Source: http://publishedforoppositiontrademark.com/stepstrademarkopposition.html
Timestamp: 2017-07-23 04:41:51
Document Index: 745745951

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§1051', '§ 66', '§ 66', '§ 1', '§ 1051', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 45', '§ 1051', '§ 1052', '§ 1127', '§ 45', '§ 1127', '§ 44', '§ 1126', '§ 66', '§ 1141', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 14', '§ 1064', '§ 13', '§ 14', '§ 1063', '§ 1064', '§ 43', '§ 1125', '§ 2', '§ 1052', '§ 44', '§ 1126', '§ 10', '§ 1060']

OPPOSITION STEPS
(to a USPTO Trademark Application)
Trademarks that have been approved for publication (“Publication & Issue Review Complete” for marks already in use) or have received “Notice of Allowance” (intent to use applications) are published for opposition and may be opposed by anyone who has standing for an opposition and grounds for an opposition. Similarly, trademarks that have been registered may be challenged for cancellation by anyone who has standing for a cancellation and grounds for a cancellation. Any ground that negates the defendant's right to registration may be raised for either opposition or cancellation. (See Examples of Grounds for Opposition and Cancellation of a Trademark below.)
Potential registrars of merely descriptive terms may be opposed and damages assumed when the mark sought to be registered is descriptive of goods and opposer has a sufficient real interest in using the same descriptive words in its business. DeWalt, Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp., 289 F.2d 656, 129 USPQ 275, 280 (CCPA 1961).
How Long Does An Opposition or Cancellation Take?
From start (the institutional order after the Petition to Cancel or Notice of Opposition) to the end of the testimony periods without delays has a schedule of 445 days. Note, however that 95% of proceedings are ended before the trial stage and are much shorter.
Delays may be caused by agreement, by motions, settlement discussions and other causes. Parties can agree to shorten the schedule or allow more time. Scheduled endings that occur on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays are moved to the next business day as noted in Patent and Trademark Rule 1.7:
§ 1.7 Times for taking action; Expiration on Saturday, Sunday or Federal holiday.
(a) Whenever periods of time are specified in this part in days, calendar days are intended. When the day, or the last day fixed by statute or by or under this part for taking any action or paying any fee in the United States Patent and Trademark Office falls on Saturday, Sunday, or on a Federal holiday within the District of Columbia, the action may be taken, or the fee paid, on the next succeeding business day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal holiday.
TTAB Case Schedules (From the United States Patent and Trademark Office OG Notices: 28 August 2007)
The Board's notice of the commencement of the proceeding (commonly referred to as the institution order) will set forth disclosure, discovery and trial-related deadlines, as illustrated below. The institution order will set forth specific dates for the various phases in a case. Since each deadline or phase is measured from the date of the institution order, the parentheticals explain the total number of days, as measured from that date, until each deadline: Due date for an answer - 40 days from the date of the institution order. (Institution date plus 40 days.) Deadline for a disclosure/discovery/settlement conference - 30 days from the date the answer is due. (Institution date plus 70 days.) Discovery opens - 30 days after the date the answer is due. (Institution date plus 70 days.) Deadline for making initial disclosures - 30 days from the opening of the discovery period. (Institution date plus 100 days.) Deadline for disclosure of expert testimony - 30 days prior to close of discovery. (Institution date plus 220 days.) Discovery closes - 180 days from the opening date of the discovery period. (Institution date plus 250 days.) Deadline for plaintiff's pretrial disclosures - 15 days prior to the opening of plaintiff's testimony period. (Institution date plus 295 days.) Plaintiff's 30-day testimony period - closes 90 days after the close of discovery. (Institution date plus 340 days.) Deadline for defendant's pretrial disclosures - 15 days prior to the opening of defendant's testimony period. (Institution date plus 355 days.) Defendant's 30-day testimony period - closes 60 days after the close of plaintiff's testimony period. (Institution date plus 400 days.) Deadline for plaintiff's rebuttal pretrial disclosures - 15 days prior to the opening of plaintiff's rebuttal testimony period. (Institution date plus 415 days.) Plaintiff's 15-day rebuttal testimony period - closes 45 days from close of defendant's testimony period. (Institution date plus 445 days.) Under this schedule, discovery typically will open after the discovery conference, unless the parties defer their discovery conference to the deadline date, in which case discovery will open concurrently with the conference. The deadline for making initial disclosures is similar to that of Federal Rule 26(a)(1), except that disclosure under the federal rule is measured from the actual date of, not the deadline for, the discovery conference. Because the Board approach measures the due date for disclosures from the opening of discovery, which typically will occur after the discovery conference, the Board approach typically will provide a longer period for making disclosures than is provided under the federal rule. This will accommodate the possibility of motions to suspend for settlement talks, which are quite common in Board proceedings. The Board anticipates that such motions may frequently result from settlement discussions begun during the required disclosure/discovery/settlement conference. The length of the discovery period is the same as under current Board practice, i.e., 180 days. Disclosures will be made no later than thirty (30) days into that period, and the parties will have another 150 days for any necessary additional discovery. The trial schedule, with its sixty-day break between discovery and trial and thirty-day breaks between the respective testimony periods, is also the same as under current Board practice. Because disclosure is tied to claims and defenses, in general, a defendant's default or the filing of various pleading motions under Federal Rule 12 will effectively stay the parties' obligations to conference and, subsequently, make initial disclosures. An answer must be filed and issues related to the pleadings resolved before the parties can know the extent of claims and defenses and, therefore, be able to discuss the extent of their initial disclosure obligations, plans for discovery, and the possibility of settlement. The Board anticipates it will be liberal in granting extensions or suspensions of time to answer, when requested to accommodate settlement talks or submission of the dispute to an arbitrator or mediator. However, if a motion to extend or suspend for settlement talks, arbitration or mediation is not filed prior to answer, then the parties will have to proceed, after the answer is filed, to their discovery conference, one point of which is to discuss settlement. It is unlikely the Board will find good cause for a motion to extend or suspend for settlement if the motion is filed after answer but prior to the discovery conference, precisely because the discovery conference itself provides an opportunity to discuss settlement. The parties' discovery conference may be in person or by other means. A Board professional, i.e., an Interlocutory Attorney or an Administrative Trademark Judge, will participate in the conference upon the request of any party. If the parties propose to meet in person, participation by a Board professional will be by telephone, and be arranged by the parties. A request for the participation of a Board professional may only be made with or after the answer is filed but in no event later than ten (10) days prior to the deadline for conducting the discovery conference. The request may be made by phone or via ESTTA. If neither party requests participation of a Board professional in the discovery conference, the parties must meet on their own, in person or by other means, no later than the prescribed deadline, and the Board will operate on the assumption that the conference was held by the deadline. The parties do not have to file a disclosure/discovery plan with the Board, following their discovery conference, unless they are seeking leave by motion or stipulation to alter standard deadlines/obligations, or unless they were directed to make a particular filing by a participating Board professional. There is no Federal Rule 16(b) scheduling conference/order. The Board's institution order will already have set a schedule for the case. Disclosure deadlines and obligations may be modified upon stipulation of the parties approved by the Board, or upon motion granted by the Board, or by order of the Board. If a stipulation or motion is denied, dates may remain as set. Because dates may remain as set if the Board denies a stipulation or motion to alter dates, it is in the interests of the parties to file stipulations or motions promptly after the conference.
(from Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP) 309.03(c) Grounds) January 2017
(1) Trademark Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d): That defendant’s mark so resembles a mark registered in the Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the defendant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. [ Note 6.]
6. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Shen Manufacturing Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Opryland USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Jones, 65 USPQ2d 1650 (TTAB 2002).
See also First Niagara Insurance Brokers Inc. v. First Niagara Financial Group Inc., 476 F.3d 867, 81 USPQ2d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (claim of prior intrastate use); Brown Shoe Co. v. Robbins, 90 USPQ2d 1752, 1756 (TTAB 2009) (doctrine of foreign equivalents inapplicable but likelihood of confusion found); Giersch v. Scripps Networks Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1020, 1023 (TTAB 2009) (earliest date respondent may rely upon is the filing date of its underlying application in absence of evidence of earlier use; petitioner must show earlier common law use in absence of registration); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club LP v. Sherman, 88 USPQ2d 1581, 1593 (TTAB 2008) (dissimilarity of marks controlling issue in likelihood of confusion analysis); Apple Computer v. TVNET.net Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 2007); Life Zone Inc. v. Middleman Group Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1953, 1959 (TTAB 2008) (although opposer failed to make its registrations of record, its burden is to demonstrate that it owns a trademark, which was used prior to applicant’s mark, and not abandoned); Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson Electric Co., 84 USPQ2d 1482, 1490 (TTAB 2007) (family of marks); Jansen Enterprises Inc. v. Rind, 85 USPQ2d 1104, 1107 (TTAB 2007) (determination of likelihood of confusion based on an analysis of all facts in evidence); Christian Broadcasting Network Inc. v. ABS-CBN International, 84 USPQ2d 1560, 1565 (TTAB 2007) (several factors considered); Fort James Operating Co. v. Royal Paper Converting Inc., 83 USPQ2d 1624 (TTAB 2007)(design marks compared); Miss Universe L.P., v. Community Marketing, Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1562, 1566 (TTAB 2007) ("Our likelihood of confusion determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion issue (the du Pont factors)"); and Kohler Co. v. Baldwin Hardware Corp., 82 USPQ2d 1100, 1113 (TTAB 2007) (doubt resolved in favor of prior user).
(2) Trademark Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e): For example, that defendant’s mark, when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the defendant, is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, [Note 7]
7. See Trademark Act § 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(1). See also, e.g., The Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 57 USPQ2d 1720, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (deceptive misdescriptiveness) and Callaway Vineyard & Winery v. Endsley Capital Group, Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1919, 1922-23 (TTAB 2002) (mere descriptiveness).
Regarding claims under Trademark Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), see Cold War Museum Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 92 USPQ2d 1626, 1629 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (in cancellation proceeding, presumption of validity of registration under Trademark Act § 2(f) includes presumption of acquired distinctiveness, and party seeking cancellation must overcome this presumption by preponderance of evidence; "burden" to prove that mark has acquired distinctiveness shifts to registrant only after plaintiff establishes prima facie case that mark has not acquired distinctiveness); Yamaha International Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 6 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (in opposing a claim under Trademark Act § 2(f), opposer has initial burden of challenging or rebutting applicant’s evidence of distinctiveness) Alcatraz Media, Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1764-1767 (TTAB 2013) (burden on petitioner to rebut presumption that mark registered under Section 2(f) has acquired distinctiveness), aff’d , 565 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (mem.); Target Brands Inc. v. Hughes, 85 USPQ2d 1676, 1680 (TTAB 2007) (ultimate burden of persuasion under Trademark Act § 2(f) rests with applicant); Kellogg Co. v. General Mills Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1766, 1768 (TTAB 2007) (mere descriptiveness; whether claim under Trademark Act § 2(f) is sufficient).
or that defendant's mark is primarily geographically descriptive [Note 8]
8. See Trademark Act § 2(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(2). See also, e.g., Grand Canyon West Ranch LLC v. Hualapai Tribe, 88 USPQ2d 1501, 1504 (TTAB 2008) (whether mark is descriptive and/or primarily geographically descriptive, applicant has shown acquired distinctiveness); University Book Store v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 33 USPQ2d 1385 (TTAB 1994). Cf. Caymus Vineyards v. Caymus Medical Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1519, 1524-25 (TTAB 2013) (assertion that a registration is not entitled to Section 15 incontestability because of alleged fraud in obtaining and maintaining the registration does not state a valid ground for cancellation of a registration that is more than five years old on the basis that the registered mark is primarily geographically descriptive).
or primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them; [Note 9]
9. See Trademark Act § 2(e)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(3). See also In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 66 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the test for determining whether a mark is geographically deceptive under Trademark Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) is the same as determining whether a mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive under Trademark Act § 2(e)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3)); In re Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 59 USPQ2d 1778, 1781-82 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing § 2(e)(3) analysis); Corporacion Habanos SA v. Guantanamera Cigars Co., 102 USPQ2d 1085, 1090-91 (TTAB 2012) (reopened for the limited purpose of having the parties address whether a significant portion of the relevant consumers would be materially influenced to purchase the goods by the geographic meaning of the mark), on remand from, 729 F. Supp. 2d 246, 98 USPQ2d 1078 (D.D.C. 2010) (remanding on third factor of the test for determining whether a mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive); Corporacion Habanos SA v. Rodriquez, 99 USPQ2d 1873, 1876 (TTAB 2011) (primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive sufficiently pled); In re Jonathan Drew, Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1640, 1642 (TTAB 2011) (mark would be perceived as a misspelling of geographic location and found primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive for the goods); Corporacion Habanos S.A. v. Anncas Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1785, 1790-91 (TTAB 2008) (primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive and deceptive claims); United States Playing Card Co., v. Harbro, LLC, 81 USPQ2d 1537, 1541 (TTAB 2006) (addressing deceptiveness of a geographic term); In re Wada, 48 USPQ2d 1689, 1690-91 (TTAB 1998), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1297, 52 USPQ2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
and that defendant's mark is primarily merely a surname; [Note 10]
10. See Trademark Act § 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(4). See also, e.g., Michael S. Sachs Inc. v. Cordon Art B.V., 56 USPQ2d 1132, 1136 (TTAB 2000); Allied Mills, Inc. v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 203 USPQ 390, 391-92 (TTAB 1979); Food Specialty Co. v. Carnation Co., 170 USPQ 522, 523 (TTAB 1971). Cf. In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 74 USPQ2d 1174, 1174-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Section 44 applications are subject to the section 2 bars to registration, of which the surname rule is one."); In re Piano Factory Group Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1522, 1526-27 (TTAB 2007) (surname plus "& SONS" refused as "primarily a surname").
or that defendant’s mark comprises any matter that, as a whole, is de jure functional; or if not de jure functional, that the product design has not acquired distinctiveness. [Note 11]
11. See Trademark Act § 2(e)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(5); TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 58 USPQ2d 1001, 1006 (2001); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 34 USPQ2d 1161, 1165(1995). See also, e.g., In re Becton, Dickinson and Co., 675 F.3d 1368, 102 USPQ2d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and Valu Engineering Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 61 USPQ2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 2002), citing In re Morton-Norwich Products Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 213 USPQ 9, 15-16 (CCPA) for factors considered in determining functionality; AS Holdings, Inc. v. H & C Milcor, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1829, 1833 (TTAB 2013) (overall design of product configuration dictated by utilitarian concerns and as a whole is functional); In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery Inc., 106 USPQ2d 1784 (TTAB 2013) (color black aesthetically functional for packaging for flowers); Doyle v. Al Johnson’s Swedish Restaurant & Butik Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1780, 1783-84 (TTAB 2012) (petitioner failed to relate claim of functionality of goats on a roof to respondent’s restaurant and gift shop services); Kistner Concrete Products Inc. v. Contech Arch Technologies Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1912, 1918-19 (TTAB 2011) (registration on Supplemental Register for a precast concrete bridge unit); and M-5 Steel Manufacturing Inc. v. O’Hagin’s Inc., 61 USPQ2d 1086 (TTAB 2001) (product design for roof vents). Cf. ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 97 USPQ2d 1048, 1056-58 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same legal principles apply to a determination of functionality whether on the Principal Register or Supplemental Register); Duramax Marine, LLC v. R.W. Fernstrum & Co., 80 USPQ2d 1780, 1794 (TTAB 2006) (prohibition on the registration of functional marks does not extend to registration of two-dimensional design mark for custom manufacturing services).
(3) Trademark Act § 2(a),15 U.S.C. § 1052(a): For example, that defendant’s mark is geographically deceptive, [Note 12]
12. See, e.g,., Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma v. Parma Sausage Products, Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (TTAB 1992) (mark’s geographic deceptiveness must be established as of the time the registration issues). Cf. Corporacion Habanos S.A. v. Anncas Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1785, 1790 (TTAB 2008) (Board declines to consider geographically deceptive claim under Trademark Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)); United States Playing Card Co., v. Harbro, LLC, 81 USPQ2d 1537, 1541 (TTAB 2006) (addressing deceptiveness of a geographic term under the ambit of Trademark Act § 2(e)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3) rather than Trademark Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) ("The amended Lanham Act gives geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks the same treatment as geographically deceptive marks under § 1052(a).") (citing In re California Innovations Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 66 USPQ2d 1853, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); K-Swiss Inc. v. Swiss Army Brands Inc., 58 USPQ2d 1540, 1543 (TTAB 2001) (can be cancelled if a registrant, through its own actions, causes its mark to become geographically deceptive subsequent to the issuance of the registration).
that defendant’s mark disparages members of a particular group, [Note 13]
13. See, e.g., Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 USPQ2d 1080 (TTAB 2014) (disparage Native Americans), aff’d 112 F.Supp. 3d 439, 115 USPQ2d 1524 (E.D. Va. 2015), on appeal, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir.); In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 USPQ2d 1215 (TTAB 2010) (disparage religious affiliation); In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 USPQ2d 1071 (TTAB 2008) (disparage religious affiliation); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club LP v. Sherman, 88 USPQ2d 1581 (TTAB 2008) (disparage professional baseball team); In re Squaw Valley Development Co., 80 USPQ2d 1264 (TTAB 2006) (disparage Native Americans); McDermott v. San Francisco Womens Motorcycle Contingent, 81 USPQ2d 1212 (TTAB 2006); aff’d unpub’d,240 Fed. Appx. 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.1109 (2008) (while individual male citizen sufficiently alleged a "real interest" in the proceedings, he failed to properly allege "belief of damage," as he does not inherently possess an immutable trait directly implicated by the mark or allege that others share his belief of damage); Boswell v. Mavety Media Group Ltd., 52 USPQ2d 1600 (TTAB 1999) (women in general and African American women in particular); Order Sons of Italy in America v. Memphis Mafia Inc., 52 USPQ2d 1364 (TTAB 1999) (members of plaintiff’s Order and Italian-Americans in general); and Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1705, 1740-48 (TTAB 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 125, 68 USPQ2d 1225, 1248 (D.D.C. 2003), remanded, 415 F.3d 44, 75 USPQ2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and aff’d, 565 F.3d 880, 90 USPQ2d 1593 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 631 (2009) (cancellation action brought by Native Americans on grounds of disparagement barred by laches).
Please Note: In December 2015, the Federal Circuit, in an en banc decision in In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 117 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), held that the disparagement provision in § 2(a) is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s Tam decision and consider the constitutionality of the disparagement provision. Therefore, the TTAB has suspended action on all ex parte appeals and inter partes proceedings that present issues under the disparagement provision in § 2(a) with the following exception: complaining parties in inter partes proceedings are given the option to dismiss claims based on § 2(a) disparagement without prejudice and to obtain a decision on the merits of their remaining claims. Any suspension of a TTAB matter based on the disparagement provision of § 2(a) will remain in place until the U.S. Supreme Court issues a decision in Tam, after which the USPTO will re-evaluate the need for further suspension.
that defendant’s mark consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter, [Note 14]
14. See, e.g., In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 639-40, 105 USPQ2d 1247, 1251-52 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (word mark that created a double entendre was unregistrable where a substantial composite of the general public would recognize that one meaning was vulgar); In re Luxuria s.r.o., 100 USPQ2d 1146 (TTAB 2011) (design configuration of a bottle in the shape of a hand with the middle finger extended upwards found to be vulgar and thus unregistrable as scandalous or immoral); Corporacion Habanos S.A. v. Anncas Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1785 (TTAB 2008) (deceptiveness); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club L.P. v. Sherman, 88 USPQ2d 1581, 1588 (TTAB 2008) (scandalous or immoral); In re Boulevard Entertainment, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 67 USPQ2d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (use of dictionary evidence to determine whether mark is scandalous); In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 31 USPQ2d 1923 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (analyzing scandalous in terms of "vulgarity"). See also Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (standing to oppose on Trademark Act § 2(a),15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) scandalousness grounds); In re South Park Cigar, Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1507 (TTAB 2007) (deception involving geographical mark); In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375 (TTAB 2006) (scandalous mark); In re Wilcher Corp., 40 USPQ2d 1929 (TTAB 1996) (design mark scandalous); In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 USPQ2d 1216, 1220 (TTAB 1993) (design mark not scandalous). Cf. McDermott v. San Francisco Womens Motorcycle Contingent, 81 USPQ2d 1212, 1214 (TTAB 2006), aff’d unpub’d, 240 Fed. Appx. 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1109 (2008) (authority of Trademark Act §2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) does not extend to goods or services that may be viewed as scandalous or immoral in nature).
In December 2015, the Federal Circuit, in an en banc decision in In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 117 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), held that the disparagement provision in § 2(a) is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s Tam decision and consider the constitutionality of the disparagement provision. Related cases which may be affected by the Court’s decision include In re Brunetti, 2014 LEXIS 328 (TTAB Aug. 1, 2014) (non-precedential), on appeal to the Federal Circuit from the TTAB’s affirmance of a § 2(a) refusal under the scandalousness provision. Therefore, the TTAB has suspended action on all ex parte appeals and inter partes proceedings that present issues under the scandalousness provision in § 2(a) with the following exception: complaining parties in inter partes proceedings are given the option to dismiss claims based on the § 2(a) scandalous provision without prejudice and to obtain a decision on the merits of their remaining claims. Any suspension of a TTAB matter based on the scandalousness provision of § 2(a) will remain in place until the Federal Circuit issues a decision in Brunetti, after which the USPTO will re-evaluate the need for further suspension.
that defendant’s mark falsely suggests a connection with plaintiff’s name or identity; [Note 15]
15. See, e.g., University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co. Inc., 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir.1983); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club L.P. v. Sherman, 88 USPQ2d 1581, 1593 (TTAB 2008); Internet Inc. v. Corporation for National Research Initiatives, 38 USPQ2d 1435 (TTAB 1996); Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1635 (TTAB 1988); Buffett v. Chi Chi’s, Inc., 226 USPQ 428 (TTAB 1985). See also Nike, Inc. v. Palm Beach Crossfit, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1025, 1031-32 (TTAB 2015) (insufficiently pled claim where no assertion that public would recognize applicant’s mark as pointing uniquely to opposer).
or that defendant’s mark is a geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the goods and was first used on or in connection with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after January 1, 1996. [Note 16]
16. See Tea Board of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1881, 1899 (TTAB 2006) (certification mark recognized as a geographical indication). Cf. In re Spirits International N.V., 86 USPQ2d 1078, 1080 n.2 (TTAB 2008) (refusal based on "deceptiveness" provision of Trademark Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) and not that the mark is a geographical indication); In re Wada, 48 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 n.7 (TTAB 1998) (disclaimer of geographical indication cannot obviate a Trademark Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) refusal).
(4) That there was no bona fide use of defendant's mark in commerce prior to the filing of the use-based application for its registration under Section 1(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051@ [Note 17}
17. See, e.g., Lens.com Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts Inc., 686 F.3d 1376, 103 USPQ2d 1672, 1676-77 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (software that is merely a conduit through which online retail services are rendered is not "in use in commerce" in association with software); International Mobile Machines Corp. v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 800 F.2d 1118, 231 USPQ 142 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Avakoff v. Southern Pacific Co., 765 F.2d 1097, 226 USPQ 435 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 USPQ2d 1768, 1769 (TTAB 1994) ("use in commerce" involves the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark),aff’d unpub’d, 108 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Dragon Bleu (SARL) v. VENM, LLC, 112 USPQ2d 1925, 1929-30 (TTAB 2014) (claim of nonuse at time of filing for § 66(a) application legally insufficient for registration based on § 66(a) because time of nonuse begins from the date of registration); Clorox Co. v. Salazar, 108 USPQ2d 1083, 1086-87 (TTAB 2013) (applicant’s mark not in use in commerce as of the filing date of the use-based application); ShutEmDown Sports Inc. v. Lacy, 102 USPQ2d 1036 (TTAB 2012) (respondent’s mark not in use in commerce at time of filing of his use-based application); Nutrasweet Co. v. K & S Foods Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1964 (TTAB 1987); Pennwalt Corp. v. Sentry Chemical Co., 219 USPQ 542, 558 (TTAB 1983); Bonaventure Associates v. Westin Hotel Co., 218 USPQ 537, 543 (TTAB 1983). Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Kendrick, 85 USPQ2d 1032, 1033 (TTAB 2007) (opposer’s nonuse claim dismissed as moot upon Board’s acceptance of applicant’s amendment of the filing basis of its application from Trademark Act § 1(a) to 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) to (b)); CarX Service Systems, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 215 USPQ 345, 351 (TTAB 1982) (plaintiff must plead and prove that there was no use prior to filing date; mere claim that dates of use are incorrect does not state a claim of action).
(5) That defendant did not have a bona fide intent to use the mark in connection with the identified goods/services as of the filing date of the application; [Note 18]
18. See, e.g., M.Z. Berger & Co. v Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 114 USPQ2d 1892, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (lack of bona fide intent is a proper statutory grounds on which to challenge a trademark application), affirming 108 USPQ2d 1463, 1471-77 (TTAB 2013) (documentary evidence, testimony and other record evidence do not support applicant’s claimed bona fide intent to use); Swiss Grill Ltd. v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2008-09 (TTAB 2015) (lack of bona fide intent to use found where no documentary evidence predated application filing date); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1443 (TTAB 2012) (lack of a bona fide intent to use found where there was no documentary evidence, affirmative statement that no documents exist, no industry experience, no development or business plan, vague allusions to using the mark through licensing or outsourcing, and applicant’s demonstrated pattern of filing intent-to-use applications for disparate goods under the well-know and famous marks of others); Spirits International B.V. v. S. S. Taris Zeytin Ve Zeytinyagi Tarim Satis Kooperatifleri Birligi, 99 USPQ2d 1545, 1548-49 (TTAB 2011) (lack of a bona fide intent to use found where there was no documentary evidence, an affirmative statement that no such documents exist, and no other evidence to explain lack of documentary evidence); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Omnisource DDS LLS, 97 USPQ2d 1300, 1304-05 (TTAB 2010) (lack of a bona fide intent to use; no documentary evidence; record devoid of any other evidence of intended use); Honda Motor Co. v. Friedrich Winkelmann, 90 USPQ2d 1660 (TTAB 2009) (lack of bona fide intent to use); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club LP v. Sherman, 88 USPQ2d 1581, 1587 (TTAB 2008) (lack of bona fide intent to use); Lane Ltd. v. Jackson International Trading Co., 33 USPQ2d 1351, 1352 (TTAB 1994); Commodore Electronics Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha, 26 USPQ2d 1503, 1504 (TTAB 1993).
A plaintiff need not allege and prove that the defendant acted in bad faith and intended to deceive the USPTO. The requirements for pleading and proving a lack of a bona fide intent to use a mark do not equate to the requirements for pleading and proving fraud. [Note 19]
19. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Omnisource DDS LLS, 97 USPQ2d 1300, 1305 (TTAB 2010).
(6) That defendant’s mark is a mere background design that does not function as a mark separate and apart from the words displayed thereon. [Note 20]
20. See, e.g., In re Grande Cheese Co., 2 USPQ2d 1447, 1449 (TTAB 1986); General Foods Corp. v. Ito Yokado Co., 219 USPQ 822, 825 (TTAB 1983), aff’d unpub’d, slip. op. 84-517 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
(7) That defendant is not (and was not, at the time of the filing of its application for or that registration) the rightful owner of the registered mark. [Note 21]
21. See, e.g., Wonderbread 5 v. Gilles, 115 USPQ2d 1296, 1304-07 (TTAB 2015) (facts inconsistent with individual former band member’s claim that he was the owner the mark); UVeritech, Inc. v. Amax Lighting, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1242, 1249 (TTAB 2015) (presumption that a manufacturer is the owner of a disputed mark may be rebutted); Conolty v. Conolty O’Connor NYC LLC, 111 USPQ2d 1302 (TTAB 2014) (ownership claim determined under accelerated case resolution); Nahshin v. Product Source International LLC, 107 USPQ2d 1257 (TTAB 2013); Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. The Florists Association of Greater Cleveland Inc., 29 USPQ2d 1146 (TTAB 1993); Treadwell’s Drifters Inc. v. Marshak, 18 USPQ2d 1318, 1320 (TTAB 1990); Kemin Industries, Inc. v. Watkins Products, Inc., 192 USPQ 327, 328 (TTAB 1976). Cf., e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. R. Josephs Sportswear Inc., 28 USPQ2d 1464 (TTAB 1993) (where opposer was asserting that applicant’s mark is a descriptive term which cannot be owned exclusively by anyone, rather than alleging that someone other than applicant is the owner of the term as a mark) recon. den., 36 USPQ2d 1328 (TTAB 1994).
(8) That defendant’s mark, consisting of a particular color combination applied to its goods, is ornamental and has not become distinctive as an indication of the source of defendant’s goods, [Note 22]
22. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 34 USPQ2d 1161 (1995); Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., 522 F.3d 1320, 86 USPQ2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 32 USPQ2d 1120 (Fed. Cir.1994), In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 227 USPQ 417, (Fed.Cir.1985); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vogue Tyre & Rubber Co., 47 USPQ2d 1748 (TTAB 1998); Kassnar Imports v. Plastilite Corp., 180 USPQ 156, 157 (TTAB 1973), aff’d, 508 F.2d 824, 184 USPQ 348, 350 (CCPA 1975).
or that defendant’s mark, consisting of a particular sound applied to its goods, is not inherently distinctive and has not acquired distinctiveness. [Note 23]
23. See Trademark Act § 1, Trademark Act § 2 and Trademark Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 and 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Nextel Communications Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 2009)("chirp" sound). Cf. In re Vertex Group LLC, 89 USPQ2d 1694, 1700 (TTAB 2009) (registration on the Principal Register of the sound emitted by applicant’s product in its normal course of operation only available on a showing of acquired distinctiveness).
For product design see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 529 U.S. 205, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1069 (2000) (product design can never be inherently distinctive and requires showing of acquired distinctiveness); AS Holdings, Inc. v. H & C Milcor, Inc., 107 USPQ2d at 1839 (product configuration of pipe boot design has not acquired distinctiveness); Stuart Spector Designs, Ltd. v. Fender Musical Instruments Corp., 94 USPQ2d 1549 (TTAB 2009) (product configuration).
For product packaging see also Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana Inc., 505 US 763, 23 USPQ2d 1081 (1992) (trade dress packaging may be inherently distinctive); In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (court applies four-part test from Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 196 USPQ 289, 291 (CCPA 1977) to determine if trade dress packaging is inherently distinctive, or requires showing of acquired distinctiveness).
(9) That the term for which registration is sought or for which registration has been obtained has not been used as a trademark or service mark. [Note 24]
24. See, e.g., Couture v. Playdom, Inc., 778 F.3d 1379, 113 USPQ2d 2012 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (service must be offered and actually provided to constitute use in commerce); Aycock Engineering, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 90 USPQ2d 1301, 1309 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (registration on Supplemental Register never becomes immune from threat of invalidation on grounds that mark was not used prior to filing date); Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. The Florists Association of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 29 USPQ2d 1146, 1160 (TTAB 1993) (allegation that slogan was used as mere advertising and not as a trademark); Marshall Field & Co. v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 11 USPQ2d 1355 (TTAB 1989).
(10) That defendant's mark represents multiple marks in a single application (or registration) ("phantom mark"). [Note 25]
25. See, e.g., Cineplex Odeon Corp. v. Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, 56 USPQ2d 1538 (TTAB 2000). See also In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812-1813 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re International Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 47 USPQ2d 1314 (TTAB 1998), aff'd, 183 F.3d 1361, 51 USPQ2d 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
(11) That defendant’s mark has been abandoned due to nonuse with intent not to resume use, and nonuse for three consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment, [Note 26]
26. Trademark Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See, e.g., Linville v. Rivard, 41 USPQ2d 1731 (TTAB 1996), aff’d, 133 F.3d 1446, 45 USPQ2d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip Morris Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 14 USPQ2d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1990); City National Bank v. OPGI Management GP Inc./Gestion OPGI Inc., 106 USPQ2d 1676-79 (TTAB 2013) (abandonment of a registration under Trademark Act § 44(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e), based on over three years of nonuse where respondent did not use mark with recited services since at least the issuance date of the involved registration and where the nature of the use shown by respondent did not constitute use in commerce); ShutEmDown Sports Inc. v. Lacy, 102 USPQ2d 1036 (TTAB 2012) (more than three years of nonuse, commencing with filing date for majority of the identified goods, and no evidence rebutting prima facie showing); Auburn Farms, Inc. v. McKee Foods Corp., 51 USPQ2d 1439 (TTAB 1998). Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Aristide & Co., Antiquaire de Marques, 87 USPQ2d 1179 (TTAB 2008) (plaintiff could not prove priority because it abandoned mark with no intent to resume use prior to use by defendant); Otto International Inc. v. Otto Kern GmbH, 83 USPQ2d 1861, 1863 (TTAB 2007) (plaintiff must allege ultimate facts pertaining to the alleged abandonment).
See also Saddlesprings Inc. v Mad Croc Brands Inc., 104 USPQ2d 1948, 1550-52 (TTAB 2012) (claim of abandonment is available with respect to a claim against a § 66(a) registration, which is a registered extension of protection under 15 U.S.C. § 1141f(a)).
or due to a course of conduct that has caused the mark to lose significance as an indication of source. [Note 27]
(12) That defendant's mark consists of or comprises the name of a particular living individual without the individual's consent. [Note 28]
28. See Trademark Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c). See also Chester L. Krause v. Krause Publications, Inc., 76 USPQ2d 1904, 1909 (TTAB 2005), aff’d, slip. op. 2007-1364 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 7, 2007); Nike, Inc. v. Palm Beach Crossfit, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1025, 1032-33 (TTAB 2015) (claim insufficiently pled where no assertion that licensing relationship gave opposer a proprietary right to assert the claim on behalf of third party); Ross v. Analytical Technology, Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1269 (TTAB 1999) (plaintiff must establish that the "name," as used on the goods or services, points uniquely to plaintiff as a "particular living individual"); Ceccato v. Manifattura Lane Gaetano Marzotto & Figli S.p.A., 32 USPQ2d 1192, 1195 (TTAB 1994) (party asserting Trademark Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) ground must have cognizable or proprietary right in the name). Cf. Societe Civile Des Domaines Dourthe Freres v. S.A. Consortium Vinicole De Bordeaux Et De La Gironde, 6 USPQ2d 1205, 1209 (TTAB 1988) (Trademark Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) does not apply to family surnames).
(13) That defendant's product design is generic. [Note 29]
29. See Stuart Spector Designs, Ltd. v. Fender Musical Instruments Corp., 94 USPQ2d 1549, (TTAB 2009); Sunrise Jewelry Manufacturing Corp. v. Fred, S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 50 USPQ2d 1532, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (the term "generic name" as used in Trademark Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) includes trade dress such as product design or configuration).
(14) That defendant's mark would dilute the distinctive quality of plaintiff's famous mark. [Note 30]
30. See Trademark Act § 13(a) and Trademark Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1064; Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 USPQ2d 1164 (TTAB 2001). See also Trademark Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Omega SA (Omega AG) (Omega Ltd.) v. Alpha Phi Omega, 118 USPQ2d 1289, 1297 (TTAB 2016) (party alleging dilution by blurring must prove that mark(s) became famous prior to any established, continuous use of Applicant’s involved marks, whether as a trademark or trade name, and not just prior to Applicant’s use in commerce of its challenged marks in connection with the goods identified in involved applications); N.Y Yankees Partnership v. IET Products & Services, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1497, 1509-10 (TTAB 2015) (parody defense will not be considered as part of the assessment of a dilution claim; whether an applicant’s mark is registrable because it is being used in commerce to indicate source is counter to whether such use is noncommercial or fair use); McDonald’s Corp. v. McSweet LLC, 112 USPQ2d 1268, 1286 (TTAB 2014) (dilution also applies to family of marks); Chanel, Inc. v. Makarczyk, 110 USPQ2d 2013, 2023-24 (TTAB 2014) (dilution by blurring, opposer may rely on applicant’s filing (constructive use) date to satisfy second prong of test); Research in Motion Limited v. Defining Presence Marketing Group Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1187 (TTAB 2012) (full analysis of factors finding dilution by blurring); Rolex Watch U.S.A. Inc. v. AFP Imaging Corp., 101 USPQ2d 1188, 1191-97 (TTAB 2011) (same), judgment vacated based on action of defendant on appeal, 107 USPQ2d 1626 (TTAB 2013); UMG Recordings Inc. v. Mattel Inc., 100 USPQ2d 1868, 1886-90 (TTAB 2011) (same); Nike Inc. v. Maher, 100 USPQ2d 1018 (TTAB 2011) (same); National Pork Board and National Pork Producers Council v. Supreme Lobster and Seafood Co., 96 USPQ2d 1479 (TTAB 2010) (commodity promotion slogan dilution by blurring); Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC; 96 USPQ2d 1600 (TTAB 2010) (dilution by blurring and tarnishment), aff’d-in-part, rev’d-in-part and remanded on other grounds, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1645, 1649 (TTAB 2010) (party alleging fame must show that mark became famous before applicant’s use of challenged mark), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Demon International LC v. Lynch, 86 USPQ2d 1058, 1059-60 (TTAB 2008) (dilution claim in pleading must include an allegation that opposer’s mark at issue is famous); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 US 418, 65 USPQ2d 1801 (2003); Trek Bicycle Corp. v. StyleTrek Ltd., 64 USPQ2d 1540, 1542 (TTAB 2001) (dilution pleading legally insufficient where opposer failed to allege that its mark became famous before constructive use date of involved intent-to-use application); Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 USPQ2d 1164, 1174 n.9 (TTAB 2001); Polaris Industries Inc. v. DC Comics, 59 USPQ2d 1798 (TTAB 2000); Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 62 USPQ2d 1857 (TTAB 2002), aff’d, 300 F.3d 1333, 66 USPQ2d 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But see Fiat Group Automobiles, S.p.A. v. ISM, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1111, 1113 (TTAB 2010) (the "well known mark" doctrine does not constitute a basis for pleading dilution in the United States, absent a specific pleading of intent to use, the filing of an application for registration, and some basis for concluding that recognition of the mark in the United States is sufficiently widespread as to create an association of the mark with particular products or services, even if the source thereof is anonymous and even if the products or services are not available in the United States).
(15) That defendant has used its mark so as to misrepresent the source of its goods or services. [Note 31]
31. See Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC, 90 USPQ2d 1587 (TTAB 2009) (motion to dismiss misrepresentation of source claim denied), on final decision, 110 USPQ2d 1623 (TTAB 2014) (petition granted on claim of misrepresentation), rev’d on other grounds, 84 F. Supp. 3d 490 (E.D. Va. 2015), vacated and remanded 819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming TTAB); Otto International Inc. v. Otto Kern GmbH, 83 USPQ2d 1861, 1863 (TTAB 2007) (pleading of misrepresentation of source must be supported by allegations of blatant misuse of the mark by respondent in a manner calculated to trade on the goodwill and reputation of petitioner); The E.E. Dickinson Co. v. The T.N. Dickinson Co., 221 USPQ 713 (TTAB 1984) (petitioner allowed to go forward on claim of misrepresentation of source).
(16) That defendant has misused the federal registration symbol with intent to deceive the purchasing public or others in the trade into believing that the mark is registered. [Note 32]
32. See Copelands’ Enterprises Inc. v. CNV Inc., 945 F.2d 1563, 20 USPQ2d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Brown Shoe Co. v. Robbins, 90 USPQ2d 1752, 1758 (TTAB 2009) (mistaken belief that registration of mark in foreign country permits use of symbol); Barbara’s Bakery Inc. v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1290 (TTAB 2007) (allegation that opposer has misused federal registration symbol construed "as a species of the equitable affirmative defense of unclean hands"); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Concorde Battery Corp., 228 USPQ 39, 44 (TTAB 1985); Bass Pro Trademarks LLC v. Sportsman’s Warehouse Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1844, 1846 n.3 (TTAB 2008). Cf. Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 27 (CCPA 1976) (raised as affirmative defense).
(17) That defendant committed fraud in the procurement of its registration or during the prosecution of its application for registration. [Note 33]
Protection of Washington, 1929 (“Pan American Convention”), 46 Stat. 2907. [Note 34]
34. See British-American Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris Inc., 55 USPQ2d 1585 (TTAB 2000). Cf. Diaz v. Servicios De Franquicia Pardo’s S.A.C., 83 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (TTAB 2007) (Board has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain affirmative defense of priority pursuant to Article 7 of the Pan American Convention).
(19) That defendant’s application is barred from registration by claim or issue preclusion. [Note 35]
35. See Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v. Berkshire Fashions Inc., 424 F.3d 1229, 76 USPQ2d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (opposition not barred by claim or issue preclusion); Jet Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems, 223 F.3d 1360, 55 USPQ2d 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (claim preclusion doctrine did not bar petition to cancel); Chutter, Inc. v. Great Concepts, LLC, 119 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (TTAB 2016) (claim preclusion inapplicable because fraud claim based on different transactional facts, defendant’s motion for summary judgment denied); Zoba International Corp. v. DVD Format/LOGO Licensing Corp., 98 USQP2d 1106 (TTAB 2011) (claim preclusion barred petitions to cancel against two registrations but not a third registration; "defendant preclusion" does not apply to facts of case and further discussed in contrast to "plaintiff preclusion"); Nextel Communications Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1393, 1398 (TTAB 2009) (finding in prior Board proceeding that mark failed to function with respect to "two-way radios" entitled opposer to judgment with respect to those goods under principles of issue preclusion). Cf. Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., 522 F.3d 1320, 86 USPQ2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (cancellation petition barred by doctrine of "defendant preclusion"); NH Beach Pizza LLC v. Cristy's Pizza Inc., 119 USPQ2d 1861, 1863 (TTAB 2016) (issue preclusion may bar re-litigation of a standing determination made in a prior Board proceeding); Urock Network, LLC v. Sulpasso, 115 USPQ2d 1409, 1411-1413 (TTAB 2015) (claim preclusion bars cancellation proceeding in view of earlier opposition proceeding which was dismissed for failure of plaintiff to submit any evidence in support of its case; and where plaintiff in cancellation concedes it is same as plaintiff in opposition); Stephen Slesinger Inc. v. Disney Enterprises Inc., 98 USPQ2d 1890 (TTAB 2011) (ownership of the marks at issue established in court proceeding; defendant entitled to summary judgment based on issue preclusion), aff’d, 702 F.3d 640, 105 USPQ2d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert den., 134 S. Ct. 125 (2013). See also Zachry Infrastructure LLC v. American Infrastructure Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1249 (TTAB 2011) (no claim preclusion based on district court’s determination because civil action focused on respective uses and rights to use while Board proceeding focused on right to registration; issue preclusion based on district court determination found; no claim preclusion based on abandonments in related opposition because trademark owner allowed to make decision on which oppositions to defend). (20) That defendant’s mark is the title of a single creative work and not considered a trademark. [Note 36]
36. See Mattel Inc. v. Brainy Baby Co., 101 USPQ2d 1140, 1142-44 (TTAB 2011).
(21) Trademark Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b): Registration of a mark which is "the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality" is prohibited. [ Note 37.]
(22) That defendant has not established a commercial presence in the country from which its underlying foreign registration issued where such foreign registration forms the basis of the U.S. registration or application for registration. Trademark Act § 44(e); 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e). [ Note 38.]
(23) That the intent-to-use application was assigned or transferred in contravention of Trademark Act § 10; 15 U.S.C. § 1060. [ Note 39.]
37. See, e.g., In re City of Houston, 101 USPQ2d 1534 (TTAB 2012), aff’d 731 F.3d 1326, 108 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2013); In re District of Columbia, 101 USPQ2d 1588 (TTAB 2012), aff’d sub nom. In re City of Houston, 731 F.3d 1326, 108 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
38. Kallamni. v. Khan, 101 USPQ2d 1864 (TTAB 2012).
39. See Central Garden & Pet Co. v. Doskocil Manufacturing Co., 108 USPQ2d 1134, 1146-50 (TTAB 2013); The Clorox Co. v. Chemical Bank, 40 USPQ2d 1098 (TTAB 1996).
40. See H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Association of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 228 USPQ 528, 531-32 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (two-step determination of whether a term is generic involves 1) what is the genus of the goods or services at issue and 2) is the term understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus). Accord Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 114 USPQ2d 1827, 1830-31 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (there is only one legal standard for genericness).
41. Turtle Wax, Inc. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1534, 1536 (TTAB 1987).
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