Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/541/690/139147/
Timestamp: 2013-05-24 19:10:49
Document Index: 123946949

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 659', '§ 371', '§ 2517', '§ 3109', '§ 3109', '§ 3109', '§ 3109', '§ 3109', '§ 3109']

541 F.2d 690: United States of America, Appellee, v. Salvatore Ross Agrusa, Appellant :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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541 F.2d 690: United States of America, Appellee, v. Salvatore Ross Agrusa, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. - 541 F.2d 690
Submitted April 12, 1976.Decided July 6, 1976.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 26, 1976
1 The Honorable William R. Collinson, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri
2 The validity of the waiver is not contested
3 The Honorable Elmo B. Hunter, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri
4 §§ 659 and 2315 concern the theft, possession, receipt and sale of goods stolen from interstate commerce. § 371 is the conspiracy statute
5 Neither party requested that this supplemental order be included in the designated record on appeal. Defendant concedes, however, that it was in fact entered. Appellant's brief at 3
6 " . . . Each application shall include the following information: . . . (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed . . .."
7 "Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order . . . if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that . . . (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."
8 " . . . In the absence of an order, such interception shall immediately terminate when the communication sought is obtained . . .."
9 "No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any wire or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days. . . . Every order . . . shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days."
10 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3): "Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any information concerning a wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in any court of the United States or of any State or in any Federal or State grand jury proceeding."
11 We are not concerned with the fact that the same document served to authorize both the interceptions and the breaking or that the document was not in terms denominated a "warrant." The document in this case, styled simply "order authorizing the interception of wire and oral communications", plainly represented the determination of a United States judge that there was probable cause to believe that specified crimes had been, were being, or would be committed and sufficient reason for the Government both to break and enter and to intercept. This is precisely and, in respects here material, all that the Fourth Amendment and sound reason require
12 Defendant's reliance on Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961), is misplaced. The fact that the intrusion in that case was accomplished without a warrant was as critical to the result as was the fact that a "trespass" had occurred. See the Opinion of the Court at 511-12, 81 S.Ct. 679 and the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, 365 U.S. at 513, 81 S.Ct. 679. The "trespassory" aspect of the intrusion occupied the center of the Court's attention only because it had not yet been recognized that conversations were themselves entitled to protection under the Fourth Amendment, and the "trespass" finding was thus essential to invoking the Fourth Amendment in the first instance. Silverman plainly laid down no rule that "trespassory" intrusions could not occur with a warrant. Indeed, execution of a conventional search warrant typically entails a "trespass."
13 We do not decide what result obtains if the officers act without express court authorization to break and enter (although with court authorization to intercept). We are certain, however, that the resolution becomes much more difficult in that event, and we commend the procedures employed here to law enforcement officials in the future
14 The second aspect of the search and seizure, the interceptions themselves, is entitled to protection under the Fourth Amendment because of the justifiable reliance upon the privacy of the conversations intercepted. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). However, our conclusion above that Title III was in all respects complied with resolves that Fourth Amendment standards were, with respect to the interceptions themselves, satisfied. The constitutionality of Title III is well-established. United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1273 (8th Cir. 1976) and cases there cited
15 At least in a statutory context, this assumption was converted to holding in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589-90, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968)
16 Although the exceptions listed by Mr. Justice Brennan in Ker are stated to be exhaustive, they are specifically in reference to an intrusion into a private home, and the opinion draws heavily upon the historical sanctity of the private home. No home is involved in this appeal
17 We have not ignored additional language in footnote 16 in Katz, 389 U.S. at 355-56, 88 S.Ct. 507. The second paragraph in the footnote is written in deference to Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Ker. It explains that the concerns expressed in that opinion are not relevant to judicially authorized electronic surveillance. While those concerns might in some cases be relevant to judicially authorized electronic surveillance accompanied by a forcible breaking and entering, this would not be true where the premises broken and entered were, as here, vacant
18 "The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant."
19 This conclusion obviates the necessity of our deciding two questions as to whether or not § 3109 in fact applies to the facts of this case, questions which, incidentally, neither party has seen fit to raise. There is substantial authority, cited infra in this opinion, notes 21 and 22, that § 3109 has no application either to nondwellings or to vacant premises. However, once it is resolved that § 3109 is itself a codification of the common law, we see little point in determining the precise contours of § 3109, since the common law will in any event control the result. We thus prefer to view the kind of premises searched and whether they were occupied as circumstances to be considered in assessing what the common law was and is
20 United States v. Mapp also stated, 476 F.2d at 75, that the Sabbath footnote completed a merger of the Fourth Amendment rule and the statutory standard of § 3109. We have no occasion in this case to accept or reject this additional proposition
21 United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1972); Fields v. United States, 355 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 935, 86 S.Ct. 1452, 16 L.Ed.2d 536 (1966); United States v. Hassell, 336 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 965, 85 S.Ct. 1111, 14 L.Ed.2d 155 (1965). But cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-87, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (business premises attached to dwelling by hallway); United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1974) (business premises occupied); United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766, 770 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1970)
22 Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 287, 46 L.Ed.2d 263 (1975); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1973), vacating 340 F.Supp. 454 (E.D.Pa.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864, 94 S.Ct. 39, 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973). See also United States v. Hawkins, 243 F.Supp. 429, 432 (E.D.Tenn.1965). Cf. cases cited at note 16, supra, which concern forcible entries into vacant premises to effect arrests
23 Mr. Justice Brennan would allow a forcible and unannounced intrusion into a private home "where those within, made aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the belief that . . . the destruction of evidence is being attempted." Ker v. California, supra 347 U.S. at 47, 83 S.Ct. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
24 United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1976) (motel room); United States v. Smith, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 520 F.2d 74 (1975), appeal after remand, 524 F.2d 1287 (D.C.Cir. 1975); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 1993, 40 L.Ed.2d 559 (1974) (garage); United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995, 92 S.Ct. 541, 30 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971); United States v. Likas, 448 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1971); Masiello v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 317 F.2d 121 (1963)
25 A number of the cited cases concern intrusions for the purpose of effecting an arrest rather than a search. This difference is of little, if any, consequence, since the governing criteria with respect to an arrest are identical with those embodied in § 3109. Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at 588-89, 88 S.Ct. 1755. Miller v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. at 306, 78 S.Ct. 1190. An exception to this principle, however, appears to have developed with respect to the issue whether the premises are occupied or not, and we have carefully distinguished the arrest and search cases with respect to this issue. See notes 16 and 22, supra