Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98552/collins-vs-hardyman
Timestamp: 2019-02-22 11:04:11
Document Index: 537159986

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 1980']

Collins Vs Hardyman - Citation 98552 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Collins Vs. Hardyman - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98552
Case Number 341 U.S. 651
collins v. hardyman - 341 u.s. 651 (1951) u.s. supreme court collins v. hardyman, 341 u.s. 651 (1951) collins v. hardyman no. 217 argued january 8-9, 1951 decided june 4, 1951 341 u.s. 651 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus a complaint in an action to recover damages under 8 u.s.c. § 47(3) alleged that the plaintiffs were members of a political club which planned a meeting to adopt a resolution opposing the marshall plan; that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their rights as citizens of the united states peaceably to assemble and to equal privileges and immunities under the laws of the united states; that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, defendants.....
U.S. Supreme Court Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951)
Held: The complaint did not state a cause of action under 8 U.S.C. § 47(3). Pp. 341 U. S. 652 -663.
(a) Assuming, without deciding, that the facts alleged show that defendants deprived plaintiffs "of having and exercising" a federal right, the facts alleged did not show that the conspiracy was "for the purpose of depriving [them] of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," and therefore, in this case, a cause of action under 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) was not stated. Pp. 341 U. S. 660 -663.
(b) Section 47(3) does not attempt to reach a conspiracy to deprive one of rights unless it is a deprivation of equality, of "equal protection of the law," or of "equal privileges and immunities under the law." Pp. 341 U. S. 660 -661.
(c) The fact that the defendants broke up plaintiffs' meeting but did not interfere with the meetings of those who shared defendants' views is not inequality before the law unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so. P. 341 U. S. 661 .
(d) Although plaintiffs' rights were invaded, disregarded, and lawlessly violated, neither their rights nor their equality of rights under the law have been, or were intended to be, denied or impaired. Pp. 341 U. S. 661 -662.
183 F.2d 308, reversed.
In an action brought by respondents against petitioners to recover damages under 8 U.S.C. § 47(3), the District Court dismissed the complaint. 80 F.Supp. 501. The Court of Appeals reversed. 183 F.2d 308. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 809. Reversed, p. 341 U. S. 663 .
This controversy arises under 8 U.S.C. § 47(3), which provides civil remedies for certain conspiracies. [ Footnote 1 ] A motion to dismiss the amended complaint raises the issue of its sufficiency and, of course, requires us to accept its well pleaded facts as the hypothesis for decision.
The conspiracy charged as being within the Act is that defendants, with knowledge of the meeting and its purposes,
The complaint then separately sets out the overt acts of injury and damage relied upon to meet the requirements of the Act. To carry out the conspiracy, it is alleged, defendants proceeded to the meeting place and, by force and threats of force, did assault and intimidate plaintiffs and those present at the meeting, and thereby broke up the meeting, thus interfering with the right of the plaintiffs to petition the Government for
The complaint makes no claim that the conspiracy or the overt acts involved any action by state officials, or that defendants even pretended to act under color of state law. It is not shown that defendants had or claimed any protection or immunity from the law of the State, or that they in fact enjoyed such because of any act or omission by state authorities. Indeed, the trial court found that the acts alleged are punishable under the laws of California relating to disturbance of the peace, assault, and trespass, and are also civilly actionable. [ Footnote 2 ]
The District Judge held that the statute does not and cannot constitutionally afford redress for invasions of civil rights at the hands of individuals, but can only be applied to injuries to civil rights by persons acting pursuant to or under color of state law. [ Footnote 3 ] In reversing the District Court's dismissal of the complaint, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held otherwise, one judge dissenting. [ Footnote 4 ] The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Love v. Chandler, 124 F.2d 785, has ruled in accord with the District Judge and the dissenting Court of Appeals Judge here. [ Footnote 5 ] To resolve the conflict, we granted certiorari. [ Footnote 6 ]
"An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes. [ Footnote 7 ]"
The Act was among the last of the reconstruction legislation to be based on the "conquered province" theory which prevailed in Congress for a period following the Civil War. This statute, without separability provisions, established the civil liability with which we are here concerned, as well as other civil liabilities, together with parallel criminal liabilities. It also provided that unlawful combinations and conspiracies named in the Act might be deemed rebellions, and authorized the President to employ the militia to suppress them. The President was also authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It prohibited any person from being a federal grand or
The Act, popularly known as the Ku Klux Act, was passed by a partisan vote in a highly inflamed atmosphere. It was preceded by spirited debate which pointed out its grave character and susceptibility to abuse, and its defects were soon realized when its execution brought about a severe reaction. [ Footnote 8 ]
The provision establishing criminal conspiracies in language indistinguishable from that used to describe civil conspiracies came to judgment in United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 . [ Footnote 9 ] It was held unconstitutional. This decision was in harmony with that of other important decisions during that period [ Footnote 10 ] by a Court every member of
While we have not been in agreement as to the interpretation and application of some of the post-Civil War legislation, [ Footnote 11 ] the Court recently unanimously declared, through THE CHIEF JUSTICE:
"Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. [ Footnote 12 ]"
"'The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, but this provision does not, any more than the one which precedes it . . . add anything to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another.' 92 U.S. at pp. 92 U. S. 554 -555."
He summed up: "The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals. . . ." [ Footnote 13 ]
It is apparent that, if this complaint meets the requirements of this Act, it raises constitutional problems of the first magnitude that, in the light of history, are not without difficulty. These would include issues as to congressional power under and apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from national, as distinguished from state, citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act in its application to those two classes of rights. The latter question was long ago decided adversely to the plaintiffs. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678 . Before we embark upon such a constitutional inquiry, it is necessary to satisfy ourselves that the attempt to allege a cause of action within the purview of the statute has been successful.
The section under which this action is brought falls into two divisions. The forepart defines conspiracies that may become the basis of liability, and the latter portion defines overt acts necessary to consummate the conspiracy as an actionable wrong. While a mere unlawful agreement or conspiracy may be made a federal crime, as it was at common law, [ Footnote 14 ] this statute does not make the mere agreement or understanding for concerted action which constitutes the forbidden conspiracy an actionable wrong unless it matures into some action that inflicts injury. That, we think, is the significance of the second division of the section.
In the light of the dictum in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , 92 U. S. 552 , we assume, without deciding, that the facts pleaded show that defendants did deprive plaintiffs "of having and exercising" a federal right which, provided the defendants were engaged in a "conspiracy set forth in this section," would bring the case within the Act.
The "conspiracy" required is differently stated from the required overt act, and we think the difference is not accidental, but significant. Its essentials, with emphasis supplied, are that two or more persons must conspire (1) for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the law; or (2) for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities from giving or securing to all persons the equal protection of the laws; or (3) to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner toward election of an elector for President or a member of Congress; or (4) to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy. There is no claim that any allegation brings this case within the provisions that we have numbered (2), (3), and (4), so we may eliminate any consideration of those categories. The complaint is within the statute only if it alleges a conspiracy of the first described class. It is apparent that this part of the Act defines conspiracies of a very limited character. They must, we repeat, be "for the purpose of depriving . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. " (Italics supplied.)
What we have here is not a conspiracy to affect in any way these plaintiffs' equality of protection by the law, or their equality of privileges and immunities under the law. There is not the slightest allegation that defendants were conscious of or trying to influence the law, or were endeavoring to obstruct or interfere with it. The only inequality suggested is that the defendants broke up plaintiffs' meeting and did not break up meetings of others with whose sentiments they agreed. To be sure, this is not equal injury, but it is no more a deprivation of "equal protection" or of "equal privileges and immunities" than it would be for one to assault one neighbor without assaulting them all, or to libel some persons without mention of others. Such private discrimination is not inequality before the law unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so. Plaintiffs' rights were certainly invaded, disregarded, and lawlessly violated, but neither their rights nor their equality of rights under the law have been, or were intended to be, denied or impaired. Their rights under the laws and to protection of the laws remain untouched, and equal to the rights of every other Californian, and may be vindicated in the same way and with the same effect as
We do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be of such magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under laws. Indeed, the post Civil War Ku Klux Klan, against which this Act was fashioned, may have, or may reasonably have been thought to have, done so. It is estimated to have had a membership of around 550,000, and thus to have included "nearly the entire adult male white population of the South." [ Footnote 15 ] It may well be that a conspiracy, so far-flung and embracing such numbers, with a purpose to dominate and set at naught the "carpetbag" and "scalawag" governments of the day, was able effectively to deprive Negroes of their legal rights and to close all avenues of redress or vindication, in view of the then disparity of position, education and opportunity between them and those who made up the Ku Klux Klan. We do not know. But here nothing of that sort appears. We have a case of a lawless political brawl, precipitated by a handful of while citizens against other white citizens. California courts are open to plaintiffs, and its laws offer redress for their injury and vindication for their rights.
We say nothing of the power of Congress to authorize such civil actions as respondents have commenced or otherwise to redress such grievances as they assert. We think that Congress has not, in the narrow class of conspiracies defined by this statute, included the conspiracy charged here. We therefore reach no constitutional questions. The facts alleged fall short of a conspiracy to alter, impair, or deny equality of rights under the law, though they do show a lawless invasion of rights for which
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 ; In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 .
Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 .
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 , 334 U. S. 13 .
United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 70 , 341 U. S. 92 .
Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 , 229 U. S. 378 ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 , 310 U. S. 252 .
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , 92 U. S. 552 , and see In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U. S. 532 , 158 U. S. 535 . The source of the right in this case is not the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint alleges that petitioners "knowingly" did not interfere with the "many public meetings" whose objectives they agreed with, but that they did conspire to break up respondents' meeting because petitioners were opposed to respondents' views, which were expected to be there expressed. Such conduct does not differ materially from the specific conspiracies which the Court recognizes that the statute was intended to reach.
The language of the statute refutes the suggestion that action under color of state law is a necessary ingredient of the cause of action which it recognizes. R.S. § 1980(3) speaks of "two or more persons in any State or Territory" conspiring. That clause is not limited to state