Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19850301-1050583
Timestamp: 2017-04-30 07:16:27+00:00
Document Index: 88674414

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 260", "l'article 285", "l'article 260", "l'article 7", "l'article 7", "l'article 260", "l'article 7", "l'article 7", "l'article 260", "l'article 260", "l'article7", "l'article 2"]

ENKELMANN c. SUISSE
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Radiation du rôle (solution du litige)Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10505/83Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-03-01;10505.83 Parties : Demandeurs : ENKELMANNDéfendeurs : SUISSETexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 10505/83 Ma rt in ENKELMANN v/SWITZERLAN D Martin ENKELMANN c/SUISS E DECISION of 4 March 1985 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 4 mars 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 7, paragraph I of the Convention : 7ife court may specify the constituent elemenrs of an offence but may not modify the substance of the offence to the defendant's detrintent paragraphe 1, de la Conventfon : Ix juge peut prÃ©ciser les Ã©lÃ©ment s .Article7, constitutifs d'une infraction, mais non les modifier de maniÃ¨re substantielle, au dÃ©triment de l'accusÃ©.
(English : see p . 182 )
Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant, r essortissant suisse, nÃ© en 1947, journaliste, est domiciliÃ© Ã Zurich . Devant la Commission, il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Maitre P .A . StrÃ¢uli, avocat au barreau de Zurich . Le 6 aoÃ»t 1981, le requÃ©rant s'est trouvÃ©, pour exercer sa profession dejoumaliste sans toutefois po rt er de signes distinctifs de sa profession, au milieu de manifestants se livrant Ã des actes de violence contre des personnes et des biens . AprÃ¨s avoir opposÃ© rÃ©sistance, il a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© au cours de la manifestation non autorisÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s administratives . 178
A la suite de cette arrestation, il a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© le 2 mars 1982 par le Tribunal de district de Zurich Ã 21 jours d'emprisonnement avec sursis . Le tribunal lui reprochait d'avoir participÃ© Ã une manifestation ayant donnÃ© lieu Ã des actes de violence contre des personnes et des biens, ce fait constituant l'infraction d'Ã©meute (LandfriedensbrUch) prÃ©vue par l'article 260 du code pÃ©nal qui dispose : â¢ Celui qui aura pris part Ã un attroupement formÃ© en public et au cours duquel des violences ont Ã©tÃ© commises collectivement contre des personnes ou des propriÃ©tÃ©s sera puni de l'emprisonnement ou de l'amende . Il n'encourra aucune peine s'il s'est retirÃ© sur sommation de l'autoritÃ© sans avoir commis de violence ni provoquÃ© Ã en commettre . . Le tribunal a estimÃ© que cette infraction a Ã©tÃ© commise par le requÃ©rant parce que sa proximitÃ© par rapport au groupe de manifestants laissait lÃ©gitimement croire que mÃªme sans participation effective aux actes de violence, le requÃ©rant cautionnait leurs actes . Le tribunal se rÃ©fÃ©rait Ã un arrÃªt du 16 fÃ©vrier 1982 de la Cour de cassation du Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral (Schorno c/MinistÃ¨re public du canton du Zurich) oÃ¹ il a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ© qu'il fallait interprÃ©ter la nÃ©cessitÃ© du cautionnement des actes de violence pour la commission de l'infraction d'Ã©meute, exigÃ© par lajurispmdence, dans le sens qu'il Ã©tait suffisant que l'accusÃ© ait panicipÃ© Ã un attroupement formÃ© en public et qu'il sache que celui-ci reprÃ©sente un danger pour la paix publique . Cet arrÃ©t rejetait aussi la thÃ¨se selon laquelle le cautionnement consisterait dans une intention prÃ©alable d'approuver les actes de violence et a prÃ©cisÃ© que l'approbation tacite Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire et suffisante, celle-ci rÃ©sultant de la connaissance du caractÃ¨re