Source: http://lambros.name/ricosuit7/rico34.html
Timestamp: 2019-06-19 04:06:16
Document Index: 532297584

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§371', '§843', '§843', '§371', '§2675', '§1746', '§1746']

Lambros August 3, 2000 Affidavit
August 3, 2000, AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, seventeen (17) pages. NO EXHIBITS SCANNED.; August 7, 2000, AFFIDAVIT NUMBER TWO (2) OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS AS TO CORRECTIONS WITHIN AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, DATED AUGUST 3, 2000, two (2) pages. Both the August 3, 2000 AFFIDAVITS were included with the August 15, 2000 filings by Briggs and Morgan to the Clerk of Court. 19 Total pages.
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS
COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the abovestyled action. JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, (hereinafter LAMBROS), and, after being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. On July 20, 2000, Attorney Stenmoe requested that LAMBROS address some of the following topics in affidavit form.
2. Attorney Charles W. Faulkner was appointed by the U.S. District Court and/or the Federal Public Defenders Office in Minnesota to represent Lambros in U.S. vs. LAMBROS, Criminal Number 4-89-82, on June 22, 1992. See docket sheet entry number four (4).
3. Lambros was extradited from Brazil to the United States under the U.S.-BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY in U.S. vs. LAMBROS, Criminal Number 4-89-82.
4. Thirty (30) years is the maximum prison sentence in Brazil. Article 75 of the Brazilian Criminal Code limits the maximum prison sentence in Brazil. See, STATE OF WASHINGTON vs. MARTIN SHAW PANG, 940 P.2d 1293, 1352 (Wash. 1997)(Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc) Denied by the U.S. Supreme Court,
139 L.Ed.2d 608. EXHIBIT A. (PANG, at 1352, offering an overview of Brazilian
legal journals supporting 30 year maximum prison sentence.)
2. RULE OF LENITY provides that "where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct, [courts] apply the RULE OF LENITY and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor." See, U.S. vs. GRANDERSON, 511 U.S. 399 54 (1994)(citation omitted).
3. DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBT can only be invoked if two
conditions are satisfied: (1) "the statute must be genuinely susceptible to two
constructions AFTER, and NOT BEFORE, its complexities are unraveled"; and (2)
a constitutional question not only lacks an obvious answer, but causes the court
gravely to doubt that a statute, as construed, is constitutional. See, ALMENDAREZ
TORRES vs. U.S., 118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998).
4. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides: "[N]o Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects all persons from arbitrary arrest, INCLUDING PERSONS ARRESTED PURSUANT TO TREATIES. See, REID vs. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957) (plurality opinion); IN RE AIRCRASH, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1982); PLASTER vs. U.S., 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983) (the "government must, in carrying out its TREATY OBLIGATIONS conform its conduct to the requirements of the CONSTITUTION.")
5. STARE DECISIS is the time-honored principle that "[questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor RULED UPON, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents. 11 WEBSTER vs. FALL, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925); see also U.S. vs. L.A. TUCKER TRUCK LINES, INC., 344 U.S. 339 38 (1952) ("Even as to our own judicial power or JURISDICTION, this Court has followed the lead of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by prior exercise of JURISDICTION in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed SUB SILENTIO.") Quoting, PARRETTI vs U.S., 122 F.3d 758, 778 (9th Cir. 1997) (Detention of fugitive on
Extradition warrant request WITHOUT BAIL violated due process, absent showing that fugitive posed flight risk.)
6. On or about January 27, 1994, Lambros was sentenced on Count 1, Title 21 U.S.C. H 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), & 846, Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distributing more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, to a sentence of MANDATORY LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE. - Counts 5, 6, & 8, Title 21 U.S.C. H 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), & Title 18 U.S.C. § 2, AIDING & ABETTING in the knowing and intentionally possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Lambros was sentenced to a term of prison of 120 months on Counts 5 & 6, to be served concurrently with Count 1. Lambros was sentenced to a term of prison of 360 months on Count 8, to be served concurrently with the sentence on Count 1. A special term of SUPERVISED RELEASE of 8 years upon release from imprisonment was also ordered by the court. See, EXHIBIT B. (January 27, 1994, JUDGEMENT & COMMITMENT ORDER)
7. On or about February 11, 1997, Lambros was RESENTENCED by Senior Judge Robert G. Renner on Count 1 to 360 months. All conditions set forth in the January 27, 1994 sentence remained the same, including the 8 YEAR SUPERVISED RELEASE to be served upon release from imprisonment. See, EXHIBIT -C. (February 11, 1997, JUDGEMENT & COMMITMENT ORDER)
8. Lambros received a term of 38 years as per the February 11, 1997, RESENTENCING on Counts 1, 5, 6, & 8. This includes the CONSECUTIVE 8 YEAR SUPERVISED RELEASE to be served upon release from imprisonment. See, U.S. vs. ROBERTS, 5 F.3d 365, 368-69 (9th Cir. 1993).
9. The Brazilian Supreme Court DID NOT extradite Lambros on Count 9 within Criminal Indictment Number 4-89-82, and Lambros was not sentenced on January 27, 1994 nor February 11, 1997, on Count 9.
10. Lambros requested Attorney Faulkner to obtain a ruling from the Court if Count 9 was DISMISSED of if in fact Lambros will have to leave the United States within 30 days, as per the U.S. - BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY, after release
from prison before a WARRANT and Indictment 4-89-82 will be reactivated on Count 9. Attorney Faulkner REFUSED to obtain a ruling during PLEA BARGAINING and at SENTENCING as to the governments position on the U.S. - BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY.
11. Lambros does not believe Attorney FAULKNER nor anyone within
FAULKNER & FAULKNER RESEARCHED extradition law applicable to the U.S. - BRAZIL
EXTRADITION TREATY before November 23, 1992, the last day Lambros could accept
the November 16, 1992, WRITTEN PLEA AGREEMENT, from the Government, EXCEPT for
those facts and laws outlined within LAMBROS' letter to U.S. Magistrate Judge
Noel, dated October 16, 1992. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON dated
August 27, 1999, labeled Exhibits A-27 thru A-31.
12. Lambros does not believe Attorney Faulkner nor anyone within FAULKNER & FAULKNER RESEARCHED the DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY, the DOCTRINE OF DUAL CRIMINALITY, and the DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE PUNISHMENT before November 23, 1992, the last day Lambros could accept the November 16, 1992, written plea agreement from the government, EXCEPT for those facts and law outlined within Lambros' letter to U.S. Magistrate Judge Noel, dated October 16, 1992. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON . . ., dated August 27, 1999, Exhibits A-27-31.
13. Faulkner's motion entitled, "DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS FOR EXTRADITION TREATY VIOLATION," dated December 2, 1992, contained 55 words within the body of the motion and no case law and attached LAMBROS' October 16, 1992 letter to U.S. Magistrate Judge F.L. Noel. Faulkner's motion was submitted after the government's WRITTEN PLEA AGREEMENT. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON . ., dated August 27, 1999, Exhibits A-26 thru A-31.
14. U.S. Magistrate Judge Jonathan Lebedoff responded to FAULKNER'S December 2, 1992, motion entitled, "DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS FOR EXTRADITION TREATY VIOLATION," on December 21, 1992, stating within his REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, "Without addressing the standing issue, the Court finds that
defendant has FAILED TO PRESENT A LEGAL ARGUMENT. The clause defendant is relying upon to invalidate his extradition relates to whether the "legal proceedings" or the "enforcement of the penalty" for the crime committed has become barred by limitation. This clause refers to the statute of limitation for the crime, not whether the penalty is barred." See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON dated August 27, 1999, Exhibit K-9 and/or December 2, 1992, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by U.S. Magistrate Judge Lebedoff, page 9.
15. FAULKNER refused to research and investigate LAMBROS' experiences
while incarcerated within BRAZILIAN JAILS and PRISONS from on or about May 17,
1991, the day LAMBROS was arrested in BRAZIL, to on or about June 21, 1992. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated within there opinion, "[A]lthough a
specific finding on the question whether LAMBROS had been TORTURED with American
complicity would of been preferable, the state of the records obviates the need
for remand." See, U.S. vs. LAMBROS, 65 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir. 1995) LAMBROS
can state and has proven to this Court that the EIGHTH CIRCUIT has withheld
evidence and/or did not investigate the facts of his incarceration in BRAZIL,
as the EIGHTH CIRCUIT stated, "[F]irst, as discussed below, Lambros' testimony
is UNRELIABLE because he perjured himself in other regards at trial, and it is
also FANTASTIC. (For instance, Lambros maintains that he was held in the same
BRAZILIAN CELL where the mistreatment alleged in U.S. vs. TOSCANINO, 500 F.2d
267 (2nd Cir. 1974), occurred, and EVEN ASSERTS THAT HE MET TOSCANINO THERE.")
