Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2004_documents/04me32fit.htm
Timestamp: 2013-05-25 08:32:02
Document Index: 46814513

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 302', '§\n4401', '§ 4956', '§ 4403', '§ 4403', '§ 4956']

briefs: January 22, 2004
8, 2004 Panel:
[¶1] Fred Fitanides appeals from a judgment
of the Superior Court (York County, Brennan, J.), affirming, after consolidating Fitanides's five M.R.
Civ. P. 80B appeals, the decisions of the Saco Planning Board and the
Saco Zoning Board of Appeals. Fitanides challenges the constitutionality of two "applicability
preambles" that precede amendments to the City's zoning ordinance, and contends
that the plan proposed by Paul Deshaies and Properties by the Sea, LLC, the
developer, does not comply with several zoning requirements. We are unpersuaded by the majority of
Fitanides's contentions. We agree,
however, with Fitanides that the proposed private road in the project cannot
provide the required amount of road frontage because it is located within the
boundary lines of Deshaies's lot, and that there is insufficient evidence that
the Planning Board waived the through-street requirement in section 10.11.2 of
the City's subdivision regulations, and that the proposed private road satisfies
the cul-de-sac requirement in section 10.11.5.9.A. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court
and remand with instructions to remand to the Planning Board for further
[¶2] In the fall of 2001, Properties by the
Sea, LLC, through its owner, Paul Deshaies, began working on a proposal to
develop a lot on Route One in Saco into a condominium project. City officials responded favorably to
his proposal, but at that time, the City Council was preparing to amend the
City's zoning ordinance; the ordinance, as it was proposed to be amended, would
prohibit Deshaies's project from going forward. [¶3] The lot was located in the B-2a zoning
district, which permitted residential developments as a conditional use.[1] The zoning ordinance amendments would
have rezoned the lot, placing it in the B-6 zoning district, which limits
residential development to "[o]ne [s]ingle family dwelling on a lot of
record." [¶4] When Deshaies was informed of the
impending amendments, he requested that the City Council adopt applicability
preambles to grandfather his project from the changes in the zoning
accepted Deshaies's request, and the following language was added to two
sections of the zoning ordinance:
809-1. SANITARY
Applicability. Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in section 4.1 of the City of Saco Subdivision Regulations, the
following amendments shall not apply to any property for which a sketch plan
review application for a residential subdivision not to exceed 13 dwelling
units in new structures plus any dwelling units and/or bed and breakfast units
permissible in existing structures was filed under section 4.2 of the
Subdivision Regulations on or before February 19, 2002, provided a complete
application for preliminary subdivision approval and any required applications
for site plan and/or conditional use approval are submitted within six months
after the filing of the sketch plan application, the subdivision is approved
within two years of the filing of the sketch plan application, and substantial
construction of the subdivision is commenced within two years after approval.
The City Council enacted the amendments, including the
preambles, to the City's zoning ordinance on February 19, 2002. [¶5] Deshaies filed site plan, conditional
use, and preliminary subdivision applications for the development of thirteen
dwelling units with the Planning Board on April 23, 2002. Following public hearings, the Planning
Board granted Deshaies site plan, conditional use, and preliminary subdivision
approval. Fitanides, whose
campground borders the north edge of the property, appealed the site plan
approval to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, and appealed the
conditional use approval to the Zoning Board. The parties agreed to stay the 80B appeal. [¶6] The Zoning Board concluded that the
Planning Board erred by including the wetlands area in its calculations, and by
not requiring a forty-foot setback between an existing structure and a proposed
private road that would serve the new complex. Deshaies then revised the project proposal and reduced the
number of units, from thirteen to twelve in six two-family buildings. In August, the Planning Board held a
public hearing regarding the revised plan and granted final subdivision
approval and a second conditional use permit. [¶7] Fitanides filed a second 80B appeal
concerning the final subdivision approval, and appealed the conditional use
approval to the Zoning Board. Prior to the hearing before the Zoning Board, Deshaies again modified
the plan for the project by lengthening the project's proposed private
road. The Planning Board approved
this modification. Fitanides
appealed this approval to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. When the Zoning Board met in October to
consider Fitanides's appeal of the August conditional use approval, it
concluded that the private road, as it was situated in the August plan, was too
close to abutting property. [¶8] Deshaies requested a third conditional
use approval and submitted another modification to the plan to the Planning
Board, which adjusted the placement of the private road so that it was properly
set back from the abutting property. The Planning Board again granted approval. Fitanides appealed the Planning Board's site plan and
subdivision approvals to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, and
appealed the conditional use permit to the Zoning Board. The Zoning Board affirmed the decision
of the Planning Board, resulting in final approval of Deshaies's project at the
municipal level. Fitanides
appealed the Zoning Board's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R.
Civ. P. 80B. [¶9] The five 80B appeals were consolidated
by the Superior Court. The court
affirmed the decisions of the Planning and Zoning Boards, concluding that
Fitanides's challenges were without merit, and that the record revealed no
errors of law, obvious abuse of discretion, or lack of evidentiary
support. Fitanides then filed this
appeal from the Superior Court's affirmance of the Planning and Zoning Boards'
decisions. II. DISCUSSION
Legislation Clause
[¶10] The constitutionality of the applicability preambles is a question of
law that we review de novo. See
City of Bangor v. Diva's, Inc.,
2003 ME 51, ¶ 10, 830 A.2d 898, 902. Ordinances are presumed constitutional. Vella v. Town of Camden, 677 A.2d 1051, 1054 (Me. 1996). [¶11] The Special Legislation Clause, Me.
Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 13, is violated when special legislation is
enacted when a general law could have been made applicable. Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699, 704 (Me. 1981). Laws that attempt to "exempt one
individual from generally applicable requirements of the law" have violated
this clause. Id. [¶12] Fitanides contends that because the preambles exempt Deshaies from
section 4.1 of the Saco subdivision regulations, they violate the Special
Legislation Clause. Section 4.1
the request of an applicant, prior to the submission of a plan for preliminary
subdivision review, the Planning Board may hold a preapplication workshop to
discuss the lot layout, road design, and the format, procedures and process of
subdivision review. The
preapplication meeting shall not be considered as the commencement of the
regular subdivision review process. A plan viewed in preapplication workshop is not considered complete or
pending and creates no vested rights for the subdivision review process. The submittal of the preapplication
sketch plan shall not be considered the initiation of the review process for
the purposes of bringing the plan under the protection of Title 1, M.R.S.A.,
Subsection 302.
to the argument of Fitanides, section 4.1 is not a rule of law. Section 4.1 simply provides that
neither a preapplication meeting, a preapplication workshop, nor the submission
of a preapplication sketch plan, will trigger the protection that
1 M.R.S.A. § 302 (1989) would otherwise provide. Section 302 is considered a rule of construction and not a
rule of law. DeMello v. Dep't
of Envtl. Prot., 611 A.2d 985, 986
(Me. 1992). Section 4.1, which is
premised on section 302, is also a rule of construction. Accordingly, because section 4.1 is not
a rule of law, the applicability preambles do not violate the Special
Legislation Clause simply because they exempt Deshaies from the provisions of
section 4.1.[2] B. The Equal Protection Clauses
[¶13] Fitanides contends that the
applicability preambles violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Maine and
United States Constitutions because they are special laws, granting privileges
only to Deshaies. Fitanides must
establish that the applicability preambles facially violate equal protection
before the City is required to demonstrate a rational basis for the
preambles. Vella, 677 A.2d at 1054. "The prohibition against denial of equal protection of the
law to any person is implicated only when action by the state results in
treatment of that person different than that given similarly situated
individuals." Wellman v. Dep't
of Human Servs., 574 A.2d 879, 883
(Me. 1990). Fitanides must
demonstrate that, by virtue of the applicability preambles, the Deshaies's lot
and project receive treatment different from that given similarly situated lots
and projects. See Begin v. Town
of Sabattus, 409 A.2d 1269, 1276
(Me. 1979).
C. Zoning Ordinance Section 414 [¶15] Fitanides contends that the City cannot
define Deshaies's project as a multi-family complex because Deshaies's project
consists of six two-unit buildings, and, according to Fitanides, multi-family
complexes must consist of three or more dwelling units in a single building. Therefore, Fitanides argues section 414
of the zoning ordinance prohibits Deshaies's project because the project
proposes more than one two-family building on a single lot and does not fall
into the multi-family complex exception. We disagree. [¶16] Section 414 of the City's zoning
ordinance provides that: "No more than one single family or two family dwelling
and its accessory buildings as regulated by this Ordinance may be located on
any one lot except in the case of multi-family complexes that meet all other
applicable sections of the ordinance." A multi-family complex is not defined in the City's zoning ordinance. [¶17] Section 301 of the zoning ordinance provides that when a term is not specifically defined, the term "shall have the meaning implied by [its] context in the Ordinance or [its] ordinarily accepted meaning." See also George D. Ballard, Builder, Inc. v. City of Westbrook, 502 A.2d 476, 480 (Me. 1985) ("Undefined terms should be given their common and generally accepted meaning unless the context clearly indicates otherwise."). Although a multi-family complex is not defined, a multi-family dwelling is defined in section 302 as: "A building containing three (3) or more dwelling units, such buildings being designed exclusively for residential use and occupancy by three (3) or more families living independently of one another . . . ." The definition of a multi‑family dwelling suggests that the term "multi-family" means three or more families. A complex is defined as "an assemblage of units, as buildings or roadways, that together form a single comprehensive group." Webster's New World Dictionary 290 (2d ed. 1978). Therefore, a multi-family complex is appropriately defined as an assemblage of three or more units that together form a single comprehensive group. Deshaies's project, consisting of twelve single-family units, with each unit's two-car garage abutting one other unit's two-car garage, all positioned around one cul-de-sac, meets this definition. [¶18] Accordingly, contrary to Fitanides's
contention, a multi-family complex is not limited to three or more dwelling
units all located in a single building, and because Deshaies's project
qualifies as a multi-family complex, it is exempted from section 414 of the
zoning ordinance. D. Timeliness of Deshaies's Third Conditional Use Application [¶19] Fitanides contends that according to
the language of the applicability preambles, any required applications for site
plan and/or conditional use approval must be submitted within six months of the
date Deshaies filed his sketch plan. He contends that because Deshaies's second and third conditional use
applications were untimely filed, Deshaies cannot be grandfathered from the
zoning amendments. [¶20] The applicability preambles state that
Deshaies's project is grandfathered from the amendments to the zoning ordinance
provided that a complete application for preliminary subdivision
approval and any required applications for site plan and/or conditional use
approval are submitted within six months after the filing of the sketch plan
application, the subdivision is approved within two years of the filing of the
sketch plan application, and substantial construction of the subdivision is
commenced within two years after approval.
Deshaies and the City that the Planning Board was reviewing the same project
throughout the entire process. The
structure of the applicability preambles suggests that the City Council
intended that review of the project should start within six months after Deshaies filed his sketch plan
application. The City Council
acknowledged that review of the plan might involve appeals, revisions, and
further review when it included the provision providing for a two-year review
period before the plan must be approved. Concluding otherwise would elevate form over substance. Because Deshaies filed his initial
applications for preliminary subdivision, site plan, and conditional use
approval within six months of the date he filed his sketch plan review
application, his applications were timely filed.
E. Proposed Private
Road's Compliance with the Subdivision Regulations
[¶21] Fitanides contends that the proposed
private road ends in a dead end and that the Planning Board did not waive the
dead end restriction in the City's subdivision regulations. He contends that because the cul-de-sac
at the end of the road is not part of the proposed private road, but is
actually a driveway, the "through street requirement" of the subdivision
regulations has not been met. Fitanides also contends that the subdivision regulation requirement that
all streets in a subdivision must be offered for city acceptance has not been
complied with because the proposed private road has not been offered for
acceptance as a city street. Finally, he contends that the subdivision regulation requirement that
all lots in a subdivision must have access from a public street has not been
met because the development is accessed via a private road and a private
driveway. [¶22] Deshaies contends that even though the
subdivision regulations technically apply to his project, conceptually, they
were intended to apply to land that is divided into multiple lots served by
public streets, not multiple dwelling units on a single lot. Deshaies also contends that any
deviance from the subdivision regulations should be construed as a waiver. Finally, Deshaies contends that the
private road was offered for city acceptance, and that the lot does have access
to a public road because the lot continues to abut Route One. [¶23] When the Superior Court and the Zoning
Board of Appeals act in their appellate capacity, we review the Planning
Board's decision directly for an "error of law, abuse of discretion or findings
not supported by substantial evidence in the record." Veilleux v. City of Augusta, 684 A.2d 413, 415 (Me. 1996); see also Adelman v. Town of
Baldwin, 2000 ME 91, ¶ 8, 750 A.2d 577,
581-82. "Substantial evidence
exists if there is any competent evidence in the record to support a
decision." York v. Town
of Ogunquit, 2001 ME 53, ¶ 14, 769 A.2d
172, 178.
[¶24] As a preliminary matter, contrary to
Deshaies's contention, his project must be reviewed pursuant to the terms of
the subdivision regulations. Section 2.2.2 of the regulations state: "The provisions of these regulations
shall pertain to all the land proposed for subdivision as defined in Title 30
M.R.S.A., Section 4956, Subsection 1, within the boundaries of the City of
Saco." Title 30-A M.R.S.A. §
4401(4) (1996 & Supp. 2003) (former 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956) states: "The term
�subdivision' also includes . . . the construction or placement of 3 or more
dwelling units on a single tract or parcel of land . . . ." Because Deshaies's project involves
twelve dwelling units on a single parcel of land, the provisions of the City's
subdivision regulations apply.
Through-Street Requirement in the Subdivision Regulations
[¶25] Section 10.11.2 of the City's
subdivision regulations states: "All streets shall be designed as through
streets or future through streets unless waived by the Board." Section 12.4 states: "When the Board
grants a waiver to any of the standards in these regulations, the Final Plan
shall indicate the waivers granted and the date on which they were granted." Furthermore, section 12.1 of the
regulations requires the Planning Board to make "written findings of fact that
there are special circumstances" permitting a waiver. The record does not contain a copy of anything labeled a
Final Plan, and therefore, we cannot determine whether the Final Plan indicates
that the Planning Board waived section 10.11.2. [¶26] Even if the Planning Board did waive
section 10.11.2, section 10.11.5.9.A requires that all dead-end streets end in
a cul-de-sac that meets certain specifications. There is no evidence in the Planning Board's findings of
fact or in the record that the private driveway at the end of the proposed
private road meets the specifications outlined in section 10.11.5.9.A. Because the findings of fact are insufficient
to determine the Planning Board's decision regarding a waiver, and, if there
was a waiver, the basis of that decision, we remand the case to the Superior
Court for remand to the Planning Board for further findings of fact. Carroll v. Town of Rockport, 2003 ME 135, ¶ 30, 837 A.2d 148, 157.
Regulation Section 10.11
[¶27] Section 10.11 of the subdivision regulations state: "All streets are to
be designed to these standards and offered for city acceptance." The Planning Board's findings of fact
state: "Said private road and driveway are not submitted nor proposed for
future acceptance as a City street." [¶28] Although Deshaies contends that the
proposed private road was offered for city acceptance, it is clear from
subdivision regulation section 11.25 that, because the proposed private road
has not been constructed, it could not have already been offered for city
acceptance. The Planning Board's
findings of fact indicate that there is no intention of offering the proposed
private road for city acceptance, which would violate section 10.11. Nonetheless, because, pursuant to
section 11.25, the road cannot be offered until it is built, the issue is not
Regulation Section 10.8
[¶29] Section 10.8 of the subdivision
regulations state: "All lots in all subdivisions
shall have access from a public street of the City of Saco." (Emphasis in original.) The language of section 10.8 is
satisfied in this situation. Although a private road runs from Route One and ends in a private
driveway, there is only one lot, and access to that lot is from Route One. F. Subdivision
Regulation Section 10.6.8
[¶30] Fitanides contends that Deshaies's lot violates section
10.6.8 of the City's subdivision regulations because the narrowest point of the
lot is approximately eighty feet, which is less than seventy-five percent of
two hundred feet, the required amount of lot frontage. Section 10.6.8 of the subdivision
regulations states: "Flag lots and other odd shape lots in which narrow
strips are joined to other parcels in order to meet minimum lot size or
frontage requirements are prohibited. The width of a lot at its narrowest
point shall not be less than 75 percent of the width of the lot frontage." (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the section does not
apply to Deshaies's lot. See
Gerald v. Town of York, 589 A.2d 1272, 1274
(Me. 1991) ("The terms or expressions in an ordinance are to be construed
reasonably with regard to both the objectives sought to be obtained and the
general structure of the ordinance as a whole."). This is not the case where "narrow strips [were] joined to
other parcels to meet minimum lot size or frontage requirements." The division of this lot from the
original Cornforth Farms parcel simply resulted in a lot shaped somewhat like a
flag; no strip of land was added to the lot to meet minimum lot size or
frontage requirements. Accordingly, there is no violation of section 10.6.8.
Ordinance Section 724(7)
[¶31] Fitanides contends that, because the
private road would reduce the existing frontage along Route One below the
required amount of frontage, the project does not comply with section 724(7) of
the City's zoning ordinance. Section 724(7) states: "The creation of a private road shall not reduce
the frontage, lot area, or other dimensional requirements of an existing
conforming lot below that required by the zone in which it is located nor
reduce the frontage, lot area, or other dimensional requirements of an existing
nonconforming lot." Contrary to
Fitanides's contention, the creation of the proposed private road does not
reduce the frontage of either the Cornforth House lot or Deshaies's lot. The purpose of the proposed private
road is to provide frontage. Although the division of the original parcel into two lots reduced the amount
of both lots' frontage on Route One below the required amount, the proposed
private road adds to the amount of frontage. Accordingly, the proposed private road does not violate
section 724(7) of the City's zoning ordinance.
[¶32] Fitanides contends that pursuant to the
subdivision regulations, frontage must be measured along a "thoroughfare open
to the public," and because the proposed private road is completely contained
within Deshaies's parcel, frontage is impermissibly being measured along a
driveway. [¶33] There is nothing in the subdivision
regulations or in section 724 of the City's zoning ordinance requiring that a
private road be owned separately from a lot. Pursuant to section 724, a private road may be constructed
to provide frontage for a lot, so long as the private road complies with all of
the listed criteria. Fitanides
does not contest the proposed private road's compliance with section 724,
except for his unpersuasive argument, noted above, that the road violates
section 724(7). [¶34] Pursuant to section 302 of the zoning
ordinance, frontage is "[t]he linear distance of the continuous line separating
the lot from a public road or private road meeting the standards of Section
724, but not including private driveways." Pursuant to section 3.1 of the subdivision regulations,
frontage is "[t]he linear distance of the line separating a lot from a publicly
or privately maintained thoroughfare open to the public, but not including
private driveways." If only these
two definitions are considered, frontage is being measured in accordance with
the definitions; it is the line separating the lot from the private road.
[¶35] Supporting Fitanides's contention are
the zoning ordinance's definitions of lot and lot area. A lot is defined in section 302 as "[a]
continuous parcel of land in single or joint ownership, described on a deed,
plot plan, or similar legal document and having frontage." Lot area is defined in section 302 as
"[t]he area of land enclosed within the boundary lines of a lot, minus . . .
areas beneath roads serving more than two lots." The project plan shows that the proposed private road is
within the boundary line for the Deshaies lot. The proposed private road will serve only two lots, the Cornforth
House lot and the Deshaies lot, and therefore, according to the definitions of
lot and lot area, the proposed private road is part of the Deshaies lot. Frontage cannot be measured along the
proposed private road because there is no line separating the lot from the road
if the road is part of the lot.
[¶36] In light of the definitions of lot and
lot area, we cannot say that this private road, as currently proposed, can
provide the required amount of lot frontage. It is not separated from the lot, and therefore, no
continuous line separates the lot from the road. The
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to remand
to the Planning Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[1] Deshaies's lot is part of a parcel of
land originally known as the "Cornforth Farm" property. Deshaies's project proposes to divide
the Cornforth property into two lots, with the condominiums on one lot, and the
existing Cornforth House on the other. [2] Fitanides also contends that the
applicability preambles confer vested rights on Deshaies's project, and
therefore conflict with section 4.1 of the City's subdivision regulations
because, pursuant to section 4.1, the project could not have vested rights when
the zoning amendments were enacted. He contends that because section 4.1 was in effect at the time of the
zoning ordinance amendments, pursuant to 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4403(2) (1996), it
controls. Title 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4403(2) states: "The municipal
reviewing authority may, after a public hearing, adopt, amend or repeal
additional reasonable regulations governing subdivisions which shall control
until amended, repealed or replaced by regulations adopted by the municipal
legislative body." The purpose of
section 4403(2) is to grant a municipal reviewing authority the power to adopt,
amend, or repeal subdivision regulations. See Brown v. Town of Kennebunkport,
565 A.2d 324, 328 (Me. 1989) (discussing 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(2)(B), section
4403(2)'s predecessor). There is
nothing in the language of section 4403(2) that suggests that the section
limits the legislative capability of the City Council and therefore, section
4403(2) does not prohibit the City Council from enacting a zoning ordinance
more specific than the provisions found in section 4.1.
Moreover, as noted above, section 4.1 is a rule of
construction, not a rule of law. Rules of statutory construction may be overridden by clear language
evidencing a legislative intent to overcome the general rule. Bernier v. Data Gen. Corp., 2002 ME 2, ¶ 16, 787 A.2d 144, 150. The applicability preamble in section
401-2 of the zoning ordinance clearly expresses the City Council's intent that
the Cornforth parcel continue to be governed by the B-2a zoning district
provisions, providing certain events occur. The applicability preamble contained in section 809-1 of the
zoning ordinance clearly expresses the City Council's intent that the
amendments are not to apply to any projects meeting certain
specifications. The preamble in
809-1 also specifically refers to section 4.1. See Bernier,
2002 ME 2, ¶ 16, 787 A.2d at 150 (stating that one way to override a rule of
statutory construction is to explicitly cite the rule). Accordingly, the language in the
preambles override section 4.1 and therefore, section 4.1 does not require the
Planning Board to review Deshaies's project pursuant to the B-6 zoning