Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105059/fedorenko-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-02-19 15:58:02
Document Index: 595830949

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 340', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1451', '§ 316', '§ 1427', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 1451', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1427', '§ 340', '§ 1451', '§ 18', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1451', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

Fedorenko Vs United States - Citation 105059 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Fedorenko Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105059
Case Number 449 U.S. 490
Appellant Fedorenko
fedorenko v. united states - 449 u.s. 490 (1981) u.s. supreme court fedorenko v. united states, 449 u.s. 490 (1981) fedorenko v. united states no. 79-5602 argued october 15, 1980 decided january 21, 1981 449 u.s. 490 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit syllabus the displaced persons act of 1948 (dpa) enabled european refugees driven from their homelands by world war ii to emigrate to the united states without regard to traditional immigration quotas. it provided that any person "who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission into the united states as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into the united states," .....
Fedorenko v. United States - 449 U.S. 490 (1981)
U.S. Supreme Court Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981)
his application for the DPA visa but claimed that he had been forced to serve as a guard and denied any personal involvement in the atrocities committed at the camp. The District Court entered judgment for petitioner, finding, inter alia, that, although petitioner had lied about his wartime activities when he applied for a visa in 1949, he had been forced to serve as a guard, and the Government had not met its burden of proving that he had committed war crimes or atrocities at Treblinka. The court held that, because disclosure of petitioner's involuntary service as a concentration camp guard would not have been grounds for denial of citizenship, his false statements about his wartime activities were not misrepresentations of "material facts" within the meaning of the denaturalization statute under the materiality standard announced in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 . As an alternative basis for its decision, the court held that, even assuming misrepresentation of material facts, equitable and mitigating circumstances -- the inconclusiveness of the evidence that petitioner had committed war crimes or atrocities and the uncontroverted evidence that he had been responsible and law-abiding since coming to the United States -- required that he be permitted to retain his citizenship. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court had misinterpreted the Chaunt test and that it had no discretion to enter judgment for petitioner in the face of a finding that he had procured his naturalization by willfully concealing material facts.
Held: Petitioner's citizenship must be revoked under § 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because it was "illegally procured." Pp. 449 U. S. 505 -518.
(a) The Government carries a heavy burden of proof in a denaturalization proceeding, and evidence justifying revocation of citizenship must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and not leave the issue in doubt. However, there must be strict compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship. Failure to comply with any of these conditions renders the certificate of citizenship "illegally procured," and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside. Pp. 449 U. S. 505 -507.
civil[ians]" mandates the literal interpretation, rejected by the District Court, that an individual's service as a concentration camp armed guard -- whether voluntary or involuntary -- made him ineligible for a visa. Since a misrepresentation must be considered material if disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa, and since disclosure of the true facts here would, as a matter of law, have made petitioner ineligible for a visa, it is unnecessary to determine whether the materiality test of Chaunt as to applications for citizenship also applies to false statements in visa applications. Pp. 449 U. S. 507 -514.
(c) In 1970, when petitioner filed his petition for and was admitted to citizenship, the Immigration and Nationality Act required an applicant for citizenship to be lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, which admission, in turn, required that the individual possess a valid unexpired immigrant visa. And, under the law applicable at the time of petitioner's initial entry into the United States, a visa obtained through a material misrepresentation was not valid. Since petitioner thus failed to satisfy a statutory requirement which Congress had imposed as a prerequisite to the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization, his citizenship must be revoked because it was "illegally procured." Pp. 449 U. S. 514 -516.
(d) Although a denaturalization action is a suit in equity, a district court lacks equitable discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by willful misrepresentation of material facts. Once a district court determines that the Government has met its burden of proving that a naturalized citizen obtained his citizenship illegally or by willful misrepresentation, it has no discretion to excuse the conduct. Pp. 449 U. S. 516 -518.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., concurred in the judgment. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 449 U. S. 518 . WHITE, J., post, p. 449 U. S. 526 , and STEVENS, J., post, p. 449 U. S. 530 , filed dissenting opinions
Section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 260, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), requires revocation of United States citizenship that was "illegally procured or . . . procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." [ Footnote 1 ] The Government brought this denaturalization action, alleging that petitioner procured his citizenship illegally or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact. The District Court entered judgment for petitioner, but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered entry of a judgment of denaturalization. We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 1070, to resolve two questions: whether petitioner's failure to disclose, in his application for a visa to come to this country, that he had served during the Second World War as an armed guard at the Nazi concentration camp at Treblinka, Poland, rendered his citizenship revocable as "illegally procured" or procured by willful misrepresentation of a material fact, and if so, whether the District Court nonetheless possessed equitable discretion to refrain from entering judgment in favor of the Government under these circumstances.
Petitioner was born in the Ukraine in 1907. He was drafted into the Russian Army in June, 1941, but was captured by the Germans shortly thereafter. After being held in a series of prisoner-of-war camps, petitioner was selected to go to the German camp at Travnicki in Poland, where he received training as a concentration camp guard. In September, 1942, he was assigned to the Nazi concentration camp at Treblinka in Poland, where he was issued a uniform and rifle and where he served as a guard during 1942 and 1943. The infamous Treblinka concentration camp was described by the District Court as a "human abattoir" at which several hundred thousand Jewish civilians were murdered. [ Footnote 2 ] After an armed uprising by the inmates at Treblinka led to the closure of the camp in August, 1943, petitioner was transferred to a German labor camp at Danzig and then to the German prisoner of war camp at Poelitz, where he continued to serve as an armed guard. Petitioner was eventually transferred to Hamburg where he served as a warehouse guard. Shortly before the British forces entered that city in 1945, petitioner discarded his uniform and was able to pass as a civilian. For the next four years, he worked in Germany as a laborer.
In 1948, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act (DPA or Act), 62 Stat. 1009, to enable European refugees driven from their homelands by the war to emigrate to the United States without regard to traditional immigration quotas. The Act's definition of "displaced persons" [ Footnote 3 ] eligible for immigration to this country specifically excluded individuals who had "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians]" or had "voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their operations. . . ." [ Footnote 4 ] Section 10 of the DPA, 62 Stat. 1013, placed the burden of proving eligibility under the Act on the person seeking admission, and provided that
The Act established an elaborate system for determining eligibility for displaced person status. Each applicant was first interviewed by representatives of the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations (IRO) who ascertained that the person was a refugee or displaced person. [ Footnote 5 ] The applicant
was then interviewed by an official of the Displaced Persons Commission, [ Footnote 6 ] who made a preliminary determination about his eligibility under the DPA. The final decision was made by one of several State Department vice consuls who were specially trained for the task and sent to Europe to administer the Act. [ Footnote 7 ] Thereafter, the application was reviewed by officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to make sure that the applicant was admissible into the United States under the standard immigration laws.
In October, 1949, petitioner applied for admission to the United States as a displaced person. Petitioner falsified his visa application by lying about his wartime activities. He told the investigators from the Displaced Persons Commission that he had been a farmer in Sarny, Poland, from 1937 until March, 1942, and that he had then been deported to Germany and forced to work in a factory in Poelitz until the end of the war, when he fled to Hamburg. [ Footnote 8 ] Petitioner told the same
In 1969, petitioner applied for naturalization at the INS office in Hartford, Conn. Petitioner did not disclose his wartime service as a concentration camp armed guard in his application, [ Footnote 9 ] and he did not mention it in his sworn testimony to INS naturalization examiners. The INS examiners took petitioner's visa papers at face value, and recommended that his citizenship application be granted. On this recommendation, the Superior Court of New Haven County granted his petition for naturalization, and he became an American citizen on April 23, 1970.
Seven years later, after petitioner had moved to Miami Beach and become a resident of Florida, [ Footnote 10 ] the Government filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to revoke petitioner's citizenship. The complaint alleged that petitioner should have been deemed ineligible for a DPA visa because he had served as an armed guard at Treblinka and had committed crimes or atrocities
against inmates of the camp because they were Jewish. The Government charged that petitioner had willfully concealed this information both in applying for a DPA visa and in applying for citizenship, and that, therefore, petitioner had procured his naturalization illegally or by willfully misrepresenting material facts. [ Footnote 11 ]
The Government's witnesses at trial included six survivors of Treblinka who claimed that they had seen petitioner commit specific acts of violence against inmates of the camp. [ Footnote 12 ] Each witness made a pretrial identification of petitioner from a. photo array that included his 1949 visa photograph, and three of the witnesses made courtroom identifications. The Government also called as a witness Kempton Jenkins, a career foreign service officer who served in Germany after the war as one of the vice consuls who administered the DPA. Jenkins had been trained to administer the Act and had reviewed
Jenkins testified that the vice consuls made the final decision about an applicant's eligibility for displaced person status. [ Footnote 13 ] He indicated that, if there had been any suggestion that an applicant "had served or been involved in" a concentration camp, processing of his application would have been suspended to permit a thorough investigation. Id. at 766. If it were then determined that the applicant had been an armed guard at the camp, he would have been found ineligible for a visa as a matter of law. Id. at 767-768, 822. Jenkins explained that service as an armed guard at a concentration camp brought the applicant under the statutory exclusion of persons who "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians]," regardless of whether the applicant had not volunteered for service [ Footnote 14 ] or had not committed atrocities against inmates. Id. at 768, 797-798. Jenkins emphasized that this interpretation of the Act was "uniformly" accepted by the vice consuls, and that, furthermore, he knew of no case in which a known concentration camp guard was found eligible for a DPA visa. [ Footnote 15 ] Id. at 767. Jenkins also described the elaborate
Petitioner took the stand in his own behalf. He admitted his service as an armed guard at Treblinka and that he had known that thousands of Jewish inmates were being murdered there. Id. at 1442, 1451-1452, 1465. Petitioner claimed that he was forced to serve as a guard, and denied any personal involvement in the atrocities committed at the camp, id. at 1276, 1297-1298, 1539-1540; he insisted that he had merely been a perimeter guard. Petitioner admitted, however, that he had followed orders and shot in the general direction of escaping inmates during the August, 1943, uprising that led to closure of the camp. Id. at 1507-1509, 1546, 1564. Petitioner maintained that he was a prisoner of war at Treblinka, id. at 1495, although he admitted that the Russian armed guards significantly outnumbered the German soldiers at the camp, [ Footnote 16 ] that he was paid a stipend and received a good service stripe from the Germans, and that he was allowed to leave the camp regularly, but never tried to escape. Id. at 1467-1471, 1489-1494, 1497, 1508. [ Footnote 17 ] Finally, petitioner conceded that he deliberately gave false statements about his wartime activities to the investigators from the Displaced Persons Commission and to the vice consul who reviewed his visa application. Id. at 1518-1524.
455 F.Supp. 893 (1978). The court found that petitioner had served as an armed guard at Treblinka, and that he lied about his wartime activities when he applied for a PA visa in 1949. [ Footnote 18 ] The court found, however, that petitioner was forced to serve as a guard. The court concluded that it could credit neither the Treblinka survivors' identification of petitioner nor their testimony, [ Footnote 19 ] and it held that the Government had not met its burden of proving that petitioner committed war crimes or atrocities at Treblinka.
455 F.Supp. at 915 (quoting 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 355 ). The District Court rejected the Government's claim that disclosure of petitioner's service as a concentration camp armed guard would have been grounds for denial of citizenship. The court therefore ruled that the withheld facts were not material under the first Chaunt test. The Government argued, however, that the second Chaunt test did not require proof that the concealed facts prevented an investigation that would have revealed facts warranting denial of citizenship. The Government contended, instead, that the second test merely required proof that an investigation might have uncovered such facts, and it argued that petitioner's concealment of his service at Treblinka fell within this test. The District Court conceded that the language of Chaunt was ambiguous enough to support the Government's interpretation of the second test. But relying on decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits, [ Footnote 20 ] the District Court rejected the Government's position and interpreted both Chaunt tests as requiring proof that "the true facts would have warranted denial of citizenship." 455 F.Supp. at 916. Applying this test, the court ruled that petitioner's false statements were not "material" within the meaning of the denaturalization statute. In doing so, the court first rejected Jenkins' testimony and held that petitioner was not ineligible for a DPA visa. The court concluded that petitioner did not come under the DPA's exclusion of persons who had assisted in the persecution of civilians because he had served involuntarily. Second, the court found that, although disclosure of petitioner's service as a Treblinka guard "certainly would" have prompted an investigation into
his activities, the Government had failed to prove that such an inquiry would have uncovered any additional facts warranting denial of petitioner's application for a visa. Id. at 916. [ Footnote 21 ]
of the second Chaunt test as requiring proof of ultimate facts warranting denial of citizenship. Instead, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Government that the second Chaunt test requires only clear and convincing proof that (a) disclosure of the true facts would have led to an investigation and (b) the investigation might have uncovered other facts warranting denial of citizenship. [ Footnote 22 ]
In applying its formulation of the second Chaunt test to the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals concluded that one part of the test was satisfied by the District Court's finding that the American authorities would have conducted an investigation if petitioner had disclosed that he had served as an armed guard at Treblinka. The Court of Appeals then found that Jenkins' testimony and other evidence before the District Court clearly and convincingly proved that the investigation might have resulted in denial of petitioner's application for a visa, [ Footnote 23 ] and the Court of Appeals held that petitioner procured his naturalization "by misrepresentation and concealment of his whereabouts during the war years and his service as a concentration camp guard." 597 F.2d at 953. The Court of Appeals further held that the District Court had erred in supposing that it had discretion to enter judgment in favor of petitioner notwithstanding a finding that
petitioner had procured his naturalization by willfully concealing material facts. The Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he denaturalization statute . . . does not accord the district courts any authority to excuse the fraudulent procurement of citizenship." Id. at 954. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's citizenship must be revoked. [ Footnote 24 ] We affirm, but for reasons which differ from those stated by the Court of Appeals.
On the one hand, our decisions have recognized that the right to acquire American citizenship is a precious one, and that, once citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe and unsettling consequences. See Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265 , 365 U. S. 269 (1961); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 353 ; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 , 322 U. S. 675 -676 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , 320 U. S. 122 (1943). For these reasons, we have held that the Government "carries a heavy burden of proof in a proceeding to divest a naturalized citizen of his citizenship." Costello v. United States, supra at 365 U. S. 269 . The evidence justifying revocation of citizenship must be " clear, unequivocal, and convincing'" and not leave "`the issue in doubt.'" Schneiderman v. United States, supra at 320 U. S. 125 (quoting Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325 , 121 U. S. 381 (1887)). Any less exacting standard would be inconsistent with the importance of the right that
At the same time, our cases have also recognized that there must be strict compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship. Failure to comply with any of these conditions renders the certificate of citizenship "illegally procured," and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U. S. 253 , 387 U. S. 267 , n. 23 (1967). See Maney v. United States, 278 U. S. 17 (1928); United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319 (1917); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472 (1917). As we explained in one of these prior decisions:
United States v. Ginsberg, supra at 243 U. S. 474 -475. This judicial insistence on strict compliance with the statutory conditions precedent to naturalization is simply an acknowledgment of the fact that Congress alone has the constitutional authority to prescribe rules for naturalization, [ Footnote 25 ] and the courts' task is to assure compliance with the particular prerequisites to the acquisition of United States citizenship
by naturalization legislated to safeguard the integrity of this "priceless treasure." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763 , 339 U. S. 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
Petitioner does not, and indeed cannot, challenge the Government's contention that he willfully misrepresented facts about his wartime activities when he applied for a DPA visa in 1949. Petitioner admitted at trial that he "willingly" gave false information in connection with his application for a DPA visa so as to avoid the possibility of repatriation to the Soviet Union. [ Footnote 26 ] Record 1520. The District Court specifically noted that there was no dispute that petitioner "lied" in his application. 455 F.Supp. at 914. Thus, petitioner falls within the plain language of the DPA's admonition that
62 Stat. 1013. This does not, however, end our inquiry, because we agree with the Government [ Footnote 27 ] that this provision only applies to willful misrepresentations about "material" facts. [ Footnote 28 ] The first issue we must
At the outset, we must determine the proper standard to be applied in judging whether petitioner's false statements were material. Both petitioner and the Government have assumed, as did the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that materiality under the above-quoted provision of the DPA is governed by the standard announced in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960). But we do not find it so obvious that the Chaunt test is applicable here. In that case, the Government charged that Chaunt had procured his citizenship by concealing and misrepresenting his record of arrests in the United States in his application for citizenship, and that the arrest record was a "material" fact within the meaning of the denaturalization statute. [ Footnote 29 ] Thus, the materiality standard announced in that case pertained to false statements in applications for citizenship, and the arrests that Chaunt failed to disclose all took place after he came to this country. The case presented no question concerning the lawfulness of his initial entry into the United States.
