Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2014cv01401/869862/5
Timestamp: 2016-10-25 13:47:56
Document Index: 622446702

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

ORDER, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 is granted; the Complaint 1 is dismissed for failure to state a claim; Plaintiff has 30 days to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this Order; if Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Clerk must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a "strike" under 28 U for Russell v. Maricopa County Durango Jail et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Russell v. Maricopa County Durango Jail et al
ORDER, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 is granted; the Complaint 1 is dismissed for failure to state a claim; Plaintiff has 30 days to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this Order; if Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Clerk must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 7/28/14. (REW)
Justin Andrew Russell,
No. CV 14-1401-PHX-DGC (BSB)
Maricopa County Durango Jail, et al.,
Plaintiff Justin Andrew Russell, who is confined in the Maricopa County Durango
Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and
an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will dismiss the
Complaint with leave to amend.
In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants the Maricopa County
Durango Jail facility, and Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio.
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that he is forced to eat in his room on the bed
because the facility has only 30 seats even though there are 60 inmates; that there is mold
in the bathrooms and air vents; that there is rust and a lack of air ventilation; that there is
constant sickness and medication is not provided to care for sick inmates; that there is not
enough food provided, forcing inmates to steal for basic essentials; that there are no
napkins, and only one drink served each day; and that the jail deprives inmates of food,
phone calls, and a pillow. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he was sick periodically from
the mold, had a virus from the lack of ventilation and from eating on his bed, and that he
has a rash from his clothes.
In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that there is asbestos in the building, and that the
guards even use gloves “knowing the severity of the situation.” As a result, Plaintiff
alleges that he has had chronic coughing and breathing problems, phlegm in his chest,
and suffers from headaches and depression.
In his Third Count, Plaintiff alleges that the bathroom drains, toilets, and sinks are
clogged, and that there are ants and spiders in the facility. As a result, Plaintiff alleges
that he has been sick constantly.
For his alleged injuries, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief.
To prevail in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the
defendants (2) under color of state law (3) deprived plaintiff of federal rights, privileges,
or immunities, and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d
1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game
Comm’n, 42 F3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he
suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he must
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Arpaio in his Complaint. “A
plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was
personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152
F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). For an individual to be liable in his official capacity, a
plaintiff must allege that the official acted as a result of a policy, practice, or custom. See
Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, there is
no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a defendant’s position as the supervisor
of someone else who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not make
the supervisor liable. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs. Of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Arpaio directly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts regarding Defendant Arpaio in his Complaint.
rights. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that Defendant Arpaio violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom, or that
Defendant Arpaio participated in or directed any violations of Plaintiff’s rights, or knew
of any violations of Plaintiff’s rights but failed to act to prevent them. Accordingly,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Arpaio, and Defendant Arpaio will be
The Maricopa County Durango Jail facility is not a proper defendant. Claims
under §1983 are directed at “bodies politic and corporate.” Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv.
of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978). Under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
Congress intended municipalities and other local government units to be included among
those persons to whom § 1983 applies. Id. at 689-690. Because a jail is neither a
corporation nor a body politic, it is not a person for purposes of § 1983, and accordingly,
the Maricopa County Durango Jail will be dismissed.
Plaintiff appears to be asserting claims challenging his conditions of confinement.
Plaintiff should be aware that a pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement arises from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than
from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). Nevertheless, the same standards are applied,
requiring proof that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” See Frost v.
Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).
due care for the prisoner’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835
(1994). To state a claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must meet a two-part test.
First, the alleged constitutional deprivation must objectively be “sufficiently serious”;
that is, the official’s act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834 (citations omitted). Second, the prison official
“Deliberate indifference” is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary
must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”; that is, “the official must be both aware
exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added).
To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must
allege that a defendant’s acts or omissions have deprived the inmate of “the minimal
indifference to an excessive risk of inmate health or safety. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082,
1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); see Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-
Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether conditions of confinement rise
to the level of a constitutional violation may depend, in part, on the duration of an
inmate’s exposure to those conditions. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089, 1091 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)). “The circumstances,
nature, and duration of a deprivation of [] necessities must be considered in determining
whether a constitutional violation has occurred.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036,
1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)).
To adequately allege that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference, a plaintiff
must allege facts that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33. That is, “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.
only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need not be tasty or
aesthetically pleasing.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted); see Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128 (applying Eighth Amendment standard to a pretrial
detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding his conditions of confinement).
“The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is served cold,
while unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.” LeMaire, 12 F.3d at
1456 (citations omitted). An inmate may, however, state a claim where he alleges that he
With respect to meals, “[t]he Eighth [and Fourteenth] Amendment[s] require[]
is served meals with insufficient calories for long periods of time. Id.
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, however, Plaintiff may
submit a first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of
Court will mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended
Further, if Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain
or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of the Defendant is connected to the