Source: http://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/privilege/
Timestamp: 2017-12-18 04:58:29
Document Index: 252895712

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 18', '§ 18', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 19', '§19']

privilege - CBA CLE Legal Connection
Colorado Supreme Court: Reverse Transfer Request Does Not Waive Psychologist-Patient Privilege
October 4, 2016 By CBA-CLE Staff Leave a Comment
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Johnson v. People on Monday, October 3, 2016.
Criminal Law—Juvenile Law—Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege.
This case raises two questions involving what a trial court may order when a juvenile seeks reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. First, when a juvenile requests a reverse-transfer hearing, does she waive her psychotherapist-patient privilege, thereby authorizing a trial court to order her to produce privileged mental health records pursuant to C.R.S. § 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI)? Second, does C.R.S. § 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) give a trial court the power to order a juvenile to submit to a state mental health assessment? As to the first question, the Colorado Supreme Court held that, because nothing in the statute states that a juvenile waives her psychotherapist–patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, a trial court cannot order the juvenile to produce privileged mental health records. As to the second question, the court held that, because nothing in the statute explicitly grants a trial court the power to order a mental health assessment, a trial court cannot order such an assessment. The reverse-transfer statute only requires that the trial court consider mental health records “made available” (i.e., voluntarily waived by the privilege-holder) to the trial court and the parties. Therefore, the court made its rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: Colorado Supreme Court, criminal law, direct filing, juvenile law, mental health, privilege, psychologist-patient privilege, reverse transfer
Colorado Court of Appeals: Physician’s Prescription Order Falls Within Exception to Physician-Patient Privilege
March 16, 2015 By CBA-CLE Staff Leave a Comment
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Moon on Thursday, March 12, 2015.
Prescription—Physician–Patient Privilege—CRS § 18-18-415(1)(b)—Juror.
A doctor wrote Moon a prescription order for six Vicodin pills. Moon later gave a pharmacy a prescription order for sixty Vicodin pills. A pharmacist called the doctor, who said that he had prescribed six pills, not sixty. At trial, Moon testified that she received a prescription order from the doctor and gave it to the pharmacy, but she denied altering it.
On appeal, Moon contended that the trial court erroneously allowed her doctor to reveal information at trial that was protected by Colorado’s physician–patient privilege. The doctor testified that he wrote two prescription orders for Moon, one for antibiotic eyedrops and the other for six extra-strength Vicodin pills. The court also admitted copies of the two original prescription orders contained in Moon’s medical records. This evidence was not privileged in light of CRS § 18-18-415(1)(b)’s statutory exception to privileged communications for persons who alter an order in an attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud or deceit.
Moon also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to excuse a juror who revealed during trial that she knew the pharmacist. The pharmacist had filled the juror’s prescriptions. The juror’s relationship with the pharmacist was not ongoing and she said that she could be fair and impartial despite knowing the pharmacist. Therefore, the court was not required to dismiss her. The judgment was affirmed.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: Colorado Court of Appeals, criminal law, health law, physician-patient privilege, privilege
Colorado Court of Appeals: Statements to Hospital Chaplain Not Privileged
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Trammell on Thursday, March 27, 2014.
Clergy–Communicant Privilege—Confidential.
After defendant attempted suicide while incarcerated, he was hospitalized for treatment of his wounds. While hospitalized, defendant attacked the sheriff’s deputy on guard with a metal bar, striking the deputy on the head. A struggle ensued. The deputy testified that during the struggle, defendant tried to remove the deputy’s gun from its holster. Defendant also struck a nurse on the head, causing a laceration that required stitches, and causing lasting effects on the nurse’s memory. Another nurse who was struck received a minor cut.
On appeal, defendant contended that the statements he made to the hospital chaplain after the incident were privileged under the clergy–communicant privilege, and that the trial court therefore erred when it admitted the chaplain’s testimony that defendant had planned the altercation. Defendant spoke with the chaplain in defendant’s hospital room while he was being guarded by a deputy. Because defendant did not take any precautions to keep those communications confidential or private, the clergy–communicant privilege does not apply. The judgment and sentence were affirmed.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: Colorado Court of Appeals, criminal law, privilege, witness testimony
Colorado Supreme Court: Trial Court Must Become Involved in Discovery Process if Party Claims Information Not Relevant to Claim or Defense
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re DCP Midstream LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. on Monday, June 24, 2013.
The Supreme Court held that CRCP 26(b) requires trial courts to take an active role managing discovery when a scope objection is raised. The trial court must determine the appropriate scope of discovery in light of the reasonable needs of the case and tailor discovery to those needs. To resolve a dispute regarding the proper scope of discovery, the trial court should, at a minimum, consider the cost–benefit and proportionality factors set forth in CRCP 26(b)(2)(F). The Court also held that title opinions, like any document sought in discovery, may contain privileged attorney–client communications if the parameters of that doctrine are met.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, Colorado Supreme Court, discovery, litigation, privilege
Tenth Circuit: Brady Requires Party to Disclose Mental Health Records in Capital Case
The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Browning v. Trammell on Monday, May 6, 2013.
This case turns largely on principles the Supreme Court established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that an individual’s constitutional right to a fair trial obligates the prosecution in a criminal case to turn over evidence to the defense in certain circumstances. Specifically, under Brady, the State violates a defendant’s right to due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. Difficulty arises, however, when the Brady obligation to disclose comes up against the various legal privileges that protect sensitive information from disclosure, such as the psychotherapist-patient privilege at issue here. In such a situation, the Supreme Court has directed lower courts to review such information in camera to determine whether it meets the Brady standard. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57–58 (1987).
On February 18, 2001, Harry and Teresa Hye were shot to death and their house burned to the ground. Their adopted daughter, Cenessa Tackett, was also shot but survived and escaped the burning house. Tackett identified two perpetrators: her former boyfriend, Michael Browning, and another man named Shane Pethel. The State arrested them and charged them with capital murder.
During pretrial proceedings, Tackett’s attorney accidentally faxed two psychiatric reports to the prosecution. According to the first report, Tackett displayed “magical thinking” and a “blurring of reality and fantasy.” The second report described Tackett as manipulative, grandiose, egocentric, and stated that she typically projected blame onto others. The report noted memory deficits. It described Tackett as a “type . . . rarely seen except in inpatient facilities.” Tackett was described as assaultive, combative, or as having a homicidal potential that must be carefully considered.
When the prosecution received these reports, it revealed their existence but not their contents to the defense. Browning moved to compel production, which the trial court denied.
The trial court severed Browning’s case from that of his co-defendant, Pethel. Browning’s case went to trial first. No direct evidence besides Tackett’s testimony connected Browning to the crime. The State’s case therefore stood or fell largely on Tackett’s eyewitness testimony and its credibility. The jury convicted Browning on all counts, and returned a sentence of death for the murders of Harry and Teresa Hye.
Having exhausted all state post-conviction remedies, Browning filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in the Northern District of Oklahoma. Browning raised several arguments, including that Tackett’s mental health records should have been disclosed. Reviewing those records in camera, the district court disagreed with the Oklahoma courts’ conclusion that the records contained nothing favorable to Browning. It therefore ordered those records disclosed to Browning’s habeas counsel, and, after briefing, concluded that Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ (OCCA’s) determination of this issue was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court therefore granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, requiring the State to retry Browning within 180 days or release him.
The federal district court cannot grant habeas corpus simply because it disagrees with the state court. Rather, if “fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” then the federal court must defer to the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785–86 (2011).
The defense argued they should be permitted to view the mental health records for purposes of this habeas corpus petition. The Tenth Circuit disagreed. The Tenth Circuit held that a Brady claim resolved through the process established in Ritchie, i.e., an in camera review, has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of § 2254(d).
The Tenth Circuit confined its analysis of favorability and materiality to the record before the state trial court. The Court therefore could not consider Pethel’s confession and guilty plea, nor could it consider evidence Browning developed in post-conviction proceedings that he believed favored his theory of the case.
Evidence is “favorable to the defense” if it is exculpatory or impeaching. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). Evidence is “material” if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012). A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.
On the exculpatory side, Tackett’s records describe her as hostile, assaultive, combative, and even potentially homicidal. Such evidence tends to show that a person with a motive to kill might even have a disposition to kill. On the impeaching side, Tackett’s psychiatric evaluations evinced, among other things, memory deficits, magical thinking, blurring of reality and fantasy, and projection of blame onto others. This is classic impeachment evidence.
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s disposition of the favorability question: “There is no reasonable argument or theory that could support the Oklahoma courts’ conclusion that the sealed material contained nothing favorable to Browning’s defense.”
The Court then turned to the question of whether Tackett’s mental health records would have been material to Browning’s case.
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.
The Tenth Circuit concluded it was difficult to see how the Oklahoma courts could reasonably conclude there was nothing material about a recent diagnosis of a severe mental disorder that made Tackett hostile, assaultive, combative, and even potentially homicidal, or that Tackett was known to blur reality and fantasy and project blame onto others.
The district court’s grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: 10th Circuit, criminal law, death penalty, habeas corpus, health law, inadvertent disclosure, medical records, mental health, privilege
Chief Justice Directive 04-06 Amended by Colorado Supreme Court
In March 2013, the Colorado Supreme Court updated Chief Justice Directive (CJD) 04-06, concerning appointments by the Office of the Child’s Representative. The changes are in response to the Colorado Supreme Court opinion in L.A.N. et al. v. L.M.B.
The decision in L.A.N. held that the GAL holds the child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege when the child is too young to hold the privilege, the child’s interests are adverse to his or her parents’ interests, and the privilege is not abrogated by C.R.S. § 19-3-311.
The updates to the CJD are intended in part to provide counsel to children in dependency and neglect cases who have been determined of sufficient age and competent to hold their own patient-therapist privilege so that the counsel may advise the children of their privilege. The updates also clarify that appointments as counsel for children in D&N proceedings may be made from the Office of the Child’s Representative’s D&N appointment list. The CJD also clarifies payment procedures for these appointed attorneys.
Click here to view a PDF of updated CJD 04-06. For all of the Chief Justice Directives, click here.
Filed Under: Updates Tagged With: adopted rules changes, chief justice directive, dependency and neglect, family law, juvenile law, privilege
Colorado Supreme Court: Guardian ad Litem Holds Child’s Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Dependency & Neglect Proceeding if Three-Part Test Met
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in L.A.N. v. L.M.B. on Tuesday, January 22, 2013.
Dependency and Neglect—Psychotherapist–Patient Privilege—Guardian ad Litem—Waiver.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ finding that the guardian ad litem (GAL) held the minor child’s psychotherapist–patient privilege in this dependency and neglect proceeding. A GAL holds a minor child’s psychotherapist–patient privilege in a dependency and neglect case when: (1) the child is too young or otherwise incompetent to hold the privilege; (2) the child’s interests are adverse to those of his or her parent(s); and (3) CRS §19-3-311 does not abrogate the privilege.
The Court also affirmed the court of appeals’ holding that the GAL partially waived the child’s psychotherapist–patient privilege when she disseminated a letter from the child’s therapist to the juvenile court and to all of the parties. However, the Court disagreed with the procedure the court of appeals described for determining the scope of the waiver. On remand, the juvenile court must determine the scope of the waiver consistent with the Court’s instructions.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: Colorado Supreme Court, dependency and neglect, guardian ad litem, juvenile law, privilege