Source: http://ininet.org/the-administrative-and-regulatory-state-syllabus-professor-mas.html
Timestamp: 2018-05-24 11:50:04
Document Index: 192973214

Matched Legal Cases: ['§109', '§109', '§2', '§2', '§205', '§102', '§14', '§610', '§411', '§ 1983']

The Administrative and Regulatory State Syllabus Professor Mashaw Spring Term 2008
Professor Mashaw – Spring Term 2008
Part II: The Role of Legislation in the Administrative State
Statutory Vagueness and Its Antidotes
Congress may delegate to the President the power to stabilize wages and prices
Court used a balancing test of the Act’s potential for abuse and safeguards and the balance tipped in favor of safety
Economic Stabilization Act: Allowed President to issue Executive orders setting prices and wages
Separation of Powers Doctrine: Each branch of government is precluded from interfering with the authority of another
Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission
Oregon liquor commission denied liquor license to Sun Ray but it didn’t have a set of standards for issuance/denial of such license
An administrative agency must adopt and follow specific standards upon which to base decisions
Rationale: absent such standards, neither agency in question nor the public can possibly know how to conform their behavior
Judicial Review: the authority of the courts to review decisions, actions or omissions committed by another agency or branch of government
§109(b)(1) of Clean Air Act constitutionally delegates legislative power to the EPA
The EPA may not consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards under §109(b)(1)
The EPA must establish uniform national standards at a level requisite to protect public health from adverse effects of the pollutant in the ambient air
Requisite = sufficient
Congress may not reserve by statute the power to override executive enforcement of the law
Indian Citizen overstayed his Visa, he filed to stay and Attorney General approved, but the House (under clause in Act that allowed them to override A.G.’s decisions) ordered deportation anyways. UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Legislative Veto is unconstitutional
Statutory Precision and Its Consequences
USDA v. Murry
Food stamp benefits may not be denied on the basis of a conclusive presumption that households wherein members older than 18 are claimed as dependents are not needy
Ex-husband claimed some household members as dependents, so Murry was denied food stamp benefits
Administrative convenience of conclusive presumptions cannot trump the rights of citizens to due process
Delaney clause said to ban cancerous food additives; FDA banned saccharin under clause and said no choice
FDA listed carcinogenic dyes based on risk assessments indicating that their cancer risks were trivial
Delaney clause – prohibits the FDA from listing a color additive if it has induced cancer in animals.
The Delaney Clause does not contain an implicit de minimis exception for carcinogenic dyes posing trivial risks to humans
Plain language of the clause shows a rigid prohibition against such dyes
Section 112 of the 1970 Clear Air Act
NHTSA and Statutory Specificity
Framework Statutes and Legislative Oversight – CB 154-181, 1311-1325.
The Statutory Environment of Federal Administration
Statutes Promoting Procedural Fairness and Openness
Administrative Procedure Act – minimum procedural standards for agencies
Federal Register Act – must publish new rules in Federal Register
Freedom of Information Act – FOIA – agency must make available any record that doesn’t fall into 10 specified categories
Government in the Sunshine Act – must provide advance notice of meetings unless exempted (but you can claim it’s not a meeting)
Procedural Statutes With Substantive Goals
National Environmental Policy Act – Contract out environmental impact statements so environmental people not associated w/ decision makers; can only be sued for non-comprehensiveness
Regulatory Flexibility Act – Must gather info about impact on small businesses
Saco River Cellular v. FCC
Statutes Safeguarding the Integrity of Agency Decision Makers
Legislative Oversight, Casework, and Influence
Part III: Administration and the Executive Power
Appointments and Removals – CB 182-255.
Administrative Organization and the Shifting Balance of Congressional and Presidential Power
Controlling Congressional Attempts to Appoint and Remove Administrators
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 had a F.E.C. Commission that was going to have officers elected in a way that was different from Article II, §2. Issue was whether or not this was okay. Answer: NO!
Officers of the US must be appointed in a manner consistent with Article II, §2:
No member of Congress will be appointed an officer of the US during his term b/c framers intended strict separation between executive officers and legislative officials
All executive officials shall be nominated by President and confirmed by Senate
Rule: Congress may appoint officials who perform purely legislative acts but not officers who perform executive or judicial acts
General Statutes Constraining Executive Control over Personnel
Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Citizen v. US DoJ)
The separation of powers doctrine prevents Congress from delegating to an office subservient to it power to enforce laws
Balanced Budged Act  limits on the Federal Budget deficit and if the limits couldn’t be met, the Comptroller General could order across-the-board cuts in federal programs
Congress’ Power to Regulate the President’s relationship with Administrators
In the absence of congressional approval, the President may not fire administrative officials with fixed terms unless the office is purely executive
President Roosevelt fired Humphrey, member of FTC, before his term expired. After he died, his executor sued for back pay.
Distinguished from Postmaster General (said that was purely executive); where no independent judgment is involved (in a position) removal at will is permissible
Congress’ Role in Administrative Design
Executive v. Independent Agencies
Identifying Independent Agencies – Removal Provisions
Identifying Independent Agencies – Agency Functions
Identifying Independent Agencies – Congressional Labeling
Statutory Independence and Political Reality
Independence v. Executive Accountability
The independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act are not unconstitutional
B/c of the limited scope of the counsel’s office, it is an inferior (not a principal) officer – there is no constitutional prohibition on inter-branch appointments
The Special prosecutor reports to Congress, but answers MORE to the Attorney General and this doesn’t interfere w/ the powers of the President in enforcing laws
Ethics in Government Act  counsel could be remove only by impeachment or by the Attorney General for good cause. Olson wanted to quash some subpoenas
The Executive Power to Direct and Manage – CB 255-311; Soft Law Reform or Executive Branch Hard Ball: The Ambiguous Message of E.O. 13,422 (BB).
Executive Authority to Direct Agency Policy
President’s Power of Policy Initiation
The Youngstown Framework (Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer)
Jackson Concurrence
1) Express or implied statutory authority – highest power
2) Contrary to Congress’s express or implied power – lowest authority
3) No Congressional policy determines presidential power
Can make law through executive orders – need authority from constitution or statutes
Law straight out
Add substantive authority to agency
Presidential Exercise of Inherent Constitutional Power
US v. Midwest Oil
Implementation of Statutory Authority
The Instruments of Presidential Command: Executive Orders
Presidential Oversight of Regulatory Policy
US DOJ Memorandum for David Stockman
Exemption of Independent Agencies
Constitutionality of the Reagan Orders
Shane: The case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking
The Institutional Impetus for Presidential Regulatory Oversight
Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas
Due to extensive proposed rule review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the EPA wasn’t able to promulgate certain rules w/in a statutory deadline
The OMB may not use its oversight authority to frustrate compliance with statutory deadlines  this constitutes executive overreaching into the legislative sphere and is invalid under Article II
Curbing OMB Review of Specific Programs
Statutory Silence and the Legality of Presidential Oversight
Information Policy and OMB regulatory Oversight
Elana Kagan, Presidential Administration
Presidential Regulatory Oversight During Transitional Periods
Presidential “Ownership” of Administration v. Checks and Balances
Presidential Administration and Open Government
Assessments of OMG’s Regulatory Oversight Role
Executive Authority, Congressional Legislation and the “War on Terror” (materials to be provided on BB).
Part IV: Administrative Action with the Force of Law: Adjudication
Constitutional Limits on Agency Adjudication: Jurisdictional and Procedural Constraints – CB 114-123, 312-350; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (BB).
Adjudicatory Due Process
Timing and Elements of a Due Process Hearing
Welfare recipients alleged they were deprived of due process by having their benefits terminated w/o first having a hearing.
Ct found this unconstitutional
Welfare benefits may be terminated only after a hearing in which the recipient is afforded procedural safeguards, including the opportunity to be heard on his own behalf
Welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement and the recipient’s needs outweigh the government’s interest in summary adjudication of ineligibility
The Claimant’s Stake
Hearings and Accurate Decision Making
The Costs of Due Process
Other institutional Impacts of Goldberg
Eldridge had his disability benefits terminated and he sued to challenge the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures to terminate claiming it violated his right to due process. Ct. disagreed
The Due Process Clause does not require a hearing prior to termination of disability benefits
Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft
Lujan v. G and G Fire Sprinklers
Parham v. JR
Who Has a Constitutional Right to an Adjudicatory Hearing? CB 351-406.
Interests Protected by Due Process Hearing Rights
The Right/Privilege Distinction and its Demise
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy
The Return to the Search for Entitlements: The case of Public Employment
Roth was hired on a 1-yr term of employment and at the end told the contract wouldn’t be renewed. He sued saying he needed a hearing or explanation first. Ct. disagreed.
The State need not hold hearings or offer reasons for its failure to rehire an employee whose initial term of employment has expired
Due process must be accorded only when an individual is threatened with deprivation of either liberty or property
Gov’t can fire an employee unless, in doing so, it stigmatizes him in a way which seriously forecloses future employment opportunities
Π challenged the nonrenewal of his teaching contract b/c they gave no reasons and granted no hearing. Π alleged the decision was based on his public criticism of its policies (thereby infringing on his right to freedom of speech)
Absent sufficient cause, a state may not deny its employee continued employment where denial infringes on his constitutionally protected interests or frustrates his justifiable reliance
There is a protected property right in continued public employment which cannot be terminated without due process of law
Federal Statutory Hearing Rights
Finding a Hearing Right
US v. Florida East Coast Railway
The Interstate Commerce Commission adopted rules regarding per diem charges on boxcars following an informal conference, but w/o a hearing. The issue was whether or not the ICC must hold a formal hearing prior to establishing rules w/ respect to car service by common carriers
The ICC need not hold a formal hearing. When a statute doesn’t expressly require a formal hearing ,the agency may take evidence by written submission
Very narrow view
Administrative decisions regarding recouping social security overpayments must include a hearing.
Ct said that credibility had to be judged
Third Party Hearing Rights
Statutory Hearing Requirements and the Competition Between Bureaucratic Implementation and Individual Rights. CB 406-473.
“On-The-Record” Adjudication under the APA
Exclusivity of Record; Ex Parte Contacts
Appearance of Parties and other Interested Parties
Evidence and Rules on Proof
The Product of the Hearing
Written medical reports may constitute “substantial evidence” w/in the meaning of §205(g) of the Social Security Act, even though live testimony is contradictory
Hearsay in Administrative Adjudication
Evidence normally inadmissible under normal court procedures may be admitted at the adjudicator’s discretion if its admittance affords a claimant a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing
This is due to the largely informal nature of adjudicator discretion to establish hearing procedures
Follows modern trend that rejects the “residuum rule”
Residuum rule: court can’t uphold an agency order under the test of “Substantial evidence” unless the record contained at least a “residuum” of non-hearsay support for the underlying fact-finding
Adjudicative Consistency: Stare Decisis, Res Judicata, Estoppel
Formal Adjudication and Bureaucratic Decision Making
Administration v. Adjudication
Hierarchy v. Personal Judgment
Factual Context v. Policy Implementation
Neutrality v. Institutional Intelligence
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure – Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies
Managing Adjudicatory Personnel
Nash v. Califano
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) have the right to hear social security appeals (under the S.S. Admin. Procedure Act) and one ALJ attacked new regulations about how hearings would be held. Issue: can he do this?
ALJs have standing to attack work product restrictions b/c they have a sufficiently personal interest in challenges to their independence to permit them to take their grievances to court
Controlling Adjudication Through Rulemaking
Dept of Health and Human Services adopted regulations which factored in a disability claimant’s age, health, education, etc.. Π was denied disability benefits b/c of these guidelines
The Dept. of Health and Human Services may rely on published medical-vocational guidelines to determine a claimant’s right to S.S. disability benefits
The findings in this case were individualized b/c it had to compare her qualifications w/ the standards adopted to make a determination.
Avoiding Adjudication through Rulemaking
FAA regulation to prohibit commercial airline pilots from flying beyond age 60. ALPA moved for P.I. b/c the regulation was passed w/o hearings first
Under the FAA, the administrator is free to promulgate reasonable rules which adequately provide for national security and safety in air commerce
Informal Alternatives to Formal Adjudication
Part V: Administrative Action with the Force of Law: Rulemaking
Video on Rulemaking – no reading assignment.
Rulemaking at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration – CB 488-534; “The Story of State Farm” (BB).
Agency Authority to make Legislative Rules
FTC adopted a rule that failure to post octane rating numbers on gasoline pumps at service stations was a deceptive business practice; the NPRA attacked this saying the FTC didn’t have statutory power to make rules and its power was merely adjudicatory
The FTC does have statutory power to promulgate substantive rules of business conduct
Allowing such an agency to have such power gives it invaluable resource-saving flexibility in regulation and carries little danger of abuse since statutory standards exist
Demise of Formal Rulemaking
Substantive Review and the Rulemaking Process
Substantive Review Outside the APA Framework
Pacific States Box and Basket v. White
The Oregon Division of Plant Industry issued an order regarding the size/shape of raspberry and strawberry containers – this practically ended Π’s Oregon Market
An appropriate agency has authority to mandate the size and shape of fruit containers
Substantive Review Under the APA
Automotive Parts and Accessories Association v. Boyd
The Department of Transportation promulgated certain regulations mandating factory installation of automobile head restraints w/o a formal hearing (but after public response was reviewed)
Regulations under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act may be adopted informally
Decided by looking at the act itself and the legislative history
National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Assn v. Brinegar
Rule mandating certain information be permanently imprinted on retreaded tires. Π complains saying this is expensive
Rules promulgated under a legislative enactment must reasonably advance the purposes of the enactment
There must be a substantial relationship between the purpose and means
Balancing test: advancing safety v. real economic detriments
Motor Vehicle Manuftr Assn v. State Farm Auto Insurance
Air bag system and seat belt system case
NHTSA decided the safety benefits associated w/ the restraints didn’t justify the costs of implementing the standard, so it rescinded the passive restraint requirement w/o considering the possible use of airbags
When an agency modifies or rescinds a previously promulgated rule, it is required to supply a satisfactory, rational analysis supporting its decision
A rational rescission decision cannot be made w/o the consideration of technologically feasible alternatives of proven value.
Procedural Constraints on Rulemaking – CB 535-597.
The Procedural Requirements of APA Section 553
US v. Nova Scotia Food Products
FDA issued guidelines for proper processing of smoked whitefish w/o commenting on the necessity of the guidelines and w/o disclosing the data upon which it based its decision
Informal rulemaking must involve disclosure of relevant scientific data and statements concerning the need for the rule
It is not too much for an agency to formulate clear reasons for its rules, as this helps to minimize arbitrariness and facilitates judicial review
Hearings in Informal Rulemaking
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Resources Defense Council
Adequacy of the record in agency rulemaking proceeding is not correlated directly to the type of procedural devices employed but turns on whether the agency has followed the statutory mandate of the APA
Rule on nuclear wastes that was struck down b/c of alleged procedural defects
Coal combustion emission standards after a comment period.
The Ct. found that the EPA may receive input following the close of the official comment period
The contacts were put in the record so it negated the argument that some “Secret process” was occurring – it was all accounted for
The president does not have an inherent right to monitor policy making in the executive branch – some meetings between the EPA officials and the White House did not go into the official record
Bias and Prejudgment in Rulemaking
Association of National Advertisers v. FTC
Chairman of the FTC refused to step down from rulemaking about children’s television advertising after he had taken a public stand on the issue and made comments about it
An agency member should be disqualified from decision-making ONLY WHEN it is shown he has a closed mind on matters critical to the proceeding
It can’t be seriously argued that decisions cannot be made by members of Congress who have set opinions prior to fact-finding, and where such power has been delegated, the only restrictions are those imposed by due process
Complete impartiality in the political process is neither possible nor desirable
The burden to show/prove impermissible bias is substantial
Exemptions from Section 553’s Requirements
American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety and Health Administration
Mine operators were required to report any diagnosis of occupational illnesses w/in 10 days – x-rays counted
Interpretive rules do not statutorily require notice and comment
An agency pronouncement will be subject to APA notice-and-comment requirements if it has legal effect
(1) In absence of the rule, is there no other means by which the agency can enforce the performance of duties or confer benefits?
(2) Was the rule published in the Code of Federal regulations?
(3) Did the agency explicitly invoke its legislative authority as granted by Congress?
(4) Does the rule amend a prior legislative rule?
If yes to any of the 4 factors, the rule is legislative and not interpretive
Agency Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication for the Implementation of Policy – CB 598-641.
Implementing Administrative Policy without Legislative Rules
Institutional Impediments to Rulemaking
Reorganization plan for the Federal Water Service Co. was submitted to the SEC for approval
Agencies confronted with novel issues of law may announce rules of prospective application, but they may also render adjudications which are binding upon the parties to such controversies as were presented to the agency
Issues of res judicata have traditionally been relaxed in the agency context, although there is a trend toward recognizing res judicata principles as essential elements of agency decision making
Native American denied general assistance benefits b/c he didn’t live on the reservation
The BIA didn’t publish its eligibility requirements for general assistance in the Federal Register
Before an agency may extinguish the entitlement of potential beneficiaries, it must comply w/ its own internal procedures
Here, the congressional intent was to cover welfare services, not to exclude those who didn’t live on the reservation
Limitations on eligibility may not be newly imposed on an ad hoc basis, even if it’s for a good reason – limitations must be made known in advance to those adversely affected by them
Rules must be Followed until Changed by Rules
Non-Adjudication Alternatives to Making Rules
Reform of Federal Agency Rulemaking Procedures
Is Rulemaking Ossification Stifling Law Making?
Part VI: Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative and Regulatory State
“Plain Meaning” and Other Interpretive Conceits – TVA v. Hill,437 U.S. 153 (1978), BB; “Theories of Statutory Interpretation” from William M. Eskridge, Jr., et. al., Cases and Materials on Legislation. 689-720 (4th ed., 2007),BB.
“Intentionalism”, “Textualism”, “Dynamism” and the Use of Legislative History – United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979),BB; John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 U. Va. L. Rev. 419 (2005), BB; Peter Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 242 (1998), BB; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and the Idea of Progress, 94 U. Mich. L. Rev. 1546 (1996), BB.
Allocating Interpretive Authority Between Courts and Agencies – CB 825-838, 795-823.
Newsboys: regular full-time newsboys selling papers were employees w/in the Act
Questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute.
If the question is of specific application of a broad term, the reviewing court’s function is limited and it must accept the agency’s determination
Absent clear legislative intent on statutory construction, judicial review of an agency’s construction of a statute is limited to a determination of whether it is a permissible construction of the statue
First, determine legislative intent
If the legislature gives clear and unambiguous guidance as to how to interpret any statutory term, the agency does not have discretion to interpret but must adopt regulations that enforce the express intention of congress
Here, interpretation of the term “Stationary source” / EPA
Presumption: agency discretion does not exist unless the statute expressly or impliedly says so
Classification rulings are best treated as interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines and do not require a Chevron-type deference
Under Skidmore, the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness
Tariff on day planners
Chevron and the Limits of Deference – Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546, U.S. 243 (2006), BB; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. ___ (2007), BB; Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, BB.
Regulatory Authority in the Shadow of the Constitution
OSHA adopted a rule that said benzene concentrations in the workplace had to be minimized to the greatest extent technologically possible
No substantial evidence existed that exposure to 10ppm caused more cancer and the rule would cost the industry over $1 million.
Before OSHA can promulgate health or safety standards, it must make a finding that significant risks are present and can be eliminated by a change in practices
Before OSHA can specify a certain level of toxic exposure, it must show that higher levels are unreasonably dangerous – here that wasn’t shown
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 440 U.S. 490 (1979)
Public Citizen v. DoJ 491 U.S. 440 (1989)
Morrison: Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch
Judicial Review and the Interpretation of the APA
Presumptive but Limited Review
Plans to construct a 6-lane highway through Overton Park
The ruling was initially based on affidavits that had been prepared
The reviewing court must determine the scope of the duties of the official involved in a decision, whether he abused the authority vested in him, and whether in arriving at his decision he observed all applicable procedural requisites
Judicial review of administrative decisions must be meaningful
Provisions of the APA calling for judicial review of administrative determinations cannot be implemented in the absence of a record sufficient to accommodate review and that when such record is absent the courts must choose between ordering its compilation or undertaking their own review de novo
A statute prohibiting judicial review of decisions does not bar federal courts from deciding the constitutionality of veterans’ benefits legislation
There was a challenge in 1972 to the no-review clause but the court held it did not violate due process, so, Veterans Administration decisions remain immune from judicial review
Constitutional Restraints on Statutory Preclusion of Review
Decision “Committed to Agency Discretion” by Law
When the CIA terminated Π’s employment on learning he was homosexual, he sued alleging statutory and constitutional violations by the CIA director
Worked there for 9 years and consistently rated as an excellent employee
Under §102(c), of the National Security Act, employee termination decisions made by the Director of the CIA are not judicially reviewable
NOTE: on remand, the district court concluded that CIA regulations gave Π a post-probation property interest in his position and that his discharge w/o a statement of reasons why his homosexuality posed a security threat and an opportunity to respond to those reasons violated due process
Agency Enforcement Discretion
Decisions by the FDA to refrain from enforcement proceedings is not subject to judicial review
Largely due to the respect for the greater knowlegeability that an agency will be presumed to have over a court
Sometimes judicial un-reviewability of agency inaction is likened to prosecutorial discretion
Part VII – Regulatory Statutes and Individual Rights of Action
Who Has a Right to Judicial Review of Administrative Action– CB 993-1037, 1057-1074
Prior to 1970: Legal Wrongs and Public Rights
Post 1970: From Rights to Injuries
Association of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp
ADPO challenged a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency that national banks could perform data processing services for customers and other banks – comptroller attacked Association’s standing to prosecute the suit
Standing to challenge an order of an administrative agency is established by a showing that the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests to be regulated by the statute or the constitutional guarantee in question
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank and Trust
CNUA had impermissibly expanded the membership definitions of federal credit unions
Prudential standing is established when the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statue in question
(1) The interest protected by the statue must be discerned
(2) Then, the inquiry focuses on whether the complainant’s interests, as affected by the agency action, are among these statutory interests
Article III  Π must establish standing by proving:
(1) Injury-in-fact – a direct and personal harm
(2) Caused by or fairly traceable to the Δ; and
(3) Redressable by the remedy sought
Mere interest in a problem does not in itself render an organization “Adversely affected” or “aggrieved” within the meaning of the APA
The injury-in-fact test requires more than injury to a cognizable interest; it requires the party seeking review be among the injured
Sierra club sued to enjoin from permitting Disney to build a highway in a protected national park area
Particular Injuries v. Generalized Grievances
Voters have standing to challenge a regulatory decision where Congress, through legislation, intended to protect voters from the kind of injury at issue, and a harm in fact exists b/c the injury is sufficiently widespread and concrete
Prudential Standing exists where the injury asserted by the Π falls w/in a range of interests protected by the applicable legislative statute
Constitutional standing in the form of “injury in fact” exists where the asserted harm is shared in equal measure by a large or widespread class of citizens
Standing requires an actual or imminent injury in fact, fairly traceable to agency action and redressable by the court
This seemingly prevents Congress from authorizing private attorneys general to enforce the law – appears to deny that Congress can create an injury in fact for which a member of the public can seek judicial review
Causes of Action on Federal Regulatory Statutes – CB 1074-1086, 1181-1223.
Mercury in river water at high levels – violated its permit which specified the amount of waste the company could put into the environment
Π had standing to sue the Δ for injunctive relief and civil penalties b/c Π proved:
(1) injury in fact, and
(2) penalties would be deterrent
Explicit Statutory Remedies
Implied Rights of Action
J.I. Case v. Borak
Shareholder’s derivative action for alleged misleading proxy statements
While no provision for a private right of action is made in the statute, , one exists for violations of §14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
18 USC §610 made it a criminal offense for a corporation to contribute to presidential elections and Ash (Π) brought suit against various corporate directors for alleged violations of this rule in the 1972 presidential election
A private right of action against corporate directors or authorizing corporate presidential election contributions does not exist
The statute does not authorize such a right of action, so one must be implied
Four factors that were considered when implying a c/a for damages:
(1) was the Π one of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted?
(2) does anything in the legislative history suggest an intent to imple a c/a?
(3) is such a right consistent with the purpose of the statute?
(4) is the area one traditionally left to state law?
Π sued under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
A private right of action under this statute exists
Looked to the 4 factors from Cort v. Ash
Private individuals may not sue to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the absence of Congressional intent
Alabama Department of Public safety decided to administer DL exams only in English
Language cannot conjure up a private right of action
The express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others
Enforcing Federal “Rights” Against State Administrators – CB 1223-1260.
Beneficiary Enforcement Under 42 USC 1983
Welfare benefits that were alleged to be wrongfully withheld
14 USC 1983: provides a cause of action against persons who violate rights under color of law
It encompasses claims brought on purely statutory grounds
The wording permits actions based not only on constitutional violations but on violations of “laws” as well
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act does not obligate the states to provide a certain level of care to the mentally diseased
The Act is voluntary and imposes no affirmative duties upon the states beyond the extent necessary per the terms of the Act for the states to receive funds
Gonzaga University v. John Doe
Π sued Gonzaga when he was denied a state teaching position b/c of personal information supplied to the state from his personnel file
42 USC 1983 does not permit a student to sue a private university for damages to enforce the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions speak only in terms of institutional policy and practice, not individual instances of disclosure
Federal Regulation and the Preemption of Federal and State Rights of Action – CB 1268-1300.
Substitution of Public for Private Rights
Π was bumped from an airline flight due to overbooking
A common law fraud action against an airline is not dependent on §411 of the Federal Aviation Act
Section 411 isn’t available to consumers but only to the CAB
Supersession of Federal Common Law and § 1983 Rights by a Comprehensive Statutory Scheme
Congressional Supersession of State Common Law Rights
Alexis Geier v. American Honda Motor Company
A common law claim that actually conflicts with a federal statute’s purposes is preempted by the same statute
The common law no-airbag action actually conflicted
Preemption = Judicial preference recognizing the procedure of federal legislation over state legislation of the same subject matter
ATTACKS SHEETS BELOW!!!
Cannons of Statutory Interpretation
- read statutes in pari materei: relating to the same topic
-subsequent statutes trump older statutes
-specific statutes trump general statutes (e.g. APA trumped by agency specific statutes)
-abstentions: ct’s inherent power to say b/c of the jur’n of others or b/c of the timing of this case, we think we shln’t decide it now
-Presumption in favor of preserving the common law if there’s a way for it not to conflict w/ the regulation/statute
- Federalism cannon: we have to have an extremely clear statement from the Congress in order to assume that the Congress has taken over what’s historically been up to the states to regulate (Gonzales v. Oregon)
-avoidance cannon: Is there a potential conflict? If yes, and there’s another fairly arguable interpretation that would avoid any serious issue about violating the constitution, then go with that (“don’t go in the forrest) -NLRB v. Catholic Bishop (Supp Sess 21)
-Enroll Bill Rule: If the statute shows up in the Secr. of State’s office looking like it has been through bifurcation and presentment, then the ct. will presume that the statute has gone through the correct process. It’s a statute if it’s a statute.
Major theories of statutory interpretation
Ct seeks to understand the intent of the legislature
Look at specific intent
Constitution allocates policy making authority to the legislature
Fits w standard visions of electoral democracy
Interpret the statute to promote the Congress’s purpose
What did Congress attempt to do?
Ct pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably
Look at general purposes
The Constitution makes the federal courts the law-determining branch of the government
Legislation is a set of bargains that are largely opaque to us, but shld be enforced
Rule of law values
Laws shld be transparent, etc.
We take individual rights seriously