Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98961/peters-vs-hobby
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Peters Vs Hobby - Citation 98961 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Peters Vs. Hobby - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98961
Case Number 349 U.S. 331
Appellant Peters
Respondent Hobby
peters v. hobby - 349 u.s. 331 (1955) u.s. supreme court peters v. hobby, 349 u.s. 331 (1955) peters v. hobby no. 376 argued april 19, 1955 decided june 6, 1955 349 u.s. 331 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the: district of columbia circuit syllabus during his employment as a special consultant in a federal agency, petitioner had been twice cleared by the agency's loyalty board. subsequently, acting solely on its own motion, the civil service commission's loyalty review board (established under executive order 9835) determined that there was a reasonable doubt as to petitioner's loyalty, and notified him that he was barred from federal service for a period of three years. thereafter, petitioner.....
Peters v. Hobby - 349 U.S. 331 (1955)
U.S. Supreme Court Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)
1. This case can be decided without reaching certain constitutional issues raised by petitioner, stemming chiefly from the denial to petitioner of any opportunity to confront and cross-examine his secret accusers. Pp. 349 U. S. 337 -338.
2. The Loyalty Review Board's action was invalid as beyond the Board's jurisdiction under Executive Order 9835, and was an unwarranted assumption of power. Pp. 349 U. S. 338 -348.
(a) Under the provisions of the Executive Order, the Loyalty Review Board's jurisdiction to review individual cases was limited to appeals from rulings adverse to employees which were referred to the Board by the employees or their departments or agencies. The Board had no authority to review rulings favorable to employees or to adjudicate individual cases on its own motion. Pp. 349 U. S. 339 -340, 349 U. S. 342 -344.
(b) Regulation 14 of the Loyalty Review Board, to the extent that it purports to authorize the Board to adjudicate individual cases on its own motion and despite a favorable determination below, is invalid as inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order 9835. Pp. 349 U. S. 340 -345.
(c) While loyalty proceedings may not involve the imposition of criminal sanctions, the limitation on the Board's review power to adverse determinations was in keeping with the deeply rooted principle of criminal law that a verdict of guilty is appealable, while a verdict of acquittal is not. Pp. 349 U. S. 344 -345.
(d) The President's failure to express disapproval of Regulation 14 cannot be deemed to constitute acquiescence in it. Pp. 349 U. S. 345 -347.
(e) The order of debarment, moreover, did not comply with Civil Service Rule V, § 5.101(a), which bars an employee from "the competitive service" within three years after "a final determination" that he is disqualified for federal employment on loyalty grounds, because (i) the order was not limited to the "competitive service," but extended to all federal employment, and (ii) it purported to become effective before the employing agency had made any "final determination." Pp. 349 U. S. 347 -348.
3. Petitioner is entitled to a declaratory judgment that his removal and debarment were invalid and to an order directing the respondent members of the Civil Service Commission to expunge from its records (a) the Loyalty Review Board's finding that there is a reasonable doubt as to petitioner's loyalty, and (b) any ruling that petitioner is barred from federal employment by reason of that finding. Pp. 349 U. S. 348 -349.
4. Since it appears that the term of petitioner's appointment would have expired on December 31, 1953, wholly apart from his removal on loyalty grounds, his prayer for reinstatement cannot be granted. P. 349 U. S. 349 .
On March 21, 1947, Executive Order 9835 was issued by the President. [ Footnote 1 ] It provided that the head of each department and agency in the Executive Branch of the Government
The order also provided for the establishment of a central Loyalty Review Board in the Civil Service Commission. The Board, in addition to various supervisory functions, was authorized "to review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal . . . by the loyalty board of any department or agency. . . ." The standard for removal prescribed by the Order was whether, "on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States." This standard was amended on April 28, 1951. [ Footnote 2 ] As amended, the standard to be applied was whether, "on all the evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States."
Thereafter, on April 6, 1953, petitioner was advised by the Loyalty Review Board that it had determined to conduct a "post-audit" of the Agency Board's determination and, to this end, "hold a hearing and reach its own decision." [ Footnote 3 ] The hearing was held on May 12, 1953, in New Haven, before a panel of the Board consisting of respondents Hessey, Amen, and King. Once again, as at the previous hearing, the only evidence adduced was presented by petitioner. In his own testimony, petitioner denied membership in the Communist Party, discussed his political beliefs and his motives for engaging in the activities and associations which were the subject of the charges, and answered all questions put to him by the Board. In support of petitioner's testimony, five witnesses stated their long acquaintance with petitioner and their firm conviction of petitioner's loyalty. [ Footnote 4 ] In addition to this evidence, the record before the Board contained information supplied by informants whose identity was not disclosed to petitioner. The identity of one or more, but not all, of these informants was known to the Board. The information given by such informants had not been given under oath. The record also contained the evidence adduced by petitioner at the previous hearing. On this record, the Board determined that "on all the
By letter of May 22, 1953, the Chairman of the Board advised petitioner of the Board's finding. The letter further stated that respondent Hobby had been notified of the decision, and that petitioner had "been barred from the Federal service for a period of three years from May 18, 1953, and any and all pending applications or existing eligibilities are cancelled." The order of debarment was made by the Board on behalf of the Civil Service Commission, composed of respondents Young, Moore, and Lawton. [ Footnote 5 ] Following his removal and after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a rehearing, petitioner brought the instant suit, naming each of the respondents as a defendant.
In this Court, petitioner urges us to decide the case on the constitutional issues. These issues, if reached by the Court, would obviously present serious and far-reaching problems in reconciling fundamental constitutional guarantees with the procedures used to determine the loyalty of government personnel. Compare Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 ; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 . And note this Court's division in Bailey v. Richardson, supra. We find, however, that the case can be decided without reaching the constitutional issues.
From a very early date, this Court has declined to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 36 U. S. 553 . See Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129 , 329 U. S. 136 . Applying this rule to the instant case, we must at the outset determine whether petitioner's removal and debarment were effected in accord with Executive Order 9835. On consideration of this question, we conclude that the Loyalty Review Board's action was so patently in violation of the Executive Order -- in fact, beyond the Board's delegated jurisdiction under the Order -- that the constitutionality of the Order itself does not come into issue. [ Footnote 6 ]
Acting under subsection (b), the Board promulgated detailed regulations, effective December 14, 1947, elaborating its powers under the Order. [ Footnote 7 ] The regulations
distinguished between two types of proceedings in individual cases. The first dealt with appeals from adverse decisions. [ Footnote 8 ] The second, described in Regulation 14, claimed for the Board a very different function. [ Footnote 9 ] As amended on January 22, 1952, Regulation 14 provided: [ Footnote 10 ]
" Post-audit and review of files. (a) The Board, or an executive committee of the Board, shall, as deemed necessary from time to time, cause post-audits to be made of the files on loyalty cases decided by the employing department or agency, or by a regional loyalty board."
to the Board by the employee or his department or agency, the regulation asserted authority in the Board to adjudicate individual cases on its own motion. To this extent, the regulation must fall. See, e.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U. S. 607 , 322 U. S. 616 -618, and Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284 , 347 U. S. 296 -297.
"to inquire into the standards, procedures, and organizational provisions for (a) the investigation of persons who are employed by the United States Government or are applicants for such employment, and (b) the removal or disqualification from employment of any disloyal or subversive person. [ Footnote 11 ]"
In conducting its investigation, the Commission sought suggestions from 50 selected government agencies. The replies revealed general agreement "that the employing agency be responsible for the removal of its own employees." [ Footnote 12 ] But a substantial number of the replies indicated: [ Footnote 13 ]
Of these three proposals, the first was flatly rejected by the Commission, which instead urged the establishment of a centralized agency combining elements of the second and third. The Commission thought it "imperative that the head of each department or agency be solely responsible for his own loyalty program." [ Footnote 14 ] On the other hand, "so that the loyalty procedures operative in each of the departments and agencies may be properly coordinated . . . ," the Commission recognized "that a central review board should be created with definite advisory responsibilities in connection with the loyalty program." [ Footnote 15 ] These "advisory responsibilities" were envisaged as "similar to those of a clearing house." [ Footnote 16 ] But, in addition, the board was to be authorized to review decisions adverse to employees, when referred to the Board by the employee or the employing agency. [ Footnote 17 ] Nowhere in the report was it even remotely suggested that the board was to have general jurisdiction to adjudicate individual cases; on the contrary, as already noted, the Commission expressly disapproved such a proposal. The Commission's recommendations, with only slight changes in language, were adopted in the provisions of the Order designating the functions of the Loyalty Review Board. [ Footnote 18 ]
verdict of guilty is appealable, while a verdict of acquittal is not. [ Footnote 19 ] This safeguard was one of the few, and perhaps one of the most important, afforded an accused employee under the Order. Its effect was to leave the initial determination of his loyalty to his co-workers in the department -- to his peers, as it were -- who knew most about his character and his actions and his duties. He was thus assured that his fate would not be decided by political appointees who perhaps might be more vulnerable to the pressures of heated public opinion. To sanction the abrogation of this safeguard through Regulation 14, in the face of the Order's language and the Commission's report, would be to sanction administrative lawlessness. Agencies, whether created by statute or Executive Order, must, of course, be free to give reasonable scope to the terms conferring their authority. But they are not free to ignore plain limitations on that authority. Compare United States v. Wickersham, 201 U. S. 390 , 201 U. S. 398 .
