Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/787/477/197423/
Timestamp: 2019-06-26 08:33:50
Document Index: 405586477

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5861', '§ 371', '§ 5861', '§ 2', '§ 5861', '§ 5861', '§ 5845', '§ 5845', '§ 5845', '§ 5845', '§ 5845', '§ 5845', '§ 844', '§ 5845', '§ 5845', '§ 5848']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jessie Buchanan, Defendant-appellant, 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1986 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jessie Buchanan, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jessie Buchanan, Defendant-appellant, 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986)
The defendant, Jessie Buchanan, timely appeals his conviction for manufacture and possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) & (f);1 and for conspiracy to commit these offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). We affirm.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred: (1) by failing to dismiss the entire jury panel after it was exposed to prejudicial remarks by a venireman and denying a mistrial; (2) by allowing the Government to attack the defendant's character during its case-in-chief; (3) by failing to dismiss the indictment due to an Assistant United States Attorney's misstatements of law to the grand jury that returned the indictment; (4) by failing to order a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence; (5) by improperly admitting hearsay testimony under the co-conspirator exception of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) (E); (6) by refusing to strike Kathy Bunch's testimony after she admitted discussing the case with other witnesses who had been sequestered under Fed.R.Evid. 615; (7) by allowing a Government witness to testify regarding a legal conclusion that the explosive device was a "firearm" requiring registration; and (8) by failing to order a mistrial due to prosecutorial and judicial misconduct.
During voir dire of the jury, the court asked a panel member whether he "kn [e]w of any reason [he] couldn't be fair and impartial in this matter." Tr. 38. He answered "yes," explaining as follows: "In the last five years my mobile home has been vandalized three times and I have had real estate burned." Tr. 38. There was some laughter by spectators. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing at the bench that prejudice from the remarks was irreparable. The trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial, excusing the venireman for cause and admonishing the remaining panel members to disregard his statement. Tr. 39.
Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination of the qualifications of jurors will not be disturbed. E.g., United States v. Wilburn, 549 F.2d 734, 739 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mason, 440 F.2d 1293, 1298 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883, 92 S. Ct. 219, 30 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1971). We do not think a showing of abuse of discretion has been made here. The venireman's remark did not constitute an opinion on the defendant's guilt or the veracity of anyone involved in the case. See United States v. Teqzes, 715 F.2d 505, 508 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Vargas-Rios, 607 F.2d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1979). The trial judge admonished the other panel members to disregard the remark. See United States v. Warren, 594 F.2d 1046, 1049 (5th Cir. 1979). Under these circumstances, we think the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial.2
Evidence regarding prior misconduct, other than that charged, is inadmissible to show that the defendant had a criminal disposition. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b);4 see Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76, 69 S. Ct. 213, 218, 93 L. Ed. 168 (1948). The rule does not require exclusion, however, when the evidence is also probative of the defendant's motive or intent. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); see, e.g., United States v. Haskins, 737 F.2d 844, 848 (10th Cir. 1984). The court relied on this exception in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct. Tr. 575. We think the ruling was within the trial court's discretion.
The trial court was also justified in holding that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. See United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1984) (evidence admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) must also satisfy balancing test contained in Fed.R.Evid. 403). The threats against Ms. Huffman had substantial probative value, for they had some relevance to the defendant's alleged solicitation of Elrod. See United States v. Naranjo, 710 F.2d 1465, 1468 (10th Cir. 1983) (evidence that defendant previously beat ex-wife properly admitted in murder prosecution); United States v. Bufalino, 683 F.2d 639, 647 (2d Cir. 1982) (extortion threat properly admitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104, 103 S. Ct. 727, 74 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1983). The prior misconduct occurred within one year of the fire.5 See United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983) (misconduct occurring over three years earlier not too remote), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845, 104 S. Ct. 146, 78 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1983). Further, the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence was relevant only insofar as it shed light on the defendant's "intent, motive, knowledge, plan, absence of mistake or accident." Tr. 575. We think the admonition alleviated any danger that the jury would consider the evidence as relevant to the defendant's criminal disposition.
The statement by Elrod in the truck about the money paid by the defendant is perhaps questionable as not, at that point, being shown to be in furtherance of the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the circumstances point in that direction and we conclude that the evidence as a whole supports the findings made and the admission of Elrod's statements complained of in accordance with the procedure of United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979). Moreover, we feel there is no substance to the argument that the conspiracy found by the judge as a basis for application of the co-conspirator exception, under Rule 801(d) (2) (E), must be a "federal conspiracy." See United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 131 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021, 102 S. Ct. 1719, 72 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1982); see also United States v. Magnuson, 680 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that hearsay declarations were properly admitted under Rule 801(d) (2) (E) where evidence linked co-defendants to arson conspiracy). The rationale for the co-conspirator hearsay exception would apply without such special proof that a "federal conspiracy" had been demonstrated. See United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 770-71 (10th Cir. 1975). In sum, we reject the objections to the statement made by Elrod.
Whether the nature of a particular device is such that it must be registered is an ultimate fact question. See United States v. Homa, 608 F.2d 407, 409 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Markley, 567 F.2d 523, 527 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951, 98 S. Ct. 1578, 55 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1978); United States v. Kiliyan, 456 F.2d 555, 557 (8th Cir. 1972); Bryan v. United States, 373 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1967). Officer Tilley's testimony is not objectionable simply because it goes to an "ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Fed.R.Evid. 704; see United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1981). Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the testimony would "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Fed.R.Evid. 702. Such a determination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See United States v. Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1984). The question before the jury involved the consideration of a particular homemade device against an array of statutory definitions.6 Under such circumstances, the courts have admitted this sort of testimony.7 United States v. McCauley, 601 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Bryan v. United States, 373 F.2d 403, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1967).
The defendant argues, however, that Officer Tilley's testimony constituted an improper legal conclusion. While unadorned legal conclusions are impermissible, see Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1971), courts have allowed the expression of expert opinions on ultimate issues of fact. See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1981). Experts are allowed to testify that certain drugs come within a particular statutory classification, see United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 187, 188 (6th Cir. 1975), and that certain expenses are deductible under the federal tax laws, see United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905, 102 S. Ct. 1751, 72 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1982).
The trial judge in the instant case did not feel that the Rule or any cases prohibited the witnesses from discussing their testimony among themselves. The court was in error. While such a prohibition is not within the Rule's explicit wording,9 we have held that it is necessary to prevent a circumvention of the Rule. United States v. Johnston, 578 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931, 99 S. Ct. 321, 58 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1978); United States v. Prichard, 781 F.2d 179, 183 (10th Cir. 1986). We explained in Johnston that "a circumvention of the Rule does occur where witnesses indirectly defeat its purpose by discussing testimony they have given and events in the courtroom with other witnesses who are to testify." We further explained in Johnston that Rule 615 has changed the law and makes exclusion demandable as of right, instead of being merely discretionary with the trial court. 578 F.2d at 1355; see also 3 Weinstein's Evidence 615-16, with stated exceptions as to certain persons.
The defense attorney objected, stating in open court that the question did not accurately reflect "the state of facts in this case." He added that " [t]his interview was given to the prosecuting office many, many months ago." Tr. 520. The prosecutor protested the remark, and defense counsel asked to approach the bench. The trial judge responded: "No, you don't need to do that, you've been coming up here too much. Now you just make your objection, and I know how to rule on these things without coming up here. If that's true, then you may question him about it on your direct examination." Tr. 520.
We conclude that the prosecutor's questioning of Gatlin was not designed to mislead the jury. See United States v. Pinto, 755 F.2d 150, 153 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1307 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934, 97 S. Ct. 1558, 51 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1977)); United States v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 868 (10th Cir. 1984). The prosecutor was simply eliciting from Gatlin an admission that he had not submitted to cross-examination prior to trial. The questioning did not refer to Gatlin's sworn statement or suggest recent fabrication. Even though the question had implied that the prosecutor was learning about Gatlin's story for the first time, defense counsel's statement in open court effectively rebutted that notion. Under these circumstances, we do not think the Government's questioning was prejudicial. See United States v. James, 728 F.2d 465, 467-68 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 106, 83 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1984); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377, 383 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929, 79 S. Ct. 315, 3 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1959).
Similarly, we find no impropriety in the actions of the trial judge in question. The defendant points to the trial judge's two admonitions about the numerous bench conferences. The second remark was made at the bench and, hence, could not have influenced the jury. See United States v. Worthington, 698 F.2d 820, 827 (6th Cir. 1983).
Nor do we attach any significance to the first remark. The comment was brief and did not indicate a belief in the defendant's guilt. See United States v. Shelton, 736 F.2d 1397, 1404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 185, 83 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1984). Similarly, we do not believe that the statement reflected a bias against defense counsel, for the judge had earlier denied a prosecutorial request for a bench conference in similar fashion. Tr. 266.
We find no substance to the claim of error. Such an attempt to prevent trial by attacking alleged legal errors in the grand jury proceedings is generally rejected. An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S. Ct. 406, 408, 100 L. Ed. 397 (1956); United States v. Addington, 471 F.2d 560, 568 (10th Cir. 1973). The remedy of dismissal of indictment is an extraordinary one applied to insure proper standards of conduct by the prosecution. An indictment may be dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct so flagrant that there is some significant infringement on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment. United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523, 530 (10th Cir. 1983).
Finally, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. With respect to this claim, we must examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the Government to determine whether there is evidence, direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences, from which a jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Yates, 470 F.2d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1972).
Arguably, the testimony showed the existence of two conspiracies: that the defendant Buchanan and Elrod initially agreed that Elrod would burn Huffman's trailer and be paid for this job, and then that Elrod and Omstead conspired to manufacture and possess an unregistered firearm. Defendant says that taking the evidence in the best light for the Government, as to the defendant Buchanan, there was only a showing of a conspiracy to commit arson in violation of the Oklahoma Statutes (21 O.S.1981 Secs. 421(A) (1) and 1402), but not of conspiracy to commit the federal offenses of manufacturing and possessing an unregistered firearm. See United States v. Poulos, 667 F.2d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Jordan v. United States, 370 F.2d 126, 128 (10th Cir. 1966) ("gist of a criminal conspiracy is an agreement to violate a law of the United States"), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033, 87 S. Ct. 1484, 18 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1967).
We disagree. We feel that the two agreements constituted but one basic conspiracy. The attempted distinction between the two agreements is misleading, for the three men had the one basic objective of burning Huffman's trailer. Tr. 125-30, 236-37. The use of an explosive was merely one facet of the scheme. Moreover, even if the defendant did not agree to the method, he remains an integral member of the conspiracy. See United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1382 (10th Cir. 1978). In United States v. Johnson, 645 F.2d 865, 868 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1981), we stated:
See also Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557, 68 S. Ct. 248, 256, 92 L. Ed. 154 (1947) (conspiracy conviction does not require proof that defendant knew all of its details).
We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions on the substantive counts. The Government bore the burden of proving that the defendant knowingly manufactured and possessed an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) & (f) (1982); see United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 1117, 28 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1971).
Since the defendant did not personally handle the device, the Government proceeded on a theory by its proof that the defendant induced or procured the commission of the offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982) (" [w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or ... induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal"). We feel that the proof was sufficient under this theory to support the substantive convictions. The evidence showed the actions of defendant Buchanan in inducing and procuring the criminal venture, and we have noted the evidence which would support an inference of his realizing that there would be a destructive device used. See United States v. Poulos, 667 F.2d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1982) ("common knowledge that gasoline is highly combustible and capable of exploding"); United States v. Beldin, 737 F.2d 450, 453-54 (5th Cir. 1984) ("common knowledge ... that gasoline, when ignited, not only burns but may explode").11 VII
This statute provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person ... (d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record; or ... (f) to make a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter...." 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) & (f) (1982)
We addressed a similar situation in United States v. Wilburn, 549 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1977). In Wilburn, a prospective juror stated during voir dire that his wife had been victimized by arson and that the defendant had been released although the judge and both lawyers knew that he was guilty. The trial court excused the individual and admonished the panel to disregard his statement. Id. at 738. We held that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to strike the entire panel. Id. at 739
The National Firearms Act prohibits the manufacture or possession of an unregistered "firearm." 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) & (f) (1982); see supra note 1. The term "firearm" is defined in Sec. 5845. Subsection (a) states that the term includes any "destructive device." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1982). Subsection (f) defines the term "destructive device." It includes "any explosive [or] incendiary ... (A) bomb, (B) grenade, ... or (F) similar device," as well as "any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a destructive device ... and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f) (1982). This subsection contains a caveat: "The term 'destructive device' shall not include any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon...." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f) (1982)
Federal officers have given this type of testimony in other cases involving statutory classifications of firearms. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 712 F.2d 941, 942 (4th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (Government expert testified that the alleged weapon was a "machine gun" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)); United States v. Neal, 692 F.2d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1982) (law enforcement officer with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms testified that the alleged weapons were "firearms" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)); United States v. Hernandez, 668 F.2d 824, 829 (5th Cir. 1982) (Customs Service Agent identified the alleged weapon as a "machine gun" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)); United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381, 1389 (11th Cir. 1981) (Government's expert testified that the alleged weapon was an "explosive" under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)); United States v. Markley, 567 F.2d 523, 525 (1st Cir. 1977) (officer with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms testified that the alleged weapons were "explosive bombs" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951, 98 S. Ct. 1578, 55 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1978); United States v. Peterson, 475 F.2d 806, 809-810 (9th Cir.) (Treasury Department official testified that the alleged weapon was an "incendiary device" within the coverage of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846, 94 S. Ct. 111, 38 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1973); United States v. Fisher, 353 F.2d 396, 397 (5th Cir. 1965) (Government officer testified that weapon was a "pistol" under 26 U.S.C. § 5848). Apart from Bryan and McCauley, however, the courts of appeals have rarely addressed the propriety of such testimony