Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/613/1248/198027/
Timestamp: 2019-12-11 21:52:06
Document Index: 107774476

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 841', '§ 3731', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 3184', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

United States of America, Appellant, v. John Brett Allen, 613 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1980) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1980 › United States of America, Appellant, v. John Brett Allen
United States of America, Appellant, v. John Brett Allen, 613 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1980)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 613 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1980) Argued Nov. 15, 1979. Decided Feb. 5, 1980
The government appeals from the district court's grant of a new trial pursuant to Allen's motion for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) from his conviction for conspiring to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1976).1
In a direct criminal appeal, the government may only appeal orders dismissing an indictment or information or suppressing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). Moreover, in cases of direct appeal, an order granting a new trial normally is not final and hence not subject to appellate review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held, however, that the grant of a new trial is a final order in the context of a § 2255 proceeding that permits the government to appeal. See United States v. Dunham Concrete Products, Inc., 501 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S. Ct. 1656, 44 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1975). For several reasons, we agree with the result reached by the Fifth Circuit and hold that the grant of a new trial is a final, appealable order in proceedings under § 2255.
This reading of paragraphs 3 and 6 is supported by the general analytical approach of cases dealing with the meaning of final orders under § 2255. The crucial question in these cases in determining finality is whether the district court has entered one of the orders specified in paragraph 3 of § 2255. For example, in Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 83 S. Ct. 1236, 10 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1963), the defendant asked the § 2255 court to resentence him. Although the court decided to grant the motion, it did not enter an order resentencing the defendant. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court held that the failure to enter the order meant there was no appealable order. Thus the crux in Andrews was whether the § 2255 court actually had entered the specific order requested. As already noted, the district court here entered an order expressly permitted by § 2255, the action missing in Andrews.
Second, the nature of § 2255 proceedings supports the finality of the order here. As opposed to being an integral part of the criminal trial, "a proceeding under Section 2255 is an independent and collateral inquiry into the validity of the conviction." United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222, 72 S. Ct. 263, 274, 96 L. Ed. 232 (1952). Accord, e. g., Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7, 79 S. Ct. 451, 453, 3 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1959); Neely v. United States, 546 F.2d 1059, 1065 (3d Cir. 1976). Cf. Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 338, 83 S. Ct. 1236, 1239, 10 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1963) (government appeals under § 2255 are not subject to the Criminal Appeals Act).5
In short, once the § 2255 court grants a motion for a new trial, its jurisdiction as a § 2255 court ends and there is "nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 633, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945). Hence the separate nature of § 2255 proceedings means that the grant of a new trial in this context is a final order.
Moreover, the fact that the sentencing judge and the § 2255 judge are the same person is not dispositive. This merely reflects a desire to relieve the case-load burden of judges located in districts containing federal prisoners. See generally United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S. Ct. 263, 96 L. Ed. 232 (1952).
Nor is Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 40 S. Ct. 347, 64 L. Ed. 616 (1920), to the contrary. There, the British consul applied to a district court for the extradition of Collins, presenting three affidavits as the basis for extradition. The district court held a hearing only on the first affidavit, found it sufficient for extradition, ordered Collins into custody, and certified its findings to the Secretary of State. Collins then brought a petition for habeas corpus before a different judge, who partially granted the writ and ordered the first court to hold hearings on the other two affidavits. See id. at 367-68, 40 S. Ct. at 348. When Collins and the consul appealed, the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of a final order.
The Court first noted that the action of the habeas court was similar to the order of an appellate tribunal reversing and remanding to another court. Id. at 369, 40 S. Ct. at 349. Extending the analogy, the Court concluded: "The prisoner remained under the authority of the (habeas corpus court) . . . and as the writ of Habeas corpus had not been disposed of there so far as concerned the detention on two of the three affidavits, the decision below on that branch of the case was not final." Id. at 370, 40 S. Ct. at 349.
Collins is distinguishable for two reasons. In the first place, it rests on realities of extradition procedure that have no applicability here. Application for extradition can be made to a judge or a magistrate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). There is no direct appeal from that decision, the only relief being extremely limited review through habeas corpus. The analogy to a remand in Collins therefore is very instructive. Where the habeas corpus court sends the case to the extraditing judge or magistrate, that often works just like the usual remand with the habeas court retaining jurisdiction. See, e. g., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485-86 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97, 50 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1976). Under normal finality principles, a remand by the district court is not a final order. E. g., Barfield v. Weinberger, 485 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (remand to HEW not final). Here, by contrast, the § 2255 court does not remand to a lower court to retry the defendant. As already noted, jurisdiction shifts to an entirely different statutory basis at the same level in the judicial hierarchy, and the § 2255 court does not retain jurisdiction over the prisoner or the issues raised in his petition.
Moreover, only one of the three affidavits in Collins had been disposed of. 252 U.S. at 370, 40 S. Ct. at 349. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432 & n.3, 76 S. Ct. 895, 897 & n.3, 100 L. Ed. 1297 (1956). Here, the district court has disposed of the claim in the manner requested by granting a new trial. Therefore, this is not a case of partially resolved multiple claims.
Finally, in addressing the question of finality, it is appropriate for us to consider pragmatic factors. See, e. g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 85 S. Ct. 308, 13 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1964). Here, if the government actually attempted to retry Allen, it is possible the trial might be barred by the double jeopardy clause. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). If such were the case, a matter we do not decide, the district court's grant of a new trial would be meaningless. We decline to adopt a reading of finality that might render an order permitted by § 2255 into a nullity. Moreover, in civil cases generally where a new trial is granted, the judgment entered after retrial is fully subject to appellate review. Here, if the double jeopardy clause bars retrial, then the probable effect would be to preclude review at any time of the important substantive issue presented in this appeal.
On appeal, the government has abandoned its argument that federal prisoners may not raise an issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence in a § 2255 proceeding. Cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (state prisoners may raise such claims). See generally Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226-31, 89 S. Ct. 1068 (1969). Given that we reverse the district court, we will assume, without deciding, that appellee's claim was properly cognizable under § 2255. The government instead contends that the evidence as to Meador was different from the evidence as to Cooper. In addition, it points out that Meador's conviction still stands and that the rule used by the district court does not apply where at least two conspirators are convicted. E. g., United States v. Musgrave, 483 F.2d 327, 333 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023, 94 S. Ct. 447, 38 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1973). We need not reach these questions, however, because the district court erred in the legal rules it applied to the facts.
The indictment here states: "JOHN BRETT ALLEN, RICHARD JOHN COOPER, and THOMAS J. MEADOR, did knowingly and unlawfully conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, and with each other, And with other persons known and unknown to this Grand Jury . . . ." (emphasis supplied). In such a case, "the identity of the other members of the conspiracy is not needed, inasmuch as one person can be convicted of conspiring with persons whose names are unknown." Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375, 71 S. Ct. 438, 443, 95 L. Ed. 344 (1951), Citing Pomerantz v. United States, 51 F.2d 911, 913 (3d Cir. 1931). This rule has been applied to conspiracies involving drug activity. E. g., United States v. Rivera Diaz, 538 F.2d 461, 465 (1st Cir. 1976).
Even assuming absolutely no involvement of Meador and Cooper in a conspiracy, these events show the participation of at least one person other than Allen in two respects. First, the call by "Stewart" to the answering service and the paper with the number on it in room 242 alone indicate the involvement of a second person, unless we are to believe that Allen left messages for himself and then called to receive them. Second, Allen somehow got control of keys to a truck that, as far as the record shows, he had no physical connection with prior to its arrival at the Dusselfink Motel. It defies reason to say that this evidence is insufficient to show that Allen did not act alone.6 There was ample evidence from which a "rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 99 S. Ct. at 2792 (footnote omitted).
Section 2255 also states the appeal shall be "as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus." When a state prisoner is successful on his petition for habeas, the possibility of retrial by the state does not impugn the finality of the order. See United States ex rel. Thomas v. State of New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 742 (3d Cir.) (conditional grant of habeas corpus where state may release or retry defendant is final), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S. Ct. 121, 38 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1973). See also Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 490, 95 S. Ct. 1748, 1753, 44 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1975) (per curiam) (habeas corpus court has no jurisdiction over retrial of state prisoner)
Until recently, § 2255 cases were given a separate civil number. See Evans v. United States, 387 F.2d 160, 161 (3d Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 391 U.S. 968, 88 S. Ct. 2039, 20 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1968). Now the § 2255 proceeding retains the original criminal docket number and is filed along with the criminal papers. Nevertheless, the clerk's office lists the case as a civil matter for the purpose of case-load statistics
This case is thus quite different from United States v. Gardner, 475 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835, 94 S. Ct. 178, 38 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1973), where the court held the evidence of a conspiracy insufficient because the government could neither trace phone calls made by the defendant nor show from whom defendant bought the drugs. See id. at 1278. Here, we not only have traced calls, we have records of actual messages and eyewitnesses to some of the events