Source: http://openjurist.org/96/f3d/517
Timestamp: 2015-07-29 03:04:14
Document Index: 444746492

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 841', '§ 924', '§ 846', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 841', '§ 3', '§ 3742', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2']

96 F3d 517 United States v. Miranda-Santiago | OpenJurist
96 F. 3d 517 - United States v. Miranda-Santiago Home
96 F3d 517 United States v. Miranda-Santiago 96 F.3d 517
UNITED STATES, Appellee,v.Juan Jose MIRANDA-SANTIAGO, Defendant-Appellant.UNITED STATES, Appellee,v.Carmen PACHECO-RIJOS, a/k/a Fina, Defendant-Appellant.UNITED STATES, Appellee,v.Ismael RIVERA-DeCELIS, a/k/a Macho, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 95-1301, 95-1302 and 95-1304.
Heard April 2, 1996.Decided Sept. 19, 1996.
Edward E. Parson, Washington, DC by Appointment of the Court, on brief for appellant Juan Jose Miranda-Santiago.
Norberto Coln by Appointment of the Court, for appellant Carmen Pacheco-Rijos.
Harry R. Segarra, Puerto Neuvo, PR by Appointment of the Court, for appellant Ismael Rivera-DeCelis.
Miguel A. Pereira, Assistant United States Attorney, Hato Rey, PR, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief, for appellee.
In this consolidated appeal, we consider challenges to the sentences of Ismael Rivera-DeCelis, Carmen Pacheco-Rijos and Juan Jose Miranda-Santiago. In September of 1994, these defendant-appellants, along with twenty-one co-defendants, pled guilty to participation in a drug distribution conspiracy spanning over a year and involving trafficking in crack cocaine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, as well as using or brandishing firearms, and engaging in carjacking to facilitate their drug trade.
Ismael Rivera-DeCelis contends that his guilty plea was entered in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that the district judge erred in calculating his sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. He did not press the first point below. We find that the plea colloquy in his case conformed with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 and that the sentence calculations with respect to him were not in error. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
Carmen Pacheco-Rijos challenges her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum required for her offense. Her attack is based on her claim that she met the conditions set forth in the "safety valve provision" of the Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. We find the record inadequate to justify the district court's decision not to grant relief. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand the case for the purpose of allowing the district court to revisit this issue and to clarify the record by filing supplemental findings. In the event that the court finds its initial calculation in error, it should so identify and return, as well, to the issue of other adjustments, if appropriate, under the Guidelines.
Juan Jose Miranda-Santiago also attacks his sentence, arguing that the sentencing court erred, as a matter of law, by failing to grant a two-level downward adjustment based on a finding that the defendant was a "minor participant" in the criminal activity. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). We find inadequate support in the record for the court's conclusion that a downward adjustment was inappropriate. We vacate this sentence and remand the case to the district court for the purpose of having the court file supplemental findings with respect to appellant Miranda-Santiago's role in the offense. In the event that the court finds its computation in error, it should include such a determination in its findings.
On March 9, 1994 a grand jury returned an indictment against 19 defendants, including appellants Pacheco-Rijos and Miranda-Santiago, charging them with conspiracy to distribute drugs, and with using firearms in connection with a drug offense. Apparently, the conspirators hid drug substances, firearms and proceeds of drug sales in specific locations, guarded by members of the conspiracy. Members of the conspiracy were also encouraged to commit--and committed--"carjacking" offenses; armed, they would steal cars and then use the vehicles to transport drugs back to their storage locations.
A. Ismael Rivera-DeCelis
Appellant Rivera-DeCelis was alleged to have been involved in several phases of the drug conspiracy detailed in the superseding indictment. He was charged in Count One with distributing not less than fifty grams of cocaine base, an amount of not less than five kilograms of cocaine, an amount of not less than one kilogram of heroin, and some amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. Counts Three, Four and Five charged him with possessing and brandishing various firearms in connection with his drug trafficking, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
After an initial plea of not guilty, on September 8, 1994, Rivera-DeCelis offered to change his plea to guilty to Count One's charge that he acted in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and Count Three's charge that he acted in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The plea agreement was entered into under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(c).2 It provided that the defendant would be held accountable at sentencing for the distribution of no less than 15 but no more than 50 kilograms of cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of 34. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). The parties also agreed that the defendant was entitled to a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(1) & (2), reducing his offense level to 31. The parties further defined the term of imprisonment: In light of the ten year mandatory minimum sentence facing Rivera-DeCelis under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), and a criminal history category of III, they stipulated to a 139 month term of confinement on Count One to be followed by a 60 month term on Count Three.3
Turning to the factual basis of the charges, the judge asked Rivera-DeCelis whether the defendant was "recognizing [his guilt] ... for the drug conspiracy participation and also for the weapons or firearms count," and whether he acknowledged the punishment he could face. Rivera-DeCelis answered in the affirmative to both questions.5
The district judge did not accept the defendant's characterization of his involvement and rejected his challenge. The judge noted that the benefits of this plea agreement to the defendant were substantial, since, for instance, no amount of crack cocaine was attributed to the defendant, a drug "which all of them were dealing ... without a doubt." Accordingly, the court adopted a base offense level of 34 and granted the defendant a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Based on a criminal history category of III, Rivera-DeCelis was sentenced on the drug charge to a prison term of 139 months, at the lower end of the guideline range,6 to be followed by a term of 60 months on the firearms charge. The remaining charges against Rivera-DeCelis were dismissed.
a. Challenge to the Guilty Plea
A defendant does not enjoy an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty, once it has been entered. United States v. Isom, 85 F.3d 831, 834 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783, 786 (1st Cir.1991); Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 & 32(e). Where a defendant does not seek to withdraw his plea before the district court and challenges its validity only on appeal, he or she faces a high hurdle: The challenge can succeed only if the defendant demonstrates that there was a substantial defect in the Rule 11 proceeding itself.8 United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 613-14 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1118, 130 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1995); see also United States v. Japa, 994 F.2d 899, 902 (1st Cir.1993);9 United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588 (1st Cir.1991);10 accord United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 94, 133 L.Ed.2d 49 (1995); Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e).
As to the validity of the Rule 11 proceeding below, appellant Rivera-DeCelis rests his argument on two points: (1) his limited education and ability to understand the written word, because of his dyslexia; and (2) the district court's failure to ensure that Rivera-DeCelis actually had read the superseding indictment under which he was charged. The government argues that the appellant's Rule 11 challenge--at this late hour--is wholly without merit.
The core concerns of Rule 11 require that the defendant be instructed in open court with respect to the "nature of the charge to which the plea is offered," Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1), and that a plea " 'cannot be considered truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.' " United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 762, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)); Piper, 35 F.3d at 614.
In the case before us, the district judge addressed Rivera-DeCelis personally, directly, and with careful questions designed to ensure that defendant actually understood the proceedings. The judge specifically explained both the elements of each offense and the factual accusations against the defendant. As he walked Rivera-DeCelis through these aspects of the case against him, the judge inquired--at each turn--whether Rivera-DeCelis subjectively understood the situation. The district judge also made sure that Rivera-DeCelis in fact grasped the consequences of his plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). Only after assuring himself that Rivera-DeCelis understood the charges, the facts that formed their bases and the consequences of his plea, did the district judge ask Rivera-DeCelis to attest to the facts to which he was pleading guilty.12
b. Sentencing Challenge: Relevant Conduct
We review the district judge's quantity determinations at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Jimenez Martnez, 83 F.3d 488, 492 (1st Cir.1996); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).
Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, where a defendant engaged in "jointly undertaken criminal activity," he or she may be sentenced for his or her own acts and "all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of [that] ... activity." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) & comment n. 1. In the context of drug trafficking offenses, where sentences are driven largely by the amount of drugs for which a defendant is held accountable, "the base offense level of a co-conspirator ... should reflect only the quantity of drugs he reasonably foresees is the object of the conspiracy to distribute after he joins the conspiracy." United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1026 (1st Cir.1992); see also United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 982 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1556, 134 L.Ed.2d 657 (1996); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (drug quantity table).
It is well settled that defendants in a drug conspiracy are not only responsible for drug quantities which they themselves sold, transported or negotiated; they are also responsible for drug amounts which, from their particular vantage points in the conspiracy, it was reasonably foreseeable would be involved, and which were in fact involved, in the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Carrozza,