Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/525/337/169679/
Timestamp: 2017-09-23 14:51:06
Document Index: 559221733

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 1952', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 846', '§ 371', '§ 851', '§ 841', '§ 371', '§ 846', '§ 851']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Grady Quicksey, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Mary Jane Quicksey, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Alfred Dumeur, Appellant, 525 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1976) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1976 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Grady Quicksey, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee,...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Grady Quicksey, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Mary Jane Quicksey, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Alfred Dumeur, Appellant, 525 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1976)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 525 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1976)
Argued Jan. 10, 1975. Decided July 25, 1975. Supplemental Opinion Aug. 28, 1975. Certiorari Denied Jan. 26, 1976. See 96 S. Ct. 878
* Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) provides in part that it is unlawful to distribute narcotics or to possess these drugs with intent to distribute them. Section 846 punishes a conspiracy to violate § 841(a) (1) by a maximum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment or a maximum fine of $25,000, or both, for a first offender, and by more severe penalties for repeating offenders.
Count I of the indictment charged that the defendants conspired to violate both 18 U.S.C. § 1952 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). In a bill of particulars the government indicated that Count I charged a violation of only the narcotics conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, but during trial the district attorney insisted that both this statute and 18 U.S.C. § 371 were applicable. The district court accepted this expanded interpretation of the indictment and denied the defendants' motion to require the government to elect at the conclusion of its case whether it was proceeding under the general conspiracy statute, § 371, or the special conspiracy statute, § 846. Thus, the law of the case allowed the jury to convict for either a general conspiracy or a narcotics conspiracy, but it was not required to return a special verdict. The court instructed the jury that it could convict if it believed the defendants engaged in a conspiracy involving interstate travel in connection with the possession of narcotics.1
We find no reason to dismiss Count I, for it was not duplicitous. The essential element of a conspiracy is an agreement, and it may embrace the commission of several substantive offenses. The reference to different conspiracy statutes does not necessarily charge more than one agreement, but it causes confusion by authorizing inconsistent penalties. See United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 8 Moore, Federal Practice P 8.03. It is clear that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy under § 371 to violate the Travel Act, and it may well be, as the government suggests, that the evidence was sufficient to convict for a conspiracy to violate the Drug Act. But the court refused the defendants' motion to require the government to elect which statute it was relying on, and the jury was instructed that it could find guilt under Count I if it believed the defendants conspired to violate the Travel Act with intention of facilitating a business involving narcotics. Indeed, the court's charge may have led the jury to believe this was the gravamen of Count I. In any event, in the absence of a special verdict, it is not possible to ascertain whether the jury intended to find the defendants guilty of conspiracy to violate the Travel Act or the Drug Act, or both Acts.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires us to disregard a variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused. The test of substantiality is found in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S. Ct. 629, 630, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935), which requires:
'It was a part of said conspiracy that the said defendants and co-conspirators would and did unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally distribute and possess with the intent to distribute . . . heroin . . . in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812 and 841(a) (1).
In view of our ruling, we need not decide Dumeur's protest that the government's failure to comply with 21 U.S.C. § 851 precluded sentencing him as a second offender under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A). See United States v. Noland, 495 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1974). If Dumeur's conviction for conspiring to violate the Travel Act is not disturbed and he is sentenced under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, he cannot be subjected to the enhanced penalty provided by 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1) (A) as a second offender. On the other hand, if the government elects to retry him for violating the narcotics conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, the information required by 21 U.S.C. § 851 has already been timely filed
Our holding in Davis has been frequently followed. United States v. Bates, 429 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831, 91 S. Ct. 61, 27 L. Ed. 2d 61, 400 U.S. 916, 91 S. Ct. 175, 27 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1970); Tanksley v. United States, 321 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Galgano, 281 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960, 81 S. Ct. 916, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1253 (1961)