Source: https://casetext.com/case/anderson-anesthesia-inc-v-anderson-2
Timestamp: 2018-12-10 20:33:40
Document Index: 386316328

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 9', '§ 9']

Anderson Anesthesia Inc. v. Anderson, 776 S.E.2d 647 | Casetext
Anderson Anesthesia Inc. v. Anderson
776 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)
Anderson Anesthesia Inc.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.Jun 9, 2015
776 S.E.2d 647•333 Ga. App. 437•
David Edward Oles, Alpharetta, for Appellant. Boyd Collar Nolen & Tuggle, Brooke M. French, Connie H. Buffington, for Appellee.
David Edward Oles, Alpharetta, for Appellant.
McMILLIAN, Judge.Anderson Anesthesia, Inc. (“AA”), an Alabama corporation, appeals the trial court's order dismissing its petition filed pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the “UIFSA”), OCGA § 19–11–100 et seq., to stay enforcement of an “Income Assignment Order” (the “Income–Withholding Order”) issued by a Louisiana court and served on Premier Anesthesia, LLC (“Premier”), a Georgia limited liability company, seeking to withhold a portion of AA's income. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.
This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. This Court dismissed an earlier appeal by AA because the Georgia trial court had not issued a final order in the case and AA had failed to follow the procedures for an interlocutory appeal; thus, this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. See Order dated May 20, 2014, Case No. A14D0344.
“On appeal, we review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss de novo.” Liberty County School Dist. v. Halliburton, 328 Ga.App. 422, 423, 762 S.E.2d 138 (2014). And “[i]n reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, an appellate court must construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the appellant with all doubts resolved in the appellant's favor.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ewing v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 652, 653(2), 642 S.E.2d 100 (2007).This matter arises out of the divorce of Anne E. (“Anne”) and Warren Jeff Anderson (“Warren”). The Income–Withholding Order recites that Anne was awarded support in the divorce and that Warren became delinquent in making support payments. The order directs that Premier withhold 50% of any disposable income, “including but not limited to, wages, salary, commission, [and] compensation as an independent contractor,” from the income Premier owes to Warren or AA to satisfy Warren's ongoing support obligations and support arrearages.
Although the parties submitted affidavits and other documentation in briefing the motion to dismiss, the Georgia trial court's order does not indicate that it considered such evidence in ruling on the motion; rather, it states that it based its ruling on the pleadings and arguments of the parties. Thus, we review the Georgia trial court's order as a ruling on a motion to dismiss.
For clarity, we will refer to the Andersons, individually, by their first names.
The record indicates that Warren formed AA for tax purposes to receive income he earned as an independent contractor.
Following a hearing, the Georgia trial court issued an order on February 21, 2014, in which it questioned whether AA met the UIFSA's requirements for contesting the Income–Withholding Order in Georgia (the “First Order”). Under the UIFSA, “[a]n obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an income-withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer in Georgia ... in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of Georgia.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 19–11–155(a). For purposes of the UIFSA, the term
The Georgia trial court also found that the mere filing by Anne of an income assignment order in Georgia did not give the court personal jurisdiction over her, citing OCGA § 19–11–133(a). That provision states that “[p]articipation by a petitioner in a proceeding under this article before a responding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, or through services provided by the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the petitioner in another proceeding.” But given our holding in this case, we need not reach this issue.
The First Order also stated that the Georgia trial court nevertheless attempted to confer with the Louisiana court that issued the Income–Withholding Order pursuant to the provisions of the UIFSA, OCGA § 19–11–136, but was unable to reach the Louisiana judge presiding over the matter. As a result, the Georgia trial court chose to stay the case for a period of two weeks to allow AA to file “appropriate [m]otions in the Louisiana [c]ourt to have the [Income–Withholding Order] set aside since it claims that the Louisiana [c]ourt was without jurisdiction to enter the order against it in the first instance.” But if AA failed to file such motions within that period, the Georgia trial court stated it would dismiss AA's petition to stay enforcement of the Income-Withholding Order.
We note, however, that the Georgia trial court never expressly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider whether the Income-Withholding Order was entitled to full faith and credit in Georgia. Rather, in the First Order, the Georgia trial court questioned whether AA had standing to contest the Income-Withholding Order in Georgia under the UIFSA, and in the Final Order, the Georgia trial court dismissed AA's petition after it failed to establish that it had taken action in Louisiana to contest the Income–Withholding Order.
AA asserted in its original petition to stay and the two subsequent amendments to that petition that it is an Alabama corporation and “an independent legal entity.” And, in fact, AA asserted in its “2nd Amended Petition to Stay Enforcement of Foreign Order and Set Aside Foreign Order” that it “is neither the ‘obligor’ nor his ‘estate,’ “ citing OCGA § 19–11–101. Therefore, although Warren would qualify as an “obligor” under the Act, with standing to contest the Income–Withholding Order in this case, AA, a self-styled “independent” corporation, does not. Accordingly, the Georgia trial court did not err in dismissing AA's petition because even when taken as true, the allegations in the petition, as amended, establish that AA lacks standing to contest the Income–Withholding Order under the UIFSA. See, e.g., Jurden v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., 330 Ga.App. 179, 180(1), 765 S.E.2d 440 (2014) (dismissal proper where allegations of complaint show plaintiff lacked standing) (physical precedent only); Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga.App. 161, 167 –168(1), 746 S.E.2d 689 (2013) (same).
AA also submitted affidavits signed by Warren, averring that it is a “business corporation, with a separate identity and existence” and that it has no arrearage of child support to Anne. However, the Georgia trial court need not have considered this affidavit in dismissing AA's petition.
Although Anne's briefing in support of her motion to dismiss does not expressly raise the issue of standing under the UIFSA, the transcript of the hearing on that motion indicates that the issue was raised by the Georgia trial court and addressed by the parties at that time. Additionally, in an affirmative defense, Anne asserted that AA failed to comply with the requirements of the UIFSA in bringing the action.
AA argues that the Georgia trial court nevertheless should have considered the validity of the Income-Withholding Order under OCGA § 9–12–16 and/or the provisions of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law (“UEFJL”), OCGA § 9–12–130 et seq. However, AA expressly invoked the provisions of the UIFSA in filing all three versions of its petition. And because AA filed the petitions without standing, the Georgia trial court had no jurisdiction over them and no basis to consider the validity of the Income–Withholding Order. Cf. Perdue v. Lake, 282 Ga. 348, 348 (1)(a), 349(2)(a), 647 S.E.2d 6 (2007) ( “As a general rule, standing must be determined at the time at which the plaintiff's complaint is filed in order to place an actual case or controversy within the purview of the court,” and the Georgia trial court had no jurisdiction over complaint filed without standing); Julian v. Brooks, 269 Ga. 167, 167, 495 S.E.2d 569 (1998) (where appellants lack standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, dismissal was proper). Moreover, we note that Anne never sought to enforce the Income–Withholding Order under the provisions of the UEFJL, but rather served the order on Premier under the provisions of the UIFSA.