Source: http://piblawg.co.uk/category/travel
Timestamp: 2017-06-28 03:42:20
Document Index: 359524974

Matched Legal Cases: ['EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'art 20', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ']

piBlawg | travel
The Court of Appeal overturned her decision saying she had failed to ask herself the ultimate question whether the flying ember theory was more likely or not to be true. The fact that no other possible causes were identified, in large part because there was no investigation at the time, did not make it more probable than not the fire was caused by a flying ember. As Roderick Abbot observed in his blog post “Sherlock Holmes in the Court of Appeal”, the exercise is not one of identifying the least unlikely cause. The Claimant had failed to discharge the burden of proof and that was all the judge was required to find. Quantum
Billett v Ministry of Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 773 concerns how courts should assess damages for loss of future earning capacity in circumstances where the claimant suffers from a minor disability, is in steady employment and is earning at his full pre-accident rate. Should the court follow the traditional Smith v Manchester approach or should the court use the Ogden Tables, suitably adjusted? C suffered from a minor Non Freezing Cold Injury (“NFCI”) which had a substantial impact on his day to day life in cold weather. The condition had less impact on his work as a lorry driver than it had on his leisure activities. The judge found that his loss of future earning capacity should be assessed by using Ogden Tables A and B, suitably adjusted, not by applying Smith v Manchester.
In South West Strategic Health Authority v Bay Island Voyages [2015] EWCA Civ 708 the CA considered two issues relating to the Athens Convention (which governs personal injury to passengers at sea). The first was whether it extended to claims against carriers for contribution to liability of others and the second was the effect of the time bar prescribed by the convention. Dr Feest was injured in a boating accident in the Bristol Channel. The carrier was Bay Island Voyages (“BIV”). Dr Feest’s first firm of solicitors failed to issue against BIV within the 2 year time limit under the Convention and so she sued her employer SWSHA on the basis the accident occurred in the course of her employment. SWSHA joined BIV who successfully applied to have the Part 20 proceedings struck out. The Court of Appeal found that the provisions of the convention were not directly applicable to SWSHA’s claim against BIV. It also found that the time bar in Article 16 did not extinguish the cause of action but only barred the remedy: this was critical for SWSHA’s contribution claim as, if the limitation provisions had extinguished the right to bring the claim, under the provisions of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 SWSHA could only have brought a claim within 2 years of the accident. Ian Miller, who represented SWSHA with John Ross QC, blogged on the case: “Contribution, limitation and the Athens Convention.”
The Court of Appeal in NA v Nottingham County Council [2015] EWCA Civ 1139 held that a local authority was not vicariously liable for the abuse of a child by the foster carers with which it placed her, nor did it owe her a non-delegable duty to protect her from harm. The relationship between the local authority and the foster carers was not sufficiently akin to one of employment to give rise to vicarious liability. On the issue of a non-delegable duty all three members of the court of appeal gave different reasons summarised in our November 2015 PI Briefing. In brief, Tomlinson LJ held that the local authority had discharged rather than delegated its duty in placing the child with foster carers. Burnett LJ held that what the Claimant sought to do was to expand the common law imposing a strict duty on local authorities on the basis that foster parents were not always able to satisfy a claim. Black LJ held that it would not be fair just and reasonable to apply such a duty; in fact it would be unreasonably burdensome and potentially harmful if it led to over cautious practice.
case report, Damages, employers liability, personal injury, travel
In South West Strategic Health Authority v Bay Island Voyages [2015] EWCA Civ 708 the Court of Appeal considered the scope of the Athens Convention and the nature of the time-bar in Article 16. In coming to its decision, the Court also considered sections 5(1) and 5(2) of the Carriage by Air Act 1961.
John Ross QC and Ian Miller of 1 Chancery Lane acted for the successful appellant.
There is a phrase in Northern Ireland, where I am from: “as clear as muck”, which is what comes to mind when attempting to fathom the meaning of the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ exception to compensation under the Denied Boarding Regulations (Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004). Reading the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jet2.com Limited v Huzar (‘Huzar’, [2014] EWCA Civ 791), it is clear that I am in good company. Whilst this appeal concerns fixed compensation for flight delay under the Regulations rather than personal injury it is of interest to travel law practitioners whose work encompasses both specialisms (as well as the numerous other international conventions engaged when holiday makers have accidents abroad). Article 5(3) provides:
1. The nature or origin of the event or events which cause the technical problem must not be inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the carrier (limb 1); and 2. It should be beyond its actual control (limb 2).
EC Regulations, travel
The European Commission has today announced proposals to extend air passenger rights. If approved by member states and the European Parliament, the measures will come into force in 2015.
The new measures would include:
Clarifying the meaning of ‘extraordinary circumstances’;
Requiring airlines to re-route passengers who have been delayed by more than 12 hours, using other air carriers if they cannot do so themselves;
Care requirements for planes delayed on the runway; and
Requiring airlines to allow passengers to disembark and to provide reimbursements, if the plane has sat on the runway for more than 5 hours.
However, before the Court was able even to consider the substantive argument about extraordinary circumstances, it had to deal with the Council of Europe’s contention that the claim made by Ms McDonagh was ‘inadmissible’. By this, it meant that the Claimant could not bring a claim, before her national courts, to recover the cost of the expenses that she had incurred in providing the care, assistance and accommodation that Ryanair should have provided her in the first place. In effect, the argument was that a breach of the Regulations is not actionable. The Court was not persuaded by this argument. It is worth reproducing its reasoning on the point, in full:
21 A claim such as that at issue in the main proceedings seeks to obtain, from the air carrier, equivalent compliance with its obligation to provide care arising from Articles 5(1)(b) and 9 of Regulation No 261/2004, an obligation which, it should be recalled, operates at an earlier stage than the system laid down by the Montreal Convention (see Case C‑549/07 Wallentin-Hermann [2008] ECR I‑11061, paragraph 32, and Joined Cases C‑581/10 and C‑629/10 Nelson and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 57). 22 The fact, noted in this connection by the Council, that each Member State designates a body responsible for the enforcement of Regulation No 261/2004 which, where appropriate, takes the measures necessary to ensure that the rights of passengers are respected and which each passenger may complain to about an alleged infringement of that regulation, in accordance with Article 16 of the regulation, is not such as to affect the right of a passenger to such reimbursement.