Source: http://narf.org/nill/bulletins/state/documents/dakotal.html
Timestamp: 2014-07-24 21:30:18
Document Index: 209082104

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 1911', '§ 43', '§ 1911', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 1911', '§ 1911', '§ 1911', '§ 1911', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 23', '§ 43', '§ 43', '§ 43']

(Cite as: 2006 WL 709867 (Neb.App.))
of Nebraska, appellee
Courts: Judgments: Appeal and Error.
Cases arising under the Nebraska Juvenile Code are reviewed de
novo on the record, and an appellate court is required
to reach a conclusion independent of the trial court's findings.
In reviewing questions of law arising in such proceedings, an
appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court's
A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute
is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time by any party or by the court sua sponte.
In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before
Child Welfare Act: Child Custody: Jurisdiction: Domicile.
An Indian tribe shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
law. When an Indian child is a ward of a
tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding
Child Welfare Act: Parental Rights: Jurisdiction: Domicile.
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of
Child Welfare Act: Evidence: Expert Witnesses.
No foster care placement may be ordered in an involuntary
proceeding in state court involving an Indian child in the
absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence,
9. Pleadings.
An amended pleading supersedes the original pleading, whereupon the original
pleading ceases to perform any office as a pleading.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County: Christopher
Kelly, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Craig H. Borlin for appellant.
Christine T. appeals the order by the separate juvenile court
of Douglas County adjudicating her five minor children under Neb.Rev.Stat.
247(3)(a) (Reissue 2004). Christine claims five separate errors with respect
to the adjudication order; specifically, that (1) the court erred
in assuming concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal court of the
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska (Omaha Tribe); (2) the State's petition
failed to meet the pleading requirements of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), thus infringing on Christine's due process rights;
(3) insufficient notice was sent to the tribal court that
the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS); (4)
and (5) the court erred in finding that it was
in the children's best interests to remain placed outside the
home. For the reasons set forth herein, we find that
jurisdiction was proper, but that the court erred when it
proceeded under a petition which lacked ICWA pleading requirements. In
was proper. Thus, the order of adjudication is reversed and
the cause is remanded to the juvenile court, which we
direct to proceed under an appropriate ICWA petition and to
properly serve notice to the tribe.
This case involves five children born to Christine: Chastidy T.
(born January 18, 1994), Dakota L. (born July 23, 1995),
Darius L. (born December 10, 1996), Corice L. (born January
12, 1999), and Mary L. (born October 26, 2002). All
Macy, Nebraska. The family has had numerous contacts with DHHS
and apparently has had some contact with Child Protective Services
(CPS) in Macy as well, though the extent of the
family's involvement with CPS and the tribal court was not
clear from the record.
The family's involvement with DHHS with respect to this case
began in December 2004. Specifically, on December 17, 2004, the
State filed a petition in the separate juvenile court of
Douglas County, alleging that the five children were within the
meaning of § 43-247(3)(a)
the faults or habits of Christine. The petition included the
following allegations: (1) that on or about December 15, 2004,
the family home was without necessary food, bedding, or pillows
for the children; (2) that Christine had failed to provide
the necessary financial or emotional support for the children's well-being;
(3) that Christine had failed to assist the children in
obtaining an education as required by law; (4) that Christine
had failed to take advantage of services offered by DHHS
and other providers to assist her children; and (5) that
because of the truth of these allegations, the children were
In addition to the petition alleging that the children were
within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a),
five children be placed with DHHS. The motion for temporary
custody was based on an "Affidavit for Removal From Parental
Home" by Jessyca Vandercoy, an initial assessment worker with DHHS.
Because it is not necessary to our resolution of this
case, we do not include the detailed information concerning the
alleged need for removal of the children at this juncture.
The affidavit indicated that according to DHHS documentation, all five
children had been in numerous placements and had been removed
from Christine's care several times.
Vandercoy's affidavit also included information on the family's involvement with
the Omaha Tribe. Vandercoy stated: All
Tribal Court in Macy, Nebraska. The Tribal Court has been
involved with this family since October 1998. The family has
not been provided support services since 2003. On December 15,
2004 this worker spoke with [a] CPS [worker] in Macy.
[The worker] stated that [CPS was] unable to provide services
to this family because of the distance. She stated that
she believes [the] Douglas County Court should have jurisdiction as
the services have not [been] and are no[t] being provided
to this family. Vandercoy concluded that "[t]he Tribal Court and CPS in Macy
and over again," and that for this and several other
reasons, the children continued to be at risk for harm
and should be placed in protective custody.
On December 22, 2004, a first appearance and detention/protective custody
hearing was held before the court. At the start of
the hearing, the court was informed by the State that
"the [ICWA] will apply to this matter based on previous
court intervention with this family." The court asked whether the
children were actually enrolled in a tribe or eligible for
enrollment, and Christine responded that the children were enrolled in
the Omaha Tribe. Christine did not resist the continued detention
of her children, and Christine's attorney noted that the State
had agreed to provide some services to Christine, including assistance
to complete a GED program, parenting classes, and the help
of a family support worker. Christine entered a denial of
the allegations in the petition and was told the possible
consequences of her involvement with the juvenile court and informed
of her rights, including the enhanced evidentiary standard of the
ICWA. In its verbal findings at the conclusion of the
hearing, the court stated, among other things, that the ICWA
applied, that the children were enrolled members of the Omaha
Tribe, and that notice of the proceedings was to be
given to the Omaha Tribe. In its written detention
hearing order, the court stated that it had been advised
that the ICWA applied in that the children were enrolled
members of the Omaha Tribe. The court ordered the continued
detention of the children by DHHS.
On February 4, 2005, the State sent an "ICWA Notice"
to an ICWA specialist with the Omaha Tribe. The notice
indicated that a petition had been filed under § 43-247(3)(a)
the children might be enrolled in the tribe, "thus invoking
the [ICWA]." The notice included several other rights of the
tribe, such as the right to intervene and the right
to petition the court to transfer the proceeding to the
tribal court. The next hearing date was also provided in
On February 7, 2005, the State filed an amended petition
with the court. The amended petition was similar to the
first petition in its allegations, but added ICWA pleading language.
Specifically, the amended petition alleged that the five children were
enrolled or were eligible for enrollment in the Omaha Tribe
and that pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-1505(4)
The adjudication hearing was held on February 28 and March
1, 2005. Christine was not present when court began, and
the court denied her attorney's motion to continue.
The court decided to proceed on the original petition, noting
that while the amended petition included language about the applicability
of the ICWA, the court at the detention hearing had
advised Christine that both the ICWA and its enhanced standard
of proof applied, so that Christine had full notice that
the ICWA was applicable. Christine's attorney noted that Christine had
not been served with the State's February 4, 2005, ICWA
notice. The attorney for the children's father, present for a
first appearance of the father in these proceedings, stated that
Christine and the father would like the case transferred to
the Omaha Tribe "as has been done before" and that
both parents must receive formal notice that the ICWA is
applicable, even though the court had made a finding that
the ICWA applied. The court responded that notice had been
served on the tribe and that the court had discussed
the matter with a prosecutor for the tribe, who said
that he was aware of the hearing but would not
be able to attend due to his involvement with another
adjudication. The court noted the father's attorney's comments and stated
that they were probably well placed, but that the father
was not affected at that point by any lack of
formal notice. The father was excused for an ongoing trial
proceeding in a different case, and the hearing began on
adjudication under the original petition.
During testimony of the first witness, Christine appeared in court.
The court asked the State whether it wanted to proceed
on the amended petition, and the State
responded in the affirmative. Christine's attorney objected, stating that if
the case proceeded on the amended petition, he would ask
that Christine be arraigned that day on the amended petition
and that he be allowed time to meet with Christine
to discuss the amended petition. The court stated that operating
under the amended petition would not really change anything, because
Christine had been served with a copy of the amended
petition, to which statement Christine's attorney responded that he had
not had time to discuss the amended petition with Christine
to see whether she had any questions. The court then
proceeded with the adjudication hearing on the original petition, and
the testimony of the first witness continued.
That first witness, called by the State, was Vandercoy, the
DHHS initial assessment worker who had written the affidavit supporting
the motion for temporary custody. Vandercoy's verbal testimony was similar
to the facts provided in her affidavit, albeit with more
elaboration. Vandercoy also testified to the family's involvement with the
Omaha Tribe. Vandercoy stated that as of December 16, 2004,
the children were "in the custody of the Tribe, so
they were State wards at the time." Upon cross-examination of
Vandercoy by Christine's attorney, a discussion of the tribe's involvement
with the family occurred, apparently for the purpose of demonstrating
that in fact the tribe, not Christine, was primarily responsible
for the children's well-being and that thus, Christine was not
at fault if she had failed to provide for the
children. Vandercoy
family in 1998. She was then asked when the tribe
became involved in 2004, and she replied that the documentation
from the tribe was confusing, but that Chastidy had been
in the custody of the tribe continuously since 1998 and
the other children also had been in the care and
custody of the tribe continuously, though it was unclear whether
the tribe had closed their case and then reopened it.
Vandercoy was then asked a series of specific questions relating
to the family's involvement with the tribe. Vandercoy was asked
whether the tribe had actually assumed jurisdiction of the children,
and she responded yes. Vandercoy was asked whether the children
were under the care and custody of the tribe at
some point between her receipt of an initial report regarding
the children in September 2004 and the time of the
hearing, and she again responded yes. Later in her testimony,
Vandercoy was asked whether, "as far as legal jurisdiction goes,
the children were in the care and control of the
Omaha Tribe" on December 15 and 16, 2004, and she
responded yes. Asked to elaborate with respect to the tribe's
providing services to the family, Vandercoy responded that the tribe
had recently provided the family a food voucher and a
rent voucher, but that there were no family support services
involved. She stated that no worker associated with the tribe
had been out to visit the family since September, but
that the tribe had had plans for a worker to
come out to visit the family on December
Christine's attorney continued to ask questions on the issue of
Christine's responsibility for the care of her children in light
of the tribe's involvement. Vandercoy responded, "The tribe had been
involved and didn't--and stayed involved, so there was an assessment
made by someone there that there was continued concern for
these children; otherwise, they would have closed the case."
During cross-examination by the guardian ad litem, Vandercoy stated that
she had tried to make contact with the tribe around
the time of DHHS' December 2004 removal of the children
from the family home. Vandercoy said that she left messages
for a CPS worker in Macy on December 13, 14,
and 15 because "we had had concerns, and the children
were in the jurisdiction of the Tribe," but that she
did not receive a callback until the children had already
been placed into protective custody, on December 17. Vandercoy testified
that she spoke with the family's tribal case manager on
December 17. Vandercoy further stated that workers for the tribe
had explained that the distance was too great for them
to be able to provide supervision of the situation or
provide services to the family.
Tayla Dickey, a DHHS protection and safety worker assigned to
the case, also testified as to the family's involvement with
the tribe. On cross-examination by the guardian ad litem, Dickey
was asked whether the children had been
in the custody of DHHS or in the custody of
the Omaha Tribe in September 2004, when Vandercoy received the
above-mentioned initial report of concern. Dickey responded that it was
her understanding that they had been under the custody of
the Omaha Tribe during that time. On recross-examination by Christine's
attorney, Dickey was asked whether she knew of any "court
order from the Omaha Tribe ... giving Christin[e] any direction
as to what she's supposed to do." Dickey responded that
she did not and that she did not have any
order from the Omaha Tribe in the family's case file.
well. Her attorney initiated the following line of questioning: Q.
And have you had an action or a matter in
the Omaha Tribal Court since October 1st of 2004? A.
Have I had--excuse me? Q.
Has there been a matter concerning the children in the
Omaha Tribal Court since October of 2004? A.
No. Like explain it to me. Q.
When you were in this court previously in September-- A.
--was the matter transferred to the Omaha Tribal Court-- A.
--at that time? A.
And was that approximately October 1st of 2004? A.
That was back in January of 2004. Q.
Have you been continuously under the jurisdiction of the Omaha
Tribal Court during the year of 2004, then? A.
Have you appeared before the Omaha Tribal Court during 2004?
No, I have not. Q.
Have you been issued any orders concerning the children out
of the Omaha Tribal Court during 2004? A.
No, just find [sic] housing. Q.
Do you have a caseworker through the Omaha Tribal Court?
[Yes]. Q.
And when was the last time that you met with
[her]? A.
Back in November. Q.
In the time prior to November of 2004, when did
you meet with [her]? A.
Other than that, I haven't met with her, but I've
talked to her. Christine gave further confirmation that the tribe had intervened in
a proceeding in January 2004, and she testified that the
children had been taken to Macy in February and returned
to her in May. Chastidy was later placed in a
shelter in Macy and returned to live with Christine on
November 29. Christine stated
that she had not received services from the tribe since
Additional evidence was presented regarding the allegations in the petition
concerning Christine's care of the children, which evidence we need
not detail here. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court made the following observation: First
or two. *7
The court then adjudicated the children under § 43-247(3)(a).
