Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/101243/jankovich-vs-indiana-toll-road-comm-n
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:49:13
Document Index: 64607649

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 1', '§ 21', 'Art. 1', '§ 21', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 14', '§ 1101']

Jankovich Vs Indiana Toll Road Comm N - Citation 101243 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Jankovich Vs. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/101243
Case Number 379 U.S. 487
Appellant Jankovich
Respondent Indiana Toll Road Comm'n
.....petitioners contended exceeded that permitted by the municipal airport zoning ordinance. the state supreme court reversed the trial court's award of damages to petitioners, holding that the ordinance purported to authorize an appropriation of property (airspace) without compensation, which was unlawful under the indiana constitution and under the fourteenth amendment. held: 1. in holding that the ordinance effected a taking of respondent's property right in the airspace above its land without compensation, the state supreme court rested its decision upon independent and adequate state grounds, even though it also relied on similar federal grounds, and this court is therefore deprived of jurisdiction to review the state court judgment. pp. 379 u. s. 489 -492. .....
Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n - 379 U.S. 487 (1965)
U.S. Supreme Court Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965)
1. In holding that the ordinance effected a taking of respondent's property right in the airspace above its land without compensation, the State Supreme Court rested its decision upon independent and adequate state grounds, even though it also relied on similar federal grounds, and this Court is therefore deprived of jurisdiction to review the state court judgment. Pp. 379 U. S. 489 -492.
2. The state court decision is compatible with the Federal Airport Act, which does not defeat this respondent's right under state law to compensation for the taking of airspace. Pp. 379 U. S. 493 -405.
Pursuant to a 20-year lease with the City of Gary, Indiana, petitioners are the operators of Gary Municipal Airport, one of the airports included in the National Airport Plan. They seek review of a decision invalidating the city's airport zoning ordinance, which, with regard to buildings and other structures in the immediate vicinity of the airport, prescribes height limitations based upon a 40-to-1 glide angle for approaching aircraft ( i.e., at a distance of 40 feet from the end of the planned runway, structures may not exceed one foot in height). After passage of the ordinance, respondent, the Indiana Toll Road Commission, constructed a toll road parallel to the south side of the airport and 443 feet from the end of the planned runway. Contending that at that location the ordinance prescribes a maximum height of 18.08 feet above the surrounding land, and that respondent's toll road (which is raised 29.8 feet above the surrounding land surface) violates the ordinance, petitioners brought suit in the Indiana courts for injunctive relief and damages. Although it refused to grant an injunction, the trial court awarded petitioners damages of $164,000 and costs. That judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of
"'the settled rule that where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other nonfederal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.' Fox Film Corp. v. Miller, 296 U. S. 207 , 296 U. S. 210 ."
Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 , 368 U. S. 281 . As we have concluded that respondent is correct in its contention that the judgment sought to be reviewed is supported by an independent and adequate state ground, we dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
the Indiana Constitution [ Footnote 1 ] and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
244 Ind. at 577, 193 N.E.2d at 238. In resolving that issue, however, the Indiana Supreme Court, quite understandably, did not analyze separately the effect of the two provisions but considered them together. From that fact, petitioners would have us conclude that the state ground of decision -- invalidity of the zoning ordinance under Art. 1, § 21, of the Indiana Constitution -- "is so interwoven with the other as not to be an independent matter. . . ." Enterprise Irrig. District v. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157 , 243 U. S. 164 (dictum). (Emphasis added.) We cannot agree.
Quoting both Art. 1, § 21, of the Indiana Constitution and § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and citing both a decision of this Court, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 , and one of its own decisions, General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.W. 309 (1930), the Indiana Supreme Court began its analysis with the proposition that private property may not be taken for public use without compensation. Two issues were singled out as determinative of whether the ordinance under consideration violated that constitutional protection:
In holding that landowners did have a protected property interest in the airspace above their land, the court first discussed an Indiana statute, Acts 1927, c. 43, § 3,
Burns' Ind.Stat.Ann. § 14-103 (1950 Repl.) ("The ownership of the space above the lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, . . ."), and a prior interpretation of state law, Capitol Airways, Inc. v. Indianapolis P. & L. Co., 215 Ind. 462, 466, 18 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1939) (airport operator has no right to damages from public utility whose power line obstructs flight into and out of airport). In addition, the Indiana Supreme Court cited and discussed two cases of this Court holding low altitude overflights to constitute a taking of an air easement requiring just compensation under the United States Constitution. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U. S. 84 ; United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 . But nothing in the court's opinion suggests that its conclusion that,
In such circumstances, even though a state court's opinion relies on similar provisions in both the State and Federal Constitutions, the state constitutional provision has been held to provide an independent and adequate
ground of decision depriving this Court of jurisdiction to review the state judgment. New York City v. Central Savings Bank, 306 U.S. 661, explained in Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551 , 309 U. S. 556 -557; Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U. S. 52 . This is not a case like those cited by petitioners, where the lower court opinion, as a whole,
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., supra, at 309 U. S. 554 -555, or "because it felt under compulsion of federal law as enunciated by this Court so to hold," Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 , 340 U. S. 5 , with the result that the state and federal grounds are "so interwoven that we are unable to conclude that the judgment rests upon an independent interpretation of the State law," State Tax Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511 , 306 U. S. 514 . See also Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437 , 342 U. S. 443 , 342 U. S. 448 -449; Enterprise Irrig. District v. Canal Co., supra. Under our settled decisions, the state ground in this case must be regarded as an independent and adequate ground of decision, and we so hold.
Petitioners nevertheless contend that the state ground of decision is not adequate, because it is inconsistent with the policy of the Federal Airport Act, 60 Stat. 170, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1958 ed. and Supp. V), and therefore founders on the Supremacy Clause. [ Footnote 2 ]
244 Ind. at 582, 193 N.E.2d at 241. (Emphasis added.) As we read the opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court, it certainly does not portent the wholesale invalidation of all airport zoning laws.
We conclude that the decision of the Supreme
Court of Indiana in this case is compatible with the congressional policy embodied in the Federal Airport Act. [ Footnote 3 ]
244 Ind. at 584, 193 N.E.2d at 242, but that conclusion was based on two cases condemning easements over property adjoining federal bases that were decided several years before the recent amendment to the Federal Airport Act, United States v. 48.10 Acres of Land, 144 F.Supp. 258 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1956); United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land, 137 F.Supp. 567 (D.C.N.D.Tex.1956), not on any assessment of the policy of that Act. These circumstances, of course, bar petitioners from seeking reversal of the judgment below on the basis of their preemption claim, and it is therefore questionable whether petitioners may advance the same argument under the guise of an attack on the adequacy of the state ground of decision. We need not consider this problem further, however, because, as is explained in the text, infra , the preemption claim is insubstantial.
Although the opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana relies on state and federal precedents, I can find nowhere in its opinion any clear indication of whether that court's ultimate conclusion is based upon the Federal Constitution, the Constitution of Indiana, or both. Therefore, I think the posture of this case is identical to that presented in Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551 , and that we should, as the Court did there, vacate the judgment of the State Supreme Court and remand the cause for further proceedings.
309 U.S. at 309 U. S. 557 .