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ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR 531 U.S. 326 - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR 531 U.S. 326
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Although, in the ordinary case, personal property seizures are unreasonable unless accomplished pursuant to a warrant, United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 701, there are exceptions to this rule involving special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, and the like, see, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938, 940-941. The circumstances here involve a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need. Cf., e. g., United States v. Place, supra, at 701. Moreover, the restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope, cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29-30, and avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself, cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 585. Consequently, rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, the Court must balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion here was reasonable. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654. In light of the following circumstances, considered in combination, the Court concludes that the restriction was reasonable, and hence lawful. First, the police had probable cause to believe that McArthur's home contained evidence of a crime and unlawful drugs. Second, they had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, he would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant. Third, theycralaw
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 337. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 338.
Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah Watson.cralaw
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Lisa B. Kemler; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.cralaw
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, 304 Ill. App. 3dcralaw
We nonetheless have made it clear that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable. See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938, 940-941 (1996) (per curiam) (search of automobile supported by probable cause); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444, 455 (1990) (suspicionless stops at drunk driver checkpoint); United States v. Place, supra, at 706 (temporary seizure of luggage based on reasonable suspicion); Michigan v.cralaw
We conclude that the restriction at issue was reasonable, and hence lawful, in light of the following circumstances, which we consider in combination. First, the police had probable cause to believe that McArthur's trailer home contained evidence of a crime and contraband, namely, unlawfulcralaw
Fourth, the police imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, namely, two hours. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 28 (manner in which police act is "vital ... part of ... inquiry"). As far as the record reveals, this time period was no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant. Compare Unitedcralaw
Our conclusion that the restriction was lawful finds significant support in this Court's case law. In Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984), the Court considered the admissibility of drugs which the police had found in a lawful, warrant-based search of an apartment, but only after unlawfully entering the apartment and occupying it for 19 hours. The majority held that the drugs were admissible because, had the police acted lawfully throughout, they could have discovered and seized the drugs pursuant to the validly issued warrant. See id., at 799, 814-815 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920)). The minority disagreed. However, when describing alternative lawful search and seizure methods, both majority and minority assumed, at least for argument's sake, that the police, armed with reliable information that the apartment contained drugs, might lawfully have sealed the apartment from the outside, restricting entry into the apartment while waiting for the warrant. Compare Segura v. United States, 468 U. S., at 814 ("Had police never entered the apartment, but instead conducted a perimeter stakeout to prevent anyone from entering ... and destroying evidence, the contraband ... would have been ... seized precisely as it was here"), with id., at 824, n. 15 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("I assume impoundment would be permissiblecralaw
Nor are we persuaded by the countervailing considerations that the parties or lower courts have raised. McArthur argues that the police proceeded without probable cause. But McArthur has waived this argument. See 304 Ill. App. 3d, at 397, 713 N. E. 2d, at 95 (stating that McArthurcralaw
Finally, McArthur points to a case (and we believe it is the only case) that he believes offers direct support, namely, Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra. In Welsh, this Court held that police could not enter a home without a warrant in order to prevent the loss of evidence (namely, the defendant's blood alcohol level) of the "nonjailable traffic offense" of driving while intoxicated. 466 U. S., at 742, 754. McArthur notescralaw
We have explained above why we believe that the need to preserve evidence of a "jailable" offense was sufficiently urgent or pressing to justify the restriction upon entry that the police imposed. We need not decide whether the circumstances before us would have justified a greater restriction for this type of offense or the same restriction were only a "nonjailable" offense at issue.cralaw
I join the Court's opinion subject to this afterword on two points: the constitutionality of a greater intrusion than the one here and the permissibility of choosing impoundment over immediate search. Respondent McArthur's location made the difference between the exigency that justified temporarily barring him from his own dwelling and circumstances that would have supported a greater interference with his privacy and property. As long as he was inside his trailer, the police had probable cause to believe that he had illegal drugs stashed as his wife had reported and that with any sense he would flush them down the drain before the police could get a warrant to enter and search. This probability of destruction in anticipation of a warrant exemplifies the kind of present risk that undergirds the accepted exigent circumstances exception to the general warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966). That risk would have justified the police in entering McArthur's trailer promptly to make a lawful, warrantless search. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967). When McArthur steppedcralaw
The Illinois General Assembly has decided that the possession of less than 2.5 grams of marijuana is a class C misdemeanor. See Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 720, § 550/4(a) (1998). In so classifying the offense, the legislature made a concerted policy judgment that the possession of small amounts ofcralaw
2 Nor in many other States. Under the laws of many other States, the maximum penalty McArthur would have faced for possession of 2.3 grams of marijuana would have been less than what he faced in Illinois. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11357(b) (West 1991) ($100 fine); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-406(1) (1999) ($100 fine); Minn. Stat. § 152.027(4) (2000) ($200 fine and drug education); Miss. Code Ann. §41-29-139(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1999) ($100-$250 fine); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-416(13) (1995) ($100 fine and drug education); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-23(B) (1997) ($50-$100 fine and 15 days in jail); N. Y. Penal Law §221.05 (McKinney 2000) ($100 fine); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4)(f) (Supp. 1998) ($100 fine).cralaw