Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20080723_0001126.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-07-24 14:52:41
Document Index: 717727344

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 16', '§ 552', '§ 16', '§ 2241']

| Toolasprashad v. Grondolsky
Toolasprashad v. Grondolsky
LATCHMIE TOOLASPRASHAD, PETITIONER,v.JEFF GRONDOLSKY, RESPONDENT.
I. Petitioner's Previous Legal Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. Petitioner's Pending Legal Actions . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A. Bivens-VII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. 2241-III; the Instant Petition. . . . . . . . . . . 25
C. Supplement to the Instant Petition. . . . . . . . . 33
D. Joint Reading of the Petition and Supplement. . . . 34
E. Post-Supplement Submissions In This Action. . . . . 35
III. Discussion.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A. The Nature of Habeas Action and Pleading Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B. Claims Not Cognizable Under § 2241. . . . . . . . . 42
1. Expungement Claims.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
a. Complete Expungement of the BOP Report. . 45
b. Partial Expungement.. . . . . . . . . . . 48
2. Curative/Future Parole Hearing Claims. . . . . 51
a. Parole Hearing Conducted by a Single Examiner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
b. Presence of Audience and Life Testimony.. 61
c. Examiner's Bias.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
C. Habeas-like Claims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1. Mickens-Thomas.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2. Gambino v. Morris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3. Wasman, Pearce, Bono and Marshall Cases. . . . 81
4. Solomon, Misasi, Dye, Billiteri and Persico Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
IV. Conclusion.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Latchmie Toolasprashad ("Petitioner") is presently confined at F.C.I. Fort Dix, New Jersey, serving a life term for contract murder. This matter is before this Court upon Petitioner's filing of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ("Petition"). See Docket Entry No. 1. After filing his Petition, Petitioner then filed a document titled "amended petition" ("Supplement"), which, it appears, was intended by Petitioner to operate as a supplement to, rather than a substitute of, the original Petition. See Docket Entries No. 2, 4. Petitioner raises various civil rights claims and habeas-like allegations. As explained below, the present case will be referred to as "2241-III," as it is but one of a long series of related, often duplicative, filings by Mr. Toolasprashad.*fn1
I. PETITIONER'S PREVIOUS LEGAL ACTIONS
Since the Petition and Supplement directly relate to many of Petitioner's past and ongoing litigations, this Court finds it helpful to begin this Opinion with a summary of some of these actions. Petitioner's earliest actions concentrated on Petitioner's challenges to his convictions.*fn2 See United States v. Toolasprashad ("2255-III"), 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4486 (4th Cir. Mar. 14, 1994); United States v. Toolasprashad ("2255-II"), 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1557 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1993); Toolasprashad v. United States, ("2255-I"), 902 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1990).
His next set of actions arose from his allegations that, upon his conviction, he began serving his life sentence "at the federal correctional facility in Allenwood, Pennsylvania [where] he and a female staff member had a sexual relationship." Toolasprashad v. Beeler, App. No. 99-5512, Docket Entry No. 19 (opinion), at 2 and n.1 (3d Cir. 2000).*fn3
Apparently, as a disciplinary measure, [Petitioner] was transferred . . . to the federal correctional facility in Marianna, Florida . . . . [W]hile at FCI-Marianna, [Petitioner was written up in an incident report and charged with [two minor offenses]. Following a disciplinary hearing, [he] was found guilty . . . and sanction [to minor a sanction, which] was suspended in its entirety pending 180 days of clear conduct. The sanction did not include loss of good time credit. [After being transferred to FCI Fort Dix, petitioner] filed [a] § 2241 [application (hereinafter "2241-I") alleging that the] Incident Report . . . was invalid because the staff [at FCI-Marianna] was racially biased [and] the Disciplinary Hearing Officer reneged on his promise to recommend that the Parole Commission not credit the incident Report in calculating [his] parole eligibility date. [He] also alleged that [the aforesaid] actions . . . were taken in retaliation for his having filed numerous grievances.*fn4
Judge Irenas, presiding over Petitioner's 2241-I action, dismissed the petition, finding that: (a) Petitioner's due process rights were not violated during the administrative hearings, which fully comported to the requirements set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-71 (1974); (b) Petitioner's liberty rights were not implicated by the transfer from FCIAllenwood to FCI-Marianna; (c) no facts suggesting retaliatory motives were offered by Petitioner; and (d) the Parole Commission was allowed to rely on Petitioner's incident reports to determine his parole eligibility. See Toolasprashad v. Beeler ("2241-I"), Civ. Action No. 98-4983 (JEI) (D.N.J.), Docket Entry No. 15. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Irenas' decision, with clarification that--while Petitioner's § 2241 application indeed failed to allege a constitutional violation--"habeas relief [was] not available on [Petitioner's] claim[s] . . . because he did not lose good time credit." Toolasprashad v. Beeler, 234 F.3d 1266 (3d Cir. 2000), App. No. 99-5512, Docket Entry No. 19, at 4. The Court of Appeals explained that "[a] suspended sentence to disciplinary confinement [is a decision of the type that does] not impact on a prisoner's release date and thus [does] not involve a significant liberty interest," amenable to § 2241 review.*fn5 Id.
Then, in 1999, Petitioner filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, pursuant to the Privacy Act, against the United States Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), alleging that his transfer to another facility and reclassification as a special offender adversely affected him in several ways. Upon the district court's decision granting the BOP's motion to dismiss Petitioner's complaint for insufficiency of pleadings, Petitioner appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint, but solely because Petitioner's allegations (that the BOP failed to maintain accurate records regarding Petitioner's history of harassing and demeaning staff members and, in addition, included a certain memorandum containing false information in Petitioner's prison file, all in order to obtain basis for his transfer) met the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8, thus preventing dismissal of the complaint as insufficiently pled. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (an intermediary decision in Petitioner's Bivens-II line of cases).
It appears that Petitioner was moved to a correctional facility in Pennsylvania during the time when the District of Columbia was considering the above-discussed remand, and the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Judge Muir, presiding over that matter, addressed the "false information" claim (i.e., the sole claim that remained unresolved by the District of Columbia) and resolved the matter in favor of the BOP.*fn6 Petitioner appealed Judge Muir's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed Judge Muir's conclusion. See Toolasprashad v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons ("Bivens-II"), 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25263 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2007). Specifically, the Court of Appeals agreed with Judge Muir's finding that Petitioner failed to show any material statement in the memorandum so inaccurate as to warrant monetary relief. See id. at *4-6 and n.1 (combing through Petitioner's prison file supporting the statements in the BOP's memorandum stating that Petitioner disrupted the orderly running of a federal prison through his blatant disrespect for authority and harassment of correctional staff members).
It also appears that, around the same time when he began his challenge with respect to the BOP's memorandum in the District of Columbia, Petitioner filed another action in that court, that is, an application for a writ of mandamus alleging that the BOP violated his rights by offering him only a copy of the current Parole Commission Manual and failing to provide him with a copy of 1985-87 Parole Commission Manuals. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons ("Mandamus-I"), 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25145 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 2002). Upon the district court's denial of the writ, Petitioner appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the district court's finding.*fn7 See id.
On June 10, 2002, Petitioner filed another petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this District, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Toolasprashad v. De Rosa ("2241-II"), Civ. Action No. 02-2841 (JHR), Docket Entry No. 1. Presiding over Petitioner's 2241-II matter, Judge Rodriguez summarized the facts underlying that litigation, as well as Petitioner's challenges, as follows:*fn8
Petitioner was eligible for parole [consideration on] December 16, 1995 . . . On June 7, 1995, Petitioner received [his] initial parole hearing wherein he denied committing the crime; rather, he alleged that both he and his co-conspirator had been dating the victim, and that he was targeted because of his race.*fn9 The Parole Commission then rated the severity of Petitioner's offense as Category Eight . . . and found his guideline range to be 100 plus months. The Commission set Petitioner's reconsideration hearing for June 2010. Petitioner appealed [this] fifteen-year mandate, and the commission's decision was affirmed. [That decision] was again affirmed on administrative appeal following [the] interim hearing held on November 3, 1998. The [BOP] was then ordered to conduct a psychological evaluation of Petitioner before his next interim hearing. . . . Petitioner was evaluated as having Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a disorder in which individuals are generally unpredictable and have difficulty maintaining employment and relationships.*fn10 Petitioner's next interim hearing was held on August 22, 2001. After reviewing Petitioner's institutional achievements, the hearing examiner recommended that Petitioner's reconsideration date be advanced two years from June 2010 to June 2008. Upon review, two reviewing examiners disagreed . . . and ordered that the June 2010 hearing date remained unchanged. . . . Petitioner subsequently filed an administrative appeal . . . . The Board affirmed the decision [concluding that] : (1) the Commission's decision did not exceed the guideline range . . . .; (2) the initial decision was based on the record which established that petitioner denied his guilt [and] was without remorse; (3) information from the [BOP's] psychological report contradict[ed] Petitioner's claim that he [was] a good parole risk . . . ; (4) despite Petitioner's good behavior in the prison setting, his "indications of posturing and violent personality [were] sufficient to deny parole"; and (5) even if Petitioner did not pose a risk, parole [was properly] denied on the basis of just punishment for a heinous crime.*fn11 Petitioner objected to the Board's denial of parole in his [§ 2241] petition [in the 2241-II action. In addition to raising § 2255 challenges to his conviction,] Petitioner claim[ed] that the Commission's decision did not sufficiently credit his institutional accomplishments, relied on outdated psychological evaluations and discriminated against him as a Hindu-Indian. Petitioner requested that [Judge Rodriguez] review transcripts of [Petitioner's] parole hearings, . . . review Petitioner's case de novo, and release Petitioner on parole.
Toolasprashad v. De Rosa ("2241-II"), Civ. Action No. 02-2841, Docket Entry No. 21, at 2-4, 16.
Assessing Petitioner's 2241-II application, Judge Rodriguez: (a) dismissed Petitioner's § 2255 claims for lack of jurisdiction; (b) partially granted Petitioner's requests to release his presentence reports to him; and (c) denied Petitioner's requests as to Parole Commission manuals on the grounds that "the Commission [did] not have the desired volumes on file and [these volumes] are likewise inapplicable to Petitioner's parole hearing." Id. at 6-11, 14. Then, turning to Petitioner's challenges to the Commission's decision to deny him both immediate parole and acceleration of his parole review date, Judge Rodriguez explained to Petitioner that "[t]he role of the court, in reviewing a within-guidelines parole decision, is . . . essentially limited to insuring that the guidelines were in fact followed, once the Commission has exercised its informed discretion." Id. at 15 (quoting Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 950 (3d Cir. 1988)). Since Petitioner's offense was both properly categorized by the Commission, and the guidelines set no upper limit for offenses like the one committed by Petitioner, Judge Rodriguez found no error as to the framework within which the Commission exercised its discretion. See id. at 15-16. Similarly, Judge Rodriguez found no violations with respect to the Commission's discretionary considerations and held that: (a) Petitioner was not entitled to parole on the basis of his institutional accomplishments, since the accomplishments, while duly considered by the Commission, provide a merely permissible rather than mandatory basis for parole; and (b) Petitioner's contention that the Commission ignored the conclusions of Dr. Schwartz (a psychiatrist who prepared a report stating that Petitioner had "no mental illness, no personality disorder and no physical disorder") because Petitioner was not paroled were without merit, since the record established the Commission's legitimate exercise of discretion in light of both Dr. Schwartz' report and the BOP's psychological report evaluating Petitioner with narcissistic personality disorder. See id. at 12-13, 16-17.
Consequently, Judge Rodriguez dismissed Petitioner's § 2241 petition and later denied his motion for reconsideration. See id., Docket Entry No. 23. Petitioner appealed these decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed Judge Rodriguez' findings. See Toolasprashad v. De Rosa, 122 Fed. App. 598 (3d Cir. 2005). Subsequently, when Petitioner sought certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application. See Toolasprashad v. DeRosa, 545 U.S. 1122 (2005).
Five months after filing his aforesaid 2241-II petition examined by Judge Rodriguez, Petitioner filed with this Court another Bivens action asserting that he was denied access to the prison commissary bathroom and water fountain during his work shifts, that no chairs were made available for him while he was working, and that prison employees obstructed his administrative remedies, retaliated against him, and conspired to violate his constitutional rights. See Toolasprashad v. Wright ("BivensIV"), Civ. Action No. 02-5473, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36408 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2005). Petitioner's claims were dismissed by the undersigned upon consideration of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and that decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit.*fn12 See Toolasprashad v. Wright, 232 Fed. App. 208 (3d Cir. 2007).
On April 23, 2004, while his Bivens-IV action was still pending with this Court, Petitioner filed another Bivens action with the District of Columbia. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons ("Bivens-V"), Civ. Action No. 04-652 (D.D.C.). On July 2, 2004, that Bivens-V matter was transferred to this District and assigned to the undersigned. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, Civil Action No. 04-3219 (JBS) (D.N.J.).
