Source: http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Granite_Rock_Co_v_Intl_Brotherhood_of_Teamsters_130_S_Ct_2847_177
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 19:01:42
Document Index: 767062488

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 20', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 301']

Granite Rock Co. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 177 L. Ed. 2d 567, 188 LRRM 2897 (2010), Court Opinion
Granite Rock Co. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 177 L. Ed. 2d 567, 188 LRRM 2897 (2010) [2010 BL 142332]
GRANITE ROCK COMPANY, PETITIONER v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS ET AL.
Argued January 19, 2010.
Decided June 24, 2010.
[*2849] Hide Headnotes
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT [1] Presumption of arbitrability ►94.02 ►94.09 [Show Topic Path]
Arbitration is strictly matter of consent, and thus presumption in favor of arbitration applies only if it reflects—and derives legitimacy from—court's determination that parties'
express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed and that agreement, in absence of some provision clearly and validly committing relevant issues to arbitration, is legally enforceable and best construed to encompass parties' dispute.
[2] No-strike clause — Ratification date — Arbitrability ►24.30 ►80.07 ►80.45 ►80.8432 ►94.02 ►94.09 ►94.163 ►94.557 ►94.585 [Show Topic Path]
Federal district court, not arbitrator, must resolve question of when labor contract containing no-strike clause was ratified by striking union members who refused to honor back-to-work pledge and broadened their contract-demand strike to protest proposed contract's failure to include striker hold-harmless clause, where determination of date on which contract was ratified is, in this case, contract-formation question and critical to answering question of whether parties had agreed, under arbitration clause applying to disputes that “arise under” contract, to arbitrate underlying no-strike dispute or ratification-date dispute raised by union as defense to strike claim.
[3] No-strike clause — Ratification date — Arbitrability ►24.30 ►80.07 ►80.45 ►80.8432 ►94.02 ►94.09 ►94.163 ►94.557 ►94.585 [Show Topic Path]
Federal district court, not arbitrator, must resolve question of when labor contract containing no-strike clause was ratified by striking union members who refused to honor back-to-work pledge and broadened their contract-demand strike to protest proposed contract's failure to include striker hold-harmless clause, regardless of whether no-strike dispute was arbitrable, since issue of when contract was ratified cannot fairly be said to “arise under” such contract, and related contract provisions describe arbitration requirement as applicable to labor disputes that are addressed by contract and are subject to mandatory mediation.
[4] No-strike clause — Ratification date — Arbitrability ►24.30 ►80.07 ►80.8432 ►94.02 ►94.09 ►94.163 ►94.585 ►94.59 [Show Topic Path]
Employer that sued to enforce new labor contract's no-strike and arbitrable grievance provisions did not, implicitly or otherwise, consent to arbitration of issue of whether contract was ratified before or after union members refused to honor back-to-work pledge and broadened existing contract-demand strike to protest proposed contract's failure to include striker hold-harmless clause, where ratification-date issue was raised by union—not employer—as defense to employer's suit, and employer has always and correctly claimed that issue was beyond scope of contract's arbitration clause.
[5] Section 301 — Contractual interference — Federal common law ►5.10 ►24.55 ►24.708 ►24.902 ►40.01 ►45.03 ►45.29 ►55.714 ►57.932 ►59.32 ►80.45 ►80.554 ►80.70 ►80.844 ►86.01 [Show Topic Path]
U.S. Supreme Court declines to recognize federal tort of contractual interference under Section 301(a) of LMRA in employer's suit for damages against international union that told striking local union's members not to honor their back-to-work pledge, allegedly in breach of new contract's no-strike clause, since recognition would require host of policy choices that would upset balance federal statutes strike between employers and unions in collective bargaining, section grants jurisdiction only to enforce contracts, employer has neither litigated state-law tort claims nor fully explored breach-of-contract claims or charges before NLRB, even though related board decision suggests that board may have jurisdiction over international under alter ego or agency theory, and there is precedent for unfair-labor-practice claim against international.
[**570] In June 2004, respondent local union (Local), supported by its
parent international (IBT), initiated a strike against petitioner
Granite Rock, the employer of some of Local's members, following the
expiration of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) and
an impasse in their negotiations. On July 2, the parties agreed to a
new CBA containing no-strike and arbitration clauses, but could not
reach a separate back-to-work agreement holding local and
international union members harmless for any strike-related damages
Granite Rock incurred. IBT instructed Local to continue striking
until Granite Rock approved such a hold-harmless agreement, but the
company refused to do so, informing Local that continued strike
activity would violate the new CBA's no-strike clause. IBT and Local
responded by announcing a company-wide strike involving numerous
facilities and workers, including members of other IBT locals.
Granite Rock sued IBT and Local, invoking federal jurisdiction
under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA),
seeking strike-related damages for the unions' alleged breach of
contract, and asking for an injunction against the ongoing strike
because the hold-harmless dispute was an arbitrable grievance under
the new CBA. The unions conceded § 301(a) jurisdiction, but asserted
that the new CBA was never validly ratified by a vote of Local's
members, and, thus, the CBA's no-strike clause did not provide a
basis for Granite Rock to [*2850] challenge the strike. After Granite Rock
amended its complaint to add claims that IBT tortiously interfered
with the new CBA, the unions moved to dismiss. The District Court
granted IBT's motion to dismiss the tortious interference [**571] claims on
the ground that § 301(a) supports a federal cause of action only for
of contract. But the court denied Local's separate motion to send
the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date to
arbitration, ruling that a jury should decide whether ratification
occurred on July 2, as Granite Rock contended, or on August 22, as
Local alleged. After the jury concluded that the CBA was ratified on
July 2, the court ordered arbitration to proceed on Granite Rock's
breach-of-contract claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the tortious interference claims, but reversed the arbitration
order, holding that the parties' ratification-date dispute was a
matter for an arbitrator to resolve under the CBA's arbitration
clause. [1] The Court of Appeals reasoned that the clause covered the
ratification-date dispute because the clause clearly covered the
related strike claims; national policy favoring arbitration required
ambiguity about the arbitration clause's scope to be resolved in
favor of arbitrability; and, in any event, Granite Rock had
implicitly consented [***2] to arbitrate the ratification-date dispute by
suing under the contract.
1. The parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date was a
matter for the District Court, not an arbitrator, to
resolve. Pp. 6-20.
(a) Whether parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute
is typically an "`issue for judicial determination,'" e.g.,
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 83, as
is a dispute over an arbitration contract's formation, see,
e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U. S. 938, 944. These principles would neatly dispose of this
case if the formation dispute here were typical. But it is not. It
is based on when (not whether) the new CBA containing the parties'
arbitration clause was ratified and thereby formed. To determine
whether the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date is
arbitrable, it is necessary to apply the rule that a court may order
arbitration of a particular dispute only when satisfied that the
parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. See, e.g.,
id., at 943. To satisfy itself that such agreement exists, the
court must resolve any issue that calls into question the specific
arbitration clause that a party seeks to have the court
enforce. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,
ante, at 4-6. Absent an agreement committing them to an
arbitrator, such issues typically concern the scope and
enforceability of the parties' arbitration clause. In addition, such
issues always include whether the clause was agreed to, and
may include when that agreement was formed. Pp. 6-7.
(b) In cases invoking the "federal policy favoring arbitration of
labor disputes," Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers,
414 U. S. 368, 377, courts adhere to the same framework, see,
e.g., AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers,
475 U. S. 643, and discharge their duty to satisfy themselves
that the parties agreed to arbitrate a
particular dispute by (1) applying the presumption of arbitrability
only where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is
ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute [**572] at hand
and (2) ordering arbitration only where the presumption is not
rebutted, see, e.g., id., at 651-652. Local is thus wrong to
suggest that the [*2851] presumption takes courts outside the settled
framework for determining arbitrability. This Court has never held
that the presumption overrides the principle that a court may submit
to arbitration "only those disputes . . . the parties have agreed to
submit," First Options, supra, at 943, nor that courts may use
policy considerations as a substitute for party agreement, see,
e.g., AT&T Technologies, supra, at 648-651. The
presumption should be applied only where it reflects, and derives
its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion (absent a provision
validly committing the issue to an arbitrator) that arbitration of a
particular dispute is what the parties intended because their
express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed, is legally
enforceable, and is best construed to encompass the dispute. See,
e.g., First Options, supra, at 944-945. This simple
framework compels reversal of the Ninth Circuit's judgment because
it requires judicial resolution of two related questions central to
[***3] Local's arbitration demand: when the CBA was formed, and whether its
arbitration clause covers the matters Local wishes to
arbitrate. Pp. 7-13.
(c) The parties characterize their ratification-date dispute as a
formation dispute because a union vote ratifying the CBA's terms was
necessary to form the contract. [2] For purposes of determining
arbitrability, when a contract is formed can be as critical as
whether it was formed. That is so where, as here, an
agreement's ratification date determines its formation date, and
thus determines whether its provisions were enforceable during the
period relevant to the parties' dispute. This formation date
question requires judicial resolution here because it relates to
Local's arbitration demand in a way that required the District Court
to determine the CBA's ratification date in order to decide whether
the parties consented to arbitrate the matters the demand covered.
The CBA requires arbitration only of disputes that "arise under" the
agreement. The parties' ratification-date dispute does not clearly
fit that description. But the Ninth Circuit credited Local's
argument that the ratification-date dispute should be presumed
arbitrable because it relates to a dispute (the no-strike dispute)
that does clearly "arise under" the CBA. The Ninth Circuit
overlooked the fact that this theory of the ratification-date
dispute's arbitrability fails if, as Local asserts, the new CBA was
not formed until August 22, because in that case there was no CBA
for the July no-strike dispute to "arise under." Local attempts to
address this flaw in the Circuit's reasoning by arguing that a
document the parties executed rendered the new CBA effective as
of May 1, 2004, the date the prior CBA expired. The Court of Appeals
did not rule on this claim, and this Court need not do so either
because it was not raised in Local's brief in opposition to the
certiorari petition. Pp. 13-17.
(d) Another reason to reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment is
that the ratification-date dispute, whether labeled a formation
dispute or not, falls outside the arbitration clause's scope [**573] on
grounds the presumption favoring arbitration cannot cure.
CBA § 20 provides, inter alia, that "[a]ll disputes arising
under this agreement shall be resolved in accordance with the
[Grievance] procedure," which includes arbitration. The parties'
ratification-date dispute cannot properly be said to fall within
this provision's scope for at least two reasons. First, the question
whether the CBA was validly ratified on July 2, 2004 — a question
concerning the CBA's very existence — cannot fairly be said to
"arise under" the CBA. Second, even if the "arising under" language
could in isolation [*2852] be construed to cover this dispute, § 20's
remaining provisions all but foreclose such a reading by describing
that section's arbitration requirement as applicable to labor
disagreements that are addressed in the CBA and are subject to its
requirement of mandatory mediation. The Ninth Circuit's contrary
conclusion finds no support in § 20's text. That court's only [***4] effort
to grapple with that text misses the point by focusing on whether
Granite Rock's claim to enforce the CBA's no-strike provisions
could be characterized as "arising under" the agreement, which is
not the dispositive issue here. Pp. 17-18.
(e) Local's remaining argument in support of the Court of Appeals'
judgment — that Granite Rock "implicitly" consented to arbitration
when it sued to enforce the CBA's no-strike and arbitrable grievance
provisions — is similarly unavailing. Although it sought an
injunction against the strike so the parties could arbitrate the
labor grievance giving rise to it, Granite Rock's decision to sue
does not establish an agreement, "implicit" or otherwise, to
arbitrate an issue (the CBA's formation date) that the company did
not raise and has always rightly characterized as beyond the
arbitration clause's scope. Pp. 19-20.
2. The Ninth Circuit did not err in declining to recognize a
new federal common-law cause of action under LMRA § 301(a) for IBT's
alleged tortious interference with the CBA. Though virtually all
other Circuits have rejected such claims, Granite Rock argues
that doing so in this case is inconsistent with federal labor law's
goal of promoting industrial peace and economic stability through
judicial enforcement of CBAs, and with this Court's precedents
holding that a federal common law of labor contracts is necessary to
further this goal, see,
e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala.,
353 U. S. 448, 451. The company says the remedy it seeks is
necessary because other potential avenues for deterrence and
redress, such as state-law tort claims, unfair labor practices
claims before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and federal
common-law breach-of-contract claims, are either unavailable or
insufficient. But Granite Rock has not yet exhausted all of these
avenues for relief, so this case does not provide an opportunity to
judge their efficacy. Accordingly, it would be premature to
recognize the cause of action Granite Rock seeks, even
assuming § 301(a) authorizes this Court to do so. That is
particularly true here because the complained-of course of conduct
has already prompted judgments favorable to Granite Rock from the
jury below and from the NLRB in separate proceedings concerning the
union's attempts to delay the new CBA's ratification. Those
proceedings, and others to be conducted on remand, buttress the
conclusion that [**574] Granite Rock's assumptions about the adequacy of
other avenues of relief are questionable, and that the Court of
Appeals did not err in declining to recognize the new federal tort
Granite Rock requests. Pp. 20-25.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO,
JJ., joined, and in which STEVENS and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined as to
Part III. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, J., joined.
[*2853] JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves an employer's claims against a local union and
the union's international [***5] parent for economic damages arising out
of a 2004 strike. The claims turn in part on whether a
collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a no-strike
provision was validly formed during the strike period. The employer
contends that it was, while the unions contend that it was not.
Because the CBA contains an arbitration clause, we first address
whether the parties' dispute over the CBAs ratification date was a
matter for the District Court or an arbitrator to resolve. We
conclude that it was a matter for judicial resolution. Next, we
address whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining the
employer's request to recognize a new federal cause of action
61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), for the international union's
alleged tortious interference with the CBA. The Court of Appeals did
not err in declining this request.
Petitioner Granite Rock Company is a concrete and building
materials company that has operated in California since 1900.
Granite Rock employs approximately 800 employees under different
labor contracts with several unions, including respondent
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 287 (Local). Granite
Rock and Local were parties to a 1999 CBA that expired in
April 2004. The parties' attempt to negotiate a new CBA hit an
impasse and, on June 9, 2004, Local members initiated a strike in
support of their contract demands.[fn1]
The strike continued until July 2, 2004, when the parties reached
agreement on the terms of a new CBA. The CBA contained a no-strike
clause but did not directly address union members' liability for any
strike-related damages Granite Rock may have incurred before the
new CBA was negotiated but after the prior CBA had expired. At the
end of the negotiating session on the new CBA, Local's business
representative, George Netto, approached Granite Rock about
executing a separate "back-to-work" agreement that would, [*2854] among
other things, hold union members harmless [**575] for damages incurred
during the June 2004 strike. Netto did not make execution of such an
agreement a condition of Local's ratification of the CBA, or of
Local's decision to cease picketing. Thus, Local did not have a
back-to-work or hold-harmless agreement in place when it voted to
ratify the CBA on July 2, 2004.
Respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), which had
advised Local throughout the CBA negotiations
and whose leadership and members supported the June strike, opposed
Local's decision to return to work without a back-to-work agreement
shielding both Local and IBT members from liability for
strike-related damages. In an effort to secure such an agreement,
IBT instructed Local's members not to honor their agreement to
return to work on July 5, and instructed Local's leaders to continue
the work stoppage until Granite Rock agreed to hold Local and IBT
members free from liability for the June strike. Netto demanded such
an agreement on July 6, but Granite Rock refused the request and
informed Local that the company would view any continued strike
activity as a violation [***6] of the new CBA's no-strike clause. IBT and
Local responded by announcing a company-wide strike that involved
numerous facilities and hundreds of workers, including members of
IBT locals besides Local 287.
According to Granite Rock, IBT not only instigated this strike; it
supported and directed it. IBT provided pay and benefits to union
members who refused to return to work, directed Local's negotiations
with Granite Rock, supported Local financially during the strike
period with a $1.2 million loan, and represented to Granite Rock
that IBT had unilateral authority to end the work stoppage in
exchange for a hold-harmless agreement covering IBT members within
and outside Local's bargaining unit.
On July 9, 2004, Granite Rock sued IBT and Local in
the District Court, seeking an injunction against the ongoing strike
and strike-related damages. Granite Rock's complaint, originally and
as amended, invoked federal jurisdiction under LMRA § 301(a),
alleged that the July 6 strike violated Local's obligations under
the CBA's no-strike provision, and asked the District Court to
enjoin the strike because the hold-harmless dispute giving rise to
the strike was an arbitrable grievance. See Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks,
398 U. S. 235, 237-238, 253-254 (1970)
(holding that federal courts may enjoin a strike where a CBA
contemplates arbitration of the dispute that occasions the strike).
The unions conceded that LMRA § 301(a) gave the District Court
jurisdiction over the suit but opposed Granite Rock's complaint,
asserting that the CBA was not validly ratified on July 2 (or at any
other time relevant to the July 2004 strike) and, thus, its
no-strike clause did not provide a basis for Granite Rock's claims
challenging the strike.
The District Court initially denied Granite Rock's request to
enforce the CBA's no-strike provision because Granite Rock was
unable to produce evidence that the CBA was ratified on July 2.
App. 203-213. Shortly after the District Court ruled, however, a
Local member testified that Netto had put the new CBA to a
ratification vote on July 2, and that the voting Local members
unanimously approved the agreement. Based on this statement and
supporting testimony from 12 [**576] other employees, Granite Rock moved for
a new trial on its injunction and damages claims.
On August 22, while that motion was pending, Local conducted a
second successful "ratification" vote on the CBA, and [*2855] on
September 13, the day the District Court was scheduled to hear
Granite Rock's motion, the unions called off their strike. Although
their return to work mooted Granite Rock's request for an
injunction, the District Court proceeded with the hearing and
granted Granite Rock a new trial on its damages claims. The parties
proceeded with discovery and Granite Rock amended its complaint,
which already alleged federal[fn2] claims for breach of the CBA
against both Local and IBT, to add federal inducement of breach and
(hereinafter tortious interference) claims against IBT.
IBT and Local both moved to dismiss. Among other things, IBT
argued that Granite Rock could not plead [***7] a federal tort claim
under § 301(a) because that provision supports a federal cause of
action only for breach of contract. The District Court agreed and
dismissed Granite Rock's tortious interference claims.
The District Court did not, however, grant Local's separate motion
to send the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date to
arbitration.[fn3] The District Court held that whether the CBA was
ratified on July 2 or August 22 was an issue for the court to
decide, and submitted the question to a jury. The jury reached a
unanimous verdict that Local ratified the CBA on July 2, 2004.
The District Court entered the verdict and ordered the parties to
proceed with arbitration on Granite Rock's breach-of-contract claims
for strike-related damages.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part. See 546 F. 3d 1169 (2008). The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Granite Rock's tortious
interference claims against IBT. See id., at 1170-1175. But it
disagreed with the District Court's determination that the date of
the CBA's ratification was a matter for judicial resolution. See
id., at 1176-1178. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the
parties' dispute over this issue was governed by the CBA's
arbitration clause because the clause clearly covered the related
strike claims, the "national policy favoring arbitration" required
that any ambiguity about the scope of the parties' arbitration
clause be resolved in favor of arbitrability, and,
in any event, Granite Rock had "implicitly" consented to arbitrate
the ratification-date dispute "by suing under the contract."
Id., at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted). We granted
certiorari. See 557 U. S. ___ (2009).
[3] It is well settled in both commercial and labor cases that whether
parties have agreed to "submi[t] a particular dispute to
arbitration" is typically an "`issue for judicial determination.'"
537 U. S. 79, 83 (2002) ([**577] quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986)); see
376 U. S. 543, 546-547 (1964). [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] It is similarly well settled
that where the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the
dispute is [*2856] generally for courts to decide. See, e.g., First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U. S. 938, 944 (1995) ("When deciding whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts generally . . . should
apply ordinary . . . principles that govern the formation of
contracts"); AT&T Technologies,
supra, at 648-649 (explaining the settled rule in labor cases
that "`arbitration is a matter of contract'" and "arbitrators derive
their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have
agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration");
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U. S. 440, 444, n. 1 (2006) (distinguishing treatment of the
generally nonarbitral question whether an arbitration agreement was
"ever concluded" from the question whether a contract containing an
arbitration clause was illegal when formed, which question we held
to be arbitrable in certain circumstances).
These principles would neatly dispose of this case if the
formation dispute here were typical. [***8] But it is not. It is based on
when (not whether) the CBA that contains the parties' arbitration
clause was ratified and thereby
formed.[fn4] And at the time the District Court considered Local's
demand to send this issue to an arbitrator, Granite Rock, the party
resisting arbitration, conceded both the formation and the validity
of the CBA's arbitration clause. These unusual facts require us to
reemphasize the proper framework for deciding when disputes are
arbitrable under our precedents. [9] Under that framework, a court
may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court
is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate
that dispute. See First Options, supra, at 943;
AT&T Technologies, supra, at 648-649. To satisfy itself
that such agreement exists, the court must resolve any issue
that calls into question the formation or applicability of the
specific arbitration clause that a party seeks to have the court
enforce. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.
Jackson, ante, at 4-6 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Where there
is no provision validly committing them to an arbitrator, see
ante, at 7, these issues typically concern the scope of the
arbitration clause and its enforceability. In addition, these issues
always include whether the clause was agreed to, and may include
when that agreement was formed.
The parties agree that it was proper for the District Court to
decide whether their ratification dispute was [**578] arbitrable.[fn5] They
disagree about whether the District Court answered the question
correctly. Local contends that the District Court erred in holding
that the CBA's
ratification date was an issue for the court to decide. The Court of
Appeals agreed, holding that the District Court's refusal to send
that dispute to arbitration violated two principles of arbitrability
set forth in our precedents. See [*2857] 546 F. 3d, at 1177-1178. [10] [11] The first
principle is that where, as here, parties concede that they have
agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration
clause, the "law's permissive policies in respect to arbitration"
counsel that "`any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.'" First Options,
supra, at 945 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 626 (1985)); see
546 F. 3d, at 1177-1178 (citing this principle and the "national
policy favoring arbitration" in concluding that arbitration clauses
"are to be construed very broadly" (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). [12] [13] [14] The second principle the Court of Appeals
invoked is that this presumption of arbitrability applies even to
disputes about the enforce-ability of the entire contract containing
the arbitration clause, because at least in cases governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., [fn6]
courts must treat the arbitration clause as severable from the
contract in which it appears, and thus apply the clause to all
disputes within its scope "`[u]nless the [validity] challenge is to
the arbitration clause itself'" or the party "disputes the
formation of [the] contract,"
546 F. 3d, at 1176 (quoting Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 445-446);
546 F. 3d, at 1177, and n. 4 (explaining that it would treat the
parties' arbitration clause as enforceable [***9] with respect to the
ratification-date dispute because no party argued that the "clause
is invalid in any way")).
Local contends that our precedents, particularly those applying
the "`federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes,'"
permit no other result. Brief for Respondent Local, p. 15 (quoting
414 U. S. 368, 377 (1974)); see Brief for Respondent Local,
pp. 10-13; 16-25. Local, like the Court of Appeals, over-reads our
precedents. [15] [16] The language and holdings on which Local and the Court
of Appeals rely cannot [**579] be divorced from the first principle
that underscores all of our arbitration decisions: Arbitration is
strictly "a matter of consent," Volt Information Sciences,
489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989), and thus "is a way to resolve those
disputes — but only those disputes — that the parties have
agreed to submit to arbitration," First Options,
514 U. S., at 943 (emphasis added).[fn7] [17] Applying this principle, our
precedents hold that courts should order arbitration of a dispute
only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the
[*2858] parties' arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision
specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its
enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue.
Ibid. Where a party contests either or both matters, "the
court" must resolve the disagreement. Ibid.
Local nonetheless interprets some of our opinions to depart from
this framework and to require arbitration of
certain disputes, particularly labor disputes, based on policy
grounds even where evidence of the parties' agreement to arbitrate
the dispute in question is lacking. See Brief for Respondent
Local, p. 16 (citing cases emphasizing the policy favoring
arbitration generally and the "impressive policy considerations
favoring arbitration" in LMRA cases (internal quotation marks
omitted)). That is not a fair reading of the opinions, all of which
compelled arbitration of a dispute only after the Court was
persuaded that the parties' arbitration agreement was validly formed
and that it covered the dispute in question and was legally
enforceable. See, e.g., First Options,
supra, at 944-945. That Buckeye and some of our cases
applying a presumption of arbitrability to certain disputes do not
discuss each of these requirements merely reflects the fact that in
those cases some of the requirements were so obviously satisfied
that no discussion was needed.
In Buckeye, the formation of the parties' arbitration
agreement was not at issue because the parties agreed that they had
"concluded" an agreement to arbitrate and memorialized it as an
arbitration clause in their loan contract. 546 U. S., at 444, n. 1.
The arbitration clause's scope was also not at issue, because the
provision expressly applied to "`[a]ny claim, dispute, or
controversy . . . arising from or relating to . . . the validity,
enforceability, or scope of this Arbitration Provision or the entire
Agreement.'" Id., at 442. The parties resisting arbitration
(customers who agreed to the broad arbitration clause as a condition
of using Buckeye's loan service) claimed only [***10] that a usurious
interest provision in the loan agreement invalidated the entire
contract, including the arbitration clause, and thus precluded the
Court from relying on the clause as evidence of the parties' consent
to arbitrate matters [**580] within its scope. See id., at 443. In
rejecting this argument, we simply applied the requirement
in § 2 of the FAA that courts treat an arbitration clause as
from the contract in which it appears and enforce it according to
its terms unless the party resisting arbitration specifically
challenges the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself, see
id., at 443-445 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2; Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 402-404 (1967)), or
claims that the agreement to arbitrate was "[n]ever concluded,"
546 U. S., at 444, n. 1; see also Rent-A-Center,
ante, at 6-7, and n. 2.
Our cases invoking the federal "policy favoring arbitration" of
commercial and labor disputes apply the same framework. [18] They
recognize that, except where "the parties clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise," AT&T Technologies, 475 U. S., at 649, it is
"the court's duty to interpret the agreement and to determine
whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning" a
particular matter, id., at 651. [19] They then discharge this duty
by: (1) applying the presumption of arbitrability only where a
validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous
about whether it covers the dispute at hand; and (2) adhering to the
presumption [*2859] and ordering arbitration only where the presumption is
not rebutted. See id., at 651-652; Prima Paint Corp.,
supra, at 396-398; Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine
Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 374-377 (1974); Drake Bakeries
Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 370 U. S. 254, 256-257 (1962);
370 U. S. 238, 241-242 (1962); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 576 (1960).[fn8]
Local is thus wrong to suggest that the presumption of
arbitrability we sometimes apply takes courts outside [**581] our settled
framework for deciding arbitrability. The presumption simply assists
in resolving arbitrability disputes within that framework. Confining
the presumption to this role reflects its foundation in "the federal
policy favoring arbitration." As we have explained, this "policy" is
merely an acknowledgment of the FAA's commitment to "overrule the
judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate
and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts." Volt,
489 U. S., at 478 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[20] Accordingly, we have never held that this policy overrides the
principle that a court may submit to arbitration "only those
disputes . . . that the parties have agreed to submit." First
Options, 514 U. S., at 943; see also Mastrobuono v.
Shear-son Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 57 (1995) ("[T]he
FAA's proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the
wishes of the contract parties"); AT&T Technologies,
475 U. S., at 650-651 (applying the same rule to the "presumption of
arbitrability for labor disputes"). [21] Nor
have we held that courts may use policy considerations as a
substitute for party agreement. See, e.g.,
id., at 648-651; Volt, supra, at 478. We have applied
the presumption favoring arbitration, in FAA and in labor cases,
only where it reflects, and derives [***11] its legitimacy from, a judicial
conclusion that arbitration of a particular dispute is what the
parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was
validly formed and (absent a provision clearly and validly
committing such issues to an arbitrator) is legally enforceable and
[*2860] best construed to encompass the dispute. See First Options,
supra, at 944-945 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U. S., at 626);
Howsam, 537 U. S., at 83-84; AT&T Technologies,
supra, at 650 (citing Warrior & Gulf,
supra, at 582-583); Drake Bakeries,
supra, at 259-260. This simple framework compels reversal of
the Court of Appeals' judgment because it requires judicial
resolution of two questions central to Local's arbitration demand:
when the CBA was formed, and whether its arbitration clause covers
the matters Local wishes to arbitrate.
[2] We begin by addressing the grounds on which the Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court's decision to decide the parties'
ratification-date dispute, which the parties characterize as a
necessary to form the contract. See App. 351.[fn9] For purposes of
determining arbitrability,
when a contract is formed can be as critical as
whether it was [**582] formed. That is the case where, as here, the
date on which an agreement was ratified determines the date the
agreement was formed, and thus determines whether the agreement's
provisions were enforceable during the period relevant to the
parties' dispute.[fn10]
This formation date question requires judicial resolution here
because it relates to Local's arbitration demand in such a way
that the District Court was required to decide the CBA's
ratification date in order to determine whether the parties
consented to arbitrate the matters covered by the demand.[fn11] The
parties agree that the CBA's arbitration clause pertains only to
disputes that "arise under" the agreement. Accordingly, to hold the
parties' ratification-date dispute arbitrable, the Court of Appeals
had to decide whether that dispute could be characterized as
"arising under" the CBA. In answering this question in the
affirmative, both Local and the Court of Appeals tied the
arbitrability of the ratification-date issue — which Local raised as
a defense to Granite Rock's strike claims — to the arbitrability of
the strike claims themselves. See id., at 347. They did so
because the CBA's arbitration clause, which pertains only to
disputes "arising under" the CBA
and thus presupposes the CBA's existence, would seem plainly to
cover a dispute that "arises [*2861] under" a specific substantive provision
of the CBA, but does not so obviously cover disputes about the CBA's
own formation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals relied upon the
ratification dispute's relationship to Granite Rock's claim
that Local breached the CBA's no-strike clause (a claim the Court of
Appeals viewed as clearly "arising under" the CBA) to conclude
that "the arbitration clause is certainly `susceptible of an
interpretation' that covers" Local's formation-date
defense. 546 F. 3d, at 1177, n. 4.
[22] The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that this theory of the
ratification dispute's [***12] arbitrability fails if the CBA was not
formed at the time the unions engaged in the acts that gave rise to
Granite Rock's strike claims. The unions began their strike
on July 6, 2004, and Granite Rock filed its suit on July 9. If, as
Local asserts, the CBA containing the parties' arbitration clause
was not ratified, and thus not formed, until August 22, there
was no CBA for the July no-strike dispute to "arise under," and
thus no valid basis for the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that Granite Rock's July 9 claims arose under the CBA and were thus
arbitrable along with, by extension, Local's formation date defense
to those claims.[fn12] See ibid. For the foregoing [**583] reasons,
resolution of the parties' dispute about whether the CBA was
ratified in July or August was central to deciding Local's
arbitration demand. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it was not necessary for the District Court to
determine the CBA's ratification date in order to decide whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate Granite Rock's no-strike claim or the
ratification-date dispute Local raised as a defense to that claim.
Local seeks to address this flaw in the Court of Appeals' decision
by arguing that in December 2004 the parties executed a document
that rendered the CBA effective as
of May 1, 2004 (the date the prior CBA expired), and that this
effective-date language rendered the CBA's arbitration clause (but
not its no-strike clause) applicable to the July strike period
notwithstanding Local's view that the agreement was ratified in
August (which ratification date Local continues to argue controls
the period during which the no-strike clause applies). See Brief for
Respondent Local, pp. 26-27; Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, 37-39. The Court
of Appeals did not rule on the merits of this claim (i.e., it
did not decide whether the CBA's effective date language indeed
renders some or all of the agreement's provisions retroactively
applicable to May 2004), and we need not do so either. [23] Even
accepting Local's assertion that it raised this retroactivity
argument in the District Court, see Brief for Respondent
Local, p. 26, [fn13] Local did not raise this argument in the Court
of Appeals. Nor, more importantly, did Local's brief in opposition
to Granite Rock's petition for certiorari raise the argument as an
alternative ground on which this Court could or should affirm the
Court of Appeals' judgment finding the ratification-date dispute
arbitrable for the reasons discussed above. Accordingly, the
argument is properly "deemed waived." This Court's Rule 15.2;
[*2862] Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip
op., at 15-16).[fn14]
[3] Although the foregoing is sufficient to reverse the Court of
Appeals' judgment, there is an additional reason to do so: The
dispute here, whether labeled a formation dispute or not, falls
outside the scope of the parties' arbitration clause on grounds the
presumption favoring arbitration cannot cure. Section 20 of the CBA
provides in relevant part that "[a]ll disputes arising under this
agreement shall be resolved in accordance with the [Grievance]
procedure," which includes arbitration. App. 434 (emphasis added);
see [***13] also id., at 434-437. The parties' ratification-date
dispute cannot properly be characterized as falling within the
(relatively narrow, [**584] cf., e.g., Drake Bakeries Inc.,
370 U. S., at 256-257) scope of this provision for at least two
reasons. First, we do not think the question whether the CBA was
validly ratified on July 2, 2004 — a question that concerns the
CBA's very existence — can fairly be said to "arise under" the
CBA. Second, even if the "arising under" language could in isolation
be construed to cover this dispute, Section 20's remaining
provisions all but foreclose such a reading by describing
requirement of mandatory mediation. See App. 434-437 (requiring
arbitration of disputes "arising under" the CBA, but only after the
Union and Employer have exhausted mandatory mediation, and limiting
any arbitration decision under this provision to those "within the
scope and terms of this agreement and . . . specifically limited to
the matter submitted").
The Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion does not find support in
the text of § 20. The Court of Appeals' only effort to grapple with
that text misses the point because it focuses on whether Granite
Rock's claim to enforce the CBA's no-strike provisions could be
characterized as "arising under" the agreement. See
546 F. 3d, at 1177, n. 4. Even assuming that claim can be
characterized as "arising under" the CBA, it is not the issue here.
[24] The issue is whether the formation-date defense that Local raised in
response to Granite Rock's no-strike suit can be characterized as
"arising under" the CBA. It cannot for the reasons we have
explained, namely, the CBA provision requiring arbitration of
disputes "arising under" the CBA is not fairly read to include a
dispute about when the CBA came into existence. The Court of Appeals
erred in failing to address this question and holding instead
that the arbitration clause is "susceptible of an interpretation"
that covers Local's formation-date defense to Granite Rock's suit
"[b]ecause Granite Rock is suing `under' the alleged new CBA" and
"[a]rbitration clauses are to be construed very broadly."
Ibid.; see also id., at 1178.
[4] Local's remaining argument in support of the Court of Appeals'
judgment [*2863] is similarly unavailing. Local reiterates the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that Granite Rock "implicitly" consented to
arbitration when it sued to enforce the CBA's no-strike and
arbitrable grievance provisions. See Brief for Respondent Local,
pp. 17-18. We do not agree that by seeking an injunction against the
strike so the parties could arbitrate the labor grievance that gave
rise to it, Granite Rock also consented to arbitrate the
ratification (formation) date dispute we address above. See
564 F. 3d, at 1178. It is of course true that when Granite Rock
sought that injunction it viewed the CBA (and all of its provisions)
as enforceable. But Granite
Rock's decision to sue for compliance with the CBA's grievance
procedures on strike-related matters does not establish an
agreement, "implicit" or otherwise, to arbitrate an issue
(the CBA'[***14] s formation date) that Granite Rock did not raise, and
that Granite Rock has always (and rightly, see Part II-C,
supra) characterized as beyond the scope of the CBA's
arbitration clause. [25] The mere fact that Local raised the formation
date dispute as a defense to Granite Rock's suit does not make
that dispute attributable to Granite Rock in the waiver or estoppel
sense [**585] the Court of Appeals suggested, see 546 F. 3d, at 1178, much
less establish that Granite Rock agreed to arbitrate it by suing to
enforce the CBA as to other matters. Accordingly, we hold that the
parties' dispute over the CBA's formation date was for
the District Court, not an arbitrator, to resolve, and remand for
proceedings consistent with that conclusion.
We turn now to the claims available on remand. The parties agree
that Granite Rock can bring a breach-of-contract claim under
LMRA § 301(a) against Local as a CBA signatory, and against IBT as
Local's agent or alter ego. See Brief for Respondent IBT 10-13;
Reply Brief for Petitioner 12-13 and n. 11.[fn15] The question is
Granite Rock may also bring a federal tort claim under § 301(a) for
IBT's alleged interference with the CBA.[fn16] Brief for
Petitioner 32. The Court of Appeals joined virtually all other
Circuits in holding that it would not recognize such a claim
under § 301(a).
Granite Rock asks us to reject this position as inconsistent with
federal labor law's [*2864] goal of promoting industrial peace and economic
stability through judicial enforcement of CBAs, as well as with our
precedents holding that a federal common law of labor contracts is
necessary to further this goal. See id., at 31; see also,
353 U. S. 448, 451 (1957). Explaining that IBT's conduct in this
case undermines the very core of the bargaining relationship federal
labor laws exist to protect, Granite Rock argues that a federal
common-law tort remedy for IBT's conduct is necessary because other
potential avenues for deterring and redressing such conduct are
either unavailable or insufficient. See Brief for Petitioner 32-33;
Reply Brief for Petitioner 19-20. On the unavailable side of the
ledger Granite Rock lists state-law tort claims, some of which this
Court has held § 301(a) pre-empts, as well
as administrative (unfair labor practices) claims, which Granite
Rock says the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) cannot entertain
against international unions that (like IBT) are not part of the
certified local bargaining unit they allegedly control. On the
insufficient side of the ledger Granite Rock lists [**586] federal
common-law breach-of-contract claims, which Granite Rock says are
difficult to prove against non-CBA signatories like IBT because
international unions structure their relationships with local unions
in a way that makes agency or alter ego difficult to establish.
Based on these assessments, Granite Rock suggests that this
case presents us with the choice of either recognizing the federal
common-law tort claim Granite Rock seeks or sanctioning conduct
inconsistent with federal labor statutes and our own precedents. See
[5] We do not believe [***15] the choice is as stark as Granite Rock implies.
[26] It is of course true that we have construed "Section 301 [to]
authoriz[e] federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements." Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459, 470 (1960) (citing
Lincoln Mills, supra). But we have also emphasized that in
developing this common law we "did not envision any freewheeling
inquiry into what the federal courts might find to be the most
desirable rule." Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees,
417 U. S. 249, 255 (1974). The balance federal statutes strike
between employer and union relations in the collective-bargaining
arena is carefully calibrated, see, e.g., NLRB v.
Drivers, 362 U. S. 274, 289-290 (1960), and as the parties'
briefs illustrate, creating a federal common-law tort cause of
action would require a host of policy choices that could easily
upset this balance, see Brief for Respondent IBT 42-44; Reply Brief
for Petitioner 22-25. It is thus no surprise that virtually all
Courts of Appeals have held that federal courts' authority to
"create a federal common law of collective bargaining
agreements under section 301" should be confined to "a
common law of contracts, not a source of independent rights, let
alone tort rights; for
section 301 is . . . a grant of jurisdiction only to enforce
contracts." Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co.,
6 F. 3d 1176, 1180 (CA7 1993). [27] We see no reason for a different
result here because it would be premature to recognize the federal
common law tort Granite Rock requests in this case even assuming
that § 301(a) authorizes us to do so.
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that the question before
us is a narrow one. It is not whether the conduct Granite Rock
challenges is remediable, but whether we should augment the claims
already available to Granite Rock by creating a new federal
common-law cause of action [*2865] under § 301(a). That we decline to do so
does not mean that we approve of IBT's alleged actions. Granite Rock
describes a course of conduct that does indeed seem to strike at the
heart of the collective-bargaining process federal labor laws were
designed to protect. As the record in this case demonstrates,
however, a new federal tort claim is not the only possible remedy
for this conduct. Granite Rock's allegations have prompted favorable
judgments not only from a federal jury, but also from the NLRB. In
proceedings that predated those in which the District Court entered
judgment for Granite Rock on the CBA's formation date, [fn17] the
NLRB [**587] concluded that a "complete agreement" was reached on
July 2, and that Local and IBT violated federal labor
laws by attempting to delay the CBA's ratification pending execution
of a separate agreement favorable to IBT. See In re Teamsters
Local 287,
347 N.L.R.B. 339, 340-341, and n. 1 (2006) (applying the remedial
order on the 2004 conduct to both
Local and IBT on the grounds that IBT did not disaffiliate from the
AFL-CIO until July 25, 2005).
These proceedings, and the proceedings that remain to be conducted
on remand, buttress our conclusion that Granite Rock's case for a
new federal common-law cause of action is based on assumptions about
the adequacy of other avenues of relief
that are at least questionable [***16] because they have not been fully
tested in this case and thus their efficacy is simply not before us
to evaluate. Notably, Granite Rock
(like IBT and the Court of Appeals) assumes that federal
common law provides the only possible basis for the type of tort
claim it wishes to pursue. See Brief for Respondent IBT 33-34; Reply
Brief for Petitioner 16. But Granite Rock did not litigate below,
and thus does not present us with occasion to address, whether
state law might provide a remedy. See, e.g.,
Steelworkers v. Raw-son, 495 U. S. 362, 369-371 (1990);
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO Corp. v.
Automobile Workers, 523 U. S. 653, 656, 658 (1998). Nor did
Granite Rock fully explore the breach-of-contract
and administrative causes of action it suggests are insufficient to
remedy IBT's conduct. For example, far from establishing that an
agency or alter ego claim against IBT would be unsuccessful, the
record in this case suggests it might be easier to prove than usual
if, as the NLRB's decision observes, IBT and Local were affiliated
in 2004 in a way relevant to Granite Rock's claims. See In re
Teamsters Local 287, supra, at 340, n. 6. Similarly, neither
party has established that the Board itself could not issue
additional relief against IBT. IBT's amici argue that the
"overlap between Granite Rock's § 301 claim against the IBT and the
NLRB General Counsel's unfair labor practice complaint against Local
287 brings into play the National Labor Relations Act rule that an
international union commits an unfair labor practice by causing its
affiliated local unions to `impose extraneous non-bargaining unit
considerations into the collective bargaining process.'" Brief for
American Federation of Labor et al. 30-31 (quoting Paperworkers
Local 620, 309 N.L.R.B. 44, 44 (1992)). The fact
that at least one Court of Appeals has recognized the viability of
such a claim, see [*2866] Kobell v. United Paper-workers Int'l
Union, 965 F. 2d 1401, 1407-1409 (CA6 1992), further persuades us
that Granite Rock's arguments do not justify recognition of a
new federal tort claim under § 301(a).
We reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment on the arbitrability of
the parties' formation-date dispute, affirm its judgment dismissing
Granite Rock's claims against IBT to the extent those claims depend
on the creation [**588] of a new federal common-law tort cause of action
under § 301(a), and remand the case for further proceedings
[fn1] In deciding the arbitration question in this case we rely upon
the terms of the CBA and the facts in the District Court record. In
reviewing the judgment affirming dismissal of Granite Rock's tort
claims against respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(IBT) for failure to state a claim, we rely on the facts alleged in
Granite Rock's Third Amended Complaint. See, e.g.,
H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
492 U. S. 229, 250 (1989).
[fn2] [28] This Court has recognized a federal common-law claim for
breach of a CBA under LMRA § 301(a). See, e.g., Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala.,
353 U. S. 448, 456 (1957).
[fn3] The CBA's ratification date is important to Granite Rock's
underlying suit for strike damages. If the District Court correctly
concluded that the CBA was ratified on July 2, Granite Rock could
argue on remand that the July work stoppage violated the CBA's
no-strike clause.
[fn4] [29] Although a union ratification vote is not always required for
the provisions in a CBA to be considered validly formed, the parties
agree that ratification was such a predicate here. See
App. 349-351.
[fn5] Because neither party argues that the arbitrator should decide
this question, there is no need to apply the rule requiring "`clear
and unmistakable'" evidence of an agreement to arbitrate
arbitrability. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communications Workers,
475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986) (alterations omitted)).
[fn6] We, like the Court of Appeals, discuss precedents applying the
FAA because they employ the same rules of arbitrability that govern
labor cases. See, e.g., AT&T Technologies,
supra, at 650. Indeed, the rule that arbitration is strictly a
matter of consent — and thus that courts must typically decide any
questions concerning the formation or scope of an arbitration
agreement before ordering parties to comply with it — is the
cornerstone of the framework the Court announced in the
Steel-workers Trilogy for deciding arbitrability disputes in
LMRA cases. See Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U. S. 564, 567-568 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582 (1960);
363 U. S. 593, 597 (1960).
[fn7] See also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 57 (1995); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 219-220 (1985); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506, 511 (1974); AT&T
Technologies, supra, at 648; Warrior & Gulf,
supra, at 582; United States v. Moorman,
338 U. S. 457, 462 (1950).
[fn8] That our labor arbitration precedents apply this rule is
hardly surprising. As noted above, see n. 6, supra, the rule is
the foundation for the arbitrability framework this Court announced
in the Steelworkers Trilogy. Local's assertion
that Warrior & Gulf suggests otherwise is misplaced. Although
Warrior & Gulf contains language that might in isolation be
misconstrued as establishing a presumption that labor disputes are
arbitrable whenever they are not expressly excluded from an
arbitration clause, 363 U. S., at 578-582, the opinion else where
emphasizes that even in LMRA cases, "courts" must construe
arbitration clauses because "a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."
Id., at 582 (applying this rule and finding the
dispute at issue arbitrable only after determining that the parties'
arbitration clause could be construed under standard principles of
contract interpretation to cover it).
Our use of the same rules in FAA cases is also unsurprising.
The rules are suggested by the statute itself. Section 2 of the FAA
requires courts to enforce valid and enforceable arbitration
agreements according to their terms. And § 4 provides in pertinent
part that where a party invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court
over a matter that the court could adjudicate but for the presence
of an arbitration clause, "[t]he court shall hear the parties" and
"direc[t] the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the agreement" except "[i]f the making of the
arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform
the same be in issue," in which case "the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof." 9 U.S.C. § 4.
[fn9] The parties' dispute about the CBA's ratification date
presents a formation question in the sense above, and is therefore
not on all fours with, for example, the formation disputes we
referenced in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U. S. 440, 444, n. 1 (2006), which concerned whether, not when,
an agreement to arbitrate was "concluded." That said, the manner in
which the CBA's ratification date relates to Local's arbitration
demand makes the ratification-date dispute in this case one
that requires judicial resolution. See
infra, at 14-19.
[fn10] Our conclusions about the significance of the CBA's
ratification date to the specific arbitrability question before us
do not disturb the general rule that parties may agree to arbitrate
past disputes or future disputes based on past events.
[fn11] In reaching this conclusion we need not, and do not, decide
whether every dispute over a CBA's ratification date would require
judicial resolution. [30] We recognize that ratification disputes in
labor cases may often qualify as "formation disputes" for
contract law purposes because contract law defines formation as
acceptance of an offer on specified terms, and in many labor cases
ratification of a CBA is necessary to satisfy this formation
requirement. See App. 349-351. But it is not the mere labeling of a
dispute for contract law purposes that determines whether an issue
is arbitrable. The test for arbitrability remains whether the
parties consented to arbitrate the dispute in question.
[fn12] This analysis pertains only to the Court of Appeals'
decision, which did not engage the 11th-hour retroactivity argument
Local raised in its merits brief in this Court, and that we address
[fn13] This claim is questionable because Local's
February 2005 references to the agreement "now in effect" are not
obviously equivalent to the express retroactivity argument Local
asserts in its merits brief in this Court. See Brief for Respondent
Local, pp. 26-27.
[fn14] JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR's conclusion that we should nonetheless
excuse Local's waiver and consider the retroactivity argument, see
post, at 5-6 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part),
is flawed. [31] This Court's Rule 15.2 reflects the fact that our
adversarial system assigns both sides responsibility for framing the
issues in a case. The importance of enforcing the Rule is evident in
cases where, as here, excusing a party's noncompliance with it would
require this Court to decide, in the first instance, a question
whose resolution could affect this and other cases in a manner
that the District Court and Court of Appeals did not have an
opportunity to consider, and that the parties' arguments before this
Court may not fully address.
[fn15] Although the parties concede the general availability of such
a claim against IBT, they dispute whether Granite Rock abandoned its
agency or alter ego allegations in the course of this litigation.
Compare Brief for Respondent IBT, p. 10 with Reply Brief for
Petitioner 12-13, n. 11. Granite Rock concedes that it has abandoned
its claim that IBT acted as Local's undisclosed principal in
orchestrating the ratification response to the July 2, 2004, CBA.
See Plaintiff Granite Rock's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Defendant IBT's Motion to Dismiss in
No. 5:04-cv-02767-JW (ND Cal., Aug. 7, 2006),
Doc. 178, pp. 6, 8 (hereinafter Points and Authorities). But Granite
Rock insists that it preserved its argument that Local served as
IBT's agent or alter ego when Local denied ratification and engaged
in unauthorized strike activity in July 2004. Nothing in the record
before us unequivocally refutes this assertion. See
App. 306, 311-315, 318; Points and Authorities 6, n. 3. Accordingly,
nothing in this opinion forecloses the parties from litigating these
[fn16] IBT argues that we should dismiss this question as
improvidently granted because Granite Rock abandoned its tortious
interference claim when it declared its intention to seek only
contractual (as opposed to punitive) damages on the claim. See Brief
for Respondent IBT 16. We reject this argument, which confuses
Granite Rock's decision to forgo the pursuit of punitive damages on
its claim with a decision to abandon the claim itself. The two are
not synonymous, and IBT cites no authority for the proposition
that Granite Rock must allege more than economic damages to state a
claim on which relief could be granted.
[fn17] Although the Board and federal jury reached different
conclusions with respect to the CBA's ratification date, the
discrepancy has little practical significance because the Board's
remedial order against Local and IBT gives "retroactive effect to
the terms of the [CBA of] July 2, 2004, as if ratified on
that date." In re Teamsters Local 287,
347 N.L.R.B. 339, 340 (2006).
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in
I join Part III of the Court's opinion, which holds
that petitioner Granite Rock's tortious interference claim against
respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) is not
cognizable under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). I respectfully dissent, however,
from the Court's conclusion that the arbitration provision in the
collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between Granite Rock and IBT
Local 287 does not cover the parties' dispute over whether Local
287 breached the CBAs no-strike clause. In my judgment, the parties
clearly agreed in the CBA to have this dispute resolved by an
arbitrator, not a court.
The legal principles that govern this case are simpler than the
Court's exposition suggests. [***17] Arbitration, all agree, "is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which [it] has not agreed so to submit."
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co.,
363 U. S. 574, 582 (1960). Before ordering parties to arbitrate, a
court must therefore confirm (1) that the parties have an agreement
to arbitrate and (2) that the agreement covers their dispute. See
ante, at 9. In determining the scope of an arbitration
agreement, "there
is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that `[a]n order to
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.'"
475 U. S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting Warrior,
363 U. S., at 582-583); see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 550, n. 4 (1964) ("[W]hen a contract
is scrutinized for evidence of an intention to arbitrate a
particular kind of dispute, national labor policy requires, within
reason, that an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute
. . . be favored" (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks
omitted)).[*2867] [fn1]
The application of these established precepts to the facts of this
case strikes me as equally straightforward: It is undisputed
that Granite Rock and Local 287 executed a CBA in [**589] December 2004. The
parties made the CBA retroactively "effect[ive] from May 1, 2004,"
the day after the expiration of their prior collective-bargaining
agreement. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-190. Among other things, the CBA
prohibited strikes and lockouts. Id., at A-181. The CBA
authorized either party, in accordance with certain grievance
procedures, to "refe[r] to arbitration" "[a]ll disputes arising
under this agreement," except for three
specified "classes of disputes" not implicated here.
Id., at A-176 to A-179.
Granite Rock claims that Local 287 breached the CBA's no-strike
clause by engaging in a work stoppage in July 2004. Local
287 contests this claim. Specifically, it contends that it
had no duty to abide by the no-strike clause in July because it did
not vote to ratify the CBA until August. As I see it, the parties'
disagreement as to whether the no-strike clause proscribed the
July work stoppage is plainly a "disput[e] arising under" the CBA
and is therefore subject to arbitration as Local
287 demands. Indeed, the parties' no-strike dispute is
indistinguishable from myriad other disputes that an employer and
union might have concerning the interpretation and application of
the substantive provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement.
These are precisely the sorts of controversies that labor
arbitrators are called upon to resolve every day.
The majority seems to agree that the CBA's arbitration provision
generally encompasses disputes between Granite Rock and Local
287 regarding the parties' compliance with the terms of the CBA,
including the no-strike clause. The majority contends, however,
that Local 287's "formation-date defense" raises a preliminary
question of contract formation that must be resolved by a court
rather [***18] than an arbitrator. Ante, at 15. The majority's
reasoning appears to be the following: If Local 287 did not ratify
the CBA until August, then there is "no valid basis" for applying
the CBA's arbitration provision to events that occurred in July.
The majority's position is flatly inconsistent with the language
of the CBA. The parties expressly chose to make the agreement
effective from May 1, 2004. As a result, "the date on which [the]
agreement was ratified" does not, as the majority contends,
determine whether the parties' dispute about the permissibility of
the July work stoppage
falls within the scope of the CBA's arbitration provision.
Ante, at 14. When it comes to answering the arbitrability
question, it is entirely irrelevant whether Local 287 ratified the
CBA in August (as it contends) or in July (as Granite Rock
contends). In either case, the parties' dispute — which postdates
May 1 — clearly "aris[es] under" the CBA, which is all the
arbitration provision requires to make a dispute referable to an
arbitrator. Cf. Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business
Systems, Inc. v. NLRB,
501 U. S. 190, 201 (1991) (recognizing that "a collective-bargaining
agreement might be drafted so as to eliminate any hiatus between
expiration of the old and execution of the new agreement").[*2868] [fn2]
Given the CBA's express retroactivity, [**590] the majority errs in
treating Local 287's ratification-date defense as a "formation
dispute" subject to judicial resolution. Ante, at 13. The
defense simply goes to the merits of Granite Rock's claim: Local
287 maintains that the no-strike clause should not be construed to
apply to the July work stoppage because it had not ratified the
CBA at the time of that action. Cf. First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 942 (1995) (distinguishing a
disagreement that "makes up the merits of the dispute" from a
disagreement "about the arbitrability of the dispute").
Accordingly, the defense is necessarily a matter for the arbitrator,
not the court. See AT&T, 475 U. S., at 651 ("[I]t is for the
arbitrator to determine the relative merits of the parties'
interpretations of the agreement"). Indeed, this Court has been
emphatic that "courts . . . have no business weighing the merits of
the grievance." Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U. S. 564, 568 (1960). "When the judiciary undertakes to
determine the merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting
the [arbitration provisions] of collective bargaining agreements, it
usurps a function . . . entrusted to the arbitration tribunal."
Id., at 569; see also AT&T, 475 U. S., at 649 ("[I]n
deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular
grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential
merits of the underlying claims"); Warrior,
363 U. S., at 582, 585 ("[T]he judicial inquiry under
[LMRA] § 301 must be strictly confined to the question whether the
reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance"; "the court
should view with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become
entangled in the construction of the substantive provisions of a
labor agreement").
Attempting to sidestep this analysis, the majority declares
that Local 287 waived its retroactivity argument by failing in the
courts below [***19] to challenge Granite Rock's consistent characterization
of the parties' dispute as one of contract formation. See
ante, at 16. As a result of Local 287's omission,
the District Court and Court of Appeals proceeded under the
understanding that this case presented a formation question. It was
not until its merits brief in this Court that Local 287 attempted to
correct this mistaken premise by pointing to the parties' execution
of the December 2004 CBA with its May 2004 effective date. This
Court's rules "admonis[h] [counsel] that they have an obligation to
the Court to point out in the brief in opposition [to certiorari],
and not later, any perceived misstatement made in the petition [for
certiorari]"; nonjurisdictional arguments not raised at that time
"may be deemed waived." This Court's Rule 15.2. Although it is
regrettable and inexcusable that Local 287 did not present its
argument earlier, I do not see it as one we can ignore. The question
presented in this case presupposes that "it is disputed whether any
binding contract exists." Brief for Petitioner [**591] i. Because it is
instead undisputed that the parties executed a binding contract in
December 2004 that was effective as of May 2004, we can scarcely
pretend that the parties have a formation dispute. Consideration of
this fact is "a `predicate to an intelligent resolution' of the
question presented, and therefore `fairly included therein.'"
[*2869] Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 38 (1996) (quoting
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258, n. 5 (1980); this
Court's Rule 14.1(a)). Indeed, by declining to consider the plain
terms of the parties' agreement, the majority offers little more
than "an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U. S. 227, 241 (1937). In view of the CBA's effective date, I
would hold that the parties agreed to arbitrate the no-strike
dispute, including Local 287's ratification-date defense, and I
would affirm the judgment below on this alternative
ground. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U. S. 471, 475, n. 6 (1970) ("The prevailing party may, of
course, assert in a reviewing court any ground in support of [the]
judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even
considered by the trial court").
[fn1] When the question is "`who (primarily) should decide
arbitrability'" (as opposed to "`whether a particular
merits-related dispute is arbitrable'"), "the law reverses the
presumption." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944-945 (1995). In other words,
"[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,"
it is presumed that courts, not arbitrators, are responsible for
resolving antecedent questions concerning the scope of an
arbitration agreement. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986). As the
majority correctly observes, ante, at 7, n. 5, this case does
not implicate the reversed presumption because both parties accept
that a court, not an arbitrator, should resolve their current
disagreement about whether their underlying dispute is
[fn2] Notably, at the time they executed the CBA in
December 2004, the parties were well aware that they disagreed about
the legitimacy of the July work stoppage. Yet they made the CBA
retroactive to May and declined to carve out their no-strike dispute
from the arbitration provision, despite expressly excluding three
other classes of disputes from
arbitration. Cf. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U. S. 574, 584-585 (1960) ("In the absence of any
express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration,
we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the
claim from arbitration can prevail").