Source: http://hi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190115_0000027.HI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-11-12 19:10:11
Document Index: 801341197

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 701', '§ 701', '§ 291', '§ 291', '§ 701', '§ 291', '§ 291', '§ 701', '§ 701', '§ 291', '§ 291', '§ 701', '§ 291', '§ 701', '§ 291', '§ 701', '§ 701', '§ 701']

FindACase™ | State v. Kalua
MANAIAKALANI N.K. KALUA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-12-000057 8; 3DTC-11-04 02 82)
John M. Tonaki Jon N. Ikenaga for Petitioner
Mitchell D. Roth E. Britt Bailey for Respondent
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee Manaiakalani N.K. Kalua (Kalua) was concurrently cited for speeding and excessive speeding offenses while driving through two separate speed zones. This case addresses the issue whether the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) erred in holding that the entry of judgment on Kalua's noncriminal speeding infraction failed to bar the Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai'i (State) from prosecuting him for the crime of excessive speeding. Kalua contends that his prosecution for excessive speeding is barred by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 701-109 (1)[1] and (2)[2] (2007) and by the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Hawai'i Constitutions.[3] We hold that double jeopardy is inapplicable to the civil offense of speeding under its current statutory framework. We also hold Kalua is subject to prosecution for both excessive speeding and speeding; however, if on remand the District Court of the Third Circuit (district court) finds at trial that the excessive speeding charge arises from the same conduct as the speeding infraction, the "lesser included offense" provision of HRS § 701-109(1)(a) will preclude his conviction for excessive speeding. We thus affirm the ICA's judgment vacating the district court's dismissal of the excessive speeding offense, but for the reasons stated herein, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
On September 14, 2011, Kalua was cited for speeding, in violation of HRS § 291C-102, [4] and for excessive speeding, in violation of HRS § 291C-105.[5] On November 28, 2011, Kalua paid the $137 fine for the speeding infraction after a default judgment was entered against him in the district court. On January 5, 2012, in the district court, Kalua pled not guilty to the charge of excessive speeding. Kalua subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the excessive speeding charge pursuant to HRS § 701-109(2) .
At the April 19, 2012 hearing[6] on the motion to dismiss the excessive speeding charge, the parties agreed to stipulate to the following relevant facts: (1) the citing police officer, Thomas Koyanagi, used radar to measure Kalua's speed at a "steady speed of 73 miles per hour while entering a 45 miles per hour zone"; (2) Officer Koyanagi observed Kalua pass two 40 miles per hour signs; and (3) Officer Koyanagi subsequently stopped Kalua and cited him for driving 71 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone in violation of HRS § 291C-102(a)(1)[7] and for driving 73 miles per hour in a 40 miles per hour zone in violation of HRS § 291C-105(a) (1). Additionally, the parties agreed that "at no time was there a break in the occurrence from the time that . . . Officer Koyanagi saw [Kalua] to the time [Kalua] stopped and was cited. And he was issued both tickets upon that stop."
The district court granted Kalua's motion to dismiss the excessive speeding charge. The court determined that the speeding infraction was a lesser included offense of excessive speeding. Because Kalua had paid the fine for the speeding infraction, the court reasoned that prosecuting him for the excessive speeding charge would violate HRS § 701-109(1) (a), which prohibits the State from convicting a defendant "of more than one offense" if one offense "is included in the other." The court thus found that HRS § 701-109(1) (a) barred the State from prosecuting Kalua on the excessive speeding charge. The court further found that the double jeopardy clause barred the State from prosecuting Kalua on the excessive speeding charge.
In its opinion, the ICA vacated the district court's order granting Kalua's motion to dismiss and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. State v. Kalua, 136 Hawai'i 181, 189, 358 P.3d 750, 758 (App. 2015). The ICA held that the prior adjudication of Kalua's speeding infraction fails to bar the State from subsequently prosecuting Kalua for the crime of excessive speeding. Id. at 184-86, 358 P.3d at 753-55. In the ICA's view, HRS § 291D-3(d) (2007) "eliminates any bar to criminal prosecution that could otherwise arise from the separate adjudication of non-criminal traffic infractions[, ]" and "permit[s] prosecution of a criminal offense where the adjudicated traffic infraction is a lesser included traffic infraction of the charged crime." Id. at 186, 358 P.3d at 755. The ICA also concluded that double jeopardy did not bar subsequent prosecution for excessive speeding because double jeopardy only prohibits successive criminal prosecutions, and therefore did not apply to the prior civil adjudication for the speeding infraction. Id. at 187-89, 358 P.3d at 756-58.
"This court reviews questions of constitutional law de novo under the right/wrong standard and thus exercises its own independent judgment based on the facts of the case." State v. Curtis, 139 Hawai'i 486, 492, 394 P.3d 716, 722 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Statutory interpretation is "a question of law reviewable de novo." State v. Levi, 102 Hawai'i 282, 285, 75 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Statutory construction is guided by established rules:
State v, Bayly, 118 Hawai'i 1, 6, 185 P.3d 186, 191 (2008) (citation omitted).
"A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard." State v. Adler, 108 Hawai'i 169, 174, 118 P.3d 652, 657 (2005) (citation omitted).
We begin by examining the double jeopardy doctrine and conclude it is not applicable. We then consider the State's arguments that HRS § 291D-3(d) precludes traffic offenses from the prohibitions contained in HRS § 701-109 regarding separate prosecutions and multiple convictions. We hold that HRS § 291D- 3(d) precludes the compulsory joinder requirement contained in HRS § 701-109(2) in the context of traffic infractions. Accordingly, Kalua can be prosecuted separately for speeding and excessive speeding. However, we also conclude that HRS § 291D- 3(d) does not preclude applicability of HRS § 701-109 regarding lesser included offenses.[8] Thus, Kalua cannot be convicted of speeding and excessive speeding if both offenses involve the same conduct pursuant to HRS § 701-109(1), as speeding is a lesser included offense of excessive speeding pursuant to HRS §§ 701-109(1) (a) and 701-109 (4) .
"Double jeopardy protects individuals against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Higa, 79 Hawai&#39;i 1, 5, 897 P.2d 928, 932 (1995). Kalua argues that the double jeopardy clauses of the U.S. and Hawai&#39;i Constitutions bar the State from prosecuting the excessive speeding charge. The ICA rejected Kalua&#39;s argument by concluding that because the double jeopardy clause only bars successive criminal prosecutions and multiple criminal punishments, the prior adjudication of Kalua's noncriminal speeding ...