Source: http://www.miami-criminal-lawyer.net/caselaw/2009/09/page/2/
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 06:26:03
Document Index: 192380215

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 5', '§ 1', '§ 12', '§ 92', '§ 92', '§ 92', 'Art.18', '§ 12', '§ 933', '§ 933', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 933', '§ 12']

September « 2009 « Florida Criminal Law Opinions
F.C. v. State, Case No. 2D08-4420 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
F.C., Appellant,
Case No. 2D08-4420.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Tosha Cohen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ha Thu Dao, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Based on B.B.P. v. State, 841 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), Williams v. State, 590 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), and the State’s concession of error, we
summarily reverse F.C.’s conviction for trafficking in stolen property, direct dismissal of the delinquency petition, and order F.C.’s discharge. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(b).
NORTHCUTT, VILLANTI, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
Nelson v. State, No. 4D09-1966 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
LEE NELSON, Appellant,
No. 4D09-1966
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Marc H. Gold, Judge; L.T. Case No. 08-15715 CF10A.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mark J. Hamel, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant was charged with one count of possession of cocaine and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and pled no contest to the charges. The circuit court accepted the plea, denied appellant’s motion for alternative sentencing under Florida Statutes section 948.20 (drug offender probation) and sentenced appellant to 37.2 months in prison. The State concedes, and we agree, that the circuit court erred in failing to consider the motion for alternative sentencing for the circuit court’s stated reason that appellant was “not eligible” for alternative sentencing under section 948.20 since he had prior non-felony drug convictions. In Nelson v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D1743 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 26, 2009) (Nelson I), another case involving this same defendant, this court recently clarified that a defendant with prior non-felony convictions is eligible for alternative sentencing under section 948.20. Id.
As in Nelson I, we reverse the sentence and remand so that the circuit court may reconsider appellant’s motion for alternative sentencing under the plain language of section 948.20. We emphasize that the circuit court retains the discretion to decide the merits of appellant’s motion under the statute’s provisions and nothing in this opinion should suggest an outcome thereof.
Delgado v. State, No. 3D08-1008 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
Rogelio Delgado, Appellant,
No. 3D08-1008.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Rosa I. Rodriguez, Judge, Lower Tribunal No. 06-16939-B.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before COPE, LAGOA, and SALTER, JJ.
Rogelio Delgado appeals his conviction and sentence for burglary of an occupied conveyance, petit theft, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and kidnapping. The issue before us1 is whether Delgado committed kidnapping when he and a co-defendant jumped into a pickup truck left running by its driver and drove away with a two-year-old child asleep in the truck, seat-belted into the back seat. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and therefore affirm the conviction.
The Truck and the Child: Testimony at Trial
In May 2006, Mr. Gonzalez drove his two-door pickup truck to a furniture store. His girlfriend, Ms. Alvarado, sat in the front seat. His aunt sat in the back seat of the extended cab next to Ms. Alvarado’s two year old daughter, who was asleep in a car seat. Mr. Gonzalez and his aunt started to move the furniture that was to be loaded into the bed of the truck, but they asked Ms. Alvarado to help.
When Ms. Alvarado exited the vehicle and walked into the store to help, the truck’s engine was running and the keys were in the ignition. In a matter of minutes, and before Ms. Alvarado returned to the door of the furniture store, Delgado and his co-defendant commandeered the pickup truck and drove away. Surveillance video recorded the perpetrators and the theft.
The victims immediately reported the theft of the truck with the child inside it, and Ms. Alvarado reported that she had noticed two men in the area. The police found the truck within 30 minutes, about 3.6 miles away from the site of the theft. The truck was in the back of a business parking lot. The engine was still running and the doors were not locked. A detective opened the driver’s side door and saw the child in back in the car seat.2 The child’s eyes were puffy from crying, and mucus was on her face, but she was otherwise unharmed.
Importantly, the truck cab had been ransacked; the radio had been removed, and Mr. Gonzalez’s tools had been taken as well. Police officers used the surveillance video to search for Delgado, and they found him that evening.
At the close of the State’s case, Delgado moved for a judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge based on Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983). The motion was denied, and Delgado was convicted of burglary of an occupied conveyance, petit theft, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and kidnapping.
Subparagraph 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2006), defines “kidnapping” to include “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to …
[c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony.” Paragraph (1)(b) of the statute applies to the child in this case: “Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian.”
In Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 1983), the Florida Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether the evidence in a particular case is sufficient to support a separate charge of kidnapping:
If a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement:
In this case, Delgado argues that he was unaware of the sleeping child in the back seat when he committed the felony of grand theft auto. It follows, he contends, that the confinement or abduction of the child did not facilitate the theft of the vehicle, and thus that his motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted.
We review the motion de novo, but in doing so we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128 (Fla.
2006), including conclusions “that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence.” Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 657 (Fla. 2000). In this case, it is reasonable to infer from the evidence that Delgado became aware that the child was confined in the truck in the course of removing the radio, taking the owner’s tools, and ransacking the interior of the vehicle in an obvious search for other valuables (if not at the time Delgado jumped into the front seat).
Faison requires “movement or confinement,” not both. Here the confinement of the child continued through the theft of contents within the vehicle and even after Delgado’s abandonment of the unlocked, still-idling vehicle. The continued confinement of the child in this case was essential to Delgado’s attempt to avoid apprehension for the theft of the vehicle and its contents. Only through an anonymous tip of some kind3 or a voluntary surrender could Delgado have avoided the inference that his successful consummation of the theft of the truck and its contents was more important to him than the continued and dangerous confinement of the helpless child.
Each of Faison‘s three elements was satisfied. The confinement of the child was not slight, inconsequential, and “merely incidental” to the theft of the truck and contents. To the contrary, once Delgado drove away with someone else’s child, he moved from the realm of a crime against property to that of a crime against persons. The Court of Appeals of Indiana considered similar facts (a carjacker drove away an automobile that had been left running in the driveway with the front doors open and children, ages four and seven, in carseats in the back) and addressed the special danger to the children:
We discern that the legislature had it in mind in enacting this part of the kidnapping statute to prevent persons from being exposed to that special danger, that increased probability of injury or death, which results when one is seized and confined or transported in a commandeered vehicle. The message intended for the would-be wrong-doer, is that if you are going to steal or commandeer a vehicle, let the people in it go and don’t force people into it against their will.
Taylor v. State, 879 N.E.2d 1198, 1202-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1375, 1378 (Ind. 1984)). North Carolina recognizes this special danger as well by recognizing a “kidnapping in the second degree” with a lesser range of punishment if “the person kidnapped was released in a safe place by the defendant and had not been seriously injured or sexually assaulted.”4 Although the Florida statute does not include such language, the “special danger” analysis of
kidnapping squares neatly with the “not slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental” element of Faison.
The second and third elements of Faison were plainly satisfied as well. Kidnapping a child is not inherent in the nature of the theft of a vehicle and the property within the vehicle, and the confinement of the child had significance independent of those crimes. As already noted, the continuation of that confinement substantially lessened Delgado’s risk of detection and apprehension.5
The trial court did not err in denying Delgado’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
1. Delgado raised a second issue as well, but his arguments on the point have no merit.
2. The detective testified that he did not have to get in the front seat and look back in order to see the child. After opening the driver’s side door, he “moved the seat over a little bit, then there was a little crease and then I looked and then I could see her, then I folded the car seat forward because I remember having a clear view of the little girl.”
3. While we naturally agree with defense counsel’s assertion that there is no statute or case law imposing such a duty, the failure to attend to the child’s safety (immediately upon becoming aware of her presence) extended her involuntary confinement. The jury could reasonably and fairly infer that Delgado’s abandonment of the confined child was to facilitate commission of the theft by avoiding detection and apprehension. Because Delgado and his co-defendant were the only persons who knew the location of the truck and the child for 30 minutes or more, Delgado extended the time of confinement by keeping that information to himself.
4. N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-39(b) (2008).
5. In Robinson v. State, 757 So. 2d 1267,1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the Fourth District affirmed the conviction of a defendant who “stole a car containing a child in a car seat.” The facts recited in that opinion, however, do not report the point at which the defendant became aware of the child.
Williams v. State, No. 4D07-4659 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
NELSON A. WILLIAMS, Appellant,
No. 4D07-4659.
Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Edward A. Garrison, Judge, L.T. Case No. 96-7773 CFA06.
Silvia M. Gonzalez, Miami Lakes, for appellant.
The defendant appeals the summary denial of his motion to vacate his plea, based on allegations that he was not advised of the deportation consequences of the plea. In State v. Green,, 944 So. 2d 208, 218 (Fla. 2006), the Florida Supreme Court reiterated requirements that a defendant: (1) allege and prove that he or she would not have entered the plea if informed of the possibility of deportation, and (2) state in the Rule 3.850 motion how he or she will prove that the immigration warning was not given. The defendant failed to comply with both of these requirements. In addition, the defendant failed to allege that he was not otherwise subject to deportation. See Sabnani v. State, 5 So. 3d 808, 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
However, as to all three defects, remand is necessary for the trial court to provide the defendant with at least one opportunity to amend his motion to correct these defects if, in good faith, he can do so. See Buton v. State, 995 So. 2d 1130, 1332 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). To then deny the motion, the trial court must decide that the motion is legally insufficient, that the claims are conclusively refuted by the record and attach to the order portions of the record demonstrating this, or hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion. See Rodriguez v. State, 954 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
FARMER, TAYLOR and GERBER, JJ., concur.
Wilson v. State, No. 4D08-3264 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
BRYAN KEITH WILSON, Appellant,
No. 4D08-3264
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Larry Schack, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562005CF004625A.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Wolfe, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
The circuit court conducted a violation of probation hearing and found that the defendant violated his probation. The defendant claims in this direct appeal that his counsel was ineffective, and that the facts giving rise to the claim are apparent on the face of the record. See Jones v. State, 815 So. 2d 772, 772 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“[Ineffective assistance of counsel will only be addressed on direct appeal for the first time when the facts giving rise to the claim are apparent on the face of the record, a conflict of interest is shown, or prejudice to the defendant is shown.”).
We affirm because the reasons for counsel’s choices on how to proceed during the violation of probation hearing are not apparent from the face of the record. This opinion, however, is without prejudice to the defendant raising his claim in an appropriate motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We make no comment on whether such a motion would have merit or not.
STEVENSON, J., and BROWN, LUCY CHERNOW, Associate Judge, concur.
Johnson v. State, Case No. 1D08-4976 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
SIRRON J. JOHNSON, Appellant,
Case No. 1D08-4976.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County, Mark H. Mahon, Judge.
Sirron J. Johnson, pro se, Appellant.
ON MOTION TO WITHHOLD THE ISSUANCE OF THE MANDATE
Appellee, State of Florida, has moved that we withhold issuance of the mandate in this case. The State reasons that because Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), is now pending briefing in the Supreme Court, State v. Isaac, 4 So. 3d 677 (Fla. 2009), we should warehouse this, and other cases, until the Supreme Court decides the controlling issue in Isaac, which is, of course, whether
Florida will retroactively apply the rule in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Fully understanding the State’s position, we nonetheless deny the motion. Because harmless error analysis is mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Galindez v. State 955 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2007), we deem it more efficient to remand for such analysis as we did in the opinion in this case. No matter what the outcome in Isaac, the possibility exists that harmless error analysis will dispose of this and other cases pursuant to the reasoning in Galindez.
BARFIELD, KAHN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.
Benjamin v. State, No. 3D09-1339 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
Robert T. Benjamin, Appellant,
No. 3D09-1339
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David Miller, Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 01-5367
Robert T. Benjamin, in proper person.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SUAREZ, SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
On Robert T. Benjamin’s proper motion for rehearing, we grant rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion dated June 24, 2009, and substitute the following:
Robert T. Benjamin seeks to reverse a trial court order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. We reverse and remand.
Benjamin was convicted of strong-arm robbery and sentenced to a term of forty years in prison, with a thirty-year mandatory minimum sentence as a Violent Career Criminal (VCC)1, and a concurrent fifteen-year mandatory minimum as a prison release reoffender (PRR)2. On post-conviction motion, Benjamin argued that his VCC sentence is illegal because he does not have a prior qualifying offense under the VCC statute. According to the record of the oral pronouncement of sentence, one of the defendant’s qualifying offenses was battery on a law enforcement officer. The Florida Supreme Court has held that battery on a law enforcement officer is not a qualifying offense for VCC sentencing. State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007); De la Portilla v. State, 2 So. 3d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
In this case, the trial court denied relief on the theory that Benjamin had previously made this same claim and the claim was denied.3 However, because of
the severity of the sentence, this case fits squarely within the `manifest injustice’ exception set forth in State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2003); see also State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 840 (Fla. 2007) (stating that an illegal conviction falls within the concept of manifest injustice); Cribbs v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D1782 (Fla. 2d DCA, Aug. 28, 2009) (holding that, although defendant’s VCC sentence claim was previously denied and affirmed on appeal and would typically be collaterally estopped, the court is compelled to correct a manifest injustice).
We therefore grant Benjamin’s motion for rehearing, vacate the VCC sentence and remand for resentencing. At resentencing, the State may attempt to establish that Benjamin qualifies for an enhanced sentence under any other applicable portion of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2001).
Reversed, VCC sentence vacated, and remanded for resentencing.
1. Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2001); the defendant states that his offense date was February 15, 2001.
2. Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).
3. See Romeo v. State, 965 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), which reminds the court that, as a procedural matter, when there is a denial on the basis that the same issue has previously been disposed of on the merits, the correct procedure is to attach the previous motion and denial so it is made part of the post-conviction record on appeal. Here, the trial court did not do so. See also Lopez v. State, 946 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
Nelson v. State, Case No. 1D08-6159 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
KENNETH NELSON, Appellant,
Case No. 1D08-6159.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County, Linda F. McCallum, Judge.
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Giselle Denise Lylen, Assistant Attorney General, and Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Kenneth Nelson, Appellant, seeks review of the summary denial of his timely pro se motion to withdraw his plea, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.170(l). Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to appoint conflict-free counsel to assist him in arguing his motion. As the Florida Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Sheppard v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S477 (Fla. Aug. 27, 2009), reveals, the trial court’s options were to either strike the motion as a nullity or to appoint conflict-free counsel. Because the trial court did not exercise either of these options, it erred. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In Sheppard, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S477, the Florida Supreme Court recognized a “limited exception to the rule of striking pro se pleadings as nullities.” Id. at S477. Under Sheppard, when a represented defendant files a timely pro se Rule 3.170(l) motion, the trial court should first determine whether the motion is “based on allegations giving rise to an adversarial relationship, such as counsel’s misadvice, misrepresentation, or coercion that led to the entry of the plea.” Id. at S481. If the motion is based on such allegations and the allegations are not conclusively refuted by the record, the trial court is required to hold a limited hearing with the defendant, defense counsel, and the State to determine whether “it appears . . . that an adversarial relationship between counsel and the defendant has arisen.” Id. After the hearing, the trial court must appoint conflict-free counsel if it finds that an adversarial relationship exists between the defendant and defense counsel and the motion’s allegations are not conclusively refuted by the record. Id.
Because this rule is only an exception to the general policy of striking pro se motions filed by represented parties, when a trial court determines that it is not required to appoint conflict-free counsel under Sheppard, its only option is to strike the motion as a nullity. See id. at S477.
Because Sheppard was decided during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court has not yet considered the standards adopted in that opinion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to consider the motion to withdraw based on the procedures outlined in Sheppard.
HAWKES, C.J. and LEWIS, J., CONCUR; THOMAS J., CONCURS WITH OPINION.
I write to urge the Florida Supreme Court to consider the negative impact of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l). The Court’s opinion in Sheppard v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S477, S481 (Fla. August 27, 2009), states that “the wisdom of the rule is not before us.” Id. at S481 n.7. I question the wisdom of rule 3.170(l). This rule imposes high costs and heavy burdens on the administration of justice by creating an entitlement to a second lawyer at public expense, where mandated by the rule and Sheppard.
I note Judge Warner’s thoughtful special concurrence in Williams v. State, and I fully agree that
a motion to withdraw the plea after sentencing is not a critical stage of the proceedings, as the defendant has already pled and been sentenced. Therefore, the “proceedings” are in fact at an end with sentencing. Rule 3.170(l) is a collateral, judicially-created proceeding which is not essential to due process. . . . It has proved costly with little, if any, benefit.
959 So. 2d 830, 832-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (Warner, J., specially concurring).
I respectfully suggest that the better view is that motions to withdraw pleas after sentencing are postconviction proceedings. Thus, a movant in such a case would not be entitled to the appointment of counsel as a matter of right. See Murray v. Giarratano, 429 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1979); Deen v. Wilson, 1 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Rather, trial courts could require defendants seeking to
withdraw their plea after sentencing to file a motion to discharge their counsel and, if granted, allow a defendant to move pro se to withdraw the plea, either within a 30-day window or pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
While it is true that it is far better to have legal representation whenever possible, I think such a decision is properly left to the Legislature where not mandated by organic law. See, e.g., Deen v. Wilson, 1 So. 3d 1179, 1181-83 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (containing a general discussion of various legislative enactments providing for capital postconviction counsel and conflict counsel at trial). It is for the Legislature to provide additional publicly-funded counsel in cases where the organic law does not require such appointments. To date, the United States Supreme Court has not established such a requirement.
I concur in the majority opinion, however, as
State v. Moreno-Gonzalez, No. 3D08-1094 (Fla. App. 9/30/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
Alfredo Moreno-Gonzalez, Appellee.
No. 3D08-1094.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Israel Reyes, Judge, Lower Tribunal No. 07-16793.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Nikole Hiciano, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Martin L. Roth, for appellee.
Before COPE, CORTIÑAS, and LAGOA, JJ.
We review a trial court order suppressing evidence on the ground that the officer did not sign the affidavit in support of the search warrant. Although the affidavit was not signed, it is undisputed that probable cause was shown by the officer swearing to the allegations in the affidavit under oath before the judge, initialing each of the pages of the affidavit, and also initialing each of the three pages of the search warrant.
Article I of the Florida Constitution sets forth a declaration of certain rights. Among these is the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. In order to protect this right, Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution provides that:
Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.
The sentence, requiring this right to “be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,” was added in a 1982 amendment to Article I, Section 12. The Commentary to this section details the history of the 1982 amendment as follows:
The exclusionary rule, which holds that evidence obtained in violation of a person’s right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible as evidence, was recognized by Florida courts in 1927, Gildrie v. State, 113 So. 704 (Fla. 1927), and was first placed in the state constitution in its 1968 revision.
From the mid-1970′s to the early 1980′s, federal courts began developing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule such that evidence could be admitted when an officer reasonably and in good faith believed the search or seizure was lawful. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). In a series of state cases, Florida courts rejected the opportunity to adopt a good faith exception, finding that the citizens of Florida provided themselves with greater protection from governmental intrusion than that afforded by the federal constitution. State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981); Hoberman v. State, 400 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1981). In response, the governor, attorney general, state prosecutors, and the law enforcement community supported a joint resolution in the 1982 Regular Session, which would have engrossed a good faith exception onto the constitutional exclusionary rule. Significant opposition precluded its passage in the regular session.
In Special Session H, the “conformity” language that was ultimately adopted was presented as a compromise and was approved for ballot placement. Opponents filed suit to enjoin the amendment from appearing on the ballot, asserting that the ballot summary was misleading and did not fully advise the electors of its effect. Grose v. Firestone, 422 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1982). The Florida Supreme Court allowed the measure to remain on the ballot and it was adopted.
William A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney, Commentary to 1982 Amendment, 25A, Fla. Stat. Ann., Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. (2004).
Thus, prior to passage of the 1982 revisions to Article I, Section 12, Florida courts “were free to provide its citizens with a higher standard of protection from governmental intrusion than that afforded by the federal constitution.” State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1983). With this amendment, however, Florida courts became bound to follow the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court with relation to the Fourth Amendment, and provide no greater protection than those interpretations. See State v. Butler, 655 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 1995) (“This Court is bound, on search and seizure issues, to follow the opinions of the United States Supreme Court regardless of whether the claim of an illegal arrest or search is predicated upon the provisions of the Florida or United States Constitutions.”) (citations omitted); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 992 (Fla. 1988). Indeed, an exclusionary rule that was once constitutionally mandated in Florida can now be eliminated by judicial decision of the United States Supreme Court. Bernie, 524 So. 2d at 990-91. We note that our Supreme Court has not addressed the post-1982 interplay of the above-quoted sentences in Article I, Section 12, where a search warrant was procured upon probable cause shown by an officer who swore to the allegations in the affidavit under oath before the judge,
initialed each of the pages of the affidavit, and also initialed each of the three pages of the search warrant but did not sign the affidavit.
We are guided by the rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole. Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2008); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 406-07 (Fla. 2006); United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salgado, No. 3D07-461, 2009 WL 2382408 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 5, 2009). “Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992). While our colleague in dissent would have us exclusively focus our inquiry on the words “supported by affidavit,” we are required to construe the right against unreasonable searches and seizures “in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.
Our dissenting colleague inappropriately relies on State v. Tolmie, 421 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), which was a 1982 case that was decided prior to the effective date of the 1982 amendment requiring Florida courts to follow the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court with relation to the Fourth Amendment. Unless otherwise stated, the effective date for an amendment to the Florida Constitution is the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January
following the election. Art. XI, § 5(e), Fla. Const. Thus, Tolmie was decided prior to January 4, 1983, the effective date of the 1982 amendment, at a time that the Florida Constitution permitted Florida courts to more strictly interpret the Fourth Amendment and thus require that the failure to sign a search warrant affidavit was fatal. However, through a constitutional amendment approved by Florida voters, since January 4, 1983 to the present, that is no longer the law. Instead, as the Florida Supreme Court has held, “the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution brings this state’s search and seizure laws into conformity with all decisions of the United States Supreme Court rendered before and subsequent to the adoption of that amendment . . . .” Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d at 992.
In construing the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.” United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965); see United States v. Mendoza, 491 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1974). The Court has held that
[T]he Fourth Amendment’s commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the teachings of the Court’s cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108 (emphasis added).
To argue that this holding is not binding on Florida courts after the approval of the 1982 amendment to our Constitution is to ignore the will of the people. The very first words of the Florida Constitution provide that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.” Art. I, § 1, Fla. Const. The people have spoken and required that, under our Constitution, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure “shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. Yet, our dissenting colleague would do precisely what the United States Supreme Court dictated should not be done, that is, invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a “hypertechnical” manner despite the fact that the contents of the affidavit were sworn to under oath and each page initialed by the officer. Respectfully, the absence of a case that is identical to this one does not
give judicial officers the authority to ignore the “teachings of the Court’s cases” and the clear dictate that “[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.” With respect to the issue of technical flaws in an affidavit, there is no doubt that the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly addressed and spoken on this issue. So clear are the Supreme Court’s teachings on this issue that there is not a single Federal case that would support the dissent’s view. Under our state constitution, we must adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court’s teachings and dictates.
The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to require that probable cause must be supported by oath or affirmation, and not necessarily by an affidavit. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 158 (1927); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. 448, 451 (1806); see also Christofferson v. Washington, 393 U.S. 1090, (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Language in these Supreme Court decisions has been relied upon to support the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not require sole reliance upon an affidavit, see United States ex rel. Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 516, 522 (3d Cir. 1973), and Federal Circuit Courts have held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require that the basis for probable cause be established in a written affidavit . . . .” United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1994).
In Mendoza, the federal Fifth Circuit addressed a case analogous to the one before us where the search warrant affidavit was signed by a different officer than the one making the declarations in the affidavit. Stating it was following the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the court found that the technical deficiency was not fatal because both officers swore under oath that the contents of the affidavit were true and correct. The court, in Mendoza, held that courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense manner, quoting from the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Ventresca. Mendoza, 491 F.2d at 539. Similarly, in our case, the officer testified he swore to the allegations in the affidavit under oath before the judge and initialed each of the pages of the affidavit as well as initialed each of the three pages of the search warrant. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, it would be entirely unrealistic and lacking in common sense to find that the technical deficiency of failing to sign a document, the contents of which were sworn to under oath and initialed on each page, is fatal to the question of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
Moreover, although the Florida Constitution provides that probable cause is to be “supported by affidavit,”1 this requirement may also be satisfied by oath or affirmation under section 92.525, Florida Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Under oath or affirmation taken or administered before an officer authorized under s. 92.50 to administer oaths . . .
§ 92.525, Fla. Stat. (2007). The term “document” is further defined as “any writing including, without limitation, any form, application, claim, notice, tax return, inventory, affidavit, pleading, or paper.” § 92.525(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Florida:
Oaths, affidavits, and acknowledgments required or authorized under the laws of this state (except oaths to jurors and witnesses in court and such other oaths, affidavits and acknowledgments as are required by law to be taken or administered by or before particular officers) may be taken or administered by or before any judge, clerk, or deputy clerk of any court of record within this state, including federal courts, or before any United
States commissioner or any notary public within this state. The jurat, or certificate of proof or acknowledgment, shall be authenticated by the signature and official seal of such officer or person taking or administering the same; however, when taken or administered before any judge, clerk, or deputy clerk of a court of record, the seal of such court may be affixed as the seal of such officer or person.
§ 92.50(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). Because section 92.525 provides that any document, which expressly includes an affidavit, requiring verification may be so verified by oath, and section 92.50(1) allows for such an oath to be taken or administered in front of any judge of any court of record before this state, we are satisfied that the affidavit at issue was sufficient to support the issuance of the warrant and the absence of a signature was not fatal.
The precise issue before us has been addressed by a Texas court in a case that is virtually identical to ours. In Smith v. State, 207 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas examined the sufficiency of an unsigned affidavit written and presented by an officer to a district court judge in support of a search warrant. The officer in Smith set out all of the facts pertaining to his investigation in a probable cause affidavit and swore to them, but failed to actually sign the document. Id. at 788-89. As in Florida, Texas law specifically provides that “[a] sworn affidavit setting forth substantial facts establishing probable cause shall be filed in every instance in which a search warrant is requested.” Id. at 790-91, n.10; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art.18.01(b).
Nevertheless, after examining evidence of the officer swearing to the affidavit, the court upheld the validity of the affidavit and found that:
Although the affiant’s signature on an affidavit serves as an important memorialization of the officer’s act of swearing before the magistrate, it is that act of swearing, not the signature itself, that is essential. It is important too, that the law retain some flexibility in the face of technological advances. For example the federal courts and some state courts, now permit telephonic search warrants, and one can foresee the day in which search warrants might be obtained via e-mail or a recorded video conference with a magistrate located many miles away. In a state as large as Texas, such innovations should not be foreclosed by the requirement of a signed affidavit if the officer’s oath can be memorialized by other, equally satisfactory, means. We leave those potential future changes to the Texas Legislature, but we should not stand in the way of the future by declaring that all affidavits, which are properly sworn to but unsigned, are necessarily invalid. That is not to condone carelessness or sloppiness in either police procedure or judicial oversight. Forgetfulness or carelessness in the formalities of an affidavit may well indicate to either the issuing magistrate or the reviewing court that the officer is forgetful or careless in his factual statements as well. Such forgetfulness may affect the credibility of the officer, but that is a matter for magistrates and trial courts. It is sufficient for today to simply conclude that an affiant’s failure to sign his affidavit is not necessarily fatal if it can be proved by other means that he did swear to the facts contained within that affidavit before the magistrate.
Id. at 792-93. We agree with the reasoning of the Smith court and find it persuasive as to the matter before us.
Following Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution, we find that, in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, it was error for the trial court to suppress the evidence. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in finding the lack of signature on the affidavit to be a fatal error and suppressing the evidence as a result.
1. We note that section 22 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution of 1885, as amended, like the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, formerly provided that the warrant for search and seizure be supported by “oath or affirmation.” When the Florida Constitution was revised in 1968, the present language of Article I, section 12 was modified to state that a warrant for search and seizure is to be “supported by affidavit.”
I respectfully dissent. The police officer in this case failed to sign the affidavit in support of the search warrant. Florida follows a rule of strict construction of the statutory and constitutional provisions governing the issuance of search warrants, so the failure to sign is fatal to the warrant.
The majority opinion errs in saying that the warrant can be upheld under the Comformity Clause of Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution. Absent a United States Supreme Court case squarely on point—and there is none—Florida law governs.
This is a State appeal of an order suppressing evidence because the officer failed to sign the affidavit in support of the search warrant. A Miami-Dade County police detective drafted an affidavit in support of a search warrant to search a single family home and two additional structures which were on the same property. The affidavit set forth the reasons why the detective believed that marijuana was being grown at that location.
The detective took the affidavit to a circuit judge. The first paragraph of the affidavit states that the detective was duly sworn. The detective and the judge initialed each of the six pages of the affidavit.
On the final page there was a signature line for the affiant. The detective failed to sign it. Below the signature blank was a jurat stating “Sworn to and subscribed before me this the 16th day of May, 2007.” The judge signed the jurat.
The search warrant was executed and contraband was found. Defendant-appellant Alfredo Moreno-Gonzalez was charged with being in actual or constructive possession of more than twenty-five pounds, but less than two thousand pounds, of cannabis.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. A successor judge conducted an evidentiary hearing. The detective testified that the judge administered an oath and that she swore to the affidavit. The detective acknowledged that she did not sign on the signature line.
The trial court suppressed the evidence, reasoning that the affidavit was defective because it was not signed, and that suppression was required. The State has appealed.
“When searches and seizures are made pursuant to the command of a search warrant, both the search warrant and the prerequisite oath or affirmation required
for it must conform strictly to the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing their issue.” Jackson v. State, 99 So. 548, 549 (Fla. 1924) (emphasis added); see also State v. Laiser, 322 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1975) (referring to the “strict interpretation which we have imposed for pre-seizure protections.”); Collins v. State, 465 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (“affidavits and warrants must meticulously conform to statutory and constitutional provisions.”); cf. State v. Vargas, 667 So. 2d 175, 176-77 (Fla. 1995) (suppressing evidence where warrant was served by an officer not named in the warrant, in violation of section 933.08, Florida Statutes).2
The strict construction rule is subject to the qualification that suppression is not required for a purely technical error. Cain v. State, 287 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 1973). In Cain the judge failed to fill in the date that he signed the warrant. The Court concluded that suppression was not required because the error “was a mere technicality and not prejudicial.” Id.
The question, then, is whether the failure to sign the affidavit is a mere technical error, or is a substantive issue. The Florida constitutional provision states that a search warrant cannot be issued except upon probable cause, “supported by affidavit[.]” Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. (1968). By statute, the affidavit must be
signed. § 933.06, Fla. Stat. (2007) (“The judge must, before issuing the warrant, have the application of some person for said warrant duly sworn to and subscribed[.]“) (emphasis added); see also id. § 933.18 (specifying grounds for search of dwelling; requiring “sworn proof by affidavit . . . that . . . one of said conditions exists[.]“).
In State v. Tolmie, 421 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), the court considered a case indistinguishable from the present one. There, as here, the officer had been placed under oath and swore to the truth of the statements in the affidavit, but failed to sign the affidavit. Over one dissent, the court concluded that under the rule of strict compliance, the signature requirement must be enforced. Id. at 1087-88.
It is true that the result in this case would be different under decisions of the federal courts of appeals and in a number of other states. According to Professor LaFave, “a written affidavit is not per se defective because it contains no signature or because it is shown that the signature was affixed subsequent to the search; in such instances it is still open to the prosecution to show by testimony that the affiant had taken an oath.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: a Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.3(e), at 521-22 (4th ed. 2004). “[T]he failure to sign the warrant affidavit does not invalidate the warrant if other evidence proves that
the affiant personally swore to the truth of the facts in the affidavit before the issuing magistrate.” Smith v. State, 207 S.W.3d 787, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
There is, however, an exception. Professor LaFave states, “In some jurisdictions, the applicable statutes or court rules may be more strict.” Id. § 4.3(e), at 522 n.64. Florida is such a jurisdiction.
Florida law requires that the application for the search warrant be signed. § 933.06, Fla. Stat. (2007) (“sworn to and subscribed”). Florida follows a rule of strict construction. Jackson, 99 So. at 549 (oath or affirmation “must conform strictly to the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing their issue.”). See also Smith, 207 S.W.3d at 791 n.20 (“A few states have held that a signature is required; in these cases, though, either a statutory provision or the state constitution required the signature.”).
Given (a) the text of the Florida Constitution and statutory provisions, and (b) the rule of strict construction, suppression is required.
The majority opinion reasons that reversal is required by the Conformity Clause contained in Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution. Respectfully, that is not correct. The majority opinion is inconsistent with Florida Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Conformity Clause.
Florida’s protection against illegal searches and seizures is found in Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution. As stated in the majority opinion, this was amended in 1982 to specify that Article I, section 12 will be construed “in conformity with the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution, “as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Articles seized in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence “if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Emphasis added).3
The Florida Supreme Court has held that for the Conformity Clause to be applicable, there must be a United States “Supreme Court pronouncement factually and legally on point . . . .” State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040, 1047 n.10. (Fla. 1995), receded from on other grounds, Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla. 1997). The Court has explained:
[I]n the absence of a controlling U.S. Supreme Court decision, Florida courts are still “free to provide its citizens with a higher standard of protection from governmental intrusion than that afforded by the Federal Constitution.”
With the conformity clause amendment, we are bound to follow the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the Fourth Amendment and provide to Florida citizens no greater protection than those interpretations. Bernie v. State, 524 So.2d 988, 990-91 (Fla.1988). However, when the United States Supreme Court has not previously addressed a particular search and seizure issue which comes before us for review, we will look to our own precedent for guidance. Soca v. State, 673 So. 2d 24, 26-27 (Fla. 1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).4
The question, then, is whether there is a United States Supreme Court pronouncement which is “factually and legally on point with the present case[.]” Daniel, 665 So. 2d at 1047 n.10. The answer to that question is no.
The majority opinion relies on the United States Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), but that case involved a different issue. The question there was how to interpret the text of an affidavit in support of a search warrant in order to determine whether probable cause for a search exists. In Ventresca, a federal court of appeals had held an affidavit “insufficient on the ground that `[t]he affidavit failed to clearly indicate which of the facts alleged thereon were hearsay or which were within the affiant’s own knowledge,’ and therefore `(t)he Commissioner could only conclude that the entire affidavit was based on hearsay.’” Id. at 109. Rejecting these technical objections, the United States Supreme Court held that affidavits for search warrants “must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. . . . Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.” Id. at 108. The Ventresca decision did not involve the factual situation now before us, namely, where an officer submitted an affidavit in support of a search warrant and failed to sign it.
The majority opinion relies in passing on three other United States Supreme Court decisions. Majority opinion at 6. None is factually or legally on point. In
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), the Court concluded that the text of the complaint filed by the sheriff was facially insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest or search. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), the Court held that a congressional committee’s unsworn report was a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant to compel the attendance of an absent witness. In Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. 448 (1806), the defendant had been illegally committed to jail where a warrant had been issued without any sworn evidence. None of these cases addresses the factual and legal issue now before us.
The First District has considered the Conformity Clause in a case similar to the one which is now before us. In Mylock v. State, 750 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), a judge issued a search warrant on the basis of oral statements by deputy sheriffs. No affidavit was submitted. The State argued that under the Conformity Clause and the United States Supreme Court decisions Whiteley, McGrain, and Burford, it was unnecessary to file an affidavit. The First District said that while there are federal court of appeals decisions holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require a written affidavit, there was no United States Supreme Court decision on the point. “The United States Supreme Court . . . has never squarely reached the issue.” Mylock, 750 So. 2d at 147.
The Mylock court concluded that “in the absence of a United States Supreme Court decision controlling the issue before us, the validity of the warrant
is controlled by Florida constitutional and statutory provisions requiring that a search warrant must be supported by an affidavit.” Id. Because the warrant was issued without an affidavit, the warrant was invalid. Id.
The Mylock analysis is applicable here. There is no United States “Supreme Court pronouncement factually and legally on point with the present case . . . .” Daniel, 665 So. 2d at 1047 n.10. Florida’s Conformity Clause is therefore not applicable.
It follows that the Florida Constitution, statutes, and cases are controlling. Under the case law requiring strict construction, we are obligated to affirm the suppression order. If we wish to suggest a change in Florida law, then the appropriate procedure would be to affirm the trial court’s ruling but certify a question.5
2. In Laiser, the Court explained that strict interpretation would be applied pre-seizure, whereas for post-seizure conduct, “we conclude that substantial compliance is sufficient where no prejudice is shown.” Laiser, 322 So. 2d at 492.
3. Article I, section 12 states in full (with the 1982 amendment indicated in boldface in the text):
Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. (amended 1982) (emphasis added).
4. The Soca decision has been superseded on other grounds. Bamberg v. State, 953 So. 2d 649, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
5. The State argues that we should reverse under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), but that argument was not raised in the trial court and may not be considered here.
Williams v. State, Case No. 2D08-3997 (Fla. App. 9/25/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)
SCOTT LEROY WILLIAMS, Appellant,
Case No. 2D08-3997
Opinion filed September 25, 2009.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Simone A. Lennon, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Elba C. MartinS-chomaker, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Scott Leroy Williams appeals his judgments and sentences for assault on a law enforcement officer, fleeing or eluding, and possession of cocaine. We affirm his judgments and sentences without discussion but reverse the restitution orders and remand for a new restitution hearing.
In imposing Williams’ sentence, the trial court ordered restitution in an amount to be determined at a later hearing. Williams then filed his notice of appeal. While this appeal was pending, the trial court conducted the restitution hearing, imposed restitution, and rendered restitution orders.
Williams contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing or enter a restitution order after Williams filed his notice of appeal. See L’Heureux v. State, 968 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Colson v. State, 711 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Pearson v. State, 686 So. 2d 721, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). “A trial court does not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing or enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been filed, even though the trial court may have previously ordered restitution and reserved jurisdiction only as to the amount.” Pearson, 686 So. 2d at 721. We note that no request was made to relinquish this court’s jurisdiction. See L’Heureux, 968 So. 2d at 630. Therefore, we reverse the orders that set the amount of restitution and remand to allow the trial court to again conduct a hearing and impose restitution. See Colson, 711 So. 2d at 605; Pearson, 686 So. 2d at 721-722.
FULMER and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur.