Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/407/385/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-06-26 01:42:36
Document Index: 635571152

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 2', '§ 610', '§ 371', '§ 205', '§ 610', '§ 406', '§ 205', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 313', '§ 304', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 304', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 610', '§ 304', '§ 304', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 109', '§ 3', '§ 205', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 610', '§ 109', '§ 610', '§ 371', '§ 610', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 304', '§ 304', '§ 610', '§ 3282', '§ 205', '§ 610', '§ 205', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610', '§ 610']

"For the purposes of this section 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exist [sic] for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. [Footnote 1]"
The indictment charged, in essence, that petitioners had conspired from 1963 to May 9, 1968, to establish and maintain a fund that (1) would receive regular and systematic payments from Local 562 members and members of other locals working under the Union's jurisdiction; (2) would have the appearance, but not the reality of being an entity separate from the Union; and (3) would conceal contributions and expenditures by the Union in connection with federal elections in violation of § 610. [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The evidence tended to show, in addition to disbursements of about $150,000 by the fund to candidates in federal elections, an identity between the fund and the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Union and a collection of well over $1 million in contributions to the fund by a method similar to that employed in the collection of dues or assessments. In particular, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
it was established that, from 1949 through 1962, the Union maintained a political fund to which Union members and others working under the Union's jurisdiction were, in fact, required to contribute, and that the fund was then succeeded in 1963 by the present fund, which was, in form, set up as a separate "voluntary" organization. Yet a principal Union officer assumed the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
role of director of the present fund, with full and unlimited control over its disbursements. The Union's business manager, petitioner Lawler, became the first director of the fund, and was later succeeded by petitioner Callanan, whom one Local 562 member described as "the Union" in explaining his influence within the local. Moreover, no significant change was made in the regular and systematic method of collection of contributions at a prescribed rate based on hours worked, and Union agents continued to collect donations at jobsites on Union time. In addition, changes in the rate of contributions were tied to changes in the rate of members' assessments. In 1966, for example, when assessments were increased from 2 1/2% to 3 3/4% of gross wages, the contribution rate was decreased from $1 to 50¢ per day worked, with the result that the change did not cause, in the words of the Union's executive board, "one extra penny cost to members of Local Union 562." At the same time, the contribution rate for nonmembers, who were not required to pay the prescribed travel card fee for working under Local 562's jurisdiction, remained the same at $2 per day worked, approximately matching the total assessment and contribution of members. Finally, in addition to political contributions, the fund used its monies for nonpolitical purposes, such as aid to financially distressed members on strike, and, for a period of a few months, upon the vote of its members, even suspended collections in favor of contributions to a separate gift fund for petitioner Callanan. [Footnote 3] Not surprisingly, various witnesses testified that, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
during the indictment period, contributions to the fund were often still referred to as -- and actually understood by some to be -- assessments, or that they paid their contributions "voluntarily" in the same sense that they paid their dues or other financial obligations. [Footnote 4]
On the other hand, the evidence also indicated that the political contributions by the fund were made from accounts strictly segregated from Union dues and assessments, [Footnote 5] and that donations to the fund were not, in fact, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
necessary for employment or Union membership. The fund generally required contributors to sign authorization cards, which contained a statement that their donations were "voluntary . . . [and] no part of the dues or financial obligations of Local Union No. 562 . . . ," [Footnote 6] and the testimony was overwhelming from both those who contributed and those who did not, as well as from the collectors of contributions, that no specific pressure was exerted, and no reprisals were taken, to obtain donations. [Footnote 7] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Significantly, the Union's attorney who had advised on the organization of the fund testified on cross-examination that his advice had been that payments to the fund could not be made a condition of employment or Local 562 membership, but it was immaterial whether contributions appeared compulsory to those solicited. [Footnote 8]
Under instructions to determine whether, on this evidence, the fund was in reality a Union fund or the contributors' chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
fund, [Footnote 9] the jury found each defendant guilty. The jury also found specially that a willful violation of § 610 was not contemplated, and the trial court imposed chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
sentence accordingly. The Union was fined $5,000, while the individual defendants were each sentenced to one year's imprisonment and fined $1,000. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, petitioners contended that the indictment failed to allege, and the evidence was insufficient to sustain, a conspiracy to violate § 610, and that § 610, on its face or as construed and applied, abridged their rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventeenth Amendments and Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution. They argued further that the special finding by the jury that a willful violation of § 610 was not contemplated effectively resulted in acquittal, since such willfulness was an essential element of the conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The Court of Appeals, in a four-to-three en banc decision, 434 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After we heard oral argument, the President, on February 7, 1972, signed into law the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which in § 205 amends 18 U.S.C. § 610, see infra at 407 U. S. 409-410, effective April 7, 1972. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 406, 86 Stat. 20. We accordingly requested the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the impact of that amendment on this prosecution. [Footnote 10] Having considered those briefs, we now hold that § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act merely codifies prior law, with one possible exception pertinent to this case; that the change in the law, if in fact, made, does not, in any event, require this prosecution to abate; but that the judgment below must, nevertheless, be reversed chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
because of erroneous jury instructions. [Footnote 11] This disposition makes decision of the constitutional issues premature, and we therefore do not decide them. Cf. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Brief for the United States 27 n. 7, quoting Brief for Petitioners 62. See also Brief for the United States 30. This construction of § 610 is clearly correct. [Footnote 12] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The antecedents of § 610 have previously been traced in United States v. Auto Workers and United States v. CIO, both supra. We need recall here only that the prohibition in § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1074, on contributions by corporations in connection with federal elections was extended to labor organizations in the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 163, but only for the duration of the war. As the Court noted in CIO, supra, at 335 U. S. 115,
The prohibition on contributions was then permanently enacted into law in § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 19, with the addition, however, of a proscription on "expenditures" and an extension of both prohibitions to payments in connection with federal primaries and political conventions as well as federal elections themselves. Yet, neither prohibition applied to payments by union political funds in connection with federal elections so long as the funds were financed in some sense by the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The special committees investigating the 1944 and 1946 campaigns devoted particular attention to the activities of the Political Action Committee (PAC) of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) because they had stirred considerable public controversy. See H.R.Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-6 (1945); S.Rep. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-24, 57-59 (1945); H.R.Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 30-31 (1946). See also S.Rep. No. 1, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 (1947). The committee findings were that PAC had been established by the executive board of the CIO in July 1943; that it consisted of a national office and 14 regional offices advising and coordinating numerous state and local political action committees; that its connection to the CIO was close at every level of organization; that its program, adopted by the CIO convention in November, 1943, had included the reelection of President Roosevelt and the election of a "progressive" Congress; that it had initially been financed by sizable pledges from the treasuries of CIO international unions and that some of these funds had been expended in federal primaries; but that, following the nomination in July, 1944, of President Roosevelt for reelection, it was generally financed by $1 contributions knowingly and freely made by individual CIO members; and that these monies were used for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
political educational activities, including "get out the vote" drives, but were not directly contributed to any candidate or political committee. Thus, PAC had limited its direct contributions in federal campaigns to primaries, to which the Act at the time expressly did not apply, and restricted its activities in the elections themselves to so-called "expenditures," rather than "contributions." The Senate Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures concluded in 1945 that, in these circumstances, there was "no clear-cut violation" by PAC of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act. S.Rep. No. 101, supra, at 23. Although there was agreement within the committee that § 313 should be extended to federal primaries and nominating conventions because of their importance in determining final election results, id. at 81-82, [Footnote 13] there was disagreement on whether § 313 should also be amended to proscribe "expenditures" in addition to "contributions." A majority believed that it should not be, in part because the amendment "would tend to limit the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 83. [Footnote 14] Senators Ball and Ferguson, who dissented from this conclusion, nevertheless conceded that even as to "expenditures"
Id. at 24. The chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
House Campaign Expenditures Committee in 1946, however, strongly urged the adoption of a prohibition on "expenditures" in terms condemning the activities of PAC without regard to the source of its fund's. [Footnote 15]
Then, in 1947, Congress made permanent the application of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act to labor organizations and closed the loopholes that were thought to have been exploited in the 1944 and 1946 elections. These changes were embodied in § 304 of the labor bill introduced by Representative Hartley, which was adopted by the House and the conference committee with little apparent discussion or opposition. [Footnote 16] The provision, however, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
copies of the newspaper, and the union can put such matters in the newspaper if it wants to. The union can separate the payment of dues from the payment for a newspaper if its members are willing to do so, that is, if the members are willing to subscribe to that kind of a newspaper. I presume the members would be willing to do so. A union can publish such a newspaper, or unions can do as was done last year, organize something like the PAC, a political organization, and receive direct contributions, just so long as members of the union know what they are contributing to, and the dues which they pay into the union treasury are not used for such purpose."
Senator Taft's view that a union cannot violate the law by spending political funds volunteered by its members was consistent with the legislative history of the War Labor Disputes Act and an express interpretation given to that Act by the Attorney General in 1944. [Footnote 17] His chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
view also reflected concern that a broader application of § 610 might raise constitutional questions of invasion of First Amendment freedoms, and he wished particularly to reassure colleagues who had reservations on that score and whose votes were necessary to override a predictable presidential veto, see 93 Cong.Rec. 7485, of the Labor Management Relations Act. [Footnote 18] We conclude, accordingly, that his view of the limited reach of § 610, entitled, in any event, to great weight, is, in this instance, controlling. Cf. Newspaper Pub. Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U. S. 100, 345 U. S. 106-111 (1953); Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 383, 340 U. S. 392 n. 15 (1951). We therefore hold that § 610 does not apply to union contributions and expenditures from political funds financed in some sense by the voluntary donations of employees. Cf. United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 352 U. S. 592; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 123.
"As used in this section, the phrase 'contribution or expenditure' shall include any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank
86 Stat. 10 (emphasis added). This amendment stemmed from a proposal offered by Representative Hansen on the House floor, see 117 Cong.Rec. 43379, to which the Senate acquiesced in conference. See id. at 46799 (joint conference committee report). Hansen stated that the purpose of his proposal was, with one exception not pertinent here, [Footnote 19] "to codify the court decisions interpreting [and the legislative history explicating] section 610 . . . and to spell out in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
more detail what a labor union or corporation can or cannot do in connection with a Federal election." [Footnote 20] Moreover, there was substantial agreement among his colleagues that the effect of his amendment was, in fact, mere codification and clarification, [Footnote 21] and even those who disagreed did not dispute that voluntarily financed union political funds are permissible. Indeed, Representative Crane, who led the opposition to the Hansen amendment, [Footnote 22] himself had written the House committee provision for which the Hansen amendment was, in effect, substituted. [Footnote 23] Mr. Crane's provision, like the Hansen amendment, was said in some measure to codify existing law, [Footnote 24] and would also have specifically authorized voluntary funds. [Footnote 25] This consensus that has now been captured in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
express terms in § 610 cannot, of course, by itself, conclusively establish what Congress had in mind in 1947. But it does "throw a cross-light'" on the earlier enactment that, together with the latter's legislative history, demonstrates beyond doubt the correctness of the parties' common ground of interpretation of § 610. Michigan Nat. Bank v. Michigan, 365 U. S. 467, 365 U. S. 481 (1961) (quoting L. Hand, J.). Cf. 388 U. S. 194 (1967); NLRB v. Drivers Local Union,@ 362 U. S. 274, 362 U. S. 291-292 (1960).
