Source: http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140822_0000504.WKY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-09 17:27:21
Document Index: 656363695

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1332', '§ 1441', '§ 1441', '§ 1441', '§ 1331', '§ 1331']

| Miller v. Medtronic, Inc.
Miller v. Medtronic, Inc.
DAVID MILLER, PLAINTIFFv.MEDTRONIC, INC. et al., DEFENDANTS
For David Miller, Plaintiff: Brett H. Oppenheimer, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brett H. Oppenheimer, PLLC, Louisville, KY; David B. Gray, LEAD ATTORNEY, Goldberg & Simpson, LLC, Prospect, KY.
For Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., Defendants: Carol D. Browning, Julie McDonnell, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Stites & Harbison, PLLC - Louisville, Louisville, KY.
For Norton Hospitals, Inc., doing business as Norton Hospital, Defendant: Allison Olczak Wildman, W. Kennedy Simpson, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Thompson Miller & Simpson PLC, Louisville, KY.
This matter is before the court on a motion to remand filed by the plaintiff, David Miller (" Plaintiff" ), against the defendants, Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.,[1] John Doe #1, and Norton Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Norton Hospital.[2] (DN 16).
In February 2007, Plaintiff underwent a spinal fusion surgery that was performed at Norton Hospital. During the surgery, Plaintiff's surgeon used a bio-engineered liquid bone graft product known as Infuse Bone Graft. Infuse was allegedly designed, developed, manufactured, promoted, and sold by the Medtronic Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Infuse is approved by the Federal Drug Administration (" FDA" ) for use in a specific type of spinal surgery, and that the Medtronic Defendants have Page 647
illegally promoted " off-label" use [3] of Infuse. Plaintiff claims that his surgeon used Infuse in such an off-label manner during his surgery, and he allegedly suffered injuries as a result.
Plaintiff, a citizen of Indiana, filed this action in Jefferson County Circuit Court on October 29, 2013. (Compl., DN 1-1). In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts six state law causes of action against the defendants, including, inter alia, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, strict products liability, and medical negligence. In sum, Plaintiff alleges that the Medtronic Defendants actively promoted the use of Infuse in manners not approved by the FDA, concealed the side effects associated with off-label use, and provided misleading information regarding Infuse to consumers and the medical community. Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages for the damages he allegedly suffered as a result of the off-label use of Infuse during his spinal surgery.
The Medtronic Defendants removed the case to this court on October 30, 2013, invoking our diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, as well as our federal-question jurisdiction to hear cases " arising under" federal law. (Notice of Removal, DN 1). Plaintiff has moved to remand. (Mot. to Remand, DN 16).
" A defendant seeking to remove a case to federal court has the burden of proving that the district court possesses jurisdiction." Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 375 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). " All doubts as to the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand." Coyne v. American Tobacco Co., Page 648
183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
The Medtronic Defendants argue that diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although Plaintiff acknowledges that the parties are diverse, he argues that remand is appropriate because at least one of the Non-Medtronic Defendants is a Kentucky resident and, pursuant to the forum defendant rule, " [a] civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).[4]
Plaintiff filed his complaint with the Jefferson County Circuit Court on Tuesday, October 29, 2013. The following day, October 30, 2013, the Medtronic Defendants filed a notice of removal with this court. The Medtronic Defendants contend that the forum defendant rule is inapplicable in the instant action because this notice of removal was filed before any of the Non-Medtronic Defendants were served, thus precluding the application of § 1441(b)(2). Plaintiff acknowledges that the Medtronic Defendants filed the notice of removal the day after the lawsuit was filed, and that service was not accomplished on either the Non-Medtronic Defendants or the Medtronic Defendants until October 31, 2013.[5] However, Plaintiff argues that the Medtronic Defendants' tactics in seeking quick removal before service on any defendant violates the language and intent of the forum defendant rule.
" The proper interpretation of the 'properly joined and served' language of the Page 649
forum defendant rule has not been resolved by the federal appellate courts." In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 2012 WL 2919219, *2 (E.D. Ky. July 17, 2012). The Sixth Circuit has recognized that " the inclusion of an unserved resident defendant in the action does not defeat removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)," but it has not indicated when, or if, removal would be warranted when a defendant attempts to " game" the system by watching the state court docket and removes the action before a forum defendant can be joined and served. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
One purpose of the forum defendant rule is to prevent an out-of-state plaintiff from gaming the prohibition against removal by joining an in-forum party against whom no legitimate claim is made. See United Steel Supply, LLC v. Buller, 2013 WL 3790913, *1 (W.D. Ky. July 19, 2013); see also Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys " R" Us, Inc., 314 F.Supp.2d 177, 180- 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The forum defendant rule permits removal if the in-forum party is not properly joined in the lawsuit. The same consideration against gamesmanship would seem to apply when defendants attempt to use the forum defendant rule to their advantage by monitoring the state court docket and quickly removing an otherwise non-removable action before service can be accomplished. See Ethington v. General Elec. Co., 575 F.Supp.2d 855 (N.D. Ohio 2008); Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 2008 WL 2247067 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2008).
This case presents the kind of gamesmanship that the court referenced in United Steel Supply. Plaintiff has shown that in each of the fourteen cases pending before Page 650
this court alleging off-label promotion of Infuse by Medtronic, the Medtronic Defendants filed notices of removal within two business days following the filing of the complaint and before service of process was, as a practical matter, possible. (DN 13-3). Indeed, in the instant action, the Medtronic Defendants immediately filed the notice of removal the day after the complaint was filed in state court. This case can be distinguished from United Steel Supply, as the single defendant in that action removed the case thirty days after the complaint had been filed. 2013 WL 3790913. The facts of the present case bear more similarity to those in Ethington, where the court noted:
The Medtronic Defendants alternatively argue that the court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff's claims arise under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (" The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." ). An action " arises under" federal law if (1) " federal law creates the cause of action," or (2) " the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-09, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9). In the instant action, federal law does not create a private right of action. See id. at 806-07 ( " [T]he FDCA does not create or imply a private right of action for individuals injured as a result of violations of the Act[.]" ) (quotation and internal marks omitted). Thus, removal is only proper if Plaintiff's state law claims " necessarily turn[ ] on some construction of federal law." Id. at 808- 09.
The well-pleaded complaint rule " provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936)). Thus, it is well-settled " that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue." Id. at 393 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12). The Sixth Circuit recognizes three exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule: (1) the artful pleading doctrine; (2) the complete preemption doctrine; and (3) the substantial federal question doctrine. Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2007). Although the Medtronic Defendants raise preemption as a defense to Plaintiff's state law claims, they acknowledge that the MDA does not completely preempt the field. Accordingly, only the third exception is relevant in the instant action if Plaintiff's state law claims raise substantial federal questions relating to labeling requirements under the MDA.
Under the substantial federal question doctrine, state law claims can be said to arise under federal law and thus permit the removal of the action to federal court " where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law." Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9) (alteration in original). The Supreme Court recognizes that only a narrow category of cases fall within the substantial federal question doctrine, and the Court has provided the lower courts Page 652
with a framework for determining when state law claims necessarily turn on federal law so as to permit federal jurisdiction.
This court is not without guidance in applying the framework developed in Grable, Page 653
and further refined by Gunn, to a motion to remand involving claims against Medtronic for alleged off-label promotion of Infuse. Several federal district courts have applied this framework to claims that are similar, if not identical, to the ones brought by Plaintiff in the instant action against Medtronic. See, e.g., H.R. ex rel. Reuter v. Medtronic, Inc., 996 F.Supp.2d 671, 2014 WL 554454 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2014); Dillon v. Medtronic, Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 751, 2014 WL 37759 (E.D. Ky. 2014); Anders v. Medtronic, Inc., 2014 WL 1652352 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2014); Goade v. Medtronic, Inc., 2013 WL 6237853 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2013); Jenkins v. Medtronic, Inc., 984 F.Supp.2d 873 (W.D. Tenn. 2013).
However, the analysis falters with respect to the third element, the substantiality of the federal issue. Gunn restricted the application of this element so that it is no longer enough that the federal courts have a greater expertise with federal law. Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1068 (" But the possibility that a state court will incorrectly resolve a state claim is not, by itself, enough to trigger the federal courts' exclusive patent jurisdiction, even if the potential error finds its root in a misunderstanding of patent law." ). Gunn clarified the substantiality inquiry to require that the disputed federal issue be " significant to the federal system as a whole." Id. The Court in Gunn found that such a requirement was met in Grable, because the Court had been " primarily focused not on the interests of the litigants themselves, but rather on the broader significance of the notice question for the Federal Government . . ., emphasiz[ing] the Government's 'strong interest' in being able to recover delinquent taxes through seizure and sale of property, which in turn 'require[d] clear terms of notice'" to buyers. Id. at 1066 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 310-15). In contrast, the federal issue in Gunn did not satisfy the substantiality requirement because " the resolution of a patent issue in the context of a state legal malpractice action can be vitally important to the particular parties," but there needed to be " something more" than a showing of a federal element as part of the cause of action. Id. at 1068.
There is a need to demonstrate the issue 'is significant to the federal system as a Page 654
whole," Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1068--that is, an importance that transcends the parties. As noted, this degree of importance has been found only when the Government's operations are affected by the federal issue. Only in such cases could it be confidently stated that if Congress had thought about the issue it would have sensibly concluded the dispute should be resolved by a federal court. In contrast, Congress has not created a federal right of action, preempted the entirety of state regulation, or divested state courts of jurisdiction in such matters. This failure is telling and cements the Court's conclusion that the federal issues raised in the Petition are not substantial within the meaning of Gunn.
(1) The motion of the plaintiff, David Miller, to remand (DN 16) is GRANTED; (2) This action is REMANDED to the Jefferson County, Kentucky, Circuit Court, Division One (1), for all further proceedings; and