Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/307/148/case.php
Timestamp: 2018-06-21 11:59:11
Document Index: 127233448

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 206', '§ 345', '§ 203', '§ 207', '§ 206', '§ 206', '§ 207', '§ 208', '§ 206']

UNITED STATES V. MAHER, 307 U. S. 148 (1939) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
1. The Interstate Commerce Commission denied an application of a common carrier by motor vehicle for a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing him to operate over a designated route, and ordered him to cease operating, holding inapplicable to his case a provision of § 206(a) of the Motor Carrier Act, upon which he relied, whereby carriers in bona fide operation on chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The case is here on appeal, under Section 238 of the Judicial Code as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 345, to review a final chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On January 24, 1936, the appellee, Maher, filed an application under the "grandfather clause" for a certificate to engage in the transportation of passengers and baggage over U.S. Highway No. 99 between Portland and Seattle and intermediate points. After a hearing was had before a "Joint Board" composed of members from the states involved (§§ 203(a)(4) and 205) at which competing carriers and the Public Utilities Commission of Oregon appeared in opposition to the application, and after a report was filed by the Joint Board with the Interstate chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Commerce Commission recommending that the application be denied, the Interstate Commerce Commission, Division 5, on October 27, 1937, found the facts to be as follows: from 1931 until May 29, 1936, the appellee had engaged in bona fide "anywhere for hire" operations in Oregon with occasional entries into Washington. There were rare trips to Seattle, no service at all to most of the intervening points, and no showing that passengers were transported on return trips to Portland. On May 29, 1936, the appellee began his regular route service between Portland and Seattle, which he conducted regularly since that time. But upon the institution of the regular route service between Portland and Seattle, the appellee discontinued the "anywhere for hire" operations theretofore conducted. Upon this showing, Division 5 found that the service conducted by the appellee since May 29, 1936, was a different service from that conducted by him prior to that time, and therefore concluded that he did not come within "the grandfather clause." And so the Commission denied Maher's application and ordered him "to cease and desist" from "all operations" as a common carrier in interstate commerce. Thereupon the appellee filed the present suit in the District Court for the District of Oregon against the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, praying that the Commission's order be set aside and "any construction thereunder" enjoined. The suit was disposed of on the pleadings, the answer of the Commission having incorporated its report and orders. A majority of the District Court entertained jurisdiction, and held that the appellee was entitled to an "anywhere for hire" permit under "the grandfather clause" as well as the regular route permit under § 207. 23 F.Supp. 810. Circuit Judge Haney found jurisdiction to review the cease and desist order, although not the order denying the certificate of convenience and necessity, but sustained the Commission's view of the Act. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The jurisdictional problem presents another instance of the Interstate Commerce Commission's having been invested with power to free a complainant of restrictions placed upon his conduct by a statutory scheme, and having definitively rejected the claim for dispensation. The applicant before the Commission then came into court to "set aside" and "annul" the "order" of the Interstate Commerce Commission, claiming that the Commission's action was based on a wrong reading of the authority which the Act of Congress gave it. To the hearing of such a claim there is no jurisdictional barrier, as we have held today in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ante, p. 307 U. S. 125. [Footnote 1]
On the merits, the case brings into question the validity of the construction placed by the Interstate Commerce Commission upon § 206(a) of the Motor Carrier Act relieving carriers operating on June 1, 1935, under the circumstances defined by the terms of § 206(a) from the requirements of § 207. [Footnote 2] The latter section requires a finding chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
By this legislation, Congress responded to the felt need for regulating interstate motor transportation through familiar administrative devices, while, at the same time, it satisfied the dictates of fairness by affording sanction for enterprises theretofore established. Whether an applicant seeking exemption chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Invoking the "grandfather clause," the appellee sought from the Commission a certificate authorizing continuance of his regular service between the fixed termini of Portland and Seattle on U.S. Highway 99. But the Commission found that the regular operation over this route had only been instituted on May 29, 1936. Theretofore, and including the crucial period prior to June 1, 1935, the appellee had been engaged in quite different services from those for which it asked a certificate -- namely, "an chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The recognized practices of an industry give life to the dead words of a statute dealing with it. In differentiating between operations over the "route or routes" for which an application under the "grandfather clause" is made, as against operations "within the territory," Congress plainly adopted the familiar distinction between "anywhere for hire" bus operations over irregular routes and regular route bus operations between fixed termini. [Footnote 3] Such recognition is implicit also in the provision of § 208(a) that
Since the new regular route of appellee was not in existence on June, 1935, and the irregular "anywhere for hire" service was not "so operated," as required by § 206, when the Commission passed upon the application for a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary