Source: http://www.uclpractitioner.com/ucl_preemption/page/2/
Timestamp: 2015-02-27 22:40:01
Document Index: 754250678

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17200', '§ 17204', '§ 17200', '§1331', '§ 1331', '§ 17200', '§ 1531', '§ 185', '§ 128', '§ 301', '§ 2981', '§ 2983', '§ 1461', '§ 560', '§ 301', '§ 2981', '§ 1461', '§200']

The UCL Practitioner: UCL - preemption
Posts categorized "UCL - preemption"
Thanks to the blog reader who emailed me to point out that on October 10, 2007, the Supreme Court issued a supplemental briefing order in In re Tobacco II Cases, no. S147345. The order indicates that the Court is considering whether its decision in the other Tobacco case, which addressed preemption, impacts the Prop. 64 case: The court requests that the parties file supplemental letter briefs addressing the impact of this court's recent opinion in In re Tobacco II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257 on the issues presented in this case, and particularly our conclusion that certain claims advanced under Unfair Competition Law regarding advertising by tobacco companies to minors are preempted by federal law. Supplemental briefing is to proceed as follows: The parties may file simultaneous letter briefs on or before November 16, 2007, 2007. Each party may then file an additional letter brief in response on or before November 29, 2007. No further extensions of time for the filing of these briefs are contemplated by the Court.In a blog post on the Tobacco II (preemption) decision, I explained why I didn't think the Tobacco II (Prop. 64) case was affected: According to the Court of Appeal's opinion, Tobacco II (Prop. 64) involves both CLRA and UCL claims "that the tobacco companies had made false and misleading statements denying or disputing the health hazards and addictiveness of cigarette smoking" in addition to "their targeting of minors." In re Tobacco II Cases, 142 Cal.App.4th 891, 896 (2006) (review granted). In other words, Tobacco II (Prop. 64) is predicated on allegedly misleading advertisements, not on the problem of truthful marketing to minors. According to the Supreme Court in Tobacco II (preemption), the FCLAA does not preempt state-law claims that "[seek] to regulate cigarette advertising on the basis that it contained false assertions of fact—a content-neutral basis—and [that] sought to impose a duty—the duty not to deceive—that was broader and more general than concerns about smoking and health." Slip op. at 14 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 528-29 (1992); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 552).
Also, the representative plaintiffs in Tobacco II (Prop. 64) (Willard R. Brown, Damien Bierly and Michelle Denise Buller-Seymore) are different from those in Tobacco II (preemption) (Devin Daniels, Bryce Clements, Daimon Fullerton, Nicole Morrow, and Maren Sandler), indicating that these are wholly separate cases. In sum, the two cases appear to involve different claims and, indeed, different cases from among the group coordinated under J.C.C.P. no. 4042. Nothing on the face of the two opinions suggests that Tobacco II (preemption) will moot any of the issues pending on review in Tobacco II (Prop. 64). Still, it is certainly prudent for the Supreme Court to ask the parties for supplemental briefing and there may be relevant facts that are not apparent from the publicly-available information. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption, UCL - Supreme Court | Permalink
The Supreme Court's opinion in In re Tobacco Cases II, ___ Cal.4th ___ (Aug. 2, 2007), has very little to say about the UCL, but much to say about preemption. One notable thing is that the Court relied entirely on pre-Prop. 64 precedents in its single-paragraph description of the UCL: The state unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) authorizes civil suits for “unfair competition” (id., § 17204), which it defines to “include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” (id., § 17200). “It governs ‘anti-competitive business practices’ as well as injuries to consumers, and has as a major purpose ‘the preservation of fair business competition.’ ” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) “By defining unfair competition to include any ‘unlawful . . . business act or practice’ [citation], the [unfair competition law] permits violations of other laws to be treated as unfair competition that is independently actionable.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.)Slip op. at 6-7 (alterations in original). The UCL "unlawful" prong claim in this case was predicated on alleged violations of Penal Code section 308, which prohibits sale of tobacco to minors. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court determined that it was bound by Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), which held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("FCLAA") (15 U.S.C. §§1331 et seq.) preempted state regulations enacted based on "concerns about smoking and health." Slip op. at 12-13, 16. In so holding, the Supreme Court overruled its prior contrary conclusion in Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 7 Cal.4th 1057 (1994). The Court explained that the particular UCL claim that these plaintiffs sought to pursue was based on "concerns about smoking and health" and thus preempted under Lorillard: The state unfair competition law is a law of general application, and it is not based on concerns about smoking and health. Therefore, the FCLAA does not preempt that law on its face; nor would the FCLAA preempt a claim under that law that sought to impose only content-neutral restrictions on cigarette advertising—such as a requirement that the advertising not contain false statements of fact—that were unrelated to concerns about smoking and health. To the extent we so concluded in Mangini, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1057, we were correct, and we reaffirm those conclusions.
