Source: http://www.personal.psu.edu/jph13/Civil_Complaint_Judges.html
Timestamp: 2018-11-18 05:55:18
Document Index: 458084052

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1983', '§1983', 'art:\n6', '§ 1983', '§50', '§1983', '§1983', '§50', '§11']

Civil_Complaint_Judges.html
Civ. 1442 (HB)
John Doe 1, Assistant District Attorney for Criminal Case #2007NY029913
Honorable Eileen Koretz, Supervising Judge, Criminal Court, New York County
Serena Springle, Borough Chief Clerk, Criminal Court, New York County,
John Doe 2, Judge issuing bench arrest warrant for Julian Heicklen, Docket # 2007–NY029913, Criminal Court, New York County
Jacqueline W. Silbermann, Administrative Judge, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch
Honorable Norman Goodman, County Clerk, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch
Justice Edward Lehner, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch
Jonathan Lippman, Presiding Judge, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department
Richard T. Andrias, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department
George D. Marlow, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department
John T. Buckley, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department
James M. Catterson, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department
John McConnell, Chief Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department,
William C. Thompson, Jr., Comptroller of the City of New York
Michael Aaronson, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Law and Adjustment, Comptroller’s Office of New York City
Yvonne Roma, Bureau of Law and Adjustment, Comptroller’s Office of New York City
Plaintiff was denied several Constitutional rights and legal redress. He is suing under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for damages and relief. The immunity provisions of 42 U.S.C. #1983 are not applicable, because declaratory relief was unavailable to Plaintiff.
A. JURISDICTION.......................................................................................4
B. STANDINGS...........................................................................................5
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES.................................................................22
D. THE ARREST..........................................................................................23
E. THE ARRAIGNMENT.............................................................................26
F. POLICE ALLEGATIONS..... ..................................................................30
G. THE NON-TRIAL.....................................................................................31
H. DENIABILITY..........................................................................................39
I. REPLY TO JUDGE WOOD’S OPINION..................................................39
J. CLAIMS....................................................................................................46
K. CAUSES OF ACTION.............................................................................48
L. DAMAGES...............................................................................................53
M. REMEDIES SOUGHT............................................................................54
N. MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL..................................................................55
O. MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE WOOD................................................55
P. SERVICE OF DEFENDANTS................................................................55
Q. SEPARATE DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED............................................55
R. ADDRESSES OF DEFENDANTS...........................................................57
S. EXHIBITS.................................................................................................59
1. Jurisdiction rules are listed in FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH FORMS DECEMBER 1, 2006 .
3. Form 2. Allegation of Jurisdiction (a) Jurisdiction founded on diversity of citizenship and amount. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of New Jersey. All Defendants are government officials of New York City or New York State (b) Jurisdiction founded on the existence of Federal questions. The action arises under the Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8: “The Congress shall have Power... To Constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;” and Article IIl, Sections 1 and 2.
4. 42 U. S. C §1983 states in part:
6. Plaintiff has exhausted all avenues of relief in the New York Courts and with the Comptroller of the City of New York.
7. Plaintiff is the aggrieved party who is seeking redress. He is acting as counsel pro se.
8. Originally, all of the Defendants were co-Defendants in U. S. District Court for Southern New York, Case #08 CV 02457: However they were disallowed by Chief Judge Kimba Wood (OPINION enclosed).
9. Judge Wood stated that if an appeal were filed, it would prejudice the case against the other Defendants. Plaintiff has the right to appeal. However, he will be punished if he uses it. An interesting legal system!
10. Therefore, Plaintiff is filing this case as a separate action.
11. Numerous citations were given by Judge Wood to justify the disallowance. These will be discussed in detail in Section I.
I. The Role of Case Law
12. The Torah (Old Testament or five books of Moses) lists 613 laws (commandments) that the Israelites must follow. However five (5) words in Deuteronomy (Ch 16, verse 20) sum up the whole law. These are:
“JUSTICE, JUSTICE, THOU SHALL PURSUE”
13. These same five words sum up the full intent of U. S. law as well.
14. The word “Justice” is repeated to emphasize that the duty of judges is not the enforcement of laws if justice is denied. The Judiciary is an independent branch of government. It is not the slave of the legislative branch.
15. Judge Wood’s decision is argued based on a few statutes and many opinions of the U. S. Supreme and Circuit Courts.
16. There is much to be said for decisions based on precedent. They provide stability to what otherwise would be a society fraught with uncertainty and instability.
17. However there are times when precedent must be overruled to provide justice.
18. Such an example was the decision of the Warren Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court, which overturned earlier rulings going back to Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896) by declaring that state laws that established separate public schools for black and white students denied black children equal educational opportunities.
19. Another more recent example involves the decisions of the Supreme Court to stop the death penalty and then to reinstate it. Though The existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers of the Constitution, and for nearly two centuries the Supreme Court had recognized its validity, in Furman v. Georgia 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) the Court ruled that “Imposition and carrying out of death penalty in these cases held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” and ended the practice. Then four years later, the Court reversed itself again in Gregg v. Georgia 428 U. S. 153 (1976) and ruled “...that the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of murder is not invalid per se.”
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) is a United States Supreme Court case that resulted in a landmark decision regarding abortion. According to the Roe decision, most laws against abortion in the United States violated a constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision overturned all state and federal laws outlawing or restricting abortion that were inconsistent with its holdings.
21. Lawrence et al. v. Texas, (certiorari to the court of appeals of Texas, fourteenth district, No. 02-102, Argued March 26, 2003--Decided June 26, 2003) found that criminalization of homosexual acts violates the Due Process Clause. This reversed Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986).
22. The courts’ opinions on censoring pornographic literature have changed constantly. Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, also known as Fanny Hill, by John Cleland, Forever Amber by Kathleen Winsor, Ulysses by James Joyce, and Tropic of Cancer by Henry Miller all were censored as violation of obscenity laws, which later were discarded. Currently banning printed documents is not in vogue, except in the executive branch of the U. S. Government.
23. When Tropic of Cancer was banned by the U. S. Supreme Court, Plaintiff’s mother, the ultimate prude, was President of the Board of Trustees of the Rochester, NY public library system. She persuaded the Board of Trustees to keep Tropic of Cancer on open shelves and available for circulation.
24. When judges make foolish decisions, the law collapses, and civil norms break down. Consider the war on drugs.
25. Plaintiff will argue that the instant case requires overruling the precedent of judicial immunity in some instances, such as when declaratory relief is unavailable. No judge will agree to such an infringement on his or her improper actions. But judges have extreme conflict of interest in such a ruling. That is why a jury trial is mandatory.
26. The jury of peers of citizens was instituted as the last legal defense against a tyrannical government. It is not the jury’s duty to uphold the law. It is the jury’s duty to see that justice is done. This is not just Plaintiff’s opinion.
27. John Jay, the first Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court, stated (State of Georgia v. Brailsford 3 Dall. 1,4)
“It is presumed, that the juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumed that the courts are the best judges of law. But still, both objects are within your power of decision. You have a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and determine the law as well as the facts in controversy.”
28. Samuel Chase, U. S. Supreme Court Justice and signer of the Declaration of Independence, said in 1796: "The jury has the right to determine both the law and the facts.”
29. U. S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in 1902: "The jury has the power to bring a verdict in the teeth of both law and fact."
30. Harlan F. Stone, the 12th Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, stated in 1941: "The law itself is on trial quite as much as the cause which is to be decided."
31. In Morissette v United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the U. S. Supreme Court recognized the powers of juries to engage in nullification. The court stated:
32. Likewise, the U. S. Supreme Court in Duncan v Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), implicitly endorsed the policies behind nullification when it stated: "If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of the jury to the more tutored but less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it."
