Source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_States_v._Jones_(336_U.S._641)/Opinion_of_the_Court
Timestamp: 2019-09-22 08:10:46
Document Index: 19583189

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 523', '§ 523', '§ 541', '§ 541', '§ 542', '§ 542', '§ 549', '§ 549', '§ 525', '§ 525', '§ 145', '§ 1491', '§ 1491', '§ 549', '§ 549', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 2516', '§ 536', '§ 536', '§ 1001', '§ 1001']

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United States v. Jones (336 U.S. 641)/Opinion of the Court
< United States v. Jones (336 U.S. 641)
United States v. Jones (336 U.S. 641)
904495United States v. Jones (336 U.S. 641) — Opinion of the Court
Argued: Feb. 2-3, 1949. --- Decided: April 18, 1949
Through all these years the carrier and the Commission have been at odds over whether the railroad is entitled to an increase in the rates prescribed for its service for the period beginning April 1, 1931, and ending, as covered by the present suit, February 28, 1938. [1] The case is now here on certiorari to the Court of Claims, 335 U.S. 883, 69 S.Ct. 231, which had rendered a judgment awarding respondent $186,707.06 as increased compensation due for the years 1931 to 1938, Griffin v. United States, 77 F.Supp. 197, 110 Ct.Cl. 330, contrary to the findings and orders of the Commission denying any increase beyond the amounts already paid for that service under the rates fixed by it. Railway Mail Pay, Georgia & Florida R. Co., 192 I.C.C. 779; id., 214 I.C.C. 66.
In 1916 Congress enacted the Railway Mail Pay Act. 39 U.S.C. §§ 523-568, 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 523-568. This embodied a comprehensive scheme for regulating transportation of the mails by railroad common carriers. Such carriers were required to transport the mails pursuant to the Act's provisions. These included that the carriers should be compensated at 'fair and reasonable rates' to be fixed and determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The rates were to be established only after notice and hearing. But after six months from the entry of a rate order the Postmaster General or a carrier was authorized to apply for a reexamination of the order. 39 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, 544-554, 553, 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 541, 542, 544-554, 553.
The Commission was authorized to prescribe 'the method or methods by weight, or space, or both, or otherwise, for ascertaining such rate,' 39 U.S.C. § 542, 39 U.S.C.A. § 542, and for the same purpose 'to make such classification of carriers as may be just and reasonable and, where just and equitable, fix general rates applicable to all carriers in the same classification.' 39 U.S.C. § 549, 39 U.S.C.A. § 549. Other sections specify and define four classes of service, namely, full railway post-office car service, apartment service, § orage-car service and closed-pouch service. 39 U.S.C. §§ 525-530, 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 525-530. [2] Only apartment service and closed-pouch service are involved in this case.
Again the carrier resorted to the District Court, filing a supplemental bill. And again that court, composed of the same three judges, held the Commission's order unlawful in a decree filed on February 23, 1937. The Government appealed directly to this Court, which, in United States v. Griffin, supra, held that the order was not of a type reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. [3] Accordingly, on February 28, 1938, the District Court's judgment was reversed with directions to dismiss the bill and without determination of the cause on the merits.
After nearly four years the receivers renewed the litigation by filing this suit in the Court of Claims. The amended petition sets forth in some detail the history of the previous stages of controversy before the Commission and the courts. The carrier's basic claims on the merits are substantially the same as in those proceedings. They are, in effect, (1) that the Commission's orders denying any increase are confiscatory, in that the rates prescribed by the general rate order on July 10, 1928, and continued in effect specifically as to this carrier by the orders of May 10, 1933, and February 4, 1936, do not afford just compensation under the Fifth Amendment on the ground that they do not provide for payment of the cost of the service rendered plus a reasonable return upon invested capital allocated to that service; and (2) that the Commission's orders do not afford the 'fair and reasonable' compensation required by the Railway Mail Pay Act. [4] Both claims rest upon attacks made on the Commission's findings as b ing unsupported by the evidence before it and on its conclusions as being contrary to that evidence.
To sustain jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, respondent rests upon § 145 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. s 250, now 28 U.S.C. § 1491, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491, and upon statements made in part Fourth of the opinion in United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. at page 238, 58 S.Ct. at page 607, 82 L.Ed. 764. [5]
While the 'negative order' basis for the Court's ruling is no longer effective, Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 59 S.Ct. 754, 83 L.Ed. 1147, the alternative grounding remains in full force. 303 U.S. at page 234, 58 S.Ct. at page 605, 82 L.Ed. 764. [6] Since the very orders now in issue were involved in the Griffin case, it is settled that the railroad or its receivers had no recourse to a district court, under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, for securing review of the Commission's order or relief of the type now sought.
On the other hand, the Court of Claims expressly disclaims that it was exercising any jurisdiction over constitutional matters. This was done in denying the carrier's claim to interest on the award. [7] In the court's view therefore the jurisdiction which it was exerting fell within the first class of cases stated in the Griffin opinion to be within the Court of Claims' jurisdiction, mamely, where the Commission makes the appropriate finding of reasonable compensation but fails, because of an alleged error of law, to order payment of the full amount the carrier believes payable under the finding.
The Government, however, insists that the Court of Claims did not exercise jurisdiction under this category. It disputes that the court 'gave effect,' as the court stated, [8] to the Commission's order or ordered payment of any balance due under the Commission's finding. Rather, the Government urges, the court flouted that order, substituted its own judgment for the Commission's concerning the appropriate order to be entered, and in effect entered a wholly new and different order from that made by the Commission, together with a money judgment giving its own view effect.
If, as the court asserts, it was 'giving effect' to the Commission's order and doing so without substituting its own judgment for the Commission's as to what was a 'fair and reasonable rate,' there should be little difficulty in sustaining the jurisdiction; [9] that is, unless respondent is right in his contention the the Court was caled upon to and, notwithstanding its disclaimer, in fact did adjudicate his claim for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In that event and on the assumption that the award was proper on the merits, reversal would be required in order that the court might make appropriate allowance for interest. [10]
It would be strange, indeed anomalous in the extreme, if this Court by its Griffin pronouncements intended to confer on the Court of Claims, by implication in the cases there held not reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, a broader, more conclusive and final power of judicial review than that Act expressly provided for like orders within its purview. The assumption is hardly tenable that Congress intended such a result when it enacted the Railway Mail Pay Act or the Urgent Deficiencies Act or both. Congress in no instance has expressly empowered the Court of Claims to review rate orders of the Commission, [11] either to set them aside or to render a money judgement for additional amounts found due upon a determination of an order's invalidity. To infer such an intention would be contrary not only in spirit to the limitations Congress has placed upon review of such orders wherever expressly provided, but also to the whole history and practice of Congress in conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims.
Necessarily this restraint reflected the jurisdictional limitations placed upon the court by the Urgent Deficiencies Act. But those limitations themselves reflected another policy, quite apart from and in addition to that giving effect to the constitutional limitations of Article III. [12] The limitations exemplify settled congressional policy concerning the relations of ratemaking bodies and reviewing courts. Not only is rate making essentially legislative in the first instance. The policy of judicial restraint is one having regard for the expertise of special agencies charged with performing the rate-making function and for the inherent actual, as well as legal, disability of courts to execute that function. Such doctrines or policies as those of primary jurisdiction' [13] and exhaustion of administrative remedies [14] lie at the very root of the problem. And this is as true of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, which is not restricted by Article III, as it is of courts so limited. [15]
It is equally significant, we think, that when the three-judge district court twice set aside the Commission's order it did so on grounds substantially similar to those used by the Court of Claims in this case for holding the order invalid. In other words, what the district court did by way of examining the orders on their merits, factual as well as legal, the Court of Claims has done in this case. Indeed, it has gone much further, since it has rendered a money judgment for the carrier covering the period 1931-1938, having the effect in the particular circumstances of a new and final order.
A full understanding of the Commission's orders and of the effects of the action taken regarding them, both by the three-judge district court and by the Court of Claims, can be had only by readling and comparing the reports and opinions. [16] The limitations of space prevent summarizing their content here in substantial detail. But the gist of the controversy between the Commission and the courts may be indicated.
In its first general rate proceeding the Commission classified the nation's carriers, for mail-pay compensation purposes, placing the Georgia & Florida Railroad in Class I. [17] It also decided generally upon the space basis as an appropriate method of determining fair and reasonable compensation. 56 I.C.C. 1.
The problem arose both in the proceedings culminating in the first general rate order, 56 I.C.C. 1, and in those resulting in the general rate increase of 1928. 144 I.C.C. 675. In the latter the initial separation of total operating expenses between freight and passenger services was made on the basis of the Commission's rules governing such separation on large steam railways. Id. at 685-688. But, for determining the cost of service in respect to the further allocation and apportionment of passenger-train service among its three components, the Commission, having determined upon the space basis for this initial stage in fixing 'fair and reasonable rates,' was faced with the problem of what should be done with unused space.
That problem presents the crux of this case, as it did of the Commission's action. In the proceedings leading to the 1928 order, three general plans were given primary consideration for distributing space. They are described in the report last cited. See id. at 681, 689. In general they were alike in allocating full-car [18] space to the service it performed. But they differed widely in allocating unused space in so-called combination cars and mixed cars. [19] Without going into further detail here, suffice it to say that Plan 3 allocated the largest amounts of unused space to passenger and express service and correspondingly the smallest amount to mail service; Plan 2, more nearly approximating the carrier's proposals, worked out in inverse proportions; and Plan 1 lay between the two. See 144 I.C.C. at 681, 689.
The differences in results following from use of the various plans were highly significant, making the difference between net return and net deficit, or deficits of different sizes, depending upon which plan was used. [20] In each plan after the ultimate space ratios were determined by complicated statistical studies, they were applied to total passenger-train service expense to determine expense ratios for the three constituent services. And those expense ratios were also used to apportion investment in road and equipment assigned to passengertrain service.
The Commission rejected Plan 3 because, it said, that plan had departed from the car-operating unit which it had adopted for making space allocations. 144 I.C.C. 689-691. While not specifically eliminating Plan 1 from consideration for purposes of comparison, the Commission primarily rested its allocations of space for purposes of tentative or preliminary apportionment of costs and capital on Plan 2. Id. at 691.
'In connection with the cost studies under any of the plans for dividing the train space, it should be borne in mind that in computations of this character where the direct allocations are relatively small and the great bulk of expenses and investment are necessarily divided, subdivided, apportioned, and reapportioned upon various theories and assumptions, the results can not be accepted as an accurate ascertainment of the costs of service. At best, they are approximations to be given such weight as seems proper in view of all the circumstances under which they have been obtained and the theories underlying the assumptions and the various steps in the computations.' 144 I.C.C. at 691-692. (Emphasis added.)
As in the general rate investigations and for the same reasons, the Division was unwilling to rest exclusively upon the results obtained by the computations under Plan 2, and went on to consider other factors which it deemed relevant in determining the fairness and reasonableness of the rates. It found that of the three component services in passenger-train service, 'the mail service makes the best showing with respect to revenue.' [21] The Division further pointed out that in the period 1929 to 1931, mail revenues had been more stable than revenues from other passenger-train services, passenger service proper having decreased 67 per cent, express service 64 per cent, and mail service 12 per cent. Consideration also was given to the special facts shown relating to use of unused space.
When the cause was returned to the Commission by the Georgia District Court in 1935, the full Commission reopened the proceeding and held a further hearing at which further evidence was received. In remanding the cause the district court had stressed the computed finding under Plan 2 that 'The distribution of expense upon the space ratios shows that the operating ratio for mail service was 102.79' [22] or, as the court added, 'that for every dollar applicants received for transporting mails they expended one dollar and 2.79 cents.' The court then asserted that other considerations taken into account by Division 5 'do not refute or impair the fact that the compensation allowed this railroad for the transportation of mail does not equal the cost of so doing.'
The Commission then again repeated its insistence that cost computed under such a formula as Plan 2 'is a hypothetical cost and not an actual cost,' ibid.; that in other mail-pay proceedings consideration had been given to other factors; [23] and, again taking such factors into account, concluded upon the augmented record that the rates then applicable to the carrier were fair and reasonable. 214 I.C.C. at 70-76.
It is obvious, from the foregoing account, that the basic difference between the Commission and the district court lay in whether the Commission's statistical and mathematical computations under Plan 2 alone should be taken as determinative of costs and thus of fair and reasonable rates [24] or whether those computations were rightly taken by the Commission as merely tentative estimates or approximations, applicable in the initial stage of rate determination, but subject to qualification by comparison with results obtained under other plans and, in the final stage, by consideration of other factors found pertinent in the Commission's judgment.
'Under finding 16 herein, it is shown that the Interstate Commerce Commission found and determined that plaintiff would require an increase in its mail revenue of 87.4% in order to secure for itself, under Plan 2 adopted by the Commission, a return of 5.75% theretofore fixed by the Commission, on its investments in road and equipment engaged in mail traffic. * * * The Commission has, by its use of Plan No. 2, adjudged it to be a fair and reasonable basis. And out of that basis there has been ascertained, by formulae prescribed by the Commission, what is the fair and reasonable compensation for plaintiffs' carriage of the mails beginning the first of April 1931, and ending at the close of February 1938. Fair and reasonable compensation cannot be both a deficit and the amount of $186,707.06 so found. It is, we conclude, the latter.' 77 F.Supp. at page 203, 110 Ct.Cl. at pages 366-367, 369. (Emphasis added.)
In the latter respect the court disregarded not only the general rule which gives administrative determinations in such matters presumptive weight, [25] but also the effect of the statute itself. As has been noted the Railway Mail Pay Act expressly authorized the Commission to classify carriers and 'where just and equitable, fix general rates applicable to all carriers in the same classification.' 39 U.S.C. § 549, 39 U.S.C.A. § 549. While this general authority did not preclude examination of the gene al rate's application to a particular carrier, it gave that rate prima facie validity as to all within the classification. Indeed, contrary to the court's holding that the Commission could not consider rates paid to other carriers or their effects, the statute required the Commission to take those rates into account. Ibid. The burden of proof was therefore clearly upon the carrier to show that the general rate was unfair and unreasonable as applied to it and not, as the court held, upon the Commission to show that that rate as applied was fair and reasonable.
Such a construction is sustained by none of the cases cited in the Griffin opinion to support the statement [26] and is directly contrary to previous decisions by the Court of Claims with reference to its power to review such orders of the Commission. [27] Moreover, to conceive the Griffin statement as sanctioning the broad authority assumed by the court would be, for reasons already stated, to give it by implication a jurisdiction which Congress has never expressly conferred.
The same result would follow if, contrary to the Court of Claims' disclaimer, the suit could be regarded as one for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, as respondent insists it was. For the reasons already stated, respondent has not shown that the Commission's order was confiscatory in its effects. Moreover, jurisdictionally speaking, none of th cases cited by the Griffin opinion to sustain the second category [28] of jurisdiction in the Court of Claims involved any problem of reviewing rate orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. All related to questions of compensation resulting from takings of private property for public use, in which the only questions determined were the value of the property taken or that value coupled with the right to interest on the award. [29] While respondent contends that the effect of the Commission's order here has been to deprive it of its property without just compensation and justifies the Court of Claims' award on that basis, the court did not so ground its decision and, as we have said, respondent has not made out any such case.
However, notwithstanding some obvious difficulties in making district court jurisdiction available for review in such a proceeding as this, [30] that jurisdiction posesses one outstanding advantage over review in the Court of Claims. It is that the district courts are not confined, as is the Court of Claims, to rendering a money judgment by way of relief against the United States. Under their general equity jurisdiction they would have power, on finding a rate order invalid, whether as confiscatory or as not complying with the statute, to remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings. In this respect the review afforded and the relief given would more nearly approximate that given by the Urgent Deficiencies Act in similar cases reviewable under its terms.
Since the Griffin case was decided, Congress has adopted the so-called Administrative Procedure Act, [31] which by § 10, entitled 'Judicial review of agency action,' provides:
'Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review of (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion-
This provision, we think, adds force to the suggestion made in the Griffin case concerning the jurisdiction of the district courts in relation to review of rate orders like those now in question. Such review under the equity or declaratory jurisdiction of those courts would seem to afford a remedy consonant with § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act and also more nearly like that afforded by the Urgent Deficiencies Act, though without its expediting features. The relief afforded, unlike that required in the Court of Claims, could thus be limited to setting aside or enjoining the Commission's order and remanding the cause to it for further consideration, as is done in like cases reviewable by three-judge courts. Consistently with that jurisdiction also the review could be confined to the record made before the Commission [32] rather than one compiled by independent evidence not presented to the Commission or considered by it.
^1 The present receiver, Alfred W. Jones, was substituted as respondent in No. 135 by order of this Court dated December 6, 1948. 335 U.S. 883, 69 S.Ct. 231.
^2 Full railway post-office-car service involves service in which an entire car of specified length and equipment is authorized. Apartment-car service involves authorized use of thirty- or fifteen-foot apartments partitioned off from the remaining portion of the car. Closedpouch service involves handling by railroad employees where full or apartment railway post-office cars are not authorized and where space authorizations are for units of seven feet and three feet in space, unenclosed, on both sides of the car.
^3 See note 6.
^4 The amended petition and the brief assign both grounds. Nevertheless, respondent insists that his case is in fact grounded upon the constitutional basis. Indeed, so strongly does respondent insist upon this point of view that, without challenging the award or its amount, except for the disallowance of interest, he has sought and we granted certiorari in No. 198, in effect to have the judgment of the Court of Claims grounded solely on the Fifth Amendment footing as the basis for establishing his claim of accrued interest. See note 7 infra.
^5 As has been stated, the Court of Claims, accepting jurisdiction, rendered judgment for the respondent for $186,707.06. Its determination was based upon the various reports of the Commission above cited, although evidence was received by the court's commissioner which was not before the Interstate Commerce Commission. He made extensive special findings of fact based in part upon this evidence which were adopted by the court and filed, together with its opinion. 77 F.Supp. 197, 110 Ct.Cl. 330. Both the Government and the respondent applied for certiorari and both petitions were granted. See note 4.
^6 This was in brief that Congress could not be assumed to have made the extraordinary remedy of the Urgent Deficiencies Act applicable to such orders as the one here involved, since 'There is no wide public interest in its speedy determination'; 'no danger of temporarily interrupting the mail service through the improvident issue of an injunction by a single judge'; and 'only the method or amount of payments currently to be made would be affected.'
^7 The opinion, quoting the Court of Claims' language in an earlier railway mail pay case, New York Central R. Co. v. United States, 65 Ct.Cl. 115, 128-129, affirmed United States v. New York Central R. Co., 279 U.S. 73, 49 S.Ct. 260, 73 L.Ed. 619, stated): "We do not think the plaintiff can have judgment for interest on the deferred payments. We are not determining just compensation but are giving effect to an authorized order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In such case the statute forbids the allowance of interest. Sec. 177, Judicial Code, as amended (1948 Revision, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2516)." 77 F.Supp. at page 206, 110 Ct.Cl. at page 373. Cf. notes 10 and 29 infra.
^8 See note 7.
^9 See the cases cited at note 26 infra.
^10 Cf. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142, 96 A.L.R. 1.
^11 See the cases cited at note 27 infra.
^12 Which, among other things, forbid non-District of Columbia courts created pursuant to that Article to exercise legislative functions such as rate making. Cf. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 43 S.Ct. 445, 67 L.Ed. 731; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 47 S.Ct. 284, 71 L.Ed. 478; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S.Ct. 67, 69, 53 L.Ed. 150.
^13 Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553, 9 Ann.Cas. 1075; cf. Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 139, 59 S.Ct. 754, 761, 762, 83 L.Ed. 1147; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638. See 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1251.
^14 United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U.S. 457, 463-464, 54 S.Ct. 471, 473-474, 78 L.Ed. 909; (and cf. concurring opinion, 291 U.S. at page 465, 54 S.Ct. at page 474, 78 L.Ed. 909); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 303 U.S. 41, 50 52, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463-465, 82 L.Ed. 638. See Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale L.J. 981; 44 Mich.L.Rev. 1035.
^15 See the authorities cited at note 27 infra.
^16 The opinions of the three-judge court rendered when this controversy was twice before its are not reported.
^17 Class I included all railroads of more than 100 miles in length. At the general rate hearings the Georgia & Florida Railroad was represented by representatives of another class and seems to have contended that it should be classified with or treated as though it were a member of that class. But no question concerning its classification has been made in the proceedings begun in 1931 or afterward.
^18 See note 2.
^19 Combination cars include space separated by partitions into 'apartments,' cf. note 2, with each apartment devoted exclusively to a different use. Mixed cars contain no partitions or 'apartments,' but are used for several different services, e.g., baggage, express and mailpouch services. See note 2; 144 I.C.C. at 679.
^20 See Railway Mail Pay, 144 I.C.C. at 688-689. Plan 3, the Commission said in that general rate proceeding, would result in a 'net railway operating income from mail of $18,759,056 instead of a deficit of $1,104,744 under plan 2, and a net income of $12,844,643 under plan 1,' id. at 689, giving a net return under Plan 3 of 5.94 per cent but requiring an increased rate of 26.48 per cent under Plan 2 and of 7.43 per cent under Plan 1 to meet the computed deficits and give a net return of 5.7 per cent on the invested capital allocated to mail.
^21 The report continued: 'The total mail revenue of $35,728 for the year 1931 on a space ratio of 12.96 was only $594 less than the total revenue from passenger service proper, including baggage, and miscellaneous service, with a space ratio of 80.35 * * *. The distribution of expense upon the space ratios shows that the operating ratio for mail service was 102.79 as compared with 630.41 for passenger proper, including baggage, etc., and 249.67 for express.' 192 I.C.C. at 781-782.
^22 See note 21.
^23 'In other mail-pay proceedings, in which space authorized and paid for was found to be the space that should be charged to mail in cost studies similar to that here, consideration was given to other factors as well, such as the amount and character of the unused space reported as operated, Railway Mail Pay, 85 I.C.C. 157, 170, 123 I.C.C. 33, 39; the actual space occupied by mail, as distinguished from authorized space, determined by the mail load, carried, based upon a count of bags and of packages outside of bags, and, in some instances, by the weight, Railway Mail Pay, 95 I.C.C. 493, 500, 511, 120 I.C.C. 439, 446; comparisons with compensation received from other services in passenger-train cars, Railway Mail Pay, 144 I.C.C. 675, 706; comparisons with freight rates, Railway Mail Pay, 144 I.C.C. 675, 705, 151 I.C.C. 734, 742; comparisons per car-mile and per car-foot mile of the computed cost of mail service and the revenue from authorized mail service with the computed cost of corresponding units in passenger-train service as a whole, Railway Mail Pay, 144 I.C.C. 675, 699; and the character of the service performed in connection with transporting the mail, Railway Mail Pay, 56 I.C.C. 1, 8, Electric Railway Mail Pay, 58 I.C.C. 455, 464, 98 I.C.C. 737, 755.' 214 I.C.C. at 69-70.
^24 It is to be recalled that the expense ratios based upon the space ratios accepted under Plan 2 were applied also to capital allocated to passenger-train service to apportion that capital among the three component services making up passenger-train service.
^25 See, e.g., Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177, 184-185, 59 S.Ct. 160, 164-165, 83 L.Ed. 111. Cf. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 568-569, 64 S.Ct. 747, 749-750, 88 L.Ed. 430.
^26 Cited in the text, 303 U.S. at page 238, 58 S.Ct. at page 607, 82 L.Ed. 764, were Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 603, 46 S.Ct. 598, 70 L.Ed. 1109, upholding the Court of Claims' view on demurrer that Congress, in enacting 39 U.S.C. § 536, 39 U.S.C.A. § 536, not only intended to but had power to provide that land-grant railroads were to receive only 80% of whatever mail pay rate the Commission should set not only for mere transportation of mail (e.g., closed-pouch space) but for space in which postal employees sorted mail (e.g., apartment mail-cars), and United States v. New York Central R. Co., 279 U.S. 73, 49 S.Ct. 260, 73 L.Ed. 619, affirming the Court of Claims' conclusion that the Commission had power to make mail rate revisions applicable as of the date of the carrier's request for reexamination of rates rather than as of the date of the Commission order raising the rate.
^27 In Pere Marquette R. Co. v. United States, 59 Ct.Cl. 538, the carrier sought compensation for mail car space furnished by the carrier where that space was neither authorized by the Post Office Department nor in fact used for mail transportation, and where the Commission had not ordered compensation; the Court of Claims said, Id., 59 Ct.Cl. at page 545, in dismissing the petition:
^28 'And since railway mail service is compulsory, the Court of Claims would, under the general provisions of the Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505, have jurisdiction also of an action for additional compensation if an order is confiscatory. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 5 S.Ct. 306, 28 L.Ed. 846; North American Transportation & Trading Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 330, 333, 40 S.Ct. 518, 64 L.Ed. 935; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16, 54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142, 96 A.L.R. 1.' 303 U.S. at page 238, 58 S.Ct. at page 607, 82 L.Ed. 764.
^29 As to interest compare the Great Falls case with the Jacobs case, both cited in note 28.
^30 Our attention has not been called to attacks on railway mail rate orders based on this grant of jurisdiction; but it may be noted that district court suits to enjoin the Postmaster General's fraud orders are commonplace. See, e.g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 492, n. 2, 68 S.Ct. 188, 189.
^31 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1011.
^32 See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 444, n. 50 S.Ct. 220, 226, 74 L.Ed. 524. Cf. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1014, 87 L.Ed. 1344; Shields v. Utah, Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177, 185, 59 S.Ct. 160, 164, 165, 83 L.Ed. 111.
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