Source: http://openjurist.org/656/f2d/593/coalition-for-fair-utility-rates-inc-v-baker
Timestamp: 2017-01-16 16:07:11
Document Index: 654384776

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2632', '§ 2632', '§ 2632', '§ 2633', '§ 2632', '§ 2632', '§ 2632', '§ 2633', '§ 2632']

656 F2d 593 Coalition for Fair Utility Rates Inc v. Baker | OpenJurist
656 F. 2d 593 - Coalition for Fair Utility Rates Inc v. Baker HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 656 F.2d.
656 F2d 593 Coalition for Fair Utility Rates Inc v. Baker 656 F.2d 593
COALITION FOR FAIR UTILITY RATES, INC. and Neighbor ForNeighbor, Inc., each Oklahoma nonprofitcorporations, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.Hamp BAKER, Bill Dawson, Norma Eagleton as CorporationCommissioners, and the State of Oklahoma, ex relthe Corporation Commission, Defendants-Appellees,Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company, and Public Service Companyof Oklahoma, Intervenors-Appellees.
No. 81-1334.
Submitted June 11, 1981.Decided Aug. 7, 1981.
Section 2631 describes procedures for electricity consumer intervention and participation in ratemaking proceedings conducted by a state regulatory authority. Intervention is encouraged, in § 2632(a), by providing for compensation to intervenors who substantially contribute to partial or total approval of positions advocated by them. Compensation is to include "reasonable attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and other reasonable costs incurred in preparation and advocacy." 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a)(1). Compensation may be collected pursuant to § 2632(a)(2):
Section 2633 delimits the jurisdiction of the federal courts over actions arising under PURPA. Of primary importance to the instant controversy, § 2633(b)(2) provides:
Since the legislative history of the Act indicates that the conferees intended the compensation mechanism of § 2632 to encourage consumer representation in ratemaking proceedings, plaintiff's theory in bringing this federal action is that the refusal of the state regulatory agency to provide for compensation so impairs the right of intervention as to render the right non-existent. We express no opinion on this theory, but hold that the federal courts have no jurisdiction to consider it until attorney's fees have been denied "by any state court." Plaintiffs have only been denied their compensation by the Commission. Plaintiffs have not pursued their additional method of obtaining compensation; no civil suit has been brought to collect such compensation "in any state court of competent jurisdiction" as is provided for in § 2632(a) (2). The State Supreme Court only held that it could not order the Commission to set up procedures for awarding compensation to intervenors. The State Supreme Court did not deny the right to compensation altogether. To the contrary, that court directed plaintiffs to the state trial court where § 2632(a)(2) allows them to bring a civil suit to secure their compensation. If compensation is denied in such state court, and plaintiffs are thus left without compensation,1 then § 2633(b)(2) will form the jurisdictional predicate for a federal district court's review of plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiffs have another possible avenue of recovery. Their appeal to the State Supreme Court of the Commission's opinion that it lacked authority to make compensation awards under PURPA may result in the discreditation of that opinion and the subsequent promulgation of Commission procedures for compensation awards. In that case, plaintiff's suit for compensation in state court would be precluded by the language in § 2632(a)(2)