Source: http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/opinions/1999/980987-1.htm
Timestamp: 2014-09-02 19:00:40
Document Index: 210614039

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 15', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§\n609', '§ 15']

State v. Holston, 134 NC App 599 (98-987) 08/17/1999
VICTOR KENNETH HOLSTON AKA ROBERT VERNON YOUNG
No. COA98-987
1. Evidence--impeachment--prior violent conduct--specific instance--probative of truthfulness
The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by denying defendant's right to cross-examine a
State's witness with regard to that witness' prior violent conduct because a specific instance of violent conduct
is not admissible for impeachment purposes unless it is probative of truthfulness.
2. Constitutional Law--right to be present at all stages--unwillingness to come into courtroom--jury
recess--not a trial proceeding
The trial court did not violate defendant's right to be present at all stages of his capital trial when it
discussed with defendant's attorney and the State, in defendant's absence, his unwillingness to come into the
courtroom because the jury was in recess at the time of the alleged violation and the conversation concerning
his presence in the courtroom was not in the nature of a trial proceeding.
3. Evidence--expert--exclusion of conversations with defendant--harmless error--substantially the
The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by refusing to allow defendant's expert to relate
the content of his conversations with defendant, after conducting a voir dire, on the grounds that the probative
value of such testimony was outweighed by its confusion because any error was harmless in light of the fact
that the information was substantially the same evidence presented to the jury through the expert's other
4. Evidence--work product--privilege waived
The trial court did not err in requiring defendant's attorney to produce to the State his notes
summarizing defendant's previous medical records, after conducting a voir dire, because even if those notes
constitute work product, the privilege was waived when defendant's attorney provided those same notes to an
expert who relied on them for his testimony. 5. Evidence--impeachment--prior conviction--more than ten years ago--credibility--more probative
than prejudicial
The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by allowing the State to impeach defendant with
a prior conviction for attempted robbery that occurred more than ten years ago because defendant's credibility
was central to the resolution of this case and his prior conviction was more probative than prejudicial. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b). Appeal by defendant from judgment filed 10 February 1997 by Judge
Judson D. DeRamus, Jr. in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 18 May 1999.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney General Jill
Ledford Cheek, for the State.
W. David Lloyd for defendant-appellant.
Victor Holston (Defendant) appeals from a jury conviction of first-
The evidence at trial tended to show that in the months leading up to
15 May 1993 Defendant and Pierre Brown (Brown), the victim in this case,
lived together and had a drug dealing partnership. Prior to 15 May 1993,
their relationship had gone "sour." On the day in question, Brown showed
up at their house with four other friends. Defendant testified that, "he
was afraid because he knew [he] was going to die or be hurt real bad
because Brown had told him to get out of the house, and he had not moved
out." After an initial conversation, Brown and Defendant walked alone to
the street. Defendant then shot Brown five times and claims the shooting
At trial, the State contended Defendant acted with premeditation and
deliberation when he shot Brown. The State called the victim's best
friend, who was present on 15 May 1993, to testify against Defendant. Defendant, in his effort to impeach the witness on cross-examination,
attempted to present evidence that the witness had on at least one occasion
shot at other individuals in a drug turf dispute while acting as the
victim's enforcer. The State objected and the trial court sustained the
objection. One morning during the middle of trial, but before the jury had been
seated after an overnight recess, the trial judge informed Defendant's
attorney and the State that Defendant was refusing to cooperate in being
transported from the jail to the courthouse; that he had refused to get
dressed; had advised jail personnel that if he did come to court, he would
disrupt the proceedings; and that while feigning sickness, had refused to
allow nurses to examine him. The trial court advised counsel that it could
not go forward without Defendant's presence and that Defendant, while
having the ability to stand trial, did not have the inclination. The trial
court ordered the bailiffs to bring Defendant to the courtroom using as
little force as necessary. Later, Defendant entered the courtroom and the
trial resumed.
After the State rested, Defendant presented psychiatrist Dr. Billy
Royal (Dr. Royal) as an expert witness. Earlier, Dr. Royal had conducted a
series of interviews with Defendant in order to determine if he had a
mental illness. Prior to his testimony, however, the State requested the
trial court preclude Dr. Royal from relating to the jury any statements
made by Defendant to him. The trial court ruled that it would conduct a
voir dire at the conclusion of Dr. Royal's testimony and, at that time,
determine whether any of Defendant's statements to Dr. Royal would be
admissible. Until that time, Dr. Royal would be precluded from testifying
as to any statements made to him by Defendant.
Dr. Royal testified that based on several interviews with Defendant,
he diagnosed Defendant as suffering from a "paranoid personality disorder." This illness, Dr. Royal concluded, could have prevented Defendant fromacting with premeditation and deliberation on 15 May 1993. His mental
illness, Dr. Royal opined, caused Defendant to misinterpret the acts of
others as threatening.
The trial court sustained all objections to questions soliciting
Defendant's statements to Dr. Royal made during the interviews. Dr. Royal
did explain, in general terms, that Defendant's behavior, as observed in
these interviews, was very mistrustful and uncooperative. Additionally, he
testified that the way Defendant talked about himself and the way he
perceived others was consistent with the pathology of a "paranoid
personality disorder." Dr. Royal, for example, stated Defendant was
unwilling to cooperate with Dr. Royal because he had a "fear that [his
answers would be] used against him," he "did not trust [Royal]," he "felt
that he had to be eternally vigilant in terms of surviving," and he "was
very concerned about what [Royal] was about and [Royal] had to use all
[his] skills to get him to talk."
At the end of cross-examination and in the absence of the jury, voir
dire was conducted with respect to specific comments Defendant had made to
Dr. Royal. Defendant's attorney summarized for the trial court what Dr.
Royal would have told the jury had he been allowed to testify. This
summary revealed that Defendant: (1) refused to answer any of Dr. Royal's
questions because Dr. Royal would be able to "see into his mind" and think
that he was crazy; (2) did not want a psychiatric defense of any kind; (3)
thought his attorneys and Dr. Royal were collaborating with the State; and
(4) covered up his true feelings about things because he did not want
people to see inside the shell of a person and was basically willing totake whatever comes in life to prevent that. Dr. Royal took the stand and
testified there were no other direct statements Defendant made to him, in
addition to those related by Defendant's attorney, which formed the basis
Following voir dire, the trial court ruled "that [while] such comments
were probative of showing how Dr. Royal formed the basis of his opinions as
to those matters of mental state at the time in question . . . they would
be outweighed . . . [by] the confusion that would result from putting
[Defendant's statements] in through [Dr. Royal]." Thus, the trial court
refused to allow Defendant to present his statements to Dr. Royal into
In addition to the above-mentioned interviews with Defendant, Dr.
Royal testified he also had relied on Defendant's attorney's oral summary
to him of another psychologist's evaluation in forming his opinion that
Defendant suffered from a paranoid personality disorder. Before Dr. Royal
took the stand, Defendant's attorney provided him with a handwritten
summary of this evaluation, which summary had been prepared by Defendant's
attorney after the attorney had reviewed Defendant's medical records,
including a report from another psychologist. After an in-camera hearing,
the trial court found as a fact that Dr. Royal had relied on these notes in
his testimony and the State was entitled, over Defendant's objections, to
be provided a copy of the notes.
After Defendant's psychiatrist testified, Defendant testified in
support of his claim of self-defense. Previously, the State gave written
notice that it intended to impeach Defendant, if Defendant took the stand,with a 1981 conviction for second-degree attempted robbery in New York. Defendant objected and contended that he had been paroled in January of
1984 for that offense, and thus impeachment was barred under Rule 609 of
the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. After conducting a voir dire and
hearing extensive argument, as reflected in fifteen pages of the
transcript, the trial court ruled that "the credibility of the Defendant
would be central to his defense of self-defense . . . the court has weighed
the probative value with respect to credibility against any prejudicial
effect . . . and does find the evidence [of the 1981 conviction] should be
admissible under 609, in the interests of justice."
On his cross-examination, Defendant was asked about, and admitted he
pleaded guilty to, the 1981 conviction for attempted robbery in the second
degree in New York, for which he received a sentence of eighteen to fifty-
four months. He also admitted that he had again pleaded guilty in 1985 to
second-degree attempted robbery, for which he was sentenced to six years to
life, and for which he was released on parole in 1992.
The issues are whether: (I) it was error not to allow Defendant to
impeach the State's witness with questions about the prior violent activity
of that witness; (II) it was error for the trial court to discuss with
trial counsel, in the absence of Defendant, administrative matters
involving Defendant's refusal to cooperate; (III) it was error to prevent
Dr. Royal from relating the statements made by Defendant to him and used by
him to form the basis of his expert opinion of Defendant's mental state at
the time of the homicide; (IV) the State can call upon the court'scompulsory process for the production of portions of Defendant's attorney's
work product where those notes were given to the expert witness and relied
on by that witness in his trial testimony; and (V) it was error under Rule
609 to allow into evidence Defendant's prior conviction for attempted
robbery when Defendant was released from time served for that conviction
more than ten years before the start of the 1997 trial.
[1]/A HREF>Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying him the right
to cross-examine a State's witness with regard to that witness's prior
violent conduct. We disagree.
Under Rule 608(b), evidence of a specific instance of conduct is not
admissible for impeachment purposes unless it "is in fact probative of
truthfulness." State v. Lamb, 321 N.C. 633, 647, 365 S.E.2d 600, 607
(1988); see N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (1992). Evidence of specific
instances of violent conduct of a party against others is irrelevant to the
question of a person's truthfulness. Lamb, 321 N.C. at 647, 365 S.E.2d at
607. Because the testimony Defendant sought to elicit in this case related
to instances of violence of the witness, the trial court properly sustained
the State's objections.
[2]Defendant argues his unwaivable right to be present at all stages
of his capital trial was violated when the trial court discussed in his
absence, with Defendant's attorney and the State, his unwillingness to come
into the courtroom. We disagree.
As a general proposition, a defendant is entitled to be present "ateach and every stage of trial." State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 215, 410
S.E.2d 832, 840 (1991). A time of jury recess is not considered a stage of
the trial, unless during that recess some "trial proceedings" are
conducted. Id. at 217, 410 S.E.2d at 841. In this case, the jury was in
recess at the time of the alleged violation and the conversation concerning
Defendant's presence in the courtroom was not in the nature of a "trial
proceeding." Accordingly, Defendant's constitutional rights were not
[3]As a general proposition, an expert, who is qualified to offer his
findings and diagnosis of a defendant, also must be permitted to testify
"as to the content of the conversations with [a] defendant in order to show
the basis for his diagnosis." State v. Ward, 338 N.C. 64, 106, 449 S.E.2d
709, 732 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1134, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1995);
see N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) (1992); cf. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 705
(1992). "The [trial] court [, however,] should . . . exercise care in the
manner in which such testimony is elicited, so that the jury may understand
that the case history does not constitute factual evidence, unless
corroborated by other competent evidence." Ward, 338 N.C. at 106, 449
S.E.2d at 732. Furthermore, the testimony must be consistent with "the
rules of competency, relevancy and materiality," McClain v. Otis Elevator
Co., 106 N.C. App. 45, 49, 415 S.E.2d 78, 80 (1992); State v. Baldwin, 330
N.C. 446, 457, 412 S.E.2d 31, 38 (1992) (if "content of the conversations"
is not "reasonably necessary" for an explanation of the basis of theexpert's conclusions, then trial court is justified in excluding the
evidence as not relevant), and its probate value must not be outweighed by
its prejudicial value, Baldwin, 330 N.C. at 456; 412 S.E.2d at 37; N.C.G.S.
§ 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992).
In this case, the trial court refused to allow Dr. Royal, Defendant's
expert, to relate the content of his conversations with Defendant on the
grounds that the probative value of such testimony was outweighed by "the
confusion that would result from putting [Defendant's statements] in
through [Dr. Royal]." We can reverse that ruling only upon a showing that
it "was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result
of a reasoned decision." State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30, 41, 347 S.E.2d 783,
789 (1986). Assuming, without deciding, the trial court did abuse its
discretion, any error was harmless, as substantially the same information
as that contained in the excluded testimony was presented to the jury in
answers given by Dr. Royal to other questions. See Ward, 338 N.C. at 106,
449 S.E.2d at 732. Although the admitted evidence is somewhat different
from the excluded statements of Defendant, the differences are not material
and Defendant has not met his burden of showing there is a reasonable
possibility a different result would have been reached had the excluded
evidence been admitted. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1997).
[4]Work product is a qualified privilege for certain materials
prepared by an attorney acting on behalf of his client in anticipation of
litigation. State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 126, 235 S.E.2d 828, 840-41
(1977). The doctrine applies in criminal as well as civil cases. Id. Assuming, without deciding, Defendant's attorney's summary of
Defendant's previous medical records constitutes work product, the
privilege was waived in this case. Id. (work product privilege can be
waived). The waiver occurred when Defendant's attorney provided Dr. Royal,
prior to Dr. Royal's testimony, the very notes he now contends should be
shielded from discovery and Dr. Royal relied on those notes in his
testimony. See id. (State waived privilege when it called witness and
witness made use of work product in his testimony).
[5]Rule 609 allows a defendant's prior convictions to be offered into
evidence when he takes the stand and thereby places his credibility at
issue. State v. Chandler, 100 N.C. App. 706, 710, 398 S.E.2d 337, 339
(1990); N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(a) (1992). Evidence of a conviction is
not admissible, however, if more than "10 years has elapsed since the date
of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b) (1992). Nonetheless, a conviction that is
outside this ten-year rule is admitted properly if the trial court makes
"findings as to the specific facts and circumstances which demonstrate the
probative value [substantially] outweighs the prejudicial effect" of the
evidence. (See footnote 1) State v. Hensley, 77 N.C. App. 192, 195, 334 S.E.2d 783, 785
(1985), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 393, 338 S.E.2d 882 (1986); see
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b). Some factors properly considered by thetrial court in determining if a conviction over ten years old should be
admitted include: the impeachment value of the prior crime(s); the
remoteness of the prior crime(s); and the centrality of the defendant's
credibility. 4 Joseph M. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Federal Evidence §
609.04[2][a] (2d ed. 1999).
In this case, the trial court conducted an extensive hearing on the
Rule 609(b) motion and entered findings of fact revealing that it believed
the credibility of Defendant's testimony was central to the resolution of
this case and that evidence of the 1981 conviction was therefore more
probative than prejudicial. Although the findings are minimal, we believe
they are legally sufficient in this case, as they indicate the trial court
exercised meaningful discretion in weighing the probative value of the 1981
conviction against its prejudicial effect. Furthermore, Defendant's
credibility was central to the resolution of this case. He testified he
acted in self defense and this testimony was in direct contradiction to all
the evidence offered by the State. The evidence of the 1981 conviction for
attempted robbery was a factor properly presented to the jury for their
consideration in evaluating Defendant's credibility. (See footnote 2) See State v. Lynch,
337 N.C. 415, 420, 445 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1994) (robbery is a crime of
dishonesty and a prior conviction is admissible under Rule 609(b)).
Footnote: 1 There is a rebuttable presumption that "prior convictions more
than ten years old tend to be more prejudicial to a defendant's
defense than probative of his general character for truthfulness." State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 119, 405 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1991).Footnote: 2 Even assuming the trial court erred in admitting the 1
attempted robbery conviction, Defendant has not met his burden of
showing there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have
reached a different result had this evidence not been admitted. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1997).