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Behringer Harvard Suit | Real Estate Investment Trust | Board Of Directors
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION LILLIAN HOHENSTEIN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, vs. BEHRINGER HARVARD REIT I, INC., BEHRINGER HARVARD HOLDINGS, LLC, ROBERT M. BEHRINGER, ROBERT S. AISNER, STEVEN W. PARTRIDGE, RONALD WITTEN, SCOTT W. FORDHAM, JAMES E. SHARP, and CHARLES G. DENNIS. Defendants. § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § §
Case No. 3:12-CV-03772
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Lillian Hohenstein ("Plaintiff") by her attorneys, alleges and for her class action complaint, upon personal knowledge as to herself and her own acts, as to all other matters upon information and belief derived from, inter alia, counsel’s review of documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), press releases issued by defendants, and publicly available news sources, such as newspaper articles, as follows: NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This is a class action on behalf of investors of Behringer Harvard REIT I ("BH
REIT" or the “Company”), against BH REIT, the parent company of its advisor Behringer Harvard Holdings, LLC, its Board of Directors (the “Board”) and certain of its executive officers (the "Individual Defendants") (collectively "Defendants") for violating federal securities laws and breaching their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the proposed class.
Case 3:12-cv-03772-G Document 1 Filed 09/17/12
With the contraction of the United States economy, the Federal Reserve Board
has continued to pursue a policy of historically low interest rates. The current rates of interest available to savers are the lowest in the history of the country. Passive investors seeking reasonable risk adjusted returns have few attractive options. Individual savers, in particular, have been hard hit because safe investments traditionally available to "Mom and Pop" savers such as certificates of deposit, money market funds, and highly rated corporate bonds offer almost no return on investment. These developments have left retirees and other retail investors vulnerable to investment promoters who promise attractive rates of return. 3. Defendants are in the business of selling investments in real estate investment
trusts, or "REITs." Most REIT shares are registered for trading on a national securities exchange. Publicly traded REIT shares are widely followed by securities analysts. Their share prices fluctuate with changes in the REIT's portfolio and economic conditions. Other REITs, such as BH REIT are referred to as “non-traded REITs,” as their shares are not registered for trading on any exchange. Investors in non-traded REITs generally expect to hold their shares for a five to seven year term, with the understanding that the sponsor will seek to list the shares on a national securities exchange. Investors depend on the legitimate operation and accounting of the REIT's business and the sale of properties or listing for the return of their principal. Investors in nontraded REITs who seek to sell their shares before the term of the investment must either resell their shares to the sponsor or sell in an inefficient secondary market, usually at severe discounts. Because non-traded REIT shares do not trade in an open market, investors depend on the disclosures made by the sponsor for information about the value of the REIT's shares. 4. Since BH REIT’s shares are not listed on a national stock exchange, BH REIT is
deemed an illiquid investment. Therefore, BH REIT’s articles of incorporation mandate that the
Company provide its shareholders with a liquidity event by 2017 by means of a liquidation of its investments and subsequent distribution to shareholders (the “Liquidation”), if its common stock was not listed by the Liquidation deadline, unless that deadline is extended. 5. Plaintiff and the proposed class invested in BH REIT with the understanding that
the money they invested with Defendants would be used to pursue the stated investment objectives of BH REIT which were: “to preserve, protect and return your capital contributions, to maximize cash distributions paid to you, to realize growth in the value of our investments upon our ultimate sale of such investments; and to list our shares for trading on a national securities exchange….” The offerings in which Plaintiff and the proposed class invested were structured as “blind pool” offerings, in which Plaintiff and the proposed class committed their money before knowing what properties Defendants would purchase with the net offering proceeds. Plaintiff necessarily depended on the accuracy of Defendants' disclosures about their investment objectives and policies to assess the risks associated with investment. 6. BH REIT’s initial public offering occurred between February 19, 2003 and
February 19, 2005 (“Initial Offering”). The initial offering was of 80,000,000 shares at a price of $10 per share. The Company also offered up to 8,000,000 additional shares at $10.00 per share under its distribution reinvestment plan at this time. BH REIT commenced a second public offering that offered 80,000,000 shares of common stock at $10.00 a share on February 11, 2005 (“Second Offering”). The Second Offering also offered 16,000,000 additional shares at $9.50 per share. This was terminated on October 20, 2006. BH REIT commenced a third public offering (“Third Offering”) on October 20, 2006. Under this offering, BH REIT offered
200,000,000 shares at $10.00 per share and an additional 50,000,000 shares at $9.50 per share. On January 5, 2009, BH REIT then shocked those who had previously invested and commenced
the current offering of shares of common stock at a price of $4.64 (“Current Offering”). The termination date of the Current Offering is January 5, 2014 or the date which BH REIT sells all $570 million of the offering. 7. Since investing in BH REIT, Plaintiff and the proposed class have seen the value
of their investment plummet. On December 28, 2011, Defendants filed a Form-8-K with the SEC estimating the per share value of the Company’s common stock to be $4.64 per share, a 53.6% decline for those shareholders that purchased BH REIT stock at $10.00 per share. It is doubtful that BH REIT stock is even worth the $4.64 claimed by Defendants. As the Company’s shares have traded in the secondary market for as little as $2.40 per share. 8. Moreover, BH REIT has seen two of its properties foreclosed upon this year and
Defendants have intimated in the Company’s most recent quarterly report filed with the SEC that more foreclosures are on the horizon. Moreover, BH REIT has historically operated essentially what one might characterize as a Ponzi scheme. Although BH REIT has consistently paid distributions to its shareholders, it has never covered paying them out of real operating cash flow. Instead, Defendants have covered dividends out of offering proceeds. This flies in the face of BH REIT’s stated investment objective of preserving its shareholders capital contributions. 9. What’s worse is that although BH REIT is illiquid, Defendants have made it even
harder for the Company’s shareholders to exit their investment by both misrepresenting its true value and amending the Company’s charter to make it more difficult for third parties making a tender offer for BH REIT shares. 10. In March 2009, BH REIT suspended its shareholder redemption program under
which shareholders could sell their shares back to the Company. Then, on April 1, 2011, BH
REIT Filed a Schedule 14A Proxy Statement seeking shareholders’ approval to amend and restate its charter to require any person making a tender offer, including any mini tender-offer for fewer than 5% of outstanding securities to comply with most of the provisions of Regulation 14D of the Exchange Act. Defendants in part argued that it was necessary to restate the Company’s charter to effect the Liquidation. What they really were trying to do, however, was preserve their control over BH REIT. BH REIT shareholders approved the restated charter and thus, their only means of achieving liquidity now is attempting to tender their shares to third parties under a much more restrictive standard or the Liquidation. 11. Defendants’ representations regarding BH REIT’s valuation and the prospects for
the Liquidation are incredibly important to its shareholders given the non-public nature of the REIT. BH REIT’s shareholders rely upon Defendants’ representations when making material decisions regarding their investments when deciding whether to accept or reject occasional tender offers such as those made by CMG Legal Income Fund and its affiliates (“CMG”) on August 23, 2011 and February 23, 2012 (the “Tender Offers”). 12. In a September 7, 2011 Schedule 14D-9 and again in a February 24, 2012 14D-9,
Defendants claimed that shareholders should reject CMG’s Tender Offers in part because their estimated value of BH REIT exceeded that of the Tender Offers. However, Defendants
misrepresented the true value of BH REIT to keep shareholders from tendering. Defendants have done so because tendering jeopardizes their control over BH REIT. If Defendants lose control over BH REIT then they will no longer be able to continue to prosper from related party transactions they have forced BH REIT to undertake. Also, they will be no longer able to drain the millions of dollars in asset and property management fees from BH REIT that they charge every year despite its negative operational performance. Moreover, Defendants have failed to
inform BH REIT shareholders that CMG’s tender offers were a timely liquidity event and viable exit strategy for the Company’s stock. 13. By encouraging Plaintiff and the proposed class to repose trust and confidence in
Defendants and soliciting their investments in BH REIT, Defendants assumed a duty to deal fairly and forthrightly with Plaintiff, and to refrain from engaging in the acts, practices and courses of conduct described in this complaint. Defendants knew that by their actions they were likely to mislead Plaintiffs and cause financial and other injury to them. By engaging in the actions described in the complaint, Defendants breached and continue to breach their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. Moreover, Defendants have damaged BH REIT’s shareholders who were encouraged by false and misleading SEC filings disseminated by Defendants to not tender their shares to a third party. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 47. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to
Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aa, 28 U.S.C §§1331, 1337, and the principles of supplemental and pendent jurisdiction. 48. This Court also has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(a), as Plaintiff and
Defendants are either citizens of different states or citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interests and costs. This action is not a collusive action designed to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States that it would not otherwise have. 49. This Court has jurisdiction over each Defendant because each Defendant is either
a corporation that conducts business in, and maintains operations in, this District, or is an individual who has sufficient minimum contacts with this District so as to render the exercise of
jurisdiction by the District courts permissible under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 50. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1391(a) because: (1) one or more
defendants either reside in, or maintain executive offices in, this District; (2) a substantial portion of the transactions and wrongs complained of herein, including the defendants’ primary participation in the wrongful acts detailed herein, occurred within this District, and (3) defendants have received substantial compensation in this District by conducting business herein and by engaging in numerous activities that have had an effect in this District. 51. In connection with the acts, conduct and other wrongs complained or herein, the
Individual Defendants used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. THE PARTIES Plaintiff 52. Plaintiff initially purchased 500 shares of BH REIT on June 1, 2004 and made
subsequent purchases on various dates as indicated on the attached statement and is and was at all times relevant hereto, a shareholder of BH REIT. BH REIT I 53. BH REIT I, Inc. was incorporated in June 2002 as a Maryland corporation and has
elected to be taxed and currently qualifies, as a real estate investment trust. BH REIT maintains its headquarters at 17300 Dallas Parkway, Suite 1010, Dallas, Texas 75248. BH REIT operates institutional quality real estate. BH REIT completed its first property acquisition in October 2003, and as of December 31, 2011 BH REIT owned 57 properties located in 21 states and the District of Columbia. BH REIT may be served with process by and through its Registered
Agent, C T Corporation System, 350 North St. Paul Street, Suite 2900, Dallas, Texas 752014234. 54. Until August 31, 2012, BH REIT was externally managed and advised by BH Behringer Advisors in its capacity as BH REIT’s
Advisors, LLC (“Behringer Advisors”).
advisor was responsible for “managing the Company’s day-to-day affairs.” To become a “selfmanaged” REIT, effective August 31, 2012, BH REIT hired 54 persons previously employed by Behringer Advisors, although BH REIT will continue to purchase core services from Behringer Advisors such as, human resources, and information technology. BH REIT also contracts with HPT Management Services, LLC (“HPT Management”) which manages BH REIT’s properties. Both Behringer Advisors and HPT Management are owned and controlled by either Behringer Harvard Holdings, LLC or one of its subsidiaries. Behringer Harvard Holdings, LLC 55. Behringer Harvard Holdings, LLC (“Behringer Harvard Holdings”) is a limited
liability company incorporated in the State of Delaware and maintains its headquarters in Addison, Texas. Defendant Behringer is the majority owner, sole manager and Chief Executive Officer of Behringer Harvard Holdings. Behringer Harvard Holdings is the parent corporation of Behringer Advisors and HPT Management. Behringer Harvard Holdings may be served with process by and through its Registered Agent, Corporation Service Company, 2711 Centerville Road, Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19808. Director Defendants 56. Defendant Robert M. Behringer (“Behringer”) is Chairman of BH REIT’s Board
and has served as a director since June 2002. Defendant Behringer served as BH REIT’s Chief Executive Officer from June 2002 to June 2008. He has served as the sole manager and Chief
Executive Officer of Behringer Harvard Holdings, LLC since December 2001. Due to his experience and positions at the Company, access to internal corporate documents, conversations and connections with other corporate offices and employees, attendance at management and Board meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to in connection therewith, and Defendant Behringer is familiar with the wrongful conduct alleged herein and helped to facilitate that conduct. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant Behringer is a citizen of the State of Texas and a resident of Dallas County. Defendant
Behringer may be served with process at 5969 Westgrove Circle, Dallas, Texas 75248-2807. 57. Defendant Robert S. Aisner (“Aisner”) has been the President of BH REIT since
May 2005 and a director since June 2002. Additionally, Defendant Aisner has served as the Company’s Chief Executive Officer since August 2009, and also held this position from June 2008 until May 2009. Defendant Aisner also served as the Company’s Chief Operating Officer from February 2003 to June 2008. Due to his experience and positions at the Company, access to internal corporate documents, conversations and connections with other corporate offices and employees, attendance at management and Board meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to in connection therewith, and Defendant Aisner is familiar with the wrongful conduct alleged herein and helped to facilitate that conduct. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant Aisner is a citizen of the State of Texas and a resident of Collin County. Defendant Aisner may be served with process at 1701 Anglebluff Lane, Plano, Texas 75093-2804. 58. Defendant Steven W. Partridge (“Partridge”) has been a director of BH REIT
since October 2003. Due to his experience and positions at the Company, access to internal corporate documents, conversations and connections with other corporate offices and employees,
attendance at management and Board meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to in connection therewith, and Defendant Partridge is familiar with the wrongful conduct alleged herein and helped to facilitate that conduct. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant Partridge is a citizen of the State of Texas and a resident of Dallas County. Defendant Partridge may be served with process at 1902 Spring Meadow Lane, Richardson, Texas 75081-2169. 59. 2004. Defendant Ronald Witten (“Witten”) has been a director of BH REIT since April
Due to his experience and positions at the Company, access to internal corporate
documents, conversations and connections with other corporate offices and employees, attendance at management and Board meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to in connection therewith, and Defendant Witten is familiar with the wrongful conduct alleged herein and helped to facilitate that conduct. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant Witten is a citizen of the State of Texas and a resident of Dallas County. Defendant Witten may be served with process at 3912 Bryn Mawr Drive, Dallas, Texas 752257029. 60. Defendant Charles G. Dennis (“Dennis)” has been a director of BH REIT since
January 2003. Due to his experience and positions at the Company, access to internal corporate documents, conversations and connections with other corporate offices and employees, attendance at management and Board meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to in connection therewith, and Defendant Dennis is familiar with the wrongful conduct alleged herein and helped to facilitate that conduct. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant Dennis is a citizen of the State of Texas and a resident of Dallas County. Defendant Dennis may be served with process at 9140 Greenville Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75243.
Defendants Behringer, Aisner, Partridge, Witten and Dennis comprise the current
BH REIT Board of Directors and were members of the BH REIT Board at all relevant times: (a) Defendants Behringer, Aisner, Partridge and Witten authorized and filed with the
SEC, and disseminated to BH REIT’s shareholders the September 7, 2011 and February 24, 2012 Schedule 14D-9s. (b) Defendants Behringer, Aisner, Partridge, Witten and Dennis made the
recommendation that BH REIT shareholders should reject CMG’s Tender Offers. (c) Defendants Behringer, Aisner, Partridge, Witten and Dennis authorized, filed with
the SEC and disseminated to BH REIT shareholders the April 4, 2011 Proxy and the supplements thereto dated May 09, 2011 and May 31, 2011. (d) Directors.” (e) Defendants Behringer, Aisner, Partridge, Witten and Dennis are liable The shareholders’ votes on the Proxy were solicited “By Order of the Board of
individually and collectively as primary violators for making false and misleading statements. (f) Defendants are collectively referred to herein as the Company’s “Board of
Directors” and “Director Defendants.” Executive Officer Defendants 62. Defendant Scott W. Fordham (“Fordham”) has served as BH REIT’s Chief
Financial Officer and Treasurer since June 2010 and served as the Company’s Chief Accounting Officer from May 2009 until November 2010. Defendant Fordham has also served as the Chief Financial Officer of Behringer Advisors and HPT Management since June 2010 and the Senior Vice President –Accounting Of Harvard Property Trust, the managing member of Behringer Advisors and HPT Management since May 2008. Due to his experience and positions at the
Company, access to internal corporate documents, conversations and connections with other corporate offices and employees, attendance at management and Board meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to in connection therewith, and Defendant Fordham is familiar with the wrongful conduct alleged herein and helped to facilitate that conduct. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant Fordham is a citizen of the State of Texas and a resident of Dallas County. Defendant Fordham may be served with process at 301 Meadowcreek Road, Coppell, Texas 75019-4024. 63. Defendant James E. Sharp (“Sharp”) serves as the Company’s Chief Accounting
Officer since November 2010. He also serves as Vice President of Accounting as Behringer Advisors and HPT Management. Due to his experience and positions at the Company, access to internal corporate documents, conversations and connections with other corporate offices and employees, attendance at management and Board meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to in connection therewith, and Defendant Sharp is familiar with the wrongful conduct alleged herein and helped to facilitate that conduct. Defendant Sharp is a citizen of the State of Texas and a resident of Denton County. Defendant Sharp may be served with process at 2305 Hickory Leaf Lane, Flower Mound, Texas 750224946. 64. The Defendants identified in paragraphs 56 through 64 are key members of the
BH REIT Board and/or officers and are collectively referred to herein as the “Individual Defendants.” By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of BH REIT, the Individual Defendants are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the other proposed class members of and owe Plaintiff and the proposed class the highest obligation of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing, due care, and full and fair disclosure. Each of the Individual Defendants has, and at all
relevant times had, the power to control and influence and did control and influence BH REIT to engage in practices complained of herein. DUTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 65. By reason of their positions as officers and directors of the Company, and because
of their ability to control the business and corporate affairs of the Company, the Individual Defendants owed the Company and its shareholders the fiduciary obligations of good faith, trust, loyalty, and due care, and were, and are, required to use their utmost ability to control and manage the Company in a fair, just, honest, and equitable manner. The Individual Defendants were, and are, required to act in furtherance of the best interests of the Company’s shareholders so as to benefit all shareholders equally, and not in furtherance of their personal interest or benefit. 66. Each director and officer of the Company owes to Plaintiff and the proposed class
the fiduciary duty to exercise good faith and diligence in the administration of the affairs of the Company and in the use and preservation of its property and assets, and the highest obligations of fair dealing. In addition, as officers and directors, the Individual Defendants had a duty to promptly disseminate accurate and truthful information with regard to the Company’s revenue, margins, operations, performance, management, projections and forecasts so that valuation of the Company’s stock would be based on truthful and accurate information. 67. The Individual Defendants, because of their positions of control and authority as
directors and/or officers were able to and did, directly and/or indirectly, exercise control over the wrongful acts complained of herein, as well as the contents of the various public statements issued by the Company. Because of their executive, managerial and directorial positions, each of the Individual Defendants had access to adverse, non-public information about the financial
condition, operations, and misrepresentations made. 68. At all times relevant hereto, each of the Individual Defendants was the agent of
the other Individual Defendants and was at all times acting within the course and scope of such agency. 69. To discharge their duties, the officers and directors of BH REIT were required to
exercise reasonable and prudent supervision over the management, policies, practices and controls of the financial affairs of the Company. Defendants were required to among other things: a. manage, conduct, supervise and direct the business affairs of the Company By virtue of such duties, the Individual
in accordance with all applicable laws; b. neither violate nor knowingly permit any officer, director or employee of
the Company to violate applicable laws, rules and regulations; c. establish and maintain systematic and accurate records and reports of the
business and affairs of the Company and procedures for the reporting of the business and affairs to the Board and to periodically investigate, or cause independent investigation to be made of, said reports and records; d. neither engage in self-dealing nor knowingly permit any officer, director
or employee of the Company to engage in self-dealing; e. ensure that the Company complied with its legal obligations and
requirements, including acting only within the scope of its legal authority and disseminating truthful and accurate statements to the SEC and the investing public; f. conduct the affairs of the Company in an efficient, business-like manner
so as to make it possible to provide the highest quality performance of its business, to avoid
wasting the Company’s assets, and to maximize the value of the Company’s stock; g. properly and accurately guide investors and analysts regarding the true
financial condition of the Company at any given time, including making accurate statements about the Company’s financial results and prospects, and ensuring that the Company maintained an adequate system of financial controls such that the Company’s financial reporting would be true and accurate at all times; and h. remain informed of how the Company conducted its operations, and, upon
receipt of notice or information of imprudent or unsound conditions or practices, to make reasonable inquiry in connection therewith, and to take steps to correct such conditions or practices and make such disclosures as necessary to comply with applicable laws. 70. Each of the Individual Defendants, by virtue of his or her position as a director
and officer, owed to the Company’s shareholders the fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and the exercise of due care and diligence in the management and administration of the affairs of the Company, as well as in the use and preservation of its property and assets. The conduct of the Individual Defendants alleged herein involves violations of their obligations as directors and officers of the Company, the absence of good faith on their part and a reckless disregard for their duties to the Company and its shareholders. The Individual Defendants were aware or should have been aware that this posed a risk of serious injury to the Company’s shareholders. The conduct of the Individual Defendants, who were also officers and/or directors of the Company, has been ratified by the remaining Director Defendants who collectively comprised all of the Company’s Board during the Class Period. 71. The Individual Defendants breached their duties of loyalty and good faith by
allowing Defendants to cause, or by themselves causing, the Company to misrepresent its
financial results and prospects, as detailed herein, and by failing to prevent employees and/or officers of the company from taking such illegal actions. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 72. on behalf of: (a) all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired shares in BH REIT from This is a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
February 19, 2003 to the present (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant; (b) all persons who were entitled to tender their shares pursuant to the Tender Offer
Statement on Schedule TO under Section 14(d)(1) or 13(e)(1) of the Exchange Act, filed with the SEC by CMG on August 23, 2011 and February 23, 2012 (the “CMG Tender Offers”), and who suffered harm as a result of the Director Defendants’ action and violations of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act for issuing materially false and misleading Schedule 14D-9 Solicitation/Recommendation Statements on September 7, 2011 and February 24, 2012 (the “Tender Class”); and (c) And all persons who were BH REIT shareholders of record as of April 1, 2011
and were entitled to vote on the Schedule 14A filed with the SEC on April 1, 2011, and their heirs, successors, and assigns who suffered harm as a result of the Director Defendants actions and violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act for materially false and misleading Proxy (“Proxy Class”). 73. According to the Company’s Form 10-Q filed with the SEC for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2012, BH REIT 298,461,977 shares outstanding, thus members of each class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of
class members in each class can only be determined through appropriate discovery, members of each class number at least in the thousands and they are geographically dispersed. 74. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, because Plaintiff has the
same interests as the other members of the Class and Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have and will sustain harm arising out of the Individual Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties. Plaintiff does not have any interests that are adverse or antagonistic to those of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained counsel competent and experienced in this type of litigation. 75. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class that
predominate over any questions which, if they exist, may affect individual Class members. The predominant questions of law and fact include, among others, whether: a. and the Class; b. Whether the members of the Class have sustained damages and, if so, what is the The Defendants have and are breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff
proper measure of damages; c. Whether the Director Defendants violated Section 14(e) by causing a materially
false and misleading Schedule 14D-9 Solicitation/Recommendation Statements to be issued; and d. Whether the Director Defendants violated Section 14(a) by causing a materially
false and misleading Proxy to be issued. 76. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or
varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendants, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS Overview of the Company 77. A real estate investment trust, or REIT, is an entity that owns and operates
income-producing real estate and distributes the income to investors. REITs pool the capital of numerous investors to purchase a portfolio of properties the typical investor might not be able to buy individually. To qualify as a REIT, a company must have most of its assets and income tied to a real estate investment and must distribute at least 90% of its taxable income to shareholders annually in the form of dividends. To be sustainable, a REIT’s dividends should be funded by cash flows from the income-producing properties. 78. Since at least 2002 Defendants Behringer and Aisner have teamed up to sell a
series of REITS, including BH REIT. The following chart shows the ownership structure of BH REIT and other various Behringer Harvard Entities that are affiliated with it: // // // //
(1) Robert M. Behringer, our Chairman of the Board, controlled the disposition of approximately 40% of the outstanding limited liability company interests and the voting of 85% of the outstanding limited liability company interests of Behringer Harvard Holdings as of March 31, 2008. (2) Behringer Harvard Holdings owns 100.0% of the limited liability company interests of Behringer Harvard Partners, LLC. (3) Behringer Harvard Partners is the 99.9% owner and the sole member of Behringer Advisors, LLC, our advisor, and the sole limited partner of each of Behringer Securities LP, our dealer manager, and HPT Management Services LP, our property manager. Harvard Property Trust, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Behringer Harvard Holdings, is the owner of the remaining 0.1% and the sole general partner of each of Behringer Advisors and Behringer Securities. IMS, LLC, another wholly-owned subsidiary of Behringer Harvard Holdings, is the owner of the remaining 0.1% interest and the sole general partner of HPT Management. Behringer Advisors owns 1,000 shares of our convertible stock, which is convertible into shares of our common stock in certain circumstances. (4) Behringer Harvard Holdings currently owns 22,000 of our issued and outstanding shares. The remaining approximately 121.5 million issued and outstanding shares were held by approximately 47,641 stockholders of record as of March 31, 2008. (5) We own 100% of the shares of BHR, Inc. (6) We own 100% of the shares of BHR BT, Inc., which owns 100% of the interests of BHR Business Trust. (7) We own 100% of the limited liability company interests of BHR Partners, LLC.
79. • • •
The investment objectives of BH REIT are: To preserve, protect and return capital contributions; To maximize distributable cash to investors; To realize growth in the value of investments investments; and • By 2017, either (1) to cause the shares [of the Company] either to be listed for trading on a national securities exchange or for quotation on the Nasdaq National Market System (or any successor market or exchange) or (2) to make an orderly disposition of assets and distribute the cash to investors, unless a majority of the board of directors and a majority of the independent directors approve otherwise. upon the ultimate sale of
To achieve its investment objectives BH REIT’s prospectus and the amendments
thereto indicate that BH REIT will “invest principally in institutional quality properties that have premier business addresses, desirable locations, personalized amenities, and high quality construction, high creditworthy commercial tenants.” 81. Under these tenants, BH REIT has pursued its offerings and as a result has raised
approximately $2.9 Billion. The following chart shows the opening and closing date for each of BH REIT’s offerings.
Defendants have compensated themselves handsomely out of the proceeds they
have raised from the offerings. Defendants as graphically depicted above have created a shell game of entities that have drained significant sums of money from BH REIT and its shareholders. The two primary entities they have done this with are Behringer Advisors which performs asset management services for BH REIT and HPT Management, which performs property management services. The following chart depicts the millions of dollars that these
two entities and their affiliates have siphoned since 2004. Property Management Fees (millions) 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 $13.8 $15.0 $15.3 $17.4 $9.1 $4.9 Asset Management Fees (millions) $19.2 $17.7 $18.8 $27.8 $13.3 $5.1 Total
$33 32.7 34.1 45.2 22.4 $10
Property Management Fees (millions) 2005 2004 Total 83. $1.5 $0.2 $77.2
Asset Management Fees (millions) $1.9 $.09 $103.89
$3.4 $0.29 $181.09
Additionally, Behringer Advisors and its affiliates are entitled to receive
compensation and fees for services related to BH REIT’s offerings. For example, according to the Registration Statement Form S-11 that BH REIT filed with the SEC on April 7, 2006, Behringer Harvard Advisors and its affiliates could earn as much as $112,090,000 in connection with that particular offering in the form of sales commissions, dealer manager fees and organization and offering expenses. 84. According to BH REIT itself, the Company’s “advisor and its affiliates, including
our property manager, are entitled to substantial fees from us under the terms of our advisory agreement and property management agreement. These fees were not negotiated at arm’s
length…” Moreover, Defendants have entered into agreements with Behringer Advisors and HPT Management that create a disincentive to terminate BH REIT’s ongoing relationship with these entities and a provides an additional incentive for Defendants to utilize them to charge excessive fees. According to Defendants: Our advisory management agreement also requires us to pay a performance-based termination fee to our advisor (reduced by the value of shares of common stock issued or issuable upon conversion of our convertible stock) in the event that the advisory management agreement expires and is not renewed or is terminated, other than because of a material breach by the advisor; the holders of the common stock have received distributions equal to the sum of the capital invested by such stockholders and a 9% cumulative, non-compounded, annual return; or the shares of common stock are listed for trading on a national securities exchange. To avoid paying this fee, our independent directors may decide against terminating the advisory management agreement prior to our listing even if, but for the termination fee, termination of the advisory management agreement would be in 22
our best interest. In addition, the requirement to pay a fee to our advisor at termination could cause us to make different investment or disposition decisions than we would otherwise make, in order to satisfy our obligation to pay the fee to the terminated advisor 85. Thus, although BH REIT’s performance has been abysmal, there has been nothing
to stop them from diverting whatever little cash flow is available to shareholders to themselves. BH REIT has Consistently Paid Distributions in Excess of its Operating Income 86. Since its inception, BH REIT has been operated as what one could characterize as
a quasi ponzi scheme. In May 2005, Forbes.com Magazine ran an article titled “Unreal Returns” that focused on the operating performance of various REITS. In regards to BH REIT, the article stated: Consider Behringer Harvard REIT I. This tiny Addison, Tex. outfit owns $200 million of interests in eight office buildings, including a handsome 24-story structure at 250 West Pratt Street in downtown Baltimore. The buildings produced $16.8 million in revenue for Behringer last year. After interest payments, taxes and property expenses, Behringer's FFO stood at $586,000. It paid out a hefty $3.1 million in dividends. So of the 58 cents each share paid, only 11 cents came from the company's FFO. The remainder, admits Behringer Harvard, was cash raised from the company's investors. 87. In response, Defendant Aisner stated “his trust shouldn’t be compared with
established public REIT’s because one-year old Behringer is only beginning…” and that the Company’s dividend deficit would “narrow greatly.” However, this was not to be the case. 88. BH REIT offering documents state that “the amount of any future distributions
will be based upon such factors as cash available or anticipated, current and projected cash requiremetns and tax considerations.” The offering documents also state that “our board of directors has and will continue to evaluate our distributions on at least a quarterly basis and depending upon the investment trends at this time, it may consider lowering our distribution rate
for subsequent periods.” However, to promote sales, mask the performance of BH REIT and ensure that they continued to have ample funds from which to pilfer, Defendants maintained distribution levels above what BH REIT could actually afford. 89. BH REIT has never been able to pay distributions from its Funds From
Operations (“FFO”)1 and has resorted to returning capital or borrowing to make distributions. The chart below illustrates year over year BH REIT distributions versus FFO. Year FFO (millions) Distributions (millions) $0.05 $3.10 $22.40 $63.20 $114.00 $154.00 $125.80 $56.9 $29.7 Coverage
$(0.23) $0.586 $18.4 $59.9 $108.9 $111.9 ($150.60) $11.3 $12.4
-467% 19% 82% 95% 95% 73% -119% 19% 42%
Thus, what Defendants have done is return capital to investors and taken on debt
that must be serviced out of future income and new investor proceeds thereby limiting BH REIT’s ability to acquire income-producing assets and diluting BH REIT’s shareholders principal contrary to the Company’s stated investment objectives. In effect, Defendants have
FFO is a figure used by REITS to define the cash flow from operations.
sought to mask the poor performance of BH REIT by paying investors back with their own money while at the same time draining the Company of millions of dollars for themselves. 91. BH REIT’s ability cover its future distributions is equally unlikely. In January
and February 2012 the Company transferred ownership of two of its properties pursuant to foreclosure. Additionally, on March 31, 2012, Behringer Harvard Opportunity REIT disclosed in a filing with the SEC that: On September 26, 2011, we, through a wholly-owned subsidiary of our operating partnership, entered into a lease agreement with Behringer Harvard REIT I, Inc., a real estate investment program sponsored by our sponsor Behringer Harvard Holdings LLC, to lease approximately 14,500 rentable square feet at Bent Tree Green to Behringer Harvard REIT I, Inc 92. In other words, Behringer Harvard Opportunity REIT, another struggling REIT in
Defendants’ portfolio is receiving money from BH REIT to stay afloat. This not only represents a conflict of interest, but highlights the fact that BH REIT is both lending money to its own REITs and moving investors money around between its non-traded REITs. Again, this is
contrary to the Company’s stated investment objectives and puts additional strain on BH REIT. The Proxy 93. On April 1, 2011, BH REIT filed its Definitive Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A
pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act (“Proxy”), soliciting shareholder approval to amend and restate the Company’s Charter. The Company requested that shareholders approve a provision requiring any person making a tender offer, including any “mini-tender” offer made for fewer than 5% of our outstanding securities, to comply with most of the provisions of Regulation 14D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). The board believes that the addition of this provision will further protect the Company and its stockholders by requiring any person or group seeking to tender for the Company’s shares to provide substantial disclosure regarding its or their offer. (emphasis added). 25
Defendants further stated that their first objective in pursuing the amended and
restated charter was to “position the Company to pursue a liquidity event in the future.” The Liquidation is speculative however, given that it may not occur until 2017 or possibility later dependent upon future Board decisions that ulterior motives were at play. Under the guise of generating liquidity for the Company’s shareholders, Defendants pushed through a proposal that did not “protect” shareholders but rather protected themselves from losing control over BH REIT and made it more difficult for the Company’s shareholders to exit their investment. Despite this, an opportunity for liquidity presented itself in August 2011. To thwart the threat, Defendants had to take more drastic measures. The CMG Tender Offers A. 95. August 23 2011 CMG Tender Offer On August 23, 2011, CMG Legacy Growth Fund and its affiliates (“CMG”) filed
with the SEC a Tender Offer Statement on Schedule TO under Section 14(d)(1) or 13(e)(1) of the Exchange Act, to purchase up to 1,000,000 shares at $1.80 per share of BH REIT (August 23, 2011 CMG Offer). 96. In support of its tender CMG’s schedule TO stated in relevant part:
The REIT made the following statements in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2010: “There is no established public trading market for our common stock.” The lack of any public market for the sale of Shares means that Shareholders have limited alternatives if they seek to sell their Shares. As a result of such limited alternatives for Shareholders, the Purchasers may not need to offer as high a price for the Shares as they would otherwise. On the other hand, the Purchasers take a greater risk in establishing a purchase price as there is no prevailing market price to be used for reference and the Purchasers themselves will have limited liquidity for the Shares upon consummation of the purchase. The Purchasers’ review of independent secondary market reporting publications such as The Stanger Report and The Direct Investments Spectrum, reported sales of Shares on secondary markets at $1.75-$3.25 during the Spring 2011 and Jan/Feb 2011 issues. The information published by these independent 26
sources is believed to be the product of their private market research and does not constitute the comprehensive transaction reporting of a securities exchange. Accordingly, the Purchasers do not know whether the foregoing information is accurate or complete. Certain of the Purchasers and/or their affiliates have purchased shares for approximately $1.5 per share in the recent past. The Purchasers are unaware of any other recent trading prices. The REIT previously had a Share Redemption Program in place, but that program had been suspended since March 2009. Deceased shareholders may redeem Shares at $4.55 per Share, up to $1,062,500 per quarter. It should be noted that the Purchasers have not made an independent appraisal of the Shares or the REIT’s properties and are not qualified to appraise real estate. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that the REIT’s estimate accurately reflects an approximate value of the Shares or that the actual amounts that may be realized by Shareholders for the may not vary substantially from this estimate. The Purchasers are offering to purchase Shares which are an illiquid investment and are not offering to purchase the REIT’s underlying assets. Accordingly, the underlying asset value of the REIT is only one factor used by the Purchasers in arriving at the Offer Price. The REIT has estimated the share value to be $4.55 per Share as of December 31, 2010. It should be noted, however, that the Purchasers have not made an independent appraisal of the Shares or the REIT’s properties, and are not qualified to appraise real estate. Furthermore, there can be no assurance as to the timing or amount of any future REIT dividends, and there cannot be any assurance that the REIT’s estimate accurately reflects an approximate value of the Shares or that the actual amounts which may be realized by holders for the Shares may not vary substantially from this estimate. The Offer Price represents the price at which the Purchaser is willing to purchase Shares. The Purchaser arrived at the $1.80 Offer Price by applying an approximate 60% liquidity discount to the Estimated Net Asset Value of the REIT’s assets. The Purchaser used a 18% discount because such a discount would meet the return targets based on the estimated time frame to potentially reach the Estimated Net Asset Value but nevertheless result in a significant number of shareholders choosing to sell. 97. CMG Group’s August 23 2011 Offer represented a liquidity event for BH REIT
shareholders. It also created an opportunity for CMG Group to add to its preexisting holdings of BH REIT of 250,000 shares. A single entity owning 1.25 million shares represented a credible threat to Defendants control and as a result they sought to dissuade BH REIT shareholders from tendering their shares.
BH REIT Schedule 14D-9 Responds to the August 23 CMG Tender Offer On September 7, 2011, BH REIT filed a Schedule 14D-9
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement with the SEC pursuant to Section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act (“Schedule 14D-9) responding to the August 23 CMG Tender Offer. 99. The Schedule 14D-9 stated that the Board of Directors, the Director Defendants,
unanimously recommended that the Company’s shareholders, the Tender Offer Class, reject the August 23 Tender Offer and not tender their shares for purchase. The 14D-9 stated the following reasons for why shareholders should reject the tender offer: The Board of Directors believes that the Offer Price is less than the current and potential long-term value of the shares of Common Stock, which belief is based on, among other things, the Board’s December 31, 2010 estimated per share value of $4.55 (the “December Valuation”), which is $2.75 per share (153%) higher than the Offer Price. The Company and the Board of Directors have not formally updated this estimate and do not intend to do so until December 31, 2011. The Board of Directors also noted that, because the Company is an unlisted REIT, there is a limited market for the Common Stock and that there can be no certainty regarding the long-term value of the Common Stock because the value is dependent on a number of factors that may be difficult to predict and may be outside of the Company’s control, including future economic conditions and the other factors referenced below in Item 8 – “Additional Information.” The Board of Directors believes that the Offer Price represents an opportunistic attempt by the Bidders to purchase shares of Common Stock at a low price and make a profit for themselves, thereby depriving the Stockholders who tender shares of the potential opportunity to realize the long-term value of their investment in the Company. In this regard, the Board of Directors noted that the Bidders state in their Schedule TO that: o o o the Bidders are seeking to acquire the shares “for investment purposes”; the Bidders determined their Offer Price by applying a discount to their own estimated value of the net asset value of the Company’s assets; the Bidders did not offer any explanation or basis for the amount of the “illiquidity discount” they applied to the value of the Common Stock to
reach their Offer Price, which Offer Price is only 40% of the December Valuation; the Bidders believe that our Common Stock is worth more than the Offer Price; and the Bidders note that shares of Common Stock have been traded in the secondary market for $3.25 per share, which is a price $1.45 higher (approximately 80% higher) than the Offer Price.
The Company has recently been paying distributions at an annualized rate of $0.10 per share, which represents an annual yield of 2.2% per share based on the December Valuation and 5.5% per share based on the Bidders’ Offer Price. Although the Board of Directors cannot provide any guarantee that the Company will maintain any particular rate of distributions or pay any distributions in the future, Stockholders who choose to participate in the Tender Offer by selling their shares to the Bidders will lose the right to receive any future distributions. (emphasis added).
The Director Defendants specifically told shareholders that they should reject the
tender offer because of the distributions that the Company has made. What they failed to disclose is that in reality, as described above, the Company was just paying back its shareholders the money that they originally invested. Moreover, the lack of transparency of BH REIT given that it is a nonpublic REIT enables Defendants to assert that BH REIT’s valuation is much higher than it actually is. Defendants’ overvaluation of BH REIT is supported by their own statement that the Company’s common stock has traded in the secondary market for $3.25 per share, which is over a $1.30 per share less than Defendants stated value of the Company’s shares. C. 101. CMG’s February 23, 2012 Tender Offer On February 23, 2012, CMG made a renewed tender offer by filing with the SEC
a Tender Offer Statement on Schedule TO under Section 14(d)(1) or 13(e)(1) of the Exchange
Act, to purchase up to 1,000,000 shares at $1.80 per share of BH REIT (February 23 CMG Offer). In support of its tender, CMG stated in relevant part: The Purchasers have set the Offer Price at $1.80 per Share. In determining the Offer Price, the Purchasers analyzed a number of quantitative and qualitative factors, including: (i) the lack of a formalized market for resale of the Shares and the resulting lack of liquidity of an investment in the REIT; (ii) the estimated value of the REIT’s real estate assets; and (iii) the costs to the Purchasers associated with acquiring the Shares. The REIT made the following statements in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2010: “There is no established public trading market for our common stock. Therefore, there is a risk that a stockholder may not be able to sell our stock at a time or price acceptable to the stockholder. ” The lack of any public market for the sale of Shares means that Shareholders have limited alternatives if they seek to sell their Shares. As a result of such limited alternatives for Shareholders, the Purchasers may not need to offer as high a price for the Shares as they would otherwise. On the other hand, the Purchasers take a greater risk in establishing a purchase price as there is no prevailing market price to be used for reference and the Purchasers themselves will have limited liquidity for the Shares upon consummation of the purchase. The Purchasers’ review of independent secondary market reporting publications such as The Stanger Report and The Direct Investments Spectrum, reported sales of Units on secondary markets at $2.35-$3.00 during the Winter 2012 and sales of Units on secondary markets at $2.40-$2.95 per Unit in Nov./Dec. 2011, respectively. The information published by these independent sources is believed to be the product of their private market research and does not constitute the comprehensive transaction reporting of a securities exchange. Accordingly, the Purchasers do not know whether the foregoing information is accurate or complete. Certain of the Purchasers and/or their affiliates have purchased shares for approximately $1.50 and $1.80 per share in the recent past. The Purchasers are unaware of any other recent trading prices. The REIT previously had a Share Redemption Program in place, but that program has been suspended since March 2009. Deceased & Disabled shareholders may redeem Shares at $4.64 per Share, up to $1,062,500 per quarter. It should be noted that the Purchasers have not made an independent appraisal of the Shares or the REIT’s properties and are not qualified to appraise real estate. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that the REIT’s estimate accurately reflects a realistic value of the Shares or that the actual amounts that may be realized by Shareholders for the Shares may not vary substantially from this estimate. The Purchasers are offering to purchase Shares which are an illiquid investment and are not offering to purchase the REIT’s underlying assets. The REIT’s current articles require it to begin an orderly liquidation of assets if it has not
listed the Shares by 2017, unless it decides not to (including a majority of the independent directors). Accordingly, the underlying asset value of the REIT is only one factor used by the Purchasers in arriving at the Offer Price. However, in the absence of significant trading price information, the REIT’s estimate of the net asset value of the REIT may be relevant to Shareholders’ review of the Offer Price. The REIT estimated that the Shares are worth approximately $4.64, up from $4.55 one year ago, based upon the estimated net asset value per share resulting from a valuation performed on its properties as of December 31, 2011, subject to the adjustments described in the Form 8-K filed December 28, 2011. There can be no assurance, however, that the REIT’s estimate accurately reflects an approximate value of the Shares or that the actual amounts that may be realized by Shareholders for the Shares may not vary substantially from this estimate. D. 102. BH REIT Responds to CMG February 23 Tender Offer Although the Director Defendants, and not surprisingly, the Company’s advisor
Behringer Advisors, claimed to have “thoroughly and carefully reviewed and analyzed the terms of the Tender Offer,” Defendants issued their response one day after the February 23 CMG offer was announced. 103. On February 24, 2012, BH REIT filed a Schedule 14D-9
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement with the SEC pursuant to Section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act (“Schedule 14D-9) responding to the August 23 CMG Tender Offer. 104. The Schedule 14D-9 stated that the Board of Directors, the Director Defendants,
unanimously recommended that the Company’s shareholders, the Tender Offer Class, reject the August 23 Tender Offer and not tender their shares for purchase. The 14D-9 stated the following reasons for why shareholders should reject the tender offer: • The Board of Directors believes that the Offer Price is less than the current and potential long-term value of the shares of Common Stock, which belief is based on, among other things, the $4.64 estimated per share value of the Common Stock, as announced in the Company’s Current Report on Form 8-K dated December 28, 2011 (the “2011 Valuation”), which is $2.84 per share (157%) higher than the Offer Price. The Company and the Board of Directors have not formally updated this estimate and do not intend to do so until
December 2012. The Board of Directors also noted that, because the Company is an unlisted REIT, there is a limited market for the Common Stock and there can be no certainty regarding the long-term value of the Common Stock because the value is dependent on a number of factors that may be difficult to predict and may be outside of the Company’s control, including future economic conditions and the other factors referenced in Item 8 — “Additional Information.” • The Board of Directors believes that the Offer Price represents an opportunistic attempt by the Bidders to purchase shares of Common Stock at a low price and make a profit for themselves, thereby depriving the Stockholders who tender shares of the potential opportunity to realize the long-term value of their investment in the Company. In this regard, the Board of Directors noted that the Bidders state in their Schedule TO that: o the Bidders are seeking to acquire the shares “for investment purposes”; o the Bidders determined their Offer Price by applying a discount to the Company’s estimated per share value of the Common Stock; o the Bidders believe that the Common Stock is worth more than the Offer Price; and o the Bidders note that shares of Common Stock have been traded in the secondary market at “$2.35-$3.00 during the Winter 2012” and at “$2.40$2.95 per Unit in Nov./Dec. 2011, respectively,” which are prices that range from $1.20 higher (approximately 67% higher) to $0.55 higher (approximately 30% higher) than the Offer Price. • Effective since May 2010, the declared distribution rate has been equal to a monthly amount of $0.0083 per share of Common Stock, which is equivalent to an annual distribution rate of 2.2% based on the 2011 Valuation and 5.5% per share based on the Bidders’ Offer Price. Although the Board of Directors cannot provide any guarantee that the Company will maintain any particular rate of distributions or pay any distributions in the future, Stockholders who choose to participate in the Tender Offer by selling their shares to the Bidders will lose the right to receive any future distributions, including any distributions made or declared after the expiration date of the Tender Offer. 105. Again, the Director Defendants sought to dissuade BH REIT’s shareholders from
tendering by highlighting the distributions of the Company and again Defendants assert that BH REIT’s valuation is much higher than it actually is. This is supported by their own statement that the Company’s common stock has traded in the secondary market for as low as $2.40 per share,
which is over $2.24 per share less than what Defendants have stated the Company’s shares value is. 106. Typical investors of BH REIT purchased shares believing it was a safe and secure
investment given Defendants’ representations regarding its investment objectives and valuation. Given the nature of a non-public REIT, BH REIT’s investors had no choice but to rely upon Defendants’ representations. Defendants took advantage of that reliance and actively and
affirmatively concealed material underlying facts concerning BH REIT’s properties and the performance of the REIT to its shareholders. COUNT I (By Tender Offer Class Against the Director Defendants for Violations of Section 14(e) and Rule 14 e-2(b)) 107. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set
forth above, as though fully set forth herein. This Count is asserted under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e-2(b) promulgated thereunder on behalf of the Tender Offer Class against the Director Defendants. Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §78n(e), states that it is "unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” SEC Rule 14e-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(b), requires that with respect to a tender offer, when a material change occurs in the disclosure
recommending acceptance or rejection of a tender offer, "the subject company shall promptly publish or send or give a statement disclosing such material change to security holders.” 108. In the Schedule 14D-9s filed by the Director Defendants on September 7, 2011
and on February 24, 2012, the Board recommended that shareholders reject the August 23 and September 7 CMG Tenders based upon the valuation of the Company and the distributions the Company has paid in the past. The Director Defendants violated § 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e- 2(b) promulgated thereunder by: by failing to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made in the Schedule 14D-9s not misleading. The Schedule 14D-9 failed to disclose material facts that about the value of the Company's stock and that FFO of the Company has never been sufficient to cover its distributions. 109. As a result of this wrongdoing, the Plaintiff and members of the Tender Offer
Class are threatened with irreparable injury, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, as well as substantive economic damages. COUNT II (Against the Director Defendants for Violation of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9) 110. This Count is asserted under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9
promulgated thereunder on behalf of the Proxy Class against the Director Defendants. Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78n(a), prohibits any person soliciting a proxy from doing so "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, promulgated pursuant to Section 14(a), prohibits the issuance of any proxy statement "which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false and misleading with respect to any material fact,
or which omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statements therein not false and misleading." 111. The Director Defendants violated § 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a- 9
promulgated thereunder by: (a) Making untrue statements of material fact in the Proxy by failing to state
material facts necessary in order to make the statements made in the Proxy, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made; and (b) Failing to promptly publish or send or give a statement disclosing a
material change to shareholders with respect to the Proxy, when a material change occurred. 112. The Proxy stated that the first objective of amending and restating the Company’s
charter was “to position the Company to pursue a liquidity event in the future” and that the proposal with regard to tender offers was necessary to “protect” the Company’s stockholders. 113. Because information regarding a listing of the Company's stock on a national
stock exchange and the value of a Company's stock is material information, the Proxy is rendered false and misleading by making statements and omitting material facts about the Liquidation and Defendants ulterior motives regard potential tender offers which effectively misled and induced the majority of shareholders to approve the Proxy. Such material information was never disclosed in the Proxy or a supplement thereto. This information would have altered the total mix of information made available to the shareholders when determining whether to approve the Proxy, and was therefore material to the shareholders.
By reason of the foregoing, the Proxy is materially false and misleading, in
violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 115. None of the Director Defendants named in this Count made a reasonable
investigation or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements made in the Proxy were true, without omissions of any material facts, and not misleading. The Director Defendants named in this Count are liable under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act for the following reasons: (a) The Director Defendants as directors and/or officers of BH REIT, allowed
their names to be used in the false and misleading Proxy, in connection with the solicitation of votes regarding the matters to be voted upon in the Proxy, and affirmatively recommended in the Proxy that shareholders vote in favor of all of the proposals contained in therein; (b) The Director Defendants allowed their names to be used in connection
with the solicitation of votes regarding the matters to be voted upon in the Proxy and allowed a description of their backgrounds and other relevant information to be used in the Proxy. The use of their names was not incidental, but rather material in connection with the solicitation of votes regarding all of the matters to be voted upon in the Proxy, including, but not limited to, their standing for election as directors of BH REIT. The use of their names lent substantial and material support to the other matters to be voted upon and which were recommended for affirmative action by BH REIT's Board of Directors; and
The Director Defendants, directly, or through the employ of others,
solicited votes for the matters to be voted upon in the Proxy and caused the Proxy to be disseminated to the Proxy Class through the use of the United States mails and the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 116. As a result of this wrongdoing, the members of the Proxy Class are threatened
with irreparable injury, for which there is no adequate remedy at law. COUNT III (Breach of Fiduciary Duty By All Classes Against All Defendants) 117. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set
forth above, as though fully set forth herein. 118. As alleged in detail herein, each of the Individual Defendants had a duty to
disseminate accurate, truthful and complete information to Plaintiff and the proposed class. 119. The Individual Defendants violated their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
good faith by causing or allowing the Company to disseminate materially misleading and inaccurate information to its shareholders through, inter alia, SEC filings and other public statements and disclosures as detailed herein. These actions could not have been a good faith exercise of prudent business judgment. COUNT IV (Against All Defendants by All Classes for Unjust Enrichment) 120. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set
forth above, as though fully set forth herein. 121. By their wrongful acts and omissions, Defendants were unjustly enriched at the
expense of and to the detriment of Plaintiff and the proposed class.
Plaintiff, as shareholders of BH REIT, seek restitution from Defendants, and each
of them, and seeks an order of this Court disgorging all profits, benefits and other compensation obtained by them from their wrongful conduct and fiduciary breaches. COUNT V (Against All Defendants by All Classes for Negligence) 123. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate each and every allegation set forth above, as
though set forth herein. 124. Defendants owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and class members through their roles
directors, officers and financial advisors of BH REIT. 125. Defendants had a duty to exercise due care. Defendants’ duty to exercise due care
included the following duties: (a) disclosed; (b) To provide full and fair disclosure of the risks and rewards associated with To ensure that all material facts about the risks of investing in BH REIT were
investment in BH REIT; and To ensure that investors were not misled of practices of BH REIT’s board of directors issuing distributions which were not derived from operating income. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment and relief as follows: A. Ordering that this action may be maintained as a class action and certifying the Classes as set forth herein and designating Plaintiff as the Class representative; B. Declaring the Proxy to be materially false and misleading in violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
Declaring the 14D-9 Solicitation/Recommendation Statements filed on September 7, 2011 and February 24, 2012 to be materially false and misleading in violation of Section 14(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
Declaring the conduct of the Defendants to be in violation of law as set forth herein;
Declaring any authorizations secured by Defendants pursuant to the false and misleading Proxy, null and void, and requiring that any resolicitation of shareholder votes shall be pursuant to Court supervision and Court-approved proxy materials;
Declaring that Defendants have violated their fiduciary duties to the shareholders who purchased shares of BH REIT from February 19, 2003 to the present;
Directing defendants to account to Plaintiff and the Class for their damages sustained because of the wrongs complained of herein;
Awarding Plaintiff the costs of this action, including reasonable allowance for Plaintiff’s attorneys’ and experts’ fees; and
Granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury. Dated: September 17, 2012 Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Joe Kendall Joe Kendall Texas Bar No. 11260700 Jamie J. McKey Texas Bar No. 24045262 KENDALL LAW GROUP, LLP
3232 McKinney Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 75204 Telephone: 214-744-3000 Facsimile: 214-744-305 Email: jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com jmckey@kendalllawgroup.com GLANCY BINKOW & GOLBERG LLP Lionel Z. Glancy Louis Boyarsky 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-9150 Facsimile: (310) 201-9160 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
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