Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/3:2014cv08141/876925/7
Timestamp: 2017-03-23 07:11:10
Document Index: 320258461

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 12132', '§ 12131', '§ 12131', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

ORDER, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 is granted; thc Complaint 1 is dismissed for failure to state a claim; Plaintiff has 30 days to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this Order; if Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Clerk must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a "strike" under 28 U for Rodrigues v. Ryan et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
ORDER, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 is granted; thc Complaint 1 is dismissed for failure to state a claim; Plaintiff has 30 days to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this Order; if Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Clerk must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 11/17/14. (REW)
No. CV 14-8141-PCT-DGC (MEA)
Plaintiff Anthony L. Rodrigues, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison
Complex-Kingman in Kingman, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint
(Doc. 2). The Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.
The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing fee will be
collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to
Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C.
Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may
possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend.
Plaintiff alleges seven counts against Defendants Charles L. Ryan, Director of the
Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”); R. Scott Marquardt, President and CEO
of Management Training Corporation (“MTC”); Tara R. Diaz, Director of Contract Beds
Bureau-Arizona Department of Corrections; and P. Rider, Warden of the Arizona State
Prison Complex-Kingman.
and official capacity for a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Plaintiff
alleges that Ryan was aware that MTC and ADOC personnel had adopted a written
policy imposing disciplinary sanctions “not otherwise inclusive of ADOC earned
incentive program (EIP) phase level privileges subject to non-discretionary loss or
forfeiture for alleged [ADOC policy] violation[s].” While not entirely clear, Plaintiff
appears to assert that the alleged policy took away certain of his “state created liberties” –
including participation in federally subsidized education programs and earned release
credits – without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Plaintiff alleges that Ryan showed
deliberate indifference to significant hardships that Plaintiff endured as a result of this
policy, including loss of educational opportunities and reassignment to housing that
exposed Plaintiff to conditions that aggravated his pre-existing chronic medical
condition. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “emotional trauma, mental anguish, medical
complications involving hospitalization, loss of physical and emotional wellness and the
enjoyment of quality life/free of discrimination.”
In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendant Ryan in his individual
In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts a second claim against Defendant Ryan in his
individual and official capacity for violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, and the ADA.
Plaintiff suffered from a chronic medical condition that qualified as a disability under the
ADA yet denied Plaintiff’s request for alternative housing and reasonable
accommodation, thus exposing Plaintiff to elevated levels of stress, airborne
contaminants, overcrowding, extreme fluctuations in temperature, and second-hand
compliance with the ADA deprived Plaintiff of participation in federally subsidized
Plaintiff alleges that Ryan knew that
Plaintiff further alleges that Ryan’s failure to enforce ADOC policies and
disciplinary response to conduct he claims was the result of medications he used to treat
his disability. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a variety of physical and emotional
injuries, including medical complications that required hospitalization.
Plaintiff appears to allege that he suffered these losses as a
In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendant R. Scott Marquardt in
his individual and official capacity for violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the ADA. Plaintiff alleges nearly identical
facts in Count Three against Marquardt to those alleged in Count One against Ryan,
namely that Marquardt was aware that MTC personnel had adopted a written policy
imposing “non-discretionary disciplinary sanctions” that deprived Plaintiff of certain
alleged “liberty interests” in educational programs, leave credits, and assigned housing,
the last of which resulted in his exposure to preventable environmental stresses and
contaminants – all without notice or a hearing. Plaintiff alleges that Marquardt failed to
monitor, supervise, or ensure the proper training of MTC staff to prevent these losses.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered emotional trauma and mental and physical
complications, including hospitalization.
her individual and official capacity for violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fifth,
In Counts Four and Five, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant Tara Diaz in
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the ADA. Plaintiff makes nearly identical
allegations against Diaz to those made in Counts One and Two against Ryan. In Count
Four, Plaintiff alleges that Diaz was aware that MTC staff had a written policy leading to
the loss of Plaintiff’s “liberty interests” in educational programs, leave credits, and
housing without notice or a hearing, but she failed “to take corrective action and monitor,
supervise[,] and ensure the proper training” of these individuals. In Count Five, Plaintiff
alleges that Diaz knew or should have known that Plaintiff suffered from a chronic
medical condition recognized by the ADA, yet she denied his request for alternative
housing and reasonable accommodation. In both counts, Plaintiff re-alleges that he
suffered emotional trauma and mental and physical complications, including
In Counts Six and Seven, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant P. Rider in her
and Fourteenth Amendments, and the ADA. Again, Plaintiff asserts nearly identical
allegations with respect to Rider as to those made in Counts One and Two against Ryan.
In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges that MTC personnel enforced a written policy leading to
the loss of Plaintiff’s alleged “liberty interests” in educational programs, leave credits,
and housing without notice or a hearing, but Rider failed “to monitor, supervise or take
corrective action to ensure the proper training” of these individuals. In Count Seven,
Plaintiff alleges that Rider knew that Plaintiff suffered from a chronic medical condition
recognized by the ADA yet denied his request for alternative housing and reasonable
accommodation. In both counts, Plaintiff re-alleges that he suffered emotional trauma
and mental and physical complications, including hospitalization.
severally violated his right to due process and equal protection and his right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment, specifically by denying his requests for reasonable
accommodation pursuant to the ADA. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief requiring
Defendants to discontinue current policy, compensatory damages in an amount to be
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as to all Defendants, finding that they jointly and
determined, punitive damages of $4,000,000, and attorney fees and costs.
Failure to State a Claim under § 1983
Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant Ryan. “A plaintiff must
injuries resulting from a policy, practice, or custom of the agency over which that
individual has final policy-making authority. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294
F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under
plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not make him liable. Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)
constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed
the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880
Defendant Ryan
A supervisor in his individual capacity “is only liable for
ADOC, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that ADOC’s policy or custom lead to the
alleged violations. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Plaintiff alleges that
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue Ryan in his official capacity as Director of
ADOC and MTC personnel adopted a “written policy” that lead to deprivations of his
alleged liberty interests. More specifically, Plaintiff appears to allege that he suffered
disciplinary sanctions pursuant to “ADOC policy 809.” Plaintiff’s statements about the
substance of this alleged policy, however, are vague and largely incomprehensible.
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing in short, plain terms what happened.
Absent further factual detail, Plaintiff’s mere statements that he was deprived of certain
liberty interests as a result of an ADOC policy are insufficient to state a claim. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against Ryan in his official capacity will be dismissed.
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to sue Ryan in his personal capacity, Plaintiff
also fails to state a claim. Plaintiff does not allege that Ryan participated in or directed
the alleged violations, or that he knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Ryan in his personal capacity will be
For the same reasons discussed above with respect to Defendant Ryan, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim against Defendants Marquardt, Diaz, or Rider, either in their official
or personal capacities.
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to sue Defendant Marquardt in his official
capacity as President and CEO of MTC, Plaintiff alleges that Marquardt knew MTC
personnel had adopted a “written policy” that led to the deprivation of certain of
Plaintiff’s alleged liberty interests. Plaintiff once again fails to provide an intelligible
description of this policy, however, or to allege any facts showing in short, plain terms
what occurred to deprive him of his rights.
capacity, Plaintiff alleges that Marquardt failed “to monitor, supervise[,] and ensure the
proper training of MTC staff responsible for the management and enforcement of ADOC
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to sue Defendant Marquardt in his personal
Policy.” Plaintiff fails, however, to allege any facts showing that Marquardt “knew of the
violations [against Plaintiff] and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Marquardt in his personal capacity will be
As to Defendants Diaz and Rider, Plaintiff fails to allege any additional facts
regarding the alleged ADOC and MTC policy that would cure the deficiencies noted
above. Additionally, although Plaintiff alleges generally that he was deprived of his
ability to participate in federally funded educational programs; he lost “release credits”;
and he was reassigned to less-desirable housing – all without notice or a hearing – he fails
to allege specific actions on the parts of either Defendant or to allege any facts showing
that either Defendant was made aware of these alleged violations and failed to act to
prevent them. Accordingly Plaintiff has failed to state claims against Diaz and Rider in
either their official or individual capacities. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against these
Failure to State a Claim under the ADA
ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12132. A “public entity” is “any State or local government; [or] (B) any
or local government. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12131. Individuals, however, may only be sued
under the ADA in their official, rather than, their individual capacities.
Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff cannot sue state officials in their
individual capacities to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA). To state an
ADA claim, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that he: “(1) is a handicapped person;
(2) that he is otherwise qualified; and that [prison officials’] actions either (3) excluded
his participation in or denied him the benefits of a service, program, or activity; or
Plaintiff asserts violation of the ADA against all Defendants. Under Title II of the
(4) otherwise subjected him to discrimination on the basis of his physical handicap.”
Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1996). The term “qualified individual with
a disability” includes “an individual with a disability who, with or without . . . the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for
the receipt of services or participation in programs or activities provided by a public
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA as to Defendant Ryan. Plaintiff
alleges in Count Two that Ryan “knew Plaintiff suffered from a chronic medical
condition recognized by ADOC Policy as a qualifying disability subject to [the ADA]
and denied Plaintiff’s request for alternative housing reassignment and reasonable
accommodation.” He further alleges that Ryan based this denial on the absence of
medical necessity rather than disability. Plaintiff appears to allege that Ryan applied the
wrong standard for responding to a request for reasonable accommodation under the
ADA. Nowhere, however, does Plaintiff allege facts showing that he has a qualifying
excluded from a program or denied services based on disability. Plaintiff alleges that he
was deprived of benefits – including his preferred housing assignment and participation
in educational programs – and that these losses were due to conduct related to the
medications he took for his disability. But Plaintiff fails to provide any facts about his
conduct and how it resulted in his alleged deprivations or to show any connection
between his conduct, the medications, and his disability. Absent additional facts showing
that Plaintiff had a disability and was otherwise qualified for the benefits he allegedly
lost, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA claim
against Ryan will be dismissed.
Neither does Plaintiff allege facts showing that he was
For the same reasons cited above, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA as
to Defendants Marquardt, Diaz, and Rider. Plaintiff alleges similar facts in Counts Five
and Seven against Diaz and Rider as to those alleged against Ryan in Count Two. But
Plaintiff fails to allege additional facts anywhere in his Complaint showing that he has a
disability or showing that he was denied services for which he was otherwise qualified
simply because of that disability. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the
ADA as to any Defendant, and his ADA claims against Marquardt, Diaz, and Rider will
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a
first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will
mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If
Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended
A first amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet,
963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896
F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat an original
complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised
in the original complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without
prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a first amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa
County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Because the Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, if Plaintiff
fails to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order, the
judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner
is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted.
agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial
The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff
has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in