Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/220/655/78920/
Timestamp: 2020-02-17 06:56:41
Document Index: 156297355

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 741', '§ 1346', '§ 741', '§ 742', '§ 2401', '§ 745', '§ 742', '§ 781', '§ 745', '§ 781']

Prudential Steamship Corporation, Libellant-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee.states Marine Corporation of Delaware, Plaintiff-appellee, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellant, 220 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1955) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1955 › Prudential Steamship Corporation, Libellant-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appel...
Prudential Steamship Corporation, Libellant-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee.states Marine Corporation of Delaware, Plaintiff-appellee, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellant, 220 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1955)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 220 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1955) Argued December 15, 1954
Rehearing Denied March 29, 1955
In the Prudential case the vessel owner brought a libel under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 741 et seq. An exception challenging the jurisdiction of the court was sustained and the libel was dismissed pursuant to an opinion by Judge Goddard reported in 122 F. Supp. 164. Although expressing doubt about the matter, Judge Goddard felt that in the interest of judicial consistency he should follow the interpretation of the Suits in Admiralty Act taken in Judge Irving R. Kaufman's opinion in the States Marine case, States Marine Corp. of Del. v. United States, D.C., 120 F. Supp. 585. That was an action brought under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C.A. § 1346(a) (2), on the civil side of the District Court, to recover a general average contribution from the United States as owner of part of the cargo carried on the plaintiff's vessel. Jurisdiction was challenged by the United States on the ground that the claims alleged in the complaint are cognizable exclusively under the Suits in Admiralty Act. In sustaining jurisdiction, Judge Kaufman, relying on prior district court decisions and a statement in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 175 F.2d 490, 493, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 899, 70 S. Ct. 249, 94 L. Ed. 553, ruled that the Suits in Admiralty Act does not apply to government owned cargo carried on a private vessel but concerns only cargo carried on merchant vessels operated by or for the United States.
Section 1 of the Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 741, provides that [1] "No vessel owned by the United States * * * or [2] in the possession of the United States * * * or [3] operated by or for the United States * * * and [4] no cargo owned or possessed by the United States * * * shall, in view of the provisions herein made for a libel in personam, be subject to arrest or seizure by judicial process * * *." Section 2, 46 U.S.C.A. § 742, provides that "In cases where [1] if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or [2] if such cargo were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained * * *, a libel in personam may be brought against the United States * * *, provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel * * *." It will be observed that the references to "vessel" or "cargo" are in the disjunctive; each is given immunity from seizure, and the United States consents to be sued in personam in the district, among others, in which "the vessel or cargo charged with liability is found." There is nothing in the history or the words of the Suits in Admiralty Act to suggest that the claim against government cargo is limited to cargo carried on vessels operated by or for the United States. Indeed, so to limit it, would make superfluous the prohibition in section 741 against seizure of cargo owned or possessed by the United States, for government owned cargo was subject to seizure only when carried on a private vessel. If carried on a government vessel, it was "possessed" by the United States and immune from seizure. See The Davis, 10 Wall. 15, at pages 20-22. To leave subject to arrest government owned cargo, such as munitions of war, when carried on a private vessel, cannot reasonably be thought to have been the legislative intent. The proviso in section 742 that "such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel" apparently refers to government owned or operated vessels; if read broadly enough to include a privately operated vessel it is also satisfied since every privately operated vessel carrying cargo for hire is a merchant vessel. The additional requirement imposed by the district court restricting government cargo to that carried on government vessels or those operated for the government is not justified, in our opinion. "As the words of the section are plain, we are not at liberty to add to or alter them to effect a purpose which does not appear on its face or from its legislative history." Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 356, 52 S. Ct. 162, 164, 76 L. Ed. 336.
This gloss upon the statute was introduced by Judge Hulbert in American President Lines v. United States, D.C.N. Y., 75 F. Supp. 110. It was accepted by the district court in Alcoa Steamship Co. v. United States, D.C., 80 F. Supp. 158; but that case was reversed on other grounds, 2 Cir., 175 F.2d 661, affirmed 338 U.S. 421, 70 S. Ct. 190, 94 L. Ed. 225. In Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 175 F.2d 490, 493, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 899, 70 S. Ct. 249, 94 L. Ed. 553, this court cited the American President Lines as authority for the statement that "the liability referred to in the statute as arising from the government's ownership of cargo must be one `directly connected with the Government's ownership and operation of a vessel' * * *." The statement was unnecessary to the decision in the Ryan case, since there the government goods had not been loaded on a vessel but were still on the pier, and the actual decision was that goods were not "cargo" until placed aboard the vessel. The vessel on which the goods were to be loaded was a government vessel; hence the Suits in Admiralty Act would have been applicable, under Judge Hulbert's gloss, except for the decision that the goods were not yet cargo.
In a case decided by the Court of Claims, subsequent to the decisions pending before us on appeal, that court disagreed with the results reached by the district court in the cases above cited, and found our Ryan case inapplicable. Lykes Bres. S. S. Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl., 124 F. Supp. 622. In accord is Pacific Far East Lines, Inc. v. United States, D.C.Cal., 1952 A.M.C. 815. We agree with the Court of Claims' view that the Suits in Admiralty Act gives the district courts jurisdiction of libels to enforce general average contribution aganist government cargo carried on a private merchant vessel. Consequently the Prudential Steamship case will be reversed and remanded.
The pleadings establish that the plaintiff's vessel left the port of New York in December 1947 with a general cargo, part of which was government owned. She reached the port of Piraeus without accident, and there discharged cargo destined for that port. Between Piraeus and Salonika the vessel stranded without fault on her part. To get her off the strand general average expenditures were made. She reached Salonika on January 28, 1948 and all the government owned cargo destined for that port was there delivered and accepted in regular course, part of the cargo having been delivered from the vessel and part from lighters to which it had been transferred at the time of her strand. A general average statement was served on the United States in October 1951, and by subsequent stipulation the government's share was fixed at $1,623. The plaintiff's action was commenced January 22, 1954. This was timely under the Tucker Act, which provides a six year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(a). It was barred by the two year limitation of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S. C.A. § 745, if that statute provides the exclusive remedy. Judge Kaufman having ruled that the Suits in Admiralty Act applies only to government owned cargo carried on a vessel operated by or for the United States, 120 F. Supp. 585, summary judgment on the pleadings was awarded the plaintiff.
In Cutler v. Rae, 7 How. 729, 12 L. Ed. 890 the court discussed the nature of the cargo owner's obligation to pay general average when the saved goods are delivered to him. At page 732 of 7 How. it is said:
The Cutler case was a libel in admiralty by the owner of a vessel against the consignee of cargo to whom the master of the vessel had delivered the goods before the libel was filed. The libel was dismissed because the lien was waived by delivery to the consignee. The principles enunciated were approved in Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Vance, 19 How. 162, 171, 15 L. Ed. 584, and were reaffirmed in Re 4,885 Bags of Linseed, 1 Black 108, 66 U.S. 108, 113, 17 L. Ed. 35, where the court said that the shipowner's lien "is analogous to the lien given by the common law to the carrier on land * * *." See also Det Forenede Dampskibs Selskab v. Insurance Co., 2 Cir., 31 F.2d 658, 659, certiorari denied 280 U.S. 571, 50 S. Ct. 28, 74 L. Ed. 623. And in United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 298 U.S. 483, at page 489, 56 S. Ct. 889, 890, 80 L. Ed. 1296 the court listed among "well recognized" means of enforcing general average contribution, "a suit in rem in admiralty against ship or cargo, a suit in personam in admiralty against ship owner or cargo owner, and an action at law or a suit in equity against ship owner or cargo owner."3
In United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Rosenberg Bros., 276 U.S. 202, 48 S. Ct. 256, 72 L. Ed. 531, which was a libel by a shipper of cargo on a government owned vessel operated by the Fleet Corporation, 276 U.S. at page 214, 48 S. Ct. at page 258, the court said:
But in Johnson v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 280 U.S. 320, 327, 50 S. Ct. 118, 120, 74 L. Ed. 451, the court concluded "that the remedies given by the act are exclusive in all cases where a libel might be filed under it." The Johnson decision reviewed four cases, one of them being Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 30 F.2d 254. That case involved a cargo of sugar shipped on a vessel owned by and operated for the United States as a merchant vessel. The vessel arrived in New York in March 1920 but made delivery of only part of the sugar. In 1924 the cargo owner brought action in the district court against the United States under the Tucker Act to recover damages for failure to perform the contracts evidenced by the bills of lading. The trial court gave judgment for the defendant. This court affirmed on the ground that the action was too late because the six year limitation of the Tucker Act was repealed by the two year limitation of the Suits in Admiralty Act. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The case is not precisely in point since it did not involve government cargo carried on a private vessel, but we believe that the reasoning of the opinion, 280 U.S. on page 327, 50 S. Ct. 118, requires us to hold that in such a case the contract remedy formerly available under the Tucker Act is no longer available. This view is in accord with that of the Court of Claims in Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl., 124 F. Supp. 622. See also Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446, 455, 73 S. Ct. 733, 97 L. Ed. 1140.
It is true that in United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 298 U.S. 483, 56 S. Ct. 889, 80 L. Ed. 1296, the Supreme Court recognized the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act to enforce a contribution for general average in respect to cargo carried on a public vessel. But that holding, we think, was based upon the fact that a public vessel was not one "employed as a merchant vessel" and hence not within the purview of the provisions in the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 742, whereby the remedy of a libel in personam against the United States was provided. Both the Johnson and the Atlantic Mutual decisions were by unanimous opinions with only six years intervening between them. We think it more reasonable to interpret the Atlantic Mutual decision as holding that the Johnson rule was not applicable to the facts of the Atlantic case than as overruling, sub silentio, the Johnson rule which had been so recently announced. Moreover, the Atlantic Mutual decision dealt with a claim which arose prior to enactment in 1925 of the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq. Consequently, that case does not collide with our holding in Phalen v. United States, 2 Cir., 32 F.2d 687, that suits under the Public Vessels Act are subject to the statutory limitations of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 745.
The Lake Monroe, 250 U.S. 246, 39 S. Ct. 460, 63 L. Ed. 962
The Davis, 10 Wall. 15, 19 L. Ed. 875; United States v. Wilder, 28 F.Cas. page 601, 16,694; The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24, D.C.C.C.N.Y., 231 F. 365; see also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 37, 65 S. Ct. 530, 89 L. Ed. 729
This was a suit in the Court of Claims for a general average contribution in respect to cargo carried on a public vessel. The claim arose prior to enactment of the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq. The suit was dismissed because the claim was barred by the six year limitation of the Tucker Act
The Everett Fowler, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 662; Conners Marine Co. v. Petterson Lighterage & Tow. Corp., 152 F.2d 657, certiorari denied United States v. Petterson Lighterage & Tow. Corp., 327 U.S. 804, 66 S. Ct. 963, 90 L. Ed. 1029; C. F. Harms Co. v. Erie R. Co., 2 Cir., 167 F.2d 562; Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 159 F.2d 349; Alcoa S.S. Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 421, 70 S. Ct. 190, 94 L. Ed. 225
Sentence stricken on rehearing. See 220 F.2d 660