Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/4:2013cv00102/758993/17
Timestamp: 2017-07-21 17:36:00
Document Index: 262727783

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', 'art 1', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', 'art, 474', 'art 1', 'art 2']

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge enter an order DENYING Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U for Arvizu &#035;163713 v. Ryan et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Arvizu &#035;163713 v. Ryan et al
Jose Luis Arvizu,
No. CV-13-00102-TUC- JAS (BGM)
Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Jose Luis Arvizu’s pro se Petition
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-
Death Penalty) (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 15). Petitioner did not file a Reply. The Petition is
Tucson Police Department (“TPD”) Officer Valerie Berg testified that on
November 7, 2006 she was working as an undercover narcotics officer.
11/27/2007 (Doc. 15-7) 128:4–134:18.
Trial Tr.
Officer Berg further testified that she was
introduced to Patricia Loya through a confidential informant, and made her first buy
directly from Ms. Loya on August 8, 2006. Id. at 132:19–133:3. Officer Berg testified
that on November 7, 2006, she placed a telephone call to Ms. Loya to tell her that she
wanted to purchase two ounces of methamphetamine.
Id. at 140:8–20, 179:17–24.
Officer Berg further testified that she spoke with Ms. Loya and was directed to Ms.
Loya’s apartment. Id. at 141:14–142:8. Officer Berg testified that she drove to Ms.
Loya’s apartment, parked her vehicle, and observed Ms. Loya’s daughter, Angélica
Ramirez going up the stairs to the second floor balcony. Id. Officer Berg further testified
that Angélica motioned for her to come up to the apartment. Trial Tr. 11/27/2007 (Doc.
15-7) 143:6–22, 181:4–15. After Officer Berg went to the apartment, Ms. Loya informed
her that they needed to meet the person, so Officer Berg, Ms. Loya, and Angélica
returned to Officer Berg’s vehicle. Id. Officer Berg testified that she drove with Ms.
Loya and Angélica to an apartment off of Country Club and Fifth Street. Id. at 146:11–
147:10. During the drive Ms. Loya and Angélica both used Officer Berg’s phone to try
and contact the source. Id. Once they were in the apartment parking lot, Angélica used
Officer Berg’s phone, asked for Jose, and told the person that they were waiting, and
hung up. Id. at 151:1–13. Officer Berg testified that she gave Ms. Loya $2,000.00,
$1,800.00 for the drugs and $200 for her. Id. at 151:21–152:16, 184:22–185:17. Officer
Berg testified that Ms. Loya put the money in her purse, got out of her car and into a
Dodge Neon, then returned in less than a minute or minute and a half, and handed Officer
Berg three baggies of methamphetamine. Id. at 147:24–148:11, 153:16–154:16, 186:10–
19. Officer Berg further testified that she had audio and video recording equipment
recording the November 7, 2006 encounter with Ms. Loya and Angélica. Id. at 144:9–20.
Officer Cardwell, who worked for TPD on November 7, 2006, testified that he
was assigned to perform surveillance of undercover Officer Berg and whoever she was
meeting with. Trial Tr. 11/27/2007 (Doc. 15-7) 162:8–22. Officer Cardwell testified that
he took photographs of the meet at the Country Club Apartments on November 7, 2006.
Id. at 162:23–163:1. Officer Cardwell further testified regarding photographs from that
encounter showing Officer Berg’s vehicle, Ms. Loya exiting her vehicle and getting into
a Dodge Neon, Ms. Loya returning to Officer Berg’s vehicle, and then two male subjects
exiting the Dodge Neon after the transaction was completed.
Id. at 163:2–167:22.
Officer Cardwell identified one of the males who exited the Dodge Neon as Defendant
Jose Arvizu. Id. 167:8–22.
Patricia Loya testified that on November 7, 2006, she accompanied the undercover
officer and her daughter Angélica to an apartment complex at Country Club and
Speedway to buy drugs from Defendant Jose Arvizu. Trial Tr. 11/28/2007 (Doc. 15-8)
41:7–42:23. Ms. Loya testified that she got out of the undercover officer’s vehicle and
got in the car with Jose Arvizu and another unknown individual. Id. at 43:5–46:25. Ms.
Loya testified that she got in the back seat and Jose Arvizu was in the front driver’s seat.
Id. Ms. Loya further testified that she bought drugs from Jose Arvizu that day and had
previously, as well. Id. at 47:1–20. Ms. Loya testified that the drugs she purchased from
Jose Arvizu were to be sold to the undercover officer. Id. at 49:1–50:16.
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Special Agent (“SA”) Richard Kivi
testified regarding the wiretap that had been placed on Patricia Loya’s cellular telephone.
Trial Tr. 11/28/2007 (Docs. 15-8 & 15-9) 103:4–112:12. SA Kivi testified that initially,
he analyzed Ms. Loya’s cellular telephone records and obtained a warrant to install a pen
register on that line. Trial Tr. 11/28/2007 (Doc. 15-9) 108:16–109:14. SA Kivi further
testified that there were a significant number of phone calls between Ms. Loya’s cellular
telephone and the telephone subscribed to by Jose Arvizu. Id. SA Kivi compared the
subscriber account information with Jose Arvizu’s motor vehicle records and found a
Id. at 109:19–110:21.
SA Kivi also testified that the net weight of
methamphetamine purchased on November 7, 2006 was 54.4 grams. Id. at 111:7–
112:12.
Petitioner was charged with one count of conspiracy to possess for sale, transport
for sale, offer to transport for sale, sell, transfer or offer to sell or transfer dangerous
drugs and one count of unlawful transport for sale or offer to transport for sale or sell,
transfer or offer to sell or transfer a dangerous drug, methamphetamine, in violation of
Arizona law. Trial Tr. 11/28/2007 (Doc. 15-7) 109:23–21; see also Answer (Doc. 15),
Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Minute Entry 11/29/2007 (Exh. “A”) at ¶ 1. On
November 29, 2007, a jury found Petitioner guilty of both counts. Answer (Doc. 15),
Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Minute Entry 11/29/2007 (Exh. “A”) at 1–2. On
December 21, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of five (5) years
imprisonment for the conspiracy count and the presumptive term of ten (10) years
imprisonment for the unlawful transport and/or transfer count to run concurrently.
Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Order 12/21/2007 (Exh. “B”) at 2–3.
On September 16, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Delayed Appeal Pursuant
to Rule 32.1(f) with the trial court. Answer (Doc. 15), Pet. for a Delayed Appeal
9/16/2008 (Exh. “E”).
On September 19, 2008, the trial court granted Petitioner’s
Petition for a Delayed Appeal. Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County,
Order 9/19/2008 (Exh. “F”). On November 16, 2009, Petitioner filed a Request for
Amended Sentence; Notice to Court with the trial court. Answer (Doc. 15), Pet.’s
Request for Amended Sentence; Notice to Ct. 11/16/2009 (Exh. “H”).
acknowledged the Court’s previous grant of his Petition for a Delayed Appeal, but stated
that counsel was unable to file Petitioner’s direct appeal because counsel did “not have a
contract with Pima County to accept such appointments.” Id., Exh. “H” at 1. As such,
Petitioner sought amendment of his sentence to time served. Id., Exh. “H” at 2. On
November 19, 2009, the trial court issued its Order noting “that counsel need not be
appointed appellate counsel in order to file a Notice of Appeal on Petitioner’s behalf.”
Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Order 11/19/2009 (Exh. “I”) at 1.
The trial court granted counsel leave to “file the initial Notice of Appeal and request that
appellate counsel be appointed for Petitioner.” Id., Exh. “I” at 1.
On February 8, 2010, Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal. Answer (Doc. 15),
Notice of Appeal 2/8/2010 (Exh. “J”). On August 5, 2010, counsel for Petitioner filed an
Anders2 brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals.3
Answer (Doc. 15), Appellant’s
Opening Br. 8/5/2010 (Exh. “K”). On August 9, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals
granted Petitioner leave to file a pro se supplemental brief on or before September 8,
2010. Id., Ariz. Ct. App. Order 8/9/2010 (Exh. “L”). Petitioner did not file a pro se
On October 27, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s appeal
as untimely. Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz. Ct. App. Order 10/27/2010 (Exh. “M”). Petitioner
did not file a motion for reconsideration or petition for review. See Answer (Doc. 15),
Ariz. Ct. App. Mandate 1/21/2011 (Exh. “N”) at 1.
On January 4, 2008, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”).
Answer (Doc. 15), Not. of PCR 1/4/2008 (Exh. “C”). On November 19, 2008, the Rule
32 court stayed the pending Rule 32 proceedings in light of having granted his request for
a delayed appeal.
See Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Order
11/19/2008 (Exh. “G”). On February 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a Request to Reinstate
Rule 32 Proceedings. Answer (Doc. 15), Pet.’s Request to Reinstate Rule 32 Proceedings
2/3/2011 (Exh. “O”). The Rule 32 court granted Petitioner’s request and ordered that
Petitioner file his PCR petition on or before April 5, 2011. Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz.
Superior Ct., Pima County, Order 2/7/2011 (Exh. “P”).
On April 5, 2011, Petitioner filed his Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Answer
(Doc. 15), Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Q”). Petitioner asserted three (3) grounds for relief: “1)
defense counsel was ineffective in failing to provide a jury instruction on Petitioner’s
prior bad acts, 2) defense counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner with respect to
plea negotiations, and 3) Petitioner’s sentence is disproportionate to a more culpable co-
defendant’s prison sentence.” Id., Exh. “Q” at 1. On July 28, 2011, the Rule 32 court
held an evidentiary hearing. See Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County,
Minute Entry 7/28/2011 (Exh. “W”) & Hr’g Tr. 7/28/2011 (Doc. 15-12).
On August 1, 2011, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR petition. See Answer
(Doc. 15), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Under Advisement Ruling, Rule 32 Petition
8/1/2011 (Exh. “X”). The trial court recognized that “[t]o prove ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below the standard of
care in the profession, and that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s defective
performance.” Id., Exh. “X” at 1 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88
(1984); State v. Rodriguez, 227 Ariz. 58 ¶ 7, 251 P.3d 1045, 1046–47 (Ct. App. 2010)).
The Rule 32 court further stated that “[t]o reverse a conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that counsel’s actions were
unreasonable in that they fell below the threshold of what minimally competent counsel
would do, and that but for counsel’s unprofessional performance, the outcome of the case
would have been different.” Id., Exh. “X” at 1–2 (citations omitted).
With regard to counsel’s alleged failure to seek a jury instruction limiting Loya’s
testimony, the Rule 32 court found that counsel’s strategic decision not to seek such an
instruction, because of a concern that it might “draw attention to or emphasize the
importance of unfavorable testimony” was within counsel’s discretion and insufficient to
sustain a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Answer (Doc. 15), Exh. “X” at 2.
The Rule 32 court further noted that “[e]ven if failing to request the limiting instruction
fell below reasonable professional standards, . . . Defendant has not shown that, but for
this error, the outcome of his trial would have been different.” Id., Exh. “X” at 2.
Regarding plea negotiations, the Rule 32 court found that the record did not support a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., Exh. “X” at 2–3. The Rule 32 court held
that Defendant understood the terms of the State’s second and final plea offer and noted
“that Defendant’s real issue [was] his strong feeling that a better plea agreement should
have been offered.” Id., Exh. “X” at 2–3. The Rule 32 court also found that counsel’s
decision not to call Petitioner’s brother Carlos as a witness was a strategic decision that
could not “be said to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id., Exh. “X” at 3
(citations omitted). Regarding Defendant’s claim that his sentence should not have
exceeded that given to co-defendant Lorenzo Sanchez, the Rule 32 court stated that this
issue could and should have been raised on direct appeal. Answer (Doc. 15), Exh. “X” at
3. The Rule 32 court further noted that Petitioner was given the presumptive sentence,
which was well within the Judge’s discretion and not subject to modification unless it
was clearly excessive. Id., Exh. “X” at 3–4. The Rule 32 court also acknowledged that
Sanchez was sentenced following a guilty plea, was not convicted of participating in the
drug conspiracy, and did not have a prior felony conviction. Id., Exh. “X” at 4. As such,
the Rule 32 court found that Petitioner was “not entitled to relief based on any disparity
in sentence with co-defendant Sanchez.” Id., Exh. “X” at 4.
On December 16, 2011, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review in the Arizona
Court of Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 15), Pet. for Review 12/16/2011 (Exh. “Y”). On
March 8, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. Answer
(Doc. 15), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 3/8/2012 (Exh. “Z”). The court of appeals
considered Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to an alleged
failure not to seek a limiting instruction, noting that “Arvizu suggests that, because any
limiting instruction would have been given well after the evidence had been admitted and
would not have listed the evidence specifically, the failure to request the instruction as
not a reasoned choice.” Id., Exh. “Z” at 4. The court of appeals found that “Arvizu cites
no authority or evidence supporting his assertion or suggesting the court was incorrect.”
Id., Exh. “X” at 4. Regarding the Petitioner’s refusal of the state’s plea offer based on a
belief that a particular witness would be called, the court of appeals stated that “it was the
trial court’s duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and we will not disturb its
conclusions absent clear error. Id., Exh. “Z” at 4 (citations omitted). The court of
appeals did not find clear error with regard to the trial court’s findings. Id., Exh. “Z” at 4.
Regarding Petitioner’s contention that his sentencing claim was not precluded because he
did not have a direct appeal, the court of appeals found that “Arvizu cites no authority,
and we find none, suggesting the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2. does not apply to a
defendant who has not exercised his right to an appeal.” Answer (Doc. 15), Exh. “Z” at
4–5. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that “[t]he trial court did not err in finding
this claim precluded.” Id., Exh. “Z” at 5.
On April 7, 2012, Petitioner sought review of the denial of his PCR petition by the
Arizona Supreme Court. See Answer (Doc. 15), Pet. for Further Review 4/17/2012 (Exh.
“AA”). On June 20, 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment.
Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz. Supreme Ct. ME 6/20/2012 (Exh. “BB”).
On February 19, 2013, Petitioner filed his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a
Petitioner claims five (5) grounds for relief.
First, Petitioner alleges that “Defense
Counsel at trial was ineffective in failing to provide a Jury [sic] instruction on Petitioner’s
prior bad acts[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 43. Second, Petitioner alleges that “Defense
Counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner with respect to plea negotiations, and
effectively explain [sic] plea that was being offered to defendant.” Id. at 44. Third,
Petitioner claims that his “sentence is disproportionate to a more culpable co-defendant’s
prison sentence.”
Fourth, Petitioner asserts that “Defense Counsel was
ineffective and negligent in representing Petitioner with Defense Counsel’s defense, at
trial.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 48. Petitioner argues that the defense that he “never sold
meth, but instead bought drugs from state’s witness, Loya, this [sic] very defense finds
Petitioner guilty of the transfer of drugs.” Id. Subsumed within this claim, Petitioner
also asserts that he “was under a lot of stress, depressed and taking 4 different
medications; [sic] Remoron [sic], Celexa, Doxipin [sic] and thorsin [sic], the side effect
[of] these medications diminished Petitioner’s ability to participate adequetly [sic] in
trial” in violation of his Due Process rights pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 49.
Fifth, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his post-conviction
relief counsel’s failure to file a timely appeal.” Id. at 54. On December 23, 2013,
Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 15). Petitioner did not file a reply.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398,
179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal
habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116
L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Ultimately, “[t]he statute’s design is to ‘further the principles of
comity, finality, and federalism.’” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S.Ct.
2842, 2854, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337,
123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meet
and highly deferential “for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that state-
court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398
Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of Arvizu’s petition.
Grounds One, Two, Four (Part 1), and Five: Ineffective Assistance of
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)
(quoting Strickland, 466 at 686) (emphasis and alteration in original).
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Accordingly, “[w]e apply the doubly deferential
standard to review the state court’s ‘last reasoned decision.’” Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d
960, 966 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of
any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in
2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington, 131 U.S. at 98, 131 S.Ct. at 784. As such, Petitioner
also bears the burden of showing that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his
case in an objectively unreasonable manner. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99, 122
S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
2. Ground One: Failure to Request a Limiting Instruction
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective “in failing to provide a Jury
[sic] instruction on Petitioner’s prior bad acts[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 43. Petitioner
asserts that “Patricia Loya’s testimony regarding Petitioner selling drugs to her in the past
and on several occasions was prejudicial to Petitioner.” Id. Petitioner argues that the
jury “might conclude from the testimony that Petitioner was involved in the drug
transaction on 11/7/06[.]” Id.
Petitioner acknowledges that defense counsel “filed a
motion in limine to prevent such testimony[,]” but the trial court denied the motion. Id.
Petitioner alleges that defense counsel “failed” to file a jury instruction, “and therefore,
Loya’s prejudicial testimony went unabated before the Jury [sic].” Id. Petitioner asserts
that “[t]here is no reasoned basis for trial counsel’s failure to request a limiting
instruction[,] [and] [t]he fact that defense counsel didn’t want to draw attention to
testimony doesn’t suffice as a reasoned basis.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 43.
The Rule 32 court stated that “[t]o prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below the standard of care in the
profession, and that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s defective performance.”
Answer (Doc. 15), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Under Advisement Ruling, Rule 32
Petition 8/1/2011 (Exh. “X”) at 1–2 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
The Rule 32 court acknowledged that “there are good reasons why an attorney might
decide that the instruction should not be requested; for example, it may draw attention to
or emphasize the importance of unfavorable testimony.” Id., Exh. “X” at 2. The Rule 32
court went on to state that “[i]n this case, counsel testified that this was, in fact, the
reason he did not submit the instruction, and stated that his was a strategic decision.” Id.,
Exh. “X” at 2. As such, the Rule 32 court held that “[s]uch decisions are within the
discretion of counsel and do not provide grounds for finding ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Id., Exh. “X” at 2. The Rule 32 court also noted that:
Even if failing to request the limiting instruction fell below reasonable
professional standards, however, Defendant has not shown that, but for this
error, the outcome of his trial would have been different. In this case, the
contested evidence was properly considered by the jury for allowable
purposes, including the relationship between Defendant and witness Loya
with respect to methamphetamine purchase and sale, and Defendant’s
understanding of the nature of the transaction occurring at the time of the
offense. Furthermore, even without this testimony there was ample
evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction. Under the circumstances it is
highly unlikely that the limiting instruction would have affected the
Id., Exh. “X” at 2.
The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. See Answer
(Doc. 15), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 3/8/2012 (Exh. “Z”). The appellate court stated
that it would not disturb the lower court’s ruling “unless the court clearly ha[d] abused its
discretion.” Id., Exh. “Z” at 2. Regarding Petitioner’s suggestion that “any limiting
instruction would have been given well after the evidence had been admitted and would
not have listed the evidence specifically, the failure to request the instruction was not a
reasoned decision[,]” the court of appeals stated that the Rule 32 court “found otherwise,
and Arvizu cites no authority or evidence supporting his assertion or suggesting the court
was incorrect.” Id., Exh. “Z” at 4. As such, the appellate court denied relief. Id., Exh.
“Z” at 5.
light of the evidence presented. “It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess
counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence[;] . . . [however,] [b]ecause of
the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance[.]” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As such, “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id.
(citations omitted). In this case, the Rule 32 court held an evidentiary hearing, and
defense counsel testified regarding his trial strategy not to seek a limiting instruction. See
Answer (Doc. 15), Exh. “X” at 2; Hr’g Tr. 7/28/2011 (Doc. 15-12). Petitioner has failed
to overcome the strong presumption that this was a reasonable tactical decision and sound
trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–90, 104 S.Ct. at 2064–66. As such,
Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding counsel’s alleged failure
seek a limiting instruction must fail. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
3. Ground Two: Plea Negotiations4
Petitioner asserts that “Defense Counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner with
To the extent that there is a second ineffective assistance of counsel claim embedded
within this count regarding defense counsel’s decision to cancel a status conference without
consulting Petitioner, it was never presented to the state courts. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495
F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (“ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead
highly fact-dependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it”). As such,
any ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the cancellation of a status conference is
unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); see also Baldwin v.
Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present”
one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s
claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546,
2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to
which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion
requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s
claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent
review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims
in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause
and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner
“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked
to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v.
Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally
defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his
respect to plea negotiations, and effectively explain [sic] plea that was being offered to
defendant.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 44. Petitioner asserts that at a November 5, 2007 hearing
before the trial court regarding Petitioner’s rejection of the plea agreement, “[a]
discussion was had regarding a more favorable plea agreement, which Petitioner
understood would be offered.” Id. Petitioner states that “[a] better plea was never
presented to Petitioner[,]” and that defense counsel “felt Petitioner should not accept any
plea agreement offered by the State.” Id. Petitioner asserts that during his discussion
with defense counsel, counsel “assured Petitioner that he would call the passenger in the
vehicle, Carlos Arvizu Petitioner’s brother, to testify that Patricia Loya was lying with
respect to Petitioner’s selling drugs to her.” Id. Petitioner claims that he was “entitled to
make a reasonable informed decision whether to accept or reject a plea offer[,] [and] [his]
decision with respect to the plea agreement was . . . based on an empty promise that went
unfulfilled.” Petitioner (Doc. 1) at 45.
The Rule 32 court, after an evidentiary hearing, held that “[t]he record in this case
does not support this second claim.” Answer (Doc. 15), Exh. “X” at 2. The Rule 32
court went on to state that “[i]t is clear from Defendant’s testimony at the hearing on this
Petition, his statement at sentencing, and the discussion of plea negotiations at the pretrial
hearing held on November 7, 2007 that Defendant understood the State’s second and
final plea offer.” Id., Exh. “X” at 2. The Rule 32 court declared that “[i]t is further
apparent that Defendant’s real issue is his strong feeling that a better plea agreement
should have been offered.” Id., Exh. “X” at 2–3. The Rule 32 court held that “Defendant
was not entitled to a particular plea offer, and his decision to go to trial rather than to
accept the available offer does not stem from any failure of effective counsel.” Id., Exh.
“X” at 3. “Similarly, that Defendant, up to the time of trial, may have understood that
counsel intended to call Carlos as a witness does not constitute grounds for finding that
counsel’s actions in this regard improperly influenced Defendant’s decision not to accept
the State’s plea proposal.” Id., Exh. “X” at 3.
(Doc. 15), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 3/8/2012 (Exh. “Z”). The court of appeals held
that “[a]lthough Arvizu points to contradicting evidence, it was the trial court’s duty to
resolve conflicts in the evidence, and we will not disturb it conclusions absent clear
error.” Id., Exh. “Z” at 4. Because “Arvizu ha[d] identified none[,]” the court of appeals
upheld the Rule 32 court’s findings. Id., Exh. “Z” at 4–5.
“The ‘Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present
at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.’” Missouri v. Frye, — U.S. —, 132
S.Ct. 1399, 1405, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778,
786, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009)). This Sixth Amendment right extends to
the plea-bargaining process. Lafler v. Cooper, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384, 182
L.Ed.2d 398 (2012); Frye, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. at 1407–08. A defendant, however, has
no right to be offered a plea[.]” Frye, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. at 1410. “[T]he two-part
Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d
203 (1985).
Here, after an evidentiary hearing during which Petitioner and his former counsel
both testified, the Rule 32 court found that Petitioner’s claim lacked merit. The court of
appeals affirmed this ruling recognizing the lower court’s role to resolve conflicts in the
evidence. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state
court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178
L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140,
158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)). Moreover, “Section 2254(d) ‘gives federal habeas courts no
license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the
state trial court.” Aiken v. Blodgett, 921 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Marshall
v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434, 103 S.Ct. 843, 851, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983)). “Where
there are two permissible views of the evidence, a fact finder’s choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous.” Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 919 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 226, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988)). Petitioner
has failed to present any evidence to show that the Arizona court’s decision regarding his
ineffective assistance claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
4. Ground Four–Part 1: Negligence Regarding Defense
Petitioner claims that “Defense Counsel was ineffective and negligent in
representing Petitioner with Defense Counsel’s defense[.]”
Petition (Doc. 1) at 48.
Petitioner alleges that counsel’s “defense was that Petitioner never sold meth, but instead
bought drugs from State’s witness, Loya, this very defense finds Petitioner guilty of the
transfer of drugs.” Id. Respondent asserts that Petitioner did not present this claim to the
state courts. Answer (Doc. 15) at 11–12. The Court agrees with Respondent.
address the merits of his claims.”). As such, Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel based on negligence regarding his defense must fail.
5. Ground Five: PCR Counsel and Lack of Appeal
Petitioner asserts that he “was never given the opportunity to exercise his right to
file an appeal[,] . . . [because his] appellate lawyer failed to file appeal [sic] in a timely
fashion.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 54. As outlined in Section I.A., supra, Petitioner’s PCR
counsel filed an out of time Notice of Appeal. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief,
and the Arizona Court of Appeals gave Petitioner leave to file a pro se supplemental
brief, which Petitioner did not do. The court of appeals then dismissed the appeal as
It is undisputed that Petitioner did not raise this claim in the state courts. Thus,
Petitioner failed to “fairly present” this claim “in each appropriate state court[.]” Baldwin,
541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. Moreover, although Rule 32.1(f), Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure, provides a ground for relief where “[t]he defendant’s failure to file a
notice of post-conviction relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was
without fault on the defendant’s part[,]” it does not afford a mechanism to apply the
proper test for prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
In order to avoid preclusion and fall within the exception, Petitioner is required to assert
“meritorious reasons . . . substantiating the claim and indicating why the claim was not
stated in the previous petition or in a timely manner[.]” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b).
Petitioner cannot meet that burden.
As such, Petitioner’s claim is “technically”
exhausted, and procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that “a criminal
defendant has no right to counsel beyond his first appeal in pursuing state discretionary or
collateral review[.]” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 756, 111 S.Ct. at 2568. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has also observed that “Martinez did not create a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in PCR proceedings.” Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054
(9th Cir. 2012). “Thus, the claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel used to
establish cause in the narrow circumstances outlined in Martinez is an equitable claim
and not a constitutional claim[.]” Id. As such, any attempt by Petitioner to assert an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his PCR counsel must fail.
Ground Three: Disproportionate Sentence
Petitioner asserts that his “sentence is disproportionate to a more culpable codefendant’s prison sentence.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 47. Although Petitioner presented this
claim to each state court, he did not raise it as a violation of his federal Constitutional
rights. See Answer (Doc. 15), Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Q”) at 13–14; Answer (Doc. 15), Pet.
for Review (Exh. “Y”) at 18–20; Answer (Doc. 15), Pet. for Further Review (Exh. “AA”)
at 16–20.
The fair presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the
state court “to the presence of a federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim
“federal” or expecting the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition is
insufficient. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64
(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because
his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a
violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court
decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195
F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process
issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on state
As such, Petitioner’s claim is “technically” exhausted, and procedurally
defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n. 1.
Petitioner asserts that he “was under a lot of stress, depressed and taking 4
Ground Four–Part 2: Due Process Violation
different medications; [sic] Remoron [sic], Celexa, Doxipin [sic] and Thorsin [sic], the
side effects of these medications diminished Petitioner’s ability to participate adequatly
[sic] in trial” in violation of his “due process rights under Fifth [sic] Amendment of U.S.
[sic] Constitution.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 49.
The Court finds that Petitioner did not “fairly present” this claim to the Arizona
state courts. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d
64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented”
because his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining
about a violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower
court decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood,
195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due
process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on state
grounds). “Fair presentation” requires alerting “each appropriate state court” to the
presence of a federal claim, which Petitioner failed to do. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124
S.Ct. at 1349. As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v.
find the claims procedurally barred”).
Where a habeas petitioner’s claim has been
claims.”). As such, Petitioner’s habeas claim must fail.
Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-130102-TUC-JAS.