Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/495/257/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-09-21 05:01:20
Document Index: 622492475

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518']

"[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing
Page 495 U. S. 260
such order and sealed under his directions."
Respondents are members of a Puerto Rican organization known as Los Macheteros (the "machete wielders"). All have been charged with federal crimes relating to the robbery in 1983 of a Wells Fargo depot in Connecticut, a robbery which netted approximately $7 million. Petitioner (the Government) first began investigating respondents in connection with a rocket attack on the United States Courthouse in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico. Effective April 27, 1984, the Government obtained an order of electronic surveillance for the residence of Filiberto Ojeda Rios in Levittown, Puerto Rico, and for some public telephones near the residence. During its investigation of the rocket attack, the Government discovered evidence chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 495 U. S. 261
indicating that respondents had been involved in the Wells Fargo depot robbery. The Government obtained two extensions of the April 27 surveillance order, with the final extension expiring on July 23, 1984. The Government actually terminated surveillance at the Levittown residence and public telephones on July 9, 1984, when Ojeda Rios moved to an apartment in El Cortijo, a community adjacent to Levittown. On July 27, 1984, the Government obtained a new surveillance order covering Ojeda Rios's El Cortijo residence. After extensions, that order expired on September 24, 1984. Another surveillance order authorizing surveillance of Ojeda Rios's car, originally entered on May 11, 1984, was extended and finally expired on October 10, 1984. All tapes created during the surveillance of Ojeda Rios were sealed by the District Court on October 13, 1984.
After respondents were indicted for various offenses relating to the Wells Fargo depot robbery, they moved to suppress all evidence the Government had obtained as a result of electronic surveillance. Following a suppression hearing, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 495 U. S. 262
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut refused to suppress the El Cortijo and Vega Baja residence tapes, but suppressed the Levittown tapes and the public telephone tapes made in Vega Baja. In doing so, the District Court determined that the July 27, 1984, order authorizing the wiretap at the El Cortijo residence was not an extension of the April 27, 1984, order authorizing the Levittown wiretaps and, therefore, the obligation to seal the Levittown tapes arose when the last extension of the April 27 order expired on July 23, 1984. The court calculated that there had been at least an 82-day delay in sealing the Levittown tapes. With respect to the public telephone wiretaps in Vega Baja, the court determined that the March 1, 1985, order could not be considered an extension of the initial January 18, 1985, order -- which had expired on February 17, 1985 -- because of the 12-day delay in seeking reauthorization of the January 18 order and the Government's failure to satisfactorily explain that delay. The court calculated that the sealing of the tapes on June 15, 1985, occurred 118 days after the order which authorized the surveillance had expired. Without determining the authenticity of these two sets of tapes, the District Court suppressed them on the basis of the delay alone.
The Government first argues that, because § 2518(8)(a) states that, as a prerequisite to admissibility, electronic surveillance tapes must either bear a seal or the Government must provide a "satisfactory explanation" for the "absence" of a seal, the "satisfactory explanation" requirement does not apply where the tapes to be offered in evidence actually bear chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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a seal, regardless of when or why the seal was applied. This argument is unpersuasive. The narrow reading suggested by the Government is not a plausible interpretation of congressional intent when the terms and purpose of § 2518(8)(a) are considered as a whole. The section begins with the command that tapes shall be sealed "immediately" upon expiration of the underlying surveillance order and then, prior to the clause relied upon by the Government, provides that "the seal provided for by this subsection" (emphasis added) is a prerequisite to the admissibility of electronic surveillance tapes. The clear import of these provisions is that the seal required by § 2518(8)(a) is not just any seal, but a seal that has been obtained immediately upon expiration of the underlying surveillance order. The "absence" the Government must satisfactorily explain encompasses not only the total absence of a seal, but also the absence of a timely applied seal. Contrary to what is so plainly required by § 2518(8)(a), the Government would have us nullify the immediacy aspect of the sealing requirement.
The Government's view of the statute would create the anomalous result that the prosecution could delay requesting a seal for months, perhaps even until a few days before trial, without risking a substantial penalty. Since it is likely that a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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district court would automatically seal the tapes, [Footnote 3] there would be no "absence" of a seal, in the sense suggested by the Government, and § 2518(8)(a) would not come into play, even though the tapes would have been exposed to alteration or editing for an extended period of time. Such a view of the statute ignores the purposes of the sealing provision, and is too strained a reading of the statutory language to withstand scrutiny. Like every Court of Appeals that has considered the question, we conclude that § 2518(8)(a) applies to a delay in sealing as well as to a complete failure to seal tapes. [Footnote 4]
The Government's second contention is that, even if § 2518(8)(a)'s "satisfactory explanation" requirement applies to delays in sealing tapes, it is satisfied if the Government first explains why the delay occurred and then demonstrates that the tapes are authentic. This submission, however, also is not a sensible construction of the language of § 2518(8)(a), and would essentially nullify the function of the sealing requirement as a safeguard against tampering. The statute requires a satisfactory explanation, not just an explanation. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Government could not explain why it delayed in seeking to have tapes sealed. Even deliberate delay would be enough, so long as the Government could establish the integrity of the tapes; yet deliberate delay could hardly be called a satisfactory explanation. To hold that proof of nontampering is a substitute for a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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Finally, we must consider whether the Government established good cause for the sealing delays that occurred in this case. The Government contends in this Court that its delays were the result of a good faith, objectively reasonable misunderstanding of the statutory term "extension." According to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 495 U. S. 266
These cases do not establish that the Government's asserted understanding of the law in this case was correct; indeed, the Second Circuit's decision in this case indicates the contrary, but the cases do support the conclusion that the "extension" theory now pressed upon us was objectively reasonable at the time of the delays. Thus, we conclude that the excuse now advanced by the Government is objectively reasonable. In establishing a reasonable excuse for a sealing delay, the Government is not required to prove that a particular understanding of the law is correct, but rather only that its interpretation was objectively reasonable at the time. To the extent the Second Circuit in this case required an absolutely chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 495 U. S. 267
I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that a "satisfactory explanation" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) cannot merely be a reasonable excuse for the delay; it must also reflect the actual reason for the delay. Thus, as the Court today holds, an appellate court's review of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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the sufficiency of the Government's explanation for a delay should be based on the findings made and evidence presented in the district court, rather than on a post hoc explanation given for the first time on appeal. See ante at 495 U. S. 267. With this understanding, I agree with the Court that this case should be remanded for a determination whether the Government's explanation to the District Court for the delay -- not the explanation offered on appeal -- meets the "satisfactory explanation" standard.
The failure to comply with the sealing requirements of Title III was the unfortunate consequence of a Government lawyer's good faith, but incorrect, understanding of the law. Whether such a mistake should constitute a "satisfactory explanation" for the failure is, as both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized, a close question. Both of those courts resolved their doubts in favor of requiring strict compliance with a statute that was carefully drawn to protect extremely sensitive privacy interests. I think their resolution of the issue was correct. [Footnote 2/1] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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The ordinary citizen is often charged with presumptive knowledge of laws even when they are complex and confusing. A similar presumption should apply to a federal prosecutor responsible for insuring that a prolonged and extensive program of electronic surveillance is conducted in compliance with the law. Moreover, when issues turn on the details of such an investigation -- in this case involving 1,011 tapes made pursuant to 8 separate orders and 17 extensions -- I believe we should give special deference to the consistent evaluations of the record by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Chief Judge Oakes succinctly stated the concern that is decisive for me: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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