Source: http://tenant.net/forum/board/messages/arcs00/arcs0006/9268.html
Timestamp: 2017-11-25 03:58:20
Document Index: 760866959

Matched Legal Cases: ['§26', '§2204', '§14', '§14', '§2204', '§2204', '§14', '§2204', '§14', '§26', '§26', '§741', '§2001']

Re: Death in family. a case?????
Re: Death in family. a good case! Anna 06/13/00 (0)
:  Better get $5000 ready for a lawyer,  you will need it  because the Landlord will spend $10,000 to evict you.........
:  He doesnt want YOUR MONEY...he wants the APARTMENT!
: .nieces and nephews were eliminated in 1997 from sucession rights.UNLESS    you
: can prove   that  your girlfriend made that apartment her permenant
: residence  BEFORE  JUNE  19 TH 1995........
: You need checking accounts, bank statements driver license voting
: card,   any and all   verification of her address  before that date.....
:  You  have a right to stay in the apartment untill the lease
: ends......... the estate will or could pay the rent.......but  youd
: better economize your life TODAY!
:  And even if you get the apartment the landlord is under NO obligation
: to upgrade anything......even if you offer to pay,,   and if YOU upgrade
: anything.....EVICTION BABY!
: She has been there 5 years  this is cutting it very close to the cutoff point.....
: Here is a recent case
: 2000 NYSlipOp 20207
:  707 N.Y.S.2d 285
:                   MESROBE VARTARIAN, Petitioner
:                               v.
:                  KATHY BRADY, et al., Respondents.
:                       Index No. L&T 95092/98
:       CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY
:                        DATED: July 6, 1999
:                    APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
:  Chapman & Francis, L. L. P., New York City (Leslie Francis of counsel),
:  petitioner.
:  Dennis Casey, New York City, for respondents.
:                      OPINION OF THE COURT
:                        MAJORITY OPINION
:  BILLINGS, J.:
:  In this summary holdover proceeding petitioner seeks to evict
: respondent- tenant  Kathy Brady from 18 Abington Square, Apartment 1, in New York County,  because she has not maintained the apartment as her primary residence. Petitioner seeks also to evict respondent-undertenant John Brady from
: the apartment because he has not established any right to possession of the
:  apartment.
:       I. THE FACTS PRESENTED AND THE ISSUES RAISED AT TRIAL
:  A. Respondent Kathy Brady's Surrender of Possession of the Rent
: Controlled Apartment
:  In 1949, Mesrob Vartanian, the named petitioner, identified in the
: petition as "Mesrobe Vartarian," leased Apartment 1 at 18 Abington Square, a rent controlled  apartment, to Peter Brady and his wife. Before 1992, their daughter,respondent Kathy Brady, succeeded to her parents' tenancy. At least since 1997,however, she has lived in Far Rockaway, New York, caring for her brother whosuffered a   heart attack in 1997.
:  A tenant's need to care for an ailing relative does not, without more,
: support the  conclusion of a non-primary residence. Sutton Realty v. Vang, N.Y.L.J.,Mar. 12,  1992, at 25 (App. Term 1st Dep't). Here, the record included other indicators of  Kathy Brady's residence with her ailing brother in Far Rockaway, such as bills and  other mail to her at the Far Rockaway address, as well as a dearth of indicators  that she retained any ties to 18 Abington Square. See Beth Israel Medical Center  v. Matsil, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1991, at 26 (App. Term 1st Dep't); Sommer v. Ann  Turkel, Inc., 137 Misc. 2d 7, 9-10 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1987); Emay Props. Corp.  v. Norton, 136 Misc. 2d 127, 128 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1987); Michael Realty v.  Sampietro, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 24, 1991, at 23 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co.). Thus Kathy Brady   no longer occupies 18 Abington Square, Apartment 1, as her primary  residence.  See N.Y.C. Admin. Code §26- 403(e) (2) (i) (10).
:  B. Respondent John Brady's Succession to Possession of the Rent
: Controlled   Apartment   Respondent John Brady, Kathy Brady's nephew, resided with her at 18 Abington   Square, Apartment 1, for at least two years during 1992 to 1997, until  she ceased   to maintain the apartment as her primary residence, and he continues to reside  there. Thus, under the law in effect at least until 1997, John Brady   lived with his  aunt for the requisite two years to succeed to his aunt's possessory  right to the   apartment. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §2204.6(d).   A statutory amendment effective June 19, 1997, however, removed nephews  from   the definition of traditional family members entitled to succession  rights. N.Y.   Pub. Hous. Law §14(4). As John Brady established succession rights  before the  amendment's effective date, these circumstances raise the issue whether this  amendment's retroactive effect is sufficiently limited to permit Mr. Brady to  succeed his aunt as tenant.
: Public Housing Law §14(4), referring to the New York State Division of
: Housing  and Community Renewal (DHCR), states that:
:  The agency shall promulgate regulations, rules and policies which
: provide  for the rights of family members to succeed in certain cases to the rights of tenants  protected by . . . the local emergency housing rent control act, the administrative  code of the city of New York and any regulations, rules and policies enacted  pursuant thereto. Such regulations, rules and policies shall contain provisions  which include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
:  (a) that . . . any member of the tenant's family, as defined in
: paragraph (c) of this  subdivision, shall succeed to the rights of a tenant under such acts and laws  where the tenant has permanently vacated the housing accommodation and such  family member has resided with the tenant in the housing accommodation as a  primary residence for a period of no less than two years . . .immediately prior to  the permanent vacating of the housing accommodation by the tenant . ... . . .
:  (c) that for the purposes of such regulations: (i) "family member"
: shall be defined  as a husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, father, mother,  stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, grandfather, grandmother, grandson,  granddaughter, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, mother-in-law or father- in-law of the  tenant; or any other person residing with the tenant in the housing accommodation  as a primary residence who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and  interdependence between such person and the tenant.  (emphasis added) This statutory language is substantively identical to 9  N.Y.C.R.R. §2204.6(d), which has remained unchanged since before 1997, except  the statute eliminates nieces, nephews, aunts, and uncles from the definition of  "family members" eligible for succession.
:  The statutory language presents two threshold questions pertinent to
: whether its  definition or 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §2204.6(d)'s definition of family members applies to Mr. Brady. Is application of the new definition dependent on DHCR promulgating new  regulations? Given that the regulatory definition need "not be limited to" the  statutory definition, Pub. Hous. Law §14(4), is the current 9N.Y.C.R.R. §2204.6(d)  a proper implementing regulation without change? If the answer to either question  is affirmative, "family members" eligible for succession still include nieces,  nephews, aunts, and uncles and, hence, John Brady.
:  Even if the answer to both questions is negative, and the statutory
: definition  supplanted the regulatory definition upon the statute's enactment, it does not  apply retroactively to persons who established succession rights before June 19, 1997. The succession rights laws apply retroactively only to the extent they  accomplish the legislation's remedial purposes. Although tightening the definition  of family members may have been intended to remedy the adverse effects on  landlords of the more expansive definition, the remedial purpose of
: legislation  governing rent control succession rights, as a whole, remains the
: protection of  tenants and their family members from eviction. Where a new law confers a tenancy right, the law is applied retroactively, but where it takes
: away a right conferred by the old law, the new law is not applied retroactively.
: Beary v. City of  Rye, 44 N.Y.2d 398, 411-13 (1978); Morales v. Gross, 230 A.D.2d 7,14-15 (2d  Dep't 1997).
:  Consequently, amendments to the rent control laws are not applied
: retroactively  when they would evict a tenant entitled to protection under the prior law. Gottlieb v.  Licursi, 191 A.D.2d 256, 257 (1st Dep't 1993); 911 Alwyn Owners Corp. v.  Rosenthal, 157 Misc. 2d 828, 830-31 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992), aff'd,190 A.D.2d  621 (1st Dep't 1993); 43-45 West 129th Street HDFC v. Doe, N.Y.L.J.,Mar. 2,  1992, at 31 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co.); Coleman v. Sillman, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 1991, at 22 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co.). Since John Brady succeeded his aunt as tenant at 18  Abington Square, Apartment 1, under the law in effect before June 1997,Pub.  Hous. Law §14(4) does not apply retroactively to deprive him of that
:  C. The Owner's Right to Charge John Brady a Vacancy Allowance
:  As John Brady is a successor to Kathy Brady's interest in the
: apartment, because  Kathy Brady succeeded her parents, her nephew became a second successor  tenant. Another statutory amendment effective June 19, 1997, entitles owners to  charge a vacancy allowance to second successor tenants. N.Y.C. Admin. Code  §26-403.2. Unlike the amendment removing nephews from the definition of  traditional family members, the retroactive application of the new Admin. Code  §26-403.2 is clear from the statute. It expressly applies only "where all tenants  occupying the housing accommodation on the effective date of this section have  vacated." Id. If John Brady already occupied the apartment by 1997, the vacancy  allowance is unavailable until he vacates. It will apply only if a family member  succeeds him and then "to each subsequent second succession." Id.   D. Ownership of the Premises and Commencement of the Proceeding  Upon the presentation of evidence establishing the following facts at the end of  petitioner's case, however, respondents moved to dismiss the entire petition. From  1949 until his death in May 1998, Mesrob Vartanian owned 18 Abington Square.  On June 17, 1998, Delfi Soto signed the notice terminating respondents' tenancy,  and on August 24, 1998, he signed the petition. He signed both documents as  petitioner's agent.
:  Robert Cancellare is the registered managing agent for the premises.
: For at least   the last eight years, he has been the managing agent on a "day-to-day" basis,  Transcript of Proceedings at 12 (Jan. 26, 1999), in conjunction with Mesrob  Vartanian's son, John Vartanian, who has managed the building for the last 15  years.
:  In Mesrob Vartanian's will of January 1996, he left the property to
: John Vartanian  and his two brothers and named John Vartanian executor of the estate. On  November 30, 1998, the will was admitted to probate, and on December 1, 1998,  letters testamentary were issued authorizing John Vartanian to
: administer the  estate.  Respondents sought dismissal on the grounds that the petition had been brought  in the name of a deceased person, and the notice of termination and the petition were signed by a person without authority. In response, petitioner's counsel moved  to amend the petition to name the Estate of Mesrob Vartanian petitioner.
:   II. THE PETITION AND TERMINATION NOTICE MAY NOT BE AMENDED TO
:                        NAME THE ESTATE
:  OF MESROB VARTANIAN PETITIONER AND TO BE SIGNED BY AN AGENT OF
:                          THE ESTATE.
:  A. The Petition and Termination Notice Were Not Signed by a Person
: Authorized   to Initiate the Proceeding.
:  Although the evidence established ownership of the premises, it was not
: by the  named petitioner, who died before the proceeding was commenced. Even if
: Delfi  Soto, who signed the termination notice and petition as agent for the
: deceased  petitioner, was an authorized agent for that purpose when the deceased
: was alive,
:  R.P.A.P.L. §741, the principal's death revoked the agent's authority to
: act for the   principal. Wisdom v. Wisdom, 111 A.D.2d 13, 14-15 (1st Dep't 1985); Hemphill v.  Rock, 87 A.D.2d 836 (2d Dep't 1982). Any purported legal action on behalf of a  decedent, absent appointment of an executor, administrator, or other party  competent to represent the estate, is a nullity and subject to vacatur. Silvagnoli v. Consolidated Edison Employees Mut. Aid Socy., 112 A.D.2d 819, 820 (1stDep't 1985); Meagher v. ARA Serv., 242 A.D.2d 286, 287 (2d Dep't 1997);Macomber v. Cipollina, 226 A.D.2d 435, 436- 37 (2d Dep't 1996). The court may grant a motion to change the named petitioner to a
: decedent's estate if, when the proceeding was commenced, the estate had a
: representative competent to bring the proceeding. C.P.L.R. §2001; Rosenberg v. Caban,16 N.Y.2d 905, 906 (1965); McDonough v. Bonnie Heights Realty Corp., 249
: A.D.2d 520, 521 (2d Dep't 1998); Kramer v. Twin County Grocers, 151 A.D.2d
: 722, 723 (2d Dep't 1989). In such a case, the representative could ratify nunc
: pro tunc any prior action the representative or an agent for the estate had taken in prosecuting the proceeding. Carp v. Marcus, 114 A.D.2d 695, 696 (3d Dep't 1985);Wichlenski v. Wichlenski, 67 A.D.2d 944, 946 (2d Dep't 1979).
:  Here, John Vartanian did not become executor of the named petitioner's
: estate until after the termination notice was served and the notice of
: petition and petition  were filed. The evidence did not otherwise indicate that he, Delfi Soto, or any other  person was authorized to initiate litigation on behalf of the decedent's estate when  this proceeding was commenced or that Delfi Soto was that person's agent.  Manhanaim Resort Corp. v. Samples, 156 A.D.2d 342, 344 (2d Dep't 1989);Carp  v. Marcus, 114 A.D.2d at 696; Hemphill v. Rock, 87 A.D.2d at 836-37;Gross v.  New York State Teachers Retirement System, 81 Misc. 2d 964, 966-67(Sup. Ct. Albany Co.), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 980 (3d Dep't 1975).
:  In the absence of anyone to stand in for the deceased named petitioner,
: a judgment by this court would be a nullity. Manhanaim Resort Corp. v.
: Samples,  156 A.D.2d at 344; Estate of Agliata v. Agliata, 155 Misc. 2d 385, 388
: (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 1992). The court has no jurisdiction to conduct proceedings
: commenced  by persons without authority to act on behalf of the named petitioner
: or his estate.  Harding v. Noble Taxi Corp., 155 A.D.2d 265, 266 (1st Dep't 1989); Oberlander v. Levi, 207 A.D.2d 437, 438 (2d Dep't 1994); Bossert v. Ford Motor Co.,  140 A.D.2d  480, 481 (2d Dep't 1988).
:  The "active participation of the parties in the litigation without
: objection" may   constitute a waiver of the right to object to unauthorized proceedings. Durrant v.  Kelly, 186 A.D.2d 237, 238 (2d Dep't 1992). Here the basis for the objection  emerged only at the conclusion of petitioner's case when petitioner's counsel proved that Mesrob Vartanian died before the proceeding was commenced,and John Vartanian's capacity as executor of Mesrob Vartanian's estate matured after  the proceeding was commenced. Thus respondents' objection is timely.See Bauernfeind v. Albany Med. Center Hosp., 154 A.D.2d 754, 755 n. (3dDep't 1989).
:  B. The Termination Notice May Not Be Amended by Substituting an
: Authorized  Signature.  Even were the court to permit the named petitioner to be replaced by the Estate of  Mesrob Vartanian or the current owner, John Vartanian, the petition must be dismissed on other grounds. A valid notice of termination is a condition precedent  to the proceeding. 170 West 85th Street Tenants Assn. v. Cruz, 173 A.D.2d 338,  339 (1st Dep't 1991). Such notices are not amendable; their defects may not be  cured retroactively. Chinatown Apts. v. Chu Cho Lam, 51 N.Y.2d 786, 787 (1980). See also, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Suoto, 158 Misc. 2d  219, 221 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1993); Homestead Equities v. Washington, 176 Misc.  2d 459, 464 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co. 1998).
:  A notice of termination may be issued only by a person authorized "to
: bind the  landlord in the giving of such notice." Siegel v. Kentucky Fried
: Chicken of Long Is.,  108 A.D.2d 218, 220 (2d Dep't 1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 792 (1986). See also Linroc  Enters. v. 1359 Broadway Assocs., 186 A.D.2d 95 (1st Dep't 1992). Delfi Soto, identified as the agent of a deceased person, signed the termination notice. The  principal's death, however, terminated that agency. Soto had no authority to issue  the notice unless when this proceeding was commenced, he was empowered to  initiate eviction proceedings as the representative of the decedent's estate or as  such a representative's agent. Manhanaim Resort Corp. v. Samples, 156 A.D.2d at 344. No such principal has been identified.
:  Thus, even were the court to permit a replacement by the named
: petitioner, a  condition precedent to the proceeding has not been satisfied. That condition may  not be revived nunc pro tunc by adding a competent signer to the termination  notice. Chinatown Apts. v. Chu Cho Lam, 51 N.Y.2d at 787. "Where a defective  predicate notice has been served, the proceeding based thereon falls with the  defective notice." First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Suoto, 158 Misc.  2d at 221.  On this ground, the court must dismiss the petition. In sum, the termination notice  and the petition suffer from non-amendable defects because they were signed and  the proceeding thus commenced on behalf of a deceased person by a person not  shown to have any authority to do so. Even if the petitioner could be changed to
:  the decedent's estate or to the new owner and the petition signed by
: that party's  authorized representative, the predicate notice may not be changed.  N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 1999.  Vartarian v Brady
:  END OF DOCUMENT
: : My girlfriend and I were looking for an apartment for a while. At that time, she was living with an elderly aunt. Her aunt just passed about a week ago. Now, we are thinking about taking over the apartment. My girlfriend's name is not on the lease but she established legal residency there for 5 years. Here are my concerns: Her aunt was living in the apartment for over 40 years so the landlords didn't do much of a repair job or upgrading the apartment. The rent is about $280. How can we determine if we can get the apartment? What would we have to do? Also, how much can they legally raise the rent? And if they raise the rent, are they required by law to upgrade/repair apartment? I would like some new wiring and appliances. The ones in the apartment now are old. These are my main concerns now. I know the management will eventually find out that my girlfriend's aunt died. So we want to be honest and do what is right instead of hiding and waiting until they "catch" us.