Source: https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-11-bankruptcy/chapter-3-case-administration/subchapter-iv-administrative-powers/365-executory-contracts-and-unexpired-leases
Timestamp: 2018-12-16 09:15:06
Document Index: 504619367

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 365', '§\u202f365', '§\u202f365', '§ 362', '§ 257', '§ 1', '§ 2522', '§ 19', '§ 205', '§ 501', '§ 1', '§ 309', '§ 404', '§ 328', '§ 328', '§ 328', '§ 404', '§ 328', '§ 404', '§ 328', '§ 309', '§ 219', '§ 1', '§ 501', '§ 219', '§ 501', '§ 205', '§ 501', '§ 501', '§ 1', '§ 501', '§ 501', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 283', '§ 283', '§ 257', '§ 257', '§ 283', '§ 283', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 402', '§ 403', '§ 404', '§ 362', '§ 19', '§ 19']

§ 365. Executory contracts and unexpired leases, 11 U.S.C. § 365 | Casetext
11 U.S.C. § 365
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(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2574; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §§ 362, 402–404, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 361, 367; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §§ 257(j), (m), 283(e), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3115, 3117; Pub. L. 100–506, § 1(b), Oct. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 2538; Pub. L. 101–647, title XXV, § 2522(c), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4866; Pub. L. 102–365, § 19(b)–(e), Sept. 3, 1992, 106 Stat. 982–984; Pub. L. 103–394, title II, §§ 205(a), 219(a), (b), title V, § 501(d)(10), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4122, 4128, 4145; Pub. L. 103–429, § 1, Oct. 31, 1994, 108 Stat. 4377; Pub. L. 109–8, title III, §§ 309(b), 328(a), title IV, § 404, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 82, 100, 104.)
Section 365(b)(3) represents a compromise between H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment. The provision adopts standards contained in section 365(b)(5) of the Senate amendment to define adequate assurance of future performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center. Section 365(b)(4) of the House amendment indicates that after default the trustee may not require a lessor to supply services or materials without assumption unless the lessor is compensated as provided in the lease. Section 365(c)(2) and (3) likewise represent a compromise between H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment. Section 365(c)(2) is derived from section 365(b)(4) of the Senate amendment but does not apply to a contract to deliver equipment as provided in the Senate amendment. As contained in the House amendment, the provision prohibits a trustee or debtor in possession from assuming or assigning an executory contract of the debtor to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or the issuance of a security of the debtor. Section 365(e) is a refinement of comparable provisions contained in the House bill and Senate amendment. Sections 365(e)(1) and (2)(A) restate section 365(e) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House. Sections 365(e)(2)(B) expands the section to permit termination of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor if such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or for the issuance of a security of the debtor. Characterization of contracts to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, is limited to the extension of cash or a line of credit and is not intended to embrace ordinary leases or contracts to provide goods or services with payments to be made over time. Section 365(f) is derived from H.R. 8200 as passed by the House. Deletion of language in section 365(f)(3) of the Senate amendment is done as a matter of style. Restrictions with respect to assignment of an executory contract or unexpired lease are superfluous since the debtor may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor only if such contract is first assumed under section 364(f)(2)(A) of the House amendment. Section 363(h) of the House amendment represents a modification of section 365(h) of the Senate amendment. The House amendment makes clear that in the case of a bankrupt lessor, a lessee may remain in possession for the balance of the term of a lease and any renewal or extension of the term only to the extent that such renewal or extension may be obtained by the lessee without the permission of the landlord or some third party under applicable non-bankruptcy law.
Subsection (a) of this section authorizes the trustee, subject to the court’s approval, to assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease. Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides. A note is not usually an executory contract if the only performance that remains is repayment. Performance on one side of the contract would have been completed and the contract is no longer executory. Because of the volatile nature of the commodities markets and the special provisions governing commodity broker liquidations in subchapter IV of chapter 7, the provisions governing distribution in section 765(a) will govern if any conflict between those provisions and the provisions of this section arise. Subsections (b), (c), and (d) provide limitations on the trustee’s powers. Subsection (b) requires the trustee to cure any default in the contract or lease and to provide adequate assurance of future performance if there has been a default, before he may assume. This provision does not apply to defaults under ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses, which is a significant departure from present law. Subsection (b)(3) permits termination of leases entered into prior to the effective date of this title in liquidation cases if certain other conditions are met. Subsection (b)(4) [enacted as (c)(2)] prohibits the trustee’s assumption of an executory contract requiring the other party to make a loan or deliver equipment to or to issue a security of the debtor. The purpose of this subsection is to make it clear that a party to a transaction which is based upon the financial strength of a debtor should not be required to extend new credit to the debtor whether in the form of loans, lease financing, or the purchase or discount of notes. Subsection (b)(5) provides that in lease situations common to shopping centers, protections must be provided for the lessor if the trustee assumes the lease, including protection against decline in percentage rents, breach of agreements with other tenants, and preservation of the tenant mix. Protection for tenant mix will not be required in the office building situation. Subsection (c) prohibits the trustee from assuming or assigning a contract or lease if applicable nonbankruptcy law excuses the other party from performance to someone other than the debtor, unless the other party consents. This prohibition applies only in the situation in which applicable law excuses the other party from performance independent of any restrictive language in the contract or lease itself. Subsection (d) places time limits on assumption and rejection. In a liquidation case, the trustee must assume within 60 days (or within an additional 60 days, if the court, for cause, extends the time). If not assumed, the contract or lease is deemed rejected. In a rehabilitation case, the time limit is not fixed in the bill. However, if the other party to the contract or lease requests the court to fix a time, the court may specify a time within which the trustee must act. This provision will prevent parties in contractual or lease relationships with the debtor from being left in doubt concerning their status vis-a-vis the estate. Subsection (e) invalidates ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses. These clauses, protected under present law, automatically terminate the contract or lease, or permit the other contracting party to terminate the contract or lease, in the event of bankruptcy. This frequently hampers rehabilitation efforts. If the trustee may assume or assign the contract under the limitations imposed by the remainder of the section, the contract or lease may be utilized to assist in the debtor’s rehabilitation or liquidation. The unenforcibility [sic] of ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses proposed under this section will require the courts to be sensitive to the rights of the nondebtor party to executory contracts and unexpired leases. If the trustee is to assume a contract or lease, the court will have to insure that the trustee’s performance under the contract or lease gives the other contracting party the full benefit of his bargain. This subsection does not limit the application of an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause if a new insolvency or receivership occurs after the bankruptcy case is closed. That is, the clause is not invalidated in toto, but merely made inapplicable during the case for the purposes of disposition of the executory contract or unexpired lease. Subsection (f) partially invalidates restrictions on assignment of contracts or leases by the trustee to a third party. The subsection imposes two restrictions on the trustee: he must first assume the contract or lease, subject to all the restrictions on assumption found in the section, and adequate assurance of future performance must be provided to the other contracting party. Paragraph (3) of the subsection invalidates contractual provisions that permit termination or modification in the event of an assignment, as contrary to the policy of this subsection. Subsection (g) defines the time as of which a rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease constitutes a breach of the contract or lease. Generally, the breach is as of the date immediately preceding the date of the petition. The purpose is to treat rejection claims as prepetition claims. The remainder of the subsection specifies different times for cases that are converted from one chapter to another. The provisions of this subsection are not a substantive authorization to breach or reject an assumed contract. Rather, they prescribe the rules for the allowance of claims in case an assumed contract is breached, or if a case under chapter 11 in which a contract has been assumed is converted to a case under chapter 7 in which the contract is rejected. Subsection (h) protects real property lessees of the debtor if the trustee rejects an unexpired lease under which the debtor is the lessor (or sublessor). The subsection permits the lessee to remain in possession of the leased property or to treat the lease as terminated by the rejection. The balance of the term of the lease referred to in paragraph (1) will include any renewal terms that are enforceable by the tenant, but not renewal terms if the landlord had an option to terminate. Thus, the tenant will not be deprived of his estate for the term for which he bargained. If the lessee remains in possession, he may offset the rent reserved under the lease against damages caused by the rejection, but does not have any affirmative rights against the estate for any damages after the rejection that result from the rejection. Subsection (i) gives a purchaser of real property under a land installment sales contract similar protection. The purchaser, if the contract is rejected, may remain in possession or may treat the contract as terminated. If the purchaser remains in possession, he is required to continue to make the payments due, but may offset damages that occur after rejection. The trustee is required to deliver title, but is relieved of all other obligations to perform. A purchaser that treats the contract as terminated is granted a lien on the property to the extent of the purchase price paid. A party with a contract to purchase land from the debtor has a lien on the property to secure the price already paid, if the contract is rejected and the purchaser is not yet in possession. Subsection (k) relieves the trustee and the estate of liability for a breach of an assigned contract or lease that occurs after the assignment.
Subsection (c) prohibits the trustee from assuming or assigning a contract or lease if applicable nonbankruptcy law excuses the other party from performance to someone other than the debtor, unless the other party consents. This prohibition applies only in the situation in which applicable law excuses the other party from performance independent of any restrictive language in the contract or lease itself. The purpose of this subsection, at least in part, is to prevent the trustee from requiring new advances of money or other property. The section permits the trustee to continue to use and pay for property already advanced, but is not designed to permit the trustee to demand new loans or additional transfers of property under lease commitments. Thus, under this provision, contracts such as loan commitments and letters of credit are nonassignable, and may not be assumed by the trustee. Subsection (e) invalidates ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses. These clauses, protected under present law, automatically terminate the contract or lease, or permit the other contracting party to terminate the contract or lease, in the event of bankruptcy. This frequently hampers rehabilitation efforts. If the trustee may assume or assign the contract under the limitations imposed by the remainder of the section, then the contract or lease may be utilized to assist in the debtor’s rehabilitation or liquidation. The unenforceability of ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses proposed under this section will require the courts to be sensitive to the rights of the nondebtor party to executory contracts and unexpired leases. If the trustee is to assume a contract or lease, the courts will have to insure that the trustee’s performance under the contract or lease gives the other contracting party the full benefit of his bargain. An example of the complexity that may arise in these situations and the need for a determination of all aspects of a particular executory contract or unexpired lease is the shopping center lease under which the debtor is a tenant in a shopping center. A shopping center is often a carefully planned enterprise, and though it consists of numerous individual tenants, the center is planned as a single unit, often subject to a master lease or financing agreement. Under these agreements, the tenant mix in a shopping center may be as important to the lessor as the actual promised rental payments, because certain mixes will attract higher patronage of the stores in the center, and thus a higher rental for the landlord from those stores that are subject to a percentage of gross receipts rental agreement. Thus, in order to assure a landlord of his bargained for exchange, the court would have to consider such factors as the nature of the business to be conducted by the trustee or his assignee, whether that business complies with the requirements of any master agreement, whether the kind of business proposed will generate gross sales in an amount such that the percentage rent specified in the lease is substantially the same as what would have been provided by the debtor, and whether the business proposed to be conducted would result in a breach of other clauses in master agreements relating, for example, to tenant mix and location. This subsection does not limit the application of an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause to a new insolvency or receivership after the bankruptcy case is closed. That is, the clause is not invalidated in toto, but merely made inapplicable during the case for the purpose of disposition of the executory contract or unexpired lease.
2005—Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 109–8, § 328(a)(1)(A), inserted before semicolon at end “other than a default that is a breach of a provision relating to the satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any failure to perform nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired lease of real property, if it is impossible for the trustee to cure such default by performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption, except that if such default arises from a failure to operate in accordance with a nonresidential real property lease, then such default shall be cured by performance at and after the time of assumption in accordance with such lease, and pecuniary losses resulting from such default shall be compensated in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph”. Subsec. (b)(2)(D). Pub. L. 109–8, § 328(a)(1)(B), substituted “penalty rate or penalty provision” for “penalty rate or provision”. Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 109–8, § 328(a)(2), struck out par. (4) which read as follows: “such lease is of nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate at an airport at which the debtor is the lessee under one or more additional nonresidential leases of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate and the trustee, in connection with such assumption or assignment, does not assume all such leases or does not assume and assign all of such leases to the same person, except that the trustee may assume or assign less than all of such leases with the airport operator’s written consent.” Subsec. (d)(4). Pub. L. 109–8, § 404(a), amended par. (4) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (4) read as follows: “Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in a case under any chapter of this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days after the date of the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to the lessor.” Subsec. (d)(5) to (10). Pub. L. 109–8, § 328(a)(3), redesignated par. (10) as (5) and struck out former pars. (5) to (9) which related to rejection of leases under which the debtor is an affected air carrier that is the lessee of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate. Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 109–8, § 404(b), substituted “provided in subsections (b) and” for “provided in subsection”. Pub. L. 109–8, § 328(a)(4), struck out “; except that the trustee may not assign an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property under which the debtor is an affected air carrier that is the lessee of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate if there has occurred a termination event” before period at end. Subsec. (p). Pub. L. 109–8, § 309(b), added subsec. (p). 1994—Subsec. (b)(2)(D). Pub. L. 103–394, § 219(a), added subpar. (D). Subsec. (d)(6)(C). Pub. L. 103–429, § 1(1), substituted “section 40102(a) of title 49” for “section 101 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 App. U.S.C. 1301)”. Pub. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(10)(A), which directed the substitution of “section 40102 of title 49” for “the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301)”, could not be executed because the phrase “(49 U.S.C. 1301)” did not appear in text. Subsec. (d)(10). Pub. L. 103–394, § 219(b), added par. (10). Subsec. (g)(2)(A), (B). Pub. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(10)(B), substituted “1208, or 1307” for “1307, or 1208”. Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 103–394, § 205(a), amended subsec. (h) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (h) read as follows: “(h)(1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor under which the debtor is the lessor, or a timeshare interest under a timeshare plan under which the debtor is the timeshare interest seller, the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser under such lease or timeshare plan may treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by such rejection, where the disaffirmance by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser to treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by virtue of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or other agreements the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser has made with other parties; or, in the alternative, the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser may remain in possession of the leasehold or timeshare interest under any lease or timeshare plan the term of which has commenced for the balance of such term and for any renewal or extension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser under applicable nonbankruptcy law. “(2) If such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser remains in possession as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser may offset against the rent reserved under such lease or moneys due for such timeshare interest for the balance of the term after the date of the rejection of such lease or timeshare interest, and any such renewal or extension thereof, any damages occurring after such date caused by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor under such lease or timeshare plan after such date, but such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser does not have any rights against the estate on account of any damages arising after such date from such rejection, other than such offset.” Subsec. (n)(1)(B). Pub. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(10)(C), substituted “a right to” for “a right to to”. Subsec. (o). Pub. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(10)(D), substituted “a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency (or predecessor to such agency)” for “the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or its predecessors or successors,”. Subsec. (p). Pub. L. 103–429, § 1(2), which directed the amendment of subsec. (p) by substituting “section 40102(a) of title 49” for “section 101(3) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958”, could not be executed because subsec. (p) was repealed by Pub. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(10)(E). See below. Pub. L. 103–394, § 501(d)(10)(E), struck out subsec. (p), which read as follows: “In this section, ‘affected air carrier’ means an air carrier, as defined in section 101(3) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, that holds 65 percent or more in number of the aircraft gates at an airport— “(1) which is a Large Air Traffic Hub as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration in Report FAA–AP 92–1, February 1992; and “(2) all of whose remaining aircraft gates are leased or under contract on the date of enactment of this subsection.” 1992—Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 102–365, § 19(c), added par. (4). Subsec. (d)(5) to (9). Pub. L. 102–365, § 19(b), added pars. (5) to (9). Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 102–365, § 19(d), substituted for period at end “; except that the trustee may not assign an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property under which the debtor is an affected air carrier that is the lessee of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate if there has occurred a termination event.” Subsec. (p). Pub. L. 102–365, § 19(e), added subsec. (p). 1990—Subsec. (o). Pub. L. 101–647 added subsec. (o). 1988—Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 100–506 added subsec. (n). 1986—Subsec. (c)(1)(A). Pub. L. 99–554, § 283(e)(1), struck out “or an assignee of such contract or lease” after “debtor in possession”. Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 99–554, § 283(e)(2), inserted “is” after “lease” and “and” after “property”. Subsecs. (d)(2), (g)(1). Pub. L. 99–554, § 257(j), (m)(1), inserted reference to chapter 12. Subsec. (g)(2). Pub. L. 99–554, § 257(m)(2), inserted references to chapter 12 and section 1208 of this title. Subsec. (h)(1). Pub. L. 99–554, § 283(e)(2), inserted “or timeshare plan” after “to treat such lease”. Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 99–554, § 283(e)(3), substituted “362(b)(10)” for “362(b)(9)”. 1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–353, § 362(a), amended subsec. (a) generally, making minor changes. Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–353, § 362(a), amended subsec. (b) generally, inserting in par. (3) reference to par. (2)(B) of subsec. (f) of this section, in par. (3)(A) inserting provisions relating to financial condition and operating performance in the case of an assignment, and in par. (3)(C) substituting “that assumption or assignment of such lease is subject to all the provisions thereof, including (but not limited to) provisions such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision, and will not breach any such provision contained in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement relating to such shopping center” for “that assumption or assignment of such lease will not breach substantially any provision, such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision, in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement relating to such shopping center”. Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98–353, § 362(a), amended subsec. (c) generally, substituting in par. (1)(A) “applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession or an assignee of such contract or lease, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties” for “applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee or an assignee of such contract or lease, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties” and adding par. (3). Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 98–353, § 362(a), amended subsec. (d) generally, inserting in par. (1) reference to residential real property or personal property of the debtor, inserting in par. (2) reference to residential real property or personal property of the debtor, and adding pars. (3) and (4). Subsec. (h)(1). Pub. L. 98–353, § 402, amended par. (1) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (1) read as follows: “If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor under which the debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such lease may treat the lease as terminated by such rejection, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession for the balance of the term of such lease and any renewal or extension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” Subsec. (h)(2). Pub. L. 98–353, § 403, amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (2) read as follows: “If such lessee remains in possession, such lessee may offset against the rent reserved under such lease for the balance of the term after the date of the rejection of such lease, and any such renewal or extension, any damages occurring after such date caused by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor after such date, but such lessee does not have any rights against the estate on account of any damages arising after such date from such rejection, other than such offset.” Subsec. (i)(1). Pub. L. 98–353, § 404, amended par. (1) generally, inserting provisions relating to timeshare interests under timeshare plans. Subsecs. (l), (m). Pub. L. 98–353, § 362(b), added subsecs. (l) and (m).
Pub. L. 102–365, § 19(f), Sept. 2, 1992, 106 Stat. 984, provided that: “The amendments made by this section [amending this section] shall be in effect for the 12-month period that begins on the date of enactment of this Act [Sept. 3, 1992] and shall apply in all proceedings involving an affected air carrier (as defined in section 365(p) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by this section) that are pending during such 12-month period. Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall report to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House of Representatives on whether this section shall apply to proceedings that are commenced after such 12-month period.”
Pub. L. 102–365, § 19(a), Sept. 2, 1992, 106 Stat. 982, provided that:“Congress finds that— “(1) there are major airports served by an air carrier that has leased a substantial majority of the airport’s gates; “(2) the commerce in the region served by such a major airport can be disrupted if the air carrier that leases most of its gates enters bankruptcy and either discontinues or materially reduces service; and “(3) it is important that such airports be empowered to continue service in the event of such a disruption.”