Source: http://www.ga-lawyers.pro/Zoning-and-Land-Use-Procedures/ZONING-PROCEDURES-AND-ANNEXATION-LAWS.shtml
Timestamp: 2018-01-18 08:01:27
Document Index: 345798897

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 1971', '§ 36', 'art 51', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 1973', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 36']

ZONING PROCEDURES AND ANNEXATION LAWS | Jenkins & Bowen, PC | Cartersville, Georgia, Bartow County
Disputes between cities and counties have generated several attempts by the General Assembly to enact a workable process to resolve disputes. The latest provisions, codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-36-110 et seq., were adopted in 2007, and are discussed in detail. Turing to the actual process of annexation, Title 36 of the Georgia Code describes three main types of annexation: the 100 percent method, the 60 percent method, and annexation by resolution and referendum. Property can also be annexed by Local Act of the General Assembly, as each municipality is nothing but a “creation of the General Assembly,” whose boundaries can be modified by the General Assembly. Each method of annexation will be outlined in turn, and deannexation procedures will be briefly discussed.
3. Final Action. If no objection is received within 30 days of the county’s receipt of notice, final action on the annexation can proceed. If objection is lodged, then the procedures discussed in Section V of this paper are triggered.
Annexations or deannexations which would create unincorporated islands are prohibited. An unincorporated island consists of an unincorporated area whose boundaries are entirely bounded by one or several cities, or an unincorporated area which the county has no reasonable means of “physical access” to for provisions of services. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-4. This latter provision raises interesting issues, in that no annexation ever changes physical reality; it is simply an administrative boundary change. That is, roads are not physically blocked by annexation. Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of the provision is that if the county has to traverse city roads or property to access the annexed area, it is an unincorporated island, even if a sliver of access if left in some fashion. Annexations that create unincorporated islands are void, subject to challenge at any later date. As for preexisting unincorporated islands, counties can request by resolution that cities provide services to such areas. Cities can also annex them without owner consent. See Section X of this paper for further discussion.
The requirements of the Voting Rights Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq., and particularly Section 5 of the Act, apply to all annexations. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-3. The basis of this requirement is the effect annexation has on voting. Even the annexation of vacant land which is anticipated to become residential has been held to require preclearance, as it constituted a “change in voting practice or procedure.” City of Pleasant Grove v. U.S., 479 U.S. 462, 107 S.Ct. 794, 93 L.Ed.2d 866 (1987). Therefore, after the annexation is effective, a “Section 5 preclearance letter” is submitted to the Department of Justice, at least sixty days before any election. City of Arcade v. Emmons, 268 Ga. 230, 486 S.E.2d 359 (1997). Procedures for preclearance can be found at 28 C.F.R. part 51. The City Attorney should be involved in this submission, as it is highly technical. Useful information can be found at the Department of Justice website, http://www.usdoj.gov/ crt/voting/sec_5/about.php. A copy of the preclearance letter should be submitted to the Dept. of Community Affairs. Additionally, O.C.G.A. § 36-60-11 requires all actions submitted for preclearance by a local government to be submitted to the Attorney General.
Once an annexation is effective, the property transfers from the jurisdiction of the county, losing whatever zoning the county provided, and becomes unzoned. This issue presents problems to most cities conducting annexation. A variety of invalid zoning methods has been used in the past. The main difficulty involved conducting rezoning hearings of property not in the city; the alternative was a period when property was unzoned. Recognition of this problem sparked amendments to the Zoning Procedures Law (the “ZPL” located at O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq.), designed to address the problems. Any rezoning occurring in connection with an annexation must comply with the ZPL. Simply stating that “all annexed property is R-1” or that “all annexed property shall be annexed at the same zoning classification as the city” are invalid (with the very limited exception of “qualified municipalities,” see below).
The ZPL was amended effective July 1, 1996, added a new definition to “Zoning Decision,” to include an amendment to a zoning ordinance which zones property which is to be annexed by a municipality. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4. The main amendment provides the procedure to be followed by municipalities when they annex property.
1. “Qualified” Local Governments. Qualified municipalities are now authorized to adopt a zoning ordinance that provides for all annexed property to come into the city for the same use for which that property was zoned immediately prior to such annexation. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-4(e). Qualified counties that deal with deannexed properties can adopt similar ordinances. (Id.).
2. Common Zoning Ordinance. Qualification means that the relevant city and county must have a “common zoning ordinance with respect to zoning classifications.” (Id.). While there are no reported cases, if the two zoning ordinances only share a similar name but the zoning classifications are not identical as to uses permitted, or other provisions, they would not likely be found to be common zoning ordinances. The logic of this is that, if the permitted uses do not change, there is no reason for a ZPL hearing. However, if the two ordinances both have an “R-1” or “A-1” district, but the permitted uses, setbacks or other provisions are different, they are not common ordinances, since the impact of the annexation would be to permit something that was not otherwise permitted.
The amendments to the ZPL discussed above were necessitated by the quandary cities were left in when attempting to annex property. Often, the municipality made a mistake and inadvertently left the property unzoned, thus creating future land use problems and spawning litigation. The courts have found that an zoning violation does not invalidate the annexation, so the result was unzoned property in the city. City of Cartersville v. Bartow County School Dist., 145 Ga.App. 129, 243 S.E.2d 293 (1978) (“Even assuming arguendo that the city did not follow proper procedures in adopting these zoning classifications, this would affect only the validity of the zoning, not the validity of the annexations.”).
The Zoning Procedures Law defines a “zoning decision” as, among other things, “The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance by a municipal local government which zones property to be annexed into the municipality.” Thus, adopting any zoning on an annexed property is subject to the ZPL.
One invalid method used in the past, and still to be found in some ordinances, was to adopt a provision in the zoning ordinance that all future annexed property is to be zoned one particular way. Cities would sometimes simply state in their ordinance or council minutes that the property was annexed as R-1, for example. As this works a change in zoning, it is a “zoning decision” under O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3 and any zoning decision must comply with the Zoning Procedures Law. Another invalid method was to have a provision in the zoning ordinance that any property annexed keeps the zoning classification assigned by the county. This is discussed above under Section III(C). This only works if the county and city have identical zoning classifications, which is not the case just because they have the same name.
Disputes between cities and counties over annexation became very common in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s era, because of the explosive growth in the Atlanta metro region. Developers found that if the county did not take a pro-growth attitude, a nearby city may well be a better choice, leading to some cities doubling or tripling their size in a short period of time, through ambitious annexations. These sorts of actions frustrated counties and their citizens, and the General Assembly began enacting a serious of provisions regarding land use disputes and how to address them. The cities strongly defended their unfettered right to annex property.
After the individuals are chosen at random from each pool, the city gets to strike two names from the county official’s pool, and one name from the academics pool. In a same manner, the objecting county may then strike two names from the city official’s pool, and one name from the academics pool. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-114(c).
The panel first determines if the county’s grounds for objection are valid. In arriving at its determination, the panel shall consider:
I. Costs. The County pays at least 75% of the cost of the arbitration, with the remaining 25% divided between the county and city in a manner in which the panel deems appropriate. Costs include per diems for the panel. However, in the event the panel finds that a frivolous position has been advanced, the advancing party must bear the entire cost of the arbitration. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-115(a)(4). It is uncertain whether this would include attorney’s fees, for example.
K. Appeal of the Panel’s Decision.
2. The appeal must be based on very narrow grounds: errors or fact or law, bias or misconduct of an arbitrator, or the panel’s abuse of discretion.
A. Contiguity. Municipal corporations can annex unincorporated areas contiguous to the existing corporate limits – “contiguous” means at least 1/8th of the external boundary or 50 feet (whichever is less) abuts the municipal limits, or is separated by city land, or land owned by some other political subdivision, or the lands owned by the state or by the width of a street, river, or railroad/PSC regulated utility right-of-way. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20.
B. Special Contiguity Provision. If the property to be annexed is owned by the municipal corporation, and the county approves of the annexation by resolution, property can be contiguous if separated by city land, state land, or the width or length of a street, river or railroad right of way. This in effect authorizes “spoke” annexation down roads, if the county consents.
A. Contiguity. Under this method, municipal corporations of at least 200 persons can annex a contiguous area. Here, “contiguous” means at least one-eighth of the property’s aggregate external boundary must abut the municipal boundary (or would abut if not separated by width of streets, rivers, public rights-of-way, county land, city land or state land). O.C.G.A. § 36-36-31.
G. Appeal. Appeal to the superior court is available, but in determining whether the criteria of A. have been met, the court must use the city’s estimates so long as those estimates meet certain criteria described in the statute. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-55.
The General Assembly has the authority to pass local Acts annexing territory to municipal corporations. The above methods are derived from the General Assembly’s legislative power to annex. This authority was codified effective July 1, 1996 as Article 1A of Chapter 36, Title 36. Annexation or deannexation can be accomplished by this
method. Municipalities are “creations of the General Assembly,” so their boundaries may be changed by the General Assembly.
D. The legislation may incorporate referendum approval under the terms and conditions specified in local law. However, such referendum approval is required if the area to be annexed contains more than 500 people, or more than 3 percent of the municipality’s population. The municipality must pay for the referendum. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-16.
This case concerns the failure to preclear an annexation under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. There, the City had allowed people to vote in an election, despite the fact that they lived in areas that had been improperly annexed. The impropriety was failure to preclear the annexation with the Justice Department. Despite receiving the preclearance during the pendency of the suit, the issue was not necessarily rendered moot. The trial court had set aside the election, and the Supreme Court noted that the power to set aside the election was proper, but it should be exercised only when absolutely necessary to protect important voting rights. It therefore reversed the trial court’s action. The Court concluded by noting that, since the error had been corrected by retroactive preclearance, the matter was ended.
The city attempted to annex property separated from the city by three other parcels: one owned by the county, one owned by Georgia Power, and one over which the Georgia Department of Transportation has a right-of-way for the proposed Northern Arc. The trial court held that no more than one such parcel could be crossed and still meet O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21’s definition of “contiguous.” The Court of Appeals reversed in part and found that the General Assembly intended a liberal policy in the area of annexation by municipalities, seeking to leave such matters primarily under local control. It interpreted the statute defining contiguous area as allowing stacking of such properties. Any other interpretation would mean that a city would be forever bound by a creek next to a railroad right of way, or by a state road next to a piece of county property. However, while the county and DOT parcels could be crossed, the Georgia Power property was not a “right of way” easement as specified by the statute, but rather a fee simply grant. This was ascertained by a close examination of the language in the deed. The statue refers to “separated…by the definite width of: Any right of way of a railroad or other public service corporation.” Fee simple is not a right of way. Thus the annexation was void.
In this case, an annexation was invalidated due to the city’s failure to produced adequate plans for the extension of services to the area to be annexed as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-36-35, and its failure to make a determination that the proposed annexation was in the best interest of the citizens of the city and the area to be annexed as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-36-37(a). The Court held that the best interest determination must be made for the annexation to be valid. Although technically it is not required to be made on the record, the court noted that “it certainly behooves any municipal corporation to make a record of such a mandated determination.” As for the extension of services, the plans provided by the city contained only short, conclusory statements by the heads of the various departments that such services could be provided. The Court held that these sorts of statements were inadequate under the statute because they prevented the public from participating intelligently in the hearing on the annexations.
