Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ark/c2411071/us-term-limits-inc-v-hill
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 21:33:59+00:00
Document Index: 280687638

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 29', '§ 7', '§ 25003', '§ 9', '§ 22', 'art. 6', '§ 4', '§ 16', 'art. 5', '§ 17', '§ 8']

US Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, Arkansas Supreme Court, State Courts, COURT CASE
872 S.W.2d 349 (1994) 316 Ark. 251
U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC., et al., Appellants,
Bobbie E. HILL, et al., Appellees.
ARKANSAS TERM LIMITATION AMENDMENT
SECTION 1Executive Branch
(a) The Executive Department of the State shall consist of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of State, Auditor of State, Attorney General, and Commissioner of State Lands, all of whom shall keep their offices at the seat of government, and hold their offices for the term of four years, and until their successors are elected and qualified.
(b) No elected officials of the Executive Department of this State may serve in the same office more than two such four-year terms.
SECTION 2Legislative Branch
(b) The Arkansas Senate shall consist of members to be chosen every four years by the qualified electors of the several districts. No member of the Arkansas Senate may serve more than two such four-year terms.
SECTION 3Congressional Delegation
(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas.
(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States Senate from Arkansas.
SECTION 4Severability
SECTION 5Provisions Self-Executing
SECTION 6Application
(a) This Amendment to the Arkansas Constitution shall take effect and be in operation on January 1, 1993, and its provisions shall be applicable to all persons thereafter seeking election to the offices specified in this Amendment.
(b) All laws and constitutional provisions which conflict with this Amendment are hereby repealed to the extent that they conflict with this amendment.
We turn next to the facet of this case on which the circuit court predicated its decision the absence of an Enacting Clause in Amendment 73. Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution sets the following requirement:
Enacting ClauseThe style of all the bills initiated and submitted under the provisions of this section shall be, "Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Arkansas" (municipality, or county as the case may be). In submitting measures to the people, the Secretary of State and all other officials shall be guided by the general election laws or municipal laws, as the case may be, until additional legislation is provided therefor.
Under the title "Initiative," Amendment 7 reads:
The first power reserved by the people is the initiative. Eight percent of the legal voters may propose any law and ten percent may propose a Constitutional *355 Amendment by initiative petition, and every such petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed. (Emphasis ours.)
§ 2. House of representatives.
[2.] No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen.
§ 3. Senate.
[3.] No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of the state for which he shall be chosen.
The ultimate document proposed by the framers and ratified by the states as the U.S. Constitution enumerated three benchmarks for congressional serviceage, citizenship, and residency. No other qualifications were included. When the House of Representatives attempted to add one more by refusing to seat one of its own members in 1967, Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, for wrongfully diverting federal funds to himself, his wife, and staff, the United States Supreme Court scuttled the effort. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969). In doing so, the Court quoted Alexander Hamilton, who was answering an antifederalist charge during the ratification process that the proposed U.S. Constitution favored the wealthy and propertied interests:
395 U.S. at 539, 89 S.Ct. at 1973.
The Legislature referenced by Hamilton was the Congress, but it is his allusion to the fixed and immutable character of the enumerated qualifications that is illuminating today. In that same decision, Powell v. McCormack, the Court made mention of a Report by the House Committee on Elections regarding the eligibility of William McCreery to sit in Congress. The issue concerned an additional residency requirement imposed by the State of Maryland that disqualified him. That Report clearly and specifically determined that the U.S. Constitution reserved no authority in the State legislatures to change, add to, or diminish the qualifications set forth in Article 1. 395 U.S. at 542-543, 89 S.Ct. at 1974-1975, citing 17 Annals of Cong. 871-872 (1807).
This effort to dress eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access clothing, that is, as a regulatory measure falling within the State's ambit under Article 1, § 4, is not without some rational appeal. We do not agree, however, that excluding a broad category of persons from seeking election to Congress is a mere exercise of regulatory power. The intent and the effect of Amendment 73 are to disqualify congressional incumbents from further service. We do recognize that an ineligible congressman under Amendment 73 is not totally disqualified and might run as a write-in candidate for Congress or receive a gubernatorial appointment to fill a vacancy in the same body. Following this thread, the appellants posit that term limitations do not mean disqualificationonly ineligibility to be placed on the ballot as a candidate for certain offices. These glimmers of opportunity for those disqualified, though, are faint indeedso faint in our judgment that they cannot salvage Amendment 73 from constitutional attack. See Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.Wash.1994).
