Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/99-1240/
Timestamp: 2013-05-19 15:18:46
Document Index: 785856639

Matched Legal Cases: ['§12112', '§5', '§1', '§5', '§1', '§1', '§12101', '§5', '§12112', '§12112', '§12111', '§12112', '§12112', '§12111', '§12112', '§12102', '§12111', '§12202', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§1', '§5', '§1', '§1', '§1', '§5', '§5', '§12101', '§5', '§12101', '§12101', '§12112', '§12112', '§12112', '§2', '§12101', '§12132', '§5', '§5', '§12101', '§5', '§5', '§12202', '§5', '§12101', '§12101', '§5', '§5', '§12101', '§12101', '§5', '§5', '§12112', '§12112', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§8', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§1', '§12188', '§5', '§5', '§4151', '§701', '§1400', '§6000', '§1973', '§41705', '§10801', '§3604']

531 U.S. 356 | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
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193 F. 3d 1214, reversed.
[HTML] [PDF] BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA et al. <font i="1">v.
No. 991240. Argued October 11, 2000Decided February 21, 2001
Respondents Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits against petitioners, Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of th[at] disability … in regard to … terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, 42 U. S. C. §12112(a). In an opinion disposing of both cases, the District Court granted petitioners summary judgment, agreeing with them that the ADA exceeds Congress authority to abrogate the States Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the ADA validly abrogates such immunity.
: Suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the States failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Pp. 417.
(a) Congress may abrogate the States Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62. Only the second of these requirements is in dispute here. While Congress may not base abrogation of state immunity upon its Article I powers, see e.g., id., at 79, it may subject nonconsenting States to federal-court suit when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see e.g., id., at 80. Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in §1 of that Amendment by enacting appropriate legislation. See City of Boerne
521 U. S. 507. Because it is this Courts responsibility, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees, id., at 519524, §5 legislation, to the extent it reaches beyond the precise scope of §1s protections, must exhibit congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end, id.,
at 520. Pp. 47.
(b) The first step in applying these principles is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Here, that inquiry requires examination of the limitations §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment places upon States treatment of the disabled. To do so, the Court looks to its prior decisions under the Equal Protection Clause dealing with this issue. Kimel, supra
, at 83. In Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U. S. 432, the Court held, inter alia
, that mental retardation did not qualify as a quasi-suspect classification for equal protection purposes, id
., at 435, and that, accordingly, a city ordinance requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded incurred only the minimum rational-basis review applicable to general social and economic legislation, id.
, at 446. Although negative attitudes and fear often accompany irrational biases, their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational. They could quite hardheadedlyand perhaps hardheartedlyhold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 710.
(c) The requirements for private individuals to recover money damages against the Statesthat there be state discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the remedy imposed by Congress be congruent and proportional to the targeted violationare not met here. First, the ADAs legislative record fails to show that Congress identified a history and pattern of irrational employment discrimination by the States against the disabled. See, e.g., Kimel, supra
, at 89. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to local governmental units such as cities and counties, see Lincoln County
v. Luning,
133 U. S. 529, the Court rejects respondents contention that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend to such units as well as to States. Congress made a general finding in the ADA that historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination … continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem. 42 U. S. C. §12101(a)(2). Although the record includes instances to support such a finding, the great majority of these incidents do not deal with state activities in employment. Even if it were to be determined that the half a dozen relevant examples from the record showed unconstitutional action on the part of States, these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which §5 legislation must be based. See, e.g., Kimel, supra
, at 8991. Moreover, statements in House and Senate committee reports indicate that Congresss targeted the ADA at employment discrimination in the private sector. Second, the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the States raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in City of Boerne
For example, while it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by disabled individuals, §§12112(5)(B), 12111(9). The ADA does except employers from the reasonable accommodatio[n] requirement where the employer can demonstrate that accommodation would impose an undue hardship upon it, §12112(b)(5)(A), but, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required. The ADAs constitutional shortcomings are apparent when it is compared to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Holding the latter Act to be appropriate legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendments protection against racial discrimination in voting, South Carolina
383 U. S. 301, this Court emphasized that Congress had there documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by the States, see id.
, at 312, and had determined that litigation had proved ineffective to remedy the problem, see id.
, at 313. The contrast between the kind of evidence detailed in Katzenbach
, and the evidence that Congress considered in the present case, is stark. To uphold the ADAs application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne
. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority. Pp. 1017.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, et<fs fs="9"> <fs fs="11">al.
PATRICIA GARRETT et al.
We decide here whether employees of the State of Alabama may recover money damages by reason of the States failure to comply with the provisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104Stat.
330, 42 U. S. C. §§1211112117.
We hold that such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The ADA prohibits certain employers, including the States, from discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. §§12112(a), 12111(2), (5), (7). To this end, the Act requires employers to mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employers] business. §12112(b)(5)(A).
 [R]easonable accommodation may include
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. §12111(9).
The Act also prohibits employers from utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration … that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability. §12112(b)(3)(A).
The Act defines disability to include (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. §12102(2). A disabled individual is otherwise qualified if he or she, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. §12111(8).
Respondent Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, was employed as the Director of Nursing, OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services, for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. See App. 31, 38. In 1994, Garrett was diagnosed with breast cancer and subsequently underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy. See id.
, at 38. Garretts treatments required her to take substantial leave from work. Upon returning to work in July 1995, Garretts supervisor informed Garrett that she would have to give up her Director position. See id.
, at 39. Garrett then applied for and received a transfer to another, lower paying position as a nurse manager. See ibid.
Respondent Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services (Department). See id.
, at 8. Upon commencing this employment, Ash informed the Department that he suffered from chronic asthma and that his doctor recommended he avoid carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke, and Ash requested that the Department modify his duties to minimize his exposure to these substances. See ibid.
Ash was later diagnosed with sleep apnea and requested, again pursuant to his doctors recommendation, that he be reassigned to daytime shifts to accommodate his condition. See id.
, at 9
Ultimately, the Department granted none of the requested relief. See id.
, at 89. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he noticed that his performance evaluations were lower than those he had received on previous occasions. See id.
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the District Court, both seeking money damages under the ADA.
Petitioners moved for summary judgment, claiming that the ADA exceeds Congress authority to abrogate the States Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1410 (ND Ala. 1998). In a single opinion dispos-
ing of both cases, the District Court agreed with petitioners position and granted their motions for summary judgment. See id.,
at 1410, 1412. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals reversed, 193 F. 3d 1214 (1999), adhering to its intervening decision in Kimel
v. State Bd. of Regents
, 139 F. 3d 1426, 1433 (CA11 1998), cert. granted, 525 U. S. 1121, cert. dismissed, 528 U. S. 1184 (2000)
ADA validly abrogates the States Eleventh Amendment immunity.
We granted certiorari, 529 U. S. 1065 (2000)
, to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether an individual may sue a State for money damages in federal court under the ADA.
Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have extended the Amendments applicability to suits by citizens against their own States. See Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 7273 (2000)
; College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 669670 (1999)
517 U. S. 44, 54 (1996)
; Hans
134 U. S. 1, 15 (1890)
. The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court. See Kimel
We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate the States Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. 528
U. S., at 73. The first of these requirements is not in dispute here. See 42 U. S. C. §12202 (A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter). The question, then, is whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money damages under the ADA.
Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I. See Kimel
at 79 (Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] rests solely on Congress Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in todays cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers); Seminole Tribe
at 7273 (The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction); College Savings Bank
, at 672; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 636 (1999)
v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 730733 (1999)
. In Fitzpatrick
, however, we held that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
, at 456 (internal citation omitted). As a result, we concluded, Congress may subject nonconsenting States to suit in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its §5 power. See ibid.
Our cases have adhered to this proposition. See, e.g.
at 80. Accordingly, the ADA can apply to the States only to the extent that the statute is appropriate §5 legislation.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in §1 by enacting appropriate legislation. See City of Boerne
521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997)
. Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Courts constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, Congress power to enforce the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendments text. Kimel
at 81; City of Boerne, supra,
also confirmed, however, the long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees. 521 U. S., at 519524. Accordingly, §5 legislation reaching beyond the scope of §1s actual guarantees must exhibit congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Id.,
The first step in applying these now familiar principles is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Here, that inquiry requires us to examine the limitations §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment places upon States treatment of the disabled.
As we did last Term in Kimel
, see 528 U. S., at 83, we look to our prior decisions under the Equal Protection Clause dealing with this issue.
473 U. S. 432 (1985)
, we considered an equal protection challenge to a city ordinance requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The specific question before us was whether the Court of Appeals had erred by holding that mental retardation qualified as a quasi-suspect classification under our equal protection jurisprudence. Id
., at 435. We answered that question in the affirmative, concluding instead that such legislation incurs only the minimum rational-basis review applicable to general social and economic legislation.
, at 446. In a statement that today seems quite prescient, we explained that
if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so. Id.
, at 445446.
Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement, a States decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation. Id.
, at 441. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. Heller
509 U. S. 312, 320 (1993)
(citing Nordlinger
505 U. S. 1 (1992)
v. Dukes,
427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976)
). Moreover, the State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative  any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.  Heller
, at 320 (quoting FCC
v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993)
suggests that Cleburne
stands for the broad proposition that state decisionmaking reflecting negative attitudes or fear necessarily runs afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. See post
, at 5 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Cleburne
, 473 U. S., at 448). Although such biases may often accompany irrational (and therefore unconstitutional) discrimination, their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make. As we noted in Cleburne
: [M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently … . Id.,
at 448 (emphasis added). This language, read in context, simply states the unremarkable and widely acknowledged tenet of this Courts equal protection jurisprudence that state action subject to rational-basis scrutiny does not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment when it rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia,
427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976)
Thus, the result of C
is that States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational. They could quite hard headedlyand perhaps hardheartedlyhold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.
Once we have determined the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question, we examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled. Just as §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to actions committed under color of state law, Congress §5 authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions. See Florida Prepaid
, 527 U. S., at 640 (It is this conduct thenunremedied patent infringement by the Statesthat must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation that Congress sought to redress in the Patent Remedy Act); Kimel
U. S., at 89 (Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation). The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled.
Respondents contend that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend not only to States themselves, but to units of local governments, such as cities and counties. All of these, they say, are state actors for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief for Respondents 8. This is quite true, but the Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local government. See Lincoln County
133 U. S. 529, 530 (1890)
. These entities are subject to private claims for damages under the ADA without Congress ever having to rely on §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so. It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment.
Congress made a general finding in the ADA that historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem. 42 U. S. C. §12101(a)(2). The record assembled by Congress includes many instances to support such a finding. But the great majority of these incidents do not deal with the activities of States.
Respondents in their brief cite half a dozen examples from the record that did involve States. A department head at the University of North Carolina refused to hire an applicant for the position of health administrator because he was blind; similarly, a student at a state university in South Dakota was denied an opportunity to practice teach because the dean at that time was convinced that blind people could not teach in public schools. A microfilmer at the Kansas Department of Transportation was fired because he had epilepsy; deaf workers at the University of Oklahoma were paid a lower salary than those who could hear. The Indiana State Personnel Office informed a woman with a concealed disability that she should not disclose it if she wished to obtain employment.
Several of these incidents undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to make the sort of accommodations for the disabled required by the ADA. Whether they were irrational under our decision in Cleburne
is more debatable, particularly when the incident is described out of context. But even if it were to be determined that each incident upon fuller examination showed unconstitutional action on the part of the State, these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which §5 legislation must be based. See Kimel
, 528 U. S., at 8991; City of Boerne
, 521 U. S., at 530531. Congress, in enacting the ADA, found that some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities. 42 U. S. C. §12101(a)(1). In 1990, the States alone employed more than 4.5 million people. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 338 (119th ed. 1999) (Table 534). It is telling, we think, that given these large numbers, Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against the disabled.
maintains that Congress applied Title I of the ADA to the States in response to a host of incidents representing unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against persons with disabilities. A close review of the relevant materials, however, undercuts that conclusion. Justice Breyer
s Appendix C consists not of legislative findings, but of unexamined, anecdotal accounts of adverse, disparate treatment by state officials. Post
, at 3. Of course, as we have already explained, adverse, disparate treatment often does not amount to a constitutional violation where rational-basis scrutiny applies. These accounts, moreover, were submitted not directly to Congress but to the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, which made no findings on the subject of state discrimination in employment.
See the Task Forces Report entitled From ADA to Empowerment (Oct. 12, 1990). And, had Congress truly understood this information as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States, one would expect some mention of that conclusion in the Acts legislative findings. There is none. See 42 U. S. C. §12101. Although Justice Breyer
would infer from Congress general conclusions regarding societal discrimination against the disabled that the States had likewise participated in such action, post
, at 3, the House and Senate committee reports on the ADA flatly contradict this assertion. After describing the evidence presented to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and its subcommittee (including the Task Force Report upon which the dissent relies), the Committees report reached, among others, the following conclusion: Discrimination still persists in such critical areas as employment in the private sector
, public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunications. S. Rep. No. 101116, p. 6 (1989) (emphasis added). The House Committee on Education and Labor, addressing the ADAs employment provisions, reached the same conclusion: [A]fter extensive review and analysis over a number of Congressional sessions, … there exists a compelling need to establish a clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas of employment in the private sector
, public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunications. H. R. Rep. No. 101485, pt. 2 p. 28 (1990) (emphasis added). Thus, not only is the inference Justice Breyer
draws unwarranted, but there is also strong evidence that Congress failure to mention States in its legislative findings addressing discrimination in employment reflects that bodys judgment that no pattern of unconstitutional state action had been documented.
Even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the States would raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in City of Boerne
For example, whereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to mak[e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. 42 U. S. C. §§12112(5)(B). The ADA does except employers from the reasonable accommodatio[n] requirement where the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity. §12112(b)(5)(A). However, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an undue burden upon the employer. The Act also makes it the employers duty to prove that it would suffer such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate reasonable bases for the employers decision. See ibid.
The ADA also forbids utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis. §12112(b)(3)(A). Although disparate impact may be relevant evidence of racial discrimination, see Washington
426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976)
, such evidence alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny. See, e.g.
([O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact).
The ADAs constitutional shortcomings are apparent when the Act is compared to Congress efforts in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to respond to a serious pattern of constitutional violations. In South Carolina
383 U. S. 301 (1966)
, we considered whether the Voting Rights Act was appropriate legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendments protection against racial discrimination in voting. Concluding that it was a valid exercise of Congress enforcement power under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
we noted that [b]efore enacting the measure, Congress explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting. Id.
, at 308. In that Act, Congress documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by the States. State officials, Congress found, routinely applied voting tests in order to exclude African-American citizens from registering to vote. See id.
, at 312. Congress also determined that litigation had proved ineffective and that there persisted an otherwise inexplicable 50-percentage-point gap in the registration of white and African-American voters in some States. See id.
, at 313. Congress response was to promulgate in the Voting Rights Act a detailed but limited remedial scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant evidence of States systematic denial of those rights was identified.
The contrast between this kind of evidence, and the evidence that Congress considered in the present case, is stark. Congressional enactment of the ADA represents its judgment that there should be a comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U. S. C. §12101(b)(1). Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation. Those requirements are not met here, and to uphold the Acts application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne
Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Respondents complaints in the United States District Court alleged violations of both Title I and Title II of the ADA, and petitioners Question Presented can be read to apply to both sections. See Brief for Petitioners i; Brief for United States I. Though the briefs of the parties discuss both sections in their constitutional arguments, no party has briefed the question whether Title II of the ADA, dealing with the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 42 U. S. C. §12132, is available for claims of employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA expressly deals with that subject. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983)
([W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Courts of Appeals are divided on this issue, compare Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F. 3d 1169 (CA9 1999), with Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F. 3d 816 (CA11 1998). We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is appropriate legislation under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when the parties have not favored us with briefing on the statutory question. To the extent the Court granted certiorari on the question whether respondents may sue their state employers for damages under Title II of the ADA, see this Courts Rule 24.1(a), that portion of the writ is dismissed as improvidently granted. See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 184 (1959)
Garrett raised other claims, but those are not presently before the Court.
It is clear that Congress intended to invoke §5 as one of its bases for enacting the ADA. See 42 U. S. C. §12101(b)(4).
Applying the basic principles of rationality review, Cleburne struck down the city ordinance in question. 473 U. S., at 447450. The Courts reasoning was that the citys purported justifications for the ordinance made no sense in light of how the city treated other groups similarly situated in relevant respects. Although the group home for the mentally retarded was required to obtain a special use permit, apartment houses, other multiple-family dwellings, retirement homes, nursing homes, sanitariums, hospitals, boarding houses, fraternity and sorority houses, and dormitories were not subject to the ordinance. See ibid.
It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At least one Member of Congress remarked that this is probably one of the few times where the States are so far out in front of the Federal Government, its not funny. Hearing on Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1987). A number of these provisions, however, did not go as far as the ADA did in requiring accommodation.
The record does show that some States, adopting the tenets of the eugenics movement of the early part of this century, required extreme measures such as sterilization of persons suffering from hereditary mental disease. These laws were upheld against constitutional attack 70 years ago in Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927)
. But there is no indication that any State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was adopted.
Only a small fraction of the anecdotes Justice Breyer identifies in his Appendix C relate to state discrimination against the disabled in employment. At most, somewhere around 50 of these allegations describe conduct that could conceivably amount to constitutional violations by the States, and most of them are so general and brief that no firm conclusion can be drawn. The overwhelming majority of these accounts pertain to alleged discrimination by the States in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA. 8
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)
. In addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress. See n. 5, supra.
Only a small fraction of the anecdotes Justice Breyer identifies in his Appendix C relate to state discrimination against the disabled in employment. At most, somewhere around 50 of these allegations describe conduct that could conceivably amount to constitutional violations by the States, and most of them are so general and brief that no firm conclusion can be drawn. The overwhelming majority of these accounts pertain to alleged discrimination by the States in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or hostile animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against people who appear to be different in some respects from ourselves. Quite apart from any historical documentation, knowledge of our own human instincts teaches that persons who find it difficult to perform routine functions by reason of some mental or physical impairment might at first seem unsettling to us, unless we are guided by the better angels of our nature. There can be little doubt, then, that persons with mental or physical impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill will.
It is a question of quite a different order, however, to say that the States in their official capacities, the States as governmental entities, must be held in violation of the Constitution on the assumption that they embody the misconceived or malicious perceptions of some of their citizens. It is a most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws, particularly where the accusation is based not on hostility but instead on the failure to act or the omission to remedy. States can, and do, stand apart from the citizenry. States act as neutral entities, ready to take instruction and to enact laws when their citizens so demand. The failure of a State to revise policies now seen as incorrect under a new understanding of proper policy does not always constitute the purposeful and intentional action required to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Washington
For the reasons explained by the Court, an equal protection violation has not been shown with respect to the several States in this case. If the States had been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by their mistreatment or lack of concern for those with impairments, one would have expected to find in decisions of the courts of the States and also the courts of the United States extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations. This confirming judicial documentation does not exist. That there is a new awareness, a new consciousness, a new commitment to better treatment of those disadvantaged by mental or physical impairments does not establish that an absence of state statutory correctives was a constitutional violation.
It must be noted, moreover, that what is in question is not whether the Congress, acting pursuant to a power granted to it by the Constitution, can compel the States to act. What is involved is only the question whether the States can be subjected to liability in suits brought not by the Federal Government (to which the States have consented, see Alden
v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 755 (1999)
), but by private persons seeking to collect moneys from the state treasury without the consent of the State. The predicate for money damages against an unconsenting State in suits brought by private persons must be a federal statute enacted upon the documentation of patterns of constitutional violations committed by the State in its official capacity. That predicate, for reasons discussed here and in the decision of the Court, has not been established. With these observations, I join the Courts opinion.
Stevens, Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg
Reviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative agency record, the Court holds the statutory provision before us, 42 U. S. C. §12202, unconstitutional. The Court concludes that Congress assembled insufficient evidence of unconstitutional discrimination, ante
, at 12, that Congress improperly attempted to re-write the law we established in Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985)
, at 16, and that the law is not sufficiently tailored to address unconstitutional discrimination, ante
Section 5, however, grants Congress the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection guarantee. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §5. As the Court recognizes, state discrimination in employment against persons with disabilities might  run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause  where there is no  rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.  Ante
, at 8 (quoting Heller
). See also Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra
, at 440 (stating that the Court will sustain a classification if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest). In my view, Congress reasonably could have concluded that the remedy before us constitutes an appropriate way to enforce this basic equal protection requirement. And that is all the Constitution requires.
The Court says that its primary problem with this statutory provision is one of legislative evidence. It says that Congress assembled only … minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment. Ante
, at 12. In fact, Congress compiled a vast legislative record documenting  massive, society-wide discrimination  against persons with disabilities. S. Rep. No. 101116, pp. 89 (1989) (quoting testimony of Justin Dart, chairperson of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities). In addition to the information presented at 13 congressional hearings (see Appendix A, infra
), and its own prior experience gathered over 40 years during which it contemplated and enacted considerable similar legislation (see Appendix B, infra
), Congress created a special task force to assess the need for comprehensive legislation. That task force held hearings in every State, attended by more than 30,000 people, including thousands who had experienced discrimination first hand. See From ADA to Empowerment, Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, 16 (Oct. 12, 1990) (hereinafter Task Force Report). The task force hearings, Congress own hearings, and an analysis of census data, national polls, and other studies led Congress to conclude that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally. 42 U. S. C. §12101(a)(6). As to employment, Congress found that [t]wo-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64 [were] not working at all, even though a large majority wanted to, and were able to, work productively. S. Rep. No. 101116, at 9. And Congress found that this discrimination flowed in significant part from stereotypic assumptions as well as purposeful unequal treatment. 42 U. S. C. §12101(a)(7).
The powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment throughout society in general, including discrimination by private persons and local governments, implicates state governments as well, for state agencies form part of that same larger society. There is no particular reason to believe that they are immune from the stereotypic assumptions and pattern of purposeful unequal treatment that Congress found prevalent. The Court claims that it make[s] no sense to take into consideration constitutional violations committed by local governments. Ante
, at 71. But the substantive obligation that the Equal Protection Clause creates applies to state and local governmental entities alike. E.g.,
488 U. S. 469 (1989)
. Local governments often work closely with, and under the supervision of, state officials, and in general, state and local government employers are similarly situated. Nor is determining whether an apparently local entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as simple as the majority suggestsit often requires a  detailed examination of the relevant provisions of [state] law.  Regents of Univ. of Cal.
519 U. S. 425, n. 6 (1997) (quoting Moor
v. County of Alameda,
411 U. S. 693, 719721 (1973)
In any event, there is no need to rest solely upon evidence of discrimination by local governments or general societal discrimination. There are roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments themselves in the legislative record. See, e.g.,
Appendix C, infra.
I fail to see how this evidence fall[s] far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which §5 legislation must be based. Ante
The congressionally appointed task force collected numerous specific examples, provided by persons with disabilities themselves, of adverse, disparate treatment by state officials. They reveal, not what the Court describes as half a dozen instances of discrimination, ante,
at 11, but hundreds of instances of adverse treatment at the hands of state officialsinstances in which a person with a disability found it impossible to obtain a state job, to retain state employment, to use the public transportation that was readily available to others in order to get to work, or to obtain a public education, which is often a prerequisite to obtaining employment. State-imposed barriers also frequently made it difficult or impossible for people to vote, to enter a public building, to access important government services, such as calling for emergency assistance, and to find a place to live due to a pattern of irrational zoning decisions similar to the discrimination that we held unconstitutional in Cleburne,
473 U. S., at 448. See Appendix C, infra.
As the Court notes, those who presented instances of discrimination rarely provided additional, independent evidence sufficient to prove in court that, in each instance, the discrimination they suffered lacked justification from a judicial standpoint. Ante
, at 12 (stating that instances of discrimination are described out of context). Perhaps this explains the Courts view that there is minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination. Ibid. But a legislature is not a court of law. And Congress, unlike courts, must, and does, routinely draw general conclusionsfor example, of likely motive or of likely relationship to legitimate needfrom anecdotal and opinion-based evidence of this kind, particularly when the evidence lacks strong refutation. See Task Force Report 16, 20 (task force met many times with significant representatives of groups opposed to [the] ADA, and as to the general public, although the task force received about 2,000 letters in support of the ADA, there was only one letter in opposition); S. Rep. No. 101116, at 10 (summarizing testimony that many reasonable accommodations cost less than $50, and the expense of others, such as hiring employees who can interpret for the deaf, is frequently exaggerated). In reviewing §5 legislation, we have never required the sort of extensive investigation of each piece of evidence that the Court appears to contemplate. Compare ante
, at 1213, with Katzenbach
384 U. S. 641, 652656 (1966)
(asking whether Congress likely conclusions were reasonable, not whether there was adequate evidentiary support in the record). Nor has the Court traditionally required Congress to make findings as to state discrimination, or to break down the record evidence, category by category. Compare ante, at 13 (noting statements in two congressional Reports that mentioned state discrimination in public services and transportation but not in employment), with Morgan, supra
, at 654 (considering what Congress might have concluded); 384 U. S., at 652 (holding that likely discrimination against Puerto Ricans in areas other than voting supported statute abolishing literacy test as qualification for voting).
Regardless, Congress expressly found substantial unjustified discrimination against persons with disabilities. 42 U. S. C. §12101(9) (finding a pattern of 
discrimination and prejudice that costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary
expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity (emphasis added)). See also 2 Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Leg. Hist.) (Committee Print compiled for the House Committee on Education and Labor), Ser. No. 102B, p. 1620 (1990) (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson) (describing unjustifiable and discriminatory loss of job opportunities); id.
, at 1623 (citing study showing  strong evidence that employers fears of low performance among disabled workers are unjustified ). Moreover, it found that such discrimination typically reflects stereotypic assumptions or purposeful unequal treatment. 42 U. S. C. §12101(7). See also 2 Leg. Hist. 1622 (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson) (Outmoded stereotypes whether manifested in medical or other job requirements that are unrelated to the successful performance of the job, or in decisions based on the generalized perceptions of supervisors and hiring personnel, have excluded many disabled people from jobs for which they are qualified). In making these findings, Congress followed our decision in Cleburne
, which established that not only discrimination against persons with disabilities that rests upon a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group, 473 U. S., at 447 (quoting Department of Agriculture
413 U. S. 528, 534 (1973)
(omission in Cleburne
)), violates the Fourteenth Amendment, but also discrimination that rests solely upon negative attitude[s], fea[r], 473 U. S., at 448, or irrational prejudice, id.
, at 450. Adverse treatment that rests upon such motives is unjustified discrimination in Cleburne
The evidence in the legislative record bears out Congress finding that the adverse treatment of persons with disabilities was often arbitrary or invidious in this sense, and thus unjustified. For example, one study that was before Congress revealed that most … governmental agencies in [one State] discriminated in hiring against job applicants for an average period of five years after treatment for cancer, based in part on coworkers misguided belief that cancer is contagious. 2 Leg. Hist. 16191620 (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson). A school inexplicably refused to exempt a deaf teacher, who taught at a school for the deaf, from a listening skills requirement. Governments Lodging 1503. A State refused to hire a blind employee as director of an agency for the blindeven though he was the most qualified applicant. Id.
, at 974. Certain state agencies apparently had general policies against hiring or promoting persons with disabilities. Id.
, at 1159, 1577. A zoo turned away children with Downs Syndrome because [the zookeeper] feared they would upset the chimpanzees. S. Rep. No. 101116, at 7. There were reports of numerous zoning decisions based upon negative attitudes or fear, Cleburne
, at 448, such as a zoning board that denied a permit for an obviously pretextual reason after hearing arguments that a facility would house  deviants  who needed  room to roam,  Governments Lodging 1068. A complete listing of the hundreds of examples of discrimination by state and local governments that were submitted to the task force is set forth in Appendix C, infra
. Congress could have reasonably believed that these examples represented signs of a widespread problem of unconstitutional discrimination.
The Courts failure to find sufficient evidentiary support may well rest upon its decision to hold Congress to a strict, judicially created evidentiary standard, particularly in respect to lack of justification. Justice Kennedy
s empirical conclusionwhich rejects that of Congressrests heavily upon his failure to find extensive litigation and discussion of constitutional violations, in 
of the United States. Ante
, at 2 (K
, J., concurring) (emphasis added). And the Court itself points out that, when economic or social legislation is challenged in court as irrational, hence unconstitutional, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Ante
, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or as Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, put the matter many years ago,  if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain  challenged legislation, then  there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing . . . that the action is arbitrary.  Pacific States Box & Basket Co.
296 U. S. 176, 185 (1935)
(quoting Bordens Farm Products Co.
293 U. S. 194, 209 (1934)
). Imposing this special burden upon Congress, the Court fails to find in the legislative record sufficient indication that Congress has negative[d] the presumption that state action is rationally related to a legitimate objective. Ante
The problem with the Courts approach is that neither the burden of proof that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable to judges
applies to Congress
when it exercises its §5 power. Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process … have no application to Congress. Oregon
400 U. S. 112, 248 (1970)
(Brennan, White, and M
arshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rationalbasis reviewwith its presumptions favoring constitutionalityis a paradigm of judicial restraint. FCC
v. Beach Communications, Inc.
, 508 U. S. 307, 314 (1993)
(emphasis added). And the Congress of the United States is not a lower court.
Indeed, the Court in Cleburne
drew this very institutional distinction. We emphasized that courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices. 473 U. S., at 441. Our invocation of judicial deference and respect for Congress was based on the fact that [§]5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment empowers Congress
to enforce [the equal protection] mandate. Id.
at 439 (emphasis added). Indeed, we made clear that the absence of a contrary congressional finding was critical to our decision to apply mere rational-basis review to disability discrimination claimsa congressional direction to apply a more stringent standard would have been controlling. Ibid.
See also Washington
426 U. S. 229, 248 (1976)
(refusing to invalidate a law based on the Equal Protection Clause because a disparate impact standard should await legislative prescription). Cf. Mitchell,
, at 284 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon individual records). In short, the Courts claim that to uphold the Acts application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne
, at 16, is repudiated by Cleburne
There is simply no reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant to the exercise of its §5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions that reflect a courts institutional limitations. Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy. Cf. Cleburne
, at 442443 (addressing the problems of the large and diversified group of persons with disabilities is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary). Unlike courts, Congress directly reflects public attitudes and beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where, and to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount to behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking constitutional justification. Unlike judges, Members of Congress can directly obtain information from constituents who have first-hand experience with discrimination and related issues.
Moreover, unlike judges, Members of Congress are elected. When the Court has applied the majoritys burden of proof rule, it has explained that we, i.e.,
the courts, do not  sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations.  Heller, 509 U. S., at 319 (quoting New Orleans
v. Dukes
, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976)
). To apply a rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted Congress legislative power is to stand the underlying principlea principle of judicial restrainton its head. But without the use of this burden of proof rule or some other unusually stringent standard of review, it is difficult to see how the Court can find the legislative record here inadequate. Read with a reasonably favorable eye, the record indicates that state governments subjected those with disabilities to seriously adverse, disparate treatment. And Congress could have found, in a significant number of instances, that this treatment violated the substantive principles of justificationshorn of their judicial-restraint-related presumptionsthat this Court recognized in Cleburne
The Court argues in the alternative that the statutes damage remedy is not congruent with and proportional to the equal protection problem that Congress found. Ante
, at 14 (citing City of Boerne
521 U. S. 507, 520 (1997)
). The Court suggests that the Acts reasonable accommodation requirement, 42 U. S. C. §12112(b)(5)(A), and disparate impact standard, §12112(b)(3)(A), far excee[d] what is constitutionally required. Ante
, at 14. But we have upheld disparate impact standards in contexts where they were not constitutionally required. Compare Griggs
401 U. S. 424, 432 (1971)
, with Washington, supra,
at 239, and City of Rome
446 U. S. 156, 172173 (1980)
, with Mobile
446 U. S. 55, 62 (1980)
And what is wrong with a remedy that, in response to unreasonable employer behavior, requires an employer to make accommodations that are reasonable? Of course, what is reasonable in the statutory sense and what is unreasonable in the constitutional sense might differ. In other words, the requirement may exceed what is necessary to avoid a constitutional violation. But it is just that powerthe power to require more than the minimum that §5 grants to Congress, as this Court has repeatedly confirmed. As long ago as 1880, the Court wrote that §5 brought within the domain of congressional power whatever tends to enforce submission to its prohibitions and to secure to all persons … the equal protection of the laws. Ex parte Virginia,
100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880)
. More recently, the Court added that §5s draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 18. Morgan
, 384 U. S., at 650 (citing McCulloch
4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819)).
In keeping with these principles, the Court has said that [i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of the various conflicting considerationsthe risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services … , the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that would be affected. 384 U. S., at 653. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did. Ibid.
See also South Carolina
383 U. S. 301, 324 (1966)
(interpreting the similarly worded enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment to permit Congress to use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition). Nothing in the words reasonable accommodation suggests that the requirement has no tend[ency] to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, Ex parte Virginia
, at 346, that it is an irrational way to achieve the objective, Katzenbach
, 383 U. S., at 324, that it would fall outside the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Morgan, supra
, at 650, or that it somehow otherwise exceeds the bounds of the appropriate, U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §5.
The Courts more recent cases have professed to follow the longstanding principle of deference to Congress. See Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents
, 528 U. S. 62, 81 (2000)
(Congress §5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, Congress can prohibit a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendments text); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd.
v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 639 (1999)
( Congress must have wide latitude ) (quoting City of Boerne, supra,
at 519520); City of Boerne
, 521 U. S., at 528 (reaffirming Morgan
); 521 U. S., at 536 (Congress conclusions are entitled to much deference). And even today, the Court purports to apply, not to depart from, these standards. Ante
, at 7. But the Courts analysis and ultimate conclusion deprive its declarations of practical significance. The Court sounds the word of promise to the ear but breaks it to the hope.
The Courts harsh review of Congress use of its §5 power is reminiscent of the similar (nowdiscredited) limitation that it once imposed upon Congress Commerce Clause power. Compare Carter
v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U. S. 238 (1936)
, with United States
v. Darby,
312 U. S. 100, 123 (1941)
(rejecting Carter Coals rationale). I could understand the legal basis for such review were we judging a statute that discriminated against those of a particular race or gender, see United States
, 518 U. S. 515 (1996)
, or a statute that threatened a basic constitutionally protected liberty such as free speech, see Reno
; see also Post & Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison
and Kimel
, 110 Yale L. J. 441, 477 (2000) (stating that the Courts recent review of §5 legislation appears to approach strict scrutiny); 1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §516, p. 959 (3d ed. 2000) (same). The legislation before us, however, does not discriminate against anyone, nor does it pose any threat to basic liberty. And it is difficult to understand why the Court, which applies minimum rational-basis review to statutes that burden
persons with disabilities, ante
, at 78, subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help
those same individuals.
I recognize nonetheless that this statute imposes a burden upon States in that it removes their Eleventh Amendment protection from suit, thereby subjecting them to potential monetary liability. Rules for interpreting §5 that would provide States with special protection, however, run counter to the very object of the Fourteenth Amendment. By its terms, that Amendment prohibits States
from denying their citizens equal protection of the laws. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. Hence principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments by appropriate legislation. Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty. City of Rome,
446 U. S., at 179. See also Fitzpatrick
427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976)
; Ex parte Virginia
, at 345. And, ironically, the greater the obstacle the Eleventh Amendment poses to the creation by Congress of the kind of remedy at issue herethe decentralized remedy of private damage actionsthe more Congress, seeking to cure important national problems, such as the problem of disability discrimination before us, will have to rely on more uniform remedies, such as federal standards and court injunctions, 42 U. S. C. §12188(a)(2), which are sometimes draconian and typically more intrusive. See College Savings Bank
527 U. S. 666, 704705 (1999)
, J., dissenting). Cf. ante
, at 15, n. 8. For these reasons, I doubt that todays decision serves any constitutionally based federalism interest.
The Court, through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to distinguish between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improperly invades a power that the Constitution assigns to Congress. Morgan, 384 U. S., at 648, n. 7 (The sponsors and supporters of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were primarily interested in augmenting the power of Congress). Its decision saps §5 of independent force, effectively confin[ing] the legislative power … to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch [is] prepared to adjudge unconstitutional. Id
., at 648649. Whether the Commerce Clause does or does not enable Congress to enact this provision, see, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe of Fla.
517 U. S. 44, 100185 (1996)
., joined
by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); College Savings Bank, supra
, at 699700 (
, J., dissenting), in my view, §5 gives Congress the necessary authority.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on H. R. 2273 before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
Hearing on H. R. 2273, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Select Education and Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18 & Sept. 13, 1989) (two hearings)
Oversight Hearing on H. R. 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989)
Act of June 10, 1948, ch. 434, 62Stat.
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U. S. C. §4151
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. §701 et seq.
Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91230, Title VI, 84Stat.
175 (reenacted in 1990 as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U. S. C. §1400 et seq.
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §6000 et seq.
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 42 U. S. C. §1973ee et seq.
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U. S. C. §41705
Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, 42 U. S. C. §10801
Fair Housing Amendments of 1988, 42 U. S. C. §3604.
Submissions made by individuals to the Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. See the Governments Lodging (available in Clerk of Courts case file).
discrimination against the mentally ill in city zoning process
inaccessible exercise equipment at University of Alabama
school failed to train teachers how to work with students with learning disabilities
courts failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people
lack of accessible police and court services for deaf people
child denied public education because of cerebral palsy
inaccessible public transportation, which prevented persons with disabilities from getting to work
inaccessible public buildings and services; inaccessible transportation
inaccessible public schools; inaccessible public transportation
failure to enforce building codes requiring access for persons with disabilities
lack of instructions for use of voting machine by blind people; inaccessible restrooms in newly renovated State House
failure to enforce state and local laws protecting persons with disabilities
schools failed to provide an adequate education for children with disabilities
man denied vocational rehabilitation services based on his cerebral palsy; inaccessible public transportation
vocational rehabilitation agency failed to provide services for schizophrenics; zoning discrimination against group homes
school failed to provide an adequate education
school placed child with cerebral palsy in special education classes
inaccessible restrooms in state legislature information office
inaccessible areas at new Alaska Performing Arts Center
lack of curb cuts in sidewalks near apartment building for persons with disabilities
child erroneously placed in special education classes
inaccessible new performing arts center
Alaska Psychiatric Institute failed to provide interpretive services for deaf patients 00052
state and local agencies disregarded laws requiring accessibility
jail failed to provide person with disability medical treatment 00056
inaccessible government buildings in Seward
city failed to train employees how to communicate with people with hearing impairments
segregated seating and inaccessibility at new performing arts center
inaccessibility of State Ferry Columbia and Alaska Railroad; denial of job interview because person was in a wheelchair
person using a respirator denied access to Alaska State Division of Medical Assistance
school district retaliated against teacher for asking to be assigned to an accessible classroom
lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation
state agencies failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people 00072
department of motor vehicles failed to provide interpretive services 00073
inaccessibility of Seward City Hall and other state and local buildings
state university failed to assist in covering expense of interpretive services for deaf graduate student
inaccessible public school
survey showing inaccessibility problems in city of Phoenixs public services
inaccessible restrooms at state recreation areas
department of motor vehicles failed to provide visual signs or other assistance for people with hearing impairments
person with disability denied police officer job
Arizona Department of Economic Security took 3½ to 4 years to fix unsafe van lift
county paratransit refused to provide transportation to college
department of motor vehicles placed restrictions on drivers license because of deafness
teacher with hearing impairment denied numerous jobs
department of motor vehicles failed to assist deaf people
inaccessible entrance, restroom, water fountain, and office at building leased by State
woman injured trying to use inaccessible restroom at roadside rest stop; lack of curb cuts
inaccessible social service agencies
public school failed to enforce accommodations for student
public school teacher refused to allow student with disability to use authorized calculator
state university failed to inform student with hearing impairment about activities and rules
lack of curb cuts
inaccessible office area at public housing for persons with disabilities
inaccessible state office of human services; state agencies failed to hire persons with disabilities
failure to enforce handicapped parking law
school erroneously placed child with mobility impairment in special education classes
public schools failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people
person with disability forced to resign employment because of architectural barriers
public school held meetings and conferences at inaccessible locations
physical barriers prevented citizens from voting
rehabilitation services failed to assist people with all kinds of disabilities 00159
inaccessible city and county buildings
human services office relocated to inaccessible building
inaccessible public recreation sites
California Relay System failed to provide telephone access to other States for deaf people
public transit failed to provide visual signs for deaf people
California Childrens Services refused to help with cost of caring for child with head injury at home
inaccessible county buildings
deaf people denied access to state agencies that lacked TDDs
limited out-of-state telephone relay services
inaccessible public transportation limited access to community college
state mental health services failed to provide access for deaf people
government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people
inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts
inaccessible airport; inaccessible public transportation
California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people to make interstate calls
inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible restrooms in public buildings
University of California attempted to terminate employees with disabilities for taking medical leave
state agencies failed to provide TDDs
person denied opportunity to serve on jury because county failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people
public school district failed to provide TTD for deaf parents
California Civil Service Exam held at high school with inaccessible restrooms
inaccessible restrooms in county administration building; lack of curb cuts
inaccessible public transportation prevented persons with disabilities from getting to work; States failed to enforce laws requiring accessibility
inaccessible county courthouse; street signals too fast for safe crossing by wheelchair
public functions failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people
California Basic Educational Skills Test discriminated against deaf adults who wanted to become teachers of deaf students
department of motor vehicles required doctors to report patients with seizure disorders and revoked such patients licenses, but did not require reporting of other conditions that could cause erratic driving
person in wheelchair passed by five bus drivers, all of whom claimed that lifts were broken
lack of curb cuts and ramps; inaccessible public transportation
persons with disabilities placed in segregated public housing
lack of curb cuts forced person in wheelchair to use street
inaccessible county courthouse
inaccessible public transportation in small cities; public schools failed to assist students with disabilities
inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible public facilities and recreation sites
political parties held caucuses at inaccessible private home
children with developmental disabilities required to attend segregated schools
public school system refused to transfer student with disabilities from special to regular school until she brought suit
vocational rehabilitation agency refused to take referrals from psychiatric halfway house; person denied drivers license in Virginia because of mental illness
public school inaccessible to parent with disability
state university denied renewal of contract for graduate assistantship because of age and disability
inaccessible public high school; inaccessible public transportation
inaccessible voting machines; inadequate handicapped parking
man with physical disability spent 45 minutes crawling into polling place because it was inaccessible to wheelchairs
inaccessible public transportation; public ceremony held at inaccessible building
failure to enforce laws requiring handicapped parking spaces, which were usually occupied by police cars
high percentage of children with disabilities placed in segregated schools
restrictive zoning limited reintegration of institutionalized people into community
inaccessible voting system
inaccessible public transportation made person with disability late for work; inaccessible library and other public buildings
State refused to fund services for people with mental illness
state transit system provided special vouchers for persons with physical disabilities, but not for mentally ill
state criminal justice system failed to provide psychiatric treatment
State kept child with schizophrenia in Delaware State Hospital because it lacked services for people who could be released
state labor departments restrictive policies prevented persons with disabilities from applying for employment
public transportation refused to transport person carrying oxygen
staff and patients at Delaware State Hospital sexually abused women patients 00343
state police interrogated deaf citizens without providing interpretive services
vocational high school sought to transfer student back to special segregated school
public colleges failed to provide assistance for students with learning disabilities
University of Georgia students with disabilities faced architectural barriers, inaccessible public transportation, lack of housing, and failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
inaccessible classrooms at University of Georgia
University of Georgia located its office of handicapped services in inaccessible second floor office
University of Georgia charged students with learning disabilities $600 per quarter for services that other students with disabilities received at no cost
Learning Disability Adult Clinic at University of Georgia charged unreasonable fees
traffic court failed to provide interpretive services for deaf person
state university failed to enforce handicapped parking laws
state employee in wheelchair forced to resign job because frequently unable to get to office due to broken elevator in state building; State Commission on the Handicapped refused employees request for reasonable accommodation
state university failed to provide blind student with timely or adequate books on tape for coursework; lack of signs or information for blind people using public transit
person with disability denied opportunity to testify because department of labor held hearing in an inaccessible room
state employment agency refused to provide interpretive services for deaf people
public school put three-year-old deaf child in same class as fourth graders
quadriplegic person who had California drivers license denied license by Hawaii
state government office refused to interview persons with emotional disorder or history of alcoholism
inaccessible state buildings
person with mobility impairment denied serious consideration for state job due to unreliability of accessible public transportation
inaccessible public transportation prevented person with disability from getting to work; inaccessible public buildings
elevators in public buildings not marked for blind people; bus drivers failed to announce stops for blind people
inaccessible public transportation; bus drivers harassed mentally retarded passengers
state mental health system had restrictive institutional policies
state social service employees placed limits on opportunities for persons with disabilities based on stereotypical assumptions
lack of curb cuts and ramps
inaccessible public transportation 00476
inaccessible public library
denial of certain licenses to persons with mental disabilities
inaccessible restroom in state park; lack of curb cuts
state and local government meetings failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people
students with disabilities unable to participate in school interscholastic sports
blind people prevented from traveling outside State because quarantine laws permitted no exemption for their guide dogs 00487
state mental health services unavailable for deaf people due to failure to train staff
inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible city and county buildings
handi-van refused service to person paralyzed from waist down
state agencies failed to monitor conditions in community residential facilities for persons with disabilities
inadequate assistance for deaf person at court appearance
adult victims of abuse with developmental disabilities denied equal rights to testify in court
inaccessible public recreation activities 00508
city and county failed to provide assistance for deaf people at public meetings
public school failed to provide adequate assistance for students with disabilities 00516
public defenders offices and public meetings failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people; police harassed persons with disabilities who appeared to be intoxicated
vocational rehabilitation agency lacked TTY service 00521
government agencies lacked staff to assist people with head injuries
inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible public buildings
limited access at new county courthouse, library, and city hall
school district refused to hire licensed teacher because of speech impediment
public school failed to provide assistance for deaf student 00537
public school failed to provide interpretive services for deaf student
Idaho lacked statewide telephone relay service for deaf people 00541
department of employment and department of health and welfare lacked telephone access for deaf people
inaccessible restrooms at public high school; student in wheelchair denied admission to regular classes
state system for providing ballots to people unable to enter polling place and special bus service caused long wait outside in cold weather
schools that mainstream deaf children refused to hire deaf teacher
government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people at public hearing on school budget
department of rehabilitation limited services to persons with disabilities by threatening placement in nursing home
police stations lacked TTY service 00572
deaf people arrested and held in jail overnight without explanation because of failure to provide interpretive services
inaccessible polling place
inaccessible public schools prevented attendance at PTA meetings
lack of curb cuts and ramps for wheelchairs
most state housing agencies lacked telecommunications devices or interpretive services for deaf people
state and local government agencies lacked telecommunications devices for deaf people
emergency medical, police, and fire services lacked TDDs or personnel trained to receive TDD calls
inaccessible public pools; inaccessible restrooms in municipal building
inaccessible library
lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public buildings; inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible polling place
state vocational rehabilitation agency refused to help person
it classified as severely disabled
for five years, state vocational rehabilitation agency failed to provide assistance
inadequate curb cuts
inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible public facilities
government agencies failed to provide interpretive services and TTY/TDDs for deaf people
deaf counselors discouraged from applying for jobs as rehabilitation counselors for deaf people
staff at state psychiatric facilities abused and physically dragged patients
person with disability dismissed as director of deaf unit at Central State Hospital
public meetings held at inaccessible locations
state counselors failed to provide rehabilitation assistance to person with head injury
person dismissed as city bus operator after seeking treatment for mental illness
state commission failed to supply necessary equipment for deaf and blind employee
high school limited opportunities for mentally retarded student to be integrated KANSAS
Kansas Commission of Civil Rights denied legally blind person job as investigator because of limited ability to drive and refused to allow accommodation that would have permitted use of public transportation
police failed to provide interpretive services after arresting deaf man
Kansas Department of Transportation fired person because she had epilepsy
state investigator failed to examine employment discrimination claims
county failed to assist mentally ill with housing and vocational opportunities
damaged sidewalks and poor street lighting posed risk to persons with disabilities
inaccessible city-owned arena
bus driver bypassed person standing at stop with guide dog
department of employment services failed to make reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities
state employment service refused to place person in wheelchair
public library, police department, and state university library lacked personnel trained to use TTY devices
state university failed to provide assistance to parttime teacher with a disability
State prevented deaf teachers from teaching deaf students by requiring courses such as music education
Kentucky School for the Deaf preferred hiring hearing teachers rather than deaf teachers
inaccessible housing for graduate students at Louisiana State University
police assumed person with coordination problems was drunk
vocational rehabilitation program failed to provide services for person with head injury
inaccessible public transportation prevented persons with disabilities from getting to work
inaccessible voting machine
Louisiana Sheriffs Pension and Relief Fund denied membership to person with disability
inaccessible buildings at Louisiana State University
inadequate sidewalk ramps; failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
failure to enforce state regulations requiring accessibility in public buildings
town refused request for interpretive services for deaf people at town meeting
public transportation unsafe for persons with disabilities
public libraries, state prison and other state offices lacked TDDs
department of human relations failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people and did not answer TTY calls
vocational rehabilitation counselors failed to help deaf people find jobs
state hospital refused to provide interpretive services for deaf people
Office for Children refused to license blind person as day care assistant
inaccessible restrooms in state building and state armory
state college threatened to terminate employee because of blindness
Massachusetts Adoption Exchange refused to let family with mother who had muscular dystrophy adopt child 00835
department of vocational rehabilitation hired able-bodied person instead of qualified person in wheelchair
person denied admission to University of Michigan Medical School because of speech impediment
inaccessible state university campuses 00922
65 percent of voting precincts in Detroit inaccessible
buses with lifts often failed to stop for people in wheelchairs or their lifts did not work
state employee threatened with discipline for serving on and attending meetings of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission advisory committee
state university stadium lacked accessible restrooms, water fountains, and telephones
school system failed to hire teachers who could communicate with deaf students
state university denied interpretive services to part-time deaf student
public transportation refused to serve persons in wheelchairs; public agency refused to provide interpretive services for deaf people
state university had transportation system for students with disabilities but not for faculty and staff
state university lacked adequate curb ramps
state denied drivers license to person with epilepsy
inaccessible public recreation facilities
inaccessible government buildings
state university denied sabbatical proposal of faculty member with disability
Michigan Rehabilitation Services placed people in inappropriate positions
Michigan Rehabilitation Services failed to accommodate mentally ill persons
man with disability forced to use girls restroom at state job
person with disability terminated from county job and banned from future county employment
person with disability and score of 100 was finalist for job as director of agency for the blind, but able-bodied person with score of 70 was hired
person with cerebral palsy humiliated at interview for job with state department of education
inaccessible beaches, pools, and parks
inaccessible classrooms and library at Mississippi School for the Deaf 00985
no state agency to provide or coordinate community service programs for deaf adults
inaccessible classrooms at Mississippi School for the Deaf
public programs failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people; government failed to post caution signs warning drivers of deaf children
inaccessible polling places and voting booths
courts refused to pay for qualified interpretive services for deaf people
inaccessible state university building 00993
teacher denied position at public elementary school because of need for braces and a cane to walk
lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public school rooms; inaccessible public transportation
inaccessible department of motor vehicles
inaccessible courthouses
state university instructor refused to teach blind person
inaccessible polling place; city employee required to go outside to get to restroom
inaccessible restrooms in public buildings; lack of curb cuts
public schools segregated children with disabilities; inaccessible school buildings
inaccessible public transportation and public buildings such as post offices, libraries, schools, and polling places
state university tried to discourage blind persons chosen field of study 01013
courthouse failed to provide amplified sound system in courtrooms
inadequate curb cuts in downtown area
state agencies refused to make reasonable accommodations to paraplegics seeking employment
person in wheelchair forced to vote in street
government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people serving on juries, commissions, and committees
local school district failed to provide interpretive services for deaf child
inaccessible entrance at office of county assistance
local government failed to provide assistance for people with head injuries
inaccessible government buildings and public facilities
person with disability denied access to public transportation because it took too long to get on and off bus
community college refused to provide interpretive services for deaf people
city ordinance prevented mentally ill from living in residential areas
inaccessible public transportation; inadequate curb cuts and ramps
failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
lack of sidewalk and crosswalk accommodations for persons in
state agency failed to assist persons with head injuries despite availability of state surplus funds
vocational rehabilitation counselor tried to cut off funds and assistance to person with disability
commission for the blind and visually impaired demoted visually impaired person
zoning commission denied permission to open home for persons with head injuries
architectural barriers on Cumberland County College campus
state university denied entry into school of social work to blind person but admitted partially sighted person with lower grades
New Mexico lacked statewide TDD relay service
prisoners with developmental disabilities subjected to longer terms and abused by other prisoners in state correctional system
University of New Mexico failed to provide assistance for blind student
city and county government offices lacked TDDs
University of New Mexico hospital failed to provide interpretive services for deaf patients
University of New Mexico failed to provide interpretive services for deaf students
inaccessible buildings on University of New Mexico campus
state agencies failed to hire persons with disabilities
custodian in public high school denied request of person with disability to use locked elevator
at state legislature, person in wheelchair had to wait 45 minutes to use freight elevator
public village meetings held in second floor meeting room with no elevator; many polling places inaccessible
lack of curb cuts; failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
inaccessible state parks and public beaches
public elementary school initially denied admission and then charged extra fee for child with Downs Syndrome to attend afterschool day care program
blind people told not to participate in regular public parks and recreation programs
state agencies, other than services for the blind and vocational rehabilitation, employed few persons with disabilities
police arrested and jailed deaf person without providing interpretive services
person with disability denied access to drivers license exam because held in inaccessible room
lack of curb cuts; failure to enforce handicapped parking laws; inaccessible polling places; inaccessible city government meetings
inaccessible polling places; inaccessible state and local government buildings
government agencies failed to enforce policies regarding hiring persons with disabilities; inaccessible polling places; inaccessible public buildings
state and local government failed to hire persons with disabilities; inaccessible polling places
person with head-injury disability denied consideration for position of election polls inspector
city failed to trim trees regularly, which posed a hazard to blind people
inaccessible state, county, and city buildings
inaccessible social service agency offices; inaccessible public transportation
vocational rehabilitation agency denied assistance to person with disability
rehabilitation services agency failed to assist paranoid schizophrenic
vocational rehabilitation agency discouraged person with disability from being a nurse
persons with disabilities denied jobs because of inaccessible public transportation
blind person denied drivers license though legally eligible
public paratransit system often left passengers stranded
vocational rehabilitation agency steered person with mental disability to menial job, despite his Ph. D. degree
police failed to provide interpretive services for deaf person who was arrested
Cleveland State University lacked wheelchair ramps
Tulsa Housing Authority failed to communicate with and provide information to tenants with disabilities
state employment office lacked TDD or workers with interpretive skills; state university paid deaf employees less than hearing employees; state agencies made no effort to hire deaf applicants
police officer pointed gun at person with disability who could not get out of car quickly
person with speech impediment denied numerous state jobs
inaccessible restrooms at city parks
state government held meeting at hotel with inaccessible restrooms
person in wheelchair worked at polling place with inaccessible restrooms
qualified blind person who offered to provide own driver denied job as state social worker
blind people unable to access printed material from state government
school system barred child with cerebral palsy from physical education class and gave her cleaning job instead
person with two college degrees and extensive professional experience turned down for appro-
priate state government jobs and advised to seek entry-level jobs because of his disability
commission for the handicapped lacked funds to enforce laws
public library had restrictive policy regarding issuance of library cards to residents of group homes
government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people at school budget hearing
inaccessible automatic ticket dispensers on Pennsylvania Turnpike
bus drivers refused to transport person in wheelchair
inaccessible county offices
GED programs offered at inaccessible public schools; bus drivers unwilling or unable to use wheelchair lifts
child unable to enroll in first grade because of inaccessible classroom
lack of curb cuts in rural areas
unsafe curb cuts
inaccessible state office building
government failed to provide 911 emergency service for deaf people
state and local agencies, library, and police and fire departments lacked TDDs; government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people at meetings
school district failed to provide adequate services to child with disability
traffic light and fire hydrant placed where they posed obstacle to blind pedestrians and those in wheelchairs who needed to use curb cuts
State failed to hire persons with disabilities without giving a reason
criminal court failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people
state university denied blind student opportunity to practice teach as required for teaching certificate
poles obstructed sidewalks; lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation
state teachers exam required deaf teachers who wanted to teach deaf children to pass section on speech assessment and listening
medical examination required for renewal of drivers license despite unblemished 20-year driving record
inadequate handicapped parking spaces
state vocational rehabilitation agency refused to assist college student who chose to major in political science
employee of county human services agency denied handicapped parking place
inaccessible state university transportation system
denial of drivers licenses or accommodations to take drivers test
inaccessible buildings at state university
state hospital sought to discharge mentally ill boy with HIV
special transit system refused to transport man with mental retardation though he could not use regular bus
deaf man not permitted to take state cosmetology exam with assistance from interpreter
blind man not permitted to take state chiropractic exam because he could not read x-rays alone
deaf instructors unable to pass state teachers exam for teachers of deaf students that assessed speech and language skills
inadequate handicapped parking and enforcement
state rehabilitation service had never hired deaf counselor or administrator
child denied admission to public school because first-grade teacher refused to teach him
public school failed to implement state review panel findings regarding accommodation for child with disability
state office for persons with disabilities failed to hire such persons; inaccessible public transportation
state government denied persons with disabilities upper level management jobs
rehabilitation services agency discriminated against employee with reading disability
qualified blind teacher denied job and told that school needed teacher who could also coach football, but school hired sighted person who was
inaccessible government office
public school teacher refused to give child with learning disability his grades and said he did not belong in public school
Utah denied mainstream education to child with Downs Syndrome, though child had been mainstreamed in another State
person with disability involuntarily hospitalized and abused by state university hospital
inaccessible public high school facilities
zoning board denied use permit for community mental health center
student with learning disability misclassified as mentally retarded and deemed ineligible to take drama class at public school
inaccessible buildings at state school for blind and deaf youth
inaccessible restrooms in government buildings; failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
state programs for persons with disabilities failed to communicate with deaf people
lack of state institutional care to rehabilitate people with head injuries
inaccessible traffic court 01664
inaccessible public transportation prevented persons with disabilities from voting
state and local government failed to provide interpretive services for deaf people at meetings
lack of curb cuts outside county courthouse
deaf people denied access to 911 emergency services
lack of curb cuts and ramp for access to courthouse
inaccessible courthouse and library
inaccessible high school
lack of curb cuts at citys main intersection
person in wheelchair received ticket for obstructing street traffic even though sidewalks not accessible
inaccessible transportation on state university campus
deaf people required to pay for interpretive services in court
state governments lack of TDD deterred deaf people from applying for employment
government office lacked TDD and interpretive services for deaf people
state human rights commission lacked staff to pursue case of discrimination against blind person
community college failed to provide interpretive services for deaf students or to assist students with disabilities in other ways
local sheriff s department discontinued TDD 01717
inaccessible restroom at state ferry terminal
sheriff denied person with disability use of elevator in courthouse
law enforcement agencies lacked ability to communicate with deaf people
public school recreation program refused to provide interpretive services for deaf child
state university hospital and sheriff s office failed to provide TDDs or trained personnel
person with disabilities denied admission to graduate study at state university
state offices lacked TDDs and failed to provide material in braille or on tape
department of motor vehicles revoked person with diabetes drivers license despite doctors report
inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts or ramps
department of motor vehicles tried to revoke license of person who used hand controls in car
blind and deaf people denied equal access to jury service
State lacked telephone relay system for deaf people
department of motor vehicles denied drivers license to person with epilepsy
zoning board denied permit for group home for persons with disabilities
person in wheelchair denied marriage license because courthouse was inaccessible