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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 428', '§ 428', '§ 611', '§ 31105', '§ 25', 'art 18', 'art 18', 'art 1986', 'art 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', '§ 1986', 'art 1986']

Skip Navigation HomeHelpResourcesContact Us Advanced Search Start of Main Content Procedures for Handling of Retaliation Complaints under Employee Protection Provision of Seaman's Protection Act This Rule document was issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)For related information, Open Docket Folder Show agency attachment(s) DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
SummaryThis document provides the interim final text of regulations governing the employee protection (whistleblower) provisions of the Seaman's Protection Act (“SPA” or “the Act”), as amended by Section 611 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010. Section 611 transfers to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA” or “the Agency”) the administration of the whistleblower protections previously enforced solely via a private right of action. This interim rule establishes procedures and time frames for the handling of retaliation complaints under SPA, including procedures and time frames for employee complaints to OSHA, investigations by OSHA, appeals of OSHA determinations to anadministrative law judge (ALJ) for a hearing de novo, hearings by ALJs, review of ALJ decisions by the Administrative Review Board (ARB) on behalf of the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), and judicial review of the Secretary's final decision. In addition, this interim rule provides the Secretary's interpretation of the term “seaman” and addresses other interpretive issues raised by SPA.
DatesThis interim final rule is effective on February 6, 2013. Comments on the interim final rule must be submitted (postmarked, sent or received) on or before April 8, 2013.
AddressesYou may submit comments and additional materials by any of the following methods:
For Further Information ContactBeth S. Slavet, Director, Directorate of Whistleblower Programs, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-4624, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-2199. This is not a toll-free number. ThisFederal Registerpublication is available in alternative formats: large print, electronic file on computer disk (Word Perfect, ASCII, Mates with Duxbury Braille System) and audiotape.
Supplementary InformationI. BackgroundCongress enacted SPA as Section 13 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1984, Public Law 98-557, 98 Stat. 2860 (1984). SPA protected seamen from retaliation for reporting a violation of Subtitle II of Title 46 of the U.S. Code, which governs vessels and seamen, or a regulation promulgated under that Subtitle. S. Rep. No. 98-454, at 11 (1984). Congress passed SPA in response to Donovan v. Texaco, 720 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1983), in which the Fifth Circuit held that the whistleblower provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) did not cover a seaman who had been demoted and discharged from his position because he reported a possible safety violation to the U.S. Coast Guard. S. Rep. No. 98-454, at 12 (1984). This original version of SPA prohibited “[a]n owner, charterer, managing operator, agent, master, or individual in charge of a vessel” from retaliating against a seaman “because the seaman in good faith has reported or is about to report to the Coast Guard that the seaman believes that” a violation of Subtitle II had occurred. Public Law 98-557 § 13(a), 98 Stat. at 2863. It permitted seamen to bring actions in U.S. district courts seeking relief for alleged retaliation in violation of the Act. Id.§ 13(a), 98 Stat. at 2863-64.
In 2002, Congress amended SPA. Section 428 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-295, 116 Stat. at 2064 (2002), altered both the protections afforded and remedies permitted by the Act. First, Congress removed the specific list of actors who were prohibited from retaliating against seamen and replaced that text with “[a] person.” Public Law 107-295 § 428(a), 116 Stat. at 2127. Second, Congress expanded the existing description of protected activity to include reports to “the Coast Guard or other appropriate Federal agency or department,” rather than only to the Coast Guard, and violations “of a maritime safety law or regulation prescribed under that law or regulation,” rather than only of Subtitle II and its accompanying regulations. Id. Third, Congress added a second type of protected activity; a seaman who “refused to perform duties ordered by the seaman's employer because the seaman has a reasonable apprehension or expectation that performing such duties would result in serious injury to the seaman, other seamen, or the public” was granted protection from retaliation. Id. The new text clarified that, “[t]o qualify for protection against the seaman's employer under paragraph (1)(B), the employee must have sought from the employer, and been unable to obtain, correction of the unsafe condition.”Id. The amended statute further explained that “The circumstances causing a seaman's apprehension of serious injury under paragraph (1)(B) must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would conclude that there is a real danger of an injury or serious impairment of health resulting from the performance of duties as ordered by the seaman's employer.” Public Law 107-295 § 428, 116 Stat. at 2127.
(D) the seaman notified, or attempted to notify, the vessel owner or the Secretary [of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating (1)
] of a work-related personal injury or work-related illness of a seaman;
(F) the seaman furnished information to the Secretary [of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating], the National Transportation Safety Board, or any other public official as to the facts relating to any marine casualty resultingin injury or death to an individual or damage to property occurring in connection with vessel transportation; or
Id.§ 611(a), 124 Stat. at 2969.
Id. Section 31105 of title 49 is the “Employee protections” provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. 31105. STAA provides that initial complaints regarding retaliation under that statute are to be filed with and handled by the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), see id.§ 31105(b)-(e), and the Secretary has delegated her authority in this regard to OSHA. See Secretary's Order 1-2012 (Jan. 18, 2012), 77 FR 3912 (Jan. 25, 2012). The Secretary has also delegated to OSHA her authority under SPA. Id. at 3913. Hearings on determinations by the Assistant Secretary for OSHA (Assistant Secretary) are conducted by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and appeals from decisions by administrative law judges (ALJs) are decided by the Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB). See Secretary's Order 1-2010, 75 FR 3924-01 (Jan. 25, 2010).
OSHA is promulgating this interim final rule to establish procedures for the handling of whistleblower complaints under SPA and address certain interpretative issues raised by the statute. To the extent possible within the bounds of applicable statutory language, these regulations are designed to be consistent with the procedures applied to claims under STAA, and the other whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA, including the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. 1514A, and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA), 15 U.S.C. 2087.II. Summary of Statutory ProceduresAs explained above, SPA adopts the process for filing a complaint established under subsection (b) of STAA. 46 U.S.C. 2114(b). It further incorporates the other “procedures, requirements, and rights described in” STAA, id., described below. OSHA therefore understands SPA to incorporate STAA subsections (b) through (g). SPA's text could cause confusion regarding which sections of STAA it adopts by referring, in some cases incorrectly, (2)
to certain sections while not mentioning others. (3)
Those references follow the word “including,” however, with no suggestion that the subsequent list is meant to be exclusive, so OSHA will not treat it as such. OSHA does not read SPA as incorporating Sections (a), (h), (i), or (j) of STAA because those provisions are substantive and specific to STAA or agencies other than the Department of Labor rather than describing “procedures, requirements, and rights.” The statutory procedures applicable to SPA claims are summarized below.Filing of SPA ComplaintsA seaman, or another person at the seaman's request, alleging a violation of SPA, may file a complaint with the Secretary not later than 180 days after the alleged retaliation.Legal Burdens of Proof for SPA ComplaintsSection (b)(1) of STAA states that STAA whistleblower complaints will be governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in AIR21, 49 U.S.C. 42121(b), which contains whistleblower protections for employees in the aviation industry. 49 U.S.C. 31105(b)(1). Accordingly, these burdens of proof also govern SPA whistleblower complaints.
Under AIR21, a violation may be found only if the complainant demonstrates that protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action described in the complaint. 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). Relief is unavailable if the employer demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of the protected activity. 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv); see Vieques Air Link, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 437 F.3d 102, 108-09 (1st Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (burdens of proof under AIR21); see also Formella v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 628 F.3d 381, 389 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that because it incorporates the burdens of proof set forth in AIR21, STAA requires only a showing that the protected activity was a contributing factor, not a but-for cause, of the adverse action.).Written Notice of Complaint and Findings.Under Section (b) of STAA, upon receipt of the complaint, the Secretary must provide written notice of the filing of the complaint to the person or persons alleged in the complaint to have violated the Act (“respondent”). 49 U.S.C. 31105(b).
Within 60 days of receipt of the complaint, the Secretary must conduct an investigation of the allegations, decide whether it is reasonable to believe the complaint has merit, and provide written notification to the complainant and the respondent of the investigative findings.RemediesIf the Secretary decides it is reasonable to believe a violation occurred, the Secretary shall include with the findings a preliminary order for the relief provided for under Section (b)(3) of STAA, 49 U.S.C. 31105(b)(3). This order shall require the respondent to take affirmative action to abate the violation; reinstate the complainant to the former position with the same pay and terms and privileges of employment; and pay compensatory damages, including back pay with interest and compensation for anyspecial damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees. Additionally, if the Secretary issues a preliminary order and the complainant so requests, the Secretary may assess against the respondent the costs, including attorney fees, reasonably incurred by the complainant in bringing the complaint. Punitive damages of up to $250,000.00 are also available.HearingsSection (b) of STAA also provides for hearings. Specifically, the complainant and the respondent have 30 days after the date of the Secretary's notification in which to file objections to the findings and/or preliminary order and request a hearing. The filing of objections does not stay a reinstatement ordered in the preliminary order. If a hearing is not requested within 30 days, the preliminary order becomes final and is not subject to judicial review.
If a hearing is held, it is to be conducted expeditiously. The Secretary shall issue a final order within 120 days after the conclusion of any hearing. The final order may provide appropriate relief or deny the complaint. Until the Secretary's final order is issued, the Secretary, the complainant, and the respondent may enter into a settlement agreement that terminates the proceeding.De Novo ReviewSection (c) of STAA provides for de novo review of a whistleblower claim by a United States district court in the event that the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 210 days after the filing of a complaint and the delay is not due to the complainant's bad faith. 49 U.S.C. 31105(c). The provision provides that the court will have jurisdiction over the action without regard to the amount in controversy and that the case will be tried before a jury at the request of either party.Judicial ReviewSection (d) of STAA provides that within 60 days of the issuance of the Secretary's final order following a hearing, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by the Secretary's final order may file an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation occurred or the circuit where the complainant resided on the date of the violation. 49 U.S.C. 31105(d).Civil Actions To EnforceSection (e) of STAA provides that if a person fails to comply with an order issued by the Secretary under Section (b), the Secretary of Labor “shall bring a civil action to enforce the order in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the violation occurred.” 49 U.S.C. 31105(e).PreemptionSection (f) of STAA clarifies that nothing in the statute preempts or diminishes any other safeguards against discrimination provided by Federal or State law. 49 U.S.C. 31105(f).Employee RightsSection (g) of STAA states that nothing in STAA shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under any Federal or State law or under any collective bargaining agreement. 49 U.S.C. 31105(g). It further states that rights and remedies under 49 U.S.C. 31105 “may not be waived by any agreement, policy, form, or condition of employment.”III. Summary and Discussion of Regulatory ProvisionsThe regulatory provisions in this part have been written and organized to be consistent with other whistleblower regulations promulgated by OSHA to the extent possible within the bounds of the statutory language of SPA and of STAA.
Throughout the regulatory text, OSHA has used the term “retaliate” rather than “discharge or in any manner discriminate,” the phrase that appears in the text of SPA. The use of “retaliate,” which also appears in the regulations implementing STAA, the ERA, SOX, and CPSIA, is not intended to have a substantive effect. It simply reflects that claims brought under these whistleblower provisions, whether alleging discharge or some other form of discrimination, are prototypical retaliation claims. A retaliation claim is a specific type of discrimination claim that focuses on actions taken as a result of an employee's protected activity rather than as a result of an employee's characteristics (such as race, gender, or religion).Subpart A—Complaints, Investigations, Findings, and Preliminary OrdersSection 1986.100Purpose and ScopeThis section describes the purpose of the regulations implementing SPA's whistleblower provision and provides an overview of the procedures contained in the regulations.Section 1986.101DefinitionsThis section includes general definitions applicable to SPA's whistleblower provision. Most of the definitions are of terms common to whistleblower statutes and are defined here as they are elsewhere. Some terms call for additional explanation.
SPA protects seamen when they make certain reports and notifications. 46 U.S.C. 2114(a)(1)(A), (D), (G). Paragraphs (h) and (k) define “report” and “notify” both to include “any oral or written communications of a violation.” This interpretation of the statute is consistent with a plain reading of the statutory text and best fulfills the purposes of SPA. See Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Ind., 451 F.3d 424, 445-46 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that to interpret SPA's reference to a “report” as requiring a formal complaint “would narrow the statute in a manner that Congress clearly avoided, and, in the process, would frustrate the clear purpose of the provision”). It is also consistent with the legislative history of the statute, which indicates that Congress meant SPA to respond to Donovan v. Texaco, 720 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1983), a case in which a seaman had told the Coast Guard about an unsafe condition by telephone. S. Rep. No. 98-454, at 11; Donovan, 720 F.2d at 825; see also Gaffney, 451 F.3d at 446 (reasoning that SPA's legislative history, “coupled with Congress' decision not to define `report' in the statute or in the course of discussing Donovan in the relevant legislative history,” indicates that SPA “does not require a formal complaint, or even a written statement, as a prerequisite to statutory whistleblower protection”); cf. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (holding that the provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act that prohibits employersfrom retaliating against an employee because such employee has “filed any complaint” protects oral complaints).
Section 2214(a)(1)(D) of SPA protects a seaman's notification of the “vessel owner” of injuries and illnesses. This would include all notifications to agents of the owner, such as the vessel's master. See 2 Robert Force & Martin J. Norris, The Law of Seamen§ 25-1 (5th ed. 2003). Other parties that may fall within the meaning of “vessel owner” include an owner pro hac vice, operator, or charter or bare boat charterer. See 33 U.S.C. 902(21) (defining, for purposes of the LHWCA, the entities liable for negligence of a vessel); see also Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1041 (5th Cir. 1983) (referring to this list of entities as “the broad definition of `vessel owner' under 33 U.S.C. 902(21)”). Paragraph (q) defines “vessel owner” as including “all of the agents of the owner, including the vessel's master.”
SPA protects “a seaman” from retaliation, but it does not include a definition of “seaman.” The Senate Report that accompanied the original, 1984 version of SPA indicates that SPA was originally intended to provide a remedy for workers whose whistleblower rights under 11(c) might be not be available in a jurisdiction that follows Donovan v. Texaco, 720 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1983). (4)
See S. Rep. No. 98-454, at 11-12 (1984). The Senate Report also provides specific insight as to the definition of “seaman,” stating that “the Committee intends the term `seaman' to be interpreted broadly, to include any individual engaged or employed in any capacity on board a vessel owned by a citizen of the United States.”Id. at 11.
First, OSHA rejected adopting a definition of “seaman” for SPA that mirrors the one established by case law under the Jones Act. The Jones Act provides that a “seaman” injured in the course of employment may bring a civil action against his or her employer, 46 U.S.C. 30104, but like SPA, the Jones Act does not define the term “seaman.” Looking to general maritime law, the Supreme Court has defined the term as including those who have an employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation that contributes to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, even if the employment does not aid in navigation or contribute to the transportation of the vessel, McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991). Importantly, the Supreme Court views the term seaman as excluding land-based workers; that is, a seaman “must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature.”Chandris v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995).
Second, OSHA rejected the approach of defining “seaman” as applying only to workers who arguably are not covered by 11(c). The legislative history shows that Congress originally passed the SPA in response to Texaco:“This section responds to Donavan v. Texaco, (720 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1983)) in which a seaman was demoted and ultimately discharged from his job for reporting a possible safety violation to the Coast Guard * * * [This section] establishes a new legal remedy for seamen, to protect them against discriminatory action due to their reporting a violation of Subtitle II to the Coast Guard. The Amendment creates a private right of action similar but not identical to that in OSH Act Section 11(c).” S. Rep. No. 98-454, at 11-12 (1984). But the legislative history in 2010 suggests a broader definition for “seaman” workers also who may be covered by 11(c). On a more practical level, OSHA could not fashion a clear definition of “seaman” that squarely fills the gap arguably left by Texaco without requiring agency investigators to conduct a complex case-by-case analysis of whether each SPA complainant is exempt from the OSH Act under the rationale of Texaco, a holding with which the Department does not agree.
Thus, the interim final rule adopts the third option—the broader definition of seaman as clarified in the legislative history of SPA. The first sentence of paragraph (m) incorporates the languageof the Senate report to define “seaman.” As indicated in the report, and consistent with the remedial purposes of whistleblower statutes like SPA, OSHA intends that the regulatory language be construed broadly. See Whirlpool Corporation v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980); Bechtel Const. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 932 (11th Cir. 1995). Workers who are seamen for purposes of the Jones Act or general maritime law, see, e.g., Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355 (1995), are covered by the definition, as are land-based workers, if they are “engaged or employed * * * on board a vessel” for some part of their duties. See H. Rep. No. 111-303, pt. 1, at 119 (2009) (noting that SPA extends protections to “maritime workers”).
Paragraph (p) defines “vessel,” a term used in the definition of seaman and that also arises in SPA itself. This definition is taken from Title 46 of the U.S. Code and “includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” 46 U.S.C. 115; see also 1 U.S.C. 3; Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 496-97 (2005) (analyzing the meaning of the term “vessel,” as defined by 1 U.S.C. 3, and concluding that “a `vessel' is a watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment,” and thus excludes ships “taken out of service, permanently anchored, or otherwise rendered practically incapable of maritime transport”).Section 1986.102Obligations and Prohibited ActsThis section describes the activities that are protected under SPA and the conduct that is prohibited in response to any protected activities. These protected activities are set out in the statute, as described above. Consistent with OSHA's interpretation of other anti-retaliation provisions, the prohibited conduct includes any form of retaliation, including, but not limited to, discharging, demoting, suspending, harassing, intimidating, threatening, restraining, coercing, blacklisting, or disciplining a seaman. Section 1986.102 tracks the language of the statute in defining the categories of protected activity.
As with other whistleblower statutes, SPA's provisions describing protected activity are to be read broadly. See, e.g., Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1998) (expansively construing language in STAA to facilitate achieving the policy goals of encouraging corporate compliance with safety laws and employee reports of violations of those laws); Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is appropriate to give a broad construction to remedial statutes such as nondiscrimination provisions in Federal labor laws.”); Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing the “broad remedial purpose” of the whistleblower provision in the Clean Water Act in expansively interpreting a term in that statute). Indeed, SPA's prohibition of discharging or “in any manner” discriminating against seamen indicates Congress's intent that the provision have broad application. See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (determining that language in the National Labor Relations Act should be read broadly because “the presence of the preceding words `to discharge or otherwise discriminate' reveals, we think, particularly by the word `otherwise,' an intent on the part of Congress to afford broad rather than narrow protection to the employee”); Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 782-83 (DC Cir. 1974) (relying on Scrivener in reasoning that the words “in any other way discriminate” in the Mine Safety Act support a broad reading of that Act's protections for miners). Likewise, the statement in the Senate Report regarding SPA that the term “seaman” is to be “interpreted broadly” further supports the premise that Congress did not intend that SPA beconstrued narrowly. S. Rep. No. 98-454, at 11 (1984).
OSHA therefore will interpret each of the seven types of protected activity listed in the Act broadly. Moreover, while SPA, unlike other whistleblower statutes, does not contain a provision directly protecting all internal complaints by seamen to their superiors, many such complaints are covered under the seven specific categories listed in the Act. Protection of internal complaints is important because it “leverage[es] the government's limited enforcement resources” by encouraging employees to report substandard working conditions to their employers. Clean Harbors, 146 F.3d at 19-20. Such protections promote the resolution of violations without drawn-out litigation, and the “failure to protect internal complaints may have the perverse result of encouraging employers to fire employees who believe they have been treated illegally before they file a formal complaint.”Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories, Inc., 669 F.3d 428, 437 (4th Cir. 2012). In addition, in the maritime context, a seaman on a vessel at sea may not be able to contact the authorities to correct a dangerous condition, and his or her only recourse will be to seek correction from the ship's officers. Because internal complaints are an important part of keeping a workplace safe, OSHA will give a broad construction to the Act's language to ensure that internal complaints are protected as fully as possible.
The Act also protects the seaman against discrimination when “the seaman has refused to perform duties ordered by the seaman's employer because the seaman has a reasonable apprehension or expectation that performing such duties would result in serious injury to the seaman, other seamen, or the public.” 46 U.S.C. 2114(a)(1)(B). To qualify for this protection, the seaman “must have sought from the employer, and been unable to obtain, correction of the unsafe condition.” 46 U.S.C. 2114(a)(3). Although not stated explicitly, in the Secretary's view, the reasonable implication of the statutory language is that the seaman's preliminary act of seeking correction of the condition is itself protected activity. That is, a seaman who asks his or her employer to correct a condition he reasonably believes would result in serious injury and suffers retaliation because of that request before the occasion to refuse to perform the unsafe work arises is protected by the Act. Although the literal terms of the Act could be read to leave the request for correction required yet unprotected, courts reject “absurd result[s].”Stone v. Instrumentation Laboratory Co., 591 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Courts will not * * * adopt a `literal' construction of a statute if such interpretation would thwart the statute's obvious purpose or lead to an `absurd result.' ” [quoting Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Calvert County, 401 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2005)]). The Agency's interpretation is embodied in the last sentence of section 1986.102(c): “Any seaman who requests such a correction shall be protected against retaliation because of the request.”
Finally, consistent with the broad interpretation of the statute as discussed above, OSHA believes that most reports required by the U.S. Coast Guard under 46 CFR 4.04 and 4.05 are protected by SPA.Section 1986.103Filing of Retaliation ComplaintsThis section describes the process for filing a complaint alleging retaliation in violation of SPA. The procedures described are consistent with those governing complaints under STAA as well as other whistleblower statutes OSHA administers.
Paragraph (e), which is consistent with provisions implementing other OSHA whistleblower programs, describes the relationship between section 11(c) complaints and SPA whistleblower complaints. Section 11(c) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 660(c), generally prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for filing safety or health complaints or otherwise initiating or participating in proceedings under the OSH Act. Some of the activityprotected by SPA, including maritime safety complaints and work refusals, may also be covered under section 11(c), though the geographic limits of section 4(a) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 653(a), which are applicable to section 11(c), do not apply to SPA. (5)
Paragraph (e) states that SPA whistleblower complaints that also allege facts constituting an 11(c) violation will be deemed to have been filed under both statutes. Similarly, section 11(c) complaints that allege facts constituting a violation of SPA will also be deemed to have been filed under both laws. In these cases, normal procedures and timeliness requirements under the respective statutes and regulations will apply.
