Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19510221_0040131.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-10 03:23:37
Document Index: 601478395

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 901', '§ 933', '§ 933', '§ 933', '§ 933', '§ 933', '§ 933']

| Baccile v. Halcyon Lines
Baccile v. Halcyon Lines
Both Halcyon and Haenn appeal: Haenn, in No. 10,213, because of the judgment against it, and Halcyon, in No. 10,219, because of the action of the District Judge in altering the jury verdict. The substance of Halcyon's contentions is that the admiralty law recognizes comparative contribution and the trial judge was without warrant upon the record to alter the verdict. The substance of Haenn's contentions is, first, that it was not guilty of negligence, but if it were, the only negligence lay in its failure to inspect, for which it would be entitled to indemnity fron Halcyon, in any event, since Halcyon owed the primary duty to furnish a safe place to work; and second, that its exclusive liability is to pay compensation to its injured employee under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901, et seq., pursuant to which it had secured the payment of compensation to its employees Haenn also asserts error in the court below in the admission of certain evidence relating to the performance of its work.
We reach, then, the significant question whether, as between the mutual wrongdoers Halcyon and Haenn, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is in any degree a defense to Halcyon's claim for contribution. Upon principles of the controlling maritime law,*fn1 our answer is that Haenn has a liability over to Halcyon limited, however, by the amount of compensation payable to Baccile had he elected, as was his right,*fn2 to receive compensation under the Act.
In so deciding we are cognizant that contribution between tortfeasors is generally predicated upon a common liability, which in this situation has been held not to exist. American Mutual Liability Co. v. Matthews, 2 Cir.1950, 182 F.2d 322. As Professor Prosser points out,*fn3 the term "joint tortfeasors" is the subject of much confusion; and where contribution, which could be had at common law only in particular situations, is allowed, liability in solido is accounted for by the difficulty of assessing the actual damages attributable to the respective tortfeasors. In a strict sense it may be said that no common liability exists here because Haenn was responsible to Baccile for compensation regardless of its fault, but not in a greater amount than provided in the statutory schedule. Notwithstanding, literal adherence to concepts derived from the common law would not seem appropriate in a system of jurisprudence that has developed rules according to its own sense of right,*fn4 even contrary to those of the common law. The admiralty law early recognized that contributory negligence was not necessarily a bar to recovery,*fn5 and it devised the "moiety rule" to satisfy a singular desire "for a better distribution of justice between mutual wrongdoers."*fn6 And where comparative negligence is said to be "not unknown",*fn7 the requirement of common liability cannot be deeply ingrained, for the equity of the one is inconsistent with the concept of liability in solido attaching to the other. While Haenn was responsible to Baccile regardless of its fault, Haenn's negligence in fact brought to fruition his right to compensation. In a pragmatic sense, therefore, Haenn and Halcyon were, to use the preferable admiralty law description, "mutual wrongdoers".
As between the employer and a stranger contributing to the injury of an employee, the Act unquestionably falls short of cover. It provides, as we have already noted, that the employee may sue a third party in lieu of taking compensation from his employer. But if the employee fails in such action to recover as much as the statutory compensation, the employer must stand for the shortage. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(f). Where the employee accepts compensation under an award, the employer automatically becomes the assignee of the employee's right against the third party. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(b). And if the employer succeeds in recovering more than he has paid as compensation, such excess less costs of enforcement belongs to the employee. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(e). Only incidentally to the rights of employee and employer, inter se, are we made aware of the employer's independent right to repay to himself out of his recovery as assignee the compensation already paid to his employee. But this is in accordance with accepted principles,*fn8 to the extent that the employer's own fault is not involved.
Manifestly the concern of the Act is the employer-employee relationship. Its objective is social in character and its method of effectuating the social policy is to force upon industry a real cost of its productive operations. The Act, nevertheless, does not say that employers shall be free of liability when they are at fault. Rather, it fixes the quantum of liability as an equitable adjustment for imposing responsibility where none was recognized previously; hence, the fault of the employer, vis-a-vis his employee, is irrelevant in this limited sphere.
The Act strongly indicates, therefore, that the legal relations between the employer and the third party who injures his employee are not completely remodeled. And while it is not now a question here, we should hardly conclude that § 933, 33 U.S.C.A., creates in the negligent employer a right to fully recover from the negligent third party compensation already paid by the employer to his employee. Otherwise the burden of the injured employee would weigh inevitably and exclusively upon the third party, whose misfortune it is to hurt one within the Act.*fn9 It is not merely too much a matter of chance; it is apparently inconsistent with the policy of the Act, which is to fix the employer's liability, not to provide him with a convenient escape from responsibility. In the situation here, were all recovery denied to one in the position of Halcyon, it should be said not only that the entire burden may fall upon him because of the employee's elective rights, but also that it would undoubtedly fall upon him, for it is too much to expect of human nature that the employer should not attempt to influence his employee in the exercise of his election; and failing that, the employer could assure himself of the recovery of paid compensation through 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(e) by forcing an award under 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(b), which, as noted, operates as an assignment of the employee's right of action.*fn10 This would be true unless, of course, it should be determined that the employee may have both damages and compensation, a result not indicated by the Act.
Nevertheless, the device of the Act must be frustrated if the negligent employer is subject to full contribution. For then the third party is merely the conduit between employer and employee for the transfer of damages in excess of compensation. The solution which we adopt here at once preserves inviolate the forward-looking objectives of the Act, and consistent with those objectives retains a substantial measure of equity in the legal relations between the employer and the third party. Since the statute intends to render the employer liable even without fault, we can find no reason why the employer should not, where he is a cause of harm and therefore without right of full recourse, be required to admit of contribution to the extent of the compensation he would have had to pay to the employee, had the employee not elected to sue the third party. Nor do we think it an insurerable obstacle that the result we reach does not satisfy the historical notions of the relation between tortfeasors. The Act has intervened in their affairs, and in so responsive a system as the admiralty, we have no difficulty in reaching the equitable solution to a problem not previously contemplated by judicial expressions.