Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/470/856/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-01-18 04:06:33
Document Index: 272243893

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 1202', '§ 922', '§ 1202', '§ 922', '§ 1202', '§ 922']

Ball v. United States (full text) :: 470 U.S. 856 (1985) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
U.S. Supreme CourtBall v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985)Ball v. United StatesNo. 84-5004Argued January 9, 1985Decided March 26, 1985470 U.S. 856CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
Ball, a previously convicted felon, [Footnote 2] was indicted on charges of receiving a firearm shipped in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(h)(1) and 924(a), and possessing that firearm, 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1). [Footnote 3] It is conceded that both counts rest on the same conduct. Ball was convicted on both Page 470 U. S. 858 counts [Footnote 4] by a jury in the Western District of Virginia and sentenced to consecutive terms of three years' imprisonment on the receipt count and two years' imprisonment on the possession count, the latter sentence suspended with two years' probation.
The application of the firearms statutes, § 922(h)(1) and § 1202(a)(1), charging a convicted felon with receiving and possessing the same gun, has produced conflicting decisions among the Courts of Appeals. [Footnote 5] We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. We reverse. Page 470 U. S. 859
It is clear that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously for violations of §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) involving the same firearm. This Court has long acknowledged the Government's broad discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions, including its power to select the charges to be brought in a particular case. E.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368, 457 U. S. 382 (1982); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 74 U. S. 457-459 (1869). Page 470 U. S. 860
442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 118. This Court rejected the argument that § 1202(a) impliedly repealed § 922(h) with respect to acts covered by both provisions, noting that both the statutory language and the legislative history showed that the two provisions were to be applied independently. See id. at 118-121. [Footnote 7] Under these circumstances, there is no bar to the Government's proceeding with prosecution simultaneously under the two statutes. [Footnote 8] Page 470 U. S. 861
For purposes of applying the Blockburger test in this setting as a means of ascertaining congressional intent, "punishment" must be the equivalent of a criminal conviction, and not simply the imposition of sentence. Congress could not have intended to allow two convictions for the same conduct, even if sentenced under only one; Congress does not create criminal offenses having no sentencing component. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 11 U. S. 34 (1812); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 100 U. S. 275 (1880) (Clifford, J., dissenting). Page 470 U. S. 862 Cf. Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 32(b)(1), which provides that the sentence is a necessary component of a "judgment of conviction."
Section 922(h), the receipt statute, is part of a "carefully constructed package of gun control legislation,' which had been in existence for many years." Batchelder, 442 U.S. at Page 470 U. S. 863 442 U. S. 120 (quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563, 431 U. S. 570 (1977)). [Footnote 11] One principal purpose of Title IV was to make
Section 1202(a), on the other hand, was a "last-minute Senate amendment" to the Omnibus Act, "hastily passed, with little discussion, no hearings, and no report." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 344 (footnote omitted). The circumstances surrounding consideration of Title VII and the haste in which it was enacted may well explain why it does not dovetail neatly with the prohibition that was, at the time of its passage, already contained in Title IV. [Footnote 12] Title VII was enacted as supplementary legislation; Title VII filled the gaps in and expanded the coverage of Title IV. [Footnote 13] In short, Page 470 U. S. 864 we are persuaded that Congress had no intention of creating duplicative punishment for one limited class of persons falling within the overlap between the two Titles -- convicted felons who receive firearms and who, by definition, possess them. The independent but overlapping statutes simply are not "directed to separate evils" under the circumstances. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 343. [Footnote 14]
The second conviction, whose concomitant sentence is served concurrently, does not evaporate simply because of Page 470 U. S. 865 the concurrence of the sentence. The separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored. For example, the presence of two convictions on the record may delay the defendant's eligibility for parole or result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense. Moreover, the second conviction may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility, and certainly carries the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 395 U. S. 790-791 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 392 U. S. 54-56 (1968). Thus, the second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment.
JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of this case. Page 470 U. S. 866
"and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Page 470 U. S. 867 Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both."
"When multiple charges are brought, the defendant is 'put in jeopardy' as to each charge. To retain his freedom, the defendant must obtain an acquittal on all charges; to put the defendant in prison, the prosecution need only obtain a single guilty verdict. The prosecution's ability to bring multiple charges increases the risk that the defendant will be convicted on one or more of those charges. The very fact that a defendant has been arrested, charged, and brought to trial on several charges may suggest to the jury that he must be guilty Page 470 U. S. 868 of at least one of those crimes. Moreover, where the prosecution's evidence is weak, its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty on one or more charges as a result of a compromise verdict. The submission of two charges, rather than one, gives the prosecution"