Source: http://openjurist.org/411/f3d/377/united-states-v-fruchter
Timestamp: 2015-01-31 23:12:28
Document Index: 219031167

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1961', '§ 1341', '§ 371', '§ 1963', '§ 1963', '§ 1963']

411 F3d 377 United States v. Fruchter | OpenJurist
411 F. 3d 377 - United States v. Fruchter	Home411 f3d 377 united states v. fruchter
411 F3d 377 United States v. Fruchter 411 F.3d 377
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.Philip FRUCHTER, Lawrence Braun, Dauda Yague, Mamadou Sylla, Samba William and Frank Singh, Defendants-Appellants,Steven Fruchter, Mitchell Grand, Miguel Mercedes and Muninauth Pulchan, Defendants.
No. 02-1422(L).
No. 02-1451(CON).
No. 02-1474(CON).
No. 02-1542(CON).
No. 02-1552(CON).
No. 02-1561(CON).
Argued June 14, 2004.
Joshua L. Dratel (Marshall A. Mintz, on the brief), Joshua L. Dratel, P.C., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Lawrence Braun.
Maurice H. Sercarz, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Daouda Yague.
William J. Stampur, Hurwitz Stampur & Roth, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Mamadou Sylla.
Daniel Noble, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Samba William.
Arthur J. Viviani, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Frank Singh.
Robin W. Morey, Assistant United States Attorney (David N. Kelley, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Sarah Lai, Barbara A. Ward, Laura Grossfield Birger, and Gary Stein, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), New York, NY, for Appellee.
Before: WALKER, Chief Judge, B.D. PARKER and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
Defendants-appellants1 Lawrence Braun, Daouda Yague, Mamadou Sylla, Samba William, and Frank Singh appeal their convictions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Michael B. Mukasey, Chief Judge), following an eleven-week jury trial, for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Appellants raise numerous challenges to their convictions and sentences, all but one of which we address in a summary order, filed today, that affirms the district court in part and remands for proceedings consistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.2005). The sole issue addressed in this opinion is the constitutionality under the Sixth Amendment2 of the district court's imposition, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963, of a forfeiture order against appellant Braun, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and Booker, where the forfeiture amount was based in part on facts found by the district judge by a preponderance of the evidence. The disposition of this appeal was delayed to accommodate the legal developments that followed upon Blakely and culminated in Booker. We now affirm.
From at least 1994 until 1997, Braun — along with Steven and Philip Fruchter — owned and operated a mail sorting and metering company in Manhattan called American Presort, Inc. ("API"). API acted as a kind of middleman between the Postal Service and private companies engaged in bulk mailings. The companies would send large numbers of letters to API for sorting and (in some cases) metering. API would then either transport the processed mail to the post office or have the postal employees pick it up. In theory, this arrangement benefitted everyone concerned. Pursuant to the Postal Service's "work share" regulations, API — in return for doing preliminary mail processing work — received discounted postage rates. It then, in theory, passed some of those savings on to its customers, achieving a profit by charging a rate somewhere between the standard rate and the discounted rate. The customers saved money, and the Postal Service was spared a considerable amount of work.
In practice, however, API was overcharging its customers, passing off unsorted mail as sorted mail, using defective postage meters to get free postage, bribing postal employees and customer employees, and under-representing to the Postal Service the number of letters it had processed. Braun, a one-third co-owner of API, was in charge of finances and garnered substantial proceeds from API's illegal activities.
The government charged Braun in a multi-count indictment. After an eleven-week jury trial, Braun was convicted of (1) racketeering, based on mail fraud against API's customers; (2) RICO conspiracy; (3) general conspiracy; and (4) mail fraud against customers. The jury, however, acquitted Braun of mail fraud against the Postal Service and of making false statements to the Postal Service, and deadlocked on the charge of postage meter fraud.
On July 9, 2002, the district court sentenced Braun principally to sixty months' incarceration and ordered criminal forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963, of approximately $20.7 million. That amount, like certain sentencing enhancements imposed by the district court, was based in part on proceeds derived from conduct with which Braun had been charged, but of which he was ultimately acquitted. This appeal followed.
Braun claims that the district court's imposition of criminal forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963 violated the Sixth Amendment.3 Specifically, Braun contends that under the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely and Booker, the district court was required to determine the forfeiture amount only by reference to conduct that had been proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Before discussing the merits of Braun's claim, we address two preliminary matters. First, the parties dispute the proper standard of review. The government contends that Braun's forfeiture claim is reviewable only for plain error because he did not raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the forfeiture order below.4 See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548-49, 137 L.Ed.2d 718, 727 (1997). Braun, however, maintains that he expressly preserved before the district court a Sixth Amendment challenge to the inclusion of acquitted conduct in his sentence and forfeiture amount, and, therefore, that the harmless error standard applies. See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 639 (2d Cir.1993). Determining the appropriate standard of review to apply to claims of constitutional error, however, is crucial only when an error actually exists. See United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir.1996). Because we conclude that the district court committed no error, it is unnecessary to determine the applicable standard of review.