Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/439/259
Timestamp: 2016-02-14 23:37:57
Document Index: 373600117

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 522', '§ 4']

Robert M. LALLI, Appellant, v. Rosamond LALLI, Administratrix of the Estate of Mario Lalli, et al. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews Robert M. LALLI, Appellant, v. Rosamond LALLI, Administratrix of the Estate of Mario Lalli, et al.
439 U.S. 259 (99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503)
Robert M. LALLI, Appellant, v. Rosamond LALLI, Administratrix of the Estate of Mario Lalli, et al.
[HTML] dissent, BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS
[HTML] Syllabus Appellant, assertedly the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli, who died intestate in New York, filed a petition for a compulsory accounting from appellee administratrix of the estate, claiming that he was entitled to inherit from Mario as his child. Appellee opposed the petition, arguing that even if appellant were Mario's child, he was not a lawful distributee of the estate because he had failed to comply with a New York statutory provision (§ 4-1.2) that in pertinent part allows an illegitimate child to inherit from his intestate father only if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the father's lifetime, entered an order declaring paternity. Appellant contended that his failure to obtain such an order during Mario's lifetime could not bar his inheritance because § 4-1.2 discriminated against him on the basis of his illegitimate birth in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant tendered evidence that he was Mario's child. The Surrogate's Court ruled that appellant was properly excluded as a distributee under § 4-1.2. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 264-276; 276; 276-277.
(b) The Illinois statute invalidated in Trimble (which, in addition to requiring the father's acknowledgment of paternity, required the legitimation of the child through intermarriage of the parents as a precondition to inheritance) eliminated "the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion of illegitimates claiming under their fathers' estates and case-by-case determination of paternity." But the single requirement at issue under § 4-1.2 is an evidentiary one; the marital status of the parents is irrelevant. Pp. 266-267.
This case presents a challenge to the constitutionality of § 4-1.2 of New York's Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law,
which requires illegitimate children who would inherit from their fathers by intestate succession to provide a particular form of proof of paternity. Legitimate children are not subject to the same requirement.
* Appellant Robert Lalli claims to be the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli who died intestate on January 7, 1973, in the State of New York. Appellant's mother, who died in 1968, never was married to Mario. After Mario's widow, Rosamond Lalli, was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate, appellant petitioned the Surrogate's Court for Westchester County for a compulsory accounting, claiming that he and his sister Maureen Lalli were entitled to inherit from Mario as his children. Rosamond Lalli opposed the petition. She argued that even if Robert and Maureen were Mario's children, they were not lawful distributees of the state because they had failed to comply with § 4-1.2,
Appellant conceded that he had not obtained an order of filiation during his putative father's lifetime. He contended, however, that § 4-1.2, by imposing this requirement, discriminated against him on the basis of his illegitimate birth in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellant tendered certain evidence of his relationship with Mario Lalli, including a notarized document in which Lalli, in consenting to appellant's marriage, referred to him as "my son," and several affidavits by persons who stated that Lalli had acknowledged openly and often that Robert and Maureen were his children.
the New York Court of Appeals, with two judges dissenting, adhered to its former disposition. In re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 400 N.Y.S.2d 761, 371 N.E.2d 481 (1977). It acknowledged that Trimble contemplated a standard of judicial review demanding more than "a mere finding of some remote rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate State purpose," 43 N.Y.2d, at 67, 400 N.Y.S.2d, at 762, 371 N.E.2d, at 482, though less than strictest scrutiny. Finding § 4-1.2 to be "significantly and determinatively different" from the statute overturned in Trimble, the court ruled that the New York law was sufficiently related to the State's interest in " 'the orderly settlement of estates and the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws,' " 43 N.Y.2d, at 67, 69-70, 400 N.Y.S.2d, at 763-764, 371 N.E.2d, at 482-483, quoting Trimble, supra, 430 U.S., at 771, 97 S.Ct., at 1465, to meet the requirements of equal protection.
The Illinois statute, however, was constitutionally flawed because, by insisting upon not only an acknowledgment by the father, but also the marriage of the parents, it excluded "at least some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men whose inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws." Id., at 771, 97 S.Ct., at 1465. We concluded that the Equal Protection Clause required that a statute placing exceptional burdens on illegitimate children in the furtherance of proper state objectives must be more " 'carefully tuned to alternative considerations,' " id., at 772, 97 S.Ct., at 1466, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, supra, 427 U.S., at 513, 96 S.Ct., at 2766, than was true of the broad disqualification in the Illinois law.
Under § 4-1.2, by contrast, the marital status of the parents is irrelevant. The single requirement at issue here is an evidentiary onethat the paternity of the father be declared in a judicial proceeding sometime before his death.
The child need not have been legitimated in order to inherit from his father. Had the appellant in Trimble been governed by § 4-1.2, she would have been a distributee of her father's estate. See In re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d at 68 n. 2, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 762 n. 2, 371 N.E.2d, at 482 n. 2.
The primary state goal underlying the challenged aspects of § 4-1.2 is to provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death.
We long have recognized that this is an area with which the States have an interest of considerable magnitude. Trimble, supra, 430 U.S., at 771, 97 S.Ct., at 1466; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S., at 170, 92 S.Ct., at 1404; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S., at 538, 91 S.Ct., at 1021; see also Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193, 59 S.Ct. 155, 158, 83 L.Ed. 119 (1938); Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490, 493, 12 L.Ed. 1168 (1850).
This interest is directly implicated in paternal inheritance by illegitimate children because of the peculiar problems of proof that are involved. Establishing maternity is seldom difficult. As one New York Surrogate's Court has observed: "The birth of the child is a recorded or registered event usually taking place in the presence of others. In most cases the child remains with the mother and for a time is necessarily reared by her. That the child is the child of a particular woman is rarely difficult to prove." In re Ortiz, 60 Misc.2d 756, 761, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (1969). Proof of paternity, by contrast, frequently is difficult when the father is not part of a formal family unit. "The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of a child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother. Indeed the mother may not know who is responsible for her pregnancy." Ibid. (emphasis in original); accord, In re Flemm, 85 Misc.2d 855, 861, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573, 576-577 (Surr.Ct.1975); In re Hendrix, 68 Misc.2d, at 443, 326 N.Y.S.2d, at 650; cf. Trimble, supra, 430 U.S., at 770, 772, 97 S.Ct., at 1465, 1466.
Thus, a number of problems arise that counsel against treating illegitimate children identically to all other heirs of an intestate father. These were the subject of a comprehensive study by the Temporary State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates. This group, known as the Bennett Commission,
consisted of individuals experienced in the practical problems of estate administration. In re Flemm, supra, 85 Misc.2d, at 858, 381 N.Y.S.2d, at 575. The Commission issued its report and recommendations to the legislature in 1965. See Fourth Report of the Temporary State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates, Legis.Doc. No. 19 (1965) (hereinafter Commission Report). The statute now codified as § 4-1.2 was included.
Although the overarching purpose of the proposed statute was "to alleviate the plight of the illegitimate child," Commission Report 37, the Bennett Commission considered it necessary to impose the strictures of § 4-1.2 in order to mitigate serious difficulties in the administration of the estates of both testate and intestate decedents. The Commission's perception of some of these difficulties was described by Surrogate Sobel, a member of "the busiest surrogate's court in the State measured by the number of intestate estates which traffic daily through this court," In re Flemm, supra, at 857, 381 N.Y.S.2d, at 574 (Sobel, S.), and a participant in some of the Commission's deliberations:
"An illegitimate, if made an unconditional distributee in intestacy, must be served with process in the estate of his parent or if he is a distributee in the estate of the kindred of a parent. . . . And, in probating the will of his parent (though not named a beneficiary) or in probating the will of any person who makes a class disposition to 'issue' of such parent, the illegitimate must be served with process. . . . How does one cite and serve an illegitimate of whose existence neither family nor personal representative may be aware? And of greatest concern, how achieve finality of decree in any estate when there always exists the possibility however remote of a secret illegitimate lurking in the buried past of a parent or an ancestor of a class of beneficiaries? Finality in decree is essential in the Surrogates' Courts since title to real property passes under such decree. Our procedural statutes and the Due Process Clause mandate notice and opportunity to be heard to all necessary parties. Given the right to intestate succession, all illegitimates must be served with process. This would be no real problem with respect to those few estates where there are 'known' illegitimates. But it presents an almost insuperable burden as regards 'unknown' illegitimates. The point made in the Bennett commission discussions was that instead of affecting only a few estates, procedural problems would be created for manysome members suggested a majority of estates." 85 Misc.2d, at 859, 381 N.Y.S.2d, at 575-576.
As the State's interests are substantial, we now consider the means adopted by New York to further these interests. In order to avoid the problems described above, the Commission recommended a requirement designed to ensure the accurate resolution of claims of paternity and to minimize the potential for disruption of estate administration. Accuracy is enhanced by placing paternity disputes in a judicial forum during the lifetime of the father. As the New York Court of Appeals observed in its first opinion in this case, the "availability of the putative father should be a substantial factor contributing to the reliability of the fact-finding process." In re Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d, at 82, 378 N.Y.S.2d, at 355, 340 N.E.2d, at 724. In addition, requiring that the order be issued during the father's lifetime permits a man to defend his reputation against "unjust accusations in paternity claims," which was a secondary purpose of § 4-1.2. Commission Report 266.
The administration of an estate will be facilitated, and the possibility of delay and uncertainty minimized, where the entitlement of an illegitimate child to notice and participation is a matter of judicial record before the administration commences. Fraudulent assertions of paternity will be much less likely to succeed, or even to arise, where the proof is put before a court of law at a time when the putative father is available to respond, rather than first brought to light when the distribution of the assets of an estate is in the offing.
Appellant contends that § 4-1.2, like the statute at issue in Trimble, excludes "significant categories of illegitimate children" who could be allowed to inherit "without jeopardizing the orderly settlement" of their intestate fathers' estates. Trimble, 430 U.S., at 771, 97 S.Ct., at 1465. He urges that those in his position"known" illegitimate children who, despite the absence of an order of filiation obtained during their fathers' lifetimes, can present convincing proof of paternity cannot rationally be denied inheritance as they pose none of the risks § 4-1.2 was intended to minimize.
The New York courts have interpreted § 4-1.2 liberally and in such a way as to enhance its utility to both father and child without sacrificing its strength as a procedural prophylactic. For example, a father of illegitimate children who is willing to acknowledge paternity can waive his defenses in a paternity proceeding, e. g., In re Thomas, 87 Misc.2d 1033, 387 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Surr.Ct.1976), or even institute such a proceeding himself.
N.Y. Family Court Act § 522 (McKinney Supp.1978); In re Flemm, 85 Misc.2d, at 863, 381 N.Y.S.2d, at 578. In addition, the courts have excused "technical" failures by illegitimate children to comply with the statute in order to prevent unnecessary injustice. E. g., In re Niles, 53 A.D.2d 983, 385 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1976), appeal denied, 40 N.Y.2d 809, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 360 N.E.2d 1109 (1977) (filiation order may be signed nunc pro tunc to relate back to period prior to father's death when court's factual finding of paternity had been made); In re Kennedy, 89 Misc.2d 551, 554, 392 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (Surr.Ct.1977) (judicial support order treated as "tantamount to an order of filiation," even though paternity was not specifically declared therein).
Even if, as Mr. Justice BRENNAN believes, § 4-1.2 could have been written somewhat more equitably, it is not the function of a court "to hypothesize independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternatives" to the statutory scheme formulated by New York. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S., at 515, 96 S.Ct., at 2767. "These matters of practical judgment and empirical calculation are for the State. . . . In the end, the precise accuracy of the State's calculations is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their detail beyond the evident consistency and substantiality." Id., at 515-516, 96 S.Ct. at 2767.
Two interests are said to justify this discrimination against illegitimates. First, it is argued, reliance upon mere formal public acknowledgments of paternity would open the door to fraudulent claims of paternity. I cannot accept this argument. I adhere to the view that when "a father has formally acknowledged his child . . . there is no possible difficulty of proof, and no opportunity for fraud or error. This purported interest in avoiding fraud . . . can offer no justification for distinguishing between a formally acknowledged illegitimate child and a legitimate one." Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 552, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 1028, 28 L.Ed.2d 288 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
I see no reason to retreat from our decision in Trimble v. Gordon. The New York statute on review here, like the Illinois statute in Trimble, excludes "forms of proof which do not compromise the State's interests." Trimble v. Gordon, supra, 430 U.S., at 772 n. 14, 97 S.Ct., at 1466 n. 14. The statute thus discriminates against illegitimates through means not substantially related to the legitimate interests that the statute purports to promote. I would invalidate the statute.