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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1927', '§ 1927', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1982', '§ 1982', '§ 1920', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 2072', '§ 5', 'art, 461', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 552', '§ 470', '§ 1988', '§ 1710', '§ 1117', '§ 107', '§ 1631', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1982', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988']

MAREK V. CHESNEY, 473 U. S. 1 (1985) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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Held: Petitioners are not liable for the attorney's fees incurred by respondent after petitioners' offer of settlement. Pp. 474 U. S. 5-12. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
BURGER, C.J.,delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., post, p. 473 U. S. 12, and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 473 U. S. 13, filed concurring opinions. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 473 U. S. 13. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Prior to trial, petitioners made a timely offer of settlement "for a sum, including costs now accrued and attorney's fees, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
720 F.2d 476. We, too, reject respondent's argument. We do not read Rule 68 to require that a defendant's offer itemize the respective amounts being tendered for settlement of the underlying substantive claim and for costs.
This construction of the Rule best furthers the objective of the Rule, which is to encourage settlements. If defendants are not allowed to make lump-sum offers that would, if accepted, represent their total liability, they would understandably chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
720 F.2d 477.
The second question we address is whether the term "costs" in Rule 68 includes attorney's fees awardable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. By the time the Federal Rules of Civil chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The authors of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 were fully aware of these exceptions to the American Rule. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 54(d), 28 U.S.C.App. p. 621, contains an extensive list of the federal statutes which allowed for costs in particular cases; of the 35 "statutes as to costs" set forth in the final paragraph of the Note, no fewer than 11 allowed for attorney's fees as part of costs. Against this background of varying definitions of "costs," the drafters chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Here, respondent sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a prevailing party in a § 1983 action may be awarded attorney's fees "as part of the costs." Since Congress expressly included attorney's fees as "costs" available to a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit, such fees are subject to the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68. This "plain meaning" interpretation of the interplay between Rule 68 and § 1988 is the only construction that gives meaning to each word in both Rule 68 and § 1988. [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, Rule 68's policy of encouraging settlements is neutral, favoring neither plaintiffs nor defendants; it expresses a clear policy of favoring settlement of all lawsuits. Civil rights plaintiffs -- along with other plaintiffs -- who reject an offer more favorable than what is thereafter recovered at trial will not recover attorney's fees for services performed after the offer is rejected. But, since the Rule is neutral, many civil rights plaintiffs will benefit from the offers of settlement encouraged by Rule 68. Some plaintiffs will receive compensation in settlement where, on trial, they might not have recovered, or would have recovered less than what was offered. And, even for those who would prevail at trial, settlement will provide them with compensation at an earlier date without the burdens, stress, and time of litigation. In short, settlements, rather than litigation, will serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congress, of course, was well aware of Rule 68 when it enacted § 1988, and included attorney's fees as part of recoverable costs. The plain language of Rule 68 and § 1988 subjects such fees to the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68. Nothing revealed in our review of the policies underlying § 1988 constitutes "the necessary clear expression of congressional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The question presented by this case is whether the term "costs," as it is used in Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Footnote 2/1] and elsewhere throughout the Rules, refers simply chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I dissent. The Court's reasoning is wholly inconsistent with the history and structure of the Federal Rules, and its application to the over 100 attorney's fees statutes enacted by Congress will produce absurd variations in Rule 68's operation chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court's "plain language" analysis, ante at 473 U. S. 11, goes as follows: Section 1988 provides that a "prevailing party" may recover "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Rule 68 in turn provides that, where an offeree obtains a judgment for less than the amount of a previous settlement offer, "the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer." Because "attorney's fees" are "costs," the Court concludes, the "plain meaning" of Rule 68 per se prohibits a prevailing civil rights plaintiff from recovering fees chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Roadway Express, the petitioner argued that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976 ed.) (which at that time allowed for the imposition of "excess costs" on an attorney who "unreasonably and vexatiously" delayed court proceedings), [Footnote 2/6] "costs" chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court today restricts its discussion of Roadway to a single footnote, urging that that case "is not relevant to our decision" because "§ 1927 came with its own statutory definition of costs," whereas "Rule 68 does not come with a definition of costs." Ante at 473 U. S. 9-10, n. 2. But this purported "distinction" merely begs the question. As in Roadway, the question we face is whether a cost-shifting provision "come[s] with a definition of costs" -- that set forth in § 1920 in an effort chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
First. The limited history of the costs provisions in the Federal Rules suggests that the drafters intended "costs" to mean only taxable costs traditionally allowed under the common law or pursuant to the statutory predecessor of § 1920. [Footnote 2/8] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Second. The Rules provide that "costs" may automatically be taxed by the clerk of the court on one day's notice, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 54(d) -- strongly suggesting that "costs" were intended to refer only to those routine, readily determinable charges that could appropriately be left to a clerk, and as to which a single day's notice of settlement would be appropriate. Attorney's fees, which are awardable only by the court chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Fourth. With the exception of one recent Court of Appeals opinion and two recent District Court opinions, the Court can point to no authority suggesting that courts or attorneys have ever viewed the cost-shifting provisions of Rule 68 as including attorney's fees. [Footnote 2/12] Yet Rule 68 has been in effect for 47 years, and potentially could have been applied to numerous fee statutes during this time. "The fact that the defense chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Fifth. We previously have held that words and phrases in the Federal Rules must be given a consistent usage and be read in pari materia, reasoning that to do otherwise would "attribute a schizophrenic intent to the drafters." Id. at 450 U. S. 353. Applying the Court's "plain language" approach consistently throughout the Rules, however, would produce absurd results that would turn statutes like § 1988 on their heads and plainly violate the restraints imposed on judicial rulemaking by the Rules Enabling Act. For example, Rule 54(d) provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." [Footnote 2/13] Similarly, the plain language of Rule 68 provides that a plaintiff covered by the Rule "must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer" -- language requiring the plaintiff to bear both his postoffer costs and the defendant's postoffer costs. [Footnote 2/14] If "costs" as used in these provisions were interpreted to include attorney's fees by virtue of the wording of § 1988, losing civil rights plaintiffs would be required by the "plain language" of Rule 54(d) to pay the defendant's attorney's fees, and prevailing plaintiffs falling within Rule 68 would be required to bear the defendant's postoffer attorney's fees. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Had it addressed this troubling consequence of its "plain language" approach, perhaps the Court would have acknowledged that such a reading would conflict directly with § 1988, which allows an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant only where "the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant," [Footnote 2/15] and that the substantive standard set forth in § 1988 therefore overrides the otherwise "plain meaning" of Rules 54(d) and 68. But that is precisely the point, and the Court cannot have it both ways. Unless we are to engage in "schizophrenic" construction, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, supra, at 450 U. S. 360, the word "costs" as it is used in the Federal Rules either does or does not allow the inclusion of attorney's fees. If the word "costs" does subsume attorney's fees, this "would alter fundamentally the nature of " civil rights attorney's fee legislation. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 762. To avoid this extreme result while still interpreting Rule 68 to include fees in some circumstances, however, the Court would have to "select on an ad hoc basis those features of § 1988 . . . that should be read into" Rule 68 -- a process of construction that would constitute nothing short of "standardless judicial lawmaking." Ibid. [Footnote 2/16] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congress has enacted well over 100 attorney's fees statutes, many of which would appear to be affected by today's decision. As the 472 U. S. Congress has employed a variety of slightly different wordings in these statutes. It sometimes has referred to the awarding of "attorney's fees as part of the costs," to "costs including attorney's fees," and to "attorney's fees and other litigation costs." Under the "plain language" approach of today's decision, Rule 68 will operate to include the potential loss of otherwise recoverable attorney's fees as an incentive to settlement in litigation under these statutes. But Congress frequently has referred in other statutes to the awarding of "costs and a reasonable attorney's fee," of "costs together with a reasonable attorney's fee," or simply of "attorney's fees," without reference to costs. Under the Court's "plain language" analysis, Rule 68 obviously will not include the potential loss of otherwise recoverable attorney's fees as a settlement incentive in litigation under these statutes, because they do not refer to fees "as" costs. [Footnote 2/17] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The untenable character of such distinctions is further illustrated by reference to the various civil rights laws. For example, suits involving alleged discrimination in housing are chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
