Source: http://openjurist.org/619/f2d/332
Timestamp: 2016-02-14 02:14:35
Document Index: 706457905

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 160', '§ 29', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

619 F2d 332 Abilene Sheet Metal Inc v. National Labor Relations Board | OpenJurist
619 F. 2d 332 - Abilene Sheet Metal Inc v. National Labor Relations Board HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 619 F.2d.
619 F2d 332 Abilene Sheet Metal Inc v. National Labor Relations Board 619 F.2d 332
104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3077, 89 Lab.Cas. P 12,152
ABILENE SHEET METAL, INC., Abilene Area Sheet MetalContractors Association, and Area Association of theJourneymen and Apprentices of the Sheet Metal Workers inCentral West Texas, Petitioners Cross Respondents,v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent Cross Petitioner.
We review the Board's findings of fact under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to accept findings that are supported by substantial evidence. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f). Congress, through the substantial evidence test, has directed the circuit courts to assume "responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds" in making its findings of fact. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 490, 71 S.Ct. 456, 466, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). Substantial evidence is therefore simply "relevant evidence (that) a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 477, 71 S.Ct. at 459, quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938).
Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 489, 71 S.Ct. at 465. See also Watson v. Gulf Stevedore Corp., 400 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 1471, 22 L.Ed.2d 755 (1969) (stating that the substantial evidence formula for review "is not like a standard of weights and measures"). Thus, the term "substantial evidence" is a label of convenience that the courts use to define their process of reviewing administrative decisions. See generally OKC Corp. v. Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co., 381 F.Supp. 865, 868 (N.D.Tex.1974). Individual cases applying the substantial evidence test do not define the process of review. Instead, they offer specific illustrations of it. The process of review is flexible, not constant. "It can be stretched . . . . And the courts are both willing and able to do the stretching, in accordance with what they deem to be the needs of justice." 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 29.02, (1958).
Though we cannot define the process of review itself, we can delineate specific steps in the process that the courts have approved or disapproved. In reviewing administrative fact findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence, we must look to the entire record, and we "must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from" the finding. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 464. The fact that we must look at the entire record on which the agency made its finding requires us to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the finding. Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association v. Federal Aviation Administration, 600 F.2d 965, 970 (D.C.Cir.1979). See also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1027, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (stating that the substantial evidence test "frees the reviewing courts of the time-consuming and difficult task of weighing the evidence").
The ALJ and the Board found that the Company discriminatorily discharged Walker in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), for filing a grievance seeking the higher pay that a journeyman sheet metal worker, as opposed to an apprentice, receives.1 Section 8(a)(3) provides that, "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . ." The motive of the company for discharging Walker determines whether the discharge was discriminatory and therefore in violation of Section 8(a) (3). Mueller Brass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 544 F.2d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 1977); Syncro Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 597 F.2d at 924. Here, if Walker's filing of a grievance motivated the company to discharge him, then the discharge violated § 8(a)(3).
The cases have not clearly established the degree of improper motivation required for a finding of a Section 8(a)(3) violation. In National Labor Relations Board v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 398 F.2d 640, 646 (5th Cir. 1968), this court reviewed various decisions requiring the company's improper motive, to be the pure motive, the real motive, a substantial motive, the moving cause, the primary motive, and the actual motive. The Court then selected a "but for" standard. "(T)o constitute an 8(a)(3) violation, an improper motive must be a cause without which the employee would not have been discharged." Id. at 647. Accord, Sweeney & Co. v. NLRB, 437 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir. 1971). This Circuit, however, has not consistently followed the "but for" test. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 566 F.2d 1245, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978) (concurring opinion).
B. The Events Preceding Walker's Discharge
C. The Discharge Was Not Discriminatory
The General Counsel had the burden of showing that improper motives moved the Company to discharge Walker. The General Counsel failed to introduce proof that the Company had ever used any penalty less severe than discharge for time card falsification. Because the General Counsel failed to offer such proof, we hold that a reasonable person might have been unable to conclude whether proper or improper motives moved the Company to discharge, or that a reasonable person might have concluded that proper motives moved the Company to discharge Walker. A reasonable person could not have concluded that improper motives moved the Company to discharge Walker. Substantial evidence does not support the Board's finding that the Company discriminatorily discharged Walker. Compare NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34-35, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 1798, 18 L.Ed. 1027 (1967) (holding that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of discriminatory conduct as the Company failed to meet its burden of establishing legitimate motives for its conduct). Accordingly, we do not enforce that portion of the Board's order requiring the Company to reinstate Walker with backpay.
The ALJ and the Board found that the Association and the Company illegally interfered with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), by dealing with the Company Foreman Deatherage as President of the Union. This finding hinged on the factual finding that Deatherage was a supervisor for the Company.
