Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/245781299/Vitoria-HR-Foundation
Timestamp: 2018-10-23 22:44:58
Document Index: 462231139

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 10', 'Art. 217', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 1998', 'art. 4', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 35', 'Art. 1993', 'Art.60']

Vitoria HR Foundation | Jurisprudence | Natural And Legal Rights
Vitoria HR Foundation
Citizenship, Youth and Europe
Naga Tel vs CA 1994- 1267 Doctrine of unforeseen circumstances.pdf
Equatorial Devt v. Mayfair Theater
Khe Hong Cheng v. CA.pdf
Sps. Mamaril v. Boy Scouts of the Phil.pdf
75. Moreno vs. Commission on Elections.pdf
67. Santiago vs. Garchitorena
Copyright © 2012 Ave Maria Law Review
OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA: A CATHOLIC
Robert John Araujo, S.J. g
It is exciting to be here with you as we consider and study the
foundation of human rights and the contributions from Catholic
minds. Moreover, I am delighted to be a part of a community of
scholars who recognize the extraordinary contributions of Catholic
thinkers to this crucial topic. In particular, I salute those of you who
acknowledge the significance and relevance of thinkers such as the
two Francises: de Vitoria and Suàrez. I am further delighted that a
number of you have addressed their work at this conference.
Here we are, more than half a millennium later, recalling and
celebrating their pioneering work to the eminent field of human rights
that some argue is quite new.1 Although for some, the events of sixtythree years ago, when the U.N. General Assembly voted on a
resolution adopting an international charter of basic rights may seem
like an eternity ago. Nevertheless, since the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in December of 1948, most individuals
have had some exposure to the phrase “human rights”—both the idea
itself as well as some application of it in their respective lives or the
lives of people with whom they are familiar. It is clear that
recognition of this idea and its implementation did not enjoy much
popular acclaim before the end of the Second World War, so it would
be understandable to assume that human rights are essentially a
product of the contemporary age subsequent to the Second World War.
This outlook was recently acclaimed in a review of Professor
Samuel Moyn’s new book The Last Utopia: Human Rights in
History,2 appearing in a recent issue of the Columbia alumni
magazine.3 The title of the review is: “Human Rights: Newer than
You Think,” and the author is quoted by the reviewer as stating that
John Courtney Murray, S.J. University Professor, Loyola University Chicago.
1. See, e.g., Michael B. Shavelson, Human Rights: Newer Than You Think, COLUM. MAG.,
Winter 2010 – 2011, at 56.
2. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
3. Shavelson, supra note 1.
he reached conclusions about the legitimate claims of both native peoples and 4.H. doing so would discount the extraordinary pioneering work of the Neo-Scholastic scholars of the sixteenth century to whom we owe a great debt—especially to de Vitoria. See generally ON LAW: LECTURES ON ST I–II 90 – 105. supra note 6. 5. One of his most influential works regarding the natural law and its application to human rights discourse is De Indis..314 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9. 3. the idea of international human rights doesn’t become widespread until the 1970s. the source of de Vitoria’s legal principles dealing with human rights matters was founded in the natural law and the method of legal reasoning that accompanies this school of legal thought.P. Q. DE INDIS. 6. O. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA. 10:2 while there were early sources of human rights discourse. He was for much of his adult life a Dominican friar and professor of theology at Salamanca. C. 1. Francis of Vittoria.. reprinted in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS. supra note 6. De Vitoria discusses the capacity of a majority of the native peoples electing to be led by the Spanish. supra note 6. However. Q. in 14 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 727 (1967).g. Id. e.P. Art. 10. see also JACQUES MARITAIN. Q.. at 239–51. See id.8 Like the Jesuits Suàrez and Bellarmine who were to follow. reprinted in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 231 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence eds.9 It was this foundation that led him to consider the notions of popular sovereignty and selfdetermination. See. if this were the case. thereby leaving Professor Moyn’s position intact. it would be easy to assume that human rights concepts and principles and the laws addressing them are products of the contemporary age. we must acknowledge that a crucial source of human rights is to be found in the writings of Francis de Vitoria. “It’s not that there weren’t early sources. essentially unheard of before his time. at 281. but at the level of common speech. 1943).”5 In spite of this interesting perspective held by some contemporary scholars. 1. as vital elements of human rights doctrine. 1991) [hereinafter DE INDIS]. however. THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 59 (Doris C. see also DE INDIS. This volume also includes other political and legal writings authored by de Vitoria that have a bearing on the points made in this Article. Id. O. it would seem that a majority could just as easily decide to retain their own system and method of governance. 6.6 By failing to understand his contribution. . the popular concept is of recent generation. 6.. ON CIVIL POWER. Anson trans.. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA. 8. Art. McKenna. Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546)7 lived during the age of the Conquistadors and the Reformation. See id.4 Professor Moyn is quoted as saying. in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS. 7. at 17–18.10 Moreover.
Doc.Spring 2012] OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA 315 Europeans that established the foundation for fundamental rights that are addressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”). Those definitions would undermine the term’s import insofar as these explanations are self-relational. and focused on the individual person vis-à-vis the individual himself or herself.N. 12. McKenna. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2009). self-esteem. Art. 217(III) A.13 What is due one person cannot be correctly understood until what is also due others. The first question deals with the term dignity . e. 1948). is methodically considered.14 What is claimed by one must be the sort of thing that can rightfully be claimed by others. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (9th ed. at 727–28. 13. DE INDIS.. Res.e. if the term is to mean something in the context of universal human rights (i. supra note 7. it must convey the understanding that the entitlements properly belonging to a person are relational to others. As we shall subsequently see. 10. subjective. Here we must take stock of what Jacques Maritain. de Vitoria provided important groundwork for consideration of these two inextricably related matters that relate dignity and rights of the human person—God’s most beloved creation—which found their way into the Universal Declaration.A/RES/217(III) (Dec. . G. who chaired the UNESCO committee that advised 11. Regarding the significance of the term dignity. claims that are universal and proper to every member of the human family including its most vulnerable—the unborn). Q. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 1. 14.12 This point made by de Vitoria sets the stage for consideration of the suum cuique : the principle that necessitates that each person is to receive his or her due. U. This is why the idea of human rights must be universal if they are to have both substantive content and meaning—a point comprehended well by de Vitoria and explained in De Indis. who are in relation to the first person mentioned.. or pride. the second follows and pertains to the meaning of rights. at 278 – 84 (examining the interests of and relations between the native peoples and the Europeans). 3. See. it cannot be restricted to understandings that involve self-respect. supra note 6.”11 Two questions immediately occur about the meaning of this passage. The Universal Declaration begins with an important and remarkable claim: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.g.A. Indeed.
acknowledged that the native peoples of the Americas were. an end which must be treated as such. Right or rights is an unpretentious word found in the daily usage of most people. and consistent with what is just rather than unjust. They are both founded on the freedom proper to spiritual agents. at 249–50. to anyone else. Yet its significance is not always understood properly. and which consequently is not merely a means to an end. 1. . at 65 (emphasis added). and so it must be carefully defined when placed in the context of the often-heard phrase “human rights. MARITAIN. but an end. for that matter. Art. the human person has the right to be respected. is the subject of rights. obviously. master of itself and of its acts.16 With this fundamental understanding of the term dignity in mind (i. rights involve the qualities of the human person that relate to that which is proper. then. The dignity of the human person? The expression means nothing if it does not signify that by virtue of natural law. possesses rights. supra note 6. Hence. a whole. The application of objective reason has much to do with defining rights of persons and the justification of claims made 15.e. de Vitoria. As noted above. If man is morally bound to the things which are necessary to the fulfillment of his destiny.15 De Vitoria recognized these principles offered by Maritain many years earlier when he.” Does it mean the ability to make any claim a person desires to make on one’s own behalf? Or must it take stock of the claims made by a person in relation to the claims or potential claims that can be made by others? In the context of the claims that relate to the Universal Declaration. The notion of right and the notion of moral obligation are correlative. people to whom were owed the very same things which were owed to Europeans or. we can proceed to defining the term rights. it is a term of familiarity. See DE INDIS. correct.316 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. and if he has the right to fulfill his destiny he has the right to the things necessary for this purpose. 6. had to say about human dignity and rights in 1943: The human person possesses rights because of the very fact that it is a person. 16. he has the right to fulfill his destiny. Q.. what is owed the human person because of the very fact that he or she is a human person). 10:2 the drafting committee of the Universal Declaration. supra note 9. Maritain acknowledged the role of de Vitoria in charting the concept of human rights upon the natural law. There are things which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is man. indeed.
18 The essential concept underlying these various formulations may be summed up in the following manner: justice—an issue of vital importance to most understandings of natural law (to which de Vitoria was a devoted adherent)19—is a critical element of legal systems and international order. 19. McKenna. 18. therefore. REV. Rights deal with the moral dimension of human nature and human existence and with the contexts of individual persons who live in societies with other persons. alterum non laedere .J. L. See generally Rev. the claim must be sustained because of the inherent nature and essence of the person and his or her accompanying human dignity as one person who lives in the midst of other persons. particularly those concerned with the rights and the obligations of people. S. Id. Justice as Right Relationship: A Philosophical and Theological Reflection on Affirmative Action. or civil authorities. In short. there is juris praecepta sunt haec —nos este vivere . These points are well comprehended in de Vitoria’s thinking and writing. supra note 7. or organizations determine what is due. In the natural law. societies. at 1841. And what is due the person materializes in reality not because persons. and facts fortify and intensify. or associations..Spring 2012] OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA 317 about them. supra note 13. 377 (2000). justice is often considered existing in the context of the suum cuique. at 1842. reason. For example. In other words. and what is improper—for others involved with the same question or issue is considered and determined. the justice for one cannot be determined until what is just— what is proper. to render everyone his due. 27 PEPP. and. at 728. Robert John Araujo. Thus. In consequence. suum cuique tribuere —these are the precepts of the law: to live honorably. to hurt nobody. rather.17 Another is a traditional definition of justice: Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi —justice is a steady and unceasing disposition to render everyone his due. The principle of the suum cuique subsists in ancient legal precepts with which de Vitoria was familiar. the right or rights claimed by a person is or are legitimate and morally proper when justice.20 In essence. . or restrict or deny. what is due is determined by the fact that the claimant is a person. the justice that is due someone or something relates to what is due others with whom this person shares society and is therefore in relationship with other persons. 17. rights have to do with the essence of what is due the individual person because he or she is an individual person—this is the suum cuique in operation. the specific claim and its legitimacy. 20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
the rights of the human person relate to a well-ordered claim versus a disordered claim. rights claims must always be understood next to rights obligations and responsibilities. at 231–92. then. The justifications underlying this point ensure that rights are reciprocal—perhaps not in all their precise details. but it is a reality that de Vitoria saw and valued as he considered and evaluated what was happening between the Europeans and the native peoples of the Americas.23 There is no question that the Universal Declaration provides the foundation for the major international human rights instruments of the past half-century. My point about the nexus between claims and obligations cannot be overemphasized. often times but not always competing. The nexus between rights and responsibilities is essential to the Universal Declaration. Res. . supra note 6. In essence. serves as the guarantor and protector of claims made by one and all. The importance to American legal institutions is expressed. and responsibilities.A. See G. but reciprocal nonetheless. supra note 7. McKenna.21 But if the notion of rights addresses claims. 22. 23. See DE INDIS. 217(III) A. which is critical to the meaning of rights that belong to humans. is characteristic of the contemporary understanding of the international 21. This is patent in the thinking and writing of de Vitoria who assessed the claims of the native peoples of America and the claims. Yet.318 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. in the component of the federal Constitution known as the Bill of Rights as founded on the Declaration of Independence. in part. Hence. 10:2 what is due one person cannot be considered until what is due others who find themselves in the same context is considered. the suum cuique in a natural law context plays a significant role. such as Locke and Rousseau. at 727. of the Spanish colonialists.22 This responsibility. obligations. This duties-responsibility facet of human rights claims may seem controversial to some. many Americans may think with some amusement or intrigue that it took the rest of the world another two centuries to address the subject of human rights that seem integral to American legal institutions. the view that international human rights emerged from the American Revolution and the works of Enlightenment political philosophers. supra note 11. Indeed. it must also take stock of duties. It should now become clear that in the framework of the most basic examination of human rights.
J. and even war if it could not. Natural Law and the Law of Nations: Some Theoretical Considerations. The Internationalization of Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto. this author states: [T]he law of nations itself was a necessary derivative from natural law. 1031 (1991–1992). disagreement. see James V. the distinguished American international jurist of the early twentieth century. See John P. 27. as commentators of legal and political institutions of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries who relied on the Scholastic tradition and natural law 26 principles. . 15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. at 239 – 40. as was acknowledged by Jacques Maritain. how do his insights assist us today to understand what human rights are about? 24. Art. Francisco Suárez: On Preaching the Gospel to People Like the American Indians. See DE INDIS. understood. James Brown Scott.25 The Neo-Scholastics lived and labored during the years of the European exploration of the New World.. It was based on the principle that human beings throughout time and space were the same in their essential structure. 26. and that reason could be formulated.Spring 2012] OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA 319 law texts we rely upon today in the contemporary world and its legal academies. JAMES BROWN SCOTT. However. 1. 1. conceptions integral to human rights. could and should be tested by reason. Doyle.P. and—at least for the French— fraternity. See generally MARITAIN. even rulers. For an extremely helpful explanation of the role of natural law in international law. Q. 27 But how did de Vitoria actually provide a foundation from which the contemporary identification and understanding of universal human rights could emerge in the twentieth century? In particular. Ramón Hernández. It would result in violence. Id. 997 (1991–1992). see generally JAMES BROWN SCOTT. communicated. equality. had often noted that de Vitoria and Suàrez. Their extant writings broadly contributed to the establishment of human rights. S. supra note 6.24 These important political and legal principles have deep roots that go back in time to earlier thinkers—especially those from the Catholic Neo-Scholastic tradition such as de Vitoria. and debated wherever men sought understanding. 879 (1991–1992). The theories and actions of anyone. in that they each possessed reason. at 1017. are not solely or firstly the work of English and French Enlightenment thinking.J. Schall. liberty. had been ahead of their times in advancing the ideal of universal rights principles based on the natural law. 25. 15 FORDHAM INT’L L. supra note 9. THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000) (1934). O. In particular. This testing would result in an agreed upon law if the reasonable solution could be found.J.. THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: LECTURES ON FRANCISCO DE VITORIA [1480 –1546] AND FRANCISCO SUÀREZ [1548 –1617] (1928). 15 FORDHAM INT’L L.
