Source: https://openjurist.org/449/us/90/allen-v-mccurry
Timestamp: 2018-10-20 11:40:41
Document Index: 790275565

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1738', '§ 1', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 1983', '§ 3', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1738', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 68', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 93', '§ 92']

449 U.S. 90 - Allen v. McCurry
449 US 90 Allen v. McCurry
Marvin ALLEN et al., Petitioners,
Willie McCURRY.
The actual basis of the Court of Appeals' holding appears to be a generally framed principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises. But the authority for this principle is difficult to discern. It cannot lie in the Constitution, which makes no such guarantee, but leaves the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to the wisdom of Congress.21 And no such authority is to be found in § 1983 itself. For reasons already discussed at length, nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state-court judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its proper jurisdiction, has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims, and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights. And nothing in the legislative history of § 1983 reveals any purpose to afford less deference to judgments in state criminal proceedings than to those in state civil proceedings.22 There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged at all.23
Through § 1983, the 42d Congress intended to afford an opportunity for legal and equitable relief in a federal court for certain types of injuries. It is difficult to believe that the drafters of that Act considered it a substitute for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the purpose of which is not to redress civil injury, but to release the applicant from unlawful physical confinement, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 484, 93 S.Ct., at 1833; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399, n. 5, 83 S.Ct. 822, 827, n. 5, 9 L.Ed.2d 837,24 particularly in light of the extremely narrow scope of federal habeas relief for state prisoners in 1871.
The only other conceivable basis for finding a universal right to litigate a federal claim in a federal district court is hardly a legal basis at all, but rather a general distrust of the capacity of the state courts to render correct decisions on constitutional issues. It is ironic that Stone v. Powell provided the occasion for the expression of such an attitude in the present litigation, in view of this Court's emphatic reaffirmation in that case of the constitutional obligation of the state courts to uphold federal law, and its expression of confidence in their ability to do so. 428 U.S., at 493-494, n. 35, 96 S.Ct., at 3051-52, n. 35; see Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637, 4 S.Ct. 544, 551, 28 L.Ed. 542 (Harlan, J.).
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that McCurry's inability to obtain federal habeas corpus relief upon his Fourth Amendment claim renders the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable to his § 1983 suit.25 Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In deciding whether a common-law doctrine is to apply to § 1983 when the statute itself is silent, prior cases uniformly have accorded the intent of the legislators great weight.1 For example, in reference to the judicially created immunity doctrine, the Court has observed that when the "immunity claimed . . . was well established at common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, and where its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity." Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1409, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980).2 This very proper inquiry must be made in order to ensure that § 1983 will continue to serve the important goals intended for it by the 42d Congress. In the present case, however, the Court minimizes the significance of the legislative history and discounts its own prior explicit interpretations of the statute. Its discussion is limited to articulating what it terms the single fundamental principle of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Respondent's position merits a quite different analysis. Although the legislators of the 42d Congress did not expressly state whether the then existing common-law doctrine of preclusion would survive enactment of § 1983, they plainly anticipated more than the creation of a federal statutory remedy to be administered indifferently by either a state or a federal court.3 The legislative intent, as expressed by supporters4 and understood by opponents,5 was to restructure relations between the state and federal courts.6 Congress deliberately opened the federal courts to individual citizens in response to the States' failure to provide justice in their own courts. Contrary to the view presently expressed by the Court, the 42d Congress was not concerned solely with procedural regularity. Even where there was procedural regularity, which the Court today so stresses, Congress believed that substantive justice was unobtainable.7 The availability of the federal forum was not meant to turn on whether, in an individual case, the state procedures were adequate. Assessing the state of affairs as a whole, Congress specifically made a determination that federal oversight of constitutional determinations through the federal courts was necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of constitutional rights.
That the new federal jurisdiction was conceived of as concurrent with state jurisdiction does not alter the significance of Congress' opening the federal courts to these claims. Congress consciously acted in the broadest possible manner.8 The legislators perceived that justice was not being done in the States then dominated by the Klan, and it seems senseless to suppose that they would have intended the federal courts to give full preclusive effect to prior state adjudications. That supposition would contradict their obvious aim to right the wrongs perpetuated in those same courts.
I appreciate that the legislative history is capable of alternative interpretations. See the Court's opinion, ante, at 98-101. I would have thought, however, that our prior decisions made very clear which reading is required. The Court repeatedly has recognized that § 1983 embodies a strong congressional policy in favor of federal courts' acting as the primary and final arbiters of constitutional rights.9 In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 51 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Court held that Congress passed the legislation in order to substitute a federal forum for the ineffective, although plainly available, state remedies:
"It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies." Id., at 180, 81 S.Ct., at 480.10
The Court appears to me to misconstrue the plain meaning of Monroe. It states that in that case, "the Court inferred that Congress had intended a federal remedy in three circumstances: where state substantive law was facially unconstitutional, where state procedural law was inadequate to allow full litigation of a constitutional claim, and where state procedural law, though adequate in theory, was inadequate in practice." Ante, at 100-101. It is true that the Court in Monroe described those three circumstances as the "three main aims" of the legislation. 365 U.S., at 173, 81 S.Ct., at 476. Yet in that case, the Court's recounting of the legislative history and its articulation of these three purposes were intended only as illustrative of why the 42d Congress chose to establish a federal remedy in federal court, not as a delineation of when the remedy would be available. The Court's conclusion was that this remedy was to be available no matter what the circumstances of state law:
"It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court." Id., at 183, 81 S.Ct., at 481.
In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), the Court reiterated its understanding of the effect of § 1983 upon state and federal relations:
"Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century. . . . The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.' Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. [339], at 346 [25 L.Ed. 676]." Id., at 242, 92 S.Ct., at 2162.11
One should note also that in England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964), the Court had affirmed the federal courts' special role in protecting constitutional rights under § 1983. In that case it held that a plaintiff required by the abstention doctrine to submit his constitutional claim first to a state court could not be precluded entirely from having the federal court, in which he initially had sought relief, pass on his constitutional claim. The Court relied on "the unqualified terms in which Congress, pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred specific categories of jurisdiction upon the federal courts," and on its "fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state court's determination of those claims." Id., at 415, 84 S.Ct., at 464. The Court set out its understanding as to when a litigant in a § 1983 case might be precluded by prior litigation, holding that "if a party freely and without reservation submits his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates them there, and has them decided there, then-whether or not he seeks direct review of the state decision in this Court-he has elected to forgo his right to return to the District Court." Id., at 419, 84 S.Ct., at 466. I do not understand why the Court today should abandon this approach.
The Court now fashions a new doctrine of preclusion, applicable only to actions brought under § 1983, that is more strict and more confining than the federal rules of preclusion applied in other cases. In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979), the Court pronounced three major factors to be considered in determining whether collateral estoppel serves as a barrier in the federal court:
"[W]hether the issues presented . . . are in substance the same . . .; whether controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the state-court judgment; and finally, whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion." Id., at 155, 99 S.Ct., at 975.
But now the Court states that the collateral-estoppel effect of prior state adjudication should turn on only one factor, namely, what it considers the "one general limitation" inherent in the doctrine of preclusion: "that the concept of collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate that issue in the earlier case." Ante, at 95, 101. If that one factor is present, the Court asserts, the litigant properly should be barred from relitigating the issue in federal court.12 One cannot deny that this factor is an important one. I do not believe, however, that the doctrine of preclusion requires the inquiry to be so narrow,13 and my understanding of the policies underlying § 1983 would lead me to consider all relevant factors in each case before concluding that preclusion was warranted.
In this case, the police officers seek to prevent a criminal defendant from relitigating the constitutionality of their conduct in searching his house, after the state trial court had found that conduct in part violative of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and in part justified by the circumstances. I doubt that the police officers, now defendants in this § 1983 action, can be considered to have been in privity with the State in its role as prosecutor. Therefore, only "issue preclusion"14 is at stake.
The following factors persuade me to conclude that this respondent should not be precluded from asserting his claim in federal court. First, at the time § 1983 was passed, a nonparty's ability, as a practical matter, to invoke collateral estoppel was nonexistent. One could not preclude an opponent from relitigating an issue in a new cause of action, though that issue had been determined conclusively in a prior proceeding, unless there was "mutuality."15 Additionally, the definitions of "cause of action" and "issue" were narrow.16 As a result, and obviously, no preclusive effect could arise out of a criminal proceeding that would affect subsequent civil litigation. Thus, the 42d Congress could not have anticipated or approved that a criminal defendant, tried and convicted in state court, would be precluded from raising against police officers a constitutional claim arising out of his arrest.
Also, the process of deciding in a state criminal trial whether to exclude or admit evidence is not at all the equivalent of a § 1983 proceeding. The remedy sought in the latter is utterly different. In bringing the civil suit the criminal defendant does not seek to challenge his conviction collaterally. At most, he wins damages. In contrast, the exclusion of evidence may prevent a criminal conviction. A trial court, faced with the decision whether to exclude relevant evidence, confronts institutional pressures that may cause it to give a different shape to the Fourth Amendment right from what would result in civil litigation of a damages claim. Also, the issue whether to exclude evidence is subsidiary to the purpose of a criminal trial, which is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and a trial court, at least subconsciously, must weigh the potential damage to the truth-seeking process caused by excluding relevant evidence. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-495, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3050-3052, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-424, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2012-2018, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
A state criminal defendant cannot be held to have chosen "voluntarily" to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the state court. The risk of conviction puts pressure upon him to raise all possible defenses.17 He also faces uncertainty about the wisdom of forgoing litigation on any issue, for there is the possibility that he will be held to have waived his right to appeal on that issue. The "deliberate bypass" of state procedures, which the imposition of collateral estoppel under these circumstances encourages, surely is not a preferred goal. To hold that a criminal defendant who raises a Fourth Amendment claim at his criminal trial "freely and without reservation submits his federal claims for decision by the state courts," see England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S., at 419, 84 S.Ct., at 466, is to deny reality. The criminal defendant is an involuntary litigant in the state tribunal, and against him all the forces of the State are arrayed. To force him to a choice between forgoing either a potential defense or a federal forum for hearing his constitutional civil claim is fundamentally unfair.
Nevertheless, relying on the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to abstain from conducting the trial until McCurry had exhausted his opportunities for review of his claim in the state appellate courts. 606 F.2d, at 799.
In Blonder-Tongue the Court noted other trends in the state and federal courts expanding the preclusive effects of judgments, such as the broadened definition of "claim" in the context of res judicata and the greater preclusive effect given criminal judgments in subsequent civil cases. 402 U.S., at 326, 91 S.Ct., at 1441.
Other factors, of course, may require an exception to the normal rules of collateral estoppel in particular cases. E. g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S., at 162, 99 S.Ct., at 978 (unmixed questions of law in successive actions between the same parties on unrelated claims).
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, post, at 112-113, our decision today does not "fashion" any new more stringent doctrine of collateral estoppel, nor does it hold that the collateral-estoppel effect of a state-court decision turns on the single factor of whether the State gave the federal claimant a full and fair opportunity to litigate a federal question. Our decision does not "fashion" any doctrine of collateral estoppel at all. Rather, it construes § 1983 to determine whether the conventional doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to the case at hand. It must be emphasized that the question whether any exceptions or qualifications within the bounds of that doctrine might ultimately defeat a collateral-estoppel defense in this case is not before us. See n. 2, supra.
It has been argued that, since there remains little federal common law after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, to hold that the creation of a federal cause of action by itself does away with the rules of preclusion would take away almost all meaning from § 1738. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 317, 328 (1978).
By contrast, the roughly contemporaneous statute extending the federal writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners expressly rendered "null and void" any state-court proceeding inconsistent with the decision of a federal habeas court, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254), and the modern habeas statute also expressly adverts to the effect of state-court criminal judgments by requiring the applicant for the writ to exhaust his state-court remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), and by presuming a state-court resolution of a factual issue to be correct except in eight specific circumstances, § 2254(d). In any event, the traditional exception to res judicata for habeas corpus review, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1840, 36 L.Ed.2d 439, provides no analogy to § 1983 cases, since that exception finds its source in the unique purpose of habeas corpus-to release the applicant for the writ from unlawful confinement. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 10 L.Ed.2d 148.
To the extent that Congress in the post-Civil War period did intend to deny full faith and credit to state-court decisions on constitutional issues, it expressly chose the very different means of postjudgment removal for state court defendants whose civil rights were threatened by biased state courts and who therefore "are denied or cannot enforce [their civil rights] in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
E. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 514 (1871) (Rep. Poland); id., at 695 (Sen. Edmunds); see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-284, n.7, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, n.7, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (noting that the state courts may entertain § 1983 claims, while reserving the question whether the state courts must do so).
The dissent suggests, post, at 112, that the Court's decision in England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440, demonstrates the impropriety of affording preclusive effect to the state-court decision in this case. The England decision is inapposite to the question before us. In the England case, a party first submitted to a federal court his claim that a state statute violated his constitutional rights. The federal court abstained and remitted the plaintiff to the state courts, holding that a state-court decision that the statute did not apply to the plaintiff would moot the federal question. Id., at 413, 84 S.Ct., at 463. The plaintiff submitted both the state- and federal-law questions to the state courts, which decided both questions adversely to him. Id., at 414, 84 S.Ct., at 464. This Court held that in such a circumstance, a plaintiff who properly reserved the federal issue by informing the state courts of his intention to return to federal court, if necessary, was not precluded from litigating the federal question in federal court. The holding in England depended entirely on this Court's view of the purpose of abstention in such a case: Where a plaintiff properly invokes federal-court jurisdiction in the first instance on a federal claim, the federal court has a duty to accept that jurisdiction. Id., at 415, 84 S.Ct., at 464. Abstention may serve only to postpone rather than to abdicate, jurisdiction, since its purpose is to determine whether resolution of the federal question is even necessary, or to obviate the risk of a federal court's erroneous construction of state law. Id., at 416, and n. 7, 84 S.Ct., at 465, and n. 7. These concerns have no bearing whatsoever on the present case.
Dictum in Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (CA9 1971), suggested that applying collateral estoppel in § 1983 actions might make the Civil Rights Act "a dead letter," but in that case, because the state prosecutor had agreed to withdraw the evidence allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the state court had never decided the constitutional claim. In Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534, 537-538 (1974), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that since the issues in the state and federal cases were different-the legality of police conduct in the former and the good faith of the police in the latter-the state-decision could not have preclusive effect in the federal court. This solution, however, fails to recognize that a state court decision that the police acted legally cannot but foreclose a claim that they acted in bad faith. At least one Federal District Court has relied on the Brubaker case. Clark v. Lutcher, 436 F.Supp. 1266 (MD Pa.1977).
U.S.Const., Art. III.
The remarks of the proponents of § 1983 quoted in n. 16, supra, suggest the contrary. The Court of Appeals did not in any degree rest its holding on disagreement with the common view that judgments in criminal proceedings as well as in civil proceedings are entitled to preclusive effect. See, e. g., Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 71 S.Ct. 408, 95 L.Ed. 534.
We do not decide how the body of collateral estoppel-doctrine or 28 U.S.C. § 1738 should apply in this case. See n. 2, supra.
See, e. g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).
See also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (survival of action); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 97 S.Ct. 1642, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (nature of damages award).
See, e. g., id., at 460 (remarks of Rep. Coburn, whom the Court by its reference to the Congressman's "spring up and resume" observation, ante, at 100. n. 16, would interpret the other way) ("The United States courts are further above mere local influence than the county courts; their judges can act with more independence, cannot be put under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage; the jurors are taken from the State, and not the neighborhood; they will be able to rise above prejudices or bad passions or terror more easily. . . . We believe that we can trust our United States courts, and we propose to do so"); Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 79 (comments of Rep. Perry) ("The first section provides redress by civil action in the Federal courts for a deprivation of any rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution . . .") (emphasis added).
E. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 51 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967).
To the extent that Monroe v. Pape held that a municipality was not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, it was overruled by the Court in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S., at 664-689, 98 S.Ct., at 2022-2035. That ruling, of course, does not affect Monroe's authoritative pronouncement of the legislative purposes of § 1983.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 15, 1977); F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure §§ 11.16-11.22 (2d ed. 1977).
See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877); F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure §§ 11.3, 11.16 (2d ed. 1977).
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 56 S.Ct. 645, 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), overruled by the Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32 S.Ct. 641, 56 L.Ed. 1009 (1912); F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 11.2 (2d ed. 1977); Restatement of Judgments § 93 (1942); 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice &Par; 0.412[1], 0.441[3] (2d ed. 1974).
Compare McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 Yale L.J. 614, 638 (1925) (defining "cause of action" as "that group of operative facts which, standing alone, would show a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right giving cause for the state, through its courts, to afford relief to the party or parties whose right was invaded"), with C. Clark, Handbook on the Law of Code Pleading 84 (1928) (adopting "modern" rule expanding "cause of action" to include more than one "right"). See also 1 H. Herman, Law of Estoppel and Res Judicata §§ 92, 96 ("cause of action"), 98, 103, 111 ("issue") (1886); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 818, 826, 841-843 (1952).
See Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F.Supp. 86, 88-89 (ED Va.1973) (noting the defendant's dilemma).