Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/239/72/636110/
Timestamp: 2019-05-22 08:57:28
Document Index: 491281355

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1111', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 2']

United States, Appellee,v.ricardo Padro Burgos, A/k/a Ricky Padro, Defendant, Appellant, 239 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2001) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 2001 › United States, Appellee,v.ricardo Padro Burgos, A/k/a Ricky Padro, Defendant, Appellant
United States, Appellee,v.ricardo Padro Burgos, A/k/a Ricky Padro, Defendant, Appellant, 239 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2001)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 239 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2001)
Defendant-appellant Ricardo Padro Burgos was found guilty by a jury of being part of a conspiracy to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine, in excess of five kilograms of cocaine base, and in excess of one hundred kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (count II). He was also found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) by using firearms during and in relation to drug trafficking, and of aiding and abetting the commission of both offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count III).
A salient exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), is that "a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy" is not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (E). In United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993), we explained how the exception works:
The last sentence of Rule 801(d) (2) (E) states in pertinent part:
There can be no doubt that the testimony of the principal witness for the government, Acevedo, fell squarely within the hearsay exception set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) (2) (E). He identified each of the defendants, including Padro Burgos, and described in detail their activities as part of the conspiracy. Acevedo described Padro Burgos's role in the conspiracy as being in charge of the drug point at the Hogar Crea facility. Acevedo also identified Padro Burgos as being part of a group that executed two members of a rival gang that had temporarily wrested control of the Hogar Crea drug point from the members of the conspiracy. The district court did not commit error, plain or otherwise, in admitting Acevedo's testimony under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
This independent non-hearsay corroborating testimony was more than sufficient to meet the "aliunde" requirement of the last sentence of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (E). Hence, there was no error in admitting Acevedo's testimony against Padro Burgos.
On July 15, 1998, the defendant Ricardo Padro Burgos was found guilty by jury trial of counts 2 and 3 of the indictment in this case charging violations of Title 21 U.S. Code section 846 and 18 U.S. Code section [924(c) (1)]. That is a conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence and aiding and abetting. The guideline for a 21 U.S. Code section 846 offense is found at section 2D1.1 of the guidelines. That section provides that offenses involving 30 kilos or more of heroin, 150 kilos or more of cocaine, 1.5 kilos or more of cocaine base and 100 kilos or more of marijuana have a base offense level of 38. However, as victims were killed under the circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S. Code section 1111 and the killings took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States the provisions of Section 2D1.1(d) (1) require the application of guideline section 2A1.1 dealing with first degree murder. As such the appropriate offense level is 43. Guideline provisions preclude application of guideline adjustments to offenses under 18 U.S. Code section 924(c) (1) as charged in Count 3. [The] statute mandates the imposition of a fixed consecutive imprisonment term in accordance with section 2K2.4(a). Based on a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of 6, the guideline imprisonment term in this particular case is life with a fine range of $25,000 to four million plus a supervised release term of three to five years.
Padro Burgos first argues that the district court erred because it made no specific findings as to the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible, but rather simply adopted the presentence report findings, which were themselves devoid of detail. The court based the offense level not on the quantity of drugs, however, but on the fact that victims were killed, bringing the sentence within the ambit of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d) (1). That section provides: "If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder) [setting forth a base offense level of 43]." Section 2D1.1(d) (1) does not involve consideration of the quantity of drugs involved. Thus, any error in the district court's failure to make particularized findings as to the drug quantity is harmless.
Padro Burgos next takes issue with the application of § 2D1.1(d) (1), maintaining that his sentence was driven by the murders, which were not separately charged, rather than the charged offense of drug conspiracy. He attacks the lack of "proportionality" between the sentence he "might have received" based on drug quantity, § 2D1.1(a), and the life sentence he received under § 2D1.1(d) (1). As this court discussed at length in United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1995), life sentence enhancements constituting "the tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense" may raise serious due process concerns. Id., quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986). There is no reversible error in this case, however.
As Padro Burgos acknowledges, his sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(d) (1) needs only be based on facts proved by a preponderance of the evidence.3 See id. at 176. Significantly, Padro Burgos does not contest the district court's finding that he was, in fact, responsible for murders meeting the criteria of § 2D1.1(d) (1). His complaint that the murders were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt thus is without merit.4
Padro Burgos also suggests that the district court erred in failing to give a downward departure to remedy the "disproportion" between the quantity-based sentence he would have received under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a) and the enhanced sentence he received under § 2D1.1(d) (1). He argues that the district court, like the court in Lombard, 72 F.3d at 172, was unaware of its authority to award a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. This analogy is unavailing, however; there is nothing in the sentencing hearing to indicate that the court believed it was unable to adjust the guideline sentence downward.5 See id. at 172. Padro Burgos never requested such a departure, and the court did not address the subject.
It is true that the district court stated, "Guideline provisions preclude application of guideline adjustments to offenses under 18 U.S. Code section 924(c) (1) as charged in Count 3." To the extent that this statement indicates that the court believed it did not have the discretion to adjust downward, however, it pertains only to the firearm offense, not to the drug conspiracy offense for which Padro Burgos received a life sentence.
Indeed, a life sentence was within the guideline range even without the enhancement under § 2D1.1(d) (1). With a base offense level of 38 (as initially calculated by the district court based on drug quantity) and a criminal history category of VI, the applicable sentencing range would have been 360 months to life imprisonment.