Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/court-of-appeals-division-one-published/2008/ic070054.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-11 02:18:19
Document Index: 512341125

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 231062', '§ 94', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 23']

Carbajal v. ICA/Phelps :: 2008 :: Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One Published Decisions :: Arizona Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE SABINO CARBAJAL, Petitioner, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, PHELPS DODGE, Respondent Employer, GABB ROBBINS NORTH AMERICA, Respondent Carrier. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1 CA-IC 07-0054 DEPARTMENT E OPINION FILED 8-26-08
Special Action--Industrial Commission ICA CLAIM NO. 99632-000148 CARRIER CLAIM NO. 48846-57065 Anthony F. Halas, Administrative Law Judge AWARD AFFIRMED Law Office of Aida Rico By Aida J. Rico Attorneys for Petitioner Employee Laura L. McGrory, Chief Counsel The Industrial Commission of Arizona Attorneys for Respondent Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston PLLC By Scott H. Houston Attorneys for Respondents Employer and Carrier O R O Z C O, Judge Phoenix
Commission of Arizona (ICA) decision denying Sabino Carbajal’s (Claimant) request seeking compensation from Gabb Robbins North America (Carrier) for care provided by Celia Carbajal (Wife) during the times in which no skilled attendant care is provided to Claimant. For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Claimant sustained severe injuries to his head and spinal As a result of
cord in an industrial accident on November 4, 1999.
the accident, Claimant has right hemiparesis,1 as well as problems related to his cognitive ability. with a wheelchair or a walker. Claimant is able to ambulate
Claimant’s injury was found to be
compensable and Carrier accepted his claim for benefits. ¶3 In addition to his monthly loss of earning capacity (LEC)
entitlement, Carrier provided Claimant with a wheelchair accessible van. Carrier also made special modifications to Claimant’s home,
which included adding tile to the floor of the house and making the bathroom and shower area handicap accessible. The bathroom was
specifically designed so that Claimant could use it independently.
“Hemiparesis” is paralysis affecting only one side of the body. RightHealth, http://righthealth.com/Health/hemiparesis/-oddefinition_wiki_Hemiparesis-s (last visited July 28, 2008). 2
Additionally, Carrier provides Claimant with attendant
care services seven days a week for eight to ten hours each day. Monday through Friday, an attendant arrives at Claimant’s home at 6:00 a.m. to bathe, dress, and perform simple physical exercises with Claimant. his medication. Wife prepares Claimant’s breakfast and administers At 8 a.m. the attendant takes Claimant to the In the afternoon, Claimant
adult day care rehabilitation center.
is picked up from the center and dropped off at his home at 3:30 p.m.2 At 6:30 p.m., another attendant arrives and assists Claimant After performing range of motion exercises with
Claimant, the attendant prepares Claimant for bed and leaves at approximately 9:30 p.m. ¶5 On Saturdays, an attendant arrives at Claimant’s home at After the attendant has
7:00 a.m. and stays for a couple of hours.
left, Wife usually takes Claimant out to visit with family or the two will go out to eat. An attendant returns at 6:30 p.m. and On Sundays, an to church.
stays with Claimant until approximately 9:30 p.m. attendant
The dissent, infra ¶ 54, in arguing that the services provided are compensable, makes much of the fact that Wife “had to leave her full-time work to care for her husband.” However, it was undisputed that Claimant was at the facility six to seven hours each day. Therefore, if Wife wanted to work, there was certainly time in the day for her to do so. Wife, however, has not sought employment since the injury and there are doubts whether she could secure employment given her own health issues. Consequently, while it is undisputed that Wife did not work outside the home following Claimant’s accident, the reason why and whether she is able to do so, are unclear from this record. 3
Claimant is returned to his home at 1:00 p.m.
An attendant returns
at 6:30 p.m. for Claimant’s normal evening routine. ¶6 In addition to the services provided daily to Claimant, a
registered nurse visits with Claimant on a weekly basis to set up his medications, take his blood pressure, and check his
The nurse is also available to Claimant should any
significant health issues arise and will accompany him to the emergency room if need be. ¶7 On April 26, 2006, to Claimant filed a request for
section 23-1061(J) (Supp. 2007), alleging that Carrier had refused to compensate Wife for the attendant care she provided. Claimant
sought retroactive compensation for the care rendered by Wife during those hours when no attendant care was provided. hearing held on September 22, 2006, Claimant argued At a that
compensating Wife was only fair since Claimant requires attendant care 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Wife testified that on
weekdays, between 3:30 p.m. when Claimant returns from the day care center and 6:30 p.m. when the second attendant arrives, she sits him in his reclining chair, administers his medication, and feeds him dinner. Occasionally, Claimant will defecate or urinate on
himself at the rehabilitation center and Wife will change his clothing and clean him up when he returns home in the afternoon. Wife also testified that, after the second attendant leaves for the
night, she monitors Claimant’s oxygen while he is sleeping and assists him when he has to use the bathroom, which is often two to three times a night. Wife testified that, since Claimant’s injury,
she has had no life and likened caring for Claimant to having a child. ¶8 At a subsequent hearing held on November 22, 2006,
Claimant’s treating physician, Dr. Porter, testified that, although Claimant “cannot live alone” and must be “supervised for the most part,” he does not require “skilled [care at all times] that you can get in someone who has a tracheostomy or need[s] tube feedings or things like that.” For example, Dr. Porter testified that a
family member familiar with his needs could help Claimant get up and use the bathroom or set up his meals during the hours in which no attendant care was provided to Claimant. This assistance, Dr.
Porter explained, did not require a licensed health care provider or skilled caregiver, “just an attendant of sorts.” ¶9 Registered Nurse Boggs (Boggs), the case manager who
developed Claimant’s attendant care plan with Dr. Porter, also testified at the November 22 hearing. Boggs testified that she Boggs opined that
would not change Claimant’s attendant care plan.
Claimant was capable of doing some things for himself, but Claimant believes that the attendants should do these tasks for him since they are being paid. For instance, Boggs testified that Claimant
has used the bathroom without assistance at home and at the day
She also testified that Claimant would not need to
get up as much at night if he used a urinal placed by his bed, as he had previously done when Wife went to Mexico for a couple of weeks. Boggs testified that none of her other patients that are
similarly situated to Claimant require “24-hour per day attendant care.” ¶10 After considering all the evidence before him, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Wife was not entitled to compensation for the care she provided Claimant and denied
Claimant’s request for investigation.
The ALJ reasoned that “the
care rendered by [Wife] is not of the type which necessitates a trained attendant, but rather is more closely akin to the day-today duties assumed The by a spouse in accord with the marriage award on
administrative review, and Claimant brought this special action. ¶11 This court has jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12(2003), 23-951(A) (1995), and Arizona Rules of
120.21(A)(2)
Procedure for Special Actions 10. DISCUSSION ¶12 Although deference is owed to the ALJ’s factual findings
on appeal, PFS v. Indus. Comm’n, 191 Ariz. 274, 277, 955 P.2d 30, 33 (App. 1997), questions requiring the interpretation of a statute are issues of law, which we review de novo. Schwarz v. City of “When
Glendale, 190 Ariz. 508, 510, 950 P.2d 167, 169 (App. 1997). 6
considering the facts of this case, we have been mindful of our duty to liberally construe the Act to effect its purpose of having industry bear its share of the burden of human injury as a cost of doing business. But, a ‘liberal construction is not synonymous Putz v. Indus. Comm’n, 203 Ariz. 983-84 (App. 2002)(quoting
with a generous interpretation.’” 146, 150-51, ¶ 24, 51 P.3d
Nicholson v. Indus. Comm’n, 76 Ariz. 105, 109, 259 P.2d 547, 549 (1953)). ¶13 Our workers’ compensation statute provides that, “upon
notice to the employer, every injured employee shall receive medical, surgical and hospital benefits or other treatment,
nursing, medicine, surgical supplies, crutches and other apparatus, . . . reasonably required . . . during the period of disability.” A.R.S. § 23-1062(A) (1995). In this case of first impression, we
are asked to determine whether care provided by a spouse to an injured claimant in the marital home can be considered “other treatment” under A.R.S. § 23-1062(A). While in other circumstances
we might be compelled to hold otherwise, we conclude that, under the facts of this case, the care rendered by Wife did not fall within the ambit of medical care contemplated by A.R.S. § 231062(A). ¶14 Courts were initially reluctant to embrace the idea of a spouse who is not a licensed health-care
practitioner for care provided to an injured claimant “on the 7
ground that the [spouse] did no more than he or she was bound to do as an affectionate member of the family.” 5 Arthur Larson & Lex K.
Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 94.03(4)(b) (2007). Many jurisdictions have abandoned that view and permitted
compensation to a spouse on the ground “that the services required were of an extraordinary nature and not those contemplated by the usual marital relationship.” A.G. Crunkleton Elec. Co. v.
Barkdoll, 177 A.2d 252, 255 (Md. 1962); see, e.g., Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So.2d 241, 243-44 (Fla. 1961). Those courts have
considered a number of factors in determining whether spousal care is compensable including: whether the services are those typically performed by licensed health practitioners; whether the services were performed under medical direction; and whether the claimant needs continuous care. See Warren Trucking Co. v. Chandler, 277
S.E.2d 488, 493 (Va. 1981); Close v. Superior Excavating Co., 693 A.2d 729, 731 (Vt. 1997). ¶15 Two cases illustrate the framework under which courts In
employing this approach analyze the issue of spousal care.
Warren Trucking, the claimant suffered injuries to his head and neck as a result of an industrial accident. 277 S.E.2d at 489.
After the accident, the claimant had a series of dizzy spells and frequently blacked out, which forced him to remain home under his wife’s care. Id. at 490-91. The claimant requested compensation
for the attendant care provided to him by his wife, which consisted 8
of “bathing, shaving, feeding, assistance in walking, help with braces, aid upon falling, driving and administering routine
Id. at 489, 494.
The Virginia Supreme Court, in
reversing the compensation award, held that such services were “not beyond the scope of normal household duties.” Id. at 494. Nor
were the services “of the type usually rendered only by trained attendants.” ¶16 Id.
In Close, the claimant sustained a severe head injury in 693 A.2d at 730. The claimant required
24-hour attendant care as a result of the accident, which left him subject to seizures, disorientation, and memory loss. Id. The Id.
claimant’s wife provided full-time care to him at their home.
The wife’s duties were assigned to her by the claimant’s physicians and included administering and monitoring his medications, changing the doses of his medication, maintaining a log of the claimant’s behaviors, and assisting the claimant during seizures. Id. The
claimant sought compensation for the care rendered by his wife. Id. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the wife’s services were compensable. Id. at 732. Of particular significance to the court
was the fact that the claimant’s physicians regarded the duties performed by the wife as those which would typically be rendered by a nurse. Id. at 731-32. Moreover, given the claimant’s seizure Id. at 731;
activity, he required attendant care 24 hours a day.
see also Kenbridge Constr. Co. v. Poole, 486 S.E.2d 567, 569 (Va. 9
Ct. App. 1997) (finding “extensive” services provided by the claimant’s wife compensable when she received significant medical training in order to care for him and the care provided was of the type usually performed by skilled heart and attendants, rate enemas, and and which blood included pressure, his
administering medications). ¶17
The dissent, infra ¶ 40, maintains that we misinterpret
A.R.S. § 23-1062(A) because we interpret “other treatment” to mean “other [medical] treatment,” which presumably would not cover the services performed by Wife. statute “superfluous.” The dissent calls our reading of the
However, one of the cardinal rules of
statutory interpretation provides that “when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining principle Section 23-1062(A) states that “upon notice
of ejusdem generis).
to the employer, every injured employee shall receive medical, surgical and hospital benefits or other treatment, nursing,
medicine, surgical supplies, crutches and other apparatus, . . . reasonably required . . . during the period of disability.” § 23-1062(A) (emphasis added). A.R.S.
In light of the rule of ejusdem
generis, the words preceding “other treatment,” “medical, surgical and hospital,” suggest that the legislature intended the statute to
cover treatment or benefits of the “medical” type and not services which would normally be rendered by a spouse during a marriage. ¶18 The dissent, infra ¶ 41, further argues that we are not
free to rely on rules of statutory interpretation when a statute, like A.R.S. § 23-1062(A), is “clear on its face.” However, we do
not believe the language of A.R.S. § 23-1062(A) is as clear and unambiguous as the dissent suggests, and therefore, find it
appropriate to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to this statute. The ambiguity of the phrase is punctuated by the use of
the adjective, “other,” and must, therefore, be read in relation to the words preceding it. ¶19 We find support for our interpretation of A.R.S. § 23-
1062(A) in Hughes v. Industrial Commission, 188 Ariz. 150, 933 P.2d 1218 (App. 1996). In Hughes, this court held that “other
treatment” did not encompass child care services for purposes of benefits under A.R.S. § 23-1062(A). at 1221-22. 188 Ariz. at 153-54, 933 P.2d
The claimant argued that “child care [was] reasonably
required other treatment because it [was] necessitated by and necessary to treat her industrial injury.” 1221. Id. at 153, 933 P.2d at
Applying the principle of ejusdem generis to A.R.S. § 23-
1062(A), this court concluded that the statute did not extend to child care because it was not of the same type or class as the specifically enumerated services. P.2d at 1222. Hughes, 188 Ariz. at 154, 933
The court reasoned that child care was a service 11
“not generally considered medical treatment.” added.) ¶20
Likewise, the services rendered by Wife in this case are Contrary to the
not generally considered medical treatment.
dissent’s assertion, infra ¶ 51, the services provided by Wife in this case were not the type of services typically rendered by a nurse, as in Close. In Close, the physician concluded “that if
only one person were to be in attendance, that person should be capable of providing skilled nursing care.” 693 A.2d at 732. In
this case, there was no such conclusion by Claimant’s physician. In fact, as previously stated, Claimant only required “an attendant of sorts,” not someone capable of