Source: http://openjurist.org/185/f3d/922/peerless-corporation-v-united-states-of-america
Timestamp: 2013-12-12 07:59:10
Document Index: 747290738

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4051', '§ 4053', '§ 4053', '§ 6110', '§ 6110', '§ 4053']

185 F3d 922 Peerless Corporation v. United States of America | OpenJurist
185 F. 3d 922 - Peerless Corporation v. United States of America	Home185 f3d 922 peerless corporation v. united states of america
185 F3d 922 Peerless Corporation v. United States of America 185 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 1999)
PEERLESS CORPORATION, APPELLANT,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE.
No. 98-3552
Submitted: June 17, 1999Decided August 30, 1999
Peerless manufactures specialty truck trailers, including trailers fitted with a hydraulic "live-floor" mechanism that automatically unloads cargo. From July 1, 1993, through June 30, 1995, the time relevant to this appeal, Peerless sold 125 live-floor trailers to retail customers. Peerless paid the federal excise tax under § 4051 on only the portion of the sales price attributable to the trailer chassis, claiming that the live-floor trailer body qualified for the tax exemption provided by Internal Revenue Code § 4053(2). See 26 U.S.C. § 4053(2) (1994).4 Peerless apparently relied for its position on an IRS private letter ruling issued to another taxpayer stating that the live-floor trailer bodies manufactured by that taxpayer were "primarily designed for the exempt purposes set forth in the [Internal Revenue] Code.... [and] are exempt from tax under section 4053(2)(B) of the Code," while the "chassis components of such semitrailers are subject to the tax imposed by section 4051." IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8907008, at 2 (Nov. 14, 1988). The private letter ruling further provides, in accordance with Internal Revenue Code § 6110(j)(3), that "[t]his ruling is directed only to the taxpayer who requested it." Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1994) (providing that private letter rulings, determination letters, and technical advice memoranda issued by the IRS "may not be used or cited as precedent").
For its first issue on appeal, Peerless claims that the District Court erred in denying Peerless's motion in limine. Peerless argues that the § 4053(2) exemption refers only to the purpose for which the trailers primarily were designed and, therefore, that evidence regarding the actual use of the trailers by purchasers should have been excluded. Peerless, however, failed to object at trial to the admission of the evidence regarding the actual uses of the trailers and, moreover, introduced its own evidence on that subject. As we explained in Huff v. Heckendorn Manufacturing Co., "[W]hen a motion to exclude evidence is made in limine and is overruled, if the evidence is thereafter admitted at trial without objection,'the error if any, has not been preserved for review.'" 991 F.2d 464, 466 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Starr v. J. Hacker Co., 688 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1333-34 (8th Cir. 1985).
Even if Peerless had preserved the issue for appeal, the evidence of actual use properly was admitted for the limited purpose of determining the primary function for which the trailer bodies were designed. See Hagan v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 16,166 (D. Me. Sept. 11, 1974) (instructi