Source: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6790?geography=Florida&geography%5B1%5D=United+States&geography%5B2%5D=California&paging.startRow=1
Timestamp: 2017-11-23 04:02:38
Document Index: 498778204

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'arts 4', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 4', 'art 5']

(6 datasets; 1945 KB)
Principal Investigator(s): Pontell, Henry N., University of California-Irvine. Department of Criminology, Law, and Society; Calavita, Kitty, University of California-Irvine. Department of Criminology, Law, and Society; Tillman, Robert, University of California-Irvine. Department of Criminology, Law, and Society
DS1: Case Data - Download All Files (0.793 MB)
DS2: Defendant Data - Download All Files (0.927 MB)
DS3: Institution Data - Download All Files (0.612 MB)
DS4: Texas Referral Data - Download All Files (0.294 MB)
DS5: California Referral Data - Download All Files (0.303 MB)
Pontell, Henry N., Kitty Calavita, and Robert Tillman. Fraud in the Savings and Loan Industry in California, Florida, Texas, and Washington, DC: White-Collar Crime and Government Response, 1986-1993. ICPSR06790-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1999. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06790.v1
Unit of Observation: Part 1: Case, Part 2: Individuals, Part 3: Single RTC Institution, Parts 4 and 5: Referrals
Universe: White-collar savings and loan crime cases in the United States.
Study Purpose: The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of the factors that contributed to the epidemic of fraud in the savings and loan ("thrift") industry, the role that white-collar crime played, and the government response to this crisis. The researchers sought to describe the magnitude, role, and nature of thrift crime, analyze factors related to the effectiveness of law enforcement control of savings and loan fraud, and develop the broader implications, from both a theoretical and policy perspective. Data focus on all types of thrift, i.e., bank solvent and insolvent, that fell under the jurisdiction of the Office of Thrift Supervision in Florida, Texas, and California and all insolvent thrifts under the control of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in Washington, DC. Questions the project sought to answer were: (1) How many crimes were committed at thrift institutions? (2) What were the costs resulting from these crimes? (3) What types of financial institutions were most vulnerable to fraud? (4) How many types of individuals were most responsible for these crimes? (5) How many of these individuals were prosecuted for their crimes, and once prosecuted, what types of sentences were imposed?
Study Design: Data from three federal agencies -- the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Executive Office of United States Attorneys -- were combined to present the most comprehensive view of fraud in the industry. The Executive Office of United States Attorneys provided data about the major prosecutions, the individual defendants in each case, and their dispositions. The Resolution Trust Corporation provided data on final referrals and the estimated loss to the financial institutions as a result of these referrals. In addition to criminal referrals, the Resolution Trust Corporation provided information on the financial condition of all the institutions under its control. This allowed for the examination of the relationship between selected features of insolvent thrifts and the crimes that were committed. The main objective of the data supplied by this agency was to obtain a better sense of what constituted the crimes reported at thrift institutions. The Office of Thrift Supervision provided Category I referrals for the states of Florida, Texas, and California.
Sample: Four major sites were chosen for the study: California, Florida, Texas, and Washington, DC. The first three sites were chosen either because of the high numbers of savings and loan failures and frauds in the 1980s or because of the high number of executives that were being indicted. Washington, DC, was chosen because it is home to numerous federal agencies whose staffs were available to be interviewed.
Description of Variables: Part 1 consists of data about the cases that were prosecuted, the number of institutions victimized, the state in which these occurred, and the seriousness of the offense as indicated by the dollar loss and the number of victims. Part 2 provides information on the defendant's position in the institution (director, officer, employee, borrower, customer, developer, lawyer, or shareholder), and disposition (fines, restitution, prison, probation, or acquittal). Part 3, Institution Data, describes indictments, convictions, and sentences for all cases in the respective regions, organizational structure and behavior for a single institution, and the estimated loss to the institution. Variables coded are ownership type, charter, home loans, brokered deposits, net worth, number of referrals, number of individuals referred, assets and asset growth, ratio of direct investments to total assets, and total dollar losses due to fraud. Part 4 covers Category I referrals for Texas. Variables include the individual's position in the institution, the number of referrals, and the sum of dollar losses from all referrals. Part 5 measures the total dollar losses due to fraud in California, the total number of criminal referrals, and the number of individuals indicted.
Spahr, Lisa L., Alison, Laurence J. U. S. savings and loan fraud: Implications for general and criminal culture theories of crime. Crime, Law and Social Change . 41, (1), 95-106.
Calavita, Kitty . Deep in the heart of Texas and California: Savings and loan fraud in two states. Research in the Sociology of Work . 8, 73-92.
Calavita, Kitty, Pontell, Henry N., Tillman, Robert H. Big Money Crime: Fraud and Politics in the Savings and Loan Crisis. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Calavita, Kitty, Tillman, Robert, Pontell, Henry N. The savings and loan debacle, financial crime, and the state. Annual Review of Sociology . 23, 19-38.
Tillman, Robert, Calavita, Kitty, Pontell, Henry . Criminalizing white-collar misconduct: Determinants of prosecution in savings and loan fraud cases. Crime, Law and Social Change . 26, (1), 53-76.
Black, William K., Calavita, Kitty, Pontell, Henry N. The savings and loan debacle of the 1980s: White-collar crime or risky business. Law and Policy . 17, (1), 23-55.
Tillman, Robert, Pontell, Henry N. Organizations and fraud in the savings and loan industry. Social Forces . 73, (4), 1439-1463.
Calavita, Kitty, Pontell, Henry N. The state and white-collar crime: Saving the savings and loans. Law and Society Review . 28, (2), 297-324.
Pontell, Henry N., Calavita, Kitty, Tillman, Robert . Corporate crime and criminal justice system capacity: Government response to financial institution fraud. Justice Quarterly . 11, (3), 383-410.
Pontell, Henry N., Calavita, Kitty, Tillman, Robert . Fraud in the Savings and Loan Industry: White-Collar Crime and Government Response, Final Report. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.