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Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon (full text) :: 466 U.S. 294 (1984) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center Log In
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Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon 466 U.S. 294 (1984)
U.S. Supreme CourtJustices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984)Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. LydonNo. 82-1479Argued December 6, 1983Decided April 18, 1984466 U.S. 294CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
1. The District Court had jurisdiction to entertain respondent's habeas corpus action. Pp. 466 U. S. 300-303. Page 466 U. S. 295
(d) The Massachusetts system does not constitute governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect, even when a defendant convicted at the first tier claims insufficiency of the evidence. The defendant's absolute right to obtain a de novo jury trial without alleging error at the bench trial ameliorates Page 466 U. S. 296 the danger of affording the prosecution an opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. The prosecution has every incentive to put forward its strongest case at the bench trial, because an acquittal would preclude reprosecution of the defendant. There is nothing to stop a defendant from choosing a bench trial for the sole purpose of getting a preview of the State's case to enable him to prepare better for the jury trial. The two-tier system, unlike a more conventional system, gives a defendant two opportunities to be acquitted on the facts. If the prosecution obtains a conviction at the second trial, the defendant then has the usual appellate remedies. Pp. 466 U. S. 310-312.
We granted certiorari, 463 U.S. 1206 (1983), to review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirming the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the trial de novo of respondent Lydon, pursuant to Massachusetts' "two-tier" Page 466 U. S. 297 system for trying minor crimes, would violate his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same crime, because it determined that insufficient evidence of a critical element of the charge was adduced at the first-tier trial. We reverse.
Lydon requested a trial de novo in the jury session of the Boston Municipal Court. Pending retrial, he was released Page 466 U. S. 298 on personal recognizance. Before the jury trial commenced, Lydon moved to dismiss the charge against him on the ground that no evidence of the element of intent had been presented at the bench trial. He contended that retrial was therefore barred under the principles of Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978), which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second trial when a reviewing court reverses a conviction on the ground that the evidence presented at the first trial was legally insufficient.
On review by the Supreme Judicial Court, the court initially noted that the single justice did not sit as a reviewing Page 466 U. S. 299 court in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, and that any conclusion reached by him on that issue
Lydon then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. First addressing the question of its jurisdiction, the District Court held that Lydon was "in custody" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), and that he had exhausted his state remedies because there was no state remedy available to him short of submitting to a second trial. 536 F.Supp. 647 (1982). On the merits, the District Court viewed Burks v. United States, supra, as "bestow[ing] a constitutional right upon defendants not to be retried when the initial conviction Page 466 U. S. 300 rests on insufficient evidence," 536 F.Supp. at 651, and thought that this holding foreclosed a second trial if the evidence against Lydon at the bench trial was insufficient, id. at 652. After reviewing the transcript of the bench trial, the District Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of intent to support a conviction, and ordered the writ to issue. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in all respects. 698 F.2d 1 (1982).
Our cases make clear that "the use of habeas corpus has not been restricted to situations in which the applicant is in actual, physical custody." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 371 U. S. 239 (1963). In Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U. S. 345 (1973), we held that a petitioner enlarged on his own recognizance pending execution of sentence was in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). Hensley's release on personal recognizance was subject to the conditions that he would appear when ordered by the court, that he would waive extradition if he was apprehended outside the State, and that a court could revoke the order of release and require that he be returned to confinement or Page 466 U. S. 301 post bail. Although the restraints on Lydon's freedom are not identical to those imposed on Hensley, we do not think that they are sufficiently different to require a different result.
"Finally, we emphasize that our decision does not open the doors of the district courts to the habeas corpus petitions of all persons released on bail or on their own recognizance. We are concerned here with a petitioner who has been convicted in state court and who has apparently exhausted all available state court opportunities to have that conviction set aside. Where a state defendant is released on bail or on his own recognizance pending trial or pending appeal, he must still contend with the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine if he seeks habeas corpus relief in the federal courts. Nothing Page 466 U. S. 302 in today's opinion alters the application of that doctrine to such a defendant."
We should keep in mind in this respect the unique nature of the double jeopardy right. In Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977), the Court held that denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds constitutes a Page 466 U. S. 303 final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That decision was based upon the special nature of the double jeopardy right and the recognition that the right cannot be fully vindicated on appeal following final judgment, since, in part, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects "against being twice put to trial for the same offense." Id. at 431 U. S. 661 (emphasis in original). Because the Clause "protects interests wholly unrelated to the propriety of any subsequent conviction," ibid., a requirement that a defendant run the entire gamut of state procedures, including retrial, prior to consideration of his claim in federal court would require him to sacrifice one of the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. [Footnote 4]
In our view, therefore, Lydon had exhausted his double jeopardy claim in the state courts, and that precondition to the District Court's jurisdiction was satisfied. We conclude below, however, that the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining Lydon's double jeopardy claim: in our view, Lydon could be retried de novo without any judicial determination of the sufficiency of the evidence at his prior bench trial. [Footnote 5] Page 466 U. S. 304
"The Massachusetts system presents no danger of prosecution after an accused has been pardoned; nor is there any doubt that acquittal at the first tier precludes reprosecution. Instead, the argument appears to be that, because the appellant has been placed once in jeopardy and convicted, the State may not retry him when Page 466 U. S. 305 he informs the trial court of his decision to 'appeal' and to secure a trial de novo."
"The same cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial, Page 466 U. S. 306 in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble. Moreover, such an appellate reversal means that the government's case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury. Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal -- no matter how erroneous its decision -- it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."
Our cases have recognized three separate guarantees embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause: it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, Page 466 U. S. 307 and against multiple punishments for the same offense. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U. S. 410, 447 U. S. 415 (1980). [Footnote 6] The primary goal of barring reprosecution after acquittal is to prevent the State from mounting successive prosecutions, and thereby wearing down the defendant. As was explained in Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 355 U. S. 187-188 (1957):
In this case, the Commonwealth is not attempting to impose multiple punishments for a single offense. Nor is it making another attempt to convict Lydon after acquittal. It is satisfied with the results of the bench trial, and would have abided the results of a jury trial had Lydon taken that initial course. The conceptual difficulty for Lydon is that he has not been acquitted; he simply maintains that he ought to have been. His claim is that the evidence at the bench trial was insufficient to convict, and that a second trial to a jury will offend the fundamental rule that a verdict of acquittal may "not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy." United States v. Ball, 163 Page 466 U. S. 308 U.S. 662, 163 U. S. 671 (1896); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 430 U. S. 571 (1977). Our cases, however, do not take us as far as Lydon would like.
In Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 398 U. S. 329 (1970), we recognized that implicit in the Ball rule permitting retrial after reversal of a conviction is the concept of "continuing jeopardy." See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519, 421 U. S. 534 (1975). That principle "has application where criminal proceedings against an accused have not run their full course." 398 U.S. at 398 U. S. 326. Interests supporting the continuing jeopardy principle involve fairness to society, lack of finality, and limited waiver. Id. at 398 U. S. 329, n. 4. Acquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy. This is so whether they are "express or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense." Id. at 398 U. S. 329. In Burks, 437 U. S. 1 (1978), we recognized that an Page 466 U. S. 309 unreversed determination by a reviewing court that the evidence was legally insufficient likewise served to terminate the initial jeopardy.
In Burks, the question involved the significance to be attached to a particular event -- an appellate determination that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Concededly, no such event has occurred here; but Lydon insists that he is entitled under the Federal Constitution to a review Page 466 U. S. 310 of the evidence presented at the bench trial before proceeding with the second-tier trial. Burks does not control this very different issue, and we are convinced that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not reach so far. Consequently, we reject the suggestion that Burks modified Ludwig, and we reaffirm our holding in the latter case. [Footnote 7]
"[t]he process of judicial review Page 466 U. S. 311 has conveniently pinpointed the evidence which was lacking, and retrial simply gives the prosecutor another opportunity to supply it."
A claim that our decision in this case creates an incentive for a prosecutor to hold back and learn the defendant's case in the first trial, in order to hone his presentation in the second, is unpersuasive. The prosecution has every incentive to put forward its strongest case at the bench trial, because an acquittal will preclude reprosecution of the defendant. Although admittedly the Commonwealth at the de novo trial will have the benefit of having seen the defense, the defendant likewise will have had the opportunity to assess the prosecution's case. Because in most cases the judge presiding at the bench trial can be expected to acquit a defendant when legally insufficient evidence has been presented, it is clear that the system provides substantial benefits to defendants, as well as to the Commonwealth. [Footnote 8] In fact, as we recognized in Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 626-627, there appears to be nothing to stop a defendant from choosing a bench trial for the sole purpose of getting a preview of the Commonwealth's case to enable him to prepare better for the jury Page 466 U. S. 312 trial. To put the matter another way, as we observed in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, 407 U. S. 119 (1972), a defendant's chances in a two-tier system are
As the dissent in the Court of Appeals recognized, the two-tier system affords benefits to defendants that are unavailable in a more conventional system. 698 F.2d at 11-12 (Campbell, J., dissenting). In traditional systems, a convicted defendant may seek reversal only on matters of law; in the Massachusetts system, a defendant is given two opportunities to be acquitted on the facts. If he is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, supra, at 427 U. S. 631. If he is convicted, he may then choose to invoke his right to a trial de novo and once again put the prosecution to its proof. If the prosecution fails in the second trial to convince the trier-of-fact of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, an acquittal results. If the prosecution succeeds in obtaining a conviction the second time, the defendant then has the usual appellate remedies. As we noted in Ludwig, "[n]othing in the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a State from affording a defendant two opportunities to avoid conviction and secure an acquittal." [Footnote 9] 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 632. Page 466 U. S. 313
The Court rejects Lydon's double jeopardy claim by relying on the absence of "government oppression" and the presence of "continuing jeopardy." For many of the reasons advanced by the Court, as well as others, see infra at 466 U. S. 324-326, I completely agree that the two-tier trial option available to Massachusetts defendants appears eminently fair and reasonable, and that there is therefore no evidence of the kind of "governmental oppression" that might, apart from other analytical considerations, provide an independent basis for a double jeopardy claim. I do not, however, believe -- nor do I Page 466 U. S. 314 understand the Court to suggest -- that the absence of "governmental oppression," standing alone, would defeat a double jeopardy claim otherwise valid under our cases.
The Court meets this argument by noting that Lydon has only a "claim of evidentiary failure . . . [, not] a legal judgment to that effect. . . ." Ante at 466 U. S. 309. Invoking the concept of "continuing jeopardy," the Court maintains that such a "legal judgment" is required before jeopardy is "terminated" and a retrial barred. Nor, in the Court's view, is it Page 466 U. S. 315 enough for these purposes that Lydon has obtained a "legal judgment" that the evidence was constitutionally inadequate from a Federal District Court, acting within its jurisdiction and after the defendant has exhausted state remedies. Instead, Lydon's claim must be rejected because "he fails to identify any stage of the state proceedings that can be held to have terminated jeopardy." Ante at 466 U. S. 309.
I agree that a valid double jeopardy claim presupposes some identifiable point at which a first trial may be said to have ended. See infra at 466 U. S. 320. I respectfully suggest, however, that mere incantation of the phrase "continuing jeopardy," without more, partakes of the sort of "conceptual abstractions" that our decisions elaborating the requirements of the Double Jeopardy Clause have attempted to avoid. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U. S. 463, 377 U. S. 466 (1964). For example, although the Court holds that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after certain jeopardy-terminating "legal judgments," its approach sets no apparent limits on a State's ability to withhold the necessary "legal judgment," thereby maintaining a state of "continuing jeopardy" and justifying repeated attempts to gain a conviction. And by ignoring the realities of Lydon's situation and demanding a state court "legal judgment" of acquittal, the Court manages to avoid grappling with the common sense intuition that the guilty verdict rendered at the end of Lydon's first-tier trial constitutes an obvious point at which proceedings against him "terminated." [Footnote 2/3] Page 466 U. S. 316
In particular, the rule allowing retrials after reversal for trial error, first announced in United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 163 U. S. 672 (1896), has never rested on the theory that, notwithstanding a guilty verdict ending trial level proceedings, the trial never "terminated" and the defendant therefore remained in a state of "continuing jeopardy." Instead, we have grounded the Ball rule in "the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice." United Page 466 U. S. 317 States v. Tateo, supra, at 377 U. S. 466. See also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U. S. 31, 457 U. S. 40 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 449 U. S. 131 (1980); United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 437 U. S. 89-92 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 420 U. S. 343-344, n. 11 (1975). [Footnote 2/4] The opinion in Burks provided the fullest explanation for the Ball rule, and also explained why that rule does not permit retrials after reversals based on insufficient evidence:
"The same cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble. Moreover, such an appellate reversal means that the government's case was Page 466 U. S. 318 so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury. Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal -- no matter how erroneous its decision -- it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."
To be sure, the Burks rule is not engaged unless the conviction at the first trial is reversed and the State seeks a retrial; Burks forbids a retrial under those circumstances if the evidence at the first trial was constitutionally insufficient. In that respect, the Court is quite correct in stating that a prerequisite to a successful Burks claim is a "legal judgment" rendered at some point that the evidence was insufficient Page 466 U. S. 319 under the standards of Jackson v. Virginia, supra. But the Court's "continuing jeopardy" concept begs the questions of whether and when the defendant is entitled to a judgment barring further proceedings. [Footnote 2/5] For all that concept provides, the defendant in Burks was simply fortunate that the reviewing court chose to provide him with a judicial "determination that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction," ante at 466 U. S. 309, and did not instead rely on an alternative ground of reversal. In the latter event, Burks, like Lydon, would have been left with only a "claim of evidentiary failure[, not] a legal judgment to that effect." Ibid. I cannot agree that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause depend so heavily on the grace of a reviewing court. See infra at 466 U. S. 320-321.
For these reasons, I do not find invocation of an unadorned "continuing jeopardy" concept helpful in resolving the issues posed by this case. Instead, if we are to employ the label "continuing jeopardy," I would attempt to give it content by turning to the principles and policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause that this Court has elaborated in analogous cases. Page 466 U. S. 320
Hence, although in most instances a "legal judgment" undoubtedly entails the kind of circumstances under which we may easily conclude that jeopardy has terminated, it seems obvious that a State may not evade the strictures of the Clause simply by withholding a legal judgment, and thereby Page 466 U. S. 321 subjecting a defendant to retrial on the theory of "continuing jeopardy." To take two extreme examples, a trial judge, having received a jury verdict of not guilty, may not justify an order that the trial be repeated by refusing to enter a formal judgment on the jury's verdict; nor may a State with a one-tier system avoid a double jeopardy claim by refusing to acknowledge that the first trial had in fact begun and ended. These hypothetical situations, while admittedly unrealistic, nevertheless demonstrate that the determination of whether a trial has in fact "terminated" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause -- like the question of whether a trial has begun, Crist v. Bretz, supra -- is an issue of federal constitutional law; it cannot turn solely on whether the State has entered a "legal judgment" ending the proceedings. Cf. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 571 ("what constitutes an acquittal' is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's action").
The fact that a trial has ended does not, however, complete the constitutional inquiry; the Court has concluded, most notably in applying the Ball rule, that strong policy reasons may justify subjecting a defendant to two trials in certain circumstances notwithstanding the literal language of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See n. 5, supra. The issue of whether policy reasons of that kind justify retrial in a given case is, however, analytically distinct from the question of whether the challenged proceeding constitutes a second trial or, instead, a continuation of the first. Cases applying the Ball rule, for instance, acknowledge that the defendant will be subjected to two trials but find that fact constitutionally permissible. E.g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 465-466.
Accordingly, once it has been determined that a trial has ended as a matter of constitutional law, a court considering a double jeopardy claim must consider the separate question of whether a second trial would violate the Constitution. For example, when a defendant challenging his conviction on appeal Page 466 U. S. 322 contends both that the trial was infected by error and that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient, the court may not, consistent with the rule of Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978), ignore the sufficiency claim, reverse on grounds of trial error, and remand for retrial. Because the first trial has plainly ended,
In short, I believe there are two distinct limitations on a State's ability to retry a defendant on a claim of "continuing jeopardy." First, the issue of whether a trial has ended so that a second trial would constitute double jeopardy is a federal constitutional question, informed but not controlled by the State's characterization of the status of the proceedings; resolution of that question turns essentially on the relationship between the circumstances at issue and the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, once it has been determined that a first trial has in fact ended, terminating former jeopardy as a matter of federal constitutional law, a State may not place the defendant in jeopardy a second time if retrial is constitutionally barred on any grounds properly preserved and presented. [Footnote 2/6] Page 466 U. S. 323
In this case, the guilty verdict rendered by the first-tier judge undeniably ended a set of proceedings in that courtroom that would be most naturally understood as a single, completed trial. Arguably, therefore, that verdict "terminated" jeopardy. If so, and if the evidence at the first trial was insufficient, then retrial of Lydon at the second tier would be constitutionally barred under Burks, without regard to whether the vacating of the guilty verdict, in and of itself, would otherwise permit a new trial under the Ball rule. And because Lydon has fully exhausted available state remedies, the federal habeas court would be fully authorized to vindicate his claim before trial or after conviction. See ante at 466 U. S. 302-303; Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497 (1978). [Footnote 2/7] Page 466 U. S. 324
In contrast, as the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals pointed out, Lydon chose to be tried in a system the defining characteristic of which is that it provides the defendant "two full opportunities to be acquitted on the facts." 698 F.2d at 11 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Unlike a defendant in a traditional trial system, a defendant in Lydon's position knows from the outset of the first-tier proceeding that, at its conclusion, he can demand a chance to convince a second factfinder that he is innocent. This knowledge permits him to adopt in advance a trial strategy based on that opportunity. He can, for example, withhold some of his stronger evidence with the intention of introducing it at Page 466 U. S. 325 the second tier after evaluating the prosecution's entire case; in addition, he can take risks in his presentation, secure in the knowledge that he can avoid any resulting dangers the second time around. Perhaps more importantly, the defendant's realization throughout the first-tier trial that he has an absolute right to a second chance necessarily mitigates the sense of irrevocability that normally attends the factfinding stage of criminal proceedings, from beginning to end. For these reasons, the defendant's prospective knowledge of his entitlement to a second factfinding opportunity substantially diminishes the burden imposed by the first proceeding, as well as the significance of a guilty verdict ending that proceeding.
Ibid. Of course, both of these points could be advanced to justify the retrial of a defendant who has been convicted in a traditional system and who has not appealed -- a practice prohibited under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ante at 466 U. S. 306-307. What distinguishes the Massachusetts system for me, however, is that it permits, but does not compel, a defendant to secure the advantage of knowing in advance that he, but not the prosecution, may demand a second factfinding opportunity. [Footnote 2/8] That advantage substantially reduces Page 466 U. S. 326 the significance of the circumstances surrounding a guilty verdict concluding the first-tier to the point that I conclude that such a verdict does not "terminate" jeopardy.
This conclusion is unaffected by Lydon's claim that earlier Massachusetts cases led him to believe that he could challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the first-tier trial through a motion to dismiss filed at the outset of the second-tier. See Brief for Respondent 5. Cf. post at 466 U. S. 331-332, n. 2 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Assuming the authoritativeness of those cases and Lydon's reasonable reliance on them, the Commonwealth's failure to provide a promised avenue of relief might amount to a violation of due process. The prospect of such a remedy does not, however, bear on whether the circumstances surrounding a guilty verdict at the end of the first tier "terminated" proceedings for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Faced with a charge for which he believes the prosecution has constitutionally insufficient evidence, a defendant in Lydon's position can choose the ordinary one-tier system in the expectation that, if his sufficiency claim is sustained, he will never be required to undergo a second trial under Burks. A decision to select the two-tier system instead necessarily achieves the advantages flowing from the knowledge that he can demand a second factfinding opportunity. Even if that choice is made only as a hedge against the possibility that the insufficiency claim will be rejected by every court the defendant believes can entertain it, selection Page 466 U. S. 327 of the two-tier alternative itself clearly diminishes both the strategic and emotional significance of the guilty verdict at the first tier.
Although it appears in 466 U. S. I do not agree with the implications of footnote 5 of the Court's opinion See n. 7, infra.
Ultimately, the Court's decision rests on an ipse dixit that "[a]cquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy." Ante at 466 U. S. 308. The Court nowhere explains why an acquittal marks the end of a trial while a conviction or, as in this case, a judgment that the defendant was entitled to an acquittal, lack that effect. Cf. Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 355 U. S. 187 (1957), quoting Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 85 U. S. 169 (1874) ("The common law not only prohibited a second punishment for the same offence, but it went further and forb[ade] a second trial for the same offence, whether the accused had suffered punishment or not, and whether in the former trial he had been acquitted or convicted"). Cf. post at 466 U. S. 329-330 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); infra at 466 U. S. 323-327. In any event, if in fact convictions do not terminate jeopardy, then renewed prosecution of a defendant after an unreversed conviction for the same offense -- which the Court acknowledges is barred, ante at 466 U. S. 306-307 -- would constitute only "continuing," and not double, jeopardy under the Court's theory. Nor, under the Court's approach, could the prohibition against such a prosecution be justified by the policy against subjecting a defendant to multiple punishments for the same offense. If a guilty verdict does not "terminate" proceedings, a convicted defendant subjected to further prosecution for the same offense is simply not "twice put in jeopardy" within the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause. U.S.Const., Amdt. 5 (emphasis added). See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 459 U. S. 366 (1983) ("With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended").
Lydon's petition does not present such a case. Until Lydon is convicted, he is obligated only to appear at trial and to "keep the peace." If the trial court finds that he has defaulted on his recognizance, the court may sentence him pursuant to his first conviction; but Lydon then may seek appellate review, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 374 Mass. 744, 374 N.E.2d 1203 (1978). It trivializes habeas Page 466 U. S. 328 corpus jurisdiction, historically a protection against governmental oppression, to use it as a remedy against restraints as petty as those to which Lydon is subject.
However, as the Court chooses a different tack, I address the merits as well and join Parts 466 U. S. 466 U. S. 466 U. S. and 466 U. S. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
The answer to the first question is easy. If, as respondent alleged and the District Court found, the Commonwealth's evidence at respondent's first-tier trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt in the first-tier trial, he was entitled to an acquittal. Such an acquittal would have given respondent his unconditional freedom. Instead, he was found guilty of a crime and sentenced to two years in jail. It is true, of course, that Massachusetts has afforded him a right to have that judgment vacated, but as the Court has demonstrated, that relief does not terminate his custodial status. Ante at 466 U. S. 300-302. As a matter of federal constitutional law, he had a right to a judgment of acquittal that would eliminate the restraints on his liberty. The Due Process Clause does not permit a State to deprive a person of liberty based on a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt after a proceeding in which it failed to adduce sufficient evidence to persuade any Page 466 U. S. 329 trier of fact of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979). Therefore, respondent's continued custody constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
What makes this case difficult is that the first-tier trial actually ended with a judgment of conviction. Respondent does not rely on that judgment as the bar to the second-tier trial. Instead, the predicate for his double jeopardy claim is a hypothetical judgment that he contends should have been entered at the end of the first trial. I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that the Court's use of the concept of "continuing jeopardy" is unhelpful, and that the underlying issue in this case is whether respondent is constitutionally entitled to a judgment of acquittal that could form the predicate for his double jeopardy claim. Ante at 466 U. S. 313-319. To Page 466 U. S. 330 put it another way, until a judgment of acquittal is entered -- or until there is an adjudication establishing his right to such a judgment -- respondent's double jeopardy claim is premature.
Id. at 16 (emphasis in original). [Footnote 3/1] Page 466 U. S. 331
In short, if Massachusetts affords respondent no remedy, I believe a federal court must adjudicate respondent's Jackson claim, and, if it is sustained, provide habeas corpus relief in the form of an order that requires the State to enter, nunc pro tunc, the judgment of acquittal to which respondent is constitutionally entitled. If and when such a judgment of acquittal is entered, that judgment would bar a second prosecution for the same offense. Or, if the second prosecution had already been concluded before the judgment of acquittal was entered, any jeopardy associated with the second proceeding would be foreclosed; even if the prosecutor had adduced additional evidence at the second-tier trial, the second judgment could not survive the preclusive effect of the acquittal, even though it was belatedly entered. [Footnote 3/2] Page 466 U. S. 332
"This Court has long recognized that, in some circumstances, considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly Page 466 U. S. 333 administration of criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power."
Similarly, the statutory exhaustion requirement found in the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, reflects a recognition that federal habeas courts should not disrupt ongoing state proceedings. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 455 U. S. 518 (1982). Indeed, in our leading case concerning the propriety of pretrial federal habeas intervention under the exhaustion doctrine, we cautioned that such review would be inappropriate when it threatens to disrupt pending state proceedings and orderly state processes. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U. S. 484, 410 U. S. 490-493 (1973). Thus, the habeas statute itself reflects this concern with disrupting ongoing state proceedings. [Footnote 3/3] Page 466 U. S. 334
If we were to uphold the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction here, similar delays could become routine in Massachusetts. Already there are some 14,000 cases a year taken to the second-tier jury trial. In virtually all of these cases, the defendant could seek federal habeas review at the conclusion of the first trial, claiming that the evidence used to convict him was insufficient. Defendants have every incentive to seek habeas review, not only to delay eventual Page 466 U. S. 335 punishment, but to obtain leverage in plea negotiations. [Footnote 3/5] The speed and efficiency of the process would quickly be eroded if collateral litigation intervened between the first and second trials. The wholesale disruption of pending proceedings that would occur if federal habeas review were available between the first and second trials to every defendant who thought the evidence of his guilt was insufficient counsels strongly against the exercise of such jurisdiction. [Footnote 3/6] The state process should be permitted to proceed in an uninterrupted fashion before federal habeas review comes into play.
The postponement of review in this case would not render petitioner's double jeopardy claim entirely nugatory. First, if respondent's claim is meritorious, under my view, he would ultimately obtain relief from his conviction through federal habeas review after state proceedings are complete. Moreover, if his claim is meritorious, respondent will likely be acquitted at his second-tier trial precisely because of the insufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence. It is true, of course, that the prosecutor may supply proof of an element of the offense that was omitted in the first trial. It is reasonable to assume, however, that in most of the relatively simple Page 466 U. S. 336 misdemeanor prosecutions that employ this procedure, the same evidence will again be offered and the same issue will again be presented to the second judge as to the first. The likelihood that the substance of respondent's claim will be heard and vindicated at his impending trial argues all the more strongly against federal intervention at this point in the proceedings. [Footnote 3/7]
On balance I think the principles of comity that underlie the exhaustion and abstention doctrines make the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction in this case premature. The state interest in avoiding wholesale disruption of its criminal process requires a federal habeas court to postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction over this case until after the second-tier trial has been completed. I would hold that, in order to assert his constitutional claims, respondent must first take advantage of the opportunity the State provides him for an Page 466 U. S. 337 acquittal in the second trial. If he is convicted in that proceeding, I would hold that a federal court may then review the record of the first trial to determine whether he was constitutionally entitled to an acquittal. If the record should then support the claim that respondent has made, I would conclude that he is entitled to release even if the State adduced enough additional evidence at the second-tier trial to support a conviction. Accordingly, I concur in Parts 466 U. S. S. 300|>II of the Court's opinion and in the judgment.
I am not suggesting that respondent's double jeopardy claim has not been exhausted; I agree that it has been for the reasons stated in 466 U. S. However, while that claim has been exhausted, it would nevertheless be meritless unless the antecedent Jackson claim may also be entertained by the federal habeas court. As to that claim, it is true that, in a technical sense, respondent may well have no state remedy to exhaust, inasmuch as the Massachusetts courts have indicated that they will not review respondent's Jackson claim even after his second-tier trial. See ante at 466 U. S. 322-323, n. 6 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). However, even if there has been exhaustion in a technical sense here, the more fundamental policies underlying the exhaustion requirement may be jeopardized if a habeas petition is entertained while state proceedings remain pending. After all, exhaustion was originally a judge-made rule designed not as a technical doctrine, but rather to prevent premature and unjustified interference in state proceedings. See, e.g., Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 321 U. S. 116-118 (1944) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13, 269 U. S. 17-19 (1925); Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399, 179 U. S. 402-403 (1900); Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 117 U. S. 251-252 (1886).
Under Massachusetts law, as I read it, Lydon is no longer in custody "pursuant" to the judgment entered at his first trial. Lydon has invoked his right to a second trial and appeared at the second proceeding. Under Massachusetts law, therefore, the results of the first trial -- together with any incidental "custody" imposed in consequence of that trial -- have already been eliminated. The restraints on Lydon's freedom now derive not from the prior conviction, but from the fact Page 466 U. S. 338 that a new criminal proceeding is in progress. Every state defendant who fails to attend a criminal trial risks punitive sanctions not dissimilar to those to which Lydon is currently exposed.
In Hensley, the Court made it quite clear that a relaxed definition of "custody" was accepted only because incarceration was imminent and, absent federal intervention, inevitable. The habeas petitioner in Hensley had exhausted "all available state court opportunities to have [his] conviction set aside," 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 353; see also id. at 411 U. S. 346, 411 U. S. 347, and n. 4, 411 U. S. 351, 411 U. S. 352, not merely all available court opportunities to review the particular Page 466 U. S. 339 claim in question. Hensley emphasized that the typical restrictions on freedom attending a release on personal recognizance would not, standing alone, constitute "custody" within the meaning of the habeas statute. Such restraints amount to "custody" only when state judicial proceedings have been completed and incarceration has become a purely executory decision. Hensley accepted a liberal definition of "custody" only in conjunction with an unusual requirement of absolute exhaustion -- exhaustion not of the particular claim in question, cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), but of all possible state avenues of relief from the conviction.
Lydon's condition clearly does not meet the Hensley test as I understand it. Lydon has not come close to exhausting state opportunities to have the conviction set aside. Lydon cannot be incarcerated without a further judicial hearing. His position is thus functionally indistinguishable from that of a defendant pressing an interlocutory appeal. One claim may have been exhausted, but others have not. In these circumstances, incarceration is far from inevitable, and the minor constraints that attend a release on personal recognizance are much less significant. If Massachusetts stood ready to incarcerate Lydon on the basis of the conviction at the first trial, my view of the case would be different. Page 466 U. S. 340