Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/365/1225/608983/
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2253', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2255', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 963', '§ 846', '§ 952', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2254', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

Richard Lynn, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 365 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 2004 › Richard Lynn, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee
Richard Lynn, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 365 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2004)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 365 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2004)
Although Lynn's appeal was dismissed, the direct appeals of codefendants Eyster and Marshall remained pending. On December 17, 1991, this Court reversed Eyster's and Marshall's convictions based on the prosecutor's improper vouching for the credibility of Sheehy, a key government witness during the trial. United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 1991). This Court concluded that the "prosecutor's comments implicated the government's credibility, so infecting the trial with unfairness as to rise to the level of a denial of due process." Id. at 1207. Because Lynn's § 2255 motion claims that his due process rights were violated by this same prosecutorial misconduct, we outline what happened during the 1989 trial.
In our Eyster decision, this Court concluded that Eyster and Marshall were not entitled to a new trial based on the witness sequestration violations. Id. Although this Court noted that "the record ... reflects that both the district court and the government were lax in upholding the sequestration rule," it ultimately concluded that, "given the curative aspect of the cross-examination," the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants a new trial. Id. (emphasis added). In so concluding, this Court determined that " [d]efense counsel fully cross-examined [witnesses] Purvis, DeWeese, Barclay and Sheehy about the nature and extent of their contacts with each other, thereby giving the jury the opportunity to evaluate their credibility." Id.
The district court granted a certificate of appealability as to these three issues: (1) the application of procedural bar to Lynn's § 2255 motion; (2) "the prosecutor's improper vouching for the credibility of a government witness"; and (3) "the violation of the sequestration of certain of the government's witnesses."11 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (3).
"In a Section 2255 proceeding, we review legal issues de novo and factual findings under a clear error standard." United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 (11th Cir. 1999).
Courts have long and consistently affirmed that a collateral challenge, such as a § 2255 motion, may not be a surrogate for a direct appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1593, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982) (collecting cases).13 Because collateral review is not a substitute for a direct appeal, the general rules have developed that: (1) a defendant must assert all available claims on direct appeal, Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1055 (11th Cir. 1994);14 and (2) " [r]elief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 `is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A Sep.1981)). Accordingly, a non-constitutional error that may justify reversal on direct appeal does not generally support a collateral attack on a final judgment, Frady, 456 U.S. at 165, 102 S. Ct. at 1593, unless the error (1) could not have been raised on direct appeal and (2) would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n. 10, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3044 n. 10, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976).
In many cases in the past, this Court has opted to address the issues of procedural default, cause, and prejudice, as the district court did here, without expressly addressing the threshold inquiry of whether the claimed error is even cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding. However, in some cases, this Court has recognized this threshold issue and concluded that certain claimed errors, even if meritorious on direct appeal, are not cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding. See Burke v. United States, 152 F.3d 1329, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that " [t]he threshold inquiry is whether Burke's claim that his sentence is contrary to a subsequently enacted clarifying amendment is cognizable under § 2255" and holding his claim does not provide a basis for collateral relief); Richards, 837 F.2d at 966 (noting defendant may not make a statutory non-constitutional claim in a § 2255 motion); Kett v. United States, 722 F.2d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1984) (" [A]s the district court correctly noted, claims of excessive bail are not cognizable in a section 2255 action.").15
Under the procedural default rule, a defendant generally must advance an available challenge to a criminal conviction or sentence on direct appeal or else the defendant is barred from presenting that claim in a § 2255 proceeding. McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); Jones v. United States, 153 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998); Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055; Greene v. United States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 1989). This rule generally applies to all claims, including constitutional claims. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354, 114 S. Ct. 2291, 2300, 129 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1994) ("Where the petitioner — whether a state or federal prisoner — failed properly to raise his claim on direct review, the writ is available only if the petitioner establishes cause for the waiver and shows actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation." (internal quotation marks, punctuation, and citations omitted)); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2505, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977) (applying cause and prejudice standard to constitutional claims).17
A defendant can avoid a procedural bar only by establishing one of the two exceptions to the procedural default rule. Under the first exception, a defendant must show cause for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the alleged error. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1611, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998); Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055; Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 1990); Greene, 880 F.2d at 1305; Martorana v. United States, 873 F.2d 283, 284 (11th Cir. 1989); Parks v. United States, 832 F.2d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 1987). Under the second exception, a court may allow a defendant to proceed with a § 2255 motion despite his failure to show cause for procedural default if "`a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.'" Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986)); see also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622, 118 S. Ct. at 1611; Jones, 153 F.3d at 1307.
