Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/83/145/586007/
Timestamp: 2017-09-24 05:12:19
Document Index: 438874455

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 858', '§ 858', '§ 2', 'Art. 1', '§ 9', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 858', '§ 856', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 1', '§ 858']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Carl Jennings (95-3317); John Stepp (95-3318), Defendants-appellants, 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir. 1996) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1996 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Carl Jennings (95-3317); John Stepp (95-3318), Defe...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Carl Jennings (95-3317); John Stepp (95-3318), Defendants-appellants, 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir. 1996)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir. 1996)
Argued March 25, 1996. Decided May 8, 1996
Defendants appeal their convictions and sentences which followed indictments charging a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (count one), possession of over one hundred grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (count two), and endangerment of human life while manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 858 (count four).1 Defendants raise six arguments on appeal: one concerns the District Court's denial of defendants' motions for substitution of counsel and the other five concern sentencing issues. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for proceedings pursuant to instructions.
Defendants argued in the first appeal that the District Court erred in failing to grant defendants' motions for substitution of counsel and that their sentences were improperly determined when the District Court computed their base offense level by weighing the total amount of the Crockpot mixture. See United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 135 (6th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 n. 8 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
We agree with the District Court that the factor of timeliness does not count favorably for defendants. They moved for substitution of counsel on the day before trial for the first time. Defendant Jennings counters that he had notified the court of his dissatisfaction with counsel ten weeks earlier through a letter sent to the District Court. First, we note that this letter is irrelevant with respect to defendant Stepp's claim. Furthermore, the timeliness to be considered is "timeliness of the motion." We do not see Jennings' letter as notifying the court of a desire for new counsel, even construing it liberally as required of pro se motions. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). Far from asking for new counsel, defendant Jennings' letter to the District Court strives for greater contact with his attorney. Thus, the District Court accurately fixed the time of the motion as the day before trial and did not abuse its discretion in finding this factor unsupportive of defendants' motions. Defendants correctly point out that timing of such a motion is not, by itself, justification for denial of good cause. Appellant Jennings' Brief at 17 (citing United States v. Lillie, 989 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1993)). It remains, however, a factor not in their favor.
In fact, as referred to previously, Jennings' November letter cuts against him on this issue. Although the letter complains of the lack of communication, it expresses a desire for more communication, complaining that " [a]t the present time my attorney has not come to see me once. I seen him in court and talk to him twice on the phone.... I know this is a matter I should talk to my attorney about." Furthermore, defendant's wishes for more communication with counsel were met, following Jennings' letter; defendants met with counsel repeatedly between the sending of Jennings' letter and trial.
We review the District Court's determination of drug quantity for clear error. United States v. Mahaffey, 53 F.3d 128, 131 (6th Cir. 1995). The quantity of drugs must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 1993). When precise measurement of the drugs is impossible, as in this case, the sentencing court must approximate the amount charged to defendants. Mahaffey, 53 F.3d at 131. A court's approximation of the amount of drugs involved is not clearly erroneous if supported by "competent evidence in the record." Mahaffey, 53 F.3d at 132 (citing United States v. Brannon, 7 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Although defense expert questioned the feasibility of any prediction, he stated unequivocally that some methamphetamine had been produced by defendants. Our inquiry, therefore, is whether the estimate on which the District Court relied was supported by "competent evidence in the record." Mahaffey, 53 F.3d at 132 (citing United States v. Brannon, 7 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Defendants' objection to the District Court's estimate of drug quantity involved in this case, is therefore meritless. The objection nevertheless highlights a troubling aspect of current sentencing procedure in that the sentencing court's estimate is dependent on factors which defy precise calculation. We are mindful of the risk posed by such imprecision, however, and we have emphasized that the sentencing court "should err on the side of caution." Mahaffey, 53 F.3d at 131 (citing United States v. Meacham, 27 F.3d 214, 216 (6th Cir. 1994)). In this case, the District Court did just that, using the government expert's lowest estimate for conversion percentages of clandestine laboratories. The District Court was not clearly erroneous in having done so.
We have previously found that Stepp was a willful member of this conspiracy to manufacture and sell methamphetamine. " [T]he record establishes that Stepp helped locate and obtain the necessary chemicals. In addition, Stepp was present and aided in the actual manufacture of the drug." Jennings, 945 F.2d at 133. Given these facts, we cannot conclude that the District Court erred in attributing to him the full amount of methamphetamine.C. The District Court's Consideration of Relevant Conduct at Defendant Jennings' Resentencing
Jennings relies on United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419 (6th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that "the District Court may revisit other findings relating to the previous sentencing proceedings, and reverse its prior findings." Case law subsequent to Moored is even more favorable to defendant Jennings. See United States v. Duso, 42 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Crouse, 78 F.3d 1097 (6th Cir. 1996). On remand, the only constraint under which the District Court must operate, for the purposes of resentencing, is the remand order itself. Where the remand does not limit the District Court's review, sentencing is to be de novo. The District Court erred in refusing to consider Jennings' objections to the relevant conduct section of his supplemental presentence report.
Defendants committed the charged offenses between July and October of 1989 but the guideline for 21 U.S.C. § 858 only became effective on November 1, 1989. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.10. Due to concern for the defendants' constitutional rights to be free from ex post facto laws, U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl.3, the District Court declined to apply the newly established guideline which would have "guided" the Court to add 3 to the defendants' base offense levels. No one objected to this decision either before the District Court or on appeal although the issue was highlighted following defendants' first appeal. United States v. Jennings, 966 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1992).
The judge's only constraints under the 1987 guidelines were the ten year statutory maximum and the parameters of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A)-(D). Under such circumstances, the sentencing judge had broad discretion with regard to defendants' sentences. In the absence of a guideline, Congress instructs the sentencing court to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to provide adequate deterrence, to protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, and to provide defendant with the most effective rehabilitative services. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We therefore essentially review for reasonableness and conclude that, in spite of the District Court's ill-chosen use of the phrase "upward departure," District Court's addition of 2 to defendants' offense levels for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 858 was well within the District Court's discretion.
United States v. Brannon, 7 F.3d 516, 521-22 (6th Cir. 1993).
Defendant Jennings was also convicted of maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing and using methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (1) (count three, of which Stepp was acquitted), distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (count five), and distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (count six)
Although Dr. Skowronski did not cite any specific study, cross-examination of defense expert Dr. Hans Zimmer included discussion of an article in the publication Forensic Science International, "Methamphetamine Synthesis Via Hydriodic Acid/Red Phosphorous Reduction of Ephedrine," which, the record suggests, estimated clandestine lab yields of fifty to seventy-five percent by weight of ephedrine. See United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1510-11 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 990, 113 S. Ct. 1595, 123 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1993) (hearsay may be admissible at sentencing)
Actually, the District Court appears to have had a look at the merits of defendant's claims on remand. See JA at 847 (" [T]he Court will consider those, those pro se objections [to the relevant conduct section of the original presentence report]."); JA at 857 (" [A]ll of defendants' pro se objections fall into one of two categories: objections already raised and argued by counsel, and objections that fall outside of the scope of the issues before this Court on remand.") Nevertheless, the Court held that some of the objections were "beyond the scope" and we must thus consider the propriety of that decision
We analyze upward departures from sentencing guidelines pursuant to three part test: (1) we assay the circumstances relied on by the District Court in determining that the case was sufficiently "unusual" to warrant departure, (2) we consider whether there was a factual basis from which to infer the existence of the "unusual" element(s), and (3) having established sufficiently "unusual" circumstances for which there is a factual basis, we consider the reasonableness of the degree of departure. United States v. McDowell, 902 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1990)
In determining whether the circumstances of the case were sufficiently unusual to warrant departure, we employ a "heartland" analysis. See McDowell, 902 F.2d at 455 (citing United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1989)); U.S.S.G. § 1A.4(b). That is, we look to the facts of the case to determine whether there is anything " 'special' about a given offender, or the accouterments of the crime committed, which distinguishes the case from the mine-run for that offense." Id. We fail to see such "specialness" in the facts of this case. All facts but one cited by the government to support a finding of such "special" circumstances are facts inherent to the charged offenses. The manufacture of methamphetamine always includes use of dangerously toxic chemicals. The sole factor in this case which is not universal to any conviction on similar charges is that the place of drug manufacturing was "in a common subdivision." Because we conclude, however, that the District Court's action in this case were not truly an upward departure but rather sentencing for 21 U.S.C. § 858 for which the 1987 Sentencing Guidelines afforded no guideline, the absence of sufficiently "unusual" circumstances does not end our inquiry into the District Court's sentencing determination for Count 4.