Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/452/576/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 02:24:03
Document Index: 787764944

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 192', '§ 1964', '§ 1961']

US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 452 > UNITED STATES V. TURKETTE, 452 U. S. 576 (1981)
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(a) Neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its application to legitimate enterprises. On its face, the definition of "enterprise" in § 1961(4) appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope. The section describes two separate categories of associations that come within the purview of an "enterprise" -- the first encompassing organizations such as corporations, partnerships, and other "legal entities," and the second covering "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." The second category is not a more generalized description of the first, and hence the rule of ejusdem generis cannot be properly applied to hold chanrobles.com-red
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 452 U. S. 593.
Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), entitled chanrobles.com-red
Count Nine of a nine-count indictment charged respondent and 12 others with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise [Footnote 2] engaged in interstate commerce chanrobles.com-red
On appeal, respondent argued that RIO was intended chanrobles.com-red
§ 1961(4). There is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact. On its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes chanrobles.com-red
Section 1961(4) describes two categories of associations that come within the purview of the "enterprise" definition. The first encompasses organizations such as corporations and partnerships, and other "legal entities." The second covers chanrobles.com-red
632 F.2d 899. chanrobles.com-red
Apart from § 1962(c)'s proscription against participating in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities, RICO also proscribes the investment of income derived from racketeering activity in an enterprise engaged in or which chanrobles.com-red
affects interstate commerce as well as the acquisition of an interest in or control of any such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a) and (b). [Footnote 6] The Court of Appeals concluded that these provisions of RICO should be interpreted so as to apply only to legitimate enterprises. If these two sections are so limited, the Court of Appeals held that the proscription in § 1962(c), at issue here, must be similarly limited. Again, we do not accept the premise from which the Court of Appeals derived its conclusion. It is obvious that §§ 192(a) and (b) address the infiltration by organized crime of legitimate businesses, but we cannot agree that these sections were not also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or reinvesting in wholly illegal enterprises and from acquiring through a pattern of racketeering activity wholly illegitimate enterprises such as an illegal gambling business or a loan-sharking chanrobles.com-red
Similarly, the Court of Appeals noted that various civil remedies were provided by § 1964, [Footnote 7] including divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, restrictions on future activities by violators of RICO, and treble damages. These remedies it thought would have utility only with respect to legitimate enterprises. As a general proposition, however, the civil remedies could be useful in eradicating organized crime from the social fabric, whether the enterprise be ostensibly legitimate or admittedly criminal. The aim is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains. See infra at 452 U. S. 591-593. Even if one or more of the civil remedies might be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this fact would not serve to limit the enterprise concept. Congress has provided civil remedies for use when the circumstances so warrant. It is untenable to argue that their existence limits the scope of the criminal provisions. [Footnote 8] chanrobles.com-red
Finally, it is urged that the interpretation of RICO to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises will substantially alter the balance between federal and state enforcement of criminal law. This is particularly true, so the argument goes, since included within the definition of racketeering activity are a significant number of acts made criminal under state law. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). But even assuming that the more inclusive definition of enterprise will have the effect suggested, [Footnote 9] the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Congress was well aware that it was entering a new domain of federal involvement through the enactment of this measure. Indeed, the very purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal Government to address a large and seemingly neglected problem. The view was that existing law, state and federal, was not adequate to address the problem, which was of national dimensions. That Congress included within the definition of racketeering activities a number of state crimes strongly indicates that RICO criminalized conduct that was also criminal under state law, at least when the requisite elements of a RICO offense are present. As the hearings and legislative debates reveal, Congress was well aware of the fear that RICO would "mov[e] large substantive areas formerly totally within the police power of chanrobles.com-red
Section 904(a) of RICO, 84 Stat. 947, directs that "[t]he provisions of this Title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." With or without this admonition, we could not agree with the Court of Appeals that illegitimate enterprises should be excluded from coverage. We are also quite sure that nothing in the legislative history of RICO requires a contrary conclusion. [Footnote 10] chanrobles.com-red
Considering this statement of the Act's broad purposes, the construction of RICO suggested by respondent and the court below is unacceptable. Whole areas of organized criminal activity would be placed beyond the substantive reach of the enactment. For example, associations of persons engaged solely in "loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, chanrobles.com-red
116 Cong.Rec. 592 (1970). In view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltration of legitimate business. chanrobles.com-red
Id. at 602. [Footnote 14] Undoubtedly, the infiltration chanrobles.com-red