Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103214/united-states-dept-agriculture-vs-murry
Timestamp: 2017-05-24 02:43:44
Document Index: 62649030

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2011', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 2011', '§ 2014', '§ 5', '§ 2014', '§ 2014', '§ 2014', '§ 2014', '§ 2023', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 151', '§ 151', '§ 2011', '§ 2012']

United States Dept of Agriculture Vs Murry - Citation 103214 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize United States Dept. of Agriculture Vs. Murry - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/103214CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-25-1973Case Number413 U.S. 508AppellantUnited States Dept. of AgricultureRespondentMurryExcerpt:
united states dept. of agriculture v. murry - 413 u.s. 508 (1973)
"[a]ny household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall be ineligible to participate in any..... Judgment:
The tax deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in a prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax deducting parent lives, and the administration of the Act allows no hearing to show that the tax deduction is irrelevant to the need of the household. Section 5(b) therefore violates due process. Pp.
413 U. S. 511
DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J.,
413 U. S. 514
413 U. S. 517
, filed concurring opinions. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
413 U. S. 520
. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, J., joined,
413 U. S. 522
The Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. § 2011
as amended in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, has been applied to these appellees so as to lead the three-judge District Court to hold one provision of it unconstitutional. 348 F.Supp. 242. We noted probable jurisdiction. 410 U.S. 924.
Appellee Murry has two sons and ten grandchildren in her household. Her monthly income is $57.50, which comes from her ex-husband as support for her sons. Her expenses far exceed her monthly income. By payment, however, of $11, she received $128 in food stamps. But she has now been denied food stamps because her ex-husband (who has remarried) had claimed her two sons and one grandchild as tax dependents in his 1971 income tax return. That claim, plus the fact that her eldest son is 19 years old, disqualified her household for food stamps under § 5(b) of the Act. [
] Appellee Alderete is in comparable
Appellee Joe Valdez is 18 years old and married, and he and his wife have a child. He lives wholly on public
Appellees are members of households that have been denied food stamp eligibility solely because the households contain persons 18 years or older who have been claimed as "dependents" for federal income tax purposes by taxpayers who are themselves ineligible for food stamp relief. Section 5(b) makes the entire household of which a "tax dependent" was a member ineligible for food stamps for two years: (1) during the tax year for which the dependency was claimed and (2) during the next 12 months. During these two periods of time, § 5(b) creates a conclusive presumption that the "tax dependent's" household is not needy and has access to nutritional adequacy.
The tax dependency provision was generated by congressional concern about nonneedy households participating in the food stamp program. [
history reflects a concern about abuses of the program by "college students, children of wealthy parents." [
] But, as the District Court said, the Act goes far beyond that goal, and its operation is inflexible.
Tax dependency in a prior year seems to have no relation to the "need" of the dependent in the following year. It doubtless is much easier from the administrative point of view to have a simple tax "dependency" test that will automatically -- without hearing, without witnesses, without findings of fact -- terminate a household's claim for eligibility for food stamps. Yet, as we recently stated in
405 U. S. 656
We have difficulty in concluding that it is rational to assume that a child is not indigent this year because the parent declared the child as a dependent in his tax return for the prior year. But even on that assumption, our problem is not at an end. Under the Act, the issue is not the indigency of the child, but the indigency of a different household with which the child happens to be living. Members of that different household are denied food stamps if one of its present members was used as a tax deduction in the past year by his parents even though the remaining members have no relation to the parent who used the tax deduction, even though they are completely destitute, and even though they are one, or 10 or 20 in number. We conclude that the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax deducting parent lives, and rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact. It therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process found wanting in
412 U. S. 452
Stanley v. Illinois, supra;
"Any household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and
who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household
shall be ineligible to participate in any food stamp program established pursuant to this chapter during the tax period such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after expiration of such tax period. . . ."
The food stamp program was established in 1964 for the twin purposes of promoting the agricultural economy and alleviating hunger and malnutrition among the needy members of "the other America." 7 U.S.C. § 2011. Under this program, currently needy households whose members comply with a work requirement, 7 U.S.C. § § 2014(b), (c), are entitled to purchase enough food stamps to provide those households with nutritionally
adequate diets. In 1971, Congress became concerned with the possibility that nonneedy households were receiving food stamps, and its response was the enactment of Pub.L. 91-671. While the curbing of abuses in the administration of a government program is assuredly a legitimate purpose, that statute has given rise to constitutional questions in the present case and its companion,
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, post,
413 U. S. 528
The challenged provision in the present case is § 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b), as amended, 84 Stat. 2049. That section renders ineligible for food stamps any household that includes a member over 18 years of age who has been claimed as a tax dependent by a taxpayer who is not himself eligible for the stamps. What little legislative history there is suggests that the sole reason for enactment of this section was to prevent the receipt of food stamps by the sons and daughters of more affluent families. 116 Cong.Rec. 41979, 41981, 41993, 42021;
cf. Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U. S. 483
Rather than requiring an individualized determination that a particular household linked to a relatively more affluent household by a claimed tax dependency was not in fact, needy, Congress chose instead to utilize a conclusive presumption. The simple fact that a household member has been claimed as a tax dependent by a nonindigent taxpayer results in the complete termination of benefits for that entire household in the relevant tax period and in the subsequent 12 months as well. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b). It matters not whether that dependency claim was fraudulent, what the amount of support from the non-indigent taxpayer actually was, [
This Court recently declared unconstitutional, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a Connecticut statute establishing a permanent, conclusive presumption of nonresidency for purposes of qualifying for reduced tuition rates at a state university.
