Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1694501.html
Timestamp: 2020-05-30 09:57:00
Document Index: 128787497

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1101', '§ 41', '§ 1186', '§ 216', '§ 1003', '§ 1186', '§ 216', '§ 1227', '§ 1154', '§ 1325']

Bouras entered the United States in 1997 as a nonimmigrant visitor for business. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B); 22 C.F.R. § 41 .31(a). He overstayed his visa and thus was, like so many others, living in this country illegally. In September 2006, while Bouras was living in Chicago, he married Jennifer Schreiner, a U.S. citizen who lived in Ohio. A year after marrying he became a conditional permanent resident based on that marriage. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 216.1.
The only decision that Bouras challenges in this court is the denial of his request for a continuance. We have jurisdiction to review that denial. Although we lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of the good-faith marriage waiver, review of a related procedural motion (such as a motion for a continuance) is foreclosed “only if the agency's rationale for denying the procedural request also establishes the petitioner's inability to prevail on the merits of his underlying claim.” Calma v. Holder, 663 F.3d 868, 876 (7th Cir.2011); see Zambrano–Reyes v. Holder, 725 F.3d 744, 749 & n. 2 (7th Cir.2013); Moral–Salazar v.. Holder, 708 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir.2013); Cruz–Mayaho v. Holder, 698 F.3d 574, 576–77 (7th Cir.2012). Here, the agency's rationale for denying Bouras's motion for a continuance—that he failed to establish good cause—does not affect whether he is entitled to or eligible for the discretionary waiver, so we have jurisdiction over his petition.
By regulation, a party seeking a continuance must show “good cause.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29; Mozdzen v. Holder, 622 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir.2010). “Good cause” is not defined by the regulations, so the standard is interpreted by the Board “in different ways depending on the facts and circumstances presented.” Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 788 (BIA 2009). When a continuance is sought for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, the standard for granting the request is high. Id. At a minimum, the party must show that significantly favorable evidence is not currently available despite a good-faith effort to present it. See Adame v. Holder, 762 F.3d 667, 672—73 (7th Cir.2014); Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 788; Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 356—57 (BIA 1983).
The majority opinion notes the complaint of the Board of Immigration Appeals that Bouras “had not clarified whether his ex-wife ‘could provide testimony by phone or in-person on a date that would not conflict with her work schedule.’ “ It is possible that neither Bouras nor his lawyer were aware that witnesses can testify in an immigration hearing by telephone, though Bouras's lawyer had made an appearance in the case by telephone. In any event the immigration judge didn't mention the telephonic option; the Board mentioned it, but that of course was too late. Chapter 4 of the Immigration Court Practice Manual, www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_review.pdf# page=67, sets forth a (needlessly) complicated procedure for telephonic testimony. One might expect an immigration judge to have reminded Bouras's lawyer of the procedure, but of course he did not. Or he could just have asked for her phone number and called her. Immigration hearings are informal.
So less weight—fine. But he gave the affidavits no weight, despite the weakness of the government's evidence. The majority opinion states that the denial of a continuance must be upheld “ ‘unless it was made without a rational explanation.’ “ The immigration judge's denial was made without a rational explanation. He said that his policy is to deny a continuance asked for after he has scheduled a hearing (even if it was scheduled six months earlier), unless there is an emergency or an extenuating circumstances-there certainly was the latter, which he ignored completely. Where was the rationality?
1. There was no inherent inconsistency in the immigration judge's finding that Bouras had failed to meet his burden of proof without making an affirmative finding of a fraudulent marriage. To obtain the discretionary waiver, Bouras had the burden of proving good faith. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(a)(1)(ii). The government has not taken the further step of trying to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the marriage was in fact fraudulent. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); Surganova v. Holder, 612 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir.2010). Such a finding could result in Bouras being barred for life from attaining immigration benefits through a citizen spouse or other relative. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c); Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729 (7th Cir.2009) (affirming denial of visa to alien based on good-faith second marriage where government found that his first marriage had been fraudulent). Nor, quite sensibly, has the government tried to take the still further step of criminal prosecution, which is also possible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c); United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701 (7th Cir.2006). We recognize that Bouras has offered evidence of a good-faith marriage that could have supported a discretionary finding in his favor. There is no evidence that he paid Schreiner to marry him, which is the typical hallmark of a sham marriage. Since the immigration system is certainly overburdened, it's no surprise in this close case that the government has not tried to meet these higher burdens to impose punitive sanctions on Bouras in addition to his removal.
2. Although Bouras may have been unaware that witnesses could testify telephonically, the record shows that his lawyer was familiar with this option. Prior to the Master Calendar Hearing in February 2011, he filed an “Emergency Motion to Appear Telephonically.” That motion was granted by the immigration judge and counsel appeared at the hearing via telephone.