Source: http://sc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20160523_0001859.DSC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-07-19 21:19:18
Document Index: 440422352

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 200', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404']

Jeremy Slaughter, Plaintiff,
This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28 U.S.C. Â§ 636(b)(1)(B). Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.
On January 13, 2011, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI alleging an onset of disability date of November 26, 2009. [R. 142-49, 132-41.] These claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 65-72, 76-79.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and on April 1, 2013, ALJ Wendell M. Sims conducted a de novo hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 26-56.]
The ALJ issued a decision on April 18, 2013, finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act ("the Act") and not eligible for SSI benefits. [R. 12-21.] At Step 1, [1] the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act on November 26, 2009, the alleged date of disability onset, and continued to meet them through the date of the decision. [R. 20, Finding 1.] The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. [R. 20, Finding 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found that the medical evidence established that Plaintiff had "severe" impairments of degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis of his knees, major depression, and general anxiety. [R. 20, Finding 3.] The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had non-severe impairments of discrete schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, residuals of a right foot injury, poor hearing in one ear, and poor vision in his right eye. [R. 15.] At Step 3, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the criteria of one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. [R. 14; R. 20, Finding 5.]
Having carefully reviewed all of the evidence in this case, I find that the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform "light" work requiring completion of only simple, routine, repetitive tasks with only occasional public contact, as well as only occasional stooping, kneeling, and climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds. I find that the claimant has not met his burden of establishing that he is unable to perform other work functions, including standing, sitting, or walking for 6 to 8 hours in a work day, frequently lifting and carrying as much as 10 pounds, occasionally lifting and carrying as much as 20 pounds, pushing, pulling, meeting the other physical non-exertional demands of work, and meeting the mental demands of unskilled work, including performing the simple, routine, repetitive tasks associated with such work.
[R. 18; R. 20 Finding 7.] Based on this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work. [R. 21, Finding 8.] Taking into consideration Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience, the ALJ determined that, although the claimant is unable to perform the full range of "light" work, he is capable of making the adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy including employment as a small parts assembler, bench assembly, an assembler machine tender, and a night business cleaner. [R. 21, Finding 11.] The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of the Act at any time through the date of the decision. [R. 21, Finding 12.]
Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, and on September 8, 2014, the Council declined review.[2] [R. 1-8.] Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on November 20, 2014. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff does not allege any specific error in the ALJ's analysis but argues that his claim should have been granted at the initial level based on the "overwhelming evidence of physical and mental disability as seen in the medical records provided." [Doc. 20.] Plaintiff contends that he "has suffered several years of back and joint pain, along with psychiatric impairments that are not expected to improve to a point of allowing" him to become employable. [ Id. at 2.] Plaintiff argues the medical evidence of record supports a finding that Listings 1.02, 1.04, 12.04, and 12.06 are met because the evidence showed joint space narrowing in the knees and lumbar spinal stenosis and nerve root canal compression; Plaintiff also argues that Plaintiff's mental impairments satisfy "the grid for mood disorders and anxiety disorders." [ Id. at 3.] Plaintiff contends that several physicians and psychiatric physicians have stated that Plaintiff is disabled and cannot work. [ Id. ] Plaintiff also points out that his VA disability rating has been changed from 50% to 80% during the course of this disability claim due to his deteriorating knees and back; and, during the week of August 17, 2015, Plaintiff had surgery to correct his pinched spinal nerves. [ Id. at 1.]
The Commissioner contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits and the decision should be affirmed. [Doc. 21.] The Commissioner explains that Plaintiff's primary arguments reference certain evidence that was not presented to the ALJ and is not before this Court or made part of the record. [ Id. at 1, 11.]
To facilitate uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, federal regulations have reduced the statutory definition of disability to a series of five sequential questions. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983) (noting a "need for efficiency" in considering disability claims). The ALJ must consider whether (1) the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals an impairment included in the Administration's Official Listings of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant from having substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1520, 416.920. Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the claimant. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983). The claimant must prove disability on or before the last day of her insured status to receive disability benefits. Everett v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 412 F.2d 842, 843 (4th Cir. 1969). If the inquiry reaches step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to produce evidence that other jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Grant, 699 F.2d at 191. If at any step of the evaluation the ALJ can find an individual is disabled or not disabled, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a)(4); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
"Substantial gainful activity" must be both substantial-involves doing significant physical or mental activities, 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a)-and gainful-done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized, id. Â§Â§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b). If an individual has earnings from employment or self-employment above a specific level set out in the regulations, he is generally presumed to be able to engage in substantial gainful activity. Id. Â§Â§ 404.1574-.1575, 416.974-.975.
An impairment is "severe" if it significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. See id. Â§Â§ 404.1521, 416.921. When determining whether a claimant's physical and mental impairments are sufficiently severe, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's impairments. 42 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 423(d)(2)(B), 1382c(a)(3)(G). The ALJ must evaluate a disability claimant as a whole person and not in the abstract, having several hypothetical and isolated illnesses. Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that, when evaluating the effect of a number of impairments on a disability claimant, "the [Commissioner] must consider the combined effect of a claimant's impairments and not fragmentize them"). Accordingly, the ALJ must make specific and well-articulated findings as to the effect of a combination of impairments when determining whether an individual is disabled. Id. at 50 ("As a corollary to this rule, the ALJ must adequately explain his or her evaluation of the combined effects of the impairments."). If the ALJ finds a combination of impairments to be severe, "the combined impact of the impairments shall be considered throughout the disability determination process." 42 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 423(d)(2)(B), 1382c(a)(3)(G).
If a claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of a listing found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1 and meets the duration requirement found at 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1509 or 416.909, the ALJ will find the claimant disabled without considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience.[4] 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d).
The assessment of a claimant's ability to perform past relevant work "reflect[s] the statute's focus on the functional capacity retained by the claimant." Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir. 1995). At this step of the evaluation, the ALJ compares the claimant's residual functional capacity[5] with the physical and mental demands of the kind of work he has done in the past to determine whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to do his past work. 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1560(b), 416.960(b).
As previously stated, once the ALJ finds that a claimant cannot return to her prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant could perform other work that exists in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1520(f)-(g), 416.920(f)-(g); Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992). To meet this burden, the Commissioner may sometimes rely exclusively on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "grids"). Exclusive reliance on the "grids" is appropriate where the claimant suffers primarily from an exertional impairment, without significant nonexertional factors.[6] 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Â§ 200.00(e); Gory v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 929, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that exclusive reliance on the grids is appropriate in cases involving exertional limitations). When a claimant suffers from both exertional and nonexertional limitations, the grids may serve only as guidelines. Gory, 712 F.2d at 931. In such a case, the Commissioner must use a vocational expert to establish the claimant's ability to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1569a, 416.969a; see Walker, 889 F.2d at 49-50 ("Because we have found that the grids cannot be relied upon to show conclusively that claimant is not disabled, when the case is remanded it will be incumbent upon the [Commissioner] to prove by expert vocational testimony that despite the combination of exertional and nonexertional impairments, the claimant retains the ability to perform specific jobs which exist in the national economy."). The purpose of using a vocational expert is "to assist the ALJ in determining whether there is work available in the national economy which this particular claimant can perform." Walker, 889 F.2d at 50. For the vocational expert's testimony to be relevant, "it must be based upon a consideration of all other evidence in the record, ... and it must be in response to proper hypothetical questions which fairly set out all of claimant's impairments." Id. (citations omitted).
If a treating physician's opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence" in the record, the ALJ must give it controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); see Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The ALJ may discount a treating physician's opinion if it is unsupported or inconsistent with other evidence, i.e., when the treating physician's opinion does not warrant controlling weight, Craig, 76 F.3d at 590, but the ALJ must nevertheless assign a weight to the medical opinion based on the 1) length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; 2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; 3) supportability of the opinion; 4) consistency of the opinion with the record a whole; 5) specialization of the physician; and 6) other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion, 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Similarly, where a treating physician has merely made conclusory statements, the ALJ may afford the opinion such weight as is supported by clinical or laboratory findings and other consistent evidence of a claimant's impairments. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 590 (holding there was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to reject the treating physician's conclusory opinion where the record contained contradictory evidence).
In any instance, a treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to more weight than a consulting physician's opinion. See Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that treating physician's opinion must be accorded great weight because "it reflects an expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient's condition for a prolonged period of time"); 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). An ALJ determination coming down on the side of a non-examining, non-treating physician's opinion can stand only if the medical testimony of examining and treating physicians goes both ways. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 346 (4th Cir. 1986). Further, the ALJ is required to review all of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). However, the ALJ is responsible for making the ultimate determination about whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. Id.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The ALJ is required to order additional medical tests and exams only when a claimant&#39;s medical sources do not give sufficient medical evidence about an impairment to determine whether the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1517, 416.917; see alsoConley v. Bowen,781 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir. 1986). The regulations are clear: a consultative examination is not required when there is sufficient medical evidence to make a determination on a claimant's disability. 20 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 404.1517, ...