Source: http://openjurist.org/520/us/397/board-of-county-commissioners-of-bryan-county-oklahoma-v-brown
Timestamp: 2015-01-25 10:26:52
Document Index: 432499227

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1983', '§1983', '§1979', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983']

520 US 397 Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County Oklahoma v. Brown | OpenJurist
520 U.S. 397 - Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County Oklahoma v. Brown	Home520 us 397 board of county commissioners of bryan county oklahoma v. brown
520 US 397 Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County Oklahoma v. Brown 520 U.S. 397117 S.Ct. 1382137 L.Ed.2d 626
BOARD OF the COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BRYAN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, Petitioner,v.Jill BROWN et al.
Respondent brought this 42 U.S.C. §1983 damages action against petitioner county, alleging, among other things, that its Deputy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's Department policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to §1983 municipal liability. Respondent prevailed following a jury trial, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns.
Respondent Jill Brown brought a claim for damages against petitioner Bryan County under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983. She alleged that a county police officer used excessive force in arresting her, and that the county itself was liable for her injuries based on its sheriff's hiring and training decisions. She prevailed on her claims against the county following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment against the county on the basis of the hiring claim alone. 67 F.3d 1174 (1995). We granted certiorari. We conclude that the Court of Appeals' decision cannot be squared with our recognition that, in enacting §1983, Congress did not intend to impose liability on a municipality unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the "moving force'' behind the plaintiff's deprivation of federal rights. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2027, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides in relevant part:
We held in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S., at 689, 98 S.Ct., at 2035, that municipalities and other local governmental bodies are "persons'' within the meaning of §1983. We also recognized that a municipality may not be held liable under §1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Our conclusion rested partly on the language of §1983 itself. In light of the statute's imposition of liability on one who "subjects [a person], or causes [that person] to be subjected,'' to a deprivation of federal rights, we concluded that it "cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.'' Id., at 692, 98 S.Ct., at 2036. Our conclusion also rested upon the statute's legislative history. As stated in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), "while Congress never questioned its power to impose civil liability on municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt its constitutional power to impose such liability in order to oblige municipalities to control the conduct of others'' (citing Monell, supra, at 665-683, 98 S.Ct., at 2022-2032). We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2433, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality opinion); id., at 828, 105 S.Ct., at 2438 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Pembaur, supra, at 478-479, 106 S.Ct., at 1297-1298; St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122, 108 S.Ct. 915, 923, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion); id., at 137, 108 S.Ct., at 931 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1206, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
We concluded in Canton that an "inadequate training'' claim could be the basis for §1983 liability in "limited circumstances.'' Id., at 387, 109 S.Ct., at 1204. We spoke, however, of a deficient training "program,'' necessarily intended to apply over time to multiple employees. Id., at 390, 109 S.Ct., at 1205. Existence of a "program'' makes proof of fault and causation at least possible in an inadequate training case. If a program does not prevent constitutional violations, municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is called for. Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action-the "deliberate indifference''-necessary to trigger municipal liability. Id., at 390, n. 10, 109 S.Ct., at 1205, n. 10 ("It could . . . be that the police, in exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are "deliberately indifferent' to the need''); id., at 397, 109 S.Ct., at 1209 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (" [M]unicipal liability for failure to train may be proper where it can be shown that policymakers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern of constitutional violations . . . ''). In addition, the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the officer involved in a particular incident, is the "moving force'' behind the plaintiff's injury. See id., at 390-391, 109 S.Ct., at 1205-1206.
Before trial, counsel for Bryan County stipulated that Sheriff Moore "was the policy maker for Bryan County regarding the Sheriff's Department.'' App. 30. Indeed, the county sought to avoid liability by claiming that its Board of Commissioners participated in no policy decisions regarding the conduct and operation of the office of the Bryan County Sheriff.