Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-barton-3
Timestamp: 2020-07-11 13:41:51
Document Index: 83019956

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 10', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 1', '§ 2113', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553']

U.S. v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649 | Casetext Search + Citator
U.S. v. Waseta
532 U.S. at 460, 121 S.Ct. 1693. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, "Ex post facto concerns require a slightly…
c. Blakely made clear that the statutory maximum as it existed at the time of the commission of the offense…
Full title:UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Douglas Alan BARTON…
455 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2006)
holding that Booker did not change the burden of proof for enhancements
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Burley
Before: KENNEDY and COLE, Circuit Judges; VARLAN, District Judge.
The Honorable Thomas A. Varlan, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
Douglas Alan Barton ("defendant") appeals his post- Booker sentence. In his appeal, he alleges that Booker was applied in a manner inconsistent with his due process rights. He also argues that the district court imposed a sentence that was not reasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's sentence.
Defendant pled guilty on August 11, 2004, to three counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). A Presentence Investigation Report prepared for defendant's sentencing using the 2004 edition of the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ("Guidelines") calculated defendant's combined adjusted offense level as 24 and assigned him a criminal history category of VI. These scores resulted in a recommended sentencing range of between 100 and 125 months' imprisonment. The sentence was imposed on February 8, 2005, after the United States Supreme Court released its opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
Defendant's sentencing was delayed several times in anticipation of the United States Supreme Court ruling in Booker. In addition, defendant's sentencing was delayed at one point because his counsel did not appear at a hearing.
The district court overruled both of defendant's objections. The district court relied on pre- Booker case law in determining that the phrase "I have a gun" is an implicit threat of death. It then found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had used an implicit threat of death in connection with the bank robberies, and the two-level enhancement was appropriate. It also rejected defendant's general objection to the use of the Guidelines, holding that to consult the Guidelines, it had to accurately calculate the Guidelines range including enhancements, just as it would have done prior to Booker, but that it would then treat the resulting range as an advisory range to be considered in addition to the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The district court also rejected the government's motion for an upward departure under the Guidelines. It recognized that the Guidelines give judges flexibility to treat certain defendants as de facto career criminals but asserted that "the technical aspects of the guidelines, as part of the lawyer's art, often times serve . . . important purpose[s] by making valid legal distinctions which should have or ought to have some effect. In this case, the distinctions count for more than naught." The district court noted that the Guidelines do attempt to account for the fact that, in general, when a defendant goes on a spree, that defendant is less dangerous than a defendant that commits three separate crimes. The six bank robberies included more than one in the same day and were closely related in time. The court ruled that defendant's criminal history was accurately reflected by the Guidelines criminal history score, and an upward departure on that ground was inappropriate in this case.
When sentencing the defendant, the court listed the factors that it was required to consult under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court noted that defendant had robbed nine banks but that his history suggested "defendant has had profound difficulties adjusting to societal legal expectations caused in no small measure by his mental health problems." It also described the level of threats used in the bank robberies as mild compared to other armed robbery crimes but expressed that it did not believe "that anybody['s statement to] a bank teller . . . I have a gun I want money can be considered a mild threat." By way of comparison, the court considered a previous bank robbery where, although the perpetrator had not intended to harm the teller, the robber had used a gun, mistakenly fired it, killing the teller, and subsequently received a life sentence. It noted that defendant's crimes were committed as a spree but that, in the court's estimate, defendant was a dangerous person. The district court also focused on the need to rehabilitate defendant and get him the psychiatric and substance abuse treatment that he needed, but it also indicated that selecting an appropriate amount of time to achieve all of those aims was difficult. The district court sentenced defendant to 168 months, three years of supervised release, a $300 special assessment, and restitution to the financial institutions. Additionally, in light of defendant's history of severe depression and substance abuse, the court expressed its intention to strongly recommend that defendant be incarcerated at Butner Federal Correctional Institution, per defendant's request, or at another medical prison facility that could help him with both of those issues.
Defendant pled guilty after the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). He was sentenced after the Supreme Court decided Booker. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that because he pled guilty after Blakely and prior to Booker, the Due Process Clause prohibits "retroactive application of the detrimental aspects of the Booker decision," asserting that the judicial construction in Booker was "unexpected" and "indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue." Rogers, 532 U.S. at 457, 121 S.Ct. 1693. This court reviews constitutional challenges de novo, United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 601 (6th Cir. 2003), however, because this argument was not raised below, Sixth Circuit precedent requires application of the plain error standard. See id. See also United States v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 615, 619-20, 622 (6th Cir. 2000). Since we conclude that no due process violation occurred, and, thus, there was no error, any ambiguity in the appropriate standard of review need not be resolved.
Defendant relies primarily on Rogers to support his arguments. In Rogers, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to judicial decisions through the Due Process Clause prohibited the retroactive application of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision to abolish the common law "year and a day rule" in prosecutions for homicide. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 453, 456-57, 121 S.Ct. 1693 (citing and discussing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964)). The Rogers Court held that "a judicial alteration of a common law doctrine of criminal law violates the principle of fair warning, and hence must not be given retroactive effect, only where it is `unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.'" Id. at 462, 121 S.Ct. 1693 (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697). It determined that the Tennessee Supreme Court's change to the law was not unexpected because the year and a day rule was "widely viewed as an outdated relic of the common law" and that the defendant in that case did not provide any good reason to retain the rule. Id. at 462-63, 121 S.Ct. 1693. The Court discussed the common law and legislative abolition of the rule in other states and described the paucity of case law using the rule in Tennessee as further reasons that retroactive abolition of the rule was neither unexpected nor indefensible. Id. at 463-67, 121 S.Ct. 1693.
In Bouie v. City of Columbia, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Supreme Court of South Carolina's post-arrest construction of its criminal trespass statute violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). The United States Supreme Court found that:
There can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language. As the Court recognized in Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311, 62 S.Ct. 237, 239, 86 L.Ed. 226, "judicial enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness." Even where vague statutes are concerned, it has been pointed out that the vice in such an enactment cannot "be cured in a given case by a construction in that very case placing valid limits on the statute," for "the objection of vagueness is two-fold: inadequate guidance to the individual whose conduct is regulated, and inadequate guidance to the triers of fact. The former objection could not be cured retrospectively by a ruling either of the trial court or the appellate court, though it might be cured for the future by an authoritative judicial gloss. . . ." If this view is valid in the case of a judicial construction which adds a `clarifying gloss' to a vague statute, making it narrower or more definite than its language indicates, it must be a fortiori so where the construction unexpectedly broadens a statute which on its face had been definite and precise. Indeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids.
The Rogers Court explained its rationale for the use of a more stringent standard in the due process context by noting that: "[s]trict application of ex post facto principles in that context would unduly impair the incremental and reasoned development of precedent that is the foundation of the common law system. The common law, in short, presupposes a measure of evolution that is incompatible with stringent application of ex post facto principles." Id. at 461, 121 S.Ct. 1693.
The instant case differs from both Bouie and Rogers in important respects. In both of those cases, the Supreme Court was concerned with the retroactive application of a binding judicial interpretation. In other words, the interpretation of the statute and the common law rule compelled a result that had a negative retroactive effect on the defendants advancing the due process claims. In contrast, the Supreme Court decision in Booker made the Guidelines advisory. Because the Guidelines are advisory post- Booker, they can be described as providing recommended sentences for district court judges. It is difficult to see how those recommendations can raise the same constitutional infirmities as can the binding judicial interpretations at issue in Bouie and Rogers. While it is true that, under Booker, district courts must consult the Guidelines, after they are consulted, the district court may impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range if the other relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) direct the selection of a different sentence. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65, 125 S.Ct. 738. Indeed, post- Booker, while the district court is required to consult the Guidelines, the critical inquiry in determining an appropriate sentence is not the Guidelines range, but a sentence that is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in [Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]." Id. at 268, 125 S.Ct. 738. See United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383-85 (6th Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 553-55 (6th Cir. 2006). Put another way, if, in calculating the Guidelines sentence, the district court enhances a defendant's sentence, that enhancement provides no guarantee that that calculated Guidelines range will have a critical effect on defendant's sentence in view of the fact that the Guidelines are now advisory. Absent such a guarantee, it is difficult to see how the protection against ex post facto laws that a defendant's right to due process provides could be violated. Even before Booker, the district court had some freedom to depart from Guidelines ranges. Finally, the freedom to depart upward is not unfettered post- Booker in view of this court's reasonableness review.
