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Timestamp: 2019-10-23 13:51:12
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1902', '§ 209', '§ 1396', '§ 1902', '§ 1396', '§ 209', '§ 1396', '§ 435', '§ 435', '§ 435', '§ 435', '§ 435', '§ 1902', '§ 1902', '§ 1902', '§ 1396', '§ 209', '§ 435', '§ 1382', '§ 1382', '§ 1902', '§ 1396', '§ 435', '§ 1902', '§ 1396', '§ 1902', '§ 1396', '§ 435']

HERWEG V. RAY, 455 U. S. 265 (1982) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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and that the federal time limitation regulation was inconsistent with § 1902(a)(17), because it disabled the States in certain instances from considering the spouse's income as available to the applicant. In response to this order, Iowa adopted a procedure for making individualized factual determinations of the amount of income available to an institutionalized chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 455 U. S. 278. BURGER, C.J.,filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 455 U. S. 279. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Last Term, in Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 453 U. S. 49-50 (1981), we upheld the validity of federal Medicaid regulations that permit "deeming" of income between spouses in those States that have exercised the so-called "§ 209(b) option" provided for in the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). "Deeming," in the parlance of the Social Security laws and regulations, means that a State determines eligibility by assuming that a portion of the spouse's income is "available" to the applicant. Because an individual's eligibility for Medicaid benefits depends in part on the financial resources that are "available" to him, "[d]eeming . . . has the effect of reducing both the number of eligible individuals and the amount of assistance paid to those who qualify." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 453 U. S. 36. We rejected contentions that these regulations were arbitrary or capricious, and that the regulations were inconsistent with § 1902(a)(17) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). [Footnote 1] 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 43. In chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If a State participates in the Medicaid program without exercising the § 209(b) option, the State is required to make Medicaid assistance available to all recipients of SSI benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 CFR § 435.120 (1980). [Footnote 2] SSI States, however, are not limited to providing Medicaid benefits to SSI recipients. The Medicaid program offers participating States the option of providing Medicaid assistance chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
With regard to the "optional categorically needy," the Secretary's regulations require the States to "deem" the income and resources of spouses who share the same household. 42 CFR § 435.723(b) (1980). Where both spouses are eligible for Medicaid, the States must "deem" income for the first six months after the spouses cease to live together. After this 6-month period, the States may consider only the income and resources actually contributed by one spouse to the other. § 435.723(c). If only one spouse is eligible for Medicaid, a similar rule applies, but the time period is one month, instead of six. § 435.723(d). [Footnote 4] In effect, § 435.723 places time limitations chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Iowa, however, was deeming in a manner inconsistent with the Secretary's regulations, which place time limitations upon the States' ability to consider as available to the applicant his spouse's income where the spouses do not share the same household. Supra at 455 U. S. 269 and this page, and n. 4. Because Elvina was institutionalized and because Darrell is not chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
443 F.Supp. 1316, 1319 (1978). In interpreting § 1902(a)(17), the District Court concluded that "deeming' is contrary to congressional intent, whether income of the noninstitutionalized spouse is deemed available or unavailable." Id. at 1320. The District Court noted that the predecessor to 42 CFR 435.723 (1980) [Footnote 8] was inconsistent with its interpretation of § 1902(a)(17). In the District Court's view, therefore, the Secretary's regulation was inconsistent with chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
With regard to recipients of SSI benefits, the District Court's order clearly conflicts with § 1902(a)(10)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), which requires States not having exercised the § 209(b) option to provide Medicaid assistance to all SSI recipients. [Footnote 9] 42 CFR § 435.120 (1980). See Beltran v. Myers, 451 U. S. 625, 451 U. S. 626, n. 3 (1981). The SSI program, contained in Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), contains its own eligibility provisions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a)(1), 1382c(b), (f)(1). Pursuant to the District Court's order, however, Iowa is permitted to deny chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The issue that remains, therefore, is whether § 1902(a)(17) precludes the Secretary from promulgating regulations that impose time limitations upon the States' ability to consider the income of the institutionalized applicant's spouse. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). In Gray Panthers, we recognized that subsection (17)(B) delegates to the Secretary broad authority to prescribe standards setting eligibility requirements for state Medicaid plans. In view of Congress' explicit delegation of authority to give substance to the meaning of "available," the Secretary's definition of the term is "entitled to more than mere deference or weight.'" chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although Congress has approved of some deeming of income between Medicaid applicants and their spouses, Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 453 U. S. 48, we cannot agree with respondents that Congress intended the States to enforce their spousal responsibility policies wholly unimpeded by the Secretary's congressionally authorized power to give substance to the term "available." In placing time limitations upon the States' ability to consider the spouse's income where the Medicaid applicant and his spouse no longer live together, the Secretary has done nothing more than define what income is "available." Although Congress intended that a spouse's income could be part of the income which the Secretary may determine should be considered by the States as available to the Medicaid applicant, Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 453 U. S. 45, we see nothing in subsection (17)(D) that precludes the Secretary from imposing upon the States the time limits at issue in the instant case. We find nothing in subsection (17)(D) either that disables the Secretary from defining the term "available" in such circumstances or that gives the States authority to "deem" income unimpeded by the Secretary's authority under subsection (17)(B). [Footnote 13] Subsection (17)(D) cannot chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In upholding the Secretary's limitation on deeming, we do not thereby render subsection (17)(D) meaningless. That provision, however, may not be read in isolation from the other provisions of the Social Security Act. We have no doubt that some tension exists between the Secretary's congressionally authorized power under subsection (17)(B) to determine what income is "available" to the applicant and Congress' intent in subsection (17)(D) to permit the States to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On the contrary, 42 CFR § 435.723 (1980) is simply an exception to the general rule that the spouse's income may be considered available to the applicant. With regard to the optional categorically needy, SSI States are required to deem chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court speculates that subsection 17(D) might well be superfluous if subsection 17(B) were read to permit the Secretary to foreclose entirely the States' ability to consider the income of the spouse of an institutionalized applicant. Ante chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although the Medicaid program is a morass of bureaucratic complexity, I do not believe it is nearly so difficult to apply the Social Security Act in this case as the Court makes it seem. Iowa is an "SSI State." This means that, under § 1902(a)(10)(A) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), it must develop a plan "for making medical assistance available to all individuals receiving . . . supplemental security income benefits. . . ." As part of the plan Iowa developed, a noninstitutionalized spouse must contribute toward the care of an institutionalized spouse. This is explicitly authorized by § 1902(a)(17)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D), which prohibits a state from reducing the amount of Medicaid assistance to be made available to a recipient because of the financial responsibility of another person, unless the other person is the recipient's spouse or parent. See ante at 455 U. S. 267-268, n. 1. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court apparently believes that Iowa overemphasizes the importance of subsection (17)(D). See ante at 455 U. S. 274. It bases its conclusion on subsection (17)(B), which delegates to the Secretary of Health and Human Services the task of determining what income is "available" to an institutionalized spouse. The applicable regulation promulgated by the Secretary goes 180 degrees contrary to the expressed will of Congress, and prohibits states from taking the income of a noninstitutionalized spouse into account after the month in which the SSI recipient is institutionalized. 42 CFR § 435.723(d) (1980); see ante at 455 U. S. 269-270, n. 4. In Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34 (1981), and Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416 (1977), we held that the Secretary's definition of "available" is entitled to great weight. I do not believe, however, that the Secretary may, by regulation, practically rewrite a portion of the statute. The statute is entitled to greater weight than the regulation, which was promulgated by the Secretary's staff, which apparently regarded the statute as too rigid. [Footnote 3/2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The effect of the Court's decision will be to reduce the amount of Medicaid assistance available to those most in need. As we noted in Gray Panthers, some spouses will accept this open invitation of the "regulators" not to support an institutionalized spouse. In many cases, noncontributing spouses will get away with not contributing, because the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary