Source: http://ilw.com/immigrationdaily/cases/2002,0206-Cervantes.shtm
Timestamp: 2017-01-17 13:09:12
Document Index: 648582927

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1326', '§ 301', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 301', '§301', '§309', '§301', '§309', '§309', '§ 16', '§ 16', 'art. 1', '§ 8', '§ 301', '§ 1401', '§ 12', '§ 1401', '§ 309', '§ 1409', '§ 1326']

ILW.COM - Guns for Aliens
No. 01-50200
Roberto Cervantes-Nava, a/k/a Roberto Nava Cervantes, a/k/a Roberto Cervantes-Nova,	Defendant-Appellant.
Before Jolly, Smith, and Benavides,	Circuit Judges.
The district court found Roberto Cervantes-Nava guilty of illegally re-entering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and imposed an increase of sixteen in his base offense level for a driving while intoxicated ("DWI") conviction. Because, in this criminal case, the federal courts cannot alter the derivative citizenship requirements of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA") to grant Cervantes-Nava citizenship, we affirm the conviction despite his equal protection challenge. Because this court recently has concluded that Texas DWI is not an aggravated felony, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Cervantes-Nava argues that the government cannot carry its burden of proving his alien status by relying on the denial of citizenship under immigration statutes that he claims are unconstitutional. The premise of Cervantes-Nava's argument is correct--alien status counts as an element of the illegal re-entry charge that the United States must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.5 As proof, the government presented copies of the 1965 denial of citizenship and the immigration judge's 1993 order deporting Cervantes-Nava.6 Cervantes-Nava does not challenge a single fact underlying these orders and concedes that the derivative citizenship statues at the time of his birth made him an alien rather than a citizen.
We will assume, arguendo, the unconstitutionality of the derivative citizenship statutes and will consider whether that assumed unconstitutionality would disprove the alienage element of the illegal re-entry conviction. That hypothetical inquiry leads us to conclude that if a court found the derivative citizenship statutes unconstitutional, it either would sever the more lenient residency requirement for citizen mothers of illegitimate children or would strike down the INA in its entirety. Neither remedy would result in Cervantes-Nava's being granted citizenship. Because any judicial interpretation of the INA would classify him as an alien, the government has met its
burden of proving his alien status even if the derivative citizenship statutes are unconstitutional.7
Theoretically, a court would have two severance options to cure the equal protection problems of which Cervantes-Nava complains.9 A court (1) could sever the stringent, default parental residency requirement of § 301(a)(7) and expand citizenship to both
legitimate and illegitimate children under § 309(c) or (2) could sever the more lenient
parental residency requirement of § 309(c) and apply the more stringent, default requirement of § 301(a)(7) to both legitimate and illegitimate children.(0
The first option, however, would not cure the constitutional defect, because severance of §301(a)(7) would not suffice to eliminate the unconstitutional distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, given that §309(c) specifically confers benefits on children born "out of wedlock." For these benefits to be extended to legitimate children, we not only have to sever §301(a)(7), but also would have to rewrite §309(c). We decline to engage in legislative draftsmanship of this sort.11
Thus, if a court were to use severance to cure the unconstitutionality, it would simply sever §309(c) and leave the rest of the statute intact. Such a construction would not result in Cervantes Nava's obtaining citizenship.
The district court, under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), enhanced Cervantes-Nava's base offense level
by sixteen for a Texas state DWI conviction. We review statutory and guideline interpretations de novo. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 2001). While this case was on appeal, we held in another case that Texas DWI is not a crime of violence or an aggravated felony under § 16(b). Id. at 923-28. Changes in sentencing law between sentencing and appeal that benefit the defendant require us to reverse and remand for resentencing. United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 445 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 410 (2001). The district court should recalculate Cervantes-Nava's sentence without the sixteen-level enhancement.
The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The judgment of sentence is VACATED and REMANDED for
1. The Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause does not apply to Cervantes-Nava, because he was not "born or naturalized in the United States." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Any right to citizenship must be granted by Congress pursuant to its powers under U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8. cl. 4 (granting Congress the power "To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization"). 2. The parties agree that the law in effect at the time of Cervantes-Nava's birth should govern his alien status. United States v. Gomez-Orozco, 188 F.3d 422, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1999) (looking to law at time of birth).
3. INA § 301(a)(7), Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 236 (June 27, 1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7)(1952)), granted citizenship at birth to
[A] person born outside the geographical limits of the United States or its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen
Congress amended this statute effective in 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 12, 100 Stat. 3655, 3657 (Nov. 14, 1986). The current version tracks the same language but requires that the citizen parent spend a total of five years in the United States and at least two years in the United States after age fourteen. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994). The current version favors unwed mothers, but favors them
less than did the version in effect at the time of Cervantes-Nava's birth. 4. INA § 309(c), 66 Stat. at 238-39 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c)(1952)), established residency requirements for the unwed citizen mothers of illegitimate children born abroad:
5. The statute criminalizing illegal re-entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, repeatedly uses the word "alien," and the Ninth Circuit has inferred that the United States must prove alien status as an element. United States v. Marin Cuevas, 147 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1998). In dictum, we have listed alien status as an element of the crime. United States v. Cabrera-Teran, 168 F.3d 141, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1999).
6. The government does not argue that these administrative decisions, standing alone, should establish Cervantes-Nava's alien status. We decline to decide the case on this ground. Giving the administrative decisions such sweeping preclusive effect would raise serious constitutional questions, because neither the 1965 application for citizenship nor the 1993 deportation proceeding included the full range of constitutional rights available in a criminal trial. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839 & n.15 (1987) (refusing
to grant preclusive effect to deportation hearing because aliens lacked opportunity for meaningful judicial review).
7. Naturally, this means that we do not need to address the constitutional issue.
8. Courts may not grant citizenship directly under their equitable powers. INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883-84 (1988) ("More fundamentally, however, the power to make someone a citizen of the United States has not been conferred upon the federal courts, like mandamus or injunction, as one of their generally applicable equitable powers."); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 517 (1981) (citation omitted) ("Once it has been determined that a person does not qualify for citizenship, . . . the district court has no discretion to ignore the defect and grant citizenship."); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474 (1917) ("An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this nation can rightfully obtain them only upon the terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without the authority to sanction changes or modifications."). Thus, the only potential remedy in this case would be to grant citizenship indirectly through statutory construction--either via severance or by striking down the statute altogether.
9. Outside the immigration context, courts often sever parts of statutes to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. E.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-91 (1979). Courts have the power to sever parts of the INA as well. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983) (severing one-house veto from remainder of the INA). It remains uncertain, however, whether courts may sever portions of the INA in a manner that expands citizenship. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, __, 121 S.Ct. 2053, 2065 (2001) (reserving the question whether
courts may sever portions of the INA to expand citizenship). 10. A court sustaining an equal protection claim has "two remedial alternatives: [It] may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion." Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 (1984) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
11. Courts should select the severance option most compatible with the statute's original text and structure, because severance is based on the assumption that Congress would have enacted the remainder of the law absent the severed portion. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992). For example, we cannot sever portions of the statute where "the provisions are inseparable by virtue of their inherent character." Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 322 (1936).