Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/lazar-v-superior-court-rykoff-sexton-inc-31731
Timestamp: 2020-02-25 06:23:23
Document Index: 755661765

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 676', '§ 1709', '§ 1710', '§ 685', '§ 530', '§ 676', '§ 1709', '§ 662', '§ 726']

Lazar v. Superior Court (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.) - 12 Cal.4th 631 S044234 - Mon, 01/29/1996 | California Supreme Court Resources
Home > Opinions > Lazar v. Superior Court (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.)
Citation 12 Cal.4th 631
Lazar v. Superior Court (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.)
Lazar v. Superior Court (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.) (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 377; 909 P.2d 981
We granted review in this matter to clarify, following our decisions in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654 [254 [12 Cal.4th 635] Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373] (Foley) and Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1174 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 8, 864 P.2d 88] (Hunter), whether or under what circumstances a plaintiff may state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement of employment contract. The Court of Appeal concluded the allegations of the plaintiff in this case are adequate to state such a cause of action. For the reasons that follow, we agree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
[1] Because this matter comes to us after the trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer, "we must, under established principles, assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations of the complaint in evaluating the validity" of the decision below. (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 [164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R.4th 314]; see also Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216].)
In response to Lazar's concerns, Rykoff made representations to Lazar that led him to believe he would continue to be employed by Rykoff so long [12 Cal.4th 636] as he performed his job and achieved goals. Rykoff represented that Lazar would enjoy continued advancement within the organization, would be welcomed as part of the Rykoff "family" and, as a Rykoff employee, would enjoy security and a strong future. Rykoff represented that Lazar would have a long-term relationship with the company. Additionally, Rykoff implied the current head of the department in which Lazar would work had plans to retire and Lazar would be groomed to assume that position.
In April 1992, Rykoff failed to pay Lazar certain bonus compensation to which he had become entitled under a company incentive program. Subsequently, in July, Lazar was terminated. Rykoff told Lazar his job was being [12 Cal.4th 637] eliminated owing to management reorganization. A Rykoff vice-president told Lazar his termination was not performance related and was for cause.
The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order, insofar as it sustained Rykoff's demurrers to Lazar's causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and to enter a new order overruling the demurrers to those causes of action. [12 Cal.4th 638]
[2a] "The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or 'scienter'); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage." (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 676, p. 778; see also Civ. Code, § 1709; Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1174, 1184; Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1108 [252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46].)
[3] "Promissory fraud" is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud. (Union Flower Market, Ltd. v. Southern California Flower Market, Inc. (1938) 10 Cal.2d 671, 676 [76 P.2d 503]; see Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. (4); 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, § 685, pp. 786-787.)
An action for promissory fraud may lie where a defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to enter into a contract. (Chelini v. Nieri (1948) 32 Cal.2d 480, 487 [196 P.2d 915] ["tort of deceit" adequately pled where plaintiff alleges "defendant intended to and did induce plaintiff to employ him by making promises ... he did not intend to (since he knew he could not) perform" (fn. omitted)]; Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 541, 549 [98 Cal.Rptr. 588], citing Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 477, 484 [75 Cal.Rptr. 871]; Squires Dept. Store, Inc. v. Dudum (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 320, 323 [252 P.2d 418].) In such cases, the plaintiff's claim does not depend upon whether the defendant's promise is ultimately enforceable as a contract. "If it is enforceable, the [plaintiff] ... has a cause of action in tort as an alternative at least, and perhaps in some instances in addition to his cause of action on the contract." (Rest.2d Torts, § 530, subd. (1), com. c., p. 65, cited with approval in Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 29 [216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212].) Recovery, however, may be limited by the rule against double recovery of tort and contract compensatory damages. (Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1159 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 608, 847 P.2d 574].) [12 Cal.4th 639]
In Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1174, we considered whether a terminated employee may recover tort damages for fraud and deceit predicated on a [12 Cal.4th 640] misrepresentation used to effect the termination. Hunter, a welder, was falsely told by his supervisor a corporate decision to eliminate his position had been made. (Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1179, 1186.) After being refused an opportunity to work in a lesser position within the company, Hunter signed a document setting forth his resignation. (Id. at p. 1179.) The jury found that Up-Right, Hunter's employer, had breached an implied contract not to dismiss him without good cause. We noted that Up-Right could have accomplished Hunter's termination directly (incurring the risk of contract liability only) and had merely introduced the element of misrepresentation in the course of effecting that result. (Id. at pp. 1178, 1184.) Hunter, therefore, could not be said to have "relied to his detriment on the misrepresentations in suffering constructive dismissal." (Id. at p. 1184.)
