Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97224/opp-cotton-mills-inc-vs-administrator
Timestamp: 2019-01-21 22:43:28
Document Index: 215693031

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 5', '§ 8', '§ 5', '§ 8', '§ 15', '§ 6', '§ 8']

Opp Cotton Mills Inc Vs Administrator - Citation 97224 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. Vs. Administrator - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97224
Case Number 312 U.S. 126
Appellant Opp Cotton Mills, Inc.
Respondent Administrator
opp cotton mills, inc. v. administrator - 312 u.s. 126 (1941) u.s. supreme court opp cotton mills, inc. v. administrator, 312 u.s. 126 (1941) opp cotton mills, inc. v. administrator, wage and hour division, department of labor no. 330 argued december 20, 1940 decided february 3, 1941 312 u.s. 126 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit syllabus 1. wage and hours provisions of the fair labor standards act, as applied to manufacturers of textile goods for interstate commerce, held within the commerce power and consistent with the fifth and tenth amendments. united states v. darby, ante, p. 312 u. s. 100 . p. 312 u. s. 142 . 2. in the exertion of its.....
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator - 312 U.S. 126 (1941)
U.S. Supreme Court Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941)
1. Wage and hours provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as applied to manufacturers of textile goods for interstate commerce, held within the commerce power and consistent with the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. United States v. Darby, ante, p. 312 U. S. 100 . P. 312 U. S. 142 .
2. In the exertion of its legislative powers, Congress may provide that administrative findings of fact, made in conformity to previously adopted legislative standards and definitions of Congressional policy, shall be prerequisite to the operation of its statutory command. P. 312 U. S. 144 .
3. Where the standards set up for the guidance of the administrative agency, the procedure which it is directed to follow, and the record of its action which is required by the statute to be kept, or which is in fact preserved, are such that Congress, the courts, and the public can ascertain whether the agency has conformed to the standards which Congress has prescribed, there is no failure of performance of the legislative function. P. 312 U. S. 144 .
4. The Fair Labor Standards Act, to the extent that it authorizes the Administrator and the industry committees appointed by him to classify industries and fix minimum wages, is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Pp. 312 U. S. 142 , 312 U. S. 145 .
5. Under this Act, § 8(a)-(d), an industry committee acts as an investigating body with duty to report its recommendations to the Administrator. Its report is the basis of proceedings before the Administrator under § 8(d), which are judicial in character, with provisions for notice and full hearing. P. 312 U. S. 147 .
6. The preliminary definition of an industry made by the Administrator when he appoints an industry committee under § 5(a) of the Act -- distinguished from the definition to be made in the final order fixing the wage, § 8(f) -- may be revised by him while the investigation is pending before the committee, but the committee's report must be based on the amended definition. P. 312 U. S. 147 .
with the products included and the different nature of the establishments, labor forces, and wage structures associated with the two types of product. Held consistent with the provisions and purpose of the statute. P. 312 U. S. 149 .
8. The composition of the industry committee in this case satisfies the requirements of § 5(b) of the statute. P. 312 U. S. 150 .
9. An industry committee engaged in investigations with a view to recommending a minimum wage is not required by the Act to conduct a quasi -judicial proceeding upon notice and hearing. P. 312 U. S. 151 .
10. The demands of due process do not require a hearing at the initial stage, or at any particular point, or at more than one point, in an administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective. P. 312 U. S. 152 .
11. The command of § 8(d) that the Administrator, as a prerequisite to a wage order, find that the recommendations of the committee "are made in accordance with law" does not extend to a review of the evidence and hearings before the committee or an investigation of the mental processes by which committee members reached their conclusion to recommend the minimum wage, or extend beyond inquiry upon evidence before the Administrator whether the requirements of the statute and rules of the Administrator as to the composition of the committee, the definition of the industry, and the actions required to be taken by the committee have been observed. P. 312 U. S. 153 .
12. Such being the function of the committee, it is immaterial that, in this case, substitutes were appointed for two of its members in the course of its deliberations, it not appearing that they did not consider the evidence taken and the proceedings had before their appointments. P. 312 U. S. 153 .
13. A party who appeared before the Administrator, was heard, introduced evidence, and was given opportunity to introduce more, has no ground to complain that notice of the hearing, given 40 days previously and in conformity with the statute, was inadequate. P. 312 U. S. 153 .
14. Persons interested in a wage hearing before the Administrator are sufficiently informed of the matter in issue by the report and recommendation of the industry committee, upon which the hearing is based. P. 312 U. S. 153 .
15. There was no error or want of due process in permitting the industry committee to appear before the Administrator by counsel and to offer evidence in support of its recommendations, or in permitting members of the staff of the Wage and Hour Division to give testimony. P. 312 U. S. 154 .
16. The evidence upon which the Administrator's findings may be based is not limited to such as would be competent in a court of law. It includes relevant statistical and economic data in published reports of investigations by governmental agencies. P. 312 U. S. 154 .
The general scope of the Act and the provisions of § 15(a)(1)(2) and (5) and §§ 6 and 7, prohibiting the manufacture for and shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced for the commerce by employees employed at less than the prescribed minimum wage or more than the prescribed maximum hours without payment of the required overtime wage, have been discussed in United States v. Darby, ante, p. 312 U. S. 100 . It is unnecessary to repeat that discussion here.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 407 , 17 U. S. 415 . In an increasingly complex society, Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative policy in fixing, for example, a tariff rate, a railroad rate, or the rate of wages to be applied in particular industries by a minimum wage law. The Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable. The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy, and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Those essentials are preserved when Congress specifies the basic conclusions of fact upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it ordains that its statutory command is to be effective.
Measured by this requirement, the present statute is no less an exercise of the legislative function than was the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 858, authorizing the President to raise or lower tariff duties so as to equalize the difference which, with the aid of the Tariff Commission, he finds between the costs of production of dutiable articles in this and in foreign countries, his determination to be based upon a variety of relevant factors, some specified and others not, for which the statute prescribed no relative weight. See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 ; cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 ; United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U. S. 371 . See, to the like effect under other statutes, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 190 U. S. 273 (Interstate Commerce Act); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 , 307 U. S. 48 -49 (Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 , 310 U. S. 399 (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 (Federal Tobacco Inspection Act); United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, 307 U. S. 533 (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act).
It is clear that the sections of the statute now before us do not require the committee to conduct a quasi -judicial proceeding upon notice and hearing. Its function, as already stated, is to investigate upon the basis of data which the Administrator may submit and which the committee may procure for itself, and to report its recommendation with respect to the minimum wage. Cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, supra, 288 U. S. 318 . That such is the interpretation of the statute is abundantly supported by its legislative history. See Conference Committee Report, H.Rept. No. 2738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 31, and the explanation of the bill by the Chairman of the Senate Committee, 83 Cong.Rec. 9164. In his statement, he pointed out that the procedure is modeled upon the New York Minimum Wage Act, see Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 , 298 U. S. 619 , and he emphasized that no minimum wage rate could be established which had not been first "carefully worked out" by a committee drawn principally from the industry itself, and that it should not then be put into effect
as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective. The proceedings before the Administrator, as provided by § 8(b), satisfy the requirements of due process without further requirement, which the statute omits, of a hearing on notice before the committee. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15 ; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 , 287 U. S. 168 ; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U. S. 457 , 291 U. S. 463 .
was framed by the report and recommendation of the committee to the Administrator, there was no failure to inform petitioner of the contentions made in behalf of the Government. Cf. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 ; 304 U. S. 304 U.S. 1. Nor can we find any error or want of due process in permitting the Industry Committee to appear before the Administrator by counsel and to offer evidence in support of its recommendations, or in permitting members of the staff of the Wage and Hour Division to give testimony. See Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 470 , 304 U. S. 477 .
The argument of petitioner is not that the record contains no evidence supporting the findings, but, rather, that this class of evidence must be ignored because not competent in a court of law. But it has long been settled that the technical rules for the exclusion of evidence applicable in jury trials do not apply to proceedings before federal administrative agencies in the absence of a statutory requirement that such rules are to be observed. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25 , 194 U. S. 44 ; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88 , 227 U. S. 93 ; Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 253 U. S. 117 ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274 , 265 U. S. 288 ; John Bene & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 F. 468, 471. We need not consider whether this class of evidence must be excluded from proceedings in court.
Further, the documents in question were received in evidence without objection. And, even in a court of law, if evidence of this character is admitted without objection, it is to be considered, and must be accorded "its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible." Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442 , 223 U. S. 450 ; Rowland v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co., 244 U. S. 106 , 244 U. S. 108 ; cf. United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U. S. 299 , 273 U. S. 312 .