Source: http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/04180002.bed.html
Timestamp: 2018-01-18 15:58:03
Document Index: 375022155

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35']

SHIRLEY MITCHELL, )
The defendant, Shirley Mitchell, was convicted of murder See footnote and neglect of a dependent, a class B felony.See footnote The victim was her granddaughter. For murder, the trial court ordered a sentence of sixty-five years but suspended five years. For neglect of a dependent, the trial court entered the conviction as a class D felony and sentenced the defendant to three years. The sentences were to be served concurrently.
On appeal, the defendant claims seven errors: (1) erroneous admission of hearsay testimony; (2) inappropriate comments by the trial court; (3) improper admission of autopsy photographs; (4) jury misconduct; (5) inconsistent jury verdicts; (6) improper and confusing instructions on lesser-included offenses; and (7) use of an inappropriate aggravating factor in sentencing. In its appellees brief, the State also claims error, asserting that the trial court improperly modified the conviction for neglect of a dependent from a class B felony to a class D felony.
A ruling on the admissibility of an arguably hearsay statement is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 511 (Ind. 1997) (citing Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 56 (Ind. 1995)); Taylor v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1293, 1302 (Ind. 1992)). We will reverse "'only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.'" Jackson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 53, 54 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997)). Even if a trial court errs in admitting hearsay evidence, we will only reverse when the error is inconsistent with substantial justice. Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 255 (Ind. 1997). Thus, evidence improperly admitted under Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will not give rise to a new trial if its "'probable impact on the jury, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.'" Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Brown v. State, 671 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. 1996)). See also Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a); Ind. Trial Rule 61.
Although hearsay evidence is generally not admissible, Indiana Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay if "[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant's testimony, offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, and made before the motive to fabricate arose."
Challenging the trial court's ruling allowing the testimony, the defendant contends first that Auinia's prior statement was not consistent with her trial testimony. We disagree and find Auinia's prior statement sufficiently consistent with her trial testimony. In both statements, Auinia described the defendant, at approximately the same time, hitting Emporia and speaking about Emporia dying. Minor inconsistencies between trial testimony and prior statements do not necessarily render the prior statements inadmissible for purposes of Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Brown, 671 N.E.2d at 407.
The defendant also contends that her defense counsel neither challenged the veracity of Auinia's testimony nor expressly or implicitly suggested that Auinia's testimony was a fabrication or that someone had improperly influenced the testimony. Because the defense cross-examination presented a prior statement and thereby suggested that Auinia had previously described the earlier incident without mentioning that the defendant told Emporia to die, we find that the defense implied that Auinia had fabricated her trial testimony.
We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the social worker to testify as to comments made by Auinia in January of 1997, nearly nine months before trial.
Comments by the Trial Court
Seeking to avoid procedural default, the defendant, citing Kennedy v. State, 258 Ind. 211, 280 N.E.2d 611 (1972), and Ware, 560 N.E.2d 536, urges that this claim is not foreclosed because the judge's comments constitute fundamental error. We acknowledge that Indiana appellate courts have on rare occasions determined that the comments of a judge constituted fundamental error. See footnote These cases do not, however, establish as a rule that any improper comment by a trial judge will constitute fundamental error and thereby avoid the need for contemporaneous objection.
The trial court admitted six autopsy photographs into evidence. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting three of these photographs, State's exhibit numbers 19, 21, and 26, claiming that they were unfairly prejudicial. See footnote The defendant claims that the primary effect of these photographs was to sway the emotions of the jury. At trial, the defense objected to the admission of these photographs, arguing that the post-mortem changes to the body caused the photographs to be more prejudicial than probative, that one of the photographs was duplicative, and that injuries in one photograph did not appear as they did at the time of death, were not caused by the defendant, and thus would confuse the jury. The defense did not object to the admission of the three other photographs. The State responds that the pathologist testified that the photographs accurately represented the appearance of Emporia's body at the time of the autopsy, that the pathologist used the photographs to explain and illustrate the many injuries to various parts of Emporia's body, and that the pathologist explained that the post-mortem changes to her body had nothing to do with her injuries.
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify (1) to drug or alcohol use by any juror, (2) on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or (3) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying may not be received for these purposes.
Evid. R. 606(b). In Kennedy v. State, 578 N.E.2d 633, 640-41 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1299, 117 L.Ed.2d 521 (1992), we held that the actions of two jurors, who were of height and build similar to the defendant, in trying on clothing introduced into evidence, constituted a permissible examination of the evidence and not an improper extra-judicial experiment.
In this case, the trial court admitted into evidence the two-foot-long wooden rod used to beat Emporia. The pathologist testified that Emporia had suffered a minimum of fifty separate injuries to her head and body. Before closing argument, the defendant objected to the State using the rod to beat on a table or metal bar, and the trial court limited the State's use to striking only something soft. During closing argument, the State used the rod to strike a bag five times and directed the jury to consider Emporia being struck fifty times. The trial court, acting within its discretion, allowed the admitted exhibits to be taken with the jury into deliberation. The defendant did not object.
When this Court reviews a claim of inconsistent jury verdicts, we will take corrective action only when the verdicts are "extremely contradictory and irreconcilable." Jones v. State, 689 N.E.2d 722, 724 (Ind. 1997). See also Hodge v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind. 1997) ("'Verdicts may be so extremely contradictory and irreconcilable as to require corrective action.'") (quoting Jackson v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1989)); Butler v. State, 647 N.E.2d 631, 636 (Ind. 1995) ("[T]his court will 'review findings and verdicts to determine whether they are consistent; however, perfect logical consistency is not demanded and only extremely contradictory and irreconcilable verdicts warrant corrective action by this Court.'") (quoting Hoskins v. State, 563 N.E.2d 571, 577 (Ind. 1990)) (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, we will not attempt to interpret the thought process of the jury in arriving at its verdict, and perfect logical consistency is not required. Jones, 689 N.E.2d at 724; Butler, 647 N.E.2d at 636. See also Hodge, 688 N.E.2d at 1249 ("'In resolving such a claim, the Court will not engage in speculation about the jury's thought processes or motivation.'") (quoting Jackson, 540 N.E.2d at 1234).
In this case, the State charged the defendant with knowingly killing Emporia Pirtle, by striking her with a wooden stick, thereby inflicting mortal injuries and causing her to die. To convict the defendant of murder, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed Emporia. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. To prove that the defendant acted knowingly, the State had to prove that the defendant was aware of a high probability that the conduct would result in death. See footnote Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) ("A person engages in conduct 'knowingly' if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so."); Powers v. State, 696 N.E.2d 865, 870 (Ind. 1998). See also Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1021(Ind. 1998) ("The trial court could reasonably determine that by inflicting over twenty wounds Brown acted 'knowing' that his actions could produce death."); Horne v. State, 445 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ind. 1983) ("[A]n act is done 'knowingly' or 'purposely' if it is willed, is the product of a conscious design, intent or plan that it be done, and is done with an awareness of the probable consequences."). In determining whether a defendant was aware of the high probability that her actions would result in the death of the victim, the duration, severity, and brutality of a defendant's actions, and the relative strengths and sizes of a defendant and a victim, may be considered. Anderson v. State, 681 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ind. 1997); Gibson v. State, 515 N.E.2d 492, 496-97 (Ind. 1987).
The State also charged the defendant with knowingly placing Emporia Pirtle in a situation that might endanger her life or health by failing to seek medical attention for her, which resulted in serious bodily injury and death. To convict the defendant of neglect of a dependent, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, having the care of Emporia Pirtle, a dependent, by failing to seek medical attention, knowingly or intentionally See footnote placed Emporia in a situation endangering her life or health. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a). To convict the defendant of neglect as a class B felony, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the neglect resulted in serious bodily injury. See footnote Id.
Under the dependent neglect statute, the level of culpability required for knowing behavior "is that level where the accused must have been subjectively aware of a high probability that he placed the dependent in a dangerous situation." Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985) (applying Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2). Proof of this subjective awareness requires resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain the defendant's mental state. Barrett v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Kellogg v. State, 636 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Hill v. State, 535 N.E.2d 153, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). When there are symptoms from which the average layperson would have detected a serious problem necessitating medical attention, it is reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant knowingly neglected the dependent. See footnote Hill, 535 N.E.2d at 155. Also, in the context of care of a dependent, we have said that "'[n]eglect is the want of reasonable carethat is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind. . . .'" White v. State, 547 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ind. 1989) (quoting Eaglen v. State, 249 Ind. 144, 150, 231 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1967)).
However, a single aggravating circumstance is adequate to justify a sentence enhancement. Gibson v. State, 702 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ind. 1998); Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 172 (Ind. 1997). When a sentencing court improperly applies an aggravating circumstance, but other valid aggravating circumstances exist, a sentence enhancement may still be upheld. Gibson, 702 N.E.2d at 710; Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 715 (Ind. 1998). In this case, the trial court found several other aggravating circumstances: the defendant's extensive history of criminal and delinquent activity; the defendant's need for correctional or rehabilitative treatment and the failure of previous rehabilitation; See footnote the heinous nature and circumstances of the crime; and the victim's age of six years. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1. The trial court found two mitigating factors: the defendant's remorse; and the defendant's mental health condition.
The trial court considered these factors and determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The trial court imposed a sentence of sixty-five years See footnote and suspended five years, for a total executed term of sixty years.See footnote Any error by the court in using the factor of depreciation of the seriousness of the crime as an aggravating circumstance is overcome because several valid aggravating circumstances were found, including the age of the victim, the heinous nature and circumstances of the crime, and the defendant's lengthy history of criminal and delinquent activity. See Blanche, 690 N.E.2d at 715; Isaacs, 673 N.E.2d at 765 n.6 ("[T]he improper use of th[e depreciate the seriousness of the crime] aggravating circumstance does not invalidate a sentence enhancement where other valid aggravating circumstances are found."). We find no reversible error on this issue.
Recently, in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999), we explained that two tests apply to determine whether multiple offenses constitute the same offense under the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause:
Id. at 53. In Richardson, we noted that the trial court's instructions to the jury and the presentations of counsel to the jury can be helpful to the reviewing court in analyzing the actual evidence to determine whether the jury used the same evidence to establish multiple offenses. Id. at 54 n.48. To convict the defendant of class B felony neglect, the State had to prove that the neglect resulted in serious bodily injury. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a).
Footnote: The defendant dates these incidents on or about November 6, 1996.
Footnote: We have held that a trial before an impartial judge is an essential element of due process. Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 256 (citing Abernathy v. State, 524 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Ind. 1988)); Harrington v. State, 584 N.E.2d 558, 561 (Ind. 1992). In Kennedy v. State, this Court refused to foreclose a defendant's claim of improper judicial intervention, even though the defendant had failed to object at trial, because "[a] fair trial by an impartial judge and jury is an essential element in due process." Kennedy, 258 Ind. at 218, 280 N.E.2d at 615. The Indiana Court of Appeals has considered the fundamental error doctrine in cases when a defendant claims improper judicial intervention, even when the defendant failed to object at trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1056, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (regarding a trial judge's comments and questioning of a witness); Ware, 560 N.E.2d at 539 (regarding a trial judge's comments and interruptions); Spaulding v. State, 533 N.E.2d 597, 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (regarding a trial judge's remarks allegedly impeaching or discrediting witness testimony); Decker v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1129, 1131-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (regarding a trial judge's questioning of a witness).
The defendant has waived this issue by failing to make a timely objection at trial to the pathologist's characterization of the evidence. Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767, 788 (Ind. 1999); Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ind. 1997); Henderson v. State, 544 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ind. 1989); Frith v. State, 452 N.E.2d 930, 931 (Ind. 1983).
Footnote: In the court's preliminary and final instructions to the jury, the court instructed that "[a] person engages in conduct 'knowingly' if, when he engages in this conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. If a person is charged with knowingly causing a result by his conduct, he must have been aware of a high probability that his conduct would cause the result." Record at 349, 386, 632, 996.
Footnote: Under the statute, the state of mind required to commit the crime of neglect of a dependent is not negligence. Rather, a knowing or intentional state of mind is required.