Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/321/158
Timestamp: 2016-10-21 13:26:09
Document Index: 474251475

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 79', '§ 80', '§ 69', '§ 69', '§ 81', '§ 69']

Prince v. Massachusetts | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews Prince v. Massachusetts
Argued: December 14, 1943
Decided: January 31, 1944
Separate, Jackson
Held -- as applied [p159]
The case brings for review another episode in the conflict between Jehovah's Witnesses and state authority. This time Sarah Prince appeals from convictions for violating Massachusetts' child labor laws, by acts said to be a rightful exercise of her religious convictions. When the offenses were committed, she was the aunt and custodian of Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age. Originally, there were three separate complaints. They [p160]
were, shortly, for (1) refusal to disclose Betty's identity and age to a public officer whose duty was to enforce the statutes; (2) furnishing her with magazines, knowing she was to sell them unlawfully, that is, on the street, and (3) as Betty's custodian, permitting her to work contrary to law. The complaints were made, respectively, pursuant to §§ 79, 80 and 81 of Chapter 149, Gen.Laws of Mass. (Ter. Ed.). The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction under the first complaint on state grounds, [n1]
but sustained the judgments founded on the other two. [n2]
313 Mass. 223, 46 N.E.2d 755. They present the only questions for our decision. These are whether §§ 80 and 81, as applied, contravene the Fourteenth Amendment by denying or abridging appellant's freedom of religion and by denying to her the equal protection of the laws.
Sections 80 and 81 form parts of Massachusetts' comprehensive child labor law. [n3]
They provide methods for enforcing the prohibitions of § 69, which is as follows: No boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall sell, expose or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise of any [p161]
The story told by the evidence has become familiar. It hardly needs repeating, except to give setting to the variations introduced through the part played by a child of tender years. Mrs. Prince, living in Brockton, is the mother of two young sons. She also has legal custody of Betty Simmons, who lives with them. The children, too, are Jehovah's Witnesses, and both Mrs. Prince and Betty testified they were ordained ministers. The former was accustomed to go each week on the streets of Brockton to distribute "Watchtower" and "Consolation," according to the usual plan. [n4]
She had permitted the children to [p162]
However, Mrs. Prince and Betty departed. She remarked as she went, "I'm not going through this any more. We've been through it time and time again. I'm going home and put the little girl to bed." It may be added that testimony, by Betty, her aunt, and others was offered at the trials, and was excluded, [p163]
As the case reaches us, the questions are no longer open whether what the child did was a "sale" or an "offer to sell" within § 69 [n5]
or was "work" within § 81. The state court's decision has foreclosed them adversely to appellant as a matter of state law. [n6]
The only question remaining therefore is whether, as constituted and applied, the statute is valid. Upon this, the court said:
We think that freedom of the press and of religion is subject to incidental regulation to the slight degree involved in the prohibition of the selling of religious literature in streets and public places by boys under twelve and girls under eighteen, and in the further statutory provisions herein considered, which have been adopted as means of enforcing [p164]
Appellant does not stand on freedom of the press. Regarding it as secular, she concedes it may be restricted as Massachusetts has done. [n7]
Hence, she rests squarely on freedom of religion under the First Amendment, applied by the Fourteenth to the states. She buttresses this foundation, however, with a claim of parental right as secured by the due process clause of the latter Amendment. [n8]
Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390. These guaranties, she thinks, guard alike herself and the child in what they have done. Thus, two claimed liberties are at stake. One is the parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go, which, for appellant, means to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith. The other freedom is the child's, to observe these, and among them is "to preach the gospel . . . by public distribution" of "Watchtower" and "Consolation," in conformity with the scripture: "A little child shall lead them."
If, by this position, appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147"] 308 U.S. 147; 308 U.S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296. All are interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime place because they have unity in their human sources and [p165]
The rights of children to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition here, most recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624"]319 U.S. [p166]
624. Previously, in 319 U.S. [p166]
624. Previously, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510"] 268 U.S. 510, this Court had sustained the parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the state's requirement of attendance at public schools. And in 268 U.S. 510, this Court had sustained the parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the state's requirement of attendance at public schools. And in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, children's rights to receive teaching in languages other than the nation's common tongue were guarded against the state's encroachment. It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333. And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's wellbeing, the state, as parens patriae, may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, [n9]
regulating or prohibiting the child's labor [n10]
and in many other ways. [n11]
Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. [n12]
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child [p167]
to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243. [n13]
The catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare, and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.
Concededly a statute or ordinance identical in terms with § 69, except that it is applicable to adults or all persons generally, would be invalid. Young v. California, 308 U.S. 147"] 308 U.S. 147; 308 U.S. 147; Nichols v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 147"] 308 U.S. 147; 308 U.S. 147; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413"] 318 U.S. 413; 318 U.S. 413; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105"] 319 U.S. 105; 319 U.S. 105; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141. [n14]
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of employment. A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, [n15]
more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the street. [n16]
It is too late now to doubt [p169]
Street preaching, whether oral or by handing out literature, is not the primary use of the highway, even for adults. While for them it cannot be wholly prohibited, it can be regulated within reasonable limits in accommodation to the primary and other incidental uses. [n17]
But, for obvious reasons, notwithstanding appellant's contrary view, [n18]
the validity of such a prohibition applied to children not accompanied by an older person hardly would seem on to question. The case reduces itself therefore to the question whether the presence of the child's guardian puts a limit to the state's power. That fact may lessen the likelihood that some evils the legislation seeks to avert will occur. But it cannot forestall all of them. The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in propagandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other matters, may, and at times does, create situations [p170]
In so ruling, we dispose also of appellant's argument founded upon denial of equal protection. It falls with that based on denial of religious freedom, since, in this instance, the one is but another phrasing of the other. Shortly, the contention is that the street, for Jehovah's Witnesses and their children, is their church, since their conviction makes it so, and to deny them access to it for religious purposes, as was done here, has the same effect as excluding altar boys, youthful choristers, and other children from the edifices in which they practice their religious beliefs and worship. The argument hardly needs more than statement, after what has been said, to refute it. However Jehovah's Witnesses may conceive them, the public highways have not become their religious property [p171]
Cf. the facts as set forth in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413"] 318 U.S. 413; 318 U.S. 413; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418"] 318 U.S. 418; 318 U.S. 418; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105; Busey v. District of Columbia, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 129 F.2d 24. A common feature is that specified small sums are generally asked and received, but the publications may be had without the payment if so desired.
State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730; compare Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390"] 262 U.S. 390; 262 U.S. 390; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510"] 268 U.S. 510; 268 U.S. 510; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320; compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11.
14. Pertinent also are the decisions involving license features: Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444"] 303 U.S. 444; 303 U.S. 444; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147"] 308 U.S. 147; 308 U.S. 147; Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569"] 312 U.S. 569; 312 U.S. 569; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568.
The record makes clear the basic fact that Betty Simmons, the nine-year old child in question, was engaged in a genuine religious, rather than commercial, activity. She was a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, and had been taught the tenets of that sect by her guardian, the appellant. Such tenets included the duty of publicly distributing religious tracts on the street and from door to door. Pursuant to this religious duty and in the company of the appellant, Betty Simmons on the night of December 18, 1941, was standing on a public street corner and offering to distribute Jehovah's Witness literature to passersby. There was no expectation of pecuniary profit to [p172]
herself or to appellant. It is undisputed, furthermore, that she did this of her own desire, and with appellant's consent. She testified that she was motivated by her love of the Lord, and that He commanded her to distribute this literature; this was, she declared, her way of worshipping God. She was occupied, in other words, in "an age-old form of missionary evangelism" with a purpose "as evangelical as the revival meeting." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108, 109.
Religious training and activity, whether performed by adult or child, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against interference by state action, except insofar as they violate reasonable regulations adopted for the protection of the public health, morals and welfare. Our problem here is whether a state, under the guise of enforcing its child labor laws, can lawfully prohibit girls under the age of eighteen and boys under the age of twelve from practicing their religious faith insofar as it involves the distribution or sale of religious tracts on the public streets. No question of freedom of speech or freedom of press is present, and we are not called upon to determine the permissible restraints on those rights. Nor are any truancy or curfew restrictions in issue. The statutes in question prohibit all children within the specified age limits from selling or offering to sell "any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise of any description . . . in any street or public place." Criminal sanctions are imposed on the parents and guardians who compel or permit minors in their control to engage in the prohibited transactions. The state court has construed these statutes to cover the activities here involved, cf. State v. Richardson, 92 N.H. 178, 27 A.2d 94, thereby imposing an indirect restraint through the parents and guardians on the free exercise by minors of their religious beliefs. This indirect restraint is no less effective than a direct one. A square conflict between the constitutional [p173]
The burden in this instance, however, is not met by vague references to the reasonableness underlying child labor legislation in general. The great interest of the state in shielding minors from the evil vicissitudes of early life does not warrant every limitation on their religious training and activities. The reasonableness that justifies the prohibition of the ordinary distribution of literature in the public streets by children is not necessarily the reasonableness [p174]
that justifies such a drastic restriction when the distribution is part of their religious faith. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra, 319 U.S. 111"]111. If the right of a child to practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means, there must be convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child. 111. If the right of a child to practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means, there must be convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624"] 319 U.S. 624, 639. The vital freedom of religion, which is "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," 319 U.S. 624, 639. The vital freedom of religion, which is "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, cannot be erased by slender references to the state's power to restrict the more secular activities of children.
It is claimed, however, that such activity was likely to affect adversely the health, morals and welfare of the child. Reference is made in the majority opinion to "the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public [p175]
places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the street." To the extent that they flow from participation in ordinary commercial activities, these harms are irrelevant to this case. And the bare possibility that such harms might emanate from distribution of religious literature is not, standing alone, sufficient justification for restricting freedom of conscience and religion. Nor can parents or guardians be subjected to criminal liability because of vague possibilities that their religious teachings might cause injury to the child. The evils must be grave, immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262. Yet there is not the slightest indication in this record, or in sources subject to judicial notice, that children engaged in distributing literature pursuant to their religious beliefs have been or are likely to be subject to any of the harmful "diverse influences of the street." Indeed, if probabilities are to be indulged in, the likelihood is that children engaged in serious religious endeavor are immune from such influences. Gambling, truancy, irregular eating and sleeping habits, and the more serious vices are not consistent with the high moral character ordinarily displayed by children fulfilling religious obligations. Moreover, Jehovah's Witness children invariably make their distributions in groups subject at all times to adult or parental control, as was done in this case. The dangers are thus exceedingly remote, to say the least. And the fact that the zealous exercise of the right to propagandize the community may result in violent or disorderly situations difficult for children to face is no excuse for prohibiting the exercise of that right.
No chapter in human history has been so largely written in terms of persecution and intolerance as the one dealing with religious freedom. From ancient times to the present day, the ingenuity of man has known no limits in its ability to forge weapons of oppression for use against [p176]
JACKSON, J., Separate Opinion
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The novel feature of this decision is this: the Court holds that a state may apply child labor laws to restrict or prohibit an activity of which, as recently as last term, it held:
This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion.
. . . the mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itinerant preachers, rather than "donated." does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the collection plate in church would make the church service a commercial project. The constitutional right of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken [p177]
and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109, 111.
This case brings to the surface the real basis of disagreement among members of this Court in previous Jehovah's Witness cases. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105"] 319 U.S. 105; 319 U.S. 105; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141"] 319 U.S. 141; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 319 U.S. 103; 319 U.S. 141; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 319 U.S. 103; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157. Our basic difference seems to be as to the method of establishing limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom.
My own view may be shortly put: I think the limits begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public. Religious activities which concern only members of the faith are and ought to be free -- as nearly absolutely free as anything can be. But beyond these, many religious denominations or sects engage in collateral and secular activities intended to obtain means from unbelievers to sustain the worshippers and their leaders. They raise money not merely by passing the plate to those who voluntarily attend services or by contributions by their own people, but by solicitations and drives addressed to the public by holding public dinners and entertainments, by various kinds [p178]