Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/356/282/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-12-16 16:54:54
Document Index: 557832370

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 303', '§ 304', '§ 302', '§ 306', '§ 304', '§ 202', '§ 303', '§ 312', '§ 310', '§ 307']

The prayer in the answer was that the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
§ 301(c). The Act also provides that "no person shall carry on the business of a market agency . . . at such stockyard unless he has registered with the Secretary. . . ." § 303. Respondent is registered not only with the Denver Union Stock Yard Co., but with other stockyards as well. One impact of the Regulations on respondent is therefore clear: having registered with this Stock Yard Company, it may chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The words "at such stockyard," as used in § 304, obviously mean, as applied to a "market agency," every stockyard where that "market agency" is registered. From the Act it seems plain, therefore, that the duty of respondent would be to furnish a producer in the Denver area stockyard service at Kansas City, if the producer so desired. Stockyards and market agencies are made public utilities by the Act. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 258 U. S. 516; Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U. S. 216, 316 U. S. 232. Their duty is to serve all, impartially and without discrimination. The Regulations bar both the market agency and the stockyard from performing their statutory duty. A market agency registered with Denver could not, by force of the challenged Regulations, furnish producers in the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The argument contra is premised on the theory that stockyard owners, like feudal barons of old, can divide up the country, set the bounds of their domain, establish "no trespassing" signs, and make market agencies registering with them their exclusive agents. The institution of the exclusive agency is, of course, well known in the law, and the legal problem here would be quite different if the Act envisaged stockyards as strictly private enterprise. But, as noted, Congress planned differently. The Senate Report proclaimed that these "great public markets" are "public utilities." S.Rep. No. 39, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 7. The House Report, in the same vein, placed this regulation of the stockyards on a par with the regulation of the railroads. H.R.Rep. No. 77, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We take the Act as written. As written, it is aimed at all monopoly practices, of which discrimination is one. When Chief Justice Taft wrote of the aim of the Act in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The regulatory scheme devised by the Congress, however, makes it possible for invalidity on the face of the regulations to be overcome by evidence showing that their application and operation is not in fact unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory. Primary jurisdiction is placed in the Secretary to make such a determination. Because of that, I should think the normal course of action where dismissal is found unwarranted would be to remand the case to the Secretary for a full hearing. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Emphasis added.) With greater force than any other possible evidence, this frank statement reveals that petitioner intended to, and did, monopolize the livestock market in the entire State of Colorado, save a small area on the eastern border. Since the Denver stockyard itself would impose the only sanction possible for violation of the regulation, namely, cancellation of registration, the affidavit is a complete answer to any chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To deny the Secretary of Agriculture the power even to hear evidence as to the reasonableness of such regulations is to misconceive the whole scheme for the regional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I respectfully dissent. The question presented is whether certain regulations issued by the owner of a posted stockyard are void on their face. Petitioner, the Denver Union Stock Yard Company, is the "stockyard owner" [Footnote 2/1] of the Denver Union stockyard, a facility in Denver, Colorado, which constitutes a "stockyard" within the meaning of § 302 of the Packers and Stockyards Act, [Footnote 2/2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Emphasis supplied.) By § 306(a), it became the duty of respondent, as a "market agency at such stockyard," to print, file with the Secretary, and keep open to public inspection "at the [Denver] stockyard," a schedule showing all rates and charges for "stockyard services" to be furnished by it "at such stockyard"; and, under § 304, it became its duty "to furnish upon reasonable request, without discrimination, reasonable chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thereupon the Secretary sent a copy of the complaint to petitioner, and, in a covering letter, stated that the complaint would be entertained as a "disciplinary proceeding" in accordance with § 202.6(b) of his rules of practice; advised that petitioner was required to file an answer within 20 days from receipt of the complaint "containing a definite statement of the facts which constitute the grounds of defense"; and concluded that, under his rules of practice, "the burden of proof [would] be upon the complainant to establish the matters complained of." Petitioner answered, admitting that it was the "owner" of the "posted" Denver Union "stockyards"; that respondent was "registered" to do business thereon as a "market agency"; that it had published the questioned regulations, but specifically denied the conclusions concerning the interpretation and effect of the regulations, and generally denied all other averments of the complaint, and then proceeded to allege facts which it concluded made the regulations reasonable and necessary to prevent unfair and unjustly discriminatory practices by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On December 23, 1955, respondent filed what it termed an "Election To Rest," reciting "that this complainant elects to stand upon the illegality of said regulation, as a matter of law," and that it would "not present evidence in this cause." Thereupon petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for failure of respondent "to sustain the burden of making a prima facie case in support of its complaint." After hearing the parties upon that motion, the hearing examiner certified the proceeding to the Judicial chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
241 F.2d 196-197. Upon petition of the Denver Union Stock Yard Company in No. 106, and of the Secretary of Agriculture in No. 118, we granted certiorari. 353 U.S. 982.
This Court now affirms. Its opinion, like that of the Court of Appeals, is based upon the conclusion that the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 304 is no less plain in stating that it is the duty of every "market agency to furnish upon reasonable request, without discrimination, reasonable stockyard services at such stockyard." (Emphasis supplied.) I submit that these provisions of the Act leave no room to doubt that a person, by registering with the Secretary to do business as a market agency at a particular stockyard, acquires the rights, and assumes the obligations, of a "market agency" only "at such stockyard." And inasmuch as the challenged regulations apply only to a "market agency or dealer engaging in business at this Stockyard" -- the Denver Union stockyard -- they cannot have any application or effect at any other stockyard. Registration to do business as a "market agency" at "such stockyard" does not give the registrant the status of a "market agency," or create the right or obligation to furnish "stockyard services," at all stockyards in the Nation, or at any place other than a particular stockyard where so registered as a "market agency." While a market agency is a public utility (Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495; Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U. S. 216, 316 U. S. 232), it is such only on the posted stockyard where registered as a market agency. Doubtless one who has the status of a "market agency," and thus also of a public utility at the Denver stockyard, may, by an additional registration under § 303, acquire a like status at another posted stockyard, yet he would not thereby become one market agency or one public utility covering the several stockyards where so registered. On the contrary, his status as a market agency and public utility on each of such posted stockyards would be just as several, separate, and independent as though owned by different persons. In legal effect, a "market agency" and public utility on chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is plain and undisputed that the regulations may not -- in the total absence of evidence, as here -- be held void unless it is clear upon their face that there cannot be any circumstances under which they, or any of them, could be lawful, "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
in violation of § 312 of the Act ( 356 U. S. and (2) that these regulations -- or at least some of them -- are a "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory [means] to be thereafter followed" (§ 310) to prevent such illegal practices by a market agency on that yard, and to enable the stockyard owner to furnish, and to require market agencies on that yard to furnish, "reasonable stockyard services," at the Denver stockyard. But, of course, the Secretary could not make findings in a vacuum -- in the total absence of evidence, as here. We must keep in mind that Congress, by § 307, made it the "duty" of petitioner to
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 313 U. S. 194. After such "full hearing," the Secretary might reasonably find, from all the facts and circumstances disclosed, that all of the regulations were just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory, or that only part of them met that test, or that none of them did so; but it is evident that he could reach no conclusion upon those matters in the total absence of any facts. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is worthy of note that, though the questioned regulations apply to "dealers" as well as market agencies on the Denver stockyard, the validity of the regulations in respect to dealers is in no way here questioned. Yet -- in the total absence of evidence and assuming certain facts -- chanroblesvirtualawlibrary