Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/857/749/114486/
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 04:42:31
Document Index: 1146315

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 285', '§ 102', '§ 285', '§ 2844', '§ 285', '§ 285', 'art, 461', '§ 285', '§ 1920', '§ 1821', '§ 1920', '§ 1821', '§ 1920', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1821', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1821', '§ 1961', '§ 285', '§ 15', '§ 1988', '§ 285', '§ 284', '§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 284', 'art:\n28', '§ 1821', '§ 1988']

Cleo D. Mathis and Vico Products Manufacturing Co., Inc.,plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bill Spears D/b/a Waterway Plastics and Waterway Plastics,inc., Philip E. Chalberg, Robert Weygand,hydrabaths, Hydro Air Industries, Inc.,and Gerald Moreland,defendants/cross-appellants, 857 F.2d 749 (Fed. Cir. 1988) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Federal Circuit › 1988 › Cleo D. Mathis and Vico Products Manufacturing Co., Inc.,plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bill Spears D/b/a...
Cleo D. Mathis and Vico Products Manufacturing Co., Inc.,plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bill Spears D/b/a Waterway Plastics and Waterway Plastics,inc., Philip E. Chalberg, Robert Weygand,hydrabaths, Hydro Air Industries, Inc.,and Gerald Moreland,defendants/cross-appellants, 857 F.2d 749 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - 857 F.2d 749 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Sept. 6, 1988
With truth thus discovered, Mathis dedicated the design patent (but not the '449 patent) to the public and moved to withdraw it. The district court granted the motion but allowed Hydro to use evidence relating to the design patent to show unenforceability of the utility patents and to establish the case as exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285.
Following an eight-day bench trial on patent validity and enforceability, the district court issued an opinion on February 20, 1986, Mathis v. Hydro Air Industries, Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1513 (1986), holding that all claims of the three utility patents were invalid under at least one of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112, and unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
Citing Mathis' inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), its discovery abuses, its continuation of the suits on the utility patents when aware of prior art that "clearly rendered them invalid," and its misleading "simulation" at trial of a prior art device, 1 USPQ2d at 1520-23, 1529-30, the district court said Mathis' "course of conduct demonstrates a recklessness with regard to the truth, which justifies an award of attorneys' fees under the 'exceptional case' provision of 35 U.S.C. § 285." 1 USPQ2d at 1523.
This court affirmed in an unpublished opinion, perceiving no error in the determination of unenforceability, the finding of exceptional case, or the award of attorney fees, and deeming it unnecessary to reach the holdings of invalidity. Mathis v. Hydro Air Indus., Inc., 818 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Continuing to exhibit a vincible ignorance of reality and a persistent penchant for wasting judicial resources, Mathis filed a Petition for Rehearing in this court (denied March 11, 1987) and a Petition for Certiorari in the Supreme Court (denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 92, 98 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1987)).
Mathis' unsupported and unsupportable cries of judicial bias and incompetence fail to show any error whatever in the earlier decisions, much less any "exceptional circumstances" that might permit reopening them. See United States v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 612 F.2d 517, 522, 222 Ct. Cl. 1 (1979). Mathis has had his day in court, a day undeserved, on the issues previously decided. Our earlier affirmance remains the law of the case. See, e.g., Gindes v. United States, 740 F.2d 947, 949-50 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1074, 105 S. Ct. 569, 83 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1984); Turtle Mountain, 612 F.2d at 520-21.
Confusing (or obfuscating) the purpose of Section 285, Mathis attacks the award as though it is made to Hydro's attorneys. The purpose of Section 285 is to reimburse a party injured when forced to undergo an "exceptional" case.3 As the Supreme Court said in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975) (quoting Wicker v. Happock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99, 18 L. Ed. 752 (1867)):
In the present case, a wrong has been done. Mathis has severely injured Hydro, having forced it to defend, at monstrous expense, its right freely to compete, subjecting Hydro to a totally unwarranted suit and two unwarranted appeals. Provisions for increased damages under 35 U.S.C. § 2844 and attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 are available as deterrents to blatant, blind, willful infringement of valid patents. The only deterrent to the equally improper bringing of clearly unwarranted suits on obviously invalid or unenforceable patents is Section 285. No award under Section 285 can fully compensate a defendant subjected to bad faith litigation, e.g., for loss of executives' time and missed business opportunities. Thus that defendant cannot be fully returned to "the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed." 422 U.S. at 418-19, 95 S. Ct. at 2372. In determining the compensatory quantum of an award under Section 285 in such an egregious case, therefore, courts should not be, and have not been, limited to ordinary reimbursement of only those amounts paid by the injured party for purely legal services of lawyers, or precluded from ordinary reimbursement of legitimate expenses defendant was unfairly forced to pay. See Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578, 220 USPQ 490, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
The methodology of assessing a reasonable award under 35 U.S.C. § 285 is within the discretion of the district court. Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1068, 219 USPQ 670, 678 (Fed. Cir. 1983). To show that the district court abused its discretion, Mathis must convince us that the district court based its award on clearly erroneous factual findings, legal error, or a manifest error of judgment. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialities Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567, 6 USPQ2d 1010, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Mathis makes not even a colorable showing of any basis for finding an abuse of discretion.
Though Mathis stresses that the district court adopted findings prepared by Hydro, that neither renders them improper nor relaxes our standard of review. Hydro drafted the findings after trial, at the district court's request, and Mathis fully exercised its opportunity to object to them. Once adopted, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 572, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985); Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1556, 4 USPQ2d 1772, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The findings here are not clearly erroneous.
In an attempt at creative nonsense, Mathis accuses the district court of abuse of discretion because it did not award Hydro less than the amount asked, charges Hydro with "inequitable conduct" because it "researched every conceivable issue," and points to denials of some of Hydro's motions, saying the court should have "balanced" those "facts." The argument simply ignores the district court's finding that " [t]he amount of work that was done [by Hydro's attorneys] was absolutely necessary." 1 USPQ2d at 1531, 1534, 1537. Where, as here, a prevailing party "has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation...." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983).
Mathis exalts form over substance in saying the district court "ignored" Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S. Ct. 1726, 48 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1976), and its guidelines for attorney fee awards. That the district court did not specifically mention Kerr is irrelevant. In reaching its findings and conclusions the court followed the same guidelines as they are set forth by the Supreme Court in Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n. 3, 103 S. Ct. at 1938 n. 3. The court committed no legal error and correctly found the requested fees reasonable.
Continuing its reckless disregard for truth, Mathis says the district court "granted each of the defendants all of their individual attorney fees and all litigation expenses without proper documentation enabling an evaluation as to 'reasonableness.' " The record reflects, as the court found, Hydro's "complete documentation relating to the amount of fees incurred in connection with the patent issues of this litigation, including invoices, time entries, and summaries detailing the time expended, billing rates, and disbursements incurred," 1 USPQ2d at 1530, 1533, 1536, and that "there was no duplication of effort," id. at 1531, 1534, 1537. It wastes the time of all concerned when an appellant misstates the record and cites only its mere disagreement with findings as support for its burden of showing them clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at 1512; Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Again pointing to no evidence in the record, Mathis labels "inconclusive" American Patent Law Association (APLA) surveys for 1981 and 1983, and an American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) 1985 survey of Los Angeles-area patent-lawyer billing rates to which the district court referred in assessing the reasonableness of rates charged Hydro. See 1 USPQ2d at 1530-31, 1533-34, 1536. As the law makes clear, the district court properly considered the surveys. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n. 3, 103 S. Ct. at 1938 n. 3 (customary fee a factor to guide determination of "reasonable attorney's fee"); Lam, 718 F.2d at 1069, 219 USPQ at 678 (no abuse of discretion in fee award where record contained documentation in support of billing rates).
Saying the district court erred by including fees relating to patent misuse issues that were not tried, Mathis does not say why one sued for infringement should not investigate that defense. Nor does Mathis recognize the legal effect of the excellent defensive results Hydro obtained. When a prevailing party "has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.... Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is what matters." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1940 (emphasis added). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it included fees for issues not tried.
Mathis points to no record evidence that the rate actually charged for preparation of the motions was excessive. See Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Alloy Surfaces Co., 353 F. Supp. 429, 431, 176 USPQ 508, 510 (D. Del. 1973) ("Only if the evidence reveals that the rate actually charged is abnormally high or abnormally low will the Court base an attorney fee award on an hourly rate at variance with the bill for legal services that was actually rendered to the client.")
Continuing to ignore facts, Mathis objects to fees for work relating to the design patent, saying " [t]he defendants prevailed on this issue because of the dedication of the design patent [to the public], not because of any proofs." One ignored fact is that Mathis' dedication occurred only after Hydro found the invalidating invoices Mathis tried to conceal. Another is that Mathis' own conduct forced Hydro to incur fees for what Mathis describes as the "army of document searchers" that "invaded" its premises. Another is that an award under Section 285 is not limited to fees paid for counsel's work at trial. The fees Hydro incurred in discovery, as everywhere else in this litigation, were necessary to the outcome of the case and were properly included in the award. See PPG Indus., 840 F.2d at 1568-69, 6 USPQ2d at 1013-14 (prevailing defendant entitled to fees for participation in PTO proceedings undertaken after defendant discovered invalidating prior art known to patentee, as PTO proceedings substituted for district court litigation).
In Central Soya this court affirmed an award of expenses as properly within the scope of Section 285, saying " [w]e interpret attorney fees [under 35 U.S.C. § 285] to include those sums that the prevailing party incurs in the preparation for and performance of legal services related to the suit." 723 F.2d at 1578, 220 USPQ at 493.
Mathis says all recovery of expenses was waived because they were not presented separately in a bill of costs and are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d),6 28 U.S.C. § 1920,7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1821.8 In strenuously debating the question of whether a statutorily authorized award of attorney fees may include "costs" not set forth in Section 1920 and witness fees greater than those set forth in Section 1821, the parties misperceive the nature of this case. Unlike the normal case characterized by an honest search for the light of truth, this case was initiated and conducted by a party which, from the filing of the first application in the PTO through this consolidated appeal, has dwelt in the darkness of deceit and distortion.
The cited Rule and statutes relate to good faith proceedings, i.e., to court resolutions of controversies about which reasonable persons may disagree. In such expectably more common cases, the "American Rule" is that each party bears its own attorney fees and expenses. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4, 93 S. Ct. 1943, 1945, 36 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1973). Rule 54(d) modifies slightly the American Rule in such routine-type cases in providing for reimbursement of the winner for the relatively low "costs" set forth in Section 1920. Similarly, Section 1821 sets a witness attendance fee of $30 a day in such cases. Though courts have not been unanimous in approving or refusing awards of costs as part of an attorney fee award in such routine, good faith cases,9 nothing in the Rule or statutes impedes or precludes a district court from exercising its inherent equitable power to make whole a party injured by an egregious abuse of the judicial process. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 5, 93 S. Ct. at 1946. Though courts have exercised that inherent power in the absence of express statutory authorization, see Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631, 636-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941, 92 S. Ct. 285, 30 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1971), Congress has not been unaware of the distinction between good faith litigation to which the American Rule applies and bad faith litigation to which it does not.
Congress enacted Section 285 to codify in patent cases the "bad faith" equitable exception to the American Rule. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 688, 690, 222 USPQ 97, 98 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In Section 285, as above indicated, Congress authorized awards of attorney fees to prevailing defendants "to enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged infringer." S.Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.Code Cong.Serv. 1386, 1387 (emphasis added); see generally Rohm & Haas, 736 F.2d at 690-92, 222 USPQ at 98-100. Recognizing the good faith/bad faith distinction, Congress expressly limited such awards to "exceptional cases"
Similarly, we conclude in this case that it would be inconsistent with the intent of Section 285 to limit prevailing-party Hydro to something less than the fees and expenses to which it was subjected by Mathis in this "very exceptional" case of "gross injustice," and that Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821 are not here applicable.
The award of expenses included $45,000 paid to an expert witness. Mathis objects to that amount, arguing that Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 479 U.S. 1080, 107 S. Ct. 2494, 96 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1987), precludes recovery of expert witness fees beyond the $30-per-day amount specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b). Crawford, however, confirms the above-stated view that Sections 1920 and 1821 are here inapplicable, for in Crawford the Supreme Court held only that Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) does not grant federal courts discretion to award witness fees beyond the limitations of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821 in a routine, nonexceptional case, for which Congress had made no special provision. It did not reach the question of whether awards of attorney fees under statutes specifically providing for such awards may include witness fees beyond the limits of Sections 1920 and 1821. See 107 S. Ct. at 2499 (Blackmun, J., concurring "upon the understanding that [the Court] does not reach the question whether, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a district court may award fees for an expert witness"), 107 S. Ct. at 2500 n. 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I do not understand today's decision to decide the question whether a district court may award expert witness fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.")10
Courts have concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1821 does not limit the amount of expert witness fees included in awards of attorney fees, even in the absence of a statute requiring a finding of bad faith or other egregious conduct making a case "exceptional." See Heiar v. Crawford County, Wis., 746 F.2d 1190, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (expert witness fees part of reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027, 105 S. Ct. 3500, 87 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1985); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 559 (10th Cir. 1983) (reasonable expert witness fees reimbursable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
Courts have distinguished good faith from bad faith litigation in the specific context of the relationship of Section 1821 to expert witness fees. In International Woodworkers of America v. Champion International Corp., 790 F.2d 1174, 1180 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), the court held that a statute authorizing attorney fees but failing to address expert witness fees will not authorize fees beyond the Section 1821 amount, but noted that full expert witness fees have been awarded, without specific statutory authorization, upon a finding of bad faith. Id. at 1177 & n. 2 (citing Kinnear-Weed Corp., 441 F.2d at 636-37). See also Roberts v. S.S. Kyriakoula D. Lemos, 651 F.2d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1981) (" [E]xpert fees may be awarded if the losing party has conducted the case in a vexatious or oppressive manner.").
It follows that under Section 285, which authorizes an award of fees only upon a finding of "exceptional case," a district court may, in the exercise of its discretion and inherent equity power, in a proper case, include an award of reasonable expert witness fees in excess of the $30/day attendance fee specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1821.11
The district court awarded post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, not 35 U.S.C. § 285. Section 1961 provides, in relevant part:
"Any judgment" in Section 1961 includes a judgment awarding attorney fees. E.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (attorney fee award under 15 U.S.C. § 15); Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1982) (attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
In its consolidated cross-appeal, Hydro argues that the purpose of awarding attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, like that of awarding damages for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284, is to compensate the injured party. In light of that purpose, prevailing patent owners ordinarily receive prejudgment interest on damages awarded under Section 284. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657, 103 S. Ct. 2058, 2063, 76 L. Ed. 2d 211, 217 USPQ 1185, 1189 (1983); Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 807 F.2d 964, 967, 1 USPQ2d 1191, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1986); cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S. Ct. 3187, 96 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1987). It follows, says Hydro, that defendants awarded attorney fees under Section 285 should also receive prejudgment interest. That argument would support prejudgment interest on all attorney fee awards to all prevailing defendants in all exceptional cases and is thus unnecessarily broad. Whatever the wisdom or logic of such a rule, it is not necessary to go that far in disposing of the present cross-appeal.
In the present case, the district court's authority lies not in a statute but in its inherent equitable power. In Devex, the Supreme Court, in dealing with Section 284, discussed the common law standard set forth in Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 56 S. Ct. 792, 80 L. Ed. 1274, 29 USPQ 306 (1936), saying:
461 U.S. at 651-52, 103 S. Ct. at 2060, 217 USPQ at 1186-87 (emphasis added), and:
461 U.S. at 653, 103 S. Ct. at 2061, 217 USPQ at 1187 (emphasis added).
Thus, in Duplate, the Court recognized that a court did have authority to award prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages where, as here, there was "bad faith or other exceptional circumstances." Id.; see Duplate, 298 U.S. at 459, 56 S. Ct. at 797, 29 USPQ at 311; see also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1325, 1327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Duplate standard in a copyright case), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S. Ct. 877, 93 L. Ed. 2d 831 (1987). That the Court in Duplate was dealing with damages for infringement and the present case involves "damages" owed Hydro for the injury done it by Mathis12 does not affect the common law authority to avoid injustice that is commonly called a court's "inherent equity power." It can hardly be said that a court's inherent power is exercisable to avoid gross injustice to one side but not to the other, or when bad faith is exhibited by one side but not when bad faith is exhibited by the other.
Analysis of most of Mathis' contentions compels the conclusion that those contentions lack even a minimally arguable basis and that this consolidated appeal is in major part frivolous. Based as it is on record distortions, manufactured facts, and implausible and unsupportable legal arguments,13 all of Mathis' appeal except that relating to expenses "wastes the time of the court and of opposing counsel, and imposes unnecessary costs on the parties and on fellow citizens whose taxes support this court and its staff." Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331, 335, 222 USPQ 738, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Hydro is entitled to the costs and attorney fees it incurred in resisting the frivolous portion of Mathis' consolidated appeal. See Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 887, 229 USPQ 814, 817-18 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378, 1382, 215 USPQ 921, 921 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Fed. R. App. P. 38.
In accord with Fed. R. App. P. 38, Mathis shall pay to Hydro the costs and attorney fees incurred by Hydro in connection with the frivolous portion of Mathis' consolidated appeal.
Included in the "attorney fee" calculation, the district court awarded the defendants their expert witness fees. Expert witness fees are not "attorney fees", although they may be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the defense. However, I agree with this court's interpretation that because 35 U.S.C. § 285 can be invoked only in an "exceptional case", one in which bad faith or disregard of law has been shown, recovery of expert witness fees is not necessarily excluded. Mathis has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the defendants their full expert witness fees, and I join the court's affirmance of that award.
I also agree with the court that there was fair basis for Mathis raising this question on appeal, particularly in view of Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 479 U.S. 1080, 107 S. Ct. 2494, 96 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1987), wherein the Court held in a FELA action that "when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound by the limits of Sec. 1821, absent contract or explicit statutory authority to the contrary". The application to section 285 fee awards of the principles discussed in Crawford Fitting had not previously been considered.
In view of the absence of direct precedent, and the substantial sum involved, I believe that this issue alone justified the taking of this appeal. Although Mathis in his brief did reargue the merits, his abandoned attempt to reopen an issue already decided is not so egregious, or unusual, as to require sanction. (I note that the appellee responded merely by invoking the doctrine of the law of the case.) The record on this appeal does not enable my independent review of the appellant's "iniquity" at trial of the merits, despite the catalog thereof in the majority opinion, but that iniquity presumably led to the award of attorney fees under section 285, a matter that has already been affirmed on appeal. Mathis v. Hydro Air Industries, Inc., 818 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 92, 98 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1987). In my view the imposition of sanctions for raising certain issues on appeal, while accepting that other issues are properly raised, is unwarranted. Thus I respectfully dissent from that aspect of the court's opinion.
Hydro's antitrust and patent misuse claims were set aside for later trial. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 86 S. Ct. 347, 15 L. Ed. 2d 247, 147 USPQ 404 (1965)
35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) provides:
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982) provides:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) reads, in relevant part:
28 U.S.C. § 1821 reads, in relevant part:
(a) (1) Except as otherwise provided, a witness in attendance at any court of the United States, or before a United States Magistrate, or before any person authorized to take his deposition pursuant to any rule or order of a court of the United States, shall be paid the fees and allowances provided by this section.
Compare Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1084 (4th Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 698 F.2d 1181, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 1983); Bennett v. Central Tel. Co. of Ill., 619 F. Supp. 640, 643 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1985) with Bennett v. Department of the Navy, 699 F.2d 1140, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); Machinery Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 225 USPQ 743, 746 n. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 774 F.2d 467, 227 USPQ 368 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see generally Bartell, Taxation of Costs and Awards of Expenses in Federal Court, 101 F.R.D. 553, 589-96 (1984)
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) reads in pertinent part:
District court decisions interpretable as holding to the contrary are not, of course, precedent in this court. See, e.g., Machinery Corp., 225 USPQ at 746; Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 630, 640, 224 USPQ 910, 917 (W.D. Wis. 1984); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Norton Co., 578 F. Supp. 1561, 1568, 223 USPQ 779, 783 (N.D.N.Y.1984)