Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105659/furniture-moving-drivers-vs-crowley
Timestamp: 2018-05-25 19:05:31
Document Index: 660292319

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 402', '§ 401', '§ 481', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 403', '§ 483', '§ 102', '§ 402', '§ 482', '§ 402', '§ 482', '§ 402', '§ 482', '§ 483', '§ 402', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 482', '§ 403', '§ 101', '§ 411', '§ 401', '§ 481', '§ 102', '§ 403', '§ 483', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 403', '§ 102', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 403', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 101', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 102']

Furniture and Moving Drivers Vs Crowley - Citation 105659 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Furniture and Moving Drivers Vs. Crowley - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105659
Case Number 467 U.S. 526
Appellant Furniture and Moving Drivers
Respondent Crowley
furniture & moving drivers v. crowley - 467 u.s. 526 (1984) u.s. supreme court furniture & moving drivers v. crowley, 467 u.s. 526 (1984) local no. 82, furniture & piano moving, furniture store drivers, helpers, warehousemen & packers v. crowley no. 82-432 argued january 9, 1984 decided june 12, 1984 467 u.s. 526 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit syllabus title i of the labor-management reporting and disclosure act of 1959 (lmrda) provides a "bill of rights" for labor union members, including various protections for members involved in union elections. section 102 provides that any person whose title i rights have been violated may bring an action in federal district court.....
Furniture & Moving Drivers v. Crowley - 467 U.S. 526 (1984)
U.S. Supreme Court Furniture & Moving Drivers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526 (1984)
Held: The District Court overstepped the bounds of "appropriate" relief under Title I when it enjoined an ongoing union election and ordered that a new election be held pursuant to procedures imposed by the court. Pp. 467 U. S. 535 -551.
(a) While § 102, standing by itself, suggests that individual union members may properly maintain a Title I suit whenever rights guaranteed by that Title have been violated, that section explicitly limits relief that may be ordered by a district court to that which is "appropriate" to any given situation. Moreover, while Title IV protects many of the same rights as does Title I, § 402 of Title IV sets up an exclusive method for protecting Title IV rights, and under this method, individuals are not permitted to block or delay union elections by filing suits for violation of Title IV. Pp. 467 U. S. 536 -540.
(b) Whether suits alleging violations of Title I may properly be maintained during the course of a union election depends upon the appropriateness of the remedy required to eliminate the claimed violations. In the absence of legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to require or allow courts to preempt the Secretary's expertise and supervise their own elections, and given the clear congressional preference expressed in Title IV for supervision of new elections by the Secretary, the conclusion is compelled that Congress did not consider court supervision of union elections to be an "appropriate" remedy for a Title I suit filed during the course of an election. Thus, if the remedy sought is invalidation of an election already being conducted and court supervision of a new election, union members must utilize the remedies provided by Title IV. For less intrusive remedies sought during an election, however, a district court retains authority to order appropriate relief under Title I. Pp. 467 U. S. 540 -550.
(c) The District Court's order here directly interfered with the Secretary's exclusive responsibilities for supervising new elections, and was inconsistent with the basic objectives of the LMRDA enforcement scheme. Pp. 467 U. S. 550 -551.
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 467 U. S. 552 .
Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen, and Packers (Local 82) represents approximately 700 employees engaged in the furniture moving business in the Boston, Mass., area. [ Footnote 1 ] The union is governed by a seven-member executive board whose officers, pursuant to § 401(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 481(b), must be chosen by election no less than once every three years. These elections, consistent with the executive board's discretion under the union's bylaws and constitution, have traditionally been conducted by mail referendum balloting. The dispute giving rise to the present case stems from the union election that was regularly scheduled for the last two months of 1980.
Several dissatisfied members of the union, now respondents before this Court, [ Footnote 2 ] filed a protest with the union. On November 20, their protest was denied by Local 82. [ Footnote 3 ] Election ballots were thereafter distributed to all members of the union, who were instructed to mark and return the ballots by mail so that they would arrive in a designated post office box by 9 a.m. on December 13, 1980, at which time they were scheduled to be counted. Respondent Lynch's name appeared on the ballot as a candidate for president, and not for secretary-treasurer.
candidates [and] to attend membership meetings" under § 101(a)(1) of the Act, [ Footnote 4 ] as well as their right freely to express views at meetings of the union under § 101(a)(2) of the Act. [ Footnote 5 ] They also alleged that the union and its officers had violated § 101(a)(1) by failing to recognize respondent Lynch as a candidate for secretary-treasurer. [ Footnote 6 ]
After concluding that the respondents had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claims, [ Footnote 7 ] the court issued its comprehensive injunction. [ Footnote 8 ] The court explicitly intended to issue an order that "interfere[d] as little as possible with the nomination and election procedures" required by the union's constitution and bylaws, id. at 634; moreover, the terms of the preliminary injunction were derived in large part from an ongoing process of negotiations and hearings that the court had conducted with the parties during the preceding six months. Nonetheless, the order declared the ballots cast in December, 1980, to be "legally without effect," id. at 636, n., and provided detailed procedures to be followed by the union during a new nominations meeting and a subsequent election. Among other things, the order selected an outside group of arbitrators to conduct and supervise the election, and set forth eligibility requirements for attending the nominations meeting, being a candidate for office, and
The petitioners appealed, and the Secretary of Labor, who until then had not participated in the proceedings, intervened on their behalf. They argued that the District Court lacked authority under Title I to enjoin the tabulation of ballots and order new nominations and elections under court supervision. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments, however, and affirmed in all respects. 679 F.2d 978 (CA1 1982). It agreed with the District Court that Title I remedies are not foreclosed when violations of Title I occur during the course of an election. The court also held that § 403 of the Act, which explicitly provides that Title IV's remedies are exclusive for elections that are "already conducted," 29 U.S.C. § 483, does not apply until all the ballots have actually been tabulated. [ Footnote 9 ]
under Title I and Title IV of the Act, [ Footnote 10 ] we granted certiorari. 459 U.S. 1168 (1983). We now reverse. [ Footnote 11 ]
LMRDA, it is necessary first to summarize the relevant statutory provisions and Congress' principal purposes in their enactment. The LMRDA was "the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership." Finnnegan v. Leu, 456 U. S. 431 , 456 U. S. 435 (1982). Although the Act "had a history tracing back more than two decades," ibid., and was directly generated by several years of congressional hearings, see S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959) (hereafter S.Rep. No. 187), many specific provisions did not find their way into the Act until the proposed legislation was fully considered on the floor of the Senate, 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 435 , n. 4. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the interaction between various provisions that were finally included in the Act has generated considerable uncertainty.
restrictions on speech and assembly, and protection from improper discipline. See Finnegan v. Leu, supra, at 456 U. S. 435 -436; Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U. S. 102 , 457 U. S. 109 -110 (1982). Given these purposes, there can be no doubt that the protections afforded by Title I extend to union members while they participate in union elections. As we have previously noted:
As first introduced by Senator McClellan on the floor of the Senate, see 105 Cong.Rec. 6469-6476, 6492-6493 (1959), Title I empowered the Secretary of Labor to seek injunctions and other relief in federal district court to enforce the rights guaranteed to union members. A few days later, however, the McClellan amendment was replaced by a substitute amendment offered by Senator Kuchel. See id. at 6693-6694, 6717-6727. Among the principal changes made by this substitute was to provide for enforcement of Title I through suits by individual union members in federal district court. Id. at 6717, 6720. [ Footnote 12 ] As so amended, the legislation
Standing by itself, this jurisdictional provision suggests that individual union members may properly maintain a Title I suit whenever rights guaranteed by that Title have been violated. [ Footnote 13 ] At the same time, however, § 102 explicitly limits the relief that may be ordered by a district court to that which is "appropriate" to any given situation. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U. S. 1 , 412 U. S. 10 -11 (1973).
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 , 379 U. S. 140 (1964). [ Footnote 14 ] In general terms, "Title IV's special function in furthering the overall goals of the LMRDA is to insure free and democratic' elections," Wirtz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U. S. 463 , 389 U. S. 470 (1968), an interest "vital" not only to union members but also to the general public, id. at 389 U. S. 475 . See Wirtz v. Laborers, 389 U. S. 477 , 389 U. S. 483 (1968).
Although Congress meant to further this basic policy with a minimum of interference in the internal affairs of unions, see Calhoon, supra, at 379 U. S. 140 , § 402 of Title IV contains its own comprehensive administrative and judicial procedure for enforcing the standards established in that Title of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975); Trbovich v. Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528 , 404 U. S. 531 (1972); Calhoon, supra, at 379 U. S. 138 -140.
