Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/217/82/494941/
Timestamp: 2018-12-18 14:14:02
Document Index: 565565470

Matched Legal Cases: ['§42', '§2', '§ 42', '§42', '§42', '§42']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., Defendant-appellant, 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 2000 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., Defendant-appellant, 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000)
Submitted: May 7, 1999)Decided: June 30, 2000
It seems reasonably clear from a reading of the text that the word "knowingly" in this sentence refers to all three of the phrases that follow: " [1] caus [ing] or permit [ting] any wild animalor bird to be transported [2] to the United States... [3] under inhumane or unhealthful conditions."
If a simple review of the language of §42(c) does not establish that "knowingly" refers to "inhumane or unhealthful," however, the legal principle that criminal statutes are presumed to contain a mens rea requirement does. In interpreting criminal laws, we are required to assume that Congress "legislate [d] against the background of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical factor." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978). As Justice Jackson, writing for the Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), observed:
Id. at 250. "' [T]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence.'" Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 436 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 506 (1951)). " [S]ince Morissette it has become clear that knowledge may suffice for criminal culpability if 'extensive enough to attribute to the knower a "guilty mind," or knowledge that he or she is performing a wrongful act.'" United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 723 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115-16); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (stating as the default rule that "a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense").
In applying the presumption that a mens rea is required, our recent decision in Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, is highly instructive. There we interpreted a statute that set forth increased criminal penalties for " [a]ny person who knowingly aids or assists any alien excludable under Section 1182(a) (2) . . . (insofar as an alien excludable under such section has been convicted of an aggravated felony) . . . to enter the United States." See id. at 112. We observed that "knowingly" could not apply only to the phrase "aids or assists any alien to... enter the United States" because there is nothing wrong with aiding or assisting someone to enter the United States. Knowingly to do so would not evidence knowledge of wrongdoing sufficient to support the finding of mens rea ordinarily necessary to impose criminal responsibility on a defendant.
To apply these principles, we return to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 42(c): " [I]t shall be unlawful for any person, including any importer, knowingly to cause or permit any wild animalor bird to be transported to the United States... under inhumane or unhealthful conditions...." For much the same reasons that a simple review of the language of §42(c) indicates that "knowingly" applies to "inhumane or unhealthful," the mens rea presumption compels the interpretation. "In many, if not most, circumstances, it is perfectly innocent," Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 116, for a person knowingly to cause or permit the transportation of a wild animal or bird to the United States. We can safely assume that not only animal importers, but circuses, pet stores, pet purchasers, and others regularly, knowingly, and innocently cause or permit wild animals, from elephants to parrots to parrot fish, to be transported to the United States. As we could find no mens rea in Figueroa for someone to aid persons in entering the United States, we can find none here for someone to "cause or permit [a] wild animalor bird to be transported to the United States." We therefore hold that to apply the "knowingly" requirement only to "caus [ing] or permit [ting] any wild animalor bird to be transported to the United States" would be to go below the "floor to the knowledge requirement" that we identified in Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 116.
" [P]ublic welfare offenses have been created by Congress, and recognized" by courts "in limited circumstances." Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Supreme Court has explicitly declined to define this category of offenses precisely, see id. at 619-20 (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260), it has noted that cases recognizing such offenses " [t]ypically ... involve statutes that regulate potentially harmful or injurious items," id. at 607; see, e.g., Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 (Narcotic Act of 1914); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (National Firearms Act). "In such situations, [the Court has] reasoned that as long as a defendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a character that places him 'in responsible relation to a public danger,' he should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation, and [it may be] assumed that Congress intended to place the burden on the defendant to 'ascertain at his peril whether [his or her conduct] comes within the inhibition of the statute.'" Staples, 511 U.S. at 620 (citations omitted); cf. Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 116-17 ("These Supreme Court cases stand for the proposition that absent congressional intent to the contrary, statutes defining public welfare offenses should be read to require only so much knowledge as is necessary to provide defendants with reasonable notification that their actions are subject to strict regulation.").
In support of its claim that a violation of §42(c) is a "public welfare offense," the government relies on our recent decision in Figueroa. In that case, discussed in section I above, we held that the defendant's knowledge of the specific legal basis for an alien's exclusion is unnecessary for conviction of a person aiding an excludable alien to enter the United States -- but only "because knowledge that an alien is excludable should put any reasonable person on notice that it would be illegal to aid that person's entry into the country." Id. at 118.6 In the case at bar, such notice of illegality is precisely what is missing. Frogs are not "potentially harmful or injurious items," Staples, 511 U.S. at 607, and there is in our view nothing about transporting them that would "place [] [a defendant] in responsible relation to a public danger,... alert [ing it] to the probability of strict regulation." 511 U.S. at 607 (internal quotation marks omitted). We thus decline to recognize a violation of §42(c) as a "public welfare offense."
Cf. Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 112, 118 (statute providing increased criminal penalties for " [a]ny person who knowingly aids or assists any alien excludable under Section 1182(a) (2) . . . (insofar as an alien excludable under such section has been convicted of an aggravated felony) . . . to enter the United States," applies if the defendant "knowingly aids or assists any . . . excludable alien . . . to enter the United States" irrespective of whether the defendant knows that the alien "is excludable under Section 1182(a) (2)" or "excludable [because of having] been convicted of an aggravated felony").