Source: https://casetext.com/case/slakan-v-porter
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 148', '§ 148', '§ 148', '§ 148', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 148', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 | Casetext Search + Citator
Slakan v. Porter
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Full title:CHARLES J. SLAKAN, APPELLEE, v. T.C. PORTER, M.M. WALTERS, AMOS REED…
737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984)
holding that deliberate indifference of prison officials could properly be found effective cause of subordinates' infliction of constitutional injury
Argued February 10, 1984.
Decided June 5, 1984. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied August 13, 1984.
Before SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
Hon. John W. Peck, Senior Circuit Judge, Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Charles J. Slakan, a North Carolina inmate, was injured when prison guards Michael Walters, Tracy Porter, and Johnny Barefoot used high-pressure water hoses, tear gas, and billy clubs to subdue him while he was confined in a one-man cell. He brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the three guards and three high ranking prison supervisory officials, Warden Sam Garrison, Director of Prisons Ralph Edwards, and Secretary of Corrections Amos Reed, alleging (1) that the guards used excessive force against him in violation of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause and (2) that supervisory officials were deliberately indifferent to a known risk of harm, as evidenced by their failure to provide prison guards with adequate training and guidance. The jury absolved prison guard Porter of liability, but awarded Slakan $32,500 in combined compensatory and punitive damages against the remaining five defendants. We affirm.
Meanwhile, tear gas was sprayed into the cell every several minutes, eventually rendering the prisoner powerless. Guards Walters, Barefoot, and Porter ceased their two-pronged attack against Slakan after five to ten minutes and entered his cell. One of the guards struck Slakan twice on the head with a billy club causing him to fall onto his bed. He then was beaten repeatedly on the head and body and indeterminate number of times until he apparently lost consciousness. Slakan eventually was removed from the cell and taken to the first aid room for treatment. He required sixty-nine stitches for the head wounds received during the attack, and reportedly suffered minor contusions and eye irritation from the water blasts and tear gas.
The unjustified striking or beating of a prisoner by police or correctional officials constitutes cruel and unusual punishment which is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 1983); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1980). See also Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973). Society's intolerance for such brutality is well-documented, but it rises to new levels when the instrument of harm, even when properly used, possesses inherently dangerous characteristics capable of causing serious and perhaps irreparable injury to the victim. High-pressure water hoses, tear gas, and billy clubs, though legitimate forms of control in certain circumstances, become instruments of brutality when used indiscriminately against a defenseless prisoner. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). Even when a prisoner's conduct warrants some form of response, evolving norms of decency require prison officials to use techniques and procedures that are both humane and restrained.
The decisions of this Court have firmly established the principle that supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates. See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981). See also Wellington, 717 F.2d at 936; Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980). Liability in this context is not premised on respondeat superior, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), but on a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care. Orpiano, 632 F.2d at 1101.
The plaintiff, of course, assumes a heavy burden of proof in supervisory liability cases. He not only must demonstrate that the prisoners face a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm from some specified source, but he must show that the supervisor's corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or "tacit authorization of the offensive [practices]". Orpiano, 632 F.2d at 1101 (quoting Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161) (4th Cir. 1981). Ordinarily, he cannot satisfy his burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents, Orpiano, 632 F.2d at 1101, for a supervisor cannot be expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering every conceivable occurrence within the area of his responsibilities. Nor can he reasonably be expected to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct. A supervisor's continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses, however, provides an independent basis for finding he either was deliberately indifferent or acquiesced in the constitutionally offensive conduct of his subordinates. Id. See also Wellington, 717 F.2d at 936.
Supervisory liability in the civil rights context may extend to the highest levels of state government. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The outer limits of liability in any given case are determined ultimately by pinpointing the persons in the decisionmaking chain whose deliberate indifference permitted the constitutional abuses to continue unchecked. The final determination "generally is one of fact, not law," Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981), but state statutes fixing the administrator's legal duties provide a useful guide in determining who had the responsibility and capability to end the offensive practices.
