Source: http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/opinions/2004/040015-1.htm
Timestamp: 2014-07-28 22:32:48
Document Index: 94749133

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 95', '§ 12101', '§\n1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 95', '§ 95', '§\n95']

Skinner v. Quintiles Transnational Corp., 167 NC App 478 (04-15) 12/21/2004
JUDY SKINNER, Plaintiff, v. QUINTILES TRANSNATIONAL CORP.,
NO. COA04-15
1. Appeal and Error--appealability--interlocutory order--denial of motion for
judgment on pleadings--res judicata--substantial right
Although an order denying a N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) motion is interlocutory, the
denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on res judicata affects a substantial right
and is immediately appealable. Although another panel of the Court of Appeals has limited such
interlocutory appeals to situations where the prior decision involved a jury verdict, this panel did
not need to attempt to resolve this apparent conflict since it exercised its discretion to hear the
appeal under N.C. R. App. P. 2.
2. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata-_motion for judgment on the pleadings--new
The trial court erred by denying defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings based
on the contention that the final judgment issued in a prior federal case based upon the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) barred plaintiff's state claims under the doctrine of res judicata in
an action alleging that defendant violated North Carolina's Retaliatory Employment
Discrimination Act (REDA) by discharging plaintiff in retaliation for a work injury and her
attempt to secure workers' compensation benefits, because: (1) the instant action was a relevant
and material matter within the scope of the proceeding which plaintiff, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could and should have brought forward for determination in her federal
action; (2) each of plaintiff's two claims are based upon her termination by defendant, and the
instant action merely presents a new legal theory as to why plaintiff was terminated by
defendant; (3) although plaintiff did not receive a right-to-sue under REDA letter from the N.C.
Commissioner of Labor until after she filed her federal ADA action, she had a right to request a
right-to-sue letter before she filed her federal action and thus could have brought her REDA
claim as part of her federal action; and (4) requiring plaintiff to request a right-to-sue letter from
the North Carolina Department of Labor in order to bring all of her related claims in one action
does not place an unnecessarily burdensome responsibility upon plaintiff. Judge GEER concurring in a separate opinion.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 4 September 2003 by
Judge Stafford G. Bullock in Durham County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 15 September 2004.
Roger W. Rizk for plaintiff-appellee.
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P.,
by Rosemary G. Kenyon, J. Mitchell Armbruster and Kathryn R.
Valeika, for defendant-appellant. THORNBURG, Judge.
Defendant appeals from an order denying their motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Defendant moved for such a judgment
based on the contention that the final judgment issued in the prior
case Judy Skinner v. Quintiles Transnational Corp., Case No. 1:01-
CV-01123 (M.D.N.C.), entered on 19 March 2003, barred plaintiff's
state claims under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff was employed by defendant for about six years, from
April 1994 until October 2000, in various administrative positions,
which required extensive amounts of typing. In early 1995,
plaintiff began to experience pain in both of her arms. After a
medical evaluation, plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral ganglion
cysts. Defendant provided plaintiff with a new mouse, a new chair
with arm rests and occasional help from an assistant. Plaintiff's
pain diminished. In early 2000, plaintiff was promoted to the Information
Technology Software Quality Control Department as the documentation
processor. Plaintiff began to experience pain in her arms, hands
and shoulders. After reporting this pain to defendant on 3 March
2000, plaintiff encountered problems with management in her
department and eventually transferred to a different department.
Despite repeated discussions with her managers, plaintiff was still
given tasks that required extensive typing and computer work, which
aggravated her condition. Plaintiff sought medical treatments and
was diagnosed with ganglion cysts, torn ligaments in her right
hand, tendinitis, bursitis and carpal tunnel syndrome. Plaintiff
filed a workers' compensation claim for her condition in March2000. Plaintiff contacted defendant's human resources director in an attempt to find a position that would not require typing all day. Upon the director's recommendation, plaintiff sought training for
an open Clinical Research Assistant position. On 19 October 2000,
while in a training session, plaintiff was asked to attend a
meeting with management. Plaintiff was informed that she was being
laid off from her current position due to reduction in staff. Plaintiff was offered a new position as a Project Associate, which
plaintiff felt she could not perform given the position's
requirements and her medical condition. At the conclusion of the
meeting, defendant told plaintiff that she had 24 hours to make a
decision concerning the Project Associate position. Plaintiff immediately went to the North Carolina Department of
Labor to file an employment discrimination complaint under North
Carolina's Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA), N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 95-240, et seq. (2003). An investigator for the
Department of Labor contacted defendant's Human Resources
Department to inquire about the status of plaintiff's employment. The investigator was told that plaintiff would not be required to
accept or reject the new position within 24 hours and that
plaintiff would, in fact, not have to respond until someone from
defendant got in touch with plaintiff. Several weeks later,
sometime in November 2000, plaintiff also filed a charge of
discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, claiming that defendant had violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2000). On 22December 2000, plaintiff received her last paycheck from defendant. On 18 January 2001, defendant informed plaintiff that she had been
terminated after she failed to accept the offered job position.
On 24 July 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
alleging that defendant had violated provisions of the ADA in that
defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations for
plaintiff's disability and had discharged plaintiff without
accommodating her disability. On 17 December 2001, the matter was
District of North Carolina, due to the fact that all matters giving
rise to the action occurred in Durham County and Durham County is
located in the Middle District. Defendant moved for summary
judgment on all of plaintiff's claims. Summary judgment was
granted and plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice on
19 March 2003. Plaintiff commenced the instant action on 17 January 2003,
alleging that defendant violated REDA in that defendant discharged
plaintiff in retaliation for a work injury and her attempt to
secure workers' compensation benefits. Defendant answered
plaintiff's complaint and asserted as a defense that plaintiff's
claim was barred by res judicata due to the final judgment of the
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in the
first case. Defendant then moved, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
1A-1, Rule 12(c), for a judgment on the pleadings based on the res
judicata defense. This motion was denied on 4 September 2003. Defendant appeals. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2003). The function of this
section of the rule is to dispose of baseless claims or defenses
when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of merit. Ragsdale v.
Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974). In
determining whether the trial court erred in its ruling on a Rule
12(c) motion, this Court applies the following standard:
A motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a
Rule 12(c) motion, is proper when all the
material allegations of fact are admitted on
the pleadings and only questions of law
remain. The movant must show, even when
viewing the facts and permissible inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, that he is clearly entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Because judgment on the
pleadings is a summary procedure and the
judgment is final, the movant is held to a
strict standard and must show that no material
issue of fact exists. DeTorre v. Shell Oil Co., 84 N.C. App. 501, 504, 353 S.E.2d 269,
271 (1987) (internal citations omitted). Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff's claim was not barred by res judicata
and, thus, erred in denying defendant's motion for a judgment on
the pleadings. [1] We first note that an order denying a Rule 12(c) motion is
interlocutory and that there is generally no right to appeal an
interlocutory order. There are two exceptions to this general
[F]irst, where there has been a final
determination of at least one claim, and the
trial court certifies there is no just reason
to delay the appeal, [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1,Rule 54(b) (2003)]; and second, if delaying
the appeal would prejudice a substantial
right. Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar.
Co., 135 N.C. App. 159, 162, 519 S.E.2d 540, 543 (1999) (quoting
Liggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 23-24, 437 S.E.2d 674,
677 (1993)), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 352, 542 S.E.2d 207-08
(2000). Defendant notes that this Court has held that the denial
of a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on res judicata
affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. Clancy
v. Onslow Cty., 151 N.C. App. 269, 271, 564 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2002). However, another panel of this Court has limited such interlocutory
appeals to situations where the prior decision involved a jury
verdict. Country Club, 135 N.C. App. at 167, 519 S.E.2d at 546. We need not attempt to resolve this apparent conflict, because we
choose to exercise our discretion to hear this appeal pursuant to
Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
[2] The doctrine of res judicata is intended to force parties
to join all matters which might or should have been pleaded in one
action. Clancy, 151 N.C. App. at 271-72, 564 S.E.2d at 922-23. Res judicata is a bar to subsequent action when there is a final
judgment on the merits in a prior action, both actions involve the
same parties and both actions involve the same cause of action. Id. at 271, 564 S.E.2d at 922. A final judgment bars not only all
matters actually determined or litigated in the prior proceeding,
but also all relevant and material matters within the scope of the
proceeding which the parties, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could and should have brought forward for determination. Rogers Builders v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 22, 331 S.E.2d 726,
730 (1985), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 590, 341 S.E.2d 29
(1986). It is clear that there was a final judgment entered in
plaintiff's federal claim and that plaintiff and defendant are the
same parties as in the federal claim. However, the two actions do
not involve exactly the same issue. Thus, the question becomes
whether the instant action was a relevant and material [matter]
within the scope of the proceeding which [plaintiff], in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, could and should have brought
forward for determination. Id. Plaintiff contends that the
instant claim is separate and distinct from the claim brought in
the federal action. Plaintiff argues: (1) that claims under the
ADA and REDA require proof of different facts, thus making them
different claims; and (2) that plaintiff had no REDA claim to
assert in the federal action because she had not received a right-
to-sue letter from the North Carolina Department of Labor at the
time of filing the federal action. Our courts have not adopted the transactional approach to
res judicata in which all issues arising out of a single
transaction or series of transactions must be tried together as one claim. Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 493-94, 428 S.E.2d 157,
162-63 (1993). In Bockweg, the Court determined that res judicata
was inapplicable because plaintiffs sought separate remedies for
distinct acts of negligence leading to separate and distinct
injuries. Id. at 496, 428 S.E.2d at 164. However, [t]he defense
of res judicata may not be avoided by shifting legal theories orasserting a new or different ground for relief . . . . Rogers, 76
N.C. App. at 30, 331 S.E.2d at 735. In the instant action, while
plaintiff has brought claims under two different statutes, her
claims stem from the same relevant conduct by defendant. In the
first complaint, plaintiff specifically alleged that:
28. The Defendant has violated [the ADA] by
retaliating against the Plaintiff for filing
her initial charge of discrimination by
terminating the Plaintiff. (Emphasis added). In the instant action, plaintiff alleged:
16. The [REDA] prohibits the discharge of an
employee in retaliation for a work injury and
an attempt by the employee to recover workers
[sic] compensation benefits. The Defendant
has violated the provisions of such act by
terminating the Plaintiff in retaliation for
her work related injury and her attempt to
secure workers [sic] compensation benefits.
(Emphasis added). Further, the United States Magistrate Judge, in
an opinion fully adopted by United States District Judge Frank W.
Bullock, Jr., spent several pages discussing the termination aspect
of plaintiff's ADA claim. It is clear that each of plaintiff's two
claims are based upon her termination by defendant and that the
instant action merely presents a new legal theory as to why
plaintiff was terminated by defendant. See Rogers, 76 N.C. App. at
30, 331 S.E.2d at 735. However, before res judicata can bar the instant action, this
Court must also decide whether plaintiff, with reasonable
diligence, could and should have brought the claims included in the
instant action with the first action. Plaintiff argues that she
could not have included her current claims in the first action
because she had not yet received a right-to-sue letter from theNorth Carolina Department of Labor. An employee may only bring an action under this section when
he has been issued a right-to-sue letter by the [North Carolina
Labor] Commissioner. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-243(e) (2003). N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 95-242(a) (2003) requires the Commissioner of Labor to
make a determination on a complaint no later than 90 days after the
filing of the complaint. However, this Court has concluded that
the time limit is not mandatory because the statute fails to
provide any ramifications in the event the Commissioner fails to
take action. Commissioner of Labor v. House of Raeford Farms, 124
N.C. App. 349, 477 S.E.2d 230 (1996). An employee may make a
written request to the Commissioner for a right-to-sue letter after
180 days following the filing of a complaint if the Commissioner
has not issued a notice of conciliation failure and has not
commenced an action pursuant to G.S. 95-242. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
95-242(c) (2003).
The Commissioner did not issue plaintiff a right-to-sue letter
until 23 October 2002. However, plaintiff filed her complaint on
21 October 2000, and was thus entitled to request a right-to-sue
letter on or about 21 April 2001, before she filed the complaint in
the original federal action. While the administrative
investigation process set up under REDA is a valid and useful part
of pursuing employment discrimination claims, plaintiff chose the
path of litigation of her claims regarding her termination when she
filed her original complaint. We do not believe, in this case,
that requiring plaintiff to request a right-to-sue letter in order
to bring all of her related claims in one action places anunnecessarily burdensome responsibility upon plaintiff. Thus, we
conclude that, with reasonable diligence, plaintiff could and
should have brought the claims that make up the instant action as
part of her original federal action. Defendant has shown that plaintiff's claims are barred by res
judicata. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to
enter an order granting a judgment on the pleadings to defendant. Reversed and remanded.
Judge GEER concurs in a separate opinion.
GEER, Judge concurring.
I concur with the foregoing opinion, but write separately to
address further the fact that a right-to-sue letter had not yet
been issued at the time plaintiff filed her ADA suit. Plaintiff's
appeal places two policy considerations squarely in conflict. On the one hand, dismissing this action based on res judicata
would undermine the administrative scheme established by the
General Assembly. By requiring the parties to proceed
administratively before the Department of Labor prior to filing
suit, the General Assembly _ like Congress, before it, in enacting
Title VII _ recognized the value of having an administrative body
investigate claims and, if appropriate, attempt to resolve them
without the need for litigation. On the other hand, the common law rule against claim-splitting
is well-established in North Carolina and holds that "all damages
incurred as the result of a single wrong must be recovered in onelawsuit." Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 492, 428 S.E.2d 157,
161 (1993) (emphasis omitted). To allow a person to seek damages
for a termination of employment based on one theory and then, after
an adverse decision on that theory, seek the same damages under
another theory raises the specter of repetitive litigation,
duplicative discovery, possibly inconsistent results, and no
assurance of finality.
I believe the two policies must be reconciled. The question
is whether the policy underlying REDA's administrative review
process trumps traditional claim-splitting principles. In this
case, as the majority opinion explains, plaintiff was permitted by
state law to request a notice of right to sue in order to include
the REDA claim in her federal lawsuit. If she preferred to
continue the administrative process, she had the option, as
defendant suggests, (a) to seek a stay of the pending action in
order to allow completion of the administrative process or (b) to
move to amend the complaint once the notice of right to sue was
received. Plaintiff, however, took no steps at all to try to
include the REDA claim in the pending action. Significantly, the
federal district court did not enter summary judgment on
plaintiff's ADA claim until 19 March 2003, five months after
plaintiff received her notice of right to sue with respect to the
REDA claim.
I would also observe that while North Carolina courts have not
previously addressed the issue before this Court, numerous other
courts have considered closely analogous circumstances and
overwhelmingly have reached the same conclusion as this Court. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep't of Employment Div. of Labor
Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 506 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that a Title
VII lawsuit was barred by res judicata since plaintiff could have
requested a right-to-sue letter or sought to stay a prior Equal Pay
Act lawsuit pending completion of the EEOC administrative process),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826, 157 L. Ed. 2d 48, 124 S. Ct. 181
(2003); Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 193-94 (3d Cir.
1999) (when a jury had rendered a verdict in a case alleging that
plaintiff's termination violated the FMLA, plaintiff's second
action challenging the discharge under the ADA was barred by res
judicata; plaintiff should have requested a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC or sought a stay of the FMLA action pending receipt
of the letter); Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 494 (6th
Cir. 1997) (wrongful discharge ADA claim was barred by res judicata
because of entry of summary judgment in a state court action
alleging discharge in retaliation for workers' compensation claim
even though plaintiff did not have right-to-sue letter from the
EEOC; holding that plaintiff should have sought to amend the state
complaint upon obtaining the letter), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1046,
140 L. Ed. 2d 511, 118 S. Ct. 1361 (1998).
Because I find these cases persuasive in balancing the
conflicting policies, I join the majority opinion. I would,
however, urge trial courts to view favorably motions to stay
proceedings and motions to amend complaints in these circumstances. See Churchill, 183 F.3d at 194 ("We believe that district courts
are likely to look favorably on applications for stays of FMLA
proceedings while plaintiffs promptly pursue administrativeremedies under Title VII and similar state laws and we urge them to
do so.").