Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/332/480/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-10-13 21:19:40
Document Index: 117743957

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 9', '§ 7', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 9']

The complaint alleges that respondent is not an enemy or ally of an enemy, and that at no time at or since the vesting has the property in question been owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by an enemy, ally of an enemy, or a national of a designated enemy country. It also alleges that none of the property has been owing or belonging to or held on account of or for the benefit of any such person or interest. We construe these allegations to mean that the property is free of all enemy taint, and particularly that the corporations whose shares have been seized, the corporations which have a contract in which respondent has an interest, and respondent itself are companies in which no enemy, ally of an enemy, nor any national of either has any interest of any kind whatsoever, and that respondent has not done business in the territory of the enemy or any ally of an enemy. Those allegations, as so construed, are indeed taken as true for the purposes of the present ruling, since petitioner's motion to dismiss is based solely on the fact that respondent is a national of a foreign country. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Under the Act as it read prior to the 1941 amendment, respondent would have been able to maintain this suit on a showing, without more, that it was a corporation organized under the laws of a friendly nation and not doing business in the territory of an enemy nation or any of its allies. That result would be reached as follows: Sec. 7(c) permitted seizure by the Custodian only of property in which an enemy or ally of an enemy had an interest. Sec. 9(a) permitted "any person not an enemy or ally of enemy" claiming an interest in any seized property to sue to reclaim it. And the Court held in Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U. S. 457, that a corporation organized under the laws of a friendly nation and not doing business in the territory of an enemy nation or any of its allies [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That was at least one respect in which the Act had a "rigidity and inflexibility" that was sought to be cured by the amendment to § 5(b) in 1941. See H.R. Rep. No. 1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3. It was notorious that Germany and her allies had developed numerous techniques for concealing enemy ownership or control of property which was ostensibly friendly or neutral. They had, through numerous devices, including the corporation, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, the President acquired new "flexible powers" (H.R. Rep. No. 1507, supra, p. 3) to deal effectively chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That is to make the right to sue run not to "any person not an enemy or ally of enemy," as § 9(a) in terms provides, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There are several reasons which make us hesitate to take that course. In the first place, as we have suggested, the phase of the problem with which we are presently concerned and with which Congress was wrestling when it amended the Act in 1941 started and ended with property having an enemy taint. We find not the slightest suggestion that Congress was concerned under this Act with property owned or controlled by friendly or neutral powers and in no way utilized by the Axis. Those interests were not waging economic warfare against us. Secondly, we are dealing here with the power "to affirmatively compel the use and application of foreign property in a manner consistent with the interests of the United States." [Footnote 6] Sen.Rep. No. 911, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. It is hard for us to assume that Congress adopted that drastic course in the case of friendly or neutral foreign interests whose investments in our economy were in no way infected with enemy ownership or control. Our hesitation is, moreover, increased when we note that § 7(c) makes the remedy under the Act the only one Congress has granted a claimant. It is not easy for us to assume that Congress treated all nonenemy nations, including chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Yet if the question were presented for the first time under the amended Act, we could not confine the statutory definitions of enemy or ally of enemy to the narrow categories indicated by Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller. To do so would be to run counter to the policy of the Act and be disruptive of its purpose. We are dealing with hasty legislation which Congress did not stop to perfect as an integrated whole. Our task is to give all of it -- 1917 to 1941 -- the most harmonious, comprehensive meaning possible. Markham v. Cabell, supra. So, if the definitions contained in § 2 [Footnote 8] are to be harmonized with the policy underlying § 5(b) and § 9(a) of the amended Act, we would have to say that they are merely illustrative, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is suggested, however, that this approach may produce results which are both absurd and uncertain. It is said that the entire property of a corporation would be jeopardized merely because a negligible stock interest, perhaps a single share, was directly or indirectly owned or controlled by an enemy or ally of an enemy. It is also pointed out that securities or interests other than stock might be held by an enemy or ally of an enemy and used effectively in economic warfare against this country. But what these interests are, the extent of holdings necessary to constitute an enemy taint, what part of a friendly alien chanroblesvirtualawlibrary