Source: http://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=455
Timestamp: 2020-04-07 19:10:35
Document Index: 768610862

Matched Legal Cases: ['EWCA ', '§51', '§18', '§65', '§70', '§22', '§71', '§45']

United Kingdom / 18 April 2... - New York Convention Guide 1958
United Kingdom / 18 April 2002 / England and Wales, Court of Appeal / Yukos Oil Co v. Dardana Ltd / A3/2001/1029
Parties Yukos Oil Co v. Dardana Ltd
Case number A3/2001/1029
Applicable NYC Provisions I | II | II(2) | III | IV | V | V(1) | V(1)(a) | VI
[2002] EWCA Civ 543 | online: BAILII
Summary Dardana Limited ("Dardana") was the assignee of the benefits of an award made by an arbitral tribunal in Sweden against the Yukos Oil Company ("Yukos"). Yukos sought to have the award set aside before the Swedish courts, while Dardana obtained an order granting leave to enforce the award in the United Kingdom under section 101 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (U.K.) ("the Act") (providing for the enforcement of NYC awards as judgments). Yukos contended that the Act required Dardana to satisfy the English court that there was an arbitration agreement as defined by section 100 of the Act. The judge disagreed. He held that Yukos' right to challenge the existence of any arbitration agreement was only to be found in section 103(2) of the Act (which directly incorporates and whose wording is equivalent to Article V(1) NYC) and that the onus was on Yukos to prove that there was no such agreement. Rather than decide whether Yukos had done so, the judge adjourned the application under section 103(5) of the Act (which directly incorporates and whose wording is equivalent to Article VI NYC) to await the Swedish decision. The judge also ordered Yukos to provide security of US$2.5 million. Yukos challenged each of those decisions. The Court of Appeal granted Yukos leave to appeal, but refused to stay the order for security. On the ensuing appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the order for security. It held that the judge had erred by treating Yukos as the party seeking an adjournment, when it was not. Any order could not therefore be made a condition of an adjournment. The judge had also erred insofar as he considered that the provision of security could be treated as a condition of avoiding enforcement, since Yukos was entitled to have its application under section 103(2) determined and to have a stay of execution in the meantime. Any order for security could be, at most, a simple order for the provision of security.
VI / 2. ANALYSIS (VI) / a. Relationship between adjournment and security / §51
VI / 2. ANALYSIS (VI) / c. Whether the party must request an adjournment and/or an order for security / §18
IV / 2. ANALYSIS (IV) / A. The requirement that the applicant provide the arbitration agreement 'referred to in article II' / §65
IV / 2. ANALYSIS (IV) / B. No requirement to prove the validity of the arbitration agreement / §70
VI / 2. ANALYSIS (VI) / d. The discretionary power of the courts to adjourn the decision on enforcement or order security / §22
I / 2. ANALYSIS (I) / ARTICLE I(3) / a.The territorial criterion and the reciprocity reservation / §71
I / 2. ANALYSIS (I) / ARTICLE I(1) / a. Awards “made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought” / §45