33. U. S. Supreme Court Justice Byron White [Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968)}] said:
“The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power–to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge”
34. In a 1972 decision (U. S. v Dougherty, 473 F 2nd 1113, 1139), the Court said: "The pages of history shine on instances of the jury's exercise of its prerogative to disregard instructions of the judge."
35. It was a jury of twelve ordinary men who struck the decisive blow for religious liberty. In the year 1670, William Penn and William Mead were on trial for their lives for having preached the Quaker gospel in violation of the Conventicle Act. The judge instructed the jury that it had no choice but to find the defendants guilty. The jury acquitted both men. William Penn came to America and founded the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania based on religious freedom.
36. In the 1730s, John Peter Zenger published The New York Weekly Journal, an illegal newspaper, in which he criticized Governor William Cosby of New York for corruption in his office. In 1735, he was tried under the seditious libel law, which prohibited criticism of the King or his appointed officers, .and acquitted by a jury in spite of the law. Thus freedom of the press was born.
37. In the 1850s juries throughout the non-slave states refused to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act and Article IV, Section 3, Paragraph 2 of the U. S. Constitution. The juries nullified both federal laws and the U. S. Constitution!
38. In recent times, the courts have tried to erode the nullification powers of juries. Particular impetus for this was given by the fact that all-white juries in the southern states refused to convict whites of crimes against blacks. As a result there is a practice of judges to incorrectly instruct the jury that the judge determines the law, and that the jury is limited to determining the facts. Such an instruction defeats the purpose of the jury, which is to protect the litigants from the tyranny of the state. Judges or expert witnesses can determine the facts better than juries can. The purpose of the jury is to protect the litigants from the tyranny of the law.
39. The problem with the all-white juries that refused to convict whites that committed crimes against blacks was not in jury nullification, but in jury selection. The juries were not representative of the community and would not provide a fair and impartial trial.
40. In recent years, jury nullification has played a role in the trials of Mayor Marion Barry of Washington, DC for drug use, Oliver North for his role in the Iran-Contra Affair, and Bernhard Goetz for his assault in a New York City subway.
41. In Les Miserables, Victor Hugo highlighted the difference between justice and law. The jury's responsibility is to deliver justice, not to uphold the law. Judges in Maryland and Indiana are required by law to inform the jury of its right to nullification. Article 23 of the Maryland Bill of Rights states:
42. Nullification applies just as much in other states, including Pennsylvania. Article I of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania states in Section 6: "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." Section 25 states: "To guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate." Taken together, these two sections mean that juries shall have the powers that they had "Heretofore." i. e. when the Constitution was adopted.
43. Judges usually do not inform the jury of this right. Even worse, some judges instruct the jury that it does not have the right to interpret or nullify the law, but only to determine the facts. Near the end of alcohol prohibition, juries refused to convict for alcohol violations. Has the time arrived for juries to do the same for
marijuana violations?
44. Judge Wood’s arguments are based on two federal laws (28 USC 2283 and 42 USC 1983).
45. 28 USC 2283 states:
“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay a proceeding in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
46. This law does not apply to the instant case, because there is no proceeding in a State court. It is more than a year since arraignment, and Plaintiff has not been committed nor indicted. Plaintiff has been denied a speedy trial, among other violations of the U. S. Constitution.
47. 42 USC 1983 states:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”
48. Plaintiff attempted to obtain declaratory relief in both divisions of the New York State Supreme Court (civil and appellate), but was denied the opportunities for hearings. Thus the 42 USC 1983 restriction for judicial immunity is not applicable. Therefore 42 USC 1983 grants the right to sue for deprivation of rights in federal courts.
49. As pointed out by Ian D. Forsythe:
“Only "persons" under the statute are subject to liability. [Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)]. A state is not a person subject to suit under section 1983 [Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)], but a state officer can be sued in his official capacity for prospective or injunctive relief [Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)] despite the fact that an suit against a government official in his official capacity represents nothing more than a suit against the government entity itself! [Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25, 31 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)]. Despite this logical inconsistency, the current state of the law is that a state may not be sued for damages, but may be sued for declaratory or injunctive relief. Municipalities and local governments are persons subject to suit for damages and prospective relief [Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978)], but the United States Government is not [Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)]. Individual employees of federal [Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)], state [Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25 (1991)], and local [City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)] government may be sued in their individual capacities [Government officials may be sued in their individual capacity. Such a suit does not represent a suit against the government entity for which he is associated [Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)]. The failure to identify in which capacity a defendant is being sued is a critical pleading defect. Colvin v. McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1995)] for damages, declaratory or injunctive relief.”
“The traditional definition of acting under the color of state law requires that the defendant have exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law," [West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)]. However, in the only case in which the Supreme Court held that a government employee did not act under color of sate law, the Court held that a public defender does not act under color of state law while performing a lawyer's traditional function of representing criminal defendants. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) and such actions may result in liability even if the defendant abuses the position given to him by the state [Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)]. ”
“Section 1983 does not impose a state of mind requirement independent of the underlying basis for liability [Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)], but there must be a causal connection between the defendant's actions and the harm that results [Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977)]. In order to hold a local government liable under section 1983, the Supreme Court has interpreted this causation element to require that the harm be the result of action on the part of the government entity that implemented or executed a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers, or the result of the entity's custom [Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, (1978). This "custom or policy" requirement has also been applied to private corporations who contract with the state to provide medical care to prisoners. Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723-24 (11th Cir.), order vacating appeal, 931 F.2d 711, 712 (11th Cir. 1991), partially reinstated and appealed sub nom, Howell v. Burden, 12 F.3d 190 (11th Cir. 1994].”
“A local government is said to have an unconstitutional policy when it fails to train its employees, and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the employee making a wrong decision [City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 1998 WL 54803 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th. Cir. 1997). However, where the employee's proper course of action "is obvious to all without training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not 'so likely' to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the need to train or supervise." Sewell, 117 F.3d at 490]. An unconstitutional policy may also exist if an isolated action of a government employee is dictated by a "final policymaker" [Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). Who is a "final policymaker" is decided by reference to state law. Pembaur, at 483; McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)], or if the authorized policymaker approves a subordinate's decision and the basis for it [City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). However, merely going along with the discretionary decisions made by subordinates is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy. Id]“ In addition to protection against deprivations of procedural due process, the Due Process Clause has two substantive components--the substantive due process simpliciter, and incorporated substantive due process. In order to state a claim for a violation of the substantive due process simpliciter, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in conduct that was "arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense" [Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992); Rymer v. Douglas County, 764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1985)]. This form of due process has very limited application [Collins, 503 U.S. at 125("As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."). See also, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (high speed police chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability for violation of substantive due process); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272 (plaintiff could not make out substantive due process claim for alleged prosecution without probable cause because Fourth Amendment is more appropriately considered); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (claims of force arrest by police officer during arrest or detention cannot state a substantive due process claim--it is more appropriately analyzed under Fourth Amendment); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994) (in non-legislative cases, only procedural due process claims are available to pretextually terminated employees)], but, in contrast to certain procedural due process claims [See note 46, supra, and accompanying text], the existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies does not bar a substantive due process claim [McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994)]. With respect to incorporated substantive due process, the plaintiff may state a claim by proving a violation of one of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has held that one of the substantive elements of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are fundamental--rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and has, over time, held that virtually all of the Bill of Rights protect such fundamental rights and has likewise held that they apply to the states through the "liberty" interest of the Due Process Clause [Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures [Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)], and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy public trial [Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)], apply to the states.”
“Further, state law sovereign immunity and state law limitations on damages do not protect local governments from liability under section 1983 [Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1989)], and state laws requiring pre-suit notification prior to initiating an action against the state or its subdivisions similarly do not apply [Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)]. Therefore, local governments are left in the unique and unhappy situation of being subject to suit without the benefit of any form of immunity.”
“Also, the existence of concurrent state remedies is not a bar to a section 1983 action [Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1990)]. With respect to the extent of damages available, the Supreme Court has noted that the basic purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate the victims of official misconduct, and therefore held that there is no limit on actual damages if they can be proven [Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)]. But where they are not proved, only nominal damages of $1.00 may be awarded [Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-267 (1978)]. Punitive damages may also be awarded, but not against a municipality [Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981). A municipality may, however, be jointly and severally liable. Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1989)]. Injunctive relief is also permitted [42 U.S.C. § 1983].”
“States and state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court [Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But as discussed above, because states are not "persons" under the statute, they cannot be sued in either state or federal court. See note 6, supra, and accompanying text], but local governments have no immunity from damages flowing from their constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its agents as a defense to liability [Owen v. City of Independence, MO, 445 U.S. 621 (1980); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 699–700 (1978)]."
50. Individuals named as Defendants were either directly involved in illegal action, or are the responsible government officials responsible (accessory to the improprieties), and/or will be the representatives of the entity who are authorized to carry out any court orders applying to that entity.
51. All the below-named Defendants are subject to prosecution under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The immunity clause in that statue does not apply, because Plaintiff did not have the opportunity for declaratory relief. Furthermore, the immunity clause does not protect criminal acts.
52. Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York County and John Doe 1, Assistant District Attorney for Criminal Case #2007NY029913 are responsible for prosecuting crime and avenging the innocent.
53. In the criminal case against Plaintiff, the District Attorney’s office offered to drop charges and dismiss the case against Plaintiff, if he would agree to not get arrested for six (6) months and not sue the police.
54. This offer is outrageous. Instead of protecting the innocent and prosecuting the criminal police officers, ridiculous constraints would be imposed on the innocent.
55. Plaintiff has no control over when the police will arrest him, which probably would be as soon as he signed such an agreement.
56. Instead of prosecuting the criminal police, the District Attorney’s office is protecting them, in violation of the oath of office.
57. Honorable Eileen Koretz, Supervising Judge, Criminal Court of Manhattan; Serena Springle, Borough Chief Clerk, Criminal Court of Manhattan; and John Doe 2, Judge issuing bench arrest warrant for Plaintiff, Docket # 2007–NY029913 are responsible for gross miscarriage of justice and harassment of Plaintiff.
58. These individuals, are representatives of the aptly-named Criminal Court of Manhattan They have denied Plaintiff several rights and procedures of a court of law. The Court has acted as a court of inquisition as delineated in Section G.
59. The Court has committed theft of $210.00 from Plaintiff. This is a violation of his U. S. Constitutional right under Amendment V to not be “deprived of property without due process of law.”
60. It is also a violation of his U. S. Constitutional right under Amendment VIII prohibiting excessive bail, as this money is being used as bail money, in spite of the fact that no bail was set or required.
61. Furthermore, the unconstitutional procedures of the Court were not directly solely at the Plaintiff. Other arrestees also are denied their Constitutional rights as described in Section E.
62. Jacqueline W. Silbermann, Administrative Judge, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch; Honorable Norman Goodman, County Clerk, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch; and Justice Edward Lehner, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch have denied Plaintiff a speedy and public trial, as required by Amendment VI of the U. S. Constitution, by their failure to hear Plaintiff’s REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION (RJI).
63. Furthermore the County Clerk refused to send Plaintiff’s PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION to Judge Lehner. Instead he forwarded it to the Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department.
64. Jonathan Lippman, Presiding Judge, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department; Richard T. Andrias, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department; George D. Marlow, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department; John T. Buckley, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department; James M. Catterson, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department; and John McConnell, Chief Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department have denied Plaintiff a speedy and public trial, as required by Amendment VI of the U. S. Constitution, by their failure to grant Plaintiff’s MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL.
65. The Court rules to grant a Motion for leave of Appeal require two judges to approve. However of the seventeen (17) judges, only five were present at the hearing. Perhaps two of the missing would have granted the Motion.
66. The logical extension of not having all the judges rule on the Motion would be to have only one judge present. Then no matter how he ruled, the Motion would be denied.
67. William C. Thompson, Jr., Comptroller, Comptroller’s Office of New York City; Michael Aaronson, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Law and Adjustment, Comptroller’s Office of New York City; and Yvonne Roma, Bureau of Law and Adjustment, Comptroller’s Office of New York City:
68. William C. Thompson, Jr. is the Comptroller of New York City. He represent New York City and will be responsible for paying the damages and subject to any other orders from the Court, as stated in the General Municipal Law of New York City. Chapter 24 of the Consolidated Laws, Article 4, §50-k, section 2 states:
“2. At the request of the employee and upon compliance by the employee with the provisions of subdivision four of this section, the city shall provide for the defense of an employee of any agency in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court including actions under sections nineteen hundred eighty-one through nineteen hundred eighty-eight of title forty-two of the United States code arising out of any alleged act or omission which the corporation counsel finds occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment and in the discharge of his duties and was not in violation of any rule or regulation of his agency at the time the alleged act or omission occurred. This duty to provide for a defense shall not arise where such civil action or proceeding is brought by or on behalf of the city or state or an agency of either.”
69. Michael Aaronson and Yvonne Roma were the agents of the Comptroller’s office processing Plaintiff’s claims against the City of New York. They failed to discharge their responsibilities.
70. Several U. S. Constitution issues are involved. These are:
71. U. S. Constitution, Amendment I: “Congress shall make no law ...prohibiting the right of the people peaceably to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
72. U. S. Constitution, Amendment IV: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,..:”
73. U. S. Constitution, Amendment V: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,...nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without the due process of law;”
74. U. S. Constitution, Amendment VI: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed;...”
75. U. S. Constitution, Amendment VII: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,...”
76. U. S. Constitution, Amendment VIII: “Excessive bail shall not be required,...”
77. U. S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1: “...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without the process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
78. U. S Constitution, Article I, Section 9...”The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety require it.”
79. On April 17, 2007, at approximately noon, 25 rabbis and about 50–100 other demonstrators gathered in front of the Isaiah wall across from the United Nations building in Manhattan to protest the visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
80. The rabbis were wearing religious garments. A few of them gave short speeches. All 25 of them then sat on the steps closest to the street and blocked pedestrian traffic.
81. The other demonstrators were carrying signs, blowing rams’ horns, and using electronic audio equipment. The police did not object to any of this.
82. The police told the rabbis that they would have to move or be arrested. The rabbis refused to move.
83. The police asked the other demonstrators to move back, so as not to interfere with the arrests. This was a reasonable request, and the demonstrators proceeded to move back. However, the police kept moving the demonstrators further and further back until they were 35 feet behind the nearest rabbi.
84. The Isaiah wall is curved, so that the demonstrators were moved so far back that they could no longer be seen from the street. It was apparent to Plaintiff that the intent of the police was to disband the demonstration.
85. Plaintiff alone moved only 13 feet behind the closest rabbi and was visible from the street. He stood next to the guard rail, which was 8 feet from the Isaiah wall, holding two signs, both of which read: “STOP HATING JEWS”. He was silent and made no hand or foot gestures. There was no interference with pedestrian traffic. The police raised no objection.
86. After all of the rabbis were arrested, there was no one in front of Plaintiff for at least 40 feet or behind him for at least 22 feet. He was standing alone next to the chain railing 8 feet from the Isaiah wall. The police approached him and asked him to move back with the other demonstrators, 22 feet behind him. Plaintiff refused saying that he was not bothering anyone. The police repeated that Plaintiff must move back to the other demonstrators or be arrested. Plaintiff insisted that he had the right to be there, and that an arrest could result in a law suit.
87. The police then put Plaintiff under arrest and reached for him. Plaintiff went limp. The police did not catch him, and he fell to the ground , lay still, and made no sound.
88. A woman approached Plaintiff, introduced herself as a nurse, and asked if he was alright. Plaintiff did not answer at first. She pleaded with the police that Plaintiff was an old man, and that they should not arrest him. After some pleading, the police agreed on the condition that Plaintiff would leave the location and join the other demonstrators. Plaintiff sat up, assured the woman that he was OK, and stood up.
89. Plaintiff told the police that he would not leave, that he had a permit to be there. Plaintiff read to the police officers the First Amendment from a pocket U. S. Constitution.
90. The police said that Plaintiff would be arrested. Plaintiff asked for what reason, and was told for refusing to obey the order of a law enforcement officer. No mention was made of disorderly conduct or any of the specific items of disorderly conduct (NY Penal Code #240.20).
91. Plaintiff went limp and fell to the ground. From then until in his cell at police headquarters for some time, Plaintiff did not move a muscle or utter any sound.
92. When on the ground, the police lifted and dragged Plaintiff to the police wagon, carried him into the wagon, and placed him into a holding cell at police headquarters. Plaintiff did not move a muscle or utter any sound until approached by medics from the fire department.
93. As far as Plaintiff could tell, no-one except the police officers were anywhere in his vicinity at the time of the confrontation and arrest. Plaintiff was unaware that anyone else was arrested together with him.
94. An improper arrest often is called euphemistically a false arrest by law enforcement personnel. False means it did not occur. This was no false arrest. It was real. Plaintiff spent 22 hours in confinement.
95. On April 19, 2007, Plaintiff went to Property Control at Police Headquarters Security to reclaim his property. Sergeant Rufulo and Police officer Privleau returned his cell phone, but claimed that they did not have his demonstration signs or any record of them.
96. This arrest might be called an illegal arrest. To the Plaintiff, an illegal arrest would mean that the police officers thought that they were acting legally, but were mistaken. No such doubt existed here, since Plaintiff read to the officers the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. The officers knew that they were breaking the law, but did not care.
97. Thus this act of confinement was a kidnapping, plain and simple. It was accompanied by theft, since Plaintiff’s signs were confiscated and not returned.
98. Furthermore the police were involved in reckless endangerment when they ordered Plaintiff to move into a crowd with signs, rams’ horns, and electronic equipment.
99. Also the police were ordering Plaintiff to participate in a crime, since the other demonstrators were blocking pedestrian traffic.
100. The arraignment occurred on April 18, 2007, in the Criminal Court of Manhattan.
101. Neither the arraignment magistrate nor the prosecuting assistant district attorney were identified to the Plaintiff (Defendant in the criminal trial) or to any of the other arrestees in keeping with the procedures of a court of inquisition.
102. About 15 other arrestees were arraigned before Plaintiff. All of them, except for one man, pleaded guilty.
103. The exceptional arrestee pleaded not guilty several times, even though the Court would not accept this plea and kept asking him to reconsider. Finally one of the court stenographers yelled: “Plead guilty. You know that you are guilty.” At this point the arrestee’s court-appointed counsel pleaded guilty on his behalf. So much for the presumption of innocence.
104. Another arrestee was a 19-year old black woman. She was eating dinner at a restaurant when she was arrested and strip searched. Cocaine was found in her brassiere. It did not occur to anyone to inquire if the police had a search warrant. Apparently the quaint custom of search warrants is discarded ancient English law.
105. When Plaintiff’s turn occurred, the magistrate first asked if he had attended school and, if so, what was his highest degree. Plaintiff, who at the time was 75 years old, responded that he had not attended school recently, but that his highest degree was a Ph. D. in chemistry, and that he was a professor of chemistry.
106. Plaintiff still does not understand why this information was any of the magistrate’s business.
107. Plaintiff was then asked if he had legal counsel. Plaintiff replied that he would be acting as counsel pro se. He said that he had tried about 40 cases, but none in New York state. He said that he was unaware of New York laws or court procedures and that he could use an advisory counsel.
108. At that point the Court appointed Edward McCarthy, Supervising Attorney, Criminal Defense Division, The Legal Aid Society, 100 Centre Street, Room 511, New York, NY 10013 (Telephone: 212–571–5930) as temporary advisory counsel. Coincidentally, the Court had already positioned Mr. McCarthy at Plaintiff’s side in the dock.
109. Plaintiff then was advised by the magistrate that before he pleaded, the prosecuting assistant district attorney had a plea bargain.
110. The prosecuting assistant district attorney offered to settle for time served (22 hours), if Plaintiff would plead guilty.
111. Plaintiff replied: “If I was willing to accept that, I would not have bothered to be arrested in the first place.”
112. The magistrate asked: “Are you pleading not guilty?” She then warned (threatened) Plaintiff that, if so, he could go to prison.
113. Plaintiff acknowledged that he was aware that a prison sentence was possible. He then pleaded not guilty, demanded indictment by a Grand Jury, and asked for a jury trial.
114. After the stunned Court recovered, the magistrate did not object to the plea or the demand for indictment by a Grand Jury. She had no idea of what the charges were, since she had to ask the prosecuting assistant district attorney if Plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial. The answer was affirmative.
115. Plaintiff was told that he must report for a court hearing on June 20, 2007, and submit all informations before May 17, 2007. Plaintiff asked the purpose of the hearing, but his question was ignored. No written ORDER was issued to appear for the hearing date of June 20, 2007.
116. Plaintiff was handed the unsigned arraignment form with the police charges and released after 22 hours of confinement.
117. Plaintiff was not committed at arraignment nor at any other time.
118. Plaintiff has not been indicted nor informed that any Grand Jury has been convened.
119. A few days later, Plaintiff was contacted by Simone Levine, an attorney at The Legal Aid Society, and informed that the prosecuting assistant district attorney was willing to drop the charges and dismiss the case, if Plaintiff would agree to not get arrested in the next 6 months and not sue the police. Plaintiff declined.
120. It is not clear to Plaintiff why the prosecuting assistant District Attorney did not contact Plaintiff directly. It seems to Plaintiff that it is improper for the District Attorney’s office to be conducting negotiations with anyone but the Plaintiff.
121. The function of the district attorney is to prosecute crime, not to protect it. He should be prosecuting the police, not protecting them. By protecting them, the prosecuting assistant district attorney is an accessory to the crimes of kidnapping and theft. He should be dismissed from his position and disbarred.
122. A lawyer, who works in the public defender’s office, told Plaintiff that if he demands a jury trial his class A misdemeanor, which carries a one year maximum sentence, will be reduced to a class B misdemeanor, which carries a maximum sentence of 6 months, and he will be denied a jury trial.
123. This procedure, which of course is unconstitutional, has not been challenged by the public defender’s office.
124. In the arrest report (Exhibit 1), the police allege that:
“...the defendant intentionally attempted to prevent a police officer and peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself and another person; the defendant intentionally prevented and attempted to prevent a public servant from performing an official function by intimidation, physical force and interference and by means of an independently unlawful act; the defendant, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance and alarm and recklessly creating a risk thereof, obstructing vehicular and pedestrian traffic; and the defendant, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance and alarm and recklessly creating a risk thereof, congregated in a public place with other persons and refused to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse.”
125. Plaintiff admits to refusing to comply with an order of the police, because it was unlawful. The other allegations were never made to Plaintiff at the time of arrest, even though Plaintiff asked for the reasons for arrest. They were manufactured later. All of them are untrue.
126. At the bottom of the form signed by Deponent Jason Toala, there is a statement that reads: “False statements made herein are punishable as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to section 210.45 of the penal law.” Thus Deponent Toala will be guilty of perjury, if he repeats these statements under oath, along with the other crimes of kidnapping and theft.
127. Let us consider these allegations individually:
128. Plaintiff never attempted to prevent an authorized arrest of himself and another person. There was no other person placed under arrest or even in the vicinity at the time of arrest. Plaintiff was standing still and holding two signs when he was placed under arrest. After he was placed under arrest he went limp and fell to the ground, because the police officers failed to catch him.
129. There was no intimidation, physical force and interference after the arrest, because Plaintiff was lying on the ground completely silent and motionless. He was carried and dragged to the patrol wagon. He did not resist handcuffing, which was readily effected.
130. The Plaintiff did not cause public inconvenience, annoyance and alarm. At the time of the arrest, he was standing still and alone displaying two signs, but uttering no sounds or making any facial, arm, or leg motions. In any case, actions after the arrest is made cannot be a cause for arrest.
131. He was next to the guard rail, 8 feet from the wall, 22 feet in front of the other demonstrators, and at least 40 feet from the street. He could not have been obstructing either vehicular or pedestrian traffic. Pedestrians were passing by him routinely near the wall 8 feet away.
132. Plaintiff was not congregating with other people. In fact that was the bone of contention. The police ordered him to congregate with the others, but Plaintiff refused because the order was a violation of his constitutional right to peaceful protest, would have recklessly endangered the Plaintiff, and would have made him a participant in a crime (blocking pedestrian traffic).
133. Plaintiff was not ordered to disperse. In fact it would have been impossible to do so, since he was standing alone. He was ordered to congregate.
134. Plaintiff was assigned orally a court hearing date for June 20, 2007, in the Criminal Court of Manhattan. He agreed to appear at the hearing. [See “Reproduced Record of New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch Re: Manhattan Criminal Court Case Docket #2007-NY029913 People of New York against Julian Heicklen” (Hereafter referred to as “Reproduced Record”) Tab I, Exhibit J, p. 36.]
135. Plaintiff filed several motions (Reproduced Record, Tab I, Exhibits G–T, pp. 28–100), including a motion for a Grand Jury hearing (Exhibits K and L, pp. 39 and 42), a motion for a jury trial (Exhibit M, p. 50), a motion for a habeas corpus hearing (Exhibit O, p. 57) , and a motion for an explanation of the purpose of the court date (Exhibit J, p. 36). The Court did not respond to any of the motions.
136. Plaintiff notified the Court by certified mail on June 11, 2007, that he would not appear at the hearing of June 20, 2007 (Reproduced Record, Tab I, Exhibit D, p. 21).
137. On June 11, 2007, Plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal and a filing fee of $210.00 with the Criminal Court of Manhattan. By two (2) telephone calls from the Clerk’s office, Plaintiff was notified that all appeals must be filed with the Supreme Court. In the first call, Plaintiff was told that the the $210.00 would be returned by mail. In the second call, he was notified that the $210.00 would only be returned when he appeared in court.
138. On June 20, 2007, Plaintiff was informed by a telephone call from Kenny Fay from the Clerk of Court that the Court issued a bench warrant for his arrest, because he did not appear for the court date.
139. Plaintiff filed a motion to quash the bench arrest warrant (Reproduced Record, Tab I, Exhibit T, p. 72). The Court did not respond.
140. About a week later, Plaintiff received a telephone call from Police Detective John Anasa, Shield #4740 (Telephone 516–635–9013) informing him of the bench warrant and asking him to come to a police station to clear the warrant. Plaintiff did not comply.
141. Plaintiff has never received nor seen a written document or the name of the issuing judge, if there even is one, indicating that an arrest warrant was issued.
142. It is apparent from the following that there is no intent to enforce the arrest warrant. Its function solely is to harass Plaintiff and make it difficult to obtain compensation from the police.
143. As far as Plaintiff knows, extradition papers have not been filed with the state of New Jersey. Plaintiff has never been contacted by the New Jersey police or sheriffs.
144. Plaintiff frequently visits Manhattan and makes it a point to talk with police officers. None has ever mentioned the warrant.
145. Plaintiff has filed papers in person twice in the New York State Supreme Court New York County-Civil Branch and appeared twice in the Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department. His identity was known to the clerks, but the subject of the warrant was never broached.
146. On his second visit to the Supreme Court New York County-Civil Branch, Plaintiff informed the Clerk that he was pursuing a REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION (RJI) because there was a bench warrant for his arrest. Plaintiff was advised by the Clerk to drop the RJI and stay out of New York State. No attempt was made to effect an arrest.
147. Plaintiff has demonstrated several times in front of the New York Times buildings displaying signs reading: “STOP HATING JEWS” and “N Y TIMES HATES JEWS.” He also distributes literature criticizing the NY Times.
148. On the first occasion at the New York Times, a security guard ordered Plaintiff to move away from the wall. Plaintiff ignored the guard, who then called the police in Plaintiff’s presence.
149. Plaintiff continued his demonstration for about another hour, but the police did not appear.
150. On subsequent appearances, Plaintiff has engaged the police and the outside NY times security guard in conversation. No action by the police.
151. The Criminal Court of Manhattan is trying to protect the police officers in their criminal activity, and thus is an accessory to their crimes.
152. Plaintiff filed a REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION (RJI) with the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County-Civil Branch on July 10, 2007, (Reproduced Record, Tab I) moving for dismissal of the case and quashing the bench warrant on the grounds that he was being denied a fair and speedy trial. Fifteen (15) separate reasons were given in support of these contentions (Reproduced Record, Tab I, Exhibit A, p. 1–10).
153. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County-Civil Branch said that he would examine the RJI to see if it was proper. Plaintiff was asked to return the next day, but was unable to return until July 17, 2007.
154. Plaintiff returned on July 17, 2007. He then personally delivered the RJI to the secretary of Judge Edward Lehner, Room 252, Supreme Court of the State of New York. New York County-Civil Branch at 11:45 am. Plaintiff was informed by the secretary that Judge Lehner was at a funeral and would not return until 2:15 pm. Plaintiff left the RJI with the secretary and left for lunch.
155. Plaintiff returned to Room 252 at 2:00 pm. The room was locked. It was opened at 2:15 pm, and Plaintiff was notified by a court officer that the judge had just returned.
156. A number of people, including Plaintiff, were admitted to the court room, where Judge Lehner presided over another case commencing at 2:30 pm.
157. Plaintiff observed the trial for about 1/2 hour. Counsels for both litigants stood to raise objections several times. Each time, Judge Lehner yelled “objection overruled” before hearing the objections, which were never articulated.
158. Plaintiff noticed Judge Lehner’s evenhandedness in providing equal injustice to both sides.
159. During the trial, Judge Lehner was reading another document and not paying full attention to the proceedings.
160. Plaintiff was appalled. Is this what justice in America has become?
161. At about 3:00 pm a court order was given to Plaintiff by a court officer (Exhibit 2 and Supreme Court ORDER-TAB II of Reproduced Record).
162. Obviously Judge Lehner had failed to read the 100-page RJI, but denied the RJI on July 17, 2007, on the grounds that “...as petitioner has set forth no basis for the relief sought.” (Exhibit 2 and Reproduced Record Tab II).
163. Plaintiff filed a PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County-Civil Branch where the fifteen (15) reasons were repeated (Reproduced Record Tab III). The petition was forwarded by the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County-Civil Branch to the Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department, which returned it to the Plaintiff.
164. A NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed with the the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County County-Civil Branch on August 11, 2007 (Reproduced Record, Tab IV).
165. Plaintiff tried to file a LEAVE TO APPEAL OF REFUSAL OF THE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION to the Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department on August 16, 2007, but it was rejected because it was necessary to file a motion for leave to appeal first.
166. Plaintiff filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL with the Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department on August 27, 2007, along with the filing fee of $45.00. A response date of September 26, 2007, and time of 10:00 am was requested.
167. Plaintiff appeared at the Court on September 26, 2007, at 9:45 am, but was informed by the Clerk’s office that he was not permitted to attend the hearing, and that he would be notified by mail of the Court’s decision in 2-4 weeks. Plaintiff left a self-addressed envelope for the reply. No reply was received by November 13, 2007.
168. On November 27, 2007, the Supreme Court of the State of NY, Appellate Division: First Department denied Plaintiff’s application pursuant to CPLR 5704(a) (Exhibit 3).
169. CPLR 5704(a) states:
“#5704. Review of ex parte orders. (a) By appellate division. The appellate division or a justice thereof may vacate or modify any order granted without notice to the adverse party by any court or a judge thereof from which an appeal would lie to such appellate division; and the appellate division may grant any order or provisional remedy applied for without notice to the adverse party and refused by any court or a judge thereof from which an appeal would lie to such appellate division.”
170. To the Plaintiff, CPLR 5704(a) means that the appellate division: “may vacate or modify any order granted without notice to the adverse party...”
171. Therefore the appellate division denied hearing the motion for no valid reason.
172. In Rule II.B of the Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department it states:
“All motions for leave are conferenced and voted on by all the Judges of the Court. Leave to appeal will be granted upon concurrence of two Judges (CPLR 5602[a]).”
173. Only five (5) of the seventeen (17) Judges voted on the MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL. Therefore the Court violated its own rules in denying the motion.
174. Plaintiff has not filed an appeal with the State of New York Court of Appeals, because two lower courts have denied relief for invalid reasons.
175. Furthermore CPLR 5611 states, in part:
“If the appellate division disposes of all the issues in the action its order shall be considered a final one, and a subsequent appeal may be taken only from that order and not from any judgment or order entered pursuant to it.”
176. There is no reason to believe that the State of New York Court of Appeals will behave any differently than the other New York State courts.
177. Plaintiff has submitted four (4) separate claims with the Comptroller of the City of New York. These are:
178. The Comptroller’s office assigned identification numbers to the complaints, but has made no decisions regarding the first three. It closed the case against the Supreme Court of the State of NY- Appellate Division: 1st Department on December 12, 2007, because it claims that it is not a city agency.
179. Most of the state officials refuse to sign any documents, so that they can retain deniability. Specific examples follow:
180. The identities of the prosecuting Assistant District Attorney and the trial Judge have not been divulged. Neither of them has submitted copies of any documents to Plaintiff, including the alleged bench arrest warrant.
181. On Judge Lehner’s ORDER from the New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch, some chicken scratching appears over the word “signature,” but the Judge’s printed name is nowhere near the chicken scratching and is barely legible.
182. The ORDER of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division: First Department is not signed by any judge, but by the Clerk of Court. The Clerk is not empowered to issue Court orders, so the judges can deny responsibility for the ORDER.
183. Most of the correspondence from the Comptroller’s office is unsigned, so that they are worthless legal documents.
184. The failure to sign documents is the behavior of people who know that they are doing wrong.
I. REPLY TO JUDGE WOOD’S OPINION
185. Judge Wood states in:
1. Intervention in State Court criminal proceedings:
“Plaintiff’s request that this Court intervene in the ongoing criminal proceedings against him must be rejected. It is well-settled and ‘restated...in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37[(1971)], that a federal court may not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate.’ Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1973); Younger, 401 U.S. at 54; see also Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F. 3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002) (‘Younger generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.’ To the extent plaintiff asks this Court to intervene in ongoing criminal proceedings against him in state court, the claim is dismissed as he fails to allege facts demonstrating that the criminal proceedings pending against him present special circumstances of bad faith, harassment or irreparable injury meriting this Court’s intervention. Gibson, 411 U.S. 573–74.”
186. The above arguments are all inconsistent with the facts of the case.
187. Younger v. Harris states:
“2. Federal Courts will not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate...”
188. There never was a criminal case pending in the New York State courts, because Plaintiff was never committed nor indicted. When the original case was presented to the District Court, the possibility of indictment still existed. That is no longer the case because over a year has passed since the arrest, and the Criminal Court of Manhattan has made no attempt to obtain an indictment.
189. The state courts certainly exhibited bad faith, harassment, and irreparable injury (Plaintiff has been a fugitive from justice for over a year for no reason whatsoever.) as Plaintiff has discussed at great length in the accompanying documents.
190. There is no longer any reason for the U. S. District Court to issue an injunction to stop the criminal case, as it has not existed and will not exist. However Plaintiff still wants the District Court to quash the arrest warrant.
191. In Gibson v. Berryhill at the beginning of I, it is stated that:
“We agree with the District Court that neither statute nor case law precluded it from adjudicating the issues before it and from issuing the injunction if it decision on the merits were correct.”
192. In Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, the Court found it:
“curious that plaintiff never petitioned the appropriate State court to issue a writ of mandamus that would have directed the DOL to hold its post-deprivation hearing without further delay.”
193. Thus the above reason for disqualification in the Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan decision is not applicable here, since Plaintiff did exhaust all possible avenues through the NY state courts.
194. Furthermore Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan states:
“Despite the strong policy in favor of abstention, a federal court may nevertheless intervene in a state proceeding upon a showing of ‘bad faith...’”
That is certainly the situation in the instant case.
195. Judge Wood argues in: 2. Judicial Immunity that: “Judges have absolute immunity from suit for judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. She cites five cases.
196. In Mireles v. Waco, 502 U. S. 9 (1991), respondent Waco argued that Judge Mireles exceeded his judicial authority when ordering court officers to forcibly make him appear in court. The Supreme Court held, properly in the opinion of Plaintiff, that this was a legitimate judicial decision.
197. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349, a 15-year old girl’s mother was granted the right to have her daughter sterilized. The daughter was not aware of this and was told that she was entering the hospital to have her appendix removed. Years later, after she was married and could not have children, she learned what happened to her. She sued Judge Mireles. He was acquitted on grounds of judicial immunity.
198. This decision is repulsive to civilized behavior and law in a supposedly free society. The person being punished had committed no offense and was not even aware of the judicial proceeding. The judge could have ordered her to be euthanized and still be immune from damages. Nazi Germany has come to the United States.
199. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), Petitioners were vindicated on appeal. When they sued in federal court, the judge in the original trial was dismissed as a defendant, since the decision was rectified on appeal.
200. Huminski v. Corsones 396 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2005) is an involved and complicated case. The pertinent issues are condensed as follows:
201. Huminski was ordered out of the Courthouse by Judge Corsones et. al. on grounds that the U. S. District Court found to be non-judicial, and therefore found in favor of Huminski.
202. On appeal to the U. S. Circuit Court, the decision was reversed, because that Court considered the decision to be judicial, and that Corsones was acting in her judicial capacity. 203. However that case is not really applicable here, because Huminski had not sought declaratory relief in the Vermont state courts.
204. In the instant case, Plaintiff attempted three times to seek declaratory relief in the NY state courts, but was denied the opportunity to do so each time.
205. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219 (1988) is a case of a judge acting in his executive capacity, not his judicial capacity, and is not relevant here. However the Court pointed out that: “We conclude that Judge White was not entitled to absolute immunity for his decisions to demote and discharge Forrester.”
206. 42 U.S.C. §1983 states that injunctive relief against judicial decisions shall not be granted unless declaratory relief was unavailable. In the instant case, Petitioner was denied the opportunity for declaratory relief by both the New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch (twice) and the Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department. Declaratory relief from the New York State Court of Appeals was not available. Therefore the immunity clause of 42 U.S.C §1983 is not applicable here.
207. Furthermore two of the issues raised in the instant case do not involve judicial decisions. The Criminal Court of Manhattan stole $210 from Plaintiff. The Supreme Court-civil branch was involved in breach of contract. Plaintiff paid a fee of $95 specifically to have a judge read his REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION (RJI), but that was not done. Therefore that fee should be recoverable.
208. Finally, Plaintiff wishes to comment on the fact that judges, who are supposed to know the law, are immune from malpractice suits, but no other professional people are. Is this reasonable?
209. Judge Wood dismissed the cases against the Chief Judge and others, which are based on respondent superior. She refers to Fitzgerald v. First Est Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2000) and Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 1995) as precedents for dismissing frivolous cases against respondent superior.
