Source: https://m.openjurist.org/344/f2d/798
Timestamp: 2019-07-18 14:30:38
Document Index: 484893578

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 912', '§ 912', '§ 32', '§ 76']

344 F2d 798 Honea v. United States | OpenJurist
344 F. 2d 798 - Honea v. United States
344 F2d 798 Honea v. United States
344 F.2d 798
See also Russell v. United States, 1962, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240; 4 Barron, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1913 and 1964 Supp. § 1913 (Wright ed.). "An indictment or information in the language of the statute [as here] ordinarily is sufficient, except where the words of the statute do not contain all of the essential elements of the offense; but if the statute omits an essential element, the indictment must supply it with certainty." Babb v. United States, 5 Cir., 218 F.2d 538, 539. One of the laudable reforms of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was to eliminate the necessity for much of the cumbersome claptrap which typically encased the common law indictment. See F.R.Cr. P. 7. Yet "the substantial safeguards to those charged with serious crimes cannot be eradicated under the guise of technical departures from the rules." Smith v. United States, 1959, 360 U.S. 1, 9, 79 S. Ct. 991, 997, 3 L.Ed.2d 1041. It is often said that an indictment must (a) apprise the defendant of what he will have to meet and (b) protect him from double jeopardy. This indictment is sufficient as to (b), but, as in Russell, insufficient as to (a).
"Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and [1] acts as such, or [2] in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both." Brackets ([1] and [2]) are inserted to facilitate classification and discussion of the two separate kinds of offenses under § 912
The indictment obviously was intended to — and certainly does no more than — charge Honea with committing offense [2] under § 912. See note 1, supra
Nevertheless, the Judge charged the jury, as requested by Honea's counsel, that intent to defraud was a necessary element of the offense
Act of March 4, 1909, c. 321, § 32, 35 Stat. 1095, as amended, Act of February 28, 1938, c. 37, 52 Stat. 83, formerly codified as 18 U.S.C.A. § 76 (1940)
Judge Holtzoff, who assisted in the revision, offers this explanation in the Preface to Title 18 U.S.C.A., Vol. 1, p. v, vi:
318 U.S. at 704, 63 S.Ct. at 916
Counsel for Honea challenged the admissibility of testimony relating to the instance where Honea obtained the $10,000 both by a pretrial motion to restrict Government evidence and by excepting to the trial Court's charge to the jury that proof of a greater or lesser sum than that alleged in the indictment was irrelevant