Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/428/1215/565341/
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 23:04:39
Document Index: 282369889

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 832', '§ 832', '§ 1043', '§ 148', '§ 132', '§ 134']

428 F.3d 1215: Darren David Chaker, Petitioner-appellant, v. Alan Crogan; San Diego Probation Department; People of the State of California, Respondents-appellees :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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428 F.3d 1215: Darren David Chaker, Petitioner-appellant, v. Alan Crogan; San Diego Probation Department; People of the State of California, Respondents-appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. - 428 F.3d 1215
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2004
Even with the limiting construction, however, the Court concluded that the statute was an impermissible content-based regulation of speech. The Court noted that "[d]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics," such as race, color, creed, religion, or gender. Id. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538. The Court further explained that those "who wish to use `fighting words' in connection with other ideas &#x2014; to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality &#x2014; are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." Id.
Displays containing some words &#x2014; odious racial epithets, for example &#x2014; would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But "fighting words" that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender &#x2014; aspersions upon a person's mother, for example &#x2014; would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speakers' opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all `anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all `papists' are, for that would insult and provoke violence `on the basis of religion.' St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.
Just as in R.A.V., the category of speech at issue in this case &#x2014; knowingly false speech regarding a public official &#x2014; is "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech." R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. 2538. As the Supreme Court made clear in its landmark decision in New York Times, a public official may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood if he or she can prove "that the statement was made with `actual malice' &#x2014; that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710. That same standard has been applied in the context of state criminal libel laws where a public official is concerned. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. 209 ("The constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel application of the [New York Times] standard to the criminal remedy."). Indeed, it is well-established that knowing falsehoods are constitutionally unprotected because they are "at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected." Id. at 75, 85 S.Ct. 209.
The statute's under-inclusiveness is particularly troublesome in this case because section 148.6 is necessarily limited to criticism of government officials &#x2014; peace officers. "Suspicion that viewpoint discrimination is afoot is at its zenith when the speech restricted is speech critical of the government," Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 86 (1st Cir.2004), because "[c]riticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free discussion," Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966). See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) ("[T]he First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers."); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. 710 (recognizing the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials"). The imbalance generated by section 148.6&#x2014;i.e., only individuals critical of peace officers are subject to liability and not those who are supportive&#x2014;therefore turns the First Amendment on its head.
1 Chaker described Officer Bradberry's conduct as follows: (1) "Unlawful use of force. Det. Bill Bradberry [used] force by hitting me, twisting [my] wrist, when he arrested me," (2) "[o]n or about April 8, 1996 at 1 pm. I complied [with the] arrest but Det. Bradberry hit me on my ribs anyway," (3) "Det. Bradberry's use of force damaged my wrist, ribs," (4) "Det. Bradbery did not seat belt me in when transported &#x2014; he braked so I hit the dashboard. Ribs hurt, [wrist]" Chaker requested $25,000 in damages from the City of El Cajon
2 Prior to trial, the court excluded evidence of between ten or twelve suits filed by Chaker against other law enforcement agencies. The court also excluded evidence that Chaker had been declared a vexatious litigant in another lawsuit
3 The court also admitted a statement made by Chaker to an attorney in an unrelated lawsuit against a different El Cajon Police Officer. According to the attorney, Chaker said, "If all that happens in this case is that the City of El Cajon has to pay your fee of $20,000, and that prevents the City from purchasing one or two patrol cars, then that is an acceptable result to me."
4 The state also argues that Chaker lacks standing to attack his conviction on First Amendment grounds. We disagree. Chaker has shown "that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer an `injury in fact' that a favorable judgment will redress."See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (citations omitted).
5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2) provides, in part, that "[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2)
6 The full advisory, which must be written in boldface type, provides:
7 Use and discovery of complaints of peace officer misconduct is limited. Employing agencies "shall not use the complaints. . . for punitive or promotional purposes" except as permitted under specific disciplinary procedures set forth by statute. Cal.Penal Code § 832.5(c). Furthermore, a party seeking discovery of such complaints in any civil or criminal proceeding must provide notice to the employing agency and show "good cause" for the discovery; otherwise such records are confidentialSee Cal.Penal Code § 832.7; Cal. Evid.Code § 1043.
8 We grant Chaker's motion for judicial notice, in which he requests we take judicial notice of the legislative history of § 148.6See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b).
9 Several courts have already addressed this precise issue. The California Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to section 148.6 similar to the instant challengeSee Stanistreet, 29 Cal.4th at 512, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 633, 58 P.3d 465. One federal district court, however, held that the statute is an impermissible content-based and viewpoint-based regulation of speech in violation of the First Amendment. See Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, 325 F.Supp.2d 1087 (C.D.Cal.2004); see also Eakins v. Nevada, 219 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D.Nev.2002) (striking down analogous provision of Nevada law on First Amendment grounds).
10 Because we conclude that section 148.6 discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, we need not reach the remaining arguments offered by Chaker and amicus curiae regarding content discrimination
11 California Penal Code 118.1 provides:
12 Penal Code § 132 provides:
13 California Penal Code § 134 provides: