Source: https://casetext.com/case/west-v-parker-3
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West v. Parker, NO. 3:19-cv-00006 | Casetext Search + Citator
Protocol B is a three-drug protocol comprised of successive doses of midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and…
The Court recently described in detail the intervening changes to Tennessee law regarding methods of…
Full title:STEPHEN MICHAEL WEST, Plaintiff, v. TONY PARKER, et al., Defendants
NO. 3:19-cv-00006 (M.D. Tenn. Jun. 3, 2019)
analyzing West's argument that new facts prevented the application of claim preclusion
CAPITAL CASE NO. 3:19-cv-00006
STEPHEN MICHAEL WEST, Plaintiff, v. TONY PARKER, et al., Defendants
Rule 12(b)(1) governs dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss...generally come in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack." Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). "When reviewing a facial attack, a district court takes the allegations in the complaint as true, which is a similar safeguard employed under 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss." Id. "When considering a factual attack upon the court's jurisdiction, the court may weigh the evidence, and no presumption of truth applies to the plaintiff's factual allegations." Hickam v. Segars, 905 F.Supp.2d 835, 838 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (citing Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330). "In its review, the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve jurisdictional facts." Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "'a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "If the plaintiffs do not nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation and brackets omitted). Dismissal is likewise appropriate where the complaint, however factually detailed, fails to state a claim as a matter of law. Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2007). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is not required to accept summary allegations, legal conclusions, or unwarranted factual inferences. Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999); Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-114 (1982). In keeping with this law, at the conclusion of Plaintiff's sentencing hearing, the trial judge announced that "[i]n accordance with the verdict of the jury, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant be sentenced to death by electrocution at a time to be fixed by the Supreme Court of this State." (Doc. No. 11-46 at 2.)
(e) If lethal injection or electrocution is held to be unconstitutional by the Tennessee supreme court under the Constitution of Tennessee, or held to be unconstitutional by the United States supreme court under the United States Constitution, or if the United States supreme court declines to review any judgment holding lethal injection or electrocution to be unconstitutional under the United States Constitution made by the Tennessee supreme court or the United States court of appeals that has jurisdiction over Tennessee, or if the Tennessee supreme court declines to review any judgment by the Tennessee court of criminal appeals holding lethal injection or electrocution to be unconstitutional under the United States or Tennessee Constitution, all persons sentenced to death for a capital crime shall be executed by any constitutional method of execution. No sentence of death shall be reduced as a result of a determination that a method of execution is declared unconstitutional under the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States. In any case in which an execution method is declared unconstitutional, the death sentence shall remain in force until the sentence can be lawfully executed by any valid method of execution.
Pursuant to every version of the statute in effect since 1998, the TDOC devised a series of protocols to carry out executions in Tennessee. As relevant to this case, the lethal injection protocols adopted in 2013, 2014, and 2015 all called for execution by a lethal dose of the barbiturate pentobarbital. West v. Schofield, 519 S.W.3d 550, 552 (Tenn. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. West v. Parker, 138 S. Ct. 476 (2017), and cert. denied sub nom. Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, 138 S. Ct. 647 (2018), reh'g denied, 138 S. Ct. 1183 (2018). A group of death row inmates including Plaintiff filed suit in state court alleging, among other things, that the pentobarbital protocol constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution by exposing them to a substantial risk of serious harm or lingering death. Id., 519 S.W.3d at 563. The state courts concluded after trial that the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims failed on their merits, id., and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 8, 2018. Abdur'Rahman, 138 S. Ct. 647.
On the same day that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the challenge to pentobarbital, TDOC revised its lethal injection protocol to provide for two alternative methods of execution: Protocol A, comprised of a lethal dose of pentobarbital; and Protocol B, comprised of a dose of midazolam, followed by vecuronium bromide, and then potassium chloride, in that order. (Doc. No. 11-3 at 34.) Plaintiff and dozens of his fellow death row inmates again filed suit in state court "seeking a declaration that the new, January 8, 2018 Lethal Injection Protocol, Protocol B, violates their constitutional and statutory rights." (Doc. No. 13-1 at 7.) They alleged, among other things, that the three-drug execution method constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, 558 S.W.3d 606, 610 (Tenn. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Zagorski v. Parker, 139 S. Ct. 11 (2018), and cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. Parker, 139 S. Ct. 626 (2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. March 7, 2019) (No. 18-8332). On July 5, 2018, while that lawsuit was still pending in the trial court and two days after the plaintiffs filed their second and final amended complaint, TDOC revised its lethal injection protocol to eliminate the pentobarbital option and leave the three-drug protocol as the sole method of lethal injection. (Doc. No. 11-4 at 34.)
Trial started on the inmates' claims on July 9, 2018. Abdur'Rahman, 558 S.W.3d at 612. During his opening statement, counsel for Plaintiff and several other inmates in the state case asserted that the issue before the court was still the January protocol and that he "intend[ed] to go forward with claims against their new protocol, the newly ripe claims" through "either an amended pleading or a new pleading." Response-Attachment A at 3-9, Miller v. Parker, No. 3:18-781 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 4, 2018) (Miller Doc. No. 18-1 at 3-9). He acknowledged, however, that relevant provisions of the protocols were the same and that the pending causes of action "address[ed] the same issues, but not the same protocol." Id. at 4. He asserted that the pending claims were not moot and that "we can't completely start over." Id. The trial proceeded and lasted ten days. Abdur'Rahman, 558 S.W.3d at 612.
At the conclusion of the trial, the state court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to conform to the proof with regard to an alternative lethal injection method that was not alleged in the complaint but about which witnesses had testified. Order Applying Tennessee Civil Procedure Rule 15.02, Abdur'Rahman, et al. v. Parker, No. 18-183-II(III) (Davidson Chancery Jul. 19, 2018). In a written order, the state court explained that:
Federal courts "may properly take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record." CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 709 F. App'x 440, 442 (9th Cir. 2017); see also New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that court ruling on motion to dismiss "may consider materials in addition to the complaint if such materials are public records or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judicial notice"). Accordingly, the Court herein considers the existence and text of filings in Plaintiff's state-court litigation but does not rely on them for the truth or accuracy of their contents.
Relevant filings from the state-court case not already in this Court's record are attached as a Collective Appendix to this opinion in the order in which they are cited herein.
Denial of the Plaintiffs' Rule 15.02 motion to amend on the Glossip alternative, however, is separate from and does not affect that by express consent of the parties . . . the pleadings have been amended to conform to the filing on July 5, 2018 and the proof at trial that the protocol in issue and on which declaratory judgment is
sought is the Lethal Injection Execution Manual, Execution Procedures For Lethal Injection, Revised July 5, 2018.
Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff and three others filed a motion seeking "reconsideration of that portion of the Court's order which adds consideration of Defendant's July 5, 2018 [protocol] to those matters presently pending before the court." Motion of Plaintiffs, Abdur'Rahman, et al. v. Parker, No. 18-183-II(III) (Davidson Chancery filed Jul. 20, 2018). In their memorandum in support of the motion, the inmates argued that allowing them to bring separate claims against the July protocol would not mean the recently concluded trial was "for naught," because "under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel/issue preclusion, the results of this Court's judgment as to each issue relevant to its determination of the constitutionality of the January 8th Protocol will bind the parties in a subsequent litigation." Memorandum in Support at 10, Abdur'Rahman, et al. v. Parker, No. 18-183-II(III) (Davidson Chancery Jul. 20, 2018). Specifically, they asserted that:
The motion was filed on behalf of state-court plaintiffs David Earl Miller, Nicholas Todd Sutton, Stephen Michael West, and Larry McKay. It expressly noted that "[r]econsideration is not sought by any Plaintiff not so joined." Id. at 2 n.2.
Plaintiff and three other inmates—the same group who joined in the motion to reconsider in state court discussed above—filed suit in this Court on November 2, 2018, alleging violations of their constitutional rights in connection with their anticipated executions and seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Miller, et al. v. Parker, No. 3:18-1234 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 2018). On November 15, 2018, the Court enjoined Defendants from proceeding with any Plaintiff's execution without providing telephone access to his attorney-witness, but held that Plaintiffs had insufficient likelihood of success on their Ex Post Facto, Eighth Amendment, and coerced-waiver claims to warrant further preliminary relief. Memorandum and Order, Miller, et al. v. Parker, No. 3:18-1234 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018) (Campbell, J.), (Miller Doc. No. 20). The United States Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. Miller v. Parker, 910 F.3d 259, 260 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018). After Mr. Miller's execution on December 6, 2018, the Court severed the claims of the remaining three inmates, Order, Miller, et al. v. Parker, No. 3:18-1234 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 1, 2019) (Campbell, J.), (Miller Doc. No. 47), and Plaintiff West's case was assigned to the undersigned for further proceedings. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief on February 7, 2019 (Doc. No. 11), which is the subject of Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 12.)
Plaintiff sues Tony Parker, the Commissioner of the TDOC, in his official capacity as the official who seeks to execute Plaintiff pursuant to the current execution protocol and will oversee the execution. He also sues Tony Mays, the Warden of Riverbend Maximum Security Institution, in his official capacity as the official who is "directly in charge" of Plaintiff's execution. (Doc. No. 11 at 5.) He seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Defendants from executing him by the current lethal injection protocol, executing him by electrocution, executing him in any manner that violates the Ex Post Facto clause and is contrary to the sentence imposed on him, and executing him in any manner without allowing him to have two attorney witnesses with immediate access to a telephone and each other throughout the execution. (Id. at 146-47.) Defendants move to dismiss all claims on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 12.)
Before turning to Plaintiff's individual claims, the Court must resolve a dispute between the parties about whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to this litigation to any extent. Res judicata, in its narrowest sense, is "the preclusion of claims that have once been litigated or could have been litigated" in a previous lawsuit. Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cty., Tenn., 326 F.3d 747, 758 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003). It "rests at bottom upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction." Richards v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996).
The policy rationale in support of Res Judicata is not based upon any presumption that the final judgment was right or just. Rather, it is justifiable on the broad grounds of public policy which requires an eventual end to litigation. Akin to statutes of limitations, the doctrine of Res judicata is a 'rule of rest' and 'private peace'. . ..
