Source: http://www.717madisonplace.com/?p=3548
Timestamp: 2018-06-23 05:52:03
Document Index: 774382105

Matched Legal Cases: ['§101', '§112', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§101']

The “Latent Code” Cases « 717 Madison Place
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Supreme Court Patent Case of the Week »
The Finjan case raises several interesting issues. First, in view of Judge Moore’s comments during the oral argument of eSPEED, Inc. et al. v. Brokertec USA, et al., 480 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2007), does it sound like she would agree with this decision? Second, does the court’s analysis effectively construe/apply the claims to cover an inoperable device and in doing so raise the issues of whether the claims satisfy 35 USC §101 and 35 USC §112? Third, even if the claims are still valid while reading on an inoperable device, do they present that rare instance for application of the reverse doctrine of equivalents?
The Finjan Opinion
While the argument is not waived, we disagree with the merits of Defendants’ theory. Defendants claim that our court has held that “locked” or disabled products cannot infringe apparatus claims. Their reliance on our precedent is misplaced.
In Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., this court affirmed denial of a new trial on infringement, after a verdict of non-infringement, because the evidence showed that the accused software product “included a manual step which avoided the automatic selection feature of the patented invention even though the code for automatic selection remained in place.” 226 F.3d 1280, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Defendants interpret Southwest to hold that locked code cannot infringe. However, the claim at issue in that case was a method that required performance of each claimed step. Id. at 1285. Here, the claims at issue are “system” and “storage medium” claims, which do not require the performance of any method steps. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he use of a process necessarily involves doing or performing each of the steps recited. This is unlike use of a system as a whole . . . .”).
Defendants also rely on ACCO Brands, where we overturned a jury verdict of inducement because the patentee failed to “either point to specific instances of direct infringement or show that the accused device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.” 501 F.3d at 1313. The asserted apparatus claims covered locking devices with pins in a specific configuration. The accused device could “be operated in either of two modes,” one infringing and one not. Id. We explained that, in the absence of any evidence that customers actually operated the device in the infringing mode, direct infringement could not be inferred. Defendants insist that under ACCO Brands, an accused device does not infringe if it “can be used at any given time in a non-infringing manner.” Defs.’ Principal Br. 33 (citing 501 F.3d at 1313). However, in ACCO Brands, the claim language required the locking device’s pin to extend through a slot in a specific configuration. 501 F.3d at 1310. Here, by contrast, Finjan’s apparatus claims do not require that the proactive scanning software be configured in a particular way to infringe—only that it be programmed for performing the claimed steps. For example, claim 32 of the ’194 patent covers “[a] system for execution by a server that serves as a gateway to a client, the system comprising: a security policy; an interface . . . ; a comparator . . . ; and a logical engine . . . .”
Defendants insist that the asserted claims require actual operability. The asserted “system” claims include “engines,” such as a “logical engine” (’194 patent claim 32), a “communications engine” (’780 patent claim 9), and a “linking engine” (’822 patent claim 12). Defendants cite the testimony of Finjan’s expert Dr. Giovanni Vigna, who stated at trial that an engine “has an active task to perform,” and is an “active component.” Transcript at 410:6-7, 22. Seizing upon the word “active,” Defendants argue that the source code must be “enabled” to infringe. However, neither the claim language nor Vigna’s testimony supports this contention.
As we have cautioned, “in every infringement analysis, the language of the claims, as well as the nature of the accused product, dictates whether an infringement has occurred.” Fantasy Sports Props. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we have held that, to infringe a claim that recites capability and not actual operation, an accused device “need only be capable of operating” in the described mode. Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus, depending on the claims, “an accused device may be found to infringe if it is reasonably capable of satisfying the claim limitations, even though it may also be capable of non-infringing modes of operation.” Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that the “reasonably capable” test applies “only to claim language that specifies that the claim is drawn to capability”).
