Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/91572/slocum-vs-new-york-life-ins-co
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Document Index: 86758372

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 5', '§ 914', '§ 5', '§ 914']

Slocum Vs New York Life Ins Co - Citation 91572 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Slocum Vs. New York Life Ins. Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/91572
Case Number 228 U.S. 364
slocum v. new york life ins. co. - 228 u.s. 364 (1913) u.s. supreme court slocum v. new york life ins. co., 228 u.s. 364 (1913) slocum v. new york life insurance company no. 20. argued april 26, 1912 decided april 21, 1913 228 u.s. 364 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the third circuit syllabus where a life insurance policy plainly provides for payment of the stipulated premium within a specified period of grace after the due day and as plainly excludes any idea of partial payments distributed between the premium dates, the insured gains nothing by giving an agent a portion of the premium in the absence of authority given him by the company to accept it. one dealing with an agent knowing that his.....
U.S. Supreme Court Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913)
Nothing in Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24 , or Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S. 301 , tends to show that a federal court has power to reexamine, otherwise than according to the rules of the common law, issues of fact which have been determined by the verdict of a jury.
" This policy is automatically nonforfeitable from date of issue, as follows: "
" Grace in payment of premiums. -- A grace of one month, during which the policy remains in full force, will be allowed in payment of all premiums except the first, subject to an interest charge at the rate of five percent per annum."
" General provisions. -- (1) Only the president, a vice-president, the actuary, or the secretary has power in behalf of the company to make or modify this or any contract of insurance, or to extend the time for paying any premium, and the company shall not be bound by any promise or representation heretofore or hereafter given by any person other than the above. (2) Premiums are due and payable at the Home Office, unless otherwise agreed in writing, but may be paid to an agent producing receipts signed by one of the above-named officers and countersigned by the agent. If any premium is not paid on or before the day when due, or within the month of grace, the liability of the company shall be only as hereinbefore provided for such case."
As a preliminary to the consideration of the first question, it may be well to repeat what this Court often has said, that, when, on the trial of the issues of fact in an action at law before a federal court and a jury, the evidence, with all the inferences that justifiably could be drawn from it, does not constitute a sufficient basis for a verdict for the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be, so that such a verdict, if returned, would have to be set aside, the court may and should direct a verdict for the other party. Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 478 ; Delaware &c.; Railroad Co. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 469 ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Pool, 160 U. S. 438 ; Patton v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 179 U. S. 658 . The recognized mode of invoking the application of this rule is by preferring at the conclusion of the evidence, a request for
"This note is accepted by said company at the request of the maker, together with one hundred forty-five and 60-100 dollars [ Footnote 1 ] in cash, on the following express agreement: that, although no part of the premium due on the 27th day of November, 1907, under policy No. 3,011, 158, issued by said company on the life of A. W. Slocum, has been paid, the insurance thereunder shall be continued in force until midnight of the due date of said note; that, if this note is paid on or before the date it becomes due, such payment, together with said cash, will then be accepted by said company as payment of said premium, and all rights under said policy shall thereupon be the same as if said premium had been paid when due; that, if this note is not paid on or before the day it becomes due, it shall thereupon automatically cease to be a claim against the maker, and
In Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, decided in 1830, the same learned justice, speaking for this Court, said (p. 28 U. S. 446 ):
And then coming to the clause, and "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law," he continued (pp. 28 U. S. 447 -448):
In Walker v. New Mexico &c.; Railroad Co., 165 U. S. 593 , 165 U. S. 596 , decided in 1897, where the Amendment was again under consideration, it was said by this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brewer:
In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 , 174 U. S. 13 , decided in 1899, the subject was much considered, and, following a careful review of the prior decisions, it was said by Mr. Justice Gray, who spoke for the Court:
687; Stephen on Pleading 96-98; Rand v. Vaughan, 1 Bing. N.C. 767; Pim v. Grazebrook, 2 C.B. 429, 444; Schermerhorn v. Schermerhorn, 5 Wend. 513; Bellows v. Shannon, 2 Hill, 86; McFerran v. McFerran, 69 Ind. 29, 32; Lewis v. Foard, 112 N.C. 402; Manning v. Orleans, 42 Neb. 712; McCoy v. Jones, 61 Ohio St. 119, 129. In Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604 , 112 U. S. 60 , and Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 128 , 142 U. S. 135 , this Court, recognizing that this was the extent of the common law practice, held that a motion in arrest of judgment could not be sustained for an insufficiency in the evidence, but only for a defect apparent on the face of the record proper. Thus, it will be perceived that the rules of the common law, permitting a judgment non obstante veredicto and the arrest of judgment on a verdict, did not embrace cases like the present, but only those in which the pleadings presented no material issue requiring a trial or verdict.
