Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/596/928/447152/
Timestamp: 2019-07-17 04:21:42
Document Index: 577649111

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1202', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 1202']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Quay C. Kilburn, Defendant-appellant, 596 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1979 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Quay C. Kilburn, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Quay C. Kilburn, Defendant-appellant, 596 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 596 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1979)
Argued Nov. 13, 1978. Decided Dec. 13, 1978. Rehearing Denied Feb 12, 1979. Certiorari Denied March 19, 1979. See 99 S. Ct. 1517
Counsel for Kilburn and the Government stipulated at trial that the rifle was received at the Thrifty Drug Store in Magna, Utah from California on April 8, 1975. At the close of the Government's case, Kilburn moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the transaction whereby Kilburn acquired the rifle was intrastate as opposed to interstate in nature and, therefore, he could not be guilty under the indictment as charged. Kilburn did not dispute the fact that the gun had been shipped from California to Utah on April 8, 1975. However, he argued that Montoya's purchase and resale of the rifle removed it from interstate commerce and that the subsequent sale to Kilburn was an intrastate transaction. The trial court, relying on Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 96 S. Ct. 498, 46 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976), rejected Kilburn's argument and denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. No evidence was presented by Kilburn at trial.
The construction and validity of § 2(f) of the 1938 Act was put in issue in Tot v. U. S., 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 1519 (1943). Tot dealt primarily with the constitutionality of the presumption contained in the second clause of § 2(f) which provided that possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person convicted of a crime of violence or a fugitive from justice was evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received in violation of the Act. The court upheld the Government's position and the ruling of the appellate court in Tot, supra, that intrastate transactions were excluded from the Act:
319 U.S., at p. 466, 63 S. Ct. at p. 1244.
In United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971) the Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether or not receipt or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charged under § 1202(a) must be connected with interstate commerce. The indictment against Bass failed to allege and there was no evidence to show that the firearms involved had been possessed in interstate commerce or that they affected such commerce. The Government contended that the statutes did not require proof of a connection with interstate commerce in individual cases involving possession or receipt of firearms. In essence, the Bass court held that there existed an ambiguity in the statute. The court then resolved the issue in favor of the narrow reading that a nexus with interstate commerce must be shown with respect to all three offenses contemplated by the statute. The court observed that the pertinent subsections of Titles IV (of which § 922(h) is a part) and VII addressed their prohibitions to some of the same people, but that they also reach substantial groups of people not involved by the other. Title VII encompasses "convicted felons." Title IV reaches persons "under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." The Court noted that Titles VII and IV were, in part, redundant, but observed that: ". . . no conclusion can be drawn from Title IV concerning the correct interpretation of Title VII." 404 U.S. at 344, 92 S. Ct. at 521. The court further stated that: ". . . the reach of Title IV itself is a question to be decided finally some other day." 404 U.S. at 343 n. 10, 92 S. Ct. at 520.
The decision in Ruffin concerning the requisite interstate nexus of § 922(h) set the stage for Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 96 S. Ct. 498, 46 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1975):
423 U.S., at p. 215, 96 S. Ct. at p. 500.
The issue before the court in Barrett was ". . . whether § 922(h) has application to a purchaser's intrastate acquisition of a firearm that previously, but independently of the purchaser's receipt, had been transferred in interstate commerce from the manufacturer to the distributor and then from the distributor to the dealer." Id. 423 U.S. at p. 213, 96 S. Ct. at p. 499.
The issue in the case at bar is identical to that in Barrett, notwithstanding that here we have an intervening intrastate purchase of the rifle by Montoya. As in Barrett Kilburn argues that § 922(h) was not intended to, and does not reach an isolated intrastate receipt of a firearm. This was rejected by the Barrett court when it observed ". . . the language of § 922(h), the structure of the Act of which § 922(h) is a part, and the manifest purpose of Congress are all adverse to petitioner's position." Id. at p. 216, 96 S. Ct. at p. 501. The court held that the language "to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce" is without ambiguity: "It is directed unrestrictedly at the felon's receipt of any firearm that 'has been' shipped in interstate commerce. It contains no limitation to a receipt which itself is part of the interstate movement." Id. The court noted that while the language "to receive any firearm" is in the present tense, the interstate commerce reference "has been shipped" is couched in the present perfect tense, denoting a completed act. Accordingly, the court stated "there is no warping or stretching of language when the statute is applied to a firearm that already has completed its interstate journey and has come to rest in the dealer's showcase at the time of its purchase and receipt by the felon." Id. at p. 217, 96 S. Ct. at p. 501.
423 U.S. at p. 219, 96 S. Ct. at p. 502.
Kilburn contends that the trial court took the issue of knowledge away from the jury by failing to include in its instructions a reference to the elements of knowledge as set out in the indictment. The indictment does charge that Quay C. Kilburn Knowingly did receive a firearm. However, "knowledge" is neither an element of the crime, nor a matter which the prosecution is required to prove in establishing a violation under § 922(h). Haddad, supra. In a case involving a firearms violation charge under § 1202(a) (1) of Title VII, this Court observed: "The addition of an issue by careless drafting cannot give the defendant a windfall. The terms 'knowingly' and 'unlawfully,' introduced an element which the statute does not require the prosecution to prove and thus is clearly surplusage." United States v. Henry, 504 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1974).
It is not apparent from the transcript of trial whether Kilburn was redeeming from the pawnbroker a rifle which had previously been pawned by him or whether it was an original purchase out of the pawn dealer's stock of weapons. In any event, the redemption of a firearm from a pawnshop would be a transaction contemplated under the statute. See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 94 S. Ct. 1262, 39 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1974)