Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/1999/04/98-2027.htm
Timestamp: 2019-01-16 06:09:51
Document Index: 252518440

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2422', '§ 2423', '§ 2422', '§ 2423', '§ 2422', '§ 3237', '§ 3237']

98-2027 -- U.S. v. Byrne -- 04/06/1999
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (26727 bytes) (23474 bytes)
TIMOTHY BYRNE,
No. 98-2027
(D. Ct. No. CR-97-281-BB)
Defendant-Appellant Timothy Byrne was convicted of using telecommunications devices in interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in sexual acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). The district court sentenced him to twenty-one months imprisonment followed by a three-year period of supervised release. On appeal, defendant argues that we should reverse his convictions because: (1) the district court did not allow his counsel to fully impeach the complaining witness; (2) the prosecution failed to produce evidence of the district court's venue; and (3) extraneous material was introduced into the jury room. We affirm.
On May 7, 1997, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against defendant charging him with using telecommunications devices in interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in sexual acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). During Mr. Byrne's jury trial, the prosecution called the complaining minor to testify. On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to question the minor regarding his interactions with another man whom he had met over the Internet. The minor had traveled out of town to meet this man, and authorities arrested him as a runaway. After his arrest, he made statements inculpating defendant. The district court did not allow questioning regarding these events pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, having found the testimony substantially more prejudicial than probative.
At the conclusion of the government's case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government had failed to offer evidence establishing the district court's venue and jurisdiction. Specifically, defendant argued that as to both counts in the indictment, the prosecution failed to establish that Clovis was in Curry County, New Mexico,(1) and as to the enticement count, the government failed to prove that defendant used any instrumentality of interstate commerce within Curry County, New Mexico. The district court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
Defendant argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it restricted defense counsel's cross-examination of the complaining witness. "We review de novo whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated by cross-examination restrictions, and whether any such violation was harmless." United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 253 (1998); accord United States v. Bindley, 157 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1086 (1998). A defendant's "right to cross-examine witnesses is an integral part of the right to confrontation, [but] it is not an absolute or unlimited right." Gault, 141 F.3d at 1403. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about . . . harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also Bindley, 157 F.3d at 1240; Gualt, 141 F.3d at 1403.
Defendant also argues that the district court erred by failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the prosecution did not produce any evidence of proper venue. "We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if the jury could have found defendant guilty of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Ailsworth, 138 F.3d 843, 846 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 221 (1998); accord United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1055 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 844 (1999). However, when the motion raises a question of venue, we alter the analysis somewhat, for unlike other substantive elements of the offense charged, the government need only prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1438 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1856 (1998); United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 1997). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the record is replete with evidence that establishes proper venue in the District of New Mexico. The evidence indicates that defendant used telecommunications devices in interstate commerce to communicate with a minor in New Mexico(2) and that defendant traveled to New Mexico, where he engaged in sexual acts with the minor. Thus, the government provided ample evidence from which the jury could have found proper venue. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for acquittal.
Moreover, to the extent that the defendant suggests that the jury was not adequately instructed on venue and thus made no explicit venue finding, we find this argument without merit. Although venue is a question of fact that ordinarily must be decided by the jury, see Miller, 111 F.3d at 749, failure to instruct the jury on venue does not necessarily constitute reversible error. In Miller, we stated that "failure to instruct on venue, when requested, is reversible error unless it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's guilty verdict on the charged offense necessarily incorporates a finding of proper venue." 111 F.3d at 751 (emphasis added). In this case, however, defendant fails to assert or direct our attention to any request for a specific instruction on venue. Consequently, Miller is inapposite. Because defendant also did not object to the lack of a specific venue instruction at trial, we review this claim only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Meuli, 8 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
Finally, defendant claims that the district court committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial predicated on the submission of extraneous material to the jury. We review the district court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial under the abuse of discretion standard. See Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Robinson, 39 F.3d 1115, 1116 (10th Cir. 1994). "We will therefore overturn that decision only if that court has abused its discretion by rendering a judgment that is 'arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.'" Robinson, 39 F.3d at 1116 (quoting United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938, 943 (10th Cir. 1987)). "In determining whether the jury's exposure to [extraneous material] during deliberation warranted a new trial, the proper inquiry for the district court was whether there was the 'slightest possibility' that it affected the verdict." United States v. Wood, 958 F.2d 963, 966 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Johnston v. Makowski, 823 F.2d 387, 389-91 (10th Cir. 1987).
1. Presumably, defense counsel premised this argument on the fact that the allegation of venue in the indictment refers only to Curry County, New Mexico, rather than the city of Clovis. We find this argument borders on the frivolous. In any event, we take judicial notice of the fact that the city of Clovis is located within Curry County, New Mexico. See United States v. Burch, -- F.3d --, No. 97-1442, 1999 WL 111141, at *5-6 (10th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999) (asserting that judicial notice may be taken for the first time on appeal and that "[w]hether an offense occurred within particular geographic boundaries is an appropriate subject for judicial notice").
2. Defendant apparently argues that he had to use the telecommunications device within New Mexico to establish proper venue in the District of New Mexico. Defendant is mistaken. Coercion and enticement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 is a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237 and venue is proper in "any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed." 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). Because the communications in this case must have reached New Mexico for the minor to have been enticed, venue is proper in New Mexico. Cf., e.g., United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that "phone calls from one jurisdiction into another can establish venue so long as they further the ends of the conspiracy."); United States v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 508, 511 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that telephone call from Florida to Texas was sufficient to establish venue in the Western District of Texas when the telephone call was in furtherance of the offense).
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/1999/04/98-2027.htm.