Source: http://www.delawareiplaw.com/page/88
Timestamp: 2017-02-25 09:09:53
Document Index: 428720463

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 285']

Delaware IP Law Blog — Page 88 of 196 — Published by Wilmington, Delaware Intellectual Property Litigation Lawyer — Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP
Judge Andrews construes claims relating to telephone network technologies
In a recent claim construction opinion, Judge Richard G. Andrews construed seven terms from U.S. Patent Nos. 7,012,916; 7,206,304; 7,903,641; 8,170,008; 8,189,565; 8,204,046; and 8,223,752 (collectively, the “Low Patents”), which each relate to “facilitating the integration of traditional telephone networks with computer networks.” Comcast IP Holdings I, LLC v. Sprint Communications Company et al., C.A. No. 12-205-RGA (D. Del. Aug. 16, 2013). Judge Andrews also construed three terms from an unrelated patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,873,694 (the “’694 Patent”), which teaches “systems and methods to optimize a telephony network.” Judge Andrews construed the following seven terms from the Low Patents:
– “switched telecommunication system I telecommunication system”
– “requesting . . . a communication to be set up through the switched telecommunication
– “telecommunications system control apparatus”
– “URI I uniform resource identifier (URI) I universal resource identifier (URI) I universe
resource name (URN)”
– “DNS-type database system I DNS-type distributed database system”
– “Domain name system signaling”
– “A substantial portion of the number string”
Judge Andrews also construed the following three terms from the ’694 Patent:
– “Dial-up prompt [parameter]”
– “Telephony parameter”
– “Telephone usage of the telephony network”
By Gregory J. Brodzik	Posted in: Richard G. Andrews	Published on: August 21, 2013	Updated:
August 21, 2013 10:57 pm
By Pilar G. Kraman	Posted in: Richard G. Andrews	Published on: August 20, 2013	Updated:
Judge Robinson orders plaintiff to show cause why it should not be sanctioned for prosecution of allegedly frivolous, eventually withdrawn infringement claim.
Judge Robinson recently granted a motion to dismiss a § 285 counterclaim for attorneys’ fees relating to an allegedly frivolous and eventually withdrawn claim, but ordered the plaintiff to show cause why it should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for its prosecution of that claim. Technology Innovations, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civ. No. 11-690-SLR (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2013). The plaintiff alleged infringement of two patents, one of which (the ‘407 patent) previously had been asserted in the Southern District of Texas. The defendant claimed that during the course of the litigation in Texas, the plaintiff agreed not to pursue the ‘407 infringement claim because of the “high unlikelihood of infringement.” Id. at 1-2. As a result, when the plaintiff asserted the ‘407 infringement claim in Delaware, the defendant moved for Rule 11 sanctions. Id. The Court denied that motion without prejudice as premature (previously discussed here). Almost a year later, after the defendant answered, filed counterclaims, and engaged in discovery regarding the ‘407 patent, the plaintiff amended its complaint to remove allegations relating to the ‘407 patent and to provide an affirmative statement of non-liability with respect to that patent. Id. at 2. The defendant answered and asserted a counterclaim under § 285 for attorneys’ fees in connection with the plaintiff’s continued prosecution of the withdrawn allegations. The plaintiff then moved to dismiss that counterclaim.
The Court reviewed the history of § 285, and cases applying it, and concluded that § 285 attorneys’ fees “can only be awarded after the substantive issues in the case have been resolved and the prevailing party has been determined.” Id. at 7. The Court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the § 285 counterclaim, since the “prevailing party” could not be determined until the claims relating to the other asserted patent were tried. Id. at 8. However, the Court noted that “Rule 11 is not circumscribed by the time-oriented limitations of § 285.” Id. at 8. Because the plaintiff continued to assert the ‘407 patent for nearly a year after the Court denied without prejudice the original motion for Rule 11 sanctions, the defendant was forced to respond to the complaint, file counterclaims, and engage in discovery during that time. As a result, Judge Robinson ordered the plaintiff to show cause why its filing of the eventually withdrawn ‘407 patent infringement claim was not sanctionable under Rule 11. Id at 9.
UPDATE: In an October 22, 2014 order on a motion for reconsideration, Judge Robinson clarified that the analytical framework for the award of fees should have been 35 U.S.C. 285, rather than Rule 11. A link to that order appears below.
By James L. Higgins	Posted in: Sue L. Robinson	Published on: August 19, 2013	Updated:
October 24, 2014 5:37 pm
By Robert Vrana	Posted in: Richard G. Andrews	Published on: August 12, 2013	Updated:
Judge Robinson grants motion for leave to amend induced infringement claim
By Samantha G. Wilson	Posted in: Sue L. Robinson	Published on: August 12, 2013	Updated:
Judge Sue L. Robinson recently denied Ricoh Company, Ltd.’s motion to dismiss Telecomm Innovations, LLC’s indirect infringement claims. Telecomm Innovations, LLC v. Ricoh Company, Ltd., et al., C.A. No. 12-1277-SLR (D. Del. Aug. 6, 2013) (click here for a discussion of trends in the District of Delaware regarding pleading direct and indirect patent infringement). Plaintiff accused Ricoh’s “fax-capable products” of infringement and, in support of its indirect infringement claims alleged that Ricoh provides “technical support and services, as well as detailed explanations, instructions and information as to arrangements, applications and uses, which induce defendants’ customers to infringe the ‘519 patent through use of [the accused products].” Id. at 2. Plaintiff also alleged that Ricoh “specifically intended to induce infringement by its customers and others … knowing that such acts would cause infringement and/or were willfully blind to the possibility that their inducing acts would cause infringement.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
Ricoh argued that Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims did not pass muster because Plaintiff had “not pled with sufficient ‘factual detail’ that there was at least one direct infringer and that defendants knew of and specifically intended to induce infringement.” Id. at 5. Judge Robinson noted that Plaintiff was “not required to specifically identify the customers who [were] induced to infringe, as this is a ‘proper question for discovery.'” Id. Because Plaintiff pled that Ricoh’s customers infringe the patent-in-suit, “the requirement for pleading facts to allow an inference that at least one direct infringer exists ha[d] been met.” Id.
Regarding knowledge of the patent-in-suit, Judge Robinson found that Plaintiff’s allegations that Ricoh received notice of the patent at least as early as the filing of the Complaint was sufficient to plead knowledge “for purposes of post-complaint relief.” Id. at 6. Finally, regarding Ricoh’s intent for their customers to infringe, Judge Robinson found that Plaintiff’s allegations that Ricoh “provided technical support and instructions to their customers on how to use products in such a way as to infringe the patented invention” was sufficient to plead Ricoh’s specific intent to induce patent infringement. Id at 6-8.
By Pilar G. Kraman	Posted in: Sue L. Robinson	Published on: August 9, 2013	Updated:
Because the litigations were mirror images with respect to Belden’s patents, Nexans sought to enjoin the Indiana litigation under the first-filed rule. Belden argued several exceptions to the first-filed rule existed, such that the Delaware litigation should be dismissed in favor of the Indiana case. Specifically, Belden argued that Nexans’ declaratory judgment action was anticipatory (or, in the alternative, was filed in bad faith during settlement negotiations) and was the result of forum shopping. The Court disagreed, finding that Nexans’ suit, filed 19 days after the parties’ Standstill Agreement expired and at a time when settlement negotiations had broken down, could not be considered anticipatory or in bad faith. Id. at 11. The Court also found that alleged forum-shopping was no reason to depart from the first-filed rule, explaining that it would not “characterize a plaintiff’s choice of venue as ‘forum shopping’ when, by essentially moving to transfer venue, a defendant is doing the same thing – choosing a venue that it believes to be more favorable to its claims for whatever reason.” Id. at 12. Finally, the Court was not convinced that any other considerations weighed in favor of departing from the first-filed rule, and explained that it made more sense to litigate in Delaware because “dismissal of the declaratory judgment claims in favor of the Indiana action would still leave Nexans’ affirmative claim for infringement of its patent in the instant action and require the parties to litigate in two separate courts.” Id. at 13. The Court therefore granted Nexans’ motion to enjoin the prosecution of the Indiana action. Id. at 13-14.
By James L. Higgins	Posted in: Sue L. Robinson	Published on: August 9, 2013	Updated:
By Samantha G. Wilson	Posted in: Special Master	Published on: August 6, 2013	Updated:
By Samantha G. Wilson	Posted in: Leonard P. Stark, Chief Judge	Published on: August 2, 2013	Updated:
By James L. Higgins	Posted in: Leonard P. Stark, Chief Judge	Published on: August 2, 2013	Updated: