Source: https://www.massachusettscriminallawyer-blog.com/page/2/
Timestamp: 2018-12-10 07:24:13
Document Index: 467287766

Matched Legal Cases: ['§3663', '§3663', '§24', '§24', '§23', '§23', '§10', '§10', '§10']

Massachusetts Criminal Lawyer Blog — Page 2 of 35 — Published by Framingham Criminal Defense Attorney — Cappetta Law Offices
Prior to his trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the text messages on the ground that “the evidence was not sufficient to authenticate [the messages] as having been authored by him. The judge … [ruled] that the Commonwealth had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the text messages were authentic.” At the trial, “[t]he defendant denied sending the threatening text messages to E.B.” “[He] testified that at the time the … messages were received by E.B., he … had been living with his aunt for ‘[a] couple of months.’ The defendant and his mother testified that the cellular telephone … associated with the number from which the … messages were received was not owned by the defendant. According to the defendant, his aunt had purchased the cell phone, but it was shared with the defendant and at least six other people who lived at his aunt’s residence,” including “his new girl friend [who] did not like E.B.” “At the close of cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor posed to the defendant a series of ten questions, each asking whether the defendant had sent a particular text message. Each question incorporated the exact language of the text message.” “For example, the prosecutor asked, ‘[D]o you deny saying, “I hope you kill yourself, bye-bye?”’” “In each instance, the defendant denied sending the text message. On appeal, the defendant claim[ed] that this line of cross-examination improperly relied on facts not in evidence.” Continue reading →
US Supreme Court Weighs in On What Restitution a Defendant Can be Ordered to Pay
The U. S. Supreme Court recently ruled in Lagos v. United States that ruled that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 requires the restitution of expenses incurred during a victim’s participation in government proceedings, as opposed to proceedings conducted by the victim.
The background was as follows. Petitioner Lagos “was convicted of using a company that he controlled (Dry Van Logistics) to defraud a lender (General Electric Capital Corporation, or GE) of tens of millions of dollars. The fraud involved generating false invoices for services that Dry Van Logistics had not actually performed and then borrowing money from GE using the false invoices as collateral. Eventually, the scheme came to light. Dry Van Logistics went bankrupt. GE investigated. The Government indicted Lagos,” who “pleaded guilty to wire fraud. And the [federal District Court] judge, among other things, ordered him to pay GE restitution” pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996. That act “requires defendants convicted of a listed range of offenses to ‘reimburse the victim for lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.’ 18 U.S.C. §3663A(b)(4) (emphasis added).” The judge’s restitution order included a requirement that Lagos “reimburse GE for expenses GE incurred during its own investigation of the fraud and during its participation in Dry Van Logistics’ bankruptcy proceedings. The [expenses] primarily consist of professional fees for attorneys, accountants, and consultants. The Government argued that the District Court must order restitution of these amounts under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act because these sums were ‘necessary … other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation … of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.’ §3663A(b)(4). The District Court agreed, as did the … Fifth Circuit.” Lagos sought certiorari. Continue reading →
The background was as follows. “On January 24, 2016, a State police trooper stopped the defendant’s vehicle after observing him commit several marked lane violations…. During the stop, the defendant was exhibiting signs of possible intoxication, including glassy or bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. A number of field sobriety tests were conducted, which indicated that the defendant was intoxicated. A breathalyzer test also was administered, which measured the defendant’s alcohol level at 0.132 per cent. The defendant was arrested and transported to the State police barracks, where he submitted to a blood alcohol test that registered his alcohol level to be 0.13 per cent. The defendant was given a citation and … his right to operate a motor vehicle was administratively suspended for thirty days” pursuant to G.L. c.90, §24(1)(f)(2), which “allows police to confiscate immediately the license of an individual who has failed a breathalyzer test.” “The defendant was then arraigned for, among other things, OUI, in violation of G.L. c.90, §24(1)(a). While the defendant’s charges were pending, on February 17, 2016,” the defendant’s vehicle was again stopped by a State trooper and when “the defendant admitted that his license had been suspended,” he “was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle after license suspension for OUI, in violation of [G.L. c.90,] §23, third par. The defendant moved to dismiss the charge of operating after a suspension for OUI. Concluding that §23, third par., did not apply to the defendant, the judge granted the motion in part and dismissed the OUI portion of the charge, leaving the defendant charged with operating after a suspension.” The Commonwealth appealed. Continue reading →
In its response to the defendant’s first appellate claim, the SJC ruled that the judge erred in denying the defendant’s rule 17 motion on grounds of confidentiality, because, in the Court’s view, “whether records are confidential does not affect whether they are discoverable…. Rather, confidential records, such as those in a victim compensation fund file, are subject to normal discovery rules.” The Court opined that “[t]he denial of the defendant’s request for records under rule 17 prejudiced him. The defendant established that the records … were relevant to” the complainant’s credibility and potential bias, which were probably significant issues for the jury. The judge’s ruling interfered with the defendant’s due process right to explore those issues by cross-examining the complainant on the subject of her request for financial compensation. (The Court also opined that “the records in the Attorney General’s files are not subject to mandatory disclosure under rule 14” because they “‘are not within the control of the prosecution….’ Commonwealthv. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 268 n.4 [2004].”) Continue reading →
The background was as follows. A state police trooper (Moran) stopped a vehicle the defendant was driving … for a defective rear brake light. There were two passengers in the vehicle.” Moran determined that because the driver’s licenses of the defendant and [one of the passengers] were suspended and “because [the other passenger] did not have a … license, the vehicle would have to be towed from the highway, as none of the occupants legally could drive it. In preparation for towing, Moran conducted an inventory search of the vehicle,” in the course of which he “discovered a handgun loaded with five rounds of ammunition in the console between the rear passenger seats.” “The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm in a vehicle [c.269, §10(a)] and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm in a vehicle [c.269, §10(n)].” “In his appeal…, [he] challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction under G.L. c.269, §10(n), arguing that the Commonwealth was required [but failed] to prove that he knew the firearm was loaded.” Continue reading →
SJC Affirms Conviction Where Defendant Raised Concerns of Biased Juror
In Commonwealth v. Lee, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder, rejecting the defendant’s contention that the judge seated a biased juror, thereby violating the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.
The background was as follows. The victim was the defendant’s father. A woman for whom the defendant had done housework (Ruth) “saw the defendant walk behind her house carrying white garbage bags. Soon after, the defendant left without any garbage bags.” Ruth and her daughter “checked the backyard for the garbage bags. They found white garbage bags in a compost bin, and inside one of the garbage bags, they found a human head. When police arrived, officers found two arms and two legs in the other garbage bags. Ruth reported that she had seen the defendant carrying white garbage bags behind her house. Police officers learned that the defendant’s father had sought an abuse prevention order against him three days earlier. Officers went to the defendant’s father’s house to check on his safety. In the house, officers found white garbage bags and a human torso in a plastic tub. A fingerprint on the tub was later identified as the defendant’s.” When the police interviewed the defendant, he told them “that he had dismembered his father but not killed him.” “During jury empanelment, the judge informed each juror that participating in the trial would include viewing ‘graphic photos of body parts’ and inquired about the impact of those photographs on each juror’s impartiality. The defendant contends that prospective juror no. 226 ‘expressed doubts about his ability to be fair and impartial’ and was seated on the jury nonetheless. The transcript contains the following exchange between the judge and prospective juror no. 226: ‘The judge: “All right. In this trial you will see some graphic photos of body parts, and the question is whether you think that would affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror?” The juror: ‘Yes.’ [] (Emphasis supplied.)’” At the time, “neither the defendant nor the Commonwealth opposed the juror’s empanelment. Later, [however,] when discussing another juror, the defendant asked to challenge prospective juror no. 226. The judge declined to allow the defendant [to] do so.” On appeal, “[t]he defendant argue[d] that the seating of prospective juror no. 226 was structural error [requiring] a new trial.”
Updated: September 5, 2018 11:10 am
The background was as follows. The day before the victim was killed, “the defendant’s roommate warned [him] that he would be asked to move out [of their shared apartment] if he did not pay the total amount that he owed by the following day.” That evening, the defendant spent time at a local bar. Also at the bar was the victim, who “appeared to be drunk … and ‘flaunt[ed]’ [a large sum of cash] such that one of his friends urged him to ‘put [it] away.’” The defendant left the bar at 12:30 a.m. “The victim left the bar when it closed” at 1:00 a.m. At 1:30 a.m., the defendant gave his roommate the overdue rent money. At 7:00 a.m., “[t]he victim’s lifeless body was discovered” at an outdoor location “with contusions to his nose and the back of his head. Although his wallet was still on his person, most of the cash he had had was missing. Investigators took samples from the defendant’s clothing, including a snippet from the left front jeans pocket and a snippet from the front of the victim’s shirt, both of which had bloodstains. The DNA extracted from the jeans pocket sample was a mixture that matched the DNA profiles of both the victim and the defendant. The DNA extracted from the bloodstain on the victim’s shirt matched the profile of the defendant alone. The defendant, who testified at trial, offered weak alibi evidence.” On appeal from his convictions of first-degree murder and armed robbery, he contended that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of substitute expert testimony regarding the DNA test results. Continue reading →
The background was as follows. Police officers responded to reports of an altercation outside a bar. At the scene, the defendant “was yelling at” some other people. He was “unsteady on his feet, smelled of alcohol, and had slurred speech. Concluding that the defendant was intoxicated, the officers placed him into protective custody … and transported him to the police station…. Once at the station garage, the defendant was unwilling or unable to exit the cruiser. The officers therefore pulled him out of the vehicle, and placed him on the ground after he could not, or would not, stand. At that point, the officers radioed their supervisors inside the station for assistance, and they were brought a restraint chair to transport the defendant to the booking area. A restraint chair is designed to immobilize unruly detainees. It has a seat that is tilted so that … the person sitting there is lying back at an angle with his knees elevated above his hips. The chair has straps to be used to hold in place a detainee’s wrists, ankles, lap and shoulders. In this instance, however, the officers did not use the available straps to secure the defendant…. Instead, after placing him in the chair with his hands handcuffed behind his back, they left him that way for the trip into the station. According to the defendant, who testified at trial, this meant that his entire weight fell on his handcuffed wrists, causing him ‘excruciating pain.’…. The failure of the police to secure the defendant in the restraint chair appears to be at odds with a written policy that emerged only in postconviction discovery…. At least at one point during the trip from the garage to the booking area, the defendant’s [unsecured] foot … was hanging off the side of the chair,” thus “imped[ing] the movement of the chair…. [In response,] the police officers tilted the restraint chair back in order to keep [it] moving…. The defendant described the tilting of the chair as a sudden jerking that caused him to flail in it. He admitted that his foot came into contact with one of the officers, but he characterized it as an accidental ‘knee-jerk reaction’ to the sudden tilting of the chair. The officers described it as a … deliberate [and forceful] kick to the … stomach,” which the officer who was struck described as painful. On the basis of the alleged kick, the defendant was indicted for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, a shod foot. Continue reading →