Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/09-475/
Timestamp: 2013-12-06 01:57:04
Document Index: 512630421

Matched Legal Cases: ['§7711', '§4332', '§7701', '§7711', '§2', '§340', '§340', '§7711', '§340', '§340', '§4332', '§1508', '§1506', '§1506', '§1531']

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[HTML] [PDF] MONSANTO CO. et al.
. GEERTSON SEED FARMS et al.
No. 09475.Argued April 27, 2010Decided June 21, 2010
The Plant Protection Act (PPA) provides that the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture may issue regulations to prevent the introduction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United States. 7 U. S. C. §7711(a). Pursuant to that grant of authority, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) promulgated regulations that presume genetically engineered plants to be plant pestsand thus regulated articles under the PPAuntil APHIS determines otherwise. However, any person may petition APHIS for a determination that a regulated article does not present a plant pest risk and therefore should not be subject to the applicable regulations. APHIS may grant such a petition in whole or in part. In determining whether to grant nonregulated status to a genetically engineered plant variety, APHIS must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which requires federal agencies to the fullest extent possible to prepare a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) for every … major Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C). The agency need not complete an EIS if it finds, based on a shorter statement known as an environmental assessment (EA), that the proposed action will not have a significant environmental impact. This case involves a challenge to APHISs decision to approve the unconditional deregulation of Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a variety of alfalfa that has been genetically engineered to tolerate the herbicide Roundup. Petitioners are the owner and the licensee of the intellectual property rights to RRA. In response to petitioners deregulation request, APHIS prepared a draft EA and solicited public comments on its proposed course of action. Based on its EA and the comments submitted, the agency determined that the introduction of RRA would not have any significant adverse impact on the environment. Accordingly, APHIS decided to deregulate RRA unconditionally and without preparing an EIS. Respondents, conventional alfalfa growers and environmental groups, filed this action challenging that decision on the ground that it violated NEPA and other federal laws. The District Court held, inter alia,
that APHIS violated NEPA when it deregulated RRA without first completing a detailed EIS. To remedy that violation, the court vacated the agencys decision completely deregulating RRA; enjoined APHIS from deregulating RRA, in whole or in part, pending completion of the EIS; and entered a nationwide permanent injunction prohibiting almost all future planting of RRA during the pendency of the EIS process. Petitioners and the Government appealed, challenging the scope of the relief granted but not disputing that APHISs deregulation decision violated NEPA. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding, among other things, that the District Court had not abused its discretion in rejecting APHISs proposed mitigation measures in favor of a broader injunction. Held: 1. Respondents have standing to seek injunctive relief, and petitioners have standing to seek this Courts review of the Ninth Circuits judgment affirming the entry of such relief. Pp. 714.
(a) Petitioners have constitutional standing to seek review here. Article III standing requires an injury that is (i) concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, (ii) fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (iii) redressable by a favorable ruling. See Horne v. Flores
, 557 U. S. ___, ___. Petitioners satisfy all three criteria. Petitioners are injured by their inability to sell or license RRA to prospective customers until APHIS completes the EIS. Because that injury is caused by the very remedial order that petitioners challenge on appeal, it would be redressed by a favorable ruling from this Court. Respondents nevertheless contend that petitioners lack standing because their complained-of injury is independently caused by a part of the District Courts order that petitioners failed to challenge, the vacatur of APHISs deregulation decision. That argument fails for two independent reasons. First, one of the main disputes between the parties throughout this litigation has been whether the District Court should have adopted APHISs proposed judgment, which would have replaced the vacated deregulation decision with an order expressly authorizing the continued sale and planting of RRA. Accordingly, if the District Court had adopted APHISs proposed judgment, there would still be authority for the continued sale of RRA notwithstanding the District Courts vacatur, because there would, in effect, be a new deregulation decision. Second, petitioners in any case have standing to challenge the part of the District Courts order enjoining a partial deregulation. Respondents focus their argument on the part of the judgment that enjoins planting, but the judgment also states that before granting the deregulation petition, even in part, the agency must prepare an EIS. That part of the judgment inflicts an injury not also caused by the vacatur. Pp. 711. (b) Respondents have constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief from the complete deregulation order at issue here. The Court disagrees with petitioners argument that respondents have failed to show that any of them is likely to suffer a constitutionally cognizable injury absent injunctive relief. The District Court found that respondent farmers had established a reasonable probability that their conventional alfalfa crops would be infected with the engineered Roundup Ready gene if RRA were completely deregulated. A substantial risk of such gene flow injures respondents in several ways that are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the constitutional standing analysis. Moreover, those harms are readily attributable to APHISs deregulation decision, which gives rise to a significant risk of gene flow to non-genetically-engineered alfalfa varieties. Finally, a judicial order prohibiting the planting or deregulation of all or some genetically engineered alfalfa would redress respondents injuries by eliminating or minimizing the risk of gene flow to their crops. Pp. 1114.
2. The District Court abused its discretion in enjoining APHIS from effecting a partial deregulation and in prohibiting the planting of RRA pending the agencys completion of its detailed environmental review. Pp. 1422.
(a) Because petitioners and the Government do not argue otherwise, the Court assumes without deciding that the District Court acted lawfully in vacating the agencys decision to completely deregulate RRA. The Court therefore addresses only the injunction prohibiting APHIS from deregulating RRA pending completion of the EIS, and the nationwide injunction prohibiting almost all RRA planting during the pendency of the EIS process. P. 14. (b) Before a court may grant a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy a four-factor test, demonstrating: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay Inc.
, 547 U. S. 388. This test fully applies in NEPA cases. See Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. ___, ___. Thus, the existence of a NEPA violation does not create a presumption that injunctive relief is available and should be granted absent unusual circumstances. Pp. 1516. (c) None of the four factors supports the District Courts order enjoining APHIS from partially deregulating RRA during the pendency of the EIS process. Most importantly, respondents cannot show that they will suffer irreparable injury if APHIS is allowed to proceed with any partial deregulation, for at least two reasons. First, if and when APHIS pursues a partial deregulation that arguably runs afoul of NEPA, respondents may file a new suit challenging such action and seeking appropriate preliminary relief. Accordingly, a permanent injunction is not now needed to guard against any present or imminent risk of likely irreparable harm. Second, a partial deregulation need not cause respondents any injury at all; if its scope is sufficiently limited, the risk of gene flow could be virtually nonexistent. Indeed, the broad injunction entered below essentially pre-empts the very procedure by which APHIS could determine, independently of the pending EIS process for assessing the effects of a complete
deregulation, that a limited
deregulation would not pose any appreciable risk of environmental harm. Pp. 1623. (d) The District Court also erred in entering the nationwide injunction against planting RRA, for two independent reasons. First, because it was inappropriate for the District Court to foreclose even the possibility of a partial and temporary deregulation, it follows that it was inappropriate to enjoin planting in accordance with such a deregulation decision. Second, an injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of course. See, e.g.
v. Romero-Barcelo
, 456 U. S. 305. If, as respondents now concede, a less drastic remedy (such as partial or complete vacatur of APHISs deregulation decision) was sufficient to redress their injury, no recourse to the additional and extraordinary relief of an injunction was warranted. Pp. 2324. (e) Given the District Courts errors, this Court need not address whether injunctive relief of some kind was available to respondents on the record below. Pp. 2425.
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
MONSANTO COMPANY, et al
GEERTSON SEED FARMS et al
This case arises out of a decision by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to deregulate a variety of genetically engineered alfalfa. The District Court held that APHIS violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83Stat.
, by issuing its deregulation decision without first completing a detailed assessment of the environmental consequences of its proposed course of action. To remedy that violation, the District Court vacated the agencys decision completely deregulating the alfalfa variety in question; ordered APHIS not to act on the deregulation petition in whole or in part until it had completed a detailed environmental review; and enjoined almost all future planting of the genetically engineered alfalfa pending the completion of that review. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Courts entry of permanent injunctive relief. The main issue now in dispute concerns the breadth of that relief. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The Plant Protection Act (PPA), 114Stat.
438, 7 U. S. C. §7701
, provides that the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (USDA) may issue regulations to prevent the introduction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United States. §7711(a). The Secretary has delegated that authority to APHIS, a division of the USDA. 7 CFR §§2.22(a), 2.80(a)(36) (2010). Acting pursuant to that delegation, APHIS has promulgated regulations governing the introduction of organisms and products altered or produced through genetic engineering that are plant pests or are believed to be plant pests. See §340.0(a)(2) and n. 1. Under those regulations, certain genetically engineered plants are presumed to be plant pestsand thus regulated articles under the PPAuntil APHIS determines otherwise. See ibid
§§340.1, 340.2, 340.6; see also App. 183. However, any person may petition APHIS for a determination that a regulated article does not present a plant pest risk and therefore should not be subject to the applicable regulations. 7 U. S. C. §7711(c)(2); 7 CFR §340.6. APHIS may grant such a petition in whole or in part
§340.6(d)(3).
In deciding whether to grant nonregulated status to a genetically engineered plant variety, APHIS must comply with NEPA, which requires federal agencies to the fullest extent possible to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C). The statutory text speaks solely in terms of proposed
actions; it does not require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions. Kleppe v. Sierra Club
, 427 U. S. 390, n. 20 (1976).
An agency need not complete an EIS for a particular proposal if it finds, on the basis of a shorter environmental assessment (EA), that the proposed action will not have a significant impact on the environment. 40 CFR §§1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2009). Even if a particular agency proposal requires an EIS, applicable regulations allow the agency to take at least some action in furtherance of that proposal while the EIS is being prepared. See §1506.1(a) (no action concerning the proposal shall be taken which would: (1) Have an adverse environmental impact; or (2) Limit the choice of reasonable alternatives); §1506.1(c) (While work on a required program environmental impact statement is in progress and the action is not covered by an existing program statement, agencies shall not undertake in the interim any major Federal action covered by the program which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment
unless such action satisfies certain requirements).
Approximately eight months after APHIS granted RRA nonregulated status, respondents (two conventional alfalfa seed farms and environmental groups concerned with food safety) filed this action against the Secretary of Agriculture and certain other officials in Federal District Court, challenging APHISs decision to completely deregulate RRA. Their complaint alleged violations of NEPA, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87Stat.
884, 16 U. S. C. §1531
, and the PPA. Respondents did not seek preliminary injunctive relief pending resolution of those claims. Hence, RRA enjoyed nonregulated status for approximately two years. During that period, more than 3,000 farmers in 48 States planted an estimated 220,000 acres of RRA. App. 350.
In resolving respondents NEPA claim, the District Court accepted APHISs determination that RRA does not have any harmful health effects on humans or livestock. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a; accord, id.
, at 45a. Nevertheless, the District Court held that APHIS violated NEPA by deregulating RRA without first preparing an EIS. In particular, the court found that APHISs EA failed to answer substantial questions concerning two broad consequences of its proposed action: first, the extent to which complete deregulation would lead to the transmission of the gene conferring glyphosate tolerance from RRA to organic and conventional alfalfa; and, second, the extent to which the introduction of RRA would contribute to the development of Roundup-resistant weeds. Id.,
at 52a. In light of its determination that the deregulation decision ran afoul of NEPA, the District Court dismissed without prejudice respondents claims under the ESA and PPA.
After these rulings, the District Court granted petitioners permission to intervene in the remedial phase of the lawsuit
The court then asked the parties to submit proposed judgments embodying their preferred means of remedying the NEPA violation. APHISs proposed judgment would have ordered the agency to prepare an EIS, vacated the agencys deregulation decision, and replaced that decision with the terms of the judgment itself. Id.,
at 184a (proposed judgment providing that [the federal] defendants [June 14,] 2005 Determination of Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate is hereby vacated and replaced by the terms of this judgment
 (emphasis added)). The terms of the proposed judgment, in turn, would have permitted the continued planting of RRA pending completion of the EIS, subject to six restrictions. Those restrictions included, among other things, mandatory isolation distances between RRA and non-genetically-engineered alfalfa fields in order to mitigate the risk of gene flow; mandatory harvesting conditions; a requirement that planting and harvesting equipment that had been in contact with RRA be cleaned prior to any use with conventional or organic alfalfa; identification and handling requirements for RRA seed; and a requirement that all RRA seed producers and hay growers be under contract with either Monsanto or FGI and that their contracts require compliance with the other limitations set out in the proposed judgment.
The District Court rejected APHISs proposed judgment. In its preliminary injunction, the District Court prohibited almost all future planting of RRA pending APHISs completion of the required EIS. But in order to minimize the harm to farmers who had relied on APHISs deregulation decision, the court expressly allowed those who had already purchased RRA to plant their seeds until March 30, 2007. Id.,
at 58a. In its subsequently entered permanent injunction and judgment, the court (1) vacated APHISs deregulation decision; (2) ordered APHIS to prepare an EIS before it made any decision on Monsantos deregulation petition; (3) enjoined the planting of any RRA in the United States after March 30, 2007, pending APHISs completion of the required EIS; and (4) imposed certain conditions (suggested by APHIS) on the handling and identification of already-planted RRA. Id.,
at 79a, 109a. The District Court denied petitioners request for an evidentiary hearing.
The Government, Monsanto, and FGI appealed, challenging the scope of the relief granted but not disputing the existence of a NEPA violation. See
, 570 F. 3d 1130, 1136 (2009). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Based on its review of the record, the panel first concluded that the District Court had recognized that an injunction does not automatically issue when a NEPA violation is found and had instead based its issuance of injunctive relief on the four-factor test traditionally used for that purpose. Id.
, at 1137. The panel held that the District Court had not committed clear error in making any of the subsidiary factual findings on which its assessment of the four relevant factors was based. And the panel rejected the claim that the District Court had not given sufficient deference to APHISs expertise concerning the likely effects of allowing continued planting of RRA on a limited basis. In the panels view, APHISs proposed interim measures would have perpetuated a system that had been found by the District Court to have caused environmental harm in the past. Id.
, at 1139. Hence, the panel concluded that the District Court had not abused its discretion in choosing to reject APHISs proposed mitigation measures in favor of a broader injunction to prevent more irreparable harm from occurring. Ibid.
The panel majority also rejected petitioners alternative argument that the District Court had erred in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing before entering its permanent injunction. Writing in dissent, Judge N. Randy Smith disagreed with that conclusion. In his view, the District Court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before issuing a permanent injunction unless the facts were undisputed or the adverse party expressly waived its right to such a hearing. Neither of those two exceptions, he found, applied here.
Standing under Article III of the Constitution requires that an injury be concre