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⭐HUMANITARES VOLKERRECHT
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1 ISSN G HUMANITARES VOLKERRECHT.... Informationsschriften 2/20042 Herausgeber: Deutsches Rotes Kreuz e.v., Generalsekretariat, Carstennstraße 58, Berlin-Steglitz, Tel. (0 30) , Fax (0 30) , Internet: Institut für Friedenssicherungsrecht und Humanitäres Völkerrecht (IFHV), Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Telefon (02 34) , Telefax (02 34) , Internet: ISSN Manuskripte: Herausgeber und Redaktion haften nicht für Manuskripte, die unverlangt eingereicht werden. Sie können nur zurückgegeben werden, wenn Rückporto beigefügt ist. Mit der Annahme zur Veröffentlichung überträgt der Autor den Herausgebern alle Rechte für die Zeit bis zum Ablauf des Urheberrechts, insbesondere auch die Befugnis zur Einspeicherung in eine Datenbank sowie das Recht der weiteren Vervielfältigung zu gewerblichen Zwecken im Wege eines fotomechanischen oder eines anderen Verfahrens. Dem Autor verbleibt das Recht, nach Ablauf eines Jahres anderen Verlagen eine einfache Abdruckgenehmigung zu erteilen. 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MwSt. 7 % und Porto und Versand); Auslands-Abonnementpreis jährlich EUR 41,00 (inkl. Porto und Versand); Einzelheft-Preis EUR 7,70 (inkl. MwSt. 7 %, zzgl. Porto und Versand EUR 1,28); Ausland EUR 18,00 (inkl. Porto, Versand und Bankgebühren). Bestellungen unter DRK-Service GmbH, Verlagsbüro München, Herzogstraße 75, München, Telefon (0 89) , Telefax (0 89) , Das Abonnement kann nur schriftlich mit einer Frist von drei Monaten zum Jahresende beim Verlag gekündigt werden. Verlag: DRK-Service GmbH, Herzogstraße 75, München, Telefon (0 89) , Telefax (0 89) , Druck: Mediengruppe UNIVERSAL, Kirschstraße 16, München, Telefon (0 89) , Telefax (0 89) , Internet: Redaktion: Prof. Dr. Horst Fischer, Bochum; verantwortlicher Redakteur dieser Ausgabe: Dozent Dr. Hans-Joachim Heintze, Bochum; Redaktionsassistentin: Dr. Noëlle Quénivet LL.M., Bochum Ständige Mitarbeiter: Georg Bock, Bochum; Dr. Cristina Churruca Muguruza, Bochum; Prof. Dr. Dennis T. G. Dijkzeul, Bochum; Prof. Dr. Wolff Heintschel v. Heinegg, Frankfurt (Oder); Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Knut Ipsen, Bochum; Dr. Claus Kreß LL.M., Köln; Prof. Dr. Thilo Marauhn, Gießen; Michaela Schneider, Bochum; Gregor Schotten, Berlin; Dr. Heike Spieker, Berlin; Prof. Dr. Joachim Wolf, Bochum; Dr. Messeletch Worku LL.M., Bochum Korrespondierende Mitarbeiter: Dr. Andreas v. Block-Schlesier, Brüssel; Ralph Czarnecki LL.M., Berlin; Dr. Knut Dörmann, Genf; Robert Heinsch LL.M., Köln; Dr. Avril J. M. McDonald, M.A., LL.M., Den Haag; Sascha Rolf Lüder, Hagen3 Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften (HuV-I) Jahrgang 17 Heft 2, 2004 Editorial 67 Das Thema Can a State Victim of a Terror Act Have Recourse to Armed Force? Alain Pellet and Vladimir Tzankov 68 Understanding the Afghan Conflict Heritage: A Key for Sustainable Processes of Peace Settlement and Rehabilitation? Brigitte Piquard 73 Forum Verbreitung Aktueller Fall: Recht auf Leben nicht einklagbar? Das Varvarin- Urteil des Landgerichts Bonn vom 10. Dezember 2003 Philipp Herrmann 79 Amtshaftung und humanitäres Völkerrecht Zur Möglichkeit eines Anspruches auf Schadensersatz bei Verstößen gegen das humanitäre Völkerrecht nach 839 BGB i.v. m. Art. 34 GG Christian Johann 86 Individuelle Ersatzansprüche bei kriegsrechtswidrigen Schädigungen Zugleich eine Besprechung des Distomo- Urteils des BGH (III ZR 245/98) Stefan Baufeld 93 Kann die humanitäre Hilfe für Binnenvertriebene durch die Schaffung von vorgefassten Kategorien verbessert werden? Ralf Otto 98 Praxis Folter ein zulässiges Mittel einer effektiven Terrorismusbekämpfung? Die tickende Zeitbombe in der Großstadt Jan Wiethoff 104 Panorama Dokumente Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 27 November Konferenzen Kriegsbegründungen in der Geschichte. Strategien der Legitimierung und Legalisierung militärischer Gewalt, Berlin (Deutschland), Januar 2004 Manuela Sissakis und Annette Fath-Lihic 113 Sicherheit und Modernisierung durch Integration: Südosteuropa und die Europäische Union, Tutzing bei München (Deutschland), Oktober 2003 Claudia Hain 115 Medien und Krieg. 14. Tagung der Rechtsberater der Bundeswehr und der Konventionsbeauftragten des Deutschen Roten Kreuzes in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Institut für Friedenssicherungsrecht und Humanitäres Völkerrecht (IFHV), Bad Teinach (Deutschland), März 2004 Christian Hörl und Claudia Löbe 119 Besprechungen Andreas v. Block-Schlesier, Zur Rolle und Akzeptanz des humanitären Völkerrechts am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts Florian Pfeil 122 Eckart Klein und Christoph Menke (Hrsg.), Menschheit und Menschenrechte. Probleme der Universalisierung und Institutionalisierung Christina Binder 123 Volker Kröning, Lutz Unterseher, Günter Verheugen (Hrsg.), Hegemonie oder Stabilität: Alternativen zur Militarisierung der Politik Robert Heinsch 125 Kai-Michael König, Die völkerrechtliche Legitimation der Strafgewalt internationaler Strafjustiz Marco Kalbusch 127 Gunther Hellmann, Klaus Dieter Wolf, Michael Zürn, Die neuen internationalen Beziehungen Wolf-Dieter Eberwein 129 Rüdiger Voigt, Krieg Instrument der Politik? Bewaffnete Konflikte im Übergang vom 20. zum 21. Jahrhundert Dieter Fleck 130 Das Varvarin-Urteil des Landgerichts Bonn, 1. Zivilkammer, 10. Dezember Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 654 CONFLICT PREVENTION FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY, VOLUME 1 ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS Edited by Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment The scholarship is first-rate, thorough, and comprehensive. This work will be a significant contribution to the study, training and practice of conflict prevention.... I regard the theoretical discussion in the second volume among its greatest strengths... overall the original evidence, comprehensiveness, and integrative nature of the work are its best features. -FRANKE WILMER, DIRECTOR AND PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA These two volumes form an encyclopedic study of the means of conflict prevention.... For analysts, the two volumes push back the frontiers into new aspects to study; for practitioners, they show that the challenge is in applying what we know aplenty, not in hiding behind claims of ignorance. -WILLIAM ZARTMAN, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY In Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality, Volume 1: Organizations and Institutions conflict prevention specialists from Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas, with professional experience in regional organizations, the UN and various NGOs and research organizations, argue that, as a concept as well as a policy, conflict prevention is moving beyond rhetorical commitments and symbolic, ad hoc, activities. Institutional, long-term efforts specifically targeted at the prevention of violent conflict have become more than just wishful thinking. Together with local actors, many governments, regional organizations and the UN are embracing preventive action as a viable path towards sustainable peace. The contributions to this volume trace conflict prevention efforts in various regional contexts and explain how preventive thinking is being successfully mainstreamed into the activities of regional organizations and the UN. June 2004 _ 400 pages _ ISBN _ Paper $25.00 _ ISBN _ Cloth $75.00 CONFLICT PREVENTION FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY, VOLUME 2 OPPORTUNITIES AND INNOVATIONS Edited by David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality, Volume 2: Opportunities and Innovations offers a critical evaluation of existing and emerging approaches to applied conflict prevention. An international team of practitioners and researchers with rich theoretical and field experience examine the analytical requirements to understand the causes of conflict and link these causes to a range of response options by a variety of relevant actors. They also discuss the newest frontiers of conflict prevention, including the threat of terrorism and the role of the private sector. While development practitioners, the corporate sector, foreign policy makers, and NGOs are coming to conflict prevention from different directions, they nevertheless reflect common objectives, and need to be able to speak each other's language. The volume highlights innovative approaches to allow individuals within these organizations to understand how they can best use the array of political, economic, social and developmental instruments available to them to be better analysts and to provide more effective responses. June 2004 _ 400 pages _ ISBN _ Paper $25.00 _ ISBN _ Cloth $75.00 Albrecht Schnabel is Senior Research Fellow at swisspeace, Bern. David Carment is Director of the Centre for Security and Defense Studies and Associate Professor of International Affairs at Carleton University, Ottawa. To order, call , or order online at for a 15% discount!5 Editorial Internationale Terrorakte beschäftigen weiterhin die Politik und die Öffentlichkeit. Dabei spielen natürlich auch die Probleme der rechtlichen Reaktion auf diese Herausforderung der Staatengemeinschaft eine erhebliche Rolle. Das vorliegende Heft der Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften leistet einmal mehr einen Beitrag zu dieser Diskussion mit einem Artikel aus Frankreich von Professor Alain Pellet und Vladimir Tzankov. Darin wird die Frage untersucht, ob ein von Terrorakten betroffener Staat sich mit militärischen Mitteln zur Wehr setzen darf. Die Autoren analysieren vor allem die einschlägigen Reaktionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates und die US-Staatenpraxis nach dem 11. September und argumentieren, dass von dem Zeitpunkt an, zu dem sich der Rat mit einem Sachverhalt beschäftigt, das naturgegebene Selbstverteidigungsrecht nicht mehr wahrgenommen werden darf. Von dieser Einschätzung ausgehend, kritisieren sie die Maßnahmen der USA gegenüber den Taliban in Afghanistan und stellen deren Rechtmäßigkeit in Frage. Insbesondere halten sie es für gefährlich, den Begriff der Selbstverteidigung beliebig auszudehnen. Die Entwicklung in Afghanistan wird auch in dem Beitrag von Professorin Brigitte Piquard beleuchtet, wobei es hier allerdings um die Gestaltung der Nach-Konflikt-Ära dieses Landes geht. Einem völlig anderen Aspekt der Reaktion auf den Terrorismus wendet sich Jan Wiethoff zu. Er stellt die Frage, ob im Rahmen der Terrorbekämpfung er nimmt den Fall einer tickenden Bombe in einer Großstadt an potentielle Täter auch gefoltert werden dürfen, um einen Anschlag zu verhindern. Anhand der Untersuchung der geltenden Rechtslage verneint er dies. Dieser Analyse kommt im Lichte der unklaren Vorgänge in dem amerikanischen Stützpunkt Guantánamo und der gegenwärtigen israelischen Praxis der gezielten Tötungen eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Der zweite Schwerpunkt des Heftes sind Untersuchungen zu den Möglichkeiten, individuell Schadenersatz bei Verletzungen des humanitären Völkerrechts einzuklagen. Diese Probleme sind jüngst wieder im Zusammenhang mit dem Varvarin- und Distomo-Urteil intensiv diskutiert worden. Zahlreiche Fragen sind nach wie vor als offen zu betrachten. Bewertungen nehmen die Artikel von Philipp Herrmann, Christian Johann und Stefan Baufeld vor. Im Dokumententeil wurde zudem das Varvarin-Urteil des Landgerichts Bonn von 2003 abgedruckt. Wie gewohnt schließen sich am Ende des Heftes Konferenzberichte und Rezensionen an. Last but not least erlaubt sich die Redaktion wiederum den Hinweis, dass alle Beiträge in den Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften die Meinungen der Autoren reflektieren. Die Redaktion identifiziert sich nicht notwendigerweise mit deren Positionen. Die Redaktion Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 676 Thema Can a State Victim of a Terror Act Have Recourse to Armed Force? * Alain Pellet** and Vladimir Tzankov*** There is no doubt that, if a terror act constitutes a threat to international peace and security, a positive answer to the question raised in the title of the article is imperative. Indeed the determination of a threat to international peace and security constitutes one of the rare cases when use of force may be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, notwithstanding the general prohibition of the use of armed force enshrined in article 2(4). One must nonetheless determine whether terrorism constitutes and, necessarily constitutes, a threat to peace. Until 28 September 2001, the date on which resolution 1373 (2001) was adopted by the Security Council, the answer would probably have been: It depends on the circumstances. Terrorism can constitute a threat to the peace but it is not always the case. First, there is a purely domestic terrorism which, except when it reaches dramatic proportions as in the case of the Rwandan genocide, cannot be qualified as a threat to peace. Second, even international terrorism does not always constitute such a threat. Nowadays, in the light of Resolution 1373, the positive answer to this question may be much less hesitant. Much also, inevitably, hinges upon what one calls terrorism since there is no generally agreed upon definition. One can ask whether this term does not simply mean any usage of violence that one disapproves of. Yet, it is obviously not a very operational approach, legally speaking. Failing a reference definition, one may accept the one suggested by Judge Guillaume in his course in the Hague Academy in 1989: terrorism implies the usage of violence under circumstances that undermine the life of persons or their physical integrity in the framework of an undertaking whose aim is to provoke terror in order to reach certain goals. 1 This definition, one of many, 2 reflects the one implied in Resolution 55/158 of the General Assembly of 12 December According to this definition, criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them. 3 In the past and in a not so distant past such acts were not always considered as constituting threats to peace. Claims that such acts always constituted threats to peace were put aside on numerous occasions by the Security Council in an either formal or informal way. This was the case, for example, with the Israeli raids on Beyrouth in in Tunis in 1985, 5 the Entebbe case, 6 the hostage crisis in Tehran in and the raids done in reprisal by the Americans against Libya following the attack against the disco La Belle in Berlin in It is true that, in all these cases and in many others, the incapacity in which the Security Council found itself to characterise these terrorist acts as threats to peace was more linked to the context of the cold war rather than to considerations of a legal nature. Terrorism officially entered into the category of situations characterised as threats to peace only after the fall of the Berlin wall, with the adoption of Resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992 dealing with the attacks on Lockerbie and on UTA flight 722. According to the latter, the Security Council, * This contribution was written on the basis of the presentation made by Alain Pellet at a joint colloquium between the Société française pour le Droit International and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht on 29 November 2002 and on the basis of the dissertation of Vladimir Tzankov in the framework of his Master degree (DEA) in Law of International and European Economic Relations (University of Paris X-Nanterre), Terrorisme et chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies (Terrorism and Chapter VII of the UN Charter) (academic year ). The contribution was updated in December Translated from French by Noëlle Quénivet, Research Associate at the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict of the Ruhr-University Bochum (Germany) to whom the authors are much grateful. ** Alain Pellet is Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre (France). He is a member of the International Law Commission of the United Nations since *** Vladimir Tzankov studied at the University of Paris X-Nanterre (France). He wrote his final dissertation under the supervision of Prof. Alain Pellet. 1 French Original: le terrorisme implique l usage de la violence dans des conditions de nature à porter atteinte à la vie des persones ou à leur intégrité physique dans le cadre d une entreprise ayart pour but de provoquer la terreur en uve de parvenir à certaines fins. Guillaume, G., Terrorisme et droit international, (1989) 215 RCADI See e.g. Schmid who already in 1983 identified 109 definitions. Schmid, A.P., Political Terrorism A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature, Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing, 1984, p General Assembly, Resolution 55/158, 12 December 2000, UN Doc. A/RES/55/158, para. 2. One must also note that Resolution 55/158 adopts in almost identical terms the definition found in paragraph 3 of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annexed to Resolution 49/60. General Assembly, Resolution 49/60, 9 December 1994, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60. 4 Security Council, Resolution 263 (1968), 31 December 1968, UN Doc. S/RES/236/ Security Council, Resolution 573 (1985), 4 October 1985, UN Doc. S/RES/573/ Although there was no formal condemnation by the Security Council, the debate in the Security Council proves that many States disapproved of the intervention of the Israeli special forces. See Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV 1941, 12 July 1976 and Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV 1942, 13 July See notably the USSR s position which vetoed the draft resolution S/13735 that characterised the hostage-taking as a continuous threat to international peace and security. (Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV 2191, 13 January 1980, paras 44 56) 8 A draft resolution condemning the United States was presented by Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago as well as by the United Arab Emirates. Supported by Bulgaria, China, Thailand and USSR (Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV 2682, 21 April 1986, p. 43) the draft resolution was vetoed by the United States, the United Kingdom and France and was rejected by Australia and Denmark. The United States action was, however, by and large, condemned, notably by the General Assembly (see General Assembly, Resolution 41/38, 20 November 1986, UN Doc. A/RES/41/38). 68 Heft 2, 20047 Thema [d]eeply concerned by all activities directed against international civil aviation and affirming the right of all States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant principles of international law, to protect their nationals from acts of international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and security, 9 requested the Libyan government, whose agents were implicated in the perpetration of the attacks, to co-operate. Facing a refusal, the Security Council drew concrete consequences in Resolution 748 (1992) 10 of 31 March 1992, i.e. more than three years after the events! In the instant case, these consequences did not include the use (or the possibility of the use) of armed force; but the step was taken: as soon as a situation is characterised as a threat to international peace and security, the use of force is conceivable in the framework of article 42 of the Charter- but only in this framework, which means after (1) a statement to this end, on a case by case basis, made by the Security Council, pursuant to article 39 and (2) a formal decision by the Council to have recourse (or to authorise the recourse to) the measures envisaged in article 42. In such a case, the victim State, and possibly other States, can also be granted the right, or even the duty, to have recourse to armed force to respond to a terrorist act. This Lockerbie jurisprudence not that of the ICJ that is now excluded following the withdrawal of Libya in September 2003 but that of the Security Council- has, since then, been applied on two occasions by the Security Council. The Security Council firstly had recourse to this jurisprudence following the assassination attempt on President Mubarak in Addis-Ababa in 1995 (which gave rise to Resolution 1054 (1996) 11. Secondly following the attacks in 1998 against the American embassies in Kenya and in Tanzania, the Security Council again considered in its resolution 1267 (1999) that the refusal to surrender Ben Laden constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security. 12 In all these three cases: the terrorist acts characterised as threats to the peace were clearly identified; they were linked to a determined State (respectively Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan); and recourse to armed force was not decided. It could have been but solely by the Security Council and only to reply to the particular acts characterised as threats to peace. Upon reflection, it is not certain that Resolution 1373 (2001) has radically changed the picture in comparison with the previous practice of the Security Council. Yet, this resolution constitutes a novelty inasmuch as it proclaims, in general terms and in a quasi- legislative manner that any act of international terrorism, constitute[s] a threat to international peace and security, 13 which no prior resolution had decided. It also stresses that it is necessary to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter, threats to international peace and security, an expression that, in the UN jargon, implies that recourse to armed force is not excluded. It would however be risky to see in Resolution 1373 an ex ante authorisation to use armed force against any terrorist act. It can be seen as a sort of guideline that the Security Council grants itself with for the future. But, faced with a given situation, it certainly does not exempt it neither from defining it as a threat to the peace under article 39 nor from deciding, if the case arises, to adopt specific measures of coercion that it deems necessary in conformity with article 42. It is indeed very precisely what the Security Council did after the adoption of Resolution 1373: by its Resolution 1390 (2002), 14 the Security Council confirmed the sanctions that it had decided in 1999 and against the Taliban, thereby putting an end to the right of selfdefence of the United States after the September 11 th attacks, more neatly than it had done in Resolution 1386 (2001). 16 Similarly, in Resolution 1438 (2002) 17 concerning the attack in Bali, Resolution 1440 (2002) 18 adopted after the hostage crisis in Moscow, Resolution 1450 (2002) 19 concerning the anti-israeli attacks perpetrated in Kenya, Resolution 1465 (2003) 20 condemning the bomb attack committed in Bogota, and resolution 1516 (2003) 21 regarding the anti-british attacks committed in Istanbul, the Security Council confined itself to note the existence of a threat to the peace but without taking any subsequent measures. Finally, in its Resolutions 1452 (2002) 22 and 1455 (2003), 23 the Council, acting under Chapter VII, reasserted and specified the scope of its previous resolutions relating to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 9 Security Council, Resolution 731 (1992), 21 January 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/731 (1992), para. 2 (emphasis added). 10 Security Council, Resolution 748 (1992), 31 March 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/748 (1992). 11 Security Council, Resolution 1054 (1996), 26 April 1996, UN Doc. S/RES/1054 (1996). 12 Security Council, Resolution 1267 (1999), 15 October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999). 13 Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). 14 Security Council, Resolution 1390 (2002), 16 January 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002). 15 Security Council, Resolution 1267 (1999), supra note 12; and Security Council, Resolution 1333 (2000), 19 December 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000). 16 Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001), 20 December 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001). 17 Security Council, Resolution 1438 (2002), 14 October 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1438 (2002). 18 Security Council, Resolution 1440 (2002), 24 October 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1440 (2002). 19 Security Council, Resolution 1450 (2002), 13 December 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1450 (2002). 20 Security Council, Resolution 1465 (2003), 13 February 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1465 (2003). 21 Security Council, Resolution 1516 (2003), 20 November 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1516 (2003). 22 Security Council, Resolution 1452 (2002), 20 December 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1452 (2002). 23 Security Council, Resolution 1455 (2002), 17 January 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1455 (2003). Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 698 Thema However, in none of these resolutions, does the Security Council authorise recourse to armed force. However, it could have done so since it had characterised specific situations resulting from terrorist acts as threats to the peace. In other words, Resolution 1373 (2001) does not entail a fundamental novelty in relation to the Lockerbie jurisprudence. Admittedly Resolution 1373 is debatable on other points notably inasmuch as it stands as a sort of piece of international legislation whose conformity with the Charter appears questionable-, but it nonetheless does not constitute an authorisation granted to States victims of terrorist acts to use armed force in the absence of any prior specific authorisation. Furthermore, the legality of such a general authorisation would have been even more dubious. Again in other words, it is certainly possible for one or more States to use armed force to fight against a terrorist threat or act in the framework of the Chapter VII mechanism of collective security. Yet, this would only be possible if such a reaction is expressly authorised or imposed by a specific decision taken by the Security Council acting in the framework of Chapter VII. No doubt, Chapter VII includes article 51 which recognises to all States an inherent right [ ] of self-defence. Yet, as is well known, this right is only recognised if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations an agression armée in the French text, a distinction that may have a certain significance. However an armed attack is different from a threat to the peace. Even the title of Chapter VII, Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, shows this distinction unambiguously. A priori, in order to justify recourse to armed force, a terrorist act must constitute an armed attack. Without hesitation and very clearly, the Security Council accepted this, at least a contrario, in Resolution 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 concerning the horrifying terrorist attacks 24 that had occurred the day before. In the last paragraph of the preamble, it binds its resolution to the inherent right to self-defence, a right it feels obliged to recognise. It means that this right can be used in the given case and, therefore, again impliedly but necessarily, that the attacks constituted an armed attack in the sense of article 51. Shortly after its adoption, Resolution 1368 was the subject of rather sharp criticism. 25 It may first be due to the fact that Resolution 1368 appears rather incoherent: according to the preamble the attacks of September 11 th constituted an armed attack whereas, according to the first paragraph of the operative part, the same events were expressly characterised as a threat to international peace and security. Second, one may add that since the expression armed attack (even though the English expression has without a doubt a rather larger connotation than the French agression armée ) obviously refers to inter-state relations, it was daring to extend the scope of application of this expression to a hypothesis where no State could be considered as the perpetrator of the attack. Hindsight and a more careful examination of the precedents nonetheless lead into softening these criticisms, albeit certain reservations remain. 26 Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, defining aggression, had already recognised that an armed aggression could be constituted by [t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount 27 to acts of aggression; and the same holds true, again pursuant to this resolution, of [a State s] substantial involvement therein. The ICJ did not say anything to the contrary in its 1986 Judgment in the Nicaragua case. 28 It did not exclude that, even in less serious cases, the victim State could have a right to respond to intervention with intervention going so far as to justify a use of force in reaction to measures which do not constitute an armed attack but may nevertheless involve a use of force. 29 The Court did not exclude the right to self-defence; yet it did not recognise it either; it simply left the question open. 30 What can be inferred from all this? Certainly that terrorist attacks imputable to a State can constitute an armed attack in equivalence, knowing that this notion of imputability (or attributability) is liable to divergent subjective assessments. Should the control, as the Nicaragua case requires, be total? 31 Is State s substantial involvement as mentioned in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) sufficient? In any case, what is certain is that a State needs to be behind the terrorists. Was it the case of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in the case of the September 11 th attacks? One may doubt it although one may, without 24 Security Council, Resolution 1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, UN Doc (2001). 25 Pellet, A., Non, ce n est pas la guerre!, in: Le Monde, 17 September See for a more finely-shaped viewpoint, Pellet, A., Malaise dans la Guerre: A quoi Sert l ONU?, in: Le Monde, 15 November General Assembly, Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 26 June 1986, para 191, 195 and 205, ICJ Rep. 1986, 14 at 101, and International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 28, para. 210, at 110. The Court nonetheless added that, in such a case, States do not have a right of collective armed response to acts which do not constitute an armed attack. International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 28, para. 211, at See Guillaume, G., supra note 1, at 406. In the separate opinion to the Judgement of the ICJ of 6 November 2003 in the case of the Oil Platforms, Judge Bruno Simma unambiguously answers to this question in a positive way (para. 12). He however strangely contradicts his very firm position taken in a previous passage of the same opinion (paras 6 and 8) in which he stigmatises the Court for having failed to recall that the only legitimate defence authorised by article 51 constitutes an exception to the prohibition of the use of armed forces in the international relations. In contrast, the Judgment is silent and difficult to interpret in this regard. International Court of Justice, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Simma, 6 November International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 28, para. 115, at The often mentioned diverging jurisprudence of the ICJ and the ICTY (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Judgement, 15 July 1999, IT-94-1, para ) is here irrelevant, and probably artificially exaggerated: State s international responsibility and individual criminal liability (if international) raise different problems and are not necessarily governed by the same rules. 70 Heft 2, 20049 Thema a doubt, accuse it of complicity. In contrast, there is no doubt that the second criterion of equivalence, that of the seriousness of the given acts, is present here: it is not excessive to compare the attack on the Twin Towers to that on Pearl Harbor. 32 If one passes over the difficulty linked to a State s involvement, if one acknowledges that Afghanistan was sufficiently involved in the September 11 th drama to allow speaking of an armed attack (or agression armée ), if one goes as far as to admit that a terrorist attack can amount to an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51, even absent any significant State involvement, it does not mean that all difficulties disappear. Admittedly, the inherent right to self-defence plays a role. But how? And, first, where is it to be exercised? Inevitably, unless the terrorist acts are the product of a Goldfinger immersed somewhere 20,000 leagues under the sea, 33 it will be on the territory of a State. However, let us suppose that the State in question is not involved. Is not then its territorial integrity violated and the duty of non-intervention breached when the State victim of a terrorist attack responds? Such considerations had in the past led the Security Council to condemn, for example the Israeli raids on Beyrouth in 1968 (Resolution 263 (1968) 34 and on Tunis in 1985 (Resolution 573 (1985) 35. And can one recognise that the targets can be diversified and tailored to infinity on the pretext of a sprawling network and of an axis of evil arbitrarily defined? The recent attempt of the United States to extend to Iraq the right of self-defence of which they took advantage and whose soundness had been recognised by the Security Council against Taliban Afghanistan, fizzled out. That the Americans gave up this legal basis constitutes, without a doubt, a precedent establishing a limit to the exercise of the inherent right invoked in article 51, at least absent any proof of collusion between a State and a terrorist organisation. There are assuredly other limits to the exercise of this right under general international law: first, the principle of proportionality; 36 second, by virtue of article 51 of the UN Charter, the obligation to inform the Security Council of the measures adopted in application of this right. This obligation was fulfilled by the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the September 11 th case, though they only limited themselves to a lip service in this regard. 37 Furthermore, the inherent right to self-defence is certainly not unlimited in time, even if one may concede that it exists as long as two conditions are fulfilled: either that the terrorist threat remains; or that the Security Council has not taken the necessary measures. Here, it is a matter of alternative conditions, and regarding the second, one should not forget that, according to article 51 of the Charter, on the one hand the inherent right of selfdefence is only recognised until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security and on the other the Security Council has the power and duty to act in this regard. Concerning the September 11 th attacks, the Security Council had declared its readiness to act already in Resolution 1368 (2001); 38 yet, it carefully abstained during four months from taking any necessary measures. The responsibility for this abstention, clearly contrary to the Charter, rests assuredly on the United States of America but also on all members of the Security Council and even of the United Nations as well as on the Secretary General. Nevertheless this culpable abstention did not last forever and, on 16 January 2002, the Security Council eventually adopted Resolution 1390 (2002) 39 in which it took coercive measures by virtue of Chapter VII and, in fact, transposed to the given case the mechanism included in Resolution 1373 (2001). 40 From the moment the Security Council acts, it appears inconceivable that a victim State can continue to take advantage of its right of self-defence. Doubt was allowed as far as it concerned Resolution 1368 (2001) 41 of 20 December 2001 which had been adopted under Chapter VII. Indeed, one may have hesitated to qualify the International Security Assistance Force, created by the same resolution, as a measure in the sense of articles 41 and 42. In contrast, there is no doubt concerning Resolution 1390 (2002). Indeed, the Security Council therein reinforced previous resolutions relating to the attacks in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi as well as those regarding the horrifying terrorist attacks of September 11 th. Thus, by adopting coercive measures by virtue of Chapter VII, the Council has undoubtedly put an end to the self-defence exception in favour of a return to the system of collective security of the Charter. However, the United States behaved as if the right to selfdefence remained despite Resolution 1390 (2002): its army stayed in Afghanistan notwithstanding that resolution, without any authorisation of the Security Council and its actions 32 See for example Murphy, S.D., Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the UN Charter, (2002) 1 Harvard International Law Journal On the legal nature of armed responses to terrorist acts aimed at targets located on high sea or in the international airspace, see Schmalenbach, K., The Right of Self-Defence and the War on Terrorism one Year after September 11, (2002) 3.9 German Law Journal, available at <http://www. germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=189>, 11 March Security Council, Resolution 263 (1968), supra note Security Council, Resolution 573 (1985), supra note International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 28, para. 176, at 94. See also International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 41, ICJ Rep , at 245, and International Court of Justice, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, 6 November 2003, para See respectively Security Council, Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 7 October 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/946 and Security Council, Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 7 October 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/ Security Council, Resolution 1368 (2001), supra note Security Council, Resolution 1390 (2002), supra note Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), supra note Security Council, Resolution 1368 (2001), supra note 24. Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 7110 Thema involving the use of force continued against the Taliban. Admittedly, the United States may assert that the measures decided by (or that could have been decided by) the Security Council are not or could not be efficient. Yet, such a position tends to brush the essence of the system of collective security in that a State (or a group of States) cannot substitute its judgement to that, collective, of the United Nations which eventually assumed its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 42 What can be deduced from all this? Nothing very original (except maybe according to Mr. George W. Bush). Probably that the use of armed force by a State victim of a terrorist act is not radically excluded. Such a recourse to military means is however clearly exclusively allowed in the framework of the system of collective security established by the Charter, when the Security Council has determined that there is a threat to the peace (or a breach of the peace and even more an act of aggression) and when it has subsequently authorised it. It would not be reasonable to question whether the same holds true when no State is at the origin of these acts; this would be contrary to the relatively recent evolution albeit now firmly established and indisputable of international law that tends to extend the notion of threat to the peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council is less reluctant to discharge its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, than before and more frequently characterises situations, which are referred to it, as threats to the peace, despite their non-military nature. 43 In parallel, it uses its power of determination granted by article 39 of the Charter a discretionary and almost unlimited power 44 in order to expand, not only the amount but also, qualitatively, the nature of the potential culprits of these threats. 45 The follow-up to September 11 th demonstrates without a doubt the tendency to expand the notion of armed attack and, as an indirect result, the notion of self-defence itself. It remains that as inherent as the right to self-defence may be, it is still neither infinite nor unlimited. And the United States was certainly right in renaming the operation Infinite Justice into Enduring Freedom. It would be disastrous if the fight against terrorism would be used as a pretext to excessively expand the notion of self-defence. In fact, it would amount to negating the principle of collective security, which has been given a rough ride since autumn One can obviously look for an answer to the question raised in the title of this essay in other directions, for example, that of humanitarian intervention or the duty to intervene ( devoir d ingérence ). After all, the fight against terrorism is also a fight for the protection of human lives. And one may wish to invoke the words of Max Huber in its famous dictum in the 1924 the British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco case: It is indisputable that, to a certain point, the interest of a State into protecting its nationals and their goods must prevail over respect for territorial sovereignty, and this even despite the lack of treaty obligations. The right to intervene has been claimed by all States; only its limits can be discussed. 46 This was written however before 1945, before the Charter. Since then the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses, and such as cannot, whatever the present defects of international organisation, find a place in international law, and this even less as, terrorism or not, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful states. 47 Fifty years afterwards, this firm position of the International Court of Justice continues to be very wise. To question it means to continue nurturing the ongoing crisis of the collective security system, a crisis which can be stopped solely by refocusing on the United Nations Charter. 42 Article 24 of the UN Charter. 43 In this regard, the President of the Security Council declared on 31 January 1992 that The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, 31 January 1992, UN Doc. S/ Cohen-Jonathan, G., Article 39 in Cot, J.-P. and Pellet, A. (eds), La Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire Article par Article, Paris/Bruxelles, Economica/Bruylant, 2 nd edition, 1991, at See Sorel, J.-M., L élargissement de la notion de menace contre la paix, in SFDI, Colloque de Rennes, Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, Pedone, Paris, 1995, at Arbitration Court, British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco case, Report of 23 October 1924, RiA, Vol. II, p. 614 (in French in original our translation). 47 International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel case, (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, 9 April 1949, ICJ. reports 1949, 4 at Heft 2, 200411 Thema Understanding the Afghan Conflict Heritage: A Key for Sustainable Processes of Peace Settlement and Rehabilitation? Brigitte Piquard* 1. Introduction A conflict has long been considered a radical disruption that challenges the existing social fabric and the structural organisation of society. The purpose of reconstruction has been then to bring society back to the status quo ante. The re-conceptualisation of a conflict from an event to a process has challenged this point of view. A conflict has to be considered a social crisis period, necessary for the normal transformation or evolution of society. The degree to which those crises are affecting the existing social order is influenced by the capacities of that community to use existing coping mechanisms (e.g. negotiation, right to strike, appeals in court or elections and dissolution of elected bodies) to respond to the expectations of the population and to absorb and recover from any type of collective side effects. An uncontrollable conflict becomes a man-made disaster whenever those institutionalised coping mechanisms are not able to mitigate the crisis. Violence breaks out. According to the anthropological point of view, a conflict has to be understood as a global social fact. It is never caused by a single factor but by a multitude of factors including the political economy as well as the control over the physical environment, the cultural identity and symbolic order. Another crucial element of the anthropological approach to conflict is the relation between crisis and everyday life. The recently emerged notion of culture of war is relevant in this context. Social and cultural reality makes every conflict unique and the cultural inheritance makes the period leading up to war and the way to cope with it rather different from one place to another. Comparative studies may assuredly prove the existence of common trends in all conflicts, yet the culture of war has a particular effect on the way societies react, express and settle conflicts. It is also important to bear in mind all the dimensions of the cultural construction of war (e.g. perceptions, identification and values). A whole range of different behaviours and perceptions may be witnessed in a war context. This is how most tensions are dealt with in a violent manner. Economic behaviours are based on short-term investment or overnight benefits and the rules of societies are evaluated according to one s own judgement of risk-taking. Further, aliens or outsiders are considered as potential enemies. The notion of culture of war is also relevant while studying the volatility and contagion of conflicts. If diplomacy or world politics may be able to keep a war or a wave of violence away from neighbouring countries, the culture of war will spread easily and may settle among the most vulnerable population of neighbouring countries or regions. 1 This is how one may find a gun culture, illegal trafficking and the spread of domestic violence in neighbouring areas officially at peace. One of the most illustrative examples is the current situation in Pakistan which has inherited some aspects of the Afghan conflict. It has to be pointed out that decisions taken in war-time as coping strategies are not only determined on the basis of pure calculations such as cost/benefit analyses or consideration of danger and effectiveness. Indeed, decisions are also taken with regard to the feelings, emotions and memories of past conflicts or displacements (real or mythical) or to identities and social networks (again real or mythical). As all conflict situations have not always been experienced before, these decisions and coping strategies also hinge upon the creativeness and inventions or new social behaviours, social links, new structures, values and beliefs. Coping with a conflict may need a full recreation, re-adaptation to a new context. This understanding of coping mechanisms breaks away from the classical tropical caricature 2 of the helpless victims, the passivity of the civilian population during a conflict and the infantilisation of the survivors. During war populations are often dispossessed from their own historical process, but start re-organising their lives according to their own social framework and adopting coping mechanisms to make it more liveable. This consideration of coping mechanisms brings us back to the understanding of a conflict as a process instead of an event. If a successful adaptation to conflict requires new skills, new knowledge and new leaders, the replacement of the old ones may disrupt social links or social values and social sense. This, in turn, can create new tensions, new cleavages and new disparities among people of the same communities, for it is known that some people may adapt easier or quicker than others. This is the case, for example, for the traditional leadership (often the elders of the community) whose legitimacy, mostly based on the property of soil or kinship, starts fading away. All of a sudden, skills such as the ability to read and write, to acquire a new language or to interact with foreigners are seen as more valuable, and the influence of those skilled persons starts becoming more important than the old sources of leadership, which lose status and authority. * Prof. Brigitte Piquard is currently directing the European Master in International Humanitarian Assistance at the University of Louvain (Belgium). She is a professor of political anthropology. She has carried most of her research in South and South East Asia on transitional political set-up and social rehabilitation of war-torn societies. 1 Mentioning neighbouring areas and countries does not only refer to places having physically or geographically borders with the area at war. It also includes places of cultural proximity with the place at war: shared beliefs or religious tradition, ethnic origins, common past, etc. 2 Rufin, J-C., Le piège humanitaire suivi de Humanitaire et politique depuis la chute du mur, Paris, Hachette, Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 7312 Thema Between the 1989 withdrawal of the Red Army and the post September 11 events, the Afghan crisis had been out of the international scene. Despite this lack of interest and awareness, the situation on the field kept evolving. War mechanisms and Kalashnikov culture were established, and the conflict continued to contaminate neighbouring countries. Nowadays, the few observers still glimpsing in the region s direction are witnessing a slow, hazardous, ambiguous and confused process of settlement of the Afghan situation. Can efficient rehabilitation take place without taking into consideration the conflict heritage and war culture? 2. The Afghan Conflict Heritage 2.1. Coping with Identities The Afghan identity process is representative of the complexity of the present phenomena. It includes the formal traditional identities, their metamorphosis through the war culture, the relations with aid agencies and the experience in exile and in the Diaspora. Before the 1978 Marxist coup, it was easy to notice the weakness of the national bond. As Pierre and Micheline Centlivres point out, [t]he question of the Afghan nation and the Afghan national identity can be expressed in the following manner: in which way a Pashtun, a Hazara, an Uzbek from Afghanistan, for instance, are first, one for the other, a fellow countryman, a compatriot, a watandar, and in which way a Tajik of Tajikistan, an inhabitant of Uzbekistan, a Pathan from NWFP are for the former: a neighbour or a foreigner? 3 Undoubtedly, there was a consciousness of proximity among Afghan people but no real national identity. The two main binding forces were religion Islam, which opens up on the transnational community of believers the Umma and the kinship or the tribe, which creates a network of solidarity in a local environment (a valley or a province of origin) Exile and Identities The Afghan refugee camps offered the best examples of the modification of the identification process. Those modifications are due to promiscuity (the social space has been reduced in the camps, a semi-urban environment often in the periphery of the main cities), to the mobilisation of cultural elements in order to legitimise the war and the exodus and to the contacts with many different actors such as NGOs or IGOs, the Pakistani authorities or the Pakistani citizens. According to Centlivres and Centlivres-Dumont, 4 the Afghan refugees seemed to have defined themselves along three ideological models. First of all, the foreign imposed notion of refugees has been adopted by the refugees themselves, in a purely opportunistic way as this notion gave them international status and access to the aid delivered by international actors. Secondly, they referred to their tribal identity and the tribal code of honour, the Pashtunwali, in which norms of temporary shelter (nanawatia) and hospitality were among the key values. Finally, and most importantly, the muhâjir refers to Mohammad s flight from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD, thereby giving religious legitimacy to the exile in neighbouring countries Hijrah and Jihâd If one focuses more deeply on the religious legitimacy of the flight, one notices that the notion of hijrah (exodus) and jihâd (holy war) are two different sides of the same phenomenon. The religious duty, for a muslim, when it becomes impossible to fight back, is not to surrender but to leave the country in order to go to a safer environment from which resistance can be organised. For all Afghans in the camps, being a muhâjir was equivalent to being a mujâhid. The camps were sanctuaries of resistance. After 1989, the jihâd was supposed to be won. But instead of a peace settlement, former groups of mujâhidîn or new war lords, organised or not in political parties, were fighting each other. The notion of hijrah lost its religious ground as there was no more virtual threat on Islam in Afghanistan. To be viewed as a threat, it had to come from another source as for example the international presence both in the refugee camps and in Afghanistan itself. It was also around 1989 that many Islamic NGOs, mostly from the Gulf area, reached Afghanistan and Pakistan. It would be probably too easy to jump to conclusions by correlating those events; yet, ever since 1989, a love/hate relation with the West started to predominate in the camps and among some Afghans inside the country. The notion of Islam has been a major binding factor for Afghans, which they, as a nation, look upon as a sanctuary. In the name of Islam, they conducted their jihâd. For them, Islam has a national or even a nationalist character. Although the notion of Umma is apparent in the constant references to solidarity among Muslim countries and their affiliation to the Islamic faith, the Islamic community appears to be divided. Islam has been used, in an opposite way from the Umma,for the recovery of a very specific territory. It is also in the name of a so-called Islam that the Taliban conducted the recovery of Afghanistan from the former mujâhidîn. For some Muslims, it is also in the name of the recovery of the very values of Islam that the war against terrorism (seen as perverting the very faith and values of Islam) has to take place. For others, it is Islam which legitimises what is called terrorism by the West and others, but is considered by themselves as acts of resistance against a hegemonic and evil way of life imposed upon them The Emotional Bond Although displacement does not exclude the re-appropriation of spaces, places, and landscapes, images linked to the homeland create a sort of emotional bond with the country of origin. In this case, the situation of child refugees is particularly relevant. These children are living between two liminal spaces. One only exists in tales and their imagination, although 3 Centlivres, P. & Centlivres-Dumont, M., State, National Awareness and Levels of Identity in Afghanistan from Monarchy to Islamic State, (2000) 19.3/4 Central Asian Survey Centlivres, P. & Centlivres-Dumont, M., supra note 3, at Heft 2, 200413 Thema it is their homeland. The other exists in everyday reality in the form of a country which is not theirs. In the case of Afghan refugees, more than 30% of the children have been under fourteen since the beginning of the 1990s. They were born on Pakistani soil and knew of Afghanistan only what their parents had told them: descriptions of a mythified paradise on earth or stories of battles and warfare. The interference of temporal or spatial criteria contributes to a sort of patchwork in the constitution of identities and interpersonal relationships. For forced migrants, this creates a feeling of constant migration through time, the present being cut off from the past. When asked to draw something meaningful for them, children in the camps often drew war scenes representing well-known commanders or camps as represented in school manuals offered by NGOs. Most of them, although born in the camps, considered themselves to be travellers. Most of the elements in their identity came not from their inner feelings but from symbols provided by others. The notion of being a refugee as understood by Western organisations a mass of unarmed and helpless individuals defined according to humanitarian law was not something interiorised by them. They considered themselves to be beneficiaries of the traditional hospitality offered by the Pakistani Pashtuns, with whom they shared their cultural background and as mujâhidîn. Also this mythified image of Afghanistan and the religious legitimacy of the flight had to be nourished by the war culture to keep the recovery possible. No wonder that young children raised in the war culture of the camps became Taliban Return to Traditions as a Coping Method Reintroducing tradition is a coping method used to try to rebuild a link between a person s past and present. Most of those returns to tradition are close to traditionalism of resistance which is an instrument of denial. In exile, for example, chadors or chadri (burqah) forbidden by the communist regime of Kaboul, appeared longer and darker than ever. It can also be linked to Pseudo-traditionalism, in which self-made traditional frameworks are created to impose sense on a confused reality. These are used to control a crisis by imposing a familiar or reassuring aspect. This type of traditionalism was mostly used in the refugee camps and later on, in a more drastic manner, by the Taliban in their so-called Islamic regime. Barring girls from education in the Afghan refugee camps can be classified under pseudo-traditionalism. After 1989, when the religious legitimacy of the exodus felt itself threatened, it was common for girls to be taken out of school after third grade. This was because some families considered that at this age (around 9) the girls had to begin the observance of purdah (seclusion), although there is no such stipulation in tradition. The main reason for this withdrawal of girls from school was based on their fathers concern about being considered good Muslims by foreigners or Pakistanis. Another reason was that education for girls was perceived as an international imposition, while sovereignty over their own development process started to be one of the major claims of the Afghans. The same can be said about the imposition of the burqah (chadri) on Afghan women. In the past, the chadri had been used as a veil by the Afghan upper-middle or upper classes. Outside work performed by women in the fields did not require wearing the chadri. Moreover, it was sometimes also used for special ceremonies such as weddings or circumcisions. Nevertheless, the chadri had never been imposed on women in traditional Afghanistan. 3. The Risk of Conflict Contagion If we consider the case of Pakistan, one can notice the vicious circle between the vulnerability of the Pakistani social set-up and the war in Afghanistan. Indeed, Zia-ul-Haq s 11-year dictatorship completely broke the country s social fabric: criminalisation of the political game, division of civil society, division of the military and civil bureaucracy, the resurgence of autonomists and sectarian movements, penetration of the political, religious and educative fields by foreign groups, political use of terror and violence, religious legitimacy given to the new leadership, etc. The Afghan war served Zia s vested interests best by giving him a degree of international immunity. His assistance to the Afghan resistance suited the Americans, making Zia their best regional ally. The massive use of Islamisation modified the political set-up by giving some legitimacy to leaders who had no other way to build their own constituencies. It also de-structured the social link and brought the Pakistani society to a certain evolutionary point, different from the rest of the Muslim world. One of the main distinctions between Pakistan and the other Muslim countries consists in a growing influence of Islamic movements at the State level or at least their association to power. Islamic rhetoric has become the State s discourse. This potent symbolic efficiency should not be neglected due to the real effects on the social fabric and tangible changes brought about by the creation of groups and lobbies open to Islamic slogans. The anti-western feelings and the emotional strength of the Islamic movements should not be under-rated either. This created a climate of insecurity and violence. Finally, Zia introduced what will be called the Kalashnikov culture, letting arms and drugs penetrate into Pakistan, leading to a criminalisation of society and of the political power struggle as well as a loss of confidence of the population in the democratisation process. This climate shook all the foundations of the political set-up. Two social phenomena favoured this development: first of all, the return of migrants from the Emirates during the Gulf war. They become wealthier than before and were searching for a new kind of solidarity, broader than the traditional birâdarî or the tribes. They lacked alternatives in the political pattern and found in pan-islamism a wider network to marry their nationalism with their Arab experience. The importance of the Mullahs is due to their ordinary knowledge of the needs of the grassroots, their use of emotions and passion. They have to be related to the self-proclaimed mullahs portrayed by Olivier Roy as an Islamist Lumpen-intelligensia, recruited mostly in deprived urban areas. 5 5 Roy, O., L Humanitaire en Afghanistan: Entre Illusions, Grands Desseins Politiques et Bricolage, (2000) 29 Cahiers d Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien (CEMOTI) 73. Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 7514 Thema This digression on the Islamisation process in Pakistan gives a good idea on how the Afghan war and the Pakistani dictatorship have been feeding each other. A historical development process in a country cannot be understood without looking into its neighbour s past. The Islamisation in Pakistan brought about a whole political and social set-up that enabled madrasas and the Taliban ideology to develop. In the same way, the Afghan war brought the gun and drug culture to Pakistan, the presence of extreme Islamist movements coming from the Gulf, the war culture and a drastic need for an alternative discourse to replace the muhâjir/mujâhid semantic couple. It also provided the need for new processes perceived as authentic and sovereign instead of foreign-driven. It is likely that the groundswell of the Talibanisation of society will survive in Pakistan and most probably in Afghanistan too if its root causes are not addressed jointly. 4. Interventions in Conflict, Interventions on Conflict Up to now, anthropology has been reduced to its minimal form, in the preparation of programmes or in the field of intervention itself. Although the importance of culture, cultural diversity and cultural background is recognised by most actors on the field, the reality lying behind that notion of culture seems extremely vague for the practitioner. Further the practical way to interpret this notion in an operational way is even more obscure. When culture is taken into consideration, it is often reduced to some basic principles of intercultural communication. From the standpoint of the affected population, the relief model also remains extremely vague. Altruism for people with whom someone has no special link (e.g. kinship and allegiance) is definitely not a universal concept. Traditional codes of conduct include hospitality and support for relatives but not for strangers. Assistance has a social and political value as Marcel Mauss 6 proved in his remarkable studies on gift. Goods of any kind are always exchanged against other goods of an equivalent value or against political allegiance. The ability to give is a proof of strength and leadership in most societies. A gift for free has no sense and, thus, no value. Most relief projects do not take into account the resources, individual skills and institutional strengths of host societies. By failing to recognise the resources that people already have, it fails to mobilise them for the benefit of both individual interests and the local economy. Finally, interventions that do not take into consideration social links and cultural background can either fuel the conflict even more or be a factor of social change by creating a new elite, new needs and new expectations. This has been the case in Afghanistan since the beginning of the humanitarian intervention The Cold-War Period ( ) NGOs in the Refugee Camps of Pakistan The refugee camps became what Jean-Claude Rufin calls a Humanitarian Sanctuary, that is to say an open base of fighters situated in a neighbouring country, protected not on- ly by the border but mostly by the presence of civilians and representatives of the international community. 7 The political parties of the resistance endeavoured their best to be acknowledged as legitimate partners. They became interlocutors of the international community, informants and even partners in the distribution of aid. 8 Concerning the political organisation of the camps, one should notice the changes that occurred in the leadership. Belonging to political parties did not constitute a basic element of the identification process but more a pragmatic political attitude. Every refugee belonged to at least one political party (sometimes more). Those parties did not claim ethnic or regional affiliation, although in practice, most of them recruited in specific areas of Afghanistan, according to the origin of refugees or among specific population groups (ethnic or tribal link, sometimes the Sunni/Shia divide). This belonging to a party was the only way for a muhâjir to be temporarily enrolled in a jihâd group, to perform his duty as a freedom fighter and in this way to give a full social meaning to the semantic couple muhâjir/mujâhid. In the camps, a new type of leader emerged. They were called rationmalek as they performed the role of intermediary between the international community, the Pakistani administration of the camps and the refugees. 