Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/420/738/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 07:46:39
Document Index: 320669160

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 1331', 'Art. 76', '§ 876', '§ 8', 'Art. 76', 'Art. 53', 'Art. 76', 'Art. 76', 'Art. 76', 'Art. 76', 'Art. 76']

On March 27, 1972, court-martial charges were preferred against respondent Bruce R. Councilman, an Army captain on active duty at Fort Sill, Okla. The charges alleged that Captain Councilman had wrongfully sold, transferred, and possessed marihuana. On July 6, 1972, the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma permanently enjoined petitioners, the Secretaries of Defense and of the Army and the Commanding chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The parties in the District Court stipulated the relevant facts. [Footnote 2] They need only be summarized here. The Army's Criminal Investigation Detachment at Fort Sill received information from a confidential informant that Councilman was using marihuana at his off-post apartment. The detachment arranged to have Councilman invited to an off-post party, where he was introduced to Specialist Four Glenn D. Skaggs, an enlisted man working as a detachment undercover agent. Skaggs, who chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At a preliminary hearing held on June 27, 1972, Councilman, represented by counsel, moved to dismiss the charges, contending that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction under this Court's decision in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258 (1969), because the alleged offenses were not "service-connected." After an evidentiary hearing, the presiding military judge denied the motion and scheduled the court-martial to begin on July 11. On July 5, Councilman brought this action in the District Court, moving for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent his impending court-martial. Councilman claimed that, since chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the alleged offenses did not meet the tests for service connection set forth in O'Callahan v. Parker, supra, and elaborated in Relford v. U.S. Disciplinary Commandant, 401 U. S. 355 (171). The court found that only one of the factors enumerated in those decisions pointed to service connection in this case: the "factor relat[ing] to the rank of the persons involved in the incident or the fact that both were servicemen." 481 F.2d 614. The court concluded that this factor, standing alone, was insufficient chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Presumably the District Court found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, [Footnote 9] which grants subject matter jurisdiction of civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 "and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." No contention is made that respondent's claim fails to assert a case arising under the Constitution. See O'Callahan v. Parker, supra. Petitioners argue, however, that, even if the District Court might otherwise have had jurisdiction under § 1331, this was removed by enactment of Art. 76 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 876. That article, set forth in the margin, [Footnote 10] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We have declined to decide this question in the past. [Footnote 11] We now conclude that, although the article is highly relevant to the proper scope of collateral attack on court-martial convictions and to the propriety of equitable intervention into pending court-martial proceedings, it does not have the jurisdictional consequences petitioners ascribe to it. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This Court repeatedly has recognized that, of necessity, "[m]ilitary law . . . is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment." Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 346 U. S. 140 (1953); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 417 U. S. 744 (1974). Congress is empowered under Art. I, § 8, to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." It has, however, never deemed it appropriate to confer on this Court "appellate jurisdiction to supervise the administration of criminal justice in the military." Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683, 395 U. S. 694 (1969). See 68 U. S. 249-253 (1864). [Footnote 12] Nor has Congress conferred on any Art. III court jurisdiction directly to review court-martial determinations. The valid, final judgments of military courts, like those of any court of competent jurisdiction not subject to direct review for errors of fact or law, have res judicata effect, and preclude further litigation of the merits. See, e.g.,@ 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¦ 0.405[4.-1], pp. 634-637 (2d ed.1974). This Court therefore has adhered uniformly to
But this general rule carries with it its own qualification -- that the court-martial's acts be "within the scope of its jurisdiction and duty." Collateral attack seeks, as a necessary incident to relief otherwise within the court's chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These settled principles of the law of judgments have been held from the start fully applicable to court-martial determinations. [Footnote 15] Habeas corpus proceedings have been and remain by far the most common form of collateral attack on court-martial judgments, but historically they have not been the exclusive means of collateral attack. Nor were they the earliest. In 7 U. S. 337. See Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (1857); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat.19 (1827). [Footnote 16] At chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the end of the last century, on the basis of the same principle the Court approved collateral attack in the form of backpay suits in the Court of Claims. E.g., Runkle v. United States,@ 122 U. S. 543 (1887). These cases, and the early military habeas cases, [Footnote 17] demonstrate a uniform approach to the problem of collateral relief from the consequences of court-martial judgments: such relief was barred unless it appeared that the judgments were void. [Footnote 18]
