Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/825/763/450153/
Timestamp: 2020-07-14 12:28:36
Document Index: 538674359

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4244', '§ 4241', '§ 4241', '§ 4241', '§ 4241', '§ 4241']

United States of America v. Renfroe, Adam O., Jr., Appellant, 825 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1987 › United States of America v. Renfroe, Adam O., Jr., Appellant
United States of America v. Renfroe, Adam O., Jr., Appellant, 825 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1987)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 825 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1987) Argued May 11, 1987. Decided Aug. 7, 1987
The court then presented the critical issue to counsel for both sides as "... whether I have probable cause to believe that he may be incompetent to testify." After further testimony, the court concluded that "... there is no evidence before the court which leads the court to conclude that the defendant is incompetent to proceed during the sentencing procedure. Whether he should be confined for drug addiction, that is an issue separate and apart from his ability to participate in these proceedings." Although it appears that the court may have presented its question to counsel in the context of an application under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (a motion to determine the present mental condition of a convicted defendant), it is clear that the court's resolution of the issue pertained to Mr. Renfroe's competency to continue with the proceeding at hand. We conclude that the court's decision was directed to a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
Fundamental to our adversary system of justice, and perhaps especially of criminal justice, is the prohibition against subjecting to trial a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975). It is clear that the conviction of a legally incompetent defendant and the failure to provide adequate procedures to determine competence would violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172, 95 S. Ct. at 904.
In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960), the Supreme Court defined the test for competence to stand trial as whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceeding against him. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. at 788-89.
Congress codified the determination of a defendant's competence to stand trial in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, P.L. 98-473, 18 U.S.C. § 4241. That section provides in relevant part:
We first confront the issue of our scope of review. The appellant asserts that "where there has never been a psychiatric evaluation, hearing or a judicial determination of competence, appellate review is comprehensive," United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3543, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1392 (1983), citing Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981). The government asserts on the contrary, that the standard is whether the court's decision not to order a competency hearing is fairly supported by the record. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Foster v. DeRobertis, 741 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193, 105 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1985).
The issue before us is whether the district court properly applied the standard for determination of whether a hearing on the appellant's competency was required under the facts of this case. Therefore, we conclude that our review is plenary. Gaines v. Amalgamated Insurance Fund, 753 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1985).4
We note that the statute permits motions to determine competency "at any time after the commencement of prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant ..." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). The request for a hearing to determine Renfroe's competency at trial was, therefore, timely and should have been addressed by the district court.
A motion for a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) should be granted when there is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or a reasonable doubt as to his ability to understand the proceedings rationally as well as factually. See, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S. Ct. 896, 904, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975); United States v. Johns, 728 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1984). Whether a hearing is required is therefore not susceptible to generalized concepts, or theories, but must be based upon the facts of the particular case. See, e.g., United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946, 102 S. Ct. 2013, 72 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1982).
In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 908, the Court suggested that the aggregate of a defendant's indicia of competence should be considered, although any one factor may be sufficient in some circumstances. Included in the Court's indicia of competence were evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence.
Other factors relevant to the determination may include an attorney's representation about his client's competency. See United States v. Metcalfe, 698 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 910, 103 S. Ct. 1886, 76 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1983), and a showing of narcotics abuse, Howell v. United States, 442 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1971). All of these factors must inform the statutory requirement that a defendant be able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and be able to assist properly in his defense.
We must next consider the appropriate remedy for this violation. Given the inherent difficulties in retrospective competency determinations, such nunc pro tunc evaluations are not favored. See, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183, 95 S. Ct. 896, 909, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975), Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966), Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960).
However, such a determination may be conducted if a meaningful hearing on the issue of the competency of the defendant at the prior proceedings is still possible. See, United States v. Johns, 728 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1984). The district court is in the best position to determine whether it can make a retrospective determination of Renfroe's competency during his trial and sentencing. United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S. Ct. 733, 50 L. Ed. 2d 749 (1977). Here, because of the sparse testimony before the district court, we envision the taking of additional testimony to inform the district court's determination in that regard.
While this request lacks the formality associated with the filing or oral presentation of any motion, we are satisfied that counsel intended--and the court so treated--the request as a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241
We note that it is the final determination of competence or lack thereof which is a finding of fact subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Green, 544 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1976)
While we have held, in United States v. Pogany, 465 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1972), that [former] Sec. 4244 required a psychiatric examination if the motion for that examination was made in good faith and was not patently frivolous, we find that no such motion was ever made here.