Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20120524_0007021.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-17 00:53:55
Document Index: 75129077

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 12132', '§ 1367', '§ 905', '§ 911']

On September 2, 2009, Plaintiff Donnie Ray O'Neal, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff's Complaint is now before the Court for screening.
The Complaint names the following individuals as Defendants in this action: (1) Director, California Department of Corrections (CDC); (2) K. Allison, Warden, California State Prison, Corcoran (Corcoran); (3) A. Enenmoh, Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Corcoran; (4) T. Byers, Physicians Assistant, Corcoran; (5) M. Crum, Health Care Appeals Coordinator, Corcoran; (6) G. Miller, Health Care Appeals Coordinator, Corcoran; and (7)
R. Rottman, M.D., Corcoran.
Plaintiff alleges the following: On February 25, 2009, Plaintiff entered the specialty clinic at Corcoran for an appointment with an audiologist. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff is deaf; his disability is well- documented in medical records. (Id. at 3.) At the clinic Defendant Byers perceived that Plaintiff answered a question while Byers' back was turned, concluded that Plaintiff was not in fact deaf, and revoked Plaintiff's "Disabled Persons Placement." (Id. at 3, 4.) Defendant Enenmoh, as the CMO at Corcoran, is responsible for the conduct of Defendant Byers. (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff filed a medical complaint against Defendant Byers before the end of February, 2009. (Id. at 4.) On March 27, 2009, Defendant Crum gave an initial response advising that Plaintiff's complaint was being reviewed for sufficiency. On April 17, 2009, a Health Care Appeals notice informed Plaintiff that his complaint was being treated as a Staff Complaint and that Plaintiff would receive a response before April 21, 2009. Defendant Crum notified Plaintiff on May 28, 2009, that the response date had been moved to June 28, 2009, "due to staffing/workload issues." (Id. at 5.)
After the May notice, Plaintiff was seen by an audiologist who reported that Defendant Byers had requested a retest and "different results." (Id.) The audiologist refused and stated that his previous tests were consistent with Plaintiff's medical records. (Id.)
On May 31, 2009, Plaintiff requested that the medical appeals department return Plaintiff's original complaint so that Plaintiff could exhaust his administrative remedies. On June 2, 2009, the appeals office advised that Plaintiff's complaint was still being reviewed. On June 3, 2009, Plaintiff again asked that the complaint be returned and sent this request to Defendant Crum. An appeals office response, dated June 8, 2009, stated that Plaintiff should receive a response by the end of the week. (Id. at 6.)
On July 14, 2009, not having received a response, Plaintiff filed a general complaint against the Health Care Appeals Coordinator for violating Plaintiff's due process rights. On July 24, 2009, Defendant Miller partially granted that complaint and advised that a response to the original February, 2009, complaint would be forthcoming as soon as possible. As of August 25, 2009, Plaintiff still had not received a response. (Id. at 7.) If the response is delayed because CMO Enenmoh simply failed to review it, the delay amounts to deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Enenmoh. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; he asks the Court to award damages and injunctive relief.*fn1 Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend the Complaint at a future date so that he may include claims against Defendant Rottman, who allegedly withheld the true results of an M.R.I. in an attempt to avoid treating Plaintiff and save the prison money.*fn2 (Id. at 8.)
Aside from naming them as Defendants, the Complaint makes no mention of the CDC Director or Warden Allison. A defendant in a § 1983 action must be linked to the alleged violation with some affirmative act or omission. Plaintiff has failed to link these Defendants to any alleged violation; his claims against the Director and Warden are dismissed with leave to amend.
Defendant Enenmoh is mentioned in the body of the Complaint, but the Complaint does not sufficiently link him to any alleged violations. Plaintiff speculates that Enenmoh may be involved in the absence of a response to Plaintiff's February, 2009, complaint. Guessing that a Defendant may be liable is not sufficient. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. In order to state a claim, Plaintiff must plead factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Id. Moreover, the mere fact that Defendant Enenmoh supervised Defendant Byers is not enough. Id. at 1948. Defendants may only be held liable in a supervisory capacity if they "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint in this regard. In order to state a claim, Plaintiff needs to set forth sufficient facts showing that each Defendant personally took some action that violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Plaintiff alleges that he submitted an inmate complaint in February, 2009, regarding Defendant Byers' decision to revoke Plaintiff's status as disabled. Defendants Crum and Miller, Health Care Appeals Coordinators, repeatedly stated that Plaintiff's response was delayed. As of August 25, 2009, just prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiff had still not received a response. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Crum and Miller's failure to respond violated his due process rights.
Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to file prison grievances but does not have a right to any particular response. Johnson v. Subia, 2010 WL 3767732, *2 n. 3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2010). "An inmate has no due process rights regarding the proper handling of grievances." Wise v. Washington State Department of Corrections, 244 Fed.Appx. 106, 108 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1282 (2008).
Plaintiff has neither a liberty interest nor a substantive right to the procedures involved in inmate appeals. Plaintiff fails to state a claim in this regard. Because amendment of this claim would be futile, leave to amend will not be granted.
Defendant Byers' alleged misperception regarding Plaintiff's ability to hear at least implicates the Eighth Amendment's requirement that prisoners be afforded adequate conditions of confinement and medical care. However, there are no factual allegations indicating the decision to remove Plaintiff's disabled persons status posed a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff's health or safety and that any of the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk.
Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend. In order to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege truthful facts demonstrating that (1) the removal of the disabled persons status posed a substantial risk to either Plaintiff's health or safety and (2) a Defendant was deliberately indifferent to that risk. "Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard." Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). "Under this standard, the prison official must not only 'be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,' but that person 'must also draw the inference.'" Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). "'If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.'" Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).
The Court also has considered whether Plaintiff's allegations could be read to allege a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) but concluded they do not state such a claim. Title II of the ADA "prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability." Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA applies to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Arizona, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must allege: (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability. Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1021; McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has held that Title II of the ADA permits prisoners to bring actions against state officials in their official capacities, but not in their individual capacities. See Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that "Title II's statutory language does not prohibit . . . injunctive action against state officials in their official capacities").
Plaintiff alleges various state law causes of action against Defendant Byers: "fraud, medical malpractice, [and] practicing without a license . . . ." (Compl. at 4.) The Court does not reach the viability of Plaintiff's state law claims at this time because the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims unless Plaintiff is able to state a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001).
If Plaintiff chooses to pursue his state law claims in his amended complaint, he must demonstrate compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Under the California Tort Claims Act (CTCA), a plaintiff may not maintain an action for damages against a public employee unless he has presented a written claim to the state Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board within six months of accrual of the action. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905, 911.2(a), 945.4 & 950.2; Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff may file a written application for leave to file a late claim up to one year after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov't Code § 911.4. The purpose of CTCA's presentation requirement is "to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation." City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 706 (1974). Thus, in pleading a state law claim, plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that he has complied with CTCA's presentation requirement. State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde), 90 P.3d 116, 119 (2004). Failure to demonstrate compliance constitutes a failure to state a cause of action and will result in the dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims. Id.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form and (2) a copy of his Complaint, filed September 2, 2009;