Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020170320C19/WELLS%20v.%20BREWER
Timestamp: 2017-07-21 06:54:11
Document Index: 355154402

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2253', '§ 2253', '§ 1915']

Case No. 2:16-CV-11781. | WELLS v. BREWER | Nature of Suit: 530 Habeas Corpus (General) | By ARTHUR J. TARNOW | Leagle.com
Case No. 2:16-CV-11781.
Dante E. Wells, Petitioner, Pro Se.
Shawn Brewer, Respondent, represented by David H. Goodkin , Michigan Attorney General & Laura Moody , Michigan Department of Attorney General.
Respondent argues that the petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, applies to all habeas petitions filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996, and imposes a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A prisoner must file a federal habeas corpus petition within one year of the "date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review . . . or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) & (D). The time during which a prisoner seeks state-court collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 371-72 (6th Cir. 2007). A properly filed application for state post-conviction relief, while tolling the limitation period, does not reset the limitation period at zero. Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003).
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals, but not to the Michigan Supreme Court. Michigan Court Rule 7.305(C)(2) allows a defendant fifty-six days from the date of the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision to file an application for leave to appeal. Petitioner's application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was rejected because it was not timely filed. Thus, his conviction became final when the time for seeking such review expired, April 21, 2009. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). The one-year limitations period commenced the following day, on April 22, 2009, and continued to run until December 2, 2009, when Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The motion for relief from judgment tolled the limitations period with 141 days remaining. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) ("The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. . . ."). The limitations period continued to be tolled until July 25, 2011, when the Michigan Supreme court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal. The limitations period resumed on July 26, 2011. It continued to run, uninterrupted, until it expired 141 days later, on December 14, 2011.
Petitioner admits that his petition was not timely filed, but argues that his showing of actual innocence excuses the untimeliness. The Supreme Court has held that a showing of actual innocence overcomes AEDPA's statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). To determine whether a petitioner has satisfied the requirements for establishing a cognizable claim of actual innocence to warrant equitable tolling, the court applies "the same actual innocence standard developed in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995), for reviewing a federal habeas applicant's procedurally defaulted claim." McCray v. Vasbinder, 499 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Souter, 395 F.3d at 596. A valid claim of actual innocence requires a petitioner "to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness account, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. "The Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the `extraordinary' case." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (citation omitted). A court presented with new evidence must consider it in light of "all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules of admissibility that would govern at trial." Id., 547 U.S. at 538 (citation omitted). "Based on this total record, the court must make `a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.'" Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). This standard does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner's guilt or innocence:
House, 547 U.S. at 538.
Petitioner's actual innocence claim relates to DNA evidence. First, he argues that additional testing should have been performed on the sweatshirt found in the trash can. DNA testing was performed on these items retrieved from the trash can outside the gas station: swab from ski mask, swab from stocking, ½ sweatshirt tag, and swab from brown gloves. Only the sweatshirt tag yielded a detectible profile. At trial, the jury was informed that the DNA evidence found on the sweatshirt tag did not match Petitioner's DNA profile. Petitioner argues that additional testing should have been performed on the sweatshirt because the original laboratory report prepared by the Forensic Science Division of the Michigan State Police stated that chemical tests indicated the presence of blood on the sweatshirt, but the company that performed the DNA analysis of the tag failed to analyze the potential blood sample. Petitioner argues that if this blood sample had been analyzed it may have identified another culprit and exonerated him. This speculative claim is insufficient to satisfy Schlup's demanding standard for "new reliable evidence" of actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. Accord Hammond v. Patterson, No. 12-cv-935, 2014 WL 21617276, *3 (M.D. Ala. May 20, 2014) (speculative possibility that DNA testing of evidence might reveal potentially exculpatory evidence insufficient to satisfy Schlup's actual innocence standard); Cummings v. Dovey, No. 07-8144, 2008 WL 4664975, at *5 (C.D. Cal.2008) (finding that claim based on the assertion that DNA testing that had yet to be performed would have revealed another culprit was speculative and did not constitute the "new reliable evidence" needed to support an actual innocence claim).
Second, Petitioner states that, in 2010, the DNA profile obtained from the sweatshirt was matched to an individual, Anthony Carlos Martinez, in the Michigan State Police's CODIS (Combined DNA Indexing System) database. Petitioner argues that this match establishes his actual innocence. Significant evidence presented at trial linked Petitioner to the getaway vehicle, including his own statement that he had wiped the vehicle clean. Testimony also identified a motive for the robbery: Petitioner's friend Jordan testified that on the morning of the robbery Petitioner told Jordan that he needed $500 by that evening. Petitioner's statement to his girlfriend that someone had chased him and thrown a stick at the vehicle while he was driving it, corresponded with the circumstances surrounding the suspect's fleeing the restaurant. In addition, while the contributor of the DNA on the sweatshirt was not identified at trial, the jury was informed that Petitioner was not the contributor of the DNA. The CODIS match does not convince the Court that, when considered in light of all the evidence presented at trial, the match would make it "more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt." House, 547 U.S. at 538. The petition is therefore time-barred.
Moreover, even if the petition was not time-barred, Petitioner's sole claim for habeas relief — that he is actually innocent — fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence "have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). "[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution — not to correct errors of fact." Id. In House v. Bell, the Supreme Court declined to answer the question left open in Herrera — whether a habeas petitioner may bring a freestanding claim of actual innocence. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (noting that "in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of `actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim").
Citing Herrera and House, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that a free-standing claim of actual innocence based upon newly-discovered evidence does not warrant federal habeas relief. See Bowman v. Haas, No. 15-1485, 2016 WL 612019, *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016) (holding that a freestanding claim of actual innocence is not cognizable in a non-capital federal habeas proceeding); Muntaser v. Bradshaw, 429 F. App'x 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n actual innocence claim operates only to excuse a procedural default so that a petitioner may bring an independent constitutional challenge . . .Given that [petitioner] alleges only a free-standing claim to relief on the grounds of actual innocence, his claim is not cognizable . . . and, accordingly, does not serve as a ground for habeas relief."). Consequently, Petitioner's claim that he is actually innocent and has newly-discovered evidence to prove his innocence fails to state a claim upon which habeas relief can be granted.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings requires that a district court must "issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)." Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.
Having undertaken the requisite review, the Court concludes that jurists of reason could find debatable whether Petitioner's actual innocence claim excuses his failure to timely file the petition.
The Court finds that Petitioner failed to file his habeas petition within the applicable one-year limitations period. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED.
The Court GRANTS a certificate of appealability. If Petitioner chooses to appeal the Court's decision, he may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because an appeal could be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).