Source: http://www.annalsofhealthlaw.com/annalsofhealthlaw/vol__25_issue_1?pg=67
Timestamp: 2019-06-19 01:24:55
Document Index: 136850360

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 52', '§ 34', '§ 548', '§ 1303', '§ 7', '§ 2315']

the terms of the legislation itself144 and/or by judicial decision,145 tortfeasors, typically, are not entitled to reduce claimants’ recoveries by the amounts paid by insurance for future medical expenses or when recoveries are subject to governmental or contractual rights of subrogation.146
Another way in which the proposal would burden claimants with future medical expenses is by limiting their ability to obtain quality care. As noted
144. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a(a), (b) (West 2014) (“In any civil action . . . wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from . . . personal injury or wrongful death . . . arising out of the rendition of professional services by a health care provider, . . . the court shall reduce the amount of such award . . . by an amount equal to the total of amounts determined to have been paid . . . . Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier of fact and before the court enters judgment, the court shall receive evidence from the claimant and other appropriate persons concerning the total amount of collateral sources which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant as of the date the court enters judgment.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44- 1-2 (West 2010) (“In a personal injury or wrongful death action, the court shall allow the admission into evidence of . . . proof of collateral source payments . . . .”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251( 1) (West 2008) (“‘[ C]ollateral sources’ means payments related to the injury or disability in question made to the plaintiff, or on the plaintiff’s behalf up to the date of the verdict . . . .”); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508(a) (West 2002) (“[ A] claimant in a medical professional liability action is precluded from recovering damages for past medical expenses or past lost earnings incurred to the time of trial to the extent that the loss is covered by a private or public benefit or gratuity that the claimant has received prior to trial.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7. 70.080 (West 2006) (“Any party may present evidence to the trier of fact that the plaintiff has already been compensated for the injury complained of from any source . . . .”).
145. See Staats v. Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 63 A. D.3d 1573, 1574 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (“We conclude, however, that the court erred in granting defendant a further offset beyond that 27-month period, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. We agree with plaintiff that defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing ‘with reasonable certainty,’ i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, that plaintiff would remain entitled to the continued receipt of benefits from a collateral source.”); Grell v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3:05-cv-1237- J-32HTS, 2007 WL 1362728, at 3 (M. D. Fla. May 7, 2007) (“Accordingly, the Court declines to set off potential future third party insurance or Medicare payments for future medical expenses.”); Amlotte v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 2d 922, 924 (E. D. Mich. 2003) (“[P]ayments from a collateral source may not be set off against future medical expenses under Michigan law . . . .”); Parker v. Esposito, 677 A.2d 1159, 1162–63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“[T]he phrase ‘if a plaintiff . . . is entitled to receive benefits,’ [as used in collateral source statute,] refers only to those benefits to be paid post-judgment to which plaintiff has an established, enforceable legal right when judgment is entered and which are not subject to modification based on future unpredictable events or conditions. In other words, future collateral benefits are deductible [under collateral source statute] only to the extent that ‘they can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty.’”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So. 2d 289, 291-92 (Fla. 2000) (holding that future potential benefits under the medical payments coverage were not “available” within the meaning of the statute, requiring a court to reduce damages by amounts otherwise available from all collateral sources, and, thus, the remaining benefits did not require a setoff).
146. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20( A) (West 2015) (“In any tort action, the defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the damages that result from an injury, death, or loss to person or property that is the subject of the claim upon which the action is based, except if the source of collateral benefits has a mandatory self-effectuating federal right of subrogation, a contractual right of subrogation, or a statutory right of subrogation . . . .”).