Source: https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/rubriche/sources-of-law-in-the-european-union-member-states/germany
Timestamp: 2018-07-16 02:52:01
Document Index: 262030559

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', 'art. 9', 'art. 9', 'art. 9', 'art. 12', 'art. 3', 'art. 9', 'art. 12', 'art. 20', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6']

Hofmeister Hannes Herbert Viktor - Free University of Bolzano/Bozen
Dr. Hofmeister Hannes Herbert Viktor
Infrastructure fee amendment law (“Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Infrastrukturabgabengesetzes - 1. InfrAGÄndG“)
Germany - Gesetz zur Tarifeinheit – Tarifeinheitsgesetz (1/2016)
Gesetz zur Tarifeinheit – Tarifeinheitsgesetz
(Änderung des Tarifvertragsgesetz (TVG)
November July 3th, 2015
Law / Bundesgesetz
Arts. 9 GG German basic law (Grundgesetz)
Since July 10th 2015, the act to ensure the bargaining unity is in force (Tarifeinheitsgesetz), which added a new article to the Collective Agreements Act (§ 4a Tarifvertragsgesetz – TVG). The new regulation provides that in a company, in which collective agreements overlap, only the agreement of the union is valid, which represents the majority of employees. The regulation applies if several agreements cover the same employment group. It does not prevent collective agreements for specific groups of employees as long as the distinction between the groups is clear. The unions are to coordinate their responsibilities and apply their collective agreements for different employees. The explanatory memorandum states that avoiding the clash of collective agreements ensures the funnctioning of collective bargaining autonomy. Conflicts between collective agreements might endanger order and peace of the work environment. Competing unions may be forced to cooperate. The law does not directly regulate the right to labour dispute, but it is expected that strikes of (small) unions, which have as their objective a collective agreement, which can not be applied due to collision with a majority agreement, be regarded as disproportionate.
This regulation is constitutionally questionable. The freedom of association in art. 9 sec 3 GG includes collective bargaining and the right to strike. These rights entitle small and large unions irrespective of the number and character of their members. The new law does not only change the regulatory framework in which these rights can be exercised. Instead, certain collective agreements are declared inapplicable. The conclusion of a collective agreement, which is inapplicable, is worthless. Labour disputes for worthless agreements are not permitted. Minority unions are not longer able to collective bargaining. Thus, the new regulation affects freedom of association.
The freedom of association in art. 9 sec. 3 GG is guaranteed without reservation. Inherent limits require a constitutional value. Especially the reasoning in the explanatory memorandum does not convince. Supposed functions of collective bargaining can not be used to limit the freedom of collective bargaining. Autonomy can be excercised freely only limited by the rights of others. Freedom is hampered when it only serves to fulfill fixed purposes to the benefit of others. Especially because determination of these purposes is questionable. The freedom of association is to pursue own interests. The determination of these interests is an essential part of the autonomy. Other rights or values that would be harmed by an excessive exercise of this freedom must be found to justify its regulation. For instance, the freedom of collective bargaining of employers or competing unions could be endangered by a tattered tariff structure. Furthermore, there may be areas where escalating strike action would lead to unreasonable economic losses, such as in the health sector or other areas of public interest. If it were to avoid these actions, regulation should be limited to these areas.
In addition, the regulation poses problems with regard to proportionality. It is highly questionable whether a general threat to collective bargaining can outweigh the intervention in the freedom of collective bargaining. The same is true for the dreaded damage due to increased strike activity. To address these concerns, minority unions are granted procedural rights. They have the right to a hearing. They also have the - hardly significant – right to trace the rules of the majority collective agreement in a separate collective agreement. But it is still questionable whether this attenuation is sufficient.
The Federal Constitutional Court will soon decide on the constitutionality of the “Tarifeinheitsgesetz”.
