Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/852/1/451252/
Timestamp: 2019-10-21 04:53:10
Document Index: 494187681

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2778', '§ 1934', '§ 922', '§ 2778', '§ 2778', '§ 922', '§ 921', '§ 921']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Noel Murphy, A/k/a Noel O'murchu, Defendant, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Ciarin Hughes, Defendant, Appellant, 852 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1988 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Noel Murphy, A/k/a Noel O'murchu, Defendant, Appellant.united...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Noel Murphy, A/k/a Noel O'murchu, Defendant, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Ciarin Hughes, Defendant, Appellant, 852 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 852 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) July 7, 1988
"[A] valid entrapment defense has two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct." Mathews v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 108 S. Ct. 883, 886, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1988) (holding that a defendant may simultaneously deny the offense charged and rely on the affirmative defense of entrapment). See also United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Fera, 616 F.2d 590, 596 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969, 100 S. Ct. 2951, 64 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1980); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 1967). The defendant has the initial burden to show some evidence that he was unready to commit the crime or, in other words, that "a government agent turned him from a righteous path to an iniquitous one." Coady, 809 F.2d at 122; Kadis, 373 F.2d at 374. In Mathews, the Supreme Court pointed out that a defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction as long as "there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment." --- U.S. at ----, 108 S. Ct. at 886. This court has sometimes referred to the standard as "more than a mere scintilla." Coady, 809 F.2d at 122; Fera, 616 F.2d at 596; but cf. Tzimopoulos v. United States, 554 F.2d 1216, 1217 (1st Cir. 1977); Kadis, 373 F.2d at 374. We recognize that statements in Coady and Fera may imply that in this circuit a defendant need not meet a burden as high as the ordinary "jury issue" burden that Mathews imposes. But, any such implication would seem contrary to the Supreme Court's statement in Mathews and, in any event, seems to rest upon dicta in Fera regarding this court's earlier pronouncement in Kadis. Nonetheless, however lenient the standard we apply here, the appellants cannot meet it.
Nonetheless, Murphy argues that on three separate occasions he tried to abandon the venture and that this was sufficient evidence of unreadiness to warrant the instruction. He contends that during three conversations in 1985, he told Butchka that he had "nothing for him" and hesitated or attempted to ease out of the situation. The evidence was clear that his hesitation, if any, was not for a lack of predisposition, but from a lack of a commitment from a buyer or backer in Northern Ireland. On at least two occasions Butchka asked Murphy if he wanted to call it quits, but Murphy refused, each time affirming his commitment to deal. Murphy was far from being unready as he had had every opportunity to exit. Butchka only gave Murphy the means to strike a deal. It is clear that mere evidence of soliciting the defendant and providing him an opportunity to commit the offense does not trigger the right to an entrapment instruction. Mathews v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 108 S. Ct. 883, 887, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1988); United States v. Espinal, 757 F.2d 423, 425-26 (1st Cir. 1985).
Hughes' claim to an instruction is foreclosed for an additional reason. In United States v. Bradley, 820 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1987), this court refused to extend the entrapment defense to a defendant in contact only with an intermediary, and not the government agent, absent "a showing that pressure had been put upon him by the intermediary at the instruction of the government agent." 820 F.2d at 8. In order for Hughes to be entitled to an entrapment instruction then, we would have to create the fiction that Butchka forced Murphy into dealing with Hughes. This we cannot do, because Butchka neither pressured Murphy to bring into the negotiations Hughes or any additional persons. Hughes produced not a scintilla of evidence that Butchka ensnared him through Murphy.
Murphy next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a judgment of acquittal on count I of the indictment, the charge of conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778, on the grounds that Murphy was ignorant of the act's licensing requirement.4 He further contends that the court erred in instructing the jury under the act, arguing that the willfulness requirement of the act mandates proof of his specific knowledge of the licensing requirement and the Munitions List.
To sustain a conviction under sec. 2778, the government must prove that the defendant (1) willfully (2) engaged in the business of exporting (3) defense articles (4) that are on the United States Munitions List (5) without a license.5 See United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 450 (7th Cir. 1980). Murphy would like to escape conviction because the prosecution did not present evidence that Murphy knew he had to register with the United States government and that the arms were on the Munitions List before sending them to Ireland. While the act does require proof of specific intent, willfulness means that "defendant must know that his conduct in exporting from the United States articles proscribed by the statute is violative of the law." United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1976) (requiring specific intent under 22 U.S.C. § 1934, the predecessor statute to sec. 2778). In other words, the "government must prove that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty not to export the proscribed articles." Id. at 829. See also United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d at 450. Therefore, it is sufficient that the government prove that Murphy knew he had a legal duty not to export the weapons.6 Beck, 615 F.2d at 451.
The prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Murphy knew it was illegal to send the weapons out of the country. Evidence of these year-long clandestine efforts, covert acts, and subterfuges to purchase weapons for shipment to Ireland for the IRA's use supports the jury's verdict that Murphy was aware of that duty. United States v. Cahalane, 560 F.2d 601, 605 (3rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S. Ct. 890, 54 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1978); Beck, 615 F.2d at 451.
Appellants were also found guilty under Count III of the indictment, which charged that defendants "engage[d] in the business of dealing in firearms and ammunition without a license," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1).7 Appellants contend that the evidence does not support the conclusion that they "engaged in the business of" dealing in firearms, and therefore, the court should have directed a judgment of acquittal. This court in United States v. Tarr, 589 F.2d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1978), adopted the definition of "business" as "that which occupies time, attention and labor for the purpose of livelihood or profit."8 The court further said that "[w]hile we can conceive of a transaction sufficiently large enough in number of guns and the price paid to constitute engaging in the business of dealing in firearms, ordinarily one sale will not be sufficient to meet the statutory requirement." 589 F.2d at 59. In that case, the appellant, Tarr, delivered a machine gun to a man who then delivered it to two principals, who in turn sold it to a federal agent, with all these events occurring in one afternoon. Tarr was charged with aiding and abetting the principals in violation of sec. 922(a) (1). The court reversed a jury verdict on that count, on the basis that there was no evidence to prove that Tarr knew the principals were engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.
Lastly, Hughes contends that the court erroneously admitted declarations of Murphy against Hughes under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (3) (E). The standard regarding admission of declarations of an alleged co-conspirator against a codefendant is governed by United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977), utilized by the district court: "[I]f it is more likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy, the hearsay is admissible." Furthermore, "the defendant's membership in the conspiracy [must be] established by independent non-hearsay evidence." Petrozziello, 548 F.2d at 22.
The district court correctly applied the Petrozziello standard. The prosecution introduced a preponderance of non-hearsay evidence that Hughes had joined the battle at the time Murphy's declarations were made. Butchka's testimony placed both in a conspiracy to deal in arms. Furthermore, declarations made prior to the codefendant's joining the conspiracy are admissible against the codefendant under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) (E). United States v. Baines, 812 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1987). Finally, Hughes' own declarations placed him in a plot with Murphy. At their first meeting, he told Butchka "So this has been going on a year. We still don't know any more this here year than we did last year about you." Based on the above, it is evident that the government established a foundation for admitting the declaration of Murphy against Hughes.
22 U.S.C. § 2778 provides in pertinent part:
(a) (1) In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, the President is authorized to control the import and the export of defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the export and import of such articles and services. The President is authorized to designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles and defense services for the purposes of this section and to promulgate regulations for the import and export of such articles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List.
(b) (1) (A) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every person ... who engages in the business of ... exporting ... any defense articles or defense services designated by the President under subsection (a) (1) of this section shall register with the United States Government agency charged with the administration of this section, and shall pay a registration fee which shall be prescribed by such regulations.
(b) (2) Except as otherwise specifically provided in regulations issued under subsection (a) (1) of this section, no defense articles or defense services designated by the President under subsection (a) (1) of this section may be exported or imported without a license for such export or import, issued in accordance with this chapter and regulations issued under this chapter....
22 U.S.C. §§ 2778(a) (1), (b) (1) (A), (b) (2), and (c) (1979 and West Supp.1988).
We do not read footnote 14 in United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1437, n. 14 (8th Cir. 1987), as requiring proof that the defendant know that the arms are on the United States Munitions List. Rather, we read Gregg as requiring the same level of proof as the 7th and 9th Circuits: "When the case gets to court, all that the Government needs to prove is that the item exported appears on the Munitions List or the Commodity Control List, as the case may be (and, of course, that the defendant knowingly and willfully exported it, with the necessary intent and knowledge, and without the appropriate license)." Gregg, 829 F.2d at 1437
18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1) reads in pertinent part:
At the time of the indictment, the statute did not define "engaged in the business." However, a recent amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 921 includes a definition:
18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (21) (C). See Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. 99-308, 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News (100 Stat. 449) 1327 (1986).