LAMBROS has proved to this Court that FRANCISCO TOSCANINO was incarcerated with
LAMBROS in BRASILIA, BRAZIL for over FOUR (4) MONTHS and they did share the same
cell for a few days and lived within the same block of cells, approximately EIGHTH
(8), for the entire four (4) plus months. LAMBROS has even offered the name of
FRANCISCO TOSCANINO's attorney in Brazil during that time period to no avail. See,
U.S. vs. LAMBROS, 65 F.3d at 701 and AMENDED COMPLAINT, dated February 17, 1999,
EXHIBITS AAA-1 thru AAA-6. WHY HASN'T ANYONE CONTACTED FRANCISCO TOSCANINO'S
ATTORNEY Dr. Julio Cardella, Rua General Osorio, 939, Campinas, Sao Paulo, CEP
13.013, Brazil. Phone number 55-192-340608, as of February 12, 1996. See, Lambros' AMENDED COMPLAINT, Exhibit AAA-5, (letter from Francisco Toscanino's son, Maxime Toscanino, to LAMBROS and Attorney Jeff Orren, dated February 12, 1996).
16. FAULKNER refused to contact LAMBROS' attorneys in Brazil or interview Brazilian witnesses. FAULKNER also refused to hire an investigator to interview Brazilian witnesses and Lambros' attorneys in Brazil.
17. On August 11, 1992, Lambros wrote Attorney Dan Scott, Federal Public Defenders Office, asking why FAULKNER would not request official transcripts of Lambros' legal proceedings from the Supreme Court of Brazil or the U.S. Embassy in Brazil. FAULKNER refused to assist Lambros in obtaining the transcripts from the Brazilian Supreme Court. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND OPPOSING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, dated August 27, 1999, Exhibits A-13, 14, & 15.
18. FAULKNER refused to request Court funding for independent psychologists and set-up medical exams as per Lambros' initial requests. On or about November 9, 1992, Lambros wrote FAULKNER requesting private psychiatric exam(s) as per the request and information faxed to FAULKNER by Attorney Jeff Orren. FAULKNER refused to schedule a psychiatric exam. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA
RAE JOHNSON . . ., dated August 27, 1999, Exhibit A-14.
19. FAULKNER only filed ONE (1) NOTION during the trial of LAMBROS,
as per docket sheet entries 42 (01/04/93) thru 55 (01/15/93). See, DOCKET SHEET
entry 48.
20. FRANCISCO TOSCANINO was held with LAMBROS in Brasilia, Brazil
awaiting EXTRADITION TO ITALY.
21. FAULKNER wrote LAMBROS on November 17, 1992, as to the results of his NEGOTIATIONS for a plea agreement with U.S. Attorney HEFFELFINGER and U.S. Assistant Attorney PETERSON. FAULKNER stated that the plea "AVOIDS THE MANDATORY LIFE COUNT." FAULKNER also stated, "MY BEST ADVICE GIVEN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IS THAT YOU SHOULD ACCEPT THIS OFFER. YOU MUST CONTACT ME TO DO SO BEFORE NOVEMBER 23, 1992."
22. The November 16, 1992 letter from the U.S. Attorney's Office which included the governments WRITTEN PLEA PROPOSAL was attached to FAULKNER's November 17, 1992 letter to LAMBROS. Please note that the U.S. Attorney's Office stated to FAULKNER, "[E]nclosed please find the government's written plea proposal consistent with our DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE LAST TEN (10) DAYS."
23. LAMBROS believes that the U.S. Attorney would of offered LAMBROS a plea agreement of one (1) to four (4) years, as it is LAMBROS belief, the most any defendant received within the indictment was four (4) years, if both FAULKNER and the U.S. Attorney had RESEARCHED and/or INVESTIGATED the U.S. - BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY, BRAZILIAN LAW, LAMBROS TORTURE AND FORCED BRAIN CONTROL IMPLANTATION IN BRAZIL, and the effects of the U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION WARRANT and/or DETAINER which now brings LAMBROS sentence "IN CUSTODY" up to 55J YEARS from the MAXIMUM of THIRTY (30) YEARS, AS PER BRAZILIAN LAW. Therefore, the MAXIMUM SENTENCE LAMBROS could of received from the Court is SEVEN AN ONE-HALF (71) YEARS years due to the U.S. Parole Commission detainer that has been served and validated against LAMBROS, a total amount of incarceration EXPOSURE LESS THAN any other defendant named within the indictment. LAMBROS received an EIGHT (8) YEAR CONSECUTIVE Supervised Release term to be served upon release from imprisonment. The U.S. Parole Commission Detainer is 141 YEARS.
24. Lambros has BRAIN CONTROL IMPLANTS imbedded within his skull that control Lambros' thoughts, deeds, speech, body movements, etc. During plea bargain negotiations LAMBROS was instructed by the persons controlling him from BRAZIL not to except the plea bargain as the United States Government is trying to COVER-UP the torture, forced brain control implantation, denial of due process in BRAZIL, and other acts of criminal conspiracy against LAMBROS.
25. Lambros would of accepted a plea bargain of NOLO CONTENDERE
as to the drug indictment and/or pled guilty to Conspiracy to defraud IRS lawful functions, Title 18 U.S.C. Section 371, the same as CO-DEFENDANT PAMELA RAE LEMON in the amount of one (1) to two (2) years if the government would of removed the brain control implants from LAMBROS and exposed the truth of LAMBROS' torture and denial of due process in BRAZIL. CO-DEFENDANT PAMELA RAE LEMON received a sentence of TWO (2) MONTHS WITH WORK RELEASE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE TERM OF TWO (2) YEARS. See, PAMELA RAE LEMON'S Docket Sheet entry number seven (7) dated December 8, 1989.
26. At the time of plea bargaining, LAMBROS was not educated in law nor had access to a law library, thus the plea of LAMBROS' would of been an uneducated plea with total reliance on Attorney FAULKNER who did not know the law.
27. LAMBROS is suffering and is being deprived of his most precious liberty and freedom, as freedom from bodily restraint is at the "CORE" of liberty. See, FOUCHA vs. LOUISIANA, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
28. LAMBROS has lost his house and other belonging. Lambros' house at todays market value is approximately $650,000.00.
29. LAMBROS' "LOSS OF PROFITS" include at the minimum his NON
FUNCTIONING and loss of contracts within the following careers and professions
that LAMBROS functioned and generated PROFITS within: (a) licensed U.S. Stock
broker; (b) U.S. and State of Minnesota approved Commodities trader and consultant
that was sponsored for testing by the Cargil Corporation within the Minneapolis
Grain Exchange in Minnesota; (c) investment banker that functioned in the U.S.,
Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, China, Sweden, and Russia; (d) diamond consultant,
education including passing of all home study programs in the area of diamonds
from the worlds leading school in diamond education, the Gemological Institute
of America in California; (e) Psychoanalysis Consultant, education included
certification from the United States Department of Justice three (3) year program.
(a/k/a/ "SOCIAL ENGINEERING SKILLS"). See, "PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER THE
PLEADINGS IN THIS MATTER AS PER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN M. MASON'S ORDER, DATED OCTOBER 15, 1998, dated November 4, 1998, pages 19 and 20.
30. LAMBROS contacted NATIONAL LEGAL PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES in
Cincinnati, Ohio, to assist in the analysis and research of his criminal indictment
as FAULKNER was not researching and investigating the matters within the criminal
proceedings FAULKNER was representing LAMBROS within. See, ORIGINAL DECLARATORY
JUDGEMENT ACTION/COMPLAINT dated June 15, 1998, Exhibits B-1, B-2, I, M-1, &
31. LAMBROS' RICO CLAIMS are INCLUSIVE as to ALL CLAIMS WITHIN
THIS ACTION, as to Minnesota Local Rule 10.03 and F.R.C.P. 10(c) as to ALL FILINGS
in this action and the underlying criminal action that Attorney FAULKNER represented
LAMBROS within. All parties within this action and those parties that have
interacted within this action and the original criminal action, including U.S.
Government Officials, witnesses, Brazilian Government Officials, National Legal
Professional Associates, and others, known and unknown, TRANSMITTED INFORMATION
VIA INTERSTATE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES INCLUDING U.S. MAIL AND TELEPHONES
LAMBROS and others RELIED ON FAULKNER'S et al. STATEMENTS AS TO THE PLEA AGREEMENT
AND LEGAL ADVICE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER TRIAL. LAMBROS also includes the
information contained within his AFFIDAVIT form motion, "PLAINTIFF LAMBROS'
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR JUDGEMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENTS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. BOTH DATED JANUARY 19, 2000, dated
February 1, 2000, specifically pages 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 149 & 15. See, EXHIBIT
D. . LAMBROS has reviewed U.S. vs. EISEN, 974 F.2d 246 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(Attorneys, law firm's investigators and its office administrator were convicted
of RICO violations in connection with firm's fraudulent conduct of civil litigation
as plaintiff's counsel in personal injury case.) The EISEN case will assist all
parties within this action as to the mail fraud statute and other elements of RICO.
Please note that EXHIBIT D. , HAS NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THIS COURT due to an
ORDER by this Court that stopped all proceedings. LAMBROS NOW ENTERS HIS
February 1, 2000 MOTION INTO EVIDENCE AS EXHIBIT D (19 pages in length)
32. LAMBROS believes the COMMERCIAL LIEN he filed against Attorney
Charles Faulkner, et al., within this action is valid due to my reading of the
article "COMMERCIAL LIEN STRATEGY: A 'PRESIDENTIAL' OPINION," by Alfred Adask
that appeared in the AntiShyster Magazine, P.O. Box 540786, Dallas, Texas
75334-0786, Volume 3, Number 1, January-February 1993. See, EXHIBIT E.
