Source: https://openjurist.org/167/f3d/286
Timestamp: 2017-09-20 16:50:26
Document Index: 132935650

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 51', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 51', '§ 1', '§ 30', '§ 508', '§ 30', '§ 30']

167 F. 3d 286 - Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc
167 F3d 286 Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc
167 F.3d 286
14 NDLR P 132
Paul N. SMITH and Bernice Smith, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 97-5313.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart and its subsequent order denying plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 and 60 to alter or amend the judgment, which together had the effect of dismissing the plaintiffs' lawsuit. Both of the district court's orders are subject to de novo review by this court, using the same standards applied by the district court. See Middleton v. Reynolds Metals Co., 963 F.2d 881, 882 (6th Cir.1992) (reviewing grant of summary judgment de novo); Columbia Gas Transmission, Corp. v. Limited Corp., 951 F.2d 110, 112 (6th Cir.1991) (applying de novo standard of review to Rule 59(e) motion seeking reconsideration of a grant of summary judgment).
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment all reasonable factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 842 (6th Cir.1997). Under de novo review, we draw our own inferences and legal conclusions from the record. Lancaster Glass Corp. v. Philips ECG, Inc., 835 F.2d 652, 658 (6th Cir.1987).
Mrs. Smith's knowledge of the condition of the bathroom is a relevant issue. The district court found that she could apprehend its condition at a glance, and "[s]he did so, and chose to use the restroom regardless of its lack of handrails." J.A. at 177. These findings, however, involve disputed material facts. There is no evidence that Mrs. Smith could apprehend the conditions at a glance, that in fact she did so, and that in fact she chose to use the restroom regardless of its lack of handrails. These conclusions were not supported by evidence.
IV. Common Law Negligence
Count II is the common law negligence count. It alleges: (1) failure to use ordinary care in the location of the handicapped restroom; (2) failure to equip the front restroom with grab bars; (3) failure to equip the door of that restroom with a workable lock; and (4) breach of a duty, stated in generalized terms, to inspect its restrooms to make them safe for invitees. Though it was not specifically alleged, the district court recognized that plaintiff also complained that the restroom stall was too narrow to accommodate a walker, and it considered and ruled upon that matter. It was tried by consent.4 We have described in Part III that a finder of fact could conclude that Wal-Mart could anticipate the use of grab bars and an appropriate stall by invitees like the plaintiff. Without dispute plaintiff was an invitee. Whether Wal-Mart's failure to maintain grab bars and a stall suitable for persons like plaintiff, and its location of the handicapped-accessible restroom some 140 yards from the store entrance and without signs directing disabled persons to it, considered singly or cumulatively, constituted negligence for failure to keep the premises safe as required by § 51-3-1 was a matter for a jury. See Brown v. Who's Three, Inc., 217 Ga.App. 131, 457 S.E.2d 186, 192-93 (Ga.Ct.App.1995), which held "[t]he occupier of a business premises has a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. This includes a duty to inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which he does not know and to take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement and use of the premises.... Whether the table was deficient and whether the deficiency caused [plaintiff's] injuries is for a jury's determination." (internal quotations and citations omitted). The plaintiffs in the instant case sufficiently alleged a cause of action for common law negligence. Whether Wal-Mart committed breaches of duty alleged to have been committed by it and whether such failures proximately caused injuries to plaintiffs is for jury determination.
V. Negligence Per Se
28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a). Examples of barrier removal include installing grab bars in toilet stalls, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(12), and rearranging toilet partitions to increase maneuvering space, § 36.304(b)(13).
A state can incorporate requirements of federal law into its law or, to put it differently, it may be held that the federal law impliedly provides a private cause of action under state law for individuals harmed by violation of the federal statute. Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir.1995) (incorporation of federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in Kentucky hazardous waste law); Wren v. Sullivan Elec. Inc., 797 F.2d 323, 325-26 (6th Cir.1986) (rules of construction provided in OSHA regulations incorporated into Tennessee law). Georgia has not expressly incorporated ADA. Wal-Mart had, however, established a task force to implement the accessibility requirements of ADA. Br. of Appellant at 7; J.A. at 123.
Johnson v. Kimberly Clark, 233 Ga.App. 508, 504 S.E.2d 536 (Ga.Ct.App.1998), concerned a plaintiff employed by an independent contractor to paint iron poles on Kimberly Clark's premises. One of the poles fell on him. The trial court granted summary judgment for Kimberly Clark. The Court of Appeals reversed because there were issues of fact as to the acts and knowledge of Kimberly Clark's employees and of whether control of the premises had been surrendered to the independent contractor, and of plaintiff's exercise of care for his own safety, so that material issues of disputed fact remained for the jury. Significant to the present case is the holding that negligence per se did not apply since plaintiff was not an employee of Kimberly Clark, but if Kimberly Clark had actual or constructive knowledge (for purposes of OSHA) then it also had knowledge for purposes of § 51-3-1, supra, the general statute concerning the duty of a landowner to invitee. "Thus, if there was an OSHA violation ... Kimberly Clark was under an affirmative OSHA duty to periodically inspect and to see that work and walk surfaces were unobstructed, which duty was owed to its employees." Id. at 539.6 See also Rouse v. CSX Transp., Inc., 722 F.Supp. 751, 753 (S.D.Ga.1989), holding that under Georgia law plaintiff may proceed against a railroad pursuant to the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1910), which does not provide for a private cause of action. Plaintiff was held to be a member of the class protected by the Act and therefore could invoke the Act's absolute liability standard. It held as a matter of law that the car which injured plaintiff, as required by the Act, was "on the line" of the railroad for purposes of the Act when the accident occurred, and it granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to the applicability of the Act.
Plaintiffs assert a cause of action for negligence per se based upon alleged failure of Wal-Mart to comply with the 1988 Standard Building Code as adopted by the City of Fort Oglethorpe. Wal-Mart contended that its duties to handicapped persons relating to its building were governed by the Georgia statute, Ga.Code Ann. § 30-3-4(3) (1993). Plaintiffs sought to bring themselves within the more stringent requirements of the Building Code. The Building Code, § 508, relates to accessibility of buildings to the handicapped. It contains an exception providing that its requirements do not apply "[w]hen a code jurisdiction is using mandated handicapped requirements." The district court held that the state statute, § 30-3-4(3), is such a mandated handicapped requirement, therefore the exception prevails over the City Code provision. We therefore need not reach the issue of the allegedly higher requirements of the Building Code.
Others are slip-and-fall cases but speak of Robinson in broader terms. Steele v. Rosehaven Chapel, Inc., 233 Ga.App. 853, 505 S.E.2d 245, 247 (Ga.Ct.App.1998) (affirming summary judgment because "[e]ven after Robinson, supra, in a premises liability action, a defendant can prevail on summary judgment for pointing to the absence of evidence as to an essential element of plaintiff's prima facie case").
There are references by the parties and the district court to provisions of Georgia statutes concerning the number and location of handicapped-accessible bathrooms. Ga.Code Ann. § 30-3-2(1)(C) (Supp.1996) and American National Standards Institute model building code, requiring a handicapped-accessible facility "at a reasonable location." Plaintiffs' complaint does not assert violation of the state statutes as negligence per se. Location of restrooms may, however, be a component of the claim of violation of common law standards for negligence that require the premises owner to exercise due care to keep the premises safe. See Part IV, infra