Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-taylor-599
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 19:47:09
Document Index: 462426656

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3582', '§ 3553', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582']

United States v. Taylor, 778 F.3d 667 | Casetext Search + Citator
However, none of these decisions dealt specifically with § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirements. See…
Based upon this line of Supreme Court authority, some courts have determined that section 3582 is a…
Full title:UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Kevyn TAYLOR…
778 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2015)
holding that a district court had jurisdiction—meaning the power to adjudicate—a motion for a reduced term of imprisonment even though it was without the authority to grant the motion because the defendant did not satisfy the statutory criteria for relief
No. 13–2978. No. 13–2978.
Donald S. Boyce, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Fairview Heights, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee. Neal A. Connors, Attorney, Neal Connors Law Firm, P.C., Belleville, IL, for Defendant–Appellant.
Before WILLIAMS, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge.
While the difference will rarely have much practical significance, we take this opportunity to resolve the conflicting case law and to clarify that district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over—that is, the power to adjudicate—a § 3582(c)(2) motion even when authority to grant a motion is absent because the statutory criteria are not met. See generally United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629–31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (defining subject-matter jurisdiction as the constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a matter); United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 690–92 (7th Cir.2002) (explaining that “judges and legislators sometimes use the term jurisdiction to erroneously refer to a court's authority to issue a specific type of remedy, rather than to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction”).
Whether a limit on a court's power is truly jurisdictional is ultimately up to Congress. In a series of cases over the last dozen years, the Supreme Court has taken new care to distinguish between truly (i.e., non-waivable) jurisdictional rules and ordinary case-processing rules that may be mandatory and even strict, but which a court need not raise on its own. The general rule that has emerged is that “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). Several signals persuade us that the limits on § 3582(c)(2) relief are not jurisdictional.
We also have a cue from the Supreme Court, which has not addressed this precise question but has decided the reach of § 3582(c)(2) without referring to the statute's limits as jurisdictional. In Freeman v. United States, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011), the Court considered whether § 3582(c)(2) was available to a defendant who had entered a binding plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). All of the Justices—whether or not they joined the Court's judgment—addressed the issue in terms of whether Freeman was statutorily eligible for a sentence reduction, not whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide his motion. See Freeman, 131 S.Ct. at 2692–93 (plurality opinion); id. at 2697–98 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2701 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Freeman was decided after the Supreme Court's recent stream of cases that try to be more careful about which rules are truly jurisdictional. E.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648–49, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160–62, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). Accordingly, we do not view the silence about jurisdiction in Freeman as merely a “drive-by” jurisdictional ruling entitled to little or no weight. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 91, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).
We conclude that the better view is stated in Beard and Taylor and that a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) regardless of whether the moving defendant is actually eligible for such discretionary relief. B. The Merits
Because this opinion overrules several circuit precedents that have treated the scope of § 3582(c)(2) as affecting district courts' subject-matter jurisdiction, we have circulated this opinion to the court under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge favored hearing this case en banc.
We conclude by noting that Taylor may be eligible for a future sentencing reduction based on retroactive Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which has reduced by 2 levels the base offense levels assigned to drug quantities in § 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. Supp. app. C., amend. 782, p. 71 (2014). After applying this amendment, his imprisonment range for his drug convictions would be 151 to 188 months. See id. § 2D1.1(c)(4). But for Taylor to benefit from this amendment, he would need to file a new motion under § 3582(c)(2) in the district court based on Amendment 782. See United States v. Hayden, No. 14–1812, 775 F.d 847, 850, 2014 WL 7375538, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 30, 2014). If he is in fact eligible for relief, the district court would need to exercise its discretion under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3582(c)(2).
holding that a defendant could not seek relief on direct appeal "based on retroactive Amendment 782"
holding that a defendant could not seek relief on direct appeal “based on retroactive Amendment 782”
holding that criteria for granting sentence reduction in § 3582(c) are not jurisdictional
Summary of this case from United States v. Wolfe
Summary of this case from United States v. Roundtree
holding that Section 3582(c) is "a non-jurisdictional case processing rule" because it is outside the jurisdictional provisions of the criminal code and not "phrased in jurisdictional terms"
concluding that "district courts in § 3582(c) proceedings cannot make findings inconsistent with that of the original sentencing court"
denying Section 2255 petition and noting that two of the petitioner's arguments lacked merit because they were only "three conclusory sentences" in the petition and "neither was developed in [petitioner's] supporting memorandum."
stating district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over § 3582(c) motion
discussing an intra-circuit split and concluding that “a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) regardless of whether the moving defendant is actually eligible for such discretionary relief”
noting Graham's view that defendant's ineligibility for reduced sentence implicates jurisdiction, but concluding that "§ 3582(c) does not limit a district court's subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a motion brought under that statute, even a motion that the court would not be authorized to grant"
Summary of this case from United States v. Moya-Breton
In Taylor, the Seventh Circuit suggested that this court's decision in United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir.2013), held § 3582(c) jurisdictional.
explaining that, "[b]ecause § 3582(c) limits the substantive authority of the district court, it is a real 'jurisdictional' rule, rather than a case-processing requirement"
stating even if a court has the "power to adjudicate" a motion under § 3582(c), it may lack "authority to grant a motion ... because the statutory criteria are not met"
In Taylor, the court held that "district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over—that is, the power to adjudicate—a § 3582(c)(2) motion even when authority to grant a motion is absent because the statutory criteria are not met."
In Taylor, the court reasoned that § 3582 is not a part of a jurisdictional portion of the criminal code and is not phrased in jurisdictional terms.
stating that "§ 3582 is not part of a jurisdictional portion of the criminal code" and is not "phrased in jurisdictional terms"
In United States v. Taylor, 778 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2015), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and held that § 3582(c) is not jurisdictional because it is outside the jurisdictional provisions of the criminal code and not "phrased in jurisdictional terms."
Summary of this case from United States v. Monzon
explaining that if a defendant's applicable guideline range was not lowered by amendment, then courts must deny relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)
Summary of this case from United States v. Avila