Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/754/1251/319058/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:13:07
Document Index: 476916376

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988']

Fred B. Shelton, Iii, et al., Plaintiff-appellants Cross-appellees, v. City of College Station, et al., Defendants-appelleescross-appellants, 754 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1985 › Fred B. Shelton, Iii, et al., Plaintiff-appellants Cross-appellees, v. City of College Station, et a...
Fred B. Shelton, Iii, et al., Plaintiff-appellants Cross-appellees, v. City of College Station, et al., Defendants-appelleescross-appellants, 754 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 754 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985)
The plaintiffs Shelton and Jones appeal from the dismissal of their suit for damages against defendants who allegedly caused them to suffer monetary losses as a result of the defendants' unconstitutional actions under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Made defendants were: the City of College Station, Texas; the members of the city-created Zoning Board of Adjustment for that municipality; and the city planning director. The alleged unconstitutional actions consisted of the arbitrary and discriminatory denial of a zoning variance for the plaintiffs' business property, despite the routine grant of similar requests as to neighboring and other business property in the area.
In granting summary judgment, the district court relied upon Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921, 102 S. Ct. 1278, 71 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1981), as providing a standard that in a Sec. 1983 action for damages a federal court may consider only " 'whether the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.' " 652 F.2d at 588. The district court then held that, under that standard, although "there may be some inferences", in the record, and "there may be a scintilla of evidence" in the record, nevertheless, "the fact remains that there is no evidence that the refusal to grant the variance in this case was arbitrary and capricious."
In granting summary judgment, the district court thus inadvertently referred to the standard for granting a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, after full development of the evidence. Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). However, a different standard applies before, on a truncated summary-judgment factual record, a district court may by summary judgment deny a party a trial on the merits with full evidence before the trier of fact. As we recently summarized in Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Insurance Co., 739 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1984):
[T]he summary judgment standard ... is a strict one, allowing the entry of summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), see, e.g., Transource International v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1984). Moreover in considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litigation, 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982). However, once the moving party makes an initial showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In reviewing a summary judgment on appeal, we apply the same standard as that used by the district court. Transource, 725 F.2d at 279.
The defendant city contends that, nevertheless, no action for damages sustained by the denial of a zoning variation, admittedly under color of state law, is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The city's contentions in this regard are two-fold: (a) given the limited scope of judicial review of zoning actions, the plaintiffs as a matter of law do not have a cause of action for the allegedly arbitrary and discriminatory denial of their request for a zoning variance; and (b) in any event, the denial of a zoning variation is not a deprivation of "property" within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, so as to entitle a person aggrieved thereby to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages resulting of a violation of the plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights.
In South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 66, 42 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1974), the en banc court established governing circuit principle. In their rejecting the claim of aggrieved owners that a rezoning regulation had offended the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights, we stated that " [t]he only question which federal district courts may consider is whether the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare." 491 F.2d at 7; see also, Couf v. DeBlaker, supra, 652 F.2d at 588. We also held that this principle applied, whether the zoning action was the adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan or (as there) the reclassification of a piece of property under an existing plan.
The en banc court in South Gwinnett then held that the zoning commissioners had established adequate reasons for their denial of reclassification to the plaintiffs. This holding, however, was in the context of an evidentiary hearing at which full opportunity to develop the factual basis of the claim was afforded. 491 F.2d at 6; see district court opinion, 342 F. Supp. 703, 705 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Before so holding, however, South Gwinnett stated, preliminarily thereto, that "upon a factual showing of arbitrariness there must be [shown] some basis in fact or law to justify the zoning action as consistent with reasonableness." South Gwinnett, 491 supra at 7.
The plaintiffs' suit is founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by which a federal cause of action is granted to those subjected under color of state law to a deprivation of rights under the federal constitution and laws. The defendants point out that no Sec. 1983 action is shown unless the plaintiffs show a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976), and that whether the plaintiffs possessed such property interest is to be determined by reference to state law, id.
As stated in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972):
With regard to the right of an owner not to have his use of his property arbitrarily restricted, the defendants themselves admit, although in another context, that property-interest owners under state law can in Texas state courts obtain redress for actions of Zoning Boards of Adjustments, if they arbitrarily grant or deny variances that restrict the use of or affect their property. Board of Adjustment of City of San Antonio v. Willie, 511 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.Civ.App.1974; writ ref. n.r.e.); Swain v. Board of Adjustment of City of University Park, Texas, 433 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App.1968; writ dism'd w.o.j.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 277, 90 S. Ct. 563, 24 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1970). Texas law in general recognizes a judicial remedy for a property owner aggrieved by an arbitrary and unreasonable zoning action by a municipal agency, Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex.1971), including where, through arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the power to deny zoning applications, the municipal actor deprives the owner of a property interest of a business use of his property that is permitted to others similarly situated, City of Austin v. Nelson, 45 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Civ.App.1931), City of Austin v. Deats, 32 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.Civ.App.1930).
Thus, Texas law recognizes that the right of the owner of a property interest to use his property for a lawful purpose cannot be arbitrarily and discriminatorily restricted by governmental zoning action. This right, judicially enforceable under state law, is, in our view, sufficiently a property right--a "legitimate claim of entitlement," Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S. Ct. at 2709--that the arbitrary deprivation thereof implicates an invasion of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2698-2700, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972).
An additional related contention is made by the defendants. Whether or not a property right of the plaintiffs was violated, they contend that, nevertheless, no denial of due process occurred on which to base a Sec. 1983 claim, because an adequate state remedy was provided by state law for this alleged wrong. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981). We pretermit discussion of whether state law provides a damage remedy for deprivations of property through unconstitutional abuse of the zoning power; for (even if so), as we have held in McCrae v. Hawkins, 720 F.2d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 1983), the principle established by Parratt does not apply when the plaintiff's claim is based either upon deprivation of a liberty interest or (as here) upon the intentional deprivation of a property interest "pursuant to established state procedure." Hudson v. Palmer, --- U.S. ----, ----, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3203-04, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984); Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1984).
The defendant city further argues that, as a matter of law, it cannot be held liable for any arbitrary and discriminatory acts of its zoning adjustment board that may have offended the plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights. It relies upon the principle that a city may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injury inflicted by its employees or agents except where the latters' acts "may fairly be said to represent official policy." Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). See also Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.) (en banc), reh. den., 735 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1984).
The Board of Adjustment is thus the exclusive agency of the city to administer the city's policy. It is the official agency to which "the [city] lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority," Bennett, supra, 735 F.2d at 862, with regard to the grant or denial of zoning variances. Accordingly, the city is liable for injury caused by unconstitutional acts of its agent, the Board. See also Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), reh. den., 741 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1984).
The defendant members of the Board also claim immunity for their discretionary acts in administering the city's zoning-variance policy. " [G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
A public official may, however, be held liable if he violated constitutional or statutory rights that were clearly established at the time he acted such that a reasonably competent official should have then known the rules of law governing his conduct, unless the official pleads and proves in his defense extraordinary circumstances by virtue of which he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard. Id., 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S. Ct. at 2739. Applying this standard, summary judgment dismissing the action against the Board members individually was precluded by the disputed factual issue as to whether they arbitrarily and discriminatorily denied the plaintiffs' requests for zoning variances. If indeed they did so, they violated clearly established constitutional standards and rules of law, of which reasonably competent officials should have known.
Procedural Due Process. The plaintiffs contend that they were denied procedural due process because Bailey, a member of the Board who opposed the grant of the plaintiffs' applications for variance, was a member of a church that opposed the variances. The showing made falls far short of establishing a factual issue as to the claimed denial of procedural due process (allegedly the lack of a fair hearing before an impartial fact-finder). For one reason, among others sustaining the district court's dismissal of this claim by the defendants, Bailey's mere membership in a church that also opposed the grant of the variances does not by itself establish bias, nor raise an issue as to an "irrevocably closed mind" that might justify his disqualification from the hearing, see Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701, 68 S. Ct. 793, 803, 92 L. Ed. 1010 (1948); K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise Sec. 19.2 (2d ed. 1980)--even if we concede (as we do not) that the failure of one of five commissioners to disqualify himself because of bias somehow contributed to a denial of procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The summary judgment dismissing the claim of denial of procedural due process is affirmed.
Cross-Appeal: Attorney's Fees: By their cross-appeal, the defendants contend that the district court erred in denying them attorney's fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, against the plaintiffs for their instituting this allegedly frivolous Sec. 1983 suit. Attorney's fees should not be awarded against plaintiffs in unsuccessful Sec. 1983 suits unless the " 'action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.' " Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S. Ct. 173, 178, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980). The cross-appeal is mooted by our reversal.