Source: http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/12-14676/1106980431/
Timestamp: 2014-12-20 15:15:47
Document Index: 488980771

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 107', '§ 8', '§ 107', '§ 107', '§ 107', '§ 8', '§ 107']

Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by Andrew Pequignot for The Association of Southeastern Research Libraries for Cambridge University Press, et al v. J.L. Albert, et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings
› Filing 1106980431
Amicus Brief as of right or by consent of the parties filed by Andrew Pequignot for The Association of Southeastern Research Libraries. Service date: 04/25/2013 US mail - District Judge Evans; Attorney for Amicus Curiae: Aistars; Attorney for Appellants: Bloom, Larson; Attorney for Appellees: Lynn, Moffitt, Volkert, Warenzak; email - Originating Clerk/Ag Hatten; Attorney for Amicus Curium: Dove, Lerner, Rasenberger, Steinman, Tonsager, Wasoff; Attorney for Appellants: Krugman, Rains, Rich, Singer; Attorney for Appellees: Ashby, Askew, Bates, Eskow, Gentry, Harbin, Levie, Miller, Quicker, Schaetzel, Whiting-Pack; Attorney for Not Party: Tenny. (ECF: W. Pequignot)
Download PDF Case Nos. 12-14676 and 12-15147 (Consolidated Appeals)
MARK P. BECKER, in his official capacity as
Georgia State University President, et al.,
No. 1:08-CV-1425 (EVANS, J.)
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEASTERN RESEARCH LIBRARIES
Case Nos. 12-14676 and 12-15147 (Consolidated Appeals)
In accordance with Rule 26.1-1 of the Eleventh Circuit Rules, amicus curiae
The Association of Southeastern Research Libraries, Inc., by and through its
undersigned counsel, certifies that in addition to the persons and entities identified
by the parties and their amici curiae, the following persons and entities have an
interest in the outcome of this case:
The Association of Southeastern Research Libraries, Inc. and its member
libraries at the following institutions:
In accordance with Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
amicus curiae The Association of Southeastern Research Libraries, Inc., by and
through its undersigned counsel, certifies that it has no parent corporation and that
it has not issued any stock.
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .............................................. 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 2
This Court’s Ruling Will Have Broad Implications for Libraries in
the Eleventh Circuit and Elsewhere Throughout the Southeast. ..................... 3
E-Reserves Enhance Teaching at Universities...................................... 3
GSU’s E-Reserves Practices are Consistent With Other
ASERL Libraries. .................................................................................. 6
Limitations on the Length of E-Reserves Excerpts. .................... 7
Fair-Use Checklists...................................................................... 8
The Licensing Practices of CCC and Publishers Serve as a
Significant Impediment to Teaching. .................................................. 10
Reversing the District Court’s Order Would Harm
Education. ............................................................................................ 13
The Publisher’s Mischaracterize the Law of Fair Use. ................................. 15
Libraries Differ from Commercial Copyshops in Important
Ways. ................................................................................................... 15
Many Uses of Library E-Reserves are Transformative. ..................... 18
Educational Fair Use Extends Beyond Transformative Uses. ............ 20
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 26
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 27
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust,
No. 11 CV 6351, 2012 WL 4808939 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) ............................6
758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) .............................................................. 15, 16
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982) .............................................................................................23
448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) .................................................................................19
510 U.S. 569 (1994) ..................................................................................... passim
537 U.S. 186 (2003) ...................................................................................... 22, 23
499 U.S. 340 (1991) .............................................................................................22
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) ...........................................................................................22
364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004) .................................................................................24
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,
99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) ......................................................................... 15, 18
464 U.S. 417 (1984) .......................................................................... 16, 17, 20, 21
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................23
861 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ..................................................................21
No. 05-cv-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008) ...........................................................11
422 U.S. 151 (1975) .............................................................................................22
487 F.2d 1345, aff’d by equally divided panel, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) ..................17
17 U.S.C. § 107 ....................................................................................... 3, 13, 21, 24
David G. Post, The Continuing Saga of Thomas Jefferson and the
Internet (October 14, 2011) ..................................................................................23
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976) ..............................................18
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105,
1110 (1990)...........................................................................................................22
U.S. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 8.......................................................................................22
Amicus curiae The Association of Southeastern Research Libraries, Inc.
(“ASERL”) respectfully submits this brief in support of Defendants-Appellees
Mark P. Becker, in his official capacity as Georgia State University President, et al.
(collectively, “GSU”) and affirmance of the District Court’s decision below
finding fair use for the majority of GSU’s uses for which Plaintiffs-Appellants
(collectively, the “Publishers”) established a prima facie case of infringement.
Amicus curiae ASERL, a Georgia nonprofit association with member
libraries at forty institutions throughout the Southeast, is the largest regional
research library consortium in the United States. ASERL was founded more than
fifty years ago to advance the educational and research success of students and
faculty at its member libraries by facilitating the sharing of information, expertise,
and technology resources. Among other services offered to its member libraries,
ASERL coordinates programs and meetings to keep its member libraries abreast of
emerging issues affecting university research libraries and leads discussions on
strategies for addressing these issues.
ASERL does not typically file amicus briefs (indeed, in its over fifty-year
existence, ASERL is not aware of any prior instance where it has submitted or
signed onto an amicus brief). This case, however, is far from typical. It involves
issues of first impression regarding the scope of fair use in electronic reserves
services (“e-reserves”) made available to students and faculty at countless
university libraries across the country. As discussed infra, most of the ASERL
member libraries, fourteen of which reside in states within the Eleventh Circuit
(including GSU), offer e-reserves similar to the one offered by GSU that is the
subject of this appeal. ASERL has a substantial interest in the outcome of this case
because this Court’s decision will significantly affect its member libraries’ ability
to continue offering e-reserves in the future. ASERL believes that e-reserves are a
tremendous benefit to students and greatly enhance teaching at universities.
ASERL received consent from the parties to file this brief. This brief was
not authored in whole or in part by counsel for the parties, and ASERL alone
contributed money to fund preparing and submitting this brief.
Whether the District Court was correct to find that making short excerpts of
copyrighted works available to students on academic library e-reserves for the
purpose of facilitating classroom teaching is a fair use.
As explained below, library e-reserves benefit academic learning in many
irrefutable ways. The Publishers’ stance that all but the most minor amount of
copying for e-reserves requires a license would, if adopted, mean that many uses of
e-reserves would simply disappear, as would the benefits of these uses to teaching.
Fortunately for students in higher education, fair use “is not an infringement of
copyright,” 17 U.S.C. § 107, and does not require a license. The District Court was
right to conclude that the vast majority of GSU’s unlicensed uses of short excerpts
on e-reserves were fair uses.
This Court’s Ruling Will Have Broad Implications for Libraries in the
Eleventh Circuit and Elsewhere Throughout the Southeast.
E-Reserves Enhance Teaching at Universities.
Many ASERL libraries, like GSU, offer e-reserves to their students and
faculty. E-reserves provide limited electronic access to materials identified by
professors as reading for a particular course. Professors select these materials,
often excerpts from books and journals that the library has paid significant sums to
include in its collections, because they believe the materials will further learning in
the class. As the District Court recognized, e-reserves materials supplement other
materials assigned in the class to “provide a fuller, richer course curriculum.”
(Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dkt#423) at 37.)
This enriched curriculum does not come at the expense of textbooks.
Whereas textbooks generally cover a broad range of topics at a high level, the
excerpts placed on e-reserves primarily are intended to provide students with a
deeper perspective on a particular issue. For example, professors often assign these
materials because of the way in which an excerpt articulates an argument or
demonstrates a concept. Other times the excerpt provides background information
that helps students understand the broader context of the lecture. Other times the ereserves materials cover a topic that is too current or controversial to make it into a
general-purpose textbook written for a broad audience. And still other times, for
example, the professor has a created a unique interdisciplinary course that crosses
two divergent subjects (e.g., economics and art history) for which there are no
suitable textbooks available.
