Source: http://www.gao.gov/products/D12646
Timestamp: 2017-10-18 11:23:48
Document Index: 202751243

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 9', 'art 9', '§ 9', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 3554']

U.S. GAO - ASM Research
The RTEP, issued to contract holders under the Transformational Twenty-One Total Technology (T4) multiple-award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contract program, provided for the issuance of a fixed-price task order, with a 12‑month base period and two 12-month option periods, for Mobile Infrastructure Services (MIS).[1] The task order was to be issued to the offeror whose proposal represented the best value to the government considering three evaluation factors: technical, past performance, and price.
The agency is seeking to provide services to veterans through the use of medical mobile devices, and towards that end is arranging for the development and delivery of mobile applications (app).[2] Contracting Officer’s Statement of Facts (COSF) at 2. As part of this effort, VA’s Office of Information and Technology partnered with VA’s Connected Health Office (CHO) to establish VA’s MIS platform. The overall goal of the VA MIS effort is to further the development, production implementation, and use of web hosted and mobile apps, both internally to VA clinicians, and externally directly to veterans. See MIS Performance Work Statement (PWS) § 1.0, Background. The MIS platform currently hosts the following four enclaves: the Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) platform for managing the mobile devices that are provided to home-bound veterans, field clinicians, nurses, and physicians, and utilized by VA staff; the Mobile Application Environment (MAE) for web and mobile app development; the VA Mobile Framework, which is the production environment for web and mobile apps; and the External Cloud Environment (ECE), which operates outside of VA for mobile app demonstrations and software development without the need for connectivity to VA’s network. The MAE enclave is the focus of this protest.
ASM asserts that Booz Allen has an impaired objectivity OCI, where the PWS for the MIS task order here would require Booz Allen to monitor its own performance under two task orders‑‑the Software Quality Assurance and Certification Support (SQA) task order, and the Independent Verification and Validation (V&V) task order ‑‑previously awarded to Booz Allen in May 2015 (SQA) and July 2015 (V&V).[4] Protest at 6-7. In this regard, as a general matter, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires that contracting officers avoid, neutralize or mitigate potential significant OCIs. FAR § 9.504(a).
An impaired objectivity OCI, as addressed in FAR subpart 9.5 and the decisions of our Office, arises where a firm’s ability to render impartial advice to the government would be undermined by the firm’s competing interests. FAR § 9.505(a); Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., B‑406958.3, B-406958.4, Jan. 8, 2013, 2013 CPD ¶ 23 at 5‑6. The concern in such impaired objectivity situations is that a firm’s ability to render impartial advice to the government will be undermined by its relationship to the product or service being evaluated. PURVIS Sys., Inc., B‑293807.3, B‑293807.4, Aug. 16, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 177 at 7.
VA and the protester also disagree on whether Booz Allen under its other task orders has a significant role in the app review process. While the agency again suggests that Booz Allen will have only a limited support and management role, Agency Report (AR) at 14, the SQA PWS supports the protester’s assertion that Booz Allen, at least insofar as it serves as the SQA contractor, will play a not insignificant role in the app review process.
In this regard, the contracting officer acknowledges that other task orders performed by Booz Allen require testing of mobile applications during the course of their development and launch. Specifically, the contracting officer notes that the SQA PWS provides that software quality assurance testing “is performed to verify [that] the mobile application will meet compliance gate reviews such as end to end, functional, information assurance, regression, and integrated performance and load tests.” COSF at 7, citing SQA PWS § 3.0. The contracting officer further notes that “[e]nd to end testing under the SQA [task order] involved ensuring that all components of a mobile application are both working together and functioning correctly as a unit.” Id. at 8. The contracting officer also notes that “[i]ntegrated performance and load testing under the SQA task order will involve testing break level and load degradation levels of the mobile applications.” Id. at 9. Likewise, notes the contracting officer,
The agency, however, seeks to minimize the role played by Booz Allen as the SQA contractor in the above tests by asserting that the SQA tests are “managed” by VA’s Connected Health Office (CHO), COSF at 7, and that an Operational Readiness Review “is not actually required under the SQA task order.” Supplemental AR at 11 (emphasis in the original).
The terms of the SQA PWS do not support the agency’s narrow interpretation of the SQA contractor’s role in testing apps. In this regard, the SQA PWS provides that “[t]he Contractor shall provide all support services, products, materials, and incidentals necessary to accomplish the tasks and associated deliverables.” SQA PWS § 3.0. The PWS further provides that: “The Contractor shall provide and execute testing services defined in Table 1 - Testing Activities to support the continued development, enhancement, and deployment of applications within the Agile development methodology.” SQA PWS § 5.2. Among the “testing services” listed in Table 1 of the SQA PWS which the SQA contractor, Booz Allen, is required under the PWS to “provide and execute,” are such testing activities as “End to End” testing:
Further, ASM has provided several examples of potential situations in which Booz Allen’s judgement could be impaired as a result of its responsibilities under the two task orders. For example, ASM asserts that as additional functionality is developed and introduced into an application’s source code, the MIS infrastructure may be required to provide additional processing power, memory, and/or storage capacity to support the change. If the MIS contractor fails to provide sufficient resources at runtime, the application likely will fail. Protester’s Comments, Dec. 2, at 21-22. Booz Allen as the SQA contractor in this circumstance would be left with the choice of assigning responsibility for the app’s failure to perform as anticipated to itself as the MIS infrastructure contractor, or to the third party app developer. Such a potential conflict in roles raises the impaired objectivity concerns which the OCI rules are intended to mitigate or avoid.
In sum, the agency’s OCI analysis was premised on a view of Booz Allen’s responsibilities under the MIS and SQA contracts which appears inconsistent with, and unduly limited relative to, the terms of the PWS for each task order.[6] Further, the record indicates that given the extensive responsibilities Booz Allen would have under these task orders, and in particular the extent to which these responsibilities would affect and impact VA’s effort to develop and deploy apps to meet the health care needs of veterans, there were “hard facts” indicating the existence or potential existence of an impaired objectivity conflict of interest. Given the serious shortcomings in the agency’s OCI analysis, we have no basis to conclude that the agency meaningfully considered this potential OCI created by Booz Allen’s dual roles as the MIS contractor and the SQA contractor.[7]
[5] The VA’s emphasis on the “support” nature of the SQA contractor’s responsibilities not only appears inconsistent with the terms of the SQA PWS, but also fails to recognize the potential for an OCI even with respect to support activities. In this regard, we have previously recognized that where a contractor subjectively evaluates its own work and is expected to offer its input to the agency, the contractor has an OCI, even where the agency asserts that it is not relying solely on the contractor’s input, and where the government retains the ultimate decision-making authority. See Nortel Gov’t Solutions, Inc., B-299522.5; B‑299522.6, Dec. 30, 2008, 2009 CPD ¶ 10 at 6.
[6] Given our conclusions above as to the potential impaired objectivity OCI resulting from Booz Allen’s dual roles as the MIS and as the SQA contractor, we need not consider ASM’s arguments regarding the potential conflict resulting from Booz Allen’s role as the Verification and Validation (V&V) contractor.
[7] In a recent, December 10 submission, VA for the first time argues that, even if Booz Allen has an impaired objectivity OCI as a result of receiving the MIS task order, ASM would have a comparable OCI if awarded the MIS contract because of ASM having been awarded two task orders--the Scheduling Enhancements task order, VA118-1011-0039, and the Annie II and Provider to Provider Messaging Development (Annie Phase II) task order, 4VA118-1011-004--for the further development and enhancement of several specific mobile health applications. According to the agency, since these task orders include requirements for ASM as the contractor to test its improvements to the apps, ASM would also have an impaired objectivity OCI should it receive the MIS task order. Agency Comments, Dec. 10, 2015, at 2-7. We do not agree that the testing requirements under these task orders would present the same type of concerns as associated with the requirement under Booz Allen’s SQA task order to test third party apps. In the situation the VA describes, ASM will both develop mobile apps, and--if successful here--provide the operation and maintenance support for the VA’s cloud enclaves. Serving in both capacities provides no immediately discernable interest in favoring one over the other. Nonetheless, given the recommendation below to evaluate and document any conflict for Booz Allen, the agency may also want to investigate more fully whether ASM has a conflict, and, if so, consider how any such conflict should be addressed.
[8] In fashioning a recommendation to remedy the flaws in the VA’s consideration of the potential OCI here, we note that the agency overrode the stay applicable to the procurement on the basis that moving forward with performance of this contract was in the best interests of the United States. In such circumstances, the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 requires our Office to make our recommendation without regard to any cost or disruption from terminating, recompeting, or reawarding the contract. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(2).