Source: http://www.parentadvocates.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=article&articleID=7447
Timestamp: 2018-07-22 14:22:46
Document Index: 202062047

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1982', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1977', '§1981', '§1982', '§1982', '§1982', '§1982', '§1982', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1982', '§1982', '§1981', '§1982', '§1981', '§1982', '§1981', '§1981', '§1981', '§1982', '§1', '§1981', '§1982', '§1981', '§1982', '§1981', '§1982', '§1981', '§1981', '§1982', '§101']

Hedrick Humphries, Claiming Protection Under Section 1981, Wins a Precedent-Setting US Supreme Court Case Decision Against Workplace Racial Discrimination and Retaliation
The question raised by Humphries was whether Section 1981 protects individuals who complain about race discrimination in contracting from retaliation by their employers. This question arises because Section 1981 – both in its original and revised form – does not expressly provide for protection against retaliation. The Court thus had to decide whether such a right was implicit in the statute or not. It ruled 7-2, in an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, that Section 1981 prohibits retaliation as well as direct discrimination. In another case, and in a 6-3 ruling, the court likewise held that the part of the major anti-age bias law covering federal employees also protects them from retaliation after complaining about discrimination.
(The Associated Press circulated the following on May 27.)
WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Supreme Court sided Tuesday with employees who faced retaliation after complaining about race and age discrimination in rulings that drew support from conservative and liberal justices.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court took the case and was confronted with the following question: Does Section 1981, a federal civil rights law that prohibits race discrimination in contracting, protect employees like Humphries against such retaliation? The Court ruled, in CBOCS WEST, Inc. v. Humphries, that it does. (see below)
Immediately following the Civil War and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a wide-ranging ban on race discrimination. Part of this Act, eventually codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) addressed the problem of race discrimination in contracting. It provides that “(a)ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . .”
No. 06-1431. Argued February 20, 2008--Decided May 27, 2008
Claiming that petitioner CBOCS West, Inc., dismissed him because he is black and because he complained to managers that a black co-employee was also dismissed for race-based reasons, respondent Humphries filed suit charging that CBOCS' actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U. S. C. §1981, the latter of which gives "(a)ll persons ... the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." The District Court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to timely pay filing fees and granted CBOCS summary judgment on the §1981 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the direct discrimination claim, but remanded for a trial on Humphries' §1981 retaliation claim, rejecting CBOCS' argument that §1981 did not encompass such a claim.
(a) Because this conclusion rests in significant part upon stare decisis principles, the Court examines the pertinent interpretive history. (1) In 1969, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237, as later interpreted and relied on by Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 176, recognized that retaliation actions are encompassed by 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that "(a)ll citizens ... shall have the same right, ... , as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." (2) This Court has long interpreted §§1981 and 1982 alike because they were enacted together, have common language, and serve the same purpose of providing black citizens the same legal rights as enjoyed by other citizens. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 183, 197, 190. (3) In 1989, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 177, without mention of retaliation, narrowed §1981 by excluding from its scope conduct occurring after formation of the employment contract, where retaliation would most likely be found. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was designed to supersede Patterson, see Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 383, by explicitly defining §1981's scope to include post-contract-formation conduct, §1981(b). (4) Since 1991, the Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted §1981 as encompassing retaliation actions. Sullivan, as interpreted by Jackson, as well as a long line of related cases where the Court construes §§1981 and 1982 similarly, lead to the conclusion that the view that §1981 encompasses retaliation claims is well embedded in the law. Stare decisis considerations strongly support the Court's adherence to that view. Such considerations impose a considerable burden on those who would seek a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. Pp. 2-8.
A longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after the Civil War, provides that "(a)ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." Rev. Stat. §1977, 42 U. S. C. §1981(a). The basic question before us is whether the provision encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another person's contract-related "right." We conclude that it does.
Sullivan sued Little Hunting Park, claiming that its actions violated §1982. The Court upheld Sullivan's claim. It found that the corporation's refusal "to approve the assignment of the membership share . . . was clearly an interference with Freeman's (the black lessee's) right to 'lease.' " 396 U. S., at 237. It added that Sullivan, the white lessor, "has standing to maintain this action," ibid., because, as the Court had previously said, "the white owner is at times 'the only effective adversary' of the unlawful restrictive covenant." Ibid. (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953)). The Court noted that to permit the corporation to punish Sullivan "for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by §1982" would give "impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property." 396 U. S., at 237. And this Court has made clear that Sullivan stands for the proposition that §1982 encompasses retaliation claims. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 176 (2005) ("(I)n Sullivan we interpreted a general prohibition on racial discrimination (in §1982) to cover retaliation against
those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition").
While the Sullivan decision interpreted §1982, our precedents have long construed §§1981 and 1982 similarly. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 173 (1976), the Court considered whether §1981 prohibits private acts of discrimination. Citing Sullivan, along with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968) and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U. S. 431 (1973), the Court reasoned that this case law "necessarily requires the conclusion that §1981, like §1982, reaches private conduct." 427 U. S., at 173. See also id., at 187 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Although [Sullivan and Jones] involved §1982, rather than §1981, I agree that their considered holdings with respect to the purpose and meaning of §1982 necessarily apply to both statutes in view of their common derivation"); id., at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[(I)t would be most incongruous to give those two sections [§§1981 and 1982] a fundamentally different construction"). See also Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U. S. 615, 617-618 (1987) (applying to §1982 the discussion and holding of Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U. S. 604, 609-613 (1987), a case interpreting §1981).
As indicated in Runyon, the Court has construed §§1981 and 1982 alike because it has recognized the sister statutes' common language, origin, and purposes. Like §1981, §1982 traces its origin to §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. See General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 383-384 (1982) (noting shared historical roots of the two provisions); Tillman, supra, at 439-440 (same). Like §1981, §1982 represents an immediately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy. See General Building Contractors Assn., supra, at 388 (noting strong purposive connection between the two provisions). Like §1981, §1982 uses broad language that says "(a)ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens ... ." Compare §1981's language set forth above, supra, at 1. See Jones, supra, at 441, n. 78 (noting the close parallel language of the two provisions). Indeed, §1982 differs from §1981 only in that it refers, not to the "right . . . to make and enforce contracts," 42 U. S. C. §1981(a), but to the "right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property," §1982.
In 1991, however, Congress weighed in on the matter. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, §101, 105 Stat. 1071, with the design to supersede Patterson. Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 383 (2004). Insofar as is relevant here, the