Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/177/503/475465/
Timestamp: 2019-05-19 10:29:02
Document Index: 787865545

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13']

Everett A. Ellis, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Joe Diffie et al., Defendants-appellees, 177 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 1999) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1999 › Everett A. Ellis, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Joe Diffie et al., Defendants-appellees
Everett A. Ellis, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Joe Diffie et al., Defendants-appellees, 177 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 1999)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 177 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 1999)
Argued and Submitted March 10, 1999. Decided and Filed May 17, 1999
"Clear error" is defined most famously in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948): "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 395.
To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1991); Hi-Tech Video Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1095 (6th Cir. 1995). Because Ellis's ownership of a copyright to "Lay Me Out" is not disputed, the sole question is whether it was copied. Direct evidence of copying is rare, so frequently the plaintiff will attempt to establish an inference of copying by showing (1) access to the allegedly-infringed work by the defendant(s) and (2) a substantial similarity between the two works at issue. See Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 276-77 (6th Cir. 1988); Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 739 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 1984); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.02 [B] (revised 1998).
The district court also found, however, that Ellis did not meet his burden of proving that the defendant songwriters had access to a recording of "Lay Me Out." Access is essentially "hearing or having a reasonable opportunity to hear the plaintiff ['s] work and thus having the opportunity to copy." Tree Publ'g Co. v. Warner Bros. Records, 785 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (M.D. Tenn. 1991); see also 4 NIMMER § 13.02 [A]. Although "evidence that a third party with whom both the plaintiff and defendant were concurrently dealing had possession of plaintiff's work is sufficient to establish access by the defendant," " [a]ccess may not be inferred through mere speculation or conjecture." 4 NIMMER § 13.02 [A] (citations omitted). In this case, the district court was not persuaded that Slate ever had a copy of Ellis's song "Lay Me Out." At trial, Ellis presented some evidence from which a trier of fact could draw the conclusion that the defendant songwriters had access to his work through Slate, but it required a somewhat speculative inferential chain, which the district court did not find convincing based on his evaluation of the evidence and witness testimony before him. Moreover, access to Ellis's work is not the same as access to the song "Lay Me Out." Paying due deference to the district court's factual determinations and credibility judgments, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err. The Gypsum standard requires a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," and we have no such conviction here. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395.
Some case law indicates that the stronger the similarity between the two works in question, the less compelling the proof of access needs to be. See generally 4 NIMMER § 13.02 [B]; see also, e.g., Repp v. Lloyd Webber, 858 F. Supp. 1292, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("where the copyrighted work and the infringing work are 'strikingly similar,' the test for proof of access is less rigorous"), rev'd on other grounds, 132 F.3d 882 (2d Cir. 1997); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1984) ("absent proof of access, the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that the defendant independently arrived at the same result" (internal quotation omitted)). Although the district court did not explicitly analyze the case this way, its finding that the choruses alone have substantial similarities, coupled with its footnote about the other differences between the songs, can be read to reject implicitly an argument that the similarity is striking enough to minimize the need for Ellis to show access. The real problem with Ellis's proof, from the district court's perspective, was Ellis's inability to prove that "Lay Me Out" was actually recorded for Slate and left in his possession at all.
The ordinary observer test requires the trier of fact to gauge the similarities of the two works solely on the basis of his "net impression" and without relying on expert analysis or dissection. 4 NIMMER § 13.03 [E]. Also called the "audience" test, this approach has been criticized by at least one treatise-writer as formulaic, riddled with exceptions, increasingly less useful with the higher-technology works that are coming to dominate copyright law, and on questionable doctrinal footing. Id. § 13.03 [E] [b]. Nonetheless, it is and has been for decades the most common approach to copyright cases, and "until the Supreme Court validates or negates the audience test, the copyright bar will be left in suspense as to its ultimate validity." Id. § 13.03 [E]