Source: https://domingorivera.org/cfaa/tech-sys-inc-v-pyles-4th-cir-2015/
Timestamp: 2019-02-22 08:01:47
Document Index: 42009135

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1030', '§ 1030', '§ 1030', '§ 1030', '§ 1331', '§ 1367']

Tech Sys., Inc. v. Pyles (4th Cir., 2015) | Domingo J Rivera - domingorivera.org
I. “We review de novo the legal conclusions upon which the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law were premised.” Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146, 164 (4th Cir. 2012). “If, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found in [the non-moving party’s] favor, we are constrained to affirm the jury verdict.” Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 259 (4th Cir. 2001).
violation of the CFAA . . . .” A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir. 2009). The civil suit may be brought in limited circumstances by “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss” as a result of a CFAA violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). As relevant here, the violation must have caused “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I), (g). A person violates the CFAA by “intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer,” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), or “intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, caus[ing] damage and loss,” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C).
This court narrowly interprets the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.” WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012). “[A]n employee . . . accesses a computer ‘without authorization’ when [s]he gains admission to a computer without approval.” Id. at 204. “[A]n employee ‘exceeds authorized access’ when [s]he has approval to access a computer, but uses [her] access to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of [her] approved access.” Id. “Notably, neither of these
II. In Virginia, to establish a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed a fiduciary duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) damages resulted from the breach. Informatics Applications Grp.,
Inc. v. Shkolnikov, 836 F. Supp. 2d 400, 424 (E.D. Va. 2011). “[A]n employee . . . owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to [her] employer during [her] employment.” Williams v. Dominion Tech. Partners, LLC, 576 S.E.2d 752, 757 (Va. 2003). This duty “prohibits the employee from acting in a manner adverse to his employer’s interest.” Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Richmond v. DePew, 440 S.E.2d 918, 921 (Va. 1994). Moreover, “termination does not automatically free a[n] . . . employee from his or her fiduciary obligations” if the action was “founded on information gained during the relationship.” Today Homes, Inc. v. Williams, 634 S.E.2d 737, 744 (Va. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Finally, Pyles challenges the district court’s jury instructions allowing for punitive damages and its award of attorney’s fees in TSI’s favor. It is a “settled rule” that we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal absent “fundamental error or a denial of fundamental justice.” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Fundamental error is more limited than the plain error standard that [this Court] appl[ies] in criminal cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, this court has used the plain error standard “as something of an intermediate step in a civil case.” Id. at 286. “[W]hen a party in a civil case fails to meet the plain-error standard, we can say with confidence that [s]he has not established fundamental error.” Id.
We have refused to undertake plain error review, however, where a party “failed to make its most essential argument anywhere in its briefs . . . : it never contended that the district court fundamentally or even plainly erred.” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 292; see Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 2015) (refusing plain error review where appellant failed to assert that elements of such review were satisfied). Failing to argue either, Pyles has abandoned these claims. Moreover, Pyles’ jurisdictional argument is meritless because the court properly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction over her federal and state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (federal question), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012) (supplemental jurisdiction).
2015), Attorney Domingo Rivera, Inc. v. Pyles (4th Cir., Tech Sys.
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