Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97171/nye-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 05:38:31
Document Index: 667510206

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 268', '§ 268', '§ 1', '§ 135', '§ 268', '§ 8', '§ 230', '§ 268', '§ 135', '§ 241', '§ 268', '§ 2', '§ 135', '§ 268', '§ 2', '§ 268']

Nye Vs United States - Citation 97171 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Nye Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97171
Decided On Apr-14-1941
Case Number 313 U.S. 33
Appellant Nye
nye v. united states - 313 u.s. 33 (1941) u.s. supreme court nye v. united states, 313 u.s. 33 (1941) nye v. united states no. 558 argued march 12, 1941 decided april 14, 1941 313 u.s. 33 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the fourth circuit syllabus 1. seeking to terminate a suit for wrongful death which an administrator had brought in a federal district court, petitioners (strangers to the suit) induced the administrator, by undue influence, to file a final account and obtain his discharge as administrator, and to send letters to his attorney and the district judge asking dismissal of the suit. the misbehavior occurred more than 100 miles from the district court. petitioners were adjudged guilty of.....
Nye v. United States - 313 U.S. 33 (1941)
U.S. Supreme Court Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941)
(1) The case was not one of civil, but of criminal, contempt. P. 313 U. S. 42 .
P. 313 U. S. 42 .
(b) That the contempt proceeding was entitled in the administrator's suit and that the United States was not a party until the appeal are not conclusive as to the nature of the contempt. P. 313 U. S. 42 .
(c) Nor is the fact that one of the petitioners was ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding, including a sum to the administrator's attorney, decisive. P. 313 U. S. 42 .
(d) The punitive character of the judgment of contempt was dominant. P. 313 U. S. 43 .
(2) The appeal is not governed by the Criminal Appeals Rules. P. 313 U. S. 43 .
(a) In this case, there was no "plea of guilty," no "verdict of guilt by a jury," and no "finding of guilt by the trial court were a jury is waived." The quoted qualifying language of the Rules does not designate merely the state of the proceedings in criminal cases when the Rules become applicable, but describes the kinds of cases to which they are to be applied. P. 313 U. S. 43 .
(3) The appeal is governed by § 8(c) of the Act of February 13, 1925. P. 313 U. S. 44 .
(4) This Court being equally divided in opinion as to whether the Circuit Court of Appeals had power, in the absence of an application for allowance of the appeal, to decide the case on the merits, the action of that court in taking jurisdiction of the appeal is affirmed. P. 313 U. S. 44 .
(5) The conduct of petitioners did not constitute "misbehavior . . . so near" the presence of the court "as to obstruct the administration of justice" within the meaning of § 268 of the Judicial Code. P. 313 U. S. 52 .
2. The words "so near thereto" is § 268 of the Judicial Code are to be construed as having a geographical, rather than a causal, connotation. P. 313 U. S. 48 .
3. The phrase "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" likewise connotes that the misbehavior must have occurred in the vicinity of the court. P. 313 U. S. 48 .
4. The history of §§ 1 and 2 of the Act of March 2, 1831, and of § 135 of the Criminal Code, requires meticulous regard for the separate categories of offenses therein embraced, so that the instances where there is no right to a jury trial will be narrowly restricted. P. 313 U. S. 49 .
5. The phrase "so near thereto" must be restricted to acts in the vicinity of the court, and not be construed to apply to all acts which have a "reasonable tendency" to "obstruct the administration of justice." P. 313 U. S. 49 .
6. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402 , overruled. P. 313 U. S. 52 .
Elmore is illiterate, and feeble in mind and body. Petitioners, [ Footnote 1 ] through the use of liquor and persuasion, induced Elmore to seek a termination of the action. Nye directed his own lawyer to prepare the letters to the District Judge and to Guthrie and to prepare a final administration account to be filed in the local probate court. Nye took Elmore to the probate court, had him discharged as administrator, and paid the clerk a fee of $1.
On September 30, 1939, Guthrie filed a motion [ Footnote 2 ] asking for an order requiring Nye to show cause "why he should not be attached and held as for contempt of this Court." [ Footnote 3 ] The court issued a show cause order to Nye and Mayers, who filed their answers. There was a hearing. Evidence was introduced, and argument was heard on motions to dismiss. The court found that the writing of the letters and the filing of the final account were procured
It accordingly held that their conduct was "misbehavior so near to the presence of the court as to obstruct the administration of justice," and adjudged each guilty of contempt. It ordered Nye to pay the costs of the contempt proceedings, including $500 to Guthrie, and a fine of $500; and it ordered Mayers to pay a fine of $250. The District Court filed its finding of facts and judgment on February 8, 1940. On March 15, 1940, petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the judgment. [ Footnote 4 ] The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. [ Footnote 5 ] 113 F.2d 1006. We granted the petition for certiorari because the interpretation of the power of the federal courts under § 268 of the Judicial Code to punish contempts raised matters of grave importance.
govern, [ Footnote 6 ] and not made in the proper form if § 8(c) of the Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936, 940, 45 Stat. 54, 28 U.S.C. § 230, is applicable. [ Footnote 7 ]
We do not think this was a case of civil contempt. We recently stated, in McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61 , 307 U. S. 64 ,
The facts of this case do not meet that standard. While the proceedings in the District Court were entitled in Elmore's action and the United States was not a party until the appeal, those circumstances, though relevant ( Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 , 221 U. S. 445 -446) are not conclusive as to the nature of the contempt. The fact that Nye was ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding, including $500 to Guthrie, is also not decisive. As Mr. Justice Brandeis stated in Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107 , 259 U. S. 110 ,
The order imposes unconditional fines payable to the United States. It awards no relief to a private suitor. The prayer for relief [ Footnote 8 ] and the acts charged [ Footnote 9 ] carry the criminal hallmark. Cf. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., supra, p. 221 U. S. 449 . They clearly do not reveal any purpose to punish for contempt "in aid of the adjudication sought in the principal suit." Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U. S. 217 , 285 U. S. 220 . When there is added the "significant" fact ( Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324 , 194 U. S. 329 ) that Nye and Mayers were strangers, not parties, to Elmore's action, there can be no reasonable doubt that the punitive character of the order was dominant.
the meaning of § 268 of the Judicial Code. [ Footnote 10 ] That section derives from the Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487. The Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83, provided that courts of the United States
Abuses arose, [ Footnote 11 ] culminating in impeachment proceedings against James H. Peck, a federal district judge, who had imprisoned and disbarred one Lawless for publishing a criticism of one of his opinions in a case which was on appeal. Judge Peck was acquitted. [ Footnote 12 ] But the history of that episode makes abundantly clear that it served as the occasion for a drastic delimitation by Congress of the broad undefined power of the inferior federal courts under the Act of 1789.
"to inquire into the expediency of defining by statute all offences which may be punished as contempts of the courts of the United States, and also to limit the punishment for the same. [ Footnote 13 ]"
days later, James Buchanan brought in a bill which became the Act of March 2, 1831. He had charge of the prosecution of Judge Peck, and, during the trial, had told the Senate: [ Footnote 14 ]
Sec. 2 of that Act, from which § 135 of the Criminal Code, [ Footnote 15 ] 35 Stat. 1113, 18 U.S.C. § 241, derives, provided:
In 1918, this Court, in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402 , 247 U. S. 418 -419, stated that "there can be no doubt" that the first section of the Act of March 2, 1831 "conferred no power not already granted and imposed no limitations not already existing," and that it was
substantially curtailed by that Act was early recognized by lower federal courts. United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed.Cas. 360, at p. 363; Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed.Cas. 1205; United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 27 Fed.Cas. 91, at p. 104; United, States v. Seeley, Fed.Cas. No. 16,248a; United States v. Emerson, 4 Cranch 188 [omitted]; Kent's Commentaries (3rd ed. 1836) pp. 300, 301. And when the Act came before this Court in Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 86 U. S. 511 , Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the Court, acknowledged that it had limited the power of those courts. And see 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 364, 74 U. S. 374 . So far as the decisions of this Court are concerned, that view persisted to the time when Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, was decided. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 ; Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267 , 131 U. S. 276 ; Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280 , 131 U. S. 285 ; Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U. S. 31 , 134 U. S. 38 .
Mindful of that history, we come to the construction of § 268 of the Judicial Code in light of the specific facts of this case. The question is whether the words "so near thereto" have a geographical or a causal connotation. Read in their context and in the light of their ordinary meaning, we conclude that they are to be construed as geographical terms. In Ex parte Robinson, supra, 19 Wall. at p. 86 U. S. 511 , it was said that as a result of those provisions the power to punish for contempts "can only be exercised to insure order and decorum" in court. "Misbehavior of any person in their presence" plainly falls in that category. In re Terry, 128 U. S. 289 . And in Savin, Petitioner, supra, it was also held to include attempted bribes of a witness, one in the jury room and within a few feet of the court room and one in the hallway immediately adjoining the court room. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517 . The phrase "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" likewise connotes
that the misbehavior must be in the vicinity of the court. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 Col.L.Rev. 525, 530. It is not sufficient that the misbehavior charged has some direct relation to the work of the court. "Near" in this context, juxtaposed to "presence," suggests physical proximity, not relevancy. In fact, if the words "so near thereto" are not read in the geographical sense, they come close, as the government admits, to being surplusage. There may, of course, be many types of "misbehavior" which will "obstruct the administration of justice" but which may not be "in" or "near" to the "presence" of the court. Broad categories of such acts, however, were expressly recognized in § 2 of the Act of March 2, 1831, and subsequently in § 135 of the Criminal Code. It has been held that an act of misbehavior, though covered by the latter provisions, may also be a contempt if committed in the "presence" of the Court. Savin, Petitioner, supra. And see Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 749 . Yet, in view of the history of those provisions, meticulous regard for those separate categories of offenses must be had so that the instances where there is no right to jury trial will be narrowly restricted. If "so near thereto" be given a causal meaning, then § 268, by the process of judicial construction, will have regained much of the generality which Congress in 1831 emphatically intended to remove. See Thomas, Problems of Contempt of Court (1934) c. VII. If that phrase be not restricted to acts in the vicinity of the court, but be allowed to embrace acts which have a "reasonable tendency" to "obstruct the administration of justice" (Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, p. 247 U. S. 421 ), then the conditions which Congress sought to alleviate in 1831 have largely been restored. [email protected] Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (1927) c. IX. The result will be that the offenses which Congress designated as true crimes under § 2 of the Act of March 2,
however they may have expanded the earlier notions of "misbehavior." To be sure, the lower federal courts in the intervening years had expressed a contrariety of views on the meaning of the statute, [ Footnote 16 ] and some were giving it an expanded scope [ Footnote 17 ] which was later approved in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra. But it is significant that not until after the turn of this century did the first line of fracture appear suggesting that the statute authorized summary punishment for publication. [ Footnote 18 ] Thus, the legislative history of this statute and its career demonstrate that this case presents the question of correcting a plain misreading of language and history so as to give full respect to the meaning which Congress unmistakably intended the statute to have. Its legislative history, its interpretation prior to 1918, the character and nature of the contempt proceedings, admonish us not to give renewed vitality to the doctrine of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, but to recognize the substantial legislative limitations on the contempt power which were occasioned by the Judge Peck episode. And they necessitate an adherence to the original construction of the statute so that, unless its requirements are clearly satisfied, an offense will be dealt with as the law deals with the run of illegal acts. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes,
We may concede that there was an obstruction in the administration of justice, as evidenced by the long delay and large expense which the reprehensible conduct of petitioners entailed. And it would follow that, under the "reasonable tendency" rule of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, the court below did not err in affirming the judgment of conviction. But, for the reasons stated, that decision must be overruled. The fact that, in purpose and effect, there was an obstruction in the administration of justice did not bring the condemned conduct within the vicinity of the court in any normal meaning of the term. It was not misbehavior in the vicinity of the court disrupting to quiet and order or actually interrupting the court in the conduct of its business. Cf. Savin, Petitioner, supra, at p. 131 U. S. 278 . Hence, it was not embraced within § 268 of the Judicial Code.
voice, regarded the phrase "so near thereto" as connoting and including those contempts which are the proximate cause of actual obstruction to the administration of justice, whether because of their physical nearness to the court or because of a chain of causation whose operation in producing the obstruction depends on other than geographical relationships to the court. See Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267 ; Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280 ; Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402 ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 749 , 279 U. S. 764 -765; Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255 . Cf. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211, 213. Contempts which obstruct justice because of their effect on the good order and tranquillity of the court must be in the presence of the court or geographically near enough to have that effect. Contempts which are surreptitious obstructions to justice, through tampering with witnesses, jurors, and the like, must be proximately related to the condemned effect. We are pointed to no legislative history which militates against such a construction of the statute.
The Savin and Sinclair cases were decided by a unanimous court. The dissenting judges in the Toledo and Craig cases, in which the acts held to be contemptuous were the publication, at a distance from the court, of comments derogatory to the judge, made no contention that the phrase imposed a geographical limitation on the power of the court. Their position was that the particular contemptuous acts charged did not in fact have the effect of obstructing justice, a contention which cannot be urged here. In the Toledo case, Justice Holmes said, p. 247 U. S. 423 : "I think that "so near as to obstruct" means so near as actually to obstruct -- and not merely near enough to threaten a possible obstruction." And, in the Craig case, after commenting on the fact that no cause was pending before the court, he said, p. 263 U. S. 281 :
consider the contention that the Sherman Act can never apply to a labor union, because of longstanding decisions of this Court to the contrary, a construction which Congress had not seen fit to change. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 , 310 U. S. 487 -488.