Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19780731_0040368.C07.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-25 14:12:31
Document Index: 565688793

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201']

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 76 CR 353 - John F. Grady, Judge.
Before Swygert and Cummings, Circuit Judges, and Markey, Chief Judge.*fn*
The jury found Arroyo and Sanchez guilty of conspiracy to corruptly solicit a bribe in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) and Arroyo guilty of the substantive offense the acts of corruptly soliciting and receiving the bribe in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (1976).*fn1 Motions for acquittal and a requested instruction were based on the view that § 201(c)(1) must be limited to soliciting a bribe before the accused public official has performed the "official act"*fn2 intended to be influenced. The district court denied the motions and refused the request.*fn3 We affirm.
On August 19, 1975, Arroyo a loan officer with SBA*fn4 received the Fernandez application, for review of its credit worthiness and presentation to his supervisor, who relied upon Arroyo's recommendations in determining whether an applicant should receive a guaranteed loan. The loan received SBA authorization on August 26, 1975, but Fernandez was not told of that until later.
On March 15, 1976, Fernandez returned from a trip to Puerto Rico and spoke with Sanchez, who told him Arroyo wanted to speak with him about "the money" and to collect "the eight." Immediately thereafter, Arroyo called Fernandez and said he was going to stop by the next day about 5:00 p.m., "to pick up the money." Fernandez reported the situation to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
"Fernandez: How much do I have to give you?
Arroyo: Well, whatever you told me.
Fernandez gave Arroyo the $500 and Arroyo put the money in his coat pocket. As Arroyo was leaving, Special Agent Gregorio Rodriguez of the FBI arrested him.*fn5
"As used in this section (§ 201(c)(1)), the term "official act' means any decision or act or any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy which may at any time be pending or which may, by law, be brought before any public official in his official capacity or in his place of trust or profit."
"However, the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on the legal effect of his contention for the evidence that if they believed that the request for a gratuity was not made by the accused until after he had exhausted his power of decision or action on the question or matter before him, and was not made under any prior promise or understanding that a gratuity would be forthcoming, then his request did not constitute a transgression of the statute. This is a sound construction of the act and the District Judge should have so charged the jury. While such a solicitation would be contemptible, it would not be indictable, for it would not be possible for prior "decision or action' of an employee to be affected by later, unanticipated gifts, however rewarding they might be." (237 F.2d at 488.)
Further, Arroyo and Sanchez assert that Arroyo may have solicited a gratuity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1976),*fn6 but not a bribe, in violation of § 201(c)(1), quoting from United States v. Brewster, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 7, 506 F.2d 62, 68 (1974):
"3. The bribery section (c)(1) prohibits the receipt of anything of value "in return for: (1) being influenced in his performance of any official act,' while the gratuity section (g) prohibits the receipt of anything of value "for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him.' * * * "
We hold that the district court did not err. Further, we hold that the jury instruction given by the district court accurately stated the law. Section 201(c)(1) cannot be limited in every case to bribery solicitations occurring before actual performance of the official act without destroying the intent of the statute.*fn7
Arroyo and Sanchez' contentions, if accepted, would encourage the very conduct Congress condemned. Under the proffered interpretation, a public official could hurriedly and surreptitiously perform his official act, and then corruptly solicit and encourage the bribe, by creating the impression in the potential briber's mind that his official act had not yet been taken.*fn8
The operative language of § 201(c)(1) is "whoever, being a public official * * * corruptly * * * solicits * * * anything of value for himself * * * in return for * * * being influenced in his performance of any official act." "Official act" is defined in § 201(a), Supra note 2, as "any * * * action * * * which may At any time be pending * * * before any public official, in his official capacity * * *." (Emphasis added.) Congress having used broad language in these provisions, we find no intent to limit their coverage to future acts.*fn9 Congress did not intend for a public official, who had solicited and encouraged a bribe with a false representation that the official act was In futuro, to escape liability for bribe-solicitation by proving that he had successfully hidden the truth of past performance from the bribe-payer.
