Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/739/149/453953/
Timestamp: 2019-06-20 23:50:21
Document Index: 166734647

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 5845', '§ 2', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113']

United States of America, Appellee, v. James Edward Mcfadden, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. John(ny) Dollard, Appellant, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1984 › United States of America, Appellee, v. James Edward Mcfadden, Appellant.united States of America, Ap...
United States of America, Appellee, v. James Edward Mcfadden, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. John(ny) Dollard, Appellant, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984)
Appellants were convicted of attempting to rob the First National Bank of Orangeburg, Cameron Branch, and of attempting to rob the South Carolina Federal Savings & Loan Association at Manning, South Carolina in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2. They were also convicted of possession of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(a), 5861(d), 5871 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. They contend the convictions of attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)1 may not stand because there was no use of force as required by the statute. They also claim prejudice because an excised paragraph from a typed transcript of a taped conversation was allowed to go to the jury room. Finding no merit in either exception, we affirm.
Appellants argue that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) requires that force and violence or intimidation must accompany the attempt to take property from the custody or possession of the bank. In the present case this would mean that the agents must wait until the defendants entered the bank or the vicinity of the bank with the sawed-off shotguns at the ready. This would require that the lives of the bank employees, the police, any innocent bystanders and the defendants themselves be endangered before an arrest could be made for an attempted robbery of the bank by use of force and violence or intimidation. Appellants cite United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Cal. 1955) but we do not find this case to support appellants' position. It holds that the attempt relates to the taking and not to the intimidation. The question is best answered by United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2nd Cir. 1976) in which the court stated:
The classical elements of an attempt are intent to commit a crime, the execution of an overt act in furtherance of the intention, and a failure to consummate the crime. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1114, 95 S. Ct. 792, 42 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1975), has properly derived from the writing of many distinguished jurists a two-tiered inquiry to determine whether given conduct constitutes an attempt. Initially, the defendant must have been acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime he is charged with attempting. Then, the defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime, conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent. Id. at 376-377 (Footnotes omitted).
In United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2nd Cir. 1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 941 and 1017, 98 S. Ct. 434 and 736, 54 L. Ed. 2d 301 and 762 (1977) the court was faced with a factual situation quite similar to the present case and also the defendant's argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) mentions only attempted taking and not attempted force, violence or intimidation, and therefore actual force, violence or intimidation must precede an attempted taking in order to be an offense under the statute. The court followed Stallworth, supra., and also called attention to the definition of attempt found in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Sec. 5.01 of the Official Draft 1962. The Model Penal Code defines criminal attempt, in part, as follows:
Various activities which may be considered a substantial step under (1) (c), when strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, include lying in wait, reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime, possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, and possession and collection of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession and collection serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances.
When the exhibits went to the jury room, the transcript went along and the word "delete" was handwritten in the margin beside the offending paragraph. Neither the judge nor the attorneys knew that the paragraph had inadvertently gotten to the jury until the judge received a note from the forelady inquiring as to whether the jury was to read the section marked "delete." The judge recalled the jury, had the paragraph cut from the transcript and instructed the jury if they had read the deleted part to disregard it. After the jury returned to its deliberations the court indicated that it felt from the statement made by the forelady that the jury had not read the paragraph and had not considered it as evidence at the time the question was presented to the court. The trial judge denied defendant's motions for a mistrial and for a new trial finding that the situation was properly handled by the corrective instructions and "the generally non-prejudicial nature of the deleted matter, when compared to the totality of the evidence in this case." We find no undue prejudice in the deleted paragraph. The trial judge's evaluation of whether a mistrial is necessary is entitled to "the highest degree of respect." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 511, 98 S. Ct. 824, 833, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978). We find no reason that would require a mistrial or new trial because the "deleted" paragraph was in the jury room for a short time.