Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/495-u-s-385-605116562
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:25:48
Document Index: 535452543

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 3013', '§ 3013', '§ 3013', '§ 7', '§ 3013']

495 U.S. 385 (1990), 88-1932, United States v. Munoz-Flores - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 605116562
Docket Nº: No. 88-1932
Citation: 495 U.S. 385, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384, 58 U.S.L.W. 4563
Party Name: United States v. Munoz-Flores
110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384, 58 U.S.L.W. 4563
purposes, the fact that one governmental [110 S.Ct. 1966] institution has mechanisms available to guard against incursions into its power by other such institutions does not require that the judiciary remove itself from the controversy by labeling the issue a political question. Second, the Government's suggestion that judicial intervention is unwarranted because this case does not involve individual rights is simply irrelevant to the political question doctrine, which is designed to restrain the judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches. The litigant's identity is immaterial to the presence of these concerns in a particular case. More fundamentally, the Government's claim is in error. This Court has repeatedly adjudicated separation of powers claims brought by people acting in their individual capacities, and provisions for the separation of powers within the Legislative Branch are not different in kind from the provisions concerning relations among the branches: both sets of provisions safeguard liberty. Pp. 392-395.
(d) Justice STEVENS' theory -- that, since the Constitution is silent as to the consequences of an Origination Clause violation, but provides by implication, in Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, that any bill passed by both Houses and signed by the President becomes law, some improperly originated bills may become law -- is not supported by the better reading of § 7, which gives effect to all of its clauses in determining what procedures the legislative and executive branches must follow to enact a law. Although none of the Constitution's commands explicitly sets out a remedy for its violation, the principle that the courts will strike down a law when Congress has passed it in violation of such a command is well settled. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-180. Moreover, the logical consequence of Justice STEVENS' view is that the Origination Clause would most appropriately be treated as a constitutional requirement separate from the provisions of § 7 that govern when a bill becomes a "law." Nonetheless, saying that a bill becomes "law" within the meaning of the second clause does not answer the question whether that "law" is unconstitutional. Pp. 396-397.
2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196,
and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 397-401.
[110 S.Ct. 1967] MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 401. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 408.
This case raises the question whether 18 U.S.C. § 3013, which requires courts to impose a monetary "special assessment" on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor, was passed in violation of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. That Clause mandates that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We conclude initially that this case does not present a political question and therefore reject the Government's argument that the case is not justiciable. On the merits, we hold that the special assessment statute does
The United States petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that § 3013 did not violate the Origination Clause.1 The
Government noted that the Ninth Circuit had rejected its argument that the case raised a political question, Pet. for Cert. 5, n. 5, but did not ask this Court to review that ruling. We granted certiorari and directed the parties to brief the political question issue. 493 U.S. 808 (1989).2
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate...