Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v45/45-030.html
Timestamp: 2016-07-25 06:22:55
Document Index: 257921651

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 735', '§ 315', '§ 7106', '§ 7101', '§ 7102', '§ 7101', '§ 7131', '§ 7101', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 735', '§ 6311', '§ 6302', '§ 401']

You are hereHome [Decision Number] 45:0339(30)NG - - NTEU and Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms - - 1992 FLRAdec NG - - v45 p339
[ v45 p339 ] 45:0339(30)NG
case concerns the negotiability of 16 provisions of a negotiated
agreement that were disapproved by the Agency head under section
7114(c) of the Statute.2/ For the reasons that follow we conclude:3/
Provisions 1 and 5, which concern travel, per diem, and
official time for employees and Union officials to attend meetings
for the purpose of an oral reply to the proposed termination of a
probationary employee, do not establish procedural protections for
probationary employees as asserted by the Agency. Therefore, they
are negotiable. Provisions 2 and 6, which concern the release of
employees and Union representatives from their duties to use
official time, are negotiable.
Provision 3, which allows a 15 minute forum at formal
training sessions for the purpose of allowing the Union to address
employees, is nonnegotiable because it excessively interferes with
management's right to assign work and does not constitute an
appropriate arrangement. Provision 4, which permits the use of
official time by Union representatives to prepare and maintain reports required by
Federal agencies, is not inconsistent with section 7131(b) of the
Statute and is negotiable. Provision 7, which provides for
attendance at Union-sponsored training on official time, is
negotiable. Provision 8, which requires that all applicants for
bargaining unit positions be evaluated against the same criteria,
does not interfere with management's right to make selections from
appropriate sources under section 7106(a)(2)(C) and is negotiable. Provision 11, which requires that the Agency make efforts to
reassign an ill or injured employee, is negotiable as an
Provisions 12 and 14, which require the Agency to provide the
Union with a meeting room and a file cabinet, are not inconsistent
with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205 and are negotiable. Provisions 15, 16 and
18, which concern the granting of annual leave, excessively
7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute and are not negotiable. Provision
17, which concerns the granting of annual leave or leave without
pay to Union officers for attendance at Union-sponsored
conventions and meetings, excessively interferes with management's
right to assign work and is not negotiable.
We dismiss the petition as to section 2 of Provision 21
because the record does not permit a determination of whether it
is negotiable. We dismiss the petition as to section 3 of
Provision 21 based on procedural grounds.
A. A directly affected employee will be granted travel and
per diem, reasonable official time to travel, and
official time to participate in the following
4. attending meetings for the purpose of presenting an
oral reply to a proposed termination of a
probationary employee, if the employee is still on the rolls of the
Employer[.]
1. At the Union's option, one of the following Union
officials, i.e., Steward, Chief Steward, or Chapter
President will receive reasonable official time to be
present at discussions with the Employer concerning
conditions of employment related to employees of the
unit. Such discussions are limited to:
b. meetings for the purpose of presenting replies
to proposed termination of probationers[.]
[Only the underscored portion of this latter provision is in
The Agency contends that these two provisions grant
procedural rights to probationary employees by allowing official
time, travel, and per diem for the purpose of attending meetings
at which an oral reply to a proposed termination of a probationary
employee is presented. The Agency argues that under Authority
precedent, only the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) can
provide procedural protections for probationary employees and such
protections cannot be established through collective bargaining. As an example, the Agency cites American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1625 and Non-appropriated Fund
Instrumentality, Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, 31 FLRA
1281, 1285-88 (1988). The Agency asserts that under OPM
regulations probationers who are advised that they are being
terminated based on deficiencies in performance or conduct after
entrance on duty are given no right to reply. The Agency contends
that these two provisions would provide employees with more
procedural protections than OPM regulations provide and,
therefore, that they are nonnegotiable.
The Union asserts that these provisions do not accord
probationers a right to an oral reply and do not establish any
procedural protections for probationers. Rather, the Union
contends that the provisions merely grant official time, travel,
and per diem in the event that the Agency permits such a reply. Thus, the Union contends that these provisions would be effective
only if the OPM regulations change or the Agency permits an oral
reply of its own accord, with the permission of OPM if necessary.
As the Agency points out, the Authority has held that in
enacting the Statute, Congress did not intend that procedural
protections for probationary employees be established through
collective bargaining. For example, National Treasury Employees
Union and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Bank
Supervision, Chicago Region, Chicago, Illinois, 39 FLRA 848, 852
(1991). OPM, rather than the FLRA, has been designated to
implement the probationary program and provide whatever procedural
protections are necessary for probationary employees. For
example, id.
As the Union explains, these provisions are limited to
authorizing official time, travel, and per diem in circumstances
where an oral reply to a proposed termination of a probationary
employee is permitted under OPM regulations or becomes permissible
under OPM regulations. The Union's statement of intent is
consistent with the wording of the provisions and we adopt it for
purposes of this decision. Based on this interpretation,
Provisions 1 and 5 do not establish a right to make an oral reply. Thus, these provisions do not establish any procedural protections
for probationary employees, and we reject the Agency's claim that
We note that OPM has provided procedural protections for
probationers who are terminated based on unsatisfactory
performance or conduct after appointment that differ from those
provided for probationers who are terminated based on conduct
before appointment. 5 C.F.R. § 315.804-315.805; Federal Personnel
Manual (FPM) chapter 315, subchapter 8-4. The former group "is
not given a right of reply." FPM chapter 315, subchapter
8-4(a)(3). The latter group is entitled to "the right to reply." FPM chapter 315, subchapter 8-4(b)(1). Also, as to the latter
group, OPM has provided that they are "not entitled to an
examination of witnesses nor to a trial or hearing, except at the
discretion of the employing agency." FPM chapter 315, subchapter
8-4(b)(4). We find that this last provision permits the Agency to
allow an oral reply where the termination of a probationer is
based on conduct before appointment. Consequently, we conclude
that in some circumstances an oral reply to a proposed termination
of a probationary employee is permissible under OPM regulations.
Because these provisions are limited to providing official
time, travel, and per diem only in circumstances where an oral
reply is otherwise legally permissible, they are distinguishable
from Proposal 7 in National Federation of Federal Employees, Local
2015 and U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service,
41 FLRA 1158 (1991). Unlike these two provisions, Proposal 7
allowed for use of official time without regard to the fact that
the purpose for which the time was sought was inconsistent with an
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Provisions 1 and 5
1. If an employee wishes to meet with the Union, the
employee will request permission from his/her
supervisor. Such a request will normally be granted if
no substantial workload disruption would result. If the
request is denied, the supervisor and the employee will
endeavor to reach a mutually agreeable time for the
meeting. If postponement of the meeting directly
affects an employee's ability to meet a filing deadline
on a grievance or other action, the deadline shall be
extended to the extent of the delay.
1. A Steward, Chief Steward, or Chapter President wishing
to perform representational functions during duty hours will check with his/her
immediate supervisor and will be released absent a
severe workload disruption. If a request is denied due
to work requirements, the supervisor will explain the
reasons and will indicate when he/she will grant the
request. If the request is denied, any deadline
impacted by the denial will be extended to accommodate
The Agency asserts that these provisions are inconsistent
with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B)
of the Statute and are, for that reason, nonnegotiable. The
Agency contends that the right to assign work encompasses the
right to determine when the work assigned will be performed. The
Agency argues that these two provisions are to the same effect as
Provision 5 in American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, Local 1815 and Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker,
Alabama, 28 FLRA 1172 (1987) (Fort Rucker), which required an
agency to grant an employee's request for leave absent compelling
workload requirements and was nonnegotiable because it "nullified
management's ability to determine when assigned work would be
performed . . . . " Agency's reply brief at 3.
The Union contends that Provision 5 in Fort Rucker, which
concerned annual leave, is distinguishable from Provisions 2 and 6
in this case, which concern official time. Rather, the Union
contends that Authority precedent that holds that section 7131 of
the Statute carves out an exception to management's right to
assign work is dispositive of these two provisions. The Union
cites Military Entrance Processing Station, Los Angeles,
California, 25 FLRA 685 (1987) (Military Entrance Processing
Station), in support of this contention.
The Union argues that if the Agency is allowed to determine
unilaterally when and if an employee can contact a Union
representative, it could effectively deny an employee his or her
right under section 7102 of the Statute to engage in collective
bargaining. The Union also maintains that allowing the Agency
unilateral control over the release of a Union representative from
his or her assigned duties to perform representational duties
would undermine statutory rights granted under section 7102 of the
Statute. The Union contends that allowing the Agency unilateral
control over the use of official time would place the Agency in
the position of being able to dominate the Union in violation of
section 7116(a)(3) of the Statute and could result in situations
in which the Union would be vulnerable to allegations that it had
failed in its duty of fair representation.
In the alternative, the Union contends that these two
provisions constitute appropriate arrangements that are negotiable
under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. The Union argues that
under the analytical framework for determining whether a proposal
constitutes an appropriate arrangement, which was set forth in
Kansas Army National Guard, 21 FLRA 24 (1986) (KANG), these
provisions are negotiable. The Union asserts that the impact on
employees of being denied their right to full and adequate
representation is substantial. The Union contends that the Agency
alone controls whether it will allow a meeting or when it will
take action that aggrieves an employee and, therefore, that
employees have little control over the circumstances leading to
the adverse impact. The Union argues that the standards set forth
in the disputed portions of the provisions allow the Agency to
meet its work assignment needs with only minor impact. The Union
asserts that under the provisions, if the Agency "cannot make do
without the representative or employee, if no alternative staff is
available and if external deadlines must be met, it can delay the
meeting or deny the request." Union's reply brief at 9. The
Union contends that the balance of Union and employee rights
against management rights "must fall in favor of employees and the
Union." Id. Finally, the Union asserts that the Agency has not
shown how these provisions interfere with the efficient and
effective operation of the Agency. The Union states that "[t]hese
proposal [sic] have been in effect in the [Agency] contract since
it was first negotiated" and the Agency has not offered "a single
incident to indicate there has been a problem." Id. at 9-10.
In Military Entrance Processing Station, the Authority
reexamined the relationship between management's right to assign
work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) and the authorization to
negotiate official time for representational purposes under
section 7131(d) of the Statute. The Authority noted that Congress
provided in section 7131(d) that agencies and unions should
jointly determine through negotiations the amount of official time that will be available to employees during any given time period
that is "reasonable, necessary, and in the public interest." The
Authority also noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit had stated that "[u]nless section
7131(d) carves out an exception to section 7106(a), section
7106(a) would preclude any negotiation of official time
provisions, since official time always affects an agency's ability
to assign work." American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, Council of Locals No. 214 v. FLRA, 798 F.2d 1525, 1530-31
n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (AFGE v. FLRA). Therefore, the Authority
held that "the use of official time under section 7131(d)--that
is, its amount, allocation and scheduling--is negotiable absent an
emergency or other special circumstances . . . ." Military
Entrance Processing Station, 25 FLRA at 689.
Based on that theory, the Authority found negotiable
provisions that, similar to Provisions 2 and 6, required agencies
to grant requests by employees and union representatives to engage
in representational activity on official time, absent certain
work-related exceptions. For example, American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2354 and Department of the
Air Force, HQ 90th Combat Support Group, F.E. Warren Air Force
Base, Wyoming, 30 FLRA 1130 (1988) (Provisions 1 and 2).
More recently, the Supreme Court issued a decision that bears
on the relationship between section 7106 and other portions of the
Statute. In Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service
v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922 (1990) (IRS v. FLRA), the Court rejected the
Authority's position that section 7106 did not supersede section
7121 of the Statute. In its decision the Court stated:
The FLRA's position is flatly contradicted by the language of § 7106(a)'s command that 'nothing in this entire
chapter'--i.e., nothing in the entire Act--shall affect the
authority of agency officials to make contracting-out
determinations in accordance with applicable laws. Section
7121 is among the provisions covered by that italicized
language. [Emphasis in original.]
In our view, Congress intended by section 7131(d) of the
Statute to authorize unions to negotiate over the use of official
time for representational activity. However, the breadth and
effect that the Court has ascribed to the phase "nothing in this
chapter," which appears in section 7106(a) of the Statute,
requires us to reconsider our previous conclusion that section
7131(d) carves out an exception to section 7106(a). A strict
reading of the Court's decision in IRS v. FLRA leads to a
conclusion that section 7131(d) does not override section 7106(a)
of the Statute and, thus, that any proposals concerning official
time that are negotiated under section 7131(d) are subject to
section 7106(a).
We are mindful, however, that an elementary rule of statutory
construction is that effect must be given to every word, clause,
and sentence of a statute so that no part is rendered inoperative
or insignificant. See, for example, United States v. Menasche,
348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute,' Inhabitants of
Montclair Tp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 . . . rather than to
emasculate an entire section, as the Government's interpretation
requires."). As recognized by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in AFGE v. FLRA, subordinating
section 7131(d) to section 7106(a) of the Statute would
effectively void section 7131(d). Accordingly, as the agency
charged with the duty of enforcing the Statute, and of harmonizing
its provisions, we read IRS v. FLRA to apply to situations where
according predominance to the rights established by section 7106
can be achieved without eviscerating another provision of the
Statute. Such was the case in IRS v. FLRA, which narrowed the
scope of negotiation involving the grievance procedure but did not
render section 7121 of the Statute inoperative.4/ Sections 7106
and 7131(d) cannot be reconciled in such a manner. Therefore, we
will continue to carve out an exception to section 7106 in order
to maintain the negotiability, where otherwise warranted, of
matters involving official time.
The Union argues, as an alternative to carving out an
exception to section 7106 of the Statute, that these provisions
should be found negotiable as appropriate arrangements under
section 7106(b)(3). In view of the Union's argument and as the
effect, if any, of IRS v. FLRA on the carve-out theory is one of
first impression, we will consider the Union's argument that these provisions constitute
appropriate arrangements. We note that section 7106(a) is itself
subject to section 7106(b), which authorizes negotiations over
procedures that management will observe in exercising its
management rights and appropriate arrangements for employees
affected by the exercise of management's rights.5/ Therefore,
under section 7106 as a whole, a provision or proposal that
directly interferes with section 7106(a) may nevertheless be
negotiable by operation of section 7106(b)(3), which addresses the
negotiation of appropriate arrangements. American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (AFGE, Local 2782 v. FLRA). Accordingly, until
we receive further guidance from the courts on this issue, where
it is asserted that a provision seeking to negotiate over official
time under section 7131 is inconsistent with section 7106, we will
analyze such provisions to determine whether the provision
directly interferes with management's rights under section 7106
and whether it constitutes an appropriate arrangement that is
negotiable pursuant to section 7106(b)(3).6/ Here, the Agency asserts that Provisions 2 and 6 are
inconsistent with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B). Provisions 2 and 6 establish the
circumstances under which employees and Union representatives will
be released from their duties for purposes of meeting with the
Union or performing representational functions. The provisions
effectively require release upon request absent, in the case of
employees, a substantial workload disruption or, in the case of
Union representatives, a severe workload disruption. The right to assign work encompasses the right to determine
when work that has been assigned will be performed. See, for
example, National Association of Government Employees, SEIU,
AFL-CIO and Veterans Administration, Veterans Administration
Medical Center, Department of Memorial Affairs, 40 FLRA 657, 670
(1991) (VAMC, Department of Memorial Affairs). Applying this
principle, the Authority has found that proposals that require an
agency to grant leave to an employee or place restrictions on an
agency's ability to deny leave without regard to the agency's need
for the employee's services during the period covered by the
request directly interfere with the right to assign work. See,
for example, National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 405
and U.S. Department of the Army, Army Information Systems Command,
St. Louis, Missouri, 42 FLRA 1112, 1126-27 (1991) (Army
Information Systems Command); American Federation of Government
Headquarters, 1606th Air Base Wing (MAC), Kirtland Air Force Base,
New Mexico, 15 FLRA 580, 583-85 (1984). Applying this principle,
we also have found that proposals that require an agency to
provide employees with time during their hours of duty to clean up
directly interfere with management's right to assign work because
they preclude the assignment of other types of work during the
specified period. See, for example, National Federation of
Federal Employees, Local 1655 and U.S. Department of Defense,
National Guard Bureau, Department of Military Affairs, Illinois
Air National Guard, 35 FLRA 740 (1990) (Illinois Air National
Guard). It follows that Provisions 2 and 6 directly interfere
with management's right to assign work because they place
restrictions on the Agency's ability to deny a request that an
employee be excused from performing assigned duties for the period
covered by the request.
The Union contends that Provisions 2 and 6 constitute
appropriate arrangements negotiable under section 7106(b)(3) of
the Statute. To determine whether these provisions are negotiable
under section 7106(b)(3), we initially must determine whether they
constitute arrangements within the meaning of that section. To
do that, we must ascertain whether these provisions seek to
address or compensate for the adverse effects on employees
produced by the exercise of management rights. See KANG, 21 FLRA
The management rights that are set forth in section 7106 of
the Statute cover a broad range of matters that affect fundamental
working conditions of employees. Those rights vest agency
management with the authority to take actions that can result in
effects on bargaining unit employees that are adverse in nature. See Overseas Education Association, Inc. v. FLRA, 876 F.2d 960
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (OEA v. FLRA) (section 7106(b)(3) authorizes
negotiation of appropriate arrangements for employees adversely
affected by the exercise of any of the management rights set forth
in section 7106). Where management action adversely affects
employees, collective bargaining is one of the processes provided
by Congress to which "disgruntled employees may . . . resort." Id. at 970. For example, section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute allows
employees who have been adversely affected by the exercise of
management rights to "combine their views and their voices in a
concerted responsive effort[]" in an attempt to ease the impact of
such management actions. Id. at 971. Crucial to the efficacy of
any concerted, responsive effort is the ability of employees to
seek and receive the assistance of their collective bargaining
agent, i.e., their union. Concerted, responsive efforts will not
be limited to the negotiation of appropriate arrangements but
necessarily will include an assortment of representational
activities. The use of official time that is authorized under
section 7131(a) and (d) is an integral part of the
representational process involved in such efforts.
These provisions establish the conditions under which either
employees who wish to meet with their Union representatives or
specified Union representatives who wish to perform
representational functions will be released from their normal
duties to engage in labor-management activity on official time
that is authorized under section 7131(d) of the Statute. The
weight of our case law suggests that the need of an employee to
meet with a union representative or of a union representative to
perform representational functions generally will be related to
some action taken, or proposed, by management in the context of
its management rights. Thus, the representational activity
generally will seek to ease the effect of such actions. It
follows that the ability of employees and their union
representatives to engage in such activities is essential to their
ability to obtain some mollification of the adverse effects that
can flow from the numerous management actions covered by section
7106 of the Statute. We conclude that these provisions are
intended to enable employees to address the myriad adverse effects
that foreseeably can flow from the exercise of the panoply of
management rights that are set forth in section 7106. Accordingly, we find that under the analytical framework that was
set forth in KANG, these provisions constitute arrangements for
employees adversely affected by the exercise of management's
rights under section 7106 of the Statute.
Moreover, we find that in those few circumstances where the
need to engage in representational activity is not attributable to
the exercise of a management right, these provisions serve as
arrangements for employees whose ability to seek and obtain union
representation would be curtailed by the Agency's exercise of its
right to assign work. As discussed above, section 7131(d) of the
Statute authorizes the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement to negotiate over official time for labor-management
relations activities. We can only conclude that the purpose of
this authorization is to foster the ability of employees to
exercise rights accorded them by section 7102 of the Statute to
"form, join, or assist" unions and to promote the statutory
purpose, as expressed in section 7101, of enabling employees to
participate in decisions that affect them. When the Agency denies
requests to use official time for a purpose that has been agreed
to under section 7131(d), it undermines this statutory scheme with
the foreseeable adverse effect on employees of diminishing their
ability to pursue effectively and efficiently the avenues that are
available to them under the Statute to protect their work-related
"appropriate," within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3), we must
examine the competing practical needs of the parties and determine
whether the negative impact on management's rights is
disproportionate to the benefits that the arrangements confer on
employees. See KANG, 21 FLRA at 33.
Insofar as the nature and extent of the impact experienced by
the adversely affected employees is concerned, we note that the
effects will be myriad and dependent on the circumstances that
surround the management action that generates the particular need
for Union representation. Similarly, the extent to which the
circumstances giving rise to the adverse effects are within an
employee's control will be varied and dependent on the
circumstances surrounding the management action involved.
Management's right to assign work would be affected by the
provisions to the extent that the Agency could deny requests by
employees that they be released from duties to use available
official time only where a "substantial" workload disruption would
result and by Union representatives only where a "severe" workload
disruption would result.
Now we turn to the benefits and burdens entailed in the
proposed arrangements. The arrangements would facilitate the
employees' ability to obtain Union representation when faced with
the prospect of adverse effects flowing from Agency action. An
employee's rights to be represented by his or her union in such
circumstances flow from various portions of the Statute.
In enacting the Statute, Congress found that statutory
collectively, and participate through labor organizations in
decisions that affect them safeguards the public interest and
contributes to the effective conduct of public business. 5 U.S.C. § 7101. Congress found, therefore, that "labor organizations and
collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public
interest." Id. Based on that finding, Congress enacted the
Statute for the purpose of prescribing certain rights and
obligations for employees of the Federal Government and
establishing procedures "designed to meet the special requirements
and needs of the Government." Id. Under the Statute, employees
are given the right to "form, join, or assist any labor
organization, or to refrain from any such activity[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 7102. Section 7114 of the Statute prescribes various
representational rights and duties for employees and the unions
that represent them exclusively. Among other things, a union is
entitled to act for and represent the interests of those employees
for whom it holds exclusive recognition. To enable the union to
do so, as we have noted earlier, section 7131(d) authorizes the
parties to a collective bargaining relationship to negotiate over
grants of official time for employees who are engaged in
labor-management relations activities that are not covered by the
remainder of section 7131.7/
An agency's denial of requests by employees that they be
released from their duties to perform labor-management activities
on available official time severely diminishes the ability of the
Union and employees to control when they will perform
labor-management activities. Correspondingly, it diminishes their
ability to conduct the collective bargaining relationship in a
manner that, from the employees' perspective, is effective and
efficient. Put simply, depriving the employees and the Union of
the ability to perform labor-management relations activities at
times that are desirable from their perspective places the
employees and the Union at a disadvantage in protecting employee
interests in the face of Agency action.
We find that the provisions afford substantial benefits to
employees on both an individual and collective basis. In this
regard, these provisions enhance the ability of employees and
their representatives to engage in labor-management relations
activities in an effective and efficient manner by permitting the
employees and the Union greater control over when they will
perform such activities. These provisions reduce the need for
employees to use non-duty hours for such activities and, thus,
facilitate the employees' ability to exercise rights provided to
them by the Statute and to protect themselves against adverse
effects that flow from action taken by their employer.8/ These
provisions also benefit both the Agency and the public interest by
promoting an effective and meaningful collective bargaining
relationship. In particular, we note that facilitating the
employees' ability to obtain Union representation affords such
benefits as the promotion of the early resolution of disputes and
prevention of unjust and unwarranted personnel actions.
The provisions place a burden on the Agency by requiring it
to release employees from their duties in circumstances covered by
the provisions. Although, under the provisions, the Agency would
not be required to endure a workload disruption that amounts to
"severe" or "substantial," it would nevertheless be required to undergo any
lesser workload disruption in order to accommodate the request for
official time. In circumstances that did not meet the specified
standards, the Agency would have to either postpone the
performance of the particular work that, but for the official time
use, would be performed at the specific time by the employee or
reassign the work to someone else. Significantly, however, these
provisions do not totally preclude the assignment of work to any
individual employee or prevent the Agency from scheduling work
generally for the purpose of accomplishing its mission and
operations. Insofar as the effect on efficient and effective Government
operations is concerned, the provisions would require the Agency
to make some concessions with respect to how it accomplishes its
work to accommodate requests for official time. However, the
provisions would contribute to the effective conduct of public
business by promoting collective bargaining and employee
participation in decisions that affect them. See 5 U.S.C. § 7101. Thus, while the provisions would require the Agency to endure some
disruption in its ability to manage its workload at optimum
efficiency at the particular time that coincides with an official
time request, the extent of that impairment would be limited by
the terms of the provisions and would be offset by the long-term
benefits afforded by an effective labor-management relationship.
On balance, we conclude that the benefits to employees and
the contribution to the public interest that are afforded by the
provisions outweigh the burden placed on the Agency and that the
provisions do not excessively interfere with management's right to
assign work. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that as an
alternative to the "carve out" theory set forth in Military
Entrance Processing Station, Provisions 2 and 6 are negotiable as
appropriate arrangements under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute.
C. A steward, Chief Steward, or Chapter President shall be
given the opportunity to address formal training
classes, including training at FLETC [Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center], for up to 15 minutes on
official time during official duty hours.
The Agency asserts that this provision interferes with
the Statute. In this regard, the Agency argues that the
assignment of training is encompassed within the right to assign
work and that the right to assign work includes the right to
determine when work assignments will occur. The Agency contends
that the provision would preclude management from assigning work
or performing training during the covered period by mandating that
the Union be given 15 minutes to address employees.
The Union acknowledges that management has the right under
section 7106 of the Statute to assign work and decide when the
work will be done and that this right extends to the assignment
and content of training. However, the Union argues that
foreclosing "a mere fifteen minute forum for the [U]nion during a
management scheduled training session goes far beyond the intent
of the [S]tatute in preserving management's right." Union's reply
brief at 10. The Union contends that the Union's right to meet
with employees and discuss representational matters should be
balanced against management's right to assign 15 minutes of work
during a training session and that the provision constitutes an
appropriate arrangement within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3)
Applying the factors set forth in KANG, the Union contends
that the impact of preventing the proposed forums is substantial. The Union asserts that the forums would afford employees an
opportunity to hear and discuss how the training impacts their
work lives from the Union's perspective and would provide an
opportunity for discussing the connection between employee rights
under the contract and the subject matter of the training. In
this regard, the Union contends that such a forum is necessary
because the Union is denied the ability to bargain over the
content, breadth and scope of training as a consequence of the
management's rights provisions of the Statute. The Union contends
that the employees and the Union have no control over the
potential adverse impact that the training may have on unit
The Union argues that the impact on the Agency's right to
assign work is negligible. In support of this argument, the Union
contends that 15 minutes of a training session that can last from
several hours to several weeks is an inconsequential amount of
time "wrested from management control." Id.
The Union asserts that, on balance, the negligible impact on
management's right to assign work is outweighed by the employees'
need to know their own rights in relation to the course material. The Union also contends that the provision has no negative impact
on effective and efficient Government operations. In this regard
the Union contends that the forums would entail only a "de minimis
incursion" into training sessions and would prevent frivolous
grievances and promote quick resolution of any problems that
arise. Id. at 13.
It is well established that the assignment of job-related
training during duty hours constitutes an assignment of work. See, for example, National Association of Government Employees,
Local R1-144, Federal Union of Scientists and Engineers and U.S.
Rhode Island, 38 FLRA 456 (1990) (Proposals 6 and 14), remanded
without decision as to other matters sub nom. United States
Rhode Island v. FLRA, No. 91-1045 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 23, 1991). However, a requirement that employees be provided classes that are
solely for the purpose of conveying information concerning their
conditions of employment and do not concern instruction in some
facet of their duties and responsibilities does not involve
training that comes within the ambit of the right to assign work. See American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3407 and
(Proposal 2) (Defense Mapping Agency). Initially, we note that
Provision 3 would apply to formal training classes at which
job-related training is being given and would require that the
Agency include a 15-minute forum during duty hours at which the
Union would address employees who are attending the training. Thus, while the Union may wish only to dispense and/or obtain
information concerning the conditions of employment of employees
during that forum, the forum would occur in the context of
training that is encompassed within management's right to assign
work under section 7106(a)(2)(B). This provision requires that the Agency schedule the forum
during the period of time at which the training class is held
without regard to whatever other work the Agency may wish to
accomplish in the training session during that time. It is well
established that the right to assign work under section
7106(a)(2)(B) includes the right to determine when work that has
been assigned will be performed. See, for example, VAMC,
Department of Memorial Affairs, 40 FLRA 657. This provision
directly interferes with the Agency's right to assign work under
section 7106(a)(2)(B) because it imposes the scheduling of the
forum during duty hours regardless of whether the Agency wishes to
assign training or other work during the time involved. Thus, it
prevents the Agency from determining when work will be performed. See, for example, Illinois Air National Guard, 35 FLRA 740
(Proposal 4, which required that employees be given 10 minutes
prior to their lunch break and at the end of the day to cleanup,
directly interfered with management's right to assign work).
Moreover, we note that the right to assign work encompasses
decisions as to the type of training to be assigned and the
frequency and duration of training. See, for example,
International Plate Printers, Die Stampers and Engravers Union of
North America, AFL-CIO, Local 2 and Department of the Treasury,
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Washington, D.C., 25 FLRA 113,
124-28 (1987). This provision requires that the Agency include
the 15-minute forum for the Union in all of its formal training
classes and, consequently, directly interferes with the Agency's
right to make decisions concerning the content and duration of its
training classes. We find that this provision is distinguishable from Proposal
2 in Defense Mapping Agency. In that decision we concluded that
Proposal 2 concerned classes that did not come within the ambit of
management's right to assign work because they were limited to
providing employees with information concerning their conditions
of employment. We further concluded that Proposal 2, which was
otherwise negotiable, was not rendered nonnegotiable based solely
on the fact that it involved use of duty time by employees to
attend the classes. This provision, unlike Proposal 2, concerns
training classes that are encompassed within management's right to
assign work and does not permit the Agency to determine when work
that has been assigned will be performed. See also U.S.
Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration,
40 FLRA 690, 713-16 (1991), petition for review as to other
matters filed sub nom. Professional Airways Systems Specialists
Division, District No. 1-MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO v. FLRA, No. 91-1310
(D.C. Cir. June 23, 1991) (proposal that authorized union
representatives to attend agency training programs on drug testing
for the purpose of obtaining information about a condition of
employment in the bargaining unit did not concern training that
was encompassed within management's right to assign work).
The Union claims that this provision constitutes an
of the Statute. In support of this claim, the Union contends that
this provision is intended to provide employees with the
opportunity to discuss with the Union, and obtain information on,
the effects that the training has on their work lives. In this
regard, it is intended to provide employees and the Union with the
means to identify and address inadequacies that may exist in the
training that is provided employees or any other negative effects
that the assigned training may have on their working conditions. We find that this provision is intended to address anticipated
adverse effects on employees flowing from management's right to
assign the work of training to employees and determining the type,
frequency, and duration of that training. We conclude that
Provision 3 constitutes an arrangement within the meaning of
section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. See National Federation of
834, 840-41 (1990) (Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western
Division) (a proposal that seeks to ameliorate the adverse effects
of the exercise of a management right by inhibiting the exercise
of that right may constitute an arrangement within the meaning of
Having concluded that this provision constitutes an
arrangement, we now address whether it is appropriate or whether
it excessively interferes with management's right to assign work. Inadequacies in the job-related training provided employees can
have a significant effect on the employees' job performance. The
nature and extent of the effect experienced by employees will vary
depending on the nature and extent of the inadequacies in the
training that are addressed by the Union and how those
inadequacies relate to the individual employee's training needs. Thus, although the provision offers a significant benefit to
employees in terms of enhancing their ability to address matters
that affect their working conditions, the actual extent of the
benefits is unpredictable.
With regard to the burdens imposed by the proposal on the
Agency, the provision requires that the Agency allocate to the
Union 15 minutes at every formal training class regardless of the
need to devote that time to the accomplishment of other work and
without regard to the importance to employees and the Union of
conducting such a forum at a particular training class. Thus,
this provision imposes a significant burden on the Agency by
requiring that it allocate 15 minutes at every formal training
class in order to accommodate the forums.
On balance, we find that the burden that is placed on
management's ability to conduct its operations in an effective and
efficient manner by this requirement outweighs the benefits to
employees and that this provision excessively interferes with
management's right to assign work. We conclude that Provision 3
does not constitute an appropriate arrangement under section
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Provision 3
under section 7106(a)(2)(B) and that it is nonnegotiable.
B. A steward, Chief Steward, or Chapter President may
utilize official time from the Union Bank for the
11. to prepare and maintain records and reports
required of the Union by Federal agencies.
The Agency acknowledges that the Authority has concluded that
proposals allowing official time to prepare certain reports
required by the Statute are negotiable. However, the Agency
contends that Authority precedent suggests that the use of
official time for activities that relate to a union as an
organization is proscribed, citing American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2823 and Veterans
Administration Regional Office, Cleveland, Ohio, 2 FLRA 4 (1979)
(VA, Cleveland). The Agency asserts that this provision permits
the use of official time for any record or report required by a
Federal agency and is not limited to those required by the
Statute. The Agency contends that this provision is inconsistent
with section 7131(b) of the Statute, which prohibits the use of
official time for activities related to the internal business of a
The Union states that this provision does not apply to
reports that are discretionary in nature or required by
non-Federal agencies but applies to records and reports required
of Federal sector labor unions by Federal agencies. The Union
contends that this provision is to the same effect as the proposal
that the Authority found negotiable in VA, Cleveland. The Union
argues that the reports and records that are the subject of this
provision are of the same nature as those that were the subject of
the proposal in VA, Cleveland, that is, reports and records
required of labor organizations by the Department of Labor (DOL). The Union maintains that the reports that are the subject of this
provision are required by law and provide public oversight to
ensure the fiscal integrity of unions. The Union argues that
there are no reasonable grounds upon which to distinguish reports
required by DOL from those required by other Federal agencies. Finally, the Union asserts that the reports to which this
provision is addressed do not involve institutional matters.
This provision is to the same effect as Proposal 1 in
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 38 FLRA 1366 (1991) (IRS). In
that case, the agency argued that a proposal that permitted the
use of official time to prepare and maintain records and reports
required of the union by Federal agencies was inconsistent with
section 7131(b) of the Statute. In that decision we stated:
In our view, Proposal 1 is similar to the proposal found
negotiable in VA, Cleveland, which concerned official time
for the preparation of financial and other reports required
by the U.S. Department of Labor under section 7120(c) of the
Statute, concerning the operations of a labor organization. In that case, the Authority found that, unlike the activities
expressly cited in section 7131(b) of the Statute as not
eligible to be conducted on official time, such reports did
not solely relate to the structure and institution of the
labor organization. Rather, they "make[] available to the
public information regarding the conduct of union affairs." Similarly, the records and reports referenced in Proposal 1
do not solely relate to the structure and institution of the
Union. Rather, the Union must prepare and maintain these
records and reports to meet requirements imposed by Federal
agencies upon the Union to disclose certain information about
its operations. Accordingly, Proposal 1 is not inconsistent
with Federal law and is, therefore, within the duty to
For the reasons expressed in IRS, we conclude that Provision
4 is negotiable.
During each year of this Agreement up to 32 hours of
administrative leave will be granted to each of 3
representatives from each of the nine designated chapters for
travel and attendance at union sponsored training.
The Agency asserts that to the extent that this provision
mandates the granting of either annual or administrative leave
even if the Agency needs the Union representative present to
perform work, it is nonnegotiable because it interferes with the
right to assign work. The Agency contends that to the extent that
this provision mandates the granting of administrative leave for
Union-sponsored training that involves internal Union business, it
is nonnegotiable because it conflicts with 5 U.S.C. § 7131(b).
The Union states that this provision presents essentially the
same issue as Provisions 2 and 6. In this regard, the Union
maintains that although the term "administrative leave" is used in
this provision, its intent is to allow official time within the
meaning of section 7131 of the Statute for attendance at
Union-sponsored training about collective bargaining matters. The
Union asserts that the term "administrative leave" appears in this
provision because that term has been used in contracts since
before the Civil Service Reform Act when the parties had to rely
on the concept of administrative leave in order to obtain the
functional equivalent of the official time that now is covered by
section 7131 of the Statute. The Union also contends that
administrative leave and official time are interchangeable.
Citing the Authority's decision in Military Entrance
Processing Section, 25 FLRA 685, the Union argues that section
7131 creates an exception to management's right to assign work.
The Union contends that having Union representatives properly
trained in collective bargaining responsibilities serves the
purposes of all parties. The Union states that this provision is
intended "solely to allow [U]nion representatives to attend
[U]nion sponsored training to deal with matters of collective
bargaining, e.g., grievance procedures, contract interpretation,
labor law, etc. It is not the intent or reach of this clause to
allow official time or administrative leave for training over
matters of [U]nion interest only." Union's reply brief at 18. The Union contends that the Agency's speculation that the
provision may be improperly used should not provide a basis for
finding that the provision is nonnegotiable. The Union maintains
that in the event that the Agency believes that the official time
is being misused, it retains the ability to refuse the time and
force the Union to prove to an arbitrator that the claim for time
is in accordance with the law.
The Union's statement that Provision 7 is intended to apply
to Union-sponsored training in collective bargaining matters and
not to training over matters of solely Union interest is
consistent with the language of the provision. Therefore, we
adopt the Union's interpretation. Based on this interpretation,
we reject the Agency's contention that this provision is
inconsistent with Section 7131(b) of the Statute.
We also construe this provision as seeking official time
under section 7131(d) of the Statute. We agree with the Union
that official time and administrative leave are based on the same
concept and that the use of the latter term in the provision is
inconsequential. In this regard, we note that OPM defines the
term "administrative leave" as follows:
The term is sometimes used to refer to an excused absence
from duty without loss of pay and without charge to leave. The term is not officially recognized in statute or OPM
regulations. FPM chapter 630, subchapter 11-7 (Emphasis in original.). Significantly, in those same FPM provisions concerning excused
absences, under the heading "Employee Organizations,"
cross-reference is provided to "individual contracts between
agencies and employee organizations for granting of excused
absence." FPM chapter 630, subchapter 11-9. Under section 7131
of the Statute "official time" equates to "paid time," which is
granted in connection with labor-management relations activities. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89
(1983); American Federation of Government Employees, National
Council of Field Labor Locals and U.S. Department of Labor, Mine
Safety and Health Administration, Denver, Colorado, 39 FLRA 546
(1991). For the reasons stated above in conjunction with
Provisions 2 and 6, and consistent with Military Entrance
Processing Station, we find that Provision 7 is negotiable.
In the event that the approach taken in Military Entrance
Processing Station is no longer viable, we apply the following
analysis as an alternative. This provision would require that the
Agency grant up to 32 hours of official time per year to each of
27 Union representatives for the purpose of attending
Union-sponsored training. The Union states that its
representatives can select from at least six training sessions
that it sponsors every year. Petition at 4. Thus, under this
provision, the Agency would be required to release the designated
employees from their duties for up to 32 hours at times that
coincide with the training sessions sponsored by the Union. Based
on the reasons expressed above in conjunction with Provisions 2
and 6, we conclude that this provision directly interferes with
the right to assign work because it would require the Agency to
excuse employees from performing assigned duties in order to
attend training sessions that are sponsored by the Union.
Although the Union did not expressly raise the issue of
appropriate arrangements in conjunction with this particular
provision, we cannot ignore its similarity to Provisions 2 and 6,
which we concluded were negotiable as appropriate arrangements. In fact, the Union describes this provision as presenting
"essentially the same issue" as those two provisions. Union's
reply brief at 16. Therefore, we will apply the appropriate
arrangement analysis that was set forth in KANG to this provision.
Initially, we note that there is no claim that negotiation of
official time for Union-sponsored training that relates to
representational activity is not authorized under section 7131(d)
of the Statute. As we discussed in conjunction with Provisions 2
and 6, the management rights provisions of the Statute vest agency
adverse effects on bargaining unit employees. Collective
bargaining is one of the processes to which employees may resort
when they need to protect their work-related interests in the face
of management-generated actions. As we have noted previously, in
the collective bargaining process that has been established under
the Statute, a union that has been accorded exclusive recognition
for a particular group of employees is entitled to act for and
represent the interests of those employees.
In the Federal sector, many unions rely on employees in the
agencies in which they hold recognition to perform
representational functions either in addition to or instead of
staff employed or retained by the Union. As evidence of this
reality, section 7131 of the Statute governs the extent to which
agency employees representing a union may conduct representational
activities on official time. It follows that the representation
of employees in concerted efforts to respond to
management-generated actions that may adversely affect employees
generally will require action by an employee who is functioning as
a union representative at some, if not all, stages of the
proceedings. Training of those employee representatives is
essential to the competent and effective representation of the
interests of bargaining unit employees. The availability of
official time for the purpose of attending training dealing with
matters relating to collective bargaining facilitates the ability
of union representatives to obtain such training. Thus, providing
official time for purposes of obtaining that training constitutes
an arrangement for employees who are faced with adverse effects
flowing from the exercise of management rights and who need
representation for the purpose of protecting their interests
against such adverse effects.
need for Union representation is not attributable to the exercise
of a management right, this provision serves as an arrangement for
employees whose ability to obtain competent union representation
would be curtailed by the Agency's exercise of its right to assign
work. That is, if Union representatives are unable to attend
training because of the Agency's refusal to release them from
their duties, it is reasonably foreseeable that the quality of the
representation afforded bargaining unit employees will diminish
and, by extension, so will the ability of employees to protect
their work-related interests.
We now turn to the question of whether the proposed
arrangement is appropriate. As we discussed in conjunction with
Provisions 2 and 6, the nature and extent of the effects
experienced by the adversely affected employees will be highly
varied and dependent on the circumstances that surround the
management action that generates the particular need for Union
representation. Similarly, the extent to which the circumstances
giving rise to the adverse effects are within an employee's
control will be varied and dependent on the circumstances
surrounding the management action involved. Requiring the Agency to release employees on official time to
attend Union-sponsored training would prevent the Agency from
assigning work to the employees during the period involved. The
Union states that it offers Union-sponsored training at least six
times per year. While this circumstance may afford some
flexibility as to the timing of the release of a particular
employee, it nevertheless limits the Agency's ability to control
the timing of an employee's absence. However, the fact that such
training sessions are likely to be prescheduled allows the Agency
advance notice of an employee's absence and the opportunity to
plan around it in terms of scheduling work assignments. Like
Provisions 2 and 6, this provision does not totally preclude the
assignment of work to any individual employee or prevent the
Agency from scheduling work generally for the purpose of
accomplishing its mission and operations.
Similar to Provisions 2 and 6, the benefits to employees
afforded by this provision are significant. The opportunity for
Union representatives to attend Union-sponsored training
concerning collective bargaining matters on official time
significantly enhances the ability of those representatives to
obtain adequate training in the performance of their
representational functions. Such training affords benefits to
employees, both individually and collectively, by increasing the
level of competence of Union representatives and, by extension,
the quality and effectiveness of the representation afforded
employees. We find that increasing the competence of the Union
representatives and, by extension, their ability to engage in a
collective bargaining relationship in a more effective and
efficient manner would also benefit the Agency. Additionally, as
we noted earlier, collective bargaining in the civil service is in
the public interest. See 5 U.S.C. § 7101. It follows that
training that fosters the ability of Union representatives to
improve the collective bargaining relationship will promote the
As to the burden on management rights, we find that the
provision would impose on management by depriving it of the
services of the employees involved during particular periods of
time. However, as we have noted earlier, some flexibility in the
scheduling of absences and work assignments is afforded by virtue
of the fact that more than one training session is available
during the year and advance notice of absences is possible. Additionally, as noted above, raising the level of the competence
of the Union representatives who are involved in the conduct of
the collective bargaining relationship would contribute to
effective and efficient Government operations.
On balance, we find that the benefits that the provision
affords to employees, both individually and collectively, and to
the public interest outweigh the burden placed on management's
right to assign work. Consequently, we conclude that, as an
Entrance Processing Station, Provision 7 constitutes an
appropriate arrangement, which is negotiable under section
C. All applicants for any bargaining unit position
shall be evaluated against the same criteria
and will be given simultaneous consideration.
The Agency contends that the effect of this
provision would be "to funnel candidates from every
appropriate source through the rating and ranking
procedure" and that, consequently, it would preclude the
Agency from selecting directly from other appropriate
sources. Agency's statement of position at 8. The
Agency asserts that, like Provision 6 in Marine Corps
Logistics Base, Albany, 29 FLRA 1587, this provision
interferes with the Agency's management right to make
selections from any appropriate source under section
The Union contends that the Agency "reads beyond the
actual language" of this provision in asserting that it
requires that all candidates be rated and ranked using
the negotiated promotion procedure. Union's reply brief
at 19. According to the Union, the provision requires
only that the Agency "assess all candidates using the
same (employer determined) criteria." Id. The Union
states that under this provision the Agency can select
from any source it wishes but is "precluded from
requiring a Ph.D. from internal candidates and an
elementary school diploma from external candidates." Id.
at 20. The Union contends that as long as the Agency
looks at the qualifications of all applicants and uses
the same standards for evaluating candidates, it can use
any legal process and source for non-internal candidates.
The Union's statements as to the intent of this
provision are consistent with the language of the
provision and are adopted for purposes of this decision. Based on the language and the Union's statement of
intent, we find that the disputed portion of this
provision does not limit the Agency to making selections
from among properly ranked and certified candidates for
promotion and that it does not preclude selection from
any other appropriate source. We reject the Agency's
assertions that the provision has that effect and,
consequently, that it is inconsistent with management's
Statute. As the Agency asserts no other grounds in
support of its contention that this provision is
nonnegotiable, we conclude that Provision 8 is within the
A. Efforts shall be made to reassign or detail the
employee concerned to a different duty
assignment within his/her post of duty.
B. After efforts regarding Subsection A of this
section are exhausted, consideration will be
given to reassigning or detailing the employee
concerned to a different post of duty.
The Agency contends that this provision mandates
that efforts be made to reassign an ill or injured
employee to a different duty assignment. The Agency
argues that the provision is inconsistent with
management's rights to assign employees and assign work
under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute. The
Agency acknowledges that the Authority concluded that a
similar proposal was negotiable as an appropriate
arrangement in International Federation of Professional
Hampshire, 35 FLRA 31 (1990) (Provision 2) (Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard I). However, the Agency asserts that that
conclusion is in error. The Agency bases this assertion
on the Supreme Court's decision in IRS v. FLRA, which the
Agency describes as supporting a conclusion that no
appropriate arrangement negotiated under section
7106(b)(3) can interfere with the exercise of
management's rights under section 7106(a) of the Statute.
The Union states that this provision applies when an
employee becomes handicapped or injured and still wishes
to work. The Union contends that the Authority's
decision in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard applies and that
the provision is negotiable. The Union argues that the
Agency's interpretation of IRS v. FLRA is erroneous and
would render section 7106(b)(3) null and void.
Initially, we reject the Agency's argument that the
Supreme Court's decision in IRS v. FLRA requires a
conclusion that a matter cannot be negotiable as an
appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3) if it
interferes with management's rights under section
7106(a). See Office of Thrift Supervision, 44 FLRA 63. As we discussed in conjunction with Provisions 2 and 6
above, Section 7106 specifically provides that
management's rights under section 7106 are "subject to"
section (b) of the Statute. Thus, section 7106
unequivocally establishes that management's rights under
section 7106 are "subject to" the Union's right to
negotiate "appropriate arrangements" under section
7106(b)(3). See OEA v. FLRA, 876 F.2d at 965 ("Section
7106(a) . . . enumerates the prerogatives reserved to
management, but the immunity of [those] rights from the
duty to bargain is '[s]ubject' to Section 7106(b)(3).") (Footnote omitted.); AFGE, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d
1183 (opinion by then-Judge Scalia). Thus, the literal
wording and structure of section 7106 support a
conclusion that a proposal that constitutes an
appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3) is
negotiable notwithstanding "some constraints upon rights
generally reserved (in other contexts) to management." Id. at 1188.
As the parties acknowledge, we have previously
examined proposals requiring an agency to make efforts to
place an employee who is physically disabled for service
in his or her current position in a position that he or
she is physically able to perform. We have concluded
that such proposals directly interfere with management's
rights to assign employees and work, but, nevertheless,
are negotiable as appropriate arrangements under section
7106(b)(3) of the Statute. American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 2024 and U.S. Department of
the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, 37 FLRA 249 (1990) (Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
II) (Proposal 5); Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Western Division, 36 FLRA 834 (Provision 1); Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard I, 35 FLRA 31 (1990) (Provision 2).
We find that this provision constitutes an
the Statute. As explained by the Union, it applies in
circumstances where an employee who has become
handicapped or injured wishes to continue working but
cannot unless the Agency reassigns the employee to duties
that he or she can perform. Thus, we find that this
provision is intended to address the adverse effects that
would foreseeably result if the Agency, in exercising its
management rights, assigns an employee to a position or
work that he or she is unsuited to perform because of
handicap or injury or if the Agency exercises its right
by choosing not to assign any work because of such a
condition. In the first instance, the Agency's actions
could place the employee at risk of discipline or a
negative performance evaluation as a result of the
employee's inability to perform satisfactorily. In the
second instance, the employee could be faced with
depleting his or her leave balances and/or forgoing his
or her normal income if leave balances are exhausted.
Provision 11 has the same effect as the proposals
that we have held negotiable as appropriate arrangements
in the above-cited cases and the parties acknowledge the
applicability of that precedent. Moreover, the Agency
offers nothing to support a conclusion that a disposition
different from that reached in the above-cited cases is
warranted as to Provision 11. It is well established
that parties bear the burden of creating a record upon
which the Authority can make a negotiability
determination. For example, National Federation of
Federal Employees, Local 2050 and U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 35 FLRA 706, 711-12 (1990); National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1167 v. FLRA, 681
F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'g National Federation of
Federal Employees, Local 1167 and Department of the Air
Force, Headquarters, 31st Combat Support Group (TAC),
Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, 6 FLRA 574 (1981). A
party failing to meet this burden acts at its peril. For
Local R1-134 and U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval
589, 596 (1990). Accordingly, we conclude that the
disputed portion of Provision 11 constitutes an
Statute and that it is negotiable.
A. The Employer, upon appropriate advance request,
will provide the Union, when available, at the
Employer's facility, a meeting room for the
4. for other activities deemed necessary by
The Agency asserts that under this provision the
Union would be permitted to conduct internal union
business in meeting space provided by the Agency. In
view of this, the Agency contends that this provision is
inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205, which provides that
Government equipment will be used for only officially
approved activities. In support of its contention, the
Agency cites National Treasury Employees Union and
Internal Revenue Service, Denver District, 24 FLRA 249
(1986) (IRS, Denver), in which the Authority found that a
proposal that granted the use of a computer to the union
but expressly excluded the use of the computer for
internal union business was not inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205. The Agency states that this provision
contains no such limitation and that the Union has not
indicated that any such limitation is intended.
The Union argues that the Agency's reliance on IRS,
Denver is misplaced. The Union contends that in that decision the Authority did not address the question of
whether or not use of an agency computer for internal
union business would be nonnegotiable. The Union
contends that there is "a long history" of decisions by
the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) awarding office
or meeting space to unions with no limitation placed on
their use. Union's reply brief at 23. Additionally, the
Union states that in American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1631 and Veterans
Administration Medical Center, Chillichothe, Ohio, 25
FLRA 366 (1987), the Authority held that Provision 1,
which required the agency to provide a union with office
space, was negotiable even though that provision did not
contain any requirement that the space be used solely for
representational purposes. The Union asserts that the
Agency has offered no evidence or rationale to support
its claim that the use of meeting space for internal
union business conflicts with regulations governing the
OPM has promulgated regulations that require each
agency head to issue regulations covering the agency's
employees, prescribing, among other things, standards of
conduct and responsibilities. 5 C.F.R. § 735.101. The
OPM regulations require that, as a minimum, agency
regulations "contain provisions covering the standards of
and governing the ethical and other conduct of its
employees" that are specified within the OPM regulations. 5 C.F.R. § 735.201. One of the standards required by the
OPM regulations relates to the use of Government property
allow the use of, Government property of any kind,
including property leased to the Government, for
other than officially approved activities. An
employee has a positive duty to protect and conserve
Government property, including equipment, supplies,
and other property entrusted or issued to him.
5 C.F.R. § 735.205.
The Agency argues that Provision 7 is inconsistent
with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205 because it would allow the use of
Government property for internal union business. We
reject the Agency's assertion that internal union
business necessarily constitutes "other than officially
approved activities" for which the use of Government
property is prohibited. Here, the Agency offers no
support for its assertion, and none is otherwise
apparent to us, that, as a matter of law, internal union
business cannot constitute an "officially approved
activity." Determinations as to what constitutes an
"officially approved activity" are within the
discretionary administrative authority of an agency and
an agency is obligated to exercise that discretion
through negotiations unless precluded by regulatory or
statutory provisions. See, for example, National
Treasury Employees Union and U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 38 FLRA 615, 619
(1990) (NTEU and IRS), affirmed as to other matters sub
nom. National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, No.
91-1048 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 1991). We note that in the administration of this
provision, employees would be bound by the requirements
of 5 C.F.R. § 735.205 insofar as the use of Government
property for other than officially approved activities is
concerned. If the Union seeks to use a meeting room for
"other than officially approved activities," other
proceedings are available to remedy such abuse. See, for
example, Id. at 621. The possibility that some abuse may
occur does not remove an otherwise negotiable proposal
from bargaining. See, for example, id.
Agency's assertion that Provision 12 is inconsistent with
5 C.F.R. § 735.204 must be rejected. See Id. (Provisions
1 and 2). We conclude that Provision 12 is negotiable. In reaching this conclusion, we also reject the Agency's
claim that the Authority concluded in IRS, Denver that
use of Government property for internal union business
was inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205. In that
decision, the Authority did not reach the issue of
whether use of Government property for internal union
business would be inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205
because it found that the proposal at issue did not seek
to use Government property for that purpose.
B. The Employer will provide each Chapter
with a lockable four-drawer file cabinet
to be located in the immediate work area
of the chapter president. A. Positions of the Parties
The Agency contends that this provision conflicts
with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205 because it would permit the Union
to use the file cabinet for internal union business. Citing the Authority's decision in IRS, Denver, the
Agency contends that Provision 13 is nonnegotiable. The Union asserts that this provision is negotiable. The Union reiterates its contention that the Agency's
reliance on IRS, Denver is misplaced. The Union states
that the FSIP has rendered many decisions awarding filing
cabinets to unions and that, by tradition, this provision
The Union also argues that the denial of a file
cabinet to the Union unless it agrees not to place
"internal documents" in it is "impractical and
unenforceable." Union's reply brief at 25. In this
regard, the Union asserts that if the Agency were to
search through the file cabinet for such documents, it
would violate the confidentiality of other records
relating to employees whom the Union represents. The
Union describes the Agency's position as requiring that
the entire provision be struck down "because there may be
an incidental use of the cabinet for internal union
business." Id. The Union contends that the Agency's
failure to show any burden that use of a filing cabinet
for internal union papers would place on management
"makes it impossible to find this proposal in conflict
with [5 C.F.R. § 735.205]." Id.
This provision has the same effect as Provisions 1
and 2 in NTEU and IRS, 38 FLRA 615, which required that,
among other things, a 4-5 drawer lockable cabinet be
provided for the exclusive use of the Union. In that
decision, we rejected the agency's argument that
Provisions 1 and 2 were inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205 because they did not preclude the use of
Government equipment for internal business. Rather, we
concluded that the incidental use of Government equipment
for such institutional purposes as the storage of
election records, tax returns and membership forms is not
contrary to 5 C.F.R. § 735.205. NTEU and IRS, 38 FLRA at
619. For the reasons relied on in NTEU and IRS, we
reject the Agency's contention that Provision 13 is
inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 735.205 and we conclude that
A. Annual leave will be granted in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations. The employer
agrees to grant annual leave in a manner which
permits each employee, if he/she wishes, to
take at least two (2) consecutive weeks of
accrued annual leave each year unless
permitting such leave causes a severe work
B. Each employee will monitor his/her annual leave
account in order to make appropriate advance
requests to the Employer for leave for vacation
and other purposes which will contribute to
avoiding losing annual leave. Payroll earnings
statements issued to employees shall serve as
the notification of annual leave balances. Employees faced with the possibility of loss of
leave shall notify the Employer of their leave
requests for the balance of the leave year by
October 1. The Employer will approve such
leave requests unless the leave would cause a
severe work interruption.
C. In the event of a conflict of unapproved annual
leave requests among employees at a given post
of duty, Service Computation Date will govern.
Any person on scheduled annual leave will be called
back to work only in the case of emergency.
The employee will be granted annual leave for a
workday which occurs on a religious holiday unless
such request causes a severe work interruption.
The Agency argues that all three of these provisions
are nonnegotiable because they directly interfere with
7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. The Agency contends that
the right to assign work encompasses the right to
determine when the assigned work will be performed. The
Agency argues that Provisions 15 and 18 have the
identical effect as Provision 5 in Fort Rucker, 28 FLRA
1172, which the Authority concluded was nonnegotiable
because it directly interfered with the right to assign
work. Additionally, the Agency contends that the
Authority concluded that a proposal similar to Provision
16 directly interfered with management's right to assign
work and was not an appropriate arrangement in Illinois
Nurses Association and Veterans Administration Medical
Center, North Chicago, Illinois, 27 FLRA 714 (1987)
(Proposal 6), reversed as to other matters sub nom.
Veterans Administration Medical Center, North Chicago,
Illinois v. FLRA, No. 87-1405 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 1988).
The Union urges reconsideration of the Authority's
precedent concerning the granting of leave requests. The
Union acknowledges that these provisions "impact[] on
management's right to assign work" but argues that the
right to assign work must be balanced against an
employee's statutory right to leave. Union's reply brief
at 27. The Union contends that giving management the
"unfettered, unilateral" right to determine when leave
can be taken voids the employee's right to take leave. Id. The Union points to the phrase "in accordance with
applicable law" contained in section 7106(a)(2) of the
Statute and argues that "any right established by statute
must be balanced with a reading of section 7106." Id. The Union contends that "[p]ermitting the parties to
negotiate a substantive workload test is a fair balance"
that is more practical than allowing any workload need to
void an employee's right. Id.
The Union argues in the alternative that these three
provisions constitute appropriate arrangements within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. The Union
contends that the impact of allowing management to call
an employee back from leave, cancel leave, forbid a
two-week vacation, or prevent the observance of a
religious holiday is significant. The Union asserts that
such actions can result in restrictions on an employee's
family life, loss of deposits that have been made on
holiday reservations, and violation of spiritual beliefs.
The Union contends that employees have no control
over the circumstances leading to management's denial of
their leave. The Union maintains that management, on the
other hand, retains the ability to assign work to other
qualified employees and to manage internal deadlines.
The Union argues that the provisions would have a
minimal impact on management. In this regard, the Union
contends that the "severe work interruption" language
allows the Agency to delay an employee's leave if an
alternate employee cannot be found to perform necessary
work, if an external deadline requires that the
particular employee do work at a particular time, or if
leave would interfere with a training session or
conference that the employee must attend and there is no
alternate session. The Union asserts that the
"emergency" language in Provision 16 affords management
some flexibility because it retains the option of
recalling an employee from leave in situations that rise
to the level of an emergency.
The Union contends that "[t]he balance of the strong
employee right to leave versus the relatively small
possible inconvenience to management falls squarely in
favor of employees." Union's reply brief at 29-30. The
Union maintains that the Agency has not shown how these
proposals would interfere with the effective and
efficient operation of the Government. In this regard,
the Union states that because management is obligated to
develop work plans that acknowledge the right of
employees to take leave, it should provide staffing
levels that can accommodate the use of leave.
Annual leave is governed by chapter 63 of title 5,
United States Code. OPM is responsible for prescribing
regulations necessary for the administration of the
annual leave provisions contained in that chapter. 5 U.S.C. § 6311. Annual leave is provided and used for two
general purposes: (1) to allow employees an annual
vacation period; and (2) to provide periods of time off
for personal and emergency purposes. FPM chapter 630,
subchapter 3-4(a); FPM Supplement 990-2, book 630,
subchapter S3-4(a). According to OPM, the employee has
an absolute right to take annual leave subject to the
right of the agency to fix the time at which leave may be
taken. FPM Supplement 990-2, book 630, subchapter
S3-4(b); FPM Letter 630-29. Thus, while the legal
provisions governing annual leave may provide employees
with the right to accrue and take annual leave, they do
not provide employees with the right to determine when
the leave may be taken. Rather, under the law and
regulations governing annual leave, approval of requests
to take annual leave is discretionary on the part of the
agency with limited exceptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 6302(d);
FPM chapter 630, subchapter 3-4(b); FPM Supplement 990-2,
book 630, subchapter S3-4(b); FPM Letter 630-29.
7106(a)(2)(B) includes the right to determine when work
will be performed. See, for example, VAMC, Department of
Memorial Affairs, 40 FLRA at 670. Consequently,
proposals that place restrictions on an agency's right to
determine when annual leave may be used directly
interfere with management's right to assign work. See,
for example, Army Information Systems Command, 42 FLRA at
1126. We conclude that the disputed portions of
Provision 15, and Provisions 16 and 18 directly interfere
with the right to assign work. See, for example,
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1513
and U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Station,
Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington, 41 FLRA 589
(1991) (Provision 2, which would prevent the agency from
disapproving annual leave requests or rescinding
previously approved annual leave requests when such
action would result in the forfeiture of annual leave,
directly interfered with management's right to assign
work); Portsmouth Naval Shipyard II, 37 FLRA 249
(Proposal 1, which required that annual leave be granted
upon request for religious holidays except where an
employee's absence would prohibit the agency from
accomplishing a critical job, directly interfered with
management's right to assign work); Service and Hospital
Employees International Union, Local 150 and Veterans
Administration Medical Center, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 35
FLRA 521 (1990) (Provision 1, which prohibited the agency
from rescinding approved leave requests except in extreme
emergency, directly interfered with management's right to
assign work).
Accordingly, we must consider the Union's claim that
these provisions constitute appropriate arrangements that
are negotiable under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. Under the analysis set forth in KANG, we first must determine whether these provisions are intended as
exercise of management's rights.
As we have set forth above, the regulatory scheme
acknowledges that employees have a right to take accrued
annual leave, subject to management's right to schedule
that leave. When an agency exercises its right to assign
work by denying, or canceling, leave there will be a
reasonably foreseeable adverse effect on employees who
seek to exercise their rights to annual leave. In this
regard, it is reasonably foreseeable that the denial of
requests for annual leave or the cancellation of
previously approved leave will disrupt the employees'
personal lives in numerous ways that need not be
catalogued here. We find that Provisions 15, 16, and 18
seek to address the adverse effects that would flow from
the denial of requests for, or cancellation of, annual
leave and, therefore, that they constitute arrangements
within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3). See Naval
at 840-41 (a proposal that seeks to ameliorate the
adverse effects of the exercise of a management right by
inhibiting the exercise of that right may constitute an
arrangement within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3)).
Now, we address whether the arrangements are
appropriate by applying the analytical framework set
forth in KANG. The condition of employment affected is
the employees' ability to schedule and use accrued annual
leave. The nature and extent of the impact experienced
by individual employees as a consequence of denials of
requests for, and cancellation of, annual leave will vary
based on the circumstances involved. Depending on both
the employee's own circumstances and those surrounding
the denial of leave, employees could suffer inconvenience
and disruption to their personal lives ranging from mild
to severe. While the level of disruption and
inconvenience, to some extent, may be influenced by the
employee's personal circumstances, the action producing
the disruption--the denial of annual leave--is not within
the employee's control.
Turning to the question of the nature and extent of
the effect on management's ability to deliberate and act,
we find that these provisions would place limits on the
Agency's ability to deny leave requests or to call
employees back who are on scheduled leave. Thus, the
provisions would affect the Agency's right to assign work
by restricting the Agency's ability to determine when
particular employees would be available to perform work
assignments. Under the circumstances governed by
Provisions 15 and 18, the Agency could not deny requests
for annual leave unless a "severe work interruption"
would result. Under Provision 16, the Agency could call
an employee back to work when that employee was on
scheduled annual leave only in the case of an emergency.
These provisions offer significant benefits to
employees by permitting them a greater degree of control
over the scheduling of their annual leave. However,
these provisions also have a significant negative impact
on the Agency's right to assign work to employees by
requiring the Agency to grant or continue annual leave
notwithstanding its need for an employee's services
unless, in the circumstances covered by Provision 15 and
18, a "severe work interruption" would result, or, in the
circumstances covered by Provision 16, an emergency
exists. Absent a severe work interruption or an
emergency, the Agency would be required to accommodate an
employee's absence by foregoing the accomplishment of the
work involved, rescheduling the work, or reassigning it
to another employee. While the Agency would not be
prevented from accomplishing its operations, its ability
to do so in an efficient and effective manner would be
diminished as a result of the obligations placed on it by
We find that although these provisions would impose
a burden on the Agency's ability to assign work similar
to that imposed by Provisions 2, 6, and 7, the nature and
extent of the benefits afforded is significantly
different. Provisions 15, 16 and 18 would benefit
employees on an individual basis. In contrast, as
discussed at greater length above, Provisions 2, 6 and 7
offer benefits of a broader scope. By promoting
collective bargaining, they afford benefits to employees
on both an individual and collective basis and they also
benefit the public interest.
Given the difference in the nature of the benefits
afforded, we conclude that, on balance, a different
outcome is warranted as to Provisions 15, 16 and 18 than
that reached as to Provisions 2, 6 and 7. Insofar as
Provisions 15, 16 and 18 are concerned, we conclude that
the benefits afforded are more limited than those
afforded by Provisions 2, 6 and 7 and do not outweigh the
burden placed on management's right to assign work. Therefore, we conclude that Provisions 15, 16 and 18
work and are not appropriate arrangements that are
The Employer agrees to authorize annual leave or
leave without pay to Union officers and to any
national officer of the Union for attendance at any
Union-sponsored conventions or meetings unless
authorization would cause a severe work
The Agency argues that this provision directly
section 7106(a)(2)(B) because it requires that leave be
granted to employees. The Agency contends that this
provision is identical in effect to Provision 5 in Fort
Rucker, which the Authority concluded directly interfered
The Union contends that although this provision
presents a different issue, i.e., annual leave, than that
presented by Provisions 2 and 6, i.e., official time, the
results should be the same. In this regard, the Union
states that the purpose of this provision, unlike "other
annual leave cases[,]" is to permit an employee who is a
Union official to fulfill a statutory obligation that
"[U]nion representatives have to meet on a periodic basis
in a convention of [U]nion delegates or even at executive
board functions of the local chapter and national [U]nion
to openly and fairly decide matters of the [U]nion." Union's reply brief at 6-7. The Union maintains that
these obligations flow from section 7120 of the Statute
and section 401 of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 401. The Union
contends that if it is prevented from negotiating an
arrangement to attend to matters required by law, "then
that law is rendered useless." Id. at 7.
The Union maintains that there is precedent for
carving out exceptions to management's rights for reasons
other than section 7131 of the Statute. Specifically,
the Union cites National Federation of Federal Employees,
Local 29 and Department of Defense, HQ, U.S. Military
Entrance Processing Command, 29 FLRA 726, 728 (1987), in
which the Authority held that "the requirement of section
7121 that the parties' mandatory grievance procedure be
negotiated carves out an exception to management's right
to assign work . . . ." The Union contends that the
obligation that unions act in accordance with the LMRDA
constitutes a strongly defined Congressional policy that
warrants an exception to management's rights.
Alternatively, the Union contends that this
provision constitutes an appropriate arrangement within
the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. The
Union asserts that the effect of the Agency's denial of
annual leave for the purpose of attending conventions and
meetings on employees and the Union is substantial. The
Union argues that preventing local Union representatives
from attending conventions would deny members their LMRDA
right to vote on dues increases or other Union policy
matters. The Union contends that employees have no
control over the circumstances leading to the adverse
impact in that "[t]he [A]gency alone controls whether it
will allow the convention or meeting[.]" Union's reply
The Union asserts that the "statutory right" to a
union convention must take precedence over a "nebulous
need to get work done, unless the interruption in work is
severe." Id. The Union contends that the standard of
"severe work interruption," which is established by the
provision, allows the Agency to meet its work assignment
needs with only minor impact. The Union argues that the
balance of employee and Union rights versus management's
rights must fall in favor of employees and the Union. The Union maintains that the Agency has not shown, and
that it cannot be shown, that this provision interferes
with the efficient and effective operation of the
Initially, we reject the Union's argument that this
provision requires that we carve out section 7120 as an
exception to the exercise of management's rights. In
this regard, the exercise of management's rights does not
have the same effect on the obligations set forth in
section 7120 as it does on the rights to negotiate for
official time that are embodied in section 7131(d). As
we have shown above with respect to Provisions 2 and 6, a
strict application of section 7106(a) to provisions
seeking to negotiate official time would eviscerate
section 7131(d). In contrast, provisions requiring that
annual leave or leave without pay be granted for the
purpose of carrying out responsibilities under section
7120 leaves that section intact. That is, while the
express purpose of section 7131(d) is to authorize the
negotiation of official time for use in certain circumstances, section 7120 contains no reference to the
use of leave and its requirements can be complied with
regardless of whether a specific grant of annual leave is
negotiated.9/
As we have previously found, proposals that place
restrictions on an agency's ability to deny requests for
leave directly interfere with management's right to
assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B). This is true
with respect to both annual leave and leave without pay. See, for example, Army Information Systems Command, 42
FLRA at 1126. By requiring that requests for annual
leave or leave without pay be granted unless a severe
work interruption would result, this provision directly
interferes with management's right to assign work and is
nonnegotiable unless it constitutes an appropriate
Even assuming that this provision constitutes an
arrangement,10/ we conclude that it is nonnegotiable
because it excessively interferes with management's right
Denying an employee's request to take leave for the
purpose of attending a Union-sponsored convention or
meeting would preclude that employee from engaging in a
particular exercise of his or her right to form, join, or
assist a labor organization. See U.S. Department of
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, United
States Border Patrol, San Diego Sector, San Diego, California, 38 FLRA
701, 712 (1990), petition for review filed sub nom.
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. FLRA, No.
91-70078 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 1991) (holding leadership
positions within a union is one of the many ways that
employees can exercise their right to form, join, or
assist a labor organization). For employees who wish to
attend Union-sponsored conventions or meetings, the
impact of being denied leave that is for that purpose is
significant. However, insofar as the conventions or
meetings are not directly related to activities
undertaken on behalf of employees as part of the
collective bargaining relationship but, rather, concern
the internal business or institutional needs of the
Union, the impact of the denial of leave on the
conditions of employment of employees as a whole would be
indirect and incidental. That is, while we recognize
that the ability of the Union to accomplish its internal
business and satisfy institutional needs may affect the
Union's ability to represent employees, such activities
generally do not involve the actual representation of
employees. Therefore, the effect on bargaining unit
employees as a whole of the denial of requests by Union
officers for leave to attend Union-sponsored conventions
and meetings is limited.
As discussed above, although the benefits afforded
to the employee requesting the leave are significant, the
benefits afforded by the arrangement to employees as a
whole are limited in that the activities for which the
leave is requested generally have only an indirect
bearing on the conduct of the collective bargaining
relationship and the unit employees' conditions of
employment. Provision 17 would require the Agency to
grant leave even though it had a legitimate need for an
employee's services unless that need involved a severe
work interruption. Although Provision 17 would not
require the Agency to suffer a severe work interruption,
it nevertheless would require that the Agency undergo any
lesser degree of work disruption that might result. In
our view, this places a substantial burden on the Agency
that outweighs the benefits to employees who desire leave
to attend Union conventions and meetings. Moreover,
adding in the limited benefits that the provision affords
employees as a whole does not serve to offset this
burden. We find that, on balance, the benefit to
employees is outweighed by the burden on the Agency.
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that in
our view a critical distinction exists between this
provision and Provisions 2, 6, and 7. The latter three
provisions involve absences from work in which the time
would be spent in activities that are directly related
to the representation of employees and the collective
bargaining relationship. By contrast, Provision 17
involves absences from work to engage in activities that
are related for the most part to the internal business
and institutional needs of the Union. Thus, the level of
benefits afforded to employees as a whole by the two
groups of provisions is quite different and this
difference is critical insofar as offsetting the burden
placed on management's rights is concerned.
For similar reasons, this provision is
distinguishable from Provisions 6, 7, 8, and 9 in
Service, 39 FLRA 27 (1991) (Office of Chief Counsel,
IRS), remanded sub nom. Treasury, Office of Chief
Counsel, v. FLRA. In Office of Chief Counsel, IRS, we
concluded that Provisions 6, 7, 8 and 9, which related to
approving leaves of absence for employees elected to
union office, constituted appropriate arrangements that
were negotiable under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. In so concluding, one of the factors that we found
determinative was the benefit that the provisions
afforded to employees seeking representation. 39 FLRA at
49. In this case, Provision 17 affords the employees who
are represented by the Union, as contrasted with those
who are acting as representatives, only indirect and
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Provision
17 excessively interferes with management's right to
assign work and does not constitute an appropriate
arrangement that is negotiable under section 7106(b)(3)
All new GS-1854 field employees will be brought into
the regional office within one year after arriving
on duty for an employee orientation and introduction
to the regional office staff, functions, and
mission. During this visit, NTEU will be invited to
meet and address these employees for 15 minutes
Within one week after arriving on duty, the
employee's immediate supervisor will provide the
employee with the name and work phone number of the
NTEU steward and chapter president serving the
employee's location. The supervisor will also
notify the relevant steward and chapter president of
the new employee's name and work phone number. If
the Union steward and/or the chapter president and
the new employee are located in the same building,
the supervisor will also introduce them to each
other. The steward and/or chapter president will be
allowed 15 minutes during duty hours to speak about
NTEU's representational role.
The Agency argues that section 2 of this provision
is nonnegotiable because it directly interferes with
7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. In this regard, the Agency
asserts that orientation constitutes training and,
consequently, involves the assignment of work. The
Agency also contends that section 3 is inconsistent with
management's right to assign work because it mandates
that the immediate supervisor be assigned the tasks of
providing a new employee with the name and telephone
number of specified Union representatives and informing
those representatives of the new employee's name and
The Union contends, as to section 2, that an
orientation is not training because it does not "teach
skill, hone competencies or develop abilities" and that
it does not explain "how to perform work or how to
improve performance." Union's reply brief at 31. The
Union describes an orientation as a "formal gathering of
employees and managers to explain the logistics of the
agency's non-duty operations and to introduce people to
one another." Id.
In response to the Agency's objections to section 3,
the Union in its reply brief has submitted an amendment,
Within one week after arriving on duty, management
will provide the employee . . . . Management will
also notify . . . . If the union
steward and/or the chapter president and the new
employee are located in the same building,
management will also introduce them to each other .
. . . [Emphasis in original.]
The parties dispute whether the "orientation" sought
by section 2 constitutes "training." Previously, we have
distinguished between training that encompasses
instruction of employees in some facet of their duties
and responsibilities and that which provides information
to employees concerning their conditions of employment. See Defense Mapping Agency, 39 FLRA 557 (Proposal 2). Training that falls into the former category is
encompassed within the right to assign work, while
classes or training that fall into the latter category
are not encompassed within the right to assign work. See
The record does not make clear what the Union
intends that the "employee orientation" required by
section 2 will involve. In its reply brief, the Union
asserts, as a general matter, that orientation does not
constitute training that entails the instruction of
employees in some facet of their duties and
responsibilities. Under Authority precedent, orientation
does not constitute such training in some circumstances. See National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1430
and U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, Northern Division, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 39 FLRA 581 (1991) (Proposal 3) (Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Philadelphia). However,
in other circumstances orientation does constitute such
training. See New York State Nurses Association and
Veterans Administration, Bronx Medical Center, 30 FLRA
706 (1987) (Proposal 5).
In its reply brief the Union describes orientation
as "a formal gathering of employees and managers to
explain the logistics of the agency's non-duty
operations." It is not clear to us what this means and
that it would not necessarily include matters that
directly relate to the employees' duties and
responsibilities. Additionally, the fact that one of the
specified purposes of the employee orientation is to
introduce employees "to the regional office . . .
functions, and mission" suggests to us that the
prescribed orientation might include matters directly
relating to the employees' duties and responsibilities. In the absence of information on which to determine more precisely the Union's intention regarding the content of
the required orientation, we cannot determine whether the
orientation constitutes training that comes within the
ambit of management's right to assign work or whether it
is limited to providing employees with information
concerning their conditions of employment.11/ We are,
therefore, unable to determine whether section 2 is
negotiable and will dismiss the petition for review as to
it. See, for example, Naval Facitities Engineering
Command, Philadelphia (Proposal 1).
We conclude that the amended version of section 3 is
a substantively different proposal than the original
provision that the Agency alleged to be nonnegotiable. There is no indication in the record that the Union
requested an allegation of nonnegotiability concerning
the amended version of section 3. Therefore, the
petition for review of section 3 is not properly before
us and will be dismissed without prejudice to the Union's
refiling at a later date should it meet the conditions
for review. See, for example, National Treasury
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 38 FLRA 263,
268-69 (1990).
The Agency shall rescind its disapproval of
Provisions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14. 12/ The
petition for review is dismissed insofar as it concerns
Provisions 3, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 21.
Opinion of Member Armendariz, concurring in part and
dissenting in part as to Provisions 2, 6 and 7:
Section 7131(d) of the Statute authorizes
negotiations over the use of official time for
representational activity.
I agree with my colleagues, for the reasons stated by
them and consistent with the court's decision in AFGE v.
FLRA, that in order to give meaning to section 7131(d),
it must be read as carving out a limited exception to
section 7106(a) of the Statute. Unlike the situation in
IRS v. FLRA, in which the application of section 7106(a)
to section 7121 did not render section 7121 inoperative,
the introductory portion of section 7106(a) cannot be
applied to section 7131(d) without depriving it of
meaning. For this reason, I agree that Provisions 2 and
6, which require the Agency to grant employees' requests
for official time to engage in representational activity,
absent certain work-related exceptions, are negotiable. For the same reason, I would find that Provision 7,
providing official time for Union-sponsored training in
collective bargaining matters, is negotiable under
section 7131(d) of the Statute. Having found that Provisions 2, 6 and 7 are
negotiable for the above-stated reason, I do not believe,
however, that it is necessary to reach the Union's
alternative argument that the provisions constitute
appropriate arrangements under section 7106(b)(3) of the
Statute and, therefore, I do not join in that portion of
the majority opinion. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
1/ Member Armendariz' opinion, concurring in part and dissenting
in part as to Provisions 2, 6, and 7, is set forth below at page
52. Member Talkin's dissenting opinion as to Provision 21 is set
forth at note 11.
2/ The petition had originally included 44 provisions. However,
subsequent to the filing of the petition the parties met and successfully renegotiated a number of the
provisions that had been disapproved. Agency statement of
position at 1. The Union then withdrew five of the remaining provisions in its reply brief. Those provisions that
have been renegotiated or withdrawn by the Union will not be
considered further in this decision. In numbering the remaining
provisions, we will adopt the numbers that the Union has assigned
to the particular provisions in its reply brief. 3/ With respect to several of the provisions that are at issue in
this case, the Union first raised the applicability of section
7106(b)(3) in its response to the Agency's statement of position. In such circumstances in the past, the Authority has granted
agency requests to supplement statements of position in order to
address the section 7106(b)(3) contentions. See, for example,
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3295 and U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 44 FLRA
63, 64 (1992) (Office of Thrift Supervision), petition for review
filed sub nom. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Thrift
Supervision v. FLRA, No. 92-1170 (D.C. Cir. April 17, 1991);
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2317
and U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Logistics Base,
Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentality, Albany, Georgia, 29 FLRA
1587 (1987) (Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany), affirmed as to
other matters sub nom. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Logistics
Base, Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentality, Albany, Georgia v.
FLRA, No. 88-8006 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 1990). Here, the Agency
made no request to supplement its statement of position.
4/ As will be discussed further in conjunction with Provision 17,
the same is true insofar as section 7120 of the Statute is
concerned. That is, according predominance to section 7106 in the
context of requests for annual leave and leave without pay to
attend to matters governed by section 7120 does not render the
latter section inoperative.
official of any agency . . . [.] [Emphasis added.]
Section 7106(b), which concerns the negotiation of procedures and
appropriate arrangements, begins:
any labor organization from negotiating . . . [.] [Emphasis
6/ In KANG, the Authority announced that in addressing management
allegations that a union proposal for appropriate arrangements was
nonnegotiable because it conflicted with management rights
described in section 7106(a) or (b)(1), the Authority would
consider whether the proposed arrangement was appropriate for
negotiation within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) or whether it
was inappropriate because it excessively interfered with the
7/ The other subsections of section 7131 govern the use of
official time for the purposes of negotiating collective
bargaining agreements, conducting the internal business of a labor
organization, and participating in proceedings before the
8/ Limiting representational activities by employees to non-duty
hours could place a severe handicap on the employees. For
example, in many areas employees commute from widely dispersed
areas and are dependent on car pools or public transportation that
operate on limited or inflexible schedules. Thus, their ability
to be at the workplace outside of duty hours may be restricted by
such factors as geographical circumstances.
9/ Insofar as the Union's arguments imply that it is
subject to the LMRDA itself, we note that labor unions
that exclusively represent employees working for the
Federal government or Government-owned corporations are
not covered by the LMRDA. See Hester v. International
Union of Operating Engineers, 818 F.2d 1537, 1541-42
10/ In U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of the
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service v. FLRA, Nos.
91-1139 and 91-1316 (D.C. Cir. April 14, 1992) (Treasury,
Office of Chief Counsel v. FLRA), the Court has
questioned whether a provision that would require that
the agency approve leaves of absence for employees
elected to serve in specified, full-time union offices
constitutes an arrangement under section 7106(b)(3) of
the Statute. In view of our finding that this provision
work, it is unnecessary for us to address that question
11/ Member Talkin respectfully dissents from these
findings and conclusions. She would find that nothing in
the language of section 2 and the Union's statement of
intent suggests that the orientation that is required by
that section entails the instruction of employees in any
facet of their duties. Rather, Member Talkin would find
that the record establishes that the requirements imposed
by the Union for the orientation that is the subject of
this section are limited to acquainting new employees
with the regional staff and operations. Thus, based on
the record, she would find that the orientation
reasonably can be characterized as nothing more than
providing employees with information concerning their
conditions of employment. In her view, the relationship
between such orientation and the duties of new employees
is indirect at best, and does not provide a sufficient
basis on which to conclude that the orientation entails
and responsibilities. Consequently, she would conclude
that the orientation required by section 2 of this
provision is not encompassed within management's right to
assign work and that section 2 is negotiable.
12/ In finding that these provisions are negotiable, we