Source: https://michaelcurrylawofficedotcom.wordpress.com/category/bankruptcy/
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 15:54:59
Document Index: 293851045

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 307', '§ 329', '§ 329', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362']

Bankruptcy | Curry Law Office
I have prepared a long series of blogs reprinting and reviewing the Complaint against Upright Law in the case of In Re: Joyce Ellen Bishop, Case Number 16-20593 by the US Trustee in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York (in Rochester). In the case the US Trustee through the Department of Justice is moving to bar the Chicago firm from practicing bankruptcy in its district, which includes the city of Buffalo.
Note that if the hyperlink does not work, that means the blog has not been published yet!
This includes the Header of the Case and the UST’s introductory statements.
This includes statements/introductions to the parties involved.
Where the UST describes Upright Law and how their law practice structure.
I am intrigues by this case, being affiliated with Upright. Obviously I want to keep up-to-date on what happens next!
Tagged Chapter 7, Upright Law, index
Continuing the Complaint against Upright Law in the case of In Re: Joyce Ellen Bishop, Case Number 16-20593 by the US Trustee in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York (in Rochester).
You can read all of the parts (and by the time we are done there will be many) at this hub.
In the interest of full disclosure, I am an affiliate with Upright Law – I co-represent their (our) clients in the northern counties of the Eastern Division of the Southern District of Illinois
In this part of the Complaint the US Trustee describes what Upright Law is and how they practice. Remember this is a complaint against them trying to bar them from practice in the Western District of New York; they are not about to shower it with praise…
Note Paragraph 25 & 26: in the Southern District of Illinois the matter is different – the local attorney contacts the client right away – within a day or two – to introduce himself or herself, review the client’s situation, discuss the documents needed, the credit counselling classes required and their costs and answers questions. I encourage Upright clients to call me at any time during the process and even take creditor inquiries.
(the filed Complaint continues…)
Upright’s Business Model
21) Upright solicits both prospective debtor clients and local attorney “partners” over the Internet, using the website “www.uprightlaw.com.” On its current website, it purports to have “Local Attorneys Nationwide” and provides that “all legal services are provided by affiliated and related entities.” The website goes on to provide: “By an Act of Congress and the President of the United States, UL/ACL is a federally designated Debt Relief Agency. Attorneys and/or law firms promoted through this website are also federally designated Debt Relief Agencies. They help people file for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.” It also contains a link to “Disclosures required under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.” Finally, the website states that Edmund Scanlan is the “CEO” or “Administrator” of every entity allegedly providing the legal services to prospective debtors. On information and belief, Mr. Scanlan is not a licensed attorney.
Solicitation of Debtor Clients
22) Upon information and belief, when a prospective debtor reviews the Upright Law website, he or she is asked to provide his or her contact information to learn if they qualify for bankruptcy relief. Thereafter, Upright agents — located in Chicago – call the prospective debtor. These agents, known as “inside sales representatives,” “closers,” “first responders,” or, at other times, “senior class consultants,” are not attorneys. These non-lawyer agents conduct the initial interview, ask the prospective debtor questions about his or her financial situation, and determine if there is an apparent ability to pay for legal services and a desire to “make a life-changing decision” regarding his or her financial circumstances. If the answer is yes, these non-lawyers give the prospective debtor legal advice, including, but not limited to describing the differences between a chapter 7 and chapter 13 proceeding. After advising the prospective debtor of the available options, the “closer” will ask the potential client to “self-select” what chapter is the best fit.
23) Following this “self-selection,” the “closer” will gather basic intake information such as income, sources of income, household members, expenses and assets and enter this data into Upright’s software. Based on this information, the non-lawyer consultant will advise the client whether or not to file bankruptcy and under which chapter, quote a fee to the prospective debtor client, and ask them if they wish to hire the firm.
24) Upon information and belief, if the prospective debtor agrees to hire Upright, the “closer” asks the prospective debtor to provide bank account information, which Upright can use to withdraw bankruptcy-related fees and costs. Generally, if the prospective debtor cannot pay the fee immediately, automatic withdrawals are set up to debit the prospective debtor’s account over time.
25) Upon information and belief, after an opportunity for discovery, the evidence is expected to show that in 2015, Upright did not refer prospective debtors to a local “limited partner” licensed to practice law in the relevant local jurisdiction, such as New York, until the prospective debtors had paid Upright in full. During this process, the prospective debtor is told to contact Upright in Chicago for questions or concerns. Only after the fees are paid in full, which can take several months, depending on the installment plan, and the client’s particular financial situation, is the client “handed off” to the local partner attorney to start collecting documents and preparing the actual petition and completing their due diligence.
26) Representatives from Upright have recently testified before other courts that Upright no longer waits for the client to pay the entire fee, and now cases can be referred to a local partner as early as the day the client first makes a payment to Upright or shortly thereafter so that the partner attorney can set up a “compliance call” with the client. On information and belief, the compliance call averages 15 minutes. During that call or afterwards, the local partner attorney has the discretion to reject the client unilaterally, despite the prospective client not being given any reason to believe they are not represented.
27) Upon information and belief, during this process, Upright electronically provides an engagement agreement to the client to sign via electronic signature. Upon information and belief, Upright does not obtain wet signatures.
28) Pursuant to a partnership agreement with their various local “partners,” the local partner’s signature is affixed to the retainer agreement as well as other documents without the local partner necessarily reviewing the document with the prospective client.
(end of section reprinting the Complaint)
Tagged Chapter 7, Upright Law, US Trustee
Or use this Index Hub.
This part of the Complaint tells us what the US Trustee alleges that Upright did that led to this Complaint. Keep in mind the US Trustee is trying to bar Upright Law from practicing in the district, so they will not exactly be showering them with praise.
“I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.” Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 3, Scene 2
7) Defendant Jason Racki is the debtor’s counsel of record. He represented on the petition that his firm name in this case is Allen Chern, operating out of 140A Metro Park, Rochester, New York. His ECF participant registration form and the docket in this case disclose his firm name as the Law Office of Jason Racki, 10314 Spook Woods Rd, Port Byron, New York.
8) Mr. Racki practices before this Court as a sole practitioner and also purports to be a partner in Upright Law LCC by virtue of a limited partnership agreement.
9) During the relevant period of time for this case, Racki also purported to be a partner of Voight Law or VL.
10) Mr. Racki is a “debt relief agency” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) and he provided bankruptcy assistance to Ms. Bishop.
Upright Law, Law Solutions, Allen Chern and affiliates
11) Defendant Law Solutions Chicago LLC is an Illinois limited liability company that does business as Upright Law LLC (“Upright Law” or “Upright”). It filed articles of organization with the Illinois Secretary of State on October 10, 2008. It is authorized to transact business in Illinois under the following assumed names: Jason Allen Law, LLC; Upright Law, LLC; and Allen & Associates, LLC. On its website, Upright Law lists its headquarters at 79 West Monroe, 5th Floor, Chicago, IL 60603 and, at the time Ms. Bishop contacted it, it purported to have “Local Offices Nationwide.” Upon information and belief, Upright Law has an office in Chicago and no local offices nationwide. It has an intake/call center at its Chicago office.
12) Upright’s connection to New York appears to be through services offered by “Allen Chern Law.” Upright incorporated in the State of New York on January 16, 2014 and does business in the State of New York as “Allen Chern Law” but under the umbrella of the national name “Upright Law” and/or “Upright.”
13) Kevin Chern, an owner and manager of Upright, is an attorney licensed by the State of Illinois to practice law. Chern is not licensed to practice law in New York. 14) Jason Royce Allen, an owner and manager of Upright, is an attorney licensed by the State of Illinois to practice law. Allen is not licensed to practice law in New York.
15) According to Upright’s website, Edmund Scanlan is the chief executive officer of “Upright Law,” and a manager of an entity named Upright Litigation, LLC. According to Upright’s website, “all legal services are provided by affiliated and related entities.” The website states that Scanlan is the “CEO” or “Administrator” of every entity allegedly providing the legal services to prospective debtors.
16) On information and belief, when Ms. Bishop contacted Upright, it employed no lawyers licensed in the State of New York at its Chicago call center.
17) Moreover, Allen Chern Law does not have a have a “brick and mortar” location as required in New York.
18) Upright Law is a “debt relief agency” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) and it provided bankruptcy assistance to the debtor, Ms. Bishop.
19) Ms. Bishop is the debtor in this case and is an “assisted person” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(3) because she has primarily consumer debts and the value of her non-exempt property is less than $186,825. Moreover, Upright’s website acknowledges its federal designation as a Debt Relief Agency.[1]
20) Plaintiff United States Trustee is a Department of Justice official with standing to file this complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 307.
In this section we meet the parties involved:
James Racki is the partner or affiliate attorney with Upright, as am I and many attorneys across the country.
Upright Law and Allen Chern are a Chicago-based law firm who practice throughout the country.
Joyce Ellen Bishop is the debtor who hired Upright Law initially, then met with James Racki for local representation.
[1] On its website, Upright holds itself out as a “debt relief agency helping people file for bankruptcy under the bankruptcy code.” See https://www.uprightlaw.com/terms-conditions
Read commentary of this opinion here.
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION
In Re: Adam Vandesande, Debtor. Case No. 16-33708; Chapter 7
After reviewing the Disclosure of Compensation Statement of Attorney for Debtor (“Fee Disclosure’) filed by Troy Hawkins, Counsel for Debtor, the court set a hearing on the reasonableness of attorney compensation given the exclusions set forth in the Fee Disclosure, as well as the cost of addressing excluded matters and the proposed hourly rate for doing so. A response to the court’s hearing order was filed by the United States Trustee (“UST”). Debtor and Attorney Hawkins appeared at the hearing in person and an Attorney for the UST appeared by telephone.
Counsel’s Fee Disclosure, under Rule 2016(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, states that Troy Hawkins, Allen Chern Law LLC, received $1,250.00 for legal services on behalf of Debtor in connection with this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. It states that the services to be rendered include all legal services “to reasonably achieve the debtor’s objectives” unless specifically excluded in paragraph seven of the document. Paragraph seven then lists fifteen matters that are excluded, including matters that are basic Chapter 7 bankruptcy services often essential to achieving the goal of a fresh start, such as lien avoidance motions, motions for relief from stay, reaffirmation agreements, motions to redeem personal property, and amending schedules or other documents required to be filed with the petition. The Fee Disclosure further states that, with certain exceptions subject to a contingency fee, attorney fees for performing excluded services will be billed at the rate of $395 per hour.
Allen Chern Law, LLC, is specified as an affiliate of Upright Law, a law firm based in Chicago, Illinois. At the hearing, Attorney Hawkins explained that the fee agreement signed by Debtor was prepared by the Chicago firm for national use and sets forth the excluded services that he lists in his Fee Disclosure.
Attorney Hawkins represented to the court that he included them in the Fee Disclosure in order to be consistent with the signed fee agreement, but that, in practice, he does not and will not exclude basic bankruptcy services in Chapter 7 debtor representations, including in Debtor’s ongoing case. He also agrees that $395.00 per hour for the excluded services is unreasonable in a consumer Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in this jurisdiction.
Attorney Hawkins represented to the court that the firm will use a new fee agreement that provides that “[s]ervices include all representation to complete Client’s legal matter, except Agreement does not include representation in any objection to discharge, adversary proceeding or any heavily contested matter or Services that could not have been contemplated after reasonable diligence by Firm when this Agreement was signed (“Additional Services”).” He further represented that no more than $250.00 per hour would be charged for any Additional Services.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 329(b), if the compensation of debtor’s attorney “exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may cancel any such agreement . . . to the extent excessive. . . .” The court finds that the fee agreement signed by Debtor provides for compensation that exceeds the reasonable value of services set forth therein because of the exclusions for basic bankruptcy services. [1]
Footnote [1]: After the hearing, the court had the opportunity to review the entire fee agreement signed by Debtor that was offered as Exhibit A at the hearing. In addition to the long list of excluded services and the excessive hourly rate to be charged for excluded services set forth in that agreement, the court has additional concerns regarding its terms, including an additional $100.00 fee for each “in office visit” with counsel. The court is at this time addressing only the issues raised in its hearing order, with no other particular issues with the Fee Agreement having been raised at the hearing. The $100 additional fee for an office visit is, however, one that the court construes as within the cancellation of terms set forth in this order.
Nevertheless, based on Attorney Hawkins’ representations to the court and Debtor’s testimony at the hearing, it finds that the $1,250.00 paid to him by Debtor is not excessive and is a reasonable fee in this case, provided that no additional hourly rate is charged for basic services needed to adequately represent him in this Chapter 7 case. The fee agreement signed by Debtor is cancelled to the extent that it does not require counsel to include within the $1,250 attorney fee paid by Debtor the following services: all representation to complete Debtor’s Chapter 7 case, except representation in any objection to discharge, adversary proceeding or any heavily contested matter, or other services that could not have been contemplated after reasonable diligence by Counsel when the Fee Agreement was signed, and with the hourly rate for excluded services not to exceed $250 per hour.
Tagged Attorneys fees, Chapter 7, Upright Law
Upright Law fees excessive in ND Ohio? (summary)
Upright Law fees
As a bankruptcy attorney in Mount Vernon, IL for over 20 years, I read through and analyze court rulings throughout the country. Fees are tricky things, and you have to be careful not to charge too much in your district!
Upright Law is a law firm based in Chicago that helps people around the country find relief under the bankruptcy code. In the interest of full disclosure, I am an affiliate with Upright Law – I co-represent their (our) clients in the northern counties of the Eastern Division of the Southern District of Illinois. Our attorney fee statement comports with the requirements of the district – some things do require an extra fee (adversary actions challenging your discharge in bankruptcy, for example). That is made clear from the beginning and the court has had no issues with it.
Bank ND Ohio: Decision on Attorneys’ Fees of Upright Law in Ohio
Under 11 U.S.C. § 329(b), if the compensation of debtor’s attorney “exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may cancel any such agreement . . . to the extent excessive. . . .” The court finds that the fee agreement signed by Debtor provides for compensation that exceeds the reasonable value of services set forth therein because of the exclusions for basic bankruptcy services.
Nevertheless, based on Attorney Hawkins’ representations to the court and Debtor’s testimony at the hearing, it finds that the$1,250.00 paid to him by Debtor is not excessive and is a reasonable fee in this case, provided that no additional hourly rate is charged for basic services needed to adequately represent him in this Chapter 7 case. The fee agreement signed by Debtor is cancelled to the extent that it does not require counsel to include within the $1,250 attorney fee paid by Debtor the following services: all representation to complete Debtor’s Chapter 7 case, except representation in any objection to discharge, adversary proceeding or any heavily contested matter, or other services that could not have been contemplated after reasonable diligence by Counsel when the Fee Agreement was signed, and with the hourly rate for excluded services not to exceed $250 per hour.
Tagged Attorneys fees, Chapter 7, Court opinions, Upright Law
This is a very involved case that I love sifting through. But it basically boils down to an attorney representing more than one client in a matter and creating a “conflict of interest” – he cannot do one thing for one client that may affect or hurt another.
Here is the first part of the case. Honestly? You can see the conflict coming a mile away!
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT, Case No. 14-4001
ELIZABETH R. LOVERIDGE, Chapter 7 Trustee, Plaintiff, vs.
TONY HALL; ELLIS-HALL CONSULTANTS, LLC; SUMMIT WIND POWER, LLC; SSP, a trust, Scott Rasmussen-Trustee; CLAY R. CHRISTIANSEN; DIANE E. CHRISTIANSEN; RICHARD D. FRANCOM; STEPHEN K. MEYER; BONNIE G. MEYER; DOES I-X; Defendants, and SUMMIT WIND POWER, LLC; KIMBERLY CERUTI, an individual, as Third Party Plaintiffs – Appellants, vs.
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS, a professional corporation; GEORGE B. HOFMANN; MATTHEW M. BOLEY; KIMBERLEY L. HANSEN; VICTOR E. COPELAND; LISA R. PETERSON; MELYSSA DAVIDSON, individuals, as Third Party Defendants – Appellees.
This case has but little to do with bankruptcy. Neither the debtor nor the creditors, not even the bankruptcy trustee, are parties to it. True, the plaintiffs claim they once enjoyed an attorney-client relationship with a former bankruptcy trustee. True, they now allege the former trustee breached professional duties due them because of conflicting obligations he owed the bankruptcy estate. But the plaintiffs seek recovery only under state law and none of their claims will be necessarily resolved in the bankruptcy claims allowance process. And to know that much is to know this case cannot be resolved in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court may offer a report and recommendation. It may even decide the dispute if the parties consent. But the parties are entitled by the Constitution to have an Article III judge make the final call. So the district court’s ruling otherwise — its decision to send the dispute to an Article I bankruptcy court for final resolution without their consent — violates the Constitution’s commands and must be corrected.
Conflicts of interest often spell trouble for lawyers. The rules are complex and missteps happen. And at least as the complaint in this case tells it, a misstep happened here. When Renewable Energy Development Corporation (REDCO) found itself facing Chapter 7 proceedings, the bankruptcy court appointed attorney George Hofmann to serve as trustee for the estate. REDCO was in the wind business and its assets included lease options with private property owners who agreed to allow wind farms on their lands. As trustee, Mr. Hofmann was eager to ascertain the value of REDCO’s leases so he consulted another client of his with expertise in the field — Kimberly Ceruti, the owner of Summit Wind Power, LLC. The pair eventually discovered that REDCO had failed to pay some property owners the consideration it owed them. As a result, Mr. Hofmann allegedly concluded that REDCO’s options were unenforceable and even encouraged Summit to pursue its own leases with the same individuals. Which it promptly did.
What started off sounding like a good idea and maybe even a win-win for REDCO and Summit soon yielded a rat’s nest of conflicts. On further study, Mr. Hofmann came to the view that the property owners couldn’t cancel their leases with REDCO in favor of Summit without first giving REDCO a chance to cure its nonpayment. And, in Mr. Hofmann’s estimation, the chance to cure was a valuable opportunity for REDCO and its creditors. So he asked Summit to forgo its new leases in favor of REDCO’s old ones. Summit refused. Things got so testy that Mr. Hofmann, yes, brought an adversarial proceeding in bankruptcy court against one client (Summit) on behalf of another (the REDCO estate).
Unsurprisingly, Summit responded with state law claims against Mr. Hofmann and his law firm, alleging legal malpractice, breaches of fiduciary duties, and a good many other things besides. Mr. Hofmann, by now irredeemably conflicted, was replaced as trustee.
This opinion is to be continued!
Whether you live in Mount Vernon, McLeansboro, Centralia or anywhere in Southern Illinois call Curry Law Office today at (618) 246-0993 and Finally Be Financially Free!
Tagged Conflicts of Interest, Court opinions
Bankruptcy FAQs: Can someone refuse giving me credit?
I help people file for bankruptcy throughout southern Illinois to help eliminate their crushing debt and protect their assets. For almost 25 years and in over five thousand bankruptcy filings, I answer many questions people have about the process. I thought I would share some of the more common questions here.
“I paid off my loan and now they will not give me anymore credit, can they do that?”
You listed all of your debt in your bankruptcy filing. Some of those bills you wanted to keep paying, which is fine.
You wanted to stay in good standing with that loan company downtown and at first you did not want to even list it on your schedules, but you can’t leave off debt – you can’t tell the court you do NOT owe a debt when you do.
Remember that bankruptcy stops the creditors from collecting on the debt. It does NOT stop you from paying on the debt. You can keep paying the doctor or the loan company (as long as it is a small and reasonable amount).
Once that debt is paid off, though, whether the loan companies will still extend you credit is up to them. No one can force them to keep you as a customer. You may face this situation:
“OK, I’ve paid off my loan. May I have another advance>”
“But I paid you off!”
“Yes, and thank you, but we aren’t going to give you any more credit.”
Loyalty should be a two-way street, but that is not always the case. If the local loan company doesn’t want you as a customer anymore, then don’t give them your business. And tell your friends not to, either. Seriously. Don’t make loyalty a one-way street.
Michael Curry of Curry Law Office in Mount Vernon, Illinois (http://michaelcurrylawoffice.com/) has helped thousands of individuals, family and small businesses in southern Illinois find protection under the Bankruptcy Code for almost twenty-five years. He is also available to help individuals and families with their estate planning (probate, wills, power-of-attorney) and real estate and other sales transactions.
Whether you live in Salem, Centralia or anywhere in Southern Illinois call Curry Law Office today at (618) 246-0993 and Finally Be Financially Free!
Posted in Bankruptcy, FAQs
Tagged Credit, Debt
As a bankruptcy attorney in Mount Vernon, IL for over 20 years, I read through and analyze court rulings throughout the country. This case shows that a debtor cannot sit on his rights, a skilled bankruptcy attorney will have the implements in place to avoid critical deadlines!
Click here for commentary on this opinion.
In re: MARY EVELYN CASNER, Debtor. Case No. 16-00662 (Chapter 7)
On January 13, 2017, Specialized Loan Servicing LLC filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay regarding the debtor’s real property located at 1332 Independence Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20003. The debtor’s attorney seeks to continue the hearing on the motion to February 23, 2017.11 Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(e)(1), the automatic stay would terminate on February 13, 2017 (after the passage of 30 days after the filing of the motion for relief from the automatic stay), unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders the automatic stay to continue pending conclusion of a final hearing.
The debtor’s opposition to the motion hints that there is equity in the property. However, the debtor has claimed the property exempt under a District of Columbia statute that permits a debtor to exempt the entirety of the debtor’s residence.
The debtor does not actually assert that there is equity in the property, and a close examination of the debtor’s opposition reveals that there may be no equity. The debtor scheduled the property as worth $833,860 and does not state what she now believes the property is worth, aside from stating that “the stated valuation of the subject property is way below compatible properties sold in the neighborhood which is attached as Exhibit A.” According to the information in that exhibit, the lowest sale price of a neighboring property is $907,000. One ofthe properties listed in the attached exhibit, located at 1311 Independence Ave., SE, on the block across the street from the debtor’s home, sold for $988,500, an amount that, less typical closing costs, would not suffice to satisfy the debt in this case.
The mortgagee in this case claims that the debtor owes $1,564,690.77. The debtor asserts that the mortgagee has overstated the amount owed because “the arrearages calculated by Movant includes principal payments which are added back to the outstanding balance thereby overstating the principal amount due[.]” The debtor also questions certain fees assessed and included in the arrearages.
The debtor does not state what the correct amount owed is, but even if the entire $613,996.72 of arrearages were subtracted from the amount the mortgagee says is owed, $1,564,690.77, a debt of $950,694.05 would still be owed. If the debtor’s property were then sold at the same sales price as that of the nearby property at 1311 Independence Ave., SE, $988,500, factoring in closing costs charged to the debtor that would likely far exceed 4%, the debtor would likely realize less than $950,694.05; thus, there would be no equity in the property. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2), relief from the stay would be appropriate because there would be no equity in the property and, in this chapter 7 case, the property obviously is not necessary to achieve an effective reorganization.
Although the time for objecting to the debtor’s exemptions has not expired, the chapter 7 trustee, who represents the interests of the estate and of unsecured creditors in this case, has not seen fit to file a timely opposition to the motion for relief from the automatic stay. If, for some reason, the debtor’s exemption of the property were to be disallowed, the trustee would still be entitled to seek to sell the property, and could seek injunctive relief against any foreclosure sale so that the trustee, using a real estate broker, could realize a higher sales price then might be realized at a foreclosure sale.
The debtor does not represent the interests of the estate and creditors, and having claimed that the property in its entirety is exempt, the debtor is not in a position to contend that the interests of the estate and of unsecured creditors warrants denying relief from the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Code does not provide to a debtor in a chapter 7 case any tools to modify the rights of a creditor holding a consensual lien on real property. The automatic stay comes into effect when the petition is filed and it maintains the status quo while the parties and the court evaluate whether there is any bankruptcy-related reason to keep the automatic stay in place for the duration of the bankruptcy proceedings. When, as here, no such reason has been articulated, the automatic stay should be lifted.
In any event, the automatic stay has expired in this case.
As the debtor’s petition acknowledges, she filed a prior case in this court, Case Number 16-00333. That case was dismissed in September 2016, and the petition in this case was filed in December 2016. With exceptions of no relevance, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) provides:
[I]f a single or joint case is filed by . . . a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7 . . . and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed, .
(A) the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing such debt . . . shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case[.]
Although 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B) permits a party in interest to request a continuation of the automatic stay beyond the 30-day period, § 362(c)(3)(B) provides that any hearing on such a request must be “completed before the expiration of the 30-day period . . . .” More than 30 days have elapsed since the filing of the petition in this case, and therefore the automatic stay has terminated.
It makes no sense to continue the hearing on a motion for relief from the automatic stay when (1) the debtor has failed to articulate any bankruptcy reason why the automatic stay ought to stay in place, and (2) the automatic stay has already terminated by reason of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B). It is thus ORDERED that the debtor’s motion (Dkt. No. 39) seeking to continue the hearing on the pending motion for relief the automatic stay is DENIED.
Whether you live in Mount Vernon, Salem, Centralia or anywhere in Southern Illinois call Curry Law Office today at (618) 246-0993 and Finally Be Financially Free!
Tagged Chapter 7, Mortgages, real estate, relief from stay