Source: http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/rilr/2017/12/14/a13/jo
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 06:47:18+00:00
Document Index: 147653916

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 4', 'art 5', 'art 6', 'art 7']

Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation - Règlement ILR/T17/11 du 14 décembre 2017 relatif aux spécifications techniques pour l’interception des communications électroniques au Luxembourg - Secteur communications électroniques. - Legilux
Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation - Règlement ILR/T17/11 du 14 décembre 2017 relatif aux spécifications techniques pour l’interception des communications électroniques au Luxembourg - Secteur communications électroniques.
Permalink ELI : http://data.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/rilr/2017/12/14/a13/jo
— Mise à disposition des communications surveillées
— Mesures de sécurité
— Dispositif d’interception
Vu la loi modifiée du 27 février 2011 sur les réseaux et les services de communications électroniques et notamment son article 4 ;
Vu la loi modifiée du 30 mai 2005 concernant la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des communications électroniques et notamment son article 5 ;
Vu la consultation publique nationale du 14 septembre 2017 au 16 octobre 2017 concernant le projet de règlement relatif aux spécifications techniques pour l’interception des communications électroniques au Luxembourg ;
Le présent règlement a pour objectif de définir le format et les modalités de mise à disposition des données techniques et des équipements afin de permettre aux autorités compétentes en la matière l’accomplissement de leurs missions légales de surveillance des communications. Sont notamment visées les mises à disposition de toutes formes de communications interceptées et des données y afférentes en vertu des articles 67-1, 88-1, 88-2 du Code de procédure pénale ainsi que de l’article 7 de loi du 5 juillet 2016 portant réorganisation du Service de renseignement de l'État (ci-après « la loi du 5 juillet 2016 »).
autorisation : décision prise conformément aux articles 67-1, 88-1 et 88-2 du Code de procédure pénale et 7 de la loi du 5 juillet 2016, et ordonnant une mesure de surveillance ;
autorité légale : les autorités compétentes agissant conformément aux articles 67-1, 88-1 et 88-2 du Code de procédure pénale et agissant dans le cadre de l’article 7 de la loi du 5 juillet 2016 ;
cible : personne physique ou morale à l’encontre de laquelle la mesure de surveillance est ordonnée ;
communication interceptée : communication faite moyennant un réseau ou service de communication électronique et faisant l’objet d’une mesure d’interception ;
mesure d’interception : mesure de surveillance appliquée à l’égard des communications d’une cible aux fins d’accéder à tout contenu, y compris les données afférentes, ainsi qu’à toute information relative aux communications en question ;
mesure de surveillance : mesure ordonnée en application des articles 67-1, 88-1 et 88-2 du Code de procédure pénale ainsi que de l’article 7 de la loi du 5 juillet 2016 ;
exploitant : opérateur ou toute entreprise notifiée conformément à la loi du 27 février 2011 sur les réseaux et les services de communications électroniques ;
service-cible : un réseau de communication public ou un service de communications électroniques visés par une mesure de surveillance.
- Mise à disposition des communications surveillées
Dans le respect de l’autorisation légale, la mise à disposition par l’exploitant des données de la mesure d’interception à l’autorité légale concernée, en ce compris la communication interceptée, doit se faire en temps réel. La forme dans laquelle les données doivent être transmises et les modalités techniques de la transmission, sont définies dans les spécifications techniques nationales (National Specifications for Luxembourg) qui se trouvent en annexe du présent règlement et en font partie intégrante.
Dès la notification de l'autorisation légale à l'exploitant, celui-ci s’efforce à mettre en œuvre incessamment les mesures d’interception ordonnées sans que cette mise en œuvre ne puisse dépasser les délais maxima suivants :
l’autorisation légale est notifiée pendant les heures de bureau
l’autorisation légale est notifiée en dehors des heures de bureau
Au cas où un exploitant modifie le contenu d'une communication, il est également tenu à le reconvertir dans sa forme initiale avant de le transférer à l'autorité légale effectuant la mesure d’interception.
Le dispositif d'interception de communications ne doit en aucun cas modifier la prestation du service-cible ni fournir une indication à un utilisateur de celui-ci qu'une mesure d’interception est en cours.
