Source: https://openjurist.org/956/f2d/270/tackett-v-w-sullivan
Timestamp: 2019-12-16 12:36:14
Document Index: 288142589

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 423', '§ 416', '§ 406', '§ 416', '§ 416']

956 F2d 270 Tackett v. W Sullivan | OpenJurist
956 F. 2d 270 - Tackett v. W Sullivan
956 F2d 270 Tackett v. W Sullivan
Norman TACKETT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
This court has jurisdiction on appeal to review the Secretary's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which specifies that the Secretary's factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. " 'Substantial evidence' means 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Kirk v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir.1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). In determining whether the Secretary's findings are supported by substantial evidence, we must examine the evidence in the record "taken as a whole," Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir.1980), and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.' " Beavers v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.1978) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)). If it is supported by substantial evidence, the Secretary's determination must stand regardless of whether the reviewing court would resolve the issues of fact in dispute differently. Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam).
The claimant has the ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits by proving the existence of a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). If the claimant is working and the work constitutes substantial gainful activity, benefits are automatically denied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If the claimant is not found to have an impairment which significantly limits his or her ability to work (a severe impairment), then he or she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 406.920(c). Since the ALJ found that Tackett had not worked since he filed his application for disability benefits on April 10, 1987 and he suffered from a severe impairment, further inquiry was necessary. If the claimant is not working and has a severe impairment, it must be determined whether he or she suffers from one of the listed impairments. In such a case, assuming the individual has previously worked, the Secretary must next decide whether the claimant can return to the job he or she previously held. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). By showing "a medical basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in his particular occupation," the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir.1978). In the instant case, the ALJ found that Tackett was not capable of returning to his particular occupation.
At this step in the analysis, it becomes the Secretary's burden to establish the claimant's ability to work. Allen, 613 F.2d at 145. The Secretary must prove that, taking into consideration present job qualifications such as age, experience, education, and physical capacity, and the existence of jobs to match those qualifications, the claimant retains the capacity to perform a different kind of job. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f)(1); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983). The Secretary's burden can, on occasion, be satisfied by relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, otherwise known as the "grid." Kirk, 667 F.2d at 528-29. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. In the instant case, the ALJ found that claimant retained the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of medium work, that he was "closely approaching advanced age," completed the seventh grade and thus had a "limited education," and that his previous work experience was unskilled. Accordingly, the ALJ found that the grid directs a conclusion that considering claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience he is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 203.18.
While it is true that the medical diagnosis and opinions of a treating physician are generally accorded substantial deference, and are to be given greater weight than an opinion by a physician who treats the claimant only once, the Secretary is not bound by the treating physician's opinion where there is substantial evidence to the contrary or the treating physician's opinion is not supported by sufficient medical data. Loy v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 901 F.2d 1306, 1308 (6th Cir.1990); Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir.1985).
In light of the complete lack of clinical data to support the treating physician's assessment, the ALJ was justified in relying on evidence to the contrary. Loy, 901 F.2d at 1308. This included evidence that the claimant has not had a myelogram or CT scan and there is no evidence of a herniated disc. In fact, Dr. Hobe termed the degenerative change in claimant's lumbar region as "moderate." In addition, x-rays of claimant's right elbow showed only minimal lipping on the olecranon process. Furthermore, heart catheterization revealed that claimant did not have arteriosclerosis, but only a mild mitral valve prolapse. This finding was subsequently confirmed by echocardiogram. Finally, Dr. Gilliam, the medical advisor, characterized the pulmonary function studies as demonstrating only mild obstructive and restrictive pulmonary disease. Given the absence of any objective clinical data to support the treating physician's conclusion, the non-treating physician's assessments were substantial evidence in support of the Secretary's determination. Atterberry v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 871 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir.1989).