Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=3216
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 19:59:53
Document Index: 516683662

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 11', 'Art. 136', 'Art.\t136', 'art\t11', 'art 11', 'Art. 136', 'art 11', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 136']

ORIENT PAPER MILLS LTD. versus UNION OF INDIA
1966 AIR 1754	1966 SCR (3) 657
ORIENT PAPER MILLS LTD. V. UNION OF INDIA [1966] RD-SC 56 (25 February 1966)
25/02/1966 GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION: 1966 AIR 1754	1966 SCR (3) 657
Supreme	Court Rules, 1950, Schedule III, Part 11, Entry 2- Claim for refund of a definite amount of excise duty- Disallowed by	Excise authorities-Appeal to Supreme Court under Art. 136-Court fee payable.
The appellant claimed refund of a specific amount as excess amount	of excise duty recovered from it by assessing it under a wrong item, but the excise authorities rejected	the claim and the	appellant's revision	application to	the respondent was also dismissed.	In its application for leave to appeal to	this Court under Art.	136, the appellant challenged the	order of the respondent on the assumption that the order under	appeal	had been passed by	the respondent acting as a Tribunal, and reiterated its claim for the specified amount. The appellant contended that only fixed court fee of Rs. 250 was payable because it was	not possible to estimate at a money value the subject matter in dispute	and not fee on an ad valorem basis at the rate prescribed in	Entry 2 in Schedule 111, Part	11 of	the Supreme Court Rules.
HELD : The claim made by the appellant was for a definite, ascertained amount and therefore it is not a case where it is not possible to estimate at a money value	the subject matter	in dispute. Nor can it be said that if	the appeal before this Court succeeds, it would still be necessary	for the appellant	to take any further steps to	recover	the amount	of refund, because, this Court can	direct	the appropriate authorities to grant the refund. Therefore, the appellant should pay court fee as prescribed by Entry 2 in Part 11 of Schedule III of the Supreme Court Rules, on an ad valorem basis. [661 G-H; 662 E, F] Order in Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1956, explained.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 659-664 of 1965.
Appeals	by special leave from the judgment and order dated October	5, 1963 of the Government of	India,	Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi in Central Excise Revision Applications Nos. 720-725 of 1963.
A. K. Sen, B. P. Maheshwari and M. S. Narasimhan, for	the Appellant.
N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar,	C. J. What is the appropriate amount of court-fees payable on the petition of appeal filed by	the appellant, Orient Paper Mills Ltd., under Schedule III, Part II of	the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, that is the short question of law which arises for our decision in	this matter.
The appellant carries on the business of manufacturing	and selling	paper	and paper board, and is registered as	such under the 657 658 Central	Excise	and Salt Act, 1944	(No. I of 1944) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The respondent, the Union of India, charges excise duty under Rule 9 of the Rules framed	under the Act on the	paper manufactured by	the appellant before the manufactured goods are cleared out of the appellant's ware-house. Among various kinds of paper which the appellant manufactures and sells, are included 'Packing and Wrapping' and 'Printing and Writing Paper'.
The aforesaid	'Printing and Writing Paper' is	of various varieties and it includes Machine Glazed Poster popularly known as M.G. Posters.
Prior to the Finance Act of 1961, the printing and writing paper was classified and charged under item 17(3) of	the Schedule to the Act and the wrapping paper was charged under item 17(4) of the Schedule; even so, the duty on both	the items was the same, viz., 0 . 22 P. per kilogram. The	duty under item 17(4) was, however, enhanced by the Finance	Act of 1961 -and increased to 0 - 35 P. per kilogram from	the 1st March, 1961. About six months after the enhanced	duty came into force, the Excise authorities decided that	the M.G. Poster manufactured by the appellant should be charged under item 17(4) and demand notices were issued	accordingly for the different months during which the said paper	was manufactured. In consequence of this demand, a total sum of Rs. 2,79,175-27 P. was collected from the appellant as difference in the duty leviable for the assessment periods covered by the several appeals which are pending in	this Court and with which	we are	concerned in	the present proceedings.
As a result of these demands, the appellant had to pay	the duty which it did under protest. Thereafter, it claimed a refund under Rule II of the Rules framed under the	Act.
This Rule prescribes a period of three months within which a claim for refund can be made "in consequence	of the	sum having	been	paid through	inadvertance,	error	or misconstruction". The appellant urged that the duty on	the goods in question was chargeable under item 17(3) and	not under item 17(4) of the Tariff Rules.	One of	the reliefs claimed by the appellant in its petitions of appeal was that the Excise authorities be directed to	assess	the poster paper under item 17(3) and not under item 17(4) and to	make a direction as to the refund of the excess amount recovered from the appellant. The excess amount of which refund was thus claimed came to Rs. 84,928-84 P. This application	was rejected by the Assistant Collector	of Central Excise, Cuttack Division, Cuttack.
Against the said decision, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Collector of Central Excise under s. 35 of the	Act.
In its	appeal	memo to the Collector,	the appellant	had claimed	that the order under appeal should be	revoked	and Rs. 84,928-84 P. should be refunded to it. A further claim was made by the appellant that the excise authorities should be directed to assess the poster paper 659 under item 17(3) and not under item 17(4). The said appeal was rejected by the Collector of Customs on 28-7-1962.
The appellant then moved the respondent by way of revision under S. 36 of the Act. In its revision application,	the appellant made prayers similar to those which it had	made before	the Appellate Authority. This revision	application was also dismissed. It is against this revisional order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution. It appears that in	the various	paragraphs of	its application for	leave,	the appellant has	reiterated its claim for refund of money recovered from it in excess of the amount legitimately	due from it and has challenged	the order of	the Excise authorities rejecting its claim in that behalf. On these facts,	the question which arises is: can the appellant be permitted to pay a court-fee of Rs. 250 on its petitions for appeal,	or is it necessary that it ought to pay court-fees at the	rate prescribed by sub-clause (2) of	entry 2 in Schedule III, Part II of the Supreme Court Rules? This question was referred by the Deputy Registrar of	this Court to the Hon'ble Judge in Chambers. The learned Judge referred to the respective contentions raised before him by the parties and considered the practice in regard to	the levy of court-fees in allied matters. He took the view that the practice with regard to levy of court-fees was in a state of flux and it required full consideration. That is why he directed that the matter be adjourned to Court.	It is as a result of this direction made by the Hon'ble Judge in Chambers that this matter has come before us for disposal on the question of court-fees.
Let us	cite the relevant provisions of the Supreme Court Rules in relation to court-fees in this matter.	Enrty 2 in Part 11 of Schedule III reads thus:- "Lodging and registering Petition of Appeal:
Where the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute is Rs.
20,000 or below that sum	..Rs. 250-00 For every Rs. 1,000 in excess of Rs. 5 . 00 for every Rs. 20,000	thousand rupees or part thereof.
In cases where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute	Rs. 250 . 00" There is a proviso to this entry which reads thus:
"Provided:
(1) that the	maximum fee payable in any case shall	not exceed Rs. 2,000 and 660 (2) that where an appeal is	brought by special leave granted by this Court credit shall be given to the appellant for the amount of court-fee paid by him on the petition for special leave to appeal".
Mr. Sen for the appellant contends that it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute in the present appeals; and so, court-fee of Rs. 250 would be adequate and appropriate for each one of them. According to him, the controversy between the parties has relation to the proper classification of the goods and this being	the subject-matter of the appeals, it is incapable of valuation.
Mr. Sen presented his argument in an alternative form.	He urged that even if the appeals are allowed, this Court	will merely determine the proper classification of the goods	and make a	declaration that on the basis of the	said proper classification,	the appellant should be entitled to	the refund.	Even	after such a	declaration is	made,	the appellant would be required to adopt some other procedure to make a claim for actual recovery of the said refund. It is on these two grounds that Mr. Sen rests his case that	Rs.
250 would be the appropriate and adequate court-fees	for each one of these appeals.
In support of this contention, Mr. Sen has also referred to the practice prevailing in this Court in respect of certain categories of appeals where court-fee of Rs. 250 has	been consistently accepted as adequate and appropriate. In Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1956 (The State of Madras v. Messrs.	Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.) an appeal was filed by the State of Madras	on a certificate granted by the High Court from an order passed by it under S. 12-B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 allowing the assessee's claim for refund of the amount of	sales tax computed on the turn-over of a stated	sum of money.	Overruling the stand taken by the office	that court-fees should be paid on an	ad valorem basis,	Bhagwati, J. who was then the Hon'ble Judge in Chambers directed that "it is not possible to estimate	the value of the claim in this case and the record does not show it. Therefore, the court-fee should be paid on that basis".
Accordingly Rs. 250/- was accepted as proper court-fee.
Similarly, in Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1958 (Indian Hume Pipes v. Its Workmen) though the appeal related to a definite	and ascertainable sum of money in respect of payment of bonus, dearness allowance, etc. Bhagwati, J. directed that "I am inclined to think that Rs. 250/- fixed court-fee should be charged. , The award	merely	determines the liability;
recovery of the dues requires other procedure to be adopted for the purpose; vide section 33(c)".
In accordance with the directions thus given by the Hon'ble Judge in Chambers in these two matters, the practice in this Court 661 consistently has been that in matters coming to this Court in reference proceedings under the relevant provisions of the Sales Tax Acts and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 as well as against awards made under the	Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Rs. 250 has been accepted as proper court-fee.
In Civil Appeal No. 148 of 1954 (Mls. Bhatnagar & Co. Ltdv.
Union of India), similar court-fee of Rs. 250/- was accepted where the appellant challenged the order of the High Court passed under Art. 226 refusing the appellant's prayer for a direction for	amendment of the period of the	validity of import	licences. This plea was accepted even	though	the appellant had estimated his loss at Rs. 6,00,000/- if	the relief claimed in that behalf by him was not granted. It is on these precedents and the practice which they show	that Mr. Sen has relied in support of his argument that	the category of' cases in which the present appeals fall should be similarly treated	and Rs. 250/- should be taken as adequate and proper court-fee.
Reverting then to the first contention raised by Mr.	Sen, can it be said that the present appeals fall in the class of cases where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute.	In our opinion, the answer to this question must clearly be in the negative. We	have already	set out the nature of the relief claimed by'	the appellant in its application before the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, as well as in subsequent	appeals	and revision application.	The claim clearly and unambiguously is for	a refund of Rs. 84,928 . 84 P. It is true that a claim for this refund is sought to be justified on the basis that the assessment should be levied under item 17(3)	and not under item 17(4); but the decision of the point as to which item applies to the paper in question, serves to support the appellant's claim for a refund; and so, the fact that the issue as to which item applies cannot be said to determine the character of the present	proceedings before the Appellate Authority or that of the appeals before	this Court.	The proceedings, in terms, are to recover the stated amount of refund and since the said claim has been rejected by the Excise authorities, in the present appeals the	same claim	is made by the appellant before this Court.
Therefore, we	think it is impossible to hold	that these appeals are cases where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute.
Besides, Mr. Sen is not right in contending that if	the appeals. filed by the appellant before this Court succeed, it would be necessary for the appellant to take some further steps to recover the amount of refund claimed by it.	In case this Court holds that the basis on which the assessment has been made in respect of the paper manufactured by	the appellant is erroneous in law, the necessary consequence of the said decision would be to issue a direction that a refund of the appropriate amount should be allowed. These 662 appeals	have been brought to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution on the assumption that the orders under appeal	have been passed by the respondent which acted as a Tribunal in entertaining the revision	applications within the meaning of the said Article; and so, it would be open to this Court to	direct, if the appeals	succeed, that	the appropriate authorities should grant the appellant's claim for refund.
Then as to the precedents on which Mr. Sen relies, the posi- tion with regard to appeals brought to this Court in Sales- tax or Income-tax matters, such as the case in the State of Madras	v. Messrs. Tata Iron and Steel Co.	Ltd.(1), is entirely different. In such proceedings, the	High Court which entertains the reference ,acts purely in an advisory capacity and when the appeal is brought to	this Court against	the decision of the High Court on such reference, the capacity of this Court is exactly the same as that of the High Court.	The proceedings continue to be	proceedings in which either the High Court or this Court expresses an advisory opinion, and	so, it can well be said that	the subject-matter in such cases cannot be estimated at a money value.	Whether or not similar considerations will apply to the appeals brought to this Court by special leave against awards made under the Industrial Disputes Act	or against orders passed by the High Court in writ jurisdiction, it is unnecessary for us to decide in the present proceedings.
So far	as the present appeals are concerned,	we feel no difficulty in holding that the claim made by the appellant is for a definite, ascertained amount and	it is	the rejection of the said claim by the respondent in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction when it rejected the appellant's revision applications, that has given rise to	the present appeals. This is a claim which in terms has already	been estimated at a money value, and therefore, there is no basis for the appellant's plea that court-fee of Rs. 250/- should be held to be adequate and proper in each of these appeals.
We accordingly ,direct that the appellant should pay proper court-fees as prescribed by Entry 2 in Part II of the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Rules, subject, of course, to the maximum prescribed by clause (i) -of	the proviso thereto.
(1) C.A. No. 212 of 1956.