Source: https://casetext.com/case/prochaska-v-barnhart-4
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Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731 | Casetext
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit2006
Prochaska v. Barnhart
Prochaskav.Barnhart
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh CircuitJul 24, 2006
454 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2006)
Zenka v. Astrue
Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310–11 (7th Cir.2012) (citing Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504–05…
Plummer v. Berryhill
"A finding based on unreliable VE testimony is equivalent to a finding that is not supported by substantial…
1,517 Citing Cases
holding that the claimant "was not required to raise th[e conflict] at the hearing, because [SSR 00–4p] places the burden of making the necessary inquiry on the ALJ"
Summary of this case from Lamear v. Berryhill
holding that the ALJ's failure to explicitly address claimant's obesity was harmless because she failed to point to any evidence supporting her claim that her obesity significantly exacerbated her physical impairments
Summary of this case from Rasmussen v. Astrue
No. 05-3218.
Frederick J. Daley, Jr., Barbara H. Borowski (argued), Daley, Debofsku Bryant, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
A. Step Five Inquiry
SSR 00-4p requires an ALJ who takes testimony from a vocational expert about the requirements of a particular job to determine whether that testimony is consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The Ruling's language unambiguously sets out the ALJ's affirmative duty:
The Dictionary, published by the Department of Labor, gives detailed physical requirements for a variety of jobs. The Social Security Administration has taken "administrative notice" of the DOT. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(d)(1).
Relying on Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002), the magistrate judge here decided that Prochaska forfeited her SSR 00-4p argument by failing to raise it at the hearing. Donahue is our only interpretation to date of the ALJ's obligation under that Ruling. It notes in dicta (because the Ruling was promulgated after the hearing in that case) that SSR 00-4p "requires the ALJ to `[e]xplain [in the] determination or decision how any conflict [with the Dictionary] that has been identified was resolved.'" Id. at 279 F.3d at 446. But the Ruling "emphasizes that before relying on [a vocational expert's] evidence to support a disability determination or decision," an ALJ must perform the required inquiry. SSR 00-4p (emphasis added). And since Donahue, other circuits have held that the Ruling imposes "an affirmative duty on the part of an ALJ to inquire about conflicts between vocational expert testimony and the DOT." Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2005); Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 127 (3d Cir. 2002). In Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit explained the Ruling's core requirement:
B. Prochaska's Obesity and Depression
The ALJ's implicit consideration of Prochaska's obesity through his review and discussion of her doctors' reports makes this case analogous to Skarbek. Although the ALJ did not explicitly address Prochaska's obesity, he specifically predicated his decision upon the opinions of physicians who did discuss her weight: Drs. Zeman ("Ms. Prochaska is an overweight female in no distress"), Cederberg (she was overweight but "in no acute distress"), and Cragg (the treating physician, who described her as "[c]hronically obese") in particular. A number of other medical reports relied upon by the ALJ also noted her height and weight. No medical opinion in the record identified Prochaska's obesity as significantly aggravating her back injury or contributing to her physical limitations. She also fails to point to any other evidence suggesting that her obesity exacerbated her physical impairments. Because Prochaska failed to "specify how [her] obesity further impaired [her] ability to work," and because the record relied upon by the ALJ sufficiently analyzes her obesity, any error on the ALJ's part was harmless. Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504.
Prochaska misapprehends the ALJ's determination. The ALJ did not discredit Cragg's diagnosis; to the contrary, that diagnosis is consistent with the ALJ's conclusion. While Cragg unambiguously diagnosed Prochaska with depression and panic attacks, he repeatedly reported that her psychiatric state was stable and controlled. He wrote that Prochaska's "depression can be particularly disabling" (emphasis added), but clarified that she was "stabilized on Paxil" and that she had "[n]o other neurological complaints and states that her panic attacks are just fine as long as she stays on the Paxil." Cragg was of the opinion that Prochaska's mental condition was treatable and under control, and controllable conditions do "not entitle one to benefits or boost one's entitlement by aggravating another medical condition." See Barrett v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 2004). That the ALJ decided that Prochaska's alleged disability was not aggravated by her mental condition does not show that the he improperly discredited Cragg's diagnosis.
C. Credibility Finding