Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-perkins-23971
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 06:21:35
Document Index: 693642755

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1930', '§ 157', '§ 4510', '§ 31', '§ 211', '§ 31']

People v. Perkins - 37 Cal.2d 62 - Fri, 04/27/1951 | California Supreme Court Resources
Citation 37 Cal.2d 62
People v. Perkins , 37 Cal.2d 62
On this appeal from a judgment of conviction of first degree robbery defendant attacks the holding of the trial court that a 1949 amendment of a provision of section 1203 of the Penal Code did not change the meaning of that section. Prior to such amendment the applicable portion of the section required that "probation shall not be [37 Cal.2d 63] granted to any defendant who shall have been convicted of robbery ... and who at the time of the perpetration of said crime ... was armed with a deadly weapon ..." [1] It was settled case law that the section forbade the granting of probation to one who, although not personally armed with a deadly weapon, acted with a companion who was so armed. (People v. Gillstarr (1933), 132 Cal.App. 267 [22 P.2d 549]; People v. Lewis (1934), 140 Cal.App. 475, 477 [35 P.2d 561]; see People v. Stevens (1939), 32 Cal.App.2d 666, 669 [90 P.2d 595].) The material portion of the 1949 amendment added the word "himself" to the above quoted portion of section 1203, so that it now forbids probation to one convicted of robbery who "was himself armed with a deadly weapon." We have concluded that this amendment was intended to and did change the rule of the above cited cases.
[2] It is presumed that the Legislature knew of the judicial construction of its statute and that by amending the portion of the statute construed it intended to change the law. (Anderson v. I. M. Jameson Corp. (1936), 7 Cal.2d 60, 67 [59 P.2d 962]; Prager v. Isreal (1940), 15 Cal.2d 89, 94 [98 P.2d 729]; In re Halcomb (1942), 21 Cal.2d 126, 129 [130 P.2d 384]; McFadden v. Jordan (1948), 32 Cal.2d 330, 334 [196 P.2d 787]; Lundquist v. Lundstrom (1928), 94 Cal.App. 109, 112 [270 P. 696]; see, also, 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), § 1930.) Ordinarily (and there is nothing to suggest that this is not an ordinary case) the Legislature uses words for some reason and intends them to [37 Cal.2d 64] have some meaning. "The very fact that the prior act is amended demonstrates the intent to change the pre- existing law, and the presumption must be that it was intended to change the statute in all the particulars touching which we find a material change in the language of the act." (United States v. Bashaw (1892), 50 F. 749, 754, quoted with approval in People v. Weitzel (1927) 201 Cal. 116, 118 [225 P. 792, 52 A.L.R. 811], and in Loew's Inc. v. Byram (1938), 11 Cal.2d 746, 750 [82 P.2d 1]; see, also, People v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal.2d 121, 142 [169 P.2d 1]; 23 Cal.Jur., Statutes, §§ 157, 158; 2 Sutherland, op. cit., §§ 4510, 4705.)
[3] It should be noted that, as correctly held by the trial court, the fact that defendant Perkins was not "himself" armed with a "dangerous or deadly weapon" does not make him any the less, in a legal sense, guilty of robbery in the first degree, which is defined by section 211a fn. 1 of the Penal Code. Perkins is guilty of first degree robbery, regardless of the precise acts which he committed personally, because he aided and abetted in its commission (Pen. Code, § 31 fn. 2). Indeed it was by analogy to this rule, which makes all willful participants in a crime guilty as principals, that it was originally held that a defendant in the situation of Perkins could [37 Cal.2d 65] not have probation (People v. Gillstarr (1933), supra, 132 Cal.App. 267, 269; People v. Lewis (1934), supra, 140 Cal.App. 475, 477) and was subject to the minimum sentence required of those armed with a deadly weapon (People v. Stevens (1939), supra, 32 Cal.App.2d 666, 669).
­FN 1. Penal Code, § 211a: "All robbery which is perpetrated by torture or by a person being armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon is robbery in the first degree."
­FN 2. Penal Code, § 31: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime ... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, ... are principals in any crime so committed."
Fri, 04/27/1951 37 Cal.2d 62 Review - Criminal Appeal Opinion issued
2 , v. CHARLES DAVIS PERKINS, Appellant. (, v. CHARLES DAVIS PERKINS)
SCOCAL, People v. Perkins , 37 Cal.2d 62 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-perkins-23971) (last visited Friday August 7, 2020).