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Timestamp: 2020-08-07 21:36:30
Document Index: 468230921

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 136', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 136', 'Art.\t136', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 136']

NIHAL SINGH & ORS versus STATE OF PUNJAB
1965 AIR 26	1964 SCR (4)	5
NIHAL SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF PUNJAB [1963] RD-SC 149 (10 May 1963)
CITATION: 1965 AIR 26	1964 SCR (4)	5
RF	1972 SC 622	(32)
Criminal Trial-Acquittal order set aside by	High Court--Appeal preferred to this Court-Procedure to	be followed by this Court in hearing the appeal-Constitution of India, Art. 136.
The appellants formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and in pursuance of their common object caused the death of two persons. They were tried under ss. 148 and 302/149 of Indian	Penal Code. The trial Court acquitted them of	all the charges. On appeal, the High Court, on a review of	the entire	evidence, set	aside the order of acquittal	and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment	for life and one year respectively under the aforesaid charges.
Held, (per Subba Rao and Mudholkar JJ.) This Court has	full discretion to hear an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitu- tion on facts and law.	But this wide jurisdiction has to be regulated by the practice of this Court. There are two ways of approach to the hearing of such an appeal by this Court :
one is to go through the entire evidence and then come to a conclusion whether the High	Court	has infringed	the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh's case or whether	the appeal	is an exceptional one which calls for	the interference of this Court in the interest of justice.	The other and more convenient method is to allow the counsel to state the case broadly and, after	going through	the judgments of the lower courts, to come to a conclusion whether	the appeal falls under one or other	of the	two categories mentioned above, and then, if the court is satisfied that	it is	a fit case to	review	the entire evidence, to do so.
The second method is a more convenient one as it also	pre vents the unnecessary waste of time involved in adopting the alter native procedure of treating practically such an appeal	as a regulaappeal. Obviously this Court cannot	lay down an inflexible rule of practice in this regard and it must be left to the division benches to follow the procedure that appears suitable to them.
6 Sanwat	Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1961] 3	S.C.R.	120, followed.
State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry, A.I.R. 1960 S.C.	391, followed.
(2) The High Court had borne in mind the principles	laid down by this Court in Sanwat Singh's case and had considered the entire evidence carefully and arrived at the finding of fact as it did.	It is not an exceptional case in which	the entire evidence can be reviewed.
Held (per Raghubar Dayal J.) (1) Dividing the hearing of an appeal	under Art. 136 into two parts, hearing on a broader view and later, if necessary, on facts, does not go to	make a hearing as perfect as it would be desirable for a proper adjudication of the appeal.
(2) It	is not desirable to lay down any limitation about the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court and the limits of the exercise of its discretion in hearing an appeal of this nature as this Court has full discretion to hear an appeal on both facts and law.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 1962.
Appeal	by special leave from the judgment and	order dated January 9, 1961, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1018 of 1960.
B. K. Khanna and P. D. Menon, for the respondent. May 10, 1963.The judgment of	Subba Rao and	Mudholkar JJ.,	was delivered by Subba Rao J. Dayal J. delivered	a separate Opinion.
SUBBA RAO J.-The appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of judicature for Punjab at Chandigarh setting aside that of the Second Additional Sessions judge, Ferozepore, acquitting the 5 appellants of the charges under S. 148 and ss. 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code and convicting them under the	said sections	and sentencing each of them to rigorous imprisonment for	life and one year respectively.
The prosecution case may be briefly stated : On December 23, 1959, the 5 appellants formed themselves into	an unlawful assembly and in pursuance of their common object caused	the death of Gurdit Singh and his son Pal Singh. At about sunset time on that date, the 7 five appellants were present in the haveli of Banta Singh, the father of Nihal Singh, Appellant 1. When Tara Singh was proceeding towards his house, the 5 appellants, armed	with deadly	weapons, came out of the haveli and chased him	for the purpose of assaulting him.	At that time Ranjit Singh, who was watering his cattle at a nearby well, asked them not to beat Tara Singh. Tara Singh also raised an alarm when he was being pursued by the appellants. Gurdit Singh, father of Ranjit Singh, Gurdit Singh's another son Pal Singh	and Pal Singh's son Balbir Singh also came out of their house on hearing	the alarm raised by Tara Singh. Pal Singh	was carrying a take away in his hand. Gurdit Singh and	Pal Singh asked the assailants not to beat Tara Singh. Dalip Singh, Appellant 3, caught hold of Pal Singh from behind and Nihal Singh, Appellant 1, aimed a dang blow at Pal Singh's head.	Pal Singh used his takwa in self-defence against Darshan	Singh, Appellant 4,	whereupon Harbans Singh, Appellant 5, gave a blow with his takwa to Pal Singh and the latter	fell down. Thereafter, Darshan Singh	and Pritam Singh,	Appellant 2 belaboured Pal Singh with	their takwa when the latter was lying on the ground. The takwa in	the hand of Pal Singh fell down from his hand and thereupon	his father,	Gurdit Singh, seized the same and attempted to	use it against the appellants; Pritam Singh gave a dang blow to Gurdit	Singh on his head. Harbans Singh and Darshan Singh also did likewise. Gurdit Singh died on the spot and	Pal Singh,	a little time	thereafter. The appellants	were committed to the Sessions to meet the aforesaid charges.
The appellants	pleaded "not guilty" to the	charges	and stated that they were all implicated because of enmity.	The learned Additional Sessions judge, on a consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution	had failed	to prove their case beyond all manner of doubt against	any of the accused and, on that finding, acquitted all of them. On appeal, the High Court, on a review of	the entire	evidence, came to a different conclusion : it	held that the learned Additional Sessions judge was completely wrong in discrediting the prosecution witnesses and, on that find IA-2 S C India/64 8 ing. It convicted the appellants :.and sentenced them as aforesaid. Hence the appeal.
This Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan(1)	laid down the following principles governing the mode	of disposing of an appeal against an order of acquittal made by a. subordinate Court "The foregoing discussion yields the following results : (1). an appellate Court has.	full powers to review the evidence upon which	the order of	acquittal is	founded	; (2)	the principles, laid down	in sheo Swarup's case(1)afford a correct guide for the appeals late Court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal ;	and (3)	the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (1) substantial	and compelling reasons", (ii) "good and sufficient cogent reasons", and' (ii) "strong reasons" are not	intended to curtail the undoubted power of	an appellate Court in an appeal against.	acquittal 'to	review	the entire evidence and to 'Come to its own conclusion ;
but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a	bearing on the, questions of fact and the reasons given by the Court below in support of its order of acquittal	in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment which lead it to	hold that the acquittal was not justified." But the more difficult question is to define the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court and the limits I of	the exercise of its discretion in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution against the judgment of the	High Court convicting an	I accused after setting aside the order of acquittal made by a subordinate Court.	Article 136 of	the Constitution is couched in the widest phraseology	This Court's jurisdiction is limited only by its discretion.	It can, therefore, in its discretion, entertain an appeal	and exercise all the powers of an appellate Court in respect of judgments, decrees determinations, sentences	or orders mentioned therein' It means that,this Court has	undoubtedly jurisdiction to interfere even with (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, 129.
(2) [1931] L.R. 61 I.A.	398.
9 findings of fact arrived at by the High Court in an appeal setting	aside those of a subordinate Court acquitting	the accused. But this wide jurisdiction has to be regulated by the practice of this Court. The fact that the appellate Court in setting aside the order of acquittal has not	fol- lowed the principles	laid down by this Court in Sanwat Singh's	case(1) may certainly be a ground for	this Court interfering with the judgment of the High Court. But if the High Court, having followed the aforesaid principles,	has considered the evidence and given findings of fact thereon, we think the same practice obtaining in this Court in regard to findings of fact	in appeals under Art.	136 of	the Constitution may conveniently be adopted. This Court in State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry (2)	has	recorded the practice obtaining in this Court in regard to the regulation of the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of	the Constitution in criminal appeals thus at p. 395 :
Article 136 of	the Constitution does	not confer a right of appeal on any party from the decision	of a Court ;	but it confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. It is: implicit in the discretionary power that it cannot be exhaustively defined. It cannot obviously be so construed as to confer a right on a party where he has none under the law.	The practice of the Privy Council and that followed by	the Federal Court and the Supreme Court is not to interfere	on questions	of fact except in exceptional cases, when the finding is	such that "it shocks the conscience of the Court" or "by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial and grave injustice has been done.
The same practice may also govern the exercise of discretion of this Court in disposing of an appeal against a judgment of an appellate Court setting aside an order of acquittal made by a subordinate Court.	Shortly	stated, ordinarily this Court addresses itself to two questions when such an appeal comes before it for disposal, namely,, (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, 129.
10 (i)did	the appellate Court follow the principles laid	down by this Court in Sanwat Singh's case (1) in	appreciating the evidence ; and (ii) if it did, is it one of those exceptional cases which calls for the interference of	this Court.	There are two ways of approach to such an appeal :
one is to go through the entire evidence as this Court	does in a regular appeal and then come to a	conclusion whether the High Court has infringed the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh's case(1) or to ascertain whether the appeal is an exceptional one which calls for the interference of	this Court in the	interest of justice. The other and	more convenient method is to allow the counsel to state the	case broadly and, after going through the judgments of the lower Courts,	to come to a conclusion whether the appeal falls under one or other of the two categories mentioned above and then, if the Court is satisfied that it is a fit case to review the entire evidence, to do so. Obviously this Court cannot	lay down an inflexible rule of practice in	this regard	and it must be left to the division Benches dealing with such appeals to follow the procedure that appears suitable to them. But it may not be out of place to observe that in our view the second method is a more appropriate or at any rate a more convenient one, for while it enables this Court to do justice in an appropriate case, it also prevents the unnecessary waste	of time involved in adopting	the alternative procedure of treating practically such an appeal as a regular appeal.
Let us now look at the contentions of the parties from	the said perspective. The prosecution story was deposed to by three -eye-witnesses, Ranjit Singh (P.W. 2), Saudagar Singh (P.W. 3) and Balbir Singh (P.W. 4) and by Balwant Singh, Sarpanch (P.W. 7), who is -alleged to have gone to the	spot immediately after the occurrence. This oral	evidence is also sought to be corroborated by the production of weapons by the	accused persons. The learned	Additional Sessions judge discarded the evidence mainly on the following grounds : (1) The distance between the havli of Banta Singh and	the place of (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, 129.
11 occurrence is	17 karams i. e., about 85 feet, and	that between the place of occurrence and the gate of the house of Pal Singh is 22 karams, i.e., about 110 feet, and therefore it is not possible that the impact between the assailants and the deceased persons could have taken place at the place of clash as described by the prosecution witnesses. (2)	The time when the murders were committed was about 9 p.m.	and not sunset time as has been described by the	prosecution witnesses, for (a) the medical evidence showed	that there was semidigested food of about 2 lbs. in the	stomach of Gurgit	Singh and also 12 ounces of urine in his bladder, which indicated that he should have been done to death	when asleep	after taking meals ; (b) as P.W. 1 the	lady doctor has stated that the likely duration between the injuries inflicted on the two deceased persons and their death	was about 4 or 5 hours ; this circumstance contradicts	the evidence that they succumbed to the injuries soon after they were injured ; (c) the distance between the	village of occurrence and the police station Mallan Wala is about 61 miles and therefore P.W. 2 who gave the first	information report should have reached the police station at the latest at about 9 p.m., but as a matter of fact the	report	was lodged	at about 12.45 a.m. on December 24, 1959. (3)	(a) While P.W. 2 stated that the deceased Gurdit Singh gave a takwa blow on	the head of	Nihal Singh, the doctor's examination did not disclose that there was any injury on the head of Nihal Singh, but there was only	an abration "'XI" on the back of -his left thumb ; (b) while P.W. 3 stated	that deceased Gurdit Singh had used takwa against Dalip Singh, the doctor was not in a position to state	the nature of the weapon with which the injury found on him	was inflicted. (4) Dalip Singh not having been found with	any weapon, his name should have been falsely introduced by	the prosecution. (5) P.W. 7 stated in the cross-examination that he could not say that the blood found in the two places near the chowk was a masha or more and that it negatived	the story of the	murder	of two	persons at the place of occurrence. And (6)	there are discrepancies in minor particulars between the evidence of different witnesses.
12 The High Court was satisfied that the	learned Additional Sessions judge magnified the importance of minor aspects of the evidence and minimised or ignored its basic features.
