Source: https://casetext.com/case/fleege-v-cimpl
Timestamp: 2019-02-17 22:33:45
Document Index: 639054093

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 241', '§ 99', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 520', '§ 520']

Fleege v. Cimpl, 305 N.W.2d 409 | Casetext
305 N.W.2d 409 (S.D. 1981)
Fleegev.Cimpl
Supreme Court of South DakotaMay 6, 1981
Magbuhat v. Kovarik
…However, expert evidence is not exclusively required to establish negligence. Block, 80 S.D. at 474, 126…
Steilen v. Cabela&apos;s Wholesale, Inc.
…, 2000 S.D. 151, ¶ 18, 619 N.W.2d 682, 688 (quoting Van Zee v. Sioux Valley Hosp. , 315 N.W.2d 489, 492 (S.D.…
holding use of electrically-operated submersible pumps by homeowners common along Missouri River
Summary of this case from In re Complaint of Weeks Marine, Inc.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Yankton County, Donald E. Erickson, J.
James E. Doyle of Doyle, Bierle Porter, Yankton, for plaintiff and appellant.
Michael F. Pieplow of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee.
On August 25, 1978, at approximately 7:30 p.m., decedent and John DeJean, decedent's classmate and friend, decided to go swimming. They went to classmate Bob Haney's home, whose residence overlooks the Missouri River. The boys went down to the Missouri River and jumped off a neighbor's houseboat into the river until the neighbor told them to stay off the boat.
The underlying question is not whether medical testimony was required, because there was testimony by medical experts; rather, the question is whether the jury could consider only the medical testimony in making its determination on decedent's cause of death. We conclude that this instruction improperly restricted the jury so that they were to consider only the medical testimony on what caused decedent's death. The jury should have been allowed to consider all of the testimony when deciding whether appellant carried his burden of proof on cause of death.
It is incumbent on the plaintiff to introduce evidence which would afford a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it was more likely than not that the cause of death of James Fleege was from electrocution. DeCourcy v. Trustees of Westminster Presby. Ch., 270 Minn. 560, 134 N.W.2d 326 (1965). The medical testimony here was not conclusive and must be termed "speculative." See generally Lohr v. Watson, 68 S.D. 298, 2 N.W.2d 6 (1942). But expert medical testimony is not always required to prove a reasonable basis for the jury to reach a conclusion concerning cause of death. Howe v. Farmers Cooperative Creamery of Madison, 81 S.D. 207, 132 N.W.2d 844 (1965); 22 Am.Jur.2d Death §§ 241-243 (1965); 31 Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 99 (1967). The inference that decedent was electrocuted was not speculative or conjectural, but provided a reasonable basis for a jury determination when the medical testimony in this case is combined with the testimony of other witnesses. If not precluded from consideration by Instruction No. 8, the testimony of the nonmedical witnesses would have aided the jury in providing foundation and filling in the gaps left by the medical testimony. See generally Buie v. Birtell, 213 Kan. 354, 516 P.2d 963 (1973); Hansen v. Isaak, 70 S.D. 529, 19 N.W.2d 521 (1945). According to Instruction No. 8, the jury was precluded from considering the most important testimony on electrocution as the cause of death — the testimony of John DeJean, who was in the water near decedent and who testified that he felt electricity in the water. The jury should have been instructed that they could consider all testimony, not only the medical testimony, in determining cause of death.
[W]henever a thing which has caused an injury is shown to have been under the control and management of the defendant charged with negligence, and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care has been exercised, the fact of the accident itself is deemed to afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery in the absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the injury was not due to his want of care.
In determining whether res ipsa loquitur applies to this case, we must answer the following questions: 1) whether the jury could find as a fact that decedent's cause of death was electrocution, and if so, 2) whether the other essential elements were present to warrant application of res ipsa loquitur. We conclude that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to this case.
During oral argument, counsel for appellant stated that certain findings of fact by the jury would be necessary before the inference afforded by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could arise.
We recognize that the two pathologists did testify on other possible causes of death. These other possibilities included vomiting and aspiration, "sudden death" syndrome, and death by an unknown cause. Nevertheless, a jury can accept an inference of cause of death based on credible evidence even though inferences of other causes of death are reasonable. Ruff v. Burger, 32 Wis.2d 141, 145 N.W.2d 73 (1966). Here, DeJean's testimony provided the credible evidence to support electrocution as the cause of death. The jury might have found that decedent was electrocuted. Therefore, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was available if the essential elements were present. Shipley v. City of Spearfish, supra; Hansen v. Isaak, supra; Barger v. Chelpon, supra; Duncan v. Ft. Dodge Gas Electric Co., 193 Iowa 1127, 188 N.W. 865 (1922); Cain v. Southern Massachusetts Telephone Co., 219 Mass. 504, 107 N.E. 380 (1914). See also Arkansas Light and Power Co. v. Jackson, 166 Ark. 633, 267 S.W. 359 (1924); Bond v. City of Champaign, 128 Ill. App.2d 316, 261 N.E.2d 741 (1970).
In so holding, we reject appellee's contention by way of a petition for review that appellant did not produce sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury. There were questions of fact for the jury in that certain facts were in dispute or at least different conclusions could be fairly drawn therefrom. Schmeling v. Jorgensen, 77 S.D. 8, 84 N.W.2d 558 (1957).
We must now decide whether the essential elements were present, thus warranting application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. "It is the province of the court in the first instance to determine whether or not the circumstances are such as will, unexplained, permit the jury to draw the inference of negligence." Barger v. Chelpon, supra, 60 S.D. at 70, 243 N.W. at 98 (citation omitted). Our only determination is whether the res ipsa instruction should have been given, because the doctrine is primarily a rule of evidence. Roster v. Inter-State Power Co., 58 S.D. 521, 237 N.W. 738 (1931); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 40 (4th ed. 1971). Here, the facts of decedent's death allow the inference of negligence. The jury is not, however, compelled to make such an inference. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 33 S.Ct. 416, 57 L.Ed. 815 (1913); Midwest Oil Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 69 S.D. 343, 10 N.W.2d 701 (1943); Barger v. Chelpon, supra; W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 40 (4th ed. 1971).
The three essential elements that must be present to warrant application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are that:
Considering the evidence and their common knowledge and experience, the jury could have found that the second element was present here. A person is not normally electrocuted by an electrical pump while swimming in a river unless there is some negligence on the part of the person who has the pump in his exclusive control. Likewise, the jury could have found that the third element was present, because if decedent was electrocuted, his death must have resulted from electricity from the pump, which apparently was the only source of electricity in the area of appellee's dock. Cf. Bergeler v. Waukesha Gas Electric Co., 165 Wis. 68, 160 N.W. 1076 (1917).
We conclude that appellant did not waive the right to an instruction on res ipsa loquitur by trying to prove specific negligence. The res ipsa loquitur rule is "founded on an absence of specific proof of facts or omissions constituting negligence . . . ." Barger v. Chelpon, supra, 60 S.D. at 73, 243 N.W. at 100. We hold, as do most courts, that:
[W]here the circumstances of the occurrence and the pleadings of the parties would otherwise present a proper situation for the application of the doctrine, the plaintiff does not lose its benefits by introducing some evidence of specific negligence which does not establish clearly and definitely the precise cause of the injury . . . .
This Court previously adopted the Restatement of Torts § 520 (1938) position on ultrahazardous activity in Midwest Oil Co. v. City of Aberdeen, supra.
"Whether the activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by the court, upon consideration of all the factors listed . . . and the weight given to each that it merits upon the facts in evidence." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, comment 1 at 42 (1977).