Source: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930507s1.html
Timestamp: 2017-07-26 10:50:16
Document Index: 360251332

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 43', 'Art. 55', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 118', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 100', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 118', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 92', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 78', 'Art. 78', 'Art. 78', 'Art. 74', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 7', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 1', 'Art.\n1', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 78', 'Art. 160']

Switzerland 7 May 1993 District Court Laufen, Canton Berne (Automatic storage system case) [translation available] Go to Database Directory || Go to CISG Table of Contents || Go to Case Search Form || Go to Bibliography
Switzerland 7 May 1993 District Court Laufen, Canton Berne (Automatic storage system case) [translation available] [Cite as: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930507s1.html]
DATE OF DECISION: 19930507 (7 May 1993) JURISDICTION: Switzerland TRIBUNAL:	RA Laufen des Kantons Berne [RA = Richteramt = District Court] JUDGE(S): Unavailable CASE NUMBER/DOCKET NUMBER: Unavailable CASE NAME: Unavailable CASE HISTORY: Unavailable SELLER'S COUNTRY: Finland (plaintiff) BUYER'S COUNTRY: Switzerland (defendant) GOODS INVOLVED: Automatic storage system Case abstract
APPLICATION OF CISG: Yes [Article 1(1)(b)] APPLICABLE CISG PROVISIONS AND ISSUES Key CISG provisions at issue: Articles 3 ; 7(1) ; 78 [Also cited: Articles 2(a) ; 4 ; 74 ; 92 ; 100 ]
Classification of issues using UNCITRAL classification code numbers: 3B [Goods to be manufactured, services: services [not a] preponderant part];
78B [Rate of interest] Descriptors: Internationality ; Scope of Convention ; Services ; Interest Go to Case Table of Contents
English: Unilex database <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=105&step=Abstract> German: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales und Europäisches Recht
(SZIER) / Revue suisse de droit international et de droit
européen 1995, 277-278
CITATIONS TO TEXT OF DECISION Original language (German): Unilex database <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=105&step=FullText> Translation: Unavailable
7 May 1993 Translation [*] by Tobias Koppitz [**]
2. The business relations between the parties began in the year 1988; more precisely, with the
conclusion of the so-called Non-Disclosure Agreement, on 19 January 1988. The commercial
long-range objective of the parties, at that point of time, was that the defendant-[buyer] should
manufacture and distribute for the plaintiff-[seller] the system [�], as mentioned above, in
Switzerland under license. In that respect, the Non-Disclosure Agreement constitutes
somewhat of a preliminary stage. It sets forth the [seller's] obligation to supply know-how, as
far as this seems necessary for the evaluation of a continued and lasting business relation
(number 1), and as a corollary the [buyer's] obligation to keep confidential all secrets confided
to it (numbers 2 - 6). Number 8 also contains an arbitration clause, wherein the parties submit
to an arbitral tribunal having jurisdiction under the rules of arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC, Paris), consisting of one arbitrator to be appointed by the Finnish
Chamber of Commerce. According to its wording, the arbitration clause is applicable to all
disputes arising out of the present agreement. The choice of law in said clause 8 denotes
Finnish law as the governing law.
3. On 2 June 1990, the parties concluded a further agreement, the so-called License
Agreement. Its central content is constituted by clause 2, wherein the licensee-[buyer] is given
the exclusive right to the use, manufacture and sale of the licensed products in Switzerland, as
defined in clause 1(c). The licensee commits itself to the payment of a basic license fee and a
professional license fee, dependent on success. The substantial and characteristic main
constituent is therefore the license-contractual element, understood as the licensor-[seller's]
non-gratuitous, territorially limited waiver of the exercise of the exclusivity and the
enforceability rights towards the licensee, as derived from the European patent law. In
executing this agreement, the parties regard it as the "result of the hitherto existing evaluation
of possibilities;" it represents the parties' target since the conclusion of the Non-Disclosure
Agreement of 19 January 1988. Thus, in clause 26 number 3, under the heading "Integration",
the view is expressed that "this agreement contains the entire understanding between the
parties regarding the incorporated matter" and that it "combines all previous discussions".
Further, the license contract includes under the heading "Technology Transfer" in clause [�] a
pre-contractual obligation of the licensee for the future order of single components (clause 5
number 2), which are listed by sort; it deals in particular with [�] and with [�], whereby prices
and terms of payment are governed by Appendix 2 of the contract. Specified orders of work
which go beyond this pre-contractual obligation of the licensee / defendant-[buyer] for the
order of the said components, listed by sort, are, however, not mentioned in the license
Under OG [*] Art. 43 and Art. 55(1)(c), it can be maintained with an appeal that a decree is
based on the violation of Federal law, including an international treaty as concluded by the
Federal Government. Under OG Art. 43a(1)(a), a violation of the IPRG [*] can also be
maintained. However, an appeal is excluded if the decree (in accordance with the IPRG)
correctly applies foreign law, but applies this foreign law in a manner that violates it. As a
consequence, the [seller] reasons that in the case at hand an appeal is excluded (Statement of
Claim II. 2.)
Decisive for the determination of the applicable law is again the IPRG. Art. 118 IPRG para. 1,
does not answer the question directly, but, for the sale of movables, refers to the Convention
on the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, The Hague, 15 June 1955. It is
undisputed that the case at hand is essentially concerned with the sale of movables in that
sense, as contracts for work and materials are also governed by it. Art. 3 of the Hague
Convention lays down that for lack of choice of law by the parties, the applicable law is the law
of that State in which the seller, at the time he receives the order, has his ordinary residence.
Since there has been no choice of law (in contrast to the Non-Disclosure and the License
Agreement) and since the seller had his ordinary residence in Finland at the time of the receipt
of the order, Finnish law is applicable.
Furthermore, the question whether the CISG (Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 11 April 1980) is applicable needs to be answered. Thus, the Convention's
scope of application as regards the subject matter and the time of the contract have to be
examined (cf. v.Cammerer/Schlechtriem, Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht,
München 1990).
The CISG was ratified in Finland on 15 December 1987 and entered into force on 1 January
1989. It is undisputed and undisputable that the contracts for work and materials in question
were concluded after that point of time (cf. Arts. 2 and 3 of the Statement of Claim with the
evidence presented). Therefore, those contracts fall under the scope of the Convention as
regards the time according to Art. 100 CISG.
According to Art. 1(1)(b) CISG, this Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between
parties whose places of business are in different States when the rules of private international
law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State. It was submitted that the rules of
the IPRG (Art. 118 IPRG para. [�] in connection with Art. 3 of the Hague Convention) lead
to the application of the law of Finland and that Finland was, at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, a Contracting State to the CISG. It is just as evident that the parties have their
places of business in different States. Consequently, the court had only to examine whether the
contract of sale in the case at hand was a contract of sale in the terms of the CISG. Under the
contract-autonomous term "contract of sale", every contract in which goods are traded against
the payment of the price is understood as such (Reinhart, UN-Kaufrecht, Kommentar zum
Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen vom 1. April 1980 über Verträge über den
internationalen Warenkauf, Heidelberg 1991, Art. 1 lit. f ). It should be undisputed that both
the transaction [�] and [�] as well as the prospective delivery are such countertrade transactions. According
to Art. 3(1) CISG, contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced are to be
considered sales unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or production. In the case at hand, the [seller] committed itself to the delivery of two specific and yet to be manufactured products and for
that purpose it had to keep the whole working material ready. The [buyer], however, does not
have to deliver a substantial part of the raw materials or intermediate products for the
manufacture of the products. The contract is therefore a contract for work done and materials
supplied in the sense of Art. 3(1) CISG, and is to be considered a sales contract. According to
Art. 3(2) CISG, the Convention does not apply to contracts in which the preponderant part of
the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of labor or other
services. With this provision, contracts primarily for the performance of work services are to
be excluded. In the case at issue, the [seller] committed itself to the performance of works and
other services, however, these secondary obligations do not outweigh the primary obligation to
deliver goods. Since there are no other obvious provisions which could exclude the factual
scope of application of the CISG regarding the contracts to be evaluated (e.g., Art. 2(a) CISG:
exclusion of consumer purchases), both the contract for work done and materials supplied
regarding projects [�] and [�], as well as the contract of sale regarding the prospective
delivery are to be evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the CISG.
