Source: http://masslawyersweekly.com/fulltext-opinions/2007/08/27/charles-l-johnsons-case-441977/
Timestamp: 2016-09-30 17:09:23
Document Index: 782728998

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 50', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

– CHARLES L. JOHNSON&apos;S CASE (441977) – Full-text Opinions
Home / Fulltext Opinion / – CHARLES L. JOHNSON&apos;S CASE (441977)	– CHARLES L. JOHNSON&apos;S CASE (441977)
August 27, 2007	69 Mass. App. Ct. 834
06-P-384	Appeals Court
Workers’ Compensation Act, Decision of Industrial Accident Reviewing Board, Attorney’s fees. Penalty.
John F. Trefethen, Jr., for the employee.
Interpretation of G. L. c. 152, § 8(1), par. 2. The penalty clause in G. L. c. 152, § 8(1), par. 2, reads, in pertinent part: “Any failure of an insurer to make all payments due an employee under the terms of an order[] [or] decision . . . shall result in a penalty of . . . ten thousand dollars if [payments are] not made within ninety days.” See note 1, supra. Although Johnson asks us to construe § 8(1) as including the self-operative interest of G. L. c. 152, § 50, within “the terms of an order[] [or] decision,” we are mindful that “[a]s a penalty provision, [§ 8(1)] must be strictly construed.” DeLano v. Milstein, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 923 (2002). “A statute designed to enforce the law by punishing offenders, rather than simply by enforcing restitution to those damaged, is in the nature of a penal statute.” Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 686 (1986). The $10,000 penalty under § 8(1), par. 2, is in the nature of a penal statute. This penalty does not provide restitution to the employee, but penalizes a late payment even though, as in this case, the insurer may eventually make that payment to the employee. See Eastern Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 629 (2001) (“the penalty provisions [of G. L. c. 152, § 8(1)] . . . are enacted not to confer rights on employees, but instead to persuade insurers to make timely payments”).