Source: http://openjurist.org/462/us/919
Timestamp: 2015-05-23 03:14:43
Document Index: 179855973

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 106', '§ 242', '§ 1', '§ 7', '§ 244', '§ 7', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 1254', '§ 242', '§ 1252', '§ 244', '§ 1254', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 1254', '§ 244', '§ 1254', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 1254', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 106', '§ 1105', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 244', '§ 1252', '§ 244', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 406', '§ 1101', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 406', '§ 14', '§ 7', '§ 20', '§ 244', '§ 406', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 201', '§ 1151', '§ 106', '§ 1105', '§ 244', '§ 242', '§ 106', '§ 106', '§ 242', '§ 106', '§ 106', '§ 106', '§ 244', '§ 1254', '§ 244', '§ 1252', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 1', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 2', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 244', '§ 7', '§ 244', '§ 8', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 244', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2']

462 US 919 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha | OpenJurist
462 U.S. 919 - Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha	Home462 us 919 immigration and naturalization service v. chadha
462 US 919 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919
103 S.Ct. 2764
77 L.Ed.2d 317
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Appellantv.Jagdish Rai CHADHA et al. UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Petitioner v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE et al. UNITED STATES SENATE, Petitioner v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE et al.
Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) authorizes either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. Appellee-respondent Chadha, an alien who had been lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa, remained in the United States after his visa had expired and was ordered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to show cause why he should not be deported. He then applied for suspension of the deportation, and, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge, acting pursuant to § 244(a)(1) of the Act, which authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation, ordered the suspension, and reported the suspension to Congress as required by § 244(c)(1). Thereafter, the House of Representatives passed a Resolution pursuant to § 244(c)(2) vetoing the suspension, and the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional, but the judge held that he had no authority to rule on its constitutionality and ordered Chadha deported pursuant to the House Resolution. Chadha's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed, the Board also holding that it had no power to declare § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. Chadha then filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the Court of Appeals, and the INS joined him in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that § 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and accordingly directed the Attorney General to cease taking any steps to deport Chadha based upon the House Resolution.
1. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the INS's appeal in No. 80-1832 under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, which provides that "[a]ny party" may appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of "any court of the United States" holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in "any civil action, suit or proceeding" to which the United States or any of its agencies is a party. A court of appeals is "a court of the United States" for purposes of § 1252, the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit or proceeding," the INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the proceeding below, and the judgment below held an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Moreover, for purposes of deciding whether the INS was "any party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. An agency's status as an aggrieved party under § 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. Pp. 929-931.
2. Section 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244. Section 406 of the Act provides that if any particular provision of the Act is held invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not be affected. This gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a whole, or any part thereof, to depend upon whether the veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid. This presumption is supported by § 244's legislative history. Moreover, a provision is further presumed severable if what remains after severance is fully operative as a law. Here, § 244 can survive as a "fully operative" and workable administrative mechanism without the one-house veto. Pp. 931-935.
3. Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) since he has demonstrated "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2633, 57 L.Ed.2d 595. Pp.935-936
5. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the Act, which provides that a petition for review in a court of appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings" under § 242(b) of the Act. Section 106(a) includes all matters on which the final deportation order is contingent, rather than only those determinations made at the deportation hearing. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto, the final deportation order having been entered only to implement that veto. Pp. 937-939.
6. A case or controversy is presented by these cases. From the time of the House's formal intervention, there was concrete adverseness, and prior to such intervention, there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS and Chadha. The INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the INS would have deported him absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. Moreover, Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when a Government agency, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is unconstitutional. Pp.939-940
(a) The prescription for legislative action in Art. I, § 1 requiring all legislative powers to be vested in a Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives—and § 7 requiring every bill passed by the House and Senate, before becoming law, to be presented to the President, and, if he disapproves, to be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. This procedure is an integral part of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. Pp. 944-951.
