Source: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/07/10/2012-16411/procedures-for-the-handling-of-retaliation-complaints-under-section-219-of-the-consumer-product
Timestamp: 2018-12-12 01:13:30
Document Index: 109973745

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A Rule by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration on 07/10/2012
40494-40509 (16 pages)
Section 1983.106 Objections to the Findings and the Preliminary Order and Requests for a Hearing
Section 1983.110 Decision and Orders of the Administrative Review Board
Section 1983.111 Withdrawal of Complaints, Findings, Objections, and Petitions for Review; Settlement
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2012-16411 https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2012-16411
CPSIA's whistleblower provisions include procedures that allow a covered employee to file, within 180 days of the alleged retaliation, a complaint with the Secretary of Labor (Secretary).[1] Upon receipt of the complaint, the Secretary must provide written notice to the person or persons named in the complaint alleged to have violated the Act (respondent) of the filing of the complaint, the allegations contained in the complaint, the substance of the evidence supporting the complaint, and the rights afforded the respondent throughout the investigation. The Secretary must then, within 60 days of receipt of the complaint, afford the complainant and respondent an opportunity to submit a response and meet with the investigator to present statements from witnesses, and conduct an investigation.
This section includes general definitions from CPSA, which are applicable to the whistleblower provisions of CPSIA, including a definition of the term “consumer product.” See 15 U.S.C. 2052(a)(5). The CPSA defines “distributor” as “a person to whom a consumer product is delivered or sold for purposes of distribution in commerce, except that such term does not include a manufacturer or retailer of such product.” 15 U.S.C. 2052(a)(8). The CPSA defines “manufactured” as “to manufacture, produce, or assemble,” and defines “manufacturer” as “any person who manufactures or imports a consumer product.” 15 U.S.C. 2052(a)(10) and (11), respectively. “Private labeler” is defined by the CPSA as “an owner of a brand or trademark on the label of a consumer product which bears a private label.” 15 U.S.C. 2052(a)(12)(A). Section 2052(a)(12)(B) further provides that a “consumer product bears a private label if (i) The product (or its container) is labeled with the brand or trademark of a person other than a manufacturer of the product, (ii) the person with whose brand or trademark the product (or container) is labeled has authorized or caused the product to be so labeled, and (iii) the brand or trademark of a manufacturer of such product does not appear on such label.” 15 U.S.C. 2052(a)(12)(B). The CPSA defines “retailer” as “a person to whom a consumer product is delivered or sold for purposes of sale or distribution by such person to a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. 2052(a)(13). No comments were received on this section and no substantive changes were made to the definitions section.
In order to have a “reasonable belief” under CPSIA, a complainant must have both a subjective, good faith belief and an objectively reasonable belief that the complained-of conduct violates one of the listed categories of law. See Sylvester v. Parexel Int'l LLC, ARB No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2165854, at *11-12 (ARB May 25, 2011) (discussing the reasonable belief standard under analogous language in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) whistleblower provision, 18 U.S.C. 1514A). The requirement that the complainant have a subjective, good faith belief is satisfied so long as the complainant actually believed that the conduct complained of violated the relevant law. See id. The “reasonableness” of a complainant's belief is typically determined “based on the knowledge available to a reasonable person in the same factual circumstances with the same training and experience as the aggrieved employee.” Id. at *12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the complainant need not show that the conduct complained of constituted an actual violation of law. Pursuant to this standard, an employee's whistleblower activity is protected where it is based on a reasonable, but mistaken, belief that a violation of the relevant law has occurred. Id. at *13.
Assuming that an investigation proceeds beyond the gatekeeping phase, the statutory burdens of proof require an employee to prove that the alleged protected activity was a “contributing factor” in the alleged adverse action. If the employee proves that the alleged protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action, the employer, to escape liability, must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity. A contributing factor is “any factor which, alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.” Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks, emphasis and citation omitted) (discussing the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221(e)(1)). In proving that protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action, “'a complainant need not necessarily prove that the respondent's articulated reason was a pretext in order to prevail,'” because a complainant alternatively can prevail by showing that the respondent's “'reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct,'” and that another reason was the complainant's protected activity. See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149, 2006 WL 3246904, at *13 (ARB May 31, 2006) (quoting Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004)) (discussing contributing factor test under the SOX whistleblower provision), aff'd sub nom. Klopfenstein v. Admin. Review Bd., U.S. Dep't of Labor, 402 F. App'x 936, 2010 WL 4746668 (5th Cir. 2010).
