Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/461/171/
Timestamp: 2020-02-22 19:40:28
Document Index: 717864566

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 193', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 1507', '§ 13']

United States v. Grace :: 461 U.S. 171 (1983) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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(c) The Court grounds are not transformed into "public forum" property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds at practically all times and is admitted to the building during specified hours. But where the sidewalks forming the perimeter of the grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington,
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., post, p. 461 U. S. 184, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 461 U. S. 188, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In this case, we must determine whether 40 U.S.C. § 13k, which prohibits, among other things, the "display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public
Zywicki reappeared in February, 1980, on the sidewalk in front of the Court and distributed handbills concerning oppression in Guatemala. Zywicki had consulted with an attorney concerning the legality of his activities, and had been informed that the Superior Court for the District of Columbia had construed the statute that prohibited leafletting, 40 U.S.C. § 13k, to prohibit only conduct done with the specific intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the administration of
The Court of Appeals determined that the District Court's dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was erroneous, and went on to strike down § 13k on its face as an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment rights in a
Our normal course is first to "ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional]
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." [Footnote 6] There is no doubt that, as a general matter, peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving "speech" protected by the First Amendment. E.g., 447 U. S. Brown, 447
Page 461 U. S. 177
U.S. 455, 447 U. S. 460 (1980); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 394 U. S. 112 (1969); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
Publicly owned or operated property does not become a "public forum" simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at will. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 424 U. S. 836 (1976). Although whether the property has been "generally opened to the public" is a factor to consider in determining whether the government has opened its property to the use of the people for communicative purposes, it is not determinative of the question. We have regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish "to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so when
It is argued that the Supreme Court building and grounds fit neatly within the description of nonpublic forum property. Although the property is publicly owned, it has not been traditionally held open for the use of the public for expressive activities. As Greer v. Spock, supra, teaches, the property is not transformed into "public forum" property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds at practically all times and the public is admitted to the building during specified hours. [Footnote 7] Under this view, it would be necessary only to determine that the restrictions imposed by § 13k are reasonable in light of the use to which the building and grounds are dedicated, and that there is no discrimination on the basis of content. We need not make that judgment at this time, however, because § 13k covers the public sidewalks as well as the building and grounds inside
The prohibitions imposed by § 13k technically cover the entire grounds of the Supreme Court as defined in 40 U.S.C. § 13p. [Footnote 8] That section describes the Court grounds as extending to the curb of each of the four streets enclosing the block on which the building is located. Included within this small geographical area, therefore, are not only the building, the plaza and surrounding promenade, lawn area, and steps, but also the sidewalks. The sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Court grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C., and we can discern no reason why they should be treated any differently. [Footnote 9] Sidewalks, of course, are among those areas of public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities, and are clearly within those areas of public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public forum property. In this respect, the present case differs from Greer v. Spock, supra. In Greer, the streets and sidewalks at issue were located within an enclosed military reservation, Fort Dix, N.J., and were thus separated from the streets and sidewalks of any municipality. That is not true of the sidewalks surrounding
The Government submits that § 13k qualifies as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction which may be imposed to restrict communicative activities on public forum property such as sidewalks. The argument is that the inquiry should not be confined to the Supreme Court grounds, but should focus on "the vicinity of the Supreme Court" or "the public places of Washington, D.C." Brief for Appellants 16, n. 5. Viewed in this light, the Government contends that there are sufficient alternative areas within the relevant forum, such as the streets around the Court or the sidewalks across those streets to permit § 13k to be considered a reasonable "place" restriction having only a minimal
Section 13k was part of an 11-section statute, enacted in 1949, "[r]elating to the policing of the building and grounds of the Supreme Court of the United States." 63 Stat. 616, 40 U.S.C. §§ 13f-13p. The occasion for its passage was the termination of the practice by District of Columbia authorities of appointing Supreme Court guards as special policemen for the District. This action left the Supreme Court police force without authority to make arrests and enforce the law in the building and on the grounds of the Court. The Act, which was soon forthcoming, was modeled on the legislation relating to the Capitol grounds, 60 Stat. 718, 40 U.S.C. §§ 193a-193m. It authorizes the appointment by the Marshal of special officers "for duty in connection with the policing of the Supreme Court Building and grounds and adjacent streets." Sections 2-6 of the Act prohibit certain kinds of
The United States offers another justification for § 13k that deserves our attention. It is said that the federal courts represent an independent branch of the Government, and that
We thus perceive insufficient justification for § 13k's prohibition of carrying signs, banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the building. We hold that, under the First Amendment, the section is unconstitutional as applied to those sidewalks. Of course, this is not to say that those sidewalks, like other sidewalks, are not subject to reasonable
Grace v. Burger, 524 F. Supp. 815 (1980).
When a citizen is "in a place where [he] has every right to be," Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 383 U. S. 142 (1966) (opinion of Fortas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.), he cannot be denied the opportunity to express his views simply because the Government has not chosen to designate the area as a forum for public discussion. While the right to conduct expressive activities in such areas as streets, parks, and sidewalks is reinforced by their traditional use for purposes of assembly, Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 307 U. S. 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Black, J.), that right ultimately rests on the principle that
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 318 U. S. 416 (1943) (emphasis added). Every citizen lawfully present in a
Viewed in this light, 40 U.S.C. § 13k is plainly unconstitutional on its face. The statute is not a reasonable regulation
Nor does the statute merely forbid conduct that is incompatible with the primary activity being carried out in this Court. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 408 U. S. 116; Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 424 U. S. 843 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). In contrast to 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (1976 ed., Supp. V) and the statute upheld in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), [Footnote 2/10] 40 U.S.C. § 13k is not limited to expressive activities that are intended to interfere with, obstruct, or impede the administration of justice. In Cox, the Court stressed that a prohibition of expression "unrelated to any judicial proceedings" would raise "entirely different considerations." 379 U.S. at 379 U. S. 567. The statute at issue here is a far cry from
Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 575 (DC), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 972 (1972).
I see no reason to stretch the language of the statute to encompass the activities of either Zywicki or Grace. As a matter of statutory interpretation, we should not infer that
Oral Argument - January 18, 1983