Source: https://www.hilleylaw.com/blog/2017/03/supreme-court-of-georgia-finds-error-in-exclusion-of-expert-witness-appropriate-inquiry-is-whether-e/
Timestamp: 2020-05-26 20:12:31
Document Index: 468901884

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 10', '§ 10']

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On behalf of Hilley & Frieder, P.C. | Mar 27, 2017 | Recent Updates
Supreme Court of Georgia finds error in exclusion of expert witness: appropriate inquiry is whether expert has “appropriate level of knowledge” in performing or teaching the procedure at issue.
Zarate-Martinez submitted the an affidavit from Dr. Nancy Hendrix within the 45 days; however, Echemendia moved to strike Hendrix’s affidavit on the grounds that it did not adequately demonstrate Hendrix’s qualifications under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (c). Zarate-Martinez filed a supplemental affidavit from Dr. Hendrix outside the 45 days, reasserted her constitutional challenges, and added that the provisions of the statute were unconstitutionally vague. Despite the challenge, the trial court applied the terms of O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (c) to strike both of Hendrix’s affidavits on July 17, 2014, and ultimately dismissed her complaint for failure to file the necessary affidavit required by O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-1.1(e).
With regard to Dr. Hendrix, the trial court held that because her affidavit did not show that Dr. Hendrix had performed an open laparoscopic tubal ligation, the type of procedure at issue in the case, she was not a qualified expert under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (c) (2) (A). The Supreme Court, relying on its reasoning in Dubois, supra, held that “the pertinent question is whether an expert has ‘an appropriate level of knowledge…in performing the procedure…[or] teaching others how to perform the procedure,’ not whether the expert himself has actually performed it or taught it.” Thus, in the instant case, “although it could very well be the case that Dr. Hendrix did not demonstrate in her affidavit that she had the ‘appropriate level of knowledge…in performing the procedure’ in question in this case, the trial court was not authorized to reach that conclusion by focusing solely on the fact that Dr. Hendrix did not state in this initial affidavit that she had ‘performed…the very procedure at issue’ here.” The Supreme Court held that the trial court must reconsider its decision under the parameters of Dubois: whether Dr. Hendrix ” ‘has an appropriate level of knowledge…in performing the procedure’ at issue in order to be qualified as an expert under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (c) (2) (A).” The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s decision to strike the untimely filed affidavit of Dr. Hendrix was equally inconsistent with the analysis the Court had set forth in Dubois, and the trial court must reconsider this decision as well.
PruittHealth filed a one-count complaint against McHugh Fuller for trademark dilution, seeking interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-451(b), and requesting a temporary restraining order, which was granted. McHugh Fuller filed an Answer raising, among other defenses, First Amendment fair use. The trial court permanently enjoined McHugh Fuller from running ads concerning PruittHealth that include PruittHealth’s trade names service marks or logos, and entered the order on appeal that McHugh Fuller’s “unauthorized use” of PruittHealth’s “service marks, trademarks and related logos in its advertisements likely tarnish Plaintiff’s and its affiliates’ business reputation… and that Plaintiff is likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm to its goodwill and contractual relationships….”
According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the instant case was one of first impression since it addressed the situation where one business (McHugh Fuller) is using the marks of a second business (PruittHealth) not to identify its own goods and services, but to identify the goods and services of the second business. Justice Nahmias, writing for a unanimous Court, discussed the history of trademark law and Georgia’s anti-dilution statute. According to the Court, the instant case involved tarnishment, which O.C.G.A. § 10-1-451(b) describes as subsequent use by another of the same or any similar trademark, “if there exists a likelihood of injury to business reputation …” The theory is successful when the use of the mark is for “clearly unwholesome or degrading goods or services.”