Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-anderson-30990
Timestamp: 2017-11-21 19:13:48
Document Index: 319257062

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1259', '§ 28', '§ 190', '§ 1230', '§ 1220', '§ 1259']

People v. Anderson - 52 Cal.3d 453 S004709 - Thu, 12/27/1990 | California Supreme Court Resources
Citation 52 Cal.3d 453
People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 356; 801 P.2d 1107
[No. S004709. Dec 27, 1990.]
(Opinion by Lucas, C. J., with Panelli, Eagleson, Kennard and [52 Cal.3d 454] Arabian, JJ., concurring. Broussard, J., concurred in the judgment. Separate concurring opinion by Mosk, J., concurring in the judgment.)
Defendant Stephen Wayne Anderson appeals from a judgment imposing the death penalty following his conviction of first degree murder and burglary, accompanied by a felony-murder special circumstance. In People v. Anderson (1985) 38 Cal.3d 58 [210 Cal.Rptr. 777, 694 P.2d 1149] (Anderson I), we reversed defendant's original judgment as to penalty and set aside the special circumstance finding because of the court's failure to instruct on intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder special circumstance. (See Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].)
The evidence on retrial of the special circumstance allegation largely paralleled the evidence introduced at defendant's first trial and summarized [52 Cal.3d 465] in Anderson I. Defendant confessed to the burglary/murder of an elderly woman, Mrs. Lyman. Defendant had scrutinized the premises for several days, awaiting indications that the occupants were on vacation. He arrived at the house shortly before midnight on May 25, 1980, cut through a screen door and removed a pane of glass from a second door to gain entry. Armed with a handgun, he entered the bedroom where Mrs. Lyman was sleeping. She awoke and began to scream. Defendant turned toward her and fired his weapon, killing her. As defendant admitted, "I sleep with my gun. Somebody come at me and I-I'm going to blow them away. You know, that's the first thing I thought of, you know."
[1] Before addressing defendant's specific contentions, we observe that, by reason of our decision in People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, [52 Cal.3d 466] overruling Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, any asserted errors pertaining to the contested intent-to-kill issue were necessarily harmless. Anderson overruled Carlos's holding that the 1978 death penalty law imposes a blanket intent-to-kill requirement on all felony-murder special circumstances. Anderson held that intent to kill need be charged and proved for a felony-murder special circumstance only where the defendant was an aider and abettor to the homicide and not the actual killer. (43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138-1147.) Here, defendant does not dispute, and the evidence confirms, that he personally killed Mrs. Lyman in the commission of a burglary of her house. As we have recently held, Carlos should not be deemed "the law of the case" in light of Anderson and, accordingly, many of defendant's present challenges to the special circumstance finding on retrial may be deemed irrelevant. (See People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 637-639 [274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849].)
Initially, defendant suggests that the foregoing information was irrelevant and potentially prejudicial, coming at a time (October and November 1985) when this court's disposition of death penalty cases was becoming a subject of discussion and controversy. Defendant argues that the jury was thereby led to speculate on impermissible matters, including the availability of an appeal to this court, a matter tending to reduce the jury's sense of responsibility regarding the seriousness of its task. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 155-159 [207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430].) Although defendant does not concede the point, it seems clear that any possible [52 Cal.3d 467] prejudice resulting from the court's disclosures was limited to the jury's penalty determination, for the evidence supporting the felony-murder special circumstance was overwhelming.
[3] As we recently observed, "The fact that a first jury deadlocked, or the numerical vote of the first jury, is irrelevant to the issues before the jury on a penalty retrial." (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 178 [266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857], italics added.) Defendant argues that, by a parity of reasoning, the first jury's vote to impose death was irrelevant to the issues. No reason appears why the court could not have simply explained that the judgment had been reversed and remanded for retrial, without also disclosing the first jury's verdict.
Defendant cites several federal cases recognizing the prejudicial nature of disclosing to a jury engaged in determining a defendant's guilt or innocence the fact that the defendant had been previously convicted on the same charges. (E.g., United States v. Bagley (9th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 482, 488 [dictum]; United States v. Williams (5th Cir. 1978) 568 F.2d 464, 471.) Defendant also cites an Illinois case (People v. Hope (1986) 116 Ill.2d 265 [508 N.E.2d 202, 205-206]), which reversed a judgment on the ground that two jurors in the sentencing phase of a capital case were exposed to news stories indicating the defendant had been previously sentenced to death on charges unrelated to the capital case being tried.
Similar reasoning governs our decision here. Prior to trial, defense counsel asked the court whether the jury would be told about the procedural history of the case. The court announced its intention to "pretty much level" with the jury and explain about the prior trial, death sentence, reversal on automatic appeal, and the reason for the reversal. Defense counsel was given a copy of the court's intended statement but failed to object or [52 Cal.3d 468] propose revisions to the draft. [4] As the People observe, objections to noninstructional statements or comments by the trial court must be raised at trial or are waived on appeal. (E.g., People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 398 [85 Cal.Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961]; People v. Cheary (1957) 48 Cal.2d 301, 316 [309 P.2d 431]; cf. § 1259 [objection not required to preserve claim of instructional error on appeal].)
[2b] As in Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d 620, it seems apparent that defense counsel herein had a tactical purpose for declining to object to the court's disclosures regarding defendant's death sentence and subsequent reversal on automatic appeal. During the course of trial and in argument, counsel frequently referred to the prior death sentence and, as in Whitt, presented a "Death Row redemption" defense stressing defendant's changed attitude, reformed character and his many useful, redeemable skills. For example, counsel asked defendant whether his "thinking" had changed during the five years since he was sentenced to death. Defendant replied that "the experience of being condemned to die made me grow up and realize that it was a serious matter. And I matured. And I realized there's more to life than living and the life that I had lived. And maybe I had a chance to change."
[5] Regarding the reference to the automatic appeal, it is true that "[a]s a general rule, the jury should not be advised regarding the availability of an appeal in death cases, because such information may dilute the jury's sense of responsibility in fixing the penalty. [Citations.]" (People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 584 [244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]; see Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320.) But as Whitt explains (51 Cal.3d at p. 641), any reasonable juror, knowing that defendant was once sentenced to death and was now being retried for the same crimes, could easily infer that an appeal was available to him.
[6] In a related contention, defendant complains of the prosecutor's reference to the fact that defendant had previously received a death sentence which was "unfortunately" reversed. Thus, in the course of suggesting that defendant's "redemption" was feigned, the prosecutor observed that "We had him here. We had him tried. We had him convicted. We had him sentenced to death .... And then unfortunately, the case was reversed and it came back to trial." No objection was made to these remarks (see People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]), [52 Cal.3d 469] which included no factual information not already recounted by the trial court's pretrial disclosures. The prosecutor's disappointment with the reversal of the judgment was hardly a surprising revelation.
Defendant did not object to the foregoing remarks, and accordingly waived any claim of error based thereon. (People v. Terry, supra, 2 Cal.3d 362, 398; People v. Cheary, supra, 48 Cal.2d 301, 316.) On the merits, the court's statements do approach the kind of coercive conduct deemed improper in prior cases. In People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 534 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081], we admonished that "A trial judge should refrain from placing specific time pressure on a deliberating jury and should never imply that the case warrants only desultory deliberation. Such comments risk persuading legitimate dissidents, whatever their views, that the court considers their position unreasonable." (See also People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 775 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113] [coercion through insistence on further deliberations].)
At trial, defendant contended his tape-recorded confession and a subsequently filmed reenactment were involuntary and hence inadmissible [52 Cal.3d 470] because the statements were made (1) while he was suffering from sleep deprivation, and (2) without adequate Miranda warnings or waivers (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]). Following a foundational hearing, the court ruled the confession and reenactment were voluntary and admissible.
[8a] In challenging the voluntariness of his confession, defendant points to his own trial testimony indicating he was suffering from sleep deprivation when interrogated. That testimony, if believed, would support a finding that he did not knowingly waive his right to remain silent. Defendant urges us to hold that the prosecution failed to carry its burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Jiminez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 606-608 [147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672] [applicable to cases involving crimes committed prior to the adoption of Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d) (Prop. 8) in 1982]; see also People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 71 [260 Cal.Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042] [Prop. 8 abrogated Jiminez rule]; People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 258 [193 Cal.Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149] [Prop. 8 not retroactive].)
[9] Our role as a reviewing court is to examine the uncontradicted facts to determine independently whether the trial court's conclusion of voluntariness was properly found; if conflicting testimony exists, we must accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent supported by the record. (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 773 [248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].)
2. Statements to Dr. Flanagan-Several days after defendant made his recorded statement to the officers, and evidently before counsel was appointed [52 Cal.3d 471] to represent him, the officers introduced him to Dr. Flanagan, a psychiatrist retained to perform a mental examination of defendant. During the interview, which lasted several hours, defendant stated that he was sober during the burglary, that he thought the Lyman house was unoccupied, and that he was surprised when Mrs. Lyman confronted him. Dr. Flanagan concluded defendant was alert, cooperative and intelligent.
[10] Defendant now asserts his statements to Dr. Flanagan violated his Fifth Amendment rights because they were elicited without adequate warning that Dr. Flanagan was an agent of the prosecution and this purpose was to obtain incriminating information. We disagree. After introducing Dr. Flanagan, and immediately before the psychiatric interview began, Officer Daw gave defendant full Miranda warnings, including the admonition that, "Anything you say can and will be used in evidence against you in a court of law." Defendant thereupon waived his rights and agreed to talk. Dr. Flanagan himself cautioned defendant that his statements would not be deemed confidential. Under the circumstances, the foregoing admonitions were sufficient. (See Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 466-469 [68 L.Ed.2d 359, 371-373, 101 S.Ct. 1866].)
Defendant claims the court erred in admitting the evidence and later permitting the prosecutor during the penalty phase to call additional witnesses to confirm the incident. We find no error. As the People observe, the fact that defendant had the presence of mind to calmly cook and eat noodles after killing Mrs. Lyman indicated a lack of concern or remorse usually associated with an accidental or unintentional killing, and accordingly bore on the disputed issue of defendant's intent to kill. In any event, any evidentiary error seems harmless with respect to the special circumstance finding in light of People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104. As for calling additional penalty phase witnesses to prove the point, the People reasonably deemed it appropriate to call these witnesses after defendant took the stand and recanted his recorded statement and denied cooking or eating the noodles. [52 Cal.3d 472]
[12] Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct in various respects during her closing arguments regarding the special circumstance issue. Because defendant failed to object to the statements, or request an appropriate admonition, his misconduct claims are deemed waived on appeal. (People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 27.) Nonetheless, we briefly review them here.
2. Comment on Defendant's Failure to Testify- [14] During closing argument on the special circumstance issue, the prosecutor commented that only two persons could "tell us about what went on" during the night of the murder, namely, deceased victim Lyman and defendant, who "told you his version through the interview with the police." The prosecutor continued by noting that parts of the statement should be believed, and parts disbelieved. Defendant now claims the remark constituted an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify. (See Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110, 85 S.Ct. 1229].)
Griffin forbids either direct or indirect comment on the defendant's failure to testify, but does not extend to mere comments on the state of the [52 Cal.3d 473] evidence or the failure of the defense to present material evidence. (See People v. Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d 543, 572 [finding nonprejudicial Griffin error in prosecutor's remark, "He's never said anything to you about why, why he did these things"].) The prosecutor's statement that defendant was one of two persons who could "tell" about the murder approaches indirect comment on defendant's failure to testify, but the prosecutor's further observation that defendant in fact told his version of the facts during the police interview substantially lessened any risk that the jury might penalize defendant for remaining silent at trial.
4. Injection of Personal Belief- [16] Defendant contends the prosecutor injected her own personal belief into her argument when she disparaged defendant's defense based on lack of intent to kill, characterizing it as a "smokescreen" and suggesting it was "not true," and then stating, "We knew that beforehand. But it was for the purpose of keeping an open mind." According to defendant, the prosecutor's "beforehand" remark implied to the jury the prosecutor held a personal belief as to defendant's intent, based on evidence outside the record. (See People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848 [97 Cal.Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564].) To the contrary, examined in context the prosecutor's remarks had a far less sinister connotation, referring merely to the jurors' (and not the prosecutor's) prior knowledge.
Thus, the prosecutor first reminded the jury that, during voir dire, the court had asked each juror to keep "an open mind" on the subject of defendant's intent to kill. The prosecutor then suggested that, although the jurors may have kept an open mind during the presentation of evidence, they nonetheless knew "beforehand" that anyone who enters another [52 Cal.3d 474] person's house late at night, armed with a loaded firearm, necessarily possesses the requisite intent to kill. One reasonably might disagree with the prosecutor's assumption in this regard, but clearly her remarks did not constitute Bain error (supra, 5 Cal.3d 839).
[18] Defendant now argues the photo was irrelevant to any issue and could only have been used for the improper purpose of gaining the jury's sympathy for the victim's family. (See Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529].) We considered a similar claim of error in People v. Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d 543, 576, involving the [52 Cal.3d 475] prosecutor's use, at both the guilt and penalty phases, of a "portrait"-style photograph of the young murder victim for the apparent purpose of gaining sympathy for her. As we stated in Hovey, "Although admission of a photograph of the victim while alive may be considered error if irrelevant to any contested issue in the case, any error here was harmless. [Citations.] [¶] [The victim's] photo, though perhaps 'charming,' was nonetheless an 'ordinary' one not likely to produce a prejudicial impact." (44 Cal.3d at p. 571.)
We have examined the photo in question and conclude, as in Hovey and similar cases, that its introduction could not have prejudiced defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 594-595 [238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350].)
In People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773-776 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782], we examined section 190.3 and concluded that at the penalty phase, "Evidence of defendant's background, character, or conduct which is not probative of any specific listed factor would have no tendency to prove or disprove a fact of consequence to the determination of the action, and is therefore irrelevant to aggravation." (38 Cal.3d at p. 774.) [19] Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible Boyd error by allowing the prosecution to introduce incidents of nonviolent criminal activity, or of noncriminal activity.
As for defendant's burglaries, the record indicates that defendant was indeed convicted of these offenses, a matter properly considered as an aggravating factor. (See § 190.3, factor (c).) Finally, the matter of defendant's use of an alias was raised by him during the course of a tape-recorded interview with police. Defendant waived any claim of error by failing to object when the tape, and his reference to using an alias, was played to the [52 Cal.3d 476] jury. (People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 777-778 [251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].)
Possible remoteness of the defendant's prior offenses is not a proper ground of exclusion under section 190.3, as remoteness affects the weight, not admissibility, of the offense. (See People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 729 [274 Cal.Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215]; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 511, 531 [268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640].)
[21] Defendant, acknowledging the statement at issue was a mere "bravado" boast, nonetheless asserts its admission was reversible error. He contends the statement was inadmissible as a declaration against his interest because, among other reasons, he was available as a witness at the penalty phase. (See Evid. Code, § 1230.) But as the People explain, the trial court's ruling can be sustained on a separate ground not relied on, namely, that the [52 Cal.3d 477] statement was an admission relevant to rebut defendant's own penalty phase testimony that he had no malicious intent to kill his three murder victims (Mrs. Lyman, and two "other crimes" victims, Blundell and Glashien), as well as to rebut his general "good character" evidence. (See id., § 1220; People v. Wright, ante, p. 367 [276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 791-792; People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776.)
We think that under the foregoing circumstances, including the belated invocation of an objection based on "prejudice," the trial court was not obligated to make an express ruling weighing relevance and prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. We note that the requirement of such an explicit ruling can be a trap for a trial judge presented, as here, with multiple objections to the same evidence. For that reason, we think the requirement should be triggered only if defendant either expressly invokes Evidence Code section 352 as a ground for objection, or at least affirmatively argues that the risk of prejudice outweighs the relevance of the proffered evidence. (Cf. People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1009-1010 [248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017] ["the probative/prejudicial issue was before the court" because of defense counsel's reference, in his objection, to the "danger of undue prejudice" outweighing "the probative value" of the challenged evidence]; People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1129, fn. 3 [defendant failed "even to allude to Evidence Code section 352"]; People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 732 [214 Cal.Rptr. 801, 700 P.2d 415] [defendant "invoked Evidence Code section 352 several times"]; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 24 [counsel's argument that probative value is outweighed by prejudicial effect impliedly invoked Evidence Code section 352].) [52 Cal.3d 478]
[23] Defendant now observes that a police officer's opinion regarding the truthfulness of a suspect's confession is generally deemed inadmissible. (See People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103 [301 P.2d 854, 56 A.L.R.2d 1435]; People v. Arguello (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 413, 421 [53 Cal.Rptr. 245].) His failure to object, however, bars our consideration of the point on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 749, 777-778.)
[24] Defendant failed to object, or seek an admonition, as to any of these remarks, and accordingly he cannot raise a claim of misconduct on appeal. (People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 27.) Nonetheless, we briefly review the merits of his argument that the prosecutor's comments violated [52 Cal.3d 479] his state and federal constitutional rights and constituted reversible misconduct.
The prosecutor is generally precluded from vouching for the credibility of her witnesses, or referring to evidence outside the record to bolster their credibility or attack that of the defendant. (See People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1079 [255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619]; People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 941 [248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917], and cases cited.) In the present case, the prosecutor limited her remarks to facts of record, namely, the years of experience of the officers involved, and her "vouching" was clearly based on inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than on her personal belief or knowledge. (See People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 258-259 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906] [prosecutor's arguments were based on inferences warranted by the evidence, rather than personal belief].) We find no improper prosecutorial vouching here.
We have stated that "Isolated, brief references to retribution or community vengeance ..., although potentially inflammatory, do not constitute misconduct so long as such arguments do not form the principal basis for advocating the imposition of the death penalty. [Citation.]" ( People v. [52 Cal.3d 480] Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 771 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) The prosecutor's statement herein, rather than calling for vengeance or retribution, was directed at the jury's weighing function and indicated the prosecutor's emphatic opinion that, under the circumstances in this case, the aggravating circumstances clearly outweighed any considerations of sympathy for defendant. We have never found such comments improper or prejudicial. (See, e.g., People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1182-1184 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].)
[27] The People concede that such argument "was arguably inappropriate" under Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496. (See also South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805 [104 L.Ed.2d 876 109 S.Ct. 2207].) Booth precludes evidence of the impact of the victim's death on his or her family. Gathers makes it clear that comments regarding the victim's character or background made in order to elicit the sympathy or pity of the jury are inadmissible. Both cases held that such evidence is irrelevant to a defendant's decision to kill and to the jury's decision on the appropriate sentence. But neither Booth nor Gathers bars brief references to the victims or their families. (Booth, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 507, fn. 10 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 451]; see also People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d 468, 536; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 284 [266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 336 [261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121].) The prosecutor's references to the victims were indeed far more fleeting than those made in either Booth or Gathers and reiterated what the jury already knew-that murder is a crime against the victims, their families and society. (Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 285.)
Even if we were to conclude that the prosecutor's comments violated the proscriptions of Booth or Gathers, we would find beyond a reasonable doubt there was no prejudicial error. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) In our view, the prosecutor's brief comments could not have diverted the jury from its task of determining the appropriate punishment. (See Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 537.)
5. Cumulative Effect of Misconduct-Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the various prosecutorial misconduct resulted in a [52 Cal.3d 481] miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial. Yet as we have explained, only one of the prosecutor's remarks was arguably improper, and we believe these remarks had no effect on the jury's verdict.
The authorities cited by defendant in support of his theory of "premature deliberation" are inapposite, as none of them suggests that mere questions from individual jurors prior to actual deliberations constitute jury misconduct. (See, e.g., People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 206-207 [155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91] [prior to conclusion of defense case, juror discussed case with police officer/witness]; People v. Brown (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 476, 480-481 [132 Cal.Rptr. 217] [prior to conclusion of People's case, juror expressed to other juror his opinion of defendant's guilt].) As noted in People v. McAlister (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 633, 644 [213 Cal.Rptr. 271], "In a proper case there may be a real benefit from allowing jurors to submit questions [to witnesses] under proper control by the court."
Contrary to defendant's thesis, we do not believe that the questions tendered here indicated the jurors had commenced their deliberations or had formed any tentative conclusions regarding the appropriate penalty. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the questions posed here constituted misconduct. [52 Cal.3d 482]
As previously indicated, some of the jurors' inquiries concerned the status, privileges and potential for release of a prisoner serving a sentence of life without possibility of parole. Responding to the potential for release, the court stated that "Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole means exactly that," admonishing the jurors not to assume anything "other than death means death by execution in the gas chamber; life without possibility of parole means imprisonment for the rest of his natural life." Defendant does not suggest the court's response was inadequate or improper in any way. (See, e.g., People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1064-1065 [251 Cal.Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680].)
After deliberating over penalty for six days, one juror was injured and replaced by an alternate juror. The court instructed the jury to set aside and disregard its prior deliberations and recommence them with the alternate juror present. [30] Defendant asked the court to examine the jurors as to their ability to set aside their prior deliberations. The court denied the motion, stating its assumption the jury would be able to follow the foregoing instructions (citing People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 694 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742]), and observing that voir dire on the subject might be seem by the jurors as "coercive."
In Collins, we rejected the contention that a mistrial must be declared whenever the jury's deliberations were interrupted by dismissal of a juror for cause, providing an alternate juror is available as a substitute, and the jury is instructed to set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew. (17 Cal.3d 687, 694.) We stated that "We are confident [52 Cal.3d 483] that juries made aware of the rights involved will faithfully follow such instructions." (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
[31] Defendant observes that the court's penalty phase instructions included 22 pages devoted to the elements, burden of proof and evaluation of evidence of his prior criminal activity. Although he made no objection to the number or content of these instructions (see § 1259), he now asserts their "sheer bulk" may have unduly focused the jury's attention on the "other crimes" issues, distracting it from its primary duty to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. (Cf. People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72-73, fn. 25 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].)
The instructions given by the court were presumably deemed necessary to assist the jury in properly evaluating the aggravating aspects of defendant's prior criminal activity, and in assisting it to determine whether such offenses were established beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cf. People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 773.) Defendant does not suggest that any of these instructions was incorrect or misleading, and we cannot base error solely on speculation regarding the jury's inability to digest that material without undue distraction from its sentencing task. [52 Cal.3d 484]
Although the court could have mentioned even more aggravating facts to support its decision, including defendant's violent criminal background, on the present record we see no basis for overturning that decision. (See People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 373-374 [253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289].)
[33] Defendant also complains that the trial court failed affirmatively to ask defendant or his counsel for their comments prior to ruling on the motion to modify the sentence. (Counsel did express some views on defendant's reformed character after the court's announcement of its ruling.) The People observe, however, that defense counsel had ample opportunity to address the court prior to the court's ruling. The record shows that counsel, when asked, "Is there any legal cause why judgment should not now be pronounced?," acknowledged that his motions for new trial and modification of sentence were before the court, and he then proceeded to argue the new trial matter (based on the substitution of the alternate juror during the penalty phase). Counsel freely elected to withhold oral argument on the modification motion. Under these circumstances, the court was not required to expressly request argument on the motion before announcing its ruling thereon. [52 Cal.3d 485]
Finally, defendant asserts various constitutional challenges to the 1978 death penalty law and sentencing procedures. He acknowledges that all such challenges have been rejected by this court in recent opinions. (See, e.g., People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 992 [251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698-704 [250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 102-107 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 777-779; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 315-317 [168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 172-188 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) He states no compelling reasons which might induce us to reconsider these decisions. (See also Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190]; Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 U.S. 299 [108 L.Ed.2d 255, 110 S.Ct. 1078].)
To succeed, such a claim requires proof by the defendant that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., his conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failings, the result would have been different. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839] [discussing both federal and state constitutional rights]; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-699, 104 S.Ct. 2052] [discussing federal constitutional right].)
As to the first component, proof may indeed be available. Certainly, counsel's performance-or better, nonperformance-with regard to the court's "instruction" on the history of defendant's case appears deficient. [52 Cal.3d 486] The court effectively-and altogether improperly-informed the jurors that a prior judgment of death had been reversed on a "technicality," viz., the failure to instruct on intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder special circumstance.
Thu, 12/27/1990 52 Cal.3d 453 S004709 Automatic Appeal closed; remittitur issued
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON (STEPHEN WAYNE) (S004385)
ANDERSON (STEPHEN W.) ON H.C. (S047514)
Attn: Gil P. Gonzalez, deputy
2 Anderson, Stephen Wayne (Appellant)
3 Anderson, Stephen Wayne (Appellant)
Represented by Robert S. Horwitz
6 Hutton Centre Dr., Suite 880
4 Anderson, Stephen Wayne (Appellant)
3620 Jasmine Ave., #206
Dec 27 1990 Opinion: Affirmed
Mar 26 1986 Judgment of death
Apr 25 1986 Filed certified copy of Judgment of Death Rendered
3-26-86.
May 14 1986 Extension of Time application Granted
To C.S.R. To 6-5-86 To Complete R.T.
Aug 11 1986 Counsel appointment order filed
William Goodman, Esq.
To Applt To 2-16-87 To request correction of Record.
Mar 5 1987 Compensation awarded counsel
Dec 21 1987 Record on appeal filed
C-7 (675 Pp.) and R-36 (5,714 Pp.)
To 4-20-88 To file Aob.
Mar 1 1988 Received document entitled:
Applt's Applic./motion to Transmit Exhibits.
Mar 16 1988 Exhibits Lodged:
May 18 1988 Compensation awarded counsel
Aug 16 1988 Application for Extension of Time filed
Aug 17 1988 Extension of Time application Granted
To 10-3-88 To file Aob.
To file Applt's Opening brief
Oct 4 1988 Extension of Time application Granted
To App To 10-17-88 To file Aob.
Oct 17 1988 Appellant's opening brief filed
Amended certificate of Service for Aob.
To file Respondent's brief To 12-16-88.
Dec 13 1988 Respondent's brief filed
(110 Pp.) filed in San Diego.
Jan 25 1989 Compensation awarded counsel
Jan 27 1989 Compensation awarded counsel
Aug 27 1990 Received:
Corrected pages 101 & 105 to Aob.
Aug 30 1990 Letter sent to:
Counsel Advising Court Reviewing Appeal in Prep. for Oral Argument; Any Necessary Suppl briefs Due 10-1-90; Any Responses Due 10-22-90.
Sep 6 1990 Letter sent to:
Counsel Advising time for filing Necessary Suppl briefs extended to 10-31-90. Any Replies Due 11-21-90.
Oct 31 1990 Supplemental Brief filed by:
Nov 20 1990 Filed:
Opposition to Applt's Suppl brief (8 Pp.)
Dec 26 1990 Exhibits Returned to:
San Bernardino County Clerk.
Dec 27 1990 Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
Majority Opinion by Lucas, C.J. -- joined by Panelli, Eagleson, Kennard & Arabian JJ. -- Broussard, J. concurs in the judgment only Concurring Opinion by Mosk, J.
Jan 7 1991 Received:
Acknowledgement of Receipt of Exhibits.
Jan 11 1991 Rehearing Petition filed by:
to 3-27-91
Feb 21 1991 Order filed (150 day statement)
May 6 1991 Application to stay execution filed
Appellant's request for stay of execution pending final determination of certiorari petition to be filed in U.S.S.C. (Execution Date: 7-26-91)
Staying execution of judgment of death pending final determination of certiorari petition to be filed in U.S.S.C. If petition is not submitted within the time prescribed, the stay will terminate when the time for submitting such petition has expired.
Notice from U.S.S.C. of filing Petn for Cert. on 6-19-91, No.90-8384.
Aug 5 1994 Motion filed
By Applt for an Order for Substitution of Counsel.
Granting Applt's motion for Substitution of Counsel. the Order appointing William Goodman as Counsel for Applt, filed 8-11-86, Is Vacated. Kent M. Bridwell Is Appt'd as Atty of Record, & Robert S. Horwitz as Assoc. Counsel, for Applt. Counsel Are appointed for Purposes of Appropriate Post-Conviction Proceedings in this Court. Lucas, C.J. did not participate.
Sep 14 1994 Change of Address filed for:
Robert S. Horwitz, Esq.
Oct 31 1994 Habeas funds request filed (confidential)
Re: Applic. filed 10-31-94.
Aug 3 1995 Motion filed
By Atty Kent M. Bridwell to withdraw as Atty of Record (& Notice of change of Address)
Aug 23 1995 Filed:
Letter from Atty Robert S. Horwitz Re: Ability to be Lead Counsel.
Oct 13 1995 Filed:
Suppl Declaration of Kent Bridwell in support of motion for Leave to Withdraw.
Good cause appearing therefor, the application of appointed counsel (Kent M. Bridwell) for permission to withdraw as attorney of record for applt, filed 8-3-95, is granted. The order filed on 8-24-94, insofar as it appoints Kent M. Bridwell as lead counsel for applt, is hereby vacated. Robert S. Horwitz, previously appointed as associate counsel, is hereby appointed as lead counsel for applt, for purposes of appropriate post-conviction proceedings in this court.
May 2 1997 Filed:
Applic. of Federal public Defender for release of Files, Recordd & Any Confidential Materials (in A.A.'s and Related H.C. No. S047514).
The request of Applt to Review & copy all The Materials contained in The Court's Records, Including Any Materials Designated as Confidential Or Under Seal in this case & the Related Cases of People V. Anderson, S004385/Crim. 22143, and in Re Anderson on H.C. (S047514), Is Granted. Applt Will Supply the Personnel & Equipment Necessary to Undertake this Review & Copying of the Record, which Shall Occur on the Premises of this Court.
Superior court today set execution date for 1-29-2002.
Jan 29 2002 Appellant executed (AA)
Anderson was executed at San Quentin by means of lethal injection this date.
Robert S. Horwitz (Law Offices Of A. Lavar Taylor)
Attorney General - San Diego Office (Attn: Gil P. Gonzalez, deputy)
SCOCAL, People v. Anderson , 52 Cal.3d 453 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-anderson-30990) (last visited Tuesday November 21, 2017).