frequently brought under both the Fair Housing Act of 1968 [Footnote 2/22] and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 [Footnote 2/23] and suits involving alleged gender discrimination are often brought under both the Equal Pay Act of 1963 [Footnote 2/24] and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [Footnote 2/25] Yet because of the variations in wording of the attorney's fee provisions of these statutes, today's decision will require that fees be excluded from Rule 68 for purposes of the Fair Housing Act, [Footnote 2/26] but included for purposes of § 1982, [Footnote 2/27] and that fees be excluded for purposes of the Equal Pay Act [Footnote 2/28] but included for purposes of Title VII. [Footnote 2/29] It will be difficult enough to apply Rule 68 to the numerous cases seeking relief under both "fees as costs" and "fees and costs" statutes. [Footnote 2/30] More importantly, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, many statutes contain several fees-award provisions governing actions arising under different subsections, and the phraseology of these provisions sometimes differs slightly from section to section. It is simply preposterous to think that Congress or the drafters of the Rules intended to sanction differing applications of Rule 68 depending on which particular subsection of, inter alia, the Privacy Act of 1974, [Footnote 2/33] the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, [Footnote 2/34] the Outer Continental chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In sum, there is nothing in the history and structure of the Rules or in the history of any of the underlying attorney's fee statutes to justify such incomprehensible distinctions based simply on fine linguistic variations among the underlying fees-award statutes -- particularly where, as in Roadway Express, the cost provision can be read as embodying a uniform definition derived from § 1920. As partners with Congress, we have a responsibility not to carry "plain language" constructions to the point of producing "untenable distinctions and unreasonable results." American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 456 U. S. 71 (1982). See also 473 U. S. 378 (dissenting opinion), interpreting Rule 68 to allow a "two-tier system of cost-shifting" would attribute "woode[n] and pervers[e]" motives to Congress and to the drafters of the Rules;
on a uniform basis. [Footnote 2/37] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court is wrong. Congress has instructed that attorney's fee entitlement under § 1988 be governed by a reasonableness standard. [Footnote 2/38] Until today, the Court always has recognized that this standard precludes reliance on any mechanical "bright-line" rules automatically denying a portion of fees, acknowledging that such "mathematical approach[es]" provide "little aid in determining what is a reasonable fee in light of all the relevant factors." 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 435-436, n. 11. Although the starting point is always "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation," this "does not end the inquiry": a number of considerations set forth in the legislative history of § 1988 "may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward." Id. at 461 U. S. 433-434 (emphasis added). [Footnote 2/39] We also have emphasized that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Of course, a civil rights plaintiff who unreasonably fails to accept a settlement offer, and who thereafter recovers less than the proffered amount in settlement, is barred under § 1988 itself from recovering fees for unproductive work performed in the wake of the rejection. This is because "the extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees," 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 440 (emphasis added); hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" must be excluded from that calculus, id. at 461 U. S. 434. To this extent, the results might sometimes be the same under either § 1988's reasonableness inquiry or the Court's wooden application of Rule 68. Had the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
But the results under § 1988 and Rule 68 will not always be congruent, because § 1988 mandates the careful consideration of a broad range of other factors, and accords appropriate leeway to the district court's informed discretion. Contrary to the Court's protestations, it is not at all clear that "[t]his case presents a good example" of the smooth interplay of § 1988 and Rule 68, ante at 473 U. S. 11, because there has never been an evidentiary consideration of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the respondent's fee request. It is clear, however, that, under the Court's interpretation of Rule 68, a plaintiff who ultimately recovers only slightly less than the proffered amount in settlement will per se be barred from recovering trial fees even if he otherwise "has obtained excellent results" in litigation that will have far-reaching benefit to the public interest. Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, at 461 U. S. 435. Today's decision necessarily will require the disallowance of some fees that otherwise would have passed muster under § 1988's reasonableness standard, [Footnote 2/41] and there is nothing in § 1988's legislative history even vaguely suggesting that Congress intended such a result. [Footnote 2/42] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This sort of so-called "incentive" is fundamentally incompatible with Congress' goals. Congress intended for "private citizens . . . to be able to assert their civil rights," and for "those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws" not to be chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Other difficulties will follow from the Court's decision. For example, if a plaintiff recovers less money than was offered before trial, but obtains potentially far-reaching injunctive or declaratory relief, it is altogether unclear how the Court intends judges to go about quantifying the "value" of the plaintiff's success. [Footnote 2/48] And the Court's decision raises chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
are difficult policy questions, and I do not mean to suggest chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
that stronger settlement incentives would necessarily conflict with the effective enforcement of the civil rights laws. But contrary to the Court's 4-paragraph discussion, the policy considerations do not all point in one direction, and the question of whether and to what extent attorney's fees should be included within Rule 68 has provoked sharp debate in Congress, in the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules, and among commentators. [Footnote 2/50] The Court has offered some interesting chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
arguments based on an economic analysis of settlement incentives and aggregate results. Ante at 473 U. S. 10. But I believe Judge Posner had the better of this argument in concluding that the incentives created by interpreting Rule 68 in its current form to include attorney's fees would "cu[t] against the grain of section 1988," and that, in any event, a modification of Rule 68 to encompass fees is for Congress, not the courts. 720 F.2d 479.
28 U.S.C. § 2072. [Footnote 2/51] This grant is limited, however, by the condition that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Ibid. The right to attorney's fees is "substantive" under any reasonable definition of that term. Section 1988 was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the House and Senate Reports recurrently emphasized that "fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain . . . compliance" with the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 443, n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also 720 F.2d 479 (§ 1988 "does not make the litigation process more accurate and efficient for both parties; even more clearly than the statute of limitations [at issue in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U. S. 530 (1949)], it is designed instead to achieve a substantive objective -- compliance with the civil rights laws"). [Footnote 2/53]
or instead operates to abridge a substantive right "in the guise of regulating procedure." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 312 U. S. 10, 312 U. S. 14 (1941) (emphasis added); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 380 U. S. 464-465 (1965). Unlike those provisions of the Federal Rules that explicitly authorize an award of attorney's fees, Rule 68 is not addressed to bad faith or unreasonable litigation conduct. The courts always have had inherent authority to assess fees against parties who act "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For several years now, both the Judicial Conference and Congress have been engaged in an extensive reexamination of Rule 68, and have considered numerous proposals to amend the Rule to include attorney's fees. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules initially proposed an amendment to Rule 68 in August, 1983, that would have applied equally to plaintiffs and defendants and that would have left application of the Rule's fee provisions in the courts' informed discretion. [Footnote 2/56] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The proposal received extensive criticism, [Footnote 2/57] and subsequently was replaced with a revised version in September, 1984. The attorney's fee provisions of that proposal would chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
apply only if a court determined that "an offer was rejected unreasonably," and the proposal sets forth detailed factors for assessing the reasonableness of the rejection. [Footnote 2/58] Public chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the meantime, numerous revisions of § 1988 have been proposed in Congress in recent years. A 1981 proposal would have imposed a rule similar to that adopted by the Court today, [Footnote 2/60] but it drew sharp opposition during legislative hearings [Footnote 2/61] and never was voted out of Subcommittee. Subsequent proposals to the same effect have had a similar fate. [Footnote 2/62] In 1984, legislation was introduced that would have adopted the same rule but subject to the qualification that the failure to accept a settlement offer "was not reasonable at the time chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This activity is relevant in two respects. First, it rather strongly suggests that neither the Advisory Committee nor Congress has viewed Rule 68 as currently governing attorney's fees, else the proposals to amend Rule 68 to include attorney's fees would largely be unnecessary. Second, the Committee and Congress have given close consideration to a broad range of troubling issues that would be raised by application of Rule 68 to attorney's fees, such as (1) whether to import a reasonableness standard into Rule 68, (2) whether and to what extent district courts should have discretion in applying the Rule, (3) the need to revise Rule 68 so as to ensure that offerees have had sufficient time and discovery to evaluate the strength of their cases and the reasonableness of settlement offers, (4) application of the Rule to suits for nonpecuniary relief, (5) application of the Rule to class-action litigation, (6) conflicts of interest between attorneys and clients that the Rule might create, and (7) the precise nature and scope of the sanction. Many of the proposals discussed above have been carefully crafted to address these problems. See nn. 473 U. S. 56, 473 U. S. 58, and 473 U. S. 63, supra.
Congress and the Judicial Conference are far more institutionally competent than the Court to resolve this matter. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(B) Statutes that do not refer to attorney's fees as part of the costs. Many other fee statutes do not describe fees "as" costs, but instead as an item separate from costs. Typical formulations include "costs and a reasonable attorney's fee," "costs together with a reasonable attorney's fee," and "costs, expenses, and a reasonable attorney's fee." Some statutes simply authorize awards of fees without any reference to costs. Under the Court's "plain language" approach, none of these formulations "defin[e] costs' to include attorney's fees." Ibid. Thus, where an action otherwise is governed by Rule 68, attorney's fees that are potentially awardable under these statutes are not subject to Rule 68, and instead chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
21. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, 94 Stat. 3002, 16 U.S.C. § 470w-4. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
39. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
57. Shipping Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 3132, 46 U.S.C.App. § 1710(h)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. III). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
11. Trademark Act, 60 Stat. 439, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1117. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
29. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 71, 29 U.S.C. § 107. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
46. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2430, 43 U.S.C. § 1631(c). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Rule 68 modifies the general cost-shifting provisions set forth in Rule 54(d). See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S. 346, 450 U. S. 351-356 (1981); 473 U. S. 13, infra. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 54(d) emphasized that the terms of the statutory predecessor of § 1920 were "unaffected by this rule" -- suggesting that the drafters did not intend to alter the uniform definition of costs set forth in that statute. 28 U.S.C.App. p. 621. Moreover, the drafters cited to an article as authority on "the present rule" which emphasized
The Court's major argument is that, when Rule 68 was drafted in 1938, there already was a disparity in the phraseology of fees-award statutes such that many provisions authorized the award of fees "as" costs, and that it is therefore "very unlikely" that the drafters intended a uniform definition of costs. Ante at 473 U. S. 7-9. As set forth above, however, the limited history strongly indicates that the drafters intended to secure uniform rules on costs, and that the uniform definition contained in the statutory predecessor of § 1920 would be "unaffected" by the Rules. See supra at 473 U. S. 18 and this page, and 473 U. S. 353, "the most reasonable inference," ante at 473 U. S. 9, contrary to the Court's pronouncement, is that Rule 68 was intended to conform to § 1920 and to the general policy of uniformity in applying the Rules.
Attorney's fee awards in actions under § 1982 are governed by the terms of § 1988. See 473 U. S. 3, supra.
Indeed, the "plain language" of § 1988 authorizes the inclusion as "costs" only of those attorney's fees that have been determined to be "reasonable," see 473 U. S. 3, supra, so the cost-shifting provisions of Rule 68 necessarily will come into play only with respect to reasonable attorney's fees.
Given that Congress enumerated factors to consider in applying the reasonableness standard, see nn. 473 U. S. 4, 473 U. S. 39, supra, and given that the per se provisions of Rule 68 were nowhere mentioned in the legislative history, there is no basis to believe that Congress intended to modify the reasonableness standard in the context of settlement offers. Moreover, as we previously have noted, Congress' use of the word "costs" in § 1988 had one purpose, and one purpose only: to permit an award of attorney's fees against a State notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 437 U. S. 693-695 (1978); S.Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5; H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, at 7.
Like the question of injunctive relief, see 473 U. S. 157 (1982). Rule 68 makes no distinctions between individual and class actions. Yet, as the Advisory Committee recently has cautioned, in the class action context
In addition to the sources cited in nn. 473 U. S. 57, 473 U. S. 59, and 473 U. S. 61, infra, see, e.g., Branham, Offer of Judgment and Rule 68: A Response to the Chief Justice, 18 John Marshall L.Rev. 341 (1985); Fiss, Comment, Against Settlements, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Studies 55 (1982); Simon, Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship Between Offer of Judgment and Statutory Attorney's Fees, 53 U.Cin.L.Rev. 889 (1984); Notes, The Impact of Proposed Rule 68 on Civil Rights Litigation, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 719 (1984); Note, Rule 68: A "New" Tool for Litigation, 1978 Duke L.J. 889; Offer of Judgment and Statutorily Authorized Attorney's Fees: A Reconciliation of the Scope and Purpose of Rule 68, 16 Ga.L.Rev. 482 (1982); The "Offer of Judgment" Rule in Employment Discrimination Actions: A Fundamental Incompatibility, 10 Golden Gate L.Rev. 963 (1980); Notes, The Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68: Toughening the Sanctions, 70 Iowa L.Rev. 237 (1984).