Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/827/491/2960/
Timestamp: 2019-12-06 02:41:28
Document Index: 631860919

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1382', '§ 1331', '§ 1451', '§ 1291', '§ 1002', '§ 1381', '§ 1383', '§ 1392', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 1392', '§ 1383', '§ 1398', '§ 186', '§ 186', '§ 186', '§ 186', '§ 186', '§ 186', '§ 1392', '§ 1392', '§ 1392', '§ 1392', '§ 1392', '§ 1392', '§ 186', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1132']

Cuyamaca Meats, Inc., a California Corporation, C & M Meatpacking Corp., a California Corporation, Andnational Meat Packers, Inc., Acalifornia Corporation,plaintiffs-appellees, v. San Diego and Imperial Counties Butchers' and Foodemployers' Pension Trust Fund, an Unincorporatedassociation, Defendant-appellant, 827 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
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Cuyamaca Meats, Inc., a California Corporation, C & M Meatpacking Corp., a California Corporation, Andnational Meat Packers, Inc., Acalifornia Corporation,plaintiffs-appellees, v. San Diego and Imperial Counties Butchers' and Foodemployers' Pension Trust Fund, an Unincorporatedassociation, Defendant-appellant, 827 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1987)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 827 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1987) Argued and Submitted June 3, 1987. Decided Sept. 3, 1987
The issues in this case involve construction of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1383, and 1392, provisions of the MPPAA. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California assumed jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1451. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The appellant, San Diego and Imperial Counties Butchers' and Food Employers' Pension Trust Fund ("Pension Fund"), is a jointly trusteed labor-management trust fund created pursuant to the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"). The Pension Fund exists pursuant to a declaration of trust and was organized to receive contributions and make payments for the purpose of providing retirement benefits to employees of participating employers. Appellant is a multiemployer employee benefit plan. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(37) (A) and 1301(a) (3).
Cuyamaca Meats, Inc. $279,750.08 C & M Meat Packing Corp. 428,829.46 National Meat Packers, Inc. 146,127.28
Cuyamaca Meats, Inc. $ 38,213.76 C & M Meat Packing Corp. 48,226.50 National Meat Packers, Inc. 14,881.32
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Employers, declaring that "the plaintiffs withdrew from the defendant Trust Fund on September 1, 1983." Cuyamaca Meats, Inc. v. San Diego and Imperial Counties Butchers' and Food Employers' Pension Trust Fund, 638 F. Supp. 885, 891 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1983). In this case, the parties agree that there are no genuine issues of fact. Therefore, this Court need only decide whether the substantive law was properly applied. See United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers Arizona Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1986).
The MPPAA provides that when an employer withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan, the employer becomes liable for its proportionate share of the plan's unfunded vested liability. The purpose of this provision of the MPPAA is to ensure that multiemployer plans are not rendered insolvent by withdrawing employers. Board of Trustees v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054, 105 S. Ct. 2116, 85 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985).
29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) states:
This case involves a complete withdrawal. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a) sets out the factors which indicate a complete withdrawal:
29 U.S.C. § 1392(a) contains the definition of "obligation to contribute":
The Employers had an obligation to contribute to the Pension Fund after impasse was reached in their negotiations with Local 229A. The obligation was one resulting from a duty under applicable labor-management relations law. Specifically, the obligation to contribute resulted from duties imposed upon the Employers by Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5). That statute provides in relevant part:
Under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5), an employer must maintain the conditions of employment set forth in an expired collective bargaining agreement until a new agreement is reached or until good faith negotiations result in a bona fide impasse. American Distrib. Co. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958, 104 S. Ct. 2170, 80 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1984); Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625, 627 (9th Cir. 1981); Peerless Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1981).
When the negotiations reach impasse, the employer may unilaterally impose changes in the terms of employment if the changes were reasonably comprehended in the terms of its contract offers to the union. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 223-25, 69 S. Ct. 960, 962-64, 93 L. Ed. 1320 (1949); Peerless Roofing, 641 F.2d at 735; Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984, 101 S. Ct. 2317, 68 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1981); NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130, 136 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827, 70 S. Ct. 76, 94 L. Ed. 503 (1949). The crucial point of these authorities is that after impasse is reached an employer may unilaterally implement new terms of employment only if reasonably comprehended in a pre-impasse offer. The implementation of terms not reasonably comprehended in a pre-impasse offer is an indication that the employer failed to bargain collectively with the employees' representatives as required by 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5).
Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is clear that there was no cessation of the Employers' obligation to contribute to the Pension Fund as a result of the impasse that occurred in the negotiations. After expiration of the 1979 CBAs, the Employers had a legal duty, under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5), to continue to make contributions to the Pension Fund in accordance with the terms of the 1979 CBAs. When impasse occurred on May 23, 1983, the Employers were free to make unilateral changes in the terms of employment so long as such changes were reasonably comprehended by their offers to Local 229A. With respect to pensions, the Employers' last offer contemplated continued contributions to the Pension Fund through August 31, 1983, and the establishment of a new retirement plan thereafter. After impasse the Employers implemented their final offer. They tendered contributions to the Pension Fund until September 1, 1983. The Employers tendered those contributions under an obligation to contribute to the Pension Fund within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1392.
An employer who, after termination of a collective bargaining agreement mandating pension fund contributions and after impasse in negotiations with the employees' union, continues to contribute to a pension fund in accordance with a unilaterally implemented offer made to the union during negotiations does so under an obligation to contribute resulting from a duty under applicable labor-management relations law within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1383 and 1392.
This conclusion is particularly compelling in view of 29 U.S.C. § 1398(2):
This provision undermines the Pension Fund's argument that withdrawal of the Employers occurred as a result of the impasse in negotiations. The mere existence of an impasse in negotiations does not lead to withdrawal, even if contributions by the employer to the pension fund cease. See T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc. v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 580 F. Supp. 621 (N.D.N.Y.1984) ("Defendant suggests an impasse will trigger withdrawal liability. In fact, the concept of impasse is wholly irrelevant to the issues here. As merely a stage in the labor dispute, there is simply no talismanic significance to the presence of an 'impasse.' " 580 F. Supp. at 629), aff'd., 735 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1984); T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc. v. I.A.M. National Pension Fund, 597 F. Supp. 256, 263 (D.D.C. 1984).
The appellant argues that Section 302(c) (5) (B) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (B), prohibited it from accepting contributions from the Employers after impasse.
29 U.S.C. § 186, in relevant part, provides:
This section of the LMRA was intended by Congress to regulate payments by employers to employee representatives. It "was aimed at forestalling practices Congress considered injurious to the collective bargaining process such as bribery of employee representatives by employers, extortion by employee representatives, and the potential abuse of power by union officials armed with sole control of welfare funds." NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 1913, 531 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1976), citing, Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 79 S. Ct. 864, 3 L. Ed. 2d 915 (1959).
29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) is an exception to an overall prohibition on payments by employers to employee representatives. The exception applies to sums paid to a trust fund established for the benefit of employees and their families, provided that the detailed written basis upon which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement. In this case, under well established authority in this circuit, the expired 1979 CBAs satisfied the written agreement requirement for the contributions tendered to the Pension Fund by the Employers after impasse in negotiations.
In NLRB v. Carilli, 648 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1981), an employer cited Sec. 186(c) (5) (B) in attacking the NLRB's finding that it violated Section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA by discontinuing payments to a trust fund. The court rejected the argument, holding that an expired collective bargaining agreement satisfied the Sec. 186(c) (5) (B) requirement of a written agreement. As to the effect of impasse, the court stated:
By finding that the expired collective bargaining agreement and the trust agreements here are sufficient to permit continued payments to the trust funds, we do not, as Antonino's contends, hinge criminal liability under Section 302(c) (5) [29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) ] upon the difficult determination of whether impasse has been reached. The collective bargaining and trust agreements here are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 302(c) (5) and to permit continued payments to the trust funds, whether or not the parties have bargained to impasse.
In Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981), an employer who had continued to make contributions to a pension fund after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and after impasse in negotiations sought a refund of the contributions made after impasse. The employer argued that 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (B) prohibited the pension fund from retaining the employer's contributions after impasse in the absence of a new written agreement. The court held that Sec. 186(c) (5) (B) did not prohibit the employer's contributions after impasse because "the payments were made in conformity with the terms of an expired written agreement during the course of collective bargaining negotiations." Id. at 627. The court went on to say " [i]t is lawful for an employer to continue the payments under these circumstances." Id.
The appellant further argues that the expired collective bargaining agreements in this case cannot function as the written basis for post-impasse pension fund contributions because of the fact that those contributions were tendered under a pension plan with a new proviso, an eligibility requirement of twelve months' continuous service. In fact, the new eligibility requirement did not affect the payments tendered after impasse. All contributions actually tendered to the Pension Fund by the Employers after impasse were tendered under the terms under which contributions had been made prior to expiration of the collective bargaining agreements. The new proviso only served to further circumscribe the employees on whose behalf contributions would be made. Remembering that the purpose of 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) is to prevent payments by employers to employee representatives which undermine the collective bargaining process, it is plain that the eligibility requirement added to the pension program by the Employers after impasse should not be deemed to have terminated the effect of the expired collective bargaining agreements as written agreements satisfying Sec. 186(c) (5).
The appellant also argues that, under 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c), it was required to disregard the Employers' final offer, providing for the Employers' participation in the Pension Fund until September 1, 1983. 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c) states:
The Employers concede that a purpose of their final offer of May 5, 1983, was to minimize their withdrawal liability. Even assuming that this aim was a principal purpose of the Employers' last offer to the union, the legislative history suggests that the Employers' May 5, 1983, offer was not a transaction covered by 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c).
The following was stated concerning 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c) during House debates:
The Employers' May 5, 1983, offer to Local 229A had economic substance. Every indication is that it was a bona fide, arm's-length offer made during negotiations concerning new collective bargaining agreements. The May 5 offer was not deceptive in any way, and it in no way frustrated the purposes of the MPPAA. It is true that the purpose, and an effect, of the May 5 offer was to delay the calculation of withdrawal liability until after June 30, 1983, and to thereby minimize such liability. Such an effect, however, was not an evasion or avoidance of withdrawal liability within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c).
Employer proposals made during negotiations toward a collective bargaining agreement, and motivated, at least in part, by a desire to minimize withdrawal liability, are not transactions entered into in order to evade or avoid withdrawal liability within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c).
In conclusion, this Court holds that the district court was correct in determining that the Employers withdrew from the Pension Fund on September 1, 1983, when they stopped tendering contributions to that fund, and not on May 23, 1983, when they reached impasse in their negotiations with Local 229A. This conclusion does not conflict with 29 U.S.C. § 186 or Sec. 1392(c).
Section 4301(e) of the MPPAA, 29 U.S.C. § 1451(e), provides for the discretionary award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in cases initiated to enforce the provisions of the MPPAA. 29 U.S.C. § 1451(e):
Section 1451(e) allows the recovery of attorney's fees and costs on appeal. See Shelter Framing Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 705 F.2d 1502, 1515 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 104 S. Ct. 2709, 81 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1984).
The case of West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1987) is helpful as to the factors relevant to the granting of attorney's fees in this case. The appellee in West sought attorney's fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), the attorney's fee statute of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). The courts have applied principles developed under the ERISA statute in cases under the MPPAA statute. See Shelter Framing, 705 F.2d at 1515; T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc. v. I.A.M. National Pension Fund, 616 F. Supp. 400, 403 (D.D.C. 1985). In West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d at 956, the court said:
The factors to be considered in awarding attorney's fees are as follows: (1) the culpability or good faith of the opposing party; (2) the ability of opposing party to pay the award fees; (3) the degree of deterrence which would result from an award of fees; (4) whether a number of participants under an ERISA plan would benefit from an award of fees; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions. Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). In Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. Gilliam, 737 F.2d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1984), we stated that these "factors very frequently suggest that attorney's fees should not be charged against ERISA plaintiffs." We cannot say that the Union Workers have acted in bad faith or that their contentions were completely without merit. Accordingly, we reject ConAgra's request for attorney's fees.