Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/379/966/475116/
Timestamp: 2017-11-19 17:49:57
Document Index: 616118968

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1412', '§ 1415', '§ 300', '§ 1412', '§ 1415', '§ 1412']

L.b., and J.b., on Behalf of K.b., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Nebo School District; Nebo Board of Education; Collin Allan, As President of Nebo Board of Education; Utah State Office of Education; Steven O. Laing, Ed.d., As State Superintendent of Public Instruction; Mae Taylor, As State Director of Services for at Risk Students, Defendants-appellees, 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 2004 › L.b., and J.b., on Behalf of K.b., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Nebo School District; Nebo Board of Edu...
L.b., and J.b., on Behalf of K.b., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Nebo School District; Nebo Board of Education; Collin Allan, As President of Nebo Board of Education; Utah State Office of Education; Steven O. Laing, Ed.d., As State Superintendent of Public Instruction; Mae Taylor, As State Director of Services for at Risk Students, Defendants-appellees, 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1172, Dale A. Kimball, J. COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Gary S. Mayerson, Mayerson & Associates, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
The supplementary aide, Sarah Adolphson, was critical to ensuring that K.B.'s one-on-one ABA gains were maintained in the mainstream preschool classroom. Whenever K.B. engaged in maladaptive behaviors at school, Adolphson prompted her to the proper response. In addition, Adolphson brought home information about the areas in which K.B. needed improvement, thus ensuring that the home portion of the ABA program focused on the skills K.B. needed at school. During the school year of 1999-2000, K.B. relied less and less upon Adolphson, who was being fazed out as an aide. There were days when Adolphson did not even accompany K.B. to the private preschool. On those days, the teacher identified some of K.B.'s problems and attempted to redirect her to the appropriate behavior.
On the other hand, Mulick admitted that he has known children who progressed with only twelve to fifteen hours of ABA treatment. Nebo's expert, Dr. Annette Jerome, opined that K.B. could have made progress with as little as ten to twelve hours of one-on-one ABA per week, in conjunction with the Park View preschool time. Another expert testified that the forty-hour-per-week model is not used for all autistic children, and that the necessary intervention level differs for each child. Genaux testified that between September and December 1997, when K.B. was only receiving twenty hours per week of ABA programming,10 K.B. mastered a number of skills, made significant progress, and received educational benefit from the program. Genaux also opined that K.B. would have "made very good gains" with ten hours per week at Park View plus eight to ten hours per week of one-on-one ABA.
The IDEA sets up a unique standard for a federal court's review of the administrative due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2). A district court applies a modified de novo standard in reviewing a hearing officer's decision under the IDEA. Murray v. Montrose County Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 927 (10th Cir. 1995). It looks at the record of the administrative proceedings and decides, based on a preponderance of the evidence, whether the requirements of the IDEA are met. Id. In so doing, it must give "due weight" to the hearing officer's findings of fact, which are considered prima facie correct. Id. at 927 n. 11. Although the district court may accept additional evidence, such evidence is merely supplemental to the administrative record. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (B); Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court's proceedings must maintain the character of review and not rise to the level of a de novo trial. Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473.
This court reviews the district court's disposition of this case de novo, applying the same standard employed by the district court. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928. Because the IDEA requires a district court to grant a judgment on the record based on its own ascertainment of the preponderance of the evidence, many IDEA claims do not fit into the typical summary judgment standard of "no genuine issues of material fact." See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (B); Loren F. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2003). Although the district court called its disposition of this case a grant of "summary judgment," the record shows that the disposition was in fact a judgment on the administrative agency's record. The evidence relevant to this court's disposition of this case, i.e., the least restrictive environment, stems entirely from the administrative record.11 This court need not decide whether all summary judgment dispositions under the IDEA will always be "`better described as judgment [s] on the record.'" See Loren F., 349 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that summary judgments in IDEA cases are truly judgments on the record and are appropriate even when facts are in dispute, based on a preponderance of the evidence)). Instead, this court merely holds that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court conducted a bench trial on the administrative record which this court reviews de novo, applying the same IDEA standard that was employed by the district court. See Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1472. The district court's interpretations of the statute at issue are reviewed de novo. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928.
"The IDEA is a comprehensive statute enacted to ensure that all children with disabilities have access to a free and appropriate public education designed to meet their unique needs." Id. at 925 (quotations and alterations omitted). The IDEA provides federal grants to states, which the states then give to local educational agencies to assist in educating students with disabilities. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 107 F.3d 797, 801 (10th Cir. 1997). The IEP is the basic mechanism through which each child's individual goals are achieved. Murray, 51 F.3d at 925. The IDEA contains both procedural requirements to ensure the proper development of an IEP, and substantive requirements designed to ensure that each child receives a FAPE. Id. States must comply with the IDEA's requirements, including providing each disabled child with a FAPE in an LRE, in order to receive funds under the statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1) and (a) (5).
On appeal, Appellants argue that Nebo: (1) violated the IDEA's procedural mandates because Hirase was not impartial and because of other procedural improprieties; (2) failed to provide K.B. with a FAPE; and (3) failed to provide an LRE for K.B. by offering only the Park View placement with an ABA supplemental program. Thus, they argue, the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Nebo did not violate the IDEA.
For the reasons stated below, this court concludes that Hirase was an impartial hearing officer within the meaning of the IDEA. Therefore, K.B. was not denied an impartial hearing in violation of the IDEA's procedural safeguards.12 Likewise, for the reasons stated in the district court's order, neither the hearing officer selection and training process nor Hirase's service as a hearing officer violated K.B.'s due process rights. In addition, this court concludes that Park View was not K.B.'s least restrictive environment. Because this conclusion establishes a violation of the IDEA's substantive LRE provision, this court need not address whether Nebo provided K.B. with a FAPE.13
Appellants' argument that K.B. was denied an impartial hearing in violation of the IDEA is unavailing. Hirase was an impartial hearing officer within the meaning of the IDEA.14 Under its procedural safeguards, the IDEA sets out a minimum standard of impartiality which prohibits "an employee of the State educational agency or the local educational agency involved in the education... of the child" from conducting the due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (3). Hirase was neither an employee of USOE nor of the Nebo School District. Hirase's employment at the Murray School District, which is a separate district from Nebo, does not constitute employment at the "local educational agency." Hirase therefore meets the minimum standard of impartiality set out in the statute. Id.
Likewise, Hirase did not have a personal or professional interest that would conflict with his objectivity. The IDEA has been interpreted as prohibiting "any person having a personal or professional interest that would conflict with his or her objectivity in the hearing" from conducting a due process hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a) (2). Hirase's wife's mere employment in the same school district as Genaux does not constitute a conflicting interest, particularly because there is no evidence that the women even knew each other. Therefore, K.B. was not denied an impartial hearing within the meaning of the IDEA.
In enacting the IDEA, Congress explicitly mandated, through the least restrictive environment requirement, that disabled children be educated in regular classrooms to the maximum extent appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (5) (A). The LRE mandate provides that "removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occur [ ] only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." Id. Educating children in the least restrictive environment in which they can receive an appropriate education is one of the IDEA's most important substantive requirements. Murray, 51 F.3d at 926. Thus, the LRE requirement is a specific statutory mandate. It is not, as the district court in this case mistakenly believed, a question about educational methodology. See Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 699 (11th Cir. 1991).
In determining whether the least restrictive environment mandate in the IDEA has been violated by a school district, circuit courts have developed variations of an LRE test that weigh several different factors. The Third and Fifth Circuits adopted the two-part Daniel R.R. test,15 in which the court: (1) determines whether education in a regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily; and (2) if not, determines if the school district has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate. Murray, 51 F.3d at 926 n. 10 (quoting Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989)); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993).
Those circuits consider the following non-exhaustive factors in determining whether the first prong of the Daniel R.R. test has been met: (1) steps the school district has taken to accommodate the child in the regular classroom, including the consideration of a continuum of placement and support services; (2) comparison of the academic benefits the child will receive in the regular classroom with those she will receive in the special education classroom; (3) the child's overall educational experience in regular education, including non-academic benefits; and (4) the effect on the regular classroom of the disabled child's presence in that classroom. Murray, 51 F.3d at 926 n. 10; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216-17; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048-50.
The Ninth Circuit applies a slightly varied version of the Daniel R.R. test, which considers, in assessing the first prong of the test, the costs of mainstreaming the child in addition to the four factors listed above.16 Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit considers the cost of supplementary aides and services necessary to maintain the child in the regular classroom alongside the other factors under the first prong of the Daniel R.R. test for least restrictive environment. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697. The Seventh Circuit has also acknowledged that the cost of mainstreaming the child is relevant to determining compliance with the LRE mandate. See Sch. Dist. of Wis. Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 672 (7th Cir. 2002). No single factor, however, is dispositive. Greer, 950 F.2d at 696. Nor are the above factors exhaustive. Id. at 697. These circuits' LRE tests acknowledge the fiscal reality that school districts with limited resources must balance the needs of each disabled child with the needs of other children in the district. Id.
