Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/95/153/546945/
Timestamp: 2019-11-12 05:42:32
Document Index: 597485098

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1927', '§ 1821', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', 'art 11', '§ 1921', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920']

41 Cont.cas.fed. (cch) P 76,981, 45 Fed. R.evid. Ser v. 745united States of America, for the Use and Benefit Ofevergreen Pipeline Construction Co., Inc., Plaintiff,evergreen Pipeline Construction Co., Inc.,plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, v. Merritt Meridian Construction Corp. and General Insurancecompany of America, Defendants-appellees/cross-appellants.merritt Meridian Construction Corp., Third Partyplaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, v. Transamerica Premier Insurance Company, Inc., Third Partydefendant-appellee/cross-appellant, 95 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1996) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1996 › 41 Cont.cas.fed. (cch) P 76,981, 45 Fed. R.evid. Ser v. 745united States of America, for the Use and...
41 Cont.cas.fed. (cch) P 76,981, 45 Fed. R.evid. Ser v. 745united States of America, for the Use and Benefit Ofevergreen Pipeline Construction Co., Inc., Plaintiff,evergreen Pipeline Construction Co., Inc.,plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, v. Merritt Meridian Construction Corp. and General Insurancecompany of America, Defendants-appellees/cross-appellants.merritt Meridian Construction Corp., Third Partyplaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, v. Transamerica Premier Insurance Company, Inc., Third Partydefendant-appellee/cross-appellant, 95 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1996)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 95 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1996) Argued April 12, 1996. Decided Sept. 6, 1996
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denny Chin, J.) entered on July 12, 1995, following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Evergreen Pipeline Construction Co., Inc. (EPC or Evergreen) and against defendant Merritt Meridian Construction Corp. (MMCC or Merritt), and its surety, General Insurance Company of America (GICA or General). The district court's opinion is reported at United States ex rel. Evergreen Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Merritt-Meridian Constr. Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Merritt is challenging certain of the district court's evidentiary and post-trial rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor of Evergreen. Evergreen is challenging the dismissal of two of its claims and is seeking greater sanctions and reimbursement for its costs. We conclude that a new trial is required as to one issue, further consideration (and possibly a new trial) as to another, and in other respects we affirm.
All parties filed post-trial motions. The district court denied defendants' alternative motions to set aside the verdict, or for a new trial, on the extra work and delay damages claims. See Evergreen, 890 F. Supp. at 1219-1225. It granted defendants' motion to set aside the jury verdict on plaintiff's alleged breach of contract insofar as MMCC should have been credited for its $30,398 in completion costs. Id. at 1223. The court also denied defendants' motion for a new trial, where it had argued that the introduction of evidence regarding punitive damages was prejudicial and the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 1223-1224. The court granted EPC's cross-motions for prejudgment interest and awarded EPC, pursuant to Rule 11, $35,000 in attorney fees and costs against MMCC. Id. at 1225-28. It limited EPC's bill of costs to $13,888.36. Id. at 1228. The court awarded TPI $50,000 for MMCC's Rule 11 violations. Id. at 1229. The district court denied EPC's cross-motion for fees against GICA, id. at 1226, and for additional sanctions against both MMCC and GICA, id. at 1228. It granted EPC's motion under Rule 59(e) for an order compelling MMCC to enter a satisfaction of the $106,000 judgment entered against EPC in the state court proceeding. Id. at 1229. Finally, the court denied TPI's cross-motion for additional sanctions. Id.
Under New York law there are four elements to a prima facie business tort claim: (1) an intentional infliction of harm; (2) without excuse or justification and motivated solely by malice; (3) resulting in special damages; (4) by an act that would otherwise be lawful. See, e.g., Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 720, 451 N.E.2d 459, 467 (1983) (citations omitted); Twin Laboratories, Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1990); Azby Brokerage, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 681 F. Supp. 1084, 1087-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Paragraph 19 of EPC's amended complaint alleges $500,000 in lost profits and lost business opportunities, and $860,628.32 in withheld payments. The district court dismissed Evergreen's prima facie business tort claim for failure to plead special damages with sufficient particularity. We agree with the lower court that this claim should have been dismissed, but our reasoning goes beyond that of the district court.
We agree that the withheld payment allegation is specific, but it is entirely duplicative of contract damages. We also recognize that a plaintiff in these circumstances cannot precisely allege the amount of lost profits and lost business opportunities. Round numbers appear, however, not to be good enough under New York law, see, Leather Development Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 15 A.D.2d 761, 224 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1st Dep't 1962) (per curiam) (round sums state general, not specific damages), aff'd 12 N.Y.2d 909, 237 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 188 N.E.2d 270 (1963), and we here follow, rather than seek to justify, state law.
Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132, 493 N.E.2d 234, 235 (1986) (per curiam) ; Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 537 N.E.2d 176 (1989) (jury award for anticipated appreciation in land value reversed because parties did not contemplate these damages when contract was formed). It did not do so, and the claim is now waived.
Finally, we do not think that the restrictions upon damages for breach of contract claims can be avoided merely by recasting the breach as a tort. It has long been New York law that "a simple breach of contract is not to be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated.... This legal duty must spring from circumstances extraneous to, and not constituting elements of, the contract, although it may be connected with and dependent upon the contract." Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656-57, 516 N.E.2d 190, 192 (1987) (citations omitted). Thus, a legal duty independent of contractual obligations may be imposed by law as an incident to the parties' relationship or arise in connection with the nature of the injury, the manner in which the injury occurred and the resulting harm. Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 540, 583 N.Y.S.2d 957, 961, 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (1992). That distinction has caused one court to conclude that if "a plaintiff has not suffered personal injury or property damage but is seeking merely the replacement cost of a product or enforcement of the bargain, it should proceed only on a contract theory. But if the plaintiff has suffered personal injury or property damage, particularly if the loss results from an 'abrupt, cataclysmic occurrence,' then a tort claim may be viable." Insurance Co. of North America v. Historic Cohoes II, 879 F. Supp. 222, 227 (N.D.N.Y.1995).
Evergreen, 890 F. Supp. at 1224 (original emphasis). We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Fed.R.Evid. 403.
In Fagiola v. National Gypsum Co. AC & S., Inc., 906 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1990), the plaintiff objected to the defendants' use of court summaries to show how little of defendants' products had been sold to the decedent's workplace, thereby minimizing decedent's exposure to asbestos. Defendants' expert testified that the documents which provided the basis of the summaries were incomplete sales records for any of the defendant companies involved. In addition, many, but not all, of the underlying documents were authenticated during discovery. Plaintiffs objected at trial that the summaries were "horribly prejudicial," but the district court admitted them. The Second Circuit affirmed:
Unlike the methods in [United States v.] Citron, [783 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1986) ], [the expert's] methods were explained at length and are better described as tedious than as complicated....
In sum, the objections that [the expert's] summary did not fairly represent the documents and was excessively confusing and misleading go more to its weight than to its admissibility. See Kay v. Federal Rubber Co., 60 F.2d 454, 456 (3d Cir. 1932). The ample cross-examination and [the district court's] careful instructions ensured that the jury was fully aware of the limitations of the summary and would not give it undue weight.
Evergreen, 890 F. Supp. at 1220-1221. EPC's expert witness, David Alverson, provided evidence of EPC's damages:
Id. at 1221 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the district court concluded that the jury's verdict was not " 'the result of sheer surmise and conjecture'." Id. (quoting Mattivi v. South African Marine Corp, "Huguenot", 618 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1980)).
On an appeal from a denied motion for a judgment as a matter of law, an appellate court applies the same standard as the district court. See, e.g., Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1995); Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Management Group, Inc., 930 F.2d 228, 232 (2d Cir. 1991). We view the evidence in favor of the non-movant and give that party the benefit of all inferences. See, e.g., Logan v. Bennington College Corp., 72 F.3d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 65 USLW 3001 (June 17, 1996) (No. 95-2039). In addition, we do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, nor substitute our opinion of the facts for the jury's opinion. Id. Judgment as a matter of law may be granted
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 429 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, Village of Airmont, N.Y. v. LeBlanc-Sternberg, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 2546, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1996).
Alverson testified that the procedure by which DeLello thought the calculations were made (the powder method) was not the method that formed the basis of the $122,465 claim. Instead, Alverson used a "straight [vault] calculation" and simply measured the area blasted, relying on DeLello's "statement on the size of the vault area". In addition, Alverson looked at photographs and "observed" the vault site. What would otherwise be the most reliable evidence, the actual measurement of the vault site, is, however, somewhat uncertain because the calculations were made by "pac [ing] off" the site without benefit of a tape measure, and Alverson was unable to view the actual depth of the vault.
Evergreen, 890 F. Supp. at 1221-22 (footnote omitted). Regarding MMCC's claim that EPC failed to prove its damages, the district court wrote:
Furthermore, the jury charge made it clear that delay damages were only for costs actually sustained by Evergreen and caused by MMCC. I charged the jury that " [i]f you find in favor of Evergreen on any or all of its delay claims, you may award Evergreen damages for additional costs it proves were incurred as a result of delays ... caused by [MMCC]." I further cautioned the jury to "not engage in speculation or guess-work; Evergreen must have provided you with a sufficient basis for making a reasonable calculation of damages."
MMCC first argues that since the subcontract did not set a date for EPC's completion, the jury erred in accepting EPC's claim that its work was to be completed in four months. It points to the provision requiring EPC to excavate trench rock at $90 per cubic yard, and the extra work order, where EPC agreed to drill and blast mass rock at $35 per cubic yard. MMCC also argues that EPC's expert admitted that when EPC signed the subcontract it did not know the amount of trench rock and could not say it could be done in four months. Alverson also testified that the addition of the mass rock change order necessarily added completion time. MMCC argues that a reasonable time for completion should have been implied. Young v. Whitney, 111 A.D.2d 1013, 490 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (3d Dep't 1985) (citations omitted); United States ex rel Falco Constr. Corp. v. Summit Gen. Contracting Corp., 760 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case) (citations omitted).
The jury did not have to accept EPC's claim that the work was to be completed in four months to find for EPC on its delay claim. The Corinno exception, based on uncontemplated delay, anticipates this situation: " [E]ven broadly worded exculpatory [delay] clauses ... are generally held to encompass only those delays which are reasonably foreseeable, arise from the contractor's work during performance, or which are mentioned in the contract." Id. at 686, 493 N.E.2d at 910. For example, if the mass rock excavation itself had taken four months (the supposed time frame for EPC's participation in the project) and then the laying of the pipelines had taken another four months, we doubt EPC would have a delay damages claim because the compensation for the mass rock exhumation was to be made on a cubic-yard basis. This type of delay is contemplated and falls outside the ambit of the Corinno exceptions. However, EPC based its delay damages claim at least in part on the lack of surveyors, which was uncontemplated, unreasonable and directly interfered with the work which EPC had contracted to complete.
Delay damages are measured by "the difference between the contract price ... to do the [job] and ... total job costs, including overhead and profits, if applicable." Wolff & Munier, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 946 F.2d 1003, 1010 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Columbia Asphalt Corp. v. New York, 70 A.D.2d 133, 420 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Dep't 1979), lv. to appeal denied, 49 N.Y.2d 702, 426 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 403 N.E.2d 459 (1980); Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. New York, 63 A.D.2d 103, 406 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (3d Dep't), aff'd 47 N.Y.2d 960, 419 N.Y.S.2d 954, 393 N.E.2d 1027 (1979)). Only actual costs will be awarded. Alverson testified that EPC incurred $62,826 in equipment standby costs; $81,338 in extended field costs; and $23,138 in general field conditions, which included a reasonable salary for a field superintendent. To this he added a 10% profit and overhead for a total delay damage claim of $184,032.20. Merritt argues that EPC's proof of delay damages was inadequate as a matter of law because it was only offered by EPC's expert, whose opinions were not based on any foundation testimony or documents. We think plaintiff's expert testimony was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that plaintiff had carried its burden of persuasion on the damages issue. Any lack of detail as to the amount of damages could have been explored on cross examination and goes to the weight of the evidence, not the existence of evidence.
EPC's president testified that mandatory notice was not given and that the first written notice to MMCC of EPC's delay claim was its complaint. MMCC claims that this failure alone warrants reversal on this issue, relying on Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. HBE Corp., 978 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1992). The district court wrote:
Evergreen, 890 F. Supp. at 1221. But just because the notice provision was waived for purposes of the extra work claim, supra, does not mean the same provision was waived for purposes of the delay damages claim. The district court held that the evidence supported the conclusion that MMCC was well aware that EPC was performing extra work, but neither the court nor EPC has indicated how MMCC was on notice of any claim for delay damages. We think the judge should make a more detailed finding of what the evidence was to support a finding of waiver as to the delay damages clause. See Port Chester, 978 F.2d at 823 ("Because we do not know for which delays the district court will hold [defendant] responsible, we leave it to that court to decide in the first instance the adequacy of the pertinent notices of claim.") Therefore, we vacate the district court's decision not to grant judgment as a matter of law as to the delay damages claim. On remand, the district court's review of the record should determine what evidence, if any, would have supported the jury's verdict as to waiver of this notice provision. Obviously, if it finds such evidence, the court should identify and specify what it was. On the other hand, if the district court finds insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on this issue, it should either dismiss the claim as a matter of law or, after reviewing the jury instructions on the issue, if it finds that the jury was insufficiently instructed, the district could should include the issue in the new trial that must be held with respect to the cost-to-complete issue.
There are many ways in which a judge controls a jury. Federal district court judges determine the admissibility of evidence, see, Fed.R.Evid. 104, 402, 403; they may summarize and comment on the evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 385 (2d Cir. 1996) (criminal); Zinman v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 983 F.2d 431, 436 (2d Cir. 1993) (civil) (citing Ah Lou Koa v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 513 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1975)); they may question a witness, see e.g., Anderson v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 509 F.2d 1119, 1131 (2d Cir. 1974); they instruct the jury on the law to apply; and under certain circumstances judges may grant summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), and judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Once a jury is given the opportunity to decide an issue, its decision is still somewhat reviewable:
Crane v. Consol. Rail Corp., 731 F.2d 1042, 1047 (2d Cir.) (quoting Lind v. Schenley Industries, 278 F.2d 79, 91 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Hastie, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835, 81 S. Ct. 58, 5 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1960)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854, 105 S. Ct. 179, 83 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1984).
Here, the jury instructions mentioned that any award to EPC could be reduced by the costs MMCC incurred to complete EPC's work. Despite EPC's expert's admission that MMCC incurred just over $30,000 in costs to complete, the jury ignored the evidence and refused to award MMCC any such costs. The district court certainly did not err in concluding that the jury failed to properly complete its task. The lower court did, however, usurp the jury's role by concluding that MMCC's costs were $30,398. Because the district court was faced with conflicting evidence--EPC's expert testimony compared with MMCC's documentation of its costs--it should have granted a new trial on the cost-to-complete issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (1); In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310, 40 S. Ct. 543, 546, 64 L. Ed. 919 (1920) ("No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by jury unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to be determined."); Walker v. New Mexico & SPR Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596, 17 S. Ct. 421, 422, 41 L. Ed. 837 (1897) (" [The Seventh Amendment] requires that questions of fact in common law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative."). Therefore, we vacate the district court's decision regarding the cost-to-complete issue and remand for a jury trial on that question. We note that since the jury answered special interrogatories directed to, inter alia, the issue of MMCC's costs to complete, a partial new trial on that issue is appropriate "because it clearly appears that [that issue is] sufficiently distinct and separable from the others [and] that a trial of [that issue] alone may be had without injustice." Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
A district court's decision to award sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Under the American Rule, the cost of attorneys' fees is not ordinarily shifted onto the losing party. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 1616-17, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S. Ct. 1373, 94 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1987). Therefore, any sanction or shifting of fees and costs which is made, need not reflect actual expenditures.
In addition, § 1927 applies to attorneys, not parties, and thus it cannot provide the basis for the award of fees against a party. See, e.g., United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al., 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir. 1991); Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273. Finally, lest the court's inherent powers swallow the American Rule, awards made pursuant to this power are to be made "restrictively." Id., at 1272 (citing Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 1986)). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impose a greater sanction.
Generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) allows the district court to award the prevailing party its costs. However, the types of witness fees which may be shifted are limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994), and the types of costs which may be shifted are limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42, 107 S. Ct. 2494, 2497-98, 96 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1987). In other words, the district court has no discretion to award costs not authorized by statute or contractual provision. See id. at 439, 445, 107 S. Ct. at 2496, 2499 (party's own expert witness fees). But if costs are authorized, the determination of amounts is vested in the sound discretion of the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); Furman v. Cirrito, 782 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1986).
A prevailing party will not be entitled to private process server fees if there is no statutory authority for shifting them. Some courts have shifted private process server costs pursuant to § 1920(1). E.g., Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (based on § 1920(1) at least in part), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 812, 112 S. Ct. 61, 116 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1991); Tang How v. Edward J. Gerrits, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd 961 F.2d 174 (11th Cir. 1992); Card v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 126 F.R.D. 658, 662 (N.D. Miss. 1989), aff'd w/o opinion, 902 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1990). However, we must follow the Crawford reasoning, and we concur with the Eighth Circuit that the plain language of § 1920 clearly does not authorize the shifting of private process fees. Crues v. KFC Corp., 768 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir. 1985). See also Zdunek v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 100 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D.D.C. 1983); Goldstein v. GNOC, Corp., No. 90-0496, 1994 WL 456360 at * 2-3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1994).
Courts have found other authority for shifting private process server fees. At least one other court within this circuit has allowed the cost when it is reasonable. Big R Food Warehouses v. Local 338 RWDSU, 896 F. Supp. 292, 299-300 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ($55). But reasonableness is the analysis we apply when the fees have been granted; it does not provide any authority for granting the fees in the first instance. Other courts have shifted the fee pursuant to a local rule. See, e.g., Cody v. Private Agencies Collaborating Together, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1995) (Local Rule 214(d) subpart 11); Coulter v. Newmont Gold Co., 873 F. Supp. 394, 395 (D. Nev. 1994) (Local Rule 205-2). However, there is no local rule in the Southern District of New York that is relevant. Finally, some courts have shifted the cost because of the "trend toward substitution of private process servers for the U.S. Marshals Service." Riofrio Anda v. Ralston Purina Co., 772 F. Supp. 46, 55 (D.P.R. 1991), aff'd, 959 F.2d 1149 (1st Cir. 1992); Roberts v. Homelite Div. of Textron, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 637, 640-41 (N.D. Ind. 1987). At least one court has specifically read § 1921(a) (1) in conjunction with § 1920(1) and allowed these costs. Griffith v. Mt. Carmel Medical Ctr., 157 F.R.D. 499, 507-08 (D. Kan. 1994):
Evergreen sought $17,690.78 in photocopying costs but was awarded $5,000, and now appeals the district court's award. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) allows the costs of "exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case" to be shifted. Photocopying costs may be recovered even though the underlying document was not admitted at trial. M.T. Bonk Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 945 F.2d 1404, 1410 (7th Cir. 1991) (photocopying costs which are reasonably incurred). Evergreen did not, however, itemize those costs or explain why all those copies were necessary. Since $5,000 represented the court's "estimate of the cost of photocopying the exhibits offered at trial and other papers submitted by plaintiff in connection with [the] trial," Evergreen, 890 F. Supp. at 1228, it appropriately cabined its discretion. The $5,000 award was not an abuse of discretion.
The district court was clearly correct in denying expert witness fees. We are at a loss to see how Evergreen could seek them in light of Crawford and West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86-87, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1140-41, 113 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1991).
EPC sought $4,608.04 in Westlaw costs, which the district court denied in full. In Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV School Dist., 5 F.3d 319, 325 & n. 7 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 695 (8th Cir. 1983)), the Eighth Circuit held that computer costs are part of the attorneys' fees and not to be taxed separately. See also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1440-41 (7th Cir. 1994); cf. Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 633 (10th Cir. 1995) (computer research costs not statutorily authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1920). We agree that computer research is merely a substitute for an attorney's time that is compensable under an application for attorneys' fees and is not a separately taxable cost. See, Haroco, 38 F.3d at 1441. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to shift the cost of this item.
Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 67 F.3d 435, 437 (2d Cir. 1995) (Parker, J.)
Even assuming that Evergreen engaged in fraud or conversion with respect to the backcharges, that does not implicate public rights. See Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d, 704 [(2d Cir. 1993)], where the Second Circuit suggested that Brinks' employees stealing of money from parking meter collections was insufficient to support a punitive damages award on the breach of contract claim against Brinks.... Nor can the argument be made that public rights are implicated in the present case because of the public's interest in the sanctity of contracts, because if that were the law punitive damages would be available in virtually every breach of contract case.
The trial court found that part of MMCC's cost-to-complete calculations included "grossly inflated equipment charges." Evergreen, 890 F. Supp. at 1223 n. 9