Source: http://hannokaiser.com/lawschool/2012_svat/2012_svat_syllabus.html
Timestamp: 2018-04-22 22:05:20
Document Index: 335534520

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'Art. 102', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2']

2012_svat_syllabus
Silicon Valley Antitrust
Hanno Kaiser U.C. Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, Spring 2012
Friday 8 - 9:50 am, Room 10
Evolving Syllabus! Please check out the latest version
Herbert Hovenkamp, Black Letter Antitrust Law (2011)
Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and Competition Policy: Cases and Materials (2011)
Class 1: Introduction; Google Search and Google+ (January 13, 2012)
On January 10, 2012, Google started integrating Google+ into the Google search engine. Is this connection between two services (search and social networking) an antitrust problem? This recent development will serve as the launching pad for our discussion of the “Google Antitrust Universe.”
Enforcement models in the U.S. and in the EU
Can there be “monopoly power” if users are free to go elsewhere?
Does it matter that the product is free?
Multi-sided platforms: advertisers go to where the users are
Why “Silicon Valley Antitrust Law”? Is there a “New York Antitrust Law” as well?
Hovenkamp, Antitrust (2011), pp.129–157, or the capsule summary, pp.16–21.
WSJ, Google Embeds Social Directly Into Search (But by Social, It Means Google+) (January 10, 2012)
Google, Competition Website
Ben Edelman, Google Tying Google Plus and Many More
BusinessMBA, Google by the numbers, Infographic (2011)
Class 2: The Microsoft Universe, Part 1 (January 20, 2012)
The Microsoft cases in the U.S. and the EC are among the most important precedents for high-technology antitrust. They address key questions of market definition, multi-sided platforms, product integration, offensive and defensive uses of monopoly power, and remedies. We will examine the Microsoft cases in depth and use them as the backdrop against which to examine more recent matters.
The first part of the U.S. v. Microsoft case: Market definition and market power
Hanno Kaiser, Excerpt on Market Definition (2009). On bSpace.
U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Read pages 45–58, i.e.: I. INTRODUCTION A. Background B. Overview II. MONOPOLIZATION A. Monopoly Power; also, print out the table of contents.
Elhauge, Geradin, Global Antitrust Law and Economics, pp.248–256. (Excellent overview of Section 2 and Art. 102; highly recommended as a quick review of core concepts. Excerpts are posted on bSpace.)
Class 3: The Microsoft Universe, Part 2 (January 27, 2012)
The anticompetitive strategies playbook
Indirect “defensive” strategies in multi-sided markets
U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Read pages 58–80, i.e.: II. MONOPOLIZATION […] B. Anticompetitive Conduct C. Causation
Microsoft, Timeline of the Commission v. Microsoft case from 1998–2007
Hovenkamp, Antitrust, pp.145 - 160 (examples of exclusionary conduct; attempted monopolization)
Class 4: The Microsoft Universe, Part 3 (February 3, 2012)
Tying in the U.S. and in the EU
Microsoft 10 years later: Who won?
U.S. v. Microsoft as a roadmap to the FTC’s investigation of Google? Similarities and differences.
U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Read pages 84–98.
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C 130/01); Read paras. 214–222 (“tying”)
Case T–201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, CFI 2007. Brief summary of the proceedings and implementation. Read the excerpts bSpace (tying claim).
Elhauge, Geradin, Global Antitrust Law (2009), pp.39–54 (differences between the U.S. and EC system of antitrust enforcement). See the excerpt on bSpace.
“Default defenders” and “choice screens”
Class 5: High-tech labor markets: No-“cold call” agreements? (February 10, 2012)
Employee-plaintiffs claim that their employers agreed not to cold-call each others’ employees. Sensible self-regulation or unlawful horizontal coordination?
a. Topics for discussion:
The Silicon Valley labor market
“Non-compete agreements v. non-solicitation agreements”; Silicon Valley v. Silicon Alley
Immigration patterns and innovation
Review of horizontal agreements in the U.S. and in the EU
Per se and rule of reason analysis
Hovenkamp, Antitrust (2011), pp.95–104, 122–126.
U.S. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., Apple Inc., Google Inc., Intel Corporation, Intuit, Inc., and Pixar (2011)
In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (2011) (on bSpace)
In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (2011) (on bSpace)
Class 6: The law of “predatory innovation”. Showdown in the CPU industry: FTC and EC v. Intel. (February 17, 2012)
(1) Did Intel abuse its dominant position in the x86 CPU market by using various business tactics and technological design choices aimed at (i) defending its CPU monopoly and (ii) extending its CPU monopoly into the GPU market?
(2) A builds disk drives for B’s mainframes. B changes the interface. A’s disk drives are obsolete. Innovation or predation?
(3) A builds audio chips for smartphones. B builds graphics processors. B includes audio functionality into its new graphics processor. A’s business tanks. Efficient integration or anticompetitive foreclosure?
(4) B sells audio, graphics, and sensor modules. A sells audio modules only. B gives its customers a 25% across the board rebate if they buy all three components from B. A can’t match the discount on audio modules alone. Good deal for the buyer or below-cost bundled pricing?
b. Required reading:
FTC, In re Intel complaint (2009)
Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco Healthcare, 592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010). Read the excerpt and discussion in Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and Competition Policy: Cases and Materials (2011), Chapter 8, pp. 36–47.
Michael Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century (2009); read the excerpt from the 1st chapter on bSpace
FTC In re Intel, decision and order (2010)
Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, No. C 05–00037 JW, 2011 WL 2690511 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2011)
John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy (2012)
Class 7: Abuse of standard-essential patents (February 24, 2012)
A makes FRAND promises to an SSO. The technology covered by A’s patents gets included in the standard. Later, A refuses to grant FRAND licenses to its downstream competitors. Monopolization?
How standard setting works
Three strategies to subvert standard setting
European Commission, Press release re Samsung FRAND abuse investigation (January 31, 2012)
Rambus v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir. 2008)
Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Tx. 2008)
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F. 3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
Kaiser & Wall, The Meaning of Rambus (2008)
Florian Mueller’s FOSS Patents Blog
Class 8: Patent portfolio acquisitions (March 2, 2012)
Patents and patent portfolios
Section 7 and the “substantial lessening of competition” test
Horizontal and vertical aspects of patent portfolio acquisitions
European Commission, Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008/C 265/07
DOJ, Decision to approve Google’s acquisition of Motorola (February 12, 2012)
EC, Approval of Google’s acquisition of Motorola (February 13, 2012)
Reuters Mobile Patent Suits
Classes 9 and 10: Open v. closed systems (Part 1 & 2) (March 16, 2012)
(1) “Open systems win.” Jonathan Rosenberg, Google.
(2) “Open systems [are] good for making others lose.” John Prentice, Gartner.
(3) “Closed systems are prima facie suspect, while open systems can never be an antitrust problem." Useful antitrust rule or analytical fallacy?
(4) A sells games for B’s gaming console. B starts requiring pre-approval of the game concept and final approval of the finished game as a condition for a license to B’s console. Sensible quality control measure or monopolization of the aftermarket for B-console games?
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451
Jonathan Rosenberg, The Meaning of Open
Cory Doctorow, Lockdown, The coming war on general-purpose computing.
Class 11: Mergers: Differentiated and future products, Part 1 (March 23, 2012)
A acquires B. Some customers say that B’s pipeline products would likely be a good alternative to A’s products, but B’s products are more likely to make it to market if they are supported by A’s R&D and distribution infrastructure. Efficient merger to ensure that new products come to market more quickly and with greater certainty or substantial lessening of future competition?
a. Topics for discussion include:
U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098 (N.D.Cal. 2004)
J. Thomas Rosch, Lessons from Oracle
Case No COMP/M.5984 - INTEL / MCAFE
Case No COMP/M.6281 - MICROSOFT/ SKYPE (2011)
Class 12: Mergers: Differentiated and future products, Part 2 (April 6, 2012)
Unilateral effects in U.S. v. Oracle
How U.S. v. Oracle influenced the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Potential competition and innovation markets
FTC, In the matter of Thoratec and HeartWare, Docket No. 9339, FTC File No. 091 0064
Kaiser & Wall, What the new merger guidelines mean for technology companies (2010)
Carl Shapiro, Joseph Farrell, Mergers with unilateral effects, presentation (2008)
Class 13: Open source & social networks (April 13, 2012)
What’s the difference between free software and open source software?
Zero-price fixing? Share alike licenses in court.
Social networks and virtual currencies
a. Reading materials
Newman & DeWors, Facebook Credits Whitepaper (2012)
b. Optional reading
Tim Rogers, Who killed videogames? (2011)
Mark Silva, Social Gaming, Too Big to Ignore
Cory Doctorow, Censorship is inseparable from surveillance (2012)
Jacob Appelbaum, Keynote linux.conf.au
Eben Moglen, The Freedom Box (2010)
ConsumerWatchdog, Complaint to the FTC re Facebook Credits (2011)
ConsumerWatchdog, Analysis of revised FB Credits Terms (2011)
Wikipedia, EVE Online
Wikipedia, Facebook Credits
M.5529 Oracle / Sun Microsystems, Commission Decision (2010)
c. Seriously optional reading
Neal Stephenson, Reamde (2011)
Cory Doctorow, For the Win (2010)
Ernest Cline, Ready Player One (2010)
Class 14: Mergers affecting future products and the DOJ complaint in re eBooks (April 20, 2012)
See required reading for Class 12 (we’ll discuss the Thoratec case that we didn’t get to on April 6)
Complaint U.S. v. Apple, Hachette, et al. (April 11, 2012)
Washington Post, Apple denies Justice charges, says they’re ‘not true’ (2012)
Cory Doctorow, A Whip to Beat us with (2012)
Class 15: Review session (April 27, 2012)
U.C. Berkeley, Silicon Valley Antitrust Syllabus by Hanno Kaiser is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.