. As we said in that case:
"In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees at its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather, standards of due process require that the State allow such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a
resident entitled to the in-state rates."
See also Morrissey v. Brewer,
Similarly, I think, the conclusive presumption that led to the termination of the appellees' benefits without
any opportunity for them to prove present need denied them due process of law. [
] Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court.
The Congress has alternative means available to it by which its purpose can be achieved. The Food Stamp Act, as amended, already provides that households must demonstrate present neediness to qualify, 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b), and that its members must, under certain circumstances, accept available employment,
§ 2014(c). There is no reason that enforcement of these provisions cannot be strengthened if the Congress believes that fraud is taking place. There are already criminal penalties in effect for fraudulent acquisition, use, or transfer of food stamps.
§§ 2023(b), (c).
Railway Express Agency v. New York,
(1949) (concurring opinion). It is a corollary of this requirement that, in order to determine whether persons are indeed similarly situated, "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands" must be provided.
(1972). Specifically, we must decide whether, considering the private interest affected and the governmental interest sought to be advanced, a hearing must be provided to one who claims that the application of some general provision of the law aimed at certain abuses will not in fact, lower the incidence of those abuses but will instead needlessly harm him.
404 U. S.
404 U. S. 71
(1973). In short, where the private interests affected are very important and the governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty by a well designed hearing procedure, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to act on an individualized basis, with general propositions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burden-shifting devices. That, I think, is the import of
Is this, then, such a case? Appellants argue that Congress could rationally have thought that persons claimed as tax dependents by a taxpayer himself not a member of an eligible household in one year could, during that year and the succeeding one, probably receive sufficient funds from the taxpayer to offset their need for food stamps. If those persons received food stamps, they would be denying to the truly needy some of the limited benefits Congress has chosen to make available. The statute, on this view, is aimed at preventing abuse of the program by persons who do not need the benefits Congress has provided. Even if, as appellants urge, the statute is interpreted to make ineligible for food stamps only those persons validly claimed as tax dependents,
Reply Brief for Appellants 2-3, I do not think that Congress adopted a method for preventing abuse that is reasonably calculated to eliminate only those who abuse the program. In particular, it could not be fairly concluded that, because one member of the household had received half his support from a parent, the entire household's need for assistance in purchasing food could be offset by outside contributions.
It is, of course, quite simple for Congress to provide an administrative mechanism to guarantee that abusers of the program were eliminated from it. All that is needed is some way for a person whose household would
otherwise be ineligible for food stamps because of this statute to show that the support presently available from the person claiming a member of the household as a tax dependent does not in fact, offset the loss of benefits.
Reasonable rules stating what a claimant must show before receiving a hearing on the question could easily be devised. We deal here with a general rule that may seriously affect the ability of persons genuinely in need to provide an adequate diet for their households. In the face of readily available alternatives that might prevent abuse of the program, Congress did not choose a method of reducing abuses that was "fairly related to the object of the regulation," by enacting the statute challenged in this case.
This analysis, of course, combines elements traditionally invoked in what are usually treated as distinct classes of cases, involving due process and equal protection. But the elements of fairness should not be so rigidly cabined. Sometimes fairness will require a hearing to determine whether a statutory classification will advance the legislature's purposes in a particular case so that the classification can properly be used only as a burden-shifting device, while, at other times, the fact that a litigant falls within the classification will be enough to justify its application. There is no reason, I believe, to categorize inflexibly the rudiments of fairness. Instead, I believe that we must assess the public and private interests affected by a statutory classification and then decide in each instance whether individualized determination is required or categorical treatment is permitted by the Constitution.
The Court, however, invalidates § 5(b) for apparently two reasons. The first is that tax dependency in one calendar year is tied to the subject's lack of need in the following year, and this, it is said, has no rational connection. The second, although it may not be clearly articulated, is that all that is needed to disqualify a household is the presence in it of a person over 18 who is claimed as a dependent for federal income tax purposes by someone outside the household. That this is a reason is quite apparent from the Court's special emphasis on the claims of dependency said to have been asserted by the father or parents of appellees Valdez, Broderson, and Schultz, even though the parent or parents, according to affidavits, gave "no support" or refused to give "any aid," to use the Court's words,
For me, neither reason is persuasive. As I read § 5(b) of the Act,
413 U. S. 509
n. 1, the years of ineligibility for food stamps are "the tax period such dependency is claimed" and the year that follows. They are not the latter year and the one subsequent thereto, as the Court seems to indicate. I confess that there must be some practical awkwardness in relating the food stamp year to the tax dependency year, for one often cannot know that he is being claimed as a tax dependent for a given year until the claimant files his income tax return
My second concern centers in the meaning of the words "who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes" in § 5(b) of the Act. I cannot believe that the mere fact of claiming is sufficient, or that that is what Congress intended. It seems obvious to me that "claimed" in this context has only one meaning, that is,
claimed for income tax purposes, and not the mere assertion of dependency in the return. This would be the sensible construction of the statute. It is obvious and clear, from the Court's description of the Valdez, Broderson, and Schultz situations,
413 U. S. 510
-511, that the parent or parents who claimed those appellees as income tax dependents were not at all entitled to make those claims. They clearly did not satisfy the requirements of § 151(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 151(e)(1). Valdez' problem is with his father, not with the food stamp program, if the facts the Court states are accurate. The same is true of Broderson. The same is true of Schultz.
Each of these aspects, which the Court chooses not to analyze, and prefers, instead, to resolve by convenient nullification of the statute, could be handled by an appropriate hearing directed to the ascertainment of the actual facts. In that hearing, it may be shown whether Joe Valdez, in fact, "receives no support from Ben." If this be true, Joe should not automatically be ineligible
Appellees challenge on constitutional grounds a section of the most recent congressional revision of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011
whereby households containing persons 18 years or older who have been claimed as "dependents" for income tax purposes are made ineligible to receive food stamps. The Court's opinion sustains this challenge. Referring to what it conceives to be the legislative aim in enacting such a limitation, "a concern about abuses of the program by
college students, children of wealthy parents,'" the opinion states that "the Act goes far beyond that goal and its operation is inflexible,"
413 U. S. 513
Notions that, in dispensing public funds to the needy, Congress may not impose limitations which "go beyond the goal" of Congress, or may not be "inflexible," have not heretofore been thought to be embodied in the Constitution. In
(1970), the Court rejected this approach in an area of welfare legislation that is indistinguishable from the food
397 U. S. 484
. Applying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to state action, the Court reversed the District Court and held:
in some inequality.'
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U. S. 61
220 U. S. 78
In placing the limitations on the availability of food stamps which are involved in this case, Congress has not, in any reasoned sense of that word, employed a conclusive presumption as stated by the majority,
413 U. S. 512
, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART in his concurring opinion,
413 U. S. 516
; it has simply made a legislative decision that certain abuses which it conceived to exist in the program as previously administered were of sufficient seriousness to warrant the substantive limitation which it enacted. There is a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, holding unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds presumptions which conclude factual inquiries without a hearing on such questions as fault,
(1971), the fitness of an unwed father to be a parent,
(1972), or, accepting the majority's characterization in
(1973), residency and, on the other hand, holding unconstitutional a duly enacted prophylactic limitation on the dispensation of funds which is designed to cure systemic abuses.
Cf. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,
411 U. S. 356
Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U. S. 629
390 U. S. 643
Thus, we deal not with the law of evidence, but with the extent to which the Fifth Amendment permits this Court to invalidate such a determination by Congress. In
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U. S. 483
348 U. S. 487
-488 (1955), the Court said:
Accord, Dandridge v. Williams, supra; Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U. S. 726
-612 (1960).
. But, judged by the standards of the foregoing case, the challenged provision of the Food Stamp Act has a legitimate purpose, and cannot be said to lack any rational basis. Section 5(b) declares ineligible for food stamps
Thus, in order to disqualify a household for food stamps, the taxpayer claiming one of its members as a dependent must both provide over half of the dependent's support and must himself be a member of a household with an income large enough to disqualify that household for food stamps. These characteristics indicate that the taxpayer is both willing and able to provide his dependent with a significant amount of support. To be sure, there may be no perfect correlation between the fact that the taxpayer is part of a household which has income exceeding food stamp eligibility standards and his provision of enough support to raise his dependent's household above such standards. But there is some correlation, and the provision is, therefore, not irrational.
Dandridge v. Williams, supra.
Page 413 U. S. 526
Finally, the fact that the statute as presently administered may operate to deny food stamps on the basis of fraudulent as well as lawful dependency deduction claims does not, as suggested by the three-judge District Court, 348 F.Supp. 242, 243 (DC 1972), render it unconstitutional.
* The Court's opinion makes much of the facts that there may be no relationship between the tax dependent's parent and the remaining members of the household, that they may be completely destitute, and that they may be one or 10 or 20.
. Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e), provides in relevant part:
(Reply Brief for Appellants in No. 72-534, O.T. 1972,
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,
9 n.19,
The majority does not question that Congress could rationally so choose to dispense welfare benefits to "economic units," rather than to individuals.
(1970). Since the resources of the household member claimed as a tax dependent are, by definition, available to the entire household, it is rational to disqualify such units containing ineligible tax dependents.