Having due regard to the principles laid down by this Court in Sanvat Singh's case(1), the High Court considered	the evidence over again in detail and came the conclusion	that the prosecution had brought home the guilt to the accused.
Mr. A. Ranganadham Chetty, for the appellants contends	that the learned Additional Sessions judge had taken a reasonable view of the evidence and the High Court wrongly took a different view by	not appreciating the important circumstances which weighed with the	Additional Sessions Judge and that, on the evidence, a cleir case	of private defence has been made out.
The important around that appealed to the learned Additional Sessions judge was that, having regard to the distances, the deceased could not have been murdered at the place where it is alleged by the witnesses that they were so murdered.	If we may	say so, this argument on the	basis of time	and distance and	the movements	of witnesses	is highly hypothetical and artificial, for the simple reason that it is impossible to expect any witness, much less an illiterate one, to describe the said particulars in such a scientific detail	as to stand the test of calculation. But that is what the learned Additional Sessions Judge did and it	was rightly discarded by the High Court.
The next circumstance strongly relied upon is	the insect bites found on the dead body of Pal Singh. Dr. Balbir Kaur, the lady doctor, in her postmortem examination of the	dead body found that "both nostrils, lower lips and fore-head bore the insect bite". Udham Singh the Police Officer, in his injury statement, described the said injuries as	"the bite marks of some animal like a rat on the nose, the lower lip, the right cheek and the lid of left eye". The	lady doctor's description may be accepted as more accurate.	It is, there (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, 129, 13 fore clear that there was some insect bite on the face of the deceased Pal Singh. The contention is that no rat or insect could have bitten a dead body in the room in which it was placed when the light was burning, when it was covered and when so many people were present by its	side,	and, therefore, the said bite must have been caused by some	rat or rats when the deceased was sleeping at about 9 p.m.	near a sugar-cane crusher installed in the field.	It is	true that there is some evidence that sugar-cane	crusher	was purchased, though it	was not installed and it was in a vacant	space measuring about 5 to 6 marlas at the back of Ranjit	Singh's	house.	But from this it would be an unreasonable inference that the witnesses were not speaking the truth. We do not see any improbability in some insect or rat getting under the cloth covering the dead body	and biting it.
Another circumstance which has been magnified by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is the discovery at the time of postmortem of not less than 2 lbs. of semi-degested food in the stomach and 12 ounces of urine in the bladder of	the deceased Gurdit Singh. It is said that this	circumstance demonstrates that the said deceased must have taken his food and must be sleeping when he was murdered, for if he	was murdered at 5.30 p.m. as the witnesses deposed there would not have been such semi-digested food in the stomach of	the deceased or such a large quantity of urine in his bladder.
The High Court pointed out that the	said circumstances cannot	afford a reliable basis of ascertaining the time of death,	particularly when there is nothing on the record to show that the deceased had not taken any food a couple. of hours before he was attacked. Apart from the fact that	the time required	to digest food varies	depending upon	the nature	of the food taken, the digestive capacity of	the individual concerned and his health at a particular time, it is also not possible to rely upon such evidence unless there is some definite evidence that the deceased had not taken any substantial food within a few hours before	his death.
Without	such definite	data, a Court cannot come to	any conclusion on the general habit of villagers taking lunch at 1 p.m. and dinner at 7 p.m. The capacity to retain urine for longer time than usual depends upon 14 individual habits. That apart this aspect of the case	was not pursued in the cross-examination of the doctor and no question was put to her on the basis of the said two	fac- tors. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding	that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was wrong in giving undue importance to the said circumstances.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge again relied upon	the statement of Dr. Balbir Kaur. to the effect that	the duration between the	infliction of the injuries on	the deceased and their death might be 4 or 5 hours and concluded that the witnesses were not speaking the truth when	they said that the deceased succumbed to the injuries either on the spot or immediately after receiving the injuries.	The doctor in her evidence said that in the case of Gurdit Singh the injuries were anti-mortem in nature and that the prob- able time between the infliction of the injuries and death was a few hours or so and that in the case of Pal Singh also she said that the probable time between the infliction of the injury and death was a few hours.	This evidence	was only a mere surmise and was neither intended to be accurate nor was it based up any scientific data. She	only meant that death had taken place within a few hours after	the incident. Such a bald opinion could not certainly outweigh the direct evidence in the case. Some argument was made in regard to the alleged delay in lodging the first information report	at the police station in support of the contention that the murder must have been committed in	the night.
According to the prosecution the murder was committed at 5.30 p.m. ; the first information report was lodged at 12.45 a.m. the next day i. e., just after midnight. From this it is stated that the distance between	the place of	the incident and the police station is only 6-1/2 miles and that there is some evidence to show that the parties went on mares and that the delay in giving the report supports	the case that the murder must have been committed only in	the night.	That was accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.	The High Court rightly pointed out that in	the circumstances of the case the first information report	was neither	unduly	nor unnecessarily delayed. Ranjit Singh stated	in the evidence that he did not use mares at all in going to the police station, as the road was not fit	for using them and the witnesses also stated that they 15 wanted	to go quietly without being noticed by	the accused who were hovering about the place. In the circumstances we agree with the High Court that there was no such delay as to discredit the	evidence on the ground that	the first information report was concocted and the evidence was so shaped	as to fit in the version given in the first infor- mation report.
Another fact relied upon by the learned Additional Sessions judge	in discrediting the eye-witnesses is that	the witnesses stated that the deceased gave a takwa blow on	the head of Nihal Singh, but the medical examination showed only a small abrasion on	his left thumb. The	High Court explained that	the witnesses must be describing only	the movements of the accused with their weapons and they could not obviously give evidence as to where a particular weapon hit the body, for that would depend upon not only the manner in which the persons wielded their weapons but also on	the movements of the victim. A hit aimed at the head may, if the victim moves aside, miss altogether the body of	the victim	or fall on a part of his body different from	that aimed at. There is certainly force in what the High Court said.
It was	then stated that according to some	prosecution witnesses the accused had raised their weapons with a	view to using them against Tara Singh and indeed surrounded	him and that, if that version was upheld, it was impossible	for Tara Singh to escape unhurt. If that be so, the argument proceeded, the version given by the prosecution witnesses must be untrue. This argument is built upon	the English expression "surrounded", which is translated from a corresponding word in the Punjabi language. We are	told that the Punjabi expression would also mean "pursued".	Be it as it may, no argument could be built upon that, because in the context, the witnesses could have only meant that the accused pursued Tara Singh.
We are satisfied that the High Court has borne in mind	the principles laid down by this Court in Sanwat Singh's case(1) and has considered the entire evidence (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, 129.
16 carefully and arrived at the finding of fact as it did.	We do not see any exceptional circumstances to depart from	the usual practice and review the evidence over again.
Then it is contended that on the facts found	a case of private defence has been made out. It may be mentioned that the plea of private defence has not been taken either before the learned Additional Sessions judge or before the	High Court on appeal. Nor is there any foundation for such a plea on the facts found. The argument is mainly built	upon the description of the event by the eye-witnesses. P.W. 2 described the incident thus:
"While the accused were still chasing	Tara Singh, my father Gurdit Singh and brother	Pal Singh came out of their house, Pal Singh armed with a takwa.
When Gurdit Singh and Pal Singh came out of their house they requested the accused not to beat Tara Singh. Dalip Singh,	accused, on hearing those words of Gurdit Singh and	Pal Singh, took Pal	Singh	in his	grasp	from behind.	At that stage Nihal Singh, accused, gave a dang blow at the head of Pal Singh, Pal Singh then used his takwa in self defence, against Darshan	Singh,	accused, using	the blunt side thereof. Thereafter, Harbans Singh accused,	gave a takwa blow using the blunt side thereof to Pal Singh.
It is argued that after Tara Singh practically escaped	from the attacks of the assailants, Darshan Singh just held	the hand of Pal Singh from behind whereupon Pal Singh used	his Takwa and in self-defence the accused used their weapons.
This argument was addressed on the assumption that no takwa blow was aimed on the head of Pal Singh and the accused only grasped Pal Singh. If that was so, the argument proceeded, Pal Singh in	using his takwa was	the aggressor	and, therefore, the accused were entitled to defend	themselves.
If we	accept	this argument, we would	be misreading	the evidence. Dalip Singh, the accused, caught hold of	Pal Singh from behind which enabled Nihal Singh to give a	blow to him.	The said act of Dalip Singh and the immediate 17 blow given to	Pal Singh by Nihal Singh followed by	the subsequent blows by the other accused leave no scope for the argument of private defence.	The accused were certainly aggressors and no question of private defence would arise in this case.
Lastly	it is	contended that	the prosecution has	not established any common object of the accused to murder	the deceased and,	therefore, the	High Court was wrong in convicting them under ss. 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code.
It is said that nothing has been suggested in the evidence that the accused were lying in wait to kill Tara Singh or his rescuers, that the incident developed suddenly	and, therefore there is no common object to kill either of	the two deceased.	But the evidence clearly discloses that	all the accused conjointly took	active	part in inflicting serious injuries on the two deceased. Accused-3 grasped Pal Singh from behind, Accused-1 gave a dang blow on his head, Accused-5 gave	a takwa blow on him, and after	the victim fell down, Accused-2 and 4 gave soti blows to him while he was lying on the ground ; so too, Accused-2 gave a dang blow on the head of Gurdit Singh. Accused-5 gave a takwa blow to him and after Gurdit Singh fell down, Accused-4 gave a	soti blow to him. It is, therefore, obvious that all the accused were armed with deadly weapons and that as soon as	Tara Singh came they rushed at him and when the deceased came to rescue him they conjointly used those weapons and gave	them serious	injuries which ended in their immediate death.	In the circumstances the object to kill the deceased was	writ large on the evidence.	There is no force in this argument.
RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-I agree that the appeal be dismissed. I, however, state	about	the approach of the Court to	such appeals. I do not consider it desirable to lay down	any limitation about the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court and the limits of the exercise of its discretion in an appeal	under Art. 136 against the judgment of a High Court convicting an	accused	after setting aside the order of acquittal made by a subordinate court.	The entire exercise of the Court's discretion under Art. 136 is solely dependant on the views of a particular Bench deciding a 18 certain	appeal on the basis of the facts and law and it is for that Bench as to how to proceed to hear and decide	that appeal.	No useful purpose to my mind, is served by laying down what appears to a certain Bench to be a preferable mode for hearing such appeals and when to	interfere with	the order of the Court below.
Ordinarily one would like to exercise it according to	the practice of the Court if that be definite and uniform.
Different Benches appear to have proceeded in different manner	and to have had different objective outlook on	the appeal. Reference may be made to the observations of	this Court in Harnam Singh v. State of Punjab(1)- It is really for the Bench hearing the special leave peti- tion to consider as fully as possible whether the	case deserves a hearing in this Court; if it deserves a hearing whether	that is to be limited to any particular aspect of law or fact and that therefore if the Bench grants special leave,	it should make clear	the matters on which it considers a hearing in this Court desirable or necessary.
If no	such indication is given, I would prefer that	the appeal be heard both on facts and law.	of course everybody is agreed that the appeal is to be heard on points of	law.
There is also some common agreement that one	should	not lightly	interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the High Court, but in this matter there is	always	wide scope for different outlook. It is better that the counsel for the parties should know beforehand on what points	that would be heard so that they come prepared on those points.
What happens now, to my mind, is that counsel usually	come ready for questions of law.	The appellant's counsel, however, tries to induce the Court to go into questions of fact and whenever he succeeds he has not much to argue thereafter. The respondent's counsel, however, is taken un- awares.	He does not come prepared to meet the appellant on facts.	He can do his best in the circumstances to help	the Court,	and this cannot be much. I therefore feel	that dividing the hearing of an appeal under Art. 136 (1) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 104.
19 into two parts, hearing on a broader view and later, if necessary, on facts, does not go to make a hearing as	per- fect as it would be desirable for a proper adjudication of the appeal. If parties know that once they obtain special leave without limitations they will be free to argue on facts, they will come prepared and will present the case as best as possible for their clients, and the Court too would be in a better position to decide.
of course, after hearing the appeal fully, this Court is in the best position as to how to dispose of the	appeal.	It can surely dispose of it by merely stating that it sees no reason	to consider the findings of fact to be incorrect or it may consider those findings and express a different	opi- nion.
I would, however, as stated earlier, not like	to express anything with respect to how such an appeal be heard by this Court, when it is not doubted that this Court has	full discretion to hear an appeal on facts and law and has,	for similar reason laid down that the High Court has full power to review evidence when hearing an appeal against acquittal under s. 423 Cr. P.C.