Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/112/517/585008/
Timestamp: 2019-12-15 21:08:21
Document Index: 32507934

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 841', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Dianne Brown, Defendant-appellant, 112 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1997 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Dianne Brown, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Dianne Brown, Defendant-appellant, 112 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1997)
Dianne Brown, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging her conviction for conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 846, and for using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Brown contends that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support her section 924(c) conviction under Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995); (2) she was denied due process by the district court's failure to rule more quickly on her section 2255 motion; (3) she was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (4) she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We review de novo a district court's decision on a section 2255 motion. See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1995). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and we affirm.
Evidence offered to support a conviction is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1996).
Section 924(c) (1) provides for enhanced penalties if the defendant "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). To "carry" a firearm under 924(c), a defendant "must have transported the firearm on or about his or her person ... This means the firearm must have been immediately available for use by the defendant." See Hernandez, 80 F.3d at 1258.
Brown contends that the district court's significant delay in deciding her section 2255 motions has deprived her of due process. Because Brown has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced by the delay in hearing this appeal, her contention lacks merit. See United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that delay caused by deferring section 2255 motion until after direct appeal is concluded does not render section 2255 remedy inadequate).
In order for the petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, she must first show that (1) her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, (2) that her counsel's errors prejudiced her case. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 1989). The "reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Brown has not demonstrated how her counsel's failure to object to the PSR was prejudicial. According to the PSR, Brown was carrying a loaded firearm in her purse at the time of the offense. However, the evidence at trial showed this same information. Thus, Brown was not prejudiced by her counsel's failure to object to these facts in the PSR. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. See Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (failing to raise a meritless argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
Because Brown did not raise her "rule of lenity" claim in her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, we will not consider it here. See United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993)