Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/200/929/236799/
Timestamp: 2020-01-24 00:03:19
Document Index: 616918969

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 151', '§ 181', '§ 155', '§ 152', '§ 184', '§ 183', '§ 183', '§ 155']

O'donnell et al. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. et al, 200 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1953) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1953 › O'donnell et al. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. et al
O'donnell et al. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. et al, 200 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1953)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 200 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1953) Argued December 4, 1952
Decided January 7, 1953
The governing statute is of course the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., as extended to air carriers by 45 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. Under that Act two differing procedures are set up for the adjustment of disputes between the carrier and its employees or groups thereof susceptible of being settled by agreements between them and of grievances arising under existing employment agreements and affecting individual workmen. The first are within the jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board of three, which uses its good offices to promote settlement or submission to arbitration under the definite statutory rules, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 157-159, 183. The second go to the boards of adjustment under the direction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 183, 184. The distinction was carefully pointed out and explained in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-728, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 89 L. Ed. 1886, and adhered to on reargument, 327 U.S. 661, 66 S. Ct. 721, 90 L. Ed. 928. See also Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 566, 576. Petitioners assert that this controversy is only one of grievance among employees as to the application of the PAA collective bargaining agreement of 1945 and its successor of October 14, 1950, establishing, inter alia, the seniority rights of PAA pilots on the basis of service with the company.
We think the petitioners are highly unrealistic in their approach to this issue in either aspect of their twofold argument. Of course they would have liked to have the question of fitting the 140 additional pilots from AOA into the PAA seniority rosters determined entirely by the PAA employment agreements. But this had long since proved impracticable; the disputes had shown that some new form of agreement or award covering this essentially new area of negotiation must be developed. The various steps taken by CAB were in this direction, as was of course the Mediation Agreement of Arbitration. We therefore think the controversy much more than a grievance growing out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions under 45 U.S.C. § 184; rather it is a dispute "concerning changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" or "not referable to an adjustment board" and "not adjusted by the parties in conference" under 45 U.S.C. § 183. Similarly, execution of an award which is about to cause a strike against a carrier involves much more than a grievance among workmen and denotes a dispute which includes the carrier. In Brink v. Pan American World Airways, 2 Cir., 193 F.2d 1009, we upheld a district court decision on this same seniority problem, Petition of Brink, D.C.E.D.N.Y., 98 F. Supp. 135, where the seniority award had not gone to the point of causing strike threats. We think, therefore, that the present case is a fortiori one involving the company and that the jurisdictional objection is not well taken.
The arbitration proceedings can, moreover, be upheld yet more generally. The statute provides, "The National Mediation Board may proffer its services in case any labor emergency is found by it to exist at any time." 45 U.S.C. § 183, and see also § 155. The threat of a serious strike would seem to be clearly a "labor emergency." And since surely the Mediation Board's proffer is not to be merely an empty gesture, its acceptance by the parties must mean that the statutory processes of arbitration may be thus set in motion. See 60 Harv. L. Rev. 832, 833. Surely this is a situation where conciliation and arbitration are most desirable in the public interest and quite within the spirit of the Act. There is nowhere any countervailing prohibition. Hence, even if, contrary to our view, this was not at first a controversy within the jurisdiction of the Mediation Board, it became so when the Board's order was accepted and acted upon by the parties.
It should be noted that an attack originally directed by petitioners upon the power of ALPA's president, Sayen, to sign the arbitration agreement has now been withdrawn. This argument was based on a decision in an unrelated case holding that one Behncke, not Sayen, was lawfully the ALPA's president. Talton v. Behncke, D. C.N.D. Ill., 106 F. Supp. 157, June 25, 1952. The decision was, however, reversed before the argument here. Talton v. Behncke, 7 Cir., 199 F.2d 471, Oct. 16, 1952.