Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19770310-736776
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GUZZARDI c. ITALIE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche GUZZARDI c. ITALIE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7367/76Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1977-03-10;7367.76 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 9-1) LIBERTE DE RELIGIONParties : Demandeurs : GUZZARDIDéfendeurs : ITALIETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 7367/76 Michele GUZZARDIâ¢ v/ITALY Michele GUZZARDI' c/ITALI E DECISION of 10 March 1977 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 10 mars 1977 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Article 26 of the Convention : The person, who has raised in substance, before the highest competent national authority the complaint he makes before the Commission, has exhausted domestic remedies . Even in a State, where the Convention is directly applicable, the applicant may, instead of invoking a precise provision of the Convention, raise equivalent arguments before the netionat authority . Article 26 de fe Convention : A Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes celui qui a fait valoir, en substance, devant la plus haute autoritÃ© nationale compÃ©tente le grief qu'it formule devant /a Commission. MÃ©me dans un Etat oÃ¹ la Convention est d'application directe, le requÃ©rent peut, au lieu d'invoquer une disposition prÃ©cise de la Convention faire valoir devant lautoritÃ© nationale des arguments Ã©quive/ents .
(English : see p. 798)
Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : . Le requÃ©rant, ressortissant italien nÃ© en 1942, ouvrier, rÃ©side actuellement Ã 1 Force (Ascoli Piceno) . 2 . Le 8 fÃ©vrier 1973, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃªtÃ© comme prÃ©venu de complicitÃ© dans le rapt d'un industriel italien, libÃ©rÃ© le 7 fÃ©vrier 1973 aprÃ©s le paiement d'une ranÃ§on Iplus d'un milliard de Lireslâ¢ ; et d'association de malfaiteurs . Le MinistÃ©re public et le juge d'instruction ont demandÃ© le renvoi en jugement du requÃ©rant de ce chef . Le procÃ©s a eu lieu en octobre-novembre 1976 et s'est conclu par l'acquittement du requÃ©rant pour e manque de preuve n . Le requÃ©rant, qui protestait de son innocence, avait Ã©tÃ© placÃ© en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive dans la maison d'arrÃªt de Milan . Au cours de sa dÃ©tention, le requÃ©rant a Ã©pousÃ© sa fiancÃ©e, de laquelle il a eu par la suite un enfant . ' The applicant is represented before the Commission by Mr Michele Catelano . a lawyer practising in Milan . Le requÃ©rant est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par Me Michele Catalano, evocar 2 Milan . â¢â¢ II s'agit du rapt do l'industriel Torrielli, qui eut lieu le 18 dÃ©cembre 1972 A Vipevano ILombartliel .
3 . Peu avant que n'expire le dÃ©lai maximum prÃ©vu pour le maintien en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive (qui dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce Ã©tait de deux ansl' , le 14 janvier 1975 le Procureur de la RÃ©publique de Milan, sur la base Ã©galement d'un rapport du prÃ©fet de police IQuestorel datÃ© du 23 dÃ©cembre 1974, demanda au tribunal de Milan de prendre Ã l'encontre du requÃ©rant la mesure de prÃ©vention de la Â« surveillance spÃ©ciale n, en vertu de la loi de 1956 et de celle de 1965 . La premiÃ¨re de ces lois (celle de 1956) concerne les mesures de prÃ©vention Ã prendre Ã l'encontre de personnes dangereuses pour la sÃ©curitÃ© et la moralitÃ© publiques . La deuxiÃ©me Icelle de 1965) se rÃ©fÃ©re plus spÃ©cialement aux personnes soupÃ§onnÃ©es d'appartenir Ã des associations a mafiose n" . La mesure dont le requÃ©rant a fait l'objet consiste en une assignation Ã rÃ©sidence forcÃ©e . L'individu qui en est frappÃ© est obligÃ© de rÃ©sider dans une commune dÃ©terminÃ©e . La dÃ©cision par laquelle cette mesure est ordonnÃ©e Ã©numÃ¨re une sÃ©rie de prescriptions auxquelles l'intÃ©ressÃ© doit se conformer .
4 . Le 30 janvier 1975, le tribunal de Milan dÃ©cida de soumettre le requÃ©rant Ã la mesure de la Â« surveillance spÃ©ciale n assortie de l'obligation de rÃ©sider dans l'lle de l'Asinara, pour une durÃ©e de trois ans . Dans sa dÃ©cision, le tribunal de Milan a rejetÃ© les arguments dÃ©veloppÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, qui avait notamment contestÃ© le bien-fondÃ© de la mesure envisagÃ©e en soutenant que celle-ci ne se fondait que sur de simples prÃ©somptions . Le requÃ©rant avait Ã©galement allÃ©guÃ© ses graves conditions de santÃ© . Le tribunal a estimÃ© que les antÃ©cÃ©dents pÃ©naux du requÃ©rant, qualifiÃ© de u personne dangereuse Â» pour la sÃ©curitÃ© publique, et les liens qu'il entretenait avec des milieux rc mafiosi ft, spÃ©cialisÃ©s dans le rapt en vue d'extorsions de fonds, justifiaient la mesure envisagÃ©e .
Quant aux conditions de santÃ© invoquÃ©es par le requÃ©rant, le tribunal, tout en admettant que ce dernier souffrait d'une grave affection qui aurait pu nÃ©cessiter une intervention chirurgicale, a estimÃ© que celle-ci ne s'avÃ©rait toutefois pas urgente et que de toute faÃ§on, si le besoin s'en faisait sentir, les autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes auraient pu transfÃ©rer le requÃ©rant pour qu'il puisse Ã¨tre soignÃ© convenablement . En prenant la mesure susvisÃ©e, le tribunal a enjoint au requÃ©rant, entre autres, de chercher un travail dans l'endroit fixÃ©, de ne pas s'en Ã©loigner et d'observer certaines rÃ¨gles de conduite . 5 . En application de cette dÃ©cision, le 8 fÃ©vrier 1975, aprÃ©s expiration du dÃ©lai de maintien en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, le requÃ©rant fut conduit par la police Ã l'endroit indiquÃ© dans la dÃ©cision . 6 . Le 10 fÃ©vrier 1975, le requÃ©rant attaqua la dÃ©cision du tribunal de Milan en faisant valoir notamment que la mesure n'Ã©tait pas justifiÃ©e et que de toute faÃ§on il n'aurait pu trouver Ã l'endroit indiquÃ© dans la dÃ©cision ni travail ni un logement pour sa famille . Il a Ã©galement soutenu que son Ã©tat de santÃ© nÃ©cessitait son transfert dans une commune dotÃ©e d'une clinique urologique . Le 12 fÃ©vrier 1975, la cour d'appel de Milan, Ã la demande Ã©galement d'un substitut du Procureur de la RÃ©publique, ordonna que le requÃ©rant fÃ»t transfÃ©rÃ© dans l'hÃ´pital de Sassari pour y Ãªtre soumis Ã un examen mÃ©dical et dÃ©cida de demander Ã l'autoritÃ© de police compÃ©tente d'Ã©tre renseignÃ© sur la possibilitÃ© de trouver dans l'Ã®le de l'Asinara un logement pour la famille du requÃ©rant et un travail pour ce dernier . Anicle 272 du code de nrocÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Un rÃ©sumÃ© de ces lois se trouve annesÃ© Ã l'eMposÃ© tles fains .
7 . Le 14 fÃ©vrier 1975, un autre substitut du Procureur de la RÃ©publique demanda Ã la cour d'appel de rÃ©voquer cette ordonnance en soutenant notamment que le requÃ©rant avait refusÃ© de se soumettre Ã des analyses cliniques dans l'hÃ´pital de Milan, qu'au demeurant l'endroit choisi pour la Â« surveillance spÃ©ciale Â» est en puissance un des meilleurs d'Italie pour le climat et pour le sÃ©jour touristique et que de toute faÃ§on le but non avouÃ© de la demande du requÃ©rant Ã©tait celui de s'Ã©vader . Le mÃªme jour, la cour d'appel de Milan, statuant en chambre du conseil, rÃ©voqua l'ordonnance du 12 fÃ©vrier et fixa au 12 mars 1975 l'audience contradictoire . Toujours le 14 fÃ©vrier 1975, l'autoritÃ© de police avait communiquÃ© Ã la cour d'appel de Milan qu'il n'y avait que deux appartements rÃ©servÃ©s aux familles de ceux qui sÃ©journaient dans l'Ple pour des pÃ©riodes de un ou deux mois et qu'il n'y avait pas la possibilitÃ© de trouver un travail stable . Le 17 fÃ©vrier 1975 l'avocat du requÃ©rant, tout en contestant les affirmations faites le 14 fÃ©vrier 1975 par le substitut du Procureur de la RÃ©publique, demanda Ã la cour de dÃ©cider un complÃ©ment d'information . Le 21 fÃ©vrier 1975, l'avocat, dans un mÃ©moire adressÃ© Ã la cour d'appel, rÃ©itÃ©ra ses allÃ©gations . 8 . Le 12 mars 1975 la cour d'appel de Milan statua sur le recours du requÃ©rant et confirma Ia dÃ©cision du 30 janvier 1975 . La cour a estimÃ© pour l'essentiel que l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant ne s'opposait pas Ã ce qu'il fÃ»t obligÃ© de rÃ©sider Ã l'endroit indiquÃ© dans la dÃ©cision, que le but de la mesure dont le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© frappÃ© Ã©tait de le sÃ©parer de son milieu et de rendre plus difficiles les liens qu'il aurait pu entretenir avec ce mÃªme milieu . Ces considÃ©rations devaient par consÃ©quent prÃ©valoir sur toute autre considÃ©ration, telle que l'impossibilitÃ© de trouver du travail ou celle de ne pouvoir vivre avec sa famille . La cour a estimÃ© par ailleurs que le requÃ©rant avait contractÃ© mariage alors qu'il Ã©tait en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive prÃ©venu d'un Â« crime grave Â» et que, par consÃ©quent, il ne pouvait pas espÃ©rer vivre aux cAtÃ©s de sa femme et de son enfant .