Arroyo and Sanchez seize upon the words "being influenced" as indicating that § 201(c)(1) requires that the bribe be paid to influence a future act, arguing that one cannot be influenced to do what has already been done. The argument is without merit in this case, for it disregards the lead-in phrase "in return for." That phrase brings into play the purpose of the bribe and thus the mind of the bribe-payer. Though more careful draftsmanship might have added "or apparently being" after "being," the section prohibits solicitation of payment "in return for being influenced." As illustrated by § 201(c), the gravamen of the offense lies in the corrupt solicitation, which would fail if the solicitee were told the truth.*fn10 Bribes are paid, and solicited, in exchange for what the payer believes he is paying for. The bribe solicitor will always create the impression that the action sought is yet to come and is contingent on the bribe. The solicitation, against which the section is directed, is the same, whether the yet-to-come impression be objectively true or false. Further, § 201(c)(1), in listing one of the "in return for" elements, speaks of "Being influenced In his performance of any official act" (emphasis added). It does not speak of "being influenced To perform any official act."*fn11
The broad language of the statute, and the purpose it was designed to accomplish,*fn12 preclude the narrow construction sought by Arroyo and Sanchez.*fn13
Arroyo and Sanchez' reliance on Woelfel v. United States, supra, is misplaced.*fn14 Unlike Fernandez here, the person solicited by Woelfel knew of the performance of the official act (a change order in a government contract) at the time of Woelfel's initial solicitation.
"January 7 Woelfel by telephone informed Potter, at his residence in Atlanta, that apparently the specification would be changed to wood block flooring, and when Potter commented, "That's fine,' Woelfel said, "Yes, but I want something more than "that's fine" later on. Do you know what I mean?" Potter gave him no answer." (237 F.2d at 485-86, emphasis added.)
"The requisite intent to constitute accepting a bribe is to accept a thing of value "corruptly' under section (c)(1); the comparable intent under the gratuity section (g) is to accept a thing of value "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty.' On the face of the statute the two comparative clauses are not equivalents. Congress did not use the same language in defining criminal intent for the two offenses. "Corruptly' bespeaks a higher degree of criminal knowledge and purpose than does "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty.' It appears entirely possible that a public official could accept a thing of value "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty,' and at the same time not do it "corruptly.' Congress obviously wished to prohibit public officials accepting things of value with either degree of criminal intent; it did so, but it legislated a difference in the requisite criminal intent and correspondingly in the penalties attached."*fn15
Two sections of the statute which deal with bribery, sections 201(b) and (c), are parallel provisions which prohibit the request for and giving of bribes. Two other sections, (f) and (g), also parallel provisions, cover the giving and receipt of gratuities. It is most important to distinguish properly between the bribery and gratuity sections, a distinction made in the statute but not in the majority's opinion. Although both types of activity are prohibited under the statute, bribery is clearly considered to be the more serious offense as evidenced by the difference in penalties.*fn1
Section 201(b) may be violated even though the official was not corrupted by the offer, or the purpose of the bribe was unattainable,*fn2 or even though there was actually no occasion to seek to influence an official's conduct.*fn3 In each case, however, the defendant must intend to influence the bribee. Kemler v. United States, 133 F.2d 235 (1st Cir. 1942). Similarly, a public official charged with violating section 201(c) must intend to corruptly solicit something of value In return for being influenced, that is, intend to permit himself to be influenced. United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 195-96 (2d Cir. 1965), Cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967, 86 S. Ct. 1272, 16 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1966).
Both Arroyo and Sanchez misrepresented, implicitly if not explicitly, that the decision on the loan application was still pending, but that misrepresentation was made to Fernandez After the application was approved. I emphasize again that a bribery statute is designed to prevent official decisions made as a result of corrupt influence. Accordingly, when a public official represents to a prospective briber that a decision is still pending when in fact it has already been made, the misrepresentation takes on the character of fraudulent conduct, but it does not constitute solicitation of a bribe as defined by section 201(c)(1). The language of that section is plain and unambiguous. Its literal meaning ought not be expanded by interpretation as the majority has done, for it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a criminal statute must be strictly construed. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1820).