Additional support for our conclusion that defendant's due process rights were not violated comes from the reason why providing notice is important. In Rogers, the Supreme Court noted that " Bouie was rooted firmly in well established notions of due process. Its rationale rested on core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent conduct." Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459, 121 S.Ct. 1693. Thus, when addressing ex post facto-type due process concerns, questions of notice, foreseeability, and fair warning are paramount. Id. Courts are concerned about notice, forseeability, and fair warning because it is expected that both statutes and judicial interpretations of those statutes affect the behavior of the public. Thus, the public must be able to adequately inform itself of a law or a judicial interpretation before acting. Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954) ("The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed."). If, however, the change in question would not have had an effect on anyone's behavior, notice concerns are minimized.
Our prior precedent and the Guidelines themselves cautioned that earlier versions of the Guidelines should be used when an ex post facto problem is present. See United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 351-52 (6th Cir. 1993); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11(b)(1). Such a concern is understandable. In the past, when the Guidelines were mandatory, the Guidelines operated in a manner similar to statutes. Thus, ex post facto concerns, as opposed to the ex post facto-type due process concerns at issue here, were present because a defendant would be guaranteed to receive a higher sentence under the mandatory Guidelines if changes in the Guidelines calculations increased that defendant's offense level or criminal history score.
Ex post facto concerns require a slightly different analysis than do similar due process concerns, first because ex post facto legislation is explicitly banned in the Constitution, but also because when the Supreme Court has discussed the motivation behind the ban on ex post facto legislation, it has identified a separate concern than notice as motivating its jurisprudence, that is, the need to restrict arbitrary or vindictive legislative acts. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) ("The ban [on ex post facto legislation] also restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." (citations omitted)). These twin concerns of notice and the desire to restrict arbitrary and vindictive acts by a legislature cause courts to apply the Ex Post Facto Clause in a more stringent fashion than they do the ex post facto aspect of the Due Process Clause.
Defendant does not argue that he was ignorant of the law under which he was convicted, nor does he argue that the law is vague or otherwise failed to put him on notice as to either the prohibited conduct or the possible penalty he faced. In this case, defendant was fully aware that robbing a bank was illegal and that doing so would expose him to a significant penalty that might increase because of his prior federal convictions for committing the same crime.
The statutory maximum for defendant's crimes is 20 years in prison, a fine, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
Defendant was sentenced to 168 months' imprisonment. For this court to find that notice is a significant concern in this situation, it would have to find that a defendant would likely have changed his or her conduct because of a possible increase in jail time. While it is true that, at the margins, notice considerations might limit the increase in length of sentences, it is difficult to see why a person who was intent on committing a bank robbery and who was presumably prepared to spend a lengthy period of time in prison if he or she was caught would be dissuaded by the prospect of a somewhat longer prison term. Notice concerns are, therefore, limited in this case.
For instance, if a prior version of the Guidelines in effect at the time the crime is committed suggests a sentence of a fine and a later version recommends a period of imprisonment, such a difference might implicate the Due Process Clause.
While all the other circuits agree that the application of advisory Guidelines to defendants who committed crimes prior to Booker does not violate the Due Process Clause in the manner suggested by defendant, we are unable to simply adopt their analyses. Those courts focus on one of two arguments as to why retroactive application of Booker does not violate the Due Process Clause. Some circuits hold that because defendants were on notice as to the statutory maximums, that notice is sufficient to comport with the Due Process Clause. United States v. Pennavaria, 445 F.3d 720, 723-24 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 524-25 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jamison, 416 F.3d 538, 539 (7th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Austin, 432 F.3d 598, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2005). Cf. United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 110-12 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that statutory maximums provided enough guidance such that a defendant would not be surprised as is required by Rogers); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that statutory maximums provided sufficient guidance such that a defendant cannot claim that the application of Booker would violate the Supreme Court's test in Rogers). Were we to hold that statutory maximums are sufficient to cure any notice issue under the Due Process Clause, the same logic would have applied with equal force to changes in the Guidelines prior to Booker. Yet, this court's precedent held to the contrary, and the Guidelines themselves cautioned about violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d at 351-52; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11(b)(1). See also supra note 4.
Certain of our post- Booker cases have identified ex post facto or due process concerns as being ever-present, but those cases simply restate the prior pre- Booker rule and do not address the question of how Booker affects the ex post facto and due process analyses under Rogers and Bouie in any detail. United States v. Harmon, 409 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2005) ("When use of that edition would violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, however (i.e., when it would produce a higher sentence range than the version in effect when the crime was committed), the earlier edition is to be used." (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11(b))); United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 348-50 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding an ex post facto problem and finding that said problem meets the plain error test). Both of these cases addressed sentences that the district court gave under the mandatory Guidelines prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Booker. As such, though this court's decisions in both cases were released after Booker, this court was reviewing the district courts' errors in the posture of a court reviewing sentences given under the mandatory Guidelines. In addition, the limited analysis of the question and the citation to pre- Booker precedent in both of these cases indicate that the ex post facto-type due process arguments raised by both defendants were the same type of errors raised by other defendants when the Guidelines were mandatory. In short, they were not the same type of due process argument raised by defendant here today. As such, because these cases addressed different types of due process concerns than the ones defendant raises here, their precedent is not binding on this issue.
Other circuits have also held that the Supreme Court's direction that Booker should apply to all cases on review means that no due process issue exists, as the Supreme Court would not have ordered the lower courts to engage in unconstitutional conduct. Pennavaria, 445 F.3d at 723-24; United States v. Wade, 435 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 2006); Austin, 432 F.3d at 599-600; Vaughn, 430 F.3d at 524-25; United States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2005); Jamison, 416 F.3d at 539; Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1304. This argument is also fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. Due process concerns of the type raised here were not on appeal in Booker. Thus, the Supreme Court may not have considered the due process implications of its holding. If the Supreme Court did not consider ex post facto-type due process violations resulting from its decision in its directive to apply Booker to all cases on review, its decision can not be read as necessarily foreclosing arguments such as those advanced by defendant here.
The First Circuit also discussed the possibility that "a sentence . . . imposed for a pre- Booker crime that is higher than any that might realistically have been imagined at the time of the crime or based on factors previously discouraged, prohibited, or not recognized under the guidelines" might raise due process concerns. See Lata, 415 F.3d at 112. The court also noted that reasonableness review may well catch any such sentences that are truly out of the norm. Id. Though the problem that the First Circuit identifies is, as it concluded, unlikely to occur, its caveat is a reasonable one. Thus, while we join every other circuit in holding that Booker does not violate ex post facto-type due process rights of defendants, we come to that conclusion for the reasons stated herein. Defendant's ex post facto and due process arguments lack merit.
Defendant argues that the district court should have only applied enhancements if the government proved those enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than merely by a preponderance of the evidence. Prior to Booker, district courts used the preponderance of the evidence standard when applying enhancements. United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 491 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The burden is on the government to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a particular sentencing enhancement applies."). After Booker, this court has held that:
Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding. Instead, the remedial majority gave district courts the option, after calculating the Guideline range, to sentence a defendant outside the resulting Guideline range. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764, 769; U.S. v. Williams, 411 F.3d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2005). District courts, in cases such as these, must, therefore, calculate the Guideline range as they would have done prior to Booker, but then sentence defendants by taking into account all of the relevant factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553, as well as the Guidelines range.
United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that "a finding under the Guidelines must be based on reliable information and a preponderance of the evidence").
In assessing a sentence's reasonableness, this court has focused on the district court's obligation to consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in arriving at an appropriate sentence. See Webb, 403 F.3d at 383-85; Williams, 436 F.3d at 708. These tests have been described as the procedural requirements of reasonableness review. See United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 735-741 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring). A district court "need not recite these [§ 3553(a)] factors but must articulate its reasoning in deciding to impose a sentence in order to allow for reasonable appellate review." United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2005). Cf. United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 2006) (" Williams does not mean that a Guidelines sentence will be found reasonable in the absence of evidence in the record that the district court considered all of the relevant section 3553(a) factors."). This court does not require "explicit reference to the § 3553(a) factors in the imposition of identical alternative sentences." United States v. Till, 434 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2006).
Nevertheless, I agree that the law provided the defendant sufficiently fair warning to satisfy the Due Process Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001). Like the majority, I prefer to rest this conclusion on more than the mere fact that the defendant had fair warning of the statutory maximum for his crime. At the time the defendant committed the conduct in question, he had notice not only of the elements of the crime, and of the seriousness with which the crime was viewed as reflected by the statutory maximum, but also of the factors that would aggravate or mitigate the severity of the offense. The district court sentenced the defendant under the same Guidelines that were in effect before Booker and weighed the same factors. The defendant was therefore on notice not only that the law attached consequences to bank robbery, but also that the law attached additional consequences to, in this case, making a threat of death while performing that bank robbery, or committing that bank robbery after having committed other offenses. In my mind, the fact that the defendant had notice of these factors is more compelling than the fact that he had notice of the statutory maximum for his offense, since Rogers instructs us that one of our primary concerns should be with "attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent conduct." See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459, 121 S.Ct. 1693. I see no explicit conflict, however, between our Ex Post Facto Clause precedent such as United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 351-52 (6th Cir. 1993), and our sister circuits' resolution of the Booker retroactivity issue under the Due Process Clause, since, as the majority points out, the Supreme Court has set forth different analyses for these two spheres of jurisprudence.
upholding as reasonable a sentence 43 months above the Guidelines maximum
affirming an upward variance of 43 months
discussing Lata and noting that "the problem that the First Circuit identifies is, as it concluded, unlikely to occur, [but] its caveat is a reasonable one"
noting that "prior to Booker, upward departures could be granted for a multitude of conduct"
leaving open the same argument
In Barton, 455 F.3d at 659-60, we affirmed a variance based on the district court's reasoning that the defendant was an exceptionally "dangerous person" who "needs to be removed from society."
interpreting Rogers and stating that "when addressing ex post facto-type due process concerns, questions of notice, foreseeability, and fair warning are paramount"
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In Barton, 455 F.3d 649, the Court began by construing Bouie in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Rogers v. Tennessee. From these two Supreme Court decisions, the Court held that "when addressing ex post facto-due process concerns, questions of notice, foreseeability, and fair warning are paramount."
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interpreting Rogers
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In Barton, the Sixth Circuit found that because Blakely had been decided prior to the defendant Barton's conviction, it "would not have been a leap in logic to expect the Supreme Court to apply Blakely" to the federal sentencing guidelines in some manner and, therefore, due process was not violated.
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In United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 655 n. 4 (6th Cir. 2006), the court noted that "[n]ow that the Guidelines are advisory, the Guidelines calculation provides no such guarantee of an increased sentence, which means that the Guidelines are no longer akin to statutes in their authoritativeness.
noting that a majority of federal circuits addressing the issue have held that unchanging statutory maximums preclude any ex post facto notice issue
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compiling cases which determined Booker should apply retroactively because notice as to statutory maximums was sufficient to comport with due process
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explaining that the Court was "join[ing] every other circuit in holding that [retroactively applying] Booker does not violate ex post facto-type due process rights of defendants"
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