Source: http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=8921%7C10550%7C6020
Timestamp: 2013-12-05 17:05:37
Document Index: 716893421

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 240', '§240', '§ 240', '§203', '§ 240', '§ 244', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 304', '§ 304', '§\n304', '§\n304', '§ 304', '§\n309', '§ 203', '§ 309', '§ 240', '§ 302', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 304', '§\n240', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§\n241', '§\n241', '§ 212', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§\n309', '§ 241', '§309', '§ 309', '§ 241', '§309', '§ 309', '§ 241', '§\n309', '§ 241', '§ 309', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§\n212', '§ 240', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309']

AILA - AILF-AILA Comment to May 21 NACARA Rule
Home > Agencies & Liaison > Department of Homeland Security > AILA's Comments on DHS/INS Regulations and Memos > 1999 - 1995 > AILF-AILA Comment to May 21 NACARA Rule
AILF-AILA Comment to May 21 NACARA Rule
Cite as "AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 99072650 (posted Jul. 26, 1999)" AILF-AILA July 15, 1999 Comment Letter to INS on May 21, 1999 NACARA Interim Rule
Director, Policy Directives and Instructions Branch	Immigration and Naturalization Service
425 I Street, N.W., Room 5307	Washington, DC 20536	Re: Suspension of Deportation & Special Rule Cancellation
of Removal (Section 203 of NACARA), 64 Fed. Reg. 27856
(May 21, 1999). INS No. 1915-98
In response to the interim rule implementing
the above-mentioned provisions of NACARA, following are the
comments of the American Immigration Law Foundation ("AILF")
Immigration Lawyers Association ("AILA"). AILF is a
non-profit organization that educates the public about the
benefits of legal immigration through awareness programs,
scholarships and services and mentors attorneys across the
country on immigration law issues. AILA is a voluntary bar
our country's immigration system, and it is anticipated that AILA
members will represent a great number of NACARA applicants. We
are, therefore, in a unique position to provide preliminary
insight on the impact of the interim rule from this perspective. We commend the Department of Justice for many
of the revisions from the November, 1998 proposed rule. Most
significantly, we strongly support that the interim rule
established a streamlined procedure and a rebuttable presumption
for NACARA applicants that are class members in American
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC). The interim
rule helps to bring to a close a long history of discriminatory
treatment towards refugees who fled a region wracked by decades
of civil war. A fair and straightforward NACARA
application process also serves the United States' national
interest. When Central Americans obtain security and stability
in the United States, they can earn higher wages, and send more
money home to loved ones in Central America. These remittances
are essential to sustaining the region's economy, protecting
against renewed political instability, and helping Central
America recover from Hurricane Mitch.
This comment first discusses expanding
eligibility for the presumption of extreme hardship to include
ABC class members’ dependants. It then raises
concerns, suggestions and favorable comments in ascending
numerical order. We thank you for carefully considering the
240.64(4)(d) Eligibility for the
Rebuttable Presumption of Extreme Hardship
We strongly commend the Attorney General
for establishing a rebuttable presumption of "extreme hardship"
for ABC class members' NACARA cases. We agree with the
Attorney General's assessment that, "the ABC class
shares certain characteristics that give rise to a strong
likelihood that an ABC class member or qualified relative
would suffer extreme hardship if the class member were
deported..."
having fled civil war and violence in
their home countries; living in the United States for a lengthy
period of time with employment authorization and without the fear
of deportation; and developing significant community
This evidentiary presumption will
significantly reduce the time it takes both the Executive Office
of Immigration Review (EOIR) and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to decide a NACARA suspension or
cancellation case. This saving of time will contribute to
administrative efficiency and save taxpayers considerable sums. The interim rule's rebuttable presumption
advances the twin policy goals of a more accessible process for
applicants and administrative economy for both EOIR and INS. We
believe that the Department of Justice could increase the
benefits from these goals and promote family unity by extending
the hardship presumption to the NACARA-eligible family members
(spouse, children, and son or daughter) of the NACARA principals.
First, these immediate family members share
many or the same characteristics of their parents or spouses for
whom hardship is presumed. Most also fled the violence and civil
wars in their countries. The INS has authorized many of these
individuals to live and work in the United States. For example,
the INS granted employment authorization and protection against
removal to many children and spouses that were included in the
ABC asylum applications of their parent or spouse. These
family members face return to the same difficult economic, social
and political situations in Guatemala and El Salvador. The
NACARA dependents usually share with their ABC class
member parents or spouses, the very characteristics that the
regulation states give rise to a strong likelihood that an
ABC class member would suffer extreme hardship. Therefore, there is a strong probability that the NACARA
dependent would also suffer extreme hardship. Furthermore, a
large number of NACARA principals' dependent children will suffer
even more severe adjustment problems than their parents if forced
to return to Guatemala or El Salvador. They speak English. They are going or have gone to school in the United States. In
general, they are as much, or even more a part of the cultural
fabric of the United States than their parents.