Petitioners argue that Art. 76 effected a change in this regime, not solely as a matter of the law of judgments, but as a matter of jurisdiction. This case, of course, does not concern a collateral attack on a court-martial judgment, at least in the normal sense, since there was no judgment to attack. Instead, Councilman, alleging the likelihood of irreparable injury, sought injunctive relief from an impending court-martial. He asserted, as the basis for such relief, that any judgment entered by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Article 76, however, does not expressly effect any change in the subject matter jurisdiction of Art. III courts. Its language only defines the point at which military court judgments become final, and requires that they be given res judicata effect. But, as the Court has recognized in the past, there is no necessary inconsistency between this and the standard rule that void judgments, although final for purposes of direct review, may be impeached collaterally in suits otherwise within a court's subject matter jurisdiction. [Footnote 20] In Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128 (1950), this Court was required to determine the effect on military habeas proceedings of Art. 53 of the Articles of War, the immediate statutory predecessor of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners agree with Gusik insofar as it holds that habeas corpus remains available despite the mandate of Art. 76. It is argued, however, both from the legislative history of Art. 76 itself and from the judgment implicit in the establishment of a comprehensive system of review within the military, that Congress intended to confine collateral attack in Art. III courts exclusively to habeas corpus. In doing so, it is said, Congress was acknowledging the special constitutional status of that writ under the Suspension Clause, [Footnote 22] a status shared by no other form of collateral relief. Petitioners point in particular to statements in the House chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners' interpretation of Art. 76, if its full reach were accepted, not only would prevent servicemen from obtaining injunctions under any circumstances against pending court-martial proceedings. It also would preclude any collateral relief in Art. III courts, even if the court-martial lacked jurisdiction in the most traditional sense, unless the serviceman could satisfy the requirements of habeas corpus jurisdiction. As pointed out above, certain remedies alternative to habeas, particularly suits for backpay, historically have been available. Indeed, this availability was reiterated shortly before enactment of the Code. See Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct.Cl. 650, 69 F.Supp. 205 (1947). Yet nothing in Art. 76 distinguishes between habeas corpus and other remedies also consistent with well established rules governing collateral attack. If Congress intended such a distinction, it selected singularly inapt language to express it. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This is not to say, of course, that, for every such consequence, there is a remedy in Art. III courts. That depends on whether the relief is sought in an action otherwise chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Our holding that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, assuming the requisite jurisdictional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It therefore appears that Councilman was "threatened with [no] injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith." Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 319 U. S. 164 (1943). Of course, there is inevitable injury -- often of serious proportions -- incident to any criminal prosecution. But when the federal equity power is sought to be invoked against state criminal prosecutions, this Court has chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As to state criminal prosecutions, such justification has been found to reside in the peculiarly compelling demands of federalism and the "special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law. . . ." Stefanelli v. Minard, supra, at 342 U. S. 120. The precise content of constitutional rights almost invariably turns on the context of fact and law in which they arise. State courts are quite as capable as federal courts of determining the facts, and they alone can define and interpret state law. Equally important, under Art. VI of the Constitution, state courts chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To some extent, the practical considerations supporting both the exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus and the federal equity rule barring intervention into pending state criminal proceedings except in extraordinary circumstances are similar to those that, underlie the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. E.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 303 U. S. 551 (1938). The latter rule, looking to the special competence of agencies in which Congress has reposed the duty to perform particular tasks, is based on the need to allow agencies to develop the facts, to apply the law in which they are peculiarly expert, and to correct their own errors. The rule ensures that whatever judicial review is available will be informed and narrowed by the agencies' own decisions. It also avoids duplicative proceedings, and often the agency's ultimate decision will chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In enacting the Code, Congress attempted to balance these military necessities against the equally significant interest of ensuring fairness to servicemen charged with military offenses, and to formulate a mechanism by which these often competing interests can be chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent seeks to avoid this result by pointing to the several military habeas cases in which this Court has not chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Assuming, arguendo, that, absent incarceration or other deprivation of liberty, federal court intervention would be appropriate in cases like Toth and its progeny despite failure to exhaust military remedies, the considerations supporting such intervention are not applicable here. Councilman was on active duty when the charges against him were brought. There is no question that he is subject to military authority and, in proper cases, to disciplinary sanctions levied through the military justice system. We see no injustice in requiring respondent to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
submit to a system established by Congress and carefully designed to protect not only military interests, but his legitimate interests as well. Of course, if the offenses with which he is charged are not "service-connected," the military courts will have had no power to impose any punishment whatever. But that issue turns in major part on gauging the impact of an offense on military discipline and effectiveness, on determining whether the military interest in deterring the offense is distinct from and greater than that of civilian society, and on whether the distinct military interest can be vindicated adequately in civilian courts. These are matters of judgment that often will turn on the precise set of facts in which the offense has occurred. See Relford v. U.S. Disciplinary Commandant, 401 U. S. 355 (171). More importantly, they are matters as to which the expertise of military courts is singularly relevant, and their judgments indispensable to inform any eventual review in Art. III courts. [Footnote 34] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I concur in the judgment because I believe that Art. 76 of the UCMJ applies only to post-judgment attacks upon the proceedings of courts-martial and that the District Court should have dismissed the complaint on the basis of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is, of course, settled that federal district courts may not entertain even a habeas corpus application of a serviceman convicted of offenses raising no question of service connection until the serviceman has exhausted all available military remedies, Noyd v. Bond, supra. But our opinion in Noyd carefully distinguished situations presenting challenges to the jurisdiction of the military chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court provides no reasoned justification for its departure from these holdings in requiring exhaustion in this case. [Footnote 2/1] The Court's failure is not surprising, since plainly there is wholly lacking in military tribunals the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
qualification ordinarily relied on to justify the exhaustion requirement, namely, the know-how or "expertise" of an agency particularly knowledgeable in the determination of the same or like questions. Military tribunals simply have no special, if any, expertise in the determination of whether the offense charged to respondent was service-connected. [Footnote 2/2] Civilian courts may properly defer to military tribunals when cases involve "extremely technical provisions of the Uniform Code," Noyd v. Bond, supra, at 395 U. S. 696, or where deference may avoid unnecessary friction because the serviceman may well prevail before the military authorities. But this case presents neither situation. The offense charged here is not enmeshed in "technical provisions of the Uniform Code." On the contrary, it is a common everyday type of drug offense that federal courts encounter all over the country every day. The Court agrees that a drug transaction is not a service-connected offense merely because the participants are servicemen. Rather, the Court analogizes military tribunals to administrative agencies, and imposes the exhaustion requirement familiar in agency cases -- and it does so even though the question presented is a constitutional determination whether the military has any jurisdiction to try the serviceman at all. The mere suggestion of such an analogy is well nigh incredible. Military tribunals have no expertise whatever to bring to bear on the determination whether a common everyday practice carried on by civilians becomes service-connected when chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Brief for Petitioners on Jurisdictional Issues 19. A cursory survey chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In 401 U. S. 365 (1971), this Court identified 12 factors that O'Callahan v. Parker, supra,@ held should be weighed in determining whether an offense is service-connected:
id. at 5, causing a breakdown in military discipline, effectiveness, and morale. Second, "possession of marijuana and other proscribed drugs, whether off-base or on," id. at 6, tends to impair the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. [Footnote 2/4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary