Source: http://openjurist.org/330/f3d/691
Timestamp: 2015-11-26 00:58:50
Document Index: 144350934

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 504', '§ 794', '§ 504', '§ 504', '§ 504', '§ 504']

330 F3d 691 Miller v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center | OpenJurist
330 F. 3d 691 - Miller v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series330 F.3d
330 F3d 691 Miller v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center 330 F.3d 691
Lucinda G. MILLER and Elaine King Miller, Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-10190.
Bradley W. Howard (argued), Grant A. Bannen, Brown & Fortunato, Amarillo, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Amy Warr (argued), David Earl Jenkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Kevin K. Russell (argued), Jessica Dunsay Silver, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Washington, DC, for U.S., Intervenor.
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center ("Tech") appeals an order denying its motion to dismiss Elaine King Miller's claim of a violation of § 504 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Tech argues that it enjoys state sovereign immunity from King Miller's § 504 claim. On the basis of Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 325 F.3d 609 (5th Cir.2003),1 which binds us, we reverse and remand with instruction to dismiss the claim.
King Miller began working as an administrator and professor at Tech in 1997. She notified Tech that she suffered from a degenerative eye condition in August 1998; she was diagnosed as legally blind in 1999. In 2000, she sued Tech for allegedly failing to accommodate her disability in violation of § 504, which prohibits discrimination against the disabled by programs receiving federal funds.2
Tech concedes that King Miller suffers a "disability" as defined in § 504 and that Tech received federal funds from 1998 to 2000. Nevertheless, Tech moved to dismiss on the basis of state sovereign immunity. The district court denied the motion, and Tech filed this interlocutory appeal.3
"[T]he [Constitutional] Convention did not disturb States' immunity from private suits, thus firmly enshrining this principle in our constitutional framework." Fed.Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002). The Eleventh Amendment partially reflects this principle by prohibiting "[t]he Judicial power of the United States" from extending to suits against a state "by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Some therefore refer to the states' immunity from suit as "Eleventh Amendment immunity."
Yet, "[t]he phrase is ... something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Rather, state sovereign immunity is a structural constitutional principle barring all suits against a state, including suits by a resident of the state. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. at 753, 122 S.Ct. 1864 ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity."). Thus, King Miller's § 504 claim is subject to Tech's sovereign immunity,4 even though King Miller is a resident of Texas.
The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Pr