AprÃ¨s avoir observÃ© que la mesure litigieuse Ã©tait amplement justifiÃ©e par le fait que le requÃ©rant, compte tenu de ses antÃ©cÃ©dents, Ã©tait particuliÃ¨rement dangereux pour la sociÃ©tÃ©, la cour en a conclu que la surveillance d'un tel individu revÃªt une importance telle qu'elle justifie l'affaiblissement d'autres situations juridiques subjectives prises en considÃ©ration par la loi ( Â« infatti, avuto riguardo alla funzione di detta misura, la custodia di un individuo come sopra caratterizzato assume une tale prevalenza da giustificare l'affievolimento di altre situazioni giurdiche soggettive che la legge prende in considerazione al . 9 . Le 3 avril 1975, l'avocat du requÃ©rant se pourvut en cassation . L'avocat a contestÃ© le bien-fondÃ© des affirmations contenues dans l'arrÃªt de la cour d'appel et reproduites ci-dessus . Il a particuliÃ©rement mis l'accent sur le fait que la mesure litigieuse viole le droit du requÃ©rant, qui au demeurant n'avait pas encore Ã©tÃ© jugÃ©, Ã la vie privÃ©e et familiale protÃ©gÃ© par la Convention europÃ©enne . Le 6 octobre 1975 la Cour de cassation rejeta le pourvoi . Se ralliant Ã© l'avis exprimÃ© par le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral, la cour a estimÃ© que la mesure litigieuse Ã©tait justifiÃ©e par les circonstances de fait . Quant aux droits subjectifs revendiquÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, elle a soutenu que a les Ã©videntes limitations apportÃ©es Ã© la condition d'assignÃ© Ã rÃ©sidence dÃ©pendent directement de l'application de mesures reconnues Ã plusieurs reprises comme Ã©tant conformes Ã la Constitution, Ã©tant donnÃ© que ces limitations en constituent l'aspect corrÃ©latif la le indubbie limitazioni allo 'status' d i
soggiornante obbligato direttamente dipendono dall'applicazione di misure ripetutamente riconosciute conformi ai precetti costituzionali costituendone l'aspetto correlativo nl . 10 . Le 14 novembre 1975, l'avocat demanda au tribunal de Milan, en tant que juge compÃ©tent (giudice di sorveglianza), que son client fOt assignÃ© Ã rÃ©sidence dans une commune oÃ¹ il pÃ¹t vivre avec sa famille et y travailler . Dans cette demande, l'avocat s'Ã©tait rÃ©fÃ©rÃ© Ã une dÃ©cision du PrÃ©fet de Police de Sassari, notifiÃ©e au requÃ©rant le 9 octobre 1975, par laquelle il avait Ã©tÃ© enjoint Ã la famille du requÃ©rant de quitter l'le de l'Asinara, car le permis de sÃ©jour avait expirÃ© dÃ©s le 18 septembre 1975 . Le 20 ianvier 1976 le tribunal de Milan a dÃ©cidÃ© qu'il n'avait aucune compÃ©tence en matiÃ©re d'exÃ©cution des mesures de prÃ©vention, compÃ©tence qui par contre Ã©tait du ressort de l'autoritÃ© de police . AprÃ¨s avoir relevÃ© que les mesures prÃ©vues par la loi Ã©taient justifiÃ©es par des exigences de dÃ©fense sociale, le tribunal a toutefois estimÃ© que de telles exigences n'entraÃ®naient pas que des personnes qui en Ã©taient frappÃ©es soient sÃ©parÃ©es de leurs familles, que ces personnes avaient en outre le droit de travailler et que les autoritÃ©s administratives auraient dÃ¹ assurer le respect de ces droits .
Tout en rejetant la demande, le tribunal a dÃ©cidÃ© de communiquer le texte de la dÃ©cision au Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur et au PrÃ©fet de Police de Sassari . Le 22 iuillet 1976, le tribunal de Milan a disposÃ© la mutation de la localitÃ© du Â« sÃ©jour forcÃ© Â» du requÃ©rant qui a Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ© dans la commune de Force (Ascoli Piceno) . Cette dÃ©cision du tribunal de Milan a fait suite Ã des propositions conformes des autoritÃ©s administratives compÃ©tentes .
Le 13 novembre 1976, le tribunal de Milan acquitta le requÃ©rant pour manque de preuve lu assoluzione per insufficienza di prove rrl des accusations de rapt de l'industriel Torrielli et d'association de malfaiteurs . Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : 11 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint des dÃ©cisions qui l'ont assignÃ© Ã rÃ©sidence . Il allÃ¨gue la violation des anicles 3, 8 . 9 de la Convention et 2 du Protocole NÂ° 1 . Quant Ã son assignation Ã rÃ©sidence il fait valoir : - que l'ile de l'Asinara, inaccessible au public, n'est pas une commune, mais un Â« morceau de terre Â» ; - qu'il ne peut pas y trouver du travail ni un logement pour sa famille - qu'il ne lui est pas permis de vivre avec sa famille ; - qu'au demeurant sa femme et son enfant qui s'y Ã©taient rendus en ont Ã©tÃ© Ã©loignÃ©s ;
- qu'il y tr vÃ©gÃ©te Â» dans des conditions inhumaines et dÃ©gradantes - qu'il ne peut pas manifester sa religion par le culte ; - qu'Ã supposer mÃ©me qu'il puisse vivre avec sa famille . il ne pourrait pas se voir reconnaitre le droit Ã faire instruire son fils, car il n'y a dans l'ile ni jardin d'enfants ni Ã©cole .
Le requÃ©rant se plaint Ã©galement d'une violation du droit Ã une bonne administration de la justice . Il prÃ©cise que la mesure dont il a Ã©tÃ© frappÃ©, et qui engendre toutes les violations dÃ©noncÃ©es, rÃ©sulte du seul fait qu'il est ct soupÃ§onnÃ© n d'apparteni r
Ã© une association a mafiosa n alors qu'il a dÃ©jÃ fait l'objet, en tant que prÃ©venu du mÃªme crime (association de malfaiteursl, d'une dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive jusqu'Ã© l'expiration du dÃ©lai maximum prÃ©vu par la loi . Le requÃ©rant ajoute que toute infraction doit Ãªtre Ã©tablie et non prÃ©sumÃ©e et que toute limitation de libertÃ© consÃ©cutive Ã une dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive prÃ©suppose que la culpabilitÃ© soit prouvÃ©e . PROCEDURE SUIVI E La requÃ¨te a Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ©e par la Commission le 24 mai 1976 au Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur . Le 16 septembre 1976 le Gouvernement italien a fait parvenir ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te . Ces observations ont Ã©tÃ© aussitbt communiquÃ©es au conseil du requÃ©rant pour rÃ©ponse . Le 16 novembre 1976, le conseil du requÃ©rant a fait parvenir ses observations IdatÃ©es du 8 novembre 1976) en rÃ©ponse Ã celles du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur . Ces observations ont Ã©tÃ© aussitÃ´t communiquÃ©es au Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur . Le 20 dÃ©cembre 19761a Commission a invitÃ© le Gouvernement italien Ã© lui transmettre des observations complÃ©mentaires sur la recevabilitÃ© . Ces observations datÃ©es du 21 janvier 1977, ont Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ©es au conseil du requÃ©rant, lequel a fait parvenir sa rÃ©ponse le 18 fÃ©vrier 1977 . Le 28 fÃ©vrier 1977 le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a fait parvenir Ã la Commission un mÃ©moire additionnel concernant la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte . ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S 1 . Cessation de la matiÃ©re du contentieux A . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que la dÃ©cision du tribunal de Milan du 22 juillet 1976, par laquelle le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ© Ã la commune de Force (Ascoli Piceno), oÃ¹ il devra continuer Ã Ã©tre assujetti Ã la mesure de sÃ©jour obligatoire, a fait radicalement cesser la matiÃ©re du contentieux . Le Gouvernement en dÃ©duit que les griefs du requÃ©rant n'ont plus aucune raison d'exister et que, panant, l'examen de la requÃ¨te par la Commission doit Ãªtre exclu . Le requÃ©rant fait valoir que les graves violations de ses droits, dont il a Ã©t Ã© .B victime pendant une pÃ©riode de presque un an et six mois, ont entratnÃ© des rÃ©percussions nÃ©gatives durables et ineffaÃ§ables Ã l'encontre de toute sa famille . II . Epuisement des voies de recours interne s A . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur estime que la requÃ¨te est irrecevable pour nonÃ©puisement des voies de recours internes . Cette thÃ¨se s'appuie sur deux arguments distincts :
a . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur se rÃ©fÃ©re en premier lieu Ã la jurisprudence de la Commission, et notamment Ã la dÃ©cision NÂ° 6452/74, Sacchi c/Italieâ¢, pour affirmer que le requÃ©rant a manquÃ© d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours internes, puisqu'il n'a pas soulevÃ© la question de lÃ©gitimitÃ© constitutionnelle Ã l'Ã©gard des lois appliquÃ©es dans son cas (Loi du 27 dÃ©cembre 1956, NÂ° 1423 et Loi du 31 mai 1965, NÂ° 575) . Le requÃ©rant se serait bornÃ©, selon le Gouvernement, Ã opposer des motifs de fond . En outre, il aurait renoncÃ©, lors de l'audience du 12 fÃ©vrier 1975 devant la cour d'appel de Milan , ct . D .R . 5/43 .
Â« aux motifs d'opposition relatifs Ã la lÃ©gitimitÃ© de son assujettissement aux mesures de surveillance spÃ©ciale . . . pour insister uniquement sur les dÃ©ductions relatives Ã l'inaptitude de l'tle de l'Asinara en tant que sÃ©jour obligatoire rr . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur ajoute qu'il est vrai que le requÃ©rant a soulevÃ©, devant la Cour de cassation, la question de la lÃ©gitimitÃ© constitutionnelle, mais cette question ne concernait que l'interprÃ©tation et les modalitÃ©s d'application de la loi . Le Gouvernement fait valoir que le requÃ©rant aurait d0 utiliser le remÃ©de du prononcÃ© prÃ©ventif de la Cour constitutionnelle, eu Ã©gard aux anicles 13 et 16 de la Constitution, dont les dispositions correspondent Ã celles de l'article 8 de la Convention . D'aprÃ¨s le Gouvernement, il ne suffirait pas de se rÃ©fÃ©rer Ã de prÃ©cÃ©dents prononcÃ©s nÃ©gatifs de la Cour constitutionnelle, car le systÃ©me juridique italien admet que l'on puisse proposer de nouveau Ã la Cour la question de lÃ©gitimitÃ© constitutionnelle d'une loi que cette Cour a dÃ©jÃ proclamÃ©e lÃ©gitime . u Par ailleurs, estime le Gouvernement, l'article 26 de la Convention met les voies de recours internes Ã la charge du requÃ©rant, sans que ce dernier puisse s'y soustraire en invoquant d'Ã©ventuelles dÃ©cisions prÃ©cÃ©dentes non opposables au requÃ©rant n . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur fait aussi observer que le requÃ©rant n'a pas invoquÃ© une violation des articles 5 et 6 de la Convention (et des articles 13 et 27 de la Constitution italienne, qui y correspondent) . Il estime, Ã cet Ã©gard, que l'on se trouve en prÃ©sence de l'alternative suivante : ou bien l'on est d'avis que le requÃ©rant a lui-mÃ©me implicitement dÃ©duit la violation des normes des articles 5 et 6, citÃ©s ci-dessus, Ã tel point que la Commission a demandÃ© un examen d'office sur cette partie du recours et dans ce cas les observations prÃ©cÃ©dentes sur l'irrecevabilitÃ© de celui-ci gardent toute leur valeur, ou bien la question soulevÃ©e d'office ne ressort pas de la matiÃ©re du recours proposÃ© ; dans ce cas l'examen en est exclu aux termes de l'article 26 . b . En deuxiÃ©me lieu, le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas non plus Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes, d'aprÃ¨s le Gouvernement italien, en ce qu'il a omis d'attaquer la dÃ©cision du 20 janvier 1976 par laquelle le tribunal de Milan affirmait son incompÃ©tence en matiÃ©re d'exÃ©cution des mesures de prÃ©vention . Le Gouvernement fait valoir que c'est Ã tort que le requÃ©rant soutient, dans sa requÃ©te introductive, que ladite dÃ©cision Ã©tait sans recours . Il fait valoir, au contraire, qu'elle Ã©tait susceptible d'appel et, par la suite, de recours en cassation, ainsi qu'un principe du systÃ©me juridique italien le reconnait pour toutes les dÃ©cisions Ã©mises en premier ressort . B . Le requArant, dans sa rÃ©ponse aux observations du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, conteste les deux arguments rÃ©sumÃ©s : a . Il affirme, en premier lieu, avoir toujours fait valoir l'illÃ©gitimitÃ© de la mesure de Â« surveillance spÃ©ciale n prise Ã son encontre, face aussi bien Ã la Constitution italienne qu'aux lois appliquÃ©es . Il nie avoir renoncÃ© aux motifs d'opposition relatifs Ã la lÃ©gitimitÃ© de son assujettissement Ã ladite mesure lors de l'audience du 12 fÃ©vrier 1975 . II rappelle que la Cour de cassation a considÃ©rÃ© la question d'illÃ©gitimitÃ© constitutionnelle comme Ã©tant manifestement mal fondÃ©e .
Le requÃ©rant semble d'ailleurs soutenir qu'en principe la procÃ©dure engagÃ©e devant la Cour constitutionnelle ne constituait pas une voie de recours interne qu'il lui appartenait d'Ã©puiser . Il fait valoir, Ã ce propos, que la saisine de la Cour relÃ¨ve du pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire de l'autoritÃ© judiciaire .
b . Le requÃ©rant, en deuxiÃ¨me lieu, souligne qu'il avait Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes en formant son pourvoi en cassation et que, pa rt ant, son recours du 14 novembre 1975 devant le tribunal de Milan Ã©tait supe rf Ã©tatoire . DÃ©s lors, il serait absurde de prÃ©tendre, comme le fait le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, qu'il aurait dÃ¹ se pourvoir contre la dÃ©cision du tribunal de Milan du 20 janvier 1976 .
Le requÃ©rant fait remarquer, par ailleurs, que le tribunal de Milan avait reconnu le principe que les mesures de a surveillance spÃ©ciale e ne doivent pas violer les droits de l'homme et qu'il avait transmis sa dÃ©cision Ã© l'autoritÃ© administrative . III . Bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªt e A . a . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur examine d'abord le problÃ©me sous l'angle des articles 5 et 6, soulevÃ©s ex officio par la Commission . Il affirme notamment : Â« On ne voit donc pas dans quel sens les mesures de surveillance spÃ©ciale appliquÃ©es au requÃ©rant doivent et peuvent Ã©tre Ã©valuÃ©es en rapport avec le disposÃ© des articles 5 et 6 de la Convention, Ã©tant donnÃ© qu'elles ne donnent pas lieu - mÃªme dans l'hypothÃ©se plus grave de sÃ©jour obligatoire dans une commune dÃ©terminÃ©e au cas oÃ¹ le sujet est particuliÃ©rement dangereux (article 3, loi 1423/1956) - Ã l'emprisonnement et qu'elles ne constituent donc pas une peine de dÃ©tention infligÃ©e Ã la suite d'une condamnation pour un crime constatÃ© n . Le Gouvernement n'admet pas l'existance d'un lien entre l'accusation d'a association de malfaiteurs n et la mesure de a surveillance spÃ©ciale tr qui a Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©e au requÃ©rant . Il fait observer que cette derniÃ©re a trouvÃ© son x fondement n dans le soupÃ§on que le requÃ©rant appartenait Ã une association de rr mafia e et que l'on a tenu compte de faÃ§on tout Ã fait marginale de son inculpation dudit dÃ©lit . b . En ce qui concerne la violation de l'article 8 de la Convention, allÃ©guÃ©e par le requÃ©rant, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur fait remarquer que le t sÃ©jour forcÃ© tt constitue une mesure de prÃ©vention, une limitation du droit individuel Ã la libertÃ© de domicile, dont la lÃ©gitimitÃ© doit Ã©tre jugÃ©e Ã la lumiÃ¨re du paragraphe 2 de l'article 8 de la Convention . Le Gouvernement estime, Ã cet Ã©gard, que la mesure appliquÃ©e au requÃ©rant Ã©tait pleinement conforme aux critÃ©res Ã©noncÃ©s par ladite disposition . En gÃ©nÃ©ral, il fait observer que les lois en question x entrainent des limitations temporaires, nÃ©cessaires dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, Ã l'Ã©gard de personnes adonnÃ©es Ã des activitÃ©s illicites, mais suffisamment habiles (et par consÃ©quent particuliÃ¨rement dangereuses) pour Ã©chapper aux poursuites pinales n . Il fait remarquer qu'en l'espÃ©ce le requÃ©rant s'Ã©tait mis dans une situation de rupture et de rÃ©bellion Ã l'Ã©gard de la sociÃ©tÃ© . Par ailleurs, le Gouvernement estime que la sauvegarde des intÃ©rÃ©ts de la sociÃ©tÃ© Ã travers la fixation de limitations aux droits individuels constitue un problÃ©me de politique lÃ©gislative, rentrant dans le cadre de l'apprÃ©ciation souveraine de chaque Etat . II se rÃ©fÃ¨re, Ã cet Ã©gard, Ã la jurisprudence de la Commission . c . En ce qui concerne l'article 3 de la Convention, le Gouvernement estime qu'il est tout Ã fait dÃ©placÃ© de parler de tortures et de traitements inhumains, dans l'hypothÃ¨se d'un individuque l'on oblige Ã sÃ©journer en un lieu qui, quoique prÃ©sentant des difficultÃ©s relatives Ã l'environnement, est nÃ©anmoins une localitÃ© entrant dans un systÃ©me de vie civilisÃ©e et moderne . d . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur estime qu'on ne peut pas invoquer une violation de l'artic%9 car le sÃ©jour forcÃ© n'empÃªche pas au requÃ©rant de garder et de professer sa religion .
e . Quant Ã l'article 2 du Protocole, le Gouvernement nie que la mesure en question puisse empÃ©cher au requÃ©rant d'assurer Ã son fils l'instruction nÃ©cessaire . NÃ©anmoins, il fait remarquer que l'enfant du requÃ©rant n'aura mÃ¨me pas atteint l'Ã qe de la scolaritÃ©, Ã l'expiration de la pÃ©riode de sÃ©jour forcÃ© . B . Le requÃ©rant conteste les observations du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur . a . Quant aux articles 5 et 6 il fait remarquer que l'assignation Ã a sÃ©jour forcÃ© n dans l'ile de l'Asinara constitue une privation de libertÃ© qui est bien pire que celle que l'on souffre dans les prisons . Le fail d'Ãªtre obligÃ© de vivre dans un Â« morceau de terre n, inaccessible aux particuliers, rendrait cette mesure tout Ã fait comparable Ã une peine de dÃ©tention . C'est en vain, ajoute le requÃ©rant, que le Gouvernement nie le rapport direct entre l'inculpation d'a association de malfaiteurs n et la mesure en question . Il rappelle, Ã ce propos, que le prÃ©fet de police (Questore) de Milan avait demandÃ© l'application de cette mesure Ã l'encontre du requÃ©rant justement peu avant que n'expire le dÃ©lai prÃ©vu pour le maintien en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . b . Le requÃ©rant estime qu'il est dÃ©placÃ©, de la part du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, de se rÃ©fÃ©rer au paragraphe 2 de l'article 8 de la Convention . PremiÃ©rement parce que ledit paragraphe n'autoriserait en aucun cas des violations si graves des droits garantis par la Convention . DeuxiÃ©mement, le requÃ©rant se rÃ©fÃ¨re Ã l'affirmation, du Gouvernement selon laquelle les mesures en question seraient appliquÃ©es aux personnes u suffisamment habiles . . . pour Ã©chapper aux poursuites pÃ©nales n . Il fait valoir que de cette faÃ§on l'on affirme u le principe aberrant suivant lequel, si la justice Ã©choue, en Ã©tant incapable d'Ã©tablir la responsabilitÃ© pÃ©nale, l'individu vainement poursuivi doit Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© - en tout cas - comme dangereux ImÃ©me s'il est innocent) et donc Ã©tre objet de toute sorte de violence . . lÃ©gale n . c . Quant Ã l'article 3. le requÃ©rant conteste radicalement l'affirmation du Gouvernentent selon laquelle l'ile de l'Asinara serait insÃ©rÃ©e dans un systÃ©me de vie civilisÃ©e et moderne . Il fait, au contraire, valoir que sur ce rt morceau de terre Â» aucun systÃ¨me de vie n'est possible . Il rappelle que l'ile est totalement inaccessible au public, Ã tel point que les policiers ont mÃ¨me ouvert le feu Ã la mitraillette contre un bateau privÃ© qui s'approchait de l'ile . Il ajoute qu'Ã cause d'une telle situation, ceux qui sont assignÃ©s Ã sÃ©jour forcÃ© sur l'ile y vÃ©gÃ¨tent dans des conditions inhumaines et dÃ©gradantes . d. Quant Ã l'article 9, le requÃ©rant fait valoir que le droit Ã la religion se rÃ©fÃ¨re au culte, Ã l'enseignement, aux pratiques et Ã l'accomplissement des rites . Le sÃ©jour dans l'ile de l'Asinara empÃ¨cherait, selon le requÃ©rant, toutes ces manifestations .
e . Quant Ã l'article 2 du Protocole, le requÃ©rant affirme que l'instruction, Ã n'importe quel niveau, est impossible dans l'ile . IV . RÃ©oaratio n A . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur affirme que le requÃ©rant ne pourrait pas avancer de prÃ©tentions de dÃ©dommagement, qu'il n'a jamais fait valoir sur le plan du droit interne . B . Le requArant fait remarquer qu'il n'aurait pu formuler des demandes de rÃ©paration Ã l'Ã©gard de mesures considÃ©rÃ©es par les instances judiciaires internes comme Ã©tant parfaitement constitutionnelles et lÃ©gitimes . Le requÃ©rant s'en remet, donc, Ã l'Ã©quitable avis de la Commission .
V . Observations complÃ©mentaire s A . Dans ses obse rv ations complÃ©mentaires sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ¨te, le Gouvernement dÃ©lendeur souligne les points principaux qui ont dÃ©jÃ fait l'objet d'un exposÃ© dÃ©taillÃ© dans le cadre des observations du 3 septembre 1976 .
Le Gouvernement affirme que le requÃ©rant Â« tente . . . d'Ã©chapper Ã cette distinction que nous avons clairement Ã©tablie entre la rÃ©clamation qu'il avait originairement dÃ©posÃ©e contre un acte d'application de la loi (assignation au sÃ©jour obligatoire Ã l'le de l'Asinara) et la rÃ©clamation qu'il prÃ©tendrait Ã prÃ©sent accrÃ©diter contre la loi elle-mÃ©me qui prÃ©voit l'institution du sÃ©jour obligatoire Â» . Le Gouvernement fait donc valoir : 1 . que pour autant que le requÃ©rant s'Ã©lÃ©ve contre l'acte d'application de la loi, la requÃªte est irrecevable pour non-Ã©puisement parce qu'il n'a pas attaquÃ© la dÃ©cision du tribunal de Milan du 20 janvier 1976, statuant sur sa demande d'Ã©tre transfÃ©rÃ© de l'ile de l'Asinara Ã une autre localitÃ© . La requÃªte serait en outre et en premier lieu irrecevable Ã cause de la cessation de la matiÃ¨re litigieuse . Le Gouvernement affirme notamment : Si l'application des recours intÃ©rieurs a eu pour consÃ©quence, comme cela est hors de doute, l'Ã©limination de la situation dont se plaint le requÃ©rant, moyennant son transfert dans une autre commune, oÃ¹ des conditions de vie normale sont tout Ã fait possibles, on ne voit pas comment on peut nier la cessation de la matiÃ¨re du contentieux . 2 . Le Gouvernement fait encore valoir que pour autant que le requÃ©rant se plaint de la loi elle-mAme, la requÃªte doit Ã©tre rejetÃ©e comme irrecevable pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . Le requÃ©rant aurait d0, selon le Gouvernement, avoir recours Ã la question d'illÃ©gitimitÃ© constitutionnelle . Le Gouvernement reconnait que le requÃ©rant a soulevÃ© cette question devant la Cour de cassation, mais il souligne qu'il a attaquÃ© non pas la loi elle-mÃ©me, mais l'interprÃ©tation de cette derniÃ©re qui en Ã©tendait l'application au sÃ©jour sur un Â« morceau de terre Â» comme l'ile de l'Asinara . Â« Tout le monde sait, conclut le Gouvernement, que l'examen de la constitutionnalitÃ© d'un aspect particulier de la loi n'est pas dÃ©terminant aux fins de la constitutionnalitÃ© d'un autre aspect de cette mÃ©me loi n .
En ce qui concerne la demande de rÃ©paration adressÃ©e Ã la Commission par le requÃ©rant, le Gouvernement fait valoir que cette partie de la requÃªte doit aussi Ãªtre rejetÃ©e pour non-Ã©puisement, puisque le requÃ©rant n'a jamais formulÃ© sur le plan interne une telle demande . Le requÃ©rant, dans ses observations en rÃ©ponse, conteste les thÃ©ses du GouverB. nement dÃ©fendeur . 1. Il nie que l'on puisse parler d'une cessation de la matiÃ©re litigieuse, puisque le remÃ¨de interne n'a pas permis d'effacer les graves consÃ©quences de la violation de ses droits et puisqu'il estime qu'une telle violation persiste Ã l'heure actuelle . 2 . II affirme avoir Ã©puisÃ© toutes les voies de recours internes . A cet Ã©gard il fait valoir : a . qu'il est absurde de soutenir qu'il aurait dÃ» se pourvoir contre la dÃ©cision du tribunal de Milan du 20 janvier 1976 : une demande visant tout simplement Ã amÃ©liorer les conditions de vie du requÃ©rant ne pourrait pas Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme l'obligeant Ã reparcourir les trois Ã©tapes de la procÃ©dure ; b . que la Cour constitutionnelle ne peut Ãªtre saisie directement par les particuliers . Tout ce qu'un particulier peut faire, c'est de soulever l'exception devant une instanc e
judiciaire, lorsqu'il est question d'appliquer la norme visÃ©e . C'est prÃ©cisÃ©ment ce que le requÃ©rant a fait devant la Cour de cassation . 3 . Quant Ã la rÃ©paration, il affirme qu'il n'y a pas de moyens de la demander sur le plan interne .
VI . MÃ©moire additionnel du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeu r Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur rÃ©affirme la thÃ©se du non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . Ses principaux arguments sont les suivants : 1 . Le Gouvernement propose Ã la Commission l'alternative suivante : - ou bien la requÃªte est introduite dans le but de dÃ©noncer une violation persistante et continue de la Convention et donc elle vise Ã l'Ã©limination de la situation illÃ©gitime ;
- ou bien la requi'te consiste dans la dÃ©nonciation d'une violation qui a dÃ©jÃ eu lieu et qui a pris terme et ce dans le seul but d'obtenir la seule forme possible de rÃ©paration, c'est-Ã©-dire le dÃ©dommagement . Dans la premiÃ©re hypothÃ©se la requÃªte serait irrecevable pour cessation de la matiÃ©re litigieuse ; dans la deuxiÃ©me hypothÃ¨se, elle serait irrecevable pour nonÃ©puisement des voies de recours internes . 2 . Le Gouvernement affirme que la dÃ©termination de la localitÃ© de sÃ©jour forcÃ© revÃªt une nature administrative et non pas judiciaire . Le requÃ©rant aurait dÃ¹, par consÃ©quent, exercer des Â« recours administratifs n . 3 . En ce qui concerne la rÃ©paration, le Gouvernement affirme que le requÃ©rant aurait dÃ¹ se prÃ©valoir, sur le plan interne, de l'article 2043 du Code civil, qui donne droit Ã une rÃ©paration Ã tout individu ayant subi des dommages illÃ©gitimes . VII . RÃ©sumÃ© du contenu de la loi du 27 dÃ©cembre 1956 M . 1423 sur les personnes dangereuses (Misure di prevenzione nei confronti delle persone pericolose per la sicurezza e per la pubblica moralitÃ©) et de la loi du 31 mai 1965 M . 575 sur la mafia (Disposizioni contro la mafia) .
1 . La loi de 1956 se caractÃ©rise d'une part par la graduation des mesures prÃ©vues Ã la charge des personnes dangereuses et d'autre part par l'intervention, Ã c0tÃ© de l'autoritÃ© de police, de l'autoritÃ© judiciaire . L'article 1 de cette loi prÃ©voit en son paragraphe 1, entre autres, que ceux qui par leur conduite et leur train de vie doivent Ã¨tre considÃ©rÃ©s comme vivant habituellement, ou mÃªme en partie, des gains de dÃ©lits, ou du fait d'avoir favorisÃ© des dÃ©lits, ou qui par les manifestations auxquelles ils ont donnÃ© lieu, peuvent Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©s comme Ã©tant portÃ©s Ã enfreindre la loi, peuvent faire l'objet d'un avertissement de la part du prÃ©fet de police (Possono essere diffidati dal questore) . L'article 1 in fine ajoute que Â« le prÃ©fet de police enjoint aux personnes ainsi averties de changer de conduite n et que si elles n'obtempÃ©rent pas Ã cette prescription il y aura lieu d'appliquer les mesures prÃ©vues Ã cet effet .
a . Graduation des mesures Les mesures de prÃ©ventions ressortissent Ã la compÃ©tence du prÃ©fet de police et des tribunaux . 2 . Le prÃ©fet de police peut lancer un ave rtissement (cf . supra) . S'il s'agit de personnes, dangereuses pour la sÃ¹retÃ© et pour la moralitÃ© publiques, et qui se trouvent hors de leur rÃ©sidence, le prÃ©fet peut en outre les renvoyer Ã leur commune de rÃ©sidence .
Les personnes qui n'obtempÃ¨rent pas 8 ces prescriptions sont passibles d'une peine (arresto) de prison d'un mois au minimum et de six mois au maximum . 3 . Les personnes qui, ayant fait l'objet de l'avertissement prÃ©vu Ã l'article 1, n'ont pas changÃ© de conduite peuvent, lorsqu'elles sont dangereuses pour la sÃ¹retÃ© et la moralitÃ© publiques, Ãªtre soumises Ã©, d'autres mesures qui sont au nombre de trois : surveillance spÃ©ciale de la police, interdiction de sÃ©jour dans une ou plusieurs communes ou dans une ou plusieurs provinces, assignation Ã rÃ©sidence dans une commune dÃ©terminÃ©e . Ces mesures ressortissent Ã© la compÃ©tence exclusive du prÃ©sident du tribunal qui a son siÃ¨ge dans le chef-lieu de la province . Elles sont prises sur proposition motivÃ©e du prÃ©fet de police . b . Intervention de l'autoritA judiciair e 4 . Le tribunal statue en chambre du conseil par dÃ©cision motivÃ©e, dans un dÃ©lai de trente jours . Le MinistÃ©re Public et l'intÃ©ressÃ© doivent intervenir et il est observÃ©, dans la mesure oÃ¹ elles sont applicables, les rÃ©gles prÃ©vues aux articles 630 et 637 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . L'intÃ©ressÃ© peut prÃ©senter des mÃ©moires et se faire assister d'un dÃ©fenseur (avvocato o procuratore) . Si l'intÃ©ressÃ© ne comparaÃ®t pas et au cas oÃ¹ sa prÃ©sence s'avÃ¨re nÃ©cessaire aux fins de son interrogatoire, le prÃ©sident du tribunal l'invite Ã© comparaÃ®tre ; en cas de refus il peut dÃ©cerner Ã© son encontre un mandat d'amener . La durÃ©e de la mesure de prÃ©vention ne peut pas Ãªtre infÃ©rieure Ã© un an ni supÃ©rieure 8 cinq ans . 5 . Voies de recours Tant le MinistÃ©re Public que l'intÃ©ressÃ© peuvent interjeter appel mÃªme sur le fond (anche per il merito) . La cour d'appel statue en chambre du conseil, par dÃ©cision motivÃ©e, dans un dÃ©lai de trente jours . Contre cette dÃ©cision tant le MinistÃ©re Public que l'intÃ©ressÃ© peuvent introduire un pourvoi en cassation pour violation de la loi (per violazione di legge) . La cour statue en chambre du conseil dans un dÃ©lai de trente jours .
Pour toutes ces procÃ©dures il est fait application des dispositions du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale dans la mesure oÃ¹ elles sont applicables . 6 . Contenu des mesures La dÃ©cision du tribunal dÃ©termine les mesures auxquelles la personne en question doit Ãªtre soumise . S'il s'agit d'une mesure de surveillance spÃ©ciale, le tribunal enjoint Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ© de trouver du travail, de s'Ã©tablir, de communiquerson lieu de rÃ©sidence et de ne pas s'en Ã©loigner sans en aviser au prÃ©alable la police lautoritÃ© di pubblica sicurezza) . La dÃ©cision Ã©numbre en tout cas une sÃ©rie de prescriptions auxquelles l'intÃ©ressÃ© doit se conformer (entre autres, interdiction de frÃ©quenter d'autres personnes dangereuses, de rentrer tard le soir, de s'arrÃªter habituellement dans les cafÃ©s, etc .) . S'il s'agit de l'obligation de sÃ©jour, on peut aussi enjoindre Ã la personne intÃ©ressÃ©e de ne pas s'Ã©loigner de son habitation sans prÃ©avis et de se prÃ©senter aux jours indiquÃ©s Ã© l'autoritÃ© prÃ©posÃ©e Ã la surveillance . 7 . fxÃ©cution des mesure s L'exÃ©cution des mesures susvisÃ©es incombe au prÃ©fet de police . II est prÃ©vu que la dÃ©cision par laquelle les mesures ont Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ©es peut Ãªtre, sur demande de l'intÃ©ressÃ©, rÃ©voquÃ©e ou modifiÃ©e par l'autoritÃ© qui l'a prononcÃ©e, ou l'autoritÃ© de police, dans la mesure oÃ¹ les motifs qui l'ont engendrÃ©e ne subsistent plus .
8 . Sanctions Les personnes qui n'obtempÃ©rent pas aux prescriptions contenues dans le dÃ©cret de surveillance spÃ©ciale et dans celui de l'obligation de sÃ©jour sont punies d'arrÃªts (de trois mois Ã© un an) . 9 . La loi de 1965 concerne ceux qui sont soupÃ§onnÃ©s d'appartenir Ã des associations Â« mafiose Â» larticle 1) . L'article 2 dispose que les mesures de la surveillance spÃ©ciale, celle de l'interdiction de rÃ©sider dans une commune ou celle de l'assignation Ã rÃ©sidence peuvent Ãªtre proposÃ©es Ã©galement par les Procureurs de la RÃ©publique, mÃ¨me s'il n'y a pas eu d'injonction (rt diffida Â»I prÃ©alable .
L'article 5 dispose que rr le fait de s'Ãªtre Ã©loignÃ© sans droit de la commune d'assignation Ã rÃ©sidence est puni de six mois Ã deux ans d'arrÃ©ts . . . u . La compÃ©tence de dÃ©cider desdites mesures relÃ©ve toujours de l'autoritÃ© judiciaire, ainsi que le prescrit l'article 4 de la loi de 1956 .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de son assignation Ã rÃ©sidence forcÃ©e Ã l'le de l'Asinara, du 30 janvier 1975 au 22 juillet 1976 . II affirme que les conditions de vie sur I~e constituaient un traitement inhumain et dÃ©gradant, au sens de l'article 3 de la Convention . Il se plaint qu'il ne lui Ã©tait pas permis de vivre de faÃ§on continuelle avec sa famille . Il allÃ©gue, Ã cet Ã©gard, une violation de l'article 8 de la Convention . Il se plaint qu'il ne lui Ã©tait pas possible de manifester sa religion par le culte . Il allÃ©gue, Ã cet Ã©gard, une violation de l'article 9 de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant invoque aussi l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel, en ce qu'il n'avait pas la possibilitÃ© de faire instruire son fils . En outre, la Commission dÃ©cide d'examiner ex officio la requÃ©te sous l'angle des articles 5 et 6 de la Convention . 2 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient la thÃ©se selon laquelle le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes . 3 . II affirme en premier lieu que, pour autant que le requÃ©rant se plaint de la mesure d'application de la loi par laquelle il a Ã©tÃ© assignÃ© Ã rÃ©sidence forcÃ©e Ã l'le de l'Asinara, il aurait dÃ» se pourvoir contre la dÃ©cision du tribunal de Milan du 20 janvier 1976 rejetant sa demande de transfert Ã une autre localitÃ© . Le requÃ©rant conteste cette thÃ©se . Il affirme qu'il avait Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes en formant son pourvoi en cassation et que, partant, son recours du 14 novembre 1975 devant le tribunal de Milan Ã©tait superfÃ©tatoire . La Commission constate que le requÃ©rant s'est en effet pourvu en cassation contre la mesure d'assignation Ã rÃ©sidence forcÃ©e Ã l'Ã®le de l'Asinara . Elle remarque que la dÃ©cision du 20 janvier 1976 statuait sur une demande du requÃ©rant postÃ©rieure Ã l'arrÃªt de la Cour de cassation et visant Ã obtenir la mutation de la localitÃ© d'assignation Ã rÃ©sidence forcÃ©e . Ladite dÃ©cision constituait donc le rÃ©sultat d'une deuxiÃ©me tentative du requÃ©rant devant les instances nationales, tentative que l'on ne saurait exiger de lui sous l'angle de l'article 26 de la Convention . 4 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que le requÃ©rant, pour autant qu'il se plaint de la loi en elle-mÃªme, aurait d0 soulever la question de lÃ©gitimitÃ© constitutionnelle Ã - 196-
l'encontre des normes appliquÃ©es Ã son Ã©gard . Le Gouvernement se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã la dÃ©cision de la Commission dans la requÃ©te NÂ° 6452/74, Sacchi c/Italie . II admet que le requÃ©rant a soulevÃ© cette question devant la Cour de cassation, mais il fait remarquer qu'il n'a visÃ© que les modalitÃ©s d'application et d'interprÃ©tation de la loi . Le requÃ©rant fait valoir que la saisine de la Cour constitutionnelle relÃ¨ve du pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire de l'autoritÃ© judiciaire et que, par ailleurs, il a contestÃ© au moins devant la Cour de cassation la mesure qui lui Ã©tait appliquÃ©e . La Commission estime que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas de raisons de soulever la question de lÃ©gitimitÃ© constitutionnelle Ã l'encontre des lois en question . En effet, il contestait uniquement la conformitÃ© avec les lois de la mesure Ã laquelle il avait Ã©tÃ© assujetti : il demandait d'Ãªtre assignÃ© Ã rÃ©sidence dans une r commune nortnale u et non dans un a morceau de terre a dans des conditions de vie extrÃªmement difficiles . 5 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur attire l'attention de la Commission sur la circonstance que le requÃ©rant n'a pas invoquÃ© l'article 5 de la Convention devant les juridictions internes . Il en conclut que la Commission ne pourrait pas envisager ex officio la requÃªte sous l'angle de cet article, puisque le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes sur ce point . La Commission rappelle, Ã ce propos, que selon sa jurisprudence constante il suffit que le requÃ©rant ait articulÃ© tc en substance n devant les instances nationales le grief qu'il soumet Ã la Commission (cf . par exemple dÃ©cision NÂ° 1203/61, Recueil 8, p . 112) . La Commission se rÃ©fÃ©re, en outre, Ã sa dÃ©cision NÂ° 1661/62 (Ann . 6, pp . 361 et 367), dans laquelle elle avait Ã©tabli que mPme lorsque la Convention est directement applicable dans l'ordre interne d'un Etat (tel est le cas de l'Italiel, l'intÃ©ressÃ© peut aussi invoquer devant les juridictions internes rt d'autres arguments d'un effet Ã©quivalent Â» .
