Source: http://ppc-reports.co.za/iar-2018/remuneration-report.php
Timestamp: 2019-03-24 07:29:38
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Remuneration report | PPC | Integrated Report 2018
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I am pleased to present the remuneration committee's report for the 12 months ended 31 March 2018, highlighting key issues considered in the period.
In the past year, there have been leadership changes at board and executive level in the company. Mr Peter Nelson resigned as non-executive director and chairman of the board. He successfully led PPC through a period of headwinds and achieved some significant milestones since his appointment in January 2015. Mr Sidney Mhlarhi also resigned as non-executive director to pursue other career opportunities.
Both served as members of the remuneration committee. I thank them for their valuable contributions as committee members and wish them well in their future endeavours.
At executive director level, PPC also saw the resignation of the chief executive officer, Mr Darryll Castle, and appointment of his successor, Mr Johan Claassen.
The past year has been challenging for the company, mainly due to the lagging South African economy and low growth. Overcapacity, lack of demand for cement and the impact of competition from new entrants in the cement industry also impacted company performance for the period.
All these factors contributed to PPC's muted performance for the review period, and are reflected in remuneration outcomes.
Given these challenges, the committee has reflected and responded to shareholder views by incorporating a policy that ensures the delivery of sustained value as well as the attraction and retention of key skills at all levels in the organisation. In support of this policy, the committee is pleased to confirm that the new employee evaluation grading system has been fully implemented throughout the South African operations, including in newly acquired local subsidiaries. The integration of these subsidiaries is also on track with their respective plans. The grading system has been accepted in the DRC and is ready for implementation, while management is busy with the implementation roll-out plan in Rwanda and Zimbabwe. This new system will assist with career progression, succession and talent while supporting the group's retention strategy at all levels.
Despite the improved vote of 85% for the remuneration report at the previous AGM, the committee considers shareholder dialogue imperative. In 2017, members of the committee consulted with various shareholders on our remuneration policy. Overall, there was support for our incentive structures and level of transparency of our report. The committee will continue to evaluate and consider feedback by shareholders in future.
In line with King IVTM and the JSE Listings Requirements, the report is presented in three parts: this background statement (part 1), followed by the company-wide remuneration philosophy and policy with specific focus on the policy as it applies to executive management (part 2), and lastly implementation of the policy for the 12 months from 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018 (part 3).
T Moyo
Part 2: Remuneration policy
As a committee of the board, the committee assists in setting the company's remuneration policy as well as remuneration for directors and prescribed officers. It operates according to its approved terms of reference, published on the company website. For more detail on these terms of reference, refer to page 95 of the governance report.
All members are non-executive directors, and the majority are independent as defined by King IVTM. The committee held four meetings in the period, with attendance shown on page 95.
The chief executive, chief financial officer and group human resources executive attend meetings by invitation to assist the committee in executing its mandate. Other members of executive management can be invited when appropriate. No executives participate in the voting process or are present at committee meetings when their own remuneration is considered.
The remuneration committee has appointed PwC as an independent advisers and is satisfied that they acted independently.
Please refer to page 97.
Shareholder engagement remains a focus area for the committee. In the event that our remuneration policy (in part 2) or implementation report (in part 3) are voted against by 25% or more of voting rights exercised by our shareholders, the committee will take the following steps as a minimum:
Engage with shareholders to ascertain reasons for dissenting votes
Address legitimate and reasonable objections raised
This may include amending our remuneration policy or clarifying/adjusting our remuneration governance or processes.
The committee is focused on responsible remuneration practices and strives for a fair, living wage for all employees by reviewing salaries and ensuring these remain competitive in the industry. Our industry faces many challenges and we recognise the need to retain our top talent to ensure a focused and driven effort to meet shareholder expectations.
The company continuously strives for fair and responsible pay by remaining sensitive to the wage differential between executive and lower-income employees in awarding annual salary increases. Accordingly, annual increases for lower-income employees this year exceeded inflation while increases awarded to executives and management employees were inflation-linked.
In the remainder of this part, we summarise the company-wide remuneration policy and, as applicable, detail the policy as it applies to executive management. Our full remuneration policy can be viewed at www.ppc.co.za.
Company-wide remuneration policy – overview
Ensure employees are rewarded fairly and appropriately
Attract, retain and motivate individuals with the necessary calibre and behaviour
Appropriate to recruit and retain, but no in-built premium for performance.
Aligned to company financial performance, strategic priorities and individual performance.
Forfeitable share plan (currently used)
Share appreciation rights plan (not currently used but with outstanding awards)
Aligned to shareholder returns over the long term.
Maximum rewards are achieved only for high company and individual performance, in addition to high shareholder returns
Key principles of the remuneration policy
PPC recognises that one of its sources of competitive advantage is its highly skilled employees. To meet our business objectives, remuneration and reward policies and practices must support the following principles:
Encourage organisational, team and individual performance
Designed to drive a high-performance culture
Based on the premise that employees should share in the success of the company
Be designed to attract and retain high-calibre individuals with the optimum mixture of competencies
Consider industry benchmarks and practices of comparable companies of a similar size
The policy conforms to King IV™ and is based on the following principles:
Remuneration practices are aligned with corporate strategy
Incentive-based rewards are earned by achieving demanding performance conditions consistent with shareholder interests over the short, medium and long term
Incentive plans, performance measures and targets are structured to operate effectively throughout the business cycle
Promote an ethical culture and responsible corporate citizenship
The remuneration of executive management is fair and responsible in the context of overall employee remuneration in the company
Performance conditions used in variable pay structures support positive outcomes across the economic, social and environmental context in which the company operates; and/or all the capitals the company uses or affects
The design of long-term incentives is prudent and does not expose shareholders to unreasonable financial risk
Fixed/variable Element Definition Applicable grades
Fixed Total guaranteed pay (TGP) The fixed element of remuneration (TGP) includes salary, car allowance, retirement, life insurance and medical aid contributions. Paterson grades
F4 – C5
Base pay plus benefits Base pay refers to the cash basic pay and excludes benefits. Benefits are over and above base pay and include the company contribution to medical aid, retirement fund and any other employer funded group benefits. Paterson grades
C4 – A3
Variable Short-term incentive (STI) An annual STI is paid in cash and gives employees an incentive to achieve the company’s short and medium-term goals, with payment levels based on both company and individual performance, depending on the level of the employee. All employees
F4 – A3
LTIs comprise instruments awarded under two plans:
Share appreciation rights (SARs) awarded under the PPC share appreciation right scheme (SAR scheme)
Forfeitable shares awarded under the PPC forfeitable share plan (FSP)
The committee retains the discretion to determine the award policy, using either or a combination of both plans. Where used for performance, vesting is subject to company performance vesting conditions. Where used for retention, continued employment is used as a vesting condition.
The current policy is to make awards under the FSP.
Paterson grades F4 – C5 and C4 foremen and sales consultants
Details on executive directors and prescribed officers
Our policy for executive directors and prescribed officers means a significant portion of remuneration received depends on company performance. In part 3, we show actual total pay outcomes for the 12 months ended 31 March 2018, while total pay opportunities for the chief executive, chief financial officer and prescribed officers (on average) under the following three performance scenarios are illustrated below:
* LTI includes indicative expected value of retention FSPs on grant date.
** LTI includes indicative expected value on grant date.
*** LTI includes indicative expected value on grant date assuming full vesting.
Total gross package (TGP)
The company generally pays fixed remuneration at the relevant market median. Despite the company's March year-end, salaries are reviewed in September and annual increases effected on 1 October.
Monthly pay and benefits are targeted to be competitive for comparable roles in companies of similar complexity and size, taking cognisance of the performance and experience of the employee concerned. Market data is used to benchmark salary and benefits and to inform decisions on salary adjustments. Salary increases are not guaranteed and are adjusted annually at financial year-end based on market benchmarks, market inflation, company affordability, company performance and to address market anomalies.
Professional advisers appointed by the remuneration committee provide benchmark information. For executive directors, a peer group comprising listed companies is used to benchmark TGP.
The following benefits are provided as part of TGP:
Participation in the PPC retirement fund is compulsory for all permanent employees. This is an in-house defined-contribution fund and provides risk cover for death and disability
Employees are required to belong to a choice of company-sponsored external medical aids or to be a member of their spouse/life partner's medical aid
Employees are covered for death, medical and disability expenses as a result of an accident
Employees who need to use their motor vehicle in their duties can elect to allocate an appropriate portion of their TGP as a car allowance
Employees who are not on TGP receive a fixed monthly basic cash salary component – base pay – and benefits in addition to base pay. Benefits include the company contribution to medical aid, retirement fund and any other employer funded group benefits.
To reward employees for contributing to the company’s financial and strategic objectives. The STI scheme has been designed to be easy to understand, pay out fairly and be differentiated according to individual performance, while being linked to PPC’s overall financial performance.
Employees participate in the STI with levels of participation and minimum qualifying targets (thresholds) varying by employee grade, and higher financial thresholds for senior executives.
The STI scheme is measured over a one-year period, using the following formula:
Annual TGP/basic pay x STI maximum % x company performance % x individual performance %
The remuneration committee retains the right to vary the terms of the STI in special circumstances. For example, in previous years, this was applied pro rata across all participants to reduce the cost to company in line with lower than expected profits.
