Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105406/rice-vs-rehner
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1360', '§ 1162', '§ 1162', '§ 23384', 'Art. 20', '§ 1', '§ 7', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1360', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 1360', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 140', '§ 140', '§ 140', '§ 140', '§ 261', '§ 262', '§ 1161', '§ 21', '§ 1154', '§ 1161', '§ 4', '§ 1360', '§ 118', '§ 1857', '§ 313', '§ 1323', '§ 1161', '§ 1161', '§ 23954', '§ 23053', '§ 23320', '§ 23817', '§ 24070', '§ 13', '§ 1153', '§ 564', '§ 726', '§ 757', '§ 1161']

Rice Vs Rehner - Citation 105406 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Rice Vs. Rehner - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/105406CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJul-01-1983Case Number463 U.S. 713AppellantRiceRespondentRehnerExcerpt:
respondent is a federally licensed indian trader who operates a general store on an indian reservation in california. when she was refused an exemption from california's law requiring a state license in order to sell liquor for off-premises consumption, respondent filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that she did not need a state license. the district court dismissed the suit, holding that respondent was required to have a state license..... Judgment:
California may properly require respondent to obtain a state license in order to sell liquor for off-premises consumption. Pp.
463 U. S. 718
(a) There is no tradition of tribal sovereign immunity or inherent self-government in favor of liquor regulation by Indians. Although, in Indian matters, Congress usually acts "upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation,"
, that assumption is unwarranted in the narrow context of liquor regulation. In addition to the congressional divestment of tribal self-government in this area, the States have also been permitted, and even required, to impose liquor regulations. The tradition of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country is justified by the relevant state interests. Here, respondent's distribution of liquor has a significant impact beyond the limits of the reservation, and the State, independent of the Twenty-first Amendment, has an interest in the liquor traffic within its borders. Pp.
463 U. S. 720
that Congress intended state laws would apply of their own force to govern tribal liquor transactions as long as the tribe itself approved these transactions by enacting an ordinance. Congress contemplated that its absolute, but not exclusive, power to regulate Indian liquor transactions would be delegated to the tribes themselves, and to the States, which historically shared concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government. Because of the lack of tradition of tribal self-government in the area of liquor regulation, it is not necessary that Congress indicate expressly that the State has jurisdiction to license and distribute liquor. This Court will not apply the canon of construction that state laws generally are not applicable to Indians on a reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that state laws shall apply when application would be tantamount to a formalistic disregard of congressional intent. Thus, application of the state licensing scheme here does not impair a right granted or reserved by federal law, but, on the contrary, is specifically authorized by Congress, and does not interfere with federal policies concerning the reservation. Pp.
463 U. S. 725
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
463 U. S. 735
The question presented by this case is whether the State of California may require a federally licensed Indian trader, who operates a general store on an Indian reservation, to obtain a state liquor license in order to sell liquor for off-premises consumption. Because we find that Congress has delegated authority to the States as well as to the Indian tribes to regulate the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country, [
] we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The respondent Rehner is a federally licensed Indian trader [
] who operates a general store on the Pala Reservation in San Diego, Cal. The Pala Tribe had adopted a tribal ordinance
permitting the sale of liquor on the reservation providing that the sales conformed to state law, and this ordinance was approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
25 Fed.Reg. 3343 (1960). Rehner then sought from the State an exemption from its law requiring a state license for retail sale of distilled spirits for off-premises consumption. [
] When she was refused an exemption, Rehner filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that she did not need a license from the State, and an order directing that liquor wholesalers could sell to her. The District Court granted the State's motion to dismiss, ruling that Rehner was required to have a state license under 18 U.S.C. § 1161, which provides that liquor transactions in Indian country are not subject to prohibition under federal law provided those transactions are
"in conformity both with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country. . . . [
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that § 1161 did not confer jurisdiction on the States to require liquor licenses. The court held that "18 U.S.C. § 1161 preempts state licensing and distribution jurisdiction over tribal liquor sales in Indian country." 678 F.2d 1340, 1351 (1982). [
at 1343. The court reasoned that the liquor transactions at issue were governed exclusively by federal law, and that, if Congress wished to remove "its veil of preemption," it needed to do so by an express statement that the State had jurisdiction to impose its licensing requirement.
Second, the court held that "section 1161 has preemptive effect" because Congress provided for tribal ordinances that were to be certified by the Secretary of the Interior and published in the Federal Register.
at 1348-1349, 1349, n. 18. In this way, "the regulatory authority of the tribes . . . was safeguarded by federal supervision."
The decisions of this Court concerning the principles to be applied in determining whether state regulation of activities in Indian country is preempted have not been static. In
(1832), Chief Justice Marshall wrote that an Indian reservation
369 U. S. 74
Although "[f]ederal treaties and statutes have been consistently construed to reserve the right of self-government to the tribes," F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 273 (1982 ed.) (hereafter Cohen), our recent cases have established a "trend . . . away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemption."
(1973) (footnote omitted). The goal of any preemption inquiry is "to determine the congressional plan,"
350 U. S. 504
(1956), but tribal sovereignty may not be ignored and we do not necessarily apply "those standards of preemption that have emerged in other areas of the law."
(1980). We have instead employed a preemption analysis that is informed by historical notions of tribal sovereignty, rather than determined by them.
. Although "[t]he right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress,"
, we still employ the tradition of Indian sovereignty as a "backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read" in our preemption analysis.
. We do not necessarily require that Congress explicitly preempt assertion of state authority insofar as Indians on reservations are concerned, but we have recognized that "any applicable regulatory interest of the State must be given weight," and "
automatic exemptions "as a matter of constitutional law'" are unusual."
Bracker, supra,
448 U. S. 144
The role of tribal sovereignty in preemption analysis varies in accordance with the particular "notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal independence."
448 U. S. 145
. These traditions themselves reflect the
(1980). However, it must be remembered that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States."
447 U. S. 154
"The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress, and
is subject to complete defeasance.
See also Confederated Tribes, supra,
447 U. S. 178
-179 (opinion of REHNQUIST,J.).
When we determine that tradition has recognized a sovereign immunity in favor of the Indians in some respect, then we usually are reluctant to infer that Congress has authorized the assertion of state authority in that respect "
where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.'"
(quoting U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958) (hereafter Indian Law)). Repeal by implication of an established tradition of immunity or self-governance is disfavored.
(1976). If, however, we do not find such a tradition, or if we determine that the balance of state, federal, and tribal interests so requires, our preemption analysis may accord less weight to the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty.
See Confederated Tribes, supra,
Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra.
We begin by noting that there is nothing in the record to indicate that a federally licensed Indian trader like Rehner may sell liquor for off-premises consumption only to members of the Pala Tribe. Indeed, the State contends, and Rehner does not dispute, that Rehner, or any other federally licensed trader, may sell liquor to Indian and non-Indian buyers alike.
Brief for Petitioner 81; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. To the extent that Rehner seeks to sell to non-Indians, or to Indians who are not members of the tribe with jurisdiction over the reservation on which the sale occurred, the decisions of this Court have already foreclosed Rehner's argument that the licensing requirements infringe upon tribal sovereignty. [
If there is any interest in tribal sovereignty implicated by imposition of California's alcoholic beverage regulation, it exists only insofar as the State attempts to regulate Rehner's sale of liquor to other members of the Pala Tribe on the Pala Reservation. The only interest that Rehner advances in this regard is that freedom to regulate alcoholic beverages is important to Indian self-governance. To the extent California limits the absolute number of licenses that it distributes, state regulation may effectively preclude this aspect of self-governance.
Brief for Respondent 63-74. Rehner relies on our statement in
Rehner's reliance on
as establishing tribal sovereignty in the area of liquor licensing and distribution is misplaced. In
"independent tribal authority is quite sufficient to protect Congress' decision to vest in tribal councils this portion of
[Congress'] own authority
to regulate commerce with the Indians.
added). We expressly declined to base our holding on whether "independent [tribal] authority
sufficient for the tribes to impose" their own liquor regulations.
, tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians. The colonists regulated Indian liquor trading before this Nation was formed, and Congress exercised its authority over these transactions as early as 1802.
Indian Law at 381. Congress imposed complete prohibition by 1832, and these prohibitions are still in effect subject to suspension conditioned on compliance with state law and tribal ordinances. [
Although in Indian matters Congress usually acts "upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation,"
Wlliams v. Lee,
(1959), that assumption would be unwarranted in the narrow context of the regulation of liquor. In addition to the congressional divestment of tribal self-government in this area, the States have also been permitted, and even required, to impose regulations related to liquor transactions. As a condition of entry into the United States, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma were required by Congress to enact prohibitions against the sale of liquor to Indians and introduction of liquor into Indian country. [
] Several States, including California, pursuant to state police power, long prohibited liquor transactions with Indians. [
] These state prohibitions indicate that "
absolute' federal jurisdiction is not invariably exclusive jurisdiction."
Kake Village,
369 U. S. 68
. Indeed, we have recognized expressly that
exclusive jurisdiction within the colony. Enactments of the Federal Government passed to protect and guard its Indian wards only affect the operation, within the colony, of such state laws as
conflict with the federal enactments.
