Source: https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/stranded-navigating-aviation-delay-damages-under-the-montreal-convention/
Timestamp: 2020-08-07 09:04:18
Document Index: 546425460

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 19', 'art. 19', 'art. 5', 'art. 19', 'art. 19', 'art. 19', 'art. 19', 'art. 19']

Stranded: Navigating Aviation Delay Damages Under the Montreal Convention – The Florida Bar
Vol. 88, No. 8 September/October 2014 Pg 20 Marty Fulgueira Elfenbein and Katherine Abigail Roberts Featured Article
This international treaty provides a comprehensive liability regime governing claims arising from international air carriage.8 The drafters of the Montreal Convention intended for it to replace the predecessor treaties governing this area, including the 1929 Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (commonly known as the Warsaw Convention),9 The Hague Protocol of 1955,10 and Montreal Protocol No. 4,11 among others, as well as voluntary agreements among air carriers.12 Although intended to supersede predecessor treaties, the drafters did not intend to dispose of decades of case law interpreting the prior treaties and protocols to the extent the provisions were similar or identical.13 As the Montreal Convention has only been in effect for approximately 10 years, there is limited case law interpreting its provisions, making it “appropriate to rely on cases interpreting the Warsaw Convention where the equivalent provision of the Montreal Convention is substantively the same.”14 The pertinent delay damage provisions addressed in this article are substantively the same in both the Montreal and Warsaw conventions; therefore, this article discusses case law interpreting the relevant provisions under both treaties.
In carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded, whether under this [c]onvention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this [c]onvention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.. . . 17
Several courts have analyzed the language within art. 19 of the Montreal Convention to determine what the drafters intended by the phrase “all measures.”20 Significantly, it has not been interpreted to mean an airline must do everything in its power to avoid the delay of a flight or its cancellation.21 Rather, the airline must prove it took “all precautions that in sum are appropriate to the risk, i.e. , measures reasonably available to defendant and reasonably calculated, in cumulation, to prevent the subject loss.”22 “The failure to take any particular precaution that might have prevented the loss does not necessarily prevent the carrier from relying on this defense; not every possible precaution must be taken.”23
The court next analyzed whether it took reasonable measures to prevent any further delay by the expedient rebooking of the plaintiff’s flight. In response to the cancellation, Delta used an automated rebooking system that searched for the next available flight on any available carrier. A review of the passenger records for everyone on board the canceled flight revealed that none of them were rebooked on an earlier flight. The plaintiff then claimed Delta acted unreasonably by failing to rebook him on an alternative flight departing Atlanta earlier that evening. Citing to an opinion from the Northern District of Texas,28 the court determined Delta had no duty to rebook the plaintiff until it was clear the flight was going to be canceled. Only then did the duty to rebook passengers become imperative.29 Under these facts, Delta took all reasonable measures to prevent the flight delay, thereby exonerating itself of any liability.30
Courts have also analyzed what constitutes a reasonable measure when the airline industry is confronted with an act of God, such as extreme weather conditions or unpredictable volcanic eruptions causing the dispersion of ash clouds in the atmosphere. Cohen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
involved a claim for delay damages for a missed vacation day in Argentina when an air traffic control mandate delayed the plaintiffs’ outbound flight by one hour and 20 minutes due to wintry weather conditions. These conditions caused hundreds of late arrivals and departures at the Atlanta airport.31 The gate agents, who were working the gates for other delayed flights, arrived late to service the plaintiffs’ inbound flight from New York.32 These delays caused the plaintiffs to miss their connection to Buenos Aires.33 Delta then booked the plaintiffs on the next available flight on the following day.34 Although the plaintiffs demanded rebooking on a flight to Santiago, Chile, departing in 20 minutes, Delta could not undertake this transaction within the truncated time period between the request and the flight’s imminent departure.35
Even though an airline may be confronted with unpreventable delays due to acts of God, an airlines’ measures may be deemed insufficient if it acted unreasonably in rebooking the passenger’s flight.38 In Giannopoulos v. Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España, No. 11 C 775, 2012 WL 5499426 (N.D. Ill. 2012), the plaintiffs booked a flight from Chicago to Madrid to Athens. Due to the repeated volcanic eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland, Iberia rerouted the inbound flight to Chicago around the forecasted ash clouds, causing it to arrive two hours late.39 The plaintiffs’ flight to Madrid consequently departed more than two hours behind schedule.40 This outbound flight path was then adjusted to circumvent the ash cloud, adding 1,100 nautical miles and an additional hour and 30 minutes of flight time.41 As a result, the plaintiffs had 37 minutes to make their connecting flight in Madrid, so Iberia offered them a flight to Vienna with a connection to Athens on another airline, which they accepted.42 The plaintiffs would only have a 35-minute window in Vienna to make their connection.43 Given further volcanic complications, their flight to Vienna was delayed and they missed their connection, arriving in Athens one day after their intended arrival.44
Although Giannopoulos involved a delay claim under Regulation No. 261/2004 of the European Parliament and European Council (commonly known as EU 261), it contained the same reasonable measures defense as art. 19 of the Montreal Convention within art. 5(3) of the regulation.45 Thus, the court looked to case law under the convention for the interpretation of this defense and its analysis.46 Ultimately, Iberia was not faulted for its inability to prevent the delays caused by the reroutings due to the volcanic ash clouds.47 However, Iberia failed to take reasonable measures in the rebooking process as it booked the plaintiffs on a flight with a 35-minute connection window.48 A lthough Iberia did not believe the plaintiffs could make a 37-minute connection in Madrid, it inexplicably booked a connection in Vienna with only 35 minutes between flights.49 Under these circumstances, an issue of fact existed regarding the reasonableness of Iberia’s actions and its potential liability.50
In Rubin v. Air China Ltd., No. 5:10-CV-05110-LHK, 2011 WL 2463271 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2011), the District Court for the Northern District of California analyzed a claim made by a passenger for pain and suffering as well as monetary damages that stemmed from a 13.5-hour delay on an Air China flight from Beijing, China, to San Francisco, California. In Rubin, the plaintiff claimed that he incurred pain and suffering associated with “being trapped in a freezing Beijing airport” as well as out-of-pocket expenses including taxi fare, the cost of a round-trip ticket from San Francisco to Beijing, lost work, and physical illness with attendant medical treatment costs.62
In analyzing the type of damages that are recoverable, the court noted that art. 19 allows for recovery of “foreseeable, consequential damages such as lost wages or profits that are occasioned by the delay.”63 As such, a passenger may also recover for lost days of work or business opportunities if the plaintiff can prove that his lost days of work were occasioned by delay and resulted in financial injury.64 In Rubin, the plaintiff claimed that he missed work as a result of his 13.5-hour delay in his flight from Beijing to San Francisco. The court noted that, to the extent the plaintiff was able to prove that he sustained pecuniary injuries, he would be entitled to recovery.65 Therefore, the court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.66 In doing so, the court relied on the district court holding in Ikekpeazu v. Air France, No. 3:04-CV-0711, 2004 WL 2810063 (D. Conn. 2004).
In addition to recovery for economic losses related to lost business opportunities, courts will also allow passengers to recover art. 19 damages for consequential out-of-pocket expenses directly attributed to the delay.69 For example, the court in Rubin noted that taxi fare for the cost of the plaintiff’s transportation from the San Francisco Airport to his home would be a recoverable out-of-pocket expense.70 In Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 69, 71 (N.D. Ill. 1985),
the district court determined that recoverable out-of-pocket expenses can also include the cost of meals and lodging, inconvenience, and telephone expenses.
Although prepaid vacation expenses are generally recoverable, courts have not extended this category of damages to include reimbursement for the cost of the delayed flight if the passenger ultimately used the ticket to complete his or her travels. In Rubin, the defendant airline transported the plaintiff roundtrip from Beijing to San Francisco, albeit with a delay, eliminating the cost of the round-trip ticket as an element of the plaintiff’s damages claim.71 The court noted that the Montreal Convention only allows for recovery for damages occasioned by a flight delay,72 and found that the plaintiff did not sustain an economic loss occasioned by the delay as he actually received the benefits of his round-trip ticket.73 In so ruling, the court relied on the holding in Fields v. BWIA Int’l Airways, Ltd., No. 99-CV-2493, 2000 WL 1091129 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), in which the district court noted that the plaintiff actually flew to her destination the day following her scheduled departure and, therefore, could not claim total nonperformance under the contract to be entitled to damages.
Even in so ruling, the court noted that the amount of compensation could potentially “vary dramatically” depending on what the flight delay prevented the passenger from doing, thus, suggesting the necessity of an economic component to inconvenience damages claims.78 Instructively, few courts have followed suit in allowing compensation for “inconvenience” under art. 19.79 In Vumbaca v. Terminal One Group Assoc., L.P., 859 F. Supp. 2d 343, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2012),
the Eastern District of New York stated that “mere inconvenience does not support a claim under [art.] 19,” and noted that since plaintiff’s only timely claims were for noneconomic damages, she could not recover under art. 19.80 Courts have generally refined the recoverable scope of inconvenience damages to require some sort of economic damages and have required that the damages not merely recharacterize unrecoverable emotional harm damages. In Rubin, for example,
the court noted these types of “inconvenience” damages may occasionally be recoverable if the passenger can prove the inconvenience suffered has an economic component independent of other economic damages claims.81 The court noted that such “inconvenience” damages must “truly encompass economic damages, and cannot simply be based upon the ‘discomfort, annoyance, and irritation’ [p]laintiff experienced during the delay.”82 The court in Rubin determined that the plaintiff did not make such a showing, and granted the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The ruling was consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Lee v. American Airlines, 355 F.3d 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2004),min which the appellate court determined that the loss of a “refreshing memorable vacation” was simply a recharacterization of unrecoverable mental anguish damages.83
1 See James Barron & Henry Fountain, Polar Vortex: Temperatures Fall Far, Fast, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/nyregion/in-new-york-temperatures-fall-far-fast.html?_r=0.
2 See Alex Davis, 6,000 Flights Cancelled in 2 Days as Polar Vortex Freezes US, Jan. 7, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/polar-vortex-flight-cancellations-2014-1.
13 See S. Rep. No. 108-8 at 87 (2003) (“[E]fforts were made in the negotiation and drafting process to retain existing language and substance of other provisions to preserve judicial precedent relating to other aspects of the Warsaw Convention, in order to avoid unnecessary litigation over issues already decided by the courts under the Warsaw Convention and its related protocols….The language of the prior convention and protocols was tracked specifically for the purpose of preserving, to the greatest extent possible, the validity of judicial precedents that apply to the previous convention and protocols.”).
21 Verdesca ex rel., v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 3:99–CV–2022–BD, 2000 WL 1538704 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
38 See Giannopoulos v. Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España, No. 11 C 775, 2012 WL 5499426 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
51 See U.S. Department of Transportation , Inflation Adjustments to Liability Limits Governed by the Montreal Convention Effective December 30, 2009, available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/rules/Notice_11_09_09.pdf.
55 Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see also Rubin, 2011 WL 2463271 at *2 (finding that “purely emotional injuries” caused by delay are not available under the convention and noting that “to the extent [p]laintiff seeks to recover for ‘pain and suffering’ independent of any physical injuries or illness, such damages are not recoverable”); Elnajjar v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Nos. H-04-680, H-04-681, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36792 at *15, n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“Because [p]laintiffs do not allege they suffered any economic loss or physical injury…they cannot meet the conditions for recovery under [art.] 19.”); Ikekpeazu, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24580 at *4-5 (dismissing [p]laintiff’s claims for emotional injury under art. 19); Fields, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9397 at *19.
67 Ikekpeazu, 2004 WL 2810063 at *1.
77 Daniel, 59 F. Supp . 2d at 994.
78 Id. at 994, n. 6.
79 Vumbaca v. Terminal One Group Assoc., L.P., 859 F. Supp. 2d 343, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).