Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/333/196/case.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-19 14:02:32
Document Index: 309043723

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1']

Cole v. Arkansas - 333 U.S. 196 (1948) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia > US Law > US Case Law > US Supreme Court > Volume 333 > Cole v. Arkansas - 333 U.S. 196 > Case	NEW - Receive Justia's FREE Daily Newsletters of Opinion Summaries for the US Supreme Court, all US Federal Appellate Courts & the 50 US State Supreme Courts and Weekly Practice Area Opinion Summaries Newsletters. Subscribe Now
Case	U.S. Supreme CourtCole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948)Cole v. ArkansasNo. 373Argued February 4-5, 1948Decided March 8, 1948333 U.S. 196CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
The present convictions are under an information. The petitioners urge that the information charged them with a violation of § 2 of Act 193 of the 1943 Arkansas Legislature Page 333 U. S. 198 and that they were tried and convicted of violating only § 2. The State Supreme Court affirmed their convictions on the ground that the information had charged and the evidence had shown that the petitioners had violated § 1 of the Arkansas Act, which describes an offense separate and distinct from the offense described in § 2.
"It shall be unlawful for any person acting in concert with one or more other persons, to assemble at or near any place where a 'labor dispute' exists and by force or violence prevent . . . any person from engaging in any lawful vocation, or for any person acting . . . in concert with one or more other persons, to promote, encourage or aid any such unlawful assemblage. "Page 333 U. S. 199
This instruction, like the preceding one, told the jury that the trial of petitioners was for violation of § 2, since § 2 makes an unlawful assemblage an ingredient of the offense it defines, and § 1 [Footnote 2] does not. Thus, the petitioners were clearly tried and convicted by the jury for promoting an unlawful assemblage made an offense by § 2, and were not tried for the offense of using force and violence as described in § 1. [Footnote 3] Page 333 U. S. 200
We therefore have this situation. The petitioners read the information as charging them with an offense under § 2 of the Act, the language of which the information had used. The trial judge construed the information as charging an offense under § 2. He instructed the jury to that effect. He charged the jury that petitioners were on trial for the offense of promoting an unlawful assemblage, not for the offense "of using force and violence." Without completely ignoring the judge's charge, the jury could not have convicted petitioners for having committed the separate, distinct, and substantially different offense defined in § 1. [Footnote 4] Yet the State Supreme Court refused to consider the validity of the conviction under Page 333 U. S. 201 § 2, for violation of which petitioners were tried and convicted. It affirmed their convictions as though they had been tried for violating § 1, an offense for which they were neither tried nor convicted.
Furthermore, since Arkansas provides for an appeal to the State Supreme Court and, on that appeal, considers questions raised under the Federal Constitution, the proceedings in that court are a part of the process of law under which the petitioners' convictions must stand or fall. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 237 U. S. 327. Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 294 U. S. 113. That court has not affirmed these convictions on the basis of the trial petitioners were afforded. The convictions were for a violation of § 2. Petitioners urged in the State Supreme Court that the evidence was insufficient to support their conviction of a violation of § 2. They also raised serious Page 333 U. S. 202 objections to the validity of that section under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. [Footnote 5] None of their contentions was passed upon by the State Supreme Court. It affirmed their conviction as though they had been tried and convicted of a violation of § 1 when, in truth, they had been tried and convicted only of a violation of a single offense charged in § 2, an offense which is distinctly and substantially different from the offense charged in § 1. To conform to due process of law, petitioners were entitled to have the validity of their convictions appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court.