Because the statute is disjunctive, an individual who has authority to use independent judgment in the execution of any single listed function is a supervisor. NLRB v. Big Three, etc., 579 F.2d 304, 309, n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied 440 U.S. 960, 99 S.Ct. 1501, 59 L.Ed.2d 773 (1979); Security Guard Service, 384 F.2d at 146-147. The facts of each case determine whether an individual is a supervisor. Trailmobile Division, Pullman, Inc. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1967). We review the Board's factual findings under the substantial evidence test, but because the gradations of authority within an organization can be so subtle, we accord special deference to the Board's expertise in determining supervisory status.5 Security Guard Service, 384 F.2d at 146; Trailmobile Division, Pullman, Inc., 379 F.2d at 422.
A. Deatherage's Role at the Company
As discussed above, the courts give special deference to a Board finding of supervisory status because the Board is best able to grapple with the infinite and subtle gradations of authority within a company. See also NLRB v. Broyhill Co., 514 F.2d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1975). We conclude, therefore, that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Deatherage was a supervisor. Security Guard Service sets the guideposts for review of the Board's finding that Deatherage was a supervisor. There, the court noted that whether an employee is a supervisor depends on the nature of his position and how completely that position's responsibilities identify its holder with management. 384 F.2d at 148, quoting International Union of United Brewery, etc. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 297, 303 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied 369 U.S. 843, 82 S.Ct. 875, 7 L.Ed.2d 847 (1961). In Security Guard Service, the Court also stressed that the "natural alignment" of a person in his job bears on supervisory status. 384 F.2d at 150.
A captain, four sergeants, and six or seven guards worked in three shifts to guard a missile site in Security Guard Service. The Board found that the guard sergeants were not supervisors, and this Court enforced the Board order based on that finding. The facts there, however, differ significantly from the facts in the instant case. The guard sergeants did essentially the same work as the guards. Deatherage's duties differed substantially from those of the other employees; he spent 75% of his time checking on other people's work. Furthermore, in Security Guard Service, the employer admitted that the captain was a supervisor. Thus, the guards and sergeants were supervised. In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised. See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123, 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting "that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time"). Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time).
A. The Union Had a Duty to Represent Walker
Because the Union was certified to represent all sheet metal workers, it had a statutory duty to represent fairly all of the workers. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 909, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). The Union's duty to represent extended to all members of the bargaining unit, not just to members of the Union. Smith v. Local No. 25, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, 500 F.2d 741, 749 (5th Cir. 1974). The Union's duty to represent includes an obligation to serve the interests of the members without hostility or discrimination, to exercise its discretion in good faith, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177, 87 S.Ct. at 909. The Union could not arbitrarily ignore or give only perfunctory review to a grievance. Id. at 191, 87 S.Ct. at 917. Thus, the Union had a duty to investigate in good faith Walker's grievance seeking higher pay. If the Union failed to investigate Walker's grievance in good faith, or if the Union arbitrarily or improperly refused to process the grievance, it breached its duty of fair representation to Walker and violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Corp., Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 389 U.S. 837, 88 S.Ct. 53, 19 L.Ed.2d 99 (1967).
The ALJ and the Board found that the Union breached its duty of fair representation to Walker in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by refusing to process Walker's grievance because Walker had previously worked for a non-union contractor. We review this finding of fact under the substantial evidence test. Universal Camera. We hold that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding of a Section 8(b)(1)(A) violation.
C. The Board Ordered the Proper Remedy
The Board also ordered the Union to pay Walker the differential between the amount he would have been paid at the journeyman rate and the amount that he was actually paid for the entire time that he worked at the Company. Unions are liable in monetary damages for breaching their duty of fair representation. Thompson v. International Association of Machinists, 258 F.Supp. 235, 238 (E.D.Va.1966).
The ALJ and the Board also found that the company violated § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), by discharging Walker. We shall, however, only determine whether the company violated § 8(a)(3). If the company violated § 8(a)(3), it necessarily also violated § 8(a)(1). National Labor Relations Board v. I.V. Sutphin, Co. Atlanta, Inc., 373 F.2d 890, 894 (5th Cir. 1967). If the company did not violate § 8(a)(3) by discharging Walker, under the facts of this case, the company did not violate § 8(a)(1). There is no evidence of any possible § 8(a)(1) violation other than the discharge, and we think we can best determine the legality of the discharge by analyzing it under the specific statutory section, § 8(a)(3), that proscribes discriminatory discharges. See Syncro Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 597 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1979)
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-229, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1145-1146, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
This is not a case in which the Company's breach of contract triggered the employee's damages and insulates the Union from liability for breach of its duty of fair representation. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197, 87 S.Ct. 903, 920, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). Walker had no contract with the company for pay at the journeyman rate. He only had a contract for pay at an apprentice rate, and his damages for receiving that lower rate for the time he worked at the Company were caused, presumptively, by the Union's failure to process his grievance in good faith. The Union has not challenged the causal relationship between its breach of duty and Walker's loss of wages, and we, therefore, do not review that question, Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(2) & (4); Brown v. Sielaff, 474 F.2d 826 (3rd Cir. 1973). But see International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 99 S.Ct. 2121, 60 L.Ed.2d 698 (1979); Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 616 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980)