The factual statements made in Petitioner's Bivens-V complaint were, effectively, an extensive elaboration on the facts and contentions previously presented to Judge Rodriguez in 2241-II, supra. This Court summarized Petitioner's elaborations as follows:
On November 2, 1998, [Petitioner] appeared for a parole hearing [and was denied parole. After the hearing,] the . . . Commission . . . requested that the [BOP] provide[d] a current psychological report [evaluating Petitioner.] Psychology intern Defendant Dr. Jaime Berry prepared the BOP psychological report [for Petitioner], under the supervision of psychologist Defendant Dr. Kindra Pugh. [Petitioner now] contends that the assessment was conducted improperly and that the resulting BOP psychological report [did] not accurately report [Petitioner's] behavior or psychological condition. . . . In addition, [Petitioner] contends that the diagnosis of . . . Narcissistic Personality Disorder . . . and other conclusions and recommendations contained in the report [were] incorrect. . . . After receiving the BOP psychological report, [Petitioner's] counsel arranged for a second report by . . . Dr. Daniel Schwartz. . . . Dr. Schwartz submitted his report, appeared at [Petitioner's parole] hearing, . . . testified in favor of granting [Petitioner] parole [and] disputed Dr. Berry's diagnosis of Narcissistic Personality Disorder. [Petitioner, however,] was again denied parole and that denial was upheld on appeal to the . . . Board . . . . [Petitioner] contends that, [while] the BOP psychological report . . . could be construed as generally favorable, it is internally inconsistent and the Commission seized on certain of those inconsistencies to deny him parole. [Petitioner also] contends that the Commission did not consider Dr. Schwartz's report. Following this second denial of parole, [Petitioner] filed an Administrative Remedy with the BOP requesting that the BOP psychological report be amended to correct its various flaws. His requests were denied . . . . [Petitioner now] requests injunctive relief, in the form of (1) [expungement] of the [BOP's] psychological report prepared by Dr. Berry and Dr. Pugh [and] (2) a new parole hearing giving "equal weight" to the testimony and report of Dr. Schwartz.
Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons ("Bivens-V"), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65175 (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2006) (summarizing the findings made in an earlier opinion issued in that action, Civil Action No. 04-3219, Docket Entry No. 10 ("April Opinion")).
Addressing Petitioner's allegations, the undersigned noted that it was indeed "appropriate for [Petitioner] to bring these claims in a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief, as opposed to a habeas action," April Opinion at 6, n.5 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242 (2005)), and "construe[d] the Complaint as asserting claims that [Petitioner] was denied due process in the preparation of the BOP psychological report and in his parole hearing and claims under the Privacy Act . . . for correction of records of the BOP and the Commission." Id. at 6.
The Court, however, dismissed both the due process and Privacy Act claims. With respect to Petitioner's due process claim, this Court explained in Bivens-V:
There is no constitutional right to parole or to an error-free parole decision-making process. [See] Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) . . . . In Greenholtz, [the Supreme Court held that a parole statute might be so drafted as to] entitle [a prisoner] to some measure of constitutional protection," [but] the Court nevertheless rejected the suggestion that parole hearings should be full-scale adversary hearings. [Id.] at 12, 14. Instead, the Court found sufficient the . . . procedures that afford the prisoner an opportunity to be heard and, when parole is denied, that notify the prisoner in what respects he fell short of qualifying for parole. [Id.] at 16. In addition, . . . the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a prisoner at a parole hearing has no constitutional right to call witnesses in his behalf or to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. [See Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz,] 576 F.2d 1274, 1284 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 442 U.S. 1 . . . . Assuming that the Federal Parole Act creates the same "expectation" of parole [as discussed] in Greenholtz, [Petitioner] has failed to state a claim that he was denied due process in the creation of the BOP psychological report or in the procedures employed by the Parole Commission. According to the allegations of the Complaint, [Petitioner] participated in the testing used to create the BOP psychological report, he was given a copy of the BOP psychological report in advance of the parole hearing, he was permitted to present both the live testimony and the report of his own psychological expert, he was permitted to appear and be heard at the parole hearing, he was given a statement of the reasons why he was denied parole, and he was permitted to appeal that decision. Thus, the Commission's procedures met the Greenholtz due process requirements . . . . Cf. Furnari v. U.S. Parole Commission, 2005 WL 535390, *2 (3d Cir. March 8, 2005) (Commission has broad discretion in materials it can consider in making parole decision, and reliance on materials describing conduct other than the offense of conviction to set offense severity level does not implicate due process rights). In addition, to the extent the Complaint could be construed as asserting a claim that [Petitioner] has a due process right to have false information expunged from his parole file, cf. Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has never recognized such a cause of action, see Williams v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 85 Fed. App. 299, 304 (3d Cir. 2004), and it is not clear that the Paine case remains good law even in the Fourth Circuit, see Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 309 n.13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 995 (1997). In any event, [Petitioner] fails to state a claim even under the rule announced in Paine. Under Paine, a prisoner must allege three elements in order to state a due process claim for expungement: (1) that particular information exists in his file, (2) that the information in his file is false, and (3) that the information is relied on to a constitutionally significant degree. [See] 595 F.2d at 201. With respect to the second element, the Paine court stated,
[I]t is not sufficient that the inmate disputes evaluations and opinions regarding him. [See] Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977) (inmate disagreed with psychiatric evaluations contained in file). . . . The federal courts will not oversee the discretionary decisions of prison administrators and second-guess their evaluations. [See id.] at 201.
As [Petitioner] presents the type of claim explicitly excluded by the Paine court, a challenge to a psychological evaluation, he does not state a due process claim for expungement of records contained in his BOP or parole file.
April Opinion at 7-11 (footnotes and original brackets omitted).
Turning to Petitioner's Privacy Act claim, this Court, in Bivens-V, analogously explained to Petitioner that while, under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(A), "the court may order the agency to amend the individual's record in accordance with his request or in such other way as the court may direct, . . . [t]he BOP has exempted the Inmate Central Record System and the Inmate Physical and Mental Health Record System from . . . § 552a, [see] 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(a), (j), (n), [and] the Commission has exempted its records from the Privacy Act's amendment requirements . . . and its provision permitting injunctive relief against the agency § 552a(g)." April Opinion at 12 (citing also 28 C.F.R. § 16.85 and Deters v. U.S. Parole Commission, 85 F.3d 655, 658 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Consequently, this Court dismissed Petitioner's Bivens-V action and, on September 13, 2006, denied his request to reopen that matter.
On June 29, 2006, while Petitioner's motion to reopen the Bivens-V matter was pending with this Court, Petitioner filed another Bivens complaint with the District of Columbia. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons ("Bivens-VI"), Civil Action No. 06-1187 (ESH) (D.D.C.).*fn13 Addressing Petitioner's Bivens-VI claims, Judge Huvelle stated as follows:
[Petitioner] filed an amended complaint . . . against the [BOP], the . . . Commission and five individuals (Kathleen Pinner, [Dr.] Kerr, Marcia Baruch, Jamie Berry and Kindra Pugh). [Petitioner] challenges the use of an alleged inaccurate psychological report during parole proceedings, as well as the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the report. Under the doctrine of res judicata, "the parties to a suit and their privies are bound by a final judgment and may not relitigate any ground for relief which they already have had an opportunity to litigate--even if they chose not to exploit that opportunity--whether the initial judgment was erroneous or not." Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The doctrine of res judicata requires an identity of parties or their privies in the earlier and later suits. A final judgment in one action "bars any further claim based on the same 'nucleus of facts,' for 'it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of action, not the legal theory upon which a litigant relies.'" Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(quoting Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1234 (2d Cir.1977)); accord Velikonja v. Ashcroft, 355 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200-01 (D.D.C. 2005). [Petitioner's] amended complaint involves the same parties and nucleus of facts that formed the basis of his previous complaint [in Bivens-III]. On April 4, 2005, the District of New Jersey issued an opinion addressing [Petitioner's] constitutional and Privacy Act claims and dismissing the [Bivens-III] case with prejudice [and then denied Petitioner's] motion to reopen [the Bivens-III action. Although Petitioner now] asserts that [his] Privacy Act claim is not barred because the use of the alleged inaccurate record to deny his release to parole is "an ongoing matter,' [since the] Commission's most recent denial in June 2006 was against the recommendation of "a retired BOP Chief Forensic Psychologist . . . with more than 30 years' experience [which] contradicted the intern's report," . . . [t]he Privacy Act is not "a vehicle for amending the judgments of federal officials or . . . other[s] . . . as those judgments are reflected in records maintained by federal agencies." Kleiman v. Dep't of Energy, 294 U.S. App. D.C. 49, 956 F.2d 335, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(quoting Rogers v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 607 F. Supp. 697, 699 (N.D. Cal.1985)). Thus, a "complaint not about the accuracy of records, but about the underlying decision they reflect" is not cognizable under the Privacy Act. Levant v. Roche, 384 F. Supp. 2d 262, 270 (D.D.C. 2005). [Consequently] the doctrine of res judicata bars [Petitioner] from relitigating [his due process and Privacy Act] claims . . . .
Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons ("Bivens-VI"), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18949, at *1-6 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007).
Judge Huvelle, therefore, dismissed Petitioner's Bivens-VI action, see id. at *6, noting, inter alia, that the fact of Petitioner's naming of Parole Examiner Kathleen Pinner as a defendant in the Bivens-VI action did not affect the court's res judicata analysis, even though Pinner was not named as a defendant in Bivens-V, since Petitioner was "suing her for her actions taken as an employee of the . . . Commission."*fn14 See id. at *3, n.1 (citing LoBue v. Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(relying, in turn, on Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940))).
Petitioner appealed Judge Huvelle's decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the district court's findings in Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23275 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 1, 2007) (finding that "the motion for summary affirmance [should] be granted [because] the parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary action").
II. PETITIONER'S PENDING LEGAL ACTIONS
Petitioner has two actions currently pending in this District. The instant § 2241 Petition ("2241-III") was filed three weeks after the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision by issuing its ruling in Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23275 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 1, 2007). On the same day, Petitioner also filed a new civil action complaint ("Bivens-VII"), which was assigned to Judge Kugler. See Toolasprashad v. Williams, 07-5860 (RBK) (D.N.J.), Docket Entry No. 1. Following the mode of his previous applications, Petitioner filed extremely voluminous submissions in both Bivens-VII and 2241-III.*fn15
A. Bivens-VII
In his Bivens-VII action, Petitioner sued ten named prison officials, plus an unspecified number of "John and Jane Does," who are unnamed prison officials, all of whom are employed at Petitioner's current place of confinement, FCI Fort Dix. See Toolasprashad v. Williams, Civ. No. 07-5860 (RBK). Initially asserting that his original "[c]omplaint shall paint a clear picture" about the "Gestapo-style tactics" of these defendants, see id., Docket Entry No. 1, at 1, Petitioner then proceeded with a series of confusing narratives. The first narrative, of seven pages, was dedicated to the circumstances of Petitioner's allegedly retaliatory transfer, in spring of 2007, from a certain unit within the FCI Fort Dix to another unit, which Petitioner calls "East Gulag."*fn16 See id. at 2-9. The next three-page narrative discussed alleged withholdings of legal mail during in March of 2007. See id. at 9-12. The third, fourth and fifth narratives encompassed fifteen pages and described various alleged undue interferences with Petitioner's parole hearing in 2003, 2006 and 2007, see id. at 12-26, reflecting on the issues asserted in Petitioner's previous claims including, inter alia, those addressed by Judge Rodriguez and this Court in Petitioner's 2241-II and Bivens-V actions. The sixth narrative was seven pages long; it discussed the events of 2001 to 2004, and asserted that Petitioner's numerous parole hearings were sabotaged, implicating the same claims raised in Petitioner's 2241-II and Bivens-V actions. See id. at 27-33. The seventh (and last) narrative was also of seven pages, and it discussed alleged obstruction of Petitioner's grievance processes. See id. at 33-40. Petitioner concluded his seven narratives with an explanation that prison officials are "slimy-lying" and "blood-sucking," that "the BOP has maintained its statute as the dumping ground for unemployable and an incubator for breeding corruption and nepotism [with] an on-going culture of systemic lies." See id. at 41.
On July 16, 2008, Petitioner submitted an amended complaint in his Bivens-VII action; where he "added four defendants and two [more] issues." See id.., Docket Entry No. 8, at 1. Re-stating his claims in his amended complaint, Petitioner further elaborated on his previous claims including, inter alia, those addressed by Judge Rodriguez and this Court in Petitioner's 2241-II and Bivens-V actions. See generally, id., Docket Entry No. 8.
In his Bivens-VII action, Petitioner seeks, inter alia, "[t]hat the defendants cease and desist all interferences with [his] parole process." Docket Entry No. 1, at 41; Docket Entry No. 8, at 24.
B. 2241-III: the Instant Petition
Petitioner's instant submission, pending before the undersigned, consists of a 48-page petition and 110 pages of exhibits. Same as his Bivens-VII complaint, Petitioner's application presents a series of narratives.
The first narrative is titled "Respondents failed to timely prepare a psychological report for the Parole Commission with a May 1, 1999 due date which effectively prejudiced Petitioner from gaining parole." See Docket Entry No. 1, at 2. The narrative covers the events that took place between November 2, 1998, and February 22, 1999, and were presented to Judge Rodriguez in 2241-II and to the undersigned in Bivens-V, i.e., the alleged delay in preparation of the BOP evaluation, i.e., ...