Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/court-of-appeals-criminal/1989/11095.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 04:09:25
Document Index: 685731269

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 18', '§ 28', '§ 655', '§ 2702', '§ 2403', '§ 701', '§ 701']

FOX v. STATE :: 1989 :: Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Decisions :: Oklahoma Case Law :: Oklahoma Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Oklahoma Case Law › Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Decisions › 1989 › FOX v. STATE
1989 OK CR 51
779 P.2d 562
Case Number: F-86-511
Billy Ray Fox, appellant, was convicted in Oklahoma County District Court of three counts of Murder in the First Degree, Case No. CRF-85-3343, and was given three sentences of the death penalty. Judgments and sentences are AFFIRMED.
¶7 The United States Supreme Court held in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477, 74 S. Ct. 667, 670, 98 L. Ed. 866 (1954), that "it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to try a defendant of a particular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand jury. . . . from which all persons of his race or color have, solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the State. . . ." When a defendant asserts this form of denial of equal protection, he must show that the procedures used to call his jury "resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs. The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or applied." Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977) (citing Hernandez).
¶9 At the hearing on appellant's pretrial motion, the Oklahoma County Election Secretary was called to testify as to the procedures utilized in registering voters in the county. The local jury clerk also described how names of all registered voters in the county were entered into a computer and then randomly withdrawn for petit juries. It was clear that the procedure set forth in the Oklahoma Statutes for calling jurors, 38 O.S.Supp. 1985 § 18 [38-18], was followed and that it was racially neutral and not susceptible to abuse. The method qualified any registered voter to be called as a grand or petit juror. Thus, had appellant made a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose by showing substantial underrepresentation of his group, the State would have easily rebutted it. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494, 97 S. Ct. at 1280. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶10 Appellant's second assignment of error is that he was denied a jury representing a fair cross section of the community because 38 O.S. 1981 § 28 [38-28](A), allows jurors seventy years of age or above to opt out of jury service. We have previously discussed this issue and are unpersuaded to change our holding that this exemption from jury service does not exclude a sufficiently numerous and distinct group. Moore v. State, 736 P.2d 161, 165 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 212, 98 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1987). Appellant did not demonstrate that representation of this group in venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such people in the community. Id. [779 P.2d 567] Furthermore, we find the exemption to be reasonable in light of the increasing rate of physical infirmities incurred by senior citizens and the resulting hardships if lengthy jury service is required. The Supreme Court held in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975), that the fair cross section principle must offer much leeway and allow for relevant qualifications for jurors as well as reasonable exemptions.
¶11Appellant urged in a pretrial motion for change of venue that he could not receive a fair trial in Oklahoma County due to extensive pretrial publicity. He contends that the voir dire examination at trial showed that it was impossible for a truly fair and impartial jury to be seated in his case. We disagree with this conclusion.
¶13 The trial judge voir dired at the bench and out of hearing of the others, each venireman who had learned of the case from the media. Thus, he carefully prevented the venire from being contaminated by information others had acquired from the media while at the same time allowing each venireman to disclose his or her own knowledge and opinion. We are satisfied that this procedure adequately allowed thorough inquiry into the veniremen's knowledge and opinions acquired from media accounts and ensured that those who sat on the jury could impartially and fairly judge appellant on the evidence presented at trial. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961); Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273, 278 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Moore v. State, 672 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
¶14 We cannot say on the record before this Court that the jury that tried the appellant was unfairly prejudiced against him because of the media coverage of his case or that there was a deep pattern of prejudice throughout the community. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1975). This assignment is without merit.
¶18 Thus, appellant has not demonstrated antagonistic defenses nor prejudice resulting from being tried with codefendant Fowler. See Vowell v. State, 728 P.2d 854, 857 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); VanWoundenberg v. State, 720 P.2d 328, 331 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 956, 107 S. Ct. 447, 93 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1986); Master v. State, 702 P.2d 375, 378 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for severance.
¶20 In the previous assignment, we found that the codefendants did not present antagonistic defenses. For that reason, we cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing to grant additional challenges. Furthermore, we find Master to be controlling on this issue. Indeed, as the trial court noted, the language of the statute specifying the number of peremptory challenges is mandatory. Title 22 O.S. 1981 § 655 [22-655], states that "if two or more defendants are tried jointly they shall join in their challenges. . . ." (emphasis added). As appellant points out in his brief, peremptory challenges are not constitutionally guaranteed and are subject to limitations in their exercise. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 40 S. Ct. 28, 63 L. Ed. 1154 (1919). The Court held in Stilson that the government may permissibly regulate the number of peremptory challenges available and may require codefendants to be treated as one defendant in exercising the allotted challenges.
¶22 Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in not allowing individual voir dire of each juror, out of the hearing of the others, as to their views on capital punishment. We have previously addressed the trial court's discretion in considering such a request on several occasions and are unpersuaded of its usefulness in appellant's case. See Vowell v. State, 728 P.2d 854, 857 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Foster v. State, 714 P.2d 1031, 1037 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S. Ct. 249, 93 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1986). We have no reason to believe from the record that voir dire was unduly hampered. We note that of those questioned, three veniremen were excused for cause because of their opposition to the death penalty, and one was excused for cause due to being irrevocably committed to the death penalty.
¶24 It was clear from the trial court's inquiries that the views of these two veniremen would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of their duties as jurors in this case. This is sufficient ground to excuse a potential juror for cause in a capital case. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985). We have previously held that there is no right for counsel of either party to rehabilitate a venireman and have noted that protracted inquiry about capital punishment may tend to confuse the issue. See Banks v. State, 701 P.2d 418, 423 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). We find no abuse of discretion.
¶27 Appellant cites the case of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980), as authority for the assertion that the officers' giving of their business cards amounted to an interrogation after he had requested counsel, thereby violating his Fifth Amendment rights. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981). However, we find the holding in Innis to support the opposite position. In that case, the defendant led the arresting police officers to the location of a murder weapon after overhearing a conversation between two of the officers expressing their concerns that handicapped children in the vicinity might find the weapon and hurt themselves with it. The court held therein that "interrogation" was not limited to express questioning, but included words and actions by police which the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 446 U.S. at 300-301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689. "The case thus boils down to whether, in the context of a brief conversation, the officers should have known that the respondent would suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating response." Id. at 303, 100 S. Ct. at 1691. After a review of the record, we cannot say that appellant's statements and actions were the product of evocative conduct on the part of the officers.
¶36 This Court has never approved or disapproved of expert testimony concerning Luminal testing. "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 12 O.S. 1981 § 2702 [12-2702]. In this case, the trial judge properly informed himself of the reliability of the tests used2 and the expert's qualifications3 and his precision in using the tests and decided that the testimony would assist the trier of fact. Kennedy v. State, 640 P.2d 971, 977 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting Ned Stuart's testimony.
¶43 While it is true that the hearsay rule should not be applied in a mechanistic fashion which would defeat the ends of justice, Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1979), the rules of evidence should, nonetheless, regulate the course of proceedings in the sentencing stage of a capital case. Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), modified on other grounds sub nom., Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir. 1984).
¶44 We find that the affidavits were cumulative of the tremendous quantity of evidence introduced of appellant's good character and meaningfulness. Prohibiting the needless presentation of cumulative evidence is proper. 12 O.S. 1981 § 2403 [12-2403]. The mitigating evidence herein was not exclusive to the particular affiants as was the testimony offered by certain witnesses which was held to have been improperly excluded in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982), and Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1979). Its exclusion was not error.
¶46 Appellant asserts that the jury could not give him particularized consideration in assessing the death penalty because he was tried jointly with codefendant Fowler at the sentencing stage. This is especially so, he argues, since Fowler had prior convictions for a violent felony. The constitutional requirement for particularized consideration of an individual's character and circumstances before the death penalty may be meted out does not necessitate a separate sentencing hearing for codefendants. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976). Indeed, the jury was instructed to consider each defendant individually.
¶49 The one issue which appellant supports with authority is that the jury was not advised they could give him a life sentence even if they found the mitigating circumstances were outweighed by aggravating factors. The authority he offers is from other jurisdictions and is unpersuasive to overrule this Court's prior holding denying the same contentions. In Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273, 284 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S. Ct. 599, 93 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1987), we held:
`Jury nullification' is the jury's exercise of its inherent `power to bring in a verdict [of acquittal], in the teeth of both law and facts.' Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138, 41 S. Ct. 53, 54, 65 L. Ed. 185 (1920). In capital cases, an instruction on this issue would inform the jury of its right to return a sentence of life no matter how great the weight of evidence supporting the circumstances. However, the courts have almost uniformly held that a criminal defendant is not entitled to such an instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1974). But see Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1374 n. 54 (5th Cir. 1981). The rationale for this majority view is eloquently explained in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Although a trial judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, give such an instruction, it is not error for him to refuse the request.
¶52 We disagree with appellant's contentions. While it is true that the State must prove the existence of at least one aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury is authorized to consider the death penalty, 21 O.S. 1981 § 701.11 [21-701.11], there is no specific standard constitutionally required for weighing mitigating against aggravating circumstances. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 [779 P.2d 574] S.Ct. 2733, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983); Brogie v. State, 695 P.2d 538, 543 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). We have previously rejected a standard which would require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. Johnson v. State, 731 P.2d 993, 1004 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). The jury herein was properly instructed of the State's burden of proof and of their duty to weigh the countervailing circumstances and to determine the appropriate sentence. This assignment is without merit.
¶54 Appellant asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error by not instructing the jury that there exists a "`presumption of life' which guarantees a person convicted of murder the right to live incarcerated for life unless the prosecution demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the only appropriate penalty for the defendant." Appellant neither requested this specific instruction, Childs v. State, 744 P.2d 567, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), nor now cites relevant authority in support of it. The cases he offers are those recognizing the presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S. Ct. 1852, 68 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1981); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976); and In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). He did submit an instruction concerning a "presumption of mitigation" which the trial judge noted to have been given in substance. The instructions given concerning sentencing and legally recognized presumptions adequately advised the jury of the appropriate law. There is no error.
¶56 We do not believe that a reasonable juror could have understood the charge to mean that they could not consider all relevant mitigating circumstances, a constitutional failure expounded in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion). The jury was also instructed that:
¶57 What was prohibited by the instruction, and what would be understood by a reasonable juror as being prohibited were "emotional responses not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase." California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542, 107 S. Ct. 837, 840, 93 L. Ed. 2d 934, 940 (1987). Such a limitation promotes rather than offends the purpose in the Eighth Amendment to eliminate arbitrary and capricious action in sentencing. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976). In Johnson v. State, 731 P.2d 993, 1004 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), we noted that if juries were allowed to be guided by sympathy in their deliberations in capital cases, it is a consideration likely to work to the disadvantage of the criminal defendants.
¶59 Initially, it is obvious that Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction (Criminal) 907 does not contain the qualifier "any." Secondly, the phrase "or other arbitrary factor," which was present in the instruction in Parks, is not present in this instruction. We therefore find the Supreme Court's well-reasoned opinion in Brown, supra, to be controlling. In Brown, the Court stressed, "reading the instruction as a whole, as we must, it is no more than a catalog of the kind of factors that could improperly influence a juror's decision to vote for or against the death penalty. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis is based on common sense, and a rational juror could hardly hear this instruction without concluding that it was meant to confine the jury's deliberations to considerations arising from the evidence presented, both aggravating and mitigating." See also Byrne v. Butler, 847 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988). We also find no substantial possibility that a reasonable juror might have rested his or her verdict on an improper interpretation of the instruction. Cf. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988). Finally, when reviewed as a whole, we find that the entire instructions delivered a correct interpretation of the law.
¶60 Fox next urges that the trial court committed fundamental error in not defining the elements of the aggravating circumstance that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution. However, the instruction as given applied language commonly used and was easily understandable. No further definition was required. See Liles v. State, 702 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S. Ct. 2291, 90 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1986). Moreover, appellant failed to request or submit an instruction such as he now claims to be required and cannot be heard to complain on appeal of its absence. Liles, 702 P.2d at 1031. Nuckols v. State, 690 P.2d 463, 471 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S. Ct. 2050, 85 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1985).
¶61 We disagree with appellant when he claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding [779 P.2d 576] of this aggravating circumstance's existence. The evidence was that he went to the store where he had been formerly employed intending to rob it. He had worked with one of the victims. The codefendants made no attempts to conceal their identities. One of the three victims was resting in an upstairs break room and was brought down to the store's back room where he was killed with the others. The robbery and homicides were executed in the early morning hours when no other customers were in the store or likely to arrive. The parts of the broken shotgun and the checks taken in the robbery were hidden in various locations. The codefendants rinsed their blood splattered clothes before returning to their homes. These factors taken together were sufficient circumstantial evidence that appellant killed with the intent of preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution. Stouffer v. State, 738 P.2d 1349, 1362 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 763, 98 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1988) and Moore v. State, 736 P.2d 161, 165 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 212, 98 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1987). This assignment is without merit.
¶63 Appellant claims that the aggravating circumstance that a murder is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" is being applied in an arbitrary, and, therefore, unconstitutional manner. See Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1988). In Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (Opinion on Rehearing), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 763, 98 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1988), this Court specifically limited application of this aggravating circumstance to those murders which are preceded by torture or serious physical abuse. We find that this sufficiently narrowed the class of murders to which the circumstance could be applied. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980).
¶65 Appellant contends that the aggravating circumstance set forth in 21 O.S. 1981 § 701.12 [21-701.12](7) and found by the jury to be present in his case, that, "The existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society," is being applied in an unconstitutional manner and is not supported by the evidence. We have previously addressed the constitutionality of the application of this aggravating factor and held that it is not constitutionally infirm. VanWoundenberg v. State, 720 P.2d 328, 336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 956, 107 S. Ct. 447, 93 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1986), and Liles v. State, 702 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S. Ct. 2291, 90 L. Ed. 2d 732. See also Castro v. [779 P.2d 577] State, 745 P.2d 394, 407 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) and Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273, 285 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S. Ct. 599, 93 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1986). We are unpersuaded by appellant's argument to the contrary.
¶66 We also find that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of this factor. As appellant notes in his brief, this Court has held that evidence of the murder itself will support a finding of this aggravating circumstance. Liles, supra (and cases cited therein). Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1088 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246, 104 S. Ct. 3524, 82 L. Ed. 2d 831 (1984); Stafford v. State, 665 P.2d 1205, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), vacated, 467 U.S. 1212, 104 S. Ct. 2651, 81 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1984), affirmed on remand, 700 P.2d 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 188, 88 L. Ed. 2d 157; Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), reversed on other grounds sub. nom., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985). These cases addressed the characteristic of callousness as reflected by a defendant's actions. Here too, there was evidence of callousness where appellant planned the robbery at least four days in advance. Weapons were specially obtained to carry out the crime. The three employees on duty were collected and moved to the backroom of the store where they were killed execution style, one brutally with numerous stabs to the body and blows to the head. After the codefendants secreted evidence and washed blood from their clothes, appellant went shopping and purchased clothing, earrings and drug paraphernalia.
¶68 Appellant asserts that under the decisions of this Court, if one of the four aggravating circumstances found by the jury is not supported by the evidence his sentence must be modified to life. However, he relies upon the authority of cases previously reversed by this Court in Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (Opinion on Rehearing), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 763, 98 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1988). See also Castro v. State, 749 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (Opinion on Rehearing). Moreover, having found the circumstances properly supported by the evidence (see Proposition XXVI), this assignment is moot.
¶72 We further find, and the jury was so instructed,4 that individualized consideration of appellant's culpability supports the jury's verdict of death. See Hatch v. State, 701 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). We cannot say that appellant had no intention to kill or never contemplated that life would be taken, because he took the shotgun and shells from his roommate before going to the store. Cf. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3378, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, 1154 (1982).
1 In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S. Ct. 664, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979), the Supreme Court compared a statutory exemption from jury service of "women" with that of "persons over the age of 65" and expressed no concern with the latter as it affected the fair cross section principle.
4 The jury was instructed: "You must give separate consideration to the case of each individual defendant. Each defendant is entitled to have his case decided on the basis of the evidence and the law which is applicable to him." (O.R. 180).
¶2 This proposition of error is predicated upon the decision in Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988). The majority accurately determines that the United States Supreme Court decision in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S. Ct. 837, 93 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1987), is controlling on this issue. Judge Anderson, in his dissent in Parks to the majority's holding on the sympathy instruction, accurately and poignantly stated: