Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2006/02/05-6052.htm
Timestamp: 2019-01-19 01:59:08
Document Index: 774065483

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 1291', '§ 3585', '§ 3585', '§ 3585', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 3584', 'art:\n4', '§ 3585']

05-6052 -- Binford v. U.S. -- 02/07/2006
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (30649 bytes) (22325 bytes)
DAVID K. BINFORD,
No. 05-6052
(D.C. No. 95-CR-159-4)
Debra Woods Paull, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before KELLY, O'BRIEN and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.(*)
Petitioner, David Binford, pro se,(1) filed a habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(2) on December 29, 2004, contending he should be awarded credit against his federal sentence for certain time spent in state custody. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we review de novo the district court's decision to deny habeas relief and affirm. Patterson v. Knowles, 162 F.3d 574, 575 (10th Cir. 1998).
On appeal, Binford raises two issues. First, he contends the federal district court did not have jurisdiction to impose a sentence consecutive to a future sentence that may be imposed in pending state charges.(3) Thus, the district court erroneously applied the presumption, in the absence of a statement to the contrary, that sentences imposed at different times run consecutively. While Binford concedes the district court is authorized to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences, he maintains this authority is prohibited in cases where the sentence has yet to be imposed.
While there is authority from other circuits supporting his position,(4) Binford's argument is foreclosed by our holding in United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 57 (10th Cir. 1995). There, considering an identical challenge, we held that "no language in section 3584(a) prohibit[s] a district court from ordering that a federal sentence be served consecutively to a state sentence that has not yet been imposed." Williams, 46 F.3d at 59. The district court correctly followed the binding precedent of Williams.
Binford next contends his federal sentence began to run on the date he was delivered to the El Reno federal facility after sentencing because the state had relinquished his custody to the federal authorities. As a result, he asserts our holding in Weekes v. Fleming, 301 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2002), requires credit on his federal sentence for the time served in the state prison following his delivery to El Reno.
The computation of a federal sentence requires consideration of two separate issues. Initially, we determine the commencement date of the federal sentence and then turn to the extent to which a defendant can receive credit for time spent in custody prior to commencement of sentence. Weekes, 301 F.3d at 1179 (The "first task is to determine when [the Petitioner's] federal sentence actually commenced."). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), a federal sentence commences "on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served." A federal sentence does not commence until a prisoner is actually received into federal custody for that purpose.(5)
A federal sentence must generally be served continuously "'unless interrupted by . . . some fault of the prisoner, and he cannot be required to serve it in installments.'" Weekes, 301 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotation omitted). Binford contends the facts of his case are equivalent to those in Weekes. In Weekes, the petitioner was released from state custody and surrendered to federal authorities for prosecution under federal charges. He returned to state custody for a brief period to attend a hearing on the state charges, but again was released to federal custody. After sentencing under the federal charges, Weekes was committed to the Federal Bureau of Prisons and delivered to the federal facility at Lompoc, California. However, he was returned to state custody approximately two months later to serve his state sentence. Id.
Weekes argued, as Binford does here, "that, pursuant to § 3585(a), his federal sentence actually commenced when he was designated to be transferred to serve his time at the federal penitentiary . . . and continued to run despite the fact that the United States sent him to [the state authorities] to serve his state sentence." Id. Generally, "[t]he sovereign that first acquires custody of a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to custody until it has exhausted its remedy against the defendant." Id. at 1180. Nonetheless, the sovereign having custody determines whether to retain or surrender that custody. See Gee v. Kansas, 912 F.2d 414, 417 (10th Cir. 1990).
On appeal, Binford concedes "the only detail that is not completely parallel[]" is the fact the federal government here produced an ad prosequendam writ by which it gained custody of Binford. (Appellant's Suppl. Auth. Br. at 3.) However, Binford argues that "[t]his distinction is not relevant or dispositive of the conclusion, which remains the same in both cases." (Id.) He claims the subsequent acts of the entities are evidence of their intention to transfer primary custody to the federal authorities. He alleges Oklahoma subsequently used an ad prosequendum writ to regain his custody for continued prosecution of the pending state charge, and therefore, he was merely on "loan" to the state authorities.(6) (R. Doc. 131 at 8.) However, there is no other evidence of a subsequent state ad prosequendam writ in the record. Binford has asked this court to take judicial notice that the docket sheet for his federal case indicates the April 1, 1996 ad prosequendam writ requesting his presence for sentencing on April 3, 1996, was returned unexecuted by the State of Oklahoma. (See Motion for Expedited Ruling/Petition for Immediate Release, filed 12/27/05.) Assuming this is a proper subject for judicial notice,(7) the unexecuted return of the writ is inconsequential. What is important is that the record contains the initial application and Order for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendam requesting Binford be brought before the federal court for the purpose of prosecution of the charges against him. The Order of Temporary Custody was entered the next day. Binford remained in temporary custody until his sentencing. Therefore, he was at all times held pursuant to the original writ and order.
Contrary to Binford's approach, the continuous service rule is not a "get out of jail early card" for prisoners. Free v. Miles, 333 F.3d 550, 555 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). We find no evidence that Oklahoma surrendered Binford's custody to the federal authorities other than "to accord [Binford] expeditious administration of justice." Brown v. Perrill, 28 F.3d 1073, 1074 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Hernandez v. United States Attorney General, 689 F.2d 915, 918 (10th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations omitted). His mistaken delivery to the El Reno facility was short-lived and corrected swiftly after the prison staff discovered the error. Indeed, the overall period of his incarceration is not extended beyond the time contemplated by the sentencing courts. As a result, Binford's federal sentence never began until he was finally received into federal custody for the purpose of serving his federal sentence, after completing his state sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); Hayward v. Looney, 246 F.2d 56, 58 (10th Cir. 1957). Binford is not entitled to credit against his federal sentence for time spent in state prison.(8)
*.After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
1. "We afford a liberal construction to pleadings of a defendant appearing pro se." United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002).
2. Binford initially titled his claim as a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but concedes the district court correctly construed his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A federal prisoner need not secure a certificate of appealability before bringing a claim under § 2241. McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 115 F.3d 809, 810 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) states in relevant part:
4. See Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the division of courts of appeals "on the question whether a district court may require its sentence to be served consecutively to a state sentence that will be imposed in the future" and citing cases).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) requires the defendant be given credit "for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . .
that has not been credited against another sentence." Binford does not contend he did not receive credit on his state sentence for the time he spent in federal custody prior to his return to the state after the federal proceedings had concluded.
6. Binford submitted records indicating his "booking number" changed when he was taken into federal custody and again when he returned to state custody. He does not explain how these administrative actions evidence that he was merely on "loan" to the state when the federal authorities returned him in March, 1996.
7. "[T]he court is permitted to take judicial notice of its own files and records, as well as facts which are a matter of public record." Van Woudenberg v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 560, 568 (10th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 955 (10th Cir. 2001).
8. Two pending administrative matters are brought to an end with this disposition. Binford's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted. Binford's Motion for Expedited Ruling/Petition for Immediate Release is dismissed as moot pursuant to disposition of this case.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2006/02/05-6052.htm.