Source: https://www.oshrc.gov/assets/1/18/Truston_Technologies_15-1023_Final_Order.html?6992
Timestamp: 2019-08-18 21:18:29
Document Index: 622624176

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 659', '§ 652', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1910', '§ 1910', '§ 1910', 'art 1926', 'art 1910', 'art 1926', '§ 1910', '§ 1910', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1910', '§ 1926', '§ 1910', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1910', '§ 1926', '§ 1910', 'art, 541']

TRUSTON TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
OSHRC Docket No. 15-1023
Elena A. Pecoraro, Esq., Pecoraro Law, LLC, Lafayette, Louisiana
Approximately three years ago, the United States Navy hired Respondent, Truston Technologies, to perform maintenance on mooring systems in the Middle Loch of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Hawaii. (Stip. No. 3). Truston,1 in turn, hired Healy Tibbitts Builders to carry out certain aspects of the maintenance operation. (Stip. No. 4). Part of the maintenance operation involved lifting an 11,500-pound buoy approximately 75 feet above the deck of the barge where Truston’s and Healy Tibbitts’ employees were stationed. (Tr. 97, 171). Tragically, during the course of one such lift, the buoy detached from the crane hook and fell to the deck of the barge, seriously injuring two Healy Tibbitts employees and killing two others. (Stip. No. 25). In response, Complainant conducted an inspection, and cited Truston for three violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.2
As noted above, Complainant cited Truston for three violations of the Act and proposed a total penalty of $15,400. In response, Respondent filed a Notice of Contest, arguing Complainant could not prove a violation with respect to any of the citation items. By filing the Notice of Contest, Truston brought this case before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission pursuant to section 10(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).3
In addition to citing Truston, Complainant also cited Healy Tibbitts for multiple violations of the Act. Because the facts and some of the alleged violations overlapped, Truston, Healy Tibbitts, and Complainant agreed to consolidate the cases for the purposes of trial only. Although the discussion of facts, and certain conclusions of law, will inevitably involve the actions of both Truston and Healy Tibbitts, this decision only addresses the citations issued to Truston. As previously noted, Complainant issued three separate citation items, but only two were addressed at trial—Citation 1, Item 1 was withdrawn by Complainant at the beginning of the trial. (Tr. 16).
The parties stipulated to a number of facts, both substantive and jurisdictional. Those stipulations were submitted by the parties as Joint Exhibit 1.5 Based on the parties’ stipulations, the Court finds the Commission has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act. Further, the Court finds Respondent was an employer engaged in a business and industry affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). Slingluff v. OSHRC, 425 F.3d 861, 866–67 (10th Cir. 2005).
In May 2009, the United States Navy’s Naval Engineering and Expeditionary Warfare Center entered into a contract with Truston to provide ocean facilities engineering support services to the Navy’s Inactive Ships Yard, located in the Middle Loch of Pearl Harbor. (Stip. No. 2). The contract was subsequently modified in August 2014 to include attaching sinker blocks to existing mooring legs, which were installed in 1997. (Id.). Pursuant to the contact, Truston hired Healy Tibbitts to provide labor and equipment for the mooring upgrades. (Stip. No. 4).
According to Truston and Gustave Ruetenik, another contractor for the Navy, the Navy dictates the parameters of the contract, including specifications, guidelines, and safety. (Tr. 536, 585–86). In this case, Truston and representatives from the Navy participated in pre-planning meetings to discuss how the mooring upgrades would be accomplished, how previous operations have been carried out, and how safety would be handled. (Tr. 53, 573–74). The procedures and plans developed during this meeting were then reduced to a Project Execution Plan. (Tr. 484; Ex. T-52). Bob Pittman and Steve Cohen, both Navy representatives, reviewed the plan and gave it their approval. (Tr. 484).
