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1 THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START Katherine Porter & Dr. Deborah Thorne An untested assumption of Chapter 7 bankruptcy is that it rehabilitates debtors for a fresh start in the economy. Using original, longitudinal data, we examine this assumption against the realities of life after bankruptcy. Our findings challenge the fresh start as the theoretical underpinning for consumer bankruptcy relief. We found that just one year postbankruptcy, one in four debtors was struggling to pay routine bills, and one in three debtors reported an overall financial situation similar to, or worse than, when that debtor filed bankruptcy. Our analysis of these data demonstrates that steady and sufficient income is the key to improved postbankruptcy financial health. Factors that cause household income to decline, such as unemployment and underemployment, illness or injury, and old age, undermine the chances of financial recovery. These data reveal the limitations of bankruptcy as a social safety net and highlight the fragile economic situations of American families. We conclude that bankruptcy is an incomplete tool to rehabilitate those in financial distress, and we suggest adjustments to bankruptcy law and social programs that will improve the ability of consumers to achieve a fresh start after financial failure. INTRODUCTION I. BACKGROUND A. The Rhetoric of Rehabilitation B. Prior Studies C. Methodology and General Findings II. THE POSTBANKRUPTCY EXPERIENCES OF CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS A. Struggling to Make Ends Meet B. Postbankruptcy Financial Situations C. Broke After Bankruptcy: The Plight of the Worse- Off Families III. EXPLAINING POSTBANKRUPTCY DISTRESS: WHAT WENT WRONG? A. The Primacy of Income B. Income Trigger: Job Problems Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. Assistant Professor of Sociology, Ohio University. We thank Ronald Mann and Elizabeth Warren for their valuable comments. We also gratefully acknowledge the suggestions of participants at the 2005 Harvard-Texas Conference on Commercial Law Realities on an earlier manuscript on this topic. Saray Bermeo and Ariane Holtschlag provided helpful research assistance. 67
2 68 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 C. Income Trigger: Medical Problems D. Income Trigger: Age IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION The principal theory of consumer bankruptcy in America is that it provides a fresh start to debtors. 1 Courts, 2 Congress, 3 and scholars 4 repeatedly cite the fresh start as the justification for a particular interpretation of our consumer bankruptcy system. Despite its ubiquity in the bankruptcy landscape, the fresh start remains an elusive concept. 5 Most frequently, people equate the fresh start with the economic rehabilitation of debtors through bankruptcy s discharge of debt. 6 Central to this rehabilitation is the promise that life after bankruptcy will be free of financial hardship. 7 The belief is that the fresh start enables former debtors to earn, spend, borrow, and repay money at a manageable pace. 8 Arming former bankrupts with a new opportunity in life, the fresh start supposedly sets them on a path to prosperity. 9 The promise of a better financial life after bankruptcy lures families to file for bankruptcy relief when they are overwhelmed with debt, and the transformative power of bankruptcy is central to the policy debates about our consumer bankruptcy system. 10 Yet, buried in the rhetoric of rehabilitation is a powerful but untested assumption: Filing bankruptcy is an effective solution to financial distress. From theoretical defenses penned by scholars 11 to the sweeping bankruptcy law reforms that Congress recently enacted, 12 the core assumption that shapes our bankruptcy laws is that bankruptcy offers debtors an effective way to improve their financial pros- 1 See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047, 1059 (1987). 2 See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 3 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO , pt. 1, at 71, (1973). 4 See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 91 (1999) ( Some scholars just reiterate the term fresh start in their justifications, saying, for example, that debtors should have an opportunity to begin anew or a chance to start over. ). 5 See Howard, supra note 1, at 1059 (comparing the term rehabilitation with the equally elusive term fresh start ). 6 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO , pt. 1, at 71, (1973). 7 See id. at See GROSS, supra note 4, at Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 10 See infra Part I.A. 11 See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 4, at See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No , 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) (effective Oct. 2005).
3 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 69 pects. On the surface, this assumption seems correct, perhaps even self-evident. Bankruptcy allows debtors to eliminate all or most of their debt; with the stroke of a pen, a judge can instantly sign away thousands of dollars of debt. 13 Thus, a natural assumption is that bankruptcy discharge steers debtors toward economic success. Newly healed from their financial crises, these families should be ready to enjoy the future rewards of participating in the American economy. This Article explores the assumption that consumer bankruptcy offers families a better financial future. Using original data, we evaluate how the theory of a fresh start operates in the lives of families who file bankruptcy. Focusing on the powerful, immediate discharge of debt available in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, we assess how families fare in the year after their bankruptcies. Our data come primarily from extensive telephone interviews with 359 debtors, which we conducted approximately one year after the debtors bankruptcy filings. 14 We correlate the postbankruptcy interview data with the debtors responses to a questionnaire that the debtors completed near the time of their bankruptcy filings and with their bankruptcy court records. 15 These multifaceted data provide a rich picture of how Chapter 7 affects the lives of those who go bankrupt and represent the first systematic effort to document the postbankruptcy experiences of Chapter 7 debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. 16 One of our simplest questions about life postbankruptcy yielded a shocking finding. We asked debtors the following question: Overall, since you filed for bankruptcy, has your financial situation improved, stayed about the same, or worsened? 17 Based on the fresh-start rhetoric and the perceived benefits of a Chapter 7 discharge, we expected that nearly all debtors would report an improved financial situation one year after their bankruptcies. The data nullified this hypothesis. Although 65% of debtors stated that their financial situations had improved since they filed Chapter 7, more than one-third of the debtors reported that their financial situations were actually the same as or worse than at the time of their bankruptcies. 18 Thus, while bankruptcy appears to help a majority of families to obtain a sustainable 13 See 11 U.S.C. 727 (2000) (discharge). 14 See infra Appendix for details about our methodology. 15 See infra Parts II & III. 16 We know of only one other sizeable study of American debtors postbankruptcy experiences, and it was conducted before Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, a major overhaul to the nation s bankruptcy laws. See DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (1971) (interviewing families two years after their bankruptcy filings). See infra Part I.B for further discussion of Stanley and Girth s findings. 17 All research records to which this Article refers, including questionnaires and telephone interview questions and responses, are on file with the authors. 18 See infra Part II.B.
4 70 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 fresh start, many former debtors continue to experience financial hardship that is as bad as or worse than the distress that initially triggered their bankruptcy filings. For many families, the fresh start either failed to materialize or dissipated within one year of the discharge of their debts. Data that we gathered on postbankruptcy financial management buttressed this finding: One year after bankruptcy, one in four families reported that paying their expenses was an ongoing struggle. 19 For these families, the promise of a better life was a theoretical hope, distant from the reality of their continuing financial difficulties. In light of these findings about the hardships of postbankruptcy life, we examined our data to document the ways in which bankruptcy leaves families vulnerable to financial distress. We compared those families who reported sustained financial improvement with those who reported that their financial situations had remained unchanged or worsened, analyzing the two groups across dozens of demographic and economic variables. 20 We identified one key trait that distinguished those families who continued to struggle after bankruptcy: Lack of adequate steady income. 21 Chronic or new postbankruptcy income declines plagued families for whom the fresh start never materialized. The data supporting this finding offer important insights into the sources of these income problems and the privations that families suffer as they strain to pay living costs such as utilities, insurance premiums, and rent that accumulate postbankruptcy. A true and lasting economic transformation requires more than erasing past debt; it requires families to retool their financial lives to close the gap between income and expenses. For families whose income is declining, this task is likely futile, if not impossible. Bankruptcy may offer a temporary refuge, but it does not generate sufficient or steady enough income to shelter families with chronic income problems from further economic distress. We conclude that the theory of the fresh start obfuscates the complicated reality of financial distress. The previously untested assumption that Chapter 7 bankruptcy offers an effective means to financial success is suspect. The current bankruptcy system is an inadequate solution for chronic income problems and does not insulate families from future financial shocks. Thus, understanding the limitations of a bankruptcy discharge to effectuate a fresh start has far-reaching implications for redirecting consumer bankruptcy law. The last decade of bankruptcy scholarship has focused on documenting the causes of 19 See infra Part II.A. 20 See infra Part III.A. 21 See id.
5 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 71 bankruptcy. 22 However, we also must attend to analyzing how bankruptcy law could better help families solve the underlying problems that lead to overindebtedness. Recognizing the primacy of income stability to lasting financial well-being reorients bankruptcy law to its principal goal of providing a fresh start. With this new perspective, we offer a comprehensive view of the practical realities that debtors must overcome to rebuild their financial lives. Making our consumer bankruptcy system more effective requires finding ways for bankruptcy law to deliver more consistently on the promise of the fresh start. This Article explores the postbankruptcy financial experiences of families and the implications of these experiences. In Part I, we examine theoretical perspectives and prior studies on the efficacy of consumer bankruptcy as a rehabilitative tool, and we discuss the methodology of our study. In Part II, we describe the financial stresses that many families confront in the year after their bankruptcies. In Part III, we explore the factors that correlate with a failure to achieve economic recovery after bankruptcy. We isolate steady and sufficient income as the key variable and refute several alternative hypotheses. We conclude in Part IV with the policy implications of our findings. A rich, complete understanding of consumer bankruptcy requires a nuanced perspective of the limitations of bankruptcy s fresh start as a means to economically rehabilitate families. I BACKGROUND The long-standing and much-touted theory of consumer debt relief is that it provides a fresh start for debt-laden individuals. 23 Despite the prevalence of the fresh-start concept, a dearth of knowledge exists about what happens to people after they file bankruptcy and only limited theorizing exists on what the contours of a fresh start should look like. The data we analyze in this Article use multiple instruments to measure financial well-being and offer a complex and textured portrait of postbankruptcy life. A. The Rhetoric of Rehabilitation The contours of the fresh start are elusive despite the phrase s ubiquity in consumer bankruptcy literature. 24 The idea of a fresh start predates the current Bankruptcy Code that Congress enacted in 1978 and appears to have roots in America s development of a discharge 22 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000). 23 See GROSS, supra note 4, at See Howard, supra note 1, at 1059.
6 72 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 injunction for individuals who filed bankruptcy. 25 The Supreme Court used this phrase as early as the 1930s, citing rehabilitation as the principal goal of a bankruptcy system. 26 The Court emphasized bankruptcy s opportunity for a new beginning as a crucial underpinning of a free-market, commercial economy. 27 The legislative history of America s various bankruptcy laws is replete with references to the fresh start. 28 In 1973, the Bankruptcy Commission summarized the prevailing view: Bankruptcy should rehabilitate debtors for continued and more value-productive participation in economic life. 29 During the recent reforms to the Bankruptcy Code, 30 Congress noted its intent to preserve the fresh start for the honest debtor. 31 This rhetoric is especially notable because the general nature of the reforms was unfriendly to most consumer debtors. 32 Nevertheless, congressional representatives affirmed or at least gave the appearance of affirming bankruptcy s importance as an opportunity for a fresh start. 33 Because the fresh start dominates theoretical discussions about consumer bankruptcy, scholars have attempted to examine and justify 25 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 355 (1991) (stating that the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was motivated by a desire to relieve the plight of debtors (quoting C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 105 (1935))). 26 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ( One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes. (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, (1915))). 27 See id.; see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (giving effect to the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code). 28 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H2053 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ( The application of such objective standards will help ensure that the fresh start provisions of Chapter VII will be granted to those who need them.... ); 145 CONG. REC. H2655 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Gekas) ( We, our enlightened forefathers, saw fit to allow the Congress to evolve in a situation in which a fresh start would be accorded to an ordinary citizen who cannot meet his obligations.... ). 29 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO , pt. 1, at 71 (1973). 30 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No , 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) (effective Oct. 2005). 31 Press Release, U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Praises President for Signing Comprehensive Bankruptcy Reform Legislation (Apr. 20, 2005), available at grassley.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=pressreleases.view&pressrelease_id=4897 [hereinafter Grassley April Press Release]. 32 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 6 8 (2001) (explicating numerous ways that bankruptcy law will likely harm most individual debtors). 33 See, e.g., Grassley April Press Release, supra note 31 (quoting Senator Grassley as stating, The Bankruptcy bill preserves a fresh start for people who are overwhelmed by medical debts, loss of a job, or sudden unforeseen emergencies ).
7 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 73 the normative underpinnings of the fresh start. 34 Margaret Howard, who has explicated the multiple ways in which the fresh start could rehabilitate consumer debtors, observes that rehabilitation encompasses at least three goals: consumer financial education of the debtor, emotional and psychological relief from financial failure, and renewed debtor participation in the open-credit economy. 35 Each of these components presents a different way to evaluate the efficacy of the Bankruptcy Code for individuals who seek debt relief. Until 2005, the Bankruptcy Code did not provide for financial education, although a very small number of instructional programs did exist. 36 The newly amended Bankruptcy Code requires that an individual debtor complete a program of financial education to be eligible for a discharge. 37 This reform suggests that Congress views financial education as a valuable tool that enables debtors to capitalize on the fresh start. Recent academic research has evaluated the role that financial education plays in helping debtors avoid financial distress in the future. 38 Eventually, financial education may be a proven component of bankruptcy s fresh start, but historically, bankruptcy law has embraced a different model of rehabilitation. Similarly, the law does not explicitly effectuate the psychological and emotional relief that families should experience from filing bankruptcy. The automatic stay and the discharge do relieve debtors from the pressure of negotiating with creditors, but these provisions serve other purposes as well. 39 Limited data are available to evaluate the psychological benefits of bankruptcy for debtors and their families. 40 Nevertheless, such benefits may well be substantial, and future re- 34 See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (1994); Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515 (1991); Charles G. Hallinan, The Fresh Start Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49 (1986); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1397 ( [A] normative theory of the fresh-start policy must... explain why, in the context of a social and economic order premised on individual autonomy, the law should make inalienable the right to a fresh start. ). 35 See Howard, supra note 1, at See Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 557, (2001) (discussing a handful of financial education programs for Chapter 13 debtors that operated before the 2005 bankruptcy amendments and noting that education was less common for Chapter 7 debtors). 37 See 11 U.S.C.A. 1328(g)(1) (West 2005). 38 See, e.g., Richard L. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social Analytic Jurisprudence to Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, (suggesting ways to implement the content and delivery of financial education that the amended Bankruptcy Code requires). 39 See 11 U.S.C. 362 (2000) (automatic stay); 11 U.S.C. 727 (2000) (discharge). 40 See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at 69.
8 74 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 search of an ethnographic nature would enrich our understanding of how psychological harm and debt intersect. The third goal, economic rehabilitation, is the core of the freshstart policy in bankruptcy, at least as far as scholars have historically articulated the concept. A legal discharge from debt is the primary mechanism for economic rehabilitation and many often view it as being synonymous with the fresh start. 41 However, discharge seeks merely to implement the rehabilitation of debtors; it is no more than the chosen means to an end. Therefore, a narrow focus on discharge does not justify the fresh-start policy or help define when such rehabilitation should be available. 42 Moreover, a discharge of past debt does not ensure or even adequately delineate the contours of future economic success. Most scholarship generally asserts that rehabilitation consists of merely positioning the debtor to reenter the economy unhampered by past debt, but the ultimate objective is to provide the debtor with the incentive to earn income, spend money, and reenter the credit economy. 43 Such successful borrowing sustains the macroeconomy, which increasingly relies on consumer debt. 44 Strong economic health also prevents individuals from turning to social welfare programs for support. 45 Presumably, borrowing facilitates an immediately improved lifestyle for individuals and helps smooth gaps between income and consumption. Broadly conceived, the goal of bankruptcy rehabilitation is not to change the consumer behavior of borrowing, but to foster a different outcome of the behavior: Repayment instead of default. 46 As Karen Gross has explained, [w]e do not want debtors simply to stop incurring debt[;]... we want debtors to be able to continue borrowing if they put themselves in the position to be able to repay what they owe their creditors. 47 If we interpret the fresh-start policy in this way, what happens to people after bankruptcy defines the success or failure of our bankruptcy system. The adequacy of a rehabilitative system does not de- 41 See Howard, supra note 1, at 1047 ( The purpose of the consumer bankruptcy system, effectuated by discharge, is to give a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor. ); Jackson, supra note 34, at 1393 ( For these reasons, discharge is viewed as granting the debtor a financial fresh start. ). 42 See GROSS, supra note 4, at 91; Howard, supra note 1, at See Howard, supra note 1, at 1059, See SUSAN BURHOUSE, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., EVALUATING THE CONSUMER LENDING REVOLUTION (2003), (noting that consumer spending makes up more than two-thirds of America s gross domestic product and contributed over 85% of the nation s economic growth between 2001 and 2003). 45 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at (discussing bankruptcy in the free-market economy as an individualized risk alternative to government social safety programs that collectivize the risk of financial failure). 46 See GROSS, supra note 4, at Id.
9 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 75 pend on changes in the number of bankruptcy filings or dollars discharged. 48 These statistics may reflect the depth and breadth of financial distress in American society, but they reveal nothing about whether bankruptcy functions effectively to rehabilitate debtors. To evaluate accurately whether bankruptcy law is effectuating the goal of giving debtors a meaningful fresh start, the most crucial data to examine are the economic situations of families after their bankruptcies. The rhetoric about rehabilitation is powerful, and the academic and political consensus about the fresh start as the principal theory of consumer bankruptcy is strong and stable. To date, however, the empirical evidence necessary to assess the reality of the fresh start has been missing. 49 B. Prior Studies There is a paucity of data about how debtors fare after bankruptcy. Do families successfully regain financial health after receiving a discharge of debt? For those families who experience financial distress again, what factors explain this outcome? Jean Braucher recently identified the importance of gathering data to answer these questions. 50 She notes that [w]e do not know to what extent bankruptcy is a turning point in consumer debtors financial lives, and how many continue to be over-indebted and for what reasons.... [T]he obstacles to long-term financial security after bankruptcy are a matter of conjecture. 51 As Braucher further states, gaping holes in our knowledge make it difficult to evaluate the adequacy of the current bankruptcy system. 52 The prior research on life postbankruptcy is sparse but suggestive of the complex nature of financial recovery. The best available data are from cases filed under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Because families who file Chapter 13 bankruptcy do not receive a discharge of their debts until the end of a three- to five-year period, 48 Yet, in recent years, Congress focused on exactly these two criteria in debating whether to amend the Bankruptcy Code. See BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1999, S. REP. NO , at 2 (1999); see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2004) (documenting media and legislative response to an annual bankruptcy filing rate exceeding one million in 1996); Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77, 84 (2004) (quoting congressional representatives who cited the total amount of discharged debt as the reason for their support of the bankruptcy reform bill). 49 Mark L. Power, Tahira K. Hira & Roger P. Murphy, Personal Bankruptcy a Risk Management Technique: Policy Implications, RISK MGMT. & INS. REV., Winter 1999, at 81, ( A review of bankruptcy literature shows that none of the studies have reported the long-term personal and financial consequences of filing bankruptcy. ). 50 See Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1068, (2004). 51 Id. at Id. at 1091.
10 76 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 during which they must use their wages to repay a portion of their past debts, the court system monitors these debtors throughout the Chapter 13 process. 53 A few longitudinal studies have followed some of these families. 54 These studies aimed to measure what percentage of debtors completed their Chapter 13 payments and received a discharge. 55 Generally, the authors found a relatively low rate of Chapter 13 completion but noted that the percentage of Chapter 13 debtors receiving a discharge varied greatly in districts across the country. 56 These findings caused scholars and bankruptcy professionals to express concern about the efficacy of Chapter 13 and provoked a call for the repeal or revision of Chapter The Chapter 13 failure rate suggests that debtors may experience financial instability after filing bankruptcy given that a missed payment is often the cause of Chapter 13 dismissal. 58 The published studies do not attempt to measure the source or nature of such financial problems, likely because of the difficulty and expense of locating families, obtaining research consent, and developing and coding a primary data instrument such as a survey or personal interview. 59 These same factors have probably hindered any meaningful research about what happens to those families who do receive a Chapter 13 discharge upon completion of their bankruptcies. Even less is known about the outcomes of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Chapter 7 is liquidation bankruptcy, in which a debtor receives an immediate discharge of most past unsecured debt in return for surrendering nonexempt assets. 60 Most families receive a discharge of all of their unsecured debts within two or three months of filing for relief under Chapter The immediacy of relief in a consumer liquidation case partially eases the longitudinal data collection issues identified regarding Chapter 13 cases. Yet, there are no empirical data on the postbankruptcy experiences of families who file under Chapter 7 53 See 11 U.S.C.A. 1322(d)(2)(C) (West 2005). 54 See, e.g., Braucher, supra note See id. at See id. at (summarizing variations in Chapter 13 completion rates in several studies). 57 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 506 n.19 (1993); William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85, 104 (1989); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, (1994). 58 See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989). 59 See, e.g., STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDI- TORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 121 (5th ed. 2006). 61 See 11 U.S.C. 727 (2000).
11 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 77 of the Bankruptcy Code. 62 The only recent study that has inquired about the postbankruptcy experiences of debtors who filed liquidation bankruptcy was conducted in Australia. 63 The best data about American debtors are forty years old and were collected under the pre-1978 bankruptcy law, which was called the Bankruptcy Act. 64 In the mid-1960s, David Stanley and Marjorie Girth conducted landmark bankruptcy research that the Brookings Institute funded. A component of this large study included interviewing four hundred people who had filed bankruptcy two years prior. 65 The researchers asked the former debtors to describe their financial situations at the time of the interviews as compared with when they filed bankruptcy. 66 The table below shows the responses from the Chapter 7 debtors in their sample. TABLE 1: RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR FINANCIAL SITUATION NOW, COMPARED WITH WHEN YOU WENT INTO BANKRUPTCY COURT? Answer Percent Much better 34 A little better 29 About the same 28 Even worse 8 Much worse 2 n=400 Source: 1966 interviews with former bankrupts, Stanley and Girth at 67 These responses demonstrate that among those who filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy, more than one in three families experienced financial situations that were the same as or worse than at the time of their bankruptcies. The remaining 63% of families reported that their financial situations two years postbankruptcy were either a little better or much 62 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2123, 2147 (2002) (characterizing the state of knowledge about what happens to debtors postbankruptcy as silence ); see generally Power, Hira & Murphy, supra note 49, at 82 (comparing the number of personal bankruptcies filed between 1980 and 1996 under Chapters 7, 11, and 13). 63 A published study of Australian debtors does exist. See MARTIN RYAN, THE LAST RESORT: A STUDY OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTS (1995). Ryan conducted interviews with seventy-six debtors who had filed bankruptcy in the prior seventeen months. See id. at 80. Under the Australian bankruptcy system, these debtors were not yet eligible for a discharge of their debts. See id. at 7 8. Differences in the American and Australian bankruptcy laws and in the demographics of bankruptcy filers in the two countries sharply limit the applicability of Ryan s findings to American debtors. 64 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 65 See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at See id. at
12 78 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 better than when they declared bankruptcy. 67 These findings suggest that Chapter 7 bankruptcy produced mixed results. While a majority of families reported improved financial situations, a substantial minority remained in financial hardship similar to or worse than what they faced when they initially sought bankruptcy relief. 68 These data suggest that a discharge of debt does not adequately equip all families with the capacity to avoid future financial difficulties. However, Stanley and Girth s research has several limitations. First, the study is decades old. 69 The researchers conducted the study before the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 70 a major revision to U.S. bankruptcy law. 71 Economic conditions have also changed in the last several decades, including job stability, availability of consumer credit, and family structures. 72 Second, Stanley and Girth provided only minimal discussion of their postbankruptcy data. 73 For example, they failed to discuss how such data intersect with the theoretical construct of the fresh start or any specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, data collection problems hindered a rich analysis of their findings. In their initial study of debtors, they collected demographic and financial data from a large sample of consumer debtors. 74 At the time of the interviews, however, the researchers were unable to locate any substantial portion of this original sample and had to construct a new sample for their interviews. 75 This technique prevented Stanley and Girth from correlating the postbankruptcy findings with the demographic and court record data and sharply limited their ability to determine the shared characteristics of debtors who reported different levels of postbankruptcy financial wellbeing. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is surprising that no scholar has seized on Stanley and Girth s postbankruptcy data. Such knowledge is critical both to evaluate the adequacy of the bankruptcy system and to understand how a discharge of debt affects the economic circumstances of individuals. This failure to explore the consequences 67 See id. at See id. 69 See id. at 6 n.1, See id. 71 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No , 92 Stat (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 72 See generally ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA S ADDICTION TO CREDIT (2000) (documenting access to credit); KATHERINE S. NEW- MAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: DOWNWARD MOBILITY IN THE AGE OF AFFLUENCE (1999) (discussing increased job instability); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO- INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003) (explaining changes in family structures). 73 See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at See id. at See id.
13 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 79 of bankruptcy probably has both practical and theoretical explanations. Because there is rarely any court interaction with consumer debtors after their debts are discharged, postbankruptcy research cannot rely on public court filings, published opinions, or regulatory records. Further, conducting such longitudinal research is expensive and time consuming, because it requires creating data instruments and analyzing primary data. 76 Legal scholars have therefore eschewed postbankruptcy research in favor of examining debtors during bankruptcy, at which point the practical barriers, though formidable, are fewer. The extraordinary nature of the discharge as a theoretical remedy may also distract attention from measuring postbankruptcy outcomes. The transformative power of bankruptcy has a strong allure in America, a land touted for its second chances and opportunities for renewal. 77 American bankruptcy law provides the most generous debt relief system in the world, 78 which may explain the predominance of the untested assumption that discharge is an effective cure. The discharge is typically glorified without empirical examination: The advantages of bankruptcy are typically so profound that people who struggle to repay their debts, rather than having them erased, are often seen as foolish for continuing to throw good money after bad debts. 79 Such statements construct a view of the bankruptcy discharge as costless and miraculously transformative. Many assume that discharge guarantees a life free of further financial strain. 80 However, this view exaggerates the legal consequences of bankruptcy discharge, which the law carefully circumscribes. The legal construct of a discharge of past debt does not insulate families from experiencing financial hardship again and struggling with the same types of situations, such as job loss, that led to their overindebtedness. 81 During the recent debates over consumer bankruptcy reform, Congress portrayed Chapter 7 bankruptcy as fast, painless, and easily abused. In 2005, Senator Chuck Grassley stated that bankruptcy was 76 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002) (describing how passage of America s first federal bankruptcy act was influenced by recognition that debt was an inevitable part of an entrepreneurial, commercial economy). 78 See Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT L & COMP. L. REV. 1, (2005) ( The U.S. personal bankruptcy system is unquestionably the most forgiving in the world, and strongly encourages persons who have failed financially to get back into the economy and try again. ). 79 Liz Pulliam Weston, Why Going Broke Is a Fact of Life in America, (last visited May 19, 2006). 80 See supra text accompanying notes See infra Parts II.B & III.A.
14 80 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 not intended to be a convenient financial planning tool where deadbeats can get out of paying their debt scott-free [sic] while honest Americans who play by the rules have to foot the bill. 82 Five years before, Republican Representative Bill McCollum of Florida complained that bankruptcy has become a first stop rather than a last resort. 83 These descriptions reflect an assumption that an immediate discharge of debt is a generous remedy that provides easy relief to those who file bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 restricts access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 84 This change in bankruptcy policy may reflect Congress s belief that an immediate fresh start is such a generous benefit that it should be limited to those who are judged truly needy because they lack the means to pay their debts. However, no data support this rosy view about the benefits of bankruptcy, and once again, the fresh-start policy was articulated in a theoretical vacuum rather than informed by empirical reality. The shortage of research on what happens to debtors after bankruptcy has allowed the concept of the fresh start to flourish unchecked. The dominant vision of bankruptcy s fresh start that debtors simply bounce back from financial failure 85 has obfuscated the complex realities of life postbankruptcy. Stanley and Girth s research suggests that although a majority of families report improved financial situations in the years after their bankruptcies, many do not. 86 However, the full implications of their findings have gone unrecognized, and scholars have failed to study how and why a substantial percentage of formerly bankrupt families continue to experience financial hardship. Without an understanding of why many families remain in distress after bankruptcy, it is impossible to evaluate the efficacy of the bankruptcy system. The rhetoric of rehabilitation has masked the realities of the fresh start and fundamentally limited a complete assessment of bankruptcy law in action. C. Methodology and General Findings The data in this Article were collected during Phase III of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, a large, multiresearcher, multistate 82 Press Release, U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Renews Effort to Reform Bankruptcy Code (Feb. 2, 2005), [hereinafter Grassley February Press Release]. 83 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 8 (1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum). 84 See Pub. L. No , 119 Stat. 23, 27 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. 707(b)). 85 Weston, supra note See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at
15 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 81 study of consumer bankruptcy. 87 The research sample consists of consumer bankruptcy cases filed in the first months of 2001 in five judicial districts across the nation. The core sample contains 1,250 consumer bankruptcy cases. The ratio of sampled Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases reflected the distribution in each judicial district. Consequently, we gathered data on 780 Chapter 7 bankruptcies and 470 Chapter 13 bankruptcies. The Consumer Bankruptcy Project used three instruments to gather data. First, a questionnaire was distributed to debtors at the mandatory meetings of creditors. 88 The questionnaire requested demographic information such as age, occupation, and marital status, and inquired about the family s reasons for seeking bankruptcy relief. For each debtor who completed a questionnaire, we collected data from the corresponding public court records, including the bankruptcy petition and schedules. This second data instrument yielded information about the debtors assets, liabilities, income, and expenses at the time of their bankruptcies. The questionnaire invited debtors to participate in a series of three follow-up telephone interviews in return for compensation of fifty dollars per interview. These telephone interviews comprise the third method of data collection. Approximately one year after their bankruptcies, 930 debtors completed telephone interviews. The data presented in this Article were generated from a subsample of 359 interview participants who filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 89 This subsample captures 46% of the 780 Chapter 7 cases in the study s core sample. 90 A small team of trained researchers conducted telephone interviews that were approximately one hour long. Responses to the 87 We each served as Project Director of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project for a period. Our responsibilities included overseeing the data collection process. The other professors who contributed to the design and implementation of the study were David Himmelstein, Robert Lawless, Bruce Markell, Michael Schill, Teresa Sullivan, Susan Wachter, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, and Steffie Woolhandler. A fuller discussion of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project s methodology is available in the Appendix. 88 See 11 U.S.C. 341 (2000). 89 Families who filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy are ineligible by law to receive a discharge until three to five years after their bankruptcy filings. See 11 U.S.C.A. 1325(b)(4)(A) (West 2005). The experiences of Chapter 13 debtors while they are repaying their debts offer a rich field for further study but are beyond the scope of this Article. 90 Because the contact information that many of the debtors provided was no longer correct, we were unable to reach them for an interview. Consequently, our data may overrepresent the economic stability of the postbankruptcy population. That is, those who could not be located may be the most financially distressed group, considering that they moved and changed telephone numbers in the immediate aftermath of their bankruptcies. In anticipation of this problem, we asked debtors to provide us with two alternative contacts, which increased the response rate. Nevertheless, some debtors gave only their own information, and sometimes, we were still unable to locate them.
16 82 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 interviews were coded into a specially designed database. 91 Most questions were close-ended, and many were designed to explore families postbankruptcy financial status. Primary petitioners in the subsample averaged forty-three years old. Approximately one-third were married and living with a spouse, while another 7% were married but living separately. The median occupational prestige score was 36; 92 this score represents occupations such as office clerk, bricklayer, teacher s assistant, and steel worker. Approximately 32% of the respondents reported that they owned their homes at the time of filing. When we reviewed the economic variables, we found a wide range of incomes. Eight debtors, or just over 2% of the sample, reported no income whatsoever. At the other end of the spectrum, one debtor reported annual earnings of just over $101,000. Overall, median annual income for the subsample was $21,870 and median unsecured debt was $27,573. Debtors who completed the telephone interviews were self-selected, introducing the possibility of respondent bias. 93 To test for this bias, we compared interview participants and nonparticipants on several important demographic and economic variables. Demographically, the two groups were comparable on the variables of age, employment status, and homeownership. However, interview participants were significantly more likely to be single and white than those who did not complete interviews. Analysis of the economic variables did not reveal any statistically significant differences between the two groups. Debtors court records revealed similar incomes, assets, and liabilities. Overall, we conclude that our subsample was representative of the 780 Chapter 7 cases that comprised the Consumer Bankruptcy Project s core sample. 94 To further test the validity of our sample, we compared it to the samples that previous bankruptcy studies used. These studies measured common demographic and economic characteristics of debtors, such as age, marital status, occupational prestige score, homeownership, median annual income, and median unsecured debt. 95 The data from our subsample are consistent with prior profiles of families who filed bankruptcy. We con- 91 Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, Debtor Survey Responses, Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Phase III 1 (2001) (on file with authors). 92 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 58, at (describing the occupation prestige score that the U.S. Census bureau uses). 93 See EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (10th ed. 2004). 94 See infra Appendix for further detail on the participant and nonparticipant analyses. 95 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22; WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 72; see generally Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2004).
17 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 83 clude, like other researchers, 96 that most debtors are demographically similar to middle-class Americans but earn much lower incomes at the time of their bankruptcies. We generated the analysis presented in this Article from two main lines of inquiry that we designed for the telephone interviews. First, we asked interview participants if at the time of the interview they were experiencing any financial difficulties. We were interested in how many families were struggling postbankruptcy and what types of financial problems they were facing. We also asked participants to compare their financial situations at the time of their bankruptcies with their situations at the time of the interviews, approximately one year postbankruptcy. From these principal data points, we are able to explore whether and how Chapter 7 s discharge of debt affects the financial future of former debtors. II THE POSTBANKRUPTCY EXPERIENCES OF CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS A. Struggling to Make Ends Meet Our initial analysis examined how the families in our subsample dealt with their postbankruptcy financial obligations. Our interest was twofold. First, we wanted to measure families postbankruptcy financial health. Were they able to pay new bills after the discharge released them from their past unsecured debts? Second, we wanted to examine what a troubled financial situation meant in the context of families daily lives. When families continue to experience hardship after bankruptcy, how does this translate into the everyday realities of making ends meet? To explore these issues, we began by asking debtors the following question: Do you have any debts that you are currently having difficulties paying? As Figure 1 shows, a full quarter of debtors in our subsample affirmed that they struggled to pay some debts postbankruptcy. 96 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 22, at 27; Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, , 144 (2003).
18 84 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 FIGURE 1: PERCENT OF DEBTORS HAVING DIFFICULTY PAYING DEBTS 25% 75% No n=267 Yes n=88 These former debtors had already received an immediate discharge of most of their unsecured debt, a mechanism many herald as a means to reenter the consumer economy. 97 Despite this relief, 25% of families reported postbankruptcy financial stress. In light of the rhetoric about Chapter 7 bankruptcy allowing debtors to get off scott-free [sic], 98 these data are a powerful reminder that a fresh start does not equal a free ride. In the year following bankruptcy, these families still confronted twelve months of new expenses. Thus, the Chapter 7 discharge the holy grail of debt relief 99 does not generate adequate income. Postbankruptcy, new bills remain a challenge for a significant number of families. This finding reveals the precarious economic circumstances that many families face after filing bankruptcy. One hypothesis as to why some families continue to experience financial problems is that debtors are inherently profligate. 100 Proponents of this perspective might assert that bankrupt families are spendthrifts who simply continue their pattern of frivolous spending after bankruptcy. Our data challenge this view. Our research asked debtors who reported having difficulties paying their postbankruptcy 97 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO , pt. 1, at 71, (1973). 98 See Grassley February Press Release, supra note MANN, supra note 77, at See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It s Time for Means-Testing, BYU L. REV. 177, 183 (1999) ( Society should not broadly afford relief to well-off, able bodied debtors when poorer people, who have not elected that remedy, struggle to keep their commitments and live within their means. ).
19 2006] THE FAILURE OF BANKRUPTCY S FRESH START 85 bills to choose the sources of their hardship from a list of multiple types of debts. 101 We designed this question to reveal which specific expenses troubled families after bankruptcy. Figure 2 illustrates these findings. FIGURE 2: TYPES OF BILLS THAT FAMILIES ARE STRUGGLING TO PAY Utilities 36% Car 32% Housing Taxes Education 22% 24% 23% Medical Insurance 19% 18% Credit Cards 15% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% n=359 The postbankruptcy expenses that families struggled to pay were mundane. More than one-third of the families reported that it was difficult to pay their monthly utility bills, such as heat, electricity, water, phone, or garbage. Approximately one in three families struggled with car payments or car repairs. An African-American debtor from California described how, despite some improvements following bankruptcy, he was still struggling to keep current on his car payments: I am catching up now. I have a job and can afford to eat. I am still hiding my car so they won t repo[ssess] it. I am still a couple of payments behind on that. 102 This debtor s fear of losing his car illustrates the desperation that many families feel as they cling to the slender reed of hope that the fresh start offers. Even more alarming, about one-fourth of families found it hard to make their mortgage or rent payments after bankruptcy. Thus, even without the burden of debt, many postbankruptcy debtors struggle to meet their families basic needs. 101 The exact language we used was, Do you have any debts that you are currently having difficulties paying? If the debtor said yes, we then asked him or her, What types of debts are those? The answer options were the following: medical bills, mortgage or rent payments, credit card bills, utility bills, car payments or repairs, taxes, insurance payments, student loans, and child support or alimony payments. 102 Porter & Thorne, supra note 91 (quoting survey respondent CA ).
20 86 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:67 These data illustrate another important point: These families are not struggling because they are misusing credit. Rather, the debts that worry these families, such as utilities, transportation, housing, and taxes, are mostly for necessities and are frequently not even credit purchases; utilities, housing, and transportation are normally prepaid or carry a deposit to protect the merchant. Credit cards were a problem for fewer than one in six families. One year postbankruptcy, families are not borrowing themselves back into debt. Their difficulties arise from trying to meet typical middle-class expenses: keeping a roof over their family s heads, fixing their car s radiator, or repaying the family doctor. Many families who emerge from bankruptcy do not live in financial ease; in fact, financial stress characterizes their postbankruptcy lives. One-fourth of families continue to struggle to pay ordinary monthly bills. Clearly, the everyday expenses of middle-class families do not end with a bankruptcy court s stamp on a discharge order. Filing bankruptcy is a dose of the law s strongest medicine for financial distress, and the fact that this remedy proves insufficient for 25% of families suggests that we must reappraise the power of the fresh start. B. Postbankruptcy Financial Situations A second measure of postbankruptcy financial well-being examined how debtors overall financial situations had changed after bankruptcy. Each family was asked the following question: Overall, since you filed for bankruptcy, has your financial situation improved, stayed about the same, or worsened? For comparison, we modeled this question on the inquiry that Stanley and Girth had used in their bankruptcy study. 103 The available response options were objective; we did not ask debtors to apply subjective labels such as good or bad to their situations. In addition, families were not asked to rate their financial situations in terms of external criteria, such as by using phrases like compared to other Americans. Such results would not be helpful because we would expect bankrupt families to require time to accumulate savings and establish security equal to that of their nonbankrupt counterparts. Instead, we intended the question s design to elicit a comparison between the family s financial situation at the time of the bankruptcy filing and at the time of the interview, one year postbankruptcy. 104 Based on the powerful relief that the dis- 103 STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 16, at 66 ( How would you describe your own financial situation now, compared with when you went into bankruptcy court? ). 104 The question s wording was potentially ambiguous. We believed that debtors would interpret the question such that they would compare their current situations with their situations at the time of bankruptcy. Some respondents may have assumed that
Borrowing After Bankruptcy by Katherine Porter * I. INTRODUCTION Competing ideas about the causes of consumer bankruptcy fueled the intensity of the debate about bankruptcy reform. With millions of Americans
Texas Law Review See Also Response A Response to a Pretend Solution Henry E. Hildebrand, III * I. Introduction When a noted academic such as Professor Katherine Porter undertakes an empirical study of