Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98582/williams-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-01-16 10:45:11
Document Index: 509501491

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20']

Williams Vs United States - Citation 98582 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Williams Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98582CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-23-1951Case Number341 U.S. 97AppellantWilliamsRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:
williams v. united states - 341 u.s. 97 (1951)
1. a special police officer who, in his official capacity, by use of force and violence, obtains a confession from a person suspected of crime may be prosecuted under what is now 18 u.s.c. § 242, which makes it an offense for any person, under color of law, willfully to subject any inhabitant of any state, territory, or district to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the constitution and laws..... Judgment:
1. A special police officer who, in his official capacity, by use of force and violence, obtains a confession from a person suspected of crime may be prosecuted under what is now 18 U.S.C. § 242, which makes it an offense for any person, under color of law, willfully to subject any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Pp.
341 U. S. 98
on the record in this case, petitioner was acting "under color" of law within the meaning of § 242, or at least the jury could properly so find. Pp.
3. As applied, under the facts of this case, to the denial of rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 242 is not void for vagueness. Pp.
341 U. S. 100
4. Where police take matters into their own hands, seize victims, and beat them until they confess, they deprive the victims of rights under the Constitution. P.
341 U. S. 101
5. In view of the terms of the indictment, as interpreted by the instructions to the jury, it cannot be said that any issue of vagueness of § 242, as construed and applied, is present in this case. Pp.
341 U. S. 102
Petitioner was convicted of a violation of what is now 18 U.S.C. § 242. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 179 F.2d 656. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 850.
341 U. S. 104
The indictment charged, among other things, that petitioner acting under color of law used force to make each victim confess to his guilt and implicate others, and that the victims were denied the right to be tried by due process of law and, if found guilty, to be sentenced and punished in accordance with the laws of the state. Petitioner was found guilty by a jury under instructions which conformed with the rulings of the Court in
. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 179 F.2d 656. The case, which is a companion to No. 26,
United States v. Williams, ante,
, and No. 134,
, decided this day, is here on certiorari.
We think it clear that petitioner was acting "under color" of law within the meaning of § 20, or at least that the jury could properly so find. We interpreted this phrase of § 20 in
And see Screws v. United States, supra,
-111. It is common practice, as we noted in
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Co.,
331 U. S. 429
, for private guards or detectives to be vested with policemen's powers. We know from the record that that is the policy of Miami, Florida. Moreover, this was an investigation
conducted under the aegis of the State, as evidenced by the fact that a regular police officer was detailed to attend it. We need go no further to conclude that the lower court, to whom we give deference on local law matters,
see Gardner v. New Jersey,
329 U. S. 583
, was correct in holding that petitioner was no mere interloper, but had a semblance of policeman's power from Florida. There was, therefore, evidence that he acted under authority of Florida law, and the manner of his conduct of the interrogations makes clear that he was asserting the authority granted him, and not acting in the role of a private person. In any event, the charge to the jury drew the line between official and unofficial conduct which we explored in
Screws v. United States, supra,
325 U. S. 111
, and gave petitioner all of the protection which "color of" law as used in § 20 offers.
The main contention is that the application of § 20 so as to sustain a conviction for obtaining a confession by use of force and violence is unconstitutional. The argument is the one that a clear majority of the Court rejected in
Criminal statutes must have an ascertainable standard of guilt or they fall for vagueness.
. Section 20, it is argued, lacks the necessary specificity when rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are involved. We are pointed to the course of decisions by this Court under the Due Process Clause as proof of the vague and fluid standard for "rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution" as used in § 20. We are referred to decisions where we have been closely divided on whether state action violated due process. More specifically, we are cited many instances where the Court has been conspicuously in disagreement on the illegal character
Many criminal statutes might be extended to circumstances so extreme as to make their application unconstitutional. Conversely, as we held in
a close construction will often save an act from vagueness that is fatal. The present case is as good an illustration as any. It is as plain as a pikestaff that the present confessions would not be allowed in evidence whatever the school of thought concerning the scope and meaning of the Due Process Clause. This is the classic use of force to make a man testify against himself. The result is as plain as if the rack, the wheel, and the thumb screw -- the ancient methods of securing evidence by torture,
-- were used to compel the confession. Someday the application of § 20 to less obvious methods of coercion may be presented, and doubts as to the adequacy of the standard of guilt may be presented. There may be a similar doubt when an officer is tried under § 20 for beating a man to death. That was a doubt stirred in the
case, and it was the reason we held that the purpose must be plain, the deprivation of the constitutional right willful. But where police take matters in their own hands, seize victims, beat and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the police have deprived the victim of a right under the Constitution. It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court. Hence, when officers wring confessions from the accused
by force and violence, they violate some of the most fundamental, basic, and well established constitutional rights which every citizen enjoys. Petitioner and his associates acted willfully and purposely; their aim was precisely to deny the protection that the Constitution affords.
The indictment charged that petitioners deprived designated persons of rights and privileges secured to them by the Fourteenth Amendment. These deprivations were defined in the indictment to include "illegal" assault and battery. But the meaning of these rights in the context of the indictment was plain,
viz., immunity from the use
of force and violence to obtain a confession.
Thus, count 2 of the indictment charges that the Fourteenth Amendment rights of one Purnell were violated in the following respects:
Experience in the effort to apply the doctrine of
, leads MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE MINTON to dissent for the reasons set forth in dissent in that case.