Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/74926060/Grace-Decision
Timestamp: 2018-04-26 02:38:31
Document Index: 185790993

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1334', '§ 105', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 1334', '§ 158', '§ 1334', '§ 1292', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§1334', '§ 157', '§ 524', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 1334', '§ 105', '§ 105']

Grace Decision | Bankruptcy | Lawsuit
Grace Decision
Uploaded by Chris Kercher
Case: 08-3697
Document: 00319965719
Date Filed: 12/31/2009
PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ Nos. 08-3697/3720 _____________ In re: WR GRACE & CO, et al., Debtor W.R. Grace & Co., et. al., v. Margaret Chakarian; John Does 1-1000; Home Saving Termite Control; Abner Defendants; Carol Gerard; Keri Evans, State of Montana, Appellant in 08-3697 W.R. Grace & Co., Appellant in 08-3720. _______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. No. 08-cv-246) District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter _______________
Argued September 21, 2009 Before: BARRY, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. (Filed: December 31, 2009 ) _______________ Janet S. Baer Kirkland & Ellis 300 North LaSalle St. - #2400 Chicago, IL 60654 David M. Bernick Kirkland & Ellis 153 E. 53 rd St. New York, NY 10022 Laura D. Jones James E. O’Neill, III Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones 919 N. Market St. - 17 th Fl. Wilmington, DE 19801 Christopher Landau [ARGUED] Gregory L. Skidmore Elizabeth M. Locke Kirkland & Ellis 655 15 th St., NW - #1200 Washington, DC 20005 Counsel for WR Grace & Co.
DE 19801 Counsel for State of Montana Daniel C. Candon Cohen. Circuit Judge.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 Kevin J.#1501 Wilmington. Sandridge & Rice 222 Delaware Ave. .R. MA 02110 Adam G. The proposed expansion would have -3- . . Boston. Whitesell & Goldberg 101 Arch St. [ARGUED] Womble.#1800 Wilmington. Carlyle. Mumford Landis. (“Grace”) and the State of Montana appeal an order from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware affirming an order from the District’s Bankruptcy Court denying Grace’s motion to expand a preliminary injunction. Rath & Cobb 919 Market St. DE 19801 Counsel for Libby Claimants _______________ OPINION OF THE COURT _______________ JORDAN. Grace & Co. Jr. Monaco. Mangan Francis A. Cohen [ARGUED] Christopher M. W. Landis Kerri K.
316 F. The zonolite contained tremolite.R.R. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a) to expand the injunction to enjoin those claims and. Montana. App’x 134 (3d Cir.3d 289 (3d Cir. In re Kensington Int’l Ltd. Both the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court determined that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. Grace & Co. Grace & Co. we will affirm. For ease of reference. denied the motion..1 Disputes in the case have been aggressively litigated. For the following reasons. In re W. as our previous three opinions indicate. 2004). from 1963 until 1990. See In re W.C. Grace produces specialty chemicals and materials. 2004). App’x 565 (3d Cir. 115 F. we will refer to the debtors collectively as “Grace. Background This appeal is the fourth to reach us from Grace’s ongoing efforts to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the time of the filing.. Montana..Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 enjoined claims against the State of Montana arising from Grace’s mining operations near Libby. which is alleged to be an especially carcinogenic variety of asbestos. I. 368 F. the debtors consisted of 62 separate entities. efforts which began in 2001 when Grace sought shelter from liabilities associated with asbestos litigation. As part of its business.S. The mine yielded ore which was used to create zonolite. Grace operated a vermiculite mine ten miles north of Libby.” -4- 1 . 2009). therefore. While the mine was operating.
” (App. The Bankruptcy Court promptly granted a temporary restraining order that included a provision enjoining litigation against Grace and its non-debtor affiliates whose purported asbestos liability derived from Grace’s alleged liability.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 it generated tremolite-laden dust that allegedly caused injury to mine workers. it precluded “All Asbestos-Related and Fraudulent Transfer Claims” against affiliated entities. 2001. Persons claiming to be injured by that asbestos exposure (the “Libby Claimants”) 2 filed suit against Grace in Maryland state court (the “Lawsuit”).C. the Bankruptcy Court entered a preliminary injunction pursuant to 11 U.) At Grace’s request. it commenced an adversary proceeding to halt prosecution of the Lawsuit. A. 2001.” -5- 2 . Preliminary Injunctive Relief On April 2. the May 3rd order named Grace’s worker’s compensation insurer. More specifically. including claims “against Insurance Carriers alleging coverage from asbestos-related liabilities. the same day that Grace filed its Chapter 11 petition. at 180-81. As a result of costs associated with such asbestos litigation. encompassing the conditions of the temporary restraining order. Maryland Casualty Company (“MCC”). and others in the community. On May 3. their families. § 105(a). We follow nomenclature adopted in earlier proceedings by referring to the various plaintiffs as the “Libby Claimants. Grace decided to file a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.S.
despite a reversal by the District Court. a group of the Libby Claimants.3d 100. 107 (Mont. App’x 565 (3d Cir. alleging that Montana is liable to them because it was negligent in failing to warn them of the risks of asbestos from the Libby mine. 2002. 115 F. which. W. sought to modify the preliminary injunction to allow them to pursue claims against MCC. was ultimately affirmed by our Court on appeal. at 185.” Orr v. Grace & Co. at 110 (“The State’s argument that it -6- . 106 P.R. The request was based in part on a 1991 Settlement Agreement between Grace and MCC in which Grace agreed to release and indemnify MCC against any future asbestos-related claims against MCC that arose out of Grace’s alleged liability. the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana had a duty to “gather public health-related information and provide it to the people. see also id. 2004). State.). 2004) (“Gerard”). the Libby Claimants brought lawsuits in the Montana courts against the State of Montana (the “Montana Actions”). The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion.) On February 4. Present Litigation Prior to Grace’s April 2. Grace & Co. On January 22. 2002.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 as an insurance carrier covered by the injunction. See In re W. B. led by named plaintiff Carol Gerard.R. (Gerard v. 2004. 2001 filing for bankruptcy. the Bankruptcy Court modified the scope of the preliminary injunction to include “several additional claims and parties and to reinstate the bar against the commencement” of new actions against affiliates directly or indirectly related to Grace’s alleged asbestos liability. On December 14. (App.
groups. seven former miners from Libby. State. or the public. of “judicial. On June 9. administrative.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 owed no duty to the Miners[ 3 ] ignores the State’s [duty to] make investigations. Pursuant to 11 U.3d 100.S. and the wife of a former miner. disseminate inform ation. . whether such breach caused the damages claimed by them. but filed its own motion asking the Bankruptcy Court to expand the preliminary injunction to include actions brought against the The Montana Supreme Court used the term “Miners” to refer collectively to all of the plaintiffs in the suit before it. applicable to all entities. -74 3 .” Id.. under Montana law.S. § 362(a)(1). 2005. the State of Montana owed a duty to the Libby Claimants. or other action or proceeding against the debtor . and m ake recommendations for control of diseases and improvement of public health to persons. 102 (Mont. the filing of a petition such as Grace’s results in an automatic stay. 106 P. Montana.C.. including “an on-site carpenter. and if so.” 11 U. understandably reluctant to face potential asbestos liability alone.” Orr v. § 362(a). Montana asked the Bankruptcy Court for relief from the automatic stay of litigation against Grace so that it could implead Grace as a third-party defendant in the Montana Actions.” (citations omitted)). at 118. the Montana Supreme Court remanded for a “determination by the fact-finder of whether the State breached its duty to the Miners. Having established that. all of whom have been diagnosed with asbestos disease.4 Grace opposed that motion.C. 2004).
The Libby Claimants. 295. D. After examining 28 U. in which it stated that it did not object to the motion unless the relief granted would affect certain of its rights. “Montana must first be found liable in state court and then pursue its claim for indemnification in bankruptcy court. before there could be any effect on Grace. of course.C. 366 B. Del. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a). opposed Grace’s motion. the Bankruptcy Court stayed the Montana Actions and took the matter under advisement. 2007). the Bankruptcy Court denied Grace’s motion to expand the preliminary injunction to encompass the Montana Actions.R. The Court noted that. -8- . which would be harmful to Grace’s efforts to reorganize.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 State of Montana. 301 (Bankr. claiming that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the Montana Actions. Grace argued that its motion should be granted because Grace and Montana share an identity of interests such that the Montana Actions were essentially suits against Grace. holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. Grace’s motion failed to establish the unusual circumstances or equitable factors required for the issuance of an injunction against a third-party litigant.R. See In re W. On April 16. Grace & Co.. Id. the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it did not have “related-to” subject matter jurisdiction over the Montana Actions because Grace’s bankruptcy estate would not be directly affected by the outcome of those lawsuits.” Id. The State of Montana also filed a response to Grace’s motion.S. They also argued that. After a hearing on the motions. and controlling precedent. 2007. even if the Court did have jurisdiction.
.” 5 Id.. saying that “the automatic stay remains in effect as to the Debtors and their property . .Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 While the [Montana Supreme Court] found that a duty existed on behalf of the State. An intervening adjudication is necessary to affect the estate. indemnification/ contribution is not possible. 5 -9- . against Debtors for either contribution or indemnity during the course of the State Court Actions.. Id. and nothing in this Opinion and Order authorizes relief from the stay as to any allegation .. and that the automatic stay remained in place. The State of Montana and Grace sought leave to appeal. If breach is not found. the Montana Plaintiffs would still be obligated to bring an entirely separate proceeding to receive indemnification. though it went on While the Bankruptcy Court did not formally deny the State of Montana’s motion for relief from the automatic stay. and the District Court allowed them to do so. at 302.. (citations omitted). A judgment against the State of Montana will not bind Debtors.. Montana law prohibits the State of Montana from litigating . If breach is found. the case was remanded for determination of whether the State of Montana breached that duty. The Court effectively denied Montana’s motion to lift the automatic stay. the above-quoted language makes it clear that Montana’s motion was not granted.
Grace & Co. to which the Libby Claimants responded with objections. The State of Montana joined in the motion.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 to affirm the decision of the Bankruptcy Court.” Id. Grace then filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying expansion of the preliminary injunction. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motions and again held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Montana Actions.6 See In re W. at *4. Before seeking leave to file their interlocutory appeal. 2008). -10- 6 . while the Libby Claimants filed an opposition to it. The Court thus held that “related-to subject matter jurisdiction does not exist. Like the Bankruptcy Court. Montana and Grace filed motions for reconsideration. Del. 12. 2008 WL 3522453 (D.” Id. the District Court noted that Grace “will not be bound by a judgment against the State of Montana in the state court actions [because] a separate adjudication is necessary to affect Debtors’ estate..R. All of the parties filed briefs regarding the underlying appeal in anticipation of the District Court’s ruling on the merits if it chose to hear the appeal. 08-246. No. at *6. Grace and Montana filed timely notices of appeal to our Court. Aug.
§ 158(a). and thus our standard of review is de novo.C..) While the Appellants The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over Grace’s Chapter 11 proceedings pursuant to 28 U. not its subject-matter jurisdiction.) -118 7 . 2002). Inc. Grace and Montana argue that the Bankruptcy and District Courts erred because “a federal court need not exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a state-court action in order to enjoin it. Shaffer v.” (Grace’s Op. 551 (3d Cir. 2007). “[as] long as the federal court is acting in a case over which it has subject-matter jurisdiction. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.3d 500. at 12).3d 546.. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a). Pad & Paper Co. 478 F.8 According to Appellants. Br. which reviewed the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations de novo. (See State of Montana’s Op..”).C. In re Am. GTE N. While the language is from Grace’s brief.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 II. the Bankruptcy Court need not have ‘related to’ jurisdiction over those actions.S. We exercise the same standard of review as the District Court. the argument is also the State of Montana’s. Br. and the District Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over the Bankruptcy Court decision under 28 U. the propriety of an injunction is a matter of the federal court’s remedial authority. § 1292(a)(1). 502 (3d Cir. Discussion 7 On appeal. 284 F. at 20 (“Because the Bankruptcy Court would not have to exercise jurisdiction over the Montana Actions to grant Grace’s requested relief. Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law. and its factual findings for clear error.S.S.C.” (Id.
