Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/13/775/632129/
Timestamp: 2019-06-27 06:56:30
Document Index: 794317914

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1400', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1400', '§ 1412', '§ 1415', '§ 1415']

Stephen Komninos, an Infant, by His Guardian Ad Litem,thomas Komninos; Thomas Komninos; Winifredkomninos, Individually, Appellants, v. Upper Saddle River Board of Education, Appellee, 13 F.3d 775 (3d Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1994 › Stephen Komninos, an Infant, by His Guardian Ad Litem,thomas Komninos; Thomas Komninos; Winifredkomn...
Stephen Komninos, an Infant, by His Guardian Ad Litem,thomas Komninos; Thomas Komninos; Winifredkomninos, Individually, Appellants, v. Upper Saddle River Board of Education, Appellee, 13 F.3d 775 (3d Cir. 1994)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 13 F.3d 775 (3d Cir. 1994)
Argued Dec. 7, 1993. Decided Jan. 12, 1994
In this appeal, we determine that a district court may entertain a motion for a preliminary injunction before administrative remedies have been exhausted if a School Board's interim placement decision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1484a, will cause irreparable harm to a child. Because the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, before making a complete inquiry as to the existence of exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, we will remand for further proceedings.
In April 1993, Stephen's parents, plaintiffs in this suit, requested that he be placed in a residential facility as a means of improving his condition and skills. After the Board refused to comply with the wishes of the parents, they sought administrative relief pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), formerly known as the Education of the Handicapped Act.
In July 1993, plaintiffs moved for emergency relief before the ALJ assigned to the case. They asked for an administrative order directing the Board to pay Stephen's expenses at Heartspring for the new school year beginning August 23, 1993 during the pendency of the administrative proceedings. Noting that material facts were in dispute and that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate "irreparability of harm or irretrievable interruption of [the] educational program," the ALJ denied the motion. He characterized the order as "final pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)."
Before the Board filed responsive pleadings, the district court dismissed the complaint. The order stated that 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1484a vests a district court "with jurisdiction only when a plaintiff has first followed the procedures set forth in the Act and exhausted the administrative remedies under the Act." Accordingly, "plaintiffs not having yet exhausted the procedures required by the Act," the district court dismissed the complaint "for lack of jurisdiction."
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act provides for a "free appropriate public education" for all handicapped children, 20 U.S.C. § 1412, and establishes an elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of those individuals. One procedural safeguard is the right to a due process hearing before an administrative official.2 Parties aggrieved by the findings and decision made in the administrative proceedings provided by the Act have the right to bring a civil action in either federal or state court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2). In such an action, the court reviews the records of the administrative proceedings, hears additional evidence at the request of a party, and grants such relief as may be appropriate. Id.
Section 1415(e) thus grants subject matter jurisdiction to the district courts. However, it is clear from the language of the Act that Congress intended plaintiffs to complete the administrative process before resorting to federal court. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3468-69, 82 L. Ed. 2d 746 (1984), the Supreme Court noted that allowing an equal protection claim without requiring exhaustion under the predecessor statute, would not only "render superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute, but, more important, it would also run counter to Congress' view that the needs of handicapped children are best accommodated by having the parents and the local education agency work together to formulate an individualized plan for each handicapped child's education."
Even though the policy of requiring exhaustion of remedies in the Disabilities Education Act is a strong one, some exceptions have been recognized. In Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327, 108 S. Ct. 592, 606, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988), a case brought under an earlier version of the Act, the Court stated that "parents may bypass the administrative process where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate." In like vein, an exception exists where the issue presented is purely a legal question, Lester H. by Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1990), or where the administrative agency cannot grant relief (e.g., hearing officer lacks authority to provide a remedy). Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1992).
At least one Court of Appeals has recognized another exception--when exhaustion would work "severe or irreparable harm" upon a litigant. Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1097 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 774 (1st Cir. 1981). This last exception finds support in the legislative history of the Disabilities Education Act which states that exhaustion would not be necessary when "an emergency situation exists (e.g., the failure to take immediate action will adversely affect a child's mental or physical health)." H.R.Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985). In accordance with the position taken by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and legislative history, we also adopt an emergency situation exception to the exhaustion requirement of the Disabilities Education Act. Having recognized such a category, however, we caution that it is to be sparingly invoked.
The emergency situation exception differs from the others because of its dependence on the facts of a case and the interference created with the administrative proceedings in progress. The advantages of awaiting completion of the administrative hearings are particularly weighty in Disabilities Education Act cases. That process offers an opportunity for state and local agencies to exercise discretion and expertise in fields in which they have substantial experience. These proceedings thus carry out congressional intent and provide a means to develop a complete factual record. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1011, 104 S. Ct. at 3468 (Congress made express efforts to place primary responsibility for fulfilling the needs of handicapped children on local and state education agencies). The administrative hearings generally will produce facts and opinions relevant to the very same issues presented to the court by plaintiffs.
In order to meet that threshold, plaintiffs must provide affidavits from competent professionals along with other hard evidence that the child faces irreversible damage if the relief is not granted. If plaintiffs meet that burden but the defendant in connection with a 12b(1) motion to dismiss presents convincing evidence that such harm will not occur, the court should not proceed, but rather must require plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies. We leave the means to determine whether the threshold requirements have been met to the discretion of the district court. Tanzymore v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 457 F.2d 1320, 1323 (3rd Cir. 1972); 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1350 (1990).
We do not presume to issue a definitive ruling in the absence of a more complete record, but we doubt that "regression" per se constitutes such irreparable harm as to justify an exception to the exhaustion requirement. It is our understanding that, in general, the skills lost in regression may be recouped, but that the disabled take longer than the non-handicapped to regain their previous achievements. See generally Johnson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 4 of Bixby Tulsa County, Okla., 921 F.2d 1022, 1027-28 (10th Cir. 1990); Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1470-74 (6th Cir. 1990); Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1988); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158-59 (5th Cir. 1986); Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1980).
The decisional law discussing the regression problem in reviewing final placement decisions is helpful, but the cited cases differ from the one here where the critical question is whether there is such immediacy of harm as to preclude delay until the administrative process is completed. When awaiting the outcome of agency proceedings does not jeopardize the child's future progress to any substantial degree, courts should be wary of foregoing the benefits to be derived from a thorough development of the issues in the administrative proceeding. If a court does insist on exhaustion of the administrative process and ultimately the Board is found to have erred in failing to provide a proper placement, a remedy is available. The delay in obtaining the expected benefit may be redressed by compensable extensions of eligibility for educational aid. Lester H. by Octavia P., 916 F.2d at 872-73; see also Pihl v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188-90 (1st Cir. 1993); Miener by and through Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753-54 (8th Cir. 1986).
One other point deserves mention. Sometimes self-help rather than court action may be utilized. Parents who have adequate funds are given the option of placing their child in a facility of their choosing with the risk that they will not be reimbursed if they fail to succeed in the litigation over the child's permanent placement. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74, 105 S. Ct. 1996, 2004-05, 85 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1985). The parents in this case, however, do not appear to have adequate funds to meet the costs for Stephen's interim placement at Heartspring.
The procedures are set out in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). See the discussions in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310-12, 108 S. Ct. 592, 597-98, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988); Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180-83, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3037-39, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982)