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Timestamp: 2016-10-23 20:39:46
Document Index: 653397392

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 371', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 3731', '§ 201']

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANTv.HENRY HELSTOSKI (D.C. CRIM. NO. 76-201-1, D. OF N.J.); HENRY HELSTOSKI, PETITIONER, V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT; HONORABLE H. CURTIS MEANOR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, NOMINAL RESPONDENT
ON APPEAL FROM the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the DISTRICT of NEW JERSEY. ON PETITION for WRIT of MANDAMUS AND/OR PROHIBITION.
Henry Helstoski ("defendant"), a former United States Congressman, petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to dismiss Counts I-IV of a pending indictment against him. He seeks dismissal on the grounds, inter alia, that those counts contravene the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution. That Clause provides that "the Senators and Representatives . . . for any Speech or Debate in either House . . . shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S.Const. art. I, § 6.
Count I charges the defendant with violation of the conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The count alleges that while he was a Member of Congress the defendant conspired to violate the official bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1),*fn1 by acting with others to solicit and obtain bribes from resident aliens in return for being influenced in the performance of official acts to benefit those aliens.
The conspiracy count defined the official acts for which bribes allegedly were paid to defendant as being "the introduction of private bills in the United States House of Representatives." In addition, four of the sixteen overt acts set out in Count I alleged that the defendant introduced specific bills into the House to benefit specific individuals. For example, Overt Act 13 charged that "on or about September 6, 1973, the defendant, HENRY HELSTOSKI, introduced a private bill in the United States House of Representatives for Luis and Maria Echavarria."
Counts II-IV charged the defendant with substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1) & (2) (1976).*fn2 Each count alleged that while a Congressman the defendant solicited and agreed to receive payments from specified aliens in return for being influenced in the performance of official acts. Each count specified the official acts at issue. For example, Count IV charged:
At no time did the Government speak to the defendant about his rights under the Speech or Debate Clause. And though the district court found that when the defendant first appeared before the grand jury he knew of his Speech or Debate privilege as a result of other unrelated litigation,*fn3 it was not until the defendant's final appearance before the grand jury on May 14, 1976, that the defendant asserted his Speech or Debate Clause privilege in refusing to answer the grand jury's questions. The defendant did not testify about, or produce documents concerning, legislative acts subsequent to the May 14, 1976, assertion of privilege.
The Act has been read to grant us jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus where the underlying proceeding is one either actually or potentially within our appellate jurisdiction. Since the prosecution of this defendant for the violation of federal bribery laws is a case potentially within our appellate jurisdiction, we have the jurisdiction to grant the writ defendant seeks. "Hence the question presented on this record is not whether [we have] power to grant the writ but whether in the light of all the circumstances the case [is] an appropriate one for the exercise of that power." Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21, 25-26, 87 L. Ed. 1185, 63 S. Ct. 938 (1943).
The Supreme Court recently has emphasized that, in determining when it is "appropriate" to issue the writ we must keep in mind that "the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 48 L. Ed. 2d 725, 96 S. Ct. 2119 (1976).
Generally, federal courts have used the writ "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21, 26, 87 L. Ed. 1185, 63 S. Ct. 938 (1943), quoted in Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 48 L. Ed. 2d 725, 96 S. Ct. 2119 (1976). And while the Supreme Court in Kerr noted that it had "not limited the use of mandamus by an unduly narrow and technical understanding of what constitutes a matter of 'jurisdiction,'" the Court stressed that the writ should issue only in extraordinary situations: "the fact still remains that 'only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial "usurpation of power" will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.'" Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 48 L. Ed. 2d 725, 96 S. Ct. 2119 (1976), quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 19 L. Ed. 2d 305, 88 S. Ct. 269 (1967).
In order to further the congressional determination that appellate review should come only after final judgment except in the most exceptional circumstances, the courts also have required that even where circumstances amount to a "judicial usurpation of power," the petitioner must satisfy certain other conditions for issuance of the writ. Thus, the party seeking the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he seeks. And petitioner also must show that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Id. 426 U.S. at 403.
The defendant distinguishes this indictment from those at issue in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 33 L. Ed. 2d 507, 92 S. Ct. 2531 (1972), and United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 15 L. Ed. 2d 681, 86 S. Ct. 749 (1966). Defendant asserts that in those cases the indictments did not charge specific legislative acts, and so did not require proof of such acts. In this case, however, the defendant believes that mention of specific legislative acts shows that the indictment charges him with the performance of legislative acts. This indictment, defendant argues, depends upon proof that the defendant introduced into the House of Representatives the specified private bills, and so depends upon proof of acts privileged against such inquiry under the Speech or Debate Clause.
We do not believe that the indictment at issue in this prosecution is materially distinguishable from that upheld by the Supreme Court in Brewster. In Brewster, four counts charged the defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) by agreeing to accept money in return "'for being influenced . . . in respect to his action, vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which might at any time be pending before him in his official capacity.'" United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525, 33 L. Ed. 2d 507, 92 S. Ct. 2531 (1972). A fifth count charged Brewster with having agreed, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g), to accept money for official acts in respect to his action, vote, and decision on "'postage rate legislation which had been pending before him in his official capacity.'" Id. at 527.
Though the Brewster Court recognized that the indictment charged the defendant with accepting bribes in connection with legislative acts themselves protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, it allowed prosecution under the indictment. It did so because neither the § 201(c) nor the § 201(g) charge required the proof of any specified legislative acts concerning the postage rate legislation to which the counts referred. The Court held that to make a prima facie case, all the Government was required to prove was the "corrupt promise for payment, for it is taking the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act" under §§ 201(c) and (g). Id. at 526. (Emphasis in original).
Although the indictment alleges that the bribe was given for an act that was actually performed, it is, once again, unnecessary to inquire into the act or its motivation. To sustain a conviction it is necessary to show that [Brewster] solicited, received, or agreed to receive, money with knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act. Inquiry into the legislative performance itself is not necessary; evidence of the Member's knowledge of the alleged briber's illicit reasons for paying the money is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.
Our cases have found a "constructive amendment" of the grand jury's indictment where the trial court "permitted, in the guise of a variance . . . [modification of] the facts which the grand jury charged as an essential element of the substantive offense." United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049, 1060 (3rd Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). Thus, "we must test to see whether there is reasonable assurance from the face of the indictment that the grand jury found probable cause on each of the essential elements which [will] underlie the verdict of the petit jury." United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526, 529 (3d Cir. 1974) (in banc).
Defendant's final argument in support of his petition is that the district court is without jurisdiction to try the indictment because the grand jury that returned it heard evidence in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause. The district court rejected this argument, holding that "courts simply will not go behind the face of an indictment, once it is returned, in order to test the competency of the evidence adduced before the grand jury." United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201 at 4 (D.N.J.,Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion).
Even in light of the expansive definition of "jurisdiction" that the Supreme Court has adopted in evaluating mandamus petitions, we do not believe that in these circumstances defendant's allegations concerning the grand jury make out "'exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial "usurpation of power" [so as to] justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.'" Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 48 L. Ed. 2d 725, 96 S. Ct. 2119 (1976), quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 19 L. Ed. 2d 305, 88 S. Ct. 269 (1967). We conclude that the district court has jurisdiction to try the indictment returned against the defendant in this case, and accordingly refuse to grant the writ on grounds of grand jury abuse.
In Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21, 87 L. Ed. 1185, 63 S. Ct. 938 (1943), the Supreme Court similarly refused a petition for a writ of mandamus. There the petitioner sought to quash an indictment on the grounds that the grand jury that returned it had no power to hear the subject matter presented to it, since the grand jury's statutory power to hear the allegations against petitioner had expired before it returned an indictment against him.
The Court noted that the case before it, unlike a situation where it was alleged that an indictment had been amended by the court, involved "no question of the jurisdiction of the district court. Its jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants, and of the subject matter charged by the indictment" was not implicated by the petition. Id. at 26. Moreover, the requisite number of duly qualified grand jurors had returned the bill. Accordingly, the writ was denied.
Similarly, we do not believe defendant's allegations of grand jury abuse in this case question the jurisdiction of the court below. As established in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 100 L. Ed. 397, 76 S. Ct. 406 (1956), "an indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits." Id. at 363. Thus, we believe that in this case, the district court possesses jurisdiction to try the valid indictment returned by a competent grand jury. In such circumstances, we cannot hold that we must exercise our extraordinary powers under the All Writs Act to prevent a judicial usurpation of power.
We also note that it is far from "clear and indisputable" that defendant could prevail on his arguments that presentation to the grand jury of evidence in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause requires dismissal of the indictment. The Supreme Court consistently has refused to countenance challenges to the competency of evidence presented to a grand jury, holding that a valid indictment returned by a competent grand jury is enough to call for a trial. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-45, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974).
Moreover, in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 15 L. Ed. 2d 681, 86 S. Ct. 749 (1966), the Court allowed retrial of the conspiracy count even though it was clear from the specification of a legislative act in the overt acts supporting that conspiracy count that the grand jury heard the evidence that the Supreme Court held was barred at trial by the Speech or Debate Clause. And on appeal after the retrial, the Court of Appeals rejected Johnson's argument that the indictment was invalid because of the presentation of evidence of legislative acts to the grand jury. United States v. Johnson, 419 F.2d 56, 58 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010, 25 L. Ed. 2d 423, 90 S. Ct. 1235 (1970). See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 n.13, 16 L. Ed. 2d 510, 86 S. Ct. 1416 (1966).
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district courts [ sic ] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
We note at the outset that § 3731 explicitly provides that " the provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes." 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). And as we recognized in United States v. Beck, 483 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1132, 38 L. Ed. 2d 757, 94 S. Ct. 873 (1974), the legislative history of the current version of § 3731 "states specifically, 'The phrase "suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property" should be read broadly.'" Id. at 206, quoting S.Rep.No. 91-1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970).
Stressing that " the practical effect of the decision . . . is to suppress the evidence," and relying on the "congressional mandate that a 'suppression order' be liberally construed," we held that § 3731 gave us jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id.
We think allowing jurisdiction over this appeal is in harmony with the congressional purpose to permit appeals except where an ongoing trial would be interrupted.
The defendant attacked the jurisdiction on appeal of the Court of Appeals. He argued that the order below "did not constitute a suppression or exclusion of evidence within the meaning of § 3731 but instead 'involved an order delineating the permissible scope of acts for which [the defendant] could be prosecuted.'" Id. at 943, quoting Brief for Appellee at 10.
Id. Accord, United States v. Battisti, 486 F.2d 961, 965-67 (6th Cir. 1973); see United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 774, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973, 96 S. Ct. 2171, 48 L. Ed. 2d 796, vacated and decided in banc without reference to this issue, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S. Ct. 526, 50 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1976).
We agree with the district court that the Government misconstrues the meaning of the Speech or Debate Clause as set out in Brewster. It is true that Brewster did not foreclose the showing of the purpose in taking the bribe. But the Supreme Court in Brewster made it clear that such purpose could be shown without inquiry "into how [defendant] spoke, how he debated, how he voted, or anything he did in the chamber or in committee." United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526, 33 L. Ed. 2d 507, 92 S. Ct. 2531 (1972).
Indeed, in responding to fears expressed by the dissenters that it had gone too far in cutting back the Speech or Debate privilege, the Court emphasized that proof of legislative acts not only was not required under § 201(c), but was forbidden: "our holding in [ United States v.] Johnson precludes any showing of how he acted, voted, or decided." Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
The dissenting position stands on the fragile proposition that it "would take the Government at its word" with respect to wanting to prove what we all agree are protected acts that cannot be shown in evidence. Perhaps the Government would make a more appealing case if it could do so, but here, as in that case, evidence of acts protected by the [Speech or Debate] Clause is inadmissible.
In so holding, the Court in Brewster was relying on its earlier opinion in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 15 L. Ed. 2d 681, 86 S. Ct. 749 (1966). There the Court allowed retrial of the conspiracy count at issue only upon the condition that the Government produce no evidence of any legislative acts. "With all references to [defendant's speech on the floor] eliminated, we think the Government should not be precluded from a new trial on this count, thus wholly purged of elements offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause." Id. at 185.
Like the district court, we do not read Johnson and Brewster as prohibiting proof of legislative acts only where evidence of such acts is introduced as part of an inquiry into the legislative process itself. The Court has been clear in its prohibition of "any showing" of legislative acts, United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 527, 33 L. Ed. 2d 507, 92 S. Ct. 2531 (1972), just as the Clause itself prohibits inquiry into "any speech or debate." Legislative acts may not be shown in evidence for any purpose in this prosecution.
The question of whether an individual senator or representative may waive his Speech or Debate privilege is an open one. The history of the privilege at common law is not conclusive on this point, and the American authorities conflict. Compare Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) with T. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice, reprinted in S.Doc.No. 92-1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 431, 442 (1971); cf. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 622 n.13, 33 L. Ed. 2d 583, 92 S. Ct. 2614 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 529 n.18, 33 L. Ed. 2d 507, 92 S. Ct. 2531 (1972).
Nor is the Speech or Debate Clause analogous to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Voluntary consent to search is permissible because that lesser standard does not work against the policy aims of the rule, i.e., the deterrence of police conduct that violates the fourth amendment.
The Speech or Debate Clause is designed "to protect the integrity of the legislative process [and insure] the independence of individual legislators" by prohibiting the introduction into evidence of legislative acts. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507, 33 L. Ed. 2d 507, 92 S. Ct. 2531 (1972). To empower the judicial branch to find waiver upon any showing of less than an express relinquishment of the privilege would be in conflict with this purpose by creating the potential for judicial and executive encroachment on constitutionally protected legislative prerogatives in situations where the waiver of such prerogatives is not made expressly clear.
Out of deference, then, to a co-equal branch of government, we hold that even if an individual member may waive his Speech or Debate privilege - a question we do not decide - any waiver in the context of a criminal prosecution must be express and for the specific purpose for which the evidence of legislative acts is sought to be used against the member.