Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/590/18-9674/
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 20:45:19
Document Index: 426805078

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 37', '§2', 'Art. 37', '§2', 'Art. 37', 'Art. 37', '§2']

Andrus v. Texas :: 590 U.S. ___ (2020) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Andrus v. Texas, 590 U.S. ___ (2020)
Andrus was six years old, his mother sold drugs out of their apartment. She turned to prostitution and regularly left her five children to binge on drugs. She often was high and had drug-addicted, sometimes violent, boyfriends. When Andrus was 16, he served as a lookout while others committed a robbery. During 18 months in juvenile detention, he was exposed to gangs, drugs, and extended solitary confinement, resulting in suicidal urges. In 2008, Andrus, then 20, attempted a carjacking while under the influence of PCP-laced marijuana. Andrus fired multiple shots, killing two people. At his capital murder trial, Andrus’ defense counsel declined to present an opening statement or evidence. In his closing argument, counsel conceded Andrus’ guilt. The jury found Andrus guilty of capital murder.
During the punishment phase, the prosecution presented evidence of Andrus' aggressive behavior in juvenile detention; that Andrus had gang tattoos; that Andrus had hit, kicked, and thrown excrement at prison officials while awaiting trial; and that Andrus was involved in an aggravated robbery. Counsel raised no material objections. In mitigation, counsel focused on Andrus’ basic biographical information, without revealing the circumstances of Andrus’ childhood; the only expert witness focused on the general effects of drug use on adolescent brains. A prison counselor testified that Andrus “started having remorse.” Andrus testified about his childhood. The jury sentenced Andrus to death.
In Andrus’ state habeas proceeding, Andrus’ life history came to light. Andrus’ counsel offered no reason for failing to investigate Andrus’ history. The trial court recommended a new sentencing proceeding. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated. Andrus demonstrated counsel’s deficient performance under Strickland, but the Court of Criminal Appeals may have failed properly to engage with the question of whether Andrus established that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him.
Defense counsel's failure to investigate or present evidence of the defendant's traumatic childhood during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial established deficient performance by counsel; the Supreme Court remands for consideration of prejudice.
The Texas trial court that heard the evidence recommended that Andrus be granted habeas relief and receive a new sentencing proceeding. The court found the abundant mitigating evidence so compelling, and so readily available, that counsel’s failure to investigate it was constitutionally deficient performance that prejudiced Andrus during the punishment phase of his trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. It concluded without explanation that Andrus had failed to satisfy his burden of showing ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
At age 16, Andrus was sentenced to a juvenile detention center run by the Texas Youth Commission (TYC), for allegedly “serv[ing] as the ‘lookout’ ” while he and his friends robbed a woman of her purse. 10 Habeas Tr., State Exh. 16, p. 9; 13 id., Def. Exh. 4, p. 4 (“[R]ecords indicate[d that] Andrus served as the lookout”); 3 id., at 273–274; 5 id., at 206.[1] While in TYC custody, Andrus was prescribed high doses of psychotropic drugs carrying serious adverse side effects. He also spent extended periods in isolation, often for purported infractions like reporting that he had heard voices telling him to do bad things. TYC records on Andrus noted multiple instances of self-harm and threats of suicide. After 18 months in TYC custody, Andrus was transferred to an adult prison facility.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the trial court’s recommendation to grant habeas relief. In an unpublished per curiam order, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded without elaboration that Andrus had “fail[ed] to meet his burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7–8. A concurring opinion reasoned that, even if counsel had provided deficient performance under Strickland, Andrus could not show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him.
“It is unquestioned that under prevailing professional norms at the time of [Andrus’] trial, counsel had an ‘obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.’ ” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)). Counsel in a death-penalty case has “ ‘a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’ ” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S., at 691). “ ‘In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’ ” Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 521–522.
Counsel also failed to conduct any independent investigation of the State’s case in aggravation, despite ample opportunity to do so. He thus could not, and did not, rebut critical aggravating evidence. This failure, too, reinforces counsel’s deficient performance. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 385 (2005) (“counsel ha[s] a duty to make all reasonable efforts to learn what they c[an] about the offense[s]” the prosecution intends to present as aggravating evidence).
During the case in aggravation, the State’s task was to prove to the jury that Andrus presented a future danger to society. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071, §2(b)(1) (Vernon 2006). To that end, the State emphasized that Andrus had acted aggressively in TYC facilities and in prison while awaiting trial. This evidence principally comprised verbal threats, but also included instances of Andrus’ kicking, hitting, and throwing excrement at prison officials when they tried to control him. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 10–13. Had counsel genuinely investigated Andrus’ experiences in TYC custody, counsel would have learned that Andrus’ behavioral problems there were notably mild, and the harms he sustained severe.[2] Or, with sufficient understanding of the violent environments Andrus inhabited his entire life, counsel could have provided a counternarrative of Andrus’ later episodes in prison. But instead, counsel left all of that aggravating evidence untouched at trial—even going so far as to inform the jury that the evidence made it “probabl[e]” that Andrus was “a violent kind of guy.” 52 Tr. 35.
The State’s case in aggravation also highlighted Andrus’ alleged commission of a knifepoint robbery at a dry-cleaning business. At the time of the offense, “all [that] the crime victim . . . told the police . . . was that he had been the victim of an assault by a black man.” 3 Habeas Tr. 65. Although Andrus stressed to counsel his innocence of the offense, and although the State had not proceeded with charges, Andrus’ counsel did not attempt to exclude or rebut the State’s evidence. That, too, is because Andrus’ counsel concededly had not independently investigated the incident. In fact, at the habeas hearing, counsel did not even recall Andrus’ denying responsibility for the offense. Had he looked, counsel would have discovered that the only evidence originally tying Andrus to the incident was a lone witness statement, later recanted by the witness,[3] that led to the inclusion of Andrus’ photograph in a belated photo array, which the police admitted gave rise to numerous reliability concerns. The dissent thus reinforces Andrus’ claim of deficient performance by recounting and emphasizing the details of the dry-cleaning offense as if Andrus were undoubtedly the perpetrator. See post, at 6 (opinion of Alito, J.). The very problem here is that the jury indeed heard that account, but not any of the significant evidence that would have cast doubt on Andrus’ involvement in the offense at all: significant evidence that counsel concededly failed to investigate.[4]
Having found deficient performance, the question remains whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Andrus. See Strickland, 466 U. S., at 692. Here, prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s ineffectiveness, the jury would have made a different judgment about whether Andrus deserved the death penalty as opposed to a lesser sentence. See Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 536; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071, §2(e)(1). In assessing whether Andrus has made that showing, the reviewing court must consider “the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding”—and “reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.” Williams, 529 U. S., at 397–398; see also Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 956 (2010) (per curiam) (“A proper analysis of prejudice under Strickland would have taken into account the newly uncovered [mitigation] evidence . . . , along with the mitigation evidence introduced during [the defendant’s] penalty phase trial, to assess whether there is a reasonable probability that [the defendant] would have received a different sentence after a constitutionally sufficient mitigation investigation” (citing cases)). And because Andrus’ death sentence required a unanimous jury recommendation, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071, prejudice here requires only “a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance” regarding Andrus’ “moral culpability,” Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 537–538; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071, §2(e)(1).
Unlike the concurring opinion, however, the brief order of the Court of Criminal Appeals did not analyze Strickland prejudice or engage with the effect the additional mitigating evidence highlighted by Andrus would have had on the jury.[5] What little is evident from the proceeding below is that the concurring opinion’s analysis of or conclusion regarding prejudice did not garner a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals.[6] Given that, the court may have concluded simply that Andrus failed to demonstrate deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland (without even reaching the second prong). For the reasons explained above, any such conclusion is erroneous as a matter of law. See supra, at 8–16.
The record before us raises a significant question whether the apparent “tidal wave,” 7 Habeas Tr. 101, of “available mitigating evidence taken as a whole” might have sufficiently “ ‘influenced the jury’s appraisal’ of [Andrus’] moral culpability” as to establish Strickland prejudice, Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 538 (quoting Williams, 529 U. S., at 398). (That is, at the very least, whether there is a reasonable probability that “at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 537.) That prejudice inquiry “necessarily require[s] a court to ‘speculate’ as to the effect of the new evidence” on the trial evidence, “regardless of how much or little mitigation evidence was presented during the initial penalty phase.” Sears, 561 U. S., at 956; see also id., at 954 (“We have never limited the prejudice inquiry under Strickland to cases in which there was ‘little or no mitigation evidence’ presented”).[7] Given the uncertainty as to whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adequately conducted that weighty and record-intensive analysis in the first instance, we remand for the Court of Criminal Appeals to address Strickland prejudice in light of the correct legal principles articulated above. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).