is seeking to revoke petitioner's citizenship because of the alleged unlawfulness of his initial entry into the United States. Although the complaint charged that petitioner misrepresented facts about his wartime activities in both his application for a visa and his application for naturalization, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals focused on the false statements in petitioner's application for a visa. Thus, under the analysis of both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the misrepresentation that raises the materiality issue in this case was contained in petitioner's application for a visa. [ Footnote 30 ] These distinctions plainly raise the important question whether the Chaunt test for materiality of misrepresentations in applications for citizenship also applies to false statements in visa applications.
persons]" contained in the Constitution of the IRO, see n 3, supra, specifically provided that individuals who "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians]" were ineligible for visas under the Act. [ Footnote 31 ] Jenkins testified that petitioner's service as an armed guard at a concentration camp -- whether voluntary or not -- made him ineligible for a visa under this provision. [ Footnote 32 ] Jenkins' testimony was based on his firsthand
experience as a vice consul in Germany after the war reviewing DPA visa applications. Jenkins also testified that the practice of the vice consuls was to circulate among the other vice consuls the case files of any visa applicant who was shown to have been a concentration camp armed guard. Record 826. Thus, Jenkins and the other vice consuls were particularly well informed about the practice concerning the eligibility of former camp guards for DPA visas. The District Court evidently agreed that a literal interpretation of the statute would confirm the accuracy of Jenkins' testimony. 455 F.Supp. at 913. But by construing § 2(a) as only excluding individuals who voluntarily assisted in the persecution of civilians, the District Court was able to ignore Jenkins' uncontroverted testimony about how the Act was interpreted by the officials who administered it. [ Footnote 33 ]
The Court of Appeals evidently accepted the District Court's construction of the Act, since it agreed that the Government had failed to show that petitioner was ineligible for a DPA visa. 597 F.2d at 953. Because we are unable to find any basis for an "involuntary assistance" exception in the language of § 2(a), we conclude that the District Court's construction of the Act was incorrect. The plain language of the Act mandates precisely the literal interpretation that the District Court rejected: an individual's service as a concentration camp armed guard -- whether voluntary or involuntary -- made him ineligible for a visa. That Congress was perfectly capable of adopting a "voluntariness" limitation where it felt that one was necessary is plain from comparing § 2(a) with § 2(b), which excludes only those individuals who " voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their operations. . . ." Under traditional principles of statutory construction, the deliberate omission of the word "voluntary" from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas. [ Footnote 34 ] See National Railroad Passenger Corp.
v. National Assoc. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453 , 414 U. S. 458 (1974); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U. S. 282 , 278 U. S. 289 (1929). As this Court has previously stated:
Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U. S. 21 , 293 U. S. 38 (1934). See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S. 505 , 371 U. S. 514 -515 (1963). Thus, the plain language of the statute and Jenkins' uncontradicted and unequivocal testimony leave no room for doubt that, if petitioner had disclosed the fact that he had been an armed guard at Treblinka, he would have been found ineligible for a visa under the DPA. [ Footnote 35 ] This being so, we must conclude that petitioner's
Our conclusion that petitioner was, as a matter of law, ineligible for a visa under the DPA makes the resolution of this case fairly straightforward. As noted, supra at 449 U. S. 506 -507, our cases have established that a naturalized citizen's failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites for naturalization renders his certificate of citizenship revocable as "illegally procured" under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). In 1970, when petitioner filed his application for, and was admitted to, citizenship, §§ 316(a) and 318 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a) and 1429, required an applicant for citizenship to be lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. [ Footnote 36 ] Lawful admission for permanent
residence, in turn, required that the individual possess a valid unexpired immigrant visa. At the time of petitioner's initial entry into this country, § 13(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1924, ch.190, 43 Stat. 153, 161 (repealed in 1952), provided that "[n]o immigrant shall be admitted to the United States unless he (1) has an unexpired immigration visa. . . ." [ Footnote 37 ] The courts at that time consistently held that § 13(a) required a valid visa, and that a visa obtained through a material misrepresentation was not valid. See, e.g., Ablett v. Brownell, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 391, 240 F.2d 625, 629 (1957); United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (CA2 1951). Section 10 of the DPA, 62 Stat. 1013, provided that
And as previously noted, petitioner was inadmissible into this country under the express terms of the DPA. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner failed to satisfy a statutory requirement which Congress has imposed as a prerequisite to the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization, we must agree with the Government that petitioner's citizenship must be revoked because it was "illegally procured." See Polites v. United States, 364 U. S. 426 , 364 U. S. 436 -437 (1960); Schwinn v. United States, 311 U.S. 616 (1940); Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. at 278 U. S. 22 -23; United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. at 475; Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9 , 231 U. S. 17 (1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227 , 225 U. S. 240 (1912). Cf. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 163 (Douglas, J., concurring). [ Footnote 38 ] In the lexicon
of our cases, one of the "jurisdictional facts upon which the grant [of citizenship] is predicated," Johannessen v. United States, supra at 225 U. S. 240 , was missing at the time petitioner became a citizen.
This conclusion would lead us to affirm on statutory grounds (and not on the basis of our decision in Chaunt ), the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner argues, however, that, in a denaturalization proceeding, a district court has discretion to consider the equities in determining whether citizenship should be revoked. This is the view adopted by the District Court but rejected by the Court of Appeals. It is true, as petitioner notes, that this Court has held that a denaturalization action is a suit in equity. Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , 328 U. S. 671 (1946); Luria v. United States, supra at 231 U. S. 27 -28. Petitioner further points to numerous cases in which the courts have exercised discretion in determining whether citizenship should be granted. See, e.g., In re Iwanenko's Petition, 145 F.Supp. 838 (ND Ill.1956); Petition of R., 56 F.Supp. 969 (Mass.1944). Petitioner would therefore have us conclude that similar discretion should be available to a denaturalization court to weigh the equities in light of all the circumstances in order to arrive at a solution that is just and fair. He then argues that, if such power exists, the facts of this case, particularly his record of good conduct over the past 29 years and the reasonable doubts about some of the allegations in the Government's complaint, all weigh in favor of permitting him to retain his citizenship. Although petitioner presents this argument with respect to revocation of citizenship procured through willful misrepresentation of material facts, we assume that petitioner believes that courts should also be allowed to weigh the equities in
We agree with the Court of Appeals that district courts lack equitable discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by willful misrepresentation of material facts. Petitioner is correct in noting that courts necessarily and properly exercise discretion in characterizing certain facts while determining whether an applicant for citizenship meets some of the requirements for naturalization. [ Footnote 39 ] But that limited discretion does not include the authority to excuse illegal or fraudulent procurement of citizenship. As the Court of Appeals stated:
597 F.2d at 954. By the same token, once a district court determines that the Government has met its burden of proving that a naturalized citizen obtained his citizenship illegally or by willful misrepresentation, it has no discretion to excuse the conduct. Indeed, contrary to the District Court's suggestion, see supra at 449 U. S. 503 , this issue had been settled by prior decisions of this Court. In case after case, we have rejected lower court efforts to moderate or otherwise avoid the statutory mandate of Congress in denaturalization proceedings. For example, in United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319 (1917), we ordered the denaturalization of an individual who "possessed the personal qualifications which entitle aliens to admission and to citizenship," id. at 245 U. S. 321 , but who had failed to file a certificate of arrival as required by statute. We explained that there was "no power . . . vested in the naturalization court to dispense with" this requirement.
Id. at 245 U. S. 324 . We repeat here what we said in one of these earlier cases:
"An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon the terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare. United States v. Ginsberg , 243 U.S. at 243 U. S. 474 -75."
See Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. at 278 U. S. 22 -23; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. at 241-242.
In sum, we hold that petitioner's citizenship must be revoked under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) because it was illegally procured. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. [ Footnote 40 ]
"( a ) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United Nations; or"
"( b ) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their operations against the United Nations."
Although the denaturalization statute speaks in terms of "willful misrepresentation" or "concealment of a material fact," this Court has indicated that the concealment, no less than the misrepresentation, must be willful, and that the misrepresentation must also relate to a material fact. See Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265 , 365 U. S. 271 -272, n. 3 (1961). Logically, the same principle should govern the interpretation of this provision of the DPA.
The dissenting opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS argues that the Government "expressly disavowed" our interpretation of the DPA, post at 449 U. S. 530 , and that the Government "unequivocally accepted" the District Court's construction of § 2(a), post at 449 U. S. 535 . Elsewhere, the dissent suggests that the District Court's construction is "the Government's interpretation of the statute," post at 449 U. S. 536 . The sole basis for these assertions is a footnote in the Government's brief in the Court of Appeals which merely stated: "The United States has no quarrel with [the District Court's] construction [of § 2(a)] in this case " (emphasis added). In our judgment, none of the dissent's claims is borne out by this statement. The suggestion that the Government "unequivocally accepted" the District Court's interpretation of the Act is, at best, an exaggeration, and we have found no evidence in the record or briefs in this case of the Government's "express disavowal" of our construction of § 2(a). Furthermore, being neither endowed with psychic powers nor privy to the Government's deliberations, we cannot join JUSTICE STEVENS, see post at 449 U. S. 535 -536, in speculating about the reasons that the Government chose not to "quarrel with" the District Court's interpretation of § 2(a) "in this case."
As for JUSTICE STEVENS' belief that our interpretation of the statute is "erroneous," see post at 449 U. S. 533 , we simply note that he is unable to point to anything in the language of the Act that justifies reading into § 2(a) the "voluntariness" limitation that Congress omitted. Thus, we must conclude that JUSTICE STEVENS' real quarrel is with Congress, which drafted the statute. It is not the function of the courts to amend statutes under the guise of "statutory interpretation." See Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, ante at 449 U. S. 274 . Finally, since the term "persecution" does not apply to some of the tasks performed by concentration camp inmates, see n 34, supra, we reject the speculation that our decision "may jeopardize the citizenship of countless survivors of Nazi concentration camps," post at 449 U. S. 530 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
I agree with much of the Court's reasoning, as well as with the result it reaches. I am perplexed, however, by the Court's reluctance, ante at 449 U. S. 508 -509, to apply the materiality standard of Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960), to petitioner's circumstances. I write separately to express my understanding that application of Chaunt would yield no different result here, and to state my belief that a standard as rigorous as Chaunt's is necessary to protect the rights of our naturalized citizens.
of a material fact for purposes of the denaturalization statute. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Id. at 364 U. S. 351 -352. As construed by Chaunt, the statute authorizes denaturalization on the basis of an applicant's failure to disclose suppressed facts which (1) "if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship," or (2) "might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship." Id. at 364 U. S. 355 .