or humanitarian character. at 269. G. Art. supra note 6. De Indis illustrates de Vitoria’s awareness of these matters and how the recognition of 28.N. 3. Art. 1.28 What is at stake is the solidarity of each member of the human family with all others. and states “in cooperation with the United Nations” must pledge themselves to “universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 30. 1. . Charter art. Art. As is stated in the Charter. supra note 11. and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. This is a point that de Vitoria realized and expressed in his writings. and the most essential right of all—the right to life—the right that guarantees all other human rights. at 278. Again. 31.”30 It should come as no surprise that in the advancement of universal human rights. Q. 271. Q. 32. 217(III) A. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. de Vitoria addresses the respective legitimate claims of the native peoples and the Spanish and suggests a type of dependency or need for the two to collaborate and cooperate with one another. 3. See DE INDIS. 4. social.32 Both peoples had. Through recognition of these responsibilities. U. 1. 3 (emphasis added). at 278 – 84.29 An important and relevant illustration of solidarity and human rights that are addressed in the Universal Declaration and that establish cornerstones of contemporary international law is the Charter of the United Nations. a major purpose for the United Nations Organization is to “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic. cultural. in his estimation. See id. at 250. 1. 10:2 These issues and the answers to them are critical to the welfare of human rights as we consider the fact that some present day advocates of “human rights” claim positions that violate fundamental claims protected by the Universal Declaration including family matters. para. Art. “friendly relations between nations” is essential. 2. it follows that both groups also possessed responsibilities owed to the other. Q. and conscience.320 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.A. Res. Q. 6. id. the right to emigrate. id. Because of their respective claims and the potential for conflict. religious freedom.”31 These are principles that are quickly identifiable in the work of de Vitoria as he addressed the peaceful relations between the peoples of the New World and those of Europe. For example. pmbl. 29. legitimate claims which might lead to conflict. both sides had the capacity to defuse the potential for conflict.
‘Yes. 2. Art. 2. id. 2. 1. 2.” Jacques Maritain.35 What the natural law is and what constitutes it are matters that must be addressed here and which have a bearing on the title of my address—a debt to de Vitoria. at 264. 1. Q. Q. Q. Introduction to United Nations Educational. Art. 36. Scientific and Cultural Organization. Q.N..’ That ‘why’ is where the argument begins. 3. id. See DE INDIS. Art. 1998). Hanley trans. 3. 1948) (emphasis added). 2. THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (Thomas R. supra note 6.e.’ they said. Q. 6. surely in part. 4. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. at 288. 5. Art. at 278 – 81. id.Spring 2012] OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA 321 respective responsibilities could alleviate the tensions between the two groups and thus avert conflict.e. Art. “It is related that at one of the meetings of a [UNESCO] National Commission where [h]uman [r]ights were being discussed. which informed de Vitoria and his fellow Neo-Scholastics and which inspired the jurisprudential thinking of de Vitoria and many others since his time. 2.37 In essence. id. 1. natural law reasoning that enabled the drafters to agree on the rights identified in the Universal Declaration.. Art. human—law. who chaired the UNESCO symposium that provided the drafters of the Universal Declaration with background perspectives on human rights. i. 37. The positive/posited law will then be imbued with the essential substantive principles that are desirable for the just governing of society in which rights and responsibilities coexist side 33. Q. U. at 244 – 45. Q. 3. once said. Art. 3. See id. 34. See generally HEINRICH ROMMEN. the natural law is planted within the objective reasoning process innate to the human person which enables and equips the person to develop a just positive—i. someone expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of those rights. id. id. Art. 35. at 269. human law—that can then be applied to govern a specific subject matter or jurisdiction. at 254. at 239. Q. I am confident that it was. UNESCO/PHS/3(rev. Jacques Maritain. Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations. at 260. . id. 1. Art. at 284.34 While they did not acknowledge the source. But de Vitoria himself was in debt to the institution of natural law. Doc.) at 1 (July 25. id. id.. it is in considerable part a means by which the human mind formulates legal principles—the positive.36 In the Roman Catholic intellectual tradition from which I speak. Q. what is essential to and what is constitutive of a “human right”? Another question quickly follows: Who or what confers them? A third ensues: What is their source? These questions can be answered by considering the jurisprudence contained in the natural law. 2.33 What is often overlooked today in most discussions of “human rights” is the fundamental question: What are they. Art. ‘we agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us why. 3. Q. 1. at 273 – 74.
Art. 1993). and evil is to be avoided. I-II. at 7. 39. Thomas Aquinas identifies natural law as those precepts that are “appointed by reason. FIFTY QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE NEED IT 33 (1995). Pt. 1–20) WITH THE ORDINARY GLOSS 6 (Augustine Thompson. treaties. in turn. enables people to flourish in ordered societies.”41 The first principle of this practical reason is this: “[G]ood is to be done and pursued.” Id. servitude. Id. ST. He then went on to define “civil law” as that which “each people and each commonwealth establishes as its own law for divine or human reasons. I-II. Id. As Ralph McInerny has stated: .P. SUMMA THEOLOGICA.”39 In his commentary (the “Ordinary Gloss”). 1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. How does the natural law and its reasoning process on which de Vitoria relied so often accomplish this? Answers can be found from the works of those who have labored in this vineyard over the centuries. “Natural law is common to all nations because it exists everywhere through natural instinct. 10:2 by side. Q. 94. the obligation of not harming ambassadors. not because of any enactment. The law of nations was given the explanation that “almost all nations make use of it. In the end. Q. 2 (arguing that practical reason is a self-evident principle).”40 In the Summa Theologiae. see also id. I-II. and the prohibition of marriage with aliens. 2 (emphasis omitted). This juxtaposition. notes in the Decretum that. armistices. GRATIAN: THE TREATISE ON LAWS (Decretum DD. Pt. postliminy [the law under which something lost as a result of captivity is restored to the original owner from whom the item was taken]. 94. Id. 41. fortification. at 6. Q. Reliance on the natural law provides assistance to individuals and their civil society as they seek that which is publicly and privately good. war. 42.”42 Aquinas also notes in his discussion of the natural law 38. & James Gordley trans. Art..”38 The celebrated Canonist Gratian. Christian Classics 1981) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. with building. Gratian explains that the natural quality of law means “an instinct of nature proceeding from reason. 40. Art. Pt. who compiled his collection of juridical principles during the twelfth century. captivity. It is this ordering that is inclined to bring harmony to the specific society for which the positive law was made. 94.” and it deals with the occupation of habitations.322 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. truces. the inevitable human law product of natural law reasoning should be a society in which individuals live together in peace and prosperity because this fundamental type of reasoning is inclined to seek virtue and to eschew vice. CHARLES RICE.. O. THOMAS AQUINAS. Professor Charles Rice acknowledges that natural law is a “guide to individual conduct” and “serves as a standard for the laws enacted by the state.
i. 1. Matthew 7:12 (New American Bible). See.. Q. righteous. Ralph McInerny. but rather it should be defined according to the harmonious development and the natural perfection of man. the object of justice is to keep people together in a society in which they share not only relationships with one another but relations that are right. Q. 43. Pt. Art. Pt. but the unifying thread is the distinctive mark of the human. 6. He recognizes self-preservation as a good and devises ways and means to secure it in shifting circumstances. Id. so too law is a work of reason. 78 MODERN SCHOOLMAN 9 (2000). supra note 41. Man does not simply have an instinct for self-preservation. 1 (discussing human law). The human good. 47.”48 Natural law is a dictate of reason. I-II. reason. is complex. Precepts of natural law are rational directives aiming at the good for man. Pt.”47 The notion of justice as being the mutuality or reciprocity shared among the members of society and essential to the dignity of each person was further refined by Aquinas when he argued that “the virtue of a good citizen is general justice. Art.. e. 58. 2. Pope Pius XII developed this theme on the eve of the Second World War when he stated that it is the noble prerogative and function of the State to control. I-I.46 In the context of Aquinas. That good can neither be defined according to arbitrary ideas nor can it accept for its standard primarily the material prosperity of society.g. Summi Pontificatus. 94. 95. 3. II-II. i. 45. Morris. JURIS. 58. John F. SUMMA THEOLOGICA.. “justice is concerned only about our dealings with others. 25 AM. . 46. see also id. The Principles of Natural Law.Spring 2012] OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA 323 that.e. Q. 5 (1980).e. Pt. SUMMA THEOLOGICA. aid and direct the private and individual activities of national life that they converge harmoniously towards the common good. J. Tobit 4:15 (New American Bible). man’s ultimate end. 44. whereby [each person] is directed to the common good. As he states. Q. II-II. It is for this perfection that society is designed by the Creator as a means. Art. The Contribution of Francisco de Vitoria to the Scholastic Understanding of the Principle of the Common Good. Aquinas also considers the common good—a vital element of the natural law thinking that strongly influenced de Vitoria. supra note 41. In his first encyclical.”43 The notion of the common good that is essential to this discussion might be characterized in the following manner: the good for each person must take stock of the good for the other person—this is indispensable to a proper understanding of human rights that must include a sense of reciprocity in which the Silver Rule44 [“Do to no one what you yourself dislike”] and the Golden Rule45 [“Do to others whatever you would have them do to you”] have a role. 48. Art. “other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good. see also Luke 6:31 (New American Bible).
1997) (1690). A review of classical and contemporary writings on natural law will demonstrate the connection between natural law and the common good. which is the source of human rights law as we know it today. made by him who has care of the community. Inevitably. i. I-II. has a strong foundation in the natural law tradition. Reason and cognitive function have played a crucial role in the evolution of law. See J. See JOHN LOCKE. Summi Pontificatus [Encyclical Letter on the Unity of Human Society ] ¶ 59 (1939) [hereinafter Summi Pontificatus]. the new order of the world. Aquinas acknowledges that law may be understood as “an ordinance of reason for the common good.”50 Reason—also something of crucial concern to the Neo-Scholastics such as de Vitoria—continues to play an important role in legal theory and practice. Thus. L. . 51. a seasoned diplomat of the first half of the twentieth century. 52.. . 4. ed.51 What is presented here is only a small portion. supra note 41. This illustration comes out of the adoption of the 1787 Constitution of the United States. Art.. must rest no longer on the quicksands of changeable and ephemeral standards that depend only on the selfish interests of groups and Pope Pius XII. and the impact of John Locke.52 Of course. THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 73 (Thomas P. See Oliver Wendell Holmes.S. REV. of the history of legal philosophy and legal theory that pertains to the initiation and development of human rights jurisprudence and the natural law foundation upon which this jurisprudence is built.324 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. Oliver Wendell Holmes’ great critique comes to mind49). . Q. my modest contribution is intended to introduce readers to the fact that international law.e. Peardon ed.. The Natural Law. 90. Summi Pontificatus. of national and international life. 1963). and they have been prominent participants in natural law philosophy. 6th ed. 32 HARV. pmbl. 40 (1918). THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 16 –25 (Sir Humphrey Waldock et al. de Vitoria was steeped in this foundation. notes in his first encyclical. CONST. L. see also U. 49. a tip of the iceberg. 50. BRIERLY. . SUMMA THEOLOGICA. As Pope Pius XII. Pt. 10:2 While legal theorists may express some disagreement about whether moral considerations are to be considered in legal theory (for example. the use of reason— reason that is right because it is righteous—leads the legal thinker to the notion of the common good—a principle that supports and reinforces the existence of law that is concerned with the identification and protection of authentic human rights. there is little dispute about the role that reason and objective reasoning have to play in legal theory.
Matthew 28:19 (New American Bible).Spring 2012] OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA 325 individuals. His answers to the questions surrounding the status of the native peoples and their due most likely astonished many of his contemporaries. . It is evident that de Vitoria asked himself the question: are the native peoples of the newly discovered worlds and who are being engaged by Europeans for the first time willing to accept the faith that I wish to give?56 This question led him to ask and then answer many more about the status of native people and to explore what might be their due. and this is why he saw the pressing need for both European and native peoples to encounter one another in peace so that their families and their lives could prosper in the authentic exercise of self-determination. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. However. on the solid rock of natural law and of Divine Revelation. 56. de Vitoria saw things very differently because his perspective was thoroughly permeated by the objective reasoning of the natural law and the existence of human dignity that belongs to all. 2.”55 But he did not see this scriptural exhortation posing a threat to the ordered relationship between native peoples and Europeans.54 Indeed. Art. including the native peoples. Summi Pontificatus. like their fellow Europeans. de Vitoria’s training embraced the spirit of St. supra note 6. supra note 48. at 265–72. Yet almost half a millennium later. Some Europeans of de Vitoria’s time obviously held the view that the native peoples were not due anything because they were not Europeans. 4. were created in the divine image of 53. therefore they could be subjugated and enslaved. See DE INDIS. ¶ 82. 54. at 233. A fundamental assertion that de Vitoria makes in De Indis is the fact that the native peoples of the so-called New World are not a savage or subhuman race but are individuals and human persons who. See DE INDIS. 55. No. “baptizing them in the name of the Father. Although others of his more enlightened compatriots thought that while subjugation or enslavement was not proper. they concluded that there was nothing wrong in imposing Christianity upon the native peoples. they must rest on the unshakable foundation.53 De Vitoria recognized the wisdom of the natural law. and of the holy Spirit. Matthew’s Gospel—to go forth and teach all nations. his views still make an extraordinary and necessary contribution to human rights discourse of the present age. and their wealth and property could be confiscated. De Vitoria quotes this scripture passage at the beginning of De Indis. Q. and of the Son. supra note 6.
