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Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional
organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of
West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures,
roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in
complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. The following describes formal or informal ties
between the United States and some of the largest of these regional and IGO security organizations.
a. The United Nations. Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS,
through the US permanent representative (PERMREP) to the UN, who shall have the rank and status
of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. The US PERMREP is assisted at the US Mission to
the UN by a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).
(1) The UN normally conducts peace operations or FHA under the provisions of a
resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. Mandates are
developed through a political process which generally requires compromise, and sometimes results in
ambiguity. As with all military operations, UN mandates are implemented by US forces through orders
issued by the SecDef through the CJCS. During
such implementation, the political mandates are
converted to workable military orders.
(2) UN Peace and Humanitarian
Organizational Structure. The UN HQ
coordinates PO and FHA around the world. It
does not, however, have a system for
planning and executing these operations that
is comparable to that of the United States.
The UN organizational structure consists of the
HQ and the operational field elements. Thus, there
is a strategic and tactical-level equivalent to the
Armed Forces of the United States, but no
operational counterpart.
(a) At the HQ, the Secretariat
plans and directs missions. Normally, the
UNDPKO serves as the HQ component during
contingencies involving substantial troop
deployments. Some ‘peace building’ missions
with small numbers of military observers are
directed by UNOCHA. UNOCHA is a
coordinating body that pulls together the efforts
of numerous humanitarian/relief organizations and
is the vehicle through which official requests for
military assistance are normally made.
Joint forces support UN-coordinated peace
operations under the command authority of the
US commander.
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Established Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization,
and Nongovernmental Organization Relationships
Supplemental US support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and Service HQ staffs may
be provided for specific requirements. UN special missions, such as the UN Protection Force in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of the UN Secretary General (SYG).
(b) Field level coordination is normally determined on an ad hoc basis,
depending on which relief organization is playing the major role. The United Nations Office
of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and UNDPKO are often the
logical candidates. UNOCHA may deploy a field team to coordinate FHA or the Emergency
Relief Coordinator may designate the resident UN coordinator as Humanitarian Coordinator.
Coordination with the UN Resident Coordinator may be degraded if UN personnel are pulled
out in the face of increased threats.
(c) In certain situations the UN SYG may appoint a Special Representative
who reports directly to the SYG but also advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN HQ. The
Special Representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the case in the UN operation in
(3) United States Military Support. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements
of Disputes) authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable
or non-reimbursable basis.
(a) US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI
(Peaceful Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.
See Vol II of this publication, Annex E, “United Nations,” of Appendix C, “Regional and
Intergovernmental Organizations,” for details regarding the UN Charter and Chapter VI and
VII of that charter.
(b) UN-sponsored peace operations normally employ a multinational force (MNF)
under a single commander. The MNF commander is appointed by the SYG with the consent of
the UN Security Council and reports directly to the SYG’s Special Representative or to the SYG.
When the United States provides support to a UN-sponsored peace operation, the US military
structure that is used to conduct multinational operations normally is a JTF. The CJTF should
expect to conduct operations as part of an MNF. US forces may participate across a range of military
operations in concert with a variety of USG agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities,
IGOs, and NGOs.
(c) The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in
the field remains inviolate. On a case-by-case basis, the President may place US forces participating
in multilateral peace operations under UN auspices under the operational control (OPCON) (with
modifications) of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security
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Council. The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. The
greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the United States will agree to have a UN
commander exercise OPCON over US forces. OPCON for UN multilateral peace operations is
given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already
deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign
UN commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to
by the President. Nor may the foreign UN commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer
discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.
b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO experience exemplifies the
interagency process on a regional level. Its evolution has been propelled, often in the face of
crisis, by the demands for cooperation that characterize every regional effort. The durability of
NATO is testament to its success in interagency coordination.
(1) NATO membership presently consists of 26 nations.
(2) Coordination of US efforts within NATO begins with the Presidential appointment
of a PERMREP, who has the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary
and is a COM under the Foreign Service Act of 1980. As with any treaty, US commitment to the
North Atlantic Treaty reflects the balance between the power of the President to conduct foreign
policy and Congress’ power of the purse. Congress has authorized and regularly funds logistic
support for elements of the armed forces deployed to NATO outside the United States and
permits cross-servicing agreements in return for reciprocal support. Beyond day-to-day
operations, training exercises, and logistics authorized by statute, employment of US military
force with NATO requires Presidential action and may be subject to congressional review,
including those employments authorized and limited by the War Powers Act.
c. Public Affairs Planning with Intergovernmental Organizations. The Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)) provides overall PA guidance and
coordinates PA actions affecting IGOs. Planning for support to UN missions will normally
include coordination with UN press office personnel through OASD(PA). JTF PA efforts should
include the identification of POCs and authorized spokespersons within each IGO.
