Source: http://openjurist.org/517/us/292
Timestamp: 2016-05-01 14:07:13
Document Index: 348692536

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 3013', '§ 3013', '§ 3013', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 2106', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 1955', '§ 1955', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 922', '§ 1202', '§ 846']

517 US 292 Rutledge v. United States | OpenJurist
517 U.S. 292 - Rutledge v. United States Homethe United States Reports517 U.S.
Courts may not "prescrib[e] greater punishment than the legislature intended." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). In accord with principles rooted in common law and constitutional jurisprudence, see Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 168-170, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874), we presume that "where two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' " a legislature does not intend to impose two punishments for that offense. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-692, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-1438, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1671-1672, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985).
For over half a century we have determined whether a defendant has been punished twice for the "same offense" by applying the rule set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). If "the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Ibid. In subsequent applications of the test, we have often concluded that two different statutes define the "same offense," typically because one is a lesser included offense of t he other.6
In this case it is perfectly clear that the CCE offense requires proof of a number of elements that need not be established in a conspiracy case.7 The Blockburger test requires us to consider whether the converse is also true—whether the § 846 conspiracy offense requires proof of any element that is not a part of the CCE offense. That question could be answered affirmatively only by assuming that while the § 846 conspiracy requires proof of an actual agreement among the parties, the "in concert" element of the CCE offense might be satisfied by something less.
The Government advanced this precise argument in Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977),8 but it managed to persuade only one Justice. Id., at 158, 97 S.Ct., at 2220 (White, J., concurring). The position was rejected, to varying degrees, by the other eight. The four dissenters adopted, without comment, the proposition that conspiracy was a lesser included offense of CCE. See id., at 158, and 159, n. 5, 97 S.Ct., at 2220 and 2221, n. 5. The remaining Justices joined Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion which, while declining to hold that conspiracy was a lesser included offense,9 nonetheless explained why the Government's argument was inconsistent with the statute's text, with the way the words "in concert" have been used in other statutes, and with the legislative history of this statute.10 Based on its understanding of the "more likely" interpretation of § 848, the plurality assumed, arguendo, "that § 848 does require proof of an agreement among the persons involved in the continuing criminal enterprise. So construed, § 846 is a lesser included offense of § 848, because § 848 requires proof of every fact necessary to show a violation under § 846 as well as proof of several additional elements." Id., at 149-150, 97 S.Ct., at 2215.
In the years since Jeffers was decided, the Courts of Appeals have also consistently rejected the Government's interpretation of the "in concert" language of § 848; they have concluded, without exception, that conspiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE.11 We think it is appropriate now to resolve the point definitively: For the reasons set forth in Jeffers, and particularly because the plain meaning of the phrase "in concert" signifies mutual agreement in a common plan or enterprise, we hold that this element of the CCE offense requires proof of a conspiracy that would also violate § 846. Because § 846 does not require proof of any fact that is not also a part of the CCE offense, a straightforward application of the Blockburger test leads to the conclusion that conspiracy as defined in § 846 does not define a different offense from the CCE offense defined in § 848. Furthermore, since the latter offense is the more serious of the two, and because only one of its elements is necessary to prove a § 846 conspiracy, it is appropriate to characterize § 846 as a lesser included offense of § 848.12
We begin by noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3013 requires a federal district court to impose a $50 special assessment for every conviction, and that such an assessment was imposed on both convictions in this case. As long as § 3013 stands, a second conviction will amount to a second punishment. Cf. Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 737, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 2093-2094, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987) (per curiam) (presence of $50 assessment precludes application of "concurrent sentence doctrine"). The Government urges us not to rely on the assessment, however, pointing out that petitioner did not challenge it below, and noting that the question presented "presupposes" fully concurrent sentences. Brief for United States 7, n. 1.
"The second conviction, whose concomitant sentence is served concurrently, does not evaporate simply because of the concurrence of the sentence. The separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored. For example, the presence of two convictions on the record may delay the defendant's eligibility for parole or result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense. Moreover, the second conviction may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility and certainly carries the societal st igma accompanying any criminal conviction. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-791 [89 S.Ct. 2056, 2060-2061, 23 L.Ed.2d 707] (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 54-56 [88 S.Ct. 1889, 1898-1899, 20 L.Ed.2d 917] (1968). Thus, the second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment." Id., at 864-865, 105 S.Ct., at 1673.
The Government suggests, however, that petitioner will never be exposed to collateral consequences like those described in Ball because he is subject to multiple life sentences without possibility of release. We need not conclusively resolve the matter, for there is no doubt that the second conviction carried with it, at very least, a $50 assessment. Although the petitioner did not challenge the assessment below, 18 U.S.C. § 3013 required the District Court to impose it, and the assessment was therefore as much a collateral consequence of the conspiracy conviction as the consequences recognized by Ball would be. As a result, the conviction amounts to cumulative punishment not authorized by Congress.
The Government finds support for its position in this Court's judgment in Jeffers because that judgment allowed convictions under both §§ 846 and 848 to stand. Those convictions, however, had been entered in separate trials and our review only addressed the conviction under § 848. The Court affirmed that conviction not because anyone on the Court suggested that Congress had intended to authorize dual convictions for the same offense,13 but rather because the four-Justice plurality decided that Jeffers had waived any right to object to Jeffers' prosecution for that conviction, see Jeffers, 432 U.S., at 152-154, 97 S.Ct., at 2216-2218, and because Justice White believed that the two prosecutions were for different offenses.
The sole ground for Justice White's critical fifth vote to affirm the judgment was his belief, set forth in a single short paragraph, that conspiracy was not a lesser included offense of CCE. Id., at 158, 97 S.Ct., at 2220 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). In Part II of this opinion we have rejected that view. Accordingly, even if we could infer that the plurality had silently reached the rather bizarre conclusion that Congress intended to allow dual convictions but to preclude other multiple punishments, only four Justices would have supported it, with four others explicitly disagreeing. As to this issue, then, the judgment amounts at best to nothing more than an unexplained affirmance by an equally divided court—a judgment not entitled to precedential weight no matter what reasoning may have supported it. See Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378-379, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). The more important message conveyed by Jeffers is found not in the bare judgment, but in the plurality's conclusion, joined by the four dissenters, that CCE and conspiracy are insufficiently distinct to justify a finding that Congress intended to allow punishments for both when they rest on the same activity.14
Finally, the Government argues that Congress must have intended to allow multiple convictions because doing so would provide a "back up" conviction, preventing a defendant who later successfully challenges his greater offense from escaping punishment altogether—even if the basis for the reversal does not affect his conviction under the lesser. Brief for United States 20-22. We find the argument unpersuasive, for there is no reason why this pair of greater and lesser offenses should present any novel problem beyond that posed by any other greater and lesser included offenses, for which the courts have already developed rules to avoid the perceived danger.
In Tinder v. United States, 345 U.S. 565, 570, 73 S.Ct. 911, 913, 97 L.Ed. 1250 (1953), the defendant had been convicted of theft from a mailbox and improperly sentenced to prison for more than one year even though the evidence only supported a misdemeanor conviction. Exercising our "power to do justice as the case requires" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2106, we ordered the District Court to correct the sentence without vacating the underlying conviction. Relying on Tinder and the practice in "state courts, including courts governed by statutes virtually the same as Section 2106," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit later decided that its "power to modify erroneous judgments authorizes reduction to a lesser included offense where the evidence is insufficient to support an element of the [greater] offense stated in the verdict." Austin v. United States, 382 F.2d 129, 141-143 (1967).15
Consistent with the views expressed by the D.C. Circuit, federal appellate courts appear to have uniformly concluded that they may direct the entry of judgment for a lesser included offense when a conviction for a greater offense is reversed on grounds that affect only the greater offense. See 8A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 31.03[5], and n. 54 (2d ed.1995); United States v. Ward, 37 F.3d 243, 251 (C.A.6 1994) (after finding insufficient evidence to support CCE count, Court of Appeals vacated CCE conviction and sentence and remanded for entry of conspiracy conviction, which District Court had previously vacated as lesser included offense of CCE), cert. denied, 514 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1388, 131 L.Ed.2d 240 (1995); United States v. Silvers, 888 F.Supp. 1289, 1306-1309 (D.Md.1995) (reinstating conspiracy conviction previously vacated after granting motion for new trial on CCE conviction). This Court has noted the use of such a practice with approval. Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 246-247, 106 S.Ct. 1032, 1037-1038, 89 L.Ed.2d 187 (1986) (approving process of reducing erroneous greater offense to lesser included offense as long as the defendant is not able to demonstrate that "but for the improper inclusion of the [erroneous] charge, the result of the proceeding probably would have been different"). See also Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 384-385, n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 2527-2528, n. 3, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989) (citing Morris ).
There is no need for us now to consider the precise limits on the appellate courts' power to substitute a conviction on a lesser offense for an erroneous conviction of a greater offense.16 We need only note that the concern motivating the Government in asking us to endorse either the Seventh Circuit's practice of entering concurrent sentences on CCE and conspiracy counts, or the Second Circuit's practice of entering concurrent judgments, is no different from the problem that arises whenever a defendant is tried for greater and lesser offenses in the same proceeding. In such instances, neither legislatures nor courts have found it necessary to impose multiple convictions, and we see no reason why Congress, faced with the same problem, would consider it necessary to deviate from the traditional rule.17
A guilty verdict on a § 848 charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy violative of § 846; conspiracy is therefore a lesser included offense of CCE. B ecause the Government's arguments have not persuaded us otherwise, we adhere to the presumption that Congress intended to authorize only one punishment. Accordingly, "[o]ne of [petitioner's] convictions, as well as its concurrent sentence, is unauthorized punishment for a separate offense" and must be vacated. Ball, 470 U.S., at 864, 105 S.Ct., at 1673.
"For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if —
"(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter —
"(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources." 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
In Jeffers, we considered whether the Government could prosecute the defendant under § 848 even though he had previously been convicted of § 846 conspiracy on the basis of the same agreements. The Government argued that the multiple prosecution was permissible because the crimes were not the "same offense." "The Government's position is premised on its contention that agreement is not an essential element of the § 848 offense, despite the presence in § 848(b)(2)(A) of the phrase 'in concert with.' If five 'innocent dupes' each separately acted 'in concert with' the ringleader of the continuing criminal enterprise, the Government asserts, the statutory requirement would be satisfied. Brief for United States 23." 432 U.S., at 147, 97 S.Ct., at 2214. The Government relied on Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975), in which we construed 18 U.S.C. § 1955 as not requiring proof of conspiracy. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, however, the language of § 1955 was significantly different from § 848 in that it omitted the words "in concert" and left open "the possibility that the five persons 'involved' in the gambling operation might not be acting together." 432 U.S., at 147-148, 97 S.Ct., at 2214.
The Government suggests that convictions are authorized for both §§ 846 and 848 because they are different sections of the United States Code. Brief for United States 16. This does not rise to the level of the clear statement necessary for us to conclude that despite the identity of the statutory elements, Congress intended to allow multiple punishments. After all, we concluded in Ball that the statutes at issue did not authorize separate convictions, and they were even more distant in the Code. See 470 U.S., at 863-864, 105 S.Ct., at 1672-1673 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) and 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) (1984)). If anything, the proximity of §§ 846 and 848 indicates that Congress understood them to be directed to similar, rather than separate, evils. Cf. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144-1145, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981).