Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/428/1334/172974/
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 17:50:42
Document Index: 29884672

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 133', '§ 133', '§ 1505', '§ 14917', '§ 1505', '§ 1491', '§ 1491', '§ 24', '§ 1505', '§ 25', '§ 1502', '§ 259', '§ 24', '§ 88', '§ 24', '§ 1505', '§ 1502']

Laura Hebah, Administratrix, in the Matter of the Estate of Robert Hebah, Deceased v. the United States, 428 F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl. 1970) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Court of Claims › 1970 › Laura Hebah, Administratrix, in the Matter of the Estate of Robert Hebah, Deceased v. the United Sta...
Laura Hebah, Administratrix, in the Matter of the Estate of Robert Hebah, Deceased v. the United States, 428 F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl. 1970)
U.S. Court of Claims (1855-1982) - 428 F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl. 1970) July 15, 1970
A. The initial question is whether the 1868 Treaty with the Shoshone Tribe gives any rights to the plaintiff, an individual Indian who sues in her own behalf and that of her children.3 The very great majority of Indian treaties create tribal, not individual, rights, and the usual statements in the books are to that effect. In Blackfeather v. United States, 190 U.S. 368, 377, 23 S. Ct. 772, 776, 47 L. Ed. 1099 (1903), the Supreme Court said, affirming and quoting from this court (37 Ct. Cl. 233 (1902)):
This principle has been carried into effect even where a treaty provided for financial payments to specified beneficiaries out of annuities paid to the tribe; the holding was that, nevertheless, individual rights against the Federal Government were not created by the treaty. Sac and Fox Indians of Mississippi in Iowa v. Sac and Fox Indians of Mississippi in Okl., 220 U.S. 481, 484, 486, 487, 489, 31 S. Ct. 473, 55 L. Ed. 552 (1911), aff'g 45 Ct. Cl. 287, 300-301, 304 (1910). See, also, Seminole Nation v. United States, 93 Ct. Cl. 500, 518-519, 536 (1941), rev'd in part on other grounds, 316 U.S. 286, 62 S. Ct. 1049, 86 L. Ed. 1480 (1942).
But this court has also indicated that the principle is not universal or without exception — that some few Indian treaties did confer individual rights. In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 31 (1939), the tribe sought to recover under a treaty article providing that the head of a family or lodge who commenced farming in good faith "shall be entitled to receive seeds and agricultural implements for the first year, not exceeding in value one hundred dollars, and for each succeeding year he shall continue to farm, for a period of three years more, he shall be entitled to receive seeds and implements as aforesaid, not exceeding a value of twenty-five dollars." One of the grounds on which the court rejected the tribe's claim was that "the plaintiff tribe cannot maintain suit and recover on this character of claim for the reason that it is not a tribal claim but concerns the rights of and obligations to individual Indians members of the Sioux Tribe." 89 Ct. Cl. at 38. See Seminole Nation v. United States, supra, 93 Ct. Cl. at 536.
Of course, the treaty was made by the United States with the tribe, and not with individual Shoshonees. But the accepted theory of third-party contractual beneficiaries suffices to give plaintiff, and others similarly situated, legal rights to vindicate and enforce the Federal Government's promise. See Crumady v. Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 428, 79 S. Ct. 445, 3 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1959); Restatement of Contracts, § 133(1); Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Draft No. 4 § 133 (1968)). In the current formulation of Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the injured Indian is an "intended beneficiary" of Article I because recognition of his rights is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the treaty-parties, and the Federal Government's promise of redress and reimbursement manifests an intention to give those benefits to the "injured person" himself, directly. This liberal interpretation, which serves to advance and protect the rights accorded by Article I, is supported by the established principle that Indian treaties should be read, where possible, generously in favor of the Indians. Peoria Tribe v. United States, 390 U.S. 468, 472-473, 88 S. Ct. 1137, 20 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1968); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631, 90 S. Ct. 1328, 25 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1970).
B. Even so, says the defendant, this court has not been given jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's claim. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1505,6 the claimant must be a "tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians" — not, as here, an individual Indian. Cf. Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 488-490 (1966). But on its face 28 U.S.C. § 14917 — our basic jurisdictional charter — would seem to give us power to hear and decide this individual claim. Unlike § 1505, that broad statute is not limited as to the class of plaintiffs who may sue, and Mrs. Hebah's case is founded either upon an "Act of Congress" (if the treaty can be so characterized) or, at least, upon an "express or implied contract with the United States", i. e. Article I of the 1868 Treaty. Nothing in the terms or structure of § 1491 precludes our jurisdiction. It is settled, moreover, that an intended third-party beneficiary of a government contract may sue under § 1491. Maneely v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 623, 629 (1929); Deltec Corp. v. United States, 326 F.2d 1004, 164 Ct. Cl. 432 (1964); United States v. Huff, 165 F.2d 720, 723-724 (C.A. 5, 1948)8 .
When Congress enacted the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 1049, it created, in § 24 of that statute (60 Stat. 1055), the provision which later became 28 U.S.C. § 1505, supra, note 6. For claims accruing after the date of the Claims Commission Act (August 13, 1946), in favor of a tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians, this court was to be the forum, if the demand would be cognizable here were the claimant not an Indian tribe, band, or group. Since the Claims Commission Act (in § 25, 60 Stat. 1056) declared that " [a]ll provisions of law inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed to the extent of such inconsistency [with an immaterial exception]", the part of 28 U.S.C. § 1502, supra (then designated as 28 U.S.C. § 259) which deprived this court of general jurisdiction over claims by tribes or groups, growing out of Indian treaties, was necessarily repealed to the extent of the conflict with § 24. In 1949, this modification was made, more formally, by the Act of May 24, 1949, 63 Stat. 89, 102, §§ 88-89, which turned § 24 of the Indian Claims Commission Act into § 1505 of Title 28, and also deleted entirely the words "or with Indian tribes" from 28 U.S.C. § 1502.9
It is interesting that both the treaty in Sioux Tribe and that at issue in this case were among the last entered into by the United States with the Indians. Both were made in 1868. A rider in the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, forbade further treaties with the Indians, and there had been earlier efforts in the later 1860's to terminate such treaty-making. See Federal Indian Law (1958), pp. 114, 138, 210-12, 236.
Congress treated the last portion of Article I of the 1868 Treaty (supra, note 1), which in parallel fashion concerned injuries inflicted on others by "bad men among the Indians", as conferring individual rights on the injured non-Indian person. Provision was first made for administrative determination of those and other like claims (Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 362, 376), and then, in the Indian Depredation Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 851, for determination by this court of such claims filed by individual claimants. See Johnson v. United States, 160 U.S. 546, 16 S. Ct. 377, 40 L. Ed. 529 (1896); Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297, 16 S. Ct. 476, 40 L. Ed. 706 (1896).