Source: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/ctapun/0202/1437.htm
Timestamp: 2018-05-25 07:17:00
Document Index: 520685212

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 169']

Robert Dean Ickler, petitioner, Appellant, vs. Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent. C0-01-1437, Court of Appeals Unpublished, February 26, 2002.
C0-01-1437
Robert Dean Ickler, petitioner,
File No. 0111594
Stefan A. Tolin, 401 2nd Avenue South, Suite 540, Minneapolis, MN 55401-2307 (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Joel A. Watne, Matthew Frank, Assistant Attorneys General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103-2106 (for respondent)
Appellant Robert Dean Ickler challenges the district court’s denial of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Commissioner of Public Safety to reinstate his driver’s license. Because appellant waived his judicial remedy and because appellant does not demonstrate that the commissioner was duty-bound to reinstate the license, we affirm.
On January 12, 2001, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Officer Franzen of the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office was traveling north on County Road 13 in Hassen when he saw a vehicle in the ditch. Franzen approached the vehicle and saw appellant lying across the front seat. Franzen knocked on the window several times, but appellant did not stir. Franzen opened the door, and appellant sat up. Franzen smelled alcohol and noted that appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. When Franzen asked appellant for his driver’s license, appellant handed him a half-empty bottle of rum. Franzen asked appellant to step out of the vehicle, and he had difficulty doing so. Appellant agreed to submit to a preliminary breath test, which indicated an alcohol concentration of .216. Franzen arrested appellant for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Appellant was taken to the Rogers police station and read the implied consent advisory. Appellant indicated that he understood the advisory and agreed to take an Intoxilyzer test, which indicated an alcohol concentration of .22. Appellant informed the officers that he wished to have an additional test pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 7(b) (2000),[1] performed by a friend who was a nurse. An officer denied appellant’s request and refused him access to a phone.
Appellant’s driver’s license was revoked for one year pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4 (2000). The implied consent statute provides a 30-day period within which individuals may seek judicial review of license revocations. “Within 30 days following receipt of a notice and order of revocation or disqualification * * * a person may petition the court for review.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2(a) (2000). Appellant did not seek judicial review of his license revocation within 30 days.
Appellant was charged with one count of first-degree driving while impaired with an alcohol concentration of .20 or more for the second time in ten years pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5), .25 (2000); one count of second-degree driving while impaired with an alcohol concentration over .20 pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5), .26 (2000); one count of second-degree driving while impaired for the second time in ten years pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), .26 (2000); and one count of second-degree driving while impaired with an alcohol concentration over .10 for the second time in ten years pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5), .26.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all chargesand contested the admissibility of the Intoxilyzer results since he was unable to obtain his own test. The district court suppressed the Intoxilyzer results on the ground that appellant was denied the opportunity to procure his own test. Appellant then pleaded guilty to non-alcohol-related careless driving.
Appellant subsequently requested administrative review of the revocation of his driver’s license from the Commissioner of Public Safety.
At any time during a period of revocation * * * a person may request in writing a review of the order of revocation or disqualification by the commissioner * * * .
Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 1(a) (2000). The commissioner sustained the revocation of appellant’s license.
Appellant petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the commissioner to reinstate his license. Appellant claimed that the commissioner should have discounted the Intoxilyzer results because the district court suppressed them in the criminal proceeding. Appellant argued that the commissioner’s decision was an abuse of discretion in that, apart from the Intoxilyzer test, the only basis that the commissioner had for upholding the revocation was appellant’s guilty plea to a non-alcohol careless-driving offense. The district court ruled that it was without jurisdiction to issue the writ because appellant did not contest the revocation in court within 30 days. Appellant now challenges the district court’s denial of the writ of mandamus.
This court reviews denials of equitable relief, including writs of mandamus, under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Nadeau v. County of Ramsey, 277 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Minn. 1979). “Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy awarded, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and upon equitable principles.” County of Swift v. Boyle, 481 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. App. 1992) (quoting State ex rel. Hennepin County Welfare Bd. v. Fitzsimmons, 239 Minn. 407, 422, 58 N.W.2d 882, 891 (1953)), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 1992). We reverse a district court’s order on an application for mandamus relief “only when there is no evidence reasonably tending to sustain the trial court’s findings.” Coyle v. City of Delano, 526 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioners must meet three requirements to demonstrate an entitlement to a writ of mandamus:
(1) the failure of an official duty clearly imposed by law; (2) a public wrong specifically injurious to petitioner; and (3) no other adequate specific legal remedy.
Id. at 207 (citations omitted).
Appellant is unable to prove that the commissioner was duty-bound to reinstate his license. See State ex rel. Longman v. Kachelmacher, 255 Minn. 255, 258, 96 N.W.2d 542, 545 (1959) (quoting State ex rel. Goar v. Hoffman, 209 Minn. 308, 310, 296 N.W. 24, 25 (1941)) (noting that petitioner must demonstrate “a clear and complete right * * * to receive that which the court is asked to command the official or officer to give him” to obtain a writ of mandamus). The commissioner has discretion regarding challenges to license revocations and has no duty to reinstate licenses:
Upon receiving a request the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee shall review the order, the evidence upon which the order was based, and any other material information brought to the attention of the commissioner, and determine whether sufficient cause exists to sustain the order.
Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 1(a) (2000). Although appellant asserts that the commissioner abused its discretion in failing to reinstate his driver’s license, he provides no support for that claim. Appellant, therefore, fails the first and third prongs of the requirements for obtaining a writ of mandamus.
In Kleven v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 399 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. App. 1987), a driver of a vehicle involved in a personal injury accident lost his license for refusing to submit to chemical testing. Id. at 154. Kleven did not request judicial review of his license revocation within 30 days. Id. He sought administrative review of his license revocation, and the commissioner’s designee upheld the revocation. Id. Kleven next sought judicial review of the administrative decision, but the district court found that judicial review was not appropriate when Kleven failed to timely exercise his judicial remedy. Id. We upheld the district court, noting that administrative review of license revocations “is the unusual administrative action where nonreviewability can be demonstrated.” Id. at 155.
Kleven controls our decision in this case. Appellant failed to seek judicial review of his driver’s license revocation within 30 days. “[T]he 30-day filing period is to be strictly construed, even if a delay in filing is not the fault of the driver.” McShane v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 377 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Minn. App. 1985) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1986). The district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus because appellant waived his judicial remedy.
Appellant also contends that, under a theory of collateral estoppel, the district court’s suppression order is binding on the commissioner. Absent the Intoxilyzer results, appellant argues, the commissioner lacked sufficient grounds to uphold the revocation. We need not address the question of collateral estoppel because we find Kleven controlling.
[1] Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 7(b) (2000), provides in part: