Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98185/kordel-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2016-10-22 16:32:07
Document Index: 574953811

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 331', '§ 201', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 7', '§ 301', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§ 201', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 701', '§ 201', '§ 12', '§ 133', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301']

Kordel Vs United States - Citation 98185 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Kordel Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98185CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-22-1948Case Number335 U.S. 345AppellantKordelRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:.....sections, considered together, provide a definition for the "misbranding" of drugs. i agree that a drug is misbranded within the meaning of the statute if false and misleading written, printed, or graphic matter is either placed upon the drug, its container or wrappers, or used in the sale of the drug as a supplement to the package label to advise consumers how to use the drug. i agree that false labels may, within the meaning of the statute, "accompany," that is go along with, a drug on its interstate journey even though not in the same carton, on the same train, in the same mail, or delivered for shipment the same day. but these agreements do not settle all the problems in this case.
the federal food, drug, and cosmetic act does not purport to make all misbranding of drugs within.....Judgment:
Kordel v. United States - 335 U.S. 345 (1948)
1. It is a violation of § 301(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), to ship in interstate commerce to the same consignee a drug and also false and misleading pamphlets designed for use in the advertisement, sale, and use of the drug and constituting an essential supplement to the label on the drug -- even though the punphlets are shipped separately and at a different time. Pp.
335 U. S. 346
(a) The phrase "accompanying such article" in § 201(m) defining "labeling" is not restricted to labels that are on or in the article or package that is transported. Pp.
335 U. S. 347
(b) That the pamphlets are shipped prior to or subsequent to the shipment of the drug does not prevent the drug from being "misbranded" when introduced into commerce within the meaning of § 301(a), in spite of § 301(k), which forbids misbranding of a drug while it is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce. Pp.
335 U. S. 350
335 U. S. 351
2. That such pamphlets bear a sale price and are offered for sale is immaterial, since the Act cannot be circumvented by the easy device of a "sale" of the pamphlets where they perform the function of labeling. P.
3. The fact that, in the evolution of the Act, the ban on false advertising was eliminated and its control was transferred to the Federal Trade Commission did not eliminate from the Act advertising which performs the function of labeling. P.
4. Since the informations charging violations of § 301(a) did not allege that the acts committed were done "with intent to defraud," the maximum penalty was imprisonment for not more than a year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. Therefore, prosecution by information was authorized by the statute and by § 7(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. P. 348,
538. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 164 F.2d 913. This Court granted certiorari. 333 U.S. 872.
335 U. S. 352
United States v. Urbuteit, post,
335 U. S. 355
, decided this day, are here on certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits in the construction of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of June 25, 1938. 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. § 301
Section 301(a) of the Act prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of any drug that is adulterated or misbranded. [
] It is misbranded according to § 502(a) if its "labeling is false or misleading in any particular" and unless the labeling bears "adequate directions for use." § 502(f). The term "labeling" is defined in § 201(m) to
"all labels [
] and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article."
Section 303 makes the violation of any of the provisions of § 301 a crime. [
law is not to be read expansively to include what is not plainly embraced within the language of the statute (
299 .S. 207;
Kraus & Bros. v. United States,
-622), since the purpose fairly to apprise men of the boundaries of the prohibited action would then be defeated.
. But there is no canon against using common sense in reading a criminal law, so that strained and technical constructions do not defeat its purpose by creating exceptions from or loopholes in it.
See Roschen v. Ward,
It would, indeed, create an obviously wide loophole to hold that these drugs would be misbranded if the literature had been shipped in the same container, but not misbranded if the literature left in the next or in the preceding mail. The high purpose of the Act to protect consumers who under present conditions are largely unable to protect themselves in this field [
] would then be easily defeated. The administrative agency charged with its enforcement [
] has not given the Act any such restricted construction. [
] The textual structure of the Act is not agreeable to it. Accordingly, we conclude that the phrase "accompanying such article" is not restricted to labels that are on or in the article on package that is transported.
embraces advertising. or descriptive matter that goes with the package in which the articles are transported. The second clause -- "accompanying such article" -- has no specific reference to packages, containers, or their contents, as did a predecessor statute.
See Seven Cases v. United States,
239 U. S. 513
-515. It plainly includes what is contained within the package, whether or not it is "upon" the article or its wrapper or container. But the second clause does not say "accompanying such article in the package or container," and we see no reason for reading the additional words into the text.
There is a suggestion that the offense in this case falls under § 301(k) of the Act, which includes misbranding of a drug while it is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce. [
] Since the informations contain no such charge, it is therefore claimed that the judgment must be reversed. We do not agree. Section 301(k) has a broad sweep, not restricted to those who introduce or deliver for introduction drugs in interstate commerce. [
See United States v. Sullivan, supra.
Nor is it confined to adulteration or misbranding, as is § 301(a).
It is, however, restricted to cases where the article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce, and, unlike § 301(a), it does not reach situations where the manufacturer sells directly to the consumer.
Cf. United States v. Urbuteit, supra.
Hence, we conclude that we do not disturb the statutory scheme when we refuse to take from § 301(a) what is fairly included in it in order to leave
The informations, in charging violations of § 301(a), did not allege that the acts committed were done "with intent to defraud." Hence, the maximum penalty was imprisonment for not more than a year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. Prosecution by information was therefore authorized by the statute (
see Duke v. United States,
301 U. S. 492
) and by Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
See United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U. S. 280
United States v. Sullivan, supra,
332 U. S. 696
§ 701 and § 201(c); 1940 Reorg. Plan No. IV, § 12, 54 Stat. 231, 5 U.S.C. § 133u.
, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act creates several offenses each of which separately depends upon the relationship the misbranded drug then bears to interstate commerce. Section 301(a) forbids the "introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce" of misbranded drugs; § 301(b) forbids misbranding while the drugs are "in interstate commerce;" § 301(c) prohibits the "receipt" of such drugs in interstate commerce; and § 301(k) forbids misbranding while drugs are "held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce."
The twenty counts of the information upon which this petitioner's conviction rests charge that he had introduced drugs into interstate commerce, and that "when" he so introduced the drugs, they were "misbranded . . . in that . . . statements appearing in . . . bulletins and booklets
" the drugs "were false and misleading." (Emphasis supplied.) The undisputed evidence as to thirteen of these counts showed that, when the drugs were "introduced" into interstate commerce for shipment, they were not, within any fair meaning of the word, "accompanied" by the printed matter relied on as "labeling." The evidence under one count was that the drugs were shipped July 10, 1942, while the booklets said to be "labels" were sent a year and a half later, January 18, 1944. Thus, each of these counts charged a violation of the separate and distinct offense of introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, prohibited by § 301(a). The evidence proves the offense, if any, of violation of § 301(k), which prohibits the misbranding of drugs while held for sale after an interstate shipment.
The Court's interpretation of § 301(a) seems to me to create a new offense to make it a crime to introduce drugs into interstate commerce if they should subsequently be misbranded, even so long as eighteen months later while held for sale. This judicial action is justified in part on the ground that the offense Congress created in § 301(k) for holding misbranded drugs for sale after interstate shipment might not reach all situations covered by the congressionally created offense defined by § 301(a). If, as the Court believes, Congress in § 301(k) has limited the situations for which it will direct punishment for holding misbranded articles for sale, I cannot agree that we should rewrite § 301(a) so as to broaden its coverage. If Congress left a hiatus, Congress should fill it if it so desires. While I do not doubt the wisdom of separating these offenses as Congress has here done, we must remember that there are dangers in splitting up one and the same transaction into many offenses.