Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/nycrr/22-nycrr-202-21/
Timestamp: 2018-12-12 09:57:55
Document Index: 440273274

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3101', '§ 306', '§ 3121', '§ 306', '§ 3121', '§ 306', '§ 3121']

Category: 22 NYCRR 202.21
Author DMGPosted on July 10, 2012 Categories 22 NYCRR 202.21, CPLR § 3101, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on Motion to strike. Motion to quash
(Restored): 202.21 and 202.27. A peculiar set of facts.
Soo Ji Kim v Seney, 2012 NY Slip Op 00774 (2nd Dept., 2012)
On January 25, 2010, the Supreme Court struck the action from the trial calendar after the plaintiff appeared for the calendar call but was not ready for trial. There was no order vacating the note of issue pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.21(e). Accordingly, contrary to the defendant's contention, in moving to restore the action to the trial calendar, the plaintiff was not required to submit a certificate of readiness or show that the case was ready for trial (see 22 NYCRR 202.21[f]; Ross v Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 54 AD3d 370, 371). Furthermore, since the plaintiff moved to restore the action to the trial calendar within one year of the date it was stricken, restoration was automatic (see CPLR 3404; Ross v Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 54 AD3d at 371; Kohn v Citigroup, Inc., 29 AD3d 530, 532; Basetti v Nour, 287 AD2d 126, 133-134).
Moreover, after the matter was stricken from the trial calendar, there was no order [*2]dismissing the action pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 (see Mitskevitch v City of New York, 78 AD3d 1137, 1138; Casavecchia v Mizrahi, 62 AD3d 741, 742; Burdick v Marcus, 17 AD3d 388). Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion to reinstate the note of issue should have been granted, and, upon renewal and reargument, the plaintiff's motion to restore the action to the trial calendar should have been granted.
Author DMGPosted on February 10, 2012 Categories 22 NYCRR 202.21, 22 NYCRR 202.27, CPLR R. 3404, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on (Restored): 202.21 and 202.27. A peculiar set of facts.
Oh discovery, where art thou
Witherspoon v Surat Realty Corp., 2011 NY Slip Op 02380 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was to strike the plaintiff's supplemental bill of particulars, including the particulars of the plaintiff's left shoulder surgery. Pursuant to CPLR 3043(b), a plaintiff may serve a supplemental bill of particulars containing "continuing special damages and disabilities" without leave of the court if it alleges "no new cause of action . . . or new injury." Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to allege continuing consequences of the injuries suffered and described in previous bills of particulars, rather than new and unrelated injuries, the contested bill of particulars is a supplemental bill of particulars (see Tate v Colabello, 58 NY2d 84, 87; Maraviglia v Lokshina, 68 AD3d 1066, 1067; Shahid v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 47 AD3d 798, 800; Zenteno v Geils, 17 AD3d 457, 458), rather than an amended or new bill of particulars. Furthermore, there was no showing of prejudice to the defendants, as the supplemental bill of particulars was served more than 30 days prior to trial and the Supreme Court directed the parties to conduct further pretrial proceedings (see 22 NYCRR 202.21[d]; Maraviglia v Lokshina, 68 AD3d at 1067; Fortunato v Personal Woman's Care, P.C., 31 AD3d 370, 371).
The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was to vacate the note of issue and certificate of readiness. A motion to vacate the note of issue and certificate of readiness made more than 20 days after their service will be granted only where "a material fact in the certificate of readiness is incorrect" or upon "good cause shown" (22 NYCRR 202.21[e]; see Torres v Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs., 71 AD3d 873; Ferraro v North Babylon Union Free School Dist., 69 AD3d 559, 561). The defendants failed to satisfy these requirements (see Schenk v Maloney, 266 AD2d 199; Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265 AD2d 135, 139; Stella v Ahmed, 223 AD2d 698).
Buxbaum v Castro, 2011 NY Slip Op 01967 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
CPLR 3101(a) requires, in pertinent part, "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." However, the principle of "full disclosure" does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure (Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531, 531; see Peluso v Red Rose Rest., Inc., 78 AD3d 802, 803). The Supreme Court has broad discretion over the supervision of disclosure, and its determination will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of that discretion (see Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp., 74 AD3d 1139, 1140; Reilly Green Mtn. Platform Tennis v Cortese, 59 AD3d 694, 695). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to direct the defendant to permit him and/or his "authorized computer forensic experts" to "impound, clone and inspect" certain computer equipment, including hard drives and other digital data storage devices, possessed by the defendant (see Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d at 531).
Muzio v Napolitano, 2011 NY Slip Op 01987 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
The defendants in this medical malpractice action conducted an interview of the plaintiff's treating physician, a nonparty, without obtaining a valid authorization pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Pub L No 104-191, 110 Stat 1936 [1996]). Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff placed her medical condition in controversy, the defendants were required to obtain an authorization expressly permitting an interview with her treating physician prior to conducting the interview (see Arons v Jutkowitz, 9 NY3d 393; Porcelli v Northern Westchester Hosp. Ctr., 65 AD3d 176).
Since any information obtained by the defendants from the interview was "improperly . . . obtained" (CPLR 3103[c]), the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff's pretrial motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3103(c) for a protective order precluding the defendants from calling her treating physician to testify at trial as an expert witness for the defense, and from introducing, at trial, the information obtained from the interview (see Straub v Yalamanchili, 58 AD3d 1050; Surgical Design Corp. v Correa, 21 AD3d 409; Keschecki v St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 5 Misc 3d 539).
Wigand v Modlin, 2011 NY Slip Op 02654 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
In this action to recover damages for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, the defendant moved, on the eve of trial, inter alia, to direct the plaintiff to appear for an independent medical examination (hereinafter IME). Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued a written order dated April 16, 2009, which, among other things, directed the plaintiff to appear for the IME. The plaintiff then moved, in effect, for leave to reargue her opposition to that branch of the defendant's motion which was to direct her to appear for the IME. Upon reargument, the Supreme Court adhered to its prior determination. We reverse the order insofar as appealed from.
The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant permission to conduct additional discovery after the filing of a note of issue and certificate of readiness where the moving party demonstrates that "unusual or unanticipated circumstances" developed subsequent to the filing, requiring additional pretrial proceedings to prevent substantial prejudice (22 NYCRR 202.21[d]; see Owen v Lester, 79 AD3d 992; Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265 AD2d 135, 140). However, the Supreme Court erred in adhering to its determination granting that branch of the defendant's motion, made on the eve of trial, which was to direct the plaintiff to appear for an IME. The defendant failed to offer evidence of unusual or unanticipated circumstances that developed subsequent to the filing of the note of issue and certificate of readiness to justify relieving him of the consequences of his failure to conduct a timely medical examination of the plaintiff (see Owen v Lester, 79 AD3d 992; Manzo v City of New York, 62 AD3d 964, 965; Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265 AD2d at 138).
Author DMGPosted on April 7, 2011 Categories 22 NYCRR 202.21Leave a comment on Oh discovery, where art thou
Post Note of Issue Discovery and the “Wherefore” clause.
Don't get too caught up in the NOI discovery issue. Read all the way down where the court discusses the "Wherefore" clause. This is why you put in "such other, further, or different
relief" etc etc etc.
22 NYCRR 202.21 Note
of issue and certificate of readiness
Tirado v Miller, 2010 NY Slip Op 04364 (App. Term, 2nd, 2010)
A certificate of readiness certifies that all discovery is completed,
waived, or not required and that the action is ready for trial (see 22
NYCRR 202.21[b]). The effect of a statement of readiness is to
ordinarily foreclose further discovery (see Blondell v Malone, 91
AD2d 1201; Niagara Falls Urban Renewal Agency v Pomeroy Real Estate
Corp., 74 AD2d 734; Bookazine Co. v J & A [*3]Bindery, 61 AD2d 919).
