Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/636/913/25800/
Timestamp: 2019-11-16 21:53:14
Document Index: 556252450

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 653', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 661', '§ 4']

9 O.s.h. Cas.(bna) 1135, 1981 O.s.h.d. (cch) P 25,021columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc., Petitioner, v. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, and Occupational Safetyand Health Review Commission, Respondents, 636 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1981 › 9 O.s.h. Cas.(bna) 1135, 1981 O.s.h.d. (cch) P 25,021columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc., Petitioner,...
9 O.s.h. Cas.(bna) 1135, 1981 O.s.h.d. (cch) P 25,021columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc., Petitioner, v. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, and Occupational Safetyand Health Review Commission, Respondents, 636 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1981)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 636 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1981) Argued Oct. 14, 1980. Decided Dec. 23, 1980. Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1981
SECTION 4(b) (1) PREEMPTION
Section 4(b) (1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1) (1976), (hereinafter the "Act") provides:
Read literally, section 4(b) (1) deprives OSHA of jurisdiction over working conditions that are already subject to safety regulations promulgated by other agencies.5 The clear legislative purpose of this section was to eliminate any wasteful duplication in the efforts of federal agencies.6
As interpreted since its enactment, section 4(b) (1) preemption requires a two-part showing; first, that a coordinate federal agency has "exercised" authority by promulgating regulations in the area and second, that these concurrent regulations cover the specific "working conditions" purportedly within OSHA's jurisdiction.7 The Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety (hereinafter OPS), has exercised its authority in this area by promulgating regulations entitled "Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline: Minimum Federal Safety Standards." At issue in this case is whether the specific regulation prevention of accidental ignition, 49 C.F.R. § 192.751 (1980) envisions the working conditions faced by petitioner's employees when they performed a "hot tap" on the existing gas main. We believe this OPS regulation provides safety standards for the exact conditions of this case and hence find that section 4(b) (1) preempted OSHA's authority over the matter.
Whether the OPS regulations cover the worksite of Columbia's employees in this case requires an interpretation of the section 4(b) (1) term "working conditions." In Southern Railway Company v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1976), the fourth circuit addressed this issue in order to determine whether the Federal Railroad Administration (hereinafter "FRA") safety regulations concerning railroad transportation preempted OSHA's jurisdiction over the safety of railroad repair shops. In ruling that the FRA regulations did not preempt OSHA's authority the court defined "working conditions" as the "environmental area in which an employee customarily goes about his daily tasks."8 We adopt this definition.
If "environmental area" covers anything, it covers the discrete work site of a trench in which employees are repairing a pipeline. At the administrative hearing, the ALJ noted petitioner's employees risked accidental explosion from escaping natural gas as well as the accumulation of odorless methene gas.9 The ALJ also found that while the presence of natural gas could be detected by smell, atmospheric testing is required to determine the level of methene gas. Although these gases present risk of serious harm to petitioner's employees, they existed within the "environmental area" that is the subject of the pipeline safety regulations. Hence, the Office of Pipeline Safety regulations apply; and the general safety standard of OSHA is preempted by section 4(b) (1).
Our conclusion on section 4(b) (1) preemption is buttressed by the language of the preemptory regulation. The introductory sentence of 49 C.F.R. § 192.751 (1980) states: "Each operator shall take steps to minimize the danger of accidental ignition of gas in any structure or area where the presence of gas constitutes a hazard of fire or explosion...."10 This language covers the risks from both natural and methene gas and applies directly to the performance of a "hot tap" on an existing gas main.
Prior decisions of the Commission further support the finding of section 4(b) (1) preemption. In Secretary v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, 20 OSAHRC 712 (1975), the Commission found that a similar pipeline regulation preempted OSHA's jurisdiction over the transfer of liquefied natural gas. In so doing, the Commission examined the history of pipeline regulations and noted that the purpose of the pipeline safety regulations paralleled that of OSHA.11 While the regulation in Texas Eastern, 49 C.F.R. § 192.12(b) (2), is not at issue in this case, the Commission's recognition that the policies underlying the OPS regulations are identical to those of OSHA allays any fear that gaps in the safety regulations might exist.
Although the substance of 49 C.F.R. § 192.751 (1980) is not identical to that of the OSHA safety standard, the two are similar. In this regard, the Commission in Texas Eastern stated, that when 4(b) (1) preemption is at issue, whether the language of the preempting regulation parallels that of the OSHA standard is unimportant:
Whether the OPS standards are the same or substantively different from the OSHA standards their content is of little moment. In Mushroom Transportation Co., Inc. No. 1588 (1974) we held that: "Once another Federal agency exercises its own authority over specific working conditions, OSHA cannot enforce its own regulations covering the same conditions. Section 4(b) (1) does not require that another agency exercise its authority in the same manner or an equally stringent manner."
