Source: http://www.calattorneysfees.com/
Timestamp: 2015-07-04 19:00:28
Document Index: 204396701

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 473', '§ 998', '§ 473', '§ 1021', '§ 285', '§ 2033', '§ 6259', '§ 2033', '§ 1021']

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES ABOUT
2008-2009-2010-2011-2012-2013-2014-2015 Marc Alexander & William M. Hensley July 03, 2015
Revenue And Taxation Code Section 5152 Was The Fee Entitlement Predicate. The home of the American citizen after the tax bill has passed. July 19, 1862. Library of Congress. The caption reads: "Scroggs says he is ready and willing to pay any amount of tax, but he would like them to leave his wife's crinoline and other domestic trifles alone." Ocean Avenue, LLC filed a complaint for a sizable $314,680.95 tax refund, arguing there had been no change in a hotel’s ownership such that a reassessment was improper. The trial court found in favor of Ocean Avenue, a judgment affirmed in an earlier appellate opinion. Then, the lower court awarded Ocean Avenue $252,118.75 in attorney’s fees under Revenue and Taxation Code section 5152, which allows for recovery of attorney’s fees by the taxpayer where the assessor failed to follow a specific tax provision and did so under the belief the law was unconstitutional/invalid (versus just having a misunderstanding of the law). (Phillips Petroleum Co. v. County of Lake, 15 Cal.App.4th 180, 197-198 (1993).) The County’s appeal of the fee award was unsuccessful in Ocean Avenue, LLC v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B249722 (2d Dist., Div. 2 July 1, 2015) (unpublished). The record showed that the County did challenge the constitutionality/invalidity of certain tax provisions and failed to follow Revenue and Taxation Code section 538, which requires an assessor to file a declaratory relief action when he/she challenges a specific provisions of the law (something not done here, so there was a failure to follow a specific tax provision). County’s own statements during closing argument proved the point, and it could not backtrack from them on appeal. The appellate court, in affirming, also awarded costs on appeal, which also means Ocean Avenue can seek further fees for its appellate win.
Special Fee Shifting Statute: $17,250 Fee Award To Civil Harassment Prevailing Litigant Affirmed On Appeal
Defendant Prevailed, After Acrimonious Email Battle Involving His Wife Who Was The Losing Plaintiff’s Former Wife. Plaintiff, Mr. Grier, former husband of Nancy Truong, filed a civil harassment petition against Ms. Truong’s current husband, Mr. Baturyn. Needless to say, emotions ran high. Even though plaintiff obtained some discovery and an initial TRO, he lost the war, with the trial court denying an injunction as to current husband. Current husband moved for and obtained, with a small cut, most of his attorney’s fees of $17,250, given that Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6(r) allows a prevailing party in such a proceeding to be awarded discretionary court costs and attorney’s fees. Plaintiff’s appeal in Grier v. Baturyn, Case No. A141381 (1st Dist., Div. 2 June 30, 2015) (unpublished) did not change the result. Although griping about discovery abuses, the lower court denied the civil harassment injunction request and never imposed any discovery-related sanctions against current husband, the prevailing party. Not enough to overturn the fee award in this one, according to the appellate court.
Posted at 12:26 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink
“Clear Sailing” Provision Not Per Se Suspect. Weight Loss. Father reduces his weight. Arthur Burdett Frost, 1914. Library of Congress. In Anaya v. QuickTrim, LLC, Case No. D067432 (4th Dist., Div. 1 July 2, 2015) (unpublished), a CLRA class action challenging product labeling and packaging for weight loss products was settled under a refund/coupon mechanism, although the refunds were relatively low in amount per consumer. The settlement further had a “clear sailing” clause by which the defense would not object to a class action fee recovery request not exceeding $250,000. Although the defense did set up a settlement website receiving a large number of hits and about 16,000 class member claims, the combined estimated value of the claims through the refund/coupon options came to about $247,484.68. The trial court approved the settlement and awarded $250,000 in fees/costs to class counsel. An objector complained, among other things, that the fees award was an abuse of discretion and disproportionate to the class’s recovery. However, because the amount of a fee award is viewed through a deferential review lens, adequate substantiation was provided to support the work effort of class counsel. Also, “clear sailing” provisions are not improper under California law per se, actually being quite common so as to not raise a red flag under the facts here. (In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 553 (2009).) So, objector’s challenges to the fee award were rejected on appeal.
Posted at 10:57 AM in Cases: Class Actions | Permalink
They Did Get $76,000 In Fees And $16,961 In Costs, But Not Anything More—Plaintiffs’ Behavior In Settlement Negotiations Found To Be Irrelevant For Fixing 1717 Fees. Some of the gnarly cases involve those where there is no “unqualified winner” under Civil Code section 1717 as far as fees (although a winner for routine costs). The trial judge gets to decide, much to the chagrin of the losing party and maybe the winning side if the fee award is not high enough. Nguyen v. JMK Investments, Inc., Case No. H040901 (6th Dist. June 30, 2015) (unpublished) illustrates how “cognitive dissonance” can operate in the fee area. Plaintiff shopping center tenants sued a shopping center manager regarding excessive management and landscaping fees, with the parties settling under an arrangement by which plaintiffs obtained certain credits and moneys with the trial court to resolve which side was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. (There was a lease fees clause at play.) After requesting about $129,000 in fees and $20,000 in costs, plaintiffs were awarded $76,000 in fees and $16,961 in costs. Both sides appealed, defendant saying “no way” on fees or awarded amount, and plaintiffs saying “not enough.” Both sides went away discontent on appeal. Plaintiffs did prevail as to routine costs given that they were paid $22,500 for monetary damages on excessive CAM charge claims. Nothing showed that the costs claimed were unreasonable or unnecessary. With respect to expert fees, the Sixth District found the trial judge had authority to award expert fees as costs under a lease clause without the necessity to prove as damages at a trial. (Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Mariners Mile Gateway, LLC, 185 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1066 (2010).) Plaintiffs also prevailed for purposes of a Civil Code section 1717 fee award, given there was a lease fees clause. After all, plaintiffs obtained some money, got an audit of CAM expenses, and eliminated some improper landscaping charges—enough to prevail. Although the defense argued that plaintiffs’ behavior in settlement negotiations should be considered, the Sixth District considered it irrelevant for 1717 purposes. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the fee request, as far as making an award, with respect to plaintiffs.
Posted at 10:43 AM in Cases: Costs, Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink
Plaintiff Only Recovered $2,229, And CCP § 473 Relief Did Not Resonate. We have to say that in pro per plaintiffs need to beware when confronted with CCP § 998 offers—even though our courts are open to all, in pro per representation is fraught with perils, as Jones v. Pierce, Case No. A139665 (1st Dist., Div. 2 June 30, 2015) (unpublished) illustrates. In this one, plaintiff sued for negligence arising from a vehicle accident, but rejected a $7,500 998 offer from defendant. However, plaintiff only recovered $2,229 after a jury trial. The trial judge awarded 998 fee-shifting costs of $33,198.06, after plaintiff failed to timely move to tax costs but making a request for mercy under CCP § 473. Didn’t resonate with the appellate court. The failure to file a motion to tax costs constitutes a waiver of the right to object to a costs bill. (Douglas v. Willis, 27 Cal.App.4th 287, 289-290 (1994).) In order to counteract this obvious waiver, plaintiff tried to use the section 473 escape valve because he did not have an attorney. However, this bad assumption of risk did not work—“when a litigant accepts the risks of proceeding without counsel, he or she is stuck with the outcome, and has no greater opportunity to cast off an unfavorable judgment than he or she would if represented by counsel.” (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens, 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413 (2011).)
Posted at 10:32 AM in Cases: Equity, Cases: Section 998 | Permalink
Prevailing Party: Parties In Easement/Damages Dispute Had To Bear Own Fees—No One Prevailed
“Wash” Sentiment Of Lower Court Endorsed By Appellate Court On Review. It’s a wash. Louise Rosskam, photographer. July 1940. Library of Congress. In Yee v. Richance HB, LLC, Case No. G049598 (4th Dist., Div. 3 June 29, 2015) (unpublished), plaintiff/cross-defendant and defendant/cross-complainant got into a real estate dispute over easement rights. The end result in the lower court was that plaintiff won on the claim that an easement was enforceable (creating a parking burden), but defendant prevailed on plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages. Faced with plaintiff seeking $610,298 in fees and defendant seeking $131,695.43 in attorney’s fees under a prior stipulated judgment easement settlement fees clause, the lower court declared it a “wash” and found neither side clearly prevailed so as to be entitled to fees. The Fourth District, Division 3, in an opinion authored by Justice Moore, agreed. A detailed review of the record showed that easement preservation was not plaintiff’s only litigation objective, with damages being a main catalyst—and plaintiff did not obtain damages. The “no prevailing party” determination below was sustained on appeal.
Posted at 10:19 AM in Cases: Prevailing Party | Permalink
No Important Right Or Significant Benefit Vindicated. Not all political “victories” give rise to private attorney general fee recovery under CCP § 1021.5, as the next case illustrates. In Willard v. Kelley (Woolery), Case No. G050340 (4th Dist., Div. 3 June 29, 2015) (unpublished), one political opponent (Willard) challenged a portion of his opponent Woolery’s candidate designation as “Orange County Treasurer/CPA” as being inaccurate because it was not his principal occupation. The trial court denied the petition, directed against the Orange County Registrar of Voters, based on the ground that Woolery’s stated occupation satisfied Election Code requirements. Woolery then requested an award of $8,320 in attorney’s fees under the private attorney general statute, a request denied by the trial court. That determination was upheld on appeal, in an opinion authored by Justice Fybel. The primary reason for affirmance was that factual accuracies relating to one candidate’s personal history, versus a battle over one’s views as a candidate, did not transcend beyond a candidate’s personal interests so as to confer a significant benefit to the electorate. (Hammond v. Agran, 99 Cal.App.4th 115, 121 (2002).) Fee recovery was properly denied in this one.
Posted at 08:35 AM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink
However, Sanctions For Frivolous Appeal Denied, With Appellate Court Telling Both Sides To “Behave.” In Marriage of Weiss, Case No. D065042 (4th Dist., Div. 1 June 22, 2015) (unpublished), husband was sanctioned for $22,500 in fees under Family Code section 271’s sanction statute, about one-third of wife’s request. Husband appealed it, but the appellate court found that the sanctions were justified because (1) there was no legal basis for husband filing an annulment petition when the parties had a longstanding romantic relationship spanning 8 years, (2) husband waited until the eve of the annulment trial to withdraw his claim, and (3) husband reported the annulment petition to the INS. Although section 271 is not a provision requiring a needs-based analysis, husband had plenty of assets and cash flow to absorb the fee award. Wife wanted sanctions for a frivolous appeal, but that was denied. “In reaching this conclusion, we remind both parties and their counsel of the importance of adhering to the policies underlying the family law statutes, which require parties to cooperate and work together to reduce litigation costs. On our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that both parties engaged in inflammatory and unproductive litigation, and we echo the court’s concerns that neither party’s counsel has used his or her best efforts to reduce the level of hostility and acrimony in the litigation. We urge counsel to do so in the service of their clients’ best interests.” (Slip Opn., pp. 15-16.)
Posted at 10:18 PM in Cases: Family Law | Permalink
Exceptions Are Made For Nonstock Corporations And For Shareholder Agreements. In our March 31 and June 12, 2014 posts, we discussed ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014), where the Delaware Supreme Court upheld as facially valid a bylaw imposing liability for certain legal fees of the nonstock corporation on certain members who participated in the litigation. This raised a real fracas about whether shareholders in Delaware stock corporations could also be visited with potential fee exposure in derivative or other corporate governance suits. We can now report that the Delaware Legislature passed S.B. 75, which was signed into law by Delaware Governor Jack Markell on June 24, 2015, with the certain amendments to Delaware General Corporation law becoming effective August 1, 2015. Here is a synopsis of S.B. 75 from the Delaware legislative website: “In combination with the amendments to Sections 109(b) and 114(b)(2), new subsection (f) does not disturb that ruling [ATP Tour] in relation to nonstock corporations. In order to preserve the efficacy of the enforcement of fiduciary duties in stock corporations, however, new subsection (f) would invalidate a provision in the certificate of incorporation of a stock corporation that purports to impose liability upon a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in new Section 115. New subsection (f) is not intended, however, to prevent the application of such provisions pursuant to a stockholders agreement or other writing signed by the stockholder against whom the provision is to be enforced. “Like the concurrent amendment to Section 102, the new last sentence of subsection (b) would invalidate a provision in the bylaws of a stock corporation that purports to impose liability upon a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in new Section 115. The new last sentence of subsection (b) is not intended, however, to prevent the application of any provision in a stockholders agreement or other writing signed by the stockholder against whom the provision is to be enforced. “The amendment to Section 114 has the effect of avoiding the application to nonstock corporations of new Section 102(f) and the new last sentence of Section 109(b).”
Posted at 10:11 PM in Legislation, News | Permalink
Fee Request Remanded To See If Any Change In Result. In Gaymar Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products, Inc., No. 2014-1174 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 2015), a district court (based on a magistrate judge’s recommendations) denied “exceptional case” attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 to defendant prevailing in a patent infringement case. The bases were two-fold: (1) plaintiff did not take any objectively baseless positions in the litigation, and (2) defense counsel had engaged in litigation misconduct such that the matter could not be deemed “exceptional” in nature. The Federal Circuit affirmed basis number 1, but reversed basis number 2 and remanded to make sure that the number 2 reasoning did not taint the entire fee denial order. With respect to basis number 2, the appeals court found that there had been no misrepresentations by defense counsel, only overstatements or sloppy arguments that in the end showed no inconsistency in positions. The court found that bad lawyering is not the equivalent of misconduct for purposes of awarding section 285 fees under the Octane analytical framework.
Posted at 09:59 PM in Cases: Intellectual Property | Permalink
Request For Admissions: $287,040 In Fees And $7,448.05 In Expert Fees/Costs As RFA “Cost-Of-Proof” Sanctions Sustained On Appeal
Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Rule On Matter Post-Trial During Appeal Pendency. Plaintiff/cross-defendant prevailed in a bitterly contested real estate dispute after a jury trial as against defendant/cross-complainant. Then, after defendant/cross-complainant denied five key RFAs requiring plaintiff/cross-defendant to prove otherwise at trial, the lower court awarded prevailing plaintiff/cross-defendant RFA “cost-of-proof” sanctions in the amounts of $287,040 (attorney’s fees) and $7,448.05 (expert fees/costs) under CCP § 2033.420(b)(3). The RFA sanctions held up on appeal in Farhoomand v. Caine, Case No. D064302 (4th Dist., Div. 1 June 25, 2015) (unpublished). The denied RFAs were of substantial importance, such that cost-of-proof sanctions were in order. The lower court had jurisdiction, post-trial, to rule on the sanctions request given that the proceeding was ancillary or collateral to the appeal. (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal.4th 180, 190-191 (2005).) Losing plaintiff also ignored a “vast amount of evidence,” including her own handwritten documents, which contradicted her claims and affected her credibility with respect to the RFA subject matters. No abuse of discretion in affirming the large award, under the circumstances.
Posted at 09:45 PM in Cases: Requests for Admission | Permalink
Trope Prohibition Inapplicable to Public Records Act Request. In Law Offices of Marc Grossman v. Victor Elementary School Dist., Case No. E059579 (4th Dist., Div. 2 June 26, 2015) (unpublished), a law firm representing a student of defendant elementary school sought public records reflecting the amount of money spent defending student’s assault action. The trial court denied the California Public Records Act request, but this was reversed by the appellate court in an earlier writ of mandate proceeding filed in the name of the law firm representing student. After issuance of the appellate remittitur, plaintiff’s law firm moved to recoup $16,327 in attorney’s fees under the CPRA’s fee-shifting provision (Govt. Code, § 6259(d)). The trial court granted a motion to tax the fee request, based on the ground that plaintiff (through the law firm) represented itself in the trial court. Plaintiff again prevailed, obtaining a reversal in a 3-0 decision authored by Presiding Justice Ramirez. Because the appeal presented a legal question appropriate for de novo review, the Fourth District, Division 2 panel found that the Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal.4th 274 (1995) prohibition—disallowing fee recovery to a law firm representing itself in a Civil Code section 1717 dispute—did not apply to a CPRA petition or to a law firm seeking disclosure of public information really for the benefit of its student client. Trope was found inapposite under the circumstances.
Posted at 09:40 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink
Dismissal Of Contractual Claims Barred Fee Recovery Under Santisas. Landlord filed a suit against former tenants, after they vacated the property, for breach of contract, negligence and waste, with landlord dismissing the action without prejudice ten months later. Tenant then moved for, and obtained, $26,671 in attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1717 based on a fees clause which stated that “[i]n any action or legal proceeding to enforce any part of this Agreement [the lease], the prevailing party . . . shall recover reasonable attorneys fees and court costs.” Landlord did well to appeal in Smith v. Calbert, Case No. A140558 (1st Dist., Div. 1 June 25, 2015) (unpublished). The problem here, leading to a reversal, was that the fees clause was narrow, limited to contract claims in line with prior case law interpreting the language as only relating to contractual claims. (E.g., Casella v. Southwest Dealer Services, Inc., 157 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1160 (2007); Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp., 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 702 (1998); Loube v. Loube, 64 Cal.App.4th 421, 429 (1998).) Given that pretrial dismissal of contractual claims will not give rise to fees under Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal.4th 599 (1998) [one of our Leading Cases], there was no basis for the fee award. However, Landlord’s voluntarily dismissal did do in his effort to get his own attorney’s fees on appeal.
Also, Failure To Itemize Expenses Incurred For RFA Denials Prevented Imposition Of Costs-Of-Proof Sanctions. The standard of review is critical in appellate matters as well as the development of the record below. Appellant, the successful defendant in a residential unlawful detainer case, found that out in Kennedy v. Morin, Case No. B254871 (2d Dist., Div. 3 June 22, 2015) (unpublished). There, defendant won a jury trial based on the inhabitability of premises as against an eviction suit by the losing landlord, with the jury determining all of the alleged past due rent/damages should not be awarded but reduced entirely for the rental conditions. No one argued there was an absence of fee entitlement, based on a lease fees clause and inhabitability fee shifting statute. However, defendant was apparently shocked when the lower court awarded only $10,000 out of a requested $70,000 in attorney’s fees. That determination was affirmed on appeal because the amount of fees award is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Below, the parties presented conflicting declarations on the worth of the defense work efforts, with the lower court crediting the plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration that the worth of the unlawful detainer work by the defense was between $5,000-10,000—especially with the plaintiff’s attorney testifying he did U.D. trial work on a flat per-daily fee basis. The appellate court determined the trial judge was entitled to credit plaintiff’s declarations over those of the defense on this issue. Defendant also asked for a flat additional amount for RFA costs-of-proof sanctions under CCP § 2033.420. However, the defense had failed to develop an adequate showing below by inadequately correlating the specific expenses incurred in proving contrary facts at trial to the particularized RFA denials. The RFA sanctions denial held up on appeal, too.
$390,149.63 In Fees/$32,231.23 In Costs Is SLAPP Recovery To Wynn Opponent. After defendant James Chanos won a SLAPP motion against well-known resort developer Steve Wynn/Wynn Resorts, he moved to recoup $538,043 in attorney’s fees and $52,656.23 in costs. U.S. District Judge William H. Orrick of the Northern District of California allowed $390,149.63 in fees and $32,231.23 in costs to Mr. Chanos. He did allow high hourly rates of $645 - $1,085 for associates – partners in the Bay area, but did reduce high paralegal requested rates, reduced overall fees by 25% for block billing, and reduced an expert’s fees 50% for lack of detail. (Wynn v. Chanos, Case No. 14-cv-04329-WHO (N.D. Cal. Dkt. No. 66, June 19, 2015 Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motion For Attorneys’ Fees.) Lateral Partner Statistics For 2014 And Success Rate Opinion. According to The American Lawyer, over 2,700 AmLaw 200 law firm partners switched firms in 2014, representing between 4-5% of all partners on the AmLaw list. Adam S. Weiss of The Lateral Lawyer Group has opined that many, if not most, of lateral partner candidacies fail notwithstanding the lack of hard statistics on this topic. Revenue Gaps Between U.S. Large and Smaller Law Firms Widen In 2014. According to data collected by Citi Private Bank’s Law Firm Group for 2014, a field of 15-20 U.S. firms law dominates the law market, with revenues rising close to 6.6% (due in large part to M&A and bankruptcy work). However, 2014 revenue only rose 4% for 170 other surveyed law firms. 2014 Law School Admissions At Lowest Level Since 1974, But Incentives Are Helping Some Law Schools. A 1/5/14 Wall Street Journal article reports that the roughly 38,000 students who entered the nation’s law schools in 2014 represented the smallest first-year class since 1974, when there were 53 fewer ABA-accredited schools. However, certain law schools have seen a surge in admissions after reducing tuition or are offering in-state grants to defray some of the tuition burdens. Wanna Know Average 2013 U.S. Law School Tuition/Fees And 2012 Law School Debt? Here You Go. According to the ABA for 2014, the average tuition and fees for private law schools were $41,985, compared with $25,574 in 2003. For 2012 law school graduates, the average debt among borrowers was $84,600 attending public schools and $122,158 for those in private schools.
Costs On Allocable Non-FEHA Claims Only Allowable To Defendants Outside Of Williams Standard. In Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc., Case No. B246841 (2d Dist., Div. 7 June 17, 2015) (published), prevailing defendant in a FEHA case was awarded $4,994.98 in routine costs in a case involving a FEHA claims and other non-FEHA claims (although some did seem to be intertwined) based on the theory that frivolousness did not need to be shown for routine costs. The award had to be reversed with respect to the FEHA claim in light of Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97 (2015), which held that a non-prevailing plaintiff could only be exposed to routine costs on a FEHA claim where it was shown the case was frivolous, without objective basis, or meritless in nature. However, the real issue of further interest was whether the inclusion of additional non-FEHA claims divested the lower court of discretion to award routine costs to a prevailing FEHA defendant under Williams. Answer: It depends. As we read this one, if the non-FEHA claims were really intertwined with the FEHA claims, then Williams is the rule; if the non-FEHA claims are truly separable and not intertwined with the FEHA claim, then routine costs are allowable to the prevailing defendant. This will require some trial judge discretion, but is a fairly nice “bright line” test.
Posted at 06:50 PM in Cases: Civil Rights, Cases: Costs | Permalink
Family Law, Special Fee Shifting Statute: Lower Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Considering Two Fee Entitlement Statutes In Denying Domestic Violence Protection Act TRO Prevailing Party
Matter Remanded To Consider Fees Request Under Two Statutes. In Christner v. Sweeney, Case No. H040736 (6th Dist. June 19, 2015) (unpublished), an ex-boyfriend defendant defeated a TRO brought by plaintiff ex-girlfriend from a personal/business relationship under the Domestic Violence Protection Act. The lower court then denied defendant’s request for fees of $49,812.10 under two potential fee-shifting statutes, Family Code sections 6344 and 271. The appellate court reversed. The lower court did not believe statutory fee entitlement predicates had been presented, but defendant had done so in Judicial Council form responsive papers. The matter had to be remanded for the trial judge to consider whether fees were proper under either or both statutes.
Posted at 06:33 PM in Cases: Family Law Awards, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink
Fee Recovery Assessed Against County And Developer Equally Ruling Was Also Affirmed On Appeal. Limited success in public interest cases is an important factor that can lead to a substantial reduction in fees awardable under California’s private attorney general statute, CCP § 1021.5. That is what happened in North County Watch v. County of San Luis Obispo, Case No. B255901 (2d Dist., Div. 6 June 18, 2015) (unpublished). There, plaintiff won on two issues among a multi-pronged attack on eleven claims brought mainly under CEQA, but not obtaining a set aside of the EIR on a project in claims brought against the developer and County. Plaintiff then moved for recovery of attorney’s fees in the range of $268,000 - $312,000 (inclusive of a multiplier request), even though the trial judge asked for supplemental briefing and explanations mainly from plaintiff. Ultimately, the trial judge awarded only around a total of $66,380 (inclusive of a 1.3 multiplier fee portion) based on plaintiff’s limited success, split in assessment against the developer and County. Both plaintiff and County appealed, to no avail. The limited success indeed was an important factor justifying the lower court’s reduction in the fee request to what was actually awarded. (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of Santa Barbara, 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183 (2015) [1021.5 fee request of $231,098 reduced to fee award of $19,176 where claimant only prevailed on one of six CEQA arguments].) The lower court also properly reduced the request for an award of 126.4 hours for “fees on fees” work down to 20 hours given that plaintiff only obtained ultimate fee compensation for 100 hours. As far as County’s appeal, it was the agency whose decision triggered the CEQA proceeding in the first place, such that fee recovery was properly assessable. (Animal Protection & Rescue League v. City of San Diego, a recent 2015 published decision reviewed in our June 3, 2015 post.) Posted at 06:30 PM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink
Section 998: Two 998 Offers, One On A Complaint And One On A Cross-Complaint, Were Not “The Same” And Were Properly Analyzed In Separate Fashion
Upshot Is What Prevailing Defendant On Complaint Entitled To 998 Expert Witness Fees. “Dueling” 998 offers at play under a complaint and a cross-complaint were the subject of scrutiny in Horn v. Rand, Case No. B255051 (2d Dist., Div. 5 June 17, 2015) (unpublished). Legal malpractice plaintiff failed to accept defendant attorney’s 998 offer, with a jury subsequently finding attorney not negligent. Defendant attorney actually sent two 998 offers, one to settle plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim another to settle the cross-claim for unpaid fees on certain stated terms, even though the cross-complaint was dismissed without prejudice at trial. Defendant moved to recover $100,898.09 in 998 costs/expert witness fees, with plaintiff arguing that the defense 998 was in bad faith and that the lower court had to concurrently consider attorney’s cross-claim 998 offer in determining whether the defense offer to settle on the complaint was reasonable in nature. The defense won all of the requested costs/expert fees, prompting an appeal by plaintiff. It was unsuccessful. The 998 defense offer on the complaint was certainly reasonable: it was made close to trial so everyone had information to evaluate it; it was not too token because it only offered 7% of plaintiff’s claimed damages given plaintiff had a problematic case; and it was vindicated by the actual no malpractice liability adjudication. Because neither of the section 998 “dueling” offers were contingent on each other, it was proper to address each separately—put another way, there was not just “one” offer to be evaluated. Posted at 06:23 PM in Cases: Section 998 | Permalink