Source: https://timepast.tv/2017/06/
Timestamp: 2019-09-16 14:18:45
Document Index: 595316496

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13']

June 2017 – user's blog
Even though lower courts had divided on the question and four Justices dissented, the majority’s reasoning follows fairly directly from established precedents. Consistent with Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, the Court easily determined that the three-year period allowed for suits under § 13 of the Securities Act is a statute of repose. That statutory provision “creates a fixed bar against future liability,” “admits of no exception,” and “runs from the defendant’s last culpable act” rather than “the accrual of the claim.” Tellingly, the majority observed, § 13 also contains a separate one-year statute of limitations.
The majority then explained that statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling, as CTS Corp. v. Waldburger held. “The purpose and effect of a statute of repose . . . is to override customary tolling rules arising from the equitable powers of courts.” Statutes of repose, the Court emphasized, reflect a legislative determination that “there should be a specific time beyond which a defendant should no longer be subjected to protracted liability.” The “unqualified nature of that determination . . . forecloses the extension of the statutory period based on equitable principles.”
The only remaining question was whether the class-action tolling rule established by American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah provides for equitable tolling. Looking to American Pipe itself, the Court had no trouble answering that question affirmatively: “The source of the tolling rule applied in American Pipe is the judicial power to promote equity.” Having concluded that § 13’s three-year period is a statute of repose, that statutes of repose cannot be equitably tolled, and that American Pipe provides for equitable tolling, the Court ruled that American Pipe tolling could not apply to § 13’s three-year period.
The points raised by CalPERS in opposition did not persuade the majority. American Pipe tolling, the majority concluded, could properly be restricted to statutes of limitations. Otherwise, individual suits filed after expiration of § 13’s repose period could expand a defendant’s litigation burdens and liability beyond that imposed by a timely class action. The importance of opt-out rights would not justify ignoring mandatory time limits set by statute. Any risk of burdensome protective filings by class members seemed overblown to the Court. And the word “action” in the operative portion of § 13 could not be read to mean a claim brought in a class action on a separate date by a separate named party in a separate suit.
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Ginsburg argued that tolling § 13’s repose period would not implicate any of the reasons for that period because the class action gave the defendants all the notice of liability that they needed. She also described risks that some class members could lose their rights to proceed individually and that protective filings by other class members would “gum up the works of class litigation.” Interestingly, she also urged class counsel and district courts to notify class members as the expiration of any repose period approaches.
The post Supreme Court Refuses To Allow Class Action To Extend Deadline For Filing Suit appeared first on Class Defense Blog.
As part of the last inquiry, the court should consider both (a) whether the in-forum activity is sufficient to support the conclusion that the obligation underlying the suit was incurred there, and (b) whether permitting an assertion of specific jurisdiction based on that activity will intrude on the sovereignty of other States, because one or more States have a significantly greater connection to the underlying obligation than the forum State. The latter consideration is particularly appropriate in light of the BMS Court’s focus on the forum state’s “legitimate interest in the claims in question”—“[a]s we have put it,” the Court said, “restrictions on personal jurisdiction ‘are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.’”
Another issue likely to gain substantial attention is how personal jurisdiction applies in the class action context.(Justice Sotomayor flagged the issue in footnote 4 of her dissent.) Some courts have held that as long as the forum State may exercise specific jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs’ claims, it automatically may also adjudicate the claims of the absent class members—even if it would not be able to exercise specific jurisdiction if the absent class members’ claims were asserted in a separate case. That reasoning is significantly undermined by today’s decision, which squarely held that “[t]he mere fact that other plaintiffs” could invoke case-specific jurisdiction in California—because they obtained and ingested the drug in California—“does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”
The post Supreme Court’s Decision In Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court Rejects Expansive View Of Specific Jurisdiction appeared first on Class Defense Blog.
Posted on June 14, 2017 December 19, 2017
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California recently issued an interesting decision (pdf) denying class certification in 15 consolidated consumer class actions against the maker of 5-hour ENERGY drinks.
In the consolidated cases, captioned In re 5-Hour Energy Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, the plaintiffs allege that 5-hour Energy drinks were falsely advertised as providing hours of energy. The plaintiffs asserted claims under California, Missouri, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania law, and sought certification of state-specific classes. On June 6, 2017, the court denied class certification because the plaintiffs had failed to show that their alleged state-law deception theory was commonly experienced by consumers. In class action vernacular, individual, not common, issues predominated in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
To follow the certification analysis, it is important first to understand that to prevail on their false advertising claims under the relevant state laws, the plaintiffs were required to show that the alleged false advertising – the label statements ‘five hour energy’ and ‘hours of energy’ – were materially important to the plaintiffs’ decisions to purchase 5-hour Energy.
To demonstrate that class treatment of their claims was appropriate, the plaintiffs needed to show – via class-wide common proof, not from individual inquiry of each consumer – that class members “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as the plaintiffs themselves. Here, that meant showing that the alleged false advertising materially impacted the purchasing decisions of reasonable consumers in the same manner as it allegedly had impacted the plaintiffs. As the court underscored, “[i]f the misrepresentation or omission is not material” to the purchasing decisions of “all class members, the issue of reliance [and causation] ‘would vary from consumer to consumer’ and the class should not be certified.”
To try to meet that burden, however, plaintiffs pretty much avoided what reasonable consumers thought, relying instead on the plaintiffs’ own impressions, on defendant’s impressions, on an expert’s opinion what ‘energy’ meant, and on FDA’s definition of ‘energy.’ The court rejected all that because none of it shed light on the objective reasonable consumers’ take-away of the word ‘energy’ or how the challenged statements impacted their purchasing decisions.
Defendants, on the other hand, submitted a survey of 5-Hour Energy purchasers. It showed that a meager 2.2% of them relied on the challenged statements in the manner that the plaintiffs had alleged and, even then, only during their initial purchase. Subsequent purchases were primarily driven by the consumers’ actual experiences with the product. The survey also confirmed that consumers made their initial purchases based on many different factors having nothing to do with the challenged label statements, such as a recommendation or the product’s location at the checkout stand.
On this record, the court concluded that individual issues surrounding whether the challenged label statements deceived consumers or were material to the purchasing decisions swamped any common issues. “The element of predominance is not satisfied because Plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to a class-wide presumption of materiality, and thus, cannot establish reliance or causation with common proof. Without a market survey documenting consumer preferences, Plaintiffs have not shown that the ‘five hour energy’ representation is material to consumers as compared to other factors . . . Plaintiffs also have not shown that there is a prevalent definition of ‘energy’ in the market. Without such evidence, Plaintiffs cannot show an entitlement to a class-wide presumption of materiality.”
The court’s decision is a helpful reminder to businesses targeted by false-advertising litigation – it’s not enough for the plaintiffs to have evidence that they themselves were deceived by the challenged statements or omissions. Rather, the plaintiffs must be able to show – using common proof – that class members also were deceived in the same manner. Otherwise, the class trial will inevitably break down into a series of mini-trials of individualized evidence regarding particular consumers’ purchasing decisions and whether they each relied on the challenged statements or omissions.
The post Court refuses to certify 5-hour Energy false-advertising class action for lack of common proof appeared first on Class Defense Blog.
Posted on June 12, 2017 December 19, 2017
The post Supreme Court rejects end runs around Rule 23(f) by use of “voluntary dismissal” tactic appeared first on Class Defense Blog.