Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/577/14-1209/
Timestamp: 2020-02-28 09:45:23
Document Index: 623894917

Matched Legal Cases: ['§3102', '§2', '§100751', '§3103', '§3102', '§3103', '§410', '§6', '§6', '§3', '§1311', '§6', '§1', '§1601', '§1605', '§1601', '§3101', '§3101', '§100751', '§100102', '§3103', '§3102', '§3102', '§3103', '§6', '§1311', '§3103', '§3102', '§3121', '§3201', '§3203', '§3170']

Sturgeon v. Frost :: 577 U.S. ___ (2016) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 577 › Sturgeon v. Frost
Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. ___ (2016)
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) set aside 104 million acres of land in “conservation system units,” to include “any unit in Alaska of the National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails System, National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument,” 16 U.S.C. 3102(4), plus 18 million acres of state, Native Corporation, and private land. Sturgeon was piloting his hovercraft over the Nation River in the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, a conservation system unit managed by the National Park Service. Alaska law permits the use of hovercraft. National Park Service regulations, adopted under 54 U.S.C. 100751(b), do not. Rangers told Sturgeon that hovercraft were prohibited. Sturgeon protested that Park Service regulations did not apply because the river was owned by the state. Sturgeon complied, then filed suit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Park Service. ANILCA provides: “No lands ... conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.” Public land is generally land to which the U.S. holds title.. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the hovercraft regulation applied to all federal-owned lands and waters administered by the Park Service nationwide, so it did not apply “solely” within the units. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected that reasoning and vacated. ANILCA carves out numerous Alaska-specific exceptions to the Park Service’s general authority over federally managed preservation areas, reflecting that Alaska is often the exception, not the rule. The Court did not determine whether the Nation River qualifies as “public land” under ANILCA or whether the Park Service has authority to regulate Sturgeon’s activities on the Nation River.
Under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), the general definition of "public land" as land to which the federal government holds title may not necessarily apply to Alaska, since this law provides many Alaska-specific exceptions to the authority of the National Park Service over federally managed preservation areas.
STURGEON v. FROST, ALASKA REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, et al.
No. 14–1209. Argued January 20, 2016—Decided March 22, 2016
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) set aside 104 million acres of land in Alaska for preservation purposes. Under ANILCA, those lands were placed into “conservation system units,” which were defined to include “any unit in Alaska of the National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails System, National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument.” 16 U. S. C. §3102(4). In addition to federal land, over 18 million acres of state, Native Corporation, and private land were also included within the boundaries of those conservation system units.
In 2007, John Sturgeon was piloting his hovercraft over a stretch of the Nation River that flows through the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, a conservation system unit in Alaska that is managed by the National Park Service. Alaska law permits the use of hovercraft. National Park Service regulations do not. See 36 CFR §2.17(e). Park Service rangers approached Sturgeon, informing him that hovercraft were prohibited within the preserve under Park Service regulations. Sturgeon protested that Park Service regulations did not apply because the river was owned by the State of Alaska. The rangers ordered Sturgeon to remove his hovercraft from the preserve, and he complied. Sturgeon later filed suit against the Park Service in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief permitting him to operate his hovercraft within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley. Alaska intervened in support of Sturgeon.
The Secretary of the Interior has authority to “prescribe regulations” concerning “boating and other activities on or relating to water located within System units.” 54 U. S. C. §100751(b). The Park Service’s hovercraft regulation was adopted pursuant to Section 100751(b). The hovercraft ban is not limited to Alaska, but instead has effect in federally managed preservation areas across the country. Section 103(c) of ANILCA, in contrast, addresses the scope of the Park Service’s authority over lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska. The first sentence of Section 103(c) specifies the property included as a portion of those units. It states: “Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such unit.” 16 U. S. C. §3103(c). ANILCA defines the word “land” to include “lands, waters, and interests therein,” and the term “public lands” to include lands to which the United States has “title,” with certain exceptions. §3102.
The second sentence of Section 103(c) concerns the Park Service’s authority to regulate “non-public” lands in Alaska, which include state, Native Corporation, and private property. It provides: “No lands which, before, on, or after December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.” §3103(c). The third sentence of Section 103(c) explains how new lands become part of conservation system units: “If the State, a Native Corporation, or other owner desires to convey any such lands, the Secretary may acquire such lands in accordance with applicable law (including this Act), and any such lands shall become part of the unit, and be administered accordingly.” Ibid.
Interpreting Section 103(c) of ANILCA, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Park Service, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in pertinent part. According to the Ninth Circuit, because the hovercraft regulation “applies to all federal-owned lands and waters administered by [the Park Service] nationwide, as well as all navigable waters lying within national parks,” the hovercraft ban does not apply “solely” within conservation system units in Alaska. 768 F. 3d 1066, 1077. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Park Service therefore has authority to enforce its hovercraft regulation on the Nation River. The Ninth Circuit did not address whether the Nation River counts as “public land” for purposes of ANILCA.
