Source: https://www.cobar.org/For-Members/Opinions-Rules-Statutes/Colorado-Court-of-Appeals-Opinions/Date/bdate/2018-3-8/edate/2018-3-8/cid/6
Timestamp: 2018-10-15 18:24:30
Document Index: 204865122

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 13', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 13', '§ 13']

2018 COA 28. No. 15CA0683. People v. Robles-Sierra.
2018 COA 29. No. 16CA1369. Taylor v. HCA-HealthONE LLC.
Medical Malpractice—Service—CRCP 4(m)—CRCP 60(b)—Excusable Neglect.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action but failed to serve defendants within the CRCP 4(m) deadline. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice, and because the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff could not refile the lawsuit. She moved to set aside the judgment under CRCP 60(b) based on excusable neglect. Without holding a hearing, the district court concluded that counsel’s docketing errors did not amount to excusable neglect and denied the motion.
On appeal, plaintiff first argued that the district court’s dismissal order was invalid under CRCP 4(m) because the delay reduction order was premature. Although the rule requires notice before dismissal, it does not require notice after expiration of the service deadline. Thus, plaintiff was not entitled to additional notice beyond the delay reduction order and the district court’s order of dismissal was valid.
2018 COA 30. No. 16CA1524. Abu-Nantambu-El v. State.
2018 COA 31. No. 16CA1869. In re Marriage of Yates and Humphrey.
2018 COA 32. No. 17CA0019. Meardon v. Freedom Life Insurance Co. of America.
Health Insurance Policy—Mandatory Arbitration—Conformity Clause—Federal Arbitration Act—CRS § 10-3-1116(3)—McCarran-Ferguson Act—Federal Supremacy—Preemption—Reverse Preemption.
Defendants Freedom Life Insurance Company of America and Robert J. Pavese (collectively, Freedom Life) denied health insurance benefits claimed by plaintiff Meardon under a health insurance policy (policy) issued to her by Freedom Life. The policy contained a mandatory arbitration clause to resolve disputes. The policy also contained a “conformity clause” stating that a policy provision that conflicts with the laws of the policyholder’s state is amended to conform to the minimum requirements of such laws. Freedom Life moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the case, relying on the mandatory arbitration clause. The trial court denied the motion, relying on CRS § 10-3-1116(3), which allows denied claims to be contested in court before a jury.
On appeal, Freedom Life contended that (1) CRS § 10-3-1116(3) cannot be applied because it is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); (2) even if the FAA does not preempt the statute, the arbitration clause remains in effect for those claims that fall outside the statute; and (3) Meardon must arbitrate her claims to “exhaust her administrative remedies” under CRS § 10-3-1116(3). The plain words of the statute conflict with the mandatory arbitration clause. This conflict triggered the policy’s conformity clause, the application of which invalidated the arbitration clause for those claims covered by CRS § 10-3-1116(3). Further, the FAA does not preempt CRS § 10-3-1116(3) because the McCarran-Ferguson Act preempts the FAA under the doctrine of reverse-preemption.
Freedom Life alternatively contended that only those claims covered by CRS § 10-3-116(3) are exempted from the arbitration clause and the remaining claims must be arbitrated. Because the parties did not seek a ruling from the trial court on this specific issue, the Court of Appeals was unable to determine which claims are subject to the arbitration clause.
The court’s order denying arbitration of those claims covered by CRS § 10-3-1116(3) was affirmed. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine which claims are covered by CRS § 10-3- 1116(3) and which are subject to the policy’s arbitration clause.
2018 COA 34. No. 17CA0262. In re Marriage of Boettcher.
2018 COA 35. No. 17CA0292. White v. Estate of Soto-Lerma.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff prejudgment interest. CRS § 15-12-803(1)(a) bars all claims against a decedent’s estate that arose before the decedent’s death and were not presented within the statutory timeframe. It was undisputed that plaintiff’s claim was not timely presented. CRS § 15-12-803(3)(b) states that nothing prevents a proceeding to establish decedent’s liability to the limits of his insurance protection. This statute conflicts with CRS § 13-21-101(1), which requires a court to award prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals concluded that prejudgment interest is part of the underlying liability claim against an estate and is therefore subject to the insurance policy limits and the CRS § 15-12-803(3)(b) bar on claims above that limit. CRS § 15-12-803 bars an award of prejudgment interest above defendant’s $50,000 policy limit.
Defendant also argued it was error to award costs in the final judgment, because such an award ignores the bar on claims in excess of insurance policy limits. Plaintiff argued for costs only under CRS § 13-17-202, which provides that a plaintiff must be awarded costs only if the final judgment exceeds the settlement offer. Given that the final judgment did not and could not exceed the policy limit, which was also the amount of the settlement offer, plaintiff was not entitled to costs under CRS § 13-17-202 and the trial court erred in entering a costs judgment above the policy limit.
2018 COA 36. No. 18CA0398. People v. Ray.