Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/888/1279/203462/
Timestamp: 2018-03-20 08:11:45
Document Index: 708168801

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3372', '§ 773', '§ 773', '§ 3371', '§ 773', '§ 3372', '§ 773', '§ 773', '§ 1801', '§ 773', '§ 3373', '§ 3378', '§ 3378', '§ 3378', '§ 3378', '§ 773', '§ 773', '§ 3372', '§ 773']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Eugene B. Cameron, Appellant, 888 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1989 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Eugene B. Cameron, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Eugene B. Cameron, Appellant, 888 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1989)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 888 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1989)
Argued and Submitted Aug. 9, 1989. Decided Nov. 8, 1989
The question for decision is whether violating regulations of the International Pacific Halibut Commission ("IPHC" or "Commission") is a proper basis for a criminal prosecution under the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a) (1), 3373(d) (1) (B). If so, we must then decide if promulgating a regulation limiting a day's catch to 20,000 lbs. exceeded the Commission's authority. We conclude that violating the regulation was a sufficient basis for the Lacey Act criminal prosecution here and that the Commission was duly authorized to promulgate the fish limit regulation. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the district court in this appeal by Eugene B. Cameron from a judgment of sentence entered upon a guilty plea conditioned upon the resolution of the two issues presented to us. We will vacate only that portion of the sentence imposing a special assessment.
The Northern Pacific Halibut Fishery is regulated by the International Pacific Halibut Commission, pursuant to an international fishing treaty between the United States and Canada. Protocol Amending the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, United States-Canada, Mar. 29, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 2483 [hereinafter "Protocol"]. Regulations promulgated by the IPHC are adopted by the Secretary of Commerce, pursuant to The Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982, 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k. The Halibut Act makes it unlawful for anyone to violate any regulation adopted by the Secretary of Commerce. 16 U.S.C. §§ 773c(b) (1), 773e(a) (1). The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378, federalizes the violation of most independent state, tribal and federal wildlife laws. See, S.Rep. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 4, reprinted in 1981, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1748, 1751.
16 U.S.C. § 773e(a) (5).
A person is guilty of any (sic) [criminal] offense if he commits an act prohibited by section 773e(a) (2), (3), (4), or (6) of this title; or section 773e(b) of this title....
16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1).
The Halibut Act criminalizes certain conduct, but does not criminalize the shipment, transportation, or sale of halibut taken in violation of the Act or any regulation passed pursuant to the Halibut Act. 16 U.S.C. § 773e(a) (5); see 16 U.S.C. 773g(a). Instead, the Act provides for stringent civil penalties. 16 U.S.C. § 773f(a) (civil penalty up to $25,000 per violation). Cameron argues that this indicates that Congress intended to exclude the taking of halibut from any and all criminal penalties.
The government argues, and we agree, that the lack of criminal penalties in the Halibut Act, does not indicate that Congress intended shipment, transportation or sale of halibut, to be free from all criminal consequences. The Lacey Act, amended in 1981, had been in full force for a year before the 1982 Halibut Act was enacted to replace its predecessor statute, the Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1937. Had Congress intended that violations of the Halibut Act be exempt from enforcement under the Lacey Act, it could have said so in the Halibut Act, or it could have amended the Lacey Act. Portions of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, are specifically exempted from the Lacey Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882; see United States v. Doubleday, 804 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1986) (violations regulated by a Magnuson Fishery Management Plan are not subject to prosecution under the Lacey Act), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1005, 107 S. Ct. 1628, 95 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1987). The Halibut Act is silent as to whether the Lacey Act affects Halibut Act penalties.
In addition, the conduct regulated by the penalty section of the Halibut Act is of a different caliber than that regulated by the Lacey Act. Taking halibut in violation of the Halibut Act is a strict liability offense. See 16 U.S.C. § 773e(a) (5). But to violate the Lacey Act, halibut must be taken with scienter or knowledge for the conduct to constitute a criminal offense. 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d) (1) (B). It is reasonable to suggest that Congress may have intended that the less culpable offense of taking halibut, with or without knowledge, be subject to the lesser penalty of civil consequences, than the more culpable crime of taking halibut with knowledge. Offenses requiring proof of actual knowledge generally provide for punishment more severe than strict liability offenses. In any event, the lack of criminal penalties for violating the Halibut Act does not in itself indicate Congressional intent to exculpate such conduct from criminal penalties under other statutes.
Cameron next argues that the Lacey Act is not implicated when the underlying statute has stringent enforcement provisions because the Act was intended to bolster environmental laws with weak enforcement provisions. See e.g., United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988) (foreign law); United States v. Shelhammer, 681 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (foreign law); United States v. Doyle, 786 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984, 107 S. Ct. 572, 93 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1986) (state law); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 103 S. Ct. 2378, 76 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1983) (tribal law). He emphasizes that the enforcement provisions of the Halibut Act are similar to, and as severe as, those of the Magnuson Fishery Management Act of 1976, an act not subject to the Lacey Act's criminal enforcement provisions. This argument does not persuade us for several reasons.
The argument ignores this court's discussion in United States v. Doubleday, 804 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1005, 107 S. Ct. 1628, 95 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1987). There, a fishing boat owner and operator fished for, caught and sold halibut from an unauthorized area in Alaskan waters. The question presented was whether the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act or the Lacey Act governed his conduct. We ruled that the Magnuson Act does not directly regulate halibut fishing and, therefore, the Lacey Act controlled. In so ruling, we implicitly upheld the application of the Lacey Act to conduct that is essentially the same as Cameron's. The Doubleday defendant transported halibut taken in violation of a regulation promulgated by the Halibut Commission and subsequently adopted by the Secretary of Commerce. Cameron is accused of the same type of conduct. See id. at 1092, 1094 n. 3 (in dicta, the court recognized that the Halibut Commission regulates halibut fishing).
Cameron next argues that the disclaimer provision of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3378(c) (1), precludes prosecution for conduct governed by the Halibut Act: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as (1) repealing, superceding, or modifying any provision of Federal law...." He argues that if this court finds the Lacey Act governs his conduct, then the Lacey Act will be "superceding or modifying" the Halibut Act, a provision of federal law.
We need not address this concept anew because we have previously interpreted a portion of the disclaimer provision of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3378(c) (2). United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906, 106 S. Ct. 3278, 91 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1986). We believe that by analogy the same analysis applies here. In Sohappy a native American was prosecuted under the Lacey Act for violations of tribal fishing laws. The defendant argued that to enforce the Lacey Act against him for this conduct would be to violate the tribe's treaty reserved right to regulate fishing. He contended that this was prohibited by section 3378(c) (2) of the Lacey Act:
16 U.S.C. § 3378(c) (2). We held that the treaty did not reserve to the tribe exclusive jurisdiction to control fishing and that, therefore, the Lacey Act applied to defendant's conduct. The court recognized that the Lacey Act functions to create new offenses for trafficking in fish taken in violation of tribal law.
The disclaimer provision at issue in Sohappy is a subsection of the same Lacey Act section that Cameron argues exempts his conduct. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3378(c) (1), 3378(c) (2). Language of the two subsections of the disclaimer provision is similar, but not identical. The exemption pertaining to tribal law is broader than the exemption pertaining to federal law. But what is important about Sohappy is our court's recognition that two statutes can govern the same conduct, without running afoul of the disclaimer provision of the Lacey Act. See Sohappy, 770 F.2d at 818-20. Sohappy teaches that the Lacey Act and another statute or law, can govern identical conduct and yet have different enforcement provisions. The Lacey Act is not interpreted as "repealing, superceding, or modifying" the other law, unless the other law reserves exclusive control over the conduct at issue. Neither the Halibut Act nor the Protocol reserve exclusive control over halibut fishing. See Protocol, at 2488-89; 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k; see also, Doubleday, 804 F.2d at 1094 (the Magnuson Act controls the incidental catch of halibut).
Finally, Cameron argues that because the Lacey Act and the Halibut Act are both penal statutes, and because ambiguity exists in the two statutes, the rule of lenity should apply. And if we apply the lenity doctrine, only the Halibut Act should control defendant's conduct. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 100 S. Ct. 2247, 65 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1980); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1980). Although Cameron's authorities support his position, the argument must fail because the lenity rule comes into play only when ambiguity is present. We see no ambiguity here. The Halibut Act creates a civil penalty for the strict liability offense of transporting or selling Halibut taken in violation of IPHC regulations. 16 U.S.C. § 773e(a) (5). The Lacey Act criminalizes the intentional violation of certain federal wildlife laws. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1). The two laws are not ambiguous.
Protocol, at 2490-91. The limit on this power is that the regulations must be with the approval of the United States and Canada, see 16 U.S.C. § 773b, consistent with the Annex to the Protocol, Protocol, at 2493-2500, and for the purpose of developing the maximum yield of halibut stocks in the Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, Protocol, at 2490. The regulation at issue in this case was agreed to by the United States, 50 C.F.R. Sec. 301.9(c) (1987), consistent with the Annex to the Protocol, and was a conservation measure, see S.E.R. at 1-2. Robert McVey, a member of the IPHC, testified that the area trip limit was "purely a conservation measure." Id. at 2.
Special assessments have been declared unconstitutional in this circuit. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court imposed a $25.00 special assessment on defendant Cameron. This portion of defendant's sentence is vacated.