Source: http://hi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20160816_0001242.HI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-08-23 11:45:46
Document Index: 262197116

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 580', '§ 580', '§ 7', '§ 602', '§ 571', '§ 571', '§ 657']

The question presented on certiorari is whether Husband is entitled to appellate fees as a matter of law pursuant to HFCR Rule 68 (2006) because appellate fees, pursuant to the terms of 2006 version of HFCR Rule 68, are "incurred after the making of the offer."[6] The ICA, relying upon Nelson v. University of Hawai'i, 99 Hawai'i 262, 265, 54 P.3d 433, 436 (2002), and Nakasone v. Nakasone, 102 Hawai'i 177, 178, 73 P.3d 715, 716 (2003), held that "appellate fees and costs . . . are necessarily incurred after the making of the Rule 68 offer and thus are included within the time frame set forth in the rule." Cox v. Cox, 134 Hawai'i 475, 344 P.3d 359 (App. 2015), cert. granted, No. SCWC-12-0000762, 2015 WL 3539785 (Haw. June 3, 2015) (emphasis omitted).[7] We therefore consider the application of HFCR Rule 68 in family court proceedings in light of the existence of statutory law dealing with the same subject matter and the effect of this rule on the method by which issues subject to this rule are determined.
A. HFCR Rule 68 Does Not Apply to Cases Governed by HRS § 580-47 1. HFCR Rule 68 Contravenes HRS § 580-47
The Hawai'i Constitution accords this court the "power to promulgate rules and regulations in all civil and criminal cases for all courts relating to process, practice, procedure and appeals, which shall have the force and effect of law." Haw. Const. art. VI, § 7. "However, pursuant to HRS § 602-11 (1985), '[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant, nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts, nor affect any statute of limitations.'" In re Doe, 77 Hawai'i 109, 113, 883 P.2d 30, 34 (1994) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). Where a court-made rule affecting litigants' substantive rights contravenes the dictates of a parallel statute, the rule must give way. See In re Doe Children, 94 Hawai'i 485, 487, 17 P.3d 217, 219 (2001) (holding that HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) cannot be construed "in such a way as to modify the requisite deadline for filing an HRS § 571-54 motion for reconsideration and the subsequent notice of appeal, " and thus, "HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) is inapplicable to family court cases governed by HRS § 571-54").
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Here, HFCR Rule 68 abridges the substantive rights of parties in family court proceedings because, as discussed, it modifies the standard by which the family court should decide whether to award post-offer attorney&#39;s fees to the party-offeror. Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) ("What matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it governs only &#39;the manner and the means&#39; by which the litigants&#39; rights are &#39;enforced, &#39; it is valid; if it alters &#39;the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights, &#39; it is not." (quoting Miss. Publ&#39;g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946))). That HFCR Rule 68 modifies the governing standard for awarding post-offer attorney&#39;s fees is even more apparent in the 2015 version of the rule, which explicitly decoupled the analytical framework from that prescribed by HRS &sect; 580-47. By conferring on a party to a family court proceeding a presumptive entitlement to post-offer attorney&#39;s fees, HFCR Rule 68 creates a decisional framework that is inconsistent with the legislature&#39;s manifest directive in HRS &sect; 580-47 that attorney&#39;s fees may be discretionarily awarded to a party only if such an award "shall appear just and equitable" after considering the factors outlined in the statute and the totality of the circumstances. See Bank of Haw. v. Shinn, 120 Hawai&#39;i 1, 8, 200 P.3d 370, 377 (2008) ("Allowing a party, through reliance on HRCP Rule 5(a), to avoid giving notice to a party in default prior to extension of a judgment would eviscerate the legislature's unmistakable mandate in HRS § 657-5 that '[n]o extension shall be granted without ...