Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/klocke-v-watson-082319-809553357
Timestamp: 2020-02-20 02:40:29
Document Index: 702395875

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 27', '§ 27', 'art. 971', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 27']

Klocke v. Watson, 082319 FED5, 17-11320 - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 809553357
Party Name: WAYNE M. KLOCKE, Independent Administrator of the Estate of Thomas Klocke, Plaintiff - Appellant v. NICHOLAS MATTHEW WATSON, Defendant-Appellee
The critical issue in this appeal is whether, or to what extent, the Texas Citizens Participation Act ("TCPA"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 27.001- .011, which is a type of anti-SLAPP statute, 1 applies in a diversity suit in federal court. The district court held it applicable as a "substantive" matter and accordingly granted appellee Nicholas Watson's motion to dismiss and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to the TCPA. Resolving an issue that has brewed for several years in this circuit, we conclude that the TCPA does not apply to diversity cases in federal court and therefore REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.
Klocke responded in a document titled "Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant Watson's Motion to Dismiss; in the alternative, Motion for Protective Order and Request for Procedural Clarification from the Court and Brief in Support." The response asserted that the TCPA is inapplicable in federal court, but it did not substantively address Watson's arguments based on the requirements of the TCPA. The objection noted that the Fifth Circuit had not explicitly held whether the TCPA applied in federal court and asked the district court to clarify "whether and how it will entertain Defendant Watson's TCPA motion to dismiss in this case . . . and what procedures and deadlines will apply." Klocke also requested the district court to clarify whether he must file a reply pursuant to the Northern District of Texas's Local Rules or at the motion hearing prescribed in the TCPA.2 Alternatively, Klocke moved for discovery and further time to respond substantively to the TCPA motion if the court held that the TCPA was applicable.
The district court overruled the objection to applying the TCPA and concluded that Klocke waived any "substantive" TCPA arguments by failing to make them within twenty-one days pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(e). The district court denied his other requests and accordingly granted Watson's motion to dismiss. Later, the court awarded Watson $25, 000 in attorney's fees, $3, 000 in expenses, and a $1.00 sanction, all pursuant to the TCPA. The district court entered a "Final Judgment as to Certain Party."3 Klocke timely appealed.[4]
The TCPA is an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) statute designed to "encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.002. Other states have passed similar anti-SLAPP statutes because they "have expressed concerns over the use (or abuse) of lawsuits that have the purpose or effect of chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights." Henry v. Lake Charles American Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 169 (5th Cir. 2009). In Henry, this court held that Louisiana's "nominally procedural" anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court pursuant to the Erie doctrine. Id. at 168-69; see LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 971. This court has, however, passed several times on deciding whether, or to what extent, the TCPA applies in federal court. Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 706 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2016); but see id. at 719 (Graves, J., dissenting) (arguing that the TCPA cannot apply because the state statute conflicts with the Federal Rules); Block v. Tanenhaus, 867 F.3d 585, 589 n.2 (5th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). In this appeal, we are required to confront the question directly. And we generally agree with Judge Graves's conclusion.
Codified in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the TCPA effectuates a speedy process for resolving litigation that may impinge on a party's exercise of the rights to free speech, petition, or association. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.003(a). Under the statutory burden-shifting framework, if a movant for TCPA relief shows "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the action is based on the movant's exercise of the listed rights, a court must dismiss the case. Id. at § 27.005(b)(1)-(3). But if the non-movant "establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each element of the claim in question," the court may not dismiss. Id. at § 27.005(c). The movant...