Source: https://nclej.org/chapter-5-1-a
Timestamp: 2020-07-09 07:34:31
Document Index: 566760985

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1981', '§ 551', '§ 1981', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1232', '§ 1232', '§ 1983', '§ 2014', '§ 1396', '§ 1320', '§ 1437', '§ 1320', '§ 1437', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 601', '§ 601', '§ 601', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 4', '§ 1983']

5.1.A Express Causes of Action, Section 1983, Elements of the Claim - National Center for Law and Economic Justice
There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting [the statute] with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on [certain] conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to … institutions engaged in [prohibited] practices.34
Second, because the statute barred the funding of institutions “which have a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records”, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act was said to “speak only in terms of institutional policy and practice, not individual instances of disclosure.”35 Citing Blessing v. Freestone, the Court found the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act provisions to have an “‘aggregate’ focus … not concerned with ‘whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied,’ … and … cannot ‘give rise to individual rights.’”36 Conflating the previously separate inquiries under Section 1983 jurisprudence and the Cort v. Ash “implied rights” analysis, the Court concluded that “the initial inquiry [in a Section 1983 case] – determining whether a statute confers any right at all – is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case, the express purpose of which is to determine whether or not a statute ‘confers rights on a particular class of persons.’”37
With respect to a number of federal programs for low-income people, a strong argument can be made that Congress’ mandates are, in Gonzaga’s terms, “phrased in terms of the persons protected.”41 However, since many of these statutes were enacted under the Constitution’s Spending Clause, specific provisions of the statutes are written in a form which directs a federal agency to spend money so long as the state or other recipient complies with Congress’ rules (e.g., “the state’s plan shall provide …”). Not surprisingly, government attorneys have argued with some success42 that such statutory provisions are “focus[ed] on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected” and hence, “create ‘no implication of an intention to confer rights on a particular class of persons.’”43 This sort of argument underscores the fact that advocates need to find language in the statutory provision sought to be enforced indicating that Congress “intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.”44 In addition, the advocate must research carefully how that provision has been interpreted both before and after Gonzaga.45 Given the Supreme Court’s tendency to restrict further the ability of private litigants to enforce federal laws, one should be very leery of the consequences of exploring new ground on this issue.
In City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, the Court found that, absent an explicit or implied indication that the statutory remedy was meant to complement other available remedies, the Telecommunications Act of 1996’s provision of a limited private remedy implied that a Section 1983 action was precluded.55 In Sea Clammers, Smith and Rancho Palos Verdes, the statutes required the plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies or to comply with other procedures before bringing suit. As the Supreme Court subsequently explained in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,56 to permit a plaintiff to bypass these procedures and to sue directly under § 1983 would have been incompatible with Congress’ interest in creating these procedures. In contrast, Title IX, at issue in Fitzgerald, had no similar enforcement scheme and a private right of action directly under the statute has been implied.57 Thus, in the absence of exhaustion or alternative remedial measures, the Court held that concurrent Title IX and § 1983 claims was permissible.58
In Westside Mothers v. Haveman, the later of the two decisions, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the obligations of the state under the Medicaid Act were more than a mere contract. It quoted Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, which stated that, “[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing desirable public policy.”63 Applying the three-prong Wilder/Blessing test–before the Gonzaga decision–the appellate court found the Medicaid Act provision enforceable under Section 1983.64
In Chevron U.S.A. Incorporated v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court ruled that “[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.”68 Under this view, “a reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems unwise, … but is obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.”69
A Section 1983 action can be brought only against a person acting “under color of [state] law.”87 Liability lies against those “who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.”88 Although the term “person” was originally thought to refer only to human beings, the concept was broadened in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services89 to include cities and local governments whose custom, policy or practice caused the deprivation.90 In any event, when the defendant is a government employee doing his or her job and acting under apparent government authority, she or he is very likely a “state actor.91 When a private actor is involved, as is increasingly the case with the trend towards “privatization” of government services, the waters are somewhat murkier.
Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court has substantially narrowed the range of private conduct that constitutes state action. In determining whether a private party has engaged in “state action,” a court must weigh “whether the claimed … deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority ” and “whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor.”100 In doing so, a court looks at (1) the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, (2) whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, and (3) whether the injury caused was aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.101 Because none of these factors is definitive, one can generalize that a deprivation of federal rights by a private party can constitute “state action” if the government has: (1) delegated its authority to the private actor, (2) participated in joint activity to a degree that the actions of one party can be attributed to the other, (3) created the legal framework necessary to carry out the private action, (4) compelled the private party to act in a certain way, (5) knowingly accepted the benefits of an unconstitutional practice, or (6) the private entity is carrying out a traditional “state function,” or (7) the government has created a “special relationship” with the plaintiff.
Given the move towards privatization of formerly state programs, a close look at Sullivan’s analysis is warranted. The Court began by identifying the specific conduct complained of: the insurance company’s withholding of payments. It then analyzed the state’s role to determine whether “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action … so that the action of the [private party] may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”114 Having understood that the state’s role was simply to accept the insurer’s request for a utilization review, checking the form for accuracy, and forwarding it to a private panel of health care providers for a decision, the Court found no state action. The Court described the “State’s decision to allow insurers to withhold payments” as “state inaction, or more accurately, a legislative decision not to intervene in a dispute between an insurer and an employee over whether a particular treatment is reasonable and necessary.”115
The Court, nevertheless, recognized that the utilization review panel’s subsequent affirmative decision to uphold or reverse the insurance company would be state action because the panel possessed authority delegated to it by state statute: “While the decision of a [Utilization Review Organization], like any judicial official, may properly be considered state action, a private party’s mere use of the State’s dispute resolution machinery, without the ‘overt, significant assistance of state officials,’ … cannot.”116
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. and 701 et seq.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88.
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). Although this MANUAL is directed at cases filed in federal court, Section 1983 suits can also be heard in state court. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently struck down, on Supremacy Clause grounds, a New York state statute which divested its state courts of entertaining Section 1983 actions against state correctional employees, holding that there is strong presumption of concurrent jurisdiction that can be overcome only when the state adopts a neutral rule needed for judicial administration of its court system. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 28 (2009); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980).
The Supreme Court has ruled that in passing § 1983, Congress did not intend to strip states of sovereign immunity. Hence, while a state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 (Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979),) local governments – which cannot claim immunity – are. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003), the Court held that a sovereign Indian Tribe is not a “person within the jurisdiction” of the United States, and cannot sue under § 1983.
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285-85 (2002) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 609, n.13 (1979)). The ability to use § 1983 to enforce a statute was first established in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (in which the Court, by basing its decision on statutory rather than equal protection grounds, implied that § 1983 was a proper vehicle for raising a state’s violation of a federal statute enacted under the Constitution’s Spending Clause).
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (state claims statute); Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (state administrative proceeding); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (state procedure for challenging school segregation); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1971) (no need to resort to state causes of action). A recent example of a court rejecting an abstention argument raised in a federal trial court action seeking review of a Medicaid administrative hearing decision (invoking Section 1983 to address an erroneous interpretation of federal law) is Romano v. Greenstein, 721 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2013). Although the law seems fairly clear in this area, one consequence of the federal judiciary’s heightened concern for state’s rights has been greater reliance on abstention doctrines to keep from hearing these cases. See, e.g., 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274-81 (11th Cir. 2003). See Chapter 2.7 of this MANUAL for a detailed discussion of abstention.
Chapter 8.2 of this MANUAL discusses the limitations imposed by the Eleventh Amendment on suits against a state.
See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (allegation that police wrongfully circulated damaging information about plaintiff did not state Fourteenth Amendment violation and hence did not state § 1983 cause of action; plaintiff limited to state law remedies).
Chapter 8.3 of this MANUAL explores defendants and defenses in § 1983 litigation.
Constitutional provisions explicitly creating state obligations include the Reconstruction Amendments (Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well as those expanding the franchise to women and eliminating the poll tax. Portions of the Bill of Rights, which originally applied only to the federal government, now apply to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. For a list of these amendments, see generally, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
In alleging a “right,” plaintiffs’ attorneys should be very specific, taking to heart the Supreme Court’s dictum that “[o]nly when the complaint is broken down into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997). For examples of how courts have applied this guideline, see infra note 25.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-79 (1975). Since Cort, the Supreme Court has become more restrictive in finding rights of action implied directly under a statute. See, e.g., Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) and Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286. Sandoval and the implied statutory causes of action will be discussed further at Section 5.2 of this MANUAL.
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 420, n.3 (1987) (“[T]o us it is clear that the regulations gave low-income tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the regulations were fully authorized by the statute.”)
In hindsight, however, the Wright decision seems to have turned more on the absence of a “comprehensive enforcement mechanism” which would have precluded the applicability of § 1983 than the ability of a regulation to create “rights.” While earlier decisions held that regulations can create rights enforceable under § 1983, see, e.g., Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994), and Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the more recent trend is to reject this view. See Caswell v. City of Detroit, 418 F.3d 615, 618-20 (6th Cir. 2005); Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2003); South Camden Citizens v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 274 F.3d 771, 778 (3rd Cir. 2001); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1007-08, 1009 (11th Cir. 1997).
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002). Prior to Gonzaga, a plaintiff invoking § 1983 to enforce a statute could presume that a private right of action existed, with defendants having the burden to disprove the existence of the right. After Gonzaga, the burden appears to have shifted to the plaintiff. However, once a right is shown to exist, § 1983 is presumed to provide a remedy, while defendants have the burden to prove otherwise. Id. at 284 n.4.
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
Id. at 509-512 (1990). Wilder actually lists these factors in reverse order. However, since Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997), the factor which asks whether the statute benefits the plaintiff has generally been listed first. This is appropriate because it has become the main battleground for the use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes. While some courts seem to think that Gonzaga has entirely displaced the Wilder/Blessing inquiry, Gonzaga cites the latter decisions without reservation.
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
Much of the debate over private enforceability involves federal statutes enacted under the Constitution’s Spending Clause, where the issue is whether the right to sue can be inferred from a mandate to spend money in a particular way. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981); Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008) (Spending Clause legislation rarely confers a private right of action on funding beneficiaries); but see Grammer v. John J. Kane Regional Centers, 570 F.3d 520 (3rd Cir. 2009); cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1524 (2010). In contrast, civil rights statutes, targeting individual discrimination against individuals, are more likely to be interpreted as privately enforceable under § 1983. See, e.g., Wallace v. Chicago Housing Authority, 298 F. Supp. 2d. 710, 718 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (allowing use of § 1983 to sue for breach of Fair Housing Act, (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
24.Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343.
25. “[T]he lower court’s holding that the [statute as a whole] ‘creates enforceable rights’ paints with too broad a brush. It was incumbent upon respondents to identify with particularity the rights they claimed, since it is impossible to determine whether [the statute], as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined ‘rights.’ Only when the complaint is broken down into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights.” Id. at 342. Courts have found enforceable and unenforceable certain provisions in the same statute through a careful examination of statutory language. For instance, ASW v. Oregon, 424 F.3d 970, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2005) cited Blessing to find an enforceable right under one provision of the Adoption Assistance Act even though a separate provision had earlier been interpreted in 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) as not creating a right to sue under § 1983. Similarly, in Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004), the court held that while the relocation assistance provisions of the Housing and Community Development Act created enforceable rights, the “one for one” replacement housing mandate had an aggregate and not an individual focus and hence, could not create rights enforceable under § 1983. As explained in Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005), “[a]lthough [the Medicaid Act] sets out a comprehensive list of requirements that a state plan must meet, it does not describe every requirement in the same language. Some requirements … focus on individual recipients, while others are concerned with the procedural administration of the … Act by the States and only refer to recipients, if at all, in the aggregate.”
26.Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
27.Id. at 289.
28.Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
29.Id. at 283.
31.Id. at 283 (emphasis in original).
32.Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
33.Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
34.Id. at 289 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added)).
35.Id. at 288.
36.Id. at 288 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997)).
37.Id. at 285 (citation omitted).
38.Enforceable rights may also be created by statutes that mandate governmental duties owed to a class of beneficiaries. “Where a statute does not include this sort of explicit ‘right-or duty-creating language’ we rarely impute to Congress an intent to create a private right of action.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284, n.3. (emphasis added, citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690, n.13.) Cannon, in that footnote, stated that “the right- or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action. With the exception of one case, in which the relevant statute reflected a special policy against judicial interference, this Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case. ” Because Spending Clause legislation is often written in a form that requires state recipients to do something for members of a class, such “duty-creating” language suggests a right enforceable under § 1983.
39.Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
40.Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691. The tendency of some courts to highlight the first Blessing prong at the expense of the second and third prongs is illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption – with no mention of the other Blessing criteria – of its own three-part test for determining if Congress intended to benefit plaintiffs: (1) Does the statute contain individually focused, rights creating language? (2) Does it address the needs of individual persons instead of having a systemwide or aggregate focus? (3) Does it lack an enforcement mechanism available to the aggrieved individual? Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2003)).
41.The Food Stamp Act, for example, provides that “… households [receiving] benefits under a … program that complies with standards established by the Secretary … shall be eligible to participate in the food stamp program. Assistance … shall be furnished to all eligible households …” 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a). Hence, specific statutory provisions spelling out eligibility standards presumably create enforceable rights for those who apply and meet the standards. An example of similar language in the Medicaid Act, but one focusing on a state plan, is the requirement that “[a] State plan for medical assistance must …(10) provide … for making medical assistance available … to … all individuals [meeting the following five pages of eligibility criteria].” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a). The latter language was cited in Sabree v. Richman, 367 F. 3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir. 2004) to find an enforceable right to certain services. Judge Alito concurred, cryptically noting that the lower court’s reversed decision “may reflect the direction that future Supreme Court cases in this area will take.” Id. at 194. See also Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159 n.8 (9th Cir.), (“section 1396a(a)(10) creates an individual right enforceable under section 1983”)., cert denied sub nom, Goldberg v. Watson, 549 U.S. 1032 (2006). See Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services v. Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, 603 F.3d 365, 374-82 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness program reflects Congress’ intent to give state protection and advocacy programs right to sue for records).
42.See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 624, 627 (6th Cir. 2006) (Lead Based Paint Protection Act is aimed at entities and does not confer right to sue); Banks v. Dallas Housing Authority, 271 F. 3d 605, 609-10 (5th Cir. 2001) (requirement that privately owned Section 8 units be kept in “decent, safe and sanitary” condition is principally aimed at property owners); Hill v. San Francisco Housing Authority, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028-29 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (requirement that units be maintained in accord with Department of Housing and Urban Development housing quality standards was directed to public housing authorities and did not create enforceable rights); Almendares v. Palmer, No. 3:00-CV-7524, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258, 2002 WL 31730963 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002) (requirement that state Food Stamp agencies provide access for limited English proficient (LEP) applicants and recipients was directed to state, and did not create right to LEP services).
43.Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001).
44.For example, in Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2002), Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir. 2004), South Dakota ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603-05 (5th Cir. 2004), and Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2006), the courts focused on a Medicaid provision’s reference to “all eligible individuals.” Dickson and Watson also cited the “Suter fix,” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, in which Congress indicated that certain statutory provisions could not be held to be privately unenforceable simply because they were requirements of a state plan. Similarly, in Johnson v. Housing Authority of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2006), finding that Section 8 voucher holders had an enforceable right to an adequate utility allowance, the court focused on the reference in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A) to “the monthly assistance payment for the family….” The Johnson court also buttressed its holding by “tak[ing] the entirety of the legislative enactment into account,” 442 F.3d at 362, something not often seen when parsing statutes into “manageable analytic bites” is the order of the day.
45.An excellent reference is Jane Perkins, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Federal Laws, 38 Clearinghouse Review 720 (March-April 2005), containing an extensive table of court decisions addressing the enforceability of particular statutory provisions intended to benefit low-income clients. See also Rochelle Bobroff & Jane Perkins, Recent Developments in Court Access for Medicaid and Medicare Cases, 42 Clearinghouse Review 246 (Sept.-Oct. 2008).
46.Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 359-64 (1992).
47.Wary of Suter’s potential for undermining private enforcement of similar statutes requiring “state plans” to carry out the various subchapters of the Social Security Act, Congress has legislatively affirmed that a private right of action can exist to enforce such statutes to the extent that the right to sue existed before Suter, limiting the latter’s effect to only the specific provision of the Adoption Assistance Act addressed by the court. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (1994). See Suter, supra note 46.
48.Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 431 (1987).
49.Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 499 (1990).
50.See Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2003) (relying on Department of Health and Human Services regulations to find enforceable mandate to provide certain “specialized services” under Medicaid Act). In contrast, in Banks v. Dallas Housing Authority, 271 F.3d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 2001), the court found too vague to be judicially enforceable the “decent, safe, and sanitary” public housing ostensible entitlement set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. See also Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1162, (9th Cir. 2006); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2006)(both cases holding that Medicaid Act’s requirement that state plans include “reasonable standards … which shall be comparable for all groups” and “consistent with the objectives of this subchapter” was vague and amorphous because it did not provide more definite guidance linking “reasonable standards” to medical need).
51.Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
52.Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
53.Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
54.Id. at 1009-13.
55.City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005). Among the statutes cited in Rancho Palos Verdes as lacking a comprehensive enforcement mechanism are Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid statute, the National Labor Relations Act, the United States Housing Act and the Education of the Handicapped Act. Id. (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) , Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), Golden Gate Transit Corporation v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State II), 493 U.S. 103 (1989), Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987), and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984))
57. Id. at 255. The Court noted that the statutory remedies of withdrawing federal funding and an implied right of action under Title IX “stand in stark contrast to the ‘unusually elaborate,’ ‘carefully tailored,’ and ‘restrictive’ enforcement schemes of the statutes at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdos . . .” Id.
58.Id. 129 S. Ct. at 797 (noting that Title IX was modeled after Title VI, which has been interpreted as permitting concurrent claims as well).
59.Wright, 479 U.S. at 424-25.
60.Id. at 426. See also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521-23 (existence of administrative appeal procedures did not foreclose private enforcement) and Golden Gate Transit Corporation v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State II), 493 U.S. 103, 109 (1989) (existence of NLRB procedures). Although the National Sea Clammers test was not an articulated basis for its decision, the Gonzaga Court also pointed to Congress’ mandate to the Secretary of Education to “deal with violations” of Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act through the establishment of a review board, and the Secretary’s subsequent adoption of complaint and investigation procedures, as evidence of a “federal review mechanism” which distinguished Gonzaga from Wright. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289-90 (2002).
61.This contention is based on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997), analogizing the class of persons benefited by such federal-state cooperative programs to a third-party beneficiary under a contract. The preclusion of a § 1983 remedy is said to flow from Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981), that “[i]n legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” See also Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
62.Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 2002) and Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002) (construing enforceability, by private parties, of dental care and early and periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment provisions of Medicaid Act, respectively).
63.Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 858 (quoting Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)).
64.Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 863. In Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002), addressing whether the violation of two Spending Clause statutes – the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act – could give rise to punitive damages, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion denied such relief on the ground the Spending Clause statutes were analogous to contracts between the federal government and the state, and that punitive damages were not traditionally available in contract actions. Nevertheless, responding to the critique of the minority, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court “d[id] no[t] imply … that suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise.” 536 U.S. at 188, n.2.
65.Wright, 479 U.S. at 420, n.3 (“[T]o us it is clear that the regulations gave low-income tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the regulations were fully authorized by the statute.”)
66.Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). For a recent example of a court relying on regulations to find that a statute confers an enforceable right, see Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2003) (Medicaid specialized services to mentally disabled nursing home residents).
67.Golden State Transit Corporation v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State II), 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (“[a] rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or incomplete statutory provision” could give rise to “right” enforceable under § 1983).
68.Chevron U.S.A. Incorporated v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Incorporated, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
69.United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2002).
70.Wright, 479 U.S. at 437.
71.See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
73.Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582, 590 (1983). Id. at 623-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74.Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291. Hence, while 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person in the United States shall … be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance [on the basis of race, color, or national origin]” clearly confers a personal right to sue for intentional discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (federal agencies authorized “to effectuate [2000d] … by issuing rules, regulations, or orders …”) speaks only of the powers of agencies. According to Sandoval, “[i]t is clear now that the disparate- impact regulations do not simply apply § 601 – since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits – and therefore clear that the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations.” Id. at 285. This is because “[l]ike substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.” Id. at 286-87 (citations omitted).
75.E.g., is plaintiff a member of the class benefited by the statute? See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
76.Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (citation omitted).
77.Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003), upholding the invocation of § 1983 to enforce the disparate impact regulations against an Eleventh Amendment objection, but without addressing the issue of the enforceability of federal regulations under § 1983.
78.Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
79.Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551.
80.Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1007-1009 (11th Cir. 1997). See also American Association of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 605 F.3d 1124, 1131-37 (11th Cir. 2010) (American with Disabilities Act regulations are not enforceable).
81.South Camden Citizens v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 274 F.3d 771, 778 (3rd Cir. 2001).
82.Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003).
83.Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2003).
84.The partial dissent in Save Our Valley contains an extensive analysis of how regulations can create “rights,” opining that such rights are enforceable under § 1983 if the regulation meets the Gonzaga standard of being written in “‘individually-focused,’ ‘rights-creating language[.]’” 335 F.3d at 963. However, because the Title VI regulations at issue were focused on the person or agency regulated rather than the class benefited, Judge Berzon believed that no enforceable right had been created.
85.Caswell v. City of Detroit, 418 F.3d 615, 618-20 (6th Cir. 2005).
86.See Three Rivers Center for Independent Living v. Housing Authority, 382 F.3d 412, 430 (3rd Cir. 2004). The case holds that Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act to require the creation of accessible housing could not create an enforceable right to compel compliance. Although the statute conferred an enforceable right on plaintiffs to a “reasonable accommodation,” the accessible housing regulation mandate was said to have only an aggregate focus and “not concerned with ‘whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied.’” Id. at 430 (quoting Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002).
87.“Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’” American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999).
88.Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1971) (police misconduct). Federal officials acting under color of federal law are not subject to § 1983. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
89.Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010) (Monell’s requirement that municipality’s policy or custom cause deprivation in order to impose liability on municipality applies in cases seeking prospective injunctive relief as well as damages).
90.The issue of what constitutes a “custom, policy or practice” actionable under § 1983 is discussed later in this chapter.
91.However, a government employee or subcontractor such as a public defender, whose fundamental loyalties are owed to the criminal defendant and accordingly are adverse to the government, is not a “state actor” whose alleged malpractice is actionable under § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); cf. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1291 (2009) (court assigned counsel are not state actors for purposes of speedy trial claim). Compare Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir.) (chief public defender is state actor in devising administrative procedures governing allocation of lawyer resources to defendants based on results of lie detector tests), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 814 (2003) This exception is very narrowly construed. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), in which a private doctor under contract to a prison, who owed a professional obligation to his patient, did not as a result have interests which were necessarily so adverse to the government as to preclude a § 1983 claim.
92.Where state officials act in violation of federal law, the official is said to have been stripped of official authority for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment by acting illegally, but, nevertheless, considered to be engaged in “state action” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment if the action was taken “under color” of the apparent authority conferred by official position. Home Telephone and Telegraph v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
93.Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
94.Id.
95.Morgan v. Tice, 862 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1989).
96.Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 940 (1982). Both an official who misuses power in violation of federal law, and an official who enforces a state law which violates federal law, act under color of state law. However, as discussed in Chapter 8.3 of this MANUAL, in the first scenario, only the official who misused power, and not the agency that employs her, is liable, because state or local governments are liable only if the deprivation is the result of the agency’s custom, policy, or practice. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In the second situation, state law constitutes the “policy.”
97.In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001), the Court acknowledged the elusiveness of a comprehensive rule governing “state action”: “From the range of circumstances that could point toward the State behind an individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.”
98.Lugar, 457 U.S. at 930-32, 935.
99.Id. at 935, n.8.
100.Id. at 937. In Lugar, the fact that a court had issued a warrant authorizing a private party to attach plaintiff’s property converted the subsequent seizure – alleged to have been without due process – into “state action.”
101.Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614, 624-25 (1991) (holding that private attorney exercising peremptory challenges in civil jury trial to excuse African Americans from panel was “state actor” given that peremptory challenge could only exist in judicial context.)
102.West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). Another example of delegation is the privatization of the prison system. In Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997), the Court assumed state action in ruling that private prison guards were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for their unconstitutional practices.
103.Addickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (involving conspiracy between “dime store” and local deputy sheriffs to prevent integration of southern lunch counter during Civil Rights Movement).
104.Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980).
105.Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (Private college administered by city board “state actor” in refusing to admit African Americans).
106.National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
107.Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
108.Id. at 298.
109.North Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v. Di-Chem, Incorporated, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
110.Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 467 U.S. 922, 934, 940-42 (1980). The creditor’s action is not state action if it is contrary to state law. Id. at 940.
111.Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
112.Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
113.American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
114.Id. at 51-52 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
115.Id. at 53.
116.Id. at 54 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988)).
117.Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
118.Id. at 351; compare Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (a municipally owned utility was required to afford customers due process before terminating utilities under a statute requiring utility shut-offs to be only for “cause”).
119.Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
120.Id. at 1004.
121.San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Incorporated v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987).
122.Id. at 546-47. See also Carlin Communications v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 827 F.2d 1291, 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988) (finding that a telephone company’s decision to terminate an adults-only message service was state action because it was the product of state coercion; holding, however, that the company’s later decision to bar all adult entertainment services was not state action, since it was not coerced).
123.American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1999).
124.Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003.
125.Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
126.Id. at 840-41. To be sure of finding state action in these types of circumstances, advocates should ask whether the private actor is standing in for the government, or involved in what amounts to “joint action,” either because it could not take place without government involvement, or is compelled by government policy.
127.Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
128.Id. at 722-26.
129.Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-78 (1972).
130.Id. at 175-77.
131.Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
132.Id. at 837-43.
133.Id. at 842-43.
134.Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (state could not enforce trespass laws to bar Jehovah’s Witness from distributing literature in company town).
135.Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (collectively, the White Primary Cases).
136.Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505-10.
137.The White Primary Cases may be better understood as finding circumstantial evidence of state-sponsored intentional racial discrimination from state regulation of every aspect of primary elections but voter eligibility.
138.Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976) (overruling Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)).
139.U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV and XXVI; and art. IV, § 4. See also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-105 (2000).
140.Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
141.Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), 155-66 (1978).
142.Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 , 837-43 (982).
145.National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 194(1988).
146.See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), alluding to government’s affirmative duty to protect those in custody from injury caused by a third party.
147.An example of a decision finding such a “special relationship” or “state created danger” outside of the typical custodial situation is Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). In this case, a woman formerly held in custody by a highway patrolman was raped after being released in a high crime area without a car at 2:30 a.m. On the other hand, city liability was not found for the murder of a domestic violence victim despite a state law requiring police to enforce restraining orders, Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), or where police officers allowed a drag race to go forward, resulting in the death of a spectator. Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2005). The key distinction is whether the government took affirmative action that created the danger.
148.DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
149.Id. at 200.
150.Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 692 (1978). See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (policies, acts, and practices of government must be so widespread as to “practically have the force of law”);Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010). Chapter 8.3 of this MANUAL discusses municipal or agency liability and the parameters of a “custom, policy or practice” for purposes of § 1983.
151.Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989): “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against an official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”