Source: http://openjurist.org/454/f3d/1295/united-states-v-poyato
Timestamp: 2013-05-19 18:26:45
Document Index: 157794132

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553']

454 F3d 1295 United States v. Poyato | OpenJurist
454 F. 3d 1295 - United States v. Poyato	Home454 f3d 1295 united states v. poyato
454 F3d 1295 United States v. Poyato 454 F.3d 1295
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant,v.Fernando POYATO, Plaintiff-Appellee.
On appeal, the Government argues that the district court erred in finding that the jury's acquittal as to a firearm count of the indictment precluded it from denying Poyato a safety-valve reduction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. The Government argues that, despite the jury's finding, the district court had the authority to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Poyato possessed a firearm. The government notes that, in fact, the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Poyato possessed a firearm, and, as a result, the Government argues that Poyato was not eligible for a safety-valve reduction. The Government argues that, both before and after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the district court may consider acquitted conduct in sentencing, and the proper evidentiary standard is a preponderance, not beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government notes that the instant sentencing was conducted post-Booker. The Government reasons that because Booker rendered the guidelines advisory, there is no constitutional or statutory error in finding sentencing factors by a preponderance. The Government notes that the district court found, by a preponderance, that Poyato possessed a firearm for purposes of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) on "more than one occasion," but applied a different standard with regard to the § 5C1.2(a)(2) safety-valve. As a result, the Government argues that Poyato must be re-sentenced to the statutory minimum term of 60 months.
When reviewing a district court's safety-valve decision, "we review for clear error a district court's factual determinations. . . [and] de novo the court's legal interpretation of the statutes and sentencing guidelines." United States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1301 (11th Cir.2004). We have held that, "as was the case before Booker, the district court must calculate the Guidelines range accurately." United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir.2005). "Safety-valve relief allows for sentencing without regard to any statutory minimum, with respect to certain offenses, when specific requirements are met." United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir.2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)); see also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. One of those requirements is that the defendant did not "use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm. . . in connection with the offense." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2).
Nor does any other provision of law require that the five prerequisites be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and its progeny teach that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. However, nothing in § 3553(f) purports to designate any statutory maximum sentence. Rather than fixing a statutory maximum, the clear intent of § 3553(f) is to provide a limit on the applicability of minimum mandatory sentences in certain cases. The heading of the section reveals this clear intent: "Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimums in Certain Cases." United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 835 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 1391-92, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947), and noting that headings can be used as an aid in statutory construction). More significantly, the language of the section reveals the same clear intent— providing that if the sentencing judge finds the five prerequisite factors, then the sentence is to be imposed "without regard to any statutory minimum sentence." Thus, the clear intent of the statute has nothing to do with designating any statutory maximum sentence, but rather has to do with eliminating the applicability of minimum mandatory sentences.1 See United States v. Holguin, 436 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir.2006) (rejecting similar argument because § 3553(f) findings do not increase the minimum sentence but relate only to the applicability of a mandatory minimum sentence); United States v. Morrisette, 429 F.3d 318, 324-25 (1st Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Payton, 405 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir.2005) (same).
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