Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95287/florsheim-bros-drygoods-co-ltd-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-05-25 03:34:46
Document Index: 439681482

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 241', '§ 239', '§ 250', '§ 278', '§ 239', '§ 239', '§ 250', '§ 3176', '§ 278', '§ 277', '§ 278']

Florsheim Bros Drygoods Co Ltd Vs United States - Citation 95287 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co., Ltd. Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/95287
Case Number 280 U.S. 453
Appellant Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co., Ltd.
florsheim bros. drygoods co., ltd. v. united states - 280 u.s. 453 (1930) u.s. supreme court florsheim bros. drygoods co., ltd. v. united states, 280 u.s. 453 (1930) florsheim bros. drygoods co., ltd. v. united states nos. 118 and 414 argued january 13, 14, 1930 decided february 24, 1930 280 u.s. 453 writs of certiorari to the circuit courts of appeals for the fifth and first circuits, respectively syllabus 1. although the revenue act of 1918 was not approved until february 24, 1919, § 241(a) required that returns on the basis of the calendar year be made on or before march 15, and § 239 required that a corporation's return should state specifically the items of its gross income and deductions and credits. in.....
Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co., Ltd. v. United States - 280 U.S. 453 (1930)
U.S. Supreme Court Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co., Ltd. v. United States, 280 U.S. 453 (1930)
Held: that this so-called "tentative return" was not the return within the meaning of §§ 250(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921, limiting the time within which taxes under the Act of 1918 might be determined and assessed to five years after the return was filed, etc., and that the filing of such "tentative return" did not start that period of limitation. P. 280 U. S. 456 .
Act of 1918, and to be in effect for one year after the expiration of the statutory period of limitation, was not a contract preventing Congress from extending the statutory period for the collection of such taxes by legislation enacted before that period as extended by the waiver has expired. P. 280 U. S. 465 .
3. Income taxes assessed within the statutory period, as extended by waiver, and after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924, the collection of which had not been previously barred, could be collected pursuant to §§ 278(d) of that Act at any time within six years of the assessment. P. 280 U. S. 467 .
These cases, which were argued together, present the same questions. In each case, the taxpayer seeks to recover with interest an amount assessed and collected, after March 15, 1925, as an additional income and excess profits tax for 1918 under the Revenue Act of 1918. In each, the claim is that both the assessment and the collection were made after the expiration of the time allowed therefor. In a long line of cases arising out of similar facts, the Board of Tax Appeals has held consistently that neither the assessment nor the collection was made too late. [ Footnote 1 ] In No. 414, the action was brought in the federal court for Massachusetts against the collector to recover $39,043.99. The district court, without passing on the timeliness of the assessment, held that the collection was barred and entered judgment for the plaintiff, 28 F.2d 54. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment on the ground that the assessment was barred, and expressed no opinion on the question decided by the district court, 33 F.2d 739. In No. 118, the action was brought in the federal court for western Louisiana against the United States to recover $11,282.15.
That court, deciding both questions in favor of the government, entered a judgment for the defendant, 26 F.2d 505, which was affirmed, on both grounds, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 29 F.2d 895. In other federal courts, also, there has been diversity of opinion. [ Footnote 2 ] This Court granted writs of certiorari.
First. Whether the assessment was barred depends upon whether the period of limitation was started by the filing before March 15, 1919, of a so-called "tentative return," or by the later filing of a so-called "completed return." The question arises in this way: the Revenue Act of 1918 was not approved until February 24, 1919, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057. Section 241(a) required that returns on the basis of the calendar year should be made on or before the 15th day of March. Section 239 required that a corporation's return should state "specifically the items of its gross income and the deductions and credits allowed." The form of return prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for giving this information, known as Form 1120, is an elaborate document composed of a "summary" in four schedules, with eleven supporting schedules and twenty-six subschedules. The "summary" calls for the specification of some 93 items. The supporting schedules and subschedules call for the specification of some 357 items, and of as many more items to be stated in appendices as the circumstances of the particular taxpayers might require. [ Footnote 3 ]
"Provision for systematically handling this new feature will be made in the construction of the new return blanks . . . , embodied in which is a detachable letter of remittance. Any corporation which finds that, for sufficient reasons, it cannot complete its return by March 15, may detach and fill out the letter of remittance, and forward same to the collector on or before March 15, together with a check . . . for the tax due on that date. . . . A statement in writing of the reasons why it is impossible for the corporation to complete the return by the specified date must accompany every such remittance. [ Footnote 4 ]"
"determined and assessed within five years after the return was filed, unless both the Commissioner and the taxpayer consent in writing to a later determination, assessment, and collection of the tax. [ Footnote 5 ]"
the Act. The mere fact that Form 1031T was a formal document prescribed by the Commissioner and termed a "return" does not identify it as the return required by the Act. The word "return" is not a technical word of art. It may be true that the filing of a return which is defective or incomplete under § 239 is sufficient to start the running of the period of limitation, and that the filing of an amended return does not toll the period. [ Footnote 6 ] But the defective or incomplete return purports to be a specific statement of the items of income, deductions, and credits in compliance with § 239. And, to have that effect, it must honestly and reasonably be intended as such. There is not a pretense of such purpose with respect to Form 1031T. Nor is it the purpose of Form 1120 to supply or correct something omitted or misstated in Form 1031T. The latter was neither defective nor incomplete. The extension of time for the payment of the first installment was prevented not because Form 1031T was considered a return in compliance with the statute, but because the Commissioner exacted payment as a condition for the requested extension of time to file the return. The penalties were to be imposed for the failure to file, or the late filing, of the detailed return above described. And the penalties were avoided not by the filing of Form 1031T as a substantial compliance with the requirement of a return, but, as expressly stated in that form, by the extension of time to file which was granted
and the consequent grant of an extension of time, the mere filing of Form 1031T would not have avoided the penalties prescribed for the late filing of the return required by the Act. [ Footnote 7 ] Nor would the penalties have been avoided by the filing of that form if the complete return were not filed within the extended time.
The contention that, because Form 1031T was sufficient as a notice and demand under § 250(e), it was a sufficient return to start the period of limitation, is equally unsound. That section did not prescribe the exclusive mode for the notice and demand for payment of the first installment. Any instrument containing the notice and demand would be as efficacious for that purpose as the return required by the statute. Finally, the argument that Form 1031T was a sufficient return to furnish the basis for assessment lacks significance, whether or not it is sound. [ Footnote 8 ] The Commissioner is not confined to the taxpayer's return for the basis of his assessment. He may secure additional information, and he may assess the tax even if the taxpayer files no return. Rev.Stat. § 3176,
The question as to the applicability of the later Acts may be briefly disposed of. Section 1100 of the Revenue Act of 1924 repealed the 1921 Act. Section 277(a)(2) of the 1924 Act [ Footnote 9 ] expressly dealt with taxes due under the Acts of 1918 and 1921, and it reenacted the five-year limitation with the express qualification, "Except as provided in § 278." Section 278(c) [ Footnote 10 ] reenacted the provision as to extension of time by the consent of the Commissioner and the taxpayer, and constituted the sole statutory authority for the waiver of the period of limitation for taxes due under the 1918 and 1921 Acts. It unquestionably applied to waivers thereafter to be executed, and no reason appears why it did not equally apply to waivers executed prior to the passage of the Act. Section 278(d) [ Footnote 11 ] prescribed the period of limitation for the collection of taxes applicable to all cases enumerated in that section and § 277, which expressly included taxes under the Act of 1918. The situations intended to be excluded from the limitations prescribed were carefully specified in § 278(e) [ Footnote 12 ]: (1) Assessments
or collections already barred before the passage of that Act and (2) assessments made and proceedings begun prior to that time. Neither of the cases at bar falls within those exceptions. Since, in both cases, assessment and collection were not barred on the enactment of the 1924 Act, and were made after that date, the section is applicable. Compare Russell v. United States, 278 U. S. 181 .