Source: http://the1709blog.blogspot.de/2016/09/
Timestamp: 2017-06-24 22:37:22
Document Index: 607518272

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§49', '§31', '§51', '§40']

Matthew Fulks, an independent filmmaker, had filed a
copyright infringement suit against Beyoncé on June 8, 2016, claiming that the trailer (the Trailer) for
her “Lemonade” movie (the Movie),
which accompanied the April 2016 release of her Lemonade album, infringed on his copyright in the short movie Palinoia. Fulks created the seven-minute Palinoia movie in 2014, which the Seconded Amended Complaint (SAC)
describes as “carefully selected but seemingly unrelated visuals in a rapid
montage, with the recitation of a poem used as voiceover against a distinctive
audio soundtrack.” The short movie “depict[s] the pain of a tumultuous
relationship.” On September 12, 2016, Judge Rakoff from the Southern
District of New York (SDNY) granted Beyoncé’s motion to dismiss, writing a thoughtful
and entertaining opinion, where Voltaire, Oscar Wilde, the Beatles, Tchaikovsky,
Andy Warhol and Taylor Swift all made an appearance. The case is Matthew Fulks
v. Beyoncé Giselle Carter-Knowles, Sony Music Entertainment and al.,
1:16-cv-04278-JSR. Judge Rakoff's Opinion is Hot Stuff
If there is no direct evidence of copying, then plaintiff in
a copyright infringement suit must prove that the defendant had access to the
protected work and that there are substantial similarities of protectable
material in the two works.
Plaintiff claimed that Defendants had access to his movie,
as Plaintiff had submitted Palinoia
to Defendant Sony/Columbia in July 2015, as part of an application for a
directing job, and its receipt was acknowledged by email. Defendants did not
Plaintiff further alleged in the SAC that the Lemonade Trailer was substantially
similar to Palinoia, including, but
not limited to its “visual and auditory elements, visual and auditory
sequences, themes, format, mood, setting, plot, and pace, all of which create a
protectable total concept and feel” and that it was an unauthorized derivative
work. Judge Rakoff quoted the Second Circuit Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc. case,
which defined substantially similar works as works which an "ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to
overlook them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal as the same,” and the Second
Circuit Peter F. Gaito Architecture case, which explained that the courts
apply the substantial similarity test by "compar[ing] the contested
design's total concept and overall feel with that of the allegedly infringed
work… as instructed by our good eyes and common sense." No Substantial
Similarity in the Visual Elements Plaintiff alleged that the Trailer contained nine visual
elements substantially similar to Palinoia’s
visual elements. These elements are (1) a head down near a graffiti wall; (2)
red persons with eyes obscured; (3) parking garage; (4) stairwell; (5) black
and white eyes; (6) title cards screen; (7) grass scene; (8) feet on street;
and (9) side-lit ominous figures. The SAC has side-to-side screenshots from
both works illustrating the allegations. Judge Rakoff engaged in an analysis of these nine elements,
but was not convinced that the Trailer infringed Palinoia. Instead, “[o]nce stripped of unprotected elements and
scenes a faire, these scenes from Palinoia and the Trailer and Film have very
little in common.”
Not the Same Aesthetic
Feel Judge Rakoff was not convinced as “Plaintiff's alleged
similarities consist almost entirely of clearly defined ideas not original to
plaintiff and of stock elements with which even a casual observer would be
familiar. Moreover, to the very limited extent that there are even any
superficial similarities, these are overwhelmed by the works' vastly different
creative choices and overall aesthetic feel.” Judge Rakoff quoted the SDNY LaChapelle
v. Fenty case, where the court explained that “[o]riginality in
rendition may reside in the photographer's selection of lighting, shade, lens,
angle, depth of field, composition, and other choices that have an aesthetic effect
on the final work." In other words, you can have the idea of filming a
parking garage, a grass scene or a distressed person heads down near a graffiti
wall, but it is the expression of this idea which is protected, not the idea
itself. As both works had been expressed in different ways, there were not
similar. For example, as explained by Judge Rakoff, when analyzing
the first visual element claimed as original by plaintiff, a person seen head
down near a graffiti wall, the concept of a "state of distress" is an
unprotected idea, and it “flows naturally and necessarily that a distressed
character would be leaning (as opposed to dancing) against something stable (as
opposed to delicate) and that his or her head would be down (as opposed to up.)”
Instead, what was essential as to whether there was infringement is the
comparison of the way the two scenes were filmed. Because the scenes were aesthetically
different, there was no infringement.
Judge Rakoff analyzed all the nine visual elements in turn,
and found that none of them had the same aesthetic than the Trailer. Therefore,
he found them not similar with the Lemonade
Trailer scenes.
Similarity in the Auditory Elements Plaintiff also alleged in his SAC that both works included
“the voiceover of a narrator reciting poetry over the sounds in the background”
and that the audio sequences of both works were substantially similar, as they
both followed “a similar pattern in which harsh noises are separated by calmer
sounds in a substantially similar time table” and both included “crescendos and
decrescendos.”
But for Judge Rakoff, “no reasonable jury, properly instructed,
could find infringement based on plaintiff's… alleged similarities… [in] the
works' audio… The idea of juxtaposing poetry and disharmonious sound is not
protectable.” Plaintiff must prove instead that the way he expressed this idea,
such as his choice of poetry and sound, has been copied. However, Plaintiff did
not prove this in this case. Not the Same Total Concept
and Overall Feel For Plaintiff, the mood, setting, pace, and themes of both
works were substantially similar which contributed “to the overwhelming
similarity of total concept and feel.” Both moods were “heavy, dark, and
angst-laden.’” Both settings included similar environments, such as an empty
dark parking garage, grass field, and a stairwell. The pace of both works was
“a rapid procession of short scenes or montage, interspersed with notable
intermittent pauses through exaggeratedly slow scenes.” Also, both works had
different themes “destruction, alienation, heartbreak, and chaos versus order.”
But Judge Rakoff noted, somewhat ironically, that: “[a]pparently intent on exploring
the boundary between idea and expression, plaintiff alleges that the works
share the same narrative theme ("a struggle of a relationship") and
the same aesthetic mood and pace ("a pattern of successive montage of
abstract scenes, with unknown or unclear meanings, pieced together in 'short
takes'"). These alleged similarities fall firmly on the side of unprotected
ideas. The "struggle of a relationship" is a concept familiar to us
all, and plaintiff is not the first individual - or artist - to comment on it.
See, e.g., R. Hart-Davis, The Letters of Oscar Wilde 621 (1962) ("[H]earts
are made to be broken"); Taylor Swift, "I Knew You Were
Trouble"(2012).”
Plaintiff argued that the "race of the characters in
the [Film] is irrelevant to the total concept and feel of a film about relationships.…
Judge Rakoff wrote that the Lemonade Movie
is not just about relationships, but instead:
“depicts the protagonist's journey
from a particular perspective: that of an African-American woman in a
predominantly African-American community… The Film repeatedly references and dramatizes
Black woman is the most "neglected" person in America…. This all
takes place against what defendants accurately characterize as a "Southern
Gothic feel."… The settings transition between areas of New Orleans, the
abandoned Fort Macomb, and an Antebellum plantation. These significant
differences in characters, mood, and setting further distinguish the total
concept and feel in the [Lemonade] Film
from that in Palinoia.”
Plaintiff also argued that both works "portray a struggle
of a relationship; the reasons for such struggle are unclear and
irrelevant." But for Judge Rakoff, “[t]his is like saying that Casablanca,
Sleepless in Seattle, and Ghostbusters are substantially similar despite the
different motivating forces behind the struggles there portrayed (Nazis,
capitalism, and ghosts, respectively).”