This case interpreted an annexation where the landowner excepted a 10-foot strip from two parcels to be annexed in order to avoid creating an unauthorized unincorporated island. The County raised an objection on the basis that the exception violated the “entire parcel” requirement of O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20(a). The Court began by noting that the General Assembly intended that a liberal policy apply in the area of municipal annexations. The Court concluded that because it was undisputed that the 10-foot strip was not excepted in an attempt to evade the “entire parcel” requirement of O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20(a), the annexation was not invalid. The Court noted that if it were to rule for the County in this situation that it would, in effect, leave this particular landowner with no way to have his property properly annexed. However, this case did not deal with the language in O.C.G.A. § 36-36-4(a)(3), which presents an argument that leaving only a sliver of access still in effect creates an unincorporated island. See Sec. II(E).
In this case, the City of Smyrna desired to tie into water lines owned by the county, but located in an area annexed by the city. In support of its actions, the City cited O.C.G.A. § 36-34-5, which states that a city is authorized to “access, extend and tie on to all water lines within its municipal limits.” On the other hand, the county pointed to O.C.G.A. § 36-36-7(b), which states that “a county’s ownership and control of its facilities in an annexed area is not to be diminished by an annexation.” The court, by applying a common rule of statutory construction, concluded that the city had a right to tie into the water lines, despite the fact that they were owned by the county. In fact, the court concluded that cities have a right to extend any water line located within its municipal boundaries. The court, however, noted that city could not extend or obtain access to the line without acquiring the right through one of the three methods enumerated by the statue (i.e. acquisition by gift, purchase, or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain).
This case concerns the validity of notice. It was the practice of the city to hold regular meetings every other Thursday, and that such meetings were scheduled in September or October of the previous year. In this case, the every other Thursday schedule resulted in meetings falling on Thanksgiving and Christmas day. Recognizing these dates, the City included asterisks by these days on the original schedule noting that they would be held on alternative dates because of the holidays. At a regular meeting in October, the City voted to reschedule these meetings to November 26 and December 23, respectively, and immediately posted these dates on the City’s website, at the meeting location, and on the door of the city clerk’s office. The City then sent a letter to the property owners on November 15, and sent legal notice to the property owners in the area to be annexed on November 26. Finally, at the December 23 meeting the annexation was approved and became effective eight days later. The plaintiffs sought to have the annexation ordinance declared null and void based on the argument that the ordinance was not adopted at a “regular meeting” as required by the Open Meetings Act, because the meeting was held on an earlier date than the date shown on the original schedule. The Court held that because the notation on the original schedule stated that the meeting would have to be rescheduled, the first date was actually set during the October regular meeting when the date was set for December 23. As a result, there was no rescheduling that turned the regular meeting into a special meeting. The plaintiffs also challenged the annexation by arguing that they did not receive 30 days notice as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-36-92(b) because the city did not send out actual legal notice until November 26. The Court held that the language of the statute requires that the annexation occur no later than 30 days after the notice is mailed, and not, as the plaintiffs asserted, that the annexation occur no sooner than 30 days after the notice is mailed.
Cherokee County brought a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the City of Holly Springs alleging the city failed to follow the procedures prescribed by O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21 and its own city ordinance during the annexation of certain properties into the corporate limits of the city. As to each of the properties in question, the county alleged that the city’s efforts to annex the properties failed to comply with various procedural requirements and were therefore void. The trial court dismissed for lack of standing, but also found that an interlocutory injunction would be warranted if the county had standing. The Supreme Court found the county had standing to seek interlocutory injunction, since the county had interest in determination of its boundaries and the duties and obligations that naturally flowed therefrom. But, the Court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying interlocutory injunction, since the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding both the threat of harm to the county and the validity of the challenged annexation applications. Although county alleged procedural deficiencies in annexation application and that the county would be harmed by possible future efforts to change the zoning of the area, the city alleged that any deficiencies in the applications had been ratified by the property owners and assured the court that neither the city nor the property owners had any present intention of rezoning.