Discovery that is nevertheless sought after the filing of a note
of issue and certificate of readiness is governed by a different set of
procedural principles than discovery that is sought prior to the filing
of a note of issue. Pre-note discovery includes disclosure of "all
matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action" (see CPLR 3101[a]), which is to be liberally construed (see
Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406; Byck v
Byck, 294 AD2d 456, 457; U.S. Ice Cream Corp. v Carvel Corp., 190
AD2d 788). Post-note discovery, on the other hand, may only be sought
under two procedural circumstances set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.21. As
discussed by this Court in an opinion by Justice Feuerstein in Audiovox
Corp. v Benyamini (265 AD2d 135, 138), one method of obtaining
post-note discovery is to vacate the note of issue within 20 days of its
service pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.21(e), by merely showing that
discovery is incomplete and the matter is not ready for trial. The
second method, beyond that 20 days, requires that the movant, pursuant
to 22 NYCRR 202.21(d), meet a more stringent standard and demonstrate
"unusual or unanticipated circumstances and substantial prejudice"
absent the additional discovery (Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265
AD2d at 138; see Schroeder v IESI NY Corp., 24 AD3d 180, 181; Aviles
v 938 SCY Ltd., 283 AD2d 935, 936).
Here, it is not contested that the note of issue and certificate
of readiness were filed in February 2008. The note of issue was never
stricken as a result of any motion filed within the 20-day deadline set
forth in 22 NYCRR 202.21(a). Accordingly, any additional discovery
sought by the plaintiff from Travelers must meet the requirements of 22
NYCRR 202.21(d) that the discovery be needed because of "unusual or
unanticipated circumstances" and that its absence causes "substantial
We recognize that the trial court did not grant any unrequested
relief, but rather, granted the specific relief sought by the defendants
and Travelers in their motion of quashing the plaintiff's subpoena and,
in effect, granting a protective order. On appeal, the plaintiff takes
issue, inter alia, with the Supreme Court's having determined the motion
on a ground unrelated to the privilege and relevance issues briefed by
the parties. However, in rendering decisions on motions, trial courts
are not necessarily limited by the specific arguments raised by parties
in their submissions. CPLR 2214(a) provides that a notice of motion
shall specify the time and place of the hearing on the motion, the
supporting papers upon which it is based, the relief demanded, and the
grounds therefor. A court typically lacks the jurisdiction to grant
relief that is not requested in the moving papers (see McGuire v
McGuire, 29 AD3d 963, 965; NYCTL 1998-1 Trust v Prol Props.
Corp., 18 AD3d 525, 527). The notice of motion in this instance
sought an order quashing the subpoena and granting a protective order on
the limited grounds of privilege and irrelevance. However, the notice
of motion also contained a general prayer, for "such other and further
relief as [the] [c]ourt may deem just and proper."
General relief clauses, for "such other, further, or different
relief," are often included in notices of motion by practitioners to
cover the possibility that the appropriate relief is not what the movant
has specifically asked for, "but is close enough to enable the court to
grant it" (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY,
Book 7B, CPLR C2214:5). The presence of a general relief clause enables
the court to grant relief that is not too dramatically unlike that which
is actually sought, as long as the relief is supported by proof in the
papers and the court is satisfied that no party is prejudiced (see
Frankel v Stavsky, 40 AD3d 918; HCE Assoc. v 3000 Watermill Lane
Realty Corp., 173 AD2d 774; Lanaris v Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 9 AD2d 1015).
Author DMGPosted on May 26, 2010 Categories 22 NYCRR 202.21, It's kind of a big deal, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on Post Note of Issue Discovery and the “Wherefore” clause.
Late–but not too late–Jury Demand
Rosenbaum v Schlossman, 2010 NY Slip Op 03494 (App. Div., 1st, 2010)
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.),
entered March 30, 2009, which denied defendants' motion to vacate the
note of issue, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Order, same court,
Justice and entry date, which denied defendants' motion to stay a
scheduled nonjury trial of this matter and compel the Clerk to accept a
jury demand, unanimously modified, on the facts, to direct the Clerk to
accept the jury demand nunc pro tunc, and, in view of the interim stay
of trial previously ordered by this Court, the remainder of the appeal
from said order unanimously dismissed as academic, without costs.
Defendants should be permitted to serve and file a late jury
demand given that the lateness, by only five days, was due in part to
the late filing of the note of issue, and also given no intention by
defendants to waive a jury trial, a prompt motion by defendants to be
relieved of their default in timely filing a jury demand, and no
prejudice to plaintiff caused by the late jury demand (see A.S.L.
Enters. v Venus Labs., 264 AD2d 372, 373 [1999]). Defendants' motion
to vacate the note of issue was properly denied where defendants had
received copies of plaintiff's letter to the court requesting the
court's issuance of a written order memorializing a prior oral order
extending the time to file a note of issue, but did not object to the
requested relief or inform [*2]the court,
at that time, of their view that disclosure was incomplete (22 NYCRR
202.21[d]). We have considered and rejected defendants' remaining
Instead of simply writing that the remaining contention is "rejected" wouldn't it be nice if they said what the remaining contention was.
Author DMGPosted on May 2, 2010 Categories 22 NYCRR 202.21, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on Late–but not too late–Jury Demand
NYCRR 202.27; 22 NYCRR 202.21
Donnelly v Treeline Cos., 66 AD3d 563 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
A motion to vacate a dismissal for failure to appear at a scheduled court conference (22 NYCRR 202.27) is governed by CPLR 5015. Such a motion must be made within one year of service of a copy of the dismissal order with notice of entry, and be supported by a showing of reasonable excuse for the failure to attend the conference and a meritorious cause of action. Where the dismissal order has never been served with notice of entry, there is no time limit on making a motion to vacate the dismissal, and any alleged prejudice caused by postdismissal delay, short of laches, is not a consideration (Acevedo v Navarro, 22 AD3d 391 [2005]).
Plaintiff demonstrates both a reasonable excuse and the existence of a meritorious cause of action. The fact that none of the parties appeared for the scheduled court conference in July 2002 indicates that plaintiff's default was reasonable and likely attributable to the court's failure [*2]to notify everyone about the conference, whose date is not found in any prior conference order. Plaintiff's former attorney averred that his office was never notified of the conference or informed of the dismissal. Lack of receipt of notice can be a valid excuse for failure to appear at a conference (see Latha Rest. Corp. v Tower Ins. Co., 285 AD2d 437 [2001]).
Plaintiff has also established a meritorious cause of action. Indeed, on a prior appeal in 2004 (13 AD3d 143 [2004]), we affirmed the existence of numerous triable issues of fact concerning the liability of defendants Treeline and Commercial, and also of third-party defendant Republic.
Defendants contend that plaintiff's delay in moving to vacate the section 202.27 dismissal amounted to laches. While defendants were not apparently prejudiced in the two years immediately after the dismissal, during which they continued actively litigating, the case did thereafter remain inactive for a three-year period until plaintiff's motion to vacate the dismissal in 2007. This delay, though lengthy, was not unreasonable. In any event, defendants have not alleged prejudice from this delay, other than in conclusory fashion.
Figueroa v Sanchez, 2009 NY Slip Op 08881 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
Due to his incarceration, plaintiff defaulted by failing to appear at a preliminary conference (22 NYCRR 202.27). The only remedy for plaintiff's default in these circumstances is not an appeal, but rather a motion in Supreme Court to vacate the default (see Campos v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 307 AD2d 785, 786 [2003]). In the present posture of the case, there is no appealable order for this Court to review. Finally, we note that plaintiff claims that he made numerous attempts to communicate with the court about his appearances that were not addressed.
Gaskin v Ilowitz, 2010 NY Slip Op 00097 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)
Ferraro v North Babylon Union Free School Dist., 2010 NY Slip Op 00095 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)
Singh v City of New York, 2009 NY Slip Op 09646 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
[T]hat branch of the defendants' motion which, in effect, was to compel the plaintiffs to respond to additional discovery demands regarding the immigration status of the plaintiff Harminder Singh is denied. While the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant permission to conduct additional discovery after the filing of a note of issue and certificate of readiness where the moving party demonstrates that "unusual or unanticipated circumstances" developed subsequent to the filing which require additional pretrial proceedings to prevent substantial prejudice (see 22 NYCRR 202.21[d]; Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265 AD2d 135, 138; Futersak v Brinen, 265 AD2d 452), here, the defendants failed to establish any such unusual or unanticipated circumstances that would warrant the additional post-note-of-issue discovery they sought (see 22 NYCRR 202.21[d]; Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265 AD2d 135; Futersak v Brinen, 265 AD2d 452). The defendants also failed to establish that the denial of their request would cause them actual, substantial prejudice (see Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265 AD2d at 139).
Author DMGPosted on January 21, 2010 Categories 22 NYCRR 202.21, 22 NYCRR 202.27, [App Div 1st Dept], [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on NYCRR 202.27; 22 NYCRR 202.21
Today in the First Department (22 NYCRR 202.2, CPLR R. 3211, CPLR R. 3212, CPLR § 306-b, CPLR § 3121, SOL)
Several decisions popped out of the Appellate Division, First Department, today. In a break from my normal posting style, where I try to split posts between sections and rules, I'm going to post the few decisions that I found interesting.
Ocasio-Gary v Lawrence Hosp., 2010 NY Slip Op 00003 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
Johnson v Concourse Vil., Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 00010 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
Suss v New York Media, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 00011 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
We also reject plaintiff's argument that unless the court gives CPLR 3211(c) notice of its intention to do so, it may not consider nondocumentary evidentiary materials for fact-finding purposes on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) (see Alverio v New York Eye & [*2]Ear Infirmary, 123 AD2d 568 [1986]; Lim v Choices, Inc., 60 AD3d 739 [2009]).
Welter v Feigenbaum, 2010 NY Slip Op 00012 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
A plaintiff, in an action for negligent transmittal of genital herpes simplex II, may demand that the defendant submit to a blood test to determine if the latter indeed has the virus (see CPLR 3121). Since the test was ordered in conjunction with the litigation, it is not subject to the physician-patient privilege (see Connors, McKinney's CPLR Practice Commentary C3121:2). Even were the privilege to apply, defendant waived it by asserting the affirmative defense that he was asymptomatic (see e.g. Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d 278, 287-288 [1989]). Defendant's effort to limit the scope of discovery has simply focused the issue on whether or not he has the virus. This issue is relevant to — and potentially dispositive of — the action. If the test is negative, the case will be subject to dismissal. If, on the other hand, it is positive, defendant will have an opportunity to prove his affirmative defenses that he did not have the virus in 2002, or was unaware that he had it or was asymptomatic at the time of alleged transmittal to plaintiff.
All concur except Andrias and McGuire, JJ., who concur in a separate memorandum by McGuire, J. as follows:
We write separately to emphasize that we express no view on the issue of whether, if the test is positive, it is adm
issible at trial (see People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988] ["(e)ven where technically relevant evidence is admissible, it may still be excluded by the trial court in the [*2]exercise of its discretion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will unfairly prejudice the other side or mislead the jury"]).
The herpes case.
Author DMGPosted on January 5, 2010 Categories 22 NYCRR 202.21, CPLR § 306-b, CPLR § 3121, CPLR R. 3211, CPLR R. 3212, SOL, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on Today in the First Department (22 NYCRR 202.2, CPLR R. 3211, CPLR R. 3212, CPLR § 306-b, CPLR § 3121, SOL)