Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/358/121/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-05-22 15:22:32
Document Index: 454745321

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 835', '§ 322', '§ 222', '§ 3731', '§ 322', '§ 835', '§ 322', '§ 835', '§ 1', '§ 322', '§ 835', '§ 835']

United States v. A & P Trucking Co. (full text) :: 358 U.S. 121 (1958) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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United States v. A & P Trucking Co. 358 U.S. 121 (1958)
U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958)United States v. A & P Trucking Co.No. 32Argued October 20, 1958Decided December 8, 1958358 U.S. 121APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Appellees, two partnerships, were charged, as entities, in separate informations with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 835, which makes it criminal knowingly to violate Interstate Page 358 U. S. 122 Commerce Commission regulations for the safe transportation in interstate commerce of "explosives and other dangerous articles." Appellee A & P Trucking Company was also charged with numerous violations of 49 U.S.C. § 322(a) (§ 222(a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935). [Footnote 1] The District Court dismissed, on motion, the informations on the ground that a partnership entity cannot be guilty of violating the statutes involved. The Government appealed directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 356 U.S. 917. For reasons set forth below, we hold that the informations were erroneously dismissed.
"any person knowingly and willfully violating any provision of this chapter (Part II of the Interstate Commerce Page 358 U. S. 123 Act), or any rule, regulation, requirement, or order [of the Interstate Commerce Commission] thereunder, or any term or condition of any certificate, permit, or license, for which a penalty is not otherwise herein provided, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined. . . ."
We think that partnerships as entities may be proceeded against under both § 322(a) and § 835. The purpose Page 358 U. S. 124 of both statutes is clear: to ensure compliance by motor carriers, among others, with safety and other requirements laid down by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the exercise of its statutory duty to regulate the operations of interstate carriers for hire. In the effectuation of this policy, it certainly makes no difference whether the carrier which commits the infraction is organized as a corporation, a joint stock company, a partnership, or an individual proprietorship. The mischief is the same, and we think that Congress intended to make the consequences of infraction the same.
True, the common law made a distinction between a corporation and a partnership, deeming the latter not a separate entity for purposes of suit. But the power of Congress to change the common law rule is not to be doubted. See United States v. Adams Express Co., 229 U. S. 381. We think it beyond dispute that it has done so in § 322(a), for, as we have seen, "person" in that section is expressly defined in the Motor Carrier Act to include partnerships. We think it likewise has done so in § 835, since we find nothing in that section which would justify our not applying to the word "whoever" the definition given it in 1 U.S.C. § 1, which includes partnerships. Section 835 makes regulations promulgated by the ICC for the transportation of dangerous articles binding on all common carriers. In view of the fact that many motor carriers are organized as partnerships, rather than as corporations, the conclusion is not lightly to be reached that Congress intended that some carriers should not be subject to the full gamut of sanctions provided for infractions of ICC regulations merely because of the form under which they were organized to do business. [Footnote 3] More particularly, we perceive Page 358 U. S. 125 no reason why Congress should have intended to make partnership motor carriers criminally liable for infractions of § 322(a), but not for violations of § 835. [Footnote 4]
"It has been notorious for many years that some of the great express companies are organized as joint stock associations, and the reason for the amendment hardly could be seen unless it was intended to bring those associations under the act. As suggested in the argument for the government, no one, certainly not the defendant, seems to have doubted that the statute now imposes upon them the duty to file schedules of rates. . . . But if it imposes upon them the duties under the words 'common carrier,' as interpreted, it is reasonable to suppose that the same Page 358 U. S. 126 words are intended to impose upon them the penalty inflicted on common carriers in case those duties are not performed. . . ."
We hold, therefore, that a partnership can violate each of the statutes here in question quite apart from the participation and knowledge of the partners as individuals. Page 358 U. S. 127 The corollary is, of course, that the conviction of a partnership cannot be used to punish the individual partners, who might be completely free of personal guilt. As in the case of corporations, the conviction of the entity can lead only to a fine levied on the firm's assets.
With that approach, we would not allow this criminal sanction to attach under 18 U.S.C. § 835. A corporation is an artificial, legally created entity that can have no "knowledge" itself, and it said to have "knowledge" only through its employees. On the other hand, a partnership means A, B, and C -- the individuals who compose it. In this country, the entity theory has not in general been extended to the partnership. Judge Learned Hand summarized the history in Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590, 591-592. If Dean Ames had had his way, the mercantile or entity theory of the partnership would have prevailed. But those who took up the drafting of the Uniform Partnership Act after his death adhered to the common law attitude toward a partnership -- that Page 358 U. S. 128 it is an aggregation of individuals. That is to say, the Act adopted the aggregate, rather than the entity, theory. And that Act is in force in about three-fourths of the States. One who combs the reports today can find cases espousing the entity theory. But they are in the minority, and consciously reject the other theory. As Professor Williston has shown, the main stream of American partnership law follows the British course of treating the partnership in the pluralistic sense. The Uniform Partnership Act, 63 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 196, 208. We should therefore assume that this criminal statute, written against that background, reflects the conventional aggregate, not the exceptional entity, theory of the partnership.