Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98156/parker-vs-fleming
Timestamp: 2017-05-29 18:33:45
Document Index: 779231123

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 203', '§ 204', '§ 2', '§ 902', '§ 204', '§ 203', '§ 204', '§ 203']

Parker Vs Fleming - Citation 98156 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Parker Vs. Fleming - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98156CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJan-20-1947Case Number329 U.S. 531AppellantParkerRespondentFlemingExcerpt:.....syllabus
the tenants were "subject to" the order, within the meaning of § 203(a) of the act, and had a right to file a protest with the administrator, and were entitled, under § 204(a) of the act, to judicial review of the administrator's dismissal of their protest. pp.
329 u. s. 533
329 u. s. 538
the price administrator dismissed petitioners' protest against an order issued by him under rent regulations promulgated pursuant to the emergency price control act. the emergency court of appeals..... Judgment:
Parker v. Fleming - 329 U.S. 531 (1947)
The Price Administrator dismissed petitioners' protest against an order issued by him under rent regulations promulgated pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act. The Emergency Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' complaint. 154 F.2d 830. This Court granted certiorari. 328 U.S. 828. The Temporary Controls Administrator was substituted for the Price Administrator as the respondent in this Court.
Petitioners are tenants of a New York apartment house. Their landlords applied for a certificate from the New York Area Rent Director authorizing eviction proceedings in the State courts. [
] Section 6 of the Rent Regulations for New York City, issued by the Price Administrator under authority of § 2 of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632, 50 U.S.C.App.Supp. V, § 902, prohibits landlords from instituting such proceedings except under certain specific conditions not here relevant, [
] or when a special certificate authorizing eviction is issued by the Area Rent Director upon his finding, for example, that failure to authorize eviction would impose "substantial hardship" upon the landlords. [
In this case, the Area Rent Director refused to issue the requested certificate after extensive hearings at which both the landlords and the tenants presented evidence. Denial was based on a finding that the landlords had wholly failed to meet the regulation's conditions; that their request was part of a concerted plan to evade the Price Control Act, and that a fraud had been perpetrated against the OPA. The Regional Rent Director affirmed this ruling. On protest by the landlords, the Price Administrator reversed the ruling of the Area Director and ordered that the certificate be issued. Petitioners thereupon filed a protest of their own with the Administrator. When the Administrator dismissed this protest, they sought relief in the Emergency Court of Appeals, complaining that the Administrator's order was "not in accordance with law" and was "arbitrary and capricious." On motion of the Administrator, that action was dismissed on the ground that petitioners were not "subject to" the Administrator's order, and therefore had no right to protest or have judicial review of the dismissal of their protest.
Parker v. Porter,
154 F.2d 830. [
] We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue raised. 328 U.S. 828.
Under § 204(b), that Court can enjoin or set aside the protested "order" in whole or in part only if it is satisfied that the order "[i]s not in accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious." But § 203(a) denies the right to make a "protest" upon which review may be had to all but persons who are "subject to any provision of such . . . order." The Emergency Court of Appeals did not question that the petitioners were "aggrieved," within the meaning of § 204(b) by the Administrator's special order authorizing their landlord to institute legal proceedings to evict them from their apartments.
-477. Review was denied solely on the ground that they were not "subject to" that order within the meaning of § 203(a).
In deciding a case concerning review of the Administrator's order granting a special exception to one of his general regulations, we are mindful that the legislative history of the Price Control Act strongly indicates that judicial review of the Administrator's general regulations and orders was intended by Congress to be limited to relatively few of the millions of people who would be more or less affected by them. Congress did not provide for protest and judicial review of general price orders by the great mass of consumers because of an apprehension that this might cause delay and difficulty in administering the Price Control Act with the efficiency and expedition deemed necessary to accomplish its broad purpose. [
] Only a few categories of persons whom the Act affected and whose protests, if reviewed, would not have these consequences were specifically permitted by the Act to protest and have
general price orders affecting them judicially reviewed. [
] The Administrator and the courts have adhered to this congressional policy.
See e.g., Yakus v. United States,
Procedural Regulation No. 1 of the Office of Price Administration, 7 Fed.Reg. 971, defined a person as "subject to" a general price regulation or order, and therefore entitled to protest and obtain judicial review of it, only when such regulation or order "prohibits or requires action by him." The Emergency Court of Appeals sustained the regulation which contained this definition.
Buka Coal Co. v. Brown,
133 F.2d 949, 952. But, in other special situations not directly involving general price-fixing orders, the words "subject to" have been construed more broadly by the Administrator and the Emergency Court of Appeals.
Revised Procedural Regulation No. 1, 7 F.R. 8961, promulgated by the Administrator, provides that agricultural producers may protest an order which denies them a subsidy granted by Congress as one of the mechanisms of the price control program, the regulation stating that such a producer "shall be considered to be subject to a maximum price regulation." And, in
Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder,
151 F.2d 337, the Emergency Court of Appeals held that meat packers, denied such a subsidy under regulations of the Defense Supplies Corporation promulgated under the same authority on which Office of Price Administration orders were based, were subject to and could protest against such regulations. The Court there said that:
Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, supra,
Whether the regulations gave the tenants a "vested right" to remain in possession is not decisive of their right to protest or obtain judicial review. However that may be, general regulations prohibited these landlords from evicting the tenants unless the Administrator granted a certificate. The Emergency Price Control Act was intended in part to prevent excessive rents in the public interest, [
] and the very anti-eviction regulations under
which the Administrator granted the eviction certificate here were specifically designed to prevent manipulative renting practices which would result in excessive rents. [
] Those regulations have been held valid by the Emergency Court of Appeals,
137 F.2d 654, 662, 663, and their validity is not here challenged. If these tenants cannot "protest" this order issued under these regulations, no one can, and if they cannot challenge it in the Emergency
This situation is altogether different, in terms of administrative complications and the impact of the order on the individual, from one in which a consumer member of the public wishes to attack a general price-fixing regulation which will require him to pay higher prices, or even a tenant to pay higher rent. For this reason, the legislative history relied on by the Administrator, thought to indicate a purpose not to make such general price-fixing orders open to widespread challenge, has no relevancy here. While the scope of judicial review authorized by the Act is a limited one,
at 339, we think that these tenants were entitled to have their protest considered by the Administrator, and that the Emergency Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of their complaint.
The congressional purpose in this regard has been summarized in our previous decisions in
321 U. S. 431
321 U. S. 439
321 U. S. 441
321 U. S. 513
Section 4(a) of the Act, lists the classes of persons to be punished for disobedience of the provisions of a regulation or order, and therefore,
"subject to" it as sellers of commodities, buyers of commodities in the course of business, and landlords.