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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 18', '§ 1', '§ 1442', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1331', '§ 2', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 14', '§ 78', '§ 27', '§ 78', '§ 68']

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, (full text) :: 403 U.S. 388 (1971) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
1. Petitioner's complaint states a federal cause of action under the Fourth Amendment for which damages are recoverable upon proof of injuries resulting from the federal agents' violation of that Amendment. Pp. 403 U. S. 390-397.
2. The Court does not reach the immunity question, which was not passed on by the Court of Appeals. Pp. 403 U. S. 397-398.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. HARLAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 403 U. S. 398. BURGER, C.J., post, p. 403 U. S. 411. BLACK, J., post, p. 403 U. S. 427, and BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 403 U. S. 430, filed dissenting opinions.
On July 7, 1967, petitioner brought suit in Federal District Court. In addition to the allegations above, his complaint asserted that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, and that unreasonable force was employed in making the arrest; fairly read, it alleges as well that the arrest was made without probable cause. [Footnote 1] Petitioner claimed to have suffered great humiliation,
embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' unlawful conduct, and sought $15,000 damages from each of them. The District Court, on respondents' motion, dismissed the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that it failed to state a cause of action. [Footnote 2] 276 F.Supp. 12 (EDNY 1967). The Court of Appeals, one judge concurring specially, [Footnote 3] affirmed on that basis. 409 F.2d 718 (CA2 1969). We granted certiorari. 399 U.S. 905 (1970). We reverse.
the state law tort suit by asserting that their actions were a valid exercise of federal power: if the agents were shown to have violated the Fourth Amendment, such a defense would be lost to them, and they would stand before the state law merely as private individuals. Candidly admitting that it is the policy of the Department of Justice to remove all such suits from the state to the federal courts for decision, [Footnote 4] respondents nevertheless urge that we uphold dismissal of petitioner's complaint in federal court and remit him to filing an action in the state courts in order that the case may properly be removed to the federal court for decision on the basis of state law.
between two private citizens. In so doing, they ignore the fact that power, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used. An agent acting -- albeit unconstitutionally -- in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own. Cf. Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 255 U. S. 317 (1921); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 313 U. S. 326 (1941). Accordingly, as our cases make clear, the Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen. It guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority. And
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 327 U. S. 684 (footnote omitted); see Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 28, 289 U. S. 36 (1933) (Cardozo, J.); The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 257 U. S. 433 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
First. Our cases have long since rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment proscribes only such conduct as would, if engaged in by private persons, be condemned by state law. Thus, in Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927), petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act on the basis of evidence seized by state police officers incident to petitioners' arrest by those officers solely for the purpose of enforcing federal law. Id. at 275 U. S. 314. Notwithstanding the lack of probable cause for the arrest, id. at 275 U. S. 313, it would have been permissible under state law if effected
by private individuals. [Footnote 5] It appears, moreover, that the officers were under direction from the Governor to aid in the enforcement of federal law. Id. at 275 U. S. 315-317. Accordingly, if the Fourth Amendment reached only to conduct impermissible under the law of the State, the Amendment would have had no application to the case. Yet this Court held the Fourth Amendment applicable and reversed petitioners' convictions as having been based upon evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure. Similarly, in Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927), the petitioner was convicted on the basis of evidence seized under a warrant issued, without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, by a state court judge for a state law offense. At the invitation of state law enforcement officers, a federal prohibition agent participated in the search. This Court explicitly refused to inquire whether the warrant was "good under the state law . . . since in no event could it constitute the basis for a federal search and seizure." Id. at 273 U. S. 29 (emphasis added). [Footnote 6] And our recent decisions regarding electronic surveillance have made it clear beyond peradventure that the Fourth Amendment is not tied to the
niceties of local trespass laws. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511 (1961). In light of these cases, respondents' argument that the Fourth Amendment serves only as a limitation on federal defenses to a state law claim, and not as an independent limitation upon the exercise of federal power, must be rejected.
Second. The interests protected by state laws regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy, and those protected by the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile. Thus, we may bar the door against an unwelcome private intruder, or call the police if he persists in seeking entrance. The availability of such alternative means for the protection of privacy may lead the State to restrict imposition of liability for any consequent trespass. A private citizen, asserting no authority other than his own, will not normally be liable in trespass if he demands, and is granted, admission to another's house. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 18, pp. 109-110 (3d ed.1964); 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 1.11 (1956). But one who demands admission under a claim of federal authority stands in a far different position. Cf. Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 255 U. S. 317 (1921). The mere invocation of federal power by a federal law enforcement official will normally render futile any attempt to resist an unlawful entry or arrest by resort to the local police; and a claim of authority to enter is likely to unlock the door as well. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 232 U. S. 386 (1914); Amos v. United States, supra. [Footnote 7]
United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 106 U. S. 219 (1882). [Footnote 8] Nor is it adequate to answer that state law may take into account the different status of one clothed with the authority of the Federal Government. For just as state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment, Byars v. United States, supra; Weeks v. United States, supra; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 123 U. S. 507 (1887), neither may state law undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority can be exercised. In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (1890). The inevitable consequence of this dual limitation on state power is that the federal question becomes not merely a possible defense to the state law action, but an independent claim both necessary and sufficient to make out the plaintiff's cause of action. Cf. Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U. S. 233, 401 U. S. 241 (1971).
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 273 U. S. 540 (1927); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58 (1900); J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 28 et seq. (1966); N. Lasson, History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 43 et seq. (1937); Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1, 8-33 (1968); cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894); Lammun v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17 (1884). Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. But
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 327 U. S. 684 (footnote omitted). The present case involves no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. We are not dealing with a question of "federal fiscal policy," as in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 332 U. S. 311 (1947). In that case, we refused to infer from the Government-soldier relationship that the United States could recover damages from one who negligently injured a soldier, and thereby caused the Government to pay his medical expenses and lose his services during the course of his hospitalization. Noting that Congress was normally quite solicitous where the federal purse was involved, we pointed out that "the United States [was] the party plaintiff to the suit. And the United States has power at any time to create the liability." Id. at 332 U. S. 316; see United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 (1954). Nor are we asked in this case to impose liability upon a congressional employee for actions contrary to no constitutional
prohibition, but merely said to be in excess of the authority delegated to him by the Congress. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647 (1963). Finally, we cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question as whether the availability of money damages is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment. For we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress. The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 377 U. S. 433 (1964); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 290 U. S. 16 (1933).
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 163 (1803). Having concluded that petitioner's complaint states a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment, supra, at 403 U. S. 390-395, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment.
for acts such as those alleged. In his view, however, the critical point was recognition that some cause of action existed, albeit a state-created one, and, in consequence, he was willing, "as of now, to concur in the holding of the Court of Appeals." 409 F.2d at 726 (emphasis in original).
Brief for Respondents 13 (citations omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a); Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402 (1969). In light of this, it is difficult to understand our Brother BLACKMUN's complaint that our holding today "opens the door for another avalanche of new federal cases." Post at 403 U. S. 430. In estimating the magnitude of any such "avalanche," it is worth noting that a survey of comparable actions against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 found only 53 reported cases in 17 years (1951-1967) that survived a motion to dismiss. Ginger & Bell, Police Misconduct Litigation -- Plaintiff's Remedies, 15 Am.Jur. Trials 555, 580-590 (1968). Increasing this figure by 900% to allow for increases in rate and unreported cases, every federal district judge could expect to try one such case every 13 years.
Conversely, we have in some instances rejected Fourth Amendment claims despite facts demonstrating that federal agents were acting in violation of local law. McGuire v. United States, 273 U. S. 95 (1927) (trespass ab initio); Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924) ("open fields" doctrine); cf. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921) (possession of stolen property).
Similarly, although the Fourth Amendment confines an officer executing a search warrant strictly within the bounds set by the warrant, Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 275 U. S. 196 (1927); see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 394 U. S. 570-572 (1969) (STEWART, J., concurring in result), a private individual lawfully in the home of another will not normally be liable for trespass beyond the bounds of his invitation absent clear notice to that effect. See 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 1.11 (1956).
Petitioner alleged, in his suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, that the defendants, federal agents acting under color of federal law, subjected him to a search and seizure contravening the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. He sought damages in the amount of $15,000 from each of the agents. Federal jurisdiction was claimed, inter alia, [Footnote 2/1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), which provides:
In so concluding, Chief Judge Lumbard's opinion reasoned, in essence, that: (1) the framers of the Fourth Amendment did not appear to contemplate a "wholly new federal cause of action founded directly on the Fourth Amendment," Id. at 721, and (2) while the federal courts had power under a general grant of jurisdiction to imply a federal remedy for the enforcement of a constitutional right, they should do so only when the absence of alternative remedies renders the constitutional command a "mere form of words.'" Id. at 723. The Government takes essentially the same position here. Brief for Respondents 4-5. And two members of the Court add the contention that we lack the constitutional power to accord Bivens a remedy for damages in the absence of congressional action creating "a federal cause of action for damages for an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, post at 403 U. S. 427; see also opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post at 403 U. S. 418, 403 U. S. 422.
entirely free of ambiguity, [Footnote 2/2] I do not understand either the Government or my dissenting Brothers to maintain that Bivens' contention that he is entitled to be free from the type of official conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment depends on a decision by the State in which he resides to accord him a remedy. Such a position would be incompatible with the presumed availability of federal equitable relief if a proper showing can be made in terms of the ordinary principles governing equitable remedies. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 327 U. S. 684 (1946). However broad a federal court's discretion concerning equitable remedies, it is absolutely clear -- at least after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938) -- that, in a nondiversity suit, a federal court's power to grant even equitable relief depends on the presence of a substantive right derived from federal law. Compare Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 326 U. S. 105-107 (1945), with Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 327 U. S. 395 (1946). See also H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 818-819 (1953).
Thus, the interest which Bivens claims -- to be free from official conduct in contravention of the Fourth Amendment -- is a federally protected interest. See generally Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1, 33-34 (1968). [Footnote 2/3] Therefore, the question
The contention that the federal courts are powerless to accord a litigant damage for a claimed invasion of his federal constitutional rights until Congress explicitly authorizes the remedy cannot rest on the notion that the decision to grant compensatory relief involves a resolution of policy considerations not susceptible of judicial discernment. Thus, in suits for damages based on violations of federal statutes lacking any express authorization of a damage remedy, this Court has authorized such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210, 323 U. S. 213 (1944). Cf. Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U. S. 191, 389 U. S. 201-204 (1967). [Footnote 2/4]
If it is not the nature of the remedy which is thought to render a judgment as to the appropriateness of damages inherently "legislative," then it must be the nature of the legal interest offered as an occasion for invoking otherwise appropriate judicial relief. But I do not think that the fact that the interest is protected by the Constitution, rather than statute or common law, justifies the assertion that federal courts are powerless to grant damages in the absence of explicit congressional action authorizing the remedy. Initially, I note that it would be at least anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary -- while competent to choose among the range of traditional judicial remedies to implement statutory and common law policies, and even to generate substantive rules governing primary behavior in furtherance of broadly formulated policies articulated by statute or Constitution, see Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 332 U. S. 304-311 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943) -- is powerless to accord a damages
More importantly, the presumed availability of federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of constitutional interests appears entirely to negate the contention that the status of an interest as constitutionally protected divests federal courts of the power to grant damages absent express congressional authorization. Congress provided specially for the exercise of equitable remedial powers by federal courts, see Act of May 8, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 276; C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 257 (2d ed., 1970), in part because of the limited availability of equitable remedies in state courts in the early days of the Republic. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 326 U. S. 104-105 (1945). And this Court's decisions make clear that, at least absent congressional restrictions, the scope of equitable remedial discretion is to be determined according to the distinctive historical traditions of equity as an institution, Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 327 U. S. 395-396 (1946); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 307 U. S. 165-166 (1939). The reach of a federal district court's "inherent equitable powers," Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 353 U. S. 460 (Burton, J., concurring in result), is broad indeed, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 401 U. S. 1 (1971); nonetheless, the federal judiciary is not empowered to grant equitable relief in the absence of congressional action extending jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra, at 353 U. S. 460 (Burton, J., concurring in result); Katz, 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 43. [Footnote 2/5]
If explicit congressional authorization is an absolute prerequisite to the power of a federal court to accord compensatory relief regardless of the necessity or appropriateness of damages as a remedy simply because of the status of a legal interest as constitutionally protected, then it seems to me that explicit congressional authorization is similarly prerequisite to the exercise of equitable remedial discretion in favor of constitutionally protected interests. Conversely, if a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by Congress is thought adequate to empower a federal court to grant equitable relief for all areas of subject matter jurisdiction enumerated therein, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), then it seems to me that the same statute is sufficient to empower a federal court to grant a traditional remedy at law. [Footnote 2/6] Of course, the special historical traditions governing the federal equity system, see Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161
Id. at 20-21; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although conceding that the standard of determining whether a damage remedy should be utilized to effectuate statutory policies is one of "necessity" or "appropriateness," see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 377 U. S. 432 (1964); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 332 U. S. 307 (1947), the Government contends that questions concerning congressional discretion to modify judicial remedies relating to constitutionally protected interests warrant a more stringent constraint on
These arguments for a more stringent test to govern the grant of damages in constitutional cases [Footnote 2/7] seem to be adequately answered by the point that the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment. To be sure,
Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 194 U. S. 270 (1904). But it must also be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to these legal interests than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes.
The question, then, is, as I see it, whether compensatory relief is "necessary" or "appropriate" to the vindication of the interest asserted. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, at 377 U. S. 432; United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra, at 332 U. S. 307; Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Col.L.Rev. 1109, 1155 (1969); Katz, 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 72. In resolving that question, it seems to me that the range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy. In this regard I agree with the Court that the appropriateness of according Bivens
compensatory relief does not turn simply on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct. [Footnote 2/8] Damages as a traditional form of compensation for invasion of a legally protected interest may be entirely appropriate even if no substantial deterrent effects on future official lawlessness might be thought to result. Bivens, after all, has invoked judicial processes claiming entitlement to compensation for injuries resulting from allegedly lawless official behavior, if those injuries are properly compensable in money damages. I do not think a court of law -- vested with the power to accord a remedy -- should deny him his relief simply because he cannot show that future lawless conduct will thereby be deterred.
are different from the types of harm private citizens inflict on one another, the experience of judges in dealing with private trespass and false imprisonment claims supports the conclusion that courts of law are capable of making the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of Fourth Amendment rights. [Footnote 2/9]
On the other hand, the limitations on state remedies for violation of common law rights by private citizens argue in favor of a federal damages remedy. The injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of law, while no less compensable in damages than those inflicted by private parties, are substantially different in kind, as the Court's opinion today discusses in detail. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 365 U. S. 195 (1961) (HARLAN, J., concurring). It seems to me entirely proper that these injuries be compensable according to uniform rules of federal law, especially in light of the very large element of federal law which must, in any event, control the scope of official defenses to liability. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 373 U. S. 652 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 365 U. S. 194-195 (HARLAN, J., concurring); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593 (1959). Certainly there is very little to be gained from the standpoint of federalism by preserving different rules of liability for federal officers dependent on the State where the injury occurs. Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 332 U. S. 305-311 (1947).
The Borak case is an especially clear example of the exercise of federal judicial power to accord damages as an appropriate remedy in the absence of any express statutory authorization of a federal cause of action. There, we "implied" -- from what can only be characterized as an "exclusively procedural provision" affording access to a federal forum, cf. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 353 U. S. 462-463 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) -- a private cause of action for damages for violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a). See § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. We did so in an area where federal regulation has been singularly comprehensive and elaborate administrative enforcement machinery had been provided. The exercise of judicial power involved in Borak simply cannot be justified in terms of statutory construction, see Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Col.L.Rev. 1109, 1120-1121 (1969); nor did the Borak Court purport to do so. See Borak, supra, at 377 U. S. 432-434. The notion of "implying" a remedy, therefore, as applied to cases like Borak, can only refer to a process whereby the federal judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally available judicial remedies according to reasons related to the substantive social policy embodied in an act of positive law. See ibid., and Bell v. Hood, supra, at 327 U. S. 684.
With regard to a court's authority to grant an equitable remedy, the line between "subject matter" jurisdiction and remedial powers has undoubtedly been obscured by the fact that, historically, the "system of equity derived its doctrines, as well as its powers, from its mode of giving relief.'" See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, at 326 U. S. 105, quoting C. Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading xxvii (1877). Perhaps this fact alone accounts for the suggestion sometimes made that a court's power to enjoin invasion of constitutionally protected interests derives directly from the Constitution. See Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp. 813, 819 (SD Cal.1947).
And I think it follows from this point that today's decision has little, if indeed any, bearing on the question whether a federal court may properly devise remedies -- other than traditionally available forms of judicial relief -- for the purpose of enforcing substantive social policies embodied in constitutional or statutory policies. Compare today's decision with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). The Court today simply recognizes what has long been implicit in our decisions concerning equitable relief and remedies implied from statutory schemes; i.e., that a court of law vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit has the power -- and therefore the duty -- to make principled choices among traditional judicial remedies. Whether special prophylactic measures -- which at least arguably the exclusionary rule exemplifies, see Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 Col.L.Rev. 181, 182-185 (1969) -- are supportable on grounds other than a court's competence to select among traditional judicial remedies to make good the wrong done, cf. Bell v. Hood, supra, at 327 U. S. 684, is a separate question.
The same, of course, may not be true with respect to other types of constitutionally protected interests, and therefore the appropriateness of money damages may well vary with the nature of the personal interest asserted. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 365 U. S. 196 n. 5 (HARLAN, J., concurring).
of powers -- and perhaps get a better result -- by recommending a solution to the Congress as the branch of government in which the Constitution has vested the legislative power. Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task -- as we do not. Professor Thayer, speaking of the limits on judicial power, albeit in another context, had this to say: [Footnote 3/1]
This case has significance far beyond its facts and its holding. For more than 55 years, this Court has enforced a rule under which evidence of undoubted reliability and probative value has been suppressed and excluded from criminal cases whenever it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 633 (1886) (dictum). This rule was extended to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). [Footnote 3/2]
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587, 588 (1926). [Footnote 3/3] The plurality opinion in Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 347 U. S. 136 (1954), catalogued the doctrine's defects:
alternative justifications for the suppression of important evidence in a criminal trial. Under one of these alternative theories, the rule's foundation is sifted to the "sporting contest" thesis that the government must "play the game fairly," and cannot be allowed to profit from its own illegal acts. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 469, 471 (1928) (dissenting opinions); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 392 U. S. 13 (1968). But the exclusionary rule does not ineluctably flow from a desire to ensure that government plays the "game" according to the rules. If an effective alternative remedy is available, concern for official observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule. Nor is it easy to understand how a court can be thought to endorse a violation of the Fourth Amendment by allowing illegally seized evidence to be introduced against a defendant if an effective remedy is provided against the government.
The exclusionary rule has also been justified on the theory that the relationship between the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment requires the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the latter. Boyd v. United States, supra, at 116 U. S. 633 (dictum); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 338 U. S. 47, 48 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 367 U. S. 661-666 (BLACK, J., concurring).
Even ignoring, however, the decisions of this Court that have held that the Fifth Amendment applies only to "testimonial" disclosures, United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 388 U. S. 221-223 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 764 and n. 8 (1966), it seems clear that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not protect a person from the seizure of evidence that is incriminating. It protects a person only from being the conduit by which the police acquire evidence. Mr. Justice Holmes once put it succinctly, "A party is privileged from producing the
evidence, but not from its production." Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457, 228 U. S. 458 (1913).
The suppression doctrine vaguely assumes that law enforcement is a monolithic governmental enterprise. For example, the dissenters in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, at 338 U. S. 44, argued that:
the importance of observing the constitutional demands in his instructions to the police."
Whatever educational effect the rule conceivably might have in theory is greatly diminished in fact by the realities of law enforcement work. Policemen do not have the time, inclination, or training to read and grasp the nuances of the appellate opinions that ultimately define the standards of conduct they are to follow. The issues that these decisions resolve often admit of neither easy nor obvious answers, as sharply divided courts on what is or is not "reasonable" amply demonstrate. [Footnote 3/4] Nor can judges, in all candor, forget that opinions sometimes lack helpful clarity.
Although unfortunately ineffective, the exclusionary rule has increasingly been characterized by a single, monolithic, and drastic, judicial response to all official violations of legal norms. Inadvertent errors of judgment that do not work any grave injustice will inevitably occur under the pressure of police work. These honest mistakes have been treated in the same way as deliberate and flagrant Irvine-type violations of the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 357 U. S. 309-310 (1958), reliable evidence was suppressed because of a police officer's failure to say a "few more words" during the arrest and search of a known narcotics peddler.
This Court's decision announced today in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, post, p. 403 U. S. 443, dramatically illustrates the extent to which the doctrine represents a mechanically inflexible response to widely varying degrees of police error, and the resulting high price that society pays. I dissented in Coolidge primarily because I do not believe the Fourth Amendment had been violated. Even on the Court's contrary premise, however, whatever violation
I conclude, therefore, that an entirely different remedy is necessary, but it is one that, in my view, is as much beyond judicial power as the step the Court takes today. Congress should develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself to afford compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. The venerable doctrine of respondeat superior in our tort law provides an entirely appropriate conceptual basis for this remedy. If, for example, a security guard privately employed by a department store commits an assault or other tort on a customer such as an improper search, the victim has a simple and obvious remedy -- an action for money damages against the guard's employer, the department store. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 68, pp. 470-480 (3d ed.1964). [Footnote 3/5] Such a statutory scheme would have the added advantage of providing some remedy to the completely innocent persons who are sometimes the victims of illegal police conduct -- something that the suppression doctrine, of course, can never accomplish.
A simple structure would suffice. [Footnote 3/6] For example, Congress could enact a statute along the following lines:
Once the constitutional validity of such a statute is established, [Footnote 3/7] it can reasonably be assumed that the States
While there is no explicit right to file a civil lawsuit against federal government officials who ha...
Webster Bivens was arrested without a warrant when six agents from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics s...
Stephen A. Grant (plaintiff)