Source: http://ipkitten.blogspot.de/
Timestamp: 2014-10-21 19:53:06
Document Index: 376538539

Matched Legal Cases: ['CJEU ', 'EWCA ', 'art. 4', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ']

It's catch-up time again as the impossible quest to keep abreast of all the major IP rulings continues and this Kat gets the feeling that he is not so much making progress as merely chasing his tail. Case C‑205/13 Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v Stokke A/S, Stokke
Nederland BV, Peter Opsvik and Peter Opsvik A/S was decided on 18 September, but this Kat -- who has been beset by a succession of happy distractions -- has only just got round to writing it up for the weblog. It's a ruling of the Second Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which, as is so often the case, seems somehow less important after judgment has been given than we thought it might be when we were still awaiting it in a state of attentive uncertainty. The background to this action is that Opsvik designed the well-known ‘Tripp Trapp’ children’s
chair which, explained the CJEU, was "constructed with sloping uprights, to which all elements
of the chair were attached, as well as an L-shaped frame of uprights and
gliders (sliding plates) which, according to the referring court (the Hoge Raad
der Nederlanden, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands) give it a high level of
originality". This chair design had won praises and prizes and had even been displayed in museums. Stokke made and sold ‘Tripp Trapp’ chairs in Scandinavia from 1972 and in the Netherlands since 1995. In May 1998 Stokke applied to register as a Benelux
trade mark a three-dimensional trade mark resembling the ‘Tripp Trapp’
children’s chair. The trade mark was registered in the name of Stokke for
‘chairs, especially high chairs for children’ and was represented by the shape depicted on the right. But Stokke was not alone in the market: Hauck made, distributed and sold its own children’s articles, including two chairs named ‘Alpha’ and ‘Beta’. In Germany, in proceedings between the same parties, the
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher Regional Court, Hamburg) held that the ‘Tripp Trapp’ chair was
protected by German copyright and that the ‘Alpha’ chair infringed that
No doubt fortified by this ruling, Stokke then brought a separate action in the Netherlands
before the Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage (District Court, The Hague), claiming that Hauck’s making and selling of the ‘Alpha’ and ‘Beta’ chairs
infringed both its copyrights and its Benelux trade mark registration, seeking damages. Hauck counterclaimed for a declaration that Stokke’s
Benelux Tripp Trapp trade mark was invalid. At trial, the Rechtbank fully upheld Stokke’s claims in so far as they were based
on what the CJEU calls Stokke’s "exploitation rights", but also upheld the
counterclaim for a declaration that the Benelux trade mark was invalid.
Hauck then appealed to the Gerechtshof te’s-Gravenhage
(Court of Appeal, The Hague, Netherlands), which again held that the ‘Tripp
Trapp’ chair was protected by copyright and that the ‘Alpha’ and ‘Beta’ chairs
came within the scope of that copyright, but that the registration of the three-dimensional trade mark was invalid. In its view the attractive appearance of the
‘Tripp Trapp’ chair gave that product substantial value and its shape was
determined by the very nature of the product — it being a safe, comfortable,
reliable children’s chair. Thus, said the Gerechtshof, that mark was a
sign consisting exclusively of a shape corresponding to the grounds for refusal
or invalidity set out in the first and third indents of Article 3(1)(e) of First Council Directive 89/104, this directive having been repealed and substantially re-enacted by the current trade mark directive, Directive 2008/95 [Katnote: the three indents in Article 3(1)(e) bar and/or invalidate registration of
Hauck then brought a further appeal in cassation before the Hoge Raad, while Stokke lodged a further cross-appeal. The referring
court rejected Hauck's appeal, but considered that the cross-appeal on the issue of registrability of the trade mark called for the interpretation of Article 3(1)(e) of the directive which,
to date, has not been covered by the CJEU's case-law. This being so, it decided to stay the proceedings and refer the
following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘1. (a) Does
the ground for refusal or invalidity in [the first indent of]
Article 3(1)(e) of [the trade marks directive], namely that
[three-dimensional] trade marks may not consist exclusively of a shape which
results from the nature of the goods themselves, refer to a shape which is
indispensable to the function of the goods, or can it also refer to the
presence of one or more substantial functional characteristics of goods which
consumers may possibly looks for in the goods of competitors?
neither of those alternatives is correct, how should the provision then be
2. (a) Does
the ground for refusal or invalidity in [the third indent of]
Article 3(1)(e) [of the trade marks directive], namely, that
gives substantial value to the goods, refer to the motive (or motives)
underlying the relevant public’s decision to purchase?
a “shape which gives substantial value to the goods” within the meaning of the
aforementioned provision exist only if that shape must be considered to
constitute the main or predominant value in comparison with other values (such
as, in the case of high chairs for children, safety, comfort and reliability)
or can it also exist if, in addition to that value, other values of the goods
exist which are also to be considered substantial?
the purpose of answering Questions 2(a) and 2(b), is the opinion of the
majority of the relevant public decisive, or may the court rule that the
opinion of a portion of the public is sufficient in order to take the view that
the value concerned is “substantial” within the meaning of the aforementioned
the latter option provides the answer to Question 2(c), what requirement should
be imposed as to the size of the relevant portion of the public?
Article 3(1)(e) of [the trade marks directive] be interpreted as meaning that
the ground for exclusion referred to in subparagraph (e) of that article also
exists if the [three-dimensional] trade mark consists of a sign to which the
content of [the first indent] applies and which, for the rest, satisfies the
content of [the third indent]?’
* In terms of interpretation, the ground for refusal of registration set out in the first
indent of Article 3(1)(e) pursues the same
objective as the grounds set out in the second and third indents and must therefore be interpreted in a way that is
consistent with the aims of the other two indents. Thus, when applying the first indent correctly, you have to identify the essential characteristics — ie the most important elements — of the sign concerned on a
case-by-case basis [in other words, don't imagine for a moment that a characteristic that is found to be caught by the indent in one case will be equally caught by it in another], basing your assessment either on the overall impression
produced by the sign or on an examination of each the components of that sign
in turn [This is interesting: when comparing marks for the purposes of opposition or infringement, one has to go for the overall impression of each rather than salami-slicing them into individual similar or dissimilar components, as in Case C-329/02 P SAT.1 SatellitenFernsehen v OHIM. However, when separating registrable from unregistrable elements of the same mark, an overall assessment or the piecemeal approach are equally acceptable].
* When applying the first
indent, you also have to take account of the fact that the concept of a ‘shape which results from the nature of
the goods themselves’ means that shapes with essential characteristics which
are inherent to the generic function or functions of such goods must, in
principle, also be denied registration. The reservation of such characteristics
to a single economic operator would make it difficult for competing
undertakings to give their goods a shape which would be suited to the use for
which those goods are intended -- these being the essential characteristics that consumers look for in the products of competitors, given that they
are intended to perform an identical or similar function [what about features of shape that that are not essential, but which give rise to essentiality with regard to the shape of other goods which are intended to be interoperative with them?].
* The fact that the shape of a product is regarded as giving it substantial value does not mean that other characteristics may
not also give the product significant value [Hmm, wonders Merpel: what, at para.30, is the difference between "substantial" and "significant"?]. Thus "the aim of preventing the
exclusive and permanent right which a trade mark confers from serving to extend
indefinitely the life of other rights which the EU legislature has sought to
make subject to limited periods requires that the possibility of applying the
third indent ... not be
automatically ruled out when, in addition to its aesthetic function, the
product concerned also performs other essential functions".
* The concept of a ‘shape which gives substantial value to the
goods’ cannot be limited purely to the shape of products having only artistic
or ornamental value, as there is otherwise a risk that products which have
essential functional characteristics as well as a significant aesthetic element
will not be covered. * Where the perception of the target public must be taken into
account since it is essential for the purposes of determining whether the sign
filed for registration as a trade mark enables the goods or services concerned
to be recognised as originating from a particular undertaking, that obligation
cannot be imposed in the context of Article 3(1)(e).
* While the presumed perception of the sign by the average
consumer is not a decisive element when applying the third indent, it may still be a relevant
criterion of assessment when identifying the
essential characteristics of that sign. * The three grounds for refusal of registration in the indents to Article
3(1)(e) operate independently of one another. as is shown by the fact that they are set out as
successive points, coupled with the use of the word ‘exclusively’. This being so, the fact that a sign can be denied registration on the basis of
a number of grounds for refusal is irrelevant so long as any one of those
grounds fully applies to that sign.
1. The first indent of
Article 3(1)(e) ... must
be interpreted as meaning that the ground for refusal of registration set out
in that provision may apply to a sign which consists exclusively of the shape
of a product with one or more essential characteristics which are inherent to
the generic function or functions of that product and which consumers may be
looking for in the products of competitors.
2. The third indent of
Article 3(1)(e) ... must be interpreted as meaning that
the ground for refusal of registration set out in that provision may apply to a
sign which consists exclusively of the shape of a product with several
characteristics each of which may give that product substantial value. The
target public’s perception of the shape of that product is only one of the
assessment criteria which may be used to determine whether that ground for
refusal is applicable.
3. Article 3(1)(e) ... must be interpreted as meaning that the grounds for refusal of
registration set out in the first and third indents of that provision may not
be applied in combination.
Teva UK Limited &
Teva Pharmaceuticals Limited v Leo Pharma A/S & Leo Laboratories Limited
[2014] EWHC 3096 (Pat) is a decision by Mr Justice Birss in the Patents Court, England and Wales. This
case is about treatment of psoriasis with a combination medicinal formulation
comprising two substances known to treat psoriasis (a corticosteroid and a
vitamin D analogue) and a particular solvent that is able to stabilise the
combination formulation. The invention lies in the putting together of the two therapeutic
substances in the same formulation and the choice of the solvent. The decision
mostly concerns whether this was inventive. Since the invention could be seen as an ‘incremental’
one which concerns optimising use of known drugs, rather than the discovery of
new drugs, this decision provides insights as to how such incremental inventions
will fare for inventive step in the Courts of England and Wales. More broadly the decision adds
to the case law of how inventive step is assessed in a complex pharmaceutical
setting. Other recent
pharmaceutical cases concerning inventive step There have been several cases in recent times where inventive
step been determined in the context of a pharmaceutical invention. In Novartis AG v Generics (UK) Limited (t/a Mylan) [2012] EWCA Civ1623, discussed by the IPKat (see here) the Court of Appeal had to review the decision of Floyd J (here) in assessing inventive step where the compound
went through several steps during research and development. Whether or not the
compound would have passed each test would have been difficult to predict, and
yet the compound was found to be obvious. In Hospira UK Ltd v Genentech Inc
[2014] EWHC 1094 (Pat), noted by the IPKat here, Birss J had to deal with inventive step of an ‘incremental’
invention, and he found the inventive concept, which related to a dosage
regimen, to be obvious. In Glenmark
Generics (Europe) Limited & others v The Wellcome Foundation Limited &
Glaxo Group Ltd, [2013] EWHC 148 (Pat), reported by the IPKat here, Arnold J decided that a
combination product for treating malaria was obvious. From these cases we can see how inventive step
is being assessed by these courts where the invention concerns a
multi-step R&D process. In addition it seems clear that incremental inventions
in the pharmaceutical field are being found invalid for inventive step. The present invention In this case Leo was defending two patents, EP 1178808 and
its divisional EP 2455083. The claims of EP 1178808 relate to a pharmaceutical
composition comprising vitamin D or an analogue of it, a corticosteroid and a specific
solvent. EP 2455083 relates to a more specific embodiment where the vitamin D
analogue is calcipotriol and the corticosteroid is betamethasone. These therapeutic
substances were known for treating psoriasis, and the solvent, polyoxypropylene
15 stearyl ether, was disclosed in a prior art publication ‘Turi’, US patent
4,083,974. There are several aspects to the contribution being made by the
invention. One lies in realising that providing the two therapeutic substances
in a single formulation would increase patient compliance in comparison to
asking patients to take two separate products. However, given that the two
substances are stable at different pHs, they cannot simply be added to each
other in an aqueous formulation. A second aspect of the contribution is making
a non-aqueous formulation choosing to use polyoxypropylene 15 stearyl ether as
a solvent. The expert witnesses
and the ‘team’ for inventive step The expert witnesses gave evidence on treatment of psoriasis
with the two substances, whether they would consider combining them in a single
formulation an whether the co-formulation would be stable. Under
cross-examination it became clear that the expert reports contained ‘sweeping
generalisations’ and in their testimonies they were guilty of ‘overstatement’.
However Birss J was appreciative of the contribution of all the experts which
allowed him to determine the common general knowledge in the art and on the
skilled person being a team that included a skilled clinician and a skilled
formulator of pharmaceutical compositions. Common general knowledge Birss J held that, from the common general knowledge, it was
known that patient compliance was important in psoriasis and that using a
single combination formulation would increase compliance over prescribing two different
ones. However he did not accept Leo’s argument that the common general
knowledge of the skilled clinician would assume that combining the two
substances in a single composition was not possible. Birss J built up a complex
picture of the common general knowledge of a skilled formulator and how such a person would tackle the making of non-aqueous solutions containing substances
sensitive to pH. A key point was that the skilled formulator is an empiricist who
would proceed to test solvents that might have worked. Birss J noted that there are some cases where inventive step can
be decided on common general knowledge alone, and commented that Teva’s inventive
step attack was slightly unusual in that it started from the common general
knowledge (knowing that a single combination product would increase compliance)
and involved adding a prior art reference, Turi, which disclosed the solvent.
This was not a situation where inventive step was assessed by identifying the
differences between the invention and primary prior art reference. The information in
the patents Leo’s patents make note of the fact that patient compliance could
be improved by using a single combination product. They also give the results
of stability tests and provide evidence of a better therapeutic effect than using
the substances separately. The patents also refer to ‘synergy’ occurring, but this
aspect was not pursued by Leo in the trial to show inventive step. Had it been, it would have been a valuable addition to the case law in this area. The appropriate inventive
step test Birss J recited the much-quoted statement from Generics v Lundbeck which opens:
‘The question of obviousness must be considered on the facts
of each case. The court must consider the weight attached to any particular
factor in the light of all the relevant circumstances.’ He considered this to mean that ‘obvious to try’ is simply
‘one of a variety of factors’ to be considered. He added:
‘Obvious to try cases usually involve consideration of the level
of expectation of success but one cannot lay down a general characterisation of
what the true level of expectation must be in every case beyond stating that it
must be a fair one. In that way the differences between different cases is
taken into account. It is wrong to ask whether something might achieve a particular
desired effect. It is correct to ask whether it was obvious that it would
achieve that effect.’
What does Birss J mean? Is
he saying one should not judge inventive step by asking whether the skilled
person would have predicted it would have worked but instead, once the
invention has been found to work, one should then ask ‘was it obvious that it
would have worked’? Is that the correct approach to ‘expectation of success’?
Readers' comments in this point would be most appreciated. From Birss J’s comment it seems that ‘expectation of success’
is something complex and very fact-specific. I also wonder whether the learned judge should
have defined what ‘success’ would be in the present case. Was it simply
production of a stable combination composition or was it providing better therapeutic
results? Was the invention
obvious? Birss J started his inventive analysis from the position that
a combination formulation was desirable from the common general knowledge to
increase patient compliance. The skilled clinician would expect the combination
formulation to be more effective than using the therapeutic substances
separately. It was well known, for example, that the corticosteroid would
reduce the irritation caused by calcipotriol. Leo argued there would be ‘prejudice’ against use of corticosteroids
due to potential side effects over the long term. However Birss felt there
would not be prejudice against short term use or in the combination. The skilled formulator: he ain't saying nothin' Birss J then switched his analysis to the perspective of the
skilled formulator. It was obvious to use a non-aqueous solution to overcome
the issue of the substances being stable at different pH’s. The issue came down
to whether the solvent disclosed in Turi would be obvious to use in the
formulation. Turi disclosed a non-aqueous composition containing the solvent
and betamethasone (one of the therapeutic substances used in the present
invention) and based on this Birss J concluded that the skilled formulator would not
ignore it or dismiss it. Leo criticised the benefits described in Turi as ‘illusory’,
but Birss J felt this was an overstatement. Leo also put forward arguments based
on the fact that the solvent disclosed in Turi was not widely used and this
might would add potential cost, time and uncertainty, for example if a
regulator required extensive testing of the solvent. However, Birss J felt that
whilst factors such as this can be relevant they rarely outweigh technical
considerations. A crucial point for inventive step was the skilled person’s
perception of how difficult it would be to solve the pH problem. The expert
witnesses had disagreed on this issue, but Birss J felt that Teva’s case on this
was more persuasive. The skilled formulator presented with Turi would proceed
to test the solvent it disclosed and result would be positive. A clinical study
would then be carried out using the combination formulation and this would
confirm it was an effective treatment. This meant the invention was obvious. Inventive selections
and the Technograph test Birss J went on, tantalisingly, to discuss the situation in which the
selection of the solvent would be inventive. If evidence had been provided that
a ‘vast range of obvious agents had not worked’ then this could have been ‘compelling
evidence of non-obviousness’. However Leo had not done this. Birss J also asked whether his analysis was an example of the
unfair step-by-step approach identified in Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v
Mills and Rockley (Electronics)Ltd [1972] RPC 346. In that case Lord Diplock had
"The cross-examination of the respondents' expert
followed with customary skill the familiar "step by step" course. I
do not find it persuasive. Once an invention has been made, it is generally
possible to postulate a combination of steps by which the inventor might have
arrived at the invention…if he had started from something that was already
known…"
Birss J felt he had not made this error since his analysis had
considered the normal steps in development of a pharmaceutical product and thus
could not have been influenced by hindsight. Unanswered Questions 1. How should ‘expectation of success’ have been addressed
for this case? Should Birss J have analysed this based on ‘would the skilled
formulator have expected the solvent disclosed in Turi to have worked?’ instead
of ‘would the skilled formulator have tested the solvent disclosed in Turi?’.
Often in pharmaceutical cases there is little chance of success for any one
candidate, but the skilled person would have had reasons to test it. 2. If the inventive step analysis follows the normal steps
in development of a pharmaceutical product, is there a danger of failing the
Technograph test? How can one determine one has not failed the Technograph
test? 3. Are other incremental inventions also likely to be found
obvious? It seems that often for such inventions the contribution is modest and
there is a lot of relevant prior art. 4. What does it take for a combination product to be
inventive? Does it need to have an element of inventive selection or a
demonstration of synergy?
Typical moment outside the Rolls Building last Friday
As Jeremy announced with a breaking news post, last Friday Arnold J issued his 266-paragraph judgment in Cartier and
Others v BskyB and Others, a case concerning the possibility of requiring internet
service providers (ISPs) to block, or at least impede, access by their
subscribers to websites that advertise and sell counterfeit goods. Why everybody was waiting for this judgment?
The reason why this judgment was keenly awaited is that there is no specific provision under UK law which allows holders of trade mark rights to seek and obtain an injunction against ISPs that have actual knowledge of another person using their services to infringe their rights. As readers will promptly recall, such possibility is instead expressly available to copyright owners thanks to s97A of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), by which the UK implemented Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive into its own national law.
What is the reason behind this 'omission'? It is has of course to do with UK implementation of EU directives, in particular the Enforcement Directive. What happened at the time of transposing this directive into UK law is that UK Government thought that it did not need to take
any action to transpose the third sentence in Article 11 into its own law [see para
116 of the judgment]. This provision states that "Member States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of [the InfoSoc] Directive"
While UK Government
had deemed necessary [despite an earlier view to the contrary expressed by the
Government itself: see para 113 of the judgment] to give express implementation to Article 8(3)
of the InfoSoc Directive [see para 115], it did not do the same with regard to the third sentence in Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. UK
Government justified its [somehow contradictory?] decision not to take any action to implement this more
general rule by
referring to s37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. This provision states that “[t]he High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an
injunction … in all cases in which it appears to be just and convenient to do
This (together with - of course - other considerations) led Arnold J to conclude that blocking orders may be sought also
in respect of websites selling and advertising counterfeited goods.
Be honest: wouldn't you rather prefer finding a blocking order
This is not the only good news for rightholders though, as
this judgment also contains a very thorough assessment of the effectiveness of
blocking injunctions, the conditions under which they may be granted, as well as a comprehensive overview of the jurisprudence of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in both (online) copyright and trade mark
This Kat suspects that we will see many references to the Cartier judgment not just in future applications for blocking injunctions in the UK (and other Member States), but also in forthcoming policy briefs. This is because this ruling deals with most - if not all - the arguments employed by rightholders and ISPs when advocating in favour or against the availability of blocking orders.
Paragraph 197 ff contains a must-read assessment of blocking orders and availability of alternative measures, including: (1) action against the operators of the websites where the allegedly infringing works/counterfeited goods are hosted; (2) notice-and-takedown by hosts; (3) payment freezing; (4) de-indexing from search engines; (5) custom seizure.
Basically the conclusion of Arnold J was that none of these alternatives is as effective as blocking orders [para 217]. Incidentally, the "risk of reputational damage to the ISPs, particularly in the event of overblocking" is not a "significant one" in Arnold J's opinion [para 195]. It is particularly interesting to note what the judge stated in respect of (2), (3) and (4) mentioned above.
Similarly to what stated in his earlier judgment in 20C Fox v BT (No 2), Arnold J took the view that "the rightholders should pay the costs of an unopposed application ... [and] the ISPs should generally bear the costs of implementation as part of the costs of carrying on business in this sector". However the judge did "not rule out the possibility of ordering the rightholder to pay some or all of the implementation costs in an appropriate case." [para 240] A very interesting part of the judgment is paragraph 250 and following. Given ISPs' objection that future implementation costs are likely to increase if a substantial number of orders are granted, Arnold J noted that neither the claimants nor the defendants had addressed the economic dimension of this problem. Although the Ecommerce Directive prohibits imposing a general obligation to monitor on ISPs, according to the judge "it is economically more efficient to require intermediaries to take action to prevent infringement occurring via their services than is to require rightholders to take action directly against infringers." [para 251] Is this something for ISPs to think about? 5) Safeguards against abuse: users' rights and blocking duration
It will be intriguing to see how the final part of the judgment will be applied and developed in future orders. In particular, in line with what the CJEU ruled in Telekabel [here], at paragraph 263 Arnold J stated that "in future orders should expressly permit affected subscribers to apply to the [High] Court to discharge or vary the order." [para 264]
Cartier and Others v BSkyB and Others [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch),
online sale of counterfeits,
* Nampak: when a patent suit is too simple to go to trial Summary judgements
are a rarity in patent litigation, where judges feel more confortable when grounding their decisions on expert evidence gathered during the trial
phase. There are, however, some exceptions, like Nampak Plastics Europe Ltd
v Alpla UK Ltd, where Birss J held
that the proprietor of a very simple patent for a plastic milk bottle
could not resist an application for summary judgment on non-infringement in
respect of the claimant's bottle design. In this post, Jeremy allows occasional guest blogger Paul
England (Taylor Wessing LLP) to report on the appeal decision of this case, rendered
by the Court of Appeal for England and Wales.
Clothing retailer Duluth Holdings created an
advertisement showing two t-shirts known as “henley” with the phrase “Don A Henley AND Take it
Easy”. Don Henley, a former member of the Eagles, did not take it
easy and sued the company before the Central District Court of California,
claiming infringement of his trade marks, right of publicity, and also false advertising.
Marie-Andrée tells how it went.
* Les Wednesday
Whimsies Who said that Continental Europe is under-represented on the
IPKat? After an Eleonorian Friday
Fantasia, voilà Marie-Andrée’s finesse!
* A clear vision
of genuine use: Specsavers v Asda (again) The Court of Appeal for England and Wales has
just issued its decision in Specsavers v Asda, a very
well-known saga the previous episodes of which have been severally covered by the
IPKat [on
initial skirmishes, here and here; on the High Court judgment of Mann J here; on the main decision and referral to Europe by the Court of
Appeal here; on the costs ruling here and then the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU ) decision here]. The dispute substantially concerns the
question of whether the use of a pair of coloured overlapping ovals with a
distinctive word element can save a sign constituted of two black overlapping
ovals without any word sign from non-use revocation. After the CJEU gave its opinion, the controversy came back home, with David recounting how it went.
* Chemists and
mech/elecs unite! Informed by Bart
van Wezenbeek of V.O. Patents & Trademarks, David
recounts a change in format for the EQE (the qualifying exam to become a
European Patent Attorney), which will take effect in a couple of years.
Currently, the drafting and amendment papers are available in two versions: one
for electrical and mechanical candidates, the other for chemists and life
scientists. Is this change desirable, wonder David and Bart, leaving room
for readers’ answers in the comment section.
* Apples and
Oranges in the IP5 Statistics, or how to make your patent filing statistics
look more fruitful Once again, Jeremy
gives a platform to Peter
Arrowsmith (partner in London-based patent attorneys
Cleveland), the patent-statistics enthusiast who penned the two-part post on
whether British inventors are really a disappearing breed [“The Great British Vanishing Act”, here and here]. This time round, Peter looks at the
presentation of patent filing figures published in the IP5
statistical data for 2013, which is released jointly by the five largest
intellectual property offices in the world (IP5, indeed).
* Finland’s
Citizen Copyright Initiative In Doubt: A Sad But Necessary Win For Cross-Border
Online Copyright Enforcement? In December 2012, the Finnish police raided the
home of a nine-year-old girl who had illegally downloaded music on to her
computer. That fact gave rise to ‘Common
Sense For Copyright’, a
crowd-sourced initiative which called for the expansion of copyright fair use
exceptions under Finland’s Copyright Act. Alas, that the Finnish
Parliament is close to rejecting the initiative, Lucas reports.
* Converse sues
for trade mark infringement of iconic Chuck Taylor All Star Iconic shoe manufacturer Converse has brought
31 trade mark infringement proceedings against retailers and rival shoe designers in the US,
claiming infringement of a trade mark covering the “distinctive
midsole design made up of a toe bumper and a toe cap, plus an upper strike
and/or a lower stripe”. Rebecca tells how it is going.
* BREAKING NEWS: Cartier and friends score over ISPs: Open Rights Group intervenes Jeremy breaks the news of Mr Justice Arnold of
the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice giving his decision in Cartier,
intervening) [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch). The proceedings concerns right
owners’ claims towards most important UK access providers to block access to
websites selling infringing goods. This most Arnoldian decision considers all
the key issues of the field, from jurisdiction criteria to conditions and
principles that govern issuance of blocking injunctions under UK and EU law.
* French Designer
Sonia Rykiel Did Not Copy Shoes, Says Paris Court In the French copyright wonderland, even shoes can
be protected as a work of art. This is what happened recently at the Tribunal
de Grande Instance de Paris, Marie-Andrée explains, with that Court determining whether a shoe
reflects the personality of its author when French fashion house Sonia Rykiel was
recently sued in this court by French shoe manufacturer Apple Shoes for
* Feeling a bit
artistic? Here's a contest for you Kafriend Sophie
Stalla-Bourdillon (University of Southampton) is looking
for a logo for the new interdisciplinary Centre for Law, Internet and Culture
(iCLIC) at the University of Southampton, which comprises Eleonora
Rosati, Micheal
O’Floinn, Marta
Iljadica, with Sophie acting as
iCLIC’s director. The deadline for submitting logos is 2 November. The winner will
have his/her work reproduced on the IPKat, get a free ticket for the first
iCLIC conference, and will be most welcome to visit the Centre. More information
can be found in this Eleonora’s post.
champs for 2014; the best of times or the worst of times? Starting from the final chart of The Economist’s Innovation Awards,
published in the 4 October issue of the magazine, Neil reflects on the
criteria used to choose the winners, on the very state of innovation, and on
what that concept means nowadays. Does that list reflects the idiosyncrasies
of The Economist as much as the objective indicia considered?
Are we in an innovation trough? Questions and possible answers are in this
competition -- this time for the literary minded Jeremy launches a competition to write a limerick that (i)
begins with the line "A talented kitten called Kate" and (ii) is on
the theme of intellectual property protection other than via the patent system.
The prize is complimentary registration, complete with a free lunch, at
CLT's forthcoming conference -- "Intellectual Property: the 'no patents'
round-up for non-techie people", organised by CLT and held in Central
London on 29 October (for which further details are available here). The
deadline for submitting limericks is 26 October. Read this post to know more!
* The UPC and
Investor–State Arbitration The creation of a unitary patent title and a
common court (‘UPC’) to litigate patent infringement in Europe raises, among
other things, questions of international IP law. Katfriend Henning
Grosse Ruse-Khan (University
of Cambridge, King’s College and Max Planck Institute), kindly hosted by
Eleonora, investigates those really questions in this post.
* Galileo sees
stars as ESA logo marches on Jeremy reports on the
General Court of the European Union’s decision in Case
T-450/11 Galileo
International Technology LLC v OHIM, the European Commission and the
European Space Agency (ESA). The case concerns a device sign including the word “Galileo”, for which the EU Commission sought registration, on behalf of the European
Space Agency, in relation to “research and development in the field of
satellite radio navigation” in Class 42. In 2005, a company owning two earlier
Community GALILEO word marks for a large number of goods and services in Classes
9, 16, 35, 38, 39, 41 and 42 opposed that registration. Like the earlier
decisions in this case, the General Court goes at the very core of similarity
among products and services, providing an enlightening analysis on what “research
and development” means in terms of services and products. * Fill in the
form, keep your hair: UPC IT Prototype needs your feedback Are you terrified by the possible disasters
that the UPC-related IT systems could bring into your life? Last week the Kat posted a
little item encouraging readers to test out the UPC's
IT prototype that the UK IPO created to design an IT
interface as efficient as possible. Yesterday Annsley tested the prototype
herself and, highlighting possible inconveniences that different EU approaches
might trigger, re-encourages readers to give their feedback while there is
still time (ie, until November 2014).