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Evidence on charge of which false representation is element - The minister of justice the prosecutor-general hans peter rothen
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Evidence on charge of which false representation is element
If at criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged with an offence of which a false representation is an element, it is proved that the false representation was made by the accused, he shall be deemed, unless the contrary is proved, to have made such representation knowing it to be false.'
As the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-General rightly point out in their affidavits, the section is fundamental to the prosecution of cases of fraud and theft by false pretences where knowledge of the falsity of the representation by the person making it is an essential element of the crime. The section is said to contain a type of a reverse onus presumption the main function of which was explained by Langa J in S v Coetzee at para 12 as follows:
‘Its purpose is to facilitate the task of the State in the prosecution of crimes such as fraud and theft by false pretences by relieving the prosecution of the need to prove that the accused knew that the misrepresentation was false at the time that he or she made it. The presumption has been held to be applicable to instances in which the representation relates to facts which are objectively ascertainable.’
The successful prosecution of the crime of fraud would normally require, amongst others, proof by the State beyond reasonable doubt that the accused made a misrepresentation knowing it to be false.th The enactment of the presumption has been substantiated on the basis that it deals with matters that are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused and that proving the state of mind of the accused in the context of a false representation is much more difficult than in other cases33. The effect of the section is that, in a prosecution where an accused charged with a crime in which knowledge of the falsity of the representation is an element, the presumption becomes operative once the State has proved that the accused had made the false representation. The onus is then on the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that he or she did not know at the time that the representation was false.34 The principal basis on which the presumption is being challenged is that, in the absence of such proof by the accused to discharge the onus on him or her and in the circumstances where the probabilities are, for example even, the court would be obliged to convict ‘notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt regarding the state of mind of the accused.’35 Whether the statutory reverse onus presumption created by s. 245 falls within the ambit of permissible limitations on the constitutional presumption of innocence is what must be considered next.
Reverse onus presumptions and evidential presumptions are not necessarily unconstitutional. This much is clear from decisions in this jurisdiction such as, for example, Freiremar, Van den Berg and S v Shikunga1997 NR 156 (SC). The same approach is also evident from judgments in other jurisdictions within the region, such as inChogugudza, Meakerand Zumacases. It has become necessary to consider these cases in some detail. The Freiremar-matter concerned the constitutionality of the proviso to s 17 of the Sea Fisheries Act, 58 of 1973,36 that provided as follows:
'(1) The court convicting any person of any offence in terms of this Act may, in addition to any other penalty it may impose declare any fish, sea-weed, shells or implement or any fishing boat or other vessel or vehicle in respect of which the offence was committed or which was used in connection with the commission thereof, or any rights of the convicted person thereto, to be forfeited to the State,...: Provided that such a declaration of forfeiture shall not affect any rights which any person other than the convicted person may have to such implement, boat, vessel or vehicle, if it is proved that such other person took all reasonable steps to prevent the use thereof in connection with the offence...'
Drawing from Canadian cases considering the general limitation clause in art 1 when applied to the presumption of innocence in Art 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Strydom JP observed that the fact that a reverse onus is placed on an accused does not necessarily make the reverse onus provision unconstitutional. Much will depend on whether the provision in question satisfies the 'rational connection' test. Expanding on the application of the rational connection test in cases applied by the High Court of Namibia, Strydom JP stated37 that:
'In my opinion the test as applied in these cases is a practical one which would require an accused to speak up in circumstances where an explanation would be required because of the presumption raised by the proved facts and because of the personal knowledge of the accused. However, where the proven facts are not such that an explanation is readily required the placing, in those circumstances, of an inverted onus on an accused will require an accused to prove his innocence which will be contrary to the Constitution containing a provision as that set out in art 12(1)(d) of the Namibian Constitution.'
In Van den Berg’s-case the High Court grappled with the question whether the reverse onus provision in s 35A of the Diamond Industry Protection Proclamation, 1967, violated the presumption of innocence Art 12(1)(d) of the Constitution. Paragraph (b) of the section provided that if ‘the person charged contends that any article or substance, the subject of the charge is not a rough and uncut diamond, the burden of proving that...such article or substance is not a rough or uncut diamond...shall lie upon the person charged.’ After an extensive analysis of relevant Canadian, United States and Namibian authorities as to presumptions imposing burden of proof on an accused and a comparative examination of Art 12(1)(d), the Court extracted guidelines to be applied in determining the constitutionality of the reverse onus provision and concluded38 that the impugned presumption could not survive the rational connection test because it failed to mount the first leg, i.e. because there was no provision for a fact to be proved by the State with which the presumed fact could be connected. It held that the provision placed the onus squarely on the accused to prove the absence of an element of the offence: the element being that the diamonds bought, sold or possessed were rough and uncut. The Court thereafter proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the presumption in paragraph (a) of the section which placed a burden on the person charged to prove that he or she was the holder of a licence, permit or authority or was otherwise entitled or authorised to be in possession of, or authorised to buy, receive, sell, offer for sale, deal in, barter, pledge or otherwise dispose of or deliver, or to import or export any diamond. Applying the guidelines earlier referred to, the Court concluded that the reverse onus presumption in para (a) of the section was constitutional.
In Chogugudza, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe was concerned with the question whether or not the presumption created under s 15(2)(e) of that country's Prevention of Corruption Act whereby an onus was cast on a public officer who is shown to have done an act favouring a person, to show that he or she did not do the act for the purpose of showing favour or disfavour to that person was constitutional. Writing for the unanimous court, Gubbay CJ analysed Southern African case law dealing with the extent to which it is permissible for legislation to create reverse onus provisions and distilled the following principles therefrom:
'(a) The presumption must not place the entire onus on the accused. There is always an onus on the State to bring the accused within the general framework of a statute or regulation before any onus can be placed upon the accused for his defence.
(b) The presumption may relate to a state of mind, that is, mensrea, where the element of the crime is a fact exclusively or particularly within the knowledge of the accused.
(c) A presumption will be regarded a reasonable if it places an onus upon the accused where proof by the prosecution of such a specific fact is a matter of impossibility or difficulty; whereas such fact is well known to the accused;
(d) The presumption must not be irrebuttable.39' (Reference to authorities omitted)
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe further held, remarkably in line with Strydom JP's approach in Freiremar, and as succinctly summarised in the headnote that:
'A presumption of fact was compatible with the presumption of innocence if it could be shown by the State, due regard being paid to the enacted conclusion of the legislation, that the fact to be proved rationally and realistically follows from that proved; and also if the presumption is no more than is proportionate to what is warranted by the nature of the evil against which society requires protection. On this basis, some presumptions will be justifiable, others not; whether they are will depend on whether it remains primarily the responsibility of the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt to the required standard and whether the presumption is reasonably imposed. The test of proportionality in particular provides useful guidance, since it is the need to balance the interests of the individual and society which is at the heart of the justification of an exception to the general rule that the prosecution must establish the accused's guilt.'
Meaker’s-case concerned the question whether the presumption contained in s 130 of the South African Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989 offended the presumption of innocence provided for by s 35(3)(h) of that country's Constitution. In the judgment rendered by Cameron J (Mailula J concurring), the court held that whether s 130 infringed the Constitution and, if so, whether it was justified, depended largely on facts concerning the social milieu which gave rise to the legislation. The relevance of the evidence which the parties had tendered was confined to assisting the court in what is in essence a common sense analysis of s 130 and in answering the question whether its application was reasonably justified. As to the question whether the section in question was constitutional, the court held further that it was not difficult to conclude that s 130 offended against the right to be presumed innocent as provided for by s 35(3)(h) of the South African Constitution. Regarding the issue of whether s 130 was saved by the provisions of s 36 of that country's Constitution, the Court distilled40 the following principles from Constitutional Court decisions on reverse onus provisions:
Cases where it is practically impossible or unduly burdensome for the State to discharge the onus of proving all the elements pertaining to the offence beyond reasonable doubt;
Where there is a logical connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed and the presumed fact is something which is more likely than not to arise from the basic facts proved;
Cases where the application of the common law rule relating to the State's onus cause substantial harm to the administration of justice;
Generally, where the presumption in its terms is cast to serve only the social need it purports to address or is it disproportionate in its impact, and
Cases where the State could adequately achieve its legitimate ends by means which would not be inconsistent with the constitution in general and the presumption of innocence in particular.
The Zuma-matter, concerned the constitutionality of s 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. Writing for the unanimous South African Constitutional Court, Kentridge AJ embarked upon a survey of case law of other jurisdictions in open and democratic societies and came to the conclusion that 'reverse onus provisions were by no means uncommon and were not necessarily unconstitutional'.41 He went on to state that reverse onus provisions in South African statute law were also not uncommon.42 I pause to observe that on this score, and as previously alluded to, the position in Namibia is no different. Kentridge AJ recognised that the prosecution authorities in appropriate cases may require reasonable presumptions to assist them in the execution of the important task of prosecution so as to meet the ‘pressing social need for the effective prosecution of crime’. I respectfully share this view. Kentridge AJ, explained the various types of presumptions and the scope of the judgment in theZuma-matter43 as follows:
‘Presumptions are of different types. Some are no more than evidential presumptions, which give certain prosecution evidence the status of prima facie proof, requiring the accused to do no more than produce credible evidence which casts doubt on the prima facie proof. See, for example, the presumptions in s 212 of the Criminal Procedure Act. This judgment does not relate to such presumptions. Nor does it seek to validate every legal presumption reversing the onus of proof. Some may be justifiable as being rational in themselves, requiring an accused person to prove only facts to which he or she has easy access, and which it would be unreasonable to expect the prosecution to disprove. The provisions in s 237 of the Act (evidence on charge of bigamy) may be of this type. Or there may be presumptions which are necessary if certain offences are to be effectively prosecuted, and the State is able to show that for good reason it cannot be expected to produce the evidence itself. The presumption that a person who habitually consorts with prostitutes is living off the proceeds of prostitution was upheld on that basis in R v Downey (supra) by the Supreme Court of Canada. A similar presumption in a United Kingdom statute was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in X v United Kingdom (Application 5124/71, Collection of Decisions, ECHR 135). This is not such a case. Nor does this judgment deal with statutory provisions which are in form presumptions but which in effect create new offences. See Attorney-General v Odendaal 1982 Botswana LR 194 at 226-7.’
At paras 22-25 Kentridge AJ gave a useful and succinct summary of the jurisprudence on reverse onus provisions developed by the Supreme Court of Canada. At para 22, reference is made to the decision of Supreme Court of Canada in the Oakes-matter, where Dickson CJC made the following seminal observations in relation to the presumption of innocence:
‘The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and human dignity of any and every person accused by the State of criminal conduct. An individual charged with a criminal offence faces grave social and personal consequences, including potential loss of physical liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracism from the community, as well as other social, psychological and economic harms. In light of the gravity of these consequences, the presumption of innocence is crucial. It ensures that until the State proves an accused’s guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, he or she is innocent. This is essential in a society committed to fairness and social justice.’44
In Coetzee the South African Constitutional Court found, unanimously and as previously mentioned, that s 245 was in conflict with the long-established rule of the common law that the burden of proof had always been on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that to that extent the provision had infringed the presumption of innocence entrenched in s 25(3)(c) of the South African Interim Constitution.45
In his written heads of argument, Mr Gauntlett argued correctly that the wording of the relevant provisions in the South African and Namibian Constitutions are different. Section 25(3)(c) of the South African constitution stated that the right to a fair trial included the right '...to be presumed innocent and to remain silent during plea proceedings or trial and not to testify during trial'. In contrast, Art 12(1)(d) of the Constitution simply states that:
'All persons charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law, after having had the opportunity of calling witnesses and cross-examining those called against them.'
The differences between the two constitutions in the formulation of the right to a fair trial and the other constituent rights relating thereto as emphasised by him in argument are apparent and duly noted. They are by and large the result of different constitutional mechanisms employed to protect the substance of those rights: The South African Constitution, for example, has an extensive general limitation clause equally applicable to the individual rights protected in their Constitution’s Bill of Rights46, unlike the Namibian Constitution which, in addition to certain limitations of general application mentioned in Art 22, authorises the further limitation only in respect of some of the rights and freedoms and, in most such instances, defines the permissible ambit of such limitations differently and with due regard to the specific right or freedom in question. Mr Gauntlett went on to argue that where Art 12(1)(f) of the Constitution provides that 'no person shall be compelled to give testimony against themselves,' it does not in principle preclude a rebuttal presumption of knowledge or a presumption that merely places an evidentiary burden on an accused person and it is not unconstitutional to discharge a purely evidentiary burden. He contended that a statutory provision that imposes an evidentiary burden does not violate the presumption of innocence because there is no possibility of being convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Counsel accordingly submitted that the presumption deals with matters that are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. The accused is in the best position to explain why he or she did not know that the presentation was false. The section requires of him or her to advance facts to which he or she has easy access and which would be unreasonable to expect of the prosecution to disprove. There is also a logical connection between the facts which the State is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt and the presumed fact.
I have carefully considered Mr Gauntlett's submissions regarding the differences of the wording of the provisions of the South African and Namibian Constitutions and other relevant submissions as summarised above. The mandatory legal presumption created by s 245 significantly alleviates the evidential burden which the prosecution would otherwise have borne under common law to prove the guilt of accused persons charged with offences of which a false representation is an element. Unlike the position under common law where the prosecution had to prove all the elements of those offences beyond reasonable doubt to secure convictions, the section casts a reverse onus on persons prosecuted for those crimes to disprove an essential element of those crimes: once the prosecution has proved that they made the alleged representations and that the representations were false, the accused persons are required to establish on a preponderance of probability that they were ignorant of the falsity of the representations at the time when they were made. The objective of the section is clear: to alleviate the difficulties experienced by the State in prosecutions of that nature to prove what the mindsets of accused persons were regarding the veracity or falseness of the representations at the time of their making.
I accept that it may be quite burdensome for the State to prove an accused person’s state of mind in prosecutions of this nature. I also accept that, in instances where the falsity of the representation is easily ascertainable and, given the nature of the fact or belief which is the subject matter of the representation, it ought to have been quite apparent to the accused person that the representation was false, there would be a logical connection between proof that the representation was false and the presumption that the accused knew about its falseness. This notwithstanding, it must be recognised that the presumption created by s 245 relates to an important element of the type of offences referred to therein and that, once the operative threshold for the presumption has been met by the prosecution, the accused would be required to disprove that element on a balance of probabilities - an element, as noted earlier, which the State otherwise would have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction. The shifting of the onus from the State to the accused in respect of such an important element of the offences in question is a significant departure from the evidential norm which would otherwise apply in criminal law and procedure. The Court is therefore obliged to scrutinise the justification for the deviation closely and to satisfy itself that the presumption is fair, rational and not disproportionate in its impact.
One of the concerns about the application of the presumption is that the falseness of the representation may not always be so obvious or easily ascertainable by the maker thereof that it can be ‘said with substantial assurance that (knowledge of its falsity) is more than likely than not to flow (from later proof that it was false)’ - to borrow from the caveat in Leary’s-case. There are many instances where the line between what is true or not is difficult to observe or ascertain and persons may sometimes bona fide err in representing something as the truth – even confidently so – which may later be proved false. At other times a person may so strongly believe in something - which may later be proved false - that, instead of representing it as his or her subjective belief, hope or expectation, he or she may bona fide represent it to another as a factual truth. If the reverse onus provision created by s 245 were to be retained, there is a real danger that even if the accused is able to persuade the court that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she did not know that the representation was false at the time it was made, but nevertheless fails to prove that as a fact on a balance of probabilities, a court will be constrained to convict - assuming, of course, that the State has proven all the other elements of the offence in question.
In Alexander v Minister of Justice this Court restated that the Constitution must be interpreted liberally so as to afford to its subjects the full protection of the rights set out therein. As regards limitations on constitutional rights, the Court emphasised that, to pass the test of constitutional validity, a limitation on constitutional rights must be proportionate. The limitation must not constitute a disproportionate interference with the right in question: it must be fair, not arbitrary and the means used must impair the right to the minimum possible extent.
The Court has not been referred to similar reverse onus provisions in other democratic societies or, for that matter, a pressing social need to retain a mandatory legal presumption in the form of s 245. I recognise that the objective of the provision is to ameliorate the evidential difficulties which the prosecution might otherwise face to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a person accused of the offences contemplated therein knew that the representation was false. Had the section been formulated differently and, instead of creating a legal presumption, imposed a mere evidential burden by providing that, proof of a false representation would constitute prima facie evidence that the accused had made such representation knowing it to be false, the section’s impact on the right protected by Art 12(1)(d) would have been significantly less. The imposition of an evidentiary burden would have been more in line with the minimum impairment requirement and in my view would have gone a long way to redress the evidential considerations which had given rise to the promulgation of the section (or its statutory predecessor) in the first instance.
For these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient justification for the reverse onus presumption created by s 245 to warrant a limitation of the fundamental right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and, in any event, to the extent that it permits the conviction of accused persons in spite of the existence of a reasonable doubt that they knew that the representations made by them were false, is disproportionate to the objective which the section seeks to achieve. Therefore, I take the view that s 245 is unconstitutional. I turn next to consider s 332(5).
Section 332(5)
Section 332(5) reads as follows:
'When an offence has been committed, whether by the performance of any act or by the failure to perform any act, for which any corporate body is or was liable to prosecution, any person who was, at the time of the commission of the offence, a director or servant of the corporate body shall be deemed to be guilty of the said offence, unless it is proved that he did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he could not have prevented it, and shall be liable to prosecution therefor, either jointly with the corporate body or apart therefrom, and shall on conviction be personally liable to punishment therefor.'
As already mentioned, the constitutionality of s 332(5) was considered by the South African Constitutional Court in Coetzee andcounsel contending for the unconstitutionality of the section urged us to follow the approach of the majority of that court. The Constitutional Court did not speak with one voice on the issue whether or not the section was constitutionally defensible; there were multiple judgments with a number of dissentions. The majority found, as captured in the headnote, in the first place that the onus provisions of s 332(5) violated the right to be presumed innocent under s 25(3)(c) of that country's Interim Constitution. The effect of the provision was to permit the conviction of the accused despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt.Furthermore, the violation of s 25(3)(c) of the South African Interim Constitution by the section could not be justified in terms of s 33(1) of that Constitution. It was further found that in imposing an onus also on a servant of a corporation for the offences of the corporate body, the section was impermissibly overbroad. The majority found further that notwithstanding the legitimate purposes served by the section in relation to the honest conduct of the affairs of corporate bodies, the section was impermissibly overbroad in its scope of operation. The type of offence by the corporate body for which an accused director or servant could be held liable was not limited. All offences were included notwithstanding their nature, purpose or degree of remoteness from the ordinary activities of the corporate body and therefore from the legitimate purpose of the section. The majority ultimately came to the conclusion that no severance of the invalid provisions of s 332(5) that would leave the section constitutionally valid while giving effect to the purpose of the legislative scheme was possible and struck it out as being inconsistent with the constitution.
The majority nevertheless found that the Legislature was 'fully entitled to place a positive duty on directors and to make omission to discharge that duty an offence'.47 The majority was concerned about the manner that positive duty had been placed on directors, pointing out the effect of merely changing the form of the provision to require the accused, rather than the prosecution, to prove elements which are essential to the guilt or innocence of the accused person.48
In a minority judgment, Kentridge AJ took a different approach. He commenced his judgment by examining the nature of the provision and, in line with the views of the learned authors De Wet and Swanepoel,49 stated that the subsection does not create a new type of offence, but 'undoubtedly creates a new form of liability for the offence of another.'50 He opined that it was clear from the language of the subsection that it was the intention of the legislature to create a new form of vicarious liability. Kentridge AJ went on to say that though vicarious criminal liability was unknown to the Roman-Dutch common law, it was a common phenomenon in modern statute law world-wide informed by the complexities of societies as consequences of industrialisation and modernisation. In the light of these developments, it became necessary and imperative to embark upon measures aimed at controlling, in the public interest, the conduct of corporations involved in these activities.51Kentridge AJ expressed the view that the legislature did not create an absolute vicarious liability in s 332(5). Instead, it chose to mitigate what would have been the harshness of the provision, by allowing an accused falling within its reach to escape liability upon proof on a balance of probabilities of the two exempting factors, namely 'that he did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he could not have prevented it'.52 The learned Acting Justice went on to observe that it cannot be said in the circumstances that by rendering the impact of the section less severe than it would have otherwise been, the Legislature was thereby rendering a trial under the subsection less fair than it would otherwise have been.53 Although he would have considered the analysis he offered about the nature and scope of the subsection to be 'a complete answer' to the attack based on the ground of a fair trial provision in the South African Interim Constitution, he nevertheless found it necessary to deal with the other contention of the applicants in that case, i.e. that whatever the position might have had been, the effect of the subsection was to permit the conviction of an accused person notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable doubt as to their guilt, which would in turn offend the presumption of innocence.54Kentridge AJ indentified the object of the provision to be as follows:
'[T]he object of the subsection is to control the activities of corporate entities by imposing a responsibility on those who control or conduct their activities, and ensuring that they do not regard themselves as beyond the reach of the criminal law if a crime is committed in the course of corporate activities.'
He rejected the contention that the subsection created a new offence, or a new criminal liability, an essential element of which is that an accused must have participated in the commission of the offence and must have been able to prevent its commission. He reasoned instead that the clause in fact did not constitute an element which the prosecution must negative, 'but in terms creates an exemption or excuse which the accused may prove by way of defence'. All that needs to be charged and proved is that the accused was a director or servant of a corporate body that was liable to be prosecuted for a specific offence. It is then left for the accused to bring himself or herself within the permitted defence.55Kentridge AJ next dealt with the alternative submissions informed by Canadian jurisprudence, namely that once a criminal statute contained a reverse onus provision requiring the accused to provide proof of some fact in order to escape conviction, it mattered not whether that onus related to an essential element of the offence or to a defence by way of excuse or one by way of exemption. In either case, so the argument went, the presumption of innocence was destroyed and the fairness of the trial impaired. The learned Acting Justice observed in this regard that even judges of the Canadian Supreme Court themselves pointed out that the protections to be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights are to be interpreted and applied according to the context in which they may arise and not in the abstract.56 After a careful analysis of certain of the Canadian authorities relied upon for the contentions, Kentridge AJ concluded that those cases were decided in a completely different statutory context. Although they dealt with offences of strict liability, they did not directly deal with a provision imposing a vicarious liability such as the subsection.57 They did not therefore support the contentions made by counsel. Kentridge AJ also pointed out that the burden of proof imposed by s 332(5) is substantially less than in some of statutes considered in certain of the Canadian authorities relied upon for the proposition under consideration.
I respectfully agree with the persuasive and compelling approach adopted by Kentridge AJ in his minority judgment. I consider that his views that the subsection has created a new form of liability for corporate crimes and that in enacting the subsection, the Legislature chose to mitigate what would otherwise have been the harshness of the provision by permitting an accused director or servant to escape liability upon proof, on a balance of probabilities, of the two exempting factors are, with respect, correct. It cannot be said with any degree of conviction that a provision that is meant to ameliorate what would otherwise have been the harshness of the strict vicarious liability can for that reason be said to be unfair or unconstitutional. It is my considered view that the subsection does not derogate from the presumption of innocence provided for in Art 12(1)(d) of the Constitution, because, as Kentridge AJ convincingly reasoned, the State is still required to prove the offence by the corporate body beyond reasonable doubt without the aid of the presumption before the accused may be called upon to establish, on a balance of probabilities, a defence or excuse. As Kentridge AJ rightly observed, if an accused is convicted under s 332 it will be because all the elements required by s 332(5) in order to give rise to that liability have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and because the excuse provided for by the subsection has not been established.
It is trite that s 332(5) has been introduced in the public interest. It is meant to ensure that those that are in control of corporations, particularly commercial ones, are called to account when the corporations under their control perpetrate offences. Once the elements of the offence have been proved and a defence or excuse is called from them, all that the accused director is required to show is that he or she did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he or she could not have prevented it. The accused is, of course, not obliged to testify but if he or she does not do so, he or she takes a risk and it is the risk, to my mind, that an accused who elects not to testify in the face of prima facie evidence against him or her takes in all criminal cases. It cannot be said that he or she is thereby compelled to give testimony against oneself and there can be no question of Art 12(1)(f) being infringed in those circumstances. It is trite that a corporation is an artificial person that 'has no body to be kicked or soul to be damned'. The directors are its controlling minds. Whether the director of a corporation did not take part in the commission of the offence and he or she could not have prevented it is a matter that should be well known by the director concerned. On the other hand, such specific fact is a matter of considerable difficulty for the prosecution to prove. The subsection requires the accused director of the corporate body, in the words of Strydom JP in Freiremar to 'speak up in the circumstance where an explanation would be required because of the presumption raised by the proven facts and because of the personal knowledge of the accused'. Similar remarks by Gubbay CJ about the nature of the presumption under consideration in Chogugudza apply with equal force to the presumption under s 332(5). The learned Chief Justice said:
'The presumption does not have the effect of requiring the accused unfairly to discharge a major ingredient of the offence for no reason at all. A strong suspicion will have been created on the facts proved by the State from which a permissible inference could be drawn... The accused is simply called upon to reveal something peculiarly within his knowledge...This seems to me essentially an exercise in common sense.'58
Kentridge AJ observed in Coetzee59 that s 332(5) has been part of South African statute law since 1939. The learned Justice decisively commented on what is expected of those that take positions of control of corporations and remarked as follows:
'It is not unreasonable to regard those who take positions of control in corporate bodies as voluntarily subjecting themselves to the regime of company and corporation law, which must be taken to include the provisions of s 332(5).'
I respectfully agree with the above remarks and also agree with the submission by Mr Gauntlett in his written heads of argument that:
'[T]hose who choose to assume a directorship of a company have, in doing so, placed themselves in a position of responsibility not only vis-à-vis the company but in relation to the public generally. They must accept the consequences of that position of responsibility on behalf of what is an artificial legal entity, otherwise beyond effective redress. This is because any such director of the corporate body is in the best position to prevent the harm which may result from the activities of the corporation. More specifically, such persons must accept (and indeed, for practical purposes, are deemed to accept) that the law requires them to control the corporate body and in doing so, otherwise discharge their duties as directors or principals of the corporation in accordance with the standards of governance, failing which criminal and/or civil liability would ensue.'
Kentridge AJ's insightful dictum about the operation of the subsection in the South African history and the impact of its possible excision from the Criminal Procedure Act applies with equal force to the operation of the section in the history of this country since the two countries share similar historical backgrounds. He said:
'There is nothing before us to show that the operation of the present subsection or its predecessors has in practice given rise to injustices. Nor, I should add, have the provisions anything to do with the history of racial and other discrimination in this country. They were provisions enacted for the protection of the public in a society in which corporate entities played an increasingly pervasive and important role. To strike out s 332(5) would leave a considerable gap in the mechanisms available for ensuring the honest conduct of corporate institutions.'
Subject to the considerations that follow, I respectfully agree and have therefore come to the conclusion that s 332(5) is constitutional. It complies with the test of proportionality as set out in the Alexander-matter and other cases in that the provision is not disproportionate in its impact: there is a logical connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed. The means adopted to deal with the threat faced by society which the subsection is designed to combat are reasonable and necessary if the offence is to be effectively prosecuted.
I am of the considered view, however, that in extending the deemed liability for corporate crimes to servants of the corporation, the Legislature has cast the net too wide. On this aspect counsel were unanimous in their submissions. I agree that the words 'or servant' make the section impermissibly overbroad. Included in the description of 'servant' are lowly placed workers in the corporation who cannot conceivably be said to be the mind and soul of the corporation so as to be in a position to prove the two exempting factors set out in the subsection. Without further qualification, every employee of such a corporate body is exposed to prosecution irrespective of his or her position in the corporation or proximity or connection to the act which constitutes the offence. To that extent, the presumption is arbitrary and disproportionate in effect, overbroad and irrational. Thus, the expression 'or servant' in the subsection has the effect that the subsection exceeds the permissible ambit of the limitation authorised by the Constitution in respect of the right protected under Art 12(1)(d).
Although the expression may well be severable, regard being had to the test for severability as endorsed by this Court in the Cultura 2000-case,60 the application before the Court only requires of it to provide answers to the questions posed regarding the constitutionality of the impugned provisions. The terms of the referral under Art 79 and the nature of the relief prayed for in the Notice of Motion do not require of the Court to excise any phrases or provisions from the impugned sections or, for that matter, to strike any of the sections which offends the Constitution. I assume that the relief prayed for has been deliberately cast in that form to allow accused persons and institutions of State alike to take such further action, based on the determination of the issues by this Court as they may be allowed or advised to take. For these reasons I conclude that the reverse onus presumptions created by the impugned provisions exceed the scope of limitations authorised in respect of the right to be presumed innocent under Art 12(1)(d). In as much as the presumption of innocence is also a necessary and inseparable component of the overarching right to a fair trial in the determination of criminal charges against accused persons protected by Art 12(1)(a), it follows that the latter right is also unconstitutionally diminished as a result. In view of the conclusion which I have reached, it is not necessary to elaborate on the question whether the impugned sections also infringe accused persons’ right not to be compelled to give testimony against themselves as protected under Art 12(1)(f) or other rights or privileges associated with it. Suffice it to say that if the onus contemplated in s 245 would have been evidential in nature and the expression ‘or servant’ would have been omitted in s 332(5), the effect of the ameliorated presumptive provisions in the impugned sections would not have unconstitutionally diminished any of the rights protected under Art 12.
For all these reasons, I would give the following answers to the questions posed by the Attorney-General:
Sections 245 and 332(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, as amended, are unconstitutional to the extent that –
(a) the provisions of s 245 cast a mandatory legal onus on an accused person, charged with an offence of which a false representation is an element, to prove on a balance of probabilities that he or she did not know that the representation was false once the State has proved that he or she had made the false representation;
(b) a servant of a corporate body is in terms of s 332(5) deemed to be guilty of an offence committed for which the corporate body is or was liable to be prosecuted, unless he or she proves on a balance of probabilities that he or she did not take part in the commission of the offence and could not have prevented it
on the grounds that they impermissibly infringe an accused’s right under Art 12(1)(d) of the Constitution to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law and thus also an accused’s right to a fair trial in terms of Art 12(1)(a) of the Constitution.
To the extent noted in paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) above, the limitations imposed by sections 245 and 332(5) on an accused person’s right to a fair trial under Art 12 of the Constitution are not constitutionally authorised.