Source: https://blog.lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/people-v-humphrey-921-p-2d-1-ca-supreme-court-1996/
Timestamp: 2019-12-11 12:14:42
Document Index: 674427988

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 198', '§ 197', '§ 801', '§ 354', '§ 355', '§ 313', '§ 1107', '§ 801', '§ 1107', '§ 801']

People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (CA Supreme Court 1996) – Law of Self Defense
People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (CA Supreme Court 1996)
13 Cal. 4th 1073; 921 P.2d 1; 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142; 1996 Cal. LEXIS 4222; 96 Cal. Daily Op. Service 6509; 96 Daily Journal DAR 10609
Counsel: Jim Fahey, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C. J., Mosk, Kennard, and Werdegar, JJ., concurring. Concurring opinions by Baxter and Werdegar, JJ., and by Brown, J., with George, C. J., and Baxter, J., concurring.
“Evidence regarding Battered Women’s Syndrome has been introduced in this case. Such evidence, if believed, may be considered by you only for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant held the necessary subjective honest [belief] which is a requirement for both perfect and imperfect self-defense. However, that same evidence regarding Battered Women’s Syndrome may not be considered or used by you in evaluating the objective reasonableness requirement for perfect self-defense.”
With an exception not relevant here, Evidence Code section 1107, subdivision (a), makes admissible in a criminal action expert testimony regarding “battered women’s syndrome, including the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence . . . .” Under subdivision (b) of that section, the foundation for admission is sufficient “if the proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert witness.” 1 Defendant presented the evidence to support her claim of self-defense. It is undisputed that she established the proper qualifications of the expert witness. The only issue is to what extent defendant established its “relevancy.” To resolve this question we must examine California law regarding self-defense.
For killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must actually and reasonably believe in the need to defend. ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 668, 674 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1].) If the belief subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, there is “imperfect self-defense,” i.e., “the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder,” but can be convicted of manslaughter. ( In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 768, 783 [30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 872 P.2d 574].) 2 To constitute “perfect self-defense,” i.e., to exonerate the person completely, the belief must also be objectively reasonable. ( Id. at p. 783; see also People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1186 [264 Cal. Rptr. 167].) As the Legislature has stated, “[T]he circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person . . . .” ( Pen. Code, § 198; see also § 197, subds. 2, 3.) Moreover, for either perfect or imperfect self-defense, the fear must be of imminent harm. “Fear of future harm–no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm–will not suffice. The defendant’s fear must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily injury.” (In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal. 4th at p. 783, italics in original.)
Although the belief in the need to defend must be objectively reasonable, a jury must consider what “would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge . . . .” (CALJIC No. 5.50.) It judges reasonableness “from the point of view of a reasonable person in the position of defendant . . . .” ( People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal. 2d 229, 238 [187 P.2d 706].) To do this, it must consider all the ” ‘ “facts and circumstances . . . in determining whether the defendant acted in a manner in which a reasonable man would act in protecting his own life or bodily safety.” ‘ ” ( People v. Moore (1954) 43 Cal. 2d 517, 528 [275 P.2d 485], italics in original.) As we stated long ago, “. . . a defendant is entitled to have a jury take into consideration all the elements in the case which might be expected to operate on his mind . . . .” ( People v. Smith (1907) 151 Cal. 619, 628 [91 P. 511].)
B. Battered Women’s Syndrome 3
People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App. 3d at page 1185, applied “the law of self-defense in the context of a battered woman killing the batterer while he slept after he had beaten the killer and threatened serious bodily injury and death when he awoke.” There, unlike here, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense, but it did instruct on imperfect self-defense. The appellate court upheld the refusal, finding that “defendant presented no substantial evidence that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would have perceived imminent danger and a need to kill in self-defense.” ( Id. at p. 1192.) 4 The trial court admitted some evidence of battered women’s syndrome, but the defendant argued that it erred “by excluding expert testimony (1) that defendant was a battered woman based on the expert’s psychological evaluation of the defendant and (2) ‘explaining how the psychological impact of being a battered woman affected her perception of danger at the time she shot her husband.’ ” ( People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1193.)
The Attorney General concedes that Hampton’s behavior towards defendant, including prior threats and violence, was relevant to reasonableness (see People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 1055, 1065 [56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337]), but distinguishes between evidence of this behavior–which the trial court fully admitted–and expert testimony about its effects on defendant. The distinction is untenable. “To effectively present the situation as perceived by the defendant, and the reasonableness of her fear, the defense has the option to explain her feelings to enable the jury to overcome stereotyped impressions about women who remain in abusive relationships. It is appropriate that the jury be given a professional explanation of the battering syndrome and its effects on the woman through the use of expert testimony. [Citation.]” ( State v. Allery (1984) 101 Wash. 2d 591 [682 P.2d 312, 316].)
As Day recognizes, People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 1289 [283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563] supports this conclusion. There we held that expert testimony regarding parental reluctance to report child molestation was admissible to bolster a witness’s credibility: “Most jurors, fortunately, have been spared the experience of being the parent of a sexually molested child. Lacking that experience, jurors can rely only on their intuition or on relevant evidence introduced at trial. . . . [Evidence that parents often do not report child molestation] would therefore ‘assist the trier of fact’ ( Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a)) by giving the jurors information they needed to objectively evaluate [the witness’s] credibility.” ( Id. at p. 1302, fn. omitted.) (2c) (2c) As in McAlpin, the expert testimony in this case was ” ‘needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions . . . .’ ” ( Id. at p. 1301.) It was relevant “to explain a behavior pattern that might otherwise appear unreasonable to the average person. Evidence of [battered women’s syndrome] not only explains how a battered woman might think, react, or behave, it places the behavior in an understandable light.” ( People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal. App. 4th at p. 419.) Thus, it was admissible under Evidence Code sections 801 and 1107.
We do not hold that Dr. Bowker’s entire testimony was relevant to both prongs of perfect self-defense. Just as many types of evidence may be relevant to some disputed issues but not all, some of the expert evidence was no doubt relevant only to the subjective existence of defendant’s belief. Evidence merely showing that a person’s use of deadly force is scientifically explainable or empirically common does not, in itself, show it was objectively reasonable. To dispel any possible confusion, it might be appropriate for the court, on request, to clarify that, in assessing reasonableness, the question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would have perceived a threat of imminent injury or death, and not whether killing the abuser was reasonable in the sense of being an understandable response to ongoing abuse; and that, therefore, in making that assessment, the jury may not consider evidence merely showing that an abused person’s use of force against the abuser is understandable. 5
Defendant contends that the instructional error unconstitutionally deprived her of her rights to present a defense and to equal protection of the laws, thus requiring reversal unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710-711, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) We disagree that the Chapman standard applies. The erroneous instruction may have adversely affected the defense, but it did not deprive her of the right to present one or deny her equal protection. In effect, the court excluded some evidence as to one element of the defense. When the reviewing court applying state law finds an erroneous exclusion of defense evidence, the usual standard of review for state law error applies: the court must reverse only if it also finds a reasonable probability the error affected the verdict adversely to defendant. ( People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1075, 1102-1103 [31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 321, 875 P.2d 36]; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 585, 611 [25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 863 P.2d 635] [error in excluding evidence of third party culpability]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]; Evid. Code, § 354.)
I also disagree with the implication in the majority opinion that only the two instructions which the majority consider “appropriate” need be given when expert testimony regarding battered women’s syndrome is admitted. If an instruction limiting jury consideration of all or some parts of the expert’s relevant testimony regarding battered women’s syndrome to a particular issue is requested, the instruction must be given. ( Evid. Code, § 355; 1 People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal. 3d 57, 83 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]. See also 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Circumstantial Evidence, § 313, p. 285.)
Accordingly, “self-defense may be analyzed as having two requirements: (1) the defendant’s acts causing the victim’s death were motivated by an actual (also referred to as ‘genuine’ or ‘honest’) belief or perception that (a) the defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from an unlawful attack or threat by the victim and (b) the defendant’s acts were necessary to prevent the injury; and (2) a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have had the same perception and done the same acts.” ( People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1186 [264 Cal. Rptr. 167].) Or, as reduced to the common shorthand: “self-defense requires both actual subjective belief and objective reasonableness . . . .” ( Ibid.)
Evidence Code section 1107 makes admissible relevant expert testimony regarding BWS, “including the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence.” The statute further allows that this evidence ” shall not be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven” ( Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (b)), thus legislatively obviating the need to qualify the expert’s testimony under the standards of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240]. (See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 587, 593-604 [34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 882 P.2d 321]; but see Ibn-Tamas v. United States (D.C. 1979) 407 A.2d 626, 655 (dis. opn. of Nebeker, J.); Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent (1986) 72 Va. L.Rev. 619, 630-643.) However, since section 1107 does not specifically abrogate Evidence Code section 801, we may assume that section’s definition of the foundational prerequisites for expert testimony remains integral to the assessment of relevance. Thus, not only must the proponent establish the expert’s qualifications ( Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b); id., § 1107, subd. (b)), the testimony must “[r]elate[] to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact . . . .” (Id., § 801, subd. (a); People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 99, 103-104 [301 P.2d 854, 56 A.L.R.2d 1435].)
The foregoing substantive and evidentiary principles direct the present inquiry: we must identify those aspects of BWS not only sufficiently beyond the ken of the average juror to warrant expert testimony but also specifically relevant to the jury’s determination whether the defendant had “a reasonable belief that [she would] lose [her] life or suffer serious bodily injury unless [she] immediately defend[ed] [herself] against the attack of the adversary.” (People v. Scoggins, supra, 37 Cal. at p. 683.)
There is a clear nexus between the phenomenon of hypervigilance and the objective component of self-defense, i.e., the reasonable fear of imminent injury or death and the perceived need to react with the speed and force used. Under settled principles, if the victim’s threats caused the defendant ” ‘to fear greater peril than she would have had otherwise, [the jury may] take such facts into consideration in determining whether defendant acted in a manner which a reasonable person would act in protecting his or her own life or bodily safety.’ ” (People v. Moore, supra, 43 Cal. 2d at p. 528.) For the same reasons, the defendant may also be ” ‘justified in acting more quickly and taking harsher measures for her own protection in event of assault, than would a person who had not received such threats . . . .’ ” (Ibid.; People v. Bush, supra, 84 Cal. App. 3d at p. 304; People v. Torres (1949) 94 Cal. App. 2d 146, 152-153 [210 P.2d 324].) When antecedent threats have accompanied a recurring cycle of escalating abuse, their relevance to the reasonableness of the defendant’s fear of imminent and more serious violence is manifest.
In other circumstances, however, the situation may be confrontational but lack such overt or obvious potential for serious harm. Nevertheless, in light of her history of battering by the victim, the defendant may anticipate imminent bodily injury or death. Or, following an initial struggle in which she gained a temporary advantage, she may continue to fear the victim because she knows he reacts violently to loss of control or she senses an escalating severity to his violence. “[Where] there has been physical abuse over a long period of time, the circumstances which assist the court in determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s fear of death or serious injury at the time of a killing include the defendant’s familiarity with the victim’s behavior in the past.” ( Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, supra, 555 A.2d at p. 781.) “The cyclical nature of an intimate battering relationship enables a battered spouse to become expert at recognizing the warning signs of an impending assault from her partner–signs frequently imperceptible to outsiders. For some victims, the sign may be ‘that look in his eye’; for others, it is the advent of heavy drinking, or heightened irrational jealousy.” (Banks v. State (1992) 92 Md. App. 422, 429 [608 A.2d 1249, 1252].)
Notwithstanding the error, the question of prejudice is extremely close given the “miscarriage of justice” standard of review. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) The faulty instruction precluded the jury from considering BWS in assessing defendant’s objective reasonableness. But such evidence could not be considered in a vacuum; it was relevant only to the extent it shed light on the reality of her perceptions. The pertinent inquiry therefore is whether the jury would have discounted any of defendant’s testimony in the absence of expert BWS evidence explaining it in that context.
Other considerations tend to negate prejudice. Defendant made several inconsistent statements to the police shortly after the shooting that undermined her defense. In arguing against a finding of self-defense, the prosecutor did not substantially exploit any circumstances that hypervigilance would have explained as reasonable. Moreover, the instructions included CALJIC No. 5.50 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.), 1 which afforded an adequate basis for finding self-defense if the jury believed defendant’s account.
By Andrew Branca| 2016-03-27T13:39:04+00:00	March 27th, 2016|0 Comments