Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/420/377/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 21:48:56
Document Index: 102924033

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 462', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731']

We granted certiorari to decide whether a Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal by the United chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A grand jury returned an indictment charging petitioner with willfully failing to report for and submit to induction into the Armed Forces, in violation of 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(a). At petitioner's arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. The trial date was set for January 9, 1973. Prior to that time, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the local board did not state adequate reasons for its refusal to reopen his file. Attached to the motion was an affidavit of petitioner stating merely that he had applied for conscientious objector status and that the local board's letter was the only communication concerning his claim which he had received. At the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The United States appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, asserting jurisdiction under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, as amended by the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1890. [Footnote 3] In a "Motion to Quash Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction" and in his brief, petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction because further prosecution was prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals rejected that contention. It concluded that, although no appeal would have been possible in this case under the Criminal Appeals Act as it existed prior to the 1970 amendments, [Footnote 4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
and, in both, "denial of the motion to dismiss [would have] entitled the defendant to the jury trial which he ha[d] not waived." [Footnote 6] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Prior to 1971, appeals by the United States in criminal cases were restricted by 18 U.S.C. § 3731 to categories descriptive of the action taken by a district court, and they were divided between this Court and the courts of appeals. [Footnote 7] In United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 399 U. S. 307-308 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At the same time that this Court was struggling with the "common law distinctions" of former § 3731, the decisions of the Courts of Appeals were demonstrating that, even when apparently straightforward, the language of the statute was deceptive. Thus, although, after 1948, [Footnote 8] § 3731 literally authorized an appeal to a court of appeals whenever an indictment or information was set aside or dismissed except where direct appeal to this Court was authorized, that provision was generally construed, as it was construed by the Court of Appeals in this case, supra at 420 U. S. 381, and n. 4, to authorize an appeal to a court of appeals only if the decision setting aside or dismissing an indictment or information was "based upon a defect in the indictment or information, or in the institution of the prosecution." United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F.2d 747, 755 (CA9 1959). See United States v. Ponto, 454 F.2d 657, 659-663 (CA7 1971). In such fashion, even chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 14. Congress was of the view that "earlier versions of section 3731" had been subject to "restrictive judicial interpretations chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As an aid to the decision of cases in which the prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause has been invoked, the courts have found it useful to define a point in criminal proceedings at which the constitutional purposes and policies are implicated by resort to the concept of "attachment of jeopardy." See United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 480. In the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn. Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458 (1973). In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (CA10 1936). See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 336 U. S. 688 (1949). The Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can have no application, until a defendant is "put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge." United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 479. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 195 U. S. 128, 130-131 (1904); United States v. Macdonald, 207 U. S. 120, 207 U. S. 127 (1907); Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 208 U. S. 391-392 (1908); Collins v. Loisel, 262 U. S. 426, 262 U. S. 429 (1923). [Footnote 12] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner acknowledges that "formal or technical jeopardy had not attached" at the time the District chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is true that we have disparaged "rigid, mechanical" rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458, 410 U. S. 467 (1973). However, we also observed in that case that "the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial." Ibid. Cf. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 303. Implicit in the latter statement is the premise that the "constitutional policies underpinning chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
When a criminal prosecution is terminated prior to trial, an accused is often spared much of the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment which attend a trial. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 355 U. S. 187-188; United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 479. Although an accused may raise defenses or objections before trial which are "capable of determination without the trial of the general issue," Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(1), and although he must raise certain other defenses or objections before trial, Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(2), in neither case is he "subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction." Green v. United States, supra, at 355 U. S. 187. Moreover, in neither case would an appeal by the United States "allow the prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after having failed with the first." United States v. Wilson, ante, at 420 U. S. 352. See United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 484. Both the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its terms demonstrate that it does not come into play until a proceeding begins before a trier "having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. at 195 U. S. 133. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 398 U. S. 329. Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Our decision in United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 (1970), is not to the contrary. As we have noted in United States v. Wilson, ante at 420 U. S. 350-351, we do not believe the Court in Sisson intended to express an opinion with respect to the constitutionality of an appeal by the United States from the order entered by the District Court in that case. Moreover, even if we were to take the contrary view, we would reach the same conclusion here. For in Sisson, jeopardy had attached; the order chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 506. The question at issue in Brewster, the question decided in Sisson, and the citation of United States v. Findley [Footnote 15] demonstrate beyond question that this passage in Brewster was not concerned with the constitutional question which, by virtue of the 1970 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, is before us in this case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Compare United States v. Findley, 439 F.2d 970, 973 (CA1 1971), with United States v. Pecora, 484 F.2d 1293-1294. See United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 880 (CA2 1973), aff'd, ante, p. 420 U. S. 358. We hold only that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar an appeal by the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 with respect to a criminal defendant who has not been "put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 400 U. S. 479.
The District Court concluded that petitioner's defense was properly raised by motion before trial, and that, although petitioner had not waived his right to trial by jury, his defense was properly to be determined by the court. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 12(b)(1)(4). Compare United States v. Ponto, 454 F.2d 657, 663 (CA7 1971), with United States v. Ramos, 413 F.2d 743, 744 n. 1 (CA1 1969). See United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, 395 U. S. 60 (1969); United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 399 U. S. 301 (1970); United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77, 396 U. S. 83 (1969); 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¦ 12.04 (2d ed.1975).