In Hunter, moreover, we specifically preserved promissory fraud claims. Indeed, despite this court's division over the issue of tort recovery for [12 Cal.4th 641] misrepresentation used to effect termination, all seven members of the court either expressly or impliedly agreed that the action for promissory fraud remains viable in the employment context. (Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1186, fn. 1 (maj. opn. by Panelli, J., Lucas, C. J., Baxter, J., and George, J., conc.) ["This is not a case of promissory fraud, and nothing in this opinion affects the availability of tort damages in any case in which the elements of promissory fraud are pleaded and proved."]; id. at p. 1188 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J., Arabian, J., conc.) ["[I]n cases of promissory fraud ... both the breach [of contract] and the fraud leading to the breach are separately actionable."]; id. at p. 1197 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) ["[W]hen ... the employer's conduct is not within the scope of the contractual employment relationship" the "defrauded employee is entitled to recover tort damages."].) As previously discussed, Lazar has adequately pled a cause of action for promissory fraud.
We reasoned in Hunter that "no independent fraud claim" arose from Up-Right's "misrepresentation aimed at termination of employment" (Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1185), because Hunter could not allege all of the elements of fraud. (See Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1184, citing 5 Witkin, [12 Cal.4th 642] Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 676, p. 778; Civ. Code, § 1709; and Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412, 422 [159 P.2d 958].) Specifically, as we explained, Hunter could not allege detrimental reliance. (Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1184.)
[4b] By contrast, as alleged, Lazar's reliance on Rykoff's misrepresentations was truly detrimental, such that he may plead all the elements of fraud. Lazar's employer, Rykoff, did not have the power to compel Lazar to leave his former employment. Rykoff's misrepresentations were made before the employment relationship was formed, when Rykoff had no coercive power over Lazar and Lazar was free to decline the offered position. Rykoff used misrepresentations to induce Lazar to change employment, a result Rykoff presumably could not have achieved truthfully (because Lazar had required assurances the Rykoff position would be secure and would involve significant increases in pay). Moreover, Lazar's decision to join Rykoff left [12 Cal.4th 643] Lazar in worse circumstances than those in which he would have found himself had Rykoff not lied to him. (Allegedly, Lazar's secure living and working circumstances were disrupted, and Lazar became the employee of a financially troubled company, which intended to treat him as an at-will employee.)
Rykoff suggests our recognition, in Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d 654, that the employment relationship is "fundamentally contractual" (Foley, supra, at p. 696), coupled with references in Hunter to economic policy considerations we invoked in Foley (see Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1180-1182), implies employees should generally be limited to contract damages for employment terminations. Rykoff argues that permitting tort remedies in the employment context is unnecessary and extraordinarily costly, and the policy reasons for which we declined to extend tort relief in Foley apply with equal force [12 Cal.4th 644] against Lazar's claim for fraudulent inducement of employment contract. (See 47 Cal.3d at p. 693.)
Our concern in Foley not to create "potential tort recovery in every [discharge] case" (47 Cal.3d at p. 696) does not weigh as heavily here, [12 Cal.4th 645] where plaintiff alleges a traditional fraud cause of action. [2b] In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 74 [269 Cal.Rptr. 337]; Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1268 [258 Cal.Rptr. 787]; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 662, pp. 111-112.) "Thus ' "the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings ... will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect." ' [Citation.] [¶] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which 'show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.' " (Stansfield, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 73, italics in original.) A plaintiff's burden in asserting a fraud claim against a corporate employer is even greater. In such a case, the plaintiff must "allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written." (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 861].)
[6a] Contrary to defendant's arguments, fraudulent inducement of contract-as the very phrase suggests-is not a context where the "traditional separation of tort and contract law" (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 693; Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1181) obtains. To the contrary, this area of the law traditionally has involved both contract and tort principles and procedures. For example, it has long been the rule that where a contract is secured by fraudulent representations, the injured party may elect to affirm the contract and sue for the fraud. (Campbell v. Birch (1942) 19 Cal.2d 778, 791 [122 P.2d 902]; see generally, 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 726, pp. 825-826.)
[5d] Defendant opines that barring claims for fraudulent inducement of employment contract, in light of "existing protections against improper terminations" (see Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1182, citing Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 692-693), would leave employees well protected. But the resolution proposed here involves affirming, not inventing, the cause of [12 Cal.4th 646] action for promissory fraud. Thus the "existing protections" we invoked in Hunter necessarily included the availability of promissory fraud actions like this one.
[6b] More fundamentally, it is a truism that contract remedies alone do not address the full range of policy objectives underlying the action for fraudulent inducement of contract. In pursuing a valid fraud action, a plaintiff advances the public interest in punishing intentional misrepresentations and in deterring such misrepresentations in the future. (Cf. Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 683 [recognizing tort law is designed to vindicate social policy].) Because of the extra measure of blameworthiness inhering in fraud, and because in fraud cases we are not concerned about the need for "predictability about the cost of contractual relationships" (ibid.), fraud plaintiffs may recover "out-of-pocket" damages in addition to benefit-of-the-bargain damages. (Tavaglione v. Billings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1159, citing with approval Pat Rose Associates v. Coombe (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 9, 20 [275 Cal.Rptr. 1]; see also Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 97 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 420, 900 P.2d 669] [discussing "[t]he distinction between tort and contract actions, and their purposefully different measure of damages"].) For example, a fraudulently hired employee, as Lazar has alleged himself to be, may incur a variety of damages "separate from the termination" itself, such as the expense and disruption of moving or loss of security and income associated with former employment.
Nevertheless, we reject Rykoff's contention that, by citing Foley in Hunter, we restricted or abandoned traditional tort remedies in the employment context. Instead, our reference in Hunter to "the logic of Foley" (Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1185) merely invoked Foley's holding that tort damages should not be judicially extended in order to "fashion remedies for breach of a contract provision." (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 700.) In Hunter, we had concluded that a misrepresentation to effect termination of [12 Cal.4th 647] employment did not "rise to the level of a separately actionable fraud." (Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1185.) Since "the result of Up-Right's misrepresentation [was] indistinguishable from an ordinary wrongful termination" (id. at p. 1184), Foley's "logic" (that, in light of "potentially enormous [economic] consequences," tort remedies ought not be judicially extended beyond their traditional limits) became pertinent. (47 Cal.3d at p. 699.)
Defendant argues that, in referring to Hine and Soules in Hunter, we impliedly endorsed the proposition that an employee can never state a tort claim arising from employment termination, other than wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Defendant makes too much of our mention of these cases. Our references in Hunter simply buttressed, in general terms, [12 Cal.4th 648] our recognition that California courts "have adhered to Foley's conception of the employment relation." (Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1182, citing Hine, Soules and American Guar. & Liability.) Nothing in Hunter's language or reasoning committed us to wholesale adoption of the sometimes sweeping analyses or conclusions contained in Hine, Soules and American Guar. & Liability.
Hine v. Dittrich, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 59, was a negligent supervision case in which the plaintiff specifically alleged he suffered no injury until he was discharged. (Hine v. Dittrich, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 64.) In a portion of the opinion we did not quote in Hunter, the Court of Appeal expansively opined: "As long as the alleged injury would not have occurred but for the employment termination, Foley indicates that the employee is generally limited to a contractual remedy." (228 Cal.App.3d at p. 65.) By contrast, Lazar alleges injuries from intentionally tortious behavior which occurred before, during and after the actual termination. In Soules, the Court of Appeal disapproved the use of pleading artifice to relabel a deficient breach of contract claim. (Soules v. Cadam, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 403-404.) By contrast, even defendant does not contend this case is one of artful pleading; as discussed, Lazar has alleged the traditional elements of promissory fraud. More importantly, the plaintiff in Soules founded his tort claims entirely upon conduct alleged to have breached the employment contract. (Id. at p. 404.) Lazar alleges fraudulent inducement.
Consistent with the foregoing, as to his fraud claim Lazar may properly seek damages for the costs of uprooting his family, expenses incurred in [12 Cal.4th 649] relocation, and the loss of security and income associated with his former employment in New York. On the facts as pled, however, Lazar must rely on his contract claim for recovery of any loss of income allegedly caused by wrongful termination of his employment with Rykoff. Moreover, any overlap between damages recoverable in tort and damages recoverable in contract would be limited by the rule against double recovery. (Tavaglione v. Billings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1159.)
I concur in the judgment. I also agree with much of the reasoning of the majority opinion. I continue to believe, however, that Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1174 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 8, 864 P.2d 88] (Hunter) was wrongly decided. The majority today do not overrule Hunter-indeed, because the present case is factually distinguishable, they have no occasion to do so. Instead, they reject the more extreme view of that case urged by real party in interest Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. (Rykoff), and attempt to put Hunter on a firmer logical basis. Although I remain unpersuaded that Hunter is soundly reasoned, I welcome the majority's limitation of Hunter's potentially broad holding.
The majority wisely repudiate Rykoff's view that Hunter and Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373] stand for the radical proposition that courts should not, for public policy reasons, enforce any tort liability arising in connection with the wrongful termination of an employment contract. They correctly identify the question in Hunter and the present case as whether all the traditional elements of fraud, and specifically the element of detrimental reliance, are present. They maintain that no detrimental reliance could be found in Hunter, stating: "Hunter's employer had the power to terminate him, rightly or wrongly.... Had Hunter not resigned, he would, presumably, have been discharged in any event .... [¶] In short, because Up-Right had both the power and intention of discharging him in any event, Hunter was no worse off for being induced by Up-Right's misrepresentation to resign." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 642.) Thus, they reason that Hunter did not detrimentally [12 Cal.4th 650] rely on Up-Right's misrepresentation inducing him to resign because he would have been discharged in any case.
In the present case, the majority rightly recognize that all the elements of fraud, including detrimental reliance in the traditional sense, have been properly alleged in this ordinary fraudulent inducement case. By framing the Hunter opinion in narrow terms, the majority move in the direction of acknowledging that the question whether an employee has detrimentally [12 Cal.4th 651] relied on an employer's misrepresentations in connection with a discharge is one of fact, to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.
Concurring.-I agree with the analysis and conclusions of the majority, with the following exception. The majority describes at some length the "rationale" underlying this court's opinion in Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1174 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 8, 864 P.2d 88]. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 641-642.) Hunter is now the law, but the rationale on which it is based is not well founded, as I explained in my dissenting opinion in that case. (Hunter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1196-1198 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) To the extent that the majority opinion may be read as endorsing Hunter's reasoning, I do not join it. I agree with the majority, however, that Hunter is distinguishable from this case, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal granted a petition for peremptory writ of mandate. Concerns whether and, if so, under what circumstances an employee can state a cause of action for fraud in the inducement of an employment contract.
Mon, 01/29/1996 12 Cal.4th 631 S044234 Review - Civil Original Proceeding closed; remittitur issued
1 Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Martin C. Washton
2 Lazar, Andrew (Petitioner)
Represented by Andrew D. Morrison
3 Lazar, Andrew (Petitioner)
Represented by Barry A. Schulman
9440 Santa Monica
Represented by James E. Jr. Boddy
333 S. Hope St., 48th Fl.
6 Reyes Almanza, Lucio (Amicus curiae)
Calif Rural Legal Assistance Inc.
