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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 632', '§ 636', '§ 3401', '§ 3402', '§ 3401', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 3401', '§ 636', '§ 3401', '§ 636', '§ 3161', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636']

US Supreme Court Decisions - On-Line> Volume 490 > GOMEZ V. UNITED STATES, 490 U. S. 858 (1989)
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(b) The Act's structure and legislative history demonstrate a congressional intent to limit a magistrate's range of duties in criminal cases chanrobles.com-red
Since its enactment in 1968, the Federal Magistrates Act has permitted district courts to assign magistrates certain described powers and duties, as well as "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 860
the United States." [Footnote 1] The principal question presented is whether presiding at the selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent is among those "additional duties."
Petitioners Jose Gomez and Diego Chavez-Tesina were among 11 persons named as defendants in a 21-count indictment alleging commission of multiple felonies, including conspiracy and racketeering, involving distribution of cocaine. [Footnote 2] Having elected to stand trial, petitioners and three codefendants appeared before the Federal Magistrate to whom the District Judge had delegated the task of selecting a jury. [Footnote 3] Defense counsel made timely objections to this assignment. Following a telephone conversation with the District Judge, the Magistrate noted their objections and commenced voir dire. App. 13-16. As is the practice in the Eastern District of New York, the Magistrate, rather than the attorneys, posed questions to the venirepersons. [Footnote 4] The Magistrate also introduced the prospective jurors to the offenses charged; instructed them on numerous points of law, including the presumption of innocence and the different burdens of persuasion in civil and criminal trials; and admonished chosen jurors not to discuss the case with anyone. See generally Tr. of Jury Selection. When defense counsel appeared before the chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 861
District Judge eight days later, they renewed their objections to the Magistrate's role in jury selection. The District Judge overruled the objections, but said he would review any of the Magistrate's rulings de novo. App. 19. Defendants registered no specific challenge to any juror, and trial proceeded; 10 days later, the jury returned guilty verdicts against all five defendants. Gomez received two concurrent 10-year sentences, to be followed by a special 10-year parole term; Chavez-Tesina was ordered to serve 20 years on one count, with three lesser sentences to run concurrently, and lifetime special parole.
The Second Circuit's decision conflicts with the holding of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1438 (1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1034 (1988). The Government had urged the court to construe the additional chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 862
duties clause of the Federal Magistrates Act to allow judges to delegate jury selection in felony trials even without the defendant's consent. That construction would provoke "grave constitutional questions," the en banc majority stated. 824 F.2d 1430; see id. at 1435. After stressing the importance of jury selection and noting the specificity with which Congress defined magistrates' duties regarding other judicial proceedings, the majority concluded:
We granted certiorari to resolve this important conflict. 488 U.S. 838 (1989). [Footnote 7] chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 863
§ 632(a). The only legal constraint on many other assignments not expressly barred -- whether supervising repair of the courthouse electrical system or presiding at felony trials -- must be found, according to the literal reading, in the Constitution. The panel majority below and the dissenters in Ford embraced this construction, [Footnote 8] despite abiding concerns regarding the constitutionality of delegating felony trial duties to magistrates. [Footnote 9] chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 864
In Mathews, we considered whether preliminary review, argument, and preparation of recommended decisions in Social Security benefits cases were among the "additional duties" that a magistrate could perform. The Government opposed such referrals, arguing that Congress intended a magistrate to be a "supernotary,'" assuming only the district judge's "irksome, ministerial tasks," [Footnote 10] while the benefits chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 865
claimant likened the magistrate to a "`para-judge'" with "a wide range of substantive judicial duties and advisory functions." 423 U.S. at 423 U. S. 268. Declining to choose either extreme or to read the "additional duties" language literally, we examined the Act's structure and determined that limited, advisory review, subject to the district judge's ongoing supervision and final decision, fell among the "range of duties" that Congress intended magistrates to perform. Id. at 423 U. S. 270. In accordance with our reasoning in Mathews, our task is to consider the office of magistrate as it pertains to seating a jury in a felony case.
Constitution and laws of the United States. The additional chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 866
duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to --
§ 636(b). Commissioners had tried only "petty offenses." [Footnote 11] Magistrates were empowered to try "minor offenses," [Footnote 12] but only upon special designation by the district court and only if the defendant, in writing, specifically waived his or her rights to trial before a judge, and perhaps by a jury. 82 Stat. 1116, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). A convicted defendant could appeal to the district court, § 3402, and Congress contemplated that district courts would retain "the greatest possible scrutiny and control of a magistrate's trial jurisdiction," H.R.Rep. No. 1629, at 21. [Footnote 13] Exempted from that chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 867
jurisdiction were a number of minor offenses -- such as bribery and public corruption, deprivation of rights under color of law, and jury tampering, 82 Stat. 1116, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(f) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) -- that required the exercise of delicate judgment and "as a matter of sound congressional policy, ought to be tried in the U.S. district courts." H.R.Rep. No. 1629, at 22.
In 1976, Congress amended the Act "to clarify and further define the additional duties which may be assigned to a United States Magistrate," [Footnote 14] H.R.Rep. No. 94-1609, p. 2 (1976). [Footnote 15] Upon consent of the parties, a magistrate could be chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 868
designated a special master in any civil case. 90 Stat. 2729, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976 ed.). A magistrate also could be assigned to "hear and determine any pretrial matter," [Footnote 16] subject to reconsideration by the district court on a showing that "the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." § 636(b)(1)(A). Excepted were eight categories of "dispositive" pretrial motions; with regard to these, a magistrate might conduct evidentiary and other hearings and recommend chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 869
dispositions. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party objected to the magistrate's recommendation, the judge was to "make a de novo determination" of the matter. § 636(b)(1)(C). The 1968 Act had listed such functions among a magistrate's additional duties; the 1976 amendments, in contrast, first described specific duties and then stated in a separate subsection that a "magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." § 636(b)(3). A Committee Report explained:
By 1979, congressional concerns regarding magistrates' abilities had decreased; a legislative Committee reported that "the magistrate system now plays an integral and important role in the Federal judicial system." [Footnote 17] H.R.Rep. No. 96287, p. 5 (1979). Accordingly, in the Federal Magistrates chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 870
Act of 1979, Pub.L. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643-647, Congress enlarged the magistrate's jurisdiction over civil and criminal trials, codifying some of the experiments conducted under the Act's additional duties clause. See H.R.Rep. No. 96287, at 2, 17. Thus, since 1979, magistrates have been authorized to preside at, and enter final judgment in, civil trials, including those tried before a jury. 93 Stat. 643-644, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the first time, magistrates were permitted to conduct jury, as well as bench, trials on any misdemeanor charge. [Footnote 18] 93 Stat. 646, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b). As before, however, a magistrate's trial jurisdiction can be exercised only upon special designation by the district court, 93 Stat. 643, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); 93 Stat. 645, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a), and it remains subject to judicial review. [Footnote 19]
93 Stat. 643, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2). In criminal cases, the Government may petition for trial before a district judge. [Footnote 20] "Defendants charged with misdemeanors chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 871
can refuse to consent to a magistrate, and thus effect the same removal," S.Rep. No. 96-74, p. 7 (1979), for the magistrate's criminal trial jurisdiction depends on the defendant's specific, written consent. [Footnote 21]
Through gradual congressional enlargement of magistrates' jurisdiction, the Federal Magistrates Act now expressly authorizes magistrates to preside at jury trials of all civil disputes and criminal misdemeanors, subject to special assignment, consent of the parties, and judicial review. The Act further details magistrates' functions regarding pretrial and post-trial matters, specifying two levels of review depending on the scope and significance of the magistrate's decision. The district court retains the power to assign to magistrates unspecified "additional duties," subject only to conditions or review that the court may choose to impose. By a literal reading, this additional duties clause would permit magistrates chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 872
to conduct felony trials. But the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of the authority to preside at a felony trial. [Footnote 22] The legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable district judges to concentrate on trying cases, [Footnote 23] and its assurances that magistrates' adjudicatory jurisdiction had been circumscribed in the interests of policy as well as constitutional constraints, [Footnote 24] confirms this inference. Similar considerations lead us to conclude that Congress also did not contemplate inclusion of jury selection in felony trials among a magistrate's additional duties. [Footnote 25]
Even though it is true that a criminal trial does not commence for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause until the jury is empaneled and sworn, 420 U. S. 388 (1975), other constitutional rights attach before that point, see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 430 U. S. 398 (1977) (assistance of counsel). Thus, in affirming voir dire as a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, during which the defendant has a constitutional right to be present, the Court wrote: "[W]here the indictment is for a felony, the trial commences at least from the time when the work of empanelling the jury begins.'" Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 146 U. S. 374 (1892) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 110 U. S. 578 (1884)). See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 380 U. S. 219 (1965) (voir dire "a necessary part of trial by jury"); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U. S. 1, 483 U. S. 3 (1987); United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57, 469 U. S. 66 (1984). Jury selection is the primary means by which a court may enforce a defendant's right to be tried by a jury free from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice, Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U. S. 182, 451 U. S. 188 (1981), Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973), Dennis v. United States, 339 U. S. 162 (1950), or predisposition about the defendant's culpability, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961). Indications that Congress likewise considers jury selection part of a felony trial may be gleaned, inter alia, from its passage in 1975 of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), [Footnote 26] and its placement of rules pertaining to criminal petit juries in a chapter entitled "Trial." See Fed.Rules Crim. Proc. 23, 24; cf. [email protected] Rule 43(a) (requiring defendant's presence "at every stage of the trial including the empaneling of the jury").
Even assuming that Congress did not consider voir dire to be part of trial, it is unlikely that it intended to allow a magistrate to conduct jury selection without procedural guidance or judicial review. Significantly, when Congress clarified the magistrate's duties in 1976, it did not identify the selection of a jury as either a "dispositive" matter covered by chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 874
§ 636(b)(1)(B) or a "nondispositive" pretrial matter governed by § 636(b)(1)(A). To the limited extent that it fits into either category, we believe jury selection is more akin to those precisely defined, "dispositive" matters for which subparagraph (B) meticulously sets forth a de novo review procedure. [Footnote 27] It is incongruous to assume that Congress implicitly required such review for jury selection, yet failed even to mention that matter in the statute. It is equally incongruous to assume, in the alternative, that Congress intended not to require any review -- not even the less stringent clearly erroneous standard applicable to other pretrial matters [Footnote 28] -- of a magistrate's selection of a jury. Yet one of those assumptions would be a necessary component of a conclusion that Congress intended jury selection to be one of a magistrate's additional duties.
In any event, we harbor serious doubts that a district judge could review this function meaningfully. Far from an administrative empanelment process, voir dire represents jurors' first introduction to the substantive factual and legal issues in a case. To detect prejudices, the examiner -- often, in the federal system, the court -- must elicit from prospective chanrobles.com-red
Page 490 U. S. 875
jurors candid answers about intimate details of their lives. The court further must scrutinize not only spoken words but also gestures and attitudes of all participants to ensure the jury's impartiality. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 469 U. S. 428, n. 9 (1985) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 98 U. S. 156-157 (1879)). But only words can be preserved for review; no transcript can recapture the atmosphere of the voir dire, which may persist throughout the trial. [Footnote 29] Cf. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39, 467 U. S. 49, n. 9 (1984) ("While the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance, the Framers plainly thought them nonetheless real"). The absence of a specific reference to jury selection in the statute, or indeed, in the legislative history, [Footnote 30] persuades us that Congress chanrobles.com-red
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Cited as authority for the assignment was a local rule that states: "Full-time magistrates shall have jurisdiction to discharge the duties set forth in 28 U.S.C. Sec 636." Fed.Local Ct.Rule 1 (EDNY 1988); see Garcia, 848 F.2d 1327.
Garcia, 848 F.2d 1338 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Cf. Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 24(a).
Garcia, 848 F.2d 1338 (Oakes, J.). Cf. United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1440 (CA5 1987) (en banc) (Jolly, J., concurring in result) ("[I]t might be appropriate and wise for federal courts, in their supervisory capacity, to enact rules curtailing, or even precluding the use of magistrates at voir dire in certain situations"), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1034 (1988).
24 F.2d 1438. Nonetheless, because the defendant failed to object and "the trial was fundamentally fair," the court held that the Magistrate's participation was harmless error, and affirmed the conviction. Id. at 1439; accord, ibid. (Jolly, J., concurring in result). In dissent, four judges maintained that the delegation fell within the express scope of the statute, and withstood constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 1440-1448 (Rubin, J.).
Garcia, 848 F.2d 1329 (quoting In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Manufacturing Co., 589 F.2d 1335, 1340-1341 (CA7) (in sustaining inspection warrant issued by Magistrate, states that the "only limitations on section 636(b)(3) are that the duties be consistent with the Constitution and federal laws, and that they not be specifically excluded by section 636(b)(1)'"), cert. denied sub nom. Chromalloy American Corp., Federal Malleable Div. v. Marshall, 444 U.S. 884 (1979)); Ford, 824 F.2d 1441 (Rubin, J.).
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3475 et al. before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. and 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 109 (1966-1967) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Vinson) (magistrates' jurisdiction to try minor criminal offenses unconstitutional even with defendant's waiver of rights); H.R.Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 21 (1968) (disagreeing with Vinson); 114 Cong.Rec. 27338-27343 (1968). See also Ford, 824 F.2d 1437; H.R.Rep. No. 96-287, pp. 32-33 (1979) (dissenting views of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
"To improve judicial machinery by further defining the jurisdiction"
"of United States magistrates, and for other purposes."
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 636(b) of title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:"
Having concluded, n. 27 supra, that jury selection is more like the dispositive matters governed by § 636(b)(1)(B), we agree with the Eighth Circuit that "[s]ubparagraph (A) was plainly intended for less important matters than voir dire," Trice, 864 F.2d 1428, and deem meritless the Government's contention -- advanced for the first time in this litigation before this Court -- that jury selection is among the pretrial matters that a magistrate may "hear and determine," subject to review only for mistakes that are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Brief for United States 7-11, and n. 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 37.
In United States v. Raddatz, 447 U. S. 667, 447 U. S. 680 (1980), we noted that a judge, if troubled by the credibility determinations a magistrate made during a suppression hearing, could rehear the witnesses. Although a judge similarly could question jurors further, as a practical matter a second interrogation might place jurors on the defensive, engendering prejudices irrelevant to the facts adduced at trial. See Garcia, 848 F.2d 1337 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Even assuming that a district judge could review the magistrate's actions meaningfully by examining the transcript or reexamining jurors, the time consumed by such review would negate time initially saved by the delegation. See Ford, 824 F.2d 1437.