Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20CACO%2020170420058/PEOPLE%20v.%20WISMER
Timestamp: 2017-06-29 14:12:56
Document Index: 91826234

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 350', '§ 351', '§ 785', '§ 780', '§ 1101', 'art 2']

PEOPLE v. WISMER | No. D068743. | By DATO | Leagle.com
No. D068743.
Kamala D. Harris , Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler , Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland , Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. , and Anthony Da Silva , Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The foreperson told counsel and the investigator that the jury's discussion focused on the pretext phone calls because there was disagreement as to whether Wismer's reaction to the accusation was a "natural" response. She devised what she characterized as an "experiment" to show that Wismer's reaction was not "natural." Inside the jury room, she falsely accused one of the other jurors, a Hispanic male, of smacking her on the behind while making the racially charged comment that he wanted to put his "Mexican burrito into her chicken fried rice."
The trial court denied the motion for an evidentiary hearing, but permitted defense counsel to file a motion for new trial based on the alleged jury misconduct and to request the release of juror identifying information that would facilitate the submission of juror affidavits. In support of the motion, counsel included an affidavit from Juror No. 8 reiterating her story about the "experiment" involving a fabricated allegation of sexual misconduct leveled at a fellow juror designed to illustrate the "natural" response of an innocent person to a false accusation.3
The trial court denied the defense request for release of juror identifying information, concluding that "good cause has not been established to proceed further. . . ." Then, "tak[ing] [Juror No. 8's] statement as indicated," the court stated it had been "unable to find . . . any cases indicating that it's—that kind of discussion is misconduct. It looks to me like it was their attempt at a further critical examination of the evidence . . . that was produced at trial." On that basis the court denied the motion for new trial based on alleged jury misconduct.
The jurors in this case were instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 201 that they should not "do any research regarding the case" or "conduct any tests or experiments." (Italics added.) The law on the subject, however, is less categorical. As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th 175, "[n]ot every jury experiment constitutes misconduct. Improper experiments are those that allow the jury to discover new evidence by delving into areas not examined during trial. The distinction between proper and improper jury conduct turns on this difference. The jury may weigh and evaluate the evidence it has received. It is entitled to scrutinize that evidence, subjecting it to careful consideration by testing all reasonable inferences. It may reexamine the evidence in a slightly different context as long as that evaluation is within the `"scope and purview of the evidence."' [Citation.] What the jury cannot do is conduct a new investigation going beyond the evidence admitted." (Id. at p. 249, quoting People v. Bogle (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 770, 781.) And this is true regardless whether the new evidence is generated outside the courthouse or inside the jury deliberation room. (Collins, at pp. 248-249.)
Consider if the prosecutor had called a psychologist to testify about the "normal" reaction of an innocent person accused of sexual molestation based on experimental studies. Assuming the expert's testimony was otherwise admissible, Wismer would have been entitled to cross-examine the expert about the studies, questioning their methodology or the applicability of their conclusions. He could have called another expert to testify in opposition. He was denied that very fundamental opportunity to confront and address the evidence against him because that evidence was generated secretly within the confines of the jury deliberation room. (See Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. (1911) 159 Cal. 651, 657 [jury experiment is improper where it generates "evidence which it is not possible for the party injured to meet, answer, or explain."].)
In asserting that Juror No. 8 did not engage in misconduct, the People suggested the experiment was "just a hypothetical" akin to asking how a reasonable person would react if falsely accused. Certainly jurors are permitted to "`use common experiences and illustrations in reaching their verdicts.'" (People v. Cumpian (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 307, 316, quoting United States v. Avery (6th Cir. 1983) 717 F.2d 1020, 1026.) But Juror No. 8's experiment was conducted precisely to remove the discussion from the realm of the hypothetical by providing a new concrete standard, observable by every juror, as to how an innocent person responds to a fabricated charge of sexual misconduct. Indeed, it was Juror No. 8's frustration with the fact that the jurors' common experience had thus far failed to produce agreement that prompted her to create a different "common experience" inside the deliberation room, which amounted to new evidence.
We start with some basic principles. Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial (Evid. Code, § 350), and relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded under the federal or California Constitutions or by statute. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166; Evid. Code, § 351.) The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party. (Evid. Code, § 785.) In determining a witness's credibility, a jury generally may consider evidence that "has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his [or her] testimony," including "[h]is [or her] character for honesty or veracity or their opposites." (Evid. Code, § 780.)
Although Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), precludes the admission of evidence to show a person's character or trait of his or her character "when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion," that provision does not "affect[] the admissibility of evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness." (Evid. Code, § 1101, subds. (a), (c).) Furthermore, Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a), provides: "In a criminal action, evidence of the character or a trait of character (in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct) of the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted is not made inadmissible by [Evidence Code] Section 1101 if the evidence is: [¶] (1) [o]ffered by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in conformance with the character or trait of character. . . ." A lay (i.e., nonexpert) witness may testify in the form of an opinion if that opinion is based on his or her own perception. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 130.) Nevertheless, under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court may exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."
Wismer filed a pretrial motion to admit the testimony of Kristen Colwell regarding a specific incident in 2011 during which I.S. purportedly lied about a boy at school threatening to kill her. Colwell knew I.S. and A.S. when she was their martial arts instructor. During a recorded interview with a defense investigator, Colwell described how I.S., who seemed sad, told her in a serious manner that a boy at school threatened to kill her. Having concerns whether the statement was true or not, Colwell questioned I.S. further. As the questioning progressed, however, A.S. interrupted them and said, "She's [I.S.'s] just telling you a lie right now." I.S. and A.S. then "laughed and thought it was very funny." Although Colwell was no longer concerned about a boy threatening to kill I.S., she was very concerned about I.S.'s behavior and, in particular, about the seriousness of the lie and how convincing I.S. was when she told it. Colwell was very disturbed by the girls laughing as if it were "no big deal to tell such a horrendous lie."
Colwell was allowed to testify she taught martial arts to I.S. and A.S. over a six-month period in 2011, a period long enough for her to form an opinion regarding I.S.'s honesty. She offered her opinion that I.S. "likes to tell lies and manipulate." However, relying on Evidence Code section 352, the trial court excluded any testimony about the specific incident in which I.S. lied about a death threat at school.
Wismer also argues the trial court abused its discretion by restricting the testimony of Steve Ely, a school district employee, about the honesty of Cecily and A.S. and, in particular, excluding evidence on specific incidents. Before trial, Wismer filed a motion to admit Ely's testimony regarding his opinion on the honesty of Cecily and A.S. Wismer also filed a separate motion for admission of testimony by two other school district employees regarding A.S.'s honesty. In an interview with a defense investigator, Ely stated that he had been A.S.'s special education case manager at her school. After A.S. had attended her middle school for only a few months, Cecily wanted A.S. placed at a private school at the public school district's expense. Describing Cecily as a "helicopter parent," Ely stated that she would make things up for A.S. if she thought it would benefit their agenda. She contacted A.S.'s school with complaints about things that did not happen. He also believed A.S. knew how to get Cecily's attention "by feeding her things that will set [Cecily] off against the school."
After Cecily was informed the process to obtain a private school placement for A.S. would take about a year, Ely received a call from Cecily asserting that A.S. had attempted suicide. However, Cecily would not allow him or others to contact the hospital or obtain hospital records so they could work with A.S. Ely believed A.S.'s purported suicide attempt was "convenient" and he would not put it past Cecily "to put [A.S.] up to it to further her agenda of getting [A.S.] into the private school at the cost of the public."
McCONNELL, P. J. and O'ROURKE, J., concurs.
FootNotes * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part 2.
3. Juror No. 8 separately initialed eight of the 13 paragraphs in the affidavit, making handwritten corrections on several of them. The remaining five paragraphs were not initialed, but the numbers were circled and there was a handwritten note at the bottom: "#4, 5, 6, 7, 9—I am uncomfortable with the statements due to future mis-interpretation or how the statements would affect the case." She nonetheless signed the affidavit without crossing out or correcting any language in the five paragraphs. She also submitted a second affidavit in opposition to the motion for new trial in which she sought to "clarify" a statement in her first declaration regarding evidence about the physical positioning of bodies in defendant's car. There was no attempt to change or clarify any statement about the experiment in the jury room.