Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-edwards-239
Timestamp: 2019-09-18 11:47:42
Document Index: 399704312

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 2923', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922']

U.S. v. Edwards, 669 F. Supp. 168 | Casetext
669 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Ohio 1987)
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, W.DAug 5, 1987
Kathleen M. Brinkman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff.
The defendant was indicted for knowingly possessing a firearm in and affecting commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) after having been convicted three times for violent felonies within the definition contained in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2).
On March 9, 1987, the defendant pled guilty to violating Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.13 which provides, in relevant portions of subsection (A)(2) that "no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry or use firearm or dangerous ordinance, if . . . [s]uch person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony of violence. . . ." Defendant argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is merely the federal counterpart to the state charge of having a weapon while under disability for which the defendant has already been arrested, charged, convicted and sentenced by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. The defendant specifically refers to the part of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) which provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person (1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition;".
In support of this contention, defendant cites Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970) in which the United States Supreme Court declared that double jeopardy exists where an offender is first prosecuted for violation of a city ordinance and then charged with a violation of state law based on the same acts that were involved in the violation of the ordinance. The situation here, however, is not analogous to that in Waller in that the defendant is being prosecuted twice by different sovereigns. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, an act which violates both state and federal law may be prosecuted by both sovereigns. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a prosecution or conviction for a federal crime after conviction for the identical state crime. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194, 79 S.Ct. 666, 670, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381, 43 S.Ct. 141, 142, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922) and cases cited therein. See United States v. Strong, 778 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985) wherein, in dicta, Abbate was applied to successive firearms prosecutions. The Sixth Circuit has applied Lanza to successive gambling prosecutions. Smith v. United States, 243 F.2d 877, 878 (6th Cir. 1957).
The Supreme Court, in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 S.Ct. 433 (1985), discussed the dual sovereignty doctrine as it is found in this case. Quoting from Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19, 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852), the Heath court explained:
When a defendant in a single act violates the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct "offenses." United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382, 43 S.Ct. 141, 142-43, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922). The crucial determination, then, is whether the two entities can be termed separate sovereigns drawing their authority to punish from distinct sources of power. The Supreme Court has uniformly held that the States are separate sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because each State's power to prosecute is derived from its own "inherent sovereignty," not from the Federal Government. 106 S.Ct. at 437.
Furthermore, as also discussed in United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 105 S.Ct. 611, 83 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), a defendant's claims of double jeopardy must be denied when the statutes involved are directed to separate evils. The language of the statute belies such an argument. Where the Ohio statute punishes a person who "has been convicted of any felony of violence," the federal statute under which this defendant was indicted requires proof that the defendant "possess in or affecting commerce any firearm or ammunition." This would also obviate a finding of no double jeopardy under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), because the federal statute requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
The cases cited to this Court by the Government support the general rule that a guilty plea is admissible in a subsequent collateral criminal trial to prove an element of crime charged. United States v. Riley, 684 F.2d 542, 544-45 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Howze, 668 F.2d 322, 323 (7th Cir. 1982); Howell v. United States, 442 F.2d 265, 273 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111, 103 S.Ct. 742, 74 L.Ed.2d 962 (1983); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001, 87 S.Ct. 703, 17 L.Ed.2d 541 (1967); Myers v. United States, 49 F.2d 230, 231 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 866, 51 S.Ct. 657, 75 L.Ed. 1470 (1931).
When the defect reaches constitutional dimension, . . . attacks on the guilty plea raised for the first time in a collateral proceeding must be considered. This is especially true in a case, such as this, when a defendant may have had no idea of the extreme nature of the collateral consequences of his plea. The guilty plea here virtually precludes any effective defense to the gun possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h). For this reason, the court must be certain the plea was constitutionally firm.
Unlike Howze, this defendant did not take the stand in this Court to testify as to all of the circumstances surrounding his decision to plead guilty to the state gun charges (although he did take the stand to testify concerning the circumstances surrounding his arrest and the seizure of the gun.) He did assert that he had not been given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). If true, this clearly violates his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), however, according to this record, no extrajudicial statements were made.
The defendant unknowingly lost the right to confront witnesses at the second trial and, in effect, plead guilty to the federal crime. This is not an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). As further noted by the Howze court, quoting from Boykin:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth. . . . Second, is the right to trial by jury. . . . Third, is the right to confront one's accusors. . . .
395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.