Source: http://georgiaiplit.blogspot.com/2012/12/
Timestamp: 2017-07-24 06:45:53
Document Index: 316926484

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 1127', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 1125']

Read more »Labels: copyright, Eleventh Circuit, Southern District of Florida, trade dress, trademark
In its new opinion, the Eleventh Circuit now recognizes that there were two independent grounds on which the district court rejected Plaintiff Order’s false advertising claim: (1) The Florida Priory did, in fact, share a pre-1798 history with Plaintiff Order; “and (2) because ‘the Florida Priory expressly associates itself with the Ecumenical Order, a non-Catholic organization.’”[4] Ground (2) did not appear in the Eleventh Circuit’s September 11 opinion.[5] That is important here because, as discussed below, this previously-unmentioned ground forms the alternative basis on which the Eleventh Circuit has now been able to affirm the district court’s rejection of the false advertising claim, despite finding that the district court did, in fact, abuse its discretion when it admitted Mr. Papanicolau’s testimony. In reversing itself over the challenged testimony, the Eleventh Circuit essentially echoed the reasoning of Judge Pryor’s earlier dissenting opinion:
We acknowledge that the district court erred when it permitted Papanicolaou, a lay witness, to testify about historical matters. Papanicolaou had neither “personal knowledge” of the historical facts about which he spoke, Fed. R. Evid. 602, nor could he offer testimony in the form of an opinion based on his “perception” of those historical facts. Fed. R. Evid. 701. Papanicolaou should have been qualified as an expert witness.[6] However, the Eleventh Circuit then characterized the district court’s error as “harmless”:
Consequently, despite the different conclusion on the evidentiary issue now reflected in the December 18 opinion, the ultimate result is the same: the false advertising claim remains out of the case, and no other portion of the September 11 opinion was affected. As one might suspect, the new opinion has no dissent.
The new decision is Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. The Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, The Ecumenical Order, No. 11-15101, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S.App.LEXIS 26125 (11th Cir. Dec. 18, 2012). [1] Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. The Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, The Ecumenical Order, No. 11-15101, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S.App.LEXIS 26125, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 18, 2012) (Sovereign Military III).
The complaint alleges irreparable harm has been suffered as a result of the Columbus announcement and launch of an advertising campaign confusing the public and creating misimpressions that the Williams are unauthorized users of Columbus’ marks. The complaint asserts fraud on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) based on Columbus’ knowledge or access to knowledge of the Williams’ mark, as their website had been active for more than a decade before Columbus’ first use of the accused marks. The complaint asserts that Columbus did not disclose the Williams’ use of the mark to the USPTO and a Columbus agent wrongfully attested that “no other person, firm, corporation, or association has the right to use the mark in commerce, either in the identical form thereof or ins such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods/services of such person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” The complaint also asserts that Columbus’ sworn declaration that it was using the mark LAWYERFINDER.COM in commerce on September 20, 2010, was false. The Williams ask that Columbus registrations of LAWYERFINDER.COM (Reg. No. 3,933,108) and COLUMBUS LAWYER FINDER.COM (Reg. No. 3,699,866) be cancelled.
Northern District of Georgia dismisses copyright and state law claims brought by Master Mind Music, Inc. By Kirk Watkins
Discussed below as a “factual background” is the court’s summary of the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, taking the allegations as true solely for purposes of motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. Plaintiff Master Mind Music, Inc. (“Master Mind”) entered into an agreement with Mr. Jasiel Robinson (professionally known as Yung Joc) on February 3, 2005. Master Mind received the exclusive right to manufacture and sell records and exploit the master recordings and gained co-ownership of Yung Joc compositions. In return, Master Mind was obligated to actively seek a recording and distribution agreement for Yung Joc.
Yung Joc recorded his debut single “It’s Goin’ Down,” which gained airtime on Atlanta radio and drew the attention of Russell Spencer (“Spencer”) of Block Enterprises, LLC (“Block”). Block and Master Mind entered into a Joint VentureAgreement on October 28, 2005, with Master Mind to distribute Yung Joc’s first album, the master recordings of which had already been completed. Under that Joint Venture Agreement, if Block were successful in negotiating a distribution agreement, 50% of the revenues from that agreement would go to Block. On December 20, 2005, Block executed a distribution agreement with another defendant, Bad Boy Records, LLC (“Bad Boy”), without disclosing the Master Mind rights. Master Mind was not a party to the agreement, did not participate in negotiations, and was not identified as a third-party beneficiary.
The court observed that Master Mind sought a declaration that it was sole owner of the copyrighted works and that such ownership was disputed and time-barred. The failure of the ownership claim was, in turn, dispositive of the infringement claim.[2] The court next addressed the Block/Spencer motion to dismiss the tortious interference with contractual relations claims under the Georgia four-year statute of limitations (O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31 – defendants erroneous citation to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-26 was deemed immaterial). The court noted that the discovery rule only applies to continuing torts, expressly limited in Georgia to personal injury claims. See Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Nat. Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 368 S.E.2d 732, 733 (1988). The court found the claims time-barred whether they accrued when the Bad Boy contract was signed or when the albums released – as both events were over 4 years before the action was filed. Presumably the parties did not consider Georgia laws permitting avoidance of statutes of limitation when suits are dismissed and refilled within six months. The opinion is silent on the effect of the prior suits, specifically the suit that was dismissed for want of prosecution on August 2011. It is understandable that the court would not address the language of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(e), if no one brought it to the court’s attention. That statute concludes: “When an action is dismissed under this subsection, if the plaintiff recommences the action within six months following the dismissal then the renewed action shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original action.” See also O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (restricting use of this right to one occasion after the expiration of the statute of limitations and requiring the payment of costs).
The court next turned to the motions to dismiss of defendants Bad Boy and Atlantic Recording Corp. (“Atlantic”). Based on the same reasoning made as to Spencer and Block, Judge Story dismissed the declaratory relief claim on copyright ownership asserted against Bad Boy on the three-year statute of limitations. The copyright infringement claims against Bad Boy and Atlantic were similarly dismissed. The conversion claims against Bad Boy and Atlantic also met the same fate as the identical claims against Block and Spencer. The accounting claim was dismissed because there was no showing that it “would likely result in the discovery of an amount of money to which [Master Mind] is entitled.” The decision is Master Mind Music, Inc. v. Block Enter., LLC, No. 1:12-cv-162-RWS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179221 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2012).
Northern District of Georgia dismisses copyright and state law claims brought by Master Mind Music, Inc. Wednesday, December 19, 2012, 2:53 PM
This lawsuit concerns a species of trademarks known as “certification marks." The term “certification mark” is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . [that is used to] certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of . . . goods or services . . . .” According to the complaint, ARRT is a national credentialing organization – the largest such organization of radiologic technologists – and the only one that maintains a registry of these professionals. According to the complaint, ARRT adopted the ARRT service mark in or around 1962 and has continuously used it since that time to identify individuals who meet its educational, testing, and other requirements, and are consequently registered with the organization.
The ARRT trademark was registered on May 22, 2007 – U.S. trademark application Serial No. 78/913,063, filed June 21, 2006 (the ‘063 Application) with a first use on July 1, 1962. In addition, ARRT registered the Certification Mark R.T. on September 2, 2003 – U.S. trademark application Serial No. 76/442,210, filed August 21, 2002 (also with a first use on July 1, 1962) , and the Certification Mark R.T.(R)(ARRT) was registered on February 8, 2011 – U.S. trademark application Serial No. 77/855,878, filed on October 23, 2009, with a first use on June 1, 1977. Many health care facilities require ARRT certifications for their radiologic technologists and Medicare and Medicaid require at least one ARRT-certified radiologic technologist on duty at all times for reimbursement. According to the complaint, Brown submitted an application to take the ARRT examination in Radiography and took the exam on February 22, 2006. Brown did not pass the exam and has never registered with ARRT. ARRT awards certification to individuals passing the exam and meeting other requirements of its rules and regulations. The individual can thereafter be registered on an annual basis as long as the individual meets ARRT’s continuing education and ethics requirements.
The case is The American Registry of Radiologic Technologies v. Antoine X. Brown, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-4272, filed 12/10/12 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, and has been assigned to U.S. District Judge Orinda D. Evans.Labels: 1114, 1117(a), 1125(a), certification mark, Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Judge Evans, Northern District of Georgia, trademark infringement
The case is Mattress Safe, Inc. v. Hospi-Tel Mfg. Co., No. 1:12-cv-4273-RLV, filed 12/10/12 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, assigned to U.S. District Judge Robert L. Vining, Jr.Labels: Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Judge Vining, Northern District of Georgia, trademark
Plaintiffs appeal because they are dissatisfied with having prevailed on only false advertising and related unfair competition counts. As aptly stated by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, from which Plaintiffs took their appeal: “This case involves a relatively straightforward dispute which was aggressively litigated, between two sets of restaurant companies and their principals, regarding allegedly unfair business practices.”[1]
In early 2006, therefore, Defendant Chau launched his first competing restaurant.[11] “Defendants have consistently used ‘Philippe by Philippe Chow’ or ‘Philippe Chow’ or ‘Philippe’ in association with their restaurants, including use of these names in signs, menus, plates, etc.”[12] “The jury heard from several witnesses that Plaintiffs did nothing to protect their trademark or trade name use by Defendants for several years, despite being aware of Defendants’ competing restaurants even before the first of such restaurants opened in early 2006.”[13] To illustrate the extent to which relations between the parties had deteriorated, Defendant Chau heard from Ms. Michelle Chun, an employee of the plaintiffs’ restaurants.[14] In a phone call, according to Chau’s testimony, “Ms. Chun told him to not bother her chef and to not walk on 57th Street,”[15] where one of the New York MR CHOW restaurants are located. “[H]e was very upset about being told to avoid walking on the street.”[16] For further example, Plaintiffs brought suit in late 2009,[17] asserting a myriad of legal theories against numerous defendants over the course of an original and three amended complaints. The first amended complaint included claims, dismissed in November 2009, “for civil trespass and corporate espionage, alleging that ‘an Asian male disguised in a chef’s jacket entered the premises of the Mr. Chow restaurant [in Miami Beach] without authorization and proceeded into the Mr Chow kitchen.’”[18] “Plaintiffs alleged that the person was sent there for the ‘sole purpose of spying on behalf of the Defendants’ Miami Beach restaurant.’”[19]
Despite a larger number of claims having been asserted in the pleadings against a larger number of defendants, the jury wound up deliberating upon 11 counts against 7 defendants.[20] Plaintiffs presented a twelfth count, dilution under § 43(c) of the Lanham Act (Count V), for resolution by the district court only.[21] Defendants counterclaimed for defamation and for cancellation of the ‘402 Registration, but prevailed on neither at trial.[22] Among the 11 counts considered by the jury were claims for trademark infringement (Count I), trade name infringement (Count II), trade dress infringement (Count III), false advertising under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act (Count IV), and “unfair competition by deceptive conduct” (Counts VII and IX).[23] After a trial spanning a 5-week period in January and February 2012,[24] the jury found in Plaintiffs’ favor only as to Counts IV, VII, and IX,[25] assessing monetary awards as follows:
Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial on Trademark & Trade Name Counts The court considered these claims together, as the parties “agree[d] that in this case the relevant factors for considering whether Plaintiffs established a likelihood of confusion as to the alleged infringement of the trademark and the trade name are identical.”[28]
Newspapers that allegedly told readers that Philippe Chow restaurants were “Mr. Chow”. The court assessed the exhibits and determined that the newspapers cited by Plaintiffs did not equate the restaurants as argued. A blog post on a New York Post website described Defendants’ New York restaurant as “Mr. Chow’s famous Chinese restaurant, Philippe.” The court did not find that evidence significant because “the author herself did not go to the restaurant,” instead sending two people there on a blind date.[32] A New York Times blog post referring to a press release by Defendants in a survey of New York restaurants met with similar treatment: “The author is not identified as a customer of the restaurants, and this brief mention may have been insufficient to convince the jury that this was evidence of actual confusion by relevant customers.”[33] Other website (blog) postings. “Of the other exhibits offered by Plaintiffs,” stated the court, “all appeared on websites . . . with an unknown readership, or on an open website to which the public can post a comment . . . and, as such, may have been viewed by the jury as of little persuasive value in determining that actual consumers were confused.”[34]
The court further reasoned: “Plaintiffs did not establish that the persons writing these blog postings or comments were actual consumers of the Plaintiffs’ restaurants, with the possible exception of the ‘Lisa M.’ who posted a comment on yelp.com, nor did they establish that the reading audience, which might include actual customers of Plaintiffs’ restaurants – was confused.”[35] Summarizing its views of this evidence, as well as the newspaper evidence mentioned above, the court concluded: “The jury simply may not have viewed these exhibits as evidence of actual confusion by the relevant consuming public, or may not have found that any confusion indicated in these exhibits had been caused by Defendants’ use of ‘Philippe by Philippe Chow.’”[36]
Defendants’ JMOL Motion on False Advertising and Related Unfair Competition Counts “At trial, Plaintiffs offered evidence of two categories of allegedly false advertising: (1) statements by (or at the direction of) Defendant Morfogen to restaurant critics/reviewers in December 2005 that Defendant Chau was the mastermind of the dishes and the architect of the menu at the Mr Chow restaurants and that Defendant Chau was a chef acclaimed by top critics, and (2) the purchase of search terms on internet search engines which resulted in the Philippe restaurants appearing in searches for ‘Mr Chow’ restaurants.”[47]
Regarding category (2), the court acknowledged: “The Eleventh Circuit ‘has not determined whether the purchase of Google AdWords can be considered a use in commerce for purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).’”[50] According to the court, Plaintiffs offered no testimony “as to whether such sponsored links had resulted in consumers going to Defendants’ restaurants as a result of confusion when their original intention was to dine at a Mr Chow restaurant.”[51] Nevertheless, the court observed that the law in this area is unsettled, and that although one Eleventh Circuit decision hinted that the use of another’s mark as a “meta tag” might not always be actionable by itself, “the jury had a legally sufficient basis for its verdict as to this claim.”[52] The court was more sympathetic to Defendants’ duplicative damages argument, finding that the jury had mistakenly awarded damages to Mr. Chow individually because the verdict form was confusing and did not correspond to the jury instructions.[53] Thus the court set aside the $500,000 award to Mr. Chow.[54]
The pending appeal in the Eleventh Circuit is Michael Chow et al. v. Chak Yam Chau et al., No. 12-15994-E (docketed 11/28/12). [1] Michael Chow et al. v. Chak Yam Chau et al., No. 1:09-cv-21893-WMH, Dkt. 387, Order on Post-Trial Motions (10/24/12), hereinafter “Oct. 24 Order,” at p. 5.
[19] Id. at 2 n.2. [20] Id. at 9- 11.