Source: http://ok.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190715_0000614.WOK.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-12-12 00:16:25
Document Index: 58861823

Matched Legal Cases: ['art, 431', '§ 404', 'art 404', 'art, 365', '§ 416', '§ 404']

KEVAN COPELIN, Plaintiff,
Initially and on reconsideration, the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's applications for benefits. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision. (TR. 12-31). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (TR. 1-3). Thus, the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner.
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process required by agency regulations. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920. At step one, the ALJ determined that during the relevant time, there existed a continuous 12-month period during which Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity. (TR. 14). At step two, the ALJ determined that Mr. Copelin had the following severe impairments: osteoarthrosis and dysfunction of major joints. (TR. 15). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal any of the presumptively disabling impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (TR. 15).
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Copelin retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
[P]erform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). The claimant can lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand/walk, or sit for 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday except the claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and frequently perform bilateral handling.
(TR. 56). At the administrative hearing, the ALJ presented this RFC to a vocational expert (VE) to determine whether Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work. (TR. 83) With these limitations, the VE opined that Mr. Copelin was able to perform his past relevant work as a motor vehicle sales representative. (TR. 83). The ALJ adopted the VE's testimony and concluded that Mr. Copelin was not disabled at step four. (TR. 30).
On appeal, Mr. Copelin alleges: (1) the ALJ erred in her evaluation of evidence from two examining physicians, (2) the ALJ erred in her evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective allegations, and (3) the RFC lacked substantial evidence. (ECF No. 15:7-12).
V. THE ALJ'S EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FROM EXAMINING PHYSICIANS
Mr. Copelin alleges legal error in the ALJ's evaluation of opinions from examining physicians Dr. Karen Perl and Dr. Karl Erwin.
An ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in the record, although the weight given each opinion will vary according to the relationship between the disability claimant and the medical professional. Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). In determining what weight to accord any medical opinion, an ALJ must consider:
Hamlin, at 1215, n. 7.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & 416.927(c).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Additionally, the ALJ may not selectively review any medical opinion and must provide a proper explanation to support her findings. SeeChapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2012) (&ldquo;We have repeatedly held that [a]n ALJ is not entitled to pick and choose through an uncontradicted medical opinion, taking only the parts that are favorable to a finding of nondisability.&rdquo;); Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1996) (the ALJ must “discuss[ ] the evidence supporting [the] decision” and must also “discuss the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence [the ALJ] ...