Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/94406/swiss-national-ins-co-ltd-vs-miller
Timestamp: 2017-12-17 16:08:57
Document Index: 758429650

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 2', '§ 12', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', 'art 8', 'art 8', '§ 9', '§ 9']

Swiss National Ins Co Ltd Vs Miller - Citation 94406 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Swiss National Ins. Co., Ltd. Vs. Miller - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/94406
Case Number 267 U.S. 42
Appellant Swiss National Ins. Co., Ltd.
swiss national ins. co., ltd. v. miller - 267 u.s. 42 (1925) u.s. supreme court swiss national ins. co., ltd. v. miller, 267 u.s. 42 (1925) swiss national insurance company, limited v. miller no. 132 argued november 18, 1924 decided february 2, 1925 267 u.s. 42 appeal from the court of appeals of the district of columbia syllabus 1. where a corporation was an "enemy" within the definition of the trading with the enemy act because doing business in germany, the enemy status of its property then seized in this country was not changed by a subsequent cessation of such business. p. 267 u. s. 44 . 2. the fact that an enemy corporation ceased to be an enemy when the war was ended by the joint resolution of.....
Swiss National Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Miller - 267 U.S. 42 (1925)
U.S. Supreme Court Swiss National Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Miller, 267 U.S. 42 (1925)
1. Where a corporation was an "enemy" within the definition of the Trading with the Enemy Act because doing business in Germany, the enemy status of its property then seized in this country was not changed by a subsequent cessation of such business. P. 267 U. S. 44 .
3. Clause 1 of § 9-b of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended June 5, 1920, c. 241, 41 Stat. 977, which provides for return of seized enemy property whose owner was and remains a "citizen or subject" of a nation other than Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Austria-Hungary, cannot be construed as including corporations. So held in view of the use of "citizen or subject" in other clauses of the section relating only to natural persons, and more particularly because the 6th clause of the same section makes a special classification of partnerships, associations, and corporations, allowing return of property if they were and remain entirely owned by subjects or citizens of nations other than those above mentioned. P. 267 U. S. 45 .
4. Whether the terms "citizen or subject" are broad enough to include corporations depends upon the intent to be gathered from the legislation in which they occur. P. 267 U. S. 46 .
5. Clause 11 of § 9-b of the Trading with the Enemy Act, added by the amendment of March 4, 1923, c. 285, 42 Stat. 1511, amounts to a legislative construction of clause 1 as above construed. P. 267 U. S. 48 .
The Swiss National Insurance Company filed a bill in equity against the Alien Property Custodian and the Treasurer of the United States in the Supreme Court of the District to recover securities to the value of about $1,000,000. These it had before the war deposited in the various state treasuries because required by the state laws as a condition of doing insurance therein. The Alien Property Custodian had seized them in November, 1918, as property of an enemy under the definition of § 2, par.(a), of the Trading with the Enemy Act, approved October 6, 1917, c. 106, 40 Stat. 411, that the word "enemy" should be deemed to mean and include, for the purpose of the act, "any . . . corporation . . . incorporated within any country other than the United States and doing business within" the "territory (including
Second, it is argued that, as the war ended by joint resolution of July 2, 1921, 42 Stat. 105, the plaintiff thereby ceased to be an enemy, and was entitled to a return of its property without express legislation giving such a right. It is clear from § 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, 424, that Congress did
and the word "enemy" is declared to be equally inclusive. But there is in the Act and its amendments no such definition of the words "citizen or subject." The term "citizen or subject" may be broad enough to include corporations of the country whose citizens are in question. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Selover v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112 ; Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359 . Whether it is so inclusive in any particular instance depends upon the intent, to be gathered from the context and the general purpose of the whole legislation in which it occurs. United States v. Northwestern Express Co., 164 U. S. 686 , 164 U. S. 689 . The first clause of paragraph (b) refers to a citizen or subject who may change his nationality which could hardly refer to a corporation. The second and third clauses describing the second and third classes refer to married women, and obviously the term citizen or subject in them includes only natural persons. Clause 4
It was evidently intended by § 9(b) not to allow any individual enemies to be favored unless they, as women, only acquired their status as enemies because of marriage to a male enemy or unless they were diplomatic representatives of the enemy countries or members of their families and the property involved was within
Had no clause 6 been inserted in the Act, possibly the words "citizens or subjects" of clause 1 might have been held to include corporations; but, with a specification of them as a separate class, it would violate an obviously sound rule to include them by construction in clause 1 also as citizens or subjects.
