Source: http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a01
Timestamp: 2017-09-25 22:22:58
Document Index: 262939451

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1362', '§1371', '§4332', '§1508', '§1508', '§1456', '§1456', '§1506', '§1506', '§2948', '§2948', '§1508', '§1508', '§1501', '§1502', '§317', '§10141', '§1652', '§1506', '§1506', '§4342', '§1506', '§4332', '§2948', '§1456', '§2948', '§2948']

Supreme Court Decision in Winter v. NRDC | Winter v. NRDC | Doug Cornelius - JDSupra
Supreme Court Decision in Winter v. NRDC
This case concerns the Navy’s use of “mid-frequency active” sonar during integrated training exercises in the waters off southern California. In these exercises, ships, submarines, and air-craft train together as members of a “strike group.” A strike group may not be certified for deployment until it demonstrates proficiency in the use of active sonar to detect, track, and neutralize enemy submarines. The SOCAL waters contain at least 37 species of marine mammals.The plaintiffs—groups and individuals devoted to the protection of marine mammals and ocean habitats—assert that MFA sonar causes serious injuries to these animals. The Navy disputes that claim. Plaintiffs sued the Navy, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the training exercises violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
This decision vacates the preliminary injunction in favor of the Navy.
1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ET AL. v NATU-RAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 07–1239. Argued October 8, 2008—Decided November 12, 2008 Antisubmarine warfare is one of the Navy’s highest priorities. The Navy’s fleet faces a significant threat from modern diesel-electric submarines, which are extremely difficult to detect and track because they can operate almost silently. The most effective tool for identify-ing submerged diesel-electric submarines is active sonar, which emits pulses of sound underwater and then receives the acoustic waves that echo off the target. Active sonar is a complex technology, and sonaroperators must undergo extensive training to become proficient in its use. This case concerns the Navy’s use of “mid-frequency active” (MFA)sonar during integrated training exercises in the waters off southern California (SOCAL). In these exercises, ships, submarines, and air-craft train together as members of a “strike group.” Due to the im-portance of antisubmarine warfare, a strike group may not be certi-fied for deployment until it demonstrates proficiency in the use of active sonar to detect, track, and neutralize enemy submarines. The SOCAL waters contain at least 37 species of marine mammals.The plaintiffs—groups and individuals devoted to the protection of marine mammals and ocean habitats—assert that MFA sonar causes serious injuries to these animals. The Navy disputes that claim, not-ing that MFA sonar training in SOCAL waters has been conducted for 40 years without a single documented sonar-related injury to any marine mammal. Plaintiffs sued the Navy, seeking declaratory andinjunctive relief on the grounds that the training exercises violatedthe National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and otherfederal laws; in particular, plaintiffs contend that the Navy shouldhave prepared an environmental impact statement (EIS) before con-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a012 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Syllabus ducting the latest round of SOCAL exercises.The District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Navy from using MFA sonar during its training exercises. The Court of Appeals held that this injunction was overbroad and remanded tothe District Court for a narrower remedy. The District Court then entered another preliminary injunction, imposing six restrictions onthe Navy’s use of sonar during its SOCAL training exercises. As relevant to this case, the injunction required the Navy to shut down MFA sonar when a marine mammal was spotted within 2,200 yardsof a vessel, and to power down sonar by 6 decibels during conditionsknown as “surface ducting.”The Navy then sought relief from the Executive Branch. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) authorized the Navy to im-plement “alternative arrangements” to NEPA compliance in light of “emergency circumstances.” The CEQ allowed the Navy to continue its training exercises under voluntary mitigation procedures that theNavy had previously adopted.The Navy moved to vacate the District Court’s preliminary injunc-tion in light of the CEQ’s actions. The District Court refused to do so, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held thatthere was a serious question whether the CEQ’s interpretation of the “emergency circumstances” regulation was lawful, that plaintiffs hadcarried their burden of establishing a “possibility” of irreparable in-jury, and that the preliminary injunction was appropriate becausethe balance of hardships and consideration of the public interest fa-vored the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals emphasized that anynegative impact of the injunction on the Navy’s training exercises was “speculative,” and determined that (1) the 2,200-yard shutdown zone was unlikely to affect naval operations, because MFA sonar sys-tems are often shut down during training exercises; and (2) the power-down requirement during surface ducting conditions was not unreasonable, because such conditions are rare and the Navy haspreviously certified strike groups not trained under these conditions. Held: The preliminary injunction is vacated to the extent challenged bythe Navy. The balance of equities and the public interest—whichwere barely addressed by the District Court—tip strongly in favor of the Navy. The Navy’s need to conduct realistic training with activesonar to respond to the threat posed by enemy submarines plainlyoutweighs the interests advanced by the plaintiffs. Pp. 10–24. (a) The lower courts held that when a plaintiff demonstrates astrong likelihood of success on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be entered based only on a “possibility” of irreparable harm. The “possibility” standard is too lenient. This Court’s frequently reit-erated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to dem-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a013 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Syllabus onstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunc-tion. Even if plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable in-jury, such injury is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors. For the same reason, it is unnecessary to address the lower courts’ holding thatplaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits. Pp. 10–14. (b) A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. In each case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and consider the effect of granting or withholding the requested relief, paying particular regard to the public consequences. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312. Military interestsdo not always trump other considerations, and the Court has not held that they do, but courts must give deference to the professionaljudgment of military authorities concerning the relative importanceof a particular military interest. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503, 507. Here, the record contains declarations from some of the Navy’smost senior officers, all of whom underscored the threat posed by en-emy submarines and the need for extensive sonar training to counterthis threat. Those officers emphasized that realistic training cannotbe accomplished under the two challenged restrictions imposed bythe District Court—the 2,200-yard shutdown zone and the power-down requirement during surface ducting conditions. The use of MFA sonar under realistic conditions during training exercises is clearly of the utmost importance to the Navy and the Nation. The Court does not question the importance of plaintiffs’ ecological, scien-tific, and recreational interests, but it concludes that the balance of equities and consideration of the overall public interest tip strongly in favor of the Navy. The determination of where the public interestlies in this case does not strike the Court as a close question. Pp. 14– 16. (c) The lower courts’ justifications for entering the preliminary in-junction are not persuasive. Pp. 16–21.(1) The District Court did not give serious consideration to the balance of equities and the public interest. The Court of Appeals didconsider these factors and conclude that the Navy’s concerns about the preliminary injunction were “speculative.” But that is almost al-ways the case when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to alter a defen-dant’s conduct. The lower courts failed properly to defer to seniorNavy officers’ specific, predictive judgments about how the prelimi-nary injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the Navy’s SOCAL training exercises. Pp. 16–17. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a014 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Syllabus (2) The District Court abused its discretion by requiring theNavy to shut down MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spottedwithin 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. The Court of Appeals concluded that the zone would not be overly burdensome because ma-rine mammal sightings during training exercises are relatively rare. But regardless of the frequency of such sightings, the injunction willincrease the radius of the shutdown zone from 200 to 2,200 yards,which expands its surface area by a factor of over 100. Moreover, be-cause training scenarios can take several days to develop, each addi-tional shutdown can result in the loss of several days’ worth of train-ing. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the shutdown zone would not be overly burdensome because the Navy had shut downMFA sonar several times during prior exercises when marine mam-mals were spotted well beyond the Navy’s self-imposed 200-yard zone. But the court ignored undisputed evidence that these volun-tary shutdowns only occurred during tactically insignificant times.Pp. 18–20. (3) The District Court also abused its discretion by requiring theNavy to power down MFA sonar by 6 decibels during significant sur-face ducting conditions. When surface ducting occurs, active sonarbecomes more useful near the surface, but less effective at greater depths. Diesel-electric submariners are trained to take advantage ofthese distortions to avoid being detected by sonar. The Court of Ap-peals concluded that the power-down requirement was reasonablebecause surface ducting occurs relatively rarely, and the Navy has previously certified strike groups that did not train under such condi-tions. This reasoning is backwards. Given that surface ducting isboth rare and unpredictable, it is especially important for the Navy tobe able to train under these conditions when they occur. Pp. 20–21.(4) The Navy has previously taken voluntary measures to ad-dress concerns about marine mammals, and has chosen not to chal-lenge four other restrictions imposed by the District Court in this case. But that hardly means that other, more intrusive restrictions pose no threat to preparedness for war. The Court of Appeals notedthat the Navy could return to the District Court to seek modification of the preliminary injunction if it actually resulted in an inability totrain. The Navy is not required to wait until it is unable to train suf-ficient forces for national defense before seeking dissolution of thepreliminary injunction. By then it may be too late. P. 21. (d) This Court does not address the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims, but the foregoing analysis makes clear that it would also be an abuse of discretion to enter a permanent injunction along the same lines as the preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs’ ultimate legalclaim is that the Navy must prepare an EIS, not that it must cease Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a015 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Syllabus sonar training. There is accordingly no basis for enjoining such train-ing pending preparation of an EIS—if one is determined to be re-quired—when doing so is credibly alleged to pose a serious threat tonational security. There are many other remedial tools available, in-cluding declaratory relief or an injunction specifically tailored topreparation of an EIS, that do not carry such dire consequences. Pp. 21–23. 518 F. 3d 658, reversed; preliminary injunction vacated in part. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinionconcurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, J., joined as to Part I. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a01_________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 07–1239 DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT[November 12, 2008] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of theCourt. “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” 1 Messages and Papers of thePresidents 57 (J. Richardson comp. 1897). So said GeorgeWashington in his first Annual Address to Congress, 218 years ago. One of the most important ways the Navy prepares for war is through integrated training exercises at sea. These exercises include training in the use of modern sonar to detect and track enemy submarines,something the Navy has done for the past 40 years. The plaintiffs complained that the Navy’s sonar training pro-gram harmed marine mammals, and that the Navy should have prepared an environmental impact statement before commencing its latest round of training exercises. The Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction impos-ing restrictions on the Navy’s sonar training, even thoughthat court acknowledged that “the record contains no evidence that marine mammals have been harmed” by the Navy’s exercises. 518 F. 3d 658, 696 (CA9 2008). Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a012 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals was wrong, and its decision isreversed. I The Navy deploys its forces in “strike groups,” which aregroups of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft centeredaround either an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault ship. App. to Pet. for Cert. (Pet. App.) 316a–317a. Seam-less coordination among strike-group assets is critical. Before deploying a strike group, the Navy requires exten-sive integrated training in analysis and prioritization of threats, execution of military missions, and maintenanceof force protection. App. 110–111.Antisubmarine warfare is currently the Pacific Fleet’stop war-fighting priority. Pet. App. 270a–271a. Modern diesel-electric submarines pose a significant threat toNavy vessels because they can operate almost silently, making them extremely difficult to detect and track.Potential adversaries of the United States possess at least 300 of these submarines. App. 571. The most effective technology for identifying submergeddiesel-electric submarines within their torpedo range is active sonar, which involves emitting pulses of sound underwater and then receiving the acoustic waves thatecho off the target. Pet. App. 266a–267a, 274a. Active sonar is a particularly useful tool because it provides boththe bearing and the distance of target submarines; it isalso sensitive enough to allow the Navy to track enemy submarines that are quieter than the surrounding marine environment.1 This case concerns the Navy’s use of “mid-frequency active” (MFA) sonar, which transmits sound —————— 1In contrast, passive sonar “listens” for sound waves but does not introduce sound into the water. Passive sonar is not effective for tracking diesel-electric submarines because those vessels can operatealmost silently. Passive sonar also has a more limited range thanactive sonar, and cannot identify the exact location of an enemy subma-rine. Pet. App. 266a–271a. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a013 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court waves at frequencies between 1 kHz and 10 kHz.Not surprisingly, MFA sonar is a complex technology, and sonar operators must undergo extensive training tobecome proficient in its use. Sonar reception can be af-fected by countless different factors, including the time ofday, water density, salinity, currents, weather conditions, and the contours of the sea floor. Id., at 278a–279a. When working as part of a strike group, sonar operators must be able to coordinate with other Navy ships and planes while avoiding interference. The Navy conductsregular training exercises under realistic conditions toensure that sonar operators are thoroughly skilled in its use in a variety of situations.The waters off the coast of southern California (SOCAL)are an ideal location for conducting integrated training exercises, as this is the only area on the west coast that isrelatively close to land, air, and sea bases, as well asamphibious landing areas. App. 141–142. At issue in thiscase are the Composite Training Unit Exercises and theJoint Tactical Force Exercises, in which individual naval units (ships, submarines, and aircraft) train together as members of a strike group. A strike group cannot becertified for deployment until it has successfully completedthe integrated training exercises, including a demonstra-tion of its ability to operate under simulated hostile condi-tions. Id., at 564–565. In light of the threat posed by enemy submarines, all strike groups must demonstrate proficiency in antisubmarine warfare. Accordingly, theSOCAL exercises include extensive training in detecting, tracking, and neutralizing enemy submarines. The use of MFA sonar during these exercises is “mission-critical,”given that MFA sonar is the only proven method of identi-fying submerged diesel-electric submarines operating onbattery power. Id., at 568–571. Sharing the waters in the SOCAL operating area are at least 37 species of marine mammals, including dolphins, Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a014 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court whales, and sea lions. The parties strongly dispute the extent to which the Navy’s training activities will harm those animals or disrupt their behavioral patterns. The Navy emphasizes that it has used MFA sonar during training exercises in SOCAL for 40 years, without a singledocumented sonar-related injury to any marine mammal.The Navy asserts that, at most, MFA sonar may cause temporary hearing loss or brief disruptions of marinemammals’ behavioral patterns. The plaintiffs are the Natural Resources Defense Coun-cil, Jean-Michael Cousteau (an environmental enthusiast and filmmaker), and several other groups devoted to the protection of marine mammals and ocean habitats. Theycontend that MFA sonar can cause much more serious injuries to marine mammals than the Navy acknowledges,including permanent hearing loss, decompression sick-ness, and major behavioral disruptions. According to theplaintiffs, several mass strandings of marine mammals(outside of SOCAL) have been “associated” with the use of active sonar. They argue that certain species of marinemammals—such as beaked whales—are uniquely suscep-tible to injury from active sonar; these injuries would notnecessarily be detected by the Navy, given that beakedwhales are “very deep divers” that spend little time at the surface. II The procedural history of this case is rather compli-cated. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 86 Stat. 1027, generally prohibits any individualfrom “taking” a marine mammal, defined as harassing,hunting, capturing, or killing it. 16 U. S. C. §§1362(13), 1372(a). The Secretary of Defense may “exempt any ac-tion or category of actions” from the MMPA if such actionsare “necessary for national defense.” §1371(f)(1). In Janu-ary 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense—acting for the Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a015 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court Secretary—granted the Navy a 2-year exemption from theMMPA for the training exercises at issue in this case. Pet. App. 219a–220a. The exemption was conditioned on the Navy adopting several mitigation procedures, including: (1) training lookouts and officers to watch for marinemammals; (2) requiring at least five lookouts with binocu-lars on each vessel to watch for anomalies on the water surface (including marine mammals); (3) requiring aircraftand sonar operators to report detected marine mammals in the vicinity of the training exercises; (4) requiring re-duction of active sonar transmission levels by 6 dB if a marine mammal is detected within 1,000 yards of the bow of the vessel, or by 10 dB if detected within 500 yards; (5) requiring complete shutdown of active sonar transmission if a marine mammal is detected within 200 yards of the vessel; (6) requiring active sonar to be operated at the “lowest practicable level”; and (7) adopting coordination and reporting procedures. Id., at 222a–230a. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),83 Stat. 852, requires federal agencies “to the fullest ex-tent possible” to prepare an environmental impact state-ment (EIS) for “every . . . major Federal actio[n] signifi-cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C) (2000 ed.). An agency is not re-quired to prepare a full EIS if it determines—based on ashorter environmental assessment (EA)—that the pro-posed action will not have a significant impact on theenvironment. 40 CFR §§1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2007). In February 2007, the Navy issued an EA concluding that the 14 SOCAL training exercises scheduled throughJanuary 2009 would not have a significant impact on theenvironment. App. 226–227. The EA divided potential injury to marine mammals into two categories: Level Aharassment, defined as the potential destruction or loss of biological tissue (i.e., physical injury), and Level B har-assment, defined as temporary injury or disruption of Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a016 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court behavioral patterns such as migration, feeding, surfacing,and breeding. Id., at 160–161. The Navy’s computer models predicted that the SOCALtraining exercises would cause only eight Level A harass-ments of common dolphins each year, and that even these injuries could be avoided through the Navy’s voluntarymitigation measures, given that dolphins travel in largepods easily located by Navy lookouts. Id., at 176–177, 183. The EA also predicted 274 Level B harassments of beakedwhales per year, none of which would result in permanent injury. Id., at 185–186. Beaked whales spend little time at the surface, so the precise effect of active sonar on thesemammals is unclear. Erring on the side of caution, the Navy classified all projected harassments of beaked whales as Level A. Id., at 186, 223. In light of its conclu-sion that the SOCAL training exercises would not have asignificant impact on the environment, the Navy deter-mined that it was unnecessary to prepare a full EIS. See 40 CFR §1508.13.Shortly after the Navy released its EA, the plaintiffs sued the Navy, seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefon the grounds that the Navy’s SOCAL training exercises violated NEPA, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).2 The District Court granted plaintiffs’ motion fora preliminary injunction and prohibited the Navy from using MFA sonar during its remaining training exercises. The court held that plaintiffs had “demonstrated a prob-ability of success” on their claims under NEPA and theCZMA. Pet. App. 207a, 215a. The court also determined that equitable relief was appropriate because, under Ninth —————— 2The CZMA states that federal agencies taking actions “that affec[t]any land or water use or natural resources of the coastal zone” shallcarry out these activities “in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs.” 16 U. S. C. §1456(c)(1)(A). Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a01Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 Opinion of the Court Circuit precedent, plaintiffs had established at least a “‘possibility’” of irreparable harm to the environment. Id., at 217a. Based on scientific studies, declarations from experts, and other evidence in the record, the DistrictCourt concluded that there was in fact a “near certainty”of irreparable injury to the environment, and that thisinjury outweighed any possible harm to the Navy. Id., at 217a–218a. The Navy filed an emergency appeal, and the NinthCircuit stayed the injunction pending appeal. 502 F. 3d 859, 865 (2007). After hearing oral argument, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that preliminaryinjunctive relief was appropriate. The appellate court concluded, however, that a blanket injunction prohibiting the Navy from using MFA sonar in SOCAL was overbroad, and remanded the case to the District Court “to narrow its injunction so as to provide mitigation conditions underwhich the Navy may conduct its training exercises.” 508 F. 3d 885, 887 (2007).On remand, the District Court entered a new prelimi-nary injunction allowing the Navy to use MFA sonar only as long as it implemented the following mitigation meas-ures (in addition to the measures the Navy had adopted pursuant to its MMPA exemption): (1) imposing a 12-mile “exclusion zone” from the coastline; (2) using lookouts to conduct additional monitoring for marine mammals; (3)restricting the use of “helicopter-dipping” sonar; (4) limit-ing the use of MFA sonar in geographic “choke points”; (5) shutting down MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of a vessel; and (6) powering down MFA sonar by 6 dB during significant surface duct-ing conditions, in which sound travels further than it otherwise would due to temperature differences in adja-cent layers of water. 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–1121 (CD Cal. 2008). The Navy filed a notice of appeal, chal-lenging only the last two restrictions. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a018 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court The Navy then sought relief from the Executive Branch. The President, pursuant to 16 U. S. C. §1456(c)(1)(B),granted the Navy an exemption from the CZMA. Section 1456(c)(1)(B) permits such exemptions if the activity inquestion is “in the paramount interest of the UnitedStates.” The President determined that continuation of the exercises as limited by the Navy was “essential tonational security.” Pet. App. 232a. He concluded that compliance with the District Court’s injunction would“undermine the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises that are necessary to ensure the combat effec-tiveness of . . . strike groups.” Ibid. Simultaneously, the Council on Environmental Quality(CEQ) authorized the Navy to implement “alternativearrangements” to NEPA compliance in light of “emergencycircumstances.” See 40 CFR §1506.11.3 The CEQ deter-mined that alternative arrangements were appropriatebecause the District Court’s injunction “create[s] a signifi-cant and unreasonable risk that Strike Groups will not beable to train and be certified as fully mission capable.” Pet. App. 238a. Under the alternative arrangements,the Navy would be permitted to conduct its training exer-cises under the mitigation procedures adopted in con-junction with the exemption from the MMPA. The CEQ also imposed additional notice, research, and reportingrequirements.In light of these actions, the Navy then moved to vacatethe District Court’s injunction with respect to the 2,200-yard shutdown zone and the restrictions on training in —————— 3That provision states in full: “Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant environmental impactwithout observing the provisions of these regulations, the Federalagency taking the action should consult with the Council about alterna-tive arrangements. Agencies and the Council will limit such arrange-ments to actions necessary to control the immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain subject to NEPA review.” Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a019 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court surface ducting conditions. The District Court refused to do so, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (2008), and the Court of Ap-peals affirmed. The Ninth Circuit held that there was a serious question regarding whether the CEQ’s interpreta-tion of the “emergency circumstances” regulation was lawful. Specifically, the court questioned whether there was a true “emergency” in this case, given that the Navyhas been on notice of its obligation to comply with NEPA from the moment it first planned the SOCAL training exercises. 518 F. 3d, at 681. The Court of Appeals con-cluded that the preliminary injunction was entirely pre-dictable in light of the parties’ litigation history. Ibid. The court also held that plaintiffs had established a likeli-hood of success on their claim that the Navy was requiredto prepare a full EIS for the SOCAL training exercises. Id., at 693. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court’s holding that the Navy’s EA—which resulted in a finding of no significant environmental impact—was “cursory, unsupported by cited evidence, or unconvincing.” Ibid.4 The Court of Appeals further determined that plaintiffshad carried their burden of establishing a “possibility” of irreparable injury. Even under the Navy’s own figures, the court concluded, the training exercises would cause 564 physical injuries to marine mammals, as well as170,000 disturbances of marine mammals’ behavior. Id., at 696. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that the balanceof hardships and consideration of the public interest weighed in favor of the plaintiffs. The court emphasizedthat the negative impact on the Navy’s training exerciseswas “speculative,” since the Navy has never before oper-ated under the procedures required by the District Court. —————— 4The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of successwas limited to their NEPA claims. The court did not discuss claims under the CZMA or ESA. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0110 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court Id., at 698–699. In particular, the court determined that:(1) the 2,200-yard shutdown zone imposed by the District Court was unlikely to affect the Navy’s operations, be-cause the Navy often shuts down its MFA sonar systemsduring the course of training exercises; and (2) the power-down requirement during significant surface ductingconditions was not unreasonable because such conditions are rare, and the Navy has previously certified strikegroups that had not trained under such conditions. Id., at 699–702. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the District Court’s preliminary injunction struck a proper balance between the competing interests at stake.We granted certiorari, 554 U. S. __ (2008), and now reverse and vacate the injunction. III A A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must estab-lish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he islikely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of prelimi-nary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,and that an injunction is in the public interest. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. __, __ (2008) (slip op., at 12); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 311–312 (1982).The District Court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their NEPA claim. The Navy strongly disputes this determination, arguing that plaintiffs’ likelihood of suc-cess is low because the CEQ reasonably concluded that “emergency circumstances” justified alternative arrange-ments to NEPA compliance. 40 CFR §1506.11. Plaintiffs’ briefs before this Court barely discuss the ground relied upon by the lower courts—that the plain meaning of“emergency circumstances” does not encompass a court Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0111 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court order that was “entirely predictable” in light of the parties’ litigation history. 518 F. 3d, at 681. Instead, plaintiffscontend that the CEQ’s actions violated the separation ofpowers by readjudicating a factual issue already decided by an Article III court. Moreover, they assert that the CEQ’s interpretations of NEPA are not entitled to defer-ence because the CEQ has not been given statutory au-thority to conduct adjudications. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit also held that when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of pre-vailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be entered based only on a “possibility” of irreparable harm. Id., at 696–697; 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118 (quoting Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F. 3d 891, 906 (CA9 2007); Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 442 F. 3d 1147, 1159 (CA9 2006)). The lower courts held that plaintiffs had met this standard becausethe scientific studies, declarations, and other evidence in the record established to “a near certainty” that the Navy’straining exercises would cause irreparable harm to theenvironment. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118. The Navy challenges these holdings, arguing that plain-tiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable injury—not just a possibility—in order to obtain preliminary relief. On the facts of this case, the Navy contends that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are too speculative to give rise to irrepara-ble injury, given that ever since the Navy’s training pro-gram began 40 years ago, there has been no documented case of sonar-related injury to marine mammals in SOCAL. And even if MFA sonar does cause a limited number of injuries to individual marine mammals, the Navy asserts that plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence of species-level harm that would adversely affect their scien-tific, recreational, and ecological interests. For their part,plaintiffs assert that they would prevail under any formu-lation of the irreparable injury standard, because the Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0112 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court District Court found that they had established a “near certainty” of irreparable harm. We agree with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s “possi-bility” standard is too lenient. Our frequently reiteratedstandard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the ab-sence of an injunction. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 103 (1983); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U. S. 423, 441 (1974); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 502 (1974); see also 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948.1, p. 139 (2d ed.1995) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (applicant must dem-onstrate that in the absence of a preliminary injunction, “the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered”); id., at 155 (“apreliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury”). Issuing apreliminary injunction based only on a possibility of ir-reparable harm is inconsistent with our characterizationof injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam).It is not clear that articulating the incorrect standardaffected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of irreparable harm.Although the court referred to the “possibility” standard, and cited Circuit precedent along the same lines, it af-firmed the District Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs hadestablished a “‘near certainty’” of irreparable harm. 518 F. 3d, at 696–697. At the same time, however, the nature of the District Court’s conclusion is itself unclear. The District Court originally found irreparable harm fromsonar-training exercises generally. But by the time of theDistrict Court’s final decision, the Navy challenged onlytwo of six restrictions imposed by the court. See supra, at 7–8. The District Court did not reconsider the likelihood Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0113 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court of irreparable harm in light of the four restrictions notchallenged by the Navy. This failure is significant in lightof the District Court’s own statement that the 12-mile exclusion zone from the coastline—one of the unchallenged mitigation restrictions—“would bar the use of MFA sonarin a significant portion of important marine mammalhabitat.” 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1119. We also find it pertinent that this is not a case in which the defendant is conducting a new type of activity withcompletely unknown effects on the environment. When the Government conducts an activity, “NEPA itself does not mandate particular results.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 350 (1989). In-stead, NEPA imposes only procedural requirements to“ensur[e] that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed infor-mation concerning significant environmental impacts.” Id., at 349. Part of the harm NEPA attempts to prevent inrequiring an EIS is that, without one, there may be little ifany information about prospective environmental harmsand potential mitigating measures. Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin—or substantially restrict—training exercises that have been taking place in SOCAL for the last 40 years. And the latest series of exercises were not approved until after the defendant took a “hard look at environmental consequences,” id., at 350 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 21 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)), as evidenced by theissuance of a detailed, 293-page EA. As explained in the next section, even if plaintiffs haveshown irreparable injury from the Navy’s training exer-cises, any such injury is outweighed by the public interestand the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors. A proper consideration of these factors alone requires denial of the requested injunctive relief. For the same reason, we do not address the lower courts’ holding Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0114 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court that plaintiffs have also established a likelihood of successon the merits. B A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. Munaf, 553 U. S., at __ (slip op., at 12). In each case, courts “must balance the compet-ing claims of injury and must consider the effect on eachparty of the granting or withholding of the requestedrelief.” Amoco Production Co., 480 U. S., at 542. “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity shouldpay particular regard for the public consequences in em-ploying the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 312; see also Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500 (1941). In this case, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit significantly understated the burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises, and the injunction’s consequent adverse impact on the public interest in national defense.This case involves “complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force,” which are “essentially profes-sional military judgments.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 (1973). We “give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relativeimportance of a particular military interest.” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503, 507 (1986). As the Court em-phasized just last Term, “neither the Members of thisCourt nor most federal judges begin the day with briefingsthat may describe new and serious threats to our Nationand its people.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. __, __ (2008) (slip op., at 68). Here, the record contains declarations from some of the Navy’s most senior officers, all of whom underscored the threat posed by enemy submarines and the need for ex-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0115 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court tensive sonar training to counter this threat. Admiral Gary Roughead—the Chief of Naval Operations—stated that during training exercises: “It is important to stress the ship crews in all dimen-sions of warfare simultaneously. If one of these train-ing elements were impacted—for example, if effectivesonar training were not possible—the training valueof the other elements would also be degraded . . . .” Pet. App. 342a. Captain Martin May—the Third Fleet’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Readiness—emphasized that theuse of MFA sonar is “mission-critical.” App. 570–571. Hedescribed the ability to operate MFA sonar as a “highlyperishable skill” that must be repeatedly practiced under realistic conditions. Id., at 577. During training exercises, MFA sonar operators learn how to avoid sound-reducing “clutter” from ocean floor topography and environmentalconditions; they also learn how to avoid interference and how to coordinate their efforts with other sonar operators in the strike group. Id., at 574. Several Navy officers emphasized that realistic training cannot be accomplished under the two challenged restrictions imposed by theDistrict Court—the 2,200-yard shutdown zone and therequirement that the Navy power down its sonar systemsduring significant surface ducting conditions. See, e.g., Pet. App. 333a (powering down in presence of surfaceducting “unreasonably prevent[s] realistic training”); id., at 356a (shutdown zone would “result in a significant,adverse impact to realistic training”). We accept these officers’ assertions that the use of MFA sonar under realis-tic conditions during training exercises is of the utmost importance to the Navy and the Nation. These interests must be weighed against the possible harm to the ecological, scientific, and recreational inter-ests that are legitimately before this Court. Plaintiffs Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0116 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court have submitted declarations asserting that they takewhale watching trips, observe marine mammals underwa-ter, conduct scientific research on marine mammals, and photograph these animals in their natural habitats. Plaintiffs contend that the Navy’s use of MFA sonar will injure marine mammals or alter their behavioral patterns,impairing plaintiffs’ ability to study and observe theanimals. While we do not question the seriousness of these inter-ests, we conclude that the balance of equities and consid-eration of the overall public interest in this case tipstrongly in favor of the Navy. For the plaintiffs, the mostserious possible injury would be harm to an unknownnumber of the marine mammals that they study and observe. In contrast, forcing the Navy to deploy an inade-quately trained antisubmarine force jeopardizes the safety of the fleet. Active sonar is the only reliable technology fordetecting and tracking enemy diesel-electric submarines, and the President—the Commander in Chief—has deter-mined that training with active sonar is “essential to national security.” Pet. App. 232a. The public interest in conducting training exercises withactive sonar under realistic conditions plainly outweighs the interests advanced by the plaintiffs. Of course, mili-tary interests do not always trump other considerations,and we have not held that they do. In this case, however, the proper determination of where the public interest lies does not strike us as a close question. C 1. Despite the importance of assessing the balance ofequities and the public interest in determining whether togrant a preliminary injunction, the District Court ad-dressed these considerations in only a cursory fashion.The court’s entire discussion of these factors consisted of one (albeit lengthy) sentence: “The Court is also satisfied Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0117 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court that the balance of hardships tips in favor of granting aninjunction, as the harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, andpublic interest outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur if prevented from using MFA sonar, absent the use of effective mitigation measures, during a subset of their regular activities in one part of one state for a limitedperiod.” Id., at 217a–218a. As the prior Ninth Circuitpanel in this case put it, in staying the District Court’soriginal preliminary injunction, “[t]he district court did not give serious consideration to the public interest fac-tor.” 502 F. 3d, at 863. The District Court’s order on remand did nothing to cure this defect, but simply re-peated nearly verbatim the same sentence from its previ-ous order. Compare 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118, with Pet.App. 217a–218a. The subsequent Ninth Circuit panelframed its opinion as reviewing the District Court’s exer-cise of discretion, 518 F. 3d, at 697–699, but that discre-tion was barely exercised here.The Court of Appeals held that the balance of equitiesand the public interest favored the plaintiffs, largely basedon its view that the preliminary injunction would not infact impose a significant burden on the Navy’s ability to conduct its training exercises and certify its strike groups. Id., at 698–699. The court deemed the Navy’s concerns about the preliminary injunction “speculative” because the Navy had not operated under similar procedures before. Ibid. But this is almost always the case when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to alter a defendant’s conduct. The lower courts failed properly to defer to senior Navy offi-cers’ specific, predictive judgments about how the prelimi-nary injunction would reduce the effectiveness of theNavy’s SOCAL training exercises. See Wright & Miller §2948.2, at 167–68 (“The policy against the imposition of judicial restraints prior to an adjudication of the meritsbecomes more significant when there is reason to believe that the decree will be burdensome”). Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0118 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court 2. The preliminary injunction requires the Navy to shutdown its MFA sonar if a marine mammal is detected within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. The Ninth Circuit stated that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone wouldnot be overly burdensome because sightings of marine mammals during training exercises are relatively rare. But regardless of the frequency of marine mammal sight-ings, the injunction will greatly increase the size of the shutdown zone. Pursuant to its exemption from theMMPA, the Navy agreed to reduce the power of its MFAsonar at 1,000 yards and 500 yards, and to completely turn off the system at 200 yards. Pet. App. 222a–230a.The District Court’s injunction does not include a gradu-ated power-down, instead requiring a total shutdown ofMFA sonar if a marine mammal is detected within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. There is an exponential relationship between radius length and surface area (Area = π r2). Increasing the radius of the shutdown zone from200 to 2,200 yards would accordingly expand the surfacearea of the shutdown zone by a factor of over 100 (from125,664 square yards to 15,205,308 square yards). The lower courts did not give sufficient weight to theviews of several top Navy officers, who emphasized that because training scenarios can take several days to de-velop, each additional shutdown can result in the loss ofseveral days’ worth of training. Id., at 344a. Limiting thenumber of sonar shutdowns is particularly important during the Joint Tactical Force Exercises, which usually last for less than two weeks. Ibid. Admiral Bird ex-plained that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone would cause operational commanders to “lose awareness of the tactical situation through the constant stopping and starting ofMFA [sonar].” Id., at 332a; see also id., at 356a (“It may take days to get to the pivotal attack in antisubmarine warfare, but only minutes to confound the results upon which certification is based”). Even if there is a low likeli-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0119 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court hood of a marine mammal sighting, the preliminary in-junction would clearly increase the number of disruptivesonar shutdowns the Navy is forced to perform during its SOCAL training exercises.The Court of Appeals also concluded that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone would not be overly burdensome because the Navy had shut down MFA sonar 27 times during itseight prior training exercises in SOCAL; in several of these cases, the Navy turned off its sonar when marinemammals were spotted well beyond the Navy’s self-imposed 200-yard shutdown zone. 518 F. 3d, at 700, n. 65. Admiral Locklear—the Commander of the Navy’s Third Fleet—stated that any shutdowns beyond the 200-yard zone were voluntary avoidance measures that likely took place at tactically insignificant times; the Ninth Circuitdiscounted this explanation as not supported by the re-cord. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Ap-peals ignored key portions of Admiral Locklear’s declara-tion, in which he stated unequivocally that commanding officers “would not shut down sonar until legally required to do so if in contact with a submarine.” Pet. App. 354a–355a. Similarly, if a commanding officer is in contact witha target submarine, “the CO will be expected to continue to use active sonar unless another ship or helicopter can gain contact or if regulatory reasons dictate otherwise.” Id., at 355a. The record supports the Navy’s contentionthat its shutdowns of MFA sonar during prior training exercises only occurred during tactically insignificanttimes; those voluntary shutdowns do not justify the Dis-trict Court’s imposition of a mandatory 2,200-yard shut-down zone. Lastly, the Ninth Circuit stated that a 2,200-yard shut-down zone was feasible because the Navy had previously adopted a 2,000-meter zone for low-frequency active (LFA) sonar. The Court of Appeals failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that LFA sonar is used for long-range Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0120 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court detection of enemy submarines, and thus its use and shutdown involve tactical considerations quite different from those associated with MFA sonar. See App. 508(noting that equating MFA sonar with LFA sonar “iscompletely misleading and is like comparing 20 degrees Fahrenheit to 20 degrees Celsius”).3. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Navy’straining exercises would not be significantly affected bythe requirement that it power down MFA sonar by 6 dB during significant surface ducting conditions. Again, wethink the Ninth Circuit understated the burden this re-quirement would impose on the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises.Surface ducting is a phenomenon in which relatively little sound energy penetrates beyond a narrow layer near the surface of the water. When surface ducting occurs,active sonar becomes more useful near the surface but less useful at greater depths. Pet. App. 299a–300a. Diesel-electric submariners are trained to take advantage ofthese distortions to avoid being detected by sonar. Id., at 333a. The Ninth Circuit determined that the power-downrequirement during surface ducting conditions was unlikely to affect certification of the Navy’s strike groups because surface ducting occurs relatively rarely, and theNavy has previously certified strike groups that did nottrain under such conditions. 518 F. 3d, at 701–702. This reasoning is backwards. Given that surface ducting isboth rare and unpredictable, it is especially important for the Navy to be able to train under these conditions when they occur. Admiral Bird explained that the 6 dB power-down requirement makes the training less valuable be-cause it “exposes [sonar operators] to unrealistically lower levels of mutual interference caused by multiple sonarsystems operating together by the ships within the Strike Group.” Pet. App. 281a (footnote omitted). Although a 6 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0121 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court dB reduction may not seem terribly significant, decibelsare measured on a logarithmic scale, so a 6 dB decrease in power equates to a 75% reduction. Id., at 284a–285a. 4. The District Court acknowledged that “‘the imposi-tion of these mitigation measures will require the Navy toalter and adapt the way it conducts antisubmarine war-fare training—a substantial challenge. Nevertheless, evidence presented to the Court reflects that the Navy has employed mitigation measures in the past, without sacri-ficing training objectives.’” 527 F. Supp. 2d, at 1238.Apparently no good deed goes unpunished. The fact that the Navy has taken measures in the past to address con-cerns about marine mammals—or, for that matter, has elected not to challenge four additional restrictions im-posed by the District Court in this case, see supra, at 7– 8—hardly means that other, more intrusive restrictionspose no threat to preparedness for war.The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by stating that “the Navy may return to the district court to requestrelief on an emergency basis” if the preliminary injunction “actually result[s] in an inability to train and certify suffi-cient naval forces to provide for the national defense.” 518 F. 3d, at 703. This is cold comfort to the Navy. The Navycontends that the injunction will hinder efforts to train sonar operators under realistic conditions, ultimatelyleaving strike groups more vulnerable to enemy subma-rines. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, we do not think the Navyis required to wait until the injunction “actually result[s] in an inability to train . . . sufficient naval forces for the national defense” before seeking its dissolution. By then itmay be too late. IV As noted above, we do not address the underlying meritsof plaintiffs’ claims. While we have authority to proceed to such a decision at this point, see Munaf, 553 U. S., at __ Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0122 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court (slip op., at 13–14), doing so is not necessary here. In addition, reaching the merits is complicated by the factthat the lower courts addressed only one of several issuesraised, and plaintiffs have largely chosen not to defend the decision below on that ground.5 At the same time, what we have said makes clear that it would be an abuse of discretion to enter a permanent injunction, after final decision on the merits, along the same lines as the preliminary injunction. An injunction isa matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow fromsuccess on the merits as a matter of course. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 313 (“a federal judge sitting as chan-cellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunctionfor every violation of law”). The factors examined above—the balance of equities and consideration of the public interest—are pertinent inassessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, prelimi-nary or permanent. See Amoco Production Co., 480 U. S., —————— 5The bulk of JUSTICE GINSBURG’s dissent is devoted to the merits. For the reasons stated, we find the injunctive relief granted in this casean abuse of discretion, even if plaintiffs are correct on the underlying merits. As to the injunction, the dissent barely mentions the Navy’s interests. Post, at 11. We find that those interests, and the docu-mented risks to national security, clearly outweigh the harm on theother side of the balance. We agree with much of JUSTICE BREYER’s analysis, post, at 3–9 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), but disagree with his conclusion that the modified conditions imposed by the stay order should remain in force until the Navy completes its EIS, post, at 9–11. The Court is reviewing the District Court’s imposition of the prelimi-nary injunction; once we conclude, as JUSTICE BREYER does, post, at 9, that the preliminary injunction should be vacated, the stay order is no longer pertinent. A stay is a useful tool for managing the impact of injunctive relief pending further appeal, but once the Court resolves the merits of the appeal, the stay ceases to be relevant. See 518 F. 3d 704, 706 (CA9 2008) (“the partial stay . . . shall remain in effect until finaldisposition by the Supreme Court”). Unexamined conditions imposedby the stay order are certainly no basis for what would be in effect theentry of a new preliminary injunction by this Court. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0123 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of the Court at 546, n. 12 (“The standard for a preliminary injunction isessentially the same as for a permanent injunction withthe exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood ofsuccess on the merits rather than actual success”). Given that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must pre-pare an EIS, not that it must cease sonar training, there isno basis for enjoining such training in a manner credibly alleged to pose a serious threat to national security. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the training has been going on for 40 years with no documented epi-sode of harm to a marine mammal. A court concludingthat the Navy is required to prepare an EIS has manyremedial tools at its disposal, including declaratory relief or an injunction tailored to the preparation of an EIS rather than the Navy’s training in the interim. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 466 (1974) (“Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to act as an alternativeto the strong medicine of the injunction”). In the mean-time, we see no basis for jeopardizing national security, asthe present injunction does. Plaintiffs confirmed at oral argument that the preliminary injunction was “the whole ball game,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, and our analysis of the propriety of preliminary relief is applicable to any perma-nent injunction as well. * * * President Theodore Roosevelt explained that “the only way in which a navy can ever be made efficient is by prac-tice at sea, under all the conditions which would have to be met if war existed.” President’s Annual Message, 42 Cong. Rec. 67, 81 (1907). We do not discount the impor-tance of plaintiffs’ ecological, scientific, and recreationalinterests in marine mammals. Those interests, however, are plainly outweighed by the Navy’s need to conductrealistic training exercises to ensure that it is able toneutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines. The Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0124 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of the Court District Court abused its discretion by imposing a 2,200-yard shutdown zone and by requiring the Navy to power down its MFA sonar during significant surface ducting conditions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-versed, and the preliminary injunction is vacated to theextent it has been challenged by the Navy. It is so ordered. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a01_________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of BREYER, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 07–1239 DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT[November 12, 2008] JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins asto Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part. As of December 2006, the United States Navy planned to engage in a series of 14 antisubmarine warfare training exercises off the southern California coast. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and others (hereinafter NRDC) brought this case in Federal District Court claim-ing that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires the Navy to prepare an environmentalimpact statement (EIS) (assessing the impact of the exer-cises on marine mammals) prior to its engaging in the exercises. As the case reaches us, the District Court has found that the NRDC will likely prevail on its demand for an EIS; the Navy has agreed to prepare an EIS; the Dis-trict Court has forbidden the Navy to proceed with theexercises unless it adopts six mitigating measures; and the Navy has agreed to adopt all but two of those measures. The controversy between the parties now concerns thetwo measures that the Navy is unwilling to adopt. The first concerns the “shutdown zone,” a circle with a ship atthe center within which the Navy must try to spot marine mammals and shut down its sonar if one is found. The controverted condition would enlarge the radius of thatcircle from about one-tenth of a mile (200 yards) to one Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a012 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of BREYER, J. and one-quarter mile (2,200 yards). The second concerns special ocean conditions called “surface ducting condi-tions.” The controverted condition would require the Navy, when it encounters any such condition, to diminishthe sonar’s power by 75%. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court order that contained these two condi-tions. 518 F. 3d 658, 703 (CA9 2008). I We must now decide whether the District Court was legally correct in forbidding the training exercises unless the Navy implemented the two controverted conditions. In doing so, I assume, like the Court, that the NRDC willprevail on its demand for an EIS. (Indeed, the Navy is in the process of preparing one.) And, I would ask whether, in imposing these conditions, the District Court properly“balance[d the] harms.” See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 545 (1987). Respondents’ (hereinafter plaintiffs) argument favor-ing the District Court injunction is a strong one. As JUS-TICE GINSBURG well points out, see post, at 4–5 (dissenting opinion), the very point of NEPA’s insistence upon the writing of an EIS is to force an agency “carefully” to “con-sider . . . detailed information concerning significant envi-ronmental impacts,” while “giv[ing] the public the assur-ance that the agency ‘has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.’” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 349 (1989). NEPA seeks to assure that when Gov-ernment officials consider taking action that may affectthe environment, they do so fully aware of the relevantenvironmental considerations. An EIS does not force them to make any particular decision, but it does lead them to take environmental considerations into account when theydecide whether, or how, to act. Id., at 354. Thus, when a decision to which EIS obligations attach is made without Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a013 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of BREYER, J. the informed environmental consideration that NEPA requires, much of the harm that NEPA seeks to prevent has already taken place. In this case, for example, the absence of an injunction means that the Navy will proceed with its exercises in the absence of the fuller consideration of environmental effects that an EIS is intended to bring.The absence of an injunction thereby threatens to cause the very environmental harm that a full preaction EISmight have led the Navy to avoid (say, by adopting the two additional mitigation measures that the NRDC proposes). Consequently, if the exercises are to continue, conditionsdesigned to mitigate interim environmental harm maywell be appropriate.On the other hand, several features of this case lead me to conclude that the record, as now before us, lacks adequate support for an injunction imposing the two controverted requirements. First, the evidence of need for the two special conditions is weak or uncertain. The recorddoes show that the exercises as the Navy originally pro-posed them could harm marine mammals. The District Court found (based on the Navy’s study of the matter) thatthe exercises might cause 466 instances of Level A harm and 170,000 instances of Level B harm. App. to Pet. forCert. 196a–197a. (The environmental assessment (EA)actually predicted 564 instances of Level A harm. See App. 223–224.) The study defines Level A injury as “anyact that injures or has the significant potential to injure amarine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild” through “destruction or loss of biological tissue,” whether “slight to severe.” Id., at 160. It defines Level B harm as “‘any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marinemammal . . . by causing disruption of natural behavioralpatterns including, but not limited to, migration, surfac-ing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering to a pointwhere such behaviors are abandoned or significantlyaltered’” and describes it as a “short term” and “tempo-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a014 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of BREYER, J. rary” “disturbance.” Id., at 161, 175. The raw numbers seem large. But the parties argueabout the extent to which they mean likely harm. The Navy says the classifications and estimates err on the side of caution. (When in doubt about the amount of harm to amammal, the study assumed the harm would qualify asLevel A harassment. Id., at 200.) The Navy also points out that, by definition, mammals recover from Level Binjuries, often very quickly. It notes that, despite 40 yearsof naval exercises off the southern California coast, no injured marine mammal has ever been found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 274a–275a. (It adds that dolphins often swimalongside the ships. Id., at 290, 346.) At the same time, plaintiffs point to instances where whales have been found stranded. They add that scientific studies have found aconnection between those beachings and the Navy’s use of sonar, see, e.g., App. 600–602, and the Navy has even acknowledged one stranding where “U. S. Navy mid-frequency sonar has been identified as the most plausiblecontributory source to the stranding event,” id., at 168. Given the uncertainty the figures create in respect tothe harm caused by the Navy’s original training plans, itwould seem important to have before us at least someestimate of the harm likely avoided by the Navy’s decision not to contest here four of the six mitigating conditionsthat the District Court ordered. Without such evidence, it is difficult to assess the relevant harm—that is, the envi-ronmental harm likely caused by the Navy’s exercises with the four uncontested mitigation measures (but without thetwo contested mitigation measures) in place. Second, the Navy has filed multiple affidavits from Navy officials explaining in detail the seriousness of theharm that the delay associated with completion of this EIS(approximately one year) would create in respect to the Navy’s ability to maintain an adequate national defense.See generally App. to Pet. for Cert. 260a–357a. Taken by Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a015 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of BREYER, J. themselves, those affidavits make a strong case for theproposition that insistence upon the two additional miti-gating conditions would seriously interfere with necessarydefense training.The affidavits explain the importance of training inantisubmarine warfare, id., at 263a; the need to use active sonar to detect enemy submarines, id., at 266a–267a, App. 566; the complexity of a training exercise involving sonar,App. to Pet. for Cert. 343a; the need for realistic conditions when training exercises take place, id., at 299a–300a, App. 566; the “cascading” negative “effect” that delay inone important aspect of a set of coordinated training exer-cises has upon the Navy’s ability “to provide combat ready forces,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 343a; the cost and disruptionthat would accompany the adoption of the two additionalmitigating conditions that the NRDC seeks, ibid.; the Navy’s resulting inability adequately to train personnel, id., at 278a; the effectiveness of the mammal-protecting measures that the Navy has taken in the past, id., at 285a–298a; and the reasonable likelihood that the mitigat-ing conditions to which it has agreed will prove adequate, id., at 296a. Third, and particularly important in my view, theDistrict Court did not explain why it rejected the Navy’saffidavit-supported contentions. In its first opinion enjoin-ing the use of sonar, the District Court simply stated: “The Court is . . . satisfied that the balance of hard-ships tips in favor of granting an injunction, as the harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and public inter-est outweighs the harm that Defendants would incurif prevented from using [mid-frequency active (MFA)]sonar, absent the use of effective mitigation measures,during a subset of their regular activities in one partof one state for a limited period.” Id., at 217a–218a. Following remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a016 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of BREYER, J. Court simply repeated, word for word, this same state-ment. It said: “The Court is . . . satisfied that the balance of hard-ships tips in favor of granting an injunction, as the harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and public inter-est outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur(or the public interest would suffer) if Defendantswere prevented from using MFA sonar, absent the useof effective mitigation measures, during a subset of their regular activities in one part of one state for alimited period.” 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (CD Cal. 2008). With respect to the imposition of the 2,200 yard shutdownzone, the District Court noted evidence of the harm that MFA sonar poses to marine mammals, and then concluded that “[t]he Court therefore is persuaded that while the 2200 yard shutdown requirement may protect marinemammals from the harshest of sonar-related conse-quences, it represents a minimal imposition [on] the Navy’s training exercises.” Id., at 1119. The District Court did not there explain the basis for that conclusion. With respect to the imposition of the surface ductingcondition, the District Court said nothing about the Navy’sinterests at all. Id., at 1120–1121. While a District Court is often free simply to state its conclusion in summary fashion, in this instance neither that conclusion, nor anything else I have found in the District Court’s opinion, answers the Navy’s documented claims that the two extra conditions the District Court imposed will, in effect, seriously interfere with its ability to carry out necessary training exercises. The first condition requires the Navy to reduce thepower of its sonar equipment by 75% when the ship en-counters a condition called “surface ducting” that occurs when the presence of layers of water of different tempera-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a017 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of BREYER, J. ture make it unusually difficult for sonar operators todetermine whether a diesel submarine is hiding below. Rear Admiral John Bird, an expert in submarine warfare,made clear that the 75% power-reduction requirement wasequivalent to forbidding any related training. App. to Pet.for Cert. 297a. But he says in paragraph 52 of his declara-tion: “Training in surface ducting conditions is critical toeffective training because sonar operators need to learnhow sonar transmissions are altered due to surface duct-ing and how submarines may take advantage of them.” Id., at 299a–300a. The District Court, as far as I can tell, did not even acknowledge in its opinion the Navy’s as-serted interest in being able to train under these condi-tions. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1120–1121.The second condition requires the Navy to expand the sonar “shutdown” area surrounding a ship (i.e., turn off the sonar if a mammal is spotted in the area) from a circlewith a radius of about one-tenth of a mile to a circle with a radius of about one mile and a quarter. Both sides agreethat this requirement will lead to more shutdowns. Admi-ral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, states inparagraph 12 of his declaration that this expanded zonerequirement “will result in increased interruptions totraining exercises, . . . vastly increas[ing] the risk of negat-ing training effectiveness, preventing strike group certifi-cation, and disrupting carefully orchestrated deploymentplans to meet world-wide operational commitments.” App.to Pet. for Cert. 344a. Again, I can find nothing in the District Court’s opinion that specifically explains why thisis not so. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1119–1120. Fourth, the Court of Appeals sought, through its own thorough examination of the record, to supply the missingexplanations. But those explanations are not sufficient.In respect to the surface ducting conditions, the Court ofAppeals rejected the Navy’s contentions on the groundthat those conditions are “rar[e],” and the Navy has certi-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a018 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of BREYER, J. fied trainings that did not involve any encounter withthose conditions. 518 F. 3d, at 701–702. I am not certain, however, why the rarity of the condition supports theDistrict Court’s conclusion. Rarity argues as strongly fortraining when the condition is encountered as it argues for the contrary. In respect to the expansion of the “shutdown” area,the Court of Appeals noted that (1) the Navy in earlierexercises had shut down its sonar when marine mammals were sited within about one-half a mile, (2) the Navy hasused a larger shutdown area when engaged in exercises with lower frequency sonar equipment, and (3) foreignnavies have used larger shutdown areas. Id., at 699–701, and nn. 63, 67. But the Navy’s affidavits state that (1) earlier shutdowns when marine mammals were spotted atfarther distances “likely occurred during tactically insig-nificant times,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 356a, (2) ships withlow frequency sonar (unlike the sonar here at issue) have equipment that makes it easier to monitor the larger area,particularly by significantly reducing the number of moni-toring personnel necessarily involved, and (3) foreign navy experience is not relevant given the potentially different military demands upon those navies, App. 508–509.Finally, the Court of Appeals, mirroring a similar District Court suggestion in the language I have quoted,says that “the exercises in southern California are only a subset of the Navy’s training activities involving activesonar.” 518 F. 3d, at 702. It adds that the Navy’s study “shows the Navy is still able to conduct its exercises inalternative locations, in reduced number, or throughsimulation.” Ibid., n. 69. The Court of Appeals, however,also concluded that the study “provides reasonably de-tailed justifications for why the Southern California Oper-ating Area is uniquely suited to these exercises, and dem-onstrates that the Navy would suffer a certain hardship if the considered alternatives were employed instead.” Ibid. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a019 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of BREYER, J. Fifth, when the Court of Appeals first heard this case following the District Court’s imposition of a broad, abso-lute injunction, it held that any injunction must be crafted so that the Navy could continue its training exercises. Noting that the Navy had, in the past, been able to use mitigation measures to “reduce the harmful effects of itsactive sonar,” it “vacate[d] the stay and remand[ed] this matter to the district court to narrow its injunction so as to provide mitigation conditions under which the Navy may conduct its training exercises.” 508 F. 3d 885, 887 (CA9 2007) (emphasis added). For the reasons just stated,neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals has explained why we should reject the Navy’s assertions that it cannot effectively conduct its training exercises under the mitigation conditions imposed by the District Court. I would thus vacate the preliminary injunction im-posed by the District Court to the extent it has been chal-lenged by the Navy. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals has adequately explained its conclusionthat the balance of the equities tips in favor of plaintiffs.Nor do those parts of the record to which the parties have pointed supply the missing explanation. II Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals held when it first considered this case, the Navy’s past use of mitigation conditions makes clear that the Navy can effectively trainunder some mitigation conditions. In the ordinary course, I would remand so the District Court could, pursuant tothe Court of Appeals’ direction, set forth mitigation condi-tions that will protect the marine wildlife while also ena-bling the Navy to carry out its exercises. But, at this point, the Navy has informed us that this set of exercises will be complete by January, at the latest, and an EIS will likely be complete at that point, as well. Thus, by the timethe District Court would have an opportunity to impose Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0110 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. Opinion of BREYER, J. new conditions, the case could very well be moot. In February of this year, the Court of Appeals stayed the injunction imposed by the District Court—but only pending this Court’s resolution of the case. The Court of Appeals concluded that “[i]n light of the short time before the Navy is to commence its next exercise, the importanceof the Navy’s mission to provide for the national defenseand the representation by the Chief of Naval Operationsthat the district court’s preliminary injunction in its cur-rent form will ‘unacceptably risk’ effective training and strike group certification and thereby interfere with his statutory responsibility . . . to ‘organiz[e], train[], and equip[] the Navy,’” interim relief was appropriate, and thecourt then modified the two mitigation conditions at issue. 518 F. 3d 704, 705 (CA9 2008).With respect to the 2,200 yard shutdown zone, it required the Navy to suspend its use of the sonar if amarine mammal is detected within 2,200 yards, exceptwhen sonar is being used at a “critical point in the exer-cise,” in which case the amount by which the Navy must power down is proportional to the mammal’s proximity tothe sonar. Id., at 705–706 (internal quotation marksomitted). With respect to surface ducting, the Navy is only required to shut down sonar altogether when a ma-rine mammal is detected within 500 meters and the amount by which it is otherwise required to power down is again proportional to the mammal’s proximity to the sonar source. Id., at 705–706. The court believed these condi-tions would permit the Navy to go forward with its immi-nently planned exercises while at the same time minimiz-ing the harm to marine wildlife.In my view, the modified conditions imposed by theCourt of Appeals in its February stay order reflect the bestequitable conditions that can be created in the short time available before the exercises are complete and the EIS isready. The Navy has been training under these conditions Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0111 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of BREYER, J. since February, so allowing them to remain in place will, in effect, maintain what has become the status quo.Therefore, I would modify the Court of Appeals’ February29, 2008, order so that the provisional conditions it con-tains remain in place until the Navy’s completion of an acceptable EIS. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a01_________________ _________________ Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 GINSBURG, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 07–1239 DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT[November 12, 2008] JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins, dissenting. The central question in this action under the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was whetherthe Navy must prepare an environmental impact state-ment (EIS). The Navy does not challenge its obligation to do so, and it represents that the EIS will be complete inJanuary 2009—one month after the instant exercises conclude. If the Navy had completed the EIS before tak-ing action, as NEPA instructs, the parties and the public could have benefited from the environmental analysis—and the Navy’s training could have proceeded without interruption. Instead, the Navy acted first, and thusthwarted the very purpose an EIS is intended to serve. To justify its course, the Navy sought dispensation not fromCongress, but from an executive council that lacks author-ity to countermand or revise NEPA’s requirements. I would hold that, in imposing manageable measures tomitigate harm until completion of the EIS, the DistrictCourt conscientiously balanced the equities and did not abuse its discretion. I In December 2006, the Navy announced its intent to Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a012 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. GINSBURG, J., dissenting prepare an EIS to address the potential environmentaleffects of its naval readiness activities in the Southern California (SOCAL) Range Complex. See 71 Fed. Reg. 76639 (2006). These readiness activities include expan-sion and intensification of naval training, as well as re-search, development, and testing of various systems and weapons. Id., at 76639, 76640. The EIS process is under-way, and the Navy represents that it will be complete in January 2009. Brief for Petitioners 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. In February 2007, seeking to commence training beforecompletion of the EIS, the Navy prepared an Environ-mental Assessment (EA) for the 14 exercises it planned to undertake in the interim. See App. L to Pet. for Cert. 235a.1 On February 12, the Navy concluded the EA with afinding of no significant impact. App. 225–226. The same day, the Navy commenced its training exercises. Id., at 227 (“The Proposed Action is hereby implemented.”). On March 22, 2007, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed suit in the U. S. District Court forthe Central District of California, seeking declaratory andinjunctive relief based on the Navy’s alleged violations of NEPA and other environmental statutes. As relevant here, the District Court determined that NRDC was likelyto succeed on its NEPA claim and that equitable principles warranted preliminary relief. On August 7, 2007, thecourt enjoined the Navy’s use of mid-frequency active(MFA) sonar during the 11 remaining exercises at issue. On August 31, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-cuit stayed the injunction pending disposition of theNavy’s appeal, and the Navy proceeded with two more exercises. In a November 13 order, the Court of Appeals —————— 1An EA is used “for determining whether to prepare” an EIS. De-partment of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752, 757 (2004) (quoting 40 CFR §1508.9(a) (2003)); see ante, at 5. By definition, an EAalone does not satisfy an agency’s obligation under NEPA if the effectsof a proposed action require preparation of a full EIS. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a013 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) GINSBURG, J., dissenting vacated the stay, stating that NRDC had shown “a stronglikelihood of success on the merits” and that preliminaryinjunctive relief was appropriate. 508 F. 3d 885, 886 (2007). The Court of Appeals remanded, however, in-structing the District Court to provide mitigation meas-ures under which the Navy could conduct its remaining exercises. On remand, the District Court received briefing from both parties. In addition, the court “toured the USS Mil-ius at the naval base in San Diego, California, to improveits understanding of the Navy’s sonar training proceduresand the feasibility of the parties’ proposed mitigation measures. Counsel for both [parties] were present.” 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1112 (2008). On January 3, 2008, the District Court entered a modified preliminary injunction imposing six mitigation measures. The court revised the modified injunction slightly on January 10 in response to filings by the Navy, and four days later, denied the Navy’sapplication for a stay pending appeal.On the following day, January 15, the Council on Envi-ronmental Quality (CEQ), an advisory body within the Executive Office of the President, responded to the Navy’s request for “alternative arrangements” for NEPA compli-ance. App. L to Pet. for Cert. 233a. The “arrangements” CEQ set out purported to permit the Navy to continue its training without timely environmental review. Id., at 241a–247a. The Navy accepted the arrangements on the same day. App. 228.The Navy then filed an emergency motion in the Court of Appeals requesting immediate vacatur of the DistrictCourt’s modified injunction. CEQ’s action, the Navyurged, eliminated the injunction’s legal foundation. In the alternative, the Navy sought a stay of two aspects of theinjunction pending its appeal: the 2,200-yard mandatoryshutdown zone and the power-down requirement in sig-nificant surface ducting conditions, see ante, at 7–8. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a014 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. GINSBURG, J., dissenting While targeting in its stay application only two of the six measures imposed by the District Court, the Navy explic-itly reserved the right to challenge on appeal each of thesix mitigation measures. Responding to the Navy’s emer-gency motion, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to allow the District Court to determine in the first in-stance the effect of the intervening executive action. Pending its own consideration of the Navy’s motion, theDistrict Court stayed the injunction, and the Navy con-ducted its sixth exercise. On February 4, after briefing and oral argument, theDistrict Court denied the Navy’s motion. The Navy ap-pealed, reiterating its position that CEQ’s action elimi-nated all justification for the injunction. The Navy alsoargued that vacatur of the entire injunction was requiredirrespective of CEQ’s action, in part because the “condi-tions imposed, in particular the 2,200 yard mandatory shutdown zone and the six decibel (75%) power-down insignificant surface ducting conditions, severely degradethe Navy’s training.” Brief for Appellants in No. 08–55054 (CA9), p. 15. In the February 29 decision now underreview, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment. 518 F. 3d 658, 703 (2008). The Navy has con-tinued training in the meantime and plans to complete itsfinal exercise in December 2008. As the procedural history indicates, the courts belowdetermined that an EIS was required for the 14 exercises. The Navy does not challenge that decision in this Court. Instead, the Navy defends its failure to complete an EISbefore launching the exercises based upon CEQ’s “alterna-tive arrangements”—arrangements the Navy sought and obtained in order to overcome the lower courts’ rulings. As explained below, the Navy’s actions undermined NEPA and took an extraordinary course. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a015 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) GINSBURG, J., dissenting II NEPA “promotes its sweeping commitment” to environ-mental integrity “by focusing Government and public attention on the environmental effects of proposed agency action.” Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U. S. 360, 371 (1989). “By so focusing agency attention, NEPA ensures that the agency will not act on incompleteinformation, only to regret its decision after it is too late to correct.” Ibid. The EIS is NEPA’s core requirement. Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752, 757 (2004). This Court has characterized the requirement as “action-forcing.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 350 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Environmental concerns must be “integrated into the very process of agency decisionmaking” and “interwoven into the fabric of agency planning.” Id., at 350–351. In addition to discuss-ing potential consequences, an EIS must describe poten-tial mitigation measures and alternatives to the proposed course of action. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 351–352 (1989) (citing 40 CFR §§1508.25(b), 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h), 1505.2(c) (1987)).The EIS requirement “ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.” 490 U. S., at 349. “Publication of an EIS . . . also serves a larger informa-tional role.” Ibid. It demonstrates that an agency hasindeed considered environmental concerns, and “perhapsmore significantly, provides a springboard for public com-ment.” Ibid. At the same time, it affords other affected governmental bodies “notice of the expected consequencesand the opportunity to plan and implement correctivemeasures in a timely manner.” Id., at 350. In light of these objectives, the timing of an EIS is criti-cal. CEQ regulations instruct agencies to “integrate the Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a016 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. GINSBURG, J., dissenting NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect envi-ronmental values.” 40 CFR §1501.2 (1987). An EIS must be prepared “early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking proc-ess and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisionsalready made.” Andrus, 442 U. S., at 351–352, n. 3 (quot-ing 40 CFR §1502.5 (1979)). The Navy’s publication of its EIS in this case, scheduled to occur after the 14 exercises are completed, defeatsNEPA’s informational and participatory purposes. The Navy’s inverted timing, it bears emphasis, is the veryreason why the District Court had to confront the question of mitigation measures at all. Had the Navy prepared a legally sufficient EIS before beginning the SOCAL exer-cises, NEPA would have functioned as its drafters in-tended: The EIS process and associated public input might have convinced the Navy voluntarily to adopt mitigation measures, but NEPA itself would not have impeded the Navy’s exercises. See Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 756, 769, n. 2 (noting that NEPA does not mandate particular results, but rather establishes procedural requirements with a “focus on improving agency decisionmaking”). The Navy had other options. Most importantly, it couldhave requested assistance from Congress. The Govern-ment has sometimes obtained congressional authorization to proceed with planned activities without fulfillingNEPA’s requirements. See, e.g., Floyd D. Spence NationalDefense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. 106–398, §317, 114 Stat. 1654A–57 (exempting the mili-tary from preparing a programmatic EIS for low-levelflight training); 42 U. S. C. §10141(c) (exempting the Environmental Protection Agency from preparing an EIS for the development of criteria for handling spent nuclearfuel and high-level radioactive waste); 43 U. S. C. §1652(d) (exempting construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a017 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) GINSBURG, J., dissenting from further NEPA compliance). Rather than resorting to Congress, the Navy “soughtrelief from the Executive Branch.” Ante, at 8. On January10, 2008, the Navy asked CEQ, adviser to the President, to approve alternative arrangements for NEPA compliance pursuant to 40 CFR §1506.11 (1987). App. L to Pet. for Cert. 233a; see ante, at 8, n. 3. The next day, the Navy submitted supplementary material to CEQ, including theNavy’s EA and after-action reports, the District Court’sorders, and two analyses by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). App. L to Pet. for Cert. 237a–238a. Neither the Navy nor CEQ notified NRDC, and CEQ did not request or consider any of the materials underlying the District Court orders it addressed. Four days later, on January 15, the Chairman of CEQ issued a letter to the Secretary of the Navy. Repeating the Navy’s submissions with little independent analysis, the letter stated that the District Court’s orders posed risks tothe Navy’s training exercises. See id., at 238a (“You have explained that the training restrictions set forth in the . . . injunctive orders prevent the Navy from providing StrikeGroups with adequate proficiency training and create a substantial risk of precluding certification of the StrikeGroups as combat ready.”).The letter continued: “Discussions between our staffs, your letter and sup-porting documents, and the classified declaration andbriefings I have received, have clearly determined that the Navy cannot ensure the necessary training tocertify strike groups for deployment under the terms of the injunctive orders. Based on the record support-ing your request . . . CEQ has concluded that the Navy must be able to conduct the [exercises] . . . in a time-frame that does not provide sufficient time to com-plete an EIS. Therefore, emergency circumstances Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a018 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. GINSBURG, J., dissenting are present for the nine exercises and alternative ar-rangements for compliance with NEPA under CEQ regulation 40 C.F.R. §1506.11 are warranted.” Id., at 240a. The alternative arrangements CEQ set forth do notvindicate NEPA’s objectives. The arrangements provide for “public participation measures,” which require the Navy to provide notices of the alternative arrangements. Id., at 242a. The notices must “seek input on the process for reviewing post-exercise assessments” and “include anoffer to meet jointly with Navy representatives . . . andCEQ to discuss the alternative arrangements.” Id., at 242a–243a. The alternative arrangements also describe the Navy’s existing research and mitigation efforts. Id., at 243a–247a. CEQ’s hasty decision on a one-sided record is no substi-tute for the District Court’s considered judgment based ona two-sided record.2 More fundamentally, even an exem-plary CEQ review could not have effected the short circuit the Navy sought. CEQ lacks authority to absolve an agency of its statutory duty to prepare an EIS. NEPA established CEQ to assist and advise the President on environmental policy, 42 U. S. C. §4342, and a 1977 Ex-ecutive Order charged CEQ with issuing regulations to federal agencies for implementation of NEPA’s procedural provisions, Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 123 (1977 Comp.). This Court has recognized that CEQ’s regulations are entitled to “substantial deference,” Robertson, 490 U. S., at 355, and §1506.11 indicates that CEQ may play —————— 2The District Court may well have given too spare an explanation for the balance of hardships in issuing its injunction of August 7, 2007. The court cured any error in this regard, however, when it closely examined each mitigation measure in issuing the modified injunction ofJanuary 3, 2008. The Court of Appeals, too, conducted a detailedanalysis of the record. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a019 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) GINSBURG, J., dissenting an important consultative role in emergency circum-stances, but we have never suggested that CEQ could eliminate the statute’s command. If the Navy sought to avoid its NEPA obligations, its remedy lay in the Legisla-tive Branch. The Navy’s alternative course—rapid, self-serving resort to an office in the White House—is surelynot what Congress had in mind when it instructed agen-cies to comply with NEPA “to the fullest extent possible.”42 U. S. C. §4332.3 III A Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction. “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944)). Consistent with eq-uity’s character, courts do not insist that litigants uni-formly show a particular, predetermined quantum ofprobable success or injury before awarding equitablerelief. Instead, courts have evaluated claims for equitable relief on a “sliding scale,” sometimes awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of suc-cess is very high. 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948.3, p. 195 (2d ed.1995). This Court has never rejected that formulation,and I do not believe it does so today.Equity’s flexibility is important in the NEPA context. Because an EIS is the tool for uncovering environmental —————— 3On the same day that CEQ issued its letter, the President granted the Navy an exemption from the requirements of the Coastal ZoneManagement Act of 1972 (CZMA) pursuant to 16 U. S. C. §1456(c)(1)(B). That exemption, expressly authorized by the CZMA, does not affect NRDC’s NEPA claim. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0110 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. GINSBURG, J., dissenting harm, environmental plaintiffs may often rely more heav-ily on their probability of success than the likelihood ofharm. The Court is correct that relief is not warranted “simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury.” Ante, at 12 (quoting Wright & Miller, supra, §2948.1, at 155). “However, the injury need not have been inflicted when application is made or be certain to occur; astrong threat of irreparable injury before trial is an ade-quate basis.” Wright & Miller, supra, §2948.1, at 155–156(footnote omitted). I agree with the District Court that NRDC made the required showing here. B The Navy’s own EA predicted substantial and irrepara-ble harm to marine mammals. Sonar is linked to mass strandings of marine mammals, hemorrhaging around thebrain and ears, acute spongiotic changes in the central nervous system, and lesions in vital organs. E.g., App. 600–602; 360–362; 478–479. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the EA predicts that the Navy’s “use of MFA sonar in the SOCAL exercises will result in 564 instances of physicalinjury including permanent hearing loss (Level A harass-ment) and nearly 170,000 behavioral disturbances (Level B harassment), more than 8,000 of which would also involve temporary hearing loss.” 518 F. 3d, at 696; see App. 223–224. Within those totals, “the EA predicts 436 Level A harassments of Cuvier’sbeaked whales, of which, according to NOAA, as few as 1,121 may exist in California, Oregon and Wash-ington combined. Likewise, the EA predicts 1,092Level B harassments of bottlenose dolphins, of which only 5,271 may exist in the California Coastal and Offshore stocks.” 518 F. 3d, at 691–692. The majority acknowledges the lower courts’ findings, ante, at 9, but also states that the EA predicted “only eight Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0111 Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) GINSBURG, J., dissenting Level A harassments of common dolphins each year” and “274 Level B harassments of beaked whales per year, noneof which would result in permanent injury,” ante, at 6. Those numbers do not fully capture the EA’s predictions. The EA classified the harassments of beaked whales as Level A, not Level B. The EA does indeed state that “modeling predicts non-injurious Level B exposures.” App. 185. But, as the majority correctly notes, ante, at 6, the EA also states that “all beaked whale exposures are counted as Level A,” App. 185. The EA counted the pre-dicted exposures as Level A “[b]y Navy policy developed in conjunction with NMFS.” Id., at 200. The record reflects “the known sensitivity of these species to tactical sonar,” id., at 365 (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-stration letter), and as the majority acknowledges, beakedwhales are difficult to study, ante, at 6. Further, as the Ninth Circuit noted, “the EA . . . maintained that the methodology used was based on the ‘best available sci-ence.’” 518 F. 3d, at 669.4 In my view, this likely harm—170,000 behavioral dis-turbances, including 8,000 instances of temporary hearing loss; and 564 Level A harms, including 436 injuries to abeaked whale population numbering only 1,121—cannot be lightly dismissed, even in the face of an alleged risk tothe effectiveness of the Navy’s 14 training exercises. There is no doubt that the training exercises serve critical interests. But those interests do not authorize the Navy to —————— 4The majority reasons that the environmental harm deserves lessweight because the training exercises “have been taking place inSOCAL for the last 40 years,” such that “this is not a case in which thedefendant is conducting a new type of activity with completely un-known effects on the environment.” Ante, at 13. But the EA explainsthat the proposed action is not a continuation of the “status quo train-ing.” App. 128. Instead, the EA is based on the Navy’s proposal to employ a “surge” training strategy, ibid., in which the commander “would have the option to conduct two concurrent major range events,” id., at 124. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a0112 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. GINSBURG, J., dissenting violate a statutory command, especially when recourse to the Legislature remains open. “Of course, military inter-ests do not always trump other considerations, and wehave not held that they do.” Ante, at 16. In light of the likely, substantial harm to the environ-ment, NRDC’s almost inevitable success on the merits of its claim that NEPA required the Navy to prepare an EIS,the history of this litigation, and the public interest, Icannot agree that the mitigation measures the District Court imposed signal an abuse of discretion. Cf. Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is oftenpermanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.”). For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment ofthe Ninth Circuit. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=aa3de389-cbfa-4f00-b784-19121a177a01