Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170407_0002293.PA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-06-26 19:19:11
Document Index: 357359280

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6302', '§ 6336', '§\n6336', '§ 6336', '§ 6336', '§ 6351', '§ 6336']

| In re L.T.
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.T. AND D.T., MINOR CHILDREN ADJUDICATED DEPENDENTv.APPEAL OF: A.Z., NATURAL MOTHER APPEAL OF: A.Z., NATURAL MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: L.T. AND D.T., MINOR CHILDREN ADJUDICATED DEPENDENT
from the Order Entered June 6, 2016 In the Court of Common
Pleas of Erie County Civil Division at No(s): 25 and 26 2016.
("Mother") appeals from the respective orders
entered on June 6, 2016, wherein the juvenile court changed
the permanent placement goals of her two children, L.T. and
D.T., from reunification to adoption.[1] In addition, Mother appeals
the June 16, 2016 order that awarded Erie County Office of
Children and Youth Services ("CYS") authority to
make all medical determinations, including end of life
decisions, relating to D.T.[2] We reverse the permanency review
order relating to L.T., dismiss the appeal from the order
relating to D.T.'s end of life decisions, and remand for
and D.T. were born during October 2014 and September 2015,
respectively. D.T. died on July 15, 2016 as a result of
non-accidental traumatic brain injuries sustained during
February 2016, while in the care of N.T.
("Father").[3] Specifically, then-four-month-old D.T.
sustained a skull fracture and hematoma on the right side of
his brain. The child presented at UPMC Hamot in Erie,
Pennsylvania, unresponsive and in critical condition due to
elevated intracranial pressure. He was subsequently
transferred to Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh. The
physicians characterized D.T.'s injuries as near-fatal
obtained protective custody of the siblings and filed
petitions alleging that L.T. and D.T. were dependent under
§ 6302 of the Juvenile Act, in that they lacked proper
parental care and control. On March 16, 2016, Mother and
Father stipulated to the adjudications of dependency for the
reasons that CYS stated in its petitions. Significantly,
aggravated circumstances were neither alleged in the
dependency petitions nor found by the trial court to exist
against either parent.[4] The juvenile court awarded CYS legal and
physical custody of the children. D.T. remained in a
medically induced coma at Children's Hospital of
Pittsburgh, where he was expected to remain hospitalized
indefinitely. CYS placed L.T. in kinship care with her
maternal grandmother ("Grandmother").
court-ordered permanency goal was reunification, and the
juvenile court granted Mother a pair of two-hour supervised
visitations with L.T. per week at Grandmother's home.
However, Mother, who was recovering from an automobile
collision that Father intentionally caused, was prohibited
from residing in the home with her daughter. Mother was
granted visitation with D.T. "as often as she is able to
visit" the medical facility. Dispositional Order,
4/8/16, at 3. Although the Commonwealth had not yet leveled
criminal charges against Father, the juvenile court suspended
Father's visitation with D.T. indefinitely and precluded
Father from supervised visitation with L.T. until he
demonstrated compliance with the sobriety and parenting
components of the court-ordered services. Prior to making any
progress toward the visitation prerequisite, Father was
arrested in the underlying criminal case and confined to
county jail. Given the seriousness of the dependency case,
the juvenile court fashioned an abbreviated calendar and
scheduled the first permanency review hearing on June 1,
2016, approximately thirty days from the date of the
outset of the June 2016 hearing, CYS noted the presence in
the court room of an unidentified media outlet and objected
to its participation in the closed juvenile proceeding. The
respective guardians ad litem for both children,
Mother, and Father all joined the agency's objection. The
juvenile court overruled the collective objections noting
that, "given the fact that this case already [garnered]
a significant amount of media attention because of
[Father's] criminal cases[, ]" no compelling state
interest existed to close the court room. N.T., 6/1/16, at 4.
Accordingly, the juvenile court permitted the media to attend
the permanency review hearing. Id. at 6.
in addressing the proposed testimony of D.T.'s nurse
regarding the child's status, treatment, and prognosis,
the trial court noted, sua sponte, that it was
contemplating changing both children's permanency goals
from reunification to adoption. Specifically, the court
stated, "The agency is recommending a goal of
reunification, but from what I'm looking at in the
summary [prepared by the CYS caseworker], I am not sure
I'll go along with it. So for all intents and purposes
this is a change of goal hearing." Id. at 7.
the hearing, CYS presented the testimony of Patty Bush, the
CYS caseworker assigned to the family, and Tina Ferraro, the
director of Project First Step, the organization tasked with
providing Mother reunification and visitation services. As
noted supra, D.T.'s nurse testified about his
current condition, and Mother testified on her own behalf.
