Source: https://openjurist.org/157/f3d/1042
Timestamp: 2017-11-23 10:56:54
Document Index: 12997764

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 936', '§ 602', 'art, 41', '§ 1621', '§ 1621', '§ 1621', '§ 1623', '§ 3', '§ 3', 'art, 41', '§ 1621']

157 F3d 1042 United States of America v. Robert Dezarn | OpenJurist
157 F. 3d 1042 - United States of America v. Robert Dezarn
157 F3d 1042 United States of America v. Robert Dezarn
157 F.3d 1042
Robert DeZARN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 97-5156.
Decided Oct. 14, 1998.
Kenneth R. Taylor (argued and briefed), Asst. U.S. Attorney, Lexington, KY, for Appellee.
John K. West (argued and briefed), R. Burl McCoy (briefed), McCoy, Baker & West, Lexington, KY, for Appellant.
This appeal calls upon us to clarify the law of this Circuit as to whether a person may be found guilty of perjury where he gives sworn testimony which, from the context of the questioning and circumstances surrounding the investigation, can reasonably be inferred to be knowingly untruthful and intentionally misleading, even though the specific question to which the response is given may itself be imprecise.
In the spring of 1990, a group of active and retired officers of the Kentucky National Guard, including Defendant Robert DeZarn, Billy Wellman, John Julian, and Ed Gill, met at Billy Wellman's home to discuss raising funds for Brereton Jones' gubernatorial campaign. At that meeting, they selected officers from a list of active officers in the guard from whom funds were to be solicited by designated members of the group. The funds were to be collected at a "Preakness Party" being held at Wellman's home on May 19, 1990.
As indicated, the "Preakness Party" was held in May 1990. Invitations were sent out, inviting guests to "a Preakness Party ... for an evening of fun on the farm". Sixty guests attended and gubernatorial candidate Jones made a short speech. Contributions to Jones' campaign were collected at that event. DeZarn admitted in his trial testimony that he received contributions to Jones' campaign at that party. Other witnesses testified to giving contributions to DeZarn at that party, to seeing DeZarn, Wellman and others counting checks at the party, and to discussing with DeZarn the sources of cash contributions at the party.
A year later, in June of 1991, Wellman held another party which DeZarn also attended. This was a small dinner party, attended only by six people: Wellman and his wife, DeZarn and his wife, and another couple. They had dinner, watched the Belmont Stakes horse race on television, and then went to a horse show afterwards. No active guardsmen attended, nor were campaign contributions made or collected. Governor Jones neither attended nor was invited to that party.
Normally, the Board removes only a small number of officers. However, in 1992, an unusually large number of officers were "non-retained," several of whom complained to the Inspector General of the Army, alleging that they were let go because they did not support Jones' gubernatorial campaign. Among other things, these officers alleged that individuals who attended the Preakness Party at Wellman's and made a campaign contribution were not released.
In response to those allegations, the Inspector General sent two army officers, Colonel Thomas Mulrine and Colonel Robert Tripp, to investigate the allegations. The investigators conducted interviews of about 30 witnesses. Prior to conducting the interviews, each interviewee was contacted by phone and apprised of the investigation and its subject matter. Every witness interviewed was asked about the Preakness Party and the Selective Retention Board. The investigators did not know about the pre-party planning meeting nor did any of the individuals interviewed provide them with any information concerning that meeting.
One of the witnesses interviewed during the investigation was Defendant Robert DeZarn. In pertinent part, the interview, which was conducted by Colonel Tripp under oath pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 936(b), was as follows:
The report did reveal, however, that there was evidence that one officer, John Julian, had improperly solicited funds from fellow officers, in violation of the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. § 602. Following that revelation, Julian came forward with additional information about the Preakness Party. He also provided information concerning the planning meeting for that party which had not been disclosed to Colonels Mulrine and Tripp in their witness interviews which formed the basis of their initial report.
DeZarn was then charged with perjury on the basis of his sworn answers in his interview with the investigators.1
The indictment charged that DeZarn knew the testimony he gave the investigators--specifically, his denial of the "Preakness Party" being a fundraising activity and his denial of knowledge of campaign contributions being made at that party--was false when he gave it
At trial, DeZarn testified that Colonel Tripp, by mistakenly setting the questions in his interview about the Preakness Party in 1991, rather than 1990, led him to answer the questions with reference to the 1991 dinner party, which was not a fundraiser and at which he did not collect any contributions.
Evidence was presented at trial, however, to establish that DeZarn was not misled by the 1991 date but had answered the investigators' questions as he had with intent to deceive them. Specifically, all of the individuals questioned by the investigators described the same party, even though some were questioned about a "Preakness Party", some were questioned about a "1990 Preakness Party", and some, like DeZarn, were questioned about a "1991 Preakness Party". Witnesses further testified that "the Preakness Party" was a singular event and was the subject of much gossip in the Guard because of its alleged connection with the Selective Retention Board. Evidence was also presented that two months before DeZarn's interview with the investigators, the party and its connection with the Selective Retention Board were the focus of a series of newspaper articles in the Louisville Courier Journal. In fact, DeZarn had been interviewed by reporters in connection with those articles and admitted at trial that he had read and discussed the articles with others. In one of the articles, DeZarn is quoted as saying that he attended Wellman's 1990 Preakness Party but saw no fundraising. Finally, Billy Wellman testified that he "had only one 'Preakness Party', as a Preakness party itself, in 1990," and no witness testified that there was any Preakness party in 1991.
The sufficiency of the indictment is reviewed de novo. United States v. Holmes, 975 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.1992). The standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence is whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Pena, 982 F.2d 71 (6th Cir.1991). Failure to give a requested defense instruction is reviewed for determination of whether the instruction requested (1) is a correct statement of the law (2) is not substantially covered by another instruction and (3) is so substantial that it impairs the appellant's defense. United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1512 (6th Cir.1991). Application of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Smart, 41 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir.1994).
The "stark contrast" rule and the "literal truth" defense both had their genesis in Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973). In Bronston, the defendant was charged with perjury based upon the following answers he gave to questions in bankruptcy proceedings:
409 U.S. at 354, 93 S.Ct. 595.
Although Bronston had maintained personal accounts in a Swiss bank for five years, his answers were literally true since he did not have a Swiss bank account when he was questioned and since his business did have the account he described. 409 U.S. at 354, 93 S.Ct. 595. The jury convicted and the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that "for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, a nonresponsive answer containing half of the truth which also constitutes a lie by negative implication, when intentionally given in place of the responsive answer called for by a proper question, is perjury." 409 U.S. at 356, 93 S.Ct. 595.
[T]he perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner--so long as that witness speaks the literal truth. The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to the specific object to [sic] the questioner's inquiry.
409 U.S. at 352, 93 S.Ct. 595, (citing United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir.1967)). In reaching its determination, the Court reasoned that it saw
no reason why Congress would intend the drastic sanction of a perjury prosecution to cure a testimonial mishap that could readily have been reached with a single additional question by counsel alert--as every examiner ought to be--to the incongruity of petitioner's unresponsive answer.
409 U.S. at 358, 93 S.Ct. 595.
Taken in the context of the questioning, this response was really nonresponsive. The Court pointed out that "An unresponsive answer is unique ... because its unresponsiveness by definition prevents it from being tested in the context of the question--unless there is speculation as to what the unresponsive answer 'implies'." 409 U.S. at 355 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 595. Thus, because a nonresponsive answer, by its nature, requires speculation by the fact-finder as to what the answer "implies", there cannot be a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer is untruthful.
Where, however, the answer given is responsive to the question asked and "it is entirely reasonable to expect a defendant to have understood the terms used in the question," a charge of perjury may not be dismissed for insufficiency. United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d. Cir.1977). See also, United States v. Lane, 735 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.1984) (as long as there is an unambiguous understanding of the meaning of the question, with no possibility that the questioner and answerer were talking about different events, the issue of whether or not the answer is false is for the jury). Thus, the question and answer must be examined in the context of the investigation as a whole and the state of the defendant's knowledge in order to determine whether ambiguity exists. United States v. Calimano, 576 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.1978). See also, United States v. Schulman, 817 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 813, 111 S.Ct. 51, 112 L.Ed.2d 27 (1990) (examining context to determine ambiguity of testimony).
What is presented in this case is not a nonresponsive, or only partially responsive, answer. Rather, we have a series of categorical answers to questions with a partially mistaken premise or presupposition. In a case very similar to the one now before the court, the Eighth Circuit used factual context to resolve the ambiguity in testimony with a false presupposition, and refused to extend Bronston to allow the defendant "to escape a false oath charge by misleading the questioner with false testimony and then supply literally true answers to questions based on his false testimony." United States v. Robbins, 997 F.2d 390, 395 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 114 S.Ct. 391, 126 L.Ed.2d 340 (1993). Robbins testified as follows in a bankruptcy proceeding:
Q: Sir, what is 11th and Meridian? Is that a financial institution?
A [by Robbins]: No, Huh-uh.
A: That was a little corporation that was formed to buy a motel at 11th and--excuse me, I got to back up. Did you say 11th and Meridian?
A: I do not know what that 11th and Meridian is. There is a company called 11th and MacArthur.
Q: Okay. And that is a corporation that was formed when?
A: Oh, last couple of years.
Q: Is the corporation still in existence?
A: Yes, sir. Didn't buy the property it was going to buy.
Q: Does it have any assets?
997 F.2d at 394.
Neither 11th and Meridian, nor 11th and MacArthur, existed; however, Robbins was the president of a company called MacArthur and 11th Properties, Inc., which did have some assets. 997 F.2d at 394. Using the defendant's testimony about the existence and characteristics of the corporation, the Eighth Circuit held that, in the context of the question and answer, there was no ambiguity and the testifier clearly knew what was being asked. Therefore, the court concluded that a jury could find that the testimony was actually about a real corporation with those characteristics. 997 F.2d at 395. "Absent fundamental ambiguity or impreciseness in the questioning, the meaning and truthfulness of the declarant's answer is for the jury." 997 F.2d at 395.
The question presented here, then, is whether in a perjury case in which a mistaken premise exists in one of the questions asked of the testifier, the Government is entitled to present, and the jury to consider, evidence of the context of the questioning which would establish that the Defendant-- despite the false premise of the question--knew exactly what the questions meant and exactly what they were referring to. We hold that the law of perjury not only permits this, but in cases such as this, requires it.
First, perjury must be shown to be willful, and it must be shown that the testifier did not believe his responses to be true. 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Thus, by its very nature, perjury requires an inquiry into the Defendant's state of mind and his intent to deceive at the time the testimony was given. Indeed, the entire focus of a perjury inquiry centers upon what the testifier knew and when he knew it because in order to make a determination as to whether that person intended to testify falsely, it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew his testimony to be false when he gave it. In order to prove this, the Government, of necessity, must present evidence of the extent of a Defendant's knowledge of the subject matter of the questioning and the circumstances surrounding how he came to that knowledge. This, of course, requires the Government to show the full context of the Defendant's activities as well as other information of which he may have had knowledge and which may have influenced him.
Thus, a perjury inquiry which focuses only upon the precision of the question and ignores what the Defendant knew about the subject matter of the question at the time it was asked, misses the very point of perjury: that is, the Defendant's intent to testify falsely and, thereby, mislead his interrogators. Such a limited inquiry would not only undermine the perjury laws, it would undermine the rule of law as a whole, as truthseeking is the critical component which allows us to determine if the laws are being followed, and it is only through the requirement that a witness testify truthfully that a determination may be made as to whether the laws are being followed. Indeed, that is the entire purpose of the sworn oath: To impress upon the testifier the need--under penalty of punishment--to testify truthfully.
This is not to say that the question to which the answer is made is not an important part of a perjury inquiry. Of course it is. A question that is truly ambiguous or which affirmatively misleads the testifier can never provide a basis for a finding of perjury, as it could never be said that one intended to answer such a question untruthfully. But, where it can be shown from the context of the question and the state of the testifier's knowledge at the time that the testifier clearly knew what the question meant, the Government must be permitted to present, and the fact-finder to consider, those contextual facts.
The circumstances presented here are just such a case. The context of the investigation in this case establishes that it would be "entirely [ ]reasonable to expect that DeZarn understood that the questions posed to him" concerned the 1990 party. Slawik, supra, 548 F.2d at 86. Even if the questioning was not perfectly precise, the context in which the questions were asked made the object of the questioning clear and, more importantly, it is clear that DeZarn knew exactly the party to which Colonel Tripp was referring. The evidence at trial clearly established that Billy Wellman held only one Preakness Party and that was in 1990. No Preakness Party was held in 1991. Furthermore, the characteristics of the 1990 and 1991 parties differed markedly. More than 60 persons were invited to the 1990 Preakness Party, including then Lieutenant Governor Jones who was running for governor. In contrast, only three couples--Billy Wellman and his wife, DeZarn and his wife, and one other couple--attended Wellman's 1991 dinner party. Lieutenant Governor Jones did not attend that gathering, nor was he invited.
Perhaps most tellingly, however, the evidence at trial showed that Colonel Tripp's investigation and questioning of DeZarn did not occur in a vacuum of information or news. First, several witnesses testified that the "Preakness Party" was a singular event that was the subject of a great deal of gossip within the Guard because of its ties to the decisions made by the Selective Retention Board. But, the Preakness Party was not only the subject of gossip--it was, two months before DeZarn's testimony, the subject of a series of newspaper articles in the Louisville Courier Journal, articles which DeZarn was interviewed for and which he admitted he had read and discussed with others. Indeed, DeZarn was quoted in one of the articles as saying that he attended the 1990 Preakness Party and that, just as he falsely testified to Colonel Tripp, he did not see any fundraising at that party.
Accordingly, we find that it was not improper to send to the jury the question whether DeZarn "willfully and contrary to [his] oath state[d] or subscribe[d] any material matter which he [did] not believe to be true" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621. To dismiss this indictment for lack of "stark contrast" would be to apply that rule beyond its rationale and thereby allow the Defendant to "escape a [perjury] charge by misleading the questioner with false testimony and supply literally true answers to questions based on his false testimony." Robbins, supra, 997 F.2d at 395.2
Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not err in denying DeZarn's motion to dismiss the indictment against him for lack of "stark contrast." The context of the investigation makes clear that DeZarn had an unambiguous understanding that the Army investigator's questions were directed at the 1990 Preakness Party and the District Court was correct in permitting the jury to consider evidence showing the context of Defendant's knowledge of the subject matter of the questions.
As indicated above, the Bronston "literal truth" defense applies in cases where a perjury defendant responds to a question with an unresponsive answer. As noted, "[a]n unresponsive answer is unique ... because its unresponsiveness ... prevents it from being tested in the context of the question--unless there is speculation as to what the unresponsive answer 'implies'." Bronston, supra, 409 U.S. at 355 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 595. See also United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir.1967), (a defendant cannot be convicted of perjury if his answer is literally true on one reasonable interpretation of the question asked when there is no evidence supporting one construction over the other ). This Court's reversal of the defendant's conviction in Wall was predicated upon the fact that "there was no evidence to show what the question meant to Mrs. Wall when she answered it. In the absence of such evidence, no determination could be made as to the falsity of her answer." 371 F.2d at 400.
By contrast, in this case, Defendant DeZarn gave unequivocal and directly and fully responsive answers to the questions asked by the Army investigator. Furthermore, as discussed above, there is more than ample context and evidence to test the meaning and falsity of DeZarn's answers.
Moreover, as the Eighth Circuit observed in Robbins supra, when the questions and answers proceed on a false premise of which the defendant is aware, he may not evade the true intent of the line of questioning by stacking literally true answers on top of the false premise. 997 F.2d at 395.
This argument is as misleading as the Defendant's testimony itself. First, the Defendant's legal premise is seriously flawed. Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the test for materiality of a false statement does not require a showing that the outcome of the proceedings in which the statement was uttered would have been different had the defendant answered truthfully. A false statement can be material even if ultimately the conclusion of the tribunal would have been the same. United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir.1985). To be material, all that must be shown is that the perjurious answer "had the potential or natural tendency to affect or influence the [investigator] in, or impede or dissuade [him] from, pursuing [the] investigation." United States v. Gribben, 984 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1993) (emphasis added). See also, Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1816, 108 L.Ed.2d 946 (1990) (materiality is defined as "having any tendency to influence" an investigation).
Because the standard for materiality is a legal standard, we review the trial court's instruction on materiality de novo. Jones v. Federated Financial Reserve Corp., 144 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir.1998). If the instruction is correct, the "verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it." United States v. Warner, 971 F.2d 1189, 1195 (6th Cir.1992)(quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)).
Defendant's contention that substantially the same evidence that truthful answers by General DeZarn would provide were given to the investigators by other witnesses is simply wrong. While it is true that one witness did say that he gave money to DeZarn at the Preakness Party, this witness' testimony is of virtually no weight compared to what the state of the evidence would have been had DeZarn himself testified truthfully because (1) it was DeZarn himself who was one of the prime movers behind the Preakness Party fundraising--DeZarn helped plan the Preakness Party and was the "bag man" for numerous contributions; and (2) it was DeZarn who was the primary focus of the investigation since he was the head of the Guard and had personally appointed the members of the Selective Retention Board which had made the retention decisions under scrutiny.
DeZarn argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the "two witness rule." According to the two witness rule, proof of the falsity of the defendant's testimony cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 607, 65 S.Ct. 548, 89 L.Ed. 495 (1945); Spaeth v. United States, 218 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir.1955). The two witness rule prevents convictions from resting on "an oath against an oath" for fear that "innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or convicted in perjury prosecutions if a less stringent rule were adopted." Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609, 65 S.Ct. 548.
Since Weiler, Congress has enacted a new statute covering specifically perjury before a grand jury or court, 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e), which contains an express rejection of the two witness rule in perjury actions under this new section. ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence."). In light of the fact that Congress chose to limit the rejection of the two witness rule to prosecutions to perjury occurring before grand juries or a court, even the United States does not contest the general validity of the two witness rule, nor the defendant's entitlement to an instruction on the rule when it is applicable.
However, the Government argues that this case is one in which an instruction on the two witness rule is not required and urges this court to follow the Seventh Circuit's determination in United States v. Nicoletti, 310 F.2d 359 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 942, 83 S.Ct. 935, 9 L.Ed.2d 968 (1963), that it was not error to refuse to instruct the jury on the two witness rule when the sole issue is the defendant's state of mind when he made the statement since that rule is not applicable under such circumstances. 310 F.2d at 362-63.
In Nicoletti, the defendant had testified that he did not remember having been previously interviewed by the FBI in 1959 and the proof in the case solely concerned his memory, which could only be proven by circumstantial evidence. 310 F.2d at 362. Noting that there are two essential elements of proof in a perjury prosecution--(1) that the statements made by the defendant be proven false and (2) that the defendant did not believe those statements to be true when he made them--the court held that where the falsity of the statements is capable of proof by direct testimony, and the only issue was whether the defendant believed the statements to be false when he made them, the two witness rule is inapplicable. 310 F.2d at 362.
Although this Court has not ruled on whether an explicit instruction on the two witness rule is necessary under such circumstances, this court has previously held that the two witness rule is inapplicable when the only issue at trial relates to the state of mind of the accused. See United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 662 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937, 97 S.Ct. 2649, 53 L.Ed.2d 255 (1977); see also Behrle v. United States, 100 F.2d 714, 715-716 (D.C.Cir.1938); United States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153, 155 (4th Cir.1961); United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir.1959); Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 831, 842 (8th Cir.1943).
We find that this case falls squarely within the Nicoletti / Swainson exception since DeZarn admitted in his trial testimony that he took contributions at the 1990 Preakness Party, thereby removing from controversy the question of whether his testimony was false and leaving only the issue of whether his testimony to Colonel Tripp was intentionally false, or only inadvertently false, due to a misunderstanding of the question caused by a false presupposition. Since the jury could only determine the meaning of DeZarn's testimony from circumstantial evidence (the context of that testimony, the characteristics of the two parties which he claims to have confused, etc.), under Swainson the two witness rule is inapplicable to the jury's determination of the meaning of DeZarn's testimony. Even DeZarn does not suggest that the two witness rule is applicable in this case, only that an instruction on it is an absolute entitlement of a perjury defendant.
Since there can be no error in refusing to instruct on a rule which has no application, we reject Defendant's argument and adopt the Seventh Circuit's decision in Nicoletti. Therefore, we hold that a district court need not instruct on the two witness rule when the sole issue is the defendant's state of mind.E. SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT
DeZarn's final argument is that the trial court improperly applied a two-point adjustment for obstruction of justice when sentencing him. The enhancement was applied pursuant to U.S.S.G § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice).3 Application Note 6 to that guideline states that this enhancement is not be applied in perjury cases "except where a significant further obstruction occurred during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 n.6. DeZarn argues that the enhancement was improper since his testimony at trial was a "mere reiteration of the allegedly perjurious testimony which he gave during the Inspector General's investigation."
This court reviews for abuse of discretion a sentencing court's determination of whether a defendant's actions constitute an obstruction of justice punishable under the guidelines. United States v. Smart, 41 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir.1994).
The district court adopted the findings of the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) as the basis for the enhancement. The PSI identified four false statements by DeZarn at trial, two of which misrepresented the nature of the meeting to plan the Preakness Party, one of which was an implausible explanation of his denial to the newspapers that he saw no fundraising at the 1990 Preakness Party, and one of which was his explanation that his testimony to the investigators was not false because he was led to think of the 1991 dinner party instead of the 1990 Preakness Party. DeZarn does not challenge the finding that these statements were false, only that they constituted "significant further obstruction."
Contrary to DeZarn's claim, these statements are not mere reiteration of his testimony to the investigators since none of them were made to those investigators. Given the trial court's better view of the proceedings, the fact that DeZarn does not argue that these statements had no bearing on the trial, and the fact that DeZarn based a defense on his explanation of his testimony to the investigators, this court cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in applying the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. We, therefore, affirm the enhancement.
DeZarn was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1621, which provides:
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true....
by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.
In this case, unlike any case where the "stark contrast" rule has been applied, a material portion of the Defendant's testimony is false under every possible construction of the testimony. If DeZarn's testimony is construed to be about the 1990 Preakness Party at Wellman's, DeZarn's testimony regarding contributions to Governor Jones' campaign at that party is false. If the testimony is construed to be about a non-existent 1991 Preakness Party at Wellman's, DeZarn falsely stated that Governor Jones was invited and may have attended
3 U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 provides: