Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/134/379/562113/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:19:48
Document Index: 330327210

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 1291', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 34', '§ 37', '§ 924']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Harry C.q. Carriaga, Defendant-appellant, 134 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1998) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1998 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Harry C.q. Carriaga, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Harry C.q. Carriaga, Defendant-appellant, 134 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1998)
Submitted Sept. 8, 1997. **Jan. 23, 1998
Harry Cyril Quintanilla Carriaga appeals his sentence as an armed career criminal imposed after his guilty plea to firearm possession by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). He contends that the government failed to establish the existence of two prior burglary convictions used to enhance his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). He also contends that the government failed to prove that either of the prior convictions was a violent felony conviction and thus qualified as a predicate offense under § 924(e). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
In determining whether prior convictions qualify as predicate offenses under the armed career criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the district court must " 'look only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts under lying those convictions.' " United States v. Wofford, 121 F.3d 787, 792 (9th Cir.) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1995), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 233 (1997). Thus, the district court may consider only "the statutory definition of the crime, any conduct charged in the indictment or information, the defendants's guilty plea or plea agreement, and any jury instructions." United States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.) (construing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 217 (1995). The district court may not rely on a presentence report in determining whether a prior conviction was a violent felony and thus qualifies as a predicate offense. See United States v. Potter, 895 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1990).
Establishing the existence of prior convictions, however, is a different matter. The government need only prove the fact of a prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 575 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Asagba, 77 F.3d 324, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (fact findings reviewed for clear error).
A prior burglary conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B) (ii) if the burglary statute contains "at least the following elements: ' an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.' " United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1474 (9th Cir.) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 192 (1997).
Carriaga contends that "habitable property" refers to vehicles and vessels as well to structures, and therefore the definition of burglary is overbroad. See Bonat, 106 F.3d at 1474. This contention lacks merit because habitable property is defined as "any structure, vehicle or vessel adapted for the accommodation or occupation of persons." 9 Guam Code Ann. §§ 34.10(b), § 37.10(a); see United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (statute defining burglary of a habitation as burglary of a structure or vehicle adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons qualified as "generic" burglary under Taylor because of risk of violence to occupants). Thus, at least one of Carriaga's prior burglary convictions qualified as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B) (ii).
The panel has voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc and no active judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. The suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R