Pittman was the designated onsite representative for the Navy. However, according to Healy Tibbitts’ Contract Proposal6 and Truston’s Site-Specific Accident Prevention Plan, Truston assumed responsibility for supervision of subcontractor personnel and over all safety-related matters. (Ex. C-5, C-12). The Accident Prevention Plan specifically states, “We will provide and enforce safety rules to protect employees, subcontractor, clients and the public.” (Ex. C-12 at 3). The testimony of Richard E. Cabral, Jr. and Ricky Cabral confirmed those assumed responsibilities were carried out on a day-to-day basis by Truston’s onsite supervisors, Robert Vonderhaar and Chris Pacheco. (Tr. 313, 398, 403). While Pittman participated in a portion of the work—identifying the link on the riser chain to which the sinker blocks would be attached—Truston was still responsible for carrying out the mooring maintenance in accordance with the plan approved by the Navy. (Tr. 439–41; Ex. C-5, C-12). This is reflected in the Project Organizational chart, which was supplied by Truston in its Project Execution Plan. (Ex. T-52 at 4).
Each mooring leg consisted of a buoy, a riser chain, and a series sinkers and/or anchors placed at predetermined locations along the riser chain. (Tr. 52; Ex. C-2; T-52). The D-8-H mooring leg, which is the subject of this proceeding, consisted of a hawsepipe buoy, a riser chain, and sinkers. A hawsepipe buoy contains a section of vertical, hollow pipe that runs through the center. (Tr. 52; Ex. C-2 at 1). The riser chain travels through the pipe and connects the vessel above water to the sinker blocks below. (Id.). The chain is held in place by a capture plate, which locks the buoy onto a specific position on the chain. (Tr. 478–79; Ex. C-1 at 2, C-15 at 5). The capture plate, in turn, is welded onto a flange ring, which is then screwed to the top of the hawse pipe. (Tr. 481–82).
After the incident, OSHA was notified and sent CSHO Rajkumar Sundram to perform an investigation. (Tr. 57). As a result of his investigation, CSHO Sundram recommended Truston be cited for three violations of the Act. Complainant withdrew one of the violations at trial, leaving the Court with two alleged violations, which are addressed below.
A.Truston Was a Controlling Employer
At trial, Truston pursued a line of argument suggesting it was not a controlling employer and, hence, not responsible for the Healy Tibbitts employees were exposed to the hazardous condition. In its brief, Truston appears to have abandoned that argument, save for suggesting the Navy was ultimately responsible for the deteriorated condition of the buoy. To the extent Truston argues it should not be held liable as a controlling employer, the Court disagrees.
An employer will be held liable as a controlling employer if it could reasonably be expected to prevent or detect and abate a violation by reason of its supervisory capacity and control over the worksite. See IBP, Inc., 17 BNA OSHC 2073, 2074 (No. 93-3059, 1997); see also Summit Contractors, Inc., 23 BNA OSHC 1196, 1206 (No. 05-0839, 2010) (finding controlling employer where record shows company “maintained significant control over the worksite in general and over the cited condition in particular”); Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 BNA OSHC 1185 (No. 12775, 1975) (finding general contractor “well-situated to obtain abatement of hazards” and thus “reasonable to expect the general contractor to assure compliance with the standards insofar as all employees on the site are affected”) (emphasis added).
The evidence regarding Truston’s control over the worksite was substantial. Healy Tibbitts’ contract proposal indicated “[a]ll work shall be under the direct supervision of [Truston’s] designated superintendent.” (Ex. C-12 at 4). The lift plan, which was developed by Truston, identified two of its own employees—Chris Pacheco and Richard Vonderhaar—to serve as the on-site construction supervisors. (Ex. C-13 at 2). The Project Execution Plan also reiterated Truston’s supervisors would be directing operations. (Ex. T-25). Finally, Truston’s Accident Prevention Plan specifically states, “Truston has ultimate responsibility for the safety of the project and ensuring that all employees, subcontractor and vendors have a clear understanding of and adhere to any safety instructions.” (Ex. C-5 at 4) (emphasis added). These documents indicate Truston specifically assumed the responsibilities of a controlling employer.
Further, the testimony of the various witnesses established Truston’s position as a controlling employer. Richard E. Cabral, Jr., Healy Tibbitts’ superintendent, testified Truston was in charge of the worksite, and if he had any questions he would ask either Chris Pacheco or Richard Vonderhaar, Truston’s construction supervisors. (Tr. 314). Healy Tibbitts’ project manager, Christian Caicedo, testified Truston’s project manager would provide the schedule, instructions, and equipment lists. (Tr. 350–51). In that regard, he also testified Healy Tibbitts had no control over scheduling or sequencing; instead, Truston’s on-site management managed the workflow and provided direct instruction to the Healy Tibbitts workers that were at the worksite. (Tr. 352–53).
Truston developed the lift and execution plans, developed a site-specific accident prevention plan, assumed responsibility for health and safety at the worksite, and supervised the work of Healy Tibbitts’ employees. Given its supervisory capacity and control over the worksite in general, including the manner in which the mooring legs were to be lifted and replaced, the Court finds Respondent was a controlling employer.
B.Law Applicable to Alleged Violations
The cited standard applies to “slings used in conjunction with other material handling equipment for the movement of material by hoisting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.251(a)(5). The buoy lift was accomplished by attaching the crane hook to a riser chain, which ran through the center of the buoy and was held in place by a capture plate. (Tr. 52). In addition to the crane hook, however, Truston loosely attached a sling to the buoy and looped it through one of the links in the riser chain. Truston contends, and Complainant concedes, the sling was used as a back-up to the crane hook, which performed the lift. Even though the parties agree it was a back-up, Complainant cited Respondent for improperly rigging the sling. Should the rigging in construction standards apply to a sling that the parties agree was used solely for back-up?
While the parties have many disagreements—controlling employer, how the wire rope broke, etc.—they agree on the one fact fundamental to the question of whether the standard applies: the sling was a back-up to the principal hoisting mechanism. Insofar as the parties agree on that fact, the only question is whether the standard applies.
Complainant contends the language of the scope and application paragraph clearly indicates the cited standard applies to the back-up sling because (1) it was a sling, and (2) it was used in conjunction with other material handling equipment to hoist the buoy. Compl’t Br. at 16. Truston, on the other hand, argues the standard does not apply to a back-up sling because it was not used—nor was it intended to be used—to hoist or otherwise move the buoy; rather, it was a “can’t hurt, might help” proposition that should not subject them to liability under the Act. (Tr. 383). The Court agrees with Respondent. Although Complainant’s reading of the scope and application paragraph appears to be premised on plain language, his application of the standard to the facts of this case improperly broadens its scope and, in so doing, imposes liability where no obligation existed in the first place.
The scope and application paragraph states: “This section applies to slings used in conjunction with other material handling equipment for the movement of material by hoisting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.251(a)(5). To clarify, the Court reviewed the definition of “sling” in the parallel, general industry standard found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.184, which is defined as “[a]n assembly which connects the load to the material handling equipment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.184(b) (emphasis added). See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.184(b). Based on their location in the C.F.R., section 1910.184 and section 1926.251 are applicable to different employments; however, the history of section 1926.251 illustrates that the standards found at section 1910.184 were not only identified as applicable to construction, but were eventually adopted, in significant part, into the Part 1926 standards.8 See Identification of General Industry Safety and Health Standards (29 CFR Part 1910) Applicable to Construction Work, 44 Fed. Reg. 8577, 8577–8578, 8605 (1979). Although the definitions were not incorporated into the Part 1926 standards, the respective (and identical) scope and application paragraphs illustrate that they apply to identical subject matter, albeit on different worksites. See note 8, infra. This is further confirmed by nearly identical language used throughout the two standards. See generally 29 C.F.R §§ 1910.184, 1926.251.
