Source: https://casetext.com/case/wayzata-nissan-llc-v-nissan-n-am-inc-1
Timestamp: 2019-05-19 16:48:16
Document Index: 271588133

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 645']

Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc, 875 N.W.2d 279 | Casetext
875 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. 2016)
Wayzata Nissan, LLCv.Nissan N. Am., Inc.
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURTFeb 17, 2016
Christopher W. Madel, Aaron R. Thom, Nicole S. Frank, Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
John Rock, Bruce L. Gisi, Rock Law LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and William N. Berkowitz, Brandon L. Bigelow, Caleb J. Schillinger, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Boston, MA, for respondent Nissan North America, Inc.
Timothy J. Grande, Patrick C. Summers, DeWitt Mackall Crounse & Moore S.C., Minneapolis, MN, for respondents Stephen J. McDaniels, et al.
In May 2014, motor vehicle manufacturer Nissan North America, Inc. (Nissan) and prospective Nissan dealer Stephen McDaniels sought to relocate a Nissan dealership from Bloomington to a location 7.6 miles from a dealership operated by appellant Wayzata Nissan, LLC (Wayzata). Wayzata challenged the relocation under the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Act (MVSDA), Minn.Stat. §§ 80E.01–.17 (2014), and later moved for a temporary restraining order and a good-cause hearing pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 80E.14, subd. 1. The district court denied Wayzata's motion, concluding that the planned relocation fell within the exception in section 80E.14, subdivision 1, for the “relocation of an existing dealer.” The court of appeals affirmed. We conclude that (1) this appeal is not moot even though the relocation at issue already has occurred; (2) the notice and good-cause requirements of Minn.Stat. § 80E.14, subd. 1, apply on the date that a manufacturer develops an intention to relocate a dealership; and (3) the existing-dealer exception does not apply when the relocation of a dealership is accompanied by a change in the person or entity operating the dealership. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision on mootness, reverse on the merits, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Two corporate entities owned by McDaniels—EP Motors, Inc. and McEP Investments, LLC—also were involved in the transactions at issue in this case. Because the distinction between these three respondents is not germane to this appeal, we refer to EP Motors, McEP Investments, and McDaniels collectively as “McDaniels.”
We need look no further than the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 80E.14, subd. 1, to discern its meaning. The statute contains four phrases relevant to our analysis. The notice requirement provides that when “a manufacturer seeks to enter into a franchise ” to relocate a dealership, “the manufacturer shall ... first notify” each affected dealer “of the intention ” to relocate the dealership. Minn.Stat. § 80E.14, subd. 1 (emphasis added). And the existing-dealer exception refers to “the proposed relocation site.” Id. (emphasis added). These provisions plainly require a manufacturer to notify a dealer of the “intention” to relocate an existing dealership before the manufacturer “seeks to enter” into a contract to relocate the dealership. See id.
McDaniels contends that the statute requires notice of a manufacturer's intention and that in this case it was the dealer, not the manufacturer, that initiated the Bloomington dealership's relocation. We disagree. The statute refers to a manufacturer that “seeks to enter into a franchise ... relocating an existing new motor vehicle dealership.” Id. (emphasis added). “Franchise” is defined as “the written agreement or contract” between a manufacturer and a dealer that “grants to the dealer the right to market motor vehicles and which purports to fix the legal rights and liabilities of the parties to the agreement or contract.” Minn.Stat. § 80E.03, subd. 8. Accordingly, the statute plainly requires notice when a manufacturer seeks to enter into a contract authorizing the relocation of a dealership. It is irrelevant whether the manufacturer was the first party to propose the relocation.
Wayzata challenges this aspect of the district court's analysis, contending that the word “dealer” is defined in the MVSDA to mean “a person,” Minn.Stat. § 80E.03, subd. 3. Wayzata interprets the word “dealership,” which is undefined in the statute, to mean the business and assets of a dealer. In response, Nissan and McDaniels cite provisions of the MVSDA that appear to use the words “dealer” and “dealership” interchangeably. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. §§ 80E.09, subd. 1 (referring to both the rights of a dealer and “the extent the dealership makes other use of the property”), 80E.11, subd. 1 (referring to the “ownership ... of a dealer”), 80E.14, subd. 1 (stating that “a dealership may commence a civil action”). To determine whether the existing-dealer exception applies, we must decide whether the district court correctly concluded that the Legislature used the words “dealer” and “dealership” synonymously in the MVSDA.
For context, we also will address the meaning of the word “dealership,” which is not defined in the MVSDA. Dictionaries define “dealership” as either a franchise, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 466 (5th ed.2011); the business of a dealer, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 581 (2002); or a dealer's “trading establishment,” 4 The Oxford English Dictionary 297 (2d ed.1989, reprt. 1991). In the MVSDA, the Legislature generally used the word “dealership” to signify a “trading establishment” or “business.” See, e.g., Minn.Stat. §§ 80E.07, subd. 1(a) (referring to a “change in ownership of the ... dealer's dealership”), 80E.12(f) (referring to the “means by ... which the dealer finances the operation of the dealership”), 80E.13(j) (referring to a dealer's transfer or assignment of a dealership), 80E.135, subd. 1a(1) (referring to contracts that require a dealer to “establish or maintain exclusive dealership facilities”).
When interpreting statutes, we presume that the Legislature did not intend absurd or unreasonable results. State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn.2003); accord Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014). But this canon of construction applies only to ambiguous statutes, except in the “exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute ‘utterly confounds' the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 651 (Minn.2012) (quoting Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs., Inc., 716 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn.2006)).