Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/430/641/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-05-25 01:30:18
Document Index: 545670373

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1153', '§ 1111', '§ 1153', '§ 1111', '§ 1111', '§ 3242', '§ 1151']

U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977)United States v. AntelopeNo. 75-661Argued January 18, 1977Decided April 19, 1977430 U.S. 641CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
On the night of February 18, 1974, respondents, enrolled Coeur d'Alene Indians, broke into the home of Emma Johnson, an 81-year-old non-Indian, in Worley, Idaho; they robbed and killed Mrs. Johnson. Because the crimes were committed by enrolled Indians within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation, respondents were subject to federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. [Footnote 1] They were, accordingly, indicted by a federal grand jury on Page 430 U. S. 643 charges of burglary; robbery, and murder. [Footnote 2] Respondent William Davison was convicted of second-degree murder only. Respondents Gabriel Francis Antelope and Leonard Davison were found guilty of all three crimes as charged, including first-degree murder under the felony murder provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1111, [Footnote 3] as made applicable to enrolled Indians by 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respondents contended that their felony murder convictions Page 430 U. S. 644 were unlawful as products of invidious racial discrimination. They argued that a non-Indian charged with precisely the same offense, namely the murder of another non-Indian within Indian country, [Footnote 4] would have been subject to prosecution only under Idaho law, which, in contrast to the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, does not contain a felony murder provision. [Footnote 5] To establish the crime of first-degree murder in state court, therefore, Idaho would have had to prove premeditation and deliberation. No such elements were required under the felony murder component of 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
Because of the difference between Idaho and federal law, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents were "put at a serious racially based disadvantage," 523 F.2d 400, 406 (1975), since the Federal Government was not required to establish premeditation and deliberation in respondents' federal prosecution. This disparity, so the Court of Appeals concluded, violated equal protection requirements implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We granted the United States' petition for certiorari, 424 U.S. 907 (1976), and we reverse. Page 430 U. S. 645
Id. at 417 U. S. 554. Page 430 U. S. 646 Last Term, in Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976), we held that members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe could be denied access to Montana State courts in connection with an adoption proceeding arising on their reservation. Unlike Mancari, the Indian plaintiffs in Fisher were being denied a benefit or privilege available to non-Indians; nevertheless, a unanimous Court dismissed the claim of racial discrimination:
Both Mancari and Fisher involved preferences or disabilities directly promoting Indian interests in self-government, whereas, in the present case, we are dealing not with matters of tribal self-regulation, but with federal regulation of criminal conduct within Indian country implicating Indian interests. But the principles reaffirmed in Mancari and Fisher point more broadly to the conclusion that federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as "a separate people," with their own political institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a "racial' group consisting of Indians.' . . ." Morton v. Mancari, supra at 417 U. S. 553 n. 24. Indeed, respondents were not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race, but because they are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. [Footnote 7] We Page 430 U. S. 647 therefore conclude that the federal criminal statutes enforced here are based neither in whole nor in part upon impermissible racial classifications.
The challenged statutes do not otherwise violate equal protection. [Footnote 8] We have previously observed that Indians indicted Page 430 U. S. 648 under the Major Crimes Act enjoy the same procedural benefits and privileges as all other persons within federal jurisdiction. Keeble v. United States, 412 U. S. 205, 412 U. S. 212 (1973). See 18 U.S.C. § 3242. Respondents were, therefore, subjected to the same body of law as any other individual, Indian or non-Indian, charged with first-degree murder committed in a federal enclave. [Footnote 9] They do not, and could not, contend otherwise.
There remains, then, only the disparity between federal and Idaho law as the basis for respondents' equal protection claim. [Footnote 10] Since Congress has undoubted constitutional power to prescribe a criminal code applicable in Indian country, United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886), it is of no consequence that the federal scheme differs from a state criminal code otherwise applicable within the boundaries of the State Page 430 U. S. 649 of Idaho. Under our federal system, the National Government does not violate equal protection when its own body of law is evenhanded, [Footnote 11] regardless of the laws of States with respect to the same subject matter. [Footnote 12]
The Federal Government treated respondents in the same manner as all other persons within federal jurisdiction, pursuant to a regulatory scheme that did not erect impermissible Page 430 U. S. 650 racial classifications; hence, no violation of the Due Process Clause infected respondents' convictions. [Footnote 13]
As was true in Mancari, federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act does not apply to "many individuals who are racially to be classified as Indians.'" 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 553 n. 24. Thus, the prosecution in this case offered proof that respondents are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, and thus not emancipated from tribal relations. Moreover, members of tribes whose official status has been terminated by congressional enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to federal criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act. United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (CA9 1974) ("While, anthropologically, a Klamath Indian, even after the Termination Act, obviously remains an Indian, his unique status vis-a-vis the Federal Government no longer exists"). In addition, as enrolled tribal members, respondents were subjected to federal jurisdiction only because their crimes were committed within the confines of Indian country, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Crimes occurring elsewhere would not be subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U. S. 392, 391 U. S. 397 n. 11 (1968).