Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v48/48-046.html
Timestamp: 2016-05-30 16:49:50
Document Index: 695870067

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5595', '§ 709', '§ 5595', 'art 550', '§ 709', '§ 5595', '§\n5595', '§ 550', '§ 550', '§ 5595', '§ 550', '§ 5595', '§ 5595', '§ 5595', '§ 5595']

48:0480(46)AR - - DOD, NG Bureau, AR Army NG, North Little Rock, Arkansas and NFFE Local 1671 - - 1993 FLRAdec AR - - v48 p480 | FLRA
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The decision of the Authority follows: 48 FLRA No. 46 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU ARKANSAS ARMY NATIONAL GUARD NORTH LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS (Agency) and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1671 (Union) 0-AR-2362 _____ DECISION September 3, 1993 _____ Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
the Agency's exceptions. The Arbitrator directed the Agency to provide the grievant, who was
separated from his position as a national guard technician, with appropriate
severance pay. For the following reasons, we find that the award is deficient.
Accordingly, we will set it aside. II. Background and Arbitrator's Award A grievance was filed contesting the Agency's denial of severance pay
for a civilian technician whose employment was terminated after he lost his
military membership in the National Guard. The latter was occasioned by the
technician's failure to comply with military weight standards. The grievant
challenged the Agency's denial of severance pay based on its claim that the
grievant's "termination was not involuntary[.]" Award at 2. In the
Agency's view, the grievant's termination was voluntary "since he had control
over his own weight, and chose not to keep it within the Military Weight
Standards required for membership in the Guard." Id. The grievant
initially sought either reinstatement or severance pay. The request for
reinstatement was dropped during the processing of the grievance but the issue
of the grievant's entitlement to severance pay remained in dispute. When the grievance was not resolved, it was submitted to arbitration.
The parties stipulated the following issue to be resolved by the
Arbitrator: Is the grievant . . . a National Guard Technician, employed pursuant
to 32 U.S.C., Section 709, and who was terminated from his military technician
position, due to loss of his military membership for failure to meet military
weight standards, entitled to severance pay? Id. The parties also stipulated that the grievant was denied
severance pay based on the provisions of Technician Personnel Regulation (TPR)
990-2, which provides as follows: Separation due to loss of military membership for failure to comply
with the weight control program bars a technician's entitlement to severance
pay. Id. at 3. The Arbitrator found that the sole question before him
was whether the termination of the grievant's employment as an excepted service
technician in the National Guard was voluntary or involuntary under applicable
laws and regulations. In addressing the issues raised, the Arbitrator examined the legal and
regulatory requirements for severance pay, including those found in TPR 990-2
and Federal Personnel Manual (FPM), supplement 990-2, subchapter S7-4. As to
the FPM requirements, the Arbitrator found that an employee who has been
involuntarily separated for reasons other than misconduct, delinquency, or
inefficiency, and who meets length of service requirements is entitled to
severance pay. The Arbitrator found that the grievant most likely was entitled
to severance pay under the FPM, but was not so entitled under TPR 990-2. The Arbitrator also stated that both parties agreed that the
regulations implementing 5 U.S.C. § 5595, governing severance
pay, apply to the grievance. The applicable regulations provide severance pay
for employees who are involuntarily separated from Federal service and who meet
other prescribed conditions. The Arbitrator found that the grievant apparently
met the conditions for eligibility if his separation was involuntary. The Arbitrator then addressed the National Guard Technicians Act,
32 U.S.C. § 709, and an accompanying Senate Report, the latter
of which described the circumstances under which an employee who was
involuntarily retired for failing to meet military physical standards could be
separated from the service with severance pay. The Arbitrator found that the
wording of the Technicians Act and the Senate Report provided a basis on which
to find that the Technicians Act "provides for severance pay for those persons
who provide service as an employee under the [Technician's] Act[.]" Award at 6.
The Arbitrator further found that Technician Information Bulletin #81-1, which
provides that separation from technician employment due to loss of military
membership for failing to comply with weight requirements is a voluntary action
rendering the employee ineligible for severance pay, was not binding on
him. The Arbitrator rejected the Agency's stated position that the
grievant's own actions established that his separation was voluntary. The
Arbitrator noted that the grievant's "Termination Notice" specifically stated
that the nature of his termination was involuntary. Id. The Arbitrator
further found that when the Agency advised the grievant that he would lose his
health benefits, that loss was also based on his involuntary termination. The
Arbitrator found that the Agency was engaged in an attempt to change the basis
for the grievant's termination from involuntary to voluntary and that doing so
would deny the grievant due process. The Arbitrator concluded that "[t]he
Agency cannot have it both ways." Id. at 7. The Arbitrator also found that the cases cited by the Union in support
of its position indicated that, in similar circumstances, courts have held that
an employee is "involuntarily terminated when such termination was against the
will of the employee, and without his consent." Id. In particular, the
Arbitrator cited Sullivan v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 70 (1983)
(Sullivan), aff'd per curiam, 742 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in
which the court defined "involuntary separation" contained in analogous
regulations governing retirement benefits, to mean "any separation against the
will and without the consent of the employee[.]" Award at 8. Consequently,
the Arbitrator found that [t]he [agency] Regulations, promulgated by the National Guard (a TPR)
does [sic] not, and cannot supersede the statute itself, and was not
promulgated to effectuate the purpose of the statute. On the contrary, such
Regulation contravenes the language of the statute, and the statute must govern
over the language of the TPR. Id. On this basis, the Arbitrator found that the grievant's
"separation . . . was an involuntary separation, and the [g]rievant is entitled
to severance pay." Id. Accordingly, the Arbitrator sustained the
grievance. III. Exceptions The Agency disputes the Arbitrator's finding that the grievant was
entitled to severance pay. It claims that the award is deficient, essentially
because it is contrary to laws and regulations. First, the Agency argues that neither 5 U.S.C. § 5595 nor 5 C.F.R.
Part 550 defines what is meant by a voluntary or an involuntary separation.
Therefore, the Agency contends that the Arbitrator erred in concluding that TPR
990-2 directly conflicts with those legal and regulatory provisions. The Agency
argues that an employee's weight is primarily within the control of the
employee and, therefore, an employee who loses his or her position due to a
failure to meet military weight standards "is not entitled to severance pay
since his removal was voluntary." Exceptions at 2. The Agency notes that
if an employee is overweight due to medical reasons, the employee's "removal
would be involuntary (beyond an employee[']s control) and he or she would be
entitled to severance pay." Id. The Agency also asserts that a civilian employee in the National Guard
must maintain military membership, including the obligation to meet prescribed
military weight standards. A failure to do so results in separation from
Federal employment under 32 U.S.C. § 709(e). The Agency states that
employees are given every opportunity to meet the prescribed standards and that
"[o]nly, after every chance has been given a member, are members separated for
being overweight." Id. at 3. The Agency claims that this is the
basis "for TPR 990-2's provision that separation because of weight control
is voluntary on the part of the employee." Id. Next, the Agency asserts that the Arbitrator's reliance on a Senate
Report to find that the Technicians Act "appears" to provide for severance pay
does not equate to a finding that, in fact, severance pay is required. The
Agency explains that the Senate Report addressed situations where an employee
suffers a physical disability and does not address the situation of "an
individual who is overweight and refuses to reduce to meet military standards."
Id. Thus, the Agency argues that the Arbitrator "has used grounds for
his award that are a misstatement of fact and specific legislation." Id.
The Agency also refutes the importance the Arbitrator attached to the
termination notice provided to the grievant. According to the Agency, the
wording "Termination - Involuntary" "merely reflects that the individual was
separated without cause," and not for disciplinary reasons. The Agency further argues that the General Accounting Office (GAO) and
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) have both ruled against the
availability of severance pay in comparable circumstances. Specifically, the
Agency points to GAO Settlement Decision Z-2863882 (October 28, 1987), in which
the GAO disallowed a claim for severance pay under TPR 990-2 for an employee
who was terminated for failing to meet military weight requirements. The Agency
also notes the decision in Yarbrough v. Department of the Air Force, 36
MSPR 142 (1988) (Yarbrough), in which the MSPB held that the loss of
military membership for failure to maintain a prescribed military weight was in
the employee's control. Finally, the Agency contends that the Arbitrator erroneously
disregarded TPR 990-2, an Agency regulation that precludes the payment of
severance pay for civilian technicians who are separated because they lose
their military membership "due to obesity." Exceptions at 4. The Agency argues
that, therefore, the award is inconsistent with section 7122(a)(1) of the
Statute, which requires that awards comply with existing rules and regulations,
and with 5 U.S.C. § 5595(c) because the separation of the grievant
was purely voluntary and severance pay is not payable when separation is
voluntary. IV. Opposition The Union argues that the award is consistent with applicable law and
Government-wide regulations pertaining to severance pay. The Union maintains
that an employee's eligibility for severance pay is governed by 5 U.S.C. §
5595, which provides for such payments in instances where an employee has
worked for a continuous period of at least 12 months and is involuntarily
separated for reasons other than cause based on misconduct, delinquency, or
inefficiency. The Union also argues that in Santora v. United States, 9
Cl. Ct. 182, 186 (1985), the Court of Claims held that the statutory provision
governing such payments was "to be construed 'liberally and generously[.]'"
Opposition at 3. The Union agrees with the Agency that the legislation governing
severance pay does not define the term "involuntarily separated." Id.
However, the Union asserts that the Agency is incorrect in claiming that the
pertinent Government-wide regulation does not define this term. The Union notes
that 5 C.F.R. § 550.703 defines "involuntary separation" as "a separation
consent for reasons other than inefficiency[.]" 5 C.F.R.
§ 550.703(b). The Union argues that the "grievant's removal was
against his will and without his consent." Opposition at 4. The Union also
notes that on the termination notice that was issued to the grievant the Agency
acknowledged that the grievant's separation was involuntary and that this was
the same reason the Agency gave for the discontinuance of his health benefits.
Additionally, the Union argues that the U.S. Claims Court and the
Comptroller General have rejected claims similar to those made by the Agency
that sought to limit the availability of severance pay. In support, the Union
cites Sullivan and Wanda Pleasant, 67 Comp. Gen. 300 (1988).
According to the Union, the court in Sullivan held that because the
employee at issue "'never manifested any willingness or consent to leave upon
the expiration of any of her appointments,' her termination was involuntary
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 5595(b) and she was entitled to receive
severance pay." Opposition at 5, quoting Sullivan, 4 Cl. Ct.
at 76. As to the other cited case, the Union states that the Comptroller
General held that an employee was involuntarily separated, noting that the
employee's knowledge of her time-limited appointment did not render her removal
voluntary and there was no evidence that she consented to be separated. The
Union argues that the record in this case likewise establishes that the
grievant was involuntarily separated because the "separation was against his
will and without his consent," and was "not based on unacceptable performance
or conduct[.]" Opposition at 6. The Union also asserts that the Arbitrator correctly found that the
Agency's severance pay regulation contained in TPR 990-2, subchapter S7-3,
contravenes applicable law. In this connection, the Union argues that the
regulation was issued by the Agency without any statutory authority. According
to the Union, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the only agency
authorized by law to promulgate regulations governing severance pay and that
its regulations are found at 5 C.F.R. § 550.701 et seq. The
Union asserts that civilian technicians are covered by those provisions and
that it is OPM's regulations, rather than the Agency's regulations, that bind
the Arbitrator. The Union also argues that even assuming the Agency was authorized to
promulgate regulations pertaining to severance pay, those regulations would
have to be consistent with statutory requirements governing severance pay. The
Union reiterates that, by law, employees are entitled to severance pay when
they are "separated involuntarily for reasons other than unacceptable
performance or conduct." Opposition at 8. The Union argues that under the
holding in Sullivan "[t]he central issue of voluntariness 'resolves into
a question of fact.'" Id., quoting Sullivan at 75. Here, the
Union argues that the Agency's regulation creates an "irrebuttable presumption"
that terminations for failure to meet military weight standards are voluntary.
