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Matched Legal Cases: ['§6', '§ 3553', '§6', '§6', '§ 3661', '§ 3553', '§ 994', '§6', '§6', '§6', '§6', '§1', '§ 3553', 'art 4', '§3', '§1', '§1', '§1', '§6', '§6']

2001 CHAP6 | United States Sentencing Commission
2001 CHAP6
2001 Federal Sentencing Guideline ManualCHAPTER SIX - SENTENCING PROCEDURES AND PLEA
AGREEMENTSPART A - SENTENCING PROCEDURESIntroductory CommentaryThis Part addresses sentencing procedures that are applicable in all
cases, including those in which guilty or nolo contendere pleas are entered
with or without a plea agreement between the parties, and convictions based
upon judicial findings or verdicts. It sets forth the procedures for
establishing the facts upon which the sentence will be based. Reliable
fact-finding is essential to procedural due process and to the accuracy and
uniformity of sentencing.Historical Note: Effective November 1,
1987.§6A1.1.Presentence Report (Policy Statement)A probation officer shall conduct a presentence investigation and report
to the court before the imposition of sentence unless the court finds that
there is information in the record sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise
of sentencing authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and the court
explains this finding on the record. Rule 32(b)(1), Fed. R. Crim. P. The
defendant may not waive preparation of the presentence report. CommentaryA thorough presentence investigation is essential in determining the
facts relevant to sentencing. In order to ensure that the sentencing judge will
have information sufficient to determine the appropriate sentence, Congress
deleted provisions of Rule 32(c), Fed. R. Crim. P., which previously permitted
the defendant to waive the presentence report. Rule 32(b)(1) permits the
judge to dispense with a presentence report, but only after explaining, on the
record, why sufficient information is already available.Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.
Amended effective June 15, 1988 (see Appendix C, amendment 58); November
1, 1989 (see Appendix C, amendment 293); November 1, 1997 (see
Appendix C, amendment 574).§6A1.2.Disclosure of Presentence Report; Issues in
Dispute (Policy Statement)Courts should adopt procedures to provide for the timely disclosure of
the presentence report; the narrowing and resolution, where feasible, of issues
in dispute in advance of the sentencing hearing; and the identification for the
court of issues remaining in dispute. Rule 32(b)(6), Fed. R. Crim. P.CommentaryApplication Note:1.Under Rule 32, Fed. R. Crim. P., if the court intends to consider a
sentence outside the applicable guideline range on a ground not identified as a
ground for departure either in the presentence report or a pre-hearing
submission, it shall provide reasonable notice that it is contemplating such
ruling, specifically identifying the grounds for the departure. Burns v. United
States, 501 U.S. 129, 135-39 (1991).Background: In order to focus the issues prior to sentencing,
the parties are required to respond in writing to the presentence report and to
identify any issues in dispute. Rule 32(b)(6)(B), Fed. R. Crim. P.Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.
Amended effective June 15, 1988 (see Appendix C, amendment 59); November
1, 1991 (see Appendix C, amendment 425); November 1, 1997 (see
Appendix C, amendment 574).§6A1.3.Resolution of Disputed Factors (Policy
Statement)(a)When any factor important to the sentencing determination is
reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to
present information to the court regarding that factor. In resolving any
dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the
court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility
under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information
has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.(b)The court shall resolve disputed sentencing factors at a sentencing
hearing in accordance with Rule 32(c)(1), Fed. R. Crim. P.CommentaryIn pre-guidelines practice, factors relevant to sentencing were often
determined in an informal fashion. The informality was to some extent explained
by the fact that particular offense and offender characteristics rarely had a
highly specific or required sentencing consequence. This situation no longer
exists under sentencing guidelines. The courts resolution of disputed
sentencing factors usually has a measurable effect on the applicable
punishment. More formality is therefore unavoidable if the sentencing process
is to be accurate and fair. Although lengthy sentencing hearings seldom should be necessary,
disputes about sentencing factors must be resolved with care. When a dispute
exists about any factor important to the sentencing determination, the court
must ensure that the parties have an adequate opportunity to present relevant
information. Written statements of counsel or affidavits of witnesses may be
adequate under many circumstances. See, e.g, United States v.
Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1991). An evidentiary hearing may sometimes
be the only reliable way to resolve disputed issues. See, e.g,
United States v. Jimenez Martinez, 83 F.3d 488, 494-95 (1st Cir. 1996)
(finding error in district courts denial of defendants motion for
evidentiary hearing given questionable reliability of affidavit on which the
district court relied at sentencing); United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d
502, 521(10th Cir. 1993) (remanding because district court did not hold
evidentiary hearing to address defendants objections to drug quantity
determination or make requisite findings of fact regarding drug quantity);
see also, United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.9
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). The sentencing court
must determine the appropriate procedure in light of the nature of the dispute,
its relevance to the sentencing determination, and applicable case law.In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not
U.S.C. § 3661; see also United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct.
633, 635 (1997) (holding that lower evidentiary standard at sentencing permits
sentencing courts consideration of acquitted conduct); Witte v. United
States, 515 U.S. 389, 399-401 (1995) (noting that sentencing courts have
traditionally considered wide range of information without the procedural
protections of a criminal trial, including information concerning criminal
conduct that may be the subject of a subsequent prosecution); Nichols v.
United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747-48 (1994) (noting that district courts
have traditionally considered defendants prior criminal conduct even when
the conduct did not result in a conviction). Any information may be considered,
so long as it has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy. Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 637; Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748; United States
v. Zuleta-Alvarez, 922 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 927 (1991); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990). Reliable hearsay evidence may be
considered. United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040 (1994); United States v. Sciarrino,
884 F.2d 95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997 (1989). Out-of-court
declarations by an unidentified informant may be considered where there is good
cause for the non-disclosure of the informants identity and there is
sufficient corroboration by other means. United States v. Rogers, 1 F.3d
341 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Young, 981
F.2d 180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 980 (1993); United States v.
Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1073 (1980). Unreliable allegations shall not be considered. United States
v. Ortiz, 993 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1993).The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence
standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in
resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a
case.Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.
Amended effective November 1, 1989 (see Appendix C, amendment 294);
November 1, 1991 (see Appendix C, amendment 387); November 1, 1997
(see Appendix C, amendment 574); November 1, 1998 (see Appendix
C, amendment 586).PART B - PLEA AGREEMENTSIntroductory CommentaryPolicy statements governing the acceptance of plea agreements under
Rule 11(e)(1), Fed. R. Crim. P., are intended to ensure that plea
negotiation practices: (1)promote the statutory purposes of sentencing prescribed in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (2)do not perpetuate unwarranted sentencing
disparity.These policy statements are a first step toward implementing
28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E). Congress indicated that it expects
judges "to examine plea agreements to make certain that prosecutors have not
used plea bargaining to undermine the sentencing guidelines." S. Rep. 98-225,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 167 (1983). In pursuit of this goal, the Commission
shall study plea agreement practice under the guidelines and ultimately develop
standards for judges to use in determining whether to accept plea agreements.
Because of the difficulty in anticipating problems in this area, and because
the sentencing guidelines are themselves to some degree experimental,
substantive restrictions on judicial discretion would be premature at this
stage of the Commissions work.The present policy statements move in the desired direction in two
ways. First, the policy statements make clear that sentencing is a judicial
function and that the appropriate sentence in a guilty plea case is to be
determined by the judge. This is a reaffirmation of pre-guidelines practice.
Second, the policy statements ensure that the basis for any judicial decision
to depart from the guidelines will be explained on the record. Explanations
will be carefully analyzed by the Commission and will pave the way for more
detailed policy statements presenting substantive criteria to achieve
consistency in this aspect of the sentencing process.Historical Note: Effective November 1,
1987.§6B1.1.Plea Agreement Procedure (Policy Statement)
(a)If the parties have reached a plea agreement, the court shall, on the
record, require disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of
good cause, in camera. Rule 11(e)(2), Fed. R. Crim. P.(b)If the plea agreement includes a nonbinding recommendation pursuant
to Rule 11(e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that the court
is not bound by the sentencing recommendation, and that the defendant has no
right to withdraw the defendants guilty plea if the court decides not to
accept the sentencing recommendation set forth in the plea agreement.(c)The court shall defer its decision to accept or reject any nonbinding
recommendation pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(B), and the courts decision to
accept or reject any plea agreement pursuant to Rules 11(e)(1)(A) and
11(e)(1)(C) until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence
report, unless a report is not required under §6A1.1. CommentaryThis provision parallels the procedural requirements of Rule 11(e),
Fed. R. Crim. P. Plea agreements must be fully disclosed and a defendant whose
plea agreement includes a nonbinding recommendation must be advised that the
courts refusal to accept the sentencing recommendation will not entitle
the defendant to withdraw the plea.Section 6B1.1(c) deals with the timing of the courts decision
whether to accept the plea agreement. Rule 11(e)(2) gives the court discretion
to accept the plea agreement immediately or defer acceptance pending
consideration of the presentence report. Prior to the guidelines, an immediate
decision was permissible because, under Rule 32(c), Fed. R. Crim. P., the
defendant could waive preparation of the presentence report. Section 6B1.1(c)
reflects the changes in practice required by §6A1.1 (Presentence Report)
and amended Rule 32(c)(1). Since a presentence report normally will be
prepared, the court must defer acceptance of the plea agreement until the court
has had an opportunity to consider the presentence report.Historical Note: Effective November 1,
1987.§6B1.2.Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreements
(Policy Statement)(a)In the case of a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of any
charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges [Rule 11(e)(1)(A)], the
court may accept the agreement if the court determines, for reasons stated on
the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of
the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine
the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.However, a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of a charge or a
plea agreement not to pursue a potential charge shall not preclude the conduct
underlying such charge from being considered under the provisions of
§1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in connection with the count(s) of which the
defendant is convicted.(b)In the case of a plea agreement that includes a nonbinding
recommendation [Rule 11(e)(1)(B)], the court may accept the recommendation
if the court is satisfied either that: (1) the recommended sentence is within the applicable guideline range;
or (2) the recommended sentence departs from the applicable guideline
range for justifiable reasons.
(c)In the case of a plea agreement that includes a specific sentence
[Rule 11(e)(1)(C)], the court may accept the agreement if the court is
satisfied either that: (1)the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range;
or (2)the agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for
justifiable reasons.CommentaryThe court may accept an agreement calling for dismissal of charges or
an agreement not to pursue potential charges if the remaining charges reflect
the seriousness of the actual offense behavior. This requirement does not
authorize judges to intrude upon the charging discretion of the prosecutor. If
the governments motion to dismiss charges or statement that potential
charges will not be pursued is not contingent on the disposition of the
remaining charges, the judge should defer to the governments position
except under extraordinary circumstances. Rule 48(a), Fed. R.
Crim. P. However, when the dismissal of charges or agreement not to pursue
potential charges is contingent on acceptance of a plea agreement, the
courts authority to adjudicate guilt and impose sentence is implicated,
and the court is to determine whether or not dismissal of charges will
undermine the sentencing guidelines.Similarly, the court should accept a recommended sentence or a plea
agreement requiring imposition of a specific sentence only if the court is
satisfied either that such sentence is an appropriate sentence within the
applicable guideline range or, if not, that the sentence departs from the
applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons (i.e., that such
departure is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). See
generally Chapter 1, Part A, Subpart 4(b)(Departures).A defendant who enters a plea of guilty in a timely manner will
enhance the likelihood of his receiving a reduction in offense level under
§3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility). Further reduction in offense level
(or sentence) due to a plea agreement will tend to undermine the sentencing
guidelines.The second paragraph of subsection (a) provides that a plea agreement
that includes the dismissal of a charge, or a plea agreement not to pursue a
potential charge, shall not prevent the conduct underlying that charge from
being considered under the provisions of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in
connection with the count(s) of which the defendant is convicted. This
paragraph prevents a plea agreement from restricting consideration of conduct
that is within the scope of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in respect to the
count(s) of which the defendant is convicted; it does not in any way expand or
modify the scope of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Section 5K2.21 (Dismissed
and Uncharged Conduct) addresses the use, as a basis for upward departure, of
conduct underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement in the case,
or underlying a potential charge not pursued in the case as part of a plea
agreement.The Commission encourages the prosecuting attorney prior to the entry
of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to disclose to the defendant the facts and
circumstances of the offense and offender characteristics, then known to the
prosecuting attorney, that are relevant to the application of the sentencing
guidelines. This recommendation, however, shall not be construed to confer upon
the defendant any right not otherwise recognized in law.Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.
Amended effective November 1, 1989 (see Appendix C, amendment 295);
November 1, 1992 (see Appendix C, amendment 467); November 1, 1993
(see Appendix C, amendment 495); November 1, 2000 (see Appendix
C, amendment 604).§6B1.3.Procedure Upon Rejection of a Plea Agreement
(Policy Statement)If a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(A) or Rule 11(e)(1)(C) is
rejected, the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the
defendants guilty plea. Rule 11(e)(4), Fed. R. Crim. P.CommentaryThis provision implements the requirements of Rule 11(e)(4). It
assures the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea when the court has
rejected a plea agreement that would require dismissal of charges or imposition
of a specific sentence.Historical Note: Effective November 1,
1987.§6B1.4.Stipulations (Policy Statement)(a)A plea agreement may be accompanied by a written stipulation of facts