Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/284/299/
Timestamp: 2013-12-13 09:43:30
Document Index: 437410063

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1006', '§ 692', '§ 692', '§ 2', '§ 696', '§ 696', '§ 34', '§ 312', '§ 312']

BLOCKBURGER v. UNITED STATES. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews BLOCKBURGER v. UNITED STATES.
284 U.S. 299 (52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306)
Argued: and Submitted Nov. 24, 1931.
[HTML] On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Harry Blockburger was convicted of violating certain provisions of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act. To review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals 50 F.(2d) 795, affirming the judgment of conviction, the defendant brings certiorari.
The petitioner was charged with violating provisions of the Harrison Narcotic Act, c. 1, § 1, 38 Stat. 785, as amended by c. 18, § 1006, 40 Stat. 1057, 1131 (U. S. C. Title 26, § 692 26 USCA § 692);
and c. 1, § 2, 38 Stat. 785, 786 (U. S. C., Title 26, § 696 26 USCA § 696).
The indictment contained five counts. The jury returned a verdict against petitioner upon the second, third, and fifth counts only. Each of these counts charged a sale of morphine hydrochloride to the same purchaser. The second count charged a sale on a specified day of ten grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped package; the third count charged a sale on the following day of eight grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped package; the fifth count charged the latter sale also as having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the purchaser as required by the statute. The court sentenced petitioner to five years' imprisonment and a fine of $2,000 upon each count, the terms of imprisonment to run consecutively; and this judgment was affirmed on appeal. (C. C. A.) 50 F.(2d) 795.
The Narcotic Act does not create the offense of engaging in the business of selling the forbidden drugs, but penalizes any sale made in the absence of either of the qualifying requirements set forth. Each of several successive sales constitutes a distinct offense, however closely they may follow each other. The distinction stated by Mr. Wharton is that, 'when the impulse is single, but one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may continue. If successive impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a common stream of action, separate indictments lie.' Wharton's Criminal Law (11th Ed.) § 34. Or, as stated in note 3 to that section, 'The test is whether the individual acts are prohibited, or the course of action which they constitute. If the former, then each act is punishable separately. * * * If the latter, there can be but one penalty.' In the present case, the first transaction, resulting in a sale, had come to an end. The next sale was not the result of the original impulse, but of a fresh onethat is to say, of a new bargain. The question is controlled, not by the Snow Case, but by such cases as that of Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625, 35 S. Ct. 710, 59 L. Ed. 1151. There the accused was convicted under several counts of a willful tearing, etc., of mail bags with intent to rob. The court (page 628 of 237 U. S., 35 S. Ct. 710, 711) stated the question to be 'whether one who, in the same transaction, tears or cuts successively mail bags of the United States used in conveyance of the mails, with intent to rob or steal any such mail, is guilty of a single offense, or of additional offenses because of each successive cutting with the criminal intent charged.' Answerint this question, the court, after quoting the statute, section 189, Criminal Code, (U. S. C. title 18, § 312 18 USCA § 312) said (page 629 of 237 U. S., 35 S. Ct. 710, 711):