Source: https://www.judicialview.com/Court-Cases/Copyright/Psihoyos-v-John-Wiley-amp;-Sons-Inc./55/602356
Timestamp: 2019-05-24 15:01:53
Document Index: 719750515

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 411', '§ 101', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 507', '§ 507', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 507', '§ 411', '§ 507', '§ 411', '§ 504', '§ 101', '§ 1681', '§ 411', '§ 18', '§ 411']

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Psihoyos v John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Photographer Louis Psihoyos sued publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Wiley”) for copyright infringement based on Wiley’s publication of textbooks containing Psihoyos’s photographs. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rakoff, J.) determined that the applicable three‐year statute of limitations barred none of Psihoyos’s infringement claims because Psihoyos, exercising reasonable diligence, did not discover the infringements until fewer than three years prior to bringing suit. The District Court nonetheless granted Wiley’s motion for summary judgment as to several of the infringement claims on the ground that Psihoyos had failed to register the relevant photographs with the Copyright Office prior to instituting suit as required by 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). After a jury trial in which the jury awarded statutory damages concerning three of the remaining photographs, the District Court (Oetken, J.) denied Wiley’s motion for remittitur or, in the alternative, for a new trial. We AFFIRM.
Photographer Louis Psihoyos sued publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Wiley”) for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., based on Wiley’s publication of textbooks containing eight of Psihoyos’s photographs. Although the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rakoff, J.) determined that the applicable three‐year statute of limitations barred none of Psihoyos’s infringement claims, it nonetheless granted Wiley’s motion for summary judgment as to several of those claims, citing Psihoyos’s failure to register the relevant works prior to instituting suit as required by 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). After a jury trial in which the jury found willful infringement and awarded statutory damages for three 1 of the remaining four claims, the District Court (Oetken, J.) denied Wiley’s motion for remittitur or, in the alternative, for a new trial. We affirm.
Psihoyos, a professional photographer, created eight photographs that Wiley published in various textbooks from 2005 to 2009. In November 2010 Wiley sought a retroactive licensing arrangement with Psihoyos after discovering that it had published in several textbooks and without a license a pair of Psihoyos’s photographs of a Stanford University professor holding a narcoleptic dog (the “Narcoleptic Dog photos”). After being notified of the unlicensed publication of the photographs, Psihoyos requested full disclosure of any other unauthorized use of Psihoyos’s photographs by Wiley. After examining its records, Wiley responded that it had published without permission one photograph of a Triceratops skeleton (“Triceratops photo”) and one of an Oviraptor skeleton (“Oviraptor photo”),1 in addition to the two Narcoleptic Dog photos.
Judge(s): Raymond Lohier, Jr.
Related Categories: Civil Procedure , Damages
Kevin McCulloch Nelson & McCulloch LLP
Danial Nelson Nelson & McCulloch LLP
Christopher Beall Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz LLP
Robert Penchina Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz LLP
dog photos, as well as the dinamation photo. 8 psihoyos had failed to register the relevant photographs with the copyright 36 application to register must be filed, and either granted or refused, before suit 14 dinamation photos, leaving four infringement claims for trial.2 10 claims, which arose from infringements that occurred over three years prior 17 and “televisions” photos. 8 5 it is for these reasons that we conclude that the supreme court’s decision in “registration” means for purposes of § 411(a), it does not require a finding of defendant‐appellant‐cross‐appellee. 21 wiley contends that the district court erred by failing to consider whether 2 the deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) the infringer’s 11 john wiley & sons, inc., 19 complaint only for the purpose of correcting “scrivener’s errors,” not for the 10 civil action for infringement of the copyright . . . shall be instituted until 9 further, belated discovery on these issues. 22 are governed by 17 u.s.c. § 507(b). in doing so, we join every circuit to have 14 in the alternative, a new trial. the district court denied the motion. 2 15 wiley sought a retroactive licensing arrangement with psihoyos after 7 psihoyos v. john wiley & sons, inc. plaintiff’s actual loss and complains that the jury’s award “bears no rational 4 act’s statute of limitations did not bar any of psihoyos’s infringement claims. 9 an award of $30,000 and $100,000 in damages, respectively. arguing 15 8 discovery rule, not the injury rule.5 policy considerations also counsel in 1 wiley published in various textbooks from 2005 to 2009. in november 2010 6 graham co. v. haughey, 568 f.3d 425, 433‐37 (3d cir. 2009); warren (oetken, j.) denied wiley’s motion for remittitur or, in the alternative, for a 2 applications to the copyright office for his unregistered 18 cross‐appellant. 9 expressly legislated otherwise.” id. at 27 (quoting andrews v. trw inc., 225 12 three years after the claim accrued.” 17 u.s.c. § 507(b). the district court 3 in urging us to adopt an “injury rule” instead, wiley relies on trw inc. 1 of the copyright act”). for substantially the reasons articulated by other 5 oviraptor photos, along with two photographs of a narcoleptic dog that, 3 psihoyos submitted applications for copyright registration of the narcoleptic 7 to the infringement claims relating to the narcoleptic dog, televisions and 9 considered the issue of claim accrual in the context of infringement claims.3 15 district courts in choosing to grant or deny leave to amend. as the district 3 we agree with our sister circuits that the text and structure of the 14 affirmed. 11 14 cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value of the 12 infringement claims because psihoyos, exercising reasonable diligence, did 32 original). for substantially these reasons, we conclude that the district court 25 two days after wiley filed its summary judgment brief, psihoyos 4 distinguish the cases in which we have done so on the ground that they 11 until after the close of all discovery in this case . . . and after defendant 16 actual or constructive discovery of infringement and that psihoyos did not 3 § 411(a). 3 14 10 dismissing psihoyos’s claims relating to the narcoleptic dog and dinamation 4 registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with” the 13 cir. 2012). 2 remaining photographs, the district court (oetken, j.) denied wiley’s motion 3 court pointed out, “[a]lthough liberal amendments are allowed in the typical 4 we review de novo the district court’s partial grant and partial denial 13 corresponding to the photographs pleaded in that complaint. thus, 14 judgment as to his claim relating to the televisions photo. the four weight of the evidence under the instructions given to the jury.9 rather, 1 8 discover the infringements until 2010, well within three years of filing suit. 4 securities law, that “the standard rule is that a claim accrues when the for registration of the relevant photographs, as well as the prejudice to wiley 16 discovering that it had published in several textbooks and without a license a 8 can be brought”), and la resolana architects, pa v. clay realtors angel fire, 15 the statutory damages award is reasonably related to the proven amount of 3 plaintiff‐appellee‐cross‐appellant, 15 9 unlicensed publication of the photographs, psihoyos requested full disclosure 11 earned, by the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) 10 during discovery, psihoyos acknowledged that his initial complaint 9 applications for registration of the narcoleptic dog and dinamation photos 1 involved co‐ownership claims. we reject wiley’s suggestion that we apply 12 acted within its discretion in partially denying psihoyos leave to amend his 26 narcoleptic dog (the “narcoleptic dog photos”). after being notified of the 10 summary judgment on two grounds. first, wiley argued that the copyright 15 judgment as well as the denial of its motion for remittitur or a new trial. 4 (“wiley”) for copyright infringement based on wiley’s publication of 28 note 3, we conclude that copyright infringement claims do not accrue until 7 (9th cir. 2004); gaiman v. mcfarlane, 360 f.3d 644, 653 (7th cir. 2004); lyons failed to refer to the copyrights in the two narcoleptic dog photos that wiley 10 notice even earlier when, . . . in another of plaintiff’s copyright 11 docket nos. 12‐4874‐cv(l), 12‐5069‐cv(xap) 9 plaintiff and his counsel have been on notice since the outset of this 7 joint app’x 859‐61 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphases in 24 psihoyos had failed to register the two narcoleptic dog photos and the 1 3 1 like the better known triceratops, the oviraptor was a non‐avian dinosaur instead, psihoyos submitted the applications after discovery had closed and 11 before: walker, cabranes, and lohier, circuit judges. 25 earned substantial profits, and the jury may have viewed wiley as a repeat 4 infringed his copyright in eight photographs, including the triceratops and 2 often described as “bird‐like” in its features. see gregory s. paul, dinosaurs relevant works prior to instituting suit as required by 17 u.s.c. § 411(a). after 25 infringer in need of deterrence. 5 5 v. andrews, 534 u.s. 19 (2001).4 in trw, the supreme court held that “the 2 not even filed the applications for registration of the relevant works prior to 6 defendant with both significant delay and expense associated with 21 (s.d.n.y. 2004) (holding that trw’s reasoning supports application of an injury rule for claim accrual under the copyright act). embroil ourselves in this circuit split because, even assuming arguendo that a 4 after trial on psihoyos’s remaining four claims, the jury found no 11 a jury trial in which the jury found willful infringement and awarded 26 august term, 2013 5 statutory damages for three of the remaining four claims, the district court 1 case, this is not a typical case.” joint app’x 859 (citation omitted). the 5 “application approach” with the eleventh circuit’s “registration approach” 1 b. copyright registration prior to institution of suit 10 for the second circuit 3 f.3d 1063, 1067 (9th cir. 2000)). 13 copyright in any united states work shall be instituted until preregistration or 12 compare apple barrel prods., inc. v. beard, 730 f.2d 384, 386‐87 (5th cir. 8 failed to satisfy the act’s registration requirement under § 411(a). 7 second, the district court concluded that psihoyos’s pending copyright 5 infringement cases also originally before this court, the court ordered 12 we have not held that there must be a direct correlation between statutory 17 civil actions for copyright infringement must be “commenced within 2 rule none of psihoyos’s claims are time‐barred. 7 even though plaintiff was put on notice of this issue last year, he waited 15 award.” appellant’s reply br. 50. 6 photographs at issue. not only did the court so instruct plaintiff at the 9 photographer louis psihoyos sued publisher john wiley & sons, inc. 27 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” fed. 17 6 “preregistration” is not at issue in this appeal. structure and policy all favor such a rule. single [statutory] exception,” the court concluded that the “most natural 7 new york, ny, for plaintiff‐appellee‐8 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x 11 14 v. 17 the willful infringement context. 20 primarily that the jury’s award was excessive, wiley moved for remittitur or, 1 circuits that have grappled with this issue after trw was decided, see supra 6 background 4 1984) (copyright office’s receipt of application suffices), with m.g.b. homes, 9 as required by the plain terms of the statute. see 17 u.s.c. § 411(a) (“[n]o 8 we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of wiley’s 7 fossilized dinosaur tracks photos. haughey, 568 f.3d 425, 434‐37 (3d cir. 2009) (“[u]se of the discovery rule 3 26 infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties. 13 different accrual rules for ownership and infringement claims, both of which 13 comcast of illinois v. multi‐vision elecs., inc., 491 f.3d 938, 944 (8th cir. discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the infringement 5 we have held that district courts employing their “wide discretion . . . 7 conclusion 9 freedenfeld assocs., inc. v. mctigue, 531 f.3d 38, 44‐46 (1st cir. 2008); united states court of appeals 2 awarded psihoyos $100,000 and $30,000, respectively.8 15 12 and partial grant of summary judgment and second wiley’s appeal relating to 10 suit. the district court nonetheless granted wiley’s motion for summary 34 1996); stone v. williams, 970 f.2d 1043, 1048 (2d cir. 1992). wiley strives to 10 permission one photograph of a triceratops skeleton (“triceratops photo”) 14 act.6 17 u.s.c. § 411(a). the district court held that psihoyos’s pending 14 we refer to the four remaining photographs referenced in psihoyos’s 6 lohier, circuit judge: 16 not discover the infringements until fewer than three years prior to bringing 33 would be required . . . . to allow amendment here would prejudice 20 this circuit has previously employed a discovery rule for copyright 8 2. statutory damages 6 416 f.3d 1195, 1202‐05 (10th cir. 2005) (comparing the fifth circuit’s 16 actual or constructive discovery of the relevant infringement and that the 8 divided over whether a pending application satisfies § 411(a)’s requirement of 6 411(a)’s requirement of registration prior to the institution of suit regarding 1 judgment as to several of the infringement claims on the ground that 35 plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action,” 133 s. ct. 1216, 1220 judgment in wiley’s favor in connection with the narcoleptic dog and 6 his applications for copyright registration of both the correct narcoleptic dog 16 infringement of the gastroliths photo, non‐willful infringement of the 12 should have allowed him to amend his complaint “to assert claims related to” 15 copyright office determines that the work is not copyrightable, so whatever instituting the action claiming infringement of the copyright in these works, 7 (mtbe) products liability litigation, 725 f.3d 65, 112 n.34 (2d cir. 2013). 9 and willful infringement of the oviraptor and triceratops photos, resulting in 14 the district court concluded that several of the relevant factors could 1 failed to satisfy § 411(a)’s registration requirement. on appeal, psihoyos 2 where “the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court 10 4 relationship to the plaintiff’s actual loss” and is “an epitome of a run‐away 5 the preconditions to suit under § 411(a). 13 damages, we conclude that wiley forfeited its objection by not raising it in the most favorable to the non‐movant, “there is no genuine dispute as to any 16 complaint), gaiman v. mcfarlane, 360 f.3d 644, 655 (7th cir. 2004) (“[a]n 13 court for the southern district of new york (rakoff, j.) determined that the 30 textbooks containing psihoyos’s photographs. the united states district 29 of summary judgment. doninger v. niehoff, 642 f.3d 334, 344 (2d cir. 2011). 14 motion for leave to amend, the district court emphasized psihoyos’s 14 copyright office’s response to registration application and amended the 12 plaintiff, on pain of contempt, to produce registration numbers 13 pair of psihoyos’s photographs of a stanford university professor holding a 9 may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than 12 examining its records, wiley responded that it had published without 13 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ x 23 10 as both parties acknowledge, the federal courts of appeals are 5 7 (6th cir. 2007); polar bear prods., inc. v. timex corp., 384 f.3d 700, 705‐07 we address first the issues relating to the district court’s partial denial 9 the district court then turned to wiley’s arguments for summary 1 finally moved for leave to amend his complaint to allege infringement of the 5 7 under 17 u.s.c. § 411(a), the copyright holder may bring suit even if the 24 had filed its motion for summary judgment . . . to even submit 17 amend the complaint to correct the error. 13 early in‐court hearing . . . , but plaintiff and his counsel were put on 10 complaint. see longman v. wachovia bank, n.a., 702 f.3d 148, 151‐52 (2d 1 1 for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 10 purpose of specifying the correct narcoleptic dog photos or adding 11 (“wiley”) for copyright infringement under the copyright act of 1976, 17 18 if the motion were granted at such a late stage in the litigation. 17 new trial. we affirm. 3 photos and the dinamation photo once these applications were filed. 17 applicable three‐year statute of limitations barred none of psihoyos’s 31 significant delay in requesting leave to amend and in submitting applications 15 for the southern district of new york (rakoff, j.) determined that the 21 p’ship, l.p. v. morris costumes, inc., 243 f.3d 789, 796 (4th cir. 2001). 16 of the air: the evolution and loss of flight in dinosaurs and birds 219‐20 information about the newly filed applications for the narcoleptic dog photos 12 8 these are the only damages awards that wiley challenges on appeal. in march 2011 psihoyos filed a complaint alleging that wiley had 1 text and structure of [the fair credit reporting act (“fcra”)] evince 3 complaint as the “dinamation,” “gastroliths,” “fossilized dinosaur tracks,” 7 case that plaintiff had to produce registration numbers for the 8 finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion 11 concedes that the jury’s award of statutory damages was not against the 17 4 in an effort to clear this hurdle, psihoyos argues that the district court 14 damages and actual damages. to suggest otherwise is to ignore the various 18 fossilized dinosaur tracks photo, resulting in an award of $750 in damages, 13 6 two other, similar photographs. however, he did not then move for leave to 12 (the so‐called “discovery rule”). there is no dispute that under the discovery 6 copyright in the correct two narcoleptic dog photos. ten days later, 6 kevin p. mcculloch (danial nelson, 6 claims under 17 u.s.c. § 507(b). see merchant v. levy, 92 f.3d 51, 56 (2d cir. 9 2007); roger miller music, inc. v. sony/atv publ’g, llc, 477 f.3d 383, 390 office satisfies § 411(a)’s registration requirement. 4 photographer louis psihoyos sued publisher john wiley & sons, inc. 17 2 psihoyos does not challenge on appeal the district court’s grant of summary to suit. see 17 u.s.c. § 507(b). second, as relevant here, wiley argued that 18 of limitations runs from ‘the date on which the liability arises,’ subject to a 6 23 particular, the evidence supported a finding of willfulness and that wiley 3 of any other unauthorized use of psihoyos’s photographs by wiley. after 12 (1) the infringer’s state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits 9 had actually infringed and mistakenly referred instead to the copyrights in 11 copyrightability by the copyright office. and adopting the latter) abrogated on other grounds by reed elsevier, inc. v. 2 3 see diversey v. schmidly, 738 f.3d 1196, 1200‐01 (10th cir. 2013); william a. under § 411(a) of the act, “no civil action for infringement of the 11 $150,000.” 17 u.s.c. § 504(c)(2). the jury found that wiley had willfully 13 accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 3 and one of an oviraptor skeleton (“oviraptor photo”),1 in addition to the two 15 gabelli v. s.e.c., which held, in the readily distinguishable context of dinamation photos. 7 photos. 5 favor of the discovery rule in this context. see william a. graham co. v. 2 u.s.c. § 101 et seq., based on wiley’s publication of textbooks containing 19 18 counters that the mere act of submitting an application to the copyright 3 discussion 8 judgment as to several of those claims, citing psihoyos’s failure to register the 24 13 u.s.c. § 1681p). the court therefore reversed a decision of the ninth circuit, 10 infringement claims, it nonetheless granted wiley’s motion for summary 23 accordingly, the court granted partial summary judgment in wiley’s favor as 8 christopher perry beall (robert 11 wiley appealed the district court’s partial denial of summary 3 trial in which the jury awarded statutory damages concerning three of the 2 penchina, on the brief), levine sullivan 12 registration applications for the narcoleptic dog and dinamation photos 6 psihoyos cross‐appealed the district court’s partial grant of summary 5 district court’s decision to allow suit to proceed only after plaintiff received 11 narcoleptic dog photos wiley had admitted to using without authorization. 5 pending application constitutes a “registration” under § 411(a), psihoyos had 5 infringed psihoyos’s copyright in the triceratops and oviraptor photos and 14 2 copyright registration as a precondition to instituting an infringement action.7 7 copyright act, unlike the fcra, evince congress’s intent to employ the 15 1. summary judgment 12 discretion in refusing to alter the jury’s award of statutory damages. 8 6 16 5 summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light 15 those photographs. this argument ignores the wide discretion we accord 2 reading of [the fcra] is that congress implicitly excluded a general 8 in sum, we discern no error in the district court’s denial of wiley’s 6 preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made”). 10 muchnick, 559 u.s. 154 (2010). we need not resolve the dispute or otherwise 3 12-4874-cv(l) damages. 11 (quotation marks omitted). although revenue lost is one factor to consider, 16 comports with the text, structure, legislative history and underlying policies 4 9 insofar as wiley also complains about the jury instructions relating to district court. dinamation photo with the copyright office prior to filing suit. see 17 u.s.c. 2 motion for remittitur or a new trial. see in re methyl tertiary butyl ether 8 fcra claims. id. at 28. observing that the fcra provides that the “statute 5 in august 2011, after discovery was complete, wiley moved for 14 for remittitur or, in the alternative, for a new trial. we affirm. 4 which had employed the discovery rule as a default “unless congress has 11 defendant‐appellant‐cross‐appellee. 14 eight of psihoyos’s photographs. although the united states district court 20 22 wiley does not contest the jury’s finding of willful infringement and 16 explain the jury’s award based on the evidence adduced at trial – in 2 a. accrual of copyright infringement claims 1 (2002). appellee’s br. 65. psihoyos suggests that he would then have satisfied § 18 narcoleptic dog photos. 16 20 koch & schulz, llp, new york, ny, for 13 on the brief), nelson & mcculloch llp, 7 11 (2013), does not bar application of the discovery rule where precedent, louis psihoyos, 13 motion for remittitur or a new trial. the district court did not abuse its 7 district court explained its reasoning as follows: 6 and the dinamation photo. in explaining its partial denial of psihoyos’s 13 bryant v. media right prods., inc., 603 f.3d 135, 143‐44 (2d cir. 2010) 15 act’s three‐year statute of limitations barred many of psihoyos’s infringement 16 r. civ. p. 56(a). 18 held that an infringement claim does not “accrue” until the copyright holder 4 the district court granted psihoyos’s motion for leave to amend the 9 10 remaining claims relate to the oviraptor, triceratops, gastroliths and (argued: october 31, 2013 decided: april 4, 2014) 7 photographs. . . . now, necessary (and extensive) new discovery . . . 19 other factors a court may consider and the purposes of statutory damages in 19 15 in setting the amount of statutory damages” should consider: 8 congress’ intent to preclude judicial implication of a discovery rule” for 4 applicable three‐year statute of limitations barred none of psihoyos’s 22 4 see auscape int’l v. nat’l geographic soc’y, 409 f. supp. 2d 235, 244 discovery rule by explicitly including a more limited one.” id. (quoting 15 9 12 wiley had filed its summary judgment brief. accordingly, he failed to satisfy 12 psihoyos would later realize, were similar to but not the same as the 4 psihoyos, a professional photographer, created eight photographs that 5 inc. v. ameron homes, inc., 903 f.2d 1486, 1488‐89 (11th cir. 1990) (approving 10 office prior to instituting suit as required by 17 u.s.c. § 411(a). after a jury 1 judgment. first, it held that copyright infringement claims accrue upon 2