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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1395', '§ 302', '§ 302', '§ 8', '§ 302', '§ 8', '§ 159', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

CHEMICAL WORKERS V. PITTSBURGH GLASS, 404 U. S. 157 - Volume 404 - 1971 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 404 > CHEMICAL WORKERS V. PITTSBURGH GLASS, 404 U. S. 157 (1971) > Full Text
Under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include pension and insurance benefits for active employees, [Footnote 1] and an employer's mid-term unilateral modification of such benefits constitutes an unfair labor practice. [Footnote 2] This cause
Since 1949, Local 1, Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers of America, has been the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees "working" on hourly rates of pay at the Barberton, Ohio, facilities of respondent Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. [Footnote 4] In 1950, the Union and the Company negotiated an employee group health insurance plan in which, it was orally agreed, retired employees could participate by contributing the required
In November, 1965, Medicare, a national health program, was enacted, 79 Stat. 291, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq. The 1964 contract was still in effect, and the Union sought mid-term bargaining to renegotiate insurance benefits for retired employees. The Company responded in March, 1966, that, in its view, Medicare rendered the health insurance program useless because of a "non-duplication of benefits" provision in the Company's insurance policy, and stated, without negotiating any change, that it was planning to (a) reclaim the additional two-dollar monthly contribution as of the effective date of Medicare; (b) cancel the program for retirees; and (c) substitute the payment of the three-dollar monthly subscription fee for supplemental Medicare coverage for each retired employee. [Footnote 5]
Together, these provisions establish the obligation of the employer to bargain collectively, "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," with "the representatives of his employees" designated or selected by the majority "in a unit appropriate for such purposes." This obligation extends only to the "terms and conditions of employment" of the employer's "employees" in the "unit appropriate for such purposes" that the union represents. See, e.g., Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 381 U. S. 666 (1965); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U. S. 342 (1958); Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485 (1947); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 313 U. S. 192 (1941) (dictum); Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146 (1941). The Board found that benefits of already retired employees fell within these constraints on alternative theories. First, it held that pensioners are themselves "employees" and members of the bargaining unit, so that their benefits are a "term and condition" of their employment. [Footnote 7]
Yet the rationale of Blassie is not at all in point. The question there was simply whether, under § 302(c)(5), retirees remain eligible for benefits of trust funds established
during their active employment. The conclusion that they do was compelled by the fact that the contrary reading of the statute would have made illegal contributions to pension plans, which the statute expressly contemplates in subsections (A) and (C). [Footnote 10] No comparable situation exists in this case. Furthermore, there is no anomaly in the conclusion that retired workers are "employees" within § 302(c)(5) entitled to the benefits negotiated while they were active employees, but are not "employees" whose ongoing benefits are embraced by the bargaining obligation of § 8(a)(5). Contrary to the Board's assertion, the union's role in the administration of the fund is of a far different order from its duties as collective bargaining agent. To accept the Board's reasoning that the union's § 302(c)(5) responsibilities dictate the scope of the § 8(a)(5) collective
49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). We have always recognized that, in making these determinations, the Board is accorded broad discretion. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 322 U. S. 132-135; Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146 (1941). Moreover, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. National Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), 49 Stat. 454, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). But the Board's powers in respect of unit determinations are not without limits, and if its
Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 313 U. S. 165. The Board must also exercise care that the rights of employees under § 7 of the Act "to self-organization . . . [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing" are duly respected. In line with these standards, the Board regards as its primary concern in resolving unit issues "to group together only employees who have substantial mutual interests in wages, hours, and other conditions of employment." 15 NLRB Ann.Rep. 39 (1950). Such a mutuality of interest serves to assure the coherence among employees necessary for efficient collective bargaining and at the same time to prevent a functionally
The Board argues, however, that the pensioners' ineligibility to vote is not dispositive of their right to membership in the bargaining unit, since the franchise and the right to membership depend upon different levels of interest in the unit. [Footnote 14] Yet in W. D. Byron & Sons of Maryland, Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 172, 174-175 (1944), which the Board found controlling in Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, see 72 N.L.R.B. at 230 n. 10, the Board not merely held ineligible to vote, but expressly
Third. The Board found that bargaining over pensioners' rights has become an established industrial practice.
Even if pensioners are not bargaining unit "employees," are their benefits, nonetheless, a mandatory subject of collective bargaining as "terms and conditions of employment" of the active employees who remain in the unit? The Board held, alternatively, that they are, on the ground that they "vitally" affect the "terms and conditions of employment" of active employees principally by influencing the value of both their current and future benefits. 177 N.L.R.B. at 915. [Footnote 17] The Board explained:
Ibid. Furthermore, the actual value of future benefits depends upon contingencies, such as inflation and changes in public law, which the parties cannot adequately anticipate and over which they have little or no control. By establishing a practice of representing
Section 8(d) of the Act, of course, does not immutably fix a list of subjects for mandatory bargaining. See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 379 U. S. 220-221 (STEWART, J., concurring); Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 389-390, 231 F.2d 717, 723-724 (1956). But it does establish a limitation against which proposed topics must be measured. In general terms, the limitation includes only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U. S. 342 (1958). Although normally matters involving individuals outside the employment relationship do not fall within that category, they are not wholly excluded. In Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (1959), for example, an agreement had been negotiated in the trucking industry, establishing a minimum rental that carriers would pay to truck owners who drove their own vehicles in the carriers' service in place of the latter's employees. Without determining whether the owner-drivers were themselves "employees," we held that the minimum rental was a mandatory subject of bargaining, and hence immune from state antitrust laws, because the term "was integral to the establishment of a stable wage structure for clearly covered employee-drivers." United States v. Drum, 368 U. S. 370, 368 U. S. 382-383, n. 26 (1962). [Footnote 18] Similarly,
The Board urges that Oliver and Fibreboard provide the principle governing this cause. The Company, on the other hand, would distinguish those decisions on the ground that the unions there sought to protect employees from outside threats, not to represent the interests of third parties. We agree with the Board that the principle of Oliver and Fibreboard is relevant here; in each case, the question is not whether the third-party concern is antagonistic to or compatible with the interests of bargaining unit employees, but whether it vitally affects the "terms and conditions" of their employment. [Footnote 19] But we disagree with the Board's assessment of the significance of a change in retirees' benefits to the "terms and conditions of employment" of active employees.
theory, active employees undertake to represent pensioners in order to protect their own retirement benefits, just as if they were bargaining for, say, a cost of living escalation clause. But there is a crucial difference. Having once found it advantageous to bargain for improvements in pensioners' benefits, active workers are not forever thereafter bound to that view or obliged to negotiate in behalf of retirees again. [Footnote 20] To the contrary, they are free to decide, for example, that current income is preferable to greater certainty in their own retirement benefits or, indeed, to their retirement benefits altogether. By advancing pensioners' interests now, active employees, therefore, have no assurance that they will be the beneficiaries of similar representation when they retire. The insurance against future contingencies
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U. S. 676, 381 U. S. 685-686 (1965). The Board's holding in this cause, however, depends on the application of law to facts, and the legal standard to be applied is ultimately for the courts to decide and enforce. We think that, in holding the "terms and conditions of employment" of active employees to be vitally affected by pensioners' benefits, the Board here simply neglected to give the adverb its ordinary meaning. Cf. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 380 U. S. 292 (1965).
except upon (1) timely notice to the other party, (2) an offer to meet and confer "for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications," (3) timely notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and comparable state or territorial agencies of the existence of a "dispute," and (4) continuation "in full force and effect [of] . . . all the terms and conditions of the existing contract . . . until [its] expiration date. . . ." [Footnote 21]
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 350 U. S. 285 (1956) (quoting United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 49 U. S. 122). See also NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U. S. 282, 352 U. S. 288 (1957). Seen in that light, § 8(d) embraces only mandatory topics of bargaining. The provision begins by defining "to bargain collectively" as meeting and conferring "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." It then goes on to state that "the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean" that mid-term unilateral modifications and terminations are prohibited. Although this part of the section is introduced by a "proviso" clause, see n 21, supra, it quite plainly is to be construed in pari materia with the preceding definition. Accordingly, just as § 8(d) defines the obligation to bar
The relevant purpose of § 8(d) that emerges from the legislative history of the Act together with the text of the provision confirms this understanding. The section stems from the 1947 revision of the Act, an important theme of which was to stabilize collective bargaining agreements. The Senate bill, in particular, contained provisions in §§ 8(d) and 301(a) to prohibit unilateral mid-term modifications and terminations and to confer federal jurisdiction over suits for contract violations. See S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 8(d), 301(a). The bill also included provisions to make it an unfair labor practice for an employer or labor organization "to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement." Id. §§ 8(a)(6), 8(b)(5). In conference the Senate's proposed §§ 8(d) and 301(a) were adopted with relatively few changes. See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, supra, at 34-35, 65-66. The provisions to make contract violations an unfair labor practice, on the other hand, were rejected with the explanation that "[o]nce parties have made a collective bargaining contract the