Brief for the United States in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari 7. See also Brief for the United States 24. The requirement that the fund be separate from the sponsoring union eliminates, in the Government's view, "the corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated powers," United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 352 U. S. 582, which this Court has found to be one of the dual purposes underlying § 610. See id., passim; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 113, 335 U. S. 115. The Government urges, secondly, that, in accordance with the legislative intent to protect minority interests from overbearing union leadership, which we have found to be the other purpose of § 610, see ibid., the fund may not be financed by monies actually required for employment or union membership or by payments that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
are effectively assessed, that is, solicited in circumstances inherently coercive. [Footnote 26] Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that, to be valid, a political fund need not be distinct from the sponsoring union, and, further, that § 610 permits the union to exercise institutional pressure, much as recognized charities do, in soliciting donations. See Brief for Petitioners 71, 73 n. 22.
We think that neither side fully and accurately portrays the attributes of legitimate political funds. We hold that such a fund must be separate from the sponsoring union only in the sense that there must be a strict segregation of its monies from union dues and assessments. [Footnote 27] We hold, too, that, although solicitation by union officials is permissible, such solicitation must be conducted under circumstances plainly indicating that donations are for a political purpose, and that those solicited may decline to contribute without loss of job, union membership, or any other reprisal within the union's institutional power. Thus, we agree with the second half of the Government's position, but reject the first.
As Senator Taft's remarks quoted above indicate, supra at 407 U. S. 406-408. the test of voluntariness under § 610 focuses on whether the contributions solicited for political use are knowing free-choice donations. The dominant concern in requiring that contributions be voluntary was, after all, to protect the dissenting stockholder or union chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Nowhere, however, has Congress required that the political organization be formally or functionally independent of union control or that union officials be barred from soliciting contributions or even precluded from determining how the monies raised will be spent. The Government's argument to the contrary in the first half of its position is based on a misunderstanding of the purposes of § 610. [Footnote 28] When Congress prohibited chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
labor organizations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections, it was, of course, concerned not only to protect minority interests within the union, but to eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections. But the aggregated wealth it plainly had in mind was the general union treasury -- not the funds donated by union members of their own free and knowing choice. Again, Senator Taft adamantly maintained that labor organizations were not prohibited from expending those monies in connection with federal elections. Indeed, Taft clearly espoused the union political organization merely as an alternative to permissible direct political action by the union itself through publications endorsing candidates in federal elections. The only conditions for that kind of direct electioneering were that the costs of publication be financed through individual subscriptions, rather than through union dues, and that the newspapers be recognized by the subscribers as political organs chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
that they could refuse to purchase. [Footnote 29] Neither the absence of even a formally separate organization, the solicitation of subscriptions by the union, nor the method for choosing the candidates to be supported was mentioned as being material. Similarly, the only requirements for permissible political organizations were that they be funded through separate contributions and that they be recognized by the donors as political organizations to which they could refuse support. As Taft said,
Supra at 407 U. S. 406, 407 U. S. 407.
taint of coercion or even any interference. We do not want any money except from those who want to see the reelection of Roosevelt. [Footnote 30]"
PAC was, nevertheless, generally regarded not as a functionally separate organization (except for its method of financing [Footnote 31]) but as an instrumentality of the CIO, itself subsumed within the definition of "labor organization." [Footnote 32] It was, as we have seen, established by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the executive board of the CIO, its program was adopted at the national CIO convention, and its relationship to the CIO was close at every level of organization. [Footnote 33] Furthermore, union agents generally collected contributions, H.R.Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong., chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2d Sess., 5 (1945), and the union leadership was instrumental in choosing candidates to be supported. [Footnote 34] Thus, far from being a separate organization sprouting from the desires of the rank and file to engage in political action, PAC, the paradigm union political fund, was a medium for organized labor, conceived and administered by union officials, to pursue through the political forum the goals of the working man. [Footnote 35] And the only prerequisite for its continued chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This conclusion, too, we find confirmed by § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act, supra, at 407 U. S. 409-410. That provision expressly authorizes "the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation or labor organization. . . ." The provision then states in a proviso clause that
Thus, § 205 plainly permits union officials to establish, administer, and solicit contributions for a political fund. The conditions for that activity are that the fund be "separate" and "segregated," and that its contributions and expenditures not be financed through physical force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal or the "threat" thereof, or through "dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment." The quoted language is admittedly subject to contrary interpretations. "Separate" could (and normally, when juxtaposed to "segregated," would) be read to mean an apartness beyond "segregated"; "threat" could be construed as referring only to the expression of an actual intention to inflict chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Emphasis added.) The debate on the differences between the Crane and Hansen provisions did not involve this language when the Hansen amendment was first introduced and adopted by the House. See ibid. At that point, Hansen merely indicated in general explanation of his amendment that a permissible fund had to be "separate," which, in context, clearly meant "segregated," see 117 Cong.Rec. 43379, [Footnote 36] and that, although the law could not "control chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the mental reaction" of a union member solicited by his union chief, id. at 43381, [Footnote 37] the monies obtained had to come
After the conference committee had adopted the Hansen amendment, however, Crane inserted in the record a Wall Street Journal article suggesting that the Hansen amendment had been inspired by the AFL-CIO to overrule the Court of Appeals decision in this case by authorizing a union political fund even if it is not separate and distinct from the sponsoring union, and by altering the test of voluntariness to focus on the absence of force, rather than on the contributor's intent to make a donation of his own free and knowing choice. See 118 Cong.Rec. 323-324. [Footnote 38] Crane did not significantly elaborate on the article or specifically endorse each of the particular points it made.
"[repeated] . . . that the purpose and effect of my amendment is [sic] to codify and clarify the existing law and not to make any substantive
Id. at 328. [Footnote 39] He stated further that his
"[117 Cong.Rec. 29329. [Footnote 40]]"
We conclude from this legislative history that the term "separate" in the Hansen amendment is synonymous with "segregated." Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the word is to be understood in any other way. To the contrary, Hansen's comments in general explanation of his amendment support that interpretation, as does the use of the term in the Crane provision, with which, Hansen said, his amendment was consistent. Moreover, Hansen did not deny that his amendment departed from the Court of Appeals' insistence in the Pipefitters decision that a permissible political fund be separate and distinct from the sponsoring union; instead, he merely found his amendment consistent with the Government's argument before this Court that political contributions and expenditures cannot be made from dues or assessments. Finally, both the Crane and the Hansen amendments expressly authorize unions to establish and administer voluntary political funds. The Hansen amendment also expressly authorizes union officials to solicit contributions and, as the quoted statement of Senator Dominick indicates, further permits them to determine the disposition of the monies raised. In these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive how a valid political fund can be meaningfully "separate" from the sponsoring union in any way other than "segregated." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Construed as we have done, § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act does nothing more than accomplish the expressed purpose of its author -- that is, codify and clarify prior law. But since we have arrived at our interpretation without reference to prior law, § 205 once again throws on § 610, as embodied in § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act, "a cross-light" that confirms our understanding of the law applicable to this prosecution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As we have seen, supra at 407 U. S. 403, PAC was initially financed from general union treasuries. After the nomination of President Roosevelt for reelection, however, the costs of administration of PAC, as well as its political expenditures, were mainly, although not entirely, financed from a segregated account of voluntary individual donations. The House campaign expenditures committee explained in its 1945 report, H.R.Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong.2d Sess., 5 (1945):
"[I]t is not . . . possible completely to separate the resources and facilities made available to the Political Action Committee even after July 23, 1944 [when Roosevelt became a candidate for reelection], from those of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and its unions. On the national level and in most States, that separation appears to have been preserved so far as cash income and cash expenditures for strictly Political Action Committee. as distinguished from union activities. are concerned. The local distribution of Political Action Committee literature, for example, has been largely handled by volunteers on their own time; and the contributions have largely been taken by shop stewards outside working hours. But no such separation has proved possible where the use of union offices [Footnote 41] and office
In endorsing PAC in the enactment of § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act, Congress clearly had in mind PAC's financial structure after July, 1944. Congress, therefore, may have considered that PAC's activities in the future could be financed only from voluntary donations separate from union dues and assessments, except for incidental expenses such as office space and part-time personnel. Alternatively, in view of the emphasis on protecting minority union interests and maintaining a strict segregation of funds, Congress may have thought that all of PAC's activities, including the costs of administration and solicitation of contributions, had to be paid for exclusively from voluntary contributions. The evidence is strong at least that Congress believed the costs of organization of new union political funds had to be financed in that way. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1945) (statement by Sens. Ball and Ferguson, quoted supra at 407 U. S. 404).
In contrast, the Hansen amendment provides that "it shall be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or anything of value secured" in a prohibited way. Conceivably this language could be read to forbid making contributions or expenditures through the establishment or administration of a political fund or through the solicitation of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
117 Cong.Rec. 43381. At no point in the debate on § 205 did Hansen suggest that his amendment was to be read more broadly than this, despite the fact that the Wall Street Journal article inserted in the record by Representative Crane specifically charged that "union chiefs could use dues money to pay for the soliciting. . . ." 118 Cong.Rec. 323. Furthermore, the exemption for the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions for voluntary political funds was but one of three exceptions to the general rule prohibiting corporations and labor organizations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections. The other two exceptions were communications to, and nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns aimed at, stockholders or union members and their families. In explaining the three exemptions, Hansen clearly regarded each of them as a permissible activity to be financed by general union funds, for each, in his view, was an activity where group chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
interests predominated [Footnote 42] and "the interest of the minority [was] weakest. . . ." 117 Cong.Rec. 43380.
Id. at 43381. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, § 205 may in one respect have impliedly repealed the substantive law relating to this prosecution. [Footnote 43] But we need not now decide that question, because even if there has been such an implied repeal, it would not affect this prosecution for reasons to which we now turn.