(b) Here, the action taken by the House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) was essentially legislative in purpose and effect and thus was subject to the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7, for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentation to the President. The one-House veto operated to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation. The veto's legislative character is confirmed by the character of the congressional action it supplants; i.e., absent the veto provision of § 244(c)(2), neither the House nor the Senate, or both acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority, had determined that the alien should remain in the United States. Without the veto provision, this could have been achieved only by legislation requiring deportation. A veto by one House under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto further manifests its legislative character. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority to the Attorney General until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. Finally, the veto's legislative character is confirmed by the fact that when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alon and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action in the Constitution. Pp. 951- 959.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction in No. 80-1832. Each presents a challenge to the constitutionality of the provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), authorizing one House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
* Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported for having "remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted." App. 6. Pursuant to § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), a deportation hearing was held before an immigration judge on January 11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable for overstaying his visa and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an application for suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). Section 244(a)(1) provides:
"(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and—
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence."1
After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on February 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the results of a character investigation conducted by the INS, the immigration judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered that Chadha's deportation be suspended. The immigration judge found that Chadha met the requirements of § 244(a)(1): he had resided continuously in the United States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer "extreme hardship" if deported.
Pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1), the immigration judge suspended Chadha's deportation and a report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress. Section 244(c)(1) provides:
"Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the require ents of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first day of each calendar month in which Congress is in session."
Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspension of Chadha's deportation was conveyed to Congress, Congress had the power under § 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), to veto2 the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2) provides:
"(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsection—
if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings." The June 25, 1974 order of the immigration judge suspending Chadha's deportation remained outstanding as a valid order for a year and a half. For reasons not disclosed by the record, Congress did not exercise the veto authority reserved to it under § 244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th Congress. This was the final session in which Congress, pursuant to § 244(c)(2), could act to veto the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. The session ended on December 19, 1975. 121 Cong.Rec. 42014, 42277 (1975). Absent Congressional action, Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been cancelled after this date and his status adjusted to that of a permanent resident alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(d).
On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, introduced a resolution opposing "the granting of permanent residence in the United States to [six] aliens", including Chadha. H.R.Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; 121 Cong.Rec. 40247 (1975). The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. On December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged from further consideration by the House Committee on the Judiciary and submitted to the House of Representatives for a vote. 121 Cong.Rec. 40800. The resolution had not been printed and was not made available to other Members of the House prior to or at the time it was voted on. Ibid. So far as the record before us shows, the House consideration of the resolution was based on Representative Eilberg's statement from the floor that
"[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution [Chadha and five others] did not meet these statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the committee that their deportation should not be suspended." Ibid. The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote.3 Since the House action was pursuant to § 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated as an Article I legislative act; it was not submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for his action.
After the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to allow Chadha to remain in the United States, the immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order deporting Chadha. Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The immigration judge held that he had no authority to rule on the constitutional validity of § 244(c)(2). On November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered deported pursuant to the House action.
Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals again contending that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress" and Chadha's appeal was dismissed. App. 55-56.
Pursuant to § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed with Chadha's position before the Court of Appeals and joined him in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconsti utional. In light of the importance of the question, the Court of Appeals invited both the Senate and the House of Representatives to file briefs amici curiae.
After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals held that the House was without constitutional authority to order Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed the Attorney General "to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport this alien based upon the resolution enacted by the House of Representatives." Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 436 (CA9 1980). The essence of its holding was that § 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed consideration of our jurisdiction over the appeal in No. 80-1832, 454 U.S. 812, 102 S.Ct. 87, 70 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981), and we now affirm.
Before we address the important question of the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2), we first consider several challenges to the authority of this Court to resolve the issue raised.
Both Houses of Congress4 contend that we are without jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832. Section 1252 provides:
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 742, n. 10, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2555, n. 10, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974), makes clear that a court of appeals is a "court of the United States" for purposes of § 1252. It is likewise clear that the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit or proceeding," that the INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the proceeding below, and that that proceeding held an Act of Congress—namely, the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2)—unconstitutional. The express requisites for an appeal under § 1252, therefore, have been met.
In motions to dismiss the INS appeal, the Congressional parties5 direct attention, however, to our statement that "[a] party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980). Here, the INS sought the invalidation of § 244(c)(2) and the Court of Appeals granted that relief. Both Houses contend that the INS has already received what it sought from the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved party, and therefore cannot appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals. We cannot agree.
The INS was ordered by one House of Congress to deport Chadha. As we have set out more fully, ante at 928, the INS concluded that it had no power to rule on the constitutionality of that order and accor ingly proceeded to implement it. Chadha's appeal challenged that decision and the INS presented the Executive's views on the constitutionality of the House action to the Court of Appeals. But the INS brief to the Court of Appeals did not alter the agency's decision to comply with the House action ordering deportation of Chadha. The Court of Appeals set aside the deportation proceedings and ordered the Attorney General to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport Chadha; steps that the Attorney General would have taken were it not for that decision.
At least for purposes of deciding whether the INS is "any party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, we hold that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. It is apparent that Congress intended that this Court take notice of cases that meet the technical prerequisites of § 1252; in other cases where an Act of Congress is held unconstitutional by a federal court, review in this Court is available only by writ of certiorari. When an agency of the United States is a party to a case in which the Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitutional, it is an aggrieved party for purposes of taking an appeal under § 1252. The agency's status as an aggrieved party under § 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. The appeal in No. 80-1832 is therefore properly before us.6
Congress also contends that the provision for the one-House veto in § 244(c)(2) cannot be severed from § 244. Congress argues that if the provision for the one-House veto is held unconstitutional, all of § 244 must fall. If § 244 in its entirety is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the Attorney General has no authority to suspend Chadha's deportation under § 244(a)(1) and Chadha would be deported. From this, Congress argues that Chadha lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision because he could receive no relief even if his constitutional challenge proves successful.7
Only recently this Court reaffirmed that the invalid portions of a statute are to be severed " '[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not.' " Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108, 96 S.Ct. 612, 677, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234, 52 S.Ct. 559, 565, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932). Here, however, we need not embark on that elusive inquiry since Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of severability in § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note, which provides:
This language is unambiguous and gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a whole, or of any part of the Act, to depend upon whether the veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid. The one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is clearly a "particular provision" of the Act as that language is used in the severability clause. Congress clearly intended "the remainder of the Act" to stand if "any particular provision" were held invalid. Congress could not have more plainly authorized the presumption that the provision for a one-House veto in § 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244 and the Act of which it is a part. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 434, 58 S.Ct. 678, 683, 82 L.Ed. 936 (1938).
The presumption as to the severability of the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is supported by the legislative history of § 244. That section and its precursors supplanted the long established pattern of dealing with deportations like Chadha's on a case-by-case basis through private bills. Although it may be that Congress was reluctant to delegate final authority over cancellation of deportations, such reluctance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of severability raised by § 406.
The Immigration Act of 1924, Pub.L. No. 139, § 14, 43 Stat. 153, 162, required the Secretary of Labor to deport any alien who entered or remained in the United States unlawfully. The only means by which a deportable alien could lawfully remain in the United States was to have his status altered by a private bill enacted by both Houses and presented to the President pursuant to the procedures set out in Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution. These private bills were found intolerable by Congress. In the debate on a 1937 bill introduced by Representative Dies to authorize the Secretary to grant permanent residence in "meritorious" cases, Dies stated:
"It was my original thought that the way to handle all these meritorious cases was through special bills. I am absolutely convinced as a result of what has occurred in this House that it is impossible to deal with the situation through special bills. We had a demonstration of that fact not long ago when 15 special bills were before the House. The House consumed 51/2 hours considering four bills and made no disposition of any of these bills." 81 Cong.Rec. 5542 (1937).
Representative Dies' bill passed the House, id., at 5574, but did not come to a vote in the Senate. 83 Cong.Rec. 8992-8996 (1938).
Congress first authorized the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of certain aliens in the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. That Act provided that an alien was to be deported, despite the Attorney General's decision to the contrary, if both Houses, by concurrent resolution, disapproved the suspension.
In 1948, Congress amended the Act to broaden the category of aliens eligible for suspension of deportation. In addition, however, Congress limited the authority of the Attorney General to suspend deportations by providing that the Attorney General could not cancel a deportation unless both Houses affirmatively voted by concurrent resolution to approve the Attorney General's action. Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206. The provision for approval by concurrent resolution in the 1948 Act proved almost as burdensome as private bills. Just four years later, the House Judiciary Committee, in support of the predecessor to § 244(c)(2), stated in a report:
"In the light of experience of the last several months, the committee came to the conclusion that the requirements of affirmative action by both Houses of the Congress in many thousands of individual cases which are submitted by the Attorney General every year, is not workable and places upon the Congress and particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary responsibilities which it cannot assume. The new responsibilities placed upon the Committee on the Judiciary [by the concurrent resolution mechanism] are of purely administrative natur and they seriously interfere with the legislative work of the Committee on the Judiciary and would, in time, interfere with the legislative work of the House." H.R.Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
The proposal to permit one House of Congress to veto the Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation was incorporated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub.L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 214. Plainly, Congress' desire to retain a veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed in the context of Congress' irritation with the burden of private immigration bills. This legislative history is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of severability raised by § 406 because there is insufficient evidence that Congress would have continued to subject itself to the onerous burdens of private bills had it known that § 244(c)(2) would be held unconstitutional.
A provision is further presumed severable if what remains after severance "is fully operative as a law." Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, 286 U.S., at 234, 52 S.Ct., at 565. There can be no doubt that § 244 is "fully operative" and workable administrative machinery without the veto provision in § 244(c)(2). Entirely independent of the one-House veto, the administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation under § 244(a). Congress' oversight of the exercise of this delegated authority is preserved since all such suspensions will continue to be reported to it under § 244(c)(1). Absent the passage of a bill to the contrary,8 deportation proceedings will be cancelled when the period specified in § 244(c)(2) has expired.9 Clearly, § 244 survives as a workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto.
We must also reject the contention that Chadha lacks standing because a consequence of his prevailing will advance the interests of the Executive Branch in a separation of powers dispute with Congress, rather than simply Chadha's private interests. Chadha has dem nstrated "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. . . ." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2633, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). If the veto provision violates the Constitution, and is severable, the deportation order against Chadha will be cancelled. Chadha therefore has standing to challenge the order of the Executive mandated by the House veto.
It is contended that the Court should decline to decide the constitutional question presented by this case because Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him. It is argued that since Chadha married a United States citizen on August 10, 1980, it is possible that other avenues of relief may be open under §§ 201(b), 204, and 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1154, 1255. It is true that Chadha may be eligible for classification as an "immediate relative" and, as such, could lawfully be accorded permanent residence. Moreover, in March 1980, just prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, under which the Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum, and then permanent residence, to any alien who is unable to return to his country of nationality because of "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race."
It is urged that these two intervening factors constitute a prudential bar to our consideration of the constitutional question presented in this case. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). If we could perceive merit in this contention we might well seek to avoid deciding the constitutional claim advanced. But at most these other avenues of relief are speculative. It is by no means certain, for example, that Chadha's classification as an immediate relative would result in the adjustment of Chadha's status from nonimmigrant to permanent resident. See Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (CA9 1979). If Chadha is successful in his present challenge he will not be deported and will automatically become eligible to apply for citizenship.10 A person threatened with deportation cannot be denied the right to challenge the constitutional validity of the process which led to his status merely on the basis of speculation over the availability of other forms of relief.
It is contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). That section provides that a petition for review in the Court of Appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 242(b) of this Act." Congress argues that the one-House veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) takes place outside the administrative proceedings conducted under § 242(b), and that the jurisdictional grant contained in § 106(a) does not encompass Chadha's constitutional challenge.
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 216, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968), this Court held that "§ 106(a) embrace[s] only those determinations made during a proceeding conducted under § 242(b), including those determinations made inc dent to a motion to reopen such proceedings." It is true that one court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to preclude appeals similar to Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (CA3 1981).11 However, we agree with the Court of Appeals in this case that the term "final orders" in § 106(a) "includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations actually made at the hearing." 634 F.2d, at 412. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final order of deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action of the House of Representatives. Although the Attorney General was satisfied that the House action was invalid and that it should not have any effect on his decision to suspend deportation, he appropriately let the controversy take its course through the courts.
This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does not bar Chadha's appeal. There, after an order of deportation had been entered, the affected alien requested the INS to stay the execution of that order. When that request was denied, the alien sought review in the Court of Appeals under § 106(a). This Court's holding that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction was based on the fact that the alien "did not 'attack the deportation order itself but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with it.' " 392 U.S., at 213, 88 S.Ct., at 1975, quoting Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 777 (CA2 1966). Here, in contrast, Chadha directly attacks the deportation order itself and the relief he seeks—cancellation of deportation—is plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) to decide this case.
It is also contended that this is not a genuine controversy but "a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding," Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra, 297 U.S., at 346, 56 S.Ct., at 482 (Brandeis, J., concurring), upon which the Court should not pass. This argument rests on the fact that Chadha and the INS take the same position on the constitutionality of the one-House veto. But it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts because the Attorney General of the United States agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.
A case or controversy is presented by this case. First, from the time of Congress' formal intervention, see note 5, supra, the concrete adverseness is beyond doubt. Congress is both a proper party to defend the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) and a proper petitioner under § 1254(1). Second, prior to Congress' intervention, there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS and Chadha. We have already held that the INS's agreement with the Court of Appeals' decision that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional does not affect that agency's "aggrieved" status for purposes of appealing that decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, see ante, at 929-931. For similar reasons, the INS's agreement with Chadha's posit on does not alter the fact that the INS would have deported Chadha absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals that "Chadha has asserted a concrete controversy, and our decision will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not be deported; if we uphold § 244(c)(2), the INS will execute its order and deport him." 634 F.2d, at 419.12
Of course, there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III, concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of this case in the absence of any participant supporting the validity of § 244(c)(2). The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any such concerns by inviting and accepting briefs from both Houses of Congress. We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, supra, 392 U.S., at 210 n. 9, 88 S.Ct., at 1973 n. 9; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946).
It is also argued that this case presents a nonjusticiable political question because Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the Naturalization Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress' Article I power "To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization", combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 is not open to question, but what is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power. As we made clear in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); "Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 [4 L.Ed. 579] (1819), so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction." Id., 424 U.S., at 132, 96 S.Ct., at 688.
A brief review of those factors which may indicate the presence of a nonjusticiable political question satisfies us that our assertion of jurisdiction over this case does no violence to the political question doctrine. As identified in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), a political question may arise when any one of the following circumstances is present:
Congress apparently directs its assertion of nonjusticiability to the first of the Baker factors by asserting that Chadha's claim is "an assault on the legislative authority to enact Section 244(c)(2)." Brief for the United States House of Representatives 48. But if this turns the question into a political question virtually every challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be a political question. Chadha indeed argues that one House of Congress cannot constitutionally veto the Attorney General's decision to allow him to remain in this country. No policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both acting in concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts.13
Other Baker factors are likewise inapplicable to this case. As we discuss more fully below, Art. I provides the "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" of Baker for resolving the question presented by this case. Those standards forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial "policy determinations" or any showing of disrespect for a coordinate branch. Similarly, if Chadha's arguments are accepted, § 244(c)(2) cannot stand, and, since the constitutionality of that statute is for this Court to resolve, there is no possibility of "multifarious pronouncements" on this question.
It is correct that this controversy may, in a sense, be termed "political." But the presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by courts because the issues have political implications in the sense urged by Congress. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), was also a "political" case, involving as it did claims under a judicial commission alleged to have been duly signed by the President but not delivered. But "courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority." Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 217, 82 S.Ct., at 710.
In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892), this Court addressed and resolved the question whether
"a bill signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, presented to and approved by the President of the United States, and delivered by the latter to the Secretary of State, as an act passed by Congress, does not become a law of the United States if it had not in fact been passed by Congress.
We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this court, from the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the enactment of laws that are to operate wherever the authority and jurisdiction of the United States extend. On the other hand, we cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if this court should feel obliged, in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and private interests of vast magnitude, and which has been . . . deposited in the public archives, as an act of Congress, . . . did not become law." Id., at 669, 670, 12 S.Ct., at 496, 497 (emphasis in original).
The contentions on standing and justiciability have been fully examined and we are satisfied the parties are properly before us. The important issues have been fully briefed and twice argued, 454 U.S. 812, 102 S.Ct. 87, 70 L.Ed.2d 80, 81 (1982). The Court's duty in this case, as Chief Justice Marshall declared in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821), is clear:
We turn now to the question whether action of one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained:
"Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-195, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2302, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978).
By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent agencies:
"Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from 1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes; between 1950-59, thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions were included in eighty-nine laws." Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind.L.Rev. 323, 324 (1977). See also Appendix 1 to Justice WHITE's dissent, post,.
Justice WHITE undertakes to make a case for the proposition that the one-House veto is a useful "political inv ntion," post, at 972, and we need not challenge that assertion. We can even concede this utilitarian argument although the long range political wisdom of this "invention" is arguable. It has been vigorously debated and it is instructive to compare the views of the protagonists. See, e.g., Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 455 (1977), and Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va.L.Rev. 253 (1982). But policy arguments supporting even useful "political inventions" are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.
Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process. Since the precise terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the resolution of this case, we set them out verbatim. Art. I provides:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." Art. I, § 1. (Emphasis added).
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; . . ." Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added).
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." Art. I, § 7, cl. 3. (Emphasis added).
These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. We have recently noted that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the documents that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S., at 124, 96 S.Ct., at 684. Just as we relied on the textual provision of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, to vindicate the principle of separation of powers in Buckley, we find that the purposes underlying the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, and the bicameral requirement of Art. I, § 1 and § 7, cl. 2, guide our resolution of the important question presented in this case. The very structure of the articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplify the concept of separation of powers and we now turn to Art. I.
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the Framers.14 Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a "resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 301-302. As a consequence, Art. I, § 7, cl. 3, ante, at 945-946, was added. Id., at 304-305.
"If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense." Id., at 457-458.
See also The Federalist No. 51. In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story makes the same point. 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 614-615 (1858).
The President's role in the lawmaking process also reflects the Framers' careful efforts to check whatever propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures. The President's veto role in the legislative process was described later during public debate on ratification:
"It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority of that body. . . . The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, supra, at 458 (A. Hamilton).
See also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 678, 49 S.Ct. 463, 466, 73 L.Ed. 894 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123, 47 S.Ct. 21, 27, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926). The Court also has observed that the Presentment Clauses serve the important purpose of assuring that a "national" perspective is grafted on the legislative process:
"The President is a representative of the people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not countrywide. . . ." Myers v. United States, supra, 272 U.S., at 123, 47 S.Ct., at 27.
The bicameral requirement of Art. I, §§ 1, 7 was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto and indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized their belief, already remarked upon in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation's elected officials. In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court, commented:
"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes. Sometimes in an Execu ive, sometimes in a military, one. Is there danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it." 1 M. Farrand, supra, at 254.
"we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert." The Federalist No. 22, supra, at 135.
"Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the dominion of strong passions and excitements; impatient, irritable, and impetuous. . . . If [a legislature]
feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough under its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings and relations to society." 1 J. Story, supra, at 383-384.
These observations are consistent with what many of the Framers expressed, none more cogently than Hamilton in pointing up the need to divide and disperse power in order to protect liberty:
"In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit." The Federalist No. 51, supra, at 324.
However familiar, it is useful to recall that apart from their fear that special interests could be favored at the expense of public needs, the Framers were also concerned, although not of one mind, over the apprehensions of the smaller states. Those states feared a commonality of interest among the larger states would work to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the other hand, were skeptical of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the people. See 1 M. Farrand, supra, 176-177, 484-491. It need hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise, under which one House was viewed as representing the people and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the large and small states.15
We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person. See 1 M Farrand, supra, at 99-104. It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.
Although not "hermetically" sealed from one another, Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S., at 121, 96 S.Ct., at 683, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable. When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it. See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928). When the Executive acts, it presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II. And when, as here, one House of Congress purports to act, it is presumptively acting within its assigned sphere.
Beginning with this presumption, we must nevertheless establish that the challenged action under § 244(c)(2) is of the kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7 apply. Not every action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I. See post, at 955. Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon "whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect." S.Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897).
Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise power defined in Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch. Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House of Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien whose deportation otherwise would be cancelled under § 244. The one-House veto operated in this case to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its action has altered Chadha's status.
The legislative character of the one-House veto in this case is confirmed by the character of the Congressional action it supplants. Neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in § 244(c)(2), either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority,16 had determined the alien should remain in the United States. Without the challenged provision in § 244(c)(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only by legislation requiring deportation.17 Similarly, a veto by one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.18
The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto in this case further manifests its legislative character. After long experience with the clumsy, time consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art. I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's deportation—that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha—no less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.19
Finally, we see that when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action. There are but four provisions in the Constitution, explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto:
(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate impeachments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 6;
(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeachment on charges initiated by the House and to convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 5;
(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to approve or to disapprove presidential appointments. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2;
(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by the President. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in expl