L'exploitant doit tenir un registre de toutes activités liées aux mesures d’interception. Ce registre doit contenir les informations suivantes pour chaque opération (initialisation d'une mesure d'interception, prolongation, clôture d'une mesure d'interception, etc.) :
a) l'identité de la personne autorisée ayant effectué l’opération ;
b) référence(s) du service ayant été l'objet de l’opération ;
c) genre d'opération effectuée ;
d) date et heure de l’opération.
L'exploitant est tenu de protéger de façon adéquate les informations relatives aux mesures d’interception et aux équipements utilisés et de ne les divulguer à quiconque d'autre que les personnes autorisées mentionnées ci-dessus sans que l’autorisation écrite ne soit transmise préalablement par l'autorité légale concernée.
Tout accès non-autorisé réel ou tenté pour obtenir des informations sur les mesures d’interception et sur les équipements utilisés est à signaler à l'autorité légale concernée.
- Dispositif d’interception
Le dispositif d'interception utilisé dans le cadre des mesures d’interception doit pouvoir permettre l'interception simultanée d’une même cible par plusieurs autorités légales différentes et ceci pour tous les services-cibles.
Les mesures d’interception des différentes autorités légales doivent rester séparées de façon à éviter que les cibles de l'une des autorités légales ne soient divulguées à une autre.
À partir de son entrée en vigueur, les exploitants disposent d’un délai de douze mois pour faire les adaptations requises suite à la modification de l’annexe au présent règlement par rapport à l’annexe au règlement 14/184/ILR du 15 décembre 2014 relatif aux spécifications techniques pour l’interception des communications électroniques au Luxembourg.
Une prorogation de douze mois du délai visé au paragraphe (1) peut être accordée par l’Institut pour des services de faible importance sur le marché des communications électroniques. À cette fin, l’exploitant introduit auprès de l’Institut une demande écrite, documentant la faible importance du service visé sur le marché des communications électroniques.
Une prorogation accordée conformément au paragraphe (2) peut être renouvelée à l’issue de douze mois, lorsque les services de communications électroniques concernés sont de moindre importance sur le marché des communications électroniques, lorsque leur importance sur le marché des communications électroniques est en déclin rapide et définitif ou lorsque les équipements respectifs approchent à la fin de leur cycle de vie.
L’importance sur le marché des communications électroniques d’un service, telle que visée aux paragraphes (2) et (3) s’apprécie notamment par le nombre d’utilisateurs, le chiffre d’affaires et la pertinence du service pour les autorités légales.
Avant toute décision d’accorder une prorogation, la demande de l’exploitant est transmise par l’Institut aux autorités légales pour avis. La décision est notifiée par l’Institut au demandeur et aux autorités légales.
Le règlement 14/184/ILR du 15 décembre 2014 relatif aux spécifications techniques pour l’interception des communications électroniques au Luxembourg est abrogé.
