Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/290/339/474486/
Timestamp: 2017-11-22 16:30:57
Document Index: 780048288

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 4332', '§ 4332', '§ 1508', '§ 4332', '§ 1502', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 4332']

Grand Canyon Trust, Petitioner, v. Federal Aviation Administration, Respondent, 290 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 2002 › Grand Canyon Trust, Petitioner, v. Federal Aviation Administration, Respondent
Grand Canyon Trust, Petitioner, v. Federal Aviation Administration, Respondent, 290 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 290 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
The Grand Canyon Trust petitions for review of the decision of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") approving the federal actions necessary to allow the city of St. George, Utah, to construct a replacement airport near Zion National Park. The Trust challenges the adequacy of the FAA's environmental assessment under § 102(2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970), and the FAA's conclusion that there would be no significant environmental impacts from the project necessitating preparation of an environmental impact statement under NEPA. Focusing on the noise impacts on the Park, the Trust principally contends that the FAA failed adequately to consider the cumulative impact on the natural quiet of the Park and instead addressed only the incremental impact of the replacement airport. We grant the petition.
The essential disagreement between the parties is whether the FAA was required in its environmental assessment to address more than the incremental impact of the replacement airport as compared to the existing airport. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS") for "every ... major Federal action [] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C). An environmental assessment ("EA") is made for the purpose of determining whether an EIS is required. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. "If any `significant' environmental impacts might result from the proposed agency action then an EIS must be prepared before agency action is taken." Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Peterson").
An agency decision that an EIS is not required may be overturned "only if it was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion." Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transportation, 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Transportation"). Under the long-established standard in this circuit, the court reviews an agency's finding of no significant impact to determine whether:
The issue dividing the parties is settled by regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") to implement NEPA and by case law applying those regulations.* "The CEQ regulations, which... are entitled to substantial deference, impose a duty on all federal agencies." Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 1858, 104 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The CEQ regulations define each term within NEPA's requirement of an EIS for "every ... major Federal action [] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3. The term "significantly" is defined as those actions "with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. Significance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (7). "Cumulative impact," in turn, is defined as:
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. Although federal agencies have discretion to decide whether a proposed action "is significant enough to warrant preparation of an EIS," the court owes no deference to the FAA's interpretation of NEPA or the CEQ regulations because NEPA is addressed to all federal agencies and Congress did not entrust administration of NEPA to the FAA alone. Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transportation Board, 267 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see Amfac Resorts, LLC v. United States Dep't. of Interior, 282 F.3d 818, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2002); cf. Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The courts, in reviewing whether a federal agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding no significant environmental impact, have given effect to the plain language of the regulations. While the factual settings differ in some respects from the instant case, the consistent position in the case law is that, depending on the environmental concern at issue, the agency's EA must give a realistic evaluation of the total impacts and cannot isolate a proposed project, viewing it in a vacuum. For example, in Coalition on Sensible Transportation v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Dole"), this court stated that the CEQ regulations on cumulative impact "provide a distinct meaning to the concept" separate and apart from the notion of improper segmentation of agency action. Id. at 70. Noting that the regulatory definition of cumulative impact specifies that the "`incremental impact of the action' [at issue]" must be considered "`when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions,'" id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7), the court observed that, consistent with the regulation and purpose of NEPA, " [i]t makes sense to consider the `incremental impact' of a project for possible cumulative effects by incorporating the effects of other projects into the background `data base' of the project at issue." Id. at 70-71. The point, the court stated, was to provide in the EA "sufficient [information] to alert interested members of the public to any arguable cumulative impacts involving [] other projects." Id. at 71. Further, the court concluded that insofar as Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 49 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1976), "may bear on an agency's duty to consider impacts in a context that realistically includes other pending projects, the [agency] fully complied by planning on the basis of ... ultimate completion of the related projects." Id. (citing Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 415 n. 26, 96 S. Ct. at 2733 n. 26). Similarly, the court in Peterson, without regard to any particular NEPA regulation, reversed a finding of no significant impact and a decision to issue certain oil and gas leases in national forests without preparing an EIS, remanding the case because the agency had failed, as NEPA requires, to "fully assess [] the possible environmental consequences" of activities "which have the potential for disturbing the environment." 717 F.2d at 1415. NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988), is to the same effect. There, the agency had failed to consider the cumulative impact, as defined in the CEQ regulations, of simultaneous development in the region on "species, particularly whales and salmon, that migrate through the different planning areas" when it considered only the effect on those species "within the Planning Area" rather than "the interregional effects." Id. at 297-99. Other circuits take a similar approach in applying the regulations. See, e.g., Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, Sabine River Auth. v. Dep't of the Interior, 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the FAA would distinguish Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), on which the Trust relies, on the ground that it preceded the regulations, the court was addressing the requirements of NEPA, and the FAA can point to nothing in the regulations that would suggest the court erred in holding that NEPA requires review of a proposed action in light of
The FAA's noise analysis in the EA, including the Supplemental Noise Analysis, may, in fact, be a splendid incremental analysis, but it fails to address what is crucial if the EA is to serve its function. While, as the FAA stresses, the EA is not intended to be a lengthy document, see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (1), it must at a minimum address the considerations relevant to determining whether an EIS is required. NEPA regulations require that an agency consider cumulative impacts and the FAA's EA fails to address the total noise impact that will result from the replacement airport. Indeed, the FAA's own NEPA policy calls for consideration of cumulative impact, parroting the language of the NEPA regulations to include proposed projects and past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions. See Policies and Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D. Comments on the draft EA called the FAA's attention to the need to consider mitigation measures in view of the results of the study of noise-annoyance to persons in the Park; the EA does not respond and provides no analysis of the 2% to 9% or the 4% to 15% level of annoyance shown in the NPS study. Yet, as the FAA was aware, the NPS had identified Zion National Park as among the nine national parks of "highest priority" for attention to noise impact on their natural quiet from overflights. See U.S. Department of the Interior/National Park Service, Report on Effects of Aircraft Overflights on the National Park System: Report to Congress (July, 1995). Comments also expressed concern about the total impacts of noise on the Park and on Park visitors, yet the EA contains no analysis of the impact of 54 daily flights in 2008 and 69 in 2018 associated with St. George.
Petitioner's Reply Br. at 3, citing Fritiofson, 772 F.2d at 1245 (citing Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also Hodel, 865 F.2d at 297-99; City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. DOT, 123 F.3d 1142, 1160 (9th Cir. 1997).
The analysis in the EA, in other words, cannot treat the identified environmental concern in a vacuum, as an incremental approach attempts. Although the replacement airport may contribute only a 2% increase to the amount of overflights near or over the Park, there is no way to determine from the FAA's analysis in the EA whether, deferring to the FAA's expert calculations, a 2% increase, in addition to other noise impacts on the Park, will "significantly affect [ ]" the quality of the human environment in the Park. At no point does the FAA's EA aggregate the noise impacts on the Park. The analysis in the EA does not address the accumulated, or total, incremental impacts of various man-made noises, such as the 250 daily aircraft flights near or over the Park that originate at, or have as their destination, airports other than that in St. George. Neither does the EA consider in any manner the air tours near and over the Park originating from the St. George airport. Nor does the EA address the impact, much less the cumulative impact, of noise in the Park as a result of other activities, such as the planned expansions of other regional airports that have flights near or over the Park. Without analyzing the total noise impact on the Park as a result of the construction of the replacement airport, the FAA is not in a position to determine whether the additional noise that is projected to come from the expansion of the St. George airport facility at a new location would cause a significant environmental impact on the Park and, thus, to require preparation of an EIS.
In defense of its incremental approach in the EA, the FAA make three arguments. First, it relies on several phrases in the NEPA regulations. The FAA points to the phrase "incremental impacts" in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 to contend that it is obligated to consider only the incremental impact of any project. The difficulty with this position is that it ignores the rest of the sentence in § 1508.7 directing an agency to consider that incremental impact "when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency ... or person undertakes such other actions." The FAA also relies on the phrase "related to" in the definition of "significantly" in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (7) to contend that it need not consider either the overflights not associated with St. George or the proposed expansion at Las Vegas Airport and the proposals for new airports at Mesquite and Cedar City because they are "not related" to the St. George's airport expansion. Again, the FAA ignores other language in the regulation that " [s]ignificance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (7).
Second, the FAA points to 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) and Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 409-10 & n. 20, 96 S. Ct. at 2729-30 & n. 20, to contend that it need consider only other projects that are "inextricably intertwined" and not those that are "substantially independent." Both the regulation and the opinion address the proper scope of an EIS, not an EA, but to the extent the former influences the latter, nothing in Kleppe suggests that the FAA could ignore the total noise impact in the area of identified environmental concern. See Dole, 826 F.2d at 71.
Third, the FAA, quoting CEQ guidance on preparation of an EIS, contends that the no-action alternative is properly viewed as a "benchmark against which decisionmakers may compare the magnitude of environmental effects" of actions. See 46 Fed.Reg. 18,026, 18,027 (March 23, 1981). Neither the guidance nor the cases cited by the FAA relieve it of the duty to consider cumulative impact in the EA. Although the court stated in Allison v. DOT, 908 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1990), that 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) did not require the FAA to consider unconnected single actions that are neither related to nor dependent on the proposed new airport for Denver, Colorado, the court was not addressing the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 on cumulative impact. Id. at 1030. In contrast, here, the FAA responded to comments that baseline data and cumulative impact was lacking in the draft EA by stating, on the basis of its incremental analysis, that "The current noise levels in Zion National Park will not be adversely affected by either the existing or future noise levels associated with aircraft." Because there is no analysis of cumulative noise impact on the Park against which the additional noise impact of the replacement airport can be evaluated, the FAA's error in ignoring cumulative impact of man-made noise is not harmless, see Allison, 908 F.2d at 1029, for the FAA has impermissibly taken "a foreshortened view of the impacts which could result from the act" of constructing the replacement airport. Peterson, 717 F.2d at 1413.
Accordingly, we grant the petition without reaching the Trust's contention that an EIS is required because the project is "highly controversial," 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (4); Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 988 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1976). We remand the case because the record is insufficient for the court to determine whether an EIS is required. On remand, the FAA must evaluate the cumulative impact of noise pollution on the Park as a result of construction of the proposed replacement airport in light of air traffic near and over the Park, from whatever airport, air tours near or in the Park, and the acoustical data collected by NPS in the Park in 1995 and 1998 mentioned in comments on the draft EA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371, 109 S. Ct. at 1858; Transportation, 753 F.2d at 129 (citing Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Other data may also prove relevant. Although the FAA explained in responding to comments that it does not use "natural ambient noise levels," because they exclude human sounds and are therefore not a true reflection of the existing noise environment, and rejected the "L90" methodology5 used by NPS to calculate natural ambient noise levels, because 90% of sounds in the Park would be considered noisier than the "natural" ambient level, the FAA in fact did consider NPS data in its Supplemental Noise Analysis and fails to demonstrate that this information is not relevant to the cumulative impact analysis to be prepared for the EA. See Allison, 908 F.2d at 1029; Transportation, 753 F.2d at 129.
Neither party challenges the regulatory authority of the CEQ, and hence we have no occasion to question the binding effect of the regulations on the FAA See City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 866 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1999).