ccc. Complex of regulations Even though the present case lies within the scope of application of the CISG as regards the
subject matter and the time of the contract, there still remains room for the pure national law of
the proper law of the contract under certain circumstances. According to Art. 4 CISG, the
Convention governs the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the
parties arising from such a contract. In that respect, Finland has, however, made a reservation
in accordance with Art. 92 CISG, under which Part II of the Convention, which governs the
formation of the contract, shall not be binding for Finland. Presently, the conclusion of the
contract is not disputed by either party, so that the applicability of Part II of the Convention, or
instead the national Finnish law, is not a matter of dispute. Furthermore, Art. 4(a) CISG
excludes from the Convention questions of the validity of the contract. But even those
questions are not at issue. As far as questions regarding the construction of the content of the
contract should be concerned, however, the CISG provides rules of construction for that (Arts.
8-13 CISG, which are fully applicable for Finland). Particularly, the Convention governs the
effects of the contract, the provisions regarding the breach of contract and their consequences.
In that respect, the CISG contains the applicable provisions for the obligation to pay the price,
the obligation to pay interest and the liability for damages, which is why there is no room for
the Finnish law as claimed by the [seller] (cf. especially Art. 6 of the Statement of Claim). Only
in regard to the determination of the interest in arrears does the national law gain significance,
since Art. 78 CISG only constitutes the obligation to pay interest, however, without
determining the rate of interest. It is especially controversial in German doctrine, what national
law should be applicable to that matter. Following Schlechtriem/Eberstein (Art. 78, para. 3),
the law determined by the conflict of laws provisions shall be applicable, whereas following a
dissenting and significant opinion, the rate of interest should be determined by the law of the
interest-creditor (cf. the references in Schlechtriem/Eberstein, Art. 78, para. 9). However, this
controversy is only of significance when the seller is in arrears with his obligation to pay the
price, e.g., with the liability for damages for defective goods under Art. 74 CISG et seq.; here,
applying the conflict of laws provisions, the rate of interest is determined by the statute of the
seller, whereas the rate of interest is determined by the statute of the buyer when applying the
law of the interest-creditor. In cases where, as brought forward by the [seller], the buyer is in
arrears with his obligation to pay the price, which should be the majority of all cases, the rate
of interest is - under both approaches - to be determined by the law of the seller, which in the
case at issue is Finnish law. Nevertheless, it is all in all clear that the present case, regarding the
matters disputed, is solely governed by the scope of application of the CISG; in other words,
on the merits of the case, the CISG is relevant and has to be referred to for the solution of the
matter of dispute, and not any pure national Finnish law. Finnish law is presently significant
only for the determination of the rate of interest, as far as the [buyer] owes interest at all and
cc. CISG as Finnish Law or as a treaty concluded by the Federal Government in the
sense of OG Art. 43(1)?
Switzerland has also ratified the CISG on 21 February 1990. It entered into force on 1 March
1991, thus, obviously before the time of filing the action. The Convention is thus an
international treaty concluded by the Federal Government in the sense of OG [*] Art. 43(1).
The court therefore has to answer the question whether the matter of dispute at issue could yet
be appealable. Strictly formally, the IPR rules refer to Finnish law whose component, the CISG, would then
be applicable under Art. (1)(a) CISG. Thus, strictly formally, Finnish law would be applicable,
which is why the civil law appeal to the Federal Supreme Court would have to be denied
according to OG Art. 43(1). However, it has to be considered that this Finnish law is materially
congruent to all points with Swiss law, should this be held applicable. Despite the fact that this
is formally foreign law, the court holds that there are significant reasons in favor of the
For one thing, the complex of provisions to be applied in the present case is, as mentioned
above, materially absolutely identical with Swiss law. This is because the matter of dispute of
the present proceedings extends exclusively to questions governed by the CISG and because
the judge is barred from stretching the matter of dispute to undisputed matters, due to the
principle of party disposition.
Secondly, the CISG requires uniform interpretation on grounds of its multilaterality, whereby
special regard is to be had to its international character (Art. 7(1) CISG). Therefore, it is
supposed to be interpreted autonomously and not out of the perspective of the respective
national law of the forum. Thus, Finnish law cannot have any significance for the
interpretation; it is generally not decisive whether the Convention is formally applied as
particularly this or that national law, as it is to be interpreted autonomously and with regard to
its international character. Thirdly, it has to be taken into account that an internationally uniform interpretation can only
then nearly be realized, if possibly all judgments of first or second instance are subject to the
decision by the respective Supreme Courts of each State. On the one hand, only the instances
of the Supreme Court can unify the intra-governmental jurisdiction and make sure that a
multilateral agreement is not subject to different interpretation and application already within
one State. On the other hand, only the instances of the Supreme Court will be likely to be in
the position to survey the jurisdiction of the other Contracting States and consequently to
maintain an internationally uniform interpretation across the borders. Furthermore, it is to be considered that the lower courts have a tendency to lack the ability to
survey the international jurisdiction. This could lead to decisive uncertainty in law for Swiss
companies dealing in international trade if foreign companies file a claim against them under
the CISG and if the former could not gain access to the Federal Supreme Court on grounds of
a formalistic argument. For the rest, there is no argument evident that companies of the Swiss
export-trade - requiring the competence of the Swiss courts - should gain access to the
Federal Supreme Court, although those of the import-trade should not gain this access,
especially since in both cases the CISG will be materially applicable.
Moreover, regard is to be had to the rationale of OG [*] Arts. 43 and 43a, which essentially
flows out of the original concept of the Federal Supreme Court as an instrument for judicial
restraint and supervision. The Federal Supreme Court shall not and cannot review a violation
of foreign law essentially on two grounds: Firstly, the object of the civil law appeal is to secure the uniform and cantonal interpretation
and application of the federal civil law (Habscheid, Schweizer Zivilprozess- und
Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, 2d edition, Basel 1990, N. 782), and not of foreign civil law. Secondly, the Federal Supreme Court shall not have the impudence to interpret foreign law,
somewhat as the "Keeper of the Holy Grail" of that same foreign law, and lay down its correct
interpretation on the highest instance. However, none of the aims of those provisions allows the exclusion of an appeal [to the
Federal Supreme Court] in the case at hand. On the one hand, the CISG is materially federal civil law, whose uniform and correct
interpretation through the cantons is to be guaranteed even if it comes to application as
formally "foreign" law. On the other hand, it cannot be regarded as "interference" if the Federal Supreme Court
applies the CISG that has been ratified by the State concerned: As mentioned above, the
Convention has to be interpreted autonomously and based on international principles
internationally uniform, and not according to the respective national law. This makes obvious
that the aim of OG Art. 43 not only does not exclude an appeal in cases as the one at issue, but
moreover commands an appeal. Furthermore, it cannot be said that with such an extension, the Federal Supreme Court
would move along the edge of its capacities/jurisdiction to an even higher degree through the
mostly extensive, difficult and time-consuming establishment of foreign law in the future. Such
a time-consuming establishment of Finnish law is out of the question, since - as has been
shown - only the CISG is to be applied; however, under no circumstances can the Federal
Supreme Court evade the establishment and knowledge of the CISG, as it is applicable as
formally Swiss Law under the reservation of a choice of law in nearly all contractual relations
of the Swiss export-trade; where disputes arise out of such contractual relations, the Federal
Supreme Court is competent as the last instance - under the presumption of the local
jurisdiction of the Swiss courts - and it has to apply the CISG.
The fact that the CISG provides a uniform, final and autonomous Sales Convention, which is
not intended to be bindingly attached to the law of one State, but is effective on its own
instead, is displayed by Art. 1(1)(a) CISG. Accordingly, the CISG is applicable when the
parties have their places of business in different States and when those States are Contracting
States to the Convention. The determination of this scope of application lacks any point of
contact to the law of a certain State; the CISG is autonomously applicable regardless of the
intra-governmental regulation concerning the conflict of laws provisions, without being State-specifically qualified. Assuming, purely hypothetically, that the agreements in question in the
present case had been concluded prior to the effectiveness of the Convention on 1 March 1991,
the said provision would come in effect, since it regularly precedes the "Pre-Solution" of Art.
1(1)(b) CISG (Reinhart, Art. I, N. 2 f); this is why the CISG is applicable to all contracts
concluded by the Swiss import-trade after 1 March 1991 as provided in Art. 1(1)(a) CISG. In
this case, the Convention does not come in the formal shape of national Finnish law, but as a
part of the material private international law. It is obvious that now the appeal would be
admissible according to OG [*] Art. 43(1), as the case at hand is indisputably concerned with
an international treaty concluded by the Federal Government. If one were to deny the
appealability of CISG disputes where the Convention becomes applicable pursuant to the Pre-Solution of Art. 1(1)(b) CISG, this would lead to a differentiation regarding the question of
appealability which could not be objectively explained and which can factually simply not be
reasoned and which cannot be upheld in the court's opinion.
Finally, even the anticipated objection, that for the determination of the rate of interest one
would have to have recourse to Finnish law, does not change in the least the result that the
matter of dispute in the case at hand is appealable. For one thing, as shown above, the rate of interest for owed interest in arrears has to be
determined by Finnish law, according to Art. 78 CISG. However, it is not obvious that this
matter of law is a matter of dispute in the present proceedings. The [buyer] raises no objections
to this method for calculating the rate of interest, as already brought forward by the [seller] and
even attached to the Statement of Claim. The [buyer] rather contests the existence of an
obligation to pay interest. This is why a court which is materially concerned with the matter -
heeding the above repeatedly mentioned principle of party disposition - does not have to deal
with the rate of interest, due to the lack of it being a matter of dispute and also does not have
to make it part of the judgment. It is therefore not obvious in what way the violation of Finnish
(interest-) law should be asserted before the Federal Supreme Court and in what way the
appealability [of the decision of first instance] would have to be negated by that. Furthermore, even if, in the course of the proceedings, a dispute arose regarding the rate of
interest next to the already disputed points - which would not exceed the degree of probability
of a mere hypothesis - the appealability of the matter is altogether not to be negated. In that
case, the Federal Supreme Court could allow the appeal in the main issue and could avoid
embarking on the question of the rate of interest, as a mere minor issue, due to the lack of
appealability [of the minor issue of the rate of interest]. In such proceedings, where due to only
partly missing procedural prerequisites, a federal appeal is not dismissed as a whole, but is
embarked on as much as possible; this corresponds with the uninterrupted practice of many
years of the federal justice in all chambers (cf., e.g., BGE [*] 118 Ia 174). As mentioned, this
requires however, that there is a dispute over the rate of interest, which is at the time of the
present proceedings not obvious and has to be regarded as a mere hypothesis. All in all, even a
dispute arising in the future about the rate of interest will not be able to influence the
appealability of the matter.
In summary and in condensed form, it will be made clear why the appealability of the matter of
dispute at issue has to be affirmed: Claims under delivery transactions whose subject are
services in the nature typical to the contracts here and whose judicial constellations and
problems in the presently disputed manner are to be authoritatively disentangled, fall under the
factual and temporal scope of application of the CISG. This conclusion takes effect due to
formal views according to Finnish law. However, today and already at the time of filing the
action (bound to the proceedings according to ZPO [*] Art. 160), the rules of the mentioned
international Convention not only represent, but in a decisive way also respect Swiss private
law. Therefore, it cannot depend on the coincidence of the point of time of its effectiveness as
a result of the temporal assertion of our jurisdiction, whether a civil matter of dispute is
appealable or not. If the validity and applicability of formally existing and effective Swiss law
throughout the whole litigation yields to the reference of a foreign system of law, this merely
coincidental moment does not change in the least the need for protection of the interest in the
ability to review through the Federal Supreme Court because of violation of Swiss private law
and its qualification and determination for that.
* All translations should be verified by cross-checking against the original text. For purposes of this translation, the Plaintiff of Finland is referred to as [seller]; the Defendant of Switzerland is referred to as [buyer]. Translator's note on abbreviations: BGE = Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichts [Official Reporter of the Federal Court, the highest Swiss court in civil matters]; OG = Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Bundesrechtspflege [Swiss Federal Code on Court Organization]; IPRG = Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht [Swiss Federal Act on International Private Law, which came into force on January 1, 1989]; ZPO = Zivilprozessordnung [Swiss Code of Civil Procedure].