Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/479/1142/221317/
Timestamp: 2020-06-05 07:21:59
Document Index: 326808074

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 4253', '§ 841', '§ 802', '§ 802', '§ 4253', '§ 841']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. John William Workopich, Defendant-appellant, 479 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1973 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. John William Workopich, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. John William Workopich, Defendant-appellant, 479 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 479 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973) June 5, 1973
John William Workopich was indicted and convicted on four counts of violating the Controlled Substances Law, 21 U.S.C. § 841.1 Court I charged that he possessed "about" 1 gram of heroin on June 2, 1972, with the intent to distribute it, and Count II charged its actual distribution on that date. Counts III and IV asserted a similar type possession and distribution of "about" 1.15 grams of heroin on June 9, 1972. On appeal he argues several grounds for reversal: first, that he had established entrapment as a matter of law; second, that the evidence was sufficient to require the district judge to charge the jury on entrapment; third, that he was merely an agent for a government informer and had no dominion or control over the drugs; and, fourth, that a charge of possession with intent to distribute merges into a charge of distribution, and is therefore multiplicitous. We hold that the defendant did not establish entrapment as a matter of law but that the evidence created a question of fact as to entrapment. The defendant was therefore entitled to a charge explaining entrapment to the jury and he was entitled to have the jury decide the issue. Due process is not satisfied with less. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
At the trial the court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. The jury found the defendant guilty on all four counts and he was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4253(a) to treatment for an indeterminate period not to exceed ten years. Prior to this case the defendant had no history of dealing in drugs.
Subsequent to the briefs and argument in this case, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 1973. There a government agent approached the defendant and offered to supply him with a chemical essential to the illegal manufacture of amphetamines. This ingredient was legal in itself to possess, in contrast to the contraband supplied in Bueno.
In holding that there was not an "intolerable degree of governmental participation" in the government solicitation in Russell,3 the Court reaffirmed the entrapment doctrines enunciated in Sorrells v. United States, 1932, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413, and Sherman v. United States, 1958, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819, 2 L. Ed. 2d 848. Noting that "entrapment is a relatively limited defense" the Court emphasized that the focus of the entrapment defense is upon the predisposition of the defendant. " [T]he fact that officers or employees of the government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441, 53 S. Ct. at 212; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372, 78 S. Ct. 819.4 Both in Sorrells and in Sherman the government activity went beyond merely affording an opportunity for crime. In Sorrells a jury issue was created and in Sherman entrapment was established as a matter of law because of the repeated entreaties to the defendants, coupled with persuasive argument of an informant to enter into criminal activity. In Sherman the informant was met with "refusal," then with "evasiveness," then with "hesitancy" before eventually cooperating. Furthermore, these requests were "predicated on [the agent's] suffering." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371, 373, 78 S. Ct. 819. Similarly in Sorrells, there were multiple requests before the defendant complied and provided the agent with illegal liquor. This "repeated and persistent solicitation in which [the agent] succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by the reminiscences of their experiences as companions in arms in the World War" constituted an issue of entrapment for the jury to determine. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441, 53 S. Ct. 210. See Henderson v. United States, 5 Cir. 1958, 261 F.2d 909.
In Sorrells the Court concluded that a jury issue had been created, but in Sherman the Court concluded that entrapment was established as a matter of law. The Court noted in Sherman that in finding entrapment as a matter of law it was "not choosing between conflicting witnesses, nor judging credibility. Aside from recalling [the informer] who was the Government's witness, the defense called no witnesses. We reach our conclusion from the undisputed testimony of the prosecution's witnesses." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373, 78 S. Ct. at 821. In a companion case of the same day the Court dealt with an alignment of testimony more similar to our present facts, Masciale v. United States, 1958, 356 U.S. 386, 78 S. Ct. 827, 2 L. Ed. 2d 859. The defendant there was introduced to a government agent by a government informer. The defendant testified that the informer had lured him into crime by promises of an easy income, but the informer himself did not testify. The Court rejected the argument of the defendant that his uncontradicted testimony of conversations with the informer could establish entrapment as a matter of law. "While the petitioner presented enough evidence for the jury to consider, they were entitled to disbelieve him in regard to [the informer] and so to find for the Government on the issue of guilt. Therefore the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury." Masciale, 356 U.S. at 388, 78 S. Ct. at 829. Thus, when the undisputed testimony of a defendant is the sole basis for an entrapment defense, entrapment is not established as a matter of law but rather is an issue for the jury to decide. Accord, United States v. Burgess, 5 Cir. 1970, 433 F.2d 987. Cf. United States v. Bueno, 5 Cir. 1971, 447 F.2d 903, where, when the government supplied contraband to the defendant, his uncontradicted testimony established entrapment as a matter of law.
The defendant also contends that his activity as an intermediary between a government informant and his connection was not a "distribution" under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). The definitional section, 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) reads: "The term 'distribute' means to deliver . . . a controlled substance." That definitional section at 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) states: "The term 'deliver' or 'delivery' means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance, whether or not there exists an agency relationship."6 Thus a "sale" is not required and the issue of agency is irrelevant. Cf. Adams v. United States, 5 Cir. 1955, 220 F.2d 297. The acts of the defendant here clearly fall within the plain meaning of those words.
Finally, the appellant contends that the convictions of possession with intent to distribute and of distribution are multiplicitous. The defendant was sentenced under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4253 to treatment for a period not to exceed ten years. The court could have imposed this sentence for any of the four counts of which the defendant was convicted. Thus, under the concurrent sentence doctrine we need not now reach the issue of multiplicity. United States v. Vasquez, 2 Cir. 1972, 468 F.2d 565. Indeed, the sentence received is a shorter period than the fifteen years confinement which could have been imposed for a single count under 18 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A).
Note Section 531 of the President's version of the Revised Criminal Code, 13 Cr.L.Rep. 3001, April 4, 1973: " [T]he provision of a facility or an opportunity for commission of an offense . . . or mere solicitation which would not induce an ordinary law-abiding person to commit an offense, does not in itself constitute unlawful entrapment."