Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/408/252/509725/
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 14:53:16
Document Index: 431847596

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2332', '§ 876', '§ 4', '§ 876', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2332', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2332', '§ 4', '§ 3553', '§ 3742']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Frank Paco Guevara, Defendant-appellant, 408 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2005) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 2005 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Frank Paco Guevara, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Frank Paco Guevara, Defendant-appellant, 408 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2005)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 408 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2005) May 2, 2005
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Susan B. Cowger (argued), Dallas, TX, for U.S.
Frank Guevara challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2332a of threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction ("WMD"). He also appeals his classification as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. Finally, he challenges his sentence in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005).1 Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I am sick and tired of your games [.] All [A]mericans will die as well as you. You have been now been [sic] exposure [sic] to anthrax.
We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. See United States v. DeLeon, 170 F.3d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1999). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider "`whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Cathey, 259 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1998)).
These arguments are nonetheless unavailing in light of United States v. Reynolds, 381 F.3d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 922, 160 L. Ed. 2d 810 (2005), in which we construed § 2332a to contain no requirement of future action:
On appeal Reynolds argued that he had not "threatened" to use a WMD because the statement in question conveyed only the completion of a past act. Citing United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997), we held that § 2332a's threat language does not require reference to a future act.4 There is no reason able way to distinguish that ruling here.
Although we ordinarily review jury instructions for abuse of discretion, we review an instruction de novo where there is the possibility that the jury instruction misstated an element of the crime, because that is an issue of statutory construction. See United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 605 (5th Cir. 2002). Guevara objected to the jury instruction indicating that the government did not have to prove that he actually intended or was able to carry out the threat. The district court instructed the jury as follows:
Section 2332a requires the government to show that the use of a WMD, as threatened, would have affected interstate commerce. In United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 152 (5th Cir. 2000), we held that, in the case of a § 2332a threat, there need not be an actual or substantial effect on commerce.
In United States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1999), the court held that where a misstated element is included in the jury instruction, but not in the indictment, the misstated element does not necessarily become law of the case. Our court has held as much, albeit in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Munoz-Hernandez, 94 Fed.Appx. 243, 245 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 999, 160 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (2005). We now adopt the First Circuit rule, to the effect that the "substantially affected" language does not become law of the case.5 Consistent with the foregoing authorities, the jury instruction may not become law of the case if both (1) it is patently erroneous and (2) the issue is not misstated in the indictment.
We review the interstate commerce element determination for sufficiency of the evidence by deciding whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Daniel, 957 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1992). Without speculating unnecessarily as to the interstate commerce effects flowing from the successful release of anthrax spores, we conclude that Guevara's threat actually affected interstate commerce. The federal building was shut down for a day and a half; numerous federal agencies, including the DEA, experienced delay; and Judge Robinson's court (which handled diversity suits) was interrupted. These circumstances are more than enough for us to affirm on sufficiency of the evidence review.
Guevara argues that his WMD conviction was incorrectly classified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Before Booker, we reviewed a district court's interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. See United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Because these are questions of law, the same standard should control in the wake of Booker. " [W]hen a district court has imposed a sentence under the Guidelines, this court continues after Booker to review the district court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo." United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Because Guevara's conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2(a) (1), we express no opinion as to whether it would qualify under § 4B1.2(a) (2).
Section 2332a contains, as an element, the threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction. The jury was instructed, in relevant part, that to convict, it must find that " [Guevara], without lawful authority, knowingly and intentionally threatened to use a weapon of mass destruction" and that "the nature of the threat was to use the weapon against a third person within the United States." In other words, the jury instructions state precisely the requirements of the statute.
Given that we uphold the "threat" status of Guevara's anthrax hoax under Reynolds, the only determination we need make is whether, under the guidelines, WMD's are instruments of physical force within the meaning of § 4B1.2(a) (1); we have little problem concluding that they are. We need not look to the indictment, the facts, or anything other than the statute to determine whether § 2332a contains an element that qualifies Guevara's crime as a crime of violence under the guidelines.
Other circuits have determined that mailing a threatening communication under § 876 constitutes a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a) (1). In United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1990), the court reasoned that, because of § 876's requirement that the communication threaten to injure the addressee or another third party, § 4B1.2(a) (1) was satisfied.
Reaching the contrary conclusion, moreover, would require us to say that the use of WMD's does not involve physical force. Guevara addresses this argument in a single sentence of his opening brief: "Here, none of the offenses speak to the use of `force' or even threatened attempted force." We reject that illogical reasoning and conclude, categorically, that the WMD's at issue here involved physical force within the meaning of § 4B1.2(a) (1).6
In Booker, the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of crack. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746. Based on facts the court found by a preponderance of the evidence at a post-trial sentencing hearing, it imposed a sentence exceeding that which it could have imposed on the basis of the facts proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.8 See id.
The question Booker answered in the affirmative was " [w]hether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747 n. 1 (emphasis added). Career offender status is not "a sentencing judge's determination of a fact other than a prior conviction." Aside from Guevara's age (a fact to which he stipulated in his competency report), the determinations made in the course of a career offender classification are all questions of law; in other words, they are precisely the determinations the above-quoted italicized language exempts.
Section § 4B1.2(a) (1) instructs district courts to treat the offense of conviction as a crime of violence if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." By definition, then, a court cannot classify an offense as a crime of violence if a jury has not already found beyond a reasonable doubt the element of the offense on which that determination is predicated.
Section 4B1.2(a) (2) instructs courts to consider the instant offense a crime of violence if it is "burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Our caselaw interpreting that provision has categorically forbidden courts from looking beyond the statute and the indictment in making this decision.11 Therefore, as is the case with § 4B1.2(a) (1), under § 4B1.2(a) (2) the sentencing court cannot base its crime-of-violence determination on anything beyond what is present in the statute or alleged in the indictment, elements as to which, to convict, the jury must have found evidence beyond a reasonable doubt in any event. As a consequence, the crime-of-violence determination is made exclusively pursuant to facts found by a jury, and Guevara's classification as a career offender is not in violation of the Sixth Amendment under Booker.
In United States v. Rios-Quintero, 204 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2000), we addressed what standard of review to apply where a party briefed a claim on appeal but had not raised it in the district court because the Supreme Court had not yet issued the decision underlying the claim itself.12 We concluded that the plain error standard of review was nonetheless appropriate for claims first raised on appeal where the relevant Supreme Court case was decided during the pendency of that appeal. Id. at 215. We thus apply a plain error standard to Guevara's Sixth Amendment claim.
Under plain error review, to correct an error not properly preserved, we must find (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) affects substantial rights.13 "If all three conditions are met an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860 (2002). See also United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005) (reiterating that this is the applicable standard in Booker cases where the error is not preserved), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 31, 2005) (No. 04-9517).
With respect to the second step, we assess whether an error is "plain" or "obvious" by reference to the law as it exists at the time of appellate consideration. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631-32, 122 S. Ct. 1781. Again, Booker left no doubt as to the status of the error involved in mandatorily sentencing defendants pursuant to judge-found facts: Any case now on appeal, in which the court made factual findings pursuant to the guidelines, and where those findings were not implicit in the verdict or admitted by the defendant, involves a constitutional error that is plain under Blakely and Booker. See Mares, 402 F.3d at 521.
The base offense level for violation of § 2332a(a) (2) is 20. See U.S.S.G. § 2M6.1. Guevara's total offense level was 27 after upward adjustments for substantial disruption of public, governmental, or business functions or services (+4), see id. § 2MG.1(b) (3) (i), and because the victim was a government officer or employee and the offense of conviction was motivated by such status (+3), see id. § 3A1.2(a) (1) (A), (2).
This analysis is reinforced by Mares, which states that "the pertinent question is whether [the defendant] demonstrated that the sentencing judge—sentencing under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one—would have reached a significantly different result." Mares, 402 F.3d at 521. " [T]he defendant rather than the government bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice" in these determinations. Id. Here, as in Mares,
Id. at 522. And again, as in Mares, "the defendant cannot carry his burden of demonstrating that the result would have likely been different had the judge been sentencing under the Booker advisory regime rather than the pre-Booker mandatory regime [, so] the defendant cannot satisfy the third prong of the plain error test." Id. We need not address Guevara's arguments regarding the other two enhancements, because he points to nothing in the record suggesting that they created a prejudicial Booker error.
The challenge pursuant to Booker is made in a supplemental letter brief filed at this court's request after Booker was announced.
Guevara makes much of the fact that the statute says "to use," and he reads the "to use" language as requiring future action. Aside from the fact that Reynolds forecloses this interpretation, we remain skeptical of any earnest attempt to read too much into the "to use" language. To be sure, § 2332a is not a glittering example of statutory craftsmanship. Again, it reads:
We decline to engage in the more complicated analysis under § 4B1.2(a) (2), which under the "otherwise clause" would require us to consider risk posed by hypothetical conduct
Having heard evidence that he had distributed 92.5 grams of crack, the jury found Booker guilty of a statutory offense carrying a penalty of 10 years to life in prison See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746. Based on his criminal history and the quantity of drugs found by the jury, the guidelines stipulate a sentencing range of 210-262 months. See id. In a post-conviction sentencing hearing the court found, according to a preponderance of the evidence, that Booker had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and was guilty of obstructing justice. See id. That additional factfinding yielded, according to the guidelines, a sentence of 360 months to life in prison. See id. The court imposed a 30-year sentence, compared to d to the 21 years and 10 months that could have been meted on the basis of facts proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
Specifically, the decision severs and excises 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1) (Supp.2004) and § 3742(e) (main ed. and Supp.2004)
One might argue that whereas Booker speaks in terms of the "fact" of prior convictions, the guidelines career offender determination involves the "character" of those convictions. To classify a defendant as a career offender under the guidelines, a court must determine that he has two prior felony convictions, both of which must be either (1) crimes of violence or (2) controlled substance convictions meeting certain specifications. Though we express no opinion on the factual versus legal character of finding the controlled substance violations, characterizing an offense as a crime of violence is a purely legal determination, as we will explain.
See, e.g., United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 932, 160 L. Ed. 2d 817 (2005).
The Supreme Court case at the heart of the tardy party's claim in Rios-Quintero was Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999).
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993); United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).