STI maximum percentage
The STI limit varies by grade: for the chief executive officer (CEO), STI is capped at 140% of TGP, 120% of TGP for the chief financial officer (CFO) and a range of 110 – 90% of TGP for prescribed officers.
Company performance measures and percentages
The same performance measures are used across the company, but with lower entry-level performance for junior staff. A combination of financial (70%) and non-financial (30%) business drivers is used. The current measures comprise normalised HEPS (20% weighting), EBITDA (30% weighting) and cash HEPS (20% weighting). The non-financial measures are weighted equally and comprise transformation: BBBEE compliance (10% weighting), sustainability: CO2 emissions (10% weighting) and safety: fatalities and LTIFR (10% weighting).
Company performance is measured against these targets. As targets for junior employees have lower entry levels, the bonus opportunity is commensurately higher. For executive directors and prescribed officers, the target ranges from 0% (threshold performance) to 150% (stretch performance).
No bonus is payable below threshold performance.
Personal performance measures and percentages
Personal performance is measured through personal scorecards with objective and subjective measures, including financial and non-financial goals. They cover all aspects of an individual’s role that are important to creating value and sustainability.
Personal performance ranges depend on the grade. For executive directors and prescribed officers, this escalates from 50% (threshold) to 120% (stretch). A personal performance factor of below 50% will result in no bonus being payable, irrespective of the company performance outcome. Overall performance for executive directors and prescribed officers is expected to average 75% to 80%.
Applicable performance measures are set for each financial year. No structural changes are envisaged for 2019.
The company has two LTIs in place, comprising the following instruments:
Forfeitable share plan (FSP) – the FSP comprises full value shares. Performance awards with forward-looking performance conditions and retention awards can be made under this plan
Share appreciation rights (SARs) plan – all share appreciation rights are subject to forward-looking performance conditions
The committee regularly reviews the allocation mix between FSP and SARs awards. Currently the FSP is used, but there are outstanding SARs awards previously awarded.
To align share scheme participants with shareholders over the long term by making performance awards, with vesting subject to company performance conditions and continued employment, and to act as a retention tool by making retention awards, with vesting subject to continued employment.
Operation and instruments
Annual awards are made. Currently, FSP awards are used and forfeitable shares are awarded. These are free shares with full voting and dividend rights from award date. The FSP comprises performance awards that are subject to forwardlooking performance conditions and retention awards.
Details on the allocation between these instruments are provided below.
Performance versus retention instruments
For executive directors and prescribed officers, at least 75% and 50% respectively of the total LTI award should be performance-based.
The current mix between FSP performance and retention awards for executive directors and prescribed officers is shown below:
Level Retention FSP % Performance FSP %
CEO 25 75
CFO 25 75
Prescribed officers (MDs) 25 75
Prescribed officers (company secretary) 60 40
Employees within 36 months of retirement will only receive retention FSPs.
Appropriately stretched performance conditions are set by the committee each time an award is made, measured over a three-year performance period. Please refer to part 3 for performance conditions and measurement used in 2018.
Awards of forfeitable shares (performance awards) vest after three years and are subject to both continued employment from the date of award and achievement of performance measures noted above. Retention awards under the FSP are subject to continued employment measured over a three-year period.
LTIs are not dilutive to shareholders as they can only be settled by purchasing shares in the market.
South African employees participated in a BBBEE scheme in 2008 and a second scheme in 2012. Certain directors and prescribed officers also participated in these schemes as detailed on page 116.
Employment contracts – executive directors
The remuneration committee, subject to circumstances, will maintain the following policy for executive directors' employment contracts:
All agreements should contain a restraint of trade clause
Contracts should not commit the company to pay on termination arising from the director's failure to perform agreed duties
Employment contracts should not contain balloon payments
If a director is dismissed because of a disciplinary procedure, a shorter notice period should apply without entitlement for compensation for this period
Contracts should not compensate directors for severance because of change of control. The CEO is an exception; he has an optional six-month compensation clause if he decides to resign post any change in control
Non-executive directors appointed during the year are subject to election by shareholders at the first shareholders' meeting following their appointment. These directors are also required to retire, according to the board rotation plan.
The CEO recommends board fees to the remuneration committee for approval by the board. This recommendation follows input from independent advisers on benchmark studies based on the same comparator group used for executive directors' remuneration. PPC pays its non-executive directors a retainer fee (including attendance at all scheduled meetings) plus an attendance fee for special meetings beyond the scheduled number of meetings. The lead independent director fee is included in his board fee but he will be paid additional fees for his committee memberships and chairmanships.
Non-binding advisory vote on part 2
The remuneration policy will be subject to a non-binding advisory vote at the annual general meeting on 30 August 2018. The policy is reviewed annually and the opinions of shareholder are an important consideration during these reviews.
Part 3: Implementation of policies for the review period
Summary of remuneration activities/decisions
The main issues considered and approved by the remuneration committee for the 12 months ended 31 March 2018 included:
Approve the committee work plan for 2018
Review remuneration policy and approve remuneration report
Review shareholder feedback post annual general meeting
Approve TGP increases for senior management
Approve STI targets for executive directors, prescribed officers and all other staff
Approve STI outcomes for 2018
Approve LTIs awarded in 2018
Review fees payable to non-executive directors
TGP adjustments (2018)
As noted, annual salary increases are effected in October, taking account of market benchmark movements and company affordability. Management employees including prescribed officers received an average increase of 5,01% while non-management employees received an average increase of 5,51%. The average increase across all employees was 5,47%.
STI outcomes 2018
The remuneration committee approved the full-year STI payment based on the company performance scorecard target outcomes below. Due to affordability, the committee adjusted the company performance score downwards by 18 percentage points for the South African operations.
% Threshold Target Result Achievement
% Outcome
EBITDA 30 2 266 2 437 1 880 0 0,0
Normalised HEPS 20 21 25 14 0 0,0
Cash HEPS 20 90 106 95 31 6,2
BEE roadmap 10 Level 4 Level 4 Level 3 150 15,0
Sustainability 10 800kg
CO2/t clinker 796kg
CO2/t clinker 775kg
CO2/t clinker 53 5,3
Safety (LTIFR and fatalities) 10 0,32 0,3 0,25 150 15,0
Total 100 41,5
STIs paid to executive directors and prescribed officers are shown below:
Name STI
R STI as % of
annual TGP
J Claassen 1 441 211 21,21
T Ramano 1 352 405 27,63
N Lekula 880 443 22,87
M Ramafoko 640 831 20,00
J Snyman 462 957 19,00
In line with the disclosure format recommended by King IVTM, the following information on LTIs is disclosed:
LTIs awarded in 2018
LTIs vesting in 2018
LTIs settled in 2018
Outstanding LTIs
Further details appear in the table unvested LTI awards and cash value of settled awards on page 116.
LTIs awarded in 2018 were approved by the committee in 2017 but, due to the prolonged closed period, awards were only made on 29 March 2018. Executive directors and prescribed officers were awarded a mix of performance and retention shares.
The following performance targets, weighting and performance periods apply to FSPs awarded in 2018 and will be tested over a three-year period, beginning on 1 April 2017 and ending on 31 March 2020.
Performance conditions and weighting Detail of performance conditions Vesting profile Peer group for testing
Relative TSR condition
Relative TSR against peer group median (40%)
Absolute TSR (60%)
Three-year relative TSR
Threshold – median of peer group
Stretch – upper quartile of peer group
Threshold – cost of equity
Stretch – cost of equity plus 6%
To mitigate market volatility in determining applicable values at the onset and at vesting, a 20-day smoothing period will be applied, using the TSR daily index for the 20 trading days up to and including the start date of the performance period and the average TSR daily index for the 20 trading days up to and including the end date of the performance period.
Below threshold – 0% vesting
At threshold – 30% vesting
Stretch – 100% vesting, with linear vesting between these levels
INDI 25
FSPs awarded in 2018, expressed as a % of TGP to executive directors and prescribed officers, are reflected below.
Name FSP as % of
(face value) FSP as % of
J Claassen 142 95
T Ramano 105 70
N Lekula 75 50
M Ramafoko 47 35
J Snyman 32 25
FSP and SARs awards made in 2015 vested in 2018. These awards were made prior to the change in year-end and the performance period for the 2015 FSP performance awards and SARs awards ended on 30 September 2017. All FSP retention share awards for the 2015 allocation vested in the employees' names, while only 6,3% of the SARs 2015 awards vested for the same period. The SARs award strike price was R9,84. At date of vesting, the share price was R7,23, holding no value for participants at that date. However, participants have a three-year exercise period, ending 19 February 2021, to realise any value in the SARs awards, failing which it would lapse.
Settlements under LTIs are detailed in the tables unvested LTI awards and cash value of settled awards on page 116.
Payments to outgoing CEO
PPC's outgoing CEO, Mr Darryll Castle, was on a five-year employment contract and his services terminated on 31 July 2017. At the time of his termination, Mr Castle had served 31 months of his 60-month contract. In terms of the contractual agreement, Mr Castle received an exit payment reflecting his pay for the remaining term of the contract and received an amount in respect of accrued leave. Mr Castle did not receive a short-term payment but retained some of his previously awarded long-term incentives. Full details appear on page 116.
Total remuneration outcomes are illustrated below:
* Actual represents remuneration for the past 12 months whereas the policy remuneration scenario graphs reflect annual figures.
