Source: http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed85825
Timestamp: 2018-06-21 10:28:56
Document Index: 124493421

Matched Legal Cases: ['EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'UKHL ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ']

Family Law Week: International Children Law Update - September 2011
Jacqueline Renton, Barrister, of 4 Paper Buildings reviews the latest key decisions in international children law.
1 Hague Convention 1980 proceedings
2 Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003 proceedings
Article 11(6)-(8) applications
3 Jurisdiction outside of Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003
A v P [2011] EWHC 1530 (Fam) was an incoming Hague application from Poland. The father sought the return of the parties' child to Poland. The mother defended the proceedings on the basis that: (a) the child was habitually resident in England at the time of the removal and thus article 3 of the Hague Convention 1980 was not established and (b) in the alternative, the father had acquiesced in the removal.
The President found that: (a) the child was habitually resident in Poland at the time of the removal and (b) the father had not acquiesced as he had issued proceedings expediently. In respect of habitual residence, the President made clear that:
The Court of Appeal guidance on habitual residence in Re P-J (Abduction: Habitual Residence: Consent) [2009] EWCA Civ 588, [2011] 2 FLR 1031 should be applied;
Habitual residence is an issue of an fact – Parker J's narrow decision (upheld by the Court of Appeal (whose panel included The President) in Re S (Habitual Residence) [2009] EWCA Civ 1021, [2010] 1 FLR 1146 can therefore be distinguished on its facts);
When dealing with married parents and a child of this age (4), it is not open to a parent to unilaterally change a child's habitual residence;
A period of 7 – 8 weeks residence is sufficient to establish a child's habitual residence (as was the case in Re S (Habitual Residence))
In O (Children) [2011] EWCA Civ 128, the Court of Appeal overturned an order of HHJ Wallwork (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) that directed the children, aged 7 and 5, should be returned to the jurisdiction of the U.S.A. The mother had abducted the children from the U.S.A to England. The mother pleaded the following defences:- article 12 /settlement; article 13(a) / acquiescence; and article 13(b) / harm. The key defence was that of settlement. HHJ Wallwork found that the children were settled but nonetheless exercised his discretion in favour of the children being returned.
The Court of Appeal (Black LJ giving the lead judgment) made clear that HHJ Wallwork had wrongly applied the principles underpinning his exercise of discretion, as set down by the House of Lords in Re M (Abduction: Zimbabwe) [2007] UKHL 55. Black LJ made clear that:
Hague policy considerations remain relevant in settlement cases, but that they are not to be given more importance than other, welfare based considerations.
The trial judge had been wrong to assume that the children's young age would mean that they would adapt more easily to a return. The individual circumstances of each child must be assessed, examined and weighed in the balance when exercising the court's discretion as to whether to return a child. See, by way of example, RS v KS (Abduction: Wrongful Retention) [2009] EWHC 1494 (Fam) where Macur J made clear that the disruption of living arrangements to a young child "would have more far reaching consequences and adverse impact than in the case of an older and less sensitive child able to comprehend a sudden departure from one routine and community and the prospect of the next."
In AF v T and another [2011] EWHC 1315, the child had been removed from this jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of Germany in the midst of lengthy welfare proceedings concerning the parties, the mother latterly having applied for leave to remove the child to Germany. Prior to the determination of the mother's leave to remove application, the mother abducted the child to Germany. At that point, the father was having supervised contact with the child. The father issued Hague Convention 1980 proceedings in Germany but a return was not ordered (either at first instance or appeal.) The father was then unable to trace the whereabouts of the child as the German authorities took a protective stance and actively concealed the mother and child from the father. The father then applied in the English High Court for the return of the child, pursuant to article 11 of the Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003. The mother did not engage in the proceedings. Short reports were obtained from the Youth Welfare Office in Stuttgart, but the child's guardian was unable to meet with the child as the mother refused to engage in the proceedings. Despite the mother's stance, the father accepted that she was the child's primary carer. Accordingly, Jackson J granted the mother a residence order and awarded the father a contact order (supervised contact 6 times a year). The court issued an Annex III certificate so that the contact order could be enforced.
The court applied the principles set down by Theis J in Re D, D v N [2011] EWHC 471 (Fam), namely:
The interrelationship of articles 10 and 11(7)-(8) permits the state from which the child has been wrongfully removed or retained to undertake an assessment of the issue of custody once a non-return has been made under article 13 of the Hague Convention 1980 in the other state.
Article 11(7) proceedings should be carried out as quickly as possible.
When considering the issue of custody, the judge should be in a position that she/he would have been if the child had not been abducted. Therefore, all welfare orders are available to the judge.
When considering the issue of custody, the court exercises a welfare jurisdiction.
The foundation for making custody orders comes from article 11(7), not the inherent jurisdiction.
The court has an ability to order the summary return of the child, which would include ordering the return so as to facilitate the decision making process.
It is unclear whether the court's ability to order the return of the child is akin to an order under the inherent jurisdiction or under the Children Act 1989 (specific issue order). If it is more akin to an order under the inherent jurisdiction, then it may not be necessary for the court to mechanistically and slavishly consider the welfare checklist before ordering the child's return.
Any return order is directly enforced under articles 42 and 47 of BIIR.
SH v HH [2011] EWCA Civ 796 is a recent decision of the Court of Appeal in respect of issues of jurisdiction under the Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003.
The facts were as follows. The child was born in Afghanistan. When the child was about 20 days of age the mother came to England on a visa; the mother had already married the father in Afghanistan. The father was an Afghan who had acquired British citizenship. The child was left in Afghanistan in the care of the uncle. In Autumn 2010, the mother left the marital home (in this jurisdiction) for a refuge alleging domestic violence at the hands of the father. In January 2011, the child disappeared. The father and uncle said that the child had been abducted from the garden. The mother believed that the father was concealing the child, having arranged for the child's removal.
The proceedings commenced in February 2011 and the court ordered the father to bring the child within this jurisdiction on a without notice basis. At the return date, the father made clear that he challenged the English court's jurisdiction on the basis that the child was not habitually resident in England as the child had never set foot in England and thus the English court could not be seised on that basis. The proceedings were then listed for a jurisdictional hearing. At a further hearing, it was recorded that both parties had the intention to bring the child to this jurisdiction, but the father nonetheless maintained his challenge to the court's jurisdiction over the child. At the jurisdictional hearing, the judge accepted that the father was not accepting the English court's jurisdiction (within the wording of article 12(3) of the Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003) and focused on the child's habitual residence. The judge held that the child was habitually resident in England on the basis that both parties had the settled intention that the child should reside in England with them. The judge and went on to make an order that the father must return the child to England, having heard full evidence from the mother but no cross-examination of the father. The judge found that the father was responsible for, and complicit in, the child's removal.
On appeal, the father sought to overturn the return order on two bases: (a) the trial judge erred in finding that the English jurisdiction was validly seised on the basis that the child was habitually resident in England and (b) the trial judge violated the father's article 6 rights in the way in which he conducted the fact finding exercise that led to the return order being directed.
The Court of Appeal upheld ground (a) but rejected ground (b). In respect of ground (a), the mother conceded that she could not support the judge's finding in respect of habitual residence, but attempted without success to argue that the father had prorogued the English court's jurisdiction, pursuant to article 12(3) of the Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003. Accordingly, the return order was overturned, the wardship was discharged and the father had his passport returned to him.
As habitual residence was not properly challenged in the Court of Appeal, the court did not grapple with the application of Re B v H in light of Re F [2006] EWHC 2199 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 627, and Re A [2009] 2 FLR 1 and Mercredi v Chaffe [2011] EWCA Civ 272, [2011] 1 FLR 1293.
Mercredi v Chaffe [2011] EWCA Civ 272 is an important decision within the field of jurisdiction under the Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003. The facts are as follows. The child was nearly 8 months old. The father did not have parental responsibility for the child. The mother removed the child to the jurisdiction of La Reunion, France, less than two months after the child was born. Two days after the removal, the father started proceedings in this jurisdiction on a without notice basis by way of an application for a Tipstaff location order. At the return date, the father had issued an application for s.8 orders under the Children Act 1989 and for parental responsibility in respect of the child, and Holman J ordered the forthwith return of the child and granted the father a parental responsibility order. The father then started proceedings under the Hague Convention 1980 for the return of the child in France. The mother applied to the court in La Reunion, France, for sole parental responsibility of the chid and residence / contact. A further return order was granted in this jurisdiction, the jurisdictional foundation of the proceedings being an originating summons issued by the father. A jurisdictional hearing was listed in this jurisdiction. The father's Hague Convention 1980 application was then dismissed on the basis that he had not established rights of custody under article 3. At the time of the Court of Appeal hearing, the father's appeal against the decision in the Hague Convention 1980 proceedings remained extant. McFarlane J (as he then was) ordered the return of the child, together with 15 separate declarations which included declarations relating to issues of habitual residence, parental responsibility, rights of custody and wrongful retention. The order and judgment were sent to the Paris Central Authority to assist in the Father's Hague Convention 1980 appeal, but this was not done until after the father was out of time in respect o his appeal. The court in La Reunion rejected the order of McFarlane J and granted sole parental responsibility to the mother. The mother appealed the return order of McFarlane J. The Court of Appeal then referred the proceedings under the PPU procedure to the European Court of Justice to deal with three questions, namely:
the definition of habitual residence under articles 8 and 10 of the Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003;
guidance on the concept of rights of custody in an "institution or body", pursuant to article 3 of the Hague Convention 1980;
whether article 10 has a continuing application after the course of the requested member state have rejected an application for the return of the children under the Hague Convention 1980 on the basis that articles 3-5 of the Hague Convention 1980 are not made out.
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") ruled as follows:
The definition of habitual residence must be defined in accordance with the objectives of the Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003 ("BIIR"), and a degree of permanency is necessary for the establishment of habitual residence.
Guidance was not necessary on the concept of rights of custody in an "institution or body", pursuant to article 3 of the Hague Convention 1980 as there had been a lawful removal.
If an application for the return of the children under the Hague Convention 1980 is rejected, the requesting state can still continue with its proceedings relating to parental responsibility if those proceedings were brought prior to the commencement of Hague Convention 1980 proceedings.
The Court of Appeal then handed down its judgment, which can be summarised as follows:
Thorpe LJ made clear that the ECJ's definition of habitual residence did not alter the habitual residence declaration of McFarlane J who was right to conclude that the child's English habitual residence had not been lost when the English proceedings were issued.
Thorpe LJ accepted that a lawful removal can become a wrongful retention if a return order is issued by the courts of the child's state of habitual residence and not complied with: Re S (A Minor) (Custody: Habitual Residence) [1998] AC 750. However, Thorpe LJ made clear that the mother's removal of the child was lawful and represented the legitimate exercise of the mother's rights of free movement, pursuant to articles 20-21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Thorpe LJ stated that as a matter of comity, McFarlane J should have complied with the Hague Convention 1980 ruling of the court of La Reunion.
Thorpe LJ held that the application before McFarlane J was the father's later issued originating summons, not his original Children Act 1989 application, and accordingly the English court was not first seised. The French Hague proceedings were already afoot prior to the English court directing the return order, and in any event the child was habitually resident in France by that point.
Thorpe LJ stated that even if McFarlane J had jurisdiction, the orders that he made were plainly wrong and the court should have directed a transfer of the proceedings of its own motion under article 15 of BIIR.
Elias LJ made clear that he supported Thorpe LJ in his determination that an article 15 transfer should have been directed by McFarlane J, but declined to support Thorpe LJ on his determination that McFarlane J did not have jurisdiction to deal with the application on the basis that the father's two applications were essentially seeking the same remedy.
Elias LJ stated that the father's contention that the court in La Reunion did not consider article 3 of the Hague Convention 1980 from the stand point of a wrongful retention was an issue for the French court to consider.
The father's appeal to the Supreme Court was refused on paper.
3 Jurisdiction outside of the Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003
In SW v CW (Mirror orders jurisdiction) [2011] EWCA Civ 703, the Court of Appeal considered the issue of mirror orders. The facts were as follows. The father had an order for custody / care and control of the child from a Malaysian court. The mother had a contact order but contact had not taken place for three years as a result of her ill health and thus inability to travel to Malaysia (from England) for contact. In 2009, the father applied to the PRFD for a 'mirror order' and Moylan J granted a 'mirror order'. The mother applied for residence / variation of contact. The father stated that the English court had no jurisdiction, but failed to attend the hearing. The court accepted jurisdiction, pursuant to article 12(3) of BIIR. The father appealed, arguing that the 'mirror order' application did not engage article 12(3) of BIIR as he had not expressly and unequivocally accepted the English jurisdiction, and that in any event it would not be in the child's interests for there to be a competing Malaysian and English jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeal allowed the father's appeal, stating that:
An application for a 'mirror order' did not vest jurisdiction in the English court on a substantive basis. An application for a 'mirror order' cannot supplant the primary jurisdiction – the mother's substantive applications should be made before the Malaysian court. The purpose of a 'mirror order' was to reflect the protection ordered in the primary jurisdiction. Such an application cannot create jurisdictional conflict for the responsibility of determining welfare issues. Jurisdictional conflict is to be avoided for the sake of the child; such conflict can increase the hostility between parents, as well as to prevent comity being undermined and wasted costs and effort.
There is no clear jurisdiction to make a mirror order – the International Family Law Committee has repeatedly drawn attention to this deficit and requested an enabling section in a related statute.
In Re P (A Child: Mirror Order) [2000] 1 FLR 435, Singer J grappled with the jurisdictional foundation of a mirror order. Singer J held that this jurisdiction was based on a 'prospective presence jurisdiction', not the inherent jurisdiction – this was a decision born out of common sense and sense of comity. The Court of Appeal did not express a view on whether Singer J's analysis is correct, it not being necessary to do so as the initial 'mirror order' of Moylan J was not the subject of appeal. However, the Court of appeal did make clear that the jurisdictional rules under BIIR have "changed the landscape".
The problems encountered by Singer J in Re P [2000] will be largely overcome by the commencement of the Child Protection Convention 1996 (due to come into force in Autumn 2011). Article 24 of the Child Protection Convention 1996 provides jurisdiction for advance recognition orders.
When considering a 'mirror order' application, the judge should ask him/herself whether there is any practical benefit to the child or whether the order will be practically enforceable. If it is the latter, then it is probably better not to make such an order.
Rimer LJ made clear that there was a question mark over the jurisdictional basis of the 'mirror order' made by Moylan J, but the order remains valid as no application has been made to set it aside. However, the fact that the order remains valid does not mean that it was made under a jurisdiction that Moylan J did not have – in other words, a jurisdiction under article 12 (3) of BIIR (as had been stated by the mother.) The mother's application for residence / variation of contact has no jurisdictional foundation – it is a free standing application, not part of the jurisdiction (whatever that may be ) that underpinned the 'mirror order.'
KY v DD [2011] EWHC 1277 (Fam) is a reminder to practitioners of the appropriate procedure to adopt in without notice applications for a Tipstaff order. In this case, a without notice application was made before Theis J. A two-page affidavit was produced for the application setting out the reasons as to why a Tipstaff order needed to be made, it being alleged the father was a flight risk. Further information was supplied to the court orally by counsel to further substantiate the flight risk. Theis J made a Tipstaff order on the basis of the oral submissions. Later that afternoon, counsel emailed Theis J, indicating that the facts supplied to the court orally in fact related to another case. Theis J asked for a full written explanation from counsel and his instructing solicitors.
Theis J endorsed the procedure for without notice applications set down in the decision of Munby J (as he then was) in Re W (ex parte orders) [2000] and Baker J in B Borough Council v S and Anor [2006]. Theis J also made the following points:
Information put before the court on a without notice basis should be the subject of close scrutiny. If the applicant is not at court, then a contemporaneous note of the applicant's instructions should be produced. Without such a note, the application should be adjourned so as to enable steps to be taken to verify the information.
If additional material is put before the court orally, sworn evidence must be filed after the application within a very short period of time that sets out the oral submissions.
It is incumbent on practitioners to consider rigorously whether a without notice application is justified and to be clear as to the evidential basis for the application.