This cause requires interpretation of § 9, Trading with the Enemy Act, approved October 6, 1917, c. 106, 40 Stat. 411, 419, as amended by the Act of June 5, 1920, c. 241, 41 Stat. 977, copied below. [ Footnote 1 ]
For many years, appellant has been incorporated under the laws of Switzerland. Prior to 1917 and continuously thereafter until 1922, it did an insurance business in Germany. From 1910 until November 18, 1918, it carried on the same business within several of our states, and as security for its obligations deposited many domestic
bonds -- a million dollars. On the latter date -- a week after the Armistice -- the Alien Property Custodian took possession of these bonds, and either he or the Treasurer of the United States now holds them. Claiming the sequestered securities or their proceeds under § 9, subsection (b), appellant began this proceeding in the Supreme Court, District of Columbia, November 28, 1921. That court held the corporation could not prevail, because subjects of Germany held some of its stock, and upon motion dismissed the bill. The court of appeals affirmed the decree. The corporation came within the term "enemy" solely because of its business within Germany; but
By executive orders, the President vested certain wide powers, conferred upon him by the Trading with the Enemy Act, in the Alien Property Custodian, and that officer diligently proceeded to sequestrate property which, as he held, belonged to enemies. See Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 , 254 U. S. 567 ; Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 , 255 U. S. 245 ; Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51 , 262 U. S. 56 . Reporting to the President, February 22, 1919 (Sen.Doc. vol. 8, pp. 9, 13), the Custodian said:
The Act of July 11, 1919, c. 6, 41 Stat. 35, added to § 9 a proviso which gave right of recovery to subjects
of associated nations whose property had been sequestered solely because of residence within territory occupied by enemy forces -- e.g., Belgium and Northern France. There were several hundred cases of French and Belgium property taken solely because the owners were in such occupied territory. [H. Comm'n Hearings 1920, vol. 232-1, part 8, p. 11.] This amendment (copied in the margin [ Footnote 2 ]) applied to "a person who was an enemy or ally of enemy" and "is a citizen or subject of such associated nation." The words "citizen or subject" include "person," and "person," according to the statutory definition,
The House Committee held protracted hearings (H. Comm'n Hearings 1920, vol. 232-1, part 8), and heard representatives of the State Department, the Attorney General's office and the Alien Property Custodian, who stated what had been done and pointed out the purpose of the proposed amendments. The following is quoted from statements of Mr. Hill, Assistant to the Solicitor, State Department, and Mr. Boggs, Special Assistant to the Attorney General:
The House (Cong.Rec. vol. 59 pt. 8, p. 8429) passed the bill shortly after this report, and within a few days thereafter the Senate took like action ( id., 8475). The manifest design was to restore certain property in compliance with the original purpose of Congress.
The amending statute reenacted the material provisions of original § 9 as subsection (a), and added six subsections -- (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g). It deleted the proviso of July 11, 1919, concerning persons in occupied territory, and inserted a general proviso applicable to the whole section, which directs that no person shall be deemed or held to be citizen or subject of Germany or Austria-Hungary who had been or should become citizen or subject of any state or nation partly composed of territory once held by either of those empires. [ Footnote 3 ] "Person," of course, includes corporation, and thus, in the section now to be construed, "citizen or subject" clearly include corporations, and have their true and normal meaning.
Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U. S. 457 , considers § 9, and declares:
We there pointed out that, under the Act, a corporation is an entity with character of its own irrespective of the status attributed to stockholders, and is "enemy" only when directly within the statutory definition. The theory that all corporations are excluded from subsection (a)
Paragraph (1) is broad enough to include the property of all neutrals, and so to interpret it will do no violence to any part of the Act. The words "citizen or subject," as commonly used in international matters, include corporations. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 75 U. S. 177 -178; United States v. Northwestern Express Co., 164 U. S. 686 , 164 U. S. 689 ; Ramsey v. Tacoma Land Co., 196 U. S. 360 , 196 U. S. 362 ; Moore's International Law Digest, vol. 3, p. 804; Id., vol. 6, pp. 641, 642.
This includes corporations of Germany or Austria-Hungary, or of any state left within those empires, [ Footnote 4 ] if entirely owned by citizens of the United States or an associated power or a neutral. The practice of organizing local companies to do the business of foreign owners has become very general. Certain important German corporations were wholly owned by individuals or corporations of the United States. British subjects had large investments in German concerns, and probably the same is true of subjects of Sweden, Norway, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, and Italy. There were obvious reasons for releasing property of a corporation when wholly owned by our own people, by nationals of associated powers, or by neutrals, and paragraph (6) effects this.
That, although appellant had been permitted to do business within the United States during the whole period of
That the original seizure of the property in question would be difficult to justify, and certainly the United States can have no moral right longer to retain or to confiscate it. Neutral property cannot be used in settlement of claims against enemy countries. So to do would be wholly inconsistent with our traditions and pretensions.
" Provided, that no person shall be deemed or held to be a citizen or subject of Germany or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary for the purposes of this section, even though he was such citizen or subject at the time first specified in this subsection, if he has become or shall become, ipso facto or through exercise of option, a citizen or subject of any nation or state or free city other than Germany, Austria, or Hungary, (first) under the terms of such treaties of peace as have been or may be concluded subsequent to November 11, 1918, between Germany or Austria or Hungary (of the one part) and the United States and/or three or more of the following-named powers: The British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan (of the other part), or (second) under the terms of such treaties as have been or may be concluded in pursuance of the treaties of peace aforesaid between any nation, state, or free city (of the one part) whose territories, in whole or in part, on August 4, 1914, formed a portion of the territory of Germany or Austria-Hungary and the United States and/or three or more of the following-named powers: The British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan (of the other part). For the purposes of this section, any citizen or subject of a state or free city which at the time of the proposed return of money or other property of such citizen or subject hereunder forms a part of the territory of any one of the following nations: Germany, Austria, or Hungary, shall be deemed to be a citizen or subject of such nation. And the receipt of the said owner or of the person by whom said property was conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid over to the Alien Property Custodian shall be a full acquittance and discharge of the Alien Property Custodian or the Treasurer of the United States, as the case may be, and of the United States in respect to all claims of all persons heretofore or hereafter claiming any right, title, or interest in said property, or compensation or damages arising from the capture of such property by the President or the Alien Property Custodian: Provided further, however, that, except as herein provided, no such action by the President shall bar any person from the prosecution of any suit at law or in equity to establish any right, title, or interest which he may have therein."