Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca2/c656571/angelo-fiataruolo-angelo-veno-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2020-03-29 06:24:51
Document Index: 437161756

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 2652', '§ 7501', '§ 6672', '§ 6672', '§ 6672']

Angelo Fiataruolo, Angelo Veno v. United States, Second Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
At the outset we must consider whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), which provides that "courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." (emphasis added). The IRS questions whether the judgments of June 17 are final because they fail to include the amount of the taxpayers' monetary awards. Such specification, the IRS insists, is a necessary element of a final judgment in a tax action suit seeking an award of money. For this position the government relies on United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232-33, 78 S. Ct. 674, 678, 2 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1958). In that case the Supreme Court stated that a district court's failure to specify the dollar amount of a money judgment was "strong evidence" that the court did not intend its action to be a final appealable decision.
Contrary to the government's assertion, Schaefer does not establish that the presence of a specific dollar figure in a judgment is the sine qua non of finality. Rather, that case merely states that the expression of an amount to be awarded serves as significant indicia of finality. No rule or statute prescribes the essential elements of a final judgment, see McDermitt v. United States, 954 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th Cir.1992); see also 10 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2652 (2d ed. 1983), and Schaefer itself expressly disavowed mandating any such rule. See 356 U.S. at 233, 78 S.Ct. at 678 (" '[n]o form of words and no peculiar formal act is necessary to evince [the] rendition [of a judgment]' ") (quoting United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 534, 64 S. Ct. 359, 361, 88 L. Ed. 290 (1944)).
Thus, where other indicators are present, the lack of reference to a specific amount of money standing alone will not render a judgment non-final and hence non-appealable. Finality is determined on the basis of pragmatic, not needlessly rigid pro forma, analysis. This approach better serves the overriding aim of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dispose expeditiously and inexpensively of every action. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306, 82 S. Ct. 1502, 1513, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1962); see also Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 386-87, 98 S. Ct. 1117, 1121, 55 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1978) (per curiam) (eschewing technical interpretation of the rules of finality for a common-sense approach). Whether a judgment is final turns less on the presence of a dollar figure in the document itself than on the intent of the district court judge. See Schaefer, 356 U.S. at 232-33, 78 S.Ct. at 677-78. What essentially is required is some clear and unequivocal manifestation by the trial court of its belief that the decision made, so far as it is concerned, is the end of the case. See Paliaga v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir.1962); accord Mallis, 435 U.S. at 385 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. at 1120 n. 6; Wright et al., supra.
There is ample indication that the district court intended its June 17, 1992 judgments to be its dispositive action in this case. The judgments on their face demonstrate that the court had fully adjudicated all the issues before it, leaving nothing remaining for it to do with respect to this litigation. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373, 101 S. Ct. 669, 673, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1981); see also Arp Films, Inc. v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 905 F.2d 687, 689 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam) (noting final decision leaves nothing for trial court to do but ministerial tasks). The timing of the judgments--issued shortly after the court denied the government's motions for j.n.o.v. and for a new trial--also confirms that the trial court was closing the litigation. Its rejection of the government's motion to alter or amend the November 4, 1991 judgments further reveals that it deemed its June 17, 1992 judgments to have addressed the government's objections and to have cured any and all defects.
The Internal Revenue Code requires employers to withhold federal income and social security taxes from their employees' wages. These withheld sums are held "in trust for the United States," 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1988), and must be paid over to the IRS on a quarterly basis. See Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 1783, 56 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1978). An employer who fails to remit withheld sums to the government is liable for the taxes that should have been paid. Once an employer withholds taxes, the employee is given credit for their payment, and the government has no recourse against the employee, even when the employer does not turn over to the United States the withheld amounts. See Bowlen v. United States, 956 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir.1992).
26 U.S.C. § 6672(a). Under this section, a party may be held liable for unpaid withholding taxes if: first, he is the "responsible person" for collection and payment of the employer's taxes, see Godfrey, 748 F.2d at 1574 & n. 4, and second, he "willfully" failed to comply with the statute. See Hochstein v. United States, 900 F.2d 543, 546 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 2967, 119 L. Ed. 2d 587 (1992). The person against whom the IRS assesses a § 6672 tax penalty has the burden of disproving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of one of these two elements. See id.; see also McDermitt, 954 F.2d at 1251.
The IRS notes that Fiataruolo and Veno had authority to sign checks, which it thinks indicates that they had significant control over finances. A careful look at this factor reveals that this authority applied solely to one bank account in Connecticut. C & C Security maintained other bank accounts in New York over which the appellees had no control. They could not sign checks on these accounts, nor were they authorized to review the bank statements. Moreover, even on the Connecticut account, checks were prepared primarily by Dian Cifuni. The trial proof shows that Fiataruolo and Veno reviewed these checks only as project managers, that is, they sought to determine whether funds were used exclusively for co-venture financed construction jobs. In this context, check-signing authority and actual check-signing are slender reeds on which to rest a liability determination under § 6672. See Barrett v. United States, 580 F.2d 449, 453, 217 Ct. Cl. 617 (1978) (per curiam).
Complaining of an error in the admission of a witness' testimony into evidence shoulders an appellant with a weighty burden. See, e.g., United States v. Campino, 890 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1068, 110 S. Ct. 1787, 108 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1990). District courts have broad discretion to make evidentiary determinations, and their rulings on admissibility of proof are upheld unless "manifestly erroneous." United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 400 (2d Cir.1985) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S. Ct. 1793, 90 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1986); accord United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 425 (2d Cir.1991). No such error was committed here. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the trial court to admit expert testimony when it thinks that testimony will assist the triers of fact in understanding the case. See Fed.R.Evid. 702. Experts may testify on questions of fact as well as mixed questions of fact and law. This sort of testimony is not objectionable merely "because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Fed.R.Evid. 704.
In United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d at 140, we held it error to allow an expert in securities trading to state repeatedly that the defendants were active and material participants in the manipulation of stock and had engaged in a manipulative and fraudulent scheme in furtherance of their goals. The expert's testimony deliberately tracked the language of the relevant regulations and statutes, was not couched in even conclusory factual statements, and was not helpful to the jury in carrying out its legitimate function. Rather, the expert's opinions were "calculated to 'invade the province of the court to determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury as to that law.' " Id. (quoting FAA v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 895, 104 S. Ct. 243, 78 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1983)).
Here the trial court also admonished the jury that Cohen's views were "not binding." To be sure, such a charge cannot always cure the trial court's error in allowing inadmissible evidence. See Andrews, 882 F.2d at 708. Yet, in this case the instruction adequately protected against the jury's giving undue weight to Cohen's opinion. Cf. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 63, 116 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1991). As a consequence, the admission of Cohen's testimony was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
DocketNumber： 1292
Citation Numbers： 8 F.3d 930
Filed Date： 11/3/1993
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