Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/446/635/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-05-29 01:56:58
Document Index: 749474725

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Gomez v. Toledo :: 446 U.S. 635 (1980) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Gomez v. Toledo
Gomez v. Toledo 446 U.S. 635 (1980)
U.S. Supreme CourtGomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)Gomez v. ToledoNo. 79-5601Argued April 16, 1980Decided May 27, 1980446 U.S. 635CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
The question presented is whether, in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a public official whose position might entitle him to qualified immunity, a plaintiff must Page 446 U. S. 636 allege that the official has acted in bad faith in order to state a claim for relief or, alternatively, whether the defendant must plead good faith as an affirmative defense.
Petitioner Carlos Rivera Gomez brought this action against respondent, the Superintendent of the Police of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, contending that respondent had violated his right to procedural due process by discharging him from employment with the Police Department's Bureau of Criminal Investigation. [Footnote 1] Basing jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), [Footnote 2] petitioner alleged the following facts in his complaint. [Footnote 3] Petitioner had been employed as an agent with the Puerto Rican police since 1968. In April, 1975, he submitted a sworn statement to his supervisor in which he asserted that two other agents had offered false evidence for use in a criminal case under their investigation. As a result of this statement, petitioner was immediately transferred from the Criminal Investigation Corps for the Southern Area to Police Headquarters in San Juan, and a few weeks later to the Police Academy in Gurabo, where he was given no investigative authority. In the meantime respondent ordered an investigation of petitioner's claims, and the Legal Division of Page 446 U. S. 637 the Police Department concluded that all of petitioner's factual allegations were true.
Based on the foregoing factual allegations, petitioner brought this suit for damages, contending that his discharge violated his right to procedural due process, and that it had caused him anxiety, embarrassment, and injury to his reputation in the community. In his answer, respondent denied a number of petitioner's allegations of fact and asserted several affirmative defenses. Respondent then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, see Fed.Rule Civ Proc. 12(b)(6), and the District Court granted the motion. Observing that respondent was entitled to qualified immunity for acts done in good faith within the scope of his official duties, it concluded that petitioner was required to plead as part of his claim for relief that, in committing the actions alleged, respondent was motivated by bad faith. The absence of any such allegation, it held, required dismissal of Page 446 U. S. 638 the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 602 F.2d 1018 (1979). [Footnote 4]
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for "the deprivation of ay rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by any person acting "under color of a.ny statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Footnote 6] This statute, enacted to aid in "the preservation of human liberty and human rights,'" Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 445 U. S. 636 (1980), quoting Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 Page 446 U. S. 639 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger), reflects a congressional judgment that a "damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees," 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 651. As remedial legislation, § 1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose. See 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 636.
Nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983, Page 446 U. S. 640 however, suggests that, in an action brought against a public official whose position might entitle him to immunity if he acted in good faith, a plaintiff must allege bad faith in order to state a claim for relief. By the plain terms of § 1983, two -- and only two -- allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 365 U. S. 171 (1961). Petitioner has made both of the required allegations. He alleged that his discharge by respondent violated his right to procedural due process, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), and that respondent acted under color of Puerto Rican law. See Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 365 U. S. 172-187. [Footnote 7]
Our conclusion as to the allocation of the burden of pleading is supported by the nature of the qualified immunity Page 446 U. S. 641 defense. As our decisions make clear, whether such immunity has been established depends on facts peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the defendant. Thus, we have stated that
Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra at 416 U. S. 247-248. The applicable test focuses not only on whether the official has an objectively reasonable basis for that belief, but also on whether "[t]he official himself [is] acting sincerely, and with a belief that he is doing right," Wood v. Strickland, supra at 420 U. S. 321. There may be no way for a plaintiff to know in advance whether the official has such a belief or, indeed, whether he will even claim that he does. The existence of a subjective belief will frequently turn on factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to know. For example, the official's belief may be based on state or local law, advice of counsel, administrative practice, or some other factor of which the official alone is aware. To impose the pleading burden on the plaintiff would ignore this elementary fact, and be contrary to the established practice in analogous areas of the law. [Footnote 8] Page 446 U. S. 642
A claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 does not require the plaintiff to assert that the pu...	Facts	Gomez was fired by the Puerto Rico Police Department's Bureau of Criminal Investigation. He sued Tol...