This historical tradition of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country is justified by the relevant state interests involved.
. Rehner's distribution of liquor has a significant impact beyond the limits of the Pala Reservation. The State has an unquestionable interest in the liquor traffic that occurs within its borders, and this interest is independent of the authority conferred on the States by the Twenty-first Amendment.
(1890). Liquor sold by Rehner to other Pala tribal members or to nonmembers can easily find its way out of the reservation and into the hands of those whom, for whatever reason, the State does not wish to possess alcoholic beverages, or to possess them through a distribution network over which the State has no control. This particular "spillover" effect is qualitatively different from any "spillover" effects of income taxes or taxes on cigarettes.
462 U. S. 336
There can be no doubt that Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area. In the area of liquor regulation, we find no "congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."
(footnote omitted). With respect to the regulation of liquor transactions, as opposed to the state income taxation involved in
Indians cannot be said to "possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government."
411 U. S. 167
The court below erred in thinking that there was some
notion of tribal sovereignty that served to direct
preemption analysis involving Indians.
678 F.2d at 1348. [
] Because we find that there is no tradition of sovereign immunity that favors the Indians in this respect, and because we must consider that the activity in which Rehner seeks to engage potentially has a substantial impact beyond the reservation, we may accord little if any weight to any asserted interest in tribal sovereignty in this case.
We must next determine whether the state authority to license the sale of liquor is preempted by federal law.
. The court below held that § 1161 preempted state regulation of licensing and distribution, and that the reference to state law in § 1161 was not sufficiently explicit to permit application of the state licensing law.
We disagree with both aspects of the court's analysis. As we explained in
the tribes have long ago been divested of any inherent self-government over liquor regulation by both the explicit command of Congress and as a "necessary implication of their dependent status."
The presumption of preemption derives from the rule against construing legislation to repeal by implication some aspect of tribal self-government.
426 U. S. 391
-551 (1974). Because there is no aspect of exclusive tribal self-government that requires the deference reflected in our requirement that Congress expressly provide for the application of state law, we have only to determine whether application of the state licensing laws would "impair a right granted or reserved by federal law."
. Our examination of § 1161 leads us to conclude that Congress authorized, rather than preempted, state regulation over Indian liquor transactions.
The legislative history of § 1161 indicates both that Congress intended to remove federal prohibition on the sale and use of alcohol imposed on Indians in 1832 and that Congress intended that state laws would apply of their own force to govern tribal liquor transactions as long as the tribe itself approved these transactions by enacting an ordinance. It is clear that, by 1953, federal law curtailing liquor traffic with the Indians came to be "viewed as discriminatory." Indian Law at 382. As originally introduced, the bill that was later to become § 1161 was intended only to "[t]o terminate Federal discriminations against the Indians of Arizona."
Hearings on H.R. 1055 before the Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 6, 1953) (Hearings), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-4. [
] In hearings on this original bill, Representative Rhodes of Arizona, speaking on behalf of Representative Patten, who introduced the bill, stated that the sole purpose of the bill was to eliminate federal prohibition, because it was discriminatory and had a detrimental effect on the Indians. He also commented that the bill would permit Arizona to amend its Constitution to remove the state prohibitions on sale of liquor to Indians and on introduction of liquor into Indian country. At these same hearings, Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior, submitted a revision of the bill proposed by Representative Patten. This revision was different from the original bill in a number of respects, the most important of which for present purposes is that the revision applied to
States, and not just to Arizona. In the context of discussing the bill, Commissioner Myer stated:
at A-26 - A-27.
In a later hearing, the Department of the Interior submitted an unofficial report in which it was again urged that federal Indian liquor prohibition be ended
and not just in Arizona, as long as liquor "transactions are in conformity with the ordinances of the tribes concerned, and are not contrary to state law."
Hearings (May 6, 1953), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-54. Representative D'Ewart read into the record a telegram sent by the
Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council. The telegram indicated that the Navajo people supported the "anti-discrimination bill" as a measure to ensure "equal rights."
Representative Patten, the sponsor of the original bill, stated that, "if this bill were passed to remove all discrimination, the Indians would still have to comply with State law in every regard. . . ."
Hearings (June 2, 1953), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-69. Representative Patten's remarks are particularly valuable in determining the meaning of § 1161. As the sponsor of the bill, Representative Patten's interpretation is an "
authoritative guide to the statute's construction.'"
Bowsher v. Merck & Co.,
460 U. S. 824
460 U. S. 832
(1983) (quoting
456 U. S. 527
The House Report explained the bill as eliminating discrimination caused by legislation "applicable only to Indians." H.R.Rep. No. 775, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953). It included an official report of the Department of the Interior stating that federal prohibition would be lifted only if liquor "transactions are in conformity with the ordinances of the tribes concerned, and are not contrary to State law."
at 3. The Senate Report also expressed these sentiments:
"if this bill is enacted, a State or local municipality or Indian tribes, if they desire, by the enactment of proper legislation or ordinance,
to restrict the sales of intoxicants
to Indians, they may do so."
concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government in this area. Early administrative practice and our prior decision in
(1975), confirm this understanding of § 1161.
"The fact that a tribe in California may, by ordinance, authorize the sale of liquor on its reservation in packages for consumption only off the premises where it is sold would not, in my opinion, impinge upon the foregoing authority of the State Board of Equalization to license sales of liquor on such reservation for consumption both on and off the premises where the liquor is sold. In such circumstances, if any person so licensed by the State were to sell liquor on the reservation for on-premises consumption in accordance with his license, presumably
he would be immune from State prosecution and, thus, the license issued by the State agency would be fully effective insofar as State law is concerned.
"if a tribal ordinance permits only package sales on a reservation for consumption off the premises, a State license to sell for consumption on the premises will give protection
but not against Federal prosecutions under section 1156."
(Footnote omitted; emphasis added.) [
Both Rehner and the court below believed that § 1161 was merely an exemption from
criminal liability, and affirmatively empowered neither Indian tribes nor the State to regulate liquor transactions.
678 F.2d at 1345; Brief for Respondent 9. Our decision in
Mazurie, supra,
, rejected this argument with respect to Indian tribes, and there is no reason to accept it with respect to the State. In
we held that, in enacting § 1161, Congress intended to
to the tribes a portion of its authority over liquor transactions on reservations. Since we found this delegation on the basis of the statutory language requiring that liquor transactions conform "
with the laws of the State . . . and with an ordinance duly adopted" by the governing tribe (emphasis added), we would ignore the plain language of the statute
if we failed to find this same delegation in favor of the States. [
] Rehner argues that
merely acknowledged that Indian tribes "possessed independent authority" over liquor transactions. Brief for Respondent 67. As we noted in the context of our discussion of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, we expressly declined to base our holding in
on the doctrine of tribal self-government; rather, we held merely that the tribal authority was sufficient to protect the congressional decision to delegate licensing authority.
The thrust of Rehner's argument, and the primary focus of the court below, is that state authority in this area is preempted because such authority requires an express statement by Congress in the light of the canon of construction that we quoted in
-171 (quoting Indian Law at 845). As we have established above, because of the lack of a tradition of self-government in the area of liquor regulation, it is not necessary that Congress indicate expressly that the State has jurisdiction to regulate the licensing and distribution of alcohol. [
Even if this canon of construction were applicable to this case, our result would be the same. The canon is quoted from Indian Law at 845. In that same volume, the Solicitor of the Interior Department assumed that § 1161 would result in state prosecutions for failing to have a state license.
at 382-383. Whatever Congress had to do to provide "expressly" for the application of state law, the Solicitor obviously believed that Congress had done it in § 1161. Indeed, even in
we suggested that § 1161 satisfied the canon of construction requiring that Congress expressly provide for application of state law. In discussing statutes that did satisfy the canon, we cited § 1161 and stated that "state liquor laws may be applicable within reservations." 411 U.S. at
, n. 16. [
] More important, we have consistently refused to apply such a canon of construction when application would be tantamount to a formalistic disregard of congressional intent.
See also Andrus v. Glover Construction Co.,
446 U. S. 608
446 U. S. 619
(1980). In the present case, congressional intent is clear from the face of the statute and its legislative history. [
Congress did not intend to make tribal members "super citizens" who could trade in a traditionally regulated substance free from all but self-imposed regulations.
678 F.2d at 1352 (Goodwin, J., dissenting). Rather, we believe that in enacting § 1161, Congress intended to recognize that Native Americans are not "weak and defenseless," and are capable of making personal decisions about alcohol consumption without special assistance from the Federal Government. Application of the state licensing scheme does not "impair a right granted or reserved by federal law."
] On the contrary, such application of state law
is "specifically authorized by . . . Congress . . . and [does] not interfere with federal policies concerning the reservations."
380 U. S. 687
There is some confusion among the parties and
as to whether the court below held that the tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over the licensing and distribution of liquor on reservations irrespective of the identity of the vendor. Although we acknowledge that the decision below is somewhat ambiguous in this respect, we construe the opinion as applying only to vendors, like Rehner, who are members of the governing tribe.
The California licensing scheme is found in Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Ann. 23000
(West 1964 and Supp.1983).
Rehner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and, before a three-judge panel of that court rendered a decision on the appeal, two more cases arose presenting similar issues. The Ninth Circuit then scheduled argument en banc for all three cases. The companion cases were
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Washington,
No. 79-4403, and
Tulalip Tribes v. Washington,
No. 79-4404 (CA9). These cases involved,
state sales taxes imposed on reservation liquor transactions, an issue not discussed or relied upon by the court below in this case. The court remanded these two companion cases to the District Court in the light of
The court also rejected the argument, made by one of the parties in the companion cases, that the Twenty-first Amendment permitted the States to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over liquor transactions on reservations. Because we base our holding on § 1161, we do not reach the issue whether the Twenty-first Amendment permits the State to exercise jurisdiction over liquor transactions on reservations. We also do not consider whether the State effectively has authority to regulate licensing and distribution of liquor transactions on reservations under any other statute.
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); 18 U.S.C. § 1162. At oral argument, both Rehner's attorney and counsel for the United States as
suggested that the State had broad powers to enforce "substantive" state liquor laws on reservations through 18 U.S.C. § 1162.
Tr. of Oral. Arg. 31-32, 40.
Finally, we reject Rehner's suggestion that this case has become moot because California now permits wholesalers to sell to unlicensed persons on Indian reservations.
Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Ann. § 23384 (West Supp.1983). At oral argument, the State confirmed that, despite this statutory change, the licensing requirement is still in effect. Tr. of Oral Arg.19.
425 U.S. 463 (1976), we held that a State may impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers who conducted their businesses on the reservation, and that the State may require that the Indian retailer enforce and collect this tax. We upheld the tax on non-Indians in Moe even though we recognized that in
-476 (quoting
(1973)). In
we said of the tax upheld in Moe that
447 U. S. 151
, and n. 27. In
we also held that Indians resident on the reservation but nonmembers of the governing tribe "stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on the reservation" insofar as imposition of tax on cigarette sales is concerned.
447 U. S. 161
. Regulation of sales to non-Indians or nonmembers of the Pala Tribe simply does not "contravene the principle of tribal self-government,"
and, therefore, neither Rehner nor the Pala Tribe has any special interest that militates against state regulation in this case, providing that Congress has not preempted such regulation.
Ariz. Const., Art. 20, 13 (prohibition removed in 1954); N.M.Const., Art. XXI, § 1 (1911) (prohibition removed in 1953); Okla.Const., Art. I, § 7 (1907) (prohibition removed in 1959).
See, e.g., State v. Rorvick,
76 Idaho 58, 277 P.2d 566 (1954);
133 Wash. 140, 233 P. 327 (1925);
Dagan v. State,
162 Wis. 353, 156 N.W. 153 (1916);
44 Utah 484, 141 P. 109 (1914);
State v. Mamlock,
58 Wash. 631, 109 P. 47 (1910);
People v. Gebhard,
151 Mich.192, 115 N.W. 54 (1908);
Tate v. State,
58 Neb. 296, 78 N.W. 494 (1899);
State v. Wise,
70 Minn. 99, 72 N.W. 843 (1897);
People v. Bray,
105 Cal.344, 38 P. 731 (1894);
Territory v. Guyott,
9 Mont. 46, 22 P. 134 (1889);
Territory v. Coleman,
1 Ore.191 (1855).
G. Colby, Digest of the Excise Laws of Some of the States of the Union and Foreign Countries 9, 36, 43 (1888) (describing similar laws in Colorado, Missouri, and Nevada).
The court stated that it did not reach the sovereignty issue in the light of its holding that § 1161 had preemptive effect.
678 F.2d at 1348, and 1349, n. 18. However, the court did acknowledge that it was obligated "to incorporate the principle of tribal sovereignty into our preemption analysis."
at 1348.
In dissent, JUSTICE BLACKMUN argues that the Court's analysis of tribal sovereignty has "
turned on whether the particular area being regulated is one traditionally within the tribe's control."
463 U. S. 739
(emphasis in original). As support for this proposition, JUSTICE BLACKMUN relies on
Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico,
(1973). These cases fail to support JUSTICE BLACKMUN's position. In
we held that federal law preempted state regulation. In
we found that the state regulation was a taxing measure prohibited by federal statute. In
we held that the State could not impose a tax on personalty, because it was "
permanently attached to the realty'. . . . [and] would certainly be immune from the State's
property tax." 411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 158
Although administrative interpretation changed in 1971,
see Applicability of the Liquor Laws of the State of Montana on the Rocky Boy's Reservation,
78 I.D. 39 (1971), it is clear that the early interpretation by the Bureau of Indian Affairs favors the State's position. As that early position is consistent with the view of Commissioner Myer, whose Bureau revised H.R. 1055, it is surely more indicative of congressional intent in 1953 than a 1971 opinion to the contrary.
In addition, we note that the 1971 opinion of the Solicitor appears to be based on his view that, in
(1965), we drew a distinction between state licensing requirements and state "substantive" liquor laws, and found only the latter to be applicable under § 1161.
78 I.D. at 40, n. 1. In
Warren Trading Post Co.,
we actually described § 1161 as "permitting application of state liquor law standards within an Indian reservation under certain conditions." 380 U.S. at
, n. 3. We fail to understand how our description of § 1161 in that opinion can be interpreted as creating a distinction between "substantive" and "regulatory" laws. To the extent that the Solicitor's new interpretation owes anything to our decision in
we reject the interpretation.
In dissent, JUSTICE BLACKMUN accepts the distinction between substantive and licensing laws that he believes was articulated in
Warren Trading Post Co.
For the reasons explained in this note and
JUSTICE BLACMUN's arguments are not successful.
This canon is based, in part, on the notion that we normally resolve any doubt in a preemption analysis in favor of the Indians because of their status as "
wards of the nation.'"
(1973) (quoting
(1930)). Even if this canon properly informed a preemption analysis that involved a historic tradition of federal and state regulation, its application in the context of liquor licensing and distribution would be problematic. Liquor trade has been regulated among the Indians largely due to early attempts by the tribes themselves to seek assistance in controlling Indian access to liquor.
talk delivered by Little Turtle to President Thomas Jefferson on January 4, 1802, reprinted in 4 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol. 1, p. 655 (1832). In many respects, the concerns about liquor expressed by the tribes were responsible for the development of the dependent status of the tribes. When the substance to be regulated is that primarily responsible for "dependent" status, it makes no sense to say that the historical position of Indians as federal "wards" militates in favor of giving exclusive control over licensing and distribution to the tribes.
In three other cases, we have assumed that § 1161 delegated the authority that we now find that it so delegated. In
(1962), we stated that "the sale of liquor on reservations has been permitted subject to state law, on consent of the tribe itself." In
419 U. S. 547
(1975), we stated that § 1161 permitted
, n. 3, we described § 1161 as "permitting application of state liquor law standards within an Indian reservation under certain conditions."
"[t]he Termination Acts, Pub.L. 280 [28 U.S.C. § 1360(a)] and section 1161 are statutes regarding the applicability of state law in Indian country, and must therefore be considered
and construed together."
Rehner also argues that in the context of passing Pub.L. 280, Congress rejected the view that repeal of federal prohibition was contingent upon applicability of state liquor law.
Brief for Respondent 41-44. Rehner neglects to note that what Congress originally contemplated was that federal prohibition would be lifted in return for Indian acquiescence to broad state civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservations.
Hearings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235, and H.R. 3624 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 30, 48 (1952).
The Court of Appeals appeared to accept the argument that Congress delegated to the tribes the exclusive right to license liquor distribution. According to this argument, the reference to state law in § 1161 refers only to the fact that, for purposes of determining whether a violation of federal law has occurred, state substantive law, and not regulatory law, is to be incorporated by reference into the federal scheme. The difficulty with this argument is apparent. Nowhere in the text of § 1161, or in the legislative history, is there any distinction between "substantive" and "regulatory" laws. The distinction cannot be found in our decision in
Warren Trading Post Co., supra.
In the absence of a context that might possibly require it, we are reluctant to make such a distinction.
Cf. Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U. S. 390
(1976) (grant of civil jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1360 does not include regulatory jurisdiction to tax in light of tradition of immunity from taxation). We also note that it appears as though the court was interpreting the reach of
under § 1161 as much as it was deciding the scope of state jurisdiction. In the light of the fact that the Federal Government was not a party below, we do not understand this aspect of the court's holding.
The court also held that, because tribal ordinances must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, Congress has shown its intention to occupy the field. We reject this argument on the basis of the plain language of the statute and its legislative history. That Rehner is a licensed federal trader is also insufficient to show that Congress intended to occupy the field to the exclusion of state laws. Rehner relies on our decision in
Warren Trading Post Co., supra,
in which we held that Arizona could not impose a tax on a federally licensed trader for income earned through trading with reservation Indians on the reservation. In
we held that Congress did not authorize any additional burden on the licensed trader, while, in this case, we think that Congress
authorize the regulation. In addition, we recognized in
itself the difference between § 1161 and the income tax.
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
448 U. S. 160
(1980), upon which Rehner also relies in this respect, is based on
and similarly fails to support Rehner's point.
Since 1790,
Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, the Federal Government has regulated trade with the Indians and has required persons engaging in such trade to obtain a federal license. Existing law provides:
"The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the
power and authority to appoint traders to the Indian tribes and to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper specifying the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods shall be sold to the Indians."
Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs has promulgated detailed regulations governing the licensing and conduct of Indian traders. 25 CFR §§ 140.1-140.26 (1983). An applicant for an Indian trader's license must submit information regarding his financing, his background and business experience, and the persons he intends to employ. Both the applicant and his employees must provide detailed references.
§ 140.9(a). Gambling and drug sales on licensed premises are prohibited. §§ 140.19, 140.21. The trader's prices are reviewable by federal officials, his books are subject to inspection, his merchandise must be of good quality, and his credit practices are restricted. §§ 140.22, 140.24. These statutes and regulations governing trade with the Indians have been described aptly as "comprehensive" and "all-inclusive."
Warren Trading Post,
the Court stated that these statutes and regulations
The Court recently reaffirmed
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
(1980). In that case, the Court held that federal regulation of Indian traders was so comprehensive that States lacked authority to tax even a sale by an unlicensed trader who maintained no place of business on the reservation. "It is the existence of the Indian trader statutes," the Court said, "and not their administration, that preempts the field of transactions with Indians occurring on reservations."
448 U. S. 165
. The Court noted that Congress had
448 U. S. 166
both of which involved state taxes, necessarily extends to other types of state regulation as well. A State, through its own licensing requirement, cannot choose who may trade with the Indians and what goods they may sell. The "sole power and authority" to make decisions of this type is vested in the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 25 U.S.C. § 261, and applicants who win the Commissioner's approval are to be permitted to trade, § 262. An independent requirement of approval by state authorities has no place in this scheme. Yet California imposes just such a requirement on Indian traders who choose to sell a particular product -- liquor. California reserves to itself the power to deny any trader the right to sell, and from those to whom it grants permission, it requires a substantial fee. [
this licensing requirement clearly
The Court does not explain how it reconciles California's liquor licensing requirement with federal law governing Indian traders. Instead, the Court appears to rest its conclusion on three propositions. First, the Court asserts that "tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians."
463 U. S. 722
463 U. S. 731
. Second, the Court finds a "historical tradition of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country."
463 U. S. 724
463 U. S. 726
463 U. S. 728
, n. 14. Third, the Court concludes that Congress "authorized . . . state regulation over Indian liquor transactions" by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1161.
. None of these propositions supports the Court's conclusion.
McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n,
(1973). The Court's analysis has never turned on whether the particular area being regulated is one traditionally within the tribe's control. In
Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue,
(1982), for example, the Court held that comprehensive and pervasive federal regulation of Indian schools precluded the imposition of a state tax on construction of such a school. The Court did not find it relevant that federal policy had not "encourag[ed] the development of Indian-controlled institutions" until the early 1970's,
458 U. S. 840
, or that the school in question was "the first independent Indian school in modern times,"
458 U. S. 834
(1976), the Court held that a State could not require the operator of an on-reservation "smoke shop" to obtain a state cigarette retailer's license; the Court did not inquire whether tribal Indians traditionally had exercised regulatory authority over cigarette sales. And in
Mar. 30J 1802, § 21, 2 Stat. 146, and sales of liquor to Indians or in Indian country were absolutely prohibited by federal law until 1953.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1156.
In light of this absolute prohibition, the Court's reliance in this case upon what it perceives as a "historical tradition of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country,"
, is disingenuous, at best. The Court correctly notes that States were permitted, and in some instances required, to enforce these federal prohibitions through their own criminal laws.
463 U. S. 723
-724, and nn. 9, 10. But the sources cited by the Court do not even suggest that the States had independent authority to decide who might sell liquor in Indian country, or to impose regulations in addition to those found in federal law. [
"in conformity both with the laws of the State . . . and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over [the] area. . . . [
(1975). As is demonstrated by the Court's review of the legislative history,
-728, and indeed by the language of the statute itself, § 1161 ensures that sales of liquor that would be contrary to state law remain prohibited by federal statute. If a State is altogether "dry," Indian country within that State must be "dry" as well. If a State bans liquor sales to minors or liquor sales on Sundays, sales to minors and Sunday sales also are forbidden in the Indian country. Section 1161, in other words, as the Court has said in the past, "permit[s] application of state liquor law
within an Indian reservation."
, n. 3 (emphasis added). [
reservations, or, in other words, whether it authorizes the State to require a license as a condition of doing business. [
] On this question, the statute and its legislative history are silent.
-171, quoting U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958);
426 U. S. 376
, n. 2 (1976). In cases where a State seeks to assert regulatory authority, the Court has required far more than a mere reference to state law in a federal statute.
In Bryan v. Itasca County,
for example, the Court refused to find a grant of regulatory authority in § 4(a) of Pub.L. 280, 67 Stat. 589, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a), which provides that a State's
Despite this seemingly absolute language, the Court found nothing in the statute or its history "remotely resembling an intention to confer general state civil regulatory control over Indian reservations." 426 U.S. at
426 U. S. 384
. The Court noted that several other statutes passed by the same Congress -- the so-called Termination Acts [
] -- expressly conferred upon the States general regulatory authority over certain Indian tribes. Construing Pub.L. 280 and the Termination Acts
I reach the same conclusion here. This Court has held in other contexts that federal statutes requiring "compl[iance] with . . . State . . . requirements" do not require that the party obtain a state permit or license.
E.g., Hancock v. Train,
426 U. S. 167
(1976) (interpreting § 118 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f);
EPA v. California State Water Resources Control Board,
(1976) (interpreting § 313 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1323). The federal agency charged with administering Indian affairs takes the position that § 1161 does not authorize States to enforce their liquor licensing requirements on Indian reservations,
Applicability of the Liquor Laws of the State of Montana on the Rocky Boy's Reservation,
78 I.D. 39 (1971), and this agency interpretation is entitled to deference. [
] The only other Court of
Appeals to have considered the question has taken the same position.
See United States v. New Mexico,
590 F.2d 323 (CA10 1978),
444 U.S. 832 (1979). [
] Because nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1161 indicates any intent to confer licensing authority on the States, I would hold that California's attempt to require Indian traders to obtain state liquor licenses is preempted by federal law.
An application for an off-sale general liquor license must be accompanied by a fee of $6,000, which is deposited in the State's General Fund. Cal.Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 23954.5 (West Supp.1983). Once a license is granted, the licensee must pay annual fees totalling $409. §§ 23053.5, 23320(21), 23320.2. Portions of these fees are deposited in the General Fund as well.
§§ 23320.2, 25761. Licenses are available in very limited numbers,
§ 23817 (West 1964), but are transferable upon the approval of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
§ 24070 (West Supp.1983). Respondent Rehner has alleged that the market price for an off-sale general license is approximately $55,000. App. JA-7.
For the most part, the cases cited by the Court upheld convictions under state statutes barring liquor sales on or off the reservation to persons of Indian descent. Such statutes clearly would be unconstitutional today, and in any event involved no exercise of state regulatory authority over reservation activities. The one case involving on-reservation activity is
133 Wash. 140, 233 P. 327 (1925), which upheld a conviction of a non-Indian operating a distillery on reservation land. The court concluded that state law was applicable because "no personal or property right of an Indian, tribal or non-tribal, [was] involved in the action,"
at 144, 233 P. at 328, relying on this Court's decision in
In several other federal statutes regulating Indian affairs, Congress has chosen to incorporate substantive state standards into federal law.
18 U.S.C. § 13 (Assimilative Crimes Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Major Crimes Act). These statutes, of course, do not confer any regulatory or enforcement jurisdiction on the States.
68 Stat. 718, 25 U.S.C. § 564; 68 Stat. 769, 25 U.S.C. § 726; 68 Stat. 1103, 25 U.S.C. § 757.
Relying on a 1954 opinion issued by the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, the Court states that the Bureau of Indian Affairs "contemplated that liquor transactions on reservations would be subject to . . . state licensing laws."
463 U. S. 729
. In fact, the sole question presented to the Solicitor in 1954 was whether § 1161 authorized a tribe to limit the types of liquor sales permitted on a reservation,
whether the tribe could permit package sales but not sales for on-premises consumption. The Solicitor stated that the tribe could impose such a limit, and that an individual who sold liquor for on-premises consumption would be subject to federal prosecution even if he had obtained a state license permitting on-premises sales. The state license, in other words, would have no effect as far as federal law was concerned. But the Solicitor reserved decision on the question presented in this case:
Liquor -- Tribal Ordinance Regulating Traffic Within Reservation,
No. M-36241 (Sept. 22, 1954), reprinted in 2 Op.Solicitor of Dept. of Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974, pp. 1648, 1650. The Solicitor addressed this reserved issue directly in 1971:
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 308 (1982) ("[S]ection 1161 incorporates state liquor laws as a standard of measurement to define what conduct is lawful or unlawful under federal law. . . . [R]eservation Indians need not obtain a state liquor license to sell lawfully").