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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 32', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 4321', '§ 232', '§ 761', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 2', '§ 22', '§ 624', '§ 22', '§ 8', '§ 6201', '§ 232', '§ 483', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 8']

FEA V. ALGONQUIN SNG, INC., 426 U. S. 548 - Volume 426 - 1976 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
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FEA V. ALGONQUIN SNG, INC., 426 U. S. 548 (1976)
When it appeared that a prior program established under § 232(b) for adjusting oil imports was not fulfilling its objectives, the Secretary of the Treasury initiated an investigation. On the basis of this investigation, the Secretary found that crude oil and its derivatives and related products were being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, and accordingly recommended to the President that appropriate action be taken to reduce the imports. Following this recommendation, the President promptly issued a Proclamation, inter alia, raising the license fees on imported oil. Thereafter, respondents -- eight States and their Governors, 10 utility companies, and a Congressman -- brought suits against petitioners challenging the license fees on the ground, inter alia, that they were beyond the President's authority under § 232(b). The District Court denied relief, holding that § 232(b) is a valid delegation to the President of the power to impose license fees on imports, and that the procedures followed by the President and the Secretary in imposing the fees fully complied with the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 232(b) does not authorize the President to impose a license fee scheme as a method of adjusting imports, but encompasses only the use of "direct" controls such as quotas.
Held: Section 232(b) authorizes the action taken by the President. Pp. 426 U. S. 558-571.
of power, since it establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action, including a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an article is being imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security. Moreover, even if these preconditions are met, the President can act only to the extent he deems necessary to adjust the imports so that they will not threaten to impair the national security, and § 32(c) sets forth specific factors for him to consider in exercising his authority. Pp. 426 U. S. 558-560.
(b) In authorizing the President to "take such action and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [an] article and its derivatives," § 232(b)'s language clearly grants him a measure of discretion in determining the method used to adjust imports, and there is no support in the statute's language that the authorization to the President to "adjust" imports should be read to encompass only quantitative methods, i.e., quotas, as opposed to monetary methods, i.e., license fees, of effecting such adjustments; so to limit the word "adjust" would not comport with the range of factors that can trigger the President's authority under § 232(b)'s language. Pp. 426 U. S. 561-562.
(c) Furthermore, § 232(b)'s legislative history amply indicates that the President's authority extends to the imposition of monetary exactions, i.e., license fees and duties, and belies any suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad language in the statute itself, intended to confine the President's authority to the imposition of quotas and to bar him from imposing a license fee system such as the one in question. Pp. 426 U. S. 562-571.
"take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so that . . . imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the national security. [Footnote 1] "
The predecessor statute to § 232(b) was originally enacted by Congress as § 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, c. 169, 69 Stat. 166 (see n 21, infra), and amended by § 8 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub.L. 85-686, 72 Stat. 678. The advisory function currently performed under § 232(b) by the Secretary of the Treasury was performed by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) under the 1955 and 1958 statutes. But, like § 232(b), those statutes allowed the President, on a finding that imports of an article were threatening "to impair the national security," to "take such action as he deem[ed] necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article. . . ." In 1959, President Eisenhower, having been advised by the Director of ODM that
In light of a Cabinet task force conclusion that the MOIP, as then constituted, was not fulfilling its objectives, [Footnote 2] President Nixon, acting pursuant to § 232(b), radically amended the program in 1973. Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974). The President suspended existing tariffs on oil imports and provided
Id. at 32. This amended program established a gradually increasing schedule of license fees for importers. With respect to crude oil, the fee was scheduled to increase from an initial 10 1/2 cents per barrel on May 1, 1973, to 21 cents per barrel on May 1, 1975. With respect to most finished petroleum products, the fee was to rise gradually from 15 cents per barrel on May 1, 1973, to 63 cents per barrel on November 1, 1975. [Footnote 3] Id. at 36. While initially some oil imports were exempted from the license fee requirements, the exemption levels were scheduled to decrease annually, so that, by 1980, the fees would be applicable to all oil imports.
President Nixon's 1973 program apparently did not wholly fulfill the objectives to which it was directed. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Treasury, acting pursuant to § 232(b), see n 1, supra, initiated an investigation on January 4, 1975, "to determine the effects on the national security of imports of petroleum and petroleum products." Memorandum from Secretary of the Treasury Simon to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
The President agreed with the findings of the Secretary's investigation and concluded that it was "necessary and consistent with the national security to. further discourage importation into the United States of petroleum, petroleum products, and related products. . . ." Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2 (1975). Invoking 232(b), he issued a Proclamation on January 23, 1975, which, effective immediately, raised the so-called "first-tier" license fees that were imposed in 1973, see supra at 426 U. S. 553, to the maximum levels previously scheduled to be reached only some months later. [Footnote 4] Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, supra. The Proclamation also imposed on all imported oil, whether covered by the first-tier fees or not, a supplemental fee of $1 per barrel for oil entering the United States on or after February 1, 1975. The supplemental fee was scheduled to rise to $2 a barrel for oil entering after March 1, 1975, and to $3 per barrel for oil entering after April 1, 1975. [Footnote 5] Finally, the Proclamation reinstated the tariffs that had been suspended in April, 1973. Soon after issuance of the Proclamation, the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) amended its oil import regulations in order to implement the new program. 40 Fed.Reg. 4771-4776 (1975).
-- eight States and their Governors, [Footnote 6] 10 utility companies, [Footnote 7] and Congressman Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts -- challenged the license fees in two suits filed against the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the FEA, and the Treasurer of the United States in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, they alleged that the imposition of the fees was beyond the President's constitutional and statutory authority, that the fees were imposed without necessary procedural steps having been taken, and that petitioners (hereinafter the Government) violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to the imposition of the fees.
The District Court denied respondents' motions for preliminary injunctions and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which, at the request of respondents, it later declared to be final. See 171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 124, 126, 518 F.2d 1051, 1062, 1064 (1975) (appendix to dissenting opinion in Court of Appeals). The court found that § 232(b) is a valid delegation to the President of the power to impose license fees on oil imports. Id. at 128-129, 518 F.2d at 1066-1067. It further ruled that the procedures followed by the President
and the Secretary of the Treasury in imposing the license fees fully conformed to the requirements of the statute. Id. at 130, 518 F.2d at 1068. Finally, the court held that, "in view of the emergency nature of the problem and the need for prompt action," id. at 131, 518 F.2d at 1069, the Government was not required to file an environmental impact statement prior to imposition of the fees, and hence was not in violation of the NEPA. Ibid.
Respondents' appeals from these judgments were consolidated with their petitions to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FEA regulations implementing the license fee program. The allegations in the challenges to the regulations were substantially the same as those raised in the District Court actions, adding only a contention that the FEA had failed to follow certain procedural provisions of the Federal Energy Administration Act, 88 Stat. 97, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that § 232(b) does not authorize the President to impose a license fee scheme as a method of adjusting imports. 171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 518 F.2d 1051 (1975). According to the court, reading the statute to authorize the action taken by the President "would be an anomalous departure" from "the consistently explicit, well defined manner in which Congress has delegated control over foreign trade and tariffs." Id. at 117, 518 F.2d at 1055. In the court's view, 232(b)'s legislative history indicated that Congress' authorization of the President to "adjust the imports of [an] article" encompassed only the use of "direct" controls such as quotas, and did not encompass the use of license fees. Id. at 121, 518 F.2d at 1059. Finding no need to address any of the other issues that were raised, the court reversed the judgment of the District Court, instructed
We granted the Government's petition for certiorari, 423 U.S. 923 (1976), [Footnote 8] and now reverse. Both the language of § 232(b) and its legislative history lead us to conclude that it authorizes the action taken by the President in this case. [Footnote 9]
In Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928), this Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision empowering the President to increase or decrease import duties in order to equalize the differences between foreign and domestic production costs for similar articles. There, the Court stated:
Id. at 276 U. S. 409. Section 232(b) easily fulfills that test. It establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action -- inter alia, a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an "article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." Moreover, the leeway that the statute gives the President in deciding what action to take in the event the preconditions are fulfilled is far from unbounded. The President can act only to the extent
And § 232(c), see n 1, supra, articulates a series of specific factors to be considered by the President in exercising his authority under § 232(b). [Footnote 10] In light of these factors and
our recognition that "[n]ecessity . . . fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules . . . ," American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 329 U. S. 105 (1946), we see no looming problem of improper delegation that should affect our reading of § 232(b). [Footnote 11]
In authorizing the President to "take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [an] article and its derivatives," the language of § 232(b) seems clearly to grant him a measure of discretion in determining the method to be used to adjust imports. We find no support in the language of the statute for respondents' contention that the authorization to the President to "adjust" imports should be read to encompass only quantitative methods -- i.e., quotas -- as opposed to monetary methods -- i.e., license fees -- of effecting such adjustments.
Indeed, reading respondents' suggested limitation into the word "adjust" would be inconsistent with the range of factors that can trigger the President's authority under 232(b)'s language. Section 232(b) authorizes the President to act after a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that a given article is being imported "in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language reflects Congress' judgment that "not only the quantity of imports . . . but also the circumstances under which they are coming in: their use, their availability, their character" could endanger the national security, and hence should be a potential basis for Presidential action. 104 Cong.Rec. 10542-10543 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Mills). It is most unlikely that Congress would have provided that dangers posed by factors other than the strict quantitative level of imports can justify Presidential action, but that that action must be confined to the imposition of quotas. Unless one assumes, and we do not, that quotas will always be a feasible method of dealing directly with national security threats posed by the "circumstances" under which imports are entering the country, limiting the President to the use of quotas would effectively
Turning from § 232's language to its legislative history, again there is much to suggest that the President's authority extends to the imposition of monetary exactions -- i.e., license fees and duties. The original enactment of the provision in 1955, as well as Congress' periodic reconsideration of it in subsequent years, gives us substantial grounds on which to conclude that its authorization extends beyond the imposition of quotas to the type of action challenged here.
During congressional hearings on the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, there was substantial testimony that increased imports were threatening to damage various domestic industries whose viability was perceived to be critical to the national security. [Footnote 12] In an effort to deal with the problem, the Senate Committee on Finance considered several proposals designed to supplement the existing statutory provision, known as the Symington Amendment, [Footnote 13] that barred reductions in duties
Act of July 1, 1954, Pub.L. 464, § 2, 68 Stat. 360. [Footnote 14] Among these amendments
"[T]he President shall take such action as is necessary to restrict imports of commodities whenever such imports threaten to retard the domestic development and expansion or maintenance of domestic production of natural resource commodities or any other commodities which he determines to be essential to the national security. . . ."
Hearings on H.R. 1 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1955) (emphasis added). [Footnote 15] In explaining what action would be authorized under the Neely Amendment, Senator Martin, one of its cosponsors, explained that it authorized the President
"to take such action as is necessary, including the imposition of import quotas or the increase in duties, to protect the domestic industry concerned."
Id. at 2097 (emphasis added). Thus, the Neely Amendment clearly would have given the President the authority to impose monetary exactions as a method of restricting imports.
(1955). [Footnote 16] Given the similarity in the operative language of the two proposals, it is fair to infer that, if, as Senator Martin stated, the Neely Amendment was intended to authorize the imposition of monetary exactions, so too was the Byrd-Millikin Amendment.
101 Cong.Rec. 5299 (1955). As a statement of one of the legislation's sponsors, this explanation deserves to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 386 U. S. 640 (1967); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 341 U. S. 394-395 (1951). [Footnote 17]
"on the same basis as agricultural commodities. It simply leaves to the President the power, in his discretion, to decide whether to impose a quota or to reduce the imports."
5297 (1955) (emphasis added). The reference in the emphasized phrase is to § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the subject of an earlier exchange between Senator Byrd and Senator Thye. 101 Cong.Rec. 5296 (1955). Section 22 allows the President under certain circumstances to "impose such fees . . . or such quantitative limitations" as he finds necessary to protect the domestic production of an agricultural commodity. 49 Stat. 773, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 624(b) (emphasis added). Senator Byrd's comparison of § 22 and the Byrd-Millikin Amendment thus appears to reflect his understanding that Presidential authority under the Amendment extended to the imposition of fees. [Footnote 18]
Finally, we note two other statements on the floor of the Senate which lend direct support to the Government's reading of the Byrd-Millikin Amendment. Senator Bennett stated that it was his understanding that the amendment would authorize use of "the entire scope of tariffs, quotas, restrictions, stockpiling, and any other variation of these programs in order to protect a particular industry." 101 Cong.Rec. 5588 (1955). [Footnote 19] And Senator Barkley, a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, expressed his understanding that the Amendment would allow the President to "impose such quotas or take such other steps as he may believe to be desirable in order to
maintain the national security." Id. at 5298 (emphasis added).
In the House debate following Senate passage of the Byrd-Millikin Amendment, id. at 5655, and its acceptance with a minor modification by the House conferees, H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 745, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 6-7 (1955), we find further indications that the Amendment authorized the imposition of monetary exactions. In explaining the provisions of the Amendment, Congressman Cooper, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and a member of the Conference Committee, indicated his concern that
"any modification of a duty on imports or a quota would [because of retaliation from abroad] inevitably result in a curtailment of exports by the United States."
101 Cong.Rec. 8161 (1955) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as part of his explanation of the Amendment, Cooper presented a letter he had received from Gerald D. Morgan, Special Counsel to the President, which expressed the administration's understanding that, under the Amendment, the President's action to adjust imports "could take any form that was appropriate to the situation." Id. at 8162. [Footnote 20] Thus, when Congress finally enacted the Byrd-Millikin Amendment's national security provision, 69 Stat. 166, [Footnote 21] as part of the
Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1955, not only had Members of both Houses indicated that the provision authorized the imposition of monetary exactions, but the Executive Branch, too, had advised the Congress of its understanding of the broad scope of the authority granted by the Amendment. [Footnote 22]
Three years later, in the context of its consideration of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Congress reexamined the Byrd-Millikin national security provision. In the course of its deliberations, the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the House Ways and Means Committee had before it a 1957 report submitted to it by the ODM, expressing the views of the Executive Branch that "the imposition of new or increased tariff duties on imports . . . [was] authorized by the language adopted." [Footnote 23] Fully aware that the Executive
"those best able to judge national security needs . . . [with] a way of taking whatever action is needed to avoid a threat to the national security through imports."
While Congress, in 1958, made several procedural changes in the statute and established criteria to guide the President's determination as to whether action under the provision might be necessary, it added no limitations with respect to the type of action that the President was authorized to take. [Footnote 24] § 8, 72 Stat. 678. The 1958 reenactment, like the 1955 provision, authorized the President, under appropriate conditions, to "take such action" "as he deems necessary to adjust the imports. . . ." Ibid.
See Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil Import Question 128 (1970).
The supplemental fee increases scheduled to go into effect in March and April were twice deferred. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4355, 3A CFR 26 (1975); Presidential Proclamation No. 4370, 3A CFR 45 (1975). While the $2 fee finally went into effect on June 1, 1975, Presidential Proclamation No. 4377, 3A CFR 53 (1975), it was never increased to $3. Indeed, on January 3, 1976, President Ford eliminated the $2 fee. Presidential Proclamation No. 4412, 3 CFR 3 (1977). See n 8, infra.
Subsequent to our granting certiorari, the President signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 871, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V). That Act is aimed at encouraging domestic oil production by gradually decontrolling the price of domestically produced crude oil. On January 3, 1976, indicating that "the purposes of the supplemental [oil import license] fee" will be served by the Act, the President announced the elimination of the supplemental fees imposed by Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2 (1975). Presidential Proclamation No. 4412, 3 CFR 3 (1977). He did not, however, eliminate the "first-tier" fees originally imposed by Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974). Since respondents seek to enjoin the first-tier as well as the supplemental fees, the question here whether § 232(b) grants the President authority to impose license fees remains a live controversy.
Respondents rely on our decision in National Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336 (1974), to support their delegation doctrine argument. But we find that case clearly distinguishable from the one before us today. In National Cable Television, we held that the fees to be imposed on community antenna television systems should be measured by the "value to the recipient" even though the language of the general statute allowing fee setting by federal agencies, 31 U.S.C. § 483a, permits consideration not only of "value to the recipient," but also of "public policy or interest served and other pertinent facts." The Court's conclusion that the words of the last-quoted phrase were not relevant to the CATV situation was apparently motivated by a desire to avoid any delegation doctrine problem that might have been presented by a contrary conclusion. 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 342. But what might be considered the open-ended nature of the phrase "public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts" stands in contrast to § 232(b)'s more limited authorization of the President to act only to the extent necessary to eliminate a threat of impairment to the national security, and § 232(c)'s articulation of standards to guide the President in making the decision whether to act. See n 1, supra.
The amount of oil exempted from the "first-tier" license fees, see supra at 426 U. S. 553, imposed in 1973 varies among five geographical districts within the Nation. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2 (1975); Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974). Respondents seize on this fact to argue that the "first-tier" fee schedule contravenes Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, of the Constitution which requires that import duties be uniform throughout the United States. But that issue is not properly before the Court. Sustaining respondents' Uniformity Clause argument would call not for invalidation of the entire license fee scheme, but only for elimination of the geographical differences in the exemptions allowed under it. This would represent not an affirmance of the judgments below, which effectively invalidated the entire scheme and its implementing regulations, but rather a modification of those judgments. But since respondents filed no cross-petition for certiorari, they are at this point precluded from seeking such modification. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 396 U. S. 381 n. 4 (1970).
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1006 (analytical balance industry), 1264 (petroleum industry) (1955); Hearings on H.R. 1 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 602 (lead and zinc mining industry), 721 (coal mining industry) (1955).
Unlike the Neely Amendment, see n 15, supra, the Byrd-Millikin Amendment did not single out any named industries for protection by quotas.
Moreover, Senator Byrd's reference in the above-quoted exchange to the power of the President under the Amendment "to impose a quota or to reduce the imports," 101 Cong.Rec. 5297 (1955), also suggests that he understood that power to extend beyond the imposition of quotas. See Note, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 432, 435 n. 31 (1975).
A copy of the Morgan letter was also sent to Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance. See 101 Cong.Rec. 8162 (1955).
We are not unmindful that, as respondents point out, much of the congressional debate referred to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment in the context of giving the President the power to impose import quotas. See, e.g., 101 Cong.Rec. 5572 (1955) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 5582, 5584 (remarks of Sen. Douglas); id. at 5593 (remarks of Sen. Monroney). But nowhere do the congressional debates reflect an understanding that, under the Amendment, the President's authority was to be limited to the imposition of quotas. In light of this fact, we feel fortified in attaching substantial weight to the positive indications discussed above that the authority was not so limited.
Indeed, while, under the 1955 provision, the President was authorized to act only on a finding that "quantities" of imports threatened to impair the national security, the 1958 provision also authorized Presidential action on a finding that an article is being imported "under such circumstances" as to threaten to impair the national security. 72 Stat. 678. See supra at 426 U. S. 561.
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