The Court says that Chaunt need not be invoked when denaturalization is premised on deliberate misstatements at the visa application stage, but does not explain why this is so. I fail to see any relevant limitation in the Chaunt decision or the governing statute that bars Chaunt's application to this case. By its terms, the denaturalization statute at the time of Chaunt, as now, was not restricted to any single stage of the citizenship process. [ Footnote 2/2 ] Although, in Chaunt, the nondisclosures arose in response to a question on a citizenship application form filed some years after the applicant first arrived in this country, nothing in the language or import of the opinion suggests that omissions or false statements should be assessed differently when they are tendered upon initial entry into this country. If such a distinction was intended, it has eluded the several courts that unquestioningly have applied Chaunt's materiality standard when reviewing alleged distortions in the visa request process. See, e.g., Kassab v. Immigration &
I doubt that the failure of these courts to raise any question about the relevance of Chaunt was an oversight. It is far from clear to me that the materiality of facts should vary because of the time at which they are concealed or misrepresented. Nor do I see why the events or activities underlying these facts become more or less material depending upon the country in which they transpired. [ Footnote 2/3 ] In each context, the inquiry concerning nondisclosure addresses the same fundamental issue: did the applicant shield from review facts material to his eligibility for citizenship?
In Chaunt, the Court articulated two approaches to provide guidance and uniformity in such inquiries. The Court today adopts what it considers a new and minimal definition of materiality: it announces that a misrepresentation is material "if disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa." Ante at 449 U. S. 509 . This standard bears no small resemblance to the "first test" of Chaunt, for it too deems material those facts "which, if known, would have warranted denial of" eligibility. 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 355 . Because I see no effective difference between the standards, nor any persuasive grounds for contriving a difference, I would rely explicitly upon the Chaunt test here and avoid risking
the confusion that is likely to be engendered by multiple standards. [ Footnote 2/4 ]
Application of Chaunt to the instant record would not result in any significant departure from the Court's basic analysis. As the Court notes, ante at 449 U. S. 500 , petitioner admitted at trial that he deliberately misrepresented his wartime activities and whereabouts when communicating with representatives of the Displaced Persons Commission during the visa application process. Record 1518-1522. [ Footnote 2/5 ] The expert testimony of former Vice Consul Jenkins demonstrates convincingly that an applicant who had served as a concentration camp guard would not have qualified for a displaced person's visa. [ Footnote 2/6 ] The determination to exclude persons who had assisted in persecuting civilians was grounded in a clear statutory mandate, [ Footnote 2/7 ] and uncontroverted testimony established that
the statute was consistently applied in just this fashion against individuals in petitioner's position. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Under these circumstances, I agree with the Court that petitioner's true activities, if known, would certainly have warranted denial of his visa application. Without a valid visa, petitioner could not have been considered for status as a United States citizen. Having proved this much by clear and convincing evidence, the Government has satisfied the first test of Chaunt.
This test strikes a careful and necessary balance between the Government's commitment to supervising the citizenship process and the naturalized citizen's interest in preserving his status. The individual seeks to retain his citizenship right to full and equal status in our national community, a right conferring benefits of inestimable value upon those who possess it. The freedoms and opportunities secured by United States citizenship long have been treasured by persons fortunate enough to be born with them, and are yearned for by countless less fortunate. Indeed, citizenship has been described as "man's basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have rights." [ Footnote 2/9 ] and the effects of its loss justly have been called "more serious than a taking of one's property, or
the imposition of a fine or other penalty." [ Footnote 2/10 ] Where, as here, the Government seeks to revoke this right, the Court consistently and forcefully has held that it may do so only on scrupulously clear justification and proof. Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265 (1961); Nowak v. United States, 356 U. S. 660 (1958); Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943). Before sustaining any decision to impose the grave consequences of denaturalization, the Court has regarded it as its duty "to scrutinize the record with the utmost care," [ Footnote 2/11 ] construing "the facts and the law . . . as far as is reasonably possible in favor of the citizen." [ Footnote 2/12 ]
task is the same: it must prove the existence of disqualifying facts, not simply facts that might lead to hypothesized disqualifying facts. First, this Court's reasoning before Chaunt contains no suggestion that a naturalized citizen would be reduced to alien status merely because a thwarted Government inquiry might have shown him to be unqualified. Instead, the Court has been willing to approve denaturalization only upon a clear and convincing showing that the prescribed statutory conditions of citizenship had never been met. This, it seems to me, is the clear import of the Court's exhaustive reviews in Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. at 356 U. S. 663 -668; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 656 -669; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. at 322 U. S. 666 -678; and Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 131 -159. Of course, the Government's ability to investigate with vigor may be affected adversely by its inability to discover that certain facts have been suppressed. The standard announced by the Court of Appeals, however, seems to me to transform this interest in unhampered investigation into an end in itself. Application of that court's standard suggests that a deliberately false answer to any question the Government deems worth asking may be considered material. I do not believe that such a weak standard of proof was ever contemplated by this Court's decisions prior to Chaunt.
Instead, I conclude that the Court in Chaunt intended to follow its earlier cases, and that its "two tests" are simply two methods by which the existence of ultimate disqualifying facts might be proved. This reading of Chaunt is consistent with the actual language of the so-called second test; [ Footnote 2/13 ] it
also appears to be the meaning that the dissent in Chaunt believed the Court to have intended. [ Footnote 2/14 ]
undisclosed facts might have warranted exclusion, I fear that the valued rights of citizenship are in danger of erosion. If the weaker standard were employed, I doubt that the denaturalization process would remain as careful as it has been in the past in situations where a citizen's allegedly material misstatements were closely tied to his expression of political beliefs or activities implicating the First Amendment. [ Footnote 2/15 ] Citizenship determinations continue to involve judgments about a person's "good moral character" or his attachment "to the principles of the Constitution," see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), and the judiciary's task remains the difficult one of balancing a need to safeguard admission to United States citizenship, in accord with the will of Congress, against a citizen's right to feel secure in the exercise of his constitutional freedoms. By concluding that an impaired investigation may justify the loss of these freedoms, the Court of Appeals threatens to leave the naturalized citizen with "nothing more than citizenship in attenuated, if not suspended, animation." [ Footnote 2/16 ] The Court seems to reject this approach, and follows the essential teaching of Chaunt. I regret only its unwillingness to say so.
The statute is § 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 260, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). Its relevant provisions are quoted ante at 449 U. S. 493 , n. 1.
Except for the prohibition against "illegally procured" citizenship, added in 1961 by Pub.L. 87-301, § 18(a), 75 Stat. 656, the statute today is unchanged from the version considered in Chaunt. Now, as then, it authorizes the initiation of denaturalization proceedings should the Government discover that the order admitting a person to citizenship was "procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." In accord with the Court's prior construction of this phrase, both the concealment and the misrepresentation must be willful, and each must also relate to a material fact. Ante at 449 U. S. 507 -508, n. 28, citing Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265 , 365 U. S. 271 -272, n. 3 (1961).
This discussion of materiality relates only to proceedings brought by the Government to denaturalize a United States citizen. I do not mean to suggest that, for purposes of attaining citizenship, a misrepresentation must be analyzed in an identical fashion. The immigration law historically has afforded greater protections to persons already admitted to citizenship than to those seeking to obtain its privileges and benefits. This choice, however, reflects a judgment that the weighty interest in citizenship should be neither casually conferred nor lightly revoked. See Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U. S. 630 , 385 U. S. 636 -637 (1967). In view of petitioner's status as a United States citizen, it is unnecessary to consider here the question of materiality at the naturalization stage.
JUSTICE WHITE's observation in dissent, post at 449 U. S. 529 , and n. 10, is not to the contrary. The District Court found a lack of willfulness with respect to the nondisclosure on petitioner's citizenship application form, completed in 1969. As the Court correctly observes, ante at 449 U. S. 507 , n. 26, petitioner's misrepresentations at the visa application stage were plainly willful.
Record 766-768, 822-823, substantially reproduced ante at 449 U. S. 510 -511, n. 31. Jenkins further testified at length that, based on his knowledge and experience, "involuntary" guard service in Nazi concentration camps was unknown and virtually inconceivable. Record 754-758, 807-808, 823-824. While I find much of this testimony persuasive, I do not need to rely upon it here, since petitioner's ineligibility for a visa is independently established. See nn. 7 and 8, infra.
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44 , 356 U. S. 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , 320 U. S. 122 (1943).
Nowak v. United States, 356 U. S. 660 , 356 U. S. 663 (1958).
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 122 .
364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 355 . The Court of Appeals in effect construes the word "possibly" to modify the entire following phrase. I believe the sounder construction is that adopted by the District Court, see 455 F.Supp. 893, 915-916 (SD Fla.1978), whereby the word "possibly" modifies only the first part of the ensuing phrase. Because what would "possibly" be discovered is not "facts which might warrant denial of citizenship" but " other facts warranting denial of citizenship" (emphasis supplied), the "second test" simply asks whether knowledge of the suppressed facts could have enabled the Government to reach the ultimate disqualifying facts whose existence is now known. See also 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 353 (second test stated as whether "disclosure of the true facts might have led to the discovery of other facts which would justify denial of citizenship").
Id. at 364 U. S. 357 . (Emphasis in original.)
The dissent also voiced concern that the Court, by imposing such a heavy burden of proof on the Government in denaturalization proceedings, in effect would invite dishonesty from future applicants for citizenship. Ibid. JUSTICE WHITE, in dissent today, expresses the same concern. Post at 449 U. S. 529 . It, of course, is never easy to demonstrate the existence of statements or events that occurred long ago. Records and witnesses disappear, memories fade, and even the actor's personal knowledge becomes less reliable. While recognizing the arduous nature of the task, the Court nonetheless has insisted that the Government meet a very high standard of proof in denaturalization proceedings. Chaunt's rigorous definition of materiality, it is true, may occasionally benefit an applicant who conceals disqualifying information. Yet, practically and constitutionally, naturalized citizens, as a class, are not less trustworthy or reliable than the native-born. The procedural protection of the high standard of proof is necessary to assure the naturalized citizen his right, equally with the native-born, to enjoy the benefits of citizenship in confidence and without fear.
individual's citizenship because he had not disclosed certain facts in his application for citizenship. [ Footnote 3/1 ] Although Chaunt did not address the standard of materiality with respect to visa applications, the parties before this Court have assumed that the Chaunt test should be used to determine whether petitioner concealed material facts when he applied for a visa. [ Footnote 3/2 ]
Recognizing that the relevance of Chaunt to visa applications may be problematic, the majority turns to a wholly separate ground to decide this case, resting its decision on its interpretation of "adopted" § 2(a) of the Displaced Persons Act ( see ante at 449 U. S. 510 , n. 31). I am reluctant to resolve the issue of whether Chaunt extends to visa applications, since the parties have neither briefed nor argued the point. However, I am equally reluctant to adopt the course chosen by the majority, for the language of § 2(a) is not entirely unambiguous, [ Footnote 3/3 ] and the parties have not addressed the proper interpretation of the statute. [ Footnote 3/4 ] Under these circumstances, I would
364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 355 . [ Footnote 3/5 ] Under the District Court's interpretation of the second Chaunt test and that urged by petitioner, the Government would be required to prove that an investigation prompted by a complete, truthful response would have revealed facts justifying denial of citizenship. [ Footnote 3/6 ] The Court of Appeals and the Government contend that, under the second Chaunt test, the Government must prove only that such an investigation might have led to the discovery of facts justifying denial of citizenship. [ Footnote 3/7 ] In my opinion, the latter interpretation is correct. [ Footnote 3/8 ]
In this case, the Government alleged that, when petitioner filled out his application for citizenship, he willfully concealed that he had served as an armed guard for the Germans during the war. Petitioner failed to disclose this information, although the application form required him to list his past or present membership in any organization in the United States or elsewhere, including foreign military service. Although the Government produced evidence to support a finding of materiality under its interpretation of the second Chaunt test, [ Footnote 3/9 ] the District Court concluded that petitioner's service as an armed guard for the Germans was immaterial under the District Court's interpretation of Chaunt. It also found that the nondisclosure was not willful. [ Footnote 3/10 ]
The Court of Appeals failed to review this portion of the District Court's opinion. Instead, it focused solely on whether petitioner had willfully concealed or misrepresented material facts when he applied for a visa. Therefore, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court to review the District Court's application of the Chaunt test to petitioner's concealment at the time he applied for citizenship. [ Footnote 3/11 ]
Section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), quoted in pertinent part in the majority opinion, ante at 449 U. S. 493 , n. 1, directs the Government to seek revocation of citizenship that was "procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation."
The majority asserts that the plain language of the statute compels the conclusion that § 2(a) excluded all those who assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations, even those who involuntarily assisted the enemy. The majority explains in a footnote that, under § 2(a), one must focus on whether the individual assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations, ante at 449 U. S. 512 -513, n. 34, rather than focusing on voluntariness. Yet one could argue that the words "assist" and "persecute" suggest that § 2(a) would not apply to an individual whose actions were truly coerced.
In Chaunt, the Court also observed that complete, honest replies to all relevant questions are essential not only because concealed facts might, in and of themselves, justify denial of citizenship, but also because "disclosure of the true facts might have led to the discovery of other facts which would justify denial of citizenship." 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 352 -353.
had resulted in a misidentification of petitioner; that petitioner had not performed the atrocious acts witnessed by the survivors of Treblinka who testified; [ Footnote 4/1 ] 1 that Vice Consul Jenkins' testimony was not entirely reliable; [ Footnote 4/2 ] and that, for the most part, petitioner was a truthful witness. 455 F.Supp. 893, 906-909. The District Judge specifically found that petitioner's visa was valid, and that petitioner therefore lawfully entered the United States, id. at 916; that his service at Treblinka was involuntary, id. at 914; that he made no misstatements in his application for citizenship, id. at 917; and that he was a person of good moral character. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court committed two errors of law. 597 F.2d 946. First, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court, in assessing the materiality of the misstatement in petitioner's 1949 visa application, had misapplied this Court's decision in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 ; second, the Court of Appeals rejected the equitable basis for the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals did not, however, disturb any of the District Court's findings of fact.
Today the Court declines to endorse the Court of Appeals' first rationale. Because the Chaunt test was formulated in the context of applications for citizenship, and because the only misstatements here were made on petitioner's visa application, [ Footnote 4/3 ] the Court acknowledges that the Chaunt test is not
Section 2(a) of the DPA was "adopted" from the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization ( see ante at 449 U. S. 510 , n. 31), which described in Part II of Annex I "Persons who will not be [considered as displaced persons]." The second listing had two classifications:
"( a ) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United Nations; or "
The District Court recognized that the section dealing with assisting enemy forces contained the word "voluntarily," while the section dealing with persecuting enemy populations did not. The District Court refused to construe the statute to bar relief to any person who assisted the enemy, whether voluntarily or not, however, because such a construction would have excluded the Jewish prisoners who assisted the SS in the operation of the concentration camp. 455 F.Supp. at 913. These prisoners performed such tasks as cutting the hair of female prisoners prior to their execution and performing in a camp orchestra as a ruse to conceal the true nature of the camp. I agree without hesitation with the District Court's conclusion that such prisoners did not perform their duties voluntarily and that such prisoners should not be considered excludable under the DPA. [ Footnote 4/4 ] The Court resolves the dilemma perceived by the District Court by concluding that prisoners who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were executed could not be considered to be assisting the enemy in persecuting civilian populations. See ante at 449 U. S. 512 -513, n. 34. Thus the Court would give the word "persecution" some not yet defined specially limited reading. In my opinion, the term "persecution" clearly applies to such conduct; indeed, it probably encompasses almost every aspect of life or death in a concentration camp.
when applied to the "kapos," the Jewish prisoners who supervised the Jewish workers at the camp. According to witnesses who survived Treblinka, the kapos were commanded by the SS to administer beatings to the prisoners, and they did so with just enough force to make the beating appear realistic, yet avoid injury to the prisoner. Record 293-295, 300-302 (Kohn), 237 (Turowski). [ Footnote 4/5 ] Even if we assume that the kapos were completely successful in deceiving the SS guards and that the beatings caused no injury to other inmates, I believe their conduct would have to be characterized as assisting in the persecution of other prisoners. [ Footnote 4/6 ] In my view, the reason that such conduct should not make the kapos ineligible for citizenship is that it surely was not voluntary. The fact that the Court's interpretation of the DPA would exclude a group whose actions were uniformly defended by survivors of Treblinka, id. at 23239 (Turowski), 300 (Kohn), 1157-1159 (Epstein), merely underscores the strained reading the Court has given the statute. [ Footnote 4/7 ]
view that § 2(a) should be construed to read "persons who can be shown to have voluntarily assisted the enemy." [ Footnote 4/8 ] The Government did not retreat from that concession before this Court. [ Footnote 4/9 ] The reasons for agreeing with the Government's interpretation of the statute are compelling.
visa application. [ Footnote 4/10 ] The misstatements in that application were therefore not material under a proper application of Chaunt.