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply the Roncker test, which states that " [i]n a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting." DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. N.W. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). "If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act." Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
Thus, this case turns on the first prong of the Daniel R.R. LRE test, i.e., whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplementary aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily. This court therefore analyzes the factors set out above.
Likewise, the non-academic benefits of K.B.'s mainstream classroom outweigh the non-academic benefits she could have received at Park View. K.B.'s primary needs involved improving her social skills. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the mainstream classroom provided K.B. with appropriate role models, had a more balanced gender ratio, and was generally better suited to meet K.B.'s behavioral and social needs than was Park View's hybrid classroom.17 Thus, this factor strongly weighs in favor of a conclusion that Park View was not K.B.'s least restrictive environment.
K.B.'s parents are entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable cost of the services provided to K.B. in support of her mainstream preschool education. See Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 11, 15, 114 S. Ct. 361, 126 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1993). Parents are entitled to reimbursement under the IDEA if: (1) the school district violated the IDEA; and (2) the education provided by the private school is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. See id.; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S. Ct. 1996, 85 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1985). In this case, Nebo violated the IDEA by failing to provide K.B. with an LRE. In addition, K.B. benefitted significantly, both academically and non-academically, from her private mainstream preschool. K.B.'s performance at her private preschool far exceeded the legal measure of an appropriate education, which is "progress from grade to grade." Carter, 510 U.S. at 11, 114 S. Ct. 361 (quotation omitted). Therefore, the education provided at the private school, supported by the supplementary aide and intensive ABA program, is reasonably calculated to enable K.B. to receive educational benefits.
For these reasons, Appellants are entitled on remand to reimbursement for the reasonable costs of the ABA and aide services provided to K.B. in support of her private mainstream education. At the district court's discretion, Appellants are also eligible for reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B). This court notes, however, that the district court should determine whether any equitable considerations limit the amount of reimbursement to which Appellants are entitled.18
Nebo does not have a mainstream preschool. All of its preschools are mixed environments that focus on special education while incorporating some typical children
Costs of the ABA program for which Appellants sought reimbursement include: (1) forty hours per week of ABA services; (2) seven and one-half hours per week of preparation time for ABA therapists to plan for individual sessions; (3) two and one-half hours per week for a team meeting with K.B.'s five ABA therapists; (4) one day per month for an ABA consultant to train the five therapists; (5) materials for ABA program; (6) one hour of speech therapy per week; and (7) occupational therapy as needed
A different hearing officer, Ralph Haws, had originally been selected by the USBE to preside over K.B.'s hearing. Appellants moved for Haws' recusal. Haws, however, recused himself because of a family illness. In accordance with the USBE's hearing officer selection policy in effect at the time, Hirase was appointed by the USBE after the parties failed to agree to a hearing officer
Hirase concluded that the 1997-1998 IEP did not provide K.B. with a FAPE. He nevertheless concluded that Appellants were not entitled to damages for the 1997-1998 FAPE violation because they waived their right to seek reimbursement. The district court affirmed Hirase's conclusions regarding the 1997-1998 school year. In this appeal, Appellants do not specifically challenge the district court's denial of reimbursement for the 1997-1998 FAPE violation. As a consequence, this court does not address, and this opinion does not affect, the portion of the district court's grant of summary judgment to Nebo which pertains to the 1997-1998 school year
During the 1998-1999 school year, K.B. went to the private preschool for five hours per week. During the 1999-2000 school year, K.B. attended the private preschool for ten hours per week
The private school tuition was $100 per month. On appeal, K.B.'s counsel reiterated that Appellants never asked, and do not ask on appeal, to be reimbursed for the private school tuition
Nebo originally offered to pay for eight hours per week of one-on-one ABA, which would have been provided by K.B.'s private tutors, who were hired by Appellants
The ABA program was provided by five different therapists. K.B.'s thirty-five to forty hours of ABA were structured as follows: (1) K.B. spent ten hours per week at the mainstream preschool with Sarah Adolphson's assistance as her aide; (2) K.B. spent an additional ten to twenty hours per week with Adolphson as part of her at-home, one-on-one ABA program; (3) K.B. spent an average of five to ten more hours on at-home, one-on-one ABA instruction with her other therapists; (4) starting in the summer of 1998, K.B. spent approximately seven to ten hours per week on peer play with a tutor who observed her interactions and redirected her behavior when needed; (5) starting in the summer of 1999, K.B. also spent two and one-half to three and one-half hours per week in a play group with tutors who observed and redirected her conduct
