Source: https://openjurist.org/336/us/301
Timestamp: 2017-11-23 04:01:02
Document Index: 117429889

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 160', '§ 111', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 141', '§ 141', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 964', '§ 13', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 1501', '§ 1501', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 164', '§ 164', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 158']

336 US 301 Algoma Plywood Veneer Co v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board | OpenJurist
336 U.S. 301 - Algoma Plywood Veneer Co v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
69 S.Ct. 584
93 L.Ed. 691
Argued Nov. 18, 1948.
[Argument of Counsel from page 302 intentionally omitted]
At every stage of the proceedings the Company and the Union contested the jurisdiction of the Employment Relations Board on the ground of the exclusive authority of the National Labor Relations Board under § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a), and asserted the repugnancy of Wis.Stat. § 111.06(1)(c) 1 to § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C. § 158(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3). We granted certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(3), because of the important bearing of these issues upon the distribution of power in our federal system. 335 U.S. 812, 69 S.Ct. 55.
The discharge of Moreau and the orders of the Wisconsin Board preceded the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, colloquially known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. The judgments of the Circuit Court for Kewaunee County and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin were rendered after it came into force. If the National Labor Relations Act gave affirmative protection to the employer in discharging an employee under a union-security agreement for failure to maintain union membership, it would be necessary to decide whether adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act retroactively removed that protection and whether it equally gave effect to a reinstatement order, an award of back pay, and a cease and desist order which would previously have been invalid. Since, however, we do not find conflict between the Wisconsin law under which the orders were issued and either the National Labor Relations Act or the Taft-Hartley Act, we are relieved from defining the respective applicability of the federal Acts.
In seeking to show that the Wisconsin Board had no power to make the contested orders, petitioner points first to § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, which is set forth in the margin.1 It argues that the grant to the National Labor Relations Board of 'exclusive' power to prevent 'any unfair labor practice' thereby displaced State power to deal with such practices, provided of course that the practice was one affecting commerce. But this argument implies two equally untenable assumptions. One requires disregard of the parenthetical phrase '(listed in section 8)'; the other depends upon attaching to the section as it stands, the clause 'and no other agency shall have power to prevent unfair labor practices not listed in section 8.'
No ruling by the courts or the National Labor Relations Board, the agency entrusted with administration of the Wagner Act, has adopted a construction of § 8(3) in disregard of this legislative history. It is suggested, however, that the interpretation given the section of the War Labor Board supports petitioner's position. The Board, it is true, in view of the practical desirability of the maintenance-of-membership clause in settling wartime disputes over union security found authority to order contracts containing such clauses despite inconsistent State law. It found such authority, however, not in § 8(3) but in the conclusion that 'its power to direct the parties to abide by the maintenance-of-membership provision in such a case as this one stems directly from the war powers of the United States Government.' Greenebaum Tanning Co., 10 War Lab. Rep. 527, 534.2 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin itself acknowledged the supremacy of the war power in a decision suspending an order directing the reinstatement of an employee discharged under a maintenance-of-membership clause ordered by the War Labor Board. International Brotherhood of Paper-Makers Local No. 66 (A.F.L.) v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 245 Wis. 541, 15 N.W.2d 806. When the orders of the Wisconsin Board in the present case were entered, the War Labor Board had ceased to exist, Exec. Order No. 9672, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 964 note, 11 Fed.Reg. 221, and, with the occasion that had called it into being, the necessity for suppression of State law had also come to an end.3
Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which is set forth in the margin,4 contains important changes, but none requiring modification of the conclusions we have reached as to the corresponding section of the National Labor Relations Act. One phrase, however, reinforces those conclusions; that is the phrase 'inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act.' These words must mean that cession of jurisdiction is to take place only where State and federal laws have parallel provisions. Where the State and federal laws do not overlap, no cession is necessary because the State's jurisdiction is unimpaired. This reading is confirmed by the purpose of the proviso in which the phrase is contained: to meet situations made possible by Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 92 L.Ed. 1234. where no State agency would be free to take jurisdiction of cases over which the National Board had declined jurisdiction. See H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40; S.Minority Rep.No. 105, P. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38.
It is argued, however, that the effect of this section is to displace State law which 'regulates' but does not wholly 'prohibit' agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. But if there could be any doubt that the language of the section means that the Act shall not be construed to authorize any 'application' of a union-security contract, such as discharging an employee, which under the circumstances 'is prohibited' by the State, the legislative history of the section would dispel it. See S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5—7; H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 34, 40, 44; H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60; 93 Cong.Rec. 3554, 3559, 4904, 6383—84, 6446; N.R. 3020, as reported, § 13.