Academic libraries restrict access to e-reserves to prevent use of the
materials outside these limited educational purposes. First, access to e-reserves
typically is limited to students of the university who are enrolled in the course and
who already have access to the same materials through the library. Second, ereserves are password protected with authentication features that meet or exceed
industry best practices. Finally, the materials are usually deleted at the end of the
semester to prevent other uses of the materials. (Cf. Dkt#423 at 40-41 (describing
the access restrictions on GSU’s e-reserves).)
Print reserves, which have been a mainstay at universities for decades, are
the analog equivalent of e-reserves. With print reserves, a photocopy of a journal
article or an excerpt from a book is placed at the front desk of the library rather
than on e-reserves. Print reserves, however, impose barriers to access that make it
less likely that students will read the reserve materials. Students must come to the
library and check out the reserve copy at the front desk. Usually the copy can only
be checked out for a restricted period of time to allow other students the
opportunity to read the reserve material. And students cannot retain a copy to study
and annotate unless they create a photocopy of the reserve materials for themselves
(which some invariably do).
Even though there are limitations to print reserves that make them less
desirable to students, print reserves are not even an option for a growing number of
distance-learning classes. These students attend class remotely and cannot check a
copy out of the library or come to the library to read it. Distance learning opens the
door for universities to provide education to an expanded body of students, many
of whom would be unable to enroll at these schools because they live in a rural
area too far away to attend classes; or because they are working parents who
cannot make it to daytime classes; or because they are low-income students who
cannot afford a traditional educational experience. E-reserves allow these students
to read materials that they would otherwise be able to read if they were a
traditional student on campus.
Providing electronic access to reserve materials instead of print reserves also
has the potential to enhance accessibility to students with print disabilities (who
would otherwise be able to access these materials but for their disability). As
assistive technology continues to improve and faculty members become more
cognizant of the formats that are compatible with these technologies, universities
can take a step closer to truly equal access in higher education. See Kathy Konicek,
et al., Electronic Reserves:The Promise and Challenge to Increase Accessibility,
21 Library Hi Tech, No. 1, 102 (2003), available at http://www.uvm.edu/~bnelson/
computer/accessibility/electronicreserveaccessibility.pdf; cf. Authors Guild v.
HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 6351, 2012 WL 4808939, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012)
(noting that university libraries’ “use of digital copies to facilitate access for printdisabled persons is [a] transformative [fair use]”).
GSU’s E-Reserves Practices are Consistent With Other ASERL
GSU’s e-reserves policy is based upon the copyright policy developed by the
University System of Georgia (the “USG Copyright Policy”), which also governs
e-reserves of ASERL member libraries at the University of Georgia and The
Georgia Institute of Technology (among other schools). Since this case was first
filed, the Publishers have repeatedly suggested that GSU’s e-reserves practices and
the USG Copyright Policy are outliers among major universities. In fact, the USG
Copyright Policy and GSU’s implementation of this policy are consistent with the
practices at most other university libraries, including ASERL member libraries in
the Eleventh Circuit and throughout the Southeast.
The District Court’s findings of fact outline the various components of the
USG Copyright Policy (see Dkt#423 at 38-41), and each component is an
important factor in determining that GSU’s uses are fair uses and were made in
good faith. Without diminishing the importance of these other features of the USG
Copyright Policy (e.g., limiting access to students in the class and posting
copyright warnings to students who access e-reserves), which are largely consistent
across universities, ASERL would like to highlight two components of the USG
Copyright Policy and its implementation in particular for purposes of comparison.
First, the District Court found that the average length of the excerpts at issue
in the case, which were made under the USG Copyright Policy, was approximately
10% of the source work. (Dkt#423 at 66.) Second, the USG Copyright Policy
incorporates a “fair-use checklist” that allows professors to individually assess fair
use based on a particular use. Both elements of the USG Copyright Policy and its
implementation have been criticized by the Publishers but are entirely consistent
with practices of other universities in general, and of ASERL libraries in particular.
Limitations on the Length of E-Reserves Excerpts.
GSU’s implementation of the USG Copyright Policy to allow copying of
10% of the work comports with the typical amount allowed by other universities in
their e-reserves policies. An independent study cited by GSU’s expert, Dr. Kenneth
Crews, in his expert report submitted to the District Court found that 80% of the
libraries surveyed used some form of a quantity limit in their copyright policy.
