Source: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/brammertz-v-%e2%80%93-comments-and-contextualization-by-t_desco/
Timestamp: 2016-12-04 16:17:23
Document Index: 183317808

Matched Legal Cases: ['§19', '§24', '§25', '§26', '§31', '§34', '§39', '§41', '§43', '§44', '§45', '§45', '§46', '§47', '§48', '§50', '§51', '§53', '§54', '§62', '§63']

Syria Comment » Archives Brammertz V – Comments and Contextualization (by t_desco) - Syria Comment
19. … Preliminary technical findings indicate that this theory is unlikely." (Brammertz V, §19)
24. … The Commission can now also add that the man had significant exposure to lead pollution in an urban environment up to the age of about 12, and that such exposure was low during the last ten years of his life, … ." (Brammertz V, §24)
"25. In order to advance this line of inquiry, the Commission has collected a total of 112 samples from 28 locations in Syria and Lebanon. Over the coming weeks, it will collect samples in three other countries in the region, and further countries are identified for another series of sampling missions." (Brammertz V, §25)
"26. As stated in the previous report, the Commission is mindful that results should be carefully interpreted and the limitations clearly understood. The Commission will treat future results as forensic information to be used primarily for lead purposes in the investigation." (Brammertz V, §26)
"31. Investigations are on-going into the acquisition and storage of the Mitsubishi van, and its preparation with explosives. The Commission has received a body of new information relating to this topic, and over 500 pages of data are being prioritized for translation and analysis. The Commission is developing recent leads concerning the van, investigating the history of the vehicle from the most recent time it was known to be in Lebanon, and working backwards in time from that point." (Brammertz V, §31)
34. The Commission’s analysis of communications traffic continues in order to support and validate different points arising from the investigations. Much work has been done to support the interviews conducted, in order that respective communications contact with other persons of interest to the case can be discussed with witnesses. Patterns of communications traffic, including frequencies and timings of calls, and linkages and clear associations to others, are all developed and elicit investigation leads." (Brammertz V, §34)
"39. One working hypothesis is that the bomb team had to ensure that Hariri was indeed dead after the explosion in order for the video claim of responsibility to be delivered and to have resonance with its intended audience. It is possible that the team, and those commissioning the crime, could not afford to deliver a claim of responsibility to the global media if Hariri had survived the attack." (Brammertz V, §39)
42. The Commission is aware that Ahmad Abu Adass was acquainted with individuals associated with extremist groups, at least because they attended the same place of worship which he frequented regularly, and where he occasionally conducted prayers. The Commission has also conducted extensive analysis of communications traffic records associated with Ahmad Abu Adass, including analysis of the telephone communication at his home and place of work and on lines belonging to his alleged associates." (Brammertz V, §41-42)
"43. A working hypothesis is that Ahmad Abu Adass was either coerced or duped into making the video-taped claim of responsibility. The claim he read out on tape was made on behalf of a group, and Ahmad Abu Adass himself did not state he would be the one who would carry out the attack. In relation to the tape’s production, it is of note that relatives and persons who knew him before his disappearance have stated that his appearance on the video tape was physically different from that before 16 January 2005. To some, he appeared even thinner than previously; his beard had markedly grown, indicating that he may have made the tape towards the end of the approximately four week period between his disappearance and 14 February 2005. His clothing was also different from his usual style in that he had headwear and clothing that his close friends and family had not seen him wearing before." (Brammertz V, §43)
"44. It is of interest to the investigation that a note was included with the video on 14 February 2005 which stated that the bomber was indeed Ahmad Abu Adass. From its forensic findings, the Commission believes this to be highly unlikely. One working hypothesis is that the video and the accompanying note could have been designed to deceive. Another working hypothesis is that while an extremist group may have been involved in part in committing the crime as outlined in the tape and note, this group was actually manipulated by others for another objective not related to its own organizational aspirations." (Brammertz V, §44)
As you can see from the following quote by then Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh, the concept of DNA analysis was not unknown to the Lebanese authorities: "Franjieh, however, said he could not confirm the homicide attack theory and was awaiting DNA results from those killed."
FoxNews, February 15, 2005 Also interesting is the question why the suicide bomber did not take the place of Adass in the "martyrdom video" (the question is valid both for the case of a fake and a real extremist group):
"45. Thus, the Commission continues to investigate the various possibilities concerning the group that executed the crime. The Commission has received information in relation to individuals who operated in Lebanon and beyond who may have been involved in the production of the Ahmad Abu Adass tape, and also may have participated in the attack on Rafik Hariri in more than one context. In connection with this information, the Commission has undertaken a number of missions outside Lebanon, conducted 23 interviews to date, researched over two hundred gigabytes of data from numerous computers, USB devices, CD-ROMs, mobile telephones and SIM cards, and has analyzed large volumes of communications traffic." (Brammertz V, §45)
51. In support of this work, the Commission has researched over 200 gigabytes of electronic data, … . 53. … To add to the complexity of this painstaking analytical work, some of the electronic data received by the Commission is written in code, some is encrypted and some had already been deleted.” (Brammertz IV, §45-53)
"46. A working hypothesis is that a small number of individuals belonging to a larger group may have come together to undertake the filming of the claim of responsibility, acquire the Mitsubishi van and have it prepared with explosives. They may also have participated in the acquisition of an individual who was to detonate the bomb, and may also have assisted in delivering him and the bomb to the scene of the crime." (Brammertz V, §46)
"47. The Commission has a number of investigative leads to follow up, further interviews to conduct, and further communications traffic analysis and forensic collection missions to perform. It also awaits the final forensic analysis of various artifacts that are possibly associated with this working hypothesis, including video cameras and related equipment, cassette tapes, computer hardware and other items. …" (Brammertz V, §47)
49. The Commission is developing a hypothesis whereby the final phase of the operation to assassinate Hariri took shape by early February 2005, at which point all necessary components for the operation were assembled. These include the van, acquired and prepared with explosives and ready for use; the bomber, prepared, briefed and ready to be deployed; the minimum necessary information acquired, and surveillance and reconnaissance conducted, to be able to undertake the operation; the bomb team undiscovered and able to execute the operation; the video-taped message of Ahmad Abu Adass completed and ready to be delivered upon the success of the operation; and most importantly, the intent still present in the minds of those who ordered the crime to go ahead with the operation." (Brammertz V, §48-49)
"50. A working hypothesis is that the bomb team was working within a “window” of opportunity to deliver the attack on Hariri rather than one specific day, given the significance of the target and the time which would have been spent in overall preparation of the attack. That preparation time was most likely measured in weeks rather than days." (Brammertz V, §50)
"51. The activities of some potentially relevant individuals were noticeably altered during this period, as the bombing team began what became the final activities prior to the attack. The Commission is investigating such issues, and is finding that attitudes, behavioral patterns and comments made by certain persons in the period before the killing could have relevance." (Brammertz V, §51)
"3. Motive to assassinate Hariri …
53. The following issues shaped Hariri’s environment in this period: the inception of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) and the political implications of its implementation; the extension of the term of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud; the personal and political dynamics which existed between Hariri and other political parties and leaders in Lebanon, Syria and other countries; preparation and maneuvering ahead of the parliamentary elections due to be held in May 2005, as well as other business matters in which he was involved. All of these factors came together and were handled by Hariri, sometimes proactively, and sometimes in reaction to events around him. The Commission believes it is likely that a combination of these factors may have created the environment in which the motive and intent to kill him arose." (Brammertz V, §53)
59. It is of some note that Hariri was killed on the day that Parliament was scheduled to debate the electoral law to be applied in the forthcoming elections. Another working hypothesis for the Commission is that those who decided upon the assassination saw it as beneficial to kill him before he formally began his election campaign, especially given the perception in the media at the time that he was likely to win." (Brammertz V, §54, 57, 59)
"62. The Commission is developing a working hypothesis that in the period immediately prior to his death, Hariri and others in the national and international political arena were taking steps to defuse the tensions that had arisen between him and others on the political stage. These initiatives apparently included the development of diplomatic and political dialogue between Syrian and Lebanese individuals and Hariri. This dialogue had previously been managed through other Syrian and Lebanese channels, which had apparently fuelled misperceptions and aggravated the already tense political environment." (Brammertz V, §62)
"63. A working hypothesis is that the initial decision to kill Hariri was taken before the later attempts at rapprochement got underway and most likely before early January 2005. This leads to a possible situation in the last weeks before his murder in which two tracks, not necessarily linked, were running in parallel. On one track, Hariri was engaged in rapprochement initiatives and on the other, preparations for his assassination were underway." (Brammertz V, §63) As As'ad AbuKhalil noted, this paragraph "all but names the Syrian regime as the party that killed Hariri", but one should stress that less harsh readings are equally possible (I also disagree with his remarks regarding Brammertz' professionalism; so far it is beyond reproach. He should take into account that Brammertz is coming from an institution, the International Criminal Court, that is, by its own logic, engaged in widening the relative autonomy of the juridical field (in Bourdieu's terminology)).
However, there are some problems with this interpretation implicating "the Syrian regime" in the crime. If the Syrian regime planned the attack, could it not have stopped it at a moment's notice? Moallem would certainly not have hesitated to inform his president of the rapprochement efforts by Hariri. As I had argued earlier, (and also in this thread) it seems highly unlikely that Bashar al-Asad was involved in the plot or that he had any clue that an attempt was underway to kill Hariri.
1. Gibran said: So we can conclude from this:
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 5:21 pm 2. Alex said: This explains why Dr. Imad Moustapha attacked president Bush in his article last week… the Syrians concluded that there is simply no hope to have any progress with this administration.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 5:28 pm 3. Ford Prefect said: So what do you call a “democracy lovers” when he/she pronounces a “guilty” verdict based on their own biases while simultaneously calling out for an independent investigation? Inept hypocrite. t-desco, brilliant analysis and thanks for the insights. I have some answers to your questions later on today.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 5:38 pm 4. Gibran said: O’ sorry, I forgot we have a PERFECT proud carrier of an ACLU card around here. Should we call Bashar’s behaviour, then, with none other than S. Hersch moments before the assassination an innocent coincidence? Yes of course. Sorry, once again what is it? O’yes PREfect. And who said foolishhness doesn’t come with different spellings?
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 6:44 pm 5. Innocent_Criminal said: t_desco,
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 7:12 pm 6. ugarit said: Sadly I’m becoming more convinced that many Lebanese are not fit to run their own country.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 7:15 pm 7. 3antar said: t_desco does syria comment for a living it appears. 7atet dabo u dab el forum.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 7:17 pm 8. 3antar said: Ugarit,
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 7:19 pm 9. ugarit said: Syria should tightly seal the border with Lebanon and throw away the keys.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 7:36 pm 10. ausamaa said: I think Bashar Al Assad made that statement before our hopefull brothers come down hard at the summit asking Syria for concessions to the Bush Administration as usual on the premise that the US Administration is “trying” to promot a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 8:27 pm 11. Alex said: IC, T-DESCO is German, not Mediterranean like us.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 8:40 pm 12. EHSANI2 said: t-desco,
Do you think that the timing of this interview is enough to exclude a person’s involvement? Do you think that one can still entertain scenarios where the “political” decision to eliminate the man had already been taken and that the group in charge of the “practical” aspects of the operation can execute the order after the go ahead has already been communicated. The first Mehlis report had talked about both Maher and Asef. Is it conceivable that the President can still meet with Hirsh while the people in charge of the operation are entrusted with choosing the best time and place?
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 8:43 pm 13. Alex said: La France a-t-elle voulu qu’Israël attaque la Syrie ?
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 8:47 pm 14. ausamaa said: Alex,
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 8:49 pm 15. Alex said: : )
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 9:05 pm 16. ausamaa said: “….but,…You have asked for it”
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 9:56 pm 17. Ford Prefect said: t_desco,
• Regarding Nick Blandoford’s reference to the three initiatives of rapprochement that were underway, you are correct: the first one was via Nassrallah (when he met nightly with the late Hariri and had meetings of the minds); the second was through Walid Muallem. Blandford indicated that the Muallem move was considered by many observers as a “conciliatory gesture that would lead to a Syrian troop withdrawal to the Bekaa”. The third one that you did not remember is the infamous 9 January luncheon meeting between Hariri and Rustom Ghazali in Koreitem. This meeting was also regarded by observers (according to Blandford) as a Syrian fence-mending exercise with Hariri. The account of that meeting and what resulted afterward are very int3eresting artifacts. But that is beyond the scope of this topic.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 10:09 pm 18. Ford Prefect said: 3antar and Ausamaa, you guys rock!
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 10:17 pm 19. Alex said: Late King Hussein eventually apologized to Hafez as he admitted that he tried to get him assassinated throught he Ikhwan attempt in 1980.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 10:22 pm 20. majedkhaldoun said: T Desco said
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 11:01 pm 21. Fares said: Josh, my favorite American Baath Agent, why don’t you write about the demolishing of old Damascus and the uprising of the people there.
0 0	March 19th, 2007, 11:30 pm 22. EHSANI2 said: (From THE WALL STREET JOURNAL)
the University of Otago, New Zealand.) Almost unnoticed by the global media, a crucial turning point has arrived in
0 0	March 20th, 2007, 1:38 am 23. norman said: Published: 20/03/2007 12:00 AM (UAE)
Seventy-one years ago the words “they are half-men” echoed throughout the Syrian parliament. At the time, opposition leader Jamil Mardam Bey was trying to pass a treaty in parliament which he had just signed with the French government of prime minister Leon Blum. His opponents staged a massive demonstration at the gates of parliament, demanding that the chamber not ratify the proposed Franco-Syrian Treaty. Veiled, wailing women whose shrieks ripped through the walls of parliament filled the streets as Mardam Bey was delivering his address. The deputies – emotionally-charged by this demonstration – voted against him. He angrily shouted, “You are half-men!” They roared in objection. They fired back at him. They tried to ostracise him. But Mardam Bey survived, got his way, passed the treaty and became prime minister of Syria. Many years later, President Bashar Al Assad was similarly angered by Arab voices speaking out against Hezbollah’s performance in the summer war of 2006. As far as Bashar was concerned, this was Syria’s war. At his wits’ end, he also described his opponents as “half-men”. They too roared in objection. They fired back at him. They tried to isolate him politically. But Bashar, like Mardam Bey, got his way – and survived. The Saudis took it personally. However, the Syrians said what they wanted to say – and got away with it. German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who had cancelled a trip to Damascus minutes after Bashar’s speech, now showered Syria with praise, saying that its cooperation was necessary to resolve the numerous problems of the Middle East. Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi also telephoned Bashar last week, similarly underlining the centrality of Syria’s role in the region. The Saudis have invited Bashar to attend the upcoming Arab summit in Riyadh scheduled for March 28. The Syrians have accepted. The Americans – finally acknowledging that no solution to Iraq can be achieved without the help of Syria – met with the Syrians for the first time since 2005 at the March 10 conference held in Baghdad. Finally, the Brammertz report came out last week praising Syria’s cooperation with the UN commission in the murder of Lebanon’s former prime minister Rafik Al Hariri.
These are good days for Syria. The storm has by no means passed, yet it is quickly receding from the Damascus political skyline. One of the latest tangible outcomes of Syria’s restored standing in the international community is the visit of EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana to Damascus, ironically on March 14 – the very date that the Lebanese opposition staged demonstrations demanding Syria’s exodus from Lebanon in 2005. French President Jacques Chirac attending the European summit showed no objection to Solana’s visit to Syria. Solana came to re-engage the Syrians, offering in return economic and political incentives from the EU, the most notable being the revival and possible signing of the long-frozen partnership agreement with Syria. His visit came just four days after the Baghdad Conference – clearly after the US decided to talk to Syria. Europe did not want to be left out of the solutions to the Middle East. It was because of the US, among other things, that it severed its ties with Damascus. And today, precisely because of the US – that it decided to talk to Syria. The reasons for each engagement are different. The US wants the Syrians for Iraq. The Europeans want them for Lebanon. All of this happened without the Syrians having to fundamentally change their positions. Syria is still committed to supporting Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria is still opposed to the Fouad Siniora cabinet in Beirut, the Americans in Iraq, and are still – clearly – very close to the Iranians. Syria does not veto the tribunal, but objects to it being politicised by the international community – particularly the Beirut government (and its US and EU backers), to incriminate Syria. It continues to uphold its position on this issue. What can be deduced from all of the above?
Sami Moubayed is the managing editor of Forward Magazine in Damascus. Email this
0 0	March 20th, 2007, 2:23 am 24. norman said: There is no need for an apology , They are half men at the most.
0 0	March 20th, 2007, 2:34 am 25. 3antar said: was forwarded this today.
0 0	March 20th, 2007, 11:32 am 26. Ford Prefect said: 3Antar,
0 0	March 20th, 2007, 12:19 pm 27. 3antar said: cheers FP
0 0	March 20th, 2007, 12:37 pm 28. t_desco said: Thanks for all the comments and the kind words!
For example, many countries have phased out leaded gasoline (e.g. Saudi Arabia), probably the main source of lead pollution a decade ago (unless the person grew up in the vicinity of a battery recycling plant or a similar industrial facility). BTW, this interesting map shows the concentration of lead in gasoline in 1995, more or less the time when the exposure to lead pollution diminished significantly.
0 0	March 20th, 2007, 10:37 pm 29. Ford Prefect said: t_desco,
0 0	March 20th, 2007, 11:08 pm 30. Levant Watch - BULLETIN No. 181 at World Council For The Cedars Revolution said: […] AL Hayat Syria’s Declining Role Hassan Haydar Khalilzad: Syria Invites More Talks SyriaCommment Kurds Commemorate the “Intifadah” of 12 March 2004 Column One: As Syria prepares for war Eldar The Syrian secret Sharon did not reveal to Olmert Al Awsat Syria’s Critical Timing Bar’el The Syrian-Arab rift Bashar Assad is trying to mend fences with the rest of the Arab League, but as long as Syria remains linked to Iran and the Lebanese opposition, he will only have limited success Al Hayat Syrian Panic over Resolving the Shebaa Issue and the Progress in Brammertz’s Investigation Syria “More Accomodating” to Terrorists State Dept Adviser: 90% of Suicide Bombers Cross Syrian Border Syria Comment “Farid Ghadry, Syria’s Chalabi: From Washington to Damascus,” by Salim Abraham Presidential Hopeful Slams Bush for Stance on Syria Al Hayat The Iranian Advice and The Syrian Request in Lebanon Walid Choucair – Will any escalation further complicate the Lebanese crisis and lead to more external rows over Lebanon? Perhaps more international decisions will be taken in this regard, added to the existing list of decisions that would force Syria to take additional steps in its relations with the international community? Report: Syria rejected Israeli offers for secret talks Syria’s ‘engagers’ can’t ignore Brammertz By Michael Young Assad Says ‘No Cloud’ Over Syria, Saudi Ties Brammertz V – Comments and Contextualization (by t_desco) Report: Assad sees no progress in peace process in next 2 years In interview with Saudi newspaper, Syrian President calls U.S. main obstacle to Middle East peace Sharon’s Syrian secret Farkash, the former head of MI, says Sharon knew about Syrian-Israeli contacts. […]
0 0	March 29th, 2007, 12:30 pm Post a comment