The rule is well established that prosecutions under statutes impliedly or expressly repealed while the case is still pending on direct review must abate in the absence of a demonstration of contrary congressional intent or a general saving statute. For, "[p]rosecution for crimes is but an application or enforcement of the law, and if the prosecution continues, the law must continue to vivify it." United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217, 291 U. S. 226 (1934). This doctrine had its earliest expression in 5 U. S. 231 n. 2 (1964). As Chief Justice Hughes observed in Chambers, supra,@ at 291 U. S. 226,
In this case, however, although we do not find a demonstration of contrary congressional intent that would chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
overcome application of this rule if applicable, [Footnote 44] we do hold that the general federal saving statute, 61 Stat. 635, 1 U.S.C. § 109, operates to nullify any abatement of the prosecution. That statute provides in pertinent part:
In United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398 (1888), the Court reviewed an indictment, returned in 1885, alleging that the defendant, an attorney, had in 1883 charged chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
clients in pension cases against the Government $100 and $50, respectively, in violation of a $10 maximum fee established by Act of Congress, June 20, 1878, 20 Stat. 243. Despite the fact that Congress had expressly repealed that Act and raised the maximum permissible fee in pension cases to $25 in 1884, Act of Congress, July 4, 1884, § 3, 23 Stat. 99, the Court sustained the indictment on the basis of the federal saving statute. In Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306 (1964), on the other hand, we held that the saving statute would not nullify abatement of federal prosecutions for trespass in public luncheon facilities following enactment of the public accommodation requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We explained, id. at 379 U. S. 314:
The instant case is controlled by Reisinger, rather than by Hamm. Section 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act may, of course, make lawful what was previously unlawful -- namely, the financing of the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions for voluntary political funds from general union monies. But § 205 does not, in any event, "[substitute] a right for a crime." To the contrary, as in Reisinger and Tynen, it chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Brief for the United States 2 (emphasis added). See also Brief for the United States in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari 11-12. [Footnote 45] This was indeed, as we shall shortly see, the theory on which the indictment was drawn, the jury was instructed, and petitioners' convictions were affirmed. It is also the construction of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
§ 610 that we have rejected in favor of the Government's narrower construction that the prerequisite for a permissible political fund is simply that it not be financed by actual or effective dues or assessments. See supra at 407 U. S. 413-414. On the other hand, we find that the indictment may be read to allege not only that the Pipefitters fund was "a union fund, controlled by the union," but that "contributions to [it] were assessed by the union as part of its dues structure, [and were] collected from non-members in lieu of dues. . . ." For reasons that follow, however, we do not now construe the indictment as making this essential allegation, but leave that question open for determination on remand. We hold now only that the jury instructions failed to require proof of the essential element for conviction, and hence reverse the judgment below.
position that Section 610 . . . prohibits the members, officers, employees, agents, foremen and shop [stewards] of a union from establishing any political organization or fund for the purpose of making contributions and expenditures in connection with [federal] elections . . . [;] . . . whether it is the government's position and theory of the case that the alleged 'regular and systematic collection, receipt, and expenditures of money obtained from working members of Local 562 and from working members of other labor organizations employed under jurisdiction of the defendant Local 562' were voluntary or involuntary collections and contributions. [Footnote 46]"
id. at 56, which the indictment, in the Government's view, impliedly charged in alleging that petitioners "unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did conspire and agree with each other . . . to violate Section 610. . . .'" Id. at 54. The trial court overruled each of petitioners' motions without opinion.
434 F.2d 1120. [Footnote 47] The court then held, ibid.:
This account of the proceedings below indicates that the question of the voluntariness of the contributions to the Pipefitters fund was regarded both at trial and on appeal as a matter relating to, but not essential for, the basic charge of the indictment that Local 562 concealed political contributions of Union monies through the subterfuge of a Union controlled fund. This theory, of course, flies in the face of the legislative history of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We think, nevertheless, that the indictment may be read, consistently with the proper interpretation of § 610, to allege that the contributions to the Pipefitters fund derived from effective dues or assessments. [Footnote 48] But chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
whether the indictment should now be construed in light of the proceedings below to make this allegation is an altogether different question. [Footnote 49] Since this precise question was not addressed below and has not been briefed or argued before us, and since the case must, in any event, be remanded, whereupon the issue may become moot, [Footnote 50] we do not now undertake to decide it. Instead, in the event that the Government chooses to proceed with the indictment before us, petitioners shall have leave to renew their motion to dismiss.
Second. The jury instructions embody an interpretation of § 610 that is plainly erroneous. The trial court refused requests by petitioners for instructions that the jury should acquit if it found that contributions to the Pipefitters fund were made voluntarily. [Footnote 51] Adopting a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"A great deal of evidence has been introduced on the question of whether the payments into the Pipefitters Voluntary . . . Fund by members of Local 562 and others working under its jurisdiction were voluntary or involuntary. This evidence is relevant for your consideration, along with all other facts and circumstances in evidence, in determining whether the fund is a union fund. However, the mere fact that the payments into the fund may have been made voluntarily by some or even all of the contributors thereto does not, of itself, mean that the money so paid into the fund was not union money."
See n 9, supra. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Supra at 407 U. S. 438.
The instructions, as the Court of Appeals confirmed, clearly permitted the jury to convict without finding that donations to the Pipefitters fund had been actual or effective dues or assessments. This was plain error. [Footnote 52]
"In this case, evidence was offered by the Government to the effect that funds were contributed to or on behalf of candidates for federal office and that such funds were paid out upon checks drawn upon the Pipefitters Voluntary Political, Educational, Legislative Charity and Defense Fund. It is necessary, therefore, that the evidence establish that the Pipefitters . . . Fund was in fact, a union fund, that the money therein was union money, and that the real contributor to the candidates was the union. As to this issue, the defendants contend that the fund in question was a bona fide entity separate and apart from the union, established by the voluntary good faith act of members of the pipefitters Local 562 and others, from which contributions to candidates were made on behalf of the persons who created the fund and not on behalf of the union. On the other hand, the Government contends that the fund was a mere artifice or device set up by the defendant and others as a part of the alleged conspiracy to give the outward appearance of being an independent and separate entity, but, in fact, constituting a part of union funds."
"Does § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 [P.L. 92-225] affect the decision in this case, and, if so, with what result? More particularly, does § 205 effect a substantive change in 18 U.S.C. § 610 in any way material to this case, as, for example, by altering any of the attributes of permissible union political organizations, such as the method of organization or administration or the method of solicitation or collection of contributions? If so, must this prosecution abate under the doctrine of United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, and its progeny? Or does the federal saving statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, nullify any abatement of the prosecution? In answering the latter question, what effect should be given to Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306?"
Petitioners Callanan and Lawler died pending our decision. The judgment affirming the convictions of those petitioners will therefore be vacated with directions to the District Court to dismiss the indictment against them. Durham v. United States, 401 U. S. 481 (1971). The remaining petitioners press the argument, rejected by the Court of Appeals, that the special finding by the jury that a willful violation of § 610 was not contemplated amounted to an acquittal, since such willfulness was an essential element of the conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The trial court apparently required a special finding to determine whether the substantive offense that petitioners were charged with conspiring to commit was a misdemeanor or a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 610. That, in turn, was relevant for imposing sentence under § 371. See n 1, supra. Petitioners contend that § 371 punishes a conspiracy to commit a malum prohibitum such as § 610 only when the object of the conspiracy is known to have been unlawful, which, so the argument goes, the jury found not to have been the case here by virtue of its special finding. This argument is not persuasive. Petitioners not only failed to object to the trial court's requirement that the jury return a special finding as inconsistent with the general charge, but also failed to move for acquittal on the ground now offered once the special finding was returned. More important, even assuming, arguendo, the correctness of petitioners' premise that knowledge of the reach of § 610 was a requisite for conviction, but see Keegan v. United States, 325 U. S. 478, 325 U. S. 506 (1945) (Stone, C.J.,dissenting); see generally Developments in the Law -- Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 920, 936-937 (1959), petitioners would still be entitled at best to a new trial, not acquittal. The trial court specifically instructed the jury:
"An act is done 'willfully' if done voluntarily and purposely and with the specific intent to do that which the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law."
"You also point out [the Attorney General wrote] that committees composed of members of unions are engaged in the solicitation of funds from individual union members, and you assert that committees of this kind 'are as much a labor organization as a union organization itself.' This contention is inconsistent with the provisions of the statute. In amending section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act, the [War Labor Disputes Act] provided that, for the purposes of the amendment the words 'labor organization' should have the same meaning they have under the National Labor Relations Act. . . . I think it clear that committees of the kind that you describe are not labor organizations within the meaning of this definition, and they would not be recognized as bargaining agencies by the National Labor Relations Board. Even if it were true that these committees were identical with the labor organizations to which their members belong -- which I believe not to be the fact -- there would still be no violation of law because the statute applies to contributions made by labor organizations and in this case the contributions are made by individuals and not by the committees."
See, e.g., 93 Cong.Rec. 6448, 6522-6523 (exchange between Sen. Pepper, who, in opposing § 304, decried it as Republican legislation in contravention of the First Amendment, and Sen. Ellender, who, as a Democratic representative on the conference committee, rose in support of Sen. Taft's construction). See also United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 335 U. S. 120 (1948).
"As used in this section, the phrase 'contribution or expenditure' shall include any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, of money, or any services, or anything of value to any candidate, compaign [sic] committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this section, including any expenditure in connection with 'get out the vote' activities. Nothing in this section shall preclude an organization from establishing and administering a separate contributory fund for any political purpose, including voter registration or 'get out the vote drives,' if all contributions, gifts, or payments to such fund are made freely and voluntarily, and are unrelated to dues, fees, or other moneys required as a condition of membership in such organization or as a condition of employment."
Following the conference committee report, Crane rose once again in opposition to the Hansen amendment, this time, and for the first time, criticizing the amendment in its treatment of union political funds. The dispute centered then, however, not on whether voluntary funds were permissible, but on exactly what their prerequisites were. See infra at 407 U. S. 422-426.
Brief for the United States 38. As we shall see, infra at 407 U. S. 435-442, the Government's theory in prosecuting this case focused on the first, but not the second, of its arguments here presented.
For the scope of the required segregation of funds, see infra at 407 U. S. 428-432.
"The Supreme Court stated that the other legislative motivation [in addition to the protection of minority interests] for enactment of legislation such as section 610 was the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial contributions. [United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 113.] This consideration would be meaningless if a corporation could make expenditures for activities otherwise forbidden by section 610 by simply obtaining unanimous consent of its shareholders. In the Auto Workers case, the indictment contained no allegation that the expenditure of union funds [to finance television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate at large] was contrary to the wish of members. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the indictment sufficient."
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Auto Workers was misplaced. The indictment there did allege, as we noted, 352 U.S. at 352 U. S. 584,
By saying this, we do not mean to suggest that the result in Lewis was incorrect. To the contrary, an indictment that alleges a contribution or expenditure from the general treasury of a union or corporation in connection with a federal election states an offense. See nn. 47 and < a>| 47 and < a>S. 385fn48|>48, infra. The unanimous vote of the union members or stockholders may at most (but we need not now decide) be a defense.
In United States v. CIO, this Court, of course, went further than Senator Taft's comments would allow by holding that § 304 did not bar a union from using union funds to publish a periodical, in regular course and for distribution to those accustomed to receiving it, that urged union members to vote for a candidate for Congress. The Court, however, arrived at that construction because the contrary interpretation would create "the gravest doubt" of the statute's constitutionality. 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 121.
Hearings before the House Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures on H.Res. 551, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1944). See also id. at 16-17. PAC's method of collection of contributions appears, in large measure, to have been true to Hillman's words, since both its political and voluntary nature were well known. See id. at 51, 76-79, 712-713, 728-729, 800-801, 822-823, 844-845, 851, 864-866, 871, 880, 885-886, 921-925, 928, 935-936, 941, 946, 962, 964, 988, 999, 1017, 1021-1031, 1033-1038, 1041. In some instances complaints were lodged that pressure had been exercised in obtaining donations, and the House Committee noted in its report that in California some PAC monies were taken directly from union treasuries and "that at least one local union . . . , upon vote by its entire membership, levied an assessment of 25 cents per month upon each member. . . ." H.R.Rep. No. 2093, supra, n 13, at 6. This, nevertheless, was recognized as an exception "[to] the general national plan" following Roosevelt's nomination for reelection, under which PAC was generally financed by individual contributions "largely . . . taken by shop stewards outside working hours." Id. at 5. Indeed, the amount of individual contributions actually collected by PAC evidences that it successfully informed CIO members that donations were not mandatory assessments. Cf. L. Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds 61 (1946). From an estimated CIO membership of five million, PAC might have collected $5 million at the requested rate of $1 a member. Yet the national PAC office, which received 50¢ of each $1 donated, obtained only $376,910.77 in 1944, S Rep. No. 101, supra, n 14, at 23, suggesting contributions by less than 800,000 CIO members. See also H.R.Rep. No. 2739, supra, n 13, at 31 ($218,415.98 received in 1946).
See infra at 407 U. S. 428-429.
Indeed, in a letter to regional PAC directors, the national PAC office itself referred to the organization "as an instrumentality of the Congress of Industrial Organizations." S.Rep. No. 101, supra, n 14, at 22. See also Hearing before the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures on S.Res. 263, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1944) (testimony of Sidney Hillman) ("We just speak and act for the C.I.O. organizations"); House Hearings, supra, n 30, at 839-840 (testimony of state PAC president) (local PAC is agent of union local). It is true that Senator Taft stated at one point in the Senate debates that "[t]he PAC is a separate organization which raises its own funds for political purposes, and does so perfectly properly." 93 Cong.Rec. 6437 (1947) (emphasis added). But if meant to indicate anything more than that PAC had a formal identity separate from the CIO, this isolated statement was clearly inconsistent with well known facts about the organization. Moreover, neither Taft nor any of his colleagues appears to have attached any particular significance to the statement. Nor can we, in view of Taft's endorsement of direct union electioneering through political newspapers paid for through subscriptions. See supra at 407 U. S. 406-408, 407 U. S. 416-417. It is also true that the Attorney General, in his letter to Senator Moore in 1944, opined that committees like PAC were not "labor organizations" within the meaning of the War Labor Disputes Act, inasmuch as they were not bargaining agencies. See n 17, supra. But the Senate Campaign Expenditures Committee, implicitly in 1945, and the House Committee, expressly in 1946, rejected that conclusion. See S.Rep. No. 101, supra, n 14, at 23; H.R.Rep. No. 2739, supra, n 13, at 43 (quoted in n 15, supra). See also House Hearings, supra, n 30, at 27 (whether PAC was a "labor organization" "highly debatable" in opinion of PAC counsel).
In particular, the article quoted "a man at the Justice Department" as saying that "[t]he (Hansen) provision . . . not only doesn't codify existing law, but it overrules existing law'"; stated that Hansen had
asserted that, under the Hansen amendment, "union chiefs . . . wouldn't be required to tell members for what purpose the money [solicited] is going"; and quoted an Associate Deputy Attorney General as reporting the Government's position to be "that a contribution to a political fund [must] be not only "voluntary," in the sense of an absence of force, but also knowingly made.'"
"I will say to the gentleman that what he is saying will be the legitimate legislative history, and that what somebody down in the Department of Justice, some Assistant Attorney General's opinion [see n 38, supra], is worth exactly as much as the piece of paper it is printed on, no more and no less."
Supplemental Brief for the United States 7. Representative Hansen, to be sure, did state in the debate that this prosecution would not abate. See supra at 407 U. S. 425. But he also indicated that the effect of his amendment on pending cases was not, and should not be, a matter of concern:
118 Cong.Rec. 329. More important, Hansen's view that this prosecution would continue was possibly premised, as we have seen, on a mistaken understanding of what § 610 previously provided in terms pertinent to this case. If his understanding was, in fact, mistaken, we would have to assume that Congress would intend the general rule of abatement "applicable as part of the background against which [it] acts," Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, 379 U. S. 314 (1964), to prevail.
"In our opinion [the court there explained], the allegation in the indictment that the corporation made an 'expenditure' for the stated purpose necessarily infers [sic] an allegation that general corporate funds were used. Corporate expenditures normally come from a corporation's general funds, and not from some independent fund contributed by shareholders or otherwise obtained."
366 F.2d 713.
Compare, e.g., Hagner v. United States, 285 U. S. 427 (1932); United States v. Comyns, 248 U. S. 349 (1919), and Dunlop v. United States, 165 U. S. 486 (1897), with, e.g., United States v. Boston & M. R. Co., 380 U. S. 157, 380 U. S. 159 n. 1 (1965), and Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749 (1962).
Although two of the petitioners died pending decision in this case, see n 11, supra, the Government may decide on remand to seek a new indictment against the remaining petitioners. The present indictment charges that the conspiracy continued up to the date of the indictment, May 9, 1968, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy on July 14, 1967, in which case it does not appear that the five-year statute of limitations governing noncapital offenses has run. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 353 U. S. 396-397 (1957). See also United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398 (1888) (indictment valid, though returned after law repealed).
