Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/870/1/312009/
Timestamp: 2019-08-26 01:03:45
Document Index: 280346594

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1341', '§ 2', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', '§ 656', '§ 1006', '§ 1951', '§ 2']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Miguel A. Serrano, D/b/a Ponce Developers, Inc., Defendant,appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Juan Luis Boscio, Defendant, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. William Stamps, Defendant, Appellant, 870 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1989 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Miguel A. Serrano, D/b/a Ponce Developers, Inc., Defendant,ap...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Miguel A. Serrano, D/b/a Ponce Developers, Inc., Defendant,appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Juan Luis Boscio, Defendant, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. William Stamps, Defendant, Appellant, 870 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 870 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989)
Heard Dec. 5, 1988. March 1, 1989. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied in Nos. 85-1913 and88-1268 April 4, 1989
Miguel A. Serrano, Juan Luis Boscio, and William Stamps appeal from their convictions of mail and wire fraud. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). We affirm the convictions of Serrano and Boscio, but vacate Stamps's conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
These revelations led to three separate indictments. Count One of the indictment returned in this case charged that, by wiring funds in the May 19-20 REPOs, Serrano, Boscio and Stamps, aiding and abetting each other, committed wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341. This count alleged that the three defendants,
Counts Two, Three and Four each alleged mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Count Two charged Serrano with mailing, for the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud, a knowingly false confirmation letter dated November 10, 1982, to the Bank's auditors regarding the "financial position of the [Bank] as to [its] account with Shearson/American Express...." Count Three charged Serrano and Stamps, aiding and abetting each other for the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud, with mailing the Bank a knowingly false "memorandum dated February 23, 1983 reflecting and representing the financial position of the [Bank] as to [its] account with Shearson American Express...." Count Four charged Serrano and Stamps, aiding and abetting each other for the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud, with mailing two knowingly false "client statement sheets to the name of the [Bank] reflecting the financial position" of the Bank.
Stamps contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal. We have described the appropriate standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction in United States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 527-28 (1st Cir. 1988):
"the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 [99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560] (1979); United States v. Santiago, 828 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir. 1987). In making this determination, we do not assess the credibility of the witnesses, which is the sole function of the trier of fact. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 [98 S. Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1] (1978); United States v. Santiago, supra. Nor does the government have to disprove every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, it is sufficient that the record as a whole supports a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Santiago, supra.
Stamps was convicted as an aider and abettor1 of one count of wire fraud2 and two counts of mail fraud.3 See pages 4-5, supra. To sustain a mail or wire fraud conviction, the government must prove "the existence of '(1) a scheme conceived ... for the purpose of defrauding ... by means of false pretenses, representations or promises and (2) use of the United States mails [or interstate wire communications] in furtherance of that scheme.' " United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 307 (1st Cir.) (quoting Gold v. United States, 350 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 1965)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919, 100 S. Ct. 1854, 64 L. Ed. 2d 273 (1980). See also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8, 74 S. Ct. 358, 362, 98 L. Ed. 435 (1954). The government need not prove that the defendant devised the fraudulent scheme; but it must prove "willful participation in the scheme with knowledge of its fraudulent nature and with intent that these illicit objectives be achieved." United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S. Ct. 577, 66 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1980). See also United States v. Lanier, 838 F.2d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1988) (government need not prove that defendant originally devised scheme; knowing participation sufficient). In order to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting, the government must prove that the defendant in some way associated himself with the fraudulent scheme and that he shared the criminal intent of the principal. See United States v. Francomano, 554 F.2d 483, 486 (1st Cir. 1977).
In the fall of 1983, after irregularities surfaced concerning the REPOs, Shearson initiated an internal investigation. In October 1983, the Shearson investigators deposed Serrano. During this deposition, Serrano stated that Stamps was aware of and made the $1 million transfer to PDI. It was this $1 million transfer which eventually was diverted to Serrano's own personal use and which was at the heart of the fraudulent scheme alleged in the indictment. At trial, one of the Shearson investigators read into evidence parts of this deposition, including Serrano's statement concerning Stamps. This statement strongly indicated Stamps's knowledge of, and complicity in, the fraudulent scheme. Stamps argues that this statement was inadmissible hearsay and deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses as Serrano did not testify at trial. The government contends that the statement was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) (E) as a coconspirator statement.5
If the statement is admissible as a coconspirator statement under Rule 801(d) (2) (E), there is no violation of the confrontation clause. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987). Rule 801(d) (2) (E) provides:
But an out-of-court statement of an alleged coconspirator will be admissible under the rule only if the district court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made " '(1) during the course and (2) in furtherance (3) of a conspiracy (4) of which declarant is a member.' " Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 1 Weinstein's Evidence p 104, at 104-39 (1986)). See also United States v. Carroll, 860 F.2d 500, 506 (1st Cir. 1988).
The present statement was inadmissible hearsay as to Stamps because it was neither made in the course or in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. It should have been stricken as evidence against Stamps. Cf. United States v. Palow, 777 F.2d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1985) (post-arrest statements not made in furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1052, 106 S. Ct. 1277, 89 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1986). The statement was made during a deposition arranged by upper-echelon Shearson officers and attorneys to investigate irregularities concerning the REPOs. The deposition took place on October 21, 1983. By that time, the objectives of the alleged conspiracy had long since "either failed or been achieved." Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 801(d) (2) (E). The last substantive act alleged against defendants in the indictment took place on February 23, 1983. Various audits of the Bank had taken place, the last one completed on September 30, 1983. The Bank had instructed Serrano to cancel its REPO deal in September 1983, and Serrano himself apparently submitted his letter of resignation to Shearson in the summer of 1983. Finally, Shearson initiated its internal investigation around September of 1983. In short, whatever the fraudulent scheme achieved in 1982 and early 1983, it is evident that it had collapsed by the time of Serrano's statement at the deposition in October 1983, and thus it was not made in the course or furtherance of any alleged conspiracy.
While conceding that the overt acts of the scheme had long since passed, the government contended at oral argument that the statement was made to conceal the scheme and thus to assure its success by avoiding detection, and consequently is admissible under Rule 801(d) (2) (E). But when asked at oral argument what was left to conceal by the time the statement was made, the government could point to nothing. The Supreme Court has rejected an interpretation of the coconspirator statement exception to the hearsay rule that would go as far as the government here urges. In Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44, 69 S. Ct. 716, 718-19, 93 L. Ed. 790 (1949), the Court stated:
This does not mean that acts of concealment can never have significance where they are "done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy." Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 405, 77 S. Ct. 963, 974, 1 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1957). See also United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1985) (conspiracy continued so long as coconspirators were acting together to destroy incriminatory evidence); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980) (acts of concealment made in furtherance of main criminal objectives of the conspiracy and were thus admissible). But when the acts of concealment are done after the central objectives have been attained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime, they are inadmissible. See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 405, 77 S. Ct. at 974. As this is the case here, the statement was inadmissible hearsay and should not have been considered as evidence against Stamps.6
We also find that the admission of this statement was not harmless error.7 At trial, Stamps defended on the ground that he was completely unaware of Serrano's fraudulent scheme. Although the admissible evidence against him would support a finding of guilt, see pages 5-7 supra, the case against Stamps was far from overwhelming, and the jury would have been fully justified in concluding that Stamps simply was one of those duped by Serrano. The hearsay statement, clearly showing Stamps's complicity in the crucial $1 million transfer to PDI, strongly bolstered the government's case. Indeed, the government emphasized the statement in its closing arguments to the jury. Cf. United States v. DeVaugn, 579 F.2d 225, 228 (2d Cir. 1978) (no harmless error where, among other things, government's closing argument focused on erroneously admitted hearsay). Because "[w]e cannot say that the erroneous admission of the hearsay declaration may not have been the weight that tipped the scales against" Stamps, Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 445, 69 S. Ct. at 719, we reverse his conviction and remand his case to the district court for a new trial.8
Boscio moved for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 at the close of the government's case and after the jury returned its guilty verdict. The district court denied both motions. We affirm the district court's rulings because we find, viewing the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to the government, that there was sufficient evidence supporting Boscio's conviction as an aider and abettor.
