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NRC: Part 21 Report: 2002-33-0
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General Information or Other Event Number: 39404
REP ORG: SPECTRUM TECHNOLOGIES NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/25/2002
LICENSEE: CUTLER-HAMMER NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:25[EST]
CITY: SCHENECTADY REGION: 1 EVENT DATE: 11/25/2002
COUNTY: STATE: MN EVENT TIME: [EST]
LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Yes LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/25/2002
NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL WILLIS
PART 21 INITIAL NOTIFICATION - CUTLER-HAMMER A200 NEMA SIZE 1 STARTERS
"Equipment Identification: Starter, Non-Reversing, Size 1, 6OOVAC, 3 Pole, W/125VDC coil, Westinghouse/Cutler- Hammer P/N A2OOM1CS, Type B Thermal Overloads, Ambient Compensated, Manual Reset Only
"In March 2002, Spectrum Technologies provided 20 Class 1E safety related Cutler-Hammer A200 NEMA Size 1 starters to Rochester Gas & Electric Company - Ginna Station. We had purchased the starters as commercial grade items from Cutler-Hammer, and dedicated them per EPRI NP5652, method 1, Special Tests and Inspections. This dedication successfully verified the following critical characteristics:
Electrical Functional Attributes, Including:
"Ginna Station recently advised us that one of the starters had experienced an open phasing failure. They reported that they noted no current flow on one phase when measured with a clamp-on ammeter, and that current started to flow when the hand pressure was applied to the moving plunger extension that protrudes out the top of the starter. They also noted that the overall travel of the plunger appeared to be less than that noted on a similar older vintage starter. They provided the failed starter and the older vintage starter to us for our investigation. The continuity of all phases was successfully verified, along with the magnetic pull force of the coil, which was comparable to the older vintage starter. We then mounted the failed starter on a vertical plate in a horizontal (worst case) orientation, energized the coil and loaded the main contacts to 27 amps. This condition was maintained until the temperature stabilized with the highest temperature recorded on the terminals (i.e., 59 degrees C to 63 degrees with ambient at 20.3 degrees C). None of this testing performed could duplicate the single phasing condition observed by Ginna Station. We verified that the total stroke of the failed starter was less than that of the earlier vintage starter by as much as 0.059" by our
11/25/2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2
General Information or Other (PAR) Event# 39404
"The failed starter and the earlier vintage starter were provided to Cutler-Hammer for an OEM evaluation. The results of the OEM evaluation was e-mailed to our Cutler-Hammer distributor and provided to us on November 21, 2002, a copy is attached. This information has been provided to Ginna Station, and they advised us today (November 25, 2002) that the starters have been installed in 11 safety related locations, as follows:
MOV-857A, Residual Heat Removal Pump A Discharge
MOV-4616, Service Water Isolation in Auxiliary Building (Open & Close Circuit)
MOV-860C, Containment Spray Pump B Discharge
MOV-813, Component Cooling Water Isolation to Reactor Support Coolers (Open & Close Circuit)
MOV-700, Residual Heal Removal Pump Suction from Loop A Holt Leg
MOV-878A, Safety Injection Discharge to Loop B
MOV-856, Residual Heat Removal Suction from Refueling Water Storage Tank
MOV-4780, Service Water Isolation in Screenhouse (Open & Close Circuit)
"We are currently expediting Cutler-Hammer to complete an audit at their manufacturing facility to identify the magnitude of this condition and specify the date codes effected. We are also expediting Cutler-Hammer to obtain acceptable replacements for the starters provided to Gin na Station."
112 Erie Blvd., Schenectady, New York 12305
Tel:(518)382-0056
Fax: (518)382-0283
FAX CONTROL SHEET
DATE: November 25 2002
Number of pages including this sheet 4
TO. Name: NRC Operations Center
Phone#: (301)816-5100
Fax#: (301)816-5151
FROM: Name: Bill Willis Tel:(518)382-0056
COMMENTS: Part 21 Initial Notification - Cutler-Hammer A200 NEMA Size 1 Starters
Equipment Identification: Starter, Non-Reversing, Size 1, 6OOVAC, 3 Pole, W/125VDC coil, Westinghouse/Cutler-Harnmer P/N A2OOM1CS, Type B Thermal Overloads, Ambient Compensated, Manual Reset Only
In March 2002, Spectrum Technologies provided 2o Class 1E safety related Cutler-Hammer A200 NEMA Size 1 starters to Rochester Gas & Electric Company - Ginna Station. We had purchased the starters as commercial grade items from Cutler-Hammer, and dedicated them per EPRI NP5652, method 1, Special Tests and Inspections. This dedication successfully verified the following critical characteristics:
Ginna Station recently advised us that one of the starters had experienced an open phasing failure. They reported that they noted no current flow on one phase when measured with a clamp-on ammeter, and that current started to flow when the hand pressure was applied to the moving plunger extension that protrudes out the top ofthe starter. They also noted that the overall travel ofthe plunger appeared to be less than that noted on a similar older vintage starter. They provided the failed starter and the older vintage starter to us for our investigation. The continuity of all phases was successfully verified, along with the magnetic pull force of the coil, which was comparable to the older vintage starter. We then mounted the failed starter on a vertical plate in a horizontal (worst case) orientation, energized the coil and loaded the main contacts to 27 amps. This condition was maintained until the temperature stabilized with the highest temperature recorded on the terminals (i.e., 59 to 63 degrees C with ambient at 20.3 degrees C). None of this testing performed could duplicate the single phasing condition observed by Ginna Station. We verified that the total stroke of the failed starter was less than that of the earlier vintage starter by as much as 0.059" by our measurement.
The failed starter and the earlier vintage starter were provided to Cutler-Hammer for an OEM evaluation. The results of the OEM evaluation was e-mailed to our Cutler-Hammer distributor and provided to us on November 21, 2002, a copy is attached. This information has been provided to Ginna Station, and they advised us today (November 25, 2002) that the starters have been installed in 11 safety related locations, as follows:
MOV-700, Residual Heat Removal Pump Suction from Loop A Holt Leg
MOV-856, Residual Heat Removal Suction from Refueling Water Storage ~alll(
We are currently expediting Cutler-Hammer to complete an audit at their manufacturing facility to identify
the magnitude of this condition and specify the date codes effected. We are also expediting Cutler-
Hammer to obtain acceptable replacements for the starters provided to Ginna Station.
If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to call, fax, or e-mail us.
Spectrum Technologies Utilities Services USA, Inc.
Tel: (518) 382-0056
Fax: (518) 3~2-0283
cc: Gerald Bishoping, Ginna Station
(585) 771-3304
Subject: Final Report, Stabillty Option III: Possible Successive Confirmation Count Resets Not Reportable
This letter provides closure of the reference §21.21(a)(2) 60 Day Interim Report notification for plants that have selected stability long-term solution Option III. The closure is that GE Nuclear Energy (GE) has determined that this is not a reportable condition, however, GE recomtnends that the BWR Owners' Group Detect & Suppress Committee evaluate the need to change the minimum allowable value for period tolerance used in the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM).
As described in the reference notification, the potential problem was associated with the algorithm that provides the licensing basis Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit protection for stability Option III. The algorithm determines Successive Confirmation Count (SCC) of an oscillating power signal. A reactor trip is generated when SCC and osciUation amplitude reach their trip setpoints in accordance with the Option III and reactor protection system. configuration. The concern was that the oscillation period could change for an oscillation that initiates while reactor state conditions are changing towards eqrnlibrium state (e.g., following a two-recirculation pump (2RPT) trip event) and cause the SCC to prematurely reset, thus delaying the reactor scram.
A reactor trip signal is generated when the OPRM SCC setpoint and the amplitude
setpoint are reached or exceeded for at least one OPRM cell in each trip system channel required to generate the trip signal (e.g., one-out-of two taken twice). The Period Based Detection Algorithm (PBDA) determines the SCC for each OPRM cell. When an oscillation in an OPRM cell signal is detected by the PBDA it sets the base period for that cell. The period tolerance is used to determine if the period of each subsequent oscillation is within an acceptable difference from the base period. The acceptable range
November l8,2002
for period tolerance specified in stability Option Ill licensing topical reports is 100 to 300 msec. A period tolerance of 50 msec has been approved for OPRM systems that have a 25 msec sampling frequency.
GE evaluated this concern with TRACG simulations of a 2RPT event for typical Option III plants for reasonably limiting Extended Power Uprate (EPU) and Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis MELLLA) conditions. TRACG calculates channel power, which can be evaluated as representative of an OPRM cell signal through the hot channel oscillation reload licensing methodology, and evaluated by the PBDA for successive confirmation counts.
GE evaluated the potential for SCC spurious resets for period tolerance values of 50, 100 and 150 msec. In general, more frequent spurious resets occur with shorter period tolerance. However, the spurious SCC reset does not occur at the same time for all the OPRM cells in an OPRM channel. Some OPRM cell resets delay the trip generated by that cell, while others reset at sufficiently early times that they have again counted up to exceed the count setpoint when the amplitude setpoint is reached and others do not reset at all. Only one OPRM cell trip in an OPRM channel is sufficient to cause an OPRM channel trip, and each OPRM channel typically has 18 to 33 OPRM cells. In addition, typical core loading schemes ensure that multiple OPRM cells respond very near the peak oscillation magnitude. The analysis concluded that even though spurious resets occur, these resets are not expected to significantly delay reactor scram. Therefore, the currently licensed PBDA provides adequate protection against a MCPR Safety Limit violation for instabilities initiated during a fast transient such as a 2RPT event. Therefore, this does not represent a Reportable Condition under l0CFR21.2l.
Even though this is not a reportable condition, the potential for some OPRM cells to prematurely reset SCC for an instability initiated during a 2RPT is not consistent with the original design basis of the PBDA. The original design basis was that continuous confirmation counts would occur for fully coupled neutronic/thermal-hydraulic reactor instability. Since this may not occur for a 2RPT with period tolerance values of 50 and 100 msec, it is recommended that Option III plants evaluate the need to change the minimum allowable value for period tolerance.
November18, 2002
MFN02-089
If you have any questions, please call me at (408) 925-5362
Jason S. Post, Manager
cc: S.D. Alexander (NRC-NRRIDISPIPSIB) Mail Stop 6 F2
J. W. Foster NRC-NRR/DlSP/PSIB) Mail Stop 12 H2
J. F, Klapproth (GE-NE)
1. Closure of 60 Day Interim Report per §21.21 (a)(2)
Attachment 1 Closure of 60 Day Interim Report per §21.21(a)(2)
(i) Name and address of the individual informing the Commission: Jason S. Post, Manager, Engineering Quality & Safety Evaluation, GE Nuclear Energy, 175 Cuntier Avenue, San Jose, CA 95125
Stability Solution Option III plants were previously identified as potentially affected. These plants are listed in Attachment 2.
It was determined that the defect or failure to comply is not associated with a safety hazard and does not lead to violation of the MCPR Safety Limit
GE has communicated this concern to the BWR Owners' Group Potential Issues Resolution Team (PIRT) and to the Stability Detect & Suppress Committee. Even though this does not represent a reportable condition, the potential for some OPRM cells to prematurely reset SCC for an instability initiated during a 2RPT is not consistent with the original design basis of the PBDA. Since continuous
It is recommended that this issue be addressed by the BWROG D&S Committee in their overall consideration of stability solution Option III performance and reload licensing methodology revisions.
Attachment 2 - Previously Identified Potentially Affected Plants
x Detroit Edison Co. Fenni 2
Entergy Nuclear Northoast Fitzatrick
Entergy Nuclear Northoast Vermont Yankee
x Exelon Generation Co Limerick 2
x Exclon Genetation Co. Poach Bottom 2
x PPL Susquohanna LLC Susquehanna 2
x Soutliern Nuclear Operating Co. Hatch 1
x Soutliern Nuclear Operating Co. Hatch 2
x Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Forry l