9 Those rationmalek soon replaced traditional leaders, who, far from their land and sometimes from their kin, had lost their sources of legitimacy. The rationmalek were often former teachers or engineers who knew some English, sometimes Urdu, who understood the bureaucratic organisation of programmes and Western management procedures and values (e.g. respecting schedules, being brief in meetings and respecting privacy). The local staff of NGOs acquired the same type of legitimacy as those rationmalek. Both rationmalek and local staff of NGOs were the ones able to deliver aid in a traditionally patronised political set-up. That was enough to give them strong legitimacy and to make them the rivals of the traditional leadership. Though the refugees were starting to re-organise their lives in the camps according to their own social framework and to adopt coping mechanisms to make the experience more liveable, in the mind of the Western expatriates, the model of refugee victims, passive and, thus, co-operative and disciplined, started to prevail. There were no ideas of responsibilities or ownership of programmes by the Afghans. As victims of war, but also victims of the heavy bureaucratic apparatus imposed by the Pakistani administration of the camps, the Afghans felt dispossessed from their own war and their own lives. The growing anti-western feelings as well as, in a minor way, anti-pakistani feelings were ignored by the Western expatriate community. It should be pointed out that the Afghan refugees phobic attitude towards the Pakistanis was often shared by the Western expatriate community, due to the 6 Mauss, M., Essai sur le Don, Paris, Rufin, J-C., supra note 2. 8 Dorronsoro, G., Les Enjeux de l Aide en Afghanistan, (1993) 11 Cultures et Conflits Centlivres, P. & Centlivres-Dumont, M., The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan: An Ambiguous Identity, (1998) 1.2. Journal of Refugee Studies Heft 2, 200415 Thema heavy-handedness of the Pakistani bureaucracy and the harassment of Zia s political police, the Special branch, keeping track of every move of the NGOs, especially during their cross-border activities Cross-Border NGOs Cross-border activities were quite unique at that time, at least at this scale. Almost 80 NGOs were known for carrying out such types of activities in Afghanistan. Their leitmotiv was always the same: they wanted to avoid a larger exodus, they were willing to support the local population, mostly through the resistance, mostly offering them health facilities or cashfor-food. Those cross-border NGOs adopted an operational way of working according to the Afghan socio-political setup, that is to say a fragmented society organised in rival groups of solidarity, either traditional ones (e.g. villages, kinship and tribes) represented by the traditional leaders when those were not in exile (Maliks, Khans, Ardab), or the emerging elite born out of the resistance (mostly commanders) often opposed to the traditional leadership. 10 The humanitarian aid definitely strengthened the legitimacy of the commanders. The humanitarian workers were by and large the major if not the only source of information on the war. Journalists started to use the humanitarian channel to enter Afghanistan and to meet freedom fighters. The circle was closed: the commanders receiving the aid were the ones who benefited from international recognition through the media, which brought them more aid and more fame. A glaring example of this development is Ahmad Shah Massud, who became the major partner of a French doctors organisation Aide Médicale Internationale and the hero of a number of documentaries shot by French TV from the early 1980s up to his death Post-Geneva Agreement Period ( ) The Geneva agreement was signed on 15 April Soon afterwards, during the summer of 1988, the United Nations office for Co-ordination in Afghanistan (UNOCA) was created, fostered by Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, who a little later launched the Salam operation. This project resulted in a substantial increase in the resources being provided inside Afghanistan. 11 The concept of a tranquillity zone had been introduced and defined as a pacified zone where humanitarian action can be carried out inside Afghanistan relying on the local actors, in most cases commanders. Aid was also delivered both to mujâhidîn and government-held areas and the principle of humanitarian encirclement (delivering aid from a variety of entry points in neighbouring countries) 12 reduced the weight of Pakistan in the management of the Afghan crisis and isolated the refugees even more. Many programmes moved to Kabul, sometimes without keeping a base in Pakistan. With time, they tried to include the wider community including local shuras and jirgah. But the rivalry between the commanders and the traditional decision-making bodies was still ubiquitous. In the cities, NGOs tried to work in partnership with the remnants of the governmental apparatus, so as to co-ordinate their efforts with the priorities of the local administration. Agencies came with their own mandates, principles and objectives and these determined the nature of the assistance they were willing to provide and the conditions under which they would give aid. Similarly, the beneficiaries were already engaged in a process of rehabilitation based on their own objectives and value systems and, while they welcomed the assistance provided, they were not prepared to accept this at any price. 13 Western NGOs were already particularly concerned about the case of women. They wanted to ensure the equality of access to aid for women as beneficiaries and as local staff. This stress on women made the local partners feel uncomfortable. If the health programmes were largely accepted, Western girls schools were creating more resentment. The memory of the socialist education system that the PDPA (Afghan communist party) tried to bring into the rural areas was still very vivid. If they were to put their girls in school, Afghans were felt more comfortable with the curriculum of madrasas provided by Islamic NGOs The Taliban Era ( ) In principle, in the early days of the Taliban regime, there were no major changes in the humanitarian strategy towards the Afghans living inside the country. Programmes were supposed to keep on running and the Western expatriates were already used to negotiating with local partners, which were not always more open-minded than the first Taliban movement. Early days confirmed that negotiations were possible. For example, the Taliban accepted that women worked for the benefit of women s health programmes in most of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Things worsened when the Taliban took over Herat. The opposing forces were really strong around Herat and the Taliban had to impose a much more coercive and stricter type of regime. Most Western programmes were seriously curtailed. The increasing presence of non-afghan Taliban on the Afghan soil strengthened this trend. It is only then that the Taliban started imposing norms, rules of conduct and limits to the access of the victims (women and minorities in particular), contradicting international principles. Some NGOs, mostly in Kabul or in strictly Taliban-controlled areas, started wondering if it was ethical and politically correct to accept the conditions imposed by the regime. In other provinces, where the pressure of the Taliban was a bit looser, the continuation of programmes depended on the relations that local staff had with the regime. Some programmes were closed, others continued only in Northern-Alliance controlled provinces. In the Taliban-controlled areas, food-related programmes due to the drought as well as mines and UXO-related ones kept on working. In 1998, US air strikes led to the mass withdrawal of aid agencies. Most of them did not come back or kept an office on remote control, run by Western expatriates from abroad and inside only by local staff. 10 Roy, O., supra note 5, Atmar, H. & Goodhand, J., Coherence or Cooption?: Politics, Aid and Peace Building in Afghanistan, 2001, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, available at 12 Atmar, H. & Goodhand, J., supra note Marsden, P., The Taliban, War, religion and the New order in Afghanistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 7716 Thema 4.4. Humanitarian Aid, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction after 11 September 2001 The major change compared to the earlier periods is the important mobilisation of the whole international community in the rehabilitation and the peace process in today s Afghanistan. 14 Since the Bonn meeting and the Tokyo conference, many actors meetings and international seminars have taken place around the world. One of the major priorities mentioned by the agencies involved in the reconstruction process is Afghan ownership in the processes of relief and rehabilitation. Often three distinct levels are mentioned: the government level, both central and local; the civil society level, mostly the Afghan NGOs; and the community level, particularly the traditional bodies such as shuras and jirgah. Afghan involvement is seen as a priority for co-ordinating all the different initiatives. The role of the local community towards social and traditional structures is often seen as a key element of empowerment of the local society. Yet, those structures do not always seem to be understood as they do not always carry the same values as the strategic framework of the Afghan government. Existing capacities and capabilities are considered to be available through the return of the Afghan Diaspora, the major source of skilled and qualified Afghans. It is mentioned nowhere how difficult it can be for a population to accept the return of an elite that may play an extremely important decision-making and leadership role, and this despite having been absent from the country for most of the duration of the conflict. Afghan born but Western raised, the diasporic Afghans are considered as aliens by the local population. They may have acquired economic and technical skills in exile, but they may not understand the drastic changes in their society that are related to the conflict heritage and the war culture. They may be considered as traitors by the local population as they were not there during the hardest days of the war. The link between Afghan ownership and sustainability is rather clear. Community empowerment and development is also on top of the NGO agenda in their efforts to link emergency relief to longer-term sustainable development. Though the global objective of sustainability is mentioned in all reports, the means to achieve this goal may differ. While NGOs have worked in isolation from the Afghan authorities in the last two decades, it remains open how the NGO community is going to make the move from independence to working with the government. Therefore, it is highly recommended that specific mechanisms be designed in this regard by the NGO community. Community participation and community management programmes are currently promoted among agencies as a result of a concern to avoid the pit- falls of the dependency syndrome and promote empowerment among the beneficiaries of aid, mainly women. Though most reports mentioned the important Quick Impact Projects, EC representatives and European NGOs feel extremely concerned about the risk of projects with no lasting impact. Those positions are not completely shared by the Afghan authorities, which feel that being able to deliver rapidly is extremely important for giving ground to the new administration, and trust in the overall process. Public opinion is shaped by concrete manifestations. The international community before has disappointed Afghans. Hope could then be replaced by frustration, which in a context of raised expectations, is a recipe for anger, discord and finally conflict. We must deliver and deliver soon [ ] For an Endogenous and Afghan-Owned Reconstruction Process This overview on the Afghan situation gives us clues to understanding how fragile the current situation is. The lack of consideration of the conflict heritage and the war culture is probably the most crucial point. But other elements can also be pointed out, such as the importance given to the ethnic factor that is far and away the major binding force in Afghanistan, and difficulties for Westerners to accept the willingness of the Afghans to keep an Islamic flavour in their social setup and political system. The regional scale should not be rejected either. A sustainable peace settlement can only be foreseen if the situation in neighbouring countries is taken into account. Due to the insecurity in most rural areas, Kabul is often the reference and the place of settlement of the main organisations, and provincial programmes are mostly set up in the Northern areas, polarising the country even more in its North-South divide. Kabul is a different place all together and cannot be representative of the whole country. Finally, foreign interference is also a major concern. Afghans have overall, including during the conflict period, manifested their concern to maintain the sovereignty over their historicity. If hospitality and the respect for guests are basic principles of the traditional code of honour, it should be obvious to any observer that in all relations, Afghans want to sit in the driver s seat. Let us not deprive them from that right. 