Source: http://openjurist.org/149/f3d/1191/united-states-v-r-abbey
Timestamp: 2016-05-01 21:38:17
Document Index: 297145970

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1865', '§ 383', '§ 1865', '§ 1865', '§ 6101', '§ 6101', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1014', '§ 3']

149 F3d 1191 United States v. R Abbey | OpenJurist
149 F. 3d 1191 - United States v. R Abbey Home
149 F3d 1191 United States v. R Abbey 149 F.3d 1191
98 CJ C.A.R. 2969
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Dennis R. ABBEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 97-1284.
We review a district court's interpretation of the guidelines de novo and the court's factual findings for clear error, giving due deference to its application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Janusz, 135 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir.1998). With respect to a district court's determination of a U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 loss in particular, we apply a clear error standard. United States v. Yarnell, 129 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir.1997).
"Loss, under § 2F1.1(b)(1), 'is the value of the money, property, or services unlawfully taken.' " Janusz, 135 F.3d at 1324 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment n.7). We interpret "loss" to "mean the 'net value, not the gross value, of what was taken.' " United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Gennuso, 967 F.2d 1460, 1462 (10th Cir.1992)). Accordingly, in cases where a victim of fraud has received something of value from the defendant, the net value is determined by subtracting the value received by the victim from the gross value of what was fraudulently taken. However, we have not required a sentencing court to factor in "money subsequently returned to victims." Id. Because amounts of loss over $2,000 increase a defendant's base offense level for crimes involving fraud and deceit, the government bears the burden of proof on the loss amount. Yarnell, 129 F.3d at 1136.
In reviewing a district court's decision to impose an obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1, we review the underlying factual findings for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1424 (10th Cir.1997). Section 3C1.1 provides for a two-level upward adjustment "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." Obstruction of justice includes "producing ... a false ... document or record during an official investigation or judicial proceeding." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment n. 3(c).
After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude the district court's factual findings on this issue are not clearly erroneous.1 Although it is conceivable a large exhibit summarizing detailed time expenditures may contain innocent mistakes, the inconsistencies in the exhibits produced by Abbey and submitted to the district court were so glaring it was entirely reasonable for the court to conclude they were "palpably false" and "unreliable," and were the product of a willful attempt to "mislead[ ] the court into minimizing defendant's sentence." Record I at 54, 69.
A trial court's decision to strike a juror for cause is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 116, 139 L.Ed.2d 68 (1997). Any questions involving interpretation of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 are reviewed de novo. Id. "Under the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, ... any person is qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the district court unless, inter alia, that person '(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form; [or] (3) is unable to speak the English language.' " United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2) and (3)). "[A] juror who fails to meet the statutory qualifications is subject to challenge 'for cause.' " 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 383, at 361 (2d ed.1982).
There is no indication Vu was unable to satisfactorily complete the juror qualification form and it appears he met the statutory requirement set forth in § 1865(b)(2). Accordingly, the only conceivable basis for striking him for cause would have been an inability "to speak the English language." In Dempsey, we acknowledged the phrase " 'speak the English language' is often used to mean 'speak and understand spoken English,' " but refused to adopt this construction of the phrase for purposes of applying the Jury Selection and Service Act. 830 F.2d at 1087. Instead, we applied the phrase literally to refer only to a person's speaking ability. Under Dempsey 's construction of § 1865(b)(3), it appears Vu satisfied the Act because he was able to speak the English language when questioned by the court.
Assuming, arguendo, the district court abused its discretion in striking Vu from the panel for cause, Abbey is entitled to a new trial only if he can demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the error. See United States v. Mills, 987 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967, 974 (4th Cir.1987) (improper striking of prospective juror for cause subject to harmless error analysis). Notably, Abbey has not even attempted to argue actual prejudice and, after carefully reviewing the entire trial transcript, we are not convinced any prejudice resulted from Vu's removal.
Although Abbey attempts to argue the district court's dismissal of Vu resulted in violations of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment, we are not convinced such challenges are applicable where, as here, a potential juror is stricken for cause. See United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1364-65 (8th Cir.1996) (concluding "Batson applies only to peremptory strikes"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 963, 136 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1575 n. 3 (11th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 515-16 (1st Cir.1994) ("defendant must show that the challenge was peremptory rather than for cause" to invoke Batson ). As the Eighth Circuit noted in Elliott, the extrapolation of the Batson2 framework to for-cause strikes "fails to recognize that peremptory strikes, for which no reasons need be given (absent a Batson challenge), are different from challenges for cause, which by definition require a showing of cause." 89 F.3d at 1365. Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Abbey's Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges are proper, we are not convinced a trial court's abuse of discretion in striking a potential juror for cause, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of either the Fifth or the Sixth Amendment. See generally United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1998 WL 177982 at * 2 (10th Cir.1998) (outlining requirements to establish prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment); Contreras, 108 F.3d at 1268 (outlining requirements to establish prima facie violation of Fifth Amendment equal protection clause). Any error on the part of the district court in dismissing Vu for cause is harmless and does not entitle Abbey to a new trial.
"A charge of misconduct by a trial judge 'should not be lightly made and once made, should not be casually treated by a reviewing court.' " United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 620 (10th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Cardall, 550 F.2d 604, 606 (10th Cir.1976)). Charges of partiality or misconduct on the part of the trial judge "should be judged not on an isolated comment or two, but on the record as a whole." United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d 414, 418 (1st Cir.1988). A trial judge is " 'the governor of [a] trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct.' " Id. (quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933)). It is "beyond dispute" that a trial judge has authority to question witnesses. United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1485 (10th Cir.1996). In particular, such questioning is appropriate when necessary to clarify testimony for the court and jury, or to correct misstatements by witnesses. See id. at 1486. "[H]owever, ... in exercising this power a judge must take care not to create the appearance that he or she is less than totally impartial." Id. at 1485. In addition to questioning witnesses, a trial court also has "broad discretion 'to comment reasonably upon the evidence.' " United States v. Pearson, 798 F.2d 385, 387 (10th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 203 (10th Cir.1980)). Again, however, the trial court must " 'be[ ] careful not to become an advocate for any of the parties.' " Id.
Before directly addressing Abbey's arguments, we note he did not raise contemporaneous objections to some of the misconduct now alleged on appeal. Although he did move for a mistrial at one point in the proceedings, the trial judge's alleged improper questioning of witness Kent Olsen occurred the day after the motion for mistrial. Similarly, the alleged improper comments made during Abbey's own testimony occurred two days after the motion for mistrial had been denied. Because Abbey never renewed his motion for mistrial, any alleged misconduct that occurred after the denial of his motion for mistrial is subject to review only for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
Abbey contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions on counts 2, 6, and 7. We review de novo the question of whether the evidence at trial was sufficient. United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1284 (10th Cir.1996). Viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, we ask whether a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We will reverse only if we conclude no reasonable jury could have reached the disputed verdict. Id.
To prove a violation of § 6101(a), the language of the statute itself suggests the government must demonstrate, in part, that the defendant was either "legally vested with the responsibility or care of a claimant or a claimant's estate," or was in "charge and custody in a fiduciary capacity of money ... paid under any of the laws administered by the [VA] for the benefit of any minor, incompetent, or other beneficiary." Although the statute does not define the term "fiduciary capacity," Black's Law Dictionary indicates a person acts in a "fiduciary capacity" when
Black's Law Dictionary 625 (6th ed.1990). Recently, the Second Circuit approved this very definition of "fiduciary capacity" in concluding a defendant was properly convicted of violating § 6101, even though he had never personally signed a fiduciary agreement with the VA. United States v. Zyskind, 118 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir.1997) (defendant, administrator of home for handicapped adults, was placed in relationship of fiduciary with respect to funds paid by VA to home for care of veteran, even though defendant did not personally sign fiduciary agreement with VA).
Counts 6 and 7--false statements regarding Fred Ball's estate. Counts 6 and 7 of the indictment each charged Abbey with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by making false statements to the VA regarding the estate of veteran Fred Ball. Count 6 alleged that on or about January 28, 1991, Abbey completed and submitted to the VA a form entitled "Statement in Support of Claim," that fraudulently indicated a truck had been purchased for Fred Ball and his estate was below $20,000.3 Count 7 alleged that on or about May 10, 1991, Abbey submitted to the VA an interim accounting on behalf of Ball that falsely indicated a Ford Explorer costing $24,915.16 had been purchased for Ball. On appeal, Abbey contends his convictions on these two counts must be reversed because the government did not produce sufficient evidence that any of the statements in the two documents were "material." With respect to Count 6, Abbey argues there was nothing in the January 28, 1991, document submitted to the VA that was "material" because "it had no bearing on whether the VA would or would not continue benefits payments [for Ball] until March 31, 1991." Br. at 43. Similarly, as to Count 7, Abbey contends there was nothing in the May 10, 1991, accounting submitted to the VA that was "material" because, even though a Ford Explorer had not been purchased for Ball, a Ford Ranger truck had been purchased for him. According to Abbey, either vehicle purchase was sufficient to drop Ball's estate below $25,000 and prevent the VA from stopping benefit payments to Ball. Thus, Abbey argues, the statement regarding the purchase of the Explorer did not cause the VA to do something it would not have otherwise done had it known the true facts.
Abbey himself acknowledges that, in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, we have consistently held a " 'false statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.' " United States v. Meuli, 8 F.3d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1415 (10th Cir.1991)). Actual reliance on the false statement is unnecessary; all that need be shown is it "has the capacity to influence the decision." United States v. Haddock, 956 F.2d 1534, 1550 (10th Cir.1992) (construing similar materiality provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1014).
As Abbey acknowledges in his opening brief, this issue is subject to review for plain error since no objection was made to the jury instructions at trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b); see United States v. Galbraith, 20 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir.1994). Plain error affects the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial, and it must have been both obvious and substantial. Id.
"[T]he Fifth Amendment forbids amendment of an indictment by the court, whether actual or constructive." United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1474 (10th Cir.1995). A variance between the indictment and the jury instructions "becomes a constructive amendment if the evidence presented at trial and the instructions raise the possibility that a defendant may have been convicted on a charge other than that alleged in the Indictment." United States v. Davis, 55 F.3d 517, 520-21 (10th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1513 (10th Cir.1995) (a constructive amendment is a type of variance because it modifies an essential element of the offense charged).
(a.) DENNIS R. ABBEY submitted and caused to be submitted accountings for sixteen of the eighteen qualified veterans ..., which stated that MARGARET J. SCHAEFER provided counseling services in the aggregate amount of approximately $83,980.00, when, in fact, she did not provide the counseling services as described.
Abbey makes a passing reference in his opening brief to the appropriate standard of proof on this issue. In particular, he points to language in Application Note 1 to the applicable version of § 3C1.1 which states: "In applying this provision in respect to alleged false testimony or statements by the defendant, such testimony or statements should be evaluated in a light most favorable to the defendant." Based on this language, he contends the proper standard of proof is "clear and convincing" rather than "preponderance of the evidence." Although a few circuits have apparently agreed a "clear and convincing" standard applies when a sentencing court is relying on a defendant's perjury as a basis for the obstruction of justice enhancement, see, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 119 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1518 (D.C.Cir.1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 865 (1998), this circuit has not decided the issue. In all other contexts, we have held the appropriate standard of proof for obstruction of justice enhancement is a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Pelliere, 57 F.3d 936, 938 (10th Cir.1995). Ultimately, we find it unnecessary to decide whether a "clear and convincing" standard of proof applies in cases involving a defendant's perjury because the enhancement in this case is not based on defendant's testimony, but rather on false documents he prepared and submitted to the court
At that time, there was in effect the "$25,000 rule," which compelled the VA to cease paying benefits to any veteran whose estate exceeded $25,000. According to the evidence presented at trial, it was apparently common for VA fiduciaries to spend down their veterans' accounts to avoid application of the rule