Lambros has also researched the law as to the filing and use of COMMERCIAL LIENS,
locating court decisions that have approved the use of liens as a self-help
remedy. See, LAKE RIVER CORP. vs. CARBORUNDUM CO., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985);
U.S. vs. REEVES, 752 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1985) (The Fifth Circuit DID NOT state
the filing of a "COMMON LAW LIEN" was illegal, it only stated that the use of a
"COMMON LAW LIEN" in a "CORRUPT" "WITH IMPROPER MOTIVE OR BAD OR EVIL PURPOSE"
was illegal.)
33. LAMBROS DID NOT file the COMMERCIAL LIEN against Attorney Faulkner, et al. in this action with any type of improper motive or bad or evil purpose in mind.
34. The August 16, 1999, AFFIDAVIT of MARC DIERSEN that is filed with this court is incorrect as to his sworn statement in paragraph five (5), "Mr. Lambros failed to identify by legal description any real estate against which he had a claim pending." Lambros identified within his October 16, 1997, PARTIAL LIST OF PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED AND HELD IN ESCROW the home of Charles W. Faulkner and Sheila R. Faulkner, 2680 Sumac Ridge, St. Paul, Minnesota 55110. Property I.D. Number 363022440030. Marc Diersen DOES NOT state within his AFFIDAVIT that he has been informed by any State or Federal Official that COMMERCIAL LIENS are UNLAWFUL. Marc Diersen is the supervisor of the Abstract Division of the Ramsey County Department of Property Records and Revenue.
35. LAMBROS has not been informed by any STATE or FEDERAL AGENCY that his COMMERCIAL LIENS are UNLAWFUL.
36. LAWRENCE RANDALL PEBBLES was indicted within the same indictment LAMBROS was indicted within. PEBBLES docket sheet states that
Count 1 within the indictment was DISMISSED on June 5, 1992, docket sheet
entry number 18. EXHIBIT _F. PEBBLES was not indicted on any of the
other counts within the indictment.
37. LAMBROS served "REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS FROM LARRY PEBBLES" on July 28, 1998. The ADMISSIONS verify that PEBBLES was informed by the U.S. Attorneys Office that he COULD NOT RECEIVE MORE THAN A LIFE SENTENCE FOR COUNT ONE (1) WITHIN INDICTMENT NUMBER 4-89-82. THE SAME COUNT ONE (1) THAT THE U.S. ATTORNEYS OFFICE AND FAULKNER INFORMED LAMBROS THAT HE COULD ONLY RECEIVE A MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT PAROLE.
38. PAMELA RAE LEMON was indicted within Counts 1, 5, & 6 of the same indictment LAMBROS was indicted within. On December 8, 1989, the Court DISMISSED all counts against LEMON. LEMON pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud IRS lawful functions, Title 18 U.S.C. §371 and was sentenced to a term of TWO (2) MONTHS with work release and supervised release term of two (2) years. See, Docket Sheet entry no. 7. EXHIBIT - G.
39. RALPH A14ERO was indicted within COUNTS 1, 2, & 3 of the same
indictment LAMBROS was indicted within. On May 1, 1991, Judge Murphy DISMISSED
all counts and the indictment against AMERO. See docket sheet entry two (2).
40. IRA JAY BERINE was indicted within Counts I & 7 of the same indictment LAMBROS was indicted within. On July 26, 1991, Counts 1 and 7 were DISMISSED by the court. BERINE pled guilty to an INFORMATION FILED on 5/17/91, to Title 21 U.S.C. Section §843(b) and §843(c) and received a term of imprisonment of FOURTEEN (14) MONTHS, with a supervised release of 3 years. EXHIBIT I.
41. GEORGE FREDERICK ANGELO's docket sheet indicates that a warrant is still pending for his arrest. EXHIBIT J.
42. LAMBROS does not believe PAMELA RAE LEMON committed any violations of Title 18 U.S.C. §371, as LAMBROS lived with LEMON and assisted her in her stock purchase decisions and profits and loss of same. LAMBROS knows of no time that LEMON ever wanted to deceive the IRS nor has LAMBROS ever suggested any type of deception to LEMON as to filings with the IRS.
43. On August 13, 1997, LAMBROS attempted to file a TORT CLAIM against Attorney FAULKNER pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §2675(a) with Attorney
Daniel M. Scott, Federal Public Defender, Suite 107, U.S. Courthouse, 300 South
Fourth Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota. On August 18, 1997, Attorney Scott wrote
LAMBROS and returned LAMBROS TORT CLAIM, stating Attorney FAULKNER was an Attorney
in PRIVATE PRACTICE during his representation of LAMBROS and PAID AN HOURLY
BILLING RATE BY HIS OFFICE. Attorney Scott also stated that FERRI vs. ACKERMAN,
100 S.Ct. 402 (1979) made clear that FEDERALLY APPOINTED COUNSEL IS SU&JECT TO
SUIT FOR MALPRACTICE If the suit is not filed within the time limit set
by law then the Court will be denied the jurisdiction to provide any relief.
See, EXHIBIT A within LAMBROS' June 15, 1998, ORIGINAL DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT/
COMPLAINT within this above-entitled action.
44. DISCOVERY was requested by LAMBROS on January 20, 2000, as to EXPERT WITNESSES as to PRETRIAL SCHEDULING as per Rule 16 and Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and (B), in the form of a motion entitled, "PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO COURT'S ORDER DATED DECEMBER 22, 1999, REGARDING DISCOVERY AND EXPERT WITNESSES, SO COURT MAY ISSUE A PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER AS PER RULE 16 AND RULE 26(a)(2)(A) and (B)." The Motion was twenty (20) pages in length with EXHIBITS containing fortyseven (47) pages. LAMBROS requests this Motion to be allowed with a SUPPLEMENT from LAMBROS' attorney, due to LAMBROS uneducated understanding of the law.
45. NEW DEFENDANTS RULING was requested by LAMBROS on January 6, 2000, within LAMBROS' motion entitled, "PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A RULING BY THIS COURT AS TO THE ADDITION OF NEW DEFENDANTS' WITHIN THIS ACTION DUE TO AFFIDAVITS AND EXHIBITS INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS ON AUGUST 30, 1999, SO AS TO PRESERVE
PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, IN THIS ACTION." LAMBROS will be requesting his attorney to supplement this motion and request this Court to make a ruling as to same. LAMBROS is now requesting his attorney to supplement the above stated motion within this paragraph as to this AFFIDAVIT.
46. CLAIM 16 was submitted by LAMBROS to Attorney STENMOE for filing within this action on March 16, 2000, via U.S. Certified Mail. Claim 16 is entitled, "PLAINTIFF LAMBROS WAS DENIED A JURY INSTRUCTION ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IS CHARGED, AS EVIDENCE WOULD OF PERMITTED JURY RATIONALLY TO FIND PLAINTIFF LAMBROS GUILTY OF LESSER OFFENSE AND ACQUITTED OF GREATER OFFENSE. See, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 31(c), Title 18, U.S.C.A."
47. EXHIBIT K. , contains LAMBROS' March 16, 2000, letter to
Attorney STENMOE (2 pages); LAMBROS' motion, "PLAINTIFF LAMBROS REQUESTS LEAVE
OF THE COURT TO AMEND THIS PLEADING TO ADD NEW CLAIM THAT RELATES BACK TO
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 15(a), THIS NEW
CLAIM IS 116 AND TO BE ADDED TO PLAINTIFF'S FEBRUARY 17, 1999, AMENDED COMPLAINT.",
dated March 1, 2000 (5 pages in length); and LAMBROS' motion to be submitted
to the court entitled, "LEGAL CASES TO SUPPORT LAMBROS' RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT PLEA BARGAINING IN CORRECTLY ADVISING LAMBROS OF POTENTIAL
MAXIMUM SENTENCE.", dated February 1, 2000 (4 pages in length).
48. ATTORNEY JOSEPH S. FRIEDBERG submitted an AFFIDAVIT to this court dated June 29, 2000. Attorney FRIEDBERG stated, "[Mlr. LAMBROS' conviction and sentence are not the result of any shortcomings on the part of his appointed counsel [FAULKNER]." LAMBROS believes that Attorney FRIEDBERG has VOLUNTARILY acted to DECEIVE THIS COURT, that may be a State cause of action as per Minnesota Stat. Ann. H 481.07-.071 (West 1990). See, HANDEEN vs. LEMAIRE, 112 F.3d 1339, 1355 (8th Cir. 1997). LAMBROS offered a comprehensive overview of caselaw that
supports Attorney FAULKNER'S liability under violations of (a) improper conclusions of law, (b) violations of professional standards, (c) Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, due to FAULKNER'S inability to know and/or understand the statute of law LAMBROS was indicted under, offered a plea agreement on, and sentenced under, in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals OVERTURNED. See, pages 14, 15, 16, & 17 within LAMBROS' May 11, 1999, "PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT AND REQUESTED ORDER DATED APRIL, 26, 1999." Attorney JOSEPH S. FRIEDBERG is listed within the telephone directory as officing at
250 Second Avenue, South, Suite 205, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401. EXHIBIT.
(Pages 14, 15, 16, & 17 as described above).
49. PAROLE VIOLATION: On August 21, 1989, the U.S. Parole Commission issued a WARRANT for the arrest of LAMBROS as per past federal charges on 04/22/76 and 02/15/77. LAMBROS was arrested on the August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Commission WARRANT on May 17, 1991, in BRAZIL. On April 30, 1992, the BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT DID NOT grant extradition on the August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Commission WARRANT/DETAINER. LAMBROS was told by his BRAZILIAN ATTORNEYS and the U.S. EMBASSY that the August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Commission WARRANT/ DETAINER COULD NOT be executed or used against LAMBROS if LAMBROS was not granted extradition on the WARRANT/DETAINER by the Brazilian Supreme Court. FAULKNER told LAMBROS that he DID NOT represent LAMBROS on the August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Violation Warrant and that it COULD NOT be executed if the Brazilian Supreme Court DID NOT extradite LAMBROS on it. LAMBROS believes that FAULKNER had not researched the law and consulted with U.S. Attorney Thomas B. Heffelfinger and U.S. Assistant Attorney Douglas R. Peterson as to the August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Commission Warrant/Detainer being enforced. On January 20, 1993, U.S. Attorney Thomas B. Heffelfinger and U.S. Assistant Attorney Douglas R. Peterson submitted the "GOVERNMENT REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S MID-TRIAL MOTIONS," to the Court, which clearly stated, "LAMBROS can still be charged for ANY PRIOR CRIMES; HE
JUST MUST BE GIVEN AIR OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE THE JURISDICTION BEFORE THESE CASES CAN GO FORWARD. See, Treaty of Extradition, ARTICLE XXI (Motions Hearing Exhibit)." Id. at page 5. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND OPPOSING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, EXHIBIT A- 6.
50. On June 13, 2000, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the 5,357 day U.S. Parole Commission DETAINER of August 21, 1989, to be a consecutive "IN CUSTODY" sentence to be served by LAMBROS. See, LAMBROS vs. BOOKER, et al., No. 00-3118. LAMBROS is now serving a term of "IN CUSTODY" imprisonment of FIFTY-TWO AN ONE-HALF (52J) YEARS. The August 21, 1989 DETAINER is to be served as a CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE.
51. An individual whose PROBATION or PAROLE is being revoked is entitled to certain due process protections, including "A WRITTEN STATEMENT BY THE FACTFINDERS AS TO THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON AND THE REASONS FOR the revocation. See, MORRISSEY vs. BREWER, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)(Parole); U.S. vs. SMITH, 767 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1985) (Failure of district court to make WRITTEN STATEMENT for reasons for revoking probation [Parole] and of evidence relied upon in making revocation decision violated defendant's DUE PROCESS rights and REQUIRED A REMAND TO MAKE SUCH A WRITTEN STATEMENT.) The rational for imposing the "WRITTEN STATEMENT" requirement is to insure fact-finding and to assist in judicial review of the revocation decision. See, BLACK vs. ROMANO, 471 U.S. 606, 613- 14 (1985).
52. CLAIM SEVENTEEN (17): LAMBROS will be requesting his Attorney for assistance in developing what LAMBROS' believes to be CLAIM 17, as to the June 26, 2000 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in APPRENDI vs. NEW JERSEY, Case No. 99-478, where the Supreme Court stated, "[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to REMOVE FRO14 THE JURY the assessment of facts that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant
is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a REASONABLE DOUBT." See, Page 24, OPINION TO THE COURT.
53. On June 29, 2000, in JONES vs. U.S., Case No. 99-8176.
the U.S. Supreme Court VACATED and REMANDED to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
for further consideration in light of APPRENDI vs. NEW JERSEY, Case No. 99-478.
Also see, U.S. vs. CARLESS JONES, 194 F.3d 1178 (November 12, 1999, 10th Cir.).
54. On July 18, 2000, the EIGHTH CIRCUIT ruled on U.S. vs. SHEPPARD, 2000 WL 988127, stating, "[W]e conclude that DRUG QUANTITY MUST OFTEN BE TREATED AS AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE UNDER 1841 but that any error was harmless in this case because the INDICTMENT charged Sheppard with conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams, and THE JURY NADE A SPECIAL FINDING OF THAT QUANTITY. "
55. Honorable U.S. District Court Judge Diana E. Murphy, stated the following during the JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY on January 15, 1993, in U.S. vs. LAMBROS, criminal no. 4-89- 82(05), transcript Volume VII, pages 924 thru 960, that FAULKNER represented LAMBROS within:
56. An INDICTMENT is only a formal method of accusing a defendant of a crime. It is NOT EVIDENCE of any kind. The defendant has pled "NOT GUILTY" to the charges. This plea puts in issue EACH of the ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSES and imposes on the Government the burden of establishing EACH ELEMENT beyond REASONABLE DOUBT. See, Transcript pages 934 & 935.
57. Also, the evidence NEED NOT PROVE THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE THAT WAS PART OF THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION OR THE EXACT AMOUNT OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ALLEGED AS POSSESSED BY THE DEFENDANT with the intent to distribute. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, however that a measurable amount of the controlled substance was, in fact, knowingly and intentionally possessed by the defendant with the intent to distribute. See, Transcript page 935.
58. A form of verdict has been prepared for your use, and you'll
be taking it with you to the jury room. It bears the name of the case - - that's
the name of the parties and file number - - and reads as follows: "We, the jury,
find the defendant" - - blank; under the blank is "Guilty" or "Not Guilty" - -
as charged in Count I of the indictment"; "as charged in Count II of the indictment";
blank, "as charged in Count III of the indictment"; blank, "as charged in Count
IV of the indictment." Then there's a line for a date and a line for the
signature of the foreperson. See, Transcript page 951.
59. EXHIBIT M. , (Transcript pages 934, 935, & 951).
60. 1 JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct as per Title 28 U.S.C.A. §1746.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT ON THIS 3rd day of August, 2000.
Signed: John Gregory Lambros
AFFIDAVIT NO. TWO (2) OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS AS TO CORRECTIONS WITHIN AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, DATED AUGUST 3, 2000.
1. On August 03, 2000 LAMBROS swore and deposed an AFFIDAVIT
in this above-entitled action that was seventeen (17) pages in length and contained
sixty (60) numbered paragraphs. Exhibits where also attached.
2. LAMBROS mailed his August 03, 2000 AFFIDAVIT to Attorney Stenmoe on August 04, 2000 via U.S. Certified Mail.
3. LAMBROS reviewed his AFFIDAVIT on August 05, 2000, and noticed the following ERRORS due to typing mistakes.
4. In PARAGRAPH TWENTY-THREE (23) of LAMBROS' August 03, 2000, AFFIDAVIT the number 551 appears. The number should read 52j.
5. Paragraph twenty-three (23) within LAMBROS August 03, 2000, AFFIDAVIT should read: "[L]AMBROS believes that the U.S. Attorney would of offered LAMBROS a plea agreement of one (1) to four (1) years, as it is LAMBROS' belief,
the most any defendant received within the indictment was four (4) years, if both FAULKNER and the U.S. Attorney had RESEARCHED and/or INVESTIGATED the U.S. - BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY, BRAZILIAN LAW, LAMBROS' TORTURE AND FORCED BRAIN CONTROL IMPLANTATION IN BRAZIL, and the effects of the U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION WARRANT and/or DETAINER which now brings LAMBROS' sentence "IN CUSTODY" up to 521 YEARS from the MAXIMUM of THIRTY (30) YEARS, AS PER BRAZILIAN LAW. Therefore, the MAXIMUM SENTENCE LAMBROS could of received from the Court is SEVEN AN ONE- HALF (7 1/2) YEARS due to the U.S. Parole Commission detainer that has been served and validated against LAMBROS, a total amount of incarceration EXPOSURE LESS THAN any other defendant named within the indictment. LAMBROS received an EIGHT (8) YEAR CONSECUTIVE Supervised Release term to be served UPON RELEASE from imprisonment. The U.S. Parole Commission Detainer is 141 YEARS."
6. The above 521 YEARS LAMBROS is currently "IN CUSTODY" serving is due to the THIRTY (30) YEARS PLUS EIGHT (8) YEAR CONSECUTIVE SUPERVISED RELEASE SENTENCE in U.S. vs. LAMBROS, Criminal No. 4-89-82 and the FOURTEEN AN ONE-HALF (14J) YEAR U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION DETAINER. Therefore, 30+8+14 1/2=52 1/2.
7. Lambros is currently "IN CUSTODY" for TWENTY-TWO AN ONE-HALF (221) YEARS MORE than the MAXIMUM THIRTY (30) YEAR SENTENCE ALLOWED IN BRAZIL, AS PER ARTICLE 75 OF THE BRAZILIAN CRIMINAL CODE. See, STATE OF WASHINGTON vs. MARTIN SHAW PANG, 940 P.2d 1293, 1352 (Washington Supreme Court, En Banc), DENIED by the U.S. Supreme Court, 139 L.Ed.2d 608.
8. Therefore, if LAMBROS is in custody for twenty-two an one-half (22J) years more than allowed, LAMBROS' sentence should be no more that SEVEN AN ONE-HALF (71) YEARS in U.S. vs. LAMBROS, Criminal No. 4-89-82. The criminal proceedings FAULKNER, et al. represented LAMBROS within. (30- 22 1/2=7 1/2 years).
9. 1 JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, declare under penalty of perjury that
the foregoing is true and correct as per Title 28 U.S.C.A. §1746.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT ON THIS 7th day of August, 2000.