Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20080220_0000125.WPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-03-28 23:45:02
Document Index: 102881505

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

Presently before the Court is a PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY filed pro se by Petitioner, Michael Lavelle Simmons (Document No. 84).
On January 3, 2006, Michael Simmons pled guilty to Count One of a four-count superseding indictment which charged him with the crime of transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity in violation of Title 18, United States Code, section 2324(a) & 2. On April 7, 2006, the Court sentenced Mr. Simmons to 210 months imprisonment, to be followed by supervised release for a term of life. Mr. Simmons did not file a direct appeal. Currently, he is incarcerated at U.S. P. Marion in Marion, Illinois.
On February 19, 2008, Mr. Simmons filed the instant motion in which he argues that the "excessive term of Supervised Release [is] in violation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines as the petitioner was sentenced to life supervision." Petition, II(A). Mr. Simmons used a pre-printed form entitled "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241." Additionally, the title page contains the following instruction:
This not to be used if petitioner claims that his federal sentence itself is unlawful. If a petitioner wishes to attack his federal sentence, he or she should file a motion under 22 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct sentence in the federal court which entered judgment.
Claims are proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and not 28 U.S.C. § 2255, if they concern the manner, location, or conditions of the execution of petitioner's sentence and not the fact of petitioner's conviction or sentence. Section 2255 allows a prisoner in custody to attack his sentence if it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or statute, the court lacked jurisdiction to impose it, it exceeds the maximum allowed by law, or it is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2000) (Motion under § 2241 is appropriate to challenge the execution of a sentence, in contrast to § 2255, which permits a challenge on constitutional grounds to the imposition of the sentence).
Accordingly, although not captioned as such, because Mr. Simmons seeks a reduction of his sentence his motion should be construed as a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As such, this Court must notify Mr. Simmons of the legal consequences that may occur should it rule upon his de facto § 2255 motion. United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999).
Prior to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), district courts liberally interpreted petitions and motions such as the one filed by Mr. Simmons as a petition/ motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. "Courts engaged in this practice in order to reach the merits of pro se petitions, while avoiding the wasted time and expense of forcing petitioners to redraft their pleadings." Miller, 197 F.3d at 648. However, AEDPA has implemented a procedural framework that constrains the number and frequency of second or successive § 2255 petitions which may be brought before the federal courts.
"The once generous practice of liberally construing pro se filings as § 2255 motions was rendered potentially disadvantageous by the enactment of AEDPA:
United States v. Chew, 284 F.3d 468, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Miller, 197 F.3d at 649).
Accordingly, it is now required under Miller that "district courts provide certain prophylactic 'notice' measures before either re-characterizing a post-conviction motion as a § 2255 motion or ruling on a § 2255 motion denominated as such when the petitioner is ...