Source: http://www.appellate.net/includes/print.asp?dir=docketreports&file=sc20524558.asp&contentarea=yes
Timestamp: 2013-12-06 11:51:17
Document Index: 718641167

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 1601', '§ 2000', '§ 1601', '§ 2000', '§ 2601', '§ 2612', '§ 825', '§ 1331']

SUPREME COURT DOCKET REPORT 2000 Term, Number 18 / June 25, 2001
1. Title VII — Statute of Limitations— Continuing Violations. To preserve a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an aggrieved employee must submit a charge of discrimination to the EEOC within 180 days of the allegedly unlawful incident, or within 300 days of the incident if the employee first presented the charge to a state or local equal opportunity agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, No. 00-1614, to decide whether otherwise time-barred Title VII claims can be revived under a "continuing violation" theory by joining them with related claims that were the subject of a timely EEOC charge.
As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, there is a conflict among the Circuits regarding the proper application of the continuing violation theory to employment discrimination claims. The Fifth Circuit has permitted otherwise time-barred incidents to be linked to timely incidents if the nature of the discrimination is similar, the unlawful acts are of a recurring nature, and the untimely acts were not of such a nature that they "‘should trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights.'" See id. (quoting Berry v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981-982 (5th Cir. 1983)). By contrast, the Seventh Circuit appears to permit invocation of the continuing violation doctrine only when a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would not have immediately appreciated the unlawful nature of the conduct antedating the limitations period. See Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1167.
2. Title VII — Statute of Limitations — Relation Back of Amendments To The Charge. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Edelman v. Lynchburg College, No. 00-1072, to decide the validity of an EEOC regulation stating that any charge of employment discrimination filed with the EEOC may later be amended to cure "technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge," and that an amendment verifying the charge "will relate back to the date the charge was first received" by the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).
On June 6, 1997, Leonard Edelman was denied tenure by Lynchburg College. The applicable statute of limitations for his claim was 300 days. On November 14, 1997 (160 days later), Edelman sent a detailed letter to the EEOC alleging discrimination based upon gender and national origin, charging that Lynchburg's dean had denied him tenure because she was systematically purging white men from the faculty. Edelman did not submit a verified formal Charge of Discrimination (on EEOC's "Form 5") until April 15, 1998 — 313 days after the tenure denial. When Edelman sued Lynchburg College, the district court dismissed the claim as time-barred. 66 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780 (W.D. Va. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)).
228 F.3d 503 (2000). The court of appeals held that the EEOC's regulation permitting the verification to relate back to the filing of the initial charge, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), is invalid because it conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which requires that a charge be filed before the limitations period expires, and be in writing under oath or affirmation. "The plain meaning of this language compels the conclusion that if a discrimination claim is not in writing, under oath or affirmation, containing the information and in the form required by the Commission, it is not a charge." 228 F.3d at 508. Edelman's November 14, 1997 verified charge thus did not "relate back" to a timely-filed "charge," but rather revived a claim for which no charge had been timely filed. See id.
Stating that he was "uncomfortable with the broad[] ground for decision set forth in the majority opinion, that verification may never relate back after 180 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory action," Judge Luttig concurred only in the judgment, based on the peculiar facts of this case. 228 F.3d at 512. Judge Luttig pointed out that Title VII does not contain a single provision "stating either by terms or in effect that ‘a verified charge must be filed within 180 days of a discriminatory action'" — in which case the "opinion for the court would * * * be unassailable." Id. "Instead, we are presented with two statutes, the first providing that a charge shall be filed within 180 days of the unlawful employment practice, and the second providing that charges shall be in writing and include an oath or affirmation." Id. Judge Luttig opined that it was thus "at least plausible to read the first statute to require simply that a charge be filed within 180 days, and the second * * * simply to require that, before a charge is finalized, all of the allegations and information required by the EEOC be provided and verified." Id. (emphasis omitted). Further, he observed, Title VII contains no definition of the term "charge," and thus no requirement that, to constitute a charge, a claim must be verified. Id.