Or, la Commission constate qu'il ressort du dossier que le requÃ©rant s'est plaint devant les instances nationales et notamment devant la Cour de cassation que l'assignation Ã rÃ©sidence forcÃ©e Ã©tait, en fait, exÃ©cutÃ©e comme une privation de libertÃ© . ce qui Ã©quivaut Ã dire qu'il s'est plaint en substance d'une privation de libertÃ© au sens de l'anicle 5, plutÃ´t que de l'assignation Ã rÃ©sidence forcÃ©e . 6 . La Commission parvient donc Ã la conclusion que le requÃ©rant a rempli la condition de l'Ã©puisement prÃ©alable des voies de recours internes, au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention . 7 . La Commission a examinÃ© les diffÃ©rentes allÃ©gations du requÃ©rant sous l'angle de l'article 27, Â§ 2, de la Convention . Elle a pris en considÃ©ration dans son ensemble la situation dÃ©noncÃ©e par le requÃ©rant, Ã savoir son sÃ©jour forcÃ© Ã l'le de l'Asinara du 30 janvier 1975 au 22 juillet 1976. 8 . En ce qui concerne le grief du requÃ©rant tirÃ© de la prÃ©tendue violation de l'article 2 du Protocole N' 1, la Commission dÃ©cide de le rejeter pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . En effet, la Commission estime que la Convention ne garantit pas le droit de faire instruire les enfants dans une localitÃ© prÃ©cise . En plus, la Commission remarque que le fils du requÃ©rant, au temps de son sÃ©jour Ã l'le de l'Asinara, n'avait pas encore atteint l'8ge scolaire . 9 . Quant aux autres aspects de la requÃªte, la Commission constate qu'ils soulÃ©vent des problÃ¨mes complexes sous l'angle de diffÃ©rents articles de la Convention, notamment des articles 3, 5, 6, 8 et 9, et doivent faire l'objet d'un examen au fond .
Par ces motifs, la Commission 1 . DÃCLARE IRRECEVABLE les griefs concernant l'article 2 du Protocole add ; itonel 2 . DÃCLARE RECEVABLE et retient la requite, tout moyen de fond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ©, pour autant qu'elle vise les autres aspects de la situation dÃ©noncÃ©e par le requÃ©rant .
(TRANSLATION ) THE FACTS The facts of the case may be summarised as follows : 1 . The applicant, an Italian national born in 1942, is a workman and at present resides at Force (Ascoli Piceno) . 2 . On 8 February 1973, the applicant was arrested on the charge of being accomplice to the kidnapping of an Italian industrialist who was freed on 7 February 1973 after the payment of a ransom (more than a thousand million Lire'), and criminal conspiracy . The prosecution and the investigating judge applied for the applicant to be committed for trial on this account . The trial was held in October November 1976 and ended in an acquittal of the applicant for "lack of proof" .
The applicant who alleged his innocence had been immediately placed in detention on remand in Milan Prison . During his imprisonment he married his fiancÃ©e of whom he has since had a child . 3 . Shortly before the expiration of the maximum period provided for detention remand (which in present case was two years)", on 14 January 1975 the AttorneyGeneral in Milan applied to the Milan Regional Court on the basis of a report from the Chief of Police (Questore) of 23 December 1974 to order the preventive measures of "special supervision" against the applicant by virtue of the Acts of 1956 and 1965 . The first of these Acts (that of 1956) relates to preventive measures to be taken with respect to persons who constitute a danger to public morality and safety . The second (that of 1965) refers more especially to persons suspected of belonging to associations connected with the Mafia"' .
The measure to which the applicant was subjected was a compulsory residence order . Persons to whom such an order applies are obliged to reside in a specified district . The order in question sets out a series of directions with which the person concerned is required to comply . ' The case concerns the kidnauping of the industrialist TORRIELLI which occured on 18 December 1972 at Vipevano ILombardyl .
" Anicle 27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . 2 'â¢' A summarv of hese Acts is annexed to the statement of the facts .
4 . On 30 January 1975 the Milan Regional Court decided to subject the applicant to "special supervision" coupled with an obligation to reside in the island of Asinara for a period of 3 years .
In its decision the Milan Regional Court rejected the applicant's submission disputing that the measure in question was well founded and maintaining that it was based on mere presumptions . He also relied on his serious state of health . The Regional Court considered that the penal record of the applicant, who was described as a person constituting a danger "to the safety of the public", and the links he maintained with members of the Mafia "specialised in kidnapping with a view to extorting moneÃ¿" justified the measure in question . With respect to his state of health relied on by the applicant the court admitted that he suffered from a serious condition which might require surgical treatment but held that this was not urgent and that in any case, should it become necessary, the competent authorities could transfer the applicant in order that he might receive suitable treatment . In making the above-mentioned order the court instructed the applicant (inter alia) to look for work in the place fixed, not to leave it and to observe certain rules of behaviour . 5 . Under this decision on 8 February 1975 after the period during which he could'be kept in detention on remand had expired, the appl'icant was taken by the police to the place specified in the order . 6 . On 10 February 1975 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Milan Regional Coun arguing in particular that the measure was not justified and that in any case it would be impossible for him to find work or accommodation for his family at the place specified in the order . He also maintained that this state of health required him to be transferred to a district with a urological hospital .
On 12 February 1975, the Milan Court of Appeal on an application by the prosecution ordered that the applicant should be transferred to Sassari hospital for a medical examination and decided to ask the competent police authority to provide it with information on the possibility of finding work for the applicant and accommodation for his family in the island of Asinara . 7 . On 14 February 1975 another representative of the prosecution applied to the Court of Appeal to cancel this order on the grounds (inter alia) that the applicant had refused to submit to clinical analyses in the Milan hospital and that the place chosen for the "special supervision" was potentially one of the best in Italy as regards climate and as a tourist resort ; in any case the unavowed purpose of the applicant's application was to escape . On the same day the Milan Court of Appeal, sitting in Chambers, annulled the order of 12 February and fixed the hearing of the parties for 12 March 1975 . On 14 February too, the police authorities had informed the Milan Court of Appeal that there were only two flats reserved for the families of persons staying on the island for periods of one or two months and that there was no possibility of finding regular work . On 17 February 1975 the applicant's counsel denied the statements made by the prosecution representative on 14 February 1975 and requested the court to call for further information .
On 21 February 1975 the applicant repeated his allegations in a memorial addressed to the Court of Appeal . 8 . On 12 March 1975 the Milan Court of Appeal heard the applicant's appeal and confirmed its decision of 30 January 1975 . The court considered essentially that the applicant's state of health did not prevent his being required to reside at the place specified in the order and that the purpose of the measure ordered against the applicant was to separate him from his milieu and make his contacts with it more difficult . These considerations should therefore prevail over all others such as the impossibility of finding work or living with his family . Moreover the applicant had married when in detention on remand pending trial for a serious offence and he therefore could not expect to live with his wife and child . After observing that the measure complained of was amply justified by the fact that the applicant by virtue of his record was particularly dangerous to society the Appeal Court concluded that the supervision of such a person is a matter of such importance that it justifies a reduction of other legal advantages conferred on him by law I"infatti, avuto riguardo alla funzione di detta misura, la custodia di un individuo come sopra caratterizzato assume una tale prevalenza di giustificare l'affievolimento di altre situazioni giuridiche soggetive che la legge prende in considerazionÃ©'I .
9 . On 3 April 1975, the applicant's counsel appealed to the Court of Cassation . He disputed the cogency of the statements contained in the Court of Appeal's judgment set out above . He insisted particularly on the fact that the measure complained of violated the right of the applicant, who had not yet been tried, to private and family life as protected by the European Convention . On 7 October 1975, the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal . Adopting the opinion expressed by the Attorney General the court considered that the measure complained of was justified by the circumstances of the case . With regard to the rights claimed by the applicant it stated that "the obvious restrictions imposed on the status of a person subject to compulsory residence depended directly on the application of measures which have been repeatedly recognised as being in accordance with the Constitution seeing that these restrictions are inherent therein" . (le indubbie limitazioni allo 'status' di soggiornante obbligato direttamente dipendono dall'applicazione di misure ripetutamente riconosciute conformi ai precetti costituzionali costituendone l'aspetto correlativo . )
10 . On 14 November 1975 the applicant's counsel applied to the Milan Regional Court as responsible for supervising the applicant (giudice di sorveglianza) for his client to be required to reside in a district where he could live with his family and work . In this application counsel referred to a decision of the Head of Police in Sassari served on the applicant on 9 October 1975 whereby his family had been required to leave the island of Asinara as their residence permit had expired on 18 September 1975 . On 20 January 1976 Milan Regional Court decided that it had no jurisdiction in respect of the execution of preventive measures, which was a matter for the police authorities .
After noting that the measures prescribed by the Act were justified by the need to defend society the court nevertheless considered that this requirement did not imply that persons affected by such orders should be separated from their families ; moreover such persons had the right to work and the administrative authorities should have assured that these rights were respected .
Although it rejected the application the cou rt decided to send the text of the decision ot the Minister of the Interior and the Head of Police at Sassari . On 22 July 1975 the Milan Regional Court ordered that the applicant's place of compulsory residence be transferred to the district of Force (Ascoli Piceno) . This decision of the Milan District Cou rt was based on a proposal to this effect from the competent administrative authorities . On 13 November 1975 the Milan Regional Court acquitted the applicant for lack of proof (assoluzione per insufficiena di prove) on the charges of kidnapping the industrialist Torrielli and criminal conspiracy . The applicant's complaints may be summarised as follows : 11 . The applicant complains of the decisions imposing compulsory residence . He alleges violations of Articles 3, 8 and 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of the First Protocol . With respect to his compulsory residence he submits : - that the island of Asinara, which is inaccessible to the public, is not a district but a mere tract of land . - that he could not find work there or accommodation for his family - that he was not permitted to live with his family ; - that moreover his wife and child, who had come there had been sent away - that he was "vegetating" there in inhuman and degrading condition s
- that he was not able to manifest his religion in worship ; - even if he could live there with his family, he could not exercise his right of having his son educated as there was neither a kindergarten nor a school on the island .
The applicant also complains of violation of the right to the proper administration of justice . He states that the measure ordered against him and which was the cause of all the violations complained of was based on the sole fact that he was "suspected" of belonging to an association connected with the mafia when in fact he had already been subjected to the maximum period of detention on remand provided for by law under an accusation of the same offence (criminal conspiracy) . The applicant adds that every offence must be proved and not merely presumed and that any restriction of freedom following detention on remand requires guilt to have been proved . The Proceeding s The application was brought to the knowledge of the respondent Government by the Commission on 24 May 1976 . On 16 September 1976 the Italian Government lodged their observations on the admissibility of the application . These observations were immediately sent to the applicant's counsel for reply . On 16 November 1976 the applicant's counsel lodged his observations Idated 8 November 1976) in reply to those of the respondent Government . These observations were immediately sent to the respondent Government . On 20 December 1976 th e
Commission requested the Italian Government to send supplementary observations on admissibility . These observations, dated 21 January 1977, were sent to the applicant's counsel, who lodged his reply on 18 February 1977 . On 28 February 1977 the respondent Government lodged with the Commission a further memorial on the admissibility of the application . Submissions of the Parties Litigation now without purpos e a . The respondent Government maintain that the Milan Regional Court's decision of 22 July 1976 transferring the applicant to the district of Force (Ascoli Piceno) where he continued to be subject to compulsory residence had fundamentally disposed of the matter . The Government argued from this that his complaints had no longer any foundation and that it followed that the application should not be examined by the Commission .
B . The applicant argues that the serious violations of his rights for a period of nearly 18 months have had lasting and irremediable negative effects on his whole family . Exhaustion of the domestic remedies a . The respondent Government consider that the application is inadmissible for failure to exhaust the domestic remedies . This contention is based on two distinct arguments .
a . The respondent Government refer in the first place to the Commission's previous decisions and in particular that in Application No . 6452/74 Sacchi v . Italyâ¢ and maintain that the applicant has failed to exhaust the domestic remedies since he has not raised the question of the constitutionality of the laws applied in his case (Act of 27 December 1956 INo . 14231 and Act of 31 May 1965 (No . 57511 . According to the Government the applicant had only made objections on the merits . Moreover he had at the hearing of 12 February 1975 before the Milan Court of Appeal abandoned "his grounds of objection relating to the legality of his being subjected to measures of special supervision . . . and insisted only on the inferences relating to the unsuitability of the island as a place for compulsory residencÃ©" . The respondent Government add that it is true that the applicant raised before the Court of Cassation the question of constitutionality but only as regards the interpretation and details of the application of the Act . They argue that the applicant should have availed himself of remedy of preliminary reference to the Constitutional Court with respect to Articles 13 and 16 of the Constitution, the provisions of which correspond to Article 8 of the Convention . It was not sufficient to refer to previous negative decisions of the Constitutional Court as the Italian legal system permits raising again with the court the question of the constitutionality of an Act which the court has already pronounced constitutional . Moreover "Article 26 of the Convention requires the applicant to exhaust the domestic remedies and does not permit him to avoid this requirement by relying on earlier decisions not directly binding on him" . See D .R . 5/43 .
Moreover the applicant had not relied on a violation of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention (and the corresponding Articles 13 and 27 of the Italian Constitution) . In this connection they consider that one is faced with the following alternatives : either one considers that the applicant himself impliedly inferred violations of the rules in Articles 5 and 6 quoted above which caused the Commission to call for an ex officio examination of this part of the application and in that case the preceding observations on its inadmissibility retain their full force ; or the question raised ex officio does not arise out of the subject matter of the proposed application and in this case its examination is excluded by the terms of Article 26 . b . Secondly the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies because he had failed to appeal against the decision of 20 January 1976 by which the Milan Regional Court decided it had no jurisdiction with regard to the execution of preventive measures . The Government argue that the applicant is mistaken in maintaining in his original application that the decision in question was not subject to appeal . On the contrary, it was subject to appeal and further appeal to the Court of Cassation as was the case of all decisions at first instance under a rule of Italian law . B . Replying to the respondent Government's observations the applicant disputes the two arguments summarised above : a . he states firstly that he always argued that the measure of special supervision ordered against him was illegal both under the Italian Constitution and under the legislation applied . He had not abandoned his grounds of objection to the legality of his subjection to the measure in question at the hearing of 12 February 1975 . He recalls that the Court of Cassation had considered the ground based on unconstitutionality as manifestly ill-founded .
The applicant moreover seems to maintain that in principle the procedure before the Constitutional Court did not constitute a domestic remedy he was required to echaust . He argues on this question that whether a matter is brought before that court depends on the discretionary power of the ordinary courts . b . Secondly, he points out that he had exhausted the domestic remedies in appealing to the Court of Cassation and that accordingly his appeal of 14 November 1975 to the Milan Regional Court was superfluous . This being so, it would be absurd to claim, as did the respondent Government, that he should have appealed against the Milan Regional Court's decision of 20 January 1976. He further points out that the Milan Regional Court recognised the principle that measures of special supervision must not violate human rights and had sent its decision to the administrative authority .
Merits of the applicatio n
a. a . The respondent Government begin by examining the question from the point of view of Articles 5 and 6 which were raised ex officio by the Commission . They maintain in particular :"It is not clear in what way the measures of special supervision applied to the applicant must and can be appreciated in relation to the content of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention seeing that-even in the most serious case of compulsory residence in a specified district i .e . where the person concerned i s
particularly dangerous ISection 3 of Act 1423 of 1956)-they do not give rise to imprisonment and thus do not constitute a sentence of imprisonment imposed on conviction for an offence which has been proved" . The Government do not admit the existence of a connection between the charge of criminal conspiracy and the measure of special supervision applied to the applicant . They point out that the latter was based on the suspicion that the applicant belonged to an association connected with the "Mafia" and only marginally was account taken of the fact that he was charged with this offence . b . As regards the violation of Article 8 of the Convention alleged by the applicant the respondent Government point out that compulsory residence is a preventive measure and a limitation of the individual's riqht to the freedom of residence the legality of which must be assessed in the light of paragraph 2 ot Article 8 of the Convention . The measure applied to the applicant was entirely in accordance with the criteria specified in that provision . In general the Acts in question "entailed temporary restrictions necessary in a democratic society on persons habitually practising illegal activities but who are sufficiently skilful to escape criminal prosecution and therefore particularly dangerous" . In the present case the applicani had placed himself in a position of separation and rebellion with regard to society . Moreover, the protection of the interests of society by imposing restrictions on individual rights was a question of legislative policy falling within the sovereign appreciation of each state . They referred in this connection to the Commission's previous decisions . c . As regards Article 3 of the Convention the Government consider that it is entirely ill-conceived to speak of torture and inhuman treatment in the case of a person compelled to reside in a place which, though living there does entail certain difficulties nevenheless forms part of a system of modern civilised life . d . The respondent Government consider that the applicant cannot rely on a violation of Article 9 since compulsory residence does not prevent him from observing and professing his religion .
e . As to Article 2 of the Protocol, the Government deny that the measure in question prevents the applicant from giving his son the necessary education . Nevertheless they point out that the applicant's child will not have reached school age on the expiration of the period of compulsory residence . B . The applicant disputes the respondent Government's observations . a . As to Articles 5 and 6 he states that compulsory residence in the island of Asinara constitutes a deprivation of freedom much worse than that experienced in prison . The fact of being obliged to live on a"tract of land" not accessible to private individuals made this measure in all respects comparable to a sentence of imprisonment . It was in vain for the Government to deny the direct relationship between the charge of "criminal conspiracy" and the measure in question . The Head of Police (Questore) of Milan had called for this measure to be applied to the applicant just shortly before the expiration of the statutory period of detention on remand . b . It was irrelevant for the respondent Government to refer to paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention . Firstly because that paragraph would in no case authorise such serious violations of the rights guaranteed by the Convention . Secondly the applicant refers to the Government's statement that the measure in question wa s
applied to persons "sufficiently skilful to escape criminal prosecution" . He argues that this amounts to affirming "the untenable principle that if the prosecution fails to establish a person's guilt the individual who has been unsuccessfully prosecuted, should-in any case-be considered dangerous leven if he is innocent) and thus be exposed to all sorts of legalised violencÃ©" . c . As to Article 3 the applicant strongly denies the Government's assertion that the island of Asinara formed part of a civilised modern system of life . On tfie contrary, on this tract of land no system of life was possible . The island was totally inaccessible to the extent that the police even opend fire with machine guns on a private boat approaching the island . This meant that persons compulsorily resident on the island vegetated in inhuman and degrading conditions . d. With regard to Article 9, the applicant argues that the right to freedom of religion refers to worship, teaching practice and observance . Residence on the island of Asinara made these impossible . e. As to Article 2 of the Protocol the applicant states that education at all levels is impossible on the island . IV .
Compensetio n
A . The respondent Government maintain that the applicant is not entitled even t o put forward claims to compensation which he had never advanced under domestic law . B. The applicant points out that he could not have claimed compensation for measures considered by the domestic courts as perfectly corsstitutional and legal . He therefore relies on the Commission's equitable discretion on this point .
V . Supp/ementery observations on admissibilit y A . In its supplementary observations on admissibility the respondent Government emphasise the principal points already set out in detail in its observations of 3 September 1976 . The Government state that the applicant "is trying to escape from the distinction which we clearly established between the claim he originally made against the measure applying the Act (compulsory residence on the island of Asinara) and the claim which he is now seeking to establish against the Act itself i .e . the Act which makes provision for compulsory residence" . They thus argue : 1 . In so far as the applicant complains of the measure taken in application of the law, his application is inadmissible for failure to exhaust the domestic remedies because he did not appeal against the Milan Regional Court's decision of January 1976 on his application to be transferred elsewhere away from the island of Asinara . The application was besides and above all inadmissible because the subject matter had already been disposed of . The Government state in particular : If the application of the domestic remedies has, as is beyond doubt, resulted in the removal of the situation of which the applicant complains by his transfer to a different district where the conditions of normal life are perfectly possible one cannot see how it can be denied that the subject rnatter of the dispute has been disposed of .
2 . In so far as the applicant complained of the Act itself the application must be rejected as inadmissible for non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies .
The applicant should have used the remedy of raising the question of inconstitutionality . It is true that he had raised this question before the Court of Cassation, but there he attacked not the Act itself but the interpretation by which its application was extended to residence on a"tract of land" like the island of Asinara . "Everyone knows-argued the Government-that the consideration of the constitutionality of a particular aspect of an Act is not decisive as regards the constitutionality of a different aspect of the same Act" . The claim for compensation submitted to the Commission by the applicant should also be rejected for non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies since the applicant had never raised this claim in Italy .
B . In his observations in reply, the applicant disputes the respondent Government's arguments . 1 . He denies that one can properly speak of the matter having been disposed of since the internal remedy did not remove the serious consequences of the violation of his right and indeed this violation was still continuing . 2 . He states that he has exhausted all the domestic remedies and argues in this connection
a . it was absurd to maintain that he should have appealed against the Milan Regional Court's decision of 20 January 1976 : an application merely intended to improve his conditions of life could not be considered as requiring him to resort once again to three levels of jurisdiction : b. that private individuals could not bring matters before the Constitutional Coun . All that a private individual could do was to raise an objection before a court when the legislation in question was being applied . This is exactly what the applicant had done before the Court of Cassation . 3 . With regard to compensation, he states that there is no possibility of applying for it in internal law .
Supplementary memorief from the respondent Government
The respondent Government restate their argument based on the failure to exhaust the domestic remedies . Their principal submissions are as follow s 1 . The Government put the following alternative to the Commission : - either the application is brought for the purpose of denouncing a persistent and continuing violation of the Convention and thus aims to eliminate the illegal situation ;
- or it complains of the violation that has already taken place and ceased to exist and in this case its sole object is to obtain the only possible torm of reparation i .e . compensation . In the first case the application would be inadmissible because the matter was already disposed of ; in the second case it will be inadmissible for non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies .
2 . The Government state that the decision determining the place of compulsory residence is of an administrative and not a judicial nature . The applicant should therefore have made use of the "administrative remedies" . 3 . As regards compensation the Government state that the applicant should have made use in domestic law of Article 2043 of the Civil Code which gives a right to compensation to everyone who has suffered illegal damage . VII .
Summary of the contents of the Dangerous Persons Act of 27 December 19561No. 14231 (Misure di prevenzione nei confronti delle persone pericolose per la sicurezza e per la pubblica moralita) and of the Mafia Act of 31 May 1965INo. 5751 Idisposizioni contro la mafia )
1 . The Act of 1956 is characterised firstly by the graduated measures provided for against dangerous persons and secondly by the fact that functions are conferred on the courts as well as the police authorities . Section 1 (1) of the Act provides (inter alia) that persons whose conduct and style of life shows that they live habitually, even in part from the proceeds of crime or from having abetted offences or who by their public conduct may be considered inclined to infringe the law, may be sent a warning by the Head of Police IPossono essere diffidati dal questore) . Section 1 in fine adds that "the Head of Police shall call on the persons so warned to change their conduct" and provides that if they do not act accordingly, they shall be subjected to the measures prescribed for this purpose . a . Graduated measures
The preventive measures fall within the jurisdiction of the head of police and the courts . 2 . The head of police may issue a warning (cf . above) . Moreover he may send persons constituting a danger to public safety and morality back to the district where they reside . Persons who do not comply with these instructions are liable to imprisonment (arresto) for a minimum period of one and a maximum period of 6 months . 3 . Persons who have received the warning specified in section 1 and have not changed their conduct may, if they constitute a danger to public safety and morality, be subjected to three other measures : special police supervision, prohibition of residence in one or more districts or in one or more provinces or compulsory residence in a specified district . These measures fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the president of the regional court situated in the chief town of the province . They are ordered on a reasoned application submitted by the head of police . b . Function of the court 4 . The court makes a reasoned decision in chambers within 30 days . The prosecution and the person concerned take pa rt in the proceedings and the rules contained in Articles 630 and 637 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed in so far as they are applicable . The person concerned may submit memorials and be assisted by counsellavvocato o procuratorel .
If the person concerned does not appear and he is required to be present for questioning the President of the Court summons him to appear : in the case of refusal a warrant may be issued . The length of the preventive measure shall not be less than one nor more than 5 years . 5 . Appeal s Both the prosecution and the person concerned may appeal on the merits lanche per il merito) . The court of appeal decides in chambers by a reasoned decision within 30 days . Both the prosecution and the person concerned may appeal law to the Court of Cassation (perviolazione di legge) . The Court decides in chambers within 30 days . In all these proceedings the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed in so far as they are applicable .
6 . Content of the measure s The court's decision specifies the measures to which the person in question shall be submitted . In the case of special supervision the court directs the person concerned to find work, to establish a residence, inform the authorities of his place of residence and not to leave it without first informing the police lautorita di pubblica sicurezza) . The decision sets out in every case a series of directions with which the person concerned is required to comply (inter alia a prohibition of frequenting other dangerous persons, coming home late at night or remaining habitually in public houses, etc .) . In the case of compulsory residence the person concerned may also be directed not to leave his house without notice and to report on stated days to the authority responsible for his supervision .
7 . Execution of the measure s The head of police is responsible for the execution of the above measures . Provision is made for a decision ordering such measure to be revoked o r modified by the authority by which it was made, after hearing the police, to the extent that the grounds on which it was based no longer exist . 8.
Persons who do not obey the directions contained in the order for a special supervision or compulsory residence are punished by imprisonment (from 3 months to a yearl . 9 . The Act of 1965 relates to persons suspected of belonging to associations connected with the Mafia (Section 1) . Section 2 provides that the measures of special supervision, prohibition of residing in a district or compulsory residence in a district may be applied for by the prosecution even if there has been no previous warning ("diffida") . Section 5 provides that "improperly leaving the district of compulsory residence shall be punished by imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years . . ." . Jurisdiction to decide on the above measures is always exercised by the court as prescribed by Section 4 of the Act of 1956 .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant complains of his compulsory residence on the island of Asinara from 30 January 1975 to 22 July 1976 . He maintains that the conditions of life on the island amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention .
He complains that he was not allowed to live continuously with his family, and alleges a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in this connection . He also complains that it was not possible for him to manifest his religion in worhsip alleging a violation of Article 9 of the Convention . He also relies on Article 2 of the First Protocol as it was impossible for him to provide for his son's education . The Commission decided to examine the application ex officio from the point of view of Article 5 and 6 of the Convention . The respondent Government maintain that the applicant did not exhaust th e .2 domestic remedies . 3 . They argue that in so far as the applicant is complaining of the measure taken in application of the Act, i .e . his compulsory residence on the island of Asinara, he should have appealed against the decision of the Milan Regional Court of 20 January 1976 which rejected his application for transfer to another place . The applicant disputes this argument . He states that he exhausted the domestic remedies by appealing to the Court of Cassation from which it follows that his application of 14 November 1975 to the Milan Regional Court was superfluous . The Commission finds that the applicant did in fact enter appeals up to the Court of Cassation against the order requiring him to reside on the island of Asinara . The decision of 20 January 1976 related to an application to have the place of compulsory residence changed which was subsequent to the Court of Cassation's decision . The decision in question thus constituted the result of a second attempt by the applicant to proceed before the national authorities which could not be held against him from the point of view of Article 26 of the Convention . 4 . The respondent Government maintain that in so far as the applicant is complaining of the Act itself he should have raised the question of constitutionality with respect to the provisions applied to him . They refer to the Commission's decision in Application No . 6452/74, Sacchi v . Italy . They concede that the applicant raised this question before the Court of Cassation but point out that he only complained of the manner in which the Act was applied and interpreted .
The applicant argues that the power to bring a matter before the Constitutional Court depends on the discretion of the ordinary courts and that, moreover, he had complained of the measure which was applied to him at least before the Court of Cassation . The Commission considers that the applicant had no grounds for raising the question of constitutionality with respect to the Acts in question . In fact he was only disputing the compatibility of the measure to which he had been subjected with the Acts : he was applying for his place of compulsory residence to be "an ordinary district" and not a"mere tract of land" where the conditions of life were extremely difficult .
5 . The respondent Government draw the Commission's attention to the fact that the applicant had not relied on Article 5 of the Convention before the domestic courts .
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They draw the conclusion that the Commission could not examine the application ex officio from the point of view of this article as the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies on this point . The Commission recalls in this connection that according to its established doctrine it was sufficient that the applicant should have stated "in substancÃ©" before the national authorities the complaint he is submitting to the Commission (cf . e .g . Decision No . 1203/61, Collection 8, p . 112i . The Commission also refers to its decision No . 1661/62 (Yearbook 6, pp . 361 and 367) in which it held that even where the Convention is directly applicable in the domestic law of a state (as is the case in Italy), the person concerned may also rely before the domestic courts on "other arguments to the same effect" . However, the Commission notes that it appears from the files that the applicant complained before the national courts including the Court of Cassation that the compulsory residence order was in fact executed like a sentence of imprisonment which amounts to saying that in substance he was complaining of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 rather than of a compulsory residence order . 6. The Commission thus reaches the conclusion that the applicant has fulfilled the requirement of the previous exhaustion of the domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention . 7 . The Commission has examined the applicant's various allegations from the point of view of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
It has taken into consideration the whole situation complained of by the applicant i .e . his compulsory residence on the island of Asinara from 30 January 1975 to 22 July 1976 . 8 . The Commission decides to reject the applicant's complaint concerning the alleged violation of Article 2 of the First Protocol as manifestly ill-founded . The Convention does not guarantee the right to educate one's children in a particular place . Moreover at the time of his stay on the island of Asinara the applicant's son had not yet reached school age . 9 . The Commission considers that the other aspects of the application raise complex problems in relation to various articles of the Convention, in particular Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 and should be examined on the merits . Now therefore the Commissio n 1 . DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the complaint Protocol ;
relating to Article 2 of the first
2 . DECLARES the application ADMISSIBLE, without prejudice to the merits, in so far as it relates to the other aspects of the situation complained of by the applicant .
- 210 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 10/03/1977Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page