Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20161216_0001290.ETN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-07-17 20:46:32
Document Index: 389033720

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 846', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

KIVETTE SMITH, Petitioner,
Before the Court is Petitioner's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 761]. The petition relies on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Clause (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was unconstitutionally vague [Id.]. This Court appointed Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee (FDSET) for the limited purpose of reviewing the case to determine whether or not Petitioner is eligible for Johnson-based collateral relief on February 11, 2016. E.D. Tenn. SO-16-02 (Feb. 11, 2016). Consistent with that appointment, FDSET filed a supplement in support for Petitioner's requested vacatur [Doc. 769]. The United States responded in opposition [Doc. 770]; Petitioner, through counsel, replied in turn [Doc. 772]. Also before this Court is a request to defer ruling pending full briefing that the United States filed prior to receipt of the FDSET supplement [Doc. 766]. For the reasons that follow, the United States's request for deferral will be DENIED as moot and Petitioner's § 2255 motion will be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In 2004, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiring to distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) [Doc. 129]. He faced a statutory penalty of ten years up to life imprisonment for the offense [Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 52]. Based on prior North Carolina convictions for common-law robbery [Id. ¶ 35], and robbery with a dangerous weapon [Id. ¶ 37], the United States Probation Office deemed Petitioner to be a career offender under Section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines with an advisory guideline range of 262 to 327 months' imprisonment [Id. ¶¶ 27, 53]. In accordance with that designation, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 262 months' imprisonment followed by five years' supervised release on February 4, 2005 [Doc. 378].
Petitioner appealed, but the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on October 29, 2007. United States v. Smith, 252 F. App'x 20, 23 (6th Cir. 2007). Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court and his conviction became final for purposes of § 2255(f)(1) on January 17, 2008, at expiration of time to seek the same. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003) (explaining that a conviction affirmed on appeal becomes final when the ninety-day period for seeking a writ of certiorari expires). More than one year later-on April 13, 2009-Petitioner filed an initial motion for collateral relief under § 2255 [Doc. 566]. This Court dismissed that motion as untimely on May 4, 2009 [Doc. 569].
On June 25, 2016, the Supreme Court released the Johnson decision; Petitioner filed the instant successive petition for collateral relief less than one year later-on May 24, 2016 [Doc. 761 (suggesting North Carolina common law robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 4B1.1 and that without the conviction he cannot be categorized as a career offender)]. The Sixth Circuit recently granted leave to consider the petition [Doc. 760].
II. REQUEST FOR DEFERRAL
In addition to the petition, this Court is also in possession of the United States's request that the Court defer ruling on the petition until the parties have had a full opportunity to brief the issues [Doc. 766]. Before this Court could rule on that motion, FDSET field a supplement in support of Petitioner's pro se petition [Doc. 769], the United States responded to that supplement [Doc. 770] and FDSET replied [Doc. 772]. Because deferral is no longer necessary, the United States's request for the same [Doc. 776] will be DENIED as moot.
III. TIMELINESS OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The ACCA mandates a fifteen-year minimum sentence for any felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm after having sustained three prior convictions &ldquo;for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.&rdquo; 18 U.S.C. &sect; 924(e)(1). The statute defines &ldquo;violent felony&rdquo; as &ldquo;any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year&rdquo; that (1) &ldquo;has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another&rdquo; (the &ldquo;use-of-physical-force clause&rdquo;); (2) &ldquo;is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives&rdquo; (the &ldquo;enumerated-offense clause&rdquo;); or (3) &ldquo;otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another&rdquo; (the &ldquo;residual clause&rdquo;). 18 U.S.C. &sect; 924(e)(2)(B). It was this third clause-the residual clause-that the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional in Johnson. 135 S.Ct. at 2563. The Court went on to ...