Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-parker-6
Timestamp: 2020-01-27 20:08:00
Document Index: 672213798

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 554', '§ 554', '§ 408', '§ 408', '§ 408', '§ 408', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 391', '§ 391', '§ 40', '§ 101']

United States v. Parker, 103 F.2d 857 | Casetext
Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 506, 69 S. Ct. 201, 93 L.Ed. 187 (1948); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.…
U.S. v. Taylor, (N.D.Ind. 2004)
In terms of determining whether there is a "great inconvenience," at least one court concluded that it is the…
Full title:UNITED STATES v. PARKER et al
Date published: Apr 11, 1939
103 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1939)
concluding that a trial court's determination that "the change of venue applied for would result in great inconvenience to the Government" was not an abuse of discretion
Summary of this case from United States v. Baca
Ellis H. Parker and Ellis H. Parker, Jr., alias Albert White, were convicted of conspiring to kidnap a certain person and transport him in interstate commerce, and they appeal and move that the cause be remanded to the District Court.
Motion denied, and judgments affirmed.
James Mercer Davis, of Camden, N.J., and Harry Green and George S. Silzer, both of Newark, N.J., for appellants.
John J. Quinn, U.S. Atty., of Trenton, N.J., and Hubert J. Harrington, Asst. U.S. Atty., for the United States.
The appellants first filed a plea in abatement which was overruled by the court below. The plea was based upon three grounds, the first being that the grand jury which found the indictment was not properly drawn. It is unnecessary to consider this point, however, since it was not averred that the appellants were prejudiced by the alleged irregularities in drawing the grand jury. The plea, insofar as it was based on this ground, was, therefore, properly denied. Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 17 S.Ct. 235, 41 L.Ed. 624; Brookman v. United States, 8 Cir., 8 F.2d 803.
Finally the appellants urged in support of their plea in abatement that there was no proper indictment in the case because of the failure of the foreman of the grand jury to keep a record of the number of grand jurors concurring in the finding of the indictment and to file it with the clerk of the court when the indictment was returned, as required by Section 2 of the Act of April 30, 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 554a, 18 U.S.C.A. § 554a. This act, however, relates only to pleas to abate or motions to quash an indictment on the ground that one or more unqualified persons served upon the grand jury which found it. Consequently the failure of the foreman to comply with its provisions becomes material only if a plea in abatement is filed upon that ground. No such plea was made in this case. In its absence we think that the failure of the foreman of the grand jury to keep and file the record required by the statute should not invalidate an indictment otherwise entirely valid. It follows that the plea in abatement was properly overruled.
The appellants next demurred to the indictment. Their demurrer was overruled by the court below in an able and comprehensive opinion. 19 F. Supp. 450. The indictment charged a violation of Section 3 of the Federal Kidnapping Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 408c, 18 U.S.C.A. § 408c. The pertinent provisions of the act are as follows:
"§ 408a. Whoever shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or abet in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away by any means whatsoever and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall, upon conviction, be punished (1) by death if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, provided that the sentence of death shall not be imposed by the court if, prior to its imposition, the kidnaped person has been liberated unharmed, or (2) if the death penalty shall not apply nor be imposed the convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for such term of years as the court in its discretion shall determine: Provided, That the failure to release such person within seven days after he shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away shall create a presumption that such person has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce, but such presumption shall not be conclusive."
"§ 408c. If two or more persons enter into an agreement, confederation, or conspiracy to violate the provisions of sections 408a and 408b of this title, and do any overt act toward carrying out such unlawful agreement, confederation, or conspiracy, such person or persons shall be punished in like manner as provided for by said sections."
The appellants urge that their demurrer should have been sustained since the indictment fails to allege facts sufficient to show that they entered into a conspiracy and fails to set out the purpose of the alleged conspiracy. An examination of the indictment satisfies us that its averments were sufficient in these respects. The defendants further urge that it does not appear from the indictment that Wendel was held for "ransom, reward or otherwise." It is true that there was no averment of holding for ransom or pecuniary reward. It was, however, alleged that through the confession to be obtained from Wendel the appellants planned to publish the purported true story of the kidnapping and death of the Lindbergh child and thereby enhance the reputation of Ellis H. Parker as a successful and competent detective, whereby his services would come to be in great demand. We think that this was sufficient. The statute prohibits the interstate transportation of persons kidnapped for other reasons than ransom or reward. It is not restricted to cases involving pecuniary benefit to the kidnappers. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522. We think that Congress by the phrase "or otherwise" intended to include any object of a kidnapping which the perpetrator might consider of sufficient benefit to himself to induce him to undertake it.
