Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/41/935/564118/
Timestamp: 2019-07-19 18:24:48
Document Index: 719609469

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 247', '§ 247', '§ 247', '§ 371', '§ 3501', '§ 1028']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Douglas Lee Barlow A/k/a Douglas Lee Barlow, A/k/a Henrygibbons, and William Heber Lebaron, A/k/a Heberlebaron, Etc., Defendants-appellants.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Patricia Lebaron, A/k/a Trish Lebaron, A/k/a Valerie Davis,defendant-appellant, 41 F.3d 935 (5th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1994 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Douglas Lee Barlow A/k/a Douglas Lee Barlow, A/k/a...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Douglas Lee Barlow A/k/a Douglas Lee Barlow, A/k/a Henrygibbons, and William Heber Lebaron, A/k/a Heberlebaron, Etc., Defendants-appellants.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Patricia Lebaron, A/k/a Trish Lebaron, A/k/a Valerie Davis,defendant-appellant, 41 F.3d 935 (5th Cir. 1994)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 41 F.3d 935 (5th Cir. 1994)
In this direct criminal appeal, we are called upon for the first time to interpret the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 247. In particular, we are asked to rule whether, as used in that statute, "the free exercise of religion" comprehends not only the right actively to select and practice the religion of one's choice, but also the right passively to refrain from practicing a particular religion or to disassociate one's self from one's former religion. We hold that the concept of "the free exercise of religion" is sufficiently broad to encompass both choices, active practice and passive disassociation.
Defendants-Appellants (collectively, "Defendants"), all members of a splinter religious sect commonly known as the "Church of the Lamb of God" (hereafter referred to variously as the "Church of the First Born of the Lamb of God," "Lamb of God," or simply "the Church," depending on the context when read), were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 247 (obstruction of persons in the free exercise of religious beliefs), Sec. 1962(c) (Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")), Sec. 371 (witness tampering), and Sec. 924 (using a firearm in commission of violent crime), for conduct associated with the killing of four persons, three of whom were former members of the Church. Leaders of the Church had ordered the execution of the three ex-members for the sole reason that they had chosen to disassociate themselves from the church's teachings and its fellowship. The fourth victim, an eight-year old daughter of one of the adult victims, was killed because she witnessed the slaying of her father. Defendants challenge their convictions, raising a host of issues, including the scope of Sec. 247, insufficiency of the evidence, invalid jury instructions, and inadmissibility of certain evidence. In addition, Defendant-Appellant Patricia LeBaron ("Patricia") asserts that the introduction into evidence of a statement that she made to a law enforcement official while she was incarcerated on other charges violated her constitutional rights. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the convictions and sentences of all Defendants in all respects.
The Defendants argue that they were wrongly convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 247, which makes criminal the obstruction of persons in the free exercise of their religious beliefs. The Defendants contend that Sec. 247 is inapposite to their conduct, because (1) the Church is not a religion, and (2) even if it were, the Defendants did not obstruct the victims' "free exercise of religion" as contemplated by the drafters of that statute.
In interpreting Sec. 247, it is our task to give effect to the intent of the Congress that enacted that statute. "To divine that intent, we traditionally look first to the words of the statute...."18 If the language of Sec. 247 is clear and unambiguous, then our interpretative journey comes to an end, and we apply that plain meaning to the facts before us to determine if the Defendants' conduct was punishable under that section.19 Only if we find the text of Sec. 247 to be opaque or translucent, or even merely ambiguous, must we attempt to divine congressional intent by applying prescribed canons of statutory interpretation (including, without limitation, a resort to the rule of lenity20 and legislative history21 ).
18 U.S.C. § 371, see id. Secs. 2, 1952A (aiding and abetting murder for hire)
United States v. Long, 996 F.2d 731, 732 (5th Cir. 1993)
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 253, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2752, 61 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 840, 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2191, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1988) (" [W]e must look at the language of [the statute] and its structure, to determine the intent of the Congress...."); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1982) ("As in all cases involving statutory construction, 'our starting point must be the language employed by Congress,' and we assume 'that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' " (quotations omitted))
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, ----, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992) ("When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then ... 'judicial inquiry is complete.' "); see American Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 68, 102 S. Ct. at 1537 ("Thus ' [a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' " (quotation omitted))
NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806, 127 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1994) (" [T]he rule of lenity applies only when an ambiguity is present...."); see United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 751 n. 15 (3d Cir. 1994) (" [T]he application of the rule of lenity is not dependent whatsoever on whether there have been successful prosecutions under the statute at issue."); petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Sept. 7, 1994) (No. 94-413)
18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 247(a) (2), (c) (2) (West 1994)
Evans v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1885, 119 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1992) (" 'Where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the "cluster of ideas attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed." ' " (quotations omitted)); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583, 98 S. Ct. 866, 871, 55 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1978) (" ' [W]here words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.' " (quotation omitted))
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53-54, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2488, 86 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1985) (" [T]he court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all." (emphasis added))
For many of the same reasons, we agree with the district court that Patricia's confession also was voluntary as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3501
Patricia was charged in Illinois federal court with possession of false documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) (4), and then released
Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir. 1988) ("a break in custody dissolves a defendant's Edwards claim"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059, 109 S. Ct. 1329, 103 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1989); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Edwards rule does not apply to suspects who are not in continuous custody between the time they request counsel and the time they are reinterviewed"); see, e.g., Fairman, 813 F.2d at 125; United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 S. Ct. 3569, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1410 (1983); cf. McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654, 661 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing with approval Skinner's proposition that there can be no Edwards violation if defendant is not in continuous custody)