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05887E01 | Pump | Flammability
05887E01
Oil production platforms general safety criteria-agip specification
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SAFETY GENERAL CRITERIA
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS
TEIM COMP.
SICI VERIF.
TEIM APPR.
15.07.97 DATE
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 2
Total sheets 96 July 1997 Emission This specification has been issued in accordance with EU requirements and is applicable only to the oil platforms; thus, the following modifications have been realised: - specific references and contents relating to gas platforms have been eliminated; - specific parts about oil platforms have been revised and amplified; - the integrity classes of the safety systems and the file-cards of shut down and depressurization systems have been introduced; - the normative references not quoted in this specification have been eliminated, since the contents are already considered by the above mentioned normative references.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 3
1. 1.1 1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 2. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.4 2.4.5 2.4.6 2.4.7 2.4.8 2.4.9 2.4.10 2.4.11 2.4.12 2.4.13 2.4.14 2.4.15 2.4.16 2.4.17 2.4.18 2.4.19
GENERAL Scope Normative references European normative references Normative references of ISO, IEC and national organizations Normative references of other organizations Legislation Internal normative references References FUNCTIONAL NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS Definitions Operative environment Intrinsic safety and prevention strategies Safety requirements of the layout General Platform orientation Platform areas Landing deck Cellar deck Mezzanine Main deck Flares/Vents Allowed radiation levels Helideck Sealine risers and traps Piping Storage tanks Electric generators and sub-sea power supply cables Accommodations - Utilities - Helideck Module Escape ways Evacuation crafts Areas classification Areas segregation
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 4
2.5 2.5.1 2.5.2 2.5.3 2.5.4 2.5.5 2.5.6 2.5.7 2.5.8 2.5.9 2.5.10 2.5.11 2.5.12 2.5.13 2.5.14 2.5.15
Functional requirements of the safety systems General requirements Basic criteria Integrity classes of the safety systems Requirements of pressurized systems Requirements of shut down and depressurization systems Requirements of platform automation systems Requirements of monitoring systems Requirements of signaling, communication and alarm systems Requirements of ventilating and pressurizing systems Requirements of drainage systems Requirements of safety valves Requirements of electric system Requirements for the emergency lights Safety requirements of the lifting systems Safety requirements for the chemicals injection systems
2.6 2.6.1 2.6.2 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9.1 2.9.2 2.9.3 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13
Requirements on work health and environmental protection Noise and vibrations Environmental protection Requirements of the passive protection systems Requirements of the fire systems Emergency supplies General Life-boats and life-rafts Life-jackets and life buoys Boundaries, limits and exclusions Ergonomics Requirements for Quality Management and Quality Assurance Documentation
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 5
SUPPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS Enclosure and informative annexes Annexes Annex 1 Annex 2
Shut down and depressurization systems file cards Shut down levels of the Platform
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 6
Scope This document has the aim to define the functional requirements, the criteria and the indication relating to the safety to be respected in order to design and realise the Oil platforms. This document: defines the overall safety requirements for designing; defines the requirements to which a safety system have to satisfy in order to play its function according to the prevention, control and risks attenuation measures provided for a specific installation.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 7
Normative references European normative references EU Directives already approved by European Parliament 89/392/CEE - June 14th 1989 concerning the legislation re-approach of the member States, relating to the machines (safety codes for the cranes) Italian legislation assimilating the directive DPR. n.459 24.7.1996 92/58/EU - June 24th 1992 carrying the minimum prescriptions for safety and/or health signals on work places (ninth particular normative reference according to art.16, paragraph 1 of 89/391/EU). Italian legislation assimilating the directive D. Lgs. n. 493 14.8.1996 carrying the minimum prescriptions for improvement of the safety and health workers protection into the mining drilling industries(eleventh particular normative reference according to art.16, paragraph 1 of 89/391/EEC) Italian legislation assimilating the directive D. Lgs. n. 624 25.11.1996
92/91/EU - Nov. 3rd 1992
94/9/EU - March 23rd 1994
concerning the legislation re-approach of the member States, relating to the protection equipment and systems devoted to potentially explosive atmosphere utilisation adjustment to the technical progress of the 79/196/EU Requirement, concerning the legislation re-approach of the member States relating to electric material devoted to potentially explosive utilisation
94/26/EU - June 15th 1994
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 8
ISO, IEC and other national organizations
Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms Petroleum and natural gas industries - Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore installations - Requirements and guidelines. Impianti elettrici nei luoghi con pericolo di esplosione Grundstze fr Rechner in Systemen mit Sicherheitsaufgaben (Principles for computers in safety- related systems) Grundlegende Sicherheitsbetrachtungen fr MSR Schutzeinrichtungen (Control technology; Fundamental safety aspects to be considered for measurement and control equipment) Offshore Installation: Guidance on design, construction and certification - Section 40 Aerodromi - Annesso 14 alla Convenzione sull'Aviazione Civile Internazionale Relief, depressuring, flare and cold vent systems
CEI 64.2
DIN V VDE 19250
HMSO - Depart. of Energy
DNV TN B 306
Normative references of other organizations API RP 2G API RP 14C Production facilities on offshore structures Recommended practice for analysis, design, installation and testing of basic surface safety system for offshore production platforms Design and installation of pressure relieving systems in Refineries, Part. I e II Guide for pressure relieving and depressuring systems
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 9
API RP 607
Fire test for soft - seated ball valves
Legislation D.M. 31.7.1934 "Approvazione delle norme di sicurezza per la lavorazione, l'immagazzinamento, l'impiego e la vendita di olii minerali e per il trasporto degli oli stessi" "Norme per la prevenzione degli infortuni sul lavoro" "Norme generali per l'igiene del lavoro" "Modalit per l'effettuazione della prova di carico relative alla prima verifica della gru di cui al D.M. 12 settembre 1959" "Integrazione e adeguamento delle norme di polizia delle miniere e delle cave" "Attuazione della Direttiva CEE n. 77/576 per il ravvicinamento delle disposizioni legislative, regolamentari e amministrative degli Stati Membri in materia di segnaletica di sicurezza sul posto di lavoro e della Direttiva CEE n.79/640 che modifica gli allegati alla Direttiva suddetta" attuativi delle Direttive CEE n. 76/117 e 79/196 relative a impianti elettrici in aree a rischio d'incendio o di esplosione "Approvazione del Regolamento concernente l'espletamento dei servizi di prevenzione e di vigilanza antincendio" "Norme di sicurezza antincendio per il trasporto, la distribuzione, l'accumulo e l'utilizzazione del gas naturale con densit non superiore a 0,8" Recepimento di norme e raccomandazioni ICAO per le caratteristiche costruttive degli eliporti
D.P.R. 27.4.1955, n 547
D.P.R. 19.3.1956, n 303 D.M. 9.8.1960
D.P.R. 24.5.1979, n 886
D.P.R. 8.6.1982, n 524
D.M. 21.7.1982, n 675-727
D.P.R. 29.7.1982, n 577
D.M. 24.11.1984
D.P.R. 4.7.1985, n 461
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 10
D.P.R. 24.5.1988, n 203
"Attuazione delle direttive CEE n 80/779, 82/884, 84/360 e 85/203 concernenti norme in materia di qualit dell'aria, relativamente a specifici agenti inquinanti e di inquinamento prodotto dagli impianti industriali, ai sensi dell'art. 15 della legge 16 Giugno 1987 n 183" "Norma provvisoria per antincendio degli eliporti" la protezione
D.M. 2.4.1990, n 121
D.M. 12.7.1990
"Linee guida per il contenimento delle emissioni inquinanti degli impianti industriali e la fissazione dei valori minimi di emissione" "Protezione dei lavoratori contro i rischi derivanti da esposizione ad agenti chimici, fisici, biologici durante il lavoro" "Regolamento recante norme per disciplinare la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale relativa alla prospezione, ricerca e coltivazione di idrocarburi liquidi e gassosi" "Determinazione delle attivit istruttor ie per il rilascio dell'autorizzazione allo scarico in mare dei materiali derivanti da attivit di prospezione, ricerca e coltivazione di giacimenti idrocarburi liquidi e gassosi" "Attuazione delle direttive 89/391/CEE, 89/654/CEE, 89/655/CEE, 89/656/CEE, 90/269/CEE, 90/270/CEE, 90/394/CEE e 90/679/CEE riguardanti il miglioramento della sicurezza e della salute dei lavoratori sul luogo di lavoro" "Traduzione in lingua Italiana del testo autentico in lingua inglese degli emendamenti alla Convenzione Internazionale per la salvaguardia della vita umana in mare (SOLAS) del 1 novembre 1974 adottati dal Comitato di sicurezza marittima dell'IMO il 23 maggio 1991" (pubblicato sul supplemento ordinario alla Gazzetta Ufficiale n 91 del 20/4/94)
D.L. 15.8.1991, n 277
D.P.R. 18.4.1994, n 526
D.M. 28.7.1994
D.Lgs. 19.9.1994, n 626
Ministero degli Affari Esteri - Disposizione e comunicato n 6
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 11
(pubblicato sul supplemento ordinario alla Gazzetta Ufficiale n 91 del 20/4/94)
"Regolamento concernente i criteri generali per la sicurezza antincendio delle piattaforme fisse e strutture fisse assimilabili", conseguente all'articolo 49 del D.P.R. 24 maggio 1979, n 886
Internal normative references 20257.COO.SAF.SDS 06982.VAR.OFF.PRG 07605.VAR.OFF.SPC 07634.CMP.SAF.SDS 07636.MOD.SAF.PRG 12304.FFS.SAF.PRG Safety location plans Optimisation criteria for platform orientation Offshore platform helideck design Personal safety equipment Safety design criteria of ventilation systems Total saturation extinguishing fixed plants for closed rooms Totally enclosed lifeboats and relative davits Rigid liferafts Lifebuoys and lifejackets Noise control Offhore installation - Positioning of fire and gas sensing detectors Offhore installation - Fire proof walls and partitions Selection of sensors and gas and fire detection criteria
20028.FLO.SAF.FUN 20029.FLO.SAF.FUN 20031.FLO.SAF.FUN 20184.COO.GEN.SDS 20190.VOF.SAF.SDS
20192.VOF.SAF.FUN
20193.VAR.SAF.SDS
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 12
20245.LQR.SAF.SDS
Accomodations, utilities, helideck modules Fire extinguishing systems, devices and supplies Oil production platform - Mobile and fixed fire extinguishing systems
20246.OPF.SAF.SDS
References /Ref. 1/: /Ref. 2/: Det Norske Veritas,Study on Ekofisk platform KLAASSEN (1971) in G.L. Wells, Safety in process plant design edit. 1980 ACGIH - American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienist, TLVs, Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances in the Work Environment
/Ref. 3/:
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 13
FUNCTIONAL NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS Definitions The following definitions are valid in this document:
Classified area: Dangerous area classified according to the substances it can contain and the probability of flammable mixture developing. Dangerous area: Three-dimensional space where there is a dangerous atmosphere, so as defined by IEC 64.2 rules. ASD - Abandon shut down Shut down of the whole platform in order to assess the abandon. EDP - Emergency depressurization: Plant depressurization owing to ESD, in order to remove fuel from a fire or only to reduce the pressure of the plant and so the loss extent. ESD - Emergency Shut Down: Shut down of the plant or of one area. The causes can be determined by manual gear and/or as a consequence of automatic logic. Safety systems integrity: Probability, for a safety related system, to start the safety functions necessary in all the identified situations. LSD - Local Shut Down: Members shut down function owing to their own good running (pump shut down owed to short circuit). The effects produced determine irreversible shut down (manual reset is necessary for the re-starting).
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 14
PSD - Process Shut Down: Shut down function of process members owing directly to process variables ( i.e. feeding pumps shut down of a tank for over level). The effects produced determine irreversible shut down (manual reset is necessary for the re-starting). Hazard: Probability a determinate undesired event occur within a precise time or in specific circumstances. Hazard is the product of the undesired event by the gravity of its consequences. Fire and/or gas detection Alarm situation, generally determined by a majority voting logic system (except fusible plugs systems and some applications on gas), which determines an automatic intervention according to the provisions of specification 20193.VAR.SAF.SDS. Into Units where a the simultaneous installation of two different type of sensors is provided, for the same danger (i.e. smoke sensors and flame sensors for fire detection), it is defined as: first stage the detection which determines the only intervention of the involved Unit (i.e. that one relating to the smoke sensors). second stage the detection which operates both on the Unit and on the whole process and/or activates the fire system (i.e. that one relating to the flame sensors) Electric enclosures are an exception, in this case it is defined as: first stage the detection which determines only alarm (i.e. that one relating to only one of the two loops of majority voting logic sensors). second stage the detection which operates on the Unit and activates the fire system (i.e. that one relating to each loop of majority voting logic sensors) Intrinsic safety: Every proper and fundamental feature of a plant which, for its nature, eliminates or reduces the hazardous situations occurrence without any unacceptable consequences as impossibility to pursue the general aim of the design. TLV - TWA - Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average Concentration limit (average on time) to which one worker can be exposed for 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week without any injurious consequence (Ref. ACGIH - American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienist)
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 15
Operative environment The safety general criteria for the design of Oil platforms, as required by D.P.R. 24/5/1979 n886, however shall consider the environmental conditions of the installation place, defined in the design specification. With this aim all the environmental factors listed below shall be to consider: minimum and maximum temperature; wind velocity and direction; snow; presence of polluting and corrosive substances; earthquakes; direct or indirect fulmination; mechanical stress and vibrations due to normal running; electromagnetic influences.
Intrinsic safety and prevention strategies For a certain installation, during each phase of design a study shall be done in order to identify the hazards coming from: location of installation; well blow out; collision (ships, helicopters); earthquake; fire and explosion type of hazard; type of fluids on the installation (both process and utility fluid); environmental conditions; fluids temperature and fluids pressure; quantity of flammable material during process and storage; number, complexity and location of the critical equipment on the plant; position of installation as to the support assistance systems (helicopters, support ships, etc....); - production/maintenance strategy and protection levels. The risks which can come from the future development of the plants during all the life cycle of the installation shall be identified too. On the basis of the results of this identification, required also by the laws in force (92/91/EU Requirement Nov.-3rd-1992), the countermeasures to be adopted on the considered plant, shall be set in order to prevent or reduce the identified risks.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 16
The countermeasures shall include the necessary devices in order to: - reduce the occurrence probability of identified risk situations (e.g. use of equipment in double); - reduce the extension of the incidents that ca n be supposed (i.e. by using passive barriers as fire proof walls); - reduce the duration of the incidents that can be supposed (i.e. by using intercepting and depressurising devices); - reduce the consequences of the incidents that can be supposed (i.e. by using active barriers as fire systems). The countermeasures are set by developing a prevention strategy for the plant based on the intrinsic safety principles application. These principles, translated into aims and functional requirements of the layout and the fire and safety systems, are included in this specification. A qualitative and quantitative study of risk identification can introduce additional requirements as an integration or partial (conservative) modification of this specification.
Safety requirement of the layout General The safety aims of the layout are: - dividing dangerous areas from not dangerous areas; - dividing areas containing hydrocarbons from areas devoted to: accommodations collective safety crafts; devices necessary to the safety of installation; - minimising the possibility of accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons and allowing their own quick removing; - minimising the possibility of accumulation of flammable or toxic gases keeping on ventilation without any trouble for workers; - allowing the control or evacuation of the flammable liquids, in case of leakage, according to a reference volume or flow;
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 17
- locate the different areas in order that an incident into one of them does not represent a hazard for the personnel of the other areas; - allowing the injurious atmospheres dilution, in the open air, till to values not representing a hazard for workers; - allowing an adequate entry for operations and maintenance; - allowing at least one of the escape or evacuation ways is ready for use; - allowing an easy operation of the aero-naval means of transport for health emergency or plant emergency. The safety requirements of the layout of the onshore installations are specified in the following documents: - "Regolamento concernente i criteri generali per la sicurezza antincendio delle piattaforme fisse e strutture fisse assimilabili", following article 49 of D.P.R. 24/5/1979, n 886 - API RP 2G :"Production facilities on offshore structures" - ISO 13702 Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore installations - HMSO - Department of Energy "Offshore Installation: Guidance on design, construction and certification" - Section 40 - Specification 06982.VAR.OFF.PRG l'orientamento delle piattaforme" "Criteri di ottimizzazione per
- Specification 07605.VAR.OFF.SPC "Specifica generale - Progettazione di ponte di volo per piattaforme offshore" The following paragraphs contain some provisions which, although contained into the above stated codes and specification, are not easy to deduce, except by a careful interpretation of experts into this specific field. 2.4.2 Platform orientation The orientation of platform shall be realised according to the provisions of specification 06982.VAR.OFF.PRG.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 18
The platform shall be realised in order to take advantage from the prevalent winds and from the ventilation due to temperature gradient, in order that the ventilation minimise the accumulation of flammable gas or vapours. Thus, natural ventilation is to be preferred, although it is not always realisable for the opposite necessity of a acceptable environment for the personnels work. The platform shall be oriented as to the prevalent winds in order to avoid the smoke coming from possible liquid hydrocarbon fires can flow towards the air inlets of the living quarters and area devoted to personnels evacuation.
Platform areas A safe area shall be assigned on each platform (out of the classified areas) where shall be placed: living quarters; fire pumps; emergency power supply batteries; emergency generators; life-boats.
Where it is not allowed, the above stated enclosures shall be pressurised according to codes CEI 64-2 and air intakes shall however be outside the classified areas. 2.4.4 Landing deck The landing decks shall be placed neither under the decks connecting two platforms nor under the mooring vertical of the emergency crafts; one of the landing decks can be on this vertical if it is considered an emergency deck too (it shall not be used for usual load/unload operation with the crane). Landings shall supply an adequate approaching course for vessels, that is windward and against the prevalent direction of the sea Landings shall be placed in order to reduce the likelihood of interference between vessels and sealines and sub sea cables (e.g. in order to avoid the sealines ploughing by anchors). Landings shall be placed, as far as possible, outside the external area of the 4 legs where wells are placed (with the exception of 4 legs platforms).
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 19
Cellar deck When the well work over is made with self contained plants, the cellar deck shall be spread out in area as much as the main deck, if possible, so as to receive the equipment for well work over without any further fittings. The deck layout shall be studied in order to minimise the mobilisation times of the plant for well work over providing the location of each necessary equipment (pumps, mud basins, electric power supply, etc.). During operation of well work over, the plane of cellar deck shall usually neither be crossed by gas pipes nor contains equipment gas-involved (it is allowed to maintain equipment full of liquid hydrocarbons at atmospheric pressure); in case of simultaneous operations of production/intervention on wells, ad hoc designing and operating devices and a deep safety study are to be arranged. Positioning and rotation of the discharge arms shall be realised in order to avoid dispersion of significant gas quantities towards the platform. When the tip of the discharge arm, on stand-by, is connected with the living quarters, the arm is to be disconnected from the relevant well in order to avoid a fire in well area cause a gas release under the living quarters. Grids shall be assured one by one and so as, a removal of one of them, not to allow the adjacent ones slipping and raising.
Mezzanine Mezzanines shall be used, as far as possible, either for operative necessities and for safety reasons. They can be used particularly for: - staggering of very high fire hazard in order to reduce their interference ( e. g. well head which shall be positioned lower than the process areas); - segregating areas with presence of gas (upper level) from areas with presence of liquid hydrocarbons (lower level).
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 20
Eventual equipment placed on the mezzanines shall be over the height of the 100 years wave plus an air-gap; equipment that could be into the respect area should be checked for the relevant wave charges and be considered evaluating the total hydrodynamic charge transmitted to the support structure.
Main deck A real separation shall be done between main deck and cellar deck; it involves: - closing the plane over the well heads by striped sheet panels provided with suitable trap doors; - sealing the crossing holes of the pipes which cross the main deck.
Flares/Vents Positioning flares and/vents shall consider the following items: - possible presence of personnel, as to the concentration of the gas emission and/or to the radiation levels; - direction of the air traffic (direction of approach to the heliport) and of the ship traffic.
Allowed radiation levels Radiation from the flare and from the vent tower to the main deck, shall not be higher than the following values (including sun radiation): - 1,5 kW/m 2 (500 BTU/hft 2) for continuos exposure of not protected personnel (e. g. production test burner or normal operation); - 4.8 kW/m 2 (1500 BTU/hft 2) for personnel temporarily on the deck (e. g. crane, helideck) in emergency situations; - 7 kW/m2 (2200 BTU/hft 2) for personnel temporarily on the deck and with shielded escape ways (e. g. entries for equipment maintenance) in emergency situations.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 21
Helideck (heliport) Heliport realisation shall 07605.VAR.OFF.SPC. be in accordance with Specification
Sealine risers and traps Sealine risers shall have a shut down valve divided from the process areas and shall cross on the opposite side of the living quarters, instrumentation control room and at least one of the power generator systems. In order to avoid damages in case of boats collision, sealine risers shall be installed inside the structure of the platform (Jacket), out of the well heads and living quarters areas. Outer installation is allowed only for risers on platforms already existing. If it were necessary sealine risers passing on the outer side of the structure, they should be protected by damper systems. If the sealine risers have to pass close to the living quarters, members passing under the lodgings shall be entirely welded and without any point of possible leak (flanges, instrumentation, etc.). In order to minimise the gas volume into the pipes crossing the cellar deck, the following prescriptions shall be observed: - horizontal launching traps shall have raft-ports towa rds the sea; - traps shall be in order that hazardous gas emission does not flow towards areas containing ignition sources. According to the type of platform the following provisions shall be to consider too: a) Platforms concerned either by transit and by well: - passing sealines shall be supplied with automatic shut down valves;
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 22
- traps shall be placed at least 10 m away from the well heads and hazardous areas; traps area shall preferably be placed on the main deck or situated below the cellar deck, outside the well area and sheltered from hanging objects; - launching and receiving traps shall be supplied with an shut off valve placed below the cellar deck connected with the inspection gangway; - if the traps cannot be placed at a safe distance (i. e. for small unmanned platform), the above shut off valve shall operate also as an automatic lock valve, divided from the dangerous areas and fit to maintain its functionality even if involved in flames. b) Platforms concerned only by transit, without wells : - lock valves can be placed directly on the cellar deck.
Piping Piping containing flammable and/or toxic fluids shall be placed in order that possible leakage do not involve escape ways or ignition sources.
Storage tanks Hydrocarbons storage tanks can be close to plants or lodgings, provided at least 4 m, moreover tanks containing flammable liquids and placed on the cellar deck, shall not be hung up from the deck above, but shall lean on the deck and be supplied with a control curb and with piped drainage. The drainage storage tank can be hung below the cellar deck provided it can be reached by a service gangway. The tanks containing flammable material (i.e. liquid fuel) shall be placed far from escape ways and possible leakage shall be collected and piped by suitable control devices.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 23
Electric generators and sub-sea power supply cables Electric power generators shall be divided from facilities area and one from each other by fire walls, in order to save their integrity, so as a electric power supply is assured to the platform. The waste of internal combustion engines shall be placed into a safe area and oriented in order to reduce the possibility to involve areas where personnel could be present. The sealine risers containing power supply cables shall be placed as far as possible from the risers containing hydrocarbons and out of the ships course.
Accommodations - utilities - helideck module The main wall on the rear of the living module shall not be to the wind direction in order the natural ventilation of the hazardous areas is not limited. Supplementary living quarters, provided on the platform during the well work over, shall fulfil all the safety requirements relevant to the living quarters. Supplementary accommodations outside the accommodations module are not allowed on platforms that process oil containing hydrogen sulphide. The day-area shall be completely divided form the night area of the living module and, if possible, be placed on two different decks.
Escape ways At least two opposite main escape ways shall be provided from each platform area to the primary evacuation craft (these last two escape ways can become one in the space connecting mezzanine or platform lower deck to the landingdeck. Main escape ways shall not be less than 1 m in width and 2.2 m in height, even for doors, passages and stairs. Secondary escape ways, connecting each equipment to the primary escape ways, can be at least 0.8 m in width.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 24
The dimensions of the passages leading to the platform (doors, stairs, galleries) shall be in order to allow easy passage of the personnel supplied with selfbreathing apparatus and of operating means in case of anomalous occurrence (transport of personnel by stretcher. In order to size escape ways and considering the necessities of emergency lighting, platforms temporarily or normally manned have to be considered in the same way. Closed enclosures, where frequent and constant presence of personnel is likely to occur, shall be supplied with at least 2 escape ways in accordance with the requirements of Legislation 626/94 and following amendments. The doors of those enclosures shall not prevent the evacuation, all the between decks, stairs and passages used as escape ways shall be floored with antislip material and free from any obstacle. Maintenance manholes shall not be connected with escape ways. Escape ways shall not pass close to the open ventilation area of closed modules containing process equipment since, in the event of explosion, these opening can be used for pressure outlet. The bridge between two or more platforms is to be considered as an escape way. Escape ways and safe area shall be sufficiently lightened even if electric energy main power supply and emergency power supply can fail. Instrumentation control room, if manned, shall be supplied with escape ways placed in order that the personnel is allowed to evacuate it in the end.
Evacuation crafts The primary evacuation craft can be a boat (on unmanned platforms) or lifeboats. Life-rafts shall be considered as one secondary evacuation craft. Lifeboats shall be placed in order that, with prevalent wind and/or stream, at least half of them can land and leave the platform without any risk of collision with the platform itself. Life-rafts shall be placed close to the well head area and under the living quarter module, each of them connected with escape ways; whole capacity of the life-rafts shall be 50% of the bed seats (living quarter and supplementary accommodations).
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 25
Areas classification The classification of areas is mainly used during selection of electric equipment in order to minimise the probability of ignition in case of accidental release. However, into the areas not classified according to D.P.R.24/5/1979 n886 (and following amendments), plants shall be fail-safe realised. The only equipment not fail-safe are those contained into closed and pressurised modules, where gas can come only from the outside.
2.4.19 2.4.19.1
Areas segregation General The segregation of areas with a different level of risk can be realised by fire walls whose fire resistance shall be assessed according to the type of fire and on its expected duration. In order to identify platform rooms according to Regolamento concernente i criteri generali per la sicurezza antincendio delle piattaforme fisse e strutture fisse assimilabili, following art.49 D.P.R. 24/5/1979 n886 (and following amendments), the specification 20192.VOF.SAF.FUN is to be assumed as a reference.
2.4.19.2
Vertical and horizontal segregation In figure 1 and 2 is shown the reciprocal layout, vertical and horizontal respectively, of the various platform areas as regards the wind direction. Where a type of equipment is mentioned more than once time (e.g. separators) it means that different layouts do exist for this equipment. Letters into the frames show the typology of segregation to be adopted between two areas; where more than one letter is reported it means that more than one alternative can be adopted.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 26
For the interpretation of the layout symbols as above the following legend is valid. Fire proof deck (according to "Regolamento per la sicurezza antincendio delle piattaforme fisse...." consequent to art. 49 of DPR n 886 and following amendments). B= Grid panelled deck. C= Fire proof wall (according to "Regolamento per la sicurezza antincendio delle piattaforme fisse...." consequent to art. 49 of DPR n 886 and following amendments). D= Louvred wall or supplied with pressure outlets (o r blow out panels) whose area is equal to or more than 40% of the total area of the wall. E= Outside the classified areas (or dangerous according to DPR n886 and following amendments). F= Safety distance (10 to 15 m) from well heads. (*) Only electric pumps (**) In the event that fire pumps have diesel engines Main Deck Mezzanine Cellar Deck = Ventilation inlets H.P. = High Pressure L.P. = Low Pressure A=
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 27
Helideck module
A - Atmospheric tanks - Escape ways E A Flares Compressors Workover plant Safety electric lifting devices C Process module C Living quarters
A Methanol Injection
A Well heads
A - Gas C treatment plant - H.P. Separators A - Liquid hydr. C tanks - L.P. separat. - Transfer pumps A - Traps - ESD valves on risers
A C Diathermic oil E boiler B - Traps - Separator pipe A Atmospheric tanks for flammable liquids (to 15 m 3 )
A - Generators - Fire pumps - Water treatment
A C - Living quarters E - Utilities module
B Well manifold
Landing-deck
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C D Compress. D C F Manifold F Well heads F Manifold MAIN WIND DIRECTION
C Gas treatment plant
C Transfer pumps
C Liquid hydrocarbon tanks C E
Safety electric lifting devices
C(**) Fire pumps C (**) Traps C
C(**) Fire pumps
- Atmospheric tanks - Escape ways
Atmospheric tanks for flammables liquids (to 15 m3)
C Process module C - Living/Utilities quarters - Helideck module - Emergency generators Fire pumps (*) - Atmospheric tanks - Escape ways
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Functional requirements of the safety systems General requirements The aims the safety systems have to pursue are to: - locate and check hazardous situations in the smallest area as possible by starting up shut down and sectioning action of the plants in order to prevent degeneration of anomalous conditions in an accidental event; - isolate installation from sealines and storage tanks, in order to avoid a plenty of hydrocarbons release; - minimise the probability of hydrocarbons ignition as a consequence of a loss of containment; - preventing accumulation of flammable liquids which can create a fire if primed; - giving a continuos automatic monitoring function in order to alert the personnel about the presence of a dangerous situation connected to gas or fire and to allow check actions, either manual and automatic, in order to minimise the probability of degeneration of the dangerous situation. Besides specifications quoted by the text, the requirements of the safety systems are listed in the following documents: 92/91/CEE Requirement 89/392/CEE Requirement 92/58/CEE Requirement 94/9/CEE Requirement 94/26/CEE Requirement ISO 13702 ICAO D.M. 31.7.1934 D.P.R. 8.6.1982, n 524 D.M. 21.7.1982, n 675-727 D.P.R. 27.9.1982, n 577 D.M. 24.11.1984 D.P.R. 4.7.1985, n 461 D.Lgs. 19.9.1994, n 626 The following paragraphs carry some provisions which, although provided by the requirements and specifications quoted, are hardly deducible, if not carefully explained by skilled experts.
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Basic criteria In order to pursue the aims defined as above, the plants design shall be based on the following fundamental criteria: - the main feature of the safety systems shall be its simplicity; that assure operative easiness, awareness of the effects of the undertaken actions, maintenance simplicity and more liability; - plants design shall be inspired by the principle not to rely completely on safety systems automatically started up. - philosophy of the protection systems shall be based on the happening of only one event at a time, with believable proportions. On the gas platforms, this event is generally determined by (in accordance with CEI 64-2 codes): release from stuffing; release form connecting members (flanges, bell and spigot joints, etc.). In order to limit the release entity, flanges with ring-joint tights shall be adopted in every pressurised part of the plant; - each sectioning system shall allow, at the same time, a quick remova l of product which feeds flames or vapours dispersion; this can be done by adopting an interception system upstream and downstream of the leak by shut down valves (SDV-Shut Down Valve) and gas removal by depressurisation of plant (BDV-Blow Down Valve); - primary safety of plants is represented by the integrity of all the metal members and shut down and depressurisation valves. The first rule to be followed is designing all the equipment in a same area, or module, for the maximum pressure allowable in that area. - shut down valves and depressurisation line shall be placed, as far as possible, out of hazardous areas (e.g. out of process module); - design the installation in order that two coincident failures, reasonably probable, dont represent the highest hazard (i.e. the leak of oil and relevant fire dont determine the highest hazard thanks to the presence of drainage systems and fire walls fit to the duration of release). - when the GOR (Gas Oil Ratio in Nm 3/m3)is high enough (at least 100 relating to the minimum operating pressure) it is likely to provide a risk of explosion into confined enclosures. In this case, the rate between the room dimensions and vents shall be related so as to determine explosion overpressures below 30 kPa (300 mbar), eventually by blow out panels.
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The choice of 30 kPa as maximum overpressure arise from the following data available from specialised literature (G.L. Wells: Safety in Process Plant Design): pipe stand: stand strain at 24 kPa, pipe burst and stand breakage at 41 kPa; electric engine: throwing of fragments at 35 kPa, shifting of equipment at 62 kPa; blower: damage to the shell at 35 kPa, destruction at 69 kPa; pressurised separator: shifting of equipment at 83 kPa, destruction at 97 kPa; threshold of serious people injury is 100 kPa; - checking of safety and fire system of the installation shall be done from only one location, in safe and manned or permanently remote-controlled area; - instrumentation control room, where realisable, shall be supplied with an air ventilating system independent from that of accommodations; - in the platform modules, monitoring system shall be ready to operate even if not power supplied. - in the event of a general platform shut down, electric supply to the instrumentation control room shall be sectioned lastly in order to verify , from a remote position, the shut down operations success, before the black out.
Integrity classes of safety systems The concept of integrity class and its applicability aspects are derived from DIN V VDE 0801 and DIN V VDE 19250 Codes. The integrity class of a safety system defines the type of logic to be provided for each Plant Unit; the connection between the logic to be adopted and the integrity class is provided in 20193. VAR.SAF.SDS specification. The integrity class of safety systems to be adopted in each Unit are listed in Annex 1 file cards. The integrity class assigned to an Unit can however be changed, while designing, according to the results of the risk assessment, made ad hoc for that design. If the risk assessment showed, for a plant Unit, a variation of the probability or gravity of event, the new integrity class of safety system, for that Unit, should be immediately defined.
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The integrity class, defined in relation to risk assessment of more frequent occurrence, groups all the platform Units into 4 Categories, defined as following: Category I includes those Units where each event causes critical consequences for platform. includes those Units where each event causes critical consequences only for a wrong operation of the shut down system. includes Units, not critical but connected with other Units belonging to previous categories which can transmit consequences of certain events. includes not critical or safe Units.
Conditions of more frequent occurrence give the following summary: Category I II Unit Well head Gas treatment plant Sealines Passage ways Oil separation Oil pumping Manifold Gas compression Methyl alcohol injection Chemicals injection Combustible gas Water treatment Heating Compressed air Main power generation Emergency power generation E.E. main supply E.E. emergency supply Control system Air conditioning plant Combustible gas oil Hydraulic power Accommodations Module Solid state U.P.S. Integrity class 4 3
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Requirements of pressurised systems All the systems containing pressurised hydrocarbons shall be supplied with two protection barriers against high pressures. Each barrier shall have a capacity of 100% and the two barriers shall not be intercepted simultaneously. The equipment (separators, etc.) and piping connecting with the wells shall be designed for the following pressures: a) well dinamic pressure: if are present at least two independent barriers against high pressure; b) well static pressure: if only one barrier against high pressure is present (i.e., class of pressure).
Requirements of shut down and depressurization systems Depressurisation The depressurisation system shall be designed according to API RP 520 and API RP 521 considering the most restrictive condition, stated in DNV TN B 306 Codes, as a reference parameter. Particularly, pressurised systems containing flammable or toxic gas, shall be supplied with a EDP (automatic or manual) system. In the emergency event, this system shall be able to remove gas so reducing pressure value under 50% of the minimum operating value in 5 minutes; during the next 10 minutes pressure value shall reduce to 0.7 MPa (7 bar). Smaller depressurisation times shall be allowed by previous check of the radiation from flare, if fired. Section of plants containing up to 100 kg of natural gas does not require depressurisation /Ref.1/. The vessels containing liquid hydrocarbons shall be supplied with an emergency system if operate over 0.3 MPa (3 bar) /Ref.2/. The requirements of depressurisation systems are as follows: - automatic depressurisation line which shall flow into a manifold ending with a blow down valve (BDV) associated to the platform general shut down; - the depressurisation line shall be supplied with a device in order to avoid the backfire from flare;
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The cooling effect during depressurisation shall be carefully evaluated, both for automatic emergency depressurisation and for manual depressurisation on, taking into consideration the minimum operating temperature of the gas. This allows the choice of materials and the dimensioning of the involved equipment. When gas and vapour continuous emission into atmosphere contain toxic substances, the dimensions of flare/vent shall assure, even in hard conditions, a toxic gas concentration close to the platform decks, below the tolerability limit value (TLV - TWA) /Ref.3/. The flare tip shall be supplied with pilots and each of them shall have a flame detector to signal the lack of flame. On towers or raised structures which can not be easily left, stairs shall be placed on the opposite side of the flare in order that the structure itself can perform, although partially, the screen function.
Shut down and shut off valves The following prescriptions shall be adopted: - surface safety valves shall be fire safe, for example metal gasket valves or soft tight ball valves according to API RP 607; - shut down valves shall fail-safe, that is fail-close. - valve feeding gas oil to emergency generator shall be outer the enclosures containing users; - gas oil shut down valve shall be enslaved to flame sensors into the engine room; - valve as above shall be manually operat ed too; - gas engines shall have a stop and by-pass manual gear placed also outdoor the deck rooms.
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Instrumentation air and pneumatic systems Air as one operating fluid for pneumatic instrumentation is the safest and most reliable system. For the safety sub surface valves (SSSV) operation, a pneumatic system shall be adopted, that can be expanded to all shut down valves when an air compressed air system in not available (low energy platform).
2.5.6 2.5.6.1
Requirements of platform automation system General Platform automation system (hereinafter called system) shall determine, if can occur: a cause induced by a: - manual action; - automatic action (activation of gas, smoke, flame, explosive mixture, toxic gas sensors and starting of a section of the process equipment). an effect of: - visual and/or acoustic signal into the instrumentation control room and in the involved areas; - control of plants (electric, equipment, ventilating, conditioning, fire-fighting and production plants). Philosophy of the operating controls shall be defined in order to limit the shut down actions only to the plants and/or members where cause originated, in order to obtain a better operative treatment of the platform.
System shall be designed and realised in order that: - control and shut down functions are independent on each others: this independence can concern the mechanic element (valve) or instrumentation section (sensors, actuators, connections) or, in particular situations, both. If interfaces between control and shut down functions are provided, failures or wrong operation of control system shall not interfere with the right operation of the shut down system. - the concept of failure to safety is complied;
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- the equipment redundancy is optimised either relating to the whole availability of the system and to the out of order possibility for failure of a component; - every intervention of detection and/or shut down circuits is signalled with the alarm dedicated to the area, by visual and acoustic alarms both on the platform and into the onshore control room; - manual reset is possible only after the removal of shut down cause; - shut down sequences can not be started up accidentally; - during the maintenance and test operations protection can be reset as soon as possible; - maintenance and reliability test operations can be done previous bypass of the automatic shut down control; - activation of the input and output circuits bypass or the shut down sequences shall be allowed by the instrumentation control room operator; every exclusion shall enable inactivation of only one safety operation and shall be visually signalled on the same instrumentation control board or eventually on local panels; - a failure of the normal feeding system operates automatic switching, without black-out, over a reserve power supply; wrong feeding operations shall be signalled by acoustic and visual alarms; - it is protected against electromagnetic interference; - equipment and cables are adequately protected; cable pathways are realised in order to limit their involvement in possible accidental situations; - manual actuating points of the system are clearly identified. The system shall consist of a AUTOMATISM CONTROL BOARD and SAFETY BOARD installed into the instrumentation control room; actuating controls of the system shall be remote started up, by a remote controlled system (RTU) too.
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Shut down systems Shut down system is designed in order to divide plant into sections; division follows the priority levels determined by the importance of the situation causing shut down. In particular, the highest priority level (ASD) is associated to the whole platform (process area, utilities and electric units); the next level (ESD) is associated to process areas and utilities on the whole; other levels (PSD and LSD) are associated to plant sections. Shut down systems to be provided as to each Unit, are stated in Annex 1 filecards. Hierarchy of shut down level and correlation between various plant and utility Units is stated in Annex 2.
Abandon shut down command (ASD) The abandon shut down command shall determine irreversible shut downs (for the re-activation a manual reset is necessary) and shall determine the following actions: activation of the emergency shut down (ESD); shut down of the main power generator and emergency power generator; feeding of the vital electric appliances by emergency batteries; activation of AS1 signal for manned platform.
The abandon shut down command shall be started from manual stations which shall be placed at least in the following areas: a) Head of Platforms office; b) close to life boats; c) close to the helideck. If operated, these manual control stations shall maintain the condition assumed and be interfaced with ESD system. A reset device and a mechanical protection devoted to prevention of accidental starting shall be provided.
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Emergency shut down (ESD), for fire presence The emergency shut down command, for fire presence, shall determine irreversible shut down (for the re-activation the manual reset is necessary) and actions provided in Annexes 1 and 2: The emergency shut down shall be operated: a) automatically, by electric appliances stated in Annex 1; b) manually - by local manual valves quick device (1/4 of turn) connected with air instrumentation circuit (for heat sensors of pneumatic type); - by electric push-buttons (for heat sensors of electric type); - from onshore control room, by remote control (with double s eparated control, for redundancy). Manual starting systems of platform shall be placed close to escape ways from various decks and connected with landing-decks of the life boats. Manual starting systems shall thus so distributed: n1 n1 n1 n1 n1 near each flight of stairs of the main deck; on each flight of stairs of the cellar deck; near each life boat; on the breaker of each of the two stairs leading to landing-decks; on each of the two galleries under the helideck, near the fire fighting groups.
All the devices, with the exception of those relevant to the two last items, shall be installed on proper manual emergency stations.
Emergency shut down (ESD), for gas presence The emergency shut down command, for gas presence, shall determine irreversible shut down (manual reset) and actions provided in Annexes 1 and 2: The emergency shut down shall be operated: a) automatically, by electric appliances stated in Annex 1;
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b) manually - from Head of Platforms office; - from onshore control room, by remote control (with double separated control, for redundancy). 2.5.6.6 Production shut down (PSD) The production shut down command shall stop production process of the platform, according to what provided in Annexes 1 and 2. The production shut down shall be operated: a) automatically - by emergency shut down system (ESD); - by significant deviations from usual operative conditions of the physical quantities during critic situations (lack of air instrumentation, electric supply failure, high or low pressure into the production manifold, very low level into the glycol storage unit). b) manually, by dedicated push-buttons: - from the Head of Platforms office; - from the electro-pneumatic lock panel of the process module; - from onshore control room, by remote control (with double separated control, for redundancy). 2.5.6.7 Local shut down Deviations from usual operative conditions of the non critic quantities shall start shut down or intervention on the only involved equipment. In particular, the positions are quoted as follows. Heat detectors of gas oil tank/pumps The opening of the automatic deluge pneumatic valve, with following activation of the fire system, is determined by: a) automatically - by intervention of heat detectors placed to protect gas oil tank/pumps; b) manually - operating a device connected to the heat detection system.
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Manual operated device and control of the deluge valve shall be placed on the control board of the cooling water on the tank itself. Intervention of the heat detection system shall induce the gas oil pumps locking too. If the gas oil tank is placed close to process equipment, the intervention of heat detection systems of the gas oil area shall be associated to that one of platform. Unsuccessful shutting of the liquids discharging valve from separators Wrong operating shall be detected from the low level switch (LLS) into the separator: that will cause the automatic lock of the shut down valve (SDV for liquid discharge) and lock of the separator itself. Low pressure into the separator Anomaly shall be detected from the low pressure switch into the separator: that will cause the relevant production string by driving the following valves: closing the well head wing valve; closing the surface safety valve (SSV); closing the shut down valve; opening glycol recycling.
Flow switches The gas flow into the system quoted above shall be detected by flow switches; their intervention cause platform alarm and signal to the heliport (flashing red beacon): - process automatic depressurisation; - fuel gas depressurisation; - safety valves manifolds K.O.Drum high level The condensation separator of the automatic depressurisation system connected to the flare shall be supplied with at least one high level switch which, when activated, starts the production shut down.
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Man overboard command This command shall operated by means of manual control stations which will be placed in each of the following areas: n1 n1 n1 n1 n1 near each flight of stairs of the main deck; near each flight of stairs of the cellar deck; near each life boat; on the breaker of each of the two stairs leading to landing-decks; on each of the two galleries under the helideck.
Operating every manual control station will start the AS2 signal. 2.5.6.9 Fire command This command shall be operated by manual control stations into the accommodations and utilities module, placed close to the exits of each deck (two for each deck). These stations will start either general acoustic platform signals and visual signals into noisy rooms and determine stop of the vents of the accommodations/utilities module. Manual control stations placed on the supplementary accommodations deck, even starting the acoustic/visual signals above stated, will not cause ventilation stop unless the conditioning plant isnt placed on the same deck. 2.5.6.10 Manned-unmanned platform condition It shall be operated by a manual switch on the automatism control board, into the instrumentation room and/or into the Head of Platforms office. Switch turned on UNMANNED position shall exclude power supply to appliances not necessary for platform working. In this situation floors of the accommodation module will be completely disconnected (with the exception of the refrigerators). During unmanning all the monitoring systems shall be operating even if equipment into the monitored room are disconnected.
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Interventions and locks Operations started by platform automatism local system (included those relating to the onshore control room) will concern the following pertaining utilities: lock control of electric plant; lock control of instrumentation plants; lock and starting control of air ventilating and conditioning plant; lock control of production plant; starting control of fire system.
Those plants shall be remote controlled too. From the onshore control room shall be possible to: - drive the extinguisher discharge into the enclosures protected by a flooding system; - start the fire pumps.
2.5.7 2.5.7.1
Requirements of monitoring systems General The detection system to be provided as to each Unit requirements, is stated in Annex 1. Criteria for the choice of type of sensor and intervention logic to be used are specified in 20193.VAR.SAF.SDS. Specification. Criteria for determining number and position of sensors are specified in 20190.VOF.SAF.SDS. Specification.
Heat sensors Heat sensors shall be provided for: - detecting oil fires presence under the e quipment; - reducing the fire spreading by a shut down and depressurisation action; - shutting the sub sea safety valves (SSSV) (in this event the heat sensors shall be pneumatic sensors).
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Smoke sensors The smoke sensors shall be installed in order to : - detect fire into closed rooms in its early stage; - detect fire with feeble flame and heat growth (electric fires); - detect smoke at the inlets of the air ventilating recycling of the living quarters; - disconnect circuits which feed fire a nd start (eventual) fire fighting plants except for engine rooms where smoke is not a sure sign of fire.
Flame sensors The flame sensors shall be installed in order to : - detect fire into closed rooms when bright flame or low smoke emission flame prevail; - detect bright flame fires or electric fires outdoor, replacing smoke detectors; - detect electric arcs and sparks able to cause fires; - disconnect circuits feeding fire and start the (eventual) fire plants into all the rooms where they are installed.
Flammable gas sensors Flammable gas detection is required in order to alert and/or automatically intervene before gas concentration in air can reach the lower explosivity limit which represents, when properly fired, an hazardous situation both for personnel and for equipment. Flammable gas sensors shall therefore be provided to: - monitor flammable gas accumulation into the eventual release area; - monitor flammable gas migration towards not dangerous areas; - monitor ingress of flammable gas into closed areas not dangerous but face to dangerous areas; - reduce the gas quantity to the flammability limits by a shut down action. Monitoring shall privilege those areas where the possibility of flammable gas accumulation exists, situation with the highest safety hazard.
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No gas monitoring is required on the combustion air duct of the engines provided that an overspeed protection device to start the machine shut down if a gas ingestion may occur. 2.5.7.6 Toxic gas sensors The toxic gas detection is required in order to alert and/or automatically intervene before gas concentration in air can exceed the toxicity limits provided for occupants and environmental protection. Toxic gas sensors shall therefore be provided to: - monitor toxic gas accumulation into the eventual release area; - monitor toxic gas migration towards other areas; - monitor ingress of toxic gas into closed areas not dangerous but face to dangerous areas; - reduce the gas quantity of the place by a shut down action. Monitoring shall privilege those areas where the possibility of toxic gas accumulation exists, situation with the highest safety hazard. 2.5.8 Requirements of signalling, communication and alarm systems The signalling, communication and alarm system shall be considered as a vital system for the electric supply. Alarm signal on platform and into the connected places will be done as follows. On the unmanned or discontinuously manned platforms or where the night shift is not provided, every fire presence shall be signalled to a manned platform or ashore, from where shall be possible to remote-control acoustic alarm on the involved platform. 2.5.8.1 Visual and/or acoustic signals on instrumentation control panels a) Instrumentation control room Control panel will receive: - manning signal; - unmanning signal; - platform abandon signal, with reset;
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- man overboard signal, with reset; - gas and fire detection systems signal (failure, pre-alarm and alarm), with reset; - failure signal of the safety panel systems, with reset. b) Head of Platforms Office Alarm repeating control panel will display each alarm areas (heat, smoke, flame, explosive mixture and toxic gas) and receive: - manning signal; - unmanning signal; - platform abandon signal, with reset; - man overboard signal, with reset; - intervention signals for fire (heat, smoke, flame) and/or (flammable, toxic) gas, with reset; - failure signal of the safety panel systems, with reset. - summarising signal for unsuccessful pressurising of engine rooms or control panels. From the Head of Platforms Office shall be possible start the following controls: - platform abandon; ESD; - production shut down; - fire pumps turning on. c) Platform operator station The station will be supplied with control board and summarise all the safety and process signals. d) Onshore control room Signals of failure/pre-alarm/alarm of the detection systems will be transmitted onshore, by remote-control; signals will be underlined for each plant area. Shutting (or opening) the shut down or depressurisation valves will be underlined as a limit switch condition to be installed on the valves; limit switch simultaneously open and shut will show an alarm situation. Limit switches will be installed on the shutters of the various rooms in order to underline their opening or closing condition. 2.5.8.2 Visual and/or acoustic signals on electric boards Local control panels shall be involved by visual/acoustic signals of the safety systems relating to equipment. All the safety systems detection shall be however transferred on the instrumentation control panels of the following subparagraph.
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Visual signal into noisy rooms Into the noisy rooms, stated according to D. L. 15/8/91, n277, red flashing lights shall be placed; these lights shall be turned on for: intervention of manual control of platform abandon, fire and man overboard; safety plug intervention; failure of smoke detection systems; smoke pre-alarm; smoke alarm; failure of flame detection system; flame pre-alarm; flame alarm; failure of explosive mixture detection system; explosive mixture pre-alarm; explosive mixture alarm; failure of toxic gas detection system; toxic gas pre-alarm; toxic gas alarm; flow switches intervention.
All the signals started by local control panels of the inert gas fixed fire plants shall be added to the signals specified as above, that is: a) into the room - red flashing signals: ABANDON ROOM, made with xenon tube high intensity lamps. b) out of the room - green signal lamp EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM INCLUDED; - red signal lamp EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM EXCLUDED; - red signal lamp DO NOT ENTER (this one shall flash if discharge is imminent and be continuously light on when discharge is occurred). 2.5.8.4 Emergency signal signboard A summarising signboard of platform alarms shall be placed in each of these areas: - near each flight of stairs of the main deck; - near each flight of stairs of the cellar deck; - near each life boat;
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- on the breaker of each of the two st airs leading to landing-decks; - on each of the two galleries under the helideck. On the above stated signboards shall be displayed descriptions of platform acoustic signals (operative for manned platform). 2.5.8.5 Lights for heliport alarm The lights for alarm close to helideck shall be two, a green flashing beacon and a red flashing beacon. Signals of lights switch on, failure of themselves or failure of lighting system shall be transmitted to onshore control room. In the following situations flashing green beacon (FGB) shall be switched on: failure of smoke sensors (single sensor or system of sensors); alarm to smoke sensors; failure of flame sensors (single sensor or system of sensors); pre-alarm to flame sensors; alarm to flame sensors; intervention of heat sensors (safety plugs)of gas oil tank; manual fire alarm of living quarter.
In the following situations flashing red beacon (FRB) will be switched on: platform abandon; emergency shut down; production shut down; intervention of heat sensors (safety plugs) of well head area and of process module; failure to explosive mixture sensors or detection channels; pre-alarm to explosive mixture sensors; alarm to explosive mixture sensors; failure to toxic gas sensors or detection channels; pre-alarm to toxic gas sensors; alarm to toxic gas sensors; very high level to the liquid accumulator of the flare; lack of flame in flare.
These beacons shall be placed on the heliport space not forbidden to obstacles and so as to be seen by pilot from every deck-landing directions.
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Acoustic alarms The acoustic alarms shall be audible from every point of the platform. The execution of all the outdoor loudspeakers shall be right for the type of the classified area. Indoor loudspeakers shall be normally executed (supplementary accommodations deck is to be considered outdoor). Into the noisy rooms acoustic alarms shall be replaced by visual alarms with red flashing lamps. Standard acoustic signals are the as follows: - AS1 (HORN) this is the acoustic signal of platform abandon, it corresponds to a continuos sound with a frequency 450 Hz; - AS2 (YEOW) this is the acoustic alarm signal for man overboard, it corresponds to a bitonal decreasing sound with frequency 1200600 Hz, repeated every 1.5 s; - AS3 (YELP) this is the acoustic signal for explosive mixture detection (or operating depressurisation or detection of gas vent to flare), it corresponds to a quick siren sound (6001250 Hz) repeated every 0.25 s; - AS4 (SLOW WOOP) this is the acoustic alarm for fire , it corresponds to a bitonal increasing sound (5001200 Hz) repeated every 4.1 s.
Telecommunications and radio equipment Telecommunication system and radio equipment shall be realised according to D.P.R. 24/5/1979 n886 and shall include: n.1 aeronautic VHF; n.1 160 MHz VHF ( n.1 marine VHF (emergency channel 16); n.1 450 MHz UHF (), only on manned platforms; n.1 portable floating VHF, for life-boats (placed into the Head of platforms office).
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Platform signals The platforms shall be supplied with visual and acoustic signal systems, according to D.P.R. 24-5-1979 n886. Night visual signals (sea navigation) Platforms shall be supplied with one or more white flashing lamps, able to reproduce the letter U of the Morse code (light: 0.5s - dark: 1s - light: 0.5s dark: 1s - light: 2s - dark: 10s, for a time not higher than 15 s). Light power out of lamp (that is taking into consideration filters and glass absorption) shall be equal to 1400 candela. Lamps shall be placed in order that, over a 360 visual angle, at least one of them is always visible; lamps shall be placed not below 6 m and not over 30 m height on the sea level. Vertical divergence of the beam of each lamp shall allow its detection from the farthest to the closest positions of the platform. Lamps shall be started during the day too, when the visibility is less than 2 sea miles. One or more red lamps shall be placed as far away as possible from previous white lamps in order to show the horizontal end of big structures; these lamps, synchronised with the white ones, have a characteristic reproducing the letter U of the Morse code for a time not higher than 15 s). The light power out of lamp is 80 candela. Lamps shall be started during the day too, when the visibility is less than 2 sea miles. Platforms shall be supplied with identification panels with letters or figures (or a combination of both of them), one metre height (black on yellow background), visible from every direction. These panels shall be lightened or, if it is not possible, shall have a background covered with a reflecting film or supplied with reflectors. Acoustic signals (sea navigation) One or more boat horns shall be placed between 6 m and 30 m on the sea level (possibly close to the red lamps) in order that the sound is heard from every directions. The sound characteristic shall reproduce the letter U of the Morse code (sound 1s - silence 2s - sound 1s - silence 2s - sound 2s - silence 22s, for not more than 30 seconds). The acoustic signal shall be started when the visibility is less than 2 sea miles.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 50
Radio beacons A radio beacon (radar beacon or racon), whose characteristics are to be defined each time according to signals already operating, shall be used to identify a particular platform. Radio beacon operating is subjected to a concession by Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, according to Ministry of Defence, of the Interior and of Transports. If there are more than one unit within a radius of 4 sea miles, it is allowed only one of them is supplied with a radio beacon. Night signals (air navigation) - lamp with red steady aeroplane light, with a light range not less than 3 sea miles, to be placed on the highest tip of the platform (crane, flares) so that it can be seen from the top or every direction; - diffused lighting on the helideck (overhang shall not exceed 15 cm beyond the helideck); - yellow external lights, along the heliport edge, placed not more than 3 m apart one from another and not exceeding a 15 cm overhanging from the helideck (luminous intensity of each light shall be 300 lumen or 25 candela); - steady light lamps, contained into proper watertight red globes placed on the top of the obstacles and located in number and way so that obstacle itself can be seen from every direction (luminous intensity shall be 120 lumen or 10 candela); - 40 W incandescent lamp, for wind-hose lighting; - other signals for the highest structures lighting can be prescribed by Aeronautic Region Commands. Day-time signals (air navigation) Painting the higher edge of the obstacles, white and orange strips, each 3 m wide; this signal is provided for obstacles 45 m or more eight on the sea level.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 51
2.5.9 2.5.9.1
Requirements of ventilating and pressurizing systems Process area ventilation Safety criteria and calculations able to assure an adequate ventilation and to maintain into the module an overpressure not higher than 30 kPa (in the explosion case), are specified in 07636.MOD.SAF.PRG. Specification.
Air ventilating and conditioning of living quarters and utilities module Safety criteria to be adopted designing air ventilating and conditioning plant of living quarters and utilities module are specified in 07636.MOD.SAF.PRG. Specification.
Pressurisation Pressurisation is mandatory only into the module placed into a classified area according to CEI 64-2 codes; one exception is represented by deck rooms lodging gas power generators, which will be pressurised even if placed into a safe area.
Requirements of drainage systems All the oil drainage of an oil platform shall be closed except for those one on the main deck if no process equipment are installed on it. In case of Well work over this type of drainage shall not be used but a dedicated system shall be to provide. Oil drainage shall not have any connection with other drainage (oil or sanitary) not even through openings of the collecting system (i.e. separator pipe). The oil drainage devices placed on the decks shall be supplied with siphons in order to prevent the fire diffusion from a place to another. The drainage systems into areas with process equipment containing oil shall be able to evacuate, within 1 hour, all the oil content of the equipment to which are dedicated (and of pipe up to the shutdown valves) and the fire fighting water spilled into the area during 1 hour. The oil spilled from process equipment shall be contained by control vessels or by a suitable protection band along the perimeter of the deck (if totally welded to the deck); however, the risk of spilling oil on safe areas or on areas segregated by flame proof walls shall be prevented. A suitable drain system shall be to provide on the helideck too.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 52
Requirements of safety valves Equipment and pressurised lines shall be protected by safety valve systems in accordance with ISO 10418 code.
Requirements of electrical system Electrical systems shall fulfil what provided by D.P.R. 24/5/1979 n886 and be made according to CEI 64-2 codes. Power generation for platform will be operated by: gas generator set/s installed into proper rooms; cable coming from another platform or onshore; solar cells; eolian generators.
If a failure can occur, an emergency generator set shall start in accordance with D.P.R. 24/5/1979 n886 and following amendments. This system shall be dimensioned to supply the following essential utilities: - ventilation and pressurisation of the enclosures which shall be manned during the emergency; - detection/extinction fire systems; - gas detection systems; - alarm and public address systems; - radio and telecommunications systems; - emergency lights; - navigational aids; - battery system; - ESD system. The emergency generator shall be able to operate continuously at least for 24 hours with its own fuel tank. If the main electric power supply and the emergency electric power supply can fail, the following vital services shall be however maintained for at least 30 minutes: - alarm and public address systems;
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 53
radio and telecommunications systems; safety lights; heliport safety lights; navigational aids; ESD system.
The electric energy distribution during emergency requires a net independent from that one normally used in order to prevent outer causes or short circuit can shut down both the supply. Other systems (i.e. safety lights) shall be supplied with local batteries. The gas/air instrumentation system shall be supplied with a tank whose capacity can assure the required emergency operations. An independent power system, consisting of accumulators whose operating range is 96 hours, shall be provided for boat horn and beacons supply. These batteries, considering their own duty, shall be placed into a room separated from normal generator room and both arranged into a selfextinguishing container. Acoustic and visual platform signal shall be operated from: ashore, by remote-control; aboard, automatically by photocell. Conditions and wrong operating of the platform signal plant shall be remotecontrolled transmitted ashore. 2.5.13 Requirements for the emergency lights The platform shall be supplied with an emergency light system which assure a suitable lighting of the platform itself if the electric energy main supply can fail. The emergency lights, supplied by the emergency generator, shall be provided for the living quarters, the control room, the work areas, the escape ways and the evacuation points where personnel meet for abandoning the platform in order to allow the emergency operation and the plant safety systems activation.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 54
The sea surface where the evacuation crafts are to be put to sea shall have a suitable lighting in order to allow a clear vision of the main structure. Emergency lights shall be to provide on the helideck too.
Requirements of lifting systems safety Gas platform shall be supplied with a lifting system (crane or tackle) installed into an unclassified area, for shipping and landing of materials needed either for platform operation and for work over, wire line or other necessities. Executive specifications and operating and maintenance criteria shall fulfil D.P.R. 27/6/1955 n547 - Norme per la prevenzione degli infortuni sul lavoro and D.M. 9/8/1960 - Modalit per leffettuazione della prova di carico relativa alla prima verifica della gru di cui al D.M. 12/9/1959. For the rotating crane there are the following additional requirements: - the prime mover of crane shall be independent from platform energy sources; lifting unit needs power supply only for lighting and feeding of - the drive cab shall be usually placed near the platform outside area if crane operates with arm towards the landing-deck; - from the cab, all the crane operations shall be controlled; however, the maximum visibility of load and of load lifting cylinder shall be assured; - the cab shall be ventilated and heated, the noise level shall not exceed the legislation requirements; - the drive cab shall be supplied with a communication system, operating without hands necessity, in order that the operator is allowed to communicate continuously with the staff of the support vessel and with the platforms operator. - the crane shall be supplied with an acoustic system activated as soon as the operation starts; - the crane operator shall have an emergency escape way;
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 55
- the capacity of fuel tank shall be in order to assure a full load operating for at least 8 hours; - vents and burnt gas exhaust shall be placed as high as possible and however in order to not involve process areas; - the gas exhaust shall be supplied with a flame breaker silencer; - the support of the crane shall be fastened to the platform main deck.
Safety requirements for the chemicals injection systems The injection piping of methyl alcohol, glycol or other chemicals shall be supplied with a non-return valve installed as close as possible to the injection point. If the injection system is automatic, also a shut down valve shall be to provide close to the injection point.
Requirements of work health and environmental protection Noise and vibrations In order to protect workers against hear hazards, during working, 20184.COO.GEN.SDS Specification shall be applied. In order to protect workers against health hazards and work safety arising from exposure to vibrations, shall be applied directions stated in D.P.R. n303 19/3/1956.
Environmental protection Prospecting, research and cultivation programmes relating to Italia oil platforms shall fulfil D.P.R. n526 18/6/1994, respect directions about requirements as regard air quality stated by D.P.R. n203 24/5/1988 and by related decree D.M. 12/7/1990 and moreover observe directions about offshore unloading stated by D.M. 28/7/1994.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 56
Requirements of passive protection systems Passive protection systems shall be in accordance with 20192.VOF.SAF.FUN specification.
Requirements of fire systems Requirements of fire systems shall be in accordance with 20246.OPF.SAF.SDS, 12304.FFS.SAF.PRG and 20245.LQR.SAF.SDS specifications.
Emergency supplies General Platform shall be supplied with emergency equipment according to the following codes: - Regolamento concernente i criteri generali per la sicurezza antincendio delle piattaforme fisse e strutture fisse assimilabili January 1991, following the article 49 of D.P.R. 24/5/1979 n886 - D.M. 2/6/1990 n121 Regolamento recante norme provvisorie per la sicurezza antincendio negli eliporti The features of equipment shall be in accordance with 07634.CMP.SAF.SDS specification.
Life-boats and rigid life-rafts The characteristic of the rescue boats shall be in accordance with the following documents: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Traduzione in lingua Italiana del testo autentico in lingua inglese degli emendamenti alla Convenzione Internazionale per la salvaguardia della vita umana in mare (SOLAS) del 1 novembre 1974 adottati dal Comitato di sicurezza marittima dellIMO il 23 maggio 1991 (pubblished on G.U. n91 - 20/04/1994); specification 20028.FLO.SAF.FUN; specification 20029.FLO.SAF.FUN.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 57
Life-jackets and life-belts Life-jackets and life-belts shall be fulfil 20031.FLO.SAF.FUN Specification.
Boundary conditions, limits and exclusions What specified in this document shall be intended integrally applicable; however, since layouts can change, also the application of the above stated requirements can sometimes be hardly realised. Eventual derogation shall be evaluated by the competent authorities; however solutions shall be in accordance with laws and with the Company Internal Normative References.
Ergonomics All the systems and plants, besides for satisfying safety requirements and criteria provided by this specification and according to the operative prescriptions, shall be placed in order to: not hinder passage/escape ways; be accessible to activation operations; be accessible to setting operations; be accessible to maintenance operations.
Requirements for Quality Management and Quality Assurance Eventual requirements for quality management and/or quality assurance are included in the applicable managerial specification enclosed to the quotation enquiry.
Documentation The application of the requirements stated by this specification and 20257.COO.SAF.SDS shall provide for the following documentation oriented to the specific design: technical safety report; cause/effects diagrams; layout of fire equipment, layout of fire escapes, passive and personnel protection; layout of safety equipment.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 58
Enclosure and informative annexes Annexes Annex 1 Annex 2 Shut down and depressurisation systems file cards Shut down levels of Platform
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 59
Annex 1 - Shut down and depressurization systems file cards File cards contained into this Annex resume, for each plant Unit, the shut down causes and its related effects. Each Unit is characterised by: - one Level (corresponding to that stated in Annex 2); - one Sublevel, which determines the characterising parameter/s of hazard of that Unit (e.g. high pressure, high temperature, etc.); - one Integrity Class required for the relevant unit (see paragraph 2.5.3); - the Type of detection to be installed on that Unit; detection can be associated to general ESD, alarm only or dedicated to Unit; - the Type of intervention for each Level (ESD, PSD, EDP or LSD). The way to use the file cards is the following: 1. Identify the interested Unit, open its file card and search for lock causes. 2. If the voice type of detection relating to ESD or to PSD states one or more type of detection, also the ESD effects or PSD effects due to that detection system shall be listed in the file card. 3. Further effects, due to dedicated detection and showed in the same file card, are associated to the ESD effects: this gives a whole picture of all causes and effects of that Unit. 4. Go into 20193.VAR.SAF.SDS Specification where, for the considered Unit, can be obtained a detail of the sensors to be installed and the logic to be adopted according to the integrity class required. 5. Go into 20190.VON.SAF.SDS Specification, where detectors positioning can be obtained. Advantages in using file cards come too from the grouping possibility of the Units according to the same Integrity Class or same Sublevel (so accordingly the associated hazard) the shut down or detection system can be unified (all those systems can be optimised in order to reduce the number of elements).
