Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19720214_0040485.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-05-26 02:44:48
Document Index: 275604173

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2423', '§ 2423', '§ 2421', '§ 2423', '§ 2315', '§ 2313', '§ 111']

JAMES HAMILTON, APPELLANT
On February 23, 1971, the appellant was convicted on a one count violation of 18 U.S.C., § 2423,*fn1 the White Slave Traffic Act, and from this conviction he appeals.
The main contention of the appellant is that the Government did not prove that he knew that Gail Napier, the victim in the case, was under the age of eighteen at the time he induced her to cross state lines and engage in prostitution and that the offense described in § 2423 had not been proven.
While an examination of the statutes found within the White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C., §§ 2421, 2422 and 2423, shows that there must be proof that one knowingly transports or persuades, induces, entices or coerces a person to be transported in interstate commerce in order to engage in immoral practices including prostitution, § 2423 provides a more severe penalty when the girl is under eighteen years of age and, accordingly, knowledge that the girl is under eighteen years of age is not part of the proof requisite by the Government in order to sustain a conviction.
In 18 U.S.C., § 2315, it is shown that a recipient of stolen goods does not require knowledge that the goods have been in interstate commerce. Corey v. United States, 305 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 956, 83 S. Ct. 511, 9 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1963); Pugliano v. United States, 348 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939, 86 S. Ct. 390, 15 L. Ed. 2d 349.
In 18 U.S.C., § 2313, the statute punishes knowing receipt of stolen vehicles moving in interstate commerce. This statute is commonly known as the Dyer Act and it need not be shown that the vehicle has crossed a state line in order to convict a defendant of knowingly receiving the stolen vehicle. Pilgrim v. United States, 266 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1959).
In 18 U.S.C., § 111, knowledge of an officer's status as a federal employee has been held not to be an element of the offense. United States v. Kartman, 417 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1969.)