Held: The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 103(c) is inconsistent with both the text and context of ANILCA. Pp. 12–16.
(a) The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 103(c) violates “a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U. S. ___, ___. ANILCA repeatedly recognizes that Alaska is different, and ANILCA itself accordingly carves out numerous Alaska-specific exceptions to the Park Service’s general authority over federally managed preservation areas. Those Alaska-specific provisions reflect the simple truth that Alaska is often the exception, not the rule. Yet the reading below would prevent the Park Service from recognizing Alaska’s unique conditions. Under that reading, the Park Service could regulate “non-public” lands in Alaska only through rules applicable outside Alaska as well. The Court concludes that, whatever the reach of the Park Service’s authority under ANILCA, Section 103(c) did not adopt such a “topsy-turvy” approach. Pp. 12–14.
(b) Moreover, it is clear that Section 103(c) draws a distinction between “public” and “non-public” lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska. And yet, according to the court below, if the Park Service wanted to differentiate between that “public” and “non-public” land in an Alaska-specific way, it would have to regulate the “non-public” land pursuant to rules applicable outside Alaska, and the “public” land pursuant to Alaska-specific provisions. Assuming the Park Service has authority over “non-public” land in Alaska (an issue the Court does not decide), the Court concludes that this is an implausible reading of the statute. The Court therefore rejects the interpretation of Section 103(c) adopted by the court below. Pp. 14–15.
(c) The Court does not reach the remainder of the parties’ arguments. In particular, it does not decide whether the Nation River qualifies as “public land” for purposes of ANILCA. It also does not decide whether the Park Service has authority under Section 100751(b) to regulate Sturgeon’s activities on the Nation River, even if the river is not “public” land, or whether—as Sturgeon argues—any such authority is limited by ANILCA. Finally, the Court does not consider whether the Park Service has authority under ANILCA over both “public” and “non-public” lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska, to the extent a regulation is written to apply specifically to both types of land. The Court leaves those arguments to the lower courts for consideration as necessary. Pp. 15–16.
768 F. 3d 1066, vacated and remanded.
For almost 40 years, John Sturgeon has hunted moose along the Nation River in Alaska. Because parts of the river are shallow and difficult to navigate, Sturgeon travels by hovercraft, an amphibious vehicle capable of gliding over land and water. To reach his preferred hunting grounds, Sturgeon must pilot his hovercraft over a stretch of the Nation River that flows through the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, a 1.7 million acre federal preservation area managed by the National Park Service. 16 U. S. C. §410hh(10).
In 1867, Secretary of State William Seward, serving under President Andrew Johnson, negotiated a treaty to purchase Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, Mar. 30, 1867, 15Stat. 539. In a single stroke, the United States gained 365 million acres of land—an area more than twice the size of Texas. Despite the bargain price of two cents an acre, however, the purchase was mocked by contemporaries as “Seward’s Folly” and President Johnson’s “Polar Bear Garden.” See C. Naske & H. Slotnick, Alaska: A History 92–94 (2011) (Naske & Slotnick); S. Rep. No. 1163, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1957).
A solution was struck. The 1958 Alaska Statehood Act permitted Alaska to select 103 million acres of “vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved” federal land—just over a quarter of all land in Alaska—for state ownership. §§6(a)–(b), 72Stat. 340. That land grant included “mineral deposits,” which were “subject to lease by the State as the State legislature may direct.” §6(i), id., at 342. Upon statehood, Alaska also gained “title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters” within the State, in addition to “the natural resources within such lands and waters,” including “the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources.” §3(a), 67Stat. 30, 43 U. S. C. §1311(a); §6(m), 72Stat. 343. With over 100 million acres of land now available to the new State, Alaska could begin to fulfill its state policy “to encourage the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by making them available for maximum use consistent with the public interest.” Alaska Const., Art. VIII, §1 (2014).
The Statehood Act did not, however, determine the rights of the Alaska Natives, who asserted aboriginal title to much of the same land now claimed by the State. Naske & Slotnick 287–289. To resolve the dispute, Congress in 1971 passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which extinguished aboriginal land claims in Alaska. 85Stat. 688, as amended, 43 U. S. C. §1601 et seq. In exchange, Congress provided for a $960 million settlement and permitted corporations organized by groups of Alaska Natives to select 40 million acres of federal land to manage within the State. §§1605, 1610–1615; Naske & Slotnick 296–297. Congress sought to implement the settlement “rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs” of Alaska Natives. §1601(b).
