Source: https://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=4a43ad0d-68a1-4712-8c53-7e1ae3c8c150
Timestamp: 2017-12-17 08:38:42
Document Index: 648989788

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 52', '§ 815', '§ 945', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§123456789', '§ 1367', '§ 1983', '§ 52', '§ 815', '§ 1983']

Plaintiff's Points and Authorities in Opposition to City's Motion to Dismiss Section 1983 Lawsuit | Lambert v. City of Santa Rosa | Eric Young - JDSupra
Plaintiff's Points and Authorities in Opposition to City's Motion to Dismiss Section 1983 Lawsuit
Plaintiffs sued defendant City of Santa Rosa and its police officers for injuries sustained during an arrest. The City moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which was denied.
123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss ERIC G. YOUNG (SBN 190104) LAW OFFICES OF ERIC G. YOUNG 100 B Street, Suite 340 Santa Rosa, CA 95401 Telephone: 707.575.5005 Facsimile: 707.575.5395 Attorney for Plaintiffs WILLIAM and BEVERLY LAMBERT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WILLIAM LAMBERT, an individual; ) Case No. C 05-02931 CW BEVERLY LAMBERT, an individual, )) Plaintiffs, ) PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF ) POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN v. ) OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ ) MOTION TO DISMISS CITY OF SANTA ROSA, a chartered city; ) SANTA ROSA POLICE DEPARTMENT, ) a police agency; et al. )) Defendants. ) _________________________________ )) Date: 11/4/2005 ) Time: 10:00 a.m. ) Dept.: 2 ) Judge: Hon. Claudia Wilken ) ____________________________________)123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss TABLE OF CONTENTS I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2-5 II. ARGUMENT THE WELL-ESTABLISHED RULES GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS REQUIRE THE COURT TO DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5-10 A. Motions To Dismiss Are Generally Disfavored, And Civil Rights Complaints Must Be Construed Liberally In Favor Of The Plaintiff 5-6 B. Defendants Incorrectly Assert That The LAMBERTS Must Meet A Heightened Pleading Requirement In Pleading A Violation Of Civil Rights 6-8 C. The LAMBERTS Are Also Not Held To A “Heightened Pleading Standard” In Pleading A Violation Of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA 8-10 PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT STATES A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 1983 FOR FALSIFICATION OF DEFENDANT SANCHEZ AND JOHNSON’S ARREST REPORTS 10-11 PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT STATES VALID CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ASSAULT, BATTERY, AND VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 52.1 -THE “BANE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT” 11-15 A. MR. LAMBERT’S Causes Of Action For Assault, Battery, And Violation Of Civil Code Section 52.1 Are Pendent State Law Claims Over Which The Court Should Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction 11-13 B. The LAMBERTS’ Claims Under Government Code Section 945.4 Was Sufficient To Put Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA On Notice Of The LAMBERTS’ Claims For Assault, Battery, Violation Of Civil Code Section 52.1, And Loss Of Consortium 13-15 i.123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss DEFENDANTS ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR USING UNREASONABLE FORCE UNDER EITHER FEDERAL OR STATE LAW 15-17 MRS. LAMBERT HAS A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 17-18 DEFENDANT JOHNSON WAS PRESENT AT THE SCENE, FAILED TO INTERVENE TO PREVENT DEFENDANT SANCHEZ’S ATTACK AGAINST MR. LAMBERT, AND PARTICIPATED IN ASSAULTING AND BATTERING MR. LAMBERT 18-19 IF THE COURT GRANTS DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, THE LAMBERTS RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT THE COURT GRANT LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT 19-20 III. CONCLUSION 20 ii.123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss TABLE OF AUTHORITIES STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 1983 6 Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 11-12, 16-17 Cal. Govt. Code § 815.2 15-17 Cal. Govt. Code § 945.4 13-15 CASES Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995) 11-12 Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) 7 Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F.Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 17 Branch v. Tunnell (Branch I), 937 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1991) 7 Branch v. Tunnell (Branch II), 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) 7 Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 5, 6 Buskirk v. Seiple, 560 F.Supp. 247 (E.D. Pa. 1983) 15 Carlson v. Wald, 151 Cal.App.3d 598 (1984) 17 Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994) 5 Connelley v. State of California, 3 Cal.App.3d 744 (1970) 13 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) 8 Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000) 18 Demetrius v. Marsh, 560 F.Supp. 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1983) 7 Dixon v. City of Livermore, 127 Cal.App.4th 32 (2005) 13 Donohue v. State of California, 178 Cal.App.3d 795 (1986) 13 Fall River Joint Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal.App.3d 431 (1988) 13 iii.123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Fundiller v. Cooper, 777 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1985) 18 Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) 8-10 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) 7, 15, 16 Green v. Bransom, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997) 7 Haile v. Sag Harbor, 639 F.Supp. 718 (E.D. N.Y. 1986) 10 Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 822 F.Supp. 1468, 1472 (N.D. Cal. 1993) 6 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coord’n Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) 8, 9 Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal.App.3d 625 (1985) 17 Lewis v. Goodie, 798 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. La. 1992) 18 Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1254 (9th Cir. 1990) 5 Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) 15 McQurter v. Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga. 1983) 18 Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 701, 707 (D.N.J. 1998) 6 NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986) 6 Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) 8 O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9 (2nd Cir. 1988) 18 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636 6, 16 Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1998) 7 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) 8 Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1993) 7 Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F.Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1994) 12 Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) 16 Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382 (1974) 17-18 iv.123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal.App.2d 256 16 Smith v. County of Los Angeles, 214 Cal.App.3d 266 (1989) 13 Stevens v. Corbell, 832 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1987) 15 Stockett v. Assoc’n of Calif. Water Agencies, etc., 34 Cal.4th 441 (2004) 13 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) 9 Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1963) 7 Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820 (2004) 12 White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal.App.3d 566 17 White v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.App.3d 1505 (1990) 13-14 MISCELLANEOUS F.R.C.P. 15(a) 19 v.123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 1I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 22, 2004, in response to a call from Plaintiff BEVERLY LAMBERT (hereinafter MRS. LAMBERT), SANTA ROSA police officers SANCHEZ and JOHNSON arrived at the LAMBERTS’ home. Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON were peaceably allowed into the LAMBERTS’ home. Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON questioned Plaintiff WILLIAM LAMBERT (hereinafter MR. LAMBERT), MRS. LAMBERT and the LAMBERTS’ adult son, Jon. The LAMBERTS explained that a minor dispute had arisen in the household between MRS. LAMBERT and Jon, which MR. LAMBERT had attempted to break up by tapping MRS. LAMBERT on the head and making her sit in a chair. MR. and MRS. LAMBERT have been married for 41 years, and up until this minor incident, their marriage had been a peaceful one. MR. LAMBERT was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and was not brandishing any weapons. During the questioning, and although the parties’ interaction was peaceful, Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON separated MR. and MRS. LAMBERT. At first, Defendant JOHNSON accompanied MR. LAMBERT into the family room. Defendant SANCHEZ remained with MRS. LAMBERT in an adjacent area of the house. Subsequently, the Defendants switched positions, with Defendant SANCHEZ joining MR. LAMBERT in the family room. Defendant JOHNSON joined MRS. LAMBERT in the adjacent dining room. Defendant SANCHEZ asked to see MR. LAMBERT’S driver’s license. MR. LAMBERT replied peacefully that his wallet was in the dining room. When MR. LAMBERT moved to retrieve his wallet, however, Defendant SANCHEZ stepped in front of MR. LAMBERT telling MR. LAMBERT that he did not need to see MR. LAMBERT’S driver’s license. When MR. LAMBERT explained to Defendant SANCHEZ that it would be no problem to retrieve his wallet, Defendant SANCHEZ ordered MR. LAMBERT to turn around and put his hands behind his back.123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1MR. LAMBERT is an elderly man and a former military officer. MR. LAMBERT also has a condition which requires him to frequently urinate. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 2 MR. LAMBERT then asked Defendant SANCHEZ if he could use a nearby bathroom before Defendant SANCHEZ handcuffed him.1 Without warning, Defendant SANCHEZ forcibly grabbed MR. LAMBERT, spun him around and twisted MR. LAMBERT’S left arm behind his back. When MR. LAMBERT renewed his request to use the bathroom, Defendant SANCHEZ kicked MR. LAMBERT’S right leg out from under him, causing MR. LAMBERT to fall to the ground, crushing MR. LAMBERT’S right tibia. After MR. LAMBERT fell to the ground crushing his right leg, Defendant SANCHEZ began to twist MR. LAMBERT’S broken right leg behind him, causing MR. LAMBERT severe pain. MR. LAMBERT then became aware that Defendant SANCHEZ was holding what felt like a gun to MR. LAMBERT’S rib cage. Although MR. LAMBERT now lay on the floor, immobilized by the severe injury he had sustained as a result of Defendant SANCHEZ’S maneuver, Defendant SANCHEZ -who was, in fact, holding a “Taser” pistol to MR. LAMBERT’S rib cage -proceeded to use the “Taser” pistol on MR. LAMBERT’S crushed right leg. Defendant SANCHEZ then cuffed MR. LAMBERT’S hands behind his back and forced him to stand on his broken right leg. Unable to stand on his own, MR. LAMBERT fell to the floor a second time, suffering additional, extreme pain and distress.During these events, MRS. LAMBERT and Defendant JOHNSON were in the adjacent dining room. However, when MR. LAMBERT injured his leg and was “tasered” by Defendant SANCHEZ, MR. LAMBERT screamed in pain, attracting the attention of MRS. LAMBERT and Defendant JOHNSON. Defendant JOHNSON then entered the family room. Instead of assisting MR. LAMBERT, Defendant JOHNSON assisted Defendant SANCHEZ in lifting MR.123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 3 LAMBERT’S torso off the floor and dragging his lower body -including his badly broken leg -across the floor. Both Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON propped MR. LAMBERT against a couch, with his broken right leg under him, ignoring MR. LAMBERT’S pleas to help him remove his broken leg out from under him. After these events, MR. LAMBERT was arrested. Both Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON falsified their arrest reports, falsely accusing MR. LAMBERT of resisting arrest. The charges of false arrest against MR. LAMBERT were ultimately dismissed and, as part of a plea bargain, MR. LAMBERT pleaded nolo contendre to simple battery upon a spouse. As a result of the injuries MR. LAMBERT sustained on March 22, 2004, MR. LAMBERT was forced to undergo extensive surgery on his right leg. He has been advised that he will have to undergo at least two more surgeries in the next two years to continue to use his right leg. In addition, MR. LAMBERT continues to experience swelling and discomfort due to the prosthetic hardware MR. LAMBERT now must wear inside his right leg. MR. LAMBERT also sustained severe emotional trauma, and can no longer work at the Santa Rosa Junior College where he worked as an instructor. Furthermore, at the time of the incident, the LAMBERTS lived in a two-story home in Santa Rosa. Their bedroom was accessible only by stairs. Due to MR. LAMBERT’S difficulty walking, his long period of recuperation following his leg surgery, and his loss of income, the LAMBERTS were forced to sell their home in Santa Rosa and buy a smaller, single-story home in Cloverdale. Having to move households has been traumatic for the LAMBERTS, and represents a substantial decline in their quality of life. Finally, MRS. LAMBERT has sustained severe emotional trauma and loss of consortium as a result of the injuries inflicted upon her husband. During MR. LAMBERT’S long recuperation, he was bed-ridden in a make-shift bedroom MRS. LAMBERT set up in their downstairs family room. On a daily basis, MRS. LAMBERT provided nursing services to her123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2In an effort to narrow the issues for the Court and for trial, the LAMBERTS voluntarily agreed to dismiss Defendant Police Chief Edwin Flint from this case. In addition, the LAMBERTS voluntarily agreed to dismiss the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh causes of action as to all defendants. This voluntary dismissal was communicated to defense counsel by letter dated October 11, 2005. In addition, the LAMBERTS do not intend to pursue causes of action for deliberate indifference to medical needs. Moreover, MRS. LAMBERT does not claim that she was, herself, assaulted and battered by the defendant police officers, or that she has a claim for excessive use of force under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or California Civil Code section 52.1. MRS. LAMBERT’S sole claim is based on loss of consortium as a result of the assault on MR. LAMBERT. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 4 husband, which included helping him relieve himself and defecate. During this time, the LAMBERTS’ marriage suffered under the heavy of weight of this emotional and physical burden. Despite the severity of these incidents, Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA denied the LAMBERTS’ claim for compensation, which gave rise to this suit for damages based on a violation of MR. LAMBERT’S civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, assault and battery, violation of California Civil Code section 52.1, and MRS. LAMBERT’S loss of consortium.2 II. ARGUMENT THE WELL-ESTABLISHED RULES GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS REQUIRE THE COURT TO DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 A. Motions To Dismiss Are Generally Disfavored, And Civil Rights Complaints Must Be Construed Liberally In Favor Of The Plaintiff Under the well-established rules governing 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, a defendant must meet a high burden to warrant dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint. “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994), cited in Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1990) (Emphasis added.); see also, Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1990). ///123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 5 Generally, motions to dismiss are “regarded with disfavor and [are] rarely granted without leave to amend.” Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 822 F.Supp. 1468, 1472 (N.D. Cal. 1993), disapproved of on other grounds in KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), citing Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274, cert den 485 U.S. 940 (1988). Moreover, as the Defendants accurately point out, the material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); see, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 2, lines 25-27.) “All well-pled allegations are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in plaintiff’s favor.” Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 701, 707 (D.N.J. 1998), citing Associated Gen’l Contractors of Calif. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Finally, civil rights complaints -in particular -must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 968 F.2d at page 794, citing Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1989); see also, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636 [Remedial legislation is construed broadly to achieve its primary purpose.]