A case much in point is Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408 , decided in 1882. It was an action in trover, wherein the allegations of the complaint were all put in issue by the answer. On a trial by jury in the circuit court, a special verdict was returned consisting of responses to interrogatories specially propounded by the court, but not embracing all the issues presented by the pleadings. Following the reception of the verdict, the plaintiffs moved for judgment in their favor, and the defendants for a new trial on the ground that the verdict did not dispose of all the issues. After hearing these motions, the court refused to grant a new trial, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs on "the special verdict of the jury, and facts conceded or not disputed upon the trial." When the case came here, the defendants complained that their constitutional right to a trial by jury had been violated, and the plaintiffs insisted that the circuit court had but conformed to the local practice sanctioned by numerous decisions of the supreme court of the state where the circuit court was held, and that it therefore should be presumed, nothing appearing to the contrary, that the special verdict and the facts conceded or not disputed upon the trial disposed of all the issues presented by the pleadings and justified the action of the circuit court. Responding to these contentions this Court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan:
Even more in point is Baylis v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 113 U. S. 316 , decided in 1885. It was an action on a policy of accident insurance, and on the trial before a jury in the circuit court, the parties differed as to whether the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict in her favor, no evidence being presented by the defendant. The court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to
"If, after the plaintiff's case had been closed, the court had directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the evidence, with all inferences that the jury could justifiably draw from it, was insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff, so that such a verdict, if returned, must be set aside, it would have followed a practice sanctioned by repeated decisions of this Court. Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 109 U. S. 478 , and cases there cited. And, in that event, the plaintiff, having duly excepted to the ruling in a bill of exceptions, setting out all the evidence, upon a writ of error, would have been entitled to the judgment of this Court whether, as a matter of law, the ruling against him was erroneous."
"This constitutional right this Court has always guarded with jealousy. Elmore v. Grymes, 1 Pet. 469; De Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476; Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172; Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408 ."
And that this was not a new doctrine in this Court is shown in Young v. Black, 7 Cranch 565, 11 U. S. 568 , decided thirteen years before, where, in declining to disturb the action of the court below in refusing to compel a joinder in a demurrer to the evidence, it was said:
True, in United States Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171, and Columbian Insurance Co. v. Catlett, 12 Wheat. 383, 25 U. S. 389 , the rule that the demurrer should set forth the facts, rather than the evidence from which they are inferable was not strictly enforced, but, in each of those cases, the opposite party voluntarily joined [ Footnote 2 ] in the demurrer, thereby consenting that the case be withdrawn from the jury and submitted to the court on the evidence embodied in the demurrer; so, they are without bearing here, save as the opinions contain some observations making strongly for the views expressed in Fowle v. Alexandria. Thus, in United States Bank v. Smith, the demurrer was criticized as substituting the court in the place of the jury, which, while true of the demurrer there, would not be true of one rightly drafted and allowed, and in Columbian Insurance Co. v. Catlett, it was said:
The decision in that case was approved and reaffirmed in D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476, 26 U. S. 497 ; Crane v. Morris, 6 Pet. 598, 31 U. S. 609 , where Mr. Justice Story said the point was not longer "open for controversy;" Silsby v. Foote, 14 How. 218, 55 U. S. 222 , and Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172, 64 U. S. 183 .
to sue again, while a request for a directed verdict looks to a completion of the trial and an adjudication of the merits through the accustomed cooperation of the court and jury. Full recognition of this, as also of its bearing here, is found in Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 , 103 U. S. 264 , where it is said:
"The difference in the two modes is rather a matter of form than of substance, except in the case of a nonsuit a new action may be brought, whereas in the case of a verdict the action is ended, unless a new trial be granted, either upon motion or upon appeal. "
In Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24 , 139 U. S. 38 , a case coming here from the Eastern
The other case is Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S. 301 , which originated in a territorial court, where the Seventh Amendment was applicable. On a trial by jury, a compulsory nonsuit was entered according to a local statute for an insufficiency in the plaintiff's evidence, without prejudice to his right to sue again, and when the case came here, the judgment was affirmed, it being directly held that granting such a nonsuit does not infringe the constitutional right.
It is well to note what has been ruled in the third circuit upon this precise question. For the practice was there deliberately adopted after careful consideration. It has commended itself to the bench and bar as a salutary measure, making for the improvement of the administration of justice. And it should be observed that the Constitution of the State of Pennsylvania, where the practice obtains, also provides that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. ( See Const.Pa. 1776; Declaration of Rights, XI; 1790, Art. IX, § 6; 1838, Art. IX, § 6; 1873, Art. I, § 6.) In Smith v. Jones, 181 F. 819, 823, the circuit court of appeals for that circuit thus reviewed the matter:
In the Carstairs case to which the court thus refers, decided over ten years ago, the action was brought in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upon a policy of fidelity insurance. The defendant asked for a binding instruction. The court, reserving that question, submitted the case to the jury, which found a verdict for the plaintiff. After argument, the court concluded that the defendant was right, that there was no case for the jury, and hence set aside the verdict and directed judgment for the defendant upon the point reserved. 112 F. 620. The court of appeals sustained this action of the circuit court (116 F. 449), Circuit Judge Gray delivering the opinion. There was, however, a dissent by Circuit Judge Acheson, who thought the mode of procedure was an unwarrantable departure from the constitutional provision. Id., p. 455. This called forth a concurring opinion from Circuit Judge Dallas, who said ( id., pp. 456-457):
evidence to go to the jury in support of the plaintiffs' claim.' In our opinion, this was a good reservation. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has, after argument and reargument before a full bench, distinctly so decided ( Fisher v. Scharadin, 186 Pa. 565; Boyle v. Mahanoy City, supra ), and within the knowledge of the writer, the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, from which this case comes, has, in a number of instances, and without protest or disapproval in any, reserved precisely the same point. Indeed, counsel in this cause appear to have regarded the practice as settled, for 'the record shows no objection or any exception to the form of the reservation.' Boyle v. Mahanoy City, supra. . . . But, in our opinion, there is no substantial difference between a judgment entered upon a directed verdict for defendant and one entered in his favor notwithstanding a verdict rendered for plaintiff, subject to the question whether there was any evidence to warrant it. 'Whether there be any evidence which entitles the plaintiff to recover is necessarily a question of law' ( Fisher v. Scharadin, supra ), and that question it is which, by either method of procedure, and with like effect in each, the court decides. No encroachment is made upon the domain of the jury where either course is pursued. Its province of finding facts from evidence is not at all invaded. All that is adjudged is that a verdict which is unsupported by any evidence cannot properly be made the basis of a legal judgment, and the soundness of this fundamental proposition is now, we think, too well established to admit of question or to be open to debate."
See also Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co., 112 F. 638, 115 F. 689, 191 U. S. 191 U.S. 526-527, 191 U. S. 532 .
Chief Justice Mitchell, in delivering the opinion of the court, said ( id., pp. 411-413):
929; West Side Belt R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Construction Co., 219 U. S. 92 , 219 U. S. 96 , 219 U. S. 102 .
to join in demurrer. He cannot refuse to join in demurrer, he must join, or waive the evidence. Our books also agree that if parol evidence be offered, and the adverse party demurs, he who offers the evidence may join in demurrer if he will. We are therefore thus far advanced that the demurrer to evidence is not necessarily confined to written evidence. The language of our books is very indistinct upon the question whether the party offering parol evidence should be obliged to join in demurrer. Why is he obliged to join in demurrer when the evidence which he has offered is in writing? The reason is given in Croke's report of Baker's case, [ Footnote 2/1 ] because, says the book, ' there cannot be any variance of matter in writing. ' Parol evidence is sometimes certain, and no more admitting of any variance than a matter in writing, but it is also often loose and indeterminate, often circumstantial. The reason for obliging the party offering evidence in writing to join in demurrer applies to the first sort of parol evidence, but it does not apply to parol evidence which is loose and indeterminate, which may be urged with more or less effect to a jury, and least of all will it apply to evidence of circumstances, which evidence is meant to operate beyond the proof of the existence of those circumstances, and to conduce to the proof of the existence of other facts. And yet, if there can be no demurrer in such cases, there will be no consistency in the doctrine of demurrers to evidence, by which the application of the law to the fact on an issue is meant to be withdrawn from a jury and transferred to the judges. If the party who demurs will admit the evidence of the fact, the evidence of which fact is loose and indeterminate, or, in the case of circumstantial evidence, if he will admit the existence of the fact which the circumstances offered in evidence conduce to prove, there will then be no more variance in this parol evidence than
in a matter in writing, and the reasons for compelling the party who offers the evidence to join in demurrer will then apply, and the doctrine of demurrers to evidence will be uniform and consistent. That this is the regular course of proceeding in respect to parol evidence of the nature that I have been describing I think may be collected from the known case upon this subject, Baker's case. There is also another case, Wright v. Pindar, as it stands reported in Aleyn's Reports, [ Footnote 2/2 ] which carries the doctrine further, and home to every case of evidence circumstantial in its nature, affording ground for a conclusion of fact from fact, and the two cases taken together, I think, prove satisfactorily that the course is that which I have already supposed, and which would remove all the difficulties that are in the way of obliging the party to join in demurrer upon parol evidence. Baker's case, after stating that the party must join in demurrer or waive his evidence, where a matter in writing is shewn in evidence, goes on thus:"
other party demurs thereupon, he that alleges this matter cannot join in demurrer with him, but ought to pray the judgment of the court, that he may not be admitted to his demurrer, unless he will confess the matter of fact to be true. "
( Id., pp. 24 U. S. 323 -324.) The necessary implication is that, had the demurrer been properly framed and the record properly made, so that there had been certainty in the facts and the proper basis for the determination of a question of law, no new trial would have been ordered.
The practice of demurring to the evidence was recognized in Pawling v. United States, 4 Cranch 219; Young v. Black, 7 Cranch 565; United States Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171, 24 U. S. 182 ; Columbian Insurance Co. v. Catlett, 12 Wheat. 383, 25 U. S. 389 ; Thornton v. Bank of Washington, 3 Pet.
"The general nature and operation of such a demurrer has been expounded with great force and correctness in the opinion delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in the case of Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H.Bl. 187. The Supreme Court of the United States has also, on various occasions, been called upon to discuss the nature and effect of the proceeding. But I shall do no more at present than to refer to some of the leading cases, not meaning to comment on them. The result of the whole is that the party demurring is bound to admit not merely all the facts which the evidence directly establishes, but all which it conduces to prove. The demurrer should state the facts, and not merely the evidence of facts, and it is utterly inadmissible to demur to the evidence when there is contradictory testimony to the same points, or presumptions leading to opposite conclusions, so that what the facts are remains uncertain, and may be urged with more or less effect to a jury. The court, however, will, in favor of the party against whom the demurrer is sought, as it withdraws from the jury the proper consideration of his case, make every inference for him which the facts in proof would warrant a jury to draw. But if the facts are so imperfectly and loosely stated that the court cannot arrive at a satisfactory conclusion that the judgment can be maintained upon the actual presentation of the evidence of these facts, then the course is to reverse the judgment, and to award a venire facias de novo. "
That the practice in the present case did not differ in its essential features from that permitted at common law is shown by the decision of this Court in Chinoweth v. Haskell, 3 Pet. 92. That was an action in ejectment. What took place on the trial is thus stated by Chief Justice Marshall (p. 28 U. S. 94 ):
The applicable principles were thus stated (p. 28 U. S. 96 ):
It is said that there was a voluntary joinder in demurrer. Undoubtedly the plaintiffs in the district court did join in the demurrer, but in what sense did they join voluntarily? The demurrer to the evidence in the Chinoweth case was manifestly well taken. And, this being so, the other party was bound to join in it. As it was said in Gibson v. Hunter, supra, the cases "prove that if a party may demur, the other party must join in the demurrer." Whether a demurrer should be allowed was the initial question for the trial court, but if the case was one where it was proper to allow the demurrer, and it was duly taken and allowed, the other party was not entitled to stand on his evidence and go to the jury. Let it be assumed that he could take a nonsuit; but this is not to say that, by refusing to join in the demurrer, he had the right to have his case, although insufficient in law for that purpose, submitted to the decision of the jury. Of course, if there were some defect or variance which he believed he could remedy, it would be natural for him to withdraw his case; but if he had proved all he could possibly prove, there would be no reason for a withdrawal unless he was willing to abandon the litigation. If he did not desire to do this, but wished to proceed, insisting upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence to which the demurrer was taken, he had to join in it. For, unless he did so, he waived his evidence ( Baker's Case, supra; Gibson v. Hunter, supra ) and was left without any evidence to go upon, while if he did join in the demurrer, he had to abide the judgment of the court upon the point of law. He had no right to reach the jury, against proper objection, when his evidence raised no question of fact. In the Chinoweth case, the plaintiffs, confronted with the demurrer, and desiring to stand upon their evidence, and not to waive it, complied with the rules
The practice of demurring to the evidence was cumbrous. It fell into disuse, and the practice of moving for a direction of a verdict came to take its place. The fundamental question, however, of the legal insufficiency of the evidence remained the same. As this Court said in Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 362, 52 U. S. 373 :
This Court has frequently said that it would deal with questions of this sort according to the substance of the matter. Thus, in Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 , it was held that, where it was shown by the opening statement of counsel that the contract on which the suit was brought was void as being either in violation of law or against public policy, the trial court might properly direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. The Court, by Mr. Justice Field, said ( id., p. 103 U. S. 266 ):
In Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24 , it was held that a state statute which authorized the judge presiding at the trial to order a judgment
" Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 , 103 U. S. 264 ."
"Whether a defendant in an action at law may present in the one form or in the other, or by demurrer to the evidence, the defense that the plaintiff, upon his own case, shows no cause of action, is a question of 'practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding,' as to which the courts of the United States are now required by the Act of Congress of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 17 Stat.197, reenacted in § 914 of the Revised Statutes, to conform as near as may be to those existing in the courts of the state within which the trial is had. Sawin v. Kenny, 93 U. S. 289 ; Ex Parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647 ; Chateaugay Ore & Iron Co., 128 U. S. 544 ; Glenn v. Sumner, 132 U. S. 152 , 132 U. S. 156 ."
Id., pp. 139 U. S. 39 -40.
In other words, a practice which would not have been allowed in the absence of statute was permitted under the statute because, in the substance of the thing, it was entirely in accord with the principles of the common law. In Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S. 301 , the constitutional question was directly presented, and, after referring to the ruling in Elmore v. Grymes, 1 Pet. 469, that, in a federal court, there was no authority to order a peremptory nonsuit against the will of the plaintiff ( Crane v. Morris, 6 Pet 598; Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172), the Court said:
"The foundation for those rulings was not in the constitutional right of a trial by jury, for it has long been the doctrine of this Court that, in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, and that, if the evidence be not sufficient to warrant a recovery, it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury accordingly, and, if the jury disregard such instruction, to set aside the verdict. Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 362; Schuchardt v. Allen, 1 Wall. 359; Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 89 U. S. 120 . And, in the case of Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 264 , it was said by Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the Court, that the difference between a motion to order a nonsuit of the plaintiff and a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant is 'rather a matter of form than of substance.'"
"That the cases above cited, which held that the circuit court of the United States had no authority to order peremptory nonsuits, were based not upon a constitutional right of a plaintiff to have the verdict of a jury, even if his evidence was insufficient to sustain his case, but upon the absence of authority, whether statutory or by a rule promulgated by this Court, is shown by the recent case of Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24 , 139 U. S. 38 , where it was held that, since the Act of the Congress of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 17 Stat.197, reenacted in § 914 of the Revised Statutes, courts of the United States are required to conform, as near as may be, in questions of 'practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding,' to those existing in the courts of the state within which the trial is had, and a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordering a peremptory nonsuit in pursuance of a state statute was upheld. It is the clear implication
Id., pp. 164 U. S. 307 -308.
In Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, it was held that it was not the intention of Congress, by the Act of May 26, 1824, c. 181, 4 Stat. 62, to confer upon this Court the power, in reviewing a judgment of the district court of Louisiana, to decide questions of fact which had been passed upon by the jury. The Court said that no points of law were brought under review, and that the whole object was "to present the evidence here in order to establish the error of the verdict in matters of fact." The remarks of the Court in Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. Co., 165 U. S. 593 , 165 U. S. 596 , plainly have reference to the same subject. Thus, it is said that the Seventh Amendment "does not attempt to regulate matters of pleading or practice," that "its aim is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure, but substance of right," and that
Id., p. 76 U. S. 253 .
The cases mostly relied upon are those of Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408 , and Baylis v. Travelers' Insurance
Co., 113 U. S. 316 . But it is submitted that these cases neither control the matter nor are inconsistent with the principles which I have urged as determinative of this question.
Id., pp. 113 U. S. 320 -321.
decision, and that, although there be no facts for the jury to pass upon, still the judgment which follows as matter of law can be arrived at only through a verdict. This is to create a constitutional right out of the practice of taking verdicts by direction. The ancient method of challenging the sufficiency of the evidence by demurrer, and thereupon either discharging the jury altogether or assessing the damages conditionally to await the decision of the demurrer ( Darrose v. Newbott, Cro.Car. 143), reveals the function of court and jury in a clearer light, and shows that the idea that the jury upon a trial where there is no evidence to sustain a finding by the jury can be reached only through a verdict could not have been entertained at the time the Constitution was adopted.