Even more significantly, all NACARA dependents
will possess the additional strong hardship factor of having a
lawful permanent resident spouse or parent because their
applications may only be considered after the application
of the principal is granted. Separation suffered by an U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent from his
spouse or child has been one of the most compelling factors in
the hardship analysis in long-standing caselaw. The interim rule
also lists this separation as a hardship factor. Given the strong likelihood that the NACARA
dependents will also be able to meet the hardship requirement, it
also makes sense to extend the rebuttable presumption to them. Doing so will eliminate the confusing and cumbersome situation
for adjudicators in which they have to apply a different
evidentiary burden for members of the same family in the same
interview or hearing. An example will illustrate the benefits to the
agencies of extending the presumption to NACARA dependents of
principals from El Salvador and Guatemala. Assume that Pedro
registered for TPS. He is therefore eligible for NACARA and for
the rebuttable presumption of extreme hardship. He has worked
in the U.S. for over 10 years, and lives with his wife, Maria and
daughter Deborah, age 14, both of whom entered the U.S. after
1991. Both Pedro and Maria have taken classes to learn English,
and Deborah has only attended school here in the U.S. They are
all involved in their church, and Deborah is involved in many
school activities. Significantly, it is only after Pedro
is granted NACARA special rule cancellation that the Asylum
Office or the EOIR will adjudicate the applications of his wife,
Maria, and daughter, Deborah. Both automatically acquire the
very compelling factor of extreme hardship to their (new) LPR
husband and father in the event that the INS removes them. This
hardship to Pedro combined with the other hardship factors
discussed previously create an extremely high probability that
Maria and Deborah will be able to satisfy the hardship
requirement. At the NACARA interview, the adjudicator will
presume hardship in Pedro's case, but not in the cases of Maria
and Deborah. This will significantly increase the time and
expense of adjudicating the applications. It will also create a
somewhat confusing situation in which the Attorney General will
adjudicate by different evidentiary standards applications for
members of the same family. This situation is typical of the
vast majority of cases in which at least one family member is
presumed to meet the hardship requirement, but other family
members are not afforded the presumption. Given the high probability that the dependents
will also be able to demonstrate the hardship requirement, we
believe that the increased time and expense for agencies, as well
as applicants and their legal representatives in the application
process is unnecessary. We urge the Attorney General to extend
the presumption of extreme hardship to include the dependents of
NACARA principals for whom hardship is presumed.
To accomplish this result we recommend that
the Attorney General change 8 C.F.R. § 240.64(d)(1) as follows: "An applicant described in paragraphs (a)(1),
(a)(2) or (a)(4) of § 240.61 who has submitted a completed
Form I-881 to either the Service or the Immigration Court shall
be presumed to have established that deportation or removal from
the United States would result in extreme hardship to the
applicant, or to his or her spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence." (Proposed changes are underlined).
208.14. Approval, Denial, Referral, or
The Attorney General Should Clarify Which
Regulations Apply to Persons Applying for or Granted NACARA Who
Are Pursuing ABC Asylum Applications
Under the ABC settlement agreement, the
1990 asylum regulations govern asylum applications filed by
ABC class members. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 addresses the
relationship between asylum applications and adjustment of status
for NACARA applicants. The interim regulation fails to mention
that 8 CFR 208.14 does not apply to the asylum applications of
ABC class members. The interim regulations should clarify
which regulations do apply to the pending asylum applications of
ABC class members, and how the INS plans to handle the
relationship between an ABC class member’s asylum and
NACARA applications. We urge the Attorney General to increase
the clarity of this process by including the following
suggestions in the final regulations:
Stating that the 1990 asylum regulations govern the INS’
adjudication of an ABC class member’s request for
Identifying which regulations are controlling for ABC
class members' asylum claims;
Clarifying that an ABC class member may apply for asylum even
after winning NACARA suspension of deportation or cancellation of
Amending 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 to clarify that a person can file
an I-730 within two years of receiving asylum even if she or he
obtained lawful permanent residence by winning NACARA suspension
or cancellation; Extending the period to sixty days during which a person
granted NACARA suspension or cancellation can notify the INS that
she or he wants to pursue her or his request for asylum; and
Allowing any person that wins NACARA suspension or
cancellation sixty days to withdraw any waiver of the right to
apply for asylum 240.58 Extreme Hardship
We applaud the inclusion of the VAWA
(Violence Against Women Act) factors in the regulation as an
important recognition of the unique circumstances of battered
women and children. Recommendations for Specific Changes in the
Listed Hardship Factors in Proposed 8 C.F.R. § 240.58(b)
Below are recommendations for strengthening
some of the factors listed in the subparagraphs in paragraph 8
C.F.R. §240.58(b) of the proposed rule. We believe that the
suggestions below more appropriately reflect the circumstances of
many NACARA applicants:
(4) The alien's ability to obtain employment
that pays a living wage in the country to which the alien would
be returned. (7) The financial impact of the alien's
departure and of the alien's return to his or her country of
origin, including but not limited to, the loss of basic services
such as public education and emergency health care to his or her
United States citizen or lawful permanent resident children. (9) The psychological impact of the alien's deportation,
including but not limited to: The circumstances under which an
individual left his or her country;
The political consequences of such a
return;1
The inability to continue providing
financial support to family members, whether in the U.S. or in
the home country; and
Separation from a person who is not a
relative defined in the Act's provisions on extreme hardship for
suspension.2 (12) Contributions to a community in the
United States or to the United States, including but not limited
to remittances sent to the person's home country.3 (12a)Ties to a community in the United
States, including degree of integration into society.4 (13) Immigration history, including
authorized residence in the United States, and the reasons
the individual initially sought to immigrate to the United
States; and (14) The ability to adjust status to permanent
resident status by other means. Recommendations For Adding Additional
Hardship Factors To 8 C.F.R. § 240.58(b)
We suggest that the final regulations add the
following specific additional factors to the list of factors now
in the proposed regulations. These factors should be applied to
the applicant and to his/her qualified relative(s):
The effect on the individual, as well as on his or her home
community and nation, of returning to a place where there has
been a flood, earthquake, drought, epidemic or other
environmental disaster resulting in a substantial disruption of
Difficulty of readjustment to life in the country of
origin, including but not limited to, the inability to find a
home and heightened vulnerability to criminal violence as a
result of being identified as having returned from the United
States. 240.60.	Definitions We Commend the Interim Rule's Inclusion of Properly Filed
Derivative Applications in the Definition of "Filed An
Application for Asylum"
We commend the Attorney General for including
in the definition of "filed an application for asylum" properly
filed derivative applications. This will result in
administrative efficiency in the adjudication of the NACARA
applications of the family unit. It is also a common sense and
very fair approach.
240.61. Applicability
240.61(a)(5)(1) The Final Rule Should
Mitigate Harm from Department of Justice Delays in Implementing
NACARA §203 by Providing Eligibility to Children Who "Aged Out"
After the Statute's Enactment We recommend changing this section to
provide that a son or daughter who entered the U.S. after October
1, 1990, and who turned 21 years of age after the enactment of
NACARA and on or before December 31, 1999, remains eligible for
NACARA, provided that he or she and his or her NACARA-principal
parent applies for suspension or special rule cancellation within
60 days of the effective date of the final rule.
A significant number of sons and daughters of
NACARA principals became ineligible for NACARA because they
turned 21 years of age before the application period began on the
effective date of the interim rule on June 21, 1999. We
recommend providing that these persons will retain NACARA
eligibility. We recommend that this include children who turn 21
up until a date such as December 31, 1999. In practice, a child
who will turn 21 before that date will probably also lose
eligibility because it will be difficult to obtain interviews
before that date. This recommendation will thus also promote
administrative efficiency by eliminating the need for the Asylum
Office to use extra resources to expedite NACARA interviews of
principals whose children will be turning 21 before this
The judicial and the executive branches of
government have fashioned equitable approaches to allow a person
to remain eligible for a benefit for which Congress intended that
she or he be eligible. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
remanded cases to allow individuals to apply for relief who would
have been eligible for relief were it not for the Attorney
General’s actions.5 The implementation of the Special Immigrant
Juvenile (SIJ) provisions illustrate that the Department of
Justice is willing to use remedial regulations to prevent delays
in implementing a provision from prejudicing innocent applicants. The Immigration Act of 1990 provided that a juvenile could adjust
her or his status if a court determined that the juvenile was a
dependent juvenile, among other requirements.6 The Department of Justice did not
promulgate implementing regulations until 1993. Because of the
delay, juveniles that met the statutory requirements on November
29, 1990, (the date the statute became law), would not be
eligible.7 The Department of Justice corrected this
problem by determining juveniles to be eligible for relief that
met the statutory requirements on November 29, 1990. This
interpretation enabled juveniles to qualify who would be too old
to qualify when the Attorney General adjudicated their requests. The Attorney General's discussion which distinguishes the NACARA
aging-out from SIJ aging-out, actually supports commentators'
suggestion that the Attorney General has the authority to
grandfather eligibility. In both situations, the passage of time
threatened to make ineligible individuals that were of concern to
Congress. Faced with a group of juveniles that would no longer
be juveniles, the Attorney General "grandfathered" their
eligibility. We applaud the Attorney General's decision to
grandfather juveniles eligible for SIJ status. We urge her to
take the same steps for NACARA applicants.
240.61(a)(2) We Commend the Interim Rule's
Clarification that Persons Who Filed Asylum Applications With the
EOIR Have Also Filed With the Service.
The Attorney General's approach in the
interim rule is logical in that every person who files for asylum
with the EOIR must by necessity "serve a copy of that application
on the Service" as the rule notes.
240.62.	Jurisdiction
240.62(a) Establish a Process That Assures
All Eligible Persons May Apply for NACARA Benefits By
Permitting Persons Who Are Not in Proceedings to Apply With the
Asylum Office.
We recommend creating mechanism to permit all
eligible individuals to apply for NACARA cancellation of removal. Specifically, those persons who are not in removal or
deportation proceedings should be permitted to file their
NACARA applications with the Asylum Office. This recommendation
is consistent with the policy goal of creating a streamlined
adjudication system which enhances administrative efficiency.
In particular, we recommend including the
following groups (as long as they are not in deportation or
removal proceedings) with those who are able to apply for NACARA
relief with the Asylum Office Salvadorans who registered for TPS but have never filed for
Salvadoran and Guatemalan ABC registrants who have
never filed a request for asylum or filed a request for asylum
after the ABC filing deadlines; and
Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Eastern European nationals who
filed a request for asylum with the INS before April 1, 1990 and
whose applications are no longer pending with the Service, but
who are not in deportation or removal proceedings.
Permitting such persons to apply to the Asylum
Office would significantly increase administrative efficiency. Without such a procedure, it is very likely that the Asylum
Offices will have to adjudicate a significant number of good
faith non-frivolous requests for asylum filed with the knowledge
that a referral to the EOIR would provide a forum to apply for
NACARA cancellation. An example illustrates the advantages of
our recommendation. Under the current procedure in the interim
rule, a person who has never been in proceedings but is currently
not permitted to file with the Asylum office is unable to file
for NACARA with the EOIR because the Service will not issue a NTA
(Notice to Appear). He files a bona fide non-frivolous asylum
application. The Service Center processes the application, and
sets up an interview with the Asylum Office. The Asylum Officer
denies his asylum case, refers it to the EOIR, and issues the
NTA. Only after this considerable time and expense, is the
applicant is able to file his NACARA application. Under our
recommendation, the applicant applies for NACARA directly with
the Asylum Office, which adjudicates his case.
In the alternative, we recommend that the
Asylum Office have the option, resources permitting, to issue a
Notice to Appear when a NACARA-eligible individual requests that
she or he may apply for special rule cancellation with the EOIR. This will promote administrative efficiency for the Service as a
whole because persons in the Asylum Office are much more familiar
with eligibility requirements for special rule cancellation than
Service personnel in the district offices.
At a minimum, the final regulations should
require the INS to place those individuals who are eligible for
NACARA cancellation of removal, but who are not currently
permitted to apply with the Asylum Office into removal
proceedings within 60 days of receiving a written request. This
recommendation will significantly increase the agencies’
administrative efficiency as discussed.
240.63. Application Process
240.63(d)(3). The Attorney General Should
Change the Definition of "Complete Application" and Modify
Consequences of Filing an Incomplete Application.
The requirements for what constitutes a
"completed" application are unduly strict. The interim
regulations require the return of an application "that does
not include a response to each of the questions contained in the
application…." To compel the Service to return such
applications significantly decreases its administrative
efficiency. Such strict scrutiny to applications is not necessary
and the forced return of these applications that include a single
blank sets a discouraging tone and is inconsistent with the
remedial nature of the law. We suggest that the final rule
strike 8 CFR § 240.63(d)(3).
Adopting our recommendation will promote
administrative efficiency by permitting the agencies to accept
I-881 application packets, which are complete enough to
adjudicate at the time of the interview. Otherwise, the Attorney
General will spend considerable resources in returning I-881
packets to individuals when there is no need to do so. 240.64(b). Continuous Physical
In Determining Continuous Physical Presence in
NACARA Cancellation Cases, the Attorney General Should Consider
Only Factors That Relate to the Length of a Person's Absence. The interim regulation states that continuous
physical presence is terminated for both suspension and
cancellation whenever a person, leaves pursuant to a deportation
or removal order; leaves pursuant to an order of voluntary
departure; or where the "departure is made for purposes of
committing an unlawful act." We believe that this provision in the interim
rule fails to give effect to the unambiguous intent of Congress
to replace the subjective "brief, casual, and innocent"
test that applied in suspension cases with an objective test
based on the length of a person’s absence for cancellation
purposes. Therefore, we recommend that this portion be deleted
from the final rule. In calculating continuous physical presence
for special cancellation, the final regulations should include
only factors linked to the length of an absence. The preamble to the interim regulations offer
only conclusions to reject commentators’ suggestions that
continuous physical presence for special cancellation can be
based only on the length of an absence. The Attorney General's
conclusions, however, are not consistent with the statutory
language defining continuous physical presence.8 IIRIRA made dramatic changes to the "entry
doctrine." The BIA recently analyzed the significance those
changes. In determining the effect of IIRIRA on previous legal
interpretations of entry, the BIA held that IIRIRA superceded the
"brief, casual, and innocent" standard of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Matter of Collado, Int. Dec. #3333 (BIA 1997). The BIA based this conclusion on the fact that IIRIRA replaced
the statutory definition of "entry," upon which the
Fleuti decision was based, with the new definition of
"admission." In the same way, IIRIRA replaced the
provision of the suspension statute that allowed for "brief,
casual, and innocent" departures, former INA § 244(c), with
the straightforward time periods of INA § 240A(d)(2). Under the
reasoning the BIA applied in Collado, the statute should
be read as replacing the "brief, casual, and innocent"
standard for determining continuous presence under suspension
with the explicit standard based on the duration of the absence
set forth in INA § 240A(d).
A Departure Pursuant to Advance Parole For
Those With Final Deportation Orders Should Not Break Continuous
Physical Presence for NACARA Suspension or Special Rule
The final rule should include a provision that
a departure pursuant to advance parole authorized by the Service
which is technically a deportation will not break continuous
physical presence for either NACARA suspension of special rule
cancellation. The Service granted advance parole to a
significant number of persons with final orders of deportation,
who have subsequently become eligible for NACARA. Although
technically departures under these circumstances may be
considered deportations, the Service did not advise the persons
of this adverse consequence. It is in the interests of promoting
administrative economy as well as basic fairness not to penalize
persons for these authorized departures. We recommend that the
final rule clarify that an absence of a person with a final order
of deportation who departed the United States pursuant to advance
parole authorization by the Service does not break the requisite
continuous physical presence. Effect of Advanced Parole on Continuous
It appears from the interim regulations that
receipt of advance parole does not necessarily interrupt
continuous presence in the United States for purposes of NACARA
eligibility. In attempting to provide as transparent an
application process as possible, the final regulations should
make explicit that an individual with TPS that returned under a
grant of advance parole returns to the status that she or he was
in when they left. Section 304 of The Miscellaneous and
Technical Amendments of 1991 (MTINA) specifically states that
individuals who leave and return under a grant of advance parole
"shall be inspected and admitted in the same immigration status
the alien had at the time of departure."9 The BIA has taken note of this
provision.10 MTINA § 304 applies to the successor programs
to TPS. On June 26, 1992, President Bush gave Deferred Enforced
Departure (DED) to Salvadorans. On May 22, 1993, Attorney
General Janet Reno extended DED for eighteen months. Although
DED expired on December 31, 1994, the INS automatically extended
employment authorization for Salvadorans registered under DED. DED and the special employment authorization for Salvadorans were
the successors to their TPS designation. As such, MTINA § 304
should apply to individuals who return under a grant of advance
parole, during any of these programs. To achieve uniformity and
consistency, we urge the INS to apply the provisions of MTINA §
304 to NACARA-eligible individuals who left and returned under a
grant of advance parole regardless of their nationality. If the
Attorney General chooses not to extend the provisions of MTINA §
304 to Guatemalans and Eastern Europeans, at a minimum, the
Attorney General should apply MTINA § 304 to all Salvadorans who
left and returned under a grant of advanced parole. The Final Regulations Should Provide the
Opportunity for All Otherwise Eligible Individuals in Exclusion
Proceedings to Apply for NACARA Special Rule Cancellation.
The interim regulations do not implement
Congress’ unambiguous intent to permit those in exclusion
proceedings to apply for suspension of deportation. The NACARA
statute provides that in calculating "continuous physical
presence" both for suspension of deportation and
cancellation of removal under NACARA that the special rules apply
"regardless of whether the alien is in
exclusion or deportation proceedings." IIRAIRA §
309(c)(5)(c)(i), as amended by NACARA § 203 (emphasis added). The Attorney General can give effect to this statutory provision
by allowing who are in exclusion proceedings, but are otherwise
eligible, to apply for NACARA relief. In the preamble to the interim regulations,
the Attorney General analyzes this question as follows:
Contrary to showing a congressional intent
that NACARA relief be made available to persons in exclusion
proceedings, the phrase…simply indicates that Congress did not
want the new continuous residence and physical presence rules to
apply to NACARA beneficiaries who are eligible to apply for
suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal no matter
what charging documents, if any, may have been issued to them
prior to April 1, 1997.11
This interpretation misconstrues the meaning
Congress’s words. In the first place, there is no need for such
a clarification -- § 309(c)(5) of IIRIRA as modified by NACARA
expressly provides that INA § 240A(d) applies to OSCs and NTAs,
and nowhere suggests that it applies to form I-122, the charging
document for exclusion cases. Moreover, Congress would not have used the
present tense "in exclusion proceedings" to indicate an exception
to the continuous physical presence rules for cases in which the
Attorney General exercises her authority to reinitiate
proceedings under § 302 of IIRIRA. If the reasoning of the
interim regulations were correct, the statute would say
"regardless of whether a person 'was' or 'had been'
in exclusion proceedings." It makes no sense that Congress would
use the present tense verb "is" to describe the reach of the
physical presence rules after the Attorney General exercised her
authority under IIRIRA § 309(a)(2). Plainly, once the Attorney
General reinitiates removal proceedings, exclusion proceedings
have ended. Once exclusion proceedings have ended, the
noncitizen no longer "is" in exclusion proceedings. Consequently, the above-quoted interpretation
is not a legitimate explanation of the phrase "regardless of
whether the alien is in exclusion proceedings." Assuming, without
conceding, that the meaning of the phrase is ambiguous, the
Attorney General should follow the principle of statutory of
resolving ambiguity in the favor of prospective NACARA
applicants.12 We commend the Attorney General’s request in
the interim rule for comments on the advisability of a regulation
or policy which terminates exclusion proceedings and initiates
removal proceedings to permit otherwise eligible persons to apply
for NACARA. In response to the requests for comments on this
issue, we urge the Attorney General to reinitiate removal
proceedings under IIRIRA § 309(c)(2) in cases where the
immigration court has not conducted a hearing. In those cases
where the immigration court has concluded the hearing, the
Attorney General should end the exclusion proceedings under
IIRAIRA § 309(c)(3). These steps would be in the public
interest, promote administrative and judicial economy, and be
consistent with the statutory language. The Attorney General Should Mitigate Harm
to Persons Improperly Placed in Exclusion Proceedings in the
Event that the Attorney General Does Not Make NACARA Relief Available to All Individuals in Exclusion Proceedings
The INS' practice regarding advance parole
varies from district to district. Notwithstanding MTINA § 304,
the INS in some districts mistakenly placed individuals in
exclusion proceedings when they returned under a grant of
advanced parole. There are a number of other examples of the
Service incorrectly placing persons in exclusion proceedings.
The INS has placed individuals in exclusion
proceedings for other erroneous reasons. For example, at least
one federal court has held that the INS should only put a person
in exclusion proceedings subsequent to a return with advance
parole if the Service provided specific notice in writing of the
potential consequences of leaving under advanced parole. Rather
than engaging in a labor-intensive effort that would be necessary
to correct the errors in these cases, we recommend the adoption
of our recommendation to permit these persons to apply for relief
under NACARA by terminating the exclusion proceedings and
initiating removal proceedings.
240.64(d). Presumption of Extreme
We applaud the Attorney General for
exercising her authority to create appropriate rules and
procedures in determining eligibility for suspension of
deportation and special rule cancellation of removal and electing
to establish a rebuttable presumption of hardship for the
ABC class. We would urge however, that in the interest of
consistent decision making that reflects the spirit of the
regulation and legislation, that the supplementary information’s
guidance on the two circumstances when the presumption can be
overcome be included in the regulation at section 240.64 (d)(2). The circumstances for challenging the presumption are well
described and would offer adjudicators concrete direction in
interviews and similarly benefit judges in hearings. Without
this important guidance in the regulation itself, it will be too
easy for adjudicators and judges alike to seek to overcome the
presumption inconsistently, thereby undermining the very purpose
240.65 (suspension) and 240.66 (cancellation).
