Source: https://www.fenwick.com/insights/publications/intellectual-property-bulletin-winter-2018
Timestamp: 2020-08-14 02:31:58
Document Index: 131721946

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 201']

Intellectual Property Bulletin - Winter 2018 | Fenwick & West LLP
TheElliott case is clearly good news for trademark owners concerned about erosion of their brand rights through “indiscriminate” use by the public. Although the Ninth Circuit did not mention other marks that are often used as verbs (such as XEROX, FEDEX and PHOTOSHOP), owners of these marks might be able to worry less about such use as a result of the ruling. Because trademark rights lost to genericide are difficult if not impossible to recapture, however, all trademark owners should take steps to maintain the strength of their brands. (For a rare case in which lost trademark rights were revived, see Singer Manufacturing v. Briley, where Singer Manufacturing re-established SINGER as a trademark for sewing machines through advertising and public education after the mark had fallen into generic use.)
Trademark owners should be careful to use their own marks in a way that emphasizes their trademark significance, not in a generic sense. Although Elliott tried unsuccessfully to show that Google used its own mark generically, other marks have been found to be generic where the owner used the mark to refer to the type of goods or services offered.See e.g. Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours (use of DUCK TOURS to refer to amphibious tour services) and Pilates v. Current Concepts. (use of PILATES to refer to exercise method and equipment).
A little over a year ago, the Supreme Court of South Australia issued an injunction ordering the Electronic Frontier Foundation to remove a post on its “Stupid Patent of the Month ” blog criticizing the litigation and patent practices of Global Equity Management (GEMSA), an Australian corporation. EFF took the fight back to the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that the injunction was unenforceable and violated American free speech rights. Despite having several pending patent lawsuits in the same district, GEMSA failed to appear in the proceedings. On November 17, 2017, Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a default judgment to EFF in Electronic Frontier Foundation vs. Global Equity Management (SA), and ruled that EFF’s blog post is protected speech.
In Promega v. Life Technologies, Promega (a life sciences company) sued Life Technologies (a biotech company) for infringement of a patent related to genetic testing kits used in both clinical research and forensic identification. Life Technologies assembles the kits in the United Kingdom and sells them worldwide. All of the kits sold by Life Technologies include one component — Taq polymerase — made in the United States. Promega won its infringement case against Life Technologies on summary judgment under two sections of U.S. patent law: 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) and § 271(f)(1).
Prior to the trial on damages, the parties stipulated that Life Technologies had worldwide sales of $708 million for the infringement period. Promega argued that all sales infringed under § 271(f)(1)because all kits contained the Taq polymerase component, which qualified as a “substantial portion” of the accused products. However, the jury verdict form did not break out a damages award under § 271(a)and § 271(f)(1)and did not provide an option for a lesser damages award based only on sales in the United States. The stipulation — and the jury verdict form — proved to be grave miscalculations by Promega.
The jury awarded Promega $52 million in lost damages based on the stipulated-to worldwide sales figure. Life Technologies then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The company argued that the award was based on a misinterpretation of § 271(f)(1);it also argued that Promega had not provided adequate evidence of infringing sales under either § 271(a)or § 271(f)(1).The district court granted Life Technologies' motion, holding that no reasonable jury could have found, based on the trial record, that all of the accused products infringed under § 271(a)and § 271(f)(1) in light of the district court’s interpretation of “substantial portion.” It also held that Promega had waived any argument that the evidence at trial could support a damages calculation based on a subset of total sales. Subsequently, the district court also denied Promega’s motion for a new trial, filed by the company's new counsel.
The Federal Circuit initially reversed the district court, holding that a single component supplied from the United States could qualify as a “substantial portion” of a multicomponent product, and thus could be found to infringe under § 271(f)(1)no matter where it was sold. The court also vacated the denial of Promega’s motion for a new trial and remanded with instructions to conduct a new damages trial.
Because Promega relied on a single damages theory at trial, a significant issue the Federal Circuit considered on remand was waiver. Specifically, did Promega waive all other damages theories, or could it have a second shot at proving a lesser damages award despite its all-or-nothing gamble at trial? The court ruled that Promega had, in fact, waived all other damages theories, and that it could not have another bite at the apple. The ruling was based partly on Promega’s decision to not present any expert testimony on damages at trial, as well as the company's decision to submit a jury verdict form that asked the jury to determine a single “United States sales” figure for sales falling under both § 271(a)and § 271(f)(1).
Despite the fact that the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act has been around since 2000, the U.S. Copyright Office has refused to accept electronic signatures for copyright assignments and other documents. That all changed on December 18, 2017, when new rules (37 C.F.R. § 201.4) became effective allowing 21stcentury electronic signatures to be used for documents submitted for recordation at the Office. The new rules are first steps as the Office moves toward implementing its planned fully electronic online recordation system.
The new rules, released in August 2017 as the “Examination Guide 4-17, ” clarify the requirements and harmonize the deadlines for filing petitions to revive abandoned trademark applications with other types of petitions to the Director. They also remove any uncertainty for applicants, registrants, third parties and the USPTO as to whether a petition to revive an abandoned trademark application or petition to reinstate an expired or cancelled trademark registration is timely.
By removing the uncertainty in the USPTO’s assessment of whether an applicant or registrant was “duly diligent” in monitoring the status of an application or registration, the new rules should help ensure that the public has proper notice of the deadlines and requirements for making timely requests to the USPTO to revive an abandoned trademark application, or a petition to reinstate an expired or cancelled trademark registration.