dangereux de l'attroupement pour la paix publique et du fait que la personne persiste Ã rester au sein des manifestants . Ces conditions Ã©tant prÃ©sentes dans le cas qui lui Ã©tait soumis le tribunal a condamnÃ© le requÃ©rant . De plus, le tribunal a retenu la commission de l'infraction consistant dans l'usage de violence contre des fonctionnaires, prÃ©vue Ã l'article 285 du code pÃ©nal, puisque le requÃ©rant a pris la fuite Ã l'arrivÃ©e de la police et s'est violemment opposÃ© Ã son arrestation . Le requÃ©rant a fait appel de ce jugement auprÃ¨s de la cour d'appel du canton de Zurich . Il faisait valoir qu'il n'avait pas eu l'intention de participer Ã des actes de violence en prenant part Ã la manifestation et que sa qualitÃ© dejoumalistejustifiait sa prÃ©sence au sein des manifestants . Le 25 mai 1982, la cour a confirmÃ© que l'infraction d'Ã©meute Ã©tait commis e par la participation, en connaissance de cause, Ã une manifestation que le requÃ©rant savait reprÃ©senter un danger pour la paix publique sans qu'il soit nÃ©cessaire d e 179
rechercher l'existence d'un cautionnement exprÃ¨s des actes de violence . Elle a augmentÃ© la peine du requÃ©rant Ã 28 jours d'emprisonnement avec sursis, en prÃ©cisant qu'a la qualitÃ© de journaliste ne pouvait faire bÃ©nÃ©ficier le requÃ©rant d'un traitement diffÃ©rent des autres citoyens . Le 18janvier 1983, la Cour de cassation du Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral a rejetÃ© le pourvo i en cassation formÃ© contre cette dÃ©cision .La Cour a estimÃ© que c'Ã©tait Ã bon droit quÃ© les tribunaux avaient considÃ©rÃ© le dÃ©lit constituÃ© et a confirmÃ© les considÃ©rants de son arrÃ¨t du 16 fÃ©vrier 1982 (affaire Schorno) en ce qui concerne les Ã©lÃ©ments constitutifs de l'infraction prÃ©vue Ã l'article 260 du code pÃ©nal . D'autre pari, la Cour a relevÃ© que le principe de la non-rÃ©troactivitÃ© de la loi pÃ©nale, prÃ©vue Ã l'articlÃ¨ 2 du code pÃ©nal, ne visait que les dispositions lÃ©gislatives et ne valait pas pour une modification de la jurisprudence .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint de l'application d'une jurisprudence Ã©tablie en 1982 Ã des faits survenus en 1981 . Ce fait constitue, selon lui, une applicaiion rÃ©troactive ayant pour effet de lui infliger une pÃ©ine plus forte que celle prÃ©vue au moment oÃ¹ il a commis l'infraction . Il allÃ¨gue une violation de l'article 7 de la Convention . Selon le requÃ©rant . la nouvellejurisprudence de la Cour de cassation du Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral modifiait l'Ã©lÃ©ment intentionnel du dÃ©lit d'Ã©meute aprÃ©s une longue pÃ©riode de jurisprudence constante sur ce point . La modification consisterait dans l'abandon de l'exigence de l'Ã©lÃ©meni7intentionnel pour le dÃ©lit d'Ã©meute et elle aurait des consÃ©quences largement dÃ©favorables pour le requÃ©rant, ce qui la rend Ã©quivalente Ã une modification lÃ©gislative . Une telle modification est contraire Ã l'article 7 de la Convention lorsqu'elle est appliquÃ©e Ã des faits survenus antÃ©rieurement . D'autre part, la modificationjurisprudentielle constitue en elle-mÃªme une interprÃ©tation extensive de l'article 260 alinÃ©a lef du code pÃ©nal . Avant son arrÃªt du 16 fÃ©vrier 1982, la Cour de cassation exigeait que le participant Ã un attroupement formÃ© en public ait cautionnÃ© les actes de violence du groupe pour quÃ© l'infraction puisse Ãªtre retenue . Selon son arrÃªt du 16 fÃ©vrier .1982, il suffit que le participant prenne part Ã l'attroupement en connaissance de cause, c'est-Ã -dire qu'il sache que celui-ci reprÃ©s'ente un danger pour l'ordrÃ© pÃ»blic et qu'ildemeure pirmi le groupe . Le requÃ©rant relÃ¨ve que tout participant Ã une manifestation, dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce un journaliste, commettrait ainsi le dÃ©lit d'Ã©meute .par sa seule prÃ©sÃ©nce au sein de la manifestation, sans que lui soit donnÃ© la possibilitÃ© de se disculper en prouvant le non caulionnement des actes de violence .
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant se plaint que les tribunaux ont appliquÃ© une jurispmdence Ã©tablie en 1982 Ã des faits commis en 1981 . Cette application, ayant eu pour consÃ©quence d'aggraver la peine du requÃ©rant, serait contraire au principe de la non-rÃ©troactivitÃ© de la loi pÃ©nale, garanti par l'article 7 par . 1 de la Convention qui dispose : . â¢ Nul ne peut Ãªtre condamnÃ© pour une action ou une omission qui, au moment oÃ¹ elle a Ã©tÃ© commise, ne constituait pas une infraction d'aprÃ©s le droit national ou intemational . De mÃªme il n'est infligÃ© aucune peine plus forte que celle qui Ã©tait applicable au moment oÃ¹ l'infraction a Ã©tÃ© commise . Â» Le requÃ©rant conteste que, au moment de la survenance des faits, il pouvait avoir conscience d'agir en contrariÃ©tÃ© avec les prescriptions lÃ©gales . II Ã©tait dans l'ignorance que les tribunaux pourraient lui reprocher une simple participation Ã une manifestation et retenir la constitution du dÃ©lit d'Ã©meute alors que la jurisprudence exigeait un cautionnement des actes de violence Ã ce moment lÃ . Cette modification de jurisprudence doit Ãªtre assimilÃ©e Ã une modification de la loi pÃ©nale . et, par consÃ©quent, ne peut Ãªtre appliquÃ©e rÃ©troactivement . La Commission relÃ©ve que, conformÃ©ment Ã sa jurispmdence (cf . No 8490/79, dÃ©c . 12 .3 .81, D .R . 22 p . 140, dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable) une modificationjurispmdentielle par interprÃ©tation extensive d'une disposition pÃ©nale pose un problÃ©me sur le terrain de l'article 7 par . I de la Convention, lorsqu'elle a pour effet d'aggraver la peine infligÃ©e . La Commission a admis d'autre part, que le juge pouvait prÃ©ciser les Ã©lÃ©ments constitutifs d'une infraction mais non les modifier, de maniÃ©re substantielle, au dÃ©triment de l'accusÃ© . Elle a reconnu qu'il n'y avait rien Ã objecter Ã ce que les Ã©lÃ©ments constitutifs existants de l'infraction soient prÃ©cisÃ©s et adaptÃ©s Ã des circonstances nouvelles pouvant raisonnablement entrer dans la conception originelle de l'infraction . En revanche, il est exclu qu'un acte qui n'Ã©tait pas jusqu'alors punissable se voie attribuer par les tribunaux un caractÃ¨re pÃ©nal ou que la dÃ©finition d'infractions existantes soit Ã©largie de faÃ§on Ã englober des faits qui ne constituaient pas jusqu'alors une infraction pÃ©nale (cf . No 8710/79, dÃ©c . 7 .5 .82, D .R . 28 p . 77) . La Commission note que selon l'article 260 alinÃ©a IÂ° , du code pÃ©nal suisse toute personne qui Â« a pris pan Ã un attroupement formÃ© en public et au cours duquel des violences ont Ã©tÃ© commises collectivement contre des personnes ou des propriÃ©tÃ©s Â» commet le dÃ©lit d'Ã©meute . Selon la jurisprudence antÃ©rieure le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral a considÃ©rÃ© qu'une personne participant Ã une Ã©meute devait approuver (billigen) les actes de violence . Dans son arrÃªt du 16 fÃ©vrier 1982 le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral a relevÃ© en quoi consistait l'approbation requise pour la commission de l'infraction . Selon le tribunal il suffisait que l'accusÃ© ait eu connaissance du caractÃ¨re dangereux de l'attroupement . Il a . ce faisant, prÃ©cisÃ© un des Ã©lÃ©ments constitutifs du dÃ©lit . Cette prÃ©cision n'est pas assimilable Ã la modification substamielle des Ã©lÃ©ntents constitutifs d'un e
infraction selon lajurisprudence de la Commission et ne conduit pas Ã rendre punissables des actes qui ne l'Ã©taient pas auparavant . La Commission conclut que le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral a interprÃ©tÃ© la loi, en l'occurrence l'article 260 alinÃ©a I - du codÃ© pÃ©nal concernant le dÃ©lit d'Ã©meute, sans dÃ©passer les limites d'une interprÃ©tation raisonnable (cf. No 8866/80, , X . c/R .F .A ., dÃ©c . 5 .10 .1981, non publiÃ©e ; cf. aussi No 1852/63, dÃ©c . 22 .4 .65, Annuaire 8 p . 191) . L'examen du grief par la Commission, tel qu'il a Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©, ne permet donc de dÃ©celer aucune apparence de violation des droits et libenÃ©s garantis par la Convention et notamment par l'article7 . 11 s'ensuit que la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 2 7 par . 2de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commission 'DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE IRRECEVABLE .
(TRANSLITION) THÃ FACTS The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be suntmarised as follows : The applicant, a Swiss national born in 1947, is a journalist and resides in Zurich . He is represented before the CÃ´mmission by Mr . P .A . StrÃ«uli, a member of the ZÃ¼rich bar . On 6 August 1981 the applicant ; in the exercise of his profession as ajournalist, though without any distinguishing sign to show his profession, was in a group o . Afte frademonstracigofvlencistprdoey resisting he was arrested during the-unauthorised demonstration by the administrative authorities . After arrest he was convicted on 2 March 1982 by the ZÃ¼rich District Cour t and given a suspended sentence of 21 days' imprisÃ´nment . 182
The Court found him guilty of having taken part in a demonstration involving acts of violence against persons and property which constituted the offence of riot (Landfriedensbruch) under Article 260 of the Criminal Code which reads : "A person who takes part in an unlawful assembly in public during which acts of violence have been comntitted collectively against persons or property shall be liable to imprisonment or a fine . He shall not be liable to punishment if he withdraws when called on to do so by the authorities without having committed an act of violence or incited others to do so . " The Court considered that this offence had been committed by the applicant because his presence in the group of dentonstrators, even without actually participating in the acts of violence, allowed it to be legitimately supposed that he was showing his approval of their actions . The Court referred to a judgment of the Cassation Division of the Federal Court of 16 February 1982 (Schorno v . ZUrich can(onal public prosecutor) Finding that the requirement of approval of acts of violence in order to constitute the offence of riot postulated by case-law should be interpreted as nteaning that it was sufficient if the accused took part in an unlawful assembly in public knowing that this constituted a danger to the peace . The judgment also rejected the theory that approval must consist of a prior intention to approve acts of violence and said that tacit approval was necessary and sufficient and could be iniplied from the knowledge that the assembly constituted a danger to the peace and the fact that the person in question continued to remain with the demonstrators . As Ihis was the position in the case before it the Court convicted the applicant .
The Court also found him guilty of the offence of assaulting police officers under Article 285 of the Criminal Code since the applicant ran away when the police arrived and violently resisted arrest . The applicant appealed against this judgment to the ZÃ¼rich Cantonal Court o f Appeal . He argued that he did not intend to take part in acts of violence when he joined the denionstration and that the fact that he was a journalist justified his presence among the demonstrators . On 25 May 1982 the Court of Appeal confumed that the offence of riot wa edscomnitedbypar gwihknoleftacsiemonrtwhc applicant knew constituted a danger to the peace, without need to establish express approval of the acts of violence . It increased the sentence to 28 days' suspended intprisonment and pointed out that the fact that he was ajournalist did not entitle the applicant to be treated differently from other members of the public . On 18 January 1983 the Cassation Division of the Federal Court dismissed the appeal on points of in law against this decision . The Court held that the courts had rightly found that the offence had been committed and confirmed the reasons state d
in its judgment of .16 February 1982 (Schorno case) as rÃ©gards the requirements of the offence defined in Article 260 of the Criminal Code . Furthermore the Court pointed out that the mle in Article 2 of the Criminal Code that criminal legislation was not retrospective applied only to legislative provisions and not to a change in case-law .
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains of the application of case-law established in 1982 to facts occurring in 1981 . In his view this constitutes a retrospective application of the law with the effect of subjecting him to a higher penalty than that applicable at the time he committed the offence . He alleges a violation of Article 7 of the Convention . According to the applicant,the new case-law of the Cassation Division of the Federal Court altered the of intention component of the offence of riot after a long period in which the case-law on the point had remained unchanged . The alteration consisted in abandoning the requirement of an element of intention fÃ´r the offence of riot and had very unfavourable consequences for the applicant which made it equivalent to a change in the law . Such an alteration was contrary to Article 7 of thÃ© Convention when applied to facts occurring beforethe alteration . Funhermore the change in case-law constituted in itself an broad interpretation of Anicle 260 para . I of the Criminal Code . Before its judgment of 16 February 1982 the Court of Cassation required that a person taking part in an unlawful assembly in public should have approved the acts of violence of the group before the offence was committed . According to its judgment of 1 6 February 1982 it was sufficient that a person takes part in the unlawfulâ¢assembly with knowledge of the facts, i .e . that he knows that it represents a danger for public order and remains a member of thÃ© group . The applicant points out that anyone taking part in the demonstration, in th e instant case a journalist, would thus be committing the offence of riot simply by being present in the demonstration without beiing able to defend himself by establishing that he had not approved the acts of violence W
The applicant complains that the courts applied case-law established in 1982 to acts committed in 1981 and this had the effect of increasing the applicant's punishment and was thus contrary to the pridciple that criminal legislation is not retrospective guaranteed by Article 7 para . I of the Convention which provides ; "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitutÃ© a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when itwas committed . Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed : " 184
The applicant denies that at the time the acts occurred he could have been aware that he was acting contrary to the law . He did not know that the courts could hold against him the simple fact of participating in a demonstration and find that the requirements of the offence of riot were satisfied when, at the time, case-law required approval of the acts of violence . This change in the case-law should be treated as an amendment of the criminal law and consequently could not be appl ied retrospectively . The Commission notes that in accordance with its previous decisions (cf . No . 8490/79, Dec . 12 .3 .81, D .R . 22 p . 140, declared admissible) a change in case-law by the broad interpretation of a criminal statute raises a problem under Article 7 para . I of the Convention when its effect is to lead to the imposition of a heavier penalty . The Commission has, however, accepted that a court may clarify the requirements of an offence but not alter them substantially to the detriment of the accused . It has recognised that there is no objection to the existing requirements of the offence being clarified and adapted to new circumstances which might reasonably be covered by the original concept of the offence . On the other hand, it is not acceptable that an act which up to then had not been punishable was made a criminal offence by the courts or that the definition of existing offences was extended in such a way as to include facts which had so far not constituted a criminal offence (cf . No . 8710/79, Dec . 7 .5 .82, D .R . 28 p . 77) . The Commission notes that under Article 260 para . I of the Swiss Criminal Code anyone who "takes part in an unlawful assembly in public during which acts of violence are committed collectively against persons or property" commits the offence of riot . According to its previous case-law the Federal Court considered that a person taking part in a riot should approve (billigen) the acts of violence . In its judgment of 16 February 1982 the Federal Court defined the content of the approval required for the commission of the offence . According to the coun it is sufficient if the accused is aware of the dangerous nature of the unlawful assembly . In doing so it clarified one of the requirements of the offence . For the purposes of the Commission's case-law such clarification does not amount to a substantial modification of the requirements of an offence, and does not have the effect of making punishable acts which were previously not punishable . The Commission concludes that the Federal Court interpreted the law, in this instance Article 260 para . I of the Criminal Code, which deals with the offence of riot, without exceeding the bounds of reasonable interpretation (cf. No . 8866/80, X . v . FRG, Dec . 5 .10 .81, unpublished ; and No . 1852/63, Dec . 22 .4 .65, Yearbook 8, p . 191) . The examination of the complaint as submitted to the Commission does no t therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, and in particular by Article 7 . It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the nteaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
185Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 01/03/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page