Source: https://www.justice.gov/osg/brief/chevron-usa-inc-v-echazabel-amicus-merits
Timestamp: 2019-01-19 13:30:44
Document Index: 430141619

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1630', '§ 47', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630']

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabel - Amicus (Merits) | OSG | Department of Justice
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabel - Amicus (Merits)
B. The EEOC's regulations are reasonable. The EEOC's recognition of a threat-to-self defense reflects an employer's legitimate interest in requiring that an individual's employment not pose a significant risk of injury or death to the individual. That requirement is both "job-related" and "consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(6), 12113(a). A threat-to-self defense also comports with judicial precedent under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the EEOC's regulations interpreting that Act. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1421-1422 (9th Cir. 1985); Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-623 (9th Cir. 1982); 29 C.F.R. 1613.702(f) (1979). At the same time, the EEOC's regulations guard against paternalistic employment decisions based on a generalized notion that individuals with certain disabilities pose a threat to self; the regulations require the employer to prove a significant risk of imminent harm based on an individualized and objective assessment of the risk. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r); id. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(r).
That reasoning is flawed. The court of appeals' reliance on the expressio unius principle was inappropriate because the relevant statutory language is expressly inclusive. As noted above, the threat-to-others defense is included in the section of the ADA that sets forth a more general defense for qualification standards that are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. 12113(a). The statutory language specifies one example of that defense-a permissible qualification standard may "include" a requirement that an individual not directly threaten the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. 12113(b). The use of the term "include" indicates that what follows is illustrative rather than exclusive. See Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941) (explaining that "the term 'including' is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle"); 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07, at 231 (6th ed. 2000); see, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 n.9 (1978); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977).3
"The remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history," Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979), and such remarks certainly do not provide the requisite clarity to foreclose an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute's text. In any event, the EEOC's interpretation is consistent with Senator Kennedy's stated concern about paternalistic employment practices. See p. 21, supra (explaining that the EEOC's regulations do not permit an employer to base a threat-to-self defense on "[g]eneralized fears about risks from the employment environment," 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.§ 1630.2(r)).
The regulations further prohibit employment decisions based on "[g]eneralized fears about risks from the employment environment." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(r); see also 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.15(a) (An employer may not base an employment decision on a generalized concern that hiring disabled persons "would cause the employer's insurance premiums or workers' compensation costs to increase."); accord S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 28 ("It would also be a violation to deny employment to an applicant based on generalized fears about the safety of the applicant or higher rates of absenteeism. By definition, such fears are based on averages and group-based predictions. This legislation requires individualized assessments.") (emphases added); accord H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 2, at 58.
Thus, in considering whether an individual poses a direct threat, the regulations require the employer to consider "(1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r). The regulations require that those factors be assessed "based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence," ibid., and "not on subjective perceptions, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or stereotypes," 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(r). See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 649-652 (discussing direct threat defense under Title III of the ADA). In addition, by treating employer concerns about threat to self as a defense, the regulations appropriately place the burden of proof on employers. See pp. 25-27, supra.
The EEOC's regulations define "essential functions" to mean "the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(1); see also S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 26 ("The phrase 'essential functions' means job tasks that are fundamental and not marginal."); H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 2, at 55 (same). The EEOC also has concluded that "[t]he determination of whether an individual * * * is qualified is to be made at the time of the employment decision." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(m); accord S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 26; H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 2, at 55. The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating his ability to perform the essential functions of the job at issue. See, e.g., Webner v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 833 (8th Cir. 2001).
2. To be sure, there may be some instances in which the employer's qualification standard is so integral to a job that there will be substantial overlap between the issue whether an individual is qualified and whether the individual poses a threat to health and safety. For example, jobs in which safety concerns are paramount, such as an airline pilot or a firefighter, may demand an ability to perform the job safely, and so the individual's proof that he can perform essential job functions will necessarily implicate issues of safety. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(n) (firefighter who could not "carry an unconscious adult out of a burning building" would not be qualified to perform the essential functions of the position); cf. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 578-580 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring). But it is not always true that an ability to perform a job safely is inextricably tied to the performance of essential job functions. This is a case in point. As noted, respondent performed this job successfully for decades. Although petitioner may have a valid threat-to-self defense, respondent can perform the essential tasks of the job. In other words, respondent may be disqualified by a valid qualification standard, but he is not unqualified to perform the job tasks at issue.
12 In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 569 (1999), this Court noted the EEOC's view that, "when an employer would impose any safety qualification standard, however specific, tending to screen out individuals with disabilities, the application of the requirement must satisfy the ADA's 'direct threat' criterion." See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.15(b) and (c). The Court stated that the "[g]overnment's interpretation * * * might impose a higher burden on employers to justify safety-related qualification standards than other job requirements." 527 U.S. at 569-570 n.15. Whether or not the appropriate burden is that reflected in the direct threat provision of Section 12113(b), or some different standard under Section 12113(a), it is clear that the burden of proof rests with the employer. Moreover, in this case, the direct threat burden properly would apply in light of the EEOC's decision to frame the threat-to-self defense in direct threat terms and the clear parallelism between the statutory threat-to-others defense and the regulatory threat-to-self defense.
2000-1406.mer.ami.pdf