Source: http://www.flra.gov/decisions/v38/38-082.html
Timestamp: 2015-03-31 05:45:41
Document Index: 165972418

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 290', '§ 290', '§ 552', '§ 290', '§ 552', '§ 290', '§ 290', '§ 290', '§\n552', '§ 290', '§ 290']

38:0965(82)CA - - Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan AFB, CA and AFGE Local 1857 - - 1990 FLRAdec CA - - v38 p965 | FLRA.GOV
Authority Chairman and Members Find Types of Cases, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Office of the General Counsel Regional Offices, Guidances, Policies, Manuals, ULP Process, Forms, Representation, ADR Services, and Training.Federal Service Impasses Panel Find Jurisdiction, Statute, Work Schedules Act, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Solicitor, Administrative Law Judges, IG & Others Find General Information about these Offices and Contact Information.training & alternative dispute resolutionFind FLRA Training Information and ADR Services. 38:0965(82)CA - - Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan AFB, CA and AFGE Local 1857 - - 1990 FLRAdec CA - - v38 p965 Other Files: ALJ's Decision [ v38 p965 ] 38:0965(82)CA
The decision of the Authority follows: 38 FLRA No. 82 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE SACRAMENTO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER MCCLELLAN AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA (Respondent) and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1857 (Charging Party) 9-CA-80341 DECISION AND ORDER December 14, 1990 Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
filed by the Respondent and the General Counsel to the attached decision of the
Administrative Law Judge. The complaint alleged that the Respondent violated
Relations Statute (the Statute) by refusing to provide the Union with a
document requested under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. The Judge found
refusing to furnish the requested document to the Union. Pursuant to section 2423.29 of our Rules and Regulations and section
rulings. Upon consideration of the Judge's Decision, and the entire record, we
extent consistent with this decision. II. Background The facts, more fully set forth in the Judge's Decision, are summarized
below. Department of Air Force Regulation, AFR 40-750, which governs
discipline and adverse actions, requires the coordination of all proposed
disciplinary actions. Prior to issuing a notice of proposed discipline to an
employee, the Respondent circulates the proposed discipline file among several
supervisors and management officials. The proposed discipline file is covered
by a coordination sheet. The purpose of the coordination sheet is to designate the various
offices which must coordinate that particular action. The Civilian Personnel
Office and the Office of the Judge Advocate are included on the coordination
sheet for all proposed discipline actions. The Civilian Personnel Office
reviews the proposed action for merit and procedural correctness. The Judge
Advocate General reviews the proposed action for legal sufficiency. The
coordination sheet provides space where the signers can write comments. The
management officials listed on the coordination sheet "have significant
influence on possible changes in proposed the discipline or whether in the
proposed discipline is imposed." Judge's Decision at 5. On December 18, 1987, a Notice of Proposed Reprimand was issued to a
bargaining unit employee. The proposed discipline was signed by the employee's
first-level supervisor. Under AFR 40-750, the employee and his representative
have the right to make an oral and/or written reply to the second-level
supervisor concerning the proposed discipline. After a final decision is made
on the proposed action, and the final notice of discipline is issued, the
employee may file a grievance, under the parties' negotiated grievance
procedure, contesting the final decision. The unresolved grievances may be
submitted to arbitration. In December 1987, the employee filed his written response to the
proposed discipline with the third-level supervisor because the second-level
supervisor retired. In January 1988, the employee and the Union representative
met with the third-level supervisor to present the oral response to the
proposed discipline. During the meeting, the Union representative asked the
third-level supervisor to remove himself as the deciding official on the
proposed discipline because the third-level supervisor "had allegedly already
approved the decision to discipline" the employee and, therefore, the
proceedings were not fair. Id. at 3. The third-level supervisor did not
respond and later issued a decision upholding the proposed reprimand. The Union filed a grievance over the Respondent's decision to reprimand
the employee. The grievance was processed through the grievance procedure and
eventually submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator sustained the grievance and
the employee's reprimand was removed. During the preparation for the arbitration hearing, the Union
"determined [that] a copy of the discipline coordination sheet was needed to
present the grievance." Id. By letters dated April 14 and May 6, 1988,
the Union requested that the Respondent furnish it with a copy of the
discipline coordination sheet, showing the names and dates of the management
officials who coordinated the proposed discipline. The letters stated that the
information was being requested under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. By
letters dated April 22 and May 10, 1988, the Respondent refused to furnish the
Union the discipline coordination sheet on the grounds that it: (1) was an
internal management document; and (2) did not have any bearing on the
grievance. Id. III. Administrative Law Judge's Decision First, the Judge noted that there was no dispute that the Union had
requested a copy of the discipline coordination sheet and that the sheet was
normally maintained and reasonably available under section 7114(b)(4) of the
Statute. The Judge then concluded that the discipline coordination sheet was
necessary for full and proper discussion of subjects within the scope of
collective bargaining, within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4). The Judge
rejected the Respondent's contention that the discipline coordination sheet was
not necessary because the Union was able to elicit the information at the
arbitration hearing. In the Judge's view, the discipline coordination sheet was
necessary for the Union to adequately represent the grievant and to determine
"which arguments on behalf of [the grievant] were appropriate and whether to
proceed to arbitration." Id. at 6. Next, the Judge rejected the Respondent's contention that 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 precluded the disclosure of the discipline coordination sheet to
the Union.(1) The Judge found no merit in the Respondent's argument
that it should not be required to provide the Union with the discipline
coordination sheet because "such sheet might contain comments concerning
any alcohol or drug problems that might affect the employee." Id.
(emphasis in original). The Judge found, in this regard, that the discipline
coordination sheet "contained no such information[.]" Id. Further, the Judge rejected the Respondent's argument that it was
privileged to withhold the discipline coordination sheet because it
"might contain comments or statements that might constitute guidance,
advice or counsel relating to collective bargaining, within the meaning of
[s]ection 7114(b)(4) of the Statute[.]" Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
The Judge noted that the discipline coordination sheet "contained no comments
or statements at all." Id. The Judge concluded that the presence of a
signature and date, alone, did not constitute guidance, advice, counsel or
training within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. The Judge also rejected the Respondent's contention that disclosure of
the discipline coordination sheet to the Union would "violate an
attorney/client privilege or attorney work product privilege." Id. at 8.
The Judge stated: [W]ithout reaching whether any attorney/client privilege is present,
there were no comments or statements by the judge advocate general's office,
and thus I find no privilege can be raised. Id. Finally, the Judge concluded, based on National Labor Relations
Board Union Local 6 v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1988), that the
Respondent "had no privilege under [s]ection 7106(a)(2) of the Statute to
withhold the discipline coordination sheet in the subject case." Id. at
9. Accordingly, the Judge found that the Respondent was required by
section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute to furnish the discipline coordination sheet
to the Union, and that its failure to do so violated section 7116(a)(1), (5),
and (8) of the Statute. IV. Respondent's Exceptions The Respondent raises five exceptions to the Judge's decision: First, the Respondent excepts to the Judge's conclusion that the
discipline coordination sheet was "necessary" within the meaning of section
7114(b)(4) of the Statute. Respondent's Exceptions at 1. The Respondent argues
that the discipline coordination sheet was not necessary for the Union to
perform its representational functions because the Union had the opportunity to
elicit the information from management officials "during the grievance
procedure and at arbitration." Respondent's Brief at 4. Second, the Respondent excepts to the Judge's conclusion that "the
Privacy Act (42 U.S.C. Section 290dd-3) does not provide any limitation on the
disclosure of the discipline coordination sheet." Respondent's Exception at 1.
The Respondent argues that 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 protects the
confidentiality of information concerning the diagnosis and treatment of an
employee for alcoholism or alcohol abuse. According to the Respondent, "there
is no authorization to provide such information to labor unions for any reason
without a court order." Respondent's Brief at 6. The Respondent argues that
discipline coordination sheets should not be disclosed because they may contain
such information. Third, the Respondent excepts to the Judge's conclusion that the
discipline coordination sheet does not constitute guidance, advice, or counsel
of the Statute. The Respondent argues that coordination sheets constitute
management guidance, advice, and counsel because "they are obviously for the
purpose of decision-making relative to discipline[.]" Id. at 5. Fourth, the Respondent excepts to the Judge's conclusion that requiring
disclosure of the discipline coordination sheet does not violate the
attorney-client privilege. According to the Respondent, the Judge Advocate's
Office reviews proposed disciplinary actions for "legal sufficiency" and may
"place comments on the coordination sheets[.]" Id. at 3. Finally, the Respondent excepts to the Judge's conclusion that
disclosure of the discipline coordination sheet does not violate management's
right to discipline employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. The
Respondent contends that the information contained on coordination sheets "goes
to the heart of the internal management deliberative process and should for
that reason alone be protected from disclosure." Id. at 5-6. V. General Counsel's Exception The General Counsel excepts only to the portion of the Judge's
recommended Order providing that the Notice may be signed by an "'appropriate
official[.]'" General Counsel's Exception at 1. According to the General
Counsel, under the Judge's recommended Order, "almost anyone could be
designated to sign the Notice, which would diminish the remedial aspects of the
Notice[ ]" and "complicate compliance proceedings since the parties . . . could
disagree regarding who should sign the Notice[.]" Brief in Support of General
Counsel's Exception at 2-4. The General Counsel asserts that "[r]equiring the
Notice to be signed by the Respondent's Commanding Officer promotes the
remedial power of a Notice by assuring the unit employees who read the Notice
that the Respondent is aware of its responsibility to meet its statutory
obligations." Id. at 1-2. VI. Analysis and Conclusions (2) A. The Requested Information Was Necessary for the Union to
Perform its Representational Functions It is well established that under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute,
the exclusive representative is entitled to information that is necessary to
enable it to carry out effectively its representational responsibilities,
including information which will assist it in the investigation, evaluation,
and presentation of a grievance. See generally, U.S. Department of
Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, El Paso, Texas, 37 FLRA 1310, 1319
(1990); U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command,
Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, California, 37
FLRA 987, 995 (1990). In this case, the discipline coordination sheet was requested by the
Union in connection with the processing of a grievance filed by the Union over
a disciplinary action taken against an employee. The coordination sheet
identifies Agency officials who reviewed and approved the Respondent's proposed
decision to reprimand the employee. Moreover, as found by the Judge, the
officials who sign the coordination sheet can significantly affect the proposed
discipline. In these circumstances, it is clear that the discipline
coordination sheet was necessary, within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of
the Statute, for the Union to fulfill its representational responsibilities.
B. The Requested Document Does Not Constitute Guidance,
Advice, Counsel, or Training Under Section 7114(b)(4)(C) of the
Statute For the reasons which follow, we find that the requested document does
officials relating to collective bargaining. The record establishes that the Respondent circulated a draft of a
proposed disciplinary action to be taken against a unit employee, covered by a
coordination sheet, which designated supervisors and management officials for
review, comments, and concurrence. All the designated officials signed the
coordination sheet without comment. In National Labor Relations Board, 38 FLRA No. 48, slip op. at
17-18 (1990) (NLRB), the Authority held that section 7114(b)(4)(C) exempts from disclosure to the exclusive
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. The Authority further stated that section 7114(b)(4)(C) does not exempt from disclosure guidance, advice, or counsel to
facts and circumstances in this case, we conclude that the discipline
coordination sheet does not constitute guidance, advice, or counsel relating to
"collective bargaining" within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4)(C) of the
Statute. In so concluding, we specifically reject the Judge's statements which
imply that the discipline coordination sheet would be exempt from disclosure
under section 7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute if it contained comments or
statements of managers and supervisors. In this case, the coordination sheet sought by the Union pertains to a
disciplinary action taken against a bargaining unit employee. The concurrences
of the management officials and supervisors were not made in a context where
the Agency and the Union were engaged in actual bargaining. Moreover, the
concurrences of the supervisors and management officials do not pertain to the
processing of the employee's grievance or to an unfair labor practice charge.
Consistent with NLRB, therefore, we conclude that the requested
discipline coordination sheet does not constitute guidance, advice, counsel, or
training for management relating to collective bargaining within the meaning of
section 7114(b)(4)(C). C. Release of the Requested Discipline Coordination Sheet Is
Not Prohibited by Law The Respondent contends that the disclosure of the discipline
coordination sheet is prohibited by: (1) the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a;
(2) 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3; and (3) section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. The
Respondent also contends that disclosure of the discipline coordination sheet
violates the attorney-client privilege. For the following reasons, we reject
these contentions. These same arguments were made to, and rejected by, the Judge. In
particular, the Judge noted that the requested coordination sheet contained no
statements or comments. The Judge concluded that providing the document to the
Union would not violate the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3; or the attorney-client privilege because there was no privileged
information present. Next, the Judge rejected the Respondent's contention that
disclosure of the document violated section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute.
Citing NLRB Union Local 6 v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(NLRB Union), the Judge found that section 7106 does not bar the
disclosure of information under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. We agree with the Judge's rejection of these arguments. First, we find
no basis on which to conclude that providing a union with a coordination sheet
pertaining to a unit employee being represented by the union would constitute
an unwarranted invasion of the employee's privacy, within the meaning of
exemption b(6) of the Freedom of Information Act, so as to preclude release of
the information under the Privacy Act. In fact, as the Union obviously was
aware of the discipline against the employee at the time the Union requested
the coordination sheet, it is not apparent that there is any invasion of the
employee's privacy. Second, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 applies, by its terms, to
"[r]ecords of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient
which are maintained in connection with the performance of any program or
activity relating to alcoholism or alcohol abuse education[.]" 42 U.S.C.
§ 290dd-3(a). The Respondent's discipline coordination sheet clearly is not such
a record. As such, the statutory provision relied on by the Respondent does not
apply. Finally, there has been no demonstration that the Judge's disposition
of the Respondent's arguments relating to the attorney-client work product, or
its rights under section 7106 of the Statute, is in error. Indeed, as the
disputed coordination sheet contained no comments at all, the Respondent's
arguments in this regard are speculative. Moreover, consistent with the court's
decision in NLRB Union, and for the reasons stated by the Judge, we
reject the Respondent's assertion that disclosure of the requested information
is inconsistent with its right to discipline employees under section
7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. We conclude, therefore, that the Respondent has
not established that disclosure of the requested document is prohibited by law.
D. The Notice Must Be Signed by the Respondent's Commanding
Officer We agree with the General Counsel that the portion of the Judge's
recommended Order enabling the required Notice to be signed by an appropriate
official should be modified. The Authority consistently has held that the remedial purposes of the
Statute are best effectuated if the Notice is signed by an official designated
by the Authority rather than one determined by a respondent. In fact, in a
recent case involving the same parties, the Authority modified the Judge's
recommended Order to require that the Notice be signed by the Respondent's
Commanding Officer. Department of the Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics
Center, McClellan Air Force Base, California, 35 FLRA 1230 (1990). See
also, for example, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, McClellan
Base Exchange, McClellan Air Force Base, California, 35 FLRA 764 (1990)
(Authority order that the Notice be signed by the Exchange Manager of the
McClellan Air Force Base Exchange rather than by an "authorized
representative"). In this case, we find that requiring the Commanding Officer of the
Center to sign the Notice effectuates the remedial purposes of the Notice by
signifying that the Respondent acknowledges its obligations under the Statute
and intends to comply with those obligations. Accordingly, we will modify the
Order to require that the Notice be signed by the Commanding Officer of the
Sacramento Air Logistics Center. VII. Summary Section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute requires an agency to furnish the
a union to carry out effectively its representational functions. In this case,
there is no dispute that the information was reasonably available and normally
maintained. We have concluded that the requested discipline coordination sheet:
(1) was necessary for the Union to process the employee's grievance; (2) did
not constitute guidance, advice, counsel, or training for management officials
of the Statute; and (3) is not prohibited from disclosure by 5 U.S.C. §
552a, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 or section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. Therefore, we find that the Respondent was required by section
7114(b)(4) of the Statute to furnish the requested document to the Union and
Force Base, California, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing and refusing to furnish the American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 1857, AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of its
employees, with a copy of the requested December 1987 discipline coordination
sheet. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
Statute: (a) Upon request, furnish the American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1857, AFL-CIO, with a copy of the requested December 1987
discipline coordination sheet. (b) Post at its facilities copies of the attached Notice on forms to be
they shall be signed by the Commanding Officer of the Sacramento Air Logistics
Center and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter in
steps have been taken to comply. NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE WE NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT: WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to furnish the American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 1857, AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of our
sheet. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. WE WILL furnish the American Federation of Government Employees, Local
1857, AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of our employees, with a copy of
the requested December 1987 discipline coordination sheet. ______________________________(Activity) Dated:__________By:_________________________ (Signature) (Title) This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of
Region IX, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address is: 910 Market
Street, Suite 220, San Francisco, CA 94103 and whose telephone number is: (415)
995-5000. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) 1. As is discussed in greater detail infra, 42
U.S.C. § 290dd-3 governs the disclosure of patient records created in
connection with the implementation of section 321(b)(2) of the Comprehensive
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of
2. As there is no contention by the Respondent to the
contrary, we find that the requested information is normally maintained and
reasonably available within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the