Source: https://casetext.com/case/holt-v-2011-legislative-reapportionment-commn
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 16:33:36
Document Index: 636727448

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 17', '§ 141', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 2937', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 725', '§ 16', '§ 1973', '§ 17', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 47', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1973', '§ 18', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 1971', 'art, 577']

Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 38 A.3d 711 | Casetext
38 A.3d 711 (Pa. 2012)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.Feb 3, 2012
Amanda E. HOLT, Elaine Tomlin, Louis Nudi, Diane Edbril, Dariel I. Jamieson, Lora Lavin, James Yoest, Jeffrey Meyer, Christopher H. Fromme, Timothy F. Burnett, Chris Hertzog, Glen Eckhart, and Mary Frances Ballard, Appellants v. 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMMISSION, Appellee.Senator Jay Costa, Senator Lawrence M. Farnese, Jr., Senator Christine M. Tartaglione, Senator Shirley M. Kitchen, Senator Leanna M. Washington, Senator Michael J. Stack, Senator Vincent J. Hughes, Senator Anthony H. Williams, Senator Judith L. Schwank, Senator John T. Yudichak, Senator Daylin Leach, Senator Lisa M. Boscola, Senator Andrew E. Dinniman, Senator John P. Blake, Senator Richard A. Kasunic, Senator John N. Wozniak, Senator Jim Ferlo, Senator Wayne D. Fontana, Senator James R. Brewster, and Senator Timothy J. Solobay, Appellants v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Mayor Carolyn Comitta, Council President Holly Brown, William J. Scott, Jr., Herbert A. Schwabe, II, Jane Heald Close, Floyd Robert Bielski, David Laleike, E. Brian Abbott, Nathaniel Smith, and W. Donald Braceland, Appellants v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Mayor Leo Scoda and Council Person Jennifer Mayo, Appellants v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Thomas Schiffer, Alison Bausman, Rachel J. Amdur, Joan Tarka, Lawrence W. Abel, Margaret G. Morscheck, Lawrence J. Chrzan, Julia Schultz and Shirley Resnick, Appellants v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Sekela Coles, Cynthia Jackson and Lee Taliaferro, Appellants v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Patty Kim, Appellant v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Edward J. Bradley, Jr., Patrick McKenna, Jr., Dorothy Gallagher, Richard H. Lowe, and John F. “Jack” Byrne, Appellants v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Dennis J. Baylor, Appellant v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Andrew Dominick Alosi, Appellant v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.Carlos A. Zayas, Appellant v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.William C. Kortz, Michelle L. Vezzani, Michael E. Cherepko, Gregory Erosenko, Joyce Popovich, John Bevec, Lisa Bashioum, and Richard Christopher, Appellants v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, Appellee.
Shauna Christine Clemmer, for Bureau of Elections, Department of State. Linda L. Kelly, Office of Attorney General, Pittsburgh, for Attorney General's Office.
Shauna Christine Clemmer, for Bureau of Elections, Department of State. Linda L. Kelly, Office of Attorney General, Pittsburgh, for Attorney General's Office. Clifford B. Levine, Pittsburgh, for Costa et al.David J. Montgomery, Montgomery Law Firm, LLC, for William C. Kortz, et al.Samuel C. Stretton, Law Office of Samuel C. Stretton, West Chester, for Mayor Comitta, et al.Samuel C. Stretton, Law Office of Samuel C. Stretton, West Chester, for Mayor Leo Scoda and Council Person Jennifer Mayo.Eric Louis Ring, Bala Cynwyd, for Schiffer, et al.Robert Walter Scott, Robert W. Scott, P.C., Philadelphia, for Sekela Coles, Cynthia Jackson and Lee Taliaferro.Adam Craig Bonin, Kevin Michael Greenberg, Flaster/Greenberg, P.C., Philadelphia, for Patty Kim.Michael Churchill, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (The), Virginia A. Gibson, David Newmann, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Philadelphia, for Holt, et al.James Manly Parks, Duane Morris, L.L.P., for Edward Bradley, Jr., Patrick McKenna, Jr., Dorothy Gallagher, Richard Lowe, John Byrne.Dennis J. Baylor, pro se.Andrew Dominick Alosi, pro se.Carlos A. Zayas, pro se.The Honorable Joseph A. Del Sole, Stephen John Del Sole, Del Sole Cavanaugh Stroyd, L.L.C., Pittsburgh, Charles E. O'Connor Jr., Philadelphia, William Shaw Stickman IV, Del Sole Cavanaugh Stroyd, L.L.C., Pittsburgh, James Richard Thornburg, for 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission.
AND NOW, this 25th day of January, 2012, upon consideration of the petitions for review and briefs in these legislative redistricting appeals, and after entertaining oral argument on January 23, 2012, this Court finds that the final 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Plan is contrary to law. Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d). Accordingly, the final 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Plan is REMANDED to the 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission with a directive to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner consistent with this Court's Opinion, which will follow. Id.
For administrative purposes only, we have designated the appeal in Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 7 MM 2012 / J–7–2012, as the lead case.
1. Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556, 559 (Pa.1964).
While the Majority opines that our previous emphasis on population equality derived from federal law, see Majority Opinion, at 759 (“Rather than deriving from our Constitution itself, the primacy of population equality in redistricting, which is clearly established in our decisional law, derives from federal decisional law....”), our case law states otherwise. See In re 1981 Reapportionment, 442 A.2d at 665 (“In Specter, this Court also made clear that, as a matter of both federal and state law, equality of population must be the controlling consideration in the apportionment of legislative seats.” (emphasis added)).
The 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Plan, which this Court previously ordered to “be used in all forthcoming elections to the General Assembly until the next constitutionally mandated reapportionment shall be approved,” Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 567 Pa. 670, 790 A.2d 989, 991 (2002) (quoting per curiam order), shall remain in effect until a revised final 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Plan having the force of law is approved. Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(e).
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ ¦Thursday, January 26 ¦First day to circulate nomination petitions ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Thursday, February 16 ¦Last day to file nomination petitions ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Thursday, February 23 ¦Last day to file objections to set aside ¦ ¦ ¦nomination petitions ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Monday, February 27 ¦Last day that court may fix for hearings on ¦ ¦ ¦objections to nomination petitions ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Friday, March 2 ¦Last day for court to finally determine ¦ ¦ ¦objections to nomination petitions ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Friday, March 2 ¦Last day for withdrawal by candidates who filed ¦ ¦ ¦nomination petitions ¦ +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Legislative redistricting “involves the basic rights of the citizens of Pennsylvania in the election of their state lawmakers.” 1 In twelve separate matters, Commonwealth citizens, acting singly or in groups, filed appeals from the Final Plan for legislative redistricting of the Commonwealth, which was devised by appellee, the 2011 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission (the “LRC”), in response to the U.S. decennial census. In an attempt to conduct meaningful appellate review with the prospect of minimal disruption of the 2012 primary election process, this Court ordered accelerated briefing and oral argument. Expedition was required, as in all redistricting appeals, in part due to the compressed time frame in which to accomplish the task before the next election—particularly in an election year involving a presidential primary. However, the Court was aware at the outset that its efforts at expedition were incapable of avoiding interference with the primary election season because, for reasons not addressed by the LRC, the LRC failed to adopt a Final Plan in a timeframe that offered the remote prospect of appellate review before the primary season began. The LRC's inexplicable delay ensured that primary candidates who relied upon the 2011 Final Plan did so at their peril. As we discuss in detail infra, the Pennsylvania Constitution makes clear that a reapportionment plan can never have force of law until all appeals are decided, and even then, only if all challenges are dismissed. See Pa. Const. art II, § 17(e).
Eminent counsel for the LRC acknowledged this fact at oral argument:
The Commonwealth shall be divided into fifty senatorial and two hundred three representative districts, which shall be composed of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable. Each senatorial district shall elect one Senator, and each representative district one Representative. Unless absolutely necessary no county, city, incorporated town, borough, township or ward shall be divided in forming either a senatorial or representative district. Pa. Const. art. II, § 16. The Constitution also specifically provides that, once the LRC has adopted a Final Plan, “any aggrieved person” may appeal directly to this Court. Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d). The Constitution further commands that, if that aggrieved citizen “establishes that the final plan is contrary to law,” this Court “shall issue an order remanding the plan to the commission and directing the commission to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner not inconsistent with such order.” Id.
In our most recent redistricting opinion, Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 567 Pa. 670, 790 A.2d 989, 991 (Pa.2002), we rejected a series of localized challenges to a final plan, which were based on lack of compactness, alleged unnecessary splits of particular political subdivisions, and other issues. Central to our decision in that case was our recognition that the challengers there had “focused primarily on the impact of the plan with respect to their particular political subdivision, rather than analyzing the plan as a whole, as is required under a proper constitutional analysis.” Id. at 995. We repeated the admonition in our legal analysis, noting that “[t]he Commission persuasively argues that none of the appellants ha[s] met the heavy burden of establishing that the final plan, as a whole, is contrary to law.” Id. at 998.
Although we are satisfied that the appellants challenging the Final Plan as a whole have made their case under existing decisional law and constitutional imperative, our consideration of this appeal, and our review of prior law, has convinced us that, going forward—and the initial opportunity to go forward is upon this remand—a better and more accurate calibration of the interplay of mandatory constitutional requirements would provide salutary guidance in future redistricting efforts. Accord Order, 1/25/12 ( per curiam ) (Saylor, J., dissenting, joined by Eakin and Orie Melvin, JJ.). Part VII of this Opinion provides that guidance.
Mr. Justice Savior's dissent states: “Based on the petitions, briefs, and argument, I am not persuaded that the 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Plan is contrary to law as reflected in the existing precedent. Although I am receptive to the concern that past decisions of the Court may suggest an unnecessarily stringent approach to equalization of population as between voting districts, I believe this could be addressed via prospective guidance from the Court.”
Every ten years, following the federal decennial census, our Constitution mandates reapportionment, or redistricting, of the Commonwealth. See Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(a). The federal decennial census is conducted pursuant to Article I, Section 2 mandates of the U.S. Constitution to count every resident of the United States for the purpose of apportioning representatives to the U.S. Congress among the States. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; amend. XIV, § 2; XVI. The Commonwealth uses U.S. Census data for the purpose of apportioning and demarcating Pennsylvania seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, the state House of Representatives, and the state Senate. The process of reapportioning the Pennsylvania General Assembly is specifically outlined in Article II, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Reapportionment is perhaps a less apt term for the task than redistricting, for although the occasion for the process is the change in population distribution revealed by the census, the process requires consideration of other factors in establishing new House and Senate districts. Although we use both terms, the Pennsylvania Constitution uses the term “reapportionment.” See Pa. Const. art. II, § 17.
The U.S. Census Bureau had released 2010 census data to the Commonwealth on March 9, 2011. See Pennsylvania Legislative Redistricting website, http:// www. redistricting. state. pa. us/ index. cfm. This data was released well before the deadline provided by federal law. See 13 U.S.C. § 141 (“basic tabulations of population of each other State, shall, in any event, be completed, reported, and transmitted to each respective State within one year after the decennial census date,” i.e., April 1, 2011).
On August 17, 2011, after a lengthy delay, the LRC accepted the U.S. census data as presented by the Legislative Data Processing Center (“LDPC”) and contractor Citygate GIS as “usable,” and resolved that the availability of the data triggered the ninety-day period for filing a preliminary redistricting plan. See Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(c) (“No later than ninety days after either the commission has been duly certified or the population data for the Commonwealth as determined by the Federal decennial census are available, whichever is later in time, the commission shall file a preliminary reapportionment plan with such elections officer.”). There is no explanation for the LDPC's delay in generating “usable” data, a circumstance we will address below.
In a document provided to the LRC entitled “Legal Issues Implicated by the 2011 Decennial Legislative Reapportionment of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—An Overview,” LRC's counsel suggested that the data was available in usable form “only after the raw data with the breakdown by precinct and ward has been processed and edited by the LDPC [Legislative Data Processing Center] and the final form of data is delivered to the Commission.” See Del Sole Cavanaugh Stroyd LLC Memorandum at 5, attached as Exhibit A to the Appendix to the Petition for Review filed by the Costa Appellants at 1 WM 2012.
