Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/587/651/37682/
Timestamp: 2018-09-22 06:13:11
Document Index: 551012378

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 42', '§ 22', '§ 10', 'art. 12', '§ 9', '§ 61']

William James Rummel, Petitioner-appellant, v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department Ofcorrections, Respondent- Appellee, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1978 › William James Rummel, Petitioner-appellant, v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department Ofcorr...
William James Rummel, Petitioner-appellant, v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department Ofcorrections, Respondent- Appellee, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978)
As a preliminary matter, the State suggests that Rummel's petition is barred by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977), and the Texas "Contemporaneous Objection Rule" because Rummel failed to object to the mandatory life sentence at the punishment stage of his trial. In Sykes, the Court recognized the legitimate state interest inherent in a contemporaneous objection rule. See St. John v. Estelle, 563 F.2d 168 (5 Cir. 1977) (en banc). Since it is apparent that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly rejected Rummel-like challenges to the Texas habitual criminal statute,2 we are at a loss to see how any state interest would be served by demanding that Rummel make a futile gesture at his trial. Moreover, Texas apparently does not require a contemporaneous objection when a defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted. Gann v. Keith, 151 Tex. 626, 253 S.W.2d 413, 417 (1952).
The panel majority held that Rummel's life sentence under the Texas recidivist statute must be considered one for the entire term of Rummel's life, irrespective of any consideration of statutory good time. The majority reasoned that to consider good time credits would require the court to become involved in the parole process. 568 F.2d at 1196. Next, the court adopted the proportionality standards set out in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4 Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983, 94 S. Ct. 1577, 39 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1974). Id. Finally, the panel held that under these standards Rummel's life sentence violated the eighth amendment. Id. at 1200.
As has been frequently noted, the Supreme Court has never held a punishment unconstitutional because of length alone.7 We do know, however, that each of the nine Supreme Court Justices, at least in death cases, has embraced the proportionality concept. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1976) (White, Stewart, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272 n.14, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 458, 92 S. Ct. at 2838 (Burger, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting opinion).
Were this a question of history alone, we must admit that we would have great difficulty in accepting the proportionality analysis, despite the efforts to demonstrate to the contrary. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning," 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839 (1969), Comment, "The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine,"24 Buffalo L.Rev. 783 (1975). We conclude, however, that as a result of jurisprudential development the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment provision also prohibits unreasonable punishment, and a component of unreasonable punishment can be an excessive sentence for a trivial offense. As early as Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520, 521 (5 Cir. 1962), the court recognized that a punishment could be cruel and unusual if "it is so greatly disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice."
We do not wish to retreat from this rule and therefore we conclude that the eighth amendment does proscribe some punishments that are so disproportionate as to have no rational support. As the Second Circuit has recently said in Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 409 (2 Cir. 1978), Cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 99 S. Ct. 874, 58 L. Ed. 2d --- (1979) "(W)e accept the proposition that in some extraordinary instance a severe sentence imposed for a minor offense could, solely because of its length, be a cruel and unusual punishment."
First, we hold that a punishment must be viewed as it occurs in the real world. We will consider the system as it actually works and we will not pass on academic possibilities. Second, we will at all times be mindful that it is the legislature that selects the range of punishments and it is our duty to uphold the legislature if there is any rational basis for so doing. We will remember that the petitioner challenging his sentence carries a heavy burden, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2926, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976), and the petitioner does not discharge this burden merely by showing that he is treated more harshly than he would be treated in another state or by positing a more rational system than the one adopted by the legislature. Finally, we must remember that we can uphold a punishment as judges and disagree with that punishment as men.
Recidivist statutes have been upheld many times against a variety of challenges.9 The starting point of our analysis is that Article 63 is constitutional. In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S. Ct. 648, 651, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1967), the Court said:
Texas strictly construes this provision. Before one can be sentenced under the enhanced penalty provision, the State must prove that each succeeding conviction was subsequent to both the commission of and conviction for the preceding offense. Tyra v. State, 534 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Moreover, the defendant must actually have gone to prison before the State can use the previous conviction for enhancement, Cromeans v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 135, 268 S.W.2d 133, 135 (1954), and no conviction can be used for enhancement more than one time when establishing the habitual criminal status, Carvajal v. State, 529 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 926, 96 S. Ct. 1139, 47 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1976); Ex Parte Montgomery, 571 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
Most American jurisdictions do not interpret their recidivist statutes as strictly as Texas.11 According to Note, "Don't Steal a Turkey in Arkansas The Second Felony Offender in New York," 45 Fordham L. Rev. 76, 78-79 (1976):
We cannot agree that the recognized probability of parole in the cases before us was to be ignored when the court determined whether the statutory punishment was unconstitutional as applied to appellees. On the one hand, we are asked to look at all the circumstances which would ameliorate the seriousness of petitioners' offenses and their individual culpability in order to justify a finding that their punishment was constitutionally offensive. On the other hand, we are asked in effect to consider the appellees so incorrigible that they must be deemed destined to durance vile for the rest of their natural lives because they will never be paroled. We do not consider this to be a realistic or practical approach. See 61 Calif. L. Rev. 418, 422 (1973).
We are told that the New York Parole Board is stringent, that it lacks standards and that its determinations are beyond the jurisdiction of the federal court. The suggestion that the federal court act as a New York parole board determining which prisoner should be released and under what conditions is not at all palatable as a practical matter, Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1978), to say nothing of the offense to the principles of comity and federalism. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-81, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976). This court has properly reviewed cases where state prisoners have alleged denial of due process rights or other constitutional imperfections in parole procedures. 14 There is no reason to anticipate that either the petitioners here will be denied a constitutionally proper parole hearing or that the federal courts will hesitate to intervene if their constitutional rights are violated in the state proceedings. We conclude that in determining the severity of the sentences imposed here we cannot consider them equivalent to life sentences without parole. 15 Rather we must view the punishment as set forth by the statute which provides that the defendants here are eligible for parole, as are all other felons in the state, at the conclusion of their mandatory minimum sentences.
This test was taken from Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2757-2758, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972). Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion stated a "lack of necessity" test or a "less drastic means" test: "Although the determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the more significant basis is that the punishment serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment."27
357 U.S. 386, 78 S. Ct. 1280, 1285, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405.
AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED to the panel in part. Appendix to follow. APPENDIX ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to the State, the following are selected examples of various jurisdiction's good time provisions. I II III IV State Law Rate of Good Time Types of First Allowances Additional Good Passed Time Allowances ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ala. 1843 6mo-1 yr 5days/mo Meritorious 1-3 yr 6days/mo Industrial 3-5 yr 7days/mo Production 5-10 yr 8days/mo Remaining 10days/mo Blood Donation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cal. Repealed None 1948 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- D.C. 1901 1mo-1yr 5days/mo Blood Donation 1-3 yr 6days/mo 3-5 yr 7days/mo Meritorious conduct, 5-10 yr 8days/mo volunteer 10th 10days/mo programs, Remaining industrial 10days/mo ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fla. 1871 1st yr 5days/mo Extra gain time 2nd yr 5days/mo 3rd yr 10days/mo Special gain 4th yr 10days/mo time 5th yr 15days/mo Remaining Special gain 15days/mo time ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ga. 1856 1st yr 1mo/yr Exemplary 2nd yr 2mo/yr conduct 3-10 yr 3mo/yr Remaining 4mo/yr ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- La. 1842 25days/mo flat None ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Miss. 1892 1st yr 3days/mo Extra 2nd yr 4days/mo meritorious conduct 3rd yr 5days/mo 4th yr 6days/mo Overtime or 5th yr 7days/mo Sunday work 6th yr 8days/mo 7th yr 9days/mo Blood Donation 8th yr 10days/mo 9th yr 11days/mo 10th yr 15days/mo Remaining 15days/mo ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- N.Y. 1817 Rate determined by Meritorious good time allowance conduct, extra committee not to work exceed 1/3 of the maximum on an indeterminate sentence ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Texas 1881 Class I 20days/mo Trusty Class II 10days/mo Class III None Blood Donation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- W.Va. 1868 1 yr 5days/mo Meritorious 1-3 years 6days/mo conduct 3-5 yrs 7days/mo 5-10 yrs 8days/mo Remaining 10days/mo ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Federal 1867 6mo-1yr 5days/mo Camp good time, 1-3 yrs 6days/mo Work release 3-5 yrs 7days/mo good time, 5-10 yrs 8days/mo Community Remaining Treatment Center 10days/mo good time, Industrial good time, Meritorious good time, special award good time, Good time earned at other state institutions: military, state, D.C. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TABLE CONTINUED V VI VII VIII Rate of Offender Effect on Parole Effect on Discharge Additional Good Ineligible Eligibility and/or Release Time Allowances for Good Time -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1st yr 3days/mo Life No effect Credited to maximum 2nd, 3rd, 4th yr Murder 1st sentence to advance 4days/mo discharge 5thkyr 5days/mo 30 days/yr. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30 days/yr Life No effect Credited to maximum sentence to advance Lump sum or conditional release 1st yr 3days/mo 2ndkyr 5days/mo -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-6 days/mo All eligible No effect Credited to maximum sentence to advance 1-15 days/mo conditional release 1-60 days flat reduction -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Set by board of Life No effect Credited to minimum corrections sentence to advance conditional release -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Life No effect Credited to maximum sentence to advance discharge -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Increase All eligible No effect Credited to maximum allowances sentence to advance discharge Equivalent allowances 10 days -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rate determined Life No effect Credited to maximum by commissioner sentence to advance of corrections conditional release -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30 days/mo All eligible Credited to maximum Credited to maximum sentence to advance sentence to advance 30 days parole eligibility discharge -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 1/2 days/mo Life No effect Credited to maximum sentence to advance discharge -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1st yr 3days/mo All eligible No effect Credited to maximum 2nd and Remaining sentence to advance 5days/mo conditional release --------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only chance for release such a life sentence prisoner has is parole. Texas law specifically provides that parole is not considered a reduction in sentence, Tex. Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 42.12 § 22 (Vernon Supp.1966-1977); the sentence remains in effect during its entire period even if parole is granted. Ex parte Lefors, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 51, 303 S.W.2d 394 (1957). Unlike good time credit, which is an enforceable statutory entitlement subject to constitutional due process protection, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974) parole is a matter of executive grace which constitutional due process does not protect. See part B, Infra.
A convict is deemed to have been constitutionally deprived of all right to liberty for the length of his sentence, subject only to whatever legal entitlements he may have under state or federal law. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1976). The possibility of parole is not such an entitlement because it has no legal effect on the right of Texas to confine Rummel.
"Parole is an act of grace of the sovereign," Clifford v. Beto, 464 F.2d 1191, 1195 (5th Cir. 1972), that "cannot be demanded as a right." Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 76 S. Ct. 919, 924-25, 100 L. Ed. 1242 (1956); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 55 S. Ct. 818, 819, 79 L. Ed. 1566 (1935). Historically, parole in the United States evolved from the practice of the King of England to grant conditional pardons, C. Newman, Sourcebook on Probation, Parole and Pardons 18-19 (3d ed. 1972). In Texas, parole is still classified as a conditional pardon. Ex parte Lefors, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 51, 303 S.W.2d 394 (1957); Clifford v. Beto, 464 F.2d 1191, 1194 (5th Cir. 1972).
Since parole is totally an act of grace by the state, there is no legal basis for judicial intervention in the merits of parole decisions. The Due Process clause of the Constitution only applies to property interests or liberty interests that are established "entitlements." E. g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976). This court has repeatedly emphasized that Texas prisoners do not have any entitlement in the nature of a liberty or property interest in their expectancy of release on parole. Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1978); Craft v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, 550 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1977). We have frequently distinguished the mere hope of being granted parole from the limited liberty interest that accrues after parole has been granted by steadfastly refusing to extend the minimal due process protection applicable to parole revocation to the initial determination by parole boards on whether to grant parole. Shaw v. Briscoe, 541 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1976); Cook v. Whiteside, 505 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1974); Clifford v. Beto, 464 F.2d 1191, 1196 (5th Cir. 1972). Thus, we have refused to equate "the Possibility of conditional freedom with the Right to conditional freedom." Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), Vacated for consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809, 94 S. Ct. 79, 38 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1973), Dismissed as moot, 501 F.2d 992 (1973). The most thorough statement of this position is in Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1052-1053 (5th Cir. 1976):
At the constitutional level, there is a clear distinction between the loss of a statutory privilege once obtained and the denial of that same privilege, never given. While the threatened loss of a privilege may be "grievous" and therefore require some degree of procedural due process protection, See, e. g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 1972, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, the denial of that privilege may only be subject to the procedural demands of the particular enabling statute. Thus, while parole revocation and prison discipline are clearly within the ambit of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the mere expectation of parole release while still in otherwise lawful custody is not so vested as to result in a "grievous loss" if denied by the parole board. . . .
Parole, if it does come, is in no way equivalent to the freedom of an ordinary citizen. The conditions imposed on the parolee are wide-ranging, and any violation may result in a return to prison. The Supreme Court described typical parole restrictions in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 92 S. Ct. at 2598-99:
There is no way for this court to predict whether, in the event that he is paroled, Rummel will run afoul of some parole restrictions which again would not constitute criminal behavior. In Morrissey the Court stated that it is estimated that 35-45 percent of all parolees are returned to prison for parole violations. 92 S. Ct. at 2599, Citing President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections 62 (1967). Rummel will have to toe any line the parole board may draw during his time in prison to have any chance at parole, and he will have to continue to toe its line for the rest of his life to maintain any limited freedom he may gain as a parolee. Rummel has no right to pay a constitutional penalty for his crimes and be done with them. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1909).
Although the Supreme Court has never dealt with the proper construction of a sentence with a chance of parole for the purposes of the eighth amendment, the Court has treated the problem in reviewing sentences under the Ex post facto clause. U. S. Const. art. I, § 10. In Lindsey v. State of Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S. Ct. 797, 81 L. Ed. 1182 (1937), the Court reviewed a conviction from the State of Washington. At the time the petitioner, Lindsey, had committed his crime of larceny, the law provided for the sentence to be fixed by the trial judge at a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 15 years. Parole was authorized in the discretion of the parole board at any point prior to the expiration of the sentence received. At the time Lindsey was sentenced, however, the law had been changed to a scheme similar to the present Texas system. A mandatory 15-year sentence was provided. At the same time, however, the statute provided that "a convicted person may be released on parole by the board after he has served the period of confinement fixed by the board, less time credits for good behavior and diligence." 301 U.S. at 399, 57 S. Ct. at 798. The Supreme Court held that in determining the constitutionality of the sentence the contingent possibility of parole was irrelevant; the constitutionality of the sentence had to be measured by the mandatory statutory maximum of 15 years:
301 U.S. at 400-401, 57 S. Ct. at 798-99. The Supreme Court went on to acknowledge the difference between a release from prison after a number of years at the end of a sentence and release from prison after the same number of years on parole:
Id. at 401, 57 S. Ct. at 799. The continued vitality of the Lindsey holding was confirmed in the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977), in which the Court said with reference to Lindsey :
97 S. Ct. at 2301. Although Lindsey and Dobbert were decided under the Ex post facto clause and not the eighth amendment, their reasoning is fully applicable to Rummel's case.
The sentence which Texas imposed is society's judgment and, if upheld, society has every legal right to enforce it. If Texas chooses to make good the threat which the sentence itself imposes, no court may be a refuge for Rummel. We may speculate as to Rummel's likely fate, but these guesses are without constitutional significance. "The threat makes the punishment obnoxious." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102, 78 S. Ct. 590, 599, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 643 (1957).
It is true that Rummel's severe sentence arises not merely from the inherent nature of his crimes but from the fact that his felonies were three in number. It is equally true that Texas may treat recidivists more harshly than other offenders and that the Texas statute on its face is constitutional. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S. Ct. 648, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1967). But Rummel is not Spencer. Nor is the constitutionality of Texas' imposition of life imprisonment on Spencer a determination that life imprisonment can constitutionally be imposed on Rummel. Recidivism is no talisman that justifies life imprisonment for any three felonies without regard to their underlying seriousness.
Salazar v. Estelle, 547 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5 Cir. 1977) (semble); Rener v. Beto, 447 F.2d 20, 23 (5 Cir. 1971), Cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1051, 92 S. Ct. 1521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1972); Castle v. United States, 399 F.2d 642, 652 (5 Cir. 1968); Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433, 437 (5 Cir. 1938)
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544, 565, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910) (cases cited in dissenting opinion); Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1292 (6 Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion), Vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 993, 96 S. Ct. 419, 46 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1975); United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700, 703 (4 Cir. 1964); Anthony v. United States, 331 F.2d 687, 693-94 (9 Cir. 1964); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 467-68 (10 Cir. 1959), Cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846, 80 S. Ct. 1619, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1729 (1960); Edwards v. United States, 206 F.2d 855, 857 (10 Cir. 1953); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 (2 Cir.), Cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 73 S. Ct. 20, 97 L. Ed. 652 (1952); United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899, 902 (7 Cir. 1945), Cert. denied, 327 U.S. 794, 66 S. Ct. 821, 90 L. Ed. 1021 (1946); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340 (8 Cir. 1930); Parker v. Bounds, 329 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Ormento v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cases cited in footnote 2, Supra
United States v. Bondurant, 555 F.2d 1328, 1329 (5 Cir.), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871, 98 S. Ct. 215, 54 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1977); United States v. Gamboa, 543 F.2d 545, 548 (5 Cir. 1976); United States v. Thevis, 526 F.2d 989, 991 (5 Cir. 1976); Bonner v. Henderson, 517 F.2d 135, 136 (5 Cir. 1975); Capuchino v. Estelle, 506 F.2d 440, 442 (5 Cir. 1975); United States v. Harbolt, 455 F.2d 970 (5 Cir. 1972); Yeager v. Estelle, 489 F.2d 276 (5 Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908, 94 S. Ct. 1616, 40 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1974); United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914, 916 (5 Cir. 1969); Rodriquez v. United States, 394 F.2d 825 (5 Cir. 1968); Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520, 521 (5 Cir. 1962)
Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298, 1302 (6 Cir. 1977); Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4 Cir. 1976); Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232, 1235 (4 Cir. 1976); Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6 Cir. 1975), Vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 993, 96 S. Ct. 419, 46 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4 Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983, 94 S. Ct. 1577, 39 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1974); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4 Cir. 1970), Cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942, 92 S. Ct. 2846, 33 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1972); Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38, 43 (9 Cir. 1959); Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 237 (6 Cir.), Cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801, 68 S. Ct. 100, 92 L. Ed. 380 (1947); State v. Farrow, 386 A.2d 808 (N.H.1978); State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 574 P.2d 950, 956 (1978); State v. Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo.1978) (en banc); State v. Remmers, 259 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Iowa 1977); Stockton v. Leeke, 237 S.E. 896, 897-98 (S.C.1977); State v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 330 (W.Va.1977); State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d 932, 558 P.2d 236, 240 n.4 (1976) (en banc), Appeal dismissed, 432 U.S. 901, 97 S. Ct. 2943, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (1977); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338 (1975), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950, 96 S. Ct. 372, 46 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1975); In Re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 (1973); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); Calhoun v. State, 85 Tex.Cr.R. 496, 214 S.W. 335, 338 (1919) (semble); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899); State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker, 48 La.Ann. 527, 19 So. 457 (1896) (semble); State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423 (1878) (semble)
Rummel's reliance on Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910), must be substantially discounted by the holding in Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 36 S. Ct. 367, 60 L. Ed. 706 (1916). In Badders, the Court, per Holmes, J., summarily dismissed a proportionality attack on a five year sentence for mail fraud
Recently, the Fourth Circuit has apparently seen the difficulty in applying Hart v. Coiner to its fullest extent. In Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (1978), Reversing Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977), the Fourth Circuit refused to overturn a forty year sentence for possessing and distributing approximately nine ounces of marijuana. The Fourth Circuit stated that the Hart inquiry was limited to cases in which a life sentence is imposed. Id. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit relied on Yeager v. Estelle, 489 F.2d 276 (5 Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908, 94 S. Ct. 1616, 40 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1974). In Yeager, we upheld a 500 year sentence for murder with malice. Considering Texas law, we are unable to distinguish between Yeager's 500 year sentence and Rummel's life sentence. Therefore, we will not follow the Fourth Circuit's lead and limit our inquiry to life cases. In Texas, a life sentence has essentially the same effect as one for sixty years. Certainly, the inquiry must be the same in both cases
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S. Ct. 501, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1961); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68 S. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312, 21 S. Ct. 389, 45 L. Ed. 542 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677, 16 S. Ct. 179, 40 L. Ed. 301 (1895); Wilson v. Slayton, 470 F.2d 986 (4 Cir. 1972); Wessling v. Bennett, 410 F.2d 205 (8 Cir. 1969); Price v. Allgood, 369 F.2d 376 (5 Cir. 1966), Cert. denied, 386 U.S. 998, 87 S. Ct. 1321, 18 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1967); See generally, Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 Buffalo L.Rev. 99 (1971)
E. g., Cox v. State, 255 Ark. 204, 499 S.W.2d 630 (1973); State v. Williams, 226 La. 862, 77 So. 2d 515 (1955)
Texas Penal Code art. 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974); Wash.Rev.Code § 9.92.090 (perhaps limited by State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d 932, 558 P.2d 236, 240 n.4 (1976) (en banc); W.Va.Code § 61-11-18 (limited by Hart)
Nor do we have occasion to examine the discretion of the prosecutor in bringing the enhanced indictment. But cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663, 671-72, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (Powell, J., dissenting)
Of course, this detailed comparison of actual practices was not required in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2867, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1977), for obvious reasons
Mr. Justice White expressed a similar sentiment, 408 U.S. 238, 311, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2763, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, and, Mr. Justice Marshall Id. at 331, 92 S. Ct. at 2773
The cases cited on this issue in our own circuit as well as the Ninth and Second Circuits clearly rely on the classic right-privilege distinction, a distinction that has drawn scholarly and judicial attack. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 and n.8, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1017, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968). However, the Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements in the due process area, Roth, Sindermann, and Bishop, supra, clearly require the existence of a legal entitlement to a property or liberty interest before the due process clause applies. The entitlement doctrine is in fact the right-privilege distinction resurrected in new verbal garb. See generally Note, Democratic Due Process: Administrative Procedure After Bishop v. Wood, 1977 Duke L.J. 453. Whatever the hope of release on parole may be labeled, under the cases cited in the text, it definitely does not rise to the level of a "right" or an "entitlement" and it definitely confers no legally protectable interest on the prisoner
The California Supreme Court in In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 419, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 223, 503 P.2d 921, 926, (1972), held that a life sentence with parole had to be treated as a life sentence for the purposes of eighth amendment analysis. One of the factors relied on by the court was the fact that the penalogical function of parole is only to mitigate a punishment which would otherwise be deserving. 105 Cal. Rptr. at 217, 503 P.2d at 921. The holding in Lynch was followed by New York in People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 110, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 474, 332 N.E.2d 338, 341 (1975)