Source: https://www.sro.nysed.gov/decision/2012/12-147
Timestamp: 2019-10-17 20:25:53
Document Index: 590593184

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1400', '§ 1415', '§ 1414', '§ 1414', '§ 1414', '§ 1414', '§ 1414', '§ 1415']

Law Offices of Neal H. Rosenberg, attorneys for petitioner, Neal H. Rosenberg, Esq., of counsel
This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. Petitioner (the parent) appeals from the decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which denied her request to be reimbursed for the costs of the student's tuition at the Resources for Effective Educational Development Academy (REED Academy) for the 2011-12 school year. Respondent (the district) cross-appeals from the IHO's decision awarding reimbursement for the costs of the student's home-based applied behavior analysis (ABA) and transportation services for the 2011-12 school year. The appeal must be dismissed. The cross-appeal must be sustained in part.
The parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case and the IHO's decision is presumed and will not be recited here.[2] Briefly, the CSE convened on June 1, 2011, to develop the student's IEP for the 2011-12 school year (see generally Dist. Ex. 2 at pp. 1-20). The parent disagreed with the recommendations in the June 2011 IEP, as well as with the particular public school site to which the district assigned the student to attend for the 2011-12 school year, and as a result, notified the district of her intent to unilaterally place the student at REED Academy (see Parent Ex. C). In a due process complaint notice, dated July 18, 2011, the parent alleged that the district failed to offer the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2011-12 school year, and as relief, asserted the student's right to remain at the REED Academy funded by the district as his pendency placement, and further requested round-trip transportation services and reimbursement for the costs of the student's related services and tuition at the REED Academy for the 2011-12 school year, as well as home-based ABA services (see Parent Ex. B at pp. 1-2).
On July 29, 2011, the IHO conducted a prehearing conference, and on August 23, 2011, the parties proceeded to an impartial hearing, which concluded on May 25, 2012 after six days of proceedings (see Tr. pp. 1-379; IHO Decision at p. 3).[3], [4] In a decision dated June 19, 2012, the IHO determined that the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year, and thus, declined to address whether the REED Academy was an appropriate unilateral placement for the student (see IHO Decision at pp. 8-18). The IHO denied the parent's request for reimbursement for the costs of the student's tuition at the REED Academy for the 2011-12 school year; however, the IHO ordered the district to reimburse the parent for the costs of the student's home-based ABA and transportation services for the 2011-12 school year (id. at pp. 18-20).
The parties' familiarity with the particular issues for review on appeal in the parent's petition for review, the district's answer and cross-appeal, and the parent's answer to the district's cross-appeal thereto is also presumed and will not be recited here. The gravamen of the parties' dispute on appeal is whether the June 2011 CSE considered sufficient evaluative information and properly relied upon teacher estimates to determine the student's functional levels in the development of the June 2011 IEP; whether the annual goals were appropriate, measurable, and capable of implementation in the district's recommended program; whether the IHO erred in failing to find that the absence of home-based ABA services and parent counseling and training in the IEP resulted in a failure to offer the student a FAPE; and whether the June 2011 CSE failed to provide the parents with an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process at the meeting and impermissibly engaged in predetermination. In its cross-appeal, the district specifically argues that the IHO erred in awarding reimbursement for the costs of the student's home-based ABA and transportation services. The parties additionally argue the merits of the appropriateness of the assigned public school site. Further, the parent also alleges that the REED Academy was an appropriate unilateral placement and equitable considerations weighed in favor of the parent's request for relief.
Before reaching the merits in this case, a determination must be made regarding which claims are properly before me on appeal. First, a review of the hearing record reveals that the IHO exceeded her jurisdiction by sua sponte addressing and deciding issues in the decision regarding whether the June 2011 CSE failed to recommend parent counseling and training in the June 2011 IEP because the parent did not raise it as an issue in dispute in the due process complaint notice (compare IHO Decision at p. 14, with Dist. Ex. 1 at pp. 1-2).
Second, a review of the hearing record also reveals that the parent now raises the following issues in the petition—which she did not raise in the due process complaint notice and upon which the IHO did not issue findings—for the first time on appeal: whether the special education teacher who attended the June 2011 CSE meeting met the regulatory criteria; whether the June 2011 CSE failed to conduct a triennial evaluation and a classroom observation of the student; whether the June 2011 IEP failed to include short-term objectives; whether the recommended 6:1+1 special class placement at a specialized school was appropriate absent a recommendation for ABA and parent counseling and training in the June 2011 IEP; and whether the June 2011 CSE failed to recommend a transition plan to assist the student in navigating the assigned public school site (compare Pet. ¶¶ 14-17, 19, 22-23, 25-26, 29, with Dist. Ex. 1 at pp. 1-2).
Upon review, I find that the parent's due process complaint notice cannot be reasonably read to include the issues raised and decided sua sponte by the IHO regarding whether the June 2011 CSE failed to recommend parent counseling and training in the June 2011 IEP, or the challenges identified above that have been raised in the parent's petition for the first time on appeal (see Dist. Ex. 1 at pp. 1-2). Moreover, a further review of the hearing record shows that the district did not agree to an expansion of the issues in this case, nor did the parent attempt to amend the due process complaint notice (see Tr. pp. 1-379; Dist. Exs. 1-14; Parent Exs. A-G; IHO Ex. i).
Accordingly, the IHO exceeded her jurisdiction by addressing in the decision whether the June 2011 CSE failed to recommend parent counseling and training in the June 2011 IEP, and this particular finding must be annulled. In addition, the parent's allegations identified above and raised now, for the first time, on appeal are outside the scope of my review, and therefore, these allegations will not be considered (see N.K., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 584-86; B.M., 2013 WL 1972144, at *6; C.H., 2013 WL 1285387, at *9; B.P., 841 F. Supp. 2d at 611; M.P.G., 2010 WL 3398256, at *8; Snyder v. Montgomery Co. Pub. Schs., 2009 WL 3246579, at *7 [D. Maryland Sept. 29, 2009]).[5],[6]
Upon careful review, the evidence in the hearing record reflects that the IHO, in a well-reasoned and well-supported decision, correctly reached the conclusion that the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year (see IHO Decision at pp. 8-18).[7] The IHO accurately recounted the facts of the case, addressed the majority of the specific issues identified in the parent's due process complaint notice, set forth the proper legal standard to determine whether the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year, and applied that standard to the facts at hand (id.). The decision shows that the IHO carefully considered the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by both parties, and further, that she weighed the evidence and properly supported her conclusions (id.). Furthermore, an independent review of the entire hearing record reveals that the impartial hearing was conducted in a manner consistent with the requirements of due process and that there is no reason appearing in the hearing record to modify the determinations of the IHO (see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][2]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][2]). Thus, while my reasoning may have differed from the IHO's in some respects, the conclusions of the IHO are hereby adopted.
With regard to the June 2011 IEP, the CSE considered sufficient evaluative information and properly relied upon teacher estimates to determine the student's functional levels in the development of the IEP. Among the other elements of an IEP is a statement of a student's academic achievement and functional performance and how the student's disability affects his or her progress in relation to the general education curriculum (20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][i][I]; 34 CFR 300.320[a][1];8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]; see 8 NYCRR 200.1[ww][3][i]). In developing the recommendations for a student's IEP, the CSE must consider the results of the initial or most recent evaluation; the student's strengths; the concerns of the parents for enhancing the education of their child; the academic, developmental and functional needs of the student, including, as appropriate, the student's performance on any general State or district-wide assessments as well as any special factors as set forth in federal and State regulations (34 CFR 300.324[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2]). Furthermore, although federal and State regulations require that an IEP report the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, those regulations do not mandate or specify a particular source from which that information must come, and teacher estimates may be an acceptable method of evaluating a student's academic functioning. When a student has not been attending public school, it is also appropriate for the CSE to rely on the assessments, classroom observations, or teacher reports provided by the student's nonpublic school (S.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2011 WL 5419847, at *10 [S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011] [indicating that based upon 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (c)(1)(A), a CSE is required in part to "review existing evaluation data on the child, including (i) evaluations and information provided by the parents of the child; (ii) current classroom-based, local, or State assessments, and classroom-based observations; and (iii) observations by teachers and related services providers"]). In particular, a review of the evidence in the hearing record shows that the IHO correctly determined that the June 2011 CSE considered and relied upon sufficient evaluative information—and accurately and adequately described and identified the student's needs in the present levels of performance in the June 2011 IEP based upon that evaluative information, including teacher estimates—in the development of the June 2011 IEP (see Tr. pp. 1-379; Dist. Exs. 1-14; Parent Exs. A-G; IHO Ex. i; IHO Decision at pp. 8-12).
