Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19750321-557472
Timestamp: 2016-10-21 20:32:38+00:00
Document Index: 180880402

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 27", '§ 2', "l'article 27", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 1', "l'article 6", '§ 2', '§ 2', "l'article 6", "l'article 6", '§ 1', "l'article 6", '§ 1', "l'article 6", '§ 1', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 1', "l'article 6", "l'article 27", '§ 2']

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 6-1 ; Violation de l'Art. 8 ; Préjudice moral - constat de violation suffisantNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 5574/72Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1975-03-21;5574.72 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVIL, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES PUBLIC, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA CORRESPONDANCE, (Art. 8-2) DEFENSE DE L'ORDRE, (Art. 8-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 8-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 8-2) PREVENTION DES INFRACTIONS PENALESParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 5574/72 X . v/UNITED KINGDOM X . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 21 March 1975 on the admissibifrty of the application DÃCISION du 21 mars 1975 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Anicle 6, paragraph 7, o f the Convention : - Fair tiial-Consideration whether the trial judge pressed the applicant to plead guilty. Whether his summing-up to the jury was fair . - Impartial tribunal . Judge's statement in the absence of the jury . May raise doubts as to the judge's impartiality . Comparison of sentences imposed on co-accused . Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention : Particular reference to the summingup by the trial judge and to the fact that the burden of proving guilty remained with the prosecution throughout the trial. Article 26 of the Convention : The mere fact that all remedies have been lodged does not of itseN constitute compliance with the exhaustion of domestic remedies . It is also required that the substance of any complaint should have been raised before the appeal authorities . Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : - ProcÃ©s Ã©quitable . Examen du point de savoir si le juge a poussÃ© l'eccusÃ© Ã© plaider coupable et si son rÃ©sumÃ© A l'adresse du jury Ã©tait loyal. - Tribunal impartial. DÃ©claration du juge - faite en l'absence du jury - pouvant soulever des doutes sur son impartialitÃ© . Comparaison des peines infligÃ©es aux divers coaccusÃ©s . A rticle 6, paragraphe 2, de la Convention : RÃ©fÃ©rence particuliÃ©re au rÃ©sumÃ© fait par le juge Ã l'adresse du jury et au fait que le fardeau de la preuve a incombÃ© Ã l'accusation tout au long du procÃ©s. Article 26 de la Conventton : L'Ã©puisement des voies de recours n'est pas rÃ©alisÃ© par le seul exerclce des recours mais exige que les griefs aient Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©s â¢en substencedevant l'eutodtÃ© de recours. (franÃ§ais : voir p. 17 1
The facts presented by the parties and apparently not in dispute between them 1. may be summarised as follows : 1 . The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1947, and was, when addressing himself to the Commission, detained in M . Prison .
2 . He was tried by a judge and jury at the Central Criminal Court between . . . and . . .September 1970, together with three other men IA ., B ., and C .) for offences arising out of burglaries of some 18 houses scattered over a wide area in south-east England between January and March 1970 . The applicant was charged with conspiring with the three men mentioned above and other persons to enter buildings as trespassers and to steal property therein ; and, together with A ., B . and another man, D ., with two burglaries in Essex on . . . January 1979 .
3 . As regards the conspiracy count, the prosecution case was, briefly, that most of the break-ins of the houses contained common features which suggested that they were the work of the same gang . Evidence was adduced which, if believed, implicated the applicant as being one of the participants in a substantial number of the eighieen offences along with A . and B . in some of the cases . There was identification of the applicant in some cases as being a person who, if the identification was correct, had been seen in the vicinity of houses that had been broken into and in various cars used for the burglaries . There was also forensic evidence linking boots belonging to the applicant with foot-prints in certain of the houses and gardens belonging to them and one of the cars used was found abandoned with his finger-prints on the steering column . Evidence was further given by the police of confessions by the applicant of participation in many of the burglaries without the applicant remembering the details of the names or the places . As regards the burglary of two houses in Essex on . . . January 1970, silver and a gold wrist watch were stolen together with two pillow-cases taken from one of the houses . The principal evidence against the applicant was that of his co-accused, D ., a taxi-driver . D . stated that on . . . January 1970 he had been employed by the applicant, A . and B . to drive them on a tour in the countryside of Essex . The journey at the end of the day was a total of some 240 miles which involved frequent stops at houses . On one occasion two of the men came back carrying pillow-cases full of articles which D . said he could not see . There was further the evidence of a police officer which, if true, established a complete admission by the applicant of these offences . 4 . The applicant's defence was that he had nothing to do with any of the offences . The evidence given against him was false or irrelevant . With regard to the conspiracy charge the applicant sought to establish alibis in relation to some of the time during which the eighteen burglaries had been committed . He further submitted that the identifications were unsatisfactory for various reasons . There was also evidence that he had bought the boots referred to above after these offences had taken place .
5 . On . . . September 1970, during the evidence of a police officer, counsel for the applicant made an application for permission to call a forensic expert . In the course of this application the trial judge, in the absence of the jury, observed : "May I say this . I want to make it abundantly clear that I am not criticising counsel at all-there does not appear to be really any waste of time, or scarcely any, and I am not criticising counsel at all, but I am bound to say that personally- and I can say this in the absence of the jury, and there are no press here I hope-I regard the evidence as really overwhelming and I think it is atrocious, when people are waiting to be tried, some of them in custody for months, and they are waiting because the lists here are chock-a-block, and this is a classic example of a case, at public expense, running for weeks, when simply there is not a ghost of a chance ."
Councel for the applicant replied : "My Lord . I cannot make any useful comments on that observation and your Lordship cannot really expect me to ." . The judge then said : "No . I do not really expect you to, and I am not addressing you only . It is just a comment which I feel it right to make . May I say that there are exceptions to that . I can see a defence ; one defendant has certainly got a run on one or two counts and another defendant might have a run on one of the counts, but that is all . I was speaking generally, but there are one or two counts which can be isolated and one defendant possibly can be isolated . " 6 . On . . . September 1970 the judge commenced his summing-up . He prefaced it with the following introduction to the jury : "My functions are two-fold at this stage . I have to direct you about the law and I have to sum-up the evidence . So far as the law is concerned that is entirely my responsibility because I am a judge of the law and you are bound to follow the directions which I give you . So far as the evidence is concerned, and when I say that I mean deciding what the truth of the matter is, what really happened and bringing in your verdicts in the light of those decisions, that is entirely your responsibility because you are the judges of the facts . If, therefore, from time to time when I am summing-up the evidence I convey to you my own impression of the evidence, or part of it-which I am entitled to do if I think my opinion could be of assistance to you-and you do not agree with any opinion of mine about the evidence, then let there be no misunderstanding about it : if you do not agree with any opinion which I express or which you think I am expressing about the evidence, or part of it, you are not only entitled to ignore my opinion-if you do not agree with it-but you are bound to, for the reasons I have just mentioned, that it is your responsibility and not mine to decide the facts and to bring the verdict . You see, what we want at the end of the day, as expressed by the verdict . . . is your opinion and not mine . They may coincide, but if they do not it is yours wich must prevail . "
7 . On . . . September 1970, a verdict of guilty was returned by the jury against all the defendants, except C ., on the conspiracy charge and against all the defendants, except D ., on the charges arising out of the two burglaries . The applicant was sentenced to four years' imprisonment on the conspiracy charge and two years' imprisonment on each of the burglary charges, the sentences to run concurrently . These offences also had the effect df constituting a breach of a probation order and of an order of conditional discharge made in January 19 69 in respect of two stealing offences . For each of these two breaches, the applicant was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, the terms to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to the sentence of four years' imprisonment . The applicant was thus sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment . B . was sentenced to a total of three years' imprisonment and A . to a total of four years' imprisonment . 8 . On . . . October 1970 the applicant applied for leave to appeal against his sentence . In this application he used the words :"I know that I have done wrong, and that I must be punished ." He submitted, however, that his sentence was excessive, in particular, if compared with the sentences of his co-defendants .
On . . . December 1970 the applicant requested leave to appeal also against his conviction . He complained that his trial had been unjust and referred to the incident mentioned at para . 5 above . He stated that the trial judge's remarks had been made "while the prosecution were putting their case, before my defence started" and submitted that this "was finding us guilty before I had a chance to prove my innocence" .
On . . . April 1971 the applicant filed a further document amplifying his grounds of appeal and repeating his complaint about the conduct of the trial judge . He submitted that the judge's remarks had had a "devasting effect on my defence" and stated that he "noticed a lack of interest by my defence counsel" ; he "got the impression that it was pointless putting my defence to the court because the judge considered me guilty, and this made it virtually impossible for my counsel to put it to the court with the sincerity and effort of thought I was entitled to" . The applicant also criticised certain of the evidence given at the trial . 9 . On . . . July 1971 a single judge of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence and stated that he thought that the observations of the trial judge of which the applicant had complained should be considered by the full Court of Appeal in the light of the judgment in the case of R . v . Barnes, a decision of the Court of Appeal dated 30 November 1970 . In that case the Court of Appeal had quashed a conviction on the grounds that certain remarks made by the trial judge had destroyed the relationship of confidence between the appellant and his counsel since the latter had felt oblidged to indicate to the judge that he had advised his client to plead guilty ; furthermore a request by the appellant for an adjournment so that he could take over his own defence was refused . The Court made it clear that it was these factors rather than any alleged partiality on the pan of the judge which made the conviction unsafe, since the remarks were made in the absence of the jury and no criticism had been made of the evidence or of the judge's summing-up .
10 . The full Court of Appeal considered the case on . . . October 1971 after hearing argument by counsel both for the Crown and for the applicant, who had been granted legal aid . Counsel for the applicant submitted in particular that : a . the remarks made by the trial judge prejudged the case before the defence was heard : b . the appellant did not feel that he was getting a fair trial because he felt that the issue was being prejudged by the judge who would later have to direct the jury c . the observations of the judge might well be considered as an attempt to interfere with the right of an accused person, after taking advice, to plead not guilty d . the observations were capable of undermining the relationship of confidence which should exist between counsel and the accused person ; e . these remarks were capable of giving the impression that an accused person assisted by legal aid is in a different and less favourable category than those defendend at their own expense . 11 . The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal both against his conviction and sentence . With regard to the conviction it found that fundamental points of difference existed between Barnes' and the applicant's case . In particular, the trial judge's comments in the applicant's case, although they ought not to have been made, were not as extreme as those which occurred in Barnes' case furthermore, while Barnes was forced to continue with counsel in whom he had los t
confidence, and who felt that it was in Barnes' best interest that he should not continue to act, counsel for the applicant was not similarly handicapped in conducting the defence . The Court of Appeal also considered that the evidence against the applican t was overwhelming on each of the counts on which he was found guilty and pointed out that it was admitted by counsel, and confirmed by the Court's own examination, that the judge's summing-up was beyond any criticism . 12 . On . . . November 1971, the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal to the House of Lords, but on . . . March 1972 the Court of Appeal refused to certify that a point of law of general public importance was involved and accordingly refused the application . Complaint s
13 . The applicant, complaining of the conduct of the trial judge, alleges violations of Art . 6 ( 1) and (2) of ihe Convention . Ill .
Proceedings before the Commissio n
14 . On the proposal of a group of three members the application was on 5 February 1973 communicated to the United Kingdom Government for their observations on the admissibility . 15 . The Government's observations of 4 June arrived on 7 June 1973 . At the request of the Rapporteur the Government also submitted, under cover of a letter of 10 January 1974, the short transcript of the applicant's trial . The applicant's observations in reply of 3 July arrived on 8 July 1974 . They were amended by letter of 3 December 1974 and by telephone on 10 January 1975 . IV . Submissions of the parties 16 . The respondent Government submit that the applicant's trial was fair and that his rights under Art . 6 of the Convention were respected . This follows from the judgment of the Court of Appeal which fully and carefully examined his case . In particular, insofar as the trial judge's remarks are open to criticism, they did not impede the applicant's defence by his counsel or-since they were made in the absence of the jury-prejudice the jury's consideration of the case . Moreover, the jury were fully instructed as judges of the facts and the trial judge's summing-up was beyond any criticism . The application is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art . 27 (2) of the Convention . 17 . In the alternative the Government submit that the applicant's complaints raise the very issues which were before the Cnurt of Appeal . The applicant is therefore inviting the Commission to sit, as a tribunal of further instance, on an issue that has already been fully considered by the Court of Appeal . While the Commission may in appropriate cases examine issues that have already been canvassed before domestic courts, it should in the circumstances of the present case, in accordance with its constant jurisprudence, decline to exercise its jurisdiction in this way . The application should consequently be rejected as being incompatible with the Convention in the sense of Art . 27 (2) . 18 . The applicant submits that he did not receive a fair trial, as required by Art . 6 111 of the Convention, and that the presumption of innocence, guaranteed by Art . 6 121 of the Convention, was not observed in his case . It is true that he and hi s
counsel maintained their plea of not guilty in face of the trial judge's remarks, mentioned in para . 5 above ; but this does not justify the approvation of a trial conducted in such a manner that it "must have engendered in the accused an inhibitory lack of confidence in the presentation of his defence" . Moreover, the summing-up was in several respects defective and the judge's partiality also influenced his sentence . 19 . The applicant finally does not consider that his present complaints "raise the very issues that were betore the Court of Appeal", as submitted by the respondent Government . THE LA W As to the exheustion of domestic remedie s 1 . . The applicant alleges that his conviction and sentence were the result of a trial which violated Art . 6(1 ) and (2) of the Convention . It is true that, under Art . 6(1 ) , everyone is entitled to a fair hearing in the determination of any criminal charge against him and that, under para . (2) of that artciel, everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law . However, under Art . 26 of the Convention, the Commission may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law . The mere fact that the applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal against his conviction and sentence, that his appeal was dismissed, and that his petition for leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused, does not of itself constitute compliance with this rule . It is also required that the substance ot any complaint made before the Commission should have been raised during the proceedings concerned . In this respect the Commission refers to its constant jurispmdence, as confirmed in its decision on the admissibility of Application No . 4319/69, Samer against the Federal Republic of Gennany (Yearbook 14, pp . 322, 338, 340 ; Collection of Decisions 39 p . 11) . 2 . In the present case the applicant's complaints raise, in the Government's submission, "the very issues that were before the Court of Appeal" while the applicant submits that the issue under Art . 6(2) of the Convention "was never argued before the Court of Appeaf" . The applicant's submission might be interpreted as implying that he failed to raise in the Court of Appeal the alleged violation of the presumption of innocence of which he now complains before the Commission .
However, this issue has in fact been mentioned by the applicant in his applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence . The applicant then claimed that his trial was unjust and that the judge was biased . In this connection he submitted, in his application of . . . December 1970 for leave to appeal against conviction, that the trial judge, by remarks made "before my defence had even started", was "finding us guilty before I had a chance to prove my innocencÃ©" . 3 . The Commission therefore concludes that the application has complied with the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies . II . As to whether the application is manifestly ill-founde d 4 . The tribunal which tried the applicant at fi rs t instance was composed of a judge and a jury . The Commission notes that the applicant's complaints concern onl y
the conduct of the judge and that he complains in particular of certain remarks made by the judge in the absence of the jury, which had to decide on the applicant's guilt or innocence . However, it was the judge who conducted the trial and who fixed the applicant's sentence and, according to the Commission's case-law, as confirmed in Application No . 4991/71, Y . v . United Kingdom (Collection of Decisions 45, pp . 1, 11-12), Art . 6 applies also to proceedings on sentence . It follows that the views expressed by the trial judge in the absence of the jury may also be taken into account in the determination of the applicant's complaint under this article. 5 . The question whether a trial conforms to the standard laid down in Art . 6 (1) must be decided on the basis of an evaluation of the trial as a whole, and not on the basis of an isolated consideration of one particular aspect of the trial or one particular incident (cf . the Commission's Report in the Nielsen Case, as confirmed in the Commission's decision in the Y . Case, loc . cit . p . 12) .
6 The Commission has accordingly evaluated the applicant's trial in its entirety on the basis of the parties' submissions and, in particular, the short transcript of the trial . It considers that the following elements are relevant : a . The views expressed by the trial judge on . . . September 1970 were as such objectionable in that they raised doubts as to his impartiality . However, they were less extreme than those voiced by the same judge in the Y . case (cf . loc . cit . pp . 6-7) . b . As regards the pressure which, by the judge's above remarks, might have been put on the applicant to plead guilty, it appears from the course of the trial, as reflected in the short transcript, that defence counsel was not in fact intimidated by the trial judge . As stated by the Court of Appeal (p . 11 of the judgment) counsel appearing before that Court "fairly and frankty concedes that he is unable to say that the remarks that had been made on . . . September . . . affected defence counsel or prevented him from putting forward the defence properly thereafter" .
c . As regards the summing-up, the Commission first notes that no complaint was made in this respect before the Court of Appeal . Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal "considered the whole of that summing-up with care" and concluded that it was "a clear, accurate and fair direction to the jury" (p . 5 of the judgment) . The applicant, in his submissions to the Commission, now criticises the summing-up . It appears, however, that this criticism, in so far as it relates to Ã§harges on which the applicant was convicted, is more concerned with the questions whether the summing-up was "clear" and "accurate" than with the question whether it was "fair" . The Commission considers that, under Art . 6(1 ) of the Convention, it can only express a view on the latter issue . Having examined the summing-up, it agrees with the Court of Appeal that the summing-up was fair . d . As regards, finally, the sentences passed, the Commission notes that the three defendants at the trial received the following sentences : A . (guilty of three counts) : four years, the applicant (guilty of three counts) : four years, B . (guilty of four counts) : three years . It appears from the short transcript of the trial (p . 131) that the judge, when sentencing B ., took into account that his criminal record was "not so ba d
either in numbers or in the kinds of offences" as that ot A . and the applicant . It also seems that the applicant's record was the worst and that ihe judge treated A .'s confession, although not made at the outset of the trial, as a mitigating circumstance (cf . ibidem, p . 130) . These two elements explain why A's sentence of four years was made concurrent with the sentence he was then serving . 7 . Having considered the trial as a whole, the Commission therefore concludes that there was finally no violation of the applicant's right, under An . 6 (1) of the Convention, to receive a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal . 8 . In its examination of the applicant's complaint concerning the conduct of the trial judge, the Commission has also had regard to Art . 6 (2) of the Convention, which provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law . The Commission, referring to its above considerations relating to para . 1 of this Article, finds that the presumption of innocence has been observed at the applicant's trial . In particular, it is clear from the terms of the summing-up by the trial judge that the applicant was presumed innocent until he was found guilty by the jury and that the burden of proving guilt remained with the prosecution throughout the trial .
9 . An examination of the application thus does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Art . 6 and the Commission therefore concludes that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art . 27 (2) of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBL E (TRADUCTION) EN FAI T I . Les faits de la cause, prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties et apparemment non controversÃ©s, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit :
1 . Le requÃ©rant, ressortissant britannique, est nÃ© en 1944 et Ã©tait, au moment de la prÃ©sentation de sa requÃ©te, dÃ©tenu A la prison de M . 2 . En septembe 1970, ainsi que trois co-accusÃ©s (A, B et C) il a Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© par la Cour d'Assistes de la CitÃ© de Londres (Central Criminal Court), composÃ©e d'un magistrat et d'un jury, du chef de cambriolages perpÃ©trÃ©s de janvier Ã mars 1970 dans quelque 18 maisons dispersÃ©es dans le sud-est de l'Angleterre . Le requÃ©rant Ã©tait inculpÃ© d'association dÃ©lictueuse avec notamment les trois personnes prÃ©citÃ©es dans le but de commettre des vols avec effraction ; ainsi que de deux cambriolages dans l'Essex en janvier 1970, avec A, B et un certain D . 3 . En ce qui concerne l'accusation d'association dÃ©lictueuse, le dossier du ministÃ©re public se rÃ©sumait Ã ce que la plupart des cambriolages prÃ©sentaient des caractÃ©ristiques communes donnant Ã penser qu'il s'agissait de l'o ;uvre du mÃ©me gang . Des tÃ©moignages ont Ã©tÃ© produits qui, s'il faut y ajouter foi, sous-entendaient que le requÃ©rant avait participÃ© Ã un nombre important des 18 cambriolages avec A et, plus rarement, B . Dans certains cas, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© identifiÃ© comme un individu qui, si l'identification est correcte, avait Ã©tÃ© aperÃ§u dans le voisinage de s
maisons cambriolÃ©es et dans diverses voitures utilisÃ©es pour les cambriolages . Des analyses de laboratoire ont Ã©galement montrÃ© le rapport entre des bottes appartenant au requÃ©rant et des empreintes de pied relevÃ©es dans les maisons et jardins de certaines des propriÃ©tÃ©s cambriolÃ©es ; de mÃªme, ses empreintes digitales ont Ã©tÃ© relevÃ©es sur la colonne de direction de l'une des voitures utilisÃ©e pour un cambriolage avant d'Ã©tre abandonnÃ©e . La police a ultÃ©rieurement fourni la preuve de ce que le requÃ©rant admettait avoir participÃ© Ã beaucoup de ces cambriolages sans pouvoir se souvenir des dÃ©tails, des lieux ou des noms . Pour ce qui est du cambriolage de deux maisons dans l'Essex le . . . janvier 1970, le vol portait sur des objets en argent, une montre-bracelet en or, ainsi que sur deux taies d'oreillers prises dans l'une des maisons . Le principal tÃ©moignage Ã charge contre le requÃ©rant Ã©tait celui de son co-accusÃ©, D ., chauffeur de taxi . D . dÃ©clara avoir Ã©tÃ© employÃ© le 23 janvier 1970 par le requÃ©rant, A . et B . pour les vÃ©hiculer dans l'Essex . A la fin de la journÃ©e, ils avaient parcouru prÃ©s de 400 km, avec de frÃ©quents arrÃªts dans des maisons . A l'un de ces arrÃ©ts, deux des hommes sont sortis de la maison en portant des taies d'oreillers remplies d'articles que D . dÃ©clare n'avoir pas pu voir . Il y eut au surplus le tÃ©moignage d'un officier de police, duquel il ressortirait que le requÃ©rant aurait parfaitement reconnu avoir commis ces dÃ©lits . 4 . Le requÃ©rant argua pour sa dÃ©fense n'avoir rien Ã voir avec aucun de ces dÃ©lits, les tÃ©moignages portÃ©s contre lui Ã©tant faux ou hors de propos . Quant Ã l'accusation d'association dÃ©lictueuse, le requÃ©rant a cherchÃ© Ã prouver qu'il avait des alibis pendant une partie du temps oÃ¹ furent commis les 18 cambriolages . Il fit valoir de plus que son identification par plusieurs tÃ©moins n'Ã©tait pas satisfaisante pour diverses raisons . Il y eut Ã©galement des tÃ©moignages selon lesquels il avait achetÃ© les bottes susmentionnÃ©es aprÃ©s que les dÃ©lits en question eussent Ã©tÃ© commis .
