Source: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/24194.94-en-19971021/view/
Timestamp: 2017-01-22 18:13:41
Document Index: 496767046

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 115', '§ 1', '§ 17', '§ 16', '§ 26', '§ 44', '§ 18', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 17', '§ 16', '§ 18', '§ 19', '§ 18', '§ 20', '§ 18', '§ 8', '§ 18', '§ 18', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 18', '§ 16', '§ 18', '§ 1', '§ 11', '§ 51', '§ 47', '§ 19', '§ 42', '§ 19', '§ 47', '§ 31', '§ 11', '§ 20', '§ 32', '§ 11', '§ 18', '§ 54', '§ 34', '§ 34']

PIERRE-BLOCH v. FRANCE About Project
A. Whether there had been a “contestation” (dispute) over “civil rights and obligations”
B. Whether there had been a “criminal” charge
1. Legal classification of offence in French law and very nature of it
2. Nature and degree of severity of penalty
II. Article 14 of the Convention
In the case of Pierre-Bloch v. France2,
(a) for the Government Mr M. Perrin de Brichambaut, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agent, Mr O. Schrameck, Secretary-General of the Constitutional Council, Mrs M. Merlin-Desmartis, Administrative Court judge, special adviser to the Constitutional Council, Mr J. Lapouzade, Administrative Court judge on secondment to the Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mrs C. Brouard, magistrat, special adviser to the Constitutional Council, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission Mr B. Conforti, Delegate;
(c) for the applicant Ms J. Roué-Villeneuve, of the Conseil d’Etat and Court of Cassation Bar, Counsel.
A. Examination of the applicant's election campaign accounts and the disqualification from standing for election
1. Before the National Commission on Election Campaign Accounts and Political Funding
3. Before the Constitutional Council
(a) The decision of 24 November 1993
On the other hand, other pages in those five issues contain numerous photographs of the candidate or are made up of articles relating to topics addressed during his election campaign. Those pages consequently amount to election propaganda. This is true [of pages ...] ..., which helped to promote the elected candidate. To that extent, the corresponding expenditure must be seen as coming within the expenditure referred to in the first paragraph of Article L. 52-12 of the Elections Code and must be included in the candidate’s campaign accounts. Regard being had to the total cost of the publications concerned and the number of pages to be taken into account, the expenditure incurred under this head amounts to FRF 217,327.47.
(b) The application for rectification of a clerical error
B. Application of Article L. 52-15 of the Elections Code
20. In a decision of 8 April 1994 the National Commission, having deducted the accountant’s fees from the amount assessed by the Constitutional Council, set the amount which Mr Pierre-Bloch was to pay the Treasury pursuant to the last paragraph of Article L. 52-15 of the Elections Code at FRF 59,572.
II. Relevant domestic legislation and practice
A. Capping of election expenditure
1. Monitoring of parliamentary candidates’ election expenditure
23. Within two months of the ballot in which the election was won, each candidate who took part in the first round must file his campaign accounts, certified by an accountant, at the prefecture. The accounts are then sent to the National Commission on Election Campaign Accounts and Political Funding (Article L. 52-12).
(a) Scrutiny by the National Commission on Election Campaign Accounts and Political Funding
(b) Review by the Constitutional Council
28. Within the Constitutional Council there are three sections, each comprising three members drawn by lot. Lots are drawn separately among the members appointed by the President of the Republic, those appointed by the Speaker of the Senate and those appointed by the Speaker of the National Assembly.
2. Consequences of exceeding the ceiling on election expenditure
(a) Non-reimbursement of campaign expenditure
(b) Payment of a sum equivalent to the amount of the excess
“... even if it is accepted that the requirement to pay the State a sum equivalent to the amount by which the maximum permitted amount of election expenditure has been exceeded represents a penalty, that penalty is only an administrative penalty. It cannot be regarded as criminal in nature or intended to punish an offence. It does not therefore come within the scope of Article 7 of the Convention ... Moreover, where the ceiling on election expenditure has been exceeded, Article L. 113-1 of the Elections Code makes provision for the penalties of fines and imprisonment; these are criminal in nature and are not in issue in the instant case. The argument based on an infringement of the provisions of Article 7 of the European Convention in the contested decision must consequently fail.”
B. Deprivation of civic, civil and family rights
41. The Commission declared the application (no. 24194/94) admissible on 30 June 1995. In its report of 1 July 1996 (Article 31), it expressed the opinion that there had not been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (nine votes to eight), Article 13 (nine votes to eight) or Article 14 (unanimously). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the two dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment4.
At all events, the proceedings in issue had also related to a “quasi-criminal” charge and were on that account covered by Article 6 § 1. In support of that argument the applicant maintained, firstly, that the “offence” of exceeding the maximum permitted amount of election expenditure was one that concerned not solely a particular group of individuals but all citizens who could stand for election. He added that the nature of the penalties laid down reflected a punitive aim and that this gave them a criminal connotation. Disqualification from standing for election was a penalty provided in the Criminal Code and imposed on persons convicted of various serious offences; and the obligation to pay the Treasury the amount of the excess was not designed to compensate for damage but to punish conduct. It also had to be taken into account that it was possible to incur the penalties provided in Article L. 113-1 of the Elections Code (a fine of FRF 360 to FRF 15,000 and/or from one month’s to one year’s imprisonment), even though the Constitutional Council had no jurisdiction either to make a direct finding that the offence laid down by that provision had been committed or to institute criminal proceedings. It was in fact a “strict liability” offence, and a finding by the Constitutional Council that the maximum permitted amount of expenditure had been exceeded would be binding on any criminal court before which the case was brought. Lastly, the seriousness of the aforementioned penalties – which were dishonouring – likewise lent support to the view that they were criminal in nature.
1. Whether there was a “contestation” (dispute) over “civil rights and obligations”
2. Whether there was a “criminal charge”
(a) Legal classification of the offence in French law and the very nature of the offence
54. The Elections Code establishes the principle of capping election expenditure by parliamentary candidates (Article L. 52-11 – see paragraph 22 above) and monitoring compliance with that principle (see paragraphs 23–32 above). The National Commission examines the campaign accounts of all candidates and, if it considers that the maximum permitted amount has been exceeded by one of them, it refers the case to the Constitutional Council, the body with jurisdiction over the election of MPs (to which application can also be made by private individuals). Where the Constitutional Council subsequently finds that the maximum permitted amount has been exceeded, the candidate in question can be disqualified from standing for election for a period of a year (Articles L. 118-3, L.O. 128 and L.O. 136-1 – see paragraph 37 above) and he is required to pay the Treasury a sum equal to the amount of the excess as determined by the National Commission (Article L. 52-15 – see paragraph 34 above). Those provisions – the only ones relevant in the instant case – clearly do not belong to French criminal law but, as the title of the Elections Code chapter in which they appear confirms, to the rules governing the “financing and capping of election expenditure” and therefore to electoral law. Nor can a breach of a legal rule governing such a matter be described as “criminal” by nature.
(b) Nature and degree of severity of the penalty
(i) Disqualification
(ii) The obligation to pay the Treasury a sum equal to the amount of the excess
(iii) The penalties provided in Article L. 113-1 of the Elections Code
1. Holds by seven votes to two that neither Article 6 § 1 nor Article 13 of the Convention applies in this case;
2. Holds unanimously that it is unnecessary to consider the complaint based on Article 14 of the Convention.
II. Civil nature of the case
On the one hand, the Court says that the right of a French citizen “to stand for election to the National Assembly and to keep his seat” is “a political one and not a ‘civil’ one within the meaning of Article 6 § 1”5.
Where human rights are concerned, and more particularly where disputes over rights or obligations are to be determined, there is nothing to justify treating those who lay claim to a “political” right, such as those who are candidates in an election, more or less favourably than other citizens6.
III. Criminal nature of the case
“In accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms”7 in everyday language8, are these not true “penalties” and even rather serious penalties?
There is nothing to warrant the statement that such penalties are not “criminal” by nature or even that they “clearly do not belong to French criminal law”9. That cannot simply be inferred from the fact that the relevant provisions “appear in an elections code” and “belong to electoral law”10.
A penalty imposed on someone for having done what he was forbidden to do or for not having done what he was under an obligation to do does not cease to be a penalty merely because it is imposed on him under a law that is distinct from the Criminal Code, such as a regulatory offences act or road traffic code11, a tax code or tax regulations12, a code of criminal procedure13 or an ordinance concerning the privileges and powers of a parliamentary assembly14.
Of similarly small importance is the “degree of severity of the penalty”: even a minor penalty remains a penalty. It is, at all events, surprising in the present case that an amount of 59,572 French francs is not considered sufficiently large for it to constitute a “criminal” penalty for the purposes of Article 6 § 115, when it was accepted that 60 German marks were sufficient in the Öztürk case16, 300 Swiss francs in the Weber case17 and 250 Maltese liri in the Demicoli case18.
5. Paragraph 50 of the judgment.
6. The Court is accordingly also wrong, in my view, to have said several times that disputes relating to the “recruitment, careers and termination of service of civil servants”, who are distinguished from “employees governed by private law”, “are as a general rule outside the scope of Article 6 § 1” (see, among other authorities, the following judgments: Francesco Lombardo v. Italy, 26 November 1992, Series A no. 249-B, p. 26, § 17; Giancarlo Lombardo v. Italy, 26 November 1992, Series A no. 249-C, p. 42, § 16; Massa v. Italy, 24 August 1993, Series A no. 265-B, p. 20, § 26; and Neigel v. France, 17 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, p. 411, § 44; and the judgments delivered on 2 September 1997 in the following cases: Spurio v. Italy, Reports 1997-V, pp. 1580-81, § 18; Gallo v. Italy, ibid., p. 1591, § 19; Zilaghe v. Italy, ibid., p. 1602, § 19; Laghi v. Italy, ibid., p. 1614, § 17; Viero v. Italy, ibid., p. 1626, § 16; Orlandini v. Italy, ibid., p. 1637, § 18; Ryllo v. Italy, ibid., pp. 1648-49, § 19; Soldani v. Italy, ibid., p. 1719, § 18; Fusco v. Italy, ibid., p. 1732, § 20; Di Luca and Saluzzi v. Italy, ibid., p. 1744, § 18; Pizzi v. Italy, ibid., p. 1754, § 8; Scarfò v. Italy, ibid., pp. 1767-68, § 18; Argento v. Italy, ibid., pp. 1779-80, § 18; and Trombetta v. Italy, ibid., pp. 1791-92, § 21). It has, however, recognised the “civil character” of “an obligation on the State to pay a pension to a public servant” or “to a judge in accordance with the legislation in force” or to pay, similarly, a reversionary pension to the husband of a public servant. It explained this by remarking that “[the State] may be compared, in this respect, to an employer who is a party to a contract of employment governed by private law” (Francesco Lombardo, Giancarlo Lombardo and Massa judgments cited above). Why only in that “respect”? Very recently, the Court seems similarly to have accepted, more generally, in four cases concerning remuneration issues, that a civil servant relies on a civil right when what is concerned is a “purely economic right legally derived from her work” (see the Lapalorcia v. Italy judgment of 2 September 1997, Reports 1997-V, p. 1677, § 21; see also the judgments delivered on the same day in the cases of De Santa v. Italy, ibid., p. 1663, § 18; Abenavoli v. Italy, ibid., p. 1690, § 16, and Nicodemo v. Italy, ibid., p. 1703, § 18). Why should the same not apply to the other rights attaching to the performance of the duties of what is called the “civil service”?
7. Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
8. See, mutatis mutandis, my dissenting opinion in the Putz v. Austria judgment of 22 February 1996, Reports 1996-I, pp. 329–34, in particular paragraphs 2–7.
9. Paragraph 54 of the judgment.
10. Ibid. This does not prevent the Court from recognising in paragraph 60 the criminal “nature” of the fines and imprisonment provided in Article L. 131-1 of the same Elections Code for the same offence.
11. Öztürk v. Germany judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A no. 73, p. 9, § 11, and pp. 18–21, §§ 51–53.
12. See the following judgments: Bendenoun v. France, 24 February 1994, Series A no. 284, p. 20, § 47; A.P., M.P. and T.P. v. Switzerland, 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V, p. 1784, § 19, and p. 1488, § 42; and E.L., R.L. and J.O.-L. v. Switzerland, 29 August 1997, Reports 1997-V, p. 1515, § 19, and p. 1520, § 47.
13. Weber v. Switzerland judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A no. 177, pp. 17–18, § 31.
14. Demicoli v. Malta judgment of 27 August 1991, Series A no. 210, p. 9, § 11, pp. 12–13, § 20, and pp. 16–17, §§ 32–33.
15. The Court remains cautiously silent on this matter in paragraphs 58 and 59 of the judgment.
16. Öztürk judgment cited above, p. 9, § 11, p. 10, § 18, and p. 21, § 54. In this case the maximum provided in the Act was 1,000 marks; the Court observed: “The relative lack of seriousness of the penalty at stake … cannot divest an offence of its inherently criminal character.”
17. Weber judgment cited above, p. 18, § 34.
18. Demicoli judgment cited above, p. 17, § 34.
PIERRE-BLOCH JUDGMENT OF 21 OCTOBER 1997 PIERRE-BLOCH JUDGMENT PIERRE-BLOCH JUDGMENT – DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER PIERRE-BLOCH JUDGMENT