at 249 (discussing a child bearing the image of God). they possessed the right to life and to human existence as much as anyone else. Q. 2. De Vitoria reached conclusions that were remarkable for his day because they foreshadowed formal declarations about and codifications of the human rights many years later in the twentieth century. Q. at 278 – 86. He paved the way for recognition of the universality of rights by extending to the native peoples what the “civilized” European claimed as his due. Q. For example. 59. 3.326 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. We are in enormous debt to him. See id. Arts. it would seem that the native person would bear God’s image as well. 10:2 God. in essence. 1–2. I emphasize the modifier universality. at 251–52.58 The conclusions he makes about the rights and dignity of the human person helped to establish some principles vital to the foundation of human rights doctrines that would be articulated in the Universal Declaration and then codified in subsequent human rights instruments of the twentieth century. got it: there can be no rights without 57. In this regard. he acknowledges that they have some rights in trying to encounter that which is new to them—in short. . In asserting this claim. Thus. 1. If the child does. Art. then it is the work of de Vitoria that often serves as the springboard for what is contained in the Universal Declaration. See id. For example. 58. which is tied to the suum cuique.59 This is a truth about human nature that is often lost in today’s discourse on rights. while critical of some actions taken by some Europeans in the New World. This deduction led de Vitoria to other conclusions that were not universally shared by his fellow Europeans. if principles of the Universal Declaration set in motion elements of human rights doctrine codified in subsequent juridical instruments. the Europeans had a reasonable and justifiable claim to explore and meet new peoples such as the New World and the native peoples that lived there. De Vitoria’s perspective is remarkably invigorating on another front in that it does not portray any particular individual or group as being solely victim or victimizer. they had the right to make the same claims based on human dignity as did their European contemporaries. the native peoples had property which could not be removed by force but only by consent.57 In short. it is important to take stock of how de Vitoria considers the rights of both the native peoples and the Europeans while at the same time acknowledging their respective duties or responsibilities to one another. Id. 5. De Vitoria.
nor should they be in any way enslaved. . Q. See id. Sublimus Dei ¶ 4 (1537). so elected. THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 418 – 26 (1935). the indigenous people. For a collection of these documents. available at http://www. 3. Some Europeans thought otherwise. 3. and their way of life in the name of an alleged superior civilization. the native peoples are the masters of their dominions and the owners of the property they use. The European could come to the native not as conqueror but as bearer of things—religion. . 1741). freely and legitimately. are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property .Spring 2012] OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA 327 attendant responsibilities. from his way of thinking. enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property.” The Pope hastened to add that. Pope Paul III. De Vitoria concludes that the native peoples are rational human beings quite capable of their own self-determination.net/ Paul03/p3subli. Q. Q. Benedict XIV (Bull of December 20. the equals of the Europeans in fundamental and essential ways.” Id. Such principles demand 60.. 1. 1839) did the same. Doing so would be akin to the error identified by Pius XII in his encyclical Summi Pontificatus when he declared: [I]t is indispensable for the existence of harmonious and lasting contacts and of fruitful relations. 61.” he stated that in any missionary activities.htm (on file with the Ave Maria Law Review). 1639). Christians must acknowledge that “the Indians are truly men and that they are not only capable of understanding the Catholic Faith but. November 3. .61 His views may have inspired several popes from the fifteenth through the twentieth centuries when they issued encyclicals urging Europeans and people of European heritage to desist in their enslavement of native peoples. 6. Other popes reiterated the concerns of Paul III during their pontificates. at 284 – 8 6. 2. commerce—that could contribute to the lives of the native people if they. Eugene IV condemned the slave trade occurring in the Canary Islands. education. at 250 – 51. it shall be null and have no effect. at 288 – 89. id.62 While it would be permissible for the Europeans to claim and secure uninhabited territories for the sovereign back home.g. in 1435. Art. While noting that Christians were encouraged by Jesus to “Go ye and teach all nations. See. but de Vitoria did not.papalencyclicals. see JOHN EPPSTEIN. subsequent popes such as Urban VIII (Bull of April 22. according to our information. Art.60 Because of this. the European explorer could not dispossess the natives of their lands. See id. their culture. 62. they desire exceedingly to receive it. that the peoples recognize and observe these principles of international natural law which regulate their normal development and activity. e. “the said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians. that they may and should. should the contrary happen. and Gregory XVI (Constitution Against the Slave Trade. For example. What were some of the ways in which he expressed this crucial insight? We first begin with how he understands the native peoples and whether they are.
supra note 48. SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 141 (1995). 34 VA.68 Once again taking account of the times in which he lived and wrote. to life and to the possibility of continuous development in the paths of civilization. . 1. See id. at 279.70 The interests of both converge on the ability of individuals to exercise their selections about how they wish to live their lives and to be free from the interference 63.328 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. see Hurst Hannum. 3. 65. J. 64. The concept of “self-determination” is important to natural law theory. See id.66 In this. supra note 6. Thus. ¶ 74. For helpful background discussion about “self-determination” as a right encompassing the practice of self-government. Within this discussion. Q. Q.67 If people are peace-loving. It also enjoys a protected status in the world of international law. For a current and careful examination of “self-determination” as principle and right. de Vitoria articulates clearly the notions about human rights and obligations of every person that are widely acknowledged today in relevant human rights instruments. the ability of the traveler to enter and meet and deal with the local peoples was another of the rights supported by natural reason. Luke 10:25 – 37 (New American Bible). 10:2 respect for corresponding rights to independence.63 A second very important point is de Vitoria’s declaration on the universality of rights. 70.64 In defense of this position. Summi Pontificatus. Art. they are entitled to call some place of their choosing home. we also see the relational aspect of rights which de Vitoria knew was essential to their sustainability. A third crucial point advanced by de Vitoria focuses on the issue concerning the relation between the native and the alien. 3. Rethinking Self-Determination. See DE INDIS. he relied on the scriptural account of Jesus telling the lawyer the parable of the Good Samaritan and responding to the question: “who is my neighbor?”65 As de Vitoria notes.69 It is a notion that synthesizes the interests of the individual and relates them to those of the community. 68. 67. at 278 –79. 1. 66. supra note 6. the response to the lawyer’s question of “who is my neighbor?” is this—everyone is my neighbor. de Vitoria offers his views on the freedom of movement of one person into the territory of another. Art. see ANTONIO CASSESE. INT’L L. See DE INDIS. Assuming that the traveler has no ill purpose in mind. 69. 1 (1993). at 279. he identified the legitimacy of peaceful exploration of the Europeans.
at 54. . As Professor Cassese has pointed out. “there is no self-determination without democratic decision-making. In one sense the self can turn to the voice of the surrounding culture. Brownlie continues by stating.72 He defined self-determination as “the right of cohesive national groups (‘peoples’) to choose for themselves a form of political organization and their relation to other groups. let us acknowledge our debt to him. supra note 70. But what happens when that culture is riddled with error—error that belittles or denies the rights which belong to every person created in God’s image. 71. See DE INDIS.75 One does not have to think too long or too hard about those legal cultures that were based not on the transcendent principles inscribed on the human heart and discoverable by the natural reason of the mind. or autonomy or assimilation in a unitary (nonfederal) state. 72. Q. 1998) (“It is not necessarily the case that there is a divorce between the legal and human rights of groups. 73. rather on human whim and caprice. That which is purely of human origin can be flawed. Art. See IAN BROWNLIE. However. association with other groups in a federal state. 46 (1992).”). an origin that does not go beyond the self which made it. but.” Id.”73 It is vital to note here that these ideas were emphasized time and again by de Vitoria in his advocacy for the rights of the native peoples whom the Europeans could encounter in peace and brotherhood but not in efforts to subjugate or enslave. at 239 – 40. “The choice may be independence as a state. and individuals. See Genesis 1:27 (New American Bible). Id. INT’L L. 1. But it is challenged by other views that are purely of human origin.74 This Catholic voice of the Neo-Scholastics is certainly a part of our legal discourse today concerning the importance and role of human rights.71 Professor Brownlie has noted the overlap of interests between the individual and the identifiable group. 75. 86 AM. on the other. 1.Spring 2012] OUR DEBT TO DE VITORIA 329 and imposition of others. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 599 (5th ed. on the one hand. See generally Thomas Franck. supra note 6. the refreshing tonic that can make the world a better place for not just some but all remains within our grasp—especially if we ponder the wisdom of individuals like de Vitoria. J. 74.” CASSESE. He has shown the way. The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance.
Documents Similar To Vitoria HR Foundation