Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/957/26/1731/
Timestamp: 2020-02-28 06:56:33
Document Index: 500811232

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1904', '§ 751', '§ 1904', '§ 211', '§ 754', '§ 3172']

Energy Mgt. P 26,666united States of America, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Glenn Martin Heller, D/b/a Beacon Hill Gulf, Defendant, Appellant, 957 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1992) :: Justia
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Energy Mgt. P 26,666united States of America, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Glenn Martin Heller, D/b/a Beacon Hill Gulf, Defendant, Appellant, 957 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1992)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 957 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1992) Submitted Jan. 21, 1992. Decided Feb. 19, 1992
This appeal is from a district court judgment enforcing a remedial order issued by the Department of Energy and ordering Heller, a gasoline retailer, to pay $159,689.95 in civil penalties and in restitution for customer overcharges. Heller does not dispute the government's assertion that this case arises under the Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, and the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq. Accordingly, TECA has exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, § 211(b) (2); 15 U.S.C. § 754(a) (1). This court has no jurisdiction.
This statutory language makes it clear that in order for the transferor court to decide whether the statutory requirements for transfer are met, the transferor court must first decide whether the appeal could have been brought in the transferee court at the time it was filed. Thus, for the purpose of deciding whether we should transfer the case, we must inquire whether TECA would have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Keller v. Petsock, 849 F.2d 839, 843 (3d Cir. 1988); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Departmental Grant Appeals Board, 815 F.2d 778, 784 (1st Cir. 1987); Billops v. Dep't of the Air Force, 725 F.2d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1984). In doing so, of course, we must apply TECA's rules and precedents as we believe TECA would apply them.
TECA has made it clear that "[t]he only ground for extending the prescribed time for filing a notice of appeal which this court will consider is 'a showing of unique circumstances.' Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., supra, 371 U.S. at 217 [83 S. Ct. 283, 285, 9 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1962) ]...." Reed v. Kroger Co., 478 F.2d 1268, 1271 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 1973). Thus, Heller's only hope to avoid dismissal of his appeal for lack of jurisdiction is to make a showing of "unique circumstances."
We now entertain Heller's allegations because an appellate court is the proper forum to determine whether the doctrine of unique circumstances should apply in a given case (although the appellate court may choose to remand the matter to the trial court for factual determinations, if necessary). Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 1360, 1365 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Provan, 74 B.R. 717, 720 (9th Cir.B.A.P.1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988). We see no need for a remand here because we conclude that even if Heller could demonstrate all of the factual assertions contained in his response to our show cause order, the unique circumstances doctrine would not apply.
The doctrine permitting a late appeal in cases of "unique circumstances" is a judge-made doctrine created by the Supreme Court. See Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203, 84 S. Ct. 699, 11 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1964) (per curiam); Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 84 S. Ct. 397, 11 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1964) (per curiam); Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 83 S. Ct. 283, 9 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1962) (per curiam). The doctrine may be on shaky ground. Four Justices have rejected the doctrine in a dissent. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 282, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 2388, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Many courts have questioned its continuing vitality. See, e.g., Pinion v. Dow Chemical, 928 F.2d 1522, 1529 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 438, 116 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1991), and cases cited therein; Varhol v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1562 (7th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court, however, passed up an opportunity to repudiate it in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179, 109 S. Ct. 987, 993, 103 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1989). In the absence of express overruling by the Supreme Court, courts of appeals generally have continued to assume that the doctrine remains viable. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Moses, 951 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1991); Pinion, supra, 928 F.2d at 1530; Varhol, supra, 909 F.2d at 1562. TECA has not to date expressed any doubt on that point.
The Supreme Court in Osterneck stated that the unique circumstances exception, as articulated in Thompson, supra, 375 U.S. 384, 84 S. Ct. 397, "applies only where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done." Osterneck, supra, 489 U.S. at 179, 109 S. Ct. at 993. TECA has indicated that it views the exception to be a "limited concept" with "narrow confines." United States v. Beacon Bay Enterprises, Inc., 840 F.2d 921, 923 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 1988). The court has restated the doctrine as follows:
United States v. Wickland, 619 F.2d 75, 79-80 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393, 1399 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 1973)). TECA also has stated that an attorney's ignorance of TECA's 30-day limit, assuming in error that the 60-day limit of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) (1) would apply, did not constitute "unique circumstances" that would permit the granting of a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal. Beacon Bay Enterprises, Inc., supra, 840 F.2d at 924.
There has been some disagreement among the circuits about the scope of the doctrine, specifically about the extent to which misleading actions or statements by a judicial officer that fall short of an affirmative assurance may satisfy the doctrine. See Pinion, supra, 928 F.2d at 1530-31. In the wake of Osterneck, courts generally have insisted on the requirement "that the doctrine applies only where a court has affirmatively assured a party that its appeal will be timely." In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304, 310 (9th Cir. 1990); Green v. Bisby, 869 F.2d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1989). We need not concern ourselves with that issue here, however, because Heller has alleged that he received specific, affirmative assurances that his appeal would be timely if filed within 60 days.
The issue here, instead, is that Heller alleges affirmative assurances only by clerk's office personnel, not by a judge. The Supreme Court authorities which established the unique circumstances doctrine (Harris, Thompson, and Wolfsohn) all involved misleading statements or actions by a district judge. In Osterneck, the petitioners claimed that the doctrine should apply "because certain statements made by the District Court, as well as certain actions taken by the District Court, the District Court Clerk, and the Court of Appeals, led them to believe that their notice of appeal was timely." Osterneck, supra, 489 U.S. at 178, 109 S. Ct. at 993 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, ruling that the requirement of a "specific assurance" was not met, did not expressly address the question whether a specific assurance from the district court clerk could have been sufficient. The Court did say, however, that "specific assurance by a judicial officer" was necessary. We understand the term "judicial officer" in this context to mean a judge, not an employee in the office of the clerk. See United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1981) (the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3172(1), defines "judicial officer" to mean any federal district judge or magistrate judge, and was meant to exclude district court clerks and any persons acting on behalf of the court); United States v. Harris, 544 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 1976) (the Bail Reform Act's definition of "judicial officer" "means any federal judge or magistrate").
The Eleventh Circuit, it is true, has extended the doctrine to include misleading statements or actions by the district court clerk's office. In Willis v. Newsome, 747 F.2d 605 (11th Cir. 1984), appellant's counsel alleged that the district court clerk told him, on the last day of the 30-day appeal period, that a notice of appeal mailed on that day would be stamped with that day's date according to local custom. In reliance on this advice, appellant's counsel passed up the chance to effect timely filing by hand delivery and instead mailed the notice of appeal, which was received, filed, and stamped late. In addition, because no one in the clerk's office told counsel that the appeal had been stamped late, counsel failed to timely file a Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) (5) motion to extend the time for appeal. The Eleventh Circuit remanded to the district court for factual findings as to whether counsel had reasonably and in good faith relied upon the clerk's misrepresentation, but ruled that if counsel had, then the unique circumstances doctrine would apply. The court stated:
The Seventh Circuit has disagreed. In Sonicraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1987), appellant faced a deadline of thirty days to appeal to the Seventh Circuit from the NLRB's denial of a request for attorneys' fees. Appellant's counsel mailed the petition for review within the 30-day period, but it was received--and hence "filed"--late. Counsel claimed that he had relied on advice from a staff attorney employed by the Seventh Circuit, who told counsel that a petition mailed within thirty days would be timely. The court noted that, in fact, counsel had apparently spoken to a clerk's office employee who was not an attorney, not to a staff attorney, but ruled that "[w]hether or not there was misleading advice and whether or not it came from a staff attorney, it cannot extend the deadline for filing the petition for review. The deadline ... is jurisdictional, meaning we can't waive it; if we can't, neither can the court's nonjudicial personnel." Id. at 387. The court went on to point out that the unique circumstances doctrine "is limited to the situation where the district court (or, we suppose, other tribunal) assures a party that he has time to appeal, and the party relies and foregoes filing a timely appeal." Id. The court opined that to apply the doctrine to clerk's office employees would require extending it, which the court had "no inclination" to do. After all, the court concluded: "Subordinate employees of the judiciary have no authority to waive congressional limitations on judicial power." Id.
Other courts, too, have declined to extend the doctrine to the clerk's office. See Neeley v. Murchison, 815 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir. 1987) (counsel's reliance on incorrect oral assurances of clerk's office employees does not render timely counsel's late filing of dischargeability complaint); In re Frontier Airlines, Inc., 108 B.R. 274, 276 (D. Colo. 1989) (states that "[r]eliance on the statements, action, or inaction by the clerk of the court normally will not justify application of the doctrine of unique circumstances," but notes, citing Willis, supra, 747 F.2d 605, that the doctrine may apply where "the misleading action of the clerk has related to the time period for filing the notice of appeal, not its legal effect").
More important, TECA itself has emphatically refused to apply the unique circumstances doctrine in a case where appellant's counsel pleaded reliance on the oral advice of a district court clerk. In Reed v. Kroger Co., 478 F.2d 1268 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 1973), appellant's counsel filed a notice of appeal in person with the clerk of the district court within TECA's 30-day limit. Counsel alleged that on that occasion, he conversed with the clerk, made it clear to the clerk that the appeal was to TECA and not to the Seventh Circuit, and asked whether he was following proper procedure under TECA rules. The clerk assured him that he was. In fact, however, he was not, because at that time TECA Rule 15(a) expressly stated that a notice of appeal "shall be filed with the clerk of this court [i.e., TECA] within 30 days" of entry of judgment. By the time counsel's notice of appeal reached the clerk of TECA, the time for appeal had long since expired.1 Counsel argued that the appeal should nevertheless be treated as timely under the unique circumstances doctrine.
Id. at 1271-72. See also Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 F.2d 927, 930 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 1976) ("attorneys may not escape from their procedural errors by claiming reliance on a district court clerk's advice").
The deadline for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and therefore not waivable by TECA. The unique circumstances doctrine, if it retains any vitality, "jostles uneasily" with this principle, Sonicraft, supra, 814 F.2d at 387, and must therefore be narrowly construed. See Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1988). We conclude (and we believe that TECA would conclude) that narrow construction requires that clerk's office personnel not be, in effect, empowered to bring about the waiver of fundamental jurisdictional requirements for pro se litigants merely by giving out incorrect or misleading advice. We agree with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Sonicraft, supra, 814 F.2d at 387, that the unique circumstances doctrine "is limited to the situation where the district court (or, we suppose, other tribunal) assures a party that he has time to appeal." (Emphasis added). After all, the Supreme Court in Osterneck, supra, 489 U.S. at 179, 109 S. Ct. at 993, has required "specific assurance by a judicial officer."
Any such hardship perhaps is mitigated in the case of Heller, who has had at least three counselled appeals decided by TECA. See United States v. Heller, 726 F.2d 756 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 1983); United States v. Heller, slip op., no. 1-12 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 6/9/82); United States v. Heller, 635 F.2d 848 (Temp.Emer. Ct. App. 1980). Presumably, therefore, Heller could have afforded counsel in this appeal as well, or if he could not, he at least had some reason to understand or suspect that his appeal was to TECA, not to this court, and would be governed by TECA rules.