In its written adjudication order, the court found that the
ICWA applied to these proceedings with the "corresponding enhanced burdens
of proof." The court found the following allegations of the
petition to be true, by clear and convincing evidence: (1)
(2) that Christine had failed to provide the necessary financial
or emotional support for the children's well-being; and (3) that
at risk for harm. The court dismissed two remaining allegations
due to a lack of proof by clear and convincing
evidence, namely that Christine had failed to assist the children
in obtaining an education as required
by law and that she had failed to take advantage
of services offered by DHHS and other providers to assist
the children. The court also found that it would be
contrary to the health and safety of the children for
them to be returned home and that it was in
the best interests of the children to remain in the
temporary custody of DHHS for appropriate care and placement. No
specific findings under the ICWA were made. Christine appeals from
this adjudication order.
On appeal, Christine assigns the following errors: (1) that the
juvenile court assumed concurrent jurisdiction of the case with the
tribal court when it had no right to do so;
(2) that the State's petition failed to meet the pleading
requirements of the ICWA, infringing on Christine's due process rights;
(3) that insufficient notice was sent to the tribal court
that the children had been removed from the family residence
by DHHS; (4) that the juvenile court found the children
to be within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a);
and (5) that the juvenile court found that it was
*8 Christine claims that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction of the children under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2000) of the federal ICWA and under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-1504(1) (Reissue 2004) of the Nebraska ICWA. Section 43-1504(1) of the Nebraska ICWA provides as follows: An
by existing federal law. When an Indian child is a
Concurrent jurisdiction is addressed in the federal ICWA at § 1911(b)
the latter of which reads as follows: In
From the language of § 43-1504(1),
it is clear that in a child custody proceeding involving
an Indian child, the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction in two
instances: (1) when the Indian child resides or is domiciled
within the reservation, except where jurisdiction is otherwise vested in
the state by existing
federal law, and (2) when the Indian child is a
ward of a tribal court, notwithstanding the residence or domicile
At the time of removal, Christine's children were neither residing
nor domiciled on the reservation, making the first instance enumerated
above inapplicable to the present case. However, Christine argues that
the second instance is applicable because the children were in
fact "wards" of the tribal court. While jurisdictional issues under
other § 43-1504
re Interest of Brittany C. et al.,
13 Neb.App. 411, 693 N.W.2d 592 (2005), and In
Other state courts have addressed a tribal court's exclusive jurisdiction
under the federal ICWA statute § 1911(a),
although in different factual situations. The Supreme Court of Indiana
addressed the issue in Matter
525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind.1988). At issue in that case was
the validity of an adoption decree granted in a state
trial court. Before the adoption decree was granted, a tribal
court had filed a motion to transfer the case, attaching
a copy of an order of wardship of the child
which had been entered 1 day before the adoptive parents
filed their petition for adoption. The
and granted the adoption. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court
first found that the ICWA was inapplicable, for reasons unrelated
to those at issue in the present case; but the
court went on to state that even if the ICWA
was applicable, the tribal court had not enacted a valid
wardship of the child, and therefore, exclusive jurisdiction could not
exist under § 1911(a)
Exclusive jurisdiction under § 1911(a)
787 P.2d 1219 (Mont.1990). In that case, an Indian mother
put her child up for adoption and an adoption petition
was filed in a state trial court. The tribal court
was given notice of the adoption proceedings and filed a
motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana found that the
child was in fact a ward of the tribal court
because the child's mother had previously submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the tribal court by petitioning the court to
take over the care and custody of her child, insofar
as an infant becomes such a ward when its parents
had repeatedly referred to the
child as a "ward" in its orders. Therefore, the supreme
court reasoned, because the child was a ward of the
tribal court, the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction under § 1911(a)
Even though these cases involved adoption proceedings rather than a
juvenile adjudication, which is the issue in the present case,
the jurisdictional question is the same. The tribal court in
this case would have had exclusive jurisdiction over the children
if they were in fact wards of the tribal court.
In the two cases discussed above, the issue of exclusive
jurisdiction was raised by the tribal court, by the motions
to transfer or to dismiss. Those cases were resolved by
virtue of the existence (or lack) of evidence concerning a
valid wardship.
In this case, no direct evidence of wardship exists. Neither
The testimonial evidence given at trial was inconclusive as to
whether the children were currently wards of the tribal court.
There was no documentary evidence provided which demonstrated that the
children were wards of the tribal court. Because the record
does not conclusively establish that the children were currently wards
of a tribal court and because the children were
not residing within the reservation of the tribe, we find
no error in the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction over
the children. This conclusion does not preclude intervention by the
tribe at subsequent proceedings or presentation of further proof of
the status of tribal court proceedings; nor do we intend
by this conclusion to suggest how any subsequent motion to
transfer jurisdiction should be determined.
*10 Christine next contends that the State's petition failed to meet the pleading requirements of the ICWA and that such failure infringed on her due process rights. Two petitions for adjudication were filed in this case: an "original" petition and then, later, an "amended" petition. The original petition did not include any language concerning the ICWA, while the amended petition included ICWA pleading language, specifically the language of § 43- 1505(4). Section 43-1505(4) states that "active efforts" to prevent the breakup of the Indian family must be made when a "foster care placement" of an Indian child is involved. The exact text of § 43-1505(4) is as follows: Any
efforts have proved unsuccessful. Christine claims that the juvenile court erred when it proceeded
under the original petition, which had no ICWA language, instead
of the amended petition, which included the § 43-1505(4)
language. Although Christine references only § 43-1505(4),
which provides: No
foster care placement may be ordered in [an involuntary] proceeding
[in a state court] in the absence of a determination,
supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified
This court has addressed the issue of proper pleading under
the ICWA once before in In
9 Neb.App. 888, 621 N.W.2d 836 (2001). In that termination
of parental rights case, the State failed to include ICWA
language in its motion for termination, even though all parties
had stipulated previously that the child was Indian and that
the ICWA would apply to any termination proceedings. The termination
motion included general termination language under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-292
and (6). Again, § 43-
1505(4) requires that "active efforts" be made to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family, and § 43-1505(6)
child by the parent is
likely to result in "serious emotional or physical damage" to
the child in a termination of parental rights case. See
allegations in the motion failed to " 'articulate an essential
element to sustain a finding and Order of termination.' "
9 Neb.App. at 890, 621 N.W.2d at 839. The demurrer
was denied, and the mother's parental rights were terminated. In
in the motion. The mother appealed from the termination order,
claiming that the court erred in overruling her demurrer and
in finding that the State's motion stated a cause of
On appeal, the State argued that by pleading general termination
grounds in its motion, it had satisfactorily pled the ICWA
requirements as well. Specifically, the State argued that it had
addressed the ICWA's "active efforts" requirement in § 43-1505(4)
when it pled in its motion that "reasonable efforts" to
preserve and reunify the family pursuant to § 43-
292(6) had failed to correct the conditions leading to the
determination that the child lacked proper parental care. In addition,
the State argued that the ICWA's requirement of demonstrating that
continued custody by the parent or Indian
custodian is likely to result in "serious emotional or physical
damage" to the child, found in § 43-1505(6),
that termination was in the "best interests of the child."
On appeal, this court held that the " 'active efforts'
" requirement of the Nebraska ICWA's § 43-1505(4)
is "separate
the 'reasonable efforts' provision of § 43-292(6),"
in issue. (Emphasis supplied.) In
9 Neb.App. at 895, 621 N.W.2d at 842. We found
that the State's motion failed to allege facts sufficient to
Nebraska ICWA. The facts that the applicability of the ICWA
had been discussed verbally in court and that the court
specifically found in its order that the State had adequately
proved the relevant ICWA requirements did not rectify the failure
of the motion to include the relevant ICWA language. We
Applying the rationale of In
In this case, while the State did file an amended
petition including allegations required under the ICWA, the court did
not adjudicate the children under the amended petition. It was
error for the court to
proceed on the adjudication under the original petition, which did
not allege facts under the ICWA. This is so despite
the fact that Christine had been served with the amended
petition and had been notified in court that the ICWA
Accordingly, we reverse the order of adjudication and remand the
cause to the juvenile court for an adjudication under an
appropriate amended petition, with directions to the court to make
specific findings as required by § 43-1505.
Christine also claims that insufficient notice was given to the
tribal court that the children had been removed from the
family residence by DHHS, resulting in the tribal court's having
insufficient notice to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over its wards.
Notice requirements in a case involving the ICWA can be
found at § 43-
1505(1), which states as follows: In
If the identity or location of the parent or Indian
be given to the secretary in like manner, who may
parental rights proceedings shall be held until at least ten
custodian and the tribe or the secretary. The parent or
Indian custodian or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted
up to twenty additional days to prepare for such proceeding.
This is an involuntary proceeding in a state court involving
the foster care placement of Indian children. Therefore, § 43-1505(1)
subsection. Restated, the subsection requires that notice be sent (1)
to the "Indian child's tribe," id.;
(2) by certified or registered mail with return receipt requested;
(3) with notice of the pending proceedings; and (4) with
notice of the tribe's right of intervention. In addition,
the subsection states (5) that no foster care placement or
termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at
least 10 days after receipt of notice by the tribe
and (6) that the tribe may have an additional 20
days to prepare for the proceeding, if requested.
Correspondingly in part, the ICWA notice in the instant case
(1) was sent to the tribe on February 4, 2005,
(2) was sent by certified mail with return receipt requested,
(3) declared that a petition had been filed under § 43-
247(3)(a) concerning the children, (4) stated the tribe's right of
intervention, (5) stated that no foster care or termination proceeding
shall take place until at least 10 days after receipt
of the notice, and (6) added that the tribe could
have an additional 20 days to prepare, if requested. Although
sent to the tribal court of, rather than an "ICWA
specialist" with, the Omaha Tribe. However, Christine cites no authority
for this. The plain language of § 43-
1505(1) provides that notice must be sent to the "Indian
child's tribe." The statute
makes no mention of sending notice to the "tribal court."
Nebraska courts have not addressed the issue of to whom
specifically the notice should be sent when the statute directs
that it be sent to the "Indian Child's tribe." The
Nation. See Matter
577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind.1991). In that case, the supreme court
found that the record was not clear as to whether
the notification directed to those two individuals complied with the
notice requirements in a federal ICWA statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)
(1988). That federal ICWA subsection, pertaining to notice, is similar
to the Nebraska ICWA's corresponding notice subsection in that it
states that notice should be served on the "Indian child's
tribe." See, § 1912
The supreme court noted that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
has published guidelines, regarding the notice requirements, which correspond to
and supplement the requirements in § 1912(a).
See Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44
Fed.Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 26, 1979) (not codified). It further noted
that the Bureau of Indian Affairs authorizes tribes to designate
an agent for service of notice of child custody proceedings.
See 25 C.F.R. § 23.12
(2005). The names and addresses of the designated agents are
published in the Federal Register. The supreme court held that
the record did not show that these two persons were
the tribal agents designated and entitled to receive service of
notice, so the case was remanded to the trial court
to serve notice to the tribe in a manner which
conformed with the ICWA.
In this case, notice was given by a letter mailed
to a named "ICWA specialist" with the Omaha Tribe. From
notice requirements. Because we are remanding this matter for a
new adjudication hearing, we direct that notice be given to
the tribe as required by the ICWA.
placement at the time the notice was sent. However, Christine
points to no specific language in § 43-1505(1)
the notice. In fact, the plain language of § 43-1505(1)
in the notice. The only part of § 43-1505(1)
the tribe be notified of the "pending proceedings." In this
case, the ICWA notice stated that the addressee was "hereby
and alleging they are
within the jurisdiction of the Court." This satisfied the requirement
that the tribe be given notice of the "pending proceedings."
Furthermore, an inspection of the ICWA notice in this case
shows that the tribe was provided some information regarding the
children's state foster care placement, as the notice stated that
several documents were attached, including the "Affidavit for Removal From
Parental Home," motion for temporary custody, and order for immediate
custody. Thus, even though explicit notice that the children may
have been in a state foster care placement at the
time the ICWA notice was sent was not required, the
tribe should have been on notice as to that fact.
We find that jurisdiction in this case was proper. However,
petition. In addition, there is insufficient evidence that notice to
the tribe was proper. Accordingly, we reverse the order of
adjudication and remand the cause to the juvenile court for
an adjudication under an appropriate ICWA petition, with notice to
be served to the Omaha Tribe which conforms to the
ICWA. Because we remand the cause to the juvenile court
for the foregoing reasons, we decline to address Christine's additional