Source: https://openjurist.org/141/f3d/477/united-states-v-isaac
Timestamp: 2018-08-22 08:15:42
Document Index: 624004144

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5']

141 F3d 477 United States v. Isaac | OpenJurist
141 F. 3d 477 - United States v. Isaac
141 F3d 477 United States v. Isaac
141 F.3d 477
Rupert ISAAC, Appellant.
No. 97-7139.
The Court in Wade did not reach the question of the effect of a plea agreement on the prosecutor's discretion to file a substantial assistance motion. Indeed, the Court refused to upset prior precedent in this area, specifically noting that an "agreement on the Government's behalf to file a substantial-assistance motion" was not at issue. 504 U.S. at 185, 112 S.Ct. at 1843 (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63, 92 S.Ct. at 498-99)
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937 (1997), cited in the dissent, contains language seemingly to the contrary. However, Courtois did not involve an allegation of bad faith and did nothing to impugn the earlier decisions in Lee and Vargas
Forney more generally suggested that courts have refused to follow a contract analysis post-Wade. See 9 F.3d at 1501 n. 4. However, both the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483 (2d Cir.1992), and the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Lee, 989 F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir.1993), were decided post-Wade and fully adopted the Rexach analysis
The dissent, post at pp. 487-88, suggests that the "overwhelming majority" of other circuits to decide this issue have determined that Wade applies in the context of a plea agreement that gives the prosecution "sole discretion" to determine whether to file a § 5K1.1 motion. However, most of the cases cited by the dissent do not involve an allegation of bad faith on the part of the prosecution, nor do they apply contract principles in construing the plea agreement at issue. See United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364 (5th Cir.1996) (no discussion of bad faith or contract principles); United States v. Romsey, 975 F.2d 556 (8th Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Mote, 1996 WL 528437 (9th Cir. Sept.19, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (no discussion of bad faith). Only the Eleventh Circuit in Forney and, arguably, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 984-85 (7th Cir.1992), and the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 742-43 (5th Cir.1996), have come close to addressing the precise issue decided in this case. Comparing the analysis in those cases to that of the Second and Tenth Circuits, we find the latter more persuasive
The dissent, post at p. 487, contends that "Isaac could not have reasonably believed that the government would automatically file a § 5K1.1 motion if he cooperated." This argument misses the point. The issue is not whether the government agreed to automatically file a § 5K1.1 motion upon cooperation; rather, the issue is whether Isaac could reasonably believe that under the plea contract, the government would evaluate his cooperation in good faith. It seems to us that the analysis of the dissent leads inescapably to the conclusion that a defendant who secures a § 5K1.1 commitment from the government like the one involved here stands in exactly the same position after he extracts his bargain from the government as he did before. That analysis thus renders superfluous the provision of the plea contract concerning the filing of a § 5K1.1 motion
Presumably based on the prosecutor's comments at oral argument, the district court's opinion observes that the government decided not to file a § 5K1.1 motion "because the information defendant provided could not be independently verified or corroborated." It did not have occasion to address whether this alone would support a finding that the government acted in good faith. We express no opinion on that issue, but it may be necessary for the district court to do so on remand. If, for example, it turns out that this is an accurate characterization of the government's reasoning and Isaac is able to show that he provided full, detailed and complete information about the commission of a crime by another which the government acknowledged that it believed to be true, the district court would have to decide whether a refusal to file based solely on the government's inability to independently corroborate Isaac's information constitutes a good faith refusal
We note that Isaac asserts no other "fair and just" reason that would justify permission to withdraw his plea. The record contains no affidavit, for example, averring that his decision not to plead guilty to Count I was made in reliance on a state of the controlling law that changed between the time of his plea and the time of his motion to withdraw
I disagree with the majority's characterization of Mote, Price, Romsey, and Raynor. These cases do apply contract principles in construing the plea agreements at issue. See, e.g., Mote, 1996 WL 528437 at * 1 (stating "[a] plea agreement is contractual in nature and is subject to contract law standards"); Price, 95 F.3d at 368 (stating that issue turns on "specific language of the plea agreement at issue"); Romsey, 975 F.2d at 558 (basing decision on "carefully-worded plea agreement"); Raynor, 939 F.2d at 195 (holding that government did not promise to file a 5K1.1 motion under terms of plea agreement). In addition, each of these cases holds that where the government has entered into a plea agreement which preserves its discretion to file a 5K1.1 motion, the courts may only review for unconstitutional motive. Under this rule, allegations of prosecutorial bad faith are irrelevant
The majority's analysis disregards the government's reasonable expectations in entering into the plea agreement with Isaac. As noted by the court in Forney:
Forney, 9 F.3d at 1503 n. 4. The government's expectation that the unambiguous sole discretion language in Isaac's plea agreement would accomplish this goal is inherently reasonable and should be afforded due consideration.
As several courts have recognized, the government is not only in the best position to determine whether the defendant has provided substantial assistance but also has a very strong incentive to exercise its discretion fairly in order to encourage future cooperation. Forney, 9 F.3d at 1503 n. 4; United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 358 (D.C.Cir.1991); United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (1st Cir.1990)