The union appealed to the National War Labor Board to settle the closed shop dispute. That Board, in collaboration with the United States Department of Labor, put pressure on petitioner to yield to the union's demands. Petitioner was informed that unless it agreed to a maintenance of membership clause, which was at the time forbidden by Wisconsin law, the clause 'would be put in by the War Labor Board anyhow' since inclusion of such provisions was a part of that Board's national policy. Thus fired at from one side by the state and from the other side by powerful federal agencies, petitioner had to flee to one side or the other. Neither side offered a safe sanctuary. In weighing the conflicting considerations, petitioner not unreasonably found the scales tipped on the United States' side. Had petitioner refused the demands of the federal agency, the Government could and might have seized and operated its plants.1 Furthermore, petitioner's employees might have stopped work. In response to its best judgment, though contrary to its own strong desires, petitioner finally yielded to the Federal Government's demands and agreed to the union's terms. January 23, 1943, a collective bargaining agreement was executed which contained the controversial maintenance of union membership clause and an automatic extension clause. This contract was approved by the War Labor Board. The controversial clause was extended automatically from year to year and was in effect when the alleged discharge took place. The Court apparently concedes that this clause of the collective bargaining contract was valid when petitioner entered into it under federal compulsion. In my judgment it was equally valid when the employee was discharged under it. It seems at least a questionable interpretation of federal statutory policy for this Court—a federal tribunal—to hold that a state is free to impose a money penalty on this company for acting in obedience to a contract which a federal agency validly compelled it to make.2
2. That the President correctly assumed the continued existence of war powers after the cessation of hostilities seems beyond question in the light of this Court's holding in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166—170, 68 S.Ct. 1429, 1432-1434. The holding in the Ludecke case was that the war had not at that time officially ended and that the congressional war power still existed in May, 1947 This was long after the dissolution of the War Labor Board and the employee's discharge. In light of the 1947 Ludecke holding it seems odd that dissolution of the War Labor Board should now be held an adequate reason for permitting a state in 1946 to invalidate contracts previously entered into in obedience to federal commands made under a valid federal law rooted in the war power. It seems to me that the Court's holding today can be justified if at all only by adopting the holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in this case. That court supported the state penalty imposed on petitioner by concluding that the National War Lanor Board's action was ultra vires. Its reasoning was that national war powers had 'ended' in 1946. 252 Wis. 549, at page 560, 32 N.W.2d 417. But in the Ludecke case this Court held those powers still existed in 1947. The result here is all the more inexplicable when it is considered that wholesale invalidation of those federally authorized contracts could result in serious industrial conflicts at a time when industrial relationships were extremely strained due to the transition from a war to a peace economy. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144, 68 S.Ct. 421, 424.
It is apparent that the Wisconsin statute as here applied deprives petitioner and his employees of a substantial federal right if § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act3 authorized union membership maintenance agreements without regard to contrary state policies. For given that interpretation of § 8(3), the Wisconsin Act would not only impair collective bargaining rights protected by § 8(3);4 it would also stand 'as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' Hill v. State of Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 542, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 1375, 89 L.Ed. 1782; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Board, 330 U.S. 767, 775-776, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 91 L.Ed. 1234.
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board began proceedings against the petitioner eleven years after passage of the National L bor Relations Act. During that entire eleven-year period it seems to have been generally assumed that § 8(3) was an unequivocal federal authorization for collective bargaining provisions of the type here made. This Court had noticed that such provisions were 'frequent subjects of negotiation between employers and employees,' and had strongly indicated that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain concerning them. National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 360, 60 S.Ct. 569, 575, 576, 84 L.Ed. 799. Both the courts and the National Labor Relations Board have held that efforts of employers to frustrate the right of unions to bargain for exclusive union employment constituted a violation of the federal Act for which employers could be held accountable.5
The action of the United States Department of Labor and the National War Labor Board in forcing this petitioner to accept a maintenance of membership provision in its collective bargaining agreement was not the result of an isolated or haphazard interpretation of § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The action forced upon petitioner was pursuant to a thoroughly considered and well-established policy of the National War Labor Board.6 Both the National War Labor Board and the conciliation division of the United States Department of Labor were charged with special duties in regard to labor disputes by the War Labor Disputes Act of June 25, 1943, 57 Stat. 163, 50 U.S.C.Appendix, §§ 1501—1511, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 1501—1511. And the War Labor Disputes Act required both these federal agencies to conform to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. In order that these government agencies might be better able to carry out their statutory duty of conforming to the National Labor Relations Act, an interdepartmental committee was established. It consisted of representatives of the National Labor Relations Board, the Department of Labor, and the National War Labor Board. This committee was vested with power to discuss and consider policy questions and other problems relating to administration of the duties of the National Labor Relations Board and the National War Labor Board. This power was exercised. Rep.N.L.R.B. 74 (1943).
As early as April, 1942, the National War Labor Board in the Little Steel Companies' controversy, 1 War Lab.Rep. 325, asserted its power to require that contracts for maintenance of union membership be inserted in collective bargaining agreements. It reached the conclusion, see pp. 354—356, that such collective bargaining provisions were valid because they fell within the proviso of § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. From then on until 1945, when its last decisions were made, the National War Labor Board continued to require maintenance of membership contracts.7
The most extensive discussion of the question directly involved in this case occurred in the National War Labor Board's opinion in Greenebaum Tanning Co., 10 War Lab.Rep. 527. Greenebaum Tanning Co., a Wisconsin business, was engaged in interstate commerce and therefore was covered by the National Labor Relations Act. In the Greenebaum case, the National War Labor Board had to decide whether it could enforce a maintenance of union membership contract in Wisconsin contrary to the provisions of the very Wisconsin statute relied on by the Wisconsin Board in this case. It was decided over the strenuous objection of the company that the National War Labor Board had power to enforce contracts such as petitioner made here, despite the conflicting Wisconsin statute.8 The Board found its power to override the state law in the war powers of the President, the War Labor Disputes Act, and the National Labor Relations Act. The National War Labor Board pointed out in the Greenebaum decision that, at the request of the President of the United States, it had first considered with the National Labor Relations Board the questions of the power of these Boards in cases such as the Greenebaum case. In holding that § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act granted the employers and employees the right to make maintenance of union membership agreements, the Board at p. 543 stated: 'The Board is satisfied that, were it not for the existence of the war emergency, the employees involved in this case would have had the right to demand maintenance of membership in favor of the designated representative of a majority of employees. This right is granted to the employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and is a right which could be enforced in peacetime by strike. If the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act requires more than a majority of employees to vote for maintenance of membership under those circumstances, it must be subordinated to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.'
The foregoing is evidence that up to the time the Taft-Hartley Act was passed by Congress in 1947, § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act had been accepted by government agencies as an unequivocal authorization for maintenance of union membership contracts. The Taft-Hartley Act expressly granted the states more leeway in regard to enforcement of their own policies as to contracts of the type here involved. 61 Stat. 136, 151, 29 U.S.C. § 164, 29 U.S.C.A. § 164. And the National Labor Relations Board has now construed the new federal Act as precluding such contracts to the same extent that they are precluded by state law.9 But it is significant that this interpretation rested entirely on the language and legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Board did not indicate any belief that this phase of the new Taft-Hartley Act was a mere clarification of the old Act.
The new interpretation given § 8(3) by the Court rests on the conclusion that the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress intended to leave states free to bar the type of contract here involved. The committee reports and legislative comments on the national Act set out in the Court's opinion do lend strong support to this contention. In the light of this legislative history, I would join in the Court's interpretation of § 8(3) if we were interpreting that section on a clean slate. But we are not. The section has a history of administrative interpretation counter to the one that the Court gives it today. The language of § 8(3)10 is reasonably susceptible of the interpretation the section was given by the Conciliation Division of the United States Department of Labor and by the National War Labor Board, an interpretation to which the National Labor Relations Board appears to have assented. And, as previously pointed out, the National Labor Relations Board held this very petitioner guilty of an unfair labor practice for its refusal to bargain with its Wisconsin employees on their demand for a closed shop. Algoma Plywood Co., supra at 994, 998. This N.L.R.B. finding was in 1940, a year after the passage of the Wisconsin Act here held controlling. I think a change in the interpretation of § 8(3) should not be made at this late date, when the section is no longer the law, merely to invalidate a contract made under federal compulsion and founded on a justifiable belief that § 8(3) authorized the contract. I would not make a trap of this settled administrative interpretation by subjecting this employer to penal damages for his good faith reliance on it. See National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 123, 64 S.Ct. 851, 856, 857, 88 L.Ed. 1170.
Although some language in the Greenebaum opinion seems to point to an interpretation of § 8(3) inconsistent with its legislative history, see 10 War Lab.Rep. at 542—43, the Board adopted as its own the conclusion of its General Counsel, Mr. Lloyd K. Garrison, reached in a full-dress opinion which reviewed that history. 10 War Lab.Rep. at 541. The General Counsel had said: 'The National Labor Relations Act does not preclude a government agency from ordering maintenance of membership in suitable cases for the purpose of settling disputes and stabilizing industrial relations in time of war.' 12 War Lab.Rep. ix, xxii. The next two cases ordering a maintenance-of-membership contract which would not have been permitted by State law did not mention the National Labor Relations Act. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 11 War Lab.Rep. 217; Vilter Mfg. Co., 11 War Lab.Rep. 332. In later cases, the Board adhered to its reliance upon the war power. U.S. Vanadium Corp., 13 War Lab.Rep. 527; Ingalls Iron Works Co., 17 War Lab.Rep. 190; Cudahy Bros. Co., 19 War Lab.Rep. 124.
'Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
'(3) By discrimination in regard to hire to tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, * * * or in any code or agreement approved or prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization * * * to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unti covered by such agreement when made.' 49 Stat. 449, 452, 29 U.S.C. § 158(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3).