Opposition at 8. The Union argues that this presumption has no basis in
the law or Government-wide regulations governing severance pay. Rather, the
Union argues that, in enacting the law pertaining to severance pay, Congress
clearly intended that severance pay determinations "be made on a case-by-case
basis with careful attention to the specific facts surrounding an employee's
termination." Id. at 9. The Union concedes that the Agency has the
authority to establish that military weight requirements must be met as a
condition of maintaining civilian technician status. However, the Union asserts
that an employee who is terminated from a civilian position for failing to meet
the military weight standards nonetheless is eligible for severance pay under
the applicable statutory and regulatory framework. V. Analysis and Conclusions We will find an award deficient when it is contrary to law, rule, or
regulation, or on other grounds similar to those applied by Federal courts in
private sector labor relations cases. For the following reasons, we find that
the award is deficient. Accordingly, we will set it aside. In U.S. Department of the Army, Fort Campbell District, Third
Employees, Local 2022, 37 FLRA 186, 195 (1990)
(Fort Campbell), the Authority stated that "[a] conflict with
agency rules and regulations will provide a basis for finding an award
deficient under section 7122(a)(1) when such rules or regulations govern the
disposition of the matter resolved by the arbitration award." A rule or
regulation governs the matter in dispute when it "applies to the matter in
dispute and does not conflict with similarly applicable provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 190. In this case, the
Agency argues that the award is deficient under the Statute because the
Arbitrator disregarded TPR 990-2. We agree. In finding that the grievant was entitled to severance pay, the
Arbitrator, among other things, rejected the applicability of TPR 990-2.
Specifically, the Arbitrator found that TPR 990-2 "was not promulgated" to
effectuate the purpose of 5 U.S.C. § 5595 and, further, that
TPR 990-2 "contravene[d] the language of the statute[.](*) Award at 8. We have
concluded, after reviewing the regulations implementing 5 U.S.C.
§ 5595, that nothing in the relevant law or the Union's arguments
establishes that the National Guard Bureau lacked the authority to promulgate a
regulation defining a failure to comply with military weight standards as
constituting a bar to severance pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5595.
Rather, we see nothing that prevents the Agency from determining what conduct
it will view as within an employee's control, and not involuntary, for purposes
of applying section 5595. See generally Buriani v. Department
of the Air Force, 777 F.2d 674, 677 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the term "beyond
the employee's control" is comprised of words of art whose meaning can be
established by agency regulation). Accord Jeffries v. Department of
the Air Force, No. 92-3337, 1993 WL 267340 (Fed. Cir. July 20,
1993). Moreover, while the Union maintains that TPR 990-2 was issued
without statutory authority, the Union has presented no evidence supporting
that assertion. Having concluded that the Agency's regulation is applicable in the
circumstances of this case, we find that TPR 990-2 constitutes a governing
regulation that defines a failure to meet military weight standards as a
voluntary separation, for which severance pay is not warranted. The
Arbitrator's failure to apply a governing regulation is deficient under the
Statute. Fort Campbell. Accordingly, the award must be set
aside. In reaching our result, we reject the Union's assertion that
TPR 990-2 creates an "irrebuttable presumption" that "effectively bars
every civilian technician from receiving severance pay in every case regardless
of the facts or circumstances if the failure to meet military weight
requirements is the reason for termination." Opposition at 8. As the
Agency notes, there are circumstances under which an employee's failure to meet
the weight standards would be deemed involuntary and the employee would be
entitled to severance pay. We also find unpersuasive the Union's reliance on
Sullivan and Wanda Pleasant. Neither of those cases
addressed the applicability of a National Guard Bureau regulation or any other
regulation that was claimed to govern the matter in dispute. VI. Decision The award is set aside. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) */ 5 U.S.C. § 5595
provides, in relevant part, as follows: (b) Under regulations prescribed by the President or such officer or
agency as he may designate, an employee who-- (1) has been employed currently for a continuous period of at least
12 months; and (2) is involuntarily separated from the service, not by removal for
cause on charges of misconduct, delinquency, or inefficiency; is entitled to be paid severance pay in regular pay periods by the
agency from which separated. Federal Labor Relations Authority