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MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN CERTIFICATION REPORT - PDF
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1 REF: INF-682 v2 Difusión: Expediente Fecha: Creado: CERT2 Revisado: TECNICO Aprobado: JEFEAREA CERTIFICATION REPORT Expediente: Datos del solicitante: W HUAWEI References: EXT-1099 EXT-1284 CCRA SOGIS Certification Request of Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 21/10/2010. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Evaluation Report for Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 ETRHUAW002 M0 28/04/11. LGAI-APPLUS. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security, May European Mutual Recognition Agreement of IT Security Evaluation Certificates v3.0, January Certification report of Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001, as requested by Huawei Technologies in [EXT-1099] dated , and evaluated by the laboratory LGAI-APPLUS, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-1284] received on April 28 th 2011, and in compliance with [CCRA] and for components up to EAL3. This CR also is covered by the [SOGIS] agreement but only for components until EAL2. Página 1 de 22
2 Table Of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... 3 TOE SUMMARY... 3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS... 4 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS... 4 IDENTIFICATION... 7 SECURITY POLICIES... 8 ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT... 8 THREATS... 8 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OBJECTIVES... 9 TOE ARCHITECTURE DOCUMENTS TOE TESTING PENETRATION TESTING...14 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION EVALUATION RESULTS COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS GLOSSARY ACRONYMS BIBLIOGRAPHY SECURITY TARGET Página 2 de 22
3 Executive Summary This document constitutes the Certification Report for the product Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 developed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN). Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI). ITSEF: LGAI Technological Center. APPLUS. Protection Profile: No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed. Evaluation Level: EAL3. Evaluation end date: 28/04/2011. All the assurance components required by the level EAL3 have been assigned a PASS verdict. Consequently, the laboratory (LGAI-APPLUS) assigns the PASS VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL3 methodology, as define by of the Common Criteria [CC-P3] and the Common Methodology [CEM]. Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 product, a positive resolution is proposed. TOE Summary Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 provides highend networking capacities for telecom and enterprise core networks. It consists of both hardware and software. At the core of each router is the Versatile Routing Platform (VRP) deployed on board Main Processing Unit (MPU) or Switch Routing Unit (SRU), the software for Página 3 de 22
4 managing and running the router s networking functionality. VRP provides extensive security features. These features include different interfaces with according access levels for administrators; enforcing authentications prior to establishment of administrative sessions with the TOE; auditing of security-relevant management activities; as well as the correct enforcement of routing decisions to ensure that network traffic gets forwarded to the correct interfaces. The Line Processing Units (LPU) are the actual hardware providing network traffic processing capacity. Network traffic is processed and forwarded according to routing decisions downloaded from VRP. Security Assurance Requirements The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil EAL3, according to CC Part 3 [CC-P3]. Assurance Class Security Target Development Guidance Life Cycle Tests Vulnerability Analysis Assurance Components ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.3, ADV_TDS.2 AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1 ALC_CMC.3, ALC_CMS.3, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1 ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2 AVA_VAN.2 Security Functional Requirements The product security functionality satisfies several requirements as stated by its Security Target, and according to CC Part 2 [CC-P2]. They are requirements for Página 4 de 22
5 security functions such as information flow control, identification and authentication. These functional requirements satisfied by the product are: Security Audit (FAU) Cryptographic Support (FCS) User Data Protection (FDP) Identification and Authentication (FIA) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.2 User identity association FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review FAU_SGT.1 Protected trail storage FAU_SGT.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1/3DES Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1/MD5 Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1/HMAC-MD5 Cryptographic operation FCS_CKM.1/AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1/3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key destruction FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling Página 5 de 22 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SGT.1 FAU_SGT.3 FPT_STM.1 FCS_COP.1/AES FCS_COP.1/3DES FCS_COP.1/RSA FCS_COP.1/MD5 FCS_COP.1/HMAC- MD5 FCS_CKM.1/AES FCS_ CKM.1/3DES FCS_ CKM.1/RSA FCS_ CKM.1/RSA FDP_CKM.1 FDP_ACF.1 FIA_AFL.1
6 Security Management (FMT) Protection of the TSF (FTP) Resource utilization (FRU) TOE Access (FTA) Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection FRU_PRS.1 Limited priority of service FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path FIA_ATD.1 FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.2 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.2 FMT.MOF.1 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FPT_ITT.1 FRU_PRS.1 FRU_RSA.1 FTA_SSL.3 FTA_TAB.1 FTA_TSE.1 FTP_TRP.1 Página 6 de 22
7 Identification Product: Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001. Security Target: Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 Security Target. V0.68, 2011/02/24. Protection Profile: No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed. Evaluation Level: CC v3.1 r3 EAL3. Página 7 de 22
8 Security Policies There are no security policies declared in the ST. Assumptions and operational environment The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target, and briefly described below. These same assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited. In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE. In this ST there are only these assumptions to be considered: - A.PhysicalProtection It is assumed that the TOE (including any console attached, access of CF card) is protected against unauthorized physical access. - A.NetworkElements The environment is supposed to provide supporting mechanism to the TOE: A Radius server or TACACS+ server for external authentication/authorization decisions; Peer router(s) for the exchange of dynamic routing information; A remote entities (PCs) used for administration of the TOE. - A.NetworkSegregation It is assumed that the ETH interface on MPU/SRU in the TOE will be accessed only through sub-network where the TOE hosts. The sub-network is separated from the application (or, public) networks where the interfaces on LPU in the TOE are accessible. Threats This section describes the security threats to the TOE: Página 8 de 22
9 - T.UnwantedNetworkTraffic Unwanted network traffic sent to the TOE will not only cause the TOE s processing capacity for incoming network traffic is consumed thus fails to process traffic expected to be processed, but an internal traffic jam might happen when those traffics are sent to MPU from LPU within the TOE. This may further cause the TOE fails to respond to system control and security management operations. Routing information exchanged between the TOE and peer routes may also be affected due the traffic overload. - T.UnauthenticatedAccess A user who is not a user of the TOE gains access to the TOE. - T.UnauthorizedAccess A user of the TOE authorized to perform certain actions and access certain information, gains access to commands or information he is not authorized for. - T.Eavesdrop An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management network served by the TOE is able to intercept, and potentially modify or re-use information assets that are exchanged between TOE and LMT/RMT. Any other threats not included in this list are not necessarily resisted by the TOE. Operational environment objectives The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil the requirements listed in its Security Target. This section identifies the IT security objectives that are to be satisfied by the imposing of technical or procedural requirements on the TOE operational environment. These security objectives are assumed by the Security Target to be permanently in place in the TOE environment. With this purpose, the security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are the following: - OE.NetworkElements The operational environment shall provide securely and correctly working network devices as resources that the TOE needs to cooperate with. For example, other routers for the exchange of routing information, PCs used for TOE administration, and Radius and TACACS+ servers for obtaining authentication and authorization decisions. - OE.Physical The TOE (i.e., the complete system including attached peripherals, such as a console, and CF card inserted in the MPU) shall be protected against unauthorized physical access. Página 9 de 22
10 - OE.NetworkSegregation The operational environment shall provide segregation by deploying the Ethernet interface on MPU/SRU in TOE into a local sub-network, compared to Página 10 de 22
11 TOE Architecture Physical Architecture The physical architecture includes the following systems: - Power distribution system - Functional host system - Heat dissipation system - Network management system The functional host system is the target of this evaluation and following introductions will focus on the functional host system only. The Network management system, power distribution system and heat dissipation system are not within the scope of this evaluation. The functional host system processes data. In addition, it monitors and manages the entire system, including the power distribution system, heat dissipation system, and NMS through NMS interfaces which are not within the scope of this evaluation. The physical boundary of the TOE is the actual router system itself in particular, the functional host system. The Network management system is not within the scope of this evaluation. The power distribution system and heat dissipation system are part of the TOE but not to be evaluated because they are security irrelevant. The TOE provides several models. These models differ in their modularity and throughput by supplying more slots in hosting chassis, but they offer exchangeable forwarding unit modules, switch fabrics, and use the same version of software. The following models will be covered during this evaluation: - NE40E-X16 CX600-X16 - NE40E-X8 CX600-X8 - NE40E-X3 CX600-X3 - NE40E-8 CX NE40E-4 CX600-4 Software Architecture In terms of the software, the TOE's software architecture consists of three logical planes to support centralized routing and control and distributed forwarding mechanism. - Data plane - is responsible for high speed processing and non-blocking switching of data packets. - Control and management plane - is the core of the entire system. It controls and manages the system. Página 11 de 22
12 - Monitoring plane - is to monitor the system environment by detecting the voltage, controlling power-on and power-off of the system. The monitoring plane is not considered security-related thus will not be further covered. The VRP is the control and management platform that runs on the SRU / MPU. The VRP supports IPv4 / IPv6, and routing protocols such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), calculates routes, generates forwarding tables, and delivers routing information to the LPU(s). The VRP includes Service Control Plane (SCP), System Manage Plane (SMP), General Control Plane (GCP) and other TSF, non-tsf subsystems. The LPU implements the functions of the link layer and IP protocol stacks on interfaces and performs hardware-based IPv4 / IPv6 forwarding, multicast forwarding and statistics. The logical boundary of the TOE, namely the Versatile Routing Platform (VRP), is a software platform from view of software architecture, and the forwarding engine that processes the incoming and outgoing network traffic. The TOE controls the flow of IP traffic (datagrams) between network interfaces by matching information contained in the headers of connection-oriented or connectionless IP packets against routing table in forwarding engine. The routing table in forwarding engine is delivered from VRP's routing unit whereas the routing table in VRP's routing module can be statically configured or imported through dynamic routing protocol such as BGP, Open Shortest Path Find (OSPF). Note that BGP/OSPF functionality configuration must be performed via s secure channel enforcing SSH prior to routing table importing. System control and security managements are performed either through interfaces on MPU/SRU or interfaces on LPU via a secure channel enforcing SSH. Página 12 de 22
13 Documents The basic documentation distributed with the TOE to be used with the security assurance provided by the certificate issued is: - Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 Security Target, v Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Service Router Version 6 Release 1 Operational User Guidance, v Huawei NetEngine80E/40E Router V600R001C01_Configuration Guide - Routine Maintenance, v01. - Huawei NetEngine80E and 40E Universal Service Router Command Reference V600R001C01_05, v Huawei NetEngine80E/40E Router V600R001C00_Configuration Guide - IP Routing, v04. - Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Service Router Version 6 Release 1 Preparative Procedure, v0.51. Página 13 de 22
14 TOE Testing The process has verified each unit test, checking that the security functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the function that is intended to test. The TOE configuration is described in each test. Evaluator devised test results are consistent with the expected results. All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results. The evaluator examined the design specification and test documentation, concluding that all the modules functionality are tested. Therefore, all TSFIs are fully tested. The evaluator verified that TSFI were tested in test plan. The test procedures mapped all TSFI to SFR-enforcing modules. The evaluator has repeated all the tests defined in the TOE test specification according to the different configurations defined by the developer. All tests have been successfully performed. The evaluator executed the tests and updated the test documentation with new devised tests. The evaluator verified that the obtained results were consistent to the expected results. The result of independent tests was successfully performed and there were neither inconsistencies nor deviations between the actual and the expected results. Penetration Testing The approach of the penetration testing focused on testing the weakest points of the TOE by design or by technologies that are commonly known to be easy to exploit. The independent penetration testing devised attack vector and performed test cases covering the main types of attacks for this TOE including command retrieval, packet reinjection, MAC supplantation, denial of service, signature forgery, or seed discovery attacks. The evaluator did not find either exploitable vulnerabilities or residual vulnerabilities in the operational environment as a result of independent penetration testing. Página 14 de 22
15 Evaluated Configuration The TOE is defined by its name and version number: - Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 Página 15 de 22
16 Evaluation Results The product Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 has been evaluated in front of the Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 Security Target. V0.68, 2011/02/24. All the assurance components required by the level EAL3 have been assigned a PASS verdict. Consequently, the laboratory (LGAI-APPLUS) assigns the PASS VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL3 methodology, as define by of the Common Criteria [CC-P3] and the Common Methodology [CEM]. Página 16 de 22
17 Comments & Recommendations from the Evaluation Team There are no recommendations. Página 17 de 22
18 Certifier Recommendations Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the product Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001, a positive resolution is proposed. This certification is recognised under the terms of the Recognition Agreement [CCRA] for components up to EAL3 according to the mutual recognition levels of it and the accreditation status of the Spanish Scheme. The assurance derived from this CR also is covered by the [SOGIS] agreement but only for components until EAL2. Página 18 de 22
19 Glossary Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package. Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC. Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts. Informal - Expressed in natural language. Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs. Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE. Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics. Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation. Página 19 de 22
20 Acronyms CC ST TOE TSF TSFI PP SFR LMT RMT NE CLI GUI SRU MPU LPU SFU SPU Common Criteria Security Target Target of Evaluation TOE Security Functions TOE Security Functionalities Interface Protection Profile Security Functional Requirement Local Maintenance Terminal Remote Maintenance Terminal NetEngine Command Line Interface Graphical User Interface Switch Router Unit Main Process Unit Line Process Unit Switching Fabric Unit Service Process Unit Página 20 de 22
21 Bibliography The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product: Common Criteria [CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation- Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, r3, July [CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 3.1, r3, July [CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, r3, July [CEM] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, r3, July Página 21 de 22
22 Security Target It is published jointly with this certification report the security target, Huawei NetEngine40E/CX600 Universal Service Router V600R001 Security Target v0.68, 2011/02/24. Página 22 de 22
REF: 2010-21-INF-765 V1 Distribution: Expediente Date: 21.11.2011 Created: CERT2 Reviewed: TECNICO Approbed: JEFEAREA CERTIFICATION REPORT FOR imanager M2000 VERSION 2 RELEASE 11 C01 CP1301 Dossier: 2010-21
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