5 The Court of Criminal Appeals did briefly observe that the trial court’s order recommending relief had omitted the “ ‘reasonable probabili-ty’ ” language when reciting the Strickland prejudice standard. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8, n. 2; cf. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 694 (a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unpro-fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Even were there reason to set aside that “[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law,” Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 532, n. 4 (1997) (in-ternal quotation marks omitted), the trial court’s omission of the “reasonable probability” language would at most suggest that it held Andrusto (and found that Andrus had satisfied) a stricter standard of prejudice than that set forth in Strickland.
The Court clears this case off the docket, but it does so on a ground that is hard to take seriously. According to the Court, “[i]t is unclear whether the Court of Criminal Appeals considered Strickland prejudice at all.” Ante, at 17; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). But that reading is squarely contradicted by the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA), which said explicitly that Andrus failed to show prejudice:
“[Andrus] fails to meet his burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different, but for counsel’s deficient performance.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7–8 (emphasis added).
How, then, can the Court get around the unmistakable evidence that the CCA decided the issue of prejudice? It begins by expressing doubt about the meaning of the critical sentence reproduced above. According to the Court, that sentence “does not conclusively reveal whether [the CCA] determined . . . that Andrus had failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland’s second prong.” Ante, at 17. It is hard to write a more conclusive sentence than “[Andrus] fails to meet his burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to show by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different, but for counsel’s deficient performance.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7–8. Perhaps the Court thinks the CCA should have used CAPITAL LETTERS or bold type. Or maybe it should have added: “And we really mean it!!!”
The Court gives two reasons for doubting that the CCA reached the issue of prejudice, but both are patent makeweights. First, the Court notes that the CCA’s per curiam opinion, unlike the concurring opinion, did not provide reasons for finding that prejudice had not been shown. But the failure to explain is not the same as failure to decide. Today’s “tutelary remand” is a misuse of our supervisory authority and a waste of our and the CCA’s time. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 185 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Not only did the CCA clearly hold that Andrus failed to show prejudice, but there was strong support for that holding in the record. To establish prejudice, Andrus must show “a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood” that one of the jurors who unanimously agreed on his sentence would not have done so if his trial counsel had presented more mitigation evidence. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry focuses not just on the newly offered mitigation evidence, but on the likelihood that this evidence would have overcome the State’s aggravation evidence. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 955–956 (2010) (per curiam). While providing a lengthy (and one-sided) discussion of Andrus’s mitigation evidence, the Court never acknowledges the volume of evidence that Andrus is prone to brutal and senseless violence and presents a serious danger to those he encounters whether in or out of prison. Instead, the Court says as little as possible about Andrus’s violent record.
These senseless murders in October 2008 were not Andrus’s first crimes. In 2004, he was placed on probation for a drug offense, but just two weeks later, he committed an armed robbery. Andrus and two others followed a woman to her parents’ home, where they held her at gunpoint and took her purse and gym bag. The woman identified Andrus as the perpetrator who held the gun. Id., at 7.[1]
For this offense, Andrus was sent to a juvenile facility where he showed such “ ‘significant assaultive behavior’ toward other youths and staff ” that he was eventually transferred to an adult facility. App. to Pet. for Cert. 11.[2] Shortly after his release, he again violated his supervisory conditions and was returned to the adult facility. Ibid.
When he was released again, he committed an armed robbery of a dry-cleaning establishment. Around 7 a.m. one morning, he entered the business and chased the owner, Tuan Tran, to the back. He beat Tran and threatened him with a knife until Tran gave him money. Reh’g Op. 7–8. Andrus’s ex-girlfriend told the police that he confessed to this robbery. 8 Habeas Tr. 14.[3] In addition, Tran picked Andrus out of a photo array, 46 Tr. 66, 69–70,[4] and testified at trial that the robber was in the courtroom, id., at 59–60, but he was too afraid to point at Andrus, ibid. Less than two months after this crime, Andrus murdered Avelino Diaz and Kim-Phuong Vu Bui. App. to Pet. for Cert. 11.