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1 Vol. 76 Wednesday, No. 212 November 2, 2011 Part II Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 42 CFR Part 425 Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4717 Sfmt 4717 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2
2 67802 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 42 CFR Part 425 [CMS 1345 F] RIN 0938 AQ22 Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: This final rule implements section 3022 of the Affordable Care Act which contains provisions relating to Medicare payments to providers of services and suppliers participating in Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program. Under these provisions, providers of services and suppliers can continue to receive traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) payments under Parts A and B, and be eligible for additional payments if they meet specified quality and savings requirements. DATES: These regulations are effective on January 3, FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebecca Weiss, (410) , Facsimile: (410) , address: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents To assist readers in referencing sections contained in this preamble, we are providing a table of contents. I. Background A. Introduction and Overview of Value- Based Purchasing B. Statutory Basis for the Medicare Shared Savings Program C. Overview of the Medicare Shared Savings Program D. Public Comments Received on the Proposed Rule E. Reorganization of the Regulations Text II. Provisions of the Proposed Rule, Summary of and Responses to Public Comments, and Provisions of the Final Rule A. Definitions B. Eligibility and Governance 1. General Requirements a. Accountability for Beneficiaries b. Agreement Requirement c. Sufficient Number of Primary Care Providers and Beneficiaries d. Identification and Required Reporting on Participating ACO Professionals 2. Eligible Participants 3. Legal Structure and Governance a. Legal Entity b. Distribution of Shared Savings c. Governance d. Composition of the Governing Body 4. Leadership and Management Structure 5. Processes To Promote Evidence-Based Medicine, Patient Engagement, Reporting, Coordination of Care, and Demonstrating Patient-Centeredness a. Processes To Promote Evidence-Based Medicine b. Processes To Promote Patient Engagement c. Processes To Report on Quality and Cost Measures d. Processes To Promote Coordination of Care 6. Overlap With Other CMS Shared Savings Initiatives a. Duplication in Participation in Medicare Shared Savings Programs b. Transition of the Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration Sites Into the Shared Savings Program c. Overlap With the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center) Shared Savings Models C. Establishing the Agreement With the Secretary 1. Options for Start Date of the Performance Year 2. Timing and Process for Evaluating Shared Savings 3. New Program Standards Established During the Agreement Period 4. Managing Significant Changes to the ACO During the Agreement Period 5. Coordination With Other Agencies a. Waivers of CMP, Anti-Kickback, and Physician Self-Referral Laws b. IRS Guidance Relating to Tax-Exempt Organization Participating in ACOs c. Antitrust Policy Statement d. Coordinating the Shared Savings Program Application With the Antitrust Agencies D. Provision of Aggregate and Beneficiary Identifiable Data 1. Data Sharing 2. Sharing Aggregate Data 3. Identification of Historically Assigned Beneficiaries 4. Sharing Beneficiary Identifiable Claims Data 5. Giving Beneficiaries the Opportunity To Decline Data Sharing E. Assignment of Medicare Fee-for-Service Beneficiaries 1. Definition of Primary Care Services a. Consideration of Physician Specialties in the Assignment Process b. Consideration of Services Furnished by Non-Physician Practitioners in the Assignment Process c. Assignment of Beneficiaries to ACOs That Include FQHCs and/or RHCs (1) Identification of Primary Care Services Rendered in FQHCs and RHCs (2) Identification of the Type of Practitioner Providing the Service in an FQHC/RHC (3) Identification of the Physician Specialty for Services in FQHCs and RHCs 2. Prospective vs. Retrospective Beneficiary Assignment To Calculate Eligibility for Shared Savings 3. Majority vs. Plurality Rule for Beneficiary Assignment VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 F. Quality and Other Reporting Requirements 1. Introduction 2. Measures To Assess the Quality of Care Furnished by an ACO a. General b. Considerations in Selecting Measures c. Quality Measures for Use in Establishing Quality Performance Standards That ACOs Must Meet for Shared Savings 3. Requirements for Quality Measures Data Submission by ACOs a. General b. GPRO Web Interface c. Certified EHR Technology 4. Quality Performance Standards a. General b. Performance Scoring (1) Measure Domains and Measures Included in the Domains (2) Methodology for Calculating a Performance Score for Each Measure Within a Domain (3) Methodology for Calculating a Performance Score for Each Domain (4) The Quality Performance Standard Level 5. Incorporation of Other Reporting Requirements Related to the PQRS and Electronic Health Records Technology Under Section 1848 of the Act 6. Aligning ACO Quality Measures With Other Laws and Regulations G. Shared Savings and Losses 1. Authority for and Selection of Shared Savings/Losses Model 2. Shared Savings and Losses Determination a. Overview of Shared Savings and Losses Determination b. Establishing the Benchmark c. Adjusting the Benchmark and Actual Expenditures (1) Adjusting Benchmark and Performance Year Average Per Capita Expenditures for Beneficiary Characteristics (2) Technical Adjustments to the Benchmark and Performance Year Expenditures (a) Impact of IME and DSH (b) Geographic and Other Payment Adjustments (3) Trending Forward Prior Year s Experience To Obtain an Initial Benchmark (a) Growth Rate as a Benchmark Trending Factor (b) National Growth Rate as a Benchmark Trending Factor d. Updating the Benchmark During the Agreement Period e. Determining Shared Savings (1) Minimum Savings Rate (a) One-Sided Model (b) Two-Sided Model (2) Quality Performance Sharing Rate (3) Additional Shared Savings Payments (4) Net Sharing Rate (5) Performance Payment Limits f. Calculating Sharing in Losses (1) Minimum Loss Rate (2) Shared Loss Rate g. Limits on Shared Losses h. Ensuring ACO Repayment of Shared Losses i. Timing of Repayment
3 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations j. Withholding Performance Payments k. Determining First Year Performance for ACOs Beginning April 1 or July 1, 2012 (1) Interim Payment Calculation (2) First Year Reconciliation (3) Repayment Mechanism for ACOs Electing Interim Payment Calculations 3. Impact on States H. Additional Program Requirements and Beneficiary Protections 1. Background 2. Beneficiary Protections a. Beneficiary Notification b. ACO Marketing Guidelines 3. Program Monitoring a. General Methods Used to Monitor ACOs b. Monitoring Avoidance of At-Risk Beneficiaries (1) Definition of At-Risk Beneficiaries (2) Penalty for Avoidance of At-Risk Beneficiaries c. Compliance With Quality Performance Standards 4. Program Integrity Requirements a. Compliance Plans b. Compliance With Program Requirements c. Conflicts of Interest d. Screening of ACO Applicants e. Prohibition on Certain Required Referrals and Cost Shifting f. Record Retention g. Beneficiary Inducements 5. Terminating an ACO Agreement a. Reasons for Termination of an ACO s Agreement b. Corrective Action Plans 6. Reconsideration Review Process III. Collection of Information Requirements IV. Regulatory Impact Analysis A. Introduction B. Statement of Need C. Overall Impact D. Anticipated Effects 1. Effects on the Medicare Program a. Assumptions and Uncertainties b. Detailed Stochastic Modeling Results c. Further Considerations 2. Impact on Beneficiaries 3. Impact on Providers and Suppliers 4. Impact on Small Entities E. Alternatives Considered F. Accounting Statement and Table G. Conclusion Regulations Text Acronyms ACO Accountable Care Organization AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality BAA Business Associate Agreements BCBSMA Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts BIPA Benefits Improvement and Protection Act CAD Coronary Artery Disease CAHPS Consumer Assessment of Health Providers and Systems CAHs Critical Access Hospitals CBIC Competitive Bidding Implementation Contractor CBSA Core Based Statistical Area CHCs Community Health Centers CHIP Children s Health Insurance Program CMP Civil Monetary Penalties CMS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services CNM Certified Nurse Midwife CMS HCC CMS Hierarchal Condition Category COPD Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease CP Certified Psychologist CSW Clinical Social Worker CWF Common Working File DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DOB Date of Birth DOJ Department of Justice DRA Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (Pub. L ) DSH Disproportionate Share Hospital DUA Data use Agreement E&M Evaluation and Management EHR Electronic Health Record ESRD End Stage Renal Disease erx Electronic Prescribing Incentive Program FFS Fee-for-service FQHCs Federally Qualified Health Centers FTC Federal Trade Commission GAO Government Accountability Office GPCI Geographic Practice Cost Index GPRO Group Practice Reporting Option HAC Hospital Acquired Conditions HCAHPS Hospital Consumer Assessment of Health care Provider and Systems HCC Hierarchal Condition Category HCPCS Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System HHAs Home Health Agencies HICN Health Insurance Claim Number HIPAA Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 HIE Health Information Exchange HIT Health Information Technology HITECH Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health HMO Health Maintenance Organization HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration HVBP Hospital Value Based Purchasing IME Indirect Medical Education IOM Institute of Medicine IPPS Inpatient Prospective Payment System IQR Inpatient Quality Reporting IRS Internal Revenue Service LTCHs Long-Term Acute Care Hospitals MA Medicare Advantage MAPCP Multipayer Advanced Primary Care Practice MedPAC Medicare Payment Advisory Commission MHCQ Medicare Health Care Quality MMA Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act MS DRGs Medicare Severity-Adjusted Diagnosis Related Groups MSP Minimum Savings Percentage MSR Minimum Savings Rate NCQA National Committee for Quality Assurance NCCCN North Carolina Community Care Network NP Nurse Practitioner NPI National Provider Identifier NQF National Quality Forum OIG Office of Inspector General OMB Office of Management and Budget PA Physician Assistant PACE Program of All Inclusive Care for the Elderly PACFs Post-Acute Care Facilities VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 PCMH Patient Centered Medical Home PFS Physician Fee Schedule PGP Physician Group Practice PHI Protected health information POS Point of Service PPO Preferred provider organization PPS Prospective Payment System PQRI Physician Quality Reporting Initiative PQRS Physician Quality Reporting System PRA Paperwork Reduction Act PSA Primary Service Areas RFI Request for Information RHCs Rural Health Clinics RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis SNFs Skilled Nursing Facilities SSA Social Security Administration SSN Social Security Number TIN Taxpayer Identification Number I. Background A. Introduction and Overview of Value- Based Purchasing On March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L ) was enacted, followed by enactment of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Pub. L ) on March 30, 2010, which amended certain provisions of Public Law Collectively known as the Affordable Care Act, these public laws include a number of provisions designed to improve the quality of Medicare services, support innovation and the establishment of new payment models, better align Medicare payments with provider costs, strengthen program integrity within Medicare, and put Medicare on a firmer financial footing. Many provisions within the Affordable Care Act implement valuebased purchasing programs; section 3022 requires the Secretary to establish the Medicare Shared Savings Program (Shared Savings Program), intended to encourage the development of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in Medicare. The Shared Savings Program is a key component of the Medicare delivery system reform initiatives included in the Affordable Care Act and is a new approach to the delivery of health care aimed at: (1) Better care for individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) lower growth in Medicare Parts A and B expenditures. We refer to this approach throughout this final rule as the threepart aim. Value-based purchasing is a concept that links payment directly to the quality of care provided and is a strategy that can help transform the current payment system by rewarding providers for delivering high quality, efficient clinical care. In the April 7, 2011 Federal Register (76 FR 19528), we published the Shared Savings Program proposed rule. In the proposed rule, we
4 67804 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations discussed our experience implementing value based purchasing concepts. In addition to improving quality, valuebased purchasing initiatives seek to reduce growth in health care expenditures. We view value-based purchasing as an important step to revamping how care and services are paid for, moving increasingly toward rewarding better value, outcomes, and innovations instead of merely increased volume. For a complete discussion, including our goals in implementing value-based purchasing initiatives, please refer to section I.A. of the proposed rule (76 FR 19530). B. Statutory Basis for the Medicare Shared Savings Program Section 3022 of the Affordable Care Act amended Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (the Act) (42 U.S.C et seq.) by adding new section 1899 to the Act to establish a Shared Savings Program that promotes accountability for a patient population, coordinates items and services under Parts A and B, and encourages investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient service delivery. A detailed summary of the provisions within section 3022 of the Affordable Care Act is in section I.B. of the proposed rule (see 76 FR 19531). C. Overview of the Medicare Shared Savings Program The intent of the Shared Savings Program is to promote accountability for a population of Medicare beneficiaries, improve the coordination of FFS items and services, encourage investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient service delivery, and incent higher value care. As an incentive to ACOs that successfully meet quality and savings requirements, the Medicare Program can share a percentage of the achieved savings with the ACO. Under the Shared Savings Program, ACOs will only share in savings if they meet both the quality performance standards and generate shareable savings. In order to fulfill the intent of the Shared Savings Program as established by the Affordable Care Act, we stated in the proposed rule that we will focus on achieving the three-part aim consisting of: (1) Better care for individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) lower growth in expenditures. In developing the Shared Savings Program, and in response to stakeholder suggestions, we have worked very closely with agencies across the Federal government to develop policies to encourage participation and ensure a coordinated and aligned inter- and intra-agency program implementation. The result of this effort is the release of several documents that potential participants are strongly encouraged to review. These documents are described in more detail in section II.C.5. of this final rule, and include: (1) A joint CMS and DHHS OIG interim final rule with comment period published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register entitled Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared Savings Program; (2) IRS Notice and other applicable IRS guidance viewable on and (3) a Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Shared Savings Program issued by the FTC and DOJ (collectively, the Antitrust Agencies). In this final rule we have made significant modifications to reduce burden and cost for participating ACOs. These modifications include: (1) Greater flexibility in eligibility to participate in the Shared Savings Program; (2) multiple start dates in 2012; (3) establishment of a longer agreement period for those starting in 2012; (4) greater flexibility in the governance and legal structure of an ACO; (5) simpler and more streamlined quality performance standards; (6) adjustments to the financial model to increase financial incentives to participate; (7) increased sharing caps; (8) no downside risk and first-dollar sharing in Track 1; (9) removal of the 25 percent withhold of shared savings; (10) greater flexibility in timing for the evaluation of sharing savings (claims run-out reduced to 3 months); (11) greater flexibility in antitrust review; and (12) greater flexibility in timing for repayment of losses; and (13) additional options for participation of FQHCs and RHCs. D. Public Comments Received on the Proposed Rule We received approximately 1,320 public comments on the April 7, 2011 proposed rule (76 FR 19528). These public comments addressed issues on multiple topics and here, rather than throughout the regulation, we extend our great appreciation for the input. We received some comments that were outside the scope of the proposed rule and therefore not addressed in this final rule (for example, suggested changes to the physician fee schedule, or suggestions on other Affordable Care Act provisions). Summaries of the public comments that are within the scope of the proposals and our responses to those comments are set forth in the various sections of this final VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 rule under the appropriate headings. In this final rule, we have organized the document by presenting our proposals, summarizing and responding to the public comment for the proposal(s), and describing our final policy. Comment: We received comments expressing support for the proposed design of the Shared Savings Program, as well as comments disagreeing with it. Those in disagreement generally found the proposed requirements to be too prescriptive and burdensome. Other commenters expressed their disagreement with a program they perceive as limiting access to necessary care. Response: We appreciate all the feedback we received. We have been encouraged by the level of engagement by stakeholders in this rulemaking process. We thank all of the commenters for helping us develop the Shared Savings Program. Where possible we have tried to reduce or eliminate prescriptive or burdensome requirements that could discourage participation in the Shared Savings Program. We have also been vigilant in protecting the rights and benefits of FFS beneficiaries under traditional Medicare to maintain the same access to care and freedom of choice that existed prior to the implementation of this program. These provisions can be found throughout this final rule. Comment: Two commenters encouraged CMS to make the PGP demonstration a national program. In contrast, a few commenters stated concern about insufficient testing of the Shared Savings Program as a demonstration program prior to this final rule. The commenters acknowledged the PGP demonstration as the precursor, but stated that our proposals deviated too far from the PGP demonstration. One commenter noted the PGP demonstration consisted of large health organizations that had access to $1.75 million in capital and while half of the participants shared in savings, none had a complete return on their investment. They suggested that CMS continue to create demonstration projects for shared savings initiatives and delay the implementation of the Shared Savings Program. One commenter suggested phasing in the program. Specifically, the commenter suggested that we start small and periodically assess the program s requirements to determine which policies promote success and which create barriers. Response: The Shared Savings Program adopts many of the program aspects of the PGP demonstration, but some adjustments were necessary in
5 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations order to create a national program. We removed a few of the proposed deviations from the PGP demonstration from this final rule. For example, under the policies we are implementing in this final rule, Shared Savings Program participants may choose to enter a shared savings only track that will not require repayment of losses. The statute does not authorize us to delay the establishment of the Shared Savings Program. But, it is important to note that the Shared Savings Program is a voluntary program. Organizations that are not ready to participate can begin the transition towards a more coordinated delivery system, incorporating policies that promote success for the early participants and join the program at such time as they are ready. Additionally, the Innovation Center will continue to test program models that may influence policies adopted for future agreement periods for the Shared Savings Program. We intend to assess the policies for the Innovation Center s models and the Shared Savings Program to determine how well they are working and if there are any modifications that would enhance them. Comment: One commenter expressed concern that we appeared to be limiting participation in the Shared Savings Program to 5 million beneficiaries and 100 to 200 ACOs. Response: We assume this commenter was referring to the Regulatory Impact Analysis section of our proposed rule where our Office of the Actuary estimated that up to 5 million beneficiaries would receive care from providers participating in ACOs. That figure was an estimate based on the proposed program requirements and the anticipated level of interest and participation of providers based on the requirements. After making programmatic changes based on commenter feedback, we believe the policies implemented in this final rule will be more attractive to participants and have a positive impact on those estimates. Please note that as a voluntary national program, any and all groups of providers and suppliers that meet the eligibility criteria outlined in this final rule are invited to participate. Comment: Many commenters requested CMS issue an interim final rule, rather than a final rule, in order to have flexibility to modify the proposals in the proposed rule. One commenter suggested the 60-day comment period did not provide enough time to analyze and comment on the proposed rule given the volume and complexity of the specific proposals as related to tribal health organizations and other public health providers. Response: In the proposed rule, we not only outlined our proposals for implementing the Shared Savings Program, but also provided detailed information on other alternatives we had considered and we sought comment on both our proposed policies and the other alternatives. The public comments submitted in response to the proposed rule have provided us with additional information and background regarding not only our proposed policies, but also the alternatives we considered. In response to the public comments, we have made significant changes to a number of our proposed policies. Nevertheless, we believe the policies in this final rule remain consistent with the overall framework for the program initially laid out in the proposed rule. As a result, we do not believe that there is any benefit to publishing this rule as an interim final rule rather than a final rule. We also believe 60 days represented a sufficient amount of time for interested parties to submit their comments on the proposed rule. We received many detailed comments in response to the proposed rule within the 60-day comment period. We also note that a 60-day comment period is consistent with the requirements of section 1871(b)(1) of the Act and is the standard timeframe used for many of our proposed rules. Comment: Many commenters were concerned that the Shared Savings Program has similar characteristics to some forms of managed care where it is possible to achieve savings through inappropriate reductions in patient care. Some commenters, for example, asserted that the Shared Savings Program is a capitated model that is not in the best interest of patients. Other commenters, such as beneficiaries and beneficiary advocates, indicated that beneficiaries should retain their right to see any doctor of their choosing. We also received comments expressing concern that, as with some managed care approaches, the Shared Savings program essentially transfers the locus of responsibility for health care away from the patient, which is not as effective as more consumer-driven approaches. Another commenter expressed concern that assignment of beneficiaries to an ACO participating in the Shared Savings Program indicates that the program is a new version of managed care. One commenter suggested using the current Medicare Advantage (MA) structure to serve as the foundation of the Shared Savings Program. The commenter argued that MA plans are better suited to take on risk and provide care that meets many VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 of the goals of the Shared Savings Program, and allowing these entities to participate will enable the program to reach a larger population. Additionally, a commenter requested information on why CMS is creating new policies for compliance, marketing and ownership instead of using policies already in place by MA plans. A few commenters claimed other countries tried this model and failed. Response: It is important to note that the Shared Savings Program is not a managed care program. Medicare FFS beneficiaries retain all rights and benefits under traditional Medicare. Medicare FFS beneficiaries retain the right to see any physician of their choosing, and they do not enroll in the Shared Savings Program. Unlike managed care settings, the Shared Savings Program assignment methodology in no way implies a lock in or enrollment process. To the contrary, it is a process based exclusively on an assessment of where and from whom FFS beneficiaries have chosen to receive care during the course of each performance period. The program is also not a capitated model; providers and suppliers continue to bill and receive FFS payments rather than receiving lump sum payments based upon the number of assigned beneficiaries. The design of the Shared Savings Program places the patient at the center. It encourages physicians, through the eligibility requirements, to include their patients in decision making about their health care. While we frequently relied on our experience in other Medicare programs, including MA, to help develop program requirements for the Shared Savings Program, there are often times when the requirements deviate precisely because the intent of this program is not to recreate MA. Unlike MA, this program s design retains FFS flexibility and freedom of choice available under Medicare Parts A and B which necessitates different program requirements. Lastly, in order for an ACO to share in savings the ACO must meet quality standards and program requirements that we will be monitoring. We will monitor the ACO s compliance with these requirements, as described in section II.H. of this final rule, with a special focus on ACOs that attempt to avoid at-risk patients. The purpose of the Shared Savings Program is to achieve savings through improvements in the coordination and quality of care, and not through avoiding certain beneficiaries or placing limits on beneficiary access to needed care.
6 67806 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations Comment: One commenter suggested CMS provide funding to Regional Health Improvement Collaboratives to assist in educating Medicare beneficiaries about the program and to help enable the collection and reporting of data on patient experience. In addition, one commenter recommended the creation of a national surveillance database during ACOs implementation to guide osteoporosis prevention, intervention and treatment efforts. The commenter suggested that a national database would help reduce mortality and costs associated with preventable hip fractures due to osteoporosis. Response: Both are excellent suggestions. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to implement these recommendations for this program at this time. The comment suggesting funding for Regional Health Improvement Collaboratives is beyond the scope of the proposed rule. We note, however, that the Innovation Center is currently accepting innovative solutions aimed at improving care delivery at their Web site, Innovations.cms.gov. Comment: One commenter suggested CMS address the comments received from the November 17, 2010 RFI. Response: In the proposed rule, we summarized many of the comments we received in response to the RFI, and these comments informed many of the policy choices made in the proposed rule. In addition, the RFI comments are publicly available at regulations.gov. Accordingly, we will not be addressing the entirety of those comments in this final rule; however any RFI comments we determined pertinent to this final rule may appear. Comment: One commenter expressed concern over CMS example of reducing unnecessary hospital visits as one way that ACOs could improve care. The commenter explained that the excess revenue created by additional ER visits helps to sustain other services provided by a hospital that may not bring in as much revenue. The commenter concluded the reduction in visits would eventually lead to the closure of many small rural hospitals. A similar comment stated that encouraging coordination and reducing fragmented care will reduce hospital reimbursements. Response: The focus of the Shared Savings Program is to provide coordinated care to Medicare FFS beneficiaries. The program aims to provide higher quality care across the continuum of care; this may include additional office visits, as opposed to ER visits, for patients who do not require emergency services. Cost shifting is of great concern to us both within the Shared Savings Program and outside of the program. We believe it is in the patient s best interest to receive care in the proper setting and to receive emergency services only in times of emergency. Incurring costs for unnecessary care, or care provided in an inappropriate care setting, can be harmful to beneficiaries and payers alike. For more information about cost shifting related to the Shared Savings Program refer to section II.H.4. of this final rule. E. Reorganization of the Regulations Text We have revised the proposed regulations text to reflect the final policies adopted in this final rule. We have also made significant revisions to the structure and organization of the regulations text in order to correspond more closely with the organization of the preamble to this final rule and to make it easier to locate specific provisions within the regulations text. II. Provisions of the Proposed Rule, Summary of and Responses to Public Comments, and the Provisions of the Final Rule A. Definitions For purposes of the proposed rule, we defined three terms used throughout the discussion: Accountable care organization (ACO), ACO participant, and ACO provider/supplier. We encourage the reader to review these definitions in We incorporated comments on these definitions into the discussion that follows. B. Eligibility and Governance 1. General Requirements a. Accountability for Beneficiaries Section 1899(b)(2)(A) of the Act requires participating ACOs to be willing to become accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to it. To satisfy this requirement, we proposed that an ACO executive who has the authority to bind the ACO must certify to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief that the ACO participants are willing to become accountable for, and to report to us on, the quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare FFS beneficiaries assigned to the ACO. We further proposed that this certification would be included as part of the ACO s application and participation agreement. Comment: A commenter suggested that providers should not be held liable for unmanageable patients and/or those patients that refuse treatment altogether. VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 Other commenters recommended that we not hold an ACO accountable for those patients who choose to decline to have CMS share their claims data with the ACO. Another commenter suggested that CMS require ACOs to state specifically in their applications the processes used to assure that Medicare patients have access to relatively costly but medically necessary procedures, such as transplantation. Response: In order to retain beneficiary freedom of choice under traditional FFS Medicare, the basis for beneficiary assignment to ACOs is where, and from whom, they choose to receive a plurality of their primary care services during the performance year. ACOs must be willing to become accountable for total quality, cost, and overall care of these Medicare FFS beneficiaries. An ACO will not receive an assignment of those beneficiaries that choose not to receive care from ACO providers. Beneficiaries who choose to receive care from ACO providers, regardless of whether they are unmanageable or noncompliant with treatment recommendations may become part of the ACO s assigned population. Since patient-centeredness is an integral part of this program, we believe such beneficiaries represent an excellent opportunity for ACOs to create, implement, and improve upon patient-centered processes that improve patient engagement. We note that avoidance of such beneficiaries, as described in more detail in section II.H.3. of this final rule, will result in termination of an ACO s participation agreement. Similarly, in the interest of beneficiary engagement and transparency, we believe it is important to provide beneficiaries with an opportunity to decline data sharing. As discussed in greater detail in section II.B.4. of this final rule, a process for beneficiaries to decline data sharing provides an opportunity for ACOs to explain to patients how access to their personal health information will help the ACO improve the quality of its care. We believe that requiring an ACO executive who has the authority to bind the ACO to certify to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief that the ACO participants are willing to become accountable for, and to report to us on, the quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare FFS beneficiaries assigned to the ACO provides sufficient assurance that the ACO will be accountable for its assigned beneficiaries. By allowing ACOs to determine how they will satisfy this requirement, we will afford ACOs the flexibility needed to demonstrate their
7 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations commitment to beneficiary accountability in a manner which is most suited to their own ACO model. Final Decision: We are finalizing our policy regarding certification of accountability for beneficiaries described in (76 FR 19544) as proposed without change ( and ). b. Agreement Requirement Section 1899(b)(2)(B) of the Act requires participating ACOs to enter into an agreement with the Secretary to participate in the program for not less than a 3-year period * * *. For the first round of the Shared Savings Program, we proposed to limit participation agreements to a 3-year period. We sought comments on this proposal regarding the initial consideration of a longer agreement period. If the ACO is approved for participation, we proposed that an authorized executive specifically, an executive who has the ability to bind the ACO must certify to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief that its ACO participants and its ACO providers/suppliers agree to the requirements set forth in the agreement between the ACO and us, and sign a participation agreement and submit the signed agreement to us. We proposed that the participation agreement would also include an acknowledgment that all contracts or arrangements between or among the ACO, ACO participants, ACO providers/suppliers, and other entities furnishing services related to ACO activities would require compliance with the ACO s obligations under the agreement. Additionally, we expressed our intention that all ACOs, ACO participants, and ACO providers/ suppliers Shared Savings Program would be subject to the requirements of the agreement between the ACO and CMS and that all certifications submitted on behalf of the ACO in connection with the Shared Savings Program application, agreement, shared savings distribution or otherwise extend to all parties with obligations to which the particular certification applies. An authorized executive of the ACO would sign the participation agreement after its approval for participation. Finally, we proposed that the ACO would be responsible for providing a copy of the agreement to its ACO participants and ACO providers/ suppliers. We solicited comment on this proposal, including any additional measures or alternative means that we should consider to fulfill this requirement. Comment: Commenters requested that CMS define the term authorized executive when stating that an authorized executive of the ACO must sign the participation agreement. Response: As we stated in the proposed rule, an authorized executive is an executive of the ACO who has the ability to bind the ACO to comply with all of the requirements for participation in the Shared Savings Program. Final Decision: We are finalizing this proposal regarding agreements as described previously under and Further, as described in , the ACO s agreement period will be for not less than 3 years, consistent with statute, although some agreement periods may be longer than 3 years. c. Sufficient Number of Primary Care Providers and Beneficiaries Section 1899(b)(2)(D) of the Act requires participating ACOs to include primary care ACO professionals that are sufficient for the number of Medicare FFS beneficiaries assigned to the ACO * * * and that at a minimum, the ACO shall have at least 5,000 such beneficiaries assigned to it * * *. Physician patient panels can vary widely in the number of FFS Medicare beneficiaries served. In section II.E. of this final rule, we discuss our assignment methodology and how its use in the assignment of beneficiaries during the baseline years in order to establish a historical per capita cost benchmark against which the ACO s evaluation during each year of the agreement period would take place. In the proposed rule, we stated we believed it would be reasonable to assume that if by using this assignment algorithm the ACO demonstrates a sufficient number of beneficiaries to fulfill this eligibility requirement for purposes of establishing a benchmark, then the ACO would also demonstrate that it contains a sufficient number of primary care professionals to provide care to these beneficiaries. We stated we believed it was also reasonable to assume the ACO would continue to approximate this number of beneficiaries in each year of the agreement period. Thus, we proposed that for purposes of eligibility under section 1899(b)(2)(D) of the Act, an ACO would be determined to have a sufficient number of primary care ACO professionals to serve the number of Medicare beneficiaries assigned to it if the number of beneficiaries historically assigned over the 3-year benchmarking period using the ACO participant TINs exceeds the 5,000 threshold for each year. We solicited comment on this proposal as well as any additional VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 guidance to consider for meeting these requirements. We recognize that while an ACO could meet the requirements in section 1899(b)(2) of the Act when it applies to participate in the Shared Savings Program, circumstances may change during the course of the agreement period. We discussed the importance of maintaining at least 5,000 assigned beneficiaries with respect to both eligibility of the ACO to participate in the program and the statistical stability for purposes of calculating per capita expenditures and assessing quality performance. Therefore, we considered what action, if any, should be taken in the event the number of beneficiaries assigned to the ACO falls below 5,000 in a given performance year. Specifically, we considered whether an ACO s participation in the program should be terminated or its eligibility for shared savings be deferred if the number of beneficiaries drops below 5,000. We considered several options including immediate termination, termination following a CAP, scaling shared savings payments to reflect the population change, or taking no action against the ACO. After weighting all these options, we concluded that a reasonable compromise would balance the statutory requirements and program incentives, while still recognizing expected variations in an ACO s assigned population. Thus, if an ACO s assigned population falls below 5,000 during the course of the agreement period, we proposed to issue a warning and place the ACO on a corrective action plan (CAP). For the performance year for which we issued the warning to the ACO, we proposed that the ACO would remain eligible for shared savings. We further proposed termination of the ACO s participation agreement if the ACO failed to meet the eligibility criterion of having more than 5,000 beneficiaries by the completion of the next performance year. The ACO would not be eligible to share in savings for that year. We also reserved the right to review the status of the ACO while on the corrective action plan and terminate the agreement on the basis that the ACO no longer meets eligibility requirements. We requested comment on this proposal and on other potential options for addressing situations where the assigned beneficiary population falls below 5,000 during the course of an agreement period. Comment: Commenters generally agreed that an ACO must have a strong primary care foundation with a sufficient number of providers to meet the needs of the population it serves. Additionally, commenters suggested
8 67808 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations that there must be strong collaboration among multidisciplinary team members to ensure care coordination and patient centered care. Some commenters recommended that ACOs should be required to demonstrate sufficiency in the number, type, and location of providers available to provide care to the beneficiaries. Other commenters noted that the proposed rule did not mention any requirement that the ACO demonstrate sufficiency in the number, type and location of all providers available to provide multi-disciplinary care to the beneficiaries. Some commenters recommended that the minimum threshold of beneficiaries be increased to as high as 20,000 beneficiaries to reduce uncertainties in achieving program goals while other commenters believed that the 5,000 beneficiary threshold will preclude smaller and rural entities from participating in the Shared Savings Program as forfeiture of any shared savings and termination in the year following the corrective action plan would be too financially risky when the initial start up costs are taken into account. One commenter suggested that rather than maintain a strict 5,000 beneficiary threshold requirement, we should provide leeway to ACOs to allow for a 10 percent variation from the beneficiary minimum threshold. Response: Congress established the 5,000 beneficiary requirement under section 1899(b)(2)(D) of the Act. A minimum threshold is important with respect to both the eligibility of the ACO to participate in the program and to the statistical stability for purposes of calculating per capita expenditures and assessing quality performance as described in section II.D. of this final rule. However, the expanded assignment methodology discussed in section II.E. of this final rule should allow more beneficiaries to be assigned to those ACOs that might have initially been too close to the threshold, increasing the ability for smaller ACOs to participate. We do not believe this warrants an increase in the threshold number of assigned beneficiaries as that could prohibit the formation of ACOs in both smaller and rural health care markets, and possibly considered contrary to statutory intent. Additionally, the expanded assignment methodology discussed in section II.E. of this final rule should allow the assignment of more beneficiaries which should make the additional flexibility offered by allowing for a 10 percent variation in the assigned population unnecessary. We do not believe that we should be prescriptive in setting any requirements for the number, type, and location of the providers/suppliers that are included as ACO participants. Unlike managed care models that lock in beneficiaries to a network of providers, beneficiaries assigned to an ACO may receive care from providers and suppliers both inside and outside the ACO. ACOs represent a new model for the care of FFS beneficiaries and for practitioners to focus on coordination of care efforts. During the initial implementation of the Shared Savings Program, we believe that potential ACOs should have the flexibility to create an organization and design their models in a manner they believe will achieve the three-part aim without instituting specific requirements. Final Decision: We are finalizing our proposals without change ( ). d. Identification and Required Reporting on Participating ACO Professionals Section 1899(b)(2)(E) of the Act requires ACOs to provide the Secretary with such information regarding ACO professionals participating in the ACO as the Secretary determines necessary to support the assignment of Medicare feefor-service beneficiaries to an ACO, the implementation of quality and other reporting requirements * * *, and the determination of payments for shared savings * * *. As discussed in this section of the final rule, we are defining an ACO operationally as a legal entity that is comprised of a group of ACO participants as defined in Based on our experience, we recognized that the TIN level data alone would not be entirely sufficient for a number of purposes in the Shared Savings Program. In particular, National Provider Identifier (NPI) data would be useful to assess the quality of care furnished by an ACO. For example, NPI information would be necessary to determine the percentage of registered HITECH physicians and other practitioners in the ACO (discussed in section II.F. of this final rule). NPI data would also be helpful in our monitoring of ACO activities (which we discuss in section II.H. of this final rule). Therefore, we proposed to require that organizations applying to be an ACO must provide not only their TINs but also a list of associated NPIs for all ACO professionals, including a list that separately identifies physicians that provide primary care. We proposed that the ACO maintain, update, and annually report to us the TINs of its ACO participants and the NPIs associated with the ACO providers/suppliers. We believe that VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 requiring this information offers the level of transparency needed to implement the Shared Savings Program. We welcomed comments on our proposal to require reporting of TINs along with information about the NPIs associated with the ACO. Additionally, as we discussed in the proposed rule, the first step in developing a method for identifying an ACO, ACO participants, and ACO providers/suppliers is to establish a clear operational method of identifying an ACO that correctly associates its health care professionals and providers with the ACO. The operational identification is critical for implementation of the program and for determining, for example, benchmarking, assignment of beneficiaries, and other functions. Section 1899(a)(1)(A) of the Act defines ACOs as groups of providers of services and suppliers who work together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare FFS beneficiaries. More specifically, the Act refers to group practice arrangements, networks of individual practices of ACO professionals, partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and ACO professionals, hospitals employing ACO professionals, or other combinations that the Secretary determines appropriate. We proposed to identify an ACO operationally as a collection of Medicare enrolled TINs, defined as ACO participants. More specifically, we proposed an ACO would be identified operationally as a set of one or more ACO participants currently practicing as a group practice arrangement or in a network such as where hospitals are employing ACO professionals or where there are partnerships or joint ventures of hospitals and ACO professionals as stated under section 1899(b)(1)(A) through (E) of the Act. For example, Shared Savings Programs TIN would identify a single group practice that participates in the Shared Savings Program. The set of TINs of the practices would identify a network of independent practices that forms an ACO. We proposed to require that organizations applying to be an ACO provide their ACO participant Medicare enrolled TINs and NPIs. We can systematically link each TIN or NPI to an individual physician specialty code. We also proposed that ACO participants on whom beneficiary assignment is based, would be exclusive to one ACO agreement in the Shared Savings Program. Under our proposal, this exclusivity would only apply to ACO participants who bill Medicare for the services rendered by primary care
9 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations physicians (defined as physicians with a designation of internal medicine, geriatric medicine, family practice and general practice, as discussed later in this final rule). However, we acknowledged the importance of competition in the marketplace to improving quality of care, protecting access to care for Medicare beneficiaries, and preventing fraud and abuse. Therefore, under our proposal, ACO participants upon which beneficiary assignment was not dependent (for example, acute care hospitals, surgical and medical specialties, RHCs, and FQHCs) would be required to agree to participate in the Medicare ACO for the term of the agreement, but would not be restricted to participation in a single ACO. Comment: Several commenters recommended that CMS maintain the list of TINs and NPIs. Additionally, some commenters recommended that CMS allow ACOs to verify any data reported in association with the ACO prior to these data being made public. Response: Section 1899(b)(2)(E) of the Act requires ACOs to provide the Secretary with such information regarding ACO professionals participating in the ACO as the Secretary determines necessary to support the assignment of Medicare feefor-service beneficiaries to an ACO, the implementation of quality and other reporting requirements * * *, and the determination of payments for shared savings * * *. As discussed previously, we will need both the TINs of all ACO participants and the NPIs associated with ACO providers/ suppliers in order to assign beneficiaries to ACOs appropriately and accurately. Because section 1899(b)(2)(E) of the Act requires ACOs to provide us with the information we determine is necessary to support assignment, we believe it is consistent with this statutory requirement to require that ACOs maintain, update, and annually report to us those TINs and NPIs that are participants of their respective ACO. Since ACOs will be maintaining, updating, and annually reporting these TINs and NPIs to us, they will have ultimate review capabilities and it will not be necessary for us to provide them an additional opportunity to verify the names of ACO participants and ACO providers/suppliers before making this information available to the public. We note that, in order to ensure the accurate identification of any ACO, its participants, and its providers/ suppliers, we may request additional information (for example, CMS Certification Numbers, mailing addresses, etc.) in the application process. We will identify any such additional information in the application materials. Comment: One commenter stated that our assessment of billing practices was incorrect because beginning on May 23, 2008, all health care providers, including those enrolled in the Medicare and Medicaid program, are required by the NPI Final Rule published on January 23, 2004, to submit claims using their NPI but also notes that physicians participating in the Medicare program must enroll using their NPI and if they are billing through a group practice reassign their benefits to the group practice. Response: It is true that individuals and group practices must enroll in the Medicare program under unique NPIs. It is also true that NPIs (whether for an individual practitioner or a group practice for reassigned benefits) must be included on bills to the Medicare program. However, bills to the Medicare program must also include the TIN of the billing practitioner or group practice. As we stated in the proposed rule, not all physicians and practitioners have Medicare enrolled TINs. In the case of individual practitioners, however, their SSN may be their TIN. While providers are required to have an NPI for identification and to include the NPI in billing, billing is always through a TIN, whether that is an EIN or a SSN. We successfully employed TINs in the PGP demonstration for purposes of identifying the participating organizations, and the rules cited by the commenters did not pose any obstacle to doing so. We believe that we can operationally proceed on the same basis under the Shared Savings Program. Comment: Some commenters supported the proposal to use TINs as an organizing concept for ACOs. These commenters observed, for example, that this policy was consistent with the beginning of the PGP demonstration, under which the assignment of Medicare beneficiaries would start with the TIN of the organization providing the plurality of the visits with further assignment to a primary care provider. However, a number of other commenters requested that we reevaluate the proposal to employ TINs for identification of ACOs and assignment purposes. Some of these commenters suggested that the use of NPIs would recognize the realities of diverse systems, provide greater flexibility, and allow systems to designate those portions of the system which can most appropriately constitute an ACO. Other commenters similarly endorsed the use of NPIs as providing greater flexibility and more precision in VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 identifying ACOs and assigning beneficiaries. One observed that using NPIs would also allow CMS and ACOs to track saving and quality improvements achieved by individual practitioners, as well as afford greater flexibility for systems to expand an ACO gradually to incorporate practitioners and components of the system. Response: We are finalizing our proposal to define the ACO operationally by its Medicare enrolled ACO participants TINs. Using TINs provides a direct link between the beneficiary and the practitioner(s) providing the services for purposes of beneficiary assignment. Using TINs also makes it possible for us to take advantage of infrastructure and methodologies already developed for group-level reporting and evaluation. We believe this option affords us the most flexibility and statistical stability for monitoring and evaluating quality and outcomes for the population of beneficiaries assigned to the ACO. In contrast, adopting NPIs would create much greater operational complexity because individual NPIs move much more frequently between different organizations and practices. TINs are much more stable, and thus provide much greater precision in identifying ACOs. Furthermore, identifying through TINs avoids the necessity of making the NPIs upon which assignment is based exclusive to one ACO, thus allowing these NPIs (although not TINs) to participate in more than one ACO. Comment: Several commenters requested clarification about the use of TINs in identifying ACOs and assigning beneficiaries. Some inquired about the establishment of parameters of an ACO across a large health system with diverse and sometimes geographically remote components. Some of these commenters noted that large systems often employ a single TIN, so that the use of TINs for identification purposes would require inclusion of all the members of the system in a single ACO, even if these members are geographically remote from each other and otherwise diverse. One observed: Such remote entities may have a limited opportunity to participate in care coordination, and may in fact be better suited to participate in another more local ACO. A large clinic similarly observed that the use of TINs could pose a problem for large health systems. The owner of outpatient rehabilitation clinics in several States inquired how it would choose a single ACO in which to participate in order to serve the needs of patients in multiple States. Another asked whether it is permissible for some members of a
10 67810 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations group practice to participate in the Shared Savings Program while others do not, adding their strong belief that participation in an ACO of some but not all providers in a group must be allowed. Another asked how CMS will account for the alignment of the beneficiary, signed up/enrolled with the PCP if the NP or PA saw the patient and billed using their individual NPI (which is linked to the PCP physician s Tax ID), but the credit is not being assigned to the PCP physician because s/he isn t billing for the services. This could create a big gap and problem in the allocation process. Another commenter asked how the program would handle the situation in which a healthcare system has multiple TINs. Response: We proposed to define an ACO operationally as a collection of Medicare enrolled TINs (that is, ACO participants). Therefore, in cases in which a healthcare system has multiple TINs, the collection of the system s TINs precisely identifies the ACO which consists of that health system. We understand the commenters interest in the greater flexibility of, for example, including only parts of a large system with one TIN in an ACO. However, some level of exclusivity is necessary in order for the assignment process to function correctly, and especially to ensure the accurate assignment of beneficiaries to one and only one ACO. Use of TINs rather than NPIs provides the greatest degree of flexibility consistent with this requirement. Therefore, we are unable to allow, for example, a large health system with one TIN to include only parts of the system in an ACO. Systems that extend over several States can similarly choose more than one ACO for parts of their system only if they have multiple TINs. In order for a beneficiary to be assigned to an ACO in which his or her primary care physician is participating, the physician would have to bill for primary care services furnished to the beneficiary under a TIN included in that ACO. Comment: Many commenters objected to the exclusivity of primary care physicians on the grounds that that such exclusivity could be disruptive of their current practice patterns, which may involve the assignment of patients to a number of ACOs. Some objected that the proposed lock in was unfair. Another commenter complained that we did not sufficiently address the reasons for the lock in. Some commenters suggested methods to avoid the potential confusions that could occur in assigning beneficiary without our proposed lock in. For example, one commenter observed potential avoidance of this problem by creating incentives (for example, no deductibles and reduced co-insurance for primary care physician services) for patients to prospectively identify a primary care physician in an ACO. The commenter maintained that patients need to be accountable as well as the participating physicians and providers. Furthermore, the commenter contended that identification of a primary care physician does not have to limit patient choice in any way, but simply provides an alternative method for identifying the population of patients for which the ACO is responsible while getting more engaged patients to think about having a usual source of care. Alternatively, the commenter recommended that CMS should prospectively allow patients to choose their own Medicare ACO. This would relieve CMS from the proposed and flawed beneficiary attribution method that currently limits primary care physicians to participate in only one Medicare ACO. Several other commenters opposed the lock in but suggested that, if we retain it, the final rule should Permit primary care physicians to elect consideration as specialists without taking into account their evaluation and management services for the purpose of aligning beneficiaries with an ACO; Permit specialists to elect to be treated as primary care physicians whose evaluation and management services will be considered for beneficiary alignment; and Permit primary care physicians to participate in ACOs on an individual basis, rather than through their group practice entities or employers. In either case, the final rule should encourage providers to work collaboratively to achieve savings and enhance care by allowing ACOs to arrange for medical services using contracted providers. Another commenter requested that we revisit this requirement and provide additional flexibility so that primary care providers could join more than one ACO or switch ACOs on an annual basis. Commenters suggested alternative assignment strategies that would allow participation in more than one ACO such as default assignment to practitioners who are only in one ACO or having practitioners assign patients to a particular ACO based on patient needs. Some commenters also argued for adopting a policy of voluntary beneficiary enrollment in an ACO, arguing in part that this policy would allow us to abandon the proposal restricting primary care physicians to participation in one ACO, which we proposed to prevent uncertainty in the VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 assignment process. Other commenters specifically requested that rural physicians and ambulance providers be able to participate in multiple ACOs. Response: We regret that some of the language in the preamble about the exclusivity of ACO participants (defined by the Medicare-enrolled billing TIN) created unnecessary confusion about the proposal. The point of our proposal was that, for us to appropriately evaluate ACO performance, we must evaluate performance based on a patient population unique to the ACO. Therefore, some ACO participants, specifically those that bill for the primary care services on which we proposed to base assignment, would have to be exclusive to an ACO, for the purpose of Medicare beneficiary assignment, for the duration of an agreement period. In the absence of such exclusivity and in a situation where an ACO participant is associated with two or more ACOs, it would be unclear which ACO would receive an incentive payment for the participant s efforts on behalf of its assigned patient population. Exclusivity of the assignment-based ACO participant TIN ensures unique beneficiary assignment to a single ACO. However, exclusivity of an ACO participant TIN to one ACO is not necessarily the same as exclusivity of individual practitioners (ACO providers/suppliers) to one ACO. We did state somewhat imprecisely in the preamble to the proposed rule that ACO professionals within the respective TIN on which beneficiary assignment is based, will be exclusive to one ACO agreement in the Shared Savings Program. This exclusivity will only apply to the primary care physicians. This statement appears to be the basis of the concerns expressed by many commenters, and we understand the reasons for those concerns. However, we stated the policy (76 FR 19563) we intended to propose more precisely elsewhere in the preamble, when we stated that [t]his exclusivity will only apply to primary care physicians (defined as physicians with a designation of internal medicine, geriatric medicine, family practice and general practice, as discussed later in this final rule) by whom beneficiary assignment is established when billing under ACO participant TINs. (Emphasis added). Similarly, in the proposed regulations text at 425.5(c), we stated that each ACO must report to CMS the TINs of the ACO participants comprising the ACO along with a list of associated NPIs, at the beginning of each performance year and at other such times as specified by CMS. For purposes
11 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations of the Shared Savings Program, each ACO participant TIN upon which beneficiary assignment is dependent is required to commit to a 3-year agreement with CMS and will be exclusive to one ACO. ACO participant TINs upon which beneficiary assignment is not dependent are required to commit to a 3 year agreement to the ACO, and cannot require the ACO participant to be exclusive to a single ACO. Thus, the exclusivity necessary for the assignment process to work accurately requires a commitment of each assignment-based ACO participant to a single ACO for purposes of serving Medicare beneficiaries. It does not necessarily require exclusivity of each primary care physician (ACO provider/ supplier) whose services are the basis for such assignment. For example, exclusivity of an ACO participant leaves individual NPIs free to participate in multiple ACOs if they bill under several different TINs. Similarly, an individual NPI can move from one ACO to another during the agreement period, provided that he or she has not been billing under an individual TIN. A member of a group practice that is an ACO participant, where billing is conducted on the basis of the group s TIN, may move during the performance year from one group practice into another, or into solo practice, even if doing so involves moving from one ACO to another. This degree of flexibility is, in fact, one reason for our preference to use TINs to identify ACO participants over NPIs: adopting NPIs in place of TINs would result in the much stricter exclusivity rules for individual practitioners to which so many commenters objected, than the use of TINs to identify ACOs. This flexibility is limited, once again, only in cases where the ACO participant billing TIN and individual TIN are identical, as in the case of solo practitioners. Even in those cases, moreover, it was not our intent (and it is no part of the policy that we are adopting in this final rule) that an individual practitioner may not move from one practice to another. But while solo practitioners who have joined an ACO as an ACO participant and upon whom assignment is based may move during the agreement period, they may not participate in another ACO for purposes of the Shared Savings Program unless they will be billing under a different TIN in that ACO. We are therefore finalizing our proposal that each ACO participant TIN is required to commit to an agreement with us. In addition, each ACO participant TIN upon which beneficiary assignment is dependent must be exclusive to one ACO for purposes of the Shared Savings Program. ACO participant TINs upon which beneficiary assignment is not dependent are not required to be exclusive to a single ACO for purposes for the Shared Savings Program. As we discuss in section E found later in this final rule we are also providing for consideration of the primary care services provided by specialist physicians, PAs, and NPs in the assignment process subsequent to the identification of the triggering physician primary care services. We are therefore also extending our exclusivity policy to these ACO participants. That is, the TINs under which the services of specialists, PAs, and NPs are included in the assignment process would have to be exclusive to one ACO for purposes of the Shared Savings Program. (We emphasize that we are establishing this policy for purposes of Shared Savings Program ACOs only: Commercial ACOs may or may not wish to adopt a similar policy for their purposes.) Comment: One commenter supported our use of primary care physicians for alignment and urged us to retain the policy of non-exclusivity for specialists in the final rule: CMS s use of primary care physicians to align beneficiaries with an ACO is an important design element and we urge the agency to retain this provision in the final rule. As constructed, an ACO participant upon which beneficiary assignment is not dependent must not be required to be exclusive to an ACO ( 425.5(c)(3)). In the newly proposed Pioneer ACO regulation however, beneficiary assignment could be made on the basis of several categories of specialist physicians. Extending this Pioneer attribution scheme to the proposed Medicare Shared Savings/ACO program could result in decreased availability of specialist physicians and/or a reluctance of non-aco providers to refer to those specialists who are concerned that patients will be diverted to other ACO providers. We urge CMS to maintain the current rules aligning beneficiaries solely on the basis of their use of primary care physicians. Response: We appreciate the comment. However, in the light of our decision to employ a step-wise assignment process (as discussed in section II.E. of this final rule), this final exclusivity policy will also apply to ACO participants upon which assignment is based in either the first or second steps of the assignment process. As a result, this exclusivity will apply to ACO participants under which both primary care physicians and specialists bill for primary care services considered in the assignment process. However, we VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 emphasize again that individual provider NPIs are not exclusive to one ACO, only the ACO participant TINs under which providers bill for services that are included in the assignment of beneficiaries. When providers whose services are the basis of assignment bill under two or more TINs, each TIN would be exclusive to only one ACO, assuming they have both joined as participants, but the provider (primary care physician or specialist) would not be exclusive to one ACO. Comment: Many commenters objected to our proposal that FQHCs and RHCs could not form independent ACOs, but only participate in ACOs that included other eligible entities (for example, hospitals, and physician group practices). However, one commenter welcomed the opportunity for FQHCs to participate in multiple ACOs. Response: As we discuss in section II.E. of this final rule, we are revising our proposed policy to allow FQHCs and RHCs to form independent ACOs. We have also revised our proposed assignment methodology in order to permit claims for primary care services submitted by FQHCs and RHCs to be considered in the assignment process for any ACO that includes an FQHC or RHC (whether as an independent ACO or in conjunction with other eligible entities). As a consequence of this revised policy, the exclusivity of the ACO participants upon which beneficiary assignment is dependent also extends to the TINs of FQHCs and RHCs upon which beneficiary assignment will be dependent under the new policies discussed in section II.E. of this final rule. Final Decision: We are finalizing our proposals regarding operational definition of an ACO as a collection of Medicare-enrolled TINs, the obligation of the ACO to identify their ACO participant TINs and NPIs on the application, the obligation of the ACO to update the list, and the required exclusivity of ACO participants upon whom assignment is based without change under sections , (5), (d), , respectively. We clarify that ACO participants upon which beneficiary assignment is not dependent are not required to be exclusive to a single Medicare Shared Savings Program ACO. This final exclusivity policy extends to the ACO participant TINs of FQHCs, RHCs and ACO participants that include NP, PAs, and specialists upon which beneficiary assignment will be dependent under the revised assignment methodology discussed in section II.E. of this final rule.
12 67812 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 2. Eligible Participants Section 1899(b) of the Act establishes eligibility requirements for ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program. Section 1899(b)(1) of the Act allows several designated groups of providers of services and suppliers to participate as an ACO under this program, as determined appropriate by the Secretary, and under the condition that they have established a mechanism for shared governance. The statute lists the following groups of providers of services and suppliers as eligible to participate as an ACO: ACO professionals in group practice arrangements. Networks of individual practices of ACO professionals. Partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and ACO professionals. Hospitals employing ACO professionals. Such other groups of providers of services and suppliers as the Secretary determines appropriate. Section 1899(h)(1) of the Act defines an ACO professional as a physician (as defined in section 1861(r)(1) of the Act, which refers to a doctor of medicine or osteopathy), or a practitioner (as defined in section 1842(b)(18)(C)(i) of the Act, which includes physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and clinical nurse specialists). Section 1899(h)(2) of the Act also provides that, for purposes of the Shared Savings Program, the term hospital means a subsection (d) hospital as defined in section 1886(d)(1)(B) of the Act, thus limiting the definition to include only acute care hospitals paid under the hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS). Other providers of services and suppliers that play a critical role in the nation s health care delivery system, such as federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), rural health centers (RHCs), skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), nursing homes, long-term care hospitals (LTCHs), critical access hospitals (CAHs), nurse midwives, chiropractors, and pharmacists, among others, are not specifically designated as eligible participants in the Shared Savings Program under section 1899(b)(1) of the Act. Furthermore, while the statute enumerates certain kinds of provider and supplier groups that are eligible to participate in this program, it also provides the Secretary with discretion to tailor eligibility in a way that narrows or expands the statutory list of eligible ACO participants. Therefore, we explored several options: (1) Permit participation in the program by only those ACO participants that are specifically identified in the statute; (2) restrict eligibility to those ACO participants that would most effectively advance the goals of the program; or (3) employ the discretion provided to the Secretary under section 1899(b)(1)(E) of the Act to expand the list of eligible groups to include other types of Medicare-enrolled providers and suppliers identified in the Act. After evaluating the three alternatives, we decided to propose the third option. Since the statute requires that beneficiary assignment be determined on the basis of utilization of primary care services provided by ACO professionals that are physicians, we considered whether it would be feasible for CAHs, FQHCs, and RHCs to form an ACO or whether it would be necessary for these entities to join with one of the four groups specified in section 1899(b)(1)(A) (D) of the Act in order to meet statutory criteria. We especially considered the circumstances of CAHs, FQHCs, and RHCs because these entities play a critical role in the nation s health care delivery system, serving as safety net providers of primary care and other health care and social services. At the same time, we noted that the specific payment methodologies, claims billing systems, and data reporting requirements that apply to these entities posed some challenges in relation to their independent participation in the Shared Savings Program. In order for an entity to be able to form an ACO, it is necessary that we obtain sufficient data in order to carry out the necessary functions of the program, including assignment of beneficiaries, establishment and updating of benchmarks, and determination of shared savings, if any. As we discuss in section II.E. of this final rule, section 1899(c) of the Act requires the assignment of beneficiaries to an ACO based on their utilization of primary care services furnished by a physician. Thus, as required by the statute, the assignment methodology requires data that identify the precise services rendered (that is, primary care HCPCS codes), type of practitioner providing the service (that is, a MD/DO as opposed to NP, PA, or clinical nurse specialist), and the physician specialty in order to be able to assign beneficiaries to ACOs. We proposed that because of the absence of certain data elements required for assignment of beneficiaries, it would not be possible for FQHCs and RHCs to participate in the Shared Savings Program by forming their own ACOs. We stated that as the Shared Savings Program developed, we would continue to assess the possibilities for VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 collecting the requisite data from FQHCs and RHCs, and in light of any such developments, we would consider whether it would be possible at some future date for Medicare beneficiaries to be assigned to an ACO on the basis of services furnished by an FQHC or RHC, thereby allowing these entities to have their Medicare beneficiaries included in the ACO s assigned population. In the proposed rule, we further considered whether CAHs could participate in the Shared Savings Program by forming an independent ACO. We noted the situation is somewhat more complicated with regard to CAHs because section 1834(g) of the Act provides for two payment methods for outpatient CAH services. We described the payment methods in detail and determined that current Medicare payment and billing policies could generally support the formation of an ACO by a CAH billing under section 1834(g)(2) (referred to as method II). In summary, we proposed that the four groups specifically identified in section 1899(b)(1)(A) (D) of the Act (various combinations of physicians, nurse practitioners, physician assistants, clinical nurse specialists, and acute care hospitals), and CAHs billing under method II, would have the opportunity, after meeting the other eligibility requirements, to form ACOs independently. In addition, the four statutorily identified groups, as well as CAHs billing under method II, could establish an ACO with broader collaborations by including additional ACO participants that are Medicare enrolled entities such as FQHCs and RHCs and other Medicare-enrolled providers and suppliers not originally included in the statutory definition of eligible entities. We indicated in the proposed rule that we would consider whether it would be appropriate to expand the list of entities eligible to participate in the Shared Savings Program, either in the final rule or in future rulemaking, if we determined that it was feasible and consistent with the requirements of the program for more entities to participate as ACOs independently. In the interim, and until such time as FQHCs and RHCs would be eligible to form ACOs or have their patients assigned to an ACO, we proposed to provide an incentive for ACOs to include RHCs and FQHCs as ACO participants, by allowing ACOs that include such entities to receive a higher percentage of any shared savings under the program. We discuss our final policies regarding the determination of shared savings under the program in section II.G. of this final rule.
13 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations Comment: A large number of commenters requested an expansion of those entities eligible to participate in the Shared Savings Program. The commenters requested that entities such as, but not limited to, integrated delivery systems, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), paramedics, health plans, Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, Medicaid Managed Care Organizations, AEMTs, community based hospitals, DME Suppliers, home health agencies (HHAs), long-term care (LTC) facilities, in-patient rehabilitation facilities, hospice facilities, patient-centered medical homes, RHCs, FQHCs, and Method I CAHs be included as eligible entities. We received one comment inquiring whether non-pecos (Provider Enrollment, Chain, and Ownership System) enrolled providers can participate as ACO providers/suppliers. PECOs is a directory containing the names, addresses, phone numbers, and specialties of physicians enrolled in Medicare. Other comments suggested that we establish ESRD and cancer care specific ACOs. We received a few comments in support of limiting those entities eligible to participate in the program. These comments suggested that implementation of the Shared Savings Program will demand significant changes to health care delivery, data sharing, and data integration among providers and disparate groups. Providing clear guidance on who can participate reduces confusion and uncertainty within the provider and hospital community. Response: We agree that limiting eligibility could potentially reduce confusion but also agree that the inclusion of some additional entities as eligible to independently participate in the program could significantly increase the opportunity for success. Although the entities referenced in the comment, with the exception of CAHs billing under method II, RHCs and FQHCs, are not able to independently form ACOs, these entities are not prohibited from participating in the Shared Savings Program so long as they join as an ACO participant in an ACO containing one or more of the organizations that are eligible to form an ACO independently and upon which assignment could be made consistent with the statute and the assignment methodology discussed in section II.E. of this final rule. Thus, although we do not see the need to design distinct ESRD or cancer specific ACOs, neither of these providers types are in any manner excluded from participation in an ACO. This allows for the four groups specifically identified in section 1899(b)(1)(A) through (D) of the Act, and CAHs billing under method II, RHCs, and FQHCs to form ACOs independently. In addition, the four statutorily identified groups, as well as CAHs billing under method II, RHCs, and FQHCs could establish an ACO with broader collaborations by including additional Medicare-enrolled entities defined in the Act as ACO participants. This will afford ACOs the flexibility to include all types of providers and suppliers as ACO participants, as long as the ACO can satisfy the required eligibility standards. Finally, enrollment in the PECOs system, at this time, is not a condition of eligibility to participate in the Shared Savings Program. Comment: Many commenters, including MedPAC and commenters representing rural health advocates and a wide range of beneficiary and provider groups, raised concerns about the proposal which would preclude FQHCs and RHCs from forming independent ACOs. The commenters raised this issue in reference to eligibility, beneficiary assignment, and benchmarking issues. There were also several comments that agreed with the additional sharing rates for ACOs that include FQHCs and RHCs. Commenters generally supported eligibility approaches that would allow FQHCs/RHCs to join ACOs formed by other entities. Some commenters also generally supported our proposal that FQHCs/RHCs would not be required to be exclusive to a single ACO. Although commenters were generally appreciative of the proposal to provide a higher sharing rate for ACOs that include FQHCs and RHCs, some commenters believed this approach was flawed, too weak to be effective, and could undercut the objectives of the Shared Savings Program. Most commenters expressed general concerns that the CMS interpretation of the statute was incorrect and that the statute allows the agency to promulgate policies that will allow for full participation of FQHCs in the Shared Savings Program. Some commenters focused their detailed comments on FQHCs, but the concerns/ issues they raised were generally similar to those commenters that also addressed RHCs. Several commenters stated that CMS conclusions are flawed and that the law allows the agency to promulgate policies that will allow for full FQHC participation in the Shared Savings Program. They believe that a system that does not allow for meaningful FQHC involvement undercuts the Congressional intent in establishing the ACO/Shared Savings Program and the VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 broader goal of assuring quality cost efficient health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. They expressed fear that other payers such as Medicaid, CHIP and private health insurers will follow Medicare s approach and policies in developing their own ACO rules, leading to disparities in care. Another commenter suggested our proposal would prevent or limit dually eligible patients from receiving integrated care at FQHCs in light of State Medicaid efforts to create ACOs and our definition of at risk beneficiaries. Other commenters argued that RHCs represent a particularly compelling case for ACO formation inclusion. They believe that the promise of better integrated outpatient care for rural Medicare beneficiaries must begin with RHCs. These commenters believe that the exclusion of RHCs from those eligible to form an ACO independently would only serve to exclude rural providers and the populations they serve from forming efficiency enhancing ACOs that might serve to counterbalance the inpatient servicefavoring skew that they believe has developed out of many rural preferential payment provisions. Response: In this final rule we are addressing the specific comments regarding beneficiary assignment and the establishment of benchmarks for ACOs that include FQHCs and/or RHCs in sections II.E. and II.G. (Assignment and Benchmark) of this final rule while general comments regarding the eligibility of FQHCs and RHCs to form ACOs independently are addressed here. In the proposed rule, we proposed to use discretion afforded by the statute under section 1899(b)(1)(E) to allow participation of any Medicare-enrolled provider/supplier as an ACO participant. Thus, entities such as FQHCs and RHCs were eligible to participate in the program under our original proposal. However, we agree that it is highly desirable to allow for FQHCs and RHCs to participate independently and to determine a way to include their beneficiaries in assignment. In order for this to be possible, in this final rule we are making modifications to the proposed assignment process to recognize the different payment methodologies and claims data that are used by FQHCs and RHCs as compared to the payment methodologies and claims data that are available for physician offices/clinics that are paid under the physician fee schedule. The discussion about assignment and benchmarking process is in sections II.E. (Assignment) and II.G. (Benchmarking) of this final rule. As a result, under the policies
14 67814 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations established in this final rule, FQHCs and RHCs will be eligible to form ACOs and may also be ACO participants in ACOs formed by other entities. Additionally, Medicare enrolled entities may join independent FQHCs, RHCs, and method II billing CAH ACOs. Comment: Some commenters supported our proposal to allow CAHs billing under method II to form ACOs. A few commenters also recommended allowing CAHs billing under method I to form independent ACOs by supplementing their normal billing information with any additional information needed to assign beneficiaries. For example, a commenter indicated that because most rural facilities act as de facto sole providers for their communities, CAHs and SCH s should be able to claim all beneficiaries in their primary catchment area. The commenter suggested doing so by having the rural providers submit the 75th percentile zip codes from their patient demographic data. These zip codes could then be compared to the Medicare beneficiary claims data, and if the claims data also show that the beneficiaries in those zip codes receive >50 percent of their primary care services within the zip codes of the rural ACO, then all of the beneficiaries in those zip codes could be assigned to the rural ACO. Response: We do not agree with allowing CAHs billing under method I to independently form ACOs by simply claiming all beneficiaries in their primary catchment area. We do not believe that this would be consistent with the statutory requirement for assignment based on beneficiary utilization of primary care services furnished by a physician. Although we do not believe it would be appropriate for a CAH billing under method I to independently form an ACO, we would emphasize that we would encourage CAHs billing under method I to participate in the Shared Savings Program by establishing partnerships or joint venture arrangements with ACO professionals, just like other hospitals. Comment: Some commenters suggested using CMS s demonstration authority to include FQHCs and RHCs in the Shared Savings Program or another Shared Savings Program. Others recommended that CMS should continue to work with providers and patients practicing and living in rural underserved areas to develop ACO models specifically designed to meet the unique healthcare delivery challenges facing rural underserved areas. Response: We appreciate the comments suggesting the development of ACO models to address the special needs of rural areas and have forwarded them to our colleagues in the Innovation Center. We will consider any additional demonstrations focused on ACOs as part of the regular process for establishing CMS demonstrations. We note, however, that as discussed previously, under the policies adopted in this final rule, FQHCs and RHCs will be eligible to form an ACO independently or to participate in an ACO formed by other eligible entities. Comment: A few commenters suggested that CMS should refine its strategies to facilitate development of practitioner-driven, rather than hospitaldriven ACO s. Comments further suggested that at the very least, waiver authority should be established to enable the agency to waive hospitaloriented requirements for ACOs that consist solely of group practices. Response: There is no requirement that an ACO include a hospital. Similarly, we have not established any hospital-oriented requirements. We have intentionally provided ACOs the flexibility to establish their organizations in such a manner that will most effectively define their preferred ACO model. Final Decision: We are finalizing our proposals for identifying groups of providers of services and suppliers that may join to form an ACO under Specifically, the entities identified in section 1899(b)(1)(A) through (D) of the Act will be able to form ACOs, provided they meet all other eligibility requirements. Additionally, CAHs billing under method II, FQHCs, and RHCs may also form independent ACOs if they meet the eligibility requirements specified in this final rule. In addition, any Medicare enrolled entities not specified in the statutory definition of eligible entities in section 1899(b)(1)(A) (D) of the Act can participate in the Shared Savings Program as ACO participants by joining an ACO containing one or more of the organizations eligible to form an ACO. Additionally, in response to comments and after further consideration of the available information, we have established a process by which primary care services furnished by FQHCs and RHCs will be included in the assignment process, as discussed in section II.E. of this final rule. As a result, FQHCs and RHCs will also be able to form ACOs independently, provided they meet all other eligibility requirements. 3. Legal Structure and Governance Section 1899(b)(2)(C) of the Act requires an ACO to have a formal legal structure that would allow the VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 organization to receive and distribute payments for shared savings to participating providers of services and suppliers. As previously noted, section 1899(b)(1) of the Act also requires ACO participants to have a mechanism for shared governance in order to be eligible to participate in the program. Operationally, an ACO s legal structure must provide both the basis for its shared governance as well as the mechanism for it to receive and distribute shared savings payments to ACO participants and providers/ suppliers. a. Legal Entity In order to implement the statutory requirements that ACOs have a shared governance mechanism and a formal legal structure for receiving and distributing shared payments, we proposed that an ACO be an organization that is recognized and authorized to conduct its business under applicable State law and is capable of (1) receiving and distributing shared savings; (2) repaying shared losses, if applicable; (3) establishing, reporting, and ensuring ACO participant and ACO provider/ supplier compliance with program requirements, including the quality performance standards; and (4) performing the other ACO functions identified in the statute. We explained that it is necessary for each ACO to be constituted as a legal entity appropriately recognized and authorized to conduct its business under applicable State law and that it must have a TIN. However, we did not propose to require ACO enrollment in the Medicare program. We did not propose that existing legal entities form a separate new entity for the purpose of participating in the Shared Savings Program. We stated that if the existing legal entity met the eligibility requirements to be an ACO, it may operate as an ACO in the Shared Savings Program. However, we proposed that if an entity, such as a hospital employing ACO professionals would like to include as ACO participants other providers/suppliers who are not already part of its existing legal structure, an ACO would have to establish a separate legal entity in order to provide all ACO participants a mechanism for shared governance. We also proposed that each ACO certify that it is recognized as a legal entity under State law and authorized by the State to conduct its business. In addition, an ACO with operations in multiple States would have to certify that it is recognized as a legal entity in the State in which it was established
15 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations and that it is authorized to conduct business in each State in which it operates. We solicited comment on our proposals regarding the required legal structure and other suitable requirements that we should consider adding in the final rule or through subsequent rulemaking. We also requested comment on whether requirements for the creation of a separate entity would create disincentives for the formation of ACOs and whether there were alternative approaches that could be used to achieve the aims of shared governance and decision making and provide the ability to receive and distribute payments for shared savings. Comment: Many commenters opposed requiring ACOs formed among multiple ACO participants to form a separate legal entity, because it was costly, inefficient, and wasteful to do so (especially for small and medium-sized physician practices). These commenters also contend that forming a separate entity places such ACOs at a competitive disadvantage relative to integrated delivery systems (for example single-entity ACOs), it will likely have a chilling effect on the willingness of such providers and suppliers to participate in the program, and it disadvantages hospitals in States with a prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine. Several commenters supported allowing multiple participant ACOs to form an entity by contract and not require a separate new entity. These commenters recommended that we permit ACOs comprised of multiple ACO participants to designate one of those ACO participants to function as the ACO for purposes of participation in the program, provided that such entity meets the criteria required of an ACO under the final rule. Another commenter suggested letting a division of an existing corporation serve as the legal entity for an ACO. Specifically, this comment noted that licenseexempt, medical foundation clinics in California are often formed as either a division of a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates a hospital or have as their sole corporate member a nonprofit hospital, such as a nonprofit, licenseexempt, medical foundation clinic. One commenter suggested that ACOs that have outcome-based contracts with private payers should have flexibility in forming their legal entities. Many commenters supported the proposal not to require creation of a new distinct legal entity if one is already in place that meets the proposed criteria. Commenters stated that such a requirement is unnecessary to meet the objectives of the Shared Savings Program. Some commenters suggested existing organizations should not be forced to create whole new bureaucracies just to add a few participants to form an ACO. Response: We continue to support our proposal that each ACO certify that it is recognized as a legal entity under State law. An ACO formed among two or more otherwise independent ACO participants (such as between a hospital and two physician group practices) will be required to establish a separate legal entity and to obtain a TIN. Although some comments opposed this requirement as burdensome, we continue to believe it is essential to protect against fraud and abuse and ensure that the ACO is accountable for its responsibilities under the Shared Savings Program by enabling us to audit and assess ACO performance. In addition, to the extent an ACO becomes liable for shared losses, we believe it is essential to be able to collect such monies from the ACO and its ACO participants. For existing legal entities that otherwise meet the eligibility requirements, we agree with commenters that requiring the creation of a new separate legal entity would be inefficient. Existing legal entities which are eligible to be ACOs are permitted to continue to use their existing legal structure as long as they meet other eligibility and governance requirements explained in this final rule. However, as we proposed, if an existing legal entity adds ACO participants that will remain independent legal entities (such as through a joint venture among hospitals or group practices), it would have to create a new legal entity to do so. As discussed later in this section, we believe that creation of a new legal entity would be important to allow the newly added ACO participants to have a meaningful voice on the ACO s governing body. A separate legal entity, with such a governing body, is therefore essential to accomplish this policy objective. Although we recognize that it may be possible for ACOs to establish outcomebased contracts that reinforce some of the policy objectives discussed in the proposed rule, we believe that the proposed legal structure requirement is necessary to protect against fraud and abuse and ensure the goals of the Shared Savings Program, and does not impose too large a burden, especially in light of the flexible governance structure discussed later in this section. Comment: Several commenters suggested we address the interplay VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 between Federal and State law governing ACO formation and operation. For example, commenters suggested we clarify whether the proposed legal entity requirements include requiring an ACO to obtain a certificate of authority if so required under State law. One commenter suggested that we clarify whether we are requiring that an ACO be recognized as an ACO under State law or whether we are requiring that the ACO be recognized to conduct business as a partnership, corporation, etc. under State law. Other commenters suggested that we preempt State law or regulation of ACOs that limit the number of ACOs in a State. By contrast, another comment suggested that the Affordable Care Act did not preempt or otherwise supersede State laws prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine or otherwise alter the choice of legal entities available to ACOs for formation in particular States. In addition, some commenters recommended that we require that if an ACO assumes insurance risk, it should meet all the consumer protection, market conduct, accreditation, solvency, and other requirements consistent with State laws. One commenter suggested that we require ACOs that operate in more than one State to attest that they operate under each State s rules rather than a blend of multiple States rules for all business and other operational functions (including health information management, release of information, privacy/confidentiality, data quality, etc.). Some commenters suggested that the proposed definition of ACO would exclude entities organized pursuant to Federal and tribal law, and recommended that we also allow ACOs to be organized under Federal or tribal law as well. Response: We continue to believe that an ACO should be recognized as a legal entity under State law and authorized by the State to conduct its business. We intended this requirement to ensure the ACO would be licensed to do business in the State consistent with all applicable State law requirements. Consequently, we are finalizing our proposal that an ACO that participates in the Shared Savings Program meet State law requirements to operate in that State. We are not requiring an ACO be licensed as an ACO under State law unless, however, State law requires such licensure. We disagree with the commenters that participating in the Shared Savings Program ultimately involves insurance risk. ACO participants will continue to receive FFS payments for all services