OSHA notes that a complaint of retaliation filed with OSHA under SPA is not a formal document and need not conform to the pleading standards for complaints filed in federal district court articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See Sylvester v. Parexel Int'l, Inc., No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2165854, at *9-10 (ARB May 26, 2011) (holding whistleblower complaints filed with OSHA under analogous provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act need not conform to federal court pleading standards). Rather, the complaint filed with OSHA under this section simply alerts the Agency to the existence of the alleged retaliation and the complainant's desire that the Agency investigate the complaint. Upon the filing of a complaint with OSHA, the Assistant Secretary is to determine whether “the complaint, supplemented as appropriate by interviews of the complainant” alleges “the existence of facts and evidence to make a prima facie showing.” 29 CFR 1986.104(e). As explained in section 1986.104(e), if the complaint, supplemented as appropriate, contains a prima facie allegation, and the respondent does not show clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the alleged protected activity, OSHA conducts an investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that retaliation has occurred. See 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(2), 29 CFR 1986.104(e).Section 1986.104InvestigationThis section describes the procedures that apply to the investigation of complaints under SPA. Paragraph (a) of this section outlines the procedures for notifying the parties and the U.S. Coast Guard of the complaint and notifying the respondent of its rights under these regulations. Paragraph (b) describes the procedures for the respondent to submit its response to the complaint. Paragraph (c) explains that the Agency will share respondent's submissions with the complainant, with redactions in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, et seq., and other applicable confidentiality laws as necessary, and will permit the complainant to respond to those submissions. The Agency expects that sharing information with complainants will assist OSHA in conducting full and fair investigations and the Assistant Secretary in thoroughly assessing defenses raised by respondents. Paragraph (d) of this section discusses confidentiality of information provided during investigations.
Paragraph (f) describes the procedures the Assistant Secretary will follow prior to the issuance of findings and a preliminary order when the Assistant Secretary has reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred. Its purpose is to ensure compliance with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987) (requiring OSHA to give a STAA respondent the opportunity to review the substance of the evidence and respond, prior to ordering preliminary reinstatement).Section 1986.105Issuance of Findings and Preliminary OrdersThis section provides that, within 60 days of the filing of a complaint and on the basis of information obtained in the investigation, the Assistant Secretary will issue written findings regarding whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has merit. If the Assistant Secretary concludes that there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has merit, the Assistant Secretary will order appropriate relief, including: a requirement that the person take affirmative action to abate the violation; reinstatement to the seaman's former position; compensatory damages including back pay with interest and damages such as litigation costs; and, if the Assistant Secretary so chooses, punitive damages up to $250,000. Affirmative action to abate the violation includes a variety of measures, such as posting notices about SPA orders and rights, as well as expungement of adverse comments in a personnel record. See Scott v . Roadway Express, Inc., No. 01-065, 2003 WL 21269144, at *1-2 (ARB May 29, 2003) (posting notices of STAA orders and rights); Pollock v. Continental Express, Nos. 07-073, 08-051, 2010 WL 1776974, at *9 (ARB Apr. 7, 2010) (expungement of adverse references).
The findings and, where appropriate, preliminary order, advise the parties of their right to file objections to the findings of the Assistant Secretary and to request a hearing. If no objections are filed within 30 days of receipt of thefindings, the findings and any preliminary order of the Assistant Secretary become the final decision and order of the Secretary. If objections are timely filed, any order of preliminary reinstatement will take effect, but the remaining provisions of the order will not take effect until administrative proceedings are completed.
In ordering interest on back pay, the Secretary has determined that, instead of computing the interest due by compounding quarterly the Internal Revenue Service interest rate for the underpayment of taxes, which under 26 U.S.C. 6621 is generally the Federal short-term rate plus three percentage points, interest will be compounded daily. The Secretary believes that daily compounding of interest better achieves the make-whole purpose of a back pay award. Daily compounding of interest has become the norm in private lending and recently was found to be the most appropriate method of calculating interest on back pay by the National Labor Relations Board. See Jackson Hosp. Corp. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union, 356 NLRB No. 8, 2010 WL 4318371, at *3-4 (2010). Additionally, interest on tax underpayments under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 6621, is compounded daily pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6622(a).Subpart B—LitigationSection 1986.106Objections to the Findings and the Preliminary Order and Request for a HearingTo be effective, objections to the findings of the Assistant Secretary must be in writing and must be filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge within 30 days of receipt of the findings. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, or electronic communication transmittal is considered the date of the filing; if the objection is filed in person, by hand-delivery or other means, the objection is filed upon receipt. The filing of objections also is considered a request for a hearing before an ALJ. Although the parties are directed to serve a copy of their objections on the other parties of record and the OSHA official who issued the findings, the failure to serve copies of the objections on the other parties of record does not affect the ALJ's jurisdiction to hear and decide the merits of the case. See Shirani v. Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., No. 04-101, 2005 WL 2865915, at *7 (ARB Oct. 31, 2005).
A respondent may file a motion to stay OSHA's preliminary order of reinstatement with the Office of Administrative Law Judges. However, a stay will be granted only on the basis of exceptional circumstances. The Secretary believes that a stay of the Assistant Secretary's preliminary order of reinstatement would be appropriate only where the respondent can establish the necessary criteria for a stay, i.e., the respondent would suffer irreparable injury; the respondent is likely to succeed on the merits; a balancing of possible harms to the parties favors the respondent; and the public interest favors a stay.Section 1986.107HearingsThis section adopts the rules of practice and procedure for administrative hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges at 29 CFR Part 18 subpart A. This section provides that the hearing is to commence expeditiously, except upon a showing of good cause or unless otherwise agreed to by the parties. Hearings will be conducted de novo, on the record. If both the complainant and respondent object to the findings and/or order of the Assistant Secretary, an ALJ will conduct a single, consolidated hearing. This section states that ALJs have broad power to limit discovery in order to expedite the hearing. This furthers an important goal of SPA—to have unlawfully terminated seamen reinstated as quickly as possible.
This section explains that formal rules of evidence will not apply, but rules or principles designed to assure production of the most probative evidence will be applied. The ALJ may exclude evidence that is immaterial, irrelevant, or unduly repetitious. This is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides at 5 U.S.C. 556(d): “Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the Agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence * * *”See also Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948) (administrative agencies not restrictedby rigid rules of evidence). Furthermore, it is inappropriate to apply the technical rules of evidence in Part 18 because the Secretary anticipates that complainants will often appear pro se, as is the case with other whistleblower statutes the Department of Labor administers. Also, hearsay evidence is often appropriate in whistleblower cases, as there often is no relevant evidence other than hearsay to prove discriminatory intent. ALJs have the responsibility to determine the appropriate weight to be given to such evidence. For these reasons the interests of determining all of the relevant facts are best served by not having strict evidentiary rules.Section 1986.108Role of Federal AgenciesParagraph (a)(1) of this section explains that the Assistant Secretary, represented by an attorney from the appropriate Regional Solicitor's office, ordinarily will be the prosecuting party in cases in which the respondent objects to the findings or the preliminary reinstatement order. This has been the practice under STAA, from which the SPA's procedures are drawn, and the public interest generally requires the Assistant Secretary's participation in such matters. The case reports show that there has been relatively little litigation under SPA to date, and OSHA believes that relatively few private attorneys have developed adequate expertise in representing SPA whistleblower complainants.
Paragraph (b) states that the U.S. Coast Guard, if interested in a proceeding, also may participate as amicus curiae at any time in the proceeding. This paragraph also permits the U.S. Coast Guard to request copies of all documents, regardless of whether it is participating in the case.Section 1986.109Decisions and Orders of the Administrative Law JudgeThis section sets forth, in paragraph (a), the requirements for the content of the decision and order of the ALJ. Paragraphs (a) and (b) state the standards for finding a violation under SPA and for precluding such a finding.
Specifically, the complainant must show that the protected activity was a “contributing factor” in the adverse action alleged in the complaint. A contributing factor is “any factor which, alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.”Clarke, supra, at *3. The complainant (a term that, in this paragraph, refers to the Assistant Secretary if he or she is the prosecuting party) can succeed by providing either direct or indirect proof of contribution. Direct evidence is evidence that conclusively connects the protected activity and the adverse action and does not rely upon inference. If the complainant does not produce direct evidence, he or she must proceed indirectly, or inferentially, by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a motive prohibited by SPA was the true reason for the adverse action. One type of indirect, also known as circumstantial, evidence is evidence that discredits the respondent's proffered reasons for the adverse action, demonstrating instead that they were pretext for retaliation. Id. Another type of circumstantial evidence is temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ferguson, supra, at *2. The respondent may avoid liability if it “demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence” that it would have taken the same adverse action in any event. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probably or reasonably certain. Clarke, supra, at *3.
Paragraph (e) requires that the ALJ's decision be served on all parties to the proceeding, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor. Paragraph (e) also provides that any ALJ decision requiring reinstatement or lifting an order of reinstatement by the Assistant Secretary will be effective immediately upon receipt of the decision by the respondent. All other portions of the ALJ's order will be effective 14 days after the date of the decision unless a timely petition for review has been filed with the ARB.Section 1986.110Decisions and Orders of the Administrative Review BoardParagraph (a) sets forth rules regarding seeking review of an ALJ's decision with the ARB. Upon the issuance of the ALJ's decision, the parties have 14 days within which to petition the ARB for review of that decision. If no timely petition for review is filed with the ARB, the decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is not subject to judicial review. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, or electronic communication transmittal is considered the date of filing of the petition; if the petition is filed in person, by hand delivery or other means, the petition is considered filed upon receipt. In addition to being sent to the ARB, the petition is to be served on all parties, the Chief Administrative Law Judge, the Assistant Secretary, and, in cases in which the Assistant Secretary is a party, the Associate Solicitor, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor.
Consistent with the procedures for petitions for review under other OSHA-administered whistleblower laws, paragraph (b) of this section indicates that the ARB has discretion to accept or reject review in SPA whistleblower cases. Congress intended thesewhistleblower cases to be expedited, as reflected by the provision in STAA, which applies to SPA, providing for a hearing de novo in district court if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 210 days of the filing of the complaint. Making review of SPA whistleblower cases discretionary may assist in furthering that goal. As noted in paragraph (a) of this section, the parties should identify in their petitions for review the legal conclusions or orders to which they object, or the objections may be deemed waived. The ARB has 30 days to decide whether to grant the petition for review. If the ARB does not grant the petition, the decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the Secretary.
Paragraph (d) describes the remedies the ARB can award if it concludes that the respondent has violated SPA. (See the earlier discussion of remedies at 1986.105 and .109.) Under paragraph (e), if the ARB determines that the respondent has not violated the law, it will issue an order denying the complaint.Subpart C—Miscellaneous ProvisionsSection 1986.111Withdrawal of SPA Complaints, Findings, Objections, and Petitions for Review; SettlementThis section provides procedures and time periods for the withdrawal of complaints, the withdrawal of findings and/or preliminary orders by the Assistant Secretary, and the withdrawal of objections to findings and/or orders. It also provides for approval of settlements at the investigative and adjudicative stages of the case.
Under paragraph (e), settlements approved by the Assistant Secretary, the ALJ, or the ARB will constitute the final order of the Secretary and may be enforced pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 31105(e), as incorporated by 46 U.S.C. 2114(b).Section 1986.112Judicial ReviewThis section describes the statutory provisions for judicial review of decisions of the Secretary. Paragraph (a) provides that within 60 days of the issuance of a final order under sections 1986.109 or 1986.110, a person adversely affected or aggrieved by such order may file a petition for review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the complainant resided on the date of the violation. Paragraph (b) states that a final order will not be subject to judicial review in any criminal or other civil proceeding. Paragraph (c) requires that, in cases where judicial review is sought, the ARB or ALJ, as the case may be, submit the record of proceedings to the appropriate court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the local rules of such court.Section 1986.113Judicial EnforcementThis section provides that the Secretary may obtain judicial enforcement of orders, including orders approving settlement agreements, by filing a civil action seeking such enforcement in the United States district court for the district in which the violation occurred.Section 1986.114District Court Jurisdiction of Retaliation Complaints Under SPAThis section allows a complainant to bring an action in district court for de novo review of the allegations contained in the complaint filed with OSHA if there has been no final decision of the Secretary and 210 days have passed since the filing of that complaint and the delay was not due to the complainant's bad faith. This section reflects the Secretary's position that it would not be reasonable to construe the statute to permit a complainant to initiate an action in federal court after the Secretary issues a final decision, even if the date of the final decision is more than 210 days after the filing of the administrative complaint. In the Secretary's view, the purpose of the “kick out” provision is to aid the complainant in receiving a prompt decision. That goal is not implicated in a situation where the complainant already has received a final decision from the Secretary. In addition, permitting the complainant to file a new case in district court in such circumstances could conflict with the parties' rights to seek judicial review of the Secretary's final decision in the court of appeals.
Paragraph (b) of this section requires complainants to provide file-stamped copies of their complaint within seven days after filing a complaint in district court to the Assistant Secretary, the ALJ, or the ARB, depending on where the proceeding is pending. A copy of the complaint also must be provided to the OSHA official who issued the findings and/or preliminary order, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor. This provision is necessary to notify the Agency that the complainant has opted to file a complaint in district court. This provision is not a substitute for the complainant's compliance with the requirements for service of process of the district court complaint contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of the district court where the complaint is filed.Section 1986.115Special Circumstances; Waiver of RulesThis section provides that in circumstances not contemplated by these rules or for good cause the ALJ or the ARB may, upon application and three days notice to the parties, waive any rule or issue such orders as justice or the administration of SPA's whistleblower provision requires.IV. Paperwork Reduction ActThis rule contains a reporting provision (filing a retaliation complaint, section 1986.103) which was previously reviewed as a statutory requirement of the Seaman's Protection Act (46 U.S.C. 2114) and approved for use by the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), and was assigned OMB control number 1218-0236 under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995). A non-material change has been submitted to OMB to include the regulatory citation.V. Administrative Procedure ActThe notice and comment rulemaking procedures of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) do not apply “to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). This is a rule of agency procedure, practice, and interpretation within the meaning of that section, since it provides procedures for the handling of retaliation complaints. Therefore, publication in theFederal Registerof a notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comments are not required for these regulations. Although this is a procedural rule not subject to the notice and comment procedures of the APA, the Agency is providing persons interested in this interim final rule 60 days to submit comments. A final rule will be published after the Agency receives and reviews the public's comments.
Furthermore, because this rule is procedural and interpretative rather than substantive, the normal requirement of 5 U.S.C. 553(d) that a rule be effective 30 days after publication in theFederal Registeris inapplicable. The Assistant Secretary also finds good cause to provide an immediate effective date for this interim final rule. It is in the public interest that the rule be effective immediately so that parties may know what procedures are applicable to pending cases.VI. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563; Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995; Executive Order 13132The Department has concluded that this rule is not a “significant regulatory action” within the meaning of Section 3(f)(4) of Executive Order 12866, as reaffirmed by Executive Order 13563, because it is not likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, no regulatory impact analysis has been prepared.
The rule is procedural and interpretative in nature, and it is expected to have a negligible economic impact. For this reason, and the fact that no notice of proposed rulemaking has been published, no statement is required under Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. Finally, this rule does not have “federalism implications.” The rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government” and therefore is not subject to Executive Order 13132 (Federalism).VII. Regulatory Flexibility AnalysisThe Department has determined that the regulation will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The regulation simply implements procedures necessitated by enactment of SPA. Furthermore, no certification to this effect is required and no regulatory flexibility analysis is required because no proposed rule has been issued.
List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 1986Administrative practice and procedure, Employment, Investigations, Marine safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Seamen, Transportation, Whistleblowing.
Part 1986 Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the Employee Protection Provision of the S Protection Act Spa As Amended.Subpart a Complaints Investigations Findings and Preliminary OrdersSec.1986.100
Issuance of findings and preliminary orders.Subpart B Litigation1986.106
Decisions and orders of the Administrative Review Board.Subpart C Miscellaneous Provisions1986.111
Authority46 U.S.C. 2114; 49 U.S.C. 31105; Secretary's Order 1-2012 (Jan. 18, 2012), 77 FR 3912 (Jan. 25, 2012); Secretary's Order 1-2010 (Jan. 15, 2010), 75 FR 3924-01 (Jan. 25, 2010).
Subpart a Complaints Investigations Findings and Preliminary Orders§ 1986.100
§ 1986.101
§ 1986.102
(1) In good faith reported or is about to report to the Coast Guard or otherappropriate Federal agency or department that the seaman believes that a violation of a maritime safety law or regulation prescribed under that law or regulation has occurred;
§ 1986.103
§ 1986.104
(3) For purposes of determining whether to investigate, the complainant will be considered to have met the required burden if the complaint on its face, supplemented as appropriate through interviews of the complainant, alleges the existence of facts and either direct or circumstantial evidence to meet the required showing, i.e., to give rise to an inference that the respondent knew or suspected that the seaman engaged in protected activity and thatthe protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. The burden may be satisfied, for example, if the complainant shows that the adverse action took place shortly after the protected activity, giving rise to the inference that it was a contributing factor in the adverse action. If the required showing has not been made, the complainant (or the complainant's legal counsel if complainant is represented by counsel) will be so notified and the investigation will not commence.
(f) Prior to the issuance of findings and a preliminary order as provided for in § 1986.105, if the Assistant Secretary has reasonable cause, on the basis of information gathered under the procedures of this part, to believe that the respondent has violated the Act and that preliminary reinstatement is warranted, the Assistant Secretary will again contact the respondent (or the respondent's legal counsel, if respondent is represented by counsel) to give notice of the substance of the relevant evidence supporting the complainant's allegations as developed during the course of the investigation. This evidence includes any witness statements, which will be redacted to protect the identity of confidential informants where statements were given in confidence; if the statements cannot be redacted without revealing the identity of confidential informants, summaries of their contents will be provided. The complainant will also receive a copy of the materials that must be provided to the respondent under this paragraph. Before providing such materials to the complainant, the Agency will redact them, if necessary, in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable confidentiality laws. The respondent will be given the opportunity to submit a written response, to meet with the investigators, to present statements from witnesses in support of its position, and to present legal and factual arguments. The respondent must present this evidence within 10 business days of the Assistant Secretary's notification pursuant to this paragraph, or as soon thereafter as the Assistant Secretary and the respondent can agree, if the interests of justice so require.
§ 1986.105
(c) The findings and the preliminary order will be effective 30 days after receipt by the respondent (or the respondent's legal counsel if the respondent is represented by counsel), or on the compliance date set forth in the preliminary order, whichever is later, unless an objection and request for a hearing have been timely filed as provided at § 1986.106. However, the portion of any preliminary order requiring reinstatement will be effective immediately upon the respondent's receipt of the findings and the preliminary order, regardless of any objections to the findings and/or the order.Subpart B Litigation§ 1986.106
(a) Any party who desires review, including judicial review, must file any objections and a request for a hearing on the record within 30 days of receipt of the findings and preliminary order pursuant to § 1986.105(c). The objections and request for a hearing must be in writing and state whether the objections are to the findings and/or the preliminary order. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, or electronic communication transmittal is considered the date of filing; if the objection is filed in person, by hand-delivery or other means, the objection is filed upon receipt. Objections must be filed with the Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, and copies of the objections must be mailed at the same time to the other parties of record, and the OSHA official who issued the findings.
§ 1986.107
§ 1986.108
§ 1986.109
(c) Neither the Assistant Secretary's determination to dismiss a complaint without completing an investigation pursuant to § 1986.104(e) nor the Assistant Secretary's determination to proceed with an investigation is subject to review by the ALJ, and a complaint may not be remanded for the completion of an investigation or for additional findings on the basis that a determination to dismiss was made in error. Rather, if there otherwise is jurisdiction, the ALJ will hear the case on the merits or dispose of the matter without a hearing if the facts and circumstances warrant.
§ 1986.110
(b) If a timely petition for review is filed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the decision of the ALJ willbecome the final order of the Secretary unless the ARB, within 30 days of the filing of the petition, issues an order notifying the parties that the case has been accepted for review. If a case is accepted for review, the decision of the ALJ will be inoperative unless and until the ARB issues an order adopting the decision, except that any order of reinstatement will be effective while review is conducted by the ARB unless the ARB grants a motion by the respondent to stay that order based on exceptional circumstances. The ARB will specify the terms under which any briefs are to be filed. The ARB will review the factual determinations of the ALJ under the substantial evidence standard. If no timely petition for review is filed, or the ARB denies review, the decision of the ALJ will become the final order of the Secretary. If no timely petition for review is filed, the resulting final order is not subject to judicial review.
(e) If the ARB determines that the respondent has not violated the law, an order will be issued denying the complaint.Subpart C Miscellaneous Provisions§ 1986.111
(b) The Assistant Secretary may withdraw the findings and/or a preliminary order at any time before the expiration of the 30-day objection period described in § 1986.106, provided that no objection has been filed yet, and substitute new findings and/or a new preliminary order. The date of the receipt of the substituted findings or order will begin a new 30-day objection period.
§ 1986.112
(a) Within 60 days after the issuance of a final order under §§ 1986.109 and 1986.110, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by the order may file a petition for review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the complainant resided on the date of the violation.
§ 1986.113
Whenever any person has failed to comply with a preliminary order of reinstatement or a final order, including one approving a settlement agreement issued under SPA, the Secretary may file a civil action seeking enforcement of the order in the United States districtcourt for the district in which the violation was found to have occurred.
§ 1986.114
§ 1986.115
In special circumstances not contemplated by the provisions of these rules, or for good cause shown, the ALJ or the ARB on review may, upon application, after three days notice to all parties, waive any rule or issue such orders as justice or the administration of SPA requires.[FR Doc. 2013-02539 Filed 2-5-13; 8:45 am]BILLING CODE 4510-26-PFootnotes
The text of 46 U.S.C. 2114 refers to “the Secretary,” defined for purposes of Part A of Subtitle II as “the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating.” 46 U.S.C. 2101(34). The Coast Guard is currently part of the Department of Homeland Security.
Specifically, the Act's adoption of STAA's “procedures, requirements, and rights” is followed by the text “including with respect to the right to file an objection, the right of a person to file for a petition for review under subsection (c) of [STAA], and the requirement to bring a civil action under subsection (d) of that section.” 46 U.S.C. 2114(b). But Section (c) addresses de novo review in the district court if the Secretary has not issued a final decision after 210 days; Section (d) addresses filing a petition for review after receiving an adverse order following a hearing; and Section (e) provides that “[i]f a person fails to comply with an order issued under subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary of Labor shall bring a civil action to enforce the order in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the violation occurred.” 49 U.S.C. 31105(c)-(e).
Section (f) declares that STAA does not preempt any other federal or state law safeguarding against retaliation; Section (g) declares that STAA does not diminish any legal rights of any employee, nor may the rights of the Section be waived; Section (h) prohibits the disclosure by the Secretary of Transportation or the Secretary of Homeland Security of the identity of an employee who provides information about an alleged violation of the statute except, under certain circumstances, to the Attorney General; Section (i) creates a process for reporting security problems to the Department of Homeland Security; and Section (j) defines the term “employee” for purposes of STAA. 49 U.S.C. 31105(f)-(j).
Nothing in this preamble should be read to suggest that OSHA agrees with the holding or rationale of Texaco. (5)
SPA contains no geographic limit; its scope is limited only by the definition of “seaman.”
Attachments View All (0) View document: No documents available. Attachments View All (0) Comment Now! Comment Period Closed Apr 8 2013, at 11:59 PM ET ID: OSHA-2011-0841-0001 Tracking Number: View original printed format: Document Information Date Posted: Feb 6, 2013RIN: 1218-AC58CFR: 29 CFR Part 1986Federal Register Number: 2013-02539 Show More Details Submitter Information Comments4 Comments Received* Please find attached comments submitted to Docket No: OSHA-2011-0841 by the Chamber of Shipping of America.
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