Source: https://www.floridabar.org/news/tfb-journal/?durl=/DIVCOM%2FJN%2FJNJournal01.nsf%2F5ed402c7659b76df85256c2c004fa3bf%2F1d5184ea2dded2e785256cb8005d1e1d
Timestamp: 2018-01-23 23:51:46
Document Index: 402707266

Matched Legal Cases: ['§90', '§733', '§732', '§90', '§90', '§733', '§732', '§732', '§733', '§304']

Florida Bar Journal – Florida’s New Statutory Presumption of Undue Influence–Does It Change the Law or Merely Clarify? – The Florida Bar
by Steven G. Nilsson
Attorneys often allege undue influence to challenge the validity of a decedent’s will, trust, or inter vivos transfer. Instruments or gifts procured through undue influence are void or can be set aside.2
All these authorities support the general rule founded on public policy that where a mutual confidential relation exists and a gift is made to one in whom the confidence is reposed it is prima facie void because of such relation. The law presumes in other words, when such relation exists that the gift was obtained by undue influence or other improper means.14 (Emphasis added.)
The Evidence Code, through F.S. §§90.301–90.304 (“presumption statutes”), identifies the types of presumptions that exist in civil proceedings and prescribes the legal effect of those presumptions. A presumption is defined as an assumption of fact which the law makes from the existence of another fact or group of facts.32 Presumptions are either conclusive or rebuttable.33 Rebuttable presumptions are categorized as either implementing public policy (a stronger presumption) or facilitating the determination of a particular type of action (a weaker presumption).34
A presumption established to implement public policy is deemed to affect the burden of proof and imposes upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proving the nonexistence of the presumed fact.35 Conversely, a presumption established primarily to facilitate the determination of a particular type of case is deemed to affect the burden of producing evidence.36 In the latter scenario, the trier of fact must accept the presumed fact as true until credible evidence to the contrary is introduced; at that point, the presumption vanishes and the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact is simply determined from the evidence.37
After adoption of the Florida Evidence Code, courts applying the presumption of undue influence should have determined whether the presumption existed “to implement public policy” or merely to facilitate determination of an undue influence claim. In the former circumstance, the burden of proof would shift to the alleged wrongdoer.38 In the latter circumstance, the burden of proof would not shift to the alleged wrongdoer.39 When the Florida Evidence Code was adopted, controlling decisions of the Florida Supreme Court treated undue influence claims regarding wills differently from undue influence claims regarding inter vivos transactions.40
Immediately prior to Cripe, the presumption of undue influence regarding inter vivos transfers required the burden of proof to shift to the alleged wrongdoer under the presumption statutes.48 Confusingly, Cripe changed the foregoing rule of law without addressing the precedents that established the rule of law: the Rich/Wilkins presumption of undue influence,49 the presumption statutes,50 and In re Florida Evidence Code.51 Cripe’s citation to four district court of appeal opinions as authority/precedent for the change was unpersuasive. District courts of appeal have no authority to overrule controlling Florida Supreme Court opinions such as Rich, Wilkins, and In re Florida Evidence Code.52
In In re Estate of Davis, 428 So. 2d 774, 775–76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (“Davis I”), a will contest case, Judge Glickstein determined that “strong social policy exists” for the presumption of undue influence, cited the presumption statutes, and determined that the burden of proof indeed shifted to the alleged wrongdoer to prove that the contested will was not procured by undue influence. In In re Estate of Davis, 462 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (“Davis II”), the 4th DCA, en banc, issued a three-sentence opinion receding from Davis I on the basis of Carpenter. Davis II did not address the presumption statutes.
F.S. §733.107(2) specifically mandates that the “presumption of undue influence implements public policy . . . and is therefore a presumption shifting the burden of proof under ss. 90.301–90.304.” Accordingly, when the presumption of undue influence arises, the alleged wrongdoer bears the burden of proving there was no undue influence.
The new statute is codified as part of a statute that provides rules for will contests. The title to the legislation enacting the new statute refers to the amendment as “clarifying the circumstances which shift the burden of proof in certain proceedings contesting the validity of a will.”57 Legislative history to the new statute contains similar statements.58 No parallel statute was enacted to require a similar rule in contests involving trusts or inter vivos transfers. In other areas, the legislature has enacted parallel statutes for both wills and trusts.59
Those portions of Carpenter and Cripe that prescribe the legal effect of the presumption of undue influence61 are superseded by the new statute. Those portions of Carpenter and Cripe that explain the circumstances giving rise to the presumption of undue influence62 are not superseded by statute. Cripe’s requirement of uniform application of the presumption of undue influence is not superseded by statute.63
1	Peacock v. Dubois, 105 So. 321, 322 (Fla. 1925).
2	Fla. Stat. §§732.5165, 737.206, and 655.79; In re Palmer’s Estate, 48 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1950); Rich v. Hallman, 143 So. 292 (Fla. 1932).
3	See infra text accompanying notes 11–17.
10	2002 Fla. Laws ch. 02-82. The governor approved this law on April 23, 2002.
11	Wartmann v. Burleson, 190 So. 789, 790 (Fla. 1939).
15	Id. at 293.
16	Wilkins v. Wilkins, 192 So. 791, 792–93 (Fla. 1940).
17	Id. at 793.
18	Carpenter v. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697, 698–699 (Fla. 1971).
19	Id. at 700.
22	Id. at 701–02.
23	Id. at 703 (emphasis added).
31	Fla. Stat. §90.102.
32	Fla. Stat. §90.301(1).
45	The Florida Supreme Court and all the district courts of appeal failed to discuss or apply the presumption statutes to decisions rendered by those courts after the effective date of the Florida Evidence Code. Instead, the courts all cited and relied upon Carpenter. See, e.g., Cripe, 422 So. 2d at 823; Brock v. Brock, 692 So. 2d 907, 911–12 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1996); Ballard v. Ballard, 549 So. 2d 1176, 1178 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1989); Williamson v. Kirby, 379 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980); Raimi v. Furlong, 702 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1997); Stetzko v. Coleman, 714 So. 2d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1998); Fennell v. Lampkin, 470 So. 2d 37, 39–40 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1985).
46	For a discussion of whether an appellate court applies the law in effect at the time of the trial, or intervening new law, see Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. Rouse, 194 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1966); and Pate v. Mellen, 275 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1972).
47	Cripe, 422 So. 2d at 823–24. Williamson v. Kirby, 379 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980); Bryant v. Bryant, 379 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979); Majorana v. Constantine, 318 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975); Pate v. Mellen, 275 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1973).
48	See supra text accompanying notes 14–17, 29–30 and 38–44.
49	See supra text accompanying notes 14–17; although the court implicitly overruled the Rich/Wilkins shifting burden of proof/presumption of undue influence, Wilkins was cited and discussed with approval on other points. Cripe, 422 So. 2d at 823.
50	See supra text accompanying notes 31–37.
51	See supra text following note 31.
52	Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 440 (Fla. 1973).
54	Id. See supra note 45.
55	The Florida Bar Probate and Trust Litigation Committee’s statement of Reasons for Proposed Advocacy concerning “Proposed Amendment to §733.107, Fla. Stat.”
56	The court in Carpenter recognized an inconsistency between Fla. Stat. §732.31 and a rule holding that the presumption of undue influence shifts the burden of proof to the alleged wrongdoer. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703. The court quoted the following language of Fla. Stat. §732.31 in recognition of the will contestant’s continuing burden of proof “to establish the facts constituting the grounds upon which the probate of such purported will is opposed or revocation thereof is sought.” Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 700–04 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the similarly worded successor statute, Fla. Stat. §733.107(1), refers to the will contestant’s burden “of establishing the grounds on which the probate of the will is opposed or revocation is sought” (Emphasis added.)
57	2002 Fla. Laws ch. 02-82. (Emphasis added.)
58	See Analysis of Senate Comm. on Judiciary Staff (Feb. 19, 2002) and Analysis of House of Representatives Council for Smarter Government (March 6, 2002) for 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 02-82.
60	See supra text accompanying note 47.
61	See supra text accompanying notes 27–28 and 47.
62	See supra text accompanying notes 21–22 and 47.
63	See supra text accompanying 60.
64	See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 47.
65	Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, Florida Dept. of Admin., 372 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 1979) (indicating that degree of persuasion required for the underlying substantive claim determines degree of persuasion required to overcome the applicable presumption). C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence §304.1 n.1 (2002 ed.).
67	Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703. Although the living victim of undue influence can challenge the validity of an alleged gift/inter vivos transfer, see Rich, and testify concerning the disputed transfer, undue influence actions typically are brought after the victim’s death.
68	See supra note 26 and accompanying text.