Secondary sources/ doctrinal works (selection)
Wolfgang Ewert: Aushöhlung von Grundrechten der Berufs- und Spartengewerkschaften – Das Tarifeinheitsgesetz, NJW 2015, 2230–2235; Richard Giesen, Jens Kersten: Gesetzliche Tarfieinheit, ZfA 2015, 201–240; Christoph Hölscher: Das Tarifeinheitsgesetz: Kritik und Alternativen, ArbRAktuell 2015, 7–9.
http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*[%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl115s1130.pdf%27]#__bgbl__%2F%2F*[%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl115s1130.pdf%27]__1459616062587
Germany – Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes (n. 3/2015)
Arts. 16 GG German basic law (Grundgesetz)
The latest amendment of the German Nationality Act, which came into force on December 20th, 2014, broke with an old principle of the German citizenship law. The fundamental reform of the nationality law in 1999 had already implemented elements of the territoriality principle (ius soli) to the formerly exclusive application of the principle of descent (ius sanguinis). In order to adhere to the principle of exclusive nationality, the acquisition of German nationality by territoriality was combined with an obligation to choose between the German and the parental foreign citizenship until the age of 23 years. The new law goes one step further and renounces the principle of exclusive nationality. In the future, dual nationality is accepted in German nationality law.
The purpose of the regulation from 1999 was to facilitate integration for children who were born and raised in Germany. However, the obligation to choose between the German and the foreign nationality required a difficult decision by lot of young "Germans by option" and led to loyalty conflicts. For some, it led to a conscious departure from the German nationality though they have made their lives in Germany. That contradicts the objective to integrate these persons into German society. Therefore all Germans raised in Germany now keep the citizenship without having to choose. Dual nationality is accepted.
The legal and political function of citizenship changes with the abandonment of the principle of exclusive nationality: nationality is not a criterion to assign someone to specific national law any more. This may cause some problems in (private) international law. These may be easily solved because previous regulations have never completely avoided multiple nationalities either (e.g. in mixed marriages). However, the reciprocal loyalty between State and citizen that exists in an exclusive membership of a political community is relativized. Instead, the acceptance of multiple nationalities recognizes transcultural identities. This leads to a duplication of civic and political rights and duties. Time will tell how to deal with related problems in Germany.
Secondary sources/ doctrinal works
Seyran Ateş, Gülay Bedir, LL.M. und Charlotte Steiling, LL.M.: Neues Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz. Deutscher kann sein, wer auch Türke ist, in: Legal Tribune Online, 19.12.2014, http://www.lto.de/persistent/a_id/14177/;
Kay Heilbronner: Optionsregelung und doppelte Staatsangehörigkeit, in: ZAR 2013, 357;
Wolfang Mosbacher: Die reformierte Optionspflicht im Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, in: NVwZ 2015, 268.
http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&;jumpTo=bgbl114s1714.pdf
Germany - Gesetz zur Regelung eines allgemeinen Mindestlohns (Mindestlohngesetz – MiLoG)
Type of text (name in English / name in the official language)
Laws / Bundesgesetze
Arts. 3 and 9 GG German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
In January 2015 German law introduced for the first time a general minimum wage of 8.50 EUR per hour. For some sectors, where a lower minimum wage already existed, there are transitional arrangements until 2017. In the future, a commission will adjust the level of the minimum wage. This commission is appointed by the federal government. It consists of a chairman, three employee representatives, three employer representatives and two non-voting scientific advisers. Exceptions to the minimum wage exist for vocational training, school- and study-related internships, minors, and newspaper delivery as well as for long-term unemployed during the first six months of their re-employment.
In practice, the law causes some problems, because it came into force without sufficient lead-time and documentation requirements place unexpected burdens. In addition, employers develop a great creativity when it comes to the definition of remunerated working hours and expenses that can be deducted from the minimum wage.
Apart from this, constitutional objections are expressed. Serious concerns exist regarding the freedom of association in art. 9 sec. 3 Basic Law (GG) and the freedom to exercise a trade or profession in art. 12 sec. 1 GG. The legal exceptions might lead to inconsistency and violate the principle of equal treatment of art. 3 sec. 1 GG.
The freedom of association in art. 9 sec 3 GG includes collective bargaining, which means the right of employers' and employees' associations to conclude collective agreements on salaries. The freedom to exercise a trade or profession in art. 12 sec. 1 GG includes the individual freedom of contract taking employment. The establishment of a minimum wage limits these freedoms, because salaries cannot be agreed below the minimum wage - neither through collective agreements nor individual contracts. The composition of the commission fixing the minimum wage with representatives of employers' and employees' associations does not alter this fact. It may improve the political acceptance of the minimum wage, but does not avoid the encroachment on fundamental rights.
