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Norwood v. Kirkpatrick - 349 U.S. 29 (1955) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Case	U.S. Supreme CourtNorwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955)Norwood v. KirkpatrickNo. 337Argued March 4, 1955.-Decided April 11, 1955349 U.S. 29CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
The three petitioners, dining car employees, filed separate suits in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. They sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries received upon the Page 349 U. S. 30 derailment of one of defendant's trains near Dillon, South Carolina. The defendant filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer the cases to the Florence Division of the Eastern District of South Carolina. The District Court denied the motions to dismiss and granted the motions to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). *
The district judge, in granting the motions to transfer, stated that, if he had been free to construe § 1404(a) as he did in the case of Naughton v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 85 F.Supp. 761, he would have denied the transfers because, in his view, it called for an application of the stricter rule of forum non conveniens as recognized in decisions of this Court. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501. But, since the Naughton case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held, in All States Freight v. Modarelli, supra, that the district judge had a broader discretion in the application of the statute than under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The district judge therefore followed the rule laid down in the All States Freight case, supra. We think the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the narrower doctrine of forum non conveniens and properly construed the statute. Page 349 U. S. 31 As Judge Goodrich, speaking for the court, appropriately pointed out, 196 F.2d at 1011:
". . . A dismissal in application of that [forum non conveniens] or any other principle puts an end to the action, and hence is final and appealable. An order transferring it to another district does not end, but preserves, it as against the running of the statute of limitations and for all other purposes. The notion that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was a mere codification of existing law relating to forum non conveniens is erroneous. It is perfectly clear that the purpose of Page 349 U. S. 32 this section of the Revised Judicial Code was to grant broadly the power of transfer for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, whether dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens would have been appropriate or not."
It is conceded by the petitioners that, if the district judge was correct in exercising his discretion to transfer these cases under § 1404(a) without regard to the stringent requirements of forum non conveniens, then the Court of Appeals properly denied the applications for mandamus and prohibition. Since we agree that the district judge correctly construed the statute in evaluating the evidence, we do not find it necessary to detail the facts considered by him in reaching his judgment. It was correct in law and warranted by the facts. Page 349 U. S. 33
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. "Page 349 U. S. 34
The federal courts, in exercising their discretion under this provision, are thus not set adrift on an uncharted sea, to order transfers according to their personal notions of justice. They are explicitly referred to the body of doctrine in Anglo-American law known as forum non conveniens, Page 349 U. S. 35 a doctrine which was certainly well developed at the time of the passage of the new Code. Indeed, shortly before the revision was introduced in Congress, this Court handed down two decisions setting forth the considerations which should govern the exercise of the trial judge's discretion. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501; Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518. These opinions clearly evinced the attitude with which these matters should be approached, the standard to be applied:
Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 524. Page 349 U. S. 36 There was a direct reference to the Koster decision in hearings before the Senate Committee considering the 1948 Code. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74.
The basic issue in this case is whether the district judge should exercise his discretion in the light of these opinions, and in the light of forum non conveniens doctrine generally (of which these Supreme Court decisions are a particularization), or whether § 1404(a) expands the range of his discretion to an as yet unstated degree, and removes these decisions and other forum non conveniens cases as guiding precedents. The Courts of Appeals have divided on the issue. With the opinions cited by the majority, compare Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329; Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537; Wiren v. Laws, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 194 F.2d 873. But see Amalgamated Assn. v. Southern Bus Lines, 172 F.2d 946, 948. The section itself is merely a restatement, in very generalized form, of the considerations thought to govern the question of forum non conveniens. The particular words or their equivalents recur in the cases and literature on the subject. [Footnote 1] The Reviser's Notes repeat these factors and Page 349 U. S. 37 refer explicitly to forum non conveniens. Ordinarily these considerations, standing alone, would afford cogent grounds for finding that the old doctrine was to continue as the prevailing rule. This Court said as much in Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 337 U. S. 56, when it posed the issue:
"in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time Page 349 U. S. 38 of commencing"
"We have heretofore held that § 1404(a) makes the doctrine of forum non conveniens applicable to Page 349 U. S. 39 Federal Employers' Liability Act cases brought in federal courts, and provides for the transfer of such actions to a more convenient forum. Ex Parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55 (1949)."
(Emphasis supplied.) None of these cases is even mentioned by the majority. In each is implicit the principle that § 1404(a) embodies the doctrine of forum non conveniens; in each there is the uniform understanding of members of this Court that the language of § 1404(a) is merely a paraphrase of that rule. Instead, the majority applies a variation of the old Jennings Bill, which Congress refused to adopt at the same session in which it inserted § 1404(a) into the new Code. There is certainly nothing even remotely connected with the enactment of § 1404(a) to indicate that, when the section and the Reviser's Notes referred Page 349 U. S. 40 to forum non conveniens -- particularly as articulated in the then-recent Gulf Oil and Koster cases -- they meant the Jennings Bill or anything like it. Still the majority adopts a slight modification of that rejected provision.
It is said that we must uphold a clear change in the statute made by the Congress. We certainly agree. But the language of § 1404(a), considered against the background of judicial discussion in this area, could mean nothing but the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and the Reviser's Notes state that the purpose of the change was to apply forum non conveniens rules to the transfer of civil cases in the federal courts. The direction of Congress is clear and unmistakable. Our duty is so to interpret § 1404(a), not to expand and enlarge upon it. Changes of this type should be made by the legislative branch. And the fact that Congress has, through codification, extended a previously recognized procedure to civil cases generally, with one slight change (i.e., transfer, rather than dismissal), does not give this Court Page 349 U. S. 41 a blank check to recast the underlying law to suit its fancy.
Concluding that the prior tenets of forum non conveniens apply, embracing the standards laid down in Gulf Oil and Koster, we cannot help but agree with the district judge that his discretion would have been exercised differently in the instant case if he had applied the law of those decisions. Without detailing all the facts here involved, we note that one of the plaintiffs resided in the district where this suit was brought. Under the usual forum non conveniens approach, this would virtually suffice, in and of itself, to preclude a refusal to retain the case for trial. See Barrett, supra, at 413; Braucher, supra, at 916-917, 919; Dainow, supra, at 880. After all, the forum non conveniens situation generally envisaged is one involving a foreign cause of action and nonresident parties. See Blair, supra, at 34; Foster, supra, at 53. Apparently but one jurisdiction stands squarely behind the proposition that a court may decline to hear a personal injury suit, brought by a bona fide resident, in order to spare the defendant inconvenience and expense. Williamson v. North-Eastern R. Co., supra. That is the law in Scotland, a jurisdiction long noted for its distinctive doctrines in this area. [Footnote 2] Forum non conveniens has Page 349 U. S. 42 no such impact in this country, and, in fact, Koster may be regarded as an extreme decision in depriving a plaintiff of his home forum. [Footnote 3] With this the state of the law, both now and in 1948, when the Code was adopted, we certainly should require a more explicit direction from Congress before depriving an injured party of his privilege under the FELA of bringing suit in his own district -- at least when the standards of Koster have not been applied.
The question is one of considerable importance in the administration of the lower federal courts, and, considering the inadequacy of appeal, should be settled in this case if it is to be settled at all in the near future. Every appellate court which has passed on § 1404(a) implicitly recognizes the necessity for settling issues of law under Page 349 U. S. 43 the section. Even those courts which have refused relief, expressing the view that mandamus is an inappropriate remedy, have gone on to discuss the merits of the question presented. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174; All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010; cf. Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360. The Court's opinion in this case, by reserving the mandamus issue, follows the same course. We note, further, that the majority of Court of Appeals decisions dealing with § 1404(a) find mandamus appropriate in circumstances less compelling than these. Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, supra; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Davis, 185 F.2d 766; Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777; Wiren v. Laws, supra; Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378; cf. Nicol v. Koscinski, supra.