Source: https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/caselaw/2016/e/clr_iv_c_1_3_17_a.htm
Timestamp: 2019-07-24 03:00:50
Document Index: 670700501

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 114', 'Art. 114', 'Art. 114', 'Art. 12', 'Art. 12', 'Art. 12']

﻿ a) No consideration of late-filed evidence of public prior use - Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, IV. Proceedings before the EPO, C. Special features of opposition and appeal proceedings, 1. Late submission, 1.3. Latefiled facts, arguments and evidence in appeal proceedings, 1.3.17 Public prior use
1.3. Late‑filed facts, arguments and evidence in appeal proceedings
1.3.17 Public prior use
a) No consideration of late-filed evidence of public prior use
No consideration of late-filed evidence of public prior use
The boards began early on in their case law to set strict standards for the admissibility of late-filed evidence of public prior use by the opponent. On the basis of Art. 114(2) EPC 1973, they refused to include late-filed evidence in the proceedings where, in the specific circumstances, there had been an abuse of procedure and a breach of the principle of good faith. In such cases they chose to refrain from examining the potential relevance of the submission (see T 17/91, T 534/89, OJ 1994, 464 and T 211/90). In T 985/91 the board took the view, with reference to T 17/91, that late-filed documents should only be admitted into the proceedings under certain circumstances if they related to alleged prior use.
Taking a similar line, the board ruled in T 534/89 (OJ 1994, 464) that an objection based on prior use by the opponents themselves which was raised only after the expiry of the opposition period, although the factual circumstances were known to the opponents and there was nothing to prevent the objection being raised during that period, constituted an abuse of procedure. From this, the board concluded that when abuse of procedure was manifest, in view of the fact that a party deliberately refrained from raising an issue even though the necessary supporting evidence was available, it would be contrary to the principle of good faith to admit such evidence by applying Art. 114(2) EPC 1973 in that party's favour.
In T 691/12 the board observed that a prior-use allegation first submitted in the appeal proceedings could not be admitted and considered as prior art unless it met at least the following three conditions: (a) it did not involve an evident abuse of procedure; (b) the prior use as alleged had prima facie to be so relevant that it cast doubt on the validity of the patent; and (c) the prior use had to be fully proven, requiring no further investigation to establish its nature or context. In the case in point these conditions were not met. Therefore, exercising its discretion under Art. 114(2) EPC and Art. 12(4) RPBA, the board concluded that the new challenge, being based on public prior use first alleged in the statement of grounds of appeal, should not be considered.
In T 1835/11, in its statement of grounds the appellant submitted new prior art - an alleged public prior use - without explaining why it had not filed it earlier. As the claims had not been amended in substance and the alleged prior use concerned sales of the appellant's own products, the board took the view that the appellant should have been able to file this prior art during the opposition proceedings. It therefore decided under Art. 12(4) RPBA not to admit it in to the proceedings.
In T 450/13 the board stated that not substantiating a public prior use in opposition proceedings but attempting to substantiate it in the statement of grounds of appeal could lead to the inadmissibility of such a line of attack under Art. 12(4) RPBA.
Likewise in T 444/09, T 12/11 and T 1295/12 no account was taken of a public prior use alleged for the first time in appeal proceedings.