Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US20070219917?dq=6,606,102
Timestamp: 2016-07-27 01:19:15
Document Index: 408566064

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 300', 'art 400', 'arts 501', 'art 501', 'art 502', 'art 600']

Patent US20070219917 - Digital License Sharing System and Method - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inPatentsA digital license sharing method, system and apparatus is provided for use in a digital rights management system. Usage rights in respect of digital content are transferred between content player devices or applications by associating with each player a status indication. Transfer is carried out by transmitting...http://www.google.com/patents/US20070219917?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US20070219917 - Digital License Sharing System and MethodAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS20070219917 A1Publication typeApplicationApplication numberUS 10/599,517PCT numberPCT/AU2005/000449Publication dateSep 20, 2007Filing dateMar 29, 2005Priority dateMar 29, 2004Also published asCN101002421A, EP1735939A1, WO2005093989A1Publication number10599517, 599517, PCT/2005/449, PCT/AU/2005/000449, PCT/AU/2005/00449, PCT/AU/5/000449, PCT/AU/5/00449, PCT/AU2005/000449, PCT/AU2005/00449, PCT/AU2005000449, PCT/AU200500449, PCT/AU5/000449, PCT/AU5/00449, PCT/AU5000449, PCT/AU500449, US 2007/0219917 A1, US 2007/219917 A1, US 20070219917 A1, US 20070219917A1, US 2007219917 A1, US 2007219917A1, US-A1-20070219917, US-A1-2007219917, US2007/0219917A1, US2007/219917A1, US20070219917 A1, US20070219917A1, US2007219917 A1, US2007219917A1InventorsQiong Liu, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Nicholas SheppardOriginal AssigneeSmart Internet Tecnoogy Crc Pty LimitedExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (3), Referenced by (186), Classifications (17), Legal Events (2) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetDigital License Sharing System and Method
DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS [0100] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a digital rights management system 100 according to a preferred embodiment of the invention. The system includes two trusted player devices 102, 103, each of which includes a digital library 104, 105, a license database 106, 107 and a secure hardware counter 108, 109. Each player device 102, 103 may be, for example, a portable music player, a digital video player, or a general purpose personal computer with installed software and hardware enabling it to be used to reproduce or display digital content. [0101] Each license database 106, 107 is a conceptual database, such as a file directory, on the respective device, which stores all licenses in a protected form and further includes a transaction track file that maintains a record of transaction flags of these licenses. Each digital library 104, 105 is a digital content repository on the user's device that stores digital items in a protected form. To decrypt and use content, there must be a valid license with a valid transaction flag in the license database 106, 107. Each counter 108, 109 is a secure, monotonically increasing hardware counter that can be used to prevent replay attack. It will be incremented by one each time a license transfer happens. The player is a viewer responsible for content decryption and playback, and for providing an interface with which the user can request/transfer a license from/to another device. [0102] In one exemplary use scenario of the system, the user has acquired a license 110 from a license server and may have stored the license on a home PC, for example. If the user wishes to consume the content on multiple devices 102, 103, the license must be transferred to the appropriate device. Transfer of a license may occur directly between the devices via a network connection such as a TCP/IP LAN, or a wireless connection such as an infrared link or a Bluetooth or 802.11 radio frequency link. Alternatively, transfer of a license may be through the intermediary of a mobile phone or other handheld device with wireless connections. Since the user may carry a mobile phone or other handheld device wherever he goes, using such a device to facilitate license transfer enhances the convenience of the system. [0103] In the license sharing system and method of the invention, reliance is made upon a number of assumptions, as follows: A1. DRM protected content can be copied and distributed to any device. Note that such protected content cannot be consumed if there is no valid license on the device. A2. License transfers take place between two trusted player applications. A player is trusted if it enforces content usage rights with respect to the license. A3. Each trusted player has a public/private key pair and an authentication key. A trusted player's private key and authentication key are securely stored on a secure memory of the user's device, so that the user does not have any knowledge of these keys at any time. A4. The trusted player executes in a secure computing environment, and a malicious user cannot gain the content key and unprotected content when the content is being decrypted. A5. The trusted player application is tamper-resistant, i.e. it is impossible for the user to reverse engineer and tamper the software. A6. There exist secure audio paths between the trusted player and the display card and between the trusted player and I/O card. This assumption ensures that protected content files remain protected until the content reaches the output device. [0110] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the foregoing assumptions are generally satisfied in a number of known devices and systems implementing DRM, and can be achieved using known technologies and methods. Accordingly, these assumptions are not limiting of the present invention. [0111] The system embodiment of FIG. 1 satisfies a number of requirements in transferring a license from the first player 102 to the second player 103, as follows: R1. The digital license must be kept on the user's device in a protected form. This is because the license contains content decryption keys that should be hidden from the user. R2. The license transfer procedure must ensure that only authorised player applications can access the license. A potential threat is that all the nearby devices of a device may get the signal through wireless (or PC) broadcasting when the license is sent out from the device. R3. The license must be protected against unauthorized modification, interception and illegal forgery during transaction. FIG. 2 illustrates one arrangement that a malicious user may try to employ in order to gain unauthorised access to a license. A license is sent from a first device 202 to a second device 204, such as a general purpose PC. The license data is received via the network interface hardware 206, and processed by a network interface device driver software component 208 installed within the operating system of the device 204. An unmodified device driver would pass the license data to the player application 210 without examining or processing its contents. However, the potential threat is that the user may modify the driver software 208 on the device 204 so that the driver 208 may modify or block the received license, or even illegally forge a license. R4. The license transfer procedure must satisfy the atomicity property. Atomicity is: “Either all or none of the transaction's operations are performed. If a transaction is interrupted by failure, then partial changes are undone”. Atomicity in the license transfer procedure is to ensure that only one device has a valid copy of the license at the end of the transfer procedure regardless of any communication failure between two players. [0116] Each of the two trusted player devices 102, 103 in FIG. 1 has a copy of the DRM protected content. A license is to be transferred between the two players. The players manage license transfers and storage. Each device keeps a transaction track file for the purpose of license transfer. Each license known to the player has a corresponding data entry in the track file that contains a transaction flag of the license. Only the player can validate the integrity of the track file using its authentication key and read the records in the file. There are four types of transaction flags for the license: Active, Deactivated, Request and Recover. The meaning of these flags are described as follows: Active: the license can be used by the player to decrypt the content; Deactivated: the licence is deactivated, so the player cannot use it; Request: the license is requested by one player application to another; and Recover: the transaction flag of the license is requested to be set to ‘Active’ by one player application to another. [0121] Each device can have a copy of the license, but only the license with ‘Active’ flag can be used by the player application to decrypt the content. [0122] According to the present example, A and B are two trusted player applications executing on the devices 102 and 103 respectively. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that in a practical implementation of the transfer protocol it will typically be necessary for A and B to establish a suitable communications channel or session prior to commencing the transfer of rights, such as, for example, an authenticated session to ensure that both devices are trusted. [0123] IDL is license L's identifier. Req(A, B, L) is the license request that application B sends to A for license L. T is a timeout value of the protocol. FIG. 3 shows a flow chart 300 of the steps completed in an exemplary license transfer scenario. Prior to the transfer, the initial conditions 302 are as follows: license L is stored on the hard disk of the device 102 on which application A executes; the transaction flag for L is ‘Active’; and A and B have established a suitable communications channel as described above. Application B executing on player 103 requests the ‘Active’ license L from A: [0124] Step 304: B→A: Req(A, B, L), B writes (IDL, ‘Flag=Request’) [0125] Steps 306, 308: If Req(A, B, L)=valid, A writes (IDL, ‘Flag=Deactivated’) (step 306), A→B: L (step 308); Else, A quits after timeout (T). [0126] Step 310: If L is valid, B stores L and writes (IDL, ‘Flag=Active’); Else, B quits after timeout (T). [0127] In step 304, B writes (IDL, ‘Flag=Request’) as the entry for L in its transaction track file. The transaction flag ‘Flag=Request’ reflects the current transaction state of L, that is, that application B has requested the active license. At this time L's entry in the transaction track file on application A's device 102 is (IDL, ‘Flag=Active’). [0128] In step 306, A receives and verifies the license request from B. If the request is found to be valid, A writes (IDL, ‘Flag=Deactivated’) as the entry for L in its transaction track file, and in step 308 sends license L to B. Here, ‘Flag=Deactivated’ indicates that the license cannot be used any more, although L is still physically kept on A's device, i.e. A will refuse to use L to decrypt the content if A finds that L is marked as deactivated in the transaction track file. If A does not receive Req(A, B, L) within time T after establishing a suitable communications channel or the verification fails, A quits the transaction. [0129] In step 310, B receives and verifies L from A. If L is found to be valid, B stores L and sets the transaction flag for L as ‘Active’, i.e. the entry for L in B's transaction track file becomes (IDL, ‘Flag=Active’). Otherwise, if the verification fails or B does not receive the license from A within time T after sending Req(A, B, L), B quits the transaction. Application B may then attempt to request the license again, starting from step 304. [0130] Preferably a license recovery protocol is implemented that is similar to the license transfer procedure. FIG. 4 shows a flow chart 400 of the steps completed in a license recovery scenario. Prior to recovery, the initial conditions 402 are as follows: both A and B have a copy of the licence L on their hard disks; and the transaction flag for L is ‘Active’ on B's device, but is ‘Deactivated’ on A's device. A requests that L's transaction flag on its device to be set to ‘Active’. [0131] In this procedure, at step 404 instead of writing (IDL, ‘Flag=Request’), A writes (IDL, ‘Flag=Recover’) as the entry for L in its transaction track file after sending license recovery request to B. The transaction flag ‘Recover’ indicates that L is physically stored on A's hard disk but cannot be used, and A requests the ‘Active’ flag for L from B. At step 406, after B receives and verifies A's license recovery request, it will set the transaction flag for L on its device from ‘Active’ to ‘Deactivated’, and at step 408 will send a respond message to A. B will not be able to use the license. At step 410, the entry for L in A's transaction track file will become (IDL, ‘Flag=Active’), so L can then be used by A to decrypt the content. [0132] It is to be noted that the difference between the license recovery procedure and the license request procedure is that in license recovery, A already has a copy of the license L that is known by A to be valid, and thus it is not necessary for B to send L to A, or for A to verify the license. [0133] In known DRM implementations, a license contains content usage rules and the content key. When the license is distributed from the license server to the user's device, the content key should not be transferred in clear text. Usually, the license issuer encrypts the content key with the public key of the player on the user's device. Each player application has a unique public/private key pair, thus each license is generated uniquely for a specific player on the user's machine. For example, in the DRM scheme described in the document Architecture of Windows Media Rights Manager published by Microsoft Corporation, 2003, the protected content key and usage rights are grouped in a license that is signed by the license issuer with its private key. This is to ensure that the license has not been tampered with and to prove that the license was purchased from the issuer. [0134] The disadvantage of this scheme is that the license can only be used by the player application to which it was issued. In order to consume the content on a different player, the user must request or purchase a further license. In at least preferred embodiments, the present invention provides a license structure that may be employed to avoid this disadvantage, and thus enable the direct transfer of a license between devices. [0135] The trusted player has a public key PUB_P and corresponding private key PRI_P. The license issuer has a public key PUB_I and corresponding private key PRI_I. The license issuer generates a license L that includes metadata for the content and the content key CK encrypted with player's public key and usage rules, and then signs the license with its private key. That is, the issuer generates a signed license as follows: Signed L=L∥S PRI — I(L) L=Metadata∥E PUB — P(CK)∥Usage Rules where S( ) is a signature algorithm, E( ) is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, and ‘∥’ denotes concatenation. The signed license may then be delivered to the trusted player over a public channel. [0136] However, a potential problem arises if the above approach is used to encrypt the content key and construct the license. Suppose that A and B are two trusted player applications. Their public keys can be denoted as PUB_A and PUB_B respectively. Player A has the license L containing encrypted content key EPU — A(CK) signed by the issuer I using PRI_I. A is to transfer the license to B. [0137] Before the transfer procedure, A needs use its private key to decrypt the encrypted content key and then re-encrypt the content key using player B's public key. That is, A must generate EPUB — B(CK) and use it to replace EPUB — A(CK) in L so that B can decrypt and get the content key once the license is transferred from A to B. The problem in this scenario is that the license integrity will be compromised, because of the change in the encrypted content key part in the license is from EPUB — A(CK) to EPUB — B(CK). When player B checks the integrity of the license according to the license issuer's signature, the verification will fail, since when the license was signed it contained EPUB — A(CK). [0138] A new license structure is therefore proposed for use with preferred embodiments of the invention. FIG. 5 illustrates schematically a license 500 according to a preferred embodiment in which the license is split into two parts 501, 502. The first part 501 of the license 500 is a validated portion that includes: a cryptographic hash 504 of the encrypted content, the hash value 506 of the content key, the usage rules 508, and metadata 510. The second part 502 of the license 500 is an unvalidated portion that includes the content key encrypted with the public key of the player application 514. The first part of the license is digitally signed 512 by the issuer to enable its integrity and authenticity to be verified. The reason for constructing the license in this way is to prevent usage rules from unauthorized modification and to ensure that the issuer's signature will work properly when the content key is encrypted with another player's public key during license transfers. [0139] The question arises as to what happens in the case of a dispute when the user claims that the license issuer put the wrong content key in the license? To avoid such dispute, the hash function is preferably one-way, collision-free and pre-image resistant, so it would be very unlikely that the license issuer will generate two content keys with the same hash value. [0140] When a player receives the license, it will: verify the signature 512 of the first part of the license; verify the hash 504 of the content; decrypt the encrypted content key 506 using its private key; and pass the value of the key to the hash function. If the computed result is the same as the hash value 506 contained in the license, the player will accept the license. Otherwise, the license will be rejected and the player will contact the license server for license reissue. If the license is accepted but the key cannot be used to decrypt the content, the license issuer needs to reissue the license that contains the correct content key. [0145] To uniquely identify a license, a licence identifier 516 may be included in the first part of the license. Before decrypting the content, the player needs to find the corresponding entry in the transaction track file, which may be done by using the unique license identifier 516 as a key in the track file. If the transaction flag of the license is ‘Active’, the player will be permitted to use the content key to decrypt the content. [0146] FIG. 6 shows a flow chart 600 of an exemplary procedure followed by a device or application A for creating a second digital license for use by another device or application B, wherein both licenses are based upon the new license structure 500 illustrated in FIG. 5. At step 602, A obtains the content key CK by decrypting EPUB — A(CK) using its corresponding private key PRI_A. The hash value of CK, Hash(CK), is computed at step 604, and is then compared with the value of Hash(CK) 506 stored within the validated portion 501 of the license 500. Once the validity of CK has been verified in this way, at step 608 A encrypts CK using B's public key PUB_B, and stores the resulting value, EPUB — B(CK) within the unvalidated portion 502 of a copy of the license that is to be transmitted to B. [0147] The second license generated according to the process 600 may then be verified, used, and regenerated by B in exactly the same manner as the original license is used by A. [0148] The discussion now turns to a more detailed description of the format of the transaction track file. The transaction track file keeps a record of the current transaction state of the licenses on the user's machine. When the license is delivered to the user's device for the first time, the player application will write an entry for the license to the track file if the license integrity is verified. [0149] To prevent track entries from undetectable manipulation or deletion, in the exemplary embodiment a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is attached to the file based on a secret key held by the player. Each license must have a unique entry in the track file that contains the transaction flag of the license. Every time the player updates a track entry, it increments the secure monotonic counter, e.g. 108, 109, and includes the counter value in the MAC with the file. If the license is physically deleted from the hard disk, its track entry will be deleted and the MAC will be updated automatically. If the license is physically stored on the hard disk of the device but there is no track entry for that license, the player will detect unauthorised deletion of the track entry and refuse to transfer the license to another device. [0150] FIG. 7 illustrates the format of an exemplary track file entry 700, including a unique license identifier 702, a transaction flag 704, and a timestamp 706 that is maintained to reflect the last time the entry 700 was updated. [0151] If the license identifier 702 in the track entry 700 matches with the license identifier 516 in a license, then the track entry corresponds to the license. In the exemplary embodiment described herein there are four types of transaction flags: ‘Active’, ‘Deactivated’, ‘Request’ and ‘Recover’. The timestamp 706 records the time when a transfer of the corresponding license last occurred, and hence is the time at which the transaction flag was last updated. [0152] A MAC based on a secret key is used to prevent unauthorised tampering of the track file. In the exemplary embodiment, the player's authentication key is used for MAC computation. Suppose that the authentication key is K and TI (i=1, 2, . . . , n) is the ith entry of the track file, then the value of the MAC is: MAC=H(K∥CounterValue∥T 1 ∥T 2 ∥ . . . ∥T n) where H( ) is a one-way hash function and ∥ denotes concatenation. [0153] The transaction track file is different from an audit log as described in the literature of the art. According to the definition of “log” provided in M Ruffin, A Survey of Logging Uses, University of Glasgow (Scotland), Fide2 Report 94-82, February 1994, “a log is an append-only write store and is a plain file where data are stored sequentially as they arrive”. In the exemplary embodiment, there is only one entry in the track file for a license with a specific license identifier. When the license is distributed to the user's device for the first time, the player will create a new data entry for the license. The transaction flag for this license will be set to ‘Active’. When a license transfer happens, the player will read the license identifier in the transferred license first and then search for the position of the entry for the license in the track file according to the identifier. The player will update the transaction flag and the timestamp of the license in the track entry after the license has been transferred to another device. [0154] The security properties of the preferred embodiment of the invention are analysed below by reference to the requirements R1-R4. [0155] Requirement R1 is satisfied, i.e. content keys in the licenses are kept in encrypted form on the user's device. Only the player application can decrypt encrypted content key using its private key. [0156] Requirement R2 is satisfied. Unauthorised player applications will not be able to gain access to a license through wireless or PC broadcasting, or through any other form of eavesdropping of the communications links between devices or applications, because the content key in the license is sent to an authorised recipient B in an encrypted form using B's public key. Only B has the knowledge of the corresponding private key and thus only B is able to decrypt the encrypted content key. [0157] Requirement R3 is satisfied. Unauthorised modification, forgery and interception of the license can be prevented, because the integrity of the usage rules can be verified according to the issuer's digital signature in the license. [0158] Requirement R4 is satisfied. After a license transfer procedure takes place, only one device has the license with ‘Active’ flag. This property is analysed for a number of specific cases of license transfer from player application A to player application B, as follows. [0159] Case 1: There is no communication problem between A and B. Exchanged messages are not disrupted by an attacker. [0160] The protocol runs successfully. At the end of the license transfer, only B possesses the license, and has a corresponding track file entry with the ‘Active’ flag. [0161] Case 2: A fails to receive the license request from B in step 2. [0162] The protocol aborts after time out T. B does not obtain the license. L is still kept on A's device. The transaction entry for L on A's device is unchanged. [0163] Case 3: B fails to receive the license from A in step 3. [0164] The protocol aborts after time out T. The transaction flag for L in the track file on A's device is marked as deactivated, so A cannot use L any more. However, B can get the license from A through a negotiation procedure, i.e. B sends the licence request to A again, starting from step 1. This licence request needs to include the current transaction flag of L in the track file on B, which should be ‘Request’. A will check the license request in the negotiation procedure. Since L is still physically stored on A's device, A will send L to B again if the verification is successful. Finally, B will get license L and set the transaction flag for L as ‘Active’, so that B cannot send a valid license request to A again. [0165] Moreover, the inventive system can prevent replay attack. Suppose that a malicious user has some licenses with ‘Active’ flag on his device. The user may take a snapshot of the current state of the track file, perform one or more license transfers to another device and finally restore the snapshot, removing all records that reflect license transactions since the snapshot. However, the player is able to detect this attack because the secure counter is incremented once for each transfer. Upon the user restoring the snapshot of the track file, the counter cannot be restored by the user to its value prior to the transactions. Accordingly, the calculated MAC value will be inconsistent with the restored MAC value, due to the changed counter value. 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2007ASAssignmentOwner name: SMART INTERNET TECHNOLOGY CRC PTY LIMITED, AUSTRALFree format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE ASSIGNEE S ADDRESS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 018950 FRAME 0738;ASSIGNORS:LIU, QIONG;SAFAVI-NAINI, REIHANEH;SHEPPARD, NICHOLAS PAUL;REEL/FRAME:020184/0257;SIGNING DATES FROM 20061019 TO 20061212RotateOriginal ImageGoogle Home - Sitemap - USPTO Bulk Downloads - Privacy Policy - Terms of Service - About Google Patents - Send FeedbackData provided by IFI CLAIMS Patent Services