Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2007/01/05-4318.htm
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05-4318 -- U.S. v. Esquivel -- 01/29/2007
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (39799 bytes) (30075 bytes)
v. No. 05-4318
EZEQUIEL ROBLES ESQUIVEL,
Defendant-Appellant. (D.C. No. 04-CR-562-TS)
Esquivel was stopped while driving on I-70 for an equipment violation. As the officer spoke with Esquivel, he detected the odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed approximately 1.3 kilograms of methamphetamine.
During questioning, Esquivel stated that he had picked up the vehicle at a rest area in Utah and was transporting it to Colorado. Specifically, he stated a friend by the name of Efrin asked him to travel to Utah, pick up a vehicle, and drive it to Aurora, Colorado in exchange for $200 and some marijuana. Esquivel stated that Efrin had driven him to a rest area in a red Jeep Cherokee to retrieve the car. Although he did not remember the exact location of the rest area, he believed it was about forty-five minutes south of I-70 on I-15. Esquivel stated further that he had no knowledge that drugs were in the vehicle he retrieved. He also stated that he had transported a vehicle in this manner once before when he delivered a car from a Colorado residence to a mechanic shop where the vehicle was later stripped.
We review for clear error the district court's refusal to award a defendant a reduction for minor participant status under § 3B1.2. United States v. Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d 1122, 1131 (10th Cir. 2003). The "'clearly erroneous' standard requires the appellate court to uphold any district court determination that falls within a broad range of permissible conclusions." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990); see also United States v. Santistevan, 39 F.3d 250, 253-54 (10th Cir. 1994) ("We will not disturb a district court's finding of fact unless it is without factual support in the record, or if after reviewing the evidence we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 3B1.2 of the Guidelines provides a range of adjustments for a defendant who "plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(A).(1) Specifically, § 3B1.2(b) permits a court to reduce a defendant's offense level by two levels if the defendant was a "minor participant in any criminal activity." Id. § 3B1.2(b). According to the commentary that follows, "[t]his guideline is not applicable unless more than one participant was involved in the offense." Id. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.2. "Participant," in turn, is defined as "a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted." Id. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.1. "The determination of a defendant's role in the offense is to be made on the basis of all conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) . . . and not solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction." Id. Ch. 3, Pt. B, intro. cmt.
The district court's decision of whether to apply a minor role adjustment under § 3B1.2 "is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case." Id. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(C). Significantly, "[a]s with any other factual issue, the court, in weighing the totality of the circumstances, is not required to find, based solely on the defendant's bare assertion, that such a role adjustment is warranted." Id.; see also United States v. Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004). We have held that the minor participant inquiry must "focus upon the defendant's knowledge or lack thereof concerning the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others involved in the offense." Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d at 1277 (quoting United States v. Calderon-Porras, 911 F.2d 421, 423 (10th Cir.1990)). A defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to a reduction under § 3B1.2. Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d at 1131.
Esquivel also argues that the district court erred in concluding that the quantity of drugs found in the vehicle precluded him from receiving a minor role adjustment. We disagree. The Commentary to § 3B1.2 establishes that "a defendant who is convicted of a drug trafficking offense, whose role in that offense was limited to transporting or storing drugs and who is accountable under § 1B1.3 only for the quantity of drugs the defendant personally transported . . . is not precluded from consideration for" a minor participant reduction. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(A). At sentencing, defense counsel argued "whether it was a large quantity or a small quantity [of drugs transported] is no longer taken into account" when conducting a minor participant inquiry. Appx., Vol. IV, p. 10. The district court disagreed with counsel's characterization, stating, "What [the Commentary] says is he's not precluded, but . . . the Court can certainly take [drug quantity] into consideration." Id. Defense counsel agreed. Because the district court did not hold that the Guidelines precluded Esquivel from being considered for a minor participant reduction, it did not err in this regard.
1. "We interpret the Sentencing Guidelines as if they were a statute," United States v. Tagore, 158 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998), and the Commentary to the Guidelines as "authoritative unless [they] violate[ ] the Constitution or a federal statute, or [are] inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of" the Guidelines, Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2007/01/05-4318.htm.