Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-valenzuela-10
Timestamp: 2020-07-06 03:13:52
Document Index: 275401517

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 846', '§ 3109', '§ 844', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848']

United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361 | Casetext Search + Citator
U.S. v. Zavala
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this phrase to mean three or more federal narcotics violations. United…
Valenzuela's conviction was affirmed by this court. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.),…
Full title:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JOSE GUADALUPE…
Date published: Jun 6, 1979
596 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1979)
holding that there is no requirement to knock at a garage after properly entering home
Summary of this case from Mendez v. Cnty. of L.A.
April 5, 1979. Rehearing Denied June 6, 1979.
David R. Hinden, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chief, Appellate Sec., Robert J. Perry, Asst. U.S. Atty., Donald M. Re, Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before WALLACE and HUG, Circuit Judges, and EAST, District Judge.
Honorable William G. East. Senior United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
Jose Guadalupe Valenzuela (Jose) appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence to custody entered by the District Court on December 19, 1977 for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy), seven counts of violations under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (trafficking in heroin), and for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (continuing criminal enterprise). We affirm.
Section 848(c) authorizes the imposition of life imprisonment without possibility of suspension of sentence, probation or parole.
Count 1 charged the defendants Jose, Fernando, Manuel Valenzuela (Manuel), Nicolasa Valenzuela (Nicolasa), Alleen Seja Valenzuela (Alleen), Mary Elizabeth Corley (Mary), Edgar Estephen (Edgar), Alonso Lizarraga (Alonso), Bernardina Lizarraga (Bernardina), Sergio Mendoza Rodriguez (Sergio), and 22 unindicted family members with conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States ( § 846 and § 841(a)(1));
Count 2 charged two unindicted family members with heroin trafficking (ten ounces) and the defendants Jose and Fernando as aiders and abettors thereto ( § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2);
Jose obliquely claims he cannot be charged as an aider and abettor to an unindicted principal charged with commission of a crime. The claim is meritless. Feldstein v. United States, 429 F.2d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1970), cited in United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 1973).
Count 3 charged one unindicted family member and defendant Manuel with heroin trafficking (six ounces) and the defendant Jose as an aider and abettor thereto ( § 841(a)(1) and § 2);
Count 4 charged three unindicted family members with heroin trafficking (2.2 pounds) and the defendants Jose and Fernando as aiders and abettors thereto ( § 841(a)(1) and § 2);
Count 5 charged two unindicted family members and the defendant Alleen with heroin trafficking (4.4 pounds) and the defendants Jose and Fernando as aiders and abettors thereto ( § 841(a)(1) and § 2);
Count 6 charged four unindicted family members with heroin trafficking (44 pounds) and the defendants Jose and Fernando as aiders and abettors thereto ( § 841(a)(1) and § 2);
Count 7 charged two unindicted family members with heroin trafficking (44 pounds) and the defendants Jose and Fernando as aiders and abettors thereto ( § 841(a)(1) and § 2);
Count 8 charged the defendants Jose, Mary, Edgar, Alonso, Bernardina, and Sergio with heroin trafficking (four pounds) ( § 841(a)(1)); and
Count 9 charged Jose, in concert with at least five other persons with whom Jose acted as organizer, supervisor, and manager, with a continuing series of violations, obtaining therefrom substantial income and resources as alleged in Counts 1 through 8 ( § 848).
JURY VERDICTS AND SENTENCE:
Jose was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on each of Counts 1 through 8 and to life imprisonment on Count 9. The sentences on Counts 1 through 4 were imposed consecutively (total 60 years), and the sentences on Counts 5 through 8 were also imposed consecutively (also 60 years). The two 60-year terms were imposed to run concurrently with the term of life imprisonment. The life sentence, pursuant to § 848(c), is without possibility of suspension of sentence, probation or parole.
APPEAL OF THE DEFENDANTS:
DISCUSSION: [26] Issue 1:
"The first issue to be considered is whether Congress intended to allow cumulative punishment for violations of §§ 846 and 848. We have concluded that it did not . . .."
In Jose's case, the sentences imposed on his convictions of the conspiracy and substantive charges were made concurrent with his life sentence on the criminal enterprise conviction. Jose's resentencing argument is without merit due to the absence of any excessive cumulative punishment effect. See United States v. Davis, 548 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1977). The imposition of concurrent sentences does not affect Jose's chances of parole, cf. Audett v. United States, 265 F.2d 837, 848 (9th Cir. 1959), because the life sentence under the continuing criminal enterprise section is not subject to parole. Section 848(c). See also Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 611, 93 S.Ct. 1151, 35 L.Ed.2d 528 (1973); O'Neal v. United States, 332 F.2d 152, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1964), and United States v. Gudino, 432 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1970). In Jeffers, Justice Blackmun restricted his discussion to the imposition of cumulative monetary fines. In fact, while consecutive prison sentences had been imposed for the conspiracy and criminal enterprise convictions, Justice Blackmun specifically noted that the consecutive sentences did not raise the cumulative punishment issue as the monetary fines did because of the unavailability of parole under the criminal enterprise statute. 432 U.S. at 155, n. 24, 97 S.Ct. 2207.
Since we ultimately conclude that Jose's judgment of conviction under Count 9 and sentence to life custody is valid, we have no need to inquire into the propriety of other lesser or equal concurrent sentences since Jose's prison term under Count 9 will remain the same whatever the resolution of the other sentences might be. United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 699 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 99 S.Ct. 251, 58 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978). See also United States v. Thomas, 586 F.2d 123, 131 (9th Cir. 1978).
Under the federal statute, this entry would be proper for two reasons. First, we have held that entry through an open door is not a "breaking" within the meaning of the statute. United States v. Scharf, 421 F.2d 1239, 1240 (9th Cir. 1970); Reyes v. United States, 417 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1969); Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1965). Second, the garage entry was made only after the proper entry at the residence, and "officers are not required to announce at every place of entry; one proper announcement under [18 U.S.C.] section 3109 is sufficient." United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 at 10 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 1993, 40 L.Ed.2d 559 (1974), (emphasis in original) (unannounced entry at garage held proper because made simultaneously with proper entry at front door). The fact that the garage entry was through an open door subsequent to a proper entry at another door also leads us to find that the garage entry was constitutionally reasonable.
The view that certain knock-notice requirements are incorporated into the Fourth Amendment is partially supported by the fact that "[t]he roots of section 3109, commonly referred to as the `rule of announcement,' extend well back in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence." United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d at 9 (footnote omitted). But the Supreme Court, while observing that this rule is "deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application," Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958), has at the same time apparently recognized that the rule did not extend to open doors at common law:
"Whatever the circumstances under which breaking a door to arrest for felony might be lawful, however, the breaking was unlawful where the officer failed first to state his authority and purpose for demanding admission. The requirement was pronounced in 1603 in Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Co.Rep. 91a, 11 E.R.C. 629, 77 Eng.Repr. 194, at 195: `In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors . . ..' (Emphasis supplied.)
"The requirement stated in Semayne's Case still obtains. It is reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3109 [and] in the statutes of a large number of States . . .."
California law is more problematic because the state statutes have been held applicable to open outer doors in some, if not all, circumstances. See People v. Bradley, 1 Cal.3d 80, 87-88, 81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460-62, 460 P.2d 129, 132-34 (1969); People v. Castenada, 58 Cal.App.3d 165, 170, 129 Cal.Rptr. 755, 757 (1976). People v. Beamon, 268 Cal.App.2d 61, 65, 73 Cal.Rptr. 604, 607 (1968). We cannot liken this entry through the open outside door of the garage to an entry through an open inside bedroom door, to which the California statute has been held inapplicable. See Castenada, 58 Cal.App.3d at 170, 129 Cal.Rptr. at 757; People v. Livermore, 30 Cal.App.3d 1073, 106 Cal.Rptr. 822 (1973). People v. Bruce, 49 Cal.App.3d 580, 587, 122 Cal.Rptr. 648, 652 (1975), is distinguishable because the entry there was through a closed outside door of a detached garage located on occupied residential property.
In People v. Bradley, the California Court also apparently recognized that the common law did not require announcement prior to entry through open doors. See 1 Cal.3d at 86, 81 Cal.Rptr. at 460, 460 P.2d at 132, quoting Semayne's Case, note 3. However, the Court went on to hold that the California arrest-entry statute, Cal.Penal Code § 844, should be construed to apply to open outer doors in some circumstances "[e]ven if at common law an unannounced intrusion through an open door was lawful." 1 Cal.3d at 87, 81 Cal.Rptr. at 461, 460 P.2d at 133.
The phrase "undertaken . . . in concert" has already received the attention of the Supreme Court. In Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 148-49, 97 S.Ct. 2207, the Court indicated that "[i]n the absence of any indication from the legislative history or elsewhere to the contrary, the . . . likely explanation is that Congress intended the word `concert' to have its common meaning of agreement in a design or plan." While the Jeffers Court was not faced with a vagueness claim, its observation is relevant here. We believe that the phrase "undertaken . . . in concert" is sufficiently precise to notify a person of ordinary intelligence that any agreement in a plan or design to accomplish acts prohibited by the Act would fall within the language of § 848.
See 432 U.S. 148, n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 2215 n. 14.
We also think that the remaining contested phrases extracted from § 848 are sufficiently definite to satisfy due process strictures. Thus, while all dictionaries may not precisely specify the number of related, successive events which are necessary to constitute a "series," we think the District Court's instruction that a series must consist of three or more federal narcotic law violations was squarely based on common usage. And, as was noted in United States v. Collier, 358 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (E.D.Mich. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 327 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831, 95 S.Ct. 56, 42 L.Ed.2d 57 (1974), the definition of "series" contained in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966) reflects this usage.
See, e. g., The Random House College Dictionary (Rev.Ed. 1975).
The fact that some question may exist as to whether a series could include just two events is of no solace to Jose. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975).
holding that the phrase "organizer" as used in 21 U.S.C. § 848 was not unconstitutionally vague
Summary of this case from City of Oshkosh v. Kubiak
rejecting vagueness challenge to CCE statute and holding that its words "enjoy a wide currency in the business community and are commonly understood by members of the general public"
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Hernandez-Escarsega
rejecting vagueness challenge concerning phrase "organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management" in 21 U.S.C.A. § 848, and noting that "the words encompassed within the phrases * * * enjoy a wide currency in the business community and are commonly understood by members of the public," id. at 1368
In Valenzuela, this court upheld the "organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management" language against a vagueness attack by noting that those words "enjoy a wide currency in the business community and are commonly understood by members of the general public."
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