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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 1973', '§ 4', '§ 1973', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 14', '§ 4', '§ 14', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 51', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 14', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 14', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 5']

UNITED STATES V. BOARD OF COMM'RS OF SHEFFIELD, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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and that therefore Sheffield was not a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. The Attorney General's failure to object to the holding of the referendum did not constitute clearance under § 5 of the method of electing city councilmen under the new government. Since Sheffield sought approval only for the holding of the referendum, not for preclearance chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, and in Part III of which POWELL, J., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 435 U. S. 138. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 435 U. S. 139. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 435 U. S. 140.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act), 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V), [Footnote 1] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
requires that States, like Alabama, which are covered under § 4 of the Act, 7 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970 ed., Supp. V), [Footnote 2] obtain prior federal approval before changing any voting practice or procedure that was in effect on November 1, 1964. The questions for decision in this case are (1) whether § 5 requires an Alabama city that has never conducted voter registration [Footnote 3] to obtain preclearance of a voting change and (2), if so, whether the failure of the Attorney chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On May 13, 1975, before the Attorney General chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On July 6, 1976, the Attorney General notified the City chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There is abundant evidence that the District Court's interpretation of the Act is contrary to the congressional intent. First, and most significantly, the District Court's construction is inconsistent with the Act's structure, makes § 5 coverage depend upon a factor completely irrelevant to the Act's purposes, and thereby permits precisely the kind of circumvention of congressional policy that § 5 was designed to prevent. Second, the language of the Act does not require such a crippling interpretation, but rather is susceptible of a reading that will fully implement the congressional objectives. Finally, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The structure and operation of the Act are relatively simple. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sections 4(a) [Footnote 7] and 4(b) [Footnote 8] determine the jurisdictions that are subject to the Act's special measures. Congress, having found that there was a high probability of pervasive racial discrimination in voting in areas that employed literacy tests or similar voting qualifications and that, in addition, had low voter turnouts or registration figures, provided that coverage in a State is "triggered" if it maintained any "test or device" [Footnote 9] on a specified date and if it had voter registration or voter turnout chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If designated under § 4(b), a jurisdiction will become subject to the Act's special remedies unless it establishes, in a judicial action, that no "test or device" was used to discriminate on the basis of race in voting. Section 4(a) is one of the Act's core remedial provisions. Because Congress determined that the continued employment of literacy tests and similar devices in covered areas would perpetuate racial discrimination, it suspended their use in § 4(a). Just as the actions of every political unit that conducts elections are relevant under § 4(b), so § 4(a) imposes a duty on every entity in the covered jurisdictions having power over the electoral process, whether or not the entity registers voters. That § 4(a) has this geographic reach is clear both from the fact that a "test or device" may be employed by any official with control over any aspect of an election and from § 4(a)'s provision that its suspension operates "in any [designated] State . . . or in any [designated] political subdivision." (Emphasis supplied.) The congressional objectives plainly required that § 4(a) apply throughout each designated jurisdiction. [Footnote 10] If it did not have this scope, the covered States, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The foregoing discussion of the key remedial provisions of the Act belies the District Court's conclusion that § 5 should apply only to counties and to the political units that conduct chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court's decisions over the past 10 years have given § 5 the broad scope suggested by the language of the Act. We first construed it in Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra. There our examination of the Act's objectives and original legislative history led us to interpret § 5 to give it "the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
broadest possible scope," 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 567, and to require prior federal scrutiny of "any state enactment which altered the election law in a covered State in even a minor way." Id. at 393 U. S. 566. In so construing § 5, we unanimously rejected [Footnote 11] -- as the plain terms of the Act would themselves have seemingly required -- the argument of an appellee that § 5 should apply only to enactments affecting who may register to vote. 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 564. Our decisions have required federal preclearance of laws changing the location of polling places, see Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), laws adopting at-large systems of election, ibid.; Fairley v. Patterson (decided with Allen, supra); laws providing for the appointment of previously elected officials, Bunton v. Patterson (decided with Allen, supra); laws regulating candidacy, Whitley v. Williams (decided with Allen, supra); laws changing voting procedures, Allen, supra; annexations, City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v. United States, 410 U.S. 962 (1973), summarily aff'g 354 F.Supp. 101 (DC 1972); Perkins v. Matthews, supra; and reapportionment and redistricting, Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973); see United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). In each case, federal scrutiny of the proposed change was required because the change had the potential to deny or dilute the rights conferred by § 4(a).
Significantly, in several of these cases, this Court decided that § 5's preclearance requirement applied to cities within designated States without ever inquiring whether the cities conducted voter registration. See Beer v. United States, supra; City of Richmond v. United States, supra; Perkins v. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Matthews, supra. It is doubtful, moreover, that § 5 would have been held to be applicable in at least one of these cases if the District Court's interpretation of § 5 were the law. [Footnote 12] Although the assumption of these decisions -- that cities are covered whether or not they conduct voter registration -- perhaps has little stare decisis significance -- the issue not having been raised, but see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 370 U. S. 307 (1962) -- these decisions underscore the obvious fact that, whether or not they register voters, cities can enact measures with the potential to dilute or defeat the voting rights of minority group members, and they further illustrate that Congress could not have intended § 5's duties to apply only to those cities that register voters.
Because § 5 embodies a judgment that voting changes occurring outside the registration process have the potential to discriminate in voting on the basis of race, it would be irrational for § 5 coverage to turn on whether the political unit enacting or administering the change itself registers voters. But quite apart from the fact that this cramped construction cannot be squared with any reasonable set of objectives, the District Court's interpretation of § 5 would permit the precise evil that § 5 was designed to eliminate. Under it, local political entities like Sheffield would be free to respond to local pressure to limit the political power of minorities and take steps that would, temporarily at least, dilute or entirely defeat the voting rights of minorities, e.g., providing for the appointment of officials who previously had been elected, moving chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the polling places to areas of the city where minority group members could not safely travel, or even providing that election officials could not count the ballots of minority voters. The only recourse for the minority group members affected by such changes would be the one Congress implicitly found to be unsatisfactory: repeated litigation. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, supra, at 430 U. S. 156. The District Court's reading of § 5 would thus place the advantages of time and inertia back on the perpetrators of the discrimination as to all elections conducted by political units that do not register voters, and, equally seriously, it would invite States to circumvent the Act in all other elections by allowing local entities that do not conduct voter registration to control critical aspects of the electoral process. The clear consequence of this interpretation would be to nullify both § 5 and the Act in a large number of its potential applications. [Footnote 13] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Broader considerations support this construction of § 5's terms. The Act, of course, is designed to implement the Fifteenth chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Amendment and, in some respects, the Fourteenth Amendment, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). One would expect that the substantive duties imposed in the Act, as in the constitutional provisions that it is designed to implement, would apply not only to governmental entities formally acting in the name of the State, but also to those political units that may exercise control over critical aspects of the voting process. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969); Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953). It is, of course, the case that the term "State" does not have this meaning throughout the Act. For example, the Attorney General may not designate a city for coverage under § 4(b) of the Act on the theory the city's actions are often "state action"; for purposes of designation, "State" refers to a specific geographic territory in its entirety. But it is clear that, once a State is designated for coverage, the Act's remedial provisions apply to actions that are not formally those of the State. Section 4(a), of course, applies to all state actors, and even the legislative history relied upon by the District Court reveals the congressional understanding that the reference to "State" in § 5 includes political units within it. [Footnote 14] This alone would appear sufficient reason to make § 5's preclearance requirement apply to all state action. So chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Because the designated jurisdiction in this case is a State, we need not consider the question of how § 5 applies when a political subdivision is the designated entity. But we observe that a similar argument can be made concerning § 5's reference to "[designated] political subdivision," and this fact plainly supports our interpretation of § 5's parallel reference to "[designated] State." The legislative background of § 14(c)(2)'s definition of "political subdivision" reflects that Congress intended to define "political subdivision" as areas of a nondesignated State, [Footnote 15] not only as functional units or levels of government. The conclusion clearly follows that this definition was intended to operate only for purposes of determining which political units in nondesignated States may be chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
separately designated for coverage under § 4(b). [Footnote 16] Congress seemingly wished to ensure that, just as, for example, a school board could not be separately designated for coverage in the name of the State, so it could not be separately designated on the theory that it was a "political subdivision" of a State. By the same token, it is equally clear that Congress never intended the § 14(c)(2) definition to limit the substantive reach of the Act's core remedial provision once an area of a nondesignated State had been determined to be covered; all state actors within designated political subdivisions are subject to § 4(a). In view of the fact that "political subdivision" was understood as referring to an area of the State, the fact that the Act generally is aimed at all "state action" occurring within specified areas, and the textual interrelationship between § 4(a) and § 5, it logically follows that, where a political subdivision has been separately designated for coverage under § 4, all political units within it are subject to the preclearance requirement. [Footnote 17]
Finally, the legislative history and other related aids to ascertaining congressional intent leave little doubt but that Congress chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
has always -- and certainly by 1975 -- been of the view that § 5, like § 4(a), applies territorially and includes political units like Sheffield whether or not they conduct voter registration. The specific narrow question was not extensively discussed at the time of original enactment, but there is little, if anything, in the original legislative history that in any way supports the crippling construction of the District Court. [Footnote 18] At least one statement made in the course of the debate over § 5 strongly suggests that Congress never intended to draw a distinction between cities that do and do not register voters. In support of an amendment that would have stricken § 5 from the Act, Senator Talmadge of Georgia -- minutes before the Senate voted to reject his amendment -- argued that the section was "far-fetched" because it would require any city which sought to enact or administer a voting change to obtain federal preclearance. 111 Cong.Rec. 10729 (1965). While this statement was made by an opponent of the Act, its proponents, one of whom was on the floor defending § 5 at the time of Senator Talmadge's assertion, see 111 Cong.Rec. 10728 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Tydings), did not disagree with his assessment. Thus, whatever Senator Talmadge's intentions, his statement chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
possesses significant pertinence. See Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 373 U. S. 583 n. 85 (1963).
What is perhaps a more compelling argument concerning the original, and subsequent, congressional understanding of the scope of § 5 is that the Attorney General has, since the Act was adopted in 1965, interpreted § 5 as requiring all political units in designated jurisdictions to preclear proposed voting changes. [Footnote 19] This contemporaneous administrative construction of the Act is persuasive evidence of the original understanding, especially in light of the extensive role the Attorney General played in drafting the statute and explaining its operation to Congress. [Footnote 20] See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 409 U. S. 210 (1972); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 380 U. S. 16 (1965). In recognition of the Attorney General's key role in the formulation of the Act, this Court in the past has given great deference to his interpretations of it. See Perkins v. Matthews, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
400 U.S. at 400 U. S. 390-394. [Footnote 21] Moreover, the Attorney General's longstanding construction of § 5 was reported to Congress by Justice Department officials in connection with the 1975 extension of the Act. See testimony of Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger at the Hearings on H.R. 939 et al. before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 166 (1975) (1975 House Hearings); exhibits to the testimony of Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger at the Hearings on S. 407 et al. before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 598-599 (1975) (1975 Senate Hearings). [Footnote 22]
And the legislative history of the 1970 and 1975 reenactments compellingly supports the conclusion that Congress shared the Attorney General's view. In 1970, Congress was clearly fully aware of this Court's interpretation of § 5 as reaching voter changes other than those affecting the registration process, and plainly contemplated that the Act would continue to be so construed. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4249 et al. before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 4, 18, 83, 130-131, 133, 147-149, 154-155, 182-184, 402-454 (1969); Hearings on S. 818 et al. before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-398, 426-427, 469 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The congressional history is even clearer with respect to the 1975 extension, which, of course, is the legislation that controls the case at bar. Both the House and Senate Hearings on the bill reflect that the assumption that the coverage of § 5 was unlimited was widely shared, and unchallenged. In addition to the aforementioned testimony of the then Assistant Attorney General, which, of course, has special significance, numerous witnesses expressed this view, either directly or indirectly. See, e.g., 1975 Senate Hearings 75-76 (in covered jurisdictions, § 5 requires preclearance of all voting changes, and objections have been entered concerning every stage of the electoral process), 112-114 (describing preclearance of changes in city of Montgomery, Ala.), 463-464 (stating that, if Act were applied to Texas, § 5 would require preclearance of voting changes of cities and school districts, neither of which register voters [Footnote 23]), and 568 (statement by Justice Department official that there is no need to clarify Act to make certain that city council redistricting is covered by § 5); 1975 House Hearings 332 (referring to city of Bessemer, Ala., as "covered jurisdiction") and 631-632 (describing lengthy § 5 preclearance process for Charleston, S.C. -- a city which, like Sheffield, does not conduct chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
voter registration). [Footnote 24] More significantly, both the House and Senate Committee Reports preclude the conclusion that § 5 was not understood to operate territorially. Not only do the reports state that § 5 applies "[i]n [designated] jurisdictions," see S.Rep. No. 94-295, p. 12 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); H.R.Rep. No. 94-196, p. 5 (1975) (1975 House Report) (emphasis supplied), they also announce that one benefit of the proposed extension of the Act to portions of Texas would be that Texas cities and school districts -- neither of which has ever registered voters -- would be subject to the preclearance requirement. 1975 Senate Report 27-28; 1975 House Report 19-20. Finally, none of the opponents of the 1975 legislation took issue with the common assumption that § 5 applied to all voting changes within covered States. Indeed, they apparently shared this view. See 121 Cong.Rec. S13072 (July 21, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stennis) ("[a]ny [voting changes] . . . made in precincts, county districts, school districts, municipalities, or State legislatures, or any other kind of officers, ha[ve] to be submitted . . . to the Attorney General"). See also id. at S13331 (July 22, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Allen).
Whatever one might think of the other arguments advanced, the legislative background of the 1975 reenactment is conclusive of the question before us. When a Congress that reenacts a statute voices its approval of an administrative or other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that interpretation, and this Court is bound thereby. See, e.g., Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U. S. 569, 429 U. S. 576-577 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 422 U. S. 414 n. 8 (1975); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1404 (tent. ed.1958); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U. S. 321, 401 U. S. 336 n. 7 (1971); 328 U. S. 69-70 (194). Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, supra, is instructive. As here, there had been a longstanding administrative interpretation of a statute when Congress reenacted it, and there, as here, the legislative history of the reenactment showed that Congress agreed with that interpretation, leading this Court to conclude that Congress had ratified it. 429 U.S. at 429 U. S. 574-577. While we have no quarrel with our Brother STEVENS' view that it is impermissible to draw inferences of approval from the unexplained inaction of Congress, see post at 435 U. S. 149, citing Hodgson v. Lodge 861, Int'l Assn. of Mach. & Aerospace Workers,@ 454 F.2d 545, 562 (CA7 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting), that principle has no applicability to this case. Here, the "slumbering army" of Congress was twice "aroused," and on each occasion it reenacted the Voting Rights Act and manifested its view that § 5 covers all cities in designated jurisdictions. [Footnote 25]
Having decided that Sheffield is subject to § 5, we must consider whether the District Court properly concluded that the Attorney General's failure to object to the holding of the referendum constituted clearance under § 5 of the method of electing city councilmen under the new government. Only a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
First, it is clear on this record -- and the District Court did not find otherwise -- that Sheffield did not, in its March 20, 1975, letter, submit to the Attorney General a request for preclearance of the change in the City's form of government. Sheffield's letter sought approval only for the holding of the referendum. [Footnote 26] Moreover, under the Attorney General's own chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
regulation, the validity of which is not questioned, the City could not at that time have sought preclearance of the change in the form of government because, as the March 20, 1975, letter stated, see n 4, supra, the details of the change had not yet been worked out. See 28 CFR § 51.7 (1976). [Footnote 27]
Under the circumstances, it is irrelevant that the Attorney General might have been on notice that, if the referendum passed, Sheffield would have been required by state law to adopt an at-large system of councilmanic elections. [Footnote 28] Although chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although I find this case to be closer than much of the language of the Court's opinion would indicate, I nevertheless join that opinion. I do so because I feel that whatever chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
contrary argument might have been made persuasively on the § 5 issue a decade ago, the Court's decisions since then and the reenactments by Congress, see ante at 435 U. S. 132-135, compel the result the Court reaches today.
Although my reservations as to the constitutionality of the Act have not abated, 435 U. S. 124, such a construction of the statute could enable covered States or political subdivisions to allow local entities that do not conduct voter registration to assume responsibility for changing the electoral process. A covered State or political subdivision thereby could achieve through its instrumentalities what it could not do itself without preclearance. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The principal question presented by this case is whether the city of Sheffield, Ala., is covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. [Footnote 2/1] If that question could be answered solely by reference to the Act's broad remedial purposes, it might be an easy one. But on the basis of the statute as written, the question is not nearly as simple as the Court implies. I believe it requires two separate inquiries: first, whether the city of Sheffield is a "political subdivision" within the meaning of § 5; and second, even if that question is answered in the negative, whether action by the city should chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
S.Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1965). [Footnote 2/5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As is apparent from the comments of Senator Ervin, quoted supra, there was congressional concern over whether the Act would extend to governmental units below the county level. That concern was repeatedly expressed and was specifically addressed in § 14(c)(2). Unquestionably, as the Court recognizes, ante at 435 U. S. 128-129, that section protects small political units, such as school boards, from being separately designated for coverage under § 4(b). The concerns which motivated this exclusion from § 4(b) apply equally to § 5. [Footnote 2/6] Indeed, the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
First, a preclearance requirement limited to governmental units engaged in the registration process would be in accord with the fact that the Act was principally concerned with literacy tests and other devices which were being used to prevent black citizens from registering to vote. As Attorney General Katzenbach repeatedly emphasized, the "bill really is aimed at getting people registered." See 1965 House Hearings 21. [Footnote 2/7] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, the logistical and administrative problems inherent in reviewing all voting changes of all political units strongly suggest that Congress placed limits on the preclearance requirement. Statistics show that the Attorney General's staff is now processing requests for voting changes at the rate of over 1,000 per year, [Footnote 2/8] and this rate is by no means indicative of the number of submissions involved if all covered States and political units fully complied with the preclearance requirement, as interpreted by the Attorney General. [Footnote 2/9] Furthermore, under the statute, each request must be passed upon within 60 days of its submission. This large and rapid volume chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of work is a product, in part, of this Court's decision in Allen. [Footnote 2/10] But even apart from Allen, it is certainly reasonable to believe that Congress, having placed a strict time limit on the Attorney General's consideration of submissions, also deliberately placed a limit on the number and importance of the submissions themselves. [Footnote 2/11] This result was achieved by restricting the reach of § 5 to enactments of either the States themselves or their political subdivisions, as defined by § 14(c)(2).
The Department of Justice did not adopt regulations implementing § 5's preclearance provisions until September, 1971, six years after the passage of the Act and nearly two years after this Court's decision in Allen. 36 Fed.Reg. 18186; see Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526. And it was not until the Allen decision that the Department even attempted chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int'l Assn. of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 454 F.2d 545, 562 (CA7 1971) (dissenting opinion). [Footnote 2/12] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court reasons that, since § 4(a) was intended to apply throughout a designated State, § 5's preclearance requirement must have the same reach. This analysis is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, it does not give sufficient weight to the clear differences in statutory language between § 4(a) and § 5. See n. 435 U. S. 4, supra. When Congress wanted the term "State" to have a geographic reach, it was clearly capable of expressing that intent, as it did in § 4(a). Its failure to do so in § 5 must be accorded some significance, especially when coupled with § 14(c)(2)'s general purpose of excluding small political units from the Act's reach. Second, it does not adequately assess the reason for the inclusion of the § 14(c)(2) definition of "political subdivision." Third, the Court has already recognized that § 5 was not intended to provide a remedy for every wrong committed in a State in connection with voting.