Source: http://mi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190613_0001072.WMI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-01-20 20:13:35
Document Index: 103426197

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 636', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 423', 'art 404']

FindACase™ | Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security
CHRISTINE NELSON, Plaintiff,
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for Disability Income Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States Magistrate Judges to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition of social security appeals, the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff was 38 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (PageID.207). She successfully completed high school and worked previously as a sterilizer of medical equipment. (PageID.56). Plaintiff applied for benefits on March 26, 2015, alleging that she had been disabled since September 3, 2013, due to fibromyalgia, back pain, chronic pain, depression, anxiety, and mood disorder. (PageID.207-13, 230).
Plaintiffs application was denied, after which time she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID. 102-204). On July 12, 2017, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Nicholas Ohanesian with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (PageID.63-100). In a written decision dated November 2, 2017, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.46-58). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.30-34). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiffs shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) fibromyalgia; (2) status-post left common iliac vein occlusion; (3) obesity; (4) depressive disorder; (5) major depressive disorder; (6) chronic pain syndrome; (7) degenerative disc disease [status-post fusion at L4-5]; (8) bi-polar disorder; (9) generalized anxiety disorder; (10) an eating disorder; and (11) borderline personality disorder, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.49-51).
With respect to Plaintiffs residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform sedentary work subject to the following limitations: (1) she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) she can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; (3) she can tolerate frequent exposure to extreme cold, wetness, and vibration; (4) she can ...