Source: https://m.openjurist.org/87/f3d/872/starzenski-v-city-of-elkhart-l
Timestamp: 2018-01-19 03:50:39
Document Index: 348104674

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1738', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', 'art, 738']

87 F3d 872 Starzenski v. City of Elkhart L | OpenJurist
87 F. 3d 872 - Starzenski v. City of Elkhart L
87 F3d 872 Starzenski v. City of Elkhart L
87 F.3d 872
Sophie STARZENSKI, Kazmer Starzenski, and Gennie Starzenski,
CITY OF ELKHART, Elkhart Health and Sanitation Department,
Leroy Robinson, Director of Health and Sanitation
Department, Ray Minegar, Health Enforcement Officer, Fran
Curry, Health Enforcement Officer, Richard L. Moore, Street
Commissioner, and Larry Kasa, Elkhart City Police Officer,
No. 95-1766.
Argued Nov. 7, 1995.
A. Claim Preclusion on Count I
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides that "[state] judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit [in United States courts] as they have by law or usage in the courts of [the] State ... from which they are taken." Thus, under section 1738, we turn to Indiana law to determine the preclusive effect of its own judgments. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380-81, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1331-32, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985); Lolling v. Patterson, 966 F.2d 230, 235 (7th Cir.1992).
Because the preclusive effect of a state judgment in a collateral federal case is governed by state law, Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380-81, 105 S.Ct. at 1331-32; Lolling, 966 F.2d at 235, we must look to Indiana law to determine whether we should give preclusive effect to a case that has reached final judgment in a trial court and which is currently being appealed. See Rogers v. Desiderio, 58 F.3d 299, 301-02 (7th Cir.1995) (applying the principle that state law controls the preclusive effect of a judgment to a situation where a judgment was on appeal within the state system, but granting a stay because Illinois law was not clear on this point).
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that federal court abstention is appropriate pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, "when the proper exceptional circumstances exist, a federal court can abstain from exercising jurisdiction and defer to the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court when there is a parallel state court action pending." Rosser v. Chrysler Corp., 864 F.2d 1299, 1306 (7th Cir.1988). Abstention is based upon considerations of "[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation as well as avoiding duplicative litigation." Id. (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. at 1246). District court decisions to abstain are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lumen Constr. Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co., 780 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir.1985).
In deciding whether the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper, we undertake review de novo, inquiring as to whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the movants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Santella v. City of Chicago, 936 F.2d 328, 331 (7th Cir.1991); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In making this determination, we look to the substantive law governing the claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
"An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in [the] alleged constitutional deprivation." Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983). Similarly, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir.1986). Therefore, even if Hill acted unconstitutionally, that alone could not be grounds to hold any of the other defendants liable. In order to prevail against the City of Elkhart, the Department of Health and Sanitation, or any of the individual defendants, the plaintiff must show that these defendants were directly at fault.
In order for the City of Elkhart or the Health and Sanitation Department to be held liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate "a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom" and the claimed constitutional deprivation. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1202-03, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Cornfield v. Consolidated H.S. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir.1993). As the plaintiff correctly points out, a municipality can be held liable for a custom even though the body's "official decisionmaking channels" have not formally approved the custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. With regard to the individual defendants, they can only be held liable if their actions caused the claimed constitutional violation. Wolf-Lillie, 699 F.2d at 869.
Liability under § 1983 must be "predicated upon personal responsibility." Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231, 238 (7th Cir.1984). In order to hold a supervisory official, such as Kasa, liable for the actions of his subordinate, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he "knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the alleged deprivation...." Rascon, 803 F.2d at 274. Here, the alleged deprivation is arrest without probable cause, and therefore the narrow issue we must decide is whether the plaintiff put forward evidence sufficient to establish that Kasa caused the plaintiff to be arrested without probable cause to survive summary judgment.
Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1478 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir.1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512).
In support of her claim, Starzenski relies upon Officer Hill's arrest report, which merely states that "[Captain] Kasa ... advised me that if she returned to arrest her for disorderly conduct." However, the arrest report is neither the most detailed document in the police files nor is it all the evidence the police had at their disposal when they decided to arrest her for disorderly conduct. See United States v. Randall, 947 F.2d 1314, 1319 (7th Cir.1991) (observing that the "police who actually make the arrest need not personally know all the facts that constitute probable cause ... the arrest is proper so long as the knowledge of the officer directing the arrest, or the collective knowledge of the agency he works for, is sufficient to constitute probable cause.") (quoting United States v. Valencia, 913 F.2d 378, 382-83 (7th Cir.1990)). Rather Hill's arrest report is nothing but a two paragraph summary of many events that clearly does not spell out every detail of what transpired on February 8, 1993. Kasa might have said and meant, if she returns arrest her and charge her with disorderly conduct. Conversely, he could have meant if she returns and engages in disorderly conduct, then arrest her and charge her with that offense. Importantly, Hill's arrest report also documents the fact that the plaintiff returned to the scene and at once began shouting at the workers engaged in the clean-up and acting in a disorderly manner. Hill's report stated that after she yelled at the workers he advised her to quiet down and that the plaintiff continued to yell. It was at this point that Hill arrested the plaintiff for "disorderly conduct by loud noise."