Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/503/407
Timestamp: 2016-02-11 06:43:08
Document Index: 666708922

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 402', '§ 501', '§ 541', '§ 562', '§ 402', '§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 562', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 562', '§ 545', '§ 9']

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, et al., Petitioners, v. BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION, et al. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States, Petitioners v. BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION, et al. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, et al., Petitioners, v. BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION, et al. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States, Petitioners v. BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION, et al.
503 U.S. 407 (112 S.Ct. 1394, 118 L.Ed.2d 52)
[HTML] dissent, WHITE, BLACKMUN, THOMAS
[HTML] Syllabus The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA) created petitioner National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), a private corporation, to provide intercity and commuter rail passenger service. The Act permits Amtrak to enter into "trackage rights" agreements to use tracks owned and used by freight railroads, 45 U.S.C. 562(a); and allows Amtrak to ask petitioner Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to condemn railroad property "required for intercity rail passenger service" if Amtrak and the railroad cannot agree upon sale terms, § 562(d). For purposes of the ICC's condemnation order, Amtrak's "need for the property" "shall be deemed to be established" unless the conveyance will significantly impair the railroad's ability to carry out its obligations as a common carrier and unless Amtrak's obligations can adequately be met by the acquisition of alternative property. Ibid. Amtrak had a trackage rights agreement with respondent Boston and Maine Corporation (B & M) to operate its "Montrealer" train between Washington, D.C., and Montreal. Amtrak claims it was forced to discontinue this service because of B & M's poor maintenance of its track segment. Subsequently, Amtrak entered into an agreement with petitioner Central Vermont Railroad (CV) which provided that, among other things, Amtrak would acquire the B & M track and reconvey it to CV, and CV would grant trackage rights to Amtrak and usage rights to B & M. When B & M did not accept Amtrak's purchase offer for the track, Amtrak sought and received an ICC order compelling conveyance for just compensation. The ICC found, among other things, that § 562(d) created a statutory presumption of Amtrak's need for the track, which B & M failed to rebut. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that, because Amtrak did not intend to retain the track, it needed only its use, not its ownership. While petitions for rehearing were pending, § 562(d) was amended to allow Amtrak to subsequently convey title to acquired property to a third party if the ICC finds the reconveyance furthers the RPSA's purposes. Nonetheless, the court denied rehearing, holding that the condemnation was not valid because the property was not "required for intercity rail passenger service."
Held: 1. The ICC's decision was based on a reasonable interpretation and application of § 562(d). Pp. 417-424.
(a) The ICC's interpretation of the word "required" is due deference as a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous term in a statute that the ICC administers. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694. The existence of alternative dictionary definitions for "required" indicates that the statute is open to interpretation. The ICC's interpretation gives effect to § 562(d)'s presumption of need. In contrast, the Court of Appeals' viewthat "required" establishes a separate condition that Amtrak's condemnation authority is limited to property that is indispensable to its operationsis in clear tension with the presumption. In addition, § 562(d)'s amendment confirms the ICC's definition, while the Court of Appeals' strict rule would make the amendment superfluous by barring condemnation whenever Amtrak's purpose is to reconvey property. Pp. 417-420.
(b) The ICC was not required to make specific findings regarding Amtrak's actual need for the condemnation because its oversight responsibility is limited to ensuring that condemned property will be used in Amtrak's rail operations. The statute's structure and its presumption of need create a strong inference that it authorizes Amtrak to make a reasonable business judgment that condemnation is advisable, unless the statutory presumption is rebutted. P. 420-421.SC2Q! (c) B & M's several arguments against the ICC's interpretation are rejected. The eminent domain power has been given to the ICC, not a private entity, and thus is not limited as suggested by cases such as United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243, n. 13, 67 S.Ct. 252, 258, n. 13, 91 L.Ed. 209. Furthermore, this case turns on the need for deference to the agency, not to Amtrak. The ICC's interpretation of § 562(d) also did not violate the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, since the agency's determination that the condemnation will serve a public purpose by facilitating Amtrak's rail service was not irrational. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-241, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2329-2330, 81 L.Ed.2d 186. Moreover, the agency did not err in concluding that the statutory prerequisite that the parties were "unable to agree upon terms for the sale" mandated nothing more than a factual determination that they would be unable to reach agreement through further negotiations. Nor did it make inadequate factual findings in concluding that B & M had not rebutted the presumption of need. The ICC was not unreasonable in considering the effect of trackage rights and the just compensation award in assessing whether the conveyance would significantly impair B & M's ability to carry out its obligations, or in interpreting the availability-of-alternative-property provision as referring only to whether Amtrak could provide service using an alternative route, not whether a lesser interest in property would suffice to meet Amtrak's needs. Pp. 421-424.
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order, upon the request of petitioner National Railroad Passenger Corporation, requiring conveyance of 48.8 miles of railroad track from respondent Boston and Maine Corporation (B & M) to the Corporation. In these consolidated cases we must decide whether the ICC's decision was based on a reasonable interpretation and application of § 402(d) of the Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U.S.C. 562(d), the statute the Corporation invoked in the proceeding. We hold the ICC's decision is authorized by the statute, and so reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which set aside the agency's action.
* The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, is a private, for-profit corporation created by Congress in the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), Pub.L. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1328, 45 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The purpose of Amtrak is to provide modern and efficient intercity and commuter rail passenger service. §§ 501, 541. Amtrak is not an agency or instrumentality of the United States Government, § 541, but it has been supported over the years by congressional appropriations. Most of Amtrak's passenger trains run over existing track systems owned and used by freight railroads. In the RPSA Congress authorized Amtrak to enter into "trackage rights" agreements which would allow Amtrak to use those tracks. When Amtrak and a freight railroad are unable to agree on the terms of such an agreement, Amtrak may request the ICC to order the track to be provided on reasonable terms. § 562(a).
In 1973 Congress amended the RPSA to add subsection (d) of § 402, 45 U.S.C. 562(d). Section 562(d) provides in pertinent part:
"(1) If the Corporation Amtrak and a railroad are unable to agree upon terms for the sale to the Corporation of property (including interests in property) owned by the railroad and required for intercity rail passenger service, the Corporation may apply to the Commission ICC for an order establishing the need of the Corporation for the property at issue and requiring the conveyance thereof from the railroad to the Corporation on reasonable terms and conditions, including just compensation. Unless the Commission finds that
This was the first decided case involving Amtrak's condemnation powers under § 562(d). Id., at 39a. The ICC issued its final decision in 1988 and ordered conveyance of the segment with just compensation of $2,373,286. It reaffirmed earlier rulings and found that Amtrak "had met the statutory criteria for the institution of a proceeding" under § 562(d). Id., at 40a-42a, 81a.
Amtrak and the ICC filed petitions for rehearing, and while the petitions were pending Congress amended § 562(d). The amendment, adopted in specific response to the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, added the following sentence to § 562(d)(1): "The Corporation may subsequently convey title or other interest in such property to a third party, if such reconveyance is found by the Commission to further the purposes of this Act." Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1990 § 9(a), Pub.L. 101-641, 104 Stat. 4658. The amendment was made applicable to all pending cases, § 9(b), and B & M does not dispute that it applied in this case even while it was before the Court of Appeals on rehearing. Brief for Respondent B & M 33-35. The Court of Appeals considered the 1990 amendment, but denied rehearing nonetheless. 288 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 925 F.2d 427 (1991). The panel majority held that while § 9 made it clear Amtrak was authorized to reconvey condemned property "subsequent to a condemnation that is otherwise valid under § 562(d) ," it did not change the statutory limitation that the property be " 'required for intercity rail passenger service' " in the first place. Id., at 197, 925 F.2d, at 428 (emphasis in original). The majority reasoned that since its original decision was based on Amtrak's failure to satisfy that requirement, the amendment did not affect its holding. The majority also distinguished a case from the Second Circuit, National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Two Parcels of Land, 822 F.2d 1261 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 954, 108 S.Ct. 347, 98 L.Ed.2d 373, which had interpreted § 545(d)(1) (the provision authorizing Amtrak to condemn nonrail property) to permit reconveyance following condemnation. 288 U.S.App.D.C., at 196-197, 925 F.2d, at 427-428. In a separate opinion, Judge Ginsburg wrote that the amendment confirmed her view that the ICC had not misinterpreted the statute, but that a remand remained necessary for further factual determinations.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2524, ----, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991). I have no quarrel with that general proposition. I do, however, object to its invocation to justify the majority's deference, not to an agency interpretation of a statute, but to the post hoc rationalization of government lawyers attempting to explain a gap in the reasoning and factfinding of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission). Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2870, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983).
Section 402(d) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (RPSA), codified at 45 U.S.C. 562(d), provides that Amtrak may apply to the ICC for an order directing the conveyance of another railroad's property if Amtrak can meet two conditions: Amtrak and the other railroad must be unable to agree upon terms for sale of the property, and the property must be "required for intercity rail passenger service." If these conditions are met, "the need of Amtrak for the property shall be deemed to be established," and the other railroad will be able to retain its property only if it can rebut the strong presumption of Amtrak's need. Ibid.
This ICC definition of "required" debuted in the Commission's briefs before this Court. It is nothing more than a creation of appellate counsel, concocted to fill the gaps in the Commission's analysis. "The shortand sufficientanswer to this submission is that the courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action. . . . It is well established that an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn., supra, at 50, 103 S.Ct., at 2870 (emphasis added), citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 245, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-197, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577-1578, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 2505, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981). Therefore, the majority is simply wrong in asserting that, even though "the ICC did not in so many words articulate its interpretation of the word 'required,' " the Court may nevertheless defer to the Commission's decision. See ante, at 1402 (emphasis added).
Because of the gap in the ICC's interpretation of the statute, "there are no findings and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no indication of the basis on which the Commission exercised its expert discretion." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., supra, 371 U.S., at 167, 83 S.Ct., at 245. The majority concludes, again based on the agency's presumed interpretation of the statute, that the Commission was not obligated to make specific findings as to whether the property was "required for intercity rail passenger service." See ante, at 420. This magnifies the ICC's mistake; an administrative "agency must make findings that support its decision, and those findings must be supported by substantial evidence." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., 371 U.S., at 168, 83 S.Ct., at 245.
I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that section 402(d) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (RPSA), 45 U.S.C. 562(d), unambiguously prohibits transactions such as the sale and leaseback arrangement between Amtrak and the Central Vermont Railroad. Legislation passed while this case was pending before the Court of Appeals makes it clear that such transactions are permissible. Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1990 § 9(a), Pub.L. 101-641, 104 Stat. 4658.