Council of the EU revised the priorities of the Accession Partnership with Turkey16.1).4). not ten. In October 2004.open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay”15. SEC(2004) 1202.9 March 2000. We need Turkey as a reliable partner in foreign and security policy. We want Turkey to be a stable democracy. In consideration of the new political objectives and security concerns of the EU. Turkey . the Turkish enlargement looks as somewhat similar to the current “big” enlargement towards the East.2). Turkey is about the same size as the ten new Member States taken together in population and approximately the size of Poland. In May 2003. Our interest is that Turkey plays a constructive role in our common efforts to contribute to peace and stability in the region”. And finally. If the Eastern European enlargement also raised foreign policy considerations.
Turkish accession could help secure access to these resources and their safe transportation into the EU single market. website of the Freedom House Organisation. with the 4 later major ones under the Erdogan government. CEPS EU-Turkey Working Papers 9. 23 See the Commission 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession.
A Politically Sensitive Enlargement
EU Member States' concerns over Turkey's human rights record has been a key factor behind Turkey's prolonged application process. laws on the forming of
For an analysis of Turkish and EU’s energy policies. COM(2004) 656. For gas. Iraq. Isik. In the past three years Turkey has indeed achieved a notable level of legislative and practical progress.org/ 22 See Freedom in the World country ratings for 2004. Turkey is considered as a “partly free country”. Turkey’s membership is seen as indispensable. democracy and the West. with a worse grading than new EU members.2. The death penalty has been abolished. However.Azerbaijan are still a factor of instability in the region. However.
. in addition to Turkey’s control of the vital Bosphorus route from the Black Sea Mediterranean. Iran and Syria also means that the EU will be drawn closer to several regions of continuing political instability. Turkey has emerged as a regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean and its importance has increased in recent years. as a secular and “partly free”21 Islamic country. as well as Bulgaria and Romania22. Ultimately the countries surrounding Turkey supply 60 percent of the natural gas and petroleum demand of Europe. http://www.freedomhouse. Turkey is expected to develop further as a major oil transit country for. Since October 2001. in its October 2004 Report. the Commission emphasises Turkey’s considerable progress concerning political criteria23. Turkey. Turkish membership could in this respect represent a chance for the EU to play a role in the reconciliation of Islam. Turkey is also a transit country for important energy networks including the northern Iraq-Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Last but not least. In the Freedom House organisation’s 2003/2004 evaluations of political rights and civil freedoms. Turkey’s integration to the EU would primarily mean a fortification of the European position in the transatlantic pact. 8 reform packages have been passed. 21 See Freedom in the World country ratings for 2004. Turkey Energy’s Prospects in the EUTurkey Context. Turkish accession will also increase the EU’s interests in the Black Sea region. Azerbaijan and Georgia. The development of a common European security policy would definitely be facilitated if Turkey did not sit between the transatlantic chairs as a NATO-member without EU affiliation. see: Y. 2004. Turkey will become an increasingly important transit country between the enlarged EU and the Caspian producers as well as the Middle East. though the prior accession of Bulgaria and Romania will already have given the Union borders with Black Sea countries. Some policy makers and commentators have also argued that the future Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) would be crippled without the South Eastern flank of Europe. Turkey also has a strategic location with respect to Europe’s future energy supplies from the Middle East and more importantly. the Middle East and the countries around the Caspian. from the Caspian region20. They included measures to eliminate regulations and practices that had contributed to impunity for torture and ill-treatment. ibidem.
2. It would diversify possible EU supply lines offering alternative export outlets both for Russia. In order to realize the CFSP and for the EU to maintain the security of its adjourning regions. extending the EU’s borders to Armenia. has also been presented to the European public as a potential “bridge” to the Islamic world.
Hughes. 2004. There is further concern that Turkish membership may seriously impede further development of the Union27. 26 See § 4.3.
See § 3. Euractiv website. Opponents to Turkish accession therefore argue that Turkey will be a too powerful member for the EU26. Structural indicators like the contribution of agriculture to employment (Turkey 34%. http://www. 28 K.
A “Difficult-To-Manage” Enlargement: Turkey’s Demographic Situation
One commonly raised point is that. based on voting weight by population share. and religious and ethnic minorities have acquired greater legal rights (in particular the ban of Kurdish and other languages has been lifted)24. Shortcomings in the legal area also remain. does not constitute a distinctive impediment to its accession compared with former (or planed) rounds of enlargements. Turkey’s secular character has so far been ensured by the military. In 2003 the European Court of Human Rights laid 76 charges of human rights violations against Turkey. which are part of the second round of CEECs. So are current reforms sufficient for Turkey to be considered as a free democratic country? Despite these promising developments allegations of torture are still recurring. the crucial question of whether the retreat of the military from supervision of the political process will lead to a sustainable democracy remains.euractiv.
2. Its influence has however been reduced. Turkey’s political weight would be comparable to that of Germany. Yet. Turkey and the European Union: Just another Enlargement? Exploring the Implications of Turkish Accession. Turkey will become the EU's most populated Member State. Freedom of expression is sometimes restrained (disproportional force used against demonstrators) as well as freedom of religious belief (restricted property rights for non-Muslims). which has 83 million people today. Romania 34%. Germany.
A Costly Enlargement ?
Turkey’s economic situation.3. but whose population is projected to decrease to around 80 million by 202025.associations and the right to assemble have been liberalised. This fear is boosted by the fact that Turkey’s economy is characterised by major regional inequalities.4. Turkey’s economic situation is comparable to that of Bulgaria and Romania. 3% of the EU-15 in 2003. After heated controversies with the EU over the criminal status of adultery. 27 See H. Turkey’s per capita income level was 12. A Friends of Europe Working Paper. Berlin.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29129678-16&type=LinksDossier. In August 2004 the first civilian was appointed as head of the powerful military Council in Turkey. See dossier on EU-Turkey relations. Bulgaria 27%) and to the national economy (all around 11% to 13%) are also similar28.
2. Most importantly.1 for more details on the reforms that were initiated by the Turkish government since 1998. This compares with the largest current EU Member State. Turkey's current population is 71 million. Paper presented at the AICGS Conference. if still very fragile. 20 September 2004. The per capita GDP of Romania and Bulgaria reach only 10% of EU-15 levels. Whither Turkey’s EU Accession? Perspectives and Problems After December 2004. and demographers project it to increase to 80-85 million in the next 20 years.1 for an analysis of the institutional impact of Turkish membership. Many fear that it will be too difficult for the EU to digest the Eastern enlargement and then engage in another enlargement of almost the same dimension at the same time. when it joins the EU. partly reflecting its rural/urban divide. Kramer. a new penal code was passed (which has however not entered into force so far).
The Turkish enlargement bears specificities. Turkey entertains relations with its neighbours on the Black Sea.5. which did not emerge with previous enlargements. after the crisis of 2001. is Asian (the explicit argument). EU Heads of the State have nevertheless decided in 1999 to assess Turkey’s application for membership on the basis of the same
For an analysis against Turkish accession on cultural grounds. Turkey chose Europe. that Turkey’s economic situation does not constitute a major obstacle – if compared to that of first round CEECs and second round CEECs – to its membership. At the heart of this debate lies the core issue of what is Europe. If it cannot be established whether this is the beginning of a sustainable higher medium and long term growth path. Turkey does not have to radically restructure its economic system. the basic structures of a market economy are secured. have argued that Turkey has a different culture. Periodic crises and lapses in growth (1999 and 2001) have been a prominent feature in recent years. Thus. seen as being “outside” Europe’s natural boundaries. and more fundamentally. the currency has stabilised and debt indicators have improved. Turkish membership is seen as having an important political cultural dimension.
2. Well rooted. Moreover. inflation has reduced. The Netherlands. high state influence and recurring internal and external disequilibria (high debt and inflation) still typify the Turkish economy. in: Turkey and the European Union: From Association to Accession? Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However. or is Muslim (the more or less implicit argument)29. if sometimes irrational. and the empire’s defeat before Vienna in 1683. Furthermore.
An Unprecedented Issue: Is Turkey “European” and what is the “European Union”?
The question of Turkish membership has elicited a debate on “whether Turkey is European”. It is. unlike other new EU members.Moreover. Rather. its political institutions and the idea of a secular state. Yet others argue that its belonging to the European sphere was recognized as early as the 1950s. The second argument relates to Turkey’s history. The issue is whether. 30 See for instance K. Turkey’s main problem lies in the macro-economic imbalances that characterise the country. The EU is identified by some as a “Christian club” where non Christians may only form minorities. However. seen as the roots on which European identity is founded. 2004. the economy has returned to a growth path. There remains the argument over “Islam and the West”. resentments and even fears go back to Muslim invasions of Europe in the 8th century. European values can be anchored and sustained. what is the nature of the European Union project itself. CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor 10. Central Asia as well as the Middle East. Ankara et l’UE. Ottoman occupations of the Balkan from the 14th Century. Some argue that Turkey was not of Europe: it does not share Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage and rationalist tradition. les raisons du “non”. January 2004. by many. NATO and the European Conference on Security and Cooperation (ECSP). due to its participation in the Council of Europe. as well as some sections among Social Democrats and European Federalists. with the advent of Kemal Atartük’s modernist agenda in the 1920s. see: J-L. Bourlanges. against the background of a largely Islamic society and a state whose secular character is guaranteed by the military. Nicolaidis. however. Geography has been one of the major arguments in this debate. The contemporary manifestation is fear of massive migration from Turkey to Europe. others point to the fact that these very Byzantine and Ottoman empires have also shaped Europe30. Turkey is European … for Europe’s sake. it seems.
. Christian Democrats.
the state of emergency in the South East. A reform of the judicial system was also initiated. the Commission reiterated that the Copenhagen political criteria were not met35. SEC(2001) 1756. The Copenhagen criteria are related to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy. stressing in particular the existence of serious deficiencies concerning the respect of human rights and the protection of minorities. 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. It is in the conditions applied upon the negotiations process in view of Turkey’s accession that the EU leaders’ concerns over the particularities of the Turkish enlargement are reflected31.
. but reminded Turkish authorities of the need to properly implement the legislative reforms and address a series of fundamental issues. the Commission has published annual reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession to the EU. In 2000. In 2002. However. In October 2001. the first Commission reports32 (years 1998. COM(2002) 700. and in November 2001 a new Civil Code was adopted.criteria applied to other states. limited the use of capital punishment. 34 See the 2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. Firstly. COM(2000) 713. In light of these criteria. THE POSITION OF THE COMMISION CONCERNING TURKEY’S ACCESSION Since 1998. the Commission reports have consistently pointed out Turkey’s economic weaknesses. the situation on the ground hardly improved and the Commission’s position on Turkish progress towards accession did not change33.
3. 33 See the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. and the strengthening of democracy and protection of human rights – considered to reflect the willingness of the majority of Turkey's political leaders to move towards further alignment with the Union’s values and standards.
3. COM(1999) 513. The reports measure. the progress made by Turkey in preparing for membership. in political and economic terms. despite the adoption of reform packages concerning the death penalty. corruption and restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms34. most noticeably. the Turkish Parliament adopted the first major constitutional reform in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms – which. 35 See the 2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. COM(1998) 771. Various international human rights instruments were signed and the Turkish government endorsed the work of the Supreme Board of Co-ordination for Human Rights. two important steps were taken by the Turkish government in order to engage with the process of political reform required by the EU. They are carried out on the basis of the criteria set out by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 and the parameters of the “European Strategy for Turkey” adopted in 1999.1. respect of human rights and the protection of minorities (the so-called “Copenhagen political criteria”). The Commission welcomed these legislative changes. the rule of law. the reforms contained
The position of the Commission on the political criteria
While acknowledging that the basic features of a democratic system existed in Turkey. and the ability to take on the obligations of EU membership. 1999) assessed a general no compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. but laid greater emphasis on the country’s democratic deficits. 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. such as civilian control over the military. the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to compete in the Union market (the “Copenhagen economic criteria”).
which hampered any further economic progress. 37 See the 2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. still had to be addressed together with the question of the implementation of the reforms on the ground36. The Commission stressed the importance of these legislative efforts but at the same time concluded that a series of key issues. most of the reforms were not implemented. the situation in the Southeast and the cultural rights.a number of significant limitations concerning fundamental rights and freedoms – and most noticeably the freedom of expression. For the first time. eradicating all remaining death penalty provisions. From 2003 onwards. On the basis of the mandate received in Copenhagen in December 2002. the further alignment of civil-military relations with European practice. a number of important issues. the Commission was able to formulate its – positive – recommendation as to whether Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria38.2.
3. such as the enduring usage of torture. Nevertheless the 2002 Commission report welcomed the progress reached by Turkey regarding the functioning of the Turkish market. A number of regulations and circulars were issued by the authorities in order to enable the implementation of legislation. women’s rights. expression and religion). In May 2004 the second major constitutional reform took place. In 2002 the consequences of the two financial crises still weighted heavily on the Turkish economy. 38 Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. the overall framework for the exercise of fundamental freedoms (association. major progress still had to be achieved in order to comply with the Copenhagen “economic” criteria – which refer to the existence of a functioning market economy. COM(2004) 656. The 2000 and 2001 Commission reports indicated that the progress attained in addressing the major imbalances of the economy had been counteracted by the financial crisis of November-December 2000. the situation of persons imprisoned for expressing non-violent opinions and the non compliance with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). the Turkish government showed greater determination to achieve the Copenhagen political criteria and engaged in further legislative reforms. In September 2004 Turkey adopted a new Penal Code. discrimination and torture. broadening freedom of the press. Secondly.
The position of the Commission on the economic criteria
In its first assessments of the economic situation in Turkey. Turkey was confronted with another financial crisis in February 2001. meant to improve the situation regarding. in particular the strengthening of the independence and the functioning of the judiciary. In its October 2004 Report37 the Commission confirmed that Turkey had achieved significant legislative progress in a considerable number of areas and stressed the efforts made in implementing the political reforms. Furthermore. the Commission concluded that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria – but emphasised that reforms still needed further consolidation. a new Press Law was adopted in June 2004 and a new Law on Associations and a Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts were approved in July 2004. strengthening gender equality. had yet to be adequately addressed. COM(2004) 656.
See the 2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession (no document classification). in particular. Thirdly. aligning the judiciary system with European standards and establishing the supremacy of international agreements in the area of fundamental freedoms over internal legislation. the Commission concluded that although Turkey was close to becoming a market economy.
. the power of the military. as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
On the basis of this assessment. The Commission expressed great caution in its recommendation. the Commission suggested that the negotiation process include specific clauses that did not appear in former accession negotiations – including a “Suspension Clause”41. In order to reiterate the conditional character of its recommendation. Turkey should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
. held the opinion that if the stabilisation policy was maintained and further structural reforms were initiated. The heated debates which surrounded Turkish membership before the European Council Decision were an “avant-goût” of the intense reactions provoked by the December decision all across political forces as well as among European citizens. It was in 2004 that the Commission.1). THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECISION The European Council of December 2004 finally decided to open negotiations on 3rd October 2005 in view of Turkish accession42. The recommendation of the Commission: a “qualified yes”39
3. for the first time. ibidem. After presenting the European Council Decision itself (§4. Furthermore. 16/17 December 2004. The Commission also emphasised that Turkish accession could bring positive effects to the economy of the EU.
In its Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession40. and thus not leading automatically to accession. Thus. the Commission stated that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and recommended the opening of the accession negotiations – without however fixing a concrete date. 41 The Commission recommended to suspend or even break the accession negotiations “in the case of serious and persistent breaches of the principles of liberty. the Commission concluded favourably on Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen “economic” criteria – recommending. the Commission defined the negotiation talks as “an open-ended process whose outcome could not be guaranteed beforehand”. 42 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council. It recommended that the “green light” to the beginning of the accession negotiations be contingent to the fulfilment of a number of conditions. the Commission drafted recommendations providing for a close monitoring of the situation in Turkey. respect for human rights and fundamental rights and the rule of law on which the Union is founded”. COM(2004) 656. (2) negotiations adapted to the specific challenges related to Turkey’s accession and (3) a substantially strengthened political dialogue bringing people together from EU Member States and Turkey.3. however. with the purpose of ensuring that reforms be properly implemented. the shortterm implications of the Decision – with regard to the reform process in Turkey. the evolution of Turkey’s relations with Cyprus and reactions that have been provoked in Member States –
See Romano Prodi’s speech to the European Parliament on 6 October 2004. democracy. The Commission's recommendation suggested a three pillar strategy for the conduct of the negotiations: (1) strengthened cooperation to reinforce and support the reform process in Turkey. the Commission confirmed that significant progress had been made concerning the functioning of a market economy in Turkey. that Turkey continue the ongoing reform process. provided that the negotiations take into account the specificities of the Turkish economy. but recommended that Turkey initiate further steps to improve its macroeconomic stability and launch structural reforms to enhance its capacity to cope with competitive pressure within the Union.In its 2003 report.
. while stating that accession is the negotiation’s objective. The Decision then defines the elements of the negotiation framework. specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses “may be considered” for areas such as freedom of movement of persons. it also pointed to the necessity for Turkey to bring into force the six specific items of legislation identified by the Commission – among which the New Penal Code and the Law on Associations44. the Code on Criminal Procedure.
4. derogations.
A Conditional Accession
As recommended by the Commission.3). economic and geopolitical implications for the EU will then be analysed (§4. The Law on Intermediate Courts of Appeal. If the European Council welcomed "the decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that process of reform". L 361.
4. the Council reserves itself the right to decide by qualified majority on the suspension of the negotiations in the case of “a serious and persistent breach in a candidate state of the principles of liberty. 45 See § 19 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council. the European Council – following the Commission’s recommendation – defined negotiations as an open-ended process. in the event of non compliance with political criteria. respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded”. the legislation establishing the judicial police and the law on execution of punishments and measures are also to be implemented.1. including Cyprus. Its long-term institutional. democracy. The possibility for the negotiation framework to include “permanent safeguard clauses” for certain policy areas was strongly criticised by Turkey.2). It declares that long transition periods.
Short-term impact of the Decision
4.1.2. involving a de facto recognition of Cyprus45. Finally. it is foreseen that accession negotiations with states whose accession could have a substantial financial impact on the EU budget. Furthermore.will be examined (§4. A compromise was finally reached. ibidem. 46 OJ 1977. the Commission announced it had received a formal letter confirming Turkey's intention to sign the protocol extending its customs union with the EU to 10 new members.2. Turkey is worried about the clause which allows the Council to recommend the suspension of negotiations. Moreover. Turkey’s de facto recognition of Cyprus The sticking point of the negotiations was the EU's requirement that Turkey would sign a new customs accord with Member States. Furthermore the European Council underlined the need to implement the zero-tolerance policy relating to torture and ill-treatment. structural policies or agriculture. with no guaranteed outcome beforehand. as it is likely to be the case for Turkey. several conditions were imposed upon Turkey’s road towards accession43.
See § 17-23 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council. in which Turkey agreed verbally to sign up the protocol on the adaptation of the “Ankara Agreement”46 – by which Turkey would recognise the 10 new Member States including Cyprus. ibidem. On 29 March 2005. The lack of written commitment on the Cyprus issue was a major concession granted to the Turkish government by the EU. will only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014. who had already signalled its dissatisfaction with this condition ahead of the European Council.
2. The Dutch public is also known to be predominantly against Turkey's membership48. Cameron and E. the EU could potentially help to ensure a continued separation of state and religion. ‘The EU-25's view of Turkey's membership bid’.3. Yet. right-wing political circles would not miss out on the opportunity to couple the public decision about the EU Constitution with the question of Turkey’s accession. France is the only Member State where opposition to Turkey’s EU membership predominates at both levels – government and society. Reuters. The objective of EU membership has certainly been a very important framework in underpinning these reforms. head of the governing UMP party in France. French President Jacques Chirac found himself in a troublesome situation.
Long term impact of the decision
Turkish membership will have institutional. continue to express their reservations. F.
4. Yet. EPC Issue Paper No. Reactions in Member States Given the persistence of strong political opposition to Turkish accession in a number of EU states. Recent polls have shown that citizens’ approval in Germany is around 30% only.2. in the event of a referendum on the European constitution. better respect of human rights including minority rights and in the area of civilian control of the military. Britain and Germany. Euractiv. Akçakoca. which were supportive of Turkish accession at governmental levels. major political reforms have been implemented in Turkey. But the French case is not isolated. In this respect. it must be noted that the signing of the protocol is not a legal and formal recognition of the Republic of Cyprus”47. 16. but in a way that is
‘Turkey confirms ready to sign key EU protocol’. which in several countries is overwhelmingly hostile to Turkey's membership. And for a
. Political reforms in Turkey Since 1999. A recent poll found that 76% of Austrians were against Turkey's accession. in the Member States. Rhein. Austria. these reforms came along with a loss of power for the military and other parts of the secularist establishment. will wish to protect themselves from domestic opposition by emphasising the importance of the Commission recommendation and the decision of the European Council.2.However. His willingness to ride out doubts and opposition from his own party was confronted to the fact that he feared that. are also facing opposition from the public. and guarantee that a weakening of the power of the military does not open the door to fundamentalism. Turkey – Ready for the EU?. While the loss of control of the military over the state is a necessary step towards full democratisation. there is a widespread fear among secularists that growing Islamic conservatism would ensue – with pressure for women to adopt the veil frequently cited. 49 See also.3. promoting democratisation. French President Chirac however opted for a strong back up to Turkish accession. Thus. while opponents led by Nicolas Sarkozy. for a detailed analysis of the impact of Turkish membership (“in favour” of Turkish accession): A. it was likely that the decision to open negotiations with Turkey in 2005 would be received with dismay by certain political factions and the European public. Countries that have expressed the strongest reluctance included France. one of the biggest challenge for the EU consists in preparing opinion. economic and geopolitical implications for the EU49. 29 March 2005. It is argued here that geopolitical developments will be altered. Denmark and the Netherlands. 2004. 4. current opinion polls on voting intentions for the referendum on the EU constitutional treaty seem to prove Chirac’s fears right. 4. Some leaders. 17 December 2004.
But more than anything else. the fact that Turkey is one country. Wood. Turkey is likely to offer new opportunities for the CFSP. 2004.1. In terms of foreign policy and security.3. Geopolitical and foreign policy impacts Located at the border of the Middle East and the Caucasus. has been subject to political instability. Turkey will have an important voice in the decision making process in view of its population share which will be reflected in the Council voting system. not ten. Turkey will inevitably have a considerable impact on the EU institutional arrangements. which it is unlikely to join before a number of years after accession. Turkish membership will have a more radical impact on the EU decision-making process. and dependant on the EU’s own capacity to develop a single voice in the area of foreign policy (§4. 4. Turkish accession will have implications as to what the European project itself is (§4.difficult to predict. Turkish accession will sharpen the EU’s foreign policy concerns in these regions. Yet.2). The EU is likely to be increasingly involved in issues that were previously regarded as bilateral between Turkey and its neighbours. alters the political impact dynamics of its membership. Turkey will be a powerful player and will add to the already complex set of alliances and blocking combinations that are possible in the Council.
. Turkey’s accession will significantly affect the allocation of European Parliament seats of current Member States.3. Turkey will unlikely be in a position to lead strategically in developments in the internal market or the euro. Yet the fact that Turkey will become the largest EU country in population terms will be mitigated by the fact that Turkey will represent a small part of the EU economy. However.4). 4. Building on its strong historical.1). for Turkey’s accession will alter the current institutional equilibrium between small and big states (§4. Economic implications will be significant but manageable (§4.3. The impact on the functioning of the Commission will be less important given the planned reduction of the members of the Commission from 2014 onwards. By extending the EU’s borders to the Southern Caucasus and to Syria. such as disputes over water between Turkey and Syria or Armenia’s diplomatic recognition. If the European Constitution is ratified and a Commission with equal rotation of members across countries established. cultural and economic ties with the region.3). Also assessed on the basis of the rules set in the European Constitution. If the European Constitution is ratified by EU Member States – and the proposal for a “double-majority” system of voting thus implemented – then Union decisions will need a majority of both countries and population. EU Member Turkey? Preconditions.3. Turkey’s role as the leading provider of assistance in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” programme across the region will strengthen Central Asia’s international defence links.2. Quaisser and S.3. Forost Arbeitspapier. after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given its population size. Institutional impact Turkey is about the same size as the ten new Member States in population. a reformed Turkey could also help to stabilize Central Asia and encourage the development of democratic values in a region which. like all other EU Member States.3. Its accession will affect the delicate equilibrium between “small states” and “big states” reached by EU leaders when negotiating the content of the European Constitution. Consequences and Integration Alternatives. Turkey will sometimes have a Commissioner and sometimes not. No 25. Iran and Iraq. there are possible drawbacks in the
detailed analysis “against” full membership: W. in particular the medium sized and large countries.
Economic impact It is difficult to predict the economic situation of Turkey in 20-25 years time.3. But for Turkey. given that geopolitical arguments have been used both by tenants (new borders will bring new opportunities) and opponents (new borders will bring instability) of Turkish accession. Turkey’s overall impact will depend on how much the EU itself will be able to develop as a foreign policy player in the next decade. Turkey’s GDP on the date of its accession will not be higher that 3% of the EU-25 GDP51. In any case. as well as the presence in Turkey of certain Turkic groups opposing their domestic regimes. some have argued that Turkey as an EU member could provide the EU with a bridge to the Middle East. Turkey and the European Budget. Before the membership of Greece. 4. Yet. given its small economic size. Isik. Turkey is not likely to have a major impact on the EU economy. D. In the same manner. K. meaning that Turkish accession will have similar financial implications than that of the ten new Member States. For instance the existence of cultural and political links between Turkey and Turkic-speaking parts of Central Asia. Turkish accession will extend EU foreign policy interests in new regions. October 2004. as mentioned above.Hughes. and the EU itself. it is difficult to forecast the exact direction of future foreign policy developments. However. not least given the strong relations between Turkey and Israel. 2004. EU Member States need to find paths to overcome their divergences over foreign policy objectives and the means to reach them.3. Turkey has however taken up a more critical stance towards Israel. However these fears did not materialize. F. to become significant foreign policy players.extension of the EU’s frontiers closer to the region. could fuel tension in relations with countries in the region. which is suffering from its aging demographic profile. Turkey will also change. EU-Turkey CEPS Working Paper No. Turkey could be in a strong position to contribute to the development of EU peacekeeping forces in the context of its developing security policy. The EU is currently negotiating its budget for the period 2007-2013. 6. Turkish-Arab relations have been troublesome. However. Finally. Furthermore. Oztrak and Y. it is also likely that Turkey’s agricultural sector will still be large. see K. Prospects and Issues. it is possible to forecast that Turkey’s GDP will still be well below the EU average by then. Except that migration is also a sensitive political issue. The role that Turkey could play in connection to the Middle East is therefore difficult to predict. SEC(2004) 1202. Turkey’s GDP today is only 2% of the EU-25 GDP50. Turkey’s relations with Middle East countries are overwrought. Turkey’s demographic profile could however play a positive economic impact on the EU. Spain and Portugal to the EU these worries also existed. Yet. Even assuming that Turkey’s annual growth will reach 5%. Estimating Turkey’s likely impact on the EU budget is more difficult since the EU budget for 2015 is not yet known52.
. Gros. ibidem. 52 For a detailed analysis of the impact of Turkish membership on the EU budget. Structural policy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are expected to change considerably in the next ten years. With the arrival of the AKP government. the EU has ensured that it could preserve the right to limit the
Issues arising from Turkish membership perspective. Turkey’s continuing dispute over water with Syria and lingering fears that Iran is trying to export a fundamentalist revolution to Turkey. making Turkey an obvious candidate for structural and regional assistance. On that basis. Dervis. with. There are fears within EU public opinion that freedom of movement could allow for huge migratory flows from Turkey to the rest of the EU. Turkey will be eligible for significant budget transfers from the Union.
. the only way the original spirit of Europe would survive would be through the creation of a core Europe by the original founding members. See S. economic and political convergence between countries and citizens. cultural. At the heart of this debate lie very different conceptions of the European project itself and of the nature and objectives of the European Union. In an article published in the Financial Times in November 2004. What the Decision means for the European project The perspective of Turkish membership has raised questions concerning the nature of the European project.right to freedom of movement for Turkish labour in case of membership. 1996. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. After Turkish accession. could however contribute to some additional growth for the EU. stemming from migration from Turkey. that would challenge the view that we are now going towards a “clash of civilisations”54. namely Turkey’s ability to commit to democracy while lessening the control of the military over the state.
Financial Times. Simon and Schuster. What Turkish accession will mean for the European project has raised very different types of answers. A possible increase in labour supply. EU membership is neither predrawn nor predestined but the result of a process of social. including Turkey would mean that Europe is capable of managing difference and draw strength from its diversity. A number of federalists argue this way.3. who for many different reasons are capable of thinking of themselves as Europeans. It would also send a message to the rest of the world about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. this would not take place until 2020 at the earliest. has added his voice to those calling for a “privileged partnership” for Turkey. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York. as they did already before the Eastern European enlargement. The EU would cease to be a political project and instead have to rest content with remaining a free-trade zone. 4. the chief architect of the European Constitution. The effects on the EU will also depend on the way the Turkish economy will be able to cope with its preparation for membership. admitting Turkey means that the possibility of a United States of Europe – the federal dream at the heart of the European project – would be shattered. In this respect.4. But what Turkey’s accession means for the EU will also depend on domestic developments within Turkey. Giscard d'Estaing argued that Turkish entry to the EU would “change the nature of the European project”53. as opposed to full EU membership. For others. the possible risk to drift towards a “free-trade” zone is not specifically related to the Turkish enlargement. when the EU’s aging population problem would start being felt. In that light. 25 November 2004. The beneficial economic effects of Turkey’s membership in the EU are likely to be small for the EU-25 and much larger for Turkey. For some. Huntington. If Turkish immigration would be allowed. What Turkish accession will mean for the European project depends on the way the EU will be able to adapt its institutional system to successive rounds of enlargement.
not ten. Given the specificities of the Turkish enlargement. the impact of Turkey’s accession would also have particular consequences for the EU. Yet. Finally. but in a way that is difficult to predict. the basis on which the Commission recommended the opening of the negotiations. Because the Turkish enlargement bears clear specificities. are used both by tenants of Turkish accession and by its opponents. and the implications of the European Council’s Decision for the EU. be compared to that of the CEECs (Turkey is about the same size as the ten new Member States taken together in population and approximately the size of Poland. In this respect. The EU also faces. the reform of the EU institutional system towards an increased communautarisation of EU policies could provide a guarantee against the risk that the EU would drift towards being a “free-trade zone” in the wake of successive rounds of enlargements. ironically. Finally. in economic terms). The Turkish enlargement is specific. means that the political impact of its accession would be quite different. the challenge of negotiating the accession of a country that has different religious and cultural characteristics. the fact that Turkey is only one country. Turkey will have an important impact on EU foreign policy interests given its borders with the Middle East. the geopolitical impact of Turkish accession is dependant on the EU’s own capacity to develop a single voice in the area of foreign policy. It could also play a key role with respect to the EU’s future energy supplies. The economic situation of the EU. the impact of Turkish accession for the EU would also have unprecedented consequences: ß Economic implications will be significant. Whether Turkish accession is accepted by European citizens will also depend on other parameters. The economic impact of the Turkish enlargement on the EU will not be heavier than that of the Eastern European enlargement. If Turkish accession could. Turkish membership will have a more radical impact on the EU decision-making process. the integration of minorities in Member States and the geopolitical state of the world – and more specifically the way the EU and international institutions will be able to fight against new security issues such as international terrorism – will all play an important role as to how Turkey’s accession will be perceived by European citizens and dealt with by policy-makers. which. Geopolitical developments will be altered.
. Turkish accession will leave the EU with the unprecedented challenge of managing an enlargement that provoked strong resistance among European citizens.CONCLUSIONS This paper has analysed the specificities of the Turkish enlargement. for Turkey’s accession will modify the current institutional equilibrium between small and big states and add to the complexity of the EU decision-making process. at first sight. but manageable. the Turkish one has been analysed essentially by reference to geopolitical arguments. unlike no other enlargement before. for the first time. Caucasus and the Black Sea.
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