Federal district courts “have original jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 [of the Bankruptcy Code]. § 105(a). 225 (3d Cir.3d at 225 n. See Combustion Eng’g. should we conclude that jurisdiction exists. Thus. before considering the merits of any § 105(a) injunction.) The Libby Claimants respond that the Bankruptcy Court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the Montana Actions to enjoin them. a bankruptcy court must establish that it has subject matter jurisdiction to enter the injunction. they rely on our non-precedential opinion in Gerard to argue that this requirement “does not mean that the court must establish jurisdiction over the proceeding sought to be enjoined. and that the lower courts correctly found that the Bankruptcy Court was without such jurisdiction.S. Inc.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 recognize that a “bankruptcy court must establish subject matter jurisdiction before considering the merits of a § 105(a) injunction” (Id.” In re Combustion Eng’g. 391 F. it “does not provide an independent source of federal subject matter jurisdiction.3d 190. or arising in or related to cases -12- .35 (describing the bankruptcy court’s “threshold jurisdictional inquiry”). 2004). Bankruptcy Subject Matter Jurisdiction Generally While § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy court to issue any order necessary to carry out the provisions of the Code. A. at 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).” (Id.C.. a § 105(a) injunction is nevertheless not warranted because Grace and Montana have failed to establish the unusual circumstances or equitable factors required for the issuance of an injunction. They further argue that. see also 11 U. 391 F.
Broadly worded as that is. related-to jurisdiction “is not without limitation..S. v. however. B. 1984). see also Bd... Edwards. Id. 32. Reserve Sys. at 228. Related-to Jurisdiction To understand the limits of related-to jurisdiction. 514 U. of Governors of Fed. v. Proceedings over which a bankruptcy court can legitimately exercise related-to jurisdiction include “suits between third parties that conceivably may have an effect on the bankruptcy estate.” and “related to” jurisdiction.” “arising in. Only the last of these is at issue here. 391 F..2d 984 (3d Cir. There are thus three types of bankruptcy jurisdiction. 40 (1991) (noting the “limited authority” Congress has vested in the bankruptcy courts through related-to jurisdiction). Inc. Higgins. commonly called “arising under. §1334(b). . § 157(a). Inc. it is helpful to look at the case in which we adopted the “any conceivable effect” test for finding such jurisdiction.3d at 226 (citing Celotex Corp.S. The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.C. In Pacor.” Id. 300.” Combustion Eng’g. 502 U. 308 n.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 under title 11. we said. Section 157(a) of title 28 then permits a district court to refer “any and all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11” to the bankruptcy judges within the district. MCorp Fin.5 (1995)).S. 743 F. An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome -13- . v.” 28 U.
liabilities. Soon after.3d at 226 (describing the Pacor test as “seminal”).2d at 986. In Pacor. holding that “the primary action between Higgins and Pacor would have no effect on the Manville bankruptcy estate.. or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate. options. liabilities.” Id. in that it could not determine any rights. Pacor filed a third-party complaint impleading the Johns-Manville Corporation (“Manville”). 391 F. the facts of the case demonstrated a crucial limit on the legitimate exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. 743 F. Despite that sweeping language. Id. “[a]t best. seeking damages from injuries allegedly resulting from Mr. .Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 could alter the debtor’s rights. see also Combustion Eng’g. Manville filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.. John and Louise Higgins brought suit in Pennsylvania state court against Pacor. When Pacor attempted to remove the Higgins lawsuit to the bankruptcy court where the Manville bankruptcy was pending. which Pacor claimed was the original manufacturer of the asbestos. Higgins’s work-related exposure to asbestos supplied by Pacor. [the Higgins-Pacor lawsuit] is a mere precursor to the potential third party claim for indemnification by Pacor against Manville. Id. citations omitted) (overruled on other grounds). or course of action -14- . at 995. Thereafter. and therefore [cannot establish] ‘related to’ [jurisdiction over that suit] . We noted that. Id. we denied removal. a distributor of chemical supplies. Yet the outcome of the Higgins-Pacor action would in no way bind Manville. at 994 (emphasis in original.
There. See 391 F. since Pacor would still be obligated to bring an entirely separate proceeding to receive indemnification. Thus. Federal-Mogul made it clear that there is no related-to jurisdiction over a third-party claim if there would need to be another lawsuit before the third-party claim could have any impact on the bankruptcy proceedings. Eighteen years later. We stated that “[t]he test articulated in Pacor for whether a lawsuit could ‘conceivably’ have an effect on the bankruptcy proceeding inquires whether the allegedly related lawsuit would affect the bankruptcy proceeding without the intervention of yet another lawsuit. we held that the bankruptcy court did not have related-to subject matter jurisdiction because the indemnification claim against the debtors had “not yet accrued and would require another lawsuit before [having] an impact on [the debtor’s] bankruptcy proceeding. (“[A]ny judgment received by the plaintiff Higgins could not itself result in even a contingent claim against Manville.3d at 190. we reaffirmed the Pacor test and simultaneously reiterated that a potential indemnification claim under common law is not enough to establish a bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Applying that rule. 300 F. we again emphasized the bounds of the Pacor test for related-to jurisdiction. in Pacor.” Id.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 15 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 of the debtor. in and of itself. enough to establish the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 2002). Thus.3d 368 (3d Cir.. Finally. See id. Inc. at 382 (emphasis added).” Id. we considered a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganization plan providing that all -15- . and more recently. in In re Federal-Mogul Global. we were clear that an inchoate claim of common law indemnity is not.” Id.”). in Combustion Engineering.
and Basic. namely. Id. One of the issues on appeal was whether the bankruptcy court had the power to enter the injunction as to non-debtors Lummus and Basic. we repeated that the Pacor test. (“Lummus” and “Basic”).” Id. the alleged unity of interest between the debtor and its affiliates based on the debtor’s potential indemnity obligation to those affiliates. In analyzing that question. We also examined other factors advanced by the debtor as grounds for related-to jurisdiction. as clarified by Federal-Mogul. Id. Inc. at 227. Basic and Lummus reveals little evidence of derivative liability . Id. as well as the existence of both a shared production site and shared insurance between the debtor and the affiliates. at 230.. requires an inquiry into “whether the allegedly related lawsuit would affect the bankruptcy without the intervention of yet another lawsuit. to which all three entities were to contribute.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 16 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 asbestos claims against Combustion Engineering and two of its non-debtor affiliates. [A] review of the asbestos-related claims asserted against Combustion Engineering. were to be channeled through a postconfirmation trust created under § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. [W]e have rejected “related to” jurisdiction over third-party claims involving asbestos or asbestos-containing products supplied by the debtor when the third-party claim did not -16- . ABB Lummus Global.. The plan also provided for a § 105(a) injunction barring any asbestos-related claims against the three entities. Even when considering those additional elements of unity between Combustion Engineering and its non-debtor affiliates. at 201. . we nevertheless held that related-to jurisdiction could not be extended to asbestos claims against those non-debtors. Inc.
[A]ny indemnification claims against Combustion Engineering . at 231-32. and Combustion Engineering. The Appellants’ “unity of interest” argument does not further their cause. Turning to the facts at hand. in order for a bankruptcy court to have related-to jurisdiction to enjoin a lawsuit. Rather. would require the intervention of another lawsuit to affect the bankruptcy estate. Specifically. an entirely separate action would be necessary for any liability incurred by Montana to have an impact on Grace’s estate.. Like the debtors in those cases. and thus cannot provide a basis for “related to” jurisdiction. This is precisely the situation in which we have found that related-to jurisdiction does not exist. we not only repeated that a non-debtor’s potential right of contribution was not enough to establish related-to jurisdiction. we also rejected -17- . In Combustion Engineering. . the relationship between Grace and the State of Montana is in one crucial respect analogous to the relationships in Pacor. Id.” Federal-Mogul. Grace will not be bound by any judgment against the third party in question. Combustion Eng’g. we have stated and restated that..Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 17 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 directly result in liability for the debtor . that lawsuit must “affect the bankruptcy [] without the intervention of yet another lawsuit. Federal-Mogul. Indeed.3d at 382. Montana would first have to be found liable by its state courts and would then have to successfully bring an indemnification or contribution claim against Grace in the Bankruptcy Court.. 391 F.3d at 232.. 300 F.
3d at 108.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 18 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 the idea that shared insurance or a common production site was “a sufficient basis for the kind of unity of interest that could give rise to related to jurisdiction. a governmental duty to warn about hazards at Grace’s site. In short. let alone an entity in the business. 106 P. Here. and thus the issue in that case was -18- . our recently reaffirmed precedent dictates that a bankruptcy court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a thirdparty action if the only way in which that third-party action could have an impact on the debtor’s estate is through the intervention of yet another lawsuit. Montana’s potential liability is based on an independent legal duty that Montana’s Supreme Court has decided that the State. Here. namely. is not even a private entity. at 232 (quotations omitted). Instead. as Grace was. we are presented with state court actions that have only the potential to give rise to a separate lawsuit seeking indemnification from the debtor. owes to its people. we must affirm the Bankruptcy and District Courts’ conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist for the purpose of expanding the § 105(a) injunction to preclude the Montana Actions. but they are misguided. C.” Id. as sovereign. Accordingly. Appellants’ Alternative Theories to Support Injunctive Relief Grace and Montana seem to read our non-precedential decision in Gerard to be contrary to the above-described precedent. of course. of producing asbestos products. Orr. Gerard is factually distinguishable because it involved an injunction that was already in place as to MCC. Montana.
Thus. 115 F. Grace & Co. App’x at 568. . at *4.9 In the present case..R. Gerard. the analysis may have been different.” See In re W.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 19 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 “whether [we] should modify an injunction already entered in the Bankruptcy Court in favor of Grace and MCC. Here. against claims that are not akin to anything like the insurance indemnities at issue in Gerard. [here. Grace is seeking to expand the § 105(a) injunction to shelter Montana. It bears re-emphasis that MCC and Grace were parties to a contract in which Grace had agreed to indemnify MCC against any future asbestos-related claims filed against MCC that arose out of Grace’s asbestos liability. by contrast. unlike Gerard..” 115 F. 2008 WL 3522453. However. MCC had a clear contractual right to indemnity. App’x at 567. which may have presented a more direct threat to Grace’s reorganization. a party not already subject to the injunction.. “[h]ad the Libby Claimants sought to modify an injunction already issued under section 105(a) as to the State of Montana. In other words. we are] assessing whether to expand an injunction to include additional parties . As the District Court noted. in which the issue was whether to limit an injunction that had already been entered. Montana has Although this may have been a more direct threat to the bankruptcy estate – and we have not excavated the Gerard record to examine that – we do not mean to imply that contractual indemnity rights are in themselves sufficient to bring a dispute over that indemnity within the ambit of related-19- 9 . the issue here is whether the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to enjoin entirely new claims against an entirely new party.
3d 111.J. our decision in Combustion Engineering was rendered after Gerard and thus constitutes supervening legal authority. Baca v. See Pub. 116 (3d Cir. but there is an obvious distinction between an injunction involving Grace’s insurer. 1997) (“The law of the case doctrine directs courts to refrain from re-deciding issues that were resolved earlier in the litigation. Inc. There may be overlap. v. At the most basic level. -2010 . Also. Inc. which falls far short of direct or automatic liability . to jurisdiction. at *5. Grace & Co. Magnesium Elektron. and an injunction covering the sovereign State of Montana with respect to Montana’s state-law duties to Montana citizens. 1035 (10th Cir. 92 F. Therefore. contrary to what Appellants argue. MCC. 10 as is required for application of the law of the case doctrine.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 20 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 only a “potential common law indemnification claim against Debtors pending the outcome of the state action. What will or will not be sufficiently related to a bankruptcy to warrant the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter that must be developed on a fact-specific.. (recognizing that “supervening new law” is an exception to the law of the case doctrine).. 123 F.3d 1031.”) In addition. Gerard did not involve the same parties and issues. .. case-by-case basis. King.. Interest Research Group of N. 1996) (holding that the law of the case doctrine “is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case”). 2008 WL 3522453..R. Gerard is not the law of the case. cf.” In re W. Id.
673.) If we were to accept Grace and Montana’s position. The existence of a bankruptcy proceeding itself has never been and cannot be an all-purpose grant of jurisdiction. or related-to jurisdiction – to expand the § 105(a) injunction to include the State of Montana.”). v.S. so long as the injunction motion was filed in the adversary proceeding. Specifically. Our conclusion finds support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Celotex Corp. no matter how unrelated to the underlying bankruptcy it may be. That notion stands in stark contrast to the basic premise that “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Grace and Montana argue that the Bankruptcy Court does not need related-to jurisdiction over the Montana Actions in order to enjoin them. they exercise only the authority conferred on them by Art. (See Grace’s Op. we cannot agree.S. a bankruptcy court would have power to enjoin any action. in any event. regardless of the subject matter of that motion.” Delaware v. arising in. Further. -21- . because the Court’s jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding in Grace’s Chapter 11 case is sufficient to provide it with a basis for expanding the § 105(a) injunction. 692 (1986). at 17 (“[A] bankruptcy court has subjectmatter jurisdiction to adjudicate a motion in an adversary proceeding initiated by a debtor in its own bankruptcy case. 475 U.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 21 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 Gerard is not the law of the case. Van Arsdall. Edwards. III and by congressional enactments pursuant thereto. 300 (1995). is plainly distinguishable. and. however. to the extent that Grace and Montana argue that the Bankruptcy Court does not need one of the three statutory foundations of bankruptcy jurisdiction – arising under. 514 U. Br.
the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enjoin the other proceeding must be based on the “arising under.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 22 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 There.” Id. and limited by. Thus. Rather than assuming that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding provided it with the necessary jurisdiction to issue the injunction. the Supreme Court observed that bankruptcy court jurisdiction “is grounded in. as Grace and Montana now contend. the Supreme Court’s entire analysis of related-to jurisdiction in Celotex would have been superfluous. statute. or related to language of §§ 1334(b) and 157(a). arising in. at 307. the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue a § 105(a) injunction that had the effect of enjoining an action pending in a district court in another judicial district. including our decision in Pacor. Id. Clearly it was not. it explained. Id. (quotation marks omitted). After reviewing several circuit court opinions. at 305. but only because the proceeding was “related to” Celotex’s bankruptcy under the Pacor test. The Supreme Court undertook the analysis it did because a bankruptcy court may not enjoin proceedings between third parties unless those proceedings arise -22- . at 308-10.” Id. the Supreme Court concluded that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction. If it were the case that a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding was sufficient in and of itself to give it jurisdiction to enjoin third parties.
“it is well-settled that a federal court may enjoin a state-court action without exercising subjectmatter jurisdiction over that action” (Grace’s Op. Moreover. that lawsuit must “affect the bankruptcy without the intervention of yet another lawsuit. of Am. the issue is whether the federal bankruptcy court has subject matter jurisdiction in the first place.3d 99. the most that those cases can be read to imply is that an injunction may be permissible if the enjoined action is an attempt to collaterally attack a judgment in an earlier case over which the federal court undeniably has subject matter jurisdiction. 28. Co. but the authority they cite – dicta from a Supreme Court case and a case from our circuit – does not support their contention. Syngenta. Prudential was followed two years later by Combustion Engineering. at 20).*. and In re Prudential Ins.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 23 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 in or under or are related to the underlying bankruptcy. v. we held that an injunction over a state court action was appropriate when the state court action interfered with a settlement approved by a federal court.3d at 105. In Prudential. Here. 34 n. 314 F. which it does not. 2002). -23- 11 . 314 F. 537 U. Thus.* (2002). at Grace and Montana say.. Sales Practices Litig..3d at 232 (citations omitted).S. see also State of Montana’s Op. Br. Henson. the Supreme Court suggested in a footnote that a federal court could protect a prior settlement order by issuing an injunction requiring the dismissal of a subsequent. See Syngenta Crop Prot. where we unequivocally held that in order for a bankruptcy court to have related-to jurisdiction to enjoin a lawsuit. Br. 103 (3d Cir.” 391 F. Inc. In Syngenta. 537 U.11 Id. at 34 n. state-court action that was frustrating the order. at 14.S.
Conclusion In conclusion.Case: 08-3697 Document: 00319965719 Page: 24 Date Filed: 12/31/2009 307. our precedent dictates that a federal bankruptcy court does not have related-to jurisdiction over a third-party lawsuit if that lawsuit would affect the bankruptcy proceeding only through the intervention of yet another lawsuit. III. we affirm the judgment of the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist to expand the § 105(a) injunction to include the Montana Actions. Grace will not be bound by a judgment against Montana unless there is an additional adjudication. Accordingly. -24- .
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