Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/302/253
Timestamp: 2015-03-28 04:27:03
Document Index: 370187121

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 12', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 733', '§ 735', '§ 1', '§ 225', '§ 1342', '§ 468', '§ 41']

PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO v. SHELL CO. (P.R.), Limited, et al. | LII / Legal Information Institute
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302 U.S. 253 (58 S.Ct. 167, 82 L.Ed. 235)
[HTML] Mr. Wm. Cattron Rigby, of Washington, D.C., for People of puerto rico.
This is a criminal proceeding brought by petitioner against the respondents in the insular district court of San Juan, Puerto Rico. An information filed by the district attorney charged respondents with entering into a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the local anti-trust act, passed by the Legislature of Puerto Rico March 14, 1907. Demurrers to the information were sustained by the district court on the ground that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 17, 15 note), supplemented by the Clayton Act of 1914 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12 27), covered the entire field embraced by the local anti-trust act, and the latter, therefore, was void. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico accepted that view and dismissed the appeal; and its judgment was affirmed on appeal by the court below. (C.C.A.) 86 F.2d 577. The single question which we have to decide is whether the existence of section 3 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 3) precluded the adoption of the local act by the insular legislature.
The pertinent provisions of the Sherman Act and the local act are set forth in the margin.
Section 3 of the Sherman Act and section 1 of the local act, so far as the question here involved is concerned, are substantially identical. Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 4) confers jurisdiction in respect of violations of the act upon the several district courts of the United States. Section 3 of the local act confers jurisdiction upon the district courts of Puerto Rico in respect of violations of that act.
If, as we there determined, Congress intended by the Sherman Act to exert all the power it possessed in respect of the subject mattertrade and commerceit is equally reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to include all territories to which its powers might extend. The same reason which requires the utmost liberality of construction in respect of the word 'trade' also requires the same degree of liberality of construction in respect of the word 'territory'; and we hold, accordingly, that the word 'territory' was used in its most comprehensive sense, as embracing all organized territories, whether incorporated into the United States or not, including Puerto Rico.
2. The aim of the Foraker Act and the Organic Act was to give Puerto Rico full power of local self-determination with an autonomy similar to that of the states and incorporated territories. Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U.S. 362, 370, 32 S.Ct. 499, 56 L.Ed. 801; People of Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo, supra, 227 U.S. 270, at page 274, 33 S.Ct. 352, 57 L.Ed. 507. The effect was to confer upon the territory many of the attributes of quasi sovereignty possessed by the statesas, for example, immunity from suit without their consent. People of Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo, supra. By those acts, the typical American governmental structure, consisting of the three independent departmentslegislative, executive and judicialwas erected. 'A body politic'a commonwealthwas created. 31 Stat. 79, § 7, c. 191 (48 U.S.C.A. § 733). The power of taxation, the power to enact and enforce laws, and other characteristically governmental powers were vested. And, so far as local matters are concerned, as we have already shown in respect of the continental territories, legislative powers were conferred nearly, if not quite, as extensive as those exercised by the state legislatures.
3. In the light of the foregoing considerations, including the sweeping character of the congressional grant of power contained in the Foraker Act and the Organic Act of 1917, the general purpose of Congress to confer power upon the government of Puerto Rico to legislate in respect of all local matters is made manifest. In this connection it is significant that the only express limitation upon the power is that, in certain of its aspects, it shall be exercised consistently with the provisions of the respective acts. See sections 37, 57 of the Organic Act (48 U.S.C.A. §§ 735, 736, 774, 821), and section 32 of the Foraker Act (
31 Stat. 83). Nothing is expressed in these acts or, so far as we are advised, in any other federal act which suggests a congressional intent to limit the exercise of the power of local legislation to those subjects in respect of which there is an absence of explicit legislation by Congress; and we find nothing in the nature of the power or in the consequences likely to ensue from the duplicate exercise of it which requires an implication to that effect.
Our attention is called to certain differences of language in the two acts; and it is urged that these differences create a 'risk' of conflict of interpretation between the local courts and the federal district courts. The fear of conflicting decisions is more fanciful than real, since we agree with the court below that there is in fact no substantial conflict between the pertinent provisions of the two statutes. But in the unlikely event that, in spite of this conclusion, a conflict of decisions shall arise, the power of the federal appellate courts to resolve that conflict is clear. Sections 128(a) and 240, Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936, 938, 28 U.S.C. 225(a), 347, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 225(a), 347.
It likewise is clear that the legislative duplication gives rise to no danger of a second prosecution and conviction, or of double punishment for the same offense. The risk of double jeopardy
does not exist. Both the territorial and federal laws and the courts, whether exercising federal or local jurisdiction, are creations emanating from the same sovereignty. See Balzac v. Puerto Rico, supra, 258 U.S. 298, at page 312, 42 S.Ct. 343, 348, 66 L.Ed. 627. Prosecution under one of the laws in the appropriate court, necessarily, will bar a prosecution under the other law in another court. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 27 S.Ct. 749, 51 L.Ed. 1084, 11 Ann.Cas. 640. In that case, Grafton, a soldier in the Army, had been acquitted by a general court martial convened in the Philippine Islands of a crime not capital, alleged to have been committed in violation of the Sixty-Second Article of War. Subsequently, a criminal information in the name of the United States was filed in a Philippine court of first instance, charging him with the same offense committed in violation of a local law. This court held that the acquittal of the accused by the court martial precluded his being again tried for the same offense in the civil courts, for the reason that he would thus be put twice in jeopardy of punishment. The Sixty-Second Article of War
was a federal statute. Revised Statutes, § 1342. The general court martial was a federal tribunal. The Philippine act was a local law; and the court of first instance was a local court. But both of the laws and both of the courts owed their existence to the same supreme authority. The situation presented there was, in all essentials, the same as that presented here. The decision of the court in that case rested upon the ground that the accused, having been acquitted by the federal tribunal, could not be subjected to prosecution in another court, civil or military, of the same sovereignty. We held that, although the same act might constitute distinct offenses against a state and against the United States, for both of which the accused might be prosecuted, that rule had no application to acts committed in the Philippine Islands. We said (206 U.S. 333, at pages 354, 355, 27 S.Ct. 749, 755, 51 L.Ed. 1084, 11 Ann.Cas. 640): 'The government of a state does not derive its powers from the United States, while the government of the Philippines owes its existence wholly to the United States, and its judicial tribunals exert all their powers by authority of the United States. The jurisdiction and authority of the United States over that territory and its inhabitants, for all legitimate purposes of government, is paramount. So that the cases holding that the same acts committed in a state of the Union may constitute an offense against the United States and also a distinct offense against the state, do not apply here, where the two tribunals that tried the accused exert all their powers under and by authority of the same government,that of the United States.'
An attempt is made to distinguish the Grafton Case on the ground that but one statute was there involvednamely, the statute of the Philippine Islandsand that both the general court martial and the Philippine court undertook to enforce that statute. Obviously, that view is incorrect. The court-martial proceeding was not to enforce the Philippine legislation, but to enforce the Sixty-Second Article of War; and that article was none the less a federal law, distinct from the local law, because it might be necessary to refer to the local law to determine whether the act charged against the soldier was embraced by the term 'crimes' in the Sixty-Second Article. This is well illustrated by section 289 of the Criminal Code, as amended (
18 U.S.C. 468, 18 U.S.C.A. § 468), which, in respect of offenses committed upon places subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within the limits of a state or organized territory or district, makes applicable the laws of such state, territory, or district in respect of such offenses. Prosecutions under that section, however, are not to enforce the laws of the state, territory, or district, but to enforce the federal law, the details of which, instead of being recited, are adopted by reference. See United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 212, 55 L.Ed. 65, 21 Ann.Cas. 942.
The Wyoming and the Utah courts thought that prosecution and punishment could be had under both statutes, and attempted to justify that view by invoking the rule applicable to state and federal statutes denouncing the same criminal acts. This, of course, in the light of our later decision in the Grafton Case, is now seen to be erroneous; but the error does not affect the accuracy of the reasoning and conclusion of these courts upon the main pointthat the local statute was a valid exercise of territorial power, notwithstanding the identical legislation by Congress.
5. There is some general language in El Paso & N.E. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 30 S.Ct. 21, 23, 54 L.Ed. 106, and Davis v. Beason, supra, which, considered apart from the question which was involved and apart from the opinions in their entirety, seems to support the decision of the court below in the present case. The opinion of the court below and the argument of respondents here rest in the main upon these cases. An examination of them, however, will show that they have been misunderstood. The Gutierrez Case involved the validity of a statute of the Territory of New Mexico, which provided that no action for injuries inflicting death caused by any person or corporation in the territory should be maintained unless the person claiming damages should, within 90 days after the infliction of the injuries complained of and 30 days before commencing suit, serve upon the defendant an affidavit covering certain specified particulars. The statute also required that suit must be brought within a year and in a specified district court of the territory. The statute is set forth in full in the margin of the opinion of this court in Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 59 63, 29 S.Ct. 397, 53 L.Ed. 695. An action was brought in Taxes by Enedina Gutierrez against the railway company to recover damages for the death of her intestate. The accident causing the death happened in New Mexico, and the railway company set up the New Mexico statute by way of special plea and answer. A writ of error brought here for review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas holding that the case was controlled by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 34 Stat. 232, and refusing to give effect to the New Mexico statutea statute which was plainly an attempted restriction upon the right of action conferred in unlimited terms by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and, therefore, in direct conflict with that act. In deciding the question, this court said that there could be no doubt that the act of Congress 'would necessarily supersede the territorial law regulating the same subject.' This is broad language; but it must be construed in the light of the question presented, which was whether a territorial act, in plain conflict with the federal act, was valid. In that situation, the applicable rule is that formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, 5 L.Ed. 257, where, speaking for this court, he said: 'It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision.' See, also, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627, 55 S.Ct. 869, 873, 79 L.Ed. 1611, and cases cited.
By section 24(2) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 41(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(2), the district courts of the United States are given jurisdiction 'Of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States.'