Source: https://casetext.com/case/khourassany-v-ins
Timestamp: 2020-07-04 14:50:06
Document Index: 519382757

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1251', '§ 1227', '§ 1251', '§ 1227', '§ 2242', '§ 208', '§ 3', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 3', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 208', '§ 2242', '§ 208', '§ 2242', '§ 2242', '§ 2242', '§ 1252', '§ 2242', '§ 1252', '§ 208', '§ 1158', '§ 1101', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1101', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 208', '§ 1208']

Khourassany v. I.N.S, 208 F.3d 1096 | Casetext Search + Citator
Khourassany v. I.N.S
Sanchez v. Mukasey
We are therefore bound by Moran's core reasoning. We are aware that the result in Moran is in tension with…
Sevoian petitioned this court for review of the Board's denial of reopening. See Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d…
Full title:HAMOUDI H. KHOURASSANY; HASHEM H. KHOURASSANY; FETAM KHOURASSANY…
208 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2000)
holding that detention and questioning by Israeli police for short periods of time, without being jailed, handcuffed, beaten, or threatened with injury, "falls far short of the required showing needed to compel a finding of persecution"
Summary of this case from Fashho v. Holder
Submitted March 10, 2000
Murray D. Hilts, San Diego, California, for the petitioners.
Petition to Review a Decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS No. A74-433-346.
Before: J. Clifford WALLACE, Harry PREGERSON and Sidney R. THOMAS, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge THOMAS.
Petitioners Hamoudi H., Fetam, and Hashem Khourassany, all Israeli citizens, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") decision dismissing his appeal from the denial by the immigration judge ("IJ") of his application for asylum and withholding of deportation and his request for voluntary departure. Petitioners also request that we remand the petition to the BIA so that petitioners may file a motion to reopen for consideration of relief under the Convention on Torture.
Hamoudi Khourassany, a 39 year-old Israeli citizen of Palestinian ancestry and Muslim faith, entered the United States in May 1992 as a nonimmigrant visitor and remained in the United States after his visa expired. The INS issued an order to show cause to Hamoudi charging the deportable offense of remaining in the United States longer than permitted, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(C)(i), transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). Two other orders to show cause were issued to his wife, Fetam, and minor child, Hashem, charging them with the deportable offense of entering the United States without inspection in violation of § 1251(a)(1)(B), transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Khourassany admitted the factual allegations in the order to show cause and conceded deportability, but requested asylum, withholding of deportation, and voluntary departure.
At the merits hearing, Khourassany testified that he was a successful businessman in Israel, owning several businesses and acting as a sales representative for a national chocolate business. He claims that he left Israel because of the harassment to which he was subjected by the "Shabak," the internal Israeli security organization. Khourassany's problems with the Shabak began in 1980, when they began questioning him about his activities "many times, tens of times," and extended through 1987. During each of these encounters, Khourassany was not detained for lengthy periods nor physically harmed. The Shabak agents, however, were "tense" and they made him "nervous."
The BIA affirmed the IJ's determination in a written decision reiterating many of the IJ's conclusions. In particular, the BIA noted that Khourassany failed to establish persecution based on his political opinion, social group or religion because his overall testimony showed that he was not involved politically, that he worked successfully with the Jewish residents of Israel and that he was not targeted for conversion to Judaism or otherwise.
The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 ("Foreign Affairs Reform Act"), § 2242, Pub.L. No. 105-277, Div. G, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-761 (Oct. 21, 1998), implemented Article 3 of the Torture Convention in the United States. Article 3 provides that a signatory nation will not "expel, return . . . or extradite" a person to another country "where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Id. Passage of the Foreign Affairs Reform Act and the subsequent enactment of its implementing regulations represented a "change in eligibility for relief" that qualifies as "new information" arising "after the BIA has finalized deportation proceedings." See Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1999). As such, an asylum applicant's claims under the Convention on Torture must be "brought to the attention of the BIA" in the form of a motion to reopen proceedings. See id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b)(2) (allowing aliens under final order of deportation, exclusion or removal as of March 22, 1999, to file motion to reopen under Convention on Torture). Motions to reopen proceedings under the Convention on Torture are governed by INS general provisions on motions to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 and 3.2, with two notable exceptions. The INS has also imposed two requirements in deciding whether to grant motions to reopen proceedings under the Convention on Torture. First, the motion must be filed with the BIA "within June 21, 1999," for those aliens who were ordered removed, or whose removal orders became final, before March 22, 1999. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b)(2)(i). The applicant must also offer sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that his or her removal must be withheld or deferred under 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) or § 208.17(a).
First, the time and numerical limitations provided by the general rules for motions to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 and 3.2 do not apply, and furthermore, the alien is not required "to demonstrate that the evidence sought to be offered was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b)(2).
In contrast, aliens in exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings on or after March 22, 1999, may apply for withholding of removal under the Convention on Torture, and may be considered for "deferral of removal" under 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a) if applicable. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).
Motions to reopen for consideration of claims under the Convention on Torture may not be urged in the first instance before our court; an applicant must first exhaust his or her administrative remedies before the BIA. See Ortiz, 179 F.3d at 1152. However, Khourassany does not ask us to address the merits of a motion to reopen, he requests that we remand the petition to the BIA so that he may present a motion to reopen. His request has some basis in the Foreign Affairs Reform Act because § 2242(d) limits judicial review of an applicant's claim under the Convention on Torture to review of "a final order of removal." Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(e). Thus, if the BIA denial of a motion to reopen is not considered "a final order of removal," then remand of this petition might be appropriate so that the Convention on Torture claims could be presented in the petition for review. Conversely, if a BIA denial of a motion to reopen to consider Convention on Torture claims is "a final order of removal," then remand would be inappropriate because petitioner would have an administrative remedy separate from that at issue in the instant petition.
Section 2242(d) of the Foreign Affairs Reform Act places two jurisdictional limitations on our review of INS decisions pursuant to the Convention on Torture. First, notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided pursuant to regulations promulgated under § 2242(b) of the Foreign Affairs Reform Act, the courts cannot exercise jurisdiction "to review the regulations adopted to implement" section 2242(d). Foreign Affairs Reform Act, § 2242(d). Second, § 2242(d) provides that "nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the Convention [on Torture] . . . except as part of the review of a final order of removal" under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Id. (emphasis added). The implementing regulations reiterate this: "there shall be no judicial appeal or review of any action, decision, or claim raised under the Convention [on Torture or § 2242], except as part of the review of a final order of removal" under § 1252. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(e).
With the denial of the remand motion, we proceed to the merits of Khourassany's asylum and withholding of deportation claims. See Ortiz, 179 F.3d at 1148 (citing Aguilar-Escobar v. INS, 136 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998)). Under our venerable standards of review of BIA decisions, we may grant the petition for review only if the evidence presented by Khourassany is such that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1 (1992).
The BIA properly concluded that Khourassany failed to present sufficient evidence to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion, membership in a particular social group, or religion as a result of Hamoudi's repeated harassment by the Israeli secret police and the forced closure of his restaurant. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
Khourassany's testimony that he was harassed by the Shabak and local police falls far short of the required showing needed to compel a finding of persecution. Khourassany was detained and questioned by the Israeli police for only short periods of time, was never jailed or charged with any crime, and was never handcuffed, beaten or threatened injury by the Shabak. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (repeated incidents of vandalism, in the absence of physical injury or threat of injury, insufficient to establish persecution); Prasad, 47 F.3d at 339 ("Brief detention does not necessarily establish persecution."); Mendez-Efrain v. INS, 813 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1987) (four-day detention absent threats, warnings or other harm insufficient to establish persecution).
Other aspects of Khourassany's testimony also support the BIA's conclusion that he was not subject to persecution. Khourassany was able to continue to operate his other businesses even after his restaurant was forced to close, and some members of his family continue to live in Israel now and to operate businesses without interference. See Saballo-Cortez. v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. Kovacs v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) (deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage may indicate persecution). Khourassany retained his passport and was able to travel freely within Israel and to leave Israel without hindrance; nor did he fear venturing to the Israeli embassy in the United States to fax to his brother a power of attorney. See Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1994); Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). His contention that conditions in Israel are otherwise "extremely volatile" and that the Israeli government and other radical groups have used "brutal and torturous" tactics against Palestinians is simply too generalized to show that he is at "particular risk" of persecution. See Kotasz, 31 F.3d at 852.
Khourassany also provides insufficient testimony to establish that he was subject to persecution "on account of" political opinion, either imputed or direct, because of his Islamic faith, or based on his affiliation with the excessively diffuse "Muslim/Palestinian" social group. See Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1488-90; Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576-76 (9th Cir. 1986); Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1496 (1999).
The BIA did not err in finding him statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure based on his failure to meet the good moral character component of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1996). We review an agency's application of a statute de novo. See Lafarga v. INS, 170 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1999).
To be eligible for voluntary departure, an alien must show in part that he has been a person of good moral character for the five years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1996); Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). An alien is not considered to be of good moral character if during the five-year period he "knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law" in violation of an alien smuggler provision. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). The IJ and BIA correctly determined that Hamoudi Khourassany fell within this provision because he admitted that in 1995 he paid a smuggler to bring his wife and child into the United States illegally from Mexico. No exceptions or other waivers to the alien smuggler provision apply to Khourassany. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(ii) (iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11).
We deny the petition for review and the motion to remand. We stay the mandate for ninety days from the date this opinion is filed to allow petitioners the opportunity to file a motion to reopen with the BIA. See Ortiz, 179 F.3d at 1156.
The INS argues that Khourassany is precluded from filing a motion to reopen under the Convention on Torture because his claim is time-barred by 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b)(2)(i). However, this question is beyond the scope of our review on this petition. Indeed, to reach that question would be to address the merits of a petition for reopen not yet filed. Thus, we will adhere to our normal procedure with respect to these petitioners to allow the BIA to consider the merits of the motion, and any objections thereto, in the first instance. See Ortiz, 179 F.3d at 1156.
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