7 Reyes Almanza, Lucio (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Luis Jaramillo
9 Quackenbush, William C. (Amicus curiae)
10 Superior Court Of Los Angeles County (Respondent)
Represented by Daniel A. Curry
Judge, Suerior Court
Jan 29 1996 Opinion: Affirmed
Jan 6 1995 Petition for review filed
RPI Rykoff Sexton Inc. Record requested.
DCA Record: B083795 - 1 Doghouse
Jan 18 1995 Received letter from:
RPI Rykoff-Sexton
Jan 26 1995 Answer to petition for review filed
Petitioner Lazar
Feb 23 1995 Petition for Review Granted (civil case)
Votes: Lucas, CJ, Mosk, Kennard, Arabian, George & Werdegar, JJ.
Mar 27 1995 Opening brief on the merits filed
By: RPI Rykoff-Sexton Incorporated
Apr 26 1995 Answer brief on the merits filed
Petitioner, Andrew Lazar
May 15 1995 Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
Calif Employment Law Council. Amicus brief Due: 6/11/95. answer: 7/11/95
Employers Group in support of RPI Rykoff-Sexton. (Application Only)
May 17 1995 Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
by real party in interest Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.
The Employers Group in support of RPI Amicus brief Due: 6/16/95 answer: 7/16/95
May 23 1995 Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
Lucio Reyes Almanza in support of Appellant (Application Only) [Ok - Order in Prep]
Lucio Reyes Almanza in support of Appellant brief Due: 6/9/95 answer: 6/23/95
Jun 9 1995 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Lucio Reyes-Almanza in support of Appellant Lazar
Jun 12 1995 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Calif Employment Law Council in support of RPI
Jun 16 1995 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
The Employers Group (in support of RPI Rykoff- Sexton)
Jun 19 1995 Received document entitled:
Corrections to A/C brief of California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc.
Jun 21 1995 Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
Calif Employment Lawyers Association [Petitioner] [App & brief]
Jun 30 1995 Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
Calif Employment Lawyers Association [Petitioner] answer Due: 7-20-95
Jun 30 1995 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Calif Employment Lawyers Association [Petitioner]
Jul 5 1995 Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
And brief of William C. Quackenbush in support of Petr Lazar
Jul 7 1995 Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
William C. Quackenbush in Suppport of Petr answer Due: 7/26/95
Jul 7 1995 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
William C. Quackenbush in support of Petr Lazar
Aug 31 1995 Issues ordered limited
Issues to be argued before this court shall be limited to whether, or under what circumstances, one may state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement of employment contract. (CRC Rule 29.2(b).)
12-5-95, 1:30, S.F.
Nov 9 1995 Change of Address filed for:
Richard Simmons, Counsel for A/C Employers Group.
Letter Dated: 12/1/95 from RPI Citing Additional Cases (on Calendar for 12/5/95)
Jan 29 1996 Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
Majority Opinion by Werdegar, J. -- joined by Lucas C.J., Arabian, Baxter & George JJ. Concurring Opinion by Mosk, J. Concurring Opinion by Kennard, J.
Feb 29 1996 Remittitur Issued
Mar 7 1996 Received:
Receipt for Remittitur Signed by M. Gavinski, Deputy C/A Second
James E. Jr. Boddy (Morrison & Foerster)
Richard J. Simmons (Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton)
Andrew D. Morrison (Ross & Morrison)
Barry A. Schulman (Schulman & Miller)
William G. Hoerger (Calif Rural Legal Assistance Inc.)
Luis Jaramillo (Calif Rural Legal Assistance Inc.)
Martin C. Washton (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher)
Daniel A. Curry (Judge, Suerior Court)
SCOCAL, Lazar v. Superior Court (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.) , 12 Cal.4th 631 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/lazar-v-superior-court-rykoff-sexton-inc-31731) (last visited Monday February 24, 2020).