5 . Le 15 septembre 1970, pendant la dÃ©position d'un officier de police, l'avocat du requÃ©rant demanda au tribunal l'autorisation de citer un expert mÃ©dico-lÃ©gal . A cette occasion, le juge d'instance fit remarquer, en l'absence du jury : Â« Permettez-moi ces quelques mots . Je voudrais qu'il soit parfaitement clair que je ne critique pas du tout la dÃ©fense : sa proposition ne me semble pas Ãªtre vÃ©ritablement un gaspillage de temps, ou alors trÃ©s peu ; donc, je ne veux pas du tout critiquer la dÃ©fense, mais je me sens tenu de donner mon point de vue personnel, et je peux le donner en l'absence du jury, je pense que ce n'est pas 18 faire pression . Je considÃ©re qu'en l'espÃ¨ce les tÃ©moignages sont rÃ©ellement accablants . Or, il est, Ã mon avis, atroce de faire attendre des gens pour les juger, certains en prison pendant des mois, parce que les rÃ´les des tribunaux sont surchargÃ©s . Eh bien nous avons ici l'exemple classique d'une affaire qui traine depuis des semaines, aux frais du contribuable, alors qu'il n'y a tout simplement pas l'ombre d'une chance de rÃ©ussite . rr L'avocat du requÃ©rant rÃ©pondi t Â« M . le PrÃ©sident, je ne suis pas en mesure de formuler des observations Ã ce propos et cela ne saurait vous surprendre . n
Le juge dÃ©clara ensuite : Â« Non, je ne m'attends pas vraiment Ã ce que vous en fassiez et ce n'est pas uniquement Ã vous que je m'adresse . Je formule simplement une observation qui me semble justifiÃ©e . J'ajouterai qu'il peut y avoir des exceptions . Je vois ici un moyen de dÃ©fense : l'un des accusÃ©s . a certainement une chance de s'e n
tirer pour un ou deux chefs d'accusation et un autre des accusÃ©s en a peut-Ã©tre une pour l'un des chefs d'accusation, mais c'est tout . Je parlais tout Ã l'heure en gÃ©nÃ©ral mais, en l'espÃ©ce, il y a un ou deux chefs d'accusation que l'on peut isoler et peut-Ãªtre un accusÃ© que l'on peut dissocier des autres . Â» . Le 29 septembre 1970, le juge entama son rÃ©sumÃ© de l'affaire et le fit prÃ©cÃ©der 6 de cette adresse au jury : a A ce stade, mon rÃ´le est double . Je dois d'abord vous instruire des points de droit, puis vous rÃ©sumer les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve . En ce qui concerne les points de droit, j'en porte la seule responsabilitÃ© parce que je suis juge du droit et vous Ãªtes tenus de suivre les instructions que je vais vous donner . Par contre, en ce qui concerne les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve, je veux dire par lÃ pour dÃ©cider de la vÃ©ritÃ© dans cette affaire, de ce qui est rÃ©ellement arrivÃ© et vous faire rendre votre verdict Ã la lumiÃ©re de ces dÃ©cisions, c'est une affaire entiÃ©rement de votre ressort, parce que vous Ã¨tes les juges des faits . Si donc de temps Ã .autre, lorsque je rÃ©sume les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve, je vous fais part de mon impression personnelle au sujet de tout ou partie de ces Ã©lÃ©ments, ce que j'ai le droit de faire si j'estime que mon avis peut vous Ã©tre utile - et que vous ne soyez pas d'accord avec l'une de mes opinions en la matiÃ¨re, qu'il n'y ait alors aucune Ã©quivoque Ã ce sujet : si vous n'Ã©tes pas d'accord avec l'une des opinions que j'exprime ou que vous me prÃªtez Ã propos de tout ou partie des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve, non seulement vous Ptes autorisÃ©s Ã ne pas tenir compte de mon avis - si vous n'Ã¨tes pas d'accord avec moi - mais encore vous y Ã©tes obligÃ©s, pour la raison susdite qu'il vous appartient, Ã vous et non Ã moi, de dÃ©cider des faits et de rendre le verdict . Voyez-vous, ce qu'Ã la fin de cette journÃ©e nous dÃ©sirons voir exprimer par votre verdict, c'est votre opinion et non la mienne . Les deux peuvent cÃ´incider, mais si ce n'est pas le cas, la vÃ´tre doit l'emporter . n 7 . Le . . . septembre 1970, le jury dÃ©clarait tous les accusÃ©s, Ã l'exception de C ., coupables d'association dÃ©lictueuse et tous les accusÃ©s, Ã l'exception de D ., coupables des accusations concernant les deux cambriolages . Le requÃ©rant fut condamnÃ© Ã quatre ans de dÃ©tention du chef d'association dÃ©lictueuse et Ã deux ans pour chacune des accusations de cambriolage, avec confusion des deux peines . Ces dÃ©lits ont Ã©galement emportÃ© violation d'une ordonnance de probation et d'une ordonnance de libÃ©ration conditionnelle rendues en janvier 1969 Ã propos de deux dÃ©lits de vol . Pour chacune de ces deux violations, le requÃ©rant fut condamnÃ© Ã six mois d'emprisonnement, les peines devant se cumuler et s'ajouter Ã la peine de quatre ans de dÃ©tention . Le requÃ©rant fut donc, au total, condamnÃ© Ã cinq ans d'emprisonnement . B . fut condamnÃ© au total Ã trois ans de dÃ©tention et A . Ã quatre . 8 . Le . . . octobre 1970, le requÃ©rant sollicita l'autorisation d'interjeter appel contre la peine prononcÃ©e . Dans sa requÃªte, il usa des termes suivants : Â« Je sais que j'ai mal fait et que je dois Ãªtre puni . t Il fit valoir toutefois que sa peine Ã©tait excessive, notamment si on la comparait avec celle infligÃ©e Ã ses co-accusÃ©s . Le . . . dÃ©cembre 1970, le requÃ©rant sollicita Ã©galemem l'autorisation d'interjeter appel contre sa condamnation . II se plaignait de ce que le procÃ©s ait Ã©tÃ© injuste et Ã©voquait l'incident mentionnÃ© au paragraphe 5 ci-dessus . II dÃ©clarait que les observations du juge d'instance avaient Ã©tÃ© faites u alors que le ministÃ¨re public prononÃ§ait son rÃ©quisitoire, et avant que mon avocat ait plaidÃ© ma cause n et il a fait valoir que ceci a concluait Ã notre culpabilitÃ© avant que j'ai eu la possibilitÃ© de prouver mon innocence n .
