Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/464/845/38147/
Timestamp: 2020-04-02 18:29:13
Document Index: 251749781

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1622', '§ 371', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 1651', '§ 1404']

United States of America, Appellant, v. Nicholas Distefano et al., Defendants-appellees, 464 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1972) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1972 › United States of America, Appellant, v. Nicholas Distefano et al., Defendants-appellees
United States of America, Appellant, v. Nicholas Distefano et al., Defendants-appellees, 464 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1972)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 464 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1972)
Argued June 7, 1972.Decided July 17, 1972.
The indictment here, in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed on December 8, 1970, charged Edmund Rosner, an attorney, and three other defendants, with the serious crime of suborning perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1622, and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371, by procuring Pedro Hernandez and three others to testify falsely at a March, 1967 trial in which Hernandez was convicted of violating the federal narcotics laws. The defendants entered not guilty pleas. In March, 1971, a pre-trial conference was held before Judge Metzner to set a trial date. The Government announced readiness for trial in April or May, but counsel for the various defendants, who are among the most active members of the New York City criminal defense bar, pleaded heavy trial engagements through June.1 Without objection, the judge scheduled the trial for November 1.
It is beyond question that if appealability were governed by the statute now in effect, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, as amended by Sec. 14(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. 1890 (1970), the order dismissing the indictment would be appealable;2 indeed, we have recently entertained precisely such an appeal, United States v. Crutch, 461 F.2d 1200 (2 Cir. 1972). It is equally beyond question that the present statute does not apply since Sec. 14(b) provides that the 1970 amendments shall not apply to any criminal case begun before their effective date, January 2, 1971, and the instant indictment was filed December 8, 1970. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 311 n. 2, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971). We therefore look to the statute effective on the date of the indictment. That too, if read literally, would confer jurisdiction since it authorized an appeal to a court of appeals in criminal cases, inter alia:
Before any court had occasion to pass upon this language, which clearly would not have encompassed the appeal here sought to be taken, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on March 21, 1946. Rule 12(a) abolished all pleas except not guilty, guilty and nolo contendere. It also abolished demurrers and motions to quash and provided that "defenses and objections raised before trial which heretofore could have been raised by one or more of them shall be raised only by motion to dismiss or to grant appropriate relief, as provided in these rules," notably Rule 12(b). In addition, the last sentence of Rule 54(c) provided that terms associated with these abolished pleas, motions to quash and demurrers, when appearing in acts of Congress, "shall be construed to mean the motion raising a defense or objection provided in Rule 12." The Advisory Committee Note made clear that this "has particular reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 . . . . It is intended that the right of the Government to appeal in such cases should not be affected as the result of the substitution of a motion under Rule 12 for a demurrer, motion to quash and a special plea in bar."
The announced purpose of the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code was "the substitution of plain language for awkward terms, reconciliation of conflicting laws, omission of superseded sections, and consolidation of similar provisions." H.R.Rep.No.304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The changes represented by 18 U.S.C. § 3731 were consistent with that purpose, the Reviser's Notes stating only: "Minor changes were made to conform to rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
The first case to consider whether the 1948 amendment should be literally applied, so as to reach a dismissal for lack of prosecution under Rule 48(b), there caused by the grant of a suppression motion, was United States v. Pack, 247 F.2d 168 (3 Cir. 1957). In an able opinion by Judge Kalodner, which took note of the Supreme Court's admonition in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227-228, 77 S. Ct. 787, 1 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1957), that courts should not blandly assume, in that instance with respect to the 1948 revision of Title 28, that Congress had intended to make important jurisdictional changes not clearly expressed when it had not been apprised by the Reviser's Notes, the Court held that the section should continue to be read as theretofore, save only for the abolition of outmoded terms.3 A year later the Ninth Circuit was presented with a similar issue, United States v. Heath, 260 F.2d 623 (9 Cir. 1958),4 and reached the same result. Sitting in banc, the Ninth Circuit gave further consideration to the problem in United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F.2d 747 (9 Cir. 1959).5 There was no change in result and no dissent although Judge Pope wrote a wistful concurring opinion, in which Judge Stephens joined, over the passing of the good old days when a statute could be read to mean what it said. Compare Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95 L. Ed. 1035 (1951) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson). A later decision in the Ninth Circuit has indicated no disposition to take a new look. United States v. Kanan, 341 F.2d 509 (9 Cir. 1965). The Government has cited no case in any other circuit to the contrary. Although the point was not directly involved in United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 90 S. Ct. 2117, 26 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1970), the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan approvingly noted Apex and the reasoning as to the limited effect of the 1948 amendment on which it and the other cited decisions were based. 399 U.S. at 292 n. 22, 90 S. Ct. 2117. Beyond this, in 1968 Congress tackled the problem that had given rise to United States v. Pack, supra-the granting of a motion to suppress evidence-by authorizing an appeal on a certificate of need by the United States attorney, 82 Stat. 237,6 but left the Pack-Heath-Apex holdings intact until two years thereafter. Even if we entertained doubt with respect to the Third and Ninth Circuit decisions and felt free to act on this despite the footnote in Sisson, it would scarcely be in the interests of sound judicial administration to create a conflict with respect to a complex jurisdictional statute now happily repealed. However, we have none.
Construction of the phrase "a motion in bar" gave rise to much discussion in United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 80 S. Ct. 459, 4 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1960), although decision ultimately turned on another point. In United States v. Weller, 401 U.S. 254, 259, 91 S. Ct. 602, 606, 28 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1971), Mr. Justice Stewart summarized the state of the law as being:
He added that a characteristic common to the definition at common law "is that a special plea in bar did not deny that a defendant had committed the acts alleged and that the acts were a crime. Rather, it claimed that nevertheless he could not be prosecuted for his crime because of some extraneous factor," 401 U.S. at 260, 91 S. Ct. at 606, typically double jeopardy, pardon, or the statute of limitations.
Under this language it seems doubtful whether there could ever be "a special plea in bar" after a defendant had pleaded not guilty and thereafter sought dismissal on the basis of conduct of the Government subsequent to the indictment. This was necessarily the view taken by the decisions of courts of appeals cited in Part I of this opinion, since none found that the appeal was one for the Supreme Court and thus subject to certification. See United States v. Heath, supra, 260 F.2d at 629 & nn. 15-17; United States v. Apex Distributing Co., supra, 270 F.2d at 750-751 & nn. 5-7. The Supreme Court cases most nearly favorable to the Government are United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at 311-312, 92 S. Ct. 455, which discussed the jurisdictional problem, and United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S. Ct. 773, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1966), which did not. But neither is sufficiently favorable. Although both concerned challenges under the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment, they involved attacks on the indictment which, if successful, would have prevented prosecution then or later. The claim which the judge sustained here was addressed not to the impossibility of a valid indictment but to "unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial." F.R.Cr.P. 48(b).7 An added factor here is that the dismissal did not "bar" another prosecution. The statute of limitations had not yet run and there was nothing to prevent a new indictment. United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4 Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907, 87 S. Ct. 1688, 18 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1967); Mann v. United States 113 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 304 F.2d 394, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 896, 83 S. Ct. 194, 9 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1962). Cf. United States v. Apex Distributing Co., supra, 270 F.2d at 750-751. Although the Government intimates that this might not have been feasible without Hernandez' testimony, this would have been a case where the use of his recorded testimony before the first grand jury would clearly have been permissible under Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S. Ct. 406, 100 L. Ed. 397 (1956), and United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 900-901 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, Haywood v. United States, 396 U.S. 852, 90 S. Ct. 113, 24 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1969). Beyond all this it is unlikely in the last degree that Congress intended to burden the Supreme Court with mandatory review of dismissals under F.R.Cr.P. 48(b), rulings which rest on the circumstances of each case and rarely present an important general issue of law.
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 104, 88 S. Ct. 269, 273, 278, 19 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1967), makes plain that mere error, even gross error in a particular case, as distinguished from a calculated and repeated disregard of governing rules, does not suffice to support issuance of the writ. "While the courts have never confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of 'jurisdiction,' it is clear that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy . . . Mandamus, it must be remembered, does not 'run the gauntlet of reversible errors.' Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382, 74 S. Ct. 145, 147, 98 L. Ed. 106 (1953). Its office is not to 'control the decision of the trial court,' but rather merely to confine the lower court to the sphere of its discretionary power. Id., at 383, 74 S. Ct. 148." While it is possible to find phrases in the Will opinion that might afford some basis for distinction, such an effort would ignore the decision's main thrust. Indeed, the principle stated in Will was in no way novel. The Court had said long before that the all-writs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), cannot "be availed of to correct a mere error in the exercise of conceded judicial power," but can be used only "when a court has no judicial power to do what it purports to do-when its action is not mere error but usurpation of power . . ." De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217, 65 S. Ct. 1130, 1133, 89 L. Ed. 1566 (1945).
It is always tempting for an appellate court to resort to mandamus when confronted with a decision with which it strongly disagrees but which Congress has given it no power to review. The temptation is particularly strong when the aggrieved party, here the Government, now has no other remedy, even though it had the remedy of reindictment at the time of the action of which it complains. However, as the Chief Justice said in Will, supra, 389 U.S. at 97 n. 5, 88 S. Ct. at 274:
The writ of mandamus has long been recognized as the means whereby the federal appellate courts may reach out to correct errors in those extraordinary situations where the normal appellate process is not available. It is used sparingly and reluctantly. The party seeking mandamus has "the burden of showing that its right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable."' Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384, 74 S. Ct. 145, 148, 98 L. Ed. 106 (1953). In the last analysis it depends not on any technical analysis as to whether the error to be corrected involves exercise of a non-existent power or whether it constitutes merely an abuse of discretion; its use depends on the importance the reviewing judges place upon the need for corrective action, and how serious they view the effect of their failure to act.
I can find nothing in Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 88 S. Ct. 269, 19 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1967), which bars mandamus in the situation presented here. After Chief Justice Warren had enumerated situations where the writ has issued and where it has not, he wrote "But this Court has never approved the use of the writ to review an interlocutory procedural order in a criminal case which did not have the effect of a dismissal. We need not consider under what circumstances, if any, such a use of mandamus would be appropriate." Here, of course, we are dealing with a dismissal.
"I agree that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which should not be issued except in extraordinary circumstances. And I also realize that sometimes the granting of mandamus may bring about the review of a case as would an appeal. Yet this does not deprive a court of its power to issue the writ. Where there are extraordinary circumstances, mandamus may be used to review an interlocutory order which is by no means 'final' and thus appealable under federal statutes. Finality, then, while relevant to the right of appeal, is not determinative of the question when to issue mandamus. Rather than hinging on this abstruse and infinitely uncertain term, the issuance of the writ of mandamus is proper where a court finds exceptional circumstances to support such an order." 389 U.S. at 108, 88 S. Ct. at 280.
In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 77 S. Ct. 309, 1 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1957), the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's issuance of mandamus when the district court had abused its power under Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That case clearly points out the propriety of issuing the writ in exceptional circumstances to correct a clear abuse of discretion. The Court said, "We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system. The All Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the exceptional circumstances existing here." Id. at 259-260, 77 S. Ct. at 315. I believe that the circumstances of the case before us are likewise sufficiently "exceptional" to warrant the issuance of mandamus.
In In re United States, 286 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1961), the appellate court issued the writ to vacate an order of acquittal entered by the district court in the middle of the government's presentation of evidence. The court of appeals said that mandamus will lie to correct "usurpation of power" by the district judge, whose actions amounted to "a refusal to permit enforcement of the criminal law," id. at 564. The Supreme Court reversed, Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S. Ct. 671, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1962), but solely on double jeopardy grounds, without challenge to the appellate court's views as to its power to issue the writ.
This court has not hesitated to use the writ where it has found the exceptional circumstances which it felt required action. In United States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Persico v. United States, 395 U.S. 911, 89 S. Ct. 1744, 23 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1969), we issued the writ when the district judge had dismissed an indictment after the jury had returned a guilty verdict. We said:
We take this occasion to observe that the concentration of business of this sort in the hands of a number of lawyers insufficient to meet the preferences of defendants able to retain counsel cannot be allowed to interfere with the public interest in "disposition of criminal charges with all reasonable dispatch." Statement of the Circuit Council to Accompany Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. Counsel who are booked for months ahead cannot properly accept a retainer without the advance approval of the court. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not include the right to a lawyer whose other engagements prevent a speedy trial. See United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214-1215 (3 Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946, 90 S. Ct. 964, 25 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1970); Marxuach v. United States, 398 F.2d 548, 551 (1 Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982, 89 S. Ct. 454, 21 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1968); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 936 (2 Cir.), cert. denied [Ormento v. U. S., Di Pietro v. U. S., Fernandez v. U. S., Panico v. U. S., Galante v. U. S., Loicano v. U. S., Mancino v. U. S., Sciremammano v. U. S., Mirra v. U. S.], 375 U.S. 940, 84 S. Ct. 345, 346, 353, 354, 360, 11 L. Ed. 2d 271, 272 (1963)
Congress had previously authorized Government appeals from grants of suppression motions in certain limited classes of cases, see Pub. L. No. 84-728, title II, Sec. 201, 70 Stat. 573 (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 1404), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, title III, Sec. 1101(b) (1) (A), 84 Stat. 1292. See Bova v. United States, 460 F.2d 404, 406 & n. 4 (2 Cir. 1972)
Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 32 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972) (" [A] valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.")
Will v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at 107, 88 S. Ct. 269