Source: http://va.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190924_0000890.EVA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 09:21:00
Document Index: 99264231

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

Dwayne White, a federal inmate proceeding with counsel, filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion ("§ 2255 Motion, " ECF No. 48) arguing that his firearm conviction is invalid under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). For the reasons set out below, the § 2255 Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
On June 3, 2008, White was charged in a three-count Superseding Indictment. (ECF No. 10.) Count One charged White with conspiracy to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce by robbery ("conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery"). (Id. at 1.) Count Two charged that on October 20, 2007, White used, carried, and brandished a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, to wit, the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count One and "interference with commerce by force." (Id. at 1-2.) Count Three charged that on November 1, 2007, White used, carried, and brandished a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, to wit, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count One "and interference with commerce by force." (Id. at 2.)
On June 9, 2008, pursuant to a Plea Agreement, White pled guilty to Counts One and Three. (ECF No. 12, at 1; ECF No. 14.) The Plea Agreement specified that the predicate crime of violence for the firearm charge in Count Three was Hobbs Act conspiracy. Specifically, the relevant portion of the Plea Agreement provided:
The defendant agrees to plead guilty to Counts One and Three of the pending Superseding Indictment.
b. Count Three charges that the defendant, in furtherance of a crime of violence for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to wit: conspiracy to interfere with commerce by threats and violence, did knowingly and unlawfully possess and brandish, and did aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, and cause to be possessed and brandished, firearms, in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 924(c).
(Id. at 1.) Critically, the Plea Agreement omitted any reference to a non-conspiracy Hobbs Act robbery as a predicate crime of violence for Count Three.
On September 12, 2008, the Court sentenced White to 240 months on Count One and 240 months on Count Three, to be served consecutively. (ECF No. 23, at 2.)
II. WHITE'S § 2255 MOTION
On June 27, 2016, White, by counsel, filed his § 2255 Motion wherein he contends that, because of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) his § 924(c) conviction in Count Three must be vacated (Claim One) and his designation as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines must be vacated (Claim Two).
Claim Two is easily dismissed. "[T]he Supreme Court concluded that the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. . . . Johnson's vagueness holding does not apply to the residual clause in [USSG] § 4Bl.2(a)(2)." United States v. Lee, 855 F.3d 244, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886, 892 (2017)). Accordingly, Claim Two will be dismissed.
Initially, the Government responded by moving to dismiss the § 2255 Motion on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. As discussed below, after the Court required further briefing in light of recent decisions from the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court, the Government abandoned that defense.
In Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), the Supreme Court held "that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act [("ACCA")] violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process, " id. at 2563, because the Residual Clause of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), defined "violent felony" in an unconstitutionally vague manner for the reason that the Residual Clause encompassed "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id. at 2557-58 (citation omitted).[1] Subsequently, in Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016), the Supreme Court held that "Johnson announced a substantive rule [of law] that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review." Id. at 1268.
In his § 2255 Motion, White asserts that after Johnson, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery can no longer qualify as crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), and thus, that his conviction under Count Three must be vacated. As explained below, recent decisions from the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit support White's challenge to Count Three where his firearm conviction was predicated upon conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery.
A. Conspiracy To Commit Hobbs Act Robbery Cannot Serve As A Valid Predicate Crime Of Violence For The § 924(c) Charge In Count Three
Title 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(1)(A) provides for consecutive periods of imprisonment when a defendant uses or carries a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The baseline additional period of imprisonment is five years. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1) (A) (i) . If the defendant brandishes the firearm, the additional period of imprisonment increases to at least seven years. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). And, if the defendant discharges the firearm, the additional period of imprisonment increases to at least ten years. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
At the time of White's conviction, the United States could demonstrate that an underlying offense constitutes a crime of violence if it established that the offense is a felony and satisfies one of two requirements. Namely, the statute defined a crime of violence as any felony: