Source: http://openjurist.org/85/f3d/306
Timestamp: 2015-08-28 05:30:49
Document Index: 399050005

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 621', '§ 201', '§ 633', '§ 633', '§ 1614', '§ 1614', '§ 633', '§ 633']

85 F3d 306 Bohac v. D West | OpenJurist
85 F. 3d 306 - Bohac v. D West Home
85 F3d 306 Bohac v. D West 85 F.3d 306
70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1734,68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,101Virgil BOHAC, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Togo D. WEST, Jr., Secretary of the Army, Defendant-Appellee.
Argued Jan. 10, 1996.Decided May 31, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 94 C 858--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.*
Jeffrey C. Mochalski, Ellen M. Frantz (argued), Johns & Flaherty, La Crosse, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Christa A. Reisterer, Steven O'Connor (argued), Office of the U.S. Atty., Madison, WI, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., CUDAHY, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
Virgil Bohac appeals the district court's decision to treat the Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary of the Army ("the Army"), as a motion for summary judgment. In particular, Bohac challenges the district court's failure to provide him with prior notice of the decision to convert the Army's motion and his lack of an opportunity to further supplement the record. For the reasons provided below, we vacate in part and affirm in part. The grant of summary judgment is affirmed.
On November 17, 1994, Bohac filed suit against the Army under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Bohac, a civilian employee of the Army at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, alleged that the Army's failure to promote him to the position of heavy equipment foreman constituted an act of age discrimination and retaliation. Bohac was 62 years old at the time of his non-promotion.
The Army filed a motion to dismiss Bohac's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Army also filed a memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, to which various exhibits were attached. Bohac filed a memorandum in opposition to the Army's motion, to which Bohac also attached various exhibits.
On April 14, 1995, the district court entered its order on the Army's motion. In regard to Bohac's ADEA claim, the court first determined that the Army's motion should be treated as a motion for summary judgment, since both parties had submitted admissible exhibits outside the pleadings which the court had not excluded. The court thereupon granted the Army's converted motion for summary judgment after concluding that Bohac's suit was barred by his earlier failure to comply with an administrative time limit and by his failure to provide the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") with 30 days' notice of his intent to file suit. In addition, the court granted the Army's motion to dismiss Bohac's FLSA claim.
Bohac now appeals the district court's order on his ADEA claim. Bohac primarily argues that the district court erred by failing to provide him with prior notice and an opportunity to further supplement the record after the court decided to treat the Army's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. Bohac does not appeal the district court's decision to dismiss his FLSA claim.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment by viewing all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (herein Bohac) and determining de novo whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact requiring submission of the case to the finder of fact or whether judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Where summary judgment has been granted in a discrimination case, however, this standard is applied with "added rigor" as intent and credibility are usually crucial issues. Sarsha, 3 F.3d at 1038 (citations omitted).
A. Bohac's ADEA Claim
In order to properly address the merits of Bohac's appeal, we must first examine the nature of his underlying claim. Under the ADEA, an individual who feels that he or she has been discriminated against in federal government employment on account of age has two remedial options. The aggrieved individual may choose to first file an administrative complaint against the agency alleged to have acted discriminatorily. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b). Thereafter, the individual may file suit in federal district court if he is not satisfied with his administrative relief. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408. To commence an administrative action, however, an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") counselor must first be contacted within 45 days of the date of the questioned incident. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.107(b); 1614.105(a)(1).1 Alternatively, an action may be filed in federal district court in the first instance, provided that the EEOC is given at least 30 days' notice, within 180 days after the occurrence of the questioned matter, of the individual's intent to file such an action. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d).2
In this case, Bohac was notified on May 27, 1994, that he had not been promoted to the position of heavy equipment foreman. Bohac initially chose to pursue administrative relief, but he did not contact an EEO counselor until July 27, 1994--61 days after he was informed of his non-promotion. Consequently, Bohac was notified on August 26, 1994, that his administrative complaint was being dismissed in light of his failure to initiate contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days.
Bohac then filed suit in district court on November 17, 1994. Bohac did not, however, provide the EEOC with any notice, let alone 30 days' notice, of his intent to do so. The district court, relying upon Bohac's failure to provide notice to the EEOC and on the second holding of McGinty v. United States Dep't of the Army, 900 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that the failure to comply with an administrative time limit bars a subsequent suit in district court), granted summary judgment against Bohac.
1. Thirty Days' Notice of Intent to Sue
We first review the district court's decision regarding Bohac's failure to give the EEOC 30 days' notice of his intent to file suit. As stated by 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d), such notice need only be filed "[w]hen the individual has not filed a complaint concerning age discrimination with the Commission." The district court evidently concluded that the complaint filed by Bohac with the Army's EEO office did not constitute the filing of a complaint "with the Commission." Although there is support for the district court's view, we must disagree with this conclusion.
We acknowledge that the case law on this subject is divided. Compare McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1425 n. 6 (8th Cir.1987) (holding that the filing of a formal complaint with the employee's agency constit