Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/429/181/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-12-04 18:22:29
Document Index: 771377228

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 202', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 1252', '§ 101', '§ 205']

Mathews v. De Castro (full text) :: 429 U.S. 181 (1976) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Mathews v. De Castro
Mathews v. De Castro 429 U.S. 181 (1976)
U.S. Supreme CourtMathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976)Mathews v. De CastroNo. 75-1197Argued November 8, 1976Decided December 13, 1976429 U.S. 181APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
The statutory classification of § 202(b)(1) of the Social Security Act whereby a married woman under 62 whose husband retires or becomes disabled is granted monthly benefits under the Act if she has a minor or other dependent child in her care, but a divorced woman under 62 whose ex-husband retires or becomes disabled does not receive such benefits, held not to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Such classification, by enabling a married woman already burdened with dependent children to meet the addition need created when her husband reaches old age or becomes disabled, comports with the Act's primary objective of providing workers and their families with basic protection against hardships created by the loss of earnings due to illness or old age; and it was not irrational for Congress, in deciding to defer monthly payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage earners until they reach the age of 62, to recognize the basic fact that divorced couples typically live separate lives. Pp. 429 U. S. 185-189.
Under the Social Security Act a married woman whose husband retires or becomes disabled is granted benefits if she has a minor or other dependent child in her care. A divorced Page 429 U. S. 182 woman whose former husband retires or becomes disabled does not receive such benefits. The issue in the present case is whether this difference in the statutory treatment of married and divorced women is permissible under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Footnote 1]
Section 202(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 623, as added and amended, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (1970 ed. and Supp. V), provides for the payment of "wife's insurance benefits." [Footnote 2] To qualify under this section, a woman must be the Page 429 U. S. 183 wife or "divorce wife" [Footnote 3] of an individual entitled to old-age or disability benefits. Then, assuming that she meets the other statutory requirements, the woman is eligible to receive a monthly payment if she
"has attained age 62 or (in the case of a wife) has in her care (individually or jointly with [her husband]) a child entitled to a child's insurance benefit. . . ."
42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(B) (emphasis supplied). As the italicized phrase indicates, a woman under 62 who has in her care an entitled child [Footnote 4] must currently be married to the wage earner in order to be eligible to receive benefits. A divorced woman receives monthly payments if she is 62 or over and her ex-husband retires or becomes disabled, but if she is under 62, she receives no benefits even if she has a young or disabled child in her care. [Footnote 5] Page 429 U. S. 184
Id. at 28. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 425 U.S. 957. Page 429 U. S. 185
The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established. Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are "not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 301 U. S. 640. In enacting legislation of this kind, a government does not deny equal protection
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 397 U. S. 485.
To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must be judged "is not a toothless one," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 427 U. S. 510. But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 406 U. S. 546. It is with this principle in mind that we consider the specific constitutional issue presented by this litigation.
The old-age and disability insurance aspects of the Social Security system do not purport to be general public assistance laws that simply pay money to those who need it most. That was not the predominant purpose of these benefit provisions when they were enacted or when they were amended. Rather, the primary objective was to provide workers and Page 429 U. S. 186 their families with basic protection against hardships created by the loss of earnings due to illness or old age. [Footnote 6]
The wife's insurance benefit at issue here is consistent with this overriding legislative aim: it enables a married woman already burdened with dependent children to meet the additional need created when her husband reaches old age or becomes disabled. Accordingly, the District Court's observation that many divorced women receive inadequate Page 429 U. S. 187 child support payment, while undoubtedly true, is hardly in point. The same can be said of the District Court's statement that
Indeed, Congress took note of exactly these kinds of factors when it amended the Social Security Act in 1958. Between 1950 and 1958, wives under retirement age with dependent children received benefits only when their husbands became entitled to old-age insurance payments. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 482. Congress then amended the Act to provide the same benefits when the wage earner becomes disabled. [Footnote 7] Social Security Page 429 U. S. 188 Amendments of 1958, § 205(b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021. Both the House and Senate Committee reports accompanying the proposed legislation explained that the purpose of the monthly payments was to give "recognition to the problems confronting families whose breadwinners" stop work. The focus was specifically on "adequate protection for [the husband's] family," and the reports mentioned the high medical expenses often associated with disability and the possibility that the wife might have to forgo work in order to care for her disabled husband. H.R.Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S.Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958). In view of the legislative purpose, it is hardly surprising that the congressional judgment evidently was a different one with respect to divorced women. Divorce, by its nature, works a drastic change in the economic and personal relationship between a husband and wife. Ordinarily it means that they will go their separate ways. Congress could have rationally assumed that divorced husbands and wives depend less on each other for financial and other support than do couples who stay married. The problems that a divorced wife may encounter when her former husband becomes old or disabled may well differ in kind and degree from those that a woman married to a retired or disabled husband must face. For instance, a divorced wife need not forgo work in order to stay at home to care for her disabled husband. She may not feel the pinch of the extra expenses accompanying her former husband's old age or disability. Page 429 U. S. 189 In short, divorced couples typically live separate lives. It was not irrational for Congress to recognize this basic fact in deciding to defer monthly payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage earners until they reach the age of 62.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 422 U. S. 777. We conclude, accordingly, that the statutory classifications involved in this case are not of such an order as to infringe upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
It is well settled that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses equal protection principles. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 422 U. S. 768-770.