Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20060721_0000912.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-10 07:04:25
Document Index: 650767049

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 841', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 841', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2255']

| Lewis v. Holt
Lewis v. Holt
TURONN LEWIS, PETITIONERv.RONALD HOLT, RESPONDENT
Turonn Lewis ("Petitioner"), an inmate presently confined at the Schuylkill Federal Correctional Institution, White Deer, Pennsylvania ("FCI-Schuylkill"), initiated this pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The required filing fee has been paid. For the reasons set forth below, Lewis' petition will be dismissed without prejudice.
Named as Respondent is FCI-Schuylkill Warden Ronald Holt. Petitioner states that he was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute Fentanyl and Heroin following a 1993 jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. During a sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that death and/or bodily injury as contemplated under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) had occurred as a result of the offense. Petitioner was thereafter sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Lewis also filed an unsuccessful petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Lewis presently argues that he is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because the death and/or serious bodily injury factor which enhanced his sentence was not charged in the indictment and not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. He adds that the sentence enhancement was imposed under a preponderance of the evidence standard at his sentencing hearing and based on factors which were not adjudicated by the jury. Petitioner adds that he cannot obtain relief under § 2255 because his present action is neither based on newly discovered evidence nor a new rule of constitutional law that has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court. See id. at p. 15. Lewis argues that his § 2255 remedy is ineffective or inadequate since he was convicted under an erroneous interpretation of the law.
In support of his argument for relief, the petition references the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). See Record document no. 2, p. 4. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Booker reaffirmed Apprendi adding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were not mandates but advisory only. As relief, Lewis seeks a determination that his § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective and that his § 2241 action be permitted to proceed and transferred to the District of Maryland for disposition on the merits; i.e.,"[ r]etroactive application of the newly announced interpretation of § 841(b)." Id. at p. 8.
United States v. Brooks, 230 F.3d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954)); see also Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a petitioner has the burden to prove that the remedy afforded by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Satisfaction of this burden cannot be accomplished by showing that a prior § 2255 motion has been denied. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998); Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982 (1988); Litterio v. Parker, 369 F.2d 395, 396 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam). In his present petition, Petitioner acknowledges that his present Apprendi-based claim of improper sentence enhancement was previously raised in an application to file a successive § 2255 action. His request was denied on March 26, 2001. Thereafter, a similar request for authorization to seek relief under Booker was denied by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on January 18, 2006. To allow Lewis to file a habeas petition in his district of confinement asserting similar claims raised in a previous unsuccessful applications to file a second or successive § 2255 action would obliterate congressional attempts to promote finality in federal criminal cases.
Both the Triestman and Dorsainvil courts held that a § 2255 motion was only "inadequate and ineffective" (thus allowing a petitioner to bring a § 2241 habeas corpus action) where the denial of a habeas action would raise serious constitutional issues. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377; Dorsainvil,119 F.3d at 249. The serious constitutional issue was that a change in substantive law rendered the conduct for which petitioner was convicted no longer criminal. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 366; Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. Thus, these cases set a high bar for what types of serious constitutional issues are sufficient for courts to allow a petitioner to bring a § 2241 petition to challenge a conviction or sentence.
As previously noted, Lewis admits that his present action is not based on any newly discovered evidence. He also has not established that Apprendi and/or Booker are retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Unlike Dorsainvil, and despite Lewis' argument to the contrary, Petitioner's present claims are not premised on any intervening change in substantive law that would negate the criminal nature of his conduct with respect to his federal conviction.
Fundamental to Dorsainvil was the fact that the petitioner may actually be innocent of the crime charged. In this case, Lewis has failed to present any allegations suggesting that he was not involved in the alleged underlying criminal activity. Petitioner's sentencing related claims, namely, that his sentence was improperly enhanced, has nothing to do with the actual question of Petitioner's guilt. He has also not presented any facts to show that the denial of his habeas petition would raise serious constitutional issues.
With respect to his Apprendi/Booker claims, a review of those decisions provides that they have not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review. In Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001),*fn1 the Supreme Court established that a new rule of law is not made retroactive to cases on collateral review unless the Court itself holds it to be retroactive. A review of Apprendi/Booker reveals that there is no indication that said decisions were determined to have retroactive effect.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying on Tyler, has recognized that no Supreme Court case specifically holds that Apprendi is retroactive on collateral review. In Re: Turner, 267 F.3d 225, 231 (3d. Cir. 2001). It is additionally recognized by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120-121 (3d Cir. 2002), that under Dorsainvil, § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to raise Apprendi claims. In conclusion, Petitioner's reliance on Apprendi is misplaced.
More recently, the Court of appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Booker decision does not have retroactive effect. See Lloyd v. United States, 407 F. 3d 608, 615-16 (3d Cir. 2005). Since Apprendi/Booker cannot presently be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, this Court is precluded from considering Lewis' petition. See United States v. Pinkston, 153 F. Supp. 2d 557 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
Based on the foregoing analysis, the fact that Apprendi/Booker were decided after both conclusion of Petitioner's direct appeal and § 2255 action, does not allow him to assert his present claims in a § 2241 petition. Therefore, an application to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit seeking leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion is the only vehicle available to Petitioner. The petition for writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed without prejudice. Consequently,