Source: http://ebenchbook.wm.edu/colorado/statutes/1-45-111-5-duties-of-the-secretary-of-state-enforcement-sanctions/
Timestamp: 2017-08-24 03:07:47
Document Index: 698287533

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 4', '§ 1', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 9', '§ 1', '§ 10', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13']

The secretary of state is responsible for issuing rules necessary to enforce and administer any provision of this article. Pursuant to procedural requirements created by both statute and the state constitution, an individual may contest the rules promulgated by the secretary of state. Administrative law judges may also sanction fines and other penalties on parties who fail to abide by this article. Litigation involving any challenges or enforcement must abide by the regulations provided in this statute, including procedural requirements for subpoenas and judicial standard of review.
(1.5) (a) Any person who believes that a violation of either the secretary of state’s rules concerning campaign and political finance or this article has occurred may file a written complaint with the secretary of state not later than one hundred eighty days after the date of the occurrence of the alleged violation. The complaint shall be subject to all applicable procedures specified in section 9 (2) of article XXVIII of the state constitution.
(b) Any person who commits a violation of either the secretary of state’s rules concerning campaign and political finance or this article that is not specifically listed in section 9 (2) (a) of article XXVIII of the state constitution shall be subject to any of the sanctions specified in section 10 of article XXVIII of the state constitution or in this section.
(c) In addition to any other penalty authorized by article XXVIII of the state constitution or this article, an administrative law judge may impose a civil penalty of fifty dollars per day for each day that a report, statement, or other document required to be filed under this article that is not specifically listed in article XXVIII of the state constitution is not filed by the close of business on the day due. Any person who fails to file three or more successive committee registration reports or reports concerning contributions, expenditures, or donations in accordance with the requirements of section 1-45-107.5 shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to five hundred dollars for each day that a report, statement, or other document required to be filed by an independent expenditure committee is not filed by the close of business on the day due. Any person who knowingly and intentionally fails to file three or more reports due under section 1-45-107.5 shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars per day for each day that the report, statement, or other document is not filed by the close of business on the day due. Imposition of any penalty under this paragraph (c) shall be subject to all applicable requirements specified in section 10 of article XXVIII of the state constitutiongoverning the imposition of penalties.
(f) Any person who is fined up to one thousand dollars per day for a knowing and intentional failure to file under paragraph (c) of this subsection (1.5) shall, if the person has shareholders or members, notify such shareholders or members of the penalty and the adjudicated violations on its publicly accessible web site in a prominent manner for not less than one hundred eighty days after the final adjudication. A copy of this notice, with the web site address used, shall be filed with the secretary of state and shall be a public record.
(2) A party in any action brought to enforce the provisions of article XXVIII of the state constitution or of this article shall be entitled to the recovery of the party’s reasonable attorney fees and costs from any attorney or party who has brought or defended the action, either in whole or in part, upon a determination by the office of administrative courts that the action, or any part thereof, lacked substantial justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was interposed for delay or harassment or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct, including, but not limited to, abuses of discovery procedures available under the Colorado rules of civil procedure. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (2), no attorney fees may be awarded under this subsection (2) unless the court or administrative law judge, as applicable, has first considered the provisions of section 13-17-102 (5) and (6), C.R.S. For purposes of this subsection (2), “lacked substantial justification” means substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.
(b) If the petition required by paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) shows to the district court’s satisfaction that the administrative subpoena was properly served pursuant to rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, the district court shall order the subpoenaed witness or party to appear before the district court and show cause why the witness or party should not be ordered to comply with the administrative subpoena. A copy of the petition and the court order shall be served, pursuant to rule 5 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, on the witness or party at least fifteen days before the date designated for the witness or party to appear before the district court.
(I) The district court shall order compliance forthwith and may impose remedial and punitive fines, including attorneys’ fees and costs, for the witness’s or party’s failure to comply with the administrative subpoena; and
ource: L. 2003: Entire section added, p. 2160, § 6, effective June 3.L. 2005: (2) amended, p. 852, § 4, effective June 1.L. 2008: (1.5) added and (2) amended, p. 349, § 1, effective April 10.L. 2010: (1.5)(c), (1.5)(d), (1.5)(e), and (1.5)(f) added, (SB 10-203), ch. 269, p. 1236, § 6, effective May 25; (3) added,(HB 10-1370), ch. 270, p. 1242, § 7, effective January 1, 2011.L. 2011: (4) added, (HB 11-1117), ch. 35, p. 97, § 1, effective March 21.
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsections (1.5)(c), (1.5)(d), (1.5)(e), and (1.5)(f), see section 1 of chapter 269, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
(2) For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsection (3), see section 1 of chapter 270, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
District court did not abuse its discretion by entering preliminary injunction against secretary of state enjoining implementation of administrative rule defining “member” for purposes of constitutional provisions governing small donor committees. Proposed rule would force labor and other covered organizations to get written permission before using an individual’s dues or contributions to fund political campaigns. Plaintiffs demonstrated reasonable probability of success on the merits in challenging secretary’s authority to enact proposed rule. Secretary’s “definition” of term “member” in proposed rule is much more than an effort to define term. It can be read effectively to add, modify, and conflict with constitutional provision by imposing new condition not found in text of article XXVIII. Secretary’s stated purpose in enacting proposed rule not furthered by “definition” contained in proposed rule. Proposed rule does not further secretary’s stated goal of achieving transparency of political contributions. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2006).
Plaintiffs demonstrated reasonable probability of success on the merits in alleging that administrative rule promulgated by secretary of state violated their constitutional rights to freedom of association as applied to them. Secretary’s immediate enforcement of administrative rule forcing labor and other covered organizations to get written permission before using an individual’s dues or contributions to fund political campaigns would have effectively prevented plaintiffs from exercising their first amendment rights in general election. Administrative rule was not narrowly tailored. Rationale justifying administrative rule was based upon speculation there would be dissenters, thereby impermissibly penalizing constitutional rights of the many for the speculative rights of the few. Accordingly, district court did not abuse its discretion by entering preliminary injunction against implementation of administrative rule. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2006).
Adoption of Rule 9.3 of the Colorado secretary of state’s rules concerning campaign and political finance requiring the name of the candidate unambiguously referred to in the electioneering communication to be included in the electioneering report, was within the rulemaking authority of the secretary of state under § 9(1)(b) of article XXVIII of the state constitution and subsection (1) of this section. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008).
ALJ had jurisdiction to impose penalty for violation of Rule 9.3 and did not err by imposing a $1,000 penalty on political committee. Section (2)(a) of article XXVIII of the state constitution grants an ALJ authority to conduct hearings on alleged violations of the article and the “Fair Campaign Practices Act” and to impose penalties if a violation has occurred. Rule 9.3 is necessary to implement former § 1-45-109 (5), and, under § 10(2)(a) of article XXVIII of the state constitution, sanctions can be imposed for violations of § 1-45-109. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008).
ALJ did not err in determining that membership contribution claim was groundless and in awarding attorney fees against litigant. ALJ did not misinterpret subsection (2) by rejecting litigant’s defense based on voluntary dismissal of its membership contributions claim under § 13-17-102 (5). Although § 1-45-111.5 (2) contains the same operative language and definitions as § 13-17-102 (4), at the time of the action, the FCPA did not incorporate § 13-17-102 (5) and contained no exception for dismissal of a groundless claim prior to hearing. Moreover, although § 13-17-102 applies to any civil action commenced or appealed in any court of record, “court of record” does not include administrative courts. Finally, the record showed that the ALJ considered litigant’s arguments about the efforts it made after the filing of the action to reduce or dismiss claims it found to be invalid. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008).
Given that identical terms “substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious” are found in this section and in § 13-17-102, case law construing that section may be examined for guidance in construing terms used in this section. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Major. Fund, 275 P.3d 674 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 2012 CO 12, 269 P.3d 1248.
A claim is frivolous if its proponents can present no rational argument based on the evidence or the law to support it. A claim is vexatious if it is brought or maintained in bad faith to annoy or harass another. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Major. Fund, 275 P.3d 674 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 2012 CO 12, 269 P.3d 1248.
15. Definition for Committee