Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/312/case.html
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 112', '§ 1302', '§ 22', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', 'Art. 22', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 8', '§ 22', '§ 112', '§ 3', '§ 112', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 6', '§ 22', '§ 22']

Boos v. Barry (full text) :: 485 U.S. 312 (1988) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Boos v. Barry
U.S. Supreme CourtBoos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)Boos v. BarryNo. 86-803Argued November 9, 1987Decided March 22, 1988485 U.S. 1988CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
1. Section 22-1115's display clause is facially violative of the First Amendment, since it is a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, which is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Assuming, without deciding, that protecting the dignity of foreign diplomats by shielding them from criticism of their governments is a "compelling" interest for First Amendment purposes, the ready availability of a significantly less restrictive alternative -- 18 U.S.C. § 112, which prohibits intimidating, coercing, or harassing foreign officials or obstructing them in the performance of their duties -- amply demonstrates that the display clause is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand exacting scrutiny. Respondents' defense of the clause is further undercut by § 1302 of the Onmibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, in which Congress requested that the District of Columbia review and revise § 22-1115 in the interest of protecting First Amendment rights, and the District responded by repealing the section, contingent on the prior extension of § 112 to the District. This Court may rely on the judgment of Congress, the body primarily responsible for implementing international law obligations, that § 112 adequately satisfies the Government's interest in protecting diplomatic personnel and Page 485 U. S. 313 that, accordingly, § 22-1115's display clause is not narrowly tailored. Pp. 485 U. S. 321-329.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded in Part II-A that § 22-1115's display clause is content-based, since whether it prohibits picketing in front of a particular embassy depends entirely upon whether the picket signs are critical of the foreign government. The argument that the clause is content-neutral because it does not select between particular viewpoints, but determines a sign's permissible message solely on the basis of the foreign government's policies, is without merit, since even a viewpoint-neutral regulation violates the First Amendment when it prohibits an entire category of speech -- here, signs critical of foreign governments. Also rejected is the contention Page 485 U. S. 314 that, since the clause's real concern is not the suppression of speech, but is rather the "secondary effect" of implementing the international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their dignity, the clause is content-neutral under Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41. As used in Renton, the phrase "secondary effects" refers to secondary features that happen to be associated with the particular type of speech but have nothing to do with its content, whereas, here, the asserted justification for the display clause focuses only on the content of picket signs and their primary and direct emotive impact on their audience. Pp. 485 U. S. 318-321.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B, and V, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and with respect to Parts III and IV, in which all participating Members joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-A, in which STEVENS and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 485 U. S. 334. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Page 485 U. S. 315
Asserting that D.C. Code § 22-1115 (1981) prohibited them from engaging in these expressive activities, petitioners, Page 485 U. S. 316 together with respondent Father R. David Finzer, brought a facial First Amendment challenge to that provision in the District Court for the District of Columbia. They named respondents, the Mayor and certain other law enforcement officials of the District of Columbia, as defendants. The United States intervened as amicus curiae supporting the constitutionality of the statute.
The first portion of this statute, the "display" clause, applies to signs tending to bring a foreign government into public odium or public disrepute, such as signs critical of a foreign government or its policies. The display clause applies only to the display of signs, not to the spoken word. See Zaimi v. United States, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 82, 476 F.2d 511, 527 (1973). The second portion of the statute, the "congregation" clause, addresses a different concern. It prohibits congregation, which District of Columbia common Page 485 U. S. 317 law defines as an assemblage of three or more people. District of Columbia v. Reed, Cr. No. 2021-67 (D.C.Ct.Gen.Sess., May 11, 1967) (reprinted in App. in Kinoy v. District of Columbia, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 290, 298, 400 F.2d 761, 769 (1968)); Hunter v. District of Columbia, 47App.D.C. 406, 409 (1918). Both of these prohibitions generally operate within a 500-foot zone surrounding embassies or consulates owned by foreign governments, but the statute also can extend to other buildings if foreign officials are inside for some official purpose.
The Court of Appeals considered the two aspects of § 22-1115 separately. First, the court concluded that the display clause was a content-based restriction on speech. Relying, however, upon our decisions in Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 460 U. S. 45 (1983), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 447 U. S. 461-462 (1980), the court nonetheless found it constitutional because it was justified by a compelling governmental interest and was narrowly drawn to serve that interest. Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that the congregation clause should be construed to authorize an order to disperse "only when the police reasonably believe that a threat to the security or peace of the embassy is present," and that as construed, the Page 485 U. S. 318 congregation clause survived First Amendment scrutiny. 256 U.S.App.D.C. at 40, 798 F.2d at 1471.
Third, § 22-1115 is content-based. Whether individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether their picket signs are critical of the foreign Page 485 U. S. 319 government or not. One category of speech has been completely prohibited within 500 feet of embassies. Other categories of speech, however, such as favorable speech about a foreign government or speech concerning a labor dispute with a foreign government, are permitted. See D.C. Code § 22-1116 (1981).
We reject this contention, although we agree the provision is not viewpoint-based. The display clause determines which viewpoint is acceptable in a neutral fashion by looking to the policies of foreign governments. While this prevents the display clause from being directly viewpoint-based, a label with potential First Amendment ramifications of its own, see, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 466 U. S. 804 (1984); Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 398 U. S. 63 (1970), it does not render the statute content-neutral. Rather, we have held that a regulation that "does not favor either side of a political controversy" is nonetheless impermissible because the "First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends . . . to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U. S. 530, 447 U. S. 537 (1980). Here the government has determined that an entire category of speech -- signs or displays critical of foreign governments -- is not to be permitted. Page 485 U. S. 320
Respondents attempt to bring the display clause within Renton by arguing that here, too, the real concern is a secondary effect, namely, our international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their dignity. We think this misreads Renton. We spoke in that decision only of secondary effects of speech, referring to regulations that apply to a particular category of speech because the regulatory targets happen to be associated with that type of speech. So long as the justifications for regulation have nothing to do with content, i.e., the desire to suppress crime has nothing to do with the actual films being shown inside adult movie theaters, we concluded that the regulation was properly analyzed as content-neutral. Page 485 U. S. 321
Our cases indicate that as a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, § 22-1115 must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. Thus, we have required the State to show that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 45. Accord, 482 U. S. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. Page 485 U. S. 322 569, 482 U. S. 572-573 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 473 U. S. 800 (1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 177.
Id. at 3237-3238, Art. 22. Page 485 U. S. 323
E. Vattel, The Law of Nations 452 (J. Chitty ed. 1844) (translation). This observation is even more true today, given the global nature of the economy and the extent to which actions in other parts of the world affect our own national security. Diplomatic personnel are essential to conduct the international affairs so crucial to the wellbeing of this Nation. In addition, in light of the concept of reciprocity that governs much of international law in this area, see C. Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 32 (1967), we have a more parochial reason to protect foreign diplomats in this country. Doing so ensures that similar protections will be accorded those that we send abroad to represent the United States, and thus serves our Page 485 U. S. 324 national interest in protecting our own citizens. Recent history is replete with attempts, some unfortunately successful, to harass and harm our ambassadors and other diplomatic officials. These underlying purposes combine to make our national interest in protecting diplomatic personnel powerful indeed.
"intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign Page 485 U. S. 325 official or an official guest or obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his duties."
After the 1972 passage of § 112 in this form, congressional concerns about its impact on First Amendment freedoms apparently escalated, rather than abated. In 1976, Congress revisited the area and repealed the antipicketing provision, leaving in place only the current prohibition on willful acts or attempts to "intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign Page 485 U. S. 326 official." § 112(b)(2). In modifying § 112, Congress was motivated by First Amendment concerns:
Given this congressional development of a significantly less restrictive statute to implement the Vienna Convention, Page 485 U. S. 327 there is little force to the argument that we should give deference to a supposed congressional judgment that the Convention demands the more problematic approach reflected in the display clause. If § 112 is all that is necessary in the rest of the country, petitioners contend it should be all that is necessary in the District of Columbia. The only counterargument offered by respondents is that the District has a higher concentration of foreign embassies than other locales, and that a more restrictive statute is therefore necessary. But this is arguably factually incorrect (New York City is reported to have a greater number of foreign embassies, missions, or consulates than does the District of Columbia, see Note, Regulating Embassy Picketing in the Public Forum, 55 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 908, 928, n. 140 (1987)), and logically beside the point, since the need to protect "dignity" is equally present whether there is one embassy or mission or one hundred. The United States points to Congress' exclusive legislative authority over the District of Columbia, U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, and argues that this justifies more extensive measures. We fail to see, however, why the potential legislative power to enact more extensive measures makes such measures necessary.