In procedural default cases, the question is not whether legal developments or new evidence has made a claim easier or better, but whether at the time of the direct appeal the claim was available at all. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1986); McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992); Lomelo v. United States, 891 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1990).19 Further, to show cause for procedural default, Lynn must show that some objective factor external to the defense prevented Lynn or his counsel from raising his claims on direct appeal and that this factor cannot be fairly attributable to Lynn's own conduct.20 Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1145 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting "that `the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule'" (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. at 2645)); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001); McCoy, 953 F.2d at 1258.21 Lynn argues that he has shown cause because he has new evidence not available at the time of his 1990 direct appeal. We disagree and explain why.
We first point out that Lynn does not actually present any new evidence as to his improper vouching claim. Lynn's so-called new evidence is his allegation that the prosecutor admitted during Eyster's direct appeal that she knowingly solicited perjury from Sheehy about the "Count 7-9 typo" and knowingly misled the jury. However, Lynn's allegation is belied by this Court's Eyster decision, which noted that the government continued to assert that it conducted the redirect examination of Sheehy "in good faith" and did not intentionally mislead the jury. 948 F.2d at 1206. This Court further stated that " [i]t is irrelevant whether the prosecutor asked her question in good faith," that " [w]e do not attempt to divine whether the prosecutor indeed had a lapse of memory about the circumstances of Sheehy's plea," and that "the prosecutor cannot vouch for the credibility of a witness even if she devoutly believes the facts she improperly places before the jury." Id. at 1207. Lynn's improper vouching claim is essentially the same as Eyster's and Marshall's and is procedurally barred due to Lynn's failure to pursue it on direct appeal.22
Second, to the extent Lynn raises a pure, but stronger, witness sequestration claim, Lynn has not shown cause because he has not satisfied the standards for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This Court has concluded that § 2255 motions based on new evidence are subject to the standards generally applicable to motions for a new trial based on new evidence. Greene, 880 F.2d at 1306-07; Bentley v. United States, 701 F.2d 897, 898 (11th Cir. 1983); Everitt v. United States, 353 F.2d 532, 532 (5th Cir. 1965). There are now five requirements that a movant must satisfy before a new trial will be granted based on newly discovered evidence. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). The five requirements are as follows:
Even assuming arguendo that Lynn's newly discovered evidence satisfied all five requirements and that Lynn has established cause for his procedural default, Lynn's new claim of prosecutorial misconduct still fails on the merits because the 1999 affidavits contain nothing more than conclusory allegations. In articulating its concerns with the 1999 affidavits, the district court correctly pointed out that the affidavits do not name any government agents or investigators and do not give details or a single example of what testimony or statements were tailored or conformed to be consistent or were based on information fed from government agents. Furthermore, neither 1999 affidavit identified any statement that was made without the witnesses' personal knowledge. Because the 1999 affidavits submitted by Lynn amount to nothing more than mere conclusory allegations, the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues and correctly denied Lynn's § 2255 motion. Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) ("A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing ... when his claims are merely conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics...." (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 899 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("The petitioner will not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing when his claims are merely `conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics' ...." (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1977))); United States v. Jones, 614 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1980) ("When claims for habeas relief are based on unsupported generalizations, a hearing is not required." (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Scott v. United States, 598 F.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Contrary to [the movant's] assertions, ... the right to a hearing is not established simply by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. When claims for habeas relief are based on unsupported generalizations, a hearing is not required.").
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine permits courts to dismiss a fugitive's appeal in cases in which an individual escapes while at the same time attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of that particular court. The Supreme Court first recognized the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in the 1876 case of Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 32 (1876).25 See Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing history of fugitive disentitlement doctrine).
In Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S. Ct. 498, 24 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and dismissed a state defendant's direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court because the state defendant was a fugitive from justice. Id. at 365-66, 90 S. Ct. at 498-99. The Molinaro Court reasoned that a fugitive should not be entitled to call upon a court for relief as follows:
Id. at 366, 90 S. Ct. at 498-99.26
In Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 122 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is a tool primarily for the court that had its jurisdiction invoked while the defendant was a fugitive. See id. at 249, 113 S. Ct. at 1208. In Ortega-Rodriguez, the federal court of appeals had dismissed Ortega-Rodriguez's direct appeal because the defendant had been a fugitive while his case was under the jurisdiction of the district court. Ortega-Rodriguez, however, was "returned to custody before invocation of the appellate system." Id. at 249, 113 S. Ct. at 1208. Although the Supreme Court recognized the continued validity of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine,27 it determined that the court of appeals applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in too broad a fashion. Id. at 246-47, 113 S. Ct. at 1207. The Supreme Court stated that, " [a]bsent some connection between a defendant's fugitive status and his appeal, as provided when a defendant is at large during the ongoing appellate process, the justifications advanced for dismissal of fugitives' pending appeals generally will not apply." Id. at 249, 113 S. Ct. at 1208 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Further, the Supreme Court concluded that it was the district court's authority that had been questioned and, therefore, it was the district court — not the court of appeals — that could use the fugitive disentitlement doctrine as a tool to protect the integrity of the judicial system.28 Id. at 246, 113 S. Ct. at 1207.
While the Supreme Court in Ortega-Rodriguez concluded that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine was applied too broadly, it also specifically stated that the doctrine retained its validity as a tool for courts to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 246, 113 S. Ct. at 1206-07 ("We have no reason here to question the proposition that an appellate court may employ dismissal as a sanction when a defendant's flight operates as an affront to the dignity of the court's proceedings."). Indeed, the very premise of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine remains the same; namely, "that the fugitive has demonstrated such disrespect for the legal processes that he has no right to call upon the court to adjudicate his claim." Id. at 246, 113 S. Ct. at 1206 (internal quotations omitted).29
In Joensen v. Wainwright, 615 F.2d 1077, 1078-80 (5th Cir. 1980), our predecessor court affirmed the district court's denial of the § 2254 petition of a state prisoner whose state direct appeal was dismissed because he escaped from the state's custody while his direct appeal was pending.30 The Joensen Court recognized that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine was constitutional, stating that " [i]f the [United States] Supreme Court can summarily and unconditionally dismiss an escapee's appeal without offending the constitution, there is no reason why a state court may not do likewise." Id. at 1079. In concluding that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine was constitutional and in denying the § 2254 petition, the Joensen Court stated that a "criminal defendant abandons his appeal by escaping while the appeal is pending... [and that t]here is no constitutional right to reinstatement of an appeal abandoned by the escape" after recapture. Id. at 1080 (internal citations omitted).
In fact, in prior fugitive cases, this Court, in effect, has already applied traditional rules and case law surrounding habeas corpus relief, albeit in the context of § 2254 and not § 2255. In Hall v. Alabama, 700 F.2d 1333 (11th Cir. 1983), a state prisoner escaped while his direct appeal was pending in state court. Id. at 1334. This Court first noted that a § 2254 petitioner must exhaust all state remedies before filing a § 2254 petition. Id. at 1335. The Hall Court then concluded that a state prisoner's escape while his direct appeal was pending constituted a waiver of his right to pursue his direct appeal and thereby precluded him from exhausting all of his available state remedies. Id. at 1338. Because of the failure to exhaust, the state prisoner was prohibited from challenging his state conviction through a § 2254 petition in federal court. Id. Thus, the Hall Court reached its conclusion through traditional exhaustion principles applicable to § 2254 cases.
On the other hand, this Court, in effect, has not allowed the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to operate as a per se bar to all § 2254 relief where the state habeas court entertained the defendant's claim and did not consider it barred by state procedural rules. Stacey v. Warden, 854 F.2d 401, 405 (11th Cir. 1988). Stacey was convicted in Alabama state court, did not appeal his conviction, and escaped after serving one year of a thirty-year sentence. Id. at 402. Once recaptured and sentenced for another crime in Florida, Stacey pursued a state habeas claim in Alabama alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his original conviction. Id. After exhausting state habeas, Stacey filed a § 2254 petition. Id.
Lynn was convicted of seven drug crimes: conspiracy to import cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; three counts of importation of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952; and two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1)
Lynn's base offense level was 36 for importing 13,200 kilograms of cocaine. United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(a) (3) (1988). Lynn's offense level was increased by two levels for possession of a firearm during commission of the offense, by four levels for his role as a leader in the drug importation ring, and by two levels for obstruction of justice Id. at §§ 2D1.1(b) (1), 3B1.1(a), 3C1.1. Lynn's criminal history category III was based on three points for a prior conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and two points for committing the instant offense less than two years after release from imprisonment. Although Lynn's total offense level was 44, Lynn was sentenced based on offense level 43 because that was the highest listed level for his offenses. Lynn's offense level of 43 and criminal history category III resulted in life sentences for each crime.
On direct appeal, Eyster and Marshall also argued that the district court erred in admitting unfairly prejudicial photographs of the remains of pilots killed in a plane crash and violated their rights to an impartial jury by creating a jury pool of persons with surnames that began with letters from one portion of the alphabet. Lynn's counsel attempted to file a motion to adopt both of these arguments, but his motion was returned unfiled. This Court rejected both arguments in Eyster's and Marshall's direct appeals Eyster, 948 F.2d at 1212-13.