Finally OSHA contends that even if this court interprets section 4(b) (1) as preempting OSHA's authority over the working conditions on Neville Island, petitioner failed to raise this issue at the administrative hearing and is therefore estopped to argue the question before this court. OSHA views section 4(b) (1) preemption as an affirmative defense that under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 8(c) must be raised initially if it is to be considered on appeal. We disagree. Section 4(b) (1) preempts OSHA of subject matter jurisdiction once concurrent regulation is determined to cover the same working conditions. As such, a section 4(b) (1) claim can be raised initially on appeal or by the court sua sponte. 29 U.S.C. § 661(f) (1976); Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(h) (2). We appreciate, as the second circuit emphasized in Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., that preemption issues usually require "an inquiry into complex issues of law and fact" and that "it is proper for a court to defer examination of such difficult questions of agency jurisdiction until a party has fully exhausted its administrative remedies." 574 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1978). But we see no reason to remand the case for a second hearing on the preemption question.13 The 4(b) (1) preemption is clear; the exact working conditions at issue are covered by the OPS regulation. Therefore we vacate the citation for violation of 29 C.F.R. 1926.651(v) and the final order of the Commission affirming that citation.
This interpretation parallels that of the District of Columbia Circuit in Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1975): "Section 4(b) (1), set out in Part I is seemingly clear on its face; the Secretary has no jurisdiction to promulgate or enforce occupational safety and health standards for particular employee working conditions where another federal agency is exercising statutory authority over those conditions." Id
Both Congressional reports and case law supports this interpretation. The Senate Report which contained an analogue to the present section 4(b) (1) stated that the bill
This desire to avoid legislative overlap has been recognized and followed in prior cases. See, e. g., Taylor v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc. 621 F.2d 88, 91 (4th Cir. 1980) (purpose of § 4(b) (1) was "to eliminate any duplication in the efforts of federal agencies to secure the well being of employees"); Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1978); Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1166-68 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
While Section 4(b) (1) may not be entirely self-defining, it is clear that the exemption applies only when another Federal agency has actually exercised its statutory authority. It does not apply where such an agency has regulatory authority but has failed to exercise it. This is clear not only from the statutory language but from the legislative history as well. Earlier versions of the legislation had provided that the mere existence of statutory authority in another Federal agency was sufficient to invoke the exemption, but they were rejected by the Congress. See Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, pp. 62, 620, 671, 710 (Committee Print, 1971) (Legislative History). That actual exercise of the statutory authority rather than its mere existence was contemplated is clearly evident from the following colloquy during debate on the Act in the House of Representatives:
539 F.2d 335, 336-37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1976). In Southern Railway, the fourth circuit held that safety regulations issued by the Federal Railroad Administration covering signal inspection and hours of service did not preempt OSHA coverage of railroad repair shop facilities. See also Marshall v. Nichols, 486 F. Supp. 615, 619 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (Coast Guard regulations preempt OSHA standards for employees on offshore oil platforms court states an "actual exercise of authority to govern working conditions by the Coast Guard displaces a potential OSHA jurisdiction over offshore platform working conditions.")
Southern Railway, 539 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1976). To reach this definition the Southern Railway court relied on the Supreme Court's definition of "working conditions" as used in the Equal Pay Act of 1963:
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 202, 94 S. Ct. 2223, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1974).
In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S. Ct. 222, 54 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1977) the fifth circuit also addressed the question of what constitutes a "working condition" under section 4(b) (1). Also relying on the court's Corning Glass discussion, the fifth circuit developed a more fluid definition: "(T)he statutory term 'working conditions' embraces both 'surroundings', such as the general problem of the use of toxic liquids, and physical 'hazards,' which can be expressed as a location (maintenance shop); a category (machinery); or a specific item (furnace)." Southern Pacific, 539 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1976). We appreciate the desire for flexibility in a definition of working conditions, but adopt the Southern Railway "environmental area" test because it might afford the employer greater notice of what areas are subject to OSHA regulation and what areas are covered by other administrative regulations.
See, e. g., Southern Railway, 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1976); Southern Pacific Transportation Company v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S. Ct. 222, 54 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1977); Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company v. OSHRC, 548 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
Indeed, Columbia raised the section 4(b) (1) preemption issue before the Commission on a petition for discretionary review, but review was denied. Since the Commission had an opportunity to address the question and declined review, any administrative exhaustion requirements have been complied with. As this court stated in Universal Auto Radiator Mfg. v. Marshall: