Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97698/davies-warehouse-co-vs-bowles
Timestamp: 2018-05-26 12:22:39
Document Index: 503327333

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 302', '§ 302', '§ 2', '§ 50', '§ 19', '§ 32', '§ 29', 'art, 317']

Davies Warehouse Co Vs Bowles - Citation 97698 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Davies Warehouse Co. Vs. Bowles - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97698
Case Number 321 U.S. 144
Appellant Davies Warehouse Co.
davies warehouse co. v. bowles - 321 u.s. 144 (1944) u.s. supreme court davies warehouse co. v. bowles, 321 u.s. 144 (1944) davies warehouse co. v. bowles no. 112 argued november 18, 1943 decided january 31, 1944 321 u.s. 144 certiorari to the united states emergency court of appeals syllabus a public warehouse in california, the business of which is declared by the constitution of the state to be that of a public utility and which is subject to comprehensive regulation (including the fixing of rates and charge) under the public utilities act of the state, held a "public utility" within the meaning of the proviso of § 302(c) of the federal emergency price control act, and thereby exempt from regulation under that act......
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles - 321 U.S. 144 (1944)
U.S. Supreme Court Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944)
A public warehouse in California, the business of which is declared by the Constitution of the State to be that of a public utility and which is subject to comprehensive regulation (including the fixing of rates and charge) under the Public Utilities Act of the State, held a "public utility" within the meaning of the proviso of § 302(c) of the federal Emergency Price Control Act, and thereby exempt from regulation under that Act. Pp. 321 U. S. 152 , 321 U. S. 156 .
California [ Footnote 1 ] and its Public Utilities Act. [ Footnote 2 ] The Act subjects to regulation by the Railroad Commission all warehouses which serve the public generally for compensation. § 2 1/2. New warehouses may be established only after obtaining certificates of public convenience and necessity, which the Commission may refuse or condition and may suspend or revoke at any time for cause. § 50 1/2. Petitioner must grant nondiscriminatory and equal rates to everyone, and it may not alter any existing rate or charge without permission. §§ 19, 15. The Commission, upon its own motion or upon complaint, may determine "the just, reasonable or sufficient rates" and fix the same by order. § 32. Petitioner is required to make periodic reports, and is subject to numerous restrictions and disabilities. §§ 29, 51, 52, 75, 76 et al.
In the meantime, the United States Price Administrator, acting under the Emergency Price Control Act, [ Footnote 3 ] on April 28, 1942, issued a General Maximum Price Regulation. The effect of the federal regulation and later amendments would have been to prohibit petitioner after July 1, 1942, from charging the rate authorized by the California Railroad Commission.
This federal Act provides that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the regulation of . . . (2) rates charged by any common carrier or other public utility." [ Footnote 4 ]
Petitioner, asserting itself to be within this exemption, made timely protest to the Price Administrator, which was denied. It then filed a complaint with the United States Emergency Court of Appeals, on which the Act confers exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the validity of regulations, [ Footnote 5 ] asking it to set aside the General Maximum Price Regulations insofar as they purport to regulate its charges. The Emergency Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, 137 F.2d 201, 209. Importance of the construction of the Act to its administration led us to grant certiorari.
The Emergency Court of Appeals weighed the conflicting factors in thorough opinions and divided as to result. [ Footnote 6 ] Judges Maris and Magruder gave little weight to the existence of actual regulation, and held the phrase to comprehend enterprises of the general utility type, among which they thought this warehouse had no place. They held that the federal price regulation superseded that of the state, but said, "[t]his is one of those unfortunate cases where doubts would remain whichever way the case was decided" -- a reservation we share. Chief Judge Vinson declared that this public warehouse possesses the basic indicia of a public utility, and in addition has its rates fixed by an agency of the state, and, under these circumstances, must be considered a public utility within the meaning of the Act. He thought the state regulation should prevail over that of the Federal Price Administrator.
In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 , 94 U. S. 152 , this Court recognized that the business of public warehousing is "affected with a public interest," and that its regulation by the state is appropriate and constitutionally permissible. Cf. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517 , 143 U. S. 544 . Twenty-one states regulate warehouses in some respects. [ Footnote 7 ] Three states include warehouses in their statutory definition of
public utilities, [ Footnote 8 ] and eight include limited types of warehouses. [ Footnote 9 ] Forty-seven states have adopted the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, which gives warehouse receipts legal standing somewhat similar to that of a common carrier's bill of lading. [ Footnote 10 ]
We cannot, therefore, assume that Congress was unaware that a general statutory reference to "public utilities" might well be taken at least in some states to comprehend public warehouses. But Congress did not see fit to employ that precision of definition which it has used when it desired to make sure that its classification of public utilities for federal purposes would depend upon the nature of their activities uninfluenced by any state policy. [ Footnote 11 ] Legislative history is ambiguous, and in no instance was attention directed to the particular problem presented here as to the scope of the term "public utility." But the phrase was used to measure inclusions as well as exemptions, and it seems to have been employed in a practical, rather than legalistic, sense. An effort was made
in the Senate to insert a provision that public utility rates should not be increased without consent of the President. [ Footnote 12 ] That proposal was rejected, however, and a provision was substituted which required any public utility which asked for an increase in rates to notify the President and to assent to the appearance of such agent as the President may designate to appear in behalf of the consuming public before the appropriate railroad or public utility commission, be it a state, federal, or municipal commission. [ Footnote 13 ] It is difficult to believe that a different scope was intended to be given to the same words in different sections of the legislation. The use of the same generic term in these different contexts indicates that it had no narrower connotation, and should receive no stricter interpretation in the exemption merely because used to define an exemption.
