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[Party1] RV: template - consensus defined for ICANN dealing	with GAC advice - draft1
Wed Mar 4 18:49:49 UTC 2015
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I really don't think any one segment of the community can claim to be the sole voice of the public interest in public policy at ICANN.  No doubt GAC plays an important role in that discussion and ultimate determination, but so do other members of the community.  One advancement of multi-stakeholderism governance models is that govts alone do not set public policy for the Internet - rather that responsibility is shared among a broader variety of stakeholders.  Certainly GAC can set up its operating rules as it likes.  But what the rest of the community does in response to those operating rules is not something within the GAC's control, and would be an overreach to try to control.
On Mar 4, 2015, at 8:50 AM, Perez Galindo, Rafael wrote:
> Dear Mathieu and All,
> Thank you for this very helpful email.
> Apart from the concerns raised in yesterday’s call, I would like to underscore something already hinted in Mathieu’s email. ICANN Bylaws state clearly that the Board shall duly take into account Governments’ advice “on public policy issues”. [Article I Section 2.11, Article III Section 6.1.c and Article XI Section 2.j]. This is the key point: the GAC brings the public policy perspective into ICANN.
> Hence, if the final goal of this accountability exercise is to avoid “capture of the Board” via “capture of the GAC”, it is useful to imagine a scenario in which one single government prevents the whole GAC from reaching consensus (in the sense of unanimity, which is the current situation) and thus from giving advice to the Board to protect the global public interest (e.g. protection of human rights, protection of intellectual property rights…). This situation would entail capture of the GAC by one government, which imposes its will to the GAC and refrains it from its primary mission objective, i.e., defend the public interest. And it would mean a complete failure of this accountability measure that is being proposed.
> In addition, let us not forget that the GAC advice to the Board is entitled to be duly taken into account, but is not anything further than an advice. I do not think that preempting the way a particular AC makes decisions helps at all to reach the goal of accountability.
> Along that line, I would like to echo Roelf’s words, especially regarding the difference between quantity of advice and obligation to follow a particular advice. So, it is very doubtful that in any case the influence of the GAC would increase if it some day decided to make decisions based on supermajority (3/4 or whatever) instead of unanimity/consensus.
> My final point is a call for prudence. All possible consequences of such a change in the Bylaws should be thoroughly vetted before any decision is made.
> The forthcoming engagement of the Co-Chairs with Thomas Schneider is much welcomed.
> Rafael Pérez Galindo
> GAC - SPAIN
> De: wp1-bounces at icann.org [mailto:wp1-bounces at icann.org] En nombre de Mathieu Weill
> Enviado el: miércoles, 04 de marzo de 2015 16:27
> Para: wp1 at icann.org
> Asunto: Re: [Party1] template - consensus defined for ICANN dealing with GAC advice - draft1
> We are obviously on sensitive grounds here. We are all well aware that to reach our goal, to enhance Icann's accountability in the context of a successful transition, we need to ensure :
> - that we have consensus across all SO/ACs
> - that we ensure the absence of capture within Icann.
> This discussion started from the stress test which is precisely defined at ensuring that Icann is not captured by governments or a group of governments. The proposal being currently discussed suggests that Icann Bylaws incorporate a specific decision making rule (consensus) for GAC Advice to get special deferrence by the Board. Feedback from some GAC members in the CCWG tend to demonstrate that the proposal would not get full consensus at this point.
> We need to recognize that the proposal is consistent with current practice of the GAC, but also that this current practice has been discussed in the past within the GAC, and appears to be a point of discussion between GAC members lately. Consequently, we as CCWG run the risk of stepping into an internal GAC discussion without properly understanding the specific context.
> The co-chairs will engage the GAC Chair, Thomas Schneider, on the issue shortly, as discussed earlier within the CCWG. before doing that I would appreciate your insights on some aspects of the current proposal :
> - would other definitions of decision making, for example supermajority requirements such as those existing for some gNSO decisions, provide sufficient guarantees against capture (2/3 ; 3/4; ...) ? In this case they could replace the proposed definition of consensus ?
> - how does the current proposal (consensus being defined as "no formal objection") prevent from one single government "capturing" GAC "special deferrence" advice ? Could that not be considered by some as capture (within the GAC) by one government over the "public policy" perspective that the GAC brings into Icann.
> Thanks for your considered responses, and for the very useful debate on this topic so far.
> Le 04/03/2015 07:14, Jordan Carter a écrit :
> Dear all, dear Olga,
> Apologies for the delay in replying, but here we go:
> On 3 March 2015 at 23:35, Olga Cavalli <olgacavalli at gmail.com> wrote:
> could you clarify this sentence please:
> "I know that the GAC could do this: if it changed the Operating Principle 47 to allow advice by majority vote, this would effectively increase governmental influence in ICANN"
> In short: if GAC can choose to decide advice more easily, and ICANN is obliged to duly take GAC advice into account, then GAC can choose to increase its influence in ICANN. GAC should not be able to choose to do this on its own, is the argument here.
> Here's the long version:
> At the present time GAC advice triggers an obligation on ICANN to duly take that advice into account, as per the bylaws:
> Article IX Section 2 Part 1
> j. The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the  ICANN  Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the  ICANN  Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
> This obligation to look at the advice, and to try and find a mutual solution, is what gives GAC its influence in ICANN - its advice cannot be ignored by the Board.
> The GAC in its Operating Principles (#47) specifies that advice will be made by consensus.
> GAC can change its operating principles.
> If - hypothetically - GAC did change its operating principles to allow it to give advice to ICANN on a non-consensus basis - perhaps by voting - then it would be _lowering the threshold_ at which advice could be given.
> The current combination of ICANN having to give due heed to GAC advice, and the consensus nature of that advice, is what gives the GAC its current level of structural influence in ICANN.
> It seems to me that if the threshold was lowered for establishing such advice, then that influence would be increased. Governments would have more influence in ICANN, because it would be easier to give advice on more topics without the onerous requirement of consensus being arrived at.
> In the other direction, if the threshold for advice was made higher (e.g. if GAC - hypothetically - changed its operating principles so that it could only offer consensus advice after agreeing it was consensus at three GAC meetings in a row, with a quorum of 100 governments participating), then the level of influence would be reduced.
> The logic behind this proposed change to the ICANN bylaws is that the current level of GAC advice in the ICANN environment should be maintained, and that any changes to it would need to be agreed not just by GAC (which is the case today), but by the whole community through a change to the bylaws.
> I apologise that this is a long reply, but I cannot answer clearly more briefly.
> 2015-03-03 10:28 GMT-03:00 Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>:
> Thank you very much Julia and Rafael for these inputs. It is very helpful in further developing this proposal.
> I think there is an objective question we need an answer to, which is:
> Which, if any, SOs and ACs have the ability to change their internal rules or procedures in a way that affects the whole ICANN community?
> From where I sit, I know that the GAC could do this: if it changed the Operating Principle 47 to allow advice by majority vote, this would effectively increase governmental influence in ICANN and is solely a GAC decision.
> I do not know whether other ACs can do this, because I do not know whether the bylaws give a special privileged status to their advice similar to the status they give to GAC advice.
> I do not know whether other SOs can do this.
> I think in the ccNSO there is no advice provision, and in terms of policymaking, all the rules are set out in the PDP which is part of the bylaws. So any change for ccNSO influence is a bylaws change, as far as I know.
> If we have a clearer position of this, it would be helpful.
> Are ICANN staff able to provide this information?
> Is any volunteer member of the WP able to provide this information?
> I think if we know the answer, we will have a better basis to proceed.
> My initial thought is that if it is only GAC that has this ability, then that isn't something that should be maintained, because one of the key criteria for the IANA stewardship transition that NTIA has set out is that ICANN should not be subject to *governmental* control in future. An unlimited ability for governments to increase their influence in ICANN at their own discretion could conflict with that requirement, and mean the IANA stewardship transition fails.
> That's why resolving this in some way is part of WorkStream 1 - to be done to allow transition to proceed.
> Looking forward to more discussions!
> On 3 March 2015 at 21:36, Perez Galindo, Rafael <RPEREZGA at minetur.es> wrote:
> Spain fully concurs with the views expressed by Denmark.
> While understanding the need to avoid capture, no proposal should preempt the way in which a Committee makes decisions, which is what this idea would mean in practice by compelling the GAC to stick to the consensus rule if it wants the Board to duly take into account its advice.
> This proposal goes beyond the scope of this CCWG unless we engage in discussion of procedures in all relevant SOs/ACs, as well.
> At any rate, such a proposal would strongly affect the GAC role and should request explicit consent from the GAC prior to its inclusion in the report.
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> De: wp1-bounces at icann.org [mailto:wp1-bounces at icann.org] En nombre de Julia Katja Wolman
> Enviado el: martes, 03 de marzo de 2015 12:53
> Dear Malcolm, colleagues,
> This is indeed an interesting discussion, which is likely to generate some more comments from the government side.
> From our (DK) point of view we fully understand the need to have a stress test for such a situation, including mitigating capture, but it is our general view that any such proposal should not lower the current threshold for the obligation of the ICANN Board to duly taking into account GAC advice.
> With regard to Malcolm's suggestion below, we believe the text should not be split into two. To clarify: In practice, the example you present below where the other governments would be "indifferent" actually means that the other governments actively chose not to actively support that specific issue, for different reasons, and consequently there would be consensus on advancing that specific issue as GAC advice. We would also like to underline that reaching consensus among governments is not an easy task and is a process that requires deliberations and compromises.  Therefore, we would like keep the text from the existing consensus rules in the GAC's Operating Principles.
> Moreover with regard to the template, there may be situations where the GAC could not give consensus advice to the Board on a specific issue because of opposition from one government but the general view could still be in the benefit of the public. The opposite situation could be interpreted so that a non-consensus advice always would be contrary to the public benefit/interest.
> Consequently in the attached document we suggest to amend the following paragraph:
>  "Primarily this purpose:
> ·       Ensure decisions are for benefit of the public, not just for a particular set of stakeholders"
> "Primarily this purpose:
> .     Avoid capture of a particular set of interests"
> Julia Katja Wolman
> DANISH BUSINESS AUTHORITY
> Dahlerups Pakhus
> Langelinie Allé 17
> DK-2100 København Ø
> Telephone: +45 3529 1000
> Direct: +45 35291308
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> Fra: wp1-bounces at icann.org [mailto:wp1-bounces at icann.org] På vegne af Malcolm Hutty
> Sendt: 2. marts 2015 12:38
> Til: Kavouss Arasteh; Jordan Carter
> Cc: wp1 at icann.org
> Emne: Re: [Party1] template - consensus defined for ICANN dealing with GAC advice - draft1
> On 01/03/2015 08:01, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
> > I understand from the draft that therte would be only "CONSENSUS ADVICE"
> > from GAC to ICANN Board
> > However, today, GAC could advise the ICANN Board with advice on which
> > no consensus is reached and that is an aimportant elements on which
> > the system is working.
> > There are several examples of such kind of advice.
> Absolutely, this is an important point. It is of course important that the Board receive input from individual governments as well as other stakeholders. The GAC has sometimes found it convenient to convey such input through consensus documents such as the communique. When it does so this essentially means "We have no consensus on X, but some of our members would like to express their own view to you, and we are agreed that you should be aware of their view".
> This is entirely appropriate. At the same time, it is important to be able to distinguish between a view that has commanded a consensus in the GAC and one which does not; the bylaws provides for special weight to be given to GAC views, and that surely means the former rather than the latter. This template simply aims to clarify that.
> As a small tweak, I wonder whether the template would be improved by spltting the test into two heads ("general agreement" AND "the absence of formal objection", as follows:
> "Consensus advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies, where consensus is understood to mean the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement and the absence of any formal objection.  [...continues unchanged]"
> The aim of this change is to address the position where one government raises an issue of interest to them only, and other governments are indifferent. It seems to me if only one government holds a position, and the others state that they have no view, this doesn't really constitute a consensus position, and ought not to be treated as such.
> Of course, governments that were largely disinterested would still be free to give their positive support anyway, perhaps out of comity, and so to form a consensus. This change would merely say that input would only be treated as GAC consensus advice if they chose to do so.
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