Source: https://m.openjurist.org/500/us/160
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 02:56:11
Document Index: 691719803

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 202', '§ 507', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 801', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 811', '§ 201', '§ 811', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 811', '§ 201', '§ 811', '§ 201', '§ 811', '§ 201', '§ 811', '§ 201', '§ 811', '§ 1', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 501', '§ 871', '§ 501', '§ 201']

500 US 160 Touby v. United States | OpenJurist
500 U.S. 160 - Touby v. United States
500 US 160 Touby v. United States
500 U.S. 160
111 S.Ct. 1752
114 L.Ed.2d 219
Daniel TOUBY, et ux., Petitioners
No. 90-6282.
The Controlled Substances Act authorizes the Attorney General, upon compliance with specified procedures, to add new drugs to five "schedules" of controlled substances, the manufacture, possession, and distribution of which the Act regulates or prohibits. Because compliance with the Act's procedures resulted in lengthy delays, drug traffickers were able to develop and market "designer drugs"—which have pharmacological effects similar to, but chemical compositions slightly different from, scheduled substances—long before the Government was able to schedule them and initiate prosecutions. To combat this problem, Congress added § 201(h) to the Act, creating an expedited procedure by which the Attorney General can schedule a substance on a temporary basis when doing so is "necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety," and providing that a temporary scheduling order is not subject to judicial review. The Attorney General promulgated regulations delegating, inter alia, his temporary scheduling power to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which subsequently temporarily designated the designer drug "Euphoria" as a schedule I controlled substance. While that temporary order was in effect, petitioners were indicted for manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture Euphoria. The District Court denied their motion to dismiss, rejecting their contentions that § 201(h) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General, and that the Attorney General improperly delegated his temporary scheduling authority to the DEA. The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners' subsequent convictions.
1. Section 201(h) does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Attorney General. Pp. 164-169.
(a) The nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from seeking assistance from a coordinate Branch, so long as it lays down an "intelligible principle" to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 352, 72 L.Ed. 624. Section 201(h)'s "imminent hazard to public safety" standard is concededly such a principle. Moreover, even if more specific guidance is required when Congress authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that contemplate criminal sanctions, § 201(h) passes muster. Although it features fewer procedural requirements than the permanent scheduling statute, the section meaningfully constrains the Attorney General by placing multiple specific restrictions on his discretion to define criminal conduct. He must also satisfy § 202(b)'s requirements for adding substances to schedules. Pp. 164-167.
(b) Section 201(h) does not violate the principle of separation of powers by concentrating too much power in the Attorney General, who also wields the power to prosecute crimes. The separation-of-powers principle focuses on the distribution of powers among the three coequal Branches of Government, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382, 109 S.Ct. 647, 659, 102 L.Ed.2d 714, and does not speak to the manner in which Congress parcels out authority within the Executive Branch. Pp. 167-168.
(c) Section 201(h) does not violate the nondelegation doctrine by barring judicial review. Since § 507 of the Act plainly authorizes judicial review of a permanent scheduling order, the effect of the § 201(h) bar is merely to postpone legal challenges to a scheduling order until the administrative process has run its course. Moreover, the § 201(h) bar does not preclude an individual facing criminal charges from bringing a challenge to a temporary scheduling order as a defense to prosecution. In these circumstances, the nondelegation doctrine does not require in addition an opportunity for pre-enforcement review of administrative determinations. Pp. 168-169.
2. The Attorney General did not improperly delegate his temporary scheduling power to the DEA. Section 501(a) of the Act which authorizes delegation of "any of [the Attorney General's] functions" under the Act—permits delegation unless a specific limitation appears elsewhere in the Act. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 512-514, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1825-1826, 40 L.Ed.2d 341. No such limitation appears with regard to the temporary scheduling power. P. 169.
909 F.2d 759 (CA3 1990), affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined.
Jeffrey P. Minear, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
* In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (Act), 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The Act establishes five categories or "schedules" of controlled substances, the manufacture, possession, and distribution of which the Act regulates or prohibits. Violations involving schedule I substances carry the most severe penalties, as these substances are believed to pose the most serious threat to public safety. Relevant here, § 201(a) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to add or remove substances, or to move a substance from one schedule to another. § 201(a), 21 U.S.C. § 811(a).
To combat the "designer drug" problem, Congress in 1984 amended the Act to create an expedited procedure by which the Attorney General can schedule a substance on a temporary basis when doing so is "necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety." § 201(h), 21 U.S.C. § 811(h). Temporary scheduling under § 201(h) allows the Attorney General to bypass, for a limited time, several of the requirements for permanent scheduling. The Attorney General need consider only three of the eight factors required for permanent scheduling. § 201(h)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(3). Rather than comply with the APA notice-and-hearing provisions, the Attorney General need provide only a 30-day notice of the proposed scheduling in the Federal Register. § 201(h)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1). Notice also must be transmitted to the Secretary of HHS, but the Secretary's prior approval of a proposed scheduling order is not required. See § 201(h)(4), 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(4). Finally, § 201(h)(6), 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(6), provides that an order to schedule a substance temporarily "is not subject to judicial review." Because it has fewer procedural requirements, temporary scheduling enables the Government to respond more quickly to the threat posed by dangerous new drugs. A temporary scheduling order can be issued 30 days after a new drug is identified, and the order remains valid for one year. During this 1-year period, the Attorney General presumably will initiate the permanent scheduling process, in which case the temporary scheduling order remains valid for an additional six months. § 201(h)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(2).
The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1. From this language the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another Branch of government. "The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371, 109 S.Ct. 647, 654, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).
We have long recognized that the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches. Id., at 372, 109 S.Ct., at 654. Thus, Congress does not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors. So long as Congress "lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 352, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928).
Petitioners wisely concede that Congress has set forth in § 201(h) an "intelligible principle" to constrain the Attorney General's discretion to schedule controlled substances on a temporary basis. We have upheld as providing sufficient guidance statutes authorizing the War Department to recover "excessive profits" earned on military contracts, see Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778-786, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 1313-1317, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948); authorizing the Price Administrator to fix "fair and equitable" commodities prices, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426-427, 64 S.Ct. 660, 668-669, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); and authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing in the "public interest," see National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-226, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1013-1014, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943). In light of these precedents, one cannot plausibly argue that § 201(h)'s "imminent hazard to the public safety" standard is not an intelligible principle.
Petitioners suggest, however, that something more than an "intelligible principle" is required when Congress authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that contemplate criminal sanctions. They contend that regulations of this sort pose a heightened risk to individual liberty and that Congress must therefore provide more specific guidance. Our cases are not entirely clear as to whether or not more specific guidance is in fact required. Compare Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-250, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 1553-1554, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947), cited in Mistretta, supra, 488 U.S., at 373, n. 7, 109 S.Ct., at 655, n. 7, with Yakus, supra, 321 U.S., at 423-427, 64 S.Ct., at 666-669, and United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518, 521, 31 S.Ct. 480, 483, 484, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911). We need not resolve the issue today. We conclude that § 201(h) passes muster even if greater congressional specificity is required in the criminal context.
Petitioners next argue that the temporary scheduling statute is unconstitutional because it bars judicial review. They explain that the purpose of requiring an "intelligible principle" is to permit a court to " 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.' " Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218, 109 S.Ct. 1726, 1731, 104 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989), quoting Yakus, supra, 321 U.S., at 426, 64 S.Ct., at 668. By providing that a temporary scheduling order "is not subject to judicial review," § 201(h)(6), the Act purportedly violates the nondelegation doctrine.
We disagree. Section 501(a) of the Act states plainly that "[t]he Attorney General may delegate any of his functions under [the Controlled Substances Act] to any officer or employee of the Department of Justice." § 501(a), 21 U.S.C. § 871(a). We have interpreted § 501(a) to permit the delegation of any function vested in the Attorney General under the Act unless a specific limitation on that delegation authority appears elsewhere in the statute. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 512-514, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1825-1826, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). No such limitation appears with regard to the Attorney General's power to schedule drugs temporarily under § 201(h).
I join the Court's opinion but write separately to emphasize two points underlying my vote. The first is my conclusion that the opportunity of a defendant to challenge the substance of a temporary scheduling order in the course of a criminal prosecution is essential to the result in this case. Section 811(h)(6) of Title 21 U.S.C. expressly prohibits direct review of a temporary scheduling order in the Court of Appeals but says nothing about judicial review of such an order in other settings. Under established rules of construction, we must presume from Congress' silence on the matter that it did not intend to foreclose review in the enforcement context. See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120-122, 66 S.Ct. 423, 426-427, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946). See generally McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 888, ----, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510-1512, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). An additional consideration reinforces this principle here. As the Court notes, judicial review perfects a delegated-lawmaking scheme by assuring that the exercise of such power remains within statutory bounds. See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-219, 109 S.Ct. 1726, 1730-1731, 104 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989). Because of the severe impact of criminal laws on individual liberty, I believe that an opportunity to challenge a delegated lawmaker's compliance with congressional directives is a constitutional necessity when administrative standards are enforced by criminal law. Cf. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-839, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 2154-2156, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1362, 1379-1383 (1953). We must therefore read the Controlled Substances Act as preserving judicial review of a temporary scheduling order in the course of a criminal prosecution in order to save the Act's delegation of lawmaking power from unconstitutionality. Cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-604, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2053-2054, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988).
The second point that I wish to emphasize is my understanding of the breadth of the Court's constitutional holding. I agree that the separation of powers doctrine relates only to the allocation of power between the Branches, not the allocation of power within a single Branch. But this conclusion by no means suggests that the Constitution as a whole is indifferent to how permissibly delegated powers are distributed within the Executive Branch. In particular, the Due Process Clause limits the extent to which prosecutorial and other functions may be combined in a single actor. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-487, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602-2603, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Petitioners raise no due process challenge in this case, and I do not understand anything in today's decision as detracting from the teachings of our due process jurisprudence generally.