A year after Boscio was convicted, he moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Boscio also moved at this time to dismiss the indictment because of certain alleged prosecutorial improprieties in the grand jury proceedings. The district court denied these motions in a written order dated November 12, 1987, and filed with the clerk's office on November 13, 1987; the docket entries prepared by the clerk of the district court indicate that this order was also entered on the docket on November 13 and that the parties were notified of the ruling on November 17. On November 24, 1987, Boscio filed a notice of appeal from the order. This appeal was consolidated with his appeal from his conviction. However, at least as the record currently stands, his notice of appeal from the order denying his post-conviction motions was untimely: it was filed 11 days after the order appears to have been entered on the criminal docket. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) requires that "the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the district court within ten days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.... A judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this subdivision when it is entered in the criminal docket." (Emphasis added.) Thus, Boscio's notice of appeal had to be filed by Monday, November 23, ten days after the order appears to have been entered on the docket on November 13.
Boscio claims, however, that the order was actually entered on November 20 and thus his notice of appeal was timely. In the district court, he filed a motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 to correct the docket so that it would indicate November 20 as the entry date for the order. In support of this motion, Boscio's attorney submitted a sworn statement indicating the following: 1) On November 20, in an effort to have the district court's order entered on the docket, Boscio's attorney communicated with the district court clerk's office and was told that the order had not been entered on the docket. 2) After communicating with the district judge's chambers the same day, he was told that the order had been entered on the docket that afternoon. Thus, according to Boscio, November 13, the date appearing on the docket, is merely the date the order was filed with the clerk's office; the clerk's office mistakenly never added the notation "EOD 11-20-87," indicating the date the order was actually entered.12 The district court denied the Rule 36 motion to correct this alleged mistake without explanation.
Boscio appeals from this ruling, asking this court to reverse the district court's denial of his Rule 36 motion.13 We decline to do so. When a dispute concerning "whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court," Fed. R. App. P. 10(e), has been submitted to the district court, the court's determination is conclusive "absent a showing of intentional falsification or plain unreasonableness." United States v. Mori, 444 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913, 92 S. Ct. 238, 30 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1971). See J. Moore & B. Ward, 9 Moore's Federal Practice p 210.08, at 10-48 (1988). There has been no such showing here. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of Boscio's motion to correct the record. We, therefore, lack jurisdiction over Boscio's appeal from the denial of his post-conviction motions, as the record indicates that Boscio's notice of appeal was untimely.
Even, however, if we had jurisdiction over this appeal, we would not upset the denial of Boscio's post-conviction motions. The district court acted within its discretion in denying Boscio's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 983-84 (1st Cir.) (applying abuse of discretion standard), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 314, 102 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1988). There was simply nothing new about the "newly discovered" evidence--that the Bank never endorsed the mortgage notes used as collateral in the REPOs and thus, according to Boscio, the Bank could not have been defrauded of the notes. This matter was raised at trial when the Bank's president testified that the notes were not endorsed by the Bank when they were transferred during the REPOs "because the Bank had to keep ... title to the notes." Boscio's attorney chose not to cross-examine this witness. It also appears that Boscio was provided copies of the notes before trial. Because the evidence was not "in fact newly discovered," Boscio was not entitled to a new trial. United States v. Rodriguez, 738 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1984).
There is also no merit to Boscio's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because of alleged "irregularities which occurred during the presentation of this case to the grand jury." One such "irregularity" was the presence at one point of three Assistant United States Attorneys ("AUSA") in the grand jury room; according to Boscio, this created an "overbearing and undue influence on the grand jurors." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d) expressly states, however, that "[a]ttorneys for the government ... may be present while the grand jury is in session." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, all three AUSAs had a legitimate reason for being there: one was presenting the evidence to the grand jury; one, a newcomer to the United States Attorney's office, was simply observing a grand jury proceeding for the first time; and the third apparently introduced the newcomer to the grand jurors and then awaited his turn to present a different matter to the grand jury. The third AUSA had previously worked for the municipality of Ponce. Boscio argues that this created a conflict of interest. We reject this argument because the district court found that this AUSA did not participate or assist in the grand jury investigation that led to the indictments in this case. There is nothing in the record to contradict this finding. The remaining alleged "irregularities" do not warrant discussion. "The sanction ... of dismissing an indictment after a defendant has been convicted of an offense is employed in only truly extreme cases of egregious prosecutorial misconduct." Porcaro v. United States, 784 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916, 107 S. Ct. 320, 93 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1986). Because this is not such a case, we would conclude, assuming we had jurisdiction over this appeal, that the district court did not err in denying Boscio's motion to dismiss the indictment.