Petitioners offered seven instructions on "voluntariness." Two merely used the term without further definition, while others referred to whether the contributions constituted union dues or assessments or were made by the donors for political purposes. See App. 1096-1100. Hereafter, proper instructions on the question of voluntariness may be framed in terms of the application to the proofs of the language of § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act as herein construed. See supra at 407 U. S. 421-427.
The Court of Appeals did not directly rule on the validity of the instructions because, in the majority's view petitioners had failed to preserve their objections on appeal. See 434 F.2d 1125. See also id. at 1128 (Matthes, C.J.,concurring). The dissent below makes a strong argument to the contrary, see id. at 1135 (Lay, J.), but we need not address the question, since the instructions were plainly erroneous, the claim of error was brought to the attention of the trial court, and we may notice a plain error not presented. See, e.g., Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717 (1962). See also 434 F.2d 1130 (Heaney, J., dissenting), 1135 (Lay, J., dissenting).
The decision of the Court today will have a profound effect upon the role of labor unions and corporations in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The majority opinion holds that unions lawfully may make political contributions so long as they come from funds voluntarily given to the union for such purpose. The Court seeks to buttress this holding by a long and scholarly presentation of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 610. But some of that history invites conflicting inferences, and the background of § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, to which the majority also devotes extensive attention, is of dubious value in interpreting an earlier statute which on its face is clear and unambiguous. [Footnote 2/1]
any federal election. Despite this unqualified proscription, the majority opinion sustains the right of unions and corporations to make political contributions directly, provided only that the funds therefor come voluntarily from members, employees, or stockholders and are maintained separately from the other funds of the union or corporation. [Footnote 2/2] With all respect, this holding is precisely contrary to the express language of the law. At the risk of unnecessary repetition I set forth in juxtaposition the operative language in § 610 as contrasted with that of the Court's holding:
Ante at 407 U. S. 409.
If words are given their normal meaning, the statute and the Court's holding flatly contradict each other. One says that it shall be unlawful for a union to make a political contribution or expenditure. The other says this is perfectly lawful, so long as the funds which the union contributes or expends were donated freely and knowingly. The Court has simply added a qualification, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court's holding, moreover, directly counters the purposes for which § 610 was enacted. Congress passed this legislation to restrict and minimize the influence corporations and unions might exert on elections. In United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 335 U. S. 113 (1948), with respect to corporations, the Court stated:
Id. at 335 U. S. 115.
The two principal motivations for the enactment of 610, as identified in CIO, are (i) the minimizing of influence of labor unions (as well as corporations) on elections "through monetary expenditures"; and (ii) the elimination of the unfairness "to individual union members" of allowing union management to make political chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To be sure, there is some language in the congressional debates which emphasizes the freedom of union members, as well as that of employees and stockholders of corporations, to make uncoerced political contributions. No one contests this basic freedom. But whatever may have been said in congressional debates, courts are bound by what is written into legislation. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to resort to legislative history. Nor can such history, however illuminating it may seem, be relied upon to contradict, or dilute, or add unspecified conditions to statutory language which is perfectly clear. Where statutory provisions were "clear and unequivocal on their face," the Court has found "no need to resort to the legislative history of the Act." United States v. Oregon., 366 U. S. 643, 366 U. S. 648 (1961). As Justice Black observed, "[n]o legislative history can justify judicial emasculation" of the unambiguous language of a statute. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U. S. 409, 347 U. S. 437 (154) (dissenting). [Footnote 2/3]
Accepting, as I think we must, § 610 as written, the issue in this case is whether the political fund of Local chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
434 F.2d 1121. It is not normally the function of this Court in a case of this kind to determine whether a jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence. It may not be inappropriate, however, to say -- in light of the record before us -- that the evidence was more than sufficient to show that union officials supervised closely the collection of the "contributions," sought "contributions" in much the same manner as compulsory assessments, viewed them as part of the total cost burden which the union member had to bear, expended them freely both for union projects and political purposes, and so generally commingled the administration of the fund with the administration of the union as to entitle the jury to believe the gifts by Local 562 from the fund to candidates for federal office constituted union political contributions in violation of § 610. [Footnote 2/4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is from this interpretation of § 610 -- one which, in my view, will render the statute largely ineffectual -- that I dissent. [Footnote 2/5]
The consequences of today's decision could be far-reaching indeed. The opinion of the Court provides a blueprint for compliance with § 610, as now construed, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
which will be welcomed by every corporation and union which wishes to take advantage of a heretofore unrecognized opportunity to influence elections in this country. [Footnote 2/6]
By refusing to affirm the judgment below, the majority renders the ultimate fate of this litigation uncertain. If, on remand, the techniques of Local 562 should be sanctioned, other unions and corporations could easily follow Local 562 and obtain from members, employees, and shareholders a consent form attesting that the contribution (or withholding) is "voluntary." The trappings of voluntariness might be achieved while the substance of coercion remained. Union members and corporate employees might find themselves the objects of regular and systematized solicitation by the very agent which exercises direct control over their jobs and livelihood. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 130 U. S. 670-671 (1889); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 354 U. S. 305 (1957); United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210, 251 U. S. 217 (1920).
Even on the issue of voluntariness, which the Court of Appeals rightly found "relevant and material," though "not controlling," 434 F.2d 1120, the evidence was impressive that the collection scheme was inherently coercive. Since Local 562 had consistently collected contributions to its political funds since 1949, "contributions" appear to have become a customary de facto condition to union membership or employment within Local 562's jurisdiction. Moreover, the regularity of these contributions -- week by week and year by year and each in the same amount as requested by the union -- seems suspiciously incompatible with the concept of free-will gifts.