Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-582.ZD2.html
Timestamp: 2014-08-30 22:37:09
Document Index: 25092301

Matched Legal Cases: ['§706', '§706', '§706', '§1464', '§1464', '§1464', '§1464']

In my view, the Federal Communications Commission failed adequately to explain why it changed its indecency policy from a policy permitting a single “fleeting use” of an expletive, to a policy that made no such exception. Its explanation fails to discuss two critical factors, at least one of which directly underlay its original policy decision. Its explanation instead discussed several factors well known to it the first time around, which by themselves provide no significant justification for a change of policy. Consequently, the FCC decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion.” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 41–43 (1983)
; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 420–421 (1971)
. And I would affirm the Second Circuit’s similar determination.
I begin with applicable law. That law grants those in charge of independent administrative agencies broad authority to determine relevant policy. But it does not permit them to make policy choices for purely political reasons nor to rest them primarily upon unexplained policy preferences. Federal Communications Commissioners have fixed terms of office; they are not directly responsible to the voters; and they enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate them, to a degree, from “ ‘the exercise of political oversight.’ ” Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 916 (1991)
. That insulation helps to secure important governmental objectives, such as the constitutionally related objective of maintaining broadcast regulation that does not bend too readily before the political winds. But that agency’s comparative freedom from ballot-box control makes it all the more important that courts review its decisionmaking to assure compliance with applicable provisions of the law—including law requiring that major policy decisions be based upon articulable reasons.
The statutory provision applicable here is the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) prohibition of agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). This legal requirement helps assure agency decisionmaking based upon more than the personal preferences of the decisionmakers. Courts have applied the provision sparingly, granting agencies broad policymaking leeway. But they have also made clear that agency discretion is not “ ‘unbounded.’ ” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 167–168 (1962)
. In so holding, American courts have followed a venerable legal tradition, stretching back at least to the days of Sir Edward Coke and the draining of the English fens. See Rooke’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 209, 210, 5 Coke Rep. 99b, 100a (C. P. 1598) (Coke, J.) (members of sewer commission with authority to act according “to their discretio[n]” are nonetheless “limited and bound with the rule of reason and law … and [cannot act] according to their wills and private affections” (quoted in Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 953, 954 (1957))).
The law has also recognized that it is not so much a particular set of substantive commands but rather it is a process, a process of learning through reasoned argument, that is the antithesis of the “arbitrary.” This means agencies must follow a “logical and rational” decisionmaking “process.” Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U. S. 359, 374 (1998)
. An agency’s policy decisions must reflect the reasoned exercise of expert judgment. See Burlington Truck Lines, supra, at 167(decision must reflect basis on which agency “exercised its expert discretion”); see also Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 624 (1935)
(independent agencies “exercise … trained judgment … ‘informed by experience’ ”). And, as this Court has specified, in determining whether an agency’s policy choice was “arbitrary,” a reviewing court “must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Overton Park, supra, at 416.
Moreover, an agency must act consistently. The agency must follow its own rules. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 389–390 (1932)
(“Unexplained inconsistency is” a “reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice” (emphasis added)).
In State Farm,a unanimous Court applied these commonsense requirements to an agency decision that rescinded an earlier agency policy. The Court wrote that an agency must provide an explanation for the agency’s “revocation” of a prior action that is more thorough than the explanation necessary when it does not act in the first instance. The Court defined “revocation,” not simply as rescinding an earlier policy, cf. ante, at 10–11, but as “a reversal
of the agency’s former views as to the proper course.” State Farm, 463 U. S., at 41 (emphasis added). See also Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 502, n. 20 (2002)
(portion of Court’s opinion joined by Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.) (noting State Farm “may be read as prescribing more searching judicial review” when “an agency [is] ‘changing its course’ as to the interpretation of a statute”); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U. S. 504, 524, n. 3 (1994)
Avoiding the application of any heightened standard of review, the Court in State Farm recognized that the APA’s “nonarbitrary” requirement affords agencies generous leeway when they set policy. 463 U. S., at 42. But it also recognized that this leeway is not absolute. The Court described its boundaries by then listing considerations that help determine whether an explanation is adequate. Mirroring and elaborating upon its statement in Overton Park, 401 U. S. 402
, the Court said that a reviewing court should take into account whether the agency had “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” State Farm, supra, at 43; see also Overton Park,
We here must apply the general standards set forth in State Farm and Overton Park to an agency decision that changes a 25-year-old “fleeting expletive” policy from (1) the old policy that would normally permit broadcasters to transmit a single, fleeting use of an expletive to (2) a new policy that would threaten broadcasters with large fines for transmitting even a single use (including its use by a member of the public) of such an expletive, alone with nothing more. The question is whether that decision satisfies the minimal standards necessary to assure a reviewing court that such a change of policy is not “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A), particularly as set forth in, e.g., State Farm and Overton Park, supra,at2–7. The decision, in my view, does not satisfy those standards.
Consider the requirement that an agency at least minimally “consider … important aspect[s] of the problem.” State Farm, supra, at 43. The FCC failed to satisfy this requirement, for it failed to consider two critically important aspects of the problem that underlay its initial policy judgment (one of which directly, the other of which indirectly). First, the FCC said next to nothing about the relation between the change it made in its prior “fleeting expletive” policy and the First-Amendment-related need to avoid “censorship,” a matter as closely related to broadcasting regulation as is health to that of the environment. The reason that discussion of the matter is particularly important here is that the FCC had explicitly rested its prior policy in large partupon the need to avoid treading too close to the constitutional line.
,the Court reviewed an FCC decision forbidding the broadcast of a monologue that deliberately and repeatedly uttered the expletives here at issue more than 100 times in one hour at a time of day when children were likely to hear the broadcast. Id., at 739. The Court held that the FCC’s prohibition did not violate the First Amendment . But the Court divided 5 to 4. And two Members of the majority, Justices Powell and Blackmun, explicitly noted that the Court “does not speak to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word … as distinguished from the verbal shock treatment administered by respondent here.” Id., at 760–761 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). This statement by two Members of the majority suggested that they could reach a different result, finding an FCC prohibition unconstitutional, were that prohibition aimed at the fleeting or single use of an expletive.
In 1983, the Commission again wrote that it understood the Court’s decision in Pacifica to rest on the “repetitive occurrence of the ‘indecent’ words in question.” And, again, the Commission explained that its regulation of fleeting or isolated offensive words would reflect Justice Powell’s understanding of the First Amendment ’s scope. In re Application of Pacifica Foundation, 95 F. C. C. 2d 750, 760, ¶¶17–18. In 1987, the Commission once more explained that its “fleeting expletives” policy reflected the Court’s decision in Pacifica. It said that, under its policy, “speech that is indecent must involve more than an isolated use of an offensive word,” adding that “we believe that under the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.” In re Pacifica Foundation, 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699, ¶13 (emphasis added). In another order that same year, the Commission stated that “the First Amendment dicate[s] a careful and restrained approach with regard to review of matters involving broadcast programming”; it then explained, citing Pacifica, that “[s]peech that is indecent must involve more than the isolated use of an offensive word.” In re Infinity Broadcasting, 2 FCC Rcd. 2705, 2705, ¶¶6–7 (1987) (emphasis added). And in 2001, in giving the industry guidance, the FCC once again said in respect to its regulation of indecent speech that it “must both identify a compelling interest for any regulation … and choose the least restrictive means to further that interest.” In re Industry Guidance On Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U. S. C. §1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8000–8001, ¶3–5.
Relevant literature supports the broadcasters’ financial claims. See, e.g., Ho, Taking No Chances, Austin American-Statesman, June 18, 2006, p. J1; Dotinga, Dirty-Word Filters Prove Costly, Wired.com, July 9, 2004, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/07/64127; Stations, Cable Networks Finding Indecency Rules Expensive, Public Broadcasting Report, Aug. 4, 2006. It also indicates that the networks with which some small stations are affiliated are not liable for the stations’ local transmissions (unless the networks own them). Ho, supra, at J1; Public Stations Fear Indecency Fine Jump Means Premium Hikes, Public Broadcasting Report, July 7, 2006. The result is that smaller stations, fearing “fleeting expletive” fines of up to $325,000, may simply cut back on their coverage. See Romano, Reporting Live. Very Carefully, Broadcasting & Cable, July 4, 2005, p. 8; see also ibid. (“Afraid to take chances” of getting fined under the FCC’s new policy, “local broadcasters are responding by altering—or halting altogether—the one asset that makes local stations so valuable to their communities: live TV”); Daneman, WRUR Drops Its Live Radio Programs, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, May 27, 2004, p. 1B (reporting that a local broadcast station ceased broadcasting all local live programming altogether in response to the Commission’s policy change). And there are many such smaller stations. See, e.g., Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.cpb.org/aboutpb/faq/stations.html (noting there are over 350 local public television stations and nearly 700 local public radio stations that receive support from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting).
