Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/724/133/265323/
Timestamp: 2020-07-03 14:18:20
Document Index: 106372126

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 153', '§ 153', '§ 153', '§ 153', '§ 1', '§ 152']

Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Defendant-appellant,william B. Bircher, et al., Intervenor.office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,defendant-petitioner.office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Appellee, v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al.appeal of William B. Bircher.office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Appellee, v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al.appeal of Alan D. Peck, 724 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1983 › Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Washington Met...
Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Defendant-appellant,william B. Bircher, et al., Intervenor.office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,defendant-petitioner.office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Appellee, v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al.appeal of William B. Bircher.office and Professional Employees International Union, Local2, Appellee, v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al.appeal of Alan D. Peck, 724 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 724 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1983) Argued May 31, 1983. Decided Dec. 20, 1983
The district court, 552 F. Supp. 622, in November 1982, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Union. The district court, applying a highly deferential standard of review, decided, inter alia, that the arbitral decision was enforceable.
For many years, Amalgamated Transit Union (Amalgamated) has represented certain groups of WMATA employees. In early 1979, Local 2 began its efforts to become the representative of the nonrepresented employees. Specifically, Local 2 hoped to unionize the professional, administrative, technical, and clerical employees. After Local 2 demanded recognition as the bargaining representative and WMATA refused to bargain, Local 2 filed suit in OPEIU Local 2 v. WMATA, Civil Action No. 79-1386 (D.D.C. 1979). Amalgamated intervened. In June 1979, Local 2 withdrew the suit and the three parties--Local 2, Amalgamated, and WMATA--entered an agreement which provided for negotiations on the composition of the bargaining unit. The agreement also established that, if the parties failed to reach an understanding, "the Authority [would] submit the unit question to arbitration pursuant to [the Compact], before a single arbitrator."
It cannot be gainsaid that federal policy favors the peaceful resolution of labor disputes through arbitration. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 46, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1018, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1974). We would startle no one by recognizing arbitration as a preferred method to resolve industrial strife quickly and inexpensively. As we recently noted: " [A]rbitration of [labor] disputes is faster, cheaper, less formal, more responsive to industrial needs, and more conducive to the preservation of ongoing employment relations than is litigation." Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 435 & n. 66 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. Because "labor dispute" is so broadly defined, a vast range of nontraditional issues are subject to arbitration. Ordinarily, an arbitrator's award is limited to resolving employee grievances or interpreting collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960). In contrast, the arbitrator here determined the scope of the bargaining unit, a task which government entities like the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) normally handle. Moreover, in the customary arbitral decision, the parties have some control over the scope of the issues that are submitted to the arbitrator. Under the Compact, the scope of the submission is defined by statute.
Obviously, Congress could have displaced the presumption that the standard of review be based on deference. Such a congressional displacement might appear in either the Compact itself or in another enactment. Turning first to the Compact, we discover no language that specifically addresses the parameters of our review. Compare D.C.CODE ANN. Sec. 1-2431 (1981) (the Compact) with 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q) (1976) (providing scope of review for the Railway Labor Act). Nonetheless, we are urged to hold that the Compact's "final and binding" language reveals a congressionally-approved standard of review. The legislative history, however, clearly belies this suggestion. The "final and binding" clause had nothing to do with judicial review. Rather, the clause was envisioned as a "no strike, no lock-out" provision. H.REP. No. 92-115, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972). Simply, the Compact is silent as to the scope of judicial review.
The Compact's language and history thus offers no specific direction to the formulation of a unique standard of review. The district court, however, used the final and binding language as a bridge to another statute. The court analogized "final and binding" in the Compact to the same language in the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1976), and concluded: "Because both the RLA and the Compact provide for compulsory arbitration and both denominate the resulting award as 'final and binding,' the court adopts the standards of the RLA for its review of the award at issue here." Joint Appendix at 10. Applying the congressionally-enacted standards of the RLA, the court reviewed the award only for compliance with the Compact's substantive requirements and for confinement to matters within the arbitrator's discretion. The district court also stated that it would have reviewed the arbitral decision for fraud or corruption had such faults been alleged.
In borrowing the standard of review from the RLA, the district court erred. Because the statutory framework of the RLA and of the Compact are substantially dissimilar, we cannot assume, without any supporting evidence of legislative intent, that the mere presence in both statutes of the words "final and binding" permits a court to superimpose the RLA's congressionally-enacted standard of review onto the Compact. We note only a few examples to illustrate the differences between the two enactments. The Compact subjects all conflicts to the same arbitral process and all arbitral decisions are "final and binding." In contrast, the RLA distinguishes between "major disputes" and "minor disputes," and only arbitral awards involving minor disputes are "final and binding." 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m). Moreover, while the Compact is silent as regards judicial review, the RLA explicitly delimits the scope of review. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (g). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that, simply because "final and binding" are words common to both statutes, the same standard of review applies.
Moreover, the Compact itself limits the effect of other statutes. Section 77 of the Compact specifically exempts the Authority "from all laws, rules, regulations, and orders of the signatories and of the United States otherwise applicable to such transit services and persons, except that laws, regulations and orders relating to the inspection of equipment and facilities shall remain in force and effect...." D.C.CODE ANN. Sec. 1-2431 (1981). We note, in passing, that among the statutes displaced by section 77 are the United States Arbitration Act and any local arbitration act. Indeed, the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976) (USAA), indicates by its own terms that it is not applicable in the instant case. Section 2 of that Act limits the Act's application to "written provision [s] in a ... contract ... to settle a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction." The Arbitration Act thus envisions the "typical" situation where the parties agree to arbitrate disputes that arise from a contract. Because the agreement to arbitrate is established by the Compact, and because the Compact is not a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce," the USAA does not apply.
Notwithstanding the erroneous importation of RLA principles, a remand of the case is not necessary. The rule is well established that a decision of a lower court can be affirmed if "the result is correct 'although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.' " SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S. Ct. 454, 459, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943) (quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S. Ct. 154, 157, 82 L. Ed. 224 (1937)). Applying the traditional standards for reviewing labor arbitration to the arbitral award in controversy, we uphold the result.
Any discussion of the scope of judicial review and arbitration must begin with the Steelworkers Trilogy. In that set of cases, the Supreme Court carefully delineated the relationship between a reviewing court and an arbitrator. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960), the Court embraced the common law's deference to arbitral awards. The Court, however, cautioned that arbitrators are not authorized to dispense their own "brand of industrial justice." And, in United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S. Ct. 1343, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403 (1960), the Court focused on what judicial review does not include. "The courts ... have no business weighing the merits of a grievance, [or] considering whether there is equity in a particular claim...." Id. at 568, 80 S. Ct. at 1346. See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960).
The Steelworkers Trilogy and its progeny permit a court to make three inquiries: (1) was the award arbitrary and capricious? (2) was the award sufficiently definite to allow enforcement? (3) did the arbitrator exceed the scope of his "jurisdiction"? 6 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW Sec. 24.05, at 24-91 to 24-96 (1982). The "jurisdictional" inquiry itself has two components: the award must draw its "essence" from the collective bargaining agreement or from the "law of the shop," and the arbitrator cannot grossly deviate from his conferred authority or from the issues submitted for arbitration. See generally Devine v. White, 697 F.2d at 436 n. 80 (discussing scope of review). An arbitral award also will fail if the arbitrator demonstrates partiality or reaches a result contrary to record evidence. Id. A court, however, is bound to enforce the award even when the basis for the arbitrator's decision is ambiguous. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 2182, 76 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983).
Additionally, courts will not enforce an award that is contrary to law or explicit public policy. However, " [s]uch a public policy ... must be well-defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest." W.R. Grace & Co., 103 S. Ct. at 2783. As a corollary to this rule, an arbitral award will not be enforced if it was procured by fraud or coercion. 6 T. KHEEL, supra, Sec. 24.05 at 24-11.
