Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/516/479/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-12-12 16:15:13
Document Index: 6778011

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6972', '§ 6972', '§ 9613', '§ 9607', '§ 9607', '§ 6972', '§ 6972', '§ 6972', '§ 6972', '§ 6972', '§ 6972']

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., (full text) :: 516 U.S. 479 (1996) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 516 › Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. › Case
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,
(a) A private party cannot recover the cost of a past cleanup effort under § 6972(a), which authorizes district courts "to restrain any person [responsible for toxic waste], to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both." (Emphasis added.) Under a plain reading of this remedial scheme, a citizen plaintiff could seek a mandatory injunction that orders a responsible party to "take action" by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of waste, or a prohibitory injunction that "restrains" a responsible party from further violating RCRA. Neither remedy, however, contemplates the award of past cleanup costs, whether denominated "damages" or "equitable restitution." A comparison with the relief provided in the analogous, but not parallel, provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 demonstrates that Congress knows how to provide for the recovery of past cleanup costs, and that § 6972(a) does not provide that remedy. Pp. 483-485.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of
Massachusetts, and William L. Pardee, John Beling, and Karen McGuire, Assistant Attorneys General, Jeremiah W Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, and James Layton, Joseph P. Bindbeutel, and Douglas E. Nelson, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General of their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Calvin E. Holloway of Guam, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Carla Stolla of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for the State of Louisiana through its Department of Transportation and Development by William M. Hudson III, Edgar D. Gankendorff, Lawrence A. Durant, James M. Bookter, and Charley Hutchens; for the Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District by Timothy W Burns, Jerome M. Organ, John Fox Arnold, and Nelson G. Wolff; and for Kaufman and Broad Home Corp. et al. by William N Kammer and Robert C. Longstreth.
" ... The district court shall have jurisdiction ... to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (l)(B), to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both .... "
Chief responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of RCRA rests with the Administrator of the Environ-
In this regard, a comparison between the relief available under RCRA's citizen suit provision and that which Congress
An endangerment can only be "imminent" if it "threaten[s] to occur immediately," Webster's New International Dictionary of English Language 1245 (2d ed. 1934), and the refer-
Other aspects of RCRA's enforcement scheme strongly support this conclusion. Unlike CERCLA, RCRA contains no statute of limitations, compare § 9613(g)(2) (limitations period in suits under CERCLA § 9607), and it does not require a showing that the response costs being sought are reasonable, compare §§ 9607(a)( 4)(A) and (B) (costs recovered under CERCLA must be "consistent with the national contingency plan"). If Congress had intended § 6972(a) to function as a cost-recovery mechanism, the absence of these provisions would be striking. Moreover, with one limited exception, see Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 26-27 (1989) (noting exception to notice requirement "when there is a danger that hazardous waste will be discharged"), a private party may not bring suit under § 6972(a)(1)(B) without first giving 90 days' notice to the Administrator of the EPA, to "the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur," and to potential defendants, see §§ 6972(b)(2)(A)(i)(iii). And no citizen suit can proceed if either the EPA or the State has commenced, and is diligently prosecuting, a separate enforcement action, see §§ 6972(b)(2)(B) and (C). Therefore, if RCRA were designed to compensate private parties for their past cleanup efforts, it would be a wholly irrational mechanism for doing so. Those parties with insubstantial problems, problems that neither the State nor
RCRA does not prevent a private party from recovering its cleanup costs under other federal or state laws, see § 6972(f) (preserving remedies under statutory and common law), but the limited remedies described in § 6972(a), along with the stark differences between the language of that section and the cost recovery provisions of CERCLA, amply demonstrate that Congress did not intend for a private citizen to be able to undertake a cleanup and then proceed to recover its costs under RCRA. As we explained in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14 (1981), where Congress has provided "elaborate enforcement provisions" for remedying the viola-