I cannot agree with the plurality, however, about the critical third point, namely that the new policy obviously provides smaller independent broadcasters with adequate assurance that they will not be fined. The new policy removes the “fleeting expletive” exception, an exception that assured smaller independent stations that they would not be fined should someone swear at a public event. In its place, it puts a policy that places all broadcasters at risk when they broadcast fleeting expletives, including expletives uttered at public events. The Remand Order says that there “is no outright news exemption from our indecency rules.” 21 FCC Rcd., at 13327, ¶71 (emphasis added).The best it can provide by way of assurance is to say that “it may be inequitable to hold a licensee responsible for airing offensive speech during live coverage of a public event under some circumstances.” Id., at 13311, ¶33 (emphasis added). It does list those circumstances as including the “possibility of human error in using delay equipment.” Id., at 13313, ¶35. But it says nothing about a station’s inability to afford delay equipment (a matter that in individual cases could itself prove debatable). All the FCC had to do was to consider this matter and either grant an exemption or explain why it did not grant an exemption. But it did not. And the result is a rule that may well chill coverage—the kind of consequence that the law has considered important for decades, to which the broadcasters pointed in their arguments before the FCC, and which the FCC nowhere discusses. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 494 (1965)
(“So long as the statute remains available to the State the threat of prosecutions of protected expression is a real and substantial one. Even the prospect of ultimate failure of such prosecutions by no means dispels their chilling effect on protected expression”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234, 244 (2002)
; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U. S. 539, 556–557 (1963)
The Solicitor General sets forth one way in which the new policy might be more consistent with statutory policy. The indecency statute prohibits the broadcast of “any … indecent … language.” 18 U. S. C. §1464. The very point of the statute, he says, is to eliminate nuisance; and the use of expletives, even once, can constitute such a nuisance. The Solicitor General adds that the statutory word “any” indicates that Congress did not intend a safe-harbor for a fleeting use of that language. Brief for Petitioners 24–25. The fatal flaw in this argument, however, lies in the fact that the Solicitor General and not the agency has made it. We must consider the lawfulness of an agency’s decision on the basis of the reasons the agency gave, not on the basis of those it might have given. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196–197 (1947)
The difficulty with this argument, however, is that it does not explain the change. The FCC has long used the theory of the “first blow” to justify its regulation of broadcast indecency. See, e.g., In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U. S. C. §1464, 5 FCC Rcd. 5297, 5302, ¶¶34–35 (1990). Yet the FCC has also long followed its original “fleeting expletives” policy. Nor was the FCC ever unaware of the fact to which the majority points, namely that children’s surroundings influence their behavior. See, e.g.,
In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U. S. C. §1464, 8 FCC Rcd. 704, 706, ¶11 (1993). So, to repeat the question: What, in respect to the “first blow,” has changed?
(“A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score” (emphasis added)). That doctrine seeks to avoid unnecessary judicial consideration of constitutional questions, assumes that Congress, no less than the Judicial Branch, seeks to act within constitutional bounds, and thereby diminishes the friction between the branches that judicial holdings of unconstitutionality might otherwise generate. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 237–238 (1998)
; see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 172–173 (2001)
; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345–348 (1936)
Unlike the majority, I can find no convincing reason for refusing to apply a similar doctrine here. The Court has often applied that doctrine where an agency’s regulation relies on a plausible but constitutionally suspect interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency, supra, at 172–174; NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 506–507 (1979)
. The values the doctrine serves apply whether the agency’s decision does, or does not, rest upon a constitutionally suspect interpretation of a statute. And a remand here would do no more than ask the agency to reconsider its policy decision in light of the concerns raised in a judicial opinion. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 551 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (a holding that a congressional action implicating the Equal Protection Clause “was not adequately preceded by a consideration of less drastic alternatives or adequately explained by a statement of legislative purpose would be far less intrusive than a final determination that the substance of” that action was unconstitutional). I would not now foreclose, as the majority forecloses, our further consideration of this matter. (Of course, nothing in the Court’s decision today prevents the Commission from reconsidering its current policy in light of potential constitutional considerations or for other reasons.)