Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/752/685/57817/
Timestamp: 2020-02-24 03:26:01
Document Index: 555320410

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1341', '§ 641', '§ 287', '§ 2385', '§ 4082', '§ 1861', '§ 401', '§ 1826']

United States of America v. Albert W. Coachman.appeal of Wendell Hill (material Witness).united States of America v. Albert W. Coachman.appeal of Gary Ballard (material Witness), 752 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1985 › United States of America v. Albert W. Coachman.appeal of Wendell Hill (material Witness).united Stat...
United States of America v. Albert W. Coachman.appeal of Wendell Hill (material Witness).united States of America v. Albert W. Coachman.appeal of Gary Ballard (material Witness), 752 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 752 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985) Argued June 3, 1982. Decided Jan. 18, 1985
Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, WALD, Circuit Judge, and SWYGERT* , Senior Circuit Judge.
In so doing, we promote a fundamental policy voiced in Yates. As we have mentioned, the Yates Court declared that " [t]he policy of the law must be to encourage testimony" and, by treating "a witness willing to testify freely as to all areas of investigation but one" no worse "than a witness unwilling to give any testimony at all,"37 the Court hoped to encourage witnesses to testify at least on those subjects they find unobjectionable.38 Were we to rule that appellants each committed only one contempt, we hardly would further the policy of inducing testimony. On the contrary, we likely would discourage non-testifying grand jury witnesses from taking the stand at ensuing trials, for such a ruling would protect them from a second contempt.39 A witness already in contempt for refusal to testify before the grand jury has no incentive to testify at trial if he knows that he could suffer no additional punishment. That is a result Yates compels us to avoid.40
We close our discussion with a reminder. In Yates, the Supreme Court observed that "the more salutary procedure would appear to be that a court should first apply coercive remedies in an effort to persuade a party to obey its orders, and only make use of the more drastic criminal sanctions when the disobedience continues."43 More recently, the Court, citing "the doctrine that a court must exercise ' [t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed,' " admonished that "the trial judge [is required to] first consider the feasibility of coercing testimony through the imposition of civil contempt. The judge should resort to criminal sanctions only after he determines, for good reason, that the civil remedy would be inappropriate."44
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)
See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982)
See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982)
Coachman was ultimately convicted, United States v. Coachman, Crim. No. 81-00090 (D.D.C. 1981), and his conviction was upheld on appeal. United States v. Coachman, supra note 4
355 U.S. 66, 78 S. Ct. 128, 2 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1957)
Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982))
Yates v. United States, supra note 9, 355 U.S. at 68-69, 78 S. Ct. at 130, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 99. Yates remained in jail until the end of the trial. Thereafter, the District Court held her in criminal contempt for her four first-day refusals to answer. Both the civil contempt order and the criminal contempt conviction were reversed on appeal. See id. at 69 n. 3, 78 S. Ct. at 130-131 n. 3, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 99 n. 3
Id. at 69-70, 78 S. Ct. at 131, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 99-100
Id. at 72-75, 78 S. Ct. at 132-134, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 101-103
Id. at 73, 78 S. Ct. at 133, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102
Id., 78 S. Ct. at 133, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 101. On the first day, Yates based her refusals on the possibility that her answers might precipitate harassment or loss of employment. Id. at 68, 78 S. Ct. at 130, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 99. On the third day, however, she did identify one party member who she thought could not be hurt thereby, but declined to identify others. Id. at 69, 78 S. Ct. at 131, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 99. The Court felt that " [t]he slight modification on [the third day] of the area of refusal did not carry beyond the boundaries already established." Id. at 74, 78 S. Ct. at 133, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102
198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874, 73 S. Ct. 166, 97 L. Ed. 677 (1952)
Yates v. United States, supra note 9, 355 U.S. at 73, 78 S. Ct. at 133, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102
Id. at 73, 78 S. Ct. at 133, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102. Accord, Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382, 390 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846, 93 S. Ct. 118, 34 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972). Since Yates had argued that the multiple contempt convictions violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court rested its decision upon that provision rather than upon the Double Jeopardy Clause, but recognized that the latter might be implicated by the facts of the case. The Court stated that no double-jeopardy problem arose from the civil contempt incarceration for the first-day refusals and the subsequent criminal contempt conviction for the third-day refusals. Yates v. United States, supra note 9, 355 U.S. at 74, 78 S. Ct. at 133, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102, citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150, 76 S. Ct. 219, 221, 100 L. Ed. 149, 154 (1956) and United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 299, 67 S. Ct. 677, 698, 91 L. Ed. 884, 915 (1947). The Court also noted that the third-day criminal contempt conviction did not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause since the sentence for Yates' first-day refusals was reversed on appeal, see note 12 supra, and, moreover, since the third-day sentence was actually imposed prior to the conviction for the first-day refusals. Yates v. United States, supra note 9, 355 U.S. at 74 n. 9, 78 S. Ct. at 133 n. 9, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102 n. 9
While the Grand Jury Clause speaks of "a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury," see note 24 supra, "presentments as a method of instituting prosecutions are obsolete, at least as concerns the Federal courts." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 advisory committee note to 4 to subdiv. a. See also Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 158 n. 1, 413 F.2d 1061, 1065 n. 1 (1969); Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 437 (1958)
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger...." U.S. Const. amend. V. An infamous crime is one that is punishable by death, or by imprisonment in a penitentiary or by imprisonment at hard labor. See United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 42 S. Ct. 368, 66 L. Ed. 700 (1922); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 6 S. Ct. 777, 29 L. Ed. 909 (1886); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 5 S. Ct. 935, 29 L. Ed. 89 (1885). Since the Attorney General may direct that any term of imprisonment above one year be served in a penitentiary, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4082, 4083 (1982), any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year is infamous. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a), which embodies this understanding
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344, 94 S. Ct. 613, 618, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 569 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2659, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626, 643 (1972); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11, 7 S. Ct. 781, 786-787, 30 L. Ed. 849, 853 (1887)
United States v. Sells Eng'g, 463 U.S. 418, ----, 103 S. Ct. 3133, 3137, 77 L. Ed. 2d 743, 752 (1983), quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, supra note 25, 408 U.S. at 686-687, 92 S. Ct. at 2659, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 643. See also United States v. Calandra, supra note 25, 414 U.S. at 343, 94 S. Ct. at 617, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 568 (the grand jury's responsibilities "include both the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions"); Ex parte Bain, supra note 25, 121 U.S. at 11, 7 S. Ct. at 786, 30 L. Ed. at 852 (the grand jury "is designed as a means, not only of bringing to trial persons accused of public offences upon just grounds, but also as a means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation"); In re Grand Jury January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970) (the grand jury "is both a sword and a shield")
See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring specially), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S. Ct. 1767, 14 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1965) (" [t]he Grand Jury earned its place in the Bill of Rights by its shield, not by its sword")
The idea that the grand jury serves a dual function is probably a vestige of its history. In early England, the government was highly centralized, and could not itself know the extent of crime throughout the realm or who was responsible for it. In order to meet this problem, the Crown established juries all over the country, composed of community members instructed to inform the Crown on crimes in the neighborhood, and thus to report on probable cause as we conceive it today. The grand jury gradually became independent of the Crown, and on this account eventually became valued as a protector of the innocent. See generally United States v. Cox, supra note 27, 342 F.2d at 186-187 (Wisdom, J., concurring specially). The Framers incorporated the grand jury institution into our Constitution to serve its protective function. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 76 S. Ct. 406, 408, 100 L. Ed. 397, 402 (1956)
We are aware of suggestions that although the Framers of the Constitution conceived the federal grand jury as an institution independent of the Executive Branch, in reality the grand jury is not independent at all. E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Glanzer, Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 67 F.R.D. 513, 538-539 (1975); Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 Geo. L.J. 1, 35 (1972). Despite this criticism, the Supreme Court has continually confirmed the vitality and importance of the grand jury. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571, 96 S. Ct. 1768, 1774, 48 L. Ed. 2d 212, 219 (1976) (plurality opinion), (referring to "periodic criticism," stating that "much of [it] is superficial, overlooking relevant history," and declaring that "the grand jury continues to function as a barrier to reckless or unfounded charges"); United States v. Sells Eng'g, supra note 26, 463 U.S. at ----, 103 S. Ct. at 3141, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 756; United States v. Calandra, supra note 25, 414 U.S. at 343, 94 S. Ct. at 617, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 568; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S. Ct. 764, 773, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67, 81 (1973); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569, 580 (1962); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S. Ct. 270, 273, 4 L. Ed. 2d 252, 257 (1960); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 510, 63 S. Ct. 1233, 1237, 87 L. Ed. 1546, 1553 (1943). We ourselves have done the same. Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 70-71 n. 54, 487 F.2d 700, 711-713 n. 54 (en banc 1973). To disregard the role of the grand jury would be to effectively emasculate the Grand Jury Clause of the Constitution
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1982). "The traditional English and American grand jury is composed of 12 to 23 members selected from the general citizenry of the locality where the alleged crime was committed. They bring into the grand jury room the experience, knowledge and viewpoint of all sections of the community. They have no axes to grind and are not charged personally with the administration of the law. No one of them is a prosecuting attorney or law-enforcement officer ferreting out crime." In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 346-347, 77 S. Ct. 510, 520, 1 L. Ed. 2d 376, 388-389 (1957) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted)
See United States v. Calandra, supra note 25, 414 U.S. at 339, 94 S. Ct. at 620, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 566; Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1953)
Branzburg v. Hayes, supra note 25, 408 U.S. at 687, 92 S. Ct. at 2659, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 643 (" [g]rand jury proceedings are constitutionally mandated for the institution of federal criminal prosecutions for capital or other serious crimes"); Stirone v. United States, supra note 29, 361 U.S. at 215, 80 S. Ct. at 272, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 256 ("the Fifth Amendment requires that prosecution be begun by indictment"); Gaither v. United States, supra note 23, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 159, 413 F.2d at 1066 (" [t]he Fifth Amendment guarantees that prosecutions for serious crime may only be instituted by indictment")
" [I]t is essential that courts be able to compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses.... A grand jury subpoena must command the same respect." Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S. Ct. 1531, 1535-1536, 16 L. Ed. 2d 622, 627 (1966) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Dionnisio, supra note 29, 410 U.S. at 9-10, 93 S. Ct. at 769, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 77 (grand jury); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 52 S. Ct. 252, 255, 76 L. Ed. 375, 383 (1932) (court); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281, 39 S. Ct. 468, 471, 63 L. Ed. 979, 982-983 (1919) (grand jury and court)
E.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 95 S. Ct. 1802, 44 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1975) (court); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S. Ct. 352, 15 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1965) (grand jury). The procedural prerequisites to contempt adjudications differ between the two, however. See United States v. Wilson, supra, 421 U.S. at 314-318, 95 S. Ct. at 1805-1807, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 192-194; Harris v. United States, supra, 382 U.S. at 164-166, 86 S. Ct. at 354-355, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 242-243
In re Boyden, 675 F.2d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 1982) (three trials of common origin); United States v. Smith, 532 F.2d 158, 160-161 (10th Cir. 1976) (original trial and retrial). See also United States ex rel. Ushkowitz v. McCloskey, 359 F.2d 788, 789 (2d Cir. 1966) (three criminal contempt convictions for refusing "on three occasions separated from each other by appreciable periods of time" to testify before the same grand jury did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause)
Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683, 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909, 79 S. Ct. 1294, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1260 (1959); United States v. Hawkins, 501 F.2d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079, 95 S. Ct. 668, 42 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974); United States v. Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1970). See also cases cited supra note 36
Yates v. United States, supra note 9, 355 U.S. at 75, 78 S. Ct. at 134, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102. Civil and criminal contempt proceedings are distinguished by nature and purpose. When the objective is vindication of the court's authority by punishing the contemnor, the proceeding is criminal; when intended to coerce compliance with an order of the court, it is civil. Id. at 74, 78 S. Ct. at 133, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102. See also Penfield v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S. Ct. 918, 921, 91 L. Ed. 1117, 1122-1123 (1947); United States v. UMW, supra note 20, 330 U.S. at 302-304, 67 S. Ct. at 700-701, 91 L. Ed. at 917-918. See generally 8B M. Eisenstein, J. Moore & M. Waxner, Moore's Federal Practice p 42.02 (2d ed. 1984) (civil and criminal contempt distinguished); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 704 (2d ed. 1982) (same). As the Supreme Court has explained, " [w]here contempt consists of a refusal to obey a court order to testify at any stage in judicial proceedings, the witness may be confined until compliance.... The conditional nature of imprisonment--based entirely upon the contemnor's continued defiance--justifies holding civil contempt proceedings absent the safeguards of indictment and jury, ... provided that the usual due process requirements are met." Shillitani v. United States, supra note 34, 384 U.S. at 370-371, 86 S. Ct. at 1535-1536, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 627 (citation and footnote omitted)
Shillitani v. United States, supra note 34, 384 U.S. at 371 & n. 9, 86 S. Ct. at 1536 & n. 9, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 628 & n. 9, quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231, 5 L. Ed. 242, 248 (1821); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227, 66 S. Ct. 78, 79, 90 L. Ed. 30, 32 (1945). Accord, United States v. Wilson, supra note 35, 421 U.S. at 319, 95 S. Ct. at 1808, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 194; Harris v. United States, supra note 35, 382 U.S. at 165, 86 S. Ct. at 354, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 242-243
See Yates v. United States, supra note 9, 355 U.S. at 75, 78 S. Ct. at 134, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102. The suggestion that courts first resort to civil sanctions expectably will result in more testimony before grand juries than when criminal sanctions are imposed immediately. That is because the witness held in civil contempt may decide to testify rather than languish in jail. See note 43 supra. The witness held in criminal contempt, on the other hand, has no opportunity to purge himself of his contempt by testifying
" [C]ivil and criminal sentences serve [ ] distinct purposes, the one coercive, the other punitive and deterrent; that the same act may give rise to these distinct sanctions presents no double jeopardy problem." Yates v. United States, supra note 9, 355 U.S. at 74, 78 S. Ct. at 133, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 102, citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, supra note 20, 350 U.S. at 150, 76 S. Ct. at 221, 100 L. Ed. at 154; United States v. UMW, supra note 20, 330 U.S. at 299, 67 S. Ct. at 698, 91 L. Ed. at 915. Accord, United States v. Morales, 566 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Special September, 1972 Grand Jury (Lufman v. United States), 500 F.2d 1283, 1285-1286 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hawkins, supra note 42, 501 F.2d at 1031
A prosecutorial practice of this sort could conceivably implicate the witness' due process rights. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2080, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 669 (1968) (while not violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, " [d]ue process of law ... requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial")
See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) (a federal court has "power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion," contempts of its authority falling within three defined categories) (emphasis supplied); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 168-170, 78 S. Ct. 632, 635-636, 2 L. Ed. 2d 672, 679-680 (1958); In re Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 285, 9 S. Ct. 703, 704, 33 L. Ed. 154, 156 (1889)
A civil contempt commitment cannot endure beyond this point. "No period of ... confinement [for failure to comply with an order of the court] shall exceed the life of ... the court proceeding ... before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred ...," and in no event can the period exceed 18 months. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1982). See Shillitani v. United States, supra note 34, 384 U.S. at 371-372, 86 S. Ct. at 1536, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 627-628 (civil contempt commitment for refusing to testify before grand jury expires at end of grand jury's term); In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146, 1149-1150 (5th Cir. 1980) (witness adjudged in civil contempt for refusing to testify at trial cannot be held in prison once trial has ended); United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 625-626 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). Moreover, incarceration for civil contempt terminates when the party purges himself of the contempt by testifying. Shillitani v. United States, supra note 34, 384 U.S. at 370-372, 86 S. Ct. at 1535-1536, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 627-628; In re Dinnan, supra, 625 F.2d at 1149-1150
" [T]he appearance of justice is an independent value that must be maintained even in the absence of actual evidence that a particular litigant has been unfairly treated by the tribunal." Schwartz, The Limits of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 69 Iowa L.Rev. 127, 155 & n. 128 (1983) (emphasis in original)
United States v. Wilson, supra note 35, 421 U.S. at 317 n. 9, 95 S. Ct. at 1807 n. 9, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 193 n. 9 (parties already incarcerated when contemptuous acts occurred)