Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2004/09/03-1388a.htm
Timestamp: 2019-01-22 17:52:08
Document Index: 758817824

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1105', '§ 1252', '§ 1105', '§ 1252', '§ 1105', '§ 1252']

03-1388a -- Soberanes v. Comfort -- 09/21/2004
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (37110 bytes) (30933 bytes)
MICHAEL COMFORT, Acting District Director, et al.,
Appellees' motion to publish the order and judgment dated September 21, 2004, is granted. A copy of the published opinion is attached.
Patrick C. Hyde of Patrick C. Hyde, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant.
John W. Suthers, United States Attorney, Nina Y. Wang, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and CAUTHRON,(1) Chief District Judge.
CAUTHRON, Chief District Judge.
In early 2001, petitioner applied for adjustment of status based on marriage to a U.S. citizen. When he appeared for an interview in California in July 2002, he was taken into custody for execution of the extant deportation order. He filed a motion to reopen the deportation proceeding, which the IJ denied as untimely. After the BIA summarily affirmed that ruling, he filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit, which is still pending. In the meantime, he was transferred to Colorado, where he filed a habeas petition seeking release from custody on various grounds, some involving the merits of his administrative proceedings. The district court denied the petition and this appeal followed.(2)
Neglecting to take an appeal to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to any issue that could have been raised, negating the jurisdiction necessary for subsequent judicial review. Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th Cir. 1999) (following Rivera-Zurita v. INS, 946 F.2d 118, 120 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991)). While we have thus far had occasion to apply this exhaustion rule only in the context of petitions for review, we see no reason for excepting habeas proceedings­traditionally constrained by exhaustion principles in other contexts­from its natural reach. Many circuits, applying the exhaustion requirement that was contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (repealed) prior to passage of IIRIRA and is now contained in 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1),(3) have held the failure to exhaust issues before the BIA bars judicial review through habeas just as it does through a petition for review. See, e.g., Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 937-41 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying § 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement in accord with four other circuits); Kurfees v. United States INS, 275 F.3d 332, 335-37 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying § 1105a(c)'s exhaustion requirement); Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). Following that accepted view, we lack jurisdiction to review the unappealed deportation order issued by the IJ in 1996.
"Generally, a habeas petition cannot be used to substitute for direct appeal." Latu, 375 F.3d at 1012. Consequently, an alien subject to deportation may not bypass available direct review in the court of appeals in favor of a collateral habeas attack in the district court. Duran-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003). But by the same token, if an alien raises issues that would fall outside the jurisdictional scope of a petition for review, "he has not failed to seek an available judicial remedy, and he is not procedurally barred from habeas review in the district court." Latu, 375 F.3d at 1017 (approving habeas review of removal based on alien's status as aggravated felon, direct review of which is barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)) (emphasis added). The ineffective assistance/due process issues raised here could have been (and perhaps are being) pursued in a petition for review from the denial of petitioner's motion to reopen.(4) See, e.g., Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2004); Arreaza-Cruz v. INS, 39 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the matter is not properly before us in this habeas proceeding.
Finally, we should say something about the nature­and consequences­of the briefing in this case. Petitioner's brief makes several passing comments that show no concern for whether the issues they may touch upon were preserved in the district court, were subsequently sufficiently developed in the brief to permit informed appellate review, or indeed are even within the scope of judicial review at all.(5) Our reason for pointing this out is not to criticize counsel; the intersection of immigration and habeas corpus marks an evolving and challenging area of the law and the briefing from both sides informed our review in this case. We do, however, want to make it clear that "[w]e have considered all of petitioner's contentions and, whether explicitly addressed or implicitly rejected, each has been found [for substantive, procedural, and/or jurisdictional reasons] to lack merit." Washington v. DOT, 84 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996).
1. The Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, Chief District Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
3. Section 1105a(c) directed that "[a]n order of deportation . . . shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations." IIRIRA replaced § 1105a(c) with § 1252(d)(1), which directs that "[a] court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right."
4. It is not clear whether petitioner has actually satisfied the conditions for such review­in particular, the denial of his motion to reopen as untimely may, if upheld, mean that it did not serve to exhaust the substantive issues raised. See Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding citizenship claim, raised in untimely motion to reopen, barred for failure to exhaust); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 36 Fed. Appx. 301, 302 (9th Cir. June 3, 2002) (unpub.) (making same point more explicitly). But recognizing this contingency does not aid petitioner here. If it occurs, the procedural bar noted above would simply be replaced with an exhaustion deficiency that, as we have seen, also precludes habeas relief.
5. One example specifically noted by the Government is petitioner's reference to the BIA's failure to reopen his deportation proceedings sua sponte. The BIA's discretion to extend such relief is not subject to judicial review. See Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 2003).
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2004/09/03-1388a.htm.