5. Sections 1 and 2 of Amendment 73 are not invalid because they were combined with unconstitutional limits on United States Senators and Representatives.
6. The court cannot conclude that the voter's dislike for incumbent United States Senators and Representatives was overwhelming to the extent that it caused voters to impose state limits on officers, senators and representatives.
7. Sections 1 and 2 of Amendment 73 are severable from Section 3 pursuant to the severability clause in Section 6 thereof.
Recent authority indicates that other jurisdictions subscribe to the same basic principles for determining severability as we in Arkansas. See Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir.1993); Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 6 Cal. 4th 707, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 449, 863 P.2d 694 (1993); Legislature of the State of California v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309 (1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1292, 117 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1992). In Brown, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether the unconstitutional portion of the act was functionally independent and, secondly, on whether the Congress would have enacted the law without the unconstitutional provision. In Legislature of the State of California v. Eu, the California Supreme Court proposed a test with three facets for severability whether the invalid portion of the measure was grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable from the remainder. By volitionally separable, the court meant whether the people would have voted for it independent of the invalid provisions. The court in Eu considered the severability of a void provision in a constitutional amendment establishing term limits. It declared the clause in the amendment relating to restrictions on pensions for incumbent legislators to be unconstitutional but held it to be severable and upheld the balance of the amendment fixing term limits.
A reading of Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Amendment 73 shows that they are grammatically independent and functionally independent. The question then remains whether the Arkansas voters would have adopted Sections 1 and 2 relating to State officeholders and legislators in the absence of Section 3 which applies to U.S. senators and representatives. We believe that the circuit court was correct in concluding that what the people voted for in adopting Amendment 73 was a theme or conceptthe limitation of service terms for persons in public office. The fact that one category of persons is eliminated from that adopted Amendment does not mean that the voters did not intend it to apply to the remaining two categories. Nor do we consider term limits on federal legislators to be the bait which enticed voters to vote aye on the amendment as a whole. There is nothing to suggest that this was the case. In short, we are confident that Amendment 73 would have passed even without the inclusion of Section 3 in that the majority was voting for a conceptthe limitation of public service terms.
286 Cal.Rptr. at 303, 816 P.2d at 1329.
State of Washington. Wash.Rev.Code § 29.15.240 (Supp.1993) (no terms served before November 3, 1992, may be used to determine eligibility to appear on the ballot) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
State of California. Cal. Const. art. XX, § 7 (applies to terms of state constitutional officers and legislators where the official was elected or appointed to the office after November 6, 1990) (adopted Nov. 6, 1990).
State of California. Cal.Elections Code § 25003 (Deering Supp.1993) (terms of office in Congress prior to January 1, 1993, shall not be counted) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
State of Colorado. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 9a (applies to terms of office in Congress beginning on *361 or after January 1, 1991) (approved Nov. 6, 1992).
State of Wyoming. Wyo.Stat. §§ 22-5-103, 22-5-104 (1992) (terms of service in state offices and in Congress prior to January 1, 1993, shall not be counted) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
State of Florida. Fla. Const. art. 6, § 4 (no person may appear on ballot for state or federal office if by end of current term in office, the person will have served in that same office for eight consecutive years) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
State of North Dakota. N.D.Cent.Code § 16.1-01-13.1 (Supp.1993) (person ineligible for Congress if by the start of the term for which election is being held that person has served at least twelve years) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
State of Oklahoma. Okla. Const. art. 5, § 17A (member of Legislature elected after effective date of amendment eligible to serve 12 additional years) (approved Sept. 18, 1990).
State of Ohio. Ohio Const. art. V, § 8 (terms beginning on or after January 1, 1993, shall be considered for eligibility to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
There can be no serious doubt that a state has plenary power to impose term limits on state officials, provided it is accomplished in a constitutionally permissible manner. The sponsors of Amendment 73 obviously knew that section 3 was of questionable constitutionality because of the different approach they used: ballot access. They knew that most of the public discussion of term limits had been in the context of congressional officeholders. When they chose to blanket the two groups (state and federal officeholders) into one unified package, the voters had no choice to approve one without the other. The two groups were not only inextricably linkedthey were systemically fused in such a manner that each ceased to have a separate existence for voting purposes. Although section 3 is couched in ballot-access terminology, the distinction between outright bar and ballot-access is too fine a point for the average voter to grasp.
I concur with the holding that Amendment 73, in part, violates the Constitution of the United States. It does so for three reasons. *364 First, the framers rejected the idea of term limits in drafting the Constitution. Second, allowing a several state to create qualifications for national officeholders is antithetical to republican values. Third, the imposition of term limitations upon members of the Congress of the United States would violate the Qualifications Clause of the Constitution because it would add a qualificationlack of incumbencyto the requirements that are fixed by the Constitution, and the several states do not have this power. See Plugge v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 654, 661, 841 S.W.2d 139, 143 (1992) (Dudley, J., dissenting).
Although I agree with today's decision upholding term limits upon state officeholders and severing that part of Amendment 73, I disagree with the holding of the majority that the eligibility restriction upon United States senators and representatives is unconstitutional. I start from the premise that all political authority resides in the people, limited only by those provisions of the federal or state constitutions specifically to the contrary. In this instance the people of Arkansas have spoken, prudently or otherwise, in the most direct means available to theman initiated amendment to their state constitution. That expression should not be denied them except on clear and compelling grounds. Such grounds have not been demonstrated to my satisfaction.
Plaintiffs next argue that the application of the 15 per cent rule [restricting which candidates' names would appear on the Democratic primary ballot to those who received at least 15 percent of the vote at the party's convention] transgresses Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 of the Constitution in that it unlawfully adds a qualification for the office of United States Senator beyond the age, citizenship and residency requirements of the Constitution.
Unlike the additional requirements involved in the cases cited by plaintiffs, failure to comply with the 15 percent rule does not render a candidate ineligible for the office of United States Senator. An individual is free to run as the candidate of another party, as an independent, or as a write-in candidate. If he is elected and meets the requirements of Article I, Section 3, he will be qualified to take office. As the Wyoming Supreme Court stated in State v. Crane, [65 Wyo. 189] 197 P.2d 864, 871 (1948), the test to determine whether or not the "restriction" amounts to a "qualification" within the meaning of Article I, Section 3, is whether the candidate "could be elected if his name were written in by a sufficient number of electors."
DocketNumber： 93-1240
Citation Numbers： 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349
Alwin E. Hopfmann v. Michael Joseph Connolly , 746 F.2d 97 ( 1984 )
federal-deposit-insurance-corporation-as-receiver-for-empire-savings-and , 991 F.2d 262 ( 1993 )
board-of-natural-resources-of-the-state-of-washington-and-washington-state , 992 F.2d 937 ( 1993 )
Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Com. , 6 Cal. 4th 707 ( 1993 )
McDonald v. Bowen , 468 S.W.2d 765 ( 1971 )
Culp v. Scurlock , 284 S.W.2d 851 ( 1955 )
97-cal-daily-op-serv-7867-97-daily-journal-dar-12688-bill-jones , 127 F.3d 839 ( 1997 )
97-cal-daily-op-serv-9535-97-daily-journal-dar-15471-tom-bates , 131 F.3d 843 ( 1997 )
In Re Initiative Petition No. 360 , 879 P.2d 810 ( 1994 )
Nevada Judges Ass'n v. Lau , 910 P.2d 898 ( 1996 )
Salt Lake City v. Ohms , 881 P.2d 844 ( 1994 )
State v. Gale , 273 Neb. 889 ( 2007 )
COM. TO EST. SHERWOOD FIRE DEPT. v. Hillman , 109 S.W.3d 641 ( 2003 )
Bates v. Jones , 904 F. Supp. 1080 ( 1995 )
Ray v. Mortham , 742 So. 2d 1276 ( 1999 )
Donovan v. Priest , 326 Ark. 353 ( 1996 )
Bates v. Jones , 958 F. Supp. 1446 ( 1997 )
League of Women Voters v. Diamond , 923 F. Supp. 266 ( 1996 )
Duggan v. Beermann , 249 Neb. 411 ( 1996 )