Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2004_documents/04me15tr.htm
Timestamp: 2014-04-24 07:53:59
Document Index: 367720875

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n207', '§ 210', '§ 758', '§\n1227', '§ 16', '§ 2123', '§ 2121', '§ 2122', '§ 2124', '§ 2122', '§ 1201', '§\n1201', '§ 5', '§ 1346', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 2123', '§ 2']

STATE v. TROTT
Decision: 2004 ME 15
Docket: Yor-03-259
C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA,* ALEXANDER,
and CALKINS, JJ.
GENO L. TROTT
[¶1] Geno L. Trott appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Biddeford, Janelle, J.) dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, his
petition for a writ of coram nobis and for post-conviction review. Trott contends that the District Court
may review his conviction pursuant to the common law writ of coram nobis and that, because he is
a noncitizen facing possible deportation, he has an independent constitutional
right to some forum for post-conviction review of judgments resulting from his
no contest pleas to two criminal charges. Because the District Court correctly concluded that the Superior Court
is the proper forum for Trott's effort to obtain post-conviction relief, we
affirm the District Court judgment.
[¶2] In a three-count criminal complaint,
Geno L. Trott was charged with assaulting his wife (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.A. §
207(1) (1983), terrorizing his wife (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 210(1)(A)
(1983 & Supp. 2001), and obstructing the report of a crime (Class D), 17-A
M.R.S.A. § 758(1)(A) (Supp. 2003). At his arraignment, Trott pled not guilty. Subsequently he was assigned counsel to assist in his defense. [¶3] On December 18, 2001, Trott appeared with his attorney and pled no
contest to the terrorizing and obstructing the report of a crime charges. In return, the State dismissed the
assault charge. Upon the
convictions, Trott was sentenced to sixty days in the county jail, with credit
for time served. The court added
to the complaint a notation: "Not domestic violence cases." Because Trott had been incarcerated for
more than sixty days since he had been charged, he was released without further
restriction or any term of probation. [¶4] In early 2003, Trott, who is a citizen of Bermuda, applied to the Bureau
of Citizenship and Immigration Services for an adjustment of his citizenship
status. Upon review of his record,
it appeared to BCIS that the 2001 convictions constituted crimes of domestic
violence that may be deportable offenses pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (1999). Each of
Trott's convictions may be domestic violence crimes because they involved "use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" against Trott's wife. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000).
[¶5] In April of 2003, Trott filed in the District Court a motion to vacate
his convictions. Trott asserted
that the convictions, based on his no contest pleas, were obtained in violation
of his right to effective assistance of counsel and right to due process. Essentially, Trott argued that counsel
should have investigated and advised him regarding possible immigration
consequences of any plea prior to his entry of his pleas. The District Court denied the motion. The court concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction of the motion, citing 15 M.R.S.A. § 2123
(Pamph. 2002), which vests jurisdiction of petitions for post-conviction review
with the Superior Court.[1] [¶6] As he did in District Court, Trott argues to us that the common law writ
of coram nobis
available to provide him a remedy if no other remedy is available and that, in
addition, he has a constitutional due process right to have the District Court
consider the merits of his motion when he is facing deportation as a result of
the convictions. These arguments
need be reached only if, as Trott assumes, no remedy was available to him
through the post-conviction review statute, 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 2121‑2132
(2003). [¶7] The District Court ruled as a matter of law that Trott's remedy, if any,
was provided by the post-conviction review statute. We review de novo trial court decisions on issues of
law. Botka v. S.C. Noyes &
2003 ME 128, ¶ 18, 834 A.2d 947, 952. Accordingly, prior to addressing Trott's contentions, we
must first determine whether the District Court erred in its legal conclusion
that, pursuant to the post-conviction review statute, the Superior Court had
exclusive jurisdiction of Trott's claims seeking post-conviction relief.
[¶8] The post-conviction review statute, at 15 M.R.S.A. § 2122, provides
that: "except for direct appeals from a criminal judgment" it is "the exclusive
method of review of those criminal judgments . . . ." Section 2122 also states that: "It is a remedy for illegal
restraint and other impediments specified in section 2124 that have occurred
directly or indirectly as a result of an illegal criminal judgment or
post-sentencing proceeding." Section 2124 provides that an action for post-conviction review may be
brought when the petitioner demonstrates that the challenged criminal judgment
"is causing a present restraint or other specified impediment" as described in
section 2124. The relevant
restraints or impediments to be considered for purposes of this appeal are
stated in subsection 1 of section 2124. Subsection 1 defines "present restraint by criminal judgment" as
1. Present restraint by criminal judgment. Present restraint or impediment as a
direct result of the challenged criminal judgment:
A. Incarceration pursuant
to the sentence imposed as a result of the criminal judgment which is
B. Other restraint,
including probation, parole, other conditional release or a juvenile
disposition other than incarceration or probation, imposed as a result of the
sentence for the criminal judgment which is challenged;
C. A sentence of
unconditional discharge resulting from a criminal judgment, for a period of 2
years following the date of sentence;
D. Incarceration, other
restraint or an impediment specified in paragraphs A, B and C which is to be
served in the future, although the convicted or adjudicated person is not in
execution of the sentence either because of release on bail pending appeal of
the criminal judgment or because another sentence must be served first; or E. A fine imposed by the
challenged criminal judgment which has not been paid;