However, these encroachments are justified by the social state principle (art. 20 sec. 1 GG), which includes the design of fair working conditions, the moderation of dependency relationships and an appropriate balance of wealth differences. The interference with existing collective agreements is mitigated by the transitional arrangements.
The exceptions must be justified by objective reasons in order not to lead to inconsistency, which could jeopardise the attainment of the law. The exception for long-term unemployed is to promote the re-entry into the profession, even if it runs the risk of "revolving-door-effect” when employees are regularly replaced with new long-term unemployed after six months. Vocational trainees and short-term interns fall under the special legal regulation on the educational andtraining system. The exclusion of unskilled minors is meant to avoid that those opt for unskilled work at the minimum wage instead of a sometimes poorly remunerated further education.
The special transitional arrangements for newspaper deliverers are difficult to understand in particular as other exceptions, e.g. for seasonal workers and taxi drivers, were discarded. A review by the Federal Constitutional Court is unavoidable and expected in the near future.
Zeising / Weigert: Verfassungsmäßigkeit des Mindestlohngesetzes, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 2015, page 15–22.
Preis / Ulber: Die Verfassungsmäßigkeit des allgemeinen gesetzlichen Mindestlohns – Rechtsgutachten, www.boeckler.de/pdf/gf_gutachten_preis_2014_04.pdf
Germany - Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes in Umsetzung der Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes vom 7. Mai 2013
1. Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes in Umsetzung der Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes vom 7. Mai 2013
July 15, 2013 / July 18, 2014
Arts. 3, 6 GG German basic law (Grundgesetz)
Taxation; Family law
In its decision of May 7, 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) decided that the unequal treatment of registered civil partnerships and marriages regarding income splitting for spouses was unconstitutional.[1] Homosexual couples can choose the registered civil partnership to obtain a marriage-like legal status. But the income tax law allowed only spouses to be assessed jointly to income tax. The joint assessment leads to the application of the so-called “Splittingtarif”, which is more favorable than the ordinary assessment. In the view of the court, these provisions of the Income Tax Act violated the general right to equality before the law (Art. 3 sec. 1 of the Basic Law/GG), because there were no sufficiently weighty factual reasons for the unequal treatment. The specific protection of marriage and family in Art. 6 sec. 1 GG itself could not justify the unequal treatment of marriage and registered civil partnerships. The values enshrined in Art. 6 sec. 1 GG constituted a factual reason for differentiation that first and foremost allows to privilege marriage as compared to other ways of living together, which are characterised by a lesser measure of mutual commitments. If the privileged treatment of marriage includes that other forms of partnership that are structured in a similarly binding way were placed at a disadvantage, the mere reference to the requirement to protect the institution of marriage in Art. 6 GG did not, however, justify such a sustained differentiation in income tax regulation.
The decision met with opposition. It was controversial even within the Court. The decision was taken with 6:2 votes. The outvoted judges delivered a dissenting opinion. The criticism is primarily that the Court disregards the discretion of the legislator. The legislator may design a registered civil partnership for homosexual couples, which is similar to marriage in many ways but maintain differences in taxation regarding the traditional concept of family, which is still associated with children and the succession of generations.
Nevertheless, due to the decision of the Constitutional Court, the legislator was forced to align tax regulation for registered partners with spouses. With the "Act to amend the income tax law implementing the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court” the equal treatment in income tax was quickly implemented at the end of the 17th legislative period in July 2013. During the legislative process, the federal government had announced to examine whether further amendments were necessary and if necessary implement them in an ordinary legislative procedure at the beginning of the 18th legislative period.
This was done with the “Act for the adaptation of tax rules to the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court" from July 18, 2014. All tax laws have been adapted so that registered partnership and marriage are always mentioned simultaneously. The changes entered into force on July 24, 2014. So registered partnerships are treated equally to marriages in all tax matters. As the title of the legislation shows, impulsion for this development was not a political decision of the legislature or the government to transform society, but the Federal Constitutional Court with its extensive jurisdiction. The legislature saw itself as a mere executor of constitutional requirements.
BVerfG, Order of 7 May 2013 – 2 BvR 909/06, 2 BvR 1981/06, 2 BvR 288/07
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[1] BVerfG, Order of 7 May 2013 – 2 BvR 909/06, 2 BvR 1981/06, 2 BvR 288/07.