The appellants further urge that the overt acts alleged in the indictment were insufficient to sustain it. The sixth overt act alleged was that on or about February 24, 1936 Bleefield and Weiss did knowingly and unlawfully carry and convey Wendel by motor car operated by them in interstate commerce from the Borough of Brooklyn in the City and State of New York to Mt. Holly in the County of Burlington, New Jersey, and there deliver him into the custody of Ellis H. Parker. This was clearly a sufficient averment of an overt act and it sustains the indictment. We think that the other acts averred were likewise sufficient.
The appellants next moved under Section 40 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 101, 28 U.S.C.A. § 101, to have the trial held in Burlington County, New Jersey, where the offense was alleged to have been committed. That section provides that "the trial of offenses punishable with death shall be had in the county where the offense was committed, where that can be done without great inconvenience." The Government opposed the application upon the ground that the prosecution would be greatly inconvenienced if the trial were held in Burlington County rather than at Newark where it had been moved, since a great majority of the Government witnesses would be in the vicinity of the latter place. The court below refused the application, 19 F. Supp. 450, 455, holding that the change of venue applied for would result in great inconvenience to the Government. The application was addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Davis v. United States, 9 Cir., 32 F.2d 860; Barrett v. United States, 7 Cir., 82 F.2d 528. After carefully considering the record we are satisfied that its discretion was not abused. Obviously the inconvenience referred to in the statute is that of the Government since the appellants could hardly complain of being tried at the place where their offense was committed.
Aside from this, however, we are satisfied that Section 40 of the Judicial Code had no application for the reason that the offense with which these appellants were charged was not punishable with death. It will be seen from the provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act which we have quoted that punishment by death may not be imposed under the act if prior to its imposition the kidnapped person has been liberated unharmed. We agree with the court below that the act, reasonably interpreted in the light of its purpose, refers to the condition of the kidnapped person at the time of his release. It bans the death penalty if the kidnappers release him sound and unharmed even though he may have received injuries during his captivity from which he has recovered. Any other construction would, it seems to us, tend to encourage the murder of the victim by the kidnappers if in the course of the kidnapping he had been injured. Congress must have preferred, as the court below aptly said ( 19 F. Supp. 450, 456), "a cured and live victim to a dead or permanently injured one, even if the kidnappers must refrain from liberating until the cure is accomplished."
During the course of the hearing upon the jury tampering charge the United States Attorney stated that his opinion was that the appellants knew all about it. In examining one of the prospective jurors who was afterwards accepted counsel for the appellants asked her whether the fact that the Government had made this charge through its District Attorney would affect her ability to decide the issue presented to her without prejudice. Objection to this question was sustained by the court below, we think properly. It referred to a charge by the Government of jury tampering by the defendants when there had been no such charge but merely an expression of opinion by the District Attorney during the course of the hearing. Furthermore this matter had been fully covered with this prospective juror in her prior examination by appellants' counsel.
The trial judge presented the case to the jury in a careful and satisfactory charge. His comments as to the testimony and the witnesses were entirely proper and within the latitude allowed him by the law. He made it amply clear to the jury that they were to find the facts from the evidence and that his comments were not binding upon them. The appellants complain of the refusal of the trial judge to charge certain of their points. We find no error here. Insofar as these points were material they were sufficiently covered by the general charge and by other points which he affirmed.
Some time after the jury had retired they forwarded to the trial judge the following inquiry in writing. "Your Honor, would it be permissible to bring in a verdict of guilty with a recommendation for leniency?"
The jury having returned to the court room the trial judge answered their inquiry as follows: "The answer to that inquiry, Madam Forewoman, and ladies and gentlemen, is yes; and I am sure that from what you have heard me say about the jury system and about this particular jury, that such a recommendation would have great weight with the Court. It may be my fault that that was not clear to you originally, because you will remember that I discussed at some length the meaning of that statute and said that you could not bring in any recommendation with respect to the death penalty. That may have confused you. If so, I am sorry."
"The Court: I didn't so state. I said —
Under the Federal Kidnapping Act it is the duty of the Court if a defendant is found guilty, to impose a sentence of imprisonment upon him for such term of years as it in its discretion shall determine. This discretion is to be exercised in the light of all relevant facts and circumstances both in aggravation and in mitigation of punishment. The jury in the case before us, who for more than six weeks had heard the witnesses and observed the appellants, were undoubtedly in a position to make an intelligent and helpful recommendation as to the punishment to be imposed upon the appellants. The trial judge correctly told the jury that they were within their rights in making a recommendation for leniency. It was not error for him to indicate that he would give such a recommendation great weight, since it was addressed to his discretion. State v. Stern, 64 N.D. 593, 254 N.W. 765. It would, therefore, be his duty when he came to impose sentence to consider it in mitigation of punishment. On the other hand it was equally his duty to make clear that while such a recommendation would receive great consideration it would not be binding on him. State v. Farnsworth, 51 Idaho 768, 10 P.2d 295. We think that in the present case the trial judge made it entirely clear in his answers to counsel's request for an exception, which we have quoted, that a recommendation for leniency would not be binding upon him in any particular.
After a careful examination of the entire record of this case we are satisfied that the guilt of the appellants was clearly proved and that no errors appear which substantially prejudiced the appellants. It follows under Section 269 of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 391, 28 U.S.C.A. § 391, that the judgments appealed from must be affirmed. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314; Jarvis v. United States, 1 Cir., 90 F.2d 243, certiorari denied 302 U.S. 705, 58 S.Ct. 25, 82 L.Ed. 544; Tanchuck v. United States, 10 Cir., 93 F.2d 534; Stokes v. United States, 5 Cir., 93 F.2d 744, certiorari denied 304 U.S. 558, 58 S.Ct. 945, 82 L.Ed. 1525; Morgan v. United States, 8 Cir., 98 F.2d 473.
After the argument of the appeal in this court the appellants filed a motion that the cause be remanded to the District Court for the purpose of enabling it to entertain a motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. With the motion the appellant submitted to this court an affidavit setting forth the newly discovered evidence relied upon. Without passing upon the power of this court to grant such a motion (as to which see Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 284 U.S. 547, 52 S.Ct. 215, 76 L. Ed. 476), we are satisfied that the affidavit filed by the appellants does not provide sufficient support for their application. The after-discovered evidence alleged was not as to the facts at issue in the case, but merely affected the credibility of the defendant Bleefield who testified for the Government. It consisted of the affidavit of a business associate to the effect that Bleefield had admitted to him some time after the trial that it was he and not the appellants who engineered the kidnapping of Wendel. The credibility of Bleefield was attacked by the appellants in a number of ways and at length during the trial. The evidence now sought to be presented would be at the best, therefore, merely cumulative. If it were permitted to be introduced the questions would still remain as to whether the affiant had truthfully recited Bleefield's subsequent conversation and if so which of the conflicting statements of the latter was true. Such evidence, raising as it does collateral issues not connected with the question of the appellants' guilt, would not justify the granting of a new trial where, as in this case, there was substantial evidence of the appellants guilt aside from the testimony of the witness sought to be discredited.
Alleging the case was a capital one, the defendants prayed the court to set the case for trial in Burlington County as provided by a statute which said, "The trial of offenses punishable with death shall be had in the county where the offense was committed, where that can be done without great inconvenience." Jud.Code, § 40, 28 U.S.C.A. § 101.
Assuming I am right, as earlier contended, that the pleadings created a capital case and the subsequent procedural course were in error when the court made its ruling on this statute, eight jurors had been empanelled and selected, when the government served on defendants a list of witnesses it would call. As held in Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578, 4 S.Ct. 202, 204, 28 L.Ed. 262, followed in Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 373, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011, "the trial commences at least from the time when the work of impaneling the jury begins."
In Parker, the defendants petitioned the court for a transfer of venue from one county to the county in which the offense was committed.
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Taylor, (N.D.Ind. 2004)
In United States v. Parker, 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 857, 861, it is stated "* * * that Congress by the phrase `or otherwise' intended to include any object of a kidnapping which the perpetrator might consider of sufficient benefit to himself to induce him to undertake it."
Summary of this case from State v. Strauser