Source: http://openjurist.org/478/f3d/1332/united-states-v-v-evans
Timestamp: 2017-08-22 09:54:54
Document Index: 69648246

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3559', '§ 2332', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 2332', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 3559', '§ 16']

478 F3d 1332 United States v. V Evans | OpenJurist
478 F. 3d 1332 - United States v. V Evans
478 F3d 1332 United States v. V Evans
First, we examine whether there was a sufficient factual basis for Evans' guilty plea as to the first and second counts of the indictment. Next, we ask whether the district court conducted a sufficient inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), to allow Evans to represent himself at sentencing. Finally, we evaluate the application of the § 3559(c) enhancement to a conviction under § 2332a(a)(3) for threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction against federal government property.
Id. at 1019 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original). Furthermore, "a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea." United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 2340, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004).
The government concedes, and we agree, that § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i) does not encompass threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction against federal property, given that this crime does not appear in the list of applicable offenses. The first half of subpart (F)(ii) does not apply in this case either because the offense to which Evans pled guilty does not have "as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) (emphasis added). Under the offense charged, the only force threatened was against property, not against a person.9 See § 2332a(a)(3). Consequently, we focus on the second half of subpart (F)(ii) and decide whether threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction against federal property "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). Because the risk of physical harm presented by threatening a federal building with anthrax is "not the natural outcome of an illegal use of force," Johnson, 399 F.3d at 1301 (discussing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004)), we hold that threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction against federal property is not a "serious violent felony" within in the meaning of § 3559(c)(2)(F).
We find support for this approach in the Supreme Court's analysis in Leocal, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") and causing serious bodily injury in an accident, in violation of Florida law, is not a "crime of violence" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16. Id. at 10, 125 S.Ct. at 382. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien may be deported if he is convicted of an aggravated felony, which includes certain "crimes of violence" as defined in § 16. In Leocal, the Supreme Court considered whether DUI properly fits into the category of offenses described in § 16(b)—i.e., "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." Cf. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) (using virtually identical language to define a serious violent felony).11 The Court explained that § 16(b) "simply covers offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against another in committing an offense." Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10, 125 S.Ct. at 383 (emphasis added).