210. As noted above:
“A state is not a person subject to suit under section 1983 [Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)], but a state officer can be sued in his official capacity for prospective or injunctive relief [Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)] “
211. Judge Wood referred to Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 2004), Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2004), and Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2004) as requiring personal involvement of superior respondent.
212. Judge Wood states that two reasons to hold respondent superior responsible are: “creating a policy or custom under which constitutional practices occurred” or “ the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts.”
213. Respondents superior either were aware of procedures in their jurisdiction and approved or permitted them; or, if not aware, they were negligent in performing their supervisory duties.
14. Plaintiff spent only about two hours listening to arraignment hearings to know that the Criminal Court of Manhattan is completely out of bounds (See Section E).
215. Plaintiff spent only 1/2 hour in Judge Lehner’s court to realize that the Supreme Court is likewise out of bounds (See Section G).
216. It is inconceivable that the respondents superior were not aware of the flagrant violations of their employees. In any event, the facts of the matter are for a jury, not a judge, to decide. That is what juries do.
217. Plaintiff expects to prove either complicity or negligence of respondents superior if he gets the opportunity to question witnesses in front of a jury.
218. Comptroller Thompson is being sued for two reasons. He is respondent superior in the Comptroller’s office, and he, along with New York City Corporate Counsel Michael A. Cardozzo, is responsible for paying any damages and be subject to any other orders from the Court., as stated in the General Municipal Law of New York City. Chapter 24 of the Consolidated Laws, Article 4, §50-k, section 2 states:
219. Bureau Chief Aaronson and Yvonne Roman are being sued because they handled the claims filed with the Comptroller’s office.
220. Chief Clerk Serena Springle is using Plaintiff’s $210 as bail money. This violates the Eighth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution against excessive bail, since no bail was imposed by a judge.
221. Plaintiff was arrested illegally on April 17, 2007. The police officers were made aware that the arrest was illegal. Therefore the event was a kidnapping.
222. Two (2) picket signs owned and held by Plaintiff were confiscated by the police and never returned to Plaintiff. This is an act of theft.
223. Plaintiff was arraigned on April 18, 2007, but was not committed then nor at any other time.
224. As far as Plaintiff knows, no Grand Jury has been impaneled to decide if an indictment is warranted.
225. The failure of the Court to identify the arraignment magistrate, the prosecuting Assistant District Attorney, and the trial Judge; and to give no reason for the court date of June 20, 2007, is not appropriate in a court of law. It is reminiscent of a court of inquisition.
226. Plaintiff has been denied his constitutional right to a habeas corpus hearing.
227. It is over one year since Plaintiff was arrested. He has not been committed nor indicted. Plaintiff has been denied his constitutional right to a fair and speedy trial.
228. The bench arrest warrant, if it exists, is not justified, since the Plaintiff has neither been committed nor indicted. The only evidence for the existence of a bench arrest warrant is hearsay.
229. The failure of the Court to enforce the bench arrest warrant indicates that there is no intent to bring Plaintiff to trial, but only to harass Plaintiff and make it difficult for him to obtain a redress of grievances in other courts and with the Comptroller of the City of New York.
230. The failure of the aptly-named Criminal Court of Manhattan to refund the $210 it mistakenly received from the Plaintiff, unless the Plaintiff appears in court, is using the money as bail.
231. No judge has issued an order for bail money. Thus keeping the $210 is an act of theft.
232. Justice Edward Lehner of the New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch did not read the REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION (RJI) in spite of the fact that Plaintiff paid a fee of $95 specifically for that purpose.
233. Justice Lehner denied the RJI because “...as petitioner has set forth no basis for the relief sought.”, in spite of the fact that 15 causes of action were given. The ORDER of Justice Lehner (Exhibit 2) is not consistent with the facts.
234. Because the ORDER from the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appeals Division: First Department, is based on a misinterpretation of CPLR 5704(a), Plaintiff has been denied his constitutional right to redress in the courts of the State of New York, as given in:
a. New York State Constitution, Article I, Section 1. “No member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his or her peers,...” and
b. New York State Constitution, Article I, Section 1 §11. “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. “
235. Claims for damages to the Comptroller of the City of New York have been ignored.
K. CAUSES OF ACTION
236. Plaintiff was arrested illegally (actually kidnapped) on April 17, 2007. His two signs were confiscated by the police and never returned; an act of theft.
237. The police allegations, except for refusing an order, were all false and will constitute perjury, if repeated under oath.
238. The prosecuting assistant district attorney and the courts are aiding and abetting the crimes of the police. Thus they are accessories to the crimes.
239. The arraignment proceedings and subsequent ignoring of motions by the Plaintiff by the Court were intended to deny justice to the Plaintiff.
240. The bench arrest warrant, if it was issued at all, was intended to intimidate Plaintiff and make it difficult for him to pursue redress.
241. On July 10, 2007, Petitioner filed a REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION Index Number 07103459 (Julian Heicklen against Criminal Court of Manhattan).
242. On July 17, 2007, Justice of the Supreme Court Lehner: “ordered that this application for an order to show cause is denied as petitioner has set forth no basis for the relief sought.”
243. On the contrary, Petitioner has set forth in the Exhibits accompanying the REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION (RJI) many bases for the relief sought. Specifically, these are:
244. Item 24 of Exhibit A states:
“Police confiscated Petitioner’s property and have failed to return it. The Petitioner moved that the Court order the police to return the property or provide compensation (Exhibit G). That motion has been ignored.”
245. Item 25 of Exhibit A states:
246. Item 26 of Exhibit A states: “At arraignment, Petitioner was not informed of the case Docket Number.”
247. Item 27 of Exhibit A states: “The arraignment commitment form was not signed by a judge or anyone else (Exhibit B). It is not a valid document.”
248. Item 28 of Exhibit A states:
“The arraignment magistrate had not even looked at the arraignment commitment document. This became apparent when the Petitioner asked for a jury trial. The arraignment magistrate had to ask the Assistant District Attorney what the charges were against Petitioner to see if he qualified for a jury trial.”
249. Item 29 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner informed the Court that he would serve as counsel pro se (Exhibit I). Neither the Court nor the District Attorney has notified Petitioner of the names of the officiating judge or the prosecuting Assistant District Attorney.”
250. Item 30 of Exhibit A states:
‘The failure of the Court to inform Petitioner of the identity of any of the officials involved in his case is not the way a court of law should operate. It is the modus operandi of a court of inquisition. It shows disdain for the accused, thus precluding the possibility of an impartial trial.”
251. Item 31 of Exhibit A states: “A court date was set for June 20, 2007. Petitioner cleared his calendar and notified the Court that he would be available all day, if necessary (Exhibit J).”
252. Item 32 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner moved that the Court inform him of the nature of the court appearance, what information must be submitted, and what actions may occur (Exhibit J). There was no response to the motion. Apparently, the Court felt it proper for the accused to be uninformed, so that he could not defend himself adequately.”
253. Item 67 of Exhibit A states:
“As a result of the non-response, Petitioner notified the Court that he would not appear at the court date of June 20, 2007 (Exhibit D).”
254. Item 34 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner requested a Grand Jury hearing at the arraignment. He also so moved that the Court order the District Attorney to convene a Grand Jury to examine the evidence and decide if an indictment was warranted (Exhibit K). That request and motion were ignored.”
255. Item 35 of Exhibit A states:
“There is a widespread misconception in the trial courts that a Grand Jury indictment is not required for misdemeanor offenses. This is not true, as shown in my BRIEF FOR CONVENING A GRAND JURY (Exhibit L).”
256. Item 36 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner requested at the arraignment that the Court grant a jury trial and so moved in petition to the Court (Exhibit M). The arraigning magistrate granted the jury trial, but the Court gave no response and ignored the motion.”
257. Item 37 of Exhibit A states:
“In his petition on TESTIMONY (Exhibit N), Petitioner moved that the Court order the District Attorney to provide names and contact information for all witnesses, arresting officers, the lady who identified herself as a nurse and interceded on behalf of Petitioner, and any other persons who may testify at Petitioner’s trial. No response. Motions ignored.”
258. Item 38 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner moved that the Court order all persons who will testify at any proceedings regarding the case be sequestered during all proceedings (Exhibit N). No response. Motion ignored.”
259. Item 39 of Exhibit A states: “Petitioner filed a WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS and asked to drop all charges (Exhibit O). No response. Motion ignored.”
260. Item 40 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner moved that there be no preliminary hearing (Exhibit P). No response. Motion ignored.”
261. Item 41 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner filed a request concerning the trial jury (Exhibit Q). He moved that the Court provide information about jury selection and that the jury pool be sequestered during jury selection. No response. Motions ignored.”
262. Item 42 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner requested a reply date to his motions of June 8, 2007, so that he could prepare for the court date of June 20, 2007 (Exhibit R). No response. Motion ignored.”
263. Item 43 of Exhibit A states:
“Petitioner moved that the Court provide him with a copy of the arraignment transcript of April 18, 2007 (Exhibit S). No response. Motion ignored.”
264. Item 44 of Exhibit A states: “The INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF JUNE 11, 2007 (Exhibit C) sent to the trial court was ignored and disregarded.”
265. Item 45 of Exhibit A states: “Petitioner was notified on June 20, 2007, that a bench arrest warrant was issued, because petitioner did not appear at the court appearance scheduled for that day.”
266. Item 46 of Exhibit A states: “Petitioner has filed MOTION TO QUASH BENCH ARREST WARRANT (Exhibit T). No response. Motion ignored.”
267. Plaintiff was held in police custody for 22 hours on April 17–18, 2007, with attendant anxiety and shame.
268. Police confiscated two (2) picket signs on April 17, 2007, whose replacement cost was $96.30.
269. Plaintiff was neither committed nor indicted. Yet a bench arrest warrant ostensibly was issued when he did not appear for an unexplained court hearing on June 20, 2007. Plaintiff has been a fugitive from justice since June 20, 2007, with attendant anxiety, shame, and bitterness. He has had many sleepless nights.
270. Plaintiff has been denied Grand Jury and habeas corpus hearings, leading to attendant anxiety and frustration.
271. The courts have ignored Plaintiff’s efforts to defend himself, thus leading to anxiety, frustration, and bitterness.
272. The Criminal Court of Manhattan has withheld $210.00 of Plaintiff’s money. This is an act of theft.
273. Plaintiff has lost filing fees of $305.00 to the New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch, $45.00 to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appeals Division: First District, and $700.00 to the U. S. District Court for the Southern district of New York.
274. Plaintiff has spent a significant amount of time and money since April 17, 2007, learning New York State laws and the procedures of the various courts, preparing court documents, and traveling back and forth to New York courthouses.
275. Plaintiff has incurred expenses of printing, copying, and mailing court documents and Claims to the Comptroller of the City of New York.
M. REMEDIES SOUGHT
276. Plaintiff moves that the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York quash the alleged bench arrest warrant against Plaintiff.
277. Plaintiff moves that he be compensated for all court associated costs and out-of-pocket expenses listed above.
278. Plaintiff moves that he be compensated for time spent learning New York and federal law and court procedures and in preparing court documents.
279. Plaintiff moves that he be compensated for anxiety, shame, bitterness, and sleepless nights resulting from the arrest of April 17, 2007, and the bench arrest warrant of June 20, 2007.
280. Plaintiff moves that he be compensated for the the failure of the courts to provide a fair and speedy trial.
281. Plaintiff moves that the Court impose punitive monetary damages on the New York Courts in sufficient amount such that the police and courts will obey the law, stop harassing harmless people, and display common courtesies to litigants; and that the Comptroller of the City of New York will consider seriously and expedite claims submitted.
282. Specifically, Plaintiff requests the following:
a. One hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000.00) for actual damages.
c. Quash the bench arrest warrant.
N. MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL
283. Plaintiff moves for a jury trial as guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution, Amendment VII, which states, in part: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,...”
O. MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE WOOD
284. Plaintiff moves that Judge Wood be recused from trying this case, because she has already admitted in her OPINION that she would be prejudiced against Plaintiff in this matter.
P. SERVICE OF DEFENDANTS
285. Plaintiff moves that the Court grant permission to serve each listed Defendant by certified U. S. mail. Each Defendant will be sent appropriately completed copies of the three (3) forms Exhibits 4, 5, and 6.
Q. SEPARATE DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED
286. Enclosed are copies of documents submitted by certified mail to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division: First Department on August 27, 2007. These are:
b. Leave to Appeal of Refusal of the REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
c. Reproduced Record of New York State Supreme Court New York County-Civil Division re: Manhattan Criminal Court Case Docket #2007–NY029913, People of New York against Julian Heicklen
287. The Contents of the three (3) documents listed in Item 286 above are given in Exhibit 7. It was submitted to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division along with the three (3) documents .
288. Corrections to the three (3) documents listed in Item 286 above are given in Exhibit 8.
289. Also enclosed are copies of Claims submitted by certified mail to the Comptroller of the City of New York. This document has been updated from the one submitted with the original complaint 08 CV 02457. The claims are:
d. Claim #2007LW032284 against Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division-1st Department, mailed November 13, 2007
290. Enclosed is previous correspondence with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
291. Enclosed is the originally submitted Complaint 08 CV 02457.
292. Enclosed is the ORDER of Judge Wood of March 11, 2008.
293. Enclosed is the Amended Complaint 08 CV 02457.
R. ADDRESSES OF DEFENDANTS
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York County District Attorney's Office , One Hogan Place, New York, NY 10013, (212–335–9000)
John Doe 1, Assistant District Attorney for Criminal Case # 2007NY022913,
Manhattan Criminal Court, 100 Centre Street, Room 732, New York, NY 10013 (Telephone number unknown to Plaintiff)
Honorable Eileen Koretz, Supervising Judge, Criminal Court, New York County, 100 Centre Street New York, NY 10013 (646–386–4615)
Serena Springle, Borough Chief Clerk, Criminal Court, New York County, 100 Centre Street New York, NY 10013 (646–386–4615).
John Doe 2, Judge issuing bench arrest warrant for Julian Heicklen, Docket # 2007–NY029913, Criminal Court, New York County, 100 Centre Street, New York, NY 10013 (646–386–4615)
Jacqueline W. Silbermann, Administrative Judge, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch, 1st Judicial District Chambers, 60 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007 (646–386–3170)
Honorable Norman Goodman, County Clerk, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch, Room 161, 60 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007 (646–386–5955)
Justice Edward Lehner, New York State Supreme Court, New York County-Civil Branch, Room 252, 60 Centre Street, New York, New York 10007 (646–386–325)
Jonathan Lippman, Presiding Judge, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department, 27 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010 (212–340–0400)
Richard T. Andrias, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department, 27 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010 (212–340–0400)
George D. Marlow, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department, 27 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010 (212–340–0400)
John T. Buckley, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department, 27 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010 (212–340–0400)
James M. Catterson, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department, 27 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010 (212–340–0400)
John McConnell, Chief Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of New York-Appellate Division: First Department, 27 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010 (212–340–0400)
William C. Thompson, Jr., Comptroller, Comptroller’s Office of New York City, 1 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007–2341 (212–669–4736)
Michael Aaronson, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Law and Adjustment, Comptroller’s Office of New York City, 1 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007–2341 (212–669–4736)
Yvonne Roma, Bureau of Law and Adjustment, Comptroller’s Office of New York City, 1 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007–2341 (212–669–4736)