15 M.R.S.A. § 2124(1) (2003).
[¶9] Trott's situation does not qualify as present restraint under paragraphs
A, D, or E of subsection 1. Accordingly, we examine paragraphs B and C to determine if either
provides a basis for Trott's petition. As a result of the judgment of conviction, Trott is presently subject to
restraint in the course of the deportation proceedings. However, this restraint is imposed as a
result of the judgment itself, not the sentence for the judgment. Paragraph B addresses restraint as a
result of the "sentence" rather than the criminal judgment. Thus, paragraph B of subsection 1 does
not apply to Trott's situation. [¶10] Paragraph C defines present restraint by criminal judgment to include a
sentence of unconditional discharge resulting from a criminal judgment, for a
period of two years following the date of sentence. Trott's conviction and sentence to time served has caused a
direct or indirect impediment resulting from a criminal judgment as
contemplated by 15 M.R.S.A. § 2122. However, a sentence to "time served" with no further restraint or
restriction, as was imposed on Trott, does not appear to have been contemplated
by the drafters of section 2124 in defining the various sentencing choices that
may constitute "present restraint." We must determine whether paragraph C may be interpreted, in light of
the overall purpose and intent of the post-conviction review statute, to
include within its coverage a sentence to time served without further
restriction. [¶11] When the post-conviction review statute was adopted in 1979,
unconditional discharge was described in the Criminal Code at 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 1201(2) (Pamph. 1979). Originally, the unconditional discharge sentencing choice provided that
if there was no need for probation or other guidance or supervision of an
offender "and no proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition or
supervision on his release, he shall be sentenced to an unconditional
discharge." 17-A M.R.S.A. §
1201(2). The unconditional
discharge provision was amended by P.L. 1999, ch. 24, § 5 and moved to its own
section of the Criminal Code, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1346 (Supp. 2003). Section 1346 provides that a person who
is eligible to be sentenced to probation pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1201(1), "and for whom a court determines
that no other authorized sentencing alternative is appropriate punishment must
be sentenced by the court to an unconditional discharge." [¶12] A sentence to time served without probation or other form of restraint
or supervision is identical to an unconditional discharge in that it represents
a determination by the court that, at the time of sentencing, "no proper
purpose would be served by imposing any condition or supervision" on an
offender's release. 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 1201(2) (1983). As of the moment
Trott was sentenced, he was subject to no further impediment, supervision, or
condition. If anything, the
disposition in his case may be viewed as a more significant restraint or
impediment than a straight unconditional discharge because it reflected that,
while no further restraint or impediment was being imposed, a proper purpose
had been served by Trott having spent time in jail awaiting disposition. [¶13] We will not construe legislation to create absurd results. See Town of Eagle Lake v. Comm'r, Dep't of Educ., 2003 ME 37, ¶ 7, 818 A.2d 1034, 1037. Such a result would occur here if we construe section 2124(1)(C) to allow consideration of a post-conviction review petition as a result of an unconditional discharge where an individual had served no time in jail prior to sentencing—or where any jail time that the individual had served was not recognized in the sentence—but we deny consideration of a post-conviction review petition where an individual was similarly released without further restraint but had previously served some time in jail which was recognized in the time served sentence. A sentence to time previously served, imposed without any additional term of probation or other restriction on the individual, is the functional equivalent of an unconditional discharge as that term is addressed by the post-conviction review statute. Such a time served sentence is a present restraint by criminal judgment pursuant to section 2124(1)(C). Accordingly, the District Court correctly determined that a remedy was available for Trott to address his concerns through post-conviction review and that exclusive jurisdiction for that remedy rested with the Superior Court. [¶14] In reaching this result, we note that the factual record of counsel's
representation of Trott before the District Court is not complete. Further, we express no opinion as to
whether or to what extent as a matter of fact or law, Trott may presently be
entitled to relief through a post-conviction action in the Superior Court. We only determine that the District
Court's limited ruling was correct.
Charles K. Leadbetter, State Solicitor (orally)
6 State House Station Augusta, ME 04333-0006
Mark Lawrence, District Attorney
Tara K. Bates, Esq., of Counsel
Robert A. Levine, Esq. (orally)
* Although not available at oral argument, Justice Dana participated in the development of this opinion. See M.R. App. P. 12(a) (stating that a "qualified justice may participate in a decision even though not present at oral argument").
Effective September 13, 2003, 15 M.R.S.A. § 2123 was amended by operation of P.L. 2003, ch. 29, § 2. The 2003 amendment, effective after the District Court proceedings were completed, does not affect the issues on this appeal or the rights addressed in this opinion.