Source: https://casetext.com/case/earnest-v-regent-pool-inc
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 03:32:00
Document Index: 495841140

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 339', '§ 63', '§ 339', '§ 333', '§ 27', '§ 339']

Earnest v. Regent Pool, Inc, 288 Ala. 63 | Casetext
288 Ala. 63 (Ala. 1972)
Earnestv.Regent Pool, Inc.
Supreme Court of AlabamaJan 27, 1972
Locke v. Liquid Air Corp.
The Alabama Supreme Court has consistently held that water hazards are not attractive nuisances, and thus…
Herbert v. Regency Apartments, Inc.
The attractive nuisance doctrine cannot be applied where the dangerous condition is patent and obvious to a…
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Ingram Beasley, J.
Hare, Wynn, Newell Newton and James J. Thompson, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
Occupiers of land owe a duty to children who come onto the land and become injured. Rest., Torts § 339 "Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children"; Republic Steel Corp. v. Tillery, 261 Ala. 34, 72 So.2d 719; Ala. By-Products v. Cosby, 217 Ala. 144, 115 So. 31; Thompson v. Alexander City Cotton Mills Co., 190 Ala. 184, 67 So. 407; Goldson v. Covington Mfg., 205 Ala. 226, 87 So. 439; Gandy v. Copeland, 204 Ala. 366, 86 So. 3; 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 63(66). The duty of reasonable care is owed by the landowner to invitees, licensees and trespassers if their presence in the area of danger should reasonably have been anticipated by him. Republic Steel Corp. v. Tillery, 216 Ala. 34, 72 So.2d 719; 11 Ala.L.Rev. 1; Rest., Torts § 339 "Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children". It is a clear trend of modern authority to treat the case of a trespassing child differently and to require a greater degree of care from the defendant landowner in this instance. Rest., Torts 2d, § 333, 343B and 369; 26 A.L.R.3d 317; 2 Harper James, The Law of Torts, § 27.5. Conditions change, and the law which should adapt itself to human wants, must change with them. Western Ry. of Ala. v. Mutch, 97 Ala. 194, 9 So. 894 (1892) (Author's Emphasis).
Spain, Gillon, Riley, Tate Ansley and William F. Denson, III, Birmingham, for appellee.
A child as well as an adult may be a trespasser. Ala. Great So. R. R. Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So.2d 823; Roberts Construction Co. v. Brown, 272 Ala. 440, 131 So.2d 710; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. French, 261 Ala. 306, 74 So.2d 266; Lovell v. So. Railway Co., 257 Ala. 561, 59 So.2d 807; Luallen v. Woodstock Iron Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So. 182; Highland Ave. Belt Railroad Co. v. Robbins, 124 Ala. 113, 27 So. 422. When the complaint does not show by what right the plaintiff was upon the premises it will be presumed that he was a trespasser. Highland Avenue Belt R. R. Co. v. Robbins, 124 Ala. 113, 27 So. 422; Georgia Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ross, 100 Ala. 490, 14 So. 282; Ensley Railroad Co. v. Chewning, 93 Ala. 24, 9 So. 458. The duty owed by a landowner to a trespasser is not to wantonly or intentionally injure him. City of Dothan v. Gulledge, 276 Ala. 433, 163 So.2d 217; Lovell v. Southern Railway Co., 257 Ala. 561, 59 So.2d 807; Pollard v. McGreggors, 239 Ala. 467, 195 So. 736. A landowner is not responsible for the mere condition of his premises to one who comes thereon without invitation. Ala. Great So. R. R. Co. v. Green, Supra; Ellison v. Ala. Marble Co., 223 Ala. 371, 136 So. 787; Cox v. Ala. Water Co., 216 Ala. 35, 112 So. 352. Mere passive acquiescence in acts of trespassers upon one's land does not alter their status as trespassers and is not sufficient to constitute an invitation. Ala. Great So. R. R. Co. v. Green, Supra; Ellison v. Ala. Marble Co., Supra; Cox v. Ala. Water Co., Supra; Atlantic Coast Line v. Carter, 214 Ala. 254, 107 So. 218; Ala. Great So. R. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 156 Ala. 202, 47 So. 185.
The complaint, as amended, contains three counts. The defendant's amended demurrer to this complaint was sustained and the plaintiff, declining to plead further, moved the court for a judgment of nonsuit, because of this adverse ruling. A judgment of nonsuit was duly entered whereby the cause was dismissed and the plaintiff was taxed with the costs for which execution was to issue. The plaintiff has appealed from the adverse judgment. He makes six assignments of error on the record, all of which challenge the trial court's order sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the complaint. The question then, concerns the sufficiency of any of the three counts of the complaint as tested by the demurrer.
"And plaintiff avers that the defendants, who knew or should have known of the presence of children such as the plaintiff's minor son, who constantly and persistently came upon said premises as aforesaid, were negligent in that they negligently caused or negligently allowed the said pool to be in and remain in the dangerous and defective condition described hereinabove; and that said defendants were negligent in that they negligently failed to properly and safely maintain said premises, including said pool; and that the defendants were negligent in that they negligently failed to provide or maintain an adequate fence or other safeguard to prevent children from entering upon said premises and playing there in and about the area of said pool; and that, further, the defendants were negligent in failing to provide adequate and proper warnings of the dangerous and defective condition of said pool that existed thereon as hereinabove described; and plaintiff avers that as a proximate consequence of said negligence of the defendants the plaintiff's said minor son was drowned."
It is to be noted from reading the count that the perimeter of the defendant's premises was surrounded by a fence. There is no allegation as to how the deceased entered the fenced-in area, only that the fence was inadequate to prevent children from entering upon the premises and playing in and about the area of the pool. It seems to us that any kind of invitation to enter the enclosed area is countered by the existence of a fence. The fence which surrounded the perimeter of the premises informs those who come thereon that what lies beyond is private. Fullerton v. Conan, 87 Cal.App.2d 354, 197 P.2d 59.
A toleration of trespassers does not alter their status. Alabama Great Southern R. R. Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So.2d 823; Ellison v. Alabama Marble Co., 223 Ala. 371, 136 So. 787.
Therefore for aught appearing the deceased was a trespasser on the defendant's premises at the time of his unfortunate death. The law has long been settled in this state that a child, as well as an adult, may be a trespasser. Southern Ry. Co. v. Forrister, 158 Ala. 477, 48 So. 69; Ford v. Planters' Chem. Oil Co., 220 Ala. 669, 126 So. 866; Luallen v. Woodstock Iron Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So. 182. And the general rule is that the only duty owed to a trespasser is not to willfully or wantonly injure him, City of Dothan v. Gulledge, 276 Ala. 433, 163 So.2d 217, or negligently injure him after his peril is discovered. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. French, 261 Ala. 306, 74 So.2d 266; Birmingham So. R. R. Co. v. Kendrick, 247 Ala. 573, 25 So.2d 419; Highland Avenue Belt R. R. Co. v. Robbins, 124 Ala. 113, 27 So. 422; Alabama Great So. R. R. Co. v. Moorer, 116 Ala. 642, 22 So. 900.
Of course, the attractive nuisance doctrine cannot apply under the facts presented in this count because the swimming pool, the dangerous condition complained of, is patent and obvious to a trespasser. It is well settled in Alabama that where the danger from the instrumentality which caused the injury is patent and obvious the doctrine of attractive nuisance is inapplicable. Republic Steel Corp. v. Tillery, 261 Ala. 34, 72 So.2d 719; Luallen v. Woodstock Iron Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So. 182; Ford v. Planters' Chem. Oil Co., 220 Ala. 669, 126 So. 866; Williams v. Bolding, 220 Ala. 328, 124 So. 892; Eades v. American Cast-Iron Pipe Co., 208 Ala. 556, 94 So. 593; Athey v. Tennessee Coal, Iron Ry. Co., 191 Ala. 646, 68 So. 154; Alabama Great So. R. R. Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So.2d 823; City of Dothan v. Gulledge, 276 Ala. 433, 163 So.2d 217. In Williams v. Bolding, 220 Ala. 328, 331, 124 So. 892, the court said:
While Alabama adopted the turntable doctrine in Alabama Great So. R. R. Co. v. Crocker, 131 Ala. 584, 31 So. 561, this so called attractive nuisance doctrine has never been extended in Alabama to bodies of water. Luallen v. Woodstock Iron Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So. 182; Alabama Great So. R. R. Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So.2d 823. And thus, our courts have declined to protect children, not invitees, from water hazards.
Therefore, Alabama recognizes no exception, in the case of a child trespasser, to the conventional rule that a landowner is not liable to a trespasser on his land, when the trespasser is injured or drowns in a water hazard. The following is the collection of Alabama cases that have involved injuries or deaths of children after coming in contact with water hazards on another's property: Thompson v. Alexander City Cotton Mills, 190 Ala. 184, 67 So. 407; Athey v. Tennessee Coal, Iron Ry. Co., 191 Ala. 646, 68 So. 154; Gandy v. Copeland, 204 Ala. 366, 86 So. 3; Eades v. American Cast-Iron Pipe Co., 208 Ala. 556, 94 So. 593; Cox v. Ala. Water Co., 216 Ala. 35, 112 So. 352; Ala. Clay Prods. v. Mathews, 220 Ala. 549, 126 So. 869; Cobb v. Lowe Mfg. Co., 227 Ala. 456, 150 So. 687; Luallen v. Woodstock Iron Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So. 182; and Alabama Great So. R. R. Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So.2d 823. In each case where the child was a trespasser, either the complaint was held demurrable, or the affirmative charge for defendant was held properly given or that it should have been given.
In Alabama Great So. R. R. Co. v. Green, supra, the complaint alleged a water hazard which is comparable to the one alleged in the instant case. There the plaintiff appellee also contended "that even though water hazards are not to be considered as attractive nuisances, the facts here disclose a dangerous condition created upon the defendant's land of such nature that children were likely to be injured thereby, and the defendant should reasonably have anticipated a likely injury, and the defendant should have taken reasonable steps to guard against such happening." Alabama Great So. R. R. Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 125, 159 So.2d 823, 828. Such contention is basically the same to the present advocacy of § 339's adoption. However the court in Green, in writing to the appellee's above contention, concluded the complaint failed to aver facts showing a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff's drowned son.