In this case, Finjan’s non-method claims describe capabilities without requiring that any software components be “active” or “enabled.” The system claims recite software components with specific purposes: “a logical engine for preventing execution” (’194 patent claim 32), “a communications engine for obtaining a Downloadable” (’780 patent claim 9), or “a linking engine . . . for forming a sandbox package” (’822 patent claim 12) (emphases added). The storage medium claims similarly cover capability. Claim 65 of the ’194 patent recites a “computer-readable storage medium storing program code for causing a server that serves as a gateway to a client to perform the steps of: receiving . . . ; comparing . . . ; and preventing execution . . . .” This language does not require that the program code be “active,” only that it be written “for causing” a server (’194 patent claim 65) or a computer (’780 patent claim 18) to perform certain steps. Vigna’s infringement analysis did not contradict this language. He defined an “engine” as “some kind of component whose task is to operate some kind of analysis or transformation.” Transcript at 410:4-5. Thus, Vigna explained that an engine is a portion of code designed to perform an indicated operation, but is not necessarily unlocked or active. Defendants admit that program code for proactive scanning is “literally present” on all accused products. Oral Arg. at 1:53-58, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2009-1576.mp3. Secure’s Senior Vice President Michael Gallagher testified that even if a software module was turned off, “[t]he module is resident in the binary source code that is in the product.” Transcript at 722:19-22. Thus, it is undisputed that software for performing the claimed functions existed in the products when sold—in the same way that an automobile engine for propulsion exists in a car even when the car is turned off. 2
We addressed a similar infringement scenario in Fantasy Sports, where we held that software for playing fantasy football could infringe a claim to a “computer for playing football.” 287 F.3d at 1118. The defendants who sold the software argued that because their product was a “modifiable software tool,” direct infringement occurred only when users configured it to play games. Id. at 1117. Rejecting this contention, we explained that “although a user must activate the functions programmed into a piece of software by selecting those options, the user is only activating means that are already present in the underlying software.” Id. at 1118. Infringement occurred because the code “was written in such a way as to enable a user of that software to utilize the function . . . without having to modify that code.” Id. That analysis applies here. The code for proactive scanning was “already present” in Defendants’ accused products when sold. There is no evidence that customers needed to modify the underlying code to unlock any software modules. The fact that users needed to “activate the functions programmed” by purchasing keys does not detract from or somehow nullify the existence of the claimed structure in the accused software. Therefore, the jury’s infringement verdict on the system and media claims was based on a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” and consistent with the “weight of the evidence.” Pediatrix, 602 F.3d at 545-46 & n.9. That portion of the verdict is affirmed.
In the case of eSPEED, Inc. et al. v. Brokertec USA, et al., 480 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2007), a panel that included Judge Moore and Judge Linn (the author of the Finjan opinion) addressed a similar issue during oral argument – although the panel’s written opinion ultimately did not address the issue. In eSPEED, the panel was trying to assess whether a software routine in a prior art software program was sufficiently unavailable to a user so as not to be operable prior art for invalidity purposes – essentially trying to apply the doctrine that “that which infringes if later, anticipates if earlier.” Listen to the following sound bites from that oral argument to gain some context and to hear Judge Moore’s comments on the line of “latent code” cases: [Listen], [Listen], [Listen], and [Listen].
It strikes me from listening to Judge Moore’s comments that she viewed what she referred to as the “latent code” cases as requiring software code to be “callable” before it could serve as prior art. That would similarly suggest that “latent code” must be callable in order to infringe in circumstances like the Finjan case. Therefore, it will be interesting to see how Judge Moore treats the issue in the future or if the Finjan case is subjected to en banc review.
Intel Corp. v. ITC, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
Review of ITC’s finding of infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents
EPROMs sold to customers without any intent that they be used in “page mode operation.” Nevertheless, the EPROMs were capable of operating in “page mode operation.”
Review of district court’s finding of likelihood of infringement for purposes of a
The district court found a likelihood of infringement based on its conclusion that, but for the set screws, the camera is otherwise coupled to the body member in such a manner that it is capable of being rotated.” But a device does not infringe simply because it is possible to alter it in a way that would satisfy all the limitations of a patent claim. See Hap Corp. v. Heyman Mfg. Co., 311 F.2d 839, 843, 135 USPQ 285, 288 (1st Cir. 1962) (“The question is not what [a device] might have been made to do, but what it was intended to do and did do…. [T]hat a device could have been made to do something else does not of itself establish infringement.”), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903, 83 S.Ct. 1290, 10 L.Ed.2d 198 (1963).
claim at issue in Intel therefore read on the accused device, as made and sold. The AcuCam camera, by contrast, is not rotatable within its housing unless the AcuCam is altered, at least to the extent of removing or loosening the set screws that secure the camera to the housing.
The fact that it is possible to alter the AcuCam so that the camera becomes “rotatably coupled” to its housing is not enough, by itself, to justify a finding that the manufacture and sale of the AcuCam infringe
materials that were made part of the record. In addition, it does not appear from the record that removing the set screws would serve any functional purpose not already accomplished by other means, and HTMI offered no evidence that any user of the AcuCam had loosened or removed the set screws prior to or during actual use.
Under these circumstances, HTMI has not established that the AcuCam is “rotatably coupled” to its housing in spite of the set screws that prevent the camera from rotating. Accordingly, on the present state of the record we cannot agree with the district court that HTMI is likely to succeed in proving that the AcuCam infringes claim 24 of the ‘001 patent.
Review of district court’s granting of summary judment of literal infringement
Due to a restriction built into the software program stored in the telephone’s memory, a user is prevented from using the software to place international calls.
Telemac contends that, even though Topp has chosen not to permit direct dialing of international calls, the capability of billing for international rates is nonetheless present in the phone’s source code. According to Telemac, because Topp’s system is capable of being modified to place, and charge for, international calls, Topp’s system infringes.
Under the precedent of this circuit, however, that a device is capable of being modified to operate in an infringing manner is not sufficient, by itself, to support a finding of infringement. High Tech Med.
Symantec’s expert sought to prove that a file becomes accessible to the operating system or other programs before it is scanned for viruses by the NAV Scan Engine by running four tests. Hilgraeve’s expert asserted that these tests do not prove that Symantec’s products do not infringe, and that even if they showed that the products do not infringe under the test circumstances, they do not prove noninfringement under normal operating conditions.
We agree that tests of an accused device under unusual conditions are not necessarily relevant to an infringement analysis. For example, in determining whether a product claim is infringed, we have held that an accused device may be found to infringe if it is reasonably capable of satisfying the claim limitations, even though it may also be capable of non-infringing modes of operation. See Intel Corp. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 832, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir.1991); Key Pharms., Inc. v.Hercon Labs. Corp., 981 F.Supp. 299, 310 (D.Del.1997), aff’d, 161 F.3d 709, 48 USPQ2d 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Huck Mfg. Co. v. Textron, Inc., 187 USPQ 388, 408 (E.D.Mich.1975) (“The fact that a device may be used in a manner so as not to infringe the patent is not a defense to a claim of infringement against a manufacturer of the device if it is also reasonably capable of a use that infringes the patent.”); cf. High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556, 33 USPQ2d 2005, 2009 (Fed. Cir.1995) (finding that an accused device does not infringe if it does not infringe in its normal configuration, even if it may be altered into an infringing configuration under unusual circumstances). So too the sale of a device may induce infringement of a method claim, even if the accused device is capable of non-infringing modes of operation in unusual circumstances.
Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Review of summary judgment of non-infringement
The accused products were computerized fantasy football games. The user playing the game can cause the computer to perform claimed functions simply by playing the game and selecting those functions.
There is no mention of the functions being locked, being available by password, or being available after input of a key. Rather, the user has several options at various points in the game. A user was able to select the proper sequence to create an infringing sequence.
erroneously analyzed that product under a contributory infringement framework, arguing that under Intel Corp. v. ITC, 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the Commissioner.com product directly infringes because it is capable of being configured to award bonus points when a player scores out of position. In support of that argument, Fantasy cites the declaration of Shanen Elliott, one of Fantasy’s Product Specialists, who stated that he “was able to customize the `Commissioner.com’ football game to include essentially the same scoring system that is described in the [‘603] patent,” i.e., a system that awards bonus points for unusual plays such as out-of-position scoring. SportsLine responds that the Commissioner.com product does not directly infringe because it is not a computerized fantasy football game operated by SportsLine, but rather is a modifiable software tool that enables subscribers to operate
New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1555-56, 33 USPQ2d 2005, 2008-09 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Intel and holding that the fact that the accused device could be altered in way that satisfies the claim term “rotatably coupled” did not per se justify a finding of infringement); see also Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1330, 58 USPQ2d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]hat a device is capable of being modified to operate in an infringing manner is not sufficient, by itself, to support a finding of infringement.”). Rather, as in every infringement analysis, the language of the claims, as well as the nature of the accused product, dictates whether an infringement has occurred.
A: I didn’t ask anybody if they did that, no. So I am not personally aware of anybody else doing it the way I do it.
Thus, based on the record before us, we find no evidence of direct infringement.
We are further unpersuaded by ACCO’s reliance on Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001), which states that an accused device may be found to infringe a product claim “if it is
Ball Aerosol and Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc. et al., 555 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
Review of district court’s summary judgment finding of literal infringement.
An important issue raised by the Finjan opinion is whether a claim can be construed/applied to cover inoperable devices and still satisfy the utility/operability requirement as well as the enablement requirement. By effectively construing the claim language to cover “locked” computer code, the panel has construed the claim language to cover an inoperable device. Thus, the court adopts an interpretation that one might think naturally suggests the claim is invalid under 35 U.S.C. §101 for utility purposes.
While invalidity under §101 is a logical conclusion, the case law is not crystal clear on the issue. Namely, a claim can fall into one of three categories: (1) the claim covers only operable devices; (2) the claim covers only inoperable devices; or (3) the claim covers both operable and inoperable devices. Clearly, if the claim falls into the first category, then it is valid with respect to this issue. And, if the claim falls into the second category, it is clearly invalid. If the claim falls into the third category, however, the case law suggests it is a tougher call for §101 purposes.
For example, in EMI Group N. Am. Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1423, 1427-28 (Fed. Cir. 2001) the court said:
A claimed invention having an inoperable or impossible claim limitation may lack utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and certainly lacks an enabling disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956, 220 USPQ 592, 596 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Discussing impossibility, this court stated: “Even if some of the claimed combinations were inoperative, the claims are not necessarily invalid…. [I]f the number of inoperative combinations becomes significant, and in effect forces one of ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the claims might indeed be invalid.” Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77, 224 USPQ 409, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Even if defendant’s argument of inadequate experimentation or inexact correlation were to apply, the fact that an invention has only limited utility and is only operable in certain applications is not grounds for finding lack of utility. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 958-59, 220 USPQ 592, 598 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 694 F.2d 570, 578, 216 USPQ 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1982). Some degree of utility is sufficient for patentability. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley and Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1260, fn. 17, 205 USPQ 1, 10 (8th Cir. 1980). Further, the defense of non-utility cannot be sustained without proof of total incapacity. Id.
In these previous cases where the claim could cover operable and inoperable devices, the accused products fell into the operable bucket. In Finjan, however, the accused product falls into the inoperable bucket. Finjan is therefore unique in its application of a claim to an inoperable product. It is difficult to follow the logic that a patent should be entitled to cover an inoperable device.
Judge Gajarsa articulated a similar argument in his concurring opinion in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex et al., 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In that concurring opinion, he noted that a claim could read on both naturally occurring and unnaturally occurring forms of paroxetine hemihydrate. He concluded “[b]ecause the claimed PHC hemihydrate falls into both categories, it is not patentable under section 101.” Judge Gajarsa noted that patentability “requires ‘an examination of the contested claims to see if the claimed subject matter as a whole’ comes within the subject matter described in section 101.” The same logic applies to the accused products in the Finjan case — only it is inoperable software rather than naturally occuring paroxetine hemihydrate that creates the offending surplusage in the claim scope. Judge Gajarsa’s concurrence in SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex is also noteworthy in that it outlines how the Federal Circuit is entitled to raise the §101 issue sua sponte.
Another way to look at the utility issue is to analyze the court’s construction as permitting a claim to cover a mere aggregation of elements that serve no useful purpose. The Supreme Court has stated in Lincoln Engineering:
Now, to replace that door handle . . . .
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One Response to “The “Latent Code” Cases”
What will be the next en banc issue? « 717 Madison Place says:
[…] 2) FInjan. The court had to tap dance around the Finjan decision in a recent appeal. I would not mind seeing that issue addressed en banc. See this prior post [Link]. […]