Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-mcdaniel-23200
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 02:57:47
Document Index: 727851746

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 11912', '§ 11352', '§ 11382', '§ 13', '§ 2', '§ 1']

People v. McDaniel - 24 Cal.3d 661 - Thu, 07/19/1979 | California Supreme Court Resources
Citation 24 Cal.3d 661
People v. McDaniel , 24 Cal.3d 661
(Opinion by Clark, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court.) [24 Cal.3d 662]
Evelle J. Younger and George Deukmejian, Attorneys General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold O. Overoye, Assistant [24 Cal.3d 663] Attorney General, Robert D. Marshall, Marjory Winston Parker and James T. McNally, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
[2a] However, there is merit in defendant's alternative contention that in the circumstances alleged here violation of section 11355 is not a general intent crime. When the alleged violation consists of an offer to sell a controlled substance and an offer to deliver another substance, the jury should be instructed that the latter offer must be made with the specific intent of delivering the substitute. (See People v. Daniels (1975) 14 Cal.3d 857 [122 Cal.Rptr. 872, 537 P.2d 1232]; People v. Brown (1960) 55 Cal.2d 64 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].) Because the jury here was not properly instructed on this critical issue, the judgment must be reversed. [24 Cal.3d 664]
Testifying in his own behalf, defendant admitted offering to sell LSD to Willey, but denied showing him slips of paper or making the statement [24 Cal.3d 665] concerning "bunk." Defendant claimed he had not had anything -- either LSD or "bunk" -- to deliver. His scheme, he testified, was simply to "rip off" would-be customers by obtaining money without leaving his car and then driving away without making a delivery. He concluded by claiming he was being "framed" by the police.
[1b] We first consider defendant's contention that cases interpreting section 11355 have engrafted a delivery requirement onto the statute. Four cases bear examination regarding this contention: People v. Shephard (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 283 [337 P.2d 214]; People v. Brown (1960) 55 Cal.2d 64 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072]; People v. Hicks (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 265 [35 Cal.Rptr. 149]; and People v. Ernst (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 785 [121 Cal.Rptr. 857]. In none of these cases did the court hold -- on facts showing no delivery of a substance in lieu of the proffered controlled substance -- delivery of a substitute was a necessary element of the crime.
Shephard involved a conviction under the predecessor of section 11355 -- former section 11502. fn. 4 The defendant, who had offered to sell [24 Cal.3d 666] heroin and had actually delivered a nonnarcotic substance, contended section 11502 was unconstitutionally vague. In that context the Court of Appeal held the statute was not vague, gave fair notice, and made it "a crime for a person to agree to sell a narcotic to someone, and then to deliver instead a non-narcotic substance." (169 Cal.App.2d at p. 289.)
As the language of the proposed statute was substantially identical to that of section 11502 as enacted (Assem. Bill No. 2238 (1953 Reg. Sess.) § 2, as amended Apr. 2, 1953), the subcommittee's description of the proposed legislation was obviously not intended to exhaustively restate its provisions, but rather to highlight the most common behavior at which it was directed. Similarly, given the context of its ruling -- a defendant who had offered to sell a narcotic, had delivered a nonnarcotic, and was challenging the statute as unconstitutionally vague -- the Court of Appeal in Shephard obviously had no occasion to determine whether delivery was a necessary element of the crime, and merely held that the statute clearly prohibited offering to sell a narcotic and then delivering a nonnarcotic. In light of the many other acts prohibited by the statute, it would be unreasonable to read Shephard as holding that none of the other proscribed conduct violated the statute. [24 Cal.3d 667]
In People v. Hicks, supra, 222 Cal.App.2d 265, the defendant, having negotiated to sell an undercover agent marijuana, told the officer a brown paper bag he would place in a doorway contained the "stuff," and instructed the officer to pick it up and then pay him. The officer followed directions, but the contents of the bag turned out not to be marijuana. Rejecting the contention that former section 11503 was unconstitutionally vague, the Court of Appeal held Shephard and its reliance on the subcommittee report controlling. On evidence showing actual delivery of a substitute, as in Shephard, the Court of Appeal in Hicks stated that section 11503 "says, so far as applicable here, that every person who offers to sell a narcotic and delivers a nonnarcotic substance is guilty of a crime. [24 Cal.3d 668] This is true, whether at the time of the offer the offeror actually intends to deliver a narcotic or intends only to deliver a nonnarcotic. It is the delivery of a nonnarcotic that completes the crime." (222 Cal.App.2d at pp. 271-272; italics added.)
The Court of Appeal in Ernst did not seek to resolve the question whether delivery of another substance is an essential element of the crime. Rather, assuming for the sake of argument that delivery is required, the Court of Appeal held the requirement was satisfied there. "We merely hold that in view of the purpose of the act and the particular circumstances of this case -- the apparent tender of the narcotic for which the parties had negotiated and the accepted invitation to sample an amount sufficient to satisfy the buyer -- there was an adequate delivery to [24 Cal.3d 669] require defendants to plead to the information." (48 Cal.App.3d at p. 792.)
[2b] We now turn to the general/specific intent question. When a charge of violating section 11355 rests on evidence of an offer to sell a controlled substance and an offer to deliver a substitute, must the jury be instructed that the latter offer must be made with specific intent of delivering a substitute? An affirmative answer to this question is dictated by our prior decisions in People v. Daniels, supra, 14 Cal.3d 857 and People v. Brown, supra, 55 Cal.2d 64.
The question presented in Daniels was whether sale of a restricted dangerous drug (former § 11912, now § 11352) is a crime requiring a general or specific intent. In analyzing this question we reiterated an important "temporal difference" between the two sorts of criminal intent. "'When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.'" (14 Cal.3d at p. 860, quoting People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456-457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].)
"It is apparent," we pointed out in Daniels, "that the offense defined in former section 11912 does not expressly require an intent 'to do a further act or achieve a future consequence' [citing Hood]. Further, it does not appear that such an intent is implicit in that section as a prerequisite to a conviction of that crime in cases where, as here, the alleged sale consists of the simultaneous transfer of a restricted dangerous drug to another for cash." (14 Cal.3d at pp. 860-861.) Accordingly, we held that "selling a restricted dangerous drug (in the sense of transferring it to another for [24 Cal.3d 670] cash) is a general and not a specific intent crime." (Id., at p. 861.) "Neither People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469-470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1] nor People v. Brown (1960) 55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072]," we continued, "is contrary to our conclusion herein. Both cases involved charges of offers to sell narcotics in contradistinction to the instant charge of sale of restricted dangerous drugs. In an offer to sell a narcotic, the proscribed act is the making of the offer. An accompanying intent to do a further act, i.e., to sell, is inherent, making the offense a specific intent crime." (14 Cal.3d at p. 861.)
By parity of reasoning, on the evidence presented here a specific intent to deliver a substance other than the particular controlled substance proffered for sale is required for violation of section 11355. People v. Lechlinski (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 766 [131 Cal.Rptr. 701] and People v. Haines (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 496 [125 Cal.Rptr. 735] are not inconsistent with this conclusion. Lechlinski presented the question whether on the facts there presented section 11355 required a specific intent to deliver a substitute. Haines presented essentially the same question with regard to the parallel statute dealing with restricted dangerous drugs. (§ 11382.) In each case the Court of Appeal resolved the question in the negative on facts showing an offer to sell a controlled or restricted substance and delivery of a substitute.
In the circumstances of this case the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that defendant was not guilty of violating section 11355 unless he had a specific intent to deliver a substance other than the controlled substance offered for sale. (See People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].) As the question of defendant's intent was the crux of the case, defendant having admitted the other elements of the crime, the failure to so instruct the jury compels reversal. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
­FN 1. Section 11355 provides: "Every person who agrees, consents, or in any manner offers to unlawfully sell, furnish, transport, administer, or give any controlled substance specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11054, specified in paragraph (10), (11), (12), or (17) of subdivision (d) of Section 11054, or specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11055 or, any controlled substance classified in Schedule III, IV, or V which is a narcotic drug to any person, or offers, arranges, or negotiates to have any such controlled substance unlawfully sold, delivered, transported, furnished, administered, or given to any person and then sells, delivers, furnishes, transports, administers, or gives, or offers, arranges, or negotiates to have sold, delivered, transported, furnished, administered, or given to any person any other liquid, substance or material in lieu of any such controlled substance shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or in the state prison."
­FN 4. Section 11502 provided: "Every person who agrees, consents, or in any manner offers to unlawfully sell, furnish, transport, administer, or give any narcotic to any person, or offers, arranges, or negotiates to have any narcotic unlawfully sold, delivered, transported, furnished, administered, or given to any person and then sells, delivers, furnishes, transports, administers, or gives, or offers, arranges, or negotiates to have sold, delivered, transported, furnished, administered, or given to any person any other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of any narcotic shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or in the state prison for not more than 10 years." (Added by Stats. 1953, ch. 1770, § 2, and repealed by Stats. 1959, ch. 112, § 1.)
­FN 5. Proposed section 11509 was not enacted.
­FN 6. We therefore need not address defendant's ex post facto argument, for it assumes that prior cases have added a delivery requirement to the statute, and then argues that it would be a violation of the ex post facto prohibition not to interpret the statute in a similar fashion here.
Thu, 07/19/1979 24 Cal.3d 661 Review - Criminal Appeal Opinion issued
Jul 19 1979 Opinion: Reversed
SCOCAL, People v. McDaniel , 24 Cal.3d 661 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-mcdaniel-23200) (last visited Tuesday August 4, 2020).