"(1) [T]he District of Columbia law concerning demonstrations near foreign missions in the District of Columbia (D.C. Code, sec. 22-1115) may be inconsistent with the reasonable exercise of the rights of free speech and assembly, that law may have been selectively enforced, and peaceful demonstrators may have been unfairly arrested under the law; "Page 485 U. S. 328
The District of Columbia government has responded to the congressional request embodied in the Onmibus Act by repealing § 22-1115. The repeal is contingent, however, on Congress' first acting to extend § 112 to the District. See Protection for Foreign Officials, Official Guests, and Internationally Protected Persons Amendment Act of 1987, § 3, D.C. Act 7-138, 35 D.C. Reg. 728-729 (Feb. 5, 1988). Cf. § 112(b)(3) (Section applies "within the United States, but outside the District of Columbia"). Page 485 U. S. 329
§ 22-1115. Page 485 U. S. 330
Petitioners protest that the Court of Appeals was without authority to narrow the statute. According to petitioners, § 22-1115 must be considered to be state legislation, which brings it within the sweep of prior decisions indicating that federal courts are without power to adopt a narrowing construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent. See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 408 U. S. 110 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 405 U. S. 520-521 (1972). Even assuming that the District of Columbia could be considered a State for this purpose, the argument overlooks the fact that § 22-1115 was enacted by Congress, not by the District of Columbia Council. Cf. Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 445 U. S. 687-688 (1980). It is well settled that federal courts have the power to adopt Page 485 U. S. 331 narrowing constructions of federal legislation. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 458 U. S. 769, n. 24 (1982); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 402 U. S. 368-370 (1971). Indeed, the federal courts have the duty to avoid constitutional difficulties by doing so if such a construction is fairly possible. See, e.g., Ferber, supra, at 458 U. S. 769, n. 24; Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 402 U. S. 369; Schneider v. Smith, 390 U. S. 17, 390 U. S. 26-27 (1968). While the original congressional resolution is now part of the District of Columbia Code, this administrative transfer did not diminish the national interest in the congregation clause. As counsel for respondents indicated at oral argument, there "is no independent District of Columbia interest here." Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Accordingly, we see no barrier to the Court of Appeals' adoption of a narrowing construction.
So narrowed, the congregation clause withstands First Amendment overbreadth scrutiny. It does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct; it merely regulates the place and manner of certain demonstrations. Unlike a general breach of the peace statute, see, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965), the congregation clause is site-specific; it applies only within 500 feet of foreign embassies. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 379 U. S. 568, n. 1 (1965) (ordinance prohibiting certain picketing "near" a courthouse upheld; § 22-1115 cited with approval as being less vague due to specification of 500 feet); Grayned, supra, at 408 U. S. 112, 408 U. S. 120-121 (upholding ban on picketing near a school; special nature of place relevant in judging reasonableness of restraint). Moreover, the congregation clause does not prohibit peaceful congregations; its reach is limited to groups posing a security threat. As we have noted, "where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected quality as expression under the First Amendment." Grayned, supra, at 408 U. S. 116. These two limitations prevent the congregation clause from reaching a substantial amount of constitutionally Page 485 U. S. 332 protected conduct and make the clause consistent with the First Amendment.
"[N]othing contained in [§ 22-1115] shall be construed to prohibit picketing, as a result of bona fide labor disputes regarding the alteration, repair, or construction of either buildings or premises occupied, for business purposes, Page 485 U. S. 333 wholly or in part, by representatives of foreign governments."
Accordingly, only if § 22-1116 is construed to protect violent labor congregations, will there be any unequal treatment of nonlabor and labor picketing which could run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. In our view, § 22-1116 should not be interpreted in this manner. First, it is well established that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions if such a construction is fairly possible. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, supra, at 458 U. S. 769, n. 24; United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra. Second, the face of the statute admonishes only that nothing shall "prohibit picketing." As narrowed by the Court of Appeals, the congregation clause does not "prohibit picketing" at all, it merely regulates the place and manner of certain demonstrations. The labor proviso is thus completely consistent with the congregation clause. Third, § 22-1116 evinces an intent to protect only "bona fide" labor disputes. We think it safe to conclude that an intent to protect such "good faith" disagreements falls short of an intent to insulate violent conduct. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to construe this statute in such a way Page 485 U. S. 334 that the sole purpose of § 22-1116 would be to protect violent labor congregations.
I join all but Part II-A of JUSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion. I also join Part II-A to the extent it concludes that, even under the analysis set forth in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986), the display clause constitutes a content-based restriction on speech that merits strict scrutiny. Whatever "secondary effects" means, I agree that it cannot include listeners' reactions to speech. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, ante p. 485 U. S. 46. I write separately, however, to register my continued disagreement with the proposition that an otherwise content-based restriction on speech can be recast as "content-neutral" if the restriction "aims" at "secondary effects" of the speech, see Renton, supra, at 475 U. S. 56 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, J., dissenting), Page 485 U. S. 335 and to object to JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assumption that the Renton analysis applies not only outside the context of businesses purveying sexually explicit materials, but even to political speech.
Moreover, the Renton analysis provides none of the clear lines or sanctuaries the First Amendment demands. The traditional approach sets forth a bright-line rule: any restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the content Page 485 U. S. 336 of the speech, is a content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it. That, to my mind, has always been implicit in the fact that we term the test a "content-based" test rather than a "motivation-based" test. The traditional rule thus provides clear guidance. Governments can ascertain the scope of impermissible regulation. Individuals can ascertain the scope of their constitutional protection. The Renton analysis, in contrast, plunges courts into the morass of legislative motive, a notoriously hazardous and indeterminate inquiry, particularly where, as under the Renton approach, the posited purpose flies in the face of plain statutory language. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 391 U. S. 383-384 (1968). And even where the motivational inquiry can be resolved, the Renton approach saddles courts with a fuzzy distinction between the secondary and direct effects of speech, a distinction that is likely to prove just as unworkable as other direct/indirect distinctions in constitutional jurisprudence have proved. Compare, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977) (criticizing and wisely rejecting the distinction between direct and indirect taxation of interstate commerce); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-4, p. 408 (2d ed.1988) (noting that the Court abandoned a similar distinction between direct and indirect regulation of interstate commerce).
This indeterminacy is hardly Renton's worst flaw, for the root problem with the Renton analysis is that it relies on the dubious proposition that a statute which on its face discriminates based on the content of speech aims not at content but at some secondary effect that does not itself affect the operation of the statute. But the inherently ill-defined nature of the Renton analysis certainly exacerbates the risk that many laws designed to suppress disfavored speech will go undetected. Although an inquiry into motive is sometimes a useful supplement, the best protection against governmental attempts to squelch opposition has never lain in our ability to assess the purity of legislative motive, but rather in the requirement Page 485 U. S. 337 that the government act through content-neutral means that restrict expression the government favors as well as expression it disfavors. In Justice Jackson's felicitous words of nearly 40 years ago: "Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation." Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 336 U. S. 113 (1949) (concurring opinion). Moreover, even if we could be confident about our ability to determine that a content-based law was intended to aim at the "secondary effects" of certain types of speech, such a law would still offend fundamental free speech interests by denying speakers the equal right to engage in speech and by denying listeners the right to an undistorted debate. These rights are all the more precious when the speech subject to unequal treatment is political speech and the debate being distorted is a political debate. And the dangers, the uncertainties, and the damage to free and equal debate caused by the Renton analysis are all the more regrettable given the unlikelihood of any legitimate governmental interest in a content-based restriction on speech (especially political speech) and the ample alternatives governments have for advancing content-neutral goals through content-neutral regulation. At least, in Renton, there was a plausible argument that the secondary effect sought to be regulated -- the social decay of neighborhoods -- could not be directly regulated in the way that congestion, visual clutter, or violence can be. But absent a demonstrable showing of that type of necessity, it is hard to see how a convincing argument could ever be made that a content-based regulation does not aim at content. Nor can I conceive of any situation where a plausible argument could be made that regulating the content of political speech is necessary to regulate content-neutral secondary effects.
Until today, the Renton analysis, however unwise, had at least never been applied to political speech. Renton itself seemed to confine its application to "businesses that purvey Page 485 U. S. 338 sexually explicit materials." 475 U.S. at 475 U. S. 49, and n. 2. Indeed, the same day that we decided Renton, three of the Justices who joined it reiterated the traditional test in Pacific Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U. S. 1, 475 U. S. 20 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) ("For a time, place, or manner regulation to be valid, it must be neutral as to the content of the speech to be regulated"). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981) (evaluating a prohibition on the religious use of university buildings under the strict scrutiny applicable to content-based regulations even though the prohibition was aimed at avoiding perceived Establishment Clause problems, a secondary effect of the speech). * True, today's application of the Renton analysis to political speech is dictum: the challenged statute would be treated as content-based under either Renton or the traditional approach, and the opinion could easily have stated simply that we need not reach the issue whether Renton applies to political speech because, even under Renton, the law constitutes a content-based restriction. It is nonetheless ominous dictum, for it could set the Court on a road that will lead to the evisceration of First Amendment freedoms. I can only hope that, when the Court is actually presented with a case involving a content-based regulation of political speech that allegedly aims at so-called secondary effects of that speech, the Court will recognize and avoid the pitfalls of the Renton approach.
For the reasons stated by Judge Bork in his majority opinion below, I would uphold that portion of § 22-1115 of the District of Columbia Code that prohibits the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tends to Page 485 U. S. 339 bring that foreign government into "public odium" or "public disrepute." However, I agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that § 22-1115's congregation clause is not unconstitutional, and that the exemption for labor picketing does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, so I join in Parts III and IV of the majority opinion.