** Average TGP, including once-off benefits.
*** LTI represents the value per the single figure disclosure.
Remuneration paid to executive directors and prescribed officers for the 12 months ended 31 March 2018
All figures stated in R000 Salary Retirement
contributions Car
allowance Cash
incentive Termination
payment LTIP
reflected(1,2,3,4) Rights offer
benefits(5) Other Total single
J Claassen(6,7) 3 140 591 300 1 441 — 907 — 893 7 272
D Castle(9) 1 786 248 — — — — — 16 832 18 866
T Ramano(10) 3 751 786 240 1 352 — 985 — 1 236 8 350
N Lekula(10,12) 2 862 387 — 880 — 462 — 700 5 291
J Snyman 2 041 260 117 463 — 381 — 5 3 267
M Ramafoko(10,14,15) 1 743 311 367 641 — 469 — 681 4 212
Remuneration paid to executive directors and prescribed officers for the 12 months ended 31 March 2017
J Claassen(8) 2 633 497 300 728 — 293 259 8 4 718
D Castle(8) 5 230 700 — — — 1 087 632 8 7 656
T Ramano(11) 3 473 817 240 — — 2 080 897 5 7 512
N Lekula(13) 2 693 359 — 654 — 259 248 219 4 432
J Snyman(8) 1 925 244 117 396 — 392 348 6 3 428
M Ramafoko 1 582 263 367 70 — 389 313 10 2 994
(1) FSPs without performance conditions awarded in August 2016 are included in the LTIP reflected for 2017 at the closing share price of R8,99 on the award date of 30 August 2016.
(2) FSPs without performance conditions awarded on 29 March 2018 are included in the LTIP reflected for 2018 at the closing share price of R7,85 on that date.
(3) The performance period of the 2015 SARs ended on 30 September 2017 and are included in the LTIP reflected for 2018 at zero as the shares are effectively underwater although 6,3% of the awards vested.
(4) The BEE 1 participation rights vested on 29 March 2018 and the value of the shares vesting in participants are included in the LTIP reflected for 2018.
(5) Participants in the FSP received rights in relation to the holding of forfeitable shares under the FSP as part of the rights offer in 2017. Dividend equivalents include proceeds from rights sold as well as the estimated proceeds from rights followed in relation to performance FSPs which has not yet been included in the single figure of remuneration (the latter was calculated as the difference between the theoretical ex-rights price of R5,83 and the rights offer price of R4,00).
(6) JT Claassen (previously a prescribed officer) was appointed as interim CEO in July 2017 and as permanent CEO in February 2018.
(7) “Other” includes a relieving allowance.
(8) “Other” includes sundry expenses relating to medical gap cover and executive holiday accommodation.
(9) DJ Castle resigned as CEO and from the board in July 2017. He received an exit package of R16 832 000 included in “Other” which consisted of notice pay, leave pay and a separation package.
(10) Due to the underperformance of the BEE 1 transaction, the Remco resolved to make ex gratia payments to certain participants of the Black Managers Trust which are included under “Other”.
(11) LTIP reflected also includes the value of the RSUs granted in 2013 with a performance period ended 30 September 2016.
(12) “Other” includes relieving allowance and leave payout.
(13) “Other” includes a relocation allowance paid in April 2016.
(14) M Ramafoko became a prescribed officer in February 2018.
(15) “Other” includes a relieving allowance.
Schedule of unvested LTIs and awards settled
Names End of
2017 Settled
201 Cash value
R Closing
Share appreciation rights (17,18,19)
08/08/2007 cash-settled 2010/08/08 40 000 — — — — 40 000 — —
17/09/2008 cash-settled 2011/09/17 24 000 — — — — 24 000 — —
25/09/2009 cash-settled 2012/09/25 26 000 — — — — 26 000 — —
29/05/2015 equity-settled 2018/02/19 148 800 — — — — 148 800 — —
30/08/2016 equity-settled 2019/08/30 — 209 400 — 105 373 — 314 773 — 1 025 406
Forfeitable shares – with performance conditions(20,21,22)
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 21 500 — — — — 21 500 72 204 —
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 55 700 — — — 55 700 187 059 376 655
2018/03/29 2020/05/15
Forfeitable shares – without performance conditions(23,24)
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 33 353 — — — — 33 353 112 010 225 540
2015/05/29 2018/02/19 23 900 — — — — 23 900 80 264 161 617
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 33 400 — — — 33 400 112 168 225 857
BBBEE schemes(25)
BEE 2 2019/10/01 22 501 — — — 22 501 — —
Total 563 705 2 015 075
D Castle(26)
Share appreciation rights(17,18,19)
29/05/2015 equity-settled 2018/02/19 2 333 652 — — — 2 333 652 — —
