Source: http://caccp.blogspot.com/2016/04/
Timestamp: 2017-08-19 03:37:43
Document Index: 104178458

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1032', '§ 1032', '§ 1032', '§ 1032', '§ 998', '§ 425', '§ 425', '§ 425', '§ 1090', '§ 1292', '§ 1292']

111 North Hill Street: April 2016
Ontiveros v. Constable, No. D066412 (D4d1 Mar. 14, 2016)
Costello v. Buckley, No. D068536 (D4d1 Mar. 16, 2016)
These are a pair of attorney disqualification appeals decided by Division One of the Fourth District in a three-day period last month.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 1:49 PM No comments:
Labels: 3-310, 3-600, Buckley, california rules of professional conduct, conflicts, Constable, Costllo, derivative actions, DQ, Ontiveros
Posted by Michael Shipley at 12:02 PM No comments:
DeSaulles v. Comty. Hosp. of the Monterrey Peninsula, No. S219236 (Cal. Mar. 10, 2016)
The Supreme Court granted review of the DeSaulles case that I posted about a little less than two years ago. As a quick recap, the parties entered a settlement where the plaintiff got some cash, but a zero-dollar judgment was entered for Defendant. (The weird setup permitted the manufacture of a judgment so Plaintiff could appeal an unfavorable in limine ruling.) The settlement agreement didn’t say anything about costs. So the question was, who was the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure § 1032? Given that the statute describes the prevailing party as someone who wins a “net monetary recovery,” it was unsurprising (to me at least) that it was Plaintiff. But in getting to that result, the Court of Appeal disagreed with some earlier inconsistent precedent. Hence the granted review.
The Court, with Justice Liu writing for a 5-2 majority, affirms the Court of Appeal. “Net monetary recovery” is a pretty broad concept that can include a payment of cash under a settlement. The Court further rejects the argument that § 1032(a)(4)’s alternative definition—a “defendant in whose favor . . . dismissal is granted”—applies to cases where a judgment of dismissal is entered as part of a settlement where defendant nonetheless pays plaintiff some money. Reviewing the history of that language, the court finds that it was intended to ensure that a defendant could recover costs if plaintiff unilaterally dismissed. It was not intended to apply when the dismissal was accompanied by a monetary payment.
Justice Kruger dissents, joined by Justice Werdegar. She agrees that a plaintiff who gets a settlement has won a net monetary recovery. But she’s not so comfortable ignoring what she reads as the plain meaning of the § 1032(a)(4)’s reference to a defendant who obtains a dismissal. This case was, in fact, dismissed. (Given the payment of cash, the majority responds that this is form over substance.) That, of course creates a conundrum, because it would effectively mean that both parties meet different definitions of “prevailing party.”
But Justice Kruger reads the next sentence in § 1032(a)(4) to solve that problem. It says that “in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” So, according to the dissent, if both sides meet the definition of prevailing, the trial court has the discretion to decide who prevailed and how to allocate costs between the parties. The dissent would thus remand for such a determination in the first instance.
Labels: 1032, 1034, california code of civil procedure, community hospital of the monterrey peninsula, costs, desaulles, discretion, net monetary recovery, prevailing party
Davis v. Honeywell Int’l, No. B256793 (D2d4 Mar. 3, 2016)
This case addresses the admissibility of expert testimony on an issue that likely comes up in many of the wave of asbestos cases that are currently working their way through California courts. The testimony is based on the “every exposure” theory. The gist of the theory is that asbestos is so toxic that every exposure to it beyond the background level present in the ordinary atmosphere can potentially be a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma. Some states have rejected expert testimony on the theory, others have not. The court here finds that the testimony is sufficiently reliable under the relatively new Sargon standard, which permits courts to reject expert testimony that is: “(1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative.” According to the court, while there isn’t any scientific consensus on the theory, there is enough scientific support on the side of the every exposure theory that it should not be precluded as too unreliable for a civil trial.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 10:04 AM No comments:
Labels: admissible, asbestos, california evidence code, davis, expert testimony, honeywell, sargon, science
Toste v. Calportland Constr., No B256946 (D2d6 Mar. 2, 2016)
Plaintiff appeals on a grab-bag of issues after a defense verdict in a wrongful death case. The jury found one defendant negligent but no causation for any of them. There are two procedural issues: a new trial motion based on jury misconduct and the rejection of a § 998 offer.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 12:48 PM No comments:
Labels: 1150, 998, california code of civil procedure, california evidence code, calportland, expert fees, new trial motions, retroactivity, toste
Mountjoy v. Bank of America, No. C077283 (D3 Feb. 29, 2016)
Although trial courts get a lot of deference in fee award decisions, that deference is not unlimited. The court here decided that 70 percent of the entries in plaintiff’s bills were problematic in one way or another. So it just lopped 70 percent off the total hours when it did its lodestar analysis, even though there was no evidence that the allegedly problematic entries made up 70 percent of the time. Although the Court of Appeal rejects most of plaintiff’s specific assertions of error, it finds the 70 percent across-the-board reduction to be arbitrary and thus an abuse of discretion.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 12:50 PM No comments:
Labels: attorneys fees, bank of america, fee awards, lodestar, mountjoy
Court for Me, but Arb for You, Means Court for Everyone.
Carbajal v. CWSP, Inc., No G050438 (D4d3 Feb. 26, 2016)
The Court of Appeal here affirms a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration based on a finding that the arbitration provision was unconscionable. The clause was contained in an adhesive employment contract, which made it mildly procedurally unconscionable. That was made worse by the fact that it called for the use of “the rules of AAA,” without identifying which of the 100+ sets of AAA rules were to apply. Nor did it include or provide a means of accessing the applicable rules.
