Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/959/233/220245/
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 11:46:27
Document Index: 293792280

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1983', '§ 2731', '§ 1738', '§ 1983', '§ 2731', '§ 2731', '§ 2731', '§ 1983']

James W. Childs, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Van Wert County, Ohio, et al., Defendants-appellees, 959 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1992 › James W. Childs, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Van Wert County, Ohio, et al., Defendants-appellees
James W. Childs, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Van Wert County, Ohio, et al., Defendants-appellees, 959 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1992)
Several months later, at Judge Walters' instruction, the clerk wrote a letter to Judge Kimmel seeking guidance with respect to inquiries that Judge Walters had received from the press and others about the special prosecutor's report. Judge Kimmel replied that because there had been no motion to have the file or the report placed under seal, " [t]he record is ... a public record and whoever wishes to examine it may do so...." The file remained open for public inspection thereafter, and various people obtained copies.
Two days after the filing of his federal case, Mr. Childs commenced an action in the Supreme Court of Ohio against Judges Kimmel and Walters and the clerk of courts of Van Wert County. Invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in mandamus, prohibition and procedendo (see Article IV, §§ 2(B) (1) (b), (d) and (e) of the Ohio Constitution), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, inter al., and citing Ohio Revised Code § 2731.11 (a statute providing for the recovery of damages by a plaintiff for whom judgment is rendered in a mandamus proceeding), Mr. Childs' Supreme Court petition sought (1) a writ of procedendo directing Judge Walters to have the clerk of the Common Pleas Court expunge the criminal "case" from the files; (2) a writ of prohibition directing Judge Kimmel not to take any action therein; (3) a writ of mandamus requiring Judge Walters to notify all purchasers of documents from the criminal file that the file had been expunged from the record and requiring Judge Walters to enjoin all such persons from publishing or republishing the contents of the file; and (4) an award of multi-million dollar compensatory and punitive damages.
After further briefing and oral argument, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Relying heavily on Wozniak v. DuPage County, 845 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1988), the district court concluded that Mr. Childs' claims against Judge Walters and the court clerk were barred under the "claim preclusion" branch of the res judicata doctrine, while the claims against the defendants who were not parties to the Supreme Court action were barred by collateral estoppel, the "issue preclusion" branch of res judicata.2 Mr. Childs has perfected a timely appeal from the dismissal of his federal court case.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, judicial proceedings in a state court receive the same full faith and credit in federal courts as they have in the courts of the state. The res judicata effect of a state court dismissal order is thus the same in a federal case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as it would be if the action had been filed in a state court. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F.2d 725, 730 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989).
"The doctrine of res judicata," as we said in Lesher v. Lavrich, 784 F.2d 193, 194-195 (6th Cir. 1986), a federal case that tracked a parallel proceeding in an Ohio state court, "generally prevents relitigation in a subsequent proceeding involving the same party adversary of any issue that was or might have been decided in a prior judicial decision." To have preclusive effect, under Ohio's res judicata doctrine, the prior decision must have been " [a] final decision or decree rendered upon the merits ... by a court of competent jurisdiction...." Gilbraith v. Hixson, 32 Ohio St.3d 127, 128 (1987), quoting from the first paragraph of the syllabus in Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299 (1943), as approved and followed in various subsequent Ohio Supreme Court decisions. Where, as here, federal and state actions have proceeded simultaneously, "the first judgment entered must be regarded as res judicata for issues in the remaining case." Lesher, 784 F.2d at 195.
Mr. Childs argues on appeal, as he did in the district court, that the Supreme Court never obtained jurisdiction over the subject matter of his damage claims. Under Ohio Rev.Code § 2731.11, he points out, damages can be recovered in a proceeding for a writ of mandamus only " [i]f judgment in [the] proceeding ... is rendered for the plaintiff...." The Supreme Court not having issued a writ of mandamus, Mr. Childs says, the statute gave it no jurisdiction to award damages.3 It seems to us, however, that Ohio Rev.Code § 2731.11 clearly gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to award damages in the mandamus action. A court that rules in the defendant's favor on liability cannot award damages to the plaintiff, of course, but this hardly means that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the damage claim--and we believe that the Ohio Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Mr. Childs' damage claims, under § 2731.11, regardless of the fact that it would have had to grant Mr. Childs' request for a writ of mandamus before it could have awarded him damages.4
In reaching this conclusion, the Wozniak court relied on the following language from its decision in Hagee v. City of Evanston, 729 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1984):
We regard the quoted language as a good summary of legal principles that would be no less applicable in Ohio than in Illinois. And even if Ohio law had precluded Mr. Childs from asserting his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 theories in his original action in the Ohio Supreme Court, it would have made no difference to the result in this case. See Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 631 F. Supp. 1515, 1521 (W.D. Mich. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1987), where Judge Hillman wrote as follows:
" [R]elator prays for a writ of mandamus to issue to respondent Judge Sumner E. Walters to notify ally [sic] purchasers of copies of case NO. CR-86-11-53 that the file is expunged from the record and the record sealed and to issue an injunction against all such persons from publishing or republishing, in any manner or means, the contents, or any part thereof, in any manner and in any forum, and for his costs."
This is simply not the relief that was granted by Judge Walker in the Common Pleas Court; as we have said, Judge Walker's order of August 24, 1989, expunged the criminal case from the record and sealed the file, but gave no notice to prior purchasers of file documents and did not enjoin such purchasers from publishing or republishing the contents thereof. It does not seem to us that Mr. Childs' petition for a writ of mandamus was moot, whatever other infirmities it may have had, and the Supreme Court having failed to specify either that the petition was moot or that the order of dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits, Rule 42(B) (3) compels the conclusion that the dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits. See State ex rel. Kopchak, 44 Ohio St.2d 3 (1975).