30/08/2016 equity-settled 2019/08/30 — 775 800 — 390 395 — 1 166 195 — 3 799 004
Forfeitable shares – with performance conditions(20,21)
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 206 400 — — — 206 400 631 894 1 395 718
2015/05/29 2018/02/19 125 150 — — — — 125 150 383 147 846 289
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 123 900 — — — 123 900 379 320 837 837
Total 1 394 362 6 878 848
T Ramano
2013/09/30 cash-settled RSUs 2016/09/30 170 000 — — 85 545 255 545 — 1 415 719 —
29/05/2015 equity-settled 2018/02/19 581 300 — — — — 581 300 — —
30/08/2016 equity-settled 2019/08/30 — 474 000 — 238 524 — 712 524 — 2 321 122
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 128 700 — — — — 128 700 453 285 —
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 126 100 — — — 126 100 444 128 852 713
2015/05/29 2018/02/19 56 900 — — — — 56 900 200 404 384 769
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 75 700 — — — 75 700 266 618 511 899
BEE 1 2018/03/23 335 249 — — — — 335 249 — —
BEE 2 2019/10/01 372 737 — — — 372 737 — —
Total 2 780 154 4 070 504
N Lekula
08/08/2007 cash-settled 2010/08/08 38 000 — — — 38 000 — —
17/09/2008 cash-settled 2011/09/17 30 000 — — — 30 000 — —
25/09/2009 cash-settled 2012/09/25 24 000 — — — 24 000 — —
29/05/2015 equity-settled 2018/02/19 126 200 — — — 126 200 — —
30/08/2016 equity-settled 2019/08/30 — 184 600 — 92 894 — 277 494 — 903 966
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 18 300 — — — — 18 300 67 325 —
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 49 100 — — — 49 100 180 636 332 024
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 11 000 — — — — 11 000 40 468 74 384
2015/05/29 2018/02/19 20 300 — — - — 20 300 74 683 137 273
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 29 500 — — — 29 500 108 529 199 485
BEE 1 2018/03/23 109 531 — — — — 109 531 — —
BEE 2 2019/10/01 220 634 — — — 220 634 — —
Total 471 641 1 647 132
08/08/2007 cash-settled 2010/08/08 25 000 — — — — 25 000 — —
17/09/2008 cash-settled 2011/09/17 27 000 — — — — 27 000 — —
25/09/2009 cash-settled 2012/09/25 23 000 — — — — 23 000 — —
29/05/2015 equity-settled 2018/02/19 114 400 — — — — 114 400 — —
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 15 100 — — — — 15 100 58 695 —
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 74 500 — — — 74 500 289 587 503 784
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 9 000 — — — — 9 000 34 984 60 860
2015/05/29 2018/02/19 18 400 — — — — 18 400 71 522 124 424
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 44 700 — — — 44 700 173 752 302 270
BEE 2 2019/10/01 18 167 — — — 18 167 — —
Total 628 540 991 339
M Ramafoko
Share appreciation rights(17,19)
2015/05/29 equity-settled 54 100 — — — — 54 100 — —
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 4 300 — — — — 4 300 17 204 —
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 73 900 — — — 73 900 295 665 499 727
2014/02/18 2017/02/18 6 000 — — — — 6 000 24 005 40 573
2015/05/29 2018/02/19 13 000 — — — — 13 000 52 011 87 909
2016/08/30 2019/08/30 — 44 300 — — — 44 300 177 239 299 565
BEE 1 2018/03/23 71 132 — — — — 71 132 — —
BEE 2 2019/10/01 107 994 — — — 107 994 — —
Total 566 124 927 774
(16) Participants in the FSP received rights in relation to the holding of forfeitable shares under the FSP as part of the rights offer in 2017. The cash value of receipts includes proceeds from rights sold as well as the estimated proceeds from rights followed in relation to performance and retention FSPs (the latter was calculated as the difference between the theoretical ex-rights price of R5,83 and the rights offer price of R4,00).
(17) The 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2015 SARs have vested/is due to vest shortly after year-end. These awards are all underwater and therefore included at a zero estimated fair value.
(18) The 2016 SARs are included at an estimated fair value based on an indicative valuation of R3,72 (2017: R3,26) which includes an estimate of 100% (2017: 100%) of performance conditions being met.
(19) 6,3% of the 2015 SARs vested on 15 March 2018. Vesting was postponed due to the closed period.
(20) As the performance conditions have not been achieved, the 2014 performance FSPs were forfeited when the closed period ended on 15 March 2018 and therefore it is included at a zero fair value as at 31 March 2017.
(21) The 2016 FSPs with performance conditions are included at the 20-day VWAP of R7,53 (2017: R6,76) and an estimated 83% (2017: 100%) of performance conditions to be met.
