Source: http://openjurist.org/164/f3d/1035
Timestamp: 2015-07-02 08:12:20
Document Index: 761121466

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 1182', '§ 240', '§ 1229', '§ 106', '§ 1105', '§ 1105', '§ 2241']

164 F3d 1035 Gary Laguerre v. Janet Reno, et al. | OpenJurist
164 F. 3d 1035 - Gary Laguerre v. Janet Reno, et al.	Home164 f3d 1035 gary laguerre v. janet reno, et al.
164 F3d 1035 Gary Laguerre v. Janet Reno, et al. 164 F.3d 1035
Gary LaGUERRE, Petitioner-Appellant,v.Janet RENO, et al., Respondents-Appellees.Jose, Martin Avelar-Cruz, Petitioner-Appellee,v.Janet Reno, et al., Respondents-Appellants.
Nos. 98-1954, 98-2613.
Argued Oct. 29, 1998.Decided Dec. 22, 1998.Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied April9, 1999.*
Lucas Guttentag (argued), American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, Lisa J. Palumbo, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, IL, Lee Gelernt, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, for Gary LaGuerre Petitioner-Appellant.
Janet Reno, Office of the U.S. Atty. Gen., Washington, DC, pro se.
Thomas P. Walsh, Office of the U.S. Atty., Civil Div., Chicago, IL, Papu Sandhu (argued), Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Janet Reno Respondent-Appellee.
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, I.N.S, Chicago, IL, Thomas P. Walsh, Office of the U.S. Atty., Civil Div., Papu Sandhu, Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., (David M. McConnell, on the briefs) Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Doris Meissner, Brian R. Perryman Respondents-Appellees in No. 98-1954.
Diana C. White (argued), Maria A. Alvarado, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, IL, for Jose M. Avelar-Cruz Petitioner-Appellee.
John F. Hurlbut, Office of the U.S. Atty., Chicago, IL, Richard M. Evans and Jeffrey J. Bernstein, Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Janet Reno, Brian R. Perryman, Doris Meissner Respondents-Appellants in No. 98-2613.
John F. Hurlbut, Office of the U.S. Atty., Chicago, IL, Papu Sandhu, Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Immigration Litigation, (David M. McConnell, on the briefs) Washington, DC, for Immigration and Naturalization Service Respondent-Appellant.
We have consolidated for argument and decision two immigration cases that present overlapping issues. In one, Gary LaGuerre sought habeas corpus in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the refusal of the Board of Immigration Appeals to consider his application for a waiver of deportation under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.). Section 212(c) (since repealed and replaced by a new, but basically similar, section, § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)) grants the Attorney General (or the Attorney General's delegates, such as the Board of Immigration Appeals) discretion to waive deportation because of extraordinary hardship to the deportee or his family, or other exceptional circumstances. Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir.1995). LaGuerre had been ordered deported because he had been convicted of certain drug-related offenses, and section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, enacted in 1996, amended section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to bar waivers of deportation for aliens ordered deported on the basis of such convictions. The Act was passed while the deportation proceedings against LaGuerre were pending; nevertheless the Board of Immigration Appeals held that section 440(d) applied to him. The district court agreed, and LaGuerre appeals.
The other case differs primarily in that the alien, Jose, Martin Avelar-Cruz, prevailed in the district court by convincing the judge that section 440(d) denies equal protection of the laws because it bars waiver only for aliens deportable on the basis of particular offenses and not for aliens excludable from the United States on the basis of the same offenses. If, before deportation proceedings had been instituted against Avelar-Cruz, he had left the United States and then tried to reenter, and exclusion proceedings had been instituted against him, he could, if ordered excluded, have applied for a waiver of exclusion. The Department of Justice has appealed from the judgment in Avelar-Cruz's case.
The issues common to both cases are whether the district court had jurisdiction and if so whether section 440(d) applies to proceedings that were pending when it was enacted. A third issue, presented only in Avelar-Cruz's case, is whether if there is jurisdiction and section 440(d) is applicable to this case, the section is unconstitutional.
Until 1961, the mode of judicial review of deportation orders was by habeas corpus, or, after 1952, by declaratory judgment actions, in federal district courts. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 73 S.Ct. 603, 97 L.Ed. 972 (1953). In 1961 Congress made review of such orders by the courts of appeals, without preliminary recourse to the district courts, the exclusive method of judicial review. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994 ed.). The purpose of consolidating review in the courts of appeals and thus cutting out the district courts was to thwart the dilatory tactics frequently employed by the lawyers for deportable aliens. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 225-26, 84 S.Ct. 306, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963). The right of habeas corpus was preserved, however, in section 106(a)(9) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9) (1970 ed.) (later renumbered (10)); Foti v. INS, supra, 375 U.S. at 231 n. 19, 84 S.Ct. 306, and courts have struggled to reconcile this provision, which permits the alien to proceed in district court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), with the overall statutory purpose. E.g., Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 489-92 (10th Cir.1994); Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 743-45 (9th Cir. 1986). The best view is that the provision was intended to be limited to situations in which the alien was unable to obtain judicial review under the new statutory procedure, and should be interpreted accordingly. E.g., Bothyo v. Moyer, 772 F.2d 353, 355-56 and n. 1 (7th Cir.1985); see Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968); Singh v. Waters, 87 F.3d 346, 349 (9th Cir.1996).
Thirty-five years later, section 440(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act amended section 106 to provide that a "final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed a [drug] offense ... shall not be subject to review by any court." And section 401(e) of the new Act repeals section 106(a)(10) of the 1961 Act, the provision preserving a limited right to apply for habeas corpus. Nevertheless, several decisions in other circuits, as well as dicta in our decisions in Chow v. INS, 113 F.3d 659, 668-69(7th Cir.1997), and Turkhan v. INS, 123 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.1997), hold that the closing of the door to judicial review in section 440(a) does not apply to habeas corpus. Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 12