Distilled to its essence, the combined testimony from the
agency's two witnesses branded Mother as immature,
possessing a mentality of entitlement, and dependent upon
others for satisfying routine obligations. For example,
expecting to be evicted from subsidized housing on the day of
the hearing due to the non-payment of utilities, both
witnesses stressed that Mother resided in squalor and lacked
any concrete plans to obtain suitable housing. In sum, Mother
did not demonstrate the urgency that Ms. Bush and Ms. Ferraro
believed the situation demanded.
the witnesses both testified that, while Mother's current
situation remained unacceptable, she had made an effort
toward reunification during the brief period that they were
involved in the case. Specifically, Ms. Bush stated that
Mother started, but had not yet completed, a psychological
evaluation and parenting and domestic violence programs.
Indeed, CYS's petition for a permanency hearing and the
summary that Ms. Bush prepared for the juvenile court in
anticipation of that hearing recommended that the agency
continue providing Mother reunification services. During the
hearing, however, she expanded the recommendation to include
"looking for an adoptive resource for [L.T.]"
Ms. Ferraro indicated that Mother had not progressed in the
one month that she had been in the program. She had various
interactions with Mother, including the intake interview and
two supervised visitations with L.T. Ms. Ferraro
characterized Mother's demeanor as agitated and
defensive, and she noted her primary concern that Mother
appeared to lack motivation. Nonetheless, Ms. Ferraro did not
recommend terminating services at that juncture. To the
contrary, she stated, "I will work with her as long as
she's willing to work on herself." Id. at
close of evidence, the juvenile court invited brief argument
about the children's permanency goals. It stated,
"I'm certainly not leaving the goal of
reunification." Id. at 101. Mother and Father
persisted in arguing that reunification was an appropriate
goal in light of the fact that the family had only been in
service for two and one-half months. Similarly, L.T.'s
guardian ad litem recommended concurrent goals of
reunification and adoption because the dependency proceeding
was in an early stage. Id. at 105 ("Having said
that, we are only two and a half months in[.]").
D.T.'s guardian ad litem advocated changing the
goals to adoption. Id. at 105. Likewise, while
CYS's pre-hearing filings recommended continuing the
goals of reunification, following the hearing, the agency
argued to change the goals to adoption. Thereafter, the trial
court announced its intention to change the children's
permanency goals to adoption. Two days later, the juvenile
court entered a permanency review order memorializing the
goal change and directing CYS to cease its services to
Mother, including visitations, and to pursue the termination
of parental rights. Mother filed a timely appeal and a
concomitant statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1925(b).
as the dependency matter proceeded toward the permanency
hearing that resulted in the goal change, D.T.'s guardian
ad litem, Stephen George, Esquire, filed and
withdrew multiple petitions seeking the juvenile court's
guidance concerning D.T.'s end-of-life decisions.
Attorney George filed the most recent iteration of his
entreaty on June 10, 2016, with the benefit of the medical
testimony presented during the permanency hearing. During the
ensuing hearing on Attorney George's petition, it was
revealed that D.T. was technologically dependent,
i.e., required specialized medical equipment for
life support, but he was not in an emergent state that
required "heroic efforts . . . to sustain his
life." N.T., 6/16/16, at 5. Albert Veverka, Esquire, the
attorney representing Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh,
characterized D.T.'s condition as neither requiring nor
precluding a do not resuscitate ("DNR") order. He
summarized the perspective of the supervising physician,
Robert Clark, M.D., as follows: "If . . . a mother or
father . . . came . . . and said . . . [']I want a DNR,
['] [Dr. Clark] would say . . . [']Okay, we can do
that.[']" Id. However, "[i]f the same
situation arose and the parents . . . said . . . [']I
don't want a DNR at this point, [Dr. Clark] would say . .
. [']Okay, I respect that [too']. He is of the
opinion that[, ] at this point in time[, ] we're not in
that emergent circumstance where a DNR is absolutely
necessary or absolutely not necessary." Id.
close of the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order
confirming that the prior award of legal custody in favor of
CYS included the responsibility over "all medical
decisions, . . . including end-of-life decisions, in the best
interest of the dependent child, [D.T.]." Trial Court
Order, 6/16/16, (unnumbered at 2). The juvenile court
reasserted that Mother was not only prohibited from
contacting D.T. directly, but that she also was precluded
from contacting Children's Hospital for updates on his
condition. Eventually, the juvenile court relented and
permitted Mother one final visitation with her son prior to
his death. Trial Court Order, 7/14/16. Mother filed a timely
appeal from the June 16, 2016 order, which we consolidated
with her earlier appeal from the order changing the
children's permanency goals to adoption.
presents five issues for our review:
A. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of
discretion and/or error of law when it permitted, over
unanimous objection, the presence of the media at the
permanency review hearing held on June 1, 2016.
B. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of
discretion and /or error of law when the agency petitioned
for a change of goal and the juvenile court considered the
change of goal without providing adequate notice to the
parties that a change of goal was to be contemplated at the
C. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of
discretion and/or error of law when it determined the current
permanency goal of reunification was no longer feasible and
dispensed with the goal of reunification after only one (1)
month and twenty-seven (27) days when the record failed to
support a conclusion that it was in the best interest of the
minor child to change the goal.
D. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of
discretion and/or error of law when it determined that
visitation should cease between the appellant and the minor
children following the change of goal to adoption when the
record failed to support a conclusion that it was in the best
interests of the minor children to no longer have visitation
E. Whether the juvenile court committed an abuse of
discretion and/or error of law when it denied the appellant
the opportunity to participate in the medical decision making
for the minor children. In the alternative, whether the
juvenile court was manifestly unreasonable when it denied the
appellant the opportunity to participate in the medical
decision making for the minor children. In the alternative,
whether the juvenile court deprived the appellant of her
rights under the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions
when it denied her the right to participate in the care and
control of her minor children in violation of due process of
outset, we address whether the trial court erred in
permitting the media to attend the June 1, 2016 permanency
review hearing.[5] We review the juvenile court's
decision for an abuse of discretion. In re M.B., 819
A.2d 59, 61 (Pa.Super. 2003) ("When an appeal challenges
a trial court's decision to grant or deny access to
judicial proceedings, we will reverse only if we find that
the trial court abused its discretion.").
to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336(d), except for a declaration of
contempt of court or one of the enumerated circumstances that
are implicated in delinquency proceedings, "the general
public shall be excluded from hearings under this
chapter." The provision continues, "Only the
parties, their counsel, witnesses, the victim and counsel for
the victim, other persons accompanying a party or a victim
for his or her assistance, and any other person as the court
finds have a proper interest in the proceeding or in the work
of the court shall be admitted by the court."
Id. Hence, it is beyond cavil that the statutory
framework promotes confidentiality.
In re M.B., supra, this Court addressed
whether the press could access a dependency proceeding.
Citing the Juvenile Act approvingly, we found that §
6336(d) "demonstrate[d] our legislature's compelling
interest in safeguarding children involved in juvenile
proceedings." Id. at 62. However, referring to
an official comment to § 6336(d) specifying that
reporters were within the class of people with a "proper
interest" in attending dependency proceedings, we
observed that a juvenile court may elect at its discretion to
grant the press access. Id. at 65. We found a
rebuttable constitutional presumption that juvenile court
proceedings, like most other judicial proceedings, are open
to the public, and concluded that juvenile courts
"possess an inherent power to control access to their
proceedings and may deny access when appropriate."
Id. at 60, 62-63. However, we also recognized that
the rebuttable presumption of openness is not absolute, and
the juvenile courts may still deny access if they find that
confidentiality serves an important governmental interest and
no less restrictive means exist to serve that interest.
explained the applicable resolution of the contrasting
dynamics between the presumption of openness and the
court's inherent power to control access as follows:
In this case, where the constitutional presumption of
openness applies and where the trial court has exercised its
discretion to close the proceedings, we employ a
constitutional analysis [to determine whether the court's
decision was an abuse of discretion]. Once an interested
party, such as the press, seeks access to such proceedings,
the party seeking to keep the proceedings closed may rebut
the presumption of openness by demonstrating that: (1) the
denial of public access serves an important governmental
interest, and (2) no less restrictive means to serve that
interest exists. To satisfy these requirements, the party
seeking closure must demonstrate that the material is the
kind of information that the courts will protect and that
there is good cause for the order to issue. A party
establishes good cause by showing that opening the
proceedings will work a clearly defined and serious injury to
the party seeking closure. We have emphasized that only a
compelling government interest justifies closure and then
only by a means narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Ultimately, the decision whether to grant or deny public
access is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Id. at 63-64 (internal citations and quotations
omitted). In sum, we concluded that the protection of minors
from psychological and emotional harm and the trauma and
embarrassment associated with testifying in public were
compelling interests that militated in favor of privacy
concerns. Id. at 64, 65. We also reasoned that,
unlike delinquency proceedings, dependent children have not
brought attention upon themselves and therefore "the
public's interest is less keen than it is in delinquency
proceedings." Id. at 65 n.5. In addition, this
Court observed the informal and non-adversarial nature of
dependency hearings and highlighted the chilling effect that
publicity associated with open proceedings would have upon
the testimony of caseworkers and service providers.
addressing this issue in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the
juvenile court concluded that Mother "failed to show a
compelling reason why the hearing ought to be closed."
Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/16, at 16. The court initially
reasoned that Mother did not have standing to challenge the
media's presence on behalf of the children, presumably
because they had been adjudicated dependent, and that she
failed to demonstrate an injury to herself. Thereafter, the
court provided an alternative basis to reject Mother's
argument on its merits, which was the children's ages.
juvenile court's rationale demonstrates its
misapprehension of the relevant concerns regarding the
children's interests that we stressed in
In re M.B., supra. First, despite the
juvenile court's suggestion to the contrary, Mother was
not required to assert that she would suffer harm as a result
of opening the proceedings. As we explained supra,
the focus of the constitutional analysis is the effect of the
media's intrusion upon the children. Therefore, any
reference to Mother's privacy rights is misplaced.
Second, regardless of the dependency adjudication,
Mother's parental rights remained intact. Thus, she
retained a fundamental interest in the care, custody, and
control of L.T. and D.T., including the preservation of
privacy concerns and the prevention of psychological and
emotional harm flowing from the invasion of their privacy
rights. Hence, we reject the juvenile court's conclusion
that Mother lacked standing to object to the media's
presence at the dependency hearing.
we also find unpersuasive the trial court's alternative
argument addressing the merits of Mother's complaint.
Essentially, the trial court determined, "given the
media attention this case received because of the criminal
charges filed against the father, and the young age of the
children, allowing the press to be present at the review
hearing posed little or no danger their privacy interests
would be invaded more than had already taken place."
Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/16, at 16. Noting the
children's respective ages and the fact that D.T. is now
deceased, the juvenile court reasoned that the children would
not suffer psychological and emotional harm as a result of
the media's intrusion. For the following reasons, we
disagree with the juvenile court's conclusion that the
intrusion would not cause psychological or emotional harm.
we note that this case is procedurally defective. Typically,
in situations involving hearings that are closed to the
public by statute, the party seeking access to the closed
proceedings files a petition to open the hearing, and upon
notice of the petition, the party seeking to keep the record
closed is tasked with rebutting the presumption of openness
under the two-pronged test we discussed supra.
See e.g., In re M.B., supra;
In re J.B., 39 A.3d 421 (Pa.Super 2012). This
procedure did not occur in the case at bar.
the still unidentified media outlet neglected to file a
petition announcing its request to open the closed
proceeding. It just appeared at the scheduled permanency
review hearing. Then, without prior notice to the parties,
the juvenile court acknowledged the media's presence and
asked the parties if they wanted to address that issue.
Thereafter, the parties uniformly objected to the media's
participation, and the court questioned, "How do we know
really know that the media is going to invade the privacy of
the children. . . [?]" N.T., 6/1/16, at 5. Then, after
rebuffing an attempt by the guardian ad litem for
L.T. to explain the legislatures' interest in enacting
the confidentiality component of § 6336(d), the juvenile
court invoked its interpretation of In re M.B., and
purported to balance the children's privacy rights
against the public interest in disclosure and determined,
"given the attention the media has already given to this
case, [the collective objections do not demonstrate] how the
public interest is overridden here." N.T., 6/1/16, at 6.
Having found that the public interest prevailed over the
children's privacy rights, the juvenile court did not
confront whether a less restrictive means existed to protect
the children's privacy rights other than the total
closure of the dependency proceedings.
procedural defects in this case are manifest. By failing to
require the media to provide a written petition to open the
dependency hearing, or even issue notice of its request, the
juvenile court denied the parties to the dependency
proceeding an opportunity to prepare a measured response that
addressed the relevant aspects of the constitutional
analysis. The juvenile court's abridged, impromptu
discussion regarding the merits of opening the dependency
hearing to the media was insufficient in light of the nuanced
evaluation of the countervailing interests that we outlined
in In re M.B., and ultimately proved to be a
disservice to the children's privacy interest.
we reject the juvenile court's argument that publicizing
the dependency proceedings was harmless due to potential
dissemination of information during Father's
corresponding criminal matter. At its core, the trial
court's reasoning is premised upon the notion that the
related criminal case had revealed all of the facts
previously hidden. The logical foundation of that rationale
is faulty. First, the premise ignores the reality that the
majority of the information discussed during closed
permanency review hearings is wholly irrelevant to the
Commonwealth's case against Father or his defense, and
therefore, it would not be disclosed in the criminal
proceedings. For instance, pursuant to § 6351(e),
permanency review hearings address, inter alia, the
feasibility and compliance with the permanency plan, the date
by which permanency goals might be achieved and whether
placement continues to be best suited to the child's
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare. In
addition, the juvenile court must also determine the
appropriateness and continuing necessity for placement, the
appropriateness of the current placement goal, and the date
by which the placement goal might be achieved. In scenarios
where the children do not testify, this information is
gleaned from the testimony provided by parents, foster
parents, caseworkers and service providers.
criminal case, which the juvenile court cited as the main
reason for permitting the media's participation in the
dependency proceedings, would not reveal these confidential
aspects of L.T.'s and D.T.'s lives because they are
irrelevant to the criminal matter. As Mother accurately
notes, this Court rejected the juvenile court's precise
rationale regarding the superseding effect of concomitant
open criminal proceedings on a dependent child's privacy
rights, and it characterized the assertion as
"spurious." In re M.B., supra at
64. We explained, "While it is true that the
children's names and certain details about their family
life have been publicized, we believe . . . that the fact
that they have received some publicity enhances their need
for privacy now." Id. In addition we endorsed
the trial court's observation, "the more information
that is revealed, the more stress the children experience,
the more they are stigmatized, embarrassed, and subject to
whispers and speculation." Id. at 65 (citation
plainly, the existence of a related criminal matter is not
the dispositive consideration. As noted, few of the highly
personal facts that are essential to the permanency review
determination in this case would be subject to disclosure
during Father's criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the
harm stemming from the continued dissemination of this
delicate information in open dependency proceedings overrides
the public's interest in disclosure. We stressed this
latter concept in outlining the parameters of the two-prong
constitutional analysis in In re M.B.,
supra at 64 quoting In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d
439, 451 (Oh. 1990), "Intense publicity surrounding the
events which have brought a child into the juvenile court may
psychologically harm the child, making it more difficult, if
not impossible, for the child to recover from those
events." In addition to highlighting the chilling effect
that open dependency hearings would have upon a witness's
willingness to speak candidly about the child's best
interest, this Court noted that publicity "is
inconsistent with the nonadversarial nature of juvenile
proceedings." Id. at 64 (quoting San
Bernardino County Dep't. of Pub. Social Servs. v.
Superior Ct., 283 Cal.Rptr. 332 (Cal.App. 1991)
("Private hearings were not intended to simply avoid
publicity and its resulting stigma, but were also part and
parcel of the informal and nonadversarial nature of juvenile
court hearings.")); see also T.R., 556 N.E.2d
at 448-49 (juvenile courts differ from courts of general
jurisdiction in that "[h]earings are informal, and based
on an inquisitorial model rather than an adversarial
of the foregoing reasons, we find that the juvenile court
abused its discretion in permitting the unidentified media
member's access to the closed dependency proceedings
without first requiring a formal petition, notice, and the
opportunity for the parties to prepare an informed response
to satisfy their burden of persuasion regarding both prongs
of the constitutional analysis. Moreover, the juvenile court
exaggerated the significance of Father's criminal trial
in reasoning that the public had already garnered much of the
confidential information that would be disclosed in the
ongoing dependency proceedings. Thus, we direct the juvenile
court to close the dependency proceedings consistent with
§ 6336(d). If, upon subsequent petition, notice, and
measured argument beyond the existence of a related criminal
matter, the juvenile court finds that the presumption of
openness is unrebutted, the court may enter an appropriate
order at that juncture.
we address Mother's contention that the trial court erred
in changing the children's permanent placement goals from
reunification to adoption. The appropriate standard of review
of a juvenile court's permanency determination is as
In cases involving a court's order changing the
[court-ordered] goal . . . to adoption, our standard of
review is abuse of discretion. To hold that the trial court
abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment was
manifestly unreasonable, that the court disregarded the law,
or that its action was a result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by the facts
determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the
court's inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a
responsibility to ensure that the record represents a
comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied
the appropriate legal principles to that record. Therefore,
our scope of review is broad.
In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(citations omitted); see also In re R.J.T.,
9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 534 (Pa.Super. 2007), this
Court stressed that the focus of dependency proceedings is
upon the best interest of the children and that those
considerations supersede all other concerns, "including
the conduct and the rights of the parent." Again, in
In the Interest of D.P., 972 A.2d 1221,
1227 (Pa.Super. 2009), we explained, "In a change of
goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, and not the
interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, and the
parent's rights are secondary." Id.
Likewise, this Court has held, "a child's life
simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will
summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting." In re N.C. , 909 A.2d 818, 824
(Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting In re Adoption of M.E.P.,
825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
those principles in mind, we outline the relevant
considerations set forth in the Juvenile ...