Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/511/611/399056/
Timestamp: 2017-09-22 11:49:51
Document Index: 767004652

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 151', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 8']

Monroe Auto Equipment Co., Hartwell Division, Plaintiff-appellant, v. National Labor Relations Board et al., Defendants-appellees, 511 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975) :: Justia
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Monroe Auto Equipment Co., Hartwell Division, Plaintiff-appellant, v. National Labor Relations Board et al., Defendants-appellees, 511 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 511 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975)
In August and September 1966, the Union requested the Company to begin negotiations. The Company refused on the ground the Union was not legally elected for the reasons urged in its objections to the second election. Unfair labor practice charges were filed and on December 9, 1966, a complaint issued. On March 29, 1967, the Trial Examiner found that the Employer's refusal to bargain violated §§ 8(a) (5) and (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. On May 5, 1967, the Board affirmed the Trial Examiner's rulings, adopted his findings, and ordered the Employer to bargain with the Union. 167 NLRB 1051.
Pursuant to our remand, a hearing was held from June 4 to 7, 1969. The Trial Examiner recommended that several of the Employer's objections to the election be sustained and the election be set aside. The Board reversed the Trial Examiner, overruled the Employer's objections to the election and reaffirmed the Union's certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees. The Board found the Employer's admitted refusal to bargain with the Union violated §§ 8(a) (5) and (1) and ordered the Company to bargain in good faith with the Union. 186 NLRB No. 18. When the Company still refused to bargain, the Board again sought enforcement of its Order here. This Court enforced the Board's Order, N.L.R.B. v. Monroe Auto Equipment Co., 5 Cir., 1972, 470 F.2d 1329, and the Supreme Court denied the Employer's petition for certiorari, Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. N.L.R.B., 1973, 412 U.S. 928, 93 S. Ct. 2752, 37 L. Ed. 2d 155.
On the merits, we think both the Supreme Court, N.L.R.B. v. Warren Co., 1955, 350 U.S. 107, 76 S. Ct. 185, 100 L. Ed. 96; Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 1954,348 U.S. 96, 75 S. Ct. 176, 99 L. Ed. 125; and this Court, Bishop v. N.L.R.B., 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1024; N.L.R.B. v. Big Three Industries, Inc., 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 43, have made ourselves clear. The Employer has neither successfully distinguished those cases, nor even cited them in its briefs. Rather, we think the distinction urged at oral argument weakens rather than strengthens the Employer's case.
For the Employer argues the District Court had jurisdiction over its complaint because of Board action clearly contrary to the statutory mandate in § 9(c) (1) of the Act1 , invoking Leedom v. Kyne, 1958, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S. Ct. 180, 3 L. Ed. 2d 210 and that tiny body of case law which opens the door seldom and then only slightly. Substantial employee turnover since the 1966 election, it is argued, in itself raises ' a question of representation'. Further, it urges that this case is different from Bishop and Big Three, because here the question of representation arose solely from the employee turnover and from no culpable action on the Employer's part.
But if the Employer's hypothesis were correct, an employer's best defense would no longer be to mount a good offense, it would be to do absolutely nothing. An employer would not only be relieved of an obligation to make some showing of an employee change-of-heart, he would incur no risk of violating § 8(a) (1) and precipitating an unfair labor practice complaint. We in no way suggest that the first round was fought in bad faith--the Employer correctly points to the Examiner's sustaining its objections in 1969 to refute any such contention. But having fought through certiorari, the cause was lost--and obedience must follow loss.
The major rationale of the cited cases for the Board's not being required to reconsider representation upon the passing of time, is that the frustrating passage of time without union-gained results might unfairly prejudice employees--at least against the union in question. And frustration may be all the greater when the employer wins simply by litigation delay--without even carrying the battle to the front lines where § 8(a) (1) can be used as a weapon.