Source: http://openjurist.org/686/f2d/776/united-states-v-goodheim
Timestamp: 2016-10-26 21:59:47
Document Index: 561589282

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 1202', '§ 921', '§ 1202', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 921', '§ 922', '§ 1202', '§ 1202']

686 F. 2d 776 - United States v. Goodheim HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 686 F.2d.
Compliance with Boykin does not require that the trial court specifically articulate each of the three rights that is waived upon entry of a guilty plea. Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974). All that is required is that the record " 'affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.' " Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 n.4, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468 n.4, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)).
The statutory language defining "firearm" for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) and § 1202(a)(1) does not require that the weapon be operable. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1976); 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(c)(3) (1976).1 Moreover, Goodheim stipulated at trial that each of the weapons was a firearm as defined in sections 921(a)(3) and 1202(c)(3). The district court instructed the jury regarding the definition of "firearm" by reading from the applicable statutes. The government's expert witness did not define "firearm" in any manner inconsistent with the applicable statute; he specifically stated that a "firearm" within the statutory meaning need not be operable.
Goodheim also asserts that "a serious question developed as to the identity of the Defendant as the person who actually received certain firearms on the dates alleged in the indictment."2 Consequently, he argues that it was prejudicial error for the district court to allow Aiello and Agent Newby to identify Goodheim from photographs because the government did not comply with United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975).
Brown is inapposite. It relates to the question of when expert testimony is permissible. Here, neither Aiello nor Agent Newby testified as experts. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses is admissible if it is "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Fed.R.Evid. 701. The identification by a non-expert percipient witness of a photograph as that of the perpetrator of an offense is permissible, so long as the proper safeguards and procedures are followed. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). We reject Goodheim's argument.
Finally, Goodheim argues that the consecutive sentences he received on Counts One and Two are constitutionally infirm because they violate the proscription against multiple punishments for the same offense. In Count One, Goodheim was charged, as a convicted felon, with receipt of a firearm that had been shipped and transported in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976). In Count Two, Goodheim was charged with making a false and fictitious written statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976). The same firearm was involved in each count.
The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its rule in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), as the proper standard for determining whether two statutory offenses may be punished consecutively. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). In Blockburger, the Court held:
(Count One (18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)) ) required the making of a false statement in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of a firearm. The offense is committed whether or not a firearm is acquired. (Count Two (18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1)) ) is violated if an individual received a firearm that is shipped in interstate commerce. There is no necessity of showing that the firearm was acquired by making false statements to a firearms dealer during a purchase. Receipt is unique to Count Two just as a false statement is unique to Count One.
Consequently, under the rule of Blockburger, sections 922(a)(1) and 922(h)(1) constitute separate offenses which may be punished consecutively. With regard to double jeopardy, "the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishment, imposition of such sentence does not violate the Constitution." Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. at 1145. Thus, the sentences imposed here were lawful.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) defines "firearm" for the purposes of § 922(h) (1). It provides:
18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(c)(3) defines firearm for the purposes of § 1202(a)(1). It provides: