Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/375/440/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-02-24 17:39:31
Document Index: 755997148

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7602', '§ 7402', '§ 7210', '§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 7210', '§ 7604']

Reisman v. Caplin (full text) :: 375 U.S. 440 (1964) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Reisman v. Caplin 375 U.S. 440 (1964)
U.S. Supreme CourtReisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964)Reisman v. CaplinNo. 119Argued December 12, 1963Decided January 20, 1964375 U.S. 440CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioners, attorneys for taxpayers Martin J. and Allyn Bromley, seek declaratory and injunctive relief against respondent Caplin, the Internal Revenue Commissioner, and the accounting firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., which, at the instance of petitioners, has been working on the financial records of the Bromleys. Petitioners claim as null and void summonses issued by the Commissioner, Page 375 U. S. 442 under § 7602 [Footnote 1] of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, to Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., directing the production of "all audit reports, work papers and correspondence" in that firm's custody pertaining to Mr. Bromley and his several business interests. The contention is that the enforced production of the papers is an unlawful appropriation of petitioners' work product and trial preparation, as well as an unreasonable seizure requiring the Bromleys to incriminate themselves and depriving them of the effective assistance of counsel. The District Court concluded that petitioners had no standing to sue; that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; that none of the papers were the work product of the petitioners; and, that the papers did not fall within the attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the entirely different theory that the suit was, in substance, one against the United States to which it had not consented. Page 375 U. S. 443 115 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 317 F.2d 123. We granted certiorari, 374 U.S. 825, and have concluded that petitioners have an adequate remedy at law, and that the complaint is therefore subject to dismissal for want of equity. This obviates our passing upon any of the other questions presented.
The subpoenas were served on June 13, 1961, after Bromley had refused to make his papers available upon being informed that a criminal investigation against him was pending. The subpoenas were directed to three separate branches of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., located in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. They required the accountants to testify before a special agent of the Commissioner on the work performed and also to produce all documents, work papers and other material in their possession with regard to the Bromley matters. At the time of service, there were four civil tax cases pending in the Tax Court contesting alleged deficiencies in income tax Page 375 U. S. 444 returns of the Bromleys. [Footnote 2] In addition, a criminal investigation of Mr. Bromley on the tax matters was in progress. None of the parties involved here had prepared the tax returns under scrutiny nor advised the Bromleys with regard to the same.
The case reaches us at a stage when the only affirmative action taken by the Commissioner is the issuance of the summonses for the accountants to appear before a hearing officer, i.e., a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service, to testify and produce records. The accountants have not yet refused to do so. It is therefore necessary that we first consider the statutory scheme which Congress has provided for the issuance and enforcement of the summonses. Page 375 U. S. 445
If the Secretary or his delegate wishes to enforce the summons, he must proceed under § 7402(b), which grants the District Courts of the United States jurisdiction "by Page 375 U. S. 446 appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data." [Footnote 4]
On the other hand, in tax enforcement proceedings, the hearing officer has no power of enforcement or right to levy any sanctions. It is true that any person summoned who "neglects to appear or to produce" may be prosecuted under § 7210, [Footnote 5] and is subject to a fine not exceeding Page 375 U. S. 447 $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than a year, or both. However, this statute, on its face, does not apply where the witness appears and interposes good faith challenges to the summons. It only prescribes punishment where the witnesses "neglects" either to appear or to produce. We need not pass upon the coverage of this provision in light of the facts here. It is sufficient to say that noncompliance is not subject to prosecution thereunder when the summons is attacked in good faith. [Footnote 6]
Petitioners also point to § 7604(b) [Footnote 7] as posing the risk of arrest should the Commissioner proceed under that section for an "attachment . . . as for a contempt." Arguably, Page 375 U. S. 448 such a sanction, even though temporary, might be a penalty severe enough to bring the section within the rationale of Young, supra, but we do not so read § 7604(b). This section provides that, where "any person summoned . . . neglects or refuses to obey such summons," the Commissioner may proceed before the United States Commissioner or the judge of the District Court "for an attachment against him as for a contempt." Upon a showing of "satisfactory proof," an attachment for the person so refusing is issued, and he is brought before the United States Commissioner or the district judge, who proceeds "to a hearing of the case." Upon the hearing, the United States Commissioner or the district judge may "make such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts. . . ." The predecessor of § 7604(b) was adopted by the Congress in 1864 (13 Stat. 226) at a time when Congress was greatly concerned with tax collection delay. Cong.Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2440-2441 (1864). The proponents of the bill emphasized that, after arrest, the witness could assert his objections to the summons. Cong.Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2997 (1864). It appears to us that the provision was intended only to cover persons who were summoned and wholly made default or contumaciously refused to comply. Section 7402(b) came into the statute in 1913 (38 Stat. 179), and has been uniformly used since that time. [Footnote 8] As we read the legislative history, § 7604(b) remains in this Page 375 U. S. 449 comprehensive procedure provided by Congress to cover only a default or contumacious refusal to honor a summons before a hearing officer. But even in such cases, just as in a criminal prosecution under § 7210, the witness may assert his objections at the hearing before the court which is authorized to make such order as it "shall deem proper." § 7604(b).
Nor would there be a difference should the witness indicate -- as has Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. -- that he Page 375 U. S. 450 would voluntarily turn the papers over to the Commissioner. If this be true, either the taxpayer or any affected party might restrain compliance, as the Commissioner suggests, until compliance is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. This relief was not sought here. Had it been, the Commissioner would have had to proceed for compliance, in which event the petitioners or the Bromleys might have intervened and asserted their claims.