Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/756/1223/162076/
Timestamp: 2020-02-28 12:17:08
Document Index: 131256066

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 183', '§ 1304', '§ 182', '§ 192', '§ 1304', '§ 1303', '§ 182', '§ 1304', 'art, 682', '§ 183']

Union Oil Company of California, Mobil Producing Texas & Newmexico, Inc. and Diamond Shamrock Corporation,plaintiffs-appellees, v. M/v Point Dover, Her Engines, Tackle, Appurtenances, Etc.,in Rem, Defendant,andpoint Marine, Inc., Her Owner and Operator, in Personam,defendant-appellant, 756 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
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Union Oil Company of California, Mobil Producing Texas & Newmexico, Inc. and Diamond Shamrock Corporation,plaintiffs-appellees, v. M/v Point Dover, Her Engines, Tackle, Appurtenances, Etc.,in Rem, Defendant,andpoint Marine, Inc., Her Owner and Operator, in Personam,defendant-appellant, 756 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1985)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 756 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1985) April 11, 1985
Point Marine argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that the vessel owner would be liable on the imputed, admitted, Master's negligence under the usual principle of respondeat superior. Rather, it contends the phrase "actual fault or privity" should be interpreted and applied in light of the usual meaning attributed to the phrase in the vast body of maritime law including its use in the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183(a), the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (b), and the Fire Statute, 46 U.S.C. § 182. We agree and reverse.
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Sabine Towing Co., 117 F.2d 694, 1941 A.M.C. 262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 588, 61 S. Ct. 1111, 85 L. Ed. 1543, 1941 A.M.C. 1010 (1941), we dealt with a similar phrase in a marine insurance policy. The Continental Insurance policy provided in part:
Continental, 117 F.2d at 700 n. 12, 1941 A.M.C. at 270 n. 12 (emphasis supplied). Sabine Towing contended, and in that case the district court agreed, that the phrase "without fault or privity" should be applied only in connection with willful or intentional acts on the part of the assured. We disagreed and determined that "without fault or privity" should be given the same meaning and effect as used in the American2 and English statutes3 . In reaching this decision we reasoned that Sabine's offer of oral testimony concerning the underwriters' meaning and effect of the words used was inadmissible since this phrase as used in insurance policies or other maritime contracts has a plain and settled meaning in popular and legal usage.4
In Larsen v. Insurance Co. of North America, 362 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1966), the Ninth Circuit determined that the phrase "navigation and/or management of the vessel" in an Inchmaree clause5 in a marine insurance policy should be given the same construction as is given under the Harter Act,6 46 U.S.C. § 192 and COGSA,7 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (a). It was argued in that case that the special purpose of the Harter Act and COGSA rendered a similar construction of the phrase in the insurance policy inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.
The analysis of Continental and Larsen applies with equal force to give us ample basis for independently reaching a like result here. The phrase "actual fault or privity" in the lore and the law of the sea has a settled meaning as do the familiar terms bo's'n or fo'c's'le head. Cf. Empire Seafood, Inc. v. Anderson, 398 F.2d 204, 210 n. 4, 1968 A.M.C. 2664, 2671 n. 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983, 89 S. Ct. 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1968). The construction which Union seeks, would repudiate over a century of legal writing and salty literature.
We would add that actual fault or privity is not the only time-worn, war-weary maritime term of art used in this charter party. That same clause contains the phrase "due diligence."10 The general maritime law reads into every charter a warranty of seaworthiness. The CALEDONIA, 157 U.S. 124, 130, 15 S. Ct. 537, 540, 39 L. Ed. 644, 646 (1895). This warranty is absolute and does not depend upon the knowledge of the owner or diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. Martin v. The SOUTHWARK, 191 U.S. 1, 6, 24 S. Ct. 1, 2, 48 L. Ed. 65, 68 (1903). COGSA ameliorated this absolute warranty and substituted an obligation on the part of the vessel owner to use "due diligence" to make the vessel seaworthy. COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(1). Specifically, the use of the phrase "due diligence" in this charter party creates rights and obligations as understood by proctors, ex-proctors and former proctors.
What is privity or knowledge turns on the facts of each individual case. Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1975). The phrase "actual fault or privity" in light of the principles of the Limitation Act means complicity by managerial levels in the fault that caused the casualty. Empire Seafoods, 398 F.2d at 210 n. 4, 1968 A.M.C. at 2671 n. 4. Under these principles the owner is relieved of personal liability when he or managerial persons have not been personally negligent or privy to the negligence of servants or agents. Continental, 117 F.2d at 698, 1941 A.M.C. at 268. It is similar to the Fire Statute's, 46 U.S.C. § 182 use of the phrase "design or neglect." A finding of neglect of owner means personal negligence, or in the case of a corporate owner, negligence of managing officers and agents as distinguished from that of the Master or his subordinates. Consumers Import Co. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Kawasaki Zosenjo, 320 U.S. 249, 64 S. Ct. 15, 88 L. Ed. 30, 1943 A.M.C. 1209 (1943); see also Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420, 424-25, 53 S. Ct. 200, 200-01, 77 L. Ed. 403, 1933 A.M.C. 1, 5 (1932); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. M/V LESLIE LYKES, 734 F.2d 199, 210, 1985 A.M.C. 247, 256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1984), Complaint of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A., 677 F.2d 225, 1982 A.M.C. 1710 (2d Cir. 1982).
COGSA, in 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (b), provides that "neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from--(b) fire unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier...." Actual fault or privity as contained in this COGSA provision has been held to be substantially equivalent to "design or neglect" in the Fire Statute. Complaint of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A., 677 F.2d at 228, 1982 A.M.C. at 1714; Asbestos Corp. Ltd. v. Compagnie De Navigation Fraissinet Et Cyprien Fabre, 480 F.2d 669, 672, 1973 A.M.C. 1683, 1686 (2d Cir. 1973).
Union urges that the negligence of the Master in becoming disoriented, circling around the rig and in allowing the winch to labor for five to ten minutes was within the privity and knowledge of Point Marine's shoreside management. We simply cannot understand why. The vessel (and crew) were miles from shore and any shore-based personnel, top or low level. These acts of the Master and the crew--bewildered or not--were purely errors in navigation while at sea which, under the facts of this case imposed no liability on the vessel or owner. See Farrell Lines v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10, 1976 A.M.C. 1639, 1643 (5th Cir. 1976); Jacobus Grauwiller Co. v. Reichert, 136 F.2d 904, 1943 A.M.C. 822 (2d Cir. 1943); General Foods Corp. v. The MORMACSURF, 276 F.2d 722, 1960 A.M.C. 1103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822, 81 S. Ct. 58, 5 L. Ed. 2d 52, 1961 A.M.C. 288 (1960).
In determining how to interpret these common phrases we recall that the principal purpose of the Limitation Act is to afford protection to the remote owner who, after the ship is underweigh, has no effective control over the vessel, its Master and crew. Tittle v. Aldacosta, 544 F.2d 752, 756, 1978 A.M.C. 112, 117 (5th Cir. 1977); G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, Sec. 10-20 at 877 (1975); see also Mac Towing, Inc. v. American Commercial Lines, 670 F.2d 543, 548 (5th Cir. 1982). The disorientation of the vessel's Master and the weighing of the anchor were errors made by the Master or crew and were intimately connected with the remote navigation of the ship.
Union also urges that the failure to have these nautical charts aboard the vessel was due to a failure to use due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy thus permitting a finding of liability under the terms of the charter party. Although failure to provide a vessel with essential navigational charts may constitute unseaworthiness, see e.g., Com. of Puerto Rico v. The S.S. ZOE COLOCOTRONI, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1333, 1979 A.M.C. 21, 26-27 (D.Puerto Rico 1978), affirmed in part, vacated in part, 682 F.2d 652, 1981 A.M.C. 2185 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912, 101 S. Ct. 1350, 67 L. Ed. 2d 336, 1981 A.M.C. 2099 (1981); The MARIA, 91 F.2d 819, 1937 A.M.C. 934 (4th Cir. 1937), Union's argument fails since there was no proof at trial that a significant chart was reasonably available.
Although the vessel must be manned with a competant crew, a deficiency in manning that has no causal connection to the damages in issue is not significant. Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 212, 215, 1934 A.M.C. 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1934). In Southern Pacific, cargo claimants in a limitation proceeding urged that the sailing without a first assistant engineer was statutory fault triggering the application of The PENNSYLVANIA, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 22 L. Ed. 148 (1874). The court determined that the vessel was entitled to limitation since there was no showing of any causal connection between the lack of the engineer and the collision in that case. See also, Gertrude Parker, Inc. v. Abrams, 178 F.2d 259, 263, 1950 A.M.C. 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1949).
Assuming, without deciding the applicability of the regulation,13 we conclude that the failure to have a licensed chief engineer on board could not have been a cause of the damage to Union's pipeline. Had the chief engineer been aboard as urged, he would, or ought to have been, at his accustomed station in the engine room. How one in the engine room could have averted hooking up the pipeline is a mystery of the deep. Although the rule of The PENNSYLVANIA imposes a strenuous burden, it does not negate the clear requirement of causation. Candies Towing v. The M/V B & C ESERMAN, 673 F.2d 91, 1983 A.M.C. 2033 (5th Cir. 1982). Whatever statutory violation occurred, it did not have anything to do with the pipeline snag.
Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183(a)