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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 5', 'Art. 4', '§ 5', '§ 301', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', 'Art. 7', '§ 5', 'Art. 7', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 141', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301']

Humphrey Vs Moore - Citation 101003 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Humphrey Vs. Moore - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/101003CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJan-06-1964Case Number375 U.S. 335AppellantHumphreyRespondentMooreExcerpt:
a decision of a joint conference committee purported to determine the relative seniority rights of employees of two companies under a collective bargaining contract. respondent moore, on behalf of himself and other aggrieved employees of one of the companies, brought this class action in a kentucky state court for an injunction against the union and the company to prevent the decision of the committee to dovetail seniority lists from being carried out. the kentucky court of..... Judgment:
1. The action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and is a case controlled by federal law, even though brought in the state court. Pp.
(a) Moore contends that the decision of the Committee was not one which it was empowered to make; in his view the resulting award was therefore a nullity and any discharge pursuant thereto would be a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. P.
(b) The complaint alleges that the Committee's decision was obtained by dishonest union conduct, and could therefore not be relied on as a basis for discharge without breaching the collective bargaining agreement. Pp.
2. The decision of the Joint Conference Committee to dovetail seniority lists was a decision which § 5 of the contract empowered the Committee to make. Pp.
375 U. S. 345
3. There is not adequate support in the record in this case for the complaint's attack upon the integrity of the union and of the procedures which led to the Committee's decision. P.
375 U. S. 348
4. The evidence in this case shows no breach by the union of its duty of fair representation. P.
375 U. S. 350
5. The complaining employees were not inadequately represented at the hearing before the Committee and were not deprived of a fair hearing. Pp.
6. The decision of the Committee, reached after proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and binding upon the parties, as provided by the contract. P.
375 U. S. 351
Respondent Moore, on behalf of himself and other Dealers employees, then brought this class action in a Kentucky state court praying for an injunction against the union and the company to prevent the decision of the Joint Conference Committee from being carried out. Damages were asked in an alternative count, and certain E & L employees were added as defendants by amendment to the complaint. [
] The complaint alleged that Dealers employees had relied upon the union to represent them, that the president of Local 89, Paul Priddy, assured Dealers employees that they had nothing to worry about, and that precedent in the industry provided that, when a new business is taken over, its employees do not displace the original employees of the acquiring company; it further alleged that Priddy had deliberately "deadlocked" the local joint committee, and that the Dealers employees learned for the first time before the Joint Conference Committee in Detroit that Priddy favored dovetailing the seniority lists. Priddy's actions, the complaint went on, "in deceiving these plaintiffs as to his position left them without representation before the Joint Conference Committee." The decision, according to the complaint, was "contrived, planned and brought about by Paul Priddy" who "has deceived and failed completely to represent said employees," and whose "false and deceitful action" and "connivance . . . with the employees of E & L" threatened the jobs of Dealers employees. The International union is said to have "conspired with and assisted the defendant, Local No. 89, and its president, Paul Priddy, in bringing about this result. . . ." The decision of the Joint Conference Committee was charged to be arbitrary and capricious, contrary to the existing practice in the industry, and violative of the collective bargaining contract.
After hearing, the trial court denied a temporary and permanent injunction. [
] The Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Kentucky reversed and granted a permanent injunction, two judges dissenting. 356 S.W.2d 241. In the view of that court, Art. 4, § 5 could have no application to the circumstances of this case, since it came into play only if the absorbing company agreed to hire the employees of the absorbed company. The clause was said to deal with seniority, not with initial employment. Therefore, it was said, the decision of the Joint Conference Committee was not binding, because the question of employing E & L drivers was not "arbitrable" at all under this section. The Court of Appeals, however, went on to hold that, even if it were otherwise, the decision could not stand, since the situation involved antagonistic interests of two sets of employees represented by the same union advocate. The result was inadequate representation of the Dealers employees in a context where Dealers itself was essentially neutral. Against such a backdrop, the erroneous decision of the board became "arbitrary and violative of natural justice." Kentucky cases were cited and relied upon. We granted both the petition filed by the E & L employees in No. 17 and the petition in No. 18, filed by the local union. 371 U.S. 966, 967.
Second, Moore claims the decision of the Committee was obtained by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair representation, and that a decision so obtained cannot be relied upon as a valid excuse for his discharge under the contract. The undoubted broad authority of the union as exclusive bargaining agent in the negotiation and administration of a collective bargaining contract is accompanied by a responsibility of equal scope, the responsibility and duty of fair representation.
Syres v. Oil Workers Intern. Union,
350 U.S. 892,
223 F.2d 739;
. The exclusive agent's obligation
and its powers are "subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."
Both the local and international unions are charged with dishonesty, and one-half of the votes on the Joint Committee were cast by representatives of unions affiliated with the international. No fraud is charged against the employer, but, except for the improper action of the union, which is said to have dominated and brought about the decision, it is alleged that Dealers would have agreed to retain its own employees. The fair inference from the complaint is that the employer considered the dispute a matter for the union to decide. Moreover, the award had not been implemented at the time of the filing of the complaint, which put Dealers on notice that the union was charged with dishonesty and a breach of duty in procuring the decision of the Joint Committee. In these circumstances, the allegations of the complaint, if proved, would effectively undermine the decision of the Joint Committee as a valid basis for Moore's discharge. [
For these reasons, this action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, [
a case controlled by federal law,
, even though brought in the state court.
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
. Although there are differing views on whether a violation of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act, [
] it is not necessary for us to resolve that difference here. Even if it is, or arguably may be, an unfair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore's discharge would violate the contract, and was therefore within the cognizance of federal and state courts,
subject, of course, to the applicable federal law. [
If we assume with Moore and the courts below that the Joint Conference Committee's power was circumscribed by § 5 [
] and that its interpretation of the section is open to court review, Moore's cause is not measurably advanced. For, in our opinion, the section reasonably meant what the Joint Committee said or assumed it meant. There was an absorption here within the meaning of the section, and that section did deal with jobs as well as with seniority. [
It was also permissible to conclude that § 5 dealt with employment, as well as seniority. Mergers, sales of assets and absorptions are commonplace events. It is not unusual for collective bargaining agreements to deal with them, especially in the transportation industry, where the same unions may represent the employees of both parties to the transaction. [
] Following any of such events, the business of the one company will probably include the former business of the other; and the recurring question is whether it is the employees of the absorbed company or those of the acquiring company who are to have first call upon the available work at the latter concern. Jobs, as well as seniority, are at stake; and it was to solve just such problems that § 5 was designed. Its interpretation should be commensurate with its purposes.
The power of the Joint Conference Committee over seniority gave it power over jobs. It was entitled under § 5 to integrate the seniority lists upon some rational basis, and its decision to integrate lists upon the basis of length of service at either company was neither unique nor arbitrary. On the contrary, it is a familiar and frequently equitable solution to the inevitably conflicting interests which arise in the wake of a merger or an absorption such as occurred here. [
] The Joint Conference Committee's
Neither do we find adequate support in this record for the complaint's attack upon the integrity of the union and of the procedures which led to the decision. Although the union at first advised the Dealers drivers that they had nothing to worry about, but later supported the E & L employees before the Joint Conference Committee, there is no substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct. Priddy's early assurances to Dealers employees were not well founded, it is true, but Priddy was acting upon information then available to him, information received from the company which led him to think there was no trade or exchange involved, no "absorption" which might bring § 5 into play. Other sections of the contract, he thought, would protect the jobs of Moore and his fellow drivers. [
] Consistent with this view, he also advised E & L employees that the situation appeared unfavorable for them. However, when he learned of the pending acquisition by Dealers of E & L operating authority in Louisville and of the involvement of other locations in the transaction, he considered the matter to be one for the Joint Committee. Ultimately
The Kentucky court, however, made much of the antagonistic interests of the E & L and Dealers drivers, both groups being represented by the same union, whose president supported one group and opposed the other at the hearing before the Joint Conference Committee. But we are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees against that of another. In
, the Court found no breach of duty by the union in agreeing to an amendment of an existing collective bargaining contract, granting enhanced seniority to a particular group of employees and resulting in layoffs which otherwise would not have occurred.
. Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take a position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees represented
Moore has not, therefore, proved his case. Neither the parties nor the Joint Committee exceeded their power under the contract, and there was no fraud or breach of duty by the exclusive bargaining agent. The decision of the committee, reached after proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and binding upon the parties, just as the contract says it is.
General Drivers Union v. Riss & Co.,
372 U. S. 517
General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 89, v. Moore et al.,
Compare, for example, Labor Board v. Local 294, International Bro. of Teamsters,
317 F.2d 746 (C.A.2d Cir.),
with Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962);
enforcement denied, Labor Board v. Miranda Fuel Co.,
326 F.2d 172 (C.A.2d Cir.).
Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Villanova L.Rev. 151, 172-175.
The union contended in the state courts that the jurisdiction of the state courts had been preempted by the federal statutes. The Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled otherwise, and the union appears to have abandoned the view here, since it says, relying upon
, that individual employees "may undoubtedly maintain suits against their representative when the latter hostilely discriminates against them."
We note that, in
350 U.S. 892, individual employees sued the exclusive agent and the company to enjoin and declare void a collective bargaining agreement alleged to violate the duty of fair representation. Dismissal in the trial court was affirmed in the Court of Appeals. This Court reversed, and ordered further proceedings in the trial court in the face of contentions made both in this Court and the lower courts that the employees should have brought their proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board.
Cf. Cosmark v. Struthers Wells Corp.,
194 A.2d 325 (Pa. Oct. 17, 1963).
The E & L employees, petitioners in No. 17, urge that, even if the federal courts may entertain suits such as this, the state courts may not. Since, in our view, the complaint here charged a breach of contract, we find no merit in this position. It is clear that suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization may be brought in either state or federal courts.
We also put aside the union's contention that Art. 7, § (d) -- providing that all matters of interpretation of the agreement be submitted to the Joint Conference Committee -- makes it inescapably clear that the committee had the power to decide that the transfer of operating authority was an absorption within the scope of § 5. But it is by no means clear that this provision in Art. 7 was intended to apply to interpretations of § 5, for the latter section, by its own terms, appears to limit the authority of the committee to disputes over seniority in the event of an absorption. Reconciliation of these two provisions, going to the power of the committee under the contract, itself presented an issue ultimately for the court, not the committee, to decide. Our view of the scope and applicability of § 5,
, renders an accommodation of these two sections unnecessary.
See for example, Kent v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
204 F.2d 263 (C.A.2d Cir. 1953);
Keller v. Teamsters Local 249,
43 CCH Labor Cases Ĺš 17,119 (D.C.W.D.Pa.1961);
Pratt v. Wilson Trucking Co.,
214 Ga. 385, 104 S.E.2d 915 (1958);
Walker v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines,
142 N.J.Eq. 588, 61 A.2d 453 (1948);
In re Western Union Telegraph Co. and American Communications Association
(Decisions of War Labor Board 1944) 14 L.R.R.M. 1623.
Cf. Colbert v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
206 F.2d 9 (C.A.9th Cir. 1953);
Labor Board v. Wheland Co.,
271 F.2d 122 (C.A.6th Cir. 1959);
Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines,
303 F.2d 182 (C.A.9th Cir. 1962);
Fagan v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
173 F.Supp. 465 (D.C.M.D.Pa.1959). "Integration of seniority lists should ordinarily be accomplished on the basis of each employee's length of service with his original employer. . . ." Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 361, 378.
I concur in the judgment and in the holding of the Court that, since "Moore has not . . . proved his case . . . ," the decision below must be reversed.
I do not, however, agree that Moore stated a cause of action arising under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). It is my view, rather, that Moore's claim must be treated as an individual employee's action for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation -- a duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract, but from the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141
See Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union,
Cf. International Association of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc.,
Neither ground, it seems to me, sustains an action under § 301(a) of the L.M.R.A. A mutually acceptable grievance settlement between an employer and a union, which is what the decision of the Joint Committee was, cannot be challenged by an individual dissenting employee under § 301(a) on the ground that the parties exceeded their contractual powers in making the settlement. It is true that this Court, in a series of decisions dealing with labor arbitrations, has recognized that the powers of an arbitrator arise from and are defined by the collective bargaining agreement. [
] "For arbitration," as the
, "is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." Thus, the existing labor contract is the touchstone of an arbitrator's powers. But the power of the union and the employer jointly to settle a grievance dispute is not so limited. The parties are free by joint action to modify, amend, and supplement their original collective bargaining agreement. They are equally free, since "[t]he grievance procedure is . . . a part of the continuous collective bargaining process," to settle grievances not falling within the scope of the contract.
In this case, for example, had the dispute gone to arbitration, the arbitrator would have been bound to apply the existing agreement and to determine whether the merger-absorption clause applied. However, even in the absence of such a clause, the contracting parties -- the multiemployer unit [
] and the union -- were free to resolve the dispute by amending the contract to dovetail seniority lists or to achieve the same result by entering into a grievance settlement. The presence of the merger-absorption clause did not restrict the right of the parties to resolve their dispute by joint agreement applying, interpreting, or a ending the contract. [
] There are too many unforeseeable
. There, the union and the employer, during a collective bargaining agreement, entered into a "supplementary agreement" providing seniority credit for the pre-employment military service of veterans, a type of seniority credit not granted in the original agreement.
345 U. S. 334
, n. 6. Huffman, on behalf of himself and other union members whose seniority was adversely affected, brought suit to have the supplementary provisions declared invalid and to obtain appropriate injunctive relief against the employer and the union. There was no doubt that Huffman and members of his class were injured as a result of the "supplementary agreement"; they were subjected to layoffs that would not have affected them if the seniority rankings had not been altered. Despite the change in rights under the prior agreement, this Court held that the existing labor agreement did not limit the power of the parties jointly, in the process of bargaining collectively, to make new and
It necessarily follows from
that a settlement of a seniority dispute, deemed by the parties to be an interpretation of their agreement, not requiring an amendment, is plainly within their joint authority. Just as, under the
decision, an amendment is not to be tested by whether it is within the existing contract, so a grievance settlement should not be tested by whether a court could agree with the parties' interpretation. If collective bargaining is to remain a flexible process, the power to amend by agreement and the power to interpret by agreement must be coequal.
It is wholly inconsistent with this Court's recognition that "[t]he grievance procedure is . . . a part of the continuous collective bargaining process,"
, to limit the parties' power to settle grievances to the confines of the existing labor agreement, or to assert, as the Court now does, that an individual employee can claim that the collective bargaining contract is violated because the parties have made a grievance settlement going beyond the strict terms of the existing contract.
I turn now to the second basis of the complaint,
that the decision of the Joint Conference Committee was brought about by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair representation. In my view, such a claim of breach of the union's duty of fair representation cannot properly be treated as a claim of breach of the collective bargaining contract supporting an action under § 301(a). This is particularly apparent where, as here, "[n]o fraud is charged against the employer. . . ."
375 U. S. 343
an individual employee has a right to a remedy against a union breaching its duty of fair representation -- a duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract, but implied from the union's rights and responsibilities conferred by federal labor statutes.
See Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, supra
(National Labor Relations Act);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, supra
(Railway Labor Act);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, supra
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., supra
(Railway Labor Act).
Cf. International Association of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., supra
(Railway Labor Act). There is nothing to the contrary in
. In that case, the gravamen of the individual employee's § 301(a) action was the employer's discharge of employees in violation of the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement. No breach of the union's duty of fair representation was charged. To the contrary, the union supported the employee's suit which was brought as an individual suit out of obeisance to what the union deemed to be the requirements of
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
The remedy in a suit based upon a breach of the union's duty of fair representation may be extended to the employer under appropriate circumstances. This was recognized in
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., supra,
where the Court extended the remedy against the union to include injunctive relief against a contract between the employer and the union. There, the employer willfully participated in the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, and that breach arose from discrimination based on race, a classification that was held "irrelevant" to a union's statutory bargaining powers. The Court observed:
Where the alleged breach of a union's duty involves a differentiation based on a relevant classification -- in this case, seniority rankings following an amalgamation of employer units -- and where the employer has not willfully participated in the alleged breach of the union's duty, the collective bargaining agreement should not be open to the collateral attack of an individual employee merely because the union alone has failed in its duty of fair representation. We should not and indeed we need not strain, therefore, as the Court does, to convert a breach of the union's duty to individual employees into a breach of the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union.
I do not agree with the Court that employer willfulness was claimed in this case by "[t]he fair inference from the complaint" that Dealers "considered the dispute a matter for the union to decide."
. Nor can I agree that willfulness could be predicated on the rationale that, since "the award had not been implemented at the time of the filing of the complaint," Dealers was "put . . . on notice that the union was charged with dishonesty and a breach of duty in procuring the decision of the Joint Committee."
Dealers may indeed have been neutral when the case was presented to the Joint Conference Committee, but the Court overlooks that the employer party to the collective bargaining contract was the multiemployer unit whose representatives -- acting on behalf of both Dealers and E & L -- fully participated in the Joint Committee's
decision resolving the dispute. [
] Furthermore, an employer not willfully participating in union misconduct should not be restrained from putting a grievance settlement into effect merely by being "put . . . on notice" that an individual employee has charged the union with dishonesty. Such a rule would penalize the honest employer and encourage groundless charges frustrating joint grievance settlements. Finally, it is difficult to conceive how mere notice to an employer of union dishonesty can transform the union's breach of its duty of fair representation into a contractual violation by the employer.
In summary, then, for the reasons stated, I would treat Moore's claim as a
Syres-Steele
type cause of action, rather than as a § 301(a) contract action. So considering it, I nevertheless conclude, as the Court does, that, since "there was no fraud or breach of duty by the exclusive bargaining agent,"
, Moore is not entitled to the relief sought.
E.g., United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co.,
The Court states that, "In its brief filed here Dealers does not support the decision of the Joint Committee."
, n. 3. The Court overlooks, however, that Dealers throughout the litigation has acknowledged that it is a part of the multiemployer unit, which is the employer party to the collective bargaining agreement and that the employer representatives on the Joint Conference Committee acted honestly and properly on behalf of the employer members including Dealers.
375 U. S. 357
375 U. S. 339
But insofar as petitioners' claim rests upon alleged unfair union representation in the grievance proceeding, I agree with the views expressed in the concurring opinion of my Brother GOLDBERG (ante,
375 U. S. 355
-358) (except that I would expressly reserve the question of whether a suit of this nature would be maintainable under § 301 where it is alleged or proved that the employer was a party to the asserted unfair union representation). However, the conclusion that unilateral unfair union representation gives rise only to a cause of action for violation of a duty implicit in the National Labor Relations Act brings one face-to-face with a further question: Does such a federal cause of action come within the play of the preemption doctrine,
, contrary to what would be the case were such a suit to lie under § 301,
Short of deciding that question, I do not think it would be appropriate to dispose of this case simply by saying that no unfair union representation was shown in this instance. For if there be preemption in this situation,
would not only preclude state court jurisdiction, but would also require this Court initially to defer to the primary jurisdiction of the Labor Board.
The preemption issue is a difficult and important one, carrying ramifications extending far beyond this particular case. It should not be decided without our having the benefit of the views of those charged with the administration of the labor laws. To that end, I would reverse the judgment of the state court to the extent that it rests upon a holding that the Joint Conference Committee acted beyond the scope of its authority, set the case for reargument on the unfair representation issue, and invite the National Labor Relations Board to present its views by brief and oral argument on the preemption question.
Cf. Retail Clerks International Assn. v. Schermerhorn,