(22) These FSPs were approved by the Remco on 15 May 2017 but could not be made due to the closed period – these were awarded on 29 March 2018 following the end of the closed period. The 2018 performance FSPs are included at the 20-day VWAP as at 31 March 2018 of R7,53 and an estimated 100% of performance conditions to be met.
(23) The FSPs without performance conditions are included at the 20-day VWAP of R6,76 as at 31 March 2017. The vesting of the 2014 FSPs without performance conditions were postponed until the end of the closed period arising resulting from the cautionary announcement ended on 15 March 2018.
(24) These FSPs were approved by the Remco on 15 May 2017 but could not be made due to the closed period – these were awarded on 29 March 2018 following the end of the closed period. The FSPs without performance conditions are included at the 20-day VWAP of R7,53 as at 31 March 2018.
(25) Both tranches of the BBBEE schemes’ fair value were estimated as zero as at 31 March 2017 and 31 March 2018 as these were underwater.
(26) Due to DJ Castle’s early exit, he forfeited part of his 2015 SARs, 2016 SARs, 2015 FSPs and 2016 FSPs without performance conditions. The balance of his 2016 FSPs without performance conditions vested early on 15 March 2018.
Names Granted
2018 Forfeited/
2018 Settled
2018 Cash value
08/08/2007 cash-settled — — — 40 000 — — 26,95
17/09/2008 cash-settled — — — 24 000 — — 18,97
25/09/2009 cash-settled — — — 26 000 — — 21,3
29/05/2015 equity-settled — 139 426 — 9 374 — — 9,84
30/08/2016 equity-settled — — — 314 773 — 1 171 763 5,85
2014/02/18 — 21 500 — — — — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 55 700 — 346 788 n/a
2018/03/29 577 700 — — 577 700 — 4 351 115 n/a
2014/02/18 — — 33 353 — 93 267 — n/a
2015/05/29 — — 23 900 —- 172 797 — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 33 400 — 251 562 n/a
2018/03/29 115 500 — — 115 500 — 869 922 n/a
BEE 2 — — — 22 501 — — n/a
Total 266 064 6 991 150
29/05/2015 equity-settled — 2 216 934 — 116 718 — — 9,84
30/08/2016 equity-settled — 988 027 — 178 168 - 663 242 5,85
2016/08/30 — 206 400 — — — — n/a
2015/05/29 — 25 794 99 356 — 473 928 — n/a
2016/08/30 — 86 042 37 858 — 180 583 — n/a
Total 654 511 663 242
2013/09/30 cash-settled RSUs 5,54
29/05/2015 equity-settled — 544 678 — 36 622 — — 9,84
30/08/2016 equity-settled — — — 712 524 — 2 652 417 5,85
2014/02/18 — 128 700 — — — — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 126 100 — 785 098 n/a
2018/03/29 562 200 — — 562 200 — 4 234 372 n/a
2015/05/29 — — 56 900 — 411 387 — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 75 700 — 570 156 n/a
2018/03/29 112 400 — — 112 400 846 573 n/a
BEE 1 — — 335 249 — 102 218 n/a
BEE 2 — — — 372 737 — — n/a
Total 513 605 9 088 618
08/08/2007 cash-settled — — — 38 000 — — 26,95
17/09/2008 cash-settled — — — 30 000 — — 18,97
25/09/2009 cash-settled — — — 24 000 — — 21,3
29/05/2015 equity-settled — 118 249 — 7 951 — — 9,84
30/08/2016 equity-settled — — — 277 494 — 1 032 990 5,85
2014/02/18 — 18 300 — — — — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 49 100 — 305 696 n/a
2018/03/29 273 000 — — 273 000 — 2 056 179 n/a
2014/02/18 — — 11 000 — 79 530 — n/a
2015/05/29 — — 20 300 — 146 769 —- n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 29 500 — 222 188 n/a
2018/03/29 54 600 — — 54 600 — 411 236 n/a
BEE 1 — — 109 531 — 33 395 n/a
BEE 2 — — — 220 634 — — n/a
Total 259 694 4 028 288
08/08/2007 cash-settled — — — 25 000 — — 26,95
17/09/2008 cash-settled — — — 27 000 — — 18,97
25/09/2009 cash-settled — — — 23 000 — — 21,3
29/05/2015 equity-settled — 107 193 — 7 207 — — 9,84
2014/02/18 — 15 100 — — — — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 74 500 — 463 837 n/a
2018/03/29 53 900 — — 53 900 — 405 963 n/a
2014/02/18 — — 9 000 — 65 070 — n/a
2015/05/29 — — 18 400 — 133 032 — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 44 700 — 336 671 n/a
2018/03/29 48 500 — — 48 500 — 365 292 n/a
BEE 2 — — — 18 167 — — n/a
Total 198 102 1 571 763
2015/05/29 equity-settled — 50 692 — 3 408 — — 9,84
2014/02/18 — 4 300 — — — — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 73 900 — 460 101 n/a
2018/03/29 95 000 — — 95 000 — 715 520 n/a
2014/02/18 — — 6 000 — 43 380 — n/a
2015/05/29 — — 13 000 — 93 990 — n/a
2016/08/30 — — — 44 300 — 333 658 n/a
2018/03/29 57 000 — — 57 000 — 429 312 n/a
BEE 1 — — 71 132 — 21 690 n/a
BEE 2 — — — 107 994 — — n/a
Total 159 060 1 938 592
No increases are proposed for non-executive directors’ fees. Please refer to the notice of AGM, which details proposed board fees for 2019.
Total emoluments to non-executive directors for the 12 months to 31 March 2018
Remuneration paid to non-executive directors
For the year ended March 2018
R000 Chairman
R000 Nomi-
R000 Audit
R000 Risk and
R000 Remune-
R000 Social and
R000 Investment
R000 Special
R00 Total
A Ball(a) 24 — — — — — — — — 24
S Dakile-Hlongwane 282 — — — — — 99 — 190 571
D Earp(b) — — — — — — — — — —
N Gobodo 282 — 36 134 — — 103 — 317 872
N Goldin 282 — — 134 — 99 — 99 641 1 255
T Leaf-Wright 282 — — — 201 — 99 99 661 1 342
T Mboweni(c) 68 — 17 — — — 48 — — 133
S Mhlarhi(d) 258 — 30 — — 91 — 91 664 1 134
N Mkhondo(e) 24 — — — — — — — — 24
J Moleketi(f) — 98 — — — — — — — 98
T Moyo 282 — 71 134 — 201 — — 326 1 014
C Naude 282 — — — 99 99 — 201 683 1 364
P Nelson(g) — 2 310 — — — — — — — 2 310
T Ross(h) 366 — — 265 99 — — 99 641 1 470
2 432 2 408 154 667 399 490 349 589 4 123 11 611
(a) Appointed 2 March 2018.
(b) Appointed 15 January 2018 and resigned 2 March 2018.
(c) Resigned 18 July 2018.
(d) Resigned 2 March 2018.
(e) Appointed 2 March 2018.
(f) Appointed 2 March 2018.
(g) Resigned 2 March 2018.
(h) Resigned 9 April 2018.
Total emoluments to non-executive directors for the 12 months to 31 March 2017
S Dakile-Hlongwane 253 — — — — — 36 — 277 566
N Gobodo(1) 68 — — 32 — — — — — 100
N Goldin 253 — — 64 — 95 — 139 316 867
T Leaf-Wright 253 — — — 95 — 83 139 424 994
T Mboweni 236 — 177 — — — 169 — 104 686
S Mhlarhi 253 — — — — 115 — 119 281 768
B Modise(2) 135 — — 112 145 — — — 278 670
T Moyo 253 — 100 168 — 153 — — 404 1 078
C Naude 253 — — — 95 95 — 281 420 1 144
P Nelson — 1 291 179 — — 95 — — 543 2 108
T Ross 329 — — 286 83 — — 163 426 1 287
2 286 1 291 456 662 418 553 288 841 3 473 10 268
(1) Appointed 8 February 2017.
(2) Resigned effective 31 October 2016.
Interests of executive directors and prescribed officers in share capital
The aggregate direct beneficial holdings of directors and their immediate families (none of whom holds over 1%) in the issued ordinary shares of the company are detailed below. There are indirect holdings by directors and their immediate families.
Name Number of shares as at
J Claassen 30 629
T Ramano 469 222
N Lekula 168 242
M Ramafoko 11 775
J Snyman —
Interests of directors and prescribed officers in BBBEE schemes
In 2008, in terms of the company’s first BBBEE transaction, certain executive directors and prescribed officers were granted participation rights in the loanfunded Black Managers Trust which owns shares that are subject to vesting conditions and a lock-in period restricting transferability. This expired on 15 December 2016. Residual shares after settling outstanding debt obligations vested in the participants’ names in March 2018.
In the 2013 financial year, after implementing PPC’s second BBBEE transaction, executive directors and prescribed officers were among South African employees granted participation rights in a notional loan-funded trust owning shares that are subject to vesting conditions and a lock-in period restricting transferability. This expires in September 2019. The participation rights held by executive directors and prescribed officers were as follows:
Name BEE 1 BMT vesting of
residual shares BEE
J Claassen – – 22 501
T Ramano 335 249 14 190 372 737
N Lekula 109 531 4 636 220 634
M Ramafoko 71 132 3 011 107 994
J Snyman – – 18 167
Non-binding advisory vote on part 3
The implementation report will be subject to a non-binding advisory vote at the annual general meeting on 30 August 2018.