Source: https://casetext.com/case/allbritton-communications-co-v-nlrb
Timestamp: 2019-02-20 13:54:03
Document Index: 163087595

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 160', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 2', '§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 1441', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 158']

Allbritton Communications Co. v. N.L.R.B, 766 F.2d 812 | Casetext
Allbritton Communications Co. v. N.L.R.B
766 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1985)
Allbritton Communications Co.v.N.L.R.B
United States Court of Appeals, Third CircuitJul 8, 1985
…In proceedings before the NLRB, "[t]he General Counsel has the burden of proving an unfair labor practice…
…29 U.S.C. § 160(e); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456…
holding that "removal proceedings are in the nature of process, and defects in the removal procedures are waivable"
Decided July 8, 1985. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 3, 1985.
Frank C. Sabatino, Schnader, Harrison, Segan and Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa.; Richard W. Beckler (argued), Carl W. Vogt, David M. Foster, Stephen M. McNabb, Fulbright Jaworski, Washington, D.C., for petitioners in No. 84-3438.
Sally M. Armstrong, Brian A. Powers (argued), O'Donoghue and O'Donoghue, Washington, D.C., Jack Wysoker, Mandel, Wysoker, Sherman, Glassner Weingartner, New Brunswick, N.J., for petitioners in No. 84-3676.
Before ALDISERT, Chief Judge, GIBBONS, Circuit Judge, and DIAMOND, District Judge.
This review of a decision of the National Labor Relations Board requires us to examine contentions raised in separate petitions for review presented by an employer and a union, and the justification for the Board's action contained in the Board's application for an enforcement order. We must decide whether substantial evidence supports the Board's findings that (1) the News Printing Company, Inc. was the employer of the employees of T T, Inc.; (2) economic reasons motivated the dismissal of eight editorial employees; (3) the Company did not fail to bargain in good faith with Local 103 of the International Typographical Union; and (4) the News Printing Company, Inc. reasonably filed a civil action against employees who had claimed workmen's compensation benefits. We hold that the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence and therefore grant the application for enforcement of its order.
The News contracted in 1966 with T T, Inc. for T T to handle The News's mailroom and delivery functions. Allbritton assumed this contract when it purchased The News in 1977. T T employed workers represented by the NMDU to carry out the mailroom functions, which involved removing the printed newspapers from a conveyor belt in the mailroom, packaging the papers for delivery, placing advertising supplements in each bundle (topping) when necessary, loading the delivery trucks, and delivering the papers to retail stores and "drop" locations for distribution to deliverers. Peter Trombina, one of the owners of T T, periodically negotiated and signed collective bargaining agreements between T T and the NMDU. In October 1980, the Company and Trombina agreed that he would seek NMDU's approval of a Company proposal to consolidate delivery routes and reduce the size of T T's work force. Under the terms of the proposal, the Company would pay any severance money owed T T employees and would reimburse T t for any legal fees incurred because of the proposal. The NMDU rejected the Company's proposal and the Company hired new employees to carry out the mailroom and delivery job functions of T T. The Company denied Trombina and his employees access to The News's mailroom. The T T employees have remained out of work since February 9, 1981.
In response to various charges made by the unions involved, the Regional Director of the NLRB filed an original and two amended complaints against the Company and T T. Following a consolidated hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the ALJ issued a written opinion to which all parties filed exceptions. After a proceeding before the Board, the Board concluded, in disagreement with the ALJ, that T T was not an independent contractor but rather an "administrative arm" of the Company and as such T T's employees were also the Company's employees. Accordingly, the Board found that the actions of the Company in summarily replacing T T's employees and "locking them out" violated § 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) and (5), and ordered reinstatement. The Company petitions for review of this portion of the Board's order. Although the Union's request to intervene in this aspect of the case was granted, the Union did not file an intervenor's brief.
The Board further determined, also in disagreement with the ALJ, that the Company did not violate § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3), by discharging the editorial employees; the Company did not fail to bargain in good faith with Local 103 representing the composing room employees; and the Company did not violate § 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), by bringing an action against striking employees who had filed workmen's compensation claims. The Union petitions for review of these findings. The Company has filed a brief as an intervenor.
The Supreme Court has directed us to recognize that an ALJ's findings of fact constitute a vital part of the whole record that the court must review. These findings "are to be considered along with the consistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance of his report . . . depends largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496, 71 S.Ct. 456, 468, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). We must "recognize that evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when he has reached the same conclusion." Id.
Eastern Engineering Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1980).
Our review of the Board's application of legal precepts to the facts is plenary. NLRB v. Babcock Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112, 76 S.Ct. 679, 684, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956). The General Counsel has the burden of proving an unfair labor practice allegation by a preponderance of the evidence, NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2474, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983), and if he fails to meet this burden the Board is required by § 10(c) to dismiss the allegation. The Board's determination that the General Counsel has failed to meet his burden must be upheld unless the determination has no rational basis in the record. Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 919 (D.C.Cir. 1972). We now address the several contentions advanced by the petitioners, the intervenors, and the Board.
The Company argues that the Board's determination that The News employed the T T employees is based on erroneous legal principles. We disagree. Initially, it is important to note that the Company does not contest the Board's determination that an employer violates § 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) and (5), if it engages in the type of conduct the Company did here. The dispositive, and contested, issue is whether the Board properly found that the mailroom employees and drivers were employees of The News.
Determination of independent contractor status as opposed to employee status involves an application of common law principles of agency. NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258, 88 S.Ct. 988, 990, 19 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1968). The law of agency looks to the degree of control the principal exerts over the details of the agent's performance. NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 382 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing NLRB v. Keystone Floors, Inc., 306 F.2d 560, 562 (3d Cir. 1962)).
This court has explained that the "right to control" test requires an examination of "`the type of services rendered, the possibility of realizing additional profits through the exercise of entrepreneurial skill and the ownership and maintenance' of equipment." Duie Pyle, 606 F.2d at 382 (quoting News-Journal Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 676, 30 L.Ed.2d 664 (1972)). In determining that the mailroom workers were employees of The News, the Board explicitly applied the right to control test:
We have concluded that T T was little more than an administrative arm of the Respondents; the Trombinas were managers employed by the Respondents to operate the delivery system to the Respondents' specifications. . . .
The relationship between the Respondents and T T exhibited strongly most of the factors commonly associated with agency or employee status. T T performed functions which were an essential part of the newspaper's operation, had a long-term exclusive working arrangement with the newspaper, carried the newspaper's product in trucks bearing the newspaper's name, conducted its operation under daily guidance from newspaper personnel and subject to unilateral changes dictated by the newspaper, had no proprietary interest in the work or the premises and equipment used to perform it, and had no opportunity to take entrepreneurial risks. See News-Journal Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 676, 30 L.Ed.2d 664 (1972). Weighed against these factors and the Respondents' direct and indirect participation in labor relations matters, T T's conduct of the lower-level functions of employee management and dealing with the Union was more akin to the role performed by supervisors than that characteristic of independent contractors.
The District Court found that PMT employees exercised supervision and control over the unloading operations, although the railroad bore the "responsibility" for those functions. On these facts, the District Court was plainly correct in concluding that PMT was an agent of the railroad. . . . [A] finding of agency is not tantamount to a finding of a master-servant relationship. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2. The finding that the railroad was "responsible" for the unloading operations is significantly weaker than would be a finding that it controlled or had the right to control the physical conduct of the PMT employees in the course of their unloading operations. The railroad would satisfy the District Court's "responsibility" test whenever it agreed to perform a service and subsequently engaged another company to perform that service for it on its premises. The "control or right to control" test, by contrast, would be met only if it were shown that the role of the second company was that of a conventional common-law servant.
The fatal flaw in the Company's contention is that here the Board did not find that the Company bore mere "responsibility" for the mailroom operations. Rather, the Board properly applied the "right to control test" and found that the Company exercised significant control over the conduct of T T and its employees. The Company thus loses the Kelley-based major premise of its argument. The Board concluded that T T was an "administrative arm" of The News, or, in the words of the Kelley Court "a conventional common-law servant." Id. at 326, 95 S.Ct. at 477. Viewed as such, the mailroom employees were subservants of T T which in turn was a servant of the Company, thereby rendering the Company the statutory employer of the NMDU workers. See id. at 324, 95 S.Ct. at 476. This finding does not run afoul of the teachings of Kelley and it is supported by the following substantial evidence:
(1) The costs of establishing T T were paid for by The News. App. at 922-30, 529.
(2) The Company provided T T with its delivery trucks and paid for all of their operating expenses. The Company also provided free office space to T T and provided all of the office equipment and telephone service. App. at 406-07, 726-30, 1127-33.
(3) The Company established the number of T T employees to work each shift and retained the right to require T T to hire additional employees, and also retained the right to demand that T T discharge any driver, supervisor or assistant foreman who did not meet the Company's approval. App. at 411-13, 457-59, 528-29, 640, 1128-30, 1132-33.
(4) The Company established T T's employees' work schedules and the routes and schedules for the drivers. T T had no customers of its own. All orders from retail outlets came through the Company. App. at 407-10, 429, 457-58, 460-63, 465-68, 1127-33.
(5) The Company paid T T a weekly amount that covered the employees' salaries and fringe benefits and all the operating expenses of T T. The Company agreed that these weekly payments would be increased whenever required by the T T—NMDU contract. App. at 475, 508-19, 526-27, 534-35, 544-46, 637-41, 734-36, 805, 856-57, 863, 1125-30, 1134, 1220-21.
(6) Before Trombina would negotiate a contract with NMDU on behalf of T T, he would seek the approval of The News. App. at 331-35, 388-99, 435-51, 519-22, 1088-1112, 1124, 1160-63.
(7) The Company handled T T's employees' grievances regarding the mailroom and delivery trucks. App. at 365-66, 397-99, 560-64.
The Company further argues that principles of collateral estoppel preclude the Board's finding that The News employed the mailroom workers and drivers. Following the Company's replacement of the NMDU workers, these workers began picketing The News's facilities. The Company filed suit in New Jersey state court, seeking to enjoin acts of alleged violence by the picketers. The NMDU removed the case to the United States District Court and filed a counterclaim under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. In adjudicating the counterclaim, District Judge H. Lee Sarokin determined, inter alia, that the T T employees were not the employees of The News. Judge Sarokin then recused himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Herbert J. Stern. Judge Stern held that the case was improperly removed initially because the original action filed in state court did not "arise under" federal law, a threshold jurisdictional requirement for removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
Moreover, additional reasons, quite apart from this basic jurisdictional defect, counsel against affording any collateral estoppel effect based on the earlier proceeding before Judge Sarokin. It is well settled that collateral estoppel applies only after a particular issue has been "necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . ." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). We are persuaded that under the circumstances present here, the issue that the Company argues has already been determined — the employment status of T T's employees — was not an issue that was necessary to the district court judgment. The only order entered below was Judge Stern's remand order. Clearly, the sole issue relevant to this judgment was the jurisdictional question; any "findings" by Judge Sarokin on the merits of the dispute were simply irrelevant. Accordingly, an essential predicate to the application of collateral estoppel did not exist.
When Allbritton purchased The News in 1977, The News asserted effective control over T T and the mailroom employees, acting as their employer for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. The News cannot now be heard to complain that the concomitant burden accompanying this employer-employee relationship — the duty to negotiate and abide by the terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement — violates due process.
The Union argues that the Company's discharge of the editorial employees resulted from union animus and therefore was in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3). The General Counsel bears the burden of proving that an employee's protected conduct was a "substantial or motivating factor" leading to his dismissal. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 401-02, 103 S.Ct. at 2474, 2475. However, if the General Counsel meets this burden, the "employer [may] avoid being adjudicated a violator by showing what his actions would have been regardless of his forbidden motivation." Id. Here, the Board concluded that the General Counsel failed to discharge the initial critical burden, and found that even if the burden had been met, the Company introduced sufficient evidence showing the dismissals resulted from a permissible motive. App. at 1822-23. The Board's finding that economic considerations were the motivating factor in the dismissals is supported by substantial evidence:
[W]e find that the evidence of the Respondent's union animus and the suspicious coincidence between the Respondent's actions and the ITU's organization campaign do not establish that the latter was a motivating factor for the former. . . . The record taken as a whole gives us insufficient basis to choose the unlawful motive over the lawful one. . . .
Section 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), requires that parties bargain with "a real desire to come into agreement." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498, 80 S.Ct. 419, 432, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960). The statute does not compel "either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession," NLRB v. American Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404, 72 S.Ct. 824, 829, 96 L.Ed. 1027 (1951), nor may the Board "control the settling of the terms of collective bargaining agreements." Struthers Wells Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. at 487, 80 S.Ct. at 426).
The Union points to various events evidenced in the record and argues this evidence compels a finding of bad faith. The Union cites the hard line bargaining posture taken by the Company, statements by Singleton, president of The News and Dispatch, that if the employees did not accept a pay cut "they don't work here anymore," app. at 135, and "I don't give a damn about people anymore . . . any printer, driver or pressman who gets in my way, I'll roll right over him" id., and the unlawful "locking out" of T T and its employees. The Union also argues that no impasse had been reached and the Company's unilateral implementation of its final wage offer thus violated § 8(a)(5). Indeed, evidence exists in the record from which one could reasonably draw an inference of bad faith. That evidence, however, does not compel us to draw such an inference. "Although we . . . might have reached a different conclusion given the same facts, our power of review is not such that we may . . . reverse the decision of the Board as inadequately supported by the evidence." International Telephone Telegraph Co. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1967). Our inquiry turns, then, to whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's finding of no bad faith. The record contains such evidence:
(6) The parties met on February 6 with a federal mediator present at The News's request. At this session The News offered a three year — rather than one year — contract which set a pay cut in the first year, a restoration of the cut in the second year and a pay raise in the third year. The Union rejected the offer. App. at 138, 215-16, 667-68, 830. At this session Singleton determined the parties were deadlocked. He said he would post the conditions under which composing room employees would work until a new contract was signed. He said The News would continue to negotiate until a final agreement was reached. App. at 202, 205, 329, 830-31.
Finally, the Union argues that the suit alleging fraud and conspiracy filed against striking composing room employees was an attempt to interfere with their § 7 rights and therefore violated § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). We find no error in the Board's treatment of this issue.