14 This part of the text is based on the strategic lines of three major documents: the report of the seminar organised by EURONAID and VOICE in Brussels on February 14, 2002 on Afghanistan: The Road to recovery and the Role of NGOs, the UNDP/Asian Development Bank/World Bank preliminary needs assessment for recovery and reconstruction released in January 2002 and finally the draft of the National Development framework released in Kabul in April 2002 by the AACA, the Afghan Assistance Co-ordination Authority. There is no pretension to offer an exhaustive or strictly representative survey but in a modest manner the aim is to highlight some of the key issues of the forthcoming rehabilitation process. 15 AACA (Afghan Assistance Co-ordination Authority), Draft of the National Development Framework, Kabul, April Heft 2, 200417 Forum Verbreitung Aktueller Fall: Recht auf Leben nicht einklagbar? Das Varvarin-Urteil des Landgerichts Bonn vom 10. Dezember 2003 Philipp Herrmann* I. Einführung Während des Krieges in Jugoslawien kam es am 30. Mai 1999 zu einem Luftangriff durch NATO-Truppen auf eine kleine Brücke nahe des Dorfes Varvarin, bei dem zehn Menschen ums Leben kamen und 30 Personen verletzt wurden, 17 von ihnen schwer. Der Pressesprecher der NATO, Jamie Shea, bezeichnete die Brücke auf der Pressekonferenz damals, ohne weitere Erklärung, als ein legitimes Ziel : And again, I want to stress to all of you that that bridge is was a legitimate designated military target. 1 Tatsache ist jedoch, dass die Brücke keinerlei militärische Bedeutung hat, und das nächste militärische Ziel, eine Kaserne, über 20 km weit von dem Dorf entfernt lag. 2 Die Opfer und Hinterbliebenen wollen nunmehr wissen, wieso gerade diese Brücke zu einem Angriffsziel bestimmt wurde. Sie haben die Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf Schadensersatz in Anspruch genommen, 3 mit der Begründung, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwar nicht an der Luftoperation mittels Kampfflugzeugen beteiligt gewesen sei. Sie sei aber als NATO-Mitgliedsstaat über den Angriff informiert gewesen und habe diesen folglich auch mitgetragen. 4 Die hinter der Klage stehende, entscheidende Frage lautete, ob Individualkläger aus einem Staat A einen Staat B vor dessen Gerichten verklagen können für einen ihnen entstandenen Schaden, der darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass der Staat B durch sein Verhalten Bestimmungen des humanitären Völkerrechts verletzt hat. 5 Die bisherige Rechtsprechung in der Bundesrepublik hat dies verneint, zuletzt im Sommer letzten Jahres in einem Prozess, den Hinterbliebene der Opfer eines SS-Massakers in der griechischen Ortschaft Distomo angestrengt hatten. 6 Die Kläger sollten sich stattdessen, wie andere Naziopfergruppen auch, an ihren eigenen Staat wenden, der ein Reparationsabkommen mit der Bundesrepublik aushandeln müsse, und sie dann mit diesem Geld entschädigen könne. 7 Das Urteil des Landgerichts Bonn hat noch eine über die eigentliche Entscheidung hinausgehende Bedeutung. Verfahren, die diesem ähneln sind vor verschiedenen Gerichten anderer Staaten anhängig oder sogar bereits von diesen entschieden. 8 Das Urteil des Landgerichts ist insofern bedeutsam, als sich das Landgericht im Gegensatz zu z.b. dem kanadischen Court of Appeal für zuständig erklärte, die Klage aber als unbegründet abwies. Es ist das erste deutsche Gericht, das sich näher mit der rechtlichen Grundlage von Schadensersatzansprüchen Einzelner für Verletzungen des humanitären Völkerrechts auseinandersetzte. Dass das Urteil auch eine politische Dimension hat, nämlich, dass eine Entscheidung im Sinne der Kläger zahllosen Schadensersatzklagen Tür und Tor öffnen würde, lässt sich nicht von der Hand weisen, muss aber bei der rechtlichen Betrachtung des Urteils außen vor bleiben. Schließlich ordnet sich die Entscheidung in eine Reihe von Urteilen verschiedener Gerichte anderer Staaten ein, die alle mit ähnlichen Begründungen die Zahlungen von Schadensersatzansprüchen Einzelner abgelehnt haben. 9 II. Tatsächliches Geschehen Die Kleinstadt Varvarin liegt etwa 180 km südöstlich von Belgrad, etwa 200 km vom Kosovo entfernt und hat ca Einwohner. 10 Sie lebt von der Landwirtschaft und dem regionalen Kleinhandwerk und -handel. In der Gegend gibt es weder nennenswerte Industriebetriebe noch irgendwelche militärischen Einrichtungen. Die Stadt blieb während der gesamten Zeit der Bürgerkriege in Jugoslawien von Truppenstationierungen, Militärtransporten etc. verschont. Sie galt unter der jugoslawischen Bevölkerung als ein vor Kriegshandlungen sicherer Ort. Die Stadt wird auf ihrer östlichen Seite durch einen in südnördlicher Richtung fließenden kleinen Fluss, die Morawa, * Philipp Herrmann ist Rechtsreferendar am Oberlandesgericht Hamm. Er absolviert seine Wahlstation am IFHV. 1 Vgl. Pressesprecher der NATO auf der Pressekonferenz der NATO vom 31. Mai 1999 auf (am 04. Februar 2004). 2 Landgericht Bonn, Urteil vom 10. Dezember 2003, Az.: 1 O 361/02, S. 1.; Durch den Angriff auf ein nicht militärisches Ziel handelten die dem NATO-Vertrag beigetretenen Einzelstaaten unter Verstoß gegen Artikel 51 ZP I sowie gegen Artikel 13 I, II ZP II, die nicht Signatarstaaten unter Verstoß gegen Völkergewohnheitsrecht und damit völkerrechtswidrig; vgl. hierzu auch den Artikel von O. Medenica,Protocol I and Operation Allied Force: Did NATO Abide by Principles of Proportionality? In: Loyola L. A. International and Comparative Law Review 329, S. 424 f. 3 Landgericht Bonn, a.a.o. (Fn. 2). 4 Vgl. Antwort der deutschen Bundesregierung vom auf eine Große Anfrage im Deutschen Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/5677, dort Antwort auf die Frage unter Nr. 42, S Diese Frage musste von dem Landgericht Bonn nicht beantwortet werden, da es bereits die Existenz einer Rechtsgrundlage für die geltend gemachten Ansprüche verneinte. 6 BGH, Urteil vom 26. Juni 2003, Az.: III ZR 245/98. 7 Vgl. Kommentar von Jürgen Elsässer in der jungen Welt zum Artikel Recht auf Leben nicht einklagbar? unter frieden/themen/nato-krieg/varvarin4.html, Abs. 3, (am 04. Februar 2004) 8 Vergleiche nur etwa die Entscheidung des Ontario Court of Appeal in Kanada, der die Klage mehrerer Kanadier jugoslawischer Abstammung als unzulässig zurückwies unter 9 Vgl. z.b. das Urteil des Tokyo District Court unter ihl-nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa e /aae d8a1cbc 1256a eb?OpenDocument, das durch den Tokyo High Court bestätigt wurde: / ba29dc1256a150045e4de?OpenDocument. 10 Sachverhalt wie er vom Landgericht Bonn festgestellt wurde. Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 7918 Forum Verbreitung begrenzt. In Ost-West-Richtung überspannte den Fluss eine Brücke, die zugleich den einzigen Zugangsweg aus östlicher Richtung darstellte. Die Brücke hatte eine Spannweite von 180 m; ihre Fahrbahnbreite betrug 4,50 m zuzüglich eines Fußgängerweges von weiteren 1,50 m. Nach den in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien geltenden verkehrsrechtlichen Bestimmungen war die Brücke allein für den allgemeinen Straßenverkehr freigegeben, d.h. die auf 12 t begrenzte Tragfähigkeit schloss ihre Nutzung für Schwertransporte u.ä. aus. In dem Zeitraum vom 24. März bis zum 10. Juni 1999 wurden unter parlamentarisch genehmigter Beteiligung deutscher Streitkräfte 11 Luftoperationen in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien zur Abwendung einer humanitären Katastrophe im Kosovo durchgeführt. Deutsche Flugzeuge waren an der Luftoperation Allied Force mit sog. RECCE- und ECR-Tornados, die der Luftaufklärung und dem Begleitschutz dienten, beteiligt. Am Pfingstsonntag, den 30. Mai 1999, war auf der am stadtseitigen Brückenende weiterführenden Hauptstraße sowie den abzweigenden Nebenstraßen der Stadt Varvarin wie jeden Sonntag zwischen 8.00 und etwa Uhr Markt. Die NATO flog gegen Uhr einen Angriff auf die Brücke. Zum Zeitpunkt des Raketenbeschusses befanden sich drei Pkw sowie zahlreiche Fußgänger und Radfahrer auf ihr. Insgesamt vier Raketen wurden abgeschossen. Eine Rakete traf den Mittelpfeiler, woraufhin die Brücke zusammenbrach und in den Fluss stürzte. Die Kläger sind sämtlich Geschädigte dieses Angriffs bzw. Rechtsnachfolger der tödlich Verletzten. Bei den Kampfflugzeugen handelte es sich nicht um Flugzeuge der Beklagten, wobei zwischen den Parteien streitig ist, ob deutsche Flugzeuge diesen Einsatz unterstützten. III. Das Urteil des Landgerichts Bonn vom 10. Dezember 2003 Die Opfer des Luftangriffs und Hinterbliebene haben die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als NATO-Mitgliedsland auf Schadensersatz verklagt. Sie rügen mit der Klage eine Verletzung humanitären Völkerrechts, so dass sich zunächst einmal die Frage nach der Zuständigkeit deutscher Gerichte stellt. Gerügt wird, dass die Bundesrepublik es unterlassen hätte, das ihr im NATO-Rat zustehende Vetorecht auszuüben und die Brücke durch die deutschen Militärs von der Zielliste streichen zu lassen. 12 Damit geht es um ein angeblich pflichtwidriges Verhalten deutscher Amtsträger, so dass die deutsche Gerichtsbarkeit gegeben ist. Das Landgericht Bonn hält die Klage für zulässig, aber unbegründet: Internationales Recht regele nur die Beziehung zwischen Staaten und könne demnach nicht über die Beziehung zwischen Staaten und Individuen entscheiden. Die geltend gemachten Ansprüche fänden weder im Völkerrecht noch im deutschen Staatshaftungsrecht eine rechtliche Grundlage. 13 Normen des Völkerrechts, die den Klägern als Individuen für die Folgen des NATO-Angriffs vom 30. Mai 1999 einen gegen die Beklagte durchsetzbaren Anspruch auf Schadensersatz oder Schmerzensgeld einräumten, existierten nicht. Bereits hieran scheitere die Klage. 14 Mit diesen Worten beginnt die Begründung des Urteils des Landgerichts. Das Gericht greift sodann die, zumindest in deutschen Lehrbüchern als traditionelle Konzeption des Völkerrechts aufgeführte Meinung auf, wonach der Einzelne nicht Völkerrechtssubjekt ist, sondern nur mittelbaren internationalen Schutz genießt. 15 Bei Verletzungen des humanitären Völkerrechts durch Handlungen gegenüber fremden Staatsbürgern stehe ein Anspruch nicht dem Einzelnen, sondern nur seinem Heimatstaat zu. 16 Der Staat mache im Wege des diplomatischen Schutzes sein eigenes Recht darauf geltend, dass das Völkerrecht in der Person seines Staatsangehörigen beachtet werde. 17 Das Individuum sei nur über das Medium des Staates mit dem Völkerrecht verbunden, ohne selbst dessen Subjekt zu sein. 18 Quintessenz des Urteils sind die folgenden Feststellungen: Zwar könne es sein, dass nach dem Vortrag der Kläger ein Verstoß gegen die Grundsätze des humanitären Völkerrechts oder eine eine Ersatzpflicht auslösende Pflichtverletzung vorliege, 19 jedoch bestehe weder im Völkerrecht noch im deutschen Staatshaftungsrecht eine rechtliche Grundlage, die es den Klägern ermögliche, gegen die Bundesrepublik einen Anspruch geltend zu machen. 20 Weiterhin seien sie nicht in der Lage diesen auch durchzusetzen, da ihnen kein Verfahren zur Verfügung stehe, etwaige individuelle Ansprüche geltend zu machen. 21 IV. Bedeutung des Urteils Das Urteil des Landgerichts Bonn geht einher mit dem traditionellen Verständnis der völkerrechtlichen Lehre. Danach hat der Einzelne keine rechtliche Stellung inne, aus der er einen Anspruch gegen einen anderen Staat ableiten kann und aus dem ihm auch ein völkerrechtliches Verfahren zur Verfügung steht, mittels dessen er einen eventuell bestehenden Anspruch geltend machen könnte Beschluss des Deutschen Bundestages vom auf Antrag der Bundesregierung vom (BT-Drs. 13/11469), sowie Beschluss des Deutschen Bundestages vom (BT-Drs. 14/397). 12 Die Ziele wurden auf Listen zusammengestellt. Sie wurden nur dann tatsächlich angegriffen, wenn alle 19 NATO-Staaten mit dem Ziel als Angriffsobjekt einverstanden waren. Vgl. Antwort der deutschen Regierung vom auf eine Große Anfrage im Deutschen Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/5677, dort Antwort auf die Frage unter Nr. 42, S. 28; LG Bonn, Urteil vom 10. Dezember 2003, Az.: 1 O 361/02, S LG Bonn, Urteil vom 10. Dezember 2003, Az.: 1 O 361/02, S LG Bonn, Urteil vom 10. Dezember 2003, Az.: 1 O 361/02, S T. Stein, in: I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Völkerrecht, 10. Auflage, Köln, u. a., 2000, S. 177, Rn 927; A. Verdross/B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3. Auflage, Berlin, 1984, S. 878 f.; K. Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 4. Auflage, München 1999, S. 80, Rn K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S. 80, Rn Mavrommatis-Konzession-Fall, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 2 (1924), S. 12; T. Stein, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), Rn 927 f.; vgl. auch K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S. 305, Rn LG Bonn, Urteil vom 10. Dezember 2003, Az.: 1 O 361/02, S. 10 mit Verweis auf BVerfG, Beschluss vom 13. Mai 1996, Az.: 2 BvL 33/93, abgedruckt u.a. in BVerfGE 94, 315, 334 sowie NJW 1996, 2717 f. m.w.n.; K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S.80 f.; St. Kadelbach, Zwingendes Völkerrecht, Berlin 1992, Zugl. Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 1991, S LG Bonn, Urteil vom 10. Dezember 2003, Az.: 1 O 361/02, S Ibid., S Ibid., S K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S. 80, Rn Heft 2, 200419 Forum Verbreitung Das Landgericht hat weiterhin zu Recht darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass die Mediatisierung des Menschen durch den Staat durch die Kodifizierung des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes Veränderungen erfahren (habe). 23 Soweit Staaten entsprechende völkerrechtliche Normen schaffen, können sie durch diese dem Einzelnen bestimmte Rechte oder Pflichten zusprechen bzw. zuordnen und ihm hierdurch eine partielle bezogen auf den jeweiligen Regelungsgehalt sowie die im Einzelfall beteiligten Staaten Völkerrechtssubjektivität einräumen. 24 Im Bereich des Schutzes von Menschenrechten hat dies z.b. dazu geführt, dass die EMRK geschaffen wurde. Diese räumt dem Einzelnen ausdrücklich verschiedene Rechte ein, insbesondere das Recht auf Leben (Artikel 2 EMRK). Sie soll hauptsächlich unter normalen Friedensbedingungen 25 und im Rahmen des Rechtsverhältnisses zwischen einem Staat und den Personen gelten, 26 die sich auf dessen Territorium befinden und dessen Kompetenz zur Ausübung von Hoheitsgewalt unterliegen. 27 Darüber hinaus gewährt sie dem Einzelnen in Artikel 34 EMRK ein Verfahren (die Individualbeschwerde), das es ihm ermöglicht, tatsächliche Verletzungen gerichtlich geltend zu machen und Schadensersatzansprüche auch tatsächlich durchzusetzen, und zwar völlig unabhängig davon, wer für diese Verletzung verantwortlich ist, der Heimatoder sogar ein fremder, dritter Staat. 28 Es besteht folglich in diesem Bereich eine völkerrechtliche Individualberechtigung, denn dem Individuum wurde durch eine Völkerrechtsnorm unmittelbar die Befugnis eingeräumt, nach Ausschöpfung des innerstaatlichen Rechtsweges von einem Staat in einem völkerrechtlichen Verfahren ein bestimmtes Verhalten verlangen zu können. 29 Das humanitäre Völkerrecht auf der anderen Seite befasst sich nur mit den Gegebenheiten von internationalen und nicht-internationalen bewaffneten Konflikten und dem Verhältnis zwischen dem Staat und der Zivilbevölkerung. 30 Es umfasst alle jene Bestimmungen des Völkerrechts, die die Behandlung des einzelnen Menschen in internationalen und nicht-internationalen bewaffneten Konflikten regeln sollen. 31 Die Fragen, die sich also mit Blick auf das Urteil stellen, sind folgende: 1. Kann einer Einzelperson eines Staates ein Anspruch zustehen gegen einen das humanitäre Völkerrecht verletzenden, anderen Staat? Mit anderen Worten, wer soll Berechtigter von Wiedergutmachung 32 sein, wenn es sich hierbei z.b. um Reparationszahlungen handelt, weil eine Naturalrestitution nicht möglich ist? Der verletzte Staat, dessen Bürger, der durch die Verletzung des humanitären Völkerrechts Betroffene oder gar beide? 2. Können Individuen Wiedergutmachung für Verletzungen des humanitären Völkerrechts unmittelbar vor nationalen Gerichten geltend machen, oder müssen sie auf spezielle, internationale Foren und Mechanismen zurückgreifen? 33 Weiterhin: Für den Fall, dass das Begehren auf internationaler Ebene geltend zu machen ist, existieren solche Mechanismen? 1. Völkerrechtliche Berechtigung des Einzelnen Grundlage der Klageerhebung vor dem Landgericht Bonn und auch Ausgangspunkt für den hier diskutierten Aspekt ist die Verletzung völkerrechtlicher Vorschriften in einem internationalen bewaffneten Konflikt. 34 Die traditionelle Konzeption des Völkerrechts versteht den Einzelnen nicht als Völkerrechtssubjekt. 35 Eine unbeschränkte Völkerrechtssubjektivität kommt nur den Staaten zu, weil nur diese Träger sämtlicher völkerrechtlicher Rechte und Pflichten sind. 36 Einzelpersonen oder Gruppen von Personen wird nach h. L. eine Völkerrechtssubjektivität nicht zuerkannt. Wechselseitige Rechte und Pflichten auf der Ebene des Völkerrechts können somit auch nicht zwischen Staaten und Einzelpersonen entstehen. 37 Bei völkerrechtlichen Delikten durch Handlungen gegenüber fremden Staatsbürgern steht ein Anspruch daher nicht dem Betroffenen selbst, sondern nur dessen Heimatstaat 23 LG Bonn, a.a.o. (Fn. 2), S K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S. 80, Rn 3; S. 81, Rn Eine Anwendung auch in Zeiten eines bewaffneten Konflikts ergibt sich über Artikel 15 EMRK. 26 Ch. Greenwood in: D. Fleck, (Hrsg.), Handbuch des humanitären Völkerrechts in bewaffneten Konflikten, München 1994, S. 8, Rn Artikel 1 EMRK: Die Hohen Vertragsparteien sichern allen ihrer Hoheitsgewalt unterstehenden Personen die in Abschnitt I bestimmten Rechte und Freiheiten zu. ; vgl. auch B. Schäfer, Der Fall Bankovic oder Wie eine Lücke geschaffen wird in: MRM Heft 3/ 2002, S. 157, linke Spalte; sowie S. 158: Natürlich wird durch die Vertragsstaaten der grundsätzlich territoriale Anwendungsbereich der Konvention festgelegt. Die Regel ist ja auch, dass die Vertragsstaaten auf ihrem eigenen Territorium hoheitlich tätig werden. Die Konvention richtet sich aber an die Vertragsstaaten und deren Organe. Diese haben die Konvention einzuhalten, ob sie nun auf dem eigenen Territorium hoheitlich handeln oder auf fremdem. 28 Andererseits können nur Unterzeichnerstaaten der EMRK diesem Klageverfahren unterworfen werden, vgl. Art. 1 EMRK. 29 Ipsen unterscheidet von dieser Berechtigung die bloße Begünstigung, die nur als Reflex aus Rechten und Pflichten des Staates entstehen kann, vgl. K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S. 80, Rn 5, sowie S A. v. Block-Schlesier, Zur Frage der Akzeptanz des humanitären Völkerrechts am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden, 1999, S. 27; Ch. Greenwood, a.a.o. (Fn. 26), S. 8, Rn Es handelt sich bei diesen Vorschriften sowohl um das Haager als auch das Genfer Recht, vgl. A. v. Block-Schlesier, a.a.o. (Fn. 30), S. 27; St. Kadelbach, a.a.o. (Fn. 18), S. 286; Ch. Greenwood, a.a.o. (Fn. 26), S. 8, Rn Vgl. die Definition von K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S. 571, Rn. 65, 66: Wiedergutmachung (,reparation ) zu leisten, ist die völkerrechtliche Pflicht desjenigen Staates, dem das völkerrechtsverletzende Verhalten zurechenbar ist (Rn 65). Die Wiedergutmachung kann in Form der Naturalrestitution (,restitution in kind ) oder des Wertersatzes (,compensation ) erfolgen (Rn 66). 33 Vgl. auch: E.-Ch. Gillard, Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law in: 85 IRRC 2003, S Nicht behandelt werden sollen der Aspekt der Verletzung von Menschenrechten und die für eine solche Verletzung vorgesehene Möglichkeit, Schadensersatz zu verlangen, z.b. aufgrund von Bestimmungen der EMRK. 35 BGH, Urteil vom 26. Juni 2003, Az.: III ZR 245/98, S. 19; H. Fischer,Humanitäres Völkerrecht und humanitäre Hilfe im Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina in: W. Voit (Hrsg.), Humanitäres Völkerrecht im Jugoslawienkonflikt Ausländische Flüchtlinge Andere Rotkreuz-Fragen, Bochumer Schriften zur Friedenssicherung und zum Humanitären Völkerrecht, Band 18, Bochum 1993, S K. Hailbronner in: W. Vitzthum, Völkerrecht, 2. Auflage, Berlin, New York, 2001, S. 170, Rn 8; E.-Ch. Gillard, a.a.o. (Fn. 33), S H. Fischer, a.a.o. (Fn. 35), S. 29. Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 8120 Forum Verbreitung zu. 38 Dieser macht im Wege des diplomatischen Schutzes sein eigenes Recht darauf geltend, dass das Völkerrecht in der Person seines Staatsangehörigen beachtet wird bzw. verletzt wurde 39, und gewährt somit dem Individuum einen mittelbaren internationalen Schutz. Allerdings werden dem Einzelnen vermehrt Rechte eingeräumt. 40 Wie bereits gesehen, 41 sind Individuen überwiegend im Bereich der Menschenrechte in zunehmendem Maße mit Rechten ausgestattet worden. Die Schwierigkeit für Individuen im Bereich des humanitären Völkerrechts, Ansprüche durchzusetzen, basiert auf der bisherigen Lehre, dass nur Staaten berechtigt und verpflichtet sein können. 42 Aber auch das humanitäre Völkerrecht schützt individuelle Rechtspositionen zumindest nach materiellem Recht. 43 So enthält der allen vier Genfer Konventionen gemeinsame Artikel 3 eine Liste von Rechten, die denen entsprechen, die es im Bereich der Menschenrechte gibt. 44 Und es existieren auch im humanitäre Völkerrecht Verpflichtungen, Schadensersatz zu leisten. Eine solche Verpflichtung ergibt sich beispielsweise aus Artikel 91 des ersten Zusatzprotokolls zu den Genfer Abkommen vom 12. August 1949 über den Schutz der Opfer internationaler bewaffneter Konflikte (ZP I), 45 der Art. 3 der IV. Haager Konvention wörtlich wiederholt. 46 Die Verpflichtung, Schadensersatz für Verletzungen des humanitären Völkerrechts zu leisten, bezieht sich auf jede der am Konflikt beteiligten Parteien Angreifer und Verteidiger in gleicher Weise. 47 Gemeint sind damit allerdings die an dem Konflikt beteiligten Staaten, nicht etwa Private. Es vertreten nun mehrere die Ansicht, dass es keinen Grund gibt, das in den Haager Konventionen und im Zusatzprotokoll I genannte Recht auf Wiedergutmachung auf die Staaten als Adressaten zu beschränken, sondern die es auch Individuen zubilligen wollen. 48 So argumentiert z.b. Kleffner, dass es sinnvoll sei, der Pflicht eines Staates für Verletzungen des humanitären Völkerrechts aufzukommen, das Recht des Einzelnen gegenüber zu stellen, dem aufgrund dieser Verletzung ein Schaden entsteht, hierfür einen Ausgleich zu verlangen. 49 Das humanitäre Völkerrecht beinhalte mehrere Regeln, die ausdrücklich auf Konzepte wie Rechte, 50 Ansprüche 51 und Vorrecht Bezug nehmen. 52 Diese und andere Bestimmungen schüfen Rechte von Individuen oder setzten zumindest die Existenz dieser Rechte voraus. 53 Diese Normen entsprechen ihrer Art und Funktion nach denen, die es auch im Bereich der Menschenrechte gibt. Durch sie wird das Individuum auf völkerrechtlicher Ebene materiell-rechtlich Berechtigter, also zum Inhaber (grundlegender) Rechte. In diese Richtung gehen z.b. die von zwei unabhängigen Experten entwickelten Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, 18 Januar 2001). 54 Diese besagen in ihrem Artikel 15, dass adequate, effective and promt reparation shall be intended to promote justice by redressing violations of international human rights or humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the violations and the harm suffered. Weiterhin wird auf völkerrechtlicher Ebene in unterschiedlichen Foren propagiert, Einzelpersonen Ansprüche zuzugestehen. Vergleiche nur etwa die von der Universität von Amsterdam und dem Netherland Institute of Human Rights of the University of Utrecht organisierten zwei Expertentreffen im Mai Auf diesen Treffen wurde darüber diskutiert, inwiefern bestehende internationale Mechanismen Einzelpersonen mit der Möglichkeit auf Schadensersatz ausstatten können. 55 Auch das Übereinkommen über die Rechte des Kindes von verpflichtet in seinem Artikel 38 I die Vertragsstaaten, die für sie verbindlichen Regeln des in bewaffneten Konflikten anwendbaren humanitären Völkerrechts, die für das Kind Bedeutung haben, zu beachten und für deren Beachtung zu sorgen. 57 In welche Richtung auch immer die Entwicklung in Zukunft gehen mag, und auch bei dem allgemeinen Bestreben, Individuen vermehrt Rechte zugestehen zu wollen, ist daran zu erinnern, dass nationale Gerichte bei der Gewährung von Wiedergutmachung bisher restriktiv vorgegangen sind. So hat z.b. der Bundesgerichtshof, zuletzt in dem Urteil vom 26. Juni 2003 (Distomo), erneut bekräftigt, dass es der Heimatstaat des verletztes Bürgers sei, der einen Ersatzanspruch geltend zu machen habe und nicht etwa der verletzte Bürger selbst Mavrommatis-Konzessionen-Fall, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 2 (1924), S. 12; BGH, Urteil vom 26. Juni 2003, Az.: III ZR 245/98, S. 19; E.-Ch. Gillard, a.a.o. (Fn. 33), S. 537; J. K. Kleffner, Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law Through the Establishment of an Individual Complaint Procedure in: LJIL 15 (2002), S. 238; K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S. 305, Rn 41 f. 39 Mavrommatis-Konzessionen-Fall, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 2 (1924), 12; BGH, Urteil vom 26. Juni 2003, Az.: III ZR 245/ K. Hailbronner, a.a.o. (Fn. 36), S. 171, Rn 14; K. Ipsen, a.a.o. (Fn. 15), S. 81, Rn 6; G. Dahm; J. Delbrück; R. Wolfrum, Völkerrecht, Band I/2, Der Staat und andere Völkerrechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung; Berlin 2002, S. 266 f., V.; St. Kadelbach, a.a.o. (Fn. 18), S. 284; E.-Ch. Gillard, a.a.o. (Fn. 33), S Vgl. IV, Abs. 3, Vgl. Abs. zuvor, dort, a.a.o. (Fn. 41). 43 St. Kadelbach, a.a.o. (Fn. 18), S H.-J. Heintze, Zum Verhältnis von Menschenrechtsschutz und humanitärem Völkerrecht in: Humanitäres Völkerrecht Informationsschriften 16 (2003), S , (172). 45 Art. 91 ZP I lautet: Eine am Konflikt beteiligte Partei, welche die Abkommen oder dieses Protokoll verletzt, ist gegebenenfalls zum Schadensersatz verpflichtet. Sie ist für alle Handlungen verantwortlich, die von den zu ihren Streitkräften gehörenden Personen begangen werden. ; S. a. E.-Ch. Gillard, a.a.o. (Fn. 33), S R. Wolfrum, in: D. Fleck, a.a.o. (Fn. 26), Rn R. Wolfrum, a.a.o. (Fn. 46), Rn E.-Ch. Gillard, a.a.o. (Fn. 33), S. 536 m.w.n. in a.a.o. (Fn. 18). 49 J. K. Kleffner, a.a.o. (Fn. 38), S Vgl. Artikel 5 III, 7 I 2, 8, 38, 80 GK IV; Artikel 44 V, 45 III 2 ZP I. 51 Vgl. Artikel 27 I, II GK IV; Artikel 45 III 1 ZP I; Artikel 4, 6 II ZP II. 52 Vgl. Artikel 30 GK IV; Artikel 75 I ZP I. 53 J. K. Kleffner, a.a.o. 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