Serrano's financial dealings at Shearson and his involvement with various officials of the municipality of Ponce, popularly known in Puerto Rico as the "Shearson scandal," spawned two federal grand jury investigations which led to three separate indictments against Serrano. The first grand jury, empaneled on October 19, 1983, and discharged on April 10, 1985, returned the indictment against Serrano, Stamps, and Boscio in the present case, CR 85-0024(GG), on February 1, 1985, and also returned the indictment in CR 84-0381(JP) against Serrano alone on November 28, 1984. The indictment pertaining to CR 84-0381(JP) charged Serrano with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, misapplication of bank funds, 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982), and making false entries in documents of federal credit institutions. 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (1982). A different grand jury, empaneled on December 3, 1984, and discharged in November 1986, returned the indictment in CR 85-0449(CC) on October 31, 1985, against Serrano, Boscio, and Jose Tormos Vega, the former mayor of Ponce. Count One of this indictment charged Serrano with conspiring with Boscio and Tormos to obstruct commerce by extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
Before trial, Serrano moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been violated when, according to Serrano, "agents and officers of the United States ... obtained, directly and indirectly and as a result of [his] immunized testimony, evidence which resulted in the indictment by the grand jury." See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1964).15 After an evidentiary hearing in which agent Garcia testified and after reviewing the grand jury transcripts in camera, the district court denied this motion, finding that the indictment was "not based on evidence included in the compelled testimony of ... Serrano or its fruits." After being convicted and sentenced, Serrano filed a timely notice of appeal. While this appeal was pending, Serrano moved in the district court, among other things, to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he had obtained newly discovered evidence that the government had improperly used his immunized testimony in obtaining the indictment and prosecuting this case. After reviewing the grand jury transcripts as well as the government's investigative file in the case which contained approximately 1,000 documents, and based on the evidence adduced at trial, the district court denied Serrano's motion. United States v. Serrano, 680 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1988). Serrano has chosen not to appeal from the denial of his postconviction motion. This appeal is consequently limited to a review of the denial of his pretrial motion and the issues raised in that motion. We will, however, refer to the district court's findings of fact contained in its post-conviction ruling insofar as they relate to the pretrial motion. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 78, 59 S. Ct. 725, 732, 83 L. Ed. 1111 (1939) (considering lower court's findings of fact even though they were filed after appeal was taken).
In Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77-78, 84 S. Ct. at 1609, the Supreme Court held that "the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law...." The protection afforded a witness who testifies under a state grant of immunity is limited, however, to barring the use of the immunized testimony in the federal prosecution; it does not serve to bar the federal prosecution altogether:
Id. at 79, 84 S. Ct. at 1609-10 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Fifth Amendment prohibits "the use of [immunized] testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453, 92 S. Ct. at 1661.
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 n. 18, 84 S. Ct. at 1609 n. 18). Kastigar characterized this burden as a "heavy" one. Id. at 461, 92 S. Ct. at 1665. The district court's determination as to whether the government has carried this burden is binding unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1978).
The government does not dispute that Serrano testified under immunity at the legislative hearings "to matters related to the federal prosecution." Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 n. 18, 84 S. Ct. at 1609 n. 18. It was thus incumbent upon the government to show that it "had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." Id. The district court found that the government had met this burden. In its ruling denying Serrano's post-conviction motion, the district court described its findings regarding Serrano's pretrial motion as follows:
Serrano, 680 F. Supp. at 62.
Garcia testified before the grand jury that indicted Serrano in this case. Indeed, he appears to have been the government's key witness, explaining the REPO deals and summarizing the evidence he had gathered regarding Serrano's fraudulent scheme. At the evidentiary hearing, Garcia stated that, at least in regard to the indictment returned in this case, he did not "use or present[ ] any documents, evidence, information that [he] had not known prior to the September 1984 Legislative hearings" in his testimony before the grand jury. At the end of one grand jury session, Garcia did mention that Serrano had testified under immunity in the legislative hearings and told the grand jury that Serrano had revealed at the hearings that he, Tormos and Boscio had met in Florida and discussed disguising alleged kickbacks as loans. This reference did not concern the indictment in this case, but rather the indictment in CR-85-0449(CC). The district court, in its post-conviction ruling, found this reference to be "harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt, in light of the more than adequate untainted testimonial as well as documentary evidence adduced to support the indictment and subsequent conviction." Serrano, 680 F. Supp. at 65 (citing United States v. Rogers, 722 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835, 105 S. Ct. 129, 83 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1984), and United States v. Shelton, 669 F.2d 446, 464 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934, 102 S. Ct. 1989, 72 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1982)). See also United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529 n. 8 (11th Cir. 1985) (use of immunized testimony does not result in dismissal of indictment if found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692, 698 (11th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S. Ct. 1170, 84 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1985); United States v. Beery, 678 F.2d 856, 860 n. 3, 863 (10th Cir. 1982) (same). While the reference to Serrano's immunized testimony was clearly improper, we do not think the district court's finding of harmless error was clearly erroneous given the substantial untainted evidence presented to the grand jury and the tangential nature of the reference in relation to the indictment returned in this case. We consequently affirm the district court's finding that the government made no evidentiary use, either direct or indirect, and that the indictment was based on evidence derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the immunized testimony.
Serrano argues that, apart from alleged evidentiary use of his immunized testimony, the government used it improperly for "nonevidentiary purposes." One court has described such nonevidentiary use as "conceivably includ[ing] assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning trial strategy." United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973). To what extent the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination bars the nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony is a difficult question. Neither Murphy nor Kastigar addressed this question, and lower courts have disagreed on the issue. Compare United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1983); McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305; United States v. Carpenter, 611 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1985); United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 1418 (D.N.J. 1984) (all requiring government to show no nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony) with United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 87, 102 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1988); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985) (all rejecting claim that nonevidentiary use warranted dismissal of indictment). The commentators are also divided over this issue. Compare Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth Amendment, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 351 (1987) (arguing that Fifth Amendment prohibits only evidentiary uses of immunized testimony) with Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 791 (1978) (discussing dangers of nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony and arguing for transactional immunity to avoid these dangers). We have uncovered no First Circuit case discussing the issue.
While Serrano advances on appeal his argument that the government made nonevidentiary use of his immunized testimony, he did not raise it in his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment.16 Instead, his pretrial motion was limited to his assertion that the government had "obtained, directly and indirectly and as a result of the immunized testimony, evidence which resulted in the indictment by the grand jury." (Emphasis added.) Our review of the record indicates that Serrano never raised the issue of whether the government made nonevidentiary use of his testimony. "The ordinary rule is that appellate courts will not consider issues not raised below." United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 291 (1st Cir. 1982). See also Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 893-94 (1st Cir. 1979). In "exceptional cases or particular circumstances," however, appellate courts have discretion "to review questions of law neither pressed nor decided below." Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 291. Such an exceptional case will arise when 1) the new issue is purely legal, and the record pertinent to resolution of this issue can be developed no further; 2) the new ground is so compelling as virtually to insure appellant's success; 3) the new issue is almost certain to arise in other cases; and 4) declining to address the issue will result in a gross miscarriage of justice. Id. at 291-92; Johnston, 595 F.2d at 894.
Furthermore, the issue Serrano has raised for the first time on appeal is not "so compelling as virtually to insure [his] success." Johnston, 595 F.2d at 894. We disagree with the Eighth Circuit's statement in McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311, that, where the prosecutor has been exposed to the immunized testimony, "the government is confronted with an insurmountable task in discharging the heavy burden" of proving no nonevidentiary use. Such an approach amounts to a per se rule that would in effect grant a defendant transactional immunity once it is shown that government attorneys or investigators involved in the prosecution were exposed to the immunized testimony. Kastigar made clear that "[t]ransactional immunity ... affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege." 406 U.S. at 453, 92 S. Ct. at 1661. Instead, the purpose of the Fifth Amendment bar against the use of immunized testimony is to " 'leave[ ] the witness and the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of the grant of immunity," id. at 458-59, 92 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79, 84 S. Ct. at 1609) (emphasis added), not in the identical position or in a position as if the witness had remained silent. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 127, 100 S. Ct. 948, 955, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1980) ("For a grant of immunity to provide protection 'coextensive' with that of the Fifth Amendment, it need not treat the witness as if he had remained silent.").
As do most courts, we do not think this purpose is automatically frustrated by the government's mere exposure to immunized testimony. See Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430; United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1980). We also reject the notion that all nonevidentiary use necessarily violates the Fifth Amendment. While we need not decide whether certain nonevidentiary uses of immunized testimony may so prejudice the defendant as to warrant dismissal of the indictment, we agree with the Second Circuit that a prosecution is not foreclosed merely because the "immunized testimony might have tangentially influenced the prosecutor's thought processes in preparing the indictment and preparing for trial."18 Mariani, 851 F.2d at 600. See also Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1530-32. Our position is buttressed by the analogy Kastigar drew between the prohibition against the use of immunized testimony and cases involving coerced confessions. 406 U.S. at 461, 92 S. Ct. at 1665. While not mentioned in the Kastigar opinion, no case involving a coerced confession has prohibited the nonevidentiary use of an involuntary statement. See Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth Amendment, 66 Tex. L. Rev. at 375 n. 154. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1896, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970) (holding that a statute requiring defendant to provide the government with advance notice of alibi defense does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination).
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982) states in part: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets ... its commission, is punishable as a principal."
There are procedural issues, cutting in opposite directions, which relate to our ability to consider this question: while counsel for Stamps eventually lodged an objection to this hearsay statement, he inexplicably failed to object when the deposition was first admitted into evidence, and he waited for several minutes after the incriminating portion had been read into the record before objecting and moving for a mistrial. Given the fact that the deposition was available and its contents presumably well known to counsel in advance of its admission, there can be little reason for such tardiness. See Saville v. United States, 400 F.2d 397, 400 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 980, 89 S. Ct. 2137, 23 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1969); Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) (1). See generally J. Weinstein and M. Berger, 1 Weinstein's Evidence p 103, at 103-20-22 (1986). On the other hand, the government did not argue or otherwise point out defense counsel's tardiness in its appellate brief, thus waiving the issue. See Grubba v. Bay State Abrasives, 803 F.2d 746, 747 (1st Cir. 1986); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a) (4). We conclude that the government's failure to raise the point coupled with the fact that, while counsel was late, he did eventually object, make it appropriate for us to disregard defense counsel's otherwise very serious default in objecting
Because we have found that the statement was not admissible under Rule 801(d) (2) (E), we need not decide whether the confrontation clause barred its admission as well. While the Supreme Court in Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2782, held that statements admissible under the rule present no confrontation clause problem, the converse may not necessarily be true. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82, 91 S. Ct. 210, 216, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970) ("[M]erely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.")
Boscio appears to claim on appeal that this statement was not a coconspirator's statement under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) (E) and thus was inadmissible hearsay. But Boscio never at any time objected to the admission of this testimony at trial and thus we are foreclosed from considering this issue on appeal, see Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) (1), nor do we find that the admission of this testimony was plain error. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(d). See United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 99-100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 137, 98 L. Ed. 2d 94 (1987); United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1982)
At trial, Boscio objected to this testimony on grounds of hearsay; the district court overruled the objection. In his statement of facts in his brief on appeal, Boscio again insists that this was hearsay. However, he does not specifically challenge the district court's ruling in the argument section of his brief. See Grubba v. Bay State Abrasives, 803 F.2d 746, 747 (1st Cir. 1986); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a) (4). Even if we were to review this evidentiary ruling, the testimony appears to have been based on the witness's personal knowledge; the district court did not, therefore, err in its ruling
Boscio appears to argue that this statement did not satisfy the requirements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) (E) and was inadmissible hearsay. Because Boscio failed to object to the admission of this statement at trial, we will not consider its admissibility on appeal; its admission did not constitute plain error. See page 10 n. 9, supra
Boscio also requests that we "treat the joint motion made by the parties herein as a stipulation" and to order the correction under Fed. R. App. P. 10(e). Although the government apparently did not oppose the Rule 36 motion below, the government, while not disputing Boscio's version of events, has carefully refrained from taking any position in this appeal concerning this issue. The government has plainly not entered into any sort of stipulation that would provide a basis for an order under Rule 10(e)
Serrano made similar arguments in CR 84-0381(JP) and CR 85-0449(CC). In CR 84-0381(JP), Serrano pled guilty to three counts of the indictment. After being sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea and also moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the government had used his immunized testimony to obtain the indictment. The district court denied this motion, and Serrano has filed a separate appeal (Nos. 85-1815 and 85-1934) from this ruling. In CR 85-0449(CC), which stemmed from a separate grand jury investigation, the district court dismissed the indictment against Serrano, finding that the evidence presented to the grand jury in that case was obtained directly or indirectly from his immunized testimony. United States v. Tormos-Vega, 656 F. Supp. 1525 (D.P.R. 1987). The government did not appeal from this order of dismissal