Judge Rakoff remarked “that the differences in total concept
and feel are initially more pronounced between Palinoia and the [Lemonade]
Film than between Palinoia and the [Lemonade] Trailer” but that “the
difference in overall concept and feel between Palinoia and the [Lemonade]
Trailer still overwhelms any superficial similarities.”
I was surprised to read that Plaintiff claimed that the Trailer
for the Lemonade Movie had infringed
his own short movie, as it was meant to be a teaser announcement for both the Movie
and the Lemonade album. As noted by
Judge Rakoff, the Lemonade Movie “marks
the protagonist's progression through thematic headings, and narrates it with
songs from the Lemonade album.” The Trailer
shows scenes of the 58-minute Lemonade
Movie, which itself follows the sequence of the Lemonade album, which itself narrates a story, from one song to
another. There are several layers of creation behind the trailer, the
originality of which stems from both the originality of the Lemonade Movie and the Lemonade album. The hurdles of proving substantial
similarities between the trailer, a derivative work of an original work featuring
another original work, and the short film, an original work in itself, was
therefore very high. Image of hot sauce is courtesy of Flicker user Joe King under a CC BY 2.0 license.
So you thought copyright law for libraries was the same across the world. It isn’t! There’s a patchwork quilt of differing interpretations and applicable rights and exceptions, and this applies even within the EU!. Dr Kenneth Crews, on behalf of WIPO, has compiled a Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives that brings together information that relates to the activities of libraries and archives from 188 countries. The study shows that whilst some 66 countries have amended or updated their copyright laws in the past 6 years, many countries still have no provision for library activity within their domestic law! Nearly half do not even explicitly allow libraries to make copies for research or study. As for adapting to the fast paced changes driven by the internet and digital activities some countries are incredibly slow to make their laws fit for purpose. Teresa Hackett, writing a CILIP blog about this also points the reader to a EIFL Core Library Exceptions Checklist which is based on the findings and provides a way to assess what you think about your laws (and perhaps identify areas where you need to find more information) in relation to library activity. It’s described as ‘a practical and, we hope, a fun way to help librarians’ and those interested in this area. Image by Marcus Hansson. In its much awaited judgment in the Delhi University photocopying case (The Chancellor Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services), the Delhi High Court has dismissed the copyright infringement claim initiated in August 2012 by three publishers (Oxford, Cambridge and Taylor & Francis) against a photocopy shop located in the premises of Delhi University. The publishers argued that the creation of course packs and the photocopying of academic material amounted to an infringement of the exclusive copyright of the authors and publishers, the defendants argued that the reproduction of materials for educational purposes fell within the exceptions to copyright under Section 52(1)(i) of the Indian Copyright Act - and prevailed with the court noting changes in both technology and student approaches to studying, and saying: "Copyright, specially in literary works, is thus not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public. Copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors in order to benefit the public." An excellent report fro Lawrence Liang on Hindu,com here and comment on Forbes here and TechDirt here who add that the court also noted the hypocrisy of lawyers who regularly photocopy things "now complaining about students doing the same". Image courtesy of Solomon203.
Cheering for a much-anticipated Supreme Court opinion on conceptual separatibility The Supreme Court of the United States will hear next month
the arguments of both parties in the Star
Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. case, which is closely monitored by
copyright attorneys, but also by fashion designers, as its outcome may help, or
hinder, their ability to protect their designs. The case is about cheerleading uniforms, which the two
parties, Star Athletica and Varsity both manufacture and sell. Varsity alleged
that Star Athletica had copied some of its designs and sued its competitor for
copyright infringement. The District Court held
in favor of Star Athletica, finding Varsity's designs not copyrightable because
their graphic elements were not physically or conceptually separable from the
utilitarian function of a cheerleading uniform. For the court, the colors,
stripes, and chevrons featured on the designs are usually associated with
cheerleading uniforms. Therefore, they are what makes the uniforms recognizable
as a cheerleading uniforms. Hold on… Conceptual
separatibility? What is it? A “useful article” is not protected by U.S. copyright, 17
U.S.C. § 101. Clothes are useful articles, and therefore, are not protected by
copyright. However, a useful article may be protected if it “incorporates pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article,” 17
U.S.C. § 101. If a particular feature of a useful article is physically
separatable, or “conceptually separable” from its utilitarian aspect, then it
While physical separatability is easily understandable (see Copyright
Office Compendium 924.2[A]), conceptual separability is not easily defined.
Federal courts have each their own “conceptual separatibility” test. In our case, the Sixth Circuit reversed
and created its own five-part conceptual separability test to reach the
conclusion that the designs created by Varsity to adorn the uniforms were
conceptually separable from its utilitarian function. The Sixth Circuit test
asks five questions: (1) is the design is a pictorial, graphic or sculptural
work, (2) is the design a useful article, (3) what are the utilitarian aspects
of the useful article, (4) can the viewer of the design identify the pictorial,
graphic or sculptural features separately from the utilitarian aspects of the
useful article, and (5) whether the design features exist independently of the
utilitarian aspects of the useful article. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
designs of the uniform are “wholly
unnecessary to the performance of the garment’s ability to cover the body,
permit free movement and wick moisture” and thus the graphic features of
Varsity's cheerleading-uniform designs exists independently from this
utilitarian aspect. Judge McKeague dissented. While agreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s
general approach of first defining what is the function of the work, then
finding out whether the elements claimed as being copyrightable can be
identified separately from that function, or can exist independently of it,
Judge McKeague disagreed on in what is the function of the cheearleading
uniforms. For Judge McKeague, the function of a cheerleading uniform is to
identify its wearer as a member of a group, and thus its design is indeed
functional. Star Athletica filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in
January 2016, which was granted by the Supreme Court. The Court will now answer
this question: “What is the appropriate test to determine when a feature of a
useful article is protectable under § 101 of the Copyright Act?” (This page
of the SCOTUS blog lists all the
briefs filed in this case, including amicus curiae briefs.) Respondent Varsity has filed its brief
on September 14. It argues that two-dimensional artwork on useful articles
“easily satisfy” the separability test (p.26). For Varsity, the functions of
two-dimensional artwork are “purely decorative or communicative, not
utilitarian, which makes such artwork inherently separatable from [the
utilitarian aspects of a useful article]” (p.26). The Supreme Court now has the opportunity to unify the
conceptual-separability test. It will probably specify the instances when a
particular garment can indeed be protected by copyright. We will keep you
posted. Posted by
conceptual separatibility,
Last week's GS Media decision [here, here, here] has generated a lot of interest, and
raised a number of issues.
The 1709 Blog is delighted to host a guest contribution by Kristof Neefs (Altius)
on a specific point of the judgment, ie the profit-making nature of the
communication at hand.
"In GS Media (C-160/15), the EU Court
of Justice held that hyperlinking to content placed online elsewhere is a
communication to the public of that content if the hyperlinker had (or should
have had) knowledge that the content was posted online without the consent of
the copyright holder (§49). In my opinion – and I believe this is uncontroversial – Directive 2001/29 provides no verbatim basis
for this subjective criterion. It is therefore up for debate whether it was
within the Court’s discretion to introduce this subjective criterion in the EU
copyright acquis. In the United States, the late Justice
Scalia would probably have said no. A legalist tradition opposes judicial
law-making. In contrast, judge Posner argues for pragmatism in How Judges Think (2008). This
leaves more room for a law-making court. In any case, the judgment is out and
According to the judgment, the Court had freedom of expression and
information in mind with its ruling (§31). By requiring knowledge of the
illegal nature of the content referred to, internet users linking to it in good
faith are meant to be protected. To balance things out, however, the Court also
held in §51 that knowledge that the content the link refers to is illegal must
be presumed iuris tantum (i.e. until rebutted) if the posting
of hyperlinks “is carried out for profit”:
“Furthermore, when
the posting of hyperlinks is carried out for profit, it can be expected that
the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary checks to ensure
that the work concerned is not illegally published on the website to which
those hyperlinks lead, so that it must be presumed that that posting has
occurred with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and the
possible lack of consent to publication on the internet by the copyright
holder. In such circumstances, and in so far as that rebuttable presumption is
not rebutted, the act of posting a hyperlink to a work which was illegally
placed on the internet constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within the
meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.”
This presumption provides copyright holders with the benefit of doubt
when the hyperlink is posted for financial gain. In those cases, it will be up
to the hyperlinker to provide evidence that he or she did not know (or should
have known) that the content was initially posted online without the consent of
the copyright holder. The Court has, however, not elaborated on the criterion of profit and
financial gain. In particular, it does not seem to consider online advertising.
A great deal of blogs and websites feature per-click or per-impression advertisements
to ‘monetize’ content on their blog or website. Monetize is a big word here,
because in reality the income generated by these ads is just enough to cover
the costs of running the blog. Do such advertisements then automatically imply
that any hyperlink on the website is posted for financial gain?
I predict that this is an argument that may be run by some copyright
holders, because it relieves them of the burden of proof. Some EU courts may
accept this argument, especially if those copyright holders are clever in the
selection of cases they will initially pursue. I also predict that the blogger
who uses web advertising to finance the costs to keep a blog online (and even
those that make a small profit out of it) may not have the means to escalate
his or her case to the Court of Justice to obtain clarity over the criterion of
“financial gain” in GS Media. That is, unless a web advertisement
service operator with deep pockets would decide to lend a helping hand.
In GS Media, the Court has provided us with the means
to create flowcharts or tables to determine whether a hyperlink is a copyright infringement.
However, it seems that the Court has provided an answer that raises a new
question: what is the meaning of the “pursuit of financial gain” in
the internet context? Perhaps the phrase “commercial activity with a view to
economic advantage and not as a private matter” from the Court’s
judgment in Arsenal / Reed (C-206/01, §40), a trade mark case,
could be helpful. Another, somewhat more vague means of
interpretation could be the Recital 14 in the preamble to the Enforcement Directive 2004/48, defining acts
carried out on a commercial scale as those “carried out for direct
or indirect economic or commercial advantage; this would normally exclude acts
carried out by end consumers acting in good faith.”
If the “pursuit of financial gain” is interpreted more
broadly to cover all websites that somehow benefit financially
from online advertising, I believe the Court may have missed the mark in its
attempt to balance freedom of expression and the interests of copyright
holders." Posted by
PRS for Music has championed the case for copyright reform to address the ‘transfer of value’ resulting from the ambiguity in the current legal framework. This ambiguity is enabling some online platforms, specifically user upload services, to generate vast revenues without fairly remunerating the creators, upon whose works their services depend. And its good news for songwriters and publishers - Recital 38 of the actual proposal requires any hosting providers that give access to large amounts of copyright works to "take appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure protection of works or other subject-matter, such as implementing effective technologies. This obligation should also apply when the information society service providers are eligible for the liability exemption provided in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC." In response to today’s publications, PRS for Music Chief Executive, Robert Ashcroft, said: “PRS for Music welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the critical ‘transfer of value’ issue and we acknowledge the clear intention to redress the current imbalance of interests between user upload platforms and rightsholders. The law must clearly establish that those user upload platforms that provide search and other functionality, as distinct from being mere hosts of content, require a license from rightsholders. The European Commission’s proposed new copyright Directive provides the framework for this essential legal clarity.” Robert Ashcroft added, “Europe is our largest export market and, even outside of the European Union, its copyright framework will directly impact UK creator’s earnings. Therefore, we hope that the EU Parliament and Council will grasp this opportunity to establish a functioning, digital single market - as this is in the interests of all concerned: creators, consumers and platforms, new and established.”
In relation to the new press publishers' right [Article 11], while the version leaked a few days ago spoke of 'news publications', the actual proposal prefers the apparently broader term 'press publications'. http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-593-EN-F1-1.PDF
EU copyright event