Source: http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php?action=mnuactual_contents&ap=j70100
Timestamp: 2017-07-25 21:00:01
Document Index: 484929173

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art.\n247', 'Art.\n247', 'Art. 247', 'Art 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art. 247', 'Art.\n247', 'Art. 247']

Ordinary Appeal is Foreclosed in Presumptive Death Cases
By J. Vicente Q. Roxas Preface This
article highlights the Supreme Court case of Republic
vs. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, Jan. 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 57,
that by express mandate of Art. 247 of the Family Code, the Court of
Appeals is supposed to have lost its jurisdiction
over ordinary appeals from judgments of Regional
Trial Courts granting petitions for declaration of presumptive death.
Even the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, is foreclosed
from filing an ordinary appeal in
violation of the express provision of Art. 247 of the Family Code. Express Provision: Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction. By
express mandate of Art. 247 of the Family Code,
the Court of Appeals is supposed to have lost its
jurisdiction over ordinary appeals from
judgments of Regional Trial Courts granting petitions for
declaration of presumptive death. Art.
247 of the Family Code expressly provides: Art.
247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory. Thus,
the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain ordinary
appeals from decisions of the trial court in actions for declaration
of presumptive death. Supreme Court held in Republic vs. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino that there is no ordinary appeal in presumptive death cases. The
Supreme Court has warned the Court of Appeals in
the recent case of Republic vs. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino,
Jan. 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 57, that the Court of Appeals would be
committing grave reversible error if it failed to dismiss, on ground
of lack of jurisdiction, appeals from judgments
of Regional Trial Courts in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death, by mandate of express provision of Art. 247 of the
Family Code, which states that the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court shall be immediately final and executory, and therefore, there can be no appeal to the Court of Appeals. Distinction between the “presumed dead” and the “actually dead” is that in the latter, the cadaver has to be produced.
underlying reason intended by the framers of the law for Art 247 in
making, under Art. 247, a judgment of the RTC immediately final and executory is – to allow
petitioners, usually the heirs, to go on with their lives ([1] divide
the inheritance, if any; and [2] for the remaining spouse to remarry)
without the absentee. After so many years prescribed by the
law, a person missing for such length of time, can, by fiction of
law, be declared as: “presumed” dead. The law does
not say the absentee person is actually “dead” but allows
a kinder alternative – a fictional situation – to declare
a missing person “presumed” dead – without
requiring to see the cadaver of the missing person - which makes a
world of a difference. Jurists,
however, find it difficult to accept Art. 247 as it is. They
believe that said law can be used by people for their own wicked
intentions like “getting rich” and “getting rid of
an unwanted spouse.” But before one jumps to conclusions
in disregard of Art. 247, at the outset, what is foreclosed is only
“ordinary appeal”. There are other remedies available to
assail the decision of the trial court. It
should not be forgotten that for a person to be declared “presumed
dead”, he must be missing for a long time and the person who wishes the missing person declared dead must have no
hand in that missing person’s state. So how in the world
would petitioner know where to start to “try to locate”
the whereabouts of such missing person or even know, for that matter,
whatever happened to such missing person. The reason the absentee is
called a “missing person” is because no one has seen the
“missing person” and no one has heard about the “missing
person”. Semantics
is the least expected tool for any legal principle. A legal
principle, such as that provided in Art. 247 simply means that if
the requisite years are shown to be extant that a person is
missing, the determination by a court of law that the person has been
found to be missing for a number of years should foreclose ordinary
appeal on the issue of presumption of death. This
is the reason why the Court of Appeals, by express mandate of
Art. 247 of the Family Code, is supposed to have lost its
judgments of Regional Trial Courts in petitions for declaration
of presumptive death – because Art. 247 makes judgment of
the RTC immediately final and executory –
so that the heirs can now distribute the estate of “the
presumed dead” and for the wife or the husband to now marry
again – to get on with their lives and not spend their lifetime
looking for the dead body or carcass of the “presumed dead”. Declaration of presumptive death is a legal fiction created by law. The
better issue to be tackled is whether the term: “Till death do
us part”, could be used under Art 247 of the Family Code,
although a presumptive death only, as a fiction of law that could
void or end a marriage. As far as the Family Code is concerned, there
is no distinction between “actual brain dead” from
“court-declared as presumed dead”. The
presumption of death is only a legal fiction,
like many other legal concepts. Presumption of death cannot be
construed so literally that one must have a corpus delicti, or to be
more blunt – a cadaver. There
are still other remedies available: certiorari under Rule 65 is
available since ordinary appeal is foreclosed when there are
allegations of grave abuse of discretion by the Judge. If there
are sightings of the missing persons who have been “declared as
presumed dead”, a petition for certiorari could still be filed
because the law recognizes that when the missing person “declared
as presumed dead” re-appears, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, shall become ipso facto void because the “presumption”
has ceased to be a presumption – but in reality false because
the missing person has re-appeared to show himself or herself as
alive. Presumption
of death has by nature always been a “cloudy”,
“unknown”, “undeterminable” affair. That is
why it is called a presumption of death. A missing person is actually
dead when his cadaver is shown - only acceptable proof in law (corpus
delicti) to show a person is actually dead. Jomoc and Alegro cases did not abandon the Lorino doctrine. They were treated as petitions for certiorari, instead of ordinary appeals. The
two cases rendered by the Supreme Court after the Lorino case (that
was promulgated January 19, 2005), namely: (1) Republic vs Court of
Appeals and Jomoc (G.R. No. 163604, May 6, 2005); and (2) Republic of
the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and Alegro (G.R. No. 159614,
December 9, 2005), did not modify, reverse or abandon the Lorino
case because: (a) these two cases could be distinguished from
the Lorino cases in many aspects since they did not categorically
state that the Lorino case was modified,
reversed, or abandoned; (b) implied reversals or implied
modifications are not favored; (c) the two cases were merely treated liberally so that the “ordinary appeal” of the
Solicitor General, the government lawyer, was treated as a petition
for certiorari in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases; and (d) the two cases concentrated on the different
issue that it was apparent or even blatant that the petitioning
spouse did not exert any relevant effort at all to try to look for
the missing spouse so that there was no well-founded belief
that the RTC could have a basis to even presume that the missing
spouse was dead, because it appears that the missing
spouse was deliberately hiding from the petitioning spouse. The
Lorino case doctrine is sound and
practical. FIRST,
jurisdiction cannot be subject of any compromise. It is expressly
provided by the Family Code, that the judgment of the RTC in
presumptive death cases is final and executory and therefore, there
is no ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals
from the RTC. SECOND, under Section 1 (h),
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from an
order dismissing (or granting) an action without prejudice, although
Rule 41, just like Art. 247 of the Family Code, allows the
aggrieved party to file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65. Judgments in presumptive death, by express provision of
law, are not only summary in nature but also without prejudice
because the missing person declared as “presumed dead”
may re-appear, in which event, the judgment declaring the missing
person as “presumed dead” is void – not merely
voidable. If the petition is denied by the RTC, petitioner can still
file another case with the RTC. The proclamation of presumptive
death is without prejudice in case of reappearance of absent spouse.
THIRD, under Section 1 (f), Rule 41, no appeal
may be taken from an order of execution and under Art. 247 of the
Family Code, the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory. In
presumptive death cases, judgments are by their nature not only
immediately final but also immediately self-executory (you do not
need a writ of execution). FOURTH, by the
very nature of a petition for declaration of presumptive death, the
cause of action is only directed towards achieving a “presumption”
– as opposed to a conclusion – which makes appeal an
exercise in futility because, by nature, all presumptions are
disputable. The very reason why it is a presumption is because there could be no conclusion of a person’s having actually died
until the cadaver is presented. It always remains doubtful,
disputable and unsure. FIFTH, it is not the
business of courts to question the wisdom of the framers of the
Family Code who, to prevent a mockery of the provision, made
their intentions express that there should be no appeal that could
botch or delay the execution of the judgment of the RTC as to
presumptive death. Sixth, the judgment in
petition for declaration of presumptive death is merely a
presumption, it already having been made clear
in the law (which expressly states: “without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse”) that the
“presumption that the missing person is dead” would ipso
facto become null and void when the absent person (usually
a missing spouse) actually reappears. For practical purposes, “a
ghost ceases to be a ghost when a person appears in the flesh. Why
debate a legal fiction? Why debate a ghost? The end result and objective of a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is not a conclusion but merely a
presumption. This provision in the Family Code is unique
and has no parallel provision in any of our laws. Death in petitions
for declaration of presumptive death is “presumptively”
settled – by legal fiction. Like the concept of a corporation
as a legal fiction, declaration of presumptive death is, too, a
legal fiction. One does not belabor discussion of why it exists as a
legal fiction. The legal fiction is created by law. Its existence is
given legal acceptance. “Presumption” only, nothing conclusive, because the decision is void if the missing person re-appears. Art.
247 of the Family Code is an express, self-executing, and innovative
provision that gave life to petitions for declaration of presumptive
death. It is frank and pragmatic by recognizing the special features
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death that: (1) there is
always the possibility that the person presumed dead by the court may
reappear; (2) that the primordial issue in petitions for declaration
of presumptive death is the passage of a definite period of time
as set by the New Civil Code to qualify for petitions for declaration
of presumptive death. What is final and executory means it is immutable, unalterable, and cannot be modified through ordinary appeal - even by the Supreme Court. Nothing
is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable, and the same can no
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and whether made by the highest court of the land (Nunal v
Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 26). The
Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, is foreclosed from
filing an ordinary appeal in
violation of the express provision of Art. 247 of the Family Code. {themseting}