Plaintiffs’ unfair competition claim here seeks to impose on defendant tobacco companies a duty not to advertise in a way that could encourage minors to smoke. That is precisely the duty that the United States Supreme Court in Lorillard, supra, 533 U.S. 525, held subject to FCLAA preemption because it is necessarily and inherently based on concerns about smoking and health. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ unfair competition claim is preempted .... Slip op. at 15-17. This language led me to wonder if the outcome would have been different if the UCL claim had been predicated on the "unfair" or "fraudulent" prongs, instead of the "unlawful" prong coupled with Penal Code section 308. On reflection, I don't think it would have. Any argument that marketing to minors was "unfair" because it was either (a) unscrupulous or (b) contrary to a legislatively-declared public policy (to briefly summarize the pre- and post-Cel-Tech formulations of "unfair") would have to be "based on concerns about smoking and health." As for the "fraudulent" prong, "plaintiffs have not alleged that [the advertising directed to minors] was misleading." Slip op. at 19. This case, which I will call "Tobacco II (preemption)," does not appear to affect the other Tobacco case now pending before the Supreme Court, which I will call "Tobacco II (Prop. 64)." In re Tobacco II Cases, no. S147345. According to the Court of Appeal's opinion, Tobacco II (Prop. 64) involves both CLRA and UCL claims "that the tobacco companies had made false and misleading statements denying or disputing the health hazards and addictiveness of cigarette smoking" in addition to "their targeting of minors." In re Tobacco II Cases, 142 Cal.App.4th 891, 896 (2006) (review granted). In other words, Tobacco II (Prop. 64) is predicated on allegedly misleading advertisements, not on the problem of truthful marketing to minors. According to the Supreme Court in Tobacco II (preemption), the FCLAA does not preempt state-law claims that "[seek] to regulate cigarette advertising on the basis that it contained false assertions of fact—a content-neutral basis—and [that] sought to impose a duty—the duty not to deceive—that was broader and more general than concerns about smoking and health." Slip op. at 14 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 528-29 (1992); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 552).
Also, the representative plaintiffs in Tobacco II (Prop. 64) (Willard R. Brown, Damien Bierly and Michelle Denise Buller-Seymore) are different from those in Tobacco II (preemption) (Devin Daniels, Bryce Clements, Daimon Fullerton, Nicole Morrow, and Maren Sandler), indicating that these are wholly separate cases. In sum, the two cases appear to involve different claims and, indeed, different cases from among the group coordinated under J.C.C.P. no. 4042. Nothing on the face of the two opinions suggests that Tobacco II (preemption) will moot any of the issues pending on review in Tobacco II (Prop. 64). Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption, UCL - Supreme Court | Permalink
Supreme Court holds UCL claim preempted: In re Tobacco Cases II
I've only very quickly skimmed the opinion, but the bottom line is that the Supreme Court held that the UCL claim is preempted: We summarize: Plaintiffs’ cause of action against defendant tobacco companies is based on two laws: Penal Code section 308 (which does not itself regulate advertising but is based on concerns about smoking and health) and the state unfair competition law (which does regulate advertising but is not itself based on concerns about smoking and health). By combining these two laws in a single claim, plaintiffs seek to regulate cigarette advertising on the ground that it targets minors and encourages them to begin smoking. As the United States Supreme Court made clear in Lorillard, supra, 533 U.S. 525, the FCLAA preempts any state law or cause of action that seeks to regulate cigarette advertising on that basis. To the extent it concluded otherwise, our opinion in Mangini, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1057, has been superseded by the high court’s later decision in Lorillard, and Mangini is therefore overruled. In re Tobacco Cases II, ___ Cal.4th ___ (Aug. 2, 2007) (slip op. at 20). I do not know what impact, if any, this ruling will have on the other Tobacco II case pending in the Supreme Court. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 10:58 AM in UCL - preemption, UCL - Supreme Court | Permalink
BREAKING NEWS: Supreme Court to decide UCL preemption case tomorrow
Today, the Supreme Court announced that its opinion in In re Tobacco Cases II (no. S129522) will be posted online tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. This is the UCL preemption case, not the Prop. 64 case: IN RE TOBACCO CASES II
S129522 (D041356 – San Diego County Superior Court – 719446/JCCP No. 4042)
Argued in Los Angeles 6-06-07
This case presents the following issue: Does the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.) preempt claims under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) for advertising that allegedly targeted minors?When the opinion is posted, it will be available at this link. The Court of Appeal's opinion is In re Tobacco Cases II, 123 Cal.App.4th 617 (2004), and my prior posts on the case are here, here, and here. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 12:30 PM in UCL - preemption, UCL - Supreme Court | Permalink
New Supreme Court UCL preemption decision: Viva! v. Adidas
In Viva! International Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., ___ Cal.4th ___ (Jul. 23, 2007), the Supreme Court held that the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.) did not preempt a UCL "unlawful" prong claim predicated on violation of a Penal Code section that prohibits importation or sale of products made from kangaroo hide. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeal "to address Adidas’s remaining claims." Slip op. at 29. One of Adidas's "remaining claims" on appeal is the argument that Viva! lost standing to pursue this case after Prop. 64. However, as in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, the association still has standing to pursue its appeal because it remains an "aggrieved party." It may have to substitute plaintiffs at the trial court level. In the legal press, the Daily Journal reports that "Court OKs Kangaroo-Product Ban" (subscription). In the mainstream press, the San Francisco Chronicle reports that "State Supreme Court nixes sales of shoes made with kangaroo hide" and the Los Angeles Times reports that "Adidas' use of kangaroo hide is illegal, state justices say." Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption | Permalink
UCL preemption decision to be handed down Monday: Viva! v. Adidas
Today, the Supreme Court announced that on Monday at 10:00 a.m., it will hand down its decision in Viva! v. Adidas, a UCL preemption case previously discussed on the blog here, here, and here. When the opinion comes down, it should be available at this link. VIVA! INTERNATIONAL VOICE FOR ANIMALS, ET AL. v. ADIDAS PROMOTIONAL RETAIL OPERATIONS, ET AL.
S140064 (A106960 – City and County of San Francisco – 420214)
Argued in San Francisco 5-29-07
This case presents the following issue: Does the doctrine of conflict preemption preclude California from prohibiting importation and trade of wildlife that have been delisted under the federal Endangered Species Act and thus are not currently regulated by federal law?
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:30 PM in UCL - preemption, UCL - Supreme Court | Permalink
In People ex rel. Brown v. Powerex Corp., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Jun. 11, 2007; pub ord. Jul. 11, 2007), the Court of Appeal (Third Appellate District) held that the filed rate doctrine barred the Attorney General's UCL claim in its entirety. The Court specifically rejected the AG's argument that the UCL claim did not "rely on any filed tariff term, directly affect a filed rate or tarriff provision, nor collaterally attack the reasonableness of any filed rate": The complaint sought restitution, disgorgement of profits, civil penalties and damages as a result of Powerex’s trading activities, alleging the gaming of the market resulted in unfair payments to Powerex which harmed California electricity consumers and de-stabilized the power delivery system. Any monetary relief would be in excess of the tariffs eventually applied by FERC and therefore are barred by the filed rate doctrine. (Snohomish, supra, 384 F.3d at pp. 760-762; Dynegy, supra, 375 F.3d at p. 853; Grays Harbor, supra, 379 F.3d at pp. 651-652; TANC, supra, 295 F.3d at pp. 929-932; Enron, supra, 327 B.R. at pp. 535-537 [barring California Attorney General’s claims under UCL and CCL based on gaming the market].) Further, civil penalties are regulatory and “to impose a civil penalty upon an incident or event, without regard to whether injury was suffered, is to regulate the activity that gave rise to the incident or event.” (People v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1257-1258.) Regulating gaming schemes by imposing penalties would grant relief in excess of the tariffs and conflict with FERC’s exclusive regulatory power over the wholesale energy market. (See Duke Energy Trading and Marketing, L.L.C. v. Davis (9th Cir. 2001) 267 F.3d 1042, 1056-1057 [state “commandeering orders directly nullify the security and default mitigation provisions of the FERC-approved CTS rate schedule, and hence cross the ‘bright line’ between state and federal jurisdiction established by the FPA”].) The claim of entitlement to injunctive relief, too, is barred by the filed rate doctrine. (Snohomish, supra, 384 F.3d at pp. 760-762; Dynegy, supra, 375 F.3d at pp. 836-839, 852-853; see Norwood, supra, 202 F.3d. at pp. 419-420.) Further, we rejected an injunctive claim arising from the energy crisis, for lack of any “threat that the misconduct to be enjoined is likely to be repeated in the future.” (Madrid v. Perot Systems Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 440, 465.) The Attorney General’s complaint and briefing predicates liability on conduct during the energy crisis. Gaming could not be successfully attempted now, when the ISO, FERC and the Attorney General are all watching the power companies like hawks. Because the complaint fails to state any good claim for relief the trial court properly sustained the demurrer.Slip op. at 21-23.
One of the people who responded to The UCL Practitioner Reader Survey said they would like to see more reports about government use of the UCL. Truth be told, very few published opinions involve public prosecutor actions, which is the primary reason why I don't report much on them. It's difficult to gather information about trial-level cases. Most of the time I know nothing about them until a published opinion comes down from an appellate court. By the way, thanks to everyone who has participated in the reader survey so far. The survey is still open and you can click here to participate. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption, UCL - public prosecutor actions | Permalink
New Ninth Circuit UCL preemption decision: Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp.
In Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1760747 (9th Cir. Jun 20, 2007), the Ninth Circuit held that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)) did not preempt the plaintiffs' UCL and other claims. Accordingly, it reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment in the defendants' favor, and ordered the case remanded to San Diego County Superior Court (from which it had been removed). Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption | Permalink
New UCL preemption decision: Wholesale Electricity Antitrust Cases I & II
In Wholesale Electricity Antitrust Cases I & II, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Feb. 26, 2007), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One), held that the Federal Power Act and implementing regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission preempted the plaintiffs' UCL and Cartwright Act claims. From a UCL standpoint, this is the most interesting paragraph in the opinion: In the UCL context, in Spielholz[v. Superior Court], 86 Cal.App.4th 1366 [2001], those plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with false advertising allegations that a telecommunications carrier had falsely advertised a "seamless calling area" existed, where in reality, there were gaps where wireless telephone users were unable to connect calls. The Court of Appeal found no federal preemption of such claims, because the main allegations dealt with false advertising, such that any effect on rates was merely incidental. Here, however, as stated by the trial court, "This can be contrasted to the instant case, involving the FPA, where Plaintiffs' allegations concern conduct directly related to rates charged and ultimately paid." We agree with the trial court's analyses of the California case law claims, because plaintiffs have been unable to show why the alleged anticompetitive conduct by defendants inflicted any different kind of injury on them, that is separate from the rates charged and ultimately paid. This is not a case in which incidental damages are claimed to arise from conduct that is not covered by the federal legislation, such as false advertising. Slip op. at 26-27.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption | Permalink
This week at the Supreme Court: review denied in three cases, while a fourth is transferred
On Wednesday, January 3, 2007, the Supreme Court denied review in three cases involving plaintiff-favorable, published Court of Appeal opinions: Aron v. U-Haul Co., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Oct. 3, 2006) (review denied 01/03/07, no. S148020). As explained in my original post, the Aron court reversed an order granting judgment on the pleadings of the plaintiff's UCL and CLRA claims.
Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Sept. 28, 2006) (review and depublication denied 01/03/07, no. S147931). There, the Court of Appeal held that federal law did not preempt the plaintiff's UCL, CLRA or other state-law claims. (Here is my original post on Hood.)
Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1442 (Sept. 18, 2006) (review denied 01/03/07, no. S147997). Cohen held that a no-class-action arbitration provision was unconscionable under Discover Bank. (Click here for my original post on Cohen.) This order is consistent with the Supreme Court's other recent activity in no-class-action arbitration clause cases. It has been granting review in cases upholding such clauses, and denying review in cases striking them down. In a fourth, defendant-favorable preemption case, WFS Financial, Inc. v. Superior Court (De La Cruz), 140 Cal.App.4th 637 (June 15, 2006), in which review was granted in September, the Supreme Court issued the following order, according to the docket: In light of the parties' settlement, their stipulated request that the court vacate the Court of Appeal's judgment is granted. (Code Civ. Proc. § 128, subd. (a)(8).) The court finds there is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by vacating the judgment. (Ibid.) The court further finds that the reasons of the parties for requesting the vacating of the judgment outweigh any countervailing considerations. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal is directed to dismiss the writ proceeding so that the superior court may consider the class settlement.Accordingly, the Supreme Court will no longer be deciding the UCL preemption issue raised in this case, and the Court of Appeal's opinion remains uncitable. (See my prior posts on the opinion here and here.) Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Class actions - arbitration, The CLRA, UCL - preemption | Permalink
On December 13, 2006, the California Supreme Court granted review in Farm Raised Salmon Cases, no. S147171. The case raises the following issue: Does the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) impliedly preempt plaintiffs’ state law claims against defendants for deceptive marketing of food products by failing to disclose that farmed salmon sold in their stores contains artificial coloring?My original post on the Court of Appeal's opinion, Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 142 Cal.App.4th 805 (2006), is here. As the post points out, the underlying state-law claims included UCL and CLRA claims. Query: The Court of Appeal's opinion in In re Tobacco II Cases includes the "In re" prefix, but the Court of Appeal's opinion in Farm Raised Salmon Cases does not. Why?
New UCL/CLRA preemption decision: Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust
Last week, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Six) handed down another preemption decision. Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Sept. 28, 2006) holds that the National Bank Act and implementing OCC regulations did not preempt the plaintiffs' UCL, CLRA and other state-law claims. One justice filed a dissenting opinion. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption | Permalink
Supreme Court grants review in UCL preemption case: WFS Financial v. Superior Court (De La Cruz)
Last week, the Supreme Court granted review in a UCL preemption case, WFS Financial, Inc. v. Superior Court (De La Cruz), no. S145304. According to the main case screen, the case raises the following issue: Are the provisions of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act (Civ. Code, § 2981 et seq.) that require a creditor to include certain disclosures in a notice of intent to dispose of a vehicle after it has been repossessed and that condition the creditor's right to seek a deficiency judgment on compliance with these requirements (Civ. Code, § 2983.2), preempted by the federal Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) when the creditor is a federally chartered savings institution?As explained in my original post on this case, the Court of Appeal held that because HOLA preempted the Rees-Levering Act as applied to federal savings and loan associations, the defendant's alleged Rees-Levering violation could not support a UCL "unlawful" prong claim. WFS Financial, Inc. v. Superior Court (De La Cruz), ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 561 (June 15, 2006) (Third Appellate District). De La Cruz is to be contrasted with the McKell case, decided last week (and discussed in this post), in which the Court of Appeal held that HOLA did not preempt the plaintiff's UCL "unlawful" prong claim. In McKell, the "unlawful" prong claim was predicated on an alleged violation of a federal law (RESPA), whereas in De La Cruz, the "unlawful" prong claim was predicated on an alleged violation of a state law (the Rees-Levering Act): Insofar as plaintiffs are using the UCL to enforce federal law as set forth in RESPA, they are not seeking to enforce “state laws affecting the operations of federal savings associations.” ([12 C.F.R.] § 560.2(a) [HOLA's preemption provision].) The UCL does not “purport[] to regulate or otherwise affect [a savings association’s] credit activities” (ibid.) but only provides a means of enforcing federal requirements. It thus is the type of state law not preempted by federal law. McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Sept. 18, 2006) (slip op. at 29). Many thanks to the reader who emailed to advise of this development.
