Source: http://madison.law.ou.edu/supreme/2003-2004update18.htm
Timestamp: 2018-12-13 19:46:16
Document Index: 549963766

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1301', '§ 1151', '§ 450', '§ 1303', '§ 104', '§ 10', '§ 1911', '§1912', '§ 1171', '§ 1171', '§ 1175', '§ 2710', '§ 502']

National Indian Law Library, Indian Law Bulletin, Supreme Court, Archives
Indian Law Bulletin - Supreme Court - Archives - 2003-2004 Term
Two"Indian law-related" cases have been decided by the Supreme Court in the 2003-2004 term.
2004 WL 826057
Docket No. 03-107
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 7/22/2003. Petition granted on 9/30/03. Argued 1/21/04. Decided 4/19/04.
*Holding below: US v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 8th cir. Distinction between powers that Indian tribe derives from its retained sovereignty and powers delegated to tribe by Congress is of constitutional magnitude and thus is matter ultimately entrusted to Supreme Court, and not Congress; accordingly, 1990 amendments to Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301, are ineffective insofar as they attempted to overturn Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), which held that tribe's retained or inherent sovereignty does not provide it with criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians; tribal authority to prosecute Indian who is not member of tribe derives from power delegated by Congress rather than from tribe's retained sovereignty, and thus federal prosecution of Indian for offenses for which he had previously been prosecuted by tribe of which he was not member is barred by double jeopardy clause, because authority for both prosecutions is derived from same sovereign source.
Native American Rights Fund Tribal Supreme Court Project: Various court documents
Related News Stories: Supreme Court to Rule on Tribal-federal Prosecution (Indianz.com) 10/1, Indians Fighting Double Jeapordy (Helena Independent Record) 10/3; Duro rides again Supreme Court review will test extent of tribal sovereignty, Part One (Indianz.com) 12/2/03; Defense Counselor Reichert Discusses U.S. v. Lara (Indian Country Today) * 12/19; Tribal Prosecutions: the Jurisdictional Void (Medill News Service) 12/03; Supreme Court Hears Arguments over Tribal Prosecutions (Bismarck Tribune) 01/21; Supreme Court allows federal prosecution after tribal conviction (AP) 4/19, Supreme Court Affirms Tribal Powers over All Indians (Indianz.com) 04/20
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, et al
2004 WL 555324
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 10/21/02. Petition granted on 7/27/03. Argued 1/14/04. Decided 3/23/04.
Petition for Certiorari has been granted in three pending Indian law cases this term.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/11/2003. Petition granted 6/28/04.
Holding below: Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. City of Sherrill, Second Cir. 337 F3d. 139, District court's determination that properties reacquired by Oneida Indian Nation of New York are in Indian country and therefore are not subject to taxation by New York state and its municipalities, absent explicit congressional authorization, is affirmed, notwithstanding city's contention that although properties were part of Oneidas' aboriginal land and tribe's reservation as recognized by Treaty of Canandaigua, they are subject to taxation because they are no longer within Indian country and Oneidas no longer exist as tribe; properties in city of Sherrill, N.Y., including gasoline station, convenience store, and textile manufacturing and distribution facility, are located on Oneidas' historical reservation land set aside for tribe under Treaty Canandaigua and therefore satisfy conditions of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which defines Indian country to include "all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state"; Buffalo Creek Treaty includes no text that provides "substantial and compelling" evidence of Congress's intention to diminish or disestablish Oneidas' New York reservation, and therefore cannot be read to effect formal disestablishment of such reservation; city's contention that disputed issues of fact exist as to whether Oneidas have maintained tribal existence so as to be entitled to claim properties as reservation land is unavailing, appeals court having found no requirement in law that federally recognized tribe must demonstrate its continuous existence in order to assert claim to its reservation land.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/11/2003. Petition granted 3/22/04.
Holding below: Thompson v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Federal Cir., 2003 WL 21511710. Availability clause of Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(b), which provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision in this subchapter, the provision of funds under this subchapter is subject to the availability of appropriations," does not excuse failure by secretary of health and human services to pay full contract support costs incurred by Indian tribe in administering federal programs under contract with secretary, when there were no statutory caps on funding in appropriations acts for relevant fiscal years, and when secretary has not shown that full payment of contract support costs would breach statutory ban against reduction in "funding for programs, projects, or activities serving [another] tribe" in order to make such payments; in meeting contractual obligations, secretary lacks discretion, in absence of statutory cap, to refuse to reprogram funds within lump-sum appropriation for purposes other than those contemplated at time of appropriation; funds are "available" within meaning of Section 450j-1(b) when secretary has authority to reprogram and funds are available within lump-sum appropriation; Section 314 of 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, amounts appropriated to or earmarked in committee reports ... for payments to tribes ... for contract support costs ... are the total amounts for fiscal years 1994 through 1998 for such purposes," does not defeat tribal right to contract support costs for 1994, 1995, and 1996 fiscal years that vested long before passage of 1999 appropriations act; ISDEAA makes it clear that funds devoted by secretary to "inherently federal functions" are not unavailable for contract support costs, and thus secretary was obligated to reprogram such funds in order to pay contract support costs.
Related News Stories: Supreme Court to resolve self-determination dispute (Indianz.com) 3/23/04.
Petition for certiorari is pending in three Indian law cases this term.
Subjects: Kaw Nation, Oklahoma; Lawyers -- Fees; Sovereign immunity -- Kaw Nation, Oklahoma.
*Issues: (1) Under C&L Enterprises v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 69 U.S.L.W. 4290 (2001), can tribal chairman assert sovereign immunity as defense to suit against tribe based on contract approved by governing body of tribe when: (a) chairman is not party to contract or to suit; (b) majority of governing body of tribe has admitted that sums sought are due and owing under contract and has waived sovereign immunity; and (c) tribal vice chairman, consistent with resolution adopted by majority of governing body of tribe, confesses judgment in open court consistent with state statutes? (2) Does state appellate court have authority to decide internal tribal affairs contrary to determinations by secretary of interior: (a) by recognizing tribal chairman as being empowered to represent tribe when secretary has determined he has no such authority; (b) by recognizing persons as valid tribal judges and their orders and opinions as valid when secretary has determined that they are not properly seated as tribal judges, that their orders and opinions are not valid, and that tribal court no longer exists; and (c) by refusing to recognize actions by governing majority recognized by secretary? (3) Consistent with federal constitutional due process, can state court of appeals, without briefs or argument, affirm order granting motion to dismiss filed by nonparty after reversing basis for dismissal and converting motion to summary judgment when plaintiff has not been given fair opportunity to litigate: (a) issue of sovereign immunity; and (b) issue of nonparty's standing?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/25/2004.
*Holding below: Michael Minnis & Associates, P.C. v. Kaw Nation, 90 P.3d 1009, Law firm's contract with Indian tribe included express stipulation to jurisdiction of tribal courts, uncontroverted evidence established tribal chairman's express authorization by tribal general council to defend tribe against law firm's contract action, as well as invalidity of attempts, by putative majority of tribal executive council, to waive tribal sovereign immunity, to consent to state court jurisdiction, to confess judgment on law firm's contract claim, and to dismantle tribal judicial system, and thus law firm's state court contract action is barred by tribal sovereign immunity.
Artichoke Joe's v. Norton
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/27/2004.
*Holding below: Artichoke Joe's California Grand Casino V. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, Neither California constitutional amendment that permits operation of casino-type gambling facilities exclusively by Indian tribes and only on Indian lands, nor state-tribal compacts implementing such right, violate Indian Gaming Regulatory Act or infringe Fifth or 14th Amendment equal protection rights of non-Indians, who are prohibited by California law from operating similar facilities.
Steffler v. Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/11/2004.
Holding below: Steffler V. Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indian, 2004 WL 830080,(from the court opinion) A person must be detained in some way by tribal authority to invoke subject matter jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1303. Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 790 (9th Cir.2001). Because Steffler was detained only by Oregon state authorities, and because the record does not reveal that the tribe acted in any way to cause the detention, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Steffler's petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Docket No. 03-1479
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 4/26/2004. Petition was denied on 6/28/04.
*Holding below: Gallegos V. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 2003 WL 22854632, Indian tribe's sovereign immunity precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over Indian Civil Rights Act claims against it for declaratory relief or money damages, and thus ICRA claims by non-Indian who was formerly employed by tribal police department as patrol sergeant and who alleges that he was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for having uncovered evidence of possible criminal activities within that department was properly dismissed by district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; former sergeant's contention that jurisdiction is proper because he falls within limited exception to tribal sovereign immunity announced in Dry Creek Lodge Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), is without merit, because, to qualify for such exception, plaintiff must demonstrate that dispute involves non-Indian party, that tribal forum is not available, and that dispute involves issue falling outside internal tribal affairs, and, although employee is non-Indian, he had access to tribal administrative body and availed himself of that forum, and claims of wrongful termination of tribal employment are internal tribal affairs.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 3/15/2004. Petition was denied on 6/28/04.
Holding below: Davis ex rel. Davis v. U.S. 343 F.3d 1282, District court's dismissal of suit by two bands of Native American tribe--Seminole Nation of Oklahoma--alleging that because of their African ancestry they have been systematically denied benefits routinely given to other members of tribe and that government improperly refused to issue Certificates of Degree of Indian Blood to members of plaintiff bands, is affirmed, district court having properly determined that (i) plaintiffs failed to join indispensable party--tribe itself--with respect to claim that plaintiffs were wrongfully excluded from participation in some of tribal assistance programs, and (ii) court lacked jurisdiction to hear CDIB claim because plaintiffs failed to show that they had exhausted administrative remedies.
Ponca Tribe of Nebraska v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County
Docket No. 03-1374
Subjects: Intertribal Strategic Ventures; Ponca Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma; Sovereign immunity -- Ponca Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma; Business -- Off Indian reservations -- Ponca Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma; Disclosure in accounting.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 3/30/2004. Petition was denied 6/1/04.
Holding below: (opinion not found as of 4/6/04) Court denies petition for writ of mandate/prohibition seeking (i) order directing lower court to strike its denial of motion, made by entity formed pursuant to authority of participating Native American tribes, to quash administrative subpoena directed to bank seeking entity's financial records, and (ii) new order granting such motion.
South Dakota Dept. Revenue v. Pourrier
Docket No. 03-1401
Subjects: Motor fuels -- Taxation -- South Dakota; Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, South Dakota; South Dakota. Dept. of Revenue; Muddy Creek Oil and Gas; Tax refunds -- South Dakota.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 4/05/2004. Petition was denied on 5/24/04.
Holding below: First ruling below: Pourier v. South Dakota Dept. of Revenue, 658 N.W.2d 395,
Language in 1936 Hayden-Cartwright Act granting states authority to impose taxes on "sales, purchases, storage, or use of gasoline" by "filling stations" or "licensed traders" located on U.S. military or "other reservations," 4 U.S.C. § 104, does not manifest congressional intent to allow states to tax Indian proprietors selling gasoline on Indian reservations; corporation owned by Indian tribe or by enrolled tribal member residing on Indian reservation and doing business on reservation for benefit of reservation Indians is enrolled member for purposes of protecting tax immunity, and thus oil and gas company having sole shareholder and president who is enrolled member of Oglala Sioux Tribe and resident of Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota is entitled to seek motor fuel tax refund. Second ruling below:Pourrier v. South Dakota of Revenue, S.D., 674 N.W.2d 314, Limitations period applicable to refunds, sought in this case, of motor fuel tax that was illegally collected is 15 months under S.D. Codified Laws § 10-47B-141, and any claims for times predating Dec. 17, 1997, are untimely.
Related News Stories: U.S. Supreme Court Won't Touch Indian Tax Ruling (Indianz.com) 05/26
Docket No. 03-829
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/05/2003. Petition denied 4/19/04.
Holding below: Penn v. United States, Eigth Cir., 2003 WL 21543782,Tribal judge who issued temporary restraining order excluding non-Indian from tribe's reservation for 30 days without hearing and relying solely on uncorroborated, unsworn petition is absolutely immune, to same extent as state and federal court judges, from suit seeking damages for his actions; Bureau of Indian Affairs officer and local county sheriff are protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit seeking damages for their enforcement of order, which was facially valid.
Docket No. 03-784
*Issues: (1) Is AB, citizen of United States and North Dakota, and Indian child as that phrase is defined under ICWA, entitled to protections of U.S. and North Dakota Constitutions and thus entitled to due process and equal protection afforded other children under relevant federal and state laws concerning protection of children, and is review of application of ICWA to individual Indian child subject to strict scrutiny under both equal protection and substantive due process analyses, so that means employed must be narrowly tailored to meet compelling governmental interest especially when matter involved government action vis a vis individual child rather than government action vis a vis tribe? (2) Should existing Indian family doctrine be applied here to prevent unconstitutional application of ICWA to facts of this case? (3) Under fair application of ICWA to facts of this case should tribe's motion to transfer jurisdiction have been denied because (a) mother's prior veto of tribe's initial motion to transfer jurisdiction barred subsequent motion to transfer jurisdiction, (b) motion was untimely, (c) tribal court is inconvenient forum, and/or (d) best interests of child should have been considered by state courts? (4) Did Congress exceed its authority under Indian commerce clause and violate 10th Amendment in enacting ICWA?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 11/17/2003. Petition denied 4/5/04.
Holding below: In Re A. B. Supreme Court of ND, 2003 ND 98. Different treatment of Indians and non-Indians under Indian Child Welfare Act, which gives tribal courts concurrent but presumptive jurisdiction of child custody proceeding involving Indian child not domiciled or residing within reservation of child's tribe, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), is rationally related to protection of integrity of Native American families and tribes and to fulfillment of Congress's unique guardianship obligation toward Indians, and thus transfer of state parental termination proceeding to tribal court on tribe's motion did not deny right to equal protection or substantive due process of Indian child who lived off reservation in non-Indian foster home; Indian family exception to ICWA, under which some courts have refused to apply ICWA when Indian child is not being removed from existing Indian family with significant connection to Indian community, is contrary to plain language of ICWA, would thwart statute's protection of tribe's interest in its Indian children, and was effectively undermined in Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); tribe's motion to transfer jurisdiction filed seven weeks after filing of parental termination proceeding was timely; tribal court offered to sit in Fargo where child resided, and thus was not inconvenient forum; best interest of child is not consideration for threshold determination of whether there is good cause not to transfer jurisdiction to tribal court under ICWA; transfer is affirmed.
Docket No. 03-1156
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 2/11/2004. Petition denied 4/5/04.
Holding below: City of Roseville V. Norton 348 F.3d 1020, Secretary of interior's approval of Auburn Indian Tribe's application for creation of 49.21-acre reservation for use as casino on land identified for possible reservation use in Auburn Indian Restoration Act, which restored Auburn Indian Band to federal recognition as tribe and authorized creation of new reservation on its behalf, qualified as "restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to federal recognition" under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, even though new reservation was 40 miles from tribe's former reservation and would be put to different use than former reservation, and thus secretary's action was exempt from IGRA's requirement that secretary of interior, prior to deciding that certain Indian land may be used for gaming, must find that gaming would not be detrimental to surrounding communities and must secure consent of state's governor.
Docket No. 03-895
Subjects: Parties to actions; Indispensables; Jamul Indian Village of California -- Claims; Sovereignty; Federally recognized Indian tribes; Indian allotments; Remedies (Law); Land tenure.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/18/2003. Petition denied 3/22/04.
Holding below: Rosales v. United States, 9th cir., 73 Fed. Appx. 913. Indian tribe that has claimed jurisdiction over parcel of land at issue in this action since at least 1981, and whose interest therein would be impaired if certain litigants were declared to be beneficial owners of that land, is necessary and indispensable party that enjoys sovereign immunity from suit, whose interests cannot adequately be represented by United States in this intertribal dispute, and whose absence requires dismissal of action.
Docket No. 03-941
Subjects: Indian children -- United States; State courts -- Michigan; Jurisdiction -- Michigan; Tribal courts -- Jurisdiction; Parent and child (Law); Trials (Custody of children) -- Michigan; Child welfare; United States. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978; Procedure (Law).
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/29/2003. Petition denied on 3/08/04.
Holding below: Davis v. Beveridge, Mich. App, Ct., 2003 WL 198011. Provision of Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §1912(a), that requires notification of tribe when foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, Indian child is sought is inapplicable to action in which child's paternal grandparents, who already had temporary custody of child pursuant to child's parents' divorce decree, sought to modify decree in order to acquire full custody of child, and thus mother's contention that noncompliance with ICWA's notification provisions deprived court of jurisdiction to award custody of child to grandparents is meritless; trial court did not violate mother's constitutional rights by deciding it would be in child's best interest to award full custody to paternal grandparents, especially in light of evidence that mother had alcohol and drug abuse problem, including recent hospitalization for heroin overdose.
Docket No. 03-762
Subjects: Indian gaming -- Class II; Indian gaming -- Class III; Gambling on Indian reservations; Casinos -- Santee Sioux Tribe of the Santee Reservation of Nebraska; United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; United States. Johnson Act (15 USC 1171-1178); Machinery -- Defined.
*Issues: Is Lucky Tab II machine excluded from Johnson Act's definition of "gambling device" in 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a)(2)(B) because player becomes entitled to receive money as result of sequence of winning and losing pull-tabs on pre-printed paper roll inserted into machine?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 11/21/2003. Petition denied 3/1/04.
Holding below: U.S. v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 324 F. 3d. 607, Eighth cir. Lucky Tab II machine, which dispenses, in identical order from roll as physically placed in machine, pull-tabs from that roll, does not generate random patterns with element of chance but is merely high-tech dispenser of pull-tabs that also displays contents of tickets on screen for user, and thus is not gambling device, "designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling, and ... by the operation of which a person may become entitled to receive, as the result of the application of an element of chance, any money or property," that is prohibited within Indian country by Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a)(2)(B).
Docket No. 03-740
*Issues: (1) Does IGRA create implied exemption from Johnson Act for certain gambling devices used at tribal gaming facilities in Indian country in absence of tribal-state gaming compact? (2) Can machine qualify as gambling device under Johnson Act when player becomes entitled to receive money as result of sequence of winning and losing pull-tabs on pre-printed paper roll inserted into machine?
Holding below: Seneca Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National Indian Gaming Commission, U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth cir., 327 F.3d 1019. Provision of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act classifying "the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whether or not electronic, computer or other technologic aids are used in connection therewith) ... including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs ... and other games similar to bingo" as Class II gaming permitted in Indian country shields Indian country users of IGRA Class II technologic aids from liability under earlier-enacted Johnson Act, which prohibits possession or use of "any gambling device" within Indian country, 15 U.S.C. § 1175(a); provision of IGRA stating that Johnson Act "shall not apply to any gaming conducted under a Tribal-State compact" entered into between "any Indian Tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian country upon which a Class III gaming activity is being conducted" and "a state in which gambling devices are illegal," 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3), (6), may not be read, under canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, to preclude use of otherwise legal Class II devices in absence of tribal-state compact, particularly in view of legislative history evincing congressional intent that Johnson Act not preclude use of devices in aid of games similar to bingo that are allowed under IGRA; National Indian Gaming Commission regulation stating that "pull tab dispensers and/or readers" are included as IGRA Class II "electronic, computer, or other technologic aids," 25 C.F.R. § 502.7(a), is reasonable and entitled to deference; machine that dispenses paper pull-tabs from roll that is part of larger deal containing predetermined number of randomly distributed winning tabs, and that requires player to manually peel back top layer of pull-tab to confirm victory and to present tab for visual inspection to gaming hall clerk to become entitled to winnings, is technologic aid used in connection with playing of pull-tabs and thus Class II IGRA gaming device exempt from Johnson Act.
Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. California
Docket No. 03-804
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/01/2003. Petition denied 2/23/2004.
Holding below: Coyote Valley Band v. State of California, Ninth Cir., 331 F.3d 1094. State's obligation under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribe with respect to Class III gaming if "such gaming" is permitted in state does not require state that has legalized some forms of Class III gaming to negotiate with tribe about other forms of Class III gaming that are prohibited in state; provisions of model gaming compact between California and Indian tribes that establish (i) revenue sharing trust through which gaming tribes must share gaming revenues with non-gaming tribes, (ii) special distribution fund through which gaming tribes must contribute gaming revenues to fund state gaming regulatory activities, and (iii) collective bargaining and other labor protections for workers at tribal gaming establishments do not impose upon tribe "tax, fee, charge, or other assessment" prohibited by Section 2710(d)(4) of IGRA but, instead, fall within scope of Section 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii), which authorizes compact provisions covering "subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities"; accordingly, state did not act in bad faith by refusing to enter compact with tribe that did not include these provisions.
Docket No. 03-764
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 11/24/2003. Petition denied 2/23/2004.
Holding below: Turley v. Eddy, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth cir., 2003 WL 21675511. District court properly dismissed complaint against individual officers of Indian tribe, alleging wrongful eviction from land in which tribe claims interest, for failure to join necessary and indispensable parties--tribe and United States--that are immune from suit.
Docket No. 03-577
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 10/13/2003. Petition was denied on 1/12/2004.
Holding below: Frank v. Forest County, U.S. Court of Appeals, seventh cir., 336 F.3d 570. Ten percent rule of Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983)--which held that population disparity of greater than 10 percent creates prima facie case of discrimination in electoral districting plan--is rebuttable, and more easily so when districts being reviewed are both numerous and in sparsely populated area whose residents are unevenly distributed; accordingly, although difference between largest of sparsely populated county's 21 supervisory districts, which has 514 residents, and smallest district, with 428 residents, is 18 percent, county's districting does not deny equal protection of law, especially in light of modest functions that state has assigned to board of supervisors of remote, rural county; contention of county's Indians, who have population majorities in two districts, that Voting Rights Act requires redistricting to create third district in which Indians, when combined with transient black residents of Job Corps center, would have majority is meritless in absence of evidence that, in supervisory elections, Indian and black voters would have same electoral preferences.
Related News Stories: Mont. Court Accepts Tribal Court Convictions (Indianz.com) 6/25 http://www.indianz.com/News/show.asp?ID=2003/06/25/mont
Pataki v. Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce Inc.
Docket No. 03-392
Subjects: St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians of New York; Pataki, George E., 1945-; New York; Chamber of Commerce (Saratoga County, New York); Sovereign immunity -- Indian Country (New York); Intergovernmental agreements -- New York; Intergovernmental agreements -- St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians of New York; Gambling on Indian reservations -- New York; Indian gaming.
*Issues: May court disregard tribal sovereign immunity in determining if Indian tribe is indispensable party to suit that is likely to significantly prejudice tribe's interests?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 8/19/2003.
*Holding below: Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki Court of Appeals of NY, 2003 WL 21357342 Although sovereign immunity prevents Indian tribe from being forced to participate in state court proceedings, it does not require everyone else to forgo resolution of all disputes that could affect tribe, and thus tribe is not indispensable party to action challenging, on state constitutional grounds, governor's authority to negotiate and sign agreement with tribe to permit casino gaming on its reservation.
Docket No. 03-461
Subjects: Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas; Texas; Indian gaming -- Texas -- Law and Legislation; Gambling on Indian reservations -- Texas; United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; Sovereignty -- Indian Country (Texas).
*Issues: (1) Does Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, instead of Pueblo's Restoration Act, govern gaming activities on reservation lands of Ysleta del Sur Pueblo? (2) If not, should gaming provisions of Pueblo's Restoration Act be interpreted consistently with California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)? (3) If not, can federal courts require Pueblo (a) to obtain license from Texas prior to conducting bingo in accordance with substantive provisions of Texas state law, and (b) to be "qualified organization" prior to conducting bona fide carnival contests when no such requirement exists for any other person? (4) Will Supreme Court exercise its supervisory power to prevent grave miscarriage of justice wrought by federal courts in derogation of this country's trust relationship with Pueblo?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 9/23/2003. Petition was denied on 11/3/03.
*Holding below: Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, District Court, W.D. Texas, 220 F. Supp. 2d 668. District court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify its permanent injunction, barring Indian tribe from holding gambling activities on tribal lands, in order to permit tribe to participate in charitable bingo, carnival contests, and promotional player pool activities.
Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas v. Texas
Docket No. 03-270
Subjects: Alabama-Coushatta Tribes of Texas; Texas; Indian gaming; Gambling on Indian reservations -- Alabama-Coushatta Tribes of Texas; Gambling -- Law and legislation -- Texas; United States. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act.
*Issues: (1) Given disapproval by this court in 1998 of hypothetical jurisdiction, can Fifth Circuit now rely on dicta in 1994 Fifth Circuit decision--to effect that statutes restoring Ysleta Tribe to federal status, rather than Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, governed Ysleta Tribe's gaming activity and that federal courts had no jurisdiction to consider Ysleta Tribe's claims under those restoration statutes--to deny Alabama-Coushatta Tribe's requested declaration of its gaming rights? (2) Is remand appropriate when dicta in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, now being relied upon to deny Alabama-Coushatta right to gaming, was wrong?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 8/19/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
*Holding below: (Unreported decision from the 5th cir.) Trial court's ruling in favor of state, enjoining Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas from conducting gaming on its lands in accordance with Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, is affirmed on basis of Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994), which construed Restoration Act provision stating that "[a]ll gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas" are prohibited on tribal lands of Ysleta del Sur Pueblo--which is parallel to provision regarding Alabama Coushatta lands--to prohibit Ysleta del Sur Pueblo from engaging in any gaming activity prohibited by Texas law; contention that such interpretation in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo was dicta is meritless.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/18/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/2/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/28/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/9/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
*Holding below: State v. Shook (Briefs), 313 Mont. 347, Montana Supreme Court. Federal Indian law is binding on state, and, therefore, state constitutional equal protection guarantee must allow for state classifications based on tribal membership if those classifications can rationally be tied to fulfillment of unique federal, and consequently state, obligation towards Native Americans; state regulation that prohibits nontribal members from hunting big game on Indian reservations fulfills that test by preserving wildlife population for hunting by Native Americans, as required by treaties, and, therefore, nontribal member could be prosecuted for illegal hunting on reservation.
Related News Stories: Hunter loses fight against law (MontanaStandard.com) 10/10/03, Reservation hunting suit turned away (Missoulan.com) 10/10/03.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/10/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 4/22/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.