Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19821213-958781
Timestamp: 2017-04-27 01:37:07+00:00
Document Index: 193137118

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 25", "l'article 25", "l'article 149", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 2", "l'article 5", "l'article 25", "l'article 25", "l'article 6", "l'article 25", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 25", "l'article 26", "l'article 25", "l'article 26", "l'article 27"]

X. c. FRANCE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche X. c. FRANCE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9587/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1982-12-13;9587.81 Analyses : (Art. 13) DROIT A UN RECOURS EFFECTIF, (Art. 35-1) EPUISEMENT DES VOIES DE RECOURS INTERNES, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLEParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : FRANCETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9587/81 X . v/FRANCE X . c/FRANC E DECISION of 13 December 1982 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 13 dÃ©cembre 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 26 of the Convention : The Contracting States cannot, on their own authorirv . put aside the rule of contpliance with the six-months time limit. The deposit bv a State of a declaration made under Article 25 of the Conventinn does not affect the runnittg of this delav . Commission's competence ratione temporis : In the absence ofany stipulation to rhe contrary in the declaration made by a State in accordance with Article 25 of the Corrvention, the Commission is competent to examine facts which have occurred between the date of ratification of the Convention by this State and the date on which its declaration under Article 25 becomes effective .
Article 26 de la Convention : Les Etats ne sauraient Ã©carter, de leur propre chej. le jeu de la rÃ¨gle du dÃ©lai de six mois . Le dÃ©pÃ´t par un Etat d'une dÃ©claration faite conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 25 de la Convention est sans influence sur le cours de ce dÃ©lai. CompÃ©tence ratione temporis de la Commission : En l'absence de stipulation contraire dans la dÃ©claration faite par un Etat conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 25 de la Convention, la Commission est compÃ©tente pour connaitre de faits survenus entre la date de la ratification de la Convention par cet Etat et celle oÃ¹ prend effet sa dÃ©claration faite conformÃ©ment Ã l'urticle 25.
(English : see p . 235)
Le requÃ©rant, Ã©crivain et journaliste nÃ© en 1910, rÃ©side en RÃ©publiqu e d'Irlande oÃ¹ il exploite une entreprise de crustacÃ©s Ã C . 11 possÃ¨de la double
nationalitÃ© franÃ§aise et irlandaise . Il a Ã©galement un domicile lÃ©gal en France Ã St . Brieuc . I . Le 20 octobre 1975 le requÃ©rant fut interpellÃ© Ã St . Brieuc et placÃ© en garde Ã vue - alors qu'il s'apprÃªtait Ã regagner par avion l'Irlande - dans le cadre d'enquÃªtes dirigÃ©es par le parquet de la Cour de SÃ»retÃ© de l'Etat Ã la suite d'attentats perpÃ©trÃ©s contre des parlementaires bretons . Un mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t fut dÃ©cernÃ© Ã son encontre le 24 octobre 1975 par le juge d'instruction Ã la Cour de SÃ»retÃ© de l'Etat qui l'inculpa de .dÃ©tention d'explosifs, infraction en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective consistant ou tendant Ã substituer une autoritÃ© illÃ©gale Ã l'autoritÃ© de l'Etat, et reconstitution de ligue dissoute . . 2 . Le requÃ©rant demanda Ã trois reprises sa mise en libertÃ© . La premiÃ¨re demande, datÃ©e du 19 novembre . fut rejetÃ©e le 2 dÃ©cembre 1975 par ordonnance du juge d'instruction au motif que la demande Ã©tait prÃ©maturÃ©e et que le maintien en dÃ©tention s'avÃ©rait nÃ©cessaire afin d'Ã©viter une pression sur les tÃ©moins ou une concertation frauduleuse avec les autres inculpÃ©s . La deuxiÃ¨me demande, du 18 dÃ©cembre, fut rejetÃ©e par ordonnance du 24 dÃ©cembre 1975, ordonnance confirmÃ©e sur recours par la Chambre de contrÃ´le de la Cour de SÃ»retÃ© le 9 janvier 1976 qui, soulignant la gravitÃ© des faits objet de l'enquÃªte, estima que le maintien en dÃ©tention Ã©tait indispensable Ã la manifestation de la vÃ©ritÃ© . 3 . Le 10 fÃ©vrier 1976 le requÃ©rant formula sa troisiÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© . 4 . Par ordonnance du 12 fÃ©vrier 1976 la mise en libertÃ© fut accordÃ©e, assortie de l'interdiction pour le requÃ©rant de quitter la France . Ce dernier fut Ã©galement soumis au contrÃ´le judiciaire ; obligation lui fut donc faite de se prÃ©senter chaque semaine au commissariat de police . Le requÃ©rant sollicita la mainlevÃ©e de ce contrÃ´le, ce qui lui fut refusÃ© par ordonnance du 13 mai 1976 . Une ordonnance du 25 juin 1976 supprima par la suite l'obligation de rÃ©sidence continue en France . la remplaÃ§ant par un cautionnement . 5 . Au cours de l'instruction, le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© Ã quatre reprises sur les faits qui lui Ã©taient reprochÃ©s . Le dernier interrogatoire eut lieu le 20 octobre 1976 . 6 . Le 24 fÃ©vrier 1977, le juge d'instruction de la Cour de SÃ»retÃ© de l'Etat estimant qu'il n'existait pas de charges suffisantes contre le requÃ©rant rendit une ordonnance de non-lieu . Un recours formÃ© par le parquet gÃ©nÃ©ral contre cette ordonnance fut rejetÃ© par la Chambre de contrÃ´le de l'instruction .
7 . Estimant la dÃ©tention provisoire subie non fondÃ©e, le requÃ©rant prÃ©senta alors une requÃªte (enregistrÃ©e le 20 juillet 1977) Ã la commission spÃ©ciale prÃ©vue par l'article 149 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale', par laquelle il sollicita l'allocation d'une indemnitÃ© . Cette demande fut dÃ©clarÃ©e non fondÃ©e le 16 mars 1979 par une dÃ©cision non motivÃ©e . Il fait valoir qu'il a Ã©tÃ© justiciable d'une juridiction, supprimÃ©e depuis le 4 aoÃ»t 19 8 1, dont l'indÃ©pendance vis-Ã -vis du Gouvernement Â«a toujours Ã©tÃ© contestÃ©e et dont la structure et les modalitÃ©s de fonctionnement portaient en germeâ¢ les violations dÃ©noncÃ©es de la Convention .
En particulier, il allÃ¨gue la violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 . litt . c) et paragraphe 3 dans la mesure o Ã¹ - il y a eu une durÃ©e abusive de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, compte tenu du caractÃ¨re trÃ¨s sommaire des charges retenues ; - aucun acte d'inslruction portant sur le fond n'est intervenu entre le mois de novembre 1975 et la mise en libertÃ© provisoire . Il y a donc eu prolongation dÃ©raisonnable de la dÃ©tention qui a durÃ© trois ntois et vingt-deux jours . 1l allÃ¨gue Ã©galement la violation de l'article S . paragraphe 4 estimant que compte tenu du caractÃ¨re de la Cour de SÃ»retÃ© de l'Etat et du mode d e
* Article 1 49 - Sans prÃ©judice de l'application des dispositions des articles 505 et suivants du Code de procÃ©dure civile . une indemnitÃ© peut Ãªtre accordÃ©e Ã¨ la personne ayant fait l'objet d'une dÃ©tention provisoire au cours d'une procÃ©dure terminÃ©e Ã son Ã©gard par une dÃ©cision de non-lieu, de relaxe ou d'acquittement devenue dÃ©finitive, lorsque cette dÃ©tenlion lui a causÃ© un prÃ©judice manifestement anormal et d'une pa rticuliÃ¨ re gravitÃ© . Arricle 149-1 - L'indemnitÃ© prÃ©vue Ã l'article prÃ©cÃ©dent est allouÃ©e par dÃ©cision d'une commission qui statue souverainement . La commission est composÃ©e de trois magistrats du siÃ¨ge Ã la Cour de cassation avant le grade de prÃ©sident de chambre ou de conseiller . Ces magistrats sont dÃ©signÃ©s annuellement, en mÃªme temps que trois supplÃ©ants, par le bureau de la Cour de cassation . Les fonctions du ministÃ¨re public sont remplies par le parquet gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ¨s la Cour de cassalion . Article 149-2 - La commission, saisie par voie de requÃªte dans le dÃ©lai de six mois d e la dÃ©cision de non-lieu . de relaxe ou d'acquittement devenue dÃ©finitive, statue par une dÃ©cision non motivÃ©e qui n'est susceptible d'aucun recours de quelque nature que ce soit . Les dÃ©bats ont lieu et la dÃ©cision est rendue en chambre du conseil . Le dÃ©bat est oral et le requÃ©rant peut Ãªtre entendu personnellement sur sa demande . La procÃ©dure devant la commission qui a le caractÃ¨re d'une juridiction civile est fixÃ©e par un dÃ©cret en Conseil d'Etat .
