Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/484/889/580243/
Timestamp: 2013-12-12 23:38:30
Document Index: 525234003

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 233', '§ 2679', '§ 2679', '§ 2679', '§ 2671', '§ 2679', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 2679', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 2679', '§ 233', '§ 2675', '§ 233']

484 F.3d 889: Irma Alexander, Special Administrator of the Estate of Christen Crutcher, Deceased, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center, Sinai Health System, D/b/a Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center of Chicago, Sinai Medical Group, et al., Defendants-appellees :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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484 F.3d 889: Irma Alexander, Special Administrator of the Estate of Christen Crutcher, Deceased, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center, Sinai Health System, D/b/a Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center of Chicago, Sinai Medical Group, et al., Defendants-appelleesUnited States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. - 484 F.3d 889
Decided April 24, 2007
Harry C. Lee (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Diane I. Jennings (argued), Anderson, Bennett & Partners, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center and Sinai Health System.
Michael R. Webber (argued), Randall J. Gudmundson, Kominiarek Bresler Harvick & Gudmundson, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee Sinai Medical Group.
Brian A. Schroeder (argued), Cassiday, Schade & Gloor, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee Joseph Rosman.
Jack Donatelli (argued), Office of U.S. Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee U.S.
Irma Alexander ("Alexander") is the daughter of Christen Crutcher, a woman who died while receiving medical treatment at Mount Sinai Hospital. As administrator of her mother's estate, Alexander brought a malpractice action in the Circuit Court of Cook County against the corporate entities and individual physicians involved in her mother's care. The United States removed this malpractice case to federal court because one of the defendants, Dr. Godwin Onyema ("Dr. Onyema"), was deemed to be a federal employee under the Public Health Service Act ("PHSA"), as amended by the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995 ("FSHCAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 233. A trial resulted in judgment in favor of all of the defendants. On appeal, Alexander challenges subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Dr. Onyema could not be deemed a federal employee because he did not personally contract with a federally funded health center. Alexander also challenges the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of one of the defendants as well as several rulings the district court made in the course of the trial. We affirm.
We begin with the question of subject matter jurisdiction, which we review de novo. Samirah v. O'Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir.2003). We also review de novo a district court's decisions regarding the propriety of removal. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 2006). The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act, accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1); Osborn v. Haley, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 881, 887, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007). When a federal employee is sued, the Westfall Act empowers the Attorney General to certify, if appropriate, that the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the incident in question. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), (2). If the Attorney General issues such a certification, the employee is dismissed from the action and the United States is substituted as the defendant in place of the employee. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Thereafter, the lawsuit is governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. If the action was filed in state court, the case must be removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). The "certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal." Id.
Although Dr. Onyema was not a federal employee, he was working at Sinai Family Health Centers ("Sinai"), a federally supported health care center, at the time of the incident at issue here. Dr. Onyema had formed an "Illinois Medical Service Corporation" called Onyema Medical Service, Ltd.1 He was the sole shareholder and sole employee of this entity. Onyema Medical Service entered into an agreement with Sinai under which Dr. Onyema was to supply medical services to Sinai's various community health centers. Dr. Onyema signed the contract in his own name on a line labeled "Onyema Medical Service, Ltd." The FSHCAA, like the Westfall Act, allows the government to remove from state court a medical malpractice action filed against a physician who is "deemed" to be a federal employee. See 42 U.S.C. § 233. A physician who is employed by or is a contractor for a federally funded health center may be deemed by the government to be an employee of the Public Health Service2 if a number of conditions are met. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(h). Once a physician has been deemed to be a federal employee acting within the scope of his or her employment duties, the United States is substituted as the defendant and the FTCA provides the exclusive remedy for the physician's negligence. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), (g). Moreover, once the Secretary3 deems a physician to be an employee of the Public Health Service, "the determination shall be final and binding upon the Secretary and the Attorney General and other parties to any civil action or proceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(F).
Alexander brought this malpractice action in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), the United States removed the action to federal court after it determined that Dr. Onyema was a contract employee working in the scope of his employment with a federally-funded health center.4 See also 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)-(n). Specifically, the Attorney General's delegate certified that Sinai Family Health Center was a private entity receiving grant money from the Public Health Service pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233. R. 1. The delegate also certified that Sinai Family Health Center's "contract employee, GODWIN ONYEMA, M.D., was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the incidents and is deemed to be an employee of the United States for Federal Tort Claims Act purposes only pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233." R. 1. The United States thus removed the case to federal court and moved to substitute itself for Dr. Onyema as the defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), (g)-(n).
Thereafter, the United States moved to dismiss the case because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The district court granted the motion. Alexander moved to reconsider, arguing that the government had incorrectly deemed Dr. Onyema to be a federal employee because Onyema Medical Service rather than Dr. Onyema individually contracted with Sinai. According to Alexander, the government could not treat Dr. Onyema and Onyema Medical Service as identical without making a case for piercing the corporate veil under Illinois law. The government responded that federal tort law rather than Illinois corporate law controlled the result and that the government was entitled to deem Dr. Onyema, the sole employee and sole shareholder of Onyema Medical Service, a federal employee. Citing Dedrick v. Youngblood, 200 F.3d 744 (11th Cir.2000), the district court allowed Alexander to take discovery on the issue of whether Dr. Onyema could be deemed a federal employee in light of the contract with Onyema Medical Service. Following discovery, the district court found that Onyema Medical Service "essentially acted as Dr. Onyema's alter ego with respect to his professional services relationship with Sinai." Alexander v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Chicago, 165 F.Supp.2d 768, 772 (N.D.Ill.2001). The court found that the issue of whether a physician is a federal employee under the FTCA is determined by federal, not state, law. Refusing to elevate form over substance in characterizing the relationship between Dr. Onyema and Sinai, the district court concluded that Dr. Onyema was effectively an employee of a public health center and thus a deemed employee of the federal government. The court therefore dismissed Dr. Onyema from the action and substituted the United States as the defendant.
After Alexander exhausted her administrative remedies, she returned to the district court to pursue her remedies under the FTCA. Shortly thereafter, she learned that in another case filed against Dr. Onyema by another party, the government admitted that its decision to deem Dr. Onyema a federal employee in Alexander's case had been mistaken. See Buckley v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2002 WL 554524 (N.D.Ill. April 12, 2002). Specifically, the government admitted in the Buckley case that because Dr. Onyema had not contracted directly with Sinai, he was not entitled to coverage under the FSHCAA. The court in Buckley remanded the action to the state court on the basis of the government's representation that Dr. Onyema was not a federal employee. Citing Buckley, Alexander moved for reconsideration of the court's earlier decision dismissing Dr. Onyema and substituting the United States as a defendant. The government opposed the motion, taking the position that, although it made a mistake in Alexander's case, all of the parties were bound by the government's original certification and deeming decision under section 233(g)(1)(F). That section provides:
42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(F). The court denied the motion for reconsideration, agreeing that section 233(g)(1)(F) bound the parties to the government's initial determination that Dr. Onyema was a deemed federal employee. The court also noted that under section 233(g), review of the government's decision to deem Dr. Onyema a federal employee was extremely limited. Finally, the court noted that it had rested its decision not only on the representations of the government but also on its independent conclusion that Dr. Onyema himself (and not the professional corporation for which he signed) was the contracting party.
Since that time, yet another malpractice action filed against Dr. Onyema made its way to federal court in the Northern District of Illinois. See Ismie Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 413 F.Supp.2d 954 (N.D.Ill.2006). In that case, after the Secretary refused to deem Dr. Onyema a federal employee, the doctor's malpractice insurer sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") seeking to overturn that decision. The district court in the Ismie case framed the issue as whether Dr. Onyema is excluded from coverage under the FTCA and the FSHCAA because he contracted with a federally-funded clinic through his eponymous professional corporation rather than as an individual. 413 F.Supp.2d at 955. The Ismie action grew out of a malpractice case filed in state court against Dr. Onyema and the clinic where the plaintiff was treated. The government determined that the clinic was an entity covered under FSHCAA but that Dr. Onyema was not. The government removed the case to federal court based on the clinic's status as a covered entity. As in Alexander's case, the government then moved to dismiss the case against the clinic for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court obliged and returned the remaining claims to state court. As the malpractice case proceeded in state court with Dr. Onyema's malpractice insurer providing his defense, the insurer sought a declaration in federal court that Dr. Onyema is a covered contractor under FSHCAA and that HHS was responsible for Dr. Onyema's defense. Ismie, 413 F.Supp.2d at 957-58.
The district court ruled that HHS was judicially estopped from asserting that Dr. Onyema was not covered under FSHCAA because the government had deemed Dr. Onyema to be a federal employee in Alexander's case. Ismie, 413 F.Supp.2d at 959. In the alternative, the district court found that HHS's decision not to deem Dr. Onyema a federal employee was contrary to the law. Finding the reasoning of the district court in Alexander's case to be persuasive, the court rejected the elevation of form over substance and found that Dr. Onyema was no less a contractor simply because he signed the contract through his professional corporation. The court thus ruled that Dr. Onyema should be deemed a federal employee. Ismie, 413 F.Supp.2d at 961.
This strange history of Dr. Onyema's three odysseys through the Northern District of Illinois brings us to the instant appeal where Alexander argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Specifically, Alexander contends that Dr. Onyema could not be deemed a federal employee as a contractor of a publicly funded health center because he had no direct contract with the health center. Alexander asks us to reverse and remand with directions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction so that the district court may return the matter to the state court where it originated. The government counters that even if the original deeming determination was in error, all of the parties are statutorily bound by the government's decision. Moreover, the government contends, the deeming decision in combination with the certification that Dr. Onyema was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the relevant incident gives rise to federal jurisdiction. The government contends that a positive deeming decision by HHS is essentially unreviewable under section 233(g)(1)(F), but concedes that the Attorney General's scope of employment certification is judicially reviewable. Of course, Alexander challenges only the deeming decision and not the scope of employment certification and that must be the focus of our analysis.
Section 233(g)(1)(F) provides, as we noted above, that once the Secretary deems an employee or contractor to be an employee of the Public Health Service, that determination "shall be final and binding upon the Secretary and