Source: http://www.homesteadpropertyexemption.info/florida-exemptions-laws-statutes-2/homestead-exemption-cases-101.html
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 06:18:24
Document Index: 645374463

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 7', '§ 6', 'Art. 7', '§ 4', '§ 196', 'Art. 7', '§ 6', '§ 196', 'Art. 7', '§ 6', '§ 196', 'Art. 7', '§ 6', '§ 196', 'Art. 7', '§ 9', '§ 192', '§ 2702', '§ 196', '§ 196', '§ 196', '§ 196', 'Art. 7', '§ 1', '§ 320', '§ 196', '§ 196', '§ 14', 'art. 16', '§ 16', 'art. 7', '§ 3', '§ 196', '§ 200', 'art. 9', '§ 13', '§ 200', 'art. 9', '§ 1', '§ 200', 'art. 9', '§ 1', 'art. 10', '§ 7', '§ 192', 'art. 10', '§ 7', 'art. 10', '§ 7', 'art. 10', '§ 7', 'art. 10', '§ 7', 'art. 10', '§ 7', '§ 192', '§ 199', 'art. 10', '§ 7', '§ 192', 'art. 10', '§ 7', '§ 87', '§ 192', 'art. 10', '§ 7', 'art. 10', '§ 1', 'art. 10', '§ 1', '§ 192', 'art. 10', '§ 1', '§ 16', '§ 16', 'art. 10', '§ 7', '§ 192', 'art. 10', '§ 7', '§ 443', 'art. 10', '§ 1', 'art. 9', '§ 14', 'art. 16', '§ 16', 'art. 10', '§ 7', 'art. 10', '§ 7', 'art. 1', '§ 10', '§ 8', 'art. 10', '§ 7', 'art. 1', '§ 10', 'art. 10', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 2', 'art. 14', '§ 1', 'art. 9', '§ 11', '§ 731', 'Art. 10', '§ 4', 'Art. 10', '§ 4', 'Art. 10', '§ 4', 'Art. 10', '§ 4', 'Art. 10', '§ 4', '§ 732', 'Art. 10', '§ 4', 'Art. 10', '§ 1', '§ 222', 'art. 10', '§ 1']

Homestead Exemption Cases
#1 | Posted: 20 Oct 2006 21:43
Homesteads are partially exempt from taxes under constitution. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 7, § 6.
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Powell v. Markham, 847 So.2d 1105
Fla.App.4.Dist.,2003
Entitlement to homestead exemption, for purposes of seeking application of cap limiting annual increase in tax assessment of homestead property, was not limited to homeowners that actually applied for and were granted homestead exemption, but included all homeowners who qualified for homestead exemption, and thus homeowners who sought application of Save Our Homes cap to increase in assessed value of their home in that year were entitled to cap, even though they did not file initial homestead application until after statutory deadline. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 7, § 4(c); West's F.S.A. § 196.011.
Prewitt Management Corp. v. Nikolits, 795 So.2d 1001
Fla.App.4.Dist.,2001
Residential property owned by subchapter S corporation was not entitled to homestead exemption from ad valorem taxation, where S corporations were not on list of corporate entities that qualified for exemption, statute granting exemption was not ambiguous, and legislature's intent to limit homestead exemption for corporations to owners of condominiums and cooperative apartments was clear. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 7, § 6(a); West's F.S.A. §§ 196.031, 196.041.
City of Pembroke Pines v. McConaghey, 728 So.2d 347
Fla.App.4.Dist.,1999
Real property with a homestead exemption is exempt from tax to the extent of the homestead exemption; however, a special assessment may be levied against homestead property regardless of the exemption.
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Lisboa v. Dade County Property Appraiser, 705 So.2d 704
Fla.App.3.Dist.,1998
State's homestead tax exemption is not a constitutional right. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 7, § 6.
But the designation of homestead regarding forced sale is!
Denial of homestead tax exemption to immigrant permanently residing under color of law (PRUCOL) did not violate immigrant's equal protection right; all immigrants with PRUCOL status were deemed ineligible for exemption. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
Applicant for political asylum whose application is pending as of relevant taxing date is a "permanent resident" for purposes of state's homestead exemption from ad valorem taxation. West's F.S.A. §§ 196.012(17, 18), 196.031(1).
Crain v. Putnam, 687 So.2d 1325
Fla.App.4.Dist.,1997
Taxpayer was entitled to homestead exemption for totally and permanently disabled persons, even though taxpayer was in nursing home and not physically present in house, where taxpayer was involuntarily taken from her house to hospital, taxpayer could not communicate any intention regarding her residence due to her physical condition, taxpayer's furniture, clothing and most of her other possessions remained in house and taxpayer continued to receive mail at house. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 7, § 6(a); West's F.S.A. § 196.101.
Appleby v. Nolte, 682 So.2d 1140
Fla.App.4.Dist.,1996
Taxpayers' country club memberships represented "intangible personal property," constitutionally exempt from ad valorem taxation, rather than real property, and such memberships, thus, could not be included in assessed value of taxpayers' homes, even though home sold with agreement to transfer membership would generally command higher price. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 7, § 9(a); West's F.S.A. § 192.001(11)(b).
Robbins v. Welbaum, 664 So.2d 1
Fla.App.3.Dist.,1995
Taxpayers who placed their permanent residence in qualified personal residence trust (QPRT), which is provision in Internal Revenue Code which allows homeowners to transfer property to their children while avoiding future estate taxes, were entitled to homestead exemption, even though QPRT limited taxpayers' use of residence to earlier of ten years from QPRT's creation or one of taxpayer's death, as it was sufficient that taxpayers owned beneficial title to residence during year in which they claimed exemption. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2702; West's F.S.A. §§ 196.031, 196.041.
There is no minimum time period during which homestead exemption claimant must hold interest in property before being deemed to hold beneficial title to property for homestead exemption purposes. West's F.S.A. §§ 196.031, 196.041.
Markham v. John Knox Village of Florida, Inc., 547 So.2d 1044
Fla.App.4.Dist.,1989
Statute creating indirect homestead exemption for the elderly requires only that 75% of the occupants in a retirement village be over the age of 62 or totally disabled, not that they hold fee simple title to their residential units in the village, in order for the units to qualify for an exemption from ad valorem tax. F.S.1985, § 196.1975(8)(a).
For purposes of homestead exemption from ad valorem tax for the elderly, a long-term rental contract was created by the financial requirements for residence in retirement village and the provision entitling residents to live in the village for the rest of their lives, in spite of language in the long-term care agreement stating that it did not create a lease. F.S.1985, § 196.1975(8)(a).
Warren, Jones & Warren, Inc. v. Property Appraisal Adjustment Bd. of Metropolitan Dade County, 532 So.2d 86
Fla.App.3.Dist.,1988
Portion of concrete pump truck used to pump concrete at construction site was not exempt from ad valorem tax as motor vehicle; however, chassis portion of truck was exempt. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 7, § 1(b); West's F.S.A. § 320.01(1)(a).
Kay v. Clark, 487 So.2d 30
Fla.App.4.Dist.,1985
Household goods and personal effects located in state were not subject to ad valorem taxes, regardless of residency of property owners.
Alcime v. Bystrom, 451 So.2d 1037
Fla.App.3.Dist.,1984
An alien without a permanent visa cannot, under the prevailing interpretation of the applicable statute, prove an intention to become a permanent resident of the state for purposes of a homestead exemption from ad valorem taxes even though he has resided in the United States for over 20 years, has resided in the state for ten years, and has been employed in local government for over six years. West's F.S.A. § 196.012(16, 17).
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Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Dist., 341 So.2d 498
Fla.,1976
Automobile racetrack operated by corporate taxpayer for profit on property leased from legislatively created racing and recreational facilities district did not enjoy tax exempt status as a matter of contractual right, notwithstanding that the city agreed to levy no tax upon leasehold estate created by lease between city and district, where city was without authority to bind legislature, and lease between city and district evinced no attempt to exercise such authority ultra vires; moreover, leasehold which was assessed as nonexempt was leasehold created by lease between district as lessor and corporation as lessee as opposed to leasehold created by lease between city as lessor and district as lessee. West's F.S.A. §§ 196.001, 196.012(5), 196.199(2)(a); Laws 1971, c. 71-133, § 14; Laws 1973, c. 73-647; Const.1885, art. 16, § 16; West's F.S.A.Const. art. 7, §§ 3(a), 10(c).
Horne v. Markham, 288 So.2d 196
Fla.,1973
Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So.2d 72
Term "widow" as used in statute granting widows a tax exemption could not be judicially defined to include a man who has lost his wife where legislative intent limited application of term only to woman who lost her husband by death. F.S.A. § 196.191(7).
Hughes v. Dickinson, 196 So.2d 917
Fla.,1966
House trailers held on dealer's lot for resale were not exempt from tangible personal property taxes, under circumstances.
Palethorpe v. Thomson, 171 So.2d 526
Fla.,1965
Language of statutory provisions purporting to exempt trailers used for housing accommodations for which license tax has been paid from ad valorem tangible personal property tax is insufficient to bring house trailers eo nomine within "motor vehicle" classification constitutionally exempt per se from such ad valorem tax. F.S.A. §§ 200.01 et seq., 200.45, 320.081; F.S.A.Const. art. 9, § 13.
Whether particular house trailer is exempt from ad valorem tangible personal property tax is to be determined by county tax assessor pursuant to reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by comptroller and subject to judicial review, and in making such determination, assessor is not confined to particular tax day or date, but should take into consideration all relevant evidence over such period of time during tax year as may be reasonably necessary to determine true character of trailer and its use, either as exempt motor vehicle unit or as nonexempt housing or nontransportation facility. F.S.A. §§ 200.01 et seq., 200.03, 200.40, 200.45, 320.08(8), 320.081; F.S.A.Const. art. 9, §§ 1, 13.
Whether particular trailer is entitled to exemption from ad valorem tangible personal property tax as a motor vehicle unit depends upon the actual primary use or purpose to which trailer has been put, as determined upon consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances. F.S.A. §§ 200.01 et seq., 200.03, 200.40, 200.45, 320.08(8), 320.081; F.S.A.Const. art. 9, §§ 1, 13.
Judd v. Schooley, 158 So.2d 514
Fla.,1963
Juarrero v. McNayr, 157 So.2d 79
Citizenship is not a prerequisite for claiming constitutional homestead tax exemption. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
Alien political refugees residing in United States for indefinite stay by warrant of temporary non-immigrant visas could not rightfully and in good faith make residence purchased by them in Florida their "permanent home" within constitutional provision for homestead tax exemption. F.S.A. § 192.14; F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
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Schooley v. Judd, 149 So.2d 587
Fla.App.2.Dist.,1963
Prerequisite of wife claiming homestead exemption from taxation is a showing of necessity for establishing a residence separate from that of her husband. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
Under constitutional provision granting homestead tax exemption to property resided on and in good faith makes property permanent home, "good faith" is a concrete quality descriptive of the motivating purpose of one's act or conduct when challenged or called into question. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
Wife whose husband conveyed Florida home to her and established his domicile in Washington, D. C., because of requirements of law pertaining to his acting as a corporate director but who continued to reside with her husband in the Florida home was not in good faith making the property her permanent home as required by the homestead tax exemption provision. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
Gautier v. State ex rel. Safra, 127 So.2d 683
Fla.App.3.Dist.,1961
A "dwelling house" within constitutional provision authorizing $5,000 tax exemption therefor is the whole structure of multiple dwelling and exemption was to be apportioned between individual units separated by party walls within multiple-family building, irrespective of their separate ownership. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7; F.S.A. § 192.12.
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Marks v. Green, 122 So.2d 491
Fla.App.1.Dist.,1960
Although stockholders are the beneficial owners of property held by their corporation, and in certain respects the corporation holds title to its property in trust for the benefit of the stockholders, a domestic corporation does not constitute a trust estate within statutory exemption from intangible tax assessment of beneficial interests of state residents in trust estates. F.S.A. § 199.11(2).
Poppell v. Padrick, 117 So.2d 435
Fla.App.2.Dist.,1959
Rule, that temporary absence will not deprive homestead claimant of his right unless it appears that there was a design of permanent abandonment, applies to homestead tax exemption privilege. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7; F.S.A. §§ 192.12 et seq., 192.14.
Whether homestead has been abandoned depends upon intent of tax exemption claimant and is question of fact to be determined in each particular case. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
Actual physical presence on property on January 1 is not necessary in order to claim homestead tax exemption. F.S.A. §§ 87.01 et seq., 192.19.
Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324
Fla.,1956
Where husband and wife on September 1, 1953, were assigned lease containing option to purchase property and exercised option on July 1, 1954, they were not entitled to homestead exemption for tax year 1954, for they did not have legal or equitable title to property on January 1, 1954, when status of title to property determined who was entitled to homestead exemption for tax year 1954. F.S.A. § 192.04; F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
L'Engle v. Forbes, 81 So.2d 214
Fla.,1955
Temporary absence will not deprive homestead claimant of his right, unless it appears that there was a design of permanent abandonment, and such rule applies to homestead tax exemption privilege. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, §§ 1, 4, 7.
Where owners of home involuntarily quit premises because husband was recalled to active duty in armed forces of United States, but the owners rightfully and in good faith considered the vacated premises as their home, to the exclusion of all other places, owners were entitled to tax exemptions for homestead. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, §§ 1, 4, 7; F.S.A. § 192.14.
Member of armed forces of United States did not lose right to homestead tax exemption for 1953 because he did not file claim until October, 1953, and fact that wife was a co-owner of property and was present in city during early part of 1953 did not deprive owners of benefit of statute providing that members of armed forces, unable to file application for homestead tax exemption by reason of military service, should not be deemed to have waived right. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, §§ 1, 4, 7; F.S.A. §§ 16.19, 192.14, 192.16, 192.55, 192.161, and note; Proclamation No. 2714, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix p. XXII.
Even if 1943 statute providing that members of armed forces unable to file application for homestead tax exemption by reason of military service, should not be deemed to have waived right, and that Act shall cease to operate after present hostilities cease, was inadvertently carried forward in the 1951 compilation, it had been re-enacted and was in full force in first three months of 1953 and afforded protection to member of armed forces for 1953, notwithstanding fact that World War II hostilities were declared ended by presidential proclamation in year 1946. F.S.A. §§ 16.19, 192.55.
Wilson v. Florida Nat. Bank & Trust Co. at Miami, 64 So.2d 309
Fla.,1953
Where five acre parcel on which major portion of family house was located had been held by husband and wife as estate by entirety and husband had acquired adjoining 35 acres in own name, but entire 40 acre tract was fenced and occupied by husband, wife and daughter, during lifetime of husband, constitutional exemption from taxation and forced sales could have been claimed by husband on entire forty acres.
Overstreet v. Tubin, 53 So.2d 913
Fla.,1951
Under constitutional provision providing for the exemption of homesteads from taxation and declaring that no such exemption of more than $5,000 shall be allowed to any one person or any one "dwelling house", by use of quoted words the whole structure of a multiple dwelling house, rather than any separate unit, thereof, is meant and therefore each owner of a separate unit is entitled to claim only his proportionate part of the $5,000 tax exemption, based on his proportionate part of the assessed valuation of the entire structure. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
McCullough v. Forbes, 47 So.2d 780
Fla.,1950
Property owner who stored furniture in attic of home and rented it on a month to month basis and lived elsewhere in order to obtain nursing to regain her health and who intended to resume occupancy of house when health permitted was not entitled to homestead tax exemption on such property. F.S.A. § 192.14.
Smith v. Voight, 28 So.2d 426
Fla.,1946
A property owner who was in good faith making the property his home was entitled to homestead exemption under Constitution, notwithstanding that he was not a United States citizen. F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 7.
Florida Indus. Com'n v. Coleman, 18 So.2d 905
Fla.,1944
The owner of an automobile, on which the sheriff levied under a properly docketed general tax warrant issued by the Industrial Commission, was entitled to assert his homestead exemption against such levy in the same manner as he would have had against a levy under an execution issued pursuant to an ordinary judgment in any civil action. F.S.A. §§ 443.01 et seq., 443.15(3); F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 1.
American Can Co. v. City of Tampa, 14 So.2d 203
Fla.,1943
Property is not exempt from tax merely because other property subject to such tax is sufficient to pay entire tax.
Fleischer Studios v. Paxson, 2 So.2d 293
Fla.,1941
Exemption granted by amendment to State Constitution exempting property of motion picture studios from ad valorem taxation for a limited period may be enforced if taxable property of taxing unit is or becomes by growth or increase or otherwise of such annual tax producing value as to meet tax obligations of unit, and exemption does not clearly impair obligation of statutory contract rights in violation of Federal Constitution. Const. art. 9, § 14.
State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 200 So. 100
Under constitutional provision that property of all corporations shall be subject to taxation unless held and used exclusively for municipal and charitable purposes, a "municipal purpose" is no longer restricted to police protection or strictly governmental enterprises, but may comprehend all activities essential to the health, morals, protection, and welfare of the municipality. Const. art. 16, § 16.
Yowell v. Rogers, 175 So. 772
Fla.,1937
Homesteads are taxable for debt service as to bonded indebtedness existing at time of adoption of constitutional amendment exempting homesteads from taxation (Const. art. 10, § 7, adopted in 1934).
Folks v. Marion County, 163 So. 298
Fla.,1935
State constitutional amendment exempting homesteads from taxation could not affect or impair taxing power which had been pledged as security for payment of county bonds which had been issued and were outstanding at time of adoption of amendment, and hence homestead property remained subject to taxation for payment of such bonds which were issued before adoption of amendment. Const.Fla. art. 10, § 7, adopted in 1934; Const.U.S. art. 1, § 10.
Constitutional amendment exempting homesteads from taxation held not to affect county refunding bonds proceeds of which were to be applied to original indebtedness or refunding bonds which were to be exchanged for old bonds, where tax on all property except that which was exempt at time of creation of original indebtedness was pledged for payment of refunding bonds and original indebtedness was outstanding at time of constitutional amendment. Acts 1931, Ex.Sess., c. 15772, §§ 8, 22, 23; Const.Fla. art. 10, § 7, adopted in 1934; Const.U.S. art. 1, § 10.
Steuart v. State ex rel. Dolcimascolo, 161 So. 378
Alien head of family residing on homestead within state held not entitled to constitutional tax exemption for homestead as person who is "citizen of and resides in the State of Florida," such phrase being limited to those who, under federal Constitution, would be entitled to claim citizenship in state, in addition to residing therein (Const. art. 10, § 7, as amended in 1934; Const.U.S.Amend. 14, § 1; Declaration of Rights of Fla., §§ 2, 18; art. 14, § 1).
Hackney v. McKenney, 151 So. 524
Fla.,1933
$500 exemption from taxation to head of family is deductible from total assessed value of household goods and effects (Const. art. 9, § 11, amended in 1930).
McKean v. Warburton, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S613
202k1 k. Nature of estate or right.
Fla.,2005
The public policy furthered by a homestead exemption is to promote the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors who have given credit under such law; to that end, issues of homestead protections have been interpreted broadly by the courts. West's F.S.A. § 731.201.
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Traeger v. Credit First Nat. ****, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D191
Fla.App.5.Dist.,2004
The purpose of the homestead exemption derives from public policy rather than principles of equity to promote the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors who have given credit under such law.
Callava v. Feinberg, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2361
Fla.App.3.Dist.,2003
As a matter of public policy, the purpose of the homestead exemption is to promote the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors who have given credit under such law. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 4.
Southern Walls, Inc. v. Stilwell Corp., 810 So.2d 566
Fla.App.5.Dist.,2002
Concept of homestead will be given different meanings depending on the context in which it is used.
Homestead has significance in the law relating to devise and descent, taxation, and exemption from forced sale.
Partridge v. Partridge, 790 So.2d 1280
The purpose of the homestead exemption is to protect the family, to provide it a refuge from the stresses and strains of misfortune. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 4(a).
Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So.2d 56
Fla.,1992
Constitutional provision exempting homesteads from forced sale was intended to guarantee that homestead would be preserved against any involuntary divestiture by courts, without regard to technicalities of how that divestiture would be accomplished. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 4.
Constitutional provision exempting homestead from forced sale is not limited to debtor-creditor context; purpose of exemption is to protect family and to provide it with refuge from misfortune, without any requirement that misfortune arise from financial debt. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 4.
In re Estate of Melisi, 440 So.2d 584
Fla.App. 4 Dist.,1983
One of purposes of homestead exemption is to benefit head of family so that he may not be deprived of means of supplying necessities of life to his wife and children and those dependent upon him for support. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 4(c).
Holden v. Gardner's Estate, 420 So.2d 1082
Fla.,1982
The concept of homestead property has not been broadened to include property not previously determined to be homestead. West's F.S.A. § 732.4015; West's F.S.A.Const.Art. 10, § 4(c).
Bowers v. Mozingo, 399 So.2d 492
Fla.App. 3 Dist.,1981
Exemption of homestead from forced sale and from having a judgment or execution being a lien thereon differs from homestead exemption, as defined for tax purposes. West's F.S.A.Const.1885, Art. 10, §§ 1, 7.
Hospital Affiliates of Florida, Inc. v. McElroy, 393 So.2d 25
Purpose of homestead exemption is to protect family home from forced sale for debts of the owner and head of the family. West's F.S.A. § 222.19.
Frase v. Branch, 362 So.2d 317
Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1978
Purpose of homestead protections is to preserve home for family, even at sacrifice of just demands, and to protect family from destitution and want.
In re Noble's Estate, 73 So.2d 873
Fla.,1954
The purpose of homestead provisions is simply to shelter the family that lives, or survives.
Collins v. Collins, 7 So.2d 443
Fla.,1942
The purpose of the "homestead" is to shelter the family and provide it a refuge from the stresses and strains of misfortune.
Hill v. First Nat. Bank, 84 So. 190
Fla.,1920
The homestead right is not limited to a mere holding of the legal title to the exempt property "from forced sale," but includes the beneficial and uninterrupted use of such property superior to the claims of creditors; the policy of the law being to preserve the home for the family even at the sacrifice of just demands.
The theory of the law as to homesteads is based on the idea that as a matter of public policy, for the promotion of the state's prosperity and to render citizens independent, one should have a home where his family may be sheltered beyond the demands of creditors who have given credit under such a law.
Johns v. Bowden, 66 So. 155
Fla.,1914
The status of a homestead which Const. art. 10, § 1 et seq., impresses on property does not change the nature of the estate in the property owned by the head of the family, but merely exempts such property from such liabilities and limits the owner's inherent powers of alienation.
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