For the proposition that the LRC did not have “usable” data until August 2011, despite the earlier availability of census data, the LRC relied on an account of the 1981 and 1991 Reapportionments authored by Dean Ken Gormley, who was the Executive Director of the 1991 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, and is at present the Dean of the Duquesne University School of Law.
[T]he Commission asked whether data was deemed to b[e] “available” when it received the “raw” form from the federal government or when it was translated into a form that was actually usable. The Chief Justice issued an unpublished Order [on March 26, 1981], which stated that the census data became available “in usable form (breakdown of data by precinct and ward).” In 1991, some members of the Commission considered again seeking clarification on the definition of “usable.” Ultimately, the Commission decided that it, not the Supreme Court, was the best judge of when the data provided to it was in a form that was sufficiently “usable” for its purposes. As such, the Commission sought no further clarification from the Court and deemed the data to be “usable” on June 27, 1991—when the data had been revised and delivered to the Commission from the Legislative Data Processing Center (“LDPC”).
Del Sole Cavanaugh Stroyd LLC Memorandum at 4–5 (citations omitted); see also Ken Gormley, The Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment of 1991, at 22–24 (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Bureau of Publications 1994).
No party to these appeals objects to the notion that the data must be in “usable” form before the LRC can formulate a preliminary plan.
Absent appeals within the thirty day period afforded by the Constitution, the Final Plan would have had force of law. See Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(e). However, twelve separate appeals from the 2011 Final Plan were filed by citizens claiming to be aggrieved, as is their constitutional right. See Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d) (“Any aggrieved person may file an appeal from the final plan directly to the Supreme Court within thirty days after the filing thereof.”). In each appeal, the appellants filed petitions for review, against several of which the LRC filed preliminary objections. The LRC also filed a prompt consolidated answer, responding to the first eleven petitions for review. This Court then directed briefing on an accelerated schedule; all parties timely complied. The Court reserved a special session to hear oral argument on January 23, 2012, in Harrisburg, five days after briefing, and we heard argument in nine of the appeals that day. Many of the appeals raise overlapping claims, and indeed, in some instances, appellants ultimately relied upon the briefs of other aggrieved citizens.
We address the propriety of preliminary objections in legislative redistricting appeals and the LRC's filings infra.
The twelfth petition, Zayas v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 17 MM 2012/J–31–2012, proceeded separately, due to an administrative delay in ascertaining the timeliness of the appeal. Briefing in that matter was completed after oral argument, and it was submitted on the briefs.
Three of the appeals were submitted for consideration on the briefs: Zayas: Coles v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 5 MM 2012/J–5–2012; and Alosi v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 10 MM 2012/J–10–2012.
Two days later, on January 25, 2012, this Court issued a per curiam order, declaring that the Final Plan was contrary to law, and remanding to the LRC with a directive to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner consistent with this Court's Opinion, which would follow. See Order, 1/25/12 ( per curiam ) (citing Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d)). Our per curiam order also directed that the 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Plan, which this Court previously ordered to “be used in all forthcoming elections to the General Assembly until the next constitutionally mandated reapportionment shall be approved,” would remain in effect until a revised final 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Plan having the force of law is approved. See Order, 1/25/12 ( per curiam ) (citing Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(e) and Albert, 790 A.2d at 991). That aspect of our mandate arose by operation of law; where a Final Plan is challenged on appeal, and this Court finds the plan contrary to law and remands, the proffered plan does not have force of law, and the prior plan obviously remains in effect. Mr. Justice Saylor filed a dissenting statement, in which Mr. Justice Eakin and Madame Justice Orie Melvin joined.
Of course, the Court was cognizant that the LRC's timeline in adopting a Final Plan had ensured that the appeals would carry into the period when nomination petitions could begin to be circulated, and that any mandate other than outright denial or dismissal of the appeals could cause disruption of that process. Therefore, the per curiam order also was careful to adjust the primary election schedule and, consistently with the order we entered on February 14, 1992, the last time a presidential primary occurred in a reapportionment year, we directed that petition signatures collected before our mandate issued would be deemed valid as to timeliness. See Order, 1/25/12 ( per curiam ). Our adjustment of the primary election calendar does not alter the discretion vested in the Commonwealth Court, which will be tasked in its original jurisdiction with hearing any objections to nominating petitions. The Election Code provides a very restrictive time schedule, specifically including a ten day cut-off for hearings and a fifteen day deadline for decisions. 25 P.S. § 2937. However, this Court recognized that appeals of this nature entail the “exercise of purely judicial functions.” In re Nomination Petition of Moore, 447 Pa. 526, 291 A.2d 531, 534 (Pa.1972). Thus, as it respects the judicial function, the Election Code's deadlines are understood in this context as “directory,” although the deadlines and requirements of the Code will remain mandatory as to petitioners. See also Mellow v. Mitchell, 530 Pa. 44, 607 A.2d 204, 224 (Pa.1992) (same); In re Shapp, 476 Pa. 480, 383 A.2d 201, 204 (Pa.1978) (same).
As we have noted, the Final Plan was adopted at such a late date as to ensure that, even with adoption of the most accelerated of processes, this Court would lack adequate time to consider the matter, with due reflection, and issue a mandate and reasoned decision before the primary election process was underway. The delay is unexplained; and it stands in stark contrast to the timing of the adoption of prior plans, plans that were no doubt created with less advanced computer technology. The Constitution provides that “[n]o later than ninety days after either the commission has been duly certified or the population data for the Commonwealth as determined by the Federal decennial census are available, whichever is later in time, the commission shall file a preliminary reapportionment plan....” Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(c). The year 2012 is a presidential election year, with the result that the Pennsylvania primary is held three weeks earlier than in other years, and that all primary filing and litigation deadlines are advanced by three weeks as well. Indeed, the first day to circulate nomination petitions for the primary was January 24, 2012. Despite this known fact, the LRC did not adopt its Final Plan until December 12, 2011, a mere forty-three days before that important date. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, persons aggrieved by the Final Plan had thirty days to file an appeal to this Court, or until January 11, 2012, which is the very day the bulk of the twelve appeals were filed. Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d). Even with accelerated briefing and argument, the appeals could not be decided with a reasoned opinion before January 24, 2012. And, obviously, the lateness of the adoption of the Final Plan virtually ensured that no remand could be accomplished without disrupting the primary process.
Section 603 of the Election Code provides, in relevant part:
As noted above, the LRC states that the 2010 census data was not “available” before August 17, 2011, the date the LDPC provided it with the census data in “usable form,” and that “this event triggered the 90–day time-period for formulating a preliminary reapportionment plan.” LRC's Brief at 10: accord Costa Brief at 3. Notably, with far less sophisticated technology in 1991, and with two fewer rounds of redistricting experience, the LDPC was able to produce the census data in usable form by June 27th of that year—fifty-one days sooner. Gormley, Legislative Reapportionment, at 24. This diligent effort allowed the 1991 LRC greater time for commentary and adjustment, and permitted adoption of the 1991 Final Plan, which also affected a presidential primary election season, as early as November 15, 1991, twenty-seven days sooner than the 2011 Final Plan was filed. See In re 1991 Pa. Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 530 Pa. 335, 609 A.2d 132, 135 (Pa.1992) ( “ In re 1991 Plan ”); see also In re Reapportionment Plan, 497 Pa. 525, 442 A.2d 661 (Pa.1981) (“ In re 1981 Plan ”) (LRC filed its 1981 Final Plan on October 13, 1981). Likewise, the 2001 LRC, which did not face the compression of a presidential primary season, produced its Final Plan on November 19, 2001, twenty-three days earlier than the Plan adopted by the 2011 LRC. See Albert, 790 A.2d at 992.
Dean Gormley's account of the 1991 reapportionment describes at some length the diligent efforts of the LRC and the LDPC to ensure that the census data was in usable form as soon as possible. See Gormley, Legislative Reapportionment, at 22–24.
The LRC provides no further information about the LDPC's procedures, and what precisely the LDPC must do to the so-called “raw” census data in order to render it “usable” by the LRC for redistricting purposes. Given advances in computer technology since 1991, and the cumulative experience of those tasked with amassing and providing the data to the LRC, the delay here, in a presidential primary year, is as troubling as it is inexplicable. We remind the LRC that the Constitution specifically authorizes appeals from final plans, and the LRC this year, and whatever entity bears the burden in future years, should thus approach its bipartisan constitutional task with an eye toward affording sufficient time for meaningful appellate review, if appeals are filed. B. The LRC's Preliminary Objections
The Costa appellants responded with a motion to strike the LRC's preliminary objections, arguing that redistricting appeals lie in this Court's appellate rather than original jurisdiction and that as such, no verification is required. See Costa Motion to Strike at 4 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1513(d)). Appellants in Coles, Kim, and Bradley joined the Costa motion to strike. The appellant in Baylor sought to “cure” the alleged defects with additional filings.
Appellant Baylor sought to file an amended petition for review, with additional substantive material. Baylor also filed an application for post-submission communication, in which he claimed that the late filing of the LRC's preliminary objections foreclosed any opportunity to respond in a timely fashion. In response, the LRC challenged Baylor's request to amend as an improper attempt to add waived new claims to his petition for review. Given our disposition, infra, these ancillary petitions are denied.
Our mandate having already issued, without dissent on the grounds specified in the preliminary objections, the preliminary objections obviously must fail. Nonetheless, it is important to address the nature of these appeals, and the consequent propriety of preliminary objections, because of the supplementary layer of complexity and delay that would result from permitting preliminary objections in cases already subject to an accelerated appeals process.
Notably, at oral argument, the LRC did not press its preliminary objections, going instead to the merits of the appeals. In any event, the Holt appeal, upon which we primarily base our disposition, was not challenged by preliminary objections. Nevertheless, since these matters involve the preeminent right to the franchise and to selection of the representatives who give voice to the citizens' concerns, mere technicalities in pleadings shall not impede our deliberative process.
The question of whether preliminary objections to petitions for review are cognizable in redistricting appeals turns on whether these appeals are properly viewed as sounding in this Court's original or its appellate jurisdiction. Our Constitution describes the process to challenge the Final Plan: “[a]ny aggrieved person may file an appeal from the final plan directly to the Supreme Court....” Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d) (emphasis supplied); accord 42 Pa.C.S. § 725(1). In concert with that constitutional authority, our Rules expressly provide that, unless otherwise ordered, “appeals” under Article II, Section 17(d) shall proceed under Chapter 15 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which generally governs judicial review of governmental determinations, such as agency appeals to the Commonwealth Court. Pa.R.A.P. 3321; see Pa.R.A.P. 1501(a). Rule 1516(a) specifies that petitions for review in redistricting appeals proceed within this Court's appellate jurisdiction. See Pa.R.A.P. 1516(a). Additionally, as the Costa appellants note, this Court has generally utilized terminology applicable to appeals in reviewing reapportionment challenges. See Costa Motion to Strike at 3 (citing, inter alia, Albert, 790 A.2d at 992 and In re 1991 Plan, 609 A.2d at 135).
Generally, in matters filed within a court's appellate jurisdiction, no pleadings (including answers and preliminary objections) may be filed as of right in response to petitions for review. The Rules of Appellate Procedure simply do not contain a provision similar to that in the Rules of Civil Procedure permitting the filing of preliminary objections. Compare Pa.R.A.P. 1501 et seq. with Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028. Rule 1516 specifically provides that, as to redistricting matters, “[n]o answer or other pleading to an appellate jurisdiction petition for review is authorized, unless the petition for review is filed pursuant to ... Rule 3321.” Pa.R.A.P. 1516(a). Rule 3321 is a narrow exception to Rule 1516, by which this Court may permit filing of an “answer or other pleading” by order. In the appeals before us, our scheduling order noted that we would entertain a substantive answer and brief from the LRC, but we did not authorize the filing of preliminary objections. See Order. 1/11/12 ( per curiam ).
In the lead appeal docketed at 7 MM 2012 (“ Holt ”), the appellants describe themselves as individual voters, registered Democrats and Republicans, hailing from Allegheny, Chester, Delaware, Lehigh, and Philadelphia Counties. Appellants in the appeal docketed at 1 WM 2012 (“ Costa ”) are all twenty Senators elected as Democrats, members of the minority party in the Pennsylvania General Assembly, and registered voters. Senator Brewster, representing the 45th Senatorial District in the Monongahela Valley, filed a separate “letter brief” in support of the Costa appeal.
The appeals in both 2 MM and 3 MM 2012 focus on Chester County. Appellants in 2 MM 2012 (“ Comitta ”), are elected officials and resident voters in West Chester Borough, Chester County. Appellants in 3 MM 2012 (“ Scoda ”) are resident voters and the mayor and a member of the Borough Council, in the Borough of Phoenixville, Chester County.
The separate appeals at 4 MM 2012, 5 MM 2012, and 8 MM 2012 all focus on Delaware County. Appellants in 4 MM 2012 (“ Schiffer ”) are individual voters from Haverford Township, Delaware County. At 5 MM 2012 (“ Coles ”), appellants are individual voters from Upper Darby and Darby Townships in Delaware County. At 8 MM 2012 (“ Bradley ”), appellants are individual voters from the Delaware County Boroughs of Collingdale, Darby, Swarthmore, Upper Darby, and Yeadon. Appellant at 6 MM 2012 (“ Kim ”), is a councilwoman and voter in the City of Harrisburg, Dauphin County. Appellants in 4 WM 2012 (“ Kortz ”) are voters from Allegheny, Washington and Lawrence Counties.
Three appellants have filed pro se appeals. At 9 MM 2012 (“ Baylor ”). appellant is a voter and Township Auditor in Tilden Township, Berks County. At 10 MM 2012 (“ Alosi ”), appellant is a resident of the Shippensburg area, in South–Central Pennsylvania. Finally, in the appeal docketed at 17 MM 2012 (“ Zayas ”). appellant is a voter in the City of Reading, Berks County.
In all of these appeals, the LRC is appellee. The LRC does not dispute the standing of any of the appellants. B. The Issues Raised by Appellants
Two of the appeals before us, Holt and Costa, explicitly raise and develop global challenges premised primarily upon the constitutional ban on dividing counties, municipalities, and wards “unless absolutely necessary.” See Pa. Const. art. II, § 16. The Holt and Costa appellants requested that the Court remand the Plan to the LRC for a second attempt at redistricting in accordance with law. Because the Holt claims, and to a lesser extent, the Costa claims, form the primary basis for our conclusion that the Final Plan was contrary to law, these claims will be developed further, infra. Challengers in three other appeals, Coles, Kim, and Kortz, adopt the global challenge as developed in the appellants' brief in Costa.
We note that, after filing separate petitions for review, these appellants did not file separate briefs but joined in and adopted the Costa brief; thus, no separate discussion of their appeals is necessary.
Similarly, in Scoda, appellants object to the division of Phoenixville Borough into two House districts: under the Final Plan, four wards would remain in the 157th House District, and three would be removed from the 157th District to the 155th District. Appellants in Scoda request remand to the LRC, with a directive to maintain the integrity of Phoenixville Borough and restore it to the 157th House District. The Comitta and Scoda appellants also both claim that the divisions of West Chester and Phoenixville Boroughs were motivated by partisan politics and by the desire to dilute the voting power of minorities, in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.
Redistricting appeals are unlike the great majority of matters upon which we pass in that there is no conventional determination to review, and an atypical party responding to the appeal. The LRC, which devised the Final Plan in the first instance, also has the task of defending its constitutionality against the specific appeals brought by citizens.
This was not always so. In the first reapportionment appeals following adoption of the current Pennsylvania constitutional construct, the 1971 Final Plan was defended by the Attorney General. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Levin, 448 Pa. 1, 293 A.2d 15 (Pa.1972). The appeals from the 1981, 1991, and 2001 plans all were defended by the LRC itself. Notably, as recently as the 1991 reapportionment appeals, it was not clear precisely what role the LRC should play in response. As Dean Gormley, Executive Director of the 1991 LRC describes the argument in 1992:
Initially, we note that, although they are often confused or conflated by litigants, the scope of and the standard of review are distinct concepts and are not appropriately substituted for one another. Succinctly stated, “scope of review” refers to “the confines within which an appellate court must conduct its examination,” i.e., the “what” that the appellate court is permitted to examine. Morrison v. Commonwealth, 538 Pa. 122, 646 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa.1994). “Standard of review” addresses the manner by which that examination is conducted, the “degree of scrutiny” to be applied by the appellate court. Id.
The LRC's argument on the second point proceeds as follows. The LRC asserts that in this Court's first two reapportionment decisions following the 1968 Constitution, “a majority of the Court specifically rejected the contention that alternative plans should be reviewed—even if only as a measuring device rather than a substitute.” Id. at 29; 646 A.2d 565. The single citation accompanying this proposition stated as black letter law is the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Nix in In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 669 (Nix, J., dissenting). The LRC then adds that none of our succeeding cases have questioned or reexamined this scope of review, and we should not now “reject the forty years of precedent upon which the Commission relied in formulating the Final Plan.” LRC Brief at 29.
The LRC repeats its claim that we specifically rejected the notion that alternative plans may be considered for any purpose, with slightly more elaboration, by discussing our 1982 decision. The LRC notes that the majority opinion in that 4–3 decision stated that: “to prevail in their challenge to the final reapportionment plan, appellants have the burden of establishing not, as some of the appellants have argued, that there exists an alternative plan which is ‘preferable’ or ‘better,’ but rather that the final plan filed by the Pennsylvania Reapportionment Commission fails to meet constitutional requirements.” In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 665. On its own, this statement says nothing that would prohibit the Court, as a scope of review matter, from looking to alternate plans in order to assess the constitutionality of the Final Plan. The LRC apparently derives that limitation from the fact that Justice Nix's dissenting opinion offered that, while he agreed that “we do not dismiss a plan because ‘fortuitously’ another may have constructed a better one, the fact that a better one may be easily designed which accommodates all of the constitutional concerns may strongly suggest the constitutional invalidity of the selected plan.” Id. at 669 (Nix, J., dissenting). After quoting Justice Nix, the LRC declares that “[t]hat view was rejected by a majority of the [ In re 1981 Plan ] Court.” LRC Brief, at 29–30. The LRC does not cite where the majority opinion in In re 1981 Plan engaged Justice's Nix point, and specifically rejected it.
The Holt appellants make clear that they do not ask the Court to direct adoption of any of the alternative plans presented to the LRC, including their own. Their point is more nuanced: they embrace Justice Nix's view in dissent, quoted above, that the fact that better plans “may be easily designed which accommodate[ ] all of the constitutional concerns may strongly suggest the constitutional invalidity of the selected plan.” Holt Brief at 20. Appellants note that this Court has never been presented with an appeal that challenged a prior reapportionment plan in its entirety on grounds of constitutionally excessive subdivision splits and, therefore, we have never held that their approach—offering an alternative plan as evidence or proof that the Final Plan is unconstitutional—violates the established scope of review or is otherwise not viable. The Costa appellants agree with the Holt approach, and offer for comparison an alternate redistricting plan that Senator Costa proposed to the LRC, and which the LRC rejected. See Costa Brief at 32–33.
Unlike the Holt appellants, other appellants either accept the LRC's interpretation or offer a more rudimentary reading of prior redistricting caselaw on the scope of review, colored primarily by the unfavorable results obtained by previous challengers. Thus, some appellants interpret our prior caselaw to prohibit any challenges either offering an alternate plan or centering on the absolute necessity of a local political subdivision split. See, e.g., Schiffer Brief at 9. Other appellants understand the law as suggesting that this Court will affirm any plan that compares favorably to past redistricting plans in terms of population equality. See, e.g., Comitta Brief at 18. These appellants advocate in favor of a broader scope of review, permitting consideration of specific local challenges to prove that the LRC's Final Plan is contrary to law; they request that we overrule any precedent to the contrary. With respect to the relevance of alternate, global plans, our discussion in text, infra, provides the answer. Respecting the invitation to revisit our prior, and most recent precedent, requiring that successful challenges encompass the plan as a whole, see Albert, 790 A.2d at 995 (in conducting constitutional review, this Court “must examine the final plan as a whole”), we are disinclined to revisit that precedent, particularly given that: (1) we are aware that changes to any one aspect of a plan can cause a ripple effect; (2) the 2011 LRC could fairly rely on the unequivocal “final plan as a whole” language in Albert: and (3) the parameters this Opinion is establishing, followed with fidelity, should operate to significantly reduce the number of political subdivisions split by a new plan.
Unlike the Holt appellants, infra, the Costa appellants suggest that, upon remand, the LRC should revise the Final Plan by using Senator Costa's alternate plan as a starting point. Costa Brief at 34. Our mandate does not require such action.
The Costa alternate plan creates fewer subdivision splits than the LRC's Final Plan, but more splits than the Holt alternate plan. Questioned about this fact at oral argument, counsel for the Costa appellants explained that the purpose behind the Costa plan was not to suggest the best of all plans, but to show that the core of the Final Plan could be achieved with far less violence to the integrity of political subdivisions. Transcript of Oral Argument, 1/23/12, at 65–66. This point tracks the nuanced approach of the Holt appellants.
Indeed, legal challenges in general, and appellate challenges in particular, commonly involve an offering of alternatives. It is not effective advocacy to simply declare that a trial judge's ruling was erroneous; the good advocate addresses what the judge should have done instead. Take, for example, a trial level challenge to a jury instruction. An objection comprised of “Judge, you are wrong,” gets a litigant nowhere; the essence of the advocate's function is to go farther and explain how the charge should read— i.e., what was the better alternative. The point is obvious and hardly requires elaboration.
Rather, the Court in In re 1981 Plan actually said the following. At the outset of the opinion, we adverted to the decisional law of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In discussing that federal decisional law, we noted that the Supreme Court had rejected an equal protection challenge that was bottomed on a claim that a reapportionment plan should be invalidated “merely because the alternative plan proposed by the litigant is a ‘better’ one.” 442 A.2d at 664 (discussing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973)). We then quoted Gaffney, as follows:
The point is, that such involvements should never begin. We have repeatedly recognized that state reapportionment is the task of local legislatures or of those organs of state government selected to perform it. Id. at 664–65 (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 750–51, 93 S.Ct. 2321). Notably, in Gaffney, the U.S. Supreme Court was setting out its command for the role that federal courts should take in reviewing federal law challenges to state redistricting plans. The Gaffney Court was not, and could not, speak to the review conducted by state courts facing hybrid challenges sounding under both federal equal protection and additional state constitutional mandates.
Immediately after our quotation from Gaffney, respecting equal protection, we stated that: “Thus, to prevail in their challenge to the final reapportionment plan, appellants have the burden of establishing not, as some of the appellants have argued, that there exists an alternative plan which is ‘preferable’ or ‘better,’ but rather that the final plan filed by the Pennsylvania [Legislative] Reapportionment Commission fails to meet constitutional requirements.” In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 665. Although we did not explain ourselves further, it appears that we found that the core principle of Gaffney respecting equal protection claims was persuasive in guiding our own, broader review of redistricting plans. We did not, however, announce that the Gaffney principle altered our scope of review, i.e., we did not state that the parties were forbidden to argue, and the Court was forbidden to consider, alternate plans in assessing the constitutional validity of the Final Plan. All we stated was that the mere existence of a plan described as being “preferable” or “better” did not alone suffice to prove the unconstitutionality of the approved plan. This observation implicates a standard of review, not the scope of review. Cf. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 934, 941–44, 181 L.Ed.2d 900 (2012) (cases hold only that district court may not adopt unprecleared plan as its own; they do not prohibit use or discount value of such plan to aid drawing of interim map). Under this principle, the Court rejected challenges that proposed marginal increases in population equality of districts, as well as piecemeal challenges to splits of subdivisions; it did not reject a claim, such as the global one forwarded by the Holt and Costa appellants here, that alternate plans have been generated which prove that the adopted plan is constitutionally infirm.
The LRC's theory that we adopted a scope of review prohibiting consideration of alternatives seems to proceed upon the assumption that points raised in a dissent are necessarily and affirmatively “rejected” by the Court majority—even if the majority never discussed or rebutted the point. This is a strange theory indeed. First of all, a Court's silence on a point is of far less import than dicta, and it is settled that dicta has no binding effect. See, e.g., Albright v. Abington Mem. Hosp., 548 Pa. 268, 696 A.2d 1159, 1167 n. 8 (Pa.1997).
Nor does our holding diminish our recognition that the Constitution placed the task of devising a redistricting plan within the bailiwick of the partisan leadership of the legislative branch, in recognition of the General Assembly's “expertise in reapportionment matters.” In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 665. But, equally true is that the same provision of the Constitution placed the task of resolving appeals alleging that the LRC's Plan is “contrary to law” within the bailiwick of the judicial branch, in recognition of this Court's expertise in these such matters. The retention of legislative expertise is accomplished by the fact that the Constitution prescribes remand to the LRC if a Final Plan is found to be contrary to law. We, therefore, reject the LRC's foundational and pervasive argument that we have already adopted, or should adopt, a scope of review that limits our consideration to the four corners of the Final Plan. Our scope of review in these appeals is plenary, subject to the restriction, recognized in Albert, that a successful challenge must encompass the Final Plan as a whole, and the recognition in our prior cases that we will not consider claims that were not raised before the LRC. In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 666 n. 7. This entails consideration of all relevant evidence, and legal authority, that a Final Plan is contrary to law.
On appeal from a Final Plan, the plan may be found to be unconstitutional only if the appellant establishes that it is “contrary to law.” Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d) (“If the appellant establishes that the final plan is contrary to law, the Supreme Court shall issue an order remanding the plan to the commission....”). The primary “law” at issue consists of the constitutional imperatives set forth in Section 16. Pa. Const. art. II, § 16 (number of districts; compact and contiguous territory; districts as nearly equal in size as practicable; no divisions of county, city, incorporated town, borough, township or ward, unless absolutely necessary). The appeals sub judice present precisely such challenges. The proper construction of constitutional language (or statutory language for that matter) is a question peculiarly suited to the judicial function. The task involves purely legal questions, framed by settled rules of interpretation. Such issues of law typically are subject to de novo or plenary review, and indeed the parties agree that our review is non-deferential. Generally, in conducting de novo review, this Court corrects legal errors without deference to the judgment of the tribunal, agency, or other entity whose determination is challenged, as to the constitutionality of its actions. Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 587 Pa. 347, 899 A.2d 1085, 1094 (Pa.2006) (constitutional challenge poses question of law; therefore, review is plenary and non-deferential); Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 571 Pa. 375, 812 A.2d 591, 611 (Pa.2002) (this Court's decision is final word on meaning of Pennsylvania Constitution); see also Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464, 469 (Pa.1948) (“But, equally well settled, federally, since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175–180, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and for Pennsylvania even a few years earlier, is the rule that a law repugnant to the constitution is void and that it is not only the right but the duty of a court so to declare when the violation unequivocally appears. See Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493, 501 (1799); cf. also Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 339 (1825).”).
Notwithstanding its recognition that our standard of review ultimately is de novo, the LRC suggests, throughout its brief, that our review in fact is constrained both by the legislative nature of the LRC's task and our prior precedent. Respecting the first point, the LRC essentially asks that we review the constitutionality of the Final Plan in accordance with the standards applicable to acts of the General Assembly. A statute, of course, is generally entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. The presumption “reflects on the part of the judiciary the respect due to the legislature as a co-equal branch of government.” Sch. Dists. of Deer Lakes & Allegheny Valley v. Kane, 463 Pa. 554, 345 A.2d 658 (Pa.1975).
We agree with the Holt appellants that a Final Plan approved by the LRC is not entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. First of all, nothing in Article II, Section 17 requires such deference. The LRC's task certainly affects the Legislature, and the essence of the task may be legislative in nature. But, the Chairman of the LRC is not required to be a member of the General Assembly; in point of fact, the Chairman of the 2011 LRC is not a legislator; and none of the current Chairman's predecessors were then-current members of the General Assembly. In addition, the Final Plan, the LRC's challenged product, is not an act of the General Assembly, i.e., it was not a bill subject to legislative disclosure and debate, a general vote, adoption and presentation to the Governor for approval, or passage by a super-majority if vetoed. There is no basis for indulging a presumption of constitutionality in these circumstances. The most that can be said is that the Final Plan enjoys the same status as any action or decision where the challenging party bears the burden; and here, the burden is upon appellants to show that the plan is contrary to law.
Notably, prior to the Constitution of 1968, the task of redistricting Pennsylvania's legislative districts indeed fell to the General Assembly as a whole. See Gormley, Legislative Reapportionment, at 4–7. In practice, however, that body often failed to discharge its responsibility; indeed, it had failed to conduct a successful redistricting in over four decades. Some of this inertia may be attributed to partisan deadlock, but there is also an extent to which it simply reflected the reality that redistricting could mean some members would lose their seats. Id. at 7–9, 11; 790 A.2d 989. This legislative failure, combined with then-recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court newly interpreting the Equal Protection Clause as requiring states to address apportionment concerns along lines of population equality, and the recognition that courts were empowered to rule on such reapportionment arrangements, led the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention to adopt a new scheme. The result was the creation of the LRC, comprised of the four leaders of the Pennsylvania House and Senate and a “neutral chairman.” The decision to constitute that hybrid body, rather than enlisting the General Assembly itself, was a deliberate one. “[T]he [Reapportionment Committee of the Convention] avoided the creation of a purely political body. The proposed commission represented a compromise between allowing the legislature as a body to reapportion itself ..., and taking the process entirely out of the hands of that body ... which possessed the greatest expertise for this task. If this new hybrid commission failed to enact a lawful reapportionment plan within the prescribed time limits, the ultimate ‘tie-breaker’ would be the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, just as it had been in 1964–1966.” Id. at 10–11; 790 A.2d 989.
Our holding that the Final Plan is not entitled to a presumption of constitutionality does nothing to diminish the LRC's overall discretionary authority to redistrict the Commonwealth. As we make clear infra, our decision in this case does not command the LRC to devise particular benchmarks in terms of the number of subdivision splits, the extent of deviation in population equality, or the parameters of compact and contiguous districts. This paradigm recognizes the difficulty in the LRC's task and still reposes considerable discretion in its judgment.
Respecting the second point, the LRC states that it has viewed this Court's prior decisions passing upon redistricting challenges as setting guideposts for acceptable levels of population deviation and political subdivision splits. The LRC argues that its Final Plan should be measured against prior plans “approved” by this Court. In the LRC's view, a Plan that measures favorably with ( i.e., one that does not drastically depart from) past redistricting plans necessarily must be approved. The LRC argues that allowing a redistricting plan to be proved “contrary to law” by comparing it to proffered alternative plans invites an interminable search for the “better” or “best” plan, that would “create a jurisprudence of doubt and render future [legislative reapportionment commissions] unable to rely on precedent [to] draft a reapportionment plan with any confidence in its constitutionality.” LRC Brief at 32–33. The LRC decries such an approach as leaving redistricting to a computer rather than to “the duly-appointed members of the [LRC].” id. at 31 n. 16; 790 A.2d 989.
The Holt appellants respond that the Final Plan is reviewed by the Court to ensure that it is not contrary to law—a burden upon challengers that, in appellants' view, is not heavy. According to appellants, if a Final Plan “ignores a legal mandate ... without explanation and justification in the law,” the Plan is contrary to law. Holt Brief at 11. The Holt appellants distinguish our prior redistricting cases and argue that “[t]his Court's approval of prior reapportionment plans has no bearing on the present [appeal].” Id. at 25; 790 A.2d 989.
It is significant that the Constitution does not always require this Court's imprimatur before a redistricting plan can become final: if “the last day for filing an appeal has passed with no appeal taken,” the Final Plan automatically attains “the force of law.” Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(e). This Court has a role if, and only if, a citizen or citizens file an appeal from the Final Plan. See Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d)-(e). Unlike some other states, Pennsylvania's redistricting process does not command sua sponte judicial review by the Court of a redistricting plan, although it certainly could have done so.
In short, the current Final Plan is not insulated from attack by decisions of this Court finding prior redistricting plans constitutional, unless a materially indistinguishable challenge was raised and rejected in those decisions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garzone, 34 A.3d 67, 77–78 (Pa.2012) (court's language must be read against legal question at issue and operative facts). Our review of our precedent reveals that no decision of this Court has purported to establish, or “grandfather in,” any particular maximum level of population deviation; nor has any decision held that a certain number of political subdivision splits is constitutional, irrespective of the constitutional challenge being forwarded in challenging those splits.
This is a bedrock rule of jurisprudence involving precedent and stare decisis, and it is not a difficult rule to apply. For example, in Albert, we held that a reapportionment challenge could not succeed unless it addressed the Final Plan as a whole. Absent a reconsideration and rejection of that holding, localized challenges simply cannot succeed; and, indeed, we are enforcing the restriction and declining to reconsider Albert, See n. 18, supra.
In its redistricting jurisprudence, this Court has not purported to set any immovable “guideposts” for a redistricting commission to meet that would guarantee a finding of constitutionality, as against challenges premised upon population equality, subdivision splits, compactness, or contiguity. The LRC's reliance on prior cases as creating an expectation that its Final Plan would be found constitutional, is untenable. The “guideposts” to which a redistricting commission is bound are the U.S. Constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and this Court's relevant, specific holdings. We do not doubt that the LRC made a good faith effort to fit the population deviation and political subdivision splits in the current Final Plan within the factual parameters of the prior plans; but nothing in our decisions in the prior cases, and nothing in bedrock jurisprudence, created an expectation that such an effort was “pre-approved.” Instead, the polestar for the LRC remained, as always, the command of the people, conveyed in express terms in Article II, Section 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. B. Burden of Proof
The parties' dispute regarding the burden of proof is relatively diffuse but nonetheless important. The LRC's position is that appellants have the burden to demonstrate that the plan is contrary to law. LRC Brief at 15 (citing In re 1991 Plan, 609 A.2d at 136). The LRC notes that, unlike other state charters, our Constitution does not authorize this Court to automatically review a redistricting plan, irrespective of any objections or challenges, or to adopt rules for the production and presentation of evidence in support of the plan. See LRC Brief at 33–34 n. 18 (comparing Pa. Const. art. II, § 17(d) with Colo. Const. art. V, § 47(2)). Accordingly, in the LRC's view, the burden is not on the redistricting commission, as in those other jurisdictions, where the commission's actions are more closely and automatically scrutinized. Id.
Several appellants argue that the LRC either is or should be required to explain or justify aspects of the Final Plan. Thus, the Holt appellants argue that the Final Plan violates the Constitution “by failing to offer any ‘specific explanation for why the constitutional prerequisites of compactness and respect for political subdivisions cannot be accommodated simultaneous [sic] with the maintenance of substantial equality of population and enforcement of voting interests of protected groups in the manner prescribed by federal law.’ ” Holt Brief at 24 (quoting Albert, 790 A.2d at 1000 (Saylor, J., concurring)). Appellants in Costa suggest that the LRC should be required to “offer some demonstration of ‘necessity’ ” once an alternative plan is offered that identifies unnecessary subdivision splits. According to the Costa appellants, the LRC should have justified each division or eliminated such division from the Final Plan, rather than relying on generic assertions that respect for subdivision boundaries could not be accommodated. Costa Brief at 32. In a similar vein, but with a more direct approach, the Schiffer appellants ask the Court to consider alternate plans as prima facie proof that a particular political subdivision split was not absolutely necessary; the burden would then shift to the LRC “to show cause why [the Final P]lan was absolutely necessary.” Schiffer Brief at 10.
The operative mandates under Article II, Section 16 are to devise a legislative map of fifty senatorial and 203 representative districts, compact and contiguous, as nearly equal in population “as practicable,” and which do not fragment political subdivisions unless “absolutely necessary.” Although all of these commands are of Pennsylvania constitutional magnitude, one of the factors, that districts be “as nearly equal in population as practicable,” also exists as an independent command of federal constitutional law, including decisional law which changes and evolves. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Levin, 448 Pa. 1, 293 A.2d 15, 18 (Pa.1972) (“ Specter ”) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”)). Below, we address the developments in federal and state decisional law that govern, and complicate, our analysis of the citizen appeals before the Court. A. The Federal Overlay of Redistricting
Other mandates, not relevant to our disposition here, but important to the LRC's task, are the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title [relating to members of language minority group]....”).
26. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081(1961).
In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946), three Illinois voters challenged the extant Congressional district apportionment in that state as invalid under federal apportionment statutory law and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The appellants argued that the apportionment scheme no longer provided sufficient representation for urban areas where population had expanded significantly during the course of the twentieth century, while rural areas that had lost population retained representative power that increasingly outstripped their declining populations. The High Court declined to engage itself, finding “this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination.... It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.” Id. at 552–54, 66 S.Ct. 1198.
Concurring in the Colegrove result, Justice Rutledge wrote: “There is not, and could not be except abstractly, a right of absolute equality in voting. At best there could be only a rough approximation.” Id. at 566, 66 S.Ct. 1198 (Rutledge, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, pointed out that the Illinois districting scheme at issue had been established in 1901 and included Congressional districts ranging in population from roughly 100,000 to 900,000; but the legislative authorities in the state benefitted from the scheme and therefore ensured perpetuation of inequitable apportionment. The dissent viewed the facts presented as “a wholly indefensible discrimination” forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause, which the dissent would have found to be the basis of a cognizable cause of action. Id. at 566–74, 66 S.Ct. 1198 (Black, J., dissenting).
In 1960, the High Court decided Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), a case primarily involving the right to vote secured by the Fifteenth Amendment. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frankfurter rejected the position of city and county authorities that claims of blatant racially discriminatory redistricting in Tuskegee, Alabama, fell within the discretionary power of local government. Although recognizing that political power was at issue, the Court held that when “the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil [citizens] of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights,” the matter entered the constitutional sphere and could be subject to judicial disposition. Id. at 347–48, 81 S.Ct. 125. Later, in 1962, Colegrove was largely negated in the landmark decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), where the Court held that allegations that a state apportionment action deprived voters of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment were justiciable and therefore within the sphere of judicial engagement. What followed was as new and dynamic in the voting rights sphere as was the Warren Court's contemporaneous revolution of criminal procedure throughout the land. This new jurisprudence interpreted and gave concrete meaning to the Equal Protection Clause, and effectively changed the elective systems of virtually all of the states, as well as the U.S. House of Representatives. See Butcher v. Bloom, 420 Pa. 305, 216 A.2d 457, 460–63 (Pa.1966) ( Butcher II ) (Bell, C.J., concurring).
Shortly after Baker v. Carr, the Court developed the concepts of “one person, one vote” and the “equal population principle.” The language first arose in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963), where the Court disapproved Georgia's use of a “county unit system” to count votes in primary elections for certain statewide offices. The Court found that Georgia's weighting of each county's votes equally, regardless of population differential, violated equal protection, memorably noting that: “The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments, can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” Id. at 381, 83 S.Ct. 801. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), the Court considered the constitutionality of Georgia's apportionment scheme for federal Congressional districts, which resulted in one district of less than 300,000 in total population, and another district with more than 800,000 in total population. The Court concluded that Georgia's scheme unconstitutionally discriminated against voters in more densely populated districts, noting that: “While it may not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision, that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives. That is the high standard of justice and common sense which the Founders set for us.” Id. at 18, 84 S.Ct. 526.
Gray was not an apportionment case, however, and Wesberry addressed federal Congressional districting issues. The two concepts of “one person, one vote” and the “equal population principle” became woven together in the state legislature apportionment context in the Court's landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). In Reynolds, the Court addressed an equal protection challenge to proposed plans for reapportionment of both houses of the Alabama Legislature. The facts in Reynolds revealed that due to decades of non-reapportionment, for example, rural counties having as low as 13,462 in total population retained two seats in the Alabama House, but Mobile County, which includes the City of Mobile and had a total population exceeding 300,000, was allotted only three seats. The federal district court concluded that the scheme in Alabama led to disparities in which votes in less-populated rural senatorial districts were effectively “worth” fifteen to twenty times as much as votes cast in more densely populated and rapidly urbanizing districts. In an 8–1 opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the Court held: “Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies.... The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens....” Id. at 567–68, 84 S.Ct. 1362.
Having so concluded, the Court held that, to ensure the right of voters to have their votes “weighted equally,” each house of a state legislature must be apportioned on what the Court termed “a population basis”: “[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362. While recognizing that absolute or exact equality of population would be impossible, the Court expressed that apportionment schemes must still be based “substantially” on the principle of population equality, which was not to be “diluted in any significant way” by a given plan. Id. at 578, 84 S.Ct. 1362.
But, the Reynolds Court recognized that the task was not so simple. Thus, the Court continued that, within limits, a State's desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions and to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory is a legitimate and constitutionally valid countervailing interest. The Court noted that, “[i]ndiscriminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.” Id. at 578–79, 84 S.Ct. 1362. To allow for achievement of legitimate goals such as subdivision integrity in apportioning state legislative districts, the Court held that some deviations from the equal population principle may be permissible under federal law. Nevertheless, “the overriding objective [in redistricting] must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.” Id. at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362. The Court continued that, if the “result” of a “clearly rational state policy of according some legislative representation to political subdivisions” is to submerge population as the controlling consideration, “then the right of all of the State's citizens to cast an effective and adequately weighted vote would be unconstitutionally impaired.” Id. at 581, 84 S.Ct. 1362; see also Lucas v. Forty–Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 84 S.Ct. 1459, 12 L.Ed.2d 632 (1964) (striking down state legislative scheme for failing to provide adequate justification for substantial disparities from population-based representation in allocation of Senate seats to disfavored populous areas).
Again, however, the jurisprudence, which evolved through case-specific challenges, was dynamic. Not long after Reynolds, the Court began to express a less restrictive approach to the population equality principle when certain countervailing circumstances were presented. Thus, in Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 29 L.Ed.2d 399 (1971), the Court considered a plan to reapportion Rockland County in New York State. When compared with ideal population equality for each of the five districts within the county, the total deviation amounted to 11.9%. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall reiterated that population equality remained crucial, but opined that “the particular circumstances and needs of a local community as a whole may sometimes justify departures from strict equality.” Id. at 185, 91 S.Ct. 1904. Later, in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973), the Court reviewed and upheld a plan created by the Virginia state assembly to reapportion both of its legislative houses in which political subdivisions were largely left intact, but the total deviation from ideal population equality was 16.4% in the Virginia House of Delegates. The Court recognized that “broader latitude” may be permissible in state apportionment matters, when considerations such as the integrity of political subdivisions are at issue: “The State can scarcely be condemned for simultaneously attempting to move toward smaller districts and to maintain the integrity of its political subdivision lines.” Id. at 322, 327, 93 S.Ct. 979. Notably, in a footnote, the Mahan opinion described maintenance of subdivision integrity and providing for population equality as a “dual goal” that the Virginia plan managed to satisfy on both counts. Id. at 328 n. 9, 329, 93 S.Ct. 979.
Finally, in Gaffney, supra, the Court considered a reapportionment plan based on 1970 census data and prepared by an eight-member bipartisan commission and then a three-member board, both of which were appointed by the leadership of Connecticut's General Assembly. The Connecticut state Constitution provided that within the bounds of federal constitutional standards, division of towns (Connecticut's basic unit of local government) with regard to state house districts was not permitted except in narrow express circumstances. The Court critiqued apportionment approaches that would slavishly labor under an “unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures” such that relevant and legitimate factors and interests that states must account for are submerged. 412 U.S. at 749, 93 S.Ct. 2321. The Court stressed that the work of state apportionment authorities tasked with state legislative redistricting need not be rejected solely on the basis of deviations from population equality: “We doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment requires repeated displacement of otherwise appropriate state decisionmaking in the name of essentially minor deviations from perfect census-population equality that no one, with confidence, can say will deprive any person of fair and effective representation in his state legislature.” Id.
Subsequent cases handed down on this issue by the High Court have not established any rigid standards as to what level of deviation from absolute population equality violates the Equal Protection Clause; the analysis is fact specific.
The 1874 Pennsylvania Constitution shifted the measure of proportionality from taxable inhabitants to total population, while the task of reapportionment remained in the hands of the General Assembly, which was newly required to conduct a reapportionment after each U.S. decennial census. 1874 Pa. Const. art. II § 18. The section on apportionment of the Senate mandated that: “The State shall be divided into fifty senatorial districts of compact and contiguous territory, as nearly equal in population as may be, and each district shall be entitled to elect one Senator.” 1874 Pa. Const. art. II, § 16. Section 16 also required respect for the integrity of political subdivisions: “No ward, borough or township shall be divided in the formation of a district.” Id. The provision respecting apportionment of the House was considerably more complicated, but included mandates respecting proportional representation, and compact and contiguous territory. 1874 Pa. Const. art. II, § 17. Despite the command that reapportionment occur every ten years, in fact, reapportionment in the Commonwealth remained sporadic and, over the decades, lesser populated districts increasingly enjoyed representation far beyond their actual population numbers.
Article II, Section 17 provided:
In the wake of the then-recently issued Reynolds decision, this Court first addressed state legislative apportionment in Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556 (Pa.1964) (“ Butcher I ”). The unanimous decision by Justice Roberts noted the high stakes at the outset:
This suit challenges the recent Pennsylvania Reapportionment Acts and the election of state senators and representatives thereunder. More importantly, it challenges—in light of recent decisions interpreting the Constitution of the United States—the validity of certain provisions of the Constitution of Pennsylvania which establish the legislative branch of government. It presents one of the most important constitutional questions ever raised in the history of this Commonwealth. It involves the basic rights of the citizens of Pennsylvania in the election of their state lawmakers. Historically and logically, this Court is the most appropriate forum to determine the issues presented and to fashion suitable remedies. Proper and continuing respect for federal-state judicial relationships necessitates consideration by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of the relevant state statutes and state constitutional provisions, subject, of course, to review by the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 559–60.
We then found that the General Assembly's apportionment legislation of 1964 contained such dramatic deviations from the goal of substantially equal population, as newly announced by the U.S. Supreme Court, among both Senate and House districts, that the apportionment violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 564, 567. Part of the problem with the 1964 plan, as explained by this Court, was the vestigial practice of allocating at least one representative to each county in the state regardless of the county's population. Relying on language in Reynolds, this Court held that the historic practice could no longer continue because it so clearly resulted in unequal representation dynamics in both state houses: “[A]ssignment of one seat to each county, regardless of population, results in the submergence of population as the controlling consideration in apportionment and is offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 566. Notably, while we recognized that the “population principle” set forth in Reynolds was “the starting point and controlling criterion” in redistricting, we also stressed the importance of other provisions in the 1874 Pennsylvania Constitution:
It is our view that Section 16, when construed as a whole, demands that Senate apportionment legislation respect county lines and lines of other political subdivisions (such as wards, boroughs, and townships), insofar as possible, without doing violence to the population principle enunciated by the first sentence of Section 16 and also by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.... The requirement [in Section 17, respecting the House] that apportionment should be among the several counties further signifies an intention to respect county lines and to utilize counties as units of representation to the maximum extent consistent with the equal-population principle. Indeed, Section 17, when considered as a whole, demands that the boundaries of all political subdivisions be respected when not in conflict with the overriding population principle. Id. at 570–71.
Time constraints precluded the Butcher I Court from fashioning any remedy with regard to the 1964 plan. The Butcher I Court's solution was to direct that the 1964 elections proceed under the infirm legislation, retain jurisdiction, and direct the General Assembly to correct course and devise a constitutionally valid plan for the 1966 election cycle no later than September 1, 1965. Id. at 573. The General Assembly failed to enact a plan, and so this Court found itself obliged to reapportion the Commonwealth on its own. We did so by a 4–3 vote in Butcher II, in 1966. See 420 Pa. 305, 216 A.2d 457 ( per curiam ). In explaining the plan, the per curiam opinion in Butcher II reiterated the balancing of multiple mandates required in redistricting: “Our primary concern has been to provide for substantial equality of population among legislative districts. At the same time, we have sought to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions and to create compact districts of contiguous territory, insofar as these goals could be realized....” Id. at 459. Justice Roberts, the author of Butcher I, wrote in partial dissent, objecting to the House plan on federal constitutional grounds, i.e., “based primarily on its failure to observe the equal population principle and other guidelines mandated by the controlling decisions of the [U.S.] Supreme Court ... and set forth in our earlier opinion in this case.” Id. at 474 (Roberts, J., dissenting in part).
The advantages of assignment [of] the responsibility for reapportioning the Legislature to such a commission are quite obvious, and several other states have recently adopted or considered proposals for similar commissions. The equal representation on the Commission provided to the majority and minority members of each house precludes the reapportionment process from being unfairly dominated by the party in power at the moment of apportionment. In addition, the provision for a chairman who can act as a ‘tiebreaker’ eliminates the possibility of a legislative deadlock on reapportionment such as the one that occurred in the Legislature of this Commonwealth in 1965 and compelled this Court to undertake the task of reapportionment. At the same time the Legislature's expertise in reapportionment matters is essentially retained. Specter, 293 A.2d at 17–18 (footnotes omitted).
The fundamental districting principles that the [U.S. Supreme] Court has deemed legitimate over the years include, but are not limited to, “compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests....” The final principle mentioned is particularly important in the voting rights context. Historically, reapportionment bodies have considered “communities of interest” as one legitimate factor in drawing fair and politically sensitive districts. A redistricting body need not draw rigid squares of equal population; in fact, few states do so. Rather, redistricting bodies traditionally take into account a host of intangible communities, seeking to give them, where practicable, a voice in the government without unduly fracturing that voice. Thus, school districts, religious communities, ethnic communities, geographic communities which share common bonds due to locations of rivers, mountains and highways, and a host of other “communities of interest” are routinely considered by districting bodies in order to construct fair and effective maps. Shared racial background, along with political affiliation, ethnic identity, religious affiliation, occupational background, all can converge to create bona fide communities of interest, to the extent that the redistricting body makes an honest effort to draw lines around geographically compact groups in order to give them a voice in the governmental process.
As a practical matter, it is rare that a reapportionment body is able (or desires) to wholly capture a “community of interest” and draw lines around it, in a fashion that perfectly isolates it into a circle or square. In reality, communities of interest are elusive, imprecise entities. Reapportionment bodies and lower courts must be cautious when it comes to this concept, particularly where it serves as a basis for creating legislative districts tied to race, because it has the potential for abuse. Specifically, it can be used as a ruse to engage in improper maximization of majority-minority districts where no real communities exist. At the same time, states have historically considered a broad range of such imprecise communities of interest (many of which are naturally intertwined) in exercising their sound discretion. They do so to satisfy constituents. They do so to sweep together a host of generally identifiable interest groups that wish to be given a unified voice. This is perfectly healthy and permissible. It is an important aspect of the state's prerogative, when it comes to structuring its own form of government. Consequently, when it comes to reapportionment bodies considering race in this permissive, discretionary fashion, the courts should scrupulously avoid meddling. Gormley, Racial Mind–Games and Reapportionment, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L 735, 779–81 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
The new constitutional redistricting scheme came into play two years later, after the 1970 census. Eighteen appeals were filed from the 1971 LRC's Final Plan, and this Court found the plan to be constitutional by a 4–3 vote, with Justice Roberts authoring the majority opinion, a mere six years after the Court itself had devised a reapportionment plan. Specter, 293 A.2d at 19. Perhaps inevitably given the newness of the federal (and now state constitutional) command for districts as nearly equal in size as practicable, the Specter majority focused primarily on population divergences, as measured by federal law. We began by noting that the additional objectives for reapportionment plans in new Article II, Section 16 (beyond population equality) “were specifically recognized,” by Reynolds, as “legitimate considerations which can justify some divergence from a strict population standard.” Id. at 18.
Although the Specter Court noted that eighteen appeals were filed, it never identified the issues raised by the appellants, nor did it engage in a point-by-point discussion of the issues. Rather, the Court addressed the plan as a whole, addressing the federal equal population issue first and at length, and then provided briefer discussions of the remaining constitutional factors of integrity of political subdivisions, contiguity, and compactness. See also 293 A.2d at 27 n. 7 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting, joined by Jones, C.J.) (“The majority opinion, it will be noted, speaks only in general terms, making no attempt to address itself to the particular exceptions and arguments of the various appellants.”).
Nevertheless, Specter emphasized that Reynolds still counseled that, in any reapportionment scheme, “the overriding objective must be substantial equality of population.” Id. (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362). Given that fact, we noted that “it is not constitutionally permissible to totally achieve Section 16's objective of respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions.” Id. (emphasis added). Turning to the separate concern of compactness, we noted that “Section 16's desire for districts that are ‘compact’ must also yield, if need be, to the ‘overriding objective ... [of] substantial equality of population.’ ” Id. at 19 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362) (emphasis added). The Court viewed the balancing approach required, under the new constitutional provisions, to be the same as the balancing the Court itself had outlined in explaining the redistricting undertaken in Butcher II.
Turning to the plan under review, the Specter Court noted that, since our decision in Butcher II, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued additional decisions striking down reapportionment plans in two cases involving congressional redistricting. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 89 S.Ct. 1239, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). In those cases, the High Court had found that the states' expressed desire to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions did not justify departures from the population equality requirement. The Specter Court recognized that the new decisions did not involve state legislative reapportionment. We also recognized that “ Kirkpatrick 's rejection, in Congressional redistricting, of the maintenance of the boundaries of political subdivisions as a justification for deviations from absolute population equality, cannot be applied in full force to state legislative reapportionment.” Specter, 293 A.2d at 20. Nevertheless, we viewed the decisions as “indicat[ing]” that “deviations from equality of population that were formerly regarded as insubstantial and permissible will now be regarded as substantial and impermissible, necessitating a closer adherence to equity of population, even in the area of state legislative apportionment.” Id. Our analysis in this regard reflects that, no matter how static the governing constitutional language is, the federal decisional law that must be accounted for is fluid and dynamic.
[N]one of the appellants in this matter offered any concrete or objective data indicating that the districts established by the Commission's plan lack compactness. The Pennsylvania Constitution requires that those who challenge the Commission's plan have the burden of establishing that it is “contrary to law.” In light of appellants' failure to produce any objective data indicating that the districts established by the Commission's plan lack compactness, we cannot conclude, merely on the basis of appellants' unsupported assertions, that the Commission's plan fails for lack of compactness. Id. at 24.
In 1981, this Court approved the second reapportionment under the 1968 constitutional scheme, again by a 4–3 vote. In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 663. Justice Roberts, again writing for the majority, interpreted Specter as holding that “as a matter of both federal and state law, equality of population must be the controlling consideration in the apportionment of legislative seats.” Id. at 665 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362). Like the Specter Court, the In re 1981 Plan Court began by examining population deviations, and concluded that the 1981 Final Plan passed constitutional muster: “There is no doubt that this plan, which more nearly achieves the goal of equal population than did the 1971 reapportionment plan in Specter, satisfies equal protection requirements.” Id. at 666, 293 A.2d 15. Indeed, “the final plan achieves an equality of population among legislative districts closer to the constitutional ideal of ‘one person, one vote’ than any previous reapportionment plan in the history of the Commonwealth.” Id.
The In re 1981 Plan Court then turned to the various specific challenges brought by the appellants. First, the appellants claimed that the plan went too far in pursuing the constitutional goal of “one person, one vote,” and in so doing failed to satisfy the requirements of compactness and respect for the integrity of political subdivisions. Specifically, the appellants argued that district deviations from compactness and subdivision boundaries were constitutionally permissible “only if those deviations are absolutely necessary to survive federal equal protection analysis.” Id. The Court rejected the notion that these concerns were of equal value to population equality, and stated that “if need be, concerns for compactness and adherence to political subdivision lines must yield to this ‘overriding objective’ ” of “ ‘substantial equality of population.’ ” Id. (emphasis added).
The In re 1981 Plan Court next turned to the appellants' argument relying on U.S. Supreme Court cases decided since Specter, which had upheld greater district population deviations than in either the 1971 Final Plan or the 1981 Final Plan. From those cases, the appellants argued that federally tolerated limits of substantial equality of population should define the Pennsylvania standard as well, which would allow more room to respect other constitutional imperatives, such as compactness and subdivision integrity. We rejected the argument, noting that it: “disregards the critical fact that adherence to a percentage deviation that is at the outside limits of constitutionality cannot be squared with the overriding constitutional objective of ‘substantial equality of population’ among districts. The Pennsylvania Constitution plainly states that districts shall be ‘as nearly equal in population as practicable.’ Thus, the clear constitutional directive is that reapportionment shall strive to create districts as equal, not as unequal, as possible.” Id. at 667, 293 A.2d 15. Moreover, we noted, there is no “predetermined percentage deviation from the ideal of ‘one person, one vote’ that satisfies the federal constitutional requirement of ‘substantial equality of population.’ ” Id.
Turning to the particulars of the 1981 Plan, the Court began by stressing federal authority that, “ ‘in determining whether a good faith effort to establish districts substantially equal in population has been made, a court must necessarily consider a State's legislative apportionment scheme as a whole.’ ” Id. at 668, 293 A.2d 15 (quoting Lucas, 377 U.S. at 735 n. 27, 84 S.Ct. 1459). We then concluded that the 1981 Plan “reflects a constitutionally permissible judgment on the part of the Commission that the deviations from mathematical compactness and political subdivision boundaries contained in the plan are necessary to achieve the overriding constitutional goal of districts ‘as equal in population as practicable.’ ” Id. We elaborated by noting the inevitability that certain counties and municipalities would have to be split; the relatively small number of subdivision splits; and that none of the arguments by the appellants convinced the Court that the drawing of district lines was based on impermissible considerations. Disapproving of specific, localized challenges, the Court noted that “[m]ere dissatisfaction with the fact that certain political subdivisions have been divided or have been included within particular legislative districts is not sufficient to invalidate the Final Reapportionment Plan as unconstitutional.” Id.
The gradual preeminence of the one-person-one-vote principle in the 1971 and 1981 reapportionments would be turned on its head in the reapportionment of 1991. By this time, computers and high technology would make equality in population a simple exercise, while new frontiers, particularly the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 [42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1974E) ] (as it had been amended in 1982), would loom up with historic prominence and threaten to topple reapportionment plans in Pennsylvania and across the nation.” Gormley, Legislative Reapportionment, at 18. Gormley recounts that, cognizant of the “super-emphasis” on population equality, the 1991 LRC was armed with tools that could achieve increasingly “ideal” districts, but still sought to remain flexible when faced with additional reapportionment factors, such as those set forth in Section 16, and the belief in the propriety of attempting to achieve political “fairness” by maintaining, to a practicable degree, the parties' existing balance of power. Id. at 26–27, 45–47.
In a decision resolving twenty-five appeals, this Court upheld the 1991 Final Plan, without dissent, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Nix. In re 1991 Plan, 609 A.2d at 147. The Court spent little time dismissing challenges, similar to those raised ten years before, that the imperative of population equality “is not so important that it warrants the division of counties and other political subdivisions.” Id. at 138. As in 1981, this argument was premised upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, rendered after Reynolds, which had upheld state reapportionment plans with, by this point in time, variances of up to 16%. Id. at 138–39 & n. 6 (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983) (plan with average deviation of 16%)). From that federal authority, the appellants argued that “these cases bind this Court to require greater population variances to protect the sanctity of political subdivision borders.” Id. at 138. We disagreed:
Appellants are incorrect. The Supreme Court of the United States held [in Reynolds ] that “some deviations from the equal population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the reapportionment of seats in a state legislature.” This language merely allows a state to apportion seats between districts that are not strictly equal in population; it does not mandate it. Our Constitution requires that the overriding objective of reapportionment is equality of population, and in 1972 and 1981 this Court approved plans in which the overriding objective was equality of population. We see no reason now in 1992 to retreat from those earlier holdings. 609 A.2d at 138–39 (citation omitted and italics in original).
The remainder of the challenges reviewed in In re 1991 Plan involved issues not pertinent here; the major challenges involved the Voting Rights Act.
In 2002, this Court, in a unanimous decision by Mr. Chief Justice Zappala, approved the 2001 Final Plan, based upon the 2000 census, in the face of eleven appeals. Albert, 790 A.2d at 991. After surveying our prior reapportionment decisions, we noted that our review focused on an examination of “the final plan as a whole,” and we reiterated the teaching from In re 1981 Plan that, “ ‘to prevail in their challenge to the final reapportionment plan, appellants have the burden of establishing not .... that there exists an alternative plan which is ‘preferable’ or ‘better,’ but rather that the final plan filed by the Pennsylvania Reapportionment Commission fails to meet constitutional requirements.' ” 790 A.2d at 995 (quoting from In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 665).
More specifically, the Albert opinion credited the 2001 LRC's argument that various claims failed as conclusory or vague; and that the 2001 Final Plan “compares favorably” to prior plans the Court had approved in terms of population deviation. Id. at 998. Respecting the various complaints about particular districts being split unnecessarily, the Court also credited the 2001 LRC's averments that: the overriding objective was equality of population; other factors causing subdivision splits resulted from Voting Rights Act requirements and population shifts; the 2001 Plan compared “favorably” to prior plans “found to be constitutional by this Court”; and the number of political subdivisions split remained relatively small. Id. at 999. Finally, we rejected individual pleas premised upon particular subdivision splits, as follows: “The appellants urge us to consider the ‘homogeneity’ and ‘shared interests' of a community as guidelines. We believe that these concepts are too elastic and amorphous, however, to serve as a judicial standard for assessing the reapportionment process. As the appellants' arguments indicate, these concepts often reflect nothing more than continuation of the pre-existing legislative districts. Should community interests be fostered merely by residing in the same district, we have no reason to believe that the current reapportionment of the legislative districts will not achieve this result with the passage of time.” Id.
I remain circumspect concerning the manner in which state constitutional requirements of compactness and integrity of political subdivisions have been applied by the Court in the prior decisions that are followed here, and I am receptive to the concern that the Court should not occupy an unduly passive role in the vindication of these essential precepts. I write, therefore, to express my own position that facets of the Commission's present plan for reapportioning the Pennsylvania Legislature test the outer limits of justifiable deference, at least in the absence of some specific explanation for why the constitutional prerequisites of compactness and respect for political subdivisions cannot be accommodated simultaneous with the maintenance of substantial equality of population and enforcement of voting interests of protected groups in the manner prescribed by federal law. Id. at 1000 (Saylor, J., concurring).
Our holding that the global challengers have proven that the 2011 Final Plan is contrary to law follows almost inexorably from the global nature of their challenge—global in the sense that it challenges the entire 2011 Final Plan—and our holdings above concerning the scope and standard of review. This is so because the LRC has premised its central defense against these global challenges upon its position on the judicial review points. As noted, our last redistricting decision, in Albert, rejected a number of appeals posing various localized challenges to the 2001 Final Plan, and emphasized, consistently with our prior decisions, that a successful appellant must challenge a final plan as a whole. Albert, 790 A.2d at 995–96; accord In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 667–68. No challenger did so in Albert, and insofar as our prior Opinions in this area reflect, no challenger did so in the redistricting litigation in 1972, 1981, or 1992, either.
In the past, this Court has dismissed redistricting objections which failed to offer “any concrete or objective data” and relied instead on “conclusory” allegations and dictionary definitions to support claims of constitutional violations. Specter, 293 A.2d at 24. The Holt and Costa appellants have not made this error; they have produced, and they submitted to the LRC, detailed plans deriving from concrete data, data also used by the LRC, to support their assertions that the pervasive political subdivision splits in the Final Plan were not “absolutely necessary.” Notably, the particulars of these alternative plans have not been materially contested by the LRC.
We view the alternative, global plans as comprising the sort of concrete and objective data envisioned in Specter. The LRC argues that alternative plans should not be considered evidence by this Court because their general accuracy is questionable, given that the challengers do not benefit from the extensive and knowledgeable technical, administrative, and institutional capabilities which safeguard the LRC's process. See LRC Brief at 31–32. In addition, the LRC provides two examples in which counties are either not accounted for or are double-counted in the Holt alternative plan. At argument, however, counsel for the Holt appellants explained that the inaccuracies of which the LRC complained were clerical errors in transcription from the original document composed by Ms. Holt, which in fact accounted for all subdivisions; and noted similar errors in the LRC's legal description of the Final Plan. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 1/23/12, at 20–21. The LRC did not dispute the explanation.
For purposes of explication, in examining whether the 2011 Final Plan is contrary to law, we will focus primarily on the evidence represented by Holt's alternative plan. This plan shows that a redistricting map could readily be fashioned which maintained a roughly equivalent level of population deviation—the LRC's primary justification for the numerosity of the political subdivisions it divided—as the Final Plan, while employing significantly fewer political subdivision splits with respect to both Chambers of the General Assembly. The Holt appellants also highlighted that their alternative plan had deviations from the ideal population for both the House and Senate districts that were smaller than the deviations in the Final Plan. Although appellants' brief goes into great detail comparing their plan to the Final Plan, the most convincing point is the raw number difference in subdivision splits. In the House, the alternative plan splits seven fewer counties, 81 fewer municipalities, and 184 fewer wards; in the Senate: the Holt plan splits seven fewer counties, two fewer municipalities, and 22 fewer wards. In addition, with regard to political subdivisions which were split at least once, the Holt plan created: in the House: 39 fewer county fractures, 186 fewer municipality fractures, and 228 fewer ward fractures; and in the Senate: 37 fewer county fractures, six fewer municipality fractures, and 50 fewer ward fractures, than the Final Plan. In total, for the House, 184 fewer subdivisions were divided, and 453 fewer fractures were established; in the Senate, 31 fewer subdivisions were split, and 93 fewer divisions were established. Holt Brief at 17. The LRC does not dispute the accuracy of this accounting. The Holt appellants also offered specific examples of political subdivisions with populations smaller than the ideal House or Senate district which were maintained intact in the alternative plan while maintaining appropriate levels of population deviation.
The Holt appellants presented an alternative plan to the LRC on November 18, 2011, which was then amended twice; all three plans were attached to the Holt Petition for Review as exhibits. In their brief, the Holt appellants focus on the latest amended plan, to which we will confine our discussion.
We have intentionally avoided listing the specific number of divisions in the alternative plans because our decision does not purport to convey in absolute terms what is an acceptable number of political subdivision splits.
The Holt appellants argue that the Final Plan is contrary to law because, as their alternate plan proves, while the Final Plan may comply with governing law respecting population equality, the Plan flouted independent and coexisting Pennsylvania constitutional mandates of compactness and contiguity of legislative districts, and respect for political subdivision boundaries. Appellants claim that, if the LRC had prepared a plan in strict compliance with Section 16, including the requirement respecting population equality, a significant number of political subdivision splits would not have occurred, because they could not have been “absolutely necessary.” The alternative plan, appellants assert, proves that compliance with the constitutional requirements of population equality, compactness, and contiguity does not and cannot justify the extent of the division of counties, municipalities, and wards in the Final Plan. Accordingly, appellants suggest that remand is appropriate for the LRC to “make ‘a second attempt at reapportionment’ that complies with the plain language of Section 16 of Article [II] of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” See Holt Brief at 16–20.
In the alternative, appellants claim that the LRC should have provided a “specific explanation” for why the constitutional mandates could not be accommodated. Holt Brief at 24 (citing Albert, 790 A.2d at 1000 (Saylor, J., concurring)). As our mandate reflects, we view appellants' argument as already having established that the Final Plan was contrary to law. The LRC has had a full opportunity to offer neutral explanations of what were proven to be vast numbers of unnecessary splits of political subdivisions, and failed to do so. We see no point in a remand for a specific explanation, in addition to the ones proffered, under these circumstances.
The Costa appellants add only that the constitutional mandate to respect political subdivision boundaries in the redistricting process is unambiguous and should not be read out of Section 16. The language “unless absolutely necessary,” according to these appellants, should be read as a command that the LRC “must avoid the splits of governmental units, if at all possible.” Costa Brief at 29. In all other respects, the Costa arguments are similar to those of the Holt appellants. According to the Costa appellants: “[u]nlike in past reapportionment challenges, the statewide statistical data that Senator Costa presented provides conclusive evidence that it was not ‘absolutely necessary’ for the [LRC] to divide multiple subdivisions. That data is reflected in the [a]lternative [p]lan, which, in all relevant respects, is similar to the Final Plan except for its reduction in the number of divisions of political subdivisions.” Id. at 32–33. The Costa appellants request remand and suggest that their alternative plan should serve as the starting point for the LRC in its second attempt at redistricting. Id. at 34, 293 A.2d 15.
The LRC also levels an individual criticism at the Holt plan, complaining that, although this alternative achieves greater population parity overall, in some specific districts, the population equality deviation is greater than under the Final Plan. Thus, the LRC requests that the Court dismiss these appeals because the 2011 Final Plan is superior to the 2001 Final Plan in terms of population equality deviation and the number of political subdivision splits.
The LRC also criticizes specifics of the Costa plan, on grounds that it achieves fewer political subdivision splits at the cost of increasing the population deviation to a level higher than the Final Plan, and higher than any other plan since 1971. Furthermore, the LRC reviews each political subdivision fracture in the Final Plan of which the Costa appellants complain, and claims that each was either necessitated by the “overriding” population equality mandate or had been split in the 2001 Final Plan and, therefore, was “approved” by this Court in Albert. We answer the latter point, respecting supposed prior “approvals,” in text. Respecting the population deviation point, since our analysis above turns on Holt, we will confine our response to the LRC's criticism of that plan.
As a subsidiary point, the LRC argues that only the number of split subdivisions, and not the total number of fractures, is relevant to our constitutional inquiry. We find no support in our prior decisions, and the LRC offers no developed or cogent argument, favoring this premise.
More fundamentally, we recognize that this Court's prior decisions emphasized equality of population as the primary directive in the redistricting efforts of the LRC. That mandate is unique because it is dually commanded by our charter and the federal Equal Protection Clause—an independent force, with contours that may change with each new relevant decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. Our prior decisions have gone so far as to recognize that, “if need be,” the concerns for compactness and adherence to political subdivision lines must yield to the “overriding objective” of “substantial equality of population.” See In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 666; Specter, 293 A.2d at 18–19 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362). We have also stated that “if necessary, any political subdivision or subdivisions may be divided or combined in the formation of districts where the population principle cannot otherwise be satisfied.” Specter, 293 A.2d at 25 (quoting Butcher I, 203 A.2d at 570–571). But, all of this Court's cases, going back to Butcher I, have specifically recognized that population equality is not the only command in redistricting. Every one of the cases has an important qualifier, such as “if need be,” “if necessary,” if the population principle “cannot otherwise” be satisfied. We have always recognized the independent vitality of the requirements of contiguity, compactness, and the integrity of political subdivisions. Moreover, none of the cases identify a population variation that must be achieved in redistricting; just as we did not require the LRC to expand population deviation to the outer limits that might be approved under federal law, In re 1981 Plan, 442 A.2d at 667, we also did not say that compression of population equality to the narrowest point of difference is required, at the expense of absolute, constitutional commands of compactness, contiguity and integrity of political subdivisions. The “practicable” modifier in the “as nearly equal in population as practicable” language necessarily leaves room for the operation of the other constitutional commands.
Much focus, in the briefs, and at argument, has been placed on the level of proof required to show that a Final Plan is contrary to law, the fear being that “someone can always come up with a better plan.” We need not determine a minimum level of proof, deriving from such an “alternate” plan (or other concrete source), that would be “enough” to show that a Final Plan made excessive political subdivision splits without absolute necessity. We realize that the task is not so simple as the production of a plan with “better” numbers; thus, we reject the invitation to set firm parameters. It is enough that the Holt plan here overwhelmingly shows that the 2011 Final Plan made subdivision splits that were not absolutely necessary, and certainly could not be justified on the population equality or other grounds proffered. Indeed, the proof is strong enough that we view it as inconceivable, to borrow from one of the U.S. Supreme Court's equal protection decisions, that the magnitude of the subdivision splits here was unavoidable. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 532, 89 S.Ct. 1225 (“[I]t is simply inconceivable that population disparities of the magnitude found in the Missouri plan were unavoidable.”).
We likewise realize that the absence of certainty is a frustration for the LRC, a concern ably articulated by counsel. But, that is often the case when constitutional principles are at work, and particularly when competing constitutional principles apply. This is reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court's own fact-specific decisional law in the equal protection cases and the Voting Rights Act cases, all factors with which the LRC must contend. In Reynolds, the High Court spoke of the Equal Protection Clause requiring “that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362. We trust, too, in the good faith of the LRC to fashion a plan, upon remand, that comports with all of the requirements of Article II, Section 16.
The obvious “compactness” issues with three particular Senate districts were noted by the Court at oral argument. Senate District 3 stretches—in the shape of a wish bone—from the far northeast section of Philadelphia down into North Philadelphia, and then up again into the Roxborough/Chestnut Hill area. Meanwhile, Senate District 35 reaches—like a crooked finger—from the southernmost border of Pennsylvania, north across two thirds of the Commonwealth, and contains all of Bedford County, all of Cambria County, a small portion of Somerset County, then enters Clearfield County, and finally crosses over into Clinton County. Perhaps less overt, but no less facially problematic in terms of compactness, was Senate District 15, described by the Court as an “iron cross,” which reaches from North to South narrowly, and then East to West narrowly, to cover a third of York County, a third of Dauphin County, and to timidly reach into corners of Adams and Lancaster Counties. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 1/23/12, at 43–45, 70, 83–85. In response, the LRC explained that the reach of these districts—one of which is in the most densely populated area of the Commonwealth, Philadelphia—is justified by the primacy of the population equality concern. See, e.g., id. at 43, 790 A.2d 989 (LRC counsel stated that Senate District 3 “is compact given the population”). We have stated with respect to the constitutional mandate of compactness that “there is a certain degree of unavoidable non-compactness in any apportionment scheme.” Specter, 293 A.2d at 23. This Court did not sanction abandonment of the compactness constitutional mandate in favor of a population equality absolute.
Several factors convince us that there would be some benefit in providing prospective guidance in the redistricting realm, even as to points not necessarily joined in this litigation. First, is the fact that this Court is the sole voice passing upon state law challenges to redistricting appeals, but our consideration has been limited to a single, mass appeal, once every ten years, and under severe time constraints which affect the litigants no less than the Court. Second, is the fact that each redistricting plan seems to generate similar citizen complaints concerning the alleged disrespect of political subdivisions, and the formation of odd and non-compact districts of disparate political subdivisions. Third, is the advent of computer technology. As is reflected in Dean Gormley's account of the 1991 reapportionment, and as demonstrated in practice in the alternate plans produced by the Holt and Costa appellants here, this development suggests that this Court's early establishment of the primacy of equalization of population in formulating redistricting plans (a far more difficult task before technological advancements, as the Court itself experienced in the Butcher appeals) may warrant reconsideration—at least respecting the degree to which population equality must be pursued, or must be deferred to as an explanation for allegations of unnecessary violence to other constitutional precepts. Fourth, and finally, our own review of our governing precedent in deciding these appeals has led us to conclude that it should be recalibrated to allow the LRC more flexibility in formulating plans, and particularly with respect to population deviation. This adjustment should allow more breathing space for concerns of contiguity, compactness, and the integrity of political subdivisions to be respected. Our prior precedent sounds in constitutional law; to the extent it is erroneous or unclear, or falls in tension with intervening developments, this Court has primary responsibility to address the circumstance.
As a function of our system of government, this Court has the final word on matters of constitutional dimension in Pennsylvania. Pap's A.M., 812 A.2d at 611; Shambach v. Bickhart, 577 Pa. 384, 845 A.2d 793, 807 (Pa.2004) (Saylor, J., concurring). Our charter, unlike statutes of the General Assembly or agency regulations, is not easily amended and any errant interpretation is not freely subject to correction by any co-equal branch of our government, other than this Court. Shambach, 845 A.2d at 807 (Saylor, J., concurring); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); cf. City of Scranton v. Firefighters Local Union No. 60, 29 A.3d 773, 784–85 (Pa.2011) (describing swift legislative action to amend State Employees' Retirement Code following Court decision). For this reason, we are not constrained to closely and blindly re-affirm constitutional interpretations of prior decisions which have proven to be unworkable or badly reasoned. See Payne, supra.
Mr. Justice Saylor has twice addressed aspects of these concerns. First, in his 2002 concurrence in Albert, he noted that he remained “circumspect concerning the manner in which state constitutional requirements of compactness and integrity of political subdivisions have been applied by the Court in the prior decisions that are followed here.” 790 A.2d at 1000. Second, in his dissenting statement to the per curiam order this Court entered before announcing the reasons for our mandate here, Justice Saylor, joined by Mr. Justice Eakin and Madame Justice Orie Melvin, noted that he was “receptive to the concern that past decisions of the Court may suggest an unnecessarily stringent approach to equalization of population as between voting districts,” but he believed “this could be addressed via prospective guidance from the Court.” Order, 1/25/12 ( per curiam ) (Saylor, J., dissenting).
Rather than deriving from the language of our Constitution itself, the primacy of population equality in redistricting, which is clearly established in our decisional law, derives from federal decisional law, and particularly Reynolds v. Sims. Our earliest redistricting opinions reflected an acute awareness of Pennsylvania's obligations to respect federal law—at the same time we were construing our own organic constitutional commands. Our first decisions grappling with Reynolds, in the Butcher cases and in Specter, occurred when this area of federal constitutional law was both new and dynamic. Indeed, it appears that it was the very dynamism of the federal decisional law that led this Court in Specter to emphasize the special primacy of population equality. As we have detailed in Part V above, it appears that this Court's approach was powered by its prediction of where the U.S. Supreme Court was heading in its interpretation of Reynolds. Thus, the Court derived from the congressional reapportionment decisions in Kirkpatrick and Wells “that deviations from equality of population that were formerly regarded as insubstantial and permissible will now be regarded as impermissible, necessitating a closer adherence to equality of population, even in the area of state legislative reapportionment.” Specter, 293 A.2d at 20. In upholding the plan in Specter, the Court noted, among other things: “It is clear that the Legislative Reapportionment Commission recognized that closer adherence to the requirement of equality of population is now constitutionally in order for state legislative reapportionment plans.” Id. at 22.
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to reaffirm the importance of the multiple commands in Article II, Section 16, which embrace contiguity, compactness, and the integrity of political subdivisions, no less than the command to create legislative districts as nearly equal in population as “practicable.” Although we recognize the difficulty in balancing, we do not view the first three constitutional requirements as being at war, or in tension, with the fourth. To be sure, federal law remains, and that overlay still requires, as Reynolds taught, that equality of population is the “overriding objective.” But, as later cases from the High Court have made clear, that overriding objective does not require that reapportionment plans pursue the narrowest possible deviation, at the expense of other, legitimate state objectives, such as are reflected in our charter of government. See, e.g., Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 748–49, 93 S.Ct. 2321 (“Fair and effective representation ... does not depend solely on mathematical equality among district populations. There are other relevant factors to be taken into account and other important interests that States may legitimately be mindful of.”); Mahan, 410 U.S. at 329, 93 S.Ct. 979 (upholding deviations from ideal population equality as justified by rational policy of maintaining integrity of political subdivisions in Virginia state legislature). The law has developed to afford considerably more flexibility.
We are not in a position to predict when the LRC will complete its task of developing a new final redistricting plan that complies with law, nor when such a new plan can become final and have force of law. Any issues respecting deferring the state legislative primary, or scheduling special elections, etc., are, in the first instance, the concern and province of the political branches. Such questions have not been briefed and presented to this Court.
The Costa appellants have suggested that, with the use of available computer technology and familiarity with the necessary data, a new preliminary plan accounting for the objective criteria set forth in our Constitution can be generated in a matter of days. Costa Brief at 34.
We note that once the LRC approves a new preliminary plan, the Constitution affords persons aggrieved by the new plan a right to object, before the plan is finally approved by the LRC, and to a subsequent right to appeal to this Court. Should such appeals be filed, we will decide them with alacrity, as we have decided the ones now before us.
In light of the inevitability of dividing some political subdivisions in the redistricting exercise, the appellate review of plan challenges preeminently represents an exercise in line drawing. I use this term figuratively, of course, since the Court is not generally in a position to draw the boundaries on a map, but it does determine the degree of latitude to be accorded to a legislative reapportionment commission in arranging voting district boundaries. The allocation of the burdens and the affordance of deference in the judicial review reflect the complex nature of a commission's task and the constraints inherent in its oversight. Indeed, I had no illusions in 2002 that, had the then-existing legislative reapportionment commission narrowed or otherwise altered the range of considerations taken into account in fashioning voting-district boundaries, there could not have been fewer divisions. Moreover, with regard to the 2011 Final Plan, I agree with the majority that it is an improvement over the 2001 plan, see Majority Opinion, at 755–56, which surmounted the challenges raised in the appeals before this Court.
While our reapportionment precedent is limited, it unequivocally demonstrates that our overarching concern in redistricting matters is substantial equality of population. See Specter v. Levin, 448 Pa. 1, 293 A.2d 15, 19 (Pa.1972) ( “Section 16's desire for districts that are ‘compact’ must also yield, if need be, ‘to the overriding objective ... (of) substantial equality of population.’ ”) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)); In re Reapportionment Plan for the Pa. General Assembly (In re 1981 Reapportionment), 497 Pa.525, 442 A.2d 661, 665 (Pa.1981) (articulating same principle); In re 1991 Pa. Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 530 Pa. 335, 609 A.2d 132, 138 (Pa.1992) (same); Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 567 Pa. 670, 790 A.2d 989, 993–94 (Pa.2002) (same). Indeed, the Majority recognizes this to be true. See Majority Opinion, at 756 (“[T]his Court's prior decisions emphasized equality of population as the primary directive in the redistricting efforts of the LRC.” (emphasis added)).1 This acknowledgement, irrespective of any qualifying language, highlights the fallacy that the current plan is contrary to law. In view of this Court's precedent, I find that the LRC acted in good faith in adopting the 2011 Final Plan. Consistent with our prior pronouncements, the LRC promulgated a plan that ultimately achieved substantial equality of population while balancing the other mandates in Section 16.
As justification for the conclusion that the 2011 Final Plan is unconstitutional, the Majority cites an alleged excessive number of subdivision splits, admonishing that prior plans cannot serve as a benchmark for scrutinizing subsequent plans. Despite this contention, we have undertaken a comparative approach in the recent past. Specifically, in Albert we compared the 2001 Final Plan with those previously approved by this Court. Finding that the number of subdivision splits was similar, we determined the 2001 Plan withstood constitutional scrutiny. Albert, 790 A.2d at 998 (“[The Commission] claims that ... no political subdivision was divided in forming a district unless absolutely necessary. Upon comparison of the instant Final Plan with those previously approved by this Court, we agree.”); id. at 999 n. 12.2 The Majority has not convinced me that the LRC's use of the same exercise herein produced a constitutionally deficient plan.
I find it unnecessary to criticize the timeliness of the LRC's actions, see Majority Opinion, at 721–23, and I disagree that it unnecessarily delayed this Court's disposition. The LRC's actions comported to the time frame set forth in Article 2, Section 17(c) of our Constitution, and both the LRC and this Court have proceeded with due diligence in this matter.
The LRC faithfully applied our existing precedent in preparing the 2011 Final Plan. By failing to uphold the LRC's reliance on our prior decisions, the Majority interjects uncertainty into future redistricting cases. See Majority Opinion, at 757–58. Moreover, by declaring that the 2001 Plan remains in effect, the Majority ensures that certain districts will be overrepresented while others will be underrepresented, as evidenced by population shifts from 2000 to 2010. Such a situation is untenable. Finally, it is a fiction for the Majority to represent that the initial opportunity to “go forward” is upon remand. Majority Opinion, at 718. Rather, in my view, it is a step back. The LRC produced a reasoned plan that comports both with our decisional law and our Constitution. I am amenable to guidelines but only if they are truly prospective, i.e., applicable to the next decennial redistricting.