(Dkt#104-1 at 29 (citing Thomas H.P. Gould, et al., Copyright Policies and the
Deciphering of Fair Use in the Creation of Reserves at University Libraries, 31
Journal of Academic Librarianship 182 (May 2005)).) Where this limit was
expressed as a percentage of the work, the percentage ranged from 10% to 25%.
This is similar to ASERL’s own findings. In informal polling, ASERL found
that none of the member libraries it contacted had a fair-use policy that limited ereserves to less than 10% of the work or one chapter. This also is consistent with
ASERL’s polling of research libraries nationwide, which similarly report policies
that are no more restrictive than 10% of the work or one chapter. ASERL is not
aware of any university that has expanded the scope of permissible use in response
to the District Court’s decision. On the other hand, several universities have
indicated that they have modified their policy to be more restrictive in response to
the District Court’s decision.
Fair-Use Checklists.
A “fair-use checklist” also is a common component of library e-reserves
policies. The purpose of a “fair-use checklist” is to allow professors to evaluate the
factors that weigh for and against fair use. The instructions for the checklist often
emphasize, consistent with fair-use case law, that no single factor is determinative
and refer professors to various resources that can assist them with their
understanding of fair use. (See Dkt#423 at 39 (explaining the operation of the
checklist incorporated as part of the USG Copyright Policy).)
Many ASERL libraries, like GSU, incorporate a “fair-use checklist” as part
of their copyright policy to assist instructors with making fair use determinations.
For example, Duke University uses a checklist (available at http://www.library.
duke.edu/about/depts/scholcomm/copyright-and-fair-use.pdf) that incorporates
many of the same elements contained in the checklist used by GSU. The checklists
adopted by the university libraries at Florida State University (available at http://
guides.lib.fsu.edu/content.php?pid=73946&sid=558766), University of TennesseeKnoxville (available at http://www.lib.utk.edu/copyright/fairuse.html), and
Louisiana State University (available at http://www.lib.lsu.edu/admin/copyright/
checklist.html), are only a handful of other published examples of checklists at
ASERL libraries.
Although the Publishers criticize the use of a checklist, their central
licensing arm, the Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”), which is funding fifty
percent of this litigation, in fact previously endorsed the use of a similar checklist
and it still is available on CCC’s website, http://www.copyright.com/Services/
copyrightoncampus/basics/fairuse_list.html. Although CCC has since abandoned
the checklist, it obviously recognized at the time that the checklist can be an
effective tool for allowing professors to make reasoned judgments about fair use.
Significant Impediment to Teaching.
The Publishers paint the picture that there is a one-size-fits-all license that
would have allowed GSU to make all of the excerpts on its e-reserves available to
its students. That is simply not true. There are a variety of limitations in the
licenses offered by CCC and individual publishers that restrict, or in some cases
prevent, teachers from using materials for their classes.
First, while CCC provides an efficient (but often expensive) licensing
solution for some works, CCC does not license all of the works that a teacher
might want to use on e-reserves. For example, Plaintiff Cambridge University
Press admitted that it only allows CCC to license a portion of its books. (Trial Test.
of Frank Smith, Director of Digital Publ’g Global of Cambridge Univ. Press
(Dkt#399, Tr.1/69:25-70:11).) In these instances, without fair use, the university is
required to seek a license directly from the individual publisher. Sometimes the
current rights holder cannot be located or does not respond; sometimes ownership
is divided or unclear; and sometimes a license is simply denied.
Even when there is a clear rights holder willing to extend a limited license
for educational use, the significant time and expense of negotiating and securing a
license directly from a publisher often results in the faculty member not using the
material. An instructor may approach the course-reserves department a month or
longer before materials are needed in a particular class only to find out that there
still is insufficient time to secure a license because a publisher has failed to
respond promptly to requests for permission. If the students in the class are
fortunate, the instructor will still be able to find substitute materials. But often in
these situations, students are deprived altogether of materials that could further
In other instances, the publisher quotes an exorbitant fee. For example, one
ASERL member library relayed a situation where a professor wanted to use less
than 25% of a book in his class of 25 students. The publisher quoted permission
fees for one semester of more than $4,000, or more than $160 per student. It is
likely that the school could have purchased each student a copy of the book for less
than the permission fees, except for the fact that the book was out of print and
unavailable for purchase. Indeed, if a book is out of print—The Authors Guild, a
professional society that represents thousands of book authors, estimates that “75%
of the Books in United States libraries are out-of-print and have ceased earning any
income,” Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. For Prelim. Settlement Approval at
27, The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05-cv-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28,
2008)—the only real option is e-reserves. If the cost is prohibitive, the instructor
will simply not use the materials.
Even for those works licensable for some uses by CCC, many are not
licensable for e-reserves because the publisher that controls the rights refuses to
license digital uses. (See Dkt#423 at 25 (noting that only 12% of the works that
were available on a per-use basis were available for license in digital format).) As a
result, the many benefits of e-reserves to students are only available because the
teacher exercises the right of fair use.
In other instances, the publisher has refused to license enough content to be
of use. For example, even though an instructor or the university may be willing to
pay a per-page rate for 25% of the book, the publisher may not be willing to
license more than 15%. As a result, the professor is forced to modify the lecture or
find substitute materials.1
CCC licenses, which are offered on a per-use and an annual basis, also do
not completely overlap. For example, a particular work that is licensed on a per-use
basis might not be included in the annual license, and vice versa. As a result, a
library would need to secure both types of licenses just to cover the works CCC
has the right to license. These licenses also do not account for a library’s existing
subscriptions that may already license the use for e-reserves and do not account for
fair uses, which obviously do not require a license. (See Dkt#423 at 30 (noting that
“the licensing fees do not take fair use into account” and “CCC does not furnish
These limitations are consistent with the District Court’s finding that “[t]he lesser
availability of digital excerpts is attributable to the following: (1) some publishers
are concerned that they may not have the right to authorize distribution in digital as
opposed to print format; (2) some publishers are reluctant to place digital copies of
their works in the stream of commerce; and (3) sometimes publishers, for whatever
reason, simply prefer limiting sales to the whole book.” (Dkt#423 at 28-29.)
advice to users concerning whether a particular use is a fair use.”).) As a result,
universities end up paying more than they should for permissions fees.
Reversing the District Court’s Order Would Harm Education.
The Publishers argue that e-reserves excerpts should be limited to 1,000
words (or approximately, two or three pages), but the District Court properly
recognized that the Publishers’ approach is “so restrictive [it] undermines the
teaching objective favored by § 107.” (Dkt#423 at 71.) Indeed, a ruling in favor of
the Publishers requiring a license for virtually any use on e-reserves would require
each of these institutions to abandon their current educational practices, turning
instead to one of several equally unacceptable alternatives.
First, ASERL believes some schools would shut down their e-reserves
altogether, particularly smaller institutions that are even more cash-strapped than
larger universities. In some cases, this will simply mean that professors using ereserves will go back to using print reserves, and the limits that accompany that
format. Namely, students will be forced to wait in line for a reserve copy because it
has been checked out by another student and, when it reaches their turn, they will
need to photocopy the reserve material if they want to be able to refer to it in class.
Unfortunately, some percentage of students would simply find the hassle too great
to read the print-reserve materials and would forego reading the materials
completely. And as noted above, distance-learning students would not even have
that choice because they are not on campus to check out print-reserve materials.
Second, ASERL can foresee some schools might try to impose a new acrossthe-board fee for access to e-reserves, further adding to the escalating costs of
higher education. This clearly is the preferred result of the Publishers. But as GSU
pointed out below, GSU requires approval from both students and faculty to
increase student fees. (Trial Test. of Nancy Seamans, Dean of Libraries at Georgia
State University (Dkt#395, Tr.12/150:3-14).) This is consistent with other ASERL
member libraries. For example, in the state university system of Florida, “[t]he
Board of Governors must authorize all fees assessed to students.” Board of
Governors Regulation 7.003(1), available at http://www.flbog.edu/documents_
regulations/regulations/7-003Fees-fines-penaltiesregulationFINAL11-08-12.pdf.
As the District Court noted, on the other hand, “[i]f individual students had to pay
the cost of excerpts, the total of all permissions payments could be significant for
an individual student of modest means” (Dkt#423 at 33), especially in view of the
rising costs of textbooks, see http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/
01/why-are-college-textbooks-so-absurdly-expensive/266801/.
Third, if the District Court’s decision is reversed or meaningfully limited,
some schools would be forced to use money from their book-acquisition budgets to
pay for new licenses. This reallocation of limited resources away from new
educational content toward legacy collections hardly serves to incentivize the
creation of new works, one of the purposes of copyright. On the other hand, as the
District Court determined based on the evidence at trial, “[t]here is no reason to
believe that allowing unpaid, nonprofit academic use of small excerpts in
controlled circumstances would diminish creation of academic works.” (Dkt#423
at 82.)
Finally, the most likely result would be that many professors would simply
stop using these materials in class, in which case students will lose out on the
“fuller, richer course curriculum” that these materials could have provided.
The Publisher’s Mischaracterize the Law of Fair Use.
GSU has addressed the Publishers’ misstatements of fair use in its response
brief, and ASERL will not readdress most of them here. There are, however, a
couple issues that are particularly important to ASERL’s member libraries that
ASERL would like to touch on briefly.
Libraries Differ from Commercial Copyshops in Important Ways.
The Publishers rely extensively upon two cases from the 1990s, Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996), to justify their restrictive view of fair use. (Appellants’ Br. at 14, 44-46.)
The District Court correctly held that Basic Books and Princeton University Press
are readily distinguishable from GSU’s e-reserves practices and those of other
ASERL libraries because the commercial nature and purpose of the defendants’
uses in those cases are entirely different than the nonprofit educational purposes of
library e-reserves. (Dkt#423 at 49.)
In Basic Books, the defendant Kinko’s was a commercial copyshop that
printed and sold “coursepacks” to students for profit. Coursepacks are a collection
of excerpts that are bound together into a single volume. With this business model,
it is possible for the costs of labor and materials and the licensing fees to be
absorbed by the copyshop and passed on to students in the price of the coursepack.
At the time of the lawsuit, there were 200 Kinko’s stores nationwide that
offered these coursepack services. Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1534. The court
held that the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, weighed “strongly in
favor” of the publishers because of Kinko’s commercial purpose. Id. at 1532. The
commercial nature of Kinko’s business was so predominant that the court tacked it
on again as an “important additional factor” in its fair-use analysis. Id. at 1534.
Although not explicit in the court’s decision, it appears that the court also applied a
“presumption” that commercial uses are unfair, see id. at 1530 (citing Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)), a presumption
that the Supreme Court has since rejected, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 583-85 (1994).2
The court in Basic Books specifically noted that “[t]his commercial copying
can be contrasted to library copying,” citing Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345, aff’d by equally divided panel, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Id. at
1536. In Williams & Wilkins, the library at the National Institute of Health (“NIH”)
copied portions of journal articles to which it had subscriptions for its’ researchers’
personal use. In determining that this copying was fair use, the court emphasized
the purely noncommercial and educational nature of the use:
On both sides–library and requester–scientific progress, untainted by
any commercial gain from the reproduction, is the hallmark of the
whole enterprise of duplication. There has been no attempt to
misappropriate the work of earlier scientific writers for forbidden
ends, but rather an effort to gain easier access to the material for study
and research. This is important because it is settled that, in general,
the law gives copying for scientific purposes a wide scope.
Id. at 1354 (citations omitted).3 By citing Williams & Wilkins, the court in Basic
Books was acknowledging that the copying done by libraries was distinguishable
from the copying done by commercial copyshops.
Campbell’s rejection of an evidentiary presumption was limited to commercial
uses, see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (noting that the lower court had applied “a
presumption about the effect of commercial use, a presumption which as applied
here we hold to be error”), and thus did not upset Sony’s directive that copyright
holders must show a “meaningful likelihood of future harm” under the fourth
factor for non-commercial uses, Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
The commercial nature of the copying by the copyshop in Princeton
University Press, which the court noted “was performed on a profit-making basis
by a commercial enterprise,” 99 F.3d at 1389, similarly distinguishes that case
from the facts here. And like Basic Books, the court held that the defendants had a
burden to rebut “a presumption of unfairness” because the uses were commercial,
id. at 1386, which again is no longer good law after Campbell. Even though the
court went on to note that the publishers had satisfied their burden irrespective of a
presumption against the copyshop, it is nonetheless evident that the commercial
nature of the copyshop heavily influenced the court’s decision. The court explicitly
did not reach the issue of copying by nonprofit libraries. Id. at 1389.
Because library e-reserves are for nonprofit, educational purposes, Basic
Books and Princeton University Press are inapposite.
Many Uses of Library E-Reserves are Transformative.
The District Court determined that the particular uses by GSU at issue in this
case were not transformative. (Dkt#423 at 49.) Whether or not the District Court’s
finding on this point was correct,4 this Court should not extend this conclusion to
Although this case was decided under common-law fair use that governed the
1909 Copyright Act, the predecessor to the current Act, the statutory recognition of
fair use in Section 107 of the Copyright Act did not “change, narrow, or enlarge it
in any way.” H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
ASERL takes no position on whether this aspect of the District Court’s opinion
all uses of library e-reserves. Many uses of library e-reserves, in fact, are
A “transformative use” is one that “adds something new, with a further
message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citation omitted). Recent decisions have
focused on whether the new use is for a “different purpose,” irrespective of
whether any changes have been made to the work itself. See, e.g., Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608-11 (2d Cir. 2006).
There are many uses of e-reserves that serve a very different purpose than
the original work and thus are plainly transformative. For example:
A professor at Emory University’s medical school might use an
excerpt from a book detailing the well-accepted (at the time) need for radical
mastectomies in all cases of malignant breast cancer not for the original purpose of
conveying information about the standard procedure for this diagnosis, which has
since largely been abandoned, but rather for the different purpose of demonstrating
how mistakes were made by doctors in recommending this procedure.
A writing instructor at The University of Alabama might assign an
excerpt from a book on politics in the South not for the original purpose of
conveying information about this topic but for the different purpose of
demonstrating writing techniques in non-fiction writing.
An art history teacher at the University of Florida might use an
excerpt from a book criticizing hyperrealism as a genre of painting not for the
purpose of condoning the author’s views but instead for the purpose of rebuking
them by analogizing to early disparagement of impressionism.
A psychology professor at Auburn University might assign an excerpt
on the history of the civil rights movement by an author from Alabama and a
similar excerpt by an author from New York not for the original purpose of
conveying “facts” about these events but rather for the different purpose of
discussing possible writer bias in the differing accounts of the events.
Of course, these are only a handful of countless possible examples of
transformative uses of library e-reserves. A ruling by this Court that prohibits less
transformative uses could have a chilling effect on these transformative uses and
others. Some professors would err on the side of seeking a license and forego using
the materials if the publisher cannot be reached or the cost is prohibitive. Some
professors would stop using e-reserves altogether for fear of making an incorrect
assessment of fair use. And some schools may shut down their e-reserves, making
it more difficult for these transformative uses to take place.
Educational Fair Use Extends Beyond Transformative Uses.
Even if particular uses of library e-reserves are not transformative, they still
are fair uses. Appellants stridently argue that factor one—the purpose and
character of the use—cannot favor fair use in this case because GSU’s uses are not
transformative. (Appellants’ Br. at 49-55.) But while transformative use has proven
determinative in many cases (largely involving commercial actors), the Supreme
Court in Campbell made clear that transformative use is not “necessary for a
finding of fair use.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. And the Supreme Court in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), similarly
recognized that a first-factor label (there “productive” use) “may be helpful in
calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative.”5 Id. at 455 n.40.
In Sony, for example, the Supreme Court held that private copying of
television broadcasts to view at a later time (i.e., “time shifting”) was a fair use
even though the copyrighted works were being used for the identical, expressive
purpose. Id. at 447-55; see also Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg LP,
861 F. Supp. 2d 336, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (posting full versions of earnings
calls, while not transformative, was nonetheless a fair use because it advanced the
public interest of disseminating financial news). Likewise, the preamble of Section
107, 17 U.S.C. § 107, illustrates the types of uses courts traditionally deemed fair
uses, and includes, perfectly matching GSU’s uses here, an “obvious statutory
The Court in Sony was discussing the lower court’s overemphasis on productive
uses. The concept of productive use, which was applied by courts prior to
Campbell, is similar (if not the same) as transformative use.
exception to this focus on transformative uses [:] the straight reproduction of
multiple copies for classroom distribution.” Campbell, 510 U.S. 579 n.11.
The transformative-use requirement the Publishers seek to impose on
educational uses stems from a misguided and unduly restrictive view of fair use.
Fair use is not a rarely-used “exception” to a copyright holder’s rights (Appellants’
Br. at 37) that should only be applied “on occasion” (id. at 42). Rather, fair use is
viewed by courts as “necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose.” Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). Indeed, courts and
commentators alike have recognized that fair use “should not be considered a
bizarre, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand conception of the
copyright monopoly.” Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105, 1110 (1990).
Fair use is necessary, in part, because “[t]he primary objective of copyright
is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science
. . . .’” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(quoting U.S. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 8). And for this reason, following direction from
Article III of the Constitution, the District Court was correct to apply fair use “in a
way that promotes the dissemination of knowledge, and not simply its creation.”
(Dkt#423 at 83.) See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (“[P]rivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”) (emphasis added and
Another reason fair use cannot be viewed as an ordinary “exception” to
copyright holders’ rights is because fair use serves as one of copyright law’s “builtin First Amendment accommodations.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2003); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012). As a result, courts
must remain cognizant of the First Amendment implications of any restriction on a
particular use.6 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 n.24 (“[I]t is appropriate to construe
copyright’s internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns.”);
(considering First Amendment implications of the use in the fair use analysis). The
First Amendment guards not only speech critical of a particular work but also the
Copyright . . . doesn’t come from the laws of nature, it comes from the
laws of man. It is not, like freedom of expression, antecedent to the
law, but entirely dependent on it. . . . [This] means that when these
two great forces come into conflict with one another . . . we know
where we stand. We have our thumb on the scales on the side of free
speech; we need to be vigilant and alert to circumstances where
copyright law is not serving the cause of free expression, where it is
interfering with our right to speak and communicate with one another,
and we need to adjust it accordingly.
David G. Post, The Continuing Saga of Thomas Jefferson and the Internet
(October 14, 2011).
right to receive ideas, a necessary predicate to free speech. See Bd. of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
Fair use can serve its First Amendment function and further the purposes of
copyright law regardless of whether the uses on library e-reserves are
transformative. These uses are favored examples in the preamble: “criticism,”
“comment,” “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),” and
“scholarship.” A preamble purpose by itself can tilt factor one in favor of fair use.
See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Where the
defendants’ use is for the purposes of ‘criticism, comment . . . scholarship, or
research,’ 17 U.S.C. § 107, factor one will normally tilt in the defendants’ favor.”);
cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79 (noting that these examples “guide” the firstfactor analysis). The fact that library e-reserves also are for “nonprofit educational
purposes,” which are juxtaposed with commercial purposes in Section 107, further
supports a finding of fair use under factor one. The District Court therefore was
correct to hold: “Because the facts of this case so clearly meet the criteria of (1) the
preamble to fair use factor one, (2) factor one itself, and because (3) Georgia State
is a nonprofit educational institution, factor one strongly favors [GSU].” (Dkt#423
at 50.)
The District Court below struck the appropriate balance between
incentivizing authors to create new works and the ultimate objective of copyright
law to promote the Progress of Science by enabling uses that benefit teaching and
the public. ASERL respectfully submits that the District Court’s well-reasoned
decision on fair use should be affirmed.
/s/ Andrew Pequignot
Research Libraries, Inc.
App. P. 32(a)(7)(B). This brief contains 6250 words, excluding the parts of the
brief exempted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) and 11th Cir. R. 32-4.
I also certify that this brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed.
R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the typestyle requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6).
This brief was prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Word
in 14-point Times New Roman.
I certify that the foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of
Southeastern Research Libraries, Inc. was served by electronic service upon the
I also certify that seven copies of the brief were mailed to the clerk by firstclass mail, postage prepaid.