Source: http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/201303/?pg=72
Timestamp: 2020-04-06 09:49:04
Document Index: 465316460

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 4', '§ 1', 'art. 4', '§ 1', '§ 12', 'art 2', '§ 38']

SUPREME COURT CIVIL MATTERS Submitting Two Different
Versions of a Ballot Initiative to the Secretary of State Does Not Necessarily Run Afoul of the Requirement That a Proponent Must Submit the Text of the Proposed Measure. An initiative proponent must attach “a full and correct copy of the title and text” of a ballot initiative to “[e]ach sheet containing petitioners’ signatures,” ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1( 9). Because Arizona has a strong policy supporting the people’s exercise of the initiative power, courts liberally construe initiative requirements and apply a substantial compliance test. Where initiative proponents inadvertently submit to the Secretary of State two differing versions of the initiative (a full version on a CD and a paper version that omits several lines of text), circulate the full version with the petition sheets, and gather more than 290,000 signatures, the initiative proponents substantially comply with ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1( 9). Pedersen v. Bennett, CV-12-0260-AP/EL, 12/5/12.
including the ability to issue civil investigative demands for testimony under oath and production of documents. The OML applies to the Commission. State v. Mathis, 1 CA-CV 12-0068, 12/11/12.
Construction Defect Statute of Repose Is Not Subject to Challenge Under Anti-Abrogation Clause of Arizona Constitution. The statute of repose, A.R.S. § 12-552, limits the time within which parties may bring breach of contract and implied warranty actions against developers, builders and certain others. Such actions must be brought within eight or in some instances nine years after substantial completion of the improvement to real property. The statute of repose is not subject to challenge under Article 18, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution. This “ anti-abrogation clause” does not apply to contract claims, such as claims for breach of the implied warranty of good workmanship and habitability. The statute of repose is not subject to equitable tolling. Sullivan v. Pulte Homes Corp., 1 CA-CV 10-0754, 12/4/12.
A trial court does not err in a capital case by revoking a defendant’s right to self- representation or pro per status when he repeatedly proves himself incapable of abiding by court deadlines and disclosure rules.
Although under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Faretta v.
California a criminal defendant has
the right to represent himself, the
right is not absolute, and a trial
court “may terminate self-represen-
tation by a defendant who [not
only] engages in serious and
obstructionist misconduct,” yet
fails to “comply with the relevant
rules of procedural and substantive
law.” While a court may preclude
evidence in such a case pursuant to
Rule 15. 2, ARIZ.R.CRIM.P., when
a defendant shows over several
years that he cannot comply with
court deadlines and disclosure
rules despite repeated warnings
that their non-compliance could
result in loss of pro per status, a
court may properly revoke a defen-
dant’s right to self-representation
and appoint counsel when it
becomes evident that their con-
tinued self-representation would
undermine the court’s authority
and ability to conduct the proceed-
ings in an efficient and orderly
manner. A trial court in a capital
case does not err by failing to
conduct an evidentiary hearing
before denying requests by the
defendant and his attorney for
the appointment of new counsel
if the motion fails to allege
specific facts suggesting an irrec-
oncilable conflict or complete
or if there is no indication that a
hearing would elicit additional
facts beyond those already before
the court bearing on the issue.
State v. Gomez, CR-10-0358-AP,
defaulted for failure to appear.” Under Rule 55(b)( 2), “In all other cases,” the plaintiff must apply for a default judgment and give notice of the hearing on the application to the defendant. Although Division Two recently held that under Rule 55(b)( 2) a defendant who has appeared in an action is entitled to notice and a hearing before default judgment may be entered, regardless of whether the damages are liquidated or unliquidated, BYS Inc. v. Smoudi, 228 Ariz. 573, 578 ¶ 20, 269 P.3d 1197, 1202 (App. 2012), Division One rejected that construction of the rule. Rule 55(b) was amended in 1975. Before the amendment, the rule required “in all cases” that a defendant who appeared in an action receive notice before default judgment could be entered. After the amendment, the rule allows a party seeking liquidated damages to obtain a default judgment on motion and without notice to the defendant. No evidentiary hearing is needed to calculate damages in a case involving liquidated damages, and accordingly no notice is required. Judge Orozco dissented. Searchtoppers.com LLC v. TrustCash LLC, 1 CA-CV 11-0171, 12/20/12.*
A Party Who Has Been
Open Meeting Statute Applies
to Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission. The
Commission (“Commission”) is a
constitutional entity with powers
and duties set forth in Article IV,
Part 2, Section 1 of the Arizona
Constitution. Section 1( 13) states
that all action of the ARIC requires
“three or more affirmative votes”
and that “[w]here a quorum is
present, the [Commission] shall
conduct business in meetings open
to the public.” Arizona’s open
meeting statute, A.R.S.
§§ 38-431 to -431.09
(the “OML”) contains a
set of open-meeting reg-
ulations that are gener-
ally applicable to public
bodies. The statute also
gives the Attorney
General various powers
violations of the OML,
A Plaintiff Cannot Shift the Burden of Proof to the Defendant by Filing a Motion for Summary Judgment. Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), it is the party moving for summary judgment who bears the “burden of persuasion.” To carry its burden of persuasion, a plaintiff seeking summary judgment must submit undisputed admissible evidence that would compel any reasonable juror to find in its favor on every element of its claim. In the context of a debt claim by a bank, a general avowal in an affidavit by a paralegal claiming he is the custodian of records and that he personally reviewed records (without attaching or describing those records or otherwise providing a reviewing court the means to evaluate the accuracy of the paralegal’s calculation of the amount claimed to be due), does not demonstrate by admissible evidence that a bank is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against the alleged debtor.