Source: http://co.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190502_0000559.DCO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-06-01 00:27:47
Document Index: 90919970

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 4', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 2255']

1. KENNETH JORDAN, Defendant/Movant.
Movant, Kenneth Jordan, has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate (“§ 2255 motion”) [Docket No. 278]. The United States has responded to the § 2255 motion. Docket No. 285.
Mr. Jordan pled guilty to one count of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d)) and one count of use and carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Docket No. 278 at 2. Mr. Jordan was sentenced as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which was based upon his two prior convictions for unarmed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d)) and armed robbery of a credit union (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d)). Id. Mr. Jordan was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment for the robbery conviction and 60 months imprisonment on the § 924(c) conviction for a total sentence of 322 months. Docket No. 285 at 2.
Mr. Jordan moves, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate his sentence on the basis that it violates Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson”) because his underlying conviction of unarmed robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence. Docket No. 278 at 15.
Mr. Jordan argues that, post-Johnson, unarmed bank robbery is no longer a qualifying crime of violence under the elements in the career offender sentencing guidelines. See 559 U.S. at 140 (“[T]he phrase ‘physical force' means violent force - that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (“The term ‘crime of violence' means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”). Mr. Jordan argues that unarmed bank robbery does not require the use or threatened use of violent physical force; rather, it requires only that a defendant take property through intimidation. Docket No. 278 at 6.
Mr. Jordan's motion is similar to the argument made in United States v. McCranie, 889 F.3d 677 (10th Cir. 2018). In McCranie, the defendant pled guilty to federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Id. at 677-78. On appeal, the defendant argued that unarmed bank robbery, or bank robbery by intimidation, does not require the threatened use of force and, accordingly, a bank robbery effected solely by intimidation does not constitute a violent felony. Id. at 679-80. Mr. Jordan makes the same argument. Docket No. 278 at 6-8. The Tenth Circuit in McCranie held that “intimidation . . . qualifies as a threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 889 F.3d at 680-81. In so doing, it noted that intimidation, in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), is defined as “an act by [the] defendant ‘reasonably calculated to put another in fear, or conduct and words calculated to create the impression that any resistance or defiance by the individual would be met by force.'” Id. at 680 (quoting United States v. Valdez, 158 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original)). Indeed, the court noted that “every definition of intimidation requires a purposeful act that instills objectively reasonable fear (or expectation) of force or bodily injury.” Id. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that bank robbery by intimidation is a crime of violence under the “elements” clause of § 924(c)(3)(A). Id. at 681. See also United States v. Jones, 932 F.2d 624, 625 (7th Cir. 1991) (“There is no ‘space' between ‘bank robbery' and ‘crime of violence.' A defendant properly convicted of bank robbery is guilty per se of a crime of violence, because violence in the board sense that includes a merely threatened use of force is an element of every bank robbery.”).[2]
The elements clauses in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) are essentially identical. Under Tenth Circuit precedent, robbery by intimidation necessarily involves a purposeful act intended to create the impression that the recipient would be met by force and, accordingly, is a crime of violence under the “elements” clause of § 924(c)(3)(A). For this reason, the Court rejects Mr. Jordan's argument that unarmed robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines' elements clause, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), and his argument that the guidelines commentary alone cannot render an offense a crime of violence. See Docket No. 278 at 5-6, 10-14.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ORDERED that the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate [Docket No. 278], f iled by Kenneth ...