When read as a whole, the purpose of the standard is to regulate the integrity of an active connection between material handling equipment and its load to ensure safe lifting. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.184(b) (“which connects the load” is in the present tense and connotes an active, rather than potential, connection between load and crane). The sling at issue did not actively connect anything. This concept of an active connection clarifies the scope of section 1926.251 and the meaning of “in conjunction with other material handling equipment.” If we use the definition of slings in place of the actual term, then the scope and application paragraph reads like this: “This section applies to assembl[ies] which connect[] the load to the material handling equipment . . . for the movement of material by hoisting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.251(a)(5). By applying the definition of a sling to the scope and application paragraph, the meaning of the intervening clause becomes apparent: “[I]n conjunction with other material handling equipment” is another way of saying “connects the load to the material handling equipment”.9
The sling in this case was not used, nor was it intended to be used, for the movement of material by hoisting; the parties stipulated, and the testimony supported, the sling was purely a back-up measure.10 To be sure, the sling was connected to the load and to the crane, but it did not establish the connection between the load and the crane in order to move the material (buoy). Instead, this was accomplished through a direct connection between the riser chain and the crane hook, which was then “used . . . for the movement of material by hoisting.” The sling did not move nor hoist anything in this case. The sling may have been used in conjunction with other material handling equipment, but that only meets half of the requirements for the scope and application paragraph. It must also be used in conjunction with the material handling equipment (crane) to move a load by hoisting. The sling did not move anything; rather, it moved with the load. This is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the standard.
In addition to the plain language analysis, there are sound reasons for not imposing liability in the manner suggested by Complainant. According to CSHO Sundram, Respondent would not have been cited under the rigging standards if the back-up wire sling was not attached to the crane/load. (Tr. 149). While this is certainly attributable to the fact that no shock load would have occurred, it also says something about the nature of the violation itself. Other than the shock load violation, Respondent was not cited for any other issue related to the rigging of the buoy.11 There was a hazard associated with the lift, to be sure, but Complainant did not identify a hazard associated with the principal lifting mechanism; instead, Complainant identified hazards associated with the failure of the back-up sling. This is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, not only did the CSHO testify Respondent would not have been cited if the sling was not attached, but Crane’s analysis of the shock load illustrates the accident/hazard would have been the same regardless of whether the sling was used or not. What this suggests is the hazard identified in the citation was merely ancillary to the principal hazard posed by the buoy itself. Normally, a shock load is dangerous because it places an instantaneous and exponentially greater amount of force upon the sling than if the load were slowly lifted/hoisted. (Tr. 272–73). As illustrated by Crane, a difference of a few inches can magnify the downward force of load by a factor of 10 times. (Ex. C-32). The primary concern under the shock loading standard—29 C.F.R. § 1926.251(c)(11)—is that the sling and/or the crane would not be able to handle the additional downward force caused by the shock, which would lead to failure of the sling, the crane, or both.12
Here, the shock load would not have occurred but for the failure of the principal lifting mechanism, which was not cited as a violation by Complainant. The actual hazard to which Respondent’s employees were exposed did not come from the potential for a shock load. Instead, the hazard was the result of the manner in which the buoy was lifted, the state of the flange plate screws, and the location of the employees on the deck of the barge. If the sling was removed, no shock load would have occurred, but Respondent’s employees would nonetheless have been exposed to the hazard imposed by the primary, yet unstable, load connection. This distinction is slight, but important: Employees were exposed to a hazard, but that hazard was not the result of a potential shock load. The existence of a shock load hazard was not the result of the lift or the movement of the load, but rather the failure of the principal hoist mechanism. In other words, it is a second-order hazard the existence of which is contingent upon yet another hazard coming to fruition. The hazard to the employees was the same irrespective of whether the sling was attached to the buoy or not.
Second, and somewhat relatedly, is the issue of abatement. According to the CSHO, if Respondent had not used the sling, then it would not have been cited. This is tantamount to saying removal of the sling constituted proper abatement of the violation. While that might remove the hazard associated with shock loading, it does not address the hazard to which Respondent’s employees were actually exposed. Indeed, the abatement suggested by Complainant does not address the problem of shock loading; rather, it addresses the manner in which the load and principal hoisting mechanism are handled. Complainant’s suggested abatement, such as the manner in which the buoy is lifted, how long or how high it is aloft, and whether it is placed on the deck only address the principal hazard of a falling load. (Tr. 317, 466). If the flange plate does not fail, then the shock load does not occur.
What seems to be the case here is that a tragic accident occurred, and Complainant could not (or simply did not) identify an appropriate standard for the purposes of citing Respondent. While Truston may have been at fault for the accident, it is the Court’s obligation to ensure it is being held at fault according to an appropriate standard. To suggest Respondent be held responsible for a shock loading violation when that violation was not the reason employees were exposed to a hazard is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. The fact that not doing something would constitute sufficient abatement only reinforces the absurdity of holding Respondent liable for something they were not required to do in the first instance.
The man in charge of the lift, Richard Vonderhaar, stated, without contradiction, the sling was used as a “can’t hurt, might help” precaution. (Tr. 383). Characterized as such, and armed with the foregoing analysis of the scope and application paragraph’s plain meaning, the back-up sling was an “attempt[] to render machinery or working premises more safe” and was in no way legally required. Id. To hold Respondent liable on that basis alone would, in the words of the Sixth Circuit, be repugnant to the purposes of the Act and would dissuade similarly situated employers from making any additional attempts at safety when such was not required by regulation.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Complainant failed to establish a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.251(c)(11). Accordingly, Citation 1, Item 2 shall be VACATED.
2.Citation 1, Item 3
Employees needed to access the tops of the sinker blocks to attach them to the riser chain. In order to access the top of the blocks, which stood 4.5 feet tall, employees were using sawhorses to step up onto the top of the block. (Tr. 120; Ex. C-14 at 1–2). Complainant cited Truston because it failed to provide ladders or stairways at the point where Healy Tibbitts’ employees were accessing the tops of the concrete sinker blocks. Amongst other arguments, Truston contends the standard requires Respondent to merely provide ladders, not that employees should be required to use them. See Truston Br. at 33–34 (citing Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir. 1977)).
The terms of the standard are unequivocal—“a stairway or ladder shall be provided at all personnel points of access where there is a break in elevation of 19 inches or more.” 29 C.FR. § 1926.1051(a) (emphasis added).13 Truston did not provide a stairway or ladder at the point where the 4.5-foot tall sinker blocks were accessed. Nevertheless, Truston contends a ladder was available aboard the working barge and its obligation extended no further than ensuring a ladder was available for use.
Truston makes two principal arguments to suggest it was in compliance with, or at the very least did not violate, the standard. First, it contends ladders were not the safest means of accessing the sinker blocks. In other words, Truston contends ladders imposed a greater hazard than the sawhorses. In support of this argument, Truston points to the testimony of Richard E. Cabral, Jr. Mr. Cabral said that the sawhorse was sturdier and made it easier to pass tools and equipment to the top of the sinker blocks. (Tr. 323–24). Truston also notes CSHO Sundram agreed an employee carrying equipment in his hands would not be able to maintain three points of contact with the ladder. (Tr. 153).
In order to establish the defense of greater hazard, Truston must show: “(1) the hazards created by complying with the standard are greater than those of noncompliance; (2) other methods of protecting its employees from the hazards are not available; and (3) a variance is not available or that application for a variance is inappropriate.” Spancrete Ne., Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 1020 (No. 86-521, 1991) (citing Walker Towing Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 2072, 2078 (No. 87-1359. 1991)). Truston has failed to prove this defense. Not only is there is distinct lack of persuasive evidence to suggest that ladders are more hazardous than sawhorses—the Court is not clear as to how the handling of equipment or tools is made any easier by the sawhorse, which suffers from the same problem of maintaining three points of contact as the ladder—but Richard E. Cabral, Jr. testified that ladders were actually used during the placement of the sinker blocks on the working barge prior to the lift. (Tr. 321). Further, there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest Truston sought a variance or made an informed judgment that such an application would be futile. See Spancrete Ne., Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 1020 (No. 86-521, 1991) (rejecting greater hazard defense when employer failed to seek variance and noting this element has been recognized and endorsed by several courts of appeal); see also Dole v. Williams Enters., Inc., 876 F.2d 186, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1989); RSR Corp. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 303 (5th Cir. 1984); Diebold v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1339 (6th Cir. 1978). Truston’s “greater hazard” defense is rejected.
Second, Truston cites to Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977), to suggest that the phrase “shall be provided” merely connotes that such equipment shall be “furnished or made available.” In Kennecott, the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the question of the proper scope of the scaffolding standard found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.28(a)(12), which provides, “An access ladder or equivalent safe access shall be provided.” The Tenth Circuit reversed the Commission, which held that “shall be provided” was equivalent to “shall require use”—because the ordinary meaning of the term “to provide” means to “furnish, supply, or make available.” Kennecott, 577 F.2d at 1118–19.
The problem14 with Truston’s argument is the standards at issue are drastically different. Whereas the standard in Kennecott simply states that ladders “shall be provided”, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1051(a) specifies exactly where and under what conditions ladders shall be provided; namely, at the point of access when there is a break of 19 inches or more. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1910.28(a)(12) with 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1051(a). Further, the preamble to section 1926.1051(a) clarifies the import of its mandate: “The term [point of access] is used in § 1926.1051(a) of this subpart to indicate where a stairway or ladder must be provided when there is a break in elevation, and includes permanent and temporary travel ways . . . . It is intended to state clearly what OSHA meant when it proposed § 1926.1051(a).” 55 Fed. Reg. at 47763 (emphasis added). Thus, with respect to the cited standard, Respondent cannot fulfill its obligations merely by having a ladder anywhere on the worksite available for use; it must be located where the break in elevation occurs. Although there may have been a ladder on board the working barge, there is no dispute the ladder in question was not provided at the point of access to the sinker blocks. Thus, the terms of the standard were violated.
According to the Commission, a controlling employer’s duty under section 5(a)(2) of the Act flows to both its own employees and subcontractor employees engaged in a common undertaking. See Summit Contractors, Inc. (“Summit IV”), 23 BNA OSHC 1196 (No. 05-0839, 2010) (citing U.S. v. Pitt-Des Moines, 168 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 1999); Brennan v. Underhill Constr. Corp., 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975); Anning-Johnson Co., 4 BNA OSHC 1193 (No. 3694 et al., 1976); Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 BNA OSHC 1185 (No. 12775, 1976)). As a controlling employer, Truston was responsible for its own employees, as well as those of Healy Tibbitts.
Richard Vonderhaar, Truston’s on-site supervisor and site safety and health officer, was present on the day of the accident and was on-site to observe the process of attaching the sinker blocks to the riser chain. (Tr. 381–82). Vonderhaar testified a ladder was available on the deck of the working barge on the day of the accident; however, there was no testimony to suggest the ladder was ever used. (Tr. 386–87). Instead, the overwhelming weight of the testimony was that Healy Tibbitts employees were openly using the sawhorses, which were located directly adjacent to the concrete sinker blocks. (Tr. 120). As illustrated by the photographs of both Bob Pittman and CSHO Sundram, this condition was in plain view for anyone, especially the site safety supervisor, to see. (Ex. C-14 at 1). Accordingly, the Court finds that Truston, through its designated site supervisor, Vonderhaar, was actually and constructively aware of the violative condition.
According to Roger Forstner, Area Director for OSHA’s Honolulu Area Office, falls from ladders are the second-leading cause of death in the construction industry and ten percent of those fatal falls are from heights less than six feet. (Tr. 242). This conclusion was echoed by CSHO Sundram, who determined a fall from the sinker blocks could result in permanent injury or death. (Tr. 123). Given the dangers associated with the fall hazard, and the fact these conclusions went undisputed by Truston, the Court finds that the violation was serious.
The Court finds Complainant established a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1051(a). Accordingly, Citation 1, Item 3 shall be AFFIRMED as a serious violation of the Act.15
Complainant proposed a penalty of $4,620 for Citation 1, Item 3. Unfortunately, the basis for this penalty was not clearly explained by Complainant. AD Forstner testified it is OSHA’s policy to review probability, severity, employer size, good faith, and history. (Tr. 246–47). With respect to Truston, he stated, “We looked at both of [the citations] and all information was adequate and correct to support it.” (Tr. 247). The only other point of clarification was that Truston received a larger discount than Healy Tibbitts because Truston has fewer employees, though no testimony or documentary evidence was introduced to establish an actual number. (Tr. 247). Further, Complainant did not discuss any specific facts relevant to its assessments of severity or probability.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court is empowered to make penalty determinations on a de novo basis, focusing in particular on the gravity of the violation, which considers the number of employees exposed, the duration of the exposure, the precautions taken against injury, and the likelihood of an actual injury. There were at least four employees installing rigging on the sinker blocks. (Stip. No. 25). Based on the testimony, those employees took their positions atop the sinker blocks for only as long as was necessary to install the rigging. Though Truston did not comply with the cited standard, it did make an attempt to bridge the break in elevation through the use of sawhorses. Additionally, though AD Forstner testified fatalities have occurred on ladders at heights of less than 6 feet, Truston’s employees were only ever 4 feet, 6 inches off of the ground. At that height, Truston is not even required to provide fall protection. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(1). Further, while the evidence indicates fatal falls from less than 6 feet are possible, the percentage of those falls that actually result in fatalities is low. As such, the Court finds that the violation was of medium to low gravity.
Complainant did not present evidence on good faith, history, or the number of employees. While the Court has sufficient evidence to find Truston at least made an attempt at compliance through its use of the sawhorses, there is no evidence regarding its size or history of violations. This constitutes a failure of proof. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court shall credit Respondent with good faith for the attempt and significant reductions related to its size, history, and the foregoing assessment of gravity. Based on those determinations, the Court finds that a penalty of $2,000 is appropriate.
1.Citation 1, Item 1 is WITHDRAWN.
3.Citation 1, Item 3 is AFFIRMED, and a penalty of $2,000.00 is ASSESSED.
8 . Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1910.184(a) (“This section applies to slings used in conjunction with other material handling equipment for the movement of material by hoisting, in employments covered by this part.”) to 29 C.F.R. § 1926.251(a)(5) (“This section applies to slings used in conjunction with other material handling equipment for the movement of material by hoisting, in employments covered by this part.”). The two sections mirror each other in most respects, save for the employment practices to which they apply.
9 . The Court removed the intervening clause in this construction because it proves to be redundant in its reference to “material handling equipment”, but such a construction does not interfere with the plain meaning.
10 . There was some dispute as to when the sling would serve as an effective back-up—Respondent contended it was only for when the initial lift out of the water occurred—but that does not change the purpose behind the sling’s use.
11 . Respondent was cited for another rigging violation, but that Citation item was withdrawn by the Secretary.
12 . The shock loading standard is also found in 1910.184. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.184(c)(11).
13 . When determining the meaning of a standard, the Commission first looks to its text and structure. Superior Masonry Builders, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 1182, 1184 (No. 96-1043, 2003). “If the meaning of the [regulatory] language is ‘sufficiently clear,’ the inquiry ends there.” Beverly Healthcare-Hillview, 21 BNA OSHC 1684, 1685 (No. 04-1091, 2006) (consolidated) (citing Unarco Commercial Prods., 16 BNA OSHC 1499, 1502 (No. 89-1555, 1993)), aff’d in relevant part, 541 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court finds the meaning of the regulation cited is sufficiently clear as to what was required of Respondent.
14 . A secondary problem for Respondent is that this case occurred in the Ninth Circuit. Kennecott was decided by the Tenth Circuit and, as such, only has value as persuasive precedent. For the reasons mentioned in this Decision, the Court finds that Kennecott has little value as applied to the facts of this case.
15 . Truston asserted two “affirmative defenses” with respect to the ladder: (1) A ladder was available at all personnel points of access; and (2) A ladder was available on-site at all times. Neither of these arguments is an affirmative defense, which negates a finding that the Complainant proved his prima facie case. Rather, these “defenses” are nothing more than facts that are relevant to the question of whether the standard was violated in the first instance. As addressed above, the Court rejects these “defenses”.