Source: http://fl.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190606_0000868.NFL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-06-04 02:15:58
Document Index: 780135192

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', 'art, 474', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

FindACase™ | Bryant v. Inch
Bryant v. Inch
CYNTHIA BRYANT, Petitioner,
MARK S. INCH, [1]Respondent.
This cause is before the court on Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1). Respondent filed an answer and relevant portions of the state court record (ECF No. 25). Petitioner filed a reply (ECF No. 27).
The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are established by the state court record (see ECF No. 25).[2] On June 7, 2013, Petitioner was indicted in the Circuit Court in and for Leon County, Florida, No. 2013-CF-1757, with one count of capital first degree premeditated murder (Ex. B1 at 6-7). On January 21, 2014, Petitioner filed, in open court, a waiver of her right to a twelve-peson jury, in exchange for the State's agreement not to seek the death penalty (see Id. at 44). On March 31, 2014, Petitioner entered a written plea agreement pursuant to which she agreed to enter a no contest plea to a reduced charge of second degree murder (a life felony) in exchange for a sentence of forty-five (45) years in prison with credit for 310 days (id. at 54-55). The same day, the court held a plea and sentencing hearing (id. at 83-97). The court conducted a colloquy, and found that Petitioner understood the nature of the charges against her and the consequences of her plea; that her decision to enter a plea was made freely and voluntarily; and that she was advised by a competent attorney (id. at 86-91). The trial court further found that there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea (id. at 91). The court accepted Petitioner's plea, adjudicated her guilty of second degree murder, and sentenced her in accordance with the plea agreement (id. at 56-64, 96).
Petitioner, through counsel, appealed the judgment to the Florida First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”), No. 1D14-1622 (Ex. B2). Petitioner's counsel filed a brief, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that counsel was unable to make a good faith argument that reversible error occurred in the trial court (id.). The First DCA provided Petitioner an opportunity to file a pro se initial brief (Ex. B3), but she did not do so. The First DCA affirmed the judgment per curiam without written opinion on December 18, 2014 (Ex. B4). Bryant-Penny v. State, 152 So.3d 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (Table). The mandate issued January 13, 2015 (Ex. B5).
On March 6, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief and supporting memorandum in the state circuit court, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. C1 at 1-14). On February 19, 2015, the state circuit court dismissed Ground One as legally insufficient, without prejudice to Petitioner's amending the claim within sixty days (id. at 15). Petitioner filed a timely amendment to Ground One (id. at 16-19). On December 3, 2015, the state circuit court entered an order summarily denying Grounds One, Two, and Four, and setting an evidentiary hearing on Ground Three (id. at 21-38). At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court orally pronounced its denial of Ground Three (id. at 45-77). On February 23, 2016, the court issued a final order denying the Rule 3.850 motion (id. at 39). Petitioner appealed the decision to the First DCA, No. 1D16-1369 (Ex. C2). The First DCA affirmed the lower court's decision per curiam without written opinion on March 30, 2017 (Ex. C4). Bryant v. State, 224 So.3d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (Table). The mandate issued April 25, 2017 (Ex. C5).
Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas action on September 7, 2017 (ECF No. 1).
Additionally, the Court has indicated that it is not enough that a petitioner makes a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the “substance” of such a claim to a state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982). In Anderson, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the habeas petition on the ground that a jury instruction violated due process because it obviated the requirement that the prosecutor prove all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 459 U.S. at 7 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)). The only manner in which the habeas petitioner cited federal authority was by referring to a state court decision in which “the defendant . . . asserted a broad federal due process right to jury instructions that properly explain state law.” Anderson, 459 U.S. at 7. On review by the Supreme Court, the Court expressed doubt that a defendant's citation to a state-court decision predicated solely on state law was sufficient to fairly apprise a reviewing court of a potential federal claim merely because the defendant in the cited case advanced a federal claim. Id., 459 U.S. at 7 and n.3. Furthermore, the Court clarified that such a citation was obviously insufficient when the record satisfied the federal habeas court that the federal claim asserted in the cited case was not the same as the federal claim on which federal habeas relief was sought. Id.
An issue that was not properly presented to the state court and which can no longer be litigated under state procedural rules is considered procedurally defaulted, that is, procedurally barred from federal review. See Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1999). This court will also consider a claim procedurally defaulted if it was presented in state court and rejected on the independent and adequate state ground of procedural bar or default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 734-35 and n.1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Caniff v. Moore, 269 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[C]laims that have been held to be procedurally defaulted under state law cannot be addressed by federal courts.”); Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1998) (applicable state procedural bar should be enforced by federal court even as to a claim which has never been presented to a state court); accord Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 210 (11th Cir. 1993); Parker v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1470 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 308, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991). In the first instance, the federal court must determine whether any future attempt to exhaust state remedies would be futile under the state's procedural default doctrine. Bailey, petitioner had never mentioned the federal standards regarding extraneous materials in his brief, but relied on state law for his arguments. Id. 172 F.3d at 1303. In the second instance, a federal court must determine whether the last state court rendering judgment clearly and expressly stated its judgment rested on a procedural bar. Id.
Id. Although a habeas petitioner asserting a convincing claim of actual innocence need not prove diligence to overcome a procedural bar, timing is a factor relevant in evaluating the reliability of a petitioner's proof of innocence. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 399, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013). As the Court stated in Schlup, “[a] court may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of [a petitioner's] affiants bear on the probable reliability of . . . evidence [of actual innocence].” 513 U.S. at 332; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006).
A. Ground One: “Petitioner's constitutional amendment right [sic] was violated where counsel failed to move for a continuance in order to determine Pet[itioner's] mental state.”
Ground Three: “Counsel was ineffective for failing to inform, investigate, and/or prepare defense [of] insanity, mental incompetence, thus denying her 6th U.S. Constitutional right.” [5]
In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that at the beginning of the plea proceeding, the court “discussed the Defendant's struggle to stabalize [sic] her medication” (ECF No. 1 at 5).[6] Petitioner alleges she had not been taking her medication for some time (id.). Petitioner alleges the court asked her if she had taken any medication, and she responded that she was not taking any medication (id.). Petitioner alleges this was “a clear indication of the Defendant's mental incompetence and failure to understand simply asked questions” (id.). Petitioner contends defense counsel should have requested a continuance of the plea hearing to permit her to be evaluated for mental competence (see ECF No. 27 at 2).
In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges she is diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, which causes separation of thought process and emotion, disorientation of reality accompanied by delusion and hallucination, fragmentation of the personality, motor disturbances, and bizarre behavior (ECF No. 1 at 8). Petitioner alleges both of her mental disorders are extremely severe (id.). She alleges defense counsel failed to inform her that her mental disorders were a viable defense to the murder charge (id.).
Respondent asserts Ground One is essentially the same claim Petitioner presented to the state courts as Amended Ground One of her Rule 3.850 motion, and it thus “appears” to be exhausted (ECF No. 25 at 7, 21-22). Respondent contends the state court's adjudication Ground One was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law (id. at 22-27).
With respect to Ground Three, Respondent contends this claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (“IATC”) is similar to the IATC claim presented as Ground Three in Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion, but the claims are dissimilar in that Petitioner did not cite the Sixth Amendment in her Rule 3.850 motion (ECF No. 25 at 9-11) (emphasis in original). Respondent further contends Petitioner's citation to a Florida state case, which in turn cited Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), was insufficient to fairly present her federal claim to the state courts (id.). Respondent contends Ground Three is thus unexhausted and procedurally defaulted (id.). Respondent argues even assuming Ground Three was not procedurally defaulted, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief, because the state court adjudicated the merits of the claim, and the court's adjudication was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law (id. at 34-41).
In Petitioner's reply, she argues she fairly presented Ground Three as a federal claim in state court by arguing that her claim was a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, even though she did not expressly cite the Sixth Amendment in her argument of Ground Three (ECF No. 27 at 2).
The court will first address Respondent's exhaustion defense as to Ground Three. The state court record shows that Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion presented four IATC claims (Ex. C1 at 1-7). Petitioner argued counsel's conduct was deficient, and it prejudiced the outcome of her case (id.). In Petitioner's Amended Ground One, she cited Strickland, and in her argument of Ground Two, she contended counsel's ineffective assistance violated her Sixth Amendment right (id. at 3, 17). Petitioner did not mention federal law in her arguments of Grounds Three and Four (see Id. at 4-6). In the state court's written order denying three of Petitioner's four IATC claims (Grounds One, Two, and Four), the court cited Strickland as the applicable legal standard (id. at 21). On appeal to the First DCA, Petitioner abandoned two IATC claims (Grounds Two and Four), but with respect to Grounds One and Three, she argued that the lower court's adjudication of those claims was erroneous under Strickland (Ex. C2 at 6-7).
The undersigned concludes that Petitioner alerted the state circuit court to the federal nature of all of her IATC claims, and she alerted the First DCA to the federal nature of those IATC claims she was appealing. Further, the state courts adjudicated the merits of the federal claims which Petitioner presented. Therefore, Petitioner satisfied the exhaustion requirement as to Grounds One and Three. The court will thus proceed with the next step of determining whether Petitioner has demonstrated that the last state court's adjudication of the merits of Grounds One and Three (in this case, it is the First DCA's decision in the post-conviction appeal) was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts, or was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
The two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) applies to claims that counsel was ineffective during the plea process. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) (applying Strickland's two-part test to federal habeas petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective for advising him to reject a plea offer); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 145, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (applying Strickland's two-part test to federal habeas petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a prosecution plea offer before it lapsed); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 48, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (applying Strickland's two-part test to defendant's challenge to his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel). Strickland's first prong requires a defendant to show “‘that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'” Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The focus of inquiry under the performance prong of the Strickland standard is whether counsel's assistance was “reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Strickland's second prong requires a defendant to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the context of pleas, “[t]he . . . ‘prejudice' requirement . . . focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
When a district court considers a habeas petition, the state court's findings of historical facts in the course of evaluating an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the presumption of correctness, while the performance and prejudice components are mixed questions of law and fact. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1197 (11th Cir. 1999). “Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). “Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As the court explained in Richter:
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest “intrusive post-trial inquiry” threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one. . . . .
Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential, ” id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and when the two apply in tandem, review is “doubly” so, Knowles [v. Mirzayance], 556 U.S. [111, ] 123, 129 S.Ct. [1411, ] 1420[, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)]. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. 556 U.S. at 123, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from trying or convicting a defendant who is mentally incompetent. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). The Supreme Court set the standard to be used in determining mental competency as whether a defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he [or she] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her].” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); see also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008).
In Drope, the Court elaborated as follows:
The import of our decision in Pate v. Robinson is that evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his [or her] demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated. That they are difficult to evaluate is suggested by the varying opinions trained psychiatrists can entertain on the same facts.
Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
The Eleventh Circuit has applied and expounded upon these standards. “[N]either low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with mental incompetence to stand trial.” Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). A Pate analysis must focus on “what the trial court did in light of what it then knew, [and] whether objective facts known to the trial court were sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency.” Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). A petitioner who makes a substantive competency claim, contending that she was convicted while mentally incompetent, “is entitled to no presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his or her incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.” James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992). This standard is in contrast to a petitioner who makes a procedural competency claim alleging that the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing after her competency was put at issue. To prevail on a procedural competency claim, “a petitioner must establish that the state trial judge ignored facts raising a ‘bona fide doubt' regarding the petitioner's competency to stand trial.” Id. at 1572 n.15 (citing Fallada, 819 F.2d at 1568). A petitioner who presents “clear and convincing evidence” which creates a “real, substantial and legitimate doubt” as to her competence is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her substantive competency claim. Medina, 59 F.3d at 1106 (quoting James, 957 F.2d at 1573). However, the standard of proof is high, and “the facts must positively, unequivocally, and clearly generate the legitimate doubt.” Card v. Singletary, 981 F.2d 481, 484 (11th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted). Relevant information may include evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, demeanor at trial, or prior medical opinion. See Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 1996).
A lifelong history of mental illness and emotional problems does not demonstrate incompetency without a specific showing of how these difficulties generated a substantial doubt as to the defendant's competency at the time in question. See Medina, 59 F.3d at 1106; Card, supra. Similarly, the fact that the accused is undergoing treatment with psychiatric drugs, while relevant, does not alone prove incompetence. See Sheley v. Singletary, 955 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (11th Cir. 1992). In order to establish incompetence, evidence must establish that the drugs affected the accused to the point that she could not effectively consult with her attorney and could not understand the proceedings. See Id. at 1439.
With respect to Ground One, trial counsel's failure to request a continuance of the plea hearing in order to have Petitioner mentally evaluated, the only fact Petitioner alleged in support of this claim was that her stating “No, ” when the trial court asked her if she was currently under the influence of any medication, should have indicated to counsel and the court that she was incompetent to proceed (see Ex. C1 at 17). Petitioner alleged:
Counsel, knowledge [sic] of Defendant's diagnosis of schizophrenia and severe bi-polar disorder, and his open discussion at plea hearing with Judge about her mental instability and the jail's struggle to medicate her correctly shows he cannot claim ignorance of her condition. Defendant shows a lack of understanding and easy confusion over a simple question. At this time, counsel should have requested the Court to reschedule the hearing until he set up further evaluation for Defendant's competency and his failure to do so meets the deficiency prong for ineffective assistance of counsel. This is counsel's specific act of omission, by letting proceedings continue after witnessing Defendant's incompetency. Someone who does not even know they are taking medications until they are told so is clearly incompetent.
(Ex. C1 at 17).
The state circuit court adjudicated Ground One as follows:
Defendant now brings four grounds alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on these claims, Defendant must establish that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. See Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 757 (Fla. 2007) (outlining standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Based on this legal framework, the Court will analyze Defendant's claims.
Defendant claims that counsel should have requested that the hearing be continued because she originally answered no to the Court's question of whether she was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or medication. The remainder of the colloquy regarding Defendant's mental state refutes this claim. Under oath Defendant affirmed her attorney's explanation to the Court that she was clear headed and had her medications well adjusted. Exh. 1 - pp. 4-5. As such, there was no basis for counsel to seek a continuance. Defendant cannot go behind her statements made under oath and the plea hearing. Davis v. State, 938 So.2d 555, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). This claim is denied.
(Ex. C1 at 21-22).
The transcript of Petitioner's plea colloquy is part of the state court record. Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, her statements during the colloquy did not indicate she was incompetent.
MR. CUMMINGS [defense counsel]: . . . At this time, Ms. Bryant is prepared to withdraw her previously entered written pleas, tender to the court a plea of no contest as charged to second degree murder. The State has agreed to waive the PRR [Prison Releasee Reoffender enhancement].
The agreement is for 45 years Department of Corrections, credit for 310 days served, whatever the court costs are, and I believe a PD fee of $100.
THE COURT: . . . Is that your understanding of what you're doing, Ms. Bryant?
THE COURT: Would you swear the defendant, please?
THE COURT: State your name for the record, please.
THE DEFENDANT: Cynthia Bryant.
THE COURT: And, Ms. Bryant, are you currently under the influence of any alcohol, drug, or medication?
THE COURT: It was my understanding you are taking some medications.
THE DEFENDANT: I took the medication this morning.
THE COURT: All right. Well, that's what we're trying to discuss. Have you taken anything other than what's been prescribed for you by a doctor?
THE COURT: Is that medication interfering with your ability to understand what's ...