Source: http://www.ipsofactoj.com/DecidedCases/international/2008/part01/int2008(01)-001.htm
Timestamp: 2018-10-22 21:09:44
Document Index: 640607040

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 3', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'Art.8', 'Art.10', 'Art.34', 'Art.249', 'Art.5', 'Art.6']

Dabas v High Court of Justice at Madrid [HL]
IpsofactoJ.com: International Cases [2008] Part 1 Case 1 [HL]
The High Court of Justice, Madrid
(Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty's High Court of Justice)
By article 34(2)(b) of the Treaty on European Union, reflecting the law on directives in article 249 of the EC Treaty, framework decisions are binding on member states as to the result to be achieved but leave to national authorities the choice of form and methods. In its choice of form and methods a national authority may not seek to frustrate or impede achievement of the purpose of the decision, for that would impede the general duty of cooperation binding on member states under article 10 of the EC Treaty. Thus while a national court may not interpret a national law contra legem, it must "do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decision in order to attain the result which it pursues and thus comply with article 34(2)(b) EU" (Criminal proceedings against Pupino (Case C-105/03) [2006] QB 83, paras 43, 47).
Penal Type would be collaboration with islamist terrorist organization foreseen in article 576 of Penal Code.
that the warrant did not comply with section 64(2) of the 2003 Act because it was not accompanied by a certificate of the kind referred to in section 64(2)(b) and (c);
that the conduct which was alleged against him did not satisfy the dual criminality requirements of section 64(3) of the 2003 Act because part of it occurred at a time when such conduct did not constitute an offence under English law; and
that the warrant did not satisfy the requirements of section 64(3) of the 2003 Act because it did not set out or otherwise make available the text of the relevant law showing that the conduct constituted an offence under the law of the requesting state.
adopt framework decisions for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. Framework decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not entail direct effect.
The Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant is one of the products of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999 in which the concept of an area of freedom, security and justice within the EU was first formulated: see Office of the King's Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1, para 21. Among the various statements in the preamble which explain the purpose and objectives of the Decision are the following:
The objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice leads to abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it by a system of surrender between judicial authorities. Further, the introduction of a new simplified system of surrender of sentenced or suspected persons for the purposes of execution or prosecution of criminal sentences makes it possible to remove the complexity and potential for delay inherent in the present extradition procedure. Traditional cooperation relations which have prevailed up till now between Member States should be replaced by a system of free movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters, covering both pre-sentence and final decisions, within an area of freedom, security and justice.
This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Chapter VI thereof ....
The scope of the European arrest warrant is described in article 2. It may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four months: article 2.1. Verification of the double criminality of the act is dispensed with in the case of a European arrest warrant which is issued for any one or more of the 32 offences listed in article 2.2, provided that the act is punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years. Acts which constitute offences other than those on the list may be subject to the condition that they constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State – that is, subject to verification of their double criminality: article 2.4.
a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence by the requested person.
the penalty imposed, if there is a final judgment, or the prescribed scale of penalties for the offence under the law of the issuing Member State.
As the case of Office of the King's Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1 has demonstrated, the fact that Part 1 of the 2003 Act does not match the requirements of the Framework Decision has given rise to difficulty. This case is a further demonstration of this point. Part 1 is perhaps open to the criticism that it tries to do too much. But it is important not to lose sight of the fact that this is where one must go to find the provisions that give effect to the United Kingdom's obligation under article 34(2)(b) EU as to the result to be achieved. The wording of the provisions of the Act that are under scrutiny must be construed in that context.
The conduct constitutes an extradition offence in relation to the category 1 territory if these conditions are satisfied –
the certificate shows that the conduct is punishable under the law of the category 1 territory with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 3 years or a greater punishment.
The conduct also constitutes an extradition offence in relation to the category 1 territory if these conditions are satisfied –
the conduct is punishable under the law of the category 1 territory with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12 months or a greater punishment ( however it is described in that law).
Whether section 64(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 requires that the court be satisfied that the conduct relied on constitutes an offence under the law of the requesting state and whether, for that purpose, the text of the relevant law must be set out in the European arrest warrant or otherwise made available to the court?
Whether, in a case where section 64(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 applies, and where part of the conduct complained of did not constitute an offence under English law at the time it occurred, the court may nonetheless order extradition based upon the part of the conduct which would have constituted an offence under English law?
Whether the 'certificate' referred to in section 64(2)(b) and (c) of the Extradition Act 2003 can be the European arrest warrant itself?
Persons who are sought to be removed under the procedures that Part 1 of the 2003 Act lays down are entitled to expect the courts to see that the procedures are adhered to according to the requirements laid down in the statute: Office of the King's Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1, para 24. The fact that no reference is made to a separate "certificate" in article 8 or the Annex to the Framework Decision which sets out the content and form of the European arrest warrant is not determinative of the issue. Parliament has chosen not to follow in the same words what the Framework Decision says about this. It has chosen instead to set out its own requirements as to the form and method of giving effect to it, as article 34(b) EU permits. They must be approached on the assumption that, where there are differences from what the Framework Decision lays down, they were regarded by Parliament as a necessary protection against an unlawful infringement of the right to liberty. It was with this point in mind that Miss Montgomery submitted that a separate certificate was required in order to ensure that the matters referred to in section 64(2)(b) and (c) were not simply the subject of a mechanical, and potentially fallible, rubber-stamping or box-ticking exercise.
In Criminal proceedings against Pupino (Case C-105/03) [2006] QB 83, 91, para 23, Mrs Advocate General Kokott said that the object of creating an ever closer union among the people of Europe to which article 1 EU refers will not be achieved unless the member states and institutions of the Union co-operate sincerely and in compliance with the law. She then explained how framework decisions must be given effect in accordance with article 34(2)(b) EU:
Framework decisions in Union law are also largely identical in their structure to directives in Community law. Under article 34(2)(b) EU, they are binding on the member states as to the result to be achieved but leave the choice of form and methods to the national authorities. Although direct effect is expressly excluded, at least the wording concerning their binding character as to the result to be achieved corresponds to that of the third paragraph of article 249 EC, on the basis of which – together with other reasons – the Court of Justice has developed the doctrine of the application of national law in conformity with Community directives.
In summary, it follows from article 34(2)(b) EU and from the principle of loyalty to the Union that every framework decision obliges national courts to bring their interpretation of national laws as far as possible into conformity with the wording and purpose of the framework decision, regardless of whether those laws were adopted before or after the framework decision, so as to achieve the result envisaged by the framework decision.
The binding character of framework decisions, formulated in terms identical to those of the third paragraph of article 249EC, places on national authorities, and particularly national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law.
It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the principle of loyal co-operation, requiring in particular that member states take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under European Union law, were not also binding in the area of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, which is moreover entirely based on co-operation between the member states and the institutions, as the Advocate-General has rightly pointed out in para 26 of her opinion.
In the light of all the above considerations, the court concludes that the principle of interpretation in conformity with Community law is binding in relation to framework decisions adopted in the context of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. When applying national law, the national court that is called on to interpret it must do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decision in order to attain the result which it pursues and thus comply with article 34(2)(b) EU.
The order must contain the information necessary for its execution, in particular the details of the identity of the person sought and the nature and classification of the offence (article 8(1)). Any difficulties which may arise during the procedure must be dealt with by direct contact between the courts involved, and, where appropriate, with the involvement of the supporting administrative authorities.
The European arrest warrant, a measure which is vital to the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice (articles 2 EU and 29 EU), is an embodiment of judicial cooperation .... It is, therefore, a decision governed by the procedural law of the issuing Member State which, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition, is treated in the other Member States in the same way as a decision of a national court, from which it follows that legislative harmonisation is essential ....
The result that the Framework Decision is designed to achieve is to remove the complexity and potential for delay that was inherent in the previous extradition procedures. It seeks to introduce in place of these procedures a system of free movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters within an area of freedom, security and justice: para (5) of the preamble. The principle on which this new system is based is the mutual recognition of criminal decisions between the Member States. The European arrest warrant is designed to have a uniform effect throughout the European Union. The effect at which it aims is that of swift, speedy surrender. It must be borne in mind too that, for obvious practical reasons, a large number of European arrest warrants are not directed at only one Member State: see the House of Lords European Union Committee Report, "European Arrest Warrant – Recent Developments" (HL Paper 156), para 21. The form in the annex to the Framework Decision has been designed on this assumption. The person who issues a European arrest warrant is not required to address it to any particular Member State. Once issued, it is available to be used wherever the requested person happens to be when it is executed.
There is no doubt that the imposition of additional formalities, not to be found in the Framework Decision itself, by one Member State to suit its own purposes would tend to frustrate these objectives. As my noble and learned friend Lord Bingham of Cornhill said in Office of the King's Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1, para 8, the interpretation of Part 1 of the 2003 Act must be approached on the assumption that Parliament did not intend the provisions of Part 1 to be inconsistent with the Framework Decision or to provide for a lesser degree of cooperation by the United Kingdom than the Framework Decision requires. I can find nothing in the wording of section 64(2), read as a whole and in the light of the other provisions of Part 1, to indicate that it was the intention of Parliament that a Part 1 warrant which clearly set out all the relevant information had to be accompanied by a separate document certifying the matters referred to in section 64(2)(b) and (c). It is to be noted, as Latham LJ pointed out in the Divisional Court [2007] 1 WLR 145, para 26, that section 142(3) as to the form of the Part 3 warrant supports the proposition that a warrant can contain a certificate and that it is not a necessary requirement that it be contained in a separate document.
It is not obvious from the narrative of the circumstances set out in the arrest warrant, however, that the date when the relevant conspiracy is alleged to have begun was as early as "before the year 2000". The essence of the allegation is that the appellant was involved in a conspiracy which led up to the train bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004. Mention is made of the appellant's activities during an earlier period, but this part of the narrative appears to have been included simply as background. This impression is reinforced by the statement of facts, in which it is recorded that the appellant had previously been investigated in Spain because of his supposed relations with a separate cell of Al-Qa'eda which was dismantled in November 2001. While he is said to have been responsible for collecting voluntary donations to favour the activities of radical jihadist islamists, the principal activity which is alleged against him is that he and others continued to maintain contact with such persons after November 2001 and established a new terrorist group which was linked to the Madrid bombings. In the Divisional Court Latham LJ said that all the material before the court postdates February 2001, and that he was unclear why the notional conspiracy count sought to backdate the commencement of the conspiracy to before 2000: [2007] 1 WLR 145, para 32.
In the light of this narrative I would have been willing to hold, had it been necessary to do so, that throughout the period of the conduct which is said to constitute the offence in this case the requirement of double criminality was satisfied. A narrative of events prior in date to the conduct relied on will not be objectionable if it is included merely in order to set the scene – to identify the people with whom the person concerned was associating, for example, and their backgrounds and associates. Information of that kind is relevant and admissible to enable inferences to be drawn as to the nature of the offence constituted by the conduct for which extradition is sought. But it is the conduct for which extradition is sought, not any narrative that may be included in the Part 1 warrant simply by way of background, that must satisfy the test of double criminality.
In Office of the King's Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1, para 30, I said that the judge need not concern himself with the criminal law of the requesting state when he is asked to decide under section 10(2) whether the offence specified in the Part 1 warrant is an extradition offence. Miss Montgomery said that this was not so, but I believe that what I said there was accurate. The system on which the European arrest warrant is based depends on cooperation between the judicial authorities of member states. Any scheme which retained scrutiny of the text of the foreign law as a requirement would be bound to give rise to delay and complexity – the very things that in dealings between Member States the Framework Decision was designed to eliminate. In my opinion section 2(4)(c) does not require the text of the foreign law to be set out in the Part 1 warrant. Article 8.1(d) of the Framework Decision states that among the information that the European arrest warrant must contain is "the nature and legal classification of the offence". Section 2(4)(c) requires no more than that.
The European arrest warrant shall contain the following information set out in accordance with the form contained in the Annex.
Framework decisions shall be binding upon the member states as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not entail direct effect.
The judge must decide whether any of the offences specified in the Part 1 warrant is an extradition offence.
The expression "an extradition offence" is defined in and limited by section 64 of the Act. The section applies "in relation to conduct of a person if – (a) he is accused in a category 1 territory of the commission of an offence constituted by the conduct ...." The appellant is so accused and the section therefore applies. Subsection (2) provides as follows:
a certificate issued by an appropriate authority of the category 1 territory shows that the conduct falls within the European framework list [i.e. the article 2.2 list];
the certificate shows that the conduct is punishable under the law of the category 1 territory with imprisonment .... for a term of 3 years or a greater punishment.
Penal Type would be collaboration with islamist terrorist organisation foreseen in article 576 of Penal Code.
.... every framework decision obliges national courts to bring their interpretation of national laws as far as possible into conformity with the wording and purpose of the framework decision, ..., so as to achieve the result envisaged by the framework decision.
For the reasons given by Lord Bingham, the appellant's argument on the construction of section 64(2), if addressed simply in the context of the 2003 Act itself, is a powerful one. Although section 142 of the Act demonstrates that an arrest warrant may indeed "contain" a certificate (the very contention which the respondent advances in respect of section 64(2)), it is striking, first, that such a certificate under section 142 is one which actually "certifies" the relevant facts (as opposed to a "statement", which is also to be contained in the section 142 warrant but which is merely that – a statement to the given effect); and, secondly, that section 142's description of the warrant as a document containing the specified certificate is notably absent from section 64(2) itself. As Lord Bingham explains, moreover, section 64(2) plainly appears to require something more than the basic form of article 8 warrant such as was issued by Spain in the present case.
That being so, the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Criminal proceedings against Pupino (Case C-105/03) [2006] QB 83, obviously assumes considerable importance and it is that decision upon which the respondent principally relies. It is worth setting out paragraphs 43 and 47 of the court's judgment in Pupino in full:
The obligation on the national court to refer to the content of a framework decision when interpreting the relevant rules of its national law ceases when the latter cannot receive an application which would lead to a result compatible with that envisaged by that framework decision. In other words, the principle of interpretation in conformity with Community law cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem.
I understand Miss Montgomery QC to advance two alternative arguments as to why the respondent cannot rely on the Pupino principle here.
First, she submits that Pupino has no application: there is, she suggests, no incompatibility between section 64(2) on its ordinary meaning and the purpose of the framework decision. The framework decision itself by recital (8) provides that "decisions on the execution of the European arrest warrant must be subject to sufficient controls"; the article 64(2) requirement for a separate certificate, she submits, is designed to ensure no more than that.
Secondly, she submits that in any event section 64(2) is so clear in its meaning and effect that it cannot be construed as the respondent invites. To do so, she argues, would be to construe it "contra legem", something which Pupino expressly recognises cannot be done.
Criminal proceedings against Pupino (Case C-105/03) [2006] QB 83
Office of the King's Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147
Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147
Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA (Case C-106/89) [1990] ECR I-4135
Extradition Act 2003: s.2, s.17, s.40, s.54, s.56, s.58, s.64, s.66, s.70, s.142
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002: Preamble (recital 5, recital 6), Art.8
Treaty on European Union: Art.10, Art.34, Art.249
Terrorism Act 2000: s.12
Terrorism Act (Commencement No 3) Order 2001 (SI 2001/421)
European Convention on Human Rights: Art.5, Art.6
House of Lords European Union Committee Report, "European Arrest Warrant - Recent Developments" (HL Paper 156)
Clare Montgomery QC & Mark Summers (Instructed by Ahmed & Co) for the appellants.
David Perry QC & John Hardy (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the respondents.