Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1265231.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-03 10:09:02
Document Index: 355435100

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u20021981', '§\u20022000', '§\u2002621', '§\u20021981', '§\u20021981', '§\u20021981', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021985', '§\u20021985', '§\u20022000', '§\u20021981', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021985', '§\u20021985', '§\u20022000', '§\u2002626', '§\u20021985', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021981']

SHERLOCK v. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER | FindLaw
SHERLOCK v. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER
Elizabeth SHERLOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 1355, Docket 95-9128.
Before: KEARSE and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges, and MORAN, District Judge.* Elizabeth Sherlock, Long Island City, New York, pro se. John D. Canoni, New York City (Marcie L. Schlanger, Nixon Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, New York City, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.
Plaintiff pro se Elizabeth Sherlock appeals from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Harold Baer, Jr., Judge, dismissing her complaint alleging that defendant Montefiore Medical Center (“Montefiore”) terminated her employment in violation of, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3) (1994); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994) (“Title VII”); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994 & Supp.1995) (“ADEA”). The district court dismissed Sherlock's claims under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; it dismissed her Title VII and ADEA claims on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations by reason of her failure to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Sherlock challenges these rulings on appeal. For the reasons below, we conclude that the court applied an inappropriate presumption in order to find Sherlock's Title VII and ADEA claims time-barred, and we therefore affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
Montefiore is a not-for-profit medical institution engaged to provide medical services at New York City's Rikers Island Correctional Facility. In July 1989, Montefiore hired Sherlock, then age 45, to work as an HIV counselor at that facility. In October 1992, Montefiore terminated Sherlock's employment. Sherlock filed charges with the EEOC, alleging that Montefiore had discriminated against her on the basis of her age and gender. The EEOC dismissed those charges and issued a right-to-sue letter; the letter, dated February 15, 1995, stated that Sherlock could continue pursuit of her Title VII and ADEA claims by filing a private lawsuit but that “[s]uch a lawsuit must be commenced within 90 days of receipt of this” letter.
Sherlock commenced the present action on May 25, 1995, i.e., 99 days after the date of the EEOC right-to-sue letter. She asserted claims under Title VII, the ADEA, §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and state law. Montefiore moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, inter alia, that it failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that the claims under Title VII and the ADEA were time-barred because the complaint was filed more than 90 days after receipt of the right-to-sue letter.
In an Opinion and Order, 1995 WL 542458, dated September 11, 1995 (“District Court Opinion”), the district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the complaint failed to state a claim (a) under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because it did not allege that Sherlock was a member of a racial minority, (b) under § 1983 because it did not allege state action, and (c) under § 1985(3) because, inter alia, it did not allege the violation of a right that could serve as the basis for a § 1985(3) claim. The court dismissed the claims asserted under Title VII and the ADEA on the ground that they were untimely, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
Sherlock filed this claim ninety-six days after receiving her right-to-sue letter, thus exceeding the ninety-day statute of limitations by six days. The EEOC mailed notice to Sherlock on February 15, 1995. A presumption exists that an EEOC notice is received three days after its mailing. Baldwin County Welcome Center, 466 U.S. at 148 n. 1 [104 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 1]. Accordingly, Sherlock is presumed to have received her right-to-sue letter on February 18, 1995. Because Sherlock commenced this action on May 25, 1995-ninety-six days later-her Title VII and ADEA causes of action must be dismissed as untimely.
A. The Timeliness of the Title VII and ADEA Claims
In order to be timely, a claim under Title VII or the ADEA must be filed within 90 days of the claimant's receipt of a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 1724-25, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (per curiam); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir.1994). Normally it is assumed that a mailed document is received three days after its mailing. See, e.g., Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. at 148 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 1 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) (“Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon the party by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.”)). And normally it may be assumed, in the absence of challenge, that a notice provided by a government agency has been mailed on the date shown on the notice. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. at 148 & n. 1, 104 S.Ct. at 1724 & n. 1.
Although such presumptions are convenient and reasonable in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Baldwin case, on which the district court in the present case relied, did not suggest that they are irrebuttable. While the Baldwin Court noted the presumed date of receipt, the issue in that case was not the date on which the right-to-sue letter had been received but rather whether the forwarding of that letter by the plaintiff to the district court constituted the commencement of the lawsuit. See, e.g., id. at 150 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 1725 n. 4. If a claimant presents sworn testimony or other admissible evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred either that the notice was mailed later than its typewritten date or that it took longer than three days to reach her by mail, the initial presumption is not dispositive. See, e.g., Smith v. Local Union 28 Sheet Metal Workers, 877 F.Supp. 165, 172 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (determining date of receipt on basis of testimonial evidence), aff'd mem., 100 F.3d 943, 1996 WL 53650 (2d Cir. Feb. 8, 1996).
Nonetheless, as discussed above, the evidence that Montefiore did not receive the letter until at least February 27 creates an issue of fact as to whether Sherlock received it at or about the same time, and hence whether her complaint, filed 87 days thereafter, was timely. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of Sherlock's claims under Title VII and the ADEA.
B. The Other Federal Claims
Sherlock's other federal claims were properly dismissed. Her complaint failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because, as the district court noted, it did not allege that she was a member of a racial or ethnic minority. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 2028, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987); Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam).
Sherlock's claim under § 1983 was properly dismissed because, insofar as Montefiore's employment practices are concerned, the complaint fails to allege state action. The fact that a municipality is responsible for providing medical attention to persons held in its custody may make an independent contractor rendering such services a state actor within the meaning of § 1983 with respect to the services so provided, see, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2258, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); but that fact does not make the contractor a state actor with respect to its employment decisions, see, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2770-72, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982); Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (6th Cir.1992).
The complaint failed to state a claim under § 1985(3) because, inter alia, that section creates no substantive rights but merely “provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates,” Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2349, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979), and the Supreme Court has held that in light of the enforcement and conciliation mechanism created by Congress for claims under Title VII, see 442 U.S. at 372-78, 99 S.Ct. at 2349-52, the “deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under § 1985(3),” id. at 378, 99 S.Ct. at 2352. The similar mechanism for enforcement and conciliation of claims under the ADEA, e.g., compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) with 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), persuades us that a violation of the ADEA likewise cannot be the basis for a claim under § 1985(3). Cf. Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department, 868 F.2d 1364, 1366-68 (4th Cir.1989) (claim under § 1983 may not be predicated on violation of ADEA), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850, 110 S.Ct. 147, 107 L.Ed.2d 106 (1989).
C. The State-Law Claims
The judgment of the district court is affirmed insofar as it dismissed the claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3). The judgment is vacated insofar as it dismissed the claims asserted under Title VII, the ADEA, and state law, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.