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WEINBERGER V. SALFI, 422 U. S. 749 (1975)
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(a) That § 405(h)'s third sentence, contrary to the District Court's view, does not merely codify the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, is plain from its sweeping language; and, moreover, to construe it so narrowly would render it superfluous in view of chanrobles.com-red
3. The District Court had jurisdiction over the named appellees under § 405(g). While the allegations of the complaint with regard to exhaustion of remedies fall short of meeting § 405(g)'s literal requirement that there shall have been a "final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing" and of satisfying the Secretary's regulations specifying that the finality required for judicial review be achieved only after the further steps of a hearing before an administrative judge and possibly consideration by the Appeals Council, nevertheless the Secretary, by not challenging the sufficiency of such allegations, has apparently determined that, for purposes of this action. the reconsideration determination is "final." chanrobles.com-red
(c) The duration of relationship test meets the constitutional standard that Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse -- the use of sham marriages to secure Social Security benefits -- which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of an objective, easily administered prophylactic rule. Pp. 422 U. S. 773-780. chanrobles.com-red
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 422 U. S. 785. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 422 U. S. 786.
Appellants, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, its Secretary, the Social Security Administration and various of its officials, appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California invalidating duration of relationship chanrobles.com-red
Social Security eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. 373 F.Supp. 961 (1974).
Appellee Salfi married the deceased wage earner, Londo L. Salfi, on May 27, 1972. Despite his alleged apparent good health at the time of the marriage, he suffered a heart attack less than a month later, and died on November 21, 1972, less than six months after the marriage. Appellee Salfi filed applications for mother's insurance benefits for herself and child's insurance benefits for her daughter by a previous marriage, appellee Doreen Kalnins. [Footnote 1] These applications were denied by the Social chanrobles.com-red
Security Administration, both initially and on reconsideration at the regional level, solely on the basis of the duration of relationship requirements of §§ 416(c)(5) and (e)(2), which define "widow" and "child." The definitions exclude surviving wives and stepchildren who had their respective relationships to a deceased wage earner for less than nine months prior to his death. [Footnote 2] chanrobles.com-red
A three-judge District Court heard the case on cross-motions for summary judgment, and granted substantially all of the relief prayed for by appellees. The District Court rendered a declaratory judgment holding the challenged statute to be unconstitutional, certified a class consisting of "all otherwise eligible surviving spouses and stepchildren . . . heretofore disqualified from receipt of . . . benefits by operation" of the duration of relationship requirements, enjoined appellants from denying benefits on the basis of those requirements, and ordered them to provide such benefits "from the time of chanrobles.com-red
original entitlement." 373 F.Supp. at 966. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal from that judgment. 419 U.S. 992 (1974).
On its face, this provision bars district court federal question jurisdiction over suits, such as this one, which chanrobles.com-red
That the third sentence of § 405(h) is more than a codified requirement of administrative exhaustion is plain from its own language, which is sweeping and direct and which states that no action shall be brought under § 1331, not merely that only those actions shall be brought in which administrative remedies have been exhausted. Moreover, if the third sentence is construed to be nothing more than a requirement of administrative exhaustion, it would be superfluous. This is because the first two sentences of § 405(h), which appear in the margin, [Footnote 4] assure that administrative exhaustion will be required. Specifically, they prevent review of decisions of the Secretary save as provided in the Act, which provision is made in § 405(g). [Footnote 5] The latter section prescribes chanrobles.com-red
typical requirements for review of matters before an administrative agency, including administrative exhaustion. [Footnote 6] Thus, the District Court's treatment of the chanrobles.com-red
third sentence of § 405(h) not only ignored that sentence's plain language, but also relegated it to a function which is already performed by other statutory provisions. chanrobles.com-red
A somewhat more substantial argument that the third sentence of § 405(h) does not deprive the District Court of federal question jurisdiction relies on the fact that it only affects actions to recover on "any claim arising under [Title II]" of the Social Security Act. [Footnote 7] The argument is that the present action arises under the Constitution, and not under Title II. It would, of course, be fruitless to contend that appellees' claim is one which does not arise under the Constitution, since their constitutional arguments are critical to their complaint. But it is just as fruitless to argue that this action does not also arise under the Social Security Act. For not only is it Social Security benefits which appellees seek to recover, but it is the Social Security Act which provides chanrobles.com-red
We were required to resolve whether this language precluded an attack on the constitutionality of a statutory limitation. We concluded that it did not, basically because such a limitation was not a "decision" of the Administrator "on any question of law or fact"; indeed, the "decision" had been made by Congress, not the Administrator, and the issue was one which the Administrator considered to be beyond his jurisdiction. 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 367-368. Thus, the question sought to be litigated was simply not within § 211(a)'s express language, and there was accordingly no basis for concluding chanrobles.com-red
There is another reason why Johnson v. Robison is inapposite. It was expressly based, at least in part, on the fact that, if § 211(a) reached constitutional challenges to statutory limitations, then absolutely no judicial consideration of the issue would be available. Not only would such a restriction have been extraordinary, such that "clear and convincing" evidence would be required before we would ascribe such intent to Congress, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 373, but it would have raised a serious constitutional question of the validity of the statute as so construed. Id. at 415 U. S. 366-367. In the present case, as will be discussed below, the Social Security Act itself provides jurisdiction for constitutional challenges to its provisions. Thus, the plain words of the third sentence of § 405(h) do not preclude constitutional challenges. They simply require that they be brought under jurisdictional grants contained in the Act, and thus in conformity with the same standards which are applicable to nonconstitutional claims arising under the Act. The result is not only of unquestionable constitutionality, but it is also manifestly reasonable, since it assures the Secretary the opportunity prior to constitutional litigation to ascertain, for example, that the particular claims involved are neither invalid for other reasons nor allowable under other provisions of the Social Security Act. chanrobles.com-red
Section 405(g) specifics the following requirements for judicial review: (1) a final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing; (2) commencement of a civil action within 60 days after the mailing of notice of such decision (or within such further time as the Secretary chanrobles.com-red
The jurisdictional issue with respect to the named appellees is somewhat more difficult. In a paragraph entitled "Exhaustion of Remedies," the complaint alleges that they fully presented their claims for benefits "to their district Social Security Office and, upon denial, to chanrobles.com-red
We have previously recognized that the doctrine of administrative exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the particular administrative scheme at issue. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U. S. 34 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969). Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. See, e.g., id. at 395 U. S. 193-194. Plainly these purposes have been served once the Secretary has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that the claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a different section of the Act. Once a benefit applicant has presented his or her claim at a sufficiently high level of review to satisfy the Secretary's administrative needs, further exhaustion would not merely be futile for the applicant, chanrobles.com-red
The present case, of course, is significantly different from McKart in that a "final decision" is a statutorily specified jurisdictional prerequisite. The requirement is, therefore, as we have previously noted, something more than simply a codification of the judicially developed doctrine of exhaustion, and may not be dispensed with merely by a judicial conclusion of futility such as that made by the District Court here. But it is equally true that the requirement of a "final decision" contained in § 405(g) is not precisely analogous to the more classical jurisdictional requirements contained in such sections of Title 28 as 1331 and 1332. The term "final decision" is not only left undefined by the Act, but its meaning is left to the Secretary to flesh out by regulation. [Footnote 9] Section 405(1) accords the Secretary complete authority to delegate his statutory duties to officers and employees of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The statutory scheme is thus one in which the Secretary may specify such requirements for exhaustion as he deems serve his own interests in effective and efficient administration. While a court may not substitute its conclusion as to futility for the contrary conclusion of the Secretary, we believe it would be inconsistent with the congressional scheme to bar the Secretary from determining chanrobles.com-red
In Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971), a portion of the Social Security Act which required an otherwise entitled disability claimant to be subjected to an "offset" by reason of his simultaneous receipt of state workmen's compensation benefits was attacked as being violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The claimant in that case asserted that the provision was arbitrary in that it required offsetting of a chanrobles.com-red
These cases quite plainly lay down the governing principle for disposing of constitutional challenges to classifications in this type of social welfare legislation. The District Court, however, chose to rely on Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, supra; Vlandis v. Kline, supra; and Stanley v. Illinois, supra. It characterized this recent group of cases as dealing with "the appropriateness chanrobles.com-red
of conclusive evidentiary presumptions." 373 F.Supp. at 965.
We hold that these cases are not controlling on the issue before us now. Unlike the claims involved in chanrobles.com-red
Stanley and LaFleur, a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, though, of course, Congress may not invidiously discriminate among such claimants on the basis of a "bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group," 413 U. S. 534 (1973), or on the basis of criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 417 U. S. 636 (1974); 413 U. S. 513-514 (1973). Unlike the statutory scheme in Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 449, the Social Security Act does not purport to speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissible. As in Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234 (Minn.1970), summarily aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), the benefits here are available upon compliance with an objective criterion, one which the Legislature considered to bear a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives to be used as the test for eligibility. Like the plaintiffs in Starns, appellees are completely free to present evidence that they meet the specified requirements; failing in this effort, their only constitutional claim is that the test they cannot meet is not so rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective that it can be used to deprive them of benefits available to those who do satisfy that test.
We think that the District Court's extension of the holdings of Stanley, Vlandis, and LaFleur to the eligibility requirement in issue here would turn the doctrine of those cases into a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. For example, the very chanrobles.com-red
Id. at 348 U. S. 489. chanrobles.com-red
Title 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1970 ed. and Supp. III) is the basic congressional enactment defining eligibility for old-age and survivors insurance benefit payments, and is divided into 23 lettered subsections. Subsection (g) is entitled "Mother's insurance benefits," and primarily governs the claim of appellee Salfi. Subsection (d) governs eligibility for child's insurance benefits, and is the provision chanrobles.com-red
The present case is somewhat different, since the Secretary principally defends the duration of relationship requirement not as a reasonable legislative decision to exclude a particular type of risk from coverage, but instead as a method of assuring that payments are made only upon the occurrence of events the risk of which is covered by the insurance program. [Footnote 11] Commercial insurance policies have traditionally relied upon fixed, prophylactic rules to protect against abuses which could expand liability beyond the risks which are within the general concept of its coverage. For example, life insurance policies often cover deaths by suicide, but not those suicides which were contemplated when the policy was purchased. Frequently the method chosen to contain liability within these conceptual bounds is a strict rule that deaths by suicide are covered if, and only if, they occur some fixed period of time after the policy is issued. See, e.g., 9 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 40.50 (2d ed.1962). While such a limitation doubtless proves in particular cases to be "underinclusive" or "overinclusive," in light of its presumed purpose, it is nonetheless a widely accepted response to legitimate interests in administrative economy and certainty of coverage for those who meet its terms. When the Government chooses to follow this tradition in its own social insurance programs, it does not come up against a constitutional stone wall. Rather, it may rely on such rules so long as chanrobles.com-red
The danger of persons entering a marriage relationship not to enjoy its traditional benefits, but instead to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated early death of the wage earner, has been recognized from the very beginning of the Social Security program. While no early legislative history addresses itself specifically to the duration of relationship requirement for mother's and child's benefits, there were discussions of the analogous requirement for receipt of wife's benefits under § 402(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 416(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), defining "wife." Dr. A. J. Altmeyer, Chairman of the Social Security Board, noted that a five-year requirement "should be strict enough to prevent marriage in anticipation chanrobles.com-red
When, in 1972, Congress added the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 416(k)(2) (1970 ed., Supp. III) (eliminating chanrobles.com-red
We note initially that the requirement is effective only within a somewhat narrow range of situations lacking certain characteristics which might reasonably be thought to establish the genuineness of a marital relationship which involves children (and thus the potential for mother's and child's benefits). Even though a surviving wife has not been married for a period of nine months immediately prior to her husband's death, she is nonetheless within the definition of "widow" if she meets one of the other disjunctive requirements of § 416(c). If she is the mother of her late husband's son or daughter; if she legally adopted his son or daughter while she was married to him and while such son or daughter was under the age of 18; if he legally adopted her son or daughter under the same circumstances; or if, during their marriage, however short, they legally adopted a child under the age of 18 -- in any of these circumstances, the surviving wife may claim widow's or mother's benefits chanrobles.com-red
While it is possible to debate the wisdom of excluding legitimate claimants in order to discourage sham relationships, and of relying on a rule which may not exclude some obviously sham arrangements, we think it clear that Congress could rationally choose to adopt such a course. Large numbers of people are eligible for these programs and are potentially subject to inquiry as to the validity of their relationships to wage earners. These people include not only the classes which appellees represent, [Footnote 13] but also claimants in other programs for which chanrobles.com-red
the Social Security Act imposes duration of relationship requirements. [Footnote 14] Not only does the prophylactic approach thus obviate the necessity for large numbers of individualized determinations, but it also protects large numbers of claimants who satisfy the rule from the uncertainties and delays of administrative inquiry into the circumstances of their marriages. Nor is it at all clear that individual determinations could effectively filter out sham arrangements, since neither marital intent, life expectancy, nor knowledge of terminal illness has been shown by chanrobles.com-red
appellees to be reliably determinable. [Footnote 15] Finally, the very possibility of prevailing at a hearing could reasonably be expected to encourage sham relationships. chanrobles.com-red
The administrative difficulties of individual eligibility determinations are without doubt matters which Congress may consider when determining whether to rely on rules which sweep more broadly than the evils with which they seek to deal. In this sense, the duration of relationship requirement represents not merely a substantive policy determination that benefits should be awarded only on the basis of genuine marital relationships, but also a substantive policy determination that limited resources would not be well spent in making individual determinations. It is an expression of Congress' policy choice that the Social Security system, and its millions of beneficiaries, would be best served by a prophylactic rule which bars claims arising from the bulk of sham marriages which are actually entered, which discourages such marriages chanrobles.com-red
On the merits, I believe that the main problem with these legislatively created presumptions is that they frequently invade the right to a jury trial. See Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 319 U. S. 473 (1943) (Black, J., concurring). The present law was designed to bar payment of certain Social Security benefits when the purpose of the marriage was to obtain such benefits. Whether this was the aim of a particular marriage is a question of fact, to be decided by the jury in an appropriate case. I therefore would vacate and remand the case to give Mrs. Salfi the right to show that her chanrobles.com-red
The jurisdictional issue to which the Court devotes 10 pages, only to conclude that there is indeed jurisdiction over the merits of this case both here and in the District Court, was not raised in this Court by the parties before us nor argued, except most peripherally, [Footnote 2/1] in the briefs or chanrobles.com-red
at oral argument. The question involves complicated questions of legislative intent and a statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which has baffled district courts and courts of appeals for years in this and other contexts. [Footnote 2/2] Of course, this Court is always obliged to inquire into its own jurisdiction when there is a substantial question about whether jurisdiction is proper either in the lower courts or in this Court. But since here there is, according to the Court, jurisdiction over the cause of action in any event, [Footnote 2/3] I would have thought it the wiser chanrobles.com-red
Because the Court nonetheless treats the question fully, I am obliged to do so as well. For, at least insofar as my own research and consideration, unaided by the help ordinarily offered by adversary consideration, is adequate, I am convinced that the Court is quite wrong about the intended reach of § 405(h), and that its construction attributes to Congress a purpose both contrary chanrobles.com-red
Section 405(h), I believe, only bans, except under § 405(g), suits which arise under Title II in the sense that they require the application of the statute to a set of facts, and which seek nothing more than a determination of eligibility claimed to arise under the Act. Thus, I basically agree with the District Court that § 405(h), including its last sentence, merely codifies the usual chanrobles.com-red
Thus, the agency responsible for the enforcement of Title II adopted a construction of the statute which gave the last sentence the very meaning which the Court now rejects as "superfluous" and "already performed by other statutory provisions." Ante at 422 U. S. 757, 759, and n. 6. As explained in the margin, [Footnote 2/6] the sentence is not superfluous, chanrobles.com-red
an the Board obviously did not regard it as such. Administrative interpretations by agencies of statutes which they administer are ordinarily entitled to great weight, see, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 367-368; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 380 U. S. 16 (1965). And in this instance, the contemporary Social Security Board was intimately involved in the formulation of the 1939 amendments, [Footnote 2/7] and thus must be presumed to have had insight into the legislative intent. [Footnote 2/8] chanrobles.com-red
Without any clear evidence, indeed without any chanrobles.com-red
Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U. S. 233, 393 U. S. 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in result); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 368. [Footnote 2/9] See 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.04 (1958). Thus, in a case such as this one, in which no facts are in dispute and no other sections of the Act are possibly applicable, "the only question of exhaustion was whether to require exhaustion of nonexistent administrative remedies." Id. at 78. See Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 331 U. S. 773 (1947). To assume, with no basis in the legislative history or in the clear words of the statute, that Congress intended to require exhaustion in this kind of case is to impute to Congress a requirement of futile exhaustion in which the only issues in the case are not discussed, in which the actual issues are in no way clarified, in which no factual findings are made, and in which there is no agency expertise to apply. I see no basis for imputing such an odd intent, especially since, as discussed below, I believe the clear import of the wording of the statute is to the contrary. chanrobles.com-red
The Court, ante at 422 U. S. 761-762, suggests that this interpretation turned on the precise wording of the statute construed in Johnson, specifically on the words "decisions . . . on any question of law and fact." First, as the quotation above shows, Johnson, in fact, concentrated not upon what constitutes a "decision" of the administrator, chanrobles.com-red
Aside from Johnson, our cases concerning the meaning of "arising under" in the jurisdictional statutes affirm that this claim arises under the Constitution, and not under the Social Security Act. We have consistently held that a controversy regarding title to land does not "arise under" federal law "merely because one of the parties to it has derived his title under an act of Congress." Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 225 U. S. 570 (1912). See 414 U. S. 676, and n. 11 (1974). Rather, "a suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily one arising under the . . . laws of the United States." Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 177 U. S. 507 (1900); Oneida Indian Nation, supra, at 414 U. S. 683 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). Unless the dispute requires for its resolution a decision concerning federal law, the case does not arise under federal law even if, but for a federal statute, there would be no right at all. Shulthis v. McDougal, supra at 225 U. S. 569; Oneida Indian Nation, supra,@ at 414 U. S. 677.
Not only does this case not concern a "claim arising under" Title II, but it is, at least in part, not an "action . . . to recover on any claim." (Emphasis added.) A three-judge District Court dealt with the "recover on [a] claim" aspect of § 405(h) in Gainville v. Richardson, 319 F.Supp. 16, 18 (Mass.1970). [Footnote 2/12] Judge Wyzanski wrote concerning the effect of the last sentence of § 405(h):
319 F.Supp. at 18.
The holding in Gainville, supra, applies squarely to this case. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to both the named plaintiffs and the class, as well as retroactive benefits. App. 12-13. The injunction sought was either an order to provide benefits or "an opportunity for a hearing on the genuineness of their status, [for] plaintiffs and all those similarly situated." Id. at 13. Thus, even if § 405(h) precludes granting retroactive benefits except under § 405(g), it would not, under the rationale of Gainville, supra, preclude granting any declaratory and injunctive relief to the class, since the relief requested would not necessarily be tantamount to recovery on a claim. Indeed, chanrobles.com-red
the appellants seem to have conceded as much in this case, since it argued here that §§ 405(g) and (h) were preclusive only with regard to retroactive benefits, see 422 U. S. 1, supra.
Finally, even if I could agree, and I do not, that § 405(g) is the exclusive route for consideration of this kind of case, I would dissent from the Court's treatment of the exhaustion requirement of § 405(g), ante at 422 U. S. 764-767. chanrobles.com-red
Ante at 422 U. S. 766. (Emphasis supplied.) If, as the Court holds, the finality and hearing requirements of § 405(g) are not jurisdictional, [Footnote 2/14] ibid., then I fail to see why it is left to the Secretary to determine when the point of futility is reached, a power to be exercised, apparently, with regard only to the Secretary's needs and without taking account of the claimants' interest in not exhausting futile remedies, [Footnote 2/15] and in obtaining chanrobles.com-red
Moreover, and significantly, it flagrantly distorts the record in this case to say that the Secretary waived the exhaustion requirements of § 405(g), recognizing their futility. True, the Secretary does not here claim a lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust on the individual claim, see 422 U. S. 1, supra. But he did, in the District Court, move to dismiss the entire action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Notice and Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, at Record 114-117. The Secretary said, referring to §§ 405(g) and (h):
In Vlandis, we said, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 446: "[P]ermanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process [ Clause] of the . . . Fourteenth [Amendment]." The Court today distinguishes Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), and Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974), two cases which struck down conclusive presumptions, because both dealt with protected rights, while this case deals with "a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public treasury [which] enjoys no constitutionally protected status." Ante at 422 U. S. 772. But Vlandis also dealt with a Government benefit program -- the provision of an chanrobles.com-red
This is not to say, nor has the Court ever held, that all statutory provisions based on assumptions about underlying facts are per se unconstitutional unless individual hearings are provided. But in this case, as in the others in which we have stricken down conclusive presumptions, it is possible to specify those factors which, if proved in a hearing, would disprove a rebuttable presumption. See e.g., Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 452. For example, persuasive evidence of good health at the time of marriage would be sufficient, I should think, to disprove that the marriage was collusive. Also, in this case, as in Stanley, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 655, and LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 643, the presumption, insofar as it precludes people as to whom the presumed fact is untrue from so proving, runs counter to the general legislative policy -- here, providing true widows and children with survivors' benefits. And finally, the presumption here, like that, in Vlandis, Murry, and Jimenez, involves a measure of social opprobrium; the assumption is that the individual has purposely undertaken to evade legitimate requirements. When these factors are present, I believe chanrobles.com-red
See, e.g., on the effect of §§ 405(g) and (h) on cases seeking to invalidate as unconstitutional a provision of Title II of the Social Security Act, Bartley v. Finch, 311 F.Supp. 876 (ED Ky.1970), summarily aff'd, on the merits sub nom. Bartley v. Richardson, 404 U.S. 980 (1971); Gainville v. Richardson, 319 F.Supp. 16 (Mass.1970); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.Supp. 1226 (Md.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F.Supp. 1 (SD Fla.1973); Wiesenfeld v. Weinberger, 367 F.Supp. 981 (NJ 1973), aff'd, 420 U. S. 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F.Supp. 1299 (ED Pa.1974) (appeal docketed, No. 74-5538).
Other courts have grappled with §§ 405(g) and (h) in other contexts. See, e.g., Filice v. Celebrezze, 319 F.2d 443 (CA9 1963); compare Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (CA2 1966), with Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904 (CA9 1973) (en banc). In Cappadora, supra, Judge Friendly, in considering the application of §§ 405(g) and (h) to review of a decision not to reopen a claim of statutory qualification, cautioned against overly literal interpretation of the sections. 356 F.2d 5.
Other indices of legislative intent and administrative interpretation, although sparse, also suggest that §§ 405(g) and (h) were intended and interpreted as nothing more than a codification of ordinary administrative exhaustion requirements, applicable to cases presenting questions of fact and of interpretation of the statute. The 1939 Report of the Social Security Board, see 422 U. S. 7, supra, suggested that the amendments include a
This Court, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), summarily affirmed Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.Supp. 1226, 1230 (Md.), which expressed basically the same view, albeit somewhat less clearly.
373 F.Supp. 961, 966 (ND Cal.1974). (Emphasis added.) As the Court points out, ante at 422 U. S. 759 n. 6, in most instances, see 422 U. S. 6, supra, a person is not "eligible" for benefits until he files an application. Further, the order obviously contemplates administrative proceedings in order to determine whether "such persons are otherwise fully eligible." Finally, if exhaustion of § 405(g) is indeed, as the Court holds, always a prerequisite to eligibility, then a person would not be "otherwise fully eligible" unless and until he exhausts § 45(g). Thus, I believe that the order can be read not to mandate retroactive benefits, but only to require that claims of the class members be treated as if the nine-month marriage requirement did not exist. Such an order does not constitute recovery on a claim, and, in my view, was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.