Trbovich, supra, at 404 U. S. 531 (quoting § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482). See Calhoon, supra, at 379 U. S. 140 . Significantly, the court may invalidate an election already held, and order the Secretary to supervise a new election, only if the violation of Title IV "may have affected the outcome" of the previous election. § 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c).
73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C. § 483. Relying on this provision, and on the comprehensive nature of the enforcement scheme established by § 402, we have held that Title IV "sets up an exclusive method for protecting Title IV rights," and that Congress "decided not to permit individuals to block or delay union elections by filing federal court suits for violations of Title IV." Calhoon, supra, at 379 U. S. 140 . [ Footnote 15 ]
It is useful to begin by noting what the plain language of the Act clearly establishes about the relationship between the remedies provided under Title I and Title IV. First, the exclusivity provision included in § 403 of Title IV plainly bars Title I relief when an individual union member challenges the validity of an election that has already been completed. [ Footnote 16 ] Second, the full panoply of Title I rights is available to individual union members "prior to the conduct" of a union election. As with the plain language of most federal labor laws, however, this simplicity is more apparent than real. Indeed, by its own terms, the provision offers no obvious solution to what remedies are available during the course of a union election, the issue presented by this case.
Even if the plain meaning of the "already conducted" language of § 403 could be read not to preclude other remedies until the actual tabulation and certification of ballots have been completed, we would hesitate to find such an interpretation determinative. First, such an approach would ignore the limitation on judicial remedies that Congress included in Title I, which allows a district court to award only "appropriate" relief. Moreover, we have previously "cautioned against a literal reading" of the LMRDA. Wirtz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., supra, at 389 U. S. 468 . Like much federal
Ibid. (citing National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612 , 386 U. S. 619 (1967)). See Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 457 U. S. 111 . Indeed, in many ways, this admonition applies with its greatest force to the interaction between Title I and Title IV of the LMRDA, if only because of the unusual way in which the legislation was enacted. [ Footnote 17 ]
Nor does the legislative history of the LMRDA provide any definitive indication of how Congress intended § 403 to apply to Title I suits while an election is being conducted. Throughout the legislative debate on this provision, the exclusivity of Title IV was predominantly, if not only, considered in the context of a union election, such as one held at a union meeting, that would take place for a discrete and limited period of time. [ Footnote 18 ] Thus, Congress did not explicitly consider how the exclusivity provision might apply to an election that takes several weeks or months to complete. Moreover,
S.Rep. No. 187, at 21. [ Footnote 19 ] The bill that was finally passed by the Senate retained these procedures for violations of Title IV.
In the House, three separate bills were introduced, with all three containing substantially similar enforcement procedures for violations of Title IV. Unlike the Senate bill, the House bills permitted an aggrieved union member to file suit in federal district court to enforce his Title IV rights. See, e.g., H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 402 (1969) (Landrum-Griffin bill). Significantly, however, even these bills provided that the Secretary of Labor would supervise any new elections ordered by the court. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 741, supra, at 17 (if district court finds relevant statutory violation, the court should "declare the election, if any, to be void, and direct the conduct of a new election under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor"). Thus, even before the Conference Committee adopted the Title IV enforcement procedures included in the Senate bill, see H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1147, at 35, both Houses of Congress had consistently indicated their intent to have the Secretary of Labor supervise any new union elections necessitated by the Act. [ Footnote 20 ]
Moreover, nothing in the flurry of activity that surrounded enactment of Title I, see supra at 467 U. S. 537 -538, and n. 12, indicates that Congress intended that Title to reverse this consistent opposition to court supervision of union elections. Although the enactment of Title I offered additional protection to union members, including the establishment of various statutory safeguards effective during the course of a union election, there is no direct evidence to suggest that Congress believed that enforcement of Title I would either require or allow courts to preempt the expertise of the Secretary and
That is not to say that a court has no jurisdiction over otherwise proper Title I claims that are filed during the course of a lengthy union election. The important congressional policies underlying enactment of Title I, see supra at 467 U. S. 536 -537, likewise compel us to conclude that appropriate relief under Title I may be awarded by a court while an election is being conducted. Individual union members may properly allege violations of Title I that are easily remediable under that Title without substantially delaying or invalidating an ongoing election. For example, union members might claim that they did not receive election ballots distributed by the union because of their opposition to the incumbent officers running for reelection. Assuming that such union members prove a statutory violation under Title I, a court might appropriately order the union to forward ballots to the claimants before completion of the election. To foreclose a court from ordering such Title I remedies during an election would not only be inefficient, but would also frustrate the purposes that Congress sought to serve by including Title I in the LMRDA. Indeed, eliminating all Title I relief in this context might preclude aggrieved union members from ever obtaining relief for statutory violations, since the more drastic remedies under Title IV are ultimately dependent upon a showing that a violation "may have affected the outcome" of the election, § 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c). [ Footnote 21 ]
an ongoing election or court supervision of a new election finds further support in our prior cases interpreting the LMRDA, and in the underlying policies of the Act that have controlled those decisions. In Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964), for example, we were faced with a preelection challenge to several union rules that controlled eligibility to run and nominate others for union office. The claimants in that case asked the court to enjoin the union from preparing for or conducting any election until the rules were revised. We first concluded that, in substance, the claims alleged violations of Title IV, rather than Title I, because the latter only protects union members against the discriminatory application of union rules. Then, given that "Congress . . . decided not to permit individuals to block or delay union elections by filing federal court suits for violations of Title IV," id. at 379 U. S. 140 ; see supra at 467 U. S. 540 , we held that the District Court could not invoke its jurisdiction under Title I to hear Title IV claims. We relied for our conclusion in part on Congress' intent
379 U.S. at 379 U. S. 140 . See also ibid. ("It is apparent that Congress decided to utilize the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary of Labor in order best to serve the public interest").
violations and in supervising new union elections. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 473 -475; Wirtz v. Laborers, 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 482 -484; Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391 U. S. 492 (1968). At the same time, we noted that another primary goal of Congress was to maximize the " amount of independence and self-government'" granted to unions. See Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., supra, at 389 U. S. 472 -473 (quoting S.Rep. No. 187, at 21); Hodgson v. Steelworkers, 403 U. S. 333 (1971). As we more fully explained in Trbovich v. Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528 (1972), Congress made suit by the Secretary under Title IV the exclusive post-election remedy for challenges to an election
Id. at 404 U. S. 532 . Thus, exclusive post-election enforcement by the Secretary serves "as a device for eliminating frivolous complaints and consolidating meritorious ones." Id. at 404 U. S. 535 .
Consistent with these policies, Trbovich cited Calhoon, supra, at 379 U. S. 140 , for the proposition that "§ 403 prohibits union members from initiating a private suit to set aside an election." 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 531 . Although this somewhat overstated our holding in Calhoon, which was limited to the exclusivity of post-election suits by the Secretary for violations of Title IV, we believe that the policies supporting Congress' decision to consolidate Title IV suits with the Secretary are equally applicable to Title I suits that seek to "set aside an election." [ Footnote 22 ] Although the important protections
We conclude that the District Court overstepped the bounds of "appropriate" relief under Title I of the LMRDA when it enjoined an ongoing union election and ordered that a new election be held pursuant to court-ordered procedures. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [ Footnote 23 ]
Allowance for actions under Title I is only narrowly circumscribed by procedural requirements such as exhaustion. Compare § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4), with NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U. S. 418 , 391 U. S. 426 -428 (1968).
An exception to this general rule is provided in § 401(c) of the Act for enforcing a candidate's right to distribution of campaign literature and equal access to membership lists. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c). See 379 U.S. at 379 U. S. 140 , n. 13.
Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 852 (1960). See Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 457 U. S. 111 ; Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 468 , n. 6.
"the right of any member of a labor union to maintain an action to compel the observance of the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization in a forthcoming election of officers, to challenge his expulsion or the imposition of other discipline, or to assert any right of individual membership other than to challenge the validity of an election. "
Most recently, in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975), we held that a decision by the Secretary not to pursue court action under Title IV is subject to limited review in the district court. At the same time, we reaffirmed the Secretary's exclusive authority to challenge and, if successful, to supervise union elections. Id. at 421 U. S. 568 -571.
"Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. "
It must be conceded that there is an inconsistency between Titles I and IV of the LMRDA. While § 102 in Title I grants district courts seemingly unqualified power to grant "such relief (including injunctions), as may be appropriate," § 403 of Title IV provides: "The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive." 73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C. § 483. As the Court points out, the legislative history contains nothing that directly addresses this apparent inconsistency. Ante at 467 U. S. 542 -543. I agree with the Court that the question presented by this case can be answered only by reference to the underlying purposes of the Act. Ante at 467 U. S. 541 -542. However, I do not agree that those purposes support today's holding.
Title I was "aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution," Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U. S. 431 , 456 U. S. 435 (1982). By securing these rights, Congress hoped to ensure unions would function in a more democratic manner. [ Footnote 2/1 ] We have previously construed § 102 of Title I to have a broad sweep, consistent with its broad remedial purposes. In Hall v. Cole, 412 U. S. 1 (1973), we wrote:
Id. at 412 U. S. 13 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 105 Cong.Rec. 15548 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Elliott), and id. at 6717 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel)). Employing this broad construction of the power conferred by § 102, we then held that an award of attorney's fees was consistent with the statute. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
The Court concedes that § 102 authorizes the issuance of limited injunctions that would not substantially delay or invalidate an election, ante at 467 U. S. 546 . The anomaly that results is that only the most serious violations of Title I go unremedied as a result of today's holding. It is only when a violation takes place in the midst of an election, produces the kind of irreparable injury that only an injunction can remedy, and is of a magnitude such that it taints the entire election and the results thereof, that the Court's holding precludes a remedy. Such an approach is plainly inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of Title I.
There is no instance in which Title I rights are of greater importance, and hence the need for their effective vindication a more compelling necessity, than in the midst of an election. We wrote in Hall that "Title I of the LMRDA was specifically designed to protect the union member's right to seek higher office within the union." 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 14 . The reason for this is clear enough:
Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U. S. 102 , 457 U. S. 112 (1982) (citations omitted). By ensuring that Title I violations which go to the heart of the electoral process will not be effectively remedied, the majority seriously undermines the core purpose of Title I.
The underlying purposes of § 403, in contrast, provide no justification for limiting the relief available under § 102. Section 403 was written before Title I was added to the LMRDA on the floor of the Senate. Thus, as the majority acknowledges ante at 467 U. S. 542 -543, there is little in Title IV's history or purpose to suggest that it was directed at limiting the relief available under Title I. At the time § 403 was drafted and discussed, its only effect was to limit the ability of state courts to invalidate union elections; that is certainly the only purpose or policy identified in the legislative history. For example, the Senate Report states:
S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1959). [ Footnote 2/3 ]
Trbovich v. Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528 , 404 U. S. 534 , n. 6 (1972). Thus, the policies underlying § 403 are a slender reed on which to support today's holding.
Moreover, what limited relevance the original intent and purpose of Title IV has is undermined by the subsequent addition of Title I on the floor of the Senate. The precise reason Title I was added to the LMRDA was because Congress concluded that Title IV did not go far enough in protecting the rights of individual union members. [ Footnote 2/4 ] In particular, Congress added § 102 because it felt that these rights had to be enforced through a private right of action. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 440 , n. 10.
in nature and should be enforced through a private right of action, rather than by the Secretary of Labor. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
its enforcement to union members, aided by courts," id. at 6721. Senator Curtis said that according the individual union member a private right of action "represents the finest means by which his rights may be protected." Id. at 6723. There are numerous other statements in the legislative history to similar effect. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Thus, whatever may have been its belief when Title IV was originally drafted, the legislative history of Title I demonstrates that Congress rejected reliance on the Secretary of Labor to vindicate Title I rights. Yet that is the precise effect of today's holding -- in those cases where the seriousness of the violation and the irreparability of the remedy would justify an injunction overturning the results of an election, the Court has decreed that union members' ability to obtain a remedy for violations of their Title I rights is left to the discretion of the Secretary, a result at odds with the fundamental reason § 102 was added to the statute. [ Footnote 2/7 ]
id. at 379 U. S. 138 . In stating its
holding, the Court never mentioned § 403, much less hold that it limited the scope of relief available under § 102. The Court simply held that the complaint in that case did not fall under § 102 because it challenged the eligibility requirements for union office, and "Title IV, not Title I, sets standards for eligibility and qualifications of candidates and officials," ibid. In this case, since the Court concedes that respondents established the probable existence of violations of § 101, it follows that, under Calhoon, there is jurisdiction to issue an "appropriate" remedy for those violations. [ Footnote 2/8 ]
