Source: https://casetext.com/case/martinez-v-heckler-2
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 07:58:27
Document Index: 584586176

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 416']

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771 | Casetext
807 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1986)
Martinezv.Heckler
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth CircuitNov 13, 1986
Argued and Submitted November 4, 1986.
Decided November 13, 1986. Designated for Publication January 7, 1987. As Corrected January 16, 1987.
Martin Taller, Rucker Tucker, Anaheim, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
David R. Mazzi, Dept. of Health Human Services, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
I [3] FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
II [6] STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Secretary's decision denying benefits will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1985), amended on other grounds, No. 85-3726 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1986). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). We consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Secretary's conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Swanson v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 763 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985).
III [8] ANALYSIS
To qualify for disability benefits, the claimant must establish that a medically determinable physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful activity. The claimant must demonstrate that the impairment is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Jones, 760 F.2d at 995; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the impairment must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1452; 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
In hearings arising out of a claimant's initial application for benefits, the claimant has the burden of proving he is disabled. Swanson, 763 F.2d at 1064; Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1452. The claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability by showing that a physical or mental impairment prevents him from performing his previous occupation. Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1452. The burden then shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can perform other types of work existing in the national economy, given his residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. Id. See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(f), 404.1560-.1568 (1985).
Assuming . . . that the claimant retains the ability to stand and walk, sufficient to do light work, however he is unable to do the lifting requirements for light work. That is, his lifting would be restricted to no more than 5 to 10 pounds maximum. . . .
[and] assuming . . . that the claimant had to change positions during the day, but could otherwise work at a bench, that is, he would have to alternate standing and sitting, . . . would he be able to do those jobs that were outlined by you?
Assuming . . . that Mr. Martinez was limited as far as his walking ability so that he couldn't walk more than . . . 1/2 block at a time, that he had to walk with a cane, and also assuming that he could not stand more than a half hour at a time, and then after the first half hour his limitation would even be further reduced, . . . ."
As we also stated, "[s]ection 423(d)(5)(A) states that an individual's statement as to pain . . . shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability. . . . Objective medical evidence of pain . . . must be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether the individual is under a disability." Id. The hypothetical suggested by claimant's counsel added considerations more restrictive than those suggested by the ALJ. Based on his evaluation of the evidence, the administrative law judge was free to accept or reject those restrictions. Administrative hearings are uniquely suited for such factual determinations, and we will not overturn them as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1985); Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). The claimant was examined numerous times by several physicians. Although there is some conflicting evidence, clearly, the weight of medical evidence supports the hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ.
Martinez also argues that the district court erred in not considering the vocational expert's testimony regarding Martinez's need to alternatively sit and stand due to pain limitations. The ALJ asked the expert to assess the number of jobs that the claimant could perform if the claimant were limited in his lifting abilities, and "could otherwise work at a bench, . . . [but] would have to alternate standing and sitting, . . . ." (Emphasis added) Clearly, in answering the ALJ, Dr. Workman's estimate of the number of available jobs reflected consideration of this limitation. A review of the colloquy between the ALJ and Dr. Workman reveals that the ALJ took this limitation into consideration in making his decision.
Although the Graves court found that the availability of jobs was limited by the employment practices of employers, Congress has explicitly determined that it is the existence of jobs that is essential, and that an administrative law judge is not required to consider the hiring practices of employers, or whether a claimant could actually obtain work if he applied for it. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2) states:
Id. (emphasis added). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b)(1), (3) (7); This circuit has consistently held, in accordance with these statutes and regulations, that the definition of disability is based upon the existence of jobs in significant numbers in the national economy. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1975); Torske v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 59, 60 (9th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 993, 94 S.Ct. 2646, 41 L.Ed.2d 237; Waters v. Gardner, 452 F.2d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 1971); Chavies v. Finch, 443 F.2d 356, 357 (9th Cir. 1971). "The courts cannot rewrite the definition of disability laid down by Congress." Sorenson at 1118-19. Graves is inconsistent with the law of this circuit, and is not controlling in this case.
The claimant urges us to ignore the number of jobs he is able to perform with his limitations and to analyze the ratio of jobs to the general population of the Greater Metropolitan Los Angeles and Orange County area. We decline. Even if we had credible numbers on total existing light jobs, an analysis of the ratio of light jobs the claimant could perform to the total existing light jobs, as applied in Graves, is unwarranted. The plain language of the regulations do not contemplate a ratio analysis. The regulations speak in terms of whether a significant number of jobs exist that the claimant is capable of performing.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1566 states in pertinent part:
(b) How we determine the existence of work. Work exists in the national economy when there is a significant number of jobs . . . having requirements which you are able to meet with your physical or mental abilities and vocational qualifications. Isolated jobs that exist only in very limited numbers in relatively few locations outside of the region where you live are not considered "work which exists in the national economy". We will not deny you disability benefits on the basis of the existence of these kinds of jobs.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(b) (emphasis added).
IV [29] CONCLUSION