Source: https://m.openjurist.org/978/f2d/166
Timestamp: 2019-11-19 21:37:25
Document Index: 356680559

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5']

978 F2d 166 United States v. Peters | OpenJurist
978 F. 2d 166 - United States v. Peters
978 F2d 166 United States v. Peters
978 F.2d 166
Ronald PETERS and Thomas Pullen, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 92-4356
Both defendants pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge. The Pre-Sentencing Report for both defendants established a final offense level of nineteen. The base offense level for conspiring to violate the munitions export laws was assessed at twenty-two. This level was reduced by three for failure to complete the substantive offense, § 2X1.1(b)(2), and two for acceptance of responsibility. § 3E1.1(a). Two points were added to each defendant for playing a managerial role in the offense. § 3B1.1(c). Since both Peters and Pullen had a criminal history category I, the resulting sentence range for both was thirty to thirty-seven months, plus two to three years supervised release and fines.
The term sophisticated weaponry was not defined in the Guidelines, but its meaning was addressed by this court in United States v. Nissen, 928 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.1991). We held that the 1990 amendment to § 2M5.2 may be considered in determining whether items should be considered sophisticated weaponry under the pre-amendment provision. Id. at 695. That amendment provided that the base offense level should be twenty-two, or fourteen if the offense involved only ten or fewer non-fully-automatic small arms. § 2M5.2 (as amended Nov. 1, 1990). In light of that clarification of § 2M5.2's intended meaning, we decided that "the lower base offense level [of pre-1990 § 2M5.2] is reserved for truly minor exports of military equipment." Nissen, 928 F.2d at 695.
In making its determination, the district court referred to the clarification of § 2M5.2 by the 1990 amendment. Peters and Pullen argue that using the amendment to interpret the earlier provision amounted to an ex post facto application of the amendment. The Supreme Court has held that a criminal law is ex post facto if it is retrospective and disadvantages an offender by altering matters of substance. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). Defendants rely on United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.1990), which held that an amendment to § 1B1.3 could not be retroactively applied because it substantially changed that provision. Id. at 1022. Two important distinctions exist between this case and Suarez. First, the question in Suarez was under which set of terms--pre-amendment or post-amendment--the defendant could be sentenced. Here, the district court sentenced both defendants under the terms of pre-amendment § 2M5.2 by determining whether or not sophisticated weaponry was involved.2 Reference to the amendment was only made in order to clarify the meaning of the pre-amendment section.
Finally, Pullen complains of the district court's failure to grant a downward departure for his sentence. A claim that the court improperly failed to reduce a sentence will succeed only if the court's failure to depart violated the law. United States v. Mitchell, 964 F.2d 454, 462 (5th Cir.1992). The district court departed for Peters after a § 5K1.1 motion and sentenced him to twelve months. Pullen argues that he should have been given a similar sentence because (1) his sentence should be comparable to Peters' sentence; (2) the government made the oral equivalent of a § 5K1.1 motion at sentencing; and (3) his military service and commendations warranted a downward departure. We disagree with each of these contentions.
The fact that another party received a lesser sentence for the same offense does not make a sentence within the guideline range improper. See United States v. Puma, 937 F.2d 151, 156 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1165, 117 L.Ed.2d 412 (1992). The district court was justified in giving Peters and Pullen different sentences because the government acknowledged that Peters' cooperation was substantial. Courts give substantial weight to the government's evaluation of a defendant's assistance. § 5K1.1, comment. (n. 3). Peters promptly and completely disclosed his involvement to investigators, and convinced Pullen to plead guilty. Pullen has failed to point to similar assistance to the government.
We are not persuaded that Pullen's military service and receipt of two purple hearts and a distinguished flying cross compel a departure from the sentencing guidelines. The primary focus of the sentencing guidelines is on the crime committed rather than on the individual offender. See United States v. Reyes-Ruiz, 868 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Bachynsky, 934 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (en banc). The Guidelines discourage departing on the basis of a variety of individual characteristics including previous employment record and community ties. §§ 5H1.5, 5H1.6. An individual's service to the community does not justify a departure from the Guidelines. United States v. O'Brien, 950 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 64, 121 L.Ed.2d 31 (1992). Without deciding, as some circuits have,4 whether or not military service could ever justify a departure, we conclude that the facts of this case do not present such extraordinary circumstances as to require departure on the basis of this individual characteristic.5 The district court committed no violation of law in declining to depart downward from the guideline sentence range in Pullen's case.
The district court may rely upon information in the PSR which has some minimum indicium of reliability. United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 214, 116 L.Ed.2d 172 (1991)
See United States v. McCaleb, 908 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that military service could justify departure); United States v. Neil, 903 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir.1990) (accord). In neither McCaleb nor Neil, however, was a departure based on military service found warranted