Source: https://m.openjurist.org/394/f2d/8/bennett-county-south-dakota-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-11-14 17:20:18
Document Index: 130696500

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 185', '§ 311', '§ 357', '§ 33', '§ 341']

394 F2d 8 Bennett County South Dakota v. United States | OpenJurist
394 F. 2d 8 - Bennett County South Dakota v. United States
394 F2d 8 Bennett County South Dakota v. United States
394 F.2d 8
BENNETT COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA, a Public Corporation, Appellant,
Robert J. Parker, State's Atty., Bennett County, Martin, S. D., for appellant; Frank L. Farrar, Atty. Gen. of State of South Dakota, Pierre, S. D., on the brief.
John G. Gill, Jr., Atty., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee; Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Harold C. Doyle, U. S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S. D., and David V. Vrooman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S. D., on the brief.
Bennett County, South Dakota (hereinafter referred to as the County or appellant) appeals from the judgment of the district court permanently enjoining it from constructing, maintaining or using a road across certain land lying within its confines. United States v. Bennett County, South Dakota, 265 F.Supp. 249 (D.So.Dak.1967). Title to this land is in the United States, in trust, for the use and benefit of Newton and Doyle Cummings, enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians, of the Pine Ridge Reservation.1 The land in question is wholly within the Pine Ridge Reservation.
Pursuant to the Act of June 14, 1862, c. 101, § 1, 12 Stat. 427, now codified in 25 U.S.C.A. § 185,2 the United States sought to enjoin appellant from entering upon the land for the purpose of making repairs to the road without (1) securing permission from the Secretary of Interior, pursuant to the provisions of 25 U.S.C.A. § 311, or (2) acquiring the land by condemnation under the provisions of 25 U.S.C.A. § 357.3 Since it was conceded that appellant had neither secured permission nor had condemned, the court concluded that an injunction should be granted against entry until such time as appellant received permission to repair the road, or alternatively, until an easement has been secured by condemnation.
The Treaty of Fort Laramie constituted an agreement between various Indian tribes to cease hostilities against one another and against the people of the United States. It set off tribal boundaries and made the tribes responsible for any depredations committed within their respective territories.4
In subsequent years the Sioux territory was diminished by other agreements. Ultimately, separate Indian reservations for various bands of Sioux were permanently fixed by the Act of 1889. This Act formally established the Pine Ridge Reservation for the Oglala Sioux.5
All questions with respect to rights of occupancy in land, the manner, time and conditions of extinguishment of Indian title are solely for consideration of the federal government. Cf. United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 62 S.Ct. 248, 86 L.Ed. 260, rehear. denied, 314 U.S. 716, 62 S.Ct. 476, 86 L.Ed. 570 (1941); 27 Am.Jur. Indians § 33. As a corollary to this proposition, it follows that third parties, and in particular states and municipalities, acquire only such rights and interests in Indian lands as may be specifically granted to them by the federal government.6
To assure the utmost fairness in transactions between the United States and its Indian wards, any intent to deprive Indian tribes of their rights in land, or otherwise bring about the extinguishment of Indian title, either by grants in abrogation of existing treaties or through other Congressional legislation must be clearly and unequivocally stated and language appearing in such grants and statutes is not to be construed to the prejudice of the Indians. See United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., supra, 314 U.S. at 353-356, 62 S.Ct. 248; Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra; Leavenworth, etc. R. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 23 L.Ed. 634 (1875); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, etc., 304 U.S. 111, 58 S.Ct. 794, 82 L.Ed. 1213 (1938).
The circumstances surrounding the Treaty of 1851 have been fully delineated by the Court of Claims in Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States (Ct.Cl.1960) 284 F.2d 361, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924, 81 S.Ct. 1350, 6 L.Ed.2d 383. In determining that the Crows had a compensable interest in land described as their territory in the Fort Laramie Treaty, the Court concluded that this treaty was a recognition of Indian title by the United States, stating inter alia:
"It is true that the language of the Treaty is not the technical language of recognition of title. Nevertheless, we think that the participation of the United States in a treaty wherein the various Indian tribes describe and recognize each others' territories is, under the circumstances surrounding this treaty, and in light of one of the overriding purposes to be served by the treaty, i. e., securing free passage for emigrants across the Indians' lands by making particular tribes responsible for the maintenance of order in their particular areas, a recognition by the United States of the Indians' title to the areas for which they are to be held responsible, and which are described as `their respective territories'." 284 F.2d at 364.
The Court distinguished United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 317, 349, 61 S.Ct. 264, 85 L.Ed. 210 (1940), which had held that the Treaty of 1851 did not establish a reservation for the Indians.7 In concluding that Northern Pacific was not controlling, the Court of Claims reviewed Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 65 S.Ct. 690, 89 L.Ed. 985 (1945), which by implication approved prior decisions of the Court of Claims holding that the Treaty of Fort Laramie was a recognition of Indian title. See, e. g., Fort Berthold Indians v. United States, 71 Ct.Cl. 308 (1930); Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 77 Ct.Cl. 347 (1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 606, 54 S.Ct. 772, 78 L.Ed. 1467; Crow Nation v. United States, 81 Ct.Cl. 238 (1935). In the Shoshone Indians case the Supreme Court determined that the "Box Elder Treaty" of 1863 did not recognize Indian title. In so holding, it distinguished the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie in the following language:
In view of the language of the Treaty of 1851, the circumstances surrounding its signing, as set forth in Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, supra, 284 F.2d at 364-367, and the nature of subsequent agreements between the United States and the Sioux, as exemplified by the agreements of 1868, 1877 and 1889,8 we conclude that the land in question did not constitute a part of the public domain, subject to appropriation for highway purposes under the provisions of the "Highway Act" of 1866. Cf. Leavenworth, etc. R. R. Co. v. United States, supra, holding that a grant of public lands for railroad purposes does not apply to lands set aside for Indian occupancy pursuant to treaty.
This statute must be considered in light of the provisions of the Treaty of 1868, for the 1889 Act was designed to effect a further diminution of the Great Reservation created in 1868.9 By description, portions of the "Great Reservation" were set off as separate reservations for various bands of the Sioux, including the Pine Ridge Reservation for the Oglalas. Provision was made for future allotment of tracts to individual members of the tribe. Prior allotments under the 1868 Treaty were protected, even though made outside the confines of the new reservations. Section 19 continued in effect provisions of the Treaty of 1868 and the Agreement of 1877 which were not in conflict with the new Act.
Upon examining other sections of the Act of 1889, we are persuaded to believe that Congress intended not only that the Sioux be compensated for land ceded back to the public domain but also intended that they be compensated for any land appropriation within the new reservations. For instance, Section 18 provided that if any land within the newly created reservations was occupied by religious societies, these societies could continue to use the land, "with the approval of the Secretary," and could purchase additional land upon agreement with the Secretary. Section 12 provided that the Secretary of Interior could purchase such unneeded land within the reservation as the Indians would consent to sell.10 Section 16 confirmed a grant of rights of way for railroad purposes, subject again to approval of the Secretary of Interior and payment of compensation.11
Appellant's construction, moreover, would appear to be contrary to the express language of Section 16 of the Act, which confirms in the Indians "to their separate and exclusive use and benefit, all the title and interest of every name and nature secured therein to the different bands of the Sioux Nation by said Treaty of [1868]."12
We affirm the finding of the district court that Bennett County's right to enter the land in question is contingent upon the permission of the Secretary under Section 311, or a right obtained through lawful condemnation proceedings under Section 357. These sections are a part of the definitive and extensive legislation which has been evolved by Congress over the years in discharge of its duties toward its Indian wards.13
In addition to the Sioux, other parties to the treaty were the Crows, Cheyennes, Arrapahoes, "Assinaboines," Mandans, Gros Ventres and Arickarees
In Northern Pacific, supra, the issue before the Court concerned railroad grants, limited to lands to which the United States had full title, not reserved or otherwise appropriated
See discussion of Act of 1889, infra
Congress has from time to time granted rights of way across Indian reservations to railroad companies, but has made these grants subject to the consent of the Indians and payment of compensation. An example may be found in the Act of February 23, 1889, Ch. 202, 25 Stat. 684, granting a right of way through the Yankton Indian Reservation in Dakota Territory. See also 25 U.S.C.A. § 341 (1887)
In the Treaty of 1868, supra, 15 Stat. at p. 639, the Sioux agreed not to object to future construction of railroads, wagon roads, or other works of public necessity, but in turn, the government agreed to pay damages and compensation should such work be authorized or permitted by the laws of the United States