Source: https://openjurist.org/999/f2d/523
Timestamp: 2017-10-24 07:43:12
Document Index: 416407159

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7121', '§ 7121', '§ 7703', '§ 7121', '§ 7513', '§ 7513', '§ 7503', '§ 7513', '§ 7121']

999 F2d 523 Brook v. J Corrado | OpenJurist
999 F. 2d 523 - Brook v. J Corrado
999 F2d 523 Brook v. J Corrado
999 F.2d 523
Douglas A. BROOK, Director, Office of Personnel Management, Petitioner,
Eugene J. CORRADO,
Washington Area Metal Trades Council, Respondents.
No. 92-3381.
Under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1) (1988), Mr. Corrado contested his removal through the grievance procedures in the collective bargaining agreement between NASA and the Washington Area Metal Trades Council, Mr. Corrado's union. An arbitrator heard the case and ordered NASA to reinstate Mr. Corrado. The arbitrator based its ruling on five findings: First, the arbitrator found that NASA denied Mr. Corrado due process because the notice of proposed removal did not state a nexus between his conviction and the proposed removal. Second, the arbitrator found that NASA's loss of confidence in Mr. Corrado did not satisfy the nexus standard without some showing of decline in Mr. Corrado's job performance. Third, the arbitrator found that Mr. Corrado's misconduct was not so egregious that a nexus could be presumed. Fourth, the arbitrator found that due process barred the Director from considering the OIG report and other evidence unrelated to the specific allegations in the notice of proposed removal. Finally, the arbitrator found the penalty of removal unreasonable.
According to 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f), this court reviews the arbitrator's decision "in the same manner" as decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board. Accordingly, this court may overturn the arbitrator's ruling only if it is arbitrary, capricious, abusive of discretion, illegal, procedurally deficient, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1988). Title 5 obligates the arbitrator to sustain NASA's removal decision if supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121(e)(2), 7701(c)(1)(B) (1988); Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 651-52, 105 S.Ct. 2882, 2884-85, 86 L.Ed.2d 515 (1985).
The "nexus" and "notice" requirements of Title 5's Chapter 75 appear in two separate subsections. Section 7513(a) contains the statutory "nexus" requirement. That section requires some nexus between an employee's misconduct and any disciplinary action: "[A]n agency may take an action covered by this subchapter against an employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1988). Nowhere does section 7513(a) require a notice of proposed removal to refer explicitly to this nexus.
Section 7513(b)(1) sets forth a notice procedure for proposing adverse actions against employees. That section requires the agency to give the employee "at least thirty days' advance written notice ... stating the specific reasons for the proposed action." 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1) (1988). A notice of proposed removal is sufficient under the statute when it apprises the employee of the nature of the charges "in sufficient detail to allow the employee to make an informed reply." Brewer v. United States Postal Service, 227 Ct.Cl. 276, 647 F.2d 1093, 1097 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144, 102 S.Ct. 1005, 71 L.Ed.2d 296 (1982); see also Hayes v. Department of Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1538 (Fed.Cir.1984) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 7503(b), which contains a nearly identical notice provision, to be satisfied when employee "knew what charge he had to defend" ). Nowhere does section 7513(b) require notice to include explicitly every element of every charge underlying the proposed action. See Kochanny v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 694 F.2d 698, 703 (Fed.Cir.1982) (chapter 75 does not require notice of proposed removal to state that employee's removal was for "the efficiency of the service" ). Instead, as the term "notice" suggests, the employee need only receive enough information to permit preparation of an informed reply.
The Fifth Amendment provides essential guarantees of notice and an opportunity to respond. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Due process thus provides a Government employee: (1) notice of the charges; (2) an explanation of the employer's evidence; and (3) an opportunity to respond. Id. As for timing, the Government need only supply these rights before termination. Id.
Under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a), NASA must show a connection between the employee's misconduct and the employee's job responsibilities. Brown v. Department of Transp., 735 F.2d 543, 548 (Fed.Cir.1984). To make this showing, NASA emphasized the sensitivity of Goddard's mission. Goddard provides tracking and data for operation of the Space Shuttle, Space Station, and satellite systems. This mission relies on a dependable and uninterrupted supply of electricity. In this context, any mistake in judgment by Mr. Corrado could result in the loss of lives or millions of dollars worth of equipment.
Given the level of trustworthiness required by Mr. Corrado's position and consequences of an error in judgment, the Government showed by a preponderance of the evidence the connection between Mr. Corrado's misconduct and his removal to promote NASA's efficiency. An agency's reasonable loss of trust and confidence sufficiently establishes the necessary nexus. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States Postal Service, 801 F.2d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.1986).
A presumption of nexus arises when the employee's misconduct is so egregious that it "speaks for itself." Hayes, 727 F.2d at 1539. This court, including its predecessor, the Court of Claims, has consistently held that involvement in drug trafficking, even when limited to off-duty conduct, is sufficiently "egregious" conduct to warrant a presumption of nexus. See Parker v. United States Postal Service, 819 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed.Cir.1987); Sanders, 801 F.2d at 1330; Strothers v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 642, 644, 618 F.2d 121 (1979). Although Mr. Corrado's crime occurred off of Goddard's premises, the egregiousness of the crime and the potential effect on safety inherent in Mr. Corrado's position at Goddard warrant a presumption of nexus in this case.
Under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e)(1), arbitrators must apply the same substantive standards that the MSPB would apply if the matter had been appealed to it. Cornelius, 472 U.S. at 652, 660, 105 S.Ct. at 2885, 2889. The MSPB reviews de novo the merits of an agency's decision to take adverse action against an employee. Fucik v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 379, 655 F.2d 1089, 1097 (1981); see also Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 768 F.2d 1325, 1329 (Fed.Cir.1985). An arbitrator must do the same. Because it is a de novo proceeding, all evidence obtained up to the time of hearing is admissible.
"[D]etermination of an appropriate penalty is a matter committed primarily to the sound discretion of the employing agency." Beard v. General Servs. Admin., 801 F.2d 1318, 1322 (Fed.Cir.1986); see also Parker, 819 F.2d at 1116. This court defers to an agency's choice of penalty "unless the penalty exceeds the range of permissible punishment specified by statute or regulation, or unless the penalty is 'so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of discretion.' " Parker, 819 F.2d at 1116 (quoting Villela v. Department of Air Force, 727 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1984)). NASA regulations specify that removal is a proper punishment for possession of drugs. NASA Supplement for the Federal Personnel Manual, Supp. No. S-751-2 at 4 (March 24, 1983). Removal also is not disproportionately harsh for the crime of possessing $16,800 worth of cocaine with intent to distribute.