Source: https://casetext.com/case/dixon-v-massanari
Timestamp: 2019-03-20 21:55:43
Document Index: 558251458

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404']

Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171 | Casetext
Dixon v. Massanari
270 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2001)
ReadReadAttorney AnalysesAnalyses0lockCiting BriefsBriefs3lockCiting CasesCiting Cases2k
Dixonv.Massanari
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh CircuitNov 8, 2001
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Patricia J. Gorence, United States Magistrate Judge.
David Skidmore (argued), Social Security Admin., Office of the Gen. Counsel, Region V, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: RIPPLE, ROVNER, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
Hattie Dixon received a belated 50th birthday present on May 10, 1995. On that date, the Commissioner of Social Security determined, on Dixon's application, that she was "disabled" as of her 50th birthday (February 27, 1995) because then her age, combined with her serious medical condition, limited education, absence of transferable work skills, and ability to perform nothing more than sedentary work, earned her supplemental security income benefits under a medical-vocational guideline. Prior to turning 50, Dixon's age was not a recognizable factor in deciding whether she was entitled to benefits, and Dixon has been trying to get those benefits since 1990 when she stopped working. This case focuses, then, on a narrow question: Does substantial evidence support the Commissioner's conclusion that she was not disabled, as that term is defined by law, between 1990 and the day she turned 50 in 1995.
Although ALJ Kelly's decision after Dixon's third administrative hearing is the key matter before us, that decision drew on earlier decisions, so all, where pertinent, will be discussed. At Dixon's first administrative hearing in October 1991, ALJ Ronald G. Bernoski considered testimony, from a vocational expert, that more than 10,000 sedentary, unskilled jobs existed in the Milwaukee area. After the hearing, in January 1992, Dr. Michael Dawson examined Dixon and noted complaints about her diabetes, high blood pressure, knee and back pain. He also assessed her ability to work, indicating that she could lift no more than 10 pounds, could neither stand nor walk for more than 1 hour in an 8 hour workday, and could not sit for more than 1 hours at a time.
On August 6, 1992, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded, finding that Dixon's ability to work was limited to jobs that allowed her to alternate between sitting and standing. Dixon testified at a second administrative hearing before Bernoski in November 1992 and said she took Motrin for arthritis and insulin for diabetes. At that time, she also testified that she could stand for no more than 20 minutes at a time, but that she could "sit at a job" with little difficulty. A vocational expert testified that 9,200 jobs offering a sit/stand option existed in the Milwaukee area. Relying on this evidence, Bernoski issued a decision on December 23, 1992, again finding that Dixon was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Dixon's request for review, and Bernoski's finding became the Commissioner's final decision. Dixon requested judicial review in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. On September 19, 1995, the district court remanded, determining that substantial evidence did not support the Commissioner's final decision that Dixon was not disabled.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Schoenfeld v. Apfel, 237 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2001). In reviewing the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision, we use the same deferential standard of review as the district court. See id. The Social Security Act limits the scope of judicial review, providing that the agency's findings of fact are conclusive so long as substantial evidence supports them and no error of law occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001).
To determine disability, the ALJ makes a five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant is currently employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3) whether the claimant's impairment is one that the Commissioner considers conclusively disabling, (4) if the claimant does not have a conclusively disabling impairment, whether she can perform her past relevant work, and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 885. Dixon's appeal focuses on steps four and five of this inquiry.
The first issue we address is whether ALJ Kelly reasonably evaluated the opinions of Dixon's physicians. Dixon argues that the ALJ improperly failed to give Dr. Voss' opinion controlling weight as that of a treating physician. A treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, a claimant is not entitled to disability benefits simply because her physician states that she is "disabled" or unable to work. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. The Commissioner, not a doctor selected by a patient to treat her, decides whether a claimant is disabled. See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1).
Here, ALJ Kelly decided not to give Voss' opinion controlling weight because she seriously doubted its credibility. We do not overturn an ALJ's credibility determinations unless they are "patently wrong." See id. at 887. ALJ Kelly determined that Voss was not completely objective — that she gave Dixon the benefit of the doubt whenever possible. For example, Voss termed Dixon's arthritis "very severe" and prescribed a cane, even though X rays failed to show any serious degenerative changes and orthopedic specialists noted that Dixon had a fairly good range of motion and muscle strength. Additionally, Voss accepted Dixon's complaints about blurred vision at face value, even though repeated ophthalmology exams failed to show any significant abnormalities. Finally, ALJ Kelly questioned the validity of Voss' statement that Dixon would miss more than 20 days of work per year. As we just noted, Voss expressed this opinion by writing "yes" next to a question that Dixon's attorney had pretyped. Voss did not elaborate on the basis for this opinion. Thus, because she supported it with substantial evidence, the ALJ was not patently wrong in determining that Voss' opinion was not, given all the other facts, entitled to controlling weight.
We next consider whether ALJ Kelly reasonably concluded that Dixon could perform sedentary work with a sit/stand option. Residual functional capacity (RFC) is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform despite her limitations. See SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed.Reg. 34474, 34475 (1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). Here, ALJ Kelly determined that Dixon retained the ability to perform sedentary work that allowed her to alternate between sitting and standing. Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds and occasional walking and standing. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). In assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider both the medical and nonmedical evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
Kelly also found that Dixon's statements about her functional limitations were not credible. Because the ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses, we will not disturb her credibility determinations as long as they find some support in the record. See Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 1994). Kelly noted that Dixon's statements about her symptoms were "vague" and "ephemeral." Although Dixon complained of blurred vision, repeated ophthalmological exams revealed no serious abnormalities. Additionally, Kelly noted that although Dixon had elevated blood sugar levels, she did not always comply with dietary recommendations and that her visits to physicians were "intermittent at best." Therefore, Kelly could have reasonably determined that Dixon's testimony was not credible.