We are satisfied that the evidence offered by Slakan against Warden Garrison, Director Edwards, and Secretary Reed established the supervisory liability of these government officials. Cf. McElveen v. Hutto, 725 F.2d 954 at 958 (4th Cir. 1984) (fact-finding by jury will be set aside only where evidence, viewed in light most favorable to prevailing party, is so clearly wrong that reasonable persons could not reach any other conclusion than that asserted by losing party on appeal). Garrison was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Central Prison and for the training and conduct of the guards. He admitted at trial that he knew of and condoned the use of high-pressure water hoses against inmates housed in one-man cells on at least seven occasions in the twelve months preceding the attack upon Slakan. He admitted moreover, that on one occasion he had personally approved of the use of a high-pressure hose against an inmate who was handcuffed and confined in a cell by himself.
In the months immediately preceding the Slakan incident, several inmates confined in one-man cells were sprayed with tear gas and hosed by Central Prison guards. Only one of the incidents involved an inmate posing a physical threat to himself or guards.
Slakan's case against Garrison was bolstered by the testimony of a non-defendant guard who reportedly took part in six hosings while at Central Prison. He indicated that the practice was widespread among the guards and seldom questioned by supervisors. He also noted that alternative intervention techniques training was given to guards dealing with mental patients, but not to those handling regular inmates. Evidence introduced at trial further showed that Garrison had opposed a gubernatorial commission recommendation in 1975 that would have strictly regulated the use of water hoses against inmates locked in one-man cells. The commission recommendation was an outgrowth of an incident in which a North Carolina inmate was subjected to the high-pressure blast of a water hose for 25 to 30 minutes while he was securely confined in his cell. In sum, the prevalence of the hosing practice was well known to Garrison, yet he failed to offer adequate guidance to his subordinates concerning the appropriate uses of such techniques when dealing with inmates securely confined.
Slakan introduced evidence indicating that the inmate population deeply resented the use of water hoses against individuals who were locked in their cells. In some instances, the use of water hoses actually triggered riotous behavior among those inmates forced to watch one of their own pinned against the wall of his cell by a continuous blast of water.
Director Edwards was responsible for the day-to-day operations of all prisons in the North Carolina system. One of his primary responsibilities was implementing policies governing the treatment of inmates. 5 N.C.ADMIN. CODE 2A.0101. In his official capacity, Edwards became aware well before the Slakan incident that hoses and tear gas were routinely being used against inmates locked in their individual cells. He admitted specific knowledge about the seven incidents that immediately preceded the Slakan attack and indicated that he approved of the use of force in each case. He conceded that the practice created certain risks for the inmates, yet testified that he never attempted to discover the magnitude of the risks as part of a plan to restrict or regulate the practice. He conceded, moreover, that he had opposed implementing the 1975 commission recommendation concerning the need for tighter controls on the use of high-pressure hoses against cell-confined inmates. His own testimony also established that he had never issued orders placing restrictions on the use of hoses against inmates, despite his actual knowledge about the widespread reliance on the practice.
The case against Secretary Reed was equally convincing. The State of North Carolina invests the Secretary of Corrections with the responsibility for the "control and custody of all prisoners serving sentence(s) in the . . . the prison system." N.C.Gen.Stat. § 148-4. Every state correctional facility is by statute placed under his "administrative control and direction." N.C.Gen.Stat. § 148-36. In discharging his duties, the Secretary is empowered to "propose rules and regulations for the government of the State prison system, which shall become effective when approved by the Department of Correction." N.C.Gen.Stat. § 148-11. The Secretary shoulders specific responsibility for classifying prison facilities and for developing programs "so as to permit the proper segregation and treatment of prisoners according to the nature of the offenses committed, the character and mental conditions of the prisoners, and such other factors as should be considered in providing an individualized system of discipline, care and correctional treatment." N.C.Gen.Stat. § 148-36.
Slakan's case against Secretary Reed focused on his failure to exercise his statutory powers in a manner calculated to end the indiscriminate use of high-pressure water hoses against inmates securely housed in one-man cells. In support of his case, Slakan introduced copies of the Department of Correction's regulations governing the use of force against prisoners. Those regulations state that "[p]hysical force, firearms, tear gas, mace and other weapons for crowd and individual control will be used only when necessary to prevent escape or injury to staff, citizenry, or inmates; or to prevent damage to property." 5 N.C.ADMIN. CODE 2f. 1501(a). They do not differentiate, however, between the application of force against a roaming inmate and one locked in his one-man cell. Nor do they even mention the use of high-pressure water hoses against any segment of the prison population, much less provide proper guidance for their use against an individual securely segregated from the general prison population.
The failure of Garrison, Edwards, and Reed to act in the face of a known risk of harm does not alone establish their liability to Slakan. Though their conduct may be fairly characterized as a breach of their legal and constitutional duties, they are not liable unless an affirmative causal link exists between their inaction and the harm suffered by Slakan. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). See also Wellington, 717 F.2d at 936; Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 988 (5th Cir. 1982); Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976). The proof of causation may be direct, "as in Monell, where the policy commands the injury of which the plaintiff complains. . . . [o]r may be supplied by [the] tort principle that holds a person liable for the natural consequences of his actions." Wellington, 717 F.2d at 936.
Garrison, Edwards, and Reed argue that, even if their conduct was actionable under § 1983, they are entitled to qualified immunity from money damages. We disagree. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2739, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court carefully defined the contours of the qualified immunity or good faith defense: "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Harlow reaffirmed the principle that a public official cannot escape § 1983 liability by relying solely on his subjective good faith or lack of actual knowledge about the extent of his constitutional or statutory duties. His subjective state of mind is but one part of the formula, for he is presumed to know what the law requires and may be forced to pay money damages when his actions cross those well-marked boundaries. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815, 102 S.Ct. at 2737. See also McElveen et al. v. Hutto, 725 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1984).
The officials involved in the present case had explicit legal guideposts to follow in discharging their duties. At the time of Slakan's beating, the eighth amendment unquestionably protected inmates from the unjustified and excessive use of force by prison officials. See Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1976); Pritchard v. Perry, 508 F.2d 423, 425-26 (4th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973). Roughly the same protection was provided by North Carolina law. See N.C.Gen.Stat. § 148-20. Of course, the use of billy clubs, tear gas, and high-pressure hoses against securely confined prisoners was not then, and is not now, unlawful per se, see Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d at 195; Clemmons v. Greggs, 509 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 360, 46 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), but North Carolina officials were or should have been aware of their firmly established duty to ensure that these legitimate instruments of control were not misused. See Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881, 87 S.Ct. 168, 17 L.Ed.2d 108 (1966).
Nor can these officials seriously argue that the application of eighth amendment liability to their actions represents a novel or unanticipated development in the jurisprudence governing § 1983 actions. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90, which was decided five years before the incident involved here, the Supreme Court stated that officials at the highest levels of state government could be individually liable for the constitutional injuries they inflict. Moreover, well before the Slakan incident, this Court and others had acknowledged that the misconduct of frontline personnel could give rise to § 1983 actions against their supervisors in certain circumstances. See Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 459, n. 1 (4th Cir. 1979); Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 488 n. 7 (4th Cir. 1975) rev'd other grounds, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885, 93 S.Ct. 115, 34 L.Ed.2d 141 (1972). Whether or not these officials were actually aware of their constitutional and statutory obligations, they are presumed to know what the law requires, and may be legally accountable for conduct that violates fixed standards.
We find no merit in the defendants' contentions that the trial court erred by allowing a video tape to be viewed by the jury. The tape contained a visual depiction of the force unleashed by a hose squirting water under fifty five pounds of pressure. It was offered by Slakan to prove that serious injury could result from the indiscriminate and unregulated use of water hoses against inmates — a key element of his eighth amendment case against the prison officials. Its relevancy, therefore, was established. The only ground for excluding the evidence was its accuracy.
The water pressure and hose nozzle used against Slakan were the same as those depicted in the videotape documentation. Moreover, the tape was shown in conjunction with the expert testimony of a fireman who was fully qualified to discuss the force generated by high-pressure water hoses. There is no question, then, that the videotape accurately and fairly depicted the force applied against Slakan. In these circumstances, the trial court acted well within the bounds of its discretion in permitting the tape to be viewed by the jury. See, e.g., Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1981).
We also find no merit in the prison officials' challenge to the admissibility of a correction expert's opinions concerning the punitive nature of North Carolina's water hosing practices. Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704 permit the trial court wide discretion in admitting expert testimony bearing on the ultimate issues in the case. The trial court here exercised that discretion only after assuring itself of the witness's professional expertise and his familiarity with the North Carolina procedures under scrutiny. The court took the additional cautionary step of instructing the jury as to the proper weight to be given to the expert's opinions. Its actions were entirely proper. See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1981) (expert accountant may testify as to whether funds were improperly removed from agency).
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