I recognize that, in practice, the question whether a new election is an appropriate remedy will not be free from difficulty. In shaping a remedy, the exercise of the district court's discretion should be informed by the national labor policies discussed by the Court ante at 467 U. S. 544 , n.19, 467 U. S. 548 -549:
courts should be wary of unjustified or excessive interference in union elections and of the difficulties inherent in supervising an election; they should also accord due deference to the views of the Secretary of Labor. [ Footnote 2/9 ] However, it is unnecessary to confront any question concerning the meaning of "appropriate" relief in this case, for two reasons. First, petitioners themselves do not press the point. The questions presented in their petition for certiorari, and the thrust of their briefs, are that § 403 precluded the District Court from acting as it did. Petitioners do not argue that the District Court abused its discretion even if § 403 were not applicable here. Second, in large part, petitioners stipulated to the appropriateness of the relief in the District Court by filing stipulations indicating that they were willing to rerun the allegedly tainted election. See 521 F.Supp. 614, 618, 623 (Mass.1981); App. 55-60, 108-110. I agree with the Court of Appeals that, since the relief the District Court ultimately issued was substantially similar to what petitioners had indicated they were willing to do anyway, Judge Keeton did not abuse his discretion in fashioning a remedy. See 679 F.2d 978, 996-999 (CA1 1982).
See Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U. S. 102 , 457 U. S. 112 (1982); Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 435 -436; Hall v. Cole, 412 U. S. 1 , 412 U. S. 7 -8 (1973); Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391 U. S. 492 , 391 U. S. 497 -498 (1968).
412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 10 .
The other relevant statements in the legislative history concerning § 403 also focus on its preemptive effect with respect to state courts, see 105 Cong.Rec. 14274 (analysis of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); id. at 7632 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater); S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 (1959) (minority views); S.Rep. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-15 (1958) (report on predecessor version of the LMRDA). The majority concludes that § 403 represents a congressional recognition that judicial intervention through suits brought by private litigants is an inappropriate way to remedy unfair elections, but the only legislative history cited by the majority in support of that conclusion is the testimony of Professor Cox, and even he refers only to preemption of suits in state courts. See ante at 467 U. S. 546 -548, n. 21. See also ante at 467 U. S. 542 , n.19. The version of the LMRDA passed by the House provides little support for the Court's position that Congress was opposed to private suits to overturn union elections, since not only did the House version contain a Title I which was enforced by private suits, but also, under that version, Title IV itself was enforced by private suits, which could result in the overturning of an election. See H.R. 8342, §§ 101-102, 402, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 105 Cong.Rec. 15884, 15887 (1959). See also H.R.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1959) ("A member of a labor organization who is aggrieved by any violation of these provisions . . . may bring a civil action against such labor organization in the U.S. district court for the district in which the principal office of such labor organization is located. Such action may be for the purpose of preventing and restraining such violation and for such other relief as may be appropriate, including the holding of a new election under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor and in accordance with this title").
See Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 457 U. S. 109 ; 105 Cong.Rec. 6470-6474 (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 6476-6478; id. at 6488 (remarks of Sens. Allott and Goldwater); id. at 6490 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
See generally Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 , 379 U. S. 144 -145 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). As I have previously observed, this result leaves the individual union member's statutory rights subject to the Secretary of Labor's willingness to proceed against what may be an entrenched and politically powerful union leadership. See Hodgson v. Lodge 851, International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 564 (CA7 1971) (dissenting opinion).
The majority itself explains why two of our other cases are not controlling. Statements in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 , 421 U. S. 566 -567 (1975), concerning the preemptive effect of § 403 are correctly characterized by the majority as dicta which the majority itself repudiates as too broad. Ante at 467 U. S. 549 -550, n. 22. Similarly, the Court recognizes that Trbovich's citation of Calhoon as standing for the proposition that "§ 403 prohibits union members from initiating a private suit to set aside an election," 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 531 , was an overstatement of the holding of Calhoon. Ante at 467 U. S. 549 . Moreover, Trbovich, like Calhoon and Bachowski, involved claims properly brought under Title IV; no issue concerning the scope of § 102 was presented.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), the Secretary of Labor can intervene in Title I litigation, as he has in this case. Cf. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 536 -539 (union members may intervene in Title IV actions brought by the Secretary).