Source: https://www.lpsconservatorship.com/hearsaycaselaw.html
Timestamp: 2020-01-26 11:30:32
Document Index: 108808449

Matched Legal Cases: ['§5350', '§ 5354', '§ 5352', '§ 5354', '§ 5008', '§ 1200', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 5354', '§ 5354', '§ 1820']

Conservatorship of Manton (1985) and hearsay exceptions - PUBLICLY CONSERVED
Conservatorship of Manton (1985) and hearsay exceptions
Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645 ,
217 Cal.Rptr. 253; 703 P.2d 1147
[L.A. No. 31965. Supreme Court of California. August 22, 1985.]
A common issue of dissent is the issue of hearsay rules and what aspects of evidence rules carry over to LPS conservatorship cases.
Conservatee Manton file an appeal contesting the appointment of the public conservator as conservator over his person. He contends that the trial court erred in applying the hearsay rule and the conservatorship was an inappropriate product of the court’s error.
The appellant at the time was detained at the San Diego County Mental Health hospital. The appellant was evaluated by the hospital psychiatrist who recommended conservatorship as he deemed the defendant gravely disabled due to his inability to accept treatment voluntarily.
The court established a temporary conservator and set a hearing for a permanent conservatorship pursuant to §5350 and 5365. The court found appellant gravely disabled at the hearing establishing a permanent conservator but this order was stayed when appellant filed for a jury trial. The trial court initially agreed with the conservatee’s objections but after review of Conservatorship of Davis, they found that the report was admissible and ruled that the conservatee was gravely disabled. The conservatee filed an appeal. The appellate court responded with its disposition and opinion.
The central most important aspect of the case is the concept of procedural carryover between hearings and trials and the lack of legislative clarification on the differences. In the current legislature the law fails to account for any evidentiary procedural differences between hearings and jury trials. The public conservator contends that the legislature fails to account for any differences so the report should be admissible on all levels. The conservatee contends that the contents in the report were prejudice due to hearsay statements. The trial court disagreed by finding that the report contained inadmissible hearsay and reversed the order. The court published its opinion and judgement.
To begin to properly dissect the appellate court’s reasoning, the court turns to its first contention that hearings and jury trials are separate matters. It is important that the court finds these two proceedings different as the discovery procedure would differ. Welf and Inst Code § 5354 discusses the admissibility of the report briefly in that
5354 requires submission of the conservatorship report "prior to the hearing," and that the statements from doctors, family, medical records, and other persons with knowledge of the case may be gathered for the report.
This simple statement fails to discuss the nature of the trial v the hearing. Even though LPS is a civil matter the law fails to dissect how discovery applies between jury trials and hearings. Does it follow a criminal or civil procedure? There was no mention of which aspects of a report may be submitted into evidence after the report has been used in a hearing. How would discovery procedure and apply hearsay apply at this point in the case? All of these questions arose with the matter being set for jury trial.
The court notes that without a differentiation the two hearings would be legally identical and redundant. To summarize the court finds that the procedure for initial hearings and contested bench hearings are procedurally different from jury trials and therefore hearsay and discovery should differ. With initial LPS hearings, the issues of placement, powers, and grave disability are discussed and a judgement rendered, but with jury trials, only the matter of grave disability will be heard and adjudged.
In determining whether [name of respondent] is gravely disabled, you must not consider or discuss the type of treatment, care, or supervision
The next matter stems from the matter of jury trials and hearings being separate and therefore needing separate procedures for evidence. Because they are two separate matters with different matters being heard, certain information may considered admissible and relevant for one and not the other.
When first examining evidence through the scope of the initial hearing and bench hearings, the law stipulates the following: The initial conservatorship investigation report in accordance to Welf and Inst Code § 5352 et seq, must be complete and explore all “alternates to conservatorship”. The conservatorship investigator must recommend conservatorship if it is the least restrictive option for the conservatee. The report must contain information about the conservatee’s life, vocation, mental health, prognosis, and history; all gathered from friends, family, hospital records, and doctor notes. In addition, the report must include all powers to be granted to the conservator and reasoning for why. In addition, the report must state the level of placement for the conservatee. Because of the nature of the report’s findings, it may be admissible on the hearing level but not at the trial level.
After the report is compiled and completed, it must be sent to the court for discovery review to determine which evidence may be admissible and relevant.
§ 5354 concludes by providing that "The court may receive the report in evidence and may read and consider the contents thereof in rendering its judgment." [1] At issue here is whether that language permits use of the report at the contested court or jury trial where at issue is whether the proposed conservatee is "gravely disabled." (See §§ 5008, subd. (h), 5350, subd. (d).)
It is at this level that the conservatee appeals the contents of the report citing that they were hearsay and prejudice the outcome of the jury trial. It is unknown whether the conservatee contested the merits of the hearsay requirements at a trial level or hearing level. None the less the court answered to both. The court responds with the following
"I seriously doubt the propriety of gross hearsay that nobody says he used for diagnostic purposes and I suspect that when it comes in, and its probably in that report, it will be error, and if the jury receives it, it will be prejudicial. [¶] But it isn't error under the present law that I am bound by, and so I'm bound to make the error." The "gross hearsay" to which the court referred included statements in the report describing comments by appellant's father referring to appellant's history, the father's attitude toward appellant, and the father's description of appellant's mother's feelings about appellant. The report was based on information "from hospital records, records of prior conservatorships" and conservations with appellant's father. [39 Cal. 3d 649] Clearly, but for some exception to the hearsay rule, the report would be inadmissible as containing hearsay and even hearsay on hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.)
The county countered stating that they were within their discretion in creating the report. They cited that in the case of family/dependency law,
Civil Code § 233 provides that when a petition for termination of parental custody and control is filed the court shall order an investigation into the circumstances and the county department shall render to the court a written report of the investigation with a recommendation to the court of the proper disposition to be made ...." The report is to be received into evidence by the court which "shall read and consider the contents thereof in rendering its judgment." (Civ. Code, § 233.)
The county in effect is arguing that there is no difference between a conservatorship investigation report using family law as an example and that they should be afforded the same legal framework and rights. They cite that the specifics enumerated in these report are to be weighed and considered by the trier of fact. In this case in accordance with Conservatorship of Davis the trier of fact is supposed to analyze the case as a whole not each piece of the report in a vacuum. Specifics include the conservatee’s compliance, capacity to survive safely without intervention, and whether they have third party assistance. There were two problematic aspects to this argument;
First, the conservator incorrectly assumed a relationship to the cases, but the appellate court corrected them stating that
Neither the Davis nor the Early opinion relied on admissibility of the investigative report as a precondition to their still valid conclusions regarding the appropriate scope of inquiry in conservatorship trials.
The public conservator asked that the entire content of the investigation report be used when reaching a judgement because Welf and Inst Code § 5354 dissects the value of the investigation report. The conservator states that without a comprehensive report which entails all aspects according to the conservator, a proper verdict cannot be reached. The appellate court disagrees stating that
The issue of grave disability and suitable placement obviously can be determined based on admissible evidence; hearsay often may make things easier to "prove" but that does not mandate that its use be approved.
Like any other matter the court needs to weigh the admissibility and relevancy of each fact presented in the case. As goes with FER 403 (Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons) admissible evidence used in rendering a judgement should have a probative value that is not substantially outweighed by a danger of prejudice. In this case the conservatee is contending statements that fall under the hearsay exception would be an example of prejudice information.
Welf and Inst Code § 5354 does not appear to discuss extraneous hearsay issues within the legislature. The rules for Probate code § 1820 extend into conservatorship reports. The matter of jury trials and the contents are the report are not explicitly discussed in this section thus allowing for some confusion over how to conduct jury trials and discovery. In the matter of the exact information allowed, the law allows for:
"[the] verified petition, the proofs of service, the court investigator's report, and the testimony of the proposed conservator"
There is no mention of the nature of the statements and which ones may be considered hearsay. No addressing the manner of which they were given, best evidence rule, or exceptions such as excited utterances discussed. The lack of such discussion has led to the issues begged during this appeal.
Now tying the first matter of separate hearings with this matter, the court finds if the court were to treat the hearing and trial as separate matters, then issues such as placement would be prejudicial and therefore inadmissible.
As a result, the appellate court found the report to contain inadmissible information and that procedure for jury trials and hearings to be separate and different. The court reversed the judgement ordering the public conservator to serve as conservator over the person of Manton.
Appellant conservatee sought review of a jury trial in which the Superior Court of San Diego County (California) allowed what appellant claimed to be hearsay statements in the form of a conservatorship report submitted by respondent county conservator in an action to determine conservatorship.
Respondent county conservator sought and obtained conservatorship over appellant conservatee in a jury trial. In the course of the trial, the trial court admitted a conservatorship investigation report which contained substantial hearsay. On review, the court reversed the conservatorship judgment, because the trial court erred in admitting the conservatorship investigation report to the extent it contained inadmissible hearsay. The court held that although the report would have been admissible in a hearing, there was no such exception to the general rules of evidence for a jury trial.
The court reversed judgment in favor of appellant conservatee in an action to determine conservatorship, because the conservatorship report was inadmissible as evidence because it contained hearsay.