Source: http://tuftythecat.blogspot.de/2013/10/partial-priority-opposing-view.html
Timestamp: 2017-03-30 12:47:00
Document Index: 217574793

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 54', 'Art. 123', 'Art. 87', 'Art. 123', 'Art. 87', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 88', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 123', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 54']

Joe Muddiman15 October 2013 at 13:18If, unlike this opposing view, we accept that the "A or not A" formulation defines a limited number of alternative subject-matters, then can anyone put forward an example which does not define a limited number of alternatives? I can't think of any, and so begs the question, what does the G2/98 qualification actually mean?I think so long as there is clear support in the description for the conceptual split subject-matters then it should be okay.ReplyDeleteMyshkin15 October 2013 at 23:04The opponent spotted the same contradiction between the third example of the Memorandum and G 2/98 as I have spotted. The example is based on the premise that a claim "method of coating inner walls of hollow bodies other than pipes" can be based on the disclosure "method of coating walls of bottles or any other hollow body". This is in flat contradiction with the conclusion of G 2/98.The drafters seem to have assumed that adding a disclaimer to a claim was always allowable. At the time the Memorandum was drafted this may not have been an unreasonable assumption. But it has turned out to be an incorrect assumption.Ignoring such incorrect assumptions made by the drafters, what the Memorandum really proposes is that if it is possible to draft parallel alternative claims with various priorities, then the applicant should be allowed to OR them together into a single claim, possibly replacing the alternatives with a generic term covering exactly those alternatives, while letting each of the alternatives keep its priority. The if is essential.The opponent points out something that I had missed. In point 11.7 of the reasons of T 1222/11, the Board indeed appears to admit the contradiction between the conclusion of G 2/98 and the examples in the Memorandum. The Board brushes this contradiction away by arguing that the conclusion of G 2/98 is not valid for OR-claims. This is a remarkable argument, to say the least. According to the Board this follows "implicitly" from point 6.7 of G 2/98. The idea seems to be that if all the examples in the Memorandum fully comply with the law, then G 2/98 cannot apply to these examples because otherwise it would contradict with the examples! This is circular reasoning, and it does not explain why the conclusion does not make mention of this exception.ReplyDeleteRepliesTufty the Cat16 October 2013 at 09:44I think your point here is the key issue on which we disagree. Your argument, as I understand it, is that for a valid claim to multiple priorities it must be possible to divide the claim up into individual claims without adding matter, i.e. there must be basis in the application for an actual division of claims. My argument is that this should not be necessary, because the scope of any actual divided claims when put together would be the same as the undivided claim. I think your argument comes from the overly formulaic approach often taken at the EPO regarding basis for amendments. My argument is, I think, more pragmatic as it avoids the need for the drafter (who is not necessarily familiar with European practice) to make sure there is explicit basis for the nominal "non-A" part as well as the "A" part that has a priority claim. DeleteMyshkin16 October 2013 at 22:52Your argument, as I understand it, is that for a valid claim to multiple priorities it must be possible to divide the claim up into individual claims without adding matter, i.e. there must be basis in the application for an actual division of claims.Indeed, and this is exactly what the drafters of the Memorandum assume to be the case in the examples that they have given. The Memorandum's argument for multiple priorities is that it leads to more concise drafting (one OR-claim instead of multiple parallel claims), not that it allows to obtain protection for subject-matter that could otherwise not be protected.DeleteTufty the Cat17 October 2013 at 08:47I can see why you might think that. However, the inevitable consequence of the ability to have multiple priorities in a single claim, at least for the range and pipe/hollow body examples in the memorandum, is that an application could have a more broadly defined claim with no literal basis for dividing it out into multiple claims that together have the same scope. Although the principle aim of the memorandum appears to be, as you state, to avoid the need for multiple claims, the consequence is that a claim without clear basis for being divided up would still be valid. This must therefore mean that there is no need to have basis for multiple claims for Article 88(2) to apply.DeleteAnonymous17 October 2013 at 10:39If it's true that "the concept of disclosure must be the same for the purposes of Articles 54, 87 and 123 EPC" - why do anti-T1222/11 commentators only compare A87 and A123? A disclosure can fall within the scope of the claim and destroy the novelty of that particular subject matter under A54, even if there is no basis within the application. The same could be true for A87. A disclosure in the priority document can fall within the scope of the claim and give rise to a priority entitlement for that particular subject matter under A87, even if there is no basis within the application.DeleteMyshkin18 October 2013 at 23:09The concept of disclosure is the same, but the fact that a specific disclosure takes away the novelty of a generic disclosure within the meaning of Art. 54 does not mean that a specific disclosure provides a sufficient basis for a generic disclosure (or the other way around) within the meaning of Art. 123(2) or Art. 87(1).Art. 123(2) and Art. 87(1) require that the subject-matters being compared are the "same". Art. 54 does not require the subject-matters being compared to be the "same", but only that a subject-matter disclosed in a prior art document is encompassed by the subject-matter of a claim.I'm sorry to say this, but this is rather elementary.DeleteAnonymous25 October 2013 at 11:29The Enlarged Board in G 2/98 said "The requirement for claiming priority of ”the same invention”, referred to in Article 87(1) EPC, means that priority of a previous application in respect of a claim in a European patent application in accordance with Article 88 EPC is to be acknowledged only if the skilled person can derive the subject-matter of the claim directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the previous application as a whole."It doesn't seem unreasonable to me to understand "the subject matter of the claim" to mean any subject matter that is encompassed by the claim. Thus, provided that an embodiment (encompassed by an OR-generic claim) is directly and unambiguously disclosed within the priority application, then that embodiment of the claim is entitled to priority. As T 1222/11 states, this involves a comparison of the subject-matter of the claim with the disclosure of the multiple priority documents, so as to determine which parts of the claim are covered by the rights of priority claimed.DeleteReplyMyshkin15 October 2013 at 23:18I don't see why G 2/98's approval of the Memorandum's expression of the legislative intent underlying Article 88(2) EPC would make it improbable that G 2/98 did not also approve of the specifics of the examples.What if the EBA did not agree with the details of the examples. Should it have said so in G 2/98? I do not see a reason for that.The summary of the Memorandum given in G 2/98 abstracts away from these details and focusses on what, in the EBA's view, was really the point of the Memorandum: that if respective claims to A and B have different priorities, then a claim to A or B has multiple priorities. According to the EBA, this is how Art. 88(2) has to be understood.ReplyDeleteMyshkin15 October 2013 at 23:36Let me add that I am not necessarily against a "solution" to the perceived problem of poisonous divisionals and priorities. But I am convinced that the reasoning in T 1222/11 is incorrect and should not be followed. I think solutions can be found that fit much better with the case law of the Boards.My favourite solution is a simple exception to the letter of Art. 54(3): subject-matter X having effective date D in patent application A is not Art. 54(3) prior art for subject-matter X having effective date D in patent application B of the same applicant. (It might be better to drop "of the same applicant".) The EBA could easily formulate such an exception much like it formulated an exception to Art. 123(2) in G 1/03.I don't think there is any support for this interpretation of Art. 54(3) in the case law, but as far as I can see this interpretation would have no impact on cases not plagued by the poisonous divisional problem. This is very different for the approach of T 1222/11.ReplyDeleteRepliesAnonymous17 October 2013 at 10:48"subject-matter X having effective date D in patent application A is not Art. 54(3) prior art for subject-matter X having effective date D in patent application B of the same applicant."This doesn't work. The whole problem with a poisonous divisional applications is that it (or the subject matter in it) has an earlier effective filing date than the subject matter of the claim in the parent application. Moreover, it is well-established that subject matter cannot be used as prior art if it has the same effective filing date so I'm not sure how this would change anything.DeleteMyshkin18 October 2013 at 23:28Sorry, my formulation is indeed incorrect. This is what I should have written: "subject-matter X having effective date D in patent application A is not Art. 54(3) prior art for patent application B (of the same applicant?) disclosing the same subject-matter X with the same effective date D".So the occurrence of the novelty destroying Art. 54(3) prior art in the application itself should neutralise that prior art.Without this rule, there is actually no good reason why an application could not be novelty destroying Art. 54(3) prior art for itself.So the EBA could reason as follows. The drafters of the EPC evidently could not have wanted Art. 54(3) to be interpreted as allowing self-poisoning. A priority-entitled specific embodiment in an application B therefore does not count as Art. 54(3) prior art for B (i.e. not even for claims of B that are not entitled to priority). Now we only have to accept that the same applies for the same subject-matter with the same effective date occurring in other EP applications and we have the rule.DeleteReplyDesrousseaux16 October 2013 at 10:13A short comment on this discussion. Since I am representing the opponent (thanks for the translation of our brief), these comments are only my personal views. I am not convinced by the argument that the drafter of the original priority application should be considered - at all. This seems to be a matter of knowing whether or not the same invention had been made at the time the original priority application was filed. The whole purpose is security of the public, and the "need of the drafter" should in my opinion be a very secondary consideration. In addition, the same argument could also be used against G 2/98 as a whole. This decision drastically changed drafting practise - we all used to amend applications at the end of the priority year, which might not be such a good idea nowadays. I do not believe that construction of the law should rely on the user-friendliness for patent drafters. Encouraging innovation may still require a degree of legal certainty. ReplyDeleteRepliesTufty the Cat16 October 2013 at 11:45Many thanks for your comment Grégoire. As you already know, I disagree with you on the partial priority issue and have made my own arguments quite clear (I hope) in previous posts. My argument does not, however, depend on the general idea of considering the drafter, which as you say is a secondary issue. Instead, my point is that if the EPC is properly applied then the poisonous priority problem goes away.Amending applications at the end of the priority year is always a risky business, and should obviously be done with care, not least because any broader definition of an invention should be fully supported by the application. This is an Article 83&84 issue though, and not an Article 88 issue. Defining an invention more broadly should not in itself result in the absurd outcome where the priority document becomes novelty defeating for the application. DeleteReplyAdd commentLoad more...