Eligibility for Suspension of Deportation and Special Rule
The Attorney General Should Drop the Bars to
Eligibility for NACARA that Lack a Basis in the Statute
Section 240.65(a) of the interim rule
disqualifies NACARA suspension applicants if they are
"subject to any bars to eligibility in former section
242B(e) of the Act," or "any other provision of
law." Where applicable, these bars preclude non-citizens
from most forms of discretionary relief, including suspension of
deportation, for a five-year period. Section 240.66(a) of the
interim rule similarly applies the parallel bars of INA §§
240(b)(7), 240B(d), and 240A(c) to applicants for special rule
cancellation. In enacting NACARA, Congress allowed non-citizens
with final deportation orders to reopen their cases to apply for
suspension of deportation despite any pre-existing legal
barriers, with one exception (for aggravated felons):
Notwithstanding any limitation imposed by
law on motions to reopen removal or deportation proceedings
(except limitations premised on an alien's conviction of an
aggravated felony…) any alien who has become eligible for
cancellation of removal or suspension of deportation as a result
of the amendments made by Section 203 of the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act may file one motion to
reopen removal or deportation proceedings to apply for
cancellation of removal or suspension of deportation.13
The interim regulation apparently interprets
this paragraph to apply only to the procedural limitations on
motions to reopen in INA § 240(c)(6), but the plain language of
the statute is not amenable to such an interpretation. This is
because there is no provision of law that bars
aggravated felons from filing a motion to reopen. That Congress
in this paragraph expressly excepted "limitations premised
on an alien ‘s conviction of an aggravated felony" proves
that Congress intended the paragraph to apply to all other
limitations to relief, and not just to the statutory limitations
on motions to reopen. Otherwise, the express exception for
"limitations premised on" aggravated felony convictions
Thus, it was the intent of Congress to waive
all other limitations, including substantive bars relating
to eligibility for the underlying relief, for NACARA-eligible
individuals seeking to reopen their proceedings. By specifically
barring aggravated felons, but no other categories, Congress
indicated its intent to permit all others to apply for suspension
or cancellation if otherwise eligible, notwithstanding bars to
eligibility for other than those defined by NACARA. The language
covers all bars. Congress did not intend for any of the
limitations on motions to reopen to apply. Thus, the regulation
should make clear that INA § 241(a)(5) does not defeat
eligibility in these cases. The overall intent of the NACARA legislation
is remedial in nature, and generous by explicit design. Part of
this intent is evident in the fact that Congress made special
provision for those who are NACARA eligible to reopen their cases
despite having final orders of deportation or removal. To
interpret the statute to bar relief to most individuals in this
situation would defeat Congress’ purpose in making special
provision for NACARA motions to reopen. The Final Regulations Should Make Clear
That INA § 241(a)(5) Does Not Apply Retroactively. The Attorney General takes the position that
INA § 241(a)(5) applies to NACARA-eligible individuals.14 INA § 241(a)(5) took effect on
April 1, 1997.15 It
applies only to certain individuals and cases.16 Applying INA § 241(a)(5) to
deportation orders entered before April 1, 1997 will have a
serious negative effect on NACARA beneficiaries. Many
Salvadorans and Guatemalans have past deportation orders from the
middle 1980's. Many of those individuals left the United States
under a deportation order after their asylum applications were
denied based on procedures which were the subject of the
litigation that resulted in the ABC settlement. Many of
these individuals found that the situations in Guatemala and El
Salvador posed dangers to their safety and they were subsequently
were forced to re-enter the United States illegally. There is no
indication whatsoever that Congress intended that these
individuals be barred from NACARA eligibility. On the contrary,
there is every indication that Congress wanted all of these
individuals to be eligible for NACARA as long as they
specifically met the other eligibility requirements of NACARA. Applying INA § 241(a)(5) to NACARA cases would frustrate
Congress' intent in enacting NACARA. Therefore, we recommend
that the Attorney General establish either in the final rule or
in a policy memorandum that INA 241(a)(5) will not be applied
The Attorney General Should Interpret INA §
241(a)(5) to Apply Only to Removal Orders and Not to Past
Deportation or Exclusion Orders. Section 241(a)(5) of the INA allows the INS to
remove an individual without a hearing before an Immigration
Judge, if the individual was previously removed (or left
voluntarily) "under an order of removal," and then subsequently
re-entered the United States illegally. On its face, INA §
241(a)(5) applies only to past removal orders. Nevertheless, the
INS takes a different view. Language in IIRIRA conforming
amendments is apparently the source of the INS' view.17 Section 309(d)(2) states that "any
reference in law to an order of removal shall be deemed to
include a reference to an order of exclusion and deportation or
an order of deportation." This interpretation fails to take into
account that there is no express reference in either the INA or
IIRIRA that the quoted language applies to reinstatements of
removal orders. At a minimum, the INS should interpret this
provision to only apply to past entries to the United States
after April 1, 1997. In a recent memorandum dealing with those
ordered removed that attempt to enter the United States
unlawfully, the INS concluded that the language applied only to
entries after April 1, 1997.18 There is no justification for treating people differently under
INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) than under INA § 241(a)(5) when both
provisions apply to the same class of individuals. Even only applying INA § 241(a)(5) to entries
effected after April 1, 1997 would not be sufficient. The INS
should reconsider its position and interpret INA § 241(a)(5) to
apply to removal orders only. If the INS believes that IIRIRA §
309(d)(2) modifies INA § 241(a)(5), then, at most, it should only
apply when either: the Attorney General invokes IIRIRA §309(c)(2) to apply the
new IIRIRA amendments to pending deportation proceedings. Under
that scenario, an individual who does obtain a "deportation
order" after IIRIRA § 309(c)(2) is invoked, and who subsequently
re-enters, could properly have § 241(a)(5) applied against him or
her; or
an individual in a pending deportation proceeding is ordered
deported after IIRIRA's April 1, 1997 effective date and
subsequently re-enters. In that scenario, IIRIRA §309(d)(2) is
applied to the pending deportation proceeding, and can be deemed
to modify IIRIRA § 309(c)(1)'s otherwise prohibition on applying
the new IIRIRA procedures to pending deportation proceedings. Absent one of the above two scenarios, the
Attorney General should not apply INA § 241(a)(5) to past
deportation or exclusion orders. The only way that IIRIRA §
309(d)(2) can possibly modify INA § 241(a)(5) is for a pending
deportation proceeding. Otherwise, IIRIRA § 309(d)(2) is
inapplicable to a past deportation order (i.e., a deportation
that was executed long before the enactment of IIRIRA) and cannot
possibly be deemed to modify INA § 241(a)(5). Applying INA § 241(a)(5) to deportation orders
entered before the April 1, 1997 effective date violates the
clear intent of Congress, the retroactivity principles set forth
by the Supreme Court and due process rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.19 Moreover, the
Attorney General's view that INA § 241(a)(5) applies to NACARA
beneficiaries is inconsistent with the purpose behind NACARA. This is especially true since NACARA is a remedial statute. The
interpretation suggested above is consistent with all principles
of statutory construction, and with the presumption against
retroactively applying new rules to past proceedings. 240.67(a). Avoiding Processing Delays Due
to Backlog in CIA Background Checks
There are long delays in fingerprint
clearances in many parts of the country. The INS anticipates a
lengthy delay for individuals that filed asylum applications
before January 4, 1995 due to delays in obtaining clearance from
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). We recommend that the
Attorney General adjudicate NACARA applications notwithstanding
the absence of a CIA clearance. In those extremely small numbers
of cases in which the CIA search reveals facts that would have
prevented the granting of the NACARA application, the Attorney
General retains the authority to rescind the grant.
At a minimum, the Attorney General should
adjudicate the claims without a CIA clearance for families with
children who are nearing 21 and who will "age out. These
individuals will no longer be eligible for NACARA relief if they
turn 21 before the Attorney General grants the principal’s
application for NACARA suspension of deportation. 240.68. Failure to Appear.
We commend the Attorney General for
adopting a "reasonable excuse" to excuse failure to
attend interviews. While the interim rule is a substantial
improvement on the proposed rule, we suggest further changes.
The Attorney General recognizes that an
applicant must sometimes reschedule interviews and fingerprint
appointments, and promises to accommodate all reasonable
requests.20 The final
regulations should repeat the language the Service "intends
to accommodate all reasonable requests (for rescheduling)"
that appears in the preamble.21
The Attorney General should adjudicate the
failure to appear under the "reasonable excuse"
standard. The Attorney General should instruct asylum officers
that the "reasonable excuse" standard is a generous
one. In cases where the asylum officer determines that the
applicant did not have a reasonable excuse for failure to appear,
the INS should refer the case to the immigration court, instead
of dismissing it. We suggest that the final regulation include
language saying, "in almost all cases in which an applicant
fails to appear for an interview of fingerprinting appointment,
the Service will refer the application to an Immigration Court
for a decision."22 The preamble explains that the INS
fingerprinting centers cannot process requests to reschedule
interviews. The INS will provide an applicant scheduled for such
a center with information about how to reschedule. As applicants
may have to take time off work to attend fingerprint
appointments, it should be possible to reschedule in the same
manner as rescheduling the interview. The community is very much
aware that rescheduling will only serve to delay adjudication,
and NACARA applicants are interested in having their cases
resolved. Therefore, applicants will be seeking rescheduling
only when it is truly necessary. The INS should allocate staff to
accommodate written requests for rescheduling fingerprinting in
the same manner as requests to reschedule interviews.
Therefore, we recommend that in the final
rule, 8 C.F.R. § 240.68(b) should mirror the language of 8
C.F.R. § 240.68(a) by adding at the end: "A written request
to reschedule a fingerprinting appointment will be granted if it
is an initial request and is received by the Application Support
Center (ASC) at least two days before the scheduled appointment
date. All other requests to reschedule the fingerprinting
appointment, including those submitted after the interview date,
will be granted if the applicant has a reasonable excuse for not
appearing."23
At a minimum, if the Attorney General chooses
not to allow rescheduling of all fingerprint appointments, we
urge the Attorney General to incorporate the language from the
preamble regarding automatic rescheduling. The preamble states
that for applicants scheduled at centers that do not have the
ability to accommodate requests for rescheduling, the Attorney
General will automatically reschedule the applicant.24 240.70	Decision by the Service.
The Interim Rule’s Provision that Allows an
Asylum Officer to Grant an Application on the Date of the
Interview Promotes Administrative Efficiency We commend the Department for including a
provision in § 240.70(a) which allows the Asylum Office the
option in its discretion to grant the suspension or special
cancellation decision at the time of the interview. This will
result in significant administrative efficiency for the Asylum
Office as it eliminates the necessity of scheduling a follow-up
appointment. Additional Recommendation: The Final
Regulations Should Authorize Grants of Advance Parole in NACARA
The interim regulations do not provide
authority for granting advance parole to NACARA applicants. The
final regulations should state explicitly that advance parole is
available to NACARA cancellation or suspension applicants for any
bona fide personal or business reason. The Service already uses
this standard for adjudicating most advance parole requests –
those submitted by adjustment of status applicants. The adoption of this recommendation will
significantly promote administrative efficiency for the Service. It would eliminate the need for Service personnel to engage in
the time-consuming determination as to whether an individual
applicant established that his or her request was sufficiently
urgent to justify her or his travel. There would also be an
enormous humanitarian benefit if the Attorney General were to
clarify that advance parole is eligible. It would enable
thousands of NACARA applicants to visit their parents and other
relatives whom they have not been able to visit in their home
countries for more than ten years. This has created a great deal
of emotional suffering and anxiety in the NACARA-eligible
community. There is no reason to treat NACARA
cancellation or suspension applicants differently from adjustment
applicants. The final regulations should either amend 8 C.F.R. §
212.5 or 8 C.F.R. § 240.70 to provide for NACARA suspension or
cancellation applicants’ eligibility for advance parole.
We also recommend that the final rule permit
the local Asylum Offices to adjudicate requests for advance
parole from NACARA applicants. Under our recommendation a local
Asylum Office would be permitted but not obligated to
adjudicate advance parole requests. The advantages in terms of
administrative efficiency are: 1) the Asylum Office can process
these requests more efficiently because the officers are more
familiar with issues concerning NACARA eligibility than Service
personnel in general; 2) often they will have access to the
parole applicant’s file (if necessary to access); and, 3) Central
Office officials in charge of asylum and ABC are in a
better position to articulate relevant written warnings specific
to NACARA applicants who are requesting advance parole.
Additional Recommendation: The Attorney General Should
Amend the Final Rule on Special NACARA Motions to Reopen, 8 CFR
3.43(c)(2), to Extend the Deadline for Filing the I-881 Until
February 1, 2000.
At the time of the issuance of the final
rule on Special NACARA motions to reopen, many of us commended
the Attorney General for extending the filing deadline for the
supplementary applications and materials until 150 days after the
issuance of the final or interim rule on NACARA. We now
recommend an additional extension of time for the filing of the
I-881 and supplementary documentation until February 1, 2000 in
order to enhance administrative efficiency for the Executive
Office of Immigration Review and the Service for a number of
reasons. First, the I-881 form was only recently published. Second, many persons who filed timely special NACARA motions to
reopen still have not been able to verify whether in fact a final
order was ever issued in their case. Granting these persons
more time to determine whether a final order was issued will
reduce the number of filings to supplement the previously filed
motions to reopen with the Executive Office of Immigration
Review. Once they have been able to verify that there is no
final order in their case, these persons will be able to file for
special rule cancellation or suspension either with the Asylum
Office or directly with the EOIR rather than supplementing their
motions to reopen.
This extension may be accomplished by amending
8 CFR 3.43(c)(2) by substituting "225 days" for "150
days". In the alternative, for the sake of clarity we recommend
that the final rule state a concrete filing date, such as
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in this document)
1 The first two suggestions are
taken from the supplementary information to the proposed
regulations pg. 64903.
2 This last hardship factor (d)
is discussed in cases such as Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F.2d
19, 21 (1st Cir. 1983) and Zamora-Garcia v. INS, 737 F.2d 488,
494 (5th Cir. 1984).
3 Congressional NACARA
proponents, the administration and elsewhere have noted the
remittances from Central Americans to their families and
hometowns have contributed to United States' foreign policy goals
of promoting the political and economic stability in those
countries. 4 We have not numbered the
proposed new paragraph. Plainly, if the final regulations adopt
this suggestion all the subsequent paragraph numbers would change
5 Snadjer v. INS, 29 F.3d 1203
(7th Cir.1994) (allowing non-citizen to apply for all relief
sought at time of initial hearing); Batanic v. INS, 12 F. 3d. 662
(7th Cir. 1993) (same for withholding of deportation).
6 Pub. L. 101-649, Section 153
(Nov. 29, 1990).
7 8 C.F.R. 204.1(c)(7). 8 64 Fed. Reg. 27863.
9 Pub.L.102-232. 10 See Matter of GAC, Int. Dec.
3354 (BIA 1998) at note 4.
11 64 Fed. Reg. 27860.
12 See, e.g, INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Errico, 385 US 214
13 IIRIRA § 309(g), as enacted by
section 203(c) of NACARA (emphasis added).
14 64 Fed. Reg. 27863.
15 IIRIRA §§ 309(a), (c).
16 IIRIRA §§ 309(a), (c).
17 See IIRIRA § 309(d)(2).
18 See "Additional Guidance For
Implementing Sections 212(a)(6) and 212(a)(9) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act," June 17, 1997.
19 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994); Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138
L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Hughes v. U.S., 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d
135 (1997).
20 64 Fed. Reg. 27869.
21 64 Fed. Reg. 27869.
22 64 Fed. Reg. 27870.
23 64 Fed. Reg. 27869. 24 Ibid.