Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/694/1240/117066/
Timestamp: 2020-07-08 09:18:25
Document Index: 390483652

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', 'art. 3', '§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292']

Robert M. Mckinney, Plaintiff-appellant, Cross-appellee, v. Gannett Co., Inc., and the New Mexican, Inc.,defendants-appellees, Cross-appellants, 694 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1982) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1982 › Robert M. Mckinney, Plaintiff-appellant, Cross-appellee, v. Gannett Co., Inc., and the New Mexican,...
Robert M. Mckinney, Plaintiff-appellant, Cross-appellee, v. Gannett Co., Inc., and the New Mexican, Inc.,defendants-appellees, Cross-appellants, 694 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1982)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 694 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1982) Dec. 9, 1982
MR. MARSHALL: I think that's correct Your Honor. [R., Vol. LV at pp. 102-103].
McKinney argued, citing to Irwin v. West End Development Company, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158, 94 S. Ct. 915, 39 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1974), that the proposed judgment was proper and final.
The jurisdiction of an appellate court may, of course, be assessed at any stage of the proceedings. In United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981) we stated:
28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1291 vests our appellate jurisdiction to all final decisions of the district courts except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. In acknowledging the limitations of Sec. 1291 in United States v. Feeney, 641 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1981) we stated:
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides for appeal only "from all final decisions of the district courts," except where direct appeal to the Supreme Court is provided. This requirement promotes judicial efficiency and "embodies a strong congressional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against obstructing or impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals." United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S. 683 at 690, 94 S. Ct. 3090 at 3098-3099, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039; United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S. Ct. 1547, 56 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1978)....
In Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 65 S. Ct. 631, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945) the Court defined a final decision to be:
A "final decision" generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28, 2 S. Ct. 6, 27 L. Ed. 638 (Emphasis supplied)
324 U.S. at p. 233, 65 S. Ct. at 633.
See also: Century Laminating, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 987, 100 S. Ct. 516, 62 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1979).
In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 1460, 64 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1980) the Court, citing to Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 76 S. Ct. 895, 100 L. Ed. 1297 (1956) defined a final judgment as:
446 U.S. at p. 7, 100 S. Ct. at 1464.
The rule requiring finality of a judgment or order as a prerequisite to appeal is dependent upon statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Any exceptions must be made by Congress, not by the courts, although to the courts falls the responsibility of deciding whether a judgment or order is final and therefore appealable. It is our duty to resolve that question. United States v. Grand Jury, 425 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1970); Levin v. Baum, 513 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1975).
See also: Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1981).
Judgments which, as here, merely determine liability are not final. In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 96 S. Ct. 1202, 47 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1976) the Court held:
The order, viewed apart from its discussion of Rule 54(b), constitutes a grant of partial summary judgment limited to the issue of petitioner's liability. Such judgments are by their terms interlocutory, see Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c), and where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never been considered to be "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
424 U.S. at p. 744, 96 S. Ct. at 1206.
When, only one "branch" of the case, liability, has been fully disposed of, a final judgment is lacking and "none of it [the case] is ripe for review." Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68 S. Ct. 972, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1212 (1948), at p. 72, citing Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 40 S. Ct. 347, 64 L. Ed. 616 (1920).
The necessity of strict adherence to the final judgment rule was well articulated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978):
Moreover, allowing appeals of right from nonfinal orders that turn on the facts of a particular case thrusts appellate courts indiscriminately into the trial process and thus defeats one vital purpose of the final-judgment rule--"that of maintaining the appropriate relationship between the respective courts.... This goal, in the absence of most compelling reasons to the contrary, is very much worth preserving." 437 U.S. at p. 476, 98 S. Ct. at 2462.
Applying these standards to the case at hand, we must hold that the "Final Judgment" of August 25, 1981, entered in favor of McKinney, was not final. McKinney's option to rescind, as delineated in the court's "Final Judgment" of August 25, 1981, did not "end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, supra. A jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by means of a rule 54(b) certification. A.O. Smith Corporation v. Sims Consolidated, Ltd., 647 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1981). Thus, we cannot review the merits at this time. To do so would vitiate a vital purpose of the final judgment rule, i.e., "that of maintaining the appropriate relationship between the respective courts." Coopers & Lybrand, supra.
Under the circumstances with which we are now confronted, were we to opt to address the allegations of error raised herein, we would surely be rendering an advisory opinion, which federal courts are not empowered to issue. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1073 (1978); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 65 S. Ct. 459, 89 L. Ed. 789 (1945); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617 (1937); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. State of Oklahoma, et al., 681 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1982). By the terms of the "Final Judgment" McKinney still has the option to rescind or not rescind. Thus, a final judgment has not been entered by the district court. An appellate opinion at this juncture would be advisory only. McKinney, we observe, did elect to rescind following the liability stage of the proceeding. Following the accounting and the trial court's determinations relative thereto, it was incumbent upon the trial court to enter a final judgment delineating the specific bases of its rescission remedies which would be final and conclusive, subject only to appellate review. This the trial court failed to do. Inasmuch as the trial court's judgment is dependent upon McKinney's right to elect, our review is of a hypothetical character. We cannot render advisory opinions. In Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Development Co., Inc., 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975), we stated:
It is fundamental that federal courts do not render advisory opinions and that they are limited to deciding issues in actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. 3, Sec. 1 et seq.; Barr v. Matteo, 355 U.S. 171, 78 S. Ct. 204, 2 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1957); Oklahoma City, Oklahoma v. Dulick, 318 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1963). A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical character or from one that is academic. The controversy must be one admitting to specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, subject to judicial review. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S. Ct. 956, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968). Judicial restraint should be exercised to avoid rendition of an advisory opinion. Detroit Edison Company v. East China Township School District No. 3, 378 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932, 88 S. Ct. 296, 19 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1967).
See also: Matter of King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1980).
The trial court's "Final Judgment" did, to be sure, adjudicate all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of all the parties, and, in that sense terminate the action. See Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Industries, Inc., 549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1977). However, this adjudication, involving the full array of rescission based accounting-performance remedies is the genesis of the appeal by each of the parties.
I concur in Judge Barrett's opinion. Irwin v. West End Development Company, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), is not pertinent. That case presented a contract created stock option. In the case at bar McKinney is judicially given the option to accept or reject an appellate decision determining the intricacies of technical accounting procedures involving his and Gannett's disputes over substantial sums. Speaking generally the issues, hotly contested on this appeal, relate to taxes, interest, and dividends.
The trial court gave McKinney 60 days after a final appellate decision to choose between rescission and contract performance. He should be required to make that choice before seeking appellate review. Otherwise the appellate decision will be nothing more than advice as to what his position will be under the two alternatives given to him. The grant of advice is not within the judicial function. District court action which permits such choice after appellate decision is not a final reviewable judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
As the majority notes, a judgment is final if it leaves nothing for the court to do except execute judgment and if it informs the losing party of the extent of the remedy afforded against him. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 633, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945); Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252, 254 (10th Cir. 1981).
" [I]f nothing more than a ministerial act remains to be done, such as the entry of a judgment on a mandate, the decree is regarded as final and is immediately reviewable."
Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68, 68 S. Ct. 972, 976, 92 L. Ed. 1212 (1948).
The trial court's order in this case is very similar to the order issued by the district court in Irwin v. West End Development Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158, 94 S. Ct. 915, 39 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1974). In Irwin, the plaintiffs sued to enforce a stock purchase option granted them in the articles of incorporation. The district court held that the defendant was obligated to offer the stock to the plaintiffs. The court's judgment gave the plaintiffs thirty days from the date the judgment became final to tender the money for the shares. The defendant appealed the decision and urged that the right to tender payment had expired because the thirty days had lapsed. This Court rejected the defendant's argument and held that the plaintiff had thirty days from the date the appellate judgment became final because the appeal had suspended the running of the thirty days. Id. at 39-40. In its disposition of Irwin, the Court did not focus on finality. This is not surprising, however, because the order was not significantly different from orders routinely entered in constructive trust cases and judgments granting optional relief to members of a class.
" [T]he trust so impressed being conditioned upon the tender by plaintiffs Irwin and Lease of $4,662.75 each, and by plaintiffs Crowley and McCaleb of $3,496.00 each, all tenders to be plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from September 9, 1965, to the date of tender. Such tender shall be made within thirty days from the date this judgment becomes final, and, if such tender be not made, the trust hereby impressed shall be released."Judgment and Decree 1-2, Irwin v. West End Development Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1972). It is clear then, that the plaintiffs had the option to purchase or to not purchase the shares. Here McKinney has the option to tender the shares, plus other items, or not to make the tender. In Irwin the option to tender was to expire thirty days after the appellate judgment became final; here, McKinney's option is to expire after sixty days.
A characterization of the judgment as final furthers the policies underlying the finality requirement. These policies are: (1) to avoid interference with trial proceedings, (2) to avoid cost and burden to litigants caused by piecemeal appeals, and (3) to promote efficient judicial administration. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374, 101 S. Ct. 669, 673, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1981). These policies militate in favor of characterizing the lower court's judgment as final. Entertaining the appeal will not interrupt the proceedings below. Refusing to take the appeal will not reduce litigant cost, but rather will likely increase it, particularly if McKinney seeks a 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) certification with respect to the availability of ancillary damages and the accounting questions that constitute its appeal before us.3 Taking the appeal now will save time and avoid complications; it will promote judicial efficiency.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that finality is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 171, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2149, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1974); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S. Ct. 308, 310, 13 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1964); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949). In view of the policies underlying the finality requirement, I think the instant order qualifies as a final judgment.
Because McKinney retains the option to forgo rescission, the majority concludes that a disposition by this Court on the merits would be tantamount to issuing an advisory opinion. I do not agree. The term "advisory opinion" is generally used to describe an action that is not constitutionally justiciable because the parties are not adverse or do not have a significant stake in the controversy, 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Secs. 3529-30 (1975), because the issues are not ripe for determination, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14, 92 S. Ct. 2318, 2325-2326, 33 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1972), or because the controversy has become moot, North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S. Ct. 402, 404, 30 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1971). Here the parties are clearly adverse to each other and have a significant stake in the controversy. The majority's conclusion that a disposition on the merits would constitute an advisory opinion seems to derive from a view that the legal issues are not yet ripe for review because McKinney is not irrevocably committed to rescission.4 However, the equivocal nature of the judgment below does not implicate ripeness concerns.
The determination whether an issue is ripe for review involves weighing "the appropriateness of the issues for decision by this Court and the actual hardship to the litigants of denying them the relief sought." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 1759, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989 (1961). Accord Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967). In private litigation, whether an issue is appropriate for decision turns on whether the factual background has been adequately developed and the legal issues sufficiently crystalized. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 78, 81 S. Ct. 1357, 1400, 6 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1961); 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3532, at 239-42 (1975). Here, the legal issues were fully developed and decided by the trial court; they have been briefed and argued in this Court on appeal. The trial record comprises 71 volumes. Furthermore, delaying review imposes considerable hardship upon the parties. Under Poe and Abbott Laboratories, this case is ripe for review.
If we hold that an opinion by us would be advisory because McKinney may choose to forgo rescission after we have ruled on the merits of the appeal, then by the same reasoning McKinney could not seek review of the questions before us under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); that determination likewise would be advisory. All section 1292(b) dispositions would suffer from the same infirmity--the disposition may cause one or both parties to abandon the litigation. I cannot accept the view that because litigants may abandon rights reduced to judgment the judgment is advisory.
Such a certification is likely to be sought because resolution of the questions now before us may vary the value of rescission by millions of dollars. Therefore, the logical step in the current posture of the case is for McKinney to seek an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to have us review the controlling questions of law raised in his appeal before making the final choice to drop his suit as an alternative to taking back the newspaper with whatever cash adjustments or damage entitlements we determine accompany rescission
If McKinney should opt to forgo rescission, arguably the opinion we render would have no impact on the rights of the parties, thus "mooting" the case. The possibility that rulings will become "moot" in this sense always exists, because the parties may settle the dispute after judgment. This possibility does not render the case moot in the jurisdictional sense. Cf. Robinson v. California, 371 U.S. 905, 83 S. Ct. 202, 9 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1962) (Supreme Court refused to vacate its decision reversing a criminal conviction despite learning that the defendant had died prior to the Court's disposition of his appeal)