Congress once again stepped in to settle the controversy, passing the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. 94Stat. 2371, 16 U. S. C. §3101 et seq. ANILCA had two stated goals: First, to provide “sufficient protection for the national interest in the scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values on the public lands in Alaska.” §3101(d). And second, to provide “adequate opportunity for satisfaction of the economic and social needs of the State of Alaska and its people.” Ibid.
The Secretary of the Interior has authority to “prescribe regulations” concerning “boating and other activities on or relating to water located within System units, including water subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 54 U. S. C. §100751(b) (2012 ed., Supp. II). “System units” are in turn defined as “any area of land and water administered by the Secretary, acting through the Director [of the Park Service], for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.” §§100102, 100501.
Section 103(c) of ANILCA, in contrast, addresses the scope of the Park Service’s authority over lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska. The first sentence of Section 103(c) specifies the property included as a portion of those units. It states: “Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such unit.” 16 U. S. C. §3103(c). ANILCA defines the word “land” to include “lands, waters, and interests therein,” and the term “public lands” to include “lands the title to which is in the United States after December 2, 1980,” with certain exceptions. §3102. In sum, only “lands, waters, and interests therein” to which the United States has “title” are considered “public” land “included as a portion” of the conservation system units in Alaska.
Sturgeon’s argument proceeds in two steps. First, he asserts that the Nation River is not “public land” for purposes of ANILCA and is therefore not part of the Yukon-Charley. As discussed, ANILCA defines “public lands” as lands to which the United States has “title.” 16 U. S. C. §3102. And Section 103(c) provides that “[o]nly those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such unit.” §3103(c).
Sturgeon argues that the Nation River is not “public land” because it is owned by the State and not by the Federal Government. To support his argument, Sturgeon relies on the Alaska Statehood Act, which granted ownership of the submerged lands beneath the navigable waters in Alaska, and the resources within those waters, to the State. See §6(m), 72Stat. 343; 43 U. S. C. §1311(a). He also cites this Court’s decision in United States v. California, 436 U. S. 32 (1978) , which stated that “the Submerged Lands Act transferred title to and ownership of the submerged lands and waters” to the States. Id., at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the State and not the Federal Government owns the Nation River, Sturgeon urges, it is not “public” land under ANILCA and is therefore not part of the Yukon-Charley.
Second, Sturgeon asserts that because the Nation River is not part of the Yukon-Charley, the Park Service lacks authority to regulate it. His argument rests on the second sentence of Section 103(c), which states that “[n]o lands which, before, on, or after December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.” 16 U. S. C. §3103(c).
First, the Park Service contends that the Nation River is part of the Yukon-Charley. To support that contention, the agency cites ANILCA’s definition of “public lands,” which—as noted—includes “lands, waters, and interests therein” to which the United States has “title.” 16 U. S. C. §3102. The Park Service argues that the United States has “title” to an “interest” in the water within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley under the reserved water rights doctrine.
The reserved water rights doctrine specifies that “when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” Cappaert v. United States, 426 U. S. 128, 138 (1976) . By creating the Yukon-Charley, the Park Service urges, the Federal Government reserved the water within the boundaries of the conservation system unit to achieve the Government’s conservation goals. As a result, the Federal Government has “title” to an “interest” in the Nation River, making it “public” land subject to Park Service regulations.
ANILCA itself accordingly carves out numerous Alaska-specific exceptions to the Park Service’s general authority over federally managed preservation areas. For example, ANILCA requires the Secretary of the Interior to permit “the exercise of valid commercial fishing rights or privi-leges” within the National Wildlife Refuge System in Alaska, including the use of “campsites, cabins, motorized vehicles, and aircraft landings directly incident to the exercise of such rights or privileges,” with certain exceptions. 94Stat. 2393. ANILCA also requires the Secretary to “permit on the public lands appropriate use for subsistence purposes of snowmobiles, motorboats, and other means of surface transportation traditionally employed for such purposes by local residents, subject to reasonable regulation.” 16 U. S. C. §3121(b). And it provides that National Preserves “in Alaska shall be administered and managed as a unit of the National Park System in the same manner as a national park except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the taking of fish and wildlife for sport purposes and subsistence uses, and trapping shall be allowed” pursuant to applicable law. §3201 (emphasis added).
Many similar examples are woven throughout ANILCA. See, e.g., 94Stat. 2393 (Secretary must administer wildlife refuge “so as to not impede the passage of navigation and access by boat on the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers,” subject to reasonable regulation); id., at 2388 (Secretary must allow reindeer grazing uses in certain areas, including construction of necessary facilities); 16 U. S. C. §3203(a) (Alaska-specific rules for wilderness management apply “in recognition of the unique conditions in Alaska”); §3170(a) (Secretary must permit reasonable use of snowmachines, motorboats, and airplanes within conserva-tion system units “for travel to and from villages and homesites”).
Oral Argument - January 20, 2016
14-1209