. Under these standards, Defendants’ motion to dismiss must fail as to the LAMBERTS’ first cause of action for an excessive force violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. B. Defendants Incorrectly Assert That The LAMBERTS Must Meet A Heightened Pleading Requirement In Pleading A Violation of Civil Rights Disregarding the “liberal construction” rule for civil rights complaints, Defendants assert that the LAMBERTS must meet a “heightened pleading standard” to defeat the Defendants’ motion to dismiss their Section 1983 cause of action. See, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 3, line 19 -page 4, line 8. Defendants’ mis-quote the law regarding a plaintiff’s burden when pleading a civil rights violation. To state a cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is only required to plead and prove two elements -a deprivation of a federal right, privilege or immunity and that the123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 6 deprivation occurred as a result of defendant acting under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Moreover, despite Defendants’ assertions, a plaintiff in a civil rights action is not required to plead “‘direct evidence’ of [the defendants’] intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights.” See, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 4, lines 2-3. As the Gomez Court emphasized, “Nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983...suggests that...a plaintiff must allege bad faith in order to state a claim for relief.” Gomez, supra, at page 640; Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1963) [A specific intent to deprive a person of his constitutional rights, while required under the criminal civil rights statutes, is not a prerequisite to liability in a civil case.]; see also, Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) [If a person is abused by a police officer acting under color of state law, it is immaterial in a Section 1983 action whether the police officer lacked the motive, purpose or intent to deprive the person of a federally-protected right.]. Based on the allegations of excessive force by Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the LAMBERTS have pleaded a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 sufficient to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The LAMBERTS have alleged conduct violating their civil rights, the use of excessive force, the time of the incident, and those persons responsible. These allegations are sufficient to withstand the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Demetrius v. Marsh, 560 F.Supp. 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Moreover, with the exception of Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1998), the authority upon which the Defendants principally rely for their “heightened pleading standard” argument is either inapplicable to motions to dismiss or has been overruled by later precedent. See, e.g., Green v. Bransom, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997) [motion for summary judgment case], cited in Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 3, lines 21-22; Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1993) [motion for summary judgment case], cited in Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 3, lines 22-23; Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 7 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Branch I”) and Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994), (“Branch II”), cited in Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 4, lines 3-4, overruled by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) [Branch I and II’s heightened pleading requirement is disapproved in civil rights cases.]. Therefore, as to the LAMBERT’S first cause of action for violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants’ motion to dismiss must fail. C. The LAMBERTS Are Also Not Held To A “Heightened Pleading Standard” In Pleading A Violation Of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA Defendants also argue that the LAMBERTS are required to plead “specific facts” in support of their alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA. Defendants assert that the LAMBERTS must plead “more than a bald allegation that the injury resulted from a policy of the municipality.” See, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 4, lines 10-11 and page 5, lines 16-17. In making this assertion, Defendants rely heavily on two U.S. Supreme Court cases -Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) and Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). Unfortunately, Defendants again mis-interpret the current state of law with respect to a plaintiff’s burden when pleading a civil rights violation by a municipality. In overruling Branch I and Branch II, the 9th Circuit in Galbraith, supra, specifically relied on two U.S. Supreme Court cases that were decided after Tuttle and Dodson. These two cases -Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) and Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coord’n Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) -control the Court’s determination of Defendants’ motion to dismiss the LAMBERTS’ Section 1983 se of action, including its determination of whether to grant the motion as to Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA. The Galbraith Court correctly determined that Crawford-El and Leatherman stand for the proposition that a plaintiff need not meet a “heightened pleading standard” when pleading a civil rights cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 8 1983 against either an individual or a municipality. Galbraith, supra, at page 1124. In fact, as the Galbraith Court correctly described, the U.S. Supreme Court in Leatherman rejected a “heightened pleading standard” for Section 1983 causes of action against municipalities, stating, “We think that it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.” Leatherman, supra, at page 1163. Moreover, the Galbraith Court noted that “any remaining doubt on the issue was disspelled when the Supreme Court revisited heightened pleading requirements...and rejected their use as a device to weed out unmeritorious claims.” Galbraith, supra, at page 1125. In making this statement, the Galbraith Court