Source: https://m.openjurist.org/333/f3d/509/united-states-v-moussaoui-abc-lp-lllp
Timestamp: 2020-01-27 10:28:22
Document Index: 288118326

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2332', '§ 46502', '§ 32', '§ 2332', '§ 1114', '§ 844', '§ 1291', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 3731']

333 F3d 509 United States v. Moussaoui Abc Lp Lllp | OpenJurist
333 F. 3d 509 - United States v. Moussaoui Abc Lp Lllp
333 F.3d 509
ABC, Incorporated; Associated Press; Cable News Network, LP, LLLP; CBS Broadcasting, Incorporated; The Hearst Corporation; National Broadcasting Company, Incorporated; The New York Times Company; The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; The Star Tribune Company; Tribune Company; The Washington Post, Intervenors.
We have accepted briefing on the issues and conducted argument, and we are prepared at this time to rule on the substantive questions before us. However, we are compelled to conclude that we are without authority to do so because the order of the district court is not yet an appealable one. We are therefore constrained to dismiss. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).
Moussaoui, an admitted al Qaeda member, was arrested approximately one month prior to September 11. He has been in pre-trial confinement since his arrest. A subsequently issued indictment alleges that until the time of his arrest, Moussaoui was a part of the planned attacks. He is charged with conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(a)(2), (c) (West 2000) (Count One); conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, see 49 U.S.C.A. § 46502(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(B) (West 1997) (Count Two); conspiracy to destroy aircraft, see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 32(a)(7), 34 (West 2000) (Count Three); conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332a (West 2000) (Count Four); conspiracy to murder United States employees, see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1114, 1117 (West 2000) (Count Five); and conspiracy to destroy property, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(f), (i) (West 2000) (Count Six). The Government is seeking the death penalty on Counts One through Four.
Appellate jurisdiction is generally governed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993), which provides that the courts of appeals "shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States." A "final" judgment is one "that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In the criminal context, finality comes with the conviction and imposition of sentence." United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1010 (3d Cir.1993).
Here, the Government contends that the order of the district court directing the deposition of the enemy combatant witness is "a decision or order ... authorizing the disclosure of classified information," id., from which it may take an immediate appeal. We disagree. CIPA § 6, to which the Government points, is concerned with the disclosure of classified information by the defendant to the public at a trial or pretrial proceeding, not the pretrial disclosure of classified information to the defendant or his attorneys. Cf. United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1106 (4th Cir.1985) (en banc); id. at 1108-09 (noting that the government's interest in maintaining confidentiality of classified information "is still protectable although [the defendant] may have had access to the information"). It is true, of course, that the district court issued the testimonial writ based in part on its assessment that the enemy combatant witness' testimony would likely be helpful to Moussaoui's defense. But, neither this conclusion, nor the fact that the purpose of the deposition is to preserve the enemy combatant witness' testimony for potential use at trial, is sufficient to establish the applicability of CIPA. At its core, the order of the district court concerned only the question of whether Moussaoui and standby counsel would be granted access to the enemy combatant witness (and if so, what form of access), not whether any particular statement of this witness would be admitted at trial. The district court was thus correct to conclude that CIPA applies here only by analogy. Because CIPA is not directly applicable, § 7 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 246, 101 S.Ct. 1657, 68 L.Ed.2d 58 (1981) (noting presumption against governmental appeals in criminal cases absent express statutory authorization).
The Supreme Court has long given the finality requirement of § 1291 a practical construction rather than a technical one. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). To this end, the Court has identified "a narrow class" of collateral orders "that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as final." Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted); see id. at 867-68, 114 S.Ct. 1992 ("Immediate appeals from such orders ... do not go against the grain of § 1291, with its object of efficient administration of justice in the federal courts."). Such decisions are immediately appealable.
The collateral order doctrine provides that to be subject to immediate appeal, a ruling of the district court "must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454. The Court has emphasized that the collateral order doctrine is to be applied strictly, lest it swallow the general requirement of finality. See Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992. And, "[b]ecause of the compelling interest in prompt trials, the Court has interpreted the requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule with the utmost strictness in criminal cases." Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984); see Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940) ("[E]ncouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law.").
The order of the district court fails to satisfy the first prong of the Cohen analysis. An order that is "tentative, informal or incomplete" is not final for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221; see Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988) (explaining that an order is "final" for purposes of the collateral order doctrine when it is "made with the expectation that [it] will be the final word on the subject addressed" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the ruling of the district court is a non-final discovery order. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-91, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co., 311 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir.2002).
The order of the district court will not become final unless and until the Government refuses to comply and the district court imposes a sanction.7 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 691, 94 S.Ct. 3090. It is not enough that the Government's noncompliance with the order is anticipated or even certain, especially when it is unknown what sanction, if any, may be imposed by the district court. Cf. United States v. Kane, 646 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir.1981) (concluding that discovery order was not appealable under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (West Supp.2003) [providing for appeal of district court order excluding evidence] when the government had not yet indicated whether it would disobey the order and, even if disobedience was certain, it was not clear that exclusion of evidence would be the sanction imposed by the district court). If the Government elects not to comply with the district court order, the resulting sanction may be one that the Government is willing to bear and not challenge on appeal. On the other hand, the Government may not be willing to bear the sanction and may appeal to this court seeking relief. In either event, the order of the district court is not final until a sanction for noncompliance is imposed.
In reaching this conclusion, we are cognizant that this case involves substantial national security concerns. However, we cannot consider these legitimate concerns in our jurisdictional analysis because application of the collateral order doctrine "is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a `particular injustic[e]' averted, Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988), by a prompt appellate court decision." Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (alteration in original). Ultimately, the order of the district court is a discovery order like any other, and must be treated the same for jurisdictional purposes.8
The Government filed a petition for a writ of mandamus as an alternate basis for jurisdiction. Mandamus is a "drastic" remedy, "to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) (per curiam). Mandamus "has traditionally been used in the federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). In short, "only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to preserve the extraordinary nature of the mandamus remedy, the Supreme Court has set forth two conditions that must be satisfied as a predicate to mandamus jurisdiction. First, "the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires." Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); see Will, 389 U.S. at 97, 88 S.Ct. 269 (noting that "[m]andamus ... may never be employed as a substitute for appeal in derogation of... clear policies" favoring delay of review until final judgment). Second, the petitioner bears "the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable." Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384, 74 S.Ct. 145, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 15(a)(1) provides that the district court may order the deposition of a witness for the purpose of preserving the witness' testimony for trial "because of exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice."
As explained in more detail below, Moussaoui is representing himself in the district court. Because the right of self-representation does not extend to appeals,see Martinez v. Ct. of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 163, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), standby counsel in the district court were appointed as counsel for this appeal.
Even if we construed Moussaoui's pleadings as petitions for writs of mandamus, he would not be entitled to relief. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a district court arbitrarily refuses to rule on a motion. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Kelly (In re Sch. Asbestos Litig.), 977 F.2d 764, 792-93 (3d Cir.1992). The refusal to rule by the district court is not arbitrary, but rather is based on a reasonable judgment that this appeal may resolve a number of issues relevant to Moussaoui's request for access to the third individual.
The absence of a sanction for defiance of a discovery order may also be treated as a failure to satisfy the third prong of theCohen analysis, which requires that the challenged order be effectively unreviewable after final judgment. See MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 121-22 (4th Cir. 1994).
The defiance-and-sanction requirement is not without exception. InNixon, for example, the Supreme Court determined that it would be "inappropriate" and "unseemly" "[t]o require a President of the United States to place himself in the posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of the ruling." Nixon, 418 U.S. at 691-92, 94 S.Ct. 3090. However, this exception has been limited to its unique facts by numerous courts. See, e.g., Bennett v. City of Boston, 54 F.3d 18, 20-21 (1st Cir.1995) (per curiam) (rejecting claim that elected district attorney should be exempt from requirement; citing cases). And, we can discern no basis on which to forgo the requirement in this case.