Source: https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/blog/2018/11/endgame
Timestamp: 2019-03-19 15:28:13
Document Index: 528940038

Matched Legal Cases: ['CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'art 4', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ']

With the final draft of the proposed Withdrawal Agreement having been published, the ball is back in the corridors of power in the United Kingdom. Will it take the deal?
They took practically all day – reading it, pondering it, reviewing it, evaluating it, judging it. In the end, the ministers of Prime Minister Theresa May’s government had been asked to make a momentous call: whether to agree to the final draft of the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated during the talks between the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) delegations, respectively led by Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier and Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab. Plenty of (tactical) leaks about the final shape of the agreement had been making the rounds in the past few days, with a breakthrough about as likely as a failure. Then, yesterday, the cabinet assembled – and, after a heated discussion primarily focused on whether the final draft would be able to pass through the House of Commons – the cabinet took what was termed a “collective decision”. However, if initial rumours are to be believed, the agreement announced by Prime Minister May on Wednesday evening was anything but unanimous.
Prime Minister Theresa May should probably have thought of the Rolling Stones when negotiating the Withdrawal Agreement: You can’t always get what you want
Very Much Relevant: The Court of Justice in Luxembourg, even after Brexit
Article 4(4) of the DWA then mandates that the provisions of the agreement shall be interpreted in compliance with CJEU jurisprudence until the end of the transition period. Further, Article 86(1) enables CJEU jurisdictions over any cases involving the UK until the end of the transition period (as of now: 31 December 2020). In recent years, the UK has averaged around 15 preliminary ruling requests. There was a sharp decline in 2017, possibly triggered by uncertainty on part of UK courts and tribunals concerning the future status of the country’s legal relationship with the European Union. This may very well change – but in any case, several dozen cases from the UK may be pending before the CJEU on the final day of the transition period. Additionally, there are likely to be a handful of With Article 86(3) stipulating that submission to the Registrar of the Court of Justice serves as the date of service, and considering the typical length of preliminary rulings is 15-18 months, the Court of Justice may (at the very least) remain relevant to UK jurisprudence until the end of 2022 or the beginning of 2023. What is likely to incense the hard right within the Conservative Party, Article 87 confers upon the European Commission (a favourite bête-noire of the most vociferous and vitriolic advocates of withdrawal) the ability to bring infringement proceedings against the UK for violation of the Treaties or the transitional arrangements under Part 4 of the DWA having occurred prior to the end of the transition period, for up to four years afterwards, before the Court of Justice – which has been given jurisdiction to adjudicate these matters. Additional, there will be a residue of pending cases before the General Court and Civil Service Tribunal. This does not mean that the CJEU will have eternal jurisdiction over the United Kingdom, but its rulings will matter well beyond the date of withdrawal, something that extreme Brexiters are going to decry and complain about rather vociferously.
For Now and Forever? Not Quite
Read jointly with Articles 126 and, crucially, Article 132, this means that European Union law will continue to apply until 31 December 2020 at the very least – with that period being extendable once (and once only) by decision of an EU/UK Joint Committee (established under Article 164 of the agreement, and responsible for its implementation). At the same time, the impact of post-withdrawal jurisprudence has been somewhat limited by.
Additionally, Article 158(1) enables preliminary references on the issue of citizens rights to be brought before the Court of Justice by UK domestic courts and tribunals for a period of eight years after the end of the transition period. Whilst it is also true that the DWA establishes an EU/UK arbitration panel, Article 174(1) envisages that any question relating to issues of EU law or the UK’s compliance with the provisions of the DWA shall be referred to the CJEU – whose ruling will be binding on the Arbitration Panel (whose own rulings, in turn, have also been given binding effect by Article 175 of the DWA).
The issue of citizen rights (i.e. primarily EU citizens residing in the UK, and vice versa; in the following, for ease of reference, the provisions are reviewed from the perspective of EU nationals in the UK, even though the DWA contains reciprocal stipulations for UK nationals in the EU27 as well) is set out in Part II of the DWA. In what will anger hardline advocates of withdrawal, the provisions on citizenship rights will apply to any EU citizens who move to the UK before the end of the transition period, as well as their family members provided they fulfil the conditions set out in Article 2 of Directive 2004/38/EC (“the Citizenship Directive”). Article 16 of the DWA then stipulates that those EU citizens (and their family members) who moved to the UK before the end of the transition period shall be able to acquire permanent residence in the UK even if they had not accumulated the minimum of 5 years’ residence prior to the end of the transition period.
Paired with Article 23, namely the right of EU nationals permanently living in the UK to be employed or self-employed, this will constitute another red line crossed for extreme advocates of withdrawal. Additionally, according to Article 20 of the DWA, any restrictions imposed on the residency and entry of EU nationals will be governed by Chapter VI of the Citizenship Directive. The DWA also recognizes the judicial safeguards of Articles 30 and 31 of the Citizenship Directive as applying to EU nationals living in or moving to the UK. Subsequently, Article 158(2) clarifies that the legal effect of the CJEU’s preliminary rulings in the area of citizen rights in the UK shall be the exact same as in the remaining EU27 countries – namely binding on the signatories of the Withdrawal Agreement.
This was only a quick analysis of the judicial aspects of Brexit. Obviously, there is the Northern Irish backstop (including the notion of a Single Customs Territory formed with Great Britain), fisheries and many other aspects worthy of analysis. But the stipulations on the Court of Justice demonstrate quite clearly that cheerleaders of a hard Brexit hopelessly overestimated their bargaining position – and desperately underestimated the quiet strength and (that’s worthy of a laudatory mention these days) the unity of the residual EU27 team led by Michel Barnier, and flanked by the Member State governments.
Given that the bright red lines articulated by the Prime Minister have been largely wiped away, can the DWA get through Parliament? If the reaction of the Eurosceptic right [1] [2] and the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (on whom Mrs May depends on issues of parliamentary confidence and supply), it will be a tough act. The Labour Party’s Brexit spokesman, Keir Starmer, has decried the agreement as a “blinder than blind” deal – with pressure increasing on quietly Eurosceptic leader Jeremy Corbyn to get out of the way of the Labour Party formally endorsing a second national referendum in which “Remain” is to be one option. How realistic such a referendum is, given the tight 30 March 2019 deadline to ratify and withdraw (as well as a formal request that would have to emerge from the UK Government to extend the Article 50 period) is another matter altogether. Despite talk of a no-confidence motion and subsequent leadership challenge, the Conservative Party has no one to replace Theresa May with. Even if it did have a plausible candidate who did not deter the general electorate, changing Prime Ministers in the middle of executing the country’s proposed withdrawal from the European Union and dissolving the institutional bonds that have tied the UK to the EU for 43 years would be a monumentally uncertain undertaking. The Brexit advocates have no plausible alternative plan that would avoid even more severe damage to the UK economy that the DWA may (to a limited extent) reduce. Nonetheless, the intensity of anti-EU feeling within the hard right can wreak havoc on Mrs May’s parliamentary majority, with the resignation of Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab (the man who negotiated the agreement with Mr Barnier) being an ominous sign.
The Prime Minister still refuses to acknowledge the option of remaining in the European Union (or even the watered-down option of remaining in the Single Market via the EEA or EFTA), more for tactical reasons than personal conviction. The desperate affirmations of the Prime Minister that the national referendum (flawed as it was on a range of options and with the Leave proposition only carrying 35% of registered voters) was the final word smacks less of “the national interest” than party politics. The pragmatic, the right solution is clear: A second national referendum, with a properly crafted set of specific options to choose from, able to derive a true mandate from the British electorate (now aware of the difficulties which leaving the European Union and – more egregiously – a scandalous lack of realistic preparation) may very well be the only avenue left. The question is simple: Does the hard right within the Conservative want to be in power or stand on its principles? It cannot conceivably do both. The endgame has certainly begun, despite the formal obstacles.
Images by Flickr: Theresa May EU2017EE and European Court of Justice, Grand courtoom - Cédric Puisney
public law, MI, LBM, Brexit