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A L a Schechter Poultry Corp Vs United States - Citation 96113 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/96113
Decided On May-27-1935
Case Number 295 U.S. 495
Appellant A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
a. l. a. schechter poultry corp. v. united states - 295 u.s. 495 (1935) u.s. supreme court a. l. a. schechter poultry corp. v. united states, 295 u.s. 495 (1935) a. l. a. schechter poultry corp. v. united states no. 854 argued may 2, 3, 1935 decided may 27, 1935 * 295 u.s. 495 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus 1. extraordinary conditions, such as an economic crisis, may call for extraordinary remedies, but they cannot create or enlarge constitutional power. p. 295 u. s. 528 . 2. congress is not permitted by the constitution to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is vested. art. i, § 1; art. i, § 8, par. 18. .....
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States - 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
U.S. Supreme Court A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
Decided May 27, 1935 *
1. Extraordinary conditions, such as an economic crisis, may call for extraordinary remedies, but they cannot create or enlarge constitutional power. P. 295 U. S. 528 .
2. Congress is not permitted by the Constitution to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is vested. Art. I, § 1; Art. I, § 8, par. 18. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 . P. 295 U. S. 529 .
3. Congress may leave to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits, and the determination of facts to which the policy, as declared by Congress, is to apply; but it must itself lay down the policies and establish standards. P. 295 U. S. 530 .
4. The delegation of legislative power sought to be made to the President by § 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, is unconstitutional (pp. 295 U. S. 529 et seq. ), and the Act is also unconstitutional, as applied in this case, because it exceeds the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and invades the power reserved exclusively to the States (pp. 295 U. S. 542 et seq. ).
(1) The statutory plan is not simply one of voluntary effort; the "codes of fair competition" are meant to be codes of laws. P. 295 U. S. 529 .
(2) The meaning of the term "fair competition" (not expressly defined in the Act) is clearly not the mere antithesis of "unfair competition," as known to the common law, or of "unfair methods of competition" under the Federal Trade Commission Act. P. 295 U. S. 531 .
(3) In authorizing the President to approve codes which "will tend to effectuate the policy of this title," § 3 of the Act refers to the Declaration of Policy in § 1. The purposes declared in § 1 are all directed to the rehabilitation of industry and the industrial recovery which was the major policy of Congress in adopting the Act. P. 295 U. S. 534 .
(4) That this is the controlling purpose of the code now before the Court appears both from its repeated declarations to that effect and from the scope of its requirements. P. 295 U. S. 536 .
would approve or prescribe, as wise and beneficent measures for the government of trades and industries, in order to bring about their rehabilitation, correction and improvement, according to the general declaration of policy in § 1. Codes of laws of this sort are styled " codes of fair competition." P. 295 U. S. 535 .
(6) A delegation of its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations, empowering them to enact laws for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trades or industries, would be utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress. P. 295 U. S. 537 .
(7) Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade and industry. P. 295 U. S. 537 .
(8) The only limits set by the Act to the President's discretion are that he shall find, first, that the association or group proposing a code imposes no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership and is truly representative; second, that the code is not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and third, that it "will tend to effectuate the policy of this title" -- this last being a mere statement of opinion. These are the only findings which Congress has made essential in order to put into operation a legislative code having the aims described in the "Declaration of Policy." P. 295 U. S. 538 .
(9) Under the Act, the President, in approving a code, may impose his own conditions, adding to or taking from what is proposed, as "in his discretion" he thinks necessary "to effectuate the policy" declared by the Act. He has no less liberty when he prescribes a code on his own motion or on complaint, and he is free to prescribe one if a code has not been approved. P. 295 U. S. 538 .
(10) The acts and reports of the administrative agencies which the President may create under the Act have no sanction beyond his will. Their recommendations and findings in no way limit the authority which § 3 undertakes to vest in him. And this authority relates to a host of different trades and industries, thus extending the President's discretion to all the varieties of laws which he may deem to be beneficial in dealing with the vast array of commercial activities throughout the country. P. 295 U. S. 539 .
powers granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission, to the Radio Commission, and to the President when acting under the "flexible tariff" provisions of the Tariff Act of 1922. P. 295 U. S. 539 .
(12) Section 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, it sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion found in § 1. In view of the broad scope of that declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. The code-making authority thus sought to be conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. P. 295 U. S. 541 .
(1) When the poultry had reached the defendants' slaughterhouses, the interstate commerce had ended, and subsequent transactions in their business, including the matters charged in the indictment, were transactions in intrastate commerce. P. 295 U. S. 542 .
of transactions involved in that practical continuity of movement, are inapplicable in this case. P. 295 U. S. 543 .
(3) The distinction between intrastate acts that directly affect interstate commerce, and therefore are subject to federal regulation, and those that affect it only indirectly, and therefore remain subject to the power of the States exclusively, is clear in principle, though the precise line can be drawn only as individual cases arise. Pp. 295 U. S. 544 , 295 U. S. 546 .
(4) If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the Federal Government. Indeed, on such a theory, even the development of the State's commercial facilities would be subject to federal control. P. 295 U. S. 546 .
(5) The distinction between direct and indirect effects has long been clearly recognized in the application of the Anti-Trust Act. It is fundamental and essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system. P. 295 U. S. 547 .
(6) The Federal Government cannot regulate the wages and hours of labor of persons employed in the internal commerce of a State. No justification for such regulation is to be found in the fact that wages and hours affect costs and prices, and so indirectly affect interstate commerce, nor in the fact that failure of some States to regulate wages and hours diverts commerce from the States that do regulate them. P. 295 U. S. 548 .
(7) The provisions of the code which are alleged to have been violated in this case are not a valid exercise of federal power. P. 295 U. S. 550 .
Petitioners in No. 854 were convicted in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York on eighteen count of an indictment charging violations of what is known a the "Live Poultry Code," [ Footnote 1 ] and on an additional count for conspiracy to commit such violations. [ Footnote 2 ] By demurrer to the indictment and appropriate motions on the trial, the defendants contended (1) that the Code had been adopted pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of legislative power; (2) that it attempted to regulate intrastate transactions which lay outside the authority of Congress, and (3) that, in certain provisions, it was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The "Live Poultry Code" was promulgated under § 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act. [ Footnote 3 ] That section -- the pertinent provisions of which are set forth in the margin [ Footnote 4 ] -- authorizes the President to approve "codes of
The President approved the Code by an executive order in which he found that the application for his approval had been duly made in accordance with the provisions of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, that there had been due notice and hearings, that the Code constituted "a code of fair competition" as contemplated by the Act, and complied with its pertinent provisions, including clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of § 3 of Title I, and that the Code would tend "to effectuate the policy of Congress as declared in section 1 of Title I." [ Footnote 5 ]
and also that the Code would tend to effectuate the policy declared in Title I of the Act, as set forth in § 1. The report of the Administrator for Industrial Recovery dealt with wages, ours of labor and other labor provisions. [ Footnote 6 ]
"the practice of requiring persons purchasing poultry for resale to accept the run of any half coop, coop, or coops, as purchased by slaughterhouse operators, except for culls. [ Footnote 7 ]"
First. Two preliminary points are stressed by the Government with respect to the appropriate approach to the important questions presented. We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. [ Footnote 8 ] The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the
Second. The question of the delegation of legislative power. We recently had occasion to review the pertinent decisions and the general principles which govern the determination of this question. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 . The Constitution provides that
legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Panama Company case that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits, and the determination of facts to which the policy, as declared by the legislature, is to apply. But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. Id., p. 298 U. S. 421 .
The aspect in which the question is now presented is distinct from that which was before us in the case of the Panama Company. There, the subject of the statutory prohibition was defined. National Industrial Recovery Act, § 9(c). That subject was the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and petroleum products which are produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by State authority. The question was with respect to the range of discretion given to the President in prohibiting that transportation. Id. pp. 293 U. S. 414 , 293 U. S. 415 , 293 U. S. 430 . As to the "codes of fair competition," under § 3 of the Act, the question is more fundamental.
What is meant by "fair competition" as the term is used in the Act? Does it refer to a category established in the law, and is the authority to make codes limited accordingly? Or is it used as a convenient designation for whatever set of laws the formulators of a code for a particular trade or industry may propose and the President may approve (subject to certain restrictions), or the President may himself prescribe, as being wise and beneficent provisions for the government of the trade or industry in order to accomplish the broad purposes of rehabilitation, correction and expansion which are stated in the first section of Title I? [ Footnote 9 ]
The Act does not define " fair competition." "Unfair competition," as known to the common law, is a limited concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the palming off of one's goods as those of a rival trader. Goodyear Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598 ,
128 U. S. 604 ; Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seaman & Benedict, 198 U. S. 118 , 198 U. S. 140 ; Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 , 240 U. S. 413 . In recent years, its scope has been extended. It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as misrepresentation, to the selling of another's goods as one's own -- to misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 , 248 U. S. 241 , 248 U. S. 242 . Unfairness in competition has been predicated of acts which lie outside the ordinary course of business and are tainted by fraud, or coercion, or conduct otherwise prohibited by law. [ Footnote 10 ] Id., p. 248 U. S. 258 . But it is evident that, in its widest range, "unfair competition," as it has been understood in the law, does not reach the objectives of the codes which are authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act. The codes may, indeed, cover conduct which existing law condemns, but they are not limited to conduct of that sort. The Government does not contend that the Act contemplates such a limitation. It would be opposed both to the declared purposes of the Act and to its administrative construction.
The Federal Trade Commission Act (§ 5) [ Footnote 11 ] introduced the expression "unfair methods of competition," which were declared to be unlawful. That was an expression new in the law. Debate apparently convinced the sponsors of the legislation that the words "unfair competition," in the light of their meaning at common law, were too narrow. We have sad that the substituted phrase has a broader meaning, that it does not admit of precise definition, its scope being left to judicial determination as controversies arise. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 , 283 U. S. 648 , 283 U. S. 649 ; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304 , 291 U. S. 310 -312. What are
"unfair methods of competition" are thus to be determined in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of particular competitive conditions and of what is found to be a specific and substantial public interest. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 , 257 U. S. 453 ; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19 , 280 U. S. 27 , 280 U. S. 28 ; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., supra; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., supra; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67 , 291 U. S. 73 . To make this possible, Congress set up a special procedure. A Commission, a quasi -judicial body, was created. Provision was made formal complaint, for notice and hearing, for appropriate findings of fact supported by adequate evidence, and for judicial review to give assurance that the action of the Commission is taken within its statutory authority. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., supra; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner, supra. [ Footnote 12 ]
thereof, and to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources. [ Footnote 13 ]"
Instances are cited in which Congress has availed itself of such assistance; as, e.g., in the exercise of its authority over the public domain with respect to the recognition of local customs or rules of miners as to mining claims, [ Footnote 14 ] or, in matters of a more or less technical nature, as in designating the standard height of drawbar. [ Footnote 15 ] But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? And, could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title I? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly consistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.
Such a sweeping delegation of legislative power finds no support in the decisions upon which the Government especially relies. By the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress has itself provided a code af laws regulating the activities of the common carriers subject to the Act in order to assure the performance of their services upon just and reasonable terms, with adequate facilities and without unjust discrimination. Congress, from time to time, has elaborated its requirements as needs have been disclosed. To facilitate the application of the standards prescribed by the Act, Congress has provided an expert body. That administrative agency, in dealing with particular cases, is required to act upon notice and hearing, and its orders must be supported by findings of fact which, in turn, are sustained by evidence. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88 ; Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 ; United States
Page 295 U. S. 540
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 293 U. S. 454 . When the Commission is authorized to issue, for the construction, extension or abandonment of lines, a certificate of "public convenience and necessity," or to permit the acquisition by one carrier of the control of another, if that is found to be "in the public interest," we have pointed out that these provisions are not left without standards to guide determination. The authority conferred has direct relation to the standards prescribed for the service of common carriers, and can be exercised only upon findings, based upon evidence, with respect to particular conditions of transportation. New York Central Securities Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 , 287 U. S. 24 , 298 U. S. 25 ; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266 , 270 U. S. 273 ; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 35 , 283 U. S. 42 .
Similarly, we have held that the Radio Act of 1927 [ Footnote 16 ] established standards to govern radio communications, and, in view of the limited number of available broadcasting frequencies, Congress authorized allocation and licenses. The Federal Radio Commission was created as the licensing authority in order to secure a reasonable equality of opportunity in radio transmission and reception. The authority of the Commission to grant licenses "as public convenience, interest or necessity requires" was limited by the nature of radio communications and by the scope, character, and quality of the services to be rendered and the relative advantages to be derived through distribution of facilities. These standards established by Congress were to be enforced upon hearing, and evidence, by an administrative body acting under statutory restrictions adapted to the particular activity. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Brothers Co., 289 U. S. 266 .
In Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 , the question related to the "flexible tariff provision" of the Tariff Act of 1922. [ Footnote 17 ] We held that Congress had described its plan
As the differences cost might vary from time to time, provision was for the investigation and determination of these differences by the executive branch, so as to make "the adjustments necessary to conform the duties to the standard underlying that policy and plan." Id. pp. 276 U. S. 404 , 276 U. S. 405 . The Court found the same principle to be applicable in fixing customs duties as that which permitted Congress to exercise its ratemaking power in interstate commerce, "by declaring the rule which shall prevail in the legislative fixing of rates" and then remitting "the fixing of such rates" in accordance with its provisions "to a ratemaking body." Id., p. 276 U. S. 409 . The Court fully recognized the limitations upon the delegation of legislative power. Id. pp. 276 U. S. 408 -411.
(1) Were these transactions " in " interstate commerce? Much is made of the fact that almost all the poultry coming to New York is sent there from other States. But the code provisions, as here applied, do not concern the transportation of the poultry from other States to New York, or the transactions of the commission men or others to whom it is consigned, or the sales made by such consignees to defendants. When defendants had made their purchases, whether at the West Washington Market in New York City or at the railroad
terminals serving the City, or elsewhere, the poultry was trucked to their slaugterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition. The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then ended. Defendants held the poultry at their slaughterhouse markets for slaughter and local sale to retail dealers and butchers who, in turn, sold directly to consumers. Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions in interstate commerce. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 , 114 U. S. 632 , 114 U. S. 633 ; Public Utilities Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236 , 249 U. S. 245 ; Industrial Association v. States, 268 U. S. 64 , 268 U. S. 78 , 268 U. S. 79 ; Atlantic Coast Line v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U. S. 257 , 275 U. S. 267 .
The undisputed facts thus afford no warrant for the argument that the poultry handled by defendants at their slaughterhouse markets was in a " current " or " flow " of interstate commerce, and was thus subject to congressional regulation. The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities into a State does not mean that the flow continues after the property has arrived, and has become commingled with the mass of property within the State, and is there held solely for local disposition and use. So far as the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow in interstate commerce had ceased. The poultry had come to a permanent rest within the State. It was not held, used, or sold by defendants in relation to any further transactions in interstate commerce, and was not destined for transportation to other States. Hence, decisions which deal with a stream of interstate commerce -- where goods come to rest within a State temporarily and are later to go forward in interstate commerce -- and with the regulations of transactions involved in that practical continuity of movement, are not applicable here. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 , 387, 388 [argument of counsel omitted in electronic version]; Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 , 258 U. S. 55 ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 , 258 U. S. 519 ; Chicago
Page 295 U. S. 544
Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. l, 262 U. S. 35 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 , 280 U. S. 439 .
(2) Did the defendants' transactions directly " affect " interstate commerce, so as to be subject to federal regulation? The power of Congress extends not only to the regulation of transactions which are part of interstate commerce, but to the protection of that commerce from injury. It matters not that the injury may be due to the conduct of those engaged in intrastate operations. Thus, Congress may protect the safety of those employed in interstate transportation "no matter what may be the source of the dangers which threaten it." Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 , 222 U. S. 27 . We said in Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 51 , that it is the " effect upon interstate commerce," not "the source of the injury," which is "the criterion of congressional power." We have held that, in dealing with common carriers engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, the dominant authority of Congress necessarily embraces the right to control their intrastate operations in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to secure the freedom of that traffic from interference or unjust discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the interstate service. The Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342 , 234 U. S. 351 , 234 U. S. 352 ; Wisconsin Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563 , 257 U. S. 588 . And combinations and conspiracies to restrain interstate commerce, or to monopolize any part of it, are nonetheless within the reach of the Anti-Trust Act because the conspirators seek to attain their end by means of intrastate activities. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 , 268 U. S. 310 ; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Assn., 274 U. S. 37 , 274 U. S. 46 .
We recently had occasion, in Local 677 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293 , to apply this principle in connection with
the live poultry industry. That was a suit to enjoin a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in violation of the Anti-Trust Act. It was shown that marketmen, teamsters and slaughterers ( shochtim ) had conspired to burden the free movement of live poultry into the metropolitan area in and about New York City. Marketmen had organized an association, had allocated retailers among themselves, and had agreed to increase prices. To accomplish their objects, large amounts of money were raised by levies upon poultry sold, men were hired to obstruct the business dealers who resisted, wholesalers and retailers were spied upon, and, by violence and other forms of intimidation, were prevented from freely purchasing live poultry. Teamsters refused to handle poultry for recalcitrant marketmen, and members of the shochtim union refused to slaughter. In view of the proof of that conspiracy, we said that it was unnecessary to decide when interstate commerce ended and when intrastate commerce began. We found that the proved interference by the conspirators "with the unloading, the transportation, the sales by marketmen to retailers, the prices charged, and the amount of profits exacted" operated "substantially and directly to restrain and burden the untrammeled shipment and movement of the poultry" while unquestionably it was in interstate commerce. The intrastate acts of the conspirators were included in the injunction because that was found to be necessary for the protection of interstate commerce against the attempted and illegal restraint. Id. pp. 291 U. S. 297 , 291 U. S. 299 , 291 U. S. 300 .
to commit these violations. Interstate commerce is brought in only upon the charge that violations of these provisions -- as to hours and wages of employees and local sales - " affected " interstate commerce.
In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they "affect" interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well established distinction between direct and indirect effects. The precise line can be drawn only as individual cases arise, but the distinction is clear in principle. Direct effects are illustrated by the railroad cases we have cited, as, e.g., the effect of failure to use prescribed safety appliances on railroads which are the highways of both interstate and intrastate commerce, injury to an employee engaged in interstate transportation by the negligence of an employee engaged in an intrastate movement, the fixing of rates for intrastate transportation which unjustly discriminate against interstate commerce. But where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power. If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprise and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government. Indeed, on such a theory, even the development of the State's commercial facilities would be subject to federal control. As we said in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 410 :
See also Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 , 128 U. S. 21 ; Heisler v. Thomas Collier Co., 260 U. S. 245 , 260 U. S. 259 , 260 U. S. 260 .
The distinction between direct and indirect effects has been clearly recognized in the application of the Anti-Trust Act. Where a combination or conspiracy is formed, with the intent to restrain interstate commerce or to monopolize any part of it, the violation of the statute is clear. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 , 268 U. S. 310 . But where that intent is absent, and the objectives are limited to intrastate activities, the fact that there may be an indirect effect upon interstate commerce does not subject the parties to the federal statute, notwithstanding its broad provisions. This principle has frequently been applied in litigation growing out of labor disputes. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 , 259 U. S. 410 , 259 U. S. 411 ; United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457 , 265 U. S. 464 -467; Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 64 , 268 U. S. 82 ; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103 , 289 U. S. 107 , 289 U. S. 108 . In the case last cited, we quoted with approval the rule that had been stated and applied in Industrial Association v. United States, supra, after review of the decisions, as follows:
" Whereas, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator of the National Industrial Recovery Act having rendered their separate reports and recommendations and findings on the provisions of said code, coming within their respective jurisdictions, as set forth in the Executive Order No. 6182 of June 26, 1933, as supplemented by Executive Order No. 6207 of July 21, 1933, and Executive Order No. 6345 of October 20, 1933, as amended by Executive Order No. 6551 of January 8, 1934;"
" Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, pursuant to the authority vested in me by title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, and otherwise, do hereby find that:"
" Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, pursuant to the authority vested in me by title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, and otherwise, do hereby approve said Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry in the Metropolitan Area in and about the City of New York."
" President of the United States "
" Straight Killing. -- The use, in the wholesale slaughtering of poultry, of any method of slaughtering other that 'straight killing,' or killing on the basis of official grade. Purchasers may, however, make selection of a half-coop, coop, or coops, but shall not have the right to make any selection of particular birds."
See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 71 U. S. 120 , 71 U. S. 121 ; Home Building & Loan Assn v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 , 290 U. S. 426 .
Act of July 26, 1866, c. 262, 14 Stat. 251; Jackson v. Roby, 109 U. S. 440 , 109 U. S. 441 ; Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527 , 113 U. S. 535 ; Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 119 , 196 U. S. 126 .
Act of March 2, 1893, c.196, 27 Stat. 531; St. Louis, I. M. & So. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 , 210 U. S. 286 .
The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant, if I may borrow my own words in an earlier opinion. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 , 293 U. S. 440 .
This court has held that delegation may be unlawful, though the act to be performed is definite and single, if the necessity, time and occasion of performance have been left in the end to the discretion of the delegate. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra. I thought that ruling went too far. I pointed out in an opinion that there had been "no grant to the Executive of any roving commission to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, do anything he pleases." 293 U.S. at p. 293 U. S. 435 . Choice, though within limits, had been given him "as to the occasion, but none whatever as to the means." Ibid. Here, in the case before us, is an attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to any class or group of acts identified or described by reference to a standard. Here, in effect, is a roving commission to inquire into evils and, upon discovery, correct them.
I have said that there is no standard, definite or even approximate, to which legislation must conform. Let me make my meaning more precise. If codes of fair competition are codes eliminating "unfair" methods of competition ascertained upon inquiry to prevail in one industry or another, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative functions when the President is directed to inquire into such practices and denounce them when discovered. For many years, a like power has been committed to the Federal Trade Commission with the approval of this court in a long series of decisions. Cf. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304 , 291 U. S. 312 ; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 , 283 U. S. 648 ; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 . Delegation in such circumstances is born of the necessities of the occasion. The industries of the country are too many and diverse to make it possible for Congress, in respect of matters such as these, to legislate directly with adequate appreciation of varying conditions. Nor is the substance of the power changed because the President may act at the instance of trade or industrial associations having special knowledge of the facts. Their function is strictly advisory; it is the imprimatur of the President that begets the quality of law. Doty v. Love, ante p. 295 U. S. 64 . When the task that is set before one is that of cleaning house, it is prudent, as well as usual, to take counsel of the dwellers. But there is another conception of codes of fair competition, their significance and function, which leads to very different consequences, though it is one that is struggling now for recognition and acceptance. By this other conception, a code is not to be restricted to the elimination of business practices that would be characterized by general acceptation as oppressive or unfair. It is to include whatever ordinances may be desirable or helpful for the wellbeing or prosperity of the industry
I find no authority in that grant for the regulation of wages and hours of labor in the intrastate transactions that make up the defendants' business. As to this feature of the case, little can be added to the opinion of the court. There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording instruments at the center. A society such as ours "is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout its territory; the only question is of their size." Per Learned Hand, J., in the court below. The law is not indifferent to considerations of degree. Activities local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because of distant repercussions. What is near and what is distant may at times be uncertain. Cf. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 . There is no penumbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here. To find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost everywhere. If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our federal system.