CPSIA's burdens of proof do not address the evidentiary standard that applies to a complainant's proof that protected activity was a contributing factor in an adverse action. CPSIA simply provides that the Secretary may find a violation only “if the complainant demonstrates” that protected activity was a contributing factor in the alleged adverse action. See 15 U.S.C. 2087(b)(2)(B)(iii). It is the Secretary's position that the complainant must prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that his or her protected activity contributed to the adverse action; otherwise the burden never shifts to the employer to establish its defense by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 475 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The term `demonstrates' [under identical language in another whistleblower provision] means to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Once the complainant establishes that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action, the employer can escape liability only by proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the prohibited rationale. The “clear and convincing evidence” standard is a higher burden of proof than a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
GAP commented that while it was pleased with the provisions in § 1983.104 providing copies of respondent's submissions to complainants and protecting witness confidentiality, it was concerned that the procedures under § 1983.104(f) “disenfranchise[d] the victim, giving only one side of the dispute the chance to participate in the most significant step of the process” and that “[a]t a minimum, this procedural favoritism means there will not be an even playing field in the administrative hearing.” GAP advocated removing § 1983.104(f).
With regard to GAP's comment that § 1983.104(f) should be removed, OSHA notes that the purpose of § 1983.104(f) is to ensure compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Brock v. Roadway Express, 481 U.S. 252, 264 (1987). In that decision, the Court upheld the facial constitutionality of the analogous provisions providing for preliminary reinstatement under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. 31105, and the procedures adopted by OSHA to protect the respondent's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but ruled that the record failed to show that OSHA investigators had informed the respondent of the substance of the evidence to support reinstatement of the discharged employee. In so finding, the Court noted that, although a formal hearing was not required before OSHA ordered preliminary reinstatement, “minimum due process for the employer in this context requires notice of the employee's allegations, notice of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence, an opportunity to submit a written response, and an opportunity to meet with the investigator and present statements from rebuttal witnesses.” Roadway Express, 481 U.S. at 264; see Bechtel v. Competitive Techs, Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 480-81 (Leval, J. concurring in the judgment) (finding OSHA's preliminary reinstatement order under SOX unenforceable because the information provided to the respondent did not meet the requirements of Roadway Express). Thus, OSHA declines to remove the language providing the respondent notice and opportunity to respond under § 1983.104(f).
Nonetheless, while recognizing that the purpose of § 1983.104(f) is to ensure that the respondent's Due Process rights have been met prior to OSHA ordering preliminary reinstatement, OSHA appreciates that complainants wish to stay informed regarding their case and may continue to have valuable input, even at this late stage in the investigation. Thus, under these rules, OSHA will provide complainants with a copy of the materials sent to the respondent under § 1983.104(f).
Finally, this section has been revised to add paragraph (d), which specifies that the formal rules of evidence will not apply to proceedings before an ALJ under § 1983.107, but rules or principles designed to assure the production of the most probative evidence will be applied. The Department has taken the same approach under the other whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA. See, e.g., 29 CFR 1979.107 (AIR21); 29 CFR 1980.107 (SOX). This approach is also consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides: “Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence * * *” 5 U.S.C. 556(d); see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 805-06 (1948) (administrative agencies not restricted by rigid rules of evidence). The Department believes that it is inappropriate to apply the rules of evidence at 29 CFR part 18 subpart B because whistleblowers often appear pro se and may be disadvantaged by strict adherence to formal rules of evidence. Furthermore, hearsay evidence is often appropriate in whistleblower cases, as there often are no relevant documents or witnesses other than hearsay to prove discriminatory intent. ALJs have the responsibility to determine the appropriate weight to be given such evidence. For these reasons, the interests of determining all of the relevant facts are best served by not requiring strict evidentiary rules. No comments were received on this section, but, as explained above, this section was revised to specify that the formal rules of evidence will not apply to proceedings before an ALJ under this section.
This section sets forth the requirements for the content of the decision and order of the ALJ, and includes the standard for finding a violation under CPSIA. The section further provides that the Assistant Secretary's determination to dismiss the complaint without an investigation or without a complete investigation pursuant to § 1983.104 is not subject to review. Thus, paragraph (c) of § 1983.109 clarifies that the Assistant Secretary's determinations on whether to proceed with an investigation under CPSIA and whether to make particular investigative findings are discretionary decisions not subject to review by the ALJ. The ALJ hears cases de novo and, therefore, as a general matter, may not remand cases to the Assistant Secretary to conduct an investigation or make further factual findings. A full discussion of the burdens of proof used by the Department of Labor to resolve whistleblower cases under this part is described above in the discussion of § 1983.104. Paragraph (d) notes the remedies that the ALJ may order under CPSIA and, as discussed under § 1983.105 above, provides that interest on back pay will be calculated using the interest rate applicable to underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6621, and will be compounded daily. Paragraph (e) requires that the ALJ's decision be served on all parties to the proceeding, the Assistant Secretary, and the U.S. Department of Labor's Associate Solicitor for Fair Labor Standards. Paragraph (e) also provides that any ALJ decision requiring reinstatement or lifting an order of reinstatement by the Assistant Secretary will be effective immediately upon receipt of the decision by the respondent. All other portions of the ALJ's order will be effective 14 days after the date of the decision unless a timely petition for review has been filed with the ARB.
No comments were received on this section. However, minor modifications were made to the description of the remedies available under CPSIA in this paragraph to more closely match the language regarding remedies in the statute and the description of the remedies in § 1983.105(a)(1). The statement that the decision of the ALJ will become the final order of the Secretary unless a petition for review is timely filed with the ARB and the ARB accepts the petition for review was deleted from § 1983.110(a) and moved to paragraph (e) of this section. Additionally, OSHA has revised the period for filing a timely petition for review with the ARB to 14 days rather than 10 business days. With this change, the final rule expresses the time for a petition for review in a way that is consistent with the other deadlines for filings before the ALJs and the ARB in the rule, which are also expressed in days rather than business days. This change also makes the final rule congruent with the 2009 amendments to Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which govern computation of time before those tribunals and express filing deadlines as days rather than business days. Accordingly, the ALJ's order will become the final order of the Secretary 14 days after the date of the decision, rather than after 10 business days, unless a timely petition for review is filed. As a practical matter, this revision does not substantively alter the window of time for filing a petition for review before the ALJ's order becomes final.
NWC also suggested that the review period be extended from 10 business days to 30 days to make this section parallel to the provision in § 1983.105(c), which allows for 30 days within which to file an objection. OSHA declines to extend the review period to 30 days because the shorter review period is consistent with the practices and procedures followed in OSHA's other whistleblower programs. Furthermore, parties may file a motion for extension of time to appeal an ALJ's decision, and the ARB has discretion to grant such extensions. However, as explained above, OSHA has revised the period to petition for review of an ALJ decision to 14 days rather than 10 business days. As a practical matter, this revision does not substantively alter the window of time for filing a petition for review before the ALJ's order becomes final.
The final rule adopts a revision to § 1983.111(a) that permits complainants to withdraw their complaints orally. In such circumstances, OSHA will, in writing, confirm a complainant's desire to withdraw. This revision will reduce burdens on complainants who no longer want to pursue their claims. Other minor changes were made as needed to clarify the provision without changing its meaning.
Under CPSIA, a complainant may bring an original de novo action in district court alleging the same allegations contained in the complaint filed with OSHA, if there has been no final decision of the Secretary within 210 days of the filing of the complaint, or within 90 days after receiving a written determination. “Written determination” refers to the Assistant Secretary's written findings under § 1983.105(a). See 15 U.S.C. 2087(b)(4). The Secretary's final decision is generally the decision of the ARB issued under § 1983.110. In other words, a complainant may file an action for de novo review in the appropriate district court in either of the following two circumstances: (1) A complainant may file a de novo action in district court within 90 days of receiving the Assistant Secretary's written findings issued under § 1983.105(a), or (2) a complainant may file a de novo action in district court if more than 210 days have passed since the filing of the complaint and the Secretary has not issued a final decision. The plain language of 15 U.S.C. 2087(b)(4), by distinguishing between actions that can be brought if the Secretary has not issued a “final decision” within 210 days and actions that can be brought within 90 days after a “written determination,” supports allowing de novo actions in district court under either of the circumstances described above.
This change responds to NWC's comment that the 15-day advance notice requirement for filing in suit in district court should be eliminated because it inhibits complainants' access to federal courts. OSHA believes that a provision for notifying the agency of the district court complaint is necessary to avoid unnecessary expenditure of agency resources once a complainant has decided to remove the complaint to federal district court. OSHA believes that the revised provision adequately balances the complainant's interest in ready access to federal court and the agency's interest in receiving prompt notice that the complainant no longer wishes to continue with the administrative proceeding.
This rule contains a reporting provision (filing a retaliation complaint, § 1983.103) which was previously reviewed and approved for use by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995). The assigned OMB control number is 1218-0236.
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 2087; Secretary's Order 1-2012 (Jan. 18, 2012), 77 FR 3912 (Jan. 25, 2012); Secretary's Order 1-2010 (Jan. 15, 2010), 75 FR 3924 (Jan. 25, 2010).
(a) Upon receipt of a complaint in the investigating office, the Assistant Secretary will notify the respondent of the filing of the complaint, of the allegations contained in the complaint, and of the substance of the evidence supporting the complaint. Such materials will be redacted, if necessary, in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable confidentiality laws. The Assistant Secretary will also notify the respondent of its rights under paragraphs (b) and (f) of this section and § 1983.110(e). The Assistant Secretary will provide an unredacted copy of these same materials to the complainant (or the complainant's legal counsel if complainant is represented by counsel), and to the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
(f) Prior to the issuance of findings and a preliminary order as provided for in § 1983.105, if the Assistant Secretary has reasonable cause, on the basis of information gathered under the procedures of this part, to believe that the respondent has violated CPSIA and that preliminary reinstatement is warranted, the Assistant Secretary will again contact the respondent (or the respondent's legal counsel if respondent is represented by counsel) to give notice of the substance of the relevant evidence supporting the complainant's allegations as developed during the course of the investigation. This evidence includes any witness statements, which will be redacted to protect the identity of confidential informants where statements were given in confidence; if the statements cannot be redacted without revealing the identity of confidential informants, summaries of their contents will be provided. The complainant will also receive a copy of the materials that must be provided to the respondent under this paragraph. Before providing such materials to the complainant, the agency will redact them, if necessary, in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable confidentiality laws. The respondent will be given the opportunity to submit a written response, to meet with the investigators, to present statements from witnesses in support of its position, and to present legal and factual arguments. The respondent must present this evidence within 10 business days of the Assistant Secretary's notification pursuant to this paragraph, or as soon thereafter as the Assistant Secretary and the respondent can agree, if the interests of justice so require.
(c) The findings and any preliminary order will be effective 30 days after receipt by the respondent (or the respondent's legal counsel if the respondent is represented by counsel), or on the compliance date set forth in the preliminary order, whichever is later, unless an objection and/or a request for hearing has been timely filed as provided at § 1983.106. However, the portion of any preliminary order requiring reinstatement will be effective immediately upon the respondent's receipt of the findings and the preliminary order, regardless of any objections to the findings and/or the order.
(a) Any party who desires review, including judicial review, of the findings and/or preliminary order, or a respondent alleging that the complaint was frivolous or brought in bad faith who seeks an award of attorney's fees under CPSIA, must file any objections and/or a request for a hearing on the record within 30 days of receipt of the findings and preliminary order pursuant to § 1983.105. The objections, request for a hearing, and/or request for attorney's fees must be in writing and state whether the objections are to the findings, the preliminary order, and/or whether there should be an award of attorney's fees. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, or electronic communication transmittal is considered the date of filing; if the objection is filed in person, by hand-delivery or other means, the objection is filed upon receipt. Objections must be filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, and copies of the objections must be mailed at the same time to the other parties of record, the OSHA official who issued the findings and order, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor.
(b) The Assistant Secretary may withdraw the findings and/or preliminary order at any time before the expiration of the 30-day objection period described in § 1983.106, provided that no objection has been filed yet, and substitute new findings and/or a new preliminary order. The date of the receipt of the substituted findings or order will begin a new 30-day objection period.
(e) Any settlement approved by the Assistant Secretary, the ALJ, or the ARB will constitute the final order of the Secretary and may be enforced in United States district court pursuant to § 1983.113.
(1) Within 90 days after receiving a written determination under § 1983.105(a) provided that there has been no final decision of the Secretary; or