Source: https://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/f9152.htm
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 03:19:23
Document Index: 279234235

Matched Legal Cases: ['§87', '§87', '§3101', '§3101', '§3101', '§3101', '§3101', '§3101', '§3101', '§87', '§3101', '§3101', '§89']

Mr. Gerald S. Jacobs
I have received your letter of October 26 and the materials attached to it. You wrote that the correspondence was sent at the request of Rita M. Blanco, who referred to me in a letter to you of October 23 as "FOIL Appeals officer under Section 894A." Ms. Blanco had requested records from the Town of Eastchester pertaining to certain certiorari proceedings initiated against the Town, and her request was denied by the Town Clerk on the ground that the records relate to pending litigation. You affirmed, stating that attorney work product or documents "used in the preparation of litigation" are not discoverable, and that "any appraisal [the Town] obtained has been prepared for the purposes of litigation."
I agree in great measure with your remarks. While it is not my intent to be overly technical, I offer the following comments for purposes of clarification.
First, as stated by the Court of Appeals in a case involving a request made under the Freedom of Information Law by a person involved in litigation against an agency: "Access to records of a government agency under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (Public Officers Law, Article 6) is not affected by the fact that there is pending or potential litigation between the person making the request and the agency" [Farbman v. NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation, 62 NY 2d 75, 78 (1984)]. Similarly, in an earlier decision, the Court of Appeals determined that "the standing of one who seeks access to records under the Freedom of Information Law is as a member of the public, and is neither enhanced...nor restricted...because he is also a litigant or potential litigant" [Matter of John P. v. Whalen, 54 NY 2d 89, 99 (1980)]. The Court in Farbman, supra, discussed the distinction between the use of the Freedom of Information Law as opposed to the use of discovery in Article 31 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). Specifically, it was found that:
Second, as general matter, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. The first ground for denial, §87(2)(a), pertains to records that "are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute." From my perspective, although §3101(c) and (d) of the CPLR authorize confidentiality regarding, respectively, the work product of an attorney and material prepared for litigation, those kinds of records remain confidential in my opinion only so long as they are not disclosed to an adversary or a filed with a court, for example. I do not believe that materials that are served upon or shared with an adversary could be characterized as confidential or exempt from disclosure.
As you are aware, §3101 pertains disclosure in a context related to litigation, and subdivision (a) reflects the general principle that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action..." The Advisory Committee Notes pertaining to §3101 state that the intent is "to facilitate disclosure before trial of the facts bearing on a case while limiting the possibilities of abuse." The prevention of "abuse" is considered in the remaining provisions of §3101, which describe narrow limitations on disclosure. One of those limitations, §3101(c), states that "[t]he work product of an attorney shall not be obtainable." The other provision at issue pertains to material prepared for litigation, and §3101(d)(2) states in relevant part that:
In my view, insofar as the records in question have been communicated between the Town and its adversary or have been filed with a court, any claim of privilege or its equivalent would be effectively waived. Once records in the nature of attorney work product or material prepared for litigation are transmitted to an adversary, i.e., from the Town to its adversary and vice versa, I believe that the capacity to claim exemptions from disclosure under §3101(c) or (d) of the CPLR or, therefore, §87(2)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law, ends.
It is also noted that it has been determined judicially that if records are prepared for multiple purposes, one of which includes eventual use in litigation, §3101(d) does not serve as a basis for withholding records; only when records are prepared solely for litigation can §3101(d) be properly asserted to deny access to records [see e.g., Westchester-Rockland Newspapers v. Mosczydlowski, 58 AD 2d 234 (1977)].
Lastly, again, for purposes of clarification, it appears that Ms. Blanco believes that this office may have the authority to determine an appeal. In this regard, the Committee on Open Government is authorized to advise with respect to the Freedom of Information Law, and the preceding commentary should be considered as advisory only. While it is my hope that advisory opinions are educational and persuasive, agencies have the responsibility to determine appeals pursuant to §89(4)(a). That provision states in relevant part that:
When a denial of access is affirmed following an appeal, notwithstanding the preparation of an advisory opinion, the person denied access may seek judicial review of the denial in a proceeding initiated under Article 78 of the CPLR.
I hope that I have been of assistance. If you would like to discuss the matter, please feel free to call me.
cc: Rita M. Blanco
Patricia N. Dohrenwend