Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/664/29/198431/
Timestamp: 2019-12-10 12:40:25
Document Index: 87754537

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 2254', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2254', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

William T. Hamlin, Appellant, v. E. C. Warren, Sheriff, Halifax County, Appellee, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1981 › William T. Hamlin, Appellant, v. E. C. Warren, Sheriff, Halifax County, Appellee
William T. Hamlin, Appellant, v. E. C. Warren, Sheriff, Halifax County, Appellee, 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 664 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981) Argued June 4, 1981. Decided Nov. 3, 1981
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973), there is a dictum to the effect that a § 1983 damage claim might be asserted in a federal court, without exhaustion of state administrative and judicial remedies, by a plaintiff seeking relief from an administrative revocation of good time credits. Id. at 495, 93 S. Ct. at 1839. The plaintiffs in Preiser sought no such damages. They sought an injunction restoring their good time credits, relief which the Supreme Court held was subject to the exhaustion of state remedies requirement of § 2254(b). The plaintiffs contended, however, that if their claim was made subject to the exhaustion requirement, a damages claim in the federal court under § 1983 might be forever lost by the preclusive effect of an adverse judgment in the state court system. The Supreme Court answered by saying that a claim for damages was different, that one asserting such a claim was not seeking immediate or earlier release, and that a writ of habeas corpus was both an inappropriate and unavailable remedy. Thus, it concluded, such a claim could proceed.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court applied the Preiser dictum. The Supreme Court, in a class action in which prisoners sought both the restoration of revoked good time credits and an award of damages, held that injunctive relief was foreclosed by Preiser but that the damages claim could go forward while the prisoners sought habeas relief in the state court. Thus the Preiser dictum became Wolff 's holding.
Subsequent cases in the courts of appeals have held the exhaustion requirement applicable to a civil rights claim in which the validity of the state court conviction was called into question, notwithstanding the absence of any request for release. See, e. g., Watson v. Briscoe, 554 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1977); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd en banc, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S. Ct. 517, 54 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1977); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909, 95 S. Ct. 828, 42 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1975); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974). Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to substantially undermine the exhaustion of remedies requirement, for anyone who could state a viable civil rights claim could subvert it by postponing a claim for release until his substantive rights had been adjudicated in a federal forum. Avoidance of that kind of subversion was very much in the minds of the justices when Preiser was decided, as Mr. Justice Brennan explicitly stated. Preiser, supra, 411 U.S. at 503-04, 93 S. Ct. 1843-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
As the Supreme Court has had occasion to say, ordinarily "(i)t is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S. Ct. 473, 482, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961). The question arises here because the constitutional issues raised by Hamlin suggest that his imprisonment is illegal; and in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973), the Court held that "Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of § 1983." 411 U.S. at 490, 93 S. Ct. at 1836. Federal habeas corpus requires exhaustion of state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
411 U.S. at 494, 93 S. Ct. at 1838 (emphasis in original).
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), the Court confirmed this view of the applicability of Preiser v. Rodriguez. In Wolff state prisoners brought an action seeking both the restoration of good-time credits and damages for their deprivation. The Court noted that the restoration of credits was properly foreclosed by Preiser v. Rodriguez, saying:
418 U.S. at 554-55, 94 S. Ct. at 2974. Wolff, as I read it, thus approves a procedure closely similar to that followed by plaintiff in this case. His prayer for a declaratory judgment that his constitutional rights were violated by the sheriff represents a necessary "predicate to a damages award." In addition, the injunctive relief he seeks with respect to suspension of the sheriff is prospective; the remainder of the relief is merely for the purpose of assisting plaintiff in pursuing his legal remedies. I would conclude that under Wolff Hamlin should be able to proceed with his § 1983 complaint in the district court despite non-exhaustion.1
The majority seeks to avoid the language of Wolff on the ground that in Wolff relief was sought from prison authorities because of allegedly unconstitutional administrative actions and there was no attack upon the validity of a judgment of conviction calling into question the propriety of actions by state judges and justices. The majority asserts that the concept of comity, the foundation of the statutory requirement of exhaustion, is thus inapplicable or less forceful when something other than the correctness of state judicial actions is at stake. In expressing these views, the majority is in direct conflict with Preiser which considered and rejected this idea. There the argument was made that "the whole purpose of the exhaustion requirement ... is to give state courts the first chance at remedying their own mistakes ... (and exhaustion) does not apply when the challenge is not to the action of a state court, but ... to the action of a state administrative body." (emphasis in original) 411 U.S. at 490-91, 93 S. Ct. at 1837. The argument was rejected:
411 U.S. at 491, 93 S. Ct. at 1837. The Court then went on to say that "(i)t is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons." 411 U.S. 491-92, 93 S. Ct. at 1837. The impact and force of the language in Wolff may not be so easily avoided.
I of course recognize that other courts which have considered this question have required state prisoners to exhaust their state remedies where their claims for damages under § 1983 are predicated on the invalidity of their convictions. Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd in banc, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1251-54 (1st Cir. 1974); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909, 95 S. Ct. 828, 42 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1975); see also Esper v. Whitacre, 615 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1980) (unpublished) (citing Fulford and Guerro), following Smartt v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408, 409 (6th Cir. 1969).2
I find, however, the clear expressions of the Supreme Court in Preiser and Wolff more persuasive. If claims for damages under § 1983 are barred pending exhaustion of state remedies, adverse adjudication of those claims in state proceedings would subsequently operate as collateral estoppel upon the federal civil rights claims, Allen v. McCurry, 647 F.2d 167, and thus vitiate the congressional purpose in enacting the statute. The Congress of the Reconstruction era explicitly recognized that alternative state remedies were available, but it also determined that those remedies were insufficiently effective in protecting civil rights under the Constitution. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 173-83, 81 S. Ct. at 476-82. The Court in McCurry reemphasized the important distinctions between federal habeas corpus and § 1983. Habeas corpus is derived from criminal proceedings, so that the exhaustion requirement and limited availability of collateral estoppel represent integral parts of the statutory and constitutional scheme. Actions brought under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, in contrast, are independent civil proceedings provided by Congress for the redress of violations of constitutional rights. Just as the application of collateral estoppel to these proceedings is appropriate, the application of an exhaustion requirement is inappropriate. See 66 L. Ed. 2d at 316-20. So long as an action brought under § 1983 does not run afoul of the proscription in Preiser v. Rodriguez, I think that it should be allowed to proceed in the federal forum Congress provided therefor.
See also Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1975), where we held that the plaintiff could obtain declaratory relief on his § 1983 claim that his pardon was revoked without due process of law because he was seeking actual release from confinement in the state courts. Citing Wolff, we noted that "a federal court has inherent power to grant appropriate relief, and a declaratory judgment is always appropriate as a predicate to an award of damages." 521 F.2d at 406 n.8. Similarly, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975), the plaintiffs sought an order directing the state to hold a judicial hearing to test the probable cause for their detention; the Court noted that "(b)ecause release was neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy." 420 U.S. at 107 n.6, 95 S. Ct. at 859 n.6
Cf. Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd in banc, 550 F.2d 345, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S. Ct. 517, 54 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1977). Under the Fifth Circuit view, to the extent claims for damages are unrelated to the validity of the prisoner's conviction, the § 1983 action is permitted to proceed