The principal contention on this appeal involves the arbitrator's treatment of supervisory, managerial, and confidential employees. In essence, the question is whether the arbitrator applied incorrect employee definitions, thereby unlawfully placing managerial, confidential, and supervisory workers within the bargaining unit. Although the NLRA does not affect our standard of review, see supra, the Compact incorporates by reference the NLRA's definition of employee as set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 152 Section 66(B) of the Compact provides:
D.C.CODE ANN. Sec. 1-2431 (1981). The Compact therein ties the NLRA definition of employee to the designation of that party with whom the Authority must bargain. In essence, then, the Compact requires that the NLRA employee definition be used in delimiting the scope of the bargaining unit. The arbitral decision thus should have reflected the NLRA's classification of employees. Moreover, because the referenced NLRA section has been interpreted as excluding supervisory, managerial, and confidential employees from bargaining units, see, e.g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 102 S. Ct. 216, 70 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1982); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S. Ct. 1757, 40 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1974), the arbitrator should have excluded these groups from the Compact bargaining unit.
Local 2 and WMATA sharply contested before the Arbitrator the question whether certain jobs were excluded from any bargaining unit because they were supervisory, managerial, or confidential jobs. With respect to claims of supervisory status, the applicable rules have been set forth in a number of decisions under the National Labor Relations Act, and the principles are well-established although their application to particular facts may be difficult. With respect to claims of managerial and confidential status, the parties are in disagreement over the applicable standard. [Local 2,] adopting the views of the National Labor Relations Board, would limit the reach of those terms to employees who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. WMATA urges a broader view which has been adopted by several federal courts of appeals following the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 [94 S. Ct. 1757, 40 L. Ed. 2d 134]. The Arbitrator resolves this issue in favor of WMATA and will apply the judicially approved rather than the NLRB standard.
The arbitrator's treatment of managerial and confidential employees presents a slightly different issue. There, the arbitrator chose not to follow NLRB precedent but instead, at WMATA's urging, adopted the definition of these employees fashioned by appellate courts in reviewing NLRB decisions. Both the appellate court's and the NLRB's definitions were interpretations of the NLRA. In the year following the arbitral award, however, the Supreme Court endorsed the very NLRB definition that the arbitrator had rejected. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 102 S. Ct. 216, 70 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1982). Nevertheless, the arbitral decision is enforceable. The arbitrator was bound to apply the law as it existed at the time of the submission. The arbitrator noted the conflict in that law and made a reasonable choice. Because we cannot require that an arbitrator have the ability to predict future Supreme Court decisions, we conclude that he acted properly in his choice of a standard. A holding to the contrary--that the arbitral award should be reopened--would require renewed arbitration over an issue theoretically resolved three years ago and therefore would undermine the objective of resolving labor disputes quickly. Moreover, parties unhappy with the award would have an incentive to procrastinate in the hope of a new interpretation of the labor laws. In any event, WMATA cannot now argue that the arbitrator erred in adopting a standard that WMATA itself pressed. Throughout the negotiations, WMATA has attempted to narrow the bargaining unit. WMATA thus benefitted from the arbitrator's choice because the standard adopted by the arbitrator placed fewer managerial and confidential employees in the unit than would be permitted under the Hendricks standard. Of course, the new standard would apply if the parties choose to re-arbitrate the scope of the bargaining unit.
Because we hold that the arbitral decision is enforceable, we need not address the issue of whether the Authority's challenge came too late. The Authority waited approximately fourteen months before it challenged the award in court. Although we decline to delineate any specific time restraints, we nonetheless observe that speedy resolution of labor disputes promotes and preserves industrial peace. Thus, a party cannot wait for an indefinite period and then invoke a court's jurisdiction. In the instant case, however, WMATA did not sit idly during the interim period. In fact, the Authority engaged in ongoing negotiations allegedly aimed at a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Because good faith attempts to amicably resolve labor disputes should not be discouraged, we would be reluctant to hold that WMATA has waived its ability to seek judicial review. To determine the proper time restraints, a court might draw an analogy to NLRB bargaining unit determinations where resort to the courts is not appropriate until the election has occurred and one party has refused to bargain. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-77, 84 S. Ct. 894, 896, 11 L. Ed. 2d 849 (1964). Whether this is a proper analogy is a question to be decided in an appropriate case.