Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/718/654/417416/
Timestamp: 2019-10-14 14:10:07
Document Index: 9398049

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 2671', '§ 892', '§ 892', '§ 892', '§ 1346', 'art:\n28', '§ 2674', 'art:\n10', '§ 892']

Alice Price Harris, As Executrix of the Estate of Mark Pricefaulkenberry, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 718 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1983 › Alice Price Harris, As Executrix of the Estate of Mark Pricefaulkenberry, Appellant, v. United State...
Alice Price Harris, As Executrix of the Estate of Mark Pricefaulkenberry, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 718 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 718 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1983) Argued April 14, 1983. Decided Oct. 4, 1983
In an action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the executrix of the estate of Mark P. Faulkenberry appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant United States. We affirm.
The executrices of Faulkenberry's and Kirby's estates filed a wrongful death action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674.2 They claimed that the negligence3 of Norris was attributable to his employer, the United States, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which generally holds that a master is strictly liable for the negligent acts of a servant acting within the scope of his or her employment. Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec. 219(1) (1958). The government replied that Norris's negligence did not occur while he was acting within the scope of his employment in furtherance of his master's business. See Bolin v. Bostic, 235 S.C. 319, 111 S.E.2d 557 (1959). Therefore, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply.
The question for review is whether Norris and Kemp were acting within the scope of their employment when the accident occurred, thus permitting application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. In a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, this court must apply the law of agency of the place of the accident. Cooner v. United States, 276 F.2d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 1960). Lane v. Modern Music, Inc., 244 S.C. 299, 136 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1964), states the definitive South Carolina review of respondeat superior and scope of employment:
By the authority of Lane we think it clear that Norris and Kemp were acting outside the scope of their employment during the time of the accident. Under Lane, Harris must prove that Norris and Kemp were "about [their] master's business" when the accident occurred. The facts before us bear no such inference. Kemp and Norris met off base while Norris was dressed in civilian attire and on his way in his private car to an informal camp social function. The object of Kemp's and Norris's efforts had absolutely no connection to their military responsibilities. See United States v. Sharpe, et al., 189 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1951) (United States not liable for the negligence of a soldier on leave traveling under orders in his own car to a new base); United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949) cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903, 70 S. Ct. 517, 94 L. Ed. 1333 (1950) (since soldier could have opted to travel in convoy vehicle rather than his own car, and since his orders merely required him to report to new quarters in Florida on a certain date, the Army was not responsible for the accident he caused); Tucker v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 717 (D.S.C. 1974) (serviceman off post driving falsely procured Army vehicle without authorization from military superiors was not acting within scope of employment when he crashed into plaintiffs). Cf. Cooner v. United States, 276 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1960) (where negligent soldier was proceeding from one duty station to another on specific Army orders, traveling in own car, but not on leave or pass, he was acting within the scope of employment under New York law).
Furthermore, in the military context, acts within the scope of employment are acts carried out in the line of duty. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671. In United States v. Dykes, 6 M.J. 744 (1978), the United States Navy Court of Military Review considered the definition of "line of duty" in examining a military prosecution under 10 U.S.C. § 892.5 Dykes had been disciplined by a court-martial for violating a general order prohibiting the possession of cigarette rolling paper. On appeal, he claimed that the general order deprived him of a personal liberty unrelated to the performance of his military duties and was therefore unlawful within the purview of 10 U.S.C. § 892. The court began with the premise that in order lawfully to impel compliance, a military order must itself be lawful. The court then held that the lawfulness of an order is inferred unless the order is contrary to the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or to some lawful superior order, or for some other reason is beyond the authority of the officer issuing it. Whether the issuance of a particular order is authorized is primarily to be determined by examining the circumstances under which the order was issued. Of prime importance in ascertaining whether an order is authorized is its relation to a "military duty." The term "military duty" encompasses both customary martial pursuits and also all activities reasonably necessary to safeguard the general morale, discipline and usefulness of military personnel. If an order is unrelated to a military duty, it is in all likelihood unlawful and need not be obeyed. The court ultimately found that the order banning cigarette papers was a reasonable restriction directed at preserving military discipline.
Under the Dykes and Robinson analyses, Kemp's order to Norris was plainly unlawful as a military command. The order came while Norris was out of uniform and traveling in his personal car off the military base. Its subject was unrelated to military functions, and no military purpose was served by its issuance. Had Norris refused to obey Kemp's command, he could not have been court-martialed under 10 U.S.C. § 892.
In this appeal from the granting of summary judgment in favor of the United States, we presume that the facts are as plaintiff states them, that a captain or major "Kemp" rendered aid to the boys at the scene of the accident, a fact which the government disputes. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); 6 Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 56.04
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) states in pertinent part:
28 U.S.C. § 2674 reads in pertinent part:
10 U.S.C. § 892 states in pertinent part: