Source: https://www.aclu.org/organization-news-and-highlights/1996-term-argument-summaries
Timestamp: 2014-03-09 09:10:32
Document Index: 10182371

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

1996 Term Argument Summaries | American Civil Liberties Union
Home › Organization News and Highlights 1996 Term Argument Summaries Share
October 1, 1996 ACLU Participation Before the Supreme Court for the 1996 Term -- Summaries of Argument
ABRAMS, et al, v. JOHNSON, et al
No. 95-1425 (direct in support of appellants)
The district court abused its equitable powers in completely redrawing the congressional map of Georgia. The powers of the federal courts must be adequate to the task of fashioning remedies for violations, but those powers are limited. Any remedy must be related to the conditions that are found to offend the Constitution.
In the area of redistricting, deference by federal courts to state policy choices is especially compelling. That is true because the states have primary responsibility for apportionment. Then a district court must act in the legislature's stead, it must accomplish its task circumspectly, and in a manner that is free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.
The district court ignored the state's traditional interest in preserving the core of existing districts. It completely relocated the Eleventh District and placed it in the northeast Atlanta corridor because it felt that was a better location for the district. The court also drastically reconfigured other districts, including the Third, the Eighth, and the Tenth.
The court's plan moved incumbents and pitted them against each other in a number of districts in disregard for the state's traditional policy of avoiding contests between incumbents. Two of the three dislocated incumbents were black, and only these two were placed in new districts with other incumbents.
The court's plan shifted nearly a third of the state's population into new districts. Least-change plans proposed by the parties and amici showed that it was possible to draw far less disruptive plans that at the same time cured the constitutional defects in the prior plan.
The court eliminated two of the three majority black districts in the existing plan, despite its acknowledgment of the legislature's decision to create a second majority black district after the 1990 census. The court's justification for refusing to draw a second majority black district was that Georgia's minority population was not geographically compact. The legislature, however, in enacting its first plan was of the view that the black population was sufficiently compact to constitute a majority in a second congressional district.
Proposed remedial plans were also submitted by the parties and amici which showed that a compact second majority black district can be drawn in Georgia while adhering to the state's traditional districting principles.
As long as a state does not subordinate-traditional redistricting principles to race, it may intentionally create majority-minority districts, and may otherwise take race into consideration, without being subjected to strict scrutiny.
The court's plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Blacks in Georgia are geographically compact. As appears from various plans submitted to the district court, it is clearly possible to draw two reasonably compact majority black congressional districts in the state.
Blacks are also politically cohesive, while their preferred candidates are usually defeated by whites voting as a bloc. As the lower court found, a district containing approximately 55% of black registered voters was necessary to avoid dilution of minority voting strength.
The district court's plan is retrogressive in violation of Section 5. The court's plan reduced the number of majority black districts from the levels in the third legislative plan (which had three of eleven) and the first legislative plan (which had two of eleven), to only one of eleven in a state that is 27% black. Minorities admittedly have fewer electoral opportunities under the court ordered plan than under any of these pre-existing plans.
The court used the 1982 plan as a benchmark for measuring retrogression. The 1982 plan was not only malapportioned but contained ten districts while the 1992 plan contains eleven. The ten seat 1982 plan by definition cannot serve as a reasonable benchmark by which to evaluate the court's eleven seat plan. The most appropriate benchmarks for determining retrogression are either the state's initial eleven seat plan containing two majority black districts, or the state's policy and goal of creating two majority black districts. Using either of these benchmarks, the court ordered plan would violate the retrogression standard of Section 5.
The court's plan does not comply with one person, one vote. Congressional. redistricting is held to even stricter standards than legislative redistricting. The total deviation among districts in the district court's plan is 0.35%. Plans with lower overall deviations were submitted to the court by the United States (0.19%) and by appellants (0.29 %). Other district courts have had no difficulty in drafting or approving plans with zero deviations.
ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH, et al., v. STATE OF ARIZONA, et al.
No. 95-974 (amicus in support of respondents)
Article 28 of the Arizona Constitution is unlike any other law ever challenged on First Amendment grounds in this Court. It is a sweeping injunction against speech in any language other than English, harming vital First Amendment interests of the public without any record evidence of a compelling, substantial or even rational justification.
On its face, Article 28 explicitly suppresses a vast body of pure speech. Its sweep affects virtually every transaction between non-English speakers and every branch of state and local government in Arizona. Its injunction against speech is indiscriminate and ex ante: it effectively precludes non-English speaking Arizonans, whatever their circumstances and needs, from communicating and interacting with their governments, including state and local legislators and their aides, even if the public employees and officials are willing and able to use non-English languages. It attempts to coerce compliance with a linguistic orthodoxy in a manner which actually undermines, rather than promotes, national unity. The extraordinary nature of this law -- whose proscriptions are so remarkably broad and sweeping as to defy the usual First Amendment categories of content and viewpoint neutrality -- warrants strict judicial scrutiny.
Petitioners contend that Article 28 should not be subject to any meaningful scrutiny, because it merely governs the State's speech in "internal operations" over which the government has virtually complete control. However, limiting this case to government control over us speech, internal or other-wise, ignores the most important participants in this First Amendment equation: the non-English speaking members of the public, joint stakeholders in the communications banned by Article 28, who will no longer be able to communicate and interact with the government on an almost limitless range of subjects. Article 28, therefore, strikes at the core of participatory democracy and undermines a fundamental value of the First Amendment -- the facilitation of self governance essential to a democratically organized society.
These burdens, moreover, are selectively and discriminatorily imposed, purposefully falling on a discrete and historically disadvantaged segment of the public -- comprised almost exclusively of ethnic minorities and immigrants -- who are thereby excluded from virtually all communications with government regardless of their importance to the individual.
This case, therefore, is not controlled by the Court's public employee or government speech cases. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and its progeny have all concerned the protection afforded to speech initiated by a particular employee (such as a presentation to the board of education, a complaint to co-workers about working conditions, or writings or speeches to the public). In contrast, Article 28's ban interferes with interactive communications between citizens and their government, and thus directly infringes the First Amendment rights of the public as well as those of public employees or officials. Moreover, unlike Pickering, the State does not assert any employment-related justification for Article 28.
Nor does Article 28 embody the government's interest in communicating a particularized message or viewpoint such as the advisability of abortion (Rust v. Sullivan, 50 0 U.S. 173 (1991)) or the political nature of particular films (Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987)). Rather, it bars an entire medium of speech irrespective of its substantive content or message.
Furthermore, even assuming the government may under certain circumstances restrict public employees from using non-English languages in the course of their duties, Article 28's indiscriminate reach is fatally overbroad. It bars non-English communications not only by Maria-Kelley Yniguez, but also by elected officials communicating with their constituencies, by judges performing marriage ceremonies, and by public teachers, academics, and librarians in and out of the classroom.
Accordingly, the Court's consideration of the constitutionality of Article 28 cannot be constrained by the mechanical application of public employee speech cases nor by the general proposition that the government has significant control over the content of its own speech. Rather, Article 28 must be examined in light of, and subject to searching scrutiny consistent with, the multiple First Amendment interests directly and substantially affected by its sweeping ban. Under this standard -- indeed, even under a less rigorous standard of review -- the asserted justifications for Article 28 are unpersuasive.
Although Petitioners assert that Article 28 will make the government more efficient, the State of Arizona has stipulated that its administrative efficiency and operational effectiveness is enhanced, not impeded, by its employees' ability to use non-English languages in the course of their duties. Indeed, independent of the State's stipulation, Article 28 undermines the asserted governmental interest in ensuring that its communications are "neither garbled nor distorted," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2518 (1995), precisely by requiring the State to communicate in a language incomprehensible to non-English speakers.
The general social goals Petitioners advance also fail to withstand scrutiny. Article 28 is not needed to protect English as the State's primary language: English is already spoken by 96% of Arizonans, and English acquisition remains a high priority among immigrants. Nor is Article 28 narrowly, or even reasonably, tailored to enhance English proficiency: it indiscriminately penalizes all non-English speakers by preventing them from interacting and communicating with government regardless of their circumstances or needs. Most importantly, Article 28 does not foster by "persuasion and example" the goal of national unity. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943). Rather, Article 28 is an unconstitutionally coercive measure which categorically disenfranchises a discrete, disadvantaged and vulnerable segment of the population. Ultimately, its imposition of a rigid linguistic orthodoxy not only suppresses constitutionally protected communication in non-"official" languages, but it is divisive and counterproductive to social cohesion as well.
BLESSING v. FREESTONE
No. 95-1441 (amicus in support of respondent)
Blessing v. Freestone amicus brief
Although the word "federalism" does not appear in the Constitution, there is no doubt that it is crucial to the American constitutional system. Federalism refers to the division of powers between the national and the state governments. Under our constitutional system, each has its own sphere of authority and responsibility. Properly understood, therefore, federalism is as much about preserving the power and responsibility of the federal government as it is about preserving the power and responsibility of the states.
Petitioner emphasizes one aspect of federalism: safeguarding state governments from federal encroachments. The Tenth Amendment's limits on Congress and the Eleventh Amendment's restrictions on the federal judicial power reflect this constitutional concern. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. , 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Petitioner, however, ignores the other aspect of federalism: protecting the interests of the national government. The single most important constitutional provision concerning federalism is found in Article VI: "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." In short, federalism is also, in major part, about ensuring the supremacy of federal law. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. , , 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1872 (1995)(Kennedy, J., concurring)(emphasizing that federalism is about protecting both state sovereignty and the interests of the national government).
There is no doubt that §1983 was meant to empower the federal courts to review state and local actions to ensure their compliance with federal law. During the debates preceding enactment of ?1983, one Congressman and Senator after another so declared. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1871)(remarks of Rep. Stoughton); see also id. at 374-76 (remarks of Rep. Lowe); id. at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id. at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); id. at 687 (remarks of Sen. Surz); id. at 691 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). Likewise, this Court has often recognized the critical importance of federal court review in assuring state compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
Contrary to petitioner's argument in this case, Ex Parte Young and Maine v. Thiboutot are not at war with federalism, they are essential to its preservation. It is through suits against state officers pursuant to Ex Parte Young that state compliance with federal law is achieved. As the Court noted in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)(Pennhurst II): "Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights." Id. at 105. Or, as the Court explained in Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1986): "[T]he availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex Parte Young gives life to the supremacy clause."
Likewise, it is through Maine v. Thiboutot that suits can be brought, pursuant to §1983, to ensure state and local compliance with federal statutes. Thus, after again reviewing the legislative history of §1983 in Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court concluded that "there can be no doubt that [§1983] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights." 448 U.S. at 5, quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 700-701 (1978).
Petitioner's brief is breathtaking in its willingness to disregard this Court's well-established jurisprudence and impose new restrictions on federal court jurisdiction. For all practical purposes, petitioner seeks to overrule Ex Parte Young by contending that the Eleventh Amendment bars all suits, including suits for injunctive and declaratory relief, where it is the state that is the real party in interest. Pet.Br. at 25. In Young itself, the State of Minnesota was the real party in interest: the injunction against Edward Young was to prevent the enforcement of a state statute. Indeed, in virtually every case, suits pursuant to Ex Parte Young are brought to enjoin enforcement of a state law or policy; ultimately, the state is the real party in interest in all these cases. In addition, petitioner expressly calls for this Court to overrule its decision in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1. Pet.Br. at 30-48.
The radical changes urged by petitioner would dramatically upset the allocation of power between the national and state governments by allowing states to violate federal law with impunity. Instead of promoting federalism, the changes urged by petitioner would do exactly the opposite and would abandon the framers' plan for a national government supreme over the states.
No. 95-1853 (amicus in support of respondent)
Clinton v. Jones amicus brief
Under Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 756, a President's entitlement to absolute immunity does not apply to actions taken beyond "the 'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility." The question presented here is whether a claim for damages that would otherwise be permissible under Fitzgerald should automatically, and in every case, be "deferred" until the expiration of the President's term in office.
We respectfully suggest that the answer to that question is no for two fundamental reasons. First, the notion of deferring any litigation activity involving the President for up to eight years in all damage cases is inconsistent with our nation's deeply held view that no person is above the law.
Second, the argument in favor of an automatic stay in all cases, regardless of circumstances, undervalues the very real prejudice that such a delay may create to aggrieved litigants. Among other things, memories fade and evidence becomes stale. The odds of prevailing on even nonfrivolous claims thus inevitably decline.
In some cases, that price may be inescapable. In others, it surely is not. Trial judges can and should be trusted to balance these competing interests with due deference to the special burdens faced by the President in fulfilling his duties. In particular, a trial court may fully utilize its authority over the pace and procedures of litigation to minimize the demands on the President. An automatic deferral of all litigation would, on the other hand, strip trial judges of their traditional case management responsibilities and effectively expand a President's absolute immunity from damages well beyond the carefully defined limits set forth in Fitzgerald.
The law disfavors immunities. Accordingly, the burden is upon the party seeking an immunity to establish its need. Neither the President nor his amici acknowledge this well established rule, nor do they seek to satisfy it except in the most general way -- by emphasizing the importance of allowing the President to conduct the nation's business without undue distraction. We agree with the importance of that interest, as did both courts below. The duties of the President of the United States, particularly with respect to foreign policy, are uniquely demanding. Presidents are called upon, often at all hours, to respond to national crises. But, as both courts below also held, it simply does not follow that no litigation can ever take place against a sitting President.
One of the major fears seems to be a threatened avalanche of frivolous lawsuits motivated by partisan political considerations. In our view, that fear is overstated. Nothing in the historical record supports it. Trial judges already have an arsenal of weapons at their disposal to deal with frivolous lawsuits if they occur. Finally, if not deterred by the prospect of sanctions, such lawsuits will be routinely dismissed with little or no demands on the President's time.
The difficult issue arises in nonfrivolous cases where the stakes are undeniably higher, both for the President and the opposing litigant. Even in this context, however, the demands on a President's time necessarily vary at different stages of the litigation, and from case to case. The absolute rule proposed by the President in this case does not take account of these differences. Instead, it effectively obliterates the line between official and unofficial conduct that this Court carefully established in Fitzgerald as the basis for a President's absolute immunity.
The President is not like any other litigant. But, like any other litigant, the President should still be required to justify a requested delay in the proceedings by showing that, given the particular phase of the case (e.g., motion to dismiss, deposition, interrogatory), the suit will significantly interfere with his ability to carry out the specific duties of his office then commanding his attention, and that his ability to carry out those duties cannot be preserved by a less drastic alternative than a potential eight-year stay. The decision below is consistent with that approach and should be affirmed.
EDWARDS, et al, v. BALISOK
No. 95-1352 (amicus in support of respondent)
In Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), this Court held that a state prisoner cannot bring a damages action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for constitutional violations leading to his conviction, if success in that action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his outstanding criminal conviction. The Court in Heck also reaffirmed its holding in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), that a prisoner may bring a damages action for use of unconstitutional prison disciplinary procedures in depriving him of good time credits, if the unconstitutionality of those procedures does not necessarily vitiate the denial of good time, and the action therefore does not call into question the lawfulness of the prisoner's continuing confinement.
The courts of appeals have uniformly followed Heck and held that a prisoner may not bring a section 1983 damages action for wrongful disciplinary procedures if success in that action would necessarily result in restoration of the prisoner's good time. Conversely, if the claim is simply for using the wrong procedures, and does not necessarily implicate the loss of good time, the action may proceed under Section 1983. This was the rule applied by the court of appeals below.
Petitioners propose a radically new rule that would require this Court to abandon both Heck and Wolff. Petitioners' proposed rule is unintelligible and would defy easy or consistent application in the lower courts. It is unsupported by either the language or the legislative history of Section 1983 or 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Petitioners' arguments in support of their proposed rule are policy arguments about the optimal scope of section 1983, and are properly addressed to Congress rather than this Court.
The Court should decline petitioners' invitation to abandon Heck and Wolff. It should hold, consistent with those cases, that a state prisoner may bring an action under § 1983 for a deprivation of procedural due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding, as long as success in that action would not necessarily result in restoration of good time credits taken in that proceeding. It should then affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, because respondent's success in his § 1983 action would not necessarily result in restoration of his good time.
A fortiori, a former state prisoner who has completed his sentence, like amicus Gotcher, may directly seek damages under § 1983 for wrongful deprivation of good time credits, since the restoration of good time cannot possibly result from the § 1983 action. Because such a person is not in custody, and therefore cannot invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to seek restoration of his credits, damages under § 1983 are the only federal remedy for the violation of his federal constitutional rights. Absent the possibility of proceeding under the more specific habeas corpus statute, the plain language of § 1983 grants the former prisoner a cause of action for damages for wrongful deprivation of good time credits.
Finally, Heck left undisturbed Wolff's holding that a state prisoner may seek prospective injunctive relief from unconstitutional prison disciplinary procedures. A claim for such relief does not call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement.
STATE OF IDAHO, et al, v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE, et al.
No. 94-1474 (amicus in support of respondents)
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe Brief
The Tribe's claims against Idaho state officials for declaratory and injunctive relief fall squarely within the exception to the Eleventh Amendment articulated by the Court in Ex Parte Young.
Under the Young doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal court from adjudicating a claim for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials who allegedly act contrary to federal law. Here, the Tribe claims that Idaho state officials, by regulating and administering the land in question, are violating federal law.
They are intruding on property rights conferred on the Tribe by a federal statute. The relief sought by the Tribe is prospective, as opposed to retrospective, in nature. It seeks to prevent further violations of its property rights. It does not seek damages or restitution for past wrongs, nor does it seek to rescind a past transfer of property.
Idaho state officials argue that the Young doctrine does not apply to this action, or to any action involving real property. More specifically, they contend that real property actions against state officials should be barred by the Eleventh Amendment because such suits actually seek to adjudicate the state's interest in or right to properly and cannot resolve title disputes. They further contend that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this action because Idaho has a greater right to the disputed property than the Tribe and the Tribe can bring suit against Idaho to quiet title in state court.
Idaho state officials' arguments should be rejected. First, the Young doctrine has been used repeatedly to enforce real and personal properly rights where, as here, the right to possess the property is founded in federal law or the deprivation of the property raises federal constitutional or statutory concerns. See, e.g., Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee,13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 11 (1815); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy,140 U.S.1 (1891); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 137 (1897); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926); Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670.
Creation of a real property exception to the Young doctrine would not only require the Court to overrule 200 years of jurisprudence, but would also seriously jeopardize the federal constitutional right to enjoy, own and dispose of property without undue governmental interference. Those deprived of such a right would not be able to bring suit in federal court to seek vindication.
Second, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, all actions using the Young doctrine are actions seeking to adjudicate a state's interests or rights. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,101-02 (1984); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.159,166 (1985). Real property actions are no different.
Third, the fact that such suits cannot resolve title disputes is largely irrelevant. Here, as against the state officials, plaintiffs only seek cessation of those of Idaho's regulatory powers that are harmful to the Tribe. Should a court find in favor of plaintiffs and Idaho subsequently wishes to assert its ownership of the property, it may pursue its own remedies. Lee,106 U.S. at 222; Tindal,167 U.S. at 223.
Fourth, the fact that the state officials may ultimately prevail on the merits is also irrelevant. A determination of the merits in order to determine Eleventh Amendment immunity is patently improper. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at 699-700 (Stevens, J.); id. at 703 (White, J.).
Finally, the availability of a state forum does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.167 (1961); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). To hold otherwise would mean that federal courts would no longer be the paramount protectors of federal rights. Each individual state legislature could prevent federal courts from adjudicating such rights by enacting some sort of remedial scheme.
Thus, because the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the Tribe's claims against the Idaho state officials, the decision of the Ninth Circuit must be affirmed.
STATE OF KANSAS v. HENDRICKS
No. 95-1649 (amicus in support of respondent)
Initially, the Petitions in this case raised potentially broad and fundamental issues concerning the scope of a state's constitutional authority to commit an individual involuntarily to a psychiatric hospital. In its opening Brief, the State of Kansas has substantially narrowed the issues presented to this Court.
There no longer appears to be any dispute abou