Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/612/6/410593/
Timestamp: 2020-05-30 10:42:59
Document Index: 703992547

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 8', '§ 158']

Abilities and Goodwill, Inc., Etc., Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Etc., Respondent, 612 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1979 › Abilities and Goodwill, Inc., Etc., Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Etc., Respondent
Abilities and Goodwill, Inc., Etc., Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Etc., Respondent, 612 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 612 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1979) Argued Sept. 11, 1979. Decided Dec. 18, 1979
The National Relations Board found that Abilities and Goodwill, Inc. (Goodwill) violated § 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), by discharging 21 employees who announced that they would not return to work until Goodwill rehired its fired Director of Rehabilitation. Goodwill has petitioned this court pursuant to § 10(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
The employees, however, do have an interest in the composition of management personnel, and in exceptional circumstances this interest may outweigh that of management. Thus, when the particular management official involved is a low level foreman or supervisor who deals directly with the employees, and the employees' concern with the identity of that person is directly related to the terms and condition of their employment, both the Board and the courts have found that employee protests over changes in supervisory personnel may be protected. See NLRB v. Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498, 503 (10th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845, 69 S. Ct. 68, 93 L. Ed. 395 (1948).
In so proceeding, courts have generally held over Board protest than employee strikes over changes in even low level supervisory personnel are not protected. See Henning & Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, supra; American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, supra; Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, supra. On the other hand, courts have found protected the writing of letters expressing opposition, NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.) Cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845, 69 S. Ct. 68, 93 L. Ed. 395 (1948), or the simple voicing of complaints, NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). By thus examining both the substantive interest and the means of advancing it, courts have balanced more finely the competing interests involved. The result is a general absence of Per se rules. In some situations, with very low level supervisors and a close nexus to actual, preexisting work conditions protests, employee strikes may even be protected. NLRB v. Okla-Inn, supra.
The Board nevertheless contends that the Supreme Court opinion in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9, 82 S. Ct. 1099, 8 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1962) bars such a finely calibrated reasonableness test. That argument, however, was considered and rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, and rightly so. The Supreme Court's dictum about the irrelevance of the reasonableness of employee protest in Washington Aluminum concerned the decision of a group of employees to leave an unheated factory on an extremely cold day in winter. "The conditions there were within the proper realm of employee interest, and the walkout, while extreme under the circumstances, was reasonably related to the complaint." Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, supra at 539. It could hardly be argued that leaving a cold work place is not a reasonably related means of protesting and avoiding the intolerable conditions left behind. More importantly, Washington Aluminum did not involve the peculiar issue of changes in supervisory personnel. This issue in unique in that such changes have only recently been regarded as matters of legitimate employee concern and even then subject to the legitimate claim of employers to a minimum of interference in this area.
Moreover, if, as the Board argues, Eisenhart had assumed the role of handling employee grievances, it only serves to strengthen our finding since the specific language of the Act recognizes the employer's interest in remaining free of employee interference in managerial decisions regarding the selection of personnel for handling employee grievances. § 8(b) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B). See NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941, 948 (1st Cir. 1961) (Aldrich, J., concurring).
The only exceptions recognized by the Board are those protests which are in contravention of the basic policies of the Act, See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S. Ct. 508, 83 L. Ed. 682 (1939) (strike in breach of collective bargaining agreement), otherwise unlawful, See Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 62 S. Ct. 886, 86 L. Ed. 1246 (1942) (mutiny under the Criminal Code), violent, See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 S. Ct. 490, 83 L. Ed. 627 (1939), or "indefensible", See NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 74 S. Ct. 172, 98 L. Ed. 195 (1953) (unjustifiable attack on employer's product)