More specifically, the evidence in the hearing record demonstrates that the June 2011 CSE considered and relied upon the following evaluative information to develop the student's IEP: an April 2010 psychoeducational evaluation, an April 2010 occupational therapy school function evaluation, an April 2010 social history update, an April 2011 REED Academy present level of academic achievement and functional performance, a May 2010 speech-language evaluation, a September 2010 and a January 2011 functional behavioral assessments (FBAs), a September 2010 behavioral intervention plan (BIP), and a November 2010 REED Academy progress report (see Tr. p. 31-35; 73-74; Dist. Exs. 5-7; 9-14). At the impartial hearing, the district school psychologist who attended the June 2011 CSE meeting testified that the CSE also considered input provided by the student's REED Academy special education teacher, the REED Academy director, and the REED Academy assistant director to ascertain the student's functional levels, strengths, and areas of delay (see Tr. p. 42, 73-74; see also Dist. Ex. 2 at p. 2; 3 at p. 1). Accordingly, the evaluative information considered by the June 2011 CSE provided it with sufficient functional, developmental, and academic information about the student and her individual needs to enable it to develop the student's IEP (D.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2011 WL 4916435, at *8 [S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011]; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-041; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10-100; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-015; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 07-098; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 94-2).
With regard to whether the annual goals were appropriate, measurable, and capable of implementation in the district's recommended program, an IEP must include a written statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals designed to meet the student's needs that result from the student's disability to enable the student to be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum; and meet each of the student's other educational needs that result from the student's disability (see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][i][II]; 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]). Each annual goal shall include the evaluative criteria, evaluation procedures and schedules to be used to measure progress toward meeting the annual goal during the period beginning with placement and ending with the next scheduled review by the committee (8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii][b]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][i][III]; 34 CFR 300.320[a][3]). Additionally, a determination of the appropriateness of a particular set of annual goals for a student turns, not upon their suitability within a particular classroom setting or student-to-teacher ratio, but rather on whether the annual goals and short-term objectives are consistent with and relate to the identified needs and abilities of the student (see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A][i][II]; 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]). To hold otherwise would suggest that CSEs or CPSEs should preselect an educational setting on the continuum of alternative placements and/or related services and then draft annual goals specific to that setting; however, that is, idiomatically speaking, placing the cart before the horse (see generally, "Guide to Quality Individualized Education Program [IEP] Development and Implementation," at pp. 38-39, Office of Special Educ. [Dec. 2010], available at http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/publications/iepguidance/IEPguideDec2010.pdf [stating, among other things that "[t]he recommended special education programs and services in a student's IEP identify what the school will provide for the student so that the student is able to achieve the annual goals and to participate and progress in the general education curriculum (or for preschool students, age-appropriate activities) in the least restrictive environment] [emphasis added]). Finally, the IDEA does not require that annual goals be drafted at a CSE meeting (see E.A.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2012 WL 4571794, at * 8 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2012]).
A review of the June 2011 IEP shows that the CSE developed approximately 27 annual goals to address the student's identified needs in the areas of self-care and personal hygiene skills, social and pragmatic skills, reading skills, self-management skills, mathematics skills, language skills, fine motor skills, and sensory integration skills (see Dist. Ex. 2 at pp. 6-11). Specifically, to address reading skills, the June 2011 IEP targeted the student's ability to read functional signs and a list of sixth grade level "priority sight words" (id. at pp. 6, 9). The June 2011 IEP also targeted the student's writing and keyboarding skills and addressed her ability to type letters "U" through "Z" and to "press the enter key" (id. at p. 7). With regard to mathematics skills, the June 2011 IEP targeted the student's ability to identify coins; count, recognize, represent, name and order the number" of given objects; and tell time on a digital clock (id. at pp. 6, 8, 9). Additionally, the June 2011 IEP included an annual goal to improve the student's ability to match correct answers to questions about the month, day, and year of the calendar (id. at p. 7).
Regarding whether the June 2011 CSE failed to provide the parents with an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process at the meeting and impermissibly engaged in predetermination, the IDEA sets forth procedural safeguards that include providing parents an opportunity "to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child" (20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][1]). Federal and State regulations governing parental participation require that school districts take steps to ensure that parents are present at their child's IEP meetings or are afforded the opportunity to participate (34 CFR 300.322; 8 NYCRR 200.5[d]). Although school districts must provide an opportunity for parents to participate in the development of their child's IEP, mere parental disagreement with a school district's proposed IEP and placement recommendation does not amount to a denial of meaningful participation (see P.K. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 569 F. Supp. 2d 371, 383 [S.D.N.Y. 2008] [noting that a "professional disagreement is not an IDEA violation"]; Sch. for Language & Commc'n Dev. v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 2006 WL 2792754, at *7 [E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006] [finding that "[m]eaningful participation does not require deferral to parent choice"]; Paolella v. Dist. of Columbia, 2006 WL 3697318, at *1 [D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 2006]).[8] A review of the evidence in the hearing record shows that the June 2011 CSE considered and rejected other placement options for the student, including a general education setting and a special education class at a community school, a 12:1+1 special class placement, and a 12:1+4 special class placement in a specialized school, a nonpublic day school, and a nonpublic residential school, which the June 2011 CSE ultimately rejected as either not sufficiently supportive or too restrictive for the student (see Dist. Exs. 2 at p. 13; 3 at p. 2). Based upon my review of the hearing record, the district did not predetermine the student's program or placement for the 2011-12 school year and the parent was afforded an opportunity to meaningfully participate in the IEP development process (T.P., 554 F.3d at 253; see M.W., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 333-34; R.R., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 294).
Moreover, the evidence in the hearing record supports the IHO's finding that the 6:1+1 special class placement—together with related services; the services of a full-time, 1:1 behavior paraprofessional; management needs; and annual goals—offered the student a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year. State regulations provide that a 6:1+1 special class placement is designed for those students "whose management needs are determined to be highly intensive and requiring a high degree of individualized attention and intervention" (8 NYCRR 200.6[h][4][ii][a]. According to the evidence in the hearing record, at the time of the June 2011 CSE meeting, the student exhibited significant deficits in academics, receptive, expressive, and pragmatic language skills; sensory processing skills, including self-regulation; fine motor skills; and self-care and hygiene skills (see Dist. Exs. 2 at pp. 3-5, 20; 3; 5-7; 9-14). Consistent with the student's needs as identified in the evaluative information considered and relied upon by the June 2011 CSE, and in conformity with State regulations, the June CSE recommended that the student be placed in a 12-month school year program consisting of a 6:1+1 special class placement at a specialized school with the services of a full-time 1:1 crisis management paraprofessional to assist in addressing the student's management needs (Dist. Ex. 2 at pp. 1, 14). Consequently, the IHO did not err in failing to find that the absence of home-based ABA services and parent counseling and training in the IEP resulted in a failure to offer the student a FAPE.
Finally, with respect to the parent's claims relating to the assigned public school site, which the IHO did address and which the parties continue to argue on appeal, in this instance, similar to the reasons set forth in other decisions issued by the Office of State Review (see, e.g., Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 14-025; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 12-090; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 13-237), the parent's assertions are without merit. The parent's claims regarding the class size at the assigned public school site and the functional grouping of the students in the proposed classroom (see Parent Ex. A at p. 4), turn on how the June 2011 IEP would or would not have been implemented and, as it is undisputed that the student did not attend the district's assigned public school site (see Parent Ex. B), the parent cannot prevail on such speculative claims (R.E., 694 F.3d at 186-88; see F.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 553 Fed. App'x 2, 9, 2014 WL 53264 [2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2014]; K.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 530 Fed. App'x 81, 87, 2013 WL 3814669 [2d Cir. July 24, 2013]; P.K. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 526 Fed. App'x 135, 141, 2013 WL 2158587 [2d Cir. June 21, 2013]; see also C.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 79 [2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2014]; C.L.K. v. Arlington Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 6818376, at *13 [S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2013]; R.C. v. Byram Hills Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 256, 273 [S.D.N.Y. 2012]).
Having determined that the evidence in the hearing record supports the IHO's determination that the district offered the student a FAPE in the LRE for the 2011-12 school year, the necessary inquiry is at an end and there is no need to reach the issues of whether the student's unilateral placement at the REED Academy was an appropriate placement or whether equitable considerations weighed in favor of the parent's request for relief. I have considered the remaining contentions and find it is unnecessary to address them in light of my determinations above.[9]
IT IS ORDERED that the IHO's decision, dated June 19, 2012, is modified by reversing that portion which directed the district to reimburse the parent for the costs of the student's home-based ABA services for the 2011-12 school year.
[1] The administrative procedures applicable to the review of disputes between parents and school districts regarding any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student are well established and described in broader detail in previous decisions issued by the Office of State Review (see, e.g., Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 12-228; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 12-087; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 12-165; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 09-092).
[3] On August 31, 2011, the IHO issued an interim order regarding the student's pendency (stay-put) placement, which found that the REED Academy constituted the student's pendency placement and which directed the district to continue to fund the student's placement at the REED Academy, including the costs of round-trip transportation (see Interim IHO Decision at pp. 2-3).
[4] At the time of the impartial hearing, the student had attended the REED Academy for approximately seven years (see Tr. p. 253).
[5] To the extent that the Second Circuit has held that issues not included in a due process complaint notice may be ruled on by an administrative hearing officer when the district "open[s] the door" to such issues with the purpose of defeating a claim that was raised in the due process complaint notice (M.H., 685 F.3d 217, at 250-51; see D.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 966 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327-29 [S.D.N.Y. 2013]; N.K., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 584-86; A.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 964 F. Supp. 2d 270, 282-84[S.D.N.Y. 2013]; J.C.S., 2013 WL 3975942, at *9; B.M., 2013 WL 1972144, at *5-*6), the issues raised and addressed sua sponte by the IHO in the decision and the allegations raised in the parent's petition for the first time on appeal—in particular, the absence of recommendations for ABA and parent counseling and training in the June 2011 IEP—were initially raised by counsel on cross-examination of a district witness, or through testimony of witnesses for the parent (see, e.g., Tr. pp. 56-59, 146, 178, 210-11). With respect to the parent's allegation that the June 2011 IEP failed to include short-term objectives, a review of the hearing record indicates that although the district solicited testimony to develop the hearing record and to provide background and contextual information (see Tr. p. 37), this examination elicited general background information as part of routine questioning and did not serve to "open the door" to this issue under the holding of M.H. (see A.M., 2013 WL 4056216, at *10-*11; J.C.S., 2013 WL 3975942, at *9; B.M., 2013 WL 1972144, at *6).
[6] Even if the parent properly raised the lack of parent counseling and training in the June 2011 IEP as an issue in the due process complaint notice, the failure to recommend this service in the June 2011 IEP would not result in a failure to offer the student a FAPE. State regulations require that an IEP indicate the extent to which parent counseling and training will be provided to parents, when appropriate (8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v][b][5]). State regulations further provide for the provision of parent counseling and training for the purpose of enabling parents of students with autism to perform appropriate follow-up intervention activities at home (8 NYCRR 200.13[d]). Regulations define parent counseling and training as "assisting parents in understanding the special needs of their child; providing parents with information about child development; and helping parents to acquire the necessary skills that will allow them to support the implementation of their child's individualized education program" (8 NYCRR 200.1[kk]; see 34 CFR 300.34[c][8]). However, Courts have held that a failure to include parent counseling and training in an IEP does not constitute a denial of a FAPE where a district provided a "comprehensive parent training component" that satisfied the requirements of the State regulation (see R.E., 694 F.3d at 191; M.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 498, 509 [S.D.N.Y. 2008]). The Second Circuit has explained that "because school districts are required by [8 NYCRR] 200.13(d) to provide parent counseling, they remain accountable for their failure to do so no matter the contents of the IEP. Parents can file a complaint at any time if they feel they are not receiving this service" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 191; see M.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 141-42 [2d Cir. 2013]). The Second Circuit further explained that "[t]hough the failure to include parent counseling in the IEP may, in some cases (particularly when aggregated with other violations), result in a denial of a FAPE, in the ordinary case that failure, standing alone, is not sufficient to warrant reimbursement" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 191; see F.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 553 Fed. App'x 2, 7 [2d Cir. Jan. 1, 2014]).
[7] Given the determination concurring with the IHO that the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year, the IHO's finding with respect to reimbursement for the costs of the student's home-based ABA services must be annulled. It is well settled that an award of reimbursement or further services must be predicated upon a finding that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE (see 34 CFR 300.148[a]; see also Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-032; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 11-014; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-078). Thus, this portion of the district's cross-appeal is sustained.
[8] The IDEA only requires that the parents have an opportunity to participate in the drafting process'" (D.D.-S. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 3919040, at *11 [E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011], quoting A.E. v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 2d 208, 216 [D. Conn. 2006]; see E.F., 2013 WL 4495676, at *17 [noting that "as long as the parents are listened to," the right to participate in the development of the IEP is not impeded, "even if the [district] ultimately decides not to follow the parents' suggestions"]; see also T.Y. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 420 [2d Cir. 2009] [noting that the IDEA gives parents the right to participate in the development of their child's IEP, not a veto power over those aspects of the IEP with which they do not agree]).
[9] With respect to the district's cross-appeal of the IHO's decision awarding the parent reimbursement for the costs of the student's round-trip transportation services to the REED Academy during the 2011-12 school year, the district mistakenly relies upon section 3635 of the Education law as a basis to annul the IHO's finding. Here, the district was obligated to provide the student with transportation pursuant to section 4402(4)(d) of the Education law. Consequently, this portion of the district's cross-appeal is denied. It must be further noted, however, that the parent was entitled by operation of law to the payment of the costs of the student's tuition at the REED Academy for the 2011-12 school year—as well as round-trip transportation—pursuant to the IHO's interim order on pendency through the date of this decision (see Interim IHO Decision at pp. 2-3).