Source: http://openjurist.org/714/f2d/1038
Timestamp: 2017-06-26 21:01:37
Document Index: 309936484

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1451', '§ 1427', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1101']

714 F2d 1038 United States v. Sheshtawy | OpenJurist
714 F. 2d 1038 - United States v. Sheshtawy HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 714 F.2d.
714 F2d 1038 United States v. Sheshtawy 714 F.2d 1038
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Adel SHESHTAWY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 81-1430.
This case is squarely governed by principles established in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 81 S.Ct. 147, 5 L.Ed.2d 120 (1960). There, the Supreme Court held that the government carries a heavy burden when it seeks to revoke citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976) for the willful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.1 For a fact to be "material," the government must "show by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship." Id. at 355, 81 S.Ct. at 150.
Id. at 357, 81 S.Ct. at 151 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). This test, however, was the one espoused by the Chaunt dissent and rejected by the majority.
In Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981), the Court avoided reviewing a similar construction of the Chaunt test by the Fifth Circuit, see United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 951-52 (5th Cir.1979), by choosing to resolve the case on a different theory, see 449 U.S. at 508-16, 101 S.Ct. at 748-52. In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Blackmun carefully reviewed the Chaunt test and concluded that it requires that the government demonstrate the existence of actual disqualifying facts--facts that themselves would have warranted denial of petitioner's citizenship. Id. at 523-26, 101 S.Ct. at 755-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring).3 While there has been substantial disagreement over the meaning of Chaunt,4 its characterizations by Justice Blackmun appear to us to be correct, and until Chaunt as thus interpreted has been rejected or overturned by the Supreme Court, we must follow it.
The government alternatively argues that revocation is justified because the appellant did not meet all of the statutory prerequisites to naturalization. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506, 101 S.Ct. at 747. Only "a person of good moral character" is eligible for naturalization, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1976), and "one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter" cannot be found to be a person of good moral character, id. § 1101(f)(6). Since the appellant lied to gain naturalization benefits,5 the government argues that he was not of good moral character and therefore ineligible for naturalization.
We believe, however, that in denaturalization proceedings, section 1101(f)(6) applies only to false testimony concerning material facts. In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court construed a section of the Displaced Persons Act, providing that any person who made a willful misrepresentation in order to gain benefits under that Act--i.e., admission to the United States--should thereafter not be admissible, to apply only to material misrepresentations. 449 U.S. at 507, 101 S.Ct. at 747. The Court simply noted that materiality is required to revoke citizenship for concealments or misrepresentations under section 1451(a) and asserted that "[l]ogically, the same principle should govern the interpretation of this provision of the DPA." Id. at 507 n. 28, 101 S.Ct. at 748 n. 28. The wording of section 1101(f)(6) closely tracks that of the statute in Fedorenko, and the context within which we are construing the statute--that is, denaturalization of a citizen--and the interests at stake are the same. We therefore conclude that Fedorenko compels reading a materiality requirement into section 1101(f)(6) when it is invoked for denaturalization purposes.6
The remaining question is the legal standard for materiality under section 1101(f)(6). Although the Court in Fedorenko refrained from deciding whether the Chaunt test for materiality applied to misrepresentations on visa applications, it reaffirmed the test's applicability to determine the materiality of misrepresentations on citizenship applications. 449 U.S. at 508-10, 101 S.Ct. at 748-49. Thus, Chaunt is the controlling authority for materiality decisions under section 1101(f)(6), and the government's case under this section must fail for the reasons set out ante at 1040-1041.7
It is incongruous that Sheshtawy should be rewarded for his dishonesty. If Sheshtawy had answered the question truthfully and informed the authorities that he had been recently arrested on a charge of concealing stolen goods, such disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship. Such meets the second test in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 81 S.Ct. 147, 5 L.Ed.2d 120 (1960), as I read that case. I would affirm the trial court.
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1976). The Court has read both the willfulness and materiality requirements as applying to both concealments and misrepresentations. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 493, 101 S.Ct. 737, 740, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981).
Justice Stevens' view of the Chaunt test substantially coincides with that of Justice Blackmun. He reads Chaunt as requiring that disclosure would have led to an investigation, that a disqualifying circumstance actually exist, and that it would have been discovered in the investigation. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 537, 101 S.Ct. at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, although the Court declined to follow what is essentially the version of Chaunt for which the government argues on this appeal, only two of the justices specifically rejected it; and Justice White was the only one who embraced it, id. at 528, 101 S.Ct. at 758 (White, J., dissenting)
Compare La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir.1974) with United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833, 84 S.Ct. 50, 11 L.Ed.2d 63 (1963)
Both the Second and Third Circuits have refused to read a materiality requirement into § 1101(f)(6); however, both of those cases involved naturalization, not denaturalization, proceedings so that the important interest of the naturalized citizen in retaining his or her citizenship was not implicated. See Kovacs v. United States, 476 F.2d 843, 845 (2d Cir.1973); In re Haniatakis, 376 F.2d 728, 730 (3d Cir.1967). They are therefore inapposite in the denaturalization context
Our resolution makes it unnecessary for us to decide whether lying on a citizenship application without any accompanying oral representation to a court or naturalization examiner constitutes "false testimony" under § 1101(f)(6). Compare Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir.1981) (lying on application is not "testimony"), with Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850, 851 (7th Cir.1959) (lying on application assumed to be "testimony")