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US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 435 > LANDMARK COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, 435 U. S. 829 (1978)
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(c) The mere fact that the legislature found a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice justifying enactment of the challenged statute did not preclude the necessity of proof that such danger existed. This Court has consistently rejected the argument that out-of-court comments on pending cases or grand jury investigations constituted a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367; Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375. If the "clear and present danger" test could not be satisfied in those cases, a fortiori it could not be satisfied here. Pp. 435 U. S. 842-845. chanrobles.com-red
BURGER, C.J.,delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 435 U. S. 848. BRENNAN and POWELL, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The question presented on this appeal is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia may subject persons, including newspapers, to criminal sanctions for divulging information regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission which is authorized to hear complaints as to judges' disability or misconduct, when such proceedings are declared confidential by the State Constitution and statutes. [Footnote 1] chanrobles.com-red
The trial commenced on December 16, 1975, after the court chanrobles.com-red
At the outset, it rejected Landmark's claim that Va.Code § 2.137.13 (1973) applied only to the participants in a Commission proceeding or to the initial disclosure of confidential information. chanrobles.com-red
At the present time it appears that 47 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have established, by constitution, statute, or court rule, some type of judicial inquiry and disciplinary procedures. [Footnote 4] All of these jurisdictions, with the apparent exception of Puerto Rico, provide for the confidentiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings, although, in most, the guarantee of confidentiality extends only to the point when a formal complaint is filed with the State Supreme Court or equivalent body. [Footnote 5] Cf. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Function of the Trial Judge § 9.1 (App. Draft 1972). chanrobles.com-red
In addition to advancing these general interests, the confidentiality requirement can be said to facilitate the work of the commissions in several practical respects. When removal or retirement is justified by the charges, judges are more likely chanrobles.com-red
Acceptance of the collective judgment that confidentiality promotes the effectiveness of this mode of scrutinizing judicial conduct and integrity, however, marks only the beginning of the inquiry. Indeed, Landmark does not challenge the requirement of confidentiality, but instead focuses its attack on the determination of the Virginia Legislature, as construed by the Supreme Court, that the "divulging" or "publishing" of information concerning the work of the Commission by third parties, not themselves involved in the proceedings, should be criminally punishable. Unlike the generalized mandate of confidentiality, the imposition of criminal sanctions for its breach is not a common characteristic of the state plans; chanrobles.com-red
The narrow and limited question presented, then, is whether the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. [Footnote 9] We are not here concerned with the possible applicability of the statute to one who secures the information by illegal means and thereafter divulges it. We do not have before us any constitutional challenge to a State's power to keep the Commission's proceedings confidential or to punish participants for breach of this mandate. [Footnote 10] Cf. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 427 U. S. 564 (1976); id. at 427 U. S. 601 n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 370 U. S. 393-394 (1962). Nor does Landmark argue for any constitutionally compelled right of access for the press to those proceedings. Cf. 417 U. S. Washington Post Co., 417 chanrobles.com-red
Although chanrobles.com-red
The Commonwealth concedes that, "[w]ithout question, the First Amendment seeks to protect the freedom of the press chanrobles.com-red
The Commonwealth also focuses on what it perceives to be the pernicious effects of public discussion of Commission proceedings to support its argument. It contends that the public interest is not served by discussion of unfounded allegations of misconduct which defames honest judges and serves only to demean the administration of justice. The functioning of the Commission itself is also claimed to be impeded by premature disclosure of the complainant, witnesses, and the judge under investigation. Criminal sanctions minimize these harmful consequences, according to the Commonwealth, by ensuring that the guarantee of confidentiality is more than an empty promise. chanrobles.com-red
Moreover, neither the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the reputation of its judges nor its interest in maintaining the institutional integrity of its courts is sufficient to justify the subsequent punishment of speech at issue here, even on the assumption that criminal sanctions do, in fact, enhance the guarantee of confidentiality. Admittedly, the Commonwealth has an interest in protecting the good repute of its judges, like that of all other public officials. Our prior cases have firmly established, however, that injury to official reputation is an insufficient chanrobles.com-red
The Supreme Court of Virginia relied on the "clear and present danger" test in rejecting Landmark's claim. We question the relevance of that standard here; moreover we cannot accept the mechanical application of the test which led that court to its conclusion. Mr. Justice Holmes' test was never intended "to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 328 U. S. 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Properly chanrobles.com-red
In a series of cases raising the question of whether the contempt power could be used to punish out-of-court comments concerning pending cases or grand jury investigations, this Court has consistently rejected the argument that such commentary constituted a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. See Bridges v. California, supra; Pennekamp chanrobles.com-red
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia chanrobles.com-red
Georgia: Const., Art. 6, chanrobles.com-red
North Dakota: Cent. Code § 27-23-03(5) (Supp. 1977), Rule 4 of the Judicial Qualifications Commission; chanrobles.com-red
The relevant state constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules are listed as an 435 U. S. Confidentiality of proceedings is also an integral aspect of the proposals currently pending in Congress. See H.R. 1850, supra, § 382; H.R. 9042, supra, § 382; S. 1423, supra, § 381. None of these bills impose criminal sanctions for a breach of the confidentiality requirement.
There could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State's interest in the quality of its judiciary. Virginia's derivative interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the proceedings of its Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission seems equally clear. Only such confidentiality, the State has chanrobles.com-red