Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-lasko-32018
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 08:52:57
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People v. Lasko - 23 Cal.4th 101 S069354 - Fri, 06/02/2000 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 23 Cal.4th 101
People v. Lasko
People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441; 999 P.2d 666
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald E. Niver, Bruce Ortega and Amy Haddix, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. [23 Cal.4th 104]
On the afternoon of September 27, 1994, five teenage boys—Michael Clark, Art Flores, David Gonzales, Nathan Gonzales, and Jason Reyes—were playing next door to Fitzpatrick's house when they heard someone moaning or screaming inside the house. The boys grabbed makeshift weapons (a tire iron, a bottle, a pool cue, and a board) and went to the door of the house. David Gonzales, the oldest boy and a neighbor of Fitzpatrick's, kicked the door and asked for Fitzpatrick. Defendant yelled through the door that Fitzpatrick was not home. Hearing moaning, Gonzales told defendant to [23 Cal.4th 105] leave Fitzpatrick alone. Defendant repeated that Fitzpatrick was not home and said he was killing a cat. Gonzales accused defendant of lying and told defendant that Gonzales's mother (who lived next door to Fitzpatrick) was calling the police.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He said that a week before the killing, Fitzpatrick had accused him of stealing his watch and fired him, but Fitzpatrick permitted him to remain in the house until the end of the year because Fitzpatrick owed him $300. Defendant claimed that on the afternoon of the killing, he was heating a pan of water on the stove when he and Fitzpatrick got into an argument about the money Fitzpatrick owed defendant. When Fitzpatrick hit defendant in the side with a baseball bat, defendant grabbed the pan of water he was heating and threw it at Fitzpatrick, scalding him. The hot water also scalded defendant's arm. Fitzpatrick again hit defendant with the bat, which defendant then took and used to hit Fitzpatrick in the head. Defendant did not intend to kill Fitzpatrick; he was only trying [23 Cal.4th 106] to protect himself. After Fitzpatrick collapsed on the floor, defendant dragged him to the bathroom. He picked up the telephone to call for help, but there was no dial tone. When he heard kicking on the front door, he went outside, where the boys surrounded him.
On appeal, defendant argued the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury that intent to kill was an essential element of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. This error, he contended, required the jury to convict him of murder if it found that he had killed Fitzpatrick in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion but without the intent to kill. The Court of Appeal noted that the rule that intent to kill is a necessary element of voluntary manslaughter had become " 'deeply seated in the case law without thoughtful examination,' " as a result of " 'the offhand misreading of People v. Freel (1874) 48 Cal. 436, which only holds, correctly, that even if there were an [23 Cal.4th 107] intent to kill the offense could be manslaughter under the heat of passion doctrine.' " Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal concluded, it lacked the power to redefine the elements of voluntary manslaughter, because it was bound by decisions of this court that voluntary manslaughter requires an intent to kill. (See, e.g., People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 958-959 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574].)
[2] Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) fn. 2 Malice may be either express or implied. It is express when the defendant manifests "a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature." (§ 188.) It is implied "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." (Ibid.) We have noted in the past that this definition of implied malice "has never proved of much assistance in defining the concept in concrete terms" (People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1217 [264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200]), and that juries instead should be instructed that malice is implied "when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life" (id. at p. 1215). For convenience, we shall refer to this mental state as "conscious disregard for life." [23 Cal.4th 108]
[3a] Manslaughter is "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." (§ 192.) A defendant lacks malice and is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in "limited, explicitly defined circumstances: either when the defendant acts in a 'sudden quarrel or heat of passion' (§ 192, subd. (a)), or when the defendant kills in 'unreasonable self-defense'—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense (see In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574]; People v. Flannel [(1979)] 25 Cal.3d 668 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1])." (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].) [1b]The form of voluntary manslaughter we address here is when a defendant kills during a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. (We consider the other form of voluntary manslaughter—when a defendant kills in unreasonable self-defense—in the companion case of People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].)
[3b] In a recent decision, we discussed what facts will reduce an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter, when based on heat of passion: "An intentional, unlawful homicide is 'upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion' (§ 192(a)), and is thus voluntary manslaughter (ibid.), if the killer's reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a 'provocation' sufficient to cause an ' "ordinary [person] of average disposition ... to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than judgment." ' " (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].) No specific type of provocation is required, and "the passion aroused need not be anger or rage, but can be any ' " '[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion' " ' [citations] other than revenge [citation]." (Ibid.) Thus, a person who intentionally kills as a result of provocation, that is, "upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion," lacks malice and is guilty not of murder but of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.
Under the Attorney General's approach, one who shoots and kills another in the heat of passion and with the intent to kill is guilty only of voluntary [23 Cal.4th 109] manslaughter, yet one who shoots and kills another in the heat of passion and with conscious disregard for life but with the intent merely to injure, a less culpable mental state than intent to kill, is guilty of murder. This cannot be, and is not, the law.
[4] We drew a similar comparison in In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th 768. There, we held that a defendant who unintentionally kills in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity of self defense ("imperfect self-defense") is not guilty of murder. "A contrary conclusion," we reasoned, "namely, that imperfect self-defense applies only in cases of express, but not implied, malice would lead to a totally anomalous and absurd result, in which a defendant, who unreasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger, would be guilty only of manslaughter if he acts with the intent to kill his perceived assailant, but would be guilty of murder if he does not intend to kill, but only to seriously injure, the assailant." (Id. at p. 780, fn. 4.)
Thus, a killer who acts in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion lacks malice and is therefore not guilty of murder, irrespective of the presence or absence of an intent to kill. Just as an unlawful killing with malice is murder regardless of whether there was an intent to kill, an unlawful killing without [23 Cal.4th 110] malice (because of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion) is voluntary manslaughter, regardless of whether there was an intent to kill. In short, the presence or absence of an intent to kill is not dispositive of whether the crime committed is murder or the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.
It is true that some of our decisions appear to hold to the contrary. For instance, in Drown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 21, 24 [165 P. 5], this court observed in passing that "to constitute voluntary manslaughter there must be an intent to kill ...." Thereafter, this court repeated that fleeting observation in a number of cases. (People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th 920, 958; People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 28 [120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017]; People v. Forbs (1965) 62 Cal.2d 847, 852 [44 Cal.Rptr. 753, 402 P.2d 825]; People v. Brubaker (1959) 53 Cal.2d 37, 44 [346 P.2d 8]; People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 732-733 [336 P.2d 492]; People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406, 413 [303 P.2d 1018]; People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 181 [163 P.2d 8]; see also People v. Miller (1931) 114 Cal.App. 293, 300 [299 P. 742].) In each of these cases, that observation was mere dictum. None of them said that a defendant who kills in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, with conscious disregard for life but without intent to kill, is guilty of murder. fn. 3
Our conclusion that voluntary manslaughter does not require an intent to kill is consistent with the common law as well as the statutory law in most states. A prominent criminal law treatise explains: "[A]t common law and by statute in most states, since the homicide must be committed under circumstances which would otherwise be murder, defendant may act with the intent to kill or with any mental state which amounts to 'malice'; the malice is negated by the provocation and the offense is mitigated from murder to voluntary manslaughter." (2 Wharton's Criminal Law (15th ed. 1994) § 155, pp. 347-348.) Other criminal law scholars share that view: "It is not necessary that there should be a specific intent to kill to constitute voluntary manslaughter. Where the killing is done with a deadly weapon, if its use is intentional, and if the defendant knew or had reason to know that to use it as he did would endanger the life of [the] deceased or another, and acted recklessly of such safety, an intent to injure him may be inferred. Where one purposely assaults another with a dangerous weapon, in a way naturally to cause death, and death results, the killing is voluntary." (1 Warren on Homicide (1938) Elements of Voluntary Manslaughter, § 85, pp. 418-419.) "Most killings which constitute voluntary manslaughter are of the intent-to-kill sort .... But if [the killer] in the [heat of] passion ... should intend [23 Cal.4th 111] instead to do his tormentor serious bodily injury short of death, or if he should, without intending to kill him, endanger his life by very reckless (depraved heart) conduct, the resulting death ought equally to be voluntary manslaughter .... [T]he great majority of modern statutes ... take this broad view." (2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) § 7.10, p. 253.)
[5] A majority of this court recently held that when a trial court violates state law by failing to properly instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, this test applies: "[I]n a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under [People v. ] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]]. A conviction of the charged offense may be reversed in consequence of this form of error only if, 'after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence' (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears 'reasonably probable' the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836)." (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 178.)
[1e] Here, in addition to its erroneous instruction to the jury that voluntary manslaughter requires an intent to kill, the court gave CALJIC No. 8.50, [23 Cal.4th 112] a standard instruction explaining the difference between murder and manslaughter. This instruction stated in part: "When the act causing the death, though unlawful, is done in the heat of passion or is excited by a sudden quarrel such as it amounts to provocation ... the offense is manslaughter. In such a case, even if an intent to kill exists, the law is that malice, which is an essential element of murder, is absent. [¶] To establish that a killing is murder ... and not manslaughter, the burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of murder and that the act which caused the death was not done in the heat of passion or upon a sudden quarrel ...." (Italics added.) Thus, the jury was told that regardless of whether the killing of Fitzpatrick was intentional or unintentional, defendant could not be convicted of murder unless the prosecution proved that, at the time of the killing, defendant was not acting in the heat of passion. Had the jury believed that defendant unintentionally killed Fitzpatrick in the heat of passion, it would have concluded that it could not convict defendant of murder (because he killed in the heat of passion) and could not convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter (because he lacked the intent to kill). The jury most likely would have convicted defendant of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser offense included within the crime of murder, on which the jury was also instructed. Instead, the jury convicted defendant of second degree murder, showing that it did not believe the killing was committed in the heat of passion.
Moreover, the evidence strongly suggested an intent to kill. Defendant hit Fitzpatrick in the head with a baseball bat with extreme force. The blow (or blows) caused extensive and multiple fractures at the base and on the outside of Fitzpatrick's skull. Numerous fragments of bone, the largest of which was about three inches in length, were broken off the top of the skull. There was also evidence that defendant had threatened to kill Fitzpatrick a month and a half before the killing. Furthermore, defendant's actions after striking the fatal blow were not those of an unintentional killer: he did not call an ambulance, he tried to obscure evidence of the killing by dragging Fitzpatrick's body to the bathroom and by trying to wipe up the blood on the floor, and he tried to leave the house with $1,800 of Fitzpatrick's money. [23 Cal.4th 113] Given the strength of the evidence indicating that the killing was not only intentional but premeditated, defendant could have been, but was not, convicted of first degree murder. Instead, the jury found him guilty of second degree murder. Under the circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that a properly instructed jury would have convicted defendant of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Watson, supra, "46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Defendant also argues that the trial court's instructional error violated the federal Constitution, relying on a dissenting opinion in People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142. At the murder trial in that case the court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. A majority of the court declined to consider whether this error violated the federal Constitution by giving the jury an incomplete definition of malice, an element of murder; the majority held that the defendant had not preserved the issue because he had not raised it before this court or before the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 170, fn. 19.) The dissenting view, however, was that the defendant had preserved the issue: The dissent concluded the error violated the defendant's federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and to due process of law, because the trial court had inadequately instructed the jury on the elements of murder by failing to explain that the element of malice is not present when the defendant kills in the heat of passion. (Id. at pp. 187-195 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Here, defendant has raised the issue both in this court and in the Court of Appeal.
In contrast to People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, the trial court here instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter, correctly explaining to the jury that a killing in the heat of passion is not murder. The court erred only in telling the jury that to convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter, the jury had to find that defendant intended to kill the victim. Defendant insists this instruction could have led the jury to conclude that if he lacked an intent to kill, it had to find him guilty of the more serious crime of murder. But, as previously explained, the trial court's instructions taken as a whole do not support this assertion. Thus, the court's instructional error did not violate defendant's federal constitutional rights to trial by jury or to due process of law.
[6] The trial court also instructed the jury on an alternate theory of voluntary manslaughter: that defendant killed Fitzpatrick in "unreasonable self-defense." The court instructed the jury: "Every person who unlawfully [23 Cal.4th 114] kills another human being without malice aforethought but with an intent to kill, is guilty of voluntary manslaughter ... [¶] There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred ... in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury. [¶] In order to prove such crime, each of the following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A human being was killed, [¶] 2. The killing was unlawful, and [¶] 3. The killing was done with the intent to kill." (Brackets omitted.) Defendant contends this instruction was faulty because it did not tell the jury that unreasonable self-defense negates implied malice, and that an act resulting in death, performed with knowledge that the act endangers the life of another and with conscious disregard for life, but motivated by an unreasonable belief in the necessity of self-defense, is not murder.
Although the trial court's instructions properly told the jury that an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is not murder, in the companion case of People v. Blakeley, supra, 23 Cal.4th 82, we conclude that instructions similar to those given here do not clearly explain to the jury whether an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. Here, this lack of clarity could not have prejudiced defendant, because, in finding defendant guilty of second degree murder rather than voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, the jury must have necessarily concluded he did not act in unreasonable self-defense. (See People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].)
I write separately to note that, although I generally concur in the opinion of the court, I do not join in any implication of approval in its reference to [23 Cal.4th 115] the opinion of the court in the companion case of People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675], in which I have authored a dissenting opinion.
­FN 1. The instruction defining voluntary manslaughter stated in full: "Every person who unlawfully kills another human being without malice aforethought but with an intent to kill, is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of Section 192(a) of the Penal Code. [¶] There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury. [¶] In order to prove such crime, each of the following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A human being was killed, [¶] 2. The killing was unlawful, and [¶] 3. The killing was done with the intent to kill. [¶] A killing is unlawful, if it was not justifiable." (Brackets omitted.)
­FN 2. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
­FN 3. In this case, defendant does not contend that an unintentional killing in the heat of passion is involuntary rather than voluntary manslaughter. In the companion case of People v. Blakeley, supra, 23 Cal.4th 82, we reject the related claim that an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is involuntary manslaughter.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses. The court limited review to an issue concerning whether the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte that imperfect self-defense or provocation/heat of passion may reduce an implied malice murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Fri, 06/02/2000 23 Cal.4th 101 S069354 Review - Criminal Appeal closed; remittitur issued
1 Lasko, Jr., Louis (Appellant)
Represented by Jonathan D. Soglin
F D A P
730 Harrison St., Ste 201
Apr 6 1998 Petition for review filed
By Counsel for Applt - Record requested
Apr 28 1998 Note:
CA Record in H014879 two Doghouses
May 21 1998 Time Extended to grant or deny Petition for Review
To July 2, 1998
Appellant's petition granted. Issues limited to whether the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that imperfect self-defense or provocation/heat of passion may reduce an implied malice murder to voluntary manslaughter. Votes: George C.J., Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Brown JJ.
Jul 6 1998 Counsel appointment order filed
Jonathan Soglin to represent Appellant Louis Lasko, Jr. Appellant's Opening brief on the merits Due 30 Days from Date of this Order.
Applnt's Opening brief/merits [asking to 9/4/98]
Jul 30 1998 Extension of time granted
Appellant's Opening brief/merits to & Including September 4, 1998.
Aug 3 1998 Change of Address filed for:
By Applt to 10/4/98 to file Opening brief 2nd request (Ok to 10/4 Order Being Prepared)
Sep 3 1998 Extension of Time application Granted
To October 4, 1998, To file Applt's Opening brief
Appellant [ Lasko ]
Oct 27 1998 Application for Extension of Time filed
To Dec 4, 1998, To file Respondent's answer brief on the merits (Ok - Order Being Prepared)
Nov 2 1998 Extension of Time application Granted
To December 4, 1998, To file Respondent's answer brief on the merits
Dec 4 1998 Answer brief on the merits filed
Dec 23 1998 Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Feb 2 1999 Received letter from:
Resp Re will be Out of the State During the First two Weeks of June, 1999.
Appellant's motion to Expand Questions on Review
Applt's motion to Expand Questions on Review, filed June 25, 1999, Is denied.
One Box of Exhibits from Superior Court
Majority Opinion by Kennard, J. -- joined by George C.J., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Brown JJ. Concurring Opinion by Mosk, J.
Jun 16 2000 Rehearing Petition filed by:
Appellant Louis Lasko
Jun 26 2000 Request for modification of opinion filed
Motion to modify opinion, reopen and expand review, or transfer to Court of Appeal, filed by appellant.
to 8-01-00
Jul 19 2000 Rehearing denied
Jul 19 2000 Request for modification denied
Jul 19 2000 Remittitur Issued
To 6 DCA
Jul 26 2000 Received:
Receipt for remittitur from 6DCA, signed by Nancy Olen, Deputy Clerk.
Oct 10 2000 Exhibits Returned to:
Santa Clara County Superior Court. Defendant's exhibits 2,8A, 8I, 15,16,F,G,H,I AND J.
Apr 25 2001 Compensation awarded counsel
Atty Soglin
Jonathan D. Soglin (Attorney At Law)
SCOCAL, People v. Lasko , 23 Cal.4th 101 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-lasko-32018) (last visited Wednesday August 5, 2020).