Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/536/827/139587/
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 06:49:43
Document Index: 306166724

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3174', '§ 3163', '§ 3164', '§ 3164', '§ 3162', '§ 3161', '§ 3164', '§ 3162']

536 F.2d 827: United States of America, Appellant, v. James Henry Simmons, Appellee :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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536 F.2d 827: United States of America, Appellant, v. James Henry Simmons, AppelleeUnited States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. - 536 F.2d 827
1 Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint."
2 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967)
3 Id. at 223, 87 S.Ct. at 993; see Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 374-75, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969)
4 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)
5 Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192
6 Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. For law review articles which discuss the balancing approach adopted by the Supreme Court, see e. g., Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stanford Law Review 525, 539-41 (1975); Godbold, Speedy Trial Major Surgery for a National Ill, 24 Alabama Law Review 265, 274-88 (1972); Steinberg, Right to Speedy Trial: The Constitutional Right and its Applicability to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 66 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 229, 230-32 (1975); Comment, Devitalization of the Right to Speedy Trial, 5 St. Mary's Law Journal 106, 111-14 (1973); Comment, Right to a Speedy Trial: Maintaining a Proper Balance Between the Interests of Society and the Rights of the Accused, 4 U.C.L.A.-Alaska Law Review 242, 243-46 (1974)
7 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), where Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall, stated:
8 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)
9 Id. at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 463. Although the speedy trial right is applicable only in the post-indictment stage, Mr. Justice White emphasized that the defendant is not without a remedy in case of prosecutorial misconduct in the pre-indictment stage. Such relief is to be afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment:
10 Clerk's Transcript at 119. If the district court had granted a continuance here, such continuance would have been due to the government's negligence. See note 49, infra
11 Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192; see United States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir.1975)
12 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2182; 520 F.2d at 587
13 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2182. Thus, if this Court were confronted with a speedy trial constitutional issue where the charge involved a serious, complex conspiracy, we would have a different question than the one presently before us
14 Id; see Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973); United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498, 501 (10th Cir.1975). In Strunk, the Supreme Court held that in light of the policies underlying the Speedy Trial Clause, dismissal of the charges is the only possible remedy for a deprivation of this constitutional right. 412 U.S. at 439-40, 93 S.Ct. at 2260
15 407 U.S. at 525, 528, 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2182, see United States v. Geelan, supra, 520 F.2d at 587-88. We note that appellee requested dismissal, based on pre-indictment delay on due process grounds which motion was denied by the district judge. Nowhere in that motion nor in any other portion of the record, was there a demand for a speedy trial
16 407 U.S. at 532; 92 S.Ct. at 2193; see United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966); United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 116 (3rd Cir.1976); United States v. Brown, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 92, 520 F.2d 1106, 1110-13 (1975); United States v. Roberts, 515 F.2d 642, 645 (2nd Cir.1975); United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir.1975)
17 Clerk's Transcript at 119; see Strunk v. United States, supra, 412 U.S. at 439, 93 S.Ct. at 2263, where the Court asserted:
18 See Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 532, 534, 92 S.Ct. at 2182; United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151, 157-58 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911, 93 S.Ct. 974, 35 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)
19 See 407 U.S. at 533-34, 92 S.Ct. at 2182. We do not mean to imply that there must be a delay over a period of years before a constitutional violation is found. For instance, in United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275 (1st Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978, 91 S.Ct. 1207, 28 L.Ed.2d 328 (1971), cited by the Supreme Court in Barker at 531 n. 31, 92 S.Ct. 2182 n. 31, the First Circuit held that a delay under the circumstances of that case of nine months, absent a legitimate reason for such delay, constituted a deprivation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. In so holding, the Court stated:
20 United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576, 580 (10th Cir.1975); Mann v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 304 F.2d 394, 398, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 896, 83 S.Ct. 194, 9 L.Ed.2d 127 (1962). As the Committee Note recognizes, Rule 48(b) "is a restatement of the inherent power of the court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution." Note of Advisory Committee, following, 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 48
21 United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098, 1113 (2nd Cir.1975)
22 270 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1959)
23 366 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1035, 87 S.Ct. 771, 17 L.Ed.2d 682 (1967)
24 Id. at 365-67. The Second Circuit in Furey, supra, 514 F.2d at 1103, agrees with this interpretation of our Cohen decision
25 See 270 F.2d at 750. In Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355 (2nd Cir.) (en banc ), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 56, 38 L.Ed.2d 123 (1973), the Second Circuit distinguished Apex by concluding that "the court (in Apex ) had no occasion to consider the effect of detailed rules of the type here under consideration, which give the government fair and reasonable notice of the consequences of its non-readiness." Id. at 361. Similarly here, we construe the provisions of the Western District of Washington Plan for the Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text infra
26 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir.1973)
27 Id. at 175
28 514 F.2d 1098 (2nd Cir.1975)
29 476 F.2d 355 (2nd Cir.) (en banc ), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 56, 38 L.Ed.2d 123 (1973)
30 514 F.2d at 1104; see 476 F.2d at 358-61
31 514 F.2d at 1103-04 (emphasis added); see 476 F.2d at 361
32 522 F.2d 576 (10th Cir.1975)
33 Id. at 580. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that "Rule 48(b) implements (the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial) but also restates the inherent power of a court to dismiss a case for 'want of prosecution'." Id
34 481 F.2d 133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009, 94 S.Ct. 371, 38 L.Ed.2d 247 (1973)
35 Id. at 138 (emphasis added)
36 514 F.2d 1098 (2nd Cir.1975)
37 In relevant part, Rule 50(b) provides:
38 See United States v. Furey, supra, 514 F.2d at 1100-01, and Hilbert v. Dooling, supra, 476 F.2d at 357-62, for a more complete discussion of the Eastern District of New York Plan. "The purpose of Rule 4 is to insure that regardless whether a defendant has been prejudiced in a given case or his constitutional rights have been infringed, the trial of the charge against him will go forward promptly . . . ." 476 F.2d at 357-58. In full, Rule 4 provides:
39 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. As stated in the legislative history, the Act's purpose "is to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial." 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News p. 7402
40 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c). The Act provides that the indictment or information must be filed within thirty days from the date of arrest. The arraignment must then be conducted within ten days from the time of the indictment or information. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial must then be held within sixty days after arraignment. Thus, from the date of his arrest, the accused must be brought to trial within 100 days
41 18 U.S.C. § 3161(f), (g). For the first twelve-calendar-month period following the effective date of this section (§ 3161), the maximum time limit between arrest and indictment is sixty days, for the second such twelve-month period forty-five days, and for the third such period thirty-five days. The maximum time period between arraignment and trial is 180 days for the first such period, 120 days for the second, and eighty days for the third such period. See also § 3174
42 18 U.S.C. § 3163(a), (b)
43 18 U.S.C. § 3164(a)
44 18 U.S.C. § 3164. The trial of any defendant so incarcerated or released and designated as being of high risk, must begin no later than ninety days following the beginning of such continuous detention or designation of high risk. The consequence of not bringing a detainee, through no fault of the accused or his attorney, to trial within the ninety-day period was recently dealt with by this Circuit in United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.1976). In Tirasso, the Court stated:
45 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (emphasis added). The sanctions imposed by this section refer only to the time periods imposed by § 3161, and not to the time limits promulgated pursuant to the interim plan, § 3164
46 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (emphasis added). For law review articles which discuss the Speedy Trial Act in greater detail, see Steinberg, Right to Speedy Trial: The Constitutional Right and its Applicability to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 66 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 229 (1975); Note, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Defining the Sixth Amendment Right, 25 Catholic University Law Review 130 (1975)
47 See note 37 supra, for the relevant text of Rule 50(b)
48 The Western District of Washington has recently amended its Plan. This amended Plan, which became effective on September 29, 1975, does not apply to the case at bar
49 Section 3 of the Plan provides that the 120-day time limit prescribed by Section 2(b) may be extended by the Court for periods of delay resulting from continuances granted by the Court for persuasive reasons, on application of the accused or the prosecution. If the district court had granted a continuance here, such continuance would have been due to the government's negligence rather than due to the "exceptional circumstances" of the case. Section 3(g). Because of the government's failure to exercise adequate diligence, the district court was correct in not extending the 120-day time period prescribed by Section 2(b)
50 We do not mean to imply that Plans, such as that of the Eastern District of New York, which provide on their face, that the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice, if the government does not adhere to the mandatory time requirements, are invalid. The necessary "cautionary" requirement may very well be fulfilled in the careful consideration and evaluation of the proposed Plan by the various judges involved. By adopting and approving such a Plan, it is certainly arguable that the requisite "caution" has been exercised. Hence, by utilizing such caution and by forewarning the United States Attorney that the consequence of noncompliance is dismissal with prejudice, such Plans could be upheld
51 In relevant part, Section 4 of the Plan provides: