Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/949/310/82185/
Timestamp: 2019-07-24 05:07:36
Document Index: 444407734

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 2560', '§ 2560', '§ 2650', '§ 4206', '§ 1386', '§ 1415', '§ 2672', '§ 2672', '§ 2672']

J.w. Walter; John Allen; Robert Jones; Norah Walker, Jr.;eugene Gilliland; Sylvester Grayson; Daniel Looney;lealus Thomas; Lloyd Fortune; John Davenport; Alonzoanderson; I.b. Boyd; L.v. Davis; Cleophus Frost; Carnellgentry; Gerald Goad; Donald F. Kennedy; Norvelllancaster, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. International Association of Machinists Pension Fund;central States, Southeast and Southwest Health Andwelfare and Pension Funds, Defendants-appellees, 949 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1991 › J.w. Walter; John Allen; Robert Jones; Norah Walker, Jr.;eugene Gilliland; Sylvester Grayson; Daniel...
J.w. Walter; John Allen; Robert Jones; Norah Walker, Jr.;eugene Gilliland; Sylvester Grayson; Daniel Looney;lealus Thomas; Lloyd Fortune; John Davenport; Alonzoanderson; I.b. Boyd; L.v. Davis; Cleophus Frost; Carnellgentry; Gerald Goad; Donald F. Kennedy; Norvelllancaster, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. International Association of Machinists Pension Fund;central States, Southeast and Southwest Health Andwelfare and Pension Funds, Defendants-appellees, 949 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 949 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1991)
Central States refused to accept responsibility for payment of the benefits to the employees on the ground that IAM improperly transferred the assets and liabilities. IAM filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that the transfer was effected in compliance with ERISA. The district court held that the transfer was proper, and Central States appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court on the grounds that Central States had waived its right to contest the transfer under 29 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (3). However, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court with instructions that it allow Central States to pursue a counterclaim for an accounting.
We have raised, sua sponte, the issue whether all eighteen plaintiffs perfected their appeal to this court under Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Company, 487 U.S. 312, 315, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2408, 101 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1988). This issue will be covered in Part I of this opinion.
* The Supreme Court in Torres held that under Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), a federal appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider claims of parties below who are not specifically named as appellants in the notice of appeal. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318, 108 S. Ct. at 2409. Specifically, the Court noted that an "et al." designation of appellants does not meet the specificity requirements of Rule 3(c). Similarly, we held in Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1389 (10th Cir. 1990), that a statement that "plaintiffs hereby appeal" is insufficient to list the appellants.
The employees argue that to the extent the notice was defective, the defects were cured when they filed their docketing statement. In support of this argument, they cite Hubbert v. City of Moore, 923 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1991). However, in Hubbert we held that a docketing statement, which identified by name the parties taking the appeal, could cure a defective notice of appeal if it was filed before the deadline for filing the notice of appeal had passed. Id. at 771-72. In the instant case, the docketing statement was not filed before the filing deadline for the notice of appeal had passed. Therefore, the remaining seventeen plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of the Hubbert "curative" docketing notice exception. See id. at 772; Laidley, 914 F.2d at 1389. Throughout the remainder of this opinion, we will therefore analyze the issues only insofar as they pertain to J.W. Walter. With regard to the other plaintiffs, the district court order is final.
The flaw in Walter's argument is that section 1411 does not apply--the relevant provision is section 1415 entitled "Transfers pursuant to change in bargaining representative." Section 1415(a) requires that " [i]n any case in which an employer has completely or partially withdrawn from a multiemployer plan ... as a result of a certified change of collective bargaining representative ..., the old plan shall transfer assets and liabilities to the new plan in accordance with this section." 29 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (emphasis added). The inapplicability of section 1411 is further evidenced by section 1415(f), which provides " [n]otwithstanding subsections (b) and (e) of this section, the plan sponsors of the old plan and the new plan may agree to a transfer of assets and liabilities that complies with sections 1411 and 1414 of this title, rather than this section ...." 29 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (emphasis added). In other words, the specific (section 1415) trumps the general (section 1411) in the absence of a contrary agreement between the sponsors of the old and new Plans7 (and there is no such agreement here).
Section 1415(b), which addresses the amount of benefits to be transferred from the old plan to the new plan, does not forbid a reduction in the accrued benefits as a result of the transfer. Instead, it requires only that the old plan transfer "the appropriate amount of assets and liabilities to the new plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (3). Under section 1415(g) (1), an "appropriate amount of assets" is "the amount by which the value of the nonforfeitable benefits to be transferred exceeds the amount of the employer's withdrawal liability to the old plan...."8
There is no language in section 1415(b) suggesting that a benefit cannot be forfeitable. To the contrary, the language of section 1415(b), supra, indicates a Congressional acceptance of these forfeiture provisions.9 Thus, because section 1411 is inapplicable and because section 1415 does not require that an accrued benefit not be decreased following a transfer as a result of a certified change in collective bargaining representatives, we reject Walter's claim that the forfeiture provision of the IAM pension contract violates ERISA.10 III
Sections 1025 and 1132 do not address plan duties--instead, they only refer to the plan administrator's duties.11 Therefore, the district court correctly held that these two ERISA provisions cannot form the basis for Walter's claim against Central States and IAM.12 Cf. Groves v. Modified Retirement Plan for Hourly Paid Employees of the Johns Manville Corporation and Subsidiaries, 803 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that ERISA provisions providing for recovery against the "plan" cannot be used to recover against the "plan administrator" because "the terms 'plan' and 'plan administrator' refer to two entirely distinct actors ... [and] are terms of art").
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g). Walter argues that Central States violated 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g): "By Central States' own admission, they have not complied with this important disclosure provision." Appellants' Br. at 31.13 However, even accepting the facts as stated, ERISA does not provide a private cause of action for damages to compensate a pensioner for delay. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3092, 87 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1985); Ashenbaugh v. Crucible, Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1532 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting the general principle "that an employer's or plan's failure to comply with ERISA's procedural requirements does not entitle a claimant to a substantive remedy."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105, 109 S. Ct. 3155, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1989). In Massachusetts Mutual, the Court declined to craft a remedy under which an employee benefit plan may be held personally liable to a plan participant or beneficiary for extra-contractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of benefit claims: "The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions14 found in ... the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly." Id. (emphasis in original). There is no explicit provision providing a cause of action for damages caused by a delay in processing one's pension application, and we decline Walter's invitation to fashion one from 29 C.F.R. § 2650.503-1(e).
Walter is not entitled to relief under this section. Under section 1109, a fiduciary who breaches his fiduciary duty is liable to the plan--not to the beneficiaries individually. See Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S. at 141-42, 105 S. Ct. at 3090; Bryant v. International Fruit Product Co., 886 F.2d 132, 135 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Therefore, even if we were to agree with Walter that the district court failed to address this issue, its oversight was not critical because Walter is not entitled to relief under section 1109.16
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C. including Titles 29 and 26)
Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C. including Titles 29 and 26)
Because employees at other Lee Way facilities were still represented by IAM, the transfer was not completed for approximately two years. See ERISA § 4206, 29 U.S.C. § 1386(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1415; I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund Benefit Plan A v. Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare & Pension Funds, 830 F.2d 1163, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
The regulations support this interpretation. 29 C.F.R. § 2672.2 is entitled "Requirements for mergers and transfers." One of the requirements listed is that " [n]o participant's or beneficiary's accrued benefit may be lower immediately after the effective date of the ... transfer than the benefit immediately before the ... transfer." 29 C.F.R. § 2672.2(a) (1). However, subsection (c) provides that plan sponsors involved in " [t]ransfers of assets and liabilities pursuant to a certified change in bargaining representative ... are not required to comply with this part." 29 C.F.R. § 2672.2(c)
In his brief, Walter raises a constitutional claim and an unjust enrichment claim relating to the forfeiture provision. As these claims were not raised below, we will not address them here. In addition, Walter raises an estoppel claim. Although it does not appear that Walter formally raised the estoppel claim in the court below, the district court addressed it and dismissed it. The district court's decision was proper. See, e.g., Straub v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 1988) (no liability under ERISA can be based upon a purported oral modification of the terms of a pension plan)