Source: https://casetext.com/case/shao-v-link-cargo-taiwan-ltd
Timestamp: 2019-08-23 05:02:15
Document Index: 40308260

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11707', '§ 10501', '§ 20', '§ 11707', '§ 10103', '§ 10103', '§ 10103', '§ 10103', '§ 10103', '§ 11706', '§ 11705', '§ 11706', '§ 11706', '§ 11706', '§ 11707', '§ 11706', '§ 11707', '§ 11706', '§ 11705', '§ 11705', '§ 11707', '§ 11707', '§ 11707', '§ 11707']

Ting-Hwa Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd, 986 F.2d 700 | Casetext
Ting-Hwa Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd.
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Ting-Hwa Shaov.Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth CircuitFeb 22, 1993
Argued October 28, 1992.
Steven A. Fein, Hyman Kaplan, P.A., Miami, FL, argued (Edoardo Meloni, on brief), for defendants-appellees.
Ting-Hwa Shao contracted with Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd. and Abacus Transports and Forwarder, Ltd., in Taipei, Taiwan, to have his personal belongings shipped from Taiwan to Baltimore, Maryland. The goods were transported by ship to Long Beach, California, where a customs number was assigned to the shipment, and then forwarded, inadvertently, to a warehouse in Miami, Florida. On September 3, 1988, a fire destroyed the warehouse and Shao's goods. Over two years later Shao filed suit in the District of Maryland to recover the damages, alleging negligence and breach of contract. He named as defendants Link Cargo, Abacus Transports, and six other parties who were involved in the transportation and storage of his goods. Only three defendants were served, and after one was voluntarily dismissed for not having been involved, only Sea Horse Container Lines, which the complaint alleges arranged for the loading of the goods onto a ship in Taiwan, and Western Overseas Corp., which acted as customs broker in Long Beach, remain as parties.
Service was effected on Groat Brothers, Inc., which was alleged to have arranged for the transportation of Shao's goods from Long Beach to Baltimore. Groat Brothers contended that their name and customs bond number had been fraudulently misappropriated by another carrier and that they were not involved in Shao's shipment. After the court dismissed the claims against Groat Brothers on its limitations defense, Shao appealed. However, when Shao became convinced that Groat Brothers was not involved in arranging the shipment, he requested that it be dismissed from the appeal. The dismissal was granted by order dated July 24, 1992.
The Carmack Amendment applies to common carriers "providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission under subchapter I, II, or IV of chapter 105 of this title. . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 11707(a)(1). The ICC's jurisdiction does not extend, however, to shipments from a foreign country to the United States unless a domestic segment of the shipment is covered by a separate domestic bill of lading. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10501, 10521, 10561; Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113, 117-18, 70 S.Ct. 499, 501-02, 94 L.Ed. 698 (1950); Capitol Converting Equip., Inc. v. LEP Trans., Inc., 965 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1992); Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, 799 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 1577, 94 L.Ed.2d 768 (1987).
Federal law preempts state and common law when Congress expressly provides that the federal law supplants state authority in a particular field, or when its intent to do so may be inferred from a pervasive system of regulation which does not leave a sufficient vacancy within which any state can act. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1304 (4th Cir. 1992). Preemption may also be inferred where state legislation would impede the purposes and objectives of legislation enacted by Congress. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).
The Carmack Amendment was enacted in 1906 as an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and addresses the liability of common carriers for goods lost or damaged during a shipment over which the Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction. Originally part of the Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906), and codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20(11), the Carmack Amendment has since been recodified primarily at 49 U.S.C. § 11707. The Amendment requires, among other things, that a carrier transporting property issue a bill of lading or a receipt to the shipper, and makes the carrier liable to the one entitled to recover under the bill of lading or the receipt for loss of or injury to the property.
(a)(1) A common carrier providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation. . . . That carrier . . . and any other common carrier that delivers the property and is providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . are liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by (1) the receiving carrier, (2) the delivering carrier, or (3) another carrier over whose line or route the property is transported in the United States. . . .
Almost every detail of the subject [of the liability of a carrier under a bill of lading] is covered so completely [by the Carmack Amendment] that there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject and supersede all state regulation with reference to it. . . .
. . . The duty to issue a bill of lading and the liability thereby assumed are covered in full, and though there is no reference to the effect upon state regulation, it is evident that Congress intended to adopt a uniform rule and relieve such contracts from the diverse regulation to which they had been theretofore subject.
Id. at 505-06, 33 S.Ct. at 152; see also New York, New Haven Hartford R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 131, 73 S.Ct. 986, 988, 97 L.Ed. 1500 (1953) ("With the enactment in 1906 of the Carmack Amendment, Congress superseded diverse state laws with a nationally uniform policy governing interstate carriers' liability for property loss."); Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe Ry. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371, 378, 36 S.Ct. 665, 668, 60 L.Ed. 1050 (1916) ("[T]he Carmack Amendment . . . was an assertion of the power of Congress over the subject of interstate shipments, the duty to issue bills of lading and the responsibilities thereunder, which in the nature of things excluded state action. . . [A]s the subject of a carrier's liability for loss or damage to goods moving in interstate commerce under a bill of lading is embraced by the Carmack Amendment, state legislation on that subject has been excluded.").
Every circuit court that has considered the issue has relied upon the Court's reasoning in Adams Express to conclude likewise that the Carmack Amendment preempts a shipper's state and common law claims of breach of contract and negligence for goods lost or damaged by a carrier during interstate shipment under a valid bill of lading. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. North American Van Lines, 970 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is clear that the Carmack Amendment established a uniform national liability policy for interstate carriers" which "preempts any state common law action against [a carrier] acting solely as a common carrier."); Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. North American Van Lines, 890 F.2d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he Carmack Amendment preempts state common law remedies against common carriers for negligent loss or damage to goods shipped under a lawful bill of lading."); Intech, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 836 F.2d 672, 677 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he Carmack Amendment provides the exclusive remedy" for "an action for damages against the delivering carrier"); Hughes v. United Van Lines, 829 F.2d 1407, 1415 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he remedy provision of the Carmack Amendment preempts all state and common law remedies inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act . . . ."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 1068, 99 L.Ed.2d 248 (1988); Hopper Furs, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 749 F.2d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1984) ("All actions against a common carrier, whether designated as tort or contract actions, are governed by the federal statute. . . ."); Air Products Chemicals, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 721 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Congress intended by the Carmack Amendment to provide a uniform national remedy against carriers for breach of the contract of carriage, including a liability for default in any common-law duty as a common carrier."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S.Ct. 122, 83 L.Ed.2d 64 (1984); W.D. Lawson Co. v. Penn Cent. Co., 456 F.2d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 1972) ("As to . . . whether or not the Carmack Amendment preempted common law suits of the nature of the first count stated in this case . . . we hold that it did.").
Despite this authority, Shao maintains that the Carmack Amendment contains language that supports his contention that "the Carmack Amendment does not preempt the common law by fully occupying the field" of carrier liability for goods damaged or lost during shipment. Section 10103, found within the Amendment, states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the remedies provided under this subtitle are in addition to remedies existing under another law or at common law" (emphasis added). In attempting to apply § 10103 to his own case, however, Shao ignores the section's context and gives it overly broad application.
While § 10103 may preserve common law remedies for goods damaged due to a breach of duty by one not responsible for their shipment, Shao's complaint in this case rests on the alleged breach of duty arising from the commitment of goods to the custody of defendants for shipment. It is that very duty which Congress undertook to make uniform and regulate, preempting any state regulation of that duty. To so hold is not to say that the Carmack Amendment preempts duties existing at common law beyond those which arise from or in connection with the bailment of goods for carriage. For example, the Carmack Amendment would not preempt a state or common law claim by Shao against a third party tortfeasor who may have caused the Miami fire. To interpret § 10103, however, to allow the common law claims asserted in Shao's complaint would conflict with the narrow reading given a previous version of § 10103 by the Supreme Court in Adams Express:
The proviso of the Carmack Amendment interpreted by the Supreme Court in Adams Express read, "nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law." 34 Stat. at 593.
was "evidently only intended to continue in existence such other rights or remedies for the redress of some specific wrong or injury, whether given by the Interstate Commerce Act, or by state statute, or common law, not inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed by the provisions of this act." . . . To construe this proviso as preserving to the holder of any such bill of lading any right or remedy which he may have had under existing Federal law at the time of his action, gives to it a more rational interpretation than one which would preserve rights and remedies under existing state laws, for the latter view would cause the proviso to destroy the act itself.
Id. at 507-08, 33 S.Ct. at 153 (citation omitted). Despite Shao's contention otherwise, this virtually uniform interpretation provided by the Supreme Court and the circuit courts has "relegated the proviso relating to other remedies [§ 10103] to a category of almost total insignificance." Lloyds of London, 890 F.2d at 1116.
Although Congress reacted to a portion of the Adams Express decision in the First Cummins Amendment (incorporated into the Carmack Amendment in 1915, ch. 176, 38 Stat. 1196), it was silent regarding that decision's narrow reading of the Carmack Amendment's proviso concerning alternative causes of action. See H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. (1915); Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. North American Van Lines, 890 F.2d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 1989) (in enacting the Cummins Amendment, "nothing was said [by Congress] about the Court's narrowing of the reach of the proviso with respect to common law remedies. Indeed, much of the debate on the floor of the House and Senate simply took for granted that the Carmack Amendment was the exclusive regulation of the subject of carrier liability for its own negligence resulting in the loss or damage to the shipper's goods."); Hughes v. United Van Lines, 829 F.2d 1407, 1414 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he First Cummins Amendment addressed issues wholly separate from that of preserving for shippers their state and common law remedies; rather, it addressed the scope of the statute as it applied to the carriage of goods in foreign countries, the scope of the carrier's liability, and notice requirements for `concealed' goods"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 1068, 99 L.Ed.2d 248 (1988).
The district court, having ruled that the Carmack Amendment preempted the plaintiff's common law causes of action and that the complaint adequately alleged the necessary elements of a claim under the Amendment, proceeded to hold that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations found at 49 U.S.C. § 11706(c)(1), which requires that "[a] person must file a complaint with the [Interstate Commerce] Commission to recover damages under section 11705(b)(2) of this title within 2 years after the claim accrues." Shao contends that because a Carmack Amendment claim cannot be considered to constitute a claim under § 11705, it is not governed by the limitations of § 11706(c)(1). He contends that § 11706 applies only to claims made against carriers governed by subchapters I (rail, rail-water, express, and pipeline carriers) and III (water carriers) and that his claim is against motor carriers and freight forwarders, who are governed by subchapters II and IV, respectively. He also contends that § 11706 applies only to claims made to the ICC for acts or omission in violation of the subtitle. The appellees have not disputed Shao's contentions, arguing only that Shao did not meet the time requirements of § 11707(e) which unquestionably does apply.
As we noted in Section II, supra, to prove a claim under the Carmack Amendment the plaintiff would also have to show that the shipment came within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
We agree that the district court erred in applying the two-year limitation provision of § 11706 to a claim under § 11707. By its terms, § 11706(c)(1) supplies the limitations period for actions initiated with the ICC under § 11705(b)(2). Section 11705(b)(2) addresses the liability of carriers for "damages sustained by a person as a result of an act or omission of that carrier in violation of this subtitle." The claims under § 11705(b) have been traditionally limited to refunds for overcharges, i.e. charges exceeding the amount specified in an applicable tariff (subsection (b)(1)), or for damages for amounts charged pursuant to an unlawful tariff (subsection (b)(2)). See Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 867 F.2d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The alleged injury which Shao seeks to have remedied in this case, however, is the loss of personal belongings which were destroyed during shipment. Actions brought by shippers against carriers for goods lost or damaged in interstate shipment are governed by the Carmack Amendment, § 11707.
The district court correctly noted that § 11707(e) "is not a statute of limitations, but a statutory determination of what is a reasonable period of time for a carrier to impose for filing a claim." See Louisiana W.R.R. v. Gardiner, 273 U.S. 280, 284, 47 S.Ct. 386, 388, 71 L.Ed. 644 (1927) (holding that an earlier version of § 11707 was not intended to operate as a statute of limitation but rather was meant to "restrict[ ] the freedom of carriers to fix the period within which suit could be brought. . . ."); Yamazen U.S.A., Inc. v. Chicago and Northwestern Transp. Co., 790 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Courts have similarly held that [ 49 U.S.C. §] 11707 does not operate as a rigid statute of limitations but rather sets forth a reasonable time limit for filing."). The Carmack Amendment thus contemplates that limitation periods are terms to be bargained over between shipper and carrier, so long as the minimum conditions of § 11707(e) are met. See Swift Textiles, Inc., 799 F.2d at 704 n. 4 ("The Carmack Amendment on its face contemplates that the choice of a statute of limitation is to lie with the shipper subject to the minimum time limit prescribed by the Act. . . . [T]he Act clearly anticipates statutes of limitations and legislatively approves any limitation period exceeding two years.").
Finally, Shao contends that the dismissal, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j), of five named defendants who were not served was improper. Rule 4(j) requires that an action be dismissed as to any defendant upon whom service of the summons and complaint is not made within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, if the party on whose behalf the service was required cannot show good cause why service was not made within that period. The district court's dismissal for untimely service under this rule is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Cox v. Sandia Corp., 941 F.2d 1124, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991). In this case we find no such abuse.
They are Link Cargo (Taiwan), Ltd. (an international transportation broker in Taipei); Abacus Transports and Forwarder, Ltd. (an international transportation broker in Taipei); Inhouse Trucking Co. (a California trucker); International Warehouse Distribution Corp. (a Florida warehouseman); and MICC Venture (a Florida lessor of warehouse space).