Source: http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2012/03/
Timestamp: 2018-07-17 21:13:02
Document Index: 11097483

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

United States v. Major, 2012 WL 1001188, *9 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2012) (Noonan, J., concurring and dissenting), decision available here.
Judge Noonan (above right) doesn't note in his dissent that Major actually gives these defendants a sentencing break: thirty-six months off of their sentences. Id.
They'll only serve 742 years, instead of 745. Marcus Major's release date will be moved back to March 15, 2654. See BOP Inmate Locator, Release Date, Marcus Major, here.
Players: Decision by Judge Wallace, joined by Judge M. Smith.
Judge Noonan concurs and dissents.
Facts: Over eight months, armed robbers hit a string of Fresno and Madera retail stores. Id. at *1. Marcus Major and Jordan Huff were arrested while fleeing the scene of a liquor store and charged with over thirty counts of conspiracy, § 924(c) offenses, and other federal crimes. Id. They were convicted after trial. Id.
The “use” of a gun during a felony is a Section 924(c) offense, and sentences vary depending on how the gun was "used." A “brandishing” § 924(c) conviction carries a 7-year mand-min, a “discharge” § 924(c) carries a 10-year mand-min, and when there is a second § 924(c) conviction that carries a 25-year mand-min. Id. at *7.
Major and Huff were convicted of “brandishing” and “discharge” § 924(c)’s. When sentencing the district court started with “discharge” (10 years) then stacked 25 years for each additional § 924(c). Id. at *7. “Thus Major and Huff received sentences three years longer than they would have had the district court deemed a brandishing count to be the first conviction.” Id.
Both men were sentenced to over 745 years. Id. at *1.
Issue(s): “[Appellants] argue that the district court erred in using a ‘discharging’ offense, rather than a ‘brandishing’ offense as the first conviction under section 924(c), resulting in sentences three years longer than if the district court had used a ‘brandishing’ offense as the first conviction.” Id. at *1.
Held: “Applying the rule of lenity, when the district court does not have sufficient information to determine the order in which the jury made determinations of guilty during jury deliberations on multiple counts under section 924(c), it must order the convictions so that the mandatory minimum sentence is minimized. In this case, application of the rule requires the district court to deem one of the brandishing counts, rather than a discharging count, to be the first conviction.” Id. at *9.
Of Note: The bottom line? Major gets a 742 year sentence, instead of 745. The absurdity of this sentence is not lost on dissenting Judge Noonan: “The United States asks us to affirm this sentence. It asks us to affirm a sentence that cannot be carried out. I do not believe that we should participate in this utterly empty gesture.” Id. at *9 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
How to Use: Major is worth a worried read for its FRE 404(b) holding. Id. at *2. In the trial of the retail store robberies, the government was permitted to introduce evidence of earlier home invasion robberies as 404(b) evidence. Id. Judge Wallace walks through the evidentiary value of the home invasion robberies, as they related to the“identity” of the retail store robbers. Id. He ties the two sets of robberies together with the ballistics on the guns used. Id. at *3. Judge Wallace concludes that the home invasion robberies were relevant to identity, “because a jury could reasonably assume that possession of the firearms did not change during the period between each crime.” Id. at *3. The decision is not a profound change in (fact-bound) FRE 404(b) law, but it is a worrisome new addition. Beware of Major and FRE 404(b) in cases involving uncharged offenses and ballistics – a dangerous mix for the defense.
For Further Reading: Read Frye and Lafler yet? These are important new Supreme Court decisions on the Sixth Amendment duties owed to our clients during the plea negotiation process. See SCOTUS blog here.
Add Padilla to this mix (immigration advisement), and you’ve got a trio of opinions that stiffen our clients’ rights to make informed decisions. This is good.
The decisions, however, make DOJ and district courts twitchy. Nationally, plans are brewing to expand court inquiries into attorney-client communications about deals – possibly treading on highly confidential ground. This is bad.
Stave this off (or anticipate the trend) by revisiting that quaint old practice of conveying formal government offers to your clients, in writing, with an explanation of the offers’ pros and cons. After Frye and Lafler, seems imprudent to go to trial without such a letter in the file.
Labels: Eighth Amendment, FRE 404(b), Noonan, Plea Agreements, Rule of Lenity, Section 924(c), Sentencing, Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, Wallace
posted by Steve Kalar at 3/31/2012 08:16:00 AM 0 comments
posted by Steve Sady at 3/28/2012 04:55:00 PM 0 comments
U.S. v. Major, No. 10-10147 (3-27-12) (Wallace and M. Smith with a concurrence and dissent by Noonan).
Defendant was convicted for a series of robberies under 18 U.S.C. 1951 and 924. Guns were used, and the sentences ran consecutively. Defendant was sentenced to 8955 months (746 years, and 3 months). On appeal, the 9th affirmed the convictions. It held that admission of 404(b) evidence as to even more robberies was not error because the evidence went to identity. Moreover, evidence of a jacket from a gang was also properly admitted. Defendant argued that the sentence was unduly harsh, but the 9th held that, given the crimes, the sentences were not unconstitutional as being cruel and unusual. There was a question as to whether the sentences ran consecutive to a brandishment or a discharge of a weapon. The verdict form did not indicate which gun charge came first (a discharge or brandishment). Under the rule of lenity, brandishment must be considered first. Hence, the other gun charges run after brandishment. The 9th rejected requiring verdict forms with either the most serious gun charge first or the least. The 9th leaves open ways to determine which gun count was found first by the jury. The defendant will still die in prison even after the resentencing. Noonan, in a strange dissent from the sentence, states that it should not be characterized as "harsh" as does the majority because it simply cannot be executed. No one lives that long. Noonan does not want to participate in this empty gesture.
U.S. v. Rodrigues, No. 11-15530 (3-27-12) (Trott with Goodwin and Murguia).
Defendant was a state director of a union. In entering insurance and dental contracts for the union's members, he insisted the providers include consultant fees. The consultants were family members who, as determined by the investigation, provided no consulting. Moreover, the money ended up with the defendant. He was convicted of numerous fraud and embezzlement, money laundering, and theft of honest servcies. The latter convictions had to be limited to bribes and kickbacks as required under Skilling. The jury instructions did not have this link or element. However, the error in these instructions were harmless. The evidence was overwhelming, and the convictions necessarily had to involve kickbacks. The convictions and sentence were confirmed.
posted by Jon Sands at 3/28/2012 08:53:00 AM 0 comments
posted by Steve Kalar at 3/25/2012 09:07:00 AM 0 comments
U.S. v. Nguyen, No. 11-50061 (3-23-12)(Reinhardt with W. Fletcher and Zouhary, D.J.).
The defendant sent a letter when he was running for Congress as a Republican. The letter was sent to foreign-born registered voters with Hispanic surnames who were registered as Democrats or "decline to state." And what might that letter have said? Well, it raised the specter of investigation and implied the meaninglessness of voting. So much for a civics lesson. The defendant downplayed his involvement, but an investigation ensued, which led to a warrant being issued. No state charges were filed, but eventually he was indicted and convicted of a federal charge, obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3). This appeal focuses on the issuance of the warrant. The 9th held that the letter, with its implied threats and discouragement, did provide probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. The warrant led to a search of computers and offices, and disclosed a close connection between (surprise!) the defendant and the letter (via a mass mailing service). The 9th acknowledged that no state charges came from the search, but that the letter, read plainly, did provide probable cause to believe that interference with voters exercising their rights had occurred, or that infringement on the right to vote took place. That was all that was needed. The letter also did not violate the defendant's First Amendment rights as related to the warrant.
posted by Jon Sands at 3/23/2012 02:50:00 PM 0 comments
posted by Steve Kalar at 3/18/2012 08:10:00 AM 0 comments
posted by Steve Sady at 3/17/2012 02:08:00 PM 0 comments
Phillips v. Ornoski, No. 04-99005 (3-16-12) (Reinhardt with B. Fletcher; partial dissent by Kleinfeld).
In this capital petition, the 9th excoriates the prosecutor for wilfully misleading the jury and withholding evidence as to a special circumstance that may have impacted the death verdict. Although the "deceptive ruse" did not affect the guilt verdict, and the denial of the petitioner's claims related to them was affirmed, the 9th did vacate the death sentence. The issues revolved around what the motive was for the killing, and the hidden information were benefits received by the cooperating witness. Kleinfeld dissents from the sentence relief, arguing that it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence and the testimony of a surviving witness.
posted by Jon Sands at 3/16/2012 02:29:00 PM 0 comments
U.S. v. Del Toro-Barboza, No. 10-50487 (3-14-12) (Gould with Noonan and Ikuta).
In an appeal from bulk cash smuggling in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5332 and exporting money under 31 U.S.C. 5324, the 9th affirms the conviction and sentence. The defendants were caught with $500,000 in a box in the bed of their pick-up truck being driven to Mexico. Interesting that border agents just happened to look in the pick-up's bed, and pick out the one box among many. Cash? In the truck? Who knew? The prosecutor argued that the defendants did, and presented evidence of past trips, a cluster of calls from Mexico, and other circumstantial evidence. Ah, but the charges required specific intent, and did the government present enough evidence on that? Enough, held the 9th, to find that there was sufficient evidence, even if the reviewing court might have some doubt about the strength. The 9th did find that the two charges were multiplicitous, but did not violate double jeopardy because Congress did intend to punish twice the same conduct with different elements under Blockburger. The closing arguments were heated, and the prosecutor stated that the defense counsel played games, was like a Wizard of Oz, and so forth. The 9th did not find misconduct. Some arguments were in response to defense counsel's closing, and some were permissable. Trials can be hard fought, observed the 9th, and there may be some verbal cage fighting. The 9th let this go. The 9th found that jury instructions were not erroneous, and finally, the sentence was not unreasonable.
posted by Jon Sands at 3/14/2012 04:09:00 PM 0 comments
U.S. v. Ressam, No. 09-30000 (3-12-12) (en banc).
Sitting en banc, the 9th considers the 22-year sentence imposed upon the so-called "Millennium Bomber" and holds that it has "a definite and firm conviction" that the district court committed "clear error" in its sentence, and thus the sentence was "substantively unreasonable." The 9th engaged in a detailed analysis of the twists and turns of this case, with plea offers, counter-offers, offers to cooperate, cooperation, withdrawal from cooperation, self-representation, and various assessments of the value of cooperation he did provide. The 9th faulted the district court for its comparisons with other terrorism cases, and for its scant attention to the guidelines. It did value the familiarity of the court with this case, now some 12+ years old, and so remanded back to the court for a resentencing. Concurring, Reinhardt, with Wardlaw, caution that this is a unique case, and that it is difficult to develop general principles concerning "substantive unreasonableness." The highly contextual nature of substantive review of sentences, and the circumstances of this case, make it atypical. The concurrence believes the sentence must be vacated, but is cautious as to what markers are laid down for the future. Dissenting, Schroeder, joined by Paez, Berzon and Murguia, would defer to the district court and affirm the sentence as given. The dissent argues that the majority commits Gall error, and vacates the sentence because it disagrees with it.
Kudos to Tom Hillier, FPD of the W.Dist of Wa (Seattle) for his continued spirited representation. Back for resentencing.
U.S. v. King, No. 11-10182 (3-13-12) (Per curiam with Graber, Berzon and Tallman, and concurrences by Graber and Tallman).
The 9th affirms a search of a home based upon the defendant's probation condition specifically allowing warrantless searches with or without probable cause. Here, the defendant was supposedly linked to a shooting by various unreliable informants and/or witnesses. Reasonable suspicion was lacking. However, Baker, 658 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2011) permitted the search of his room (via a questioning, overheard conversation with others, a fight among kids over a jacket, a Google search of an album cover, and a stop at one address that led to another) which yielded a shotgun possessed by this prohibited possessor. Graber, concurring, believes that Baker should be reconsidered in light of Supreme Court developments. Searches without even reasonable suspicion via a probation condition troubles her. Tallman, concurring, would affirm because to him reasonable suspicion was established by the various links between the shooting, witnesses, and connections to the defendant.
posted by Jon Sands at 3/13/2012 11:08:00 AM 0 comments
posted by Steve Kalar at 3/10/2012 02:40:00 PM 0 comments
U.S. v. Whitney, No. 10-10118 (3-7-12) (Reinhardt with B. Fletcher and Tashima).
A deal was struck between the government and the defendant. At sentencing, the prosecutor breached explicitly and implicitly some provisions. Specifically, the prosecutor disclosed information in a debriefing that was agreed to remain confidential; and an argument about criminal history supported an upward departure. Here, in fraud case, the guideline range was 41 to 51 months. The court departed upward to 87 months, after finding an organizer adjustment, on the basis of under representation of criminal history. The 9th held that plea agreements are contracts, and the breaking of an agreed term is a violation. The 9th found that indeed promises made were broken. Moreover, the court even erred in a guideline determination, finding no evidence to support an adjustment for the defendant being an organizer. The case is remanded for resentencing before a new judge.
posted by Jon Sands at 3/08/2012 10:44:00 AM 0 comments
U.S. v. Loughner, No. 11-10339 (3-5-12) (Bybee, concurrence by Wallace, dissent by Berzon).
In a number of appeals arising from the involuntary pretrial medication of the defendant (the Tucson shootings), the 9th affirms the district court's decisions, holding that the doctors at FCI-Springfield know best. The opinion overviews the legal standards for involuntary medication, precedent (Harper, Riggins, and Sell), the procedures at issue, and findings. Parsing all the claims, the opinion finds that due process was afforded as to both substance and procedure in determining that involuntary medication was medically appropriate, and no other alternatives were as effective. The opinion did pause as to whether the defendant, under the procedure in place, had someone actually representing his interests, but nonetheless found that the staff representative was sufficient to satisfy due process. The bottom line is that the district court's finding that there was a substantial probability that the defendant could be restored to competency in the foreseeable future was supported by evidence and not clear error. Wallace, concurring, took issue with even raising this point, and concurred in the rest. Berzon, dissenting, bemoaned the abdication of judicial determination as to the appropriateness of the involuntary medication, the melding of various standards for pretrial and post-trial, and the following of due process.
U.S. v. Lequire, No. 11-10066 (3-5-12) (Silverman with Tashima and Adelman, D.J.).
Remember when we learned the elements of larceny, robbery, and embezzlement in Crim Law? Remember when the professor shrugged and said that was common law, and in modern penal codes, we are all guilty of something so it doesn't matter. Well, it does, at least here, when a treasurer of an insurance agency is caught using the premiums collected by the agency not to pay the insurance company's fees, but for other stuff, like personal expenses for the owner, and former Congressman (Renzi). It isn't embezzlement, with which he was prosecuted, because the funds were not "in trust." There was a fiduciary duty, but the use, and misuse, of the premiums were not embezzlement because they were not entrusted to the defendant. Under long-standing Arizona law, the contract between the agency and the insurance company, allowing commingling, only required monthly payments, which, if late, accrued interest. This created a creditor-debtor relationship, not a trust. An element of embezzlement was missing. A judgment of acquittal was required.
posted by Jon Sands at 3/07/2012 07:49:00 AM 0 comments
posted by Steve Kalar at 3/04/2012 09:28:00 AM 0 comments
U.S. v. Bolivar, No. 11-30055 (2-29-12) (Graber with Tashima and Rawlinson).
The probation officer searched a probationer's apartment. Nothing unusual there. In looking through a closet, though, filled with clothing of the boyfriend, a backpack was seen. Inside was a sawed off shotgun that belonged to the boyfriend, a prohibited possessor. The boyfriend became the defendant here. He moved for suppression, arguing that the probation officer lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the backpack. After all, the probation officer had consent to search the apartment, but not belongings that were not the probationer's. The 9th affirmed the search. It held that the standard was one of "reasonable suspicion" and that it was met here. There is precedent that indicated that probable cause might be required in some searches, Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), but that higher standard for warrantless searches of probationers related only to residences. Was that the actual home of the probationer? The "downstream" search afterwards was gauged by reasonable suspicion.
U.S. v. White, No. 07-10460 (2-29-12) (Wallace with M. Smith and Rakoff, Sr. D.J.).
Should the court have ordered a competency hearing sua sponte of the defendant in this RICO gang prosecution? The 9th holds that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court not to order such a hearing. The court had determined the defendant to be competent after an evaluation at FCI Butner. The court had ample time to observe the defendant and gather information from counsel and interact with the defendant. There was evidence of delusions, but on the whole, the court did not abuse its discretion. The defendant was on trial for serious charges, and this may have been a tactic. In addition, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defendant could have assisted counsel if he chose.
Towery v. Brewer, No. 12-15381 (2-28-12) (per curiam by McKeown, Berzon and Rawlinson).
Editorial note: This is an Az FPD case
The State intends to execute petitioner on March 8th. In carrying out the execution, the State changed its protocol, when it discovered that one of the three drugs to be used was expired. Other changes also occurred, such as barring counsel from seeing the client after 9:00 PM the night before. The 9th expressed exasperation with the State, chastising the Az Department of Corrections for its shell game, and wondering whether it needed to step in to manage each execution given the lack of trust with the State. Alas, though, the 9th will give the State one more chance to follow its protocols, with modifications, as the Baze standards can be met, and other constitutional challenges fall short of what is required for the granting of a preliminary injunction.
Moormann v. Schriro, No. 08-99035 (2-27-12) (Schroeder with McKeown and Rawlinson).
Petitioner faced impending execution. He filed an 11th hour petition for stay and permission to file a successive habeas. He argues that his counsel effectively abandoned him by lack of effective representation. The 9th rejects the argument, finding that his counsel was active, and although there may be claims of serious negligence or ineffectiveness, there was not abandonment. The petitioner was executed on February 29, 2012, at 10:33 A.M.
posted by Jon Sands at 3/01/2012 09:19:00 AM 0 comments