Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/852/1106/451352/
Timestamp: 2019-07-19 22:58:54
Document Index: 733203926

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1531', '§ 1531', '§ 1538', '§ 1538', '§ 1532', '§ 1531', '§ 144', '§ 455', '§ 144', '§ 455']

Palila (loxioides Bailleui, Formerly Psittirostra Bailleui),an Endangered Species; Sierra Club; National Audubonsociety, a Non-profit Association; Hawaii Audubon Society,a Non-profit Association; Alan C. Ziegler, Plaintiffs- Appellees, v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources; Susumo Onoin His Capacity As Chairman of the Hawaii Board Ofland and Natural Resources, Defendants-appellants.palila (loxioides Bailleui, Formerly Psittirostra Bailleui),an Endangered Species; Sierra Club; National Audubonsociety, a Non-profit Association; Hawaii Audubon Society,a Non-profit Association; Alan C. Ziegler, Plaintiffs- Appellees, v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources; Susumo Onoin His Capacity As Chairman of the Hawaii Board Ofland and Natural Resources, Defendants,andhawaii Rifle Association; Gerald Kang,defendants-intervenors-appellants, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1988 › Palila (loxioides Bailleui, Formerly Psittirostra Bailleui),an Endangered Species; Sierra Club; Nati...
Palila (loxioides Bailleui, Formerly Psittirostra Bailleui),an Endangered Species; Sierra Club; National Audubonsociety, a Non-profit Association; Hawaii Audubon Society,a Non-profit Association; Alan C. Ziegler, Plaintiffs- Appellees, v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources; Susumo Onoin His Capacity As Chairman of the Hawaii Board Ofland and Natural Resources, Defendants-appellants.palila (loxioides Bailleui, Formerly Psittirostra Bailleui),an Endangered Species; Sierra Club; National Audubonsociety, a Non-profit Association; Hawaii Audubon Society,a Non-profit Association; Alan C. Ziegler, Plaintiffs- Appellees, v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources; Susumo Onoin His Capacity As Chairman of the Hawaii Board Ofland and Natural Resources, Defendants,andhawaii Rifle Association; Gerald Kang,defendants-intervenors-appellants, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)
Argued and Submitted May 12, 1988. Decided July 22, 1988
As an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act ("Act"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982), the bird (Loxioides bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right. The Palila (which has earned the right to be capitalized since it is a party to this proceeding) is represented by attorneys for the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and other environmental parties who obtained an order directing the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources ("Department") to remove mouflon sheep from its critical habitat. Sports hunters, represented by the Hawaii Rifle Association, among others, had intervened to dispute the contention that the Palila was "harmed" by the presence of mouflon sheep. Hence, these appeals. But, first, some history.
In 1978 the Sierra Club and others brought an action under the Act on behalf of the Palila, claiming that the Department's practice of maintaining feral goats and sheep (animals that originally were domesticated but were allowed to run wild) in the Palila's critical habitat1 constituted an unlawful "taking" under the Act. The district court agreed and ordered the Department to remove the animals because it found that the goats and sheep destroyed the mamane-naio woodlands upon which the Palila depend.2 Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources ("Palila I"), 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979). This court affirmed. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. Land & Natural Resources ("Palila II"), 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
In November 1986 the district court ruled in favor of the Sierra Club. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources ("Palila III"), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986). It found that presence of mouflon sheep "harmed" the Palila within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. Sec. 17.3's definition of "harm" in two ways:3 (1) the eating habits of the sheep destroyed the mamane woodland and thus caused habitat degradation that could result in extinction; (2) were the mouflon to continue eating the mamane, the woodland would not regenerate and the Palila population would not recover to a point where it could be removed from the Endangered Species list.
We inquire whether the district court's interpretation is consistent with the Secretary's construction of the statute since he is charged with enforcing the Act, and entitled to deference if his regulation is reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of Congress. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131, 106 S. Ct. 455, 461, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1985).
While promulgating a revised definition of harm, the Secretary noted that harm includes not only direct physical injury, but also injury caused by impairment of essential behavior patterns via habitat modification that can have significant and permanent effects on a listed species. 46 Fed.Reg. 54748, 54750 (1981) (codified at 50 C.F.R. Sec. 17.3). Moreover, in that same promulgation notice, the Secretary let stand the district court's construction of harm in Palila I. Id. at 54749-50. In Palila I, the district court construed harm to include habitat destruction that could result in the extinction of the Palila--exactly the same type of injury at issue here. See generally Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 985. We conclude that the district court's inclusion within the definition of "harm" of habitat destruction that could drive the Palila to extinction falls within the Secretary's interpretation.
The Secretary's inclusion of habitat destruction that could result in extinction follows the plain language of the statute because it serves the overall purpose of the Act, which is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved...." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). The definition serves the overall purpose of the Act since it conserves the Palila's threatened ecosystem (the mamane-naio woodland).
The Department contends that the district court erred when it found an unlawful "taking" within the meaning of section 9 of the Act. (Section 9--codified as 16 U.S.C. § 1538--lists the conduct prohibited by the Act). The Department argues that no taking exists because the evidence shows that (1) a huntable number of sheep (a flock large enough to sustain sports hunting) could co-exist with the Palila; and (2) the Palila are doing poorly because of the recently removed feral sheep and goats, not the mouflon sheep. Our review is for clear error. Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1987).
We affirm the district court's finding that the Department's permitting mouflon sheep in the area constitutes a "taking" of the Palila's habitat. The district court made its findings based on the testimony of the Sierra Club witnesses, which was not contradicted by extrinsic evidence. Therefore, the district court's findings should not be held clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985) ("When a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error").
The Act's section on taking reads in relevant part: " [I]t is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to-- ... (B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States...." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (1982) (emphasis added). In the definition section of the Act, " [t]he term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1982) (emphasis added)
In addition, the Secretary's interpretation is consistent with the presumption that Congress is "aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and [adopts] that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change." Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n. 15, 105 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 n.15, 84 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1985)
In June 1981, in reaction to Palila I, the Secretary promulgated a definition of harm which apparently left no room for any form of habitat destruction. However, the Secretary withdrew this new definition as the result of a large number of negative comments. Instead, in November 1981, the Secretary introduced the present definition. In 1982, after the Palila I decision and the Secretary's redefinition of harm, Congress amended the Endangered Species Act. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982)). So, Congress presumably was aware of the current interpretation of harm when it amended the Act in 1982. But Congress did not modify the taking prohibition in any matter. Thus, Congress' failure to act indicates satisfaction with the current definition of harm and its interpretation by the Secretary and the judiciary.
A federal judge can be removed from a case for personal bias under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 144; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 455; or (3) the common law of reassignment--see, e.g., Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1987). Here, none of these three mechanisms entitles the Department to relief.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, either a timely motion must be filed, Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987), or good cause shown to excuse a late motion. United States v. Branco, 798 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, the Department waived its section 144 claim because it failed (1) to raise the issue below and (2) to show good cause for this failure.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, it is unsettled in this circuit whether a claim must be timely. See United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 869 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 879, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012, 101 S. Ct. 568, 66 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1980); In re Manoa Fin. Co., 781 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 S. Ct. 948, 93 L. Ed. 2d 997 (1987); Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1045-46 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, assuming, arguendo, that the Department's bias claim is timely, we conclude that no section 455 claim exists because the questioned acts do not demonstrate personal bias; instead, they fall within the district court's authority to facilitate by direct participation the orderly progress of a trial. Hansen v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, we find that our standard for reassignment has not been met. See Cintron v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 813 F.2d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 1987).