Source: https://www.lpsconservatorship.com/consofhoff.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 23:22:57
Document Index: 13877866

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1370', '§ 1370', '§ 1370', '§ 5350', '§ 5008', '§ 1370', '§ 1370', '§ 5008', '§5000', '§5000']

Conservatorship of Hofferber - PUBLICLY CONSERVED
Conservatorship of Hofferber, 28 Cal. 3d 161
Supreme Court of California September 15, 1980 L.A. No. 31121
Issues raised at court were over the issue of whether LPS conservatorship was an appropriate remedy for an incompetent defendant with a violent felony charge. Appellant appeals a judgement ordering an LPS conservatorship under the LPS act be established over his person. He contends that the LPS conservatorship is a civil conservatorship and contends the intersectionality between criminal issues and civil commitment issues.
Appellant was charged with murder. After his preliminary hearing, he was found mentally incompetent to stand trial and committed to the care of the Department of Health for placement. Appellant was entitled to statutory review of his rights (id., § 1370, subd. (b)(1)). He was subsequently returned to criminal court, found incompetent once more, and recommitted to state hospital.
By the time appellant reached the 3 year maximum confinement period permitted by law, the department of health found that there was an unlikely chance that appellant would be returned to the competence (id. § 1370, subd. (b)(1))), “a unanimous jury by a preponderance of the evidence found him incompetent to stand trial”. The instant court noted that appellant had previously been subject to an LPS conservatorship prior to the murder.
Based on this finding, the court deemed that appellant was
(1) he was incompetent to stand trial and "would constitute a danger to the safety of others if he were free of secure custody," and (2) he appeared to be "gravely disabled" within the meaning of section 5008, subdivision (h)(2). Accordingly, Judge Chernow directed the public guardian to initiate civil conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (c)(2).)
During the LPS conservatorship proceedings the court denied appellant’s request for another jury trial over the matter of his mental competence. The court also took judicial notice of the prior competence hearing. The mental health court found appellant gravely disabled under Welf and Inst Code § 5350 et seq. The public conservator was appointed conservator over appellant’s person and special disabilities established. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant cited in his appeal three contentions:
(1) a person charged with a violent felony and found mentally incompetent to stand trial may not be civilly committed for reasons and under procedures that differ from those applicable to other mentally disordered persons, (2) to establish grave disability his incompetency must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) his conservatorship violates the proscription of retroactive or ex post facto laws.
The appellate court examines each contention separately in its opinion.
A note. Before the enactment of the LPS act California law permitted those charged with criminal conduct but found incompetent to stand trial were to be committed to state hospitals until found competent to stand trial. Because this sane standard was the only factor preventing trial from progressing, many defendant were committed indefinitely as they could be held as long as they were incompetent.
In re Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715 [32 L.Ed.2d 435, 92 S.Ct. 1845] the Supreme Court denied equal protection and due process that ruled from the premise that persons could not, solely because of pending criminal charges against them, be subject to commitment standards more lenient or release standards more stringent than those applicable to persons not charged with criminal offense. [28 Cal.3d 168]
Under this law, mentally disordered persons could be committed and confined only if the court had found them dangerous or in need of treatment. Criminal defendants who were also found mentally incompetent were committed solely on the basis of inability to provide reasonable assistance at trial. The court ruled that these confinement could continue as long as the disabling condition persisted, regardless of whether this confinement was necessary for treatment or to protect the public. The court considered that a pending criminal case should not be a reason for distinction among mentally ill persons. Indiana law denied incompetent criminal defendants equal protection.
Jackson held that the procedures also denied due process because, solely for incompetence, they permitted confinement beyond a period "reasonably related" to the aims of commitment. The court reasoned as follows: Commitment solely for incompetence is intended to permit treatment to alleviate that condition. Hence, confinement on that ground may not continue beyond the time reasonably necessary to determine whether the purpose of treatment is being served.
Once there appears no substantial likelihood that defendant will regain competence, Jackson concluded, the state must justify further confinement by showing that it is necessary on some ground applicable to all mentally ill persons, such as dangerousness or need for custodial care. The court adopted a "rule of reason" that, once hopeless incompetence appears, "the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant." (P. 738 [32 L.Ed.2d p. 451]; cf. Greenwood v. United States (1956) 350 U.S. 366, 373-374 [100 L.Ed. 412, 418, 76 S.Ct. 410].)
Drawing from the Jackson court, this court invalidated indefinite commitments under California procedures for confinement of incompetent criminal defendants. Citing (in re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 805-806 [106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018) the court held that, if a defendant is found to be unlikely to be restored to competence, "the court should either order him released from confinement or initiate appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under the [LPS] Act ...." (Id., at p. 807.) fn. 3 [28 Cal.3d 169]
Under the Davis court it was established that these proceedings were to entail (1) annual conservatorships under (§§ 5008, subd. (h)(1), 5350 et seq.), and (2) 90-day maximum confinements for "imminently dangerous" persons.
Drawing from the Davis court ruling, the Legislature created the framework to bring about California's scheme for commitment of incompetent criminal defendants. Under this current set of laws a mentally ill criminal defendant confined for incompetence must be returned to the superior court after (1) three years, or (2) serve the maximum term of imprisonment for the most serious underlying offense, whichever is shorter (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (c)(1)), or whenever the treatment facility sooner finds there is no substantial likelihood the defendant will attain competence (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).It is at this point that the court must reconvene to redetermine competence. If the defendant is found competent, the criminal proceedings are resumed. If not the court must either release him or order that LPS conservatorship proceedings be initiated.
Because of this, the Legislature amended Welf and Inst Code § 5008, (h), which enumerates the grave disability standard. The new section maintains the old concept of inability to care for self under (subd. (h)(1)) but adds an new definition on criminal incompetence. A person now may be found "gravely disabled" on grounds that he (1) is charged by indictment or information with a felony involving death, great bodily harm, or a serious threat to the physical well-being of another, and (2) is incompetent to assist in his defense because of a mental disorder. fn. 6 His conservatorship may be renewed annually so long as those conditions persist.
Appellant contends that the new LPS scheme evades what was previously established in the Jackson and Davis courts. Despite the law's purpose to make incompetent offenders committable under civil commitment law, appellant contends, it still denies them equal protection because their incompetence does not bear any reasonable relationship to the "grave disability" [28 Cal.3d 171] provisions of the LPS Act. Per the Jackson and Davis courts, appellant argues that unproved criminal charges and a finding of incompetence are insufficient grounds for categorically dividing them from persons subject to civil commitment. Appellant contends that because he had been found hopelessly incompetent, he may now be civilly committed only under LPS Act provisions and may not deal with issues of criminal incompetence. Appellant also contends that this new scheme denies due process as it allows the indefinite commitment of incompetent offenders without mandating a show of cause as to why the offender is dangerous, helpless, or in need of further commitment. Based on his reasoning, appellant concludes, he must be released unless his confinement can be justified under laws articulating one or more of those grounds.
Respondent conservator asserts that the new procedures do meet the standard for due process as they follow a determination of probable cause that defendant did committed a violent felony. The issues of separate treatment and confinement of such a criminal defendant are justified on grounds of public safety. The past history of criminal conduct evidences extraordinary dangerousness that would necessitate such actions.
We agree that the rulings of Jackson and Davis are not satisfied by placing arbitrary and discriminatory confinement standards for criminal incompetents in the civil commitment statutes. However, we do not regard those cases as holding that the fact of criminal incompetency may never be a basis for involuntary confinement prescriptions.
The court did not that it has a duty to protect the public per (Cf. Turnbull, Law and the [28 Cal. 3d 172] Mentally Retarded Citizen: American Responses to the Declarations of Rights of the United Nations and International League of Societies for the Mentally Handicapped -- Where We Have Been, Are, and Are Headed (1979) 30 Syracuse L.Rev. 1093.) The court finds that it may utilize more than one means of isolating, treating, and restraining dangerous persons and that any discrepancies may be upheld if cause is given.
Variation of the length and conditions of confinement, depending on degrees of danger reasonably perceived as to special classes of persons, is a valid exercise of state power.
Appellant sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) establishing a civil conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§5000 et seq., based on a finding that appellant was "gravely disabled" because he was an incompetent defendant charged with a violent felony.
Appellant sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) establishing a civil conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§5000 et seq., based on a finding that appellant was "gravely disabled" because he was an incompetent defendant charged with a violent felony. Appellant argued that (1) a person charged with a violent felony and found mentally incompetent to stand trial may not be civilly committed for reasons and under procedures that differ from those applicable to other mentally disordered persons, (2) to establish grave disability his incompetency must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) his conservatorship violates the proscription of retroactive or ex post facto laws. The court disagreed. However, the court found that a Lanterman-Petris-Short Act determination that appellant was "gravely disabled" because he is currently dangerous as the result of a mental disease, defect, or disorder must follow a hearing addressed to that specific issue. The court found that appellant did not have such a hearing and reversed the order of conservatorship.
The court reversed the trial court's order establishing a civil conservatorship.