Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/184/550/536740/
Timestamp: 2019-05-24 12:50:34
Document Index: 59604595

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Johnny E. Gatewood, Defendant-appellant, 184 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 1999) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1999 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Johnny E. Gatewood, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Johnny E. Gatewood, Defendant-appellant, 184 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 1999)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 184 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 1999)
Under the three strikes statute, a defendant receives "mandatory life imprisonment" if he is convicted of a "serious violent felony" and has been convicted of two or more "serious violent felonies" in the past. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1). The term "serious violent felony" specifically includes "robbery," § 3559(c) (2) (F) (i), but a prior felony robbery conviction does not serve as a strike if a defendant can prove "by clear and convincing evidence" that it was "non-qualifying":
"(A) Robbery in certain cases--Robbery, an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit robbery; or an offense described in paragraph (2) (F) (ii) shall not serve as a basis for sentencing under this subsection if the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that-"
"(i) no firearm or other dangerous weapon was used in the offense and no threat of use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon was involved in the offense; and""(ii) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury... to any person." § 3559(c) (3) (A) (emphasis added).
The defendant claims that his sentence is unconstitutional because § 3559(c) (3) (A) of the three-strikes statute improperly places a heightened burden of proof on defendants to show that previous robbery convictions are "non-qualifying felonies." There is no doubt that § 3559(c) (3) (A)'s "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof on the defendant is a departure from the government's general duty to establish sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531, 1535 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court, however, has held that the there is no per se constitutional impediment to assigning the burden of proof to the defendant at the sentencing stage. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 34 (1992). Thus, the question before us now is limited to whether § 3559(c) (3) (A)'s "clear and convincing evidence" standard is too great a burden for a defendant to bear when establishing "non-qualifying felonies" under the three-strikes statute.
The recent Supreme Court Due Process decision of Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), appears to forbid § 3559(c) (3) (A)'s assignment of a "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof to a defendant. In Cooper, an unanimous Court struck down a state statute requiring a criminal defendant to prove incompetence to stand trial by "clear and convincing evidence." The Court had previously upheld another state statute requiring a defendant to prove incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence." See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992). The Court struck down the clear and convincing evidence standard because it found that the risks and costs of an erroneous determination of incompetency were significantly greater than placing the burden on the government or placing a preponderance of the evidence standard on the defendant. "The more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision." Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362 (citations omitted). Under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the risk of an erroneous determination affected only "the narrow class of cases in which the evidence on either side was equally balanced." Id. at 363 (citing Medina, 505 U.S. at 449). Under a "clear and convincingevidence" standard, the Court was concerned that there would be a class of cases in which a defendant would not prevail under a higher burden of proof even though he could prove that he is "more likely than not incompetent" under a preponderance standard. Id. at 364. The consequences of an erroneous presumption of competency may be severe, e.g., diminished capacity to communicate with counsel and exercise fundamental trial rights. See id. The Cooper Court held that the defendant's fundamental right to be competent at trial outweighed the State's interest in an efficient criminal Justice system. The Court thus found no "sound basis for allocating to the criminal defendant the large share of the risk which accompanies a clear and convincing evidence standard." Id. at 366.
The same reasoning applies to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (3) (A). The risk of error incurred by the defendant is no less than the risk concerned in Cooper, while the cost of such an error may be even greater. Under § 3559(c) (3) (A)'s "non-qualifying" felony provision, the defendant is burdened with producing proof of facts concerning old offenses when witnesses and memories of such events may now be unavailable. It simply may be impossible to be "clear and convincing" about facts of offenses that occurred twenty years ago. In this case, the Arkansas statute could have been violated in 1976 by an "attempt" that would not trigger the three-strikes statute, though the defendant alleges that he could not locate most of the witnesses associated with his 1976 conviction and that the witnesses he could locate had no recollection. Other defendants will no doubt face the same problem. It is therefore probable in many cases that a defendant may have enough evidence to prove that a previous felony is more likely than not "non-qualifying" yet not enough evidence to satisfy the clear and convincing standard. For such a defendant whose previous felony is in truth "non-qualifying," the consequences of an erroneous decision are rarely higher in the federal system, i.e., life imprisonment.
The defendant's burden of proof under § 3559(c) (3) (A) of the three-strikes statute thus fails to exhibit "fundamental fairness" as defined in Cooper's Due Process analysis because it imposes such a high risk and cost of error on defendants.2 As a result, we strike § 3559(c) (3) (A)'s "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof from the rest of the three strikes statute.3 Section 3559(c) (3) (A)'s "non-qualifying felonies" provision will now read:
"(A) Robbery in certain cases--Robbery, an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit robbery; or an offense described in paragraph (2) (F) (ii) shall not serve as a basis for sentencing under this subsection if-"
Without assigning a "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof to the defendant, § 3559(c) (3) (A) becomes no different than any other sentencing factor which the government bears the burden of resolving, if disputed, by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531, 1535 (6th Cir. 1989). In this case, the defendant claimed that his previous robbery convictions were "non-qualifying felonies," but he failed to produce any proof in support. On remand, the government will now have the burden of proving that the defendant's robbery convictions were not "non-qualifying" by a preponderance of the evidence.
Our invalidation of § 3559(c) (3) (A)'s burden of proof requires us to address whether this provision can be severed from the remainder of the statute. The Supreme Court has held that " [u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (citations omitted). There is ample indication that Congress would have enacted the three-strikes statute independently of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof under § 3559(c) (3) (A). The purpose of § 3559(c) (3) (A) is simply to limit the types of robberies that qualify as a strike under the statute. Severing § 3559(c) (3) (A)'s "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof from the rest of the statute in no way compromises Congress's intent to qualify only certain robberies under the statute, nor does it affect the statute's handling of other crimes which qualify as strikes. Section 3559(c) (3) (A)'s burden of proof is only a procedural means of resolving whether a previous robbery was indeed "non-qualifying." The substantive concept of "non-qualifying felonies" remains intact in the statute and functions independently of the assigned burden of proof.
We do not decide whether a defendant's "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof under § 3559(c) (3) (B) is likewise unconstitutional. Section 3559(c) (3) (B) provides as follows: