Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/660/1380/42085/
Timestamp: 2019-07-16 10:10:38
Document Index: 329196062

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2802', '§ 2804', '§ 2804', '§ 2804', '§ 2804', '§ 2802', '§ 2805', '§ 3612', '§ 2805', '§ 2805', '§ 2805', '§ 2802', '§ 104']

Leon Thompson, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Kerr-mcgee Refining Corporation, Defendant-appellant, 660 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1981 › Leon Thompson, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Kerr-mcgee Refining Corporation, Defendant-appellant
Leon Thompson, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Kerr-mcgee Refining Corporation, Defendant-appellant, 660 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1981)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 660 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1981)
Argued July 17, 1981. Decided Sept. 24, 1981. Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1981
In the event that you do not indicate your acceptance of the lease and motor fuel consignment by August 15, 1978, this letter is our notice to you that we will not renew your present lease and related agreements which expire August 31, 1978, because of the failure to agree on new terms, as provided in Section 102(b) (3) of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act.
15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) (1) provides:
The notification requirements of Section 28041 provide that the notice shall be in writing, shall be posted by certified mail or personally delivered to the franchisee, and shall contain a statement of intention not to renew the franchise together with the reasons for nonrenewal, the effective date of the nonrenewal, and a summary statement to be prepared by the Secretary of Energy. 15 U.S.C. § 2804(c). The summary statement is to contain a concise summary of the Act and a statement of responsibilities, remedies, and relief available. 15 U.S.C. § 2804(d) (1). The summary statement is to be furnished within five days after its publication in the Federal Register. 15 U.S.C. § 2804(d) (2). The notification must be given no less than ninety days prior to the nonrenewal, except that in cases where notice cannot be reasonably given that much in advance, the notice must be given on the earliest date on which notice is practicable. 15 U.S.C. § 2804(b).
Section 2802 provides that one ground for nonrenewal is the failure of the franchisor and franchisee to agree to changes in or additions to the provisions of the franchise, provided that the changes or additions are made in good faith and in the normal course of business and the purpose of the changes or additions is not to prevent the renewal of the franchise relationship. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) (3) (A).2
Whether we would consider this as excusable neglect is not the issue on appeal. This is because a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) is directed to the discretion of the court entering the judgment, not to the discretion of the Court of Appeals. Our review is limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion. Appleton Electric Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1980). Rule 60(b) gives the court a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case. That rule should be liberally construed when substantial justice will thus be served. Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1975) (en banc) .
Kerr-McGee argues that the district court erred in granting Thompson's demand for a jury trial. Kerr-McGee points to provisions of the Act setting out equitable remedies and determinations to be made by the court. See, 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d) (1) (C), 2805(b) (1) and 2805(d) (2). None of these provisions deal with actual damages, the remedy which the plaintiff sought and received.
If any of the claims in issue are legal rather than equitable, then the right to a jury trial on those claims is not lost and cannot be infringed upon. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S. Ct. 894, 8 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1962); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 90 S. Ct. 733, 24 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1970); United States v. New Mexico, 642 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1981). So, if any of the plaintiff's claims are legal rather than equitable, then the trial court did not err in granting a jury trial on those claims. Kerr-McGee's statutory citations do not show that the only relief available under the Act is equitable.
The authority for an award of actual damages is found in Section 2805(d) (1) (A).
Some courts have granted jury trials in Petroleum Marketing Practices Act cases. See, e. g., Sexe v. Husky Oil Co., 475 F. Supp. 135, 137 (D. Mont. 1979). Apparently, the right to a jury trial was not questioned therein.
A similar question faced the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S. Ct. 1005, 39 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1974). That case presented the question whether either the Civil Rights Act or the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial upon demand in an action for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 3612, which authorizes private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to redress violations of the Fair Housing Act. That Act provided that the court might grant as relief a permanent or temporary injunction, a temporary restraining order, or an award of actual and punitive damages.
Id., at 194-195, 94 S. Ct. at 1008.
A suit for money damages is unmistakably an action at law triable to a jury. Ross v. Bernhard, supra, 396 U.S. at 533, 90 S. Ct. at 735; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra, 396 U.S. at 476, 82 S. Ct. at 899. Congress did not limit the right to trial by jury if the claimant sought actual damages. If Congress had intended to limit the right, it could have drafted a section similar to 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d) (2), which reads:
Kerr-McGee claims that the district court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and its 12(b) (6) motion because the court had already implicitly made the determinations necessary for granting those motions. Kerr-McGee claims this determination was made when the federal court dissolved the temporary restraining order. (Kerr-McGee suggests additional reasons why it should have been awarded summary judgment. We consider those in Part V.)
15 U.S.C. § 2805(b) (2) provides the standard for determining when the court must issue a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
Kerr-McGee accurately states that the first condition, termination and nonrenewal of the franchise, was satisfied and could not have been the basis for the denial of the injunctive relief. Likewise, it is unlikely that the third condition, involving comparisons of relative hardship, was not satisfied. Therefore, the probable reason for dissolving the temporary restraining order was that the franchisee did not demonstrate the existence of "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make such questions a fair ground for litigation." If that be true, according to the defendant, its motion for summary judgment should have been granted because there are no material issues of fact and the defendant should have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Rule 56(c), F.R.Civ.P. The defendant further argues that a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss should have been granted because the complaint did not set out any claim upon which relief could be granted.
We have found nine published cases in which motions for preliminary injunctions were denied. Cf., Frisard v. Texaco, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. La. 1978); Saad v. Shell Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Malone v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1979); Walters v. Chevron U. S. A., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 615 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1980); Kesselman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 479 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Pearman v. Texaco, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Mo. 1979); McFadden v. Amoco Oil Co., 486 F. Supp. 274 (D.S.C. 1979); Ferriola v. Gulf Oil Co., 496 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 859 (3rd Cir. 1981, unpublished); Haynes v. Exxon Corp., 512 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Tenn. 1981). In these decisions, the denial of a preliminary injunction was never considered sufficient basis for granting summary judgment.
We hold that the district court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment and for dismissal under Rule 12(b) (6).
The Act provides that after the franchisee has proven that the lease has not been renewed, the franchisor shall have the burden of going forward with evidence to establish that the termination was for a permissible reason under Section 2802(b) (2) or (3) and that the franchisor complied with the notice requirements of Section 2804. 15 U.S.C. § 2805(c). We find no evidence that Kerr-McGee complied with the notice requirements.
Those district courts which have considered the issue have concluded that the notice requirement must be strictly followed. Blankenship v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (D.Ore.1979), Davy v. Murphy Oil Co., 488 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (W.D. Mich. 1980), Daniels v. Dilmar Oil Co., 502 F. Supp. 178, 181 (D.S.C. 1980). Compliance with the summary statement requirement is also mandatory. Scheele v. Mobil Oil Corp., 510 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D. Mass. 1981). We agree that strict compliance with both is mandatory.
Furthermore, we believe that there is sufficient, credible evidence to support the jury's verdict for Thompson on the basis that the nonrenewal was not for a reason outlined in Section 2802(b) (3). Kerr-McGee stated that the reason for the nonrenewal was failure to agree on new terms. Thompson claims that the changes or additions were not made in good faith. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) (3) (A) (i).
(b) (1) In circumstances in which it would not be reasonable for the franchisor to furnish notification, not less than 90 days prior to the date on which termination or nonrenewal takes effect, as required by subsection (a) (2) of this section
(2) In the case of any termination or any franchise or any nonrenewal of any franchise relationship pursuant to the provisions of section 2802(b) (2) (E) of this title or section 2803(c) (2) of this title, the franchisor shall
(d) (1) Not later than 30 days after June 19, 1978, the Secretary of Energy shall prepare and publish in the Federal Register a simple and concise summary of the provisions of this subchapter, including a statement of the respective responsibilities of, and the remedies and relief available to, any franchisor and franchisee under this subchapter.
(2) In the case of summaries required to be furnished under the provisions of section 2802(b) (2) (D) of this title or subsection (c) (3) (C) of this section before the date of publication of such summary in the Federal Register, such summary may be furnished not later than 5 days after it is so published rather than at the time required under such provisions. Pub. L. 95-297, Title I, § 104, June 19, 1978, 92 Stat. 329.
Section 2802(b) (3) (A) provides: