Source: https://m.openjurist.org/98/f3d/1266
Timestamp: 2019-09-16 06:29:49
Document Index: 494600188

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1869', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1341', '§ 1341', '§ 1341', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1341', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1866', '§ 1865', '§ 1867', '§ 1867', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 666', '§ 666']

98 F. 3d 1266 - United States v. M Paradies
98 F3d 1266 United States v. M Paradies
98 F.3d 1266
Daniel M. PARADIES, The Paradies Shops, Inc., Paradies
Midfield Corporation, Ira Jackson, Defendants-Appellants.
As Amended Nov. 6, 1996.
The Paradies defendants claim that thirteen jurors, individually, were improperly excused for bias, and eight jurors were improperly excused for undue hardship.21 They argue that the questionnaires of the jurors excluded for bias did not contain sufficient evidence of actual bias, citing United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218 (3d Cir.1991), and that the questionnaires of the jurors excluded for hardship did not show that the potential jurors would suffer hardship for the reasons listed in the Local Plan. Additionally, they claim that seventeen questionnaires are "missing" for unknown reasons, and that their lack of access to those documents impedes their ability to assess whether the trial court acted in an appropriate manner.
This court has carefully reviewed all of the questionnaires challenged by the defendants, and we find that the district court did not commit a substantial violation of the Act in excluding those jurors. With respect to those who were excused for bias, every potential juror either professed that they were badly prejudiced against one side, or they described a relationship that the court deemed inappropriate for a juror in this case.22 We find that this action by the district court was not, nor was it alleged to have been, directed to any ethnic, racial, or national origin, nor did it constitute any arbitrary, unreasonable exclusion of discrete segments of the venire. Nor did the court's action in this respect cause the venire to consist of anything other than a fair cross-section of the community. This court has rejected a similar challenge to a district court's excusal of jurors "who merely acknowledged their acquaintance" with the defendant. United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 658 (5th Cir.1972) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168, 70 S.Ct. 519, 521, 94 L.Ed. 734 (1950)). The Bailey court relied on the district court's "serious duty to determine the question of actual bias and a broad discretion in its rulings" in dismissing the defendant's challenge to the jury composition.23 Id. (finding "nothing abusive or prejudicial in the excusal of jurors admittedly acquainted, regardless [of] how remotely, with one of the parties to the proceedings"). The Paradies defendants rely on Calabrese wherein the Third Circuit rejected the notion that the district court has the broad discretion allowed by the Fifth Circuit in Bailey. Calabrese is not binding on this court, however, and it is our view that the reasoning in Bailey governs this case.24 See United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1532-33 (11th Cir.1984) ("A relationship between a juror and defendant, albeit a remote one, can form the basis of a challenge for cause."); see also North, 910 F.2d at 909-10 (upholding excusal of jurors before voir dire based on juror questionnaires); United States v. Redmond, 546 F.2d 1386, 1389 (10th Cir.1977) (upholding excusal of jurors who were acquainted with any attorneys in the case), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995, 98 S.Ct. 1645, 56 L.Ed.2d 83 (1978).
Similarly, the court did not err in excluding the eight jurors for undue hardship. The Paradies defendants argue that the court allowed some jurors to use a hardship excuse for reasons other than those named in the statute. For example, juror # 290 was excused for having two small children, but her two children were sixteen years old. The Local Plan, however, allows a hardship excuse to potential jurors with children under ten years of age. The defendants also criticized the court for excusing some of these jurors even though the jurors did not request excusal. Again, this court has reviewed all of the available questionnaires, and we find no substantial error in the court's actions.25 While the court may have violated some of the technical provisions of the Local Plan in dismissing some jurors and without one of the enumerated hardships, none of the excusals frustrated the goals of the Act. See United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (technical violations alone do not give rise to a substantial violation of the Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S.Ct. 1170, 1171, 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985); see also United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1568-69 & n. 14 (11th Cir.1986) (upholding district court's granting of hardship excuse to 245 out of 249 jurors after a personal, pre-voir dire review of juror questionnaires), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 1578, 94 L.Ed.2d 769 (1987). Additionally, under § 1869(j) of the Jury Selection Act, "undue hardship and extreme circumstances" includes "any other factor which the court determines to constitute an undue hardship or extreme inconvenience to the juror." In the instant case, where the jury would be sequestered for several weeks, the court has broad discretion in determining whether a particular juror could be excluded because of undue hardship. Finally, defense counsel's failure to locate a small portion of the juror questionnaires (some of which were never returned), from literally hundreds of questionnaires comprising several boxes in the record of this case, is no basis for a finding of failure on the part of the district court to follow legal procedures in jury selection.26
We note that the district court in this case was faced with an onerous burden in arriving at an impartial jury in this high-profile case that was originally estimated to last four to six weeks.27 With great care, the court reviewed all of the returned jury questionnaires to rule out those jurors who would have been unduly burdened by serving on a case of that duration who admittedly would have been unable to render impartial jury service. Under these circumstances, the district court in no way hindered the random selection of juror names or the use of objective criteria in excusing jurors. Nor did the process result in impermissible discrimination or arbitrariness, and the defendants do not make such an allegation. In sum, the court did not commit a substantial violation of the Jury Selection Act, and the Paradies defendants are not entitled to a reversal on that basis.28
The Paradies defendants also claim, as a separate basis for reversal, that the district court violated their unqualified right to inspect the jury records in order to substantiate their claim under the Jury Selection Act. At about 8:00 on the morning of voir dire, after approximately 115 potential jurors had been summoned to appear in court at 11:00 a.m. for the proceedings, the Paradies defendants moved the court to stay the proceedings on the ground that the court possibly committed a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the Act. The district court denied the motion for the stay, rejecting the defendants' argument that the exclusion of Dana Shepherd from the jury venire may have been a violation of the Jury Selection Act. Later that same day, the court read into the record its reasons for excusing the jurors that it dismissed sua sponte. The court thereafter, upon defendants' request, made the jury questionnaires a part of the record. Additionally, after trial, the court allowed the defendants to supplement the record with additional jury selection materials. At no time did the court preclude defense counsel from inspecting the record and finding out which jurors the court had excused. On the contrary, the record shows that the court entered an order on November 8, 1993, directing all counsel not to disclose answers of prospective jurors because that information was deemed to be privileged. From that date on, counsel for both sides were presumably aware that the questionnaires existed and that counsel would be entitled to review them. At most, the court denied the Paradies defendants additional time to formulate their argument. Therefore, we find, after careful examination of this record, that these defendants were not denied access to the jury selection documents.
B. Propriety of the Convictions Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1346
Jackson and the Paradies defendants challenge their convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1346 on several grounds. First, the Paradies defendants claim that in order to be convicted for aiding and abetting in the fraudulent scheme, an independent duty to the victim must first exist and that duty must have been breached. Second, they claim that § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague, or, in the alternative, that the district judge should have given the jury a "fair warning" instruction to allow the jury to make the vagueness determination. Finally, Jackson claims that his convictions under § 1346 violated the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. We will discuss each issue in turn.
(1) Independent Duty
The Paradies defendants argue that because the Paradies companies had no legal duty to anyone to prevent Jackson's scheme from succeeding, then they cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting him in that scheme. The defendants rely heavily on Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983), and Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980), wherein the Supreme Court found that a defendant cannot be convicted for securities fraud (Dirks ), or for aiding and abetting securities fraud (Chiarella ), unless he breached a legal duty. Because the Paradies companies claim that they merely made routine, lawful fee and dividend payments to Hartsfield Concessions and had no independent duty to disclose anything about their shareholder's fraudulent scheme, they cannot be convicted for helping Jackson in that scheme. They contend that "without access to the opinion of the Ethics Board, the Paradies defendants were lulled into a false sense of security that there was nothing inherently improper about the relationship between Wilbourn and Jackson." The government readily admits that the Paradies defendants were not fiduciaries to the City. It claims, however, that this circuit does not require that an independent duty exist in order to be convicted of aiding and abetting in a mail fraud scheme.
This court has addressed this issue in a recent case, United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1350, 134 L.Ed.2d 519 (1996). In Waymer, the defendant was a member of the Atlanta Board of Education, and he used his status to award service contracts to certain companies in return for monetary benefits. Waymer was convicted of mail fraud, because he mailed payments to the contractors for the services they rendered. He contended that because the school system had a legal obligation to make those payments, the mailing of the checks to pay a legal debt could not provide a basis on which to satisfy the mailing requirement of § 1341. In upholding his conviction, this court relied on Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1447, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), wherein the Supreme Court found that mailings that furthered the overall scheme to defraud would satisfy the mailing requirement of § 1341, even though the mailings may have been otherwise legal. The Waymer court found that it was presented with an even stronger case than in Schmuck, because the checks mailed to the contractor were the very source of the illegal payments to Waymer; if the contractors did not get paid, neither did Waymer.29 Waymer, 55 F.3d at 570.
Although the Paradies companies routinely mailed out fee and dividend checks, the government showed that those payments were made in exchange for Jackson's political influence. Under the reasoning in Waymer, those mailings can serve as the basis for a conviction under § 1341. Additionally, the Paradies defendants do not cite to one mail fraud case to support their theory that an independent duty must exist between the defendant and the victim. This court stated in Waymer that "[a] defendant's breach of a fiduciary duty may be a predicate for a violation of the mail fraud statute where the breach entails the violation of a duty to disclose material information." Id. at 571 (emphasis added). That predicate is inapplicable to the facts of this case, however, because the Paradies defendants were not charged with a failure to disclose a material fact; they were charged with aiding and abetting by actively participating in the crime. Jackson certainly had a fiduciary duty to the City. Using the mails to deliver dividend checks and fees, if intentionally designed as a payoff to Jackson, is clearly sufficient to convict the Paradies defendants for aiding and abetting the fraud under § 1346.
The Paradies defendants also argue that § 1346, which punishes schemes to defraud another of the intangible right of honest services, is unconstitutionally vague. Whether a statute is vague is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Dodger's Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 32 F.3d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir.1994).
This question was also addressed by the Waymer court, and it rejected the same challenge on strikingly similar facts. First, the court reasoned that "[a] statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it 'define[s] the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' " Waymer, 55 F.3d at 568 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). It should be plain to ordinary people that offering and accepting large sums of money in return for a city councilman's vote is the type of conduct prohibited by the language of § 1346.30 This is a specific intent crime, and the jury was properly instructed on that intent. See discussion, infra, at pp. 1284-86. Additionally, the evidence was overwhelming that these defendants "intended to defraud the citizens of Atlanta of [Jackson's] honest services." Id. at 569. Therefore, the vagueness challenge must fail.
The defendants argue that the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 91 F.3d 676 (5th Cir.1996), supports its position. In that case, the court found that Congress did not intend that § 1346 overrule the decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), discussed supra at note 30. That position, however, is contrary to this court's holding in Waymer, a case that the Brumley court specifically declined to follow.31 Compare Waymer, 55 F.3d at 568 with Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1441; see also United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir.1995) (finding that Congress intended that § 1346 overrule McNally); United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709, 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017, 111 S.Ct. 591, 112 L.Ed.2d 595 (1990) (observing that "Congress' purpose in enacting § 1346 was to restore the mail fraud statute to its pre-McNally position"). Therefore, we reject the defendants' reliance on Brumley because this court has already held that Congress intended to extend the reach of the wire fraud proscription to schemes to deprive another of "the intangible right of honest services."32
The Paradies defendants claim that even if § 1346 is not vague as a matter of law, they were entitled to a "fair warning" instruction to allow the jury to make the determination regarding vagueness. They requested that the court ask the jury whether the terms of the statute were "so vague that men of common intelligence" in the position of the Paradies defendants would not have had fair warning of a change in the law and that they would not have known they were prohibited from paying dividends or management fees to Hartsfield Concessions after the effective date of the statute. The court rejected that request, deciding the vagueness issue as a matter of law. We agree that the issue of whether a statute is void for vagueness is a question of law for the court to determine. See, e.g., Dodger's Bar & Grill, Inc., 32 F.3d at 1443; United States v. Nevers, 7 F.3d 59, 61 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1139, 114 S.Ct. 1124, 127 L.Ed.2d 432 (1994). Therefore, the Paradies defendants were not entitled to a "fair warning" instruction to the jury.
(3) The Ex Post Facto Clause
Jackson claims that his convictions pursuant to § 1346 violated his rights under the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, because the crimes for which he was convicted were committed prior to the effective date of § 1346 (November 18, 1988), a time when the mail fraud statute (§ 1341) applied only to fraudulent schemes that deprived individuals of property rights, not intangible rights.33 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), discussed supra at note 30. We find this argument to be meritless. There was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found that Jackson's fraudulent scheme began in 1985 but continued until the end of his tenure as a councilman (1990). In the ex post facto analysis, "[t]he critical question is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31, 101 S.Ct. 960, 965, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (emphasis added). Several circuits have upheld convictions under similar circumstances. See United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 1253, 1259-60 (8th Cir.1994) (upholding conviction under § 1346 when scheme began in 1986 and continued through 1989); United States v. Hammen, 977 F.2d 379, 385 (7th Cir.1992) (upholding conviction under § 1346 when bank fraud scheme spanned effective date of the statute); United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 549 (2d Cir.1991) (convictions for mail fraud upheld because defendants permitted the mailings to occur after the effective date of the statute). Accordingly, Jackson's mail fraud convictions for conduct that continued after the effective date of § 1346 do not violate the ex post facto clause.
The Paradies defendants claim that the district court erred in instructing the jury on "specific intent" and in failing to give the "theory of the defense" instruction that it proposed at trial. We will address those issues separately.
The Paradies defendants first argue that the district court erred in charging the jury on specific intent, because it failed to require the jury to find that the defendants knew that their conduct was against the law, and that "ignorance of the law" is a valid defense because mail fraud is a specific intent crime. The court refused to instruct the jury in this fashion and, instead, instructed the jury that the defendants must have had the specific intent to defraud, rather than an intent to violate the law. Again, the Paradies defendants do not cite one mail fraud case to support their position. Instead, they cite to precedent that supports the general proposition that ignorance of the law may be a defense to a specific intent crime. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (antistructuring law); United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519 (5th Cir.1977) (wire fraud conspiracy); United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1978) (conspiracy to export).
While mail fraud can be classified as a "specific intent" crime, it is clear from a review of the pertinent case law that the defendants' contention is unfounded. In mail fraud cases, the government need only prove that the defendant had the intent to deceive, and ignorance of the law is no defense. See Waymer, 55 F.3d at 568 (defendant need only show the "specific intent to defraud"); United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 731 (11th Cir.1991) (intentional participation in a scheme to defraud); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499 (11th Cir.) ("conscious knowing intent to defraud"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1404 (11th Cir.1984) (specific intent to defraud); United States v. O'Malley, 707 F.2d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir.1983) (same). The Second Circuit stated specifically, "The specific intent required under the mail fraud statute is the intent to defraud, ... and not the intent to violate a statute." United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810, 110 S.Ct. 53, 107 L.Ed.2d 22 (1989). Also, the Tenth Circuit has specifically held under similar circumstances that the district court did not err in instructing the jury that "every person is presumed to know what the law forbids." United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1451-52 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 985, 113 S.Ct. 1580, 123 L.Ed.2d 148 (1993). In light of the foregoing, we must reject the Paradies defendants' argument on this point.
Next, they argue that the court gave, in substance, a general intent instruction rather than a specific intent instruction. The district court instructed the jury as follows:
Now, fraudulent intent is necessary to sustain a charge of a scheme to defraud.
Now, in that regard, intent and motive should not be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act while intent refers to the state of mind with which the act is done.
So, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts constituting the crime charged were committed by the defendant under consideration voluntarily, with a specific intent to do something the law forbids, then the element of "willfulness", as defined in these instructions has been satisfied even though the defendant may have believed his conduct was either religiously, politically, morally or otherwise required, or that ultimate good would result from such conduct.
On the other hand, if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted in good faith, sincerely believing himself to be exempt by the law, then he did not intentionally violate a known legal duty; that is, he did not act "willfully," and that essential part of the offense has not been established.
The court reiterated the specific intent requirement in other parts of the charge. See, e.g., these instructions: "What must be proved and proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knowingly and willfully devised or intended to devise a scheme to defraud substantially the same one that is alleged in the indictment, and that the use of the United States mail was closely related to the scheme." (R48-4252). "[T]he question is, did the defendant intend to deceive and defraud?" (R48-4252-53); "Now, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these [Paradies] defendants aided, abetted, counseled, or caused mail fraud to be committed with the specific intent that each and every element of the crime of mail fraud be committed by some person." (R48-4261). "Now, in this case good faith is a complete defense ... because good faith on the part of the defendants is inconsistent with the intent to defraud or willfulness, which is an essential part of the charges." (R48-4268).
The government claims that the above-quoted portion of the jury instructions was requested by the defendants. Having asked for the charge, the government claims, they cannot now complain about it. See United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1084 (11th Cir.1993) (appellant cannot complain of a jury instruction that he submitted), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1227, 114 S.Ct. 2724, 129 L.Ed.2d 848 (1994); Leverett v. Spears, 877 F.2d 921, 924 (11th Cir.1989) (doctrine of invited error precludes appellate claim that jury instruction requested by the appellant was erroneous). The Paradies defendants claim that the charge was not accepted as they requested it verbatim, but that they strenuously objected to the amended version given by the district court.
Assuming that the defendants are not barred from complaining about the instructions, the court must look at "the charges as a whole" to determine whether the jury was "sufficiently instructed ... so that it understood the issues involved and were not misled." See Hooshmand, 931 F.2d at 731. The portions of the instructions about which the defendants complain might potentially be deemed confusing.34 However, after reviewing the instructions in their entirety, we find that they were legally sufficient, particularly in light of the other instructions pointed out by the government. The court explained many times that the defendants must have acted with the specific "intent to defraud," which constituted a correct assessment of the law.35
(2) Theory of Defense
The refusal to give an instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Turner, 871 F.2d 1574, 1578 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997, 110 S.Ct. 552, 107 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989), and is reversible error if (1) the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law, (2) its subject matter was not substantially covered by other instructions, and (3) its subject matter dealt with an issue in the trial court that was so important that failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to defend himself. United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588, 593 (11th Cir.1995).
Almost three months before trial, D. Paradies submitted a requested jury charge labeled "Theory of the Defense." The submitted charge consisted only of two introductory paragraphs, and then explained in brackets that "the remainder of this proposed charge will be submitted to the Court after the defense rests." At some point just before the court instructed the jury, D. Paradies submitted the remainder of the proposed charge, which basically summed up his defense theory: that he had no duty to supervise the financial arrangements between his co-defendants; that he had no specific intent to defraud because his duty was to pay the dividends and management fees as required by the City of Atlanta's Ordinances on Minority Participation; and that there was no illegal conspiracy because his agreement with Echols had a legitimate purpose. Now D. Paradies claims that failure to give that charge was reversible error.
The district court disallowed the "revised" version of the proposed instruction because it was untimely and because "it wasn't any good anyhow." D. Paradies argues that his proposed jury charge was, in fact, timely because he filed the first proposed charge long before trial, putting the court and the government on notice. While the timeliness of this proposed jury instruction is highly suspect because the substance of it was not submitted until just before the court delivered the charges, we will assume that the instruction was timely filed and is properly reviewable by this court.36
Paradies argues that a defendant is entitled to a theory of defense charge for which there is any evidentiary foundation, "even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility." United States v. Opdahl, 930 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir.1986)). See also United States v. Edwards, 968 F.2d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir.1992) ("[i]t has long been established in this Circuit that it is reversible error to refuse to charge on a defense theory for which there is an evidentiary foundation and which, if believed by the jury, would be legally sufficient to render the accused innocent"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1064, 113 S.Ct. 1006, 122 L.Ed.2d 155 (1993). In determining whether the record contains any evidentiary foundation to support the charge, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1406 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Lewis, 592 F.2d 1282, 1285 (5th Cir.1979). We find that the district court was correct in finding that the requested jury charge was partisan and that it aspired "to place the Paradies defendants' desired factual findings into the mouth of the court." See United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 245 (5th Cir.1979) (affirming district court's failure to give "theory of defense" jury instruction when "the requested instruction was more in the nature of a jury argument than a charge"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002, 101 S.Ct. 1711, 68 L.Ed.2d 205 (1981); see also United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1399-1400 (11th Cir.1984) (affirming district court's refusal to give "theory of defense" argument because the instruction merely emphasized a certain phase of the evidence). Also, the proposed instruction included legal theories which we have rejected supra (e.g., the "duty" theory, the "ignorance of the law" defense). Indeed, a charge must have "legal support" as well as foundation in the evidence. United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir.1994) (finding that a defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as long as it has legal support); Silverman, 745 F.2d at 1399 ("the requested instruction must be a legally cognizable defense to the indictment"). The instructions given by the district court fairly and adequately presented Paradies' defense theories to the jury. See Barham, 595 F.2d at 245 (finding that the instructions given adequately and fairly presented the defendant's theory without the "theory of defense" instruction). Therefore, we find that D. Paradies is not entitled to a reversal based on the district court's failure to give the proposed instruction.
D. Propriety of the Convictions Pursuant to § 666
D. Paradies and Jackson contest their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 666, which criminalizes the following acts:
[C]orruptly giv[ing], offer[ing], or agree[ing] to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of a value of $5000 or more.
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). The statute applies, however, only where:
18 U.S.C. § 666(b). D. Paradies argues that the district court misconstrued § 666 not to require two essential elements: (1) that the corrupt payments be made in connection with the administration of programs receiving federal funds, and (2) that the payments be made as a "quid pro quo" for an official act. He argues that those errors led the district court impermissibly to deny his motions to dismiss, for judgment of acquittal, and for a new trial, and that they also caused the court to reject the proposed jury charges relating to those issues. Jackson relies only on the first argument, and not the "quid pro quo" argument, in support of his claim. The government, on the other hand, claims that "[t]he plain language of § 666 does not impose these limitations, nor has any court ever engrafted these limitations on the clear statutory text." We will discuss each argument in turn.
(1) Does § 666 Require that the Corrupt Payment Be Directly Connected to the Administration of Federal Funds?
The defendants argue that they cannot be convicted pursuant to § 666 because the corrupt payments that were the subject of those convictions were not shown to be connected to any federally funded program. They argue, relying on legislative history, that the purpose of the statute was to protect the integrity of monies distributed through federal programs. Because the corrupt transactions at issue affected only private or local monies, their conduct was not intended to be covered under § 666. In addition to legislative history, the defendants cite authority from other jurisdictions that purport to apply this restriction to crimes under § 666. See United States v. Wyncoop, 11 F.3d 119 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1095, 114 S.Ct. 929, 127 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994); United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir.1991); and United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820, 109 S.Ct. 62, 102 L.Ed.2d 39 (1988). The government claims, however, that "[e]very court to have considered this issue has rejected defendant's argument attempting to limit the scope of the statute." Further, it argues that Westmoreland actually supports its position. We agree.
First, in construing § 666, we agree with the following expression of the Fifth Circuit:
[W]e find the relevant statutory language plain and unambiguous. By the terms of § 666, when a local government agency receives an annual benefit of more than $10,000 under a federal assistance program, its agents are governed by the statute, and an agent violates subsection (b) when he engages in the prohibited conduct "in any transaction or matter or series of transactions or matters involving $5,000 or more concerning the affairs of" the local government agency. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (Supp.1984) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) contains nothing to indicate that "any transaction involving $5,000" means "any federally funded transaction involving $5,000" or "any transaction involving $5,000 of federal funds," and other subsections of the statute contain no inconsistent provisions that might suggest such a qualification.
Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 576 (emphasis added).
Other circuits have followed this approach and have established that the government is not required under § 666 to trace the flow of federal funds and assistance to any particular project, such as the airport concession programs. See United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 172-73 (2d Cir.1995) (rejecting argument that there must be a link between the corrupt transaction and the protection of federal funds), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 713, 133 L.Ed.2d 667 (1996); Coyne, 4 F.3d at 108-09 (stating that the plain language of § 666 "neither explicitly nor implicitly requires that the $10,000 be directly linked to the program that was the subject of the bribe"); United States v. Simas, 937 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.1991) ("The broad language of [§ 666] does not require a tracing of federal funds to the project affected by the bribe."). Furthermore, the plain language of the statute merely requires that the payments be made to an agent of the State which "receives benefits in excess of $10,000 in any one year period." Because the language in the statute is clear, it would be improper to look to the legislative history for clarification. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149-50, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). We find the cases cited by defendants to be distinguishable or inapplicable.37 Accordingly, we decline the invitation to include the suggested "connection to federal funds" element as a requirement to convictions under § 666.
(2) Does § 666 Require a Quid Pro Quo?
A quid pro quo is simply a specific official act in exchange for a specific corrupt payment. D. Paradies claims that this element is required in order to convict him under § 666, as is evidenced by the amendment of § 666, and that the district court erred in failing to give an appropriate jury charge to that effect. Further, he argues that the government did not produce evidence that the 1990 reimbursement to Echols was connected in any way to an official act or benefit.
The government claims that, because this is the appeal from the district court's failure to give a "quid pro quo" jury charge, and the defendant neither requested nor objected to the absence thereof, this court reviews this issue for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Specifically, the government argues that, even in jurisdictions that require a quid pro quo, jury instructions that merely track the language of the statute is not error. The court in United States v. Medley, 913 F.2d 1248, 1260 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1013, 114 S.Ct. 604, 126 L.Ed.2d 569 (1993), stated that "[t]he essential element of a § 666 violation is a 'quid pro quo[.]' " The court opined, however, that the defendant did not object to the jury instructions given in the district court, which instructions "set forth the offense using the language in the body of § 666." Id. at 1259. In light of that fact, the instructions did not constitute error.
We have carefully reviewed the jury charges given in this case, and we are persuaded that the district court did not commit reversible error under the reasoning in Medley. The jury charges tracked the statutory requirements, and the evidence at trial was sufficient for a jury to find that Jackson accepted payments for his votes and his influence upon the City Council and the administration. Such a finding would satisfy any quid pro quo requirement under the statute. Therefore, the court's instructions were not plainly erroneous, and they would not serve as a basis for reversal under these circumstances.
The Paradies defendants also raise numerous evidentiary issues.38 Particularly, they claim that the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain testimony of their legal expert, in admitting a tape recording of a payoff to Echols, and in admitting evidence against D. Paradies under Rule 404(b). We have carefully considered those arguments and, as is explained below, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any respect.
(1) Limitation of Testimony of Legal Expert
The district court's exclusion of expert testimony is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir.1992), and constitutes reversible error if the defendant establishes that the error had a "substantial impact on the outcome." United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 601 (11th Cir.1990).
The Paradies defendants called Thomas O. Marshall, a former Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, to testify as a legal expert. He testified about the City's MBE program and the management and shareholder's agreements. The district court refused to allow Judge Marshall to testify about the enactment of § 1346 and how it changed the law. The Paradies defendants objected, claiming that this witness would support their defenses of ignorance of the law and lack of fair notice as an element of the vagueness defense. He would have testified that a reasonable man would not have been put on notice that § 1346 precluded the Paradies defendants from making the payments to Jackson, even if Paradies knew that the arrangement between Wilbourn and Jackson was illegitimate. United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.1979) (reversing conviction because trial court did not allow expert legal testimony on tax laws).
While Garber may be the law for tax cases, ignorance of the law is not a defense in this mail fraud case, as we have already discussed supra. See Hollis, 971 F.2d at 1451-52. Testimony that ignorance of the law was a defense would have mislead and confused the jury. "The law would be in a curious state if jurors received their instructions on the law from an expert witness as well from the trial judge." United States v. Brodie, 858 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir.1988) (rejecting proffer of an expert to testify on unsettled points of law). Additionally, as we have concluded, § 1346 is not vague under these circumstances as a matter of law, and testimony regarding that issue was properly excluded. The district court, indeed, gave witness Marshall a broad scope of opinion testimony over objections of the government. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to limit that testimony.
(2) Admission of Tape Recorded Payoffs
After he began to cooperate with the government, Echols agreed to be videotaped and audiotaped at breakfast/bribery meetings held between Echols and two other councilmembers, Arrington and Fowlkes. The tapes show the councilmembers accepting bribes, and they also contain statements by Mr. Echols about Paradies' decision not to testify before the grand jury. Govt. Exhibit 473T ("They wanted to talk to Paradies, and at that time Paradies' attorney wouldn't let Paradies go down."). Paradies filed a motion in limine to exclude the tapes because they constituted hearsay, and they were irrelevant and prejudicial. The district court disallowed the tapes in the governments case-in-chief because they were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. He reserved final determination on the matter, however, because the only basis for admission of the tapes would have been to rehabilitate Echols' credibility.
After Echols testified on direct at trial, the defense conducted an aggressive cross-examination of Echols. On redirect, to rehabilitate their witness, the government again sought to introduce the tapes. The district court found that the tapes were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), which states that a statement is not hearsay if it is a prior consistent statement of a witness that is used to rebut an implied charge of recent fabrication.39 On appeal, the parties agree that the admission of the tapes under this rule was error, because the Supreme Court has recently decided that the prior consistent statement under the rule must have been made before the alleged influence or motivation to fabricate arose. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995). In this case, the government made the tapes after Echols' agreement to cooperate with the government.40 Therefore, under Tome, the tapes would not constitute nonhearsay under 801(d)(1)(B), and the district court erred in so finding.
The government correctly argues, however, that "[r]egardless of the ground for admission of evidence cited by the district court, this Court will uphold the admission even if the district court's reasons were erroneous if the admission was proper on other grounds." United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir.1990). The government also correctly points out that the tapes were not hearsay, because they were not statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, the breakfast conversations were innocuous, and they were offered merely to rehabilitate Echols' testimony that the people involved had a familiar relationship and had regular breakfast meetings.41 See United States v. Price, 792 F.2d 994, 996-97 (11th Cir.1986) (statements admitted simply to put other statements into context are not hearsay). Also, there are no nonverbal hearsay concerns with the videotape of money being passed, because "[w]hen non-verbal conduct, like the transfer of money, is ambiguous, contemporaneous words which characterize the transactions are not hearsay." United States v. Valentine, 644 F.Supp. 818, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Therefore, because the video and audio tapes became relevant to rehabilitate Echols, and because the tapes did not constitute hearsay, the admission of the evidence was proper despite the court's erroneous ruling.
(3) Admission of Evidence Pursuant to 404(b)
"This court reviews the decision to admit extrinsic act evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)42 for 'clear abuse of discretion.' " United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 736 (11th Cir.1991). The government must show that "(1) the evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character and (2) the probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect." Id. Also, the "evidence is admissible only if the jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the extrinsic act." Id.
The district court admitted two days and seven witnesses regarding evidence that the Paradies defendants violated the Michigan Campaign Finance Act ("MCFA") from 1990 through 1993 by illegally reimbursing employees for contributions to political candidates and concealing those reimbursements through phony travel vouchers. D. Paradies claims that the jury could not reasonably find that he was involved in the extrinsic acts. He takes issue with the illicit intent attached to the evidence, because he claims that there was no evidence that the actions of his companies violated any laws. He claims that there is no basis for 404(b) evidence when the extrinsic act involved legal activity. Id. The government contends that the evidence was sufficient to find that Mr. Paradies was involved in his companies' illegal contributions that violated the MCFA. We agree with the government on this point, in light of the overwhelming evidence regarding the high degree of control D. Paradies had over his companies and the intricacy of the reimbursement plan. Specifically, the evidence showed that on two travel vouchers, the annotation "Per Dan" was included next to a dinner expense for which there was no dinner. Also, the evidence showed that Mr. Paradies was active in attempting to influence, or "lobby," decisionmakers for the benefit of his companies. The jury could infer from this evidence that Mr. Paradies was involved in the clandestine scheme to contribute to political campaigns and influence those in political office who could control his airport operations.
F. Jackson's Sentence Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines
Defendant Jackson raises several objections to the applications of the sentencing guidelines to his sentence. Review of the district court's determination that Jackson's sentence should have been enhanced under U.S.S.G. §§ 2F1.1, 3C1.1, and 2T1.1 is subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. See United States v. Cannon, 41 F.3d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir.) (§ 2F1.1), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 86, 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995); United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir.1994) (§ 3C1.1). The district court's determination that the specific offense characteristic in U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) applies to the recipient of a payment is a question of law subject to de novo review.
Jackson first claims that the district court erroneously calculated the amount of loss under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1. The district court used $669,653.03 as the amount of "loss" involved in the fraud. Jackson claims that this amount should be reduced by $400,000, which constitutes the "loan amounts." Curiously, Jackson does not provide any factual or legal basis on which this reduction should be made. We do not think that the loss amount, which consisted of the money that Jackson received from the scheme after November 18, 1988, should be reduced by any "loan amount," because the loans involved in this case were proven to be illegitimate. Therefore, Jackson's argument is meritless.
Next, Jackson argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under § 3C1.1 for committing perjury at his trial. That section provides that "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by two levels." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court made a factual finding that Jackson committed perjury during the trial in a number of instances, particularly when he denied having breakfast meetings with Harold Echols. On that basis, the district court enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice. Defendant Jackson has failed to establish that the district court was clearly erroneous in its determination that he testified untruthfully at trial. See Jones, 32 F.3d at 1519 (noting that the comments to § 3C1.1 allow the enhancement if the defendant commits perjury or provides materially false information to a judge). While Jackson claims that the district court erred because it penalized him merely for his failure to plead guilty, that was not the case. Therefore, Jackson's "obstruction of justice" challenge must fail.
The district court further found that Jackson used "sophisticated means" to impede discovery of the existence or extent of the tax offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2) (allowing two-level increase if sophisticated means were used to impede discovery of a tax offense). Jackson claims that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under this section because he claims that the evidence presented in the case did not support a finding that "sophisticated means" were used. The government argues, however, that it presented ample evidence that Jackson routinely transferred money through shell corporations, such as Options International, Inc., in an attempt to conceal his transactions. In light of the evidence presented at trial, we agree with the government and find that the district court did not clearly err in enhancing Jackson's level based on the use of "sophisticated means."
Finally, Jackson's offense level was increased under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, which provides that "[i]f the offense level involved more than one bribe or extortion, increase by two levels.... If the offense involved a payment for the purpose of influencing an elected official or any official holding a high level decision-making or sensitive position, increase by eight levels." U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(1) & (2)(B). Jackson claims that his sentence should not have been enhanced under this section because he was the payee, not the payor, of the bribes. The background to that section of the guidelines directly refutes Jackson's contention, because it states that "the guideline applies to a public official who solicits or accepts such a bribe." In light of this background statement and in the absence of any case law to the contrary, Jackson's contention must be rejected.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not commit reversible error in connection with any of the convictions or sentences of these defendants. We repeat the irony in this case that the thirty-five percent minority participation requirement imposed by Dobbs,43 which was designed to benefit minority-owned businesses, served as the underlying vehicle by which Jackson became involved with the Paradies defendants. In any event, these parties received a fair trial, and the jury returned a reasonable verdict. Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM the district court in all respects.
Ira Jackson was the first black person elected to the Atlanta City Council and served from 1970 to 1990. In the 1960's, Jackson opened several retail stores, including grocery stores, auto parts stores, and tire dealerships, but went bankrupt in 1978 and 1979. As councilman, he developed close ties with the Atlanta political power structure, especially with airport operations and with the law firm utilized by the mayor
Daniel Paradies, the individual, will be referred to herein as "D. Paradies." The Paradies Shops will be referred to as "Shops," and Paradies Midfield will be referred to as "Midfield." D. Paradies, Shops, and Midfield, collectively, will generally be referred to as "the Paradies defendants." The Paradies companies and D. Paradies filed separate briefs, and each have adopted the others' arguments by reference. Therefore, unless specifically stated otherwise, we deem the arguments raised by one to be made by and to inure to the benefit of the others
Wilbourn, a McDonalds franchisee, was greatly enriched by these and other private affirmative action and set-aside programs in becoming involved as an MBE participant in several Atlanta operations and with D. Paradies in airport operations across the country. Although intended to benefit a segment of Atlanta's population the set-aside, unfortunately, resulted in pollution of the political process insofar as the lucrative airport concession business was concerned
Dobbs required a thirty-five percent minority interest in Midfield for reasons unexplained
Wilbourn was a defendant in this case, but was acquitted at trial. His role in the fraud will be set out below
Additionally, Mimi and D. Paradies' wife, Billie Paradies, were close friends. One of the alleged fraudulent "loans" was put in Mimi's maiden name. When the fraud was uncovered, D. Paradies claimed that he did not know that Maudestine Simmons and Mimi Jackson were one and the same person
All the participants in the schemes formed separate corporate entities to engage in airport operations
The "Disclosure of Interest" section of the Atlanta Code of Ethics provides in part:
[A]ny council member ... who has a private interest, direct or indirect, in any proposed legislation or any decision pending before such person or the body of which the person is a member or employee, shall not vote for or against, discuss, decide or in any way participate in considering the matter, but shall publicly disclose, on the official records of the body, the nature and extent of such interest, prior to any determination of the matter.
Section 18-2008 of the Atlanta City Code, entitled "Investments in Conflict with Official Duties," provides in part:
[No] ... council member ... shall invest, or hold any investment directly or indirectly, in any financial, business, commercial or other private transaction which creates a conflict with or adversely affects his official duties to the detriment of the city.
The Paradies Companies maintain that Wilbourn needed the money to finance another minority enterprise opportunity in the Atlanta underground
The evidence was overwhelming that Options was a Jackson alter ego
D. Paradies states in his brief, however, that Hartsfield pledged to Option its stock in Midfield, as well as the fees and dividends. D. Paradies concludes in his brief that "Mr. Jackson thus came to have a financial interest in Mr. Paradies' corporation."
In fact, Jackson caused papers to be backdated to make it appear that the "loan" had been paid as the investigation proceeded
In addition to the issues discussed in this opinion, the defendants raised other less meritorious ones. We find that those issues do not warrant discussion, and "summarily affirm the district court as to all issues not herein discussed." See United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1350, 134 L.Ed.2d 519 (1996)
Section 1866(c) provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny person summoned for jury service may be (1) excused by the court ... upon a showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, ... or (2) excluded by the court on the ground that such person may be unable to render impartial jury service or that his service as a juror would be likely to disrupt the proceedings, or (3) excluded upon peremptory challenge as provided by law, or (4) excluded pursuant to the procedure specified by law upon a challenge by any party for good cause shown, or (5) excluded upon determination by the court that his service as a juror would be likely to threaten the secrecy of the proceedings, or otherwise adversely affect the integrity of jury deliberations.
28 U.S.C. § 1866(c).
While the district court entered an Order on July 11, 1994, stating that there were "approximately 250" jurors in the venire, this court found two groups of juror questionnaires, one included approximately 150 jurors, and the other included an even larger number. Whatever the actual number, it was an unusually large venire
Jackson stated in his brief that the court's excusal of certain jurors violated his "Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial." The substance of his brief, however, refers only to the Jury Selection Act, not to the Sixth Amendment. See Jackson's Brief at pp. 16-21. His reference to the Sixth Amendment may be a method by which Jackson seeks to avoid the strict timeliness requirements of a statutory claim. United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir.1995) (allowing constitutional claims even though statutory claim is untimely), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 798, 133 L.Ed.2d 746 (1996). In any event, we will address only the merits of Jackson's statutory claim. Any constitutional claim raised by Jackson would fail for the same reasons as does the same claim made by the Paradies defendants. See, infra, note 28 and accompanying text
Even if we were to consider Jackson as having impliedly joined with the Paradies defendants' timely motion, his challenge under the Jury Selection Act would fail for the same reasons as does the challenge of his codefendants
Shepherd showed that she met the minimum requirements under the Local Plan by attesting that she (1) is over the age of 18, (2) is competent to fill out the affidavit, (3) received, completed, and returned the jury questionnaire sent to her by the court, (4) had been excused from serving on the Jackson case but was to remain on call for a two-week term, (5) is a citizen of the United States and has been a resident of Atlanta, Georgia, for over one year, (6) is able to read, write, and understand the English language with sufficient proficiency to fill out the questionnaire, (7) is able to speak the English language, (8) has not been convicted of a felony, (9) is not in active service in the armed forces, (10) is not a member of the Fire or Police Department, (11) is not a public officer, (12) has not served on a grand or petit jury in the federal court in the past two years, (13) does not have active care and custody of small children, (14) is not essential to the care of aged or infirm persons, (15) is not over 70 years of age, and (16) is not a part of volunteer safety personnel. The language of her affidavit almost exactly tracks the language in the Local Plan. See N.D.Ga.Local Rule 120-1, Appendix A, §§ VI, VII, & VIII (incorporating 28 U.S.C. § 1865)
The Paradies defendants do not even claim that the district court's excusal of Dana Shepherd was improper. In fact, she stated in her questionnaire that she "regularly" saw H. Lamar Mixon (a named partner in the law firm representing Paradies Midfield), with whom she had a "godmotherly" relationship. Moreover, she virtually admitted her inability to render impartial service when she stated that she had met D. Paradies several times and "would feel funny" being in the courtroom with him. Under these circumstances, it would have been difficult for Ms. Shepherd to execute an affidavit that would have satisfied the requirements of § 1867(d)
The relief to be afforded for a "substantial violation" under the Act is not reversal, but it is a stay of the proceedings for the court to make a determination regarding the propriety of the jury selection process. See 18 U.S.C. § 1867(d)
The Paradies defendants did not claim that the basic process for choosing jurors in the Local Plan was unconstitutional. See United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 648-49 & n. 17 (11th Cir.1984) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979)). In order to substantiate a claim that the process was defective, the defendants would have had to show, among other things, that the district court was excluding a distinctive group in the community from the jury venire, and that the underrepresentation of that group was due to the systematic exclusion of the group in the selection process. Id. These defendants could not support such a claim, because they do not even identify any specific group that is excluded due to the process outlined in the Local Plan
The jurors listed the following circumstances relating to bias: (# 27) stepfather was married to Jackson's sister; (# 66) husband is prosecuting attorney in Cobb County; (# 84) friend of and worked for Jackson; (# 87) worked for Paradies; (# 113) worked as consultant to the city and Mr. Cook (attorney for Paradies) is son-in-law's friend; (# 128) mother works for Judge Shoob (niece of Paradies); (# 138) works for IRS; (# 153) parents are friends of Paradies; (# 270) had clear perception that dishonest business was involved at airport; (# 297) first cousin of district attorney; (# 343) prejudiced, but requested excusal for medical reasons; (# 376) prejudiced against the defendants. Only one "bias" juror's questionnaire, (# 89), was not found in the record. The district court, however, stated that that juror suspected shenanigans at the airport, and this court has been given no reason to discount that finding of the court
We recognize that Bailey dealt with challenges, rather than sua sponte action, but the decision establishes that the district court had broad discretion in dismissing jurors who have friendships, acquaintances, and other connections with parties to the lawsuit
In any event, Calabrese is clearly distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the district court judge sent out a form letter to approximately 300 jurors, and asked two main questions, (1) Do you know the defendants, and (2) Will you be able to serve on a four to six week trial. All of the potential jurors who answered "yes" to the first question were excused. The Third Circuit found that this "acquaintance-based excusal" was inappropriate under the Act. Calabrese, 942 F.2d at 226. The method of the district court in Calabrese was notably different from the method of the district court in this case. Here, the jurors' questionnaire was 25 pages long and consisted of over 100 questions, and explanations for each answer was requested therein. Therefore, this case involved "far more compelling connection than mere acquaintance." Id. (distinguishing cases involving more than mere acquaintance)
The jurors listed the following circumstances relating to undue hardship: (# 7) mother is 87 years old and in nursing home; (# 60) has hearing problems, needs hearing aid; (# 195) has three children seven years and younger; (# 254) has two children, ages four and two; (# 276) no questionnaire, judge released him on grounds of hardship; (# 290) two small children, both sixteen years old; (# 294) sent note in lieu of questionnaire, has two children, ages five and two; (# 340) requested excusal for business hardship, but also professed that he "assume[d] Jackson and other defendants are guilty."
The Paradies defendants did not object to the jury finally impaneled. They did, however, make an unsuccessful challenge based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), but the district court's ruling on that issue was not asserted as an error on appeal
Indeed, the Paradies defendants moved for a change of venue because of claimed widespread prejudicial publicity in Atlanta
For the same reasons, any argument based on the Sixth Amendment right to a fairly selected and impartial jury would also fail. See Green, 742 F.2d at 611
Furthermore, the Waymer court also held specifically that the required element of " 'mailing' ... need not be an essential element of the scheme." Waymer, 55 F.3d at 569 (citing Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710, 109 S.Ct. at 1447)
The contentions of defendants who claim that it is unclear whether their conduct is covered by § 1346 have a hollow ring, because until the Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), federal courts had uniformly construed the mail fraud statute to cover the situation where public officials received bribes and kickbacks thereby depriving the citizenry of their "intangible rights" to good and honest government. See, e.g., United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 828 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1076, 108 S.Ct. 1054, 98 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1988); United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085, 105 S.Ct. 589, 83 L.Ed.2d 699 (1984); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829, 103 S.Ct. 66, 74 L.Ed.2d 67 (1982); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913, 103 S.Ct. 1891, 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982, 100 S.Ct. 2961, 64 L.Ed.2d 838 (1980); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 2605, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574, 61 S.Ct. 1085, 1086, 85 L.Ed. 1531, 1532 (1941); see also, United States v. McNally, 790 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir.1986) (per curiam). In McNally, however, the Supreme Court held that § 1346 did not prohibit schemes to deprive the public of the honest services of elected officials. Congress enacted § 1346 to reinstate the pre-McNally rule that such schemes are prohibited by the mail fraud statute. According to the dissent in McNally, the Supreme Court decision reversed "the accumulated wisdom of many distinguished federal judges who have thoughtfully considered and correctly answered" the "intangible rights" questions. McNally, 483 U.S. at 376, 107 S.Ct. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Government officials, including defendant Jackson, were on notice, then, until June 24, 1987, the date of the McNally decision--and after November 18, 1988--that such intentional actions as are charged in the indictment now at issue were deemed illegal under the mail fraud statute
We agree with Judge Wood's dissent in Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1452
See also the legislative history comments of Representative Conyers in 134 Cong.Rec. H11, 108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988), quoted in Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1436:
This amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the McNally decision....
The amendment adds a new section to 18 U.S.C. 63 that defines the term "scheme or artifice to defraud to include a scheme or artifice to defraud another of the intangible right of honest services." Thus, it is no longer necessary to determine whether or not the scheme or artifice to defraud involved money or property. This amendment is intended merely to overturn the McNally decision.
It is undisputed that each of the mailings that served as a basis for Jackson's convictions were mailed after November 18, 1988, the effective date of the statute
For example, the last part instructs that if the jury doubts the defendant's good faith, then it should find that the defendant did not violate his duty. It would seem that the law is the converse (i.e., if you doubt that the defendants acted in good faith, then you should find that they violated the law.)
The Paradies defendants claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict them of mail fraud because there was no evidence that the Paradies defendants knew of the illegal nature of the relationship between Wilbourn, Hartsfield Concessions, and Jackson. In light of the fact that ignorance of the law is an invalid defense, and because of the overwhelming amount of evidence that showed the defendants' knowledge of and involvement in the fraudulent scheme, we reject that argument. We do not construe United States v. Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549 (11th Cir.1996), as requiring a different result on the issue of requisite intent
Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 requires the filing of written responses "[a]t the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs." The Local Rules of the court below directed the parties to file written jury instruction requests "no later than 9:30 a.m. on the date on which the case is calendared...." See N.D.Ga. Local Rules 255-2 and 525-6. Paradies did not file this instruction in accordance with the local rule, but he claims that "[t]he Local Rules cannot sensibly be read to require the pretrial submission of charges on issues whose substance is unknown before trial." While the defendants claim that they did not know whether their theory of defense would be supported by the evidence, they make no persuasive argument that they did not know of the substance of their defense prior to trial. See United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 633, 652-53 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081, 104 S.Ct. 1447, 79 L.Ed.2d 766 (1984)
United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441, 444 (3d Cir.1991) (finding that the test of § 666 is ambiguous); United States v. Wyncoop, 11 F.3d 119, 121-23 (9th Cir.1993) (discussing whether § 666 applies to employees of entities that receive only indirect benefits from a federal program)
Generally, all of the defendants argue that the government's trial evidence was insufficient to convict them on various counts. In reviewing that claim, we have examined the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1574 (11th Cir.1988). Using that standard, we have evaluated this evidence de novo in order to determine whether the district court erred in denying the defendants' motions for acquittal. See United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232, 239 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 595, 116 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). After a thorough review of the record in this case, we reject all of the defendants' "sufficiency of the evidence" contentions
This rule is not a hearsay exception--it is a rule defining a statement that is not hearsay
His agreement with the government is presumably the basis for his motivation to fabricate his testimony
The innocuous nature of the conversations was one reason the district court initially disallowed the evidence as irrelevant. For example, although Echols made a statement about the government wanting to talk to Paradies, the government was not attempting to show that "the government wanted to talk to Paradies." They wanted to show that Echols was not lying when he testified to having a familiar relationship with the councilman and had regular breakfast meetings with him
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident...."
The City required only 20% minority participation