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 60
UNIT 100: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 2 HIGH PRESSURE 4 WELL HEAD SET OF WELL HEADS
Integrity class required: Type of detection associated to ESD: HEAT
Type of detection associated only to alarm: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: PSD PSD causes: HYDRAULIC POWER ESD ACTIVATION (unavailability for lack of engine fluid) ESD SYSTEM ACTIVATION (for unavailability) WORKOVER PLANT ESD ACTIVATION (only for simultaneous operations) HEAT AND FIRE SENSORS ACTIVATION INTO EACH UNIT (see in each file-card: detection associated to ESD) CONTROL SYSTEM ESD ACTIVATION MAIN POWER GENERATOR UNIT ESD ACTIVATION (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single enclosure) MAIN POWER SUPPLY UNIT <1000 V ESD ACTIVATION AIR COMPRESSED UNIT ESD ACTIVATION ACTIVATION BY MANUAL STA TION ON PLATFORM PLANT ANOMALIES PSD MANUAL ACTIVATION BY REMOTE CONTROL MANUAL ACTIVATION BY LOCAL PANEL FIRE SENSORS INTERVENTION INTO THE COMPRESSION UNIT FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS SENSORS INTERVENTION INTO THE COMPRESSION UNIT (into the enclosure)
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 61
UNIT 100: Plant: WELL HEAD SET OF WELL HEADS (Continue) ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD EDP ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR PSD effects: PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT LSD OF DISCHARGE BURNERS UNIT LSD OF INJECTION UNIT (METHYL ALCOHOL) LSD OF TEST SEPARATOR UNIT LSD OF OIL SEPARATION UNIT LSD OF OIL TRANSPORT UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 62
UNIT 100: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 1 SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS 4 WELL HEAD WORKOVER
Integrity class required:
Type of detection associated to ESD: FIRE FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: ESD Causes: FIRE DETECTION FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS DETECTION ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM. FOR FIRE DETECTION ALARM (AS3) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR GAS DETECTION ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT FIRE OR GAS DETECTION DETERMINES MOREOVER: - ACTIVATION OF OPERATING WELL HEAD UNIT PSD - ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP - ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR FOR FIRE DETECTION
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 63
UNIT 120: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 4
CHEMICAL INJECTION FOR WELL HEAD AND PLANT METHYL ALCOHOL INJECTION PRESENCE OF FLAMMABLE / TOXIC AGENTS 3
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: LSD LSD causes: ACTIVATION BY PSD FLOWLINES UNIT ANOMALIES ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM. FOR FIRE DETECTION ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR LSD effects: PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT FIRE PUMPS ACTIVATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTIVATION ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 64
UNIT 130: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 2 HIGH PRESSURE 3 COLLECTING MANIFOLD SEPARATORS MANIFOLD
Integrity class required: Type of detection associated to ESD: ---
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: PSD Causes: HYDRAULIC POWER ESD ACTIVATION (unavailability for lack of engine fluid) ESD SYSTEM ACTIVATION (for unavailability) WORKOVER PLANT ESD ACTIVATION (only for simultaneous operations) HEAT AND FIRE SENSORS ACTIVATION INTO EACH UNIT (see in each file-card: detection associated to ESD) CONTROL SYSTEM ESD ACTIVATION MAIN POWER GENERATOR UNIT ESD ACTIVATION (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single enclosure) MAIN POWER SUPPLY UNIT <1000 V ESD ACTIVATION AIR COMPRESSED UNIT ESD ACTIVATION ACTIVATION BY MANUAL STATION ON PLATFORM UNIT ANOMALIES PSD MANUAL ACTIVATION BY REMOTE CONTROL MANUAL ACTIVATION BY LOCAL PANEL FIRE SENSORS INTERVENTION INTO THE COMPRESSION UNIT FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS SENSORS INTERVENTION INTO THE COMPRESSION UNIT (into the enclosure) LSD OF GAS SEPARATION UNIT LSD OF OIL TRANSPORT UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 65
UNIT 170: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 2 HIGH PRESSURE 3 (for oil); 4 (for gas) SEALINES PRODUCTION MANIFOLD (GAS AND/OR OIL)
Type of detection associated only to alarm: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: PSD PSD causes: HYDRAULIC POWER ESD ACTIVATION (unavailability for lack of engine fluid) ESD SYSTEM ACTIVATION (for unavailability) WORKOVER PLANT ESD ACTIVATION (only for simultaneous operations) HEAT AND FIRE SENSORS ACTIVATION INTO EACH UNIT (see in each file-card: detection associated to ESD) CONTROL SYSTEM ESD ACTIVATION MAIN POWER GENERATOR UNIT ESD ACTIVATION (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single enclosure) MAIN POWER SUPPLY UNIT <1000 V ESD ACTIVATION AIR COMPRESSED UNIT ESD ACTIVATION ACTIVATION BY MANUAL STATION ON PLATFORM UNIT ANOMALIES
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 66
UNIT 170: Plant: SEALINES PRODUCTION MANIFOLD (GAS AND/OR OIL) (Continue) ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR PSD effects: ACTIVATION OF PASSAGE-WAYS LSD PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 67
UNIT 190: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 3 HIGH PRESSURE 3 LAUNCHING AND/OR RECEIVING TRAPS PASSAGE-WAYS
Type of detection associated only to alarm: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: LSD LSD causes: ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD PLANT ANOMALIES ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM FOR FIRE DETECTION ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR LSD effects: PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 68
UNIT 200: Plant: Level: Sublevel: OIL SEPARATION PRIMARY SEPARATION/TEST SEPARATORS 3 (primary separation); 4 (test separators) HIGH PRESSURE 3 AND METERING
Integrity class required: Type of detection associated to ESD: HEAT FIRE
Type of detection associated only to alarm: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: EDP/LSD LSD causes: ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD PLANT ANOMALIES ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD PSD (only for test separator)
ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM FOR FIRE DETECTION ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR LSD effects: ACTIVATION OF WATER TREATMENT LSD ACTIVATION HEATING LSD (if diathermic oil comes from primary separation) PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 69
UNIT 220: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 3 HIGH PRESSURE 3 OIL TRANSPORT AND STORAGE PUMPING, METERING AND TESTING
Type of detection associated only to alarm: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: LSD LSD causes: ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MAN IFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD PLANT ANOMALIES ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM FOR FIRE DETECTION ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR LSD effects: PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 70
UNIT 240: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 4 ----DISCHARGE BURNERS ---
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: LSD Causes: PSD BY WELL HEAD UNIT UNIT ANOMALIES PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 71
UNIT 310-330: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 2 INFLAMMABLES PRESENCE 4 GAS DEHYDRATION - GAS DEACIDIFICATION
GAS DEHYDRATORS - GAS DEACIDIFICATORS
Type of detection associated only to alarm: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: PSD PSD causes: HYDRAULIC POWER ESD ACTIVATION (unavailability for lack of engine fluid) ESD SYSTEM ACTIVATION (for unavailability) WORKOVER PLANT ESD ACTIVATION (only for simultaneous operations) HEAT AND FIRE SENSORS ACTIVATION INTO EACH UNIT (see in each file-card: detection associated to ESD) CONTROL SYSTEM ESD ACTIVATION MAIN POWER GENERATOR UNIT ESD ACTIVATION (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single enclosure) MAIN POWER SUPPLY UNIT <1000 V ESD ACTIVATION AIR COMPRESSED UNIT ESD ACTIVATION ACTIVATION BY MANUAL STATION ON PLATFORM PLANT ANOMALIES PSD MANUAL ACTIVATION BY REMOTE CONTROL MANUAL ACTIVATION BY LOCAL PANEL FIRE SENSORS INTERVENTION INTO THE COMPRESSION UNIT FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS SENSORS INTERVENTION INTO THE COMPRESSION UNIT (into the enclosure)
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 72
UNIT 310-330: Plant: GAS DEHYDRATION - GAS DEACIDIFICATION
GAS DEHYDRATORS - GAS DEACIDIFICATORS (Continue)
ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD EDP ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR PSD effects: PROTECTION LO CKS OF UNIT LSD OF GLYCOL INJECTION UNIT LSD OF COMBUSTIBLE GAS UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 73
UNIT 360: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 2 HIGH PRESSURE 2 GAS COMPRESSION ---
Type of detection associated to PSD: FIRE FLAMMABLE /TOXIC GAS (into the enclosure) Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: FIRE Type of intervention: EDP/PSD/LSD
LSD causes: FIRE DETECTION TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT ESD effects: ALARM (AS3) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR GAS DETECTION COMPRESSION UNIT SHUT DOWN SHUT DOWN OF COMPRESSION UNIT CONDITIONING PLANT ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT WELL HEADS PSD SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD OIL SEPARATION LSD OIL TRANSPORT LSD COMPRESSION UNIT EDP LSD effects: FIRE (AS4) ALARM ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION SHUT DOWN OF COMPRESSION UNIT CONDITIONING PLANT FOR FIRE DETECTION, FIRST STAGE EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE HELIDECK RED LIGHT PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNI T
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 74
UNIT 390: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 4 CHEMICALS PRESENCE, INFLAMMABLES PRESENCE (Note) 2 GLYCOL FOR INHIBITION AND DEHYDRATION GLYCOL STORAGE AND INJECTION
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: Causes: LSD
GAS TREATMENT PSD MANUAL ACTIVATION TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT Only for injection pumps with pneumatic engines supplied with gas
Effects: Note:
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 75
UNIT 410: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 4 HIGH TEMPERATURE/FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS 2 HEATING DIATHERMIC OIL SYSTEM
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: GAS (heavy hydrocarbon vapours) Type of intervention: LSD
LSD causes: LSD BY GAS SEPARATION FLAMMABLE GAS PRESENCE TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD EDP ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR
LSD effects: PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT GAS (AS3) ALARM FOR GAS DETECTION ON MANNED PLATFORM ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 76
UNIT 420: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 3 INFLAMMABLES PRESENCE/LOW PRESSURE 2 COMBUSTIBLE GAS UTILITIES GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM
Type of detection associated only to alarm GAS: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: LSD causes:
EDP/LSD
MANUAL ASD ACTIVATION MANUAL ESD ACTIVATION BY REMOTE CONTROL ESD H.V.A.C. UNIT ACTIVATION ESD ACTIVATIO N BY EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single room) PSD SEALINES ACTIVATION TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MA NIFOLD EDP ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR
LSD effects: LSD ACTIVATION BY MAIN POWER GENERATOR (if placed into separated compartments) PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 77
UNIT 420: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 3 INFLAMMABLES PRESENCE 1 COMBUSTIBLE GAS OIL STORAGE AND PUMPING
Integrity class required: Type of detection associated to ESD: HEAT (Note 1)
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: HEAT (Note 2) Type of intervention: LSD causes: LSD
ASD MANUAL ACTIVATION ESD H.V.A.C. UNIT ACTIVATION ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENC Y POWER SUPPLY ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single room) TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT
ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATIO N OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 78
UNIT 430: Plant: COMBUSTIBLE GAS OIL STORAGE AND PUMPING (Continue) LSD effects: Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR SHUT DOWN (Note 3) FIRE PUMPS STARTING COOLING SYSTEM ACTIVATION ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT
Only if GAS OIL UNIT is adjacent to Process Units If GAS OIL UNIT is separated from Process Units If EMERGENCY GENERATOR is not supplied with a daily gas oil tank.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 79
UNIT 450: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 3 --1 HYDRAULIC POWER CONTROL HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: ESD/LSD
ESD causes: ESD H.V.A.C. UNIT ACTIVATION ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single room) LACK OF ENGINE FLUID TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM ACTIVATION OF WELL HEADS PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREA TMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR
LSD effects: PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 80
UNIT 460: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 1 LOW/MEDIUM FIRE LOAD 2 COMPRESSED AIR COMPRESSION STATION
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: Causes: ESD
ESD H.V.A.C. UNIT ACTIVATION ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single room) LACK OF ENGINE FLUID HEAT DETECTION TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT FIRE ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION AIR COMPRESSORS AND CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN FOR FIRE DETECTION EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE (only for compressors into a closed enclosure) FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE, DETERMINES MOREOVER: - ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD - ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP - ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT ESD - ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT - ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 81
UNIT 470: Plant: Level: Sublevel: MAIN POWER GENERATION GAS GENERATOR SET 1 (Note 1) - 4 (Note 2) LOW/MEDIUM FIRE LOAD 2
Integrity class required: Type of detection associated to ESD: FIRE (Note 1)
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: FLAMMABLE GAS (Note 2) FIRE (Note 2) Type of intervention: ESD (Note 1) / LSD (Note 2)
ESD causes: ESD H.V.A.C. UNIT ACTIVATION (Note 1) ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single enclosure) FIRE DETECTION ESD effects: FIRE ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION (Note 1) AIR COMPRESSORS AND CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN FOR FIRE DETECTION EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE (only for compressors into a closed room) FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE, DETERMINES MOREOVER - ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD - ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP - ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP - ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT - ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (Follow)
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 82
UNIT 470: Plant: MAIN POWER GENERATION GAS GENERATOR SET (Continue) LSD causes: FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION (Note 2) FIRE DETECTION TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT LSD effects: ALARM (AS3) ON MANNED PLATFORM AND HELIDECK (Note 2) RED LIGHT FOR GAS DETECTION AIR CONDITION ING PLANT AND GENERATOR SHUT DOWN FOR FIRE DETECTION, FIRST STAGE, OR FOR GAS DETECTION FIRE ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM AND HELIDECK GREEN LIGHT FOR FIRE DETECTION EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT Note 1: Note 2: If integrated in LIVING QUARTERS or into a single enclosure If generators are placed into separated enclosures
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 83
UNIT 480: Plant: Level: Sublevel: MAIN POWER GENERATION DIESEL OIL EMERGENCY GENERATOR 0 (Note 1) - 3 (Note 2) LOW/MEDIUM FIRE LOAD 2
Type of detection associated to ESD: FIRE (Note 1) FLAMMABLE GAS (at the engine intake and conditioning)) (Note 1) Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: FIRE (Note 2) Type of intervention: ESD causes: (Note 1) ESD (Note 1) / LSD (Note 2)
ASD MANUAL ACTIVATION ESD MANUAL ACTIVATION BY REMOTE CONTROL FIRE DETECTION GAS DETECTION (into the enclosure)
ESD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION (Note 1) AIR COMPRESSORS AND CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN FOR FIRE DETECTION EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE (only for compressors into a closed room) ALARM (AS3) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR GAS DETECTION (at the engine intake and conditioning) AIR COMPRESSORS AND CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN FOR GAS DETECTION FIRE OR GAS DETECTION, SECOND STAGE, DETERMINES MOREOVER: - ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD - ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP - ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP - COMPRESSED AIR AND HYDRAULIC POWER ESD ACTIVATION (Follow)
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 84
UNIT 480: Plant: EMERGENCY POWER GENERATION DIESEL OIL EMERGENCY GENERATOR (Continue) ACTIVATION OF MAIN POWER GENERATION AND SUPPLY <1000 V ESD ACTIVATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM ESD ACTIVATION OF LIVING QUARTERS ESD ACTIVATION OF COMBUSTIBLE GAS OIL LSD ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR SHUT DOWN ACTIVATION OF U.P.S. LSD causes: FIRE DETECTION (Note 2) TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT LSD effects: ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM AND HELIDECK GREEN LIGHT FOR FIRE DETECTION (Note 2) CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN OF COMPARTMENT FOR FIRE DETECTION EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT Note 1: If gas main generators are placed into LIVING QUARTERS or into a single enclosure a platform shut down shall be to provide for emergency electric generator unavailability; if a shut down of the main generator could occur a hazardous situation should arise (e.g. fire pump unavailability). If gas main generators are placed into separated enclosures or into dedicated compartments.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 85
UNIT 560: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 4 LOW PRESSURE 2 OILY WATERS TREATMENT PROCESS WATERS TREATMENT
OIL SEPARATION LSD MANUAL BYPASS PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 86
UNIT 660: Plant: HEATING VENTILATING AND AIR CONDITIONING VENTILATION ENCLOSURES QUARTERS 0 LOW/MEDIUM FIRE LOAD 2 OF INTO ACCOMMODATIONS AND OR BELOW THE LIVING
Level: Sublevel:
Type of detection associated to ESD: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS (into the plenum intake and, if present, into the enclosure) Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: FLAMMABLE / TOXIC GAS (air inlet) FIRE Type of intervention: ESD/LSD
ESD causes: MANUAL ASD ACTIVATION FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS DETECTION ESD effects: ALARM (AS3) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR GAS DETECTION CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP ACTIVATION OF COMPRESSED A IR ESD ACTIVATION OF HYDRAULIC POWER ESD ACTIVATION OF MAIN POWER GENERATION AND SUPPLY <1000 V ESD ACTIVATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM ESD ACTIVATION OF LIVING QUARTERS ESD ACTIVATION OF COMBUSTIBLE GAS OIL LSD ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR SHUT DOWN ACTIVATION OF U.P.S. (Follow)
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 87
UNIT 660: Plant: HEATING VENTILATING AND AIR CONDITIONING VENTILATION OF ACCOMMODATIONS AND ROOMS INTO OR BELOW THE LIVING QUARTERS (Continue)
LSD causes: FLAMMABLE/TOXIC GAS DETECTION (air inlet) FIRE DETECTION TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT LSD effects: ALARM (AS3) ON MANNED PLATFORM AND HELIDECK RED LIGHT FOR GAS DETECTION CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DO WN FOR GAS DETECTION ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN AND HELIDECK GREEN LIGHT FOR FIRE DETECTION, FIRST STAGE EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 88
UNIT 730: Plant: Level: Sublevel: Integrity class required: Type of detection associated to ESD: --Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: FIRE Type of intervention: Causes: LSD 2 4 FOAM/WATER FIRE SYSTEM PUMPING AND MIXING STATION
FIRE DETECTION TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT MANUAL OPERATIONS EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION (in case of closed enclosure) PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 89
UNIT 830: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 2 LOW FIRE LOAD 1 LIVING QUARTERS FRAME LIVING QUARTERS
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: FLAMMABLE GAS DECK/PASSAGES FIRE Type of intervention: Causes: ESD IN AUXILIARY LIVING
ESD H.V.A.C. UNIT ACTIVATION ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single enclosure) FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION FIRE DETECTION ALARM (AS3) ON MANNED PLATFORM AND HELIDECK RED LIGHT FOR GAS DETECTION ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM AND HELIDECK GREEN LIGHT FOR FIRE DETECTION CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN POWER INTERRUPTION TO ELECTRIC APPLIANCES
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 90
UNIT 900: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 4 LOW FIRE LOAD / LOW VOLTAGE 1 SOLID STATE U.P.S. EMERGENCY BATTERIES
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: FIRE Type of intervention: Causes: LSD
FIRE DETECTION TYPICAL ANOMALIES OF UNIT ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM AND HELIDECK GREEN LIGHT FOR FIRE DETECTION POWER INTERRUPTION TO ELECTRIC APPLIANCES PROTECTION LOCKS OF UNIT
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 91
UNIT 920: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 1 LOW FIRE LOAD 1 MAIN POWER SUPPLY < 1000 V ELECTRIC CONTROL BOARDS NORMAL OPERATING
Integrity class required: Type of detection associated to ESD: FIRE
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: FIRE Type of intervention: Causes: ESD
ESD H.V.A.C. UNIT ACTIVATION ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single enclosure) FIRE DETECTION ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, AIR COMPRESSORS AND CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN AND POWER INTERRUPTION TO ELECTRIC APPLIANCES FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE EXTINGUISHER DISC HARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE (only for compressors into a closed enclosure) FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE, DETERMINES MOREOVER (*): - ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD - ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP - ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP - ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT - ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR ESD anticipates va lve shut down of the process plants in the event of electrovalves unfeeding.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 92
UNIT 930: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 0 LOW FIRE LOAD 1 EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION BOARD
ASD MANUAL ACTIVATION FIRE DETECTION ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, AIR COMPRESSORS AND CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN AND POWER INTERRUPTION TO ELECTRIC APPLIANCES FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE (only for compressors into a closed enclosure) FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE, DETERMINES MOREOVER: - ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD - ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD - ACTIVATION OF G AS COMPRESSION EDP - ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP - ACTIVATION OF COMPRESSED AIR ESD - ACTIVATION OF HYDRAULIC POWER ESD - ACTIVATION OF MAIN GENERATORS AND SUPPLY <1000 V ESD - ACTIVATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM ESD - ACTIVATION OF LIVING QUARTERS ESD - ACTIVATION OF COMBUSTIBLE GAS OIL LSD - ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT - ACTIVATION OF U.P.S.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 93
UNIT 970: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 1 LOW FIRE LOAD / VERY LOW VOLTAGE 1 CONTROL SYSTEM REMOTE-CONTROL / DCS
FLAMMABLE GAS (into the enclosure) Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: Causes: ESD
ESD H.V.A.C. UNIT ACTIVATION ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ESD ACTIVATION BY EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (if placed into the Living Quarters or into a single enclosure) FIRE DETECTION ALARM (AS4) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR FIRE DETECTION CONDITIONING PLANT SHUT DOWN FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR SHUT DOWN FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE ALARM (AS3) ON MANNED PLATFORM, FOR GAS DETECTION
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 94
UNIT 970: Plant: CONTROL SYSTEM REMOTE-CONTROL / DCS (Continue) FIRE DETECTION, SECOND STAGE, DETERMINES MOREOVER (*): - ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD - ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP - ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD - ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP - ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT - ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY POWER GENERATOR (*) ESD anticipates valve shut down of the process plants in the event of electrovalves unfeeding.
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 95
UNIT 980: Plant: Level: Sublevel: 1 ESD UNAVAILABILITY --ESD SYSTEM ---
Type of detection associated only to alarm: --Dedicated detection: --Type of intervention: Causes: Effects: ESD
SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY ACTIVATION OF HELIDECK RED LIGHT ACTIVATION OF WELL HEAD UNIT PSD ACTIVATION OF SEPARATORS MANIFOLD PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS COMPRESSION EDP ACTIVATION OF SEALINES PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT PSD ACTIVATION OF GAS TREATMENT EDP
05887.OPF.SAF.SDS Rev. 1 July 1997 Sheet 96
Annex 2 - Shut down levels of Platform The layout of figure 3 is used for determining which hierarchic level each plant Unit (or part of Unit) and its connections belong to; this layout shall be used for preparing the block of platform one. Level 0 is occupied by platform critical utilities, which determine platform general shut down (ESD) (excluding the power interruption of 110 V DC batteries for emergency vital supply). The 1 LEVEL represents (fire) ESD and is occupied by process plants in general and by other utilities hierarchically on a lower level (which determine the shut down of the only main power generation system, accordingly to fire ESD). The 2 LEVEL represents PSD and sometimes EDP (when depressurisation starts automatically); this level includes LSD caused by PSD too. Living quarters and control boards have not a PSD, it is replaced by an ESD relating to electric plants. The 3 LEVEL represents LSD and is occupied by all Units whose shut down results from Units shut down of Level 2. The 4 LEVEL represents LSD again and is occupied by all those Units linked to the 2 Level Units (for instance by a outflow or inflow line) and which thus shut down when the liquid level is too low or there is a shut down in the linked Units (e.g., Water Treatment Unit shuts down for low liquid level in the Gas Separation Unit). It is possible some Units have to be placed on levels hierarchically higher than those ones represented, relating to the equipment layout on a certain installation or according to the risk analysis results; (if, for instance, main power supply < 1000 V were placed into the same room of control system, Unit 920 would shift to 0 level together with Unit 970, with all the consequences). That means the layout shall be utilised with the maximum flexibility. The layout doesnt show neither the safety systems firing only one alarm, nor the Units not connected to the production process (e.g., machinery rooms). The detail of causes and effects relating to each Unit is provided in Annex 1 file cards.
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