Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/347/637
Timestamp: 2014-12-19 23:43:12
Document Index: 108092601

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19', '§ 155', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 1251', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1182']

BARBER v. GONZALES. | LII / Legal Information Institute
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347 U.S. 637 (74 S.Ct. 822, 98 L.Ed. 1009)
Argued: March 10, 1954.
[HTML] dissent, MINTON, REED, BURTON
Respondent was born in the Philippine Islands in 1913 and came therefrom to the continental United States in 1930. He has lived here ever since. In 1941, he was convicted in the State of California of assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year in the Alameda County jail. In 1950, he was convicted in the State of Washington of second degree burglary and was sentenced under the indeterminate sentence law of that State to a minimum term of two years in the state penitentiary. In 1951, after an administrative hearing, he was ordered deported to the Philippine Islands under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who 'after entry' had been sentenced more than once to imprisonment for terms of one year or more for crimes involving moral turpitude. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, formerly 8 U.S.C. 155(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 155(a).
The sole question presented is whether respondentwho was born a national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, who came to the continental United States as a national prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, and who was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 and 1950 for crimes involving moral turpitudemay now be deported under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.
It is conceded that respondent was born a national of the United States; that as such he owed permanent allegiance to the United States, including the obligation of military service; that he retained this status when he came to the continental United States in 1930 and hence was not then subject to the Immigration Act of 1917 or any other federal statute relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
The Government, however, contends that respondent's status as a national was changed by the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 456, which provided for the eventual independence of the Philippines, subsequently achieved in 1946, 60 Stat. 1352. Section 8(a)(1) of the 1934 Act provides:
The Government would have us interpret 'entry' in § 19(a) in its 'ordinary, everyday sense' of a 'coming into the United States.' Under this view, respondent's 'coming into the United States' from the Philippine Islands in 1930 would satisfy the 'entry' requirement. While it is true that statutory language should be interpreted whenever possible according to common usage, some terms acquire a special technical meaning by a process of judicial construction. So it is with the word 'entry' in § 19(a). E.g., Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 68 S.Ct. 10, 92 L.Ed. 17; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 49 S.Ct. 354, 73 L.Ed. 758; DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 2 Cir., 158 F.2d 878; Del Guercio v. Gabot, 9 Cir., 161 F.2d 559. Cf. United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425, 53 S.Ct. 665, 667, 77 L.Ed. 1598.
In United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, supra, 279 U.S. at page 401, 49 S.Ct. at page 354, this Court stated the applicable rule:
See also United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129, 132, 53 S.Ct. 40, 41, 77 L.Ed. 215; Carmichael v. Delaney, 9 Cir., 170 F.2d 239, 242243. This concept of 'entry' was codified by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
At the time respondent came to the continental United States, he was not arriving 'from some foreign port or place.' On the contrary, he was a United States national moving from one of our insular possessions to the mainland. It was not until the 1934 Philippine Independence Act that the Philippines could be regarded as 'foreign' for immigration purposes. Having made no 'entry,' respondent is not deportable under § 19(a) as an alien who 'after entry' committed crimes involving moral turpitude. The Government warns that this conclusion is inconsistent with a broad congressional purpose to terminate the United States residence of alien criminals. But we believe a different conclusion would not be permissible in view of the well-settled meaning of 'entry' in § 19(a). Although not penal in character, deportation statutes as a practical matter may inflict 'the equivalent of banishment or exile', Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 376, 92 L.Ed. 433, and should be strictly construed. See Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391, 68 S.Ct. 10, 12, 92 L.Ed. 17. In the absence of explicit language showing a contrary congressional intent, we must give technical words in deportation statutes their usual technical meaning.
Now 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(15), (6)(D), (8, 12), (18)(d, e).
From the Spanish cession in 1898 until final independence in 1946, the Philippine Islands were American territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674676, 65 S.Ct. 870, 881882, 89 L.Ed. 1252. Persons born in the Philippines during this period were American nationals entitled to the protection of the United States and conversely owing permanent allegiance to the United States. They could not be excluded from this country under a general statute relating to the exclusion of 'aliens.' See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 1213, 24 S.Ct. 177, 179, 48 L.Ed. 317; Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 411, 45 S.Ct. 563, 565, 69 L.Ed. 1016. But, until 1946, neither could they become United States citizens. See Toyota v. United States, supra; 60 Stat. 416.
Section 101(a)(13) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 167, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13), provides in pertinent part: 'The term 'entry' means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession * * *.'
Section 101(a)(29), 66 Stat. 170, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(29), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a) (29), defines 'outlying possessions' as American Samoa and Swains Island. By a special provision in the 1952 Act, the exclusion process is made applicable to any alien coming to the continental United States from Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands. 66 Stat. 188, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(7).