16 67816 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations furnished to assigned beneficiaries. It is only shared savings payments (and shared losses in the two-sided model) that will be contingent upon ACO performance. As a result, we believe that we will continue to bear the insurance risk associated with the care furnished to Medicare beneficiaries, but ACOs desiring to participate in Track 2 should consult their State laws. To clarify, we are not preempting any State laws or State law requirements in this final rule. To the extent that State law affects an ACO s operations, we expect the ACO to comply with those requirements as an entity authorized to conduct business in the State. We do not believe it is necessary to make ACOs attest to do what they otherwise would be required to do under State law. We agree with commenters that we do not want to exclude ACOs that are licensed under Federal or tribal law. Accordingly, we are modifying our original proposal to clarify that entities organized pursuant to Federal and tribal law will also be allowed to participate in the Shared Savings Program, as long as the entity is able to meet the participation requirements as outlined in this final rule. Final Decision: We are finalizing our proposal that an ACO must be a legal entity for purposes of all program functions identified in this final rule. We are also finalizing commenters suggestion that ACOs licensed under Federal or tribal law are eligible to participate in the Shared Savings Program. In addition, an ACO formed among multiple ACO participants must provide evidence in its application that it is a legal entity separate from any of its ACO participants. ( ) b. Distribution of Shared Savings As discussed previously, an ACO must be a legal entity appropriately recognized and authorized to conduct its business under State, Federal, or tribal law, and must be identified by a TIN. In the proposed rule we proposed to make any shared savings payments directly to the ACO as identified by its TIN, we noted that unlike the ACO participants and the ACO providers/ suppliers that form the ACO, the legal entity that is the ACO may or may not be enrolled in the Medicare program. We acknowledged the potential for this proposal to raise program integrity concerns, because allowing shared savings payments to be made directly to a non-medicare-enrolled entity would likely impede the program s ability to recoup overpayments as there would be no regular payments that could be offset. This is part of the rationale for requiring safeguards for assuring ACO repayment of shared losses described in section II.G. of this final rule. We solicited comment on our proposal to make shared savings payments directly to the ACO, as identified by its TIN. In addition, we solicited comment on our proposal to make shared savings payments to a non-medicare-enrolled entity. We proposed to require ACOs to provide a description in their application of the criteria they plan to employ for distributing shared savings among ACO participants and ACO providers/suppliers, how any shared savings will be used to align with the three-part aim. As we stated in the proposed rule, we believe this requirement would achieve the most appropriate balance among objectives for encouraging participation, innovation, and achievement of an incentive payment while still focusing on the three-part aim. Comment: Several commenters recommended that CMS explicitly state that the ACO is required to demonstrate that ACO participants will be able to share in savings and that CMS outline exactly how the savings will be distributed while other commenters suggested that CMS work with the provider community to develop principles that ACOs should follow to ensure fair and equitable distribution of shared savings. Other commenters suggested that a requirement be established that some pre-determined portion of any shared savings be directed to improving patient care unless there is little room for improvement for ACOs in the final quality measures. A few commenters requested that standards be established regarding the length of time (ranging from 15 days to 90 days) an ACO has to actually share any savings generated with its respective providers. Finally, a commenter expressed concern that when partnering with a hospital-based system, primary care providers would not be rewarded for the significantly increased work that will be required on their part in order for an ACO to be successful. Instead this money would be used by the hospital system to replace lost revenue on the hospital side. Response: We will make any shared savings payments directly to the ACO as identified by its TIN. As explained in the proposed rule, the statute does not specify how shared savings must be distributed, only that the ACO be a legal entity so that the ACO can accept and distribute shared savings. We do not believe we have the legal authority to dictate how shared savings are distributed, however, we believe it would be consistent with the purpose VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 and intent of the statute to require the ACO to indicate as part of its application how it plans to use potential shared savings to meet the goals of the program. Consistent with the discussion found later in this final rule regarding the shared governance of an ACO, we anticipate that ACO participants would negotiate and determine among themselves how to equitably distribute shared savings or use the shared savings to meet the goals of the program. Final Decision: We will finalize our proposals under (d) without change. c. Governance Section 1899(b)(1) of the Act requires that an ACO have a mechanism for shared governance and section 1899(b)(2)(F) of the Act requires that an ACO shall have in place a leadership and management structure that includes clinical and administrative systems. However, the statute does not specify the elements that this shared governance mechanism or the accompanying leadership and management structures must possess. We proposed that such a governance mechanism should allow for appropriate proportionate control for ACO participants, giving each ACO participant a voice in the ACO s decision making process, and be sufficient to meet the statutory requirements regarding clinical and administrative systems. We proposed that an ACO also must establish and maintain a governing body with adequate authority to execute the statutory functions of an ACO. The governing body may be a board of directors, board of managers, or any other governing body that provides a mechanism for shared governance and decision-making for all ACO participants, and that has the authority to execute the statutory functions of an ACO, including for example, to define processes to promote evidenced-based medicine and patient engagement, report on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care. We proposed that this body must be separate and unique to the ACO when the ACO participants are not already represented by an existing legal entity appropriately recognized and authorized to conduct its business under applicable State law. In those instances where the ACO is an existing legal entity that has a pre-existing board of directors or other governing body, we proposed that the ACO would not need to form a separate governing body. In this case, the existing entity s governing body would be the governing body of the ACO, and the ACO would be required to provide in its application
17 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations evidence that its pre-existing board of directors or other governing body, meets all other criteria required for ACO governing bodies. We also proposed that the ACO have a conflicts of interest policy that applies to members of the governing body. The conflicts of interest policy must require members of the governing body to disclose relevant financial interests. Further, the policy must provide a procedure for the ACO to determine whether a conflict of interest exists and set forth a process to address any conflicts that arise. Such a policy also must address remedial action for members of the governing body that fail to comply with the policy. We requested comment on whether these requirements for the creation of a governing body as a mechanism for shared governance would create disincentives for the formation of ACOs and whether there were alternative requirements that could be used to achieve the aims of shared governance and decision making. We also acknowledged that allowing existing entities to be ACOs would complicate our monitoring and auditing of these ACOs, and sought comment on this issue. Comment: Although most comments supported the principle of ACO shared governance, many commenters opposed the separate governing body requirement. Some commenters stated that we exceeded our authority by imposing a separate governing body requirement. Other commenters suggested that the separate governing body requirement would discourage organizations from participating in the Shared Savings Program and increase their costs to do so. Commenters explained that existing entities already have relationships with commercial payers and it would not make sense for them to maintain multiple boards, because it is costly and organizationally complex to do so. Many commenters urged us to provide flexibility so that ACOs could use their current governance process, as long as they can demonstrate how they will achieve shared governance on care delivery policies. Some commenters explained that hospitals and other large physician groups have governing bodies designed specifically for quality and outcome reviews and oversight for clinical integration and performance appraisal, training and discipline. Commenters suggested that ACOs can be effectively governed by an operating committee within their existing governance and management structure, as is a hospital medical staff governed semi-autonomously within a hospital s governance structure. Commenters also suggested that ACOs should be permitted to access existing assets and systems, such as advisory boards, so long as the ACO management committee exercises sufficient control over these processes with respect to ACO activities to generate ACO desired outcomes. Other commenters had specific concerns about how the separate entity requirement would apply to their current or planned organizational structure. One commenter, an integrated, State-wide health system, suggested that we permit it to operate as a State wide/multi-state ACO with various regional/local ACOs as its ACO participants. In this structure, the corporate organization would handle the claims processing, reporting, and distribution of savings and the financial backing for potential loss for the regional ACO healthcare operational units. The regional ACOs would have their own board and each regional ACO would be represented on the State-wide/ multi-state board. This commenter claimed that this type of structure would take advantage of the cost savings that result from economies of scale for administrative and other functions, but would keep health care delivery local. Another commenter suggested allowing an ACO governing body s authority to be delegated from an existing governing body that possesses broad reserved powers. One commenter suggested we clarify the responsibilities of the board as distinct from those of management. In this commenter s view, governing board s role should be one of oversight and strategic direction, holding management accountable to meeting goals of ACO. Another commenter suggested that the governance structure be organized more like a scientific advisory board that will analyze the results of the particular ACO s methodology for treating its patients. Response: Our proposal to require an ACO to have a separate governing body unless it is an existing legal entity that has a pre-existing governing body is consistent with the proposed and final requirements regarding legal entity requirements discussed previously. Thus, we disagree with the commenters that suggested that such a requirement would discourage participation in the Shared Savings Program or disrupt existing relationships with commercial payers. Moreover, for ACOs formed among otherwise independent ACO participants, we will finalize our proposal that these ACOs create an identifiable governing body. This requirement is consistent with our final rule that requires such ACOs to create VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 a separate legal entity. Notwithstanding this requirement, we agree with commenters that ACOs formed among multiple otherwise independent ACO participants, should have flexibility to establish a mechanism for shared governance as required by statute. As discussed later in this section of this final rule, we are revising our specific proposals to provide ACO greater flexibility in the composition of their governing bodies. We also agree with commenters who suggested that we should clarify the governing body s responsibilities. An ACO s governing body shall provide oversight and strategic direction, holding management accountable for meeting the goals of the ACO, which include the three-part aim. This responsibility is broader than care delivery processes as suggested by numerous commenters and, in fact, encompasses not only care delivery, but also processes to promote evidencebased medicine, patient engagement, reporting on quality and cost, care coordination, distribution of shared savings, establishing clinical and administrative systems, among other functions. We believe that because of these broad responsibilities, the governing body is ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the ACO. We believe that an identifiable governing body is a reasonable prerequisite for eligibility to participate in the Shared Savings Program. As discussed previously, an existing legal entity is permitted to use its current governing body. An ACO formed among otherwise independent ACO participants must establish an identifiable governing body. A governing body that is identifiable can help insulate against conflicts of interest that could potentially put the interest of an ACO participant (in an ACO formed among otherwise independent ACO participants) before the interest of the ACO. In fact, we believe an identifiable governing body will facilitate accomplishing the ACO s mission. Comment: Numerous commenters expressed support for the requirement that the governing body include all ACO participants. For example, one commenter supported the proposal, because such a requirement would also aid CMS, FTC, and DOJ in their efforts to thwart anti-competitive behavior among ACOs. By contrast, many commenters suggested it would be unwieldy to have representatives from each participant on the governing body, because the governing body would be difficult to operate effectively. Other commenters
18 67818 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations stated that an ACO should not, for example, have to include each solopractitioner physician participant on the board. Some commenters suggested that a requirement for each ACO participant to be on the governing body would permit competitors to be on each other s boards and, thus, could be anticompetitive. Many commenters indicated that we should be concerned with the outcome of the program, not with who is on an ACO s board. One commenter suggested that ACO participants be shareholders, members, or other owners of the ACO, and the ACO participants would select the governing body members. Another commenter suggested that we require an ACO to demonstrate how ACO participants have a super-majority on a medical standards committee that has responsibility to define processes to promote evidenced-based medicine and patient engagement, report on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care. However, one commenter suggested that limiting a governance voice to physicians and hospitals reduces the chances that the aim CMS expresses of reduced dependence on inpatient care will be realized. Several commenters suggested that the requirement that all participants be on the governing body may conflict with State law requirements. Response: Although we believe that each ACO participant should have a voice in the ACO s governance, we are convinced by the comments that there are many ways to achieve this objective without requiring that each ACO participant be a member of the ACO s governing body. Thus, we will not finalize our proposal that each Medicare-enrolled ACO participant TIN, or its representative, be on the ACO s governing body. We agree with commenters that the governing bodies could become unwieldy and lose their effectiveness if we were to finalize this proposal. Such a requirement, as the commenters explained, could conflict with State law requirements regarding governing body requirements. Instead we will require an ACO to provide meaningful participation in the composition and control of the ACO s governing body for ACO participants or their designated representatives. We disagree, however, with the comment that ACO participants who may be competitors outside of the ACO s activities necessarily raise competitive concerns when they jointly participate on the ACO s governing body. The ACO requires an integration of economic activity by ACO participants, and participants participation in the governing body is in furtherance of that integration. Nonetheless, as explained in the final Antitrust Policy Statement, ACOs should refrain from, and implement appropriate firewalls or other safeguards against, conduct that may facilitate collusion among ACO participants in the sale of competing services outside the ACO. Comment: Commenters were divided in their support for the proportionate control requirement. Many commenters suggested that the proportionate share requirement is too rigid and inflexible. Several commenters stated that the concept of constituent or representative governance is antithetical to the most basic tenants of State corporation law, including the requirement of undivided loyalty applicable to members of a corporation s board of directors and the right of the shareholders of the for-profit corporation and members of nonprofit corporations to elect the governing body that is otherwise responsible for overseeing and directing the management of the corporation. Other commenters explained that the requirements are unnecessary because fiduciary decisions should be made in the best interests of the ACO as an entire organization and should not represent the individual interests of the ACO participants or any specific agendas. Other comments suggested that they would have to reconstitute their boards if we applied such a requirement. By contrast, many commenters supported this requirement if it were applied on a per participant basis, while others supported it if it were based on capital contributions. Several commenters sought clarification as to how proportionate share should be assessed and suggested that we provide guidance to avoid tangled power struggles. Commenters suggested various methods, including: distribution of Medicare costs among the various participants in the ACO, capital contributions, per participant, equity dollars, dollars received, savings generated from operations, RVUs delivered, number of Medicare lives attributed, physicians within a TIN, or on any reasonable basis. One commenter suggested that proportionate control means representation of all specialists that provide care to an ACO s beneficiaries. Response: In light of our decision to allow ACOs flexibility in how they establish their governing bodies, we will not finalize our proposal that each ACO participant have proportionate control of the ACO governing body. Comment: Several commenters suggested that we require specialty practitioner representatives on the VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 governing body, including specialists who have experience and expertise in hospice and palliative care, hematology, cataract surgery, endocrinology, surgery, mental health. Other commenters suggested that we require governing body representation of home health care and long-term care providers, the allied professions, and community stakeholders. One commenter sought a specific role for nurses on the governing body. Another commenter suggested encouraging representation from local high-level public health officials on ACO governing bodies to help inform population health and cost-containment goals. One commenter suggested that at least one stakeholder on the board be a representative of a local hospital, regardless of whether any hospital is a participant in the ACO, because all care settings should be considered. One commenter suggested that we require ACO governing bodies to include local employers and multi-state large employer plan sponsors with experience in quality improvement and reporting and providing timely information to consumers on ACOs governance boards to successfully improve quality, reduce unnecessary costs and drive through transformational change. Other commenters urged us to state that every professional service involved with the ACO be represented on the governing body. Response: In light of our decision to allow ACOs flexibility in how they establish their governing bodies, we will not require representation of particular categories of providers and suppliers or other stakeholders. Comment: Several commenters suggested we provide broad guidance on desired ACO outcomes and processes without specifying how an ACO s governing body achieves these outcomes. Other commenters suggested that we articulate the attributes of governance that we believe are important to ACOs (for example, importance of ACO participant input, the role of non-aco participants in governance, or that ACOs that are taxexempt entities would be expected to comply with exemption requirements) and then require the ACO to include a description in its application on how governance of ACO would align with these attributes. Other commenters suggested similar approaches, such as requiring the ACO applicant to describe its governing body and general rationale for its composition, how ACO participants and providers will achieve shared governance and decision-making such that they have significant input and control over decisions about how
19 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations care will be delivered and beneficiaries voices heard. Commenters suggested that this flexibility would permit the ACO to determine the appropriate balance of incorporating direct participant involvement in the governance of the ACO, including board involvement, and also using operating committees where a more limited group of ACO participants would have significant input, direction and involvement in specific activities the ACO. Another commenter urged us to deem the governance structure of entities that are qualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to meet the proposed governance requirements. One commenter recommended that we require all ACOs: (1) To enact policies and procedures to ensure that physicians who participate in the ACO are free to exercise independent medical judgment; and (2) to adopt a conflict-ofinterest disclosure policy to ensure that the governing body appropriately represents the interests of the ACO. One commenter suggested the ACO be governed by a Board of Directors that is elected by physicians in the ACO. Another commenter suggested in those cases where a hospital is part of an ACO, the governing board should be separate and independent of the hospital governing body. Several commenters urged us to require a majority of the ACO s governing body to be approved by ACO participants. Response: We agree with commenters that we should articulate our views related to governance. We will finalize the requirement that the governing body provides oversight and strategic direction for the ACO, holding management accountable for meeting the goals of the ACO, which include the three-part aim. Members of the governing body shall have a fiduciary duty to put the ACO s interests before the interests of any one ACO participant or ACO provider/supplier. The governing body also must have a transparent governing process to ensure that we are able to monitor and audit the ACO as appropriate. Final Decision: In sum, we are finalizing the requirement that an ACO must maintain an identifiable governing body with authority to execute the functions of the ACO as defined in this final rule, including but not limited to, the definition of processes to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement, report on quality and cost measures, and coordinating care. The governing body must have responsibility for oversight and strategic direction of the ACO, holding ACO management accountable for the ACO s activities. The governing body must have a transparent governing process. The governing body members shall have a fiduciary duty to the ACO and must act consistent with that fiduciary duty. The ACO must have a conflicts of interest policy for the governing body. The ACO must provide for meaningful participation in the composition and control of the ACO s governing body for ACO participants or their designated representatives. ( ). d. Composition of the Governing Body As we explained in the proposed rule, we believe that the ACO should be operated and directed by Medicareenrolled entities that directly provide health care services to beneficiaries. We acknowledged, however, that small groups of providers often lack both the capital and infrastructure necessary to form an ACO and to administer the programmatic requirements of the Shared Savings Program and could benefit from partnerships with non- Medicare enrolled entities. For this reason, we proposed that to be eligible for participation in the Shared Savings Program, the ACO participants must have at least 75 percent control of the ACO s governing body. In addition, each of the ACO participants must choose an appropriate representative from within its organization to represent them on the governing body. We explained that these requirements would ensure that ACOs remain provider-driven, but also leave room for both non-providers and small provider groups to participate in the program. Additionally, we proposed that ACOs provide for patient involvement in their governing process. We proposed that in order to satisfy this requirement, ACOs must include a Medicare FFS beneficiary serviced by the ACO on the ACO governing body. In order to safeguard against any conflicts of interest, we proposed that any patients included on an ACO s governing body, or an immediate family member, must not have a conflict of interest, and they must not be an ACO provider/supplier. We believed a conflict of interest standard was necessary to help effectuate our intent to ensure beneficiaries have a genuine voice in ACO governance. We sought comment on whether the requirement for beneficiary participation on the governing body should include a minimum standard for such participation. We also sought comment on the possible role of a Medicare beneficiary advisory panel to promote patient engagement in ACO governance. Comment: Numerous commenters supported the proposed 75 percent VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 threshold requirement for ACO participants and suppliers because they believe ACOs should be provider driven. Other commenters supported the 75 percent threshold because they believed that more than 25 percent nonparticipant investment could lead to disparities among Shared Savings Program stakeholders, create a conflict of interest, and impede the goal of efficient care delivery. One commenter urged us to clarify that up to 25 percent of the board can be represented by health plans and management companies. Several commenters sought clarification about how to assess the 75 percent requirement in the situation of hospital employment of providers, and whether it is the employer or the employee that must be represented. By contrast, several commenters urged us to eliminate the 75 percent threshold because it is overly prescriptive, will prevent many existing integrated systems from applying, fails to acknowledge that governing bodies will balance representation across all the populations it covers for multiple payers that may, for instance, encourage participation of local businesses on the governing body, and will be unnecessarily disruptive to many organizations, especially those with consumer-governed boards. Several commenters suggested that we should recognize that each governing body will need to be structured differently depending on its historical makeup, the interest in participation, and other market dynamics. One commenter suggested that requiring the exact same governance structure for all ACOs risks creating inefficient bureaucracy that does not improve quality or reduce costs. Several commenters also suggested that this restriction is likely to restrict ACO access to, and effective use of, multiple streams of capital for investing in high-value care. Other commenters argued that the restriction is likely to hinder formation of primary care physician-led organizations because they will not be able to implement effective care management and advanced information technology implementation, and lack the ability to negotiate and administer provider contracts without the participation of outside entities. Another commenter suggested the 75 percent requirement could have a chilling effect on the willingness of private payers to invest in and partner with ACOs. Some commenters stated that the 75 percent requirement may conflict with IRS policy that requires governing bodies of tax-exempt entities to be comprised of a broad spectrum of
20 67820 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations community members. Another commenter suggested that 501(c)(3) hospitals or health systems would find it difficult to form an ACO as a joint venture because the IRS requires those nonprofits to demonstrate that the joint venture is in the charity s interest and that charitable assets are not used for private inurement. Other commenters noted that the 75 percent requirement could conflict with State law requirements such as ones requiring governing boards of public hospitals to be elected, or that in order for nonprofit health care entities to maintain an exemption from certain State s business and occupation tax, paid employees cannot serve on the governing board. Other commenters suggested that we extend the same flexibility we proposed to provide to ACOs with regard to leadership and management structures to our governance requirements. Response: We continue to believe that the 75-percent control requirement is necessary to ensure that ACOs are provider driven, as requested by the comments. The implication of this requirement is that non-medicare enrolled entities, such as management companies and health plans may have less than 25 percent voting control of the ACO governing body. For example, if a hospital, two physician groups, and a health plan formed an ACO, the hospital and two physician groups must control at least 75 percent of the ACO governing body. We decline, as previously discussed, to require how the voting control of the hospital and two physicians groups is apportioned among them. Although we recognize commenters concern that this threshold could reduce the amount of investment capital available to ACOs, we believe it strikes an appropriate balance to incent and empower ACO participants to be accountable for the success of the ACO s operations. We also clarify that existing entity ACOs, such as a hospital employing ACO professionals, by definition, would have 100 percent control of the governing body, because the existing entity is the only member of the governing body. Notwithstanding this requirement, we also agree with commenters that we should provide ACOs with flexibility regarding the composition of the ACO s governing body. This flexibility is discussed later in this section of this final rule and provides a means for an ACO to compose its governing body to involve ACO participants in innovative ways in ACO governance. We believe this flexibility obviates the commenters concerns that the 75 percent threshold would conflict with laws governing the composition of tax-exempt or Statelicensed entities. Comment: In response to our request for comments on whether our requirement that 75 percent control of the governing body be held by ACO participants was an appropriate percentage, commenters suggested a variety of different percentage requirements on the governing body for certain types of ACO physicians and other health care providers. Commenters suggested that physicians occupy at least one-third, one-half, or greater than one-half of governing body seats. Other commenters suggested that primary care physicians comprise at least 50 percent of the ACO governing body and independent practices have representation proportionate to their percentage of ACO physicians, while another commenter suggested that the governing body include an equal number of primary care and specialty physicians to guarantee that ACOs leadership structures focus on primary care, prevention, care coordination and disease management. Another commenter suggested that 50 percent of the governing body consist of physicians who have their own practice and not physicians who are employed directly or indirectly by a hospital system. By contrast, some commenters suggested that we require a more balanced composition, with 50 percent ACO participant representation, a majority of which should be primary care providers, and 50 percent key community stakeholders who do not derive livelihood from the ACO or one of its products. Some commenters suggested that the inclusion of employer and/or labor representatives in the community stakeholder portion would also serve as a way to help prevent costshifting to the private sector. Another commenter suggested a bare minimum of provider representation, because anything more may bring in members to the board who do not have the requisite skill and experience to function in a leadership role. Response: For the reasons previously discussed, we will finalize our proposal to require 75 percent control by ACO participants that are Medicare-enrolled TINs. We decline, as previously discussed, to require how the voting control will be apportioned among ACO participants. Comment: Some commenters supported the requirement that each ACO participant choose an appropriate representative from within its organization to represent them on the governing body. Several commenters sought clarification about the VerDate Mar<15> :03 Nov 01, 2011 Jkt PO Frm Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02NOR2.SGM 02NOR2 requirement. For example, one commenter sought clarification that an employee of an IPA (which is a member of an ACO) can be the representative on the board. Other commenters sought clarification about the word organization in the phrase from within its organization, specifically whether organization meant each and every ACO participant s organization or the ACO as an organization. Response: Under our proposal, we intended that a representative from each ACO participant would be included on the ACO s governing body. But, as previously discussed, we believe that ACOs should have flexibility to construct their governing bodies in a way that allows them to achieve the three-part aim in the way they see fit. Accordingly, we will eliminate the requirement that each ACO participant choose an appropriate representative from within its organization to represent it on the governing body. Comment: Several commenters were unclear whether we were requiring that all entities with which an ACO contracts would be considered an ACO participant and therefore have a seat on the governing body. In particular, some commenters sought clarification about the interaction between an ACO and a third party that would develop the technology, systems, processes and administrative functions for the ACO. Other comments sought clarification of whether we will consider a provider system one ACO or multiple ACO participants, because the individuals within the system each have separate TINs that are eligible as ACOs in their own right. Response: We expect that ACOs, in some instances, will contract with third parties to provide technology, systems, processes, and administrative functions for the ACO. These entities are not ACO participants as that term is defined in of these regulations. Accordingly, we are not requiring these third parties to be represented on the governing body. A provider system made up of multiple Medicare-enrolled TINs will have flexibility to use its existing governing body (assuming it is an existing legal entity with a preexisting governing body) or to structure a new governing body in a way that meets the requirements for meaningful representation of its ACO participants while also enabling it to accomplish the three-part aim. Comment: Many commenters strongly supported our proposal to require ACOs to include a beneficiary on the governing body so that the person would advocate for the local community, patient safety issues,
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