Source: https://casebook.icrc.org/law/conduct-hostilities
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 14:07:22
Document Index: 317692918

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 48', 'Art. 49', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Arts 4', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 13', 'Arts 7', 'art 1', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 52', 'Arts 19', 'Art. 53', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 56', 'Arts 35', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 57', 'Arts 41', 'Arts 18', 'Art. 58', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 58', 'Art. 49', 'Arts 50', 'Art. 23', 'Arts 14', 'Arts 59', 'Arts 61', 'Art. 25', 'Art. 56', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 50', 'Arts 48', 'Art. 13', 'Arts 52', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 22', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Arts 26', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 57', 'Arts 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 85', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 28', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 58', 'Art. 52', 'Arts 51', 'Art. 51', 'Arts 25', 'Arts 48', 'Arts 53', 'Art. 16', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 56', 'Art. 15', 'Art. 56', 'Art. 55', 'Arts 19', 'Arts 22', 'Arts 18', 'Arts 20', 'Art. 11', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 26', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 58', 'Art. 58', 'Art. 58', 'Art. 58', 'Art. 58', 'Arts 22', 'Art. 35', 'Art.41', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Arts 7', 'Art. 40', 'Art. 37', 'Art. 39', 'Art. 23', 'Art 23', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 22', 'Art. 35', 'Art. 35', 'Art. 51', 'Arts 35', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 40', 'Art. 37', 'Art. 57', 'Arts 22', 'Art. 35', 'Arts 35', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 22', 'Art. 35', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 35', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 54', 'Art. 14', 'Arts 46', 'Arts 20', 'Arts 28', 'Art. 15', 'Art. 18', 'Arts 16', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 34', 'Art. 75', 'Art. 130', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 49', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 24', 'Art. 37', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 40', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 37', 'Art. 49', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 58', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 70', 'Art. 70', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 59', 'Art. 70', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 8', 'Arts 55', 'Art. 59', 'Art. 69']

ARRASSEN Mohamed, Conduite des hostilités, droit des conflits armés et désarmement, Brussels, Bruylant, 1986, 605 pp.
BAXTER Richard R., “The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (The Law of the Hague)”, in International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, Geneva, Henry-Dunant Institute/UNESCO, 1986, pp. 93-133.
DINSTEIN Yoram, “Jus in Bello Issues Arising in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003”, in IYHR, Vol. 34, 2004, pp. 1-14.
EPSTEIN Melissa & BUTLER Richard, “The Customary Origins and Elements of Select Conduct of Hostilities Charges before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Potential Model for Use by Military Commissions”, in Military Law Review, Vol. 179, 2004, pp. 68-127.
I. Distinction between the Law of the Hague and the Law of Geneva
(See Supra Fundamentals of IHL, Historical Development of International Humanitarian Law)
ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion [Para. 75]
France, Accession to Protocol I [Part A.]
Colombia, Constitutional Conformity of Protocol II [Para. 6]
II. The protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities
1. Basic rule: Art. 48 of Protocol I
[CIHL, Rule 7]
[Source: Protocol I]
Considering: [...]
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men. [...]
[Source: Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of certain Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, Saint Petersburg, November 29/December 11, 1868, paras 2-3 of the Preamble; original text in French; English translation in Parliamentary Papers, vol. LXIV, 1869, p. 659; reprinted from Schindler, D. & Toman, J. (eds), The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, 4th ed., Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoff, 2004, p. 91; also available on http://www.icrc.org/ihl]
Case Study, Armed Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia [Para. 13]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 229-230]
SOLF Waldemar A., “Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities under Customary International Law and under Protocol I”, in American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 1, 1986, pp. 107-135.
DOSWALD-BECK Louise, “The Value of the Geneva Protocols for the Protection of Civilians”, in MEYER Michael (ed.), Armed conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Conventions, London, 1989, pp. 137-172.
GEHRING Robert W., “Protection of Civilian Infrastructures”, in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 42/2, 1978, pp. 86-139.
SAUSSURE Hamilton de, “Belligerent Air Operations and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I”, in Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. 1, 1976, pp. 33-47.
URBINA Julio Jorge, Protección de las víctimas de los conflictos armados, Naciones Unidas y derecho internacional humanitario: desarrollo y aplicación del principio de distinción entre objetivos militares y bienes de carácter civil, Valencia, Tirant Monografías, 2000, 439 pp.
P I, Art. 49
SOLF Waldemar A., “Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities under Customary International Law and under Protocol I”, in The American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 1, 1986, pp. 107-135.
MEYROWITZ Henri, “Une révolution inaperçue : l’article 49(2) du Protocole additionnel I aux Conventions de Genève de 1949”, in Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 32, 1981, pp. 29-57.
acts of violence in defence and offence
KRETZMER David, “Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?”, in EJIL, Vol. 16/2, 2005, pp. 171-212.
no matter where, including attacks on the party’s own territory under enemy control
attacks from land, air or sea affecting the civilian population on land
BOURBONNIERE Michel, “Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralization of Satellites or Ius in bello Satellitis”, in Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 9, 2004, pp. 43 ff.
CANESTARO Nathan, “Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision Warfare”, in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37/2, 2004, 431-484.
ROSCINI Marco, “Targeting and Contemporary Aerial Bombardment”, in ICLQ, Vol. 54/2, 2005, p. 411-444.
only military objectives may be attacked
even attacks directed at military objectives are prohibited if the expected incidental effects on the civilian population are excessive
even when an attack directed at a military objective is not expected to have excessive effects on the civilian population, all feasible precautionary measures must be taken to minimize those effects
4. Definition of military objectives
P I, Art. 52(2) and (3) [CIHL, Rule 8]
When the focus of the law on the conduct of hostilities shifted from the prohibition to attack undefended towns and villages[1] to the rule that only military objectives may be attacked, the definition of military objectives became crucial. The principle of distinction is practically worthless unless at least one of the categories between which the attacker has to distinguish is defined. From the point of view of the philosophy of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), it would have been more satisfactory to define civilian objects. However, because objects become military objectives according to their use by the enemy or potential use by the attacker rather than because of their intrinsic character, it was military objectives that were defined. Indeed, all objects other than those benefiting from special protection[2] can become military objectives. By the same token, it has not been possible to draw up an exhaustive list of military objectives, although such a list would have greatly simplified practical implementation. Most definitions are therefore abstract but provide a list of examples. Protocol I chooses to illustrate its definition with an open-ended list of examples of civilian objects which are presumed not to be military objectives.[3]
Under the definition provided in Article 52(2) of Protocol I, an object[4] must cumulatively[5] meet two criteria to be a military objective.
First, the object, by its “nature, location, purpose or use”, has to contribute effectively to the military action of the enemy.[6] “Nature” refers to the object’s intrinsic character. “Location” admits that an object may be a military objective simply because it is situated in an area that is a legitimate target. Some States have clearly stated that their understanding of the word is that a specific area of land may be a military objective if its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. “Purpose” refers to the enemy’s intended future use, based on reasonable belief. “Use” refers to the current function of the object. For example, it is generally agreed that weapons factories and even extraction industries providing raw materials for such factories are military objectives, because they serve the military, albeit indirectly.
Second, the object’s destruction, capture or neutralization has to offer a definite military advantage for the attacking side.[7] According to declarations of understanding made by some States, the military advantage anticipated from an attack refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole, not just from isolated or particular parts of the attack. A direct connection with specific combat operations is not considered to be necessary. An attack as a whole must, however, be a finite event, not to be confused with the entire war.
What counts is that the action and the advantage have to be “military”; the political aim of victory may be achieved through violence only by using violence against military objectives, i.e., by weakening the military potential of the enemy.[8] By characterizing the contribution as “effective” and the advantage as “definite”, the drafters tried to avoid too broad an interpretation of what constitutes a military objective. However, the exact practical implications of those terms are subject to controversy. Both criteria must be fulfilled “in the circumstances ruling at the time”. Without this limitation to the actual situation, the principle of distinction would be void, as every object could in abstracto, in the wake of possible future developments, e.g., if used by enemy troops, become a military objective.
ICRC, The Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts [Part A]
Israel/Gaza, Operation Cast Lead [Part I, paras 101-111, Part II, paras 365-392]
Israel, The Targeted Killings Case [Paras 40-42]
Israel, Human Rights Committee’s Report on Beit Hanoun [Para. 47]
Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah, Conflict in 2006 [Part I, paras 116-117, 140-148]
Iran/Iraq, UN Security Council Assessing Violations of International Humanitarian Law [Part A.]
Case Study, Armed Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia [Paras 19 and 27]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Rajic [Part A., para. 54]
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO Intervention [Part A., paras 1018; Part B., paras 55 and 71-79]
United States, Military Commissions [Para. 5. D.]
Georgia/Russia, Human Rights Watch’s Report on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 20-22, 39-40, 58-64]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 31-51]
Iran - Victim of Cyberwarfare
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 157, 158, 163, 215]
WARD Christopher, “Distinction: The Application of the Additional Protocols in the Theatre of War”, in Asia-Pacific Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol. 2, 2006, pp. 36-45.
5. Definition of the civilian population
P I, Art. 50
The principle of distinction can only be respected if not only the permissible objectives but also the persons who may be attacked are defined. As combatants are characterized by a certain uniformity and civilians by their great variety,[9] Art. 50(1) of Protocol I logically defines civilians by excluding them from the corollary category of combatants: everyone who is not a combatant is a civilian benefiting from the protection provided for by the law on the conduct of hostilities.[10] As will be seen below, civilians only lose their protection from attack and the effects of the hostilities if and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.[11] The complementarity of the two categories, civilians and combatants, is very important in rendering IHL complete and effective, and thereby ensuring no one may fight but not be fought, or be attacked but not defend himself/herself – a privilege and a sanction which would never be respected and would undermine the whole fabric of IHL in a given conflict.
Recently, some scholars and governments have argued that persons belonging to an armed group failing to fulfil the collective requirements for combatant status (e.g., by not distinguishing themselves from the civilian population or because they do not belong to a party to the international armed conflict) may nevertheless be attacked like combatants and not only, like civilians, when and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. This argument, which could be invoked to justify acts that would otherwise qualify as extra-judicial executions, is, at a minimum, incompatible with the wording of Art. 50(1) of Protocol I. Because of the difficulties in identifying such persons in the conduct of hostilities, it also puts other civilians at risk.
Thus, under this definition there is no category of “quasi-combatants”, i.e. civilians contributing so fundamentally to the war effort (e.g. workers in ammunition factories) that they lose their civilian status although not directly participating in hostilities. Indeed, in IHL there can logically be no such category. If the civilian population is to be protected, only one distinction is practicable: the distinction between those who (may) directly participate in hostilities, on the one hand, and all others, who do not, may not and cannot militarily hinder the enemy from obtaining control over their country by means of a complete military occupation, no matter what their contribution to the war effort may be otherwise, on the other.
To allow attacks on persons other than combatants would also violate the principle of necessity, because victory can be achieved by overcoming only the combatants of a country – however efficient its armament industry and however genial its politicians may be. All this obviously does not preclude military objectives, such as armament factories, from being attacked; subject to the principle of proportionality – the attack on a military objective does not become unlawful because of the risk that a civilian who works or is otherwise present in it may come to harm during the course of the attack.
If one person so defined is a civilian, any number of such persons constitute the civilian population.[12] According to proportionality as a general principle of law, the presence of individual non-civilians among a great number of civilians does not deprive the latter of the character of a civilian population,[13] nor does it mean that the non-civilians may not be individually attacked provided that the necessary precautions are taken.
Israel/Gaza, Operation Cast Lead [Part I, paras 237-248, Part II, paras 393-437]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [para. 118]
[See also infra, Conduct of Hostilities, II. The protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities,7) Loss of protection: The concept of direct participation in hostilities and its consequences]
P I, Art. 50(1) [CIHL, Rule 5]
ICRC Appeals on the Near East [Part C., para. 7]
Israel, Military Prosecutor v. Kassem and Others [Part II. E. 4]
Sudan, Report of the UN Commission of Enquiry on Darfur [Paras 291, 292 and 422]
Case Study, Armed Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia [27]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic [Part B., paras 639 and 640]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Blaskic [Paras 211-214]
Colombia, Constitutionality of IHL Implementing Legislation [Paras D.3.3.2. and 3.3.2.1., Para. E.1]
Afghanistan, Code of Conduct for the Mujahideen [Arts 4 and 8]
the presence of a combatant or a military objective among the civilian population
P I, Art. 50(3)
Israel, Human Rights Committee’s Report on Beit Hanoun [Paras 34 and 47]
Sudan, Report of the UN Commission of Enquiry on Darfur [Paras 263-267]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Strugar [Part B., para. 282]
6. Prohibited attacks
(See also infra, Conduct of Hostilities, III. Means and Methods of Warfare)
Under IHL, lawful methods of warfare are not unlimited. In particular, IHL prohibits certain kinds of attacks. The civilian population may never be attacked; this prohibition includes attacks the purpose of which is to terrorize the population.[14] IHL also proscribes attacks directed at civilian objects.[15] Even those attacks directed at a legitimate military objective[16] are regulated by IHL; such attacks must not be indiscriminate, i.e. the weapons utilized must be capable of being directed at the specific military objective and the means used must be in proportion to the military necessity.[17] The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks, even when directed at a military objective, if they “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.[18] This principle is the inescapable link between the principles of military necessity and humanity, where they pull in opposite directions. Although military advantage, which may be taken into account, is qualified, the principle of proportionality remains very difficult to apply, and any attempt to weigh the expected military advantage against the anticipated civilian losses or damage to civilian objects is inevitably dependent on subjective value judgements, especially when both probabilities, i.e. gaining the advantage and affecting civilians, can be gauged with less than 100% accuracy.
In addition, if a military objective is targeted and the principle of proportionality is respected, but civilians or civilian objects may nevertheless be affected by the attack, precautionary measures must be taken.[19] Finally, reprisals against civilians or civilian objects are prohibited under IHL.[20]
attacks against the civilian population as such (including those intended to spread terror)
(See also supra, Fundamentals, B. International Humanitarian Law as a Branch of Public International Law, III. International Humanitarian Law: a branch of international law governing the conduct of States and individuals, 1) Situations of application, C. Other situations, d) acts of terrorism?)
P I, Art. 51(2) [CIHL, Rule 2]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Martic [Part A., paras 8, 10-14; Part B, paras 66-71, 472]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Rajic [Part A., paras 51-56.]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Galic [Part A., paras 16-137 and 561-593; Part B, paras 69-104]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Strugar [Part A.; Part B., paras 220-222 and 280-288; Part C, paras 270-272]
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Conflict in the Kivus [Part III, paras 12-23, 27, 30-34]
Sierra Leone, Special Court Ruling in the AFRC Case [Part II., paras 660-670]
SAYAPIN Sergey V., “The Spread of Terror among the Civilian Population: A War Crime?”, in Asia-Pacific Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 2, 2006, pp. 196-225.
attacks against civilian objects
P I, Art. 52(1) [CIHL, Rule 10]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Strugar [Part B., paras 223-228 and 282]
BART Gregory Raymond, “The Ambiguous Protection of Schools under the Law of War: Time for Parity with Hospitals and Religious Buildings”, in Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2009, pp. 405-446.
[CIHL, Rule 11]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Galic [Part A, paras 57-61 and 372-387]
Georgia/Russia, Human Rights Watch’s Report on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 21-22]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 71-73]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 245, 255-256, 261]
aa) attacks not directed at a specific military objective
P I, Art. 51(4)(a) [CIHL, Rule 12(a)]
Israel, Operation Cast Lead [Part II, paras 365-392]
Israel, Human Rights Committee’s Report on Beit Hanoun [Para. 34]
bb) use of weapons which cannot be directed at a specific military objective
P I, Art. 51(4)(b) [CIHL, Rule 12(b)]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Martic [Part B, paras 303-313, 461-463, 470 and 472; Part C, 248]
Georgia/Russia, Human Rights Watch’s Report on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 65-74]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 291-292]
cc) treating different military objectives as a single military objective
P I, Art. 51(5)(a) [CIHL, Rule 13]
dd) principle of proportionality
(See also supra, Fundamentals of IHL, D. Sources of Contemporary International Humanitarian Law, III. Fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law, 2) Principles of International Humanitarian Law, c) proportionality)
P I, Art. 51(5)(b) [CIHL, Rule 14]
also covers reasonably foreseeable incidental effects
ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion [Para. 43]
Israel/Gaza, Operation Cast Lead [Part I, paras 120-126, 230-232]
Israel, The Targeted Killings Case [Paras 40-46]
Israel, Human Rights Committee’s Report on Beit Hanoun [Paras 38-42]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. [Para. 526]
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO Intervention [Part A., paras 4, 18-19 and Part B., paras 75-78]
Georgia/Russia, Human Rights Watch’s Report on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 28-30, 41-47]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 66-67]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 155, 160, 168, 179, 294-295]
HOLLAND Joseph, “Military Objective and Collateral Damage: their Relationship and Dynamics”, in YIHL, Vol. 7 (2004), 2007, pp. 35-78.
MEDENICA Olivera, “Protocol I and Operation Allied Force: did NATO Abide by Principles of Proportionality?”, in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 23, 2001, pp. 329-426.
“Symposium: The International Legal Fallout from Kosovo” (articles of GAZZINI Tarcisio, HILPOLD Peter, CERONE John, FENRICK William J.,
BENVENUTI Paolo & BOTHE Michael), in EJIL, Vol. 12/3, 2001, pp. 391-536.
attacks against the civilian population (or civilian objects) by way of reprisals
P I, Art. 51(6) and 52(1)
United Kingdom and Australia, Applicability of Protocol I [Part C]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Martic [Part A, paras 15-17; Part B, 464-468; Part C., para. 268]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. [Paras 527-536]
7. Loss of protection: The concept of direct participation in hostilities and its consequences
P I, Art. 51(3); PII, Art. 13(3) [CIHL, Rule 6]
The concept of “direct participation in hostilities” is a cornerstone of the IHL on the conduct of hostilities, and its practical importance has grown as armed conflicts have become “civilianized”.[21] Both in international and non-international armed conflicts, civilians lose their protection against attacks (and their protection against the incidental effects of attacks, afforded to the civilian population as a whole) if and for such time as they participate directly in hostilities.[22] Neither treaty nor customary law defines this concept. After a broad consultation of experts revealed an absence of agreement on certain crucial points, the ICRC tried to clarify several concepts in an “Interpretive Guidance”:[23] who is covered as a “civilian” by the rule prohibiting attacks except in case of direct participation; what conduct amounts to direct participation; the duration of the loss of protection; the precautions to be taken and the types of protection afforded in case of doubt; the rules governing attacks against persons who take direct part in hostilities; and the consequences of regaining protection. The first issue is probably the most controversial.
In international armed conflicts, treaty law is clear that everyone who is not a combatant is a civilian benefiting from protection against attacks except if he or she takes a direct part in hostilities. Members of the armed forces of a party to the international armed conflict who lost their combatant status (e.g., because they did not distinguish themselves from the civilian population) may also reasonably be excluded. Some scholars also exclude members of armed groups that do not belong to a party to the international armed conflict. In our view, such “fighters” are either civilians or covered by the rule applicable to a parallel non-international armed conflict, discussed below.
In non-international armed conflicts, the absence of any mention of “combatants” might lead one to deduce that everyone is a civilian and that no one may be attacked unless they directly participate in hostilities. However, this would render the principle of distinction meaningless and impossible to apply. In addition, common Article 3 confers protection on “persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms or are otherwise hors de combat”. The latter part of the phrase suggests that for members of armed forces and groups, it is not sufficient to no longer take active part in hostilities to be immune from attack. They must take additional steps and actively disengage. On a more practical level, to prohibit government forces from attacking clearly identified fighters unless (and only while!) the latter engage in combat against government forces is militarily unrealistic, as it would oblige them to react rather than to prevent, while facilitating hit-and-run operations by the rebel group. These arguments may explain why the Commentary on Protocol II considers that “[t]hose belonging to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time.”[24]
There are two ways of conceptualizing this conclusion. First, “direct participation in hostilities” can be understood to encompass the simple fact of remaining a member of the group or of keeping a fighting function in such a group. Second, members of armed groups, or, as the ICRC Interpretive Guidance suggests, those members of an armed group whose specific function is continuously to commit acts that constitute direct participation in hostilities, may not be considered “civilians” (and therefore do not benefit from the rules that protect them against attacks unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities). The latter suggestion ensures that membership of the armed group is distinguished from simple affiliation with a party to the conflict for which the group is fighting – in other words, membership of the political, educational or humanitarian wing of a rebel movement. In every case, however, in practice the difficult question arises as to how government forces are to determine (fighting) membership in an armed group while the individual in question does not commit hostile acts.
As for the question about what conduct amounts to “direct participation”, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance concludes, based on a broad agreement among experts, that the following criteria must be cumulatively met in order to classify a specific act as direct participation in hostilities:
"the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm);
there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation);
the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus)."
Israel, Detention of Unlawful Combatants [Part A., paras 13 and 21; Part B.]
Inter-American Commission on Human Right, Tablada [Paras 178 and 189]
Colombia, Constitutionality of IHL Implementing Legislation [Paras D. 3.3.1.-5.4.3., Para. E.1]
Afghanistan, Code of Conduct for the Mujahideen [Arts 7-9, 20-21]
Civil War in Nepal [Part II]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 48-51]
CAMINS Emily, “The Past as Prologue: the Development of the ‘Direct Participation’ Exception to Civilian Immunity”, in IRRC, Vol. 90, No. 872, 2008, pp. 853-881.
DINSTEIN Yoram, “Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed Conflicts”, in IYHR, Vol. 38, 2008, pp. 1-16.
GOODMAN Ryan [et al.], “The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law”, in Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010, pp. 637-916.
LYALL Rewi, “Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of States”, in Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, Issue 2, May 2008, 21 pp.
MELZER Nils, “Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities”, in Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010, pp. 831-916.
SCHMITT Michael N., “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: the Constitutive Elements”, in Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010, pp. 697-739.
AKANDE Dapo, “Clearing the Fog of War?: The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities”, in ICLQ, Vol. 59, Part 1, January 2010, pp. 180-192.
CORN Geoffrey S., “Unarmed But How Dangerous? Civilian Augmentees, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for Permissible Civilian Battlefield Functions”, in Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2008, pp. 257-295.
MELZER Nils, “Targeted Killing or Less Harmful Means? Israel’s High Court Judgment on Targeted Killing and the Restrictive Function of Military Necessity”, in YIHL, Vol. 9, 2009, pp. 87-116.
STEPHENS Dale, LEWIS Angeline, “The Targeting of Contractors in Armed Conflict”, in YIHL, Vol. 9, 2006, pp. 25-64.
8. The civilian population is not to be used to shield military objectives
P I, Art. 51(7) [CIHL, Rule 97]
IHL prohibits attacks against the civilian population and civilian objects.[25] IHL also prohibits abuse of this prohibition: civilians, the civilian population and certain specially protected objects may not be used to shield a military objective from attack.[26] The decisive factor for distinguishing the use of human shields from non-compliance with the obligation to take passive precautions[27] is whether the intermingling between civilians and combatants, and/or military objectives, is the result of the defender’s specific intention to obtain “protection” for its military forces and objectives, or simply of a lack of care for the civilian population.
If the defender violates the prohibition to use human shields, the “shielded” military objectives or combatants do not cease to be legitimate objects of attack merely because of the presence of civilians or protected objects.[28] It is generally agreed that involuntary human shields nevertheless remain civilians. Care must therefore be taken to spare them when attacking a legitimate objective.[29] In an extreme case, if the anticipated incidental loss of life or injury among involuntary human shields is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected from attacking the military objective or combatants, an attack directed against the latter may become unlawful.[30] The status of voluntary human shields is more controversial. Some consider that acting as voluntary human shields constitutes direct participation in hostilities, which would cause the persons concerned to lose protection against the effects of hostilities while they act as human shields. Others object, first, that in order to classify an act as direct participation, the act must provoke, through a physical chain of causality, harm to the enemy or its military operations. Human shields are a moral and legal rather than physical means to an end: to hinder the enemy from attacking. Second, the theory considering voluntary human shields as civilians directly participating in hostilities is self-defeating. If it were correct, the presence of human shields would not have any legal impact on the ability of the enemy to attack the shielded objective – but an act which cannot have any impact whatsoever upon the enemy cannot possibly be classified as direct participation in hostilities. Third, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary human shields refers to a factor, i.e. the voluntary involvement of the target, which is very important in criminal law and, to a lesser extent, in law enforcement operations, but is completely irrelevant in IHL. A soldier of a country with universal compulsory military service is just as much (and for just as long) a legitimate target as a soldier who is a member of an all-volunteer army. Fourth, the distinction is not practicable. How can a pilot or soldier launching a missile know whether the civilians he observes around a military objective are there voluntarily or involuntarily? What counts as a voluntary presence? Fifth, in a self-applied system like that of IHL during armed conflict, the suggested loss of protection against attacks may prompt an attacker to invoke the prohibition to use human shields abusively, as an alibi, as a mitigating circumstance or “to ease his conscience”.
Israel/Gaza, Operation Cast Lead [Part I, paras 151-169; Part II, paras 439-498]
Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah, Conflict in 2006 [Part II, paras 6-11]
Iran/Iraq, UN Security Council Assessing Violations of International Humanitarian Law [Parts C. and D.]
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Conflict in the Kivus [Part III, paras 24-26]
ECHR, Isayeva v. Russia [Paras 15, 23, 25-26, 69-70]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 79-82]
LYALL Rewi, “Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of States”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, Issue 2, May 2008, 21 pp.
9. Protected objects
In order to further safeguard the civilian population during armed conflicts, IHL protects specific objects from attack. It prohibits attacks against civilian objects, which are all objects not defined as military objectives;[31] thus, a civilian object is one failing to contribute to military action because of, for example, its location or function, and because its destruction would provide no military advantage.
In addition, IHL grants some objects, most of which are civilian objects anyway, special protection. In addition to the general protection afforded to them as civilian objects, special protection means that these objects may not be used for military purposes by those who control them and should therefore never become military objectives under the two-pronged test of the definition of military objectives. Second, even if they meet the test and are effectively used for military purposes, specially protected objects may only be attacked under restricted circumstances and following additional precautionary measures. For each category, the specific rules on these issues are different.
Specially protected objects include: cultural objects;[32] objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, such as water;[33] works and installations containing dangerous forces (e.g., dams, dykes and nuclear electrical power generating stations). Attacks against military objectives located in the vicinity of such installations are also prohibited when they would cause sufficient damage to endanger the civilian population.[34] The special protection of these works and installations ceases only under limited circumstances.[35] The environment (made up of civilian objects) also benefits from special protection. Means or methods of warfare with the potential to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment are prohibited.[36] Medical equipment (including transport used for medical purposes) is a final group of specially protected objects against which attack is prohibited.[37]
P I, Art. 52(1) [CIHL, Rule 9]
Israel, House Demolitions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [Parts D and E]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Rajic [Part A., paras 39 and 42]
Afghanistan, Code of Conduct for the Mujahideen [Arts 19-21, 23-25, 52-53-58]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 37-47, 94-109]
JIA Bing Bing, “‘Protected Property’ and its Protection in International Humanitarian Law”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 15/1, 2002, pp. 131-153.
specially protected objects
aa) cultural objects
P I, Art. 53 [CIHL, Rules 38-40]
“Total wars”, inter-religious strife and inter-ethnic conflicts are increasingly marked by the destruction of civilian objects, in particular cultural objects. Experience unfortunately shows that, far from being accidental or mere collateral damage, such destruction is very often clearly deliberate and part of the war effort.
The first attempts to protect cultural objects against the effects of war date back to the adoption of Hague Convention IV of 1907. This protection has been considerably developed in the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict and its 1954 and 1999 Protocols, in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in Additional Protocols I and II of 1977.
Cultural objects are defined as “movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people” (which include in particular monuments of architecture, archaeological sites, works of art, scientific collections and collections of books or archives) and as “buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit movable cultural property” (such as museums, libraries or refuges intended to shelter cultural property).
On the basis of provisions applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts, States parties are required to safeguard and respect cultural objects. Safeguarding comprises all the preventive measures to be taken in peacetime (which include the obligations to list, signal and mark the cultural objects with a distinctive emblem). Respect for cultural objects implies refraining from attacking them and prohibiting any form of pillage or destruction.
Considered as civilian objects under special protection, cultural objects must not be attacked and may not be used for military purposes. Even if they are, they do not automatically become legitimate military objectives. Their immunity may only be waived in cases of “imperative military necessity”.
In spite of the many detailed provisions designed to guarantee their protection, cultural objects are still often collateral victims of modern conflicts. In most cases, their irreparable destruction often constitutes a serious obstacle to the restoration of normal relations between former belligerents.
France, Accession to Protocol I [Part B., para. 13]
Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah, Conflict in 2006 [Part I, paras 188-192]
Iran/Iraq, UN Security Council Assessing Violations of International Humanitarian Law [Part A., Annex, para. 50]
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Strugar [Part B., paras 229-233 and 298-329]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 52-55]
DESCH Thomas, “The Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict”, in YIHL, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 63-90.
EUSTATHIADES Constantin, “La protection des biens culturels en cas de conflit armé et la Convention de la Haye du 14 mai 1954”, in Études de Droit International, Athens, Klissiounis, Vol. 3, 1959, pp. 395-524.
HENCKAERTS Jean-Marie, “New Rules for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict: The Significance of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict”, in Humanitäres Völkerrecht, Vol. 12/3, 1999, pp. 147-154.
HLADIK Jan, “Protection of Cultural Property: the Legal Aspects”, in JACQUES Richard B. (ed.), “Issues in International Law and Military Operations”, in International Law Studies, Vol. 80, 2006, pp. 319-331.
KONOPKA Jean A. (ed.), La protection des biens culturels en temps de guerre et de paix d’après les conventions internationales (multilatérales), Geneva, Imprimerie de Versoix, 1997, 163 pp.
O’KEEFE Roger, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, Cambridge, CUP, 2006, 404 pp.
STAVRAKI Emmanuelle, La Convention pour la protection des biens culturels en cas de conflit armé, Athens, Editions Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 1996, 306 pp.
TANJA Gerard J., “Recent Developments Concerning the Law for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 1994, pp. 115-125.
TECHERA Erika J., “Protection of Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: the International Legal Framework Revisited”, in Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-20.
TOMAN Jiri, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Aldershot/Paris, Dartmouth Publishing Company/ UNESCO Publishing, 1996, 525 pp.
“Special issue: Protection of cultural property in armed conflict”, in IRRC, No. 854, June 2004, pp. 311-481.
VAN WOUDENBERG Nout & LIJNZAAD Liesbeth (eds), Protecting Cultural Property in Armed Conflict: an Insight into the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoff, 2010, 243 pp.
ABTAHI Hirad, “Le patrimoine culturel iraquien à l’épreuve de l’intervention militaire du printemps 2003”, in Actualité et Droit International, May 2003, 13 pp., online: http://www.ridi.org/adi.
ABTAHI Hirad, “The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia”, in Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 14, 2001, pp. 1-2.
CARDUCCI Guido, “L’obligation de restitution des biens culturels et des objets d’art en cas de conflit armé : droit coutumier et droit conventionnel avant et après la Convention de La Haye de 1954. L’importance du facteur temporel dans les rapports entre les traités et la coutume”, in RGDIP, Vol. 104/2, 2000, pp. 289-357.
DRIVER Mark C., “The Protection of Cultural Property During Wartime”, in Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, Vol. 9/1, 2000, pp. 1-12.
DUTLI Maria Teresa, Protection juridique des biens culturels dans les conflits armés : le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) et la Protection des biens culturels (PBC), Forum protection des biens culturels, No. 11, 2007, pp. 71-77.
FORREST Craig J. S., “The Doctrine of Military Necessity and the Protection of Cultural Property during Armed Conflicts”, in California Western International Law Journal, No. 37, 2007, pp. 177-219.
HLADIK Jan, “The Review Process of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property”, in YIHL, Vol. 1, 1998, pp. 313-322.
GERSTENBLITH Patty, “Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict: Looking Back, Looking Forward”, in Cardozo Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2009, pp. 677-708.
NAHLIK Stanislaw E., “La protection des biens culturels en cas de conflit armé”, in Collected Courses, Vol. 120/1, 1967, pp. 61-163.
TOMAN Jiri, “La protection des biens culturels dans les conflits armés internationaux : cadre juridique et institutionnel”, in Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet, Geneva/The Hague, ICRC/M. Nijhoff, 1984, pp. 59-580.
bb) objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
P I, Art. 54 [CIHL, Rules 53 and 54]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [para. 205]
Israel, Operation Cast Lead [Part II, paras 913-989]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 155, 160]
BOUTRUCHE Théo, “Le statut de l’eau en droit international humanitaire”, in IRRC, No. 840, December 2000, pp. 887-916.
ICRC, Water and War: ICRC Response, Geneva, ICRC, July 2009, 21 pp.
JORGENSEN Nikolai, “The Protection of Freshwater in Armed Conflict”, in Journal of International Law and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, pp. 57-96.
ZEMMALI Ameur, “The Protection of Water in Times of Armed Conflicts”, in IRRC, No. 308, September-October 1995, pp. 550-564.
ZEMMALI Ameur, “The Right to Water in Times of Armed Conflict”, in LIJNZAAD Liesbeth, VAN SAMBEEK Johanna & TAHZIB-LIE Bahia (eds), Making the Voice of Humanity Heard, Leiden/Boston, M. Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 307-318.
Water and War: Symposium on Water in Armed Conflicts (Montreux, 21-23 November 1994), Geneva, ICRC, 1995, 168 pp.
cc) works and installations containing dangerous forces
P I, Art. 56 [CIHL, Rule 42]
RAMBERG Bennett, Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities in War, Lexington, D.C. Health & Co, 1980, 203 pp.
dd) medical equipment
Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah, Conflict in 2006 [Part I, paras 172-177]
P I, Arts 35(3) and 55 [CIHL, Rules 44 and 45]
ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion [Paras 30 and 33]
Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah, Conflict in 2006 [Part I, paras 209-220]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [para. 296]
HULME Karen, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Leiden, M. Nijhoff, 2004, 340 pp. KISS Alexandre, “Les Protocoles additionels aux Conventions de Genève de 1977 et la protection de biens de l’environnement”, in Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet, Geneva/The Hague, ICRC/M. Nijhoff, 1984, pp. 229-262.
REYHANI Roman, “Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict”, in Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, pp. 323-338.
SCHMITT Michael N., “Humanitarian Law and the Environment”, in The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 28/3, 2000, 265-323.
SCHWABACH Aaron, “Environmental Damage Resulting from the NATO Military Action against Yugoslavia”, in Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 25/1, 2000, pp. 117-140.
YORK Christopher, “International Law and the Collateral Effects of War on the Environment: The Persian Gulf”, in South Africa Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 7, 1991, pp. 269-290.
YUZON E.F.J., “Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Greening the International Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime”, in American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 11, 1996, pp. 793-846.
10. Precautionary measures in attack
Under IHL only military objectives may be attacked.[38] Even such attacks, however, are not without restrictions. An attack must be cancelled if it becomes apparent that it is of a type that is prohibited.[39] If circumstances permit, an advance warning must be given for those attacks which may affect the civilian population.[40] In determining the objective of an attack, and when a choice is possible, the one causing least danger to the civilian population must be selected.[41] Furthermore, IHL requires those planning and deciding on an attack to take precautionary measures,[42] including refraining from attacking when incidental loss of civilian life or destruction of civilian objects outweighs the military advantage of the attack.[43] The meaning of these obligations in practice remains controversial in many cases, mainly with regard to which precautions are “feasible”. Military and humanitarian considerations may influence the feasibility of such precautions: the importance and the urgency of destroying a target; the range, accuracy and effects radius of available weapons; the conditions affecting the accuracy of targeting; the proximity of civilians and civilian objects; the possible release of hazardous substances; the protection of the party’s own forces (and the proportionality between the additional protection for those forces and the additional risks for civilians and civilian objects when a certain means or method is chosen); the availability and feasibility of alternatives; the necessity to keep certain weapons available for future attacks on targets which are militarily more important or more risky for the civilian population.
Israel, Operation Cast Lead [Part I, paras 132-133, Part II, para. 529]
Israel, Human Rights Committee’s Report on Beit Hanoun [Paras 26 and 38-42]
Israel, Report of the Winograd Commission [Para. 26]
ECHR, Khatsiyeva v. Russia [Paras 21 and 139]
Georgia/Russia, Human Rights Watch’s Report on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 18-25]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 66-67, 74-82]
an attack must be cancelled if it becomes apparent that it is a prohibited one
P I, Art. 57(2)(b) [CIHL, Rule 19]
France, Accession to Protocol I [Part B., para. 16]
Israel, Human Rights Committee’s Report on Beit Hanoun [Para. 26]
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO Intervention [Part A., para. 6]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 155, 160, 178-180]
advance warning must be given, unless circumstances do not permit
P I, Art. 57(2)(c) [CIHL, Rule 20]
Israel, Operation Cast Lead [Part I, paras 262-265, Part II, paras 499-536]
Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah, Conflict in 2006 [Part I, paras 149-158]
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO Intervention [Part A., paras 18, 20, 22-25 and B., para. 77]
ECHR, Isayeva v. Russia [Paras 15, 25, 72, 164, 171, 187, 192-193]
when a choice is possible, the objective causing the least danger to the civilian population must be selected
P I, Art. 57(3) [CIHL, Rule 21]
additional obligations of those who plan or decide on an attack
P I, Art. 57(2)(a) [CIHL, Rules 16 and 17]
Israel, The Rafah Case [Paras 54-58]
aa) verify that objectives are not illicit
ECHR, Khatsiyeva v. Russia [Paras 135-138]
bb) choose means and methods avoiding or minimizing civilian losses
Afghanistan, Code of Conduct of the Mujahideen [Arts 41(C.) and 46]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 74-82]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 257-258]
cc) refrain from attacks causing disproportionate civilian losses
Afghanistan, Drug Dealers as Military Targets
11. Precautionary measures against the effects of attacks
GC IV, Arts 18(5); P I, Art. 58 [CIHL, Rules 22-24]
Contrary to Art. 57 of Protocol I,[44] which lays down rules for the conduct to be observed in attacks on the territory under the control of the enemy, Art. 58 of Protocol I relates to specific measures which every Power must take in its own territory in favour of its nationals, or in territory under its control. These precautionary measures against the effects of attacks (which are often referred to as “Conduct of Defence”[45]) include three specific obligations that Parties to a conflict shall discharge “to the maximum extent feasible”:[46]
They must “endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives”.[47] In most cases, only specific categories of the population (i.e. children, the sick or women) are evacuated; sometimes the entire population is evacuated. It should be underlined that, when carrying out such measures, occupying powers remain bound by the strict limitations spelled out in Art. 49 of Convention IV.
They must “avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas”.[48] This obligation, which covers “both permanent and mobile objectives [...] should already be taken into consideration in peacetime”.[49]
They must “take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations”.[50] Practically speaking, the “other measures” are chiefly building shelters to provide adequate protection against the effect of hostilities for the civilian population and the training of efficient civil defence services.
The wording, however, clearly indicates that these obligations are weaker than those of an attacker. They have to be taken only “to the maximum extent possible,” and the defender only has to “endeavour to remove” the civilian population and “avoid” locating military objectives nearby. While responsibility for the protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities is shouldered by both the attacker and the defender, its weight is not equally distributed.
Israel, Operation Cast Lead [Part I, paras 151-169, Part II, paras 439-498]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [para. 218]
QUEGUINER Jean-François, “Precautions under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities”, in IRRC, Vol. 88, No. 864, December 2006, pp. 798-821.
P I, Arts 50(1) and 52(3)
France, Accession to Protocol I [Part B., para. 9]
ECHR, Khatsiyeva v. Russia [Paras 21, 132-139]
13. Zones created to protect war victims against the effects of hostilities
GC I, Art. 23; GC IV, Arts 14 and 15; P I, Arts 59 and 60 [CIHL, Rules 35-37]
While IHL mainly tries to protect civilians and other categories of protected persons by obliging combatants to identify positively military objectives and to only attack them, respecting civilians wherever they happen to be, it also foresees different types of zones aimed at separating civilians from military objectives. The following table summarizes the different types of protected zones. They have in common the purpose of protecting war victims from the effects of hostilities (but not from falling under the control of the enemy) by assuring enemy forces that no military objectives exist in a defined area where war victims are concentrated. Thus, if the enemy respects IHL, the war victims run no risk of being harmed by the effects of hostilities. The risk with such zones is that they presuppose the willingness of the enemy to respect IHL. Hence, they are pointless against an enemy determined to violate IHL. On the contrary, such zones may then lead to the displacement of civilians and help the enemy target and abuse civilians by concentrating them in a confined location. Established under jus in bello, such zones have to be distinguished from the safe areas, humanitarian corridors or safe havens recently created under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. under jus ad bellum, and meant to prevent certain areas and the war victims in them from falling into enemy hands.
LAVOYER Jean-Philippe, “International Humanitarian Law, Protected Zones and the Use of Force”, in BIERMANN Wolfgang & VADSET Martin (eds), UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1998, pp. 262-279.
TORELLI Maurice, “Les zones de sécurité”, in RGDIP, Vol. 99/4, 1995, pp. 787-848.
ELKIN G., “Application of the ‘Open City’ Concept to Rome 19421944”, in Air Force Law Review, 1980-1981, pp. 188-200.
P I, Arts 61-67
JAKOVLJEVIC Bosko, New International Status of Civil Defence, Geneva/The Hague, Henry-Dunant Institute/M. Nijhoff, 1982, 142 pp.
JEANNET Stéphane, “Civil Defence 1977-1997: From Law to Practice”, in IRRC, No. 325, December 1998, pp. 715-723.
SCHULTZ E., Civil Defence in International Law, Copenhagen, Danish National Civil Defence and Emergency Planning Directorate, 1977, 59 pp.
[1] See HR, Art. 25
[2] Those specially protected objects, e.g., dams, dikes, and hospitals, may not be used by those who control them for military action and should therefore never become military objectives. If they are however used for military purposes, even they can under restricted circumstances become military objectives. (See, e.g.,P I, Art. 56(2); GC IV, Art. 19)
[3] See P I, Art. 52(3)
[4] Indeed, only a material object can be a military objective under IHL, as immaterial objectives can only be achieved, not attacked. It is the basic idea of IHL that political objectives may be achieved by a belligerent with military force only by directing the latter against material military objectives. As for computer network attacks, they can only be considered as “attacks” if they have material consequences.
[5] In practice, however, one cannot imagine that the destruction, capture, or neutralization of an object contributing to the military action of one side would not be militarily advantageous for the enemy; it is just as difficult to imagine how the destruction, capture, or neutralization of an object could be a military advantage for one side if that same object did not somehow contribute to the military action of the enemy.
[6] One cannot imagine how it could do this other than by its “nature, location, purpose or use.” Those elements foreseen in Art. 52(2) only clarify that not only objects of a military nature are military objectives.
[7] Characterizing the contribution as “effective” and the advantage as “definite” – as Art. 52(2) does – avoids that everything can be considered as a military objective, taking into account indirect contributions and possible advantages; thus, the limitation to “military” objectives could be too easily undermined.
[8] If force could be used to achieve the political aim by directing it at any advantage, not just military objectives, even the civilian population as such would be attacked, as they might well influence the enemy government. Then, however, there would be no more IHL, merely considerations of effectiveness.
[9] This variety justifies the presumption of civilian status provided for in P I, Art. 50(1).
[10] The definition of civilians benefiting from protected civilian status under the Convention IV is more restrictive in that it excludes those in the power of their own side, but it is also complementary to that of the combatant. (See GC IV, Art. 4)
[11] See P I, Art. 51(3) and infra, Conduct of Hostilities, II. The protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities, 7) Loss of protection: The concept of direct participation in hostilities and its consequences
[12] See P I, Art. 50(2)
[13] See P I, Art. 50(3)
[14] See P I, Arts 48, 51(2) and 85(3); P II, Art. 13
[15] See P I, Arts 52-56 and 85(3)
[16] See P I, Art. 52(2)
[17] See HR, Art. 22; P I, Art. 51(4) and (5)
[18] See PI, Art. 51(5)(b)
[19] See HR, Arts 26 and 27; GC IV, Art. 19 (concerning hospitals); P I, Art. 57(2)
[20] See P I, Arts 51(6), 52(1), 53(c), 54(4), 55(2) and 56(4)
[21] See supra
[22] See P I, Art. 51(3); P II, Art. 13(3)
[23] See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
[24] Y. Sandoz et al. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, para. 4789
[25] See P I, Art. 51(2), 52-56, Art. 85(3); P II, Art. 13
[26] See GC IV, Art. 28; P I, Art. 51(7)
[27] See P I, Art. 58 and infra Conduct of Hostilities, II. The protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities, 11) Precautionary measures against the effects of attacks
[28] See P I, Art. 52
[29] See P I, Arts 51(8) and 57
[30] See P I, Art. 51(5)(b)
[31] See HR, Arts 25 and 27; P I, Arts 48, 52, and 85(3)
[32] See The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14 1954 [See
]; P I, Arts 53 and 85(4); P II, Art. 16; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, March 26, 1999 [See
]. See also infra Conduct of Hostilities, II. The protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities, 9) Protected objects, b. specially protected objects, aa) cultural objects
[33] See P I, Art. 54; P II, Art. 14
[34] See P I, Art. 56; P II, Art. 15
[35] See P I, Art. 56(2)
[36] See P I, Art. 55; see also Convention of 10 December 1976 on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD)
[37] See GC I, Arts 19(1) and 36(1); GC II, Arts 22, 24-27, and 39(1); GC IV, Arts 18-19 and 21-22, P I, Arts 20 and 21-31; P II, Art. 11
[38] See P I, Art. 52(2)
[39] See P I, Art. 57(2)(b)
[40] See HR, Art. 26; GC IV, Art. 19 (concerning hospitals); P I, Art. 57(2)(c)
[41] See P I, Art. 57(3)
[42] See P I, Art. 57(2)(a)
[43] See P I, Art. 57(2)(a)(iii)
[44] See supra, Conduct of Hostilities, II. The protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities, 10) Precautionary measures in attack
[45] See Mulinen, F de, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, 1987, p. 104
[46] See P I, Art. 58(1)
[47] See P I, Art. 58(a)
[48] See P I, Art. 58(b)
[49] See Sandoz, Y, Swinarski, C. & Zimmermann, B. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, ICRC, M. Nijhoff, 1987, Art. 58, para. 2251
[50] See P I, Art. 58(c)
III. Means and methods of warfare
(See also supra Conduct of Hostilities, II. The protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities, 6) Prohibited attacks and 10) Precautionary measures in attack)
HR, Arts 22-34
[We are deeply grateful to Dr. Théo Boutruche, IHL consultant, who wrote his PhD thesis (L’interdiction des maux superflus : contribution à l’étude des principes et règles relatifs aux moyens et méthodes de guerre en droit international humanitaire, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2008) on the concept of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, for this contribution.]
Under IHL the term “rules on means and methods of warfare” refers to a complex and large set of norms that are relatively fragmented and not systematically identified as such. While the term “means of warfare” commonly relates to the regulation of weapons, the term “methods” covers a broader array of rules depending on the definition considered. Traditionally, with regard to weapons, “means” encompasses weapons, weapons systems or platforms employed for the purposes of attack, whereas “methods” designates the way or manner in which the weapons are used. However, the concept of method of warfare also comprises any specific, tactical or strategic, ways of conducting hostilities that are not particularly related to weapons and that are intended to overwhelm and weaken the adversary, such as bombing, as well as the specific tactics used for attack, such as high altitude bombing. The term “methods” is rather new in treaty law.[51]
State practice offers examples of these two understandings of “methods”. The IHL governing means and methods of warfare contains two types of norms: general principles banning certain effects, and specific rules addressing particular weapons or methods. The distinction between “means” and “methods” is also related to the way IHL regulates the use of weapons. This branch of law either prohibits the use of certain weapons in any circumstances due to their inherent characteristics or it merely restricts and limits certain ways of using all weapons or certain specific weapons. For example, the prohibition of indiscriminate effects may be relevant in relation to the very nature of the effects of a weapon and at the same time for any type of weapon that can potentially be used indiscriminately.
Historically, prohibitions and limitations on means and methods of warfare were prompted by the concern to protect combatants, which saw the emergence of the principle prohibiting weapons causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering[52] and the ban on specific weapons, such as explosive projectiles weighing less than 400 grams[53] or dum-dum bullets[54], as well as particular methods like killing or wounding treacherously.[55] Protocol I laid down elaborate principles and rules governing means and methods of warfare aimed at protecting the civilian population and objects, such as the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, including those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective,[56] or those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by the Protocol.[57] While most of the treaty norms pertaining to means and methods of warfare apply only in times of international armed conflict, international customary law applicable to non-international armed conflicts progressively evolved to contain the same rules in this regard.[58]
The overarching principle of IHL governing means and methods of warfare stipulates that the right of the parties to a conflict to choose means and methods of warfare is not unlimited.[59] The principles prohibiting the means and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering[60] and the principle prohibiting means and methods of warfare causing indiscriminate effects[61] are derived from this. Protocol I does not list the latter principle among the basic rules under the section on means and methods of warfare, but in the section on the protection of the civilian population against effects of hostilities. Indeed, this principle protects only civilians. Protocol I further prohibits means or methods of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.[62]
The relationship between the general principles and the specific rules on weapons remains a delicate issue, notably concerning the extent to which the latter merely crystallize the former. For example, the prohibition to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is considered by some to outlaw in and of itself certain weapons in the absence of a particular rule, while others assert that it must be translated by States into specific prohibitions before it can produce proper legal effects. The latter approach is questionable, however, as it appears to confuse the normative value of the principle per se with the issue of its interpretation and application to specific weapons. First, it is well recognized that a weapon not covered by a specific norm remains regulated by the general principles. Second, States do rely on the principles themselves, including to prohibit methods of warfare.
Furthermore, the States parties to Protocol I are under an obligation to assess the legality of new weapons, means or methods of warfare, including in the light of the general principles.[63] General principles hence are legal rules with a normative value of their own.
Outside the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, IHL contains a series of prohibitions and limitations of use for specific weapons. Certain weapons are forbidden in all circumstances because of their characteristics,[64] while others are only governed by restrictions in use.[65] As several treaty regimes are in place, a weapon can be both prohibited and its use limited.[66]
Specific prohibited methods of warfare not particularly related to weapons primarily comprise the denial of quarter[67] and perfidy.[68] There is nevertheless no agreed list of specific prohibited methods, which may vary in State practice and according to scholars. Some include as specific prohibited methods of warfare those aimed at spreading terror, reprisals, the use of human shields, and the manipulation of the environment. Conversely, others treat those methods as distinct prohibitions, separate from the issue of methods.
Besides norms on means and methods of warfare per se, IHL also contains additional obligations with regard to the choice of means and methods when planning and deciding on an attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.[69] Those precautionary measures in attack, while being designed with reference to the protection of civilians and civilian objects, might be considered relevant for other types of means and methods of warfare to ensure respect for all relevant norms of IHL.
The exact content and scope of the term “method of warfare” within the principles and rules of IHL that refer to it remain unclear. Indeed, although the prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering traditionally concerns the nature of means of warfare, it also covers the way to use weapons as well as specific methods with particular features. Contemporary challenges in the field of the regulation of means and methods of warfare include the issue of the interaction between the general principles in the case of a means of warfare that allows for better compliance with IHL rules protecting civilians but conversely may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to combatants.
BOOTHBY William H., Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, New York, OUP, 2009, 412 pp.
CASSESE Antonio, “Means of Warfare: The Traditional and the New Law”, in CASSESE Antonio (ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Naples, Editoriale Scientifica, 1976, pp. 161-198.
1. The basic rule: Art. 35 of Protocol I
[CIHL, Rule 70]
Part III: Methods and means of warfare [...]
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. [...]
ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion [Para. 78]
United States, Memorandum of Law: The Use of Lasers as Anti-Personnel Weapons [Paras 4 and 8]
Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah, Conflict in 2006 [Part I, paras 249-263]
Afghanistan, Code of Conduct of the Mujahideen [Art.41]
ECHR, Isayeva v. Russia [Paras 19, 33, 165-167, 191]
Georgia/Russia, Human Rights Watch’s Report on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 8, 20-22, 28]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 58-63]
COUPLAND Robin M., “The SIrUS Project: Towards a Determination of Which Weapons Cause ‘Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering’”, Geneva, ICRC, 1997, 43 pp.
ICRC, Special Issue on Means of Warfare, IRRC, Vol. 87, No. 859, 2005, 604 pp.
2. Prohibited or restricted use of weapons
Lowering the level of cruelty between combatants and protecting those hors de combat and the civilian population in a more effective manner requires the regulation and, ultimately, the prohibition of certain means of warfare. To this end, several provisions of IHL applicable to international armed conflicts limit the means of warfare, i.e. weapons.[70] These provisions aim, in particular, to prohibit weapons causing “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”. In practice, the application of this basic rule is always a compromise between military necessity and humanity, as the principle of “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” has been interpreted as referring to harm that would not be justified by military utility, either because of the lack of even the slightest utility or because utility is considerably outweighed by the suffering caused. Although this standard may seem too vague to be effective, it has nevertheless led to efforts to prohibit and restrict certain conventional weapons[71] and weapons of mass destruction.[72] Although the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols limit means and methods of warfare (including those severely damaging the environment),[73] they neither prohibit nor restrict the use of any specific weapon; however, various other conventions do.[74] Recognizing that it is much easier to prohibit a weapon’s use prior to its incorporation into a State’s arsenal, Protocol I also places constraints on the development of new weapons.[75]
Case Study, Armed Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia [28]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 273-274, 280]
BOOTHBY William H., Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, New-York, OUP, 2009, 412 pp.
GREENWOOD Christopher, “The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millenium”, in International Law Studies, US Naval War College, Vol. 71, 1998, pp. 185-231.
JHA U.C., “Prohibited Weapons in Armed Conflicts”, in ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law, Vol. 4, 2004, pp. 56-78.
KALSHOVEN Frits, “Arms, Armaments and International Law”, in Collected Courses, Vol. 191, 1985, p. 183-341.
BREHM Maya, “The Arms Trade and State’s Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law”, in Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 12, Number 3, 2007, pp. 359-387.
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Humanitarian Law: Current Challenges, Effective Responsives, Sanremo, November 2007, 55 pp.
SANDOZ Yves, Des armes interdites en droit de la guerre, Thesis, Geneva, Imp. Grounauer, 1975, 137 pp.
TURNS David, “Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Law”, in Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006, pp. 201-237.
[CIHL, Rule 78]
[CIHL, Rule 77]
KALSHOVEN Frits, “The Conventional Weapons Convention: Underlying Legal Principles”, in IRRC, No. 279, 1990, pp. 510-520.
MATHEWS Robert J., “The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: A Useful Framework Despite Earlier Disappointments”, in IRRC, No. 844, December 2001, pp. 991-1012.
PARKS William H., “Conventional Weapons and Weapons Review”, in YIHL, Vol. 8 (2005), 2007, pp. 55-142.
SANDOZ Yves, “A New Step Forward in International Law: Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons”, in IRRC, No. 220, January 1981, pp. 3-18.
“Report of the ICRC for the Review Conference of the 1980 UN Conventions on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”, in IRRC, No. 299, March-April 1994, pp. 123-182.
DÖRMANN Knut, “Conventional Disarmament: Nothing New on the Geneva Front?”, in GIEGERICH Thomas (ed.), A Wiser Century ?: Judicial Dispute Settlement, Disarmament and the Laws of War 100 Years After the Second Hague Peace Conference, Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 2009, pp. 143-166.
PROKOSCH Eric, “The Swiss Draft Protocol on Small-Calibre Weapon Systems”, in IRRC, No. 307, July-August 1995, pp. 411-425.
aa) mines
[CIHL, Rules 80-83]
CARNAHAN Burrus, “The Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”, in Military Law Review, Vol. 105, 1984, p. 73-95.
CAUDERAY Gérald C., “Anti-Personnel Mines”, in IRRC, No. 295, July-August 1993, pp. 273-287.
MARESCA Louis & MASLEN Stuart (eds), The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines: The Legal Contribution of the International Committee of the Red Cross [1955-1999], Cambridge, CUP, 2000, 670 pp.
MASLEN Stuart, Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law: A View from the Vanishing Point, Antwerp, Intersentia, Transnational Publishers, 2001, 327 pp.
MASLEN Stuart & HERBY Peter, “An International Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines: History and Negociation of the ‘Ottawa Treaty’”, in IRRC, No. 325, December 1998, pp. 693-713.
PETERS Ann, “Landmines in the 21st Century”, in International Relations, Vol. 13, 1996, pp. 37-50.
DOSWALD-BECK Louise & CAUDERAY Gérald C., “The Development of New Anti-Personnel Weapons”, in IRRC, No. 279, November-December 1990, pp. 565-577.
RAUCH Elmar, “The Protection of the Civilian Population in International Armed Conflicts and the Use of Land Mines”, in German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 24, 1981, p. 262-87.
ROGERS Anthony P.V., “Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices”, in IRRC, No. 279, November-December 1990, pp. 521-534.
SCHERER Sabine, “L’extinction des sentinelles éternelles, les mines antipersonnel”, in Défense nationale, Vol. 55/12, 1999, pp. 91-103.
SHARNETZKA Craig S., “The Oslo Land Mine Treaty and an Analysis of the United States Decision not to Sign”, in Dickinson Journal of International Law, Vol. 16/3, 1998, pp. 661-689.
“Landmines Must be Stopped”, in ICRC, September 1995, 65 pp.
bb) incendiary weapons
[CIHL, Rules 84 and 85]
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Tablada [Para. 186]
JUREK Matthias, “White Phosphorous: An Outlawed Weapon?”, in Humanitäres Völkerrecht, Vol. 21(4), pp. 251-257.
PARKS William H., “The Protocol on Incendiary Weapons”, in IRRC, No. 279, November-December 1990, pp. 584-604.
cc) non-detectable fragments
[CIHL, Rule 79]
Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I to the 1980 Convention)
dd) blinding weapons
[CIHL, Rule 86]
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention)
CARNAHAN Burrus & ROBERTSON Marjorie, “The Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons: A New Direction for Humanitarian Law”, in AJIL, Vol. 90/3, 1996, pp. 484-490.
DOSWALD-BECK Louise, “New Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons”, in IRRC, No. 312, May-June 1996, pp. 272-299.
PETERS Ann, “Blinding Laser Weapons: New Limits on the Technology of Warfare”, in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 18, 1998, pp.733-766.
ee) explosive remnants of war
ff) cluster munitions
Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah, Conflict in 2006 [Paras 249-256]
Afghanistan, Operation “Enduring Freedom” [Part A.]
Georgia/Russia, Human Rights Watch’s Report on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 48-51, 65-74]
Georgia/Russia, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in South Ossetia [Paras 64-70]
CAPATI Carmel, “The Tragedy of Cluster Bombs in Laos: An Argument for Inclusion in the Proposed International Ban on Landmines”, in Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 16/1, 1997, pp. 227-245.
gg) other weapons for which limitations are under discussion
– anti-vehicle mines
– fragmentation weapons
[CIHL, Rules 74-76]
KRUTZSCH Walter & TRAPPS Ralph (eds), A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1994, 543 pp.
HR, Art. 23(a) [CIHL, Rule 72]
bacteriological and biological weapons
[CIHL, Rule 73]
DANDO Malcolm, “The Development of International Legal Constraints on Biological Warfare in the 20th Century”, in The Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 8, 1997, pp. 1-69.
GOLDBLAT Jozef, “The Biological Weapons Convention – An Overview”, in IRRC, No. 318, May-June 1997, pp. 251-265.
ROGERS Paul, “Biological Weapons”, in Medicine, Conflict and Survival, Vol. 18/2, 2002, 105 pp.
ZILINSKAS Raymond A. (ed.), Biological Warfare, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, 309 pp.
CLUNAN Anne L., LAVOY Peter & MARTIN Susan B. (eds), Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford, Stanford Security Studies, 2008, 350 pp.
KELLMAN Barry, “Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe”, in Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 24/2, 2001, p. 417-488.
LEDERBERG Joshua (ed.), Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1999, 351 pp.
ZALUAR Achilles & MONTELEONE-NETO Roque, “The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention – A View from the South”, in IRRC, No. 318, May-June 1997, pp. 295-308.
3. Mr. PAOLINI (France) made the following statement:
[A]lready in 1973, the French Government noted that the ICRC did not include any regulations on nuclear weapons in its drafts. In participating in the preparation of the additional Protocols, therefore, the French Government has taken into consideration only conflicts using conventional weapons. It accordingly wishes to stress that in its view the rules of the Protocols do not apply to the use of nuclear weapons.[Source: Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the reaffirmation and development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in armed conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), Federal Political Department, Bern, Vol. II, 1978, p. 193]
ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion [Paras 84-86, 95, and 105]
France, Accession to Protocol I [Part B., para. 2]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 290, 292, 295-299]
“Special Issue: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons and International Humanitarian Law”, in IRRC, No. 316, February 1997, p. 3 ff (articles of CONDORELLI Luigi, DAVID Éric, DOSWALD-BECK Louise and GREENWOOD Christopher).
BRING Ove E. & REIMAN H.B., “Redressing a Wrong Question: The 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Issue of Nuclear Weapons”, in Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 21, 1986, pp. 99-105.
BURTON Jeremy T., “Depleted Morality: Yugoslavia v. Ten NATO Members and Depleted Uranium”, in Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 19/1, pp 17-40.
“new means and methods”
P I, Art. 36
As a measure of precaution, Art. 36 of Protocol I requires the States Parties to assess whether the use of any new weapon or of any new method of warfare that they develop or plan to acquire or deploy in operations is allowed by, and compatible with, international law.
The rapid evolution of new military technologies and the development of potentially devastating means and methods of warfare lends added resonance to this legal review.
The parties to Protocol I are obliged to conduct such reviews, but it would also be appropriate for States that are not parties to Protocol I to do so. This would allow them to verify that their armed forces act in conformity with international rules regulating the use of means and methods of warfare.
Art. 36 does not specify the practical modalities of such reviews, which are left to the parties to decide. It is understood that the legal review should cover the weapons themselves and the ways in which they might be used. Particular attention should be paid to the potential effect of the weapon concerned on both civilians (prohibition of indiscriminate effects) and combatants (prohibition of unnecessary suffering).
United States, Memorandum of Law: The Use of Lasers as Anti-Personnel Weapons [Para. 2]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 221-241]
BEARD Jack M., “Law and War in the Virtual Era”, in AJIL, Vol. 103, No. 3, July 2009, pp. 409-445.
DAOUST Isabelle, COUPLAND Robin & HISHOEY Rikke, “New Wars, New Weapons?: The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare”, in IRRC, No. 846, June 2002, pp. 345-363.
ICRC, A Guide to Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare. Measures to Implement Art. 36, Geneva, ICRC, 2007, 34 pp.
KRÜGER-SPRENGEL Friedhelm, “Non-Lethal Weapons: A Humanitarian Perspective in Modern Conflict”, in RDMDG, Vol. 42/3-4, 2003, pp. 357-377.
LAWAND Kathleen, “Reviewing the Legality of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare”, in IRRC, December 2006, pp. 925-930.
McCELLAND Justin, “The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, in IRRC, No. 850, June 2003, pp. 397-415.
PUCKETT Christopher, “Comment: In This Era of ’Smart Weapons’, is a State under an International Legal Obligation to Use Precision-Guided Technology in Armed Conflict?”, in Emory International Law Review, Vol. 18, 2004, pp. 645-723.
FRY James D., “Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave Combat and International Humanitarian Law”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2006, pp. 453-519.
GRAHAM David E., “Cyber Threats and the Law of War”, in Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2010, pp. 87-102.
JENKS Chris, “Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the Law of Armed Conflict”, in North Dakota Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 649-671.
JENSEN Eric Talbot, “Cyber Warfare and Precautions against the Effects of Attacks”, in Texas Law Review, Vol. 88, Issue 7, June 2010, pp. 1539-1569.
KAURIN Pauline, “With Fear and Trembling: an Ethical Framework for Non-Lethal Weapons”, in Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2010, pp. 100-114.
KODAR Erki, “Computer Network Attacks in the Grey Areas of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello”, in Baltic Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 9, 2009, pp. 133-155.
KOPLOW David A., “ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons”, in Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2009, pp. 1187-1272.
O’CONNELL Mary Ellen, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: a Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 09-43, 2009, 26 pp.
OHLIN Jens David, GOVERN Kevin & FINKELSTEIN Claire, "Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts", in Oxford Univ. Press, March 2015.
3. Prohibited methods of warfare
The concept of method of warfare encompasses any tactical or strategic procedure meant to outweigh or weaken the adversary.
The limitations or prohibitions to resort to specific methods of warfare stipulated in IHL are predicated on three premises:
the choice of the methods of warfare is not unlimited;[76]
the use of methods of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury is forbidden;[77]
the only legitimate object of war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.[78]
Contemporary IHL forbids, for instance, methods of warfare involving terror,[79] starvation,[80] reprisals against protected persons and objects,[81] pillage,[82] the taking of hostages,[83] enforced enrolment of protected persons[84] and deportations.[85]
Under the specific heading “prohibited methods of warfare”, two methods of warfare are usually discussed, namely perfidy and denial of quarter.
Unlike ruses of war,[86] which are lawful, perfidy[87] is outlawed in IHL. Ruses of war are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly. Perfidy, on the contrary, invites the confidence of an adversary and leads him to believe that he is entitled to or is obliged to provide protection under the rules of IHL.
The main aim of the prohibition of the denial of quarter[88] is to protect combatants when they fall into enemy hands by ensuring that they will not be killed. The objective is to prevent the following acts: to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten the adversary therewith, or to conduct hostilities on this basis.
Most cases of perfidy and denial of quarter are grave breaches of IHL and hence war crimes.
Colombia, Constitutionality of IHL Implementing Legislation [Paras 4, D.5.4.4, E.2 and Dissenting opinion]
Afghanistan, Code of Conduct for the Mujahideen [Arts 7-9, 23-25, 54]
giving or ordering no quarter
P I, Art. 40 [CIHL, Rule 46]
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Tablada [Paras 182-185]
the distinction between perfidy and permissible ruses of war
P I, Art. 37 [CIHL, Rules 57-65]
FLECK Dieter, “Ruses of War and Prohibition of Perfidy”, in RDMDG, Vol. 13/2, 1974, pp. 269-314.
HALL Mary T., “False Colors and Dummy Ships: The Use of Ruse in Naval Warfare”, in Readings on International Law from the Naval War College Review, 1995, pp. 491-500.
HECHT Ben, Perfidy, New York, Messner, 1961, 281 pp. JOBST Valentine, “Is the Wearing of the Enemy’s Uniform a Violation of the Laws of War?”, in AJIL, Vol. 35/3, 1941, pp. 435-442.
wearing of enemy uniforms
P I, Art. 39(2) [CIHL, Rule 62]
The term cyber warfare can be defined as the means and methods of warfare that rely on information technology and are used in situations of armed conflict. The second part of the definition is of importance: IHL will only apply to cyber operations occurring during – or triggering by themselves – an armed conflict. The debates on whether a cyber-attack may amount to a “use of force” or even an “armed attack” under the UN Charter, which are ius ad bellum issues, are distinct, but parallel to the question of whether a cyber-attack alone can trigger the applicability of the IHL of international or of non-international armed conflicts. Determining the beginning of an armed conflict itself remains tricky in situations where cyber-attacks are employed alone, short of any kinetic use of force. It is argued that the respective traditional thresholds for international and non-international armed conflict should also be applied in such situations [89]. Even then, in practice, the nature of information technology often makes it difficult to attribute an attack to a State or to an armed group (which is important to differentiate international from non-international armed conflicts) or to determine the existence of a sufficiently organized armed group (which is necessary to trigger IHL of non-international armed conflicts).
Once the applicability of IHL is triggered, the question becomes one of the adaptability of the rules on the conduct of hostilities. Do cyber attacks amount to “attacks” in the sense of Article 49 of Protocol I [90]? Is it necessary for them to result in physical consequences such as destruction of objects or injury or death of persons? Some argue that acts resulting in mere destruction of data, i.e. interference with information systems, should also be considered as amounting to attacks at least if they have a considerable effect upon the targeted party[91]. This question is conceptually distinct from the above-mentioned question of when a cyber operation triggers an armed conflict, but similar elements may be decisive for both answers.
If considered an attack under the IHL meaning, a cyber operation will have to comply with the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions.
Looking at distinction first, the principle is put at stake by the nature of information networks: with most military networks relying on civilian infrastructure (optic cables, satellites, etc.), the latter virtually becomes a "dual use" object with both civilian and military functions, leading to increased difficulties in effectively identifying military objectives. In addition, while destruction of information is at the centre of the majority of cyber operations, military objectives are circumscribed to objects under IHL [92]. As a consequence, the question arises of whether data, which is by definition intangible, can ever be considered a legitimate target. With regards to persons, may a hacker operating for a party to an armed conflict be considered as directly participating in hostilities?
Second, applying the principle of proportionality to cyber operations is not an evident task either. The interconnected nature of cyber space means that any act may result in infinite reverberating or "knock-on" effects, which may easily be considered disproportionate in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated [93]. Another recurring question concerns the attacks that do not result in any destruction or loss of life, but only in mere inconvenience for civilians, mainly because civilian objects are rendered inoperative for a certain amount of time. Inconvenience not being included in the definition of proportionality, a majority of experts conclude that "inconvenience, irritation, stress, or fear […] do not qualify as collateral damage because they do not amount to “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects” [94].
Finally, as one can imagine, the issue of interconnectedness also affects the principle of precaution, in particular the obligation for parties to take passive precautions in segregating between military objectives and the civilian population and civilian objects [95].
In the light of such new challenges, legal experts met in Tallinn to discuss whether and how the rules of IHL could actually be applied to cyber operations. This resulted in the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare [96], which brings some clarification to some of the issues mentioned here as well as to numerous other ones, and at least presents the remaining controversies. In the end, it is essential to continue the discussion in order to determine whether the traditional rules of IHL provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of warfare, keeping in mind the enormous humanitarian impact that some cyber operations may have in the real world. It may be that this is one of the few fields in which the existing rules of IHL are indeed inadequate, because of the completely different environment in which cyber operations are conducted and because they are necessarily either over-inclusive or under-inclusive on some issues. Until such new regulation is in force, the existing rules have anyway to be applied according to their object and purpose. The Tallinn Manual makes many useful suggestions in this respect.
Iran, Victim of Cyberwarfare
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 197-221]
BEARD Jack M., "Law and War in the Virtual Era", in AJIL, Vol. 103, No. 3, July 2009, pp. 409-445
BROWN Davis, "A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict", in Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 47, No. 1, 2006, pp. 179-221
CRAWFORD Emily, "Virtual Battlegrounds: Direct Participation in Cyber Warfare", Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/10 (2012)
DINNISS Heather Harrison, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Cambridge, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 2012
DROEGE Cordula, Get off my cloud: cyber warfare, international humanitarian law, and the protection of civilians, IRRC 94 (2012), 533
GRAHAM David E., "Cyber Threats and the Law of War", in Journal of National Security Law and Policy, vol. 4, No. 1, 2010, pp. 87-102
HATHAWAY Oona A., CROOTOF Rebecca, LEVITZ Philip, NIX Haley, NOWLAN Aileen, PERDUE William & SIEGEL Julia, "The Law of Cyber-Attack", California Law Review, Vol. 100 (2012), pp. 817-885
JENSEN Eric Talbot, "Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks", Texas Law Review, Vol. 88 (2010), pp. 1533-1569
KELSEY Jeffrey T. G., "Hacking Into International Humanitarian Law: the Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare", Michigan Law Review, vol. 106, No. 7, May 2008, pp. 1427-1451
KESSLER Oliver & WERNER Wouter, "Expertise, Uncertainty, and International Law: A Study of the Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare", in Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, Issue 04, December 2013, pp 793-810
KODAR Erki, "Computer Network Attacks in the Grey Areas of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello", in Baltic Yearbook of International Law, vol. 9, 2009, pp. 133-155
LUBELL Noam, "Lawful Targets in Cyber Operations: Does the Principle of Distinction Apply?", International Law Studies, Vol. 89, 2013, pp. 252-275
MELZER Nils, Cyberwarfare and International Law, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Resources, 2011
PALOJARVI Pia, A Battle in Bits and Bytes: Computer Network Attacks and the Law of Armed Conflict, Helsinki, The Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, 2009, 186 pp.
RALTCHEV Christo C., Cybergewalt, Dissertation, Fribourg/Sofia, 2013
SCHAAP Arie J., "Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use under International Law", in The Air Force Law Review, vol. 64, 2009, pp. 121-173
SCHMITT Michael, "Classification of Cyber Conflict", Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2012, pp. 245–260
SCHMITT Michael, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, SLPR 25 (2014), 269
SCHMITT Michael & VIHUL Liis, "The International Law of Attribution During Proxy “Wars” in Cyberspace", Fletcher Security Review, Vol. I (II), 2014, pp. 55-73
THÜMMEL Juliane, Computernetzwerkoperationen innerhalb internationaler bewaffneter Konflikte, Dissertation, Hamburg, 2011
TODD Graham H., "Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition", in The Air Force Law Review, vol. 64, 2009, pp. 65-102
[51] See P I, Part III, Section I
[52] See St Petersburg Declaration of 1868, Preamble; HR, Art. 23(e)
[53] See St Petersburg Declaration of 1868
[54] See Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets (adopted by the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899)
[55] See HR, Art 23(b)
[56] See P I, Art. 51(4)(b)
[57] See P I, Art. 51(4)(c)
[58] See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law and ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic [Part A., para. 125],
[59] See HR, Art. 22; P I, Art. 35(1)
[60] See P I, Art. 35(2)
[61] See P I, Art. 51(4)
[62] See P I, Arts 35(3) and 55(1)
[63] See P I, Art. 36
[66] See, for example, the antipersonnel mines regime set out in the 1997 Ottawa Convention [
] and Art. 3(3) of the Protocol on Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices [
[67] See HR, Art. 23(d); P I, Art. 40
[68] See P I, Art. 37
[69] See P I, Art. 57(2)(a)(ii)
[70] See HR, Arts 22 and 23(e); P I, Art. 35
[71] For example, dum-dum bullets, mines, incendiary weapons, non-detectable fragments, and cluster munitions.
[72] For example, chemical weapons, use of poison, bacteriological and biological weapons, and – without success – nuclear weapons.
[73] See P I, Arts 35(3) and 55; see also Convention of 10 December 1976 on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Geneva, May 18, 1977
[74] For example, the Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets (adopted by the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899); the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare [
] (extending the Hague Regulation of 1899 prohibiting use of “poison or poisoned weapons”); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [See ICRC, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity [Part A.]], and the 1980 UN Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects and subsequent Protocols [See :
[75] See P I, Art. 36
[76] See HR, Art. 22; P I, Art. 35(1)
[77] See HR, Art. 23(e); P I, Art. 35(2)
[78] See 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, Preamble
[79] See P I, Art. 51(2); P II, Art. 13
[80] See P I, Art. 54; P II, Art. 14
[81] See GC I-IV, Arts 46/47/13(3)/33 respectively; P I, Arts 20 and 41-56
[82] See HR, Arts 28 and 47; GC I, Art. 15; GC II, Art. 18; GC IV, Arts 16 and 33; P II, Art. 4
[83] See GC I-IV, common Art. 3; GC IV, Art. 34; P I, Art. 75
[84] See GC III, Art. 130; GC IV, Art. 51
[85] See GC IV, Art. 49; P II, Art. 17; see also supra, Civilian Population, IV. Special Rules on Occupied Territories
[86] See HR, Art. 24; P I, Art. 37(2)
[87] See HR, Art. 23; P I, Art. 40
[88] See HR, Art. 23(b); P I, Art. 37(1)
[89] See The Law > Fundamentals of IHL > B. International Humanitarian Law as a Branch of Public International Law > III. International Humanitarian Law: a branch of international law governing the conduct of States and individuals > Situations of Application: https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/book-chapter/fundamentals-ihl-book-chapter.htm#b_iii_1
[90] See P I, Art. 49(1): " 1. "Attacks" means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence."
[91] The issue of "neutralization", but this time of targets, is also discussed in relation to the definition of "attacks" under IHL.
[92] See P I, Art. 52(2): "military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."
[93] See P I, Art. 51(5)(b)
[94] See Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, 2009, Rule 51
[95] See P I, Art. 58
[96] See Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, 2009
IV. IHL and Humanitarian Assistance
IHL recognizes that the civilian population of a State affected by an armed conflict is entitled to receive humanitarian assistance. It regulates in particular the conditions for providing humanitarian assistance, in the form of food, medicines, medical equipment or other vital supplies, to civilians in need.
During an international armed conflict, belligerents are thus under the obligation to permit relief operations for the benefit of civilians, including enemy civilians.
Art. 23 of Convention IV outlines the basic principles applicable to relief assistance for particularly vulnerable groups among the civilian population: children under fifteen and pregnant and nursing mothers. It also grants the States concerned the right to inspect the contents and verify the destination of relief supplies, as well as to refuse the passage of relief goods if they have well-founded reasons to believe that they will not be distributed to the victims but rather used in the military effort.
Art. 70 of Protocol I has considerably developed the right to humanitarian assistance. Under this provision, relief operations must be carried out for the benefit of the entire civilian population if there is a general shortage of indispensable supplies. However, Art. 70 contains a severe limitation: it stipulates that the consent of all the parties concerned – including that of the State receiving the aid – is necessary for such assistance.
In occupied territories, the occupying power has to make sure that the population receives adequate medical and food supplies.[89] If this proves impossible, the occupying power is obliged to permit relief operations by third States or by an impartial organization, and to facilitate such operations.[90]
The rules regulating humanitarian assistance during non-international armed conflicts are far less developed. However, Art. 18(2) of Protocol II stipulates that: “If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.”
Although Art. 18 undoubtedly enhances the protection of the civilian population, it has been strongly criticized because it also makes relief actions contingent on government consent. Art. 18 can, however, also be construed as implying that the government has to give this consent when the stipulated conditions are fulfilled.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001, 91 pp., online: http://www.iciss.ca.
PASQUIER André, “Action humanitaire : une légitimité en question?”, in IRRC, No. 842, June 2001, 311-321.
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 127-149]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [para. 130]
a) starvation of civilians: a prohibited method of warfare
P I, 54(1); P II, 14 [CIHL, Rule 53]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [para. 76]
MAYER Jean, “Starvation as a Weapon”, in ROSE Steven (ed.), CBW: Chemical and Biological Warfare, London conference on CBW, London, Harrap, 1968, pp. 76-84.
b) the right of the civilian population to be assisted
[CIHL, Rules 55 and 56]
Israel/Gaza, Operation Cast Lead [Part II, paras 311-326, 1305-1331]
UN, Security Council Resolution 688 on Northern Iraq [Para. 3]
Case Study, Armed Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia [3 and 13]
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 130, 136]
c) the belligerents bear primary responsibility
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 130, 132]
d) medical assistance may benefit civilians or combatants
2. Definition and characteristics of humanitarian assistance
[CIHL, Rule 55]
UN, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement [Principle 24(1)]
ICJ, Nicaragua v. United States [Paras 242 and 243]
3. The rules of treaty law
a) the starting point: Art. 23 of Convention IV
aa) addressed to all “High Contracting Parties”, not only the parties to the conflict
bb) but limitations
with regard to the beneficiaries
with regard to the kind of assistance
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [para. 148]
b) in occupied territories: Art. 59 of Convention IV: the occupying power has an obligation to accept relief
c) a broad right to assistance: Art. 70 of Protocol I and Art. 18(2) of Protocol II
aa) but subject to the consent of the State concerned
Sri Lanka, Conflict in the Vanni [Paras 24-26]
bb) the conditions on which a belligerent may make its agreement to humanitarian assistance contingent
Case Study, Armed Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia [13 and 36]
cc) is the State concerned obliged to give its consent if the conditions are fulfilled?
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts in 2015 [paras 141-144]
4. Protection of those providing humanitarian assistance
[CIHL, Rules 31 and 32]
The International Criminal Court [Part A., Art. 8(2)(b)(iii)]
ICRC, Protection of War Victims [Para. 3.3.]
First Periodical Meeting, Chairman’s Report [Part II. 1]
UN, Secretary-General’s Reports on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict [Part B., paras 58-60]
SUY Erik, “La protection des volontaires humanitaires dans les conflits armés non-internationaux et dans les operations de secours en cas de catastrophes”, in Des Menschen Recht Zwischen Freiheit und Verantwortung: Festschrift für Karl Josef Partsch zum 75 Geburtstag, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1989, pp. 173-182.
5. The protection of water supplies and water engineers
See supra, Conduct of Hostilities, II. The protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities,9. Protected objects, b) specially protected objects bb) objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population – Water
[89] See GC IV, Arts 55 and 56
[90] See GC IV, Art. 59; P I, Art. 69