nomination des magistrats qui la composent, de la structure et du fonctionnentent de la Chambre de contrÃ´le de l'instruction il n'a pas disposÃ© d'un recours devant un tribunal indÃ©pendant . Se rÃ©fÃ©rant ensuite Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 5, il expose que la dÃ©tention subie ainsi que la restriction de libertÃ© rÃ©sultant du contrÃ´le judiciaire lui ont causÃ© un important prÃ©judice dont il entend obtenir une rÃ©paration Ã©quitable . 11 prÃ©cise Ã cet Ã©gard que la commission spÃ©ciale Ã laquelle il s'est adressÃ© a retenu implicitement les conclusions de l'Agent judiciaire du TrÃ©sor public qui a fait valoir que s'il y avait eu effectivement un prÃ©judice, celui-ci n'avait pas .un caractÃ¨re manifestement anormal , Pour ce qui est de la restriction Ã sa libertÃ© individuelle, qui a durÃ© 121 jours, il indique qu'elle est contraire Ã l'article 2, paragraphe 2, du Protocole NÂ° 4 . Quant Ã la rÃ©alitÃ© du prÃ©judice subi, il fait valoir que du fait de s a dÃ©tention et du contrÃ´le judiciaire . il a Ã©tÃ© Ã©loignÃ© de son entreprise et n'Ã©tait donc plus Ã mÃªme de la diriger . Il n'a pu Ã©viter la fermeture de celle-ci qu'en faisant appel Ã un de ses fils qu'il a dÃ» rÃ©munÃ©rer . Il fait ensuite Ã©tat d'un prÃ©judice professionnel, moral et social considÃ©rable .
Il chiffre le prÃ©judice subi Ã plus de 500 000 FF .
EN DROIT 1 . Le requÃ©rant a formulÃ© divers griefs concernant son arrestation et la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive qui s'en est suivie, se fondant notamment sur l'article 5 de la Convention . 2 . Les faits de la cause remontent Ã une Ã©poque se situant entre le 20 octobre 1975, date de l'arrestation du requÃ©rant, et le 16 mars 1979, date Ã laquelle la Commission spÃ©ciale saisie par ce dernier, aprÃ¨s une ordonnance de non-lieu, a rejetÃ© la demande d'indemnitÃ© fondÃ©e sur la dÃ©tention subie . Ces faits sont postÃ©rieurs Ã la ratification par la France de la Convention - 3 mai 1974 - mais antÃ©rieurs au dÃ©pÃ´t de la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise d'acceptation du droit de recours individuel selon l'article 25 - 2 octobre 1981 . 3 . Cette dÃ©claration est libellÃ©e comme suit : Â«Au nom du Gouvernement de la RÃ©publique franÃ§aise, je dÃ©clare, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 25 de la Convention de Sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des LibertÃ©s fondamentales, signÃ©e Ã Rome le 4 novembre 1950, et conformÃ©ment au paragraphe 2 de l'article 6 du Protocole NÂ° 4 Ã ladite Convention, signÃ© Ã Strasbourg le 16 septembre 1963, reconnaitre pour un e
pÃ© riode de cinq ans Ã compter de la prÃ©sente dÃ©claration, la compÃ©tence de la Commission europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme pour Ãªtre saisie d'une requÃªte adressÃ©e au SecrÃ©tai re GÃ©nÃ©ral du Conseil de l'Europe par toute personne physique, toute organisation non gouvernementale ou tout groupe de pa rticuliers qui se prÃ©tend victime d'une violation, par l'une des Hautes Pa rt ies Contractantes, des droits reconnus dans la Convention et dans les a rt icles 1 Ã 4 du Protocole susmentionnÃ© . â¢ 4 . Dans ces conditions . il appartient Ã la Commission d'Ã©tablir, tout d'abord, si et dans quelle mesure elle est compÃ©tente ratione tempo ris pour connaÃ®tre de ces griefs . 5 . Pour dÃ©terminer la portÃ©e dans le temps de sa dÃ©claration, le Gouvernement, aprÃ¨s s'Ã©tre rÃ©fÃ©rÃ© Ã la jurisprudence de la Commission ainsi qu'Ã la doctrine, a dÃ©clarÃ© s'en reme ttre Ã la sagesse de la Commission, non sans avoir remarquÃ© que si l'on assimilait l'article 25 Ã une loi de procÃ©dure, il ne saurait y avoir alors d'effet rÃ©troactif. Le requÃ©rant soutient que la dÃ©claration s'analyse en la levÃ©e d'un obstacle de procÃ©dure et que la Commission a dÃ¨s lors compÃ©tence ratione temporis pour connaÃ®tre de l'affaire . 6 . S'il est vrai qu'en vertu du principe de non-rÃ©troactivitÃ© des traitÃ©s et conventions la Convention ne rÃ©git pour chaque Pa rtie Contractante que les faits postÃ©rieurs Ã son entrÃ©e en vigueur Ã l'Ã©gard de cette Part ie, ce qui dÃ©limite en principe la compÃ©tence ratione temporis de la Commission, certaines Parties Contractantes ont Ã©galement dÃ©limitÃ© cette compÃ©tence, dans le cas oÃ¹ leur reconnaissance du droit de recours individuel selon l'a rt icle 25 est postÃ©rieure Ã la date d'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la Convention, au moyen d'une dÃ©claration expresse insÃ©rÃ©e dans l'instrument par lequel s'opÃ©rait cette recomnaissance . Par une telle dÃ©claration, formulÃ©e par le Royaume-Uni . l'Italie et l'Espagne, la compÃ©tence de la Commission Ã Ãªtre saisie de requÃªtes individuelles n'a Ã©tÃ© reconnue qu'en raison de faits, d'actes ou d'Ã©vÃ©nements postÃ© ri eurs Ã la date de dÃ©pBt de la dÃ©claration . Ces dÃ©clarations sont au demeurant conformes Ã l'a rticle 25 de la Convention, ainsi que la Commission l'a admis expressÃ©ment dans la dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 6323/73 (X . contre l'Italie, D .R . 3, p . 80) . 7 . A la diffÃ©rence des Etats qui se sont prÃ©valus de cette facultÃ©, la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise ne contient aucune dÃ©claration visant Ã prÃ©ciser le champ d'application, pour le temps passÃ©, du droit de recours individuel . 8 . En l'absence d'une limitation expresse dans la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise . la Commission s'estime dÃ¨s lors compÃ©tente ratione temporis pour connaÃ®tre des griefs formulÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, les faits de la cause Ã©tant postÃ©rieurs Ã la date de la ratification de la Convention par la France (3 mai 1974) .
9 . Ayant admis cette compÃ©tence, il incombe Ã la Commission de vÃ©rifier ensuite si le requÃ©rant a satisfait aux rÃ¨gles qu'Ã©nonce l'article 26 de la Convention . La premiÃ¨re de ces rÃ¨gles est que .Ia Commission ne peut Ãªtre saisie qu'aprÃ¨s l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus . . . . . 10 . La Commission estime que l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes se trouve rÃ©alisÃ© en l'espÃ¨ce . Le Gouvernement, d'ailleurs, ne semble pas l'avoir sÃ©rieusement contestÃ© . En effet, il ressort du dossier que le requÃ©rant a formulÃ© trois demandes de mise en libertÃ© . Contre la deuxiÃ¨me ordonnance de rejet, il a aussi formÃ© un recours qui a lui-mÃªme Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ© par la Chambre de contrÃ´le . La troisiÃ¨me demande, elle, a amenÃ© sa mise en libertÃ© . Il . En sus de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, l'article 26 Ã©nonce une deuxiÃ¨me rÃ¨gle, selon laquelle la saisine de la Commission doit intervenir . . . .dans le dÃ©lai de six mois, Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive . . Le problÃ¨me qui se pose en l'espÃ¨ce consiste Ã dÃ©terminer la date Ã partir de laquelle le dÃ©lai prÃ©citÃ© doit Ãªtre calculÃ©, compte tenu de ce qu'avant le 2 octobre 1981 le requÃ©rant n'avait pas la facultÃ© de saisir la Commission d'une requÃªte dirigÃ©e contre la France . 12 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur est d'avis que si la portÃ©e rÃ©troactive de la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise Ã©tait retenue, le dÃ©lai devrait Ãªtre dÃ©comptÃ© Ã partir du 2 octobre 1981 . Le requÃ©rant partage cette opinion . 13 . La Commission rappelle qu' . il existe une Ã©troite corrÃ©lation entre les deux rÃ¨gles qu'Ã©nonce ledit article 26, Ã savoir celle de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et celle du dÃ©lai de six mois, car les deux rÃ¨gles, non seulement font l'objet d'un article unique, mais figurent cÃ´te Ã cÃ´te dans une seule et mÃªme phrase dont la structure grammaticale impose l'idÃ©e de pareille corrÃ©lation . (cf . la dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 214/56, De Becker c/Belgique, Ann . 2, p . 215 et ss .) . Elle tient Ã mettre l'accent sur la . ratio legis . du dÃ©lai de six mois dont l'existence .s'explique par le souci des Hautes Parties Contractantes d'empÃªcher la constante remise en cause du passÃ© . (Ibidem) . 14 . Les parties se rÃ©fÃ¨rent, il est vrai, Ã une partie de la jurisprudence de la Commission et, en particulier, Ã la dÃ©cision qu'elle a rendue sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 846/60, (X . contre Pays-Bas, Rec . 6, p . 63) . Dans cette dÃ©cision, aprÃ¨s avoir constatÃ© que plus de six mois s'Ã©taient Ã©coulÃ©s entre la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive (18 janvier 1960) et la date de l'introduction de la requÃªte (8 aoÃ»t 1960), elle avait estimÃ© que le dÃ©lai de six mois n'Ã©tait pas opposable au requÃ©rant avant le dÃ©pÃ´t de la dÃ©claration souscrite par les PaysBas en vertu de l'article 25 (5 juillet 1960) .
15 . La Commission rappelle, sur ce point, que dans des dÃ©cisions postÃ©rieures Ã celle-ci elle est implicitement revenue sur la jurisprudence rappelÃ©e ci-dessus . En effet, par exemple, dans la dÃ©cision rendue sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 2648/65 . X . contre Pays-Bas, Ann . 11, p . 355, la Commission a rejetÃ© pour tardivetÃ© un des griefs du requÃ©rant se rapportant Ã une dÃ©cision de janvier 1958 . alors que la requÃ©te n'avait Ã©tÃ© soumise qu'en octobre 1965 .c'est-Ã -dire plus de six mois aprÃ¨s la date de la dÃ©cision en question . (cf . Ã©galement la dÃ©cision rendue sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te NÂ° 3505/68, X . contre Royaume-Uni . Ann . 12, p . 299, dans laquelle elle a rejetÃ© pour tardivitÃ© un grief se rapportant Ã une dÃ©cision rendue en juillet 1964 . alors que la requÃªte avait Ã©tÃ© introduite en dÃ©cembre 1967 et alors que la dÃ©claration britannique d'acceptation du droit de recours individuel n'a pris effet que le 14 janvier 1966, sans pour cela faire usage du motif de rejet tirÃ© de l'incompÃ©tence ratione temporis de la Commission) . 16 . La rÃ¨gle contenue Ã l'article 26 de la Convention, selon laquelle une requÃªte ne peut Ãªtre prÃ©sentÃ©e que dans le dÃ©lai de six mois Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitie remplit une fonction importante dans le cadre du contr8le, par les organes de la Convention, des actes accomplis par les autoritÃ©s d'un Etat . En effet, cette rÃ¨gle constitue un facteur de sÃ©curitÃ© juridique (cf . ArrÃªt de la Cour dans les Affaires De Wilde, Ooms et Versyp, paragraphe 50) . ' . ce principe exige que tant les particuliersque les diffÃ©rents organe s â¢Or de l'Etat sachent Ã quelle date ce contrÃ´le ne sera plus possible par l'application de la rÃ¨gle de six mois . Il serait mis en Ã©chec en particulierâ¢pour les Etats qui ont ratifiÃ© la Convention, mais n'ont pas encore reconnu le droit de recours individuel, si le dÃ©lai de six mois ne devait Ãªtre calculÃ© qu'Ã partir du dÃ©pÃ´t de la dÃ©claration faite selon l'article 25 de la Convention . La Commission est d'avis, dÃ¨s lors, que les Etats contractants ne sauraient Ã©carter, de leur propre chef, le jeu de la rÃ¨gle du respect du dÃ©lai de six mois . Par consÃ©quent, elle estime devoir en faire application dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce et calculer ce dÃ©lai Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive . 17 . Or, dans la prÃ©sente affaire, la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive remonte au 16 mars 1979 (cf . supra par . 2) . Elle est donc antÃ©rieure de plus de six mois Ã la date de l'introduction de la requÃªte (13 novembre 1981) . Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte ne satisfait pas Ã la condition de dÃ©lai fixÃ© Ã l'article 26 de la Convention . La requÃªte doit dÃ¨s lors Ãªtre rejetÃ©e par application de l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention .Parcesmotifs,laCom is io n
(TRANSLATION) THE FACT S The applicant, a writer and journalist born in 1910, lives in the Republic of Ireland where he runs a shellfish business in C . He has dual French and Irish nationality . He also has an official residence in France in St . Brieuc . 1 . On 20 October 1975, the applicant was questioned at St . Brieuc and placed in custody, as he was about to fly to Ireland, in connection with inquiries being carried out by the Public Prosecutor's department attached to the National Security Court ("Cour de Sfiretr") following attacks on Breton parliamentarians . A warrant for his arrest was issued on 24 October 1975 by the investigating judge of the National Security Court, charging him with "possession of explosives, an offence connected with individual or collective action replacing or intending to replace the authority of the State by an illegal authority and reconstitution of a proscribed organisation . " 2 . The applicant applied for release on three occasions . The first application, dated 19 November . was rejected on 2 December 1975 by an order of the investigating judge on the ground that the application was premature and that his continued detention was necessary to avoid intimidation of witnesses and communication with the other accused with intend to pervert the course of justice . The second application dated 18 December was rejected by an order of 24 December 1975 and upheld on appeal by the Appeals Chamber of the Security Court on 9 January 1976 . Underlining the seriousness of the offences being investigated, the chamber held that continued detention was indispensable in order to establish the truth . On 10 February 1976, the applicant made a third application for his release . 4 . By an order dated 12 February 1976, his release was granted on condition that he was not to leave France . He was also placed under judicial supervision and was obliged to report each week to the police station . The applicant requested that the supervision order be lifted but this was refused by an order of 13 May 1976 . An order dated 25 June 1976 lifted the requirement of continuous residence in France and replaced it by bail . 5 . During the investigation, the applicant was questioned four times about the offences he was alleged to have committed . He was last questioned on 20 October 1976 . 6 . On 24 February 1977, the investigating judge of the National Security Court ordered the proceedings to be terminated on the basis that there were not sufficient charges against the applicant .
An appeal brought by the prosecuting authorities against this order was rejected by the Appeals Chamber . 7 . On the basis of unjustified detention pending trial the applicant lodged an appeal (registered on 20 July 1977) with the Special Board provided for under Article 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedureâ¢ and claimed compensation . This application was declared unfounded in a decision of 16 March 1979 . no reasons being given .
COMPLAINTS 8 . The applicant considers that the criminal proceedings instituted against him were unfounded, as the order to terminate proceedings proved, and that they were in fact intended to deny freedom of expression to a leader of the Breton movement . He claims that he had been subject to the jurisdiction of a Court that was abolished on 4 August 1981 and whose independence vis-Ã -vis the Government "had always been challenged" and that the alleged violations of the Convention "were inherent in its structure and operation" . In particular, he alleges a violation of Article 5 paras . 1(c) and 3 insofar as :
- the duration of the detention on remand was excessive, in view of the very suntntary nature of the charges against him :
â¢ Article 149 - Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 505 et seq . of the Code of Civil Procedure, compensation may be awarded to a person who has been detained on remand during proceedings concluded by a final decision to terminate such proceedings or to discharge the accused, where such detention has caused him exceptional damage of a particularly serious nature . Article 149-1 - The compensation provided for in the previous Article shall be granted by decision of a Board whose ruling shall be final . The Board shall be composed of three judges of the Court of Cassation who have attained the rank of President of a Chamber or "Conseiller", and three substitutes shall be appointed annually at the same time by the Council of the Court of Cassation . The functions of the prosecuting authori ty shall be carried out by the Public Prosecutor's office attached to the Court of Cassation . Article 149-2- W here an application has been brought within six months against a fina l decision to terminate proceedings or to acquit the accused, the Board shall give a decision without giving reasons and no appeal of any kind shall lie . The hearing shall be held and a decision delivered in chambers . The submissions of the parties shall be made orally and the appellant may be heard in penon at his request . The procedure before the Board, which is in the nature of a civil coun, shall be laid down by order after consultation of the "Conseil d'Etat" .
- no investigation measure dealing with the merits of the charge was taken between November 1975 and his conditional release . There was therefore an excessive extension of the period of detention lasting three months and twenty-two days . He also alleges a violation of Article 5 para . 4 because, in view of the nature of the National Security Court, the manner of appointment of its judges and the structure and operation of the Appeals Chamber, he did not have a remedy before an independent tribunal. With reference to Article 5 . para . 5, he claims that the detention and restriction of freedom resulting from the judicial supervision caused, him serious damage for which he intends to obtain just compensation . He notes -that the Special Board to which he applied impliedly adopted the submissions of the Treasury Solicitor who argued that while damage had in fact been caused, it was not of an exceptional nature . As regards the restriction of his personal freedom, which lasted 12 1 days . he claims that this is contrary to Article 2 para . 2 of Protocol No . 4 . As regards the real nature of the damage suffered, he claims that he was separated from his business and was unable to manage it any longer as a result of his detention and judicial supervision . He prevented it from closing only by securing the assistance of one of his sons whom he had to pay . He claims serious professional and non-pecuniary damage and injury to his reputation . He assessed the damage at more than 500,000 francs .
THE LA W The applicant has made various complaints concerning his arrest and subsequent detention on remand, relying in particularon , Atticle 5 of the Convention . The facts of this case date back to between20October 1975, the date of the applicant's arrest, and 16 March 1979, the date on which the Special Board to which the latter had applied following a decisionterminating the proceedings rejected his application for compensation based on the pe ri od of detention . These event occurred after the ratification by France of the Conventio n -3 May 1974-but before the deposit of the_French declaration accepting the ri ght of individual petition under Article .25-2 October 1981 . 3 . This declaration reads as follows "On behalf of the Government of the French Republic, I declare, i n accordance with Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human -237-
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 . and in accordance with Article 6, paragraph 2, of Protocol No . 4 to the said Convention, signed at Strasbourg on 16 September 1963, that it recognises, for a period of five years as from the date of this declaration- the competence of the European Commission of Human Rights to receive petitions addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the said Convention and in Articles I to 4 of the above-mentioned Protocol . "
4 . In the circumstances, it is up to the Commission to establish firstly, whether and to what extent it is competent ratione ternporis to deal with these complaints . 5 . In order to determine the scope of its declaration as regards time, the Government, having referred to the case-law of the Commission and to legal writing- declared that it would accept the finding of the Commission, but did note that if Article 25 were to be assimilated to a rule of procedural law, it could not therefore have retrospective effect . The applicant claints that the declaration amounts to a removal of the procedural obstacle and that the Commission is consequently competent ratione tentporis to deal with the case . 6 . Although . under the principle that treaties and conventions do not have retrospective effect, the Convention regulates only events occurring after its entry into force in respect of each Contracting Party, which defines in principle the Commission's competence ratione temporis, some Contracting States have also defined this competence, where their recognition of the right of individual petition in accordance with Article 25 is subsequent to the date of entry into force of the Convention, by means of an express declaration contained in the instrument of recognition . In such a declaration made by the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain . the competence of the Commission to receive individual petitions was recognised only in respect of acts or events subsequent to the date of deposit of the declaration . These declarations moreover comply with Article 25 of the Convention and the Commission has expressly conceded this in a decision on the admissibility of Application No. 6323/73 (X . against Italy, D .R . 3, p . 80) . 7 . Unlike States which have availed themselves of this possibility, the French declaration contains no definition of the scope of the right of individual petition as regards the past . 8 . In the absence of an express limitation in the French declaration, the Commission considers consequently that it is competent ratione temporis t o
deal with the complaints drawn up by the applicant, as the events in question occurred after the date on which France ratified the Convention (3 May 1974) . 9 . Having established its competence, the Commission has then to determine whether the applicant complied with the rules laid down by Article 26 of the Convention . The first of these rules is that "the Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law . . . . 10 . The Commission considers that in this case domestic remedies have been exhausted . The Government moreover does not seem to challenge this seriously . It is clear from the file that the applicant made three applications for his release . He also brought an appeal against the second decision rejecting his application . This appeal was rejected by the Supervision Chamber . The third application resulted in his release . 11 . In addition to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, Article 26 lays down a second rule, whereby a case must be referred to the Commission "within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken . " The problem here is to determine the date on the basis of which the above-mentioned period is to be calculated, taking account of the fact that before 2 October 1982 the applicant was unable to bring an application against France before the Commission . 12 . The respondent Government considers that if the French declaration is regarded as having retrospective effect, the period should run from 2 October 1981 The applicant agrees . 13 . The Commission recalls that "the two rules contained in Article 26 concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies and concerning the six-months period, are closely interrelated, since not only are they combined in the same Article, but they are also expressed in a single sentence whose grammatical construction implies such correlation" (cf decision on (he admissibility of Application No . 214/56, De Becker v . Belgium, Yearbook 2, p . 215 et seq.) . It insists on the "ratio legis" of the six-month period, the existence of which "is justified by the wish of the High Contracting Parties to prevent the past judgments being constantly called into question" (ibid .) . 14 . The parties admittedly refer to one part of the Commission's case-law and, in particular, to its decision on the admissibility of Application No . 846/60 (X . against the Netherlands, Rec . 6, p . 63) . In this decision, having found that more than six months had elapsed between the final dontestic decision (18 January 1960) and the date on which the application was lodged (8 August 1960), it held that the six-month time-limit could not be invoked against the applicant before the declaration by the Netherlands under Article 25 was deposited (5 July 1960) .
15 . The Commission recalls in this respect that in subsequent decisions, it impliedly came back on the case-]aw mentioned above . For example. in the decision on the admissibility of Application No . 2648/65, X against the Netherlands, Yearbook 11, p . 355, the Commission rejected as being out of time one of the applicant's complaints relating to a decision taken in January 1958 . as the application was not brought until October 1965, "that is, more than six months after the date of this decision" (cf . also the decision on the admissibility of Application No . 3505/68, X against the United Kingdom, Yearbook 12, p . 299, in which it rejected a complaint relating to a decision taken in July 1964 as being out of time, whereas the application had been brought in December 1967, and the United Kingdom declaration recognising the right of individual petition did not take effect until 14 January 1966 : it did not rely in that case on the ground of inadmissibility based on the Commission's lack of competence ratione temporis) . 16 . The rule contained in Article 26 of the Convention whereby an application can only be submitted within six months of the date on which the final domestic decision was taken fulfills an important function in the system of supervision carried out by the organs of the Convention of decisions taken by the authorities of a State . In fact this rule constitutes an element of legal stability (cf. judgment of the Court in the case of De Wild, Oomsand Versyp, paragraph 50) . However, this principle requires that both individuals and the various organs of the State know on what date such supervision is no longer possible under the six-month rule . It would not be observed, particularly in the case of States having ratified the Convention but not yet having recognised the right of individual petition, if the six-month time-limit were only to run from the date of deposit of the declaration made in accordance with Article 25 of the Convention . The Commission considers consequently that the Contracting States cannot on their own authority put aside the ru1e, of compliance with the sixmonth time-limit . Consequently it considers that it is obliged to apply it in the present case and to calculate this time-limit as from the final domestic decision . 17 . In the present case, the final domestic decision dates back t6 1 6 March 1979 (cf. above paragraph 2) . It consequently pre-dates by more than six months the date on which the application was brought (13 November 1981) . It follows that the application fails to comply with the time-]imit requirement laid down in Article 26 of the Convention . The application must consequently be rejected under Article 27 para . 3 of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE . -240-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 13/12/1982Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page