Source: https://openjurist.org/119/f3d/8/united-states-v-moreland
Timestamp: 2019-12-16 12:34:39
Document Index: 4687453

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 922', '§ 841', '§ 922', '§ 3742']

119 F3d 8 United States v. Moreland | OpenJurist
119 F. 3d 8 - United States v. Moreland
119 F3d 8 United States v. Moreland
Randall Elsworth MORELAND, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 96-30164.
Argued and Submitted April 8, 1997
Randall Moreland appeals his sentence imposed following his guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), and possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). Moreland was sentenced to 180 months in prison, a $1,900 fine, and 6 years on supervised release. Moreland argues: 1) the district court improperly sentenced him at the high end of the guideline range; 2) his plea agreement should be set aside because he was not advised he could be treated as a career offender; 3) the district court did not recognize its discretion to depart downward; 4) he was not competent to plead guilty; and 5) the district court improperly failed to determine whether the charged narcotic was 1- or d-methamphetamine.
A four-count indictment charged Moreland and co-defendant White with manufacturing and possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), using and/or carrying a firearm during a drug crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c). On December 1, 1995, Moreland pled guilty to three counts: manufacturing methamphetamine; possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute; and being a felon in possession of a gun.
II. Sentence Within Applicable Range
A sentence within the applicable range must have been imposed in violation of law for this court to review the district court's sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1); United States v. Khaton, 40 F.3d 309, 311 (9th Cir.1994). Here, based on an offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI, Moreland's guideline imprisonment range was 151 to 188 months' imprisonment. Moreland does not argue that the district court imposed the sentence "in violation of law." The district court's decision to sentence Moreland within the guideline range cannot be reviewed by this court.
Moreland contends that his plea agreement should be set aside because the court did not advise him that he could be treated as a career offender. When construing a plea agreement the court looks to a defendant's reasonable understanding of the terms of the plea agreement when he entered the plea. United States v. Serrano, 938 F.2d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir.1991). A guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970). A district court must advise a defendant of the "mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1); Brady, 379 U.S. at 748-49. There is no requirement that before entering a plea the defendant be informed of the applicable offense level or criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Turner, 881 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).
Here, the plea agreement specifically informed Moreland that the maximum possible penalty of life imprisonment and/or a $4,000,000 fine for Counts 1, 2, and 4 could be imposed. The plea agreement also stated the mandatory minimum statutory penalties which were applicable to Counts 1 and 2. At the change of plea hearing on December 1, 1995, the court again informed Moreland that for the purposes of the plea he should "assume the worst case scenario, which is that it could be thirty years." The court went on to inform Moreland of both the statutory maximum and minimum penalties. The court also instructed Moreland that under the Sentencing Guidelines, if he had a prior criminal conviction, it might serve to increase his sentence. Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, the court had no duty to inform Moreland that he might be classified as a career offender. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c); United States v. Oliveros-Orosco, 942 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir.1991) (defendant may not withdraw guilty plea even though neither defense nor prosecution contemplated that he would be sentenced as a career offender).
A district court's discretionary refusal to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines is not reviewable on appeal as long as the court in fact exercised its discretion. United States v. Robinson, 958 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir.1992). Here, the district court concluded:
V. Mental Competency
For the first time, Moreland alleges on appeal that his low intelligence and bipolar affective disorder rendered him incompetent to plead guilty. When a defendant raises an issue on appeal not raised before the district court, the court of appeals may review for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
VI. Offense Level Computations