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Timestamp: 2018-11-18 04:21:47
Document Index: 66125435

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 13', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 15', 'Art. 15', 'arts\n20', 'Art. 15', 'Art. 15']

Managing Competition Cases: Cartels & Agreements Yee Wah Chin Ingram Yuzek Gainen Carroll & Bertolotti, LLP David A. Clanton Baker & McKenzie J. Mark Gidley. - ppt download
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Presentation on theme: "Managing Competition Cases: Cartels & Agreements Yee Wah Chin Ingram Yuzek Gainen Carroll & Bertolotti, LLP David A. Clanton Baker & McKenzie J. Mark Gidley."— Presentation transcript:
1 Managing Competition Cases: Cartels & Agreements Yee Wah Chin Ingram Yuzek Gainen Carroll & Bertolotti, LLP David A. Clanton Baker & McKenzie J. Mark Gidley White & Case LLP U.S. Chamber of Commerce Washington, D.C. March 26, 2009
2 2 Table of Contents Relevant statutes …………………………………………… 3 Definition of agreement ………………………………… 6 Treatment of cartels v. other agreements ….... 11 Horizontal v. vertical agreements.………………… 14 Rule of reason v. exemptions ………………………. 16
3 3 Relevant Statutes Sherman Act Section 1 Anti-Monopoly Law Chapter II
4 4 Sherman Act Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, …
5 5 AML Art. 13 prohibits monopoly agreements among competing undertakings, including –Price setting –Output/sales limits –Sales/purchases allocation –New technology/equipment/products limits –Group boycotts Art. 14 prohibits resale price fixing and other monopoly agreements between undertakings and counterparties to a transaction Art. 15 provides exemptions to Arts. 13, 14 for agreements reached for specified purposes that will not materially limit competition in the relevant market and…can enable consumers to share the benefits…
6 6 Agreements Distinguishing agreements from unilateral conduct Identifying agreements among competitors Identifying vertical agreements
7 7 Agreements v. Unilateral Conduct Sherman Act Section 1 only applies to concerted action – not unilateral conduct Agreement must be between two or more independent entities – Intra-enterprise conspiracies Agreement may be reached under pressure
8 8 Agreements v. Unilateral Conduct contd No written agreement/verbal communication needed to find an agreement – evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action…direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove…a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). – conduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). – Consider if (1) any rational motive to join a conspiracy and (2) conduct consistent with…independent interest. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
9 9 Horizontal Agreements Among competitors as competitors More than conscious parallel action – In self-interest only if others act similarly; contrary to self-interest if act alone – Legitimate business reasons to act independently – Motive to conspire – Lawsuits alleging an antitrust conspiracy must state facts suggesting that the conspiracy is plausible, not merely conceivable. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) Actions by trade associations
10 10 Vertical Agreements Among undertakings at different levels of an industry More needed to prove agreement than termination of wholesaler/dealer by manufacturer in response to complaints by other wholesalers/dealers Hub & spokes, to benefit the hub and/or spokes – U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) – Toys R Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7 th Cir. 2000)
11 11 Treatment of Cartels v. Other Agreements Neither Sherman Act nor AML distinguishes between cartels and other agreements Sherman Act provides that all violations are criminal offenses Distinction in U.S. established by Supreme Court decisions since 1911 – Section 1 prohibits only unreasonable restraints of trade – Unreasonable = raises market prices lowers total market output/quality/choice creates/maintains/increases market power – Only cartels subject to criminal sanctions
12 12 Treatment of Cartels v. Other Agreements contd Some types of agreements presumed to be unreasonable, based on judicial experience – Price fixing, bid rigging by competitors – Market allocations by competitors Conduct per se illegal only after considerable experience with that type of conduct Other conduct considered case-by-case, under standard of reasonableness: rule of reason analysis – Whether conducts anticompetitive effect substantially outweighs procompetitive effect that reasonably requires conduct to be achieved – No consideration of social or other factors – Joint ventures
13 13 Joint Ventures DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors Joint venture agreements among competitors are often pro- competitive – New products or services created – More efficient utilization of resources – Significant cost savings – Joint ventures are presumptively reviewed under the rule of reason – The pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture do not fall within the narrow category of activity that is per se unlawful. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006) Competitive concerns may arise if the JV – Creates or enhances the market power of the participants – Imposes competitive restraints on the parties beyond the scope of the JV
14 14 Treatment of Horizontal v. Vertical Agreements Competitive impact of horizontal v. vertical agreements – Interbrand v. intrabrand competition Established by judicial precedents
15 15 Treatment of Vertical Agreements Unilateral v. coordinated action in vertical contexts – Refusals to deal – Discriminatory pricing Market power in vertical contexts Analysis of vertical price v. non-price agreements – Restrictions on sales/purchases Dual distribution arrangements – Wholesale-retail price squeezes Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. ___ (2009)
16 16 Rule of Reason in U.S. v. Exemptions U.S. rule of reason considers impact on competition Exemptions reflect concerns about non- competition factors and may ignore negative impact on competition
17 17 Impact on Competition Proof of actual anticompetitive effect – Reduction of output – Less price competition Market analysis – Relevant market – Market power = ability to raise/lower prices beyond that possible with competition Market share Market entry barriers – Impact of conduct on market power, competition, not on individual competitors Intent may indicate likely impact
18 18 Impact on Competition contd Proof of procompetitive effects – Efficiencies – Avoidance of free-riding – Increasing output/quality/choices – Introducing new products/services – Conduct reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive effects, or procompetitive effects outweigh anticompetitive effects Factors unrelated to competitive effect are irrelevant – Under the Sherman Act the criterion to be used in judging the validity of a restraint is its impact on competition. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)
19 19 Exemptions U.S. exemptions – Statutory – Judicial – Application AML Art. 15 – Application – Burden of proof – U.S. counterparts
20 20 U.S. Exemptions Statutory – Regulated sectors Agriculture, communications, transportation, energy, financial markets, healthcare, insurance, sports, organized labor – Types of conduct R&D, production joint ventures, standards setting organizations, export trading companies, medical training, higher education financial aid Judicial – Constitutional State action doctrine v. dormant commerce clause Noerr-Pennington doctrine – Implied from regulations of sectors Filed rate/Keogh doctrine
21 21 U.S. Exemptions contd Narrowly construed Trend toward exemptions – Only from per se rule and treble damages Conduct may be found unreasonable and subject to single damages – That are specific and narrow
22 22 AML Art. 15 Applies to all agreements uniformly, including cartels? Burden of proof – Anti-monopoly enforcement authority shows existence of agreement for prohibited purpose – Undertaking must show agreement has Proper purpose will not materially limit competition in the relevant market and…can enable consumers to share the benefits… – U.S. authorities must show anti-competitive effect except in case of cartels
23 23 AML Art. 15 contd U.S. rule of reason includes consideration of – Upgrading technology, R&D of new products – Improving quality, efficiency Establishing standards and specializations considered from perspective of efficiency Size of undertakings irrelevant
24 Managing Competition Cases: Cartels & Agreements Thank you Yee Wah Chin ywchin@ingramllp.com David A. Clanton david.a.clanton@bakernet.com J. Mark Gidley mgidley@whitecase.com
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