Source: https://casetext.com/case/anderson-v-city-of-atlanta
Timestamp: 2019-02-22 20:51:03
Document Index: 662632687

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2818']

Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678 | Casetext
778 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1985)
Andersonv.City of Atlanta
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh CircuitDec 16, 1985
…Taylor, DKC-10-2167, 2010 WL 5247903, at *2. To be sure, "Monell . . . and its progeny do not require that a…
…Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a new trial or…
holding that “[t]he jury could reasonably find that a policy of understaffing resulted in the unavailability of medical personnel and prevented individual officers from being able to do their tasks properly,” and that the defendant city “knew or should have known that the natural consequence of this failure to adequately staff the jail would impair proper medical care and attention necessary to protect the health of pre-trial detainees”
Summary of this case from Wilson v. Americare Sys., Inc.
finding jury award of punitive damages proper where evidence showed defendants&apos; actions motivated by racial animus and desire to punish
upholding jury&apos;s finding that if the city had not utilized a policy of inadequately staffing the detention center, the pre-trial detainee would not have died from drug overdose in the Fulton County jail
Summary of this case from James v. Bartow Cnty.
I. FACTS [2] A. Procedural History.
This civil rights action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges constitutional violations which plaintiffs contend resulted in the death of Larry Gene Anderson while he was in custody at the Atlanta Pre-trial Detention Center. Named as defendants were the individual police officers involved in the arrest of Larry Gene Anderson, R.L. Kelly, W.R. Burks, A. Bieri and M.T. Pickering. Also named as defendants were George Napper, the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety; Morris Redding, the Chief of Police of the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services; J.D. Hudson, the Director of Bureau of Corrections of the City of Atlanta; and the City of Atlanta.
The entire City Council of the City of Atlanta and Mayor Andrew Young were originally named as defendants. Their motion to dismiss was granted by the court and that order is not appealed.
In the early morning hours of January 4, 1983, while on routine patrol, Officer Kelly, of the Atlanta Police Department, observed an automobile, carrying six passengers and being driven by a white female, pull into the parking lot of a closed business. Officer Kelly observed the woman exit the car and walk around in a manner which indicated she was unsteady on her feet. He investigated and determined that the woman, Sherry Nelson, was intoxicated. He then arrested her for driving under the influence. Larry Gene Anderson, one of the passengers in the car, then approached Officer Kelly and stated that he was the person driving the vehicle. He subsequently changed his statement and maintained that he was not driving the vehicle. Based upon Anderson's statement and maintained that Officer Kelly had seen the woman driving the car, Mr. Anderson was arrested for making a false statement to a police officer. While Officer Kelly was verifying information given to him by Ms. Nelson, Elizabeth Jones, another passenger in the car, attempted to shift gears in the vehicle and gave Officer Kelly the impression she was attempting to leave. Officer Kelly then arrested Ms. Jones for driving under the influence. While Officer Kelly was filling out his paper work, Billy Moncus, another occupant of the vehicle, approached Officer Kelly in order to ask several questions regarding the arrest of his friends. As Mr. Moncus walked back to the vehicle, Officer Kelly observed the outline of what he believed to be a gun in Mr. Moncus' back pocket. Moncus was then arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. A paddy wagon was called to transport the prisoners and a female officer was summoned in order to search the female prisoners. Officer Pickering arrived with a paddy wagon and Officer Anna Bieri responded to the call for a female officer.
When Officer Kelly initially observed the vehicle being driven by Ms. Nelson, he indicated by radio that he was taking action. Sergeant Burks who was Officer Kelly's immediate supervisor, was in the vicinity and overheard the call. As a result, he drove by the parking lot. Upon observing that Officer Kelly had the situation under control, defendant Burks left the scene but returned a short time later.
There are two issues on appeal: (1) Whether the trial court properly granted the City of Atlanta's and J.D. Hudson's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and (2) Whether the trial court properly granted a new trial should this court not agree with its decision to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
II. THE LEGAL ISSUES IN CONTEXT [15] A. Did the District Court Properly Grant Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 1. The district court's decision and the Standard of Review.
The court finds that there is no evidence of record to support 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability against either defendant, J.D. Hudson, a supervisor with no personal participation, or the municipality itself, the City of Atlanta. All defendants having any actual participation in the incarceration of plaintiff's deceased had verdicts rendered in their favor. See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 [ 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420] (1981).
In reviewing the district court's decision to grant the motion for judgment N.O.V., we must consider all of the evidence in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that reasonable persons could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, then the district court's decision to grant the motion was proper. Dresco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Todd-CEA, Inc., 531 F.2d 1292, 1296 (5th Cir. 1976). If there was substantial evidence opposed to the motion, i.e., evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, then the district court's decision to grant the motion would be improper. Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
In this case we believe that the district court's decision to grant defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was erroneous. The evidence indicates the following. Several police officers testified that the pre-trial detention center was inadequately staffed and that it was very difficult to do one's job properly. For example, Officer Marshall testified that he often worked a double shift at both the new and old detention centers because "there was a shortage of officers." (TR V at 66-67). Most importantly for the purpose of this case he testified that they were short four or five officers on his shift, i.e., 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M., on January 3 and 4, 1983, when Larry Gene Anderson died at the pre-trial detention center. (TR V at 69). Additionally, he testified that he was in receiving alone that night because another officer assigned to receiving, Officer Snipes, was off doing someone else's job. (TR V at 77).
He testified that he worked a double shift on the day of Mr. Anderson's death.
He testified that Officer Pickering, who brought Anderson to the detention center, informed him that Mr. Anderson had taken a large quantity of pills. (TR V at 72). However, Officer Pickering denied having any knowledge that Mr. Anderson had taken any drugs and also denied making the statement to Officer Marshall. (TR IV at 57). However, Pickering did testify that Mr. Anderson appeared intoxicated. (TR IV at 69). Mr. Anderson also told Officer Marshall that he was overdosing on drugs and that he was sick and needed to go to the hospital. (TR V at 77 and 87). Marshall testified that he took no action because there was no medical staff present on that shift. (TR V at 80 and 89). Additionally, he testified that there was only one officer on duty on each floor in the pre-trial detention center on the night of January 3rd and 4th even though two officers were required. Finally, he indicated that it was very busy and hectic that evening and due to the shortage of staff it was impossible to check on the inmates as often as needed. (TR V at 90).
According to Officer Marshall's testimony, the screening form that Marshall filled out also indicated Mr. Anderson was under the influence of drugs and had said he was overdosing. However, the form itself could not subsequently be located. Director Hudson disputed whether Marshall ever in fact filled it out. (TR VI at 373).
This is verified by the testimony by Mr. Carl Weisgerber. He testified that the only guard on the floor was in a soundproof booth.
Lieutenant Sarah B. Irvin, the shift commander that evening, testified that no medical staff worked on her shift from 12:00 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. (TR V at 116). She testified that the medical staff's shift ran only until midnight, thus, they had "only an hour's coverage." (TR V at 106) ( See infra slip op. pg. 1220, pg. 684 for further discussion). Further, she testified that there were not enough officers on duty and that four to six more officers could have been used for the shift. (TR V at 117). It was her belief that more officers were needed in the new jail due to its size. (TR V at 116). She stated that she had received complaints from officers on her shift regarding the understaffing and that she had spoken to her supervisors about the need for more personnel and that she finally quit asking because "it was like whipping a dead horse." (TR V at 116-117). She also testified that it is standard operating procedure for her, as shift commander, to check on every detainee at least once during her shift but that she was not able to check on Mr. Anderson. (TR V at 123).
Plaintiff also called two expert witnesses. Dr. Paul Siehl, a physician employed by Correctional Medical Systems, testified regarding minimum health care standards at jails. Essentially he testified that if a correctional officer knows or has reason to believe that a detainee has taken a large quantity of drugs, he should immediately notify the health care provider to examine the patient. (TR IV at 37-38). William Alexander was also called. He was employed by Correctional Medical Systems as a director of operations overseeing the health care in a number of correctional institutions in Georgia. (TR IV at 40-41). The Fulton County Jail was one of the facilities. (TR IV at 41). He testified that if an individual detainee states that he is overdosing on drugs, the person needs to be referred to someone who can properly evaluate the complaint, preferably medical personnel at the facility. If none is available, the detainee should be referred to a community hospital or an outside facility where health care can be provided. (TR IV at 45-57). Mr. Alexander testified for plaintiff under subpoena and not voluntarily. (TR IV at 47).
He testified that medical personnel would include a physician, physician's assistant, registered nurse, LPN or medical assistant clinician. (TR IV at 36).
J.D. Hudson, Director of Bureau of Corrections for the City of Atlanta, testified that as Director of the Bureau of Corrections, he established the formal policies of the City of Atlanta to insure the health and safety of the inmates. (TR V at 244). According to his testimony, the minimum number of officers required on any given shift at the Atlanta Pre-trial Detention Center was 23. (TR V at 216). He also testified that it was his belief that the average number of officers on duty at the pre-trial detention center on any given shift was 13. (TR V at 217). Director Hudson, however, did not at any time admit that the jail was understaffed. He testified, "[t]he jail that we operate is a state of the art. We have adequate staff that has been trained and retained. . . . We have some of the best officers, the most professional officers in the country, and one of the best jails in the country. It is not understaffed." (TR V at 217).
However, he stated the question was best asked of Mr. Pocock, who was in charge of day-to-day operation of the jail. (TR VI at 216).
He did indicate, reluctantly, that he had received complaints from officers that more personnel was needed. (TR V at 222). Furthermore, Standard Operating Procedure No. 81-10-SOP-BCS, issued and signed by him as director, set out the duties to be performed by the health care provider during all shifts, including the 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. shift; however, no health care provider was required to be at the center on the 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. shift. Medical personnel were on call, either by beeper or phone. (TR VI at 239). The standard operating procedures and special orders issued by Hudson further called for a full complement of staffing of health care personnel at the Pre-trial Detention Center on a 24 hour, seven day a week basis. (TR VI at 243). A nurse was required to be on duty to make a visual observation of each detainee brought into the Pre-trial Detention Center to assess normal appearance and conditions versus abnormal appearance and to inspect the detainee's physical anatomy. (TR VI at 249). However, no nurse was ever hired to perform these duties on the 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. shift. (TR VI at 250-251). Mr. Hudson further testified that part of the standard operating procedures required for the detention areas to be checked every 30 minutes for the health and well-being of the detainees. (TR VI at 243).
Mr. Hudson did testify that shift Sergeant Sharon Green Pope, who was a licensed emergency medical technician and thus "a health care provider" within the meaning of the standard operating procedures and special orders, was frequently the assistant supervisor of the night watch. She was not on duty the night of Larry Gene Anderson's death. (TR VI at 250-251).
Most importantly, for the purposes of this case, he testified that he saw Mr. Anderson that night at the Detention Center and that he could not walk without the support of the officers and that Mr. Anderson told the officers that he was having trouble seeing and that he was sick and needed to go to a hospital. (TR V at 185). He further indicated that it was obvious from Mr. Anderson's looks that he was heavily under the influence of drugs and that he could not stand alone, his eyes were very red, and he was slobbering. (TR V at 185). Additionally, he testified that the officers were complaining about the lack of personnel and that they could not do their jobs properly. (TR V at 190).
Mr. Pocock testified that he did not believe, based upon the physical layout of the Detention Center, that it would have been possible for Weisgerber to have been Anderson. (TR VI at 357-59).
The Fulton County Medical Examiner, Doctor Stivers also testified at trial. He stated that Mr. Anderson could have lived from the amount of drugs that he ingested. His testimony was that Mr. Anderson died at approximately 4:00 A.M. from acute barbiturate intoxication. (TR V at 141). His death was in all probability preceded by at least some period in a coma. (TR V at 143). Despite the officers' testimony that they checked on Mr. Anderson at 4:30 A.M. and at 6:00 A.M., his testimony indicated that this was unlikely. He did not believe that Mr. Anderson could have spoken or stood up at these times. (TR V at 145). This testimony was based upon his examination and autopsy of Larry Gene Anderson. Mr. Anderson was not found dead in his cell until about 9:25 A.M. At this time, full rigor mortise and lividity had set in and Dr. Stivers stated that this process took at least several hours after death. He placed the time of death somewhere between 4:00 A.M. and 5:00 A.M. (TR V at 145).
The Supreme Court recently reiterated in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985), that a municipality cannot be subjected to § 1983 liability "based upon theories akin to respondeat superior." Tuttle, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 2433. Thus, only deprivations arising from municipal custom or policy can result in municipal liability. Id.; see also Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc). When an injury is inflicted as the result of governmental policy or custom, the government is responsible under § 1983. Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037.
A policy or custom generally applies to a course of action chosen from among various alternatives. Furthermore, at a minimum, a plaintiff must demonstrate some affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged. Tuttle, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 2436. See also Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380-81 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335, 78 L.Ed.2d 305 (1983).
In Monell, supra, the Court stated: "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury," the city may be liable. 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037.
Contrary to appellees' assertions, the verdict against the City in this case was not based upon single incident liability. A municipality can generally not be liable for a single act of negligence or misconduct. See Tuttle, supra; Gilmere, supra (no municipal liability where failure properly to train one police officer is not attributable to city policy or custom). If the City's evidence had shown that the jail was understaffed on the evening in question as an isolated event, this case would be within the parameters of Tuttle, supra. However, the jury instruction specifically required the jury to find a pattern or practice of incidents of indifference. There was sufficient proof here to support such a finding. Several officers testified that understaffing was a persistent problem and that complaints had been lodged with their supervisors, including J.D. Hudson. Certainly this is sufficient to show a custom or policy of understaffing. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to show an affirmative link between the policy and the death of Mr. Anderson.
Contrary to the City's position, the relevant authorities do not require a plaintiff to show a prior accident resulting in injury. A pattern or practice of understaffing is sufficient, regardless of whether it previously resulted in injury to an inmate.
[t]he language of § 1983 "plainly imposes liability on a government that, under color of some official policy, `causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights." Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 [ 98 S.Ct. at 2036]. Although the acts or omissions of no one employee may violate an individual's constitutional rights, the combined acts or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental policy or custom may violate an individual's constitutional rights.
Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 310 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Monell, supra).
The City also asserts, relying upon Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), that this case is not properly the subject of a § 1983 action. The district court in a cryptic reference also mentioned Parratt. In Gilmere, supra, the en banc court made clear that Parratt does not extend to actions alleging violations of substantive due process rights or rights protected by specific constitutional guarantees. Since plaintiff alleged and proved in this case that the defendants deprived Mr. Anderson of his right to life through deliberate indifference to serious medical needs while detaining him in a jail, this is a proper § 1983 cause of action.
Using these standards, the above summary of the testimony and proof at trial indicates that there was certainly enough evidence to permit the jury to return a verdict against Director Hudson and the City of Atlanta that was not founded upon respondeat superior. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Director Hudson, whose acts may be fairly said to represent official policy of the City of Atlanta, knew that the Pre-trial Detention Center was inadequately staffed and that it was difficult for the officers to perform their jobs properly. Thus, it was possible for the jury to decide that there was a conscious decision on the part of Director Hudson and therefore, the City of Atlanta, not to increase the staff at the Detention Center in the face of complaints of inadequate staffing. The result of this decision was that officers were unable to perform their jobs properly. Furthermore, the jury could have found that Director Hudson and the City of Atlanta knew or should have known that the natural consequence of this failure to adequately staff the jail would impair proper medical care and attention necessary to protect the health of pre-trial detainees.
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is a tort of constitutional dimension. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Pretrial detainees are entitled to the same, if not greater, medical care as are convicted inmates. See Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1985). Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs may be shown by proving a policy of deficiencies in staffing or procedures such that the inmate is effectively denied access to adequate medical care. Ancata, supra; see also Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1985); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 578 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981).
Furthermore, the court went to great length in its charge to the jury to instruct them as to the degree of proof necessary to determine whether the City of Atlanta and Director Hudson were legally liable to plaintiff. The relevant section of the instructions stated:
In Tuttle, supra, the Court in part relied upon the inadequacy of the jury instruction in reversing a finding of municipal liability. 105 S.Ct. at 2435. The instruction here, however, correctly stated the applicable law.
Now, a custom is a persistent practice of officials which is so well settled that it has the same force as a legislative pronouncement, requiring a showing of settled government practice or deeply embedded ways of carrying out city policy. They cannot — that is, a city cannot be held liable for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. It is only when that — when the execution of the government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts and acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held liable.
In order for the plaintiff to prove that a municipal policy or practice caused a constitutional violation, the plaintiff must prove an affirmative link between the various incidents of policy misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by the municipality or supervisory official showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. The mere under-staffing, without more, is not proof of such practice, policy, or custom. It would become so only if a more complete staffing were possible financially or otherwise, and that it was the deliberate intent of the policy making officials not to adequately staff the hospital, having in mind a gross indifference to the needs of the prospective prisoners for medical attention.
There may be many reasons for an under-staffing of a municipal or a governmental facility; finances, the finding of persons's [sic] causes too numerous for the court to mention, but to establish the type of policy which you must establish — find established here by a preponderance of the evidence introduced by the plaintiff is a policy coupled or having as an ingredient of that the conscious indifference to the needs of prisoners for the adequate medical attention.
Although not at issue in this case, we note our disapproval of parts of this instruction given, most especially the references to the fact that lack of finances may be a permissible reason for understaffing. Lack of funds for facilities cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent medical care or treatment of inmates. See Newman v. State of Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct. 3144, 57 L.Ed.2d 1160.
In the district court's order he stated that in the event that the Eleventh Circuit did not agree with his decision to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict he would grant defendant's motion for a new trial because he believed that "the verdict was based principally on adverse reaction by the jury to the defendant Hudson's impatient and defensive demeanor while on the stand rather than to the substance of his testimony or any other evidence of record — in other words, that he antagonized the jury."
Generally, a district court's decision to grant a motion for a new trial is not appealable. However, if an appeal is properly taken from a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court, on holding that the J.N.O.V. was erroneous, has the power to review a conditional order of the trial court granting a new trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(c); see also Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2818, at 115. In this case the district court alternatively granted the motion for a new trial because it believed that Hudson antagonized the jury. When the district court grants a new trial for reasons unrelated to the weight of the evidence but rather having to do with what it believes to be some "distortion" in the trial process, then we review the district court's decision only for abuse of discretion. O'Neil v. W.R. Grace Co., 410 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969).