Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/35055811/Burns-Scott-040810
Timestamp: 2019-08-24 03:09:25
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 43', '§ 14', '§ 44', '§ 14']

Burns Scott 040810 | Burden Of Proof (Law) | Background Check
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617) 727-2293
v. G1-08-251
Appellant’s Attorney: Patrick N. Bryant, Esq.
One State Street: Suite 200
Respondent’s Attorney: Layla G. Taylor, Esq.
One Monarch Place: Suite 1200
Commissioner: Christopher C. Bowman
Pursuant to the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), the Appellant, Scott Burns,
(hereinafter “Burns” or “Appellant”), seeks review of the Human Resources Division’s
(hereinafter “HRD”) decision to accept reasons proffered by the Respondent-Appointing
Authority, City of Holyoke (hereinafter “City” or “Appointing Authority”), for the
bypass of the Appellant for original appointment to the position of reserve police officer
in the Holyoke Police Department (hereinafter “Department”). A full hearing was held
on January 6, 2010 at the City Hall Annex in Holyoke, MA. All of the witnesses were
sequestered with the exception of the Appellant and Holyoke Police Chief Anthony Scott.
The hearing was digitally recorded and 1 CD was made of the proceeding. A copy of
the CD was provided to the parties. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs on January
22, 2010 (Appellant) and February 12, 2010 (Appointing Authority).
Forty-one (41) exhibits were entered into evidence at the hearing (Exhibit 14 was
subsequently withdrawn). Based upon the documents entered into evidence and the
 Anthony R. Scott, Chief of Police, City of Holyoke;
 Lieutenant David Fournier, Professional Standards Division, Holyoke Police Dept.;
 Sergeant Daniel McCavick, Professional Standards Division, Holyoke Police Dept.;
 Scott Burns, Appellant;
1. The Appellant has been employed by the City as a full-time police dispatcher since
2001. He served as President of SEIU Local 999 from November 2003 to February
2009. (Testimony of Appellant)
2. The Appellant also served as a volunteer member of the City’s Auxiliary police force
and as part-time special police officer in the Town of Hadley and the Town of West
Springfield. (Testimony of Appellant)
3. The Appellant took and passed an open competitive civil service examination for the
position of permanent reserve police officer for the Holyoke Police Department.
(Stipulated Fact; Testimony of Appellant)
4. In April 2008, the City made a requisition to HRD for a Certification of candidates
for the appointment of twenty (20) permanent reserve police officers. On May 5,
2008, HRD sent the City Certification No. 280376. The Appellant’s name appeared
seventh on this Certification. (Stipulated Facts)
5. The City then conducted background investigations of the candidates named on the
Certification who indicated a willingness to accept appointment and who submitted
required application materials. The background investigations were conducted and
the investigation reports were compiled by Holyoke Police Lt. David Fournier and
Holyoke Police Sgt. David McCavick of the Professional Standards Division.
(Stipulated Facts and Testimony of Fournier, McCavick and Scott)
6. The City ultimately appointed thirteen (13) individuals to the position of permanent
reserve police officer, eleven (11) of whom were ranked lower than the Appellant.
(Stipulated Facts)
7. A “bypass” occurs when an Appointing Authority selects “a person or person whose
name or names, by reason of score, merit preference status, court decree, decision on
appeal from a court or administrative agency, or legislative mandate appear lower on
a Certification than a person or persons who are not appointed and whose names
appear higher on said certification.” (PAR.02)
8. Upon determining that any candidate on a Certification is to be bypassed…an
Appointing Authority shall, immediately upon making such determination, send to
[HRD] in writing, [1] a full and complete statement of the reasons or reasons for
bypassing a person or persons more highly ranked [negative reasons], or [2] of the
reasons for selecting another person or persons, lower in score or preference category
[positive reasons]. (PAR.08 (3)) 1
9. On January 15, 2009, the City notified HRD of the negative reasons for not selecting
the Appellant including: 1) Mr. Burns has a non-renewable driver’s license; 2)
Mr.Burns’s past work history as a dispatcher with the Holyoke Police Department
was not favorable; 3) The Appellant’s background check revealed a lack of credibility
and candor as he omitted and/or misstated various information on his application.
Each of these three reasons was accompanied by additional information and examples
by the City. (Exhibit 15)
10. HRD notified the Appellant and the City on February 13, 2009 that the negative
reasons offered to justify the bypass of the Appellant were accepted. (Exhibit 17)
Non Renewable Driver’s License
11. The background investigation report of the Appellant prepared by Lt. Fournier stated:
“License Status – Non Renewable (delinquent on excise tax payment for 2006 &
2007). (Exhibit 6)
12. The Appellant acknowledged that he was delinquent on paying his excise tax
payments for 2006 and 2007. Sometime after he was bypassed for appointment, but
prior to the expiration of his driver’s license, he paid the overdue excise tax payments
and renewed his license. His license was never suspended. (Testimony of Appellant)
As of September 1, 2009, due to budgetary constraints, HRD has delegated the responsibility of ensuring
sound and sufficient reasons to the individual cities and towns. Bypassed candidates, however, maintain
their right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission. See Letter from Paul D. Dietl, Chief Human Res.
Officer, HRD, to Mun. Appointing Auths., Human Res. Divs., Fire Chiefs, and Police Chiefs (Aug. 7,
2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoaf/docs/hrd/cs/ information/cs_aug_7_2009.doc. Since these
selections occurred prior to September 1, 2009, however, the pre-existing process of first forwarding
bypass reasons to HRD was followed here.
13. The Appellant testified that the delinquent taxes were either an oversight on his part
or that the bills may have gotten lost. (Testimony of Appellant)
14. Some candidates selected for appointment by the City as reserve police officers had
poor driving records, including one candidate whose driving history was “too
extensive to list”; at least one whose license had been suspended at some point; one
who had seven (7) surchargeable accidents; and one who had been arrested, but not
convicted, of driving under the influence. (Testimony of Fournier, Exhibits 23 and
15. As part of the background investigation completed by Lieutenant David Fournier, it
was determined that as of June 2008, after nearly six (6) years of full-time
employment with the City, the Appellant had only six (6) days of accumulated sick
time remaining. (Exhibit 6) As a City employee, the Appellant earns fifteen (15) days
of sick time annually. (Testimony of Fournier)
16. The Appellant testified that all of his sick time usage during this time period was
documented and was due in part to hypoglycemia and oral reconstructive surgery.
17. On May 4, 2006, the Appellant received a written reprimand for working a police
detail for the South Hadley Police Department after reporting that he was sick and
leaving his Holyoke dispatcher job early. (Exhibit 8)
18. On June 10, 2008, the Appellant was suspended for two (2) days for working a paid
detail for the South Hadley Police Department after reporting himself sick (upset
stomach) for his tour of duty with the Holyoke Police Department on the same date.
19. On or shortly after May 12, 2008, Holyoke Police Sergeant Daniel McCavick sent an
email to the Appellant which stated in part:
“On May 12, 2008 (it was noted) you were late 37 minutes for work – resulting in an
overtime situation. Dispatcher Burns, this is the second incident of recent (of which I am
aware) – where in you were late for duty – resulting in the creation of overtime. As a
result – your time on 5/12/08 will reflect the deduction.” (Exhibit 38)
20. The Appellant sent an email reply to Sergeant McCavick on May 15, 2008 stating:
“I do not deny the fact that I was late for duty on the date indicated. However, there is a
more serious issue which will need to be addressed, and that is the practice of dispatchers
being allowed to leave early. This is a practice which occurs on a regular basis,
particularly on the Second and Third Watches. When there are two dispatchers coming
in on a regular basis at 07:00 the 8:00 dispatcher will leave early, when there are two
dispatchers coming in at 23:00 the 16:00-00:00 dispatcher will leaver one (1) hour early,
on a regular basis, essentially getting paid for 2 ½ hours a week that were never work
(sic). If you are going to deduct money from my pay check for this incident will the same
be done to others who are not working the hours? I would also request records for any
other dispatchers who have had pay deducted for the same reason as of recent? I do
believe this could become a grievance issue, and the records will be used for that
purpose.” (Exhibit 38)
21. When asked about the above-referenced incident during cross-examination, the
Appellant testified that he believed that McCavick was “targeting” him in an attempt
to “trump up” charges to justify the Appellant’s bypass. (Testimony of Appellant)
22. McCavick was called as a rebuttal witness by the City. He adamantly denied that
there was any connection between his email to the Appellant and the Appellant’s
then-pending application to be a reserve police officer. McCavick was involved in
this matter solely because he had been put temporarily in charge of the
Communications division, which includes the dispatchers, and was determining why
a fellow dispatcher had requested overtime. McCavick was a good witness. He
appeared genuinely surprised that his email to the Appellant could be construed as
anything other than him fulfilling his responsibility as a temporary manager of the
dispatchers. I credit his testimony. (Testimony, demeanor of McCavick)
23. On June 17, 2008, Captain Frederick Seklecki sent a memorandum to the Appellant
expressing his concern about the Appellant reporting for duty late. The memorandum
referenced the May 12, 2008 incident (referenced above), being 5 minutes late on
June 2, 2008 and then 90 minutes late on June 15, 2008 after the Appellant overslept.
In regard to being late on June 15, 2008, the Appellant wrote an email at the time
which stated: “Just so you’re aware, I over slept on today’s date, Sunday 6/15/08, so
I was late for my shift. I put in for 1 ½ Hours of Sick Time.” (Exhibit 39)
24. I do not credit the Appellant’s testimony that all of his sick time usage as a dispatcher
from 2002 to 2008 was documented. The documentary evidence shows that the
Appellant was disciplined for inappropriately using sick time to work paid details in a
nearby Town and that he admittedly used sick time when he “overslept”. Further,
when the issue of his sick time usage was brought to his attention by his managers,
the Appellant responded by seeking to divert attention to other matters and co-
workers. Even in his testimony before the Commission, the Appellant seemed unable
or unwilling to accept responsibility for his poor attendance record and the reasons
behind it. (Testimony, demeanor of Appellant)
25. Jean Dietrich is the Colonel in charge of personnel administration for the City’s
volunteer Auxiliary Police Department where the Appellant served as a volunteer. In
her written evaluation of the Appellant dated June 28, 2008, she stated: “Scott Burns
was a source of undermining and very critical of all our (sic) activities. Since he
secretly worked other Auxiliary units while on our roster knowing it was against the
rules, we could not trust his integrity. Scott is a very intelligent person, but tends to
undermine the authority of others. He questions why orders are given and tells you
how it should be done.” (Exhibit 19)
26. The Appellant introduced as Exhibit 35 a letter dated December 6, 2004 from Ronald
Dietrich (husband of Jean Dietrich), who is the Chief of the City’s Auxiliary Police
Department. In his 2004 letter to the Amherst Police Department, Dietrich stated in
part: “[Scott] is proud of the uniform he wears, displays his shield with honor and
serves with professionalism. He is also a dispatcher for the Department. I strongly
recommend him for consideration to be selected by your department as a member of
the Amherst Police Force. He would be an asset not only to the Amherst Police
Department but also to the Amherst community.” (Exhibit 35)
27. Holyoke Police Captain Frederick Seklecki was asked to provide an evaluation of the
Appellant’s employment as a dispatcher. Seklecki reported that the Appellant had
excellent dispatch capabilities, but that he was unable to accept criticism and tended
to become extremely defensive and put himself in attack mode. (Exhibit 6)
28. Holyoke Police Chief Anthony Scott testified that he was concerned about the
Appellant’s ability to accept criticism and make good decisions and that the Appellant
can not take criticism “about the smallest things”. Chief Scott was particularly
concerned about the Auxiliary Police Department evaluation which stated that the
Appellant was undermining the Department. He was also concerned about the
Appellant’s frequent use of sick time. (Testimony of Chief Scott)
Omissions and/or Misstatements on the Appellant’s Employment Application
29. Section 5 of the City’s employment application states: “List ALL jobs you have had,
including part-time, temporary, self-employment and volunteer. (Begin with your
most current. If more space is needed continue your response on page 25.)” (Exhibit
30. The Appellant did not list the Holyoke Auxiliary Police Department as one of his
employers in Section 5 of the employment application. (Exhibit 5) Lt. Fournier sent
the previously-referenced request for an evaluation to the Auxiliary Department after
learning from another member of the Department that the Appellant volunteered
there. (Testimony of Fournier) As previously referenced, the Holyoke Auxiliary
Department responded to this request with a negative evaluation in which it was
indicated that the Appellant would not be re-hired. (Exhibit 19)
31. When submitting his application, the Appellant provided the Department with
additional documentation that was not requested, including his resume. The
Appellant’s resume lists the Auxiliary Department as a former employer. (Testimony
of Appellant and Exhibit 28)
32. Section 5, Question 40 (b) of the City’s employment application asks the applicant if
he has ever applied to another law enforcement agency and then asks the applicant to
indicate the status of that application with the following options: hired; on list;
withdrawn; or disqualified. In this section, the Appellant indicated that he had
applied to the Virginia Beach Police Department. In regard to the status of the
application, the Appellant checked “withdrawn”. (Exhibit 5)
33. On July 25, 2008, Lt. Fournier contacted the Virginia Beach Police Department and
spoke with that Department’s Human Resources Coordinator (Ms. Manning).
Fournier asked Ms. Manning to verify that the Appellant had withdrawn his
application. Ms. Manning indicated that the Appellant had been disqualified from the
process after taking the behavioral personnel assessment test. The Appellant scored
below the acceptable range on this test and was disqualified. (Testimony of Fournier
and Exhibit 21)
34. The Appellant testified that he did fail the above-referenced test, but since Virginia
Beach allows unsuccessful candidates to reapply within three months, he withdrew
his application. (Testimony of Appellant) In the Appellant’s post-hearing brief, he
indicates that he sent a letter to Virginia Beach to notify them that he was
withdrawing and references Exhibit 27. Exhibit 27, submitted by the Appellant,
includes: a) a copy of the letter from Virginia Beach to the Appellant informing him
that he did not receive an acceptable score on the behavioral test; and b) four
duplicate copies of a web site page from Virginia Beach which provides information
on the test in question. Exhibit 27 does not include a letter from the Appellant to
Virginia Beach. (Exhibit 27)
35. As referenced above, Question 40 of Section 5 of the application asks the applicant if
they ever applied to any other law enforcement agency. The Appellant indicated on
the application that he had applied to the Amtrak Railroad Police. When Lt. Fournier
reviewed the Appellant’s Amtrak application, he learned that the Appellant taken the
Massachusetts State Police examination in 2004. Lt. Fournier believed that the
Appellant should have listed this in response to Question 40. (Testimony of Fournier
and Exhibits 5 and 22)
36. The Appellant testified that he did not consider taking the State Police examination as
an application for employment and thus did not list this information when answering
Question 40 of Section 5 on the application. (Testimony of Appellant)
37. The City’s bypass letter to HRD stated that the Appellant failed to accurately describe
his credit history. (Exhibit 15)
38. Section 7, Question 49 of the Department’s employment application asks: “Have you
ever filed for or declared bankruptcy (Chapter 7, 11 or 13)? The Appellant answered
“no”. (Exhibit 5)
39. Section 7, Question 50 of the Department’s employment application asks: “Have any
of your bills ever been turned over to a collection agency?” The Appellant answered
“yes” and wrote that “past bills have been turned over to collection, late credit card
payments, etc.” (Exhibit 5)
40. The Appellant testified that he completed the employment application in May 2008,
but did not file for personal bankruptcy until October 2008 (which the City apparently
discovered at some point prior to submitting bypass reasons to HRD). Thus,
according to the Appellant, his response to Question 49 was accurate as of the date he
submitted his application. (Testimony of Appellant)
41. Chief Scott testified that he was concerned that the Appellant was trying to hide
things that weren’t favorable to him. (Testimony of Scott)
Other Selected Candidates
42. Redacted versions of the Background Investigation Reports (BIRs) for the thirteen
(13) selected candidates were entered into evidence at the hearing. The Commission
entered a Stipulated Protective Order between the parties in order to protect the
identities of those parties subject to this appeal. The BIR reports for the thirteen (13)
candidates were assigned a number of 1 to 13, in random order, for identification
purposes. (Exhibits 23 and 34)
