Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v41/41-067.html
Timestamp: 2016-12-07 14:23:52
Document Index: 390749138

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1910', '§ 1910', '§ 1910', 'art 11', '§ 8101', '§ 5596', '§ 1960', '§ 1960', '§ 1960', 'art 11', 'art 11', 'art 1960', '§ 10', 'art 11']

41:0710(67)AR - - Treasury, IRS, Philadelphia Service Center, Philadelphia, PA and NTEU Chapter 71 - - 1991 FLRAdec AR - - v41 p710 | FLRA
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[ v41 p710 ] 41:0710(67)AR
41 FLRA No. 67
0-AR-2010
award of Arbitrator Kinard Lang filed by the Agency under
The grievance in this case alleged that the Agency
failing to provide employees with a safe and healthful work
environment. The Arbitrator sustained the grievance and
directed the Agency to: (1) treat employees' absences from
work due to the employees' exposure to unsafe conditions as
administrative leave; (2) reimburse employees' medical
expenses; and (3) pay interest on any reimbursement that is not
paid within 90 days.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the portion of
the award directing the payment of employees' medical expenses and interest is contrary to law. Accordingly, that portion of the award must be set aside. II. Background and Arbitrator's Award
On December 13, 1988, between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.,
employees from the Underreporter Branch of the Internal Revenue
Service, Philadelphia Service Center complained to managers
that odorous fumes were emanating from the mezzanine floor of
the Agency's south building. The mezzanine floor is located
immediately above the Underreporter Branch. The managers
investigated the source of the odor and determined that no
further action on the complaints was warranted.
Prior to the complaints of odorous fumes, an Agency
contractor's crew had poured approximately 8000 square feet of
fresh concrete onto the mezzanine floor. After it was poured,
the concrete was treated with a petroleum-based sealant, "Cure
Seal." The material safety data sheet for "Cure Seal" states,
in part, the following precautions:
Use with adequate ventilation. Avoid skin contact and
breathing of vapors for prolonged periods of time in an
enclosed area . . . . Inhalation of high vapor may have
results ranging from dizziness and headaches to
uncon[s]ciousness . . . . If overcome by vapor, remove
from exposure immediately: call a physician. If
breathing is irregular or stopped, start resuscitation,
administer oxygen . . . .
Arbitrator's Award at 1.
Throughout the evening of December 13, 1988, an Agency
manager located in the north building visited the south
building. During each visit, he noticed that the odor was
growing worse. At approximately 11:00 p.m., he entered the
south building in response to a telephone call and testified
that "his eyes immediately began to burn." Id. Upon arriving
in the Underreporter Branch, the manager discovered that a
woman had "been seen passed-out on the floor and other
personnel were bent over chairs, coughing." Id. at 2. After
consulting with the nurse and with other managers, the manager
allowed the affected employees to depart at 11:30
p.m.--approximately 1 hour before completing their work shift. Employees received administrative leave for the missed work
The second shift assigned to the Underreporter Branch was
scheduled to work from midnight to 8:30 a.m. on December 14,
1988. The arriving personnel who testified before the
Arbitrator stated that they "experienced the odorous fumes." Id. Although management urged the employees to stay at work,
the Underreporter Branch employees who testified all left work
within about 1 hour of their arrival because "the odorous fumes
did not permit them to stay." Id. None of the employees from
the second shift received administrative leave. They were
required to use sick, annual, or unpaid leave.
A third group of employees reported for work in the
Underreporter Branch at 6:30 a.m. on December 14, 1988. The
employees testified that they experienced "nausea, difficulty
breathing and dizziness." Id. Some of the employees
complained to management and received administrative leave time
to see the nurse. Other personnel, including supervisors, took
periodic breaks to get fresh air, while still others did not
leave their work stations. Management placed fans in the
affected area in an attempt to dissipate the fumes.
The employees who saw the nurse were supplied with various
medications and went to the cafeteria to await information on
the nature of the fumes and on whether employees would be
excused from work if the fumes had not abated. Management
advised the employees in the cafeteria to return to work,
arguing that the fumes were an insufficient basis for
disrupting work or granting administrative leave. However, one
employee testified that "[m]anagement could not give us any
answers as to really what the fumes were, so we weren't going
to report back." Id. at 3. Ultimately, the employees who felt that returning to work
could be hazardous to their health were permitted to leave work
approximately 4 hours before the end of their shift. None of
the employees from the third shift received administrative
leave. They were required to use sick, annual, or unpaid
On December 15, 1988, the Union filed a grievance on
behalf of 83 employees asserting that the Agency violated the
portion of the parties' agreement on health and safety by
telling employees to remain in an unsafe work area. As a
remedy, the Union requested that employees be made whole and
that "[a]ll employees be given Administrative Leave for the
time they used on 12/14/88 because of inadequate working
conditions." Id. On December 23, 1988, the Union filed
another grievance requesting hazard pay because the Agency "did
not live up to its contractual obligations to provide employees with a safe and healthful working environment." Id. On January 30, 1989, the Union sent notes to the Agency
requesting that an informal meeting be held on combining the
two grievances and reminding the Agency that more than 10 days
had passed since the first request for an informal meeting.
Following a fourth step grievance meeting, the Agency
denied the grievance over "the payment of four (4) hours
administrative leave for employees who went to the health unit
on December 14, 1988, then requested leave due to fumes in
their work area." Id. at 4. The Union requested that the
grievance proceed to the fifth step but mentioned no remedy in
its letter to the Agency. In its fifth step reply, the Agency
administrative leave for employees who requested
sick/annual/leave without pay on December 14, 1988, due to
fumes in their work area." Id. Subsequently, the Union took
the matter to arbitration.
The parties were unable to agree on a stipulated issue. Therefore, the Arbitrator framed the issue as follows: "Did
the Agency violate the parties' Agreement and/or applicable
Government-wide rules or regulations on December 13th and/or
14th, 198[8] when a contractor, employed by the Agency, applied
an industrial chemical to the concrete floor in the vicinity of
the grievant[s'] work area; if so, what shall the remedy be?" Id., Title Page.
The Union argued before the Arbitrator that all employees
who missed work due to their exposure to noxious fumes on
December 14, 1988 should be granted hazard pay for the hours
they worked on that date and administrative leave for any work
time missed. The Agency argued before the Arbitrator that management
did not abuse its discretion in granting administrative leave
only to employees who were about to complete their shift. The
Agency further argued that the issue of hazard pay was not
raised in a timely manner and that none of the remedies
requested by the Union are authorized under the parties'
agreement. The Arbitrator found that the Union's request for hazard
pay was untimely and, therefore, was not properly before the
Arbitrator. The Arbitrator sustained the remainder of the
grievance. The Arbitrator noted that "on the morning of December
14th[,] many employees sought the services of the Agency's
nurse; two visited hospital emergency rooms, and one placed a
call to the Poison Control Center." Id. at 6. These
circumstances, the Arbitrator found, "simply do not allow a
reasonable person to conclude that all [of] the affected
personnel were simply seeking to 'play hooky' and get paid for
it." Id. Further, the Arbitrator noted that the varying
reactions that people had to the fumes were significant "as
positive proof of the importance of clear and open
communications regarding the existence of hazardous chemicals
in the work place." Id. at 7. The Arbitrator noted that Article 27 of the parties'
agreement provides in part The Employer will, to the extent of its authority and
consistent with the applicable requirements of Title 29 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, provide and maintain safe
and healthful working conditions for all employees and
will provide places of employment which are free from
death or serious physical harm.