practice prior to April 27, 1953, three weeks after the Board had notified petitioner of its intention to "hold a hearing and reach its own decision." And knowledge of the practice can hardly be imputed to him in view of the relatively small number of cases -- only 20 -- in which the Board reversed favorable determinations over its 6-year life. [ Footnote 20 ] On April 27, 1953, the President issued Executive Order 10450, revoking Executive Order 9835 and establishing a new loyalty program. [ Footnote 21 ] Executive Order 10450, by its own terms, did not take effect until 30 days later, on May 27, 1953. Although petitioner's case was heard and determined by the Loyalty Review Board during this 30-day period, and hence was not subject to Executive Order 10450, the Government contends that § 11 evidences knowledge and approval of Regulation 14. [ Footnote 22 ]
Section 11, however, did no more than recognize that cases under Regulation 14 might be pending on the effective date, and authorize their determination thereafter. And, even as to these cases, § 11 did not authorize the Board to recommend dismissal; at most, the Board could remand the cases to the departments or agencies for reconsideration. With respect to cases determined prior to the effective date -- such as petitioner's -- § 11 surely affords no basis for divining a Presidential intention to authorize the Board to disregard its previously defined jurisdictional boundaries. Particularly is this so where, as here, substantial rights affecting the lives and property of citizens are at stake. This Court has recognized that "a badge of infamy" attaches to a public employee found disloyal. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 , 344 U. S. 191 . The power asserted by the Board to impose such a badge on petitioner cannot be supported on so tenuous a theory as that pressed upon us.
" the competitive service within 3 years after a final determination that he is disqualified for Federal employment because of a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty. . . . [ Footnote 23 ]"
The Board's order of debarment, however, was not limited to "the competitive service," but extended to all federal employment. [ Footnote 24 ]
And, although such a "final determination" could be made only by the employing agency, the Board did not wait for respondent Hobby to act on its recommendation. Petitioner's debarment was made effective on May 18, 1953, four days before the Chairman of the Board wrote petitioner of the Board's determination and nearly four weeks before the Department took action to remove petitioner from his position. The Board's haste can be understood only in terms of its announced intention to deprive agencies of all discretion to determine whether the Board's recommendations should be accepted. [ Footnote 25 ]
The question of the Board's jurisdiction was, on request of the Court, argued and briefed. Compare Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129 , 329 U. S. 132 .
"The President expects that loyalty policies, procedures, and standards will be uniformly applied in the adjudication of loyalty cases by the several agencies, and the responsibility for coordinating the program and assuring uniformity has been placed in the Loyalty Review Board. The recommendations of the Civil Service Commission in cases of employees covered by section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 are mandatory, and the loyalty of persons not covered by section 14 should be judged by the same standards. Therefore, if uniformity is to be attained, it is necessary that the head of an agency follow the the recommendation of the Loyalty Review Board in all cases. "
I would prefer to decide this case on the constitutional questions discussed by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS or on some of the other constitutional questions necessarily involved. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 . See my dissents in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 , 341 U. S. 579 -581; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 , 339 U. S. 445 -453. See also my concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 , 341 U. S. 142 -149. I agree that it is generally better for this Court not to decide constitutional questions in cases which can be adequately disposed of on nonconstitutional grounds. See Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 36 U. S. 553 . But this generally accepted practice should not be treated as though it were an inflexible rule to be inexorably followed under all circumstances. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 , 343 U. S. 584 -585. Here, as in the Youngstown case, I think it would be better judicial practice to reach and decide the constitutional issues, although I agree with the Court that the Presidential Order can justifiably be construed
as denying the Loyalty Review Board the power exercised in this case. For this reason, I join the opinion of the Court. But I wish it distinctly understood that I have grave doubt as to whether the Presidential Order has been authorized by any Act of Congress. That order and others associated with it embody a broad, far-reaching espionage program over government employees. These orders look more like legislation to me than properly authorized regulations to carry out a clear and explicit command of Congress. I also doubt that the Congress could delegate power to do what the President has attempted to do in the Executive Order under consideration here. And, of course, the Constitution does not confer lawmaking power on the President. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 .
Confrontation and cross-examination under oath are essential if the American ideal of due process is to remain a vital force in our public life. We deal here with the reputation of men and their right to work -- things more precious than property itself. We have here a system where government with all its power and authority condemns a man to a suspect class and the outer darkness without the rudiments of a fair trial. The practice of using faceless informers has apparently spread through a vast domain. It is used not only to get rid of employees in the Government, but also employees who work for private firms having contracts with the Government. [ Footnote 2/1 ] It
has touched countless hundreds of men and women, and ruined many. It is an un-American practice which we should condemn. It deprives men of "liberty" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, for one of man's most precious liberties is his right to work. When a man is deprived of that "liberty" without a fair trial, he is denied due process. If he were condemned by Congress and made ineligible for government employment, he would suffer a bill of attainder, outlawed by the Constitution. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 . An administrative agency -- the creature of Congress -- certainly cannot exercise powers that Congress itself is barred from asserting. See the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 , 341 U. S. 144 -146. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
Executive Order No. 9835 was issued by the President on March 21, 1947. By this order, he established the Loyalty Review Board and granted to it certain rulemaking powers. Part III, § 1, subd. b, Exec. Order No. 9835. The Review Board's first promulgation of regulations pursuant to this power included the original of Regulation 14, which provided that the Board had the right "on its own motion" to review the decisions of the department or agency loyalty boards "even though no appeal has been taken." 13 Fed.Reg. 255 (adopted December 17, 1947). Thus, from the very outset, the procedure followed by the Review Board in reviewing these cases was part of the loyalty program. Furthermore, from 1948 through 1952, in each of the Annual Reports of the Civil Service Commission, the results of the Review Board's post-audit actions under Regulation 14 were unmistakably recorded. [ Footnote 3/1 ] These reports were submitted to the President pursuant to statutory requirement. [ Footnote 3/2 ] In addition to stating annual data on general post-audit reviews (more than 5,000 in 1952), the reports clearly indicated that the Board was rehearing cases on its own motion, such as the present,
where the decision of the agency loyalty board had been favorable to the employee. [ Footnote 3/3 ] The Court places emphasis on the number of cases so handled, but this hardly seems relevant in view of the fact that the reports indisputably conveyed to any reader the fact of what the Board was doing, whether in one case or 100.
correctly interpreted the Presidential intention conveyed by Executive Order 9835. Such reasonable interpretation, promptly adopted and long continued by the President and the Board, should be respected by the courts. That has been judicial practice heretofore. [ Footnote 3/4 ]
Nor does comparison of Regulation 14 with the Order show, in my opinion, that the Regulation is "inconsistent with" any of the provisions of the Order. Rather, the power of the Review Board to review under Regulation 14 appears to be supplemental to the other procedures which the Order itself prescribes. Therefore, Regulation 14 constituted merely an implementation of the Order which the Review Board is specifically authorized to make under Part III, § 1, subd. b, set out in the Court's opinion, p. 349 U. S. 340 . Neither of the parties has contended otherwise before this Court. They also agree that the Board's action was valid.
Undoubtedly the President had knowledge and approved of the Regulation. This is shown by his specific recognition of such cases in his own 1953 Order. [ Footnote 3/5 ] That Order, while not controlling Dr. Peters' case directly, since it did not become effective until after the Review Board had heard his case, recognized that the Review Board had been and could review decisions which had been favorable to an employee. This action by the President amounts to approval of the practice of the Review Board under Regulation 14. I am therefore compelled to conclude that the action of the Review Board in rendering its advisory recommendation in this case was not invalid.
I agree that the Review Board's letter of May 22, 1953, may have been erroneous. Under Civil Service Rule V, § 5.101(a), [ Footnote 3/6 ] federal employees found disqualified for federal employment because of a reasonable doubt as to their loyalty are barred from the federal competitive service for three years. This "final determination" as to loyalty is and can be made only by the head of a department or agency on recommendation of a loyalty board. [ Footnote 3/7 ]
When the head of a department acts on the Review Board's recommendation, § 5.101(a) becomes effective. The Review Board, acting as an agency of the Civil Service Commission, then notifies the employee of his disqualification. Assuming that the Review Board was not notified of any "final determination" prior to the letter of May 22, it was sent erroneously. However, it amounted to no more than a nullity, and Dr. Peters lost nothing. It is undisputed that, on June 12, 1953, the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, a subordinate of Secretary Hobby, "notified plaintiff of his separation from his position as Special Consultant." [ Footnote 3/8 ] This was the notification which effectively separated him from government service, and which is the basis for his complaint for wrongful discharge.
Cf. United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534 , 310 U. S. 549 ; Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410 , 325 U. S. 413 -414; Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380 ; Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 , 288 U. S. 313 , 288 U. S. 315 ; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 , 305 U. S. 83 .