3. Family And Medical Leave Act of 1993 — Notice of Leave Designation. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., requires employers to provide eligible employees with 12 weeks of unpaid leave during any 12-month period upon the birth or adoption of a child, to care for a close relative with a serious health condition, or because of the employee's own serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The Secretary of Labor has promulgated regulations providing that an employer must give the employee advance notice that the employer will treat leave taken by the employee as FMLA leave. Under the regulations, if the employer fails to notify an employee that any paid or unpaid leave taken pursuant to company leave policy is also designated as FMLA leave, then the employee will retain his or her right to take 12 additional weeks of leave under the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.700(a), 825.208(c). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., No. 00-6029, to consider whether these regulations are a permissible interpretation of the
Tracy Ragsdale began working at Wolverine Worldwide on March 17, 1996. She was diagnosed with cancer in February, 1996, and requested medical leave on February 21, 1996. Under Wolverine's leave policy, Ragsdale was eligible for seven months unpaid leave, but was obligated to request extensions of her leave every 30 days. Wolverine granted Ragsdale's initial request for leave, and granted the six 30-day extension requests she thereafter made. Because Ragsdale had been employed by Wolverine for only 11 months when she first went on leave, Wolverine believed that she was not covered by the FMLA, which applies only to employees who have been at a company for more than a year. Wolverine therefore never notified Ragsdale that it would count her leave as FMLA leave. On September 20, 1996 — after Ragsdale had taken the full seven months of leave for which she was eligible under Wolverine policy — Wolverine terminated Ragsdale's employment. Ragsdale thereafter requested an additional 12 weeks of FMLA leave, which Wolverine refused to provide.
Ragsdale filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, claiming in relevant part a violation of the FMLA. In an unpublished opinion, the court held that Ragsdale was covered by the FMLA because her time on medical leave counted toward the year of employment required for FMLA eligibility — a decision not presented for review to the Supreme Court. The district court also concluded that the regulations providing that an employer may not retroactively designate leave as FMLA leave were inconsistent with the FMLA and hence invalid. Because Wolverine had provided Ragsdale with considerably more than the 12 weeks of leave required by the FMLA, the court held that the company had satisfied its obligations under the statute.
4. Telecommunications — Federal Jurisdiction to Review State Commission Determinations. In the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TA 96"), Congress fundamentally restructured local telecommunications markets and regulation in the United States. Prior to TA 96, local telecommunications regulation was largely a matter under the control of the individual states. TA 96 creates a new federal regime, under which the Federal Communications Commission and the federal courts have assumed new regulatory and oversight roles. Section 252(e)(6) of TA 96 provides in relevant part:
REVIEW OF STATE COMMISSION ACTIONS. — * * * In any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement * * * meets the requirements of section 251 and this section. Section 252(e)(4) of TA 96 adds that "[n]o state court shall have jurisdiction to review the action of a State commission in approving or rejecting an agreement under this section."
In the five years since TA 96 was enacted, the federal district courts and courts of appeals have struggled with the scope of their jurisdiction under these provisions and whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits under those provisions against state regulators and state regulatory bodies. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., No. 00-878, to resolve conflicts in the circuits concerning (i) the scope of federal jurisdiction under section 252(e)(6) in cases involving a state commission's enforcement of a previously approved section 252 interconnection agreement and (ii) whether the Eleventh Amendment permits a state commission or its individual commissioners to be sued in federal court in such cases. This week the Court granted two petitions for certiorari, arising out of a single Fourth Circuit decision (Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001)), that present an issue that is closely related to the questions that the Court will address in Mathias. Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of Maryland, No. 00-1531, and United States of America v. Public Service Comm'n of Maryland, No. 00-1711 (consolidated) (collectively, "Verizon"). That issue is "[w]hether a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine whether a state commission's action interpreting or enforcing an interconnection agreement violates the 1996 Act." The Supreme Court has set the Mathias and Verizon cases for oral argument in tandem. The Supreme Court's resolution of these issues will have a significant impact on all of those affected by TA 96. Mayer, Brown & Platt represents respondent Illinois Bell Telephone Company d/b/a Ameritech Illinois in the Mathias case.