Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/356406/orr2br
Timestamp: 2020-06-01 17:50:04
Document Index: 492448196

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12181', '§ 36', '§ 12186', '§ 12188', '§ 794', '§ 302', '§ 36', '§ 36', '§ 12182']

orr2br | Americans With Disabilities Act Of 1990 | Government
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S41 ADA Self-EvaluationTransition Plan LTC2013
US Department of Justice Civil Rights Division - Letter - tal118
1KERRY ALAN SCANLON, Deputy Assistant
JOHN L. WODATCH, Chief,
JOAN A. MAGAGNA, Deputy Chief,
Deputy Civil Chief,
SHERRY A. ORR as Guardian ad Litem ) No. CIV-S-95-507 EJG PAN
For JEREMY ORR, a Minor Child; )
SHERRY A. ORR, and WILLIAM ORR, )
) REPLY BRIEF OF THE
Plaintiffs, ) UNITED STATES
) AS AMICUS CURIAE
v. ) IN SUPPORT OF
) PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
KINDERCARE LEARNING CENTERS, INC., ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The complaint in this case alleged that KinderCare Learning
Centers, Inc., has violated title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89, by expelling a
nine-year old child with a disability from its after-school child
care program. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the expulsion is scheduled for hearing on May 26, 1995.
In its opening brief as amicus curiae, the United States urged
the Court to grant the motion because Plaintiffs are likely to
prevail on the merits of their claim and because the balance of
hardships and the public interest weigh in favoring of granting
This reply addresses three issues raised by KinderCare in
(1) the level of deference due to the government's
interpretations of title III and its implementing
(2) the proper application of Southeastern Community
College v. Davis and related case law; and
(3) the limited scope of the personal services exemption of
28 C.F.R. § 36.306.
All other substantive issues raised by KinderCare, as well as
those raised by Plaintiffs, are discussed at length in the United
States' opening brief.
I. The United States' Interpretation
of the ADA is Entitled to Substantial Deference.
KinderCare concedes, as it must, that the statutory and
regulatory interpretations of an agency charged with promulgating
implementation regulations are entitled to controlling weight so
long as they are reasonable and not clearly erroneous or contrary
to the statute or regulation. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984); Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381,
2386 (1994). While KinderCare challenges the government's
analysis, in fact, as detailed in its brief, the United States'
interpretations of the key title III provisions -- including the
mandate to make reasonable modifications and the limited scope of
the personal services exemption -- are consistent with
legislative intent, the statute, the regulation, and the
Department's previously published interpretations of title III.
Each of the Department's arguments is supported by citations to
KinderCare further suggests that the government's views
should be discounted because they are put forth as amicus curiae.
However, even the cases cited by KinderCare indicate that some
measure of deference must be afforded the views of the agency
that authored the regulations at issue, regardless of whether
those views have previously been articulated. See also Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144
(1991). In Martin, the Supreme Court held that even though the
Secretary of Labor's interpretation of Occupational Safety and
Health Act standards were first advanced during an adjudicative
proceeding, they were entitled to deference because the Secretary
was charged with establishing standards though the exercise of
workplace rulemaking powers and enforcing them by issuing
citations for violations of those standards. The Supreme Court
held that the Secretary's litigation positions were "as much an
exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is . . . promulgation
of a workplace health and safety standard," and not simply
appellate counsel's "post hoc rationalizations" of agency actions
that had already occurred. Id at 156 (citations omitted).
Here, the Department of Justice is the agency charged by
Congress with both implementing title III of the ADA by
promulgating a regulation, see 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b), and
enforcing it by investigating complaints and litigating matters
that cannot be resolved through voluntary compliance. See 42
U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1). The Department's position, therefore, is
analogous to the position in which the Secretary of Labor stood
in Martin. Hence, the Department's positions, even if first
espoused in the context of this litigation, are still entitled to
some deference.
II. The Davis Decision and Related Cases Are
Not Dispositive Here.
The Supreme Court held in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), that entities subject to the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, did not have to
modify their programs to accommodate persons with disabilities if
doing so would fundamentally alter those programs. The Davis
court found that a nursing college did not have to enroll a deaf
applicant who relied on lipreading for verbal communication, in
part because it appeared unlikely that the applicant could
succeed in the program, i.e., become a licensed registered nurse.
The college's curriculum included a clinical component involving
"'many situations, such as an operation room intensive care unit,
or post-natal unit, [in which] all doctors and nurses wear
surgical masks which would make lip reading impossible.'" Id. at
403 (quoting from the district court's decision, 424 F. Supp.
1341, 1343 (E.D.N.C. 1976)). Exempting the deaf applicant from
these clinical components would fundamentally alter the nature of
the college's nursing program, as she would not be fully prepared
for the career of a licensed registered nurse.
Similarly, in Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir.
1994), the Third Circuit found that a Pennsylvania program
designed to teach persons with physical disabilities to live
independently and to become active and useful members of society
did not have to be modified to include persons with mental
impairments who, the program administrators had determined, could
not meet the program's sole purpose: to develop fully-
functioning, independent citizens. Allowing persons with mental
disabilities to participate in the program with the use of
surrogates as decision-makers would be fundamentally inconsistent
with the level of achievement -- i.e., independent living --
expected of program participants.
The "fundamental alteration" defense from Davis was
specifically incorporated into title III's reasonable
modification provision, 42 U.S.C. § 302(b)(2)(A)(ii), and its
implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a). KinderCare has
used this defense to justify expelling Jeremy, arguing that he
cannot benefit from "group child care," and, as such, it would
fundamentally alter the KinderCare program to require it to
retain him. This argument is specious. It ignores the fact that
the Supreme Court's analysis in Davis was based primarily on the
achievement-oriented nature of nursing school. KinderCare relies
on Davis and Easley to say that neither the Rehabilitation Act
nor the ADA imposes any "requirement upon an 'educational
institution to lower or effect substantial modifications of
standards to accommodate a handicapped person.'" Defendant's
Brief at 13, quoting Davis at 413. However, this argument is
inapposite: simply put, KinderCare is not a competitive
educational program designed to lead to a degree or professional
certification, nor is it a program with a specific goal of
achieving independent living. Instead, it is a program that
offers children a safe, supervised place to play and rest after
school while parents work or are otherwise occupied.
Jeremy attends KinderCare after attending his regular school
-- it is there, and not at KinderCare, where he and his parents
seek a specialized educational program designed for his
particular needs. While KinderCare has set goals for healthy
child development, the nature of those goals is fundamentally
different from the achievement expectations of a professional
school (or even an elementary school): people do not attend
KinderCare or other non-competitive after-school child care
programs to obtain specialized skills that will enable them to
meet particular educational requirements or professional
standards. There is no way to "pass" or "fail" KinderCare's
program. Unlike nursing colleges, who can judge the success or
failure of their programs by monitoring the rate with which their
graduates go on to become licensed nurses, KinderCare has no
similar measurement. Also, unlike the facts underlying Easley,
the presence of an attendant will facilitate rather than
undermine Jeremy's ability to fulfil the articulated goals of
KinderCare's program, including developing a healthy, positive
self-image; developing social skills through group interaction;
increasing attention span and following simple directions;
practicing thoughtful and courteous behavior; developing fine and
gross motor skills; and experiencing success through
developmental activities. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 3-4.
Here, where Jeremy's ability to enjoy the benefits of
KinderCare's program does not require a change in the basic
curriculum, the fact that Jeremy may not benefit to the same
extent as other children does not mean that his mere presence
fundamentally alters that program. KinderCare suffers no
hardship by continuing Jeremy in its program, nor do other
participants suffer. Plaintiffs have not asked KinderCare to
provide Jeremy with any kind of disability-specific curriculum to
entertain or educate him. Nor has KinderCare been asked to
provide Jeremy with a remedial educational program, physical
therapy, tactile stimulation, speech therapy, or any other
curriculum for which specialized knowledge regarding
developmental delays would be necessary. It is irrelevant, then,
for KinderCare to assert that "KinderCare is not a special
education program." Id. at 9. Plaintiffs are not asking
KinderCare to provide Jeremy with special education, or to use
any specialized knowledge regarding developmental delays while he
is in its care. Instead, Plaintiffs are merely asking KinderCare
to make reasonable modifications that will enable Jeremy to have
an equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits of KinderCare's
III. KinderCare Must Provide Personal Services to Jeremy Orr,
As It Does for Younger Non-disabled Children.
Title III does not require public accommodations to afford
personal services to individuals with disabilities unless such
services are typically provided to non-disabled individuals. 28
C.F.R. § 36.306; see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App B at 614 (July 1,
1994). Thus, KinderCare would not have to provide diapering
services for Jeremy if no child in the center received such
services. However, KinderCare regularly does provide diapering
and toileting services for children. In this circumstance, the
reasonable modifications requirement of title III, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), requires KinderCare to make its services
normally provided to younger children available to Jeremy as
well.1 Indeed, KinderCare has provided diapering services to
Jeremy since he enrolled in its after-school program in September
1994. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this has
been difficult or problematic.2
Of course, if KinderCare permits a personal care attendant to
accompany Jeremy, the aide could provide personal services such as
diapering or assistance with eating, eliminating KinderCare's need to
provide these services directly.
KinderCare argues that it would have to supervise the aide very
closely, something it suggests would be very burdensome. KinderCare
has other aides in its program and concedes, as it must, that these
aides do not jeopardize the quality or stability of its programs.
KinderCare has done next to nothing to determine how best to
structure its relationship with the aide or with the Alta Center or
United Cerebral Palsy to ameliorate any of these concerns. Even if a
personal care attendant provides services that are different from
those provided by other aides, there are undoubtedly ways to
successfully integrate this kind of service provider into
KinderCare's program. Under title III's reasonable modification
requirement, KinderCare has a duty to explore ways of achieving this
However, there might be circumstances where diapering older
children with disabilities would not be a reasonable modification.
This is not the case with Jeremy.
The Court should issue a preliminary injunction to prevent
KinderCare from expelling Jeremy and to require KinderCare to
permit an aide to accompany him in its after-school program.
May , 1995 May , 1995
Sacramento, CA Washington, DC
CHARLES J. STEVENS, KERRY ALAN SCANLON,
United States Attorney, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Eastern Dist. of California General for Civil Rights
EDMUND F. BRENNAN, JOHN L. WODATCH, Chief
Deputy Civil Chief JOAN A. MAGAGNA, Deputy Chief
Office of the U.S. Attorney MARY LOU MOBLEY, Attorney
Eastern Dist. of California U.S. Department of Justice
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1150 Civil Rights Division
Sacramento, CA 95814 Disability Rights Section
Tel: (916) 554-2700 P.O. Box 66738
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