Source: https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/426.005
Timestamp: 2019-03-25 16:57:47
Document Index: 675610911

Matched Legal Cases: ['§25', '§1', '§5', '§3', '§11', '§125', '§203', '§381', '§23', '§160', '§15', '§1', '§1', '§47']

ORS 426.005 - Definitions for ORS 426.005 to 426.390 - 2017 Oregon Revised Statutes
2017 ORS Vol. 10 Chapter 426 Section 426.005
2017 ORS 426.005¹
(a) “Community mental health program director” means the director of an entity that provides the services described in ORS 430.630 (Services to be provided by community mental health programs) (3) to (5).
(b) “Director of the facility” means a superintendent of a state mental hospital, the chief of psychiatric services in a community hospital or the person in charge of treatment and rehabilitation programs at other treatment facilities.
(c) “Facility” means a state mental hospital, community hospital, residential facility, detoxification center, day treatment facility or such other facility as the authority determines suitable that provides diagnosis and evaluation, medical care, detoxification, social services or rehabilitation to persons who are in custody during a prehearing period of detention or who have been committed to the Oregon Health Authority under ORS 426.130 (Court determination of mental illness).
(d) “Licensed independent practitioner” means:
(A) A physician, as defined in ORS 677.010 (Definitions for chapter);
(B) A nurse practitioner certified under ORS 678.375 (Nurse practitioners) and authorized to write prescriptions under ORS 678.390 (Authority of nurse practitioner and clinical nurse specialist to write prescriptions or dispense drugs); or
(C) A naturopathic physician licensed under ORS chapter 685.
(e) “Nonhospital facility” means any facility, other than a hospital, that is approved by the authority to provide adequate security, psychiatric, nursing and other services to persons under ORS 426.232 (Emergency admission) or 426.233 (Authority of community mental health program director and of other individuals).
(f) “Person with mental illness” means a person who, because of a mental disorder, is one or more of the following:
(B) Unable to provide for basic personal needs that are necessary to avoid serious physical harm in the near future, and is not receiving such care as is necessary to avoid such harm.
(ii) Who, within the previous three years, has twice been placed in a hospital or approved inpatient facility by the authority or the Department of Human Services under ORS 426.060 (Commitment to Oregon Health Authority);
(g) “Prehearing period of detention” means a period of time calculated from the initiation of custody during which a person may be detained under ORS 426.228 (Custody), 426.231 (Hold by licensed independent practitioner), 426.232 (Emergency admission) or 426.233 (Authority of community mental health program director and of other individuals).
(2) Whenever a community mental health program director, director of the facility, superintendent of a state hospital or administrator of a facility is referred to, the reference includes any designee such person has designated to act on the person’s behalf in the exercise of duties. [1961 c.706 §25; 1973 c.838 §1; 1987 c.903 §5; 1989 c.993 §3; 1993 c.484 §11; 2001 c.900 §125; 2007 c.70 §203; 2009 c.595 §381; 2009 c.828 §23; 2011 c.720 §160; 2013 c.360 §15; 2015 c.433 §1; 2015 c.461 §1; 2017 c.356 §47]
Evidence that 19-year-old was disoriented, unco­op­er­a­tive and unable to understand directives of of­fi­cers during his incarcera­tion in county jail, and that such disorienta­tion may have been result of having taken LSD, was insufficient to support finding that he was “mentally ill per­son” within meaning of this sec­tion, absent evidence that he would be dangerous to himself or others in the future. State v. Lucas, 31 Or App 947, 571 P2d 1274 (1977)
Evidence that peti­tioner thought he was part of “interplanetary system that placed him above the law,” and that he was “angry, curt, aggressive and hostile in his verbal behavior,” was insufficient to show that defendant was dangerous to himself or others within meaning of this sec­tion. State v. Nelson, 35 Or App 57, 580 P2d 590 (1978)
Evidence with respect to peti­tioner’s prior commit­ments was relevant for purpose of determining nature and extent of peti­tioner’s mental disorder. State v. Watkins, 35 Or App 87, 581 P2d 90 (1978)
Where individual testified he heard voices talking to him from television and radio, admitted thinking about killing self and others, but denied he ever would, conclusion of one of two professional examiners that individual “could” become dangerous to others fell short of reasonable certainty of predicted dangerous behavior re­quired for commit­ment under this sec­tion. State v. Fry, 36 Or App 297, 585 P2d 354 (1978)
Where doctors’ reports informed court only that individual suffered from “depression” and was “irresponsible” and de­scribed mental state as “confused-fears” and there was no showing on what basis doctors reached conclusion patient was danger to self and others and could not care for self, evidence was insufficient for beyond reasonable doubt finding under this sec­tion. State v. Arnold, 36 Or App 869, 586 P2d 93 (1978)
Where evidence indicated that at time of commit­ment hearing, appellant had place to stay and though she had been given notice to vacate current housing, she was cognizant of necessity to move in near future and of factors involved in moving; it was not sufficient to show she was “mentally ill per­son” under (2)(b) of this sec­tion. State v. Arnston, 47 Or App 477, 614 P2d 1214 (1980)
Where primary evidence to support conclusion concerning peti­tioner’s dangerousness were his state­ments about “getting things fixed” in Washington, D.C. and he claimed no desire or ability to carry out his concerns, this was not sufficient to find him mentally ill per­son under this sec­tion. State v. Jepson, 48 Or App 411, 617 P2d 284 (1980)
General deteriora­tion in health not accompanied by specific dangerous condi­tion does not es­tab­lish that per­son is “dangerous to self.” State v. LeHuquet, 54 Or App 895, 636 P2d 467 (1981)
Where trial court found medical examiner’s evidence “skimpy” and based determina­tion of plaintiff’s mental state on plaintiff’s demeanor in court but did not state what that demeanor was, there was not clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff was mentally ill. State v. Waites, 71 Or App 366, 692 P2d 654 (1984)
Defendant Was Unable to Meet Her Basic Personal Needs for Food and Shelter Due to Mental Illness Where
Defendant was seriously malnourished when not under doctor’s care; she had no credible plan to acquire adequate nutri­tion in future, minimized danger faced from malnutri­tion and had history of failing to follow through with plans for care; she had no family or friends who would assist her. State v. Johnson, 117 Or App 237, 843 P2d 985 (1992)
Although medical examiners concluded that defendant could not provide for basic needs and defendant lived homeless lifestyle, evidence was not “highly probable” that defendant could not provide basic needs because testimony indicated that defendant had thought about future care. State v. Stanley, 117 Or App 327, 843 P2d 1018 (1992)
Establishing that per­son is “dangerous to self” does not require threat of immediate harm. State v. Jacobson, 142 Or App 371, 922 P2d 670 (1996)
Alleged mentally ill per­son need not have been twice committed for treat­ment in order to have been twice “placed” in hospital or approved inpatient facility. State v. Hilliard, 195 Or App 538, 98 P3d 767 (2004), Sup Ct review denied
Where per­son made vague but threatening state­ments, including talking about having weapons, wanting to burn down per­son’s workplace and trying to run over per­son’s estranged husband with per­son’s car, but where state­ments were unaccompanied by any overt act to carry them out or any overt violent act, state­ments do not es­tab­lish that per­son is highly likely to engage in actual future violence and is danger to others. State v. G.A.K., 281 Or App 815, 384 P3d 555 (2016)