Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/963/283/243465/
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 02:57:51
Document Index: 375300712

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1819', '§ 1331', '§ 1291', '§ 1346', '§ 2671', '§ 3', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 2671', '§ 2675']

Fareed M. Farha, Trustee of the Farha Sales, Inc., Definedbenefit Pension Plan, Plaintiff/appellant,fareed M. Farha, an Individual, Additional Party Plaintiff/appellant,rebecca O. Farha, an Individual, Additional Party Plaintiff, v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a Corporation,defendant/appellee,federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Liquidating Agentfor First National Bank of Luther, Luther,oklahoma, Intervenor-additionaldefendant/appellee, 963 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1992 › Fareed M. Farha, Trustee of the Farha Sales, Inc., Definedbenefit Pension Plan, Plaintiff/appellant,...
Fareed M. Farha, Trustee of the Farha Sales, Inc., Definedbenefit Pension Plan, Plaintiff/appellant,fareed M. Farha, an Individual, Additional Party Plaintiff/appellant,rebecca O. Farha, an Individual, Additional Party Plaintiff, v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a Corporation,defendant/appellee,federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Liquidating Agentfor First National Bank of Luther, Luther,oklahoma, Intervenor-additionaldefendant/appellee, 963 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1992)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 963 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1992) April 23, 1992
The district court entertained jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (Fourth) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a), Fed. R. App. P. We have jurisdiction in this appeal from a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
CD No. Payees 5328 Fareed M. Farha Rebecca O. Farha the pension plan 5336 Fareed M. Farha Rebecca O. Farha the pension plan 5371 Fareed M. Farha the pension plan
The district court determined that plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirements of res judicata or collateral estoppel regarding the October 1989 decision and that jurisdiction of any contract or tort claims did not lie. The court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim in contract because the dispute concerns a sum in excess of $300,000, and the U.S. Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of contract claims against the FDIC in excess of $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2). The court also ruled that it could not entertain a claim sounding in tort, because the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., controlled, and Farha had failed to file a claim with the FDIC prior to filing the action in court. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment in favor of FDIC. Farha's timely appeal, individually and as trustee, followed (We will refer to him collectively as "Farha").
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this court employs de novo review. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986, 108 S. Ct. 503, 98 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1987). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine if a genuine issue exists as to any material fact and if the court below correctly applied the relevant law. Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 934 F.2d 240, 243 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Hokansen v. United States, 868 F.2d 372, 374 (10th Cir. 1989)).
Under Oklahoma law, replevin tests the right to possess the disputed personal property. Brook v. James A. Cullimore & Co., 436 P.2d 32, 34 (Okla.1967). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized replevin as an appropriate form of action to recover a promissory note, Enid Bank & Trust Co. v. Noll, 183 Okla. 647, 84 P.2d 24 (1938), and a certificate of deposit is essentially a promissory note. Hendricks v. Grant County Bank, 379 P.2d 693, 696 (Okla.1963); U.C.C. § 3-104(j), 2 U.L.A. 26 (1991). Federal courts will entertain state-law replevin actions. Rule 64, Fed. R. Civ. P. See, e.g., Garoogian v. Medlock, 592 F.2d 997, 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1979).
At common law, there are six actions ex delicto (as distinguished from actions ex contractu) : "These actions are brought for the redress of wrongs, and include also actions for the recovery of real and personal property: (A) Trespass (B) Trespass on the Case (C) Trover (D) Ejectment (E) Detinue (F) Replevin." J. Koffler & A. Reppy, Common Law Pleading 56 (1969). Originally, replevin was available only where the goods were unlawfully taken; detinue was available where the original taking was lawful. Mennie v. Blake, 6 Ellis & Black 843, 119 Eng.Rep. 1078 (1856); see 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries ("An action of replevin, the regular way of contesting the validity of the transaction, is founded ... upon a distress taken wrongfully and without sufficient cause...."); Coke, Commentary on Littleton 145b (1823) (Where goods are improperly distrained, "the owner may have a writ de replegiare facias .... Replegiare is compounded of re and plegiare, as much as to say, to redeliver upon pledges and sureties.") Ultimately, detinue also became available where the taking was tortious.
The United States may be subject to suit for implied-in-fact contracts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2); United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217, 46 S. Ct. 501, 503, 70 L. Ed. 911 (1926); Hatzlachh Supply Co., Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 465, 100 S. Ct. 647, 650, 62 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1980) (per curiam). Assuming without deciding that a bailment contract does exist between FDIC and Farha, we agree with the district court that Farha may not press the merits of his claim in the district court. The United States Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over contract actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2). The present dispute clearly concerns the deposits, a sum of more than $300,000. That was the amount claimed as an alternative remedy in the district court. Farha may not now claim that the certificates themselves have only a nominal value, and therefore vest contract jurisdiction in the district court. Farha himself has placed the value on the paper and in so doing has delineated the proper amount for jurisdictional purposes.
Because the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit set by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2), we need not reach the merits of Farha's contract claims. The district court properly held that it was without jurisdiction.
Alternatively, Farha argues that the FDIC wrongfully offset the deposits against the debts he owed. This contention of necessity speaks of tortious conversion of the proceeds of the CDs, notwithstanding Farha's protestations that he is not seeking any recovery in tort. Reply Br. at 4. Farha cannot clap with one hand: He cannot allege wrongful appropriation of funds and contend that he is not making a tort claim. The district court noted that, to the extent that the argument sounded in tort, it was subject to the requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. One requirement is the filing of a claim with the allegedly offending agency. Id. § 2675(a). This court has held that the requirement is met by filing " '(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum certain damages claim.' " Cizek v. United States, 953 F.2d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Warren v. United States Dept. of Interior Bureau of Land Management, 724 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1984)). "The requirements are jurisdictional and cannot be waived." Id. Farha did not comply with these requirements. The district court properly held that it was without jurisdiction to consider any tort claims.