See Vol II of this publication, Appendix C for a detailed discussion of these and other “Regional
and Intergovernmental Organizations.”
9. The Nongovernmental Organizations’ Connection to Joint Operations
a. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene
before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely
remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible,
grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.
b. NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Because of their capability
to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a
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commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Although philosophical differences
may exist between military forces and NGOs, short-term objectives are frequently very similar.
Discovering this common ground is essential. A very important issue to keep in mind when dealing with
NGOs is that they will likely object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement
of military objectives. Their mission is one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military
in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the
commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected COA.
c. The Role of NGOs. NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the international
arena. Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs are assisting
in all the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in
size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in
developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular
emergency or disaster. The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary
greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education,
technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The
sheer number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their
humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency and international
communities. In fact, individual organizations are often funded by national and international donor
agencies as implementing partners to carry out specific functions. Similarly, internationally active NGOs
may employ indigenous groups, such as the Mother Teresa Society in Kosovo, as local implementing
Air component forces operating over the mountains of northern
Italy in support of DENY FLIGHT.
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d. The Increasing Number of NGOs. A JTF or MNF may encounter scores of NGOs in
a JOA. In 1999 in Kosovo, more than 150 IGOs and NGOs had applied to be registered in the
province. Over 350 such agencies are registered with the USAID. InterAction, a US-based consortium
of NGOs has a membership of over 160 private agencies that operate in 180 countries. The International
Council of Voluntary Agencies has a predominantly European membership numbering in the hundreds.
Over 1,500 NGOs around the world are registered with the UN’s Department of Public Information,
while over 2,400 have ‘consultative status’ with its Economic and Social Council. It is important to note
that NGOs may not vet their members as thoroughly as government and military organizations. Some
NGOs have had involvement in funding and facilitating the travel of terrorist elements. While this is not
the norm, it is an issue that merits consideration in the interagency, IGO, and NGO operations environment.
e. Military and Nongovernmental Organization Relations. Whereas the military’s initial
objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian
needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an
end state which they had no part in determining. The extent to which specific NGOs are
willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably. NGOs desire to preserve the
impartial character of their operations, accept only minimal necessary assistance from the military,
and ensure that military actions in the relief and civic action are consistent with the standards
and priorities agreed on within the civilian relief community.
(1) The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations
make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and
civilian attitudes, and they are sometimes willing to share such information on the basis of
collegiality. Virtually all IGO and NGO operations interact with military operations in some
way — they use the same (normally limited) lines of communications; they draw on the same
sources for local interpreters and translators; and they compete for buildings and storage space.
Thus, sharing of operational information in both directions is an essential element of successful
(2) While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the
use of military transport to move relief supplies to, or sometimes within, the operational area,
others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous, impartial operations.
This is particularly the case if US military forces are a belligerent to a conflict in the operational area.
Most NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for personal security, preferring instead to
rely upon the good will of the local populace for their safety. Any activity that strips an NGO’s
appearance of impartiality, such as close collaboration with one particular military force, may
well eliminate that organization’s primary source of security. NGOs may also avoid cooperation
with the military out of suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent
their operations. Commanders and their staffs should be sensitive to these concerns and consult these
organizations, along with the competent national or international authorities, to identify local conditions
that may impact effective military-NGO cooperation.
(3) PA planning should include the identification of POCs with NGOs that will operate
in the JOA. Military spokespersons should comment on NGO operations based on approved PA
guidance and make referrals of media queries to the appropriate organization’s spokesperson.
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f. Military Support of NGOs. The SecDef may determine that it is in the national interest
to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support
of) IGOs and NGOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the
activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and military forces
should be the goal. The creation of a framework for structured civil-military interaction, such as
a CMOC, allows the military and NGOs to meet and work together in advancing common goals.
Taskings to support IGOs and NGOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary
events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most
needed. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the armed forces
should be to enable, not perform, IGO and NGO tasks. Military commanders and other decision
makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces
and other organizations may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.
See Vol II, Appendix B of this publication, “Nongovernmental Organizations.” Annex A of
Appendix B contains “InterAction’s Geographic Index of NGOs.”
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ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COORDINATION
“We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency
operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are
institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served
as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function
of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact
that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon
as the enabling function was complete.”
General George A. Joulwan, USA
21 October 1993 – 10 July 1997
1. Organizing for Success
a. When campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which
military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized will bear directly on its
efficiency and success. To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants
from the outset. The combatant commander through his strategic concept builds the interagency,
IGO, and NGO activities into Annex V of the OPLAN. Subordinate JFCs build interagency,
IGO, and NGO participation into their operations. Within the AOR and the JOA, appropriate
decision-making structures are established at combatant command, JTF HQ, and tactical levels
in order to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This chapter
will suggest meaningful tools for the commander to organize for successful interagency
coordination, whether in domestic or foreign operations, and focus on the operational level and
b. In concert with the NSC, DOD, and Joint Staff, combatant commanders should:
(1) Recognize all USG agencies, departments, IGOs, and NGOs that are or should
be involved in the operation. In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies
will have occurred within the NSC, DOD, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff.
(2) Understand the authoritative interagency, IGO, and NGO hierarchy, to include the
lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility.
Understand the differences between roles and responsibilities of DOD, the CJCS, the Joint
Staff, and the Services in domestic and foreign operations. Understand the different command
arrangements in domestic and foreign operations.
(3) Define the objectives of the response. These should be broadly outlined in the
statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC meetings that authorized
the overall USG participation. Within the military chain of command, they are further elaborated
in tasking orders that include the commander’s intent.
“In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN and NGO community
in-theater literally ‘met on the dance floor.’ Given that a JTF commander’s concern
will be to ensure unity of effort (not command!), too brief a time to establish
relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among
so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors.
The commander, therefore, will find that, short of insuring the protection of his
force, his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US
government, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks
appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support . . .”
Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, USA
Commander, JTF SUPPORT HOPE
(4) Define COAs for the assigned military tasks, while striving for operational
compatibility with other USG agencies.
(5) Cooperate with each agency, department, or organization and obtain a clear
definition of the role that each plays. In many situations, participating agencies, departments,
and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or collocated with the combatant
command’s staff. It is then advisable for the combatant commander to request temporary
assignment of liaison officers (LNOs) from the participating agencies, departments, and
organizations to the combatant command or JTF HQ. In some cases, it may be useful or even
necessary for the military to send LNOs to selected other organizations.
(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or agency
priorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to solutions by all
participants is the first step toward resolution. Too often these obstacles are assumed to have
been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. If the obstacles cannot be
resolved they must immediately be forwarded up the chain of command for resolution.
(7) Military and civilian planners should identify resources relevant to the situation.
Determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these
resources in order to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and
identify what additional resources are needed.
(8) Define the desired military end states, plan for transition from military to
civil authority, and recommend exit criteria.
(9) Maximize the joint force assets to support long-term goals. The military’s
contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and
support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, national or international response to a
Organizing for Successful Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization,
and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination
(10) Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can rapidly
deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. These can include ad hoc multilateral teams or teams
organized under the auspices of an IGO such as the UN or OSCE.
(11) Implement crisis action planning (CAP) for incidents or situations involving a
threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests
that may require interagency coordination to achieve US objectives.
2. Interagency and Nongovernmental Organization Crisis Response: Domestic
a. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in many respects, fall
into two mission areas HD — for which DOD serves as the LFA and military forces are used to
conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and CS — for which DOD serves in a
supporting role to other agencies by providing military support to civil authorities at the federal,
state, and local level (see Figure III-1). The President and SecDef define the circumstances
under which DOD will be involved in the HD and CS missions.
(1) For HD missions the President, exercising his constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief, authorizes military action to counter threats to and within the United
(2) When conducting CS missions, DOD will be in support of an LFA. The domestic
operating environment for military CS presents unique challenges to the JFC. It is imperative
that commanders and staffs at all levels understand the relationships, both statutory and operational,
among all federal agencies involved in the operation. Moreover, it is equally important to
understand DOD’s role in supporting these other federal agencies. DOD will provide military
assistance to the LFA upon request by the appropriate authority and approval by SecDef.
There are various national level plans, such as the Initial National Response Plan (INRP)/
FRP, which detail the roles and missions of various federal departments and agencies in
the event of a domestic crisis. [Note: the provisions of the FRP continue to provide guidance
for all activities not specifically subsumed in the INRP but will eventually be integrated into a
NRP.]
(3) Within the CS mission area, circumstances may arise that fall into the realm of
emergency and temporary non-emergency incidents. In emergency circumstances, such as
managing the consequences of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, critical infrastructure
protection, or other events, DOD could be asked to provide capabilities that other agencies
do not possess or that have been exhausted or overwhelmed.
b. Command and Control Relationships and Responsibilities
(1) For HD missions, DOD is in the lead with other federal agencies in support.
DOD’s capability to respond quickly to any threat or situation places a high demand on the same
resources. For example, the same trained and ready force constituted to achieve strategic objectives
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