Source: http://wakeforestlawreview.com/tag/resentencing/
Timestamp: 2018-11-14 16:11:29
Document Index: 146612026

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§2244', '§2244', '§2254', '§ 2244', '§ 2254', '§ 2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§ 2244', '§2244', '§2254', '§2254', '§2244']

resentencing Archives - Wake Forest Law Review
Fourth Circuit Joins Other Circuit Decisions Regarding “Second-in-Time” Habeas Petitions
Categories: 4th Cir. Blog Archive
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Joins Other Circuit Decisions Regarding “Second-in-Time” Habeas Petitions
Today, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion, In re William Robert Gray, Jr., deciding on a motion for authorization to file a second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus. The movant (“Gray”) had sought the Court’s approval to file a second petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as would be necessary under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b), but the Fourth Circuit held this action was unnecessary based on finding that Gray’s petition was in fact a “first challenge” to a new or intervening judgment. By way of this ruling, the Fourth Circuit joined the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts in their treatment of habeas petitions filed after a new, intervening judgment as not second or successive within the meaning of §2244(b).
Factual Background & Procedural History of Gray’s Claims
In 1993, Gray was convicted in North Carolina of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Gray then filed a 28 U.S.C. §2254 petition—an application for a writ of habeas corpus for a person in custody based on the judgement of a State court—in federal district court, which was dismissed. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, finding that Gray’s counsel had been ineffective at his sentencing and ordering the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus, unless the State were to afford Gary a new sentencing hearing within a reasonable period of time. When resentencing still had not occurred after five years, Gray filed his own pro se motions challenging both this delay and his underlying conviction, which were all denied by the district court and affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. Then, the State decided it would not seek the death penalty and finally resentenced Gray to life in prison. Gray then filed this motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) for approval to file a second or successive § 2254 petition regarding his underlying criminal conviction.
Gray’s Contentions & Issue Presented to the Fourth Circuit
Ultimately, Gray contended that the Fourth Circuit’s approval under § 2244(b) was not necessary because his resentencing acted as a new, intervening judgment, and therefore his petition was not “second or successive.” The issue for the Court’s consideration was whether, following a successful habeas petition regarding sentencing, Gray could then challenge his underlying conviction without triggering the “second or successive” requirements, and therefore not requiring court of appeals approval.
“Second and Successive Petitions” for Habeas Relief
Per 28 U.S.C. §2244 and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a petitioner incarcerated based on a State judgment cannot bring “second or successive” motions for habeas relief, and such claims shall be dismissed unless authorized by the appropriate court of appeals. §2244(b)(1), (3). However, authorization to file may be found unnecessary if the court of appeals determines that the petition in question is not in fact second or successive. Thus, a court must first determine whether a petition is second or successive, and only then if it is found to be second or successive should the court review the claim for satisfaction of the §2244(b) requirements. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 334-35 (2010). The Supreme Court in Magwood also emphasized that this second or successive distinction must be made with respect to the particular judgment being challenged, and resentencing a defendant is an “intervening judgment” such that a subsequent petition regarding this new sentencing would not be second or successive. Id. at 339, 342. However, the Court in Magwood only decided the issue in regards to another petition following a new sentencing judgment, and did not have occasion to determine whether this result also applied when the subsequent petition went to the defendant’s underlying conviction and adjudication of guilt, rather than sentencing. Id. at 342. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all had occasion to decide this precise issue, and all but one (the Seventh Circuit) determined that where a defendant received a new judgment as a result of a habeas petition relating to resentencing, a subsequent petition relating to their underlying conviction would not be considered “second-in-time” such that §2244(b) applied and required authorization. The issue presented in Gray’s claim had yet to be addressed by the Fourth Circuit.
Petition Not Considered “Second or Successive” Where Defendant Received Intervening Judgment on Sentencing But Now Seeks to Challenge Conviction
The Fourth Circuit sided with the majority of the other circuits mentioned, and found that a movant in Gray’s situation—filing a habeas petition relating to underlying conviction after a successful habeas petition relating to sentencing—would not be submitting a second-in-time petition such that § 2244(b) would apply. The Court believed that, in the Magwood ruling, the Supreme Court made clear that an intervening judgment wholly resets the “habeas counter” at zero. Additionally, the Court also found this conclusion fitting in light of other Fourth Circuit precedent. See In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding §2244(b)’s “second and successive” requirements did apply where prisoner’s first §2254 petition was dismissed, there was no intervening judgment, and the subsequent petition was challenging the same judgment yet merely setting forth an argument that had not been included in his original.) Moreover, the Court found this interpretation of Magwood to be consistent with the AEDPA’s goal of limiting the ability to make these successive petitions to these narrowly-defined circumstances, and further emphasized that this ruling in no way inhibits the other procedural safeguards that effectively bar excessive and redundant claims.
Fourth Circuit Orders District Court to Hear Petition as First Challenge, Not Second-in-Time
Because Gray’s §2254 petition was not second or successive, the Fourth Circuit found that review under §2244(b) was unnecessary, and thus directed the district court to hear the petition as a first challenge to this new judgment.
Tags: AEDPA Antiterrorism and effective Death Penalty Act Criminal Law habeas corpus resentencing Sentencing successive petitions
« Fourth Circuit Affirms Conviction for Mine Health and Safety Violations
Fourth Circuit Affirms Juror’s Ambiguous Statement Insufficient to Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel »