Source: https://m.openjurist.org/673/f2d/1097
Timestamp: 2019-11-12 13:55:02
Document Index: 231358946

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 903', '§ 902', '§ 16', '§ 920', '§ 921', '§ 903', '§ 36', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 45']

673 F. 2d 1097 - Perkins v. Marine Terminals Corporation Director Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
673 F2d 1097 Perkins v. Marine Terminals Corporation Director Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
673 F.2d 1097
Earl PERKINS, Petitioner,
MARINE TERMINALS CORPORATION, and Pacific Employers
An injured employee cannot be compensated under the Act, as amended in 1972, without satisfying certain maritime situs and status requirements. See P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 78, 100 S.Ct. 328, 335, 62 L.Ed.2d 225 (1979). To satisfy the situs requirement, the injury must occur "upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)." 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). To meet the status requirement, the employee must be "engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker...." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
The touchstone in determining whether admiralty jurisdiction exists is whether the case "involves a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id. at 1358, discussing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). Although, as in Ramos, "this case may lie in that murky area where maritime activity blends into the nonmaritime, there is no question in our minds but that the Board had jurisdiction...." Id.
Accord, Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 2972, 53 L.Ed.2d 1092 (1977); Brown v. Reynolds Shipyard, 9 BRBS 614 (1979); Nalej v. H. W. Ramberg Inc., 8 BRBS 640 (1978). There is no requirement in the Act that a facility or area be used exclusively, or even primarily, for maritime purposes for it to be a covered situs, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Graham, 573 F.2d 167, 169 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 979, 99 S.Ct. 563, 58 L.Ed.2d 649 (1978); Dravo Corp. v. Banks, 567 F.2d 593, 595 (3d Cir. 1977), or that it be within a specified distance to the shore. See, e.g., Alford v. American Bridge Division, United States Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 807, 813-16 (5th Cir. 1981) (amended on other grounds, 655 F.2d 86), cert. applied for, 50 U.S.L.W. 3559 (1982); Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1978) (locker area located 2600 feet from shore and 2050 feet outside the entrance gate to port facility held to be a covered situs). Given Perkins' undisputed status as a maritime employee and the closeness of the situs issue (which we need not resolve here), the case clearly presented a sufficient nexus with traditional maritime activities to vest the Board with subject matter jurisdiction to address the issues raised by Marine on appeal.
Foster v. Massey, 407 F.2d 343, 345-46 (D.C.Cir.1968).
Although this description is accurate as far as it goes, it does not reflect that there are two variations of the trip-payment exception-the "payment for time of travel" and "payment for expense of travel" variations. The distinction between these variations is discussed in Larson, supra, §§ 16.20 and 16.30, at 4-153 to 4-179. See also Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 482-83, 67 S.Ct. at 809.
The first variation applies "(w)hen the employee is paid an identifiable amount as compensation for time spent in a going or coming trip." Larson, supra, at 4-153. As Larson notes, one of the most common situations in which this variation arises is where, as in Perkins' situation, "the work is to be performed at some rather remote place, and in order to induce men to work at that distance from their home, it is necessary to pay them for the time consumed by travel." Id., at 4-157 (discussing Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission, 35 Cal.2d 33, 215 P.2d 736 (1950) ).
Even where the travel payments are small and the commuting distance short, compensation is appropriate under either variation when the parties have singled travel out for separate agreement because of special circumstances. Id. at 4-172. The Supreme Court has noted in a similar vein that a union contract is highly relevant in identifying pay with the trip. Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 483, 67 S.Ct. at 809. Rule 11 of the union contract in force on February 16, 1977, the date of Perkins' injury, provides that:
As alluded to by the ALJ in the above-quoted sentence, the Act must be construed liberally in favor of coverage to effectuate its broad, remedial purpose. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2359, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). Accord, Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Associates, Inc., 655 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1981); Ramos, 653 F.2d at 1358-59. Indeed, the Act provides that it is presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that an injury is covered. 33 U.S.C. § 920(a).
The Benefits Review Board is bound by the ALJ's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole, and may not review the evidence de novo nor substitute its views of the evidence for those of the ALJ. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3); Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 477-78, 67 S.Ct. at 806. Bumble Bee Seafoods v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 629 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1980); Cordero v. Triple A Machine Shop, 580 F.2d 1331, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 1223, 59 L.Ed.2d 459 (1979). This court must accept the Board's decision only if it appears reasonable and reflects the Board's adherence to its limited standard of review and the remedial purposes of the Act. Ramos, 653 F.2d at 1358-59; National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. United States Department of Labor, 606 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 644 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1981). This court undertakes a more searching review of the Board's decision where, as in this case, it is opposed by the Director. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Robertson, 625 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1980).
In light of the well-settled rules pertaining to the trip-payment exception and the standards of review applicable to this case, we conclude that the Board erred in reversing the ALJ on this issue. It is uncontroverted that the payment for time of travel was offered as an inducement to get longshoremen to work in Oakland. The fact that Marine was obligated under the union contract to pay travel time is also strong evidence favoring coverage. See Larson, supra, at 4-172; Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 483, 67 S.Ct. at 809. Marine offered no evidence that there was anything special about the trip to Oakland as opposed to the return trip. The travel payments were clearly an inducement to get employees to work in Oakland despite the expense and inconvenience of commuting round-trip from San Francisco. Marine's argument is further undercut by the fact that the travel payments roughly corresponded to the actual round-trip travel time involved and by the fact that Marine provided round-trip bus service for those who chose not to drive their own vehicles. Finally, Marine and the Board are mistaken in their belief that the lack of employer control over Perkins at the time of the accident precludes coverage. See Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 480-81, 67 S.Ct. at 807-08. The element of employer control is not relevant to the payment-for-travel exception.IV
This issue seldom arises in the context of L.H.W.C. Act cases because it is unlikely that the site of an accident in which a longshoreman or harbor worker is injured while commuting to or from work will qualify as a "maritime situs" under the Act, as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 903(a), or that, as here, the situs issue will be waived. The issue has arisen in the District of Columbia, however, because Section 1 of the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act (D.C.Code § 36-501 (1973) ) expressly incorporates the L.H.W.C. Act as the controlling law for all worker's compensation claims in that jurisdiction. It is apparent from the handful of District of Columbia cases that have examined the coming-and-going rule's application that where, as here, situs is not in issue, the rule and its exceptions apply to L.H.W.C. Act cases in the same manner as in any other worker's compensation case. Compare Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 S.Ct. 801, 91 L.Ed. 1028 (1947) and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Donovan, 221 F.2d 515 (D.C.Cir.1954) (both holding that substantial evidence supported ALJ's finding that payment-for-travel exception precluded application of going-and-coming rule in determining whether injuries occurred in the course of employment under L.H.W.C. Act) with 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 16.20 at 4-153 (1978) (payment for time of travel) and § 16.30 at 4-158 (payment for expense of travel); 1A Benedict On Admiralty, § 45 at 3-7 (7th ed. 1981) (coming-and-going rule). Cf. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Brandt Airflex Corp., 645 F.2d 1053, 1056 (D.C.Cir.1981) ("special dangers" exception to coming-and-going rule applicable under L.H.W.C. Act)