Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/312/322/608787/
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 18:50:18
Document Index: 43474335

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 621', '§ 36', '§ 101', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 1983']

Richard A. Moore, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Muncie Police and Fire Merit Commission, Mike Szakaly, David Eiler, et al., Defendants-appellees, 312 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 2002) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 2002 › Richard A. Moore, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Muncie Police and Fire Merit Commission, Mike Szakaly, Dav...
Richard A. Moore, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Muncie Police and Fire Merit Commission, Mike Szakaly, David Eiler, et al., Defendants-appellees, 312 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 2002)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 312 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 2002) Argued May 14, 2002Decided December 5, 2002
Under Indiana law, an individual may not be hired by a municipal fire department as a firefighter (after May 31, 1985) unless he meets the conditions for membership in the Pension Fund.2 See Indiana Code § 36-8-3-21(b). But Indiana law also provides that only individuals younger than thirty-six years old may become a member of the Pension Fund. See Indiana Code § 36-8-8-7(a) (2). Therefore, no individual making application after he has turned thirty-six years old may be hired as a Muncie firefighter. On December 1, 1998, the Pension Board determined that Moore — who was then beyond the age of thirty-six — was too old to become a member of the Pension Fund. Thus, the Commission could not appoint him as a Muncie firefighter under Indiana law.
Although Indiana law requires that applicants for the position of firefighter be under the age of thirty-six, from January 1, 1994 through September 30, 1996 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (ADEA), forbade any employer from refusing to hire an individual because of the individual's age. Thus Indiana Code §§ 36-8-8-7(a) (2) and 36-8-3-21(b), which together dictate that only individuals who are less than thirty-six (36) years of age can apply to be firefighters, were preempted by federal legislation, and they were ineffective from January 1, 1994. However, on September 30, 1996 Congress amended the ADEA and removed the federal prohibition of the age limitations retroactive to December 31, 1993. See H.R. 3610, Pub. L. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, § 101(a), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-23. As a result, Indiana municipalities could comply with the age requirements of Indiana Code § 36-8-8-7(a) (2) when handling applications dating back to December 31, 1993 without violating the Federal ADEA requirements.
On February 7, 1997, a few months after Moore was placed on the eligibility list and before he received any offer of employment, the Merit Commission removed Moore from the eligibility list because of his age. The Commission decided that the recently amended ADEA removed the federal prohibition on age limitations for firefighters and thus Indiana Code §§ 36-8-3-21(b) and 36-8-8-7(a) (2) required that Moore be less than thirty-six years of age to qualify for membership in the Pension Fund, which he was not. However, on October 16, 1997, R. Thomas Parker, the director of the Pension Fund, wrote a letter to the Commission's attorney, stating:
We review de novo the trial judge's grant of summary judgment. Wright v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 204 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is proper when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). We view the record and all justifiable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
In order to succeed in an action based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law"; and (2) that "this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In this case, Moore alleged that when the Merit Commission denied his application to the Pension Fund and removed his name from the eligibility list he was deprived of a protected property interest — that of prospective employment with the Muncie Fire Department — without due process of law.
Thus, Moore's federal constitutional claim turns upon whether he had a property right in prospective employment in the Muncie Fire department. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). If, in fact, Moore does have a legal right to employment with the City of Muncie, Indiana, as a firefighter, then the Merit Commission could not remove him from the eligibility list without a due process hearing. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12, 98 S. Ct. 1554, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1978) (stating that "due process of law requires an opportunity for `some kind of hearing' prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest") (citations omitted); see also Ulichny v. Merton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2001); Fittshur v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 31 F.3d 1401, 1405 (7th Cir. 1994). We bear in mind that property interests are not created by the United States Constitution. Ulichny, 249 F.3d at 699-700. "Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701. Further, a property interest must be based on more than merely an "abstract need or desire for it." Roth, 408 U.S. at 578, 92 S. Ct. 2701.
We do not accept Moore's untenable claim that he has a property interest in prospective employment with the Muncie Fire Department. In order to create a justifiable and reasonable expectation of employment, and thereby establish a property interest, there must be a "mutually explicit understanding" between the parties. Crim v. Board of Educ. of Cairo Sch. Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, 545 (7th Cir. 1998). But Moore was never hired and thus his allegation that he had a mutually explicit understanding with the Commission regarding future employment as a Muncie firefighter is without merit. We have previously held that " [t]o recognize a `property' interest for an appointment to a classified position in the realm of public employment would drastically extend the scope of the due process clause" and we refused to make that extension. Petru v. City of Berwyn, 872 F.2d 1359, 1363 (7th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. City of Chicago, 798 F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1986) ("We need not decide now whether an unconditional agreement for prospective employment gives rise to a protectable property right ....") We have also previously held that an employee has no property interest in a prospective promotion, even when placed on an eligibility or ranking list. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 869 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Board of Examiners, 866 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Bigby v. City of Chicago, 766 F.2d 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 1985).
Initially, we do not agree with Moore's assertion that the transition policy created a "mutually explicit understanding" and thus created a property interest for him, as Indiana law requires that public employers' policies must be adequately promulgated in order to create property rights. See Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1483 (7th Cir. 1994). Moore offered no evidence that the PERF transition policy was promulgated in any way. Moore asserts, with scant factual support, that the transition policy was adequately promulgated because the Merit Commission referenced the policy in a letter that informed him he had been reinstated on the applicant eligibility list. But Moore's letter only briefly mentions that the PERF had "changed their policy," failing to name, much less describe or set forth the nature and substance of that policy. Indeed, as the trial judge correctly observed, Moore's only evidence of the nature and terms of the transition policy is contained within letters that he was never intended to receive. Moore has failed to direct us to even one iota of evidence in the record to demonstrate that the PERF promulgated the transition policy. Thus, we agree with the trial court's determination that the transition policy fell short of creating a mutually explicit understanding that gave rise to a property interest in prospective employment with the Muncie Fire Department.
Moore's claim fails for yet another reason. Even if we were to hold that the transition policy created a mutually explicit understanding between the parties, the policy does not apply to Moore. Under the plain language of the transition policy, Moore is ineligible for membership in the Pension Fund. The transition policy, as described in documents Moore introduced into the record, states that "individuals who ... received a written conditional offer of employment from the hiring authority on or before September 30, 1996, would continue to be processed without regard to the age thirty-six requirement." The policy further stated that those " [i]ndividuals who had not received a conditional offer of employment on or before September 30, 1996, would be denied entry into the Pension Fund pursuant to IC 36-8-8-7." The Muncie Fire Department did not extend Moore a conditional offer of employment until November 30, 1998. In attempting to circumvent the plain language of the transition policy, Moore unconvincingly argues that he had completed all the steps in the application process before September, 30, 1996. The date Moore completed the various steps in the application process is not relevant. The transition policy was clear in mandating that Moore receive a written conditional offer of employment before September 30, 1996, to fall within the transition policy's umbrella of protection. He did not. Indeed, Moore was not even placed on the eligibility list for hire until November 7, 1996 — more than a month later than the end of the grace period offered under the transition policy.