Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/281/528/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-12-13 22:49:27
Document Index: 526784705

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 26', '§ 3450', '§ 3450', '§ 26', '§ 3450', '§ 26', '§ 3450', '§ 26', '§ 3450', '§ 3450', '§ 26', '§ 26', '§ 3450', '§ 26', '§ 26', '§ 26', '§ 3450', '§ 26', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3450', '§ 26', '§ 3450', '§ 26', '§ 26', '§ 26', '§ 26']

RICHBOURG MOTOR CO. V. UNITED STATES, 281 U. S. 528 (1930) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 281 > RICHBOURG MOTOR CO. V. UNITED STATES, 281 U. S. 528 (1930)
RICHBOURG MOTOR CO. V. UNITED STATES, 281 U. S. 528 (1930)
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Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528 (1930)
Where a person, discovered in the act of transporting liquor unlawfully, has been arrested and the transporting vehicle seized under § 26 of the National Prohibition Act, proceedings to forfeit the vehicle must be taken under that section, which protects innocent lienors, and will not lie under Rev.Stats. § 3450. P. 281 U. S. 532.
Certiorari, 280 U.S. 549, and post, p. 707, to review judgments affirming forfeitures of automobiles under Rev.Stats. § 3450. The present petitioners intervened chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In these cases, certiorari was granted, 280 U.S. 549, and post, p. 707, respectively, to pass on the question whether proceedings for the forfeiture of a vehicle seized under § 26 of the National Prohibition Act [Footnote 1] as one used for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor, but, where there has been no prosecution for that offense, must be had under that section, or whether they may be prosecuted under the provisions of R.S. § 3450. [Footnote 2] The latter authorizes the forfeiture of vehicles used in the removal or concealment of any commodity with intent to deprive the United States of any tax upon it, which is made a criminal offense. The section does not, as does § 26, protect the interests of innocent lienors. Goldsmith Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505; cf. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465.
In each case, the court of appeals answered the question by affirming a judgment of a district court forfeiting, under § 3450, automobiles in which the petitioners, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The proceedings presently involved for the forfeiture of the vehicles were also had under that section. In each, the respective petitioners intervened, setting up that they were lienors under conditional contracts of sale, to persons other than those arrested, and that petitioners and the conditional vendees were innocent of any participation in the unlawful acts charged. In No. 452, the court refused a request of petitioner to submit to the jury the question whether the seized automobile was used in the unlawful transportation of liquor and whether the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321, it was held that there was no such direct conflict between § 26 and § 3450 as to preclude the forfeiture of the interest of an innocent lienor under the latter where the intoxicating liquor was concealed in the seized vehicle with intent to defraud the government of the tax, and where it did not appear that there was transportation of the liquor. In Port Gardner Investment Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 564, and in Commercial Credit Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 226, it was held that prosecution and conviction of the offender for the transportation of intoxicating liquor under the Prohibition Act barred forfeiture of the seized vehicle under § 3450, since the disposition of the vehicle after the conviction, prescribed by § 26, is mandatory. These cases left undetermined the question now presented -- whether, under § 26, the mere arrest of the person discovered in the act of transportation, and the seizure of the transporting vehicle, bar the forfeiture under § 3450.
The language of § 26 is in form mandatory throughout. It is made the "duty" of the officer discovering any person chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
But the government contends that § 26, is not to be read thus literally; that it was not intended by its mandatory phrases to do more than state generally the duty resting on all law enforcement officers to enforce the law, but which leaves them free, when the same act or transaction constitutes an offense under different statutes, to proceed under either one. It is argued that § 26, could not have been intended to preclude district attorneys from prosecuting violations of § 3450 merely because they involve transportation, and it can no less be taken to deprive chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Undoubtedly, "shall" is sometimes the equivalent of "may" when used in a statute prospectively affecting government action. See Railroad v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168; West Wisconsin Ry. Co. v. Foley, 94 U. S. 100, 94 U. S. 103. The usual provisions of criminal statutes that the offender "shall" be punished as the statute prescribes is not necessarily to be taken, as against the government, to direct prosecution under that, rather than some other applicable statute.
It is to be observed that § 26 neither prohibits transportation of intoxicating liquors nor prescribes the punishment of the offender. That is provided for in Title 2, §§ 3 and 29, as amended by the Jones Act (45 Stat. 1446). The general duty of investigating and reporting violations of § 3 as well as other sections of the National Prohibition Act to United States Attorneys is imposed on all prohibition officers by §§ 2 and 29. That duty is mandatory. Donnelley v. United States, 276 U. S. 505. The general chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In providing for forfeitures under this section, Congress was not unaware that the enactment of the National Prohibition Act would enormously increase seizures of vehicles beyond those made under § 3450, and that their forfeiture would place an increased and heavy burden on many innocent persons unless afforded some protection by the new legislation. By § 26, it gave such protection in all cases where the prosecution of the person guilty of the transportation is had under the National Prohibition Act. This would have been but an idle gesture, and the congressional purpose would have been defeated, if, in practically every case where the transporting vehicle is seized, the prosecuting officers could compel forfeiture of the interests of innocent third persons under § 3450. Yet that is the effect of the construction of § 26 contended for by the government, since, with the enactment of national prohibition, there can be few cases of illegal transportation which do not involve the concealment of nontax paid liquor. See United States v. One Ford Coupe, supra, p. 272 U. S. 326.
This Court has already held that the provision in § 26 that "the court upon conviction of the person so chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We are of opinion that, under § 26, it is the duty of prohibition officers to arrest any person discovered in the act of transportation and to seize the transporting vehicle; that such arrest and seizure require the government to proceed for forfeiture of the vehicle under § 26. It is unnecessary to say whether, if for any reason the seizure chanroblesvirtualawlibrary