Legislative history is unequivocal in its showing that rates already subject to state regulation as public utility rates were not considered in need of further control. Mr. Leon Henderson, one of the authors of the bill and the first Price Administrator, gave as reasons for exempting utilities that they seemed to be under an adequate system of state regulation; [ Footnote 14 ] that this was an area not likely to give difficulty or to cause, so far as could then be seen, any inflationary trend; that utilities had problems peculiar to themselves, and no further regulation seemed necessary; [ Footnote 15 ]
and that he had found the agencies in control of utility rates "just as earnest as we are about keeping those costs down." [ Footnote 16 ]
to avoid conflict of occasions for conflict between federal agencies and state authority which are detrimental to good administration and to public acceptance of an emergency system of price control that might founder if friction with public authorities be added to the difficulties of bringing private self-interest under control. [ Footnote 17 ] Where Congress has not clearly indicated a purpose to precipitate conflict, we should be reluctant to do so by decision. [ Footnote 18 ] In view of assurances to Congress that the evil would proceed only in a minor degree, if at all, from public utilities already under state price control, we think Congress did not intend, and certainly has given no clear indication that it did intend, to supersede the power of a state regulatory commission, exercising comprehensive control over the prices of a business appropriately classified as a utility. Classification by California of the public warehouse business as a utility is not novel, surprising, or capricious. The regulation imposed is not merely nominal or superficial, but appears to be penetrating and complete. Therefore, we would have little hesitation in holding that petitioner's public warehouse, under the circumstances, is a public utility within the exemption of the Price Control Act but for certain practical objections to that interpretation, urged on behalf of the Administrator with an earnestness which deserves, in view of the difficulties and importance of his task, careful examination.
Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 685 , 320 U. S. 690 ; Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79 , 308 U. S. 84 . At least in the absence of a congressional mandate to that effect, we cannot adopt a rule of construction, otherwise unjustified, to relieve federal administrators of what we may well believe is a substantial burden but one implied by the terms of the legislation
3. It also is contended that an interpretation must prevail as matter of principle which will give the exemption a general and uniform operation in all states irrespective of local law. It is, of course, true that uniform operation of a federal law is a desirable end, and, other things being equal, we often have interpreted statutes to achieve it. [ Footnote 19 ] But in no case relied upon did we achieve uniformity at the cost of establishing overlapping authority over the same subject matter in the state and in the Federal Government. When we do at times adopt for application of federal laws within a state a rule different from that used by a state in administering its laws, the two rules may subsist without conflict, each reigning in its own realm. It is a much more serious thing to adopt a rule of construction, as we are asked to do here, which precludes the execution of state laws by state authority in a matter normally within state power. The great body of law in this country which controls acquisition, transmission, and transfer of property, and defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to private parties, is found in the statutes and decisions of the state. The custom of resorting to them to give meaning and content to federal statutes is too old and its use too diversified to permit us to say that considerations of nationwide uniformity must prevail in a particular case over our judgment that it is out of harmony with other objective more important to
the legislative purpose. [ Footnote 20 ] What content we should give to the exemption in the case of a conventional utility not subject to a state regulatory statute or subject only to partial regulation is, of course, not before us.
Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood of Trainmen, 318 U. S. 1 .
The Administrator cites Chicago Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 1 ; Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188 ; Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 ; Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101 , 318 U. S. 104 . See also Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 ; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447 , 315 U. S. 470 ; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 , 317 U. S. 176 ; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 .
See Mangus v. Miller, 317 U. S. 178 ; Corn Exchange Nat. Bank v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434 ; Myers v. Matley, 318 U. S. 622 (bankruptcy); Uterhart v. United States, 240 U. S. 598 , 240 U. S. 603 ; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 ; Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 ; Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69 , 310 U. S. 74 ; Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (taxation); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154 ; Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96 (statute of limitations); Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78 (condemnation); New York, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Frank, 314 U. S. 360 , 314 U. S. 364 , 314 U. S. 366 (railroad consolidation); United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 318 U. S. 206 ; Board of Commissioners v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 .