National Specifications for
SPECIFICATION FOR PASSIVE INTERCEPTION 9
BASIS OF THIS SPECIFICATION 9
IST OF ABBREVIATIONS 10
CHOSEN OPTIONS AND AMENDMENTS 12
Re [1] (TS 101 671) 12
A.3.1.7
Re [1], General section 12
Re [1], Annex A circuit-switched network handover 13
Re [1], Annex C HI2 delivery mechanisms and procedures 14
Re [1], Annex D Structure of data at the handover interface 14
Re [1], Annex E Use of subaddress and calling party number 14
Re [1], Annex F GPRS HI3 interface (includes 3GPP as ref. in [1]) 15
Re [1], Annex D.5 ASN.1 - description of IRI (HI2) 15
Re [2] (TS 133 108) 16
Re [2], General section 16
Re [2], Annex A HI2 delivery mechanisms and procedures 17
Re [2], Annex C UMTS and EPS HI3 interface 18
Re [2], Annex J Use of subaddress and calling party number 18
Re [2], Annex O LALS (Lawful Access Location Services) 18
Re [2], Annex B Structure of data at the handover interface 18
Re [3] (TS 102 232-1) 19
Re [3], General section 19
Re [3], Annex D IRI by post and pre-processing HI3 information 20
Re [3], Annex F Traffic management of the handover interface 20
Supplements to [3], Annex A ASN.1 syntax trees 20
Re [4] (TS 102 232 - 2) 21
Re [4], General Section 21
Supplements to [4], Annex D Messaging ASN.1 21
Re [5] (TS 102 232 - 3) 22
A.3.5.1
A.3.5.2
Re [5], General Section 22
Supplements to [5], 8 ASN.1 for IRI and CC 22
Re [6] (TS 102 232 - 4) 23
Re [6], General Section 23
Supplements to [6], 8 ASN.1 for IRI and CC 23
Re [7] (TS 102 232 - 5) 24
Re [7], General Section 24
Supplements to [7], 7 ASN.1 specification for IRI and CC 24
Re [8] (TS 102 232 - 6) 25
Re [8], General Section 25
Supplements to [8], Annex A ASN.1 for IRI and CC 25
Re [9] (TS 102 232 - 7) 26
A.3.9.1
A.3.9.2
Re [9] ; General Section 26
Supplements to [9] ; Annex A ASN.1 for IRI and CC 26
TECHNICAL PROVISIONS 27
ISDN-based transmission 27
IP-based transmission 27
ANNEX A : NATIONAL HI2-ASN.1 PARAMETERS 28
SPECIFICATION FOR ACTIVE INTERCEPTION 30
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 30
TECHNICAL PROVISIONS 30
This document consists of Part A and Part B :
PART A : Specification for passive interception
This part describes the technical implementation of lawful interception of telecommunications. Implementation is carried out on the basis of the relevant ETSI specifications (refer to A.1), and this part describes the options and amendments that have been defined for Luxembourg.
PART B : Specification for active interception
This part describes the support that shall be supplied by the NWO/AP/SvP (Network Operator / Access Provider / Service Provider) in case of operations which require active interception.
This document is written in English and will be provided to the NWO/AP/SvP upon request. It applies to any NWO/AP/SvP in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg that is obligated to comply in lawful interception.
Basis of this specification
This Part A includes the ETSI documents listed below, which are applicable in the version noted as follows or in later versions, and are to be observed.
[1] ETSI TS 101 671
(2016-03) :
Lawful Interception (LI) ; Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic
[2] ETSI TS 133 108
(2017-04) :
(UMTS) ; LTE ; 3G security ; Handover interface for Lawful Interception (LI)
[3] ETSI TS 102 232-1
(2017-03) :
Lawful Interception (LI) ; Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery ; Part 1 : Handover specification for IP delivery
[4] ETSI TS 102 232-2
(2016-08) :
Part 2 : Service-specific details for messaging services
[5] ETSI TS 102 232-3
Part 3 : Service-specific details for internet access services
[6] ETSI TS 102 232-4
Part 4 : Service-specific details for Layer 2 services
[7] ETSI TS 102 232-5
Part 5 : Service-specific details for IP Multimedia services
[8] ETSI TS 102 232-6
(2014-03) :
Part 6 : Service-specific details for PSTN/ISDN services
[9] ETSI TS 102 232-7
Part 7 : Service-specific details for Mobile Services
The chosen options and national amendments to these ETSI documents are listed in the following chapters of Part A. If no options or amendments are defined in Part A, the corresponding ETSI document will be applicable without change in the version specified above or in a later version.
CC Link IDentifier
GPRS LI Correlation
Handover Interface 1
Handover Interface 2
Handover Interface 3
Lawful Access Location Services
Lawful Interception Identifier
Network Element Identifier
UMTS LI Correlation
User to User Signalling
Chosen options and amendments
Re [1] (TS 101 671)
Options that can be chosen in each country and amendments to [1] are listed in this chapter.
Re [1], General section
Re Section
National provision / extension
Handover interface 1 (HI1)
Design, electronic or manual
The HI1 interface will remain manual. If a legal basis is created for electronic implementation of the HI1 interface, this will be introduced at a later stage.
Exception : LI management notifications (LI BEGIN, LI MODIFY, LI END, ALARM) shall be sent via the electronic HI2 interface (refer to [1], D.4).
Handover Interface port 2 (HI2)
The IRI records shall be transmitted individually.
Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID)
The LIID shall be defined by the LEA.
The NID consists of the Operator ID and Network Element Identifier (NEID).
The Operator ID consists of up to 5 characters ; the nomenclature is defined and updated by the LEA.
The NEID is 1-25 characters long, as defined in [1] and shall be set by the NWO/AP/SvP.
LI notifications towards the LEMF
LI management notifications (LI BEGIN, LI MODIFY, LI END, ALARM) shall be sent via the electronic HI2 interface (refer to [1], D.4).
Data transmission protocols (HI2)
Only FTP shall be used, ROSE shall not be used.
HI3 : Interface port for Content of Communication
The Content of Communication (CC) shall be presented as a transparent en clair copy, if the encryption is managed by the network. Encryption not managed by the network, e.g. user provided end-to-end encryption, need not to be removed by the network.
If IRI cannot be transmitted, they shall be buffered by the NWO/AP/SvP.
Minimum buffer time : 3 days
ISDN transmission : An ISDN CUG (Closed User Group) shall be formed as specified by the LEA.
IP-based transmission : A VPN including IPSec encryption will be set up between the NWO/AP/SvPs obliged to provide for intercepts and the LEAs, refer to explanations in chapter A.4 of this document.
The following figures can be used as a basis for dimensioning the technical equipment installed at the NWO/AP/SvPs :
• 50 targets for the first 10000 subscribers
• an additional 20 targets for each further 10000 subscribers started
(e.g. : NWO with 76000 subscribers shall be able to set up at least 50+7*20 = 190 targets)
Re [1], Annex A circuit-switched network handover
As option A (A.5.4.1) has been specified in A.5.4, the rules according to table A.1.1, left side, apply.
Structure of IRI records
Only IRI conforming to ASN.1 - description are permissible.
Control information for HI2, item 5
Date and time shall be transmitted as local time.
The Content of Communication (CC) shall be presented as a transparent en clair copy, if the encryption is managed by the network. Encryption not managed by the network, e.g. user provided end-to-end encryption, need not be removed by the network.
Delivery of Content of Communication (CC)
Use of UUS1 has been specified. In order to enable sub-addressing as fall-back, the LIID for circuit-switched intercepts shall solely be implemented by number (LIID is set by the LEA).
Delivery of packetized Content of Communication (CC)
Text messages (SMS) and UUS shall be transmitted via the HI2 interface.
A.4.4.1
Failure of CC links
The NWO/AP/SvP shall make 3 attempts at an interval of 5 seconds.
A.4.4.2
Error messages shall be transmitted over HI2 in accordance with Annex D.4, if the system used by the NWO/AP/SvP supports this functionality.
Security requirements at the HI3 interface port
Refer to 5.1.1, re 11. Security Aspects
Multi party calls - general principles, options A, B
Option A shall be used.
Explicit call transfer, CC link
Option 2 has been specified.
Transmission via HI2 shall be used, also refer to A.4.2.
HI3 (delivery of CC)
Correlation information is transmitted in conformance with 5.1.2, sec. A.4.1.
HI2 (delivery of IRI)
Redundant information shall be sent for each further event.
Re [1], Annex C HI2 delivery mechanisms and procedures
ROSE or FTP
Use of FTP
Method B shall be used.
Re [1], Annex D Structure of data at the handover interface
ASN.1 object tree
Additional national parameters will be established, refer to Annex A for the definition.
Re [1], Annex E Use of subaddress and calling party number…
Subaddress options
According to Table E.2.1 in [1], the default value for type of subaddress is “user specified”.
Field order and layout
To distinguish between "old" transmission and transmission in accordance with this specification, the octets 16-23 are allocated as follows :
If ‘old’ transmission : no entry
If transmitting according to this specification :
"Xa.bb.cc"
X : E for ETSI
a : main version TS 101 671
bb : technical version
cc : editorial version
(Example : E3.14.01 for TS 101 671 V3.14.1)
Re [1], Annex F GPRS HI3 interface (includes 3GPP as ref. in [1])
GGSN and SGSN interception shall be set as standard in order to obtain a maximum of information. If for technical reasons only one kind of interception is possible, then SGSN interception shall be set up.
HI3 Delivery of Content of Communication (CC)
Transmission by GLIC/TCP or FTP/TCP shall be used, GLIC/UDP shall not be used.
The following triggers have been specified :
send timeout = 10s
volume trigger = 10 MByte
Re [1], Annex D.5 ASN.1 - description of IRI (HI2)
Clarification : Any parameter described in the ASN.1 notation, even if marked as OPTIONAL in the ETSI TS, SHALL be transmitted, insofar it exists with regard to the respective message.
ASN.1-Reference
04022.1 (1)
In case of a mobile connection, the following parameters shall be set :
- globalCellID
- gsmlocation or umtslocation
04022.1
Location/gsm Location/ GeoCoordinates
The AZIMUTH value shall be set except in the case of an omni-directional antenna (360° antenna).
National HI2-ASN1parameters/ LuxParameters
National parameters have been defined in addition to the ASN.1 description in [1] : the description can be found in Annex A.
An individual partyinformation shall be sent for EACH party involved in a communication.
partyinformation/partyidentity
All existing parameters shall be defined, depending on the means of communication used.
Re [2] (TS 133 108)
The options that can be chosen in each country and amendments to [2] are listed in this chapter.
Re [2], General section
HI2 : Interface port for intercept related information
If it is not possible to transmit the IRI, they shall be buffered by the NWO/AP/SvP.
As option A (5.4.4.1) has been specified in 5.4.4, the rules according to table 5.1, left side, apply.
Security requirements at the interface port of HI3
ISDN transmission: An ISDN CUG (Closed User Group) shall be formed as specified by the LEA.
Transmission via HI2 has been specified.
Precision of timestamps
The timestamps shall have a precision of at least 1 millisecond.
IP-based transmission : A VPN including IPSec encryption will be set up between the NWO/AP/SvPs obligated to provide for intercepts and the LEAs, refer to A.4 of this document.
(e.g. : NWO with 76000 subscribers shall be able to set up at least 50+7*20= 190 targets)
UMTS data events
The event “start of interception with mobile station attached” mentioned in Table 6.1 shall generate a Report IRI.
REPORT record information
All events marked as national option or as dependent on national regulations shall generate a Report IRI.
IRI reporting for packet domain at GGSN
This option does not need to be implemented in Luxembourg.
Content of Communication interception for packet domain at GGSN
The option has been chosen. All target traffic available at the interception node shall be routed to the LEA.
Location information shall be provided except it is explicitly prohibited by the warrant.
IRI for IMS-based VoIP
The national option has been chosen, LEMF shall be informed about the unavailability of CC.
Re [2], Annex A HI2 delivery mechanisms and procedures
volume trigger = 10MByte
Re [2], Annex C UMTS and EPS HI3 interface
UMTS and EPS HI3 interfaces ; methods of transmission
Only ULICv1 via TCP stream shall be used.
Re [2], Annex J Use of subaddress and calling party number…
J.2.3.2
Re [2], Annex O LALS (Lawful Access Location Services)
NWO/AP/SvPs shall inform LEA if LALS is supported in NWO/AP/SvPs’s network.
In this case, LALS shall be activated for specific targets upon LEA’s request.
The required parameters will be defined by the LEA.
Re [2], Annex B Structure of data at the handover interface
ASN.1 -Reference
04022.49 (2)
Eps-HI3-PS
To avoid any doubt : The timestamp parameter in the ULIC header shall be provided.
Re [3] (TS 102 232-1)
The options that can be chosen in each country and amendments to [3] are listed in this chapter.
Re [3], General section
Authorization country code
Specified as "LU".
Payload timestamp
Re Note 2 : The ASN.1 MicroSecond-TimeStamp should be used.
Re Note 3 : The timeStampQualifier shall be set.
Aggregation of payloads
Combined transmission of IP packets is authorised, but shall not delay transmission for more than 2 seconds.
Sending a large block of application-level data
Segmentation is not used.
Padding is not used.
Payload encryption is not used.
TCP/IP socket connections are used.
The NWO/AP/SvP shall make 3 connection attempts at an interval of 10 seconds.
The socket connection shall be closed by the NWO/AP/SvP after 2 minutes of inactivity.
Using Keep-alives may be used if desired, but use shall be agreed between NWO/AP/SvP and LEA. The preferred method is to close the connection after 2 minutes of inactivity according to 6.3.2.
If the LEA requests Keep-alives, the function shall be implemented.
Option negotiation is currently not used, but maybe implemented on LEAs request at a later stage.
The port numbers to be used will be specified by the LEA.
Acknowledging data
Option 1 is chosen.
IP-based transmission : A VPN including IPSec encryption shall be set up between the NWO/AP/SvPs and the LEAs; refer to A.4.
NWO/AP/SvPs shall inform LEA if periodic integrity checks are supported in NWO/AP/SvPs's network. In this case, this shall be activated upon LEA's request. The required parameters will be defined by the LEA.
Re [3], Annex D IRI by post and pre-processing HI3 information
IRI by post and pre-processing HI3 information
Pre-processing at LEMF to generate IRI is not considered, the IRI shall be generated by post-processing at CSP’s domain.
Re [3], Annex F Traffic management of the handover interface
Filtering at the mediation function should be implemented upon request by the LEA.
Maximum buffering time
To protect against loss of data due to equipment or network problems, the buffering time shall be 5 minutes taking into account the maximum bandwidth at the network interface of the delivery function.
Supplements to [3], Annex A ASN.1 syntax trees
04022.51 (3)
The provisions in [3] remain unchanged.
Re [4] (TS 102 232 – 2)
Re [4], General Section
Handover of intercepted e-mail shall be according to EmailCC and EmailIRI structures.
E-mail attributes
All attributes mentioned in 7.1 to 7.10 shall be set.
Supplements to [4], Annex D Messaging ASN.1
04022.52 (4)
The provisions in [4] remain unchanged.
Re [5] (TS 102 232 – 3)
Re [5], General Section
Use of location field
The location parameter shall be set.
Supplements to [5], 8 ASN.1 for IRI and CC
04022.53 (5)
The provisions in [5] remain unchanged.
Re [6] (TS 102 232 – 4)
Re [6], General Section
The provisions in the specified documents remain unchanged.
Supplements to [6], 8 ASN.1 for IRI and CC
04022.54 (6)
The provisions in [6] remain unchanged.
Re [7] (TS 102 232 – 5)
Re [7], General Section
The location information shall be reported.
Direction for IMS IRI for Signalling Messages
The payloadDirection parameter shall be used.
Direction for SIP sessions
The sessionDirection parameter shall be used.
Supplements to [7], 7 ASN.1 specification for IRI and CC
04022.55 (7)
The provisions in [7] remain unchanged.
Re [8] (TS 102 232 – 6)
Re [8], General Section
If the NWO/AP/SvP’s equipment supports delivery of CC via dedicated ISDN channels as described and defined in [1], this method shall be used for PSTN/ISDN services described in TS 102 232-6 as well.
If delivery of CC via dedicated ISDN channels is not supported by the NWO/AP/SvP’s equipment, the CC delivered via RTP according to [8] shall be coded in G.711.
All fields mentioned in the table shall be set.
Supplements to [8], Annex A ASN.1 for IRI and CC
04022.56 (8)
The provisions in [8] remain unchanged.
Re [9] (TS 102 232 – 7)
Re [9] ; General Section
Supplements to [9] ; Annex A ASN.1 for IRI and CC
ISDN-based transmission
Routing of CC (Content of Communication) is via ISDN dial-up lines using Euro ISDN (E-DSS1). An ISDN CUG (Closed User Group) between the NWO/AP/SvP and the LEA shall be set up.
IP-based transmission
IP-based transmission takes place over a VPN. Provision, configuration and operation of the VPN components are the responsibility of the LEA.
The following components shall be provided by the NWO/AP/SvP :
• Transparent Internet access to each LEA :
Internet access shall be sized adequately, shall have static, official IP addresses and shall have maximum availability with regard to the infrastructure of the NWO/AP/SvP.
Internet access needs to be planned and implemented in parallel if required by the LEA for introduction of redundancy. In this case, both Internet accesses should be planned as independently as possible from one another, taking the infrastructure at the NWO/AP/SvP into account (e.g. separate physical entry points, routing, autonomous network components, independent peering points).
• Infrastructure at the handover point :
The following components are to be supplied by the NWO/AP/SvP :
○ exclusive 19" rack, with lock
○ 2 X 230 VAC, 16 amp. power supply (connected to UPS)
○ waste heat dissipation capacity for the rack : minimum 2kW
○ installation in IT server room
○ transparent Internet access/Internet access terminates in this 19" rack (Ethernet interface)
○ handover from the provider’s network takes place in this 19" rack (Ethernet interface)
Annex A : National HI2-ASN.1 parameters
Additions to HI2-Operations
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) hi2(1) version18(18)}
Natparas FROM NatParameter;
IRI-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE
domainID [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER (hi2OperationId) OPTIONAL,
-- for the sending entity the inclusion of the Object Identifier is mandatory
national-HI2-ASN1parameters[255] National-HI2-ASN1parameters OPTIONAL
National-HI2-ASN1parameters ::= SEQUENCE
countryCode [1] PrintableString (SIZE (2)),
-- Country Code (LU for Luxembourg) according to ISO 3166-1,
-- the country to which the parameters inserted after the extension marker apply.
-- In case a given country wants to use additional national parameters according to
-- its law, these national parameters should be defined using the ASN.1 syntax and
-- added after the extension marker (...).
-- It is recommended that "version parameter" and "vendor identification parameter"
-- are included in the national parameters definition. Vendor identifications can be
-- retrieved from the IANA web site (see annex H). In addition, avoiding the use
-- of tags from 240 to 255 is recommended in a formal type definition.
natparas [2] Natparas,
-- Import from national specifications for Luxembourg, Annex A
END -- HI2Operations
NatParameter
-- National parameter
-- Content defined by national law
-- Version of this ASN.1 specification of the national parameters : '1'
-- To be inserted into the parameter "specificationVersion"
-- The coding of all text fields shall be according to CODEPAGE 1252
Natparas ::= SEQUENCE
natVersion
INTEGER(0..255)
LocationDetails OPTIONAL
-- **************************** Parameter begin **********************
LocationDetails ::= SEQUENCE
INTEGER(0..2147483647) OPTIONAL,
-- radius of a cell in metres
radiationDirection
INTEGER(0..359) OPTIONAL,
-- radiation direction of the main beam of a cell in degrees relative to true north
deflectionAngle
INTEGER(0..360) OPTIONAL,
-- deflection angle of the cell in degrees
fieldIntensity
INTEGER(-200..0) OPTIONAL,
-- field intensity of the mobile phone in [dbm]
PrintableString (SIZE (256)) OPTIONAL
-- free text for additional information
-- (e.g. "antenna position main station, building 16")
-- **************************** Parameter end **********************
Specification for active interception
In accordance with the relevant domestic laws, a NWO/AP/SvP shall support the integration of active interception equipment into its network upon request by the LEA.
The active interception equipment will be provided and operated by the LEA responsible.
Depending on the case and the nature of the active interception, the point and type of integration into the NWO/AP/SvP’s network and the level of required support may vary.
Prior to the integration, the LEA responsible will communicate the detailed requirements to the NWO/AP/SvP.
The required technical provisions will be announced by the LEA on a case-by-case basis. The general infrastructural requirements will be the same as described in chapter A.4.2 of this document.
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2) threeGPP(4) hi3eps(9) r12(12) version-0(0)}
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) li-ps(5) genHeader(1) version24(24)}
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) li-ps(5) email(2) version16(16)}
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) li-ps(5) iPAccess(3) version11(11)}
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) li-ps(5) l2Access(4) version7(7)}
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) li-ps(5) iPMultimedia(5) version8(8)}
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulIntercept(2) li-ps(5) pstnIsdn(6) version5(5)}
Mémorial A n° 13 de 2018