Because Lynn's convictions were final prior to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Lynn had one year from the AEDPA's effective date on April 24, 1996, or until April 23, 1997, to file his § 2255 motion See Goodman v. United States, 151 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998). Lynn's § 2255 motion was timely filed on March 28, 1997.
In Frady, the Supreme Court explained:
456 U.S. at 165, 102 S. Ct. at 1593 (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 2239, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979) (footnotes omitted)).
See also Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 234-39, 93 S. Ct. 1577, 1578-81, 36 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1973) (concluding that a claim of unconstitutional discrimination in the composition of the grand jury was not cognizable under § 2255); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S. Ct. 468, 472, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962) (sentencing court's failure to comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a) not cognizable under § 2255); United States v. Velez-Rendon, 845 F.2d 304, 304 (11th Cir. 1988) ("If we were to treat the application as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 we would have to find that [the petitioner's] claims [that his sentence was illegal under Rule 32] are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding... because the errors do not qualify as ... a complete miscarriage of justice"); Capua, 656 F.2d at 1037 ("In determining whether a claim of error is cognizable under Section 2255, a distinction is drawn between constitutional or jurisdictional errors on the one hand, and mere errors of law on the other."); Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding that some of the claims "raise no issue of a constitutional violation and thus are not cognizable for review under Section 2255"); Thor v. United States, 574 F.2d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 1978) (" [U]nder these circumstances, the error was not so fundamentally grievous as to be cognizable in a Section 2255 motion."); Delegal v. United States, 363 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 1966) (stating that "errors asserted in Appellant's motion are not the kind that may be raised by collateral attack under § 2255, which does not provide a substitute for direct appeal").
This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
In Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1693, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "the general rule [is] that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice." However, the Massaro Court excepted ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims from the general procedural default rule. Id. at 1696 (noting that a § 2255 motion is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that "failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255"). In so concluding, the Supreme Court stated:
"This exception is exceedingly narrow in scope as it concerns a petitioner's `actual' innocence rather than his `legal' innocence."Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559, 118 S. Ct. 1489, 1502-03, 140 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1998); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96, 106 S. Ct. at 2649). "` [A]ctual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal innocence." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. Ct. at 1611.
Perceived futility of a claim does not constitute cause for procedural default Smith, 477 U.S. at 535-36, 106 S. Ct. at 2667. "Omission of the claim will not be excused merely because evidence discovered later might also have supported or strengthened the claim." McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1472, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991). As stated in Lomelo, "In determining whether cause exists, the Supreme Court has held that the question is not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel's task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was available at all." 891 F.2d at 1515 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
To show cause, a defendant must prove that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim previously Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. at 2645. " [C]ause ... requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim." Id. at 492, 106 S. Ct. at 2648.
As stated in Lomelo, 891 F.2d at 1515 n. 9, " [t]he `cause and actual prejudice' standard for federal habeas petitions mirrors the standard used to evaluate collateral attacks on state convictions." Thus, at times in our "cause" analysis, we look to both § 2254 and § 2255 cases.
In Lynn's current appeal, the government included Eyster's direct appeal brief as an attachment wherein Eyster expressly argued: (1) that " [a]fter trial, defense counsel learned that Sheehy had in fact violated the sequestration rule and that Purvis and DeWeese had engaged in repeated violations well beyond the discussions they admitted before the jury"; and (2) that "Sheehy, DeWeese and Purvis repeatedly and intentionally violated the sequestration order, and then lied about it."
Lynn's new § 2255 claim of prosecutorial misconduct made in 1999 was untimely unless it "related back" to Lynn's timely 1997 § 2255 claims See Pruitt v. United States, 274 F.3d 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The Davenport rule makes it clear that the key factor is whether the amended claims arise from the same underlying facts as the original claims."); Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that "in order to relate back, the untimely claim must have arisen from the `same set of facts' as the timely filed claim, not from separate conduct or a separate occurrence in `both time and type'") (citations omitted). Because Lynn asserts that the 1999 affidavits about the government's complicity add a new claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on newly discovered facts, we have serious reservations about whether Lynn's new claim of prosecutorial misconduct actually "relates back" to his timely filed § 2255 motion. However, the government does not argue on appeal that Lynn's new claim of prosecutorial misconduct is untimely filed. Accordingly, we assume, but do not decide, for the purposes of this appeal that Lynn's new prosecutorial misconduct claim relates back and is timely.
In Smith, the Supreme Court refused to hear a criminal appeal because the appellant-defendant was a fugitive. 94 U.S. at 98. The Supreme Court reasoned that it had the discretion to refuse to hear the appeal because the appellant-defendant would not necessarily be bound to its ruling: "If we affirm the judgment, he is not likely to appear to submit to his sentence. If we reverse it and order a new trial, he will appear or not, as he may consider most for his interest." Id. at 97. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that it need not "hear and decide what may prove to be only a moot case." Id.
In Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 95 S. Ct. 1173, 43 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1975), the Supreme Court deemed a Texas law constitutional that automatically dismissed a criminal appeal upon the appellant-defendant's escape from custody but reinstated the appeal if the appellant voluntarily surrendered within ten days of his escape. Id. at 535-36, 95 S. Ct. at 1174-75. Noting that the "longstanding and established principle of American law" is that courts may dismiss the pending appeals of escaped prisoners, the Supreme Court accepted Texas's two-tier approach to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Id. at 537, 95 S. Ct. at 1175. Specifically, the Court concluded that a state may constitutionally "deal more severely with those who simultaneously invoked the appellate process and escaped from its custody than with those who first escaped from its custody, returned, and then invoked the appellate process." Id. at 541, 95 S. Ct. at 1177.
"It is often said that a fugitive `flouts' the authority of a court by escaping, and that dismissal is an appropriate sanction for this act of disrespect."Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 245, 113 S. Ct. at 1206 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court did note, however, "that some actions by a defendant, though they occur while his case is before the district court, might have an impact on the appellate process sufficient to warrant an appellate" dismissal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 249, 113 S. Ct. at 1208. For example, "a long escape, even if it ended before sentencing and appeal, may so delay the onset of appellate proceedings that the Government would be prejudiced in locating witnesses and presenting evidence at retrial after a successful appeal." Id. The Supreme Court recognized that appellate courts retain the authority to sanction defendants whose "misconduct at the district court level somehow [made] meaningful appeal impossible or otherwise disrupt [ed] the appellate process so that an appellate sanction is reasonably imposed." Id. at 249-50, 113 S. Ct. at 1208-09 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
We note that courts possess great latitude in their application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. For example, a court may immediately dismiss a fugitive's case without allowing any time for surrender or order a fugitive's case conditionally dismissed unless he surrenders within a certain number of days See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 250 n. 23, 113 S. Ct. at 1209 n. 23 ("Though dismissal of fugitive appeals is always discretionary, ... appellate courts may exercise that discretion by developing generally applicable rules to cover specific, recurring situations."); Estelle, 420 U.S. at 541, 95 S. Ct. at 1177 (stating that a court may "deal more severely with those who simultaneously invoked the appellate process and escaped from its custody than with those who first escaped from its custody, returned, and then invoked the appellate process."); Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366, 90 S. Ct. at 498-99 (stating that the dismissal of an appeal of a convicted defendant who has escaped from prison need not "await ... the expiration of a fixed period of time"); Fratus v. United States, 496 F.2d 1190, 1191 (5th Cir. 1974) (dismissing fugitive's appeal without prejudice so that fugitive could reinstate case once he was no longer a fugitive); United States v. Shelton, 482 F.2d 848, 849 (5th Cir. 1973) (remanding to district court to schedule a hearing at which appellant-fugitive shall appear to "show cause why the conditional revocation of his bond and conditional dismissal of his appeal should not be made final").
In Joensen, the appellant-prisoner's habeas petition argued that the Florida appellate court violated his procedural due process rights by dismissing his appeal without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard and by denying his motion to reinstate the appeal without finding that he knowingly waived his right to appeal. 615 F.2d at 1078.
Other circuits follow the rule, as we do, that a criminal defendant abandons and waives his direct appeal by escaping from custody while his appeal is pending See, e.g., United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1219, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lanier, 123 F.3d 945, 946 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Corporan-Cuevas, 35 F.3d 953, 957 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Puzzanghera, 820 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Freelove, 816 F.2d 479, 480 (9th Cir. 1987); Virgin Islands v. James, 621 F.2d 588, 589 (3rd Cir. 1980); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1345 n. 33 (2nd Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Vasquez-Gutierrez, 335 F.3d 731, 732 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. DeValle, 894 F.2d 133, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1990).
Lynn asserts that Ortega-Rodriguez fundamentally changed the meaning of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. While we expressly decline to revisit the correctness of this Court's dismissal of Lynn's direct appeal, we do note that this Court's earlier decision is in no way undermined by Ortega-Rodriguez. Rather, Lynn's direct appeal represented the classic case of an individual attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of a court while at the same time remaining a fugitive from justice. Ortega-Rodriguez in no way changed the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to situations like the one presented in Lynn's direct appeal. Furthermore, there never has been, nor is there now, a constitutional right to have a direct appeal reinstated after recapture. See Joensen, 615 F.2d at 1078.