Source: https://ielrblog.com/index.php/category/international-organizations/
Timestamp: 2020-08-09 13:35:15
Document Index: 396368028

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1701', '§ 1601', '§1182', '§7241', 'art. 1', '§ 57', 'art. 6', 'art. 17', 'art. 129']

International Organizations Archives | IELR Blog
June 12, 2020 by Bruce Zagaris 1 Comment
On June 11, 2020, United States President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on “certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court.”
The Executive Order cited as authority for the action the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),[1] the National Emergencies Act (NEA),[2] section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,[3] and section 301 of title 3, United States Code.
President Trump in the E.O. finds that the efforts of the ICC threaten U.S. national security and foreign policy:
“The ICC Prosecutor’s investigation into actions allegedly committed by United States military, intelligence, and other personnel in or relating to Afghanistan, threatens to subject current and former United States Government and allied officials to harassment, abuse, and possible arrest. These actions on the part of the ICC, in turn, threaten to infringe upon the sovereignty of the United States and imped the critical national security and foreign policy work of the United States Government and allied officials, and thereby threaten the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”
The Executive Order also refers to the enactment in 2002 of the American Service-Members’ Protection Act,[4] which “rejected the ICC’s overbroad, non-consensual assertions of jurisdiction.”[5]
According to the Executive Order, the U.S. will impose tangible and significant consequents on those responsible for the ICC’s misconduct. They may include the suspension of entry into the U.S> of ICC officials, employees, and agents, as well as their immediate family members.
Justifications of the Executive Order and Imposition of Sanctions
National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien made a statement before press alongside Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, and Attorney General Bill Barr. O’Brien said “The ICC’s effort to target American servicemen and women and other public servants are unfounded, illegitimate, and make a mockery of justice”.[6]
Barr stated “(w)e are concerned that foreign powers, like Russia, are also manipulating the ICC in pursuit of their own agenda.” The Justice Department received “substantial, credible information that raises serious concerns about a long history of financial corruption and malfeasance at the highest levels of the office of the prosecutor.”[7]
The ICC investigation that triggered the Executive order will focus on possible crimes committed by the Taliban and other groups between 2003 and 2014, including alleged mass killings of civilians, as well as the alleged torture of prisoners by Afghan authorities and, to a lesser extent, by U.S. forces and the CIA.[8]
The ICC only investigates when national governments have not already investigated atrocities and crimes against humanity.
Human rights groups criticized the order as overly broad and vague and could subject human rights researchers at risk in countries allied with the U.S., such as the Philippines.[9]
Although the Executive Order states that the ICC investigation into Afghanistan atrocities threatens to subject U.S. government and allied officials to potential arrest, U.S. allied officials are members of and support the ICC.
While the press conference talked of a “politically motivated court,” President Trump has intervened in several cases involving war-crimes accusations even though military justice experts and senior defense officials have opposed his intervention.[10]
The Trump Administration’s charge of political interference and corruption in the ICC will ring hollow. Three emoluments suits have been brought against the President. The President has dismissed five inspector generals, including ones investigating improprieties at the defense and state departments.[11] Mr. Barr has been embroiled in a series of political interference allegations, including his whitewash of the Robert Mueller report, his overriding the sentencing memorandum of DOJ attorneys for former Trump campaign adviser Roger Stone,[12] his effort to dismiss the plea of former Trump national security advisor Michael Flynn,[13] the impeachment of Trump for his effort to have the Ukrainian head of state investigate the presumptive Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden and his son, and his criticism and firing of his first Attorney General Jeff Sessions for recusing himself in the special counsel’s investigation.[14]
Already the U.S. has revoked the visa of the ICC’s chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda.[15] The Executive Order and sanctions may hinder the ICC’s recruitment of personnel.
The imposition of sanctions is a setback to the effort to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable and to the ability of the U.S. to obtain international enforcement cooperation, especially from its allies.
The current issue of the IELR will have a more comprehensive discussion of the sanctions.
[1] 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
[2] 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
[3] 8 U.S.C. §1182(f).
[4] 22 U.S.C. §7241 et seq.
[5] For a discussion of the decision by the ICC Appeals Chamber authorizing the Afghanistan investigation, see Michael Plachta, ICC Appeals Chamber Authorizes the Prosecutor’s Request to Investigate War Crimes in Afghanistan, 36 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 104 (Mar. 2020).
[6] Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, Trump Order Treats International Prosecutors Like War Criminals, Foreign Policy, June 11, 2020.
[8] Karen DeYoung and Carol Morello, Trump authorizes sanctions against ‘corrupt’ International Criminal Court, Wash. Post, June 12, 2020.
[10] Id. See also Mikhaila Fogel, When Presidents Intervene on Behalf of War Criminals, Lawfareblog, May 27, 2019 https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-presidents-intervene-behalf-war-criminals (discussing President Trump’s preparation of pardons for, among others, Special Operations Chief Edward Gallagher, a Navy SEAL accused of shooting unarmed civilians and stabbing an enemy prisoner to death; Maj. Mathew Golsteyn, who was accused of killing an unarmed Afghan man who had been connected to the Taliban; and a group of Marine Corps snipers charged in connection with urinating on the bodies of dead Taliban fighters).
[11] Melissa Quinn, The internal watchdogs Trump has fired or replaced, May 19, 2020 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-inspectors-general-internal-watchdogs-fired-list.
[12] Andrew Prokop, The fiasco at Bill Barr’s Justice Department, explained, Vox, Feb 13, 2020.
[13] Roger Parloff ,The Shoddy History Behind a Key Precedent in the Flynn Case, Lawfareblog, June 11, 2020 https://www.lawfareblog.com/shoddy-history-behind-key-precedent-flynn-case; Josh Gerstein and Kyle Cheney, Everything about this is irregular’: Ex-judge tapped to review Flynn case blasts Trump DOJ, Politico, June 10, 2020 https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/10/gleeson-flynn-sullivan-barr-justice-department-311018.
[14] Trump fires Attorney General Jeff Sessions, BBC, Nov. 18, 2018.
[15] Naha Toosi and Natasha Bertrand, Trump authorizes sanctions against the International Criminal Court, Politico, June 11, 2020 https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/11/white-house-international-criminal-court-sanctions-313070
Filed Under: Counterterrorism & International Human Rights, extradition, extraterritorial jurisdiction, Human Rights, Int'l Criminal Court, International Cooperation, International Criminal Law, international evidence gathering, International Organizations, international regimes, Law of War & Post-Conflict Transitions, national security, Sanctions, Torture, tortureandinhumanordegradingtreatement, universal jurisdiction, War Crimes
For the First Time, Trump Designates White Supremacist Group as “Terrorists”
April 14, 2020 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment
On Monday, April 6, the Trump administration designated the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), an ultranationalist white supremacist group, as a terrorist organization on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” list and imposed sanctions upon its members.
The step was announced by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his counterterrorism coordinator Nathan Sales. The designation makes it illegal for Americans to engage in any transactions with the group and freezes any assets it may have in U.S. jurisdictions.
The members who were sanctioned are all leaders within the group: Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev, Denis Valliullovich Gariev, and Nikolay Nikolayevich Trushchalov. The leaders were individually added to the OFAC list and face the same sanctions as the group, in addition to a travel ban.
This action marks the first time a white supremacist group has been named a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.” Sales emphasized the significance of this action in a statement: “This is the first time the United States has ever designated white supremacist terrorists, illustrating how seriously this administration takes the threat. We are taking actions no previous administration has taken to counter this threat.”
Indeed, this move is significant as it will make it easier for national security prosecutors at the Department of Justice (DOJ) to bring terrorism-related charges against anyone engaging in financial transactions to people associated with RIM.
It also allows the U.S. to use a powerful counterterrorism tool – international intelligence sharing – to effectively go after the group and its supporters. Now, to gain information, the U.S can, “reach out to foreign partners and trace financial flows, find incriminating statements, and otherwise disrupt plots and move toward prosecution. It can also prevent white supremacist groups from working in coordination across national borders, making them far less effective as a result.”
Furthermore, recognizing a white supremacist group as a terrorist group shows the white supremacist community that it can be targeted by law enforcement if it does not reject violence.
While RIM is relatively small and does not have large global influence, it is a good candidate for designation. The group not only conducts its own violent activities, but it has also attempted to build an international movement as part of a broader Russian effort to breed white supremacists. RIM is alleged to provide paramilitary training to neo-Nazis and white supremacists and has recruited volunteers to fight on the Russian side of the Ukraine war. Notably, in 2016, the group allegedly trained two Swedish nationals who later conducted a series of terrorist attacks in a café and refugee campsite in Gothenburg.
Interestingly, the designation comes “amid doubts the [Trump] administration believes extremist organizations of that type merit such sanctions.” In this quote, The New York Times is referring to the “organizations of that type” as white supremacist groups. Previously, Trump has solely focused on targeting Islamist terrorism, sending a potential message that Islamic terrorist organizations are more dangerous than white supremacists. In fact, the administration has been criticized for not even appearing to take the threat of white supremacism seriously. A specific instance that drew this criticism was when Trump did not respond strongly to violence caused by neo-Nazi groups in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017 that left one person dead.
Now, the designation potentially underlines the idea that white nationalist groups can be just as dangerous as groups like the Islamic State (ISIS) and that Muslims themselves are at risk from white supremacist violence.
Hopefully listing non-Islamist groups indicates the U.S. will start taking all forms of violence against citizens seriously and that any threat to the U.S. necessitates a reaction, regardless of the ideological motivation.
Filed Under: counterterrorism enforcement, Diplomatic Affairs, International Organizations, national security, Sanctions
Recent Events Suggest That International Legal Mechanisms are Insufficient for Addressing Continuing Violations of International Law in the Mediterranean
July 11, 2019 by Evan Schleicher Leave a Comment
In Volume 35, Issue 4 of the IELR, I wrote a piece which focused on the Mediterranean migration crisis and the international legal implications of the European decision to suspend EUNAVFOR MED (the military operation established as a consequence of the April 2015 Libya migrant shipwrecks with the aim of neutralizing established refugee smuggling routes in the Mediterranean) naval patrols.[1] As the article noted, there are serious concerns surrounding this program and its emphasis on returning migrants to Libyan ports, which have been deemed as “unsafe…to disembark migrants.” It would seem, then, that a suspension of this program would be a positive. However, in the aftermath of this suspension, European parties have shifted focus towards empowering the Libyan coast guard to intercept migrants and return them to Libya. This reduces liability under international law, but significantly increases risks to migrants.
Several recent events suggest that European governments remain committed to restricting immigrant access to Europe through policies which, while not technically illegal from an international perspective, create significant risks for migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean.
On June 29th, Italian officials arrested Carola Rakete, the captain of a ship that rescued 40 migrants from the Mediterranean, after she docked at the southern island of Lampedusa. Italian officials had refused to grant the ship permission to dock for two days after it arrived, prompting Rakete to order the ship to shore at approximately 2 AM. The ship had previously refused to dock in Libya due to concerns about migrant safety. These concerns seem to be well founded in light of another recent event.
On July 3rd, an air raid in Tripoli killed 44 people and injured 130 when bombs hit a migrant detention center. According to a New York Times Investigation, the detention center was housed nearby to a weapons depot, making it a prime target. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the United Nations envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salame, said that the attack “clearly could constitute a war crime.” Despite this, and despite UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres calling the bombing “outrageous” and demanding an independent investigation, the UN Security Council has, to date, failed to condemn the attack or take action.
For its part, the Libyan National Army (LNA) demanding that the UN open an investigation after The Government of National Accord (GNA) stated that: “This crime came after the statements of the air force commander of Haftar’s Libyan National Army [LNA], Mohamed Manfour, and therefore it is he who bears its legal and moral responsibility.” A day later, on July 5th, the GNA changed its tone and claimed that the United Arab Emirates bombed the detention center using a U.S.-made F-16 fighter jet.
These emerging events suggest that international law is insufficient for addressing migrant insecurity in Libya and across the Mediterranean. Clearly, political uncertainty and sovereignty issues have prevented, and continue to prevent, the effective implementation of international legal standards within Libya. Beyond the boundaries of Libya, European countries have restricted migration and left migrants in an extremely dangerous situation. They have done this all while technically conforming to international law, using the specific phrasing and structure of those laws (this is more fully articulated in the previously mentioned IELR article) in a way that ultimately introduces further risk into the lives of already disadvantaged individuals.
Clearly, something must be done to adapt international legal standards to promote practices which will actually improve conditions for vulnerable populations.
[1] Evan Schleicher, The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: Highlighting the Gaps between International Law and Justice, 35 Int’l Enforcement L. Reporter, 141-144, (April 2019).
Filed Under: Immigration Enforcement, International Organizations, national security
INTERPOL’s Power to Act Preemptively in Fighting Government Abuse
May 2, 2019 by Yuriy Nemets Leave a Comment
In May 2018, Spanish authorities detained Bill Browder, a prominent critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It has been alleged that Spain acted on an active Russian request disseminated through INTERPOL’s channels.[1] Prior to this arrest, INTERPOL had refused to cooperate with Russia, calling Mr. Browder’s case “predominantly political.”[2] However, after several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the INTERPOL General Secretariat to approve a red notice, Russia reportedly put Mr. Browder on the international wanted list by disseminating an INTERPOL diffusion.[3] Unlike notices, which are subject to the General Secretariat’s approval, governments can exchange diffusions directly, without prior approval from INTERPOL.[4]
After Mr. Browder’s arrest in Spain, I called upon INTERPOL to inform the public whether it was monitoring all incoming red notices and diffusions to ensure that no such request enters its channels if the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files already found the individual to be a victim of INTERPOL abuse from the same government. I have argued that INTERPOL must conduct such monitoring, rather than deal with abusive red notices and diffusions after they are already published or disseminated through its channels. I have also suggested that INTERPOL should implement a reliable technology that would block incoming red notices and diffusions that match the Commission’s findings. Unfortunately, in its 2017 annual report (its most recent), the Commission confirms that INTERPOL does not have comprehensive monitoring in place, and that indeed some governments have succeeded in disseminating diffusions against the same individuals whom the Commission has already found to be victims of their red notice abuse.[5]
In his recent publication in Forbes, Dr. Theodore Bromund argues that under INTERPOL’s rules (specifically, its Rules on the Processing of Data), INTERPOL does not have the power to screen incoming diffusions and block non-compliant ones before they are disseminated through the organization’s channels.[6] I disagree. In fact, INTERPOL’s rules not only give the organization the power to screen all incoming diffusions, notices and other requests from governments and block them before they enter the organization’s channels, the rules actually require INTERPOL to do so to prevent abuse. The right of governments to send diffusions to each other directly, bypassing the INTERPOL General Secretariat, does not trump the latter’s power and obligation to monitor and block all incoming requests, including diffusions, to prevent governments from violating INTERPOL’s rules.
The General Assembly, the body of supreme authority at INTERPOL,[7] instructs that the Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD) “must be effectively implemented.”[8] RPD, which the General Assembly adopted, give the INTERPOL General Secretariat broad powers to ensure their effective implementation: “If a doubt arises regarding compliance with the conditions for data processing, the General Secretariat shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any direct or indirect prejudice the data may cause to the Organization, its staff, its Members, the National Central bureaus, the national entities, the international entities or the individuals that the data concern” (emphasis added).[9] Therefore, to perform its obligation to ensure that governments and other users comply with the organization’s rules, the General Secretariat (1) does not have to possess strong evidence that a request for police cooperation is not compliant, since mere doubt suffices; (2) must use any means not contrary to INTERPOL’s rules to block a request from being communicated; and (3) must act preventively, that is, block a request before it is disseminated and before INTERPOL member countries learn about its existence.
A more comprehensive discussion will appear in the next issue of the IELR.
* Yuriy Nemets is the managing member at NEMETS, a law firm based in Washington, DC. Yuriy is an attorney with over fifteen years of experience in domestic and international litigation and arbitration, INTERPOL and international extradition defense, corporate, banking, transportation, international trade and investments, and intellectual property law. He has authored publications about INTERPOL and international extradition, corporate, banking, and intellectual property law.
[1] David Meyer, The U.S. Investor Behind the Magnitsky Act Was Arrested in Spain on a Russian Warrant, Fortune (May 30, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/30/bill-browder-arrested-spain-interpol-russia-magnitsky-act.
[2] INTERPOL, INTERPOL Cannot be Used by the Russian Federation to Seek the Arrest of Mr. William Browder (July 26, 2013), https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2013/INTERPOL-cannot-be-used-by-the-Russian-Federation-to-seek-the-arrest-of-Mr-William-Browder.
[3] Fair Trials, Why Does Bill Browder Keep Getting Arrested? (June 29, 2018), https://www.fairtrials.org/news/why-does-bill-browder-keep-getting-arrested.
[4] INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data art. 1(14), 2016, https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents [hereinafter RPD].
[5] Activity Report of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files for 2017 § 57, available at https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/Commission-for-the-Control-of-INTERPOL-s-Files-CCF/CCF-sessions-and-reports.
[6] Ted Bromund, INTERPOL CCF’s Latest Annual Report Highlights Fundamental Flaw in the System (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedbromund/2019/03/31/interpol-ccfs-latest-annual-report-highlights-fundamental-flaw-in-the-system/#20e6152b3a11.
[7] Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL, art. 6, June 13, 1956, https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents [hereinafter Constitution].
[8] RPD, supra note 4, art. 17(1).
[9] Id. art. 129(1).
Filed Under: International Organizations
US Leaves Arms Trade Treaty, Raising Concerns over Worsening Human Rights Conditions in Latin America and Globally
April 29, 2019 by Evan Schleicher Leave a Comment
On April 26th, President Trump signed an executive order meant to withdraw the United States from the UN Arms Trade Treaty, a 2013 treaty meant to set global standards for regulating transfers of conventional arms, from rifles to tanks and airplanes. He signed the executive order at a National Rifle Association speech, throwing his pen into the crowd afterwards to great applause and proclaiming that he was acting to protect America’s sovereignty and Second Amendment rights.
Although President Trump’s speech to the NRA was obviously meant to be flashy and dramatic, this move has been a long time coming. In January, the administration told Congress that they intended to finalize rules to shuffle which agency oversees consumer gun exports and, in the process, to relax export regulations and oversight. This rule change placed the Department of Commerce, which has a far simpler process for approving international arms sales than does the State Department and which does not even charge a fee for the process, wholly in charge of the verification of international arms sales. Further, under new rules, Congress does not have to be notified of arms deals in advance of their occurrence. This is worrying, because Congress has acted multiple times previously to block arms sales over human rights concerns. These moves have been widely criticized because, while the State Department has the existing framework and personnel to vet arms exports on human rights and security grounds, the Commerce Department does not. As such, the potential for human rights abuses arising from US international arms sales will almost certainly increase dramatically.
Despite the overwhelming perception that the State Department system was effective at protecting human rights, it is worth noting that the US record on arms sales has been anything but solid in recent years. IELR Editor-in-Chief, Bruce Zagaris wrote in 2016 that a lack of effective export controls within the US has led to a significant flow of “high-powered weaponry from the U.S. to Latin America and the Caribbean which has exacerbated soaring rates of gun-related violence in the region and undermine[d] U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere”. Between 2015 and 2017, the United States approved $2 million to $4 million in gun sales per year to Honduras, an amount which is significant in a relatively poor country like Honduras. Some of the guns sold to Honduras were turned on protestors in 2017 and many others ended up in the hands of criminals, with photo evidence revealing that many of the guns used by state forces in the 2017 protests had been exported from Colt’s Manufacturing in Connecticut.
Because the escalation of violence and abuse in these Latin American countries has fueled the current migrant crisis, it is likely that US efforts to deregulate its international arms trade and to increase arms sales will contribute to a further escalation of the migration crisis in Central America and Mexico. Parallel situations have occurred in Libya, Afghanistan, and Syria, suggesting that further deregulation of the US arms trade will be a source of increasing instability globally, not just in Latin America.
So, why does the United States continue to operate in ways which are likely to undermine its long-term national security objectives? The answer is alluded to in the previous reference to Trump’s NRA speech: domestic politics. It is not an accident that the President chose this venue to sign his executive order withdrawing the US from the ATT. In international organizations, domestic politics remains the strongest indicators of a states’ compliance with agreements. The NRA and other opponents of the ATT have historically wielded significant political power in the United States. The NRA, one of the strongest lobbying groups in the US, spent over $36 million on the Trump campaign in 2016, breaking its previous records for campaign spending. There were also allegations that the group illegally coordinated with the Trump campaign to maximize the value of expenditures on ads and to avoid repetitive efforts. President Trump has responded to this support by heavily supporting the NRA, even going so far as to attack the New York attorney general’s office this week for “illegally” investigating the NRA.
The Administration’s wholehearted acceptance of the NRA’s views on this issue are unfortunate, because the Arms Trade Treaty, while imperfect, provided an international framework which could help to resolve the previously mentioned migration crises and to reduce the risks posed to US national security by unregulated international arms sales. Thus, despite likely failure, active efforts must be made to bring the US into closer compliance with the agreed upon principles of the treaty.
Evan Schleicher is the Editorial Intern for the International Enforcement Law Reporter. He is currently an MA candidate in Security Policy Studies at George Washington University, focusing on transnational security and humanitarian issues, and has also interned at the Department of State previously.
Filed Under: Arms Trade, Human Rights, Immigration, International Arms Trade, International Organizations
April 22, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment
On October 27, 2019, the 19th World Congress of Criminology will commence in Doha, Qatar. The Congress, which will run from October 27-31, will gather academics, researchers, professionals, and policy makers to consider relevant, contemporary issues in crime and criminology. Since its inaugural event in 1938 in Rome, Congresses have been held throughout the world, visiting cities including Rio de Janeiro (2003), Barcelona (2008), and New Delhi (2016).
This year’s event in Doha symbolizes the truly global reach of the Congress, as well as of those sponsoring and supporting it. The group that plays the largest role in organizing the Congress – and has since its commencement – is the International Society for Criminology (ISC). Founded in 1937, the ISC strives to support activities and research aimed at fostering a better understanding of the crime phenomenon on a global scale. It also works to translate research into policy making and programmatic interventions, as well as assist in the creation of top-tier criminology and criminal justice programs. Additionally, the ISC publishes the International Annals of Criminology alongside Cambridge University Press, emphasizing their deep involvement in the subject matter.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), through its Education for Justice (E4J) initiative, is another one of the major organizations supporting the Congress. The E4J initiative seeks to support the Doha Declaration of 2015, which calls for universal education amongst children, as well as the prevention of terrorism, corruption, and crime. The E4J initiative has crafted educational materials, such as university modules and teaching guides, in their effort to develop a culture of lawfulness among children and youth. Finally, the Qatar University College of Law is another one of the Congress’s supporters.
The Congress will cover a wide range of topical areas and issues. The Congress will focus on a number of general areas, which include “Science, Technology and Teaching in Criminology,” as well as “Researching, Investigating and Preventing Crime.” Yet it will still touch on a wide variety of topics, which include international law and human rights. Themes covered within this field are to include “International Criminal Law and International Criminal Courts,” “Immigration and Crime,” and “Transnational Crime.” Alongside these, the Congress will consider comparative studies related to criminology and criminal justice. Specific issues areas to be discussed include “Globalization and Crime Trends,” alongside “Cross-Regional and Cross-National Comparison.”
The Congress offers not only an immense variety of topics for presenters to discuss, but a diverse array of ways through which they may present their projects. Individuals may not only present a paper, but hold a roundtable session, present a poster, or participate in a workshop. Participants may even read poetry, literature, or a similar form of creative work that is in some way related to criminology or criminal justice. Through offering this flexibility, the Congress hopes to create a diverse, energetic environment that allows discussion on criminology and criminal justice to thrive however possible.
The submission deadline for the Congress is August 15, though materials are accepted on a rolling, first-come-first-serve basis. Authors must submit the title of their work, as well as an abstract, here. Individuals may also register for the Congress here. If you have any questions, you may contact the Congress by filling out this form.
Filed Under: Criminology, International Cooperation, International Organizations