Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/378/78/217280/
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 12:48:52
Document Index: 327832139

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1404', '§ 51', '§ 1292', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1651', '§ 1292']

Hewlett Akers, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company, Defendant-appellant.norfolk and Western Railway Company, Petitioner, v. the Honorable Ted Dalton, United States District Court Judge for the Western District of Virginia, Respondent,hewlett Akers, Intervenor, 378 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1967) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1967 › Hewlett Akers, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company, Defendant-appellant.norfo...
Hewlett Akers, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company, Defendant-appellant.norfolk and Western Railway Company, Petitioner, v. the Honorable Ted Dalton, United States District Court Judge for the Western District of Virginia, Respondent,hewlett Akers, Intervenor, 378 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1967)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 378 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1967) Argued March 10, 1967
Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) of Hewlett Akers' Federal Employers Liability action, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., against Norfolk & Western Railway Company from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia at Roanoke, to the Southern District of West Virginia at Huntington, was refused the railway, and it now asks us to direct the removal.
The controversy comes here on the company's application for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the interlocutory order denying the transfer, and also on its petition for mandamus requiring the District Judge to order the change of courts. Exercising our statutory discretion, we decline the appeal. However, we think the transfer advisable and should be effectuated.
Transfer of cases is regulated by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which reads:
Looking at the determinative factors recited in the statute, obviously the action ought to be tried in Huntington. The circumstances just enumerated are indisputable; they uncompromisingly point to transfer. Otherwise, the railroad could be left with no alternative but to adduce its evidence through depositions, a mode of proof universally acknowledged to be inferior to the personal appearance of witnesses in court. We note that in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947), which presaged adoption of § 1404(a), the Court approved dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens of an action instituted in the City of New York to recover damages for the destruction of the plaintiff's warehouse in Virginia. The expediency of a local trial was deemed to outweigh the plaintiff's choice of forum.
Of course, we recognize the primary right of the plaintiff to choose his forum, a selection not easily to be overthrown. Moreover, we recognize, too, that the decision rests in the discretion of the District Judge. Nevertheless, we must be equally sensible to an abuse of that discretion when measured upon the considerations of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), supra. In Morehead v. Barksdale, 263 F.2d 117 (4 Cir. 1959), we upheld refusal to order a transfer, finding no abuse of discretion. In like vein we ordered a transfer in Southern Railway Company v. Madden, 235 F.2d 198 (4 Cir. 1956), cert. den. 352 U.S. 953, 77 S. Ct. 328, 1 L. Ed. 2d 244, despite denial in the trial court, where the case "clearly" called for an exercise of the power. True, in Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699, 706 (4 Cir. 1956), we declined to countermand by mandamus or prohibition an order of transfer. However, there the Court saw no abuse of discretion in the transfer and consequently there was no occasion to issue the writ, the question of power thus rendered moot. Cf. Paesch v. Winter, 366 F.2d 756 (4 Cir. 1966). In General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361 (4 Cir., en banc, January 11, 1967), we utilized the writ to effect a transfer.
In view of this history of our supervision of rulings on transfer, we have no hesitancy in holding that in the circumstances here denial of transfer constitutes abuse of discretion, and we may issue mandamus, under the authority of the all writs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to require the transfer of the case to West Virginia. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R. R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7 Cir. 1955), cert. den. 350 U.S. 822, 76 S. Ct. 49, 100 L. Ed. 735, see, also, Annotation, 93 A.L.R.2d 802, 815, 855-59 (1964). We note, too, the recent case of A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 443 (2 Cir. 1966), where it was said:
"the great majority of recent appellate decisions * * * indicate that the Courts of Appeals consider themselves possessed of the power to issue mandamus in extraordinary circumstances to correct the disposition of a transfer motion by the District Court, even where the District Court has purported to consider proper factors. * * *" (Citations omitted.)
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion with respect to the disposition of Misc. No. 382 declining the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the interlocutory order denying transfer of the case from the Western District of Virginia to the Southern District of West Virginia. Not without some feeling of hesitation because of the unsatisfactory form of the order denying transfer I indicate my disagreement with the decision of my brothers to command such transfer.
"We do not regard controversies between litigants, and between their counsel, as to where a case can most conveniently, fairly, efficiently and economically be tried as `really extraordinary.'"
The motion to transfer an action under section 1404 is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court.2 While, as pointed out in the majority opinion, section 1404(a) is more lenient in authorizing transfers than is the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens, the district judge, in exercising discretion, is limited in his consideration to factors specifically mentioned in said section,3 including "in the interest of justice." It is my firm conclusion that mandamus should lie only to redress a clear-cut abuse of discretion.
The FELA provides that an action may be brought in the United States District Court in the district of the defendant's residence and that is precisely what was done here. The plaintiff, in exercising his choice of forum, was pursuing a substantial right which the law clearly gives him, a right not to be denied unless pertinent facts, circumstances and considerations compel denial. "Interest of justice" contemplates and embraces more than mere convenience of the parties and witnesses.
The time that would elapse before trial in Huntington, if considerably greater than in Roanoke, might conceivably work to the advantage of the movant railroad if economic necessity should force the plaintiff to come to terms with the railroad in settlement of his claim for damages — a practical factor which is not to be lightly regarded. The plaintiff chose the Western District of Virginia, as he had the clear right to do, because of its earned reputation for dispensing speedy justice. The court below may have concluded that the plaintiff could ill afford to wait for the redress of the wrong allegedly done him, a waiting period which might be measured in years.
The majority opinion points to our decision in General Tire & Rubber Company v. Watkins, 4 Cir., 373 F.2d 361, where we ordered a transfer from the District of Maryland to the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. Our action was there taken after the district judge had more than once refused transfer and retained jurisdiction of the case. We recognized the right of the plaintiffs to choose their forum despite the fact that there was every indication that the convenience of the parties and witnesses would be served by such a transfer; furthermore, there was litigation pending in the Northern District of Ohio involving the same subject matter, viz., patent validity and infringement. After upholding the district judge in the exercise of his discretion on previous occasions, we finally took the action we did because of other most unusual and "really extraordinary" circumstances which were brought to light and which persuaded us that the district court had abused its discretion in refusing transfer. Our action in that protracted litigation served to demonstrate our recognition of the basic principle that the exercise by the district court of its discretion with respect to transfer was not to be disturbed in the absence of extraordinarily compelling circumstances.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7 Cir.), cert. denied 350 U.S. 822, 76 S. Ct. 49, 100 L. Ed. 735 (1955)