Source: http://jmpattorney.blogspot.com/2016_11_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2017-03-24 00:03:58
Document Index: 55816621

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1027', '§ 1028', '§1027', '§1028', '§1027', '§1012', '§1027', '§1027', '§1028', '§1027', '§ 110', '§ 117', '§413', '§ 70', '§ 454', '§ 454']

"FCA §1027 provides that if, after a hearing, "the court finds that removal is necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child's life or health, it shall remove or continue the removal of the child." FCA § 1028, provides that, upon the application of a parent for the return of his or her child who has been removed from his or her care, and following a hearing, "the court shall grant the application unless it finds that the return presents an imminent risk to the child's life or health." In either case, the court must determine if the child's "life or health" would be at "imminent risk" of harm in the respondent's custody and, additionally, whether remaining in or returning to the home
would be contrary to the child's best interests (FCA§1027(a)(I); FCA§1028(b); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 NY3d 357, 377 [2004]).
"In order to justify a finding of imminent risk to life or health ...
an agency need not prove that the child has suffered actual injury. Rather, a court engages in a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether
the child's [physical or] emotional health is at risk" (Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 377).
In reaching its determination, the "court must weigh, in the factual setting before it, whether the imminent risk to the child can be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal; [i]t must balance [the
risk to the child's life or health] against the harm removal might bring; and it must determine factually which course is in the child's best interests" (id. at 378); see also Matter of DeAndre S. (Latoya F. S.), 92 AD3d 888
[2d Dept. 2012]). The language and legislative history of the statute establish that "a blanket presumption favoring removal was never intended" (Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 378; see also Matter of Jesse J. v. Joann K., 64 AD3d 598, 599
[2d Dept 2009]). The Legislature placed "increased emphasis on preventive services designed to maintain family relationships rather than responding to children and families in trouble only by removing the
child from the family" (Mark G. v Sabol, 93 NY2d 710, 719 [1999]; see also Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 374).
A mental illness that causes a parent to act in a way that presents an imminent risk to his or her child's life or health may support a removal of the child from the parent's care under FCA §1027, just as a finding of neglect under FCA §1012 may be predicated "upon proof that a child's physical, mental, or emotional condition was impaired or was placed in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of a parent's
mental illness" (see, e.g., Matter of Soma H., 306 AD2d 531[ 2d Dept 2003]). However, just as "proof of mental illness alone will not support a finding of neglect" (Matter of Joseph A. [Fausat O.], 91 AD3d 638, 640,
[2d Dept 2012]), neither will it support a removal of the child from the parent's care in the absence of evidence that the parent's illness creates an imminent risk to the child's life or health. As the Court of Appeals cautioned in Nicholson, "[t]he plain language of [FCA§1027] and the legislative history supporting it establish that a blanket presumption favoring removal was never intended. The court must do more than identify the existence of a risk of serious harm." (3 NY3d at 378
[emphasis in original]). There must be proof of an identifiable, specific, serious and imminent risk to the life or health of the child (see Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 377
[the court must engage "in a fact-intensive inquiry" to determine whether the child's life or health is at risk]) caused by the parent's mental illness. In determining whether removal is necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child's life or health, the statute also requires the court to consider "whether continuation in the child's home would be
contrary to the best interests of the child and where appropriate, whether reasonable efforts were made ... to prevent or eliminate the need for removal...." (FCA§1027(b)(ii)). In sum, if the court determines
that an imminent risk to the child's life or health exists, it "must weigh, in the factual setting before it, whether the ... risk to the child can be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal, ... balance that risk against the harm removal might bring, and ... determine factually which course is in the child's best interests" (Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 378; see also Matter of Baby Boy D. (Adanna C.), 127 AD3d 1079 [2d Dept. 2015]).The Court in Nicholson also stressed that "imminent" means "near or impending, not merely possible" (3 NY3d at 369; see also Baby Boy D., 127 AD3d at 1080 ("imminent" risk must be shown to justify removal).
