Source: https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/1501120001
Timestamp: 2018-01-17 21:56:37
Document Index: 607557315

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 26', '§ 26', '§ 43', '§ 6', '§416', '§416', '§416', '§43', '§416', '§26']

SSA - POMS: PR 01120.001 - Alabama - 01/23/2008
PR 01120.001 Alabama
A. PR 06-034 DNA Testing Used to Establish a Parent-Child Relationship Between the Deceased Number Holder, Broderick W~, Sr., and Damonicka W~ and Broderick W~, Jr., under Alabama Law.
You asked several questions concerning whether Damonicka W~ (C1) may be entitled to child's insurance benefits on the record of the deceased number holder, Broderick W~, Sr. (NH), on the basis of DNA testing of NH's father, Lawrence W~, and NH's sister, Michelle W~. Specifically, you asked:
In October 2005, we spoke with Betty C. to clarify the questions asked, and agreed that the questions should reflect whether both C1 and Broderick W~, Jr. (C2) are entitled to benefits. We also agreed that our opinion should address whether the DNA testing is sufficient to rebut the presumption that Donald W~ is the children's legitimate father. Thus, the questions to be answered are:
Is this DNA testing sufficient to rebut the presumption that Donald W~ is the children's father?
The DNA testing in this case cannot alone rebut the controlling presumption that Donald W~ is both children's father. Thus, when taking into account the evidence before the Agency, an Alabama court would find C1 and C2 to be the children of Donald W~, and an Agency adjudicator could not conclude that C1 and C2 are NH's children for entitlement purposes.
On January 27, 2001, NH died while domiciled in Alabama. C1 was born on June 4, 1995. C2 was born on August 18, 2001. The children's mother, Ronda W~, has been married to Donald W~ since December 1988. There is no evidence that they ever divorced.
On September 10, 2004, the children's grandmother, Beulah R~ (Applicant), applied for surviving child's benefits on the children's behalf. Applicant submitted the results from a DNA kinship test dated April 12, 2005. The DNA samples were taken from Ronda W~, C1, and C2 as well as Lawrence W~, NH's father, and Michelle W~, NH's sister. The results showed that NH was not excluded as the children's biological father and that the probability of paternity was of 99.71%. The conclusion was based upon the assumption that Michelle W~ was NH's biological full sibling and Lawrence W~ was NH's biological father. This DNA test was conducted by Reliagene Technologies, Inc. Reliagene's stationary claims that it is accredited by "the Parentage Testing Committee of the American Association of Blood Banks."
The record also includes copies of the children's birth certificates. C1's birth certificate lists Donald W~ as the father. C2's birth certificate does not list a father.
Furthermore, the record includes a form SSA-795 signed by Donald W~ in July 2001 that states he is not the father of C1 or "the unborn child that Ronda W~ is carrying." We can infer that the referenced unborn child is C2 (who was born on August 18, 2001).
Given this authority, it is our opinion that the DNA testing on NH's father and sibling that shows a 99.71% probability that NH is the father of the children in this case could create a presumption of paternity under the Alabama paternity statute and that such a presumption could only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. However, this conclusion must be weighed against the clear and convincing evidence in the record that would establish Donald W~ as the children's father.
2. Sufficiency of DNA testing to rebut the presumption that Donald W~ is the children's father.
The presumption of paternity established by the DNA testing in this case does not rebut the presumption that Donald W~ is the legitimate father of both C1 or C2. Consequently, an Agency adjudicator could not conclude that C1 and C2 are NH's children for entitlement purposes based on the facts provided to the Agency.
In this case, the record shows that Ronda W~, the children's mother, married Donald W~ in December 1988, and the file provides no indication that the couple divorced. In fact, Applicant signed an SSA-795 stating that, to her knowledge, Ronda W~ and Donald W~ never divorced. Because both C1 and C2 were born to Ronda W~ while she was married to Donald W~, Mr. W~ is presumed to be the children's natural father under Alabama law. This presumption conflicts with the presumption established by the DNA testing.
Given this authority, and the fact that Ronda W~ and Donald W~ are still married, an Alabama court would find C1 and C2 to be the children of Donald W~. An Agency adjudicator, therefore, could not conclude that either C1 or C2 is NH's child for entitlement purposes.
In addition, Applicant, the maternal grandmother of C1 and C2, would not have standing to bring an action seeking to declare NH as the father of these children, because the law restricts who may bring an a paternity action when the presumption of legitimacy has been established under Ala. Code § 26-17-5(a)(1). In Presse, the Alabama Supreme Court held that when a child's presumed father is the husband, a third party would not have standing under the law. See 554 So.2d at 413. In M.H.E. v. B.E., 864 So.2d 351 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), the alleged father was deceased, and the court held that his mother did not have standing to bring an action on his behalf. See id. at 354. Given this authority, Applicant has no standing to challenge the paternity of Donald W~.
Only NH or Ronda W~ conceivably would have standing to challenge the paternity action, only if the presumed father, Donald W~, does not "persist in the presumption that he is the father." In Cravens v. Cravens, - So.2d - (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), the court held that "no one, including the mother of the child, has standing to challenge a presumed father's paternity as long as the presumed father persists in claiming paternity of the child." Id. (citing Ex parte C.A.P., 683 So.2d 1010 (Ala.1996), and Ex parte Presse, 554 So.2d 406 (Ala.1989)). The Court in Presse explained:
In this case, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Donald W~ disclaimed his status as the presumed father. While Donald W~ signed a statement for the Agency in July 2001 indicating that C1 was not his child, this does not constitute a disclaimer or waiver of his legal rights to C1 as described in R.O.M. Moreover, there is no evidence that Donald W~ did not hold himself out as the father of the child, other than his signed statement. Contrarily, C1's birth certificate lists Donald W~ as the father of the child, and they both share the same last name. Finally, there is no evidence that NH pursued any "legal avenues to establish paternity" of C1. With regard to C2, there is some evidence, albeit not very probative, from C2's kindergarten teacher which suggested NH held himself out as the father; however, there is no evidence that NH made any effort, legal or otherwise, to establish paternity, despite the fact that they share the same name. In addition, there is no evidence that Donald W~ disclaimed his legal rights to C2 or that such a legal waiver was made. However, the statement provided to the Agency makes reference to "the unborn child that Ronda W~ is carrying," and it can only be inferred that he is referring to C2 who was born one month after this statement was signed in July 2001. Thus, the evidence of record falls short of demonstrating that Donald W~ disclaimed his legal rights as the presumed father of C1 or C2, and an Alabama court would find C1 and C2 to be the children of Donald W~. An Agency adjudicator could not conclude that C1 and C2 are NH's children for entitlement purposes.
The genetic testing performed in this case can establish a rebuttable presumption of paternity that NH is the father; however, this DNA testing cannot rebut the controlling presumption that Donald W~ is the father of either C1 or C2. Thus, when taking into the account the evidence before the Agency, an Alabama court would find C1 and C2 to be the children of Donald W~, and an Agency adjudicator could not conclude that C1 and C2 are NH's children for entitlement purposes. If C1 and C2 had qualified as NH's children under Alabama law, they would not have inherited in the same manner as if they were legitimate, and would have been paid prospectively from the date of the DNA testing. Because these children would not have been paid retroactively, the Agency would not need to reopen their prior applications. Furthermore, Alabama does not require genetic testing to be conducted by an accredited laboratory to establish paternity rights, and a lack of accreditation appears to affect only the weight of such evidence, not its admissibility.
B. PR 05-246 Presumption of Paternity and Inheritance Based on Grandparent's DNA - Alabama Anthony W~ - SSN ~
Anthony W~ (the number holder) died on March 1, 1992 in Talladega, Alabama. Diletha H~ (Claimant's mother) filed for surviving child's benefits for Brandy S. H~ (Claimant) on the number holder's wage record on March 19, 1992. This claim was denied for lack of child relationship evidence. Another application, filed on November 18, 2004, was also denied for similar reasons. A third application was filed on March 1, 2005. This application was submitted with DNA testing results performed on the number holder's alleged parents (Nellie and Harold W~), the Claimant and her mother. The DNA test results concluded that there was a 99.9999% probability of grandparentage.
DNA test results that show a high probability of grandparentage do not establish a presumption of paternity under Alabama law. Section 26-17-5 of the Alabama Code enumerates all the factual situations where the presumption of paternity would arise. For example, the presumption arises when the child is born during a marriage or within 300 days after the end of a marriage, where there is an invalid marriage under state law, where there has been a written acknowledgement of paternity or when an individual is obligated to support the child voluntarily or through a court order. A presumption of paternity also arises through DNA testing. Ala. Code § 26-17-13(3) states: "Genetic test results which indicate a 97 percent or greater probability that the alleged father is the biological or natural father of the minor child sH~ create a presumption of paternity that the alleged father is in fact the father of the child. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence." The probability of the grandpaternity would not meet the legal definition of the law for the presumption of paternity. The statue provides that the testing should demonstrate the father's relationship with the child.
We have also concluded that the results of DNA testing done on grandparents, with no additional supporting information, would not likely establish that Brandy Shantese H~ is the illegitimate child of the number holder. Alabama Code § 43-8-48 states that for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine succession and the paternity must be established by an adjudication before the death of the father or established thereafter by clear and convincing proof (emphasis supplied). Clear and convincing evidence is defined in Alabama statutes as "evidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt." Ala. Code § 6-11-20(b)(4) (2005).
C. PR 88-013 Date of Entitlement of An Illegitimate Child With Inheritance Rights in Alabama - W~, Jimmy - SSN~
Under Alabama law, there is no specific provision for the retroactive extension of inheritance rights pursuant to a court order of paternity; thus, the order of paternity in this case created the legal status of "heir" and may be given only prospective application.
(W~, Jimmy - SSN ~ - RAIV [Walters] - to Dir., PPB, Atl., 05/24/88)
You have requested our opinion as to the effective date of an Alabama court order of paternity with respect to determining the child's date of entitlement. The facts are that Jeanetta L. R~, HC3, has been entitled to benefits effective August 1985 based upon a court order of paternity dated August 7, 1985. Our opinion is needed to establish whether HC3 can be given retroactive entitlement to March 1985, the number holder's month of entitlement.
The child cannot qualify for benefits under the provisions of Section 216(b)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §416(h)(2)(B), as no marriage ceremony is asserted. Similarly, the child does not qualify under the provisions of the Section 216(h)(3)(B) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §416(h)(3)(B). Thus, our consideration is directed toward the provisions of Section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §416(h)(2)(A), which would extend benefits if the applicant is a child of the insured individual under the State law as it would be applied by the Secretary in determining the devolution of the intestate personal property.
The Code of Alabama, at §43-8-48, provides for the parent and child relationship in the context of the intestate succession of children born out of wedlock, in pertinent part, as follows:
"If, for the purposes of intestate succession a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a person:
(2)... (the child born out of wedlock) is also a child of the father, if: (a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or (b) The paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof,
In this claim, paternity has been established by adjudication during the lifetime of the father.
When applying the provisions of Section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §416(h)(2)(A), to illegitimate children, the Social Security Administration has long used the State intestacy statutes not only to establish the legal status of "child" but also to date the inception of that status as well. An applicant legitimated by State law is considered, generally, to satisfy the intestacy statute as a legitimate child, i.e., from birth; however, a non-legitimated applicant with intestate inheritance rights is a child only from the time inheritance rights arose. See, the attachment to the OGC precedent opinion in B~, Frank E349.(5/22/85 - SN ~ - RAIV [Jarrett] - to Dir., Ins.Progs.Br., Atl., 05/22/85. Although the Code of Alabama at §26-17-14(a) provides that, "The order of the court determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is determinative for all purposes ...", we found no specific authority, under Alabama law, for a retroactive extension of inheritance rights.
Therefore, it is our opinion that, consistent with the rationale set forth in the above-referenced B~ opinion, the court order of paternity in this case created the legal status of "heir", and, thus, may be given only prospective application.
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PR 01120.001 - Alabama - 01/23/2008