But what really kills the deal is the one-sidedness of the substance. It let only the employer go to court to get injunctive relief, and specifically waived any bond requirement in doing so. And it waived the employee’s right to get statutory fees on her Labor Code claims. Balancing the procedural and substantive unconscionability, the trial court did not err in declining to enforce the provision. Nor did it abuse its discretion in declining to sever the problematic terms for the rest of the agreement. Given the number of substantively unconscionable terms, it was reasonable for the trial court to find the unconsionability to be too pervasive to merit severance.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 10:07 AM No comments:
Labels: arbitrability, bond, carbajal, cwsp, injunctive relief, severability, unconscionable
Posted by Michael Shipley at 10:08 PM No comments:
Sweetwater Union Sch. Dist. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., No. D067383 (D4d1 Feb. 24, 2016)
A School District sued a contractor to void some contracts it alleged were corruptly procured by the contractor’s wining and dining of various district officials. The contractor moved to strike the case under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion under Flatley v. Mauro, i.e., it held that the conduct alleged was illegal as a matter of law, and thus that the anti-SLAPP motion can’t apply.
The court of appeal affirms, but for different reasons. First off, for some strange reason, the district basically concedes that bribery of public officials “arises from protected activity.” The court cursorily notes that since lobbying local government entities is generally protected by the First Amendment, unless the district can show that the Flatley exception applies, the conduct counts as protected under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(b)(1).
Notably, there’s essentially no analysis in the opinion as to which of the four categories of “protected activity” listed in § 425.16(e)(1)-(4) is implicated here. Political bribery isn’t a “statement” as the term is used in the definitions in categories (1) to (3). (FWIW, that readily distinguishes the only case cited on the point, DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 566 (2000), which dealt with a drug company’s statements in advertising, marketing, and public relations campaigns.) The only potential applicable category that reaches conduct that does not require a written or oral utterance is the “other conduct in furtherance” catchall in § 425.16(e)(4). And as I’ve noted elsewhere, the (e)(4) catchall has led to anomalous results and an unresolved split in authority, with no case articulating a satisfying theory of how (e)(4) should be applied to activity that pretty clearly isn’t First-Amendment protected—stuff like bribery in furtherance of litigation, racial, gender, and age discrimination in media employment and tenure decisions, and litigation-related wiretapping—but can arguably be crammed into the linguistic formulation of “other conduct in furtherance” of some speech or petitioning interest.
In any event, the court goes on to decide that the Flatley exception doesn’t apply. The exception is very narrow, applying only when (1) the defendant admits the illegality of its conduct; or (2) the evidence is sufficient to establish the illegality of the conduct as a matter of law. While the District here alleges that the contract was engaged in illegal bribery, the contractor didn’t admit it, and the District’s evidence wasn’t so strong as to prove bribery as a matter of law, even though several employees of the District and the Contractor had pleaded guilty. So to avoid having its claim stricken as a SLAPP, the district needs to show a probability of prevailing. And to do that, it needs to come forward with prima facie evidence for each element on its claim.
The District, however, did meet its burden. The relevant statute—Government Code § 1090—permits a public entity to sue to cancel a contract when the people who awarded it were financially interested. And “interested” has been interpreted to include receiving bribes in exchange for approving a deal. On this issue, the District put forth a bunch of evidence, especially materials from prior criminal cases. The Contractor’s appeal argues that the trial court erroneously considered this evidence.
The Court of Appeal notes the generally applicable rule that evidence submitted in opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion needs to be admissible under the Evidence Code. But like on summary judgment, this rule recognizes a narrow exception: although technically hearsay, affidavits and declarations can be used in lieu of live testimony. The gist of the point is generally that a declaration simply puts potential trial testimony in a form that can be considered as part of a law and motion matter without holding an evidentiary hearing.
The problem is that the evidence doesn’t consist of affidavits or declarations prepared for this case. It consists instead of sworn change of plea documents from the convicted individuals and grand jury transcripts. The court nonetheless finds that these documents fall within the exception because—notwithstanding whether the declarants would or could ever attend a trial in the case—the statements and testimony were sworn under penalty of perjury. It getting to its result it confronts a split of authority addressing the admissibility of prior case testimony in the summary judgment context.
One case—Gatton v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 4th 688, 694 (1998)—holds that because prior-case testimony is not the functional equivalent of an affidavit or declaration, it is admissible on a summary judgment only only if the foundational elements of the prior testimony exception to the evidence code are present. I.e., that the witness is unavailable and a party to the prior case had a similar motive an opportunity to cross. See Cal. Evid. Cod § 1292(a). Notably Gatton specifically declined to follow the other case—Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 3d 142, 149 (1990)—which permitted use of prior case depo testimony on SJ without satisfying § 1292(a), because it was under oath and its “effect” was functionally “the same as would be a declaration supplied by [the witness] in this case.”
The court here decides Williams has the better argument. So since the evidence at issue—change of plea documents and grand jury testimony—were signed or verbally sworn under penalty of perjury, the trial court could consider it as the functional equivalent of a declaration. And that was the case even if the District couldn’t satisfy the requirements of some other hearsay exception or otherwise show that the witnesses could or would testify to those facts at some later trial. (Indeed, given the witnesses’ potential incarceration, presumably they would not.) The court notes that a technical relaxation of the hearsay rule is particularly sensible on an anti-SLAPP motion, where the plaintiff is constrained in being required to gather evidence to substantiate a prima facie case without the benefit of any discovery.
So, considering the objectionable evidence, the District set out a prima facie case, satisfying its burden under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The motion was thus properly denied.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 9:24 PM No comments:
Labels: (e)(4), anti-SLAPP, california code of civil procedure, conduct in furtherance, flatley, gibane building company, illegal as a matter of law, SLAPP, sweetwater