As previously noted, a parent's mental illness, standing alone, is not a basis for a neglect finding (Matter of Joseph A., supra, 91 AD3d at 640). A fortiori,
it does not justify removal of a child from his parent's care in the absence of evidence that the child's life or health is in imminent risk of harm as a result of that illness (cf. Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 375 (exposure of a child to domestic violence is not presumptively neglectful, so "a fortiori,
[it] is not presumptively ground for removal, and in many instances removal may do more harm to the child than good"). Where no such imminent risk has been shown, a removed child must be returned to the parent (see, e.g., In the Matter of Jeremiah L., 45 AD3d 771 [2d Dept. 2007]; FCA§1028(a) ("court shall
grant the application [for return of a child], unless it finds that the
return presents an imminent risk to the child's life or health") [emphasis added]). ACS's speculative concern that Ms. S might have be hospitalized again for her mental illness cannot serve as a basis for a finding of "imminent risk" (see Baby Boy D., 127 AD3d at 1080
[speculation that the mother might not enforce an order of protection against the father could not support a finding of imminent risk to the child's life or health]), particularly when she has been consistent with
all aspects of her mental health treatment and has cooperated with the services that were put in place for her and Gavin.
As ACS failed to establish that Gavin's life or health were ever placed in imminent risk as a result of Ms. S's mental illness, ACS's application under FCA§1027 must be denied, and Gavin must be returned to
his mother....."
DIVORCE - VACATING A DEFAULT This can arise in various situations in a matrimonial matter e.g. failure to file an answer or a motion. The policy of the courts has been recently set forth in FLORESTAL v. COLEMAN-FLORESTAL, 2016 NY Slip Op 5789 - NY: Appellate Div., 2nd Dept. 2016:
" "While a party attempting to vacate a default must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious cause of
action, defense, or opposition to a motion, this Court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial matters because the State's interest in the marital res and related issues favors dispositions on the merits" (Backhaus v Backhaus, 128 AD3d 872, 872-873; see Alam v Alam, 123 AD3d 1066, 1067)."
HAPPY THANKSGIVING From the National Archives:
To end the confusion, Congress decided to set a fixed-date for the holiday. On October 6, 1941, the House passed a joint resolution declaring the last Thursday in November to be the legal Thanksgiving Day. The Senate, however, amended the resolution establishing the holiday as the fourth Thursday, which would take into account those years when November has five Thursdays. The House agreed to the amendment, and President Roosevelt signed the resolution on December 26,
1941, thus establishing the fourth Thursday in November as the Federal Thanksgiving Day holiday."
"A finding of civil contempt must be supported by four elements: (1) "a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate,
was in effect"; (2) "[i]t must appear, with reasonable certainty, that the order has been disobeyed"; (3) "the party to be held in contempt must have had knowledge of the court's order, although it is not necessary that the order actually have been served upon the party"; and (4) "prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation must be demonstrated" (Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 583, order amended
60 NY2d 652). The party seeking an order of contempt has the burden of establishing those four elements by clear and convincing evidence (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19, 29; Belkhir v Amrane-Belkhir, 128 AD3d 1382, 1382).
Here, we agree with defendant that plaintiff failed to establish by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that defendant had actual knowledge of the TRO at the time ........ (see Puro v Puro, 39 AD2d 873, 873, affd 33 NY2d 805).
We reject plaintiff's contention that defendant's actual knowledge of the TRO is not necessary here because she served the TRO upon defendant's attorney (see CPLR 2103 [b]). "Actual knowledge of a judgment or order is an indispensable element of a contempt proceeding" (Orchard Park Cent. Sch. Dist. v Orchard Park Teachers Assn., 50 AD2d 462, 468, appeal dismissed 38 NY2d 911; see Matter of Howell v Lovell, 103 AD3d 1229, 1230),
and the record establishes that defendant did not receive the TRO before ........"
"Pursuant to DRL § 110 and DRL § 117(1)(a), adoptive parents are liable for support of their adopted children and the natural parents are relieved of all responsibility for support. See also, Harvey-Cook v. Neill, 118 AD2d 109, 504 N.Y.S.2d 434 (2d Dep't 1986).
The Family Court Act sets forth the "fundamental public policy in New York" that parents of minor children are responsible for their children's support until age twenty-one. See, FCA §413 (1) (a). In the instant case, Petitioner is the adoptive son and Respondent is the adoptive mother. Respondent, as the adoptive mother, is legally responsible to support Petitioner until he turns twenty-one years old."
My father. Posted by
There is "no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent" (Domestic Relations Law §§ 70[a]; 240[1][a]; see Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89, 93; Matter of Riccio v Riccio, 21 AD3d 1107). The essential consideration in making an award of custody is the best interests of the children (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171; Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89; Matter of McIver-Heyward v Heyward, 25 AD3d 556), which are determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances (see Matter of Garcia v Fountain, 82 AD3d 979, 980).
In making a determination as to what custody arrangement is in the children's best interests, the court should consider the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides
for the children, the ability of each parent to provide for the children's emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the children, the relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to
one parent might have on the children's relationship with the other parent (see Matter of Hutchinson v Johnson, 134 AD3d 1115, 1116; Mohen v Mohen, 53 AD3d 471, 472-473; Miller v Pipia, 297 AD2d 362, 364 ). The court should also consider the children's wishes, weighed in light of their ages and maturity (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 173; Matter of Langlaise v Sookhan, 48 AD3d 685, 686).
"As a custody determination depends to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, the findings of the Family Court will not be disturbed unless
they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Tercjak v Tercjak, 49 AD3d 772, 772; see Matter of Gilmartin v Abbas, 60 AD3d 1058).
Today at Nassau County Bar Association. I will be one of the volunteer attorneys. Posted by
The law is statutory and can be found in the New York Election Law: "ARTICLE 17 VIOLATIONS OF THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE
Sec. 17-130. Misdemeanor in relation to elections
..... 10. Shows his ballot after it is prepared for voting, to any person so as to reveal the contents, or solicits a voter to show the same; or,
The mother commenced this proceeding against the father, alleging that he was in willful violation of a child support order dated June 30,
2006. Following a hearing, the Support Magistrate found that the father
was in willful violation of the order of support and issued an order of
disposition recommending that the court consider a period of incarceration. The Family Court, in effect, confirmed the Support Magistrate's findings of fact, granted the mother's petition, and issued
an order of commitment, committing the father to the custody of the Nassau County Correctional Facility for a period of six months unless he
paid the purge amount of $112,342.80. The father appeals.
Under Family Court Act § 454(3)(a), which relates to "willful" failures to obey support orders, a "`failure to pay support as ordered itself constitutes prima facie evidence of a willful violation'" (Matter of Dezil v Garlick, 136 AD3d at 905, quoting Matter of Powers v Powers, 86 NY2d 63, 69; see
Family Ct Act § 454[3][a]). This means that "`proof that respondent has
failed to pay support as ordered alone establishes petitioner's direct case of willful violation, shifting to respondent the burden of going forward'" (Matter of Dezil v Garlick, 136 AD3d at 905, quoting Matter of Powers v Powers, 86 NY2d at 69).
Here, the mother presented proof that the father failed to pay child support as ordered (see Matter of Saintime v Saint Surin, 40 AD3d 1103).
The burden of going forward then shifted to the father to offer competent, credible evidence of his inability to make the required payments (see Matter of Powers v Powers, 86 NY2d at 69; Matter of Dezil v Garlick, 136 AD3d at 905).
The father failed to sustain his burden. The Support Magistrate found the father to be less than credible. Even assuming the truth of the father's contention that he had been unemployed in his chosen field since he lost his license to trade stocks and that he could not perform physical labor due to his heart condition, he failed to present any evidence that he had made a reasonable and diligent effort to secure employment. Thus, the father failed to meet his burden of presenting competent, credible evidence that he was unable to make payments as directed (see Matter of Dezil v Garlick, 136 AD3d at 905; Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. v Henry, 136 AD3d 639; Matter of Girasek-Brick v Girasek, 127 AD3d 861; cf. Matter of Westchester County Commr. of Social Servs. v Perez, 71 AD3d 906).
Moreover, the father did not regularly pay child support between 2001, when the first order directing that he pay child support was entered, and 2014, when the hearing was held on the mother's petition. The father
failed to provide proof that he applied for and was denied Social Security disability benefits even though directed to do so by the Support Magistrate. In addition, the Support Magistrate properly found that the father lacked credibility in his testimony that he had no income or assets from other sources.