Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19820713-905380
Timestamp: 2017-01-21 21:59:41+00:00
Document Index: 118077536

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 240", "l'article 154", "l'article 467", "l'article 467", "l'article 6", "l'article 240", "l'article 467", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 27", "l'article 6", "l'article 26", "l'article 467", "l'article 467", "l'article 467", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9053/80Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1982-07-13;9053.80 Analyses : (Art. 34) RECOURS, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLEParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9053/80 X . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAN Y X . c/RÃPUBLIQUE FÃDÃRALE D'ALLEMAGNE
DECISION of 13 July 1982 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 juillet 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Artlcle 26 of the Convention : Personal expenses imposed on the accused after a decision to discontinue the proceedings for reasons of procedural economy . Situation different from those in Applications NÂ° 6281/73 (Neubecker) and 6650/75 (Liebig) . so that an appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court ought to be attempted.
Artlcle 26 de la Conventlon : DÃ©bours laissÃ©s Ã !a charge de l'accusÃ© aprÃ¨s une dÃ©cision de suspendre les poursuites pour des raisons d'Ã©conomie. Situation diffÃ©rente de celle des RequÃ©tes NÂ° 6281/73 ( Neubecker) et 6650/75 (Liebig). de sorte qu'un recours Ã la Cour constitutionnelle f Ã©dÃ©rale devait Ãªtre tentÃ©.
((rancais : voir p . 147)
The facts of the case as they have been submitted by the applicant through his lawyers, MM . Reinhold Schlothauer and Volkert Ohm, two barrister practicing in Bremen, may be summarised as follows : The applicant is a German citizen born in 1935 who is resident in Bremen . He is a universitv teacher . Criminal proceedings were instituted against him after having participated in a demonstration on 3 January 1977 which involved the blocking of tramway rails during one and a half hours . On . . . April 1978 the District Court of Bremen acquitted him from the offence of coercion (Notigung) which is punishable under Section 240 of the Penal Code . - 142 -
The prosecution appealed from this decision, but subsequently applied for the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings under Section 154 (1) No . 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . This provision authorises the prosecution to retrain from prosecution measures inter alia if a penalty imposed by a final decision taken in another case is sufTcient to influence the offender and to defend the legal order . By a decision of . . . April 1980 the Regional Court of Bremen in fact discontinued the proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the prosecution's request as he had been convicted of a similar offence on . . . October 1975 and the resultant conditional three-months prison sentence had become final on . . . August 1978 . However, the Regional Court decided at the same time to impose on the applicant his own necessary costs in accordance with Section 467 (4) ot' the Code of Criminal Procedure . This provision reads as follows : "II' the court discontinues the proceedings on the basis of a provision which gives it discretion to do so, it can refrain from imposing on the treasurv the necessar_v costs of the accuses . " ("Stelit das Gericht das Verf-ahren nach einer Vorschrift ein, die dies nach seinem Ermessen zuliisst, so kann es davon absehen, die notwendigen Auslagen des Angeschuldigten der Staatskasse aufzuerlegen .") In the reasons for its above decision, the court stated following :
inter alia the
"The imposition on the accused of his necessary out-of court costs is justified under Section 467 (4) of the Code of Crintinal Procedure . The discontinuation of the proceedings against the accused is exclusively based on grounds ot' procedural economy . It would be unfair to impose on the treasury also the necessary expenses of the accused as his guilt is not only slightly, but highly probable (da die Schuld des Angeklagten nicht nur in geringem Masse, sondern in erheblichem Masse wahrscheinlich ist) . First, the imposition of costs does not violate the legal presumption of innocence laid down in Article 6, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights . . . Moreover it has been held in the constante case-law . . . that unpeaceful blocking going beyond lawful demonstration constitutes the offence of coercion within the meaning of Section 240 of the Penal Code . . . (extensive quotations) . The convictions of T . . . and F . . . (included in these quotations) are in fact convictions of identified accomplices (festgestellte MittÃ¯ter) of the accused for blocking of rails on 3 January 1977 . . . Finally it results from the transcript of the hearing of first instance that the guilt ot' the accused is highly probable . He has himself admitted when questioned by the judge that the tramwav traffic must be diverted where there are demon-
strations . The witness Sch . . . told the judge at the inteffogation on . . . April 1978 . . . that he had seen the accused at 4 .55 p .m . marching in the first row of a communist block which then gathered at the D . . . intersection of the tramway rails causing a standstill of all traffic . According to his testimony also witness H . . . saw the accused march among the other demonstrators . It therefore follows from the contents of the tile that the accused very probably participated knowingly and intentionally in the blocking of the D . . . intersection of tramway rails on 3 January 1977 . Accordingly it is only fair that he must bear his own costs himself . " The applicant claims that there was no effective remedy available to hi m from this decision . An appeal against the decision to discontinue the proceedings wa s excluded because this decision did not entail any disadvantage for him . An isolated appeal against the cost decision was also excluded according to the interpretation given to the relevant provision (Section 464 (3) first sentence of the Code of Criminal Procedure) in the case-law of the Courts of Appeal, including the Bremen Hanseatic Court of Appeal which would have been competent in this case . A constitutional appeal provided no prospects of success as the Federal Constitutional Court had alreadv found that the cost regulation contained in Section 467 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as such compatible with the presumption of innocence (cf . BVerfGE 22 . 254, 265) . In its decision on the admissibility of Application No . 6650/74 (Liebig, D .R . 5, 58), the Commission itselt accepted that the constitutional appeal was not an effective remedv to be exhausted in such a case . The case No . 8408/78 * in which the Commission took a different view can be distinguished on the facts because it concerned the application of a different provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 467 (3) No . 2 and not Section 467 (4)) . Moreover, the Commission's decision in this case is not yet published and can therefore not be opposed to the applicant . The applicant also points out that the introduction of a constitutional appeal which clearly lacks prospects of success entails the risk of the imposition of a fine (MissbrauchsgebÃ¼hr) of up to DM 1000.- . The applicant further explains that his complaint is not directed against the applicable legal provision itself, but against the wav of its application in the concrete case . This is a matter which the Federal Constitutional Court in its constant case-law considers to be outside its competence . This opinion has also been expressed in a case quite similar to that of the applicant (BVerfGE 22, 265) . The applicant submits that the constitutional appeal would not have constituted an effective remedv in his case also for this reason . â¢ Sec D .R . 18 . p . 209
- 1Â¢4 -
COMPLAINT The applicant now complains that the cost decision of the Regional Court of Bremen of' . . . April 1980, and in particular the reasons given for this decision, violate his right under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention to be presunted innocent until proved guiltv according to law . He considers that the formulation of the reasons of this court decision is contrary to the presumption of innocence because the court passed a judgment on the probability of his guilt and stated the facts exclusively on the basis of the written contents of the tile . His guilt was moreover considered as probable despite the trial court's conclusion to the contrary . He submits that a breach of Article 6, paragraph 2, exists in his case irrespective of whether or not the imposition of costs on the accused after a decision to discontinue the proceediugs is as such excluded by the presumption of innocence .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant complains of a decision of the Regional Court of Bremen by which that court, which was seized with an appeal of the prosecution against the applicant's acquittal in first instance, discontinued the criminal proceedings on grounds of procedural econontv and ruled that the applicant had to bear his own necessarv expenses because the appeal would probably have been successful . The applicant alleges that this decision, and in particular its reasons, violated his right under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention to "be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law" . 2 . The Government have inter alia submitted that a cost decision following the discontinuance of criminal proceedings has nothing to do with a finding on the guilt of the accused and therefore falls wholly outside the scope of Article 6, paragraph 2 . The Commission, however, recalls its earlier case-law where it has already been stated that the application of Article 6, paragraph 2, is not limited to cases where a criminal prosecution leads in fact to the determination of the guilt of the accused in the form of a decision pronouncing his conviction or'acquittal . The presumption of innocence also applies to cases where the proceedings are discontinued, and in particular to the reasons relied on by the competent court when ordering the discontinuance (cf . the Commission's Report of 8 October 1980 on Application No . 8269/78, Gustav Adolf v . Austria, in this respect confirmed by the Eur . Court H .R .'s judgment of 26 March 1982) or the cost consequences of such discontinuance (cf . the Commission's Report of 6 May 1981 on Application No . 8660/79, Ludwig Minelli v . Switzerland, and its decisions on the admissibility of Applications Nos 6281/73 (Neubecker)and 6650/74 (Liebig v . Federal Republic of Germany), D .R . 5, pp . 13 and 58) . There is no reason to depart from this jurisprudence in th e - 145 -
present case, and the application cannot therefore be rejected as being ratione materiae incompatible with the provisions of the Convention in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 2 . However, although the facts of the present case are as such susceptible t o .3 being examined under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not there is actuallv an appearance oF a violation of this provision . Under Article 26 of the Convention, the Commission mav onlv deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and in the present case the applicant has failed to comply with this requirement as he has not availed himself of the possibility to file a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutionai Court . . Contrary to the applicant's submission, the Commission considers that this possibilitv would have constituted an effective remedy in the applicant's case . The Federal Constitutional Court has recognised in several decisions that the principle of the "presumption of innocence" is embodied in the Constitution of the Federal Republic, and it has applied this argument not only in casesinvolving a review of legal regulations as to their conformitv with the Constitution (cf. the case cited bv the respondent Government B)ierfGE 25, 327), but also in cases of individual complaints alleging that the above principle has been disregarded in a concrete case (cf . BVerfGE 22, 254 and the Federal Constitutional Court's decision in the Neubecker case . 2 BVR 1/73) . This shows that a person discontent with a certain court decision which he alleges has been taken in violation of the presumption of innocence can seize the Federal Constitutional Court with this question event if-as the applicant in the present case-he does not wish to challenge the constitutionality of the applicable legal regulation as such . If he contends that a certain provision ot' the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely Section 467 (4), has been wrongly applied in his case in that he has been required to bear his own necessarv expenses in disregard of the presumption of innocence, there can be no question of this claim being directed exclusively against the reasoning, and not'alsÃ´ against the opÃ©rative pArt of the relevant court decision . It'is further no argument against the effectiveness of a constitutiona l complaint that the Federal Constitutional .Court has hitherto never actually found a violation of the constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence . The number of cases in which the court was confronted with this problem is very small and does not allow any general conclusions to be drawn . The relevant decisions moreover date back considerable time and none of them has dealt with a situation directly comparable to the circumstances of the present case . As the Government have rightly observed, the published cases were indeed concerned with the application of different legal provisions (i .e . the former version of Section 467 in BVerfGE 22, 254, and subsection (1 )
of the new version in BVerfGE 25, 327) . The only case involving the application of subsection (4) of the new version of Section 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i .e . the very provision which was also applied in the present case, is the decision in the Neubecker case (2BVRI/73) . It is a decision taken by a three-judge panel of the Federal Constitutional Court . The Commission cannot follow the Government's argument that such decisions are wholly irrelevant in the context of' Article 26 of the Convention . It must however be noted that the present case is clearly distinguishable from the Neubecker case both as regards the faclual and the legal situation . First of all, the discontinuance ot'the proceedings at the appeal level followed an acquittal and not a conviction in tirst instance, it was based on procedural economv (Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) rather than the trivialitv of the matter (Section 153) and it did not require the consent of the accused . In this respect, the present case is therefore comparable to Application No . 8408/78 which the Commission declared inadniissible for failure to exhaust the dotnestic reniedies . As in that case, the Contmission notes that the decision complained of was given considerable time after the Comntission had declared Applications Nos . 6281/73 (Neubecker) and 6650/74 (Liebig) admissible . It follows that the applicant has not complied with the conditions as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies as laid down in Article 26 of the Convention . and his application ntust accordingly be rejected under Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n
(TRADUCTION) EN FAIT Les faits de la cause, tels qu'exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant par l'intermÃ©diaire de ses avocats, M^ Reinhold Schlothauer et MÂ° Volkert Ohm, tous deux exerÃ§ant Ã BrÃ©me, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit . Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant allemand, nÃ© en 1935 et rÃ©sidant Ã Br@me . Il est professeur d'universitÃ© . Des poursuites pÃ©nales ont Ã©tÃ© ouvertes contre lui pour participation, le 3 janvier 1977, Ã une manifestation qui bloqua les rails du tramway pendant une heure et demie . Le . . . avril 1978 . le tribunal de district de BrÃªme l'acquitta sur le chef de -contrainteÂ» (NBtigung), infraction punie par l'article 240 du Code pÃ©nal . - 147 -
Le ministÃ¨re public fit appel de cette dÃ©cision mais demanda ultÃ©rieurement l'arrÃªt des poursuites pÃ©nales conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 154, paragraphe 1 no 2 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Cette disposition autorise le ministÃ¨re public Ã s'abstenir de poursuivre, notamment si la sanction infligÃ©e par une dÃ©cision rendue en dernier ressort dans une autre affaire suffit Ã influencer le dÃ©linquant et Ã sauvegarder l'ordre juridique . Par dÃ©cision du . . . avril 1980, le tribunal rÃ©gional de BrÃªme, suivant la demande du ministÃ¨re public, interrompit effectivement les poursuites contre le requÃ©rant, qui avait Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable d'une infraction analogue le . . . octobre 1975 et dont la peine de trois mois de prison avec sursis, infligÃ©e Ã cette occasion, Ã©tait devenue dÃ©finitive le . . . aoÃ»t 1978 . Cependant, le tribunal rÃ©gional dÃ©cida en mÃªme temps d'imputer au requÃ©rant ses dÃ©bours personnels, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 467, paragraphe 4 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, ainsi libellÃ© : â¢ Si le tribunal suspend les poursuites en se fondant sur une disposition qui lui en donne la facultÃ©, il peut s'abstenir de mettre Ã la charge du trÃ©sor public les dÃ©bours personnels du prÃ©venu . . (=S(ellt das Gericht das Verfahren nach einer Vorschrift ein, die dies nach seinem Ermessen zulÃ sst, so kann es davon absehen, die notwendigen Auslagen des Angeschuldigten der Staatskasse aufzuerlegen .â¢) En motivant sa dÃ©cision, le tribunal dÃ©clara notamment : . Faire supporter au prÃ©venu ses dÃ©bours nÃ©cessaires se justifie au regard de l'article 467, paragraphe 4 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . En effet, l'interruption des poursuites contre le prÃ©venu se fonde exclusivement sur des raisons d'Ã©conomie de procÃ©dure . Il serait injuste de faire supporter aussi au trÃ©sor public les dÃ©bours du prÃ©venu puisque la culpabilitÃ© de l'intÃ©ressÃ© est hautement probable (da die Schuld des Angeklagten nicht nur in geringem Masse, sondern in erheblichem Masse wahrscheinlich ist) . D'une part, imputer au prÃ©venu ses dÃ©bours n'est pas contraire Ã la prÃ©somption lÃ©gale d'innocence posÃ©e Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 2 . de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . . . D'autre part, la jurisprudence constante tient . . . que l'obstruction de la voie publique Ã des fins non pacifiques et dÃ©passant la manifestation licite constitue l'infraction de Â«contrainte ., au sens de l'article 240 du Code pÃ©nal . . . (longue citation) . Les condamnations de T . et de F . (citation) concernent en fait les complices identifiÃ©s (festgestellte MittÃ¢ter) du prÃ©venu qui ont bloqÃ»Ã© les rails le 3 janvier 1977 . . . Enfin, il rÃ©sulte du compte-rendu d'audience en premiÃ¨re instance que la culpabilitÃ© du prÃ©venuest hautement probable . L'intÃ©ressÃ© a lui-mÃªme reconnu devant le juge que la circulation du tramway doit Ãªtre dÃ©toumÃ©e lorsqu'il y a des manifestations . Le tÃ©moin Sch . . . a dÃ©clarÃ© au juge qui l'interrogeait le . . avril 1978 . . . qu'il avait vu l'accusÃ© Ã 16 h 55 s'avancer au premier rang d'une colonne de manifestants communistes qui se rassembla ensuite Ã l'intersection de D . des voies du tramway, obligean t
la circulation Ã s'arrÃ¨ier . Selon ses dires, le tÃ©moin H . a Ã©galement vu l'accusÃ© marcher au milieu des manifestants . Il ressort donc du dossier que l'accusÃ© a trÃ¨s probablement contribuÃ©, sciemment et intentionnellement, Ã bloquer l'intersection de D . des voies du tramway le 3 janvier 1977 . En consÃ©quence, il n'est que justice qu'il supporte lui-mÃªme ses dÃ©bours liÃ©s au procÃ¨s . . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend n'avoir disposÃ© d'aucun recours effectif contre cette dÃ©cision . Il Ã©tait exclu de faire appel de la dÃ©cision de suspension de la procÃ©dure, puisque celle-ci n'Ã©tait pas pri se au dÃ©triment de l'intÃ©ressÃ© . Former un appel distinct contre la dÃ©cision relative aux dÃ©bours Ã©tait Ã©galement exclu en raison de l'interprÃ©tation donnÃ©e Ã la disposition pertinente (art . 464, par . 3 premiÃ¨re phrase . du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale) par la jurisprudence des cours d'appel, y compris la cour hansÃ©atique de BrÃ¨me, qui aurait Ã©tÃ© compÃ©tente en l'espÃ¨ce . Un pourvoi constitutionnel n'offrait aucune chance de succÃ¨s car la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale a dÃ©jÃ dÃ©clarÃ© que la rÃ©glementation des frais de justice figurant Ã l'article 467, paragraphe 4 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale est compatible avec la prÃ©somption d'innocence (cf . BVerfGE 22 . 254, 265) . Dans sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte nÂ° 6650/74 (Liebig . D .R . 5, p . 58) . la Commission elle-mÃªme a reconnu que le pourvoi constitutionnel n'Ã©tait pas un recours effectif Ã Ã©puiser en pareil cas . La requÃ©te nÂ° 8408/780, pour laquelle la Commission a p ri s une position diffÃ©rente . se distingue en fait parce qu'elle concerne l'application d'une disposition diffÃ©rente du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale (article 467, paragraphe 3 nÂ° 2 et non article 467, paragraphe 4) . De reste, la dÃ©cision rendue a(ors par la Commission, qui n'Ã©tait pas encore pub(iÃ©e, ne saurait Ãªtre opposÃ©e au requÃ©rant . Ce(ui-cl souligne Ã©galement que le dÃ©pÃ´t d'un pourvoi constitutionnel qui n'a manifestement pas de chances de rÃ©ussir l'exposait Ã une amende pour fol appel (MissbrauchsgebOhr) pouvant aller jusqu'Ã 1000 DM . Le requÃ©rant explique en outre que son g rief ne concerne pas la disposition lÃ©gale comme telle, mais la maniÃ¨ re dont elle lui a Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©e . Or, c'est lÃ une question que, dans sa ju ri sprudence constante, la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale considÃ©re comme Ã©chappant Ã sa compÃ©tence . C'est Ã©galement l'avis exprimÃ© dans une aff aire tout Ã fait similai re au cas d'espÃ¨ce (BVerfGE 22, 265) . Le requÃ©rant soutient en consÃ©quence qu'un pou rvoi constitionnel n'aurait pas constituÃ© dans son cas un recours efficace .
â¢ Voir D .R . 18 . p . 24N . - 149-
GRIE F Le requÃ©rant se plaint que la dÃ©cision concernant ses dÃ©bours prise par le tribunal rÃ©gional de BrÃªme le . . . avril 1980, par ses motifs notamment, a mÃ©connu le droit que lui garantit l'article 6 . paragraphe 2 . de la Convention d'@tre prÃ©sumÃ© innocent jusqu'Ã ce que sa culpabilitÃ© ait Ã©tÃ© lÃ©galement Ã©tablie . Il estime que le libellÃ© des motifs de cette dÃ©cision judiciaire est contraire Ã la prÃ©somption d'innoncence . parce que le tribunal s'est prononcÃ© sur le caractÃ¨re probable de sa culpabilitÃ© et n'a exposÃ© les faits qu'en se fondant sur les documents du dossier . En outre, sa culpabilitÃ© a Ã©tÃ© qualifiÃ©e de probable malgrÃ© la conclusion contraire de la juridiction de jugement . Aussi le requÃ©rant soutient-il qu'il y a eu en l'espÃ¨ce violation de l'article 6. paragraphe 2 . indÃ©pendamment du point de savoir si la prÃ©somption d'innocence exclut en tant que telle la possibilitÃ© d'imputer au prÃ©venu ses dÃ©bours aprÃ¨s une dÃ©cision de suspcndre la procÃ©dure .
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'une dÃ©cision du tribunal rÃ©gional de Br@me qui, 1. saisi d'un appel du ministÃ¨re public contre l'acquittement du requÃ©rant en premiÃ¨re instance, a suspendu les poursuites pour des raisons d'Ã©conomie de procÃ©dure et dÃ©cidÃ© de menre Ã la charge du requÃ©rant ses dÃ©bours car l'appel aurait sans doute Ã©tÃ© couronnÃ© de succÃ¨s . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que cette dÃ©cision, par sa motivation notamment . Ã©tait contraire au droit, garanti par l'article 6, paragraphe 2 . de la Convention . d'@tre â¢ prÃ©sumÃ© innocent jusqu'Ã ce que sa culpabilitÃ© ait Ã©tÃ© lÃ©galement Ã©tablie â¢ . 2 . Le Gouvernement a soulenu notantment qu'une dÃ©cision relative aux dÃ©bours prise Ã la suite d'une suspension des poursuites n'a rien Ã voir avec une apprÃ©ciation de la culpabilitÃ© du prÃ©venu et Ã©chappe donc totalement Ã l'article 6 . paragraphe 2 . La Commission rappelle cependant sa jurisprudence selon laquelle l'application de l'article 6, paiagraphe 2 : ne se limite pas aux cas oÃ¹ des poursuites pÃ©nales conduisent Ã dÃ©cider de la culpabilitÃ© du prÃ©venu par une condamnation ou un acquittement . La prÃ©somption d'innticence s'applique Ã©galement aux cas oÃ¹ les poursuites sont suspendues et notamment aux motifs invoquÃ©s par Ie tribunal compÃ©tent pour en dÃ©cider (cf . Ic rapport de la Commission du 8 octobre 1980 sur la requÃªte nÂ° 8269/78, Gusiav Adolf c/Autriche, confirmÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard par l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme le 26 mars 1982) . ou aux consÃ©quences de ceue dÃ©cision sur les dÃ©bours (cf . le rapport de la Commission du 6 mai 1981 sur la requâ¬te nÂ° bbb0/79 . Ludwig Minelli c/Suisse et les dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃ©tes nÂ° 6281/731Neubecker) et b650/74 (Liebig c/RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne) . D .R . 5, pp . 13 et 58) . II n'y a pas de raison d e
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ti Ã©carter de cette jurisprudence en l'espÃ¨ce et la requÃªte ne saurait donc Ãªtre rejetÃ©e pour inconipalibilitÃ© ratione niateriae avec les dispositimts dc la Convention, au sens de l'article 27 . paragraphe 2 . 3 . Cependant . si les faits de la cause peuvent, en tant que tels . Ãªtre examinÃ©s sous l'angle de l'article 6, paragraphe 2, de la Conventinn . la Comntission n'est pas appelÃ©e Ã dÃ©cider s'il v a ici apparence de riolatiun de cene disposition . Selon l'article 26 de la Convention en effet, elle ne peut Ãªtre saisie qu'aprÃ¨s l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, tel qu'il est entendu sclon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus . Or, en l'espÃ©ce, le requÃ©rant n'a pas satisfait Ã cette exigence, puisqu'il n'a pas fait usage de la possibilitÃ© de dÃ©poser un pou rv oi constitutionnel auprÃ¨s de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale . Contrairement Ã ce que soutient le requÃ©rant . la Commission estime que ceue possibilitÃ© constituait une voie de recours efficace en l'espÃ¨ce . En effeL la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale a reconnu Ã plusieurs reprises que le principe de la â¢prÃ©soniption d'innoncenceâ¢ est consacrÃ© par la loi fondantentale de la NÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale et a appliquÃ© cet arguntent non seulement aux affaires entpnrtant contrÃ´le de la conforniitÃ© d'une nornte juridique avec la Constitutinn (cf . l'affaire citÃ©e par le Goueernement dÃ©fendeur . BVerIGE 25 . 3 27) . inais aussi au cas oÃ¹ un particulier allÃ¨guc une mÃ©connaissance de ce principe dans un cas cuncret (cf . BVerfGE 22, p . 254 et l'arrÃ©t de la C'uur constit . 2 BVR 1/7 3 ) . Ceci montre bien utionelfÃ©drasieNcubkr que le jusiiciable mÃ©coutent d'une dÃ©cision judiciaire . qui serait selon lu i
coniraire Ã la prÃ©sotnptiun d'innoncence, peut en saisir la Cou r eonstitn~ianndle fÃ©dÃ©rale ntiine si . comme en IespÃ¨ce . il ne dÃ©sire pas contester la eonstituiiunnaliic de la rÃ©glenictuation lÃ©gale en tant que telle . Si l'intÃ©ressÃ© prÃ©tend qdunc disposition du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . eu l'occurrence l'article 467 . paragraphe 4, a Ã©tÃ© mal appliquÃ©e Ã son cas puisque . au mÃ©pris cle la prÃ©somptinn d'innocencs, il a Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© de supporter ses dÃ©bours, on ne saurait prÃ©tendre qu'il ne devrait se plaindre que des motifs et non du dispositif de la dÃ©cision judiciaire contcstÃ©e . Par ailleurs, ou ne saurait invoquer contre l'efficacitÃ© d'un pounoi constitutionnel l'argument selon lequel la Cour cunstitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale n'a jusqu'Ã prÃ©sent jantais constatÃ© de violation du principe constitutionnel de la prÃ©somption dinnocence . En effet, le nombre de fois oÃ¹ la Cour a Ã©tÃ© saisie ele ce problÃ©nte est trÃ¨s faible et ne permet pas de tirer des conclusions gÃ©nÃ©rales . En outre, les dÃ©cisions en question rentontent assez loin et aucune ne traitait d'une situation directentem contparable Ã celle de l'espÃ¨ce . Comme l'a fait remarquer Ã bon droit le Gnuvernement, les affaires publiÃ©es dans les recueils de jurisprudence concernaient en fait l'application de dispositions lÃ©gales diffÃ©rentes (plus prÃ©cisÃ©ment la premiÃ¨re version de l'article 467 dans BVcrfGE 22 . 254, et le paragraphe 1 de la nouvelle version dans BVerfGE 25 . 327) . La seule affaire connue relative Ã l'application de l'alinÃ©a 4 de l a
nouvelle version de l'article 467 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . c'es :-Ã -dire la disposition en cause en l'espÃ¨ce . est la dÃ©cision rendue dans l'affaire Neubecker (2BVR1/73) par un groupe de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale . La Cuntmission ne saurait souscrire Ã l'argument du Gouvernement selon Icquel ces dÃ©cisions n'ont absolument rien Ã voir avec le contexte de l'article 26 de la Convention . Elle doit cependant relever que la prÃ©sente affaire se distingue nettement de l'affaire Neubecker, tant en fait qu'en droit . En premier lieu . la dÃ©cision de suspendre la procÃ©dure en appel suivait cette fois un acquittement et non une condamnation en premiÃ¨re instance et se fondait sur des raisons d'Ã©conomie de procÃ©dure (Art . 154 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale). et non sur l'insignifiance de l'affaire (Art . 153) : elle n'exigeait pas le consentement de l'intÃ©ressÃ© . A cet Ã©gard . les faits de la prÃ©sente affaire sont donc comparables Ã ceux de la requÃªte n' 8408/78 . que la Commission a dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable pour dÃ©faut d'Ã©puisement des recours internes . Comme dans cette affaire-lÃ . la Commission relÃ©ve que la dÃ©cision ineriminÃ©e a Ã©tÃ© rendue longtemps aprÃ¨s que la Commission a dÃ©clarÃ© recevables les requÃ©tes n' 6281i73 (Neubecker) et 6650/74 (Liebig) .
II s'ensuit que le requÃ©rant n'a pas satisfait Ã la condition de l'Ã©puise . ntent des voies de recours internes prescri(e par l'article 26 de la Convention et que sa requite cloit donc Ã©tre rejelÃ©e confurntÃ©ntent Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3 . de la Convention . Par ces motifs . la Commissio n
DECLARE I .A RE,QUÃTE IRRECEVABLE .
- 152 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 13/07/1982Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page