K.B.'s problems included inept social skills, inability to properly communicate with other children and express subtle emotions, self-talk, and tantruming
During this time period, however, Appellants were working to teach K.B. skills during "every waking moment," in addition to the twenty hours per week of ABA. Evidence shows that parents are a very important component of autism intervention because they can informally extend therapy beyond the formal treatment sessions
The district court received some supplemental evidence as allowed under the IDEA. The new evidence pertained to the issue of Hirase's bias
Appellants argue on appeal that there were other procedural violations of the IDEA. Although Appellants raised the issue of Hirase's alleged bias at the district court, they did not present to the district court any arguments regarding the other purported procedural violations of the IDEA. For that reason, this court declines to address Appellants' other procedural arguments Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721 (10th Cir. 1993) (this court will normally not consider an issue that was not presented to, considered, and decided by the district court).
The IDEA requires both that the child be provided a FAPE and that such a FAPE be provided in an LRE to the maximum extent appropriate. See Murray v. Montrose County Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 925-26 (10th Cir. 1995). The IDEA's substantive provisions are violated if: (1) the school district fails to provide a child with a FAPE; or (2) a FAPE is provided, but not, to the maximum extent appropriate, in a least restrictive environment. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1), (a) (5); Murray, 51 F.3d at 925-26. Our reversal of the district court's grant of judgment to Nebo rests solely on the ground that Park View was not the LRE for K.B.
Because this court concludes that Hirase was an impartial hearing officer, it need not address Appellants' secondary argument that they could not secure an impartial hearing officer because the USBE's list of hearing officers was "aligned in favor of the school districts."
Daniel R.R. interpreted the least restrictive environment requirement of the IDEA's predecessor, the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"). See Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1989). The Daniel R.R. test has, however, been adopted by the Third Circuit in interpreting the IDEA's LRE requirement. See Murray, 51 F.3d at 926 n. 10.
The Oberti and Daniel R.R. courts acknowledged that the cost of mainstreaming may be relevant in determining whether a school district has complied with the LRE mandate. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1218 n. 25 (3d Cir. 1993); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049 n. 9. Those courts did not consider cost a factor, however, because the facts of the cases before them did not involve cost concerns. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218 n. 25; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049 n. 9.
This court does not mean to imply that only an exclusively mainstream environment meets the IDEA's LRE mandate for all children. School officials are not required to provide an exclusively mainstream environment in every case, and partial integration may well constitute the provision of an LRE to the "maximum extent appropriate."See T.R. v. Kingwood Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2000) (IDEA does not contemplate an all-or-nothing educational system in which handicapped children attend either regular or special education); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1045.
The Supreme Court held, in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education and in Florence County School District v. Carter, that equitable considerations can limit the amount of recovery. See Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16, 114 S. Ct. 361, 126 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1993) (courts fashioning equitable relief under the IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement); Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S. Ct. 1996, 85 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1985). Nebo argued at the administrative hearing that equitable considerations such as the intensity and cost of K.B.'s ABA program should be considered in determining whether full reimbursement is proper. Upon remand, the district court should consider equitable factors such as whether K.B. needed forty hours of ABA per week in order to succeed in her mainstream classroom. In considering this equitable factor, the district court should give due deference to Hirase's finding that K.B. needed only twenty to thirty hours of at-home ABA programming combined with the Park View placement. Another appropriate equitable consideration would be whether total reimbursement for K.B.'s ABA program and supplementary aide for the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years would impose a disproportionate burden on Nebo's preschool budget. See Carter, 510 U.S. at 16, 114 S. Ct. 361 (total reimbursement is not appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the child's education was unreasonable). Whereas the issue of the allegedly unreasonable cost of K.B.'s ABA program was not presented to the district court in the context of LRE, it was presented in the context of equitable considerations under Burlington and Carter. As a consequence, in the latter context this issue has not been waived.