43. Selected candidate “1” had two prior employment evaluations that were negative.
Selected candidate “4” had multiple charges regarding operating a vehicle after a
license suspension that were all dismissed or not prosecuted and an overall driving
history that was “too extensive to list”. Selected candidate “6” admitted to past use of
marijuana, cocaine and hallucinogens and was rejected for employment by another
police department for this reason. Selected candidate “7” had past driving infractions
including operating recklessly, speeding and revocation due to an “immediate threat”
order. Selected Candidate “7” was also arrested and charged with OUI and Reckless
Driving in 2005. Selected Candidate “8” failed to indicate that he had applied for
employment with another police department. Selected Candidate “9” admitted to past
marijuana use. Selected Candidate “13” had 2 past due accounts listed on his credit
report. (Exhibits 23 and 34)
44. One (1) of the selected candidates is related to an elected official in Holyoke. One (1)
of the selected candidates has a romantic relationship with a Holyoke police officer.
Three (3) of the selected candidates have family members who work for the City.
The selected candidates with an OUI charge or the candidate who admitted to past use
of cocaine do not fall into any of these categories. (Testimony of Fournier)
45. The City’s Mayor serves as the Appointing Authority. Chief Scott met with the
Mayor to review the candidates’ background checks to determine who should move
forward in the review process. Chief Scott stated that many of the motor vehicle
infractions of the selected candidates occurred several years ago. For all of the
selected candidates, with the exception of one, the Chief concurred with the Mayor’s
appointment decisions based on the “totality” of the candidate’s application and
background investigation. Chief Scott opposed the selection of the candidate who
acknowledged prior use of cocaine. (Testimony of Chief Scott)
46. Chief Scott testified that, “in totality”, after considering many of the issues previously
referenced, he had serious concerns about the Appellant’s application and background
investigation and that he did not recommend the Appellant to the Mayor for
appointment as a reserve police officer. (Testimony of Chief Scott)
47. The Appellant testified that he was an active local union president for the dispatchers.
In that capacity, he was part of contentious bargaining negotiations and joined others
in picketing City Hall and wearing purple t-shirts in a sign of solidarity. (Testimony
of Appellant)
48. Chief Scott testified that he was aware of the grievances filed by the Appellant but
was unaware that the Appellant was part of any picketing. Further, Chief Scott
testified that he does not participate in contract negotiations as Chief of Police.
Rather, negotiations are handled by City Hall.
The role of the Civil Service Commission is to determine “whether the Appointing
Authority has sustained its burden of proving that there was reasonable justification for
the action taken by the appointing authority.” Cambridge v. Civil Service Comm’n, 43
Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997). Reasonable justification means the Appointing
Authority’s actions were based on adequate reasons supported by credible evidence,
when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of
law. Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct. of E. Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477,
482 (1928). Commissioners of Civil Service v. Municipal Ct. of the City of Boston, 359
Mass. 214 (1971). G.L. c. 31, § 2(b) requires that bypass cases be determined by a
preponderance of the evidence. A “preponderance of the evidence test requires the
Commission to determine whether, on a basis of the evidence before it, the Appointing
Authority has established that the reasons assigned for the bypass of an Appellant were
more probably than not sound and sufficient.” Mayor of Revere v. Civil Service
Comm’n, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 315 (1991). G.L. c. 31, § 43.
Appointing Authorities are rightfully granted wide discretion when choosing
individuals from a certified list of eligible candidates on a civil service list. The issue for
the Commission is “not whether it would have acted as the appointing authority had
acted, but whether, on the facts found by the commission, there was reasonable
justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found
by the commission to have existed when the Appointing Authority made its decision.”
Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 332 (1983). See Commissioners of Civil
Service v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 369 Mass. 84, 86 (1975) and Leominster v. Stratton,
58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-728 (2003). However, personnel decisions that are marked
by political influences or objectives unrelated to merit standards or neutrally applied
public policy represent appropriate occasions for the Civil Service Commission to act.
Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 304.
The City, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, has shown that it had
reasonable justification to bypass the Appellant for original appointment as a reserve
The City substantiated that the Appellant’s employment history was a valid reason for
bypassing him for appointment. He was disciplined on two separate occasions for using
sick time as a dispatcher in order to perform paid detail duties in a nearby Town. He was
also warned on more than one occasion about his tardiness. Further, he received a highly
negative evaluation from the Colonel of the Holyoke Auxiliary Police Department,
including that she had no trust in the Appellant’s integrity. Although the Chief of the
Auxiliary Department provided the Appellant with a letter of recommendation several
years prior to this evaluation, this does not negate the more recent and more detailed
evaluation prepared by the Colonel.
The City has also substantiated that the Appellant’s omissions or misstatements on his
employment application were a valid reasons for bypassing him for appointment. The
City cited four omissions or misstatements upon which they reached their conclusion. I
reach the same conclusion regarding two of those allegations. The Appellant provided
accurate information regarding his credit history (at the time) and he did not need to
indicate that he applied to the State Police when all he did was take the State Police
entrance examination. He did, however, omit on his application his employment
application that he was employed by the City’s Auxiliary Police Department. It is not
sufficient that the Appellant attached a resume indicating this employment. Background
investigators should not be required to sift through unsolicited information in order to
conduct a thorough review of all applicants. They rely on applicants to complete the
application thoroughly and provide all of the information in the format and location
proscribed in the application. The Appellant failed to do that. Further, the Appellant
misled the City when he told them he “withdrew” his application from the Virginia Beach
Police Department. He failed a behavioral test and was disqualified. The fact that the
Appellant may be able to apply at a later date does not alter the fact that he was
disqualified. Further, the Appellant, who appears to be a meticulous record-keeper and
note-taker, failed to provide a copy of the letter he purports to have sent to Virginia
Beach “withdrawing” his application.
An Appointing Authority is well within its rights to take disciplinary action when a
police officer has “a demonstrated willingness to fudge the truth…” because “[p]olice
work frequently calls upon officers to speak the truth when doing so might put into
question a search or might embarrass a fellow officer.” See Falmouth v. Civil Service
Comm’n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 801 (2004); citing Cambridge, supra at 303. Thus, it
follows that a Police Department is justified in bypassing a candidate for appointment
who fudges the truth on his application.
In regard to the Appellant’s failure to pay excise taxes, the parties’ quibbled over
whether the Appellant’s license was “non-renewable” given the fact that he could cure
this problem by making the payments due. Here, what I found most troubling was the
fact that the Appellant actually failed to pay two years of excise taxes to the City for
which he is a full-time employee. The Appellant’s testimony that he either lost or forgot
about these bills only compounds his poor judgment regarding this delinquency.
I carefully reviewed the Appellant’s allegations of bias and the fact that other
candidates with blemishes on their background investigation were appointed as reserve
police officers. Although I was troubled by at least one of the appointment decisions
made by the City, this does not alter the fact that the City has substantiated valid reasons
for not selecting the Appellant. Moreover, I credit the testimony of Chief Scott that, after
considering the “totality” of each candidate’s background, they decided to bypass the
Appellant in favor of other candidates. I may have reached a somewhat different
conclusion had some of the candidates with blemishes on their background checks had
personal or family ties to City or police officials. Finally, the Appellant has failed to
show that his role as a local union president played a role in the City’s decision to bypass
There was reasonable justification for the City’s decision and there is no evidence of
bias or improper motive. Thus, the City’s decision to bypass the Appellant is “not
subject to correction by the Commission.” Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 305. For this
reason, the Appellant’s appeal under Docket No. G1-08-251 is hereby dismissed.
By a 3-2 vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chairman - Yes, Henderson,
Commissioner – No; Marquis, Commissioner – Yes; Stein, Commissioner – Yes; and
Taylor, Commissioner - No) on April 8, 2010.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of the receipt of this decision. Under the
pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a
clerical or mechanical error in the decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may
have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration shall be deemed a motion for rehearing
in accordance with G.L. c. 30A, § 14(1) for the purpose of tolling the time for appeal.
Under the provisions of G.L c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by a final decision or order of the Commission
may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30)
days after receipt of such order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless
specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Commission’s order or decision.
Patrick Bryant, Esq. (for Appellant)
Layla Taylor, Esq. (for Appointing Authority)
John Marra, Esq. (HRD)
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