Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/588-f-3d-659-598880586
Timestamp: 2020-03-28 23:53:25
Document Index: 433399297

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1291', '§ 16720', '§ 1', '§ 17200', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 17200', '§ 1', '§ 1']

588 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2009), 06-56059, William O. Gilley Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 598880586
588 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2009), 06-56059, William O. Gilley Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
Citation: 588 F.3d 659
Party Name: WILLIAM O. GILLEY ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada corporation doing business in California and the estate of William O. Gilley, deceased; Dennis Decota, an individual; Patrick Patrick Palmer, an individual on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY; Chevron Corporation; Exxon Corporat
Attorney: Charles M. Kagay, Spiegel, Liao & Kagay LLP, San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants. Timothy D. Cohelan, Cohelan & Khoury, San Diego, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants. Hojoon Hwang, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, San Francisco, CA, for the defendant-appellee. Peter H. Mason, Fulbright & J...
Judge Panel: Before: STEPHEN S. TROTT, RICHARD R. CLIFTON and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
588 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2009)
Hojoon Hwang, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, San Francisco, CA, for the defendant-appellee.
David M. Foster, Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, Washington DC, for defendant-appellee.
Patrick J. Sullivan, Law Offices of Patrick J. Sullivan, Oceanside, CA, for the defendant-appellee.
The Opinion filed April 3, 2009, slip op. 4188, and appearing at
561 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.2009), is withdrawn. It may not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit.
The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' antitrust claim founded on § 1 of the Sherman Act, holding that 1) Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 (2001), precludes the allegations made in the operative pleading; 2) Defendants' exchange agreements can not be aggregated to establish market power and anticompetitive effect; and 3) even if the exchange agreements could be aggregated, the absence of a conspiracy to limit supply and raise prices eliminates a causal connection between the exchange agreements and anticompetitive effect. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The allegations of the complaint were plainly similar to those alleged in Aguilar, a class-action suit filed in California Superior Court in 1996. That suit was brought under the Cartwright Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 et seq., California's equivalent to the Sherman Act. Aguilar, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d at 502. The plaintiff in Aguilar was a retail purchaser and consumer of gasoline and sought to represent a class of retail purchasers. The plaintiff in this action was a wholesale purchaser and retail dealer of gasoline and sought to represent a class of wholesale purchasers. Both plaintiffs were represented by the same attorneys, and both actions targeted the same defendants for essentially the same allegedly unlawful conduct. Because of the similarity in the cases, the district court hearing this case stayed the suit pending the outcome of Aguilar.
In Aguilar, the state superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that there was insufficient evidence presented by the plaintiffs to allow a reasonable juror to find a conspiracy to limit supply and raise prices among the several gasoline companies. Id. at 503. The California Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 521. As a result, Defendants in this case brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that Gilley's claims were barred by collateral estoppel. In response, Gilley offered a proposed amended complaint, which the court found insufficient. The district court, however, granted Gilley leave to provide another proposed amended complaint, which he did.
On May 6, 2002, the district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on that complaint, holding that Gilley was precluded by Aguilar from relitigating whether a conspiracy existed to limit supply and raise prices. However, the court granted Gilley further leave to amend the
complaint to allege that " each of the bilateral agreements, entered into independently between various defendant gasoline companies, ha[s] anti-competitive effects and therefore violate[s] the Sherman Act."
On May 24, 2002, Gilley filed the third post- Aguilar complaint, alleging that forty-four bilateral exchange agreements had the effect of unreasonably restraining trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and in violation of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. On March 27, 2003, the district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss that complaint with prejudice. With respect to the § 1 claim, the court explained that Gilley had not alleged any theory as to how any individual exchange agreement, which accounts for a small percentage of the relevant market, is able to inflate the price of CARB gasoline. The district court rejected Gilley's argument that the court could consider the aggregate effects of the individual bilateral agreements to allege an anticompetitive effect-namely higher gas prices.
Gilley appealed to this Court, which reversed and remanded, holding that the district court erred in not giving Gilley an opportunity to correct the newly identified deficiencies. After the remand, the second amended complaint (" SAC") was filed.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.2005). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. On a motion to dismiss in an antitrust case, a court must determine whether an antitrust claim is " plausible" in light of basic economic principles. Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
We address the following issues in this appeal: 1) the preclusive effect of the California Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar; 2) the pleading standard for § 1 claims; 3) the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' SAC; and 4) the state law claim under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200.1
Gilley does not dispute that the decision in Aguilar has some preclusive effect in the current lawsuit, but he contends that his current claim is not entirely extinguished by Aguilar. In contrast, Defendants argue that all of the allegations as pleaded in the SAC are precluded by Aguilar. We conclude that Gilley's claims are precluded by the California Supreme Court's decision.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits " [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 1. The Supreme Court has clearly established that the section is limited to prohibiting
unreasonable restraints of trade. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 164 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). Whether a plaintiff pursues a per se claim or a rule of reason claim under § 1, the first requirement is to allege a " contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy."
The core of the plaintiff's claims in Aguilar was a per se claim based on an alleged unlawful conspiracy...