Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/560/08-1569/opinion.html
Timestamp: 2014-03-17 15:24:28
Document Index: 219842736

Matched Legal Cases: ['§924', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§924']

United States v. O’Brien - 08-1569 (2010) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Sign In	Justia > US Law > US Case Law > US Supreme Court > Volume 560 > United States v. O’Brien - 08-1569 > Opinion (Justice Kennedy)	NEW - Receive Justia's FREE Daily Newsletters of Opinion Summaries for the US Supreme Court, all US Federal Appellate Courts & the 50 US State Supreme Courts and Weekly Practice Area Opinion Summaries Newsletters. Subscribe Now
United States v. O’Brien - 08-1569 (2010)
Opinion	(Justice Kennedy)	Concurrence
The Court must interpret, once again, §924(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code. This provision prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, or the possession of a firearm in furtherance of such crimes. §924(c)(1)(A). A violation of the statute carries a mandatory minimum term of five years’ imprisonment, §924(c)(1)(A)(i); but if the firearm is a machinegun, the statute requires a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence, §924(c)(1)(B)(ii). Whether a firearm was used, carried, or possessed is, as all concede, an element of the offense. At issue here is whether the fact that the firearm was a machinegun is an element to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or a sentencing factor to be proved to the judge at sentencing.
In an earlier case the Court determined that an analogous machinegun provision in a previous version of §924 constituted an element of an offense to be proved to the jury. Castillo v. United States, 530 U. S. 120 (2000). The Castillo decision, however, addressed the statute as it existed before congressional amendments made in 1998. And in a case after Castillo, the brandishing provision in the post-1998 version of §924 was held to provide a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545 (2002). In light of the 1998 amendments and the Harris decision, the question of how to interpret §924’s machinegun provision is considered once more in the instant case.
On June 16, 2005, respondents Martin O’Brien and Arthur Burgess attempted to rob an armored car making a scheduled delivery of cash to a bank. Along with a third collaborator, respondents hid in a minivan and waited for the armored car to make its stop. Each of the men carried a firearm. Containing nearly $2 million and attended by two guards, the armored car arrived. A guard began to unload boxes of coins. The three men came out of the van and, while one of them brandished his weapon, they ordered the guards to get on the ground. One guard did so, but the other ran to a nearby restaurant. The respondents abandoned the robbery and fled without taking any money. No shots were fired, and no one was injured.
Authorities apprehended respondents and recovered the three firearms used during the attempted robbery. The firearms were a semiautomatic Sig-Sauer pistol, an AK47 semiautomatic rifle, and a Cobray pistol. The Cobray pistol had been manufactured as, and had the external appearance of, a semiautomatic firearm. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, though, it operated as a fully automatic weapon, apparently due to some alteration of its original firing mechanism. Respondents dispute whether the Cobray in fact did operate as a fully automatic weapon.
Respondents were indicted on multiple counts. Relevant here are counts three and four, both of which charged offenses under §924(c). Count three charged respondents with using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, which carries a statutory minimum of five years’ imprisonment. Count four charged respondents in more specific terms, alleging use of a machinegun (the Cobray) in