Source: https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/Supreme_Court/11-338/Doug_Decker_in_His_Official_Capacity_as_Oregon_State_Forester_et_al._Petitioners_v._Northwest_Environmental_Defense_Center/03-20-2013-Judgment_REVERSED_and_case_REMANDED/
Timestamp: 2020-08-03 23:18:59
Document Index: 487827817

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1311', '§122', '§1342', '§1342', '§122', '§1365', '§1369', '§1365', '§1365', '§1342', '§122', '§1342', '§1251', '§1311', '§1362', '§122', '§1342', '§405', '§1342', '§1342', '§1342', 'art 122', '§122', '§1365', '§1365', '§1369', '§1365', '§1369', '§1369', '§1369', '§1365', '§1365', '§122', '§1362', '§1369', '§1319', '§1365', '§1342', '§122', '§1342', '§122', '§122']

` DECKER, OREGON STATE FORESTER, ET AL. v.
`NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER
`No. 11–338. Argued December 3, 2012—Decided March 20, 2013*
`The Clean Water Act (Act) requires that National Pollutant Discharge
`Elimination System (NPDES) permits be secured before pollutants
`are discharged from any point source into the navigable waters of the
`United States. See 33 U. S. C. §§1311(a), 1362(12). One of the Envi-
`ronmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) implementing regulations, the
`Silvicultural Rule, specifies which types of logging-related discharges
`are point sources. 40 CFR §122.27(b)(1). These discharges require
`NPDES permits unless some other federal statutory provision ex-
`empts them from coverage. One such statutory provision exempts
`“discharges
`composed entirely of
`stormwater,” 33 U. S. C.
`§1342(p)(1), unless the discharge is “associated with industrial activ-
`ity,” §1342(p)(2)(B). Under the EPA’s Industrial Stormwater Rule,
`the term “associated with industrial activity” covers only discharges
`“from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm
`water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or
`raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.” 40 CFR
`§122.26(b)(14). Shortly before oral argument in the instant cases, the
`EPA issued a final version of an amendment to the Industrial
`Stormwater Rule, clarifying that the NPDES permit requirement ap-
`plies only to logging operations involving rock crushing, gravel wash-
`ing, log sorting, and log storage facilities, which are all listed in the
`Silvicultural Rule.
`Petitioner Georgia-Pacific West has a contract with Oregon to har-
`*Together with No. 11–347, Georgia-Pacific West, Inc., et al. v.
`Northwest Environmental Defense Center, also on certiorari to the same
`DECKER v. NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
`vest timber from a state forest. When it rains, water runs off two
`logging roads used by petitioner into ditches, culverts, and channels
`that discharge the water into nearby rivers and streams. The dis-
`charges often contain large amounts of sediment, which evidence
`shows may be harmful to fish and other aquatic organisms. Re-
`spondent Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) filed
`suit against petitioner and state and local governments and officials,
`including petitioner Decker, invoking the Act’s citizen-suit provision,
`33 U. S. C. §1365, and alleging that the defendants had not obtained
`NPDES permits before discharging stormwater runoff into two Ore-
`gon rivers. The District Court dismissed the action for failure to
`state a claim, concluding that NPDES permits were not required be-
`cause the ditches, culverts, and channels were not point sources of
`pollution under the Act and the Silvicultural Rule. The Ninth Circuit
`reversed. It held that the conveyances were point sources under the
`Silvicultural Rule. It also concluded that the discharges were “asso-
`ciated with industrial activity” under the Industrial Stormwater
`Rule, despite the EPA’s contrary conclusion that the regulation ex-
`cludes the type of stormwater discharges from logging roads at issue.
`Thus, the court held, the discharges were not exempt from the
`NPDES permitting scheme.
`1. A provision of the Act governing challenges to agency actions,
`§1369(b), is not a jurisdictional bar to this suit. That provision is the
`exclusive vehicle for suits seeking to invalidate certain agency deci-
`sions, such as the establishment of effluent standards and the issu-
`ance of permits. It does not bar a district court from entertaining a
`citizen suit under §1365 when the suit is against an alleged violator
`and seeks to enforce an obligation imposed by the Act or its regula-
`tions. The present action falls within the scope of §1365. Pp. 8–9.
`2. The EPA’s recent amendment to the Industrial Stormwater Rule
`does not make the cases moot. A live controversy continues to exist
`regarding whether petitioners may be held liable for unlawful dis-
`charges under the earlier version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule.
`That version governed petitioners’ past discharges, which might be
`the basis for the imposition of penalties even if, in the future, those
`types of discharges will not require a permit. These cases thus re-
`main live and justiciable. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesa-
`peake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, 64–65. The fact that the
`District Court might rule that NEDC’s arguments lack merit, or that
`relief is not warranted on the facts of these cases, does not make the
`cases moot. Pp. 9–11.
`3. The preamendment version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule,
`as permissibly construed by the EPA, exempts discharges of chan-
`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`neled stormwater runoff from logging roads from the NPDES permit-
`ting scheme. The regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the
`statutory term “associated with industrial activity,” §1342(p)(2)(B),
`and the agency has construed the regulation to exempt the discharges
`at issue here. When an agency interprets its own regulation, the
`Court, as a general rule, defers to it “unless that interpretation is
`‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ” Chase Bank
`USA, N. A. v. McCoy, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519
`U. S. 452, 461). Here, it was reasonable for the EPA to conclude that
`the conveyances at issue are “directly related” only to the harvesting
`of raw materials, rather than to “manufacturing, processing, or raw
`materials storage areas at an
`industrial plant.”
` 40 CFR
`§122.26(b)(14). The regulatory scheme, taken as a whole, leaves open
`the rational interpretation that the regulation extends only to tradi-
`tional industrial buildings such as factories and associated sites and
`other relatively fixed facilities.
`Another reason to accord Auer deference to the EPA’s interpreta-
`tion is that there is no indication that the agency’s current view is a
`change from prior practice or is a post hoc justification adopted in re-
`sponse to litigation. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
`567 U. S. ___, ___. Rather, the EPA has been consistent in its view
`that the types of discharges at issue do not require NPDES permits.
`Its decision also exists against a background of state regulation with
`respect to stormwater runoff from logging roads. In exercising the
`broad discretion the Act gives the EPA in the realm of stormwater
`runoff, the agency could reasonably have concluded that further fed-
`eral regulation would be duplicative or counterproductive in light of
`Oregon’s extensive rules on the subject. Pp. 11–15.
`640 F. 3d 1063, reversed and remanded.
`KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and THOMAS, GINSBURG, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
` joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined as to Parts I and II. ROBERTS,
` C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. SCALIA, J.,
`filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. BREYER, J.,
`took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
` Nos. 11–338 and 11–347
` DOUG DECKER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OREGON
` STATE FORESTER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`11–338
`GEORGIA-PACIFIC WEST, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
`11–347
`ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`[March 20, 2013]
` JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
`These cases present the question whether the Clean
`Water Act (Act) and its implementing regulations require
`permits before channeled stormwater runoff from logging
`roads can be discharged into the navigable waters of the
`United States. Under the statute and its implementing
`regulations, a permit is required if the discharges are
`deemed to be “associated with industrial activity.” 33
`U. S. C. §1342(p)(2)(B). The Environmental Protection
`Agency (EPA), with the responsibility to enforce the Act,
`has issued a regulation defining the term “associated with
`industrial activity” to cover only discharges “from any
`conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm
`water and that is directly related to manufacturing, pro-
`cessing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial
` CENTER
`plant.” 40 CFR 122.26(b)(14) (2006). The EPA interprets
`its regulation to exclude the type of stormwater discharges
`from logging roads at issue here. See Brief for United
`States as Amicus Curiae 24–27. For reasons now to be
`explained, the Court concludes the EPA’s determination is
`a reasonable interpretation of its own regulation; and, in
`consequence, deference is accorded to the interpretation
`under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461 (1997).
`Congress passed the Clean Water Act in 1972 to “restore
`and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
`rity of the Nation’s waters.” 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C.
`§1251(a). A central provision of the Act is its require-
`ment that individuals, corporations, and governments se-
`cure National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
`(NPDES) permits before discharging pollution from any
`point source into the navigable waters of the United
`States. See §§1311(a), 1362(12); EPA v. California ex rel.
`State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U. S. 200, 205
`(1976). The Act defines “point source” as
`“any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, in-
`cluding but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
`tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, roll-
`ing stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or
`vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants
`are or may be discharged. This term does not include
`agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows
`from irrigated agriculture.” §1362(14).
`When the Act took effect, the EPA found it difficult to
`process permit applications from countless owners and
`operators of point sources throughout the country. The
`agency issued regulations exempting certain types of
`point-source discharges from the NPDES permitting
`scheme, but in 1977 those directives were found invalid.
`The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
`ruled that the statute did not give the EPA “authority to
`exempt categories of point sources from the permit re-
`quirements” of the Act. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
`cil, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F. 2d 1369, 1377. In response the
`EPA issued new regulations to define with more precision
`which categories of discharges qualified as point sources in
`the first place. Among these regulations was the so-called
`Silvicultural Rule. This rule is at issue here. It provides:
`“Silvicultural point source means any discernible,
`confined and discrete conveyance related to rock
`crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage
`facilities which are operated in connection with silvi-
`cultural activities and from which pollutants are dis-
`charged into waters of the United States. The term
`does not include non-point source silvicultural activi-
`ties such as nursery operations, site preparation,
`reforestation and subsequent cultural treatment,
`thinning, prescribed burning, pest and fire control,
`harvesting operations, surface drainage, or road con-
`struction and maintenance from which there is natu-
`ral runoff.” 40 CFR §122.27(b)(1).
`Under the quoted rule, any discharge from a logging-
`related source that qualifies as a point source requires an
` NPDES permit unless some other federal statutory provi-
`sion exempts it from that coverage. In one such provision,
`33 U. S. C. §1342(p), Congress has exempted certain dis-
`charges of stormwater runoff. The statutory exemptions
`were considered necessary because, from the outset, the
`EPA had encountered recurring difficulties in determining
`how best to manage discharges of this kind. See, e.g.,
`Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 966 F. 2d
` 1292, 1295–1296 (CA9 1992). In 1987, Congress responded
`to these problems and adopted various stormwater-related
` amendments to the Act. §405, 101 Stat. 69, 33 U. S. C.
`§1342(p).
`The 1987 amendments exempt from the NPDES permit-
`ting scheme most “discharges composed entirely of storm-
`water.” §1342(p)(1). The general exemption, however, does
`not extend to all stormwater discharges. As relevant here,
`Congress directed the EPA to continue to require per-
`mits for stormwater discharges “associated with indus-
`trial activity.” §1342(p)(2)(B). The statute does not define
`that term, but the EPA adopted a regulation (hereinafter
`Industrial Stormwater Rule) in which it defined it as
`“the discharge from any conveyance that is used for
`collecting and conveying storm water and that is
`directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw
`materials storage areas at an industrial plant. The
`term does not include discharges from facilities or ac-
`tivities excluded from the NPDES program under this
`part 122. For the categories of industries identified
`in this section, the term includes, but is not limited
`to, storm water discharges from . . . immediate access
`roads and rail lines used or traveled by carriers of raw
`materials, manufactured products, waste material, or
`by-products used or created by the facility . . . .” 40
`CFR §122.26(b)(14) (2006).
`The Industrial Stormwater Rule also specified that, with
`one exception not relevant here, “[f ]acilities classified
`as Standard Industrial Classificatio[n] 24” are “considered
`to be engaging in ‘industrial activity’ for purposes of para-
`graph (b)(14).” Ibid. The Standard Industrial Classifica-
`tions are a system used by federal agencies to categorize
`firms engaged in different types of business activity. See
`Dept. of Labor, Standard Industrial Classifications Manual,
`online at http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html (as
`visited Mar. 14, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court’s
`case file). Standard Industrial Classification 24 identifies
`industries involved in the field of “Lumber and Wood
`Products.” 2 App. 64. This includes the “Logging” indus-
`try, defined as “[e]stablishments primarily engaged in
`cutting timber and in producing . . . primary forest or
`wood raw materials.” Ibid.
`On November 30, 2012—three days before the instant
`cases were argued in this Court—the EPA issued its final
`version of an amendment to the Industrial Stormwater
`Rule. The amendment was the agency’s response to the
`Court of Appeals’ ruling now under review. The amended
`version seeks to clarify the types of facilities within
`Standard Industrial Classification 24 that are deemed to
`be engaged in industrial activity for purposes of the rule.
`The amended Industrial Stormwater Rule does not cover
`all facilities within Standard Industrial Classification 24.
`It limits covered stormwater discharges to
`“[f ]acilities classified within Standard Industrial Clas-
`sification 24, Industry Group 241 that are rock crushing,
`gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facilities
`operated in connection with silvicultural activities
`. . . and Industry Groups 242 through 249.” 77 Fed.
`Reg. 72974, pt. 122, subpt. B (2012).
`It should be noted, by way of explanation, that an Indus-
`try Group is a subcategory of businesses within a Stand-
`ard Industrial Classification. Industry Group 241 is
`“Logging,” while Industry Groups 242 through 245 are,
`respectively, “Sawmills and Planing Mills,” “Millwork,
`Veneer, Plywood, and Structural Wood,” “Wood Contain-
`ers,” and “Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes.” Industry
`Group 249 is “Miscellaneous Wood Products.” Industry
`Groups 246 through 248 are blank categories. Standard
`Industrial Classifications Manual, supra, Major Group 24.
`It is fair to say the purpose of the amended regulation is
`to bring within the NPDES permit process only those
`logging operations that involve the four types of activity
`(rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, and log stor-
`age facilities) that are defined as point sources by the
`explicit terms of the Silvicultural Rule.
`Up to this stage in the litigation, of course, the cases
`have been concerned with the Industrial Stormwater Rule
`before the amendment adopted on November 30, 2012.
`The amended regulation will determine whether from this
`point forward NPDES permits will be required for the
`stormwater discharges at issue. The parties disagree
`about the significance of the amended rule for purposes of
`these cases. Before reaching this and other preliminary
`points, however, it is appropriate to set forth the facts and
`history of the cases leading to the proceedings in this
`At issue are discharges of channeled stormwater runoff
`from two logging roads in Oregon’s Tillamook State For-
`est, lying in the Pacific Coast Range about 40 miles west
`of Portland. Petitioner Georgia-Pacific West, along with
`other logging and paper-products companies, has a con-
`tract with the State of Oregon to harvest timber from the
`forest. It uses the roads for that purpose. When it rains
`(which it does often in the mountains of northwest Oregon,
`averaging in some areas more than 100 inches per year),
`water runs off the graded roads into a system of ditches,
`culverts, and channels that discharge the water into
`nearby rivers and streams. The discharges often contain
`large amounts of sediment, in the form of dirt and crushed
`gravel from the roads. There is evidence that this runoff
`can harm fish and other aquatic organisms.
`In September 2006, respondent Northwest Environmen-
`tal Defense Center (NEDC) filed suit in the United States
`District Court for the District of Oregon. It invoked the
`Clean Water Act’s citizen-suit provision, 33 U. S. C. §1365,
`and named as defendants certain firms involved in log-
`ging and paper-products operations (including petitioner
`Georgia-Pacific West), as well as state and local govern-
`ments and officials (including the State Forester of Oregon,
`who is now petitioner Doug Decker). The suit alleged that
`the defendants caused discharges of channeled stormwater
`runoff into two waterways—the South Fork Trask River
`and the Little South Fork Kilchis River. The defendants
`had not obtained NPDES permits, and so, the suit alleged,
`they had violated the Act.
`The District Court dismissed the action for failure to
`state a claim. It concluded that NPDES permits were not
`required because the ditches, culverts, and channels were
`not point sources of pollution under the Act and the Silvi-
`cultural Rule. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
`cuit reversed. Northwest Environmental Defense Center v.
`Brown, 640 F. 3d 1063 (2011). It relied upon three princi-
`pal propositions. First, it held that the District Court had
`subject-matter jurisdiction under §1365 notwithstanding
`a different provision of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §1369(b)(1),
`limiting judicial review of EPA regulations. Second, the
`Court of Appeals held that while the EPA’s Silvicultural
`Rule is ambiguous on the question whether the convey-
`ances at issue are point sources, those conveyances must
`be deemed point sources under the rule in order to give
`effect to the Act’s expansive definition of the term. Third,
`the Court of Appeals held that because the Industrial
`Stormwater Rule makes cross-reference to Standard In-
`dustrial Classification 24, the discharges at issue are
`“associated with industrial activity” within the meaning
`of the regulation, despite the EPA’s conclusion to the con-
`trary. The regulation was held to be unambiguous on this
`point. The Court of Appeals thus ruled that the dis-
`charges were from point sources and not exempt from the
`NPDES permitting scheme by the Industrial Stormwater
`Rule. It followed that petitioners had been in violation of
`the Act.
`This Court granted certiorari. 567 U. S. ___ (2012).
`Before proceeding to the merits, it is necessary to con-
`sider two jurisdictional questions.
`Respondent NEDC invoked the jurisdiction of the Dis-
`trict Court under 33 U. S. C. §1365(a), which “authorize[s]
`private enforcement of the provisions of [the Clean Water
`Act]” and its implementing regulations. Department of
`Energy v. Ohio, 503 U. S. 607, 613, n. 5 (1992). Petition-
`ers, however, maintain that this suit is barred by a sepa-
`rate provision of the Act, §1369(b). That statute provides
`for “judicial review in the United States courts of appeals
`of various particular actions by the [EPA] Administrator,
`including establishment of effluent standards and issu-
`ance of permits for discharge of pollutants.” Middlesex
`County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
`Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 13–14 (1981). Where that review is
`available, it is the exclusive means of challenging actions
`covered by the statute, §1369(b)(2), and an application for
`review must be lodged in the court of appeals within 120
`days of the Administrator’s action, §1369(b)(1).
`The Court of Appeals was correct to rule that the exclu-
`sive jurisdiction mandate is not applicable in this suit.
`Section 1369(b) extends only to certain suits challenging
`some agency actions. It does not bar a district court from
`entertaining a citizen suit under §1365 when the suit is
`against an alleged violator and seeks to enforce an obliga-
`tion imposed by the Act or its regulations.
`The present action is within the scope of §1365. It is a
`claim to enforce what is at least a permissible reading of
`the Silvicultural Rule. The rule is ambiguous: Its charac-
`terization of silvicultural harvesting operations “from
`which there is natural runoff,” 40 CFR §122.27(b)(1), as a
`nonpoint source might be read, as petitioners contend, to
`apply to the channeled stormwater runoff at issue; or it
`might be read, as respondent NEDC urges, to apply only
`to runoff not collected in channels or other engineered
`improvements. See New Oxford American Dictionary
`1167 (3d ed. 2010) (Oxford Dict.) (“natural” means “existing
`in or caused by nature; not made or caused by human-
`kind”). NEDC’s reading would make the channeled dis-
`charges here point-source pollution under the Act. In its
`view only this interpretation can be squared with the Act’s
`broad definition of “point source.” 33 U. S. C. §1362(14).
`On this premise, the instant suit is an effort not to chal-
`lenge the Silvicultural Rule but to enforce it under a
`proper interpretation. It is a basic tenet that “regulations,
`in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute
`under which they are promulgated.” United States v.
`Larionoff, 431 U. S. 864, 873 (1977).
`For jurisdictional purposes, it is unnecessary to deter-
`mine whether NEDC is correct in arguing that only its
`reading of the Silvicultural Rule is permitted under the
`Act. It suffices to note that NEDC urges the Court to
`adopt a “purposeful but permissible reading of the regula-
`tion . . . to bring it into harmony with . . . the statute.”
`Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U. S.
`561, 573 (2007). NEDC does not seek “an implicit declara-
`tion that the . . . regulations were invalid as written.”
`Ibid. And, as a result, §1369(b) is not a jurisdictional bar
`to this suit.
`“It is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable
`case or controversy must remain extant at all stages of
`review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”
`United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011)
`(per curiam) (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks
`omitted). This principle requires us to determine whether
`10 DECKER v. NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
`the EPA’s recent amendment to the Industrial Stormwater
`Rule makes the cases moot. In a supplemental brief filed
`after oral argument, petitioner Decker, joined by the
`United States as amicus curiae, takes the position that the
`recent amendment makes these cases moot in relevant part.
`See Supp. Brief for Petitioners in No. 11–338, pp. 4–6;
`Supp. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4–8.
`That conclusion is incorrect. “A case becomes moot only
`when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual
`relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Service
`Employees Int’l, 567 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 7)
`(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, despite the
`recent amendment, a live controversy continues to exist
`regarding whether petitioners may be held liable for un-
`lawful discharges under the earlier version of the Indus-
`trial Stormwater Rule.
`Respondent NEDC continues to press its claim that
`petitioners’ discharges are unlawful under both the
`amended regulation and the earlier version. See Supp.
`Brief for Respondent 3–13. The instant cases provide no
`occasion to interpret the amended regulation. “‘[W]e are a
`court of review, not of first view.’” Arkansas Game and
`Fish Comm’n v. United States, ante, at 13 (quoting Cutter
`v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005)). The parties,
`however, have litigated the suit extensively based on the
`earlier version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule; and
`that version governed petitioners’ past discharges, which
`might be the basis for the imposition of penalties even if,
`in the future, those types of discharges will not require a
`permit.
`If the Court of Appeals is correct that petitioners were
`obligated to secure NPDES permits before discharging
`channeled stormwater runoff, the District Court might
`order some remedy for their past violations. The Act
`contemplates civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day, 33
`U. S. C. §1319(d), as well as attorney’s fees for prevailing
`parties, §1365(d). NEDC, in addition, requests injunctive
`relief for both past and ongoing violations, in part in the
`form of an order that petitioners incur certain environmental-
`remediation costs to alleviate harms attributable to
`their past discharges. Under these circumstances, the
`cases remain live and justiciable, for the possibility of
`some remedy for a proven past violation is real and not
`remote. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
`Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, 64–65 (1987). The
`District Court, it is true, might rule that NEDC’s argu-
`ments lack merit, or that the relief it seeks is not warranted
`on the facts of these cases. That possibility, however, does
`not make the cases moot. “There may be jurisdiction and
`yet an absence of merits.” General Investment Co. v.
`New York Central R. Co., 271 U. S. 228, 230 (1926).
`The substantive question of the necessity for an NPDES
`permit under the earlier rule now must be addressed.
`Under the Act, petitioners were required to secure NPDES
`permits for the discharges of channeled stormwater runoff
`only if the discharges were “associated with industrial
`activity,” 33 U. S. C. §1342(p)(2)(B), as that statutory term
`is defined in the preamendment version of the Industrial
`Stormwater Rule, 40 CFR §122.26(b)(14) (2006). Other-
`wise, the discharges fall within the Act’s general exemp-
`tion of “discharges composed entirely of stormwater” from
`the NPDES permitting scheme. 33 U. S. C. §1342(p)(1).
`NEDC first contends that the statutory term “associated
`with industrial activity” unambiguously covers discharges
`of channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads. See
`Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
`Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843 (1984). That view, however,
`overlooks the multiple definitions of the terms “indus-
`trial” and “industry.” These words can refer to business
`activity in general, yet so too can they be limited to “eco-
`12 DECKER v. NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
`nomic activity concerned with the processing of raw mate-
`rials and manufacture of goods in factories.” Oxford Dict.
`887. The latter definition does not necessarily encompass
`outdoor timber harvesting. The statute does not foreclose
`more specific definition by the agency, since it provides no
`further detail as to its intended scope.
`Somewhat more plausible is NEDC’s claim that the
`preamendment version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule
`unambiguously required a permit for the discharges at
`issue. NEDC reasons that under the rule, “[f]or the cate-
`gories of industries identified in this section,” NPDES
`permits are required for, among other things, “storm
`water discharges from . . . immediate access roads . . . used
`or traveled by carriers of raw materials.” 40 CFR
`§122.26(b)(14) (2006). Yet this raises the question wheth-
`er logging is a “categor[y] of industr[y]” identified by the
`section. The regulation goes on to identify a list of “cate-
`gories of facilities” that “are considered to be engaging in
`‘industrial activity’ for purposes” of the Industrial Storm-
`water Rule. Ibid. In the earlier version of the regulation,
`this list included “[f]acilities classified as Standard Indus-
`trial Classificatio[n] 24,” which encompasses “Logging.”
`Ibid. See also supra, at 4–5. Hence, NEDC asserts, log-
`ging is among the categories of industries for which “storm
`or traveled by carriers of raw materials” required NPDES
`permits under the earlier version of the Industrial Storm-
`water Rule. §122.26(b)(14). NEDC further notes, in sup-
`port of its reading of the regulation, that modern logging is
`a large-scale, highly mechanized enterprise, using sophis-
`ticated harvesting machines weighing up to 20 tons. See
`Brief for Respondent 4–5.
`The EPA takes a different view. It concludes that the
`earlier regulation invoked Standard Industrial Classifica-
`tion 24 “‘to regulate traditional industrial sources such
`as sawmills.’” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
`24–25. It points to the regulation’s reference to “facilities”
`and the classification’s reference to “establishments,”
`which suggest industrial sites more fixed and permanent
`than outdoor timber-harvesting operations. Ibid. See also
`55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 48008 (1990). This reading is re-
`inforced by the Industrial Stormwater Rule’s definition
`of discharges associated with industrial activity as dis-
`charges “from any conveyance that is used for collecting
`and conveying storm water and that is directly related to
`manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage