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The Basic Structure and Democracy | Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy
Category Archives: The Basic Structure and Democracy
Posted by Gautam Bhatia in Basic features, Basic structure, Equality, Reservations/Affirmative Action, The Basic Structure and Democracy
basic structure, reservations
(This is a guest post by Nivedhitha K.).
The 103rd Constitutional amendment enables 10% reservation for the ‘economically weak’ of the forward caste. Prior to the amendment, the Indian Constitution only provided reservation for the ‘backward class’, where the determination of backward class was based on ‘caste’. Therefore, until recently, reservation has always been ‘caste-based’. The 103rd amendment revamps the structure of the equality code by enabling reservation solely based on ‘economic capacity’.
A Constitutional amendment can be struck down only if the basic structure of the Indian Constitution- as propounded in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala – is ‘damaged’. In this essay, I will analyse a series of cases that deal with the basic structure doctrine, and develop a working test to challenge Constitutional amendments. The 103rd Constitutional amendment will then be tested upon the evolved working test.
Concepts, Facets, and Conceptions
An analysis of a series of cases involving the basic structure doctrine, elucidates that the basic structure operates at three levels of abstraction: concept, facet, and conception. Consider the 99th Constitutional amendment, which substituted the NJAC in place of the collegium for the appointment of judges, and was challenged in the NJAC case. The five-judge bench struck down the amendment on the ground that ‘primacy of the judiciary’ in appointment of judges is an integral part of ‘independence of the judiciary’, which – in turn – is an integral part of the basic feature of democracy. Therefore a question of whether the ‘independence of the judiciary’ is damaged, was answered with reference to ‘primacy of the judiciary’. A similar three-level abstraction was made in the case of PUCL as well. Though the case did not involve the challenge of a Constitutional amendment, the observations in the case would be useful for our analysis. In the PUCL case, provisions of the Election Rules, 1961 that allowed a person who exercised NOTA to be identified, wre challenged on the ground of violation of secrecy of ballots. The bench while holding that the NOTA button is to be set up in the EVM, observed that secrecy of ballots was ‘fundamental’ to a free and fair election, which in turn is a basic feature of the Indian Constitution.
Therefore, three levels of abstraction could be identified through the PUCL case and the NJAC case. In the NJAC case, the abstraction is in the form of democracy –> independence of the judiciary –> primacy of the judiciary in judicial appointments. In the PUCL case, the abstraction is in the form of democracy –> free and fair elections –> secrecy of ballot. All the three levels of abstraction are a part of the basic structure. Through the remaining part of the essay, the three levels of abstraction will be termed as concept (‘democracy’), facet (‘independence of the judiciary’ and ‘free and fair elections’), and conception (‘primacy of the judiciary’ and ‘secrecy of ballots’).
A concept is a basic principle that governs the Constitution such as democracy, rule of law, secularism, federalism, and equality. They are broad principles that are usually identified with reference to preamble of the Indian Constitution. A facet is a particular aspect of the concept, which is independent of the structure of the Constitution. It is a means to the end of the ‘concept’, without which the concept would be nugatory. On the other hand, a conception is a subset of the facet, and a specific understanding of the facet that is Constitution-specific. A conception could exist in different forms, of which, a few might form a part of the basic structure and few might not. For instance, in the case of RC Poudyal, an amendment was challenged on the ground of violation of the one person- one vote conception. The court observed that alteration of the one person- one vote conception would not damage the basic feature of democracy since different conceptions of democracy could exist. However, certain conceptions might be fundamental to the concept within the constitutional framework, an alteration of which will damage the concept (which is a basic feature). This position was elucidated in the PUCL case, wherein it was observed that the conception of ‘secrecy of votes’ is fundamental in a ‘constituency-based election’, and not in a ‘proportional representation system’. In Poudyal, the conception was not a basic feature, while in PUCL the conception was a basic feature. Therefore, conceptions may or may not be fundamental to the concept. If it is the former- it is a basic feature, else it is not.
Crucially, how are facets and conceptions that are basic features identified? Though all basic features are identified through judicial recognition, the degree of intervention (for identification) differs. Facets can be identified through (what I define as) the “manifestation and interpretation” approach, and the conceptions by the “interpretation approach” alone. According to the manifestation approach, the facet is ‘per se’ a clear understanding of the concept. For instance, the identification of free and fair election as an integral part of democracy, did not involve a lot of jurisprudential debate. However, certain facets are either in their nascent stage of jurisprudential development, or are subject to conflicting views. For instance, the jurisprudence surrounding equality were undergoing evolution, until MN Thomas, where both formal and substantive equality were recognised as facets of equality. In such cases, it would not be appropriate to identify facets (that are basic features) through the manifestation approach; instead the interpretation approach is to be used. Through the interpretation approach, a two prong test is to be undertaken. Firstly, judicial pronouncements should have held that they are facets of the concept, and secondly, those facets should have been recognised as basic features, expressly or through necessary implication.
On the other hand, a conception is identified solely through judicial interpretation, because these are Constitution specific. In order to determine as to whether a conception is a basic feature, an in-depth analysis is to be undertaken. The judiciary would decide with regard to the structure of the Constitution, provisions and the silences of the Constitution. Let me explain this through an example. Federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution; the autonomy – in principle – of the constituent units is a facet of federalism (‘per se’ aspect of federalism). Conceptions of federalism are numerous. One conception is that the residuary power is to belong to the centre, while another conception is that it shall belong to the state; the centre could hold consultations with the constituent units (state), before implementing an international obligation, or might not hold consultations. Each of these conceptions are Constitution-specific. In India, the conception of the centre holding the residuary power is a part of the concept of Indian federalism, which might not be for the US. Similarly, consultations with the state on state subjects, that the international obligation covers, maybe a conception that is integral in Australia, but not in India. Therefore, unlike identification of facets, a Constitution-specific approach will have to be undertaken to identify the conceptions. As stated above, a conception may or may not be a basic feature. A conception (after identification through a Constitution-specific approach) will be a basic feature, only if it is integral to the functioning of the facet. In order to identify as to whether it is integral to a facet, judicial pronouncements and structure of the Constitution shall be used as an aid. So, if conceptions violate the facet, they will be unconstitutional. If they are not violative of the facet, they might or might not be basic features- depending on how integral they are to the facet.
Judicial pronouncements to identify a Basic Feature
In order to identify conceptions and facets that are basic features through judicial pronouncements, it is first to be established that judicial pronouncements could be used to identify basic features. Judicial pronouncements have been used to identify basic features, and to test the violation of basic structure in the past. Y V Chandrachud J, in the election case, addressed the question of whether excluding the election of the prime minister and the speaker from the ambit of judicial review would violate the basic feature of equality. To conclude that it violated the basic structure, he tested the provision on the intelligible differentia classification test propounded in Anwar Ali Sarkar. This approach was followed in I. R Coelho as well. Y K Sabharwal CJ while delivering the decision observed, “The Constitution is a living document. The constitutional provisions have to be construed having regard to the march of time and the development of law. It is, therefore, necessary that while construing the doctrine of basic structure due regard be had to various decisions which led to expansion and development of law” (paragraph 42). He analysed the transformation undergone by Article 21 from AK Gopalan to Maneka Gandhi, and held that broad interpretations must be used to identify any abridgment of the basic structure.
Finally, in the NJAC case, a submission was made that a basic feature could be identified only through plain reading of the provisions of the Constitution. Khehar CJ disagreed with the submission and observed that the basic feature is to be identified by reading original plain provisions and the interpretation placed on it by the courts. He observed, “In the above view of matter, it would neither be legal nor just to persist on an understanding of the provision(s) concerned merely on the plain reading thereof as was suggested on behalf of the respondents. Even on a plain reading of Article 141, we are obligated to read the provisions of the Constitution in the manner they have been interpreted by this court” (paragraph 299). The second judges and the third judges’ case had read ‘consultation’ with the judiciary in appointment of judges to mean ‘concurrence’. This conception – i.e., that judicial independence required judicial primacy in appointments – that was established through interpretation was regarded as a part of the basic structure in the NJAC judgment.
Facets of Equality are Basic Features
Having established that judicial interpretations could be used to determine whether a facet or a conception is a basic feature, I will now establish that egalitarian equality and formal equality are facets of equality, and are basic features of the Constitution. Before addressing this question, a preliminary question of whether fundamental rights can be a part of the basic structure is to be answered. The general perception is that Kesavananda Bharati held fundamental rights to not be a part of the basic structure. However, in IR Coelho, Khanna J’s judgment in Kesavananda Bharati was construed to hold that fundamental rights are a part of the basic structure, and it was the right to property that was held not to be a basic feature. Hence the majority in the Kesavananda Bharati case – as interpreted in Coelho – did regard fundamental rights as a part of the basic structure.
Equality has been recognised as a basic feature in quite a few cases. In Ashoka Kumar Thakur, Balakrishnan CJ observed, ‘the principle of equality cannot be completely taken away so as to leave the citizens in this country in a state of lawlessness’ (paragraph 119). Similarly, in the case of M. Nagaraj, it was held that ‘equality is the essence of democracy and, accordingly a basic structure of the Constitution’ (Paragraph 27). Likewise, a portion of Article 329A was struck down for its violation of the basic feature of equality in the election case by Y V Chandrachud J. Therefore, equality (which is a concept) is a part of the basic structure.
I now aim at establishing that substantive equality and formal equality are facets of the concept of equality, and are basic features of the Constitution. A facet, as explained above, is a means to the end of concept, which is Constitution independent. In the case of MN Thomas, substantive equality and formal equality were held to be facets of equality, after a decade of jurisprudential arguments surrounding the subject. But the facets were not ‘clear manifestations’ of equality, which is clear from the fact that it was evolved after a dozen cases had debated on the issue. Therefore, in order to establish that the facets are basic features, the interpretation approach is to be used. The two-pronged test is applied. Firstly, judicial interpretation must have regarded equality and substantive equality as facets of equality. This test is fulfilled, with reference to MN Thomas. The second test is that the facets should have been held to be a basic feature, expressly or through necessary implication. The essence test, and the judgment in Nagaraj and Indra Sawhney will be used to identify that facets of substantive and formal equality are a part of the basic structure by necessary implication.
The ‘essence test’ was propounded in IR Coelho and accepted in NJAC. It was observed in IR Coelho, “It cannot be held that the essence of the principle behind Article 14 is not a part of the basic structure. In fact, the essence or principle of the right or nature of violation is more important than the equality in the abstract or formal sense” (Paragraph 109). The essence of equality as provided in the Constitution is its ability to provide for both substantive and formal equality. In Nagaraj, a question arose as to whether providing for consequential seniority in reservations pertaining promotions would violate the basic structure. The amendment was tested on whether Art 16(1) was violated. The bench held that it cannot be said that the insertion of the concept of ‘consequential seniority’ abrogated the structure of Art 16(1). Further, in the case of Indra Sawhney (2000), it was held that if the creamy layer is not excluded from the ambit of reservation, then it would amount to treating unequal’s equally, violating Art 14 and 16(1) – the basic features of the Constitution (paragraph 65 and 27). Though it was not expressly observed that Art 16(1) which provides for substantive equality is a basic feature of the Constitution, the same could be construed through necessary implication because the amendments were tested on Art 16(1) for violation of the basic structure doctrine. Formal equality has been expressly recognised as a basic feature in Indra Sawhney as it was held that non exclusion of the creamy layer would amount to treating unequals equally(which is a principle guiding formal equality).
Therefore, through the above observations, it is proved that substantive and formal equality are facets of equality, and are basic features of the Constitution.
The Alteration Test
It has been argued by Gautam Bhatia, that only if the entire equality code is abrogated would there be a violation of the basic structure doctrine, and the parliament is qualified to prescribe different forms of equality. Bhatia’s argument is based on the Nagaraj judgment, wherein the constitutional validity of Art 16(4A) and Art 16(4 B) was in question. In Nagaraj, the revamp of the equality code was upheld because it was regarded that none of the conceptions that were basic features were altered. It was observed that the substitution of consequential seniority in place of the catch up rule was not violative of the basic feature of equality, because the catch up rule was not a constitutional requirement, but was judicially evolved through ‘service jurisprudence’. However, other judicially evolved conceptions such as the 50% ceiling limit, the concept of creamy layer, compelling reason of backwardness, inadequacy of representation, and overall administrative efficiency were regarded as constitutional requirements. Therefore, Nagaraj was an attestation that alteration of a conception that is a basic feature would violate the basic structure of the constitution- it was just that none of the conceptions that were altered in Nagaraj were regarded as basic features.
It may also be argued that Balakrishnan CJ in Ashok Kumar Thakur observed, “the principle of equality cannot be completely taken away so as to leave the citizens in this country in a state of lawlessness. But the facets of the principle of equality could always be altered especially to carry out the directive principles of state policies” (Paragraph 119). This objection would not hold good for two reasons. Firstly, in the instant case, the facet of equality- as in this case substantive equality- itself is a basic feature. Secondly, the observation was made on the premise that ‘abrogation’ of the basic structure and not ‘alteration’ is the test to determine the violation of the basic structure.
However, Madan Lokur J, in the NJAC judgment, correctly clarified that the Kesavananda Bharati case did not propound the abrogation test, but rather propounded the ‘alteration test’. He observed, “the Bench that decided Kesavananda Bharati were of the opinion that it is enough to declare a constitutional amendment as violating the basic structure if it alters the basic structure. Undoubtedly, some of the learned judges, have used very strong words in the course of their judgment, etc. But when it came to stating what is the law actually laid down, the majority decided that “Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution” (Paragraph 797). The reading down of the NJAC amendment was primarily because of the substitution of alteration test in place of the abrogation test.
Consolidating my arguments above, basic structure exists in three levels of abstraction – concept, facet, and conception. A facet is either identified through the manifestation approach or the interpretation approach. If the facet cannot be identified manifestly, because the jurisprudence surrounding it is subject to differing views, then the interpretation approach is to be used. Through the interpretation approach, it is not sufficient if it is proved that they are facets of the concept, but it must also be proved that the facets are basic features. Using this approach, it was established that both formal and substantive equality are facets of equality, and are basic features. I then explained the possibility (and necessity) of identifying basic features through principles established by judicial interpretations; this argument helped in establishing that the facet of substantive equality is a basic feature. The golden triangle of Articles’ 14, 19 and 21, which invokes the test of arbitrariness, has also received the stamp of a basic feature in the cases of M. Nagaraj and Coelho. In Nagaraj, it was held that the test of ‘reasonableness’ is a basic feature. Therefore, the 103rd constitutional amendment would now be tested for violation of the basic feature of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘formal and substantive equality’.
The test of arbitrariness and Formal Equality
Three impacts arise on the inclusion of Articles’ 15(6) and 16(6), which strike at arbitrariness and substantive equality. Firstly, through the amendment, ‘economically weaker section’ of the forward castes and the members of the backward class are treated at par with each other by providing them with reservation. A person belonging to the backward class under Article 15(4) is disadvantaged on three parameters- social, economic and educational. On the other hand, the class introduced under Article 15(6) would only be disadvantaged economically.
Secondly, explanation to Article 15(6) states that the ‘economically weaker section’ shall be notified by virtue of ‘family income’. If a threshold limit is prescribed to determine the family income, then a person who falls below the poverty line and a person who falls below the prescribed threshold but above the poverty line would be treated alike.
Thirdly, Article 16(6) provides for reservation in jobs for the economically weaker section without any requirement of proving the ‘adequacy’ of representation, while on the other hand Article 16(4) states that a person belonging to backward class, to be eligible for reservation, has to prove that his class is not adequately represented. Therefore, for a person to be eligible for reservation under Art 16(4), he will have an extra obstacle to surpass, unlike the reservation provided under Art 16(6).
Any positive steps that are taken to provide for egalitarian equality must be guided by the principle underlying formal equality- which is to treat equals equally, and unequal’s unequally. Through the first two effects, two unequally placed classes are treated equally, violating the basic structure of formal equality. All the three effects would fail the test of arbitrariness that runs through the golden triangle as well.
Violation of Substantive Equality
My next argument against the constitutionality of the 103rd amendment is that it violates the basic feature of substantive equality. Let us now go back to the three levels of abstraction of basic structure- concept, facet and conception. Art 16(4) and 15(4), which permit reservation in educational institutions and jobs on the basis of caste are conceptions of substantive equality since it is one of the forms of achieving substantive equality under the Indian Constitution. Without going into the question of whether the conception of ‘reservation solely on the basis of caste’ is a basic feature, we will analyse as to whether reservation solely based on economic criteria (which is a conception of equality (and substantive equality)), is a basic feature. Recall the first section, wherein I explained that certain conceptions are basic features and a few are not. To identify if they are basic features, judicial pronouncements shall be taken into consideration. Reference is made to the nine-judge bench decision in Indra Sawhney for this purpose. The bench made two observations on using economic determinants for the purpose of reservation. Firstly, economic criteria cannot be solely used to determine ‘backward classes’ under Art 16(4). Secondly, reservation solely based on economic criteria will not be permitted under Art 16(1). The first observation would not be of support to our case since the observation was made with regard to a specific class- the ‘backward class’- which cannot be imported to a different class that has been created (the economically weak class). However, the second observation would support our case. The observation surely restricts executive and legislative actions to provide reservation purely based on economic criteria. But my contention is that the conception of ‘prohibiting reservation solely on economic criteria’ is a basic feature. This conclusion is arrived at on basis of the interpretation approach with the aid of MN Thomas.
The Supreme Court in MN Thomas held that Art 16(4) is not an exception to Art 16(1), but is one of the methods for achieving equality under Art 16(1). Art 16(1) prescribes substantive equality, wherein positive actions are to be taken to establish factual equality. Therefore, 16(1) prescribes the facet of equality – substantive equality, and Article(s) 16(4) and (the impugned) 16 (6) are conceptions of substantive equality. Conception of substantive equality can only exist to the extent of which is permissible under Art 16(1) (the facet) since Art 16(1) is an all-encompassing provision- with regard to reservation in jobs. Any observation on Art 16(1), would hence be applicable to the different conceptions of reservation. Therefore, if reservation based on economic capacity cannot be brought under Art 16(1), it cannot be included through 16(6).A conception that alters the facet (substantive equality) which is basic feature, violates the basic structure doctrine. Therefore, by reading Indra Sawhney and MN Thomas together, a conception that reservation shall not be solely based on economic criteria is established. Since the 103rd amendment alters this conception and it is to be struck down.
Hence, the 103rd amendment is unconstitutional, for it alters the facets of formal equality and substantive equality, and violates the test of arbitrariness.
Posted by Gautam Bhatia in Ambedkar, Article 14, Basic structure, Constituent Assembly Debates, Constitutional History, Equality, Local Government (Panchayati Raj), Suffrage, The Basic Structure and Democracy
ambedkar, panchayti raj, representation, suffrage
Basic Structure – VIII: Conclusion (of sorts)
Posted by Gautam Bhatia in Basic structure, The Basic Structure and Democracy
basic structure, democracy
Over the last few of posts, we have examined the basic structure doctrine as enunciated and developed by the Indian Supreme Court. There are two broad questions before us: first, from an external point of view, it is principally justified for the judiciary to impose substantive limitations upon the power of the Parliament to amend a written Constitution? The external question is further divided into two further questions: is there anything in the Constitution that supports this doctrine? And what – if it exists – is the philosophical justification for it? And secondly, from an internal point of view, is the manner in which these limitations have been imposed by the Court consistent and coherent with the principled justifications? In the process, we have discussed the two basic types of objections that have been raised against the doctrine and which, indeed, are standard objections against any Constitutional doctrine: first, that what the doctrine seeks to accomplish is morally illegitimate, as it violates the principle of our understandings of democracy; and secondly, as the doctrine itself lacks a firm Constitutional basis, it is constitutionally illegitimate.
These questions are important because, at the very least, it is undeniable that the basic structure doctrine confers wide-ranging powers upon the Court. And at the end of the day, such powers need to be justified on grounds firmer than the technical meaning of the word “amend”. They need to be justified upon the same grounds that justify our Constitution itself – popular sovereignty, republicanism, representative democracy, and so on.
We began by considering a non-majoritarian understanding of both democracy and individual rights, one that understands democracy itself as predicated upon the guarantee of basic rights as essential checks upon the powers of majoritarian institutions such as the Parliament. This naturally raised the question: who should determine and enforce these limitations? The logical answer is a non-majoritarian institution which, in our culture, is the Court.
We then considered a second justification that, unlike the substantive-rights argument, focuses on process. It holds that the framing of the Constitution was the culmination of a heightened, lengthy and sustained process of public engagement (through the freedom struggle) which, because of the depth of involvement of the people, is a “higher form of lawmaking” than the ordinary legislative and amendment processes – and that therefore, the values entrenched by that process can be preserved from change until another similar process comes along. In this context, we located Indira Gandhi’s actions in the 70s as a failed constitutional moment – one that attempted to make changes as far-reaching as the framing, but failed to have this vision accepted by the People.
Subsequently, we examined the textual, historical and structural bases given to the doctrine by the Supreme Court, and inquired whether the doctrine that emerged as a result of this was consistent with the principled justifications argued for earlier. It was found that but for the glaring example of federalism, both approaches yielded largely the same results. We focused on the manner the doctrine has been developed, i.e. the highly abstract formulation of basic features, and the Court’s refusal to provide a complete list of the same. We found that there were good reasons for holding that this practical operation of the basic structure is fully consistent with the principles that justify the doctrine in the first place, as it leaves the widest possible room for the legislature to operate, and also averts the nightmare of inflexible rigidity.
And lastly, we considered a third approach to justification, one that seeks to avoid the pitfalls of both the substantive approach (an intuitive laundry-list of rights that just seem important) and the procedural approach (no ultimate constraints on the majority). We argued that if our system of government, a representative democracy, is to be truly effective, there must exist a structure of meaningful dialogue and deliberation, through which individual preferences are formed, modified, modulated and transformed, and ultimately expressed in public decisions. Meaningful dialogue itself presupposes a broad right of free speech, a rough parity between the participants (equality), an umpiring of the process itself (judicial review), participation (republican democracy) – that is, many of the basic features. The basic structure doctrine, then – which we saw is even implicated by the common law – provides a structural framework of constraint upon the democratic process, that makes it meaningful and worthwhile to engage in the process in the first place.
In summation, therefore, there exist arguments – perhaps not dispositive, but good arguments nonetheless – that the basic structure doctrine is justified on the following three broad levels: first, its existence, as a matter of political and moral principle; secondly, its enforcement, in terms of the institutional authority (the judiciary) responsible for its enunciation and development; and thirdly, its application, that is, the manner in which the judiciary has applied it.
Therefore, we can – tentatively – conclude by submitting that the basic structure doctrine should not necessarily be viewed as a vague and imponderable chimera used by a tyrannical judiciary to arrogate supreme State power to itself, and as a weapon to destroy the foundations of democracy. It need not even necessarily be viewed as a necessary evil, a counter-majoritirian check to correct the worst excesses of democracy, but a regrettable restriction nonetheless. In the last analysis, the basic structure is – plausibly – an essential aspect of democracy itself, a set of constraints that makes democracy work.
Does that mean that everything is perfect? Of course not, because the workings of the basic structure are left to judges who are, after all, fallible human beings. So far, the judiciary has shown both restraint and wisdom in its handing of the basic structure doctrine, but of course, there is no guarantee that it will always be so. Yet if our judges occasionally go wrong, as they are bound to, if at times their decisions stultify the scope of Parliamentary action more than is necessary or called for, it is only the inevitable cost we must bear for vesting ultimate State power in fallible human beings. The basic structure doctrine seeks to achieve a fine balance between majoritarianism, democracy, separation of powers, and basic individual rights. By the very virtue of its complexity, its implementation can never be perfect; but then, as Aristotle understood so long ago, nothing ever can.
Basic Structure – VI: Introducing Deliberative Democracy
basic structure, deliberative democracy, dualist democracy, majoritarianism
The basic structure doctrine permits unelected judges to impose near-permanent checks upon parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. Recall that we have proposed two philosophical defences that render this doctrine compatible with democracy as we understand it. The first – and let us call this the substantive defense – posits an expanded idea of democracy, one that guarantees equal concern and respect to all members of a polity, and that therefore accords legitimacy to majoritarian decision-making procedures only insofar as these procedures respect certain basic individual rights without which equal concern and respect cannot genuinely be said to exist. The second – and let us call this the procedural defense – distinguishes between different levels of lawmaking, and accord degrees of legitimacy to these levels depending upon the scope, depth and duration of popular public engagement (e.g., very simply, a constitutional amendment is a higher form of lawmaking than normal legislation). This theory then argues that lawmaking at higher levels can only be changed or amended by another process that occurs at that level – i.e., through at least the same degree of public participation. The procedural theory concludes by arguing that the basic principles of the Constitution, coming as they did upon a long, sustained and highly popular independence movement, are entrenched from change until a similar movement comes along again.
I will suggest that while both these defenses capture certain valuable insights about what it is that we find attractive about the basic structure (at least those of us who support it), they are also fundamentally inadequate qua defenses, because each ignores or excludes the insights of the other. I will then propose an argument that will attempt to incorporate the better parts of each.
The substantive approach captures the idea that there is nothing inherently valuable about a majoritarian decision-making process. As Berlin observed long ago, it doesn’t really matter to me if my house is confiscated by a majority or by a despot. No, the reason why we value majoritarian procedures must be because they often give us the right answer. But in that case, the rightness of the answer must be independent of the process used to arrive at it – that is, the value of the process is instrumental, not substantive. And then, logically, what we need to do is to figure out what the right answer or answers are, and allow the majoritarian process free play only within the bounds of the answers. The substantive view of democracy locates the rights answers in certain core, individual rights, and ensures their protection against the popular process.
The problem, however, with the substantive vision of democracy is that it gives us very little to go by in the way of what individual rights ought to be protected. Indeed, it seem to come down, in the end, to simply intuition: we intuit that free speech, freedom of conscience, equality and so on – are vitally important rights that must be protected. But history teaches us that other men and women in times past have held very different views, and so, quite certainly, will other men and women in times to come (the manner in which the right to property went from being a fundamental right to a mere statutory right is a stark example of how the place of rights in our constitutional culture can radically transform itself within a couple of generations). Leaving these rights to be determined by a few judges, themselves often drawn from the elite and therefore inclined to share in its prejudices and blind spots, seems to be especially intolerable.
On the other hands, the procedural defense confirms another of our deeply-held convictions: that there is a value to the popular decision-making process, that there is some fundamental difference between an elected legislature guaranteeing the freedom of speech, and a despot making the same guarantee. That value is not hard to find: it is the value of self-government, the idea that I am bound by a law even though I disagree with it, because it is, in some sense, my law. But if that is the case, then the procedural defense needs to explain how the process serves that value, and why a process that regularly and repeatedly leads to deeply unjust results (especially as far as dissidents and minorities are concerned), deserves some kind of inherent legitimacy. The higher-lawmaking ideal, that simply deepens and extends the process, will not solve our problem, because our problem isn’t one of degree, but of structure: we do think that outcomes matter, no matter who reaches them and how they are reached.
In other words, process matters and outcomes matter. This, then, is our challenge: we must avoid the twin perils of imposing-intuited-rights-from-on-high and unconstrained majoritarianism (and that includes supermajoritarianism), and the only way to do this is to provide a value-laden account of the majoritarian process that could well modify or change it in important ways, but must keep its essence intact. I suggest that one way of meeting the challenge is by invoking the idea of deliberative/dialogic democracy.
Deliberative democracy has a rich intellectual tradition; the ideas of the great German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, provide its fount, and lately, it has been developed in many interesting directions by theorists such as Seyla Benhabib, James Fishkin, Joshua Cohen, and so on. It is not, obviously, my intention here to provide a full-scale analysis of the divergent traditions of deliberative democracy. I can only provide a highly impressionistic account, moulded as I understand it to apply to the basic structure doctrine, that may or may not be consistent with any one school of thought. Interested readers may follow up by browsing the works of these scholars, all of whom repay close study.
As the name suggests, deliberative democracy finds the value of the democratic process in the idea of deliberation – that is, a structured arena (call this the “public sphere”) in which people come together, communicate, deliberate or discuss matters important to them, and come to decisions. The key insight that deliberative democracy seeks to capture is that we do not come into this world as atomized individuals with a set of pre-set preferences and identified interests, but rather, these preferences and interests are shaped and formed through our communications with each other. And at the end of an open and fair deliberative process, in which participants have been placed on an equal footing, and been provided equal opportunities to contribute to both individual and group preferences-formation, the collective decision that is reached is, in a sense, by virtue of the fairness of the process that led to it, our decision. In this way, deliberative democracy aims to conform to the ultimate ideal of self-government, and justify to us why laws arrived at through a certain procedure enjoy an inherent – at least prima facie – legitimacy.
Intuitively, this makes sense. But what this also means is that the deliberative procedure must be subjected to certain constraints if it is to fulfill its own goals. To take the simplest example: a deliberative procedure in which half the people are not allowed to speak is self-contradictory: any preferences or interests formed as a result of this process, and any decisions arrived at, are illegitimate because not only did one half of the population have no opportunity to communicate their points of view to others, but the process, as a whole, is incomplete, and any preference or interest-formation is partial at best. And thus we see how we derive a strong right of free expression from the logic of deliberative democracy.
Now what other constraints are placed upon the deliberative process is a matter for debate – for instance, it could be argued that religious neutrality is essential, because religions with their claim to revealed truth are fundamentally anti-deliberative. But the details of the theory may be fleshed out later. What I want to suggest here is the following: the basic structure doctrine is legitimate because it forms the essential structural framework within which the democratic process attains inherent value. A quick look at some of the basic features reveals that they are, for the most part – at least plausibly – connected with this goal: democracy, republicanism, free speech, secularism (see above) equality (a deliberative process, naturally, cannot be legitimate if some of its participants are treated as less worthy than others, and therefore, their contributions given less weight), and judicial review (umpiring the process). I admit that federalism has no place in this scheme, and insofar as the Court has upheld federalism to be part of the basic structure, that is a mistake.
How does deliberative democracy solve the problems with the two approaches we discussed above? First, the values that it protects are not some set of individual rights arrived at through introspection and intuition, but part of the logic of representative democracy itself, the system of government by which we all claim to live. But at the same time, it does explicitly identify values, and seeks to protect them. In this way, deliberative democracy captures the importance of both process and outcome by constraining and structuring the process in such a way that the outcomes can be traced back to certain important values, and thus enjoy presumptive legitimacy.
To the objection that the value I place upon deliberation is itself simply intuited, I plead guilty – there is no Archimedean point outside the circle, but I can only re-emphasize that the project we are engaged in is to locate the value that we think exists in our accepted system of government, that is, representative democracy based on the idea of majoritarian (or super-majoritarian) decision making processes. Deliberative democracy helps us to do that.
Lastly, what are the prescriptive implications of this theory? Simply this: that the Courts should keep in mind, when adjudicating upon a basic structure claim, that their role is to act as umpires of the continuing legitimacy of the democratic process, to enforce the structural conditions within which democracy is meaningful, and has value. The determination of these structural conditions themselves is a task for the individual judge, although some of the ideas listed here – and in the literature – can serve as good signposts. Beyond that, we can do no more than to trust to the good sense and intellectual humility of our judiciary, and at least as far as the basic structure doctrine goes, based on the evidence I highlighted in the previous posts, I would suggest that our trust has not yet been betrayed.
Basic Structure – II: The Argument from Democracy
basic structure, berlin, democracy, dworkin, hamilton, majoritarianism, sathe, the federalist papers
Let us now consider some possible arguments in defense of the basic structure doctrine. I will commence with political and philosophical defenses – are there principles that justify substantive limitations upon parliament’s amending authority? In what follows, I list various potential principles. (While I do not necessarily agree with them, I will nonetheless try to state them in their strongest form.)
The argument is extended by Professor Marneffe, who points out that the test of violation of democracy must be one of impact. If, therefore, the Court protects only those fundamental and basic rights that are essential to democracy as we understand it, and leaves all other political decisions to the legislature, this would not be undemocratic in impact.
A necessary question then arises: who determines the content of those basic principles and values that lie beyond the power of the majority? For reasons explained above, the power cannot lie with the Parliament. For the same reasons, it cannot lie with the executive. Therefore, within the framework of separation of powers, the judiciary must be the authority within which this power is vested. To this argument by default, it may be added out of the three wings of State, the judiciary is undoubtedly and by far, the weakest. Unlike the legislature and the executive, the judiciary cannot take any positive action, it holds neither the “sword, nor the purse strings” (see Hamilton in Federalist 78), and the maximum impact it can have upon the society is negligible, as compared to the other wings. Therefore, it may be argued that ex majore cautela, the judiciary is the ideal organ within which to vest the highest power of the State (of overruling the decisions of the popular majority), as it has the least ability to abuse that power and all the vast implications that it carries. While in Kesavananda, the judges in the majority conceded that the “possibility of abuse” of the amendment power had no bearing upon determining its scope and the limitations – it nonetheless seems obvious that when deciding the question of whether the highest form of State power ought to be limited, and if so, the nature of such limitation, the possibility of abuse and the extent to which such abuse can be taken are crucial and relevant considerations.