Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104205/dixon-vs-love
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 206', '§ 206', '§ 211', '§ 206', '§ 206', '§ 2118', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 6']

Dixon Vs Love - Citation 104205 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Dixon Vs. Love - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/104205CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMay-16-1977Case Number431 U.S. 105AppellantDixonRespondentLoveExcerpt:
dixon v. love - 431 u.s. 105 (1977)
"lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in..... Judgment:
(§ 6-206(a)(3)). Pursuant to this provision, the Secretary issued a regulation requiring revocation in the event a driver's license is otherwise suspended three times within a 10-year period. Under the statutory scheme the Secretary must provide immediate written notice of a discretionary suspension or revocation and, within 20 days of his receiving a written request from the licensee, must schedule a full evidentiary hearing for a date "as early as practical," and his final decision is subject to judicial review. After the license of appellee, a truck driver, became subject to suspension under another section of the statute, the Secretary ordered the license revoked under § 6-206(a)(3) and the corresponding rule. Without requesting an administrative hearing, appellee brought this action challenging the constitutionality of § 6-206(a)(3). A three-judge District Court, relying on
, granted appellee relief on the ground that a license cannot constitutionally be revoked under the challenged statute until after a hearing is held to determine whether the licensee meets the statutory criteria.
The Illinois statute, as implemented by the Secretary's regulations, is constitutionally adequate under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as analyzed in
(a) The nature of the private interest involved here (the granted license to operate a motor vehicle) is not so great as to require a departure from "the ordinary principle . . . that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action,"
, particularly in light of statutory provisions for
hardship and for holders of commercial licenses, who are those most likely to be affected by the deprival of driving privileges. P.
(b) The risk of an erroneous deprivation absent a prior hearing is not great and additional procedures would not significantly reduce the number of erroneous deprivations. Here the Secretary's regulations make suspension and revocation decisions largely automatic, and appellee is asserting the right to appear at a prerevocation hearing merely to argue for leniency. Pp.
(c) The requirement of a pretermination hearing in every case would impede the public interests of administrative efficiency, as well as highway safety, which is promoted by the prompt removal of hazardous drivers.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined,
431 U. S. 116
431 U. S. 117
The case centers on § 206 of the Illinois Driver Licensing Law (c. 6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code). The section is entitled "Discretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit." It empowers the Secretary of State to act "without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his records or other sufficient evidence" that a driver's conduct falls into any one of 18 enumerated categories. Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 95 1/2, § 206(a) (1975). Pursuant to his rulemaking authority under this law, § 211(a), [
] the Secretary has adopted administrative regulations that further define the bases and procedures for discretionary suspensions. These regulations generally provide for an initial summary determination based on the individual's driving record. [
] The Secretary has established a comprehensive system of assigning "points" for various kinds of traffic offenses, depending on severity, to provide an objective means of evaluating driving records.
license suspension or revocation is conviction of three moving traffic offenses within a 12-month period. § 206(a)(2). [
] This is one of the instances where the Secretary, by regulation, has provided a method for determining the sanction according to the driver's accumulated "points." [
§ 206(a)(3). Here again the Secretary has limited his broad statutory discretion by an administrative regulation. This regulation allows suspension or revocation, where sufficient points have been accumulated to warrant a second suspension within a 5-year period. [
] The regulation concludes flatly: "A person who has been suspended thrice within a 10-year period shall be revoked."
Section 6-206(c)(1) [
] requires the Secretary "immediately" to provide written notice of a discretionary suspension or revocation under this statute, but no prior hearing is required. Within 20 days of his receiving a written request from the licensee, the Secretary must schedule a full evidentiary hearing
for a date "as early as practical" in either Sangamon County or Cook County, as the licensee may specify. § 2118(a). The final decision of the Secretary after such hearing is subject to judicial review in the Illinois courts. § 2-118(e). In addition, a person whose license is suspended or revoked may obtain a restricted permit for commercial use or in case of hardship. §§ 6-206(c)(2) and (3). [
On June 3, appellee received a notice that his license was revoked effective June 6. [
] The stated authority for the revocation was § 6-206(a)(3); the explanation, following the language of the statute, was:
Appellee, then aged 25, made no request for an administrative hearing. Instead, he filed this purported class action [
] on June 5 against the Illinois Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. His complaint sought a declaratory judgment that § 6-206(a)(3) was unconstitutional, an injunction against enforcement of the statute, and damages. Appellee's application for a temporary restraining order was granted on condition that he apply for a hardship driving permit. He applied for that permit on June 10, and it was issued on July 25.
The court regarded such a prior hearing as mandated by this Court's decision in
(1971). Accordingly, the court granted judgment for appellee and enjoined the Secretary of State from enforcing § 6-206(a)(3). The Secretary appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction
sub nom. Howlett v. Love,
429 U.S. 813 (1976).
It is equally clear that a licensee in Illinois eventually can obtain all the safeguards procedural due process could be thought to require before a discretionary suspension or revocation becomes final. Appellee does not challenge the adequacy of the administrative hearing, noted above, available under § 2-118. The only question is one of timing. This case thus presents an issue similar to that considered only last Term in
(1976), namely,
We may analyze the present case, too, in terms of the factors considered in
The private interest affected by the decision here is the granted license to operate a motor vehicle. Unlike the social security recipients in
who at least could obtain retroactive payments if their claims were subsequently sustained, a licensee is not made entirely whole if his suspension or revocation is later vacated. On the other hand, a driver's license may not be so vital and essential as are social insurance payments on which the recipient may depend for his very subsistence.
(1970). The Illinois statute includes special provisions for hardship and for holders of commercial licenses, who are those most likely to be affected by the deprival of driving privileges.
We therefore conclude that the nature of the private interest here is not so great as to require us
does not dispute the factual basis for the Secretary's decision, he is really asserting the right to appear in person only to argue that the Secretary should show leniency and depart from his own regulations. [
] Such an appearance might make the licensee feel that he has received more personal attention, but it would not serve to protect any substantive rights. We conclude that requiring additional procedures would be unlikely to have significant value in reducing the number of erroneous deprivations.
Finally, the substantial public interest in administrative efficiency would be impeded by the availability of a pretermination hearing in every case. Giving licensees the choice thus automatically to obtain a delay in the effectiveness of a suspension or revocation would encourage drivers routinely to request full administrative hearings.
. Far more substantial than the administrative burden, however, is the important public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard.
See Perez v. Campbell,
402 U. S. 671
(1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). This factor fully distinguishes
where the "only purpose" of the Georgia statute there under consideration was "to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident." 402 U.S. at
] In contrast, the Illinois statute at
The present case is a good illustration of the fact that procedural due process in the administrative setting does not always require application of the judicial model. When a governmental official is given the power to make discretionary decisions under a broad statutory standard, case-by-case decisionmaking may not be the best way to assure fairness. Here, the Secretary commendably sought to define the statutory standard narrowly by the use of his rulemaking authority. [
] The decision to use objective rules in this case provides drivers with more precise notice of what conduct will be sanctioned and promotes equality of treatment among similarly situated drivers. The approach taken by the District Court would have the contrary result of reducing the fairness of the system, by requiring a necessarily subjective inquiry in each case as to a driver's "disrespect" or "lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care."
Appellee's March speeding conviction was his third within a 12-month period, and thus § 6-206(a)(2) authorized suspension of his license. That suspension, however, would have been appellee's third within a 10-year period. The Secretary therefore proceeded directly under Rule 6-206(a)3, which makes revocation mandatory under such circumstances. The District Court treated this procedure as functionally equivalent to suspension under § 6-206(a)(2), followed by mandatory revocation under Rule 6-206(a)3.
App. 20 n. 2.
Appellee also contends that a prior hearing would avoid erroneous deprivation of a license where the commercial driver or hardship exceptions are applicable.
It is clear, however, that these statutory provisions contemplate relief only after the initial decision to suspend or revoke is made, and the licensee has the burden of demonstrating his eligibility for the relief. An initial suspension or revocation, therefore, is not "erroneous" even if the licensee subsequently qualifies for relief as a commercial driver or hardship case.
was decided, courts have sustained suspension or revocation of driving privileges, without prior hearing, where earlier convictions were on the record.
See, e.g., Cox v. Hjelle,
207 N.W.2d 266, 269-270 (N.D.1973);
Stauffer v. Weedlun,
188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2d 218,
409 U.S. 972 (1972);
Horodner v. Fisher,
38 N.Y.2d 680, 345 N.E.2d 571,
429 U.S. 802 (1976);
Wright v. Malloy,
373 F.Supp. 1011, 1018-1019 (Vt.),
419 U.S. 987 (1974);
Scott v. Hill,
407 F.Supp. 301, 304 (ED Va. 1076).
K. Davis, Discretionary Justice, c. III, 52-96 (1969). The promulgation of rules may be of particular value when it is necessary for administrative decisions to be made summarily.
Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 44-49 (1972).
While I join the opinion of the Court, I believe it is important to point out that the Court has not rejected the constitutional analysis of the District Court. The District Court held that a driver's license may not be revoked on the basis of an
determination that certain facts "indicate . . . disrespect for the traffic laws." This Court does not disagree. It merely holds that the District Court erred in its assumption that appellee's license was revoked on the authority of the first sentence of Rule 6-206(a)3 (1975), [
] which the District Court construed to require such a determination. [
The Court interprets the Secretary's action as resting on the second sentence of Rule 6-206(a)3, which provides that a person's license must be revoked if it has been suspended three times in 10 years. Appellee's license had already been suspended twice. A third suspension would have been required under a different rule because appellee had three convictions in one year. [
] Consequently, appellee's license was subject to mandatory revocation,
431 U. S. 111
n. 8, and no prior hearing was necessary.
revocation mandatory if his license had been suspended three times within 10 years. Rule 6-206(a)3 (1975). Appellee's license was properly suspended for a third time within a 10-year period when he was convicted of a speeding violation on March 31, 1976. This suspension, and both earlier suspensions, were based on convictions for traffic offenses which appellee does not contest here. Under these circumstances, the requirement of a prior hearing mandated by
(1971), is not applicable since, as my Brother STEVENS demonstrates, a hearing was unnecessary to establish what was already clear -- that the revocation of appellee's license was mandatory.