Source: https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/w/index.php?title=Countermeasures&action=edit
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 02:11:47
Document Index: 73650777

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 3', 'Art 49', 'Art 52', 'Art 52', 'Art 28', 'Art 52', 'Art 49', 'Art 28', 'Art 49', 'Art 50', 'Art 50', 'Art 51', 'Art 54', 'art 3', 'Art 49', 'art 3', 'Art 49']

Editing Countermeasures - International cyber law: interactive toolkit
Editing Countermeasures
== Definition == <section begin=Definition /> {| class="wikitable mw-collapsible" style="background-color:#ffffcc;" |- ! scope="col" style="background-color:#ffffaa;"| [[Countermeasures]] |- |[[File:Countermeasures.svg|alt=|left|frameless|200x200px]]Countermeasures are “measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured State vis-à-vis the responsible State, if they were not taken by the former in response to an internationally wrongful act by the latter in order to procure cessation and reparation”.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Commentary, part 3 ch 2 at para 1.</ref> An injured State may only take countermeasures against the responsible State if the following conditions are met: # The existence of a '''prior internationally wrongful act''' of the responsible State against the injured State;<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 49(1); ''[https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)]'' (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 83.</ref> # The internationally wrongful act '''has not ceased''' and “the dispute is [not] pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions binding on the parties”, unless the “responsible State fails to implement the dispute settlement procedures in good faith”;<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 52(3) – 52(4).</ref> # The injured State has '''called upon'''<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 52(1)(a). According to the UK Attorney General, the UK does not feel legally obliged, when taking countermeasures in response to a covert cyber intrusion, to “give prior notification to the hostile state”. UK Attorney General, Jeremy Wright QC MP, ‘[https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century]’.</ref> the responsible State to fulfil its obligations arising from its internationally wrongful act;<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility,] Art 28-41; the list of consequences includes (i) continued duty of performance, (ii) cessation and non-repetition, (iii) reparation, and (iv) particular consequences of a serious breach of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.</ref> and # The injured State has '''notified''' the responsible State of its decision to take countermeasures, and '''offered to negotiate''' with that State, unless it is taking “'''urgent countermeasures''' as are necessary to preserve its rights.”<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 52(1)(b) – 52(2).</ref> Additionally, the countermeasures must fulfil the following requirements: # <li value="5">Their aim must be to '''induce the responsible State to comply''' with the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful act;<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 49(1); ''[https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)]'' (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 87. The list of consequences in Art 28-41 includes (i) continued duty of performance, (ii) cessation and non-repetition, (iii) reparation, and (iv) particular consequences of a serious breach of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.</ref> in other words, the aim of countermeasures is restoration, not retribution; and the countermeasures can only target the responsible State; # They “shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the '''resumption of performance''' of the obligations in question;”<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 49(3).</ref> # They shall not affect “obligations under '''peremptory norms''' of general international law”<ref>Such as the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the UN Charter, obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights, and obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals. ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 50(1).</ref>, obligations under any '''dispute settlement procedure''' between the injured and responsible State, and obligations arising from the '''inviolability''' of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents;<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 50(2).</ref> and # They must be “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity” of the prior unlawful act and of the rights in question (i.e. the requirement of “'''proportionality'''”).<ref>Articles on State Responsibility, Art 51; ''[https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)]'' (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 85.</ref> Taken countermeasures must be '''suspended''' if the internationally wrongful act has ceased or if “the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions binding on the parties”, and they must be '''terminated''' as soon as the responsible State has complied with its (secondary) obligations. Only the injured State may take countermeasures, unless there has been a violation of a norm of erga omnes status. Other States can only take other lawful measures.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 54.</ref> Whether a particular measure fulfils these conditions is an objective question,<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Commentary in Part 3, Chapter 2 on Art 49, para 3.</ref> while the burden of proof that the relevant conditions have been fulfilled falls on the injured State.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Commentary to Part One, Chapter 5, para 8 (noting that “[i]n a bilateral dispute over State responsibility, the onus of establishing responsibility lies in principle on the claimant State”).</ref> The exact standard of proof required is unsettled in international law and it will depend on the relevant forum. However, relevant international jurisprudence tends to rely in this regard on the standard of “clear and convincing evidence”.<ref>See, eg, ''[http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf Trail Smelter case] (United States v Canada)'' (Award) (1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1965; see also Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, ‘Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: Shifting the Focus Away from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible Countermeasures and Collective Threat-Prevention’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), ''Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace'' (NATO CCD COE 2013) 624 (noting that in cases where State responsibility is involved, the required threshold tends to shift towards ‘clear and convincing’”).</ref> This standard translates in practice into a duty to “convince the arbiter in question that it is ''substantially'' more likely than not that the factual claims that have been made are true.”<ref>James Green, ‘[https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589308000833 Fluctuating Evidentiary Standards for Self-Defence in the International Court of Justice]’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 163, 167 (emphasis original).</ref> Importantly, if a State does resort to countermeasures on the basis of an unfounded assessment that a breach has occurred, it may incur responsibility for its own wrongful conduct.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Commentary in Part 3, Chapter 2 on Art 49, para 3.</ref> |}<section end=Definition /> == Appendixes == === See also === * [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization]] * [[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory]] * [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State]] * [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage]] * [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign]] === Notes and references === <references /> === Bibliography and further reading === <!-- * MN Schmitt (ed), ''Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations'' (CUP 2017) --> [[Category:Countermeasures]] [[Category:Legal concepts]]
Retrieved from "https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Countermeasures"