Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/449/371/521130/
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 20:18:12
Document Index: 693598571

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1973', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 46', '§ 36', '§ 29']

Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, A/k/a Anthony Bottom, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Phillip Coombe, Anthony Annucci, Louis F. Mann, Defendants-appellees.docket No. 01-7260-cv, 449 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006) :: Justia
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Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, A/k/a Anthony Bottom, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Phillip Coombe, Anthony Annucci, Louis F. Mann, Defendants-appellees.docket No. 01-7260-cv, 449 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 449 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006) Argued: June 22, 2005
Jalil Abdul Muntaqim is incarcerated at the Shawangunk Correctional Facility in Wallkill, New York, serving a life term of imprisonment following his conviction for the murder of two New York City police officers in May 1971. In September 1994, Muntaqim, an African American, filed a pro se complaint against several New York officials alleging, inter alia, that New York Election Law section 5-106, which denies the right to vote to incarcerated or paroled felons, violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") because it "results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). In January 2001, the District Court for the Northern District of New York granted Defendants-Appellees summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. Muntaqim v. Coombe, No. 94-CV-1237, slip op. (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2001). Muntaqim appealed, and, in April 2004, a panel of this Court affirmed the dismissal of Muntaqim's complaint. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2004). In October 2004, our Court voted to deny en banc review. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 385 F.3d 793, 793-94 (2d Cir. 2004).
Following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 543 U.S. 978, 125 S. Ct. 480 (2004), we revisited the case and agreed to rehear it en banc. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95, 95 (2d Cir. 2004). The en banc court was convened to determine "whether, on the pleadings, a claim that a New York State statute, Section 5-106 of the New York Election Law, that disenfranchises currently imprisoned felons and parolees results in unlawful vote dilution, can state a claim for violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act." Id.
Only New York residents can register and vote in New York. New York Election Law section 5-102(1) provides that " [n]o person shall be qualified to register for and vote at any election unless he is ... a resident of this state ... for a minimum of thirty days next preceding such election." New York Election Law section 1-104(22) defines "residence" for registration and voting purposes as "that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, always intends to return." Residence is critical since it is neither gained nor lost as a consequence of incarceration. Under both the New York Constitution and the New York Election Law, "no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence, [for purposes of registering and/or voting] by reason of his or her presence or absence, while ... confined in any public prison." N.Y. Const. art. II, § 4; see also N.Y. Elec. Law § 5-104(1) (same). These provisions clearly establish that Muntaqim, a California resident, did not become a New York resident because of his incarceration in New York.
Furthermore, according to the New York Court of Appeals, " [t]he crucial determination whether a particular residence complies with the requirements of the Election Law is that the individual must manifest an intent, coupled with physical presence without any aura of sham." People v. O'Hara, 96 N.Y.2d 378, 729 N.Y.S.2d 396, 754 N.E.2d 155, 159 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In People v. Cady, 143 N.Y. 100, 37 N.E. 673 (1894), the New York Court of Appeals, construing a predecessor to New York Constitution Article II, section 4, held that a prisoner may not assume a new residence while in prison because " [t]he domicile or home requisite as a qualification for voting purposes means a residence which the voter voluntarily chooses, and has a right to take as such, and which he is at liberty to leave, as interest or caprice may dictate, but without any present intention to change it." Cady, 37 N.E. at 674. Thus, because physical presence in a prison is necessarily involuntary, an "inmate of an institution does not gain or lose a residence or domicile, but retains the domicile he had when he entered the institution." Corr v. Westchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 33 N.Y.2d 111, 350 N.Y.S.2d 401, 305 N.E.2d 483, 485 (1973).4
These authorities establish that, under New York law, Muntaqim's involuntary presence in a New York prison does not confer residency for purposes of registration and voting. Because his inability to vote in New York arises from the fact that he was a resident of California, not because he was a convicted felon subject to the application of New York Election Law section 5-106, he has suffered no "invasion of a legally protected interest." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). Moreover, there is no causal connection between New York Election Law section 5-106 and Muntaqim's inability to vote in New York, and a favorable decision of this Court on his claim that New York Election Law section 5-106 violates the VRA would do nothing to enfranchise him. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130.
Muntaqim's failure to establish standing was not raised or discussed in the district court. Ordinarily, we would not resolve the question of standing without remanding so that the district court could address the question in the first instance. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1994) (remanding to the district court for consideration of a jurisdictional issue in the first instance). Especially when the question is as fact-dependent as an individual's intent to remain in a particular state, the district court should generally be given the first opportunity to resolve the issue. In light of the specific facts before us, however, and particularly in light of Muntaqim's repeated assertions that he intended to leave the state should he be paroled, it is sufficiently clear that Muntaqim lacks standing that remand is unnecessary.
For these reasons, we conclude that Muntaqim lacks standing, and we lack jurisdiction to hear his claims. The prior opinions of the district court in Muntaqim v. Coombe, No. 94-CV-1237 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2001), and the panel opinion of this Court in Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004), are hereby vacated, and Muntaqim's complaint is dismissed.
Senior Circuit Judges Thomas J. Meskill and Richard J. Cardamone are part of the Muntaqim en banc court because they were on the three-judge panel that originally heard the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
See, e.g., Farrell v. Lautob Realty Corp., 204 A.D.2d 597, 612 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (N.Y.App. Div.1994) (" [I]t is long-established law in New York that a person does not involuntarily lose his domicile as a result of imprisonment."); Westbury Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Amityville Union Free Sch. Dist., 106 Misc.2d 189, 431 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643-44 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1980) (child born to incarcerated mother is domiciled at mother's original residence before imprisonment because incarceration did not change mother's domicile); see also Greenwald v. Bd. of Supervisors, 567 F. Supp. 200, 207-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp. 237, 239 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 358 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1966); 49 N.Y. Jur.2d Domicil & Residence § 36 (2002) ("A prison is not a place of residence; it is a place of confinement, and a person cannot go there as a prisoner and gain a residence. The freedom of choice to come and go at one's whim or pleasure are bona fide elements of determining residence and are not present in a prison setting.") (footnotes omitted); 25 Am.Jur.2d Domicil § 29 (2004) ("Since the location of domicil is voluntary, a forcible change in one's state of residence does not affect one's domicil. Thus, a prisoner's domicil ordinarily remains what it was before his or her imprisonment and does not change to the location of his or her confinement.") (footnotes omitted).