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Timestamp: 2016-12-09 18:12:06
Document Index: 671230317

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3742', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 843', '§ 922', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 4']

| U.S. v. McAllister
filed: March 1, 1991.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANTv.RONALD MCALLISTER
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. D.C. Criminal No. 89-00369-03.
Greenberg and Cowen, Circuit Judges, and Fisher, District Judge*fn*
The United States, with the personal approval of the Solicitor General, appeals pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(2) on the grounds that the sentence in this criminal case was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines. Inasmuch as we are deciding the case as a matter of law by construction of the guidelines, we are exercising plenary review. United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 390, 392 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1989).
The procedural history and facts of this case are not complicated. A 17-count indictment was returned charging appellee Ronald McAllister and certain of his relatives with the commission of controlled substance offenses between July 15, 1988, and February 4, 1989. In particular, McAllister was charged with: (1) conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, count one, 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) distribution of cocaine, counts four and eight, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); (3) distribution of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, counts five and nine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 845a, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); and (4) unlawful use of a communications facility, count sixteen, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). McAllister, a convicted felon, was later charged in a separate indictment with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), for possession of a firearm. On May 7, 1990, McAllister pleaded guilty to counts one, five, and nine of the controlled dangerous substance indictment and to the firearms indictment.
The presentence report set forth that McAllister had four prior adult convictions and that inasmuch as two were for robberies, he was a career offender within sentencing guidelines §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. The first robbery was committed on July 3, 1978, and is described as follows in the presentence report: "Court records reflect that on July 3, 1978, the defendant robbed Alice Gross by grabbing her arm and taking $190.00 from her inside 1352 W. Girard Avenue [Philadelphia]. No weapon was involved in the offense." The state record of this offense indicates that McAllister was sentenced to "Time in (7/3/78 to 7/12/78) to 23 months in Philadelphia County Prison."
This holding was extremely significant, as application of the career offender provisions of the guidelines as proposed in the presentence report resulted in an imprisonment range of 210 to 262 months, predicated on an offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of VI. Instead of using that range, the district court sentenced McAllister to concurrent terms of 51 months on each of the four counts, as reflected in a judgment of conviction and sentence of August 31, 1990.*fn1
The parties have briefed this case predicated on the guidelines as amended to the time of sentencing and we will decide it on that basis.*fn2 Guidelines § 4B1.1 provides that:
McAllister was at least 18 years old at the time of his current offenses, three of which involved controlled substances. Thus, the first two conditions of guidelines § 4B1.1 have been indisputably met and we are concerned only with whether McAllister had two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence.
Guidelines § 4B1.2(1)(i) provides that a crime of violence means any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." Application note 2 indicates that robbery is a crime of violence and application note 3 states that a "prior felony conviction" means a federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether the offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed.*fn3
Accordingly, it is apparent that McAllister had two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence, as he was convicted of two robberies punishable by imprisonment terms exceeding a year. Therefore we are satisfied that the district court erred in not sentencing McAllister as a career offender.*fn4 While we recognize that our disposition of this matter seems rather mechanical, this is because the issue before us is clearly resolved by the guidelines.*fn5
Our result is consistent with United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1990), which concerned a prosecution of a felon for possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). We held there that under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) a conviction in Pennsylvania for conspiracy to commit a robbery, like a robbery conviction itself, necessarily qualifies as a violent felony, so that inquiry beyond determining the fact of the conviction and the charge was unnecessary to ascertain if the conviction was a "violent felony" within that section for purposes of sentence enhancement. In Preston we also pointed out that "crime of violence" within guidelines § 4B1.2 is predicated on "violent felony" within 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 910 F.2d at 86 n.6. Accordingly, it follows that if inquiry into the underlying facts in Preston was not necessary, it should not be required when a career offender determination is made under the guidelines if the underlying offense is a robbery. Preston relied on Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607, 110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990), in which the Supreme Court pointed out that a case-by-case approach in determining whether a particular prior conviction was a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), could require a court to engage in an elaborate fact-finding process with respect to the facts in a prior case. The Court avoided that procedure by adopting a categorical approach to determine if the prior offense should be considered for sentence enhancement. 110 S. Ct. at 2158-60.
We do not suggest that it will always be possible to take a categorical approach to the determination of whether an underlying offense is a "crime of violence" within guidelines § 4B1.2. It may well be that more detailed inquiry into the facts of a case will be required if the offense is not specifically listed as a "crime of violence" in the application notes to the guidelines. See United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 303-04 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939, 110 L. Ed. 2d 668, 110 S. Ct. 3221 (1990). But we are not concerned with that situation and thus we do not address it. Here the robberies were per se crimes of violence and that ends our inquiry. See also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 547-48 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117, 120-21 (10th Cir. 1990).