Source: http://az.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20181119_0003517.C09.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-02-20 04:02:03
Document Index: 231922671

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1292', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1292']

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00609-GW-FFM
Patrick Francis Philbin (argued), Galen B. Bascom, Devin S. Anderson, and Jeffrey S. Powell, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, D.C.; Mark C. Holscher, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant.
The panel affirmed the district court's denial of a cable television-distribution company's motion to dismiss a claim that its refusal to enter into a carriage contract with an African American-owned operator of television networks was racially motivated, and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Reconsidering the court's approach to the causation standard for § 1981 claims under Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2007), following the Supreme Court's decisions in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), and Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013), the panel held that a plaintiff need not plead that racism was the but-for cause of a defendant's conduct, but only that racism was a factor in the decision not to contract such that the plaintiff was denied the same right as a white citizen. The panel concluded that Gross and Nassar undercut Metoyer's approach of borrowing the causation standard of Title VII's discrimination provision. The panel instead looked to the text of § 1981, and it held that mixed-motive claims are cognizable under § 1981.
Plaintiff-Appellee Entertainment Studios Networks, Inc. (Entertainment Studios), an African American-owned operator of television networks, sought to secure a carriage contract from Defendant-Appellant Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter). These efforts were unsuccessful, and Entertainment Studios, along with Plaintiff-Appellee National Association of African American-Owned Media (NAAAOM, and together with Entertainment Studios, Plaintiffs), claimed that Charter's refusal to enter into a carriage contract was racially motivated, and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court, concluding that Plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently pleaded a § 1981 claim and that the First Amendment did not bar such an action, denied Charter's motion to dismiss. The court then certified that order for interlocutory appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and we affirm.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on January 27, 2016, asserting both a claim against Charter under § 1981 and a claim against the FCC under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.[1] After learning of the derogatory racial comments allegedly made by Singer and Rutledge, Plaintiffs sought leave to file a first amended complaint (FAC), which the district court granted. The FAC alleged one claim against Charter for racial discrimination in contracting in violation of § 1981.
Charter moved to dismiss the FAC, arguing that it failed to plead that racial animus was the but-for cause of Charter's conduct and that the First Amendment barred a § 1981 claim based on a cable operator's editorial discretion. The district court denied the motion. It determined that, under Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2007), Plaintiffs needed only to plead that racism was a motivating factor in Charter's decision, not the but-for cause-a requirement, the court concluded, that Plaintiffs satisfied. Addressing Charter's contention that Metoyer was no longer good law following two subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the district court concluded that "if Metoyer is no longer good law on this point, [then] the Ninth Circuit [] should announce that conclusion." As for Charter's First Amendment challenge, the district court allowed that the cable operator's "ultimate carriage/programming activity is entitled to some measure of First Amendment protection," but declined to apply strict scrutiny and bar the § 1981 claim.
Subsequently, Charter moved for certification of the district court's order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which the district court granted. This appeal followed.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"We review de novo a district court order denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Fortyune v. City of Lomita, 766 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014). We have ...