cited Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court again held the Federal Rules require only “notice pleading” which “provides that a complaint must include only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’.” Swierkiewicz at page 998. “Such a statement must simply ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’.” Id., citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Therefore, the LAMBERTS are not held to a “heightened pleading standard” even when pleading a civil rights violation against a municipality like Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA. The Galbraith Court summed up the rule of law concisely, writing: “‘In this circuit, a claim for municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss ‘even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice’.” Galbraith, supra, at page 1127, citing Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). Under the liberal pleadings rules discussed above, the LAMBERTS’ allegations against Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA are sufficient to withstand the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The LAMBERTS’ allegations specifically allege that “Defendant City of Santa Rosa is123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 9 liable...for maintaining a policy, custom, or practice or permitting or encouraging excessive force by its officers...” See, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 38, lines 3-5. The LAMBERTS further allege that Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA’s liability is premised on Monell v. New York Dept. Of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). See, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 38, lines 8-9. Finally, the LAMBERTS allege that “the City’s policymaker(s) acted with actual knowledge, constructive knowledge and/or deliberate indifference to Mr. Lambert’s constititutional rights.” See, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 38, lines 9-12. These allegations are sufficient to give the Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” However, even if the allegations of liability against Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA could be construed as “nothing more than a bare allegation that the individiual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice,” the LAMBERTS’ allegations would still be sufficient to withstand the Defendants’ motion to dismiss as the 9th Circuit held in Galbraith. At the pleading stage, the plaintiff’s complaint is permitted to have fairly general allegations. Haile v. Sag Harbor, 639 F.Supp. 718 (E.D. N.Y. 1986). Therefore, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the LAMBERTS’ first cause of action against Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA must be denied. PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT STATES A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 1983 FOR FALSIFICATION OF DEFENDANT SANCHEZ AND JOHNSON’S ARREST REPORTS In addition to the use of excessive force, the LAMBERTS have stated a valid cause of action against Defendants under Section 1983 based on the alleged falsification of Defendant SANCHEZ and JOHNSON’s police reports. In Galbraith, supra, the plaintiff brought an action against the County of Santa Clara and the county coroner under Section 1983 as a result of the coroner falsifying an autopsy which resulted in the arrest and criminal prosecution of the plaintiff for the death of the plaintiff’s wife. In addition to rejecting the “heightened pleading standard” as123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 10 ///set forth above, the Galbraith Court also concluded that the plaintiff had adequately alleged a Fourth Amendment violation under Section 1983. In this case, the LAMBERTS allege that Defendant SANCHEZ and JOHNSON both falsified their arrest reports, falsely accusing MR. LAMBERT of resisting arrest. The LAMBERTS further allege that these false arrest reports resulted in charges against MR. LAMBERT of resisting arrest, which MR. LAMBERT had to defend himself against at considerable expense. The resisting arrest charge against MR. LAMBERT was, ultimately, dismissed by the Sonoma County District Attorney. See, Declaration of Caroline L Fowler, Exhibit B, page 5 of 6. Therefore, like the situation in Galbraith, the LAMBERTS have set forth a valid cause of action under Section 1983 based on the falsification of the arrest reports by Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON. PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT STATES VALID CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ASSAULT, BATTERY, AND VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 52.1 -THE “BANE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT” A. MR. LAMBERTS’ Causes Of Action For Assault, Battery, And Violation Of Civil Code Section 52.1 Are Pendent State Law Claims Over Which The Court Should Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction MR. LAMBERT also raises valid causes of action under California state law for assault, battery, and violation of California Civil Code Section 52.1, popularly known as “The Bane Civil Rights Act.” MR. LAMBERT’S causes of action for assault and battery are pendent state law claims over which this Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because the LAMBERTS’ causes of action for assault and battery are factually-related to the Section 1983 excessive force claim.123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 11 ///A similar situation faced the Court in Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995). In Ammerman, a college lab instructor brought a Title VII claim against the college for failing to protect her from another instructor’s sexual harassment. She also sued the alleged harasser for assault, battery, and a variety of additional state law claims. The Court approved the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in Ammerman because, like here, the claims were clearly related. In fact, the Court noted that “without reference to the facts surrounding the assault, there could have been no sexual harassment claim against the employer.” Id. at page 425. Similarly, in this case, without reference to the assaultive behavior of Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON, there could be no excessive force claim. The assault and battery claims are clearly supplemental. Likewise, MR. LAMBERT’S claim for violation of Civil Code section 52.1 is equally supplemental to the Section 1983 excessive force claim. In fact, although somewhat broader in scope, Civil Code section 52.1 bears striking similarity to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil Code section 52.1(a) permits an individual to maintain a private civil action against “a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law” when that person “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California]...” Like a Section 1983 excessive force claim, a violation of Civil Code section 52.1 requires an allegation of force or threat of force, which MR. LAMBERT has properly alleged against Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON. Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F.Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Moreover, under recent amendments to Civil Code section 52.1, MR. LAMBERT is no longer required to allege that the force or threat of force were motivated by an intent to discriminate based on a protected class. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (2000 Note), legislatively overruling Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach, 29 Cal.App.4th 1797 (1994); see also, Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 12 Cal.4th 820 (2004) [claim under Bane Act did not require plaintiff to show that sheriff’s department acted with discriminatory animus in conducting allegedly unreasonable search and seizure.]. Finally, as set forth below, the LAMBERTS have adequately notified Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA of their intent to pursue these state law claims under Government Code section 945.4 and Defendants are not immune from liability for these claims under Government Code section 812.5. B. The LAMBERTS’ Claims Under Government Code Section 945.4 Was Sufficient To Put Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA On Notice Of The LAMBERTS’ Claims For Assault, Battery, Violation Of Civil Code Section 52.1, And Loss Of Consortium Defendants next assert that the LAMBERTS’ causes of action against Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA must be dismissed because the LAMBERTS’ claims under Government Code section 945.4 “sets forth no facts establishing any action or inaction by the City or an independent claim against it.” See, Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 6, lines 7-8. Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA mis-states the specificity required of a plaintiff’s Government Code section 945.4 claim. Under California law, a Government Code section 945.4 pre-lawsuit claim need not specify each act or omission later proven to cause injury. Stockett v. Assoc’n of Calif. Water Agencies, etc., 34 Cal.4th 441 (2004); Smith v. County of Los Angeles, 214 Cal.App.3d 266 (1989). If a plaintiff’s complaint is based on the same general set of facts as set forth in the prelawsuit claim, the complaint will survive a challenge based on non-compliance with Government Code section 945.4. Dixon v. City of Livermore, 127 Cal.App.4th 32 (2005). In making this argument, Defendants rely principally on Fall River Joint Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal.App.3d 431 (1988), Donohue v. State of California, 178 Cal.App.3d 795 (1986), and Connelly v. State of California, 3 Cal.App.3d 744 (1970). However, in a later decision involving municipal liability for the actions of police officers, the Court of123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 13 Appeal expressly distinguished the Fall River, Donohue and Connelly opinions. In White v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.App.3d 1505 (1990), rev den February 20, 1991, the plaintiff bus driver was asked for assistance by a fellow bus driver. She parked her bus and exited it, attempting to assist the other bus driver. The plaintiff was then approached by a police officer employed by the City and County of San Francisco who asked the plaintiff for her driver’s license. The plaintiff asked the officer what she had done wrong. Like the instant case, the police officer did not answer her. He grabbed her hands, forcing them behind her back and slammed her face into a wall. The plaintiff was then placed in handcuffs and arrested. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a claim stating that she “was falsely arrested and imprisoned...[and] also brutally beaten by the officer...” Id. at 1507. When the claim was rejected, the plaintiff filed suit alleging -as the LAMBERTS did in this case -claims against the City and County of San Francisco for false imprisonment; negligent hiring, training and retention; intentional failure to train, supervise and discipline; assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotion distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary adjudication to the City on the grounds that the plaintiff’s additional claims against the City were not “fairly reflected” in the written, pre-lawsuit claim presented by the plaintiff. Id. at 1508. In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeal ruled that “both plaintiff’s complaint and her claim were predicated on the same fundamental facts-Officer Sanford’s alleged mistreatment of plaintiff. The causes of action for negligent hiring, training, and retention and for failure to train, supervise, and discipline merely sought to show direct responsibility of San Francisco for Officer Sanford’s conduct. Plaintiff did not shift the fundamental facts about her injury.” Id., at page 1511. The factual circumstances of White are strikingly similar to this case. Likewise, the argument raised in this case by Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA is strikingly similar to the argument rejected in White. Just like White, the LAMBERTS’ pre-lawsuit claims under123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3Both MR. LAMBERT and MRS. LAMBERT filed claims with Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 14 Government Code section 945.4 hinge upon the mistreatment and abuse perpetrated by Defendants SANCHEZ and JOHNSON.3 The state law causes of action that the LAMBERTS now allege against Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA simply seek to hold the CITY OF SANTA ROSA directly liable for SANCHEZ and JOHNSON’s misconduct and the resulting damages. Like the causes of action in White, the LAMBERTS’ causes of action against Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA arise out of the same “fundamental facts” as those set forth in their pre-lawsuit claim. Therefore, Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA’S request for dismissal based on the LAMBERTS’ alleged non-compliance with Government Code section 945.4 should be denied. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR USING UNREASONABLE FORCE UNDER EITHER FEDERAL OR STATE LAW Defendants argue that the LAMBERTS’ complaint should be dismissed under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) because they are immune from Section 1983 liability as well as any liability for state law claims under California Government Code § 815.2. However, Defendants’ immunity argument does not support dismissal of the LAMBERTS’ Section 1983 cause of action. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, States may not immunize action that violates rights protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); see also, Buskirk v. Seiple, 560 F.Supp. 247 (E.D. Pa. 1983) Moreover, a police officer enjoys only “qualified” immunity in a Section 1983 case, not absolute immunity. Stevens v. Corbell, 832 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1987) reh den, en banc 838 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1988). In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the defense of immunity is inappropriate as grounds to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint. In Gomez, supra, 446 U.S. at page 640, the Court wrote: “[T]his Court has never indicated that qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff’s cause of action...” The Court went on to state the rationale for its123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 15 decision, writing: “Our conclusion as to the allocation of the burden of pleading is supported by the nature of the qualified immunity defense. As our decisions make clear, whether such immunity has been established depends on facts peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the defendant. Thus we have stated that ‘[i]t is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity... There may be no way for a plaintiff to known in advance whether the official has such a belief or, indeed, whether he will claim that he does. The existence of a subjective belief will frequently turn on factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to know.” Id. at 640-641. Finally, Defendant CITY OF SANTA ROSA cannot assert the immunity of its police officers as grounds for immunizing itself from liability. Owen v. City of Independence, MO, (1980) 445 U.S. 622. Similarly, Government Code section 815.2 does not immunize either Defendant SANCHEZ or JOHNSON from liability for assaulting and battering MR. LAMBERT, violating MR. LAMBERT’S rights under Civil Code section 52.1, or from the resulting loss of consortium their actions caused MRS. LAMBERT. In Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002), for example, the Court reviewed Government Code section 815.2 and found that police officers are not immune from assault and battery under California law. Id. at page 1016, citing Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal.App.2d 256, 264) [“California cases have consistently held that a peace officer making an arrest is liable to the person arrested for using unreasonable force.”]. The Robinson Court further held that the municipality is also not immune from liability because its liability depends upon immunity granted to its police officers under California law, and California law does not immunize police officers from using unreasonable force in discharging their duties. Id. at 1016. Moreover, the Robinson Court recognized that California has rejected the Monell doctrine in terms of a municipality’s vicarious liability for state law claims such as assault and123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 16 battery. Id., citing Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.App.4th 125, 139-140 [“Under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), the County is liable for acts and omissions of its employess under the doctrine of respondeat superior to the same extent as a private employer.”]. This same rationale applies to MR. LAMBERT’S claim for violation of Civil Code section 52.1. See, e.g., Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F.Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995). In California, governmental liability is the rule; immunity is the exception. White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal.App.3d 566, 570 (1985). Therefore, this Court should reject Defendants’ immunity argument as to the LAMBERTS’ Section 1983 cause of action, MR. LAMBERT’S causes of action for assault, battery and violation of Civil Code section 52.1, and MRS. LAMBERT’S cause of action for loss of consortium.. MRS. LAMBERT HAS A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM Defendants assert that MRS. LAMBERT has failed to allege sufficient facts to entitle her to a claim for loss of consortium. Under California law, “the concept of consortium includes not only the loss of support or services; it also embraces such elements as love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, sexual relations, the moral support each spouse gives the other through the triumph and despair of life, and the deprivation of a spouse’s physical assistance in operating and maintaining the family home.” Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal.App.3d 625, 633 (1985). Loss of consortium can be complete or partial in the sense that the aggrieved spouse’s consortium was impaired. Carlson v. Wald, 151 Cal.App.3d 598, 602 (1984), citing Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 408 (1974). In the complaint, MRS. LAMBERT pleads that “Defendant’s tortious actions proximately and actually caused Plaintiff Mrs. Lambert to suffer a loss of consortium with her husband, Mr. Lambert.” See, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 63, lines 10-12. The complaint also makes specific123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 17 reference to Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. See, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 63, line 13. Under rules of liberal pleading, these allegations are sufficient to put Defendants on notice of MRS. LAMBERT’S cause of action for loss of consortium. Nevertheless, Defendants assert that MRS. LAMBERT has not alleged that she has lost the “support, comfort, protection, society and pleasure as required under Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382.” See, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 8, lines 5-6. Assuming, arguendo, that Defendants are correct and a plaintiff is required to allege these facts under the Federal rules allowing “notice pleading,” MRS. LAMBERT’S allegations are easily corrected by way of an amendment to the complaint. MRS. LAMBERT can easily and truthfully plead these specific facts, if need be. Therefore, if the Court finds MRS. LAMBERT’S twelfth cause of action deficient, MRS. LAMBERT requests leave to amend the complaint as set forth below. DEFENDANT JOHNSON WAS PRESENT AT THE SCENE, FAILED TO INTERVENE TO PREVENT DEFENDANT SANCHEZ’S ATTACK AGAINST MR. LAMBERT, AND PARTICIPATED IN ASSAULTING AND BATTERING MR. LAMBERT While it is true that the arresting officer who exercises the unreasonable force is the typical defendant in an excessive force case, the arresting officer who exercises force is not the only officer who may be liable in a Section 1983 action. When an officer is present at an arrest, and has an opportunity to intervene, other officers can be held liable under Section 1983 for failing to prevent a fellow officer from using excessive force. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000); O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9 (2nd Cir. 1988); Fundiller v. Cooper, 777123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 18 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Goodie, 798 F.Supp. 382 (W.D. La. 1992); McQurter v. Atlanta, 572 F.Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga. 1983), app dism 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1984). In this case, Defendants argue that Defendant JOHNSON must be dismissed because “the complaint alleges in paragraphs 17 and 22 that Officer Johnson was in another room at the time of the specific acts that form the basis of this cause of action.” See, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities, page 15, lines 6-8. In fact, beginning with paragraph 17 and ending with paragraph 22, the LAMBERTS’ complaint alleges that, Defendant JOHNSON failed to intervene even after Defendant SANCHEZ had broken MR. LAMBERT’S leg and was using his “Taser” weapon on MR. LAMBERT’S broken leg and twisting MR. LAMBERT’S broken leg. Throughout this time, MR. LAMBERT lay on the floor, screaming in pain. Nevertheless, as the complaint alleges, Defendant JOHNSON did nothing to intervene. When Defendant JOHNSON finally did intervene, she contributed to the civil rights violation against MR. LAMBERT by helping Defendant SANCHEZ drag MR. LAMBERT (in pain with a badly broken leg) across the family room floor. See, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 22. Therefore, the LAMBERTS’ should be permitted to assert their Section 1983 cause of action against Defendant JOHNSON as well as the state law causes of action for assault, battery and violation of Civil Code section 52.1, and loss of consortium. IF THE COURT GRANTS DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, THE LAMBERTS RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT THE COURT GRANT LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT In this case, the LAMBERTS’ complaint has never been amended previously. F.R.C.P. 15(a) encourages Courts to look favorably upon requests to amend pleadings, stating that leave123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 19 “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” While granting or denying a request for leave to amend rests within the sound discretion of the Court, the Court should exercise that discretion in this case in favor of the LAMBERTS, particularly considering the gravity of their allegations. Therefore, should the Court find deficiencies in any of those causes of action which the LAMBERTS have not already agreed to dismiss as part of their negotiations with the Defendants, the LAMBERTS respectfully request leave to amend their complaint to address any such deficiencies noted by the Court. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the LAMBERTS respectfully request that the Court deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Dated: October 13, 2005 LAW OFFICES OF ERIC G. YOUNG By:_________________________________ Eric G. Young, Attorney for Plaintiffs WILLIAM LAMBERT and BEVERLY LAMBERT