Source: https://openjurist.org/688/f2d/596/united-states-v-k-brown
Timestamp: 2017-10-16 22:55:18
Document Index: 514940589

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 2232', '§ 1503']

688 F2d 596 United States v. K Brown | OpenJurist
688 F. 2d 596 - United States v. K Brown
688 F2d 596 United States v. K Brown
688 F.2d 596
Wayne K. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
As Amended Sept. 24, 1982.
Howard Hertz, Cooper, Hertz & Lyons, Berkeley, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Appellant Brown, a member of the Oakland police force, was convicted of the crime of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, for attempting to warn the target of a valid search warrant in order to prevent discovery and seizure of a quantity of heroin. The caption of § 1503 reads "Influencing or injuring officer, juror or witness generally." The statute has two parts. Brown was charged and convicted under the second, or so-called "omnibus" clause, for "corruptly ... endeavor(ing) to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice ...." The sole question before this court is whether his conduct is within the ambit of § 1503.1
Brown correctly points out that interference with the execution of a search warrant in connection with a police investigation is distinguishable from interference with the production of documents subpoenaed in a grand jury proceeding for purposes of the obstruction of justice statute. No case interpreting § 1503 has extended it to conduct which was not aimed at interfering with a pending judicial proceeding. See Rasheed, supra ; United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 961 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979). Courts have held that the obstruction of a government agency's investigation is insufficient to trigger § 1503. Howard, supra, 569 F.2d at 1336 n.9, 1337; United States v. Fayer, 573 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831, 99 S.Ct. 108, 58 L.Ed.2d 125 (1978); United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1970). As the Third Circuit has stated: "Section 1503 imposes criminal sanctions on anyone who 'corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice.' Courts have interpreted this section as applying only to interference with a pending judicial proceeding." Shoup, supra, 608 F.2d at 959 (emphasis in original).2
It is also important to read § 1503 in the context of other statutes relating to the obstruction of justice. The obstruction which Brown attempted here is similar to the obstruction punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 2232.3 See, e.g., United States v. Todaro, 550 F.2d 1300, 1303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2975, 53 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1977). Brown's conduct is unlike that in any other reported case where a conviction under § 1503 has resulted.
Citing Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893); United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1972)