Le 25 avril 1971, le requÃ©rant a versÃ© au dossier un autre document qui dÃ©veloppe ses moyens d'appel et renouvelle ses griefs concernant le comportement du juge d'instance . Il fit valoir que les observations du juge avaient eu un Â« effet dÃ©sastreux sur ma dÃ©fense rr et dÃ©clara avoir Â« remarquÃ© un manque d'intÃ©rÃ©t chez mon avocat n qui, disait-il, Â« avait l'impression qu'il Ã©tait inutile de prÃ©senter ma dÃ©fense devant le tribunal puisque le juge me tenait pour coupable, ce qui a pratiquement mis mon avocat dans l'impossibilitÃ© de plaider ma cause devant le tribunal avec toute la sincÃ©ritÃ© et l'effort de rÃ©flexion auxquels j'avais droit e . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement critiquÃ© certains des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve fournis au procÃ¨s . 9 . Le . . . juillet 1971, un juge unique Ã la cour d'appel accorda l'autorisation d'interjeter appel Ã la fois contre la condamnation et contre la peine prononcÃ©e et dÃ©clara qu'Ã son avis, les observations faites par le juge d'instance et dont se plaignait le requÃ©rant devaient Ãªtre examinÃ©es par la cour d'appel siÃ©geant en sÃ©ance plÃ©niÃ©re Ã la lumiÃ©re de l'arrÃªt rendu dans l'affaire Barnes par la cour d'appel le 30 novembre 1970 . Dans cette affaire, la cour avait cassÃ© une condamnation pour le motif que certaines observations faites par le juge d'instance avaient dÃ©truit les rapports de confiance entre l'appelant et son avocat, ce dernier ayant Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© d'indiquer au juge qu'il avait conseillÃ© Ã son client de plaider coupable ; de plus, une demande formulÃ©e par l'appelant pour obtenir une remise de l'affaire afin de lui permettre de prendre en charge sa propre dÃ©fense avait Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e . La Cour prÃ©cisa que c'Ã©taient ces Ã©lÃ©ments-lÃ qui jetaient un doute sur la condamnation, plutÃ´t que toute allÃ©gation de partialitÃ© du juge, car le juge avait fait ses observations en l'absence du jury et aucune critique n'avait Ã©tÃ© formulÃ©e Ã propos des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve fournis ou du rÃ©sumÃ© qu'en avait prÃ©sentÃ© le juge . 10 . La cour d'appel rÃ©unie en sÃ©ance plÃ©niÃ¨re examina l'affaire le . . . octobre 1971, aprÃ¨s avoir entendu l'argumentation des avocats de l'accusation et de la dÃ©fense, le requÃ©rant ayant obtenu l'assistance judiciaire . L'avocat du requÃ©rant fit notamment valoir que :
a . les observations faites par le juge d'instance prÃ©jugeaient de l'issue de l'affaire avant que la dÃ©fense ait Ã©tÃ© entendue ; b. l'appelant n'a pas eu l'impression d'avoir un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable parce qu'il estimait que l'affaire Ã©tait tranchÃ©e d'avance par le juge qui devait ultÃ©rieurement instruire le jury . les observations ;c formulÃ©es par le juge pouvaient fort bien Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©e s
comme une tentative de faire entrave Ã l'exercice du droit pour un accusÃ© de plaider non coupable aprÃ¨s avoir pris conseil . les observations incriminÃ©es Ã©taient de nature Ã saper les rapports de confianc e ;d qui doivent exister entre l'accusÃ© et son avocat ;
e . ces observations pouvaient donner Ã penser qu'un accusÃ© bÃ©nÃ©ficiant de l'assistance judiciaire se trouve dans une situation diffÃ©rente et moins favorable que celui qui se dÃ©fend Ã ses frais . 11 . La cour d'appel a dÃ©boutÃ© le requÃ©rant de son appel tant pour sa condamnation que pour la peine infligÃ©e . En ce qui concerne sa condamnation, elle a estimÃ© qu'il existait des diffÃ©rences fondamentales entre l'affaire Barnes et celle du requÃ©rant . Notamment si, dans le cas du requÃ©rant, les observations faites par le juge d'instance n'auraient pas dÃ¹ Ã¨tre formulÃ©es, elles n'Ã©taient pas toutefois aussi outranciÃ©res que celles formulÃ©es dans l'affaire Barnes ; de plus, alors que Barnes avait Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© de
conserver l'avocat en qui il avait perdu confiance, et qui estimait qu'il Ã©tait de l'intÃ©rÃ¨t de son client de ne pas poursuivre la dÃ©fense, l'avocat du requÃ©rant ne s'est pas heurtÃ© au mÃ¨me handicap pour conduire la dÃ©fense de son client . La cour d'appel a estimÃ© Ã©galement que les preuves portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant Ã©taient accablantes pour chacun des chefs d'accusation pour lesquels il avait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© coupable et elle a soulignÃ© que l'avocat du requÃ©rant avait lui-mÃ©me reconnu - ce qu'a confirmÃ© la cour elle-mÃ¨me - que le rÃ©sumÃ© fait par le juge Ã©tait Ã l'abri de toute critique . 12 . Le . . . novembre 1971, le requÃ©rant a sollicitÃ© de la cour d'appel l'autorisation d'interjeter appel devant la Chambre des Lords, mais le . . . mars 1972, la cour a refusÃ© l'autorisation en ne voulant pas attester qu'un point de droit d'intÃ©rÃªt gÃ©nÃ©ral Ã©tait en jeu .
13 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de la conduite du procÃ©s par le juge du fond . Il allÃ©gue la violation des paragraphes 1 et 2 de l'article 6 de la Convention . III . ProcÃ©dure devant la Commissio n 14 . Sur proposition d'un groupe de trois membres de la Commission, la requÃªte fut portÃ©e le 5 fÃ©vrier 1973 Ã la connaissance du Gouvernement britannique, qui fut invitÃ© Ã prÃ©senter des observations sur la recevabilitÃ© . 15 . Les observations du Gouvernement, en date du 4 juin, furent reÃ§ues le 7 juin 1973 . A la demande du rapporteur le Gouvernement fit Ã©galement parvenir le 10 janvier 1974 le stÃ©nogramme de l'audience Ishort transcript) devant le juge du fond . Les observations en rÃ©ponse du requÃ©rant, datÃ©es du 3 juillet, furent reÃ§ues le 8 juillet 1974 . Elles furent encore amendÃ©es par lettre du 3 dÃ©cembre 1974 ainsi que par une conversation tÃ©lÃ©phonique du 10 janvier 1975 . IV . Argumentation des pa rt ie s 16 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que le requÃ©rant a bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable et que les droits qui lui sont garantis par l'article 6 de la Convention ont Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©s . Cela resson du jugement de la cour d'appel, qui a procÃ©dÃ© Ã un examen minutieux et complet de l'affaire . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ les remarques du juge du fond peuvent prÃ©ter Ã critique, on notera qu'elles n'ont pu entraver la dÃ©fense ou influencer le jury dans on apprÃ©ciation de la cause puisque lesdites remarques furent Ã©mises en l'absence du jury . Au surplus, le jury Ã©tait parfaitement instruit de sa fonction de juge des faits et le rÃ©sumÃ© de l'affaire prÃ©sentÃ© par le juge ne saurait Ãªtre critiquÃ© . Le Gouvernement en conclut que la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, Â§ 2 de la Convention . 17 . Le Governement fait valoir par ailleurs, Ã titre subsidiaire, que les griefs du requÃ©rant soulÃ¨vent les questions mÃªmes qui se sont posÃ©es devant la cour d'appel . En consÃ©quence, le requÃ©rant invite la Commission Ã considÃ©rer, comme une juridiction de degrÃ© supÃ©rieur, un problÃ©me qui a dÃ©jÃ© fait l'objet d'un examen approfondi de la cour d'appel . Si la Commission peut effectivement dans certains cas appropriÃ©s se saisir de questions qui ont dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© discutÃ©es devant les juridictions internes, elle devrait en l'espÃ©ce, conformÃ©ment Ã sa jurisprudence constante, refuser d'exercer sa compÃ©tence de cette maniÃ©re . La requÃªte devrait en consÃ©quence Ã¨tre dÃ©clarÃ©e incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention au sens de l'article 27, Â§ 2 .
18 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de n'avoir pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, tel que le prÃ©voit l'article 6, Â§ 1 de la Convention . Il allÃ©gue en outre que la prÃ©somption d'innocence garantie par l'article 6, Â§ 2 de la Convention n'a pas Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©e dans son affaire . Sans doute son avocat et lui-mÃªme ont-ils maintenu leur plaidoirie de non-culpabilitÃ© en dÃ©pit des remarques du juge (cf . paragraphe 5 supra), mais ceci ne saurait justifier et couvrir un procÃ©s conduit de telle maniÃ¨re qu'il a Â« dÃ¹ faire naitre chez l'accusÃ© un manque de confiance paralysant dans la prÃ©sentation de sa dÃ©fense Â» . Au surplus, le rÃ©sumÃ© de l'affaire comportait diverses imperfections et la partialitÃ© du juge a influencÃ© la dÃ©termination de la peine . 19 . Le requÃ©rant ne peut enfin partager l'opinion du Gouvernement mis en cause, selon laquelle les griefs dÃ©fÃ©rÃ©s Ã la Commission Â« soulÃ¨vent les questions mÃªmes qui Ã©taient posÃ©es devant la cour d'appel Â» .
EN DROI T 1.
Quant Ã© l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours interne s
1 . Le requÃ©rant soutient que sa condamnation est intervenue au terme d'un procÃ¨s oÃ¹ les paragraphes 1 et 2 de l'a rt icle 6 de la Convention ont Ã©tÃ© violÃ©s . Le paragraphe 1 de l'a rt icle 6 garantit, il est vrai, Ã tout accusÃ© le droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, tandis que le paragraphe 2 de cette disposition Ã©nonce le principe selon lequel toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction est prÃ©sumÃ©e innocente jusqu'Ã ce que sa culpabilitÃ© ait Ã©tÃ© lÃ©galement Ã©tablie . Toutefois, aux termes de l'a rt icle 26 de la Convention, la Commission ne peut Ãªtre saisie d'une affaire qu'aprÃ©s l'Ã©puisement des voies de recou rs internes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus . Pour satisfaire Ã cette rÃ¨gle, il ne suffit pas en soi que le requÃ©rant ait fait appel de sa condamnation et de la peine, ni qu'aprÃ©s avoir Ã©tÃ© dÃ©boutÃ©, il ait sollicitÃ© l'autorisation d'interjeter appel devant la Chambre des Lords . Il faut encore qu'il ait invoquÃ©, au cours de la procÃ©dure interne, la substance mÃ¨me de la plainte introduite devant la Commission . La Commission renvoie Ã cet Ã©gard Ã sa jurisprudence constante, telle qu'elle a Ã© tÃ© confirmÃ©e dans la dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ¨te NÂ° 4319/69 SAMER clRÃ©p . FÃ©d . d'Allemagne (Ahnuaire 14, pp . 322, 338, 340 ; Rec . 39 p . 11) .
2 . En l'espÃ¨ce les griefs du requÃ©rant soujÃ¨vent, de l'avis du Gouvernement, ct les questions mÃªmes posÃ©es Ã la cour d'appel Â» alors que le requÃ©rant nie que la question fondÃ©e sur l'a rt icle 6, Â§ 2 de la Convention tc ait Ã©tÃ© jamais plaidÃ©e devant la cour d'appel Â» . La dÃ©claration du requÃ©rant pourrait Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ©e comme impliquant qu'il a omis de soulever devant la cour d'appel la prÃ©tendue violation de la prÃ©somption d'innocence dont il se plaint Ã prÃ©sent devant la Commission . Toutefois, la question a bien Ã© tÃ© mentionnÃ©e par le requÃ©rant dans sa demande d'autorisation d'interjeter appel, dans laquelle il invoquait que le procÃ¨s Ã© tait inique et le juge pa rt ial . A cet Ã©gard il a fait valoir que le juge du fond, de par les remarques faites Â« avant mÃªme que ma dÃ©fense ait commencÃ©, nous avait estimÃ© coupable avantque j'aie eu la possibilitÃ© d'Ã©tablir mon innocence Â» . (Demande d'autorisation d'interjeter appel contre la condamnation - . . . dÃ©cembre 1970) . 3 . La Commission en conclut que le requÃ©rant a satisfait aux conditions relatives Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours .
Quant au dÃ©faut manifeste de fondemen t
4 . Le tribunal qui a jugÃ© le requÃ©rant en premiÃ©re instance Ã©tait composÃ© d'un juge et d'un jury . La Commission relÃ©ve que les griefs du requÃ©rant visent uniquement la conduite des dÃ©bats par le juge et, en particulier, certaines remarques faites par celui-ci en l'absence du jury qui devait dÃ©cider seul de la culpabilitÃ© ou de l'innocence du requÃ©rant . Toutefois c'est bien le juge qui a dirigÃ© les dÃ©bats et fixÃ© la peine . ConformÃ©ment Ã la jurisprudence de la Commission confirmÃ©e dans la dÃ©cision sur la requÃ©te NÂ° 4991 /71, Y . c/Royaume-Uni (Rec . 45 pp . 1, 11-12), l'article 6 est Ã©galement applicable Ã la procÃ©dure conduisant Ã la fixation de la peine . 5 . La question de savoir si un procÃ¨s est conforme aux exigences de l'article 6, Â§ 1 doit Ãªtre tranchÃ©e sur la base d'une apprÃ©ciation du procÃ©s dans son ensemble, et non Ã partir de l'examen sÃ©parÃ© d'un aspect ou incident dÃ©terminÃ© . (cf . Rapport de la Commission dans l'affaire Nielsen, citÃ© et confirmÃ© dans la dÃ©cision sur la requÃªte 4991 /71 Y . c/ Royaume-Uni - Loc . cit . p . 12) . 6 . La Commission a donc considÃ©tÃ© le procÃ©s du requÃ©rant dans son ensemble, Ã l'aide des observations des Parties et a examinÃ© particuliÃ¨rement le stÃ©nogramme d'audience . Elle estime devoir relever les Ã©lÃ©ments suivants : a. Les vues Ã©mises par le juge le : . . septembre 1970 Ã©taient critiquables au point de soulever un doute quant Ã¢ l'impartialitÃ© du juge . Dans leur forme toutefois, elles Ã©taient moins extrÃ©mes que celles dÃ©veloppÃ©es par le mÃ©me juge dans l'affaire Y . dÃ©jÃ© mentionnÃ©e (cf . Loc . cit . pp . 6-7 ) . b . Quant Ã la pression que les remarques du juge pourraient avoir exercÃ©e sur le requÃ©rant en vue de lui faire plaider la culpabilitÃ©, il ressort du dÃ©roulement du procÃ¨s, tel qu'il est reflÃ©tÃ© par le stÃ©nogramme d'audience, que l'avocat de la dÃ©fense n'a pas Ã©tÃ© impressionnÃ© par le juge . Ainsi que l'a relevÃ© la cour d'appel (p . 11 du jugement) l'avocat Â« admet de faÃ§on nette et franche devant la Cour qu'il ne peut dire que les remarques Ã©mises le . . . septembre . . . aient influencÃ© l'avocat de la dÃ©fense ou l'aient empÃ©chÃ© d'assurer correctement la dÃ©fense par la suite a .
c . En ce qui concerne le rÃ©sumÃ© fait par le juge Ã l'intention du jury, la Commission note qu'aucun grief n'a Ã©tÃ© formulÃ© devant la cour d'appel Ã cet Ã©gard . La cour d'appel a nÃ©anmoins Â« examinÃ© avec soin l'ensemble de ce rÃ©sumÃ© Â» et conclu qu'il s'Ã©tait agi en l'espÃ¨ce u d'un exposÃ© clair, prÃ©cis et Ã©quitable n (p . 5 du jugement) . Dans ses observations Ã l'adresse de la Commission, le requÃ©rant critique ce rÃ©sumÃ© . Toutefois, dans la mesure oÃ¹ le rÃ©sumÃ© concernait les inculpations pour lesquelles le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© finalement condamnÃ©, il est plus contestÃ© par le requÃ©rant sous l'angle de la Â« clartÃ© n ou de la Â« prÃ©cision n que de son Â« caractÃ©re Ã©quitable rt . La Commission estime ne pouvoir porter un avis que sur ce dernier aspect, au regard de l'article 6Â§ 1 de la Convention . AprÃ¨s avoir Ã©tudiÃ© le rÃ©sumÃ© fait par le juge, elle estime, comme la cour d'appel, qu'il s'agissait d'un exposÃ© Ã©quitable . d. En ce qui concerne enfin les peines prononcÃ©es, la Commission prend note des condamnations prononcÃ©es, Ã l'Ã©gard des trois dÃ©fendeurs : A .(condamnÃ© pour 3 chefs d'inculpation) : 4 ans de dÃ©tention ; le requÃ©rant (3 chefs d'inculpation) 4 ans ; B .(4 chefs) : 3 ans .
II ressort du stÃ©nogramme de l'audience (p . 131) qu'en fixant le montant de la peine de B ., le juge a tenu compte du fait que ses antÃ©cÃ©dants criminels Â« n'Ã©taient pas aussi lourds, ni par le nombre ni par la gravitÃ© des dÃ©lits rt que ceux de A .et du requÃ©rant . Il semble Ã©galement que le requÃ©rant avait les pires antÃ©cÃ©dents et que les aveux de A ., bien qu'intervenus tardivement, ont Ã©tÃ© considÃ©rÃ©s par le juge comme une circonstance attÃ©nuante (cf . ibidem p . 130) . Ces deux Ã©lÃ©ments expliquent pourquoi le juge a dÃ©cidÃ© la confusion de la peine de 4 ans .avec celle que A .purgeait Ã l'Ã©poque . 7 . AprÃ©s avoir examinÃ© le procÃ¨s dans son ensemble, la Commission conclut ainsi finalement qu'il n'y a pas eu en l'espÃ©ce violation du droit du requÃ©rant Ã un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable par un tribunal impartial, ainsi que le garantit l'article 6, Â§ 1 de la Convention .
8. Au cours de son Ã©tude du grief du requÃ©rant relatif Ã la conduite du procÃ¨s par le juge du lond, la Commission a eu Ã©galement Ã©gard Ã l'article 6, Â§ 2 de la Convention, qui dispose que toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction est prÃ©sumÃ©e innocente jusqu'8 ce que sa culpabilitÃ© ait Ã©tÃ© lÃ©galement Ã©tablie . La Commission renvoie auic considÃ©rations Ã©mises Ã propos de l'article 6 Â§ 1, qui lui permettent de conclure que la prÃ©somption d'innocence a Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©e au cours du procÃ¨s . Notamment, il ressort avec clartÃ© du rÃ©sumÃ© fait par le juge que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sumÃ© innocent jusqu'Ã l'Ã©tablissement de la culpabilitÃ©, et que l'accusation a eu, jusqu'Ã© l'issue du procÃ©s, la charge de prouver cette culpabilitÃ© . 9 . Un examen de la requÃ¨te ne permet donc pas de dÃ©celer l'apparence d'une violation des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention et en particulier l'article 6 . La Commission conclut dÃ©s lors que la requÃ©te est manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, Â§ 2 de la Convention n
DECLARE LA REQUÃTEIRRECEVABLE .
_24_Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (plénière)Date de la décision : 21/03/1975Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page