Source: http://openjurist.org/107/f3d/1472
Timestamp: 2014-04-17 12:35:06
Document Index: 492614576

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 1956', '§ 1956', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 5845', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

107 F3d 1472 United States of America v. Ruben Desantiago-Flores | OpenJurist
107 F. 3d 1472 - United States of America v. Ruben Desantiago-Flores	Home107 f3d 1472 united states of america v. ruben desantiago-flores
107 F3d 1472 United States of America v. Ruben Desantiago-Flores 107 F.3d 1472
97 CJ C.A.R. 338
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Ruben DeSANTIAGO-FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 95-1548.
Feb. 28, 1997.
Clifford J. Barnard, of Boulder, CO, for Defendant-Appellant.
John M. Hutchins, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Henry L. Solano, U.S. Attorney, and Wayne Campbell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with him on the brief), of Denver, CO, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TACHA, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Ruben DeSantiago-Flores appeals his various convictions by jury on drug trafficking counts. We affirm and remand with directions to vacate the conviction on count 11.
Defendant was indicted and tried on fourteen drug trafficking counts. Count 1 charged him with conspiracy in relation to drug trafficking offenses, 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count 2 charged him with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). Counts 3 through 8 charged him, both as a principal and as an aider and abettor, with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(B). Count 9 charged him with money laundering and attempted money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), in relation to the purchase of a pickup truck. Count 10 charged him with attempted money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), in relation to transporting $87,270 in currency to Mesquite, Nevada, in an attempt to purchase cocaine for distribution. Count 11 charged him with using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Counts 12 and 13 charged him under an aiding and abetting theory with violation of § 924(c) for using an incendiary bomb during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Count 14 charged him under an aiding and abetting theory with making and possessing a firearm in violation of Chapter 53 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(f), 5861, and 5871. The jury returned guilty verdicts on counts 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, but the court did not enter final judgment or sentence defendant on counts 11 and 12 because it found doing so would violate the double jeopardy clause. Defendant was sentenced to a total of 511 months' imprisonment.
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to prove the bombings in counts 12 and 13 were committed "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking conspiracy, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). We disagree.
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir.1995).
The Supreme Court has interpreted the "in relation to" language of § 924(c)(1) broadly:
The phrase "in relation to" is expansive, as the courts of appeals construing § 924(c)(1) have recognized. Nonetheless, the phrase does illuminate § 924(c)(1)'s boundaries. According to Webster's, "in relation to" means "with reference to" or "as regards." Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, at 2102. The phrase "in relation to" thus, at a minimum, clarifies that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. As one court has observed, the "in relation to" language "allay[s] explicitly the concern that a person could be" punished under § 924(c)(1) for committing a drug trafficking offense "while in possession of a firearm" even though the firearm's presence is coincidental or entirely "unrelated" to the crime. Instead, the gun at least must "facilitate[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating," the drug trafficking offense.
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237-38, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2058-59, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (citations omitted). The evidence in the present case is clearly sufficient to meet the requirement that the bombings be "in relation to" a drug conspiracy.
According to trial testimony, in 1989 or 1990, defendant and his brother-in-law Dan Santistevan went to the home of Jennifer Borrego at 7897 Durango Street, Thornton, Colorado, to sell a kilogram of cocaine to an acquaintance of Borrego. Borrego had arranged the transaction. The acquaintance took the cocaine and fled without paying for it, and Borrego was unable to repay defendant. Defendant remained angry at Borrego for a long time as defendant was required to pay his supplier to settle the debt.
By Labor Day 1992, Brenda Rigenhagen and Chris Cessa had run up a debt for drugs to defendant of about $5,000. As they were unable to pay defendant, he offered them a "job" as an alternative. Defendant told Rigenhagen and Cessa that he wanted them to scare residents of the Durango Street house who owed him money. Defendant apparently did not know that Borrego no longer resided in the house and that her exhusband and his brother occupied the house. Defendant suggested that Cessa throw a gasoline bomb through the window. Defendant told Cessa that the job would not only work off his debt, at least in part, but would also give Cessa a chance to "become one of the family." Cessa's first attempt to bomb the house was not successful. The glass bottle holding the gasoline went through the window, but landed upright and did not break. Believing Cessa had not done the job, defendant demanded that he pay his debt and threatened Cessa, Rigenhagen, and Cessa's relatives. Cessa improved the design of the bomb and tried again, this time more successfully. Afterward, defendant told his ex-wife that Cessa and Rigenhagen had burned the house down and "taken care of Jennifer."
Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish the bombings were committed in relation to drug trafficking. He argues the evidence supports nothing more than an independent personal vendetta. Our review of the evidence presented leads us to a different conclusion. Regardless of his motive for wanting the house bombed, defendant used the bombing as a means for Rigenhagen and Cessa to pay off their drug debt. Defendant told Cessa he would get no more drugs until the "job" was done. Thus, the bombings were not entirely unrelated to the drug trafficking conspiracy. Indeed, providing Rigenhagen and Cessa with an alternative means to pay for their drugs clearly facilitated or had the potential of facilitating defendant's drug trafficking offense. After the successful bombing, defendant again provided Rigenhagen and Cessa with cocaine on credit. In addition, there can be little doubt that defendant's attempt to intimidate Borrego, who had enabled the theft of a kilogram of cocaine from defendant, had the potential of facilitating the drug trafficking conspiracy. Even though there appeared to be no effort to collect from Borrego after the bombing, defendant's violent retaliation against Borrego is related to the drug conspiracy and its continued success and can reasonably be viewed as facilitating the conspiracy by developing defendant's reputation as someone to fear.
Defendant next argues there was insufficient evidence that he used and carried a firearm to support his count 11 conviction under the instructions given to the jury.1 He argues there was insufficient evidence to prove he actively employed his .357 magnum revolver in light of Bailey v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). Bailey clarified there must be evidence that the firearm was actively employed, and not merely readily accessible, to support a conviction under the "use" prong of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The evidence reveals defendant placed a gun in his boot before entering a building to complete a drug transaction. It does not show he brandished, displayed, bartered, referred to, or otherwise actively employed the firearm during the course of the transaction to bring about a change in circumstances of the predicate offense. See Bailey, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 508. In Bailey, the Supreme Court explicitly noted a firearm is not being "used" "when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing throughout a drug transaction." Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 507.
The government argues defendant actively employed the gun because an accomplice, Rigenhagen, saw him place the gun in his boot and was frightened. Although Bailey does not preclude the possibility that a defendant might actively employ a firearm by intimidating an accomplice to participate, the evidence in this case is insufficient to support the conclusion that defendant displayed the gun for that purpose. Instead, the testimony established defendant displayed the gun at Rigenhagen's request. The government argues, however, and defendant does not contest, that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1). Defendant responds that whatever the evidence, the instruction on § 924(c)(1) in count 11 was inadequate to support his conviction. Defendant did not object at trial to the instruction given on count 11.