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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 767', '§ 767', '§ 77', '§ 77', '§ 78']

H. L. v. Matheson, (full text) :: 450 U.S. 398 (1981) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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H. L. v. Matheson,
(a) Although a state may not constitutionally legislate a blanket, unreviewable power of parents to veto their daughter's abortion, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622; Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, a statute getting out a mere requirement of parental notice when possible does not violate the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor. Pp. 450 U. S. 407-410.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STWART, J., joined, post, p. 450 U. S. 413. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 450 U. S. 420. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 450 U. S. 425.
The question presented in this case is whether a state statute which requires a physician to "[n]otify, if possible,"
(Emphasis supplied.) [Footnote 1]
leading questions. [Footnote 6] However, when the State attempted to cross-examine appellant about her reasons for not wishing to notify her parents, appellant's counsel vigorously objected, [Footnote 7]
insisting that "the specifics of the reasons are really irrelevant to the Constitutional issue." [Footnote 8] The only constitutionally permissible prerequisites for performance of al abortion, he insisted, were the desire of the girl and the medical
Appellant challenges the statute as unconstitutional on its face. She contends it is overbroad in that it can be construed to apply to all unmarried minor girls, including those who are mature and emancipated. We need not reach that question,
There are particularly strong reasons for applying established rules of standing in this case. The United States District Court for Utah has held that § 76-7-304(2) does not apply to emancipated minors and that, if so applied, it would be unconstitutional. L. R. v. Hansen, Civil No. C-80078J (Feb. 8, 1980). Since there was no appeal from that ruling, it is controlling on the State. We cannot assume that the statute, when challenged in a proper case, will not be construed also to exempt demonstrably mature minors. [Footnote 13] See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 428 U. S. 146-148 (1976) (Bellotti I). Nor is there any reason to assume that a minor in need of emergency treatment will be treated in any way different from
Appellant contends the statute violates the right to privacy recognized in our prior cases with respect to abortions. She
"We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 406 U. S. 231-233 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, [405 U.S. 645 (1972)]; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 262 U. S. 399-401 (1923)."
Id. at 434 U. S. 255, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 321 U. S. 166 (1944). See also Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 442 U. S. 602 (1979); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 268 U. S. 535 (1925). We have recognized that parents have an important "guiding role" to play in the upbringing of their children, Bellotti II, supra at 443 U. S. 633-639, which presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions.
428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 147. As applied to immature and dependent minors, the statute plainly serves the important considerations of family integrity [Footnote 18] and protecting adolescents [Footnote 19] which we identified in Bellotti II. In addition, as applied to that class, the statute serves a significant state interest by providing an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other information to a physician. The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion are serious, and can be lasting; this is particularly so when the patient is immature. [Footnote 20] An adequate medical and psychological case history is important to the physician. Parents can provide medical and psychological data, refer the physician to other sources of medical history, such as family physicians, and authorize family physicians to give relevant data.
Appellant also contends that the constitutionality of the statute is undermined because Utah allows a pregnant minor to consent to other medical procedures without formal notice to her parents if she carries the child to term. [Footnote 23] But a state's interests in full-term pregnancies are sufficiently different to justify the line drawn by the statutes. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 432 U. S. 473-474 (1977). If the pregnant girl elects to carry her child to term, the medical decisions to be made entail few -- perhaps none -- of the potentially grave
This case requires the Court to consider again the divisive questions raised by a state statute intended to encourage
parental involvement in the decision of a pregnant minor to have an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II). I agree with the Court that Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304(2) (1978) does not unconstitutionally burden this appellant's right to an abortion. I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that it leaves open the question whether § 76-7-304(2) unconstitutionally burdens the right of a mature minor or a minor whose best interests would not be served by parental notification. See ante at 450 U. S. 412, n. 22. I write to make clear that I continue to entertain the views on this question stated in my opinion in Bellotti II. See n. 8, infra.
Section 76-7-304(2) requires that a physician "[n]otify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor." [Footnote 2/1] Appellant attacks this notice requirement on the ground that it burdens the right of a minor who is emancipated, or who is mature enough to make the abortion decision independently of parental involvement, or whose parents will react obstructively upon notice. See ante at 450 U. S. 405. The threshold question, as the Court's opinion notes, is whether appellant has standing to make such a challenge. Standing depends initially on what the complaint alleges, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 498, 422 U. S. 501 (1975), as courts have the power "only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party."
This case does not come to us on the allegations of the complaint alone. An evidentiary hearing occurred after the trial court had denied appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellant was the only witness, and her testimony -- and statements by her counsel -- make clear beyond any question that the "bare bones" averments of the complaint were deliberate, and that appellant is arguing that a mere notice requirement is invalid per se, without regard to the minor's age, whether she is emancipated, whether her parents are likely to be obstructive, or whether there is some health or other reason why notification would not be in the minor's best interests.
Id. at 9-10 (emphasis supplied).
In sum, and as the Court's opinion emphasizes, appellant alleges nothing more than that she desires an abortion, that she has decided -- for reasons which she declined to reveal -- that it is in her best interest not to notify her parents, and that a physician would be willing to perform the abortion if notice were not required. Although the trial court did not rule in terms of standing, it is clear that these bald allegations do not confer standing to claim that § 76-7-304(2) unconstitutionally burdens the right either of a mature minor or of a minor whose best interests would not be served by parental notification. [Footnote 2/6] They confer standing only to claim that § 767-304(2) is an unconstitutional burden upon an unemancipated
On the facts of this case, I agree with the Court that § 767-304(2) is not an unconstitutional burden on appellant's right to an abortion. Numerous and significant interests compete when a minor decides whether or not to abort her
None of these interests is absolute. Even an adult woman's right to an abortion is not unqualified. Roe v. Wade, supra, at 410 U. S. 154. Particularly when a minor becomes pregnant and considers an abortion, the relevant circumstances may vary widely depending upon her age, maturity, mental and physical condition, the stability of her home if she is not emancipated, her relationship with her parents, and the like. If we were to accept appellant's claim that § 77-304(2) is per se an invalid burden on the asserted right of a minor to make the abortion decision, the circumstances which normally are relevant would -- as her counsel insisted -- be immaterial. Supra at 450 U. S. 417. The Court would have to decide that the minor's wishes are virtually absolute. To be sure, our cases have emphasized the necessity to consult a physician. But we have never held with respect to a minor that the opinion
In my opinion, the special importance of a young woman's abortion decision, emphasized by JUSTICE MARSHALL in dissent, post at 450 U. S. 435-436, provides a special justification for reasonable state efforts intended to ensure that the decision be wisely made. Such reasonable efforts surely may include a requirement that an abortion be procured only after consultation
The fact that certain members of the class of unmarried "minor women who are suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the pregnancies" may actually be emancipated or sufficiently mature to make a well reasoned abortion
The decision of the Court is narrow. It finds shortcomings in appellant's complaint, and therefore denies relief. Thus, the Court sends out a clear signal that more carefully drafted pleadings could secure both a plaintiff's standing to
The Court finds appellant's complaint defective because it fails to allege that she is mature or emancipated, and neglects to specify her reasons for wishing to avoid notifying her parents about her abortion decision. As a result, the Court reason,
The majority's standing analysis rests on prudential concerns
and not on the constitutional limitations set by Art. III. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 441 U. S. 99-100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 498-499, 422 U. S. 517-518 (1975). For the Court does not question that appellant's injury due to the statute's requirement falls within the legally protected ambit of her privacy interest, and that the relief requested would remedy the harm. See ante at 450 U. S. 407-409 (majority opinion); ante at 450 U. S. 418 419 (opinion of POWELL, J.). The Court decides only that appellant cannot challenge the blanket nature of the statute, because she neglected to allege that, by her personal characteristics, she is a member of particular groups that undoubtedly deserve exemption from a parental notice requirement. [Footnote 4/3] Thus, the Court seems to apply the familiar prudential principle that an individual should not be heard to raise the rights of other persons. This principle, of course, has not precluded standing in other instances where, as here, the party has established the requisite and legally protected interest capable of
I do not believe that prudential considerations should bar standing here, for I am persuaded that appellant's complaint establishes a claim that notifying her parents would not be in her best interests. [Footnote 4/5] She alleged that she "believes that it is in her best interest that her parents not be informed of her [pregnant] condition," Complaint ¦ 6, APP. 4, and that, after consulting with her physician, attorney, and social worker, "she understands what is involved in her decision" to seek an abortion, Complaint ¦ 9, App. 4. [Footnote 4/6] This claim was further
supported, albeit without detail, at the evidentiary hearing. There appellant testified she did not feel she could discuss the abortion decision with her parents even after she consulted a social worker on the issue. Tr. 8, App. 26. [Footnote 4/7] In my judgment, appellant has adequately asserted that she has persistently held reasons for believing parental notice would not be in her best interests. This provides a sufficient basis for standing to raise the challenge in her complaint. Appellant seeks to challenge a state statute, construed definitively by the highest court of that State to permit no exception to the notice requirement on the basis of any reasons offered by the minor. 604 P.2d 907, 913 (Utah 1979). As standing is a jurisdictional issue, separate and distinct from the merits, a court need not evaluate the persuasiveness of her reasons for opposing parental notice to conclude that appellant has a concrete interest in determining whether the parental notice statute is valid. [Footnote 4/8]
Complaint ¦ 10, App. 5. This class, by definition, includes all minor women, self-supporting or dependent, sophisticated or naive, as long as the Utah statute interferes with the ability of these women to decide with their physicians to obtain abortions. If the Court is correct that appellant cannot raise challenges based on the interest of emancipated or mature minors, or others whose best interests call for avoiding parental notification, the proper disposition under federal law would be a remand. This remand would protect such class members by permitting the trial court to determine whether appellant is a proper and adequate class representative, and whether her claims are sufficiently similar to the class to warrant the class action. [Footnote 4/9]
I instead assume that appellant adequately represents the class which the trial judge concluded she represents -- all minor women seeking an abortion but finding the parental notice requirement an obstacle. I then would find that their rights and interests can be raised here by appellant in support of a facial challenge to the Utah statute, and conduct the appropriate review of appellant's claims.
Our cases have established that a pregnant woman has a fundamental right to choose whether to obtain an abortion or carry the pregnancy to term. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973). [Footnote 4/13] Her choice, like the deeply intimate decisions to marry, [Footnote 4/14] to procreate, [Footnote 4/15] and to use contraceptives, [Footnote 4/16] is guarded from unwarranted state intervention by the right to privacy. [Footnote 4/17] Grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy [Footnote 4/18] protects both the woman's "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions"
It is also settled that the right to privacy, like many constitutional rights, [Footnote 4/19] extends to minors. Planned Parenthood
Page 450 U. S. 436
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 443 U. S. 639 (1979) (Bellotti II) (POWELL, J.); id. at 443 U. S. 653 (STEVENS, J.); T. H. v. Jones, 425 F.Supp. 873, 881 (Utah 1975), summarily aff'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 986 (1976). Indeed, because an unwanted pregnancy is probably more of a crisis for a minor than for an adult, as the abortion decision cannot be postponed until her majority, "there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible." Bellotti II, supra at 443 U. S. 646 (POWELL, J.). [Footnote 4/20] Thus, for both the adult and the minor woman, state-imposed burdens on the abortion decision can be justified only upon a showing that the restrictions advance "important state interests." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 154; accord, Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, supra at 428 U. S. 61. Before examining the state interests asserted here, it is necessary first to consider Utah's claim that its statute does not "imping[e] on a woman's decision to have an abortion" or "placr[e] obstacles in the path of effectuating such a decision." Brief for Appellees 9. This requires an examination of whether the parental notice requirement of the Utah statute imposes any burden on the abortion decision.
The ideal of a supportive family so pervades our culture that it may seem incongruous to examine "burdens" imposed by a statute requiring parental notice of a minor daughter's
Realistically, however, many families do not conform to this ideal. Many minors, like appellant, oppose parental notice and seek instead to preserve the fundamental, personal right to privacy. It is for these minors that the parental notification requirement creates a problem. In this context, involving the minor's parents against her wishes [Footnote 4/23] effectively cancels her right to avoid disclosure of her personal choice. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 429 U. S. 599-600. Moreover, the absolute notice requirement publicizes her private consultation
with her doctor and interjects additional parties in the very conference held confidential in Roe v. Wade, supra at 410 U. S. 164. Besides revealing a confidential decision, the parental notice requirement may limit "access to the means of effectuating that decision." Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 431 U. S. 688 (1977). Many minor women will encounter interference from their parents after the state-imposed notification. [Footnote 4/24] In addition to parental disappointment
and disapproval, the minor may confront physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of the abortion decision. Furthermore, the threat of parental notice may cause some minor women to delay past the first trimester of pregnancy, after which the health risks increase significantly. [Footnote 4/25] Other pregnant minors may attempt to self-abort or to obtain an illegal abortion rather than risk parental notification. [Footnote 4/26] Still others may forsake
an abortion and bear an unwanted child, which, given the minor's "probable education, employment skills, financial resources and emotional maturity, . . . may be exceptionally burdensome." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 642 (POWELL, J.). The possibility that such problems may not occur in particular cases does not alter the hardship created by the notice requirement on its face. [Footnote 4/27] And that hardship is not a mere disincentive created by the State, [Footnote 4/28] but is instead an actual
As established by this Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, the statute cannot survive appellant's challenge unless it is justified by a "significant state interest." [Footnote 4/32] Further, the State must demonstrate that the means
In upholding the statute, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the notification provision might encourage parental transmission of "additional information, which might
prove invaluable to the physician in exercising his best medical judgment.'" [Footnote 4/35] Yet neither the Utah courts nor the statute itself specifies the kind of information contemplated for this purpose, nor why it is available to the parents but not to the minor woman herself. Most parents lack the medical expertise necessary to supplement the physician's medical judgment, and at best could provide facts about the patient's medical history. It seems doubtful that a minor mature enough to become pregnant and to seek medical advice on her own initiative would be unable or unwilling to provide her physician with information crucial to the abortion decision. In addition, by law, the physician already is obligated to obtain all information necessary to form his best medical judgment, [Footnote 4/36] and nothing bars consultation with the parents should the physician find it necessary.
Even if mandatory parental notice serves a substantial state purpose in this regard, the Utah statute fails to implement it. Simply put, the statute, on its face, does not require or even encourage the transfer of information; it does not even call for a conversation between the physician and the parents. A letter from the physician to the parents would satisfy the statute, as would a brief telephone call made moments before the abortion. [Footnote 4/37] Moreover, the statute is patently underinclusive if its aim is the transfer of information known to the parents but unavailable from the minor woman herself. The statute specifically excludes married minors from the parental notice requirement; only her husband need be told of the planned abortion, Utah Code Ann. § 77-304(2) (1978), and Utah makes no claim that he possesses any information valuable to the physician's judgment but unavailable from the pregnant woman. Furthermore, no notice is required for other pregnancy-related care sought by the minor. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(4)(f) (1977) (authorizing woman of any age to consent to pregnancy-related medical care). The minor woman may consent to surgical removal and analysis of amniotic fluid, Caesarian delivery, and other medical care related to pregnancy. The physician's decisions concerning such procedures would be enhanced by parental information as much as would the abortion decision, yet only the abortion decision triggers the parental notice requirement. This result is especially anomalous given the comparatively lesser health risks associated with abortion as contrasted with other pregnancy-related medical care. [Footnote 4/38] Thus, the statute not only fails to promote
Appellees also claim the statute serves the legitimate purpose of improving the minor's decision by encouraging consultation between the minor woman and her parents. Appellees do not dispute that the State cannot legally or
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 268 U. S. 535. Similarly, our decisions "have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra at 321 U. S. 166. See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 431 U. S. 505.
More recently, in Bellotti II, supra, at 443 U. S. 638, JUSTICE POWELL observed that efforts to guide the social and moral development of young people are "in large part . . . beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions."
To decide this case, there is no need to determine whether parental rights never deserve legal protection when their assertion
conflicts with the minor's rights and interests. [Footnote 4/47] I conclude that this statute cannot be defended as a mere reinforcement of existing parental rights, for the statute reaches beyond the legal limits of those rights. The statute applies, without exception, to emancipated minors, [Footnote 4/48] mature minors, [Footnote 4/49]
and minors with emergency health care needs, [Footnote 4/50] all of whom, as Utah recognizes, by law have long been entitled to medical care unencumbered by parental involvement. Most
Utah itself has allocated pregnancy-related health care decisions entirely to the pregnant minor. [Footnote 4/52] Where the physician has cause to doubt the minor's actual ability to understand and consent, by law he must pursue the requisites of the State's informed consent procedures. [Footnote 4/53] The State cannot have a legitimate interest in adding to this scheme mandatory parental notice of the minor's abortion decision. This conclusion does not
Under the majority's view, to assure standing, the plaintiff pregnant minor simply need allege her desire to obtain an abortion, her inability to do so because of the statute, and her view that she is emancipated, mature, or that it is in her best interest to have an abortion performed without notifying her parents. The majority finds no standing problem where the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is emancipated or mature, and thus reaffirms the standing analysis employed in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II). See ante at 450 U. S. 406, n. 12. In addition, the Court relies in part on a decision by the Federal District Court in Utah, which enjoined application of the same Utah statute involved here to emancipated minors. L. R. v. Hansen, Civil NO. C-80-0078J (Feb. 8, 1980). The Court apparently contemplates that similar challenges will meet with success in the future. For example, the District Court in L. R. v. Hansen also accorded intervenor status and awarded preliminary relief to a minor woman who, like appellant, is under 17 years old and is dependent upon a parent with whom she resides. T he only difference between the allegations of the instant appellant and those of that intervenor is the latter's express allegation that parental notice would result in her expulsion from home and destruction of her relationship with her parent. L. R. v. Hansen, Civil NO. C-80-0078J (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 4) (Oct. 24, 1980). Finally, the Court today does not question our prior decision upholding the standing of physicians to challenge abortion restrictions. See n. 4, infra.
See n. 1, supra. The Court does not question that exceptions from a parental notice requirement are necessary for minors emancipated from the custody or control of their parents, see n. 48, infra, and for minors able to demonstrate their maturity for the purpose of choosing to have an abortion, ante at 450 U. S. 406-407. See also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 651 (POWELL, J.); id. at 443 U. S. 653 (STEVENS, J.). Nor does the Court depart from the view, made explicit in JUSTICE POWELL's opinion in Bellotti II, supra at 443 U. S. 651, that a State cannot require parental notice when it would not be in the minor's best interests to do so. This position is articulated anew today by JUSTICE POWELL, ante at 450 U. S. 420, and bolstered by the majority, which acknowledges the need for exception where parental notification interferes with emergency medical treatment, ante at 450 U. S. 407, n. 14, and which leaves open the possibility of relief where the minor makes a "claim or showing as to . . . her relations with her parents," ante at 450 U. S. 407, or demonstrates a "hostile home situatio[n]," ante at 450 U. S. 407, n. 14. See also L. R. v. Hansen, Civil No. C-80-0078J (Utah, Feb. 8, 1980, and Oct. 24, 1980).
Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d at 1385-1386; Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State Action after Danforth and Carey, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 1216, 1224 (1977).
Hofmann, supra, n. 25, at 51. See Goldstein, 86 Yale L.J. at 633.
Cf. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d at 1388.