Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/706/282/379003/
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 20:52:06
Document Index: 581052272

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 2421', '§ 922', '§ 5861']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Joseph Valentine, Defendant-appellant, 706 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1983 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Joseph Valentine, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Joseph Valentine, Defendant-appellant, 706 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 706 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1983)
William Joseph Valentine brings this direct appeal from his conviction on all counts of a seven count indictment. Counts One and Three charged Valentine with possession on or about April 7, 1981, of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count Two charged distribution on or about April 7, 1981, of cocaine under the same statutes. Counts Four and Five charged receipt on or about March 20, 1981, of firearms, after former conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(h) (1) and 924(a). Counts Six and Seven charged possession on or about April 7, 1981, of the same firearms involved in Counts Four and Five, after former conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a).
We have held that errors in limiting cross-examination are of two types. When such an error precludes inquiry into an entire area of relevant cross-examination, the right of confrontation derived from the Sixth Amendment is infringed. United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir. 1971). The second type of error limits only the extent of cross-examination; this is a matter of the trial judge's discretion and will not lead to reversal unless an abuse of discretion, clearly prejudicial to the defendant, is shown. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d at 520; United States v. Alderete, 614 F.2d 726, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Walton, 552 F.2d 1354, 1363-64 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959, 97 S. Ct. 2685, 53 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1977).
Thus, even assuming that the cross-examination could have shown that the cocaine exhibits came from different batches, when these far-fetched scenarios are analyzed, they fail when compared to the more logical and realistic inference that Valentine, who clearly was proven to have had control of fairly substantial quantities of cocaine, had simply sold to Chalamidas cocaine that came from a different source than that later found in his dwelling. We feel that defendant has failed to show that he was clearly prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. Accordingly we conclude that the trial judge's ruling was not an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d at 520.4 III
The Government replies that the guns and a large quantity of cocaine were found in the kitchen of the residence, along with other paraphernalia such as scales and "cutting" agents, which is sufficient to indicate a common scheme or plan. We agree. From such circumstantial evidence there was a sufficient showing that the firearms and the drug were being used in pursuit of a common unlawful activity. See United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir. 1976). Hence the joinder of the charges in one indictment was not improper.5
Even though counts are properly joined in an indictment, the trial court may order a severance for trial under Rule 14 if the defendant, or the prosecution, is prejudiced thereby.6 However, " [t]he decision to grant a severance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its decision will not ordinarily be reversed in the absence of a strong showing of prejudice." United States v. Strand, 617 F.2d 571, 575 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841, 101 S. Ct. 120, 66 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1980). The burden of the defendant to show an abuse of discretion in this context is a difficult one. United States v. Van Scoy, 482 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1973).
Defendant contends further that he was prejudiced by the refusal to sever because in a separate trial for the cocaine charges, evidence of his prior conviction for burglary would have been inadmissible, citing United States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1980). In Busic the Third Circuit held that the defendants had not been prejudiced by the denial of severance because evidence of the prior convictions would have been independently admissible in a separate trial to rebut the entrapment defense raised. Nevertheless, the court was sufficiently concerned about the problem in general to offer guidance to the district courts for future cases. The guideline adopted there was that severance should be granted where evidence of the prior conviction would be admissible on one or more counts but inadmissible on others. 587 F.2d at 585.
Both parties cite Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965, 91 S. Ct. 367, 27 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1970), on this issue. The guidelines offered in Baker strike an appropriate balance between the competing policies of preservation of the accused's important rights and economical judicial administration. We therefore restate those guidelines here:
Valentine argues that because there was no evidence presented to refute Ammon's testimony, given as a Government witness, the weapons convictions cannot stand. Valentine also says he was in an impossible position, that when the guns were left with him it was without his consent, and that if he had done anything to remove them, he would have taken possession of them. Defendant also points to an instruction that informed the jury that " [a]n act ... is 'knowingly' done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason." I R. 48. Valentine says that the guilty verdicts returned on the weapons charges without evidence that Valentine intended to possess the guns demonstrate again that he was prejudiced by the denial of severance for trial because the evidence on the other charges prejudiced him before the jury and led to his convictions on the weapons counts.
Uncertainty as to the unit of prosecution intended by Congress under the statutes in question exists because of the use of the ambiguous word "any" in defining the crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) reads in pertinent part as follows:
Judicial construction of these statutes is guided by the Supreme Court's treatment of a similar ambiguity in the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421. In Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S. Ct. 620, 99 L. Ed. 905 (1955), the Court held that only one offense under the Mann Act occurred where the defendant transported two women across state lines on the same trip and in the same vehicle. This holding is based on two related axioms: the first is that Congress and not the courts should define the conduct to be punished by the criminal law; the second, a corollary to the first, is that when the intent of Congress as to the unit of prosecution cannot be clearly discerned, doubt must be resolved in favor of lenity. The Court stated (349 U.S. at 83-84, 75 S. Ct. at 622):
In a leading case under section 1202 the Eighth Circuit made a thorough analysis of the statutory language, the legislative history, and the statutory scheme in an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the ambiguity. United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1975). Finding nothing in these sources that would resolve the doubt, the court held that the rule of lenity should apply and that absent a showing of separate receipt or separate storage, simultaneous possession of several weapons constitutes only one offense under section 1202. Other courts have uniformly reached the same conclusion.10
The Bell opinion, the overwhelming weight of the authorities, and the absence of any argument by the Government against adoption of the general rule of construction applied in Bell persuade us that we should apply that rule in construing these statutes. We therefore hold that simultaneous possession of more than one weapon constitutes only one offense under 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202. We likewise hold that simultaneous receipt of more than one weapon constitutes only one offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h).
We turn now to the application of these rules to the facts of the instant case. The Government contends that this case is distinguishable from the cases cited above and that the separate convictions are proper because there was evidence of separate receipt of the shotgun and the pistol. The testimony of the prosecution's witness, Ammon, was that he first brought the pistol to Valentine's residence and then, "shortly after that," he delivered the shotgun to the defendant's house. IV R. 174-75. There was no other evidence on the time of the transactions or on any other details. This testimony could be accepted as sufficient to prove two separate and distinct acts of receipt. We are aware, also, that several courts have held or remarked in dicta that proof of separate receipt (or separate storage) of two weapons is sufficient to establish two separate offenses of possession. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231-33 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977).11
Valentine's reliance on White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977), is unavailing. There, a denial of confrontation was found but the prosecution had denied the defendant's requests for pretrial examination of critical physical evidence by an expert of the defendant's choice. We think the cases are fundamentally distinct. In the instant case the defendant elected not to have an independent pre-trial appraisal of the evidence but to attempt to bring out helpful evidence on cross-examination. In doing so, Valentine now must show a reversible error in the limitations imposed on cross-examination, which he has not done
We note that any objection to the joinder of the charges in the indictment was required to have been raised by a pretrial motion. Rule 12(b) (2), F.R.Crim.P
Although we are convinced that Valentine was not substantially prejudiced by the denial of severance, we note that in similar cases we have relied on the giving of limiting instructions to safeguard the accused from the possibility that the jury might view a prior conviction as evidence of predisposition to commit the crimes charged. United States v. Roe, 495 F.2d 600, 604 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 858, 95 S. Ct. 107, 42 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1974). Likewise, in cases involving multiple counts without the prior conviction aspect in upholding denials of severance we have relied on the fact that limiting instructions were given that each count must be given separate consideration. United States v. Strand, 617 F.2d 571, 575 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841, 101 S. Ct. 120, 66 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1980); United States v. Kellerman, 432 F.2d 371, 375 (10th Cir. 1970). Although limiting instructions on the consideration to be given to the prior conviction and on separate consideration of each count were not given here, no error is claimed in this regard. However such instructions should be given to assure defendants the fairest trial possible
The Government has suggested that we apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and decline to consider these issues. We believe, however, that they should be addressed, particularly because of the collateral consequences of the criminal convictions. See United States v. Montoya, 676 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1982)
At least seven other circuits have now reached similar results under either section 922 or section 1202, or under both. See, e.g., United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 450-55 (3d Cir. 1982) (Sec. 1202); United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 325-28 (5th Cir. 1981) (Sec. 1202); Brown v. United States, 623 F.2d 54, 56-59 (9th Cir. 1980) (false statements in connection with acquisition of firearm, Sec. 922(a) (6)); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1979) (receipt under Sec. 922(h) (1) and false statements under Sec. 922(a) (6)); United States v. Powers, 572 F.2d 146, 150-52 (8th Cir. 1978) (extending Kinsley to case involving receipt under Sec. 922(h) (1)); United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 720-22 (6th Cir. 1976) (Sec. 1202), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965, 97 S. Ct. 2920, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (1977); United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 869 (7th Cir.) (Sec. 1202), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950, 95 S. Ct. 1683, 44 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1975); McFarland v. Pickett, 469 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1972) (Sec. 922(j), concealing stolen firearms); United States v. Carty, 447 F.2d 964, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1971) (Sec. 922(i), interstate transportation of stolen firearms). Cf. Sanders v. United States, 441 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1971) (simultaneous possession of two unregistered firearms is two offenses under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); Bell v. United States, distinguished because Sec. 5861(d) uses the article "a" instead of "any"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 92 S. Ct. 147, 30 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1971)
We also note that in United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1982), we affirmed convictions on two counts under Sec. 1202 where it appears that possession of the two weapons was simultaneous. The issue we treat was not considered or decided there, however.
See United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1980) (dissenting opinion of Judge Goldberg)