Id. at 8. Examining the provisions of Title 29, Code of
Federal Regulations, the Arbitrator determined that employees
exposed to "Cure Seal" had been exposed to a hazardous chemical
within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c). Further, the
Arbitrator noted that employers are required "to provide their
personnel with information on the basis of which personnel
exposed to, or potentially exposed to hazardous chemicals may
make rational decisions regarding their physical health and
safety[.]" Id. at 7. Such information includes the
"operations in their work area where hazardous chemicals are
present" and material safety data sheets describing the "health
hazards of the hazardous chemical, including signs and symptoms
of exposure, and any medical conditions which are generally
recognized as being aggravated by exposure to the chemical[.]" Id., citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(h). The Arbitrator found that the Agency was bound by the
requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1910. The Arbitrator further found
that none of the personnel in the Underreporter Branch knew in
advance, or were told after being exposed to the fumes, what
the effects of inhaling "Cure Seal" could be. Based on "[t]he
testimony of the Agency manager and the nurse[,]" the
Arbitrator concluded that "on the evening of December 13, 1988
the conditions in the area of the Underreporter Branch were in
violation of Article 27, Health & Safety, of the Agreement[.]" Id. at 8. The Arbitrator noted that the "fact that no employee
died, and that there is no present evidence of permanent
serious physical injury to any of the affected personnel does
not . . . shield the Agency from the requirement to provide
'healthful working conditions for all employees[.]'" Id.
(emphasis in original). The Arbitrator further concluded that
the fumes had not sufficiently dissipated on December 14, 1988
and, in view of "the Agency's continued failure to provide the
information required by 29 CFR," found no support for the
Agency's denial of administrative leave for employees affected
by the fumes on December 14. Id.
In fashioning a remedy for the Agency's violation of the
parties' agreement, the Arbitrator relied on the decision of
another arbitrator in a case involving another Internal Revenue
Service District Office which failed to maintain a safe and
healthful workplace and was required, in part, to restore
annual and sick leave to its employees and to pay for unit
employees' medical care costs. Accordingly, to remedy the
violation in this case, the Arbitrator required the Agency to
take the following action: (1) treat the absences of employees
exposed to "Cure Seal" on December 13 or 14, 1988 as
administrative leave; (2) within 90 days, reimburse the medical
expenses of employees who produce "clear and convincing
evidence of experiencing unreimbursed medical expenses, as the
result of physical examinations and/or treatment, due to their
exposure to 'Cure Seal' odorous fumes, on December 13, or 14,
1988"; and (3) pay interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum
on any reimbursement not paid within 90 days. Id. at 9. III. Positions of the Parties
The Agency argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority in requiring the Agency to grant administrative leave
to employees and to reimburse employees' medical expenses. The
Agency acknowledges that the provisions of Article 27 of the
parties' agreement "clearly impose a duty on the [A]gency to
provide a safe and healthy work environment for the employees." Agency's Exceptions at 6. However, the Agency asserts that it
"acted to abate the problem as soon as it was discovered" and
that, therefore, the Agency "was in compliance with the terms
of the [] agreement." Id. at 6-7. Further, the Agency contends that: (1) the provisions of
Article 27 do not provide for administrative leave or payment
of medical expenses for a violation of the provisions; (2) the
only provision in the parties' agreement addressing
administrative leave "does not provide for the granting of
administrative leave under the facts presented"; and (3) the
portion of the parties' agreement addressing an arbitrator's
authority expressly states that "[a]ny award may not include
the assessment of expenses against either party other than as
agreed to in this Agreement." Id. at 3, 7 (emphasis in
original). As there is no provision of the parties' agreement which
authorizes administrative leave or the payment of medical
expenses for employees who may have been exposed to fumes in
the workplace, the Agency contends that the Arbitrator not only
exceeded his authority, but also rendered an award which fails
to draw its essence from the parties' agreement. The Agency further contends that the award is contrary to
law and regulation. In this regard, the Agency argues that the
award of administrative leave is contrary to provisions of the
Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) which state that "the granting
of administrative leave is purely a discretionary decision
within the control of agency management." Id. at 8, citing
FPM, Supplement 990-2, Book 630, Subchapter 11, Excused
Absence, Part 11-5. The Agency notes that the FPM provides for
administrative leave in certain situations. As "[n]one of the
enumerated examples [noted in the FPM] concern the situation in
this case[,]" the Agency argues that "this is not a situation
where the FPM generally requires that administrative leave be
granted." Id. Further, by ordering management to provide
employees with administrative leave, the Agency contends that
the award violates the portion of the FPM providing that
administrative leave is to be granted in management's
The Agency also argues that the grant of administrative
leave is contrary to previous Authority decisions that: (1)
reversed an arbitration award providing administrative leave to
a union official who was improperly denied official time,
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3231, 19 FLRA 932 (1985)
(AFGE); and (2) found nonnegotiable a union proposal mandating
the situations in which administrative leave must be granted,
Fort Bragg Association of Educators, NEA and Department of the
Army, Fort Bragg Schools, 30 FLRA 508 (1987) (Proposal 23)
(Fort Bragg), reversed as to other matters sub nom. Fort Bragg
Association of Educators, NEA v. FLRA, 870 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir.
Finally, the Agency contends that the portion of the
remedy awarding medical expenses is contrary to the Federal
Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq. (FECA).
The Union contends that the Agency has failed to show that
the award "cannot in any rational way be derived from the
agreement or that, on its face, the award does not represent a
'plausible interpretation of the contract.'" Union's
Opposition at 7. In this regard, the Union states that Article
27, Section 3 of the parties' agreement "recognizes an
employee[']s right to withhold their services, without charge
to leave, if unsafe conditions exist." Id. at 10 (emphasis in
Union's Opposition). The Union also argues that the award of
administrative leave is within the Arbitrator's authority. The
Union states that the parties' agreement "bestows further
authority on the arbitrator to 'make an aggrieved employee
whole to the extent such remedy is not limited by law.'" Id. As the Agency violated the contract and as arbitrators have
considerable latitude in fashioning remedies, the Union argues
that the Arbitrator in this case "merely fashioned a plausible
remedy to make the grievants whole, consistent with his
interpretation of the contract." Id. at 12. The Union further argues that the award of administrative
leave is consistent with law and regulation. The Union
contends that the Agency's regulations authorize the Agency to
grant administrative leave in situations similar to this case. Moreover, the Union rejects the Agency's reliance on previous
Authority decisions that reversed arbitration awards providing
administrative leave to union officials. The Union
distinguishes the cases noted by the Agency because those cases
involved arbitration awards that granted administrative leave
to union officials who had wrongfully been denied official
time. The Union contends that those cases were not modified
due to a "blanket prohibition" on awards of administrative
leave, but because of "the exclusivity of the particular
statutory provisions [on official time] at issue." Id. at 14.
With respect to the portion of the remedy granting
reimbursement for employees' medical expenses, the Union argues
that the remedy is consistent with the parties' agreement. The
Union asserts that the FECA does not apply to this case because
the injuries involved were "not of the disabling type
contemplated by [the] FECA." Id. at 17. Even if the FECA were
applicable, the Union contends that the FECA does not preclude
the remedy in this case because the FECA was not intended to
exclude remedies available under the negotiated grievance
procedure for contractual violations. The Union also cites
other laws that provide relief to employees injured in the
course of employment. According to the Union, if the FECA were
found to be the exclusive forum for employees injured in the
course of employment, "employees would be denied full
compensation for injuries arising out of contract
violations[.]" Id. at 18. IV. Analysis and Conclusions
For the following reasons, we find that the portion of the
award directing the Agency to treat the absences of employees
administrative leave is not deficient. We further find,
however, that the portion of the award requiring the Agency to
reimburse employees for medical expenses and to pay interest on
those reimbursements is contrary to law.
The Agency argues that the portion of the remedy requiring
the Agency to treat the absences of employees exposed to "Cure
Seal" on December 13 or 14, 1988 as administrative leave is
deficient because: (1) this portion of the award is contrary
to law and regulation; (2) the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority; and (3) the award fails to draw its essence from the
1. The Award Is Not Contrary to Law and Regulation
We reject the Agency's argument that the portion of the
remedy requiring the Agency to treat the absences of employees
exposed to "Cure Seal" as administrative leave is contrary to
law and regulation. The Authority has previously held that the
restoration of leave is an appropriate remedy under the Back
Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, when employees incurred the use of
leave as the result of the agency's failure to provide a safe
and healthful workplace. National Treasury Employees Union,
NTEU Chapter 51 and Internal Revenue Service, Wichita District
Office, 40 FLRA 614 (1991) (IRS, Wichita). In this case, the Arbitrator found that the Agency
violated the parties' agreement by failing to provide a safe
and healthful workplace when employees were exposed to "Cure
Seal" fumes. The Arbitrator further found that employees became ill as a result of their exposure to "Cure Seal" and
that the illnesses required some of the employees to use leave. Accordingly, the Arbitrator ordered that the employees' leave
be treated as administrative leave. Administrative leave constitutes an absence without charge
to leave. See Military Department of Arkansas, Office of the
Adjutant General, Arkansas National Guard and Local 1671,
National Federation of Federal Employees, 23 FLRA 114, 115
(1986); SSA. As an agency restoring leave to employees
generally must record the absence as administrative leave, we
find no meaningful distinction between the Arbitrator's
formulation of the remedy in this case and the arbitrator's
remedy restoring leave in IRS, Wichita. Moreover, the Arbitrator in this case found a direct
connection between the use of leave and the basis for a
contract violation. Therefore, consistent with our decision in
IRS, Wichita, we also conclude that the Arbitrator made the
requisite findings under the Back Pay Act for an award ordering
that employees' leave be treated as administrative leave. Next, we reject the Agency's contention that this portion
of the remedy is contrary to Authority precedent. The Agency
argues that the Arbitrator's grant of administrative leave is
contrary to AFGE, in which the Authority modified an
arbitration award providing administrative leave to a union
official who was improperly denied official time. For the
following reasons, we find that the Agency's reliance on AFGE
In AFGE, the Authority found that the arbitrator's remedy
was inconsistent with section 7131(d) of the Statute because
"the Statute effectively provides a remedy when official time
under section 7131(d) of the Statute is wrongfully denied[.]" AFGE, 19 FLRA at 933. In this regard, the Authority stated
that the arbitrator "should have granted the grievant [union
official] compensation for that amount of time spent performing
union representation duties in other than a leave status[,]"
rather than administrative leave. Id. at 934. Further, the
Authority noted that "corrective action for the denial of
official time is not indicated [in the FPM] as an appropriate
situation for the granting of administrative leave[.]" Id. at
933. See n.*, below.
AFGE concerned only the appropriate remedy for a violation
addressed by section 7131(d) of the Statute and not the scope
of arbitrators' remedial authority in other situations. As the
situation in this case does not concern section 7131(d), we
find that this case is distinguishable from AFGE. Accordingly,
we reject the Agency's reliance on AFGE.
The Agency further argues that this portion of the remedy
is contrary to Fort Bragg, in which the Authority found that a
proposal mandating the situations in which administrative leave
must be granted interfered with management's right to assign
work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. To the extent
that the Agency argues that the Arbitrator's enforcement of
Article 27 of the parties' agreement interferes with
management's right to assign work, we reject that argument for
Even if a contract provision mandating the situation in
which administrative leave must be granted would be found, in a
negotiability context, to directly or excessively interfere
with a management right, that fact would not necessarily
preclude the same type of provision from being found to be an
enforceable appropriate arrangement in an arbitration context. See Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service and
Service). When an agency contends that an arbitrator's award
enforcing a provision of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement is contrary to section 7106(a), we will examine the
provision enforced by the arbitrator to determine: (1) if it
constitutes an arrangement for employees adversely affected by
the exercise of management's rights; and (2) if, as interpreted
by the arbitrator, it abrogates the exercise of a management
right. Customs Service, 37 FLRA at 313-314.
In this case, Article 27 of the parties' agreement
requires the Agency
the Code of Federal Regulations, [to] provide and maintain
safe and healthful working conditions for all employees
and [to] provide places of employment which are free from
Agency's Exceptions at 5-6. Article 27 also requires the
Agency to: (1) inform employees when a hazardous condition is
present; and (2) recognize the employees' right under 29 C.F.R. § 1960 to be free from reprisal, including charge to leave,
when employees decline to perform their assigned tasks due to
hazardous conditions. Article 27 attempts to ameliorate adverse effects on
employees of having to work under hazardous conditions by
requiring management to inform employees of hazardous
conditions and preventing management from charging leave to
employees who do not perform assigned tasks due to the
hazardous conditions. Therefore, we find that the provision
the exercise of management's right to assign work.
The Arbitrator found that the Agency violated Article 27
by exposing employees to "Cure Seal" fumes and failing to
inform employees of the "health hazards of the hazardous
chemical[.]" Arbitrator's Award at 7. Noting that many
employees sought medical treatment for their exposure to the
fumes, the Arbitrator found no support for the Agency's denial
of administrative leave for those employees. As the Arbitrator
found that the employees' absences were directly related to
their exposure to a hazardous chemical, we find that the
Arbitrator was enforcing Article 27 of the parties' agreement
when he ordered the Agency to treat the employees' absences as
Moreover, we find that the Arbitrator's enforcement of
Article 27 does not abrogate the Agency's right to assign work. Article 27 affects only certain types of work assignments. Specifically, Article 27 precludes the Agency from charging
employees leave when employees decline to perform assigned
tasks due to hazardous conditions at the workplace. Article 27
merely requires the Agency to do what is required under 29 C.F.R. § 1960. It does not affect work assignments when
hazardous conditions are absent from the workplace, nor does it
address situations when employees fail to perform assigned
tasks for reasons not encompassed by 29 C.F.R. § 1960. We also reject the Agency's argument that the Arbitrator's
remedy conflicts with the FPM because "[n]one of the enumerated
examples [noted in the FPM] concern the situation in this case"
and, therefore, "this is not a situation where the FPM
generally requires that administrative leave be granted." Agency's Exceptions at 8. The following are the examples noted
in the FPM of situations when agencies commonly grant excused
absences without charge to leave: (1) blood donation; (2)
tardiness and brief absence of less than 1 hour; (3) taking
examinations; (4) conferences or conventions; and (5)
representing employee organizations. FPM Supplement 990-2,
Chapter 630, Subchapter 11, Excused Absence, Part 11-5. The
list is not intended to be exhaustive, and, therefore, agencies
have the discretion to grant excused absences in other
situations. See, for example, National Treasury Employees
Union and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 31 FLRA 566, 612-13
(1988) (Proposal 38.26, Section D), enforced in part as to
other matters sub nom. Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. FLRA,
895 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1990) (agency required to negotiate over
a proposal providing that management will give reassigned
employees administrative leave to attend counseling); and
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1994 and
Military Entrance Processing Station, Boston, Massachusetts, 27
FLRA 968 (1987) (Provision 3) (agency must negotiate over a
provision requiring management to grant employees excused
absences should dangerous conditions arise at the work place). Accordingly, we reject the Agency's assertion that the FPM
precludes this remedy because the situation involved in this
case is not listed in the FPM.(*) We further note the Agency's argument that the remedy
violates FPM Supplement 990-2, Chapter 630, Subchapter 11,
Excused Absence, Part 11-5 because management did not exercise
its discretion to order administrative leave for the grievants
when they were exposed to "Cure Seal" fumes. While that
section of the FPM states that "[a]gencies generally determine
the situations in which they will excuse employees from
duty[,]" an agency must exercise its discretion in determining
these situations consistent with its contractual obligations. Therefore, the FPM does not prevent an arbitrator from
requiring an agency to grant excused absences pursuant to the
agency's obligation under the contract. In this case, the Arbitrator interpreted the parties'
agreement as prohibiting the Agency from charging leave to
employees who declined to perform their assigned tasks due to
their exposure to "Cure Seal" fumes. The Arbitrator noted that the Agency had previously exercised its discretion
by granting administrative leave to employees on the first
shift who were exposed to "Cure Seal" and concluded that, in
view of the requirements of Article 27, the Agency had not
supported its denial of administrative leave for other
employees exposed to the same hazardous condition. As the
Arbitrator found that Article 27 required the Agency to treat
the absences of employees exposed to "Cure Seal" as
administrative leave and as an agency must exercise its
discretion consistent with its contractual obligations, we
reject the Agency's argument that the Arbitrator's remedy
violates law by improperly interfering with the Agency's
discretion to determine the situations in which it will excuse
employees from duty without charge to leave. 2. The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed His Authority
An arbitrator exceeds his or her authority when the
arbitrator resolves an issue not submitted or awards relief to
persons who are not encompassed within the grievance. See U.S.
Brookhaven Service Center and National Treasury Employees
Union, Chapter 99, 37 FLRA 1176, 1188 (1990) (IRS, Brookhaven);
and U.S. Department of the Air Force, Oklahoma City Air
Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base and American Federation
of Government Employees, Local 916, 35 FLRA 700, 703 (1990).
The issue before the Arbitrator was whether the Agency
violated the parties' agreement when a contractor employed by
the Agency applied the industrial chemical "Cure Seal" in the
vicinity of the grievants' work area and, if so, what remedy
was applicable. The Arbitrator found that the Agency violated
Article 27, Health & Safety, of the parties' agreement by
failing to provide "healthful working conditions" for employees
exposed to "Cure Seal" fumes on December 13 and 14, 1988. Arbitrator's Award at 8. The Arbitrator noted that, under the
parties' agreement, the Agency was required to inform employees
when a hazardous chemical was present and of the "health
recognized as being aggravated by exposure to the chemical[.]" Id. at 7. As the grievants were not informed of what the
effects of inhaling "Cure Seal" could be and as many employees
sought medical treatment for their exposure to the fumes on
December 14, 1988, the Arbitrator found no support for the
Agency's denial of administrative leave for those employees. Accordingly, as part of the remedy, the Arbitrator required the
Agency to treat the grievants' absences as administrative
We find that this portion of the Arbitrator's remedy was
within the Arbitrator's authority to award to the grievants. Arbitrators have great latitude in fashioning remedies. U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Los Angeles Area
Office, Region IX, Los Angeles, California and American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 2403, AFL-CIO, 35
FLRA 1224, 1229 (1990) (HUD). Requiring the Agency to treat
the absences of employees exposed to hazardous fumes as
administrative leave is directly responsive to the issues
framed by the Arbitrator and to his conclusion that the Agency
violated Article 27 of the parties' agreement by failing to
provide healthful working conditions. The Arbitrator resolved
only the issues submitted, and there is no assertion that the
Arbitrator awarded relief to employees not encompassed within
the grievance. See IRS, Brookhaven. Accordingly, we reject the Agency's argument that the
Arbitrator exceeded his authority by requiring the Agency to
treat the grievants' absences as administrative leave.
3. The Award Draws its Essence from the Agreement
Finally, we reject the Agency's assertion that the portion
of the award requiring the Agency to treat the grievants'
absences as administrative leave fails to draw its essence from
the parties' agreement. For an award to be found deficient
because it fails to draw its essence from a collective
bargaining agreement, the party making the allegation must
demonstrate that the award: (1) cannot in any rational way be
derived from the agreement; or (2) is so unfounded in reason
and fact, and so unconnected with the wording and the purpose
of the agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation
of the arbitrator; or (3) evidences a manifest disregard for
Department of the Air Force, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill
Air Force Base, Utah and American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1592, 35 FLRA 1267, 1270-71 (1990). The Agency has failed to demonstrate that the portion of
the remedy requiring the Agency to treat the absences of
employees exposed to "Cure Seal" on December 13 or 14, 1988 as
administrative leave is deficient under any of the tests set
forth above. Article 27, Section 3 of the parties' agreement
provides in part
The Employer recognizes the existence of certain employee
rights under 29 CFR Part 1960, among them the right to be
free from reprisal, including charge to leave, when
employees decline to perform their assigned tasks because
of reasonable beliefs that, under the circumstances, the
tasks pose an imminent risk of death or serious bodily
harm . . . .
Agency's Exceptions at 6 (emphasis added). As the Arbitrator
found that the Agency violated Article 27, it is not
implausible or irrational for the Arbitrator, in enforcing
Article 27, to issue a remedy preventing the Agency from
charging the grievants with leave. Further, as we noted above,
arbitrators have great latitude in fashioning remedies, HUD,
and the Authority has previously permitted an arbitrator to
order an Internal Revenue Service District Office bound by the
same collective bargaining agreement to restore leave to
employees exposed to fumes in the workplace as part of the
remedy, IRS, Wichita. Accordingly, we reject the Agency's
argument that this portion of the award fails to draw its
essence from the parties' agreement.
We note the Agency's argument that it "acted to abate the
problem as soon as it was discovered" and that, therefore, the
Agency "was in compliance with the terms of the [] agreement." Agency's Exceptions at 6-7. However, we find that the Agency
is merely disagreeing with the Arbitrator's finding that the
Agency violated Article 27 of the parties' agreement. Such an
argument constitutes disagreement with the Arbitrator's
interpretation of the contract and with the award and provides
no basis for finding the award deficient. See, for example,
Service and American Federation of Government Employees,
National Border Patrol Council, 37 FLRA 362, 378 (1990).
The Agency argues that: (1) the portion of the remedy
awarding medical expenses and interest is contrary to the FECA;
(2) the Arbitrator exceeded his authority in ordering the
payment of medical expenses and interest; and (3) this portion
of the remedy fails to draw its essence from the parties'
In IRS, Wichita, the Authority found that relief for
injuries sustained as the result of exposure to hazardous
substances in the workplace, including payment of or
reimbursement for medical expenses, is covered by the FECA and
its implementing regulations. The Authority noted that the
particular illness alleged to have been sustained by the
grievants in that case fell within the FECA because, under the
implementing regulations, "[o]ccupational disease or illness"
includes, among other things, "exposure to hazardous elements
such as, but not limited to, toxins, poisons, fumes[.]" 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(a)(16). Further, the Authority found that the implementing
regulations of the FECA "are specifically designed to cover
situations where employees believe that they have sustained
on-the-job injuries and are seeking payment or reimbursement
for expenses connected with such injuries." IRS, Wichita at
631. As reimbursement for the payments directed by the
arbitrator in that case--namely, reimbursement for
out-of-pocket medical care costs and payment for medical care
expenses--was covered exclusively by the FECA, the Authority
found that "the [a]rbitrator was not empowered to order
remedial relief that falls within the exclusive purview of the
FECA and its implementing regulations." IRS, Wichita, 40 FLRA
Similarly, we find that the particular illness alleged to
have been sustained by the grievants in this
case--specifically, illness following exposure to "Cure Seal"
fumes--falls within the FECA. We also find that reimbursement
for medical expenses incurred by employees in this case as a
result of their exposure to "Cure Seal" fumes is covered
exclusively by the FECA. We note the Union's arguments that: (1) the FECA does not
apply to this case because the injuries involved were "not of
the disabling type contemplated by [the] FECA"; and (2) even if
the FECA were applicable, the FECA does not preclude the remedy
in this case because it was not intended to exclude remedies
available under the negotiated grievance procedure for
contractual violations. Union's Opposition at 17. However,
similar arguments were considered and rejected by the Authority
in IRS, Wichita. Accordingly, for the reasons stated more
fully in IRS, Wichita, we conclude that the portion of the
Arbitrator's remedy requiring the Agency to reimburse
employees' medical expenses and pay interest on any
reimbursement that is not paid within 90 days is contrary to
law. Having found that this portion of the remedy is contrary
to law, we need not consider the Agency's additional arguments
The Arbitrator's award is modified to delete the portions
of the remedy requiring the Agency to reimburse employees'
medical expenses and pay interest on any reimbursement that is
not paid within 90 days.
have footnotes.) */ We note that AFGE states that "corrective action for the
denial of official time is not indicated as an appropriate situation for the granting of administrative leave" under FPM
Supplement 990-2, Chapter 630, Subchapter 11, Excused Absence,
Part 11-5. AFGE, 19 FLRA at 933. As we stated above, the list
of situations noted in that section of the FPM is not
exhaustive. Therefore, we will not follow the interpretation
of the FPM noted in AFGE.