Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/415/322/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-02-19 21:06:41
Document Index: 273905107

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 157', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7']

NLRB v. Magnavox Co. (full text) :: 415 U.S. 322 (1974) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› NLRB v. Magnavox Co.
NLRB v. Magnavox Co. 415 U.S. 322 (1974)
U.S. Supreme CourtNLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974)National Labor Relations Board v.Magnavox Company of TennesseeNo. 72-1637Argued January 14-15, 1974Decided February 27, 1974415 U.S. 322CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 415 U. S. 327. Page 415 U. S. 323
"Their place of work is the one location where employees are brought together on a daily basis. It is the one place where they clearly share common Page 415 U. S. 324 interests and where they traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in matters affecting their union organizational life and other matters related to their status as employees."
Employees have the right recognized in § 7 of the Act "to form, join, or assist labor organizations" or "to refrain" from such activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157. We agree that a ban on the distribution of union literature or the solicitation of union support by employees at the plant during nonworking time may constitute an interference with § 7 rights. The Board had earlier held that solicitation outside working hours but on company property was protected by § 7, and that a rule prohibiting it was "discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline." In re Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-844. We approved that ruling in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793, 324 U. S. 801-803. No contention is made here that considerations of production or discipline Page 415 U. S. 325 make respondent's rule necessary. The sole issue concerns the power of the collective bargaining representative to waive those rights.
"the exercise by Page 415 U. S. 326 workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing."
Moreover, a limitation of the right of in-plant distribution of literature to employees opposing the union does not give a fair balance to § 7 rights, as the Board ruled in the present case. For employees supporting the union have as secure § 7 rights as those in opposition. The Board's position, as noted, has not always been consistent. But its present ruling is, we think, quite consistent with § 7 rights of employees. It is the Board's function to strike a balance among "conflicting legitimate interests" which will "effectuate national labor policy," including those who support versus those who oppose the union. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U. S. 87, 353 U. S. 96. Moreover, as respects employers, the rights of solicitation of employees by employees concerning § 7 rights are not absolute. As we noted in Republic Aviation Corp., the Board may well conclude that considerations of production or discipline may make controls necessary. No such evidence existed here, and the trial examiner so found. Accordingly, this is not the occasion to balance the availability of alternative channels of communication * against Page 415 U. S. 327 a legitimate employer business justification for barring or limiting in-plant communications.
"[T]he employees, by once selecting the union as their representative, do not forfeit their fundamental right to change their representative at appropriate times. When a union acts to abridge that right Page 415 U. S. 328 -- in the manner presented in this case, it is essentially benefiting the union qua union, to the detriment of the employees it represents."
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 301 U. S. 45. Contractual waivers against a union's own interests are seldom if ever gratuitously granted in the give and take of the collective bargaining process. In return, the union typically exacts some form of quid pro quo from the management negotiators. Since it is usually impossible to identify the consideration given in return for a particular union concession, the result of nullifying a union's agreement to waive the § 7 rights of its supporters will necessarily be to deprive management of the benefit of its bargain and to leave the union with a windfall. This sort of invalidation of bargained-for concessions does not promote stability in the collective bargaining process and must certainly have a negative effect on labor-management relations. For this reason, the Board and the courts should Page 415 U. S. 329 not relieve the parties of the promises they have made unless a contractual provision violates a specific section of the Act or a clear underlying policy of federal labor law.
"Where union and employee interests are one, it can fairly be assumed that employee rights will not be surrendered except in return for bargained-for concessions from the employer of benefit to employees. But the rationale of allowing waiver by the union disappears where the subject matter waived goes to the heart of the right of employees to change their bargaining representative, or to have no bargaining representative, a right with respect to which the interests of the union and employees Page 415 U. S. 330 may be wholly adverse. Solicitation and distribution of literature on plant premises are important elements in giving full play to the right of employees to seek displacement of an incumbent union. We cannot presume that the union, in agreeing to bar such activities, does so as a bargain for securing other benefits for the employees and not from the self-interest it has in perpetuating itself as bargaining representative."
One can, of course, envision exceptional circumstances in which the union supporters' access to and communication with their fellow employees in the bargaining unit might be so restricted that it would be extremely difficult, in the absence of their § 7 distribution rights, for them to respond to the arguments made in literature distributed by their opponents. In such a case, the waiver of the supporters' rights might result in such a distortion of the labor political process as to prevent the balanced presentation of the issues to the employees Page 415 U. S. 331 that national labor policy seeks to promote. This concern was aptly expressed by the Board in its General Motors decision, 158 N.L.R.B. at 1726:
In this case, however, there is no suggestion of such exceptional circumstances that would incapacitate the union's supporters in any dispute regarding the union's continued status as the collective bargaining agent. It is clear from the record that the union supporters have access to the company bulletin boards; that they may still solicit support, although not distribute literature, in nonwork areas during nonwork time; and that they may distribute literature, and have done so in the past, at the gates of the plant. Thus, it is evident that the union supporters would not be disabled by this provision of Page 415 U. S. 332 the collective bargaining agreement from maintaining their end of the political discourse that national labor policy seeks to foster.