Source: http://docplayer.net/14932735-Ausgrid-network-pricing-proposal-for-the-financial-year-ending-june-2013-may-2012.html
Timestamp: 2019-03-25 05:49:05
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Matched Legal Cases: ['ART 1', 'ART 2', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2']

Ausgrid Network Pricing Proposal For the Financial Year Ending June May PDF
Ausgrid Network Pricing Proposal For the Financial Year Ending June May 2012
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1 Ausgrid Network Pricing Proposal For the Financial Year Ending June 2013 May 2012
2 Table of Contents PART 1 APPROACH TO PRICE SETTING 1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW BACKGROUND PRICING METHODOLOGY SMART GRID SMART CITY INITIATIVE GLOSSARY PART 2 DEMONSTRATING COMPLIANCE 1. OVERVIEW AND OUTLINE NETWORK TARIFF CLASSES PROPOSED TARIFFS AND CHARGING PARAMETERS WEIGHTED AVERAGE REVENUE VARIATIONS TO TARIFFS CLIMATE CHANGE FUND TRANSMISSION USE OF SYSTEM SERVICES CHANGES FROM THE PREVIOUS REGULATORY YEAR PUBLIC LIGHTING SERVICE PROPOSED NEW NETWORK TARIFFS REASONABLE ESTIMATES ATTACHMENTS Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 2
3 Ausgrid FY13 Network Pricing Proposal Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 3
4 1. Introduction and Overview Introduction Ausgrid s transmission and distribution services are subject to price regulation. The AER makes a five yearly determination, which sets a limit on the increase in distribution and transmission prices (X-factors) that can be applied by Ausgrid. The price limit is based on providing Ausgrid with a revenue requirement that is sufficient to recover efficient capital and operating costs. On 30 April 2009 the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) made a determination on the X-factors to apply to Ausgrid s distribution and transmission services for the regulatory period. Subsequent to this decision, Ausgrid (and the other two NSW distribution network businesses Endeavour and Essential Energy) sought review of elements of the AER s determination. On 25 November 2009, the Australian Competition Tribunal varied the AER Determination by increasing the nominal vanilla WACC (that is, the rate of return on investments) from 8.78% to 10.02%. The Australian Competition Tribunal also increased Ausgrid s operating expenditure allowance by $4.5 million. The Tribunal s determination varied the X- factors to apply to Ausgrid s distribution and transmission services for the last four years of the regulatory period, from that which was published by the AER in its April 2009 determination. The amended X-factors are set out below: Table 1: Ausgrid s Annual X Factor For Regulatory Period FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 Forecast CPI 2.47% 2.47% 2.47% 2.47% 2.47% Distribution 17.86% 18.18% 18.18% 18.18% 0.77 Transmission 7.77% 18.46% 18.46% 18.46% In addition to its decision on the X-factors to apply to distribution and transmission services, the AER must also make a decision on the price control to apply to public lighting services. Ausgrid sought review of the AER s decision of April As a result of this review, the Australian Competition Tribunal remitted the decision back to the AER for re-determination. The AER s re-determination for Ausgrid s public lighting services was published on 15 April 2010, and is discussed in Chapter 7 of Part 1 and the customer bill information and proposed prices for public lighting services are provided in Attachment B and C, respectively. As a result of the new overall X factor increases for distribution prices and transmission charges in FY13 and the contribution to the NSW State Government s Climate Change Fund, the total impact on the overall network component of the annual electricity bill for customers on the inclining block tariffs (IBT) in FY13 is summarised below: a typical domestic customer 1 on IBT is estimated to receive a nominal bill increase of $2.93 per week in FY13. a typical small business customer 2 on IBT is estimated to receive a nominal bill increase of $7.24 per week in FY13. 1 For an average domestic customer on the inclining block tariff who consumes 5,300 kwh per annum, and does not have controlled load hot water. Increase excludes GST. Retail related cost increases not included. 4
5 Document structure This document is Ausgrid s Pricing Proposal for FY13. 3 It sets out how we propose to set network tariffs in FY13 to recover the efficient cost of owning, operating, maintaining and investing in the distribution and transmission networks. This document also provides external stakeholders with the proposed prices for Ausgrid s alternative control (public lighting) services for FY13. This proposal is submitted for review and approval by the AER as required by clause 6.8.2(a)(1) of the transitional chapter 6 of the National Electricity Rules (the Rules). The proposal is split in two parts: Part 1 outlines Ausgrid s method and strategy in setting network prices. It is written with customers and other interested parties in mind, to assist in understanding how network tariffs are calculated. Part 2 is more technical in nature as it has been written specifically to demonstrate that Ausgrid s proposed network prices for FY13 comply with the obligations of the Rules. It also contains a discussion on Ausgrid s public lighting prices for FY13. Part 2 is structured to allow ready assessment of compliance by the AER. While every attempt has been made to write Part 1 of this document in a style easily understood by external stakeholders that are not familiar with network pricing and regulatory concepts, it has been necessary to introduce the reader to some technical terms. To assist in understanding these technical terms, a comprehensive glossary section has been added to the end of Part 1. 2 For an average small business customer on the inclining block tariff who consumes 11,000 kwh per annum. Increase excludes GST. Retail related cost increases not included. 3 Note that Ausgrid is the new brand name for the network business of EnergyAustralia. The EnergyAustralia brand was acquired by TruEnergy as part of the sale of the retail business to TruEnergy in
6 2. Background This section aims to provide an understanding of the historical context of Ausgrid s network prices for FY13 by discussing the progress made in reforming network tariffs over the past five years, the recent regulatory decisions by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) for distribution and transmission network revenue and prices, and variations to this decision ordered by the Australian Competition Tribunal. Ausgrid s distribution and transmission services are subject to price regulation by the AER under the Rules known as the Transitional Chapter 6 Rules. The Rules apply for the regulatory period and are set out in Appendix 1 of Chapter 11 of the National Electricity Rules made under the National Electricity Law. On a five yearly basis, the AER makes a determination which sets a limit on the price increases that we can charge customers (referred to as an X-factor for each year). The X-factors enable Ausgrid to recover an annual revenue requirement. The revenue requirement is based on the AER s appraisal of the efficient costs faced by Ausgrid for the five year period. As discussed below, distribution and transmission services are subject to different types of price control, and each have a set of X-factors. Weighted Average Price Cap (WAPC) Ausgrid s distribution prices are governed by a Weighted Average Price Cap (WAPC). The WAPC is a price cap where a limit is applied to the annual movement in distribution prices. The limit applied under either a revenue or price cap is referred to as the X factor and could be positive (price or revenue reduction) or negative (price or revenue increase), refer to Section 3 of Part 1 of this document for a more detailed explanation of the WAPC constraint. Under the WAPC, distributors need to ensure that their distribution charges are as cost reflective as possible. Otherwise, distribution prices may not generate sufficient revenue to cover the efficient cost of distribution service provision in the event of unanticipated growth in peak demand for network capacity, which drives the need for additional investment in network augmentation. By improving the efficiency of network tariffs, customers are likely to better understand the economic cost of their network use. To the extent that customers do not value their network use more than the economic cost, customers will respond by changing their network use to eliminate this economic waste. According to economic theory, this type of customer response promotes the optimal allocation of society s scarce resources. One consequence of the WAPC is that Ausgrid is exposed to distribution revenue risk arising from unanticipated variations in electricity consumption, which is discussed in more detail below. Revenue Cap Ausgrid s transmission service prices are governed by a revenue cap. A revenue cap limits the amount of revenue that can be earned each regulatory year. This form of regulation provides Ausgrid with certainty that actual transmission costs incurred will be recovered from network customers, as any under (over) recovery of these transmission costs in a given year is allowed to be recovered in the following year (plus interest accrued) by adjusting transmission use of system charges in the subsequent period. Electricity Consumption Trends Every five years, the AER uses the distributor s forecast electricity volumes for the subsequent five year regulatory period to convert the allowable distribution revenue into a five year distribution price path. This in turn is used to calculate the cap on distribution price movements at each 1 July price reset (Table 1). The AER approves the forecasts and therefore plays a critical role in determining the level of risk faced by Ausgrid in earning its allowable distribution revenue over the five year regulatory period in question. Importantly, Ausgrid is not only exposed to forecast volume risk at the time the X factors are set (every five years), but volume risk also arises from annual variation in electricity consumption volume due to such factors as unexpected weather, the take up of appliances such as air conditioners, or factors such as an economic downturn. This volume risk translates into a distribution revenue risk because network prices are set on an annual basis, using the predetermined X factors, based on the most recent complete financial year of consumption. For example, the WAPC governing the setting of distribution Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 6
7 tariffs in FY13 is based on the audited volumes for FY11. In simple terms, this means that if actual consumption in FY13 is lower than the audited consumption in FY11, it is likely that distribution revenue in FY13 will fall short of expectations. A summary of the differences between the overall forecast volumes used to set the X factor in the AER determination and a feasible range of forecasts based on more recent data is shown in the figure below. 31,000 30, IPART Forecast 2008 Forecast (AER Submission) GWh 29,000 28,000 27,000 26,000 25,000 24,000 Light grey lines represent annual forecasts prepared in 2003 to 2007 Actual Sales Weather-corrected sales Jan 2009 Forecast (Revised Proposal) AER Forecast 2010 Forecast 2011 Forecast Latest 2012 Forecast The future uncertainty in Ausgrid s volume environment reflected in Figure 1 above highlights the need for Ausgrid to continue to improve the cost reflectivity of network tariffs. It also highlights the importance of continued research into the underlying drivers of the electricity consumption behavior of households and business in Ausgrid s network area. AER Final Decision (pre-tribunal) As discussed above, Ausgrid s distribution revenue and price paths are regulated by the AER. These are reviewed every five years. The most recent regulatory review concluded in April 2009, when the AER released its final determination for distribution and transmission. Ausgrid sought review from the Australian Competition Tribunal on elements of the AER s 2009 final determination, as set out below. Tribunal Outcome On 25 November 2009 the Australian Competition Tribunal made orders varying the AER s distribution determination for which included: determining the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) to be based on an August September 2009 averaging period for the 10-year bond rates. This results in increasing the nominal vanilla WACC for Ausgrid to per cent (from 8.78 per cent). increasing the controllable operating expenditure allowance for Ausgrid by $4.5 million to $2,582 million (in 2008/9 year dollars) The Tribunal s determination varied the X factors to apply to Ausgrid s distribution and transmission services for the last four years of the regulatory period. The X factors for Ausgrid s distribution and transmission services during the regulatory period are set out below, in addition to the respective annual revenue requirements. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 7
8 Table 2: Australian Competition Tribunal Outcome for Ausgrid Ausgrid FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 Distribution X factors % % % % 0.77% Transmission X factors Annual revenue requirement (distribution) nominal $m Annual revenue requirement (transmission) nominal $m -7.77% % % % -2.02% 1, , , , , Public Lighting Services Ausgrid s public lighting services regulated by the AER through a price control mechanism that is separate to that for distribution services. It is reviewed every five years alongside the review of the distribution price control. The most recent regulatory review concluded in April 2009, when the AER released its final determination for distribution and transmission. On 25 November 2009 the Australian Competition Tribunal made orders varying the AER s distribution determination for public lighting charges over to , which included: determining the appropriate cost of capital to be consistent with that for distribution services. remitting the public lighting decision back to the AER for it to remake its decision in relation to the efficient public lighting operating expenditure and correct any errors it identified. requiring the AER to review its decision on Ausgrid s public lighting asset value. On 15 April 2010, the AER completed its review of public lighting prices and revenues. The AER s determination is on its website and chapter 9 provides an overview of the prices and charges that will result from that determination. TransGrid Ausgrid s network prices not only recover the efficient cost of operating, maintaining and augmenting Ausgrid s distribution and transmission assets, but they also include recovery for a portion of TransGrid s transmission costs. TransGrid is the owner, operator and manager of the NSW high voltage network, connecting generators, distributors and major end users in New South Wales. TransGrid's network comprises of almost 12,500 kilometres of high voltage transmission line and underground cables up to a voltage of 500kV. It also has six interconnectors to Victoria and Queensland s transmission network. 60 percent of NSW energy is generated west of the Great Dividing Range and it must be delivered to the east coast, where most of the state's load is located. The Sydney, Wollongong and Newcastle areas consume 75 percent of the state s energy. TransGrid also received a five-year revenue determination from the AER in April TransGrid operates under a revenue cap, which provides more revenue certainty than the price cap governing Ausgrid s distribution prices. TransGrid also sought review of elements of the AER s determination, and as a consequence the Australian Competition Tribunal decided to vary the maximum allowed revenue (MAR) that was set out in the AER s April 2009 determination for TransGrid. The smoothed MAR for TransGrid is set out below. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 8
9 Table 3: Australian Competition Tribunal Outcome for TransGrid $ million FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 TransGrid Maximum Allowed Revenue Some of the reasons for the recent significant increases in TransGrid s revenue recovery are as follows: increases in the regulated revenue caps for NSW transmission businesses for the next pricing period; a continuing fall in the value of National Electricity Market trading residues returned to customers as a reduction in transmission charges; and any pass through adjustments that have been approved by the AER. In July 2010 TransGrid significantly rebalanced its transmission charges by removing the peak and shoulder energy prices and more than doubling the demand charge. Given the significance of this rebalancing of TransGrid s transmission charges, Ausgrid has decided to transition its transmission tariffs to cost reflective levels over a reasonable period where required to avoid imposing unacceptable price shocks on individual customers in the remaining years of the regulatory period. Solar Bonus Scheme The NSW Government introduced the Solar Bonus scheme (SBS) in January 2010 to encourage small-scale generation in NSW, such as a solar photovoltaic (PV) system or wind turbine. Under the SBS, eligible participants 4 in this scheme are paid for the electricity generated. This scheme is closed to new connections. The network pricing arrangements associated with participation in this scheme is explained in Part 2 of this document. General Overview The revenue stream for the Ausgrid network business is derived from our customer base in the proportions shown in Figures 2a and 2b. 4 Customers using less than 160 MWh pa with a smallscale generation unit of a maximum capacity of 10 kilowatts. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 9
10 Figure 2a: FY13 Expected Revenue by Customer Segment Figure 2b: FY11 Actual Energy Consumption by Customer Segment As can be seen from the above figures, Ausgrid s largest customers on a Cost Reflective Network Price (CRNP) tariff represent 20% of energy volumes but contribute only 4% of revenues. Conversely, domestic customers consume 30% of the total energy volumes, but account for 42% of revenue. This is reflective of the amount of assets required to service these customers. For instance, large customers, though they use large volumes, are connected high up in the distribution network, whereas smaller Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 10
11 customers use the electricity network all the way down to their LV connection. Therefore the cost reflective price is therefore higher for low voltage connected customers, compared to the cost reflective price for customers connected at either the high voltage or subtransmission voltage level. Finally, Ausgrid s network revenue is comprised of a number of components, as summarised in the following figure: Figure 3: FY13 Expected Revenue by Revenue Source As shown above, the cost of owning, operating, maintaining and investing in the distribution network is the largest component of annual network revenue accounting for around 77%. Included in the distribution revenue are earnings derived from a range of ancillary activities, such as extra meter readings, new connections, answering conveyancing enquires etc. This accounts for approximately 1% of distribution revenue. The second largest component is the recovery of the cost of transmission network services 5, which accounts for around 19% of annual network revenue. Ausgrid is also required to make a contribution to the NSW Government Climate Change Fund, which is used to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy technology. This contribution accounts for only 4% of annual network revenue. 5 The transmission network connects large generators together, and transports the energy they produce to distributors. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 11
12 3. Pricing Methodology The following discussion outlines how Ausgrid sets network charges, by providing an understanding of the four basic steps in setting of network tariffs, as summarised below: Set network tariffs in accordance with the above steps and in compliance with price limits and the weighted average price cap imposed by AER. Identify a range of objectives for network tariffs to achieve. Develop pricing strategies that aim to achieve these objectives in a manner that strikes an appropriate balance between financial, economic and equity considerations. Establish an equitable amount of revenue to recover from each tariff class based on the users pay principle. Pricing Objectives The network prices are set each year to achieve a range of economic and noneconomic objectives, as summarised in the following table. Table 4: Ausgrid s Network Pricing Objectives Objective Achieve economic efficiency by providing customers with prices reflective of economic cost Achieve regulatory outcomes Description/Principle Efficient network tariffs signal to retailers the economic cost of providing network capacity to end-customers at different times. Network tariffs will be set in accordance with the National Electricity Rules and the AER Determination. This means that distribution prices should, depending on volume considerations, generate revenues that cover the efficient cost of owning, maintaining, operating and augmenting the network. Satisfy customers Comprehensible Network tariffs should be designed to: Be as simple as possible so that customers are able to understand the bill implications of usage decisions. Equitable Result in customers connected at the same level of the network with similar usage patterns receiving similar network charges. Certainty Provide certainty of price movements, which in practice means that in some situations distribution prices need to be transitioned to desired levels to avoid imposing unacceptable price shocks on customers. Equitable recovery of common network costs Allocate common costs of network service provision to tariff classes on the basis of user pays principle to ensure that prices lie between avoidable and standalone cost. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 12
13 The pricing objectives identified in the above table are discussed in more detail below: Achieve economic efficiency Ausgrid believes that it is important that network tariffs provide customers with price signals reflective of the economic cost of network service provision. This approach to setting network tariffs ensures that customers make economically rational decisions about their network use. A key strategy for achieving economic efficiency is to set prices for the use of the electricity distribution network during periods when the network is more likely to be congested reflective of marginal cost. This approach ensures that customers are informed of the economic cost of their network use and are more likely to make economically rational decisions in relation to changing their behaviour or investing in more energy efficient household appliances. While some customers may place a high value on their peak network use and, therefore, be willing to pay the higher price of network use during peak periods, other customers are more likely to respond to these peak price signals by minimising their use of network during periods of network congestion, which is likely to contribute to a reduction in peak demand and consequently less need to invest in network peak capacity. A full discussion on economic network pricing concepts is found in Part 2 of this document. Achieve regulatory outcomes To ensure the long-term viability of the network, regulators establish the annual revenue requirement of the distribution business by considering the efficient costs of owning, operating, maintaining and investing in the network over the regulatory period. This distribution revenue requirement is translated into X factors that cap the movement in weighted average price in each year of the regulatory period. This type of price control is referred to as a price cap. 6 Under a price cap, the distributor is exposed to the risk that its tariffs will not generate sufficient distribution revenue to cover the efficient cost of owning, operating, maintaining and augmenting its distribution network. Therefore, an important aspect of the network price setting process is to develop strategies to 6 Unlike distribution, the recovery of transmission costs is governed by an overs and unders account ie revenue cap. deliver regulatory outcome in a manner that does not expose the business to unacceptable levels of risk that distribution revenue will not be recovered. In an economic and volume environment of considerable uncertainty, this represents a significant challenge as it is important that revenue risk mitigation is achieved without compromising other pricing objectives, such as equity and efficiency. Make prices comprehensible Ideally, all customers should be able to understand how prices are determined and how their bills are calculated. Unfortunately, simplicity is not always consistent with achieving other goals. Developing prices which are as equitable as possible, which encourage economic behaviour and which ensure the right return on investment would lead to quite complex price structures. How the actual prices are calculated for each charging parameter (eg network access charge) is also similarly complicated given the competing objectives underpinning the price setting process. A major aim of this document is to provide a broad understanding of the process used to develop network prices. More complex network prices have tended to apply to larger customers such as businesses, while domestic and small business customers who comprise over 90% of the total customer base - have had fairly simple price structures. However, to continue to provide small customers with a highly averaged pricing signal is not desirable on economic and equity grounds. Over the remainder of the regulatory period, Ausgrid will focus on exploring a range of reform options that aim to lay the foundation for more cost reflective pricing signals for all network customers. The challenge will be to develop pricing structures that are not only more cost reflective, but are also able to be understood by retailers and their endcustomers. Provide certainty over future price trends It is not desirable to make unexpected changes to the structure and level of network charges as this is likely to undermine the willingness of customers to make permanent changes in their network use, such as investing in more energy efficient appliances. Changes to the structure of tariffs creates uncertainty over the extent to which these changes result in lower network bills in the future. It is for this reason that Ausgrid is committed to providing external stakeholders with as much certainty as possible over the future direction Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 13
14 of network prices. This commitment takes many forms, such as publishing the pricing proposal and statement of expected price trends, stakeholder engagement and consultation that aim to provide interested parties with an understanding of Ausgrid s approach to setting network tariffs and potential tariff reform options being investigated. This commitment also directly influences the setting of network tariffs to ensure that prices are transitioned to cost reflective levels, where necessary to avoid imposing unexpected price shocks on customers. Ausgrid is confident that this approach will realise the benefits of more efficient prices without raising undue equity concerns. Make prices equitable for all customers Ausgrid seeks to ensure that network prices are equitable as well as economically efficient. This concept of equity means that two customers with similar network usage patterns located next door to each other should expect to be charged on the same basis, customers whose location or consumption pattern cost the DNSP more to service should expect to pay a greater cost. Equitable recovery of common network costs Ausgrid believes that the allocation of common network costs to individual tariff classes on the basis of the user pays principle is the most equitable approach to establishing how much distribution revenue to recover from each tariff class. In recent years, Ausgrid has been refining its cost allocation approach so that the amount of distribution revenue recovered from a particular tariff class is as close as possible to the cost incurred by Ausgrid to provide network service to these customers. This approach will also ensure that distribution prices are likely to lie between avoidable and standalone cost, as required by the National Electricity Rules (as discussed in detail in Part 2 of this document). This is important as it means that the network tariff setting process will not result in economic subsidies between tariff classes. While it is desirable in theory to set network tariffs that achieve perfect cost reflectivity at the tariff class level, in practice such an approach would result in unnecessary pricing uncertainty given that the cost allocation process is influenced by relative volume movements. In practice, it is preferable to balance the competing needs of price path certainty and the user pays principle by transitioning tariffs to cost reflective levels over a reasonable time period. For example, Ausgrid has adopted transitional network pricing arrangements to avoid imposing unacceptable bill impacts on customers from directly passing through TransGrid s transmission charges in FY13. 7 Overview of network pricing strategies Ausgrid has been at the forefront of network pricing in Australia with the introduction of a wide range of tariff reforms over the past five years, such as the introduction of ToU pricing to a large number of small business and domestic customers; increases in peak energy and peak capacity charges toward economic cost, simplification of capacity charge to be on a rolling twelve month window, rather than on a fixed 24 month window with a complex reset arrangement, and the introduction of capacity charges for business customers who consume as little as 40 MWh per year. The following table provides a high-level description of the pricing strategies that promote the achievement of one or more of the pricing objectives discussed above. 7 Note that TransGrid significantly reformed the structure of transmission charges in FY11 by removing the peak and shoulder energy charges and increasing demand charges by around 150%. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 14
15 Table 5: Summary of Ausgrid s Network Tariff Strategy Objective Achieve economic efficiency by providing customers with prices reflective of economic cost Achieve regulatory entitlements Strategy/Comment Network tariffs have been designed to reflect economic cost to the extent possible given existing tariff structures and metering constraints. Ausgrid is also committed to investigating more cost reflective forms of network pricing, such as dynamic tariffs and more innovative approaches to signalling economic cost, such as dynamic rebates and to increasing the number of customers on more cost reflective network tariffs, where it is economically and socially desirable to do so. It is for this reason that Ausgrid proposes to re-assign a significant number of customers to a more cost reflective network tariff in FY13 given their consumption and metering functionality. Network tariffs have been developed in accordance with the Weighted Average Price Cap constraint and price limits and the pricing principles set out in the National Electricity Rules (refer to Part 2 of this document). As a result of increased uncertainty about future volume movements, greater emphasis has been placed on increasing fixed and capacity charges where this is economically justified and socially desirable to do so. Satisfy customers Comprehensible Ausgrid is committed to simplifying the network tariffs where appropriate. Fairness Stable Equitable recovery of common network costs Ausgrid is committed to developing network tariffs and assigning customers to network tariffs on a nondiscriminatory basis (refer to Attachment G). Ausgrid is committed to provide retailers and endcustomers with certainty over the direction of network prices through publishing pricing documents, the retailer s forum and through the establishment of transitional price path arrangements to cost reflective levels. Ausgrid is committed to improving its allocation of network costs to individual tariff classes to ensure that the amount of distribution revenue recovered from customers in a particular tariff class is as close as possible to the costs that Ausgrid incurs on these customers behalf. Ausgrid believes that it is important to provide external stakeholders with an understanding of not only the basis of the proposed network prices for FY13, but also the potential medium to longer term direction of Ausgrid s network prices. In this way, retailers and other interested parties will be better aware of the potential reforms to network tariff structures and weightings between charging parameters. The following discussion provides an understanding of the key pricing initiatives that are most likely to influence the future direction of Ausgrid s network prices: Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 15
16 Ausgrid s Time of Use (ToU) electricity pricing program Ausgrid has been at the forefront of Time of Use (ToU) metering and pricing innovation in Australia since 2004 with its ToU program, as summarised below: Disc meters at the majority of medium sized customer premises (in the consumption range of MWh per annum) have been replaced by interval meters. This meter replacement program has reached completion; Most customers with interval meters have been transferred to ToU prices; and All new and upgraded customer connections receive an interval meter. This includes new domestic dwellings as well as businesses. The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), in its 2004 Determinations, facilitated this ToU program by allowing expenditure for meter replacement and modifying the pricing side constraints to allow ToU prices to be mandated. Ausgrid has rolled out interval meters to around 420,000 customers. Compliance with regulatory constraints The AER s Determination specifies a Weighted Average Price Cap (WAPC) control mechanism for standard (distribution) control services. The WAPC limits price movements over the regulatory period, so that the business receives revenue gains or losses depending if volumes rise or fall. The WAPC works by weighting each proposed price by its historic volumes, and dividing this result by existing prices weighted by the same historic volumes. This weighted average price increase is limited to a combination of CPI, X factor and D factor for that year: Weighted Average Price Constraint The weighted average price cap formula is defined below: Proposed new tariff trial during Regulatory Period Ausgrid is planning to build on the results of the Strategic Pricing Study by launching a new tariff trial during the current regulatory period. The trial will examine a kw-based network tariff as a method of achieving demand response. As with any innovative tariff structure, an important part of this trial will be to better understand the acceptability of kwbased price signals to end-customers (and retailers). Ausgrid is also testing a comprehensive range of innovative tariffs as part of the Smart Grid Smart City initiative (refer to Chapter 6 of Part 1 of this document for more information on this initiative). Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 16
17 Figure 4: Weighted Average Price Cap (WAPC) Formula For FY13, the change in CPI is 3.39%, the allowed X-factor is 18.18% and the D-factor is -0.20%. Distribution prices are therefore allowed to increase on a weighted average basis by 21.94% for FY13. Refer to Part 2 of this document for a comparison of the overall WAPC constraint and the weighted average distribution price increase for FY12. Price Limits In addition to the weighted average price constraint, increases to Ausgrid s distribution prices are also constrained by price limits that apply to each tariff class, rather than on an individual tariff basis. Specifically, the National Electricity Rules require that the expected weighted average distribution revenue to be raised from a tariff class must not exceed the overall CPI+X constraint plus 2%. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 17
18 4. Smart Grid Smart City Initiative Overview Following a successful bid for the Australian Government s Smart Grid, Smart City project (SGSC), Ausgrid is well underway on the project that will keep Australia at the forefront of energy technology and lead to ground breaking changes to the country s energy industry. The Smart Grid, Smart City project entails the development of Australia s first commercialscale smart grid in New South Wales, in a demonstration project that will help identify technical and economic opportunities and challenges in implementing a new generation of innovative electricity distribution technology. The focus of the trial is Newcastle, with initiatives also taking place in Newington, Sydney s CBD, Ku-ring-gai and Scone. This initiative will gather robust information about the costs and benefits of smart grids to inform future decisions by government, electricity providers, technology suppliers and consumers across Australia. A smart grid is a new type of electricity network that uses advanced communication, sensing and metering that more efficiently manages electricity supply and demand. Smart grids give households the ability to better manage their energy use by providing information about how much energy is being used and the estimated costs. Smart Grid, Smart City will also trial distributed generation and storage which can provide extra electricity to the power supply during peak periods. The Ausgrid consortium testing the smart grid technologies and ensuring their suitability for Australian conditions includes IBM Australia, GE Energy, Grid Net, Hunter Water, Sydney Water and Newcastle City Council. Customer Applications The Smart Grid, Smart City project involves a large trial of Customer Applications - technology and tariff related products for residential consumers. The project is currently planning for commercial deployment of the following categories of Customer Applications: 1. Information feedback devices (without tariffs). 2. Community education programs eg. Residential energy audits. 3. Enhanced Retail Bill Payment options. 4. Rebates from Networks and/or Retailers to reward demand management activities by consumers i.e. energy saving/shifting efforts. 5. Engineering solutions such as Air Conditioner cycling. 6. Innovative tariffs that involve a Network and Retail component. 8 In keeping with common practice in the NEM, it is expected that each retail tariff structure in item 6 will be based on the underlying network tariff structure, i.e. have the same general input from electricity Retailers to devise innovative tariff structures. Each tariff aims to deliver benefits in at least one of the following categories, with no negative impacts in the others: Consumers through enhanced visibility of their energy use and likely costs, and a wider range of bill savings and payment options. The Environment through reduction in energy usage. Networks through directing consumer s energy usage away from network peaks. Retailers through directing consumers energy usage away from periods of high wholesale costs. The development of new tariffs is also limited by available technology. For example, while Real Time Pricing (RTP) has theoretical merit, the outcome of discussions with project stakeholders prioritised tariffs which are closer to having the requisite technologies in place. The Smart Grid, Smart City project is mindful of the need to ensure suitable customer protection strategies are in place during the trial. Elements of the trial designed to ensure this are: All Smart Grid, Smart City tariffs are voluntary and Retail contracts will include without-penalty exit clauses. 8 This item is of relevance to Ausgrid s FY12 Pricing Proposal. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 18
19 Providing a high standard of information to consumers to allow them to choose and benefit. The Smart Grid, Smart City project has committed to working with community groups representing the interests of customers who may experience hardship due to current or future energy costs. Tariff Design Principles The design of the Smart Grid, Smart City network tariffs has been informed by local and international thinking on efficient and costreflective tariff structures that have potential to deliver the previously noted benefits to customers, the environment, Networks and Retailers. Operation of the Pricing Trial Although Smart Grid, Smart City Customer Applications trial arrangements are not finalised, it is envisaged that: 1 Retailers will market innovative Retail tariffs to customers in the trial area. As the innovative tariffs require timebased metering, all customers taking up an offer will have a smart meter installed. 2 The Retailers will inform Ausgrid as to which customers took up which Smart Grid, Smart City Retail tariff product. Ausgrid will from that point charge the corresponding Network Tariff and the Retailer will commence billing the new Retail tariff. 3 Ausgrid will return each site to a non- Smart Grid, Smart City Network Tariff when the customer exits their Smart Grid, Smart City Retail tariff, for example, at the end of the trial period. Undercharging of Smart Grid, Smart City tariffs required due to AER approval limitations The Smart Grid, Smart City project timeline does not permit Ausgrid to finalise Network Prices in time for this pricing proposal. Given that the AER advised Ausgrid in its letter of 3 June 2011 that the AER does not have power to approve tariff variations during the course of the regulatory year, Ausgrid has formed the following intention: 1 Submit the Smart Grid, Smart City prices for approval. 2 Finalise product design and hence pricing arrangements with Retailers after Ausgrid s FY13 Pricing Proposal. 3 Charge lower than the AER approved price, to suit the product design and pricing arrangements. Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 19
20 5.Glossary Term AER Bulk Supply Point (BSP) Capacity Charge Controlled load Tariff Cost Reflective Network Prices (CRNP) Tariff Determination Distribution Use of System (DUOS) Dynamic Peak Rebate Dynamic Tariff Economic Efficiency Equity First Block Fixed Charge Inclining Block Tariff (IBT) Network Use of System (NUOS) IPART Off-peak Consumption Charge Overs & Unders Account (Transmission) Peak Consumption Charge Definition Australian Energy Regulator A vital step in the transmission of electricity is decreasing the transmission line voltage using transformers. This is performed at a large substation called a Bulk Supply Point owned and operated in NSW by TransGrid A capacity charge applies to the maximum half hourly kw or KVA recorded during the peak period of a working weekday over the 12 months prior to a bill being calculated Applicable to electricity which is separately metered and controlled by Ausgrid and used for operating storage water heaters, thermal storage space heaters, and other approved fixed wired appliances A price calculated for customers using more than 10MW, that takes into account load flows of the specific assets the customer uses 2009 AER Determination for NSW Electricity Distribution Service Providers The revenue earned for the provision of distribution services This is a rebate offered to customers for consumption reductions during a dynamic peak event This tariff applies a price for energy consumed during a dynamically signalled congestion period The improvement in societal welfare from providing customers with a price signal reflective of marginal, rather than average cost of distribution service provision. The impact of price changes on the well being of disadvantaged groups See Inclining Block Tariff (IBT) This tariff component does not vary with electricity usage at the customer s premises and is charged on a cents/day/nmi basis This tariff typically has a fixed charge and a variable energy charge component with a low price charged up to a predetermined consumption threshold (first block) and a different price charged to customers who consume electricity above predetermined thresholds (the second or third blocks) The revenue earned for the provision of transmission and distribution services Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal This tariff component applies to the price charged for electricity usage during the off-peak period of the day. See also Time of Day Period Definition This account provides Ausgrid with certainty of transmission cost recovery by allowing future TUOS prices to increase (decrease) to recoup (return) an under (over)-recovery of TUOS This tariff component applies to the price charged for electricity usage during the peak period of the day. See also Time of Day Period Definition Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 20
21 Term Price Cap Real-time Tariff Revenue Cap Revenue Requirement Reasonable Estimates Second Block Shoulder Consumption Charge Third Block Time of Day Period Definition Time of Use (TOU) Tariff Transmission Use Of System (TUOS) Weighted Average Price Cap (WAPC) X factor Definition Refer to Weighted Average Price Cap This type of tariff has variable prices that vary every halfhour interval in response to change in energy purchase costs A form of monopoly regulation where the regulated entity s allowed revenue from tariffs is limited by an X factor. Any over or under-recovered of actual revenue is accounted in an adjustment to tariffs in the subsequent period. The level of revenue that is adequate to fund the on-going operation of the business and provide a commercial return to the owner A mechanism of the WAPC process that is used to adjust the historical volumes used in the formulae if customers are moved to another tariff. The intent of this reasonable estimate mechanism is to minimise gains or losses in revenue of moving customers between tariffs See Inclining Block Tariff (IBT) This tariff component applies to the price charged for electricity usage during the shoulder period of the day. See also Time of Day Period Definition See Inclining Block Tariff (IBT) The time periods of the day used to define when the peak, shoulder and off-peak price apply. The following is the current Time of Day Period Definitions: For Residential and Small Business up to 40 MWh per annum: Peak: 14:00 20:00 working weekdays Shoulder: 07:00 14:00, 20:00-22:00 working weekdays, 07:00 22:00 weekends and public holidays Off Peak: All other times For all other ToU tariffs Peak: 14:00 20:00 working weekdays Shoulder: 07:00 14:00, 20:00-22:00 working weekdays Off Peak: All other times This tariff typically has a fixed charge and a variable energy charge component with different prices applying at different time periods of the day. See also Time of Day Period Definition The revenue earned from customers to recover the cost of transmission service provision by TransGrid and other TNSPs A form of regulation that limits the annual increase to weighted average DUOS price to CPI+X. The weight used in the calculation of the average price is the previous year s volumes The allowed rate of growth (positive or negative) in prices (under a price cap) or revenue (under a revenue cap) Part 1 Approach to Price Setting 21
22 Ausgrid FY13 Network Pricing Proposal Part 2 Demonstrating Compliance Demonstrating Compliance 22
23 1. Overview and Outline This document is Ausgrid s formal Pricing Proposal for FY13 and is submitted for review and approval by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) as required by clause (a)(2) of the Transitional Chapter 6 Rules. It is structured to allow ready assessment of compliance by the AER. Outline of Compliance with Rules Ausgrid s Pricing Proposal assesses all of the requirements set out in Rule included in Chapter 11 (Transitional Rules) of the National Electricity Rules. Our pricing proposal also demonstrates compliance against the applicable distribution determination, as required under Clause (b)(7) of the Transitional Chapter 6 Rules. Specifically, the proposal sets out the tariff classes, tariffs and charging parameters, and expected revenue for the year commencing 1 July 2012 and ending 30 June This pricing proposal is structured as follows: Chapter 2 sets out the proposed tariff classes for standard control services, the basis for the proposed tariff classes, and Ausgrid s procedures for the assignment and reassignment of customers to tariff classes; Chapter 3 sets out the proposed tariffs and charging parameters, and the matters that Ausgrid has taken into account when determining these tariffs and charging parameters including the long run marginal costs of providing services to each tariff class, the transaction cost implications and the scope for customers to respond price signals; Chapter 4 sets out the weighted average revenue by tariff class and compares it to the efficient revenue boundary defined by the standalone cost and avoidable cost; Chapter 5 briefly discusses the variations to tariffs; Chapter 6 sets out the obligations on Ausgrid to provide revenue under the Climate Change Fund; Chapter 7 sets out the approach to passing through the cost of transmission use of system services; Chapter 8 sets out the changes since the previous regulatory year, as provided for in the Determination and the Rules; and provides information on how the pricing proposal complies with the requirements for pricing proposals as set out in the Rules. Chapter 9 sets out the tariffs and tariff class for Ausgrid s public lighting services for FY13. Chapter 10 sets out the proposed new network tariffs for FY13. Chapter 11 sets out the proposed reasonable estimates and provides information on how these estimates comply with Appendix J of the Determination. Ausgrid notes that Attachment D to this proposal demonstrates: Compliance with the WAPC control mechanism and side constraint formula Compliance with the application of reasonable estimates. Compliance with the control mechanism for Ausgrid s prescribed (transmission) standard control services. Compliance with the AER s requirements for reporting recovery of TUOS charges to account for under and over recovery of those charges. Demonstrating Compliance 23