Source: https://casetext.com/case/abarca-v-district-of-columbia
Timestamp: 2019-11-13 23:35:21
Document Index: 539512721

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1400', '§ 1401', '§ 1414', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1983']

Abarca v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 06-1254 (RCL) | Casetext
Abarca v. District of Columbia
Civil Action No. 06-1254 (RCL) (D.D.C. Jun. 19, 2007)
Abarcav.District of Columbia
United States District Court, D. ColumbiaJun 19, 2007
) The standards in Buckhannon apply to administrative hearings under the IDEIA even though the relief granted…
) The standards in Buckhannon apply to administrative hearings under the IDEA even though the relief granted…
denying prevailing party status under these circumstances
Summary of this case from Wood v. Dist. of Columbia
Civil Action No. 06-1254 (RCL).
Four minors, A.B., D.E., A.W. and J.H. seek compensation for fees associated with administrative hearings conducted in regards to their disability status under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants have filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all claims of plaintiffs A.B. and D.E. and the § 1983 claims of all remaining plaintiffs under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. For reasons articulated herein, the defendants' motion is GRANTED.
In 2005, Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act in order to make certain that children with learning disabilities are able to fully utilize the public educational system. Specifically, the Act is meant to ensure that, "all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education (FAPE) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). If a child is found to have special needs, the Act requires that the child be enrolled in a special education program at public expense. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A). In order to determine the specifics of the child's special education and whether special education is even necessary, the child must undergo a full evaluation. This evaluation is used to develop the child's "individualized education program" (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). If the parents of the child are dissatisfied with the results of the evaluation, e.g. the child was not found to have a disability; he or she may challenge the evaluation findings in an administrative hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). If the parent prevails at such hearing, he or she may recover reasonable attorney's fees under the IDEIA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Further, even though the Hearing Officer only provides administrative rather than judicial relief, parents may still obtain attorney's fees associated with obtaining a favorable administrative order. "It is well-established in this Circuit that section 1415(i)(3)(B) also authorizes a parent who prevails in an IDEA administrative hearing to recover attorney's fees by filing suit for the fees in federal court. Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 329 F.Supp.2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2004). See also, Moore v. Dist. of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Holbrook v. Dist. of Columbia, 305 F.Supp.2d 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2004).
D.E. filed a hearing request on October 4, 2005 to compel DCPS to perform a full evaluation of the student (including an audiological assessment), to hold an IEP meeting to review all findings, to conduct a review and revision of the IEP to include speech/language services, to remove the student from an open-spaced school, and to provide compensatory one-on-one tutoring. Compl. at 28. Before the hearing, DCPS and D.E. entered into a settlement agreement in which DCPS agreed to convene a MDT/IEP meeting within 30 days of the hearing, conduct a review and revision of the child's IEP and discuss and determine future placement. The Hearing Officer entered this settlement agreement into the record. Id. The complaint does not allege that the Hearing Officer made a determination that the student was denied access to a free appropriate public education. Id.
Defendants have moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While this is a fairly lenient standard, the Supreme Court held, "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . ." Bell Atlantic, Corp., v. Twombly, No. 05-1126, slip op. at 8 (May 21, 2007).
The court may use its discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to parties who prevail in an action brought under the IDEIA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(R)(I). To obtain "prevailing party" status, the plaintiff must show first that there was a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; second, that the judgment was rendered in the claimant's favor; and third, that the claimant was not a prevailing party merely by virtue of having acquired a judicial pronouncement rather than judicial relief. Buckhannon Bd. Care Home, Inc. v. W.V. Dept. Of Health Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, (2001). Further, there must be an "alteration in the legal relationship of the parties" that has been given some judicial imprimatur in order to qualify as a "prevailing party" under fee-shifting statutes. Armstrong v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 50, 57 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. Care Home, Inc. v. W.V. Dept. Of Health Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, (2001)). This approach has been endorsed by other courts despite the silence of a definition of "prevailing party" in the IDEIA. See e.g, T.S. ex rel. Skrine v. D.C., 2007 WL 915227 (D.D.C., 2007); Abraham v. D.C., 338 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.D.C. 2004),
The Buckhannon standards apply to administrative hearings under the IDEIA even though the relief granted is administrative rather than judicial. See, Armstrong v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 50, 56 (D.D.C. 2004) (rejecting "catalyst theory" and adopting the Buckhannon test to determine "prevailing parties" under the IDEIA). Any reference to "court ordered" relief in this document should be understood as "hearing officer-ordered" relief, as the proceedings are administrative in nature, not judicial.
D.E. also did not obtain his primary objective in seeking the administrative hearing. D.E. sought a full evaluation to justify a revision in the child's IEP to include more services. D.E. also requested compensatory one-on-one tutoring, and placement in a new school. Complaint at 28. The parties settled and agreed to review the evaluations and discuss a possible new placement. The HO entered this settlement into the record. These facts do not support a claim for attorney's fees. An evaluation of the child's needs does not amount to an alteration in the court ordered change in the parties' legal status because these evaluations are a pre-existing duty of DCPS. Thus, the hearings officer never made any determination as to whether the child was under the correct classification; the HO merely recorded the parties' agreement to conduct further investigations, and endorsed a task that DCPS had already consented to perform.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Motion is GRANTED as to all claims regarding A.B. and D.E., and
Defendants' motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims of all remaining plaintiffs is GRANTED.