Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19780509-765476
Timestamp: 2017-04-25 03:04:03+00:00
Document Index: 163111143

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 12", "l'article 8", "l'article 26", "l'article 27", "l'article 3", "l'article 3", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 12", "l'article 3", "l'article 27", "l'article 8", "l'article 12", "l'article 27"]

Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche VAN OOSTERWIJCK c. BELGIQUE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7654/76Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-05-09;7654.76 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINEParties : Demandeurs : VAN OOSTERWIJCKDéfendeurs : BELGIQUETexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 7654/76 Daniel VAN OOSTERWIJCK v/BELGIU M Daniel VAN OOSTERWIKCK c/BELGIQU E DECISION of 9 May 1978 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 9 mai 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
A rtic% 8 of the Convention and Artic% 12 of the Convention : The refusal to recognise officialfy the new sex of a transsexual raises complex issues under these provisions . Complaint declared admissible. A rticle 26 of the Convention : a Where the evaluation of facts by a judge is concerned, and no erroneous apphcation of the law is alleged, a plea of nullity does not constitute an effective remedy . b . Complaint submitted "in substance" to national courts, and direct applicability of the Convention before them .
Artic% 8 de la Convention et Article 12 de le Convention : Le refus de reconnaitre officiellement le nouveau sexe d'un transsexuel sou/Ã¨ve des problÃ¨mes complexes sous l'angle de ces deux dispositions. RequÃ©re dÃ©c/arÃ©e recevable .
Artic% 26 de la Convention : a
S'agtssant d'une apprÃ©ciation de fait portÃ©e par le juge, afors qu'aucune application incorrecte de la loi n'est allÃ©guÃ©e, un pourvoi en cassation ne constitue pas un recours efficace.
b . Grief soumis e en substance Â» aux juridictions nationales et applicabilitÃ© immÃ©diate de la Convention devant celles-ci.
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I English : see p. 201 )
Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme sui t Le requÃ©rant, ressortissant belge nÃ© le 23 dÃ©cembre 1944, est domiciliÃ© Ã Bruxelles et est employÃ© par les services de la Commission des CommunautÃ©s europÃ©ennes . Son acte de naissance, dressÃ© le 26 dÃ©cembre 1944, fait Ã©tat d'un enfant de sexe fÃ©minin prÃ©nommÃ© Danielle . DÃ©s la petite enfance toutefois le requÃ©rant prit conscience d'une dualitÃ© de personnalitÃ© : bien que morphologiquement fÃ©minin, il se sentait psychologiquement de sexe masculin . Cette discordance plaÃ§ait le requÃ©rant dans un Ã©tat dÃ©pressif chronique Ã tel point qu'Ã© 18 ans il tenta de se suicider . En 1969, il fut Ã©tabli par trois mÃ©decins spÃ©cialistes d'endocrinologie, d e neurologie et de mÃ©decine interne, que l'ensemble des symptÃ´mes prÃ©sentÃ©s par le requÃ©rant relevaient indiscutablement de la transsexualitÃ© .
Le requÃ©rant fut d'abord soumis Ã une hormothÃ©rapie qui produisit au bout de quelques mois l'apparition de caractÃ©res sexuels mÃ¢les secondaires . Un traitement chirurgical de conversion sexuelle fut ensuite entrepris Ã Bruxelles par un chirurgien qui avait pris la prÃ©caution d'obtenir l'accord de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins . AprÃ¨s deux opÃ©rations rÃ©alisÃ©es en juillet et dÃ©cembre 1970 (mammectomie bilatÃ©rale ; hystÃ©rectomie - ovariectomie bilatÃ©ralel le requÃ©rant subit Ã Londres, en dix termes opÃ©ratoires Ã©chelonnÃ©s d'octobre 1971 Ã octobre 1973, une phalloplastie rÃ©alisÃ©e par un chirurgien au Queen Mary's Hospital de Londres . Une partie des frais rÃ©sultant de ce traitement fut prise en charge par le service mÃ©dical des CommunautÃ©s europÃ©ennes . L'administration des CommunautÃ©s dÃ©livra alors au requÃ©rant une carte de service au nom de Monsieur D . Van Oosterwijck . Le 18 octobre 1973, le requÃ©rant introduisit, par l'intermÃ©diaire de son conseil, une requÃªte en rectification d'Ã©tat civil . Le 30 janvier 1974, sur l'avis conforme du minitÃ©re public, le tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance de Bruxelles rejeta la requÃªte comme dÃ©nuÃ©e de fondement . Le 7 mai 1974, sur avis conforme du ministÃ©re public, la cour d'appel d e Bruxelles confirma cette ordonnance entreprise par le requÃ©rant . L'arrÃªt prÃ©cise notamment que Â« dans l'Ã©tat actuel de la lÃ©gislation, aucune disposition ne permet de tenir compte de changements apportÃ©s artificiellement Ã la morphologie d'un individu, dussent-ils correspondre Ã ses tendances psychiques profondes ; que ni l'examen corporel de la partie appelante, dont la morphologie volontairement modifiÃ©e est un fait constant, ni l'offre de preuve scientifique de l'Ã©tiologie biologique de la transsexualitÃ©, point controversÃ©, ne seraient de nature Ã Ã©tablir que, dÃ¨s sa naissance, la partie appelante prÃ©sentait des caractÃ©ristiques physiques du sexe masculin ou mÃªme des tendances Ã la transsexualitÃ© Â» .
AprÃ©s s'Ã©tre entourÃ© de l'avis de plusieurs personnes qualifiÃ©es, le requÃ©rant dÃ©cida de ne pas se pourvoir en cassation, considÃ©rant que l'arrÃ©t ne violait aucune disposition lÃ©gale existante . II . GRIEF S Le requÃ©rant fait valoir que les dÃ©cisions des juridictions belges attribuant aux mentions de l'acte de naissance une valeur scientifique dÃ©finitive, le placent dans une situation juridique et administrative intolÃ©rable .
Il allÃ©gue Ã cet Ã©gard la violation des articles 12 . 8 et 3 de la Convention . Ouant Ã l'article 12, il souligne que les dÃ©cisions litigieuses maintenant une distorsion entre son Ãªtre lÃ©gal lidentitÃ© fÃ©mininel et son Ãªtre physique lidentitÃ© masculinel l'empÃ©chent de se marier et de fonder une famille Il indique avoir envisagÃ© le mariage, voire l'adoption d'enfants . Quant Ã l'article 8, il prÃ©tend que l'application de la loi belge, qui l'oblige Ã Ã©tre titWaire de piÃ©ces d'identitÃ© non conformes Ã son identitÃ© rÃ©elle, constitue une ingÃ©rence Inadmissible dans la vie privÃ©e . Quant Ã l'ariicle 3, il considÃ¨re Ã©tre dans une situation de Â« mort civile Â», la loi belge le privant de l'exercice de droits fondamentaux . Il soutient que cette situatlon est inhumaine et dÃ©gradante . III . PROCÃDURE DEVANT LA COMMISSIO N La Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© le 28 fÃ©vrier 1977 de porter la prÃ©sente requÃ©te Ã la connaissance du Gouvernement mis en cause . Le Gouvernement a Ã©tÃ© invitÃ© Ã prÃ©senter par Ã©crit avant le 25 avril 1977 ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte Par ordonnance du PrÃ©sident, ce dÃ©lai a Ã©tÃ© reportÃ© au 23 mai 1977 Les observations du Gouvernement ont Ã©tÃ© produites le 14 mai 1977 et la rÃ©ponse du requÃ©rant est parvenue le 28 juillet 1977 . Le 6 dÃ©cembre 1977, la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© d'inviter les Parties Ã une audience portant aussi bien sur la recevabilitÃ© que sur le bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte Au cours de cette audience, tenue le 9 mai 1978, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait assistÃ© par M . Joe Verhoeven, chargÃ© de cours Ã la FacultÃ© de Droit de l'UniversitÃ© de Louvain . Le Gouvernement Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© par son agent, M . J . Niset, ainsi que par W De Meyer, conseil, et M . H Van Keymeulen, conseiller . IV . RÃSUMÃ DE L'ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S 1
La transsexualitÃ© face A /a lAgis/ation et A/a jurisprudence belges
Le Gouvernement indique qu'il n'existe pas de lÃ©gislation spÃ©ciale sur la transsexualitÃ© .
Sur le plan juridique, le problÃ¨me du syndrome transsexuel se situe au niveau des limites de la rectification des actes de l'Ã©tat civil en gÃ©nÃ©ral et des actes de naissance en particulier . Les dispositions lÃ©gales applicables en cette matiÃ©re sont ~ a . Code civil, article 55 ~ a Les dÃ©clarations de naissance seront faites Ã l'officier de l'Ã©tat civil du lieu . . . : l'enfant lui sera prÃ©sentÃ© . u Dans la pratique, cette prÃ©sentation est faite Ã un mÃ©decin dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© par l'officier d'Ã©tat civil . b . Code civil, article 57 : Â« L'acte de naissance Ã©noncera . . . le sexe de l'enfant . Â» Le sexe, constatÃ© au moment de la prÃ©sentation, est Ã©tabli sur base de la morphologie ; si celle-ci est incertaine, il est mentionnÃ© dans l'acte que l'enfant est de sexe incertain ou indÃ©terminÃ© . c . Articles 1583 Ã 1585 du code judiciaire relatifs Ã la procÃ©dure de rectification des actes de l'Ã©tat civil . L'Ã©tat du droit belge Ã cet Ã©gard est ainsi prÃ©sent Ã© La rectification de l'acte de naissance ne peut se justifier que si une erreur a Ã©tÃ© effectuÃ©e au moment de l'Ã©tablissement de l'acte . Or, Ã sa naissance, le transsexuel dispose morphologiquement d'organes le rattachant Ã un sexe bien caractÃ©risÃ© . Tout en conservant les organes propres Ã ce sexe, la personne atteinte du syndrome transsexuel renie son sexe originaire et revendique qu'on lui en reconnaisse un autre . Elle se plie, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, Ã un traitement qui la modifie morphologiquement . Cette transformation ne sera cependant jamais qu'apparente et ne pourra avoir pour rÃ©sultat que de lui confÃ©rer des organes artificiels incapables d'atteindre leurs fonctions naturelles . Ainsi, dans les cas de transsexualitÃ©, le doute ou l'erreur n'existe pas au moment de l'Ã©laboration de l'acte de naissance . En consÃ©quence, diverses dÃ©cisions tant belges qu'Ã©trangÃ©res, refusent de rectifier l'acte de l'Ã©tat civil d'une personne atteinte d'un syndrome transsexuel . Le requÃ©rant fait, Ã cet Ã©gard, les commentaires suivants : a . Quant Ã la dÃ©termination du sexe : si le critÃ©re morphologique, retenu par le lÃ©gislateur, est gÃ©nÃ©ralement suffisant, il ne peut constituer une prÃ©somption irrÃ©fragable que l'appartenance externe Ã un sexe correspond aux Ã©lÃ©ments internes concourant Ã la dÃ©finition de ce sexe : Ã©lÃ©ments gÃ©nÃ©tiques, gonadiques, hormonaux, somatiques et phsychiques . b Quant Ã l'erreur : l'erreur, qui doit exister au moment de l'Ã©tablissement de l'acte, peut n'apparaÃ®tre qu'ultÃ©rieurement, notamment dans le cas oÃ¹, sur base du critÃ¨re morphologique, un individu a Ã©tÃ© qualifiÃ© de masculin ou fÃ©minin et qu'un nouvel examen rÃ©vÃ¨le un sexe incertain . c . Quant au transsexuel : le transsexuel fÃ©minin est morphologiquement de sexe fÃ©minin, ainsi d'ailleurs que gÃ©nÃ©tiquement, gonadiquement et hormonale-
ment . Mais il est psychiquement de sexe masculin . A sa naissance l'enfant est ainsi de sexe incertain . L'erreur dans l'acte de naissance est Ã©videmment indÃ©celable mais nÃ©anmoins rÃ©elle . Par la suite, l'appartenance Ã un sexe prÃ©cis est Ã©tablie moyennant une intervention chirurgicale . Le requÃ©rant cite diverses dÃ©cisions qui, en Europe, ont Ã©tÃ© rendues dans u n sens favorable au transsexuel .
RecevabilitÃ© au regard de Yartic% 26 de le Convention Le Gouvernement soutient que le requÃ©rant aurait dÃ» se pourvoir en cassation en demandant Ã cette haute iuridiction de constater que la cour d'appel aurait violÃ© la loi belge en retusant de rectifier l'acte de naissance . En effet, sur la notion mÃªme d'erreur ouvrant droit Ã rectitication, la Cour de cassation aurait pu Ã©mettre une opinion ditfÃ©rente . Au surplus, la Cour de cassation aurait pu examiner si la dÃ©cision de la cour d'appel avait mÃ©connu les dispositions de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . Le Gouvernement relÃ©ve Ã©galement que le requÃ©rant n'a, Ã aucun moment, invoquÃ© devant les juridictions belges la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dont les dispositions sont self executing en Belgique . Pour ces deux raisons, la requÃªte doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme irrecevable par appllcat,on des articles 26 et 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant soutient, pour sa part, qu'un pourvoi en cassation aurait constituÃ©, en l'espÃ¨ce, un recours inefficace . Rappelant l'opinion Ã©mise par son conseil, il fait valoir que la cour d'appel, en refusant la rectification, a fait une application rÃ©guliÃ©re des dispositions lÃ©gales en vigueur, en se fondant sur une constatation de fait qui n'aurait pu Ãªtre remise en question devant la Cour de cassation . Quant au dÃ©faut d'avoir invoquÃ© la Convention devant les tribunaux belges, le requÃ©rant rappelle que, selon la jurisprudence de la Commission, dans les pays oÃ¹ la Convention fait partie de l'ordre juridique interne, il n'est pas indispensable d'invoquer ses dispositions dans tous les cas : il n'est pas nÃ©cessaire de le faire lorsque les dispositions de la Convention coÃ¯ncident, par leur portÃ©e, avec des dispositions du droit interne que le requÃ©rant a bien fait valoir . Pour se conformer Ã l'article 26 de la Convention, il suffit que tout grief formulÃ© devant la Commission ait Ã©tÃ© articulÃ© en substance devant les juridictions internes . En l'espÃ¨ce, les griefs auraient manifestement Ã©tÃ© articulÃ©s en substance Ã tous les stades de la procÃ©dure interne . RecevabilitÃ© au regard de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de ta Conventio n
Quant Ã l'article 3 Le Gouvernement fait observer que les dÃ©sagrÃ©ments encourus par le requÃ©rant, Ã la suite d'un changement volontaire de son apparence physique, n e
relÃ©vent d'aucune des situations que l'article 3 voulait atteindre . Ces dÃ©sagrÃ©ments peuvent, au surplus, Ãªtre attÃ©nuÃ©s . Le requÃ©rant soutient en revanche que l'individu empÂ®chÃ© de contracter mariage et de fonder une famille est privÃ© d'un droit fondamental, donc victime d'un traitement inhumain . L'individu qui ne peut exercer certains droits (vente devant notaire, emploi, rÃ©ception d'envois enregistrÃ©s) qu'Ã© la condition de livrer au prÃ©alable Ã n'importe qui des renseignements mÃ©dicaux le concernant, est placÃ© dans une situation dÃ©gradante et humiliante .
Quant Ã l'article 8 Le Gouvernement considÃ©re que seule une dÃ©cision de la cour d'appel autorisant la rectification de l'acte de l'Ã©tat civil aurait pu violer l'article 8 : elle se serait alors ingÃ©rÃ©e dans la vie privÃ©e du requÃ©rant en lui reconnaissant une identitÃ© masculine qu'il ne possÃ¨de qu'en apparence et artificiellement, mÃªme si elle correspond Ã certaines tendances psychiques profondes . Au reste la distorsion entre l'existence lÃ©gale et l'existence physique du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© provoquÃ©e par sa volontÃ© . Le requÃ©rant insiste essentiellement sur le fait qu'il n'a pas voulu sa transfor-
mation mais qu'elle lui a Ã©tÃ© imposÃ©e par une maladie . Quant Ã l'article 12 Le Gouvernement fait valoir qu'aucune autoritÃ© n'a jamais empÃªchÃ© le requÃ©rÃ¢nt de se marier et de fonder une famille en se conformant aux conditions fixÃ©es par la loi et notamment en rÃ©alisant la condition de diffÃ©rence de sexe . A cet Ã©gard, certaines difficultÃ©s peuvent exister aujourd'hui pour le requÃ©rant, suite aux opÃ©rations subies, encore qu'il ne puisse les imputer Ã d'autres . Le requÃ©rant affirme que le Gouvernement Ã©lude la vraie question soulevÃ©e en l'espÃ¨ce au regard du droit au mariage : le mariage qu'il contracterait avec une femme devrait-il ou non Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme un mariage entre personnes du mÃ¨me sexe, nul Ã ce titre 7 Il expose Ã cet Ã©gard que son sexe psychique est masculin et qu'il est considÃ©rÃ© comme un homme par le corps social . Depuis les opÃ©rations chirurgicales, son sexe physique est Ã©galement masculin . Ces opÃ©rations chirurgicales sont licites selon le droit belge .
En refusant au requÃ©rant la rectification de son identitÃ© lÃ©gale, l'Etat belge le prive du droit de se marier et de fonder une famille, conformÃ©ment au sexe qui est dÃ©sormais le sien .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant soutient que le dÃ©faut des autoritÃ©s belges de tenir compte de la modification de son Ã©tat, suite Ã une opÃ©ration de conversion sexuelle rÃ©guliÃ©re-
ment effectuÃ©e, porte atteinte Ã ses droits au mariage et au respect de la vie privÃ©e garantis par les articles 12 et 8 de la Convention . Il prÃ©tend en outre que la situation qui en rÃ©sulte est inhumaine et dÃ©gradante au sens de l'article 3 de la Conventlon . 2 . Le Gouvernement belge soulÃ©ve Ã cet Ã©gard l'exception de non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et indique les moyens qui, Ã son avis, Ã©taient Ã la disposition de l'intÃ©ressÃ© . II appartient Ã la Commission d'examiner si les recours visÃ©s par le Gouvernement Ã©taient adÃ©quats, c'est-Ã -dire de nature Ã porter remÃ©de aux griefs du requÃ©rant (Cour Eur . D .H, ArrÃ©t Stdgmuller du 10 novembre 1969, SÃ©rie A, p . 42, paragraphe 11) . 3 . Le Gouvernement a fait valoir en ordre principal que le requÃ©rant aurait dÃ¹ se pourvoir en cassation contre l'arrÃ«t de la cour d'appel, en date du 7 mai 1974, lui refusant la rectification de son Ã©tat civil . Pour cette cour, rien ne permettait d'Ã©tablir que, dÃ©s sa naissance, le requÃ©rant aurait prÃ©sentÃ© les caractÃ©ristiques physiques d'un sexe masculin ou indÃ©terminÃ© en sorte que l'acte de naissance aurait pu Ãªtre entachÃ© d'erreur . Elle a constatÃ© par ailleurs que, Â« dans l'Ã©tat actuel de la lÃ©gislation, aucune disposition ne permet de tenir compte des changements apportÃ©s artificiellement Ã la morphologle d'un individu, dussent-ils correspondre Ã ses tendances physiques profondes Â» . L'apprÃ©ciation de fait qu'elle a portÃ©e Ã©chappe au contrÃ´le de la Cour de cassation . Il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© soutenu, par ailleurs, qu'elle aurait pu faire une application incorrecte du droit belge en vigueur, tel qu'il ressort de la loi et des dÃ©clsions judiciaires mentionnÃ©es au dossier . Dans ces circonstances, le pourvoi en cassation ne constituait pas une voie de recours vraisemblablement efficace dont l'Ã©puisement s'imposait au requÃ©rant . Le Gouvernement a encore objectÃ©, Ã titre subsidiaire, que le requÃ©rant 4 n'avait pas invoquÃ© devant les juridictions nationales la violation de la Convention, Â« dont les dispositions sont self-executing Â» en Belgique . Dans une jurisprudence constante, la Commission a exigÃ© qu'aient Ã©tÃ© soumis aux tribunaux internes les griefs invoquÃ©s devant elle (cf . DÃ©cision sur requÃªte NÂ° 1727/62 c/Belgique, Annuaire VI, p 399) , elle a cependant admis que ne devaient pas avoir Ã©tÃ© nÃ©cessairement invoquÃ©s les moyens tirÃ©s de la Convention (cf . DÃ©cision sur requ&te NÂ° 4464/70 c/Belgique, Annuaire XV p . 3031 . II ressort de la requÃªte dÃ©posÃ©e le 14 fÃ©vrier 1974 au greffe de la cour d'appel et de l'avis du ministÃ©re public en date du 23 avril 1974 Ipage 9) que les griefs ont bien, en l'espÃ¨ce, Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©s en substance devant les juridictions belges . Le requÃ©rant aurait-il dÃ¹ nÃ©anmoins, ainsi que semble le soutenir le Gouvernement, invoquer devant le tribunal de premiÃ©re instance et la cour d'appel la primautÃ© de la Convention ? Si le principe de la primautÃ© des dispositions directement applicables des traitÃ©s sur le droit interne n'est pas un prescrit constitutionnel, la Commission n'ignore pas qu'il a Ã©tÃ© insÃ©rÃ© dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de cassation (arrÃ©t du 27 mai 1971) . Au regard du problÃ©me particulier soulevÃ© devant la Commission, les dispositions de la Convention n'ont toutefois pas u n
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caractÃ©re suffisamment prÃ©cis pour pouvoir Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©es comme entrant en conflit avec les normes du code civil et du code judiciaire belges dont l'objet immÃ©diat est trÃ¨s diffÃ©rent . En omettant de soulever ce moyen devant les tribunaux belges, le requÃ©rant n'a dÃ©s lors pas davantage failli Ã l'obligation d'Ã©puiser l'ensemble des voies de droit susceptibles de redresser les griefs articulÃ©s . 5 . II n'a pas Ã©tÃ© soutenu que le requÃ©rant aurait eu d'autres moyens de faire mettre fin Ã© la situation qu'il dÃ©nonce . II s'ensuit que la requÃ©te ne doit pas Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable en application de l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . 6 . La Commission a procÃ©dÃ© 8 un premier examen des faits et arguments soumis par les parties . Les griefs articulÃ©s par le requÃ©rant soulÃ©vent Ã son estime des problÃ©mes suffisamment complexes relativement Ã l'application de l'article 8 de la Convention et, dans une moindre mesure, de l'article 12 pour nÃ©cessiter un examen au fond . La question se pose en particulier de savoir si le dÃ©faut des autoritÃ©s d'accorder au requÃ©rant une identitÃ© lÃ©gale correspond Ã son nouvel Ã©tat, avec toutes les consÃ©quences qui en rÃ©sultent, notamment lors de contrÃ´les d'identitÃ©, de l'Ã©tablissement d'actes publics, de l'examen de candidatures Ã un emploi public ou privÃ©, ne constituent pas une mÃ©connaissance de son droit au respect de la vie privÃ©e garanti par l'article B . Il s'ensuit que la requÃ©te ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention et qu'elle doit Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable, aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© retenu .
Par ces motifs, la Commission DÃCLARELA REDUETE RECEVABLE .
THE FACT S The facts of the case may be summarised as follows : .
The applicant, a Belgian national born on 23 December 1944, is domiciled in Brussels and employed by the services of the Commission of the European Community . His birth certificate, issued on 26 December 1944, records the birth of a female child named Danielle . In his early childhood, however, the applicant became aware of the dual nature of his personality : although a female morpho-
logically, he felt himself to be a male psychologically . This discordance created in the applicant such a state of chronic depression that at the age of 18 he attempted suicide . In 1969 it was established by three doctors, specialists in endocrinology, neurology and internal medicine, that all the symptoms presented by the applicant were unquestlonably indicative of transsexuality . The applicant was first subject to a course of hormotherapy which, after a few months, fnduced the appearance of secondary male sexual characteristics . Surgical sexual conversion treatment was subsequently undertaken i n Brussels by a surgeon who had taken the precaution of obtaining the assent of the "Ordre des mÃ©decins " After two operations, performed in July and December 1970 Ibilateral mammectomy, hysterectomy-bilateral ovariectomyl, the applicant underwent a phalloplasty carried out in ten stages, between October 1971 and October 1973, by a surgeon at Queen Mary's Hospital in London Part of the cost of this treatment was borne by the Medical Service of the European Community . The applicant was thereupon issued with an employment card in the name ot Mr D . Van Ooosterwijck by the Community's administrative department . On 18 October 1973, the applicant submitted an application, through his legal adviser, for the rectification of his civll status . On 30 January 1974, on a recommendation by the public prosecutor's office, the court of first instance in Brussels rejected the application as unfounded On 7 May 1974, on the recommendation of the public prosecutor's office , the Brussels Court of Appeal confirmed that order contested by the applicant . It was stated in the judgment that there was no provision in the present legislation whereby account could be taken of changes made artificially in a person's anatomy to accord with deepseated psychical tendencies ; that neither a physical examination of the applicant, whose deliberately altered anatomy was a constant, not the scientific evidence of the biological etiology of transsexuality, a much debate dsubject,olaih eplcntad,frombihpyscalrteistics of the male sex or even transsexuality tendencies . After consulting a number of qualified persons, the applicant decided against appealing to the Court of Cassation since the judgment did not violate any existing legal provision .
GROUNDS OF COMPLAINT The applicant states that the Belgian courts' decisions, which regard the entries in the birth certificate as final and unalterable, place him in an intolerable legal and administrative situation .
He alleges, in this regard, a violation of Article 12, 8 and 3 of the Convention . As far as Article 12 is concerned, he contends that the disputed decisions, by maintaining a distortion between his legal being (feminine identity) and physical being (masculine identity), prevent his marrying and founding a family . He claims to have contemplated marriage and even the adoption of childre n As regards Article 8, he argues that the application of Belgian law, by obliging him to hold identity documents which are not in conformity with his real identity, constitutes inadmissible interference in his private life . Where Article 3 is concerned, he considers his situation to be one of "civil death" in that Belgian law prevents him exercising his fundamental rights . He assert that this situation is inhuman and degrading .
Ill . PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COMMISSIO N On 28 February 1977 the Commission decided to give notice of the present application to the Government against which it was brought . The Government was invited to present written observations on the admissibility of the application by 25 April 1977 . By order of the President that time-limit was extended to 23 May 1977 . The Government's observations were submitted on 14 May 1977 and the applicant's reply was received on 28 July 1977 . On 6 December 1977 the Commission decided to invite the parties to a hearing both on the admissibility of the application and on the merits . At that hearing, held on 9 May 1978, the applicant was assisted by Mr Joe Verhoeven, of the Law Faculty of Louvain University . The Government was represented by its agent, Mr J . Niset, as well as by Me De Meyer, counsel, and Mr H . Van Keymeulen, adviser .
IV . SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' SUBMISSION S 1 . Transsexuality in Belgian legislation and case-la w The Government states that there is no special legislation on transsexuality . The legal aspects of the transsexual syndrome relate to the limits set to rectification ot extracts from the civil register in general and of birth certificates in particular .
The relevant legal provisions are the followin g a . Civil Code, Article 55 :"Binhs shall be notified to the registrar of the place . . . : the child shall be shown to him" . In practice, the child is shown to a doctor delegated by the registrar .
b Civil Code, Article 57 :"The sex of the child shall be entered in the birth certificateÂ° The sex of the child is established morphologically by the doctor on the same occasion ; if the sex is uncertain an entry is made in the certificate to the effect that the child is of uncertain or indeterminate sex . c . Artlcles 1583 to 1585 of the Judicial Code relating to the procedure for rectification of extracts from the civil register . The current state of Belglan law in the matter is as follow s A birth certificate may be rectified only if an error was made in it when it was being drawn up . At birth, a transsexual has the physical organs characteristic of a particular sex While retaining the organs peculiar to that sex,a person with a transsexual syndrome renounces his original sex and assumes the opposite one Such a person may, if necessary, undergo treatment designed to change him physically . But such changes will never be other than apparent and can only give him artificial organs incapable of fulfilling their natural functions . Consequently, in cases of transsexuality, no doubt or error exists at the time of drawing up the birth certificate . Various examples can be quoted of both Belgian and foreign decisions rejecting requests for rectification of the civil status records of persons with transsexual syndromes . In reply, the applicant comments as follows : a . with regard to sex determination : While the morphological criterion adopted by the legislator is generally sufficient, it cannot constitute an irrebuttable presumption that the external characteristics of a sex correspond to the internal characteristics contributing to the definition of that sex : genetic, gonadal, hormonal, somatic and psychical characteristics . b . with regard to errors : The error which "must exist at the time of drawing up the certificatÃ©" may not appear till later, e .g . in cases where a person has been described as male or female according to the morphological criterion and where a further examination shows him to be of indeterminate sex . c with regard to transsexuals : From the morphological as well as from the genetic, gonadal and hormonal point of view, a feminine transsexual is of the female sex, but psychically, of the male sex . At birth, the child is thus of uncertain sex . An error in the birth certificate is obviously undetectable but nonetheless real The sex to which he will belong is determined subsequently by means of a surgical operation . The applicant quotes several decisions given, in Europe, in favour oi transsexuals . Admissibility under Article 26 of the Conventio n The Government maintains that the applicant should have appealed to the Court of Cassation and asked it to declare that the Court of Appeal had violated Belgian law by refusing his request for rectification of his birth certificate . The Court of Cassation could have issued a dissenting opinion on the actual concept of error giving entitlement to rectification .
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The Court of Cassation could also have examined whether the Court of Appeal's decision had disregarded the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights . The Government further points out that at no time did the applicant invoke, before the Belgian courts, the European Convention on Human Rights, whose provisions are self-executing in Belgium .
For these two reasons (it states) the application is to be considered inadmissible under Articles 26 and 27 131 of the Convention . The applicant, for his part, argues that an appeal to the Court of Cassation would, in this case, have been of no avail . Recalling the opinion expressed by his counsel, he points out that the Court of Appeal, in its decision refusing his request for rectification, was applying the relevant legal provisions correctly and basing itself on a statement of fact which could not have been questioned before the Court of Cassation . As regards his failure to cite the Convention before the Belgian courts, the applicant recalls that, according to the Commission's case-law in countries in which the Convention forms pari of the internal legal order it is not indispensable to refer to its provisions in all cases : it is not necessary to do so where the provisions of the Convention produce the same effect as the provisions ot domestic law, which the applicant did, in fact, cite . In order to conform with Article 26 of the Convention it is sufficient that any complaint lodged with the Commission should have been stated in substance before the domestic courts . In the present case the complaints (he alleges) were manifestly stated in substance at every stage of the internal procedure .
Admissibility under Arfic% 2712) of the Convention As to Article 3 The Government points out that the difticulties encountered by the applicant as the result of a voluntary alteration in his physical appearance are not covered by any of the situations provided for in Article 3 . Moreover, these difficulties can be mitigated . The applicant argues, however, that a person who is prevented from contracting a marriage and founding a family is deprived of a fundamental right and therefore a victim of inhuman treatment . A person barred from exercising certain rights (sale before a notary, work, receipt of registred mail) unless he first discloses medical information concerning himself to some person or other, is placed in a degrading and humiliating situation . As to Article 8 The Government considers that only a decision of the Court of Appeal authorising rectification of the applicant's birth certificate could have violate d
Article 8, for it would thereby have been interfering with the applicant's private life by recognising him as having a male identity, which is merely apparent and artificial even if it does correspond to certain deep-seated psychical tendencies . Furthermore, the distortion between the applicant's legal existence and physical existence was brought about by his own volition . The applicant points out that he did not seek his transformation it was torced upon him by a malad y As to Article 7 2 The Government argues that no authority ever prevented the applicant from marrying and founding a family in accordance with the conditions prescribed by law, and notably by fulfilling the condition of difference in sex . It recognises in this regard that certain difficulties may exist for the applicant today as a consequence of the operations he underwent, although he cannot impute these difficulties to others . The applicant asserts that the Government is evading the real issue raised, in this case, in regard to the right to marry, namely the question whether or not any marriage he contracted with a woman would be considered as a marriage between persons of the same sex, and hence null and void . He explains that his psychical sex is male and that he is considered as a man by society, that since the surgical operations his physical sex is also male, and that such surgical operations are lawful under Belgian la w By refusing rectification of his legal identity, the Belgian state (he alleges) is denying him the right to marry and found a family in conformity with what is now his sex .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant maintains that the Belgian authorities' failure to take account of the change in his status as the result of a legally performed sexual conversion operation infringes his rights to marriage and to respect for his private life, guaranteed by Articles 12 and 8 of the Convention . He further claims that the situation created thereby is inhuman and degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention . 2 In this regard, the Belgian Government raises the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and draws attention to the remedies which, in its view, were available to the applicant . It is for the Commission to consider whether the remedies referred to by the Government were adequate, that is to say capable of redressing the applicant's complaints (European Court ot Human Rights, StdgmÃ¼ller Judgement of 10 November 1969, Series A, p . 42, para . 111 . 3 . The Government's main argument was that the applicant should have appealed to the Court of Cassation against the judgement of the Court of Appea l
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of 7May 1974 refusing rectification of his civil status . The Court of Appeal had held that there was no evidence to show that the applicant possessed, from birth, the physical characteristics of a male or indeterminate sex so that an error might have been made in the birth certificate . It further stated that, in the current state of legislation, there was no provision whereby account might be taken of changes made artificially in a person's anatomy, even if he did correspond to deep-seated psychical tendencies . A review of its appraisal of the facts was outside the Court of Cassation's jurisdiction . Nor was there any assertion that it had misapplied the current Belgian law as laid down in the legal texts or in the court decisions mentioned in the file . As an appeal to the Court of Cassation did not, therefore, constitute a remedy likely to be effective, the applicant was not bound to avail himself of it . 4 . The Government also raised, subsidiarily, the objection that the applicant had not complained, before the domestic courts, of a violation of the Convention "whose provisions are self-executing" in Belgium . It has been the Commission's constant practice to require that any complaints made to it must first have been brought before the competent domestic courts (cf . Decision on Application No . 1727/62 against Belgium, Yearbook VI, p . 399) ; it allows however, that it is not necessary for the arguments based on the Convention to have been cited (cf . Decision on Application No . 4464/70 against Belgium, Yearbook XV, p . 302) . It is clear from the application lodged on 14 February 1974 with the registry of the Court of Appeal and from the opinion of the public prosecutor's office, dated 23 April 1974 Ip . 9), that in the case in point the complaints were in fact brought, in substance, before the Belgian courts . Should the applicant nevertheless, as the Government seems to maintain, have invoked the precedence of the Convention in the proceedings before the trial court and the Court of Appeal 1 Though the principle of the precedence of self-executing provisions of treaties over domestic law is not prescribed in the Constitution, the Commission is aware that it has been written into the case-law of the Court of Cassation Ijudgement of 27 May 1971) . As regards the particular problem raised before the Commission, the provisions of the Convention are not sufficiently precise in character to be considered as conflicting with the rules of the Belgian Civil Code or Judicial Code, whose immediate purpose is a very different one . Thus it cannot be said either that, by omitting to advance this argument before the Belgian courts, the applicant failed to fulfil his obligation to exhaust all the domestic remedies capable of redressing his complaints . 5 . It has not been asserted that the applicant had other means of putting an end to the situation he complains of . It follows that the application must not be declared inadmissible under Article 27 (3) of the Convention . 6 . The Commission has made an initial examination of the facts and arguments submitted by the parties . The complaints made by the applicant raise, in it s
opinion, sufficiently complex problems concerning the application of Article 8 of the Convention and, to a lesser extent, of Article 12 to necessitate an examination of the merits . In particular, the question arises whether the failure of the authorities to grant the applicant a legal identity corresponding to his new status, with all the consequences following therefrom, notably in the case of identity checks, the establishment of public documents, or the examination of applications for public or private employment, does not amount to a denial of his rlght to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 8 It follows that the application cannot be considered as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27121 of the Convention, and that it must be declared admissible, no other ground of inadmissibility having been established . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
_2p8_Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 09/05/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page