Defendants assert that several of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of the Abdur'Rahman litigation in state court and should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 13 at 1, 12-19.) Plaintiff responds that res judicata does not apply to this case at all for four reasons: (1) Plaintiff filed suit in state court about the January 8, 2018 execution protocol and was not really a party to litigation of the July 5, 2018 protocol he challenges now (Doc. No. 17 at 7); (2) the Davidson County Chancery Court lacked authority to stay Plaintiff's execution (id. at 11); (3) Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to be heard in state court (id. at 14); and (4) Plaintiff now relies on new facts that could not have been presented in state court. (Id. at 20.) The Court addresses each of Plaintiff's arguments in turn.
The state-court plaintiffs' central claim in Abdur'Rahman was that the TDOC's midazolam-based three-drug lethal injection protocol, originally known as "Protocol B," violated their constitutional and statutory rights in a host of different ways, because the three-drug protocol would cause severe and unnecessary pain and suffering. (Doc. No. 13-1 at 7, 24, 29-51). They alleged pages of facts about midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride to support their chief position that midazolam was "scientifically incapable" of preventing the "constitutionally intolerable pain" that would be caused by the three-drug protocol. (Id. at 29-51, 81). Defendants argue that the July 5 revision to the lethal injection protocol was not a substantial change with regard to the three-drug protocol at issue in both these cases and that Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish the protocols by date is "a red herring." (Doc. No. 13 at 16.)
Similarly, Tennessee courts deciding whether to apply res judicata to a second suit apply a "transactional test," under which "[t]wo suits . . . shall be deemed the same 'cause of action' for purposes of res judicata where they arise out of the same transaction or a series of connected transactions." Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tenn. 2009). Plaintiff's state-court complaint referenced the January 8, 2018 Lethal Injection Protocol for identification purposes, but its "core complaint" was clearly the alleged unconstitutionality of Protocol B—the midazolam-based three-drug protocol, and the "transaction" underlying his lawsuit was his impending execution with that protocol. Nothing material to that challenge changed with the July 5 revision to the protocol. The midazolam-based three-drug protocol did not suddenly become riskier or more painful as a result of the deletion of the pentobarbital protocol, and no significantly better alternatives suddenly became available or unavailable. Accordingly, the July 5 revision did not give rise to a newly accrued cause of action with regard to the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol. Plaintiffs' allegations about the three-drug protocol were as true or false when state case concluded as they were when it began. The cause of action in both suits—the alleged unconstitutionality of the three-drug protocol—is the same, as required for res judicata to apply. Even if the Court were persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that the change in the protocol gave rise to a new cause of action that was not litigated in state court (which it is not), the underlying issue of the three-drug protocol's constitutionality was absolutely decided in the state-court case.
In denying the motion to reconsider, the trial court found that eliminating the alternative one-drug protocol was not a substantial change to the lethal injection protocol for the purposes of this facial challenge. We agree. From the time of the filing of the original complaint on February 20, 2018, the method-of-execution claim: (1) challenged the three-drug protocol and (2) alleged a one-drug protocol using pentobarbital as an alternative method of execution. Availability in theory of pentobarbital, based solely on its status as an option in the lethal injection protocol prior to the revision on July 5, 2018, would not have satisfied the Plaintiffs' burden of proof.
Plaintiff relies on Lien v. Couch, 993 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), for the proposition that res judicata does not apply to this case because the Davidson County Chancery Court could not have granted all of the relief he now seeks—specifically, an injunction against his execution. (Doc. No. 17 at 11-14.) In that case, the Liens were sued in Arkansas for breach of contract and subsequently filed suit in Tennessee against the Arkansas parties for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Lien, 993 S.W. 2d at 54. When the Arkansas court entered judgment against the Liens, the Arkansas parties asserted that the TCPA claim in Tennessee was barred by res judicata because the Liens could have filed it as a counterclaim in the Arkansas litigation. Id. The Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected that argument because the Arkansas courts would not have awarded the full damages available to the Liens in Tennessee under the TCPA, including treble damages and attorney fees. Id. at 57-59.
The Court notes that the Davidson County Chancery Court's final order stated that "[t]he immediate effect of a ruling in the Inmates' favor would halt the upcoming and subsequent executions using this three-drug lethal injection." (Doc. No. 13-2 at 7.) However, Defendants concede that "a chancery court may not itself enjoin an execution date set by the Tennessee Supreme Court," (Doc. No. 20 at 3), so the Court presumes for the purpose of ruling on Defendants' motion that the Chancery Court lacked such authority.
Defendants respond that Lien does not apply to this case because the injunction in question "was available in the state-court system" and that it does not matter "[t]hat the inmates had to seek that relief from the Tennessee Supreme Court, rather than from the chancery court." (Doc. No. 20 at 3-4.) Specifically, Defendants assert that a favorable ruling by the Chancery Court would have provided the basis for an inmate to seek a stay of execution from the Tennessee Supreme Court. (Id. at 3.) Moreover, as a practical matter, the appeal process arising from the Chancery Court's ruling inevitably involved the Tennessee Supreme Court, which has unquestioned authority to vacate its own orders setting execution dates. And even if the state supreme court had refused to hear an appeal of a ruling favorable to the inmates, the method of the state plaintiffs' executions would have automatically defaulted to a different constitutional method by virtue of state law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-114 (d). Accordingly, there is no doubt that Plaintiff's ultimate goal in the state-court litigation was to avoid execution by the three-drug protocol or that a victory in the state case would have led to that result. By contrast, the Liens could not have obtained full relief at any stage of the Arkansas litigation. Plaintiff cannot avoid preclusion on this basis.
Plaintiff's position is that as long as the pentobarbital method remained listed as Protocol A, its "feasibility and availability . . . was established by the face of the protocol," so Defendants' elimination of Protocol A days before trial resulted in a denial of due process. (Doc. No. 17 at 18.) But that position is simply illogical. The Tennessee Supreme Court case on which Plaintiff relies, which states simply that a protocol "must be assessed on its face," does not remotely suggest that the mere existence of a protocol on paper proves that the method described is readily available for use. (Id. (quoting West v. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113, 126 (Tenn. 2015).) To the contrary, Tennessee law expressly allows for the possibility that the TDOC commissioner might certify that lethal injection ingredients are unavailable, despite the existence of a lethal injection protocol. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-114 (e)(2) (providing that executions would then be carried out by electrocution). And, as Plaintiff is obviously aware, the omission from a state's protocol of a particular method of execution does not prevent an inmate from alleging and proving that the method could be readily implemented. (See Doc. No. 11 at 28-58 (alleging four alternative methods not found in TDOC's current protocol).) The language of a protocol simply does not amount to proof of a lethal-injection method's availability one way or another.
[T]he Plaintiffs assert that they were denied notice and an opportunity to be heard on availability of an alternative method of execution because TDOC revised the lethal injection protocol on the eve of trial. . . .
. . . Availability in theory of pentobarbital, based solely on its status as an option in the lethal injection protocol prior to the revision on July 5, 2018, would not have satisfied the Plaintiffs' burden of proof. Furthermore, the State's February 15, 2018 motion, asking this Court to set execution dates in eight capital cases before June 1, 2018, because of ongoing difficulty in obtaining the necessary lethal injection drugs, put the Plaintiffs on notice that the three-drug protocol likely would be used. Additional notice came to the Plaintiffs on May 21, 2018, when the Defendants filed, as an attachment to a Motion for Protective Order, an affidavit of the TDOC commissioner, which stated, "As Commissioner, I approved the January 8, 2018 [lethal injection protocol] because the drug pentobarbital and chemicals to compound pentobarbital, the drug in TDOC's previous procedures, are unavailable to TDOC for the purpose of carrying out executions by lethal injection."
Similarly, Plaintiff cannot relitigate here the propriety of the state courts' refusal to consider any alternative execution methods that were not alleged in the state-court complaints. The Tennessee Supreme Court considered that issue at length, Abdur'Rahman, 558 S.W.3d at 620-23, and concluded that
[w]ith the filing of an original complaint, an amended complaint, and then a second amended complaint, the Plaintiffs had repeated opportunities to plead removal of vecuronium bromide from the three-drug protocol as an alternative method of execution. The Plaintiffs have no justifiable excuse for their failure to plead a two-drug protocol as an alternative, given their acknowledged recognition of it during discovery and their second opportunity to amend the complaint just six days before the trial started.
Plaintiff is correct that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata 'extends only to the facts in issue as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered, and does not prevent a re-examination of the same question between the same parties where in the interval the facts have changed or new facts have occurred which may alter the legal rights or relations of the litigants.'" Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting Banks v. Banks, 77 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934)). But, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff has already affirmatively acknowledged that "[t]he evidence regarding the pain and suffering created by Tennessee's July 5th Protocol presented by West will not be materially different than the evidence presented in . . . Abdur'Rahman." (Doc. No. 11 at 18; Doc. No. 20 at 5.) Indeed, the state-court plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged "numerous problematic and botched executions" as the result of midazolam-based protocols and detailed the physical responses allegedly indicative of pain by at least seven inmates previously executed with midazolam. (Doc. No. 13-1 at 46-50, 57.) They relied at trial on the testimony of witnesses the Chancery Court characterized as "four well-qualified and imminent experts" who convinced the court that "midazolam does not elicit strong analgesic effects and the inmate being executed may be able to feel pain from the administration of the second and third drugs." (Doc. No. 13-2 at 23.) They also presented the testimony of twelve eye-witnesses to a number of lethal injections to the effect that the inmates exhibited "grimaces, clenched fists, furrowed brows, and moans indicative that the inmates were feeling pain after the midazolam had been injected and when the vecuronium bromide was injected." Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, 558 S.W.3d 606, 612 (Tenn. 2018); (Doc. No. 13-2 at 29-30). Similar evidence about Billy Ray Irick's execution does not amount to a new material change in the evidence relevant to Plaintiff's claims.
Nor is the new allegation that TDOC did not prepare a back-up dose of midazolam for Irick's execution material to Plaintiff's claims. In his complaints in both state court and this Court, a central allegation of his claims about midazolam is that midazolam has a "ceiling effect," that "[b]ecause of that ceiling effect, 500 mg of midazolam is no more effective than the minimum dose of midazolam required to bind available GABA receptors," and that no amount of midazolam would be sufficient to avoid unnecessary pain during execution. (Doc. No. 11 at 113; Doc. No. 13-1 at 34-36.) The Tennessee Supreme Court denied a motion to consider facts about Irick's execution as moot in light of its ruling. Abdur'Rahman, 558 S.W.3d at 625 and n.24. Accordingly, whether Defendants have additional doses of midazolam on hand during an execution has no bearing on Plaintiff's claims about midazolam's effects. Having rejected Plaintiff's arguments that res judicata is wholly inapplicable to this case, the Court turns to the application of that and Defendants' other defenses to each of Plaintiff's claims.
B. Count 1 — Ex Post Facto Violation
Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits Ex Post Facto punishments. Plaintiff alleges that lethal injection pursuant to the current TDOC protocol violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it "constitutes harsher punishment than execution by electrocution, the punishment to be inflicted on Plaintiff West at the time of his crimes." (Doc. No. 11 at 21-27.) Specifically, he alleges that electrocution "involves a significantly shorter duration of pain and suffering than lethal injection" under the current protocol and that "Defendants should be preliminarily and then permanently enjoined from carrying out Plaintiff's execution under a midazolam-based, three-drug protocol." (Id. at 27.)
A change in the method of execution does not constitute an ex post facto violation because like in Malloy, the method of lethal injection does "not change the
penalty—death—for murder, but only the mode of producing this." Malloy, 237 U.S. at 185. The Plaintiffs have no vested interest in being executed by electrocution as opposed to lethal injection, and the change does not criminally punish conduct that was lawful when committed or increase the punishment of the convicted. The amendments to the law adding lethal injection as the primary method of execution in Tennessee do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. or Tennessee Constitutions.
(Doc. No. 13-3 at 30-31, 35.) Plaintiff did not appeal that ruling.
Having denounced entirely the application of res judicata to this case, Plaintiff does not address Defendants' res judicata argument specifically in the context of this claim. Nonetheless, the current claim includes a slight twist on the state-court ex post facto claims. Here, Plaintiff is not asserting an ex post facto change from one version of the relevant statute to another, or from one version of the lethal injection protocol to another. Instead, he asserts an ex post facto violation arising from the change between the old electrocution-only statute and the current three-drug lethal injection protocol. While Plaintiff did not present the state court with this precise theory, Tennessee's law of "[c]laim preclusion 'bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action with respect to all issues which were or could have been litigated in the former suit.'" Regions Fin. Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 382, 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis in Regions) (quoting Patton v. Estate of Upchurch, 242 S.W.3d 781, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim . . ., the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 379 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1)).
Tennessee's res judicata doctrine similarly prevents Plaintiff from splitting his ex post facto theories between two lawsuits here. Plaintiff brought two separate lawsuits asserting ex post facto violations under slightly different theories that were all available at the time of the first litigation. The current claim is thus barred by the claim preclusion type of res judicata.
Because Plaintiff is barred from litigating this claim, it is not necessary for the Court to resolve the parties' disputes about whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to changes in methods of execution or whether Plaintiff's statutory right to choose the method in place at the time of his crime obviates any ex post facto claim he would otherwise have.
B. Count 2 — Electrocution Violates 8th Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that Tennessee's method of electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Defendants argue that this claim is not ripe for adjudication because none of the following events has occurred that would trigger Plaintiff's execution via electrocution under state law: "(1) [Plaintiff] elects to be executed by electrocution by signing a written waiver, [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 40-23-114(b); (2) lethal injection is held unconstitutional by the Tennessee Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court, id. § 40-23-114(e); or (3) the TDOC Commissioner certifies to the Governor that he is unable to carry out the sentence because 'one or more of the ingredients essential to carrying out a sentence of death by lethal injection is unavailable,' id." (Doc. No. 13 at 9-10.)
In each of Plaintiff's cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims, he alleges violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. But if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). Accordingly, inmates' claims of cruel and unusual punishment sound solely under the Eighth Amendment. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1455 (6th Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court has indicated that 'the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners . . ..' [Whitley v.] Albers, 475 U.S. [312,] 327 [(1986)]. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff's section 1983 claim in a case such as this must be for redress of eighth amendment, not fourteenth amendment substantive due process, rights. Cf. Graham [v. Connor], 490 U.S. 386, — [(1989)].").
Plaintiff responds that the contingent nature of his claim is not determinative because "ripeness contemplates whether the contingency likely will arise." (Doc. No. 17 at 37.) He argues that the likelihood of such contingencies' occurring in this case is a factual question that requires further development. (Id.) He further asserts that the facts alleged in connection with Counts 1, 3, and 4 of his amended complaint establish the likelihood that Tennessee's current lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional and that, therefore, Tennessee will attempt to carry out his execution by electrocution. (Id. at 39-40.)
Petitioner does not have a current claim with regard to electrocution, because current Tennessee law provides for execution of the death sentence by lethal injection. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-114(a) (2000). Because he committed his offense prior to January 1, 1999, Petitioner may elect by written waiver to be executed by electrocution instead of lethal injection. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-114(b). Should he choose to make such a waiver, Petitioner would waive any claim that electrocution is unconstitutional. See Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999). A recent amendment to the controlling statute provides that execution by electrocution is otherwise authorized only in the event that lethal injection is held to be unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction or the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction certifies to the governor that an essential lethal injection ingredient is unavailable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-114(d). In the
absence of any allegation that either of those triggering events has happened, any challenge to the constitutionality of electrocution is not ripe for review.
Defendants have not asserted that this prior adjudication raises any bar to the current claim.
For those same reasons, Plaintiff's claim is not ripe for review. Plaintiff's reliance on his claims in Counts 1, 3, and 4 does not change this outcome because, as explained herein, Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating any of those claims in this case. Accordingly, he has not demonstrated a "substantial risk" of any event that would trigger Tennessee's statutory default to electrocution for his execution.
C. Count 3 — Lethal Injection Protocol Violates 8th Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that the current three-drug protocol violates the Eighth Amendment and offers multiple alternative methods of execution that he says "substantially reduce the constitutionally-unacceptable risk of inflicting unnecessary and serious pain" created by the protocol. (Doc. No. 11 at 73-136.) He claims that the protocol is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him because of the potential complications caused or exacerbated by his individual characteristics, including diabetes, a history of strokes, seizure disorder, peripheral neuropathy, unsteady gait (likely caused by tardive dyskinesia), arthritis, degenerative disk disease, acid reflux, enlarged prostate, high cholesterol, hypothyroidism, obesity, schizo-affective disorder with paranoid psychosis, mania, and depression. (Id. at 117-18.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's facial challenge to the protocol in Count 3 is barred by res judicata because it is the same Eighth Amendment claim that was adjudicated in state court. (Doc. No. 13 at 15.) They argue that Plaintiff's as-applied challenge in Count 3 is likewise barred because Plaintiff could have raised it in his state court case. (Id. at 17.)
The Court observes that, shortly before trial in state court, three other plaintiffs (not including Plaintiff West) moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint asserting as-applied challenges to the protocol on the basis of individual characteristics including diabetes, high cholesterol, depression, and other psychological issues. Motion for Leave at 16-23, Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, No. 18-183-II(III) (filed June 28, 2018). The trial court denied leave on the basis of "undue delay" and specifically observed that the plaintiffs had expressly disavowed any as-applied challenges in response to the court's question early in the pendency of the case. Memorandum and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend at 5-6, 10, id. (Davidson Chancery Court June 29, 2018). This history supports the presumption that Plaintiff could have litigated his as-applied claims in state court if he had included them in the original state-court complaint or a timely motion to amend. --------
Plaintiff responds that res judicata does not apply to Count 3 because it relies on new facts that could not have been presented in the state-court case. (Doc. No. 17 at 20-25, 41.) He relies primarily on Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), as revised (June 27, 2016), in which the Supreme Court held that adjudication of abortion providers' previous lawsuit before a statute's enforcement did not preclude a second lawsuit after enforcement. The Court reached that decision on the basis that "new evidence presented by petitioners had given rise to a new claim." Id. at 2306. It concluded that the petitioners' new claim "rests in significant part upon later, concrete factual developments" and that "[t]hose developments matter." Id. And it provided an instructive analogy applying its reasoning to the context of a prisoners' conditions-of-confinement claim:
Imagine a group of prisoners who claim that they are being forced to drink contaminated water. These prisoners file suit against the facility where they are incarcerated. If at first their suit is dismissed because a court does not believe that the harm would be severe enough to be unconstitutional, it would make no sense to prevent the same prisoners from bringing a later suit if time and experience eventually showed that prisoners were dying from contaminated water. Such circumstances would give rise to a new claim that the prisoners' treatment violates the Constitution. Factual developments may show that constitutional harm, which seemed too remote or speculative to afford relief at the time of an earlier suit, was in fact indisputable. In our view, such changed circumstances will give rise to a new constitutional claim.
Plaintiff asserts that the new material evidence supporting Count 3 is "including, but not limited to" certain facts about Billy Irick's execution, which the Court has already discussed above. (Id. at 21.) As the Court explained, none of those facts constitute the type of materially significant, concrete factual developments necessary to give rise to a new claim.
The Court is not obligated to speculate about what other unspecified facts Plaintiff relies on in connection with this dispute or to craft his response for him. See Thompson v. A.J. Rose Mfg. Co., No. 99-3728, 2000 WL 302998 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2000) (explaining that it would be improper for the court to function as "an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party"); Kirkland v. Cty. Comm'n of Elmore Cty., Alabama, No. 2:08CV86-MEF, 2009 WL 596538, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2009) ("[A] party's decision not to proffer argument or authority in response to a dispositive motion is at his peril."). But even if the Court were so inclined, it has located only two additional pieces of information alleged in the amended complaint that might be relevant here. The first is that Mr. Irick's hands and fingers were taped to the gurney during his lethal injection, which, Plaintiff alleges, increases the inmate's "level of panic and terror," which makes it harder for midazolam to take effect and increases the risk of more pain and suffering and "a spectacle execution." (Doc. No. 11 at 130-31.) But in the context of an already-litigated protocol that calls for execution staff to "place arm supports on the gurney and restrain the condemned inmate's arms securely to the gurney," (Doc. No. 11-4 at 42), the allegedly unexpected use of tape to restrain an inmate's hands is not material.
The second category of newly-alleged information consists of the details of Plaintiff's individual characteristics that he alleges will increase the likelihood or severity of pain and suffering during his execution. But Plaintiff's failure to allege those facts as part of his Eighth Amendment challenge in state court does not make them new facts. He does not maintain, in his amended complaint or his response to the pending motion, that any of the physical or mental conditions on which he relies were developed or discovered after the trial in state court. The doctor on whose Declaration Plaintiff relies did not personally examine him until November 2, 2018, but that examination only served to confirm several diagnoses already indicated by the "medical records and documents" he reviewed in Plaintiff's voluminous TDOC health chart. (Doc. No. 11-48 at 1-2.) Accordingly, those facts did not give rise to a cause of action that only accrued after Plaintiff's state-court case was adjudicated; they do not constitute intervening "factual developments," and he could have asserted them in that case. Tennessee's doctrine of res judicata, therefore, precludes this claim in its entirety.
D. Count 4 — Due Process Violation
Plaintiff alleges that the trial judge who sentenced him specifically announced that "it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant be sentenced to death by electrocution." (Doc. No. 11 at 137.) He claims that the current three-drug lethal injection protocol "constitutes an increase in the punishment imposed" in that sentence and "is, therefore, a violation of the Due Process Clause." (Id.)
Plaintiff responds that "[w]hile the Ex Post Facto Clause is founded in due process principles, this claim rests on the separate protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment; that neither a punishment, nor an additional punishment, may be inflicted without first affording due process of law." (Doc. No. 17 at 42.) But even if that distinction made a difference, there is no reason that Plaintiff's current theory could not have been raised in state court. Neither Plaintiff's 1987 sentence nor the three-drug lethal injection protocol is a new, intervening fact. Tennessee's doctrine of res judicata precludes Plaintiff from splitting his various theories about how a retroactive method of execution violates his constitutional rights into successive lawsuits.
E. Count 5 — Execution Violates the 8th Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that execution by any method constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 11 at 138-40.) Defendants raise three bases for dismissal of this claim: (1) res judicata (Doc. No. 13 at 18); (2) statute of limitations; and (3) failure on the merits. (Id. at 23.)
Defendant is correct that "it is settled that capital punishment is constitutional." (Doc. No. 13 at 23 (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015).) Plaintiff responds, relying on Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), that Supreme Court cases upholding the constitutionality of various methods of execution do not foreclose his claim because "[t]he infliction of any punishment resulting in death violates evolving standards [of decency] that define the Eighth Amendment." (Doc. No. 17 at 46.) Plaintiff may be correct one day in the future. But standards had not evolved to that point as of two months ago, when a majority of the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that "[t]he Constitution allows capital punishment." Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1122 (2019). To the contrary, the Court cautioned that "[u]nder our Constitution, the question of capital punishment belongs to the people and their representatives, not the courts, to resolve," and that "the judiciary bears no license to end a debate reserved for the people and their representatives." Id. at 1123, 1135. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim to the contrary fails as a matter of law.
In light of these findings, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the parties' dispute about the application of the statute of limitations to Plaintiff's claim.
F. Count 6 — Unconstitutional Coercion
Plaintiff alleges that the current three-drug lethal injection protocol unconstitutionally coerces him—by its lengthier infliction of severe pain as compared to electrocution—to waive his right to challenge the constitutionality of electrocution by affirmatively choosing electrocution as the method of his execution. (Doc. No. 11 at 143.) He claims that this coerced waiver violates his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 145.)
Some legal background is necessary to understand this claim. In 1999, an Arizona inmate had a similar choice between two methods of execution and elected to be executed with lethal gas—a method that had already been found to be unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit. When he later filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of execution by lethal gas, the Supreme Court held that "[b]y declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over the State's default form of execution—lethal injection—Walter LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it." Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999). Thus, the waiver on which Plaintiff's claim is based is not found in Tennessee's execution statute or its lethal injection protocol, but is purely a function of the law as announced by the Supreme Court.
Defendants assert that this claim is barred by res judicata and fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. (Doc. No. 13 at 18, 24.) Plaintiff, again, does not address the res judicata issue in the specific context of this claim. The state-court plaintiffs asserted this same theory in support of their ex post facto claim, citing Stewart v. LaGrand and arguing that the three-drug protocol forced them into "an impossible Catch-22" in which "if Plaintiffs elect electrocution—the method of execution for which they were sentenced—the law imposes a waiver of any challenge to that method despite the fact that electrocution will cause Plaintiffs to be burned alive from the inside." (Doc. No. 13-3 at 34.) Although the state-court plaintiffs did not use the word "coercion" to describe the choice they faced, they alleged that the three-drug protocol increased their punishment by burdening them with the waiver. (Id.) Because Plaintiff's current claim either was or could have been asserted in the state-court case, he is precluded by Tennessee's doctrine of res judicata from litigating it in this case.
Alternatively, the Court finds that Stewart v. LaGrand itself forecloses the claim. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish his case by asserting that LaGrand chose a method of execution that was "then-thought to be harsher" than the alternative (Doc. No. 17 at 47 n.22), but the Supreme Court found the waiver arose from the choice itself, not the relative merits of the method chosen. Stewart, 526 U.S. at 119 ("By declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over the State's default form of execution—lethal injection—Walter LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it."). As this Court previously explained with regard to this same claim:
First, as discussed above, the Defendants do not extract any waiver of a legal challenge to electrocution from Plaintiff as a condition of choosing electrocution. No such waiver is required by Tennessee's statute, TDOC's protocol, or the election form itself. The only waiver expressly included in the election form is the waiver of the right to be executed by lethal injection. (Doc. No. 11-4 at 87.) Accordingly, Defendants are not imposing any unconstitutional condition on Plaintiff.
But more importantly, as the Supreme Court's decision in Stewart v. LaGrand suggests, it is simply untenable for Plaintiff to argue simultaneously that he has a right to be electrocuted and a right not to be electrocuted or to challenge his electrocution. Even assuming for the sake of argument that each of those rights would state a claim individually under existing law, and that neither was barred by res judicata or unripe, they cannot be asserted simultaneously. Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he jury and judge expressly sentenced Plaintiff West to death by electrocution, therefore, he must be executed by electrocution. . . . Absent such provisions in the protocol Plaintiff West would be punished in accordance with the punishment imposed at the time of sentencing (electrocution), and, Plaintiff West would have a right to be heard on the constitutionality of that punishment." (Doc. No. 11 at 144-45.) Plaintiff's claim ignores the fact that constitutional rights can be mutually exclusive. For example, a criminal defendant has the right under the Fifth Amendment to remain silent and not "be a witness against himself." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). Conversely, "it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987). But that does not mean that a defendant could effectively bring a halt to his prosecution by claiming that the state conditions the benefit of testifying on waiving the right to remain silent. Instead, the combined effect of both rights enables "a criminal defendant to choose between silence and testifying in his own behalf." Ferguson v. State of Ga., 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Being faced with a similar choice regarding his method of execution does not coerce Plaintiff to do anything or otherwise violate his constitutional rights.
And finally, the lynchpin of Plaintiff's claim is that Defendants are "threatening to unlawfully subject him" to the three-drug lethal injection protocol (Doc. No. 11 at 145), and that he may be wrongfully coerced into choosing electrocution by that "credible threat of legally unjustified violence." (Doc. No. 17 at 48.) But, even aside from the Tennessee court's decision in Abdur'Rahman and any preclusive effect it has on this assertion, courts have repeatedly found execution with three-drug protocols including midazolam to be constitutionally permissible. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739-40 (2015) (collecting cases and observing that "numerous courts have concluded that the use of midazolam as the first drug in a three-drug protocol is likely to render an inmate insensate to pain that might result from administration of the paralytic agent and potassium chloride"); Miller, 910 F.3d at 261-62 (6th Cir. 2018) ("[T]his court has rejected a challenge to a similar Ohio lethal-injection protocol that, like the current Tennessee protocol, utilizes a large dose of the sedative midazolam as the first drug to render the prisoner unconscious."). For all of these reasons, Count 6 must be dismissed.
G. Count 7 — Access to Courts and Right to Counsel
Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment right to access the courts guarantees him two attorney-witnesses to his execution, who must have immediate access to a telephone and to each other. (Doc. No. 11 at 146-49.) Defendants offers four bases for dismissing this claim: (1) non-justiciability; (2) res judicata; (3) statute of limitations; and (4) failure on the merits. (Doc. No. 13 at 10-11, 18-19, 24-25.)
First, Defendants assert that there is no case or controversy for the Court to adjudicate with respect to the telephone-access portion of this claim because they have agreed to provide Plaintiff's attorney-witness with access to a telephone throughout his execution. (Doc. No. 13 at 10-11.) Plaintiff responds that his claim is viable because "this concession can be reversed at Defendants' whim," (Doc. No. 17 at 49), but he offers no basis to anticipate such a reversal. There is no statute or regulation preventing an attorney-witness's access to a prison telephone, see Memorandum and Order at 8, Zagorski v. Haslam, No. 3:18-cv-1205 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2018) (Trauger, J.), and Defendants "affirmatively represent to the Court," subject to the requirements of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that "they will provide" such access. (Doc. No. 13 at 11.) The Court, therefore, agrees with Defendants that there is no live controversy with regard to telephone access subject to judicial review.
In light of the telephone access Defendants will provide to Plaintiff's attorney-witness, there does not appear to be any factual or constitutional basis for his demand for two such witnesses. Plaintiff affirmatively acknowledges that the telephone provided during previous executions is "on a wall inside the room where counsel viewed the execution," (Doc. No. 11 at 149), and he does not clearly allege any impediment to an attorney's simultaneously observing the execution while using the telephone. Plaintiff's allegations that he "requires the assistance of two defense attorneys during the execution" and that "[t]o provide adequate access to courts, two defense attorney witnesses must be present to view the execution" are wholly conclusory and fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 2010) ("We need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, and conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice. The complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,' and 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).