New UCL/CLRA preemption decision: In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases
In In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Aug. 31, 2006), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Three) held that the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.) preempted the plaintiffs' UCL and CLRA claims.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in The CLRA, UCL - preemption | Permalink
New UCL preemption decision: WFS Financial, Inc. v. Superior Court
In WFS Financial, Inc. v. Superior Court (De La Cruz), ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (June 15, 2006), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant (an operating subsidiary of a federal savings association) violated the disclosure requirements of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act (Civ. Code §§ 2981 et seq.) and thus the UCL's "unlawful" prong. The Court of Appeal (Third Appellate District) held that the Home Owners’ Loan Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 1461 et seq.) preempted both claims: "De La Cruz cannot use the UCL to enforce a statutory violation where the underlying statute is preempted by federal law." Slip op. at 26. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption | Permalink
New UCL preemption decision: Harris v. Investor's Business Daily
In Harris v. Investor's Business Daily, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Mar. 29, 2006), the UCL claim was predicated on an alleged violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§200 et seq.). The Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) held that the FLSA's "opt-in" requirement did not preempt the "opt-out" requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382, which would govern a UCL class action. Harris is virtually identical to Bahramipour v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 2006 WL 499132 (N.D. Cal. 2006), in which Judge Claudia Wilken reached the same conclusion. My original post on Bahramipour is here.
Supreme Court grants review of UCL preemption decision: Viva v. Adidas
Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted review in Viva International v. Adidas Promotional Retailer (no. S140064). In Viva, the Court of Appeal held that a UCL "unlawful" prong claim was preempted by federal law. The defendant also raised Prop. 64 retroactivity, but the Court of Appeal did not reach that issue in light of its preemption ruling. The Court of Appeal's opinion is here, and my original post on the opinion is here.
UCL preemption decision ordered published: Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank
On January 26, 2006, the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) issued a publication order in Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Dec. 29, 2005). My original post on the Smith decision is here. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 09:46 AM in UCL - preemption | Permalink
New unpublished UCL preemption decision: Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank
Last week, the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) handed the plaintiff a complete and total victory in Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, case no. D045487. The decision has a lengthy discussion of federal preemption in UCL actions against financial institutions, including an interpretation of a new OCC preemption regulation. The Court held that neither the UCL claim nor the CLRA claim was preempted and reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the bank. The opinion also applies summary judgment law in a very plaintiff-favorable way. I'm really not sure why this opinion wasn't published, because it appears to satisfy the requirements of Rule of Court 976. UPDATE: On January 26, 2006, the opinion was ordered published. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption | Permalink
New UCL preemption decision: Viva! v. Adidas
On Monday, the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division One) held that federal law preempted a UCL "unlawful" prong claim predicated on an alleged violation of Penal Code section 653o, which "bans the import of products made from certain animals, including kangaroos, into California." Viva! International Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Nov. 21, 2005) (slip op. at 1). This is the case that was argued on the same day that I argued the Prop. 64 retroactivity issue before the same Division in the Insurance Broker cases. The Prop. 64 retroactivity issue was also argued in the Viva! case, but the Court determined that "[i]n light of this conclusion, we need not reach ... other issues raised by defendants, including the applicability of Proposition 64, pending before the Supreme Court in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 386, review granted April 27, 2005, S131798 and Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 828, review granted April 27, 2005, S132433." (Slip op. at 17-18 n.14.) I had no idea that Adidas made its shoes out of kangaroo leather. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Prop. 64 - appellate decisions, UCL - preemption | Permalink
New UCL preemption decision: Steinberg v. International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
In Steinberg v. International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Oct. 20, 2005), the Court of Appeal held that "the foreign policy of the United States" preempts claims for Holocaust-era insurance claims brought under the UCL and Civil Code section 354.5. Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in UCL - preemption | Permalink