Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/325/507/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 08:30:57
Document Index: 125912865

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', 'arte 148', '§ 13', '§ 13']

4. The findings of the Commission that the 2.2 cents interstate rate was just and reasonable; that the same trains in general carried both interstate and intrastate passengers, and that the railroads affected would have received $525,000 more annual income from the passengers they carried had the 2.2 cents rate been applied, did not support the conclusion that the intrastate traffic was not contributing chanrobles.com-red
The North Carolina State Utilities Commission brought suit to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Interstate chanrobles.com-red
This clash between state and federal agencies came about because the State Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission each claimed the paramount power to fix railroad rates in North Carolina. The North Carolina Commission ordered railroads doing business in the state to charge no more than 1.65 cents per mile for carrying intrastate coach passengers from one point in the state to another. Despite this State Commission order, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized the same railroads to charge 2.2 cents per mile for the same type of carriage. [Footnote 1]
The Interstate Commerce Commission asserted its power to prescribe these purely intrastate rates under § 13(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U.S.C. § 13(4). That section, which is set forth below, [Footnote 2] empowers chanrobles.com-red
Section 13(4) does not relate to the Commission's power to regulate interstate transportation as such. As to interstate regulation, the Commission is granted the broadest powers to prescribe rates and other transportation details. See United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U. S. 612. No such breadth of authority is granted to the Commission over purely intrastate rates. Neither § 13(4) chanrobles.com-red
Intrastate transportation is primarily the concern of the state. The power of the Interstate Commerce Commission with reference to such intrastate rates is dominant only so far as necessary to alter rates which injuriously affect interstate transportation. American Express Co. v. South Dakota, 244 U. S. 617, 244 U. S. 625. A scrupulous regard for maintaining the power of the state in this field has caused this Court to require that Interstate Commerce Commission orders giving precedence to federal rates must meet "a high standard of certainty." Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493, 245 U. S. 510. Before the Commission can nullify a state rate, justification for the "exercise of the federal power must clearly appear." Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 282 U. S. 211-212. See also Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 685. And the intention to interfere with the state's ratemaking function is not to be presumed, Arkansas Commission v. Chicago, 274 U. S. 597, 274 U. S. 603; nor must its intention in this respect be left in serious doubt. Illinois Commission v. Thompson, 318 U. S. 675, 318 U. S. 684-685. The foregoing cases also stand for the principle that the Interstate Commerce Commission is without authority to supplant a state-prescribed intrastate rate unless there are clear findings, supported by evidence, of each element essential to the exercise of that power by the Commission. We hall now take up the two grounds upon which the Commission set aside the state order. chanrobles.com-red
In effect, the Commission's holding was, and its argument is here, that § 13(4) automatically requires complete uniformity in intrastate and interstate rates. That argument is, in short, that, under our national transportation system, interstate travelers and intrastate travelers use the same trains; for a state to fix a lower intrastate rate than the interstate rate is therefore an undue advantage to the intrastate passengers and an unfair discrimination against the interstate passengers. If Congress intended to permit such an oversimplified form of proof to establish "unjust discrimination," then its requirement of a "full hearing" was mere surplusage. In fact, it need have provided for no hearing at all, since it could have easily stated in its legislation that intrastate rates shall never be lower than interstate rates. The argument of the Commission in this regard runs counter to the language of § 13(4), and would call for a declaration by us that Congress intended by this section to reverse the entire transportation history of the nation. The clause about "persons" and "localities" is, as the legislative history shows, a practical enactment into law of a decision of this Court in the chanrobles.com-red
"Shreveport" case. [Footnote 3] Houston, E. & W.T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342. In the "Shreveport" case, the Commission found from evidence that certain Texas intrastate rates to Texas points were far below the interstate rates charged to carry the same types of freight from Shreveport, Louisiana. The distances and conditions of both transportations were found to be substantially the same. The Court sustained the Commission's conclusion that the Texas intrastate rates constituted an unfair discrimination against Shreveport and persons doing business there. The Commission's order was not statewide, but only required removal of the discrimination against the particular localities and business groups affected by the discrimination.
In Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 257 U. S. 579-580, this Court refused to sustain a Commission order nullifying all state passenger rates because of a discrimination against interstate travelers and against localities. The Commission had found there, as here, that state and interstate passengers rode on the same trains in the same car, and perhaps in the same seats. It had found there, as it did here, that this constituted an undue discrimination against interstate passengers, and it issued a general sweeping order against all intrastate chanrobles.com-red
passenger rates. This Court pointed out that the order went far beyond the principles announced in the Shreveport case, and declined to sustain the statewide order on this phase of the case. See also Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 282 U. S. 208. So here, the finding that interstate passengers paid higher fares than intrastate passengers for the same facilities is an inadequate support for nullifying state rates on the ground that they constitute unjust discrimination against interstate passengers.
This conclusion of the Commission, if based on findings supported by evidence, would justify its order. For, in Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 292 U. S. 5, we said that § 13(4) authorized the Commission
Neither in its formal findings nor in its discussion of the facts did the Commission indicate that the North Carolina railroad rates here involved were less than compensatory or insufficient to cover the full cost of service. Nor did they find that maintenance of these rates was necessary to the operation of a nationally efficient and adequate railway system. [Footnote 4] chanrobles.com-red
But the question posed by the Commission's conclusion was whether the particular North Carolina railroads were obtaining from North Carolina's intrastate passenger rates their fair part of such funds as were required to enable these particular railroads to render adequate and efficient service. The Commission made no findings as to what contribution from intrastate traffic would constitute a fair proportion of the railroad's total income. It made no finding as to what amount of revenue was required to enable these railroads to operate efficiently. Instead, it relied on the mere existence of a disparity between what it said was a reasonable interstate rate and the intrastate rate fixed by North Carolina. It thought this action was justified by this Court's opinion in Illinois Commerce Commission v. United States, 292 U. S. 474, 292 U. S. 485. [Footnote 5] Aside from the fact that
Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 282 U. S. 211-212; Utah Edible Livestock Rates and Charges, 206 I.C.C. 309, there is reasonable doubt as to whether the Commission had ever fixed 2.2 cents as the only reasonable interstate rate.
The whole argument that it had done so rests primarily on an order made in 1936. At that time, the Commission made a comprehensive investigation of rates throughout the nation, and, after elaborate discussion, made findings chanrobles.com-red
of fact. It concluded that any rate over 2 cents per passenger mile would be unreasonable and unlawful. But it also declared that a rate of 1.5 cents, then commonly charged throughout the Southern states, would not be "unreasonable or otherwise unlawful." 214 I.C.C. 174, 257. Railroads in the South continued to charge 1.5 cents most of the time from then until 1942. March 2, 1942, upon an application of the American railroads, the Commission, in Ex parte 148, granted a general 10% increase on all rates then in existence. This increase, it found, was necessary to enable the railroads "to continue to render adequate and efficient railway transportation service during the present emergency." 24 I.C.C. 545, 565. The Commission specifically stated, p. 606, that its conclusion was not based on "individual, sectional, or particular industrial desires or needs." Four months later, on July 14, 1942, certain railroads operating in the South, including the railroads involved in the North Carolina case, filed a petition with the Commission asking that it modify its 1936 order so as to permit them to charge 2.2 cents per mile. Two weeks later, without a hearing, without evidence, and without discussion, the Commission entered an order declining to amend its 1936 order, but modifying its 10% rate increase order, "so as to authorize" the petitioning railroads to charge 2.2 cents per mile. It made no finding that the railroads needed this increase in order to maintain adequate railroad systems, and, of course, could not have done so unless it relied upon the old 1936 evidence. There was no issue of this nature raised by any of the parties in the 10% rate increase proceedings. Neither before nor since these Southern railroads were authorized by the Commission to increase their interstate rate to 2.2 cents has any hearing been held on the subject. Petition of North Carolina for a hearing was denied. Nor has there been any finding based on evidence that the 1.65 cents rate which the Commission chanrobles.com-red
Furthermore, even assuming that the Commission had previously made a valid 2.2 cents per mile general order broadly applicable to all railroads in the Southern territory or throughout the nation, it does not follow that such a general order must permanently stand as to each and every separate railroad or railroad system. The very nature of such a broad general order requires that it contain a saving clause for future modification and adjustment of particular rates. This Court declared that such a saving clause was essential even at the time that all surplus railroad profits were pooled for the common good of the national system. Railroad Commission v. Chicago B. & I. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 257 U. S. 579; Georgia Commission v. United States, 283 U. S. 765, 283 U. S. 772; United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 290 U. S. 76-77, 290 U. S. 79.
Such a saving clause left to the state its power to bring about particular changes in the internal intrastate rate structure necessary to keep intrastate revenues as a class in harmony with interstate needs. Railroad Commission v. Chicago B. & I. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 257 U. S. 580. For the Interstate Commerce Commission was "without jurisdiction over intrastate rates except to protect and make effective some regulation of interstate commerce." Illinois Comm'n v. Thomson, 318 U. S. 675, 318 U. S. 684. Consequently, no one but the state had power to readjust its internal intrastate rate structure. This it undertook to do by a hearing focussed upon the state railroads individually and collectively. Four railroads were denied the increase, chanrobles.com-red
All of this evidence, and much more to which we might advert, was sufficient to show that the Commission might have found, had it made any findings on the subject at all, chanrobles.com-red
that a 1.65 cents rate for these four North Carolina railroads would have been a fair coach passenger contribution to revenues required to enable them to operate profitably and efficiently. But it made no findings on this subject at all. The purpose of the National Transportation Law is to assure railroads a fair net operating income, and no more. Dayton-Goose Creek Railway v. United States, 263 U. S. 456. The power of the Commission to require states to raise their intrastate rates depends upon whether intrastate traffic is contributing its fair share of the earnings required to meet maintenance and operating costs and to yield a fair return on the value of property directed to the transportation service both interstate and intrastate. United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 290 U. S. 75. But the Commission cannot "require intrastate rates to be raised above a reasonable level." United States v. Louisiana, supra, 290 U. S. 78. And where there is evidence, as here, from which the Commission could have found that a rate of 2.2 cents was far above a reasonable rate level for the intrastate coach traffic of these four railroads, the Commission must make findings on that issue, which findings are supported by evidence, before entering an order supplanting the state authority. Without such findings supported by evidence, the Commission was not authorized to find that the intrastate rates discriminated against interstate commerce.
In Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & I. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, this Court sustained a statewide Commission order raising intrastate rates. Section 13(4), in the context of the 1920 Transportation Act, 41 Stat. 456, as it then existed, was construed as requiring the Commission to prescribe rates sufficient
257 U. S. 584-585. The 1920 Act, however, treated the national railway system as a unit. The net returns for any particular railroad were limited by the Act. . . . All above this limitation went into a common pool to be distributed for the use of weak railroads. In this way, all railway income inured to the benefit of all the railroads, individually and collectively, to aid in "maintaining an adequate railway system." This Court has said that Congress adopted the pooling provisions because
New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 261 U. S. 191. But Congress, in 1933, 48 Stat. 211, repealed this part of the 1920 Act; the income pooling system was abandoned; the rule of ratemaking was rewritten, and while the Commission was to give consideration to the need of adequate and efficient railway transportation service at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service, and to the need of revenue sufficient to enable the carriers under honest, economical, and efficient management to provide such service, the rates were no longer to be treated on a national basis as though all railroads constituted one system. House Report No.193, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 30-31. Railroads were to be treated on an individual basis. Abandonment of the profit pooling system made this necessary to carry out the continuing Congressional purpose to prevent "an unreasonably large return upon the value of their properties." The Commission recognized this legislative change in ratemaking policies by its reference to "revenues required to enable respondents to render adequate and efficient transportation service." The "respondents" referred to were the individual railroads to which North Carolina's order applied.
The Court has set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which was entered May 8, 1944, on a Commission report of the preceding March 25th. 258 I.C.C. 133. The order covered investigations instituted chanrobles.com-red
upon separate petitions of carriers in North Carolina, Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee to determine whether the maintenance of intrastate fares in these states at levels below fares and charges established for application to interstate traffic in respective states on October 1, 1942, caused undue or unreasonable advantage, prejudice, or preference between persons or localities in intrastate commerce, on the one hand, and interstate commerce, on the other, or any such discrimination against interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 13(4). The petitions sought, too, prescription of fares and charges by the Commission to remove any preference, advantage, prejudice, or discrimination found to exist. See also Alabama v. United States and Davis v. United States, post, p. 325 U. S. 535. This dissent is applicable both to this and that opinion.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has the power to make this order on a valid finding of such discrimination against interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 13(4). It has long been established that this section delegates a valid power of regulation of intrastate rates to the Commission. Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563. Cf. 230 U. S. 432, and Houston E. & W.T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 234 U. S. 351. It gives authority to the Commission to raise intrastate rates so that that traffic may produce its fair share of the required earnings. United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 290 U. S. 75. And that authority does not depend upon the recapture, in whole or in part, of excess earning of individual railroads under the requirements of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 488, Sec. 15a, now repealed, Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, 48 Stat. 220, Sec. 205, for creation of a general railroad contingent fund for financing the national transportation system of railways. Section 13(4) was not changed by the Act of 1933. This section, in conjunction with the revised and reenacted Section 15a of the Interstate Commerce Act, now empowers the Commission, in accordance with the statutory provisions, to remove the discrimination against interstate commerce by prescribing intrastate fares. [Footnote 2/1] Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 292 U. S. 4, First. Cf. Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thomson,@ 318 U. S. 675, 318 U. S. 682. This Court today recognizes this rule. The four states attack the finding of discrimination against interstate commerce, which finding is essential to the validity of the present order to maintain intrastate fares at the level of interstate fares, on the ground that there is neither finding nor evidence that the intrastate rates are chanrobles.com-red
The petitions were filed by the carriers, the investigation was made, and the order under dispute here was entered to coordinate the intrastate passenger fares in these four states with the passenger fare structure of the entire country. 258 I.C.C. 133. There had been a number of recent proceedings involving the national structure. The evidence, which will be referred to later, presented in those proceedings is, we think, properly to be considered in this investigation, and the power of the Commission to require intrastate fares to conform to interstate fares in the four states is to be appraised, in the light of a purpose to establish a national passenger rate structure. The Court apparently accepts as a premise the contention of the states that the present proceeding is an isolated investigation by the Commission into an application by the respective carriers in the four states to have their intrastate fares raised to the level of their interstate fares because the intrastate earnings were below a fair proportion of the carriers' total required income. [Footnote 2/2] Instead, we think that chanrobles.com-red
Basic Interstate Fares. The basic passenger fares were first investigated on a national scale by the Commission in Passenger Fares and Surcharges, No. 26550, decided February 28, 1936. In this proceeding, carrier coach and pullman fares, respectively, were fixed at not to exceed 2 and 3 cents per passenger mile. 214 I.C.C. 174, 256. [Footnote 2/3] The order, see paragraph 3, page 257, left these respondent roads in the southern territory free to continue certain experimental fares, which were as low as 1.5 cents per mile in coaches. A ten percent increase, applicable to both the basic 2 and 3 cent fares and the experimental fares, was allowed on January 21, 1942, in a proceeding before the Commission, docketed as Ex parte No. 148, Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 248 I.C.C. 545, 549, 564, 566, 612. A reference to the Commission's chanrobles.com-red
After the ten percent increase, the railroads of southern passenger association territory filed, on July 14, 1942, a petition in Passenger Fares and Surcharges, No. 26550, seeking a modification of paragraph 3 of the conclusions, 214 I.C.C. at 257, to enable them to file tariffs increasing their coach fare to 2.2 cents (2 cents plus 10 percent). The Commission rules that its former decision in No. 26550, 214 I.C.C. at 256, permitted all railroads, respondents therein, which included applicants, to charge a basic fare of 2 cents, and that a general increase of 10 percent on these rates had been authorized in Ex parte No. 148, and that therefore the Commission could and it did authorize the application of the 2.2 cent basic rate to interstate rates in southern territory. The Commission, by order of August 1, 1942, directed that the petition in No. 26550 be denied, evidently because the order in that number had been superseded by the "Increased Rates" proceedings, Ex parte No. 148, and that its order in Ex parte No. 148 be modified to effectuate this increase and that it be left otherwise unchanged. [Footnote 2/4] The participating chanrobles.com-red
carriers then approached the separate state authorities to obtain their consent to the increase for intrastate passenger traffic in accordance with the recitation in the order of January 21, 1942, in Ex parte No. 148. [Footnote 2/5] On the refusal of the rate, regulatory authorities of North Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky to authorize the application of the increased interstate basic coach fare of 2.2 cents, with corresponding adjustments for Pullmans, to all intrastate fares, this present proceeding was initiated by the carriers to secure the Commission order of May 8, 1944, here involved, which requires the application of a basis no lower than their present interstate basis to intrastate fares, notwithstanding the refusal of the state rate authorities to authorize a similar application. The commissions of the respective states, and the Price Administrator for himself and the Director of Economic Administration, intervened.
The foregoing references make plain that, beginning with the comprehensive investigation on passenger fares, which was instituted by Commission order of June 4, 1934, and resulted in the order of February 28, 1936, 214 I.C.C. 174, the state regulatory authorities have not only been advised of the rate proceedings, but have participated in chanrobles.com-red
them. The record specifically shows this participation except in the supplementary proceeding under docket No. 26550, which was filed July 14, 1942, and resulted in the order of August 1, 1942, in docket Ex parte No. 148. This August 1, 1942, order, 325 U. S. supra, permitted increasing the carriers' interstate fares of 1.65 cents per passenger mile (the 1.50 cents of the 1936 experimental southern district fares, then adjudged by the Commission to be "not unreasonable or otherwise unlawful," 214 I.C.C. 257, par. 3, and the ten percent increase thereon of Ex parte No. 148, 248 I.C.C. 545, 564-566) to 2.2 cents. There was no occasion or requirement for hearing or report by the Commission or notice to the states of the petition of the southern passenger association carriers for permission to apply this 2.2 cents basic passenger rate to their interstate traffic.
Obviously this provision was to make clear that the current lower rates of the southern carriers were not disapproved. It cannot properly be read, even though entirely isolated from its context, as a requirement that the southern carriers should continue to apply this lower basis to their passenger fares. The preceding provision limited the regular passenger fare structure of all railroads, including, of course, the southern carriers now appellees, to a maximum of 2 cents per passenger mile in coaches, without prejudice to lower fares. Lower fares were "discretionary" with the company. The accompanying order limited maximum interstate fares generally to 2 cents, and contained no reference to the lower experimental fares. Thus, a national interstate basis schedule, universally applicable, [Footnote 2/6] was established by the report and order in docket No. 26550, the Passenger Fares and Surcharges decision, and this basis was increased to 2.2 cents per mile by the January 21, 1942, order in Ex parte No. 148, 248 I.C.C. 545. Consequently when the southern carriers, appellees here, petitioned on July 14, 1942, seeking a modification to permit the publication of interstate passenger tariffs in conformity with the previous conclusions in No. 26550 and Ex parte No. 148, no further investigation, report, or notice to anyone was needed.
The interstate basis had been fixed at 2.2 cents a few months before. Carriers and states alike had acquiesced. The carriers now wished to exercise the discretion to raise chanrobles.com-red
fares, which discretion had been reserved to them in No. 26550, 214 I.C.C. at 255, and subsequent conclusions 2 and 3 at 256. All that was necessary was to modify the order in Ex parte No. 148 of January 21, 1942, which had approved, "as proposed," a requested ten percent increase in fares "as published in passenger tariffs," 248 I.C.C. 550, 565, and the order, 325 U. S. supra, so that the limitation "as published in passenger tariffs" would be removed. The appellee carriers had outstanding published tariffs of 1.50 cents when the January 21, 1942, order was entered. The August 1, 1942, order removed the limitation. See 325 U. S. supra.
This argument, we think, flows from another phase of the same misconception to which we earlier referred as chanrobles.com-red
In this present proceeding, the validity of the interstate rate of these carrier appellees was reexamined. [Footnote 2/7] Evidence as to each appellee carrier of former deficits from its entire passenger traffic prior to 1942 was noted. Evidence as to their passenger operating ratios, their increased expenses, their net earnings on passenger business, and other operations also, was received and appraised. Attention was called, 258 I.C.C. 142, to the fact that the previous investigation into passenger rates, Ex parte No. 148, had anticipated the earnings during war years, page 142, and their need for deferred maintenance and war service, page 148. The interstate basic rate was found just and reasonable. See Alabama Intrastate Fares, 258 I.C.C. 133, 137.
The figures used were aggregate figures for past passenger receipts and expenses. Audits for representative periods showed the estimated amount of additional chanrobles.com-red
revenue from the increased intrastate fares. [Footnote 2/8] The statistics for the net railway operating income were introduced which covered all receipts and expenses. The evidence of train service in the respective states led the Commission to find that travel conditions were "substantially similar," 258 I.C.C. 154. If the Commission's conclusion as to carrier revenue needs assumed equal intrastate and interstate fares, and if the present interstate rates were held "just and reasonable," it follows that the finding that the lower intrastate rates were not contributing their fair share of the "revenues required to enable respondents to render adequate and efficient transportation service" was proper. This logically led to the finding 6, that this failure of intrastate traffic to contribute its part discriminated against interstate commerce.
The determination of the necessary basic interstate rate in all these proceedings was made on the supposition of intrastate rates of equal level. When general basic rates, fares, or charges are fixed by the Commission, the Commission necessarily gives consideration "to the need of revenues sufficient to enable the carriers, under honest, economical, and efficient management to provide" railway transportation at the lowest cost. Section 15a. Therefore, when interstate rates are fixed with the supposition of an equal level for intrastate rates for substantially similar service, it requires a contribution on that basis from intrastate rates to avoid intrastate discrimination against interstate traffic. If it appears that interstate fares have been fixed with the supposition of an equal level for intrastate chanrobles.com-red
fares, then it is clear that intrastate rates are not producing their expected revenue. The Commission thus would have manifested its consideration of the statutory requirements of Section 13(4) and 15a that due consideration be given revenue and efficient management in finding unjust discrimination against interstate commerce and in prescribing the intrastate rate which would remove the discrimination. See United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475, 315 U. S. 489.
In the proceeding in which these southern interstate carriers were permitted to apply the general basic interstate coach rate of 2.2 cents, the order therein of August 1, 1942, by adopting the order of January 21, 1942, in Ex parte No. 148, 248 I.C.C. 545, required the appellee carriers to make application to the state authorities for similar intrastate increases. See 325 U. S. supra. The required applications led directly to this litigation.
Both in Passenger Fares and Surcharges, 214 I.C.C. 174, 257, par. 5 and Increased Railway Rates, Ex parte No. 148, 248 I.C.C. 545, 565-66, which are the two investigations which brought interstate coach fares to a maximum of 2.2 cents per passenger mile, the Commission itself ordered the numerous intrastate fares which were under its direction because regulated by the Commission through previous Section 13 proceedings, modified in accordance with the interstate fares. As pointed out in the preceding paragraph, the order in Ex parte No. 148 required application to state rate regulatory bodies for authority to increase the intrastate passenger rates to the same level. Specific consideration was given to various objections raised by state commissions to the proposed new fares and rates, all with an eye to securing future compliance by the states with the interstate rates to be set by the Commission. See 248 I.C.C. at 560, 565, 574, 580, 582. In the Passenger Fares investigation, the figures on passenger traffic reflect the aggregate use of trains without consideration of a division of the traffic between inter- and intrastate. 214 chanrobles.com-red
Under Section 13(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, in proceedings as to unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, the issue is not the earnings from intrastate chanrobles.com-red
The language of 15a has been modified from its original form in the Transportation Act of 1920 so that it no longer specifically empowers the Commission to deal with fares and rates of carriers as a whole for the nation or as a whole in designated territories or rate groups. We think, however, that the present statute, "[i]n the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates," the Commission shall give consideration to various named factors, is adequate to permit general rate regulation under 15a and Section 1(5). This power has been unquestioned. See Passenger Fares and Surcharges, 214 I.C.C. 174, and Class Rate Investigation No. 28300 and Consolidated Freight Classification No. 28310. It is the only practicable approach to the problem. See discussion in New England Division Case, 261 U. S. 184, 261 U. S. 196. We cannot treat the present proceeding as disassociated from the general investigation into passenger fares. United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 290 U. S. 76-79. We think it is adequately shown that the orders in the general investigations were predicated upon the assumption that intrastate passenger traffic would have an equal basis with interstate traffic for fares. chanrobles.com-red
"But the question posed by the Commission's conclusion was whether the particular North Carolina railroads were obtaining from North Carolina's intrastate passenger rates their fair part of such funds as were required to enable these particular railroads to render adequate and efficient service. The Commission made no findings as to what contribution from intrastate traffic would constitute a fair proportion of the railroad's total income. It made no finding as to what amount of revenue was required to enable these railroads to operate efficiently. Instead, it relied on the mere existence of a disparity between what it said was a reasonable interstate rate and the intrastate rate fixed by North Carolina. It thought this action was justified by this Court's opinion in Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. United States, 292 U. S. 474, 292 U. S. 485."
"It is further ordered that the order of January 21, 1942, in Ex Parte No. 148, be, and it is hereby, further modified so as to authorize the aforesaid petitioners to apply the increase of 10 percent approved in said order to a basic coach fare of 2 cents per mile on the lines of said petitioners, subject to the rule for the disposition of fractions as modified by order of July 6, 1942, in said proceeding, and that, in all other respects, said order of January 21, 1942, shall remain in full force and effect."
"It appearing . . . that the proper authorities of all States have been notified of this proceeding, and similar application has been or will be made to the regulatory authority of the respective States for permission to increase similarly petitioners' intrastate rates, fares, and charges;"
"It is ordered, That the increased passenger fares as proposed by the said petitioners be, and they are hereby, approved. . . ."