Source: http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/ford1214.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 11:18:20
Document Index: 633630401

Matched Legal Cases: ['CASE NO: 199520', 'CASE NO: 114718', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 2254', '§ 9', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

Melbert Ray Ford Jr. #1214
Executed June 9, 2010 07:27 p.m. by Lethal Injection in Georgia
26th murderer executed in U.S. in 2010
1214th murderer executed in U.S. since 1976
1st murderer executed in Georgia in 2010
47th murderer executed in Georgia since 1976
(26) 06-09-10 GA Lethal Injection Melbert Ray Ford Jr.
W / M / 25 - 49 12-09-60 Martha Chapman Matich
W / F / 11 03-06-86 Handgun Former Girlfriend
Her Neice 10-24-86
Martha Chapman Matich was employed at a Newton County grocery store. She had ended a relationship with Ford a few weeks earlier. Ford had continued to harass her and told a friend that he was going to rob the store and "blow her brains out." After having trouble finding a ride to the store, Ford convinced Roger Turner, an unemployed man, to drive him there after they had consumed several alcoholic drinks and Turner had been promised $8,000. The two arrived at the store after closing. Ford gained entry by shooting away the lower half of the locked and barred glass door. Waiting in the car, Turner told police he heard screams and gunshots moments before Ford ran from the store with a bag of money. Responding to an alarm, Newton County deputies found Matich shot three times and lying dead behind the counter. Her 11 year old daughter was discovered in the bathroom, still alive but shot in the head, and she later died.
Ford and Turner were arrested the next day. Accomplice Turner confessed and was sentenced to 20 years in prison after pleading guilty, and was paroled in 1991. Ford, meanwhile, told investigators the shooting began after Matich pushed the alarm button, and that if he had worn a mask it would not have happened.
Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461, 360 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. 1987). (Direct Appeal)
Ford v. Hall, 546 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2008). (Habeas)
Fried fish and shrimp, a baked potato, salad, boiled corn, ice cream, cheesecake and soda.
"I wish to thank all my family and my friends and my loved ones," Ford said in his final statement, before his voice trailed off and he began to mumble inaudibly.
Georgia Department of Corrections (Ford)
Known Alias: MALACHI,MARK, FORD,MELBERT R., FORD,MELBERT R JR, FORD,MELBERT RAY JR,. FREE,RANDELL LAMAR
GDC ID: 0000086236
CASE NO: 199520
CRIME COMMIT DATE: 03/06/1986
CASE NO: 114718
CRIME COMMIT DATE: 08/02/1978
01/02/1987 to ACTIVE
10/05/1978 to 08/31/1979
"Georgia man executed for 1986 grocery store murders," by Rhonda Cook. (June 9, 2010)
Melbert Ray Ford, who murdered his former girlfriend and the woman's 11-year-old niece in 1986, was executed on Wednesday night at the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison near Jackson, 50 miles south of Atlanta. Ford, 49, became the 47th person Georgia has executed since the U.S. Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1973, the 24th by lethal injection.
The man was put to death for killing Martha Chapman Matich and her niece, Lisa Chapman, on March 6,1986, in an act of revenge at a Newton County grocery store that employed Matich.
Earlier on Wednesday, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected appeals to spare the man's life. The decision was unanimous, though the justices didn't offer a reason. Ford's lawyers in filings argued there were more heinous murders that didn't result in the death sentence, and that this was "cruel and unusual punishment" to execute him so long after the crime.
At 7:27 p.m., Ford was administered a three-drug cocktail. He supposedly spent his final hours visiting with relatives and friends. He had requested a final meal of fried fish and shrimp, a baked potato, salad, boiled corn, ice cream, cheesecake and soda.
Ford had harassed his former girlfriend for weeks after their relationship had ended. Two weeks prior to the shootings, according to court testimony, Ford told a friend he was going to rob the store and he "was going to blow her ... brains out.” After having trouble finding a ride to the store, Ford convinced Roger Turner, an unemployed man, to drive him there after they had consumed several alcoholic drinks and Turner had been promised $8,000. The two arrived at the store after closing. Ford gained entry by shooting away the lower half of the locked and barred glass door. Waiting in the car, Turner told police he heard screams and gunshots moments before Ford ran from the store with a bag of money.
Responding to an alarm, Newton County deputies found Matich shot three times and lying dead behind the counter. The girl was discovered in the bathroom, still alive but shot in the head, and she later died.
Ford, then 25, and Turner, 19, were arrested the next day. Turner confessed and was sentenced to 20 years in prison after he pleaded guilty; he was paroled in 1991.
"Georgia man executed tonight." (Associated Press Wednesday, June 9, 2010 9:28 PM)
JACKSON, Ga. - A Georgia man convicted of the 1986 shooting deaths of his ex-girlfriend and her 11-year-old niece was executed Wednesday by lethal injection after sitting on death row for more than two decades. Melbert Ray Ford, 49, was put to death at the state prison in Jackson after his appeals were exhausted and a bid for clemency was rejected. He was pronounced dead at 7:27 p.m., about 10 minutes after the three-drug cocktail was injected into his veins.
Prosecutors said Ford was seeking revenge when he killed Martha Chapman Matich and her niece Lisa Chapman. They said Ford began harassing her with phone calls after the couple broke up and soon was spelling out a plot to kill her to his friends. He was put to death after the U.S. Supreme Court and several state courts denied Ford's motion to delay the execution or commute the sentence.
"I wish to thank all my family and my friends and my loved ones," Ford said in his final statement, before his voice trailed off and he began to mumble inaudibly. He declined a final prayer and also an earlier chance to give more extended remarks.
Family members of the victims, including some who witnessed the execution from the front row in the death chamber, said the execution provided a measure of closure. But Paul Chapman, who is Martha's brother and Lisa's uncle, said he was upset that Ford's final words didn't include an apology. "A weight has been lifted off of my shoulders," said Paul Chapman, a New Jersey pastor. "I was hoping to hear at the end he would apologize and ask for forgiveness. I believe a good Christian would ask for a prayer." Cindy Griffeth, who is Lisa's mother, said she had been encouraged by reports that Ford had become a religious man in prison, but was disappointed when he didn't seem remorseful in his final moments. "I was hoping that he would have a prayer, a sign that he had been saved," she said. "... I think the way he went ..." She paused, breaking into tears, before she composed her self and continued. "It was too easy for him."
Ford's attorney Brian Mendelsohn had argued that his client didn't deserve the death penalty and that it amounts to cruel and unusual punishment because he sat on death row so long. But state prosecutors countered that the arguments were a "ruse" and pointed to other rulings that repeatedly upheld the death sentence. The execution has closed a grisly chapter that has haunted the relatives of the victims for decades.
Authorities say anger drove Ford to plot his ex-girlfriend's death and that he was so infuriated that he tried to recruit several friends to drive him to the Newton County convenience store where she worked so he could rob it and then attack her. Nobody would help him until he ran into Roger Turner, a 19-year-old who was out of a job and nearly penniless. Ford plied Turner with alcohol and the promise of thousands of dollars in cash, eventually persuading him to join the plot, according to court testimony.
The two drove in Turner's car to Chapman's Grocery shortly after it closed on March 6, 1986. Ford leapt out, shot away the lower half of the locked door and entered the store while Turner waited in the car. Turner later said he heard only screams and gunshots while waiting for Ford, who would soon emerge with a bag of money, according to court records. When authorities arrived, they found Matich dead behind the counter, shot three times. Chapman was found sitting on a bucket in a bathroom, shot in the head and having convulsions. She died shortly after. The two men were arrested the next day and Turner confessed to authorities. Ford, meanwhile, told investigators the shooting began after Matich pushed the alarm button, and that if he had worn a mask it would not have happened.
A Newton County jury convicted Ford and sentenced him to death after an October 1986 trial in which he claimed he was too drunk to know what was happening and that Turner was the one who entered the store and began firing. Prosecutors dropped murder charges against Turner, a key witness in Ford's trial, and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison on robbery charges. Turner was released on parole after serving five years.
In several appeals, Ford argued that the jury failed to find any aggravating circumstances that would have justified a capital sentence. He also contended that prosecutors suppressed evidence about Turner's drug use the night of the killings and claimed his trial lawyer was ineffective. The appeals were repeatedly denied by state and federal judges, and a petition to appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme Court was rejected on Jan. 25. The Georgia pardons board denied his appeal for clemency Friday, and a county judge rejected a request to halt the execution on Tuesday.
Ford was initially set to be executed on Feb. 23 but the execution was delayed by more than three months because a spot on the five-member state clemency panel hadn't been filled. The execution was rescheduled for Wednesday after Gov. Sonny Perdue appointed a fifth member last month.
The three-drug cocktail began coursing through Ford's veins at 7:17 p.m. and within a minute his eyes were closed and his breathing grew shallow. He did not struggle or open his eyes again, and was pronounced dead 10 minutes later.
Outside the state prison, about a dozen death penalty opponents protested the execution, holding signs that read: "Those without capital get the punishment" and "Don't kill for me." "We are here today to stand unified that our state not take the life of anyone for any reason," said Kathryn Hamoudah of the Georgians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, a statewide advocacy group. "The death penalty perpetuates violence, does nothing for society and does nothing or victims."
Wikipedia: Melbert Ford
Melbert Ray Ford Jr (born January 9, 1960) is an American convicted double murderer who was sentenced to death by lethal injection in 1987.
Ford was born in Georgia, USA. He was convicted in 1987 of killing his former girlfriend, Martha Chapman Matich, and Lisa Chapman, her 11-year-old niece[1], in a March 6, 1986 robbery at Chapman’s Grocery store in Georgia.[2] Melbert Ford had told a friend that he “was going to blow her brains out,” and devised a plan to rob the store, saying he intended to kidnap Ms. Matich, take her into the woods, make her beg and then shoot her in the forehead.[3]
Melbert Ford was executed by lethal injection on June 9, 2010. He was the 24th inmate put to death by lethal injection in the U.S state of Georgia. Prison.[4] He was, however granted a 90-day stay in mid-February due to the fact that there was a vacancy on the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. A court had previously held that to go forward with an execution without a full five-member board is a violation of the Georgia Constitution.
Georgia's Supreme Court rejected an appeal from Melbert Ford on June 9 which could have stayed his execution on the same day. The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously denied Melbert Ray Ford's motion to halt his execution.[5] Ford has requested a last meal of fried fish and shrimp, baked potato, salad, boiled corn, ice cream, cheesecake and soda.[6]
http://www.covnews.com/news/article/12534/
http://off2dr.com/modules/extcal/event.php?event=326
http://www.wtvm.com/Global/story.asp?S=12521035
http://www.11alive.com/rss/rss_story.aspx?storyid=145044
http://www.covnews.com/news/article/12781/
Clemency for Ray Ford
Help stop the imminent execution of Ray Ford. We need your help now!
The death penalty, if used at all, should be reserved for the worst of the worst. This is not what is happening in Ray Ford’s case. The Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles will hear Ray’s request for clemency and has the power to change his sentence to life imprisonment without parole. Please write the Board and tell them that you support clemency for Ray Ford. The address is:
L. Gale Buckner, Chair
On the night of March 6, 1986, Melbert Ray Ford and William Roger Turner robbed Chapman’s Grocery store in Covington, Georgia. The clerk Martha Matich and her niece Lisa Chapman were killed during the robbery. Martha was Ray Ford’s former girlfriend and the store was her family’s store. At the time of the crime, Ray was 25 years-old with no history of violence.
Turner and Ray gave different versions of what happened that night, each blaming the other. However, Turner turned states evidence, cut a deal to testify against Ray, and served a minimal five year prison term. He was released from prison in 1991. Now, twenty-three years after the crime, the State of Georgia is seeking to execute Ray Ford.
It is undisputed that Turner was a knowing and willing participant in the armed robbery of the convenience store. Based on his own admissions Turner was guilty of armed robbery, burglary, and felony murder. Under Georgia law, he could have received 20 years for armed robbery, life for burglary, and life or death for each felony murder. In other words, even if Turner was not the shooter he could have gotten the death penalty. But he did not because he testified against Ray.
Remorse and Spiritual Reconnection
Ray is deeply remorseful for what he did at age 25. He has spent a lot of time thinking and praying about his actions and his participation in this crime. Before this case, Ray was a deeply religious man who was active in his church. In his early 20s, Ray strayed from the path by experimenting with and relying on drugs and alcohol. However, shortly into his time in prison, Ray realized that the only way for him is the way of the Lord and he reconnected with his spiritual past and has returned to Christ.
Exemplary Prison Record and Lack of Dangerousness
Living out his faith, Ray has built an exemplary prison record. He has earned the respect of inmates and prison staff through his model behavior. If his sentence were to be commuted, Ray would still be punished severely as he would spend the rest of his life in prison without any possibility of parole. Clearly, serving life without parole, he would not pose a danger to any staff or other inmates. Ray’s prison record shows no acts of violence at all during his time in prison. As a 48 year-old grand father, with his age and maturity now, plus his proven record of non-violence since 1986, it is beyond question that he poses no danger in the future.
"Melbert Ray Ford executed; No apology offered to the victims' families," by Amber Pittman. (UPDATED June 9, 2010 9:14 p.m.)
According to records from the Newton County Superior Court, Ford and Martha Chapman Matich, 31, had a romantic relationship and when it soured, he began harassing her by phone. Ford spoke to several people about robbing the store where she worked and told at least one person that he intended to kill Martha. It wasn’t his first time threatening someone. In 1978, he was convicted of terroristic threats and actions and criminal trespassing in Cobb County.
Both Ford and Turner were arrested the next day, and Turner confessed first. Ford allegedly told investigators the shooting began after Martha pushed the alarm button. He also at said his trial that he was "too drunk to know what was happening and that it was Turner who entered the store and killed the victims." Ford was convicted of burglary, possession of a firearm during a crime, armed robbery and murder — for which he was sentenced to death on Oct. 23, 1986.
Cindy Chapman-Griffeth, the mother of Lisa, said in an interview Monday, “I feel like I have been at war, but instead of guns it has been a knife in my heart the whole time. After the execution, as the sun was setting on the grounds of the prison, she said she felt closure but wished that Ford had admitted what he had done and asked her forgiveness.
Chapman-Griffeth described her daughter as a tenderhearted girl who loved animals, especially horses, and people and was always smiling and laughing. She attended Livingston Elementary School where students still stroll through a wing named in her honor. The young girl dreamed of becoming a teacher one day. “She liked to learn sign language and speaking to people who were impaired,” said Chapman-Griffeth. “She loved unicorns and walking behind her daddy as he plowed the garden, pushing the dirt between her toes. She loved to help me cook and being a big sister. She was also saved the week before she was murdered at a Bible school at Prospect Methodist Church.”
Martha’s brother Paul described his sister as a quiet, reserved girl who tended to be a follower. "She always looked for the good in every individual,” he said. Paul said he met Ford only once, when he came to Georgia in 1985 for his mother’s funeral. He remembered noticing his controlling and manipulative behavior during a meal. Being a Baptist minister, Paul was used to counseling people. “I took her aside and I told her that he was evil and she needed to put him aside,” said Paul. “She told me that she thought he would change. My sister loved life and looked for the good in everyone. She tried to see the good in this man, or this monster, and thought that maybe she could change him. But as we know, that didn’t take place.”
The night of March 6, 1986, Martha and another woman were working at the store, but the other woman went home sick. Lisa was at the store playing with the minnows and crickets sold as bait and didn’t want to leave her aunt alone at the store. According to the March 23, 1986 edition of The Covington News, Turner confessed that “Ford described killing Lisa Chapman in the bathroom at the grocery. Turner said that Ford told him that she was crouched by the toilet staring at him, so he felt he had to shoot her.” “She was begging him not to do it in the bathroom where she went to hide,” said Chapman-Griffeth Monday.
When asked what she would say to Ford if given the opportunity, Chapman-Griffeth stumbled. “I don’t know what I would say to him,” she said. “I’m trying to find peace in my heart and I think this will help. I don’t think the man has any remorse and if he doesn’t I hope he burns 70 times in Hell. He says he’s a changed man but he’s never admitted to doing it. “Twenty-four years and 32 appeals and he’s never admitted it.”
Paul said that he has forgiven Ford because that’s what God would want him to do. “Some say the death penalty should not be carried out because those were Old Testament laws, but I still believe to this day that he should pay for what he’s done and therefore, if he is put to death, he has received what he deserves,” said Paul, adding that it would be easier for him to forgive Ford if he admitted to the murders and apologized for committing them.
Although the families of Ford’s victims are in favor of his execution, members of Georgians For Alternatives to the Death Penalty organized vigils protesting capital punishment in cities across the state. About 15 protesters from the organization stood outside of the prison during the execution. “Georgians For Alternatives to the Death Penalty denounces state killing in our names,” said Vice-Chair Kathryn Hamoudah in an e-mail. “We believe that this ultimate punishment is inhumane, arbitrary in application; perpetuates violence and does nothing to keep our communities safer, nor does it address the needs of victims’ families.” The group is made up of “a coalition of individuals and organizations with a variety of representation, including those that minister to families of those on death row as well as murder victim family members who oppose the death penalty” according to www.gfadp.org. "We are here to keep vigil and stand against Georgia's actions in taking the life of Melbert Ray Ford tonight,” Hamoudah said. “We stand unified as we remember the loss of life that brings us together and the victims’ family.”
Katey Brown drove from Macon to the vigil, as she has for five other executions. "I as a taxpayer and a voter am responsible and this is not what I consider an appropriate way to protect society," Brown said. Chapman-Griffeth, however, feels differently. “I think it should be done to him the same way he did it to my daughter and my sister-in-law,” she said of Ford’s execution. “I think lethal injection is too good for him. That night I lost a part of my heart that will never be filled.”
Newton County Sheriff Ezell Brown was a deputy at the time of Lisa and Martha’s murder and remembers vividly working with other law enforcement officers to bring their killer to justice. “I feel that the justice system has carried out its responsibility for ensuring that the victims have justice,” he said. “While their families still live with the horrific memory at least they know that the perpetrator has been brought to justice. Twenty-four years ago other deputies and I had the responsibility of witnessing probably the most gruesome crime of my entire 37 years in law enforcement. Immediately we focused our attention on suspect Melbert Ray Ford and did not rest until we arrested Ford for his careless acts. Today our work is done.”
On March 6, 1986, Ford talked to several people about robbing the store. He told one that he intended to kidnap Ms. Matich, take her into the woods, make her beg, and then shoot her in the forehead. Ford tried to talk another into helping him with his robbery (Ford had no car). When this effort failed, Ford responded that "there wasn't anybody crazy around here anymore." Finally, Ford met 19-year-old Roger Turner, who was out of a job and nearly out of money. By plying him with alcohol, and promising him that they could easily acquire eight thousand dollars, Ford persuaded Turner to help him. They drove in Turner’s car to Chapman’s Grocery, arriving just after closing time. Ford shot away the lower half of the locked and barred glass door and entered the store. Turner, waiting in the car, heard screams and gunshots. Then Ford ran from the store to the car, carrying a bag of money.
At 10:20 p.m., the store’s burglar alarm sounded. A Newton County sheriff’s deputy arrived at 10:27 p.m. Ms. Matich was lying dead behind the counter, shot three times. Lisa Chapman was discovered in the bathroom, shot in the head but still alive, sitting on a bucket, bleeding from the head, and having convulsions. She could answer no questions. She died later. Ford and Turner were arrested the next day. Turner confessed first and was brought into Ford’s interrogation room to state to Ford that he had told the truth. Ford told him not to worry, that Turner was not involved in the murders. Afterwards, Ford told his interrogators that the shooting began after Martha Matich pushed the alarm button. He stated that, had he worn a mask, it would not have happened. Ford claimed at trial that he was too drunk to know what was happening, and that it was Turner who entered the store and killed the victims. Ford v. State, 257 Ga. at 461-62.
SecondStateHabeas Corpus Proceeding (2001-2002)
United StatesSupreme Court (2009-2010)
On March 6, 1986, Ford talked to several people about robbing the store. He told one that he intended to kidnap Martha, take her into the woods, make her beg, and then shoot her in the forehead. Ford tried to talk another into helping him with his robbery (Ford had no car). When this effort failed, Ford responded that “there wasn’t anybody crazy around here anymore.” Finally, Ford met 19-year-old Roger Turner, who was out of a job and nearly out of money. By plying him with alcohol, and promising him that they could easily acquire eight thousand dollars, Ford persuaded Turner to help him. They drove in Turner’s car to Chapman’s Grocery, arriving just after closing time. Ford shot away the lower half of the locked and barred glass door and entered the store. Turner, waiting in the car, 2 heard screams and gunshots. Then Ford ran from the store to the car, carrying a bag of money.
At 10:20 p.m., the store’s burglar alarm sounded. A Newton County sheriff’s deputy arrived at 10:27 p.m. Martha Matich was lying dead behind the counter, shot three times. Lisa Chapman was discovered in the bathroom, shot in the head but still alive, sitting on a bucket, bleeding from the head, and having convulsions. She could answer no questions. Lisa's father Oliver Chapman said he got to hold his daughter for a few moments before she was taken away in a medical helicopter, but she could not speak to him. She died en route to the hospital. Ford and Turner were arrested the next day. Turner confessed first and was brought into Ford’s interrogation room to state to Ford that he had told the truth. Ford told him not to worry, that Turner was not involved in the murders. Afterwards, Ford told his interrogators that the shooting began after Martha Matich pushed the alarm button. He stated that, had he worn a mask, it would not have happened. Ford claimed at trial that he was too drunk to know what was happening, and that it was Turner who entered the store and killed the victims. The jury deliberated only an hour and a half before finding Ford guilty and only one hour before imposing two death sentences.
UPDATE: Melbert Ray Ford died by lethal injection at 7:27 p.m. Wednesday, 23 years after he was convicted in the murders of his ex-girlfriend, Martha Chapman Matich, and her 11-year-old niece, Lisa Chapman. Cindy Griffeth, mother of the slain 11-year-old, said the execution, at which she was a witness, brought closure to her but also disappointment. “I was hoping that (Ford) would at least have prayer and apologize,” Griffeth said. “But I thought, deep down in my heart, he wasn’t going to do it. It shows his true character.” When asked how she felt about the execution, she replied, “It was too easy for him.”
Defendant was convicted in the Newton Superior Court, Greeley Ellis, J., of two counts of malice murder, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of firearm during commission of felony. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Weltner, J., held that: (1) sentencing jury could properly consider burglary and armed robbery conviction as aggravating circumstances; (2) statements made after defendant asked if he could call his attorney were voluntary, and did not violate defendant's right to counsel, where defendant initiated further conversation; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support convictions. Affirmed.
Melbert Ray Ford, Jr., was found guilty by a Newton County jury of murdering his former female companion, Martha Chapman Matich, and her 11-year-old niece, Lisa Chapman, and of committing the offenses of armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to death on each of the murder convictions. FN1. The crimes were committed March 6, 1986. The case was tried October 20 through October 24, 1986. A motion for new trial was filed October 28, 1986, and amended December 16, 1986. After a hearing on that date, the motion was denied December 23, 1986. The case was docketed in this court January 18, 1987, and was orally argued April 7, 1987.
After his relationship with Martha Matich broke up, Ford began harassing her by telephone. Two weeks prior to her death, Ford told a friend of his that he “was going to blow her ... brains out.” The day before her death, Ford unsuccessfully tried to convince a friend to drive him to the convenience store where Matich worked. Ford told the friend that he planned to rob the store and work revenge upon Matich by killing her. On March 6, 1986, Ford talked to several people about robbing the store. He told one that he intended to kidnap Ms. Matich, take her into the woods, make her beg, and then shoot her in the forehead. Ford tried to talk another into helping him with his robbery (Ford had no car). When this effort failed, Ford responded that “there wasn't anybody crazy around here anymore.” Finally, Ford met 19-year-old Roger Turner, who was out of a job and nearly out of money. By plying him with alcohol, and promising him that they could easily acquire eight thousand dollars, Ford persuaded Turner to help him.
They drove in Turner's car to Chapman's Grocery, arriving just after closing time. Ford shot away the lower half of the locked and barred glass door and entered the store. Turner, waiting in the car, heard screams and gunshots. Then Ford ran from the store to the car, carrying a bag of money. At 10:20 p.m., the store's burglar alarm sounded. A Newton County sheriff's deputy arrived at 10:27 p.m. Ms. Matich was lying dead behind the counter, shot three times. Lisa Chapman was discovered in the bathroom, shot in the head but still alive, sitting on a bucket, bleeding from the head, and having convulsions. She could answer no questions. She died later.
FN2. Although Ford has filed 31 enumerations of error, his brief contains seven areas of argument. The subheadings for each of these seven arguments contain references to several enumerations of error, so that all 31 ostensibly are argued, but it is apparent that many are unsupported by argument or citation of authority. We address in this opinion all argued issues, and such additional ones as merit a response. See Ga. Unified Appeal Procedure Rule IV(B)(2), 252 Ga. at A-28. Any enumeration not specifically addressed has been reviewed and found to have no arguable merit.
1. In division one of his brief, Ford raises a number of constitutional objections to Georgia death penalty procedures, both generally and as applied to this case. Many of these arguments are resolved contrary to his contentions by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987).
In addition, he complains that, under our statutory death penalty procedure, all defendants convicted of both burglary and armed robbery in addition to murder enter the sentencing phase of the trial with two “built-in” statutory aggravating circumstances, allowing the state to obtain a death sentence without presenting any aggravating evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial. In such a case, Ford argues, the § b(2) statutory aggravating circumstances fail to narrow the class of death-eligible persons. See OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2).
This argument runs counter to the nature of aggravating evidence. It is true that a statutory aggravating circumstance “must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). See also, e.g., Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 588 (3c) 340 S.E.2d 862 (1986). But it is not true that only evidence presented at the sentencing phase may be considered in aggravation.
The factors normally considered in sentencing are (1) the character of the defendant, including his previous criminal activity, if any, and (2) the circumstances of the crime on trial. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976).
Death penalty trials are bifurcated so that matters relevant to sentence, but irrelevant and prejudicial on the question of guilt-for example, a defendant's bad character and criminal record-can be withheld during the determination of guilt but can still be considered on the question of sentence. Eberheart v. State, 232 Ga. 247, 253, 206 S.E.2d 12 (1974). See also Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 190-91, 96 S.Ct. at 2933. Unlike bad-character evidence, the circumstances of the offense are relevant both to guilt and to sentence, and evidence of the circumstances of the offense will be offered, usually, during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. This evidence does not have to be re-presented at the sentencing phase of the trial in order to be considered on the question of sentence. The sentencing hearing “is for additional evidence and in no way excludes from consideration on sentence the matters heard on the issue of guilt or innocence.” Eberheart v. State, supra.
Ford was eligible for the death penalty because in addition to committing murder, he contemporaneously committed a second murder, and armed robbery and burglary. OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2). Inasmuch as not all crimes of murder involve the contemporaneous commission of additional serious offenses, the § b(2) aggravating circumstance establishes a “second plane,” separating “from all murder cases those in which the penalty of death is a possible punishment.” Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 99, 297 S.E.2d 1 (1982). See also, Jefferson v. State, 256 Ga. 821, 828-830, 353 S.E.2d 468 (1987). Proof that a defendant has committed several serious crimes in addition to a single murder reasonably justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence.
We note that several states whose death penalty laws have been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court require a jury to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances, and to impose a death sentence if the evidence in aggravation outweighs the evidence in mitigation. See Zant v. Stephens, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2741 (fn. 12). However, that is not the case in Georgia. In this state, juries are not required to balance aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances. Rather, the death sentence may be considered only if the state establishes beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in OCGA § 17-10-30, and if such a circumstance is established, the jury nonetheless “may withhold the death penalty for any reason, or without any reason.” Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 787, 325 S.E.2d 362 (1985). See also Zant v. Stephens, supra, 250 Ga. at 100, 297 S.E.2d 1.
3. Death qualification of prospective jurors is not unconstitutional. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). The trial court did not err by excusing prospective juror Gibbs after she answered that she could not vote to impose a death sentence regardless of the facts and circumstances of the case. Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206(4), 327 S.E.2d 168 (1985).
4. The trial court conducted the voir dire by first examining prospective jurors with regard to publicity and feelings about the death penalty. Thirty-four of the sixty jurors who were questioned in this regard answered that they had “read, heard or seen” something about the case. These 34 were examined “individually in chambers.” Three were excused, one because of conscientious objection to the death penalty, and two others because they “indicated some pre-existing feelings about the case, which they said would make it difficult ... or impossible for them to decide the case impartially ...” The trial court observed that “[n]o other jurors who were examined individually while being sequestered indicated any bias, leaning or prejudice or preconceived ideas at all about the case based upon any news reports or street talk or any other source of information they may have had about the case.”
The court determined that the defendant could receive a fair trial in Newton County. We find no error in the denial of the defendant's motion for change of venue. Curry v. State, 255 Ga. 215 (2g), 336 S.E.2d 762 (1985). Ford also contends that the court unnecessarily restricted the scope of the voir dire examination and denied him the opportunity to propound relevant and proper voir dire questions to prospective jurors. Prior to trial, the defendant submitted a list of proposed voir dire questions. The court observed correctly that many of these questions were improper and would not be allowed. However, the court did not expressly rule at that time on any of the questions, expressing the belief that counsel for the defendant knew which questions were proper and which were not. Not a single question asked by the defense during the actual voir dire was disallowed. We find no error in the conduct of the voir dire.
5. Ford argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial after the jury observed him in handcuffs, as he was being taken to lunch. The jury left the courthouse first. After waiting during what they believed was a sufficient period of time for the jury to be removed away from the area, two deputies walked Ford from the rear of the courthouse. Ford exited first and began descending the steps when he noticed the jury boarding a bus some 20 yards away. He was wearing an overcoat, the sleeves of which covered but did not completely hide the cuffs. Ford turned his back to the jury. He and the deputies then returned to the courthouse. “Absent justifying circumstances, the defendant normally should not be seen by the jury handcuffed in the courtroom or courthouse. However, where one or more jurors by chance see the defendant in handcuffs outside the courtroom, it is not error to deny a motion for mistrial. [Cits.]” Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 593, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979).
The court did not err by failing to declare a mistrial in this case. The defendant did not object at trial to the curative instructions given by the court, and may not now complain that the instructions “served only to impress the incident upon the minds of the jurors.”
6. Ford was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), as soon as he was taken into custody. He was transported to Newton County, re-advised of his Miranda rights, and then interrogated. After it was relayed to Ford that co-defendant Turner had admitted his involvement in the robbery and the murders, and one of the interrogators told Ford that he believed Ford to have been responsible for the victims' deaths, Ford asked if he could “call his attorney.” GBI agent Nicholson advised Ford that he could. Then Ford began questioning agent Nicholson about Turner's statement. Nicholson stopped Ford and told him that because he had asked for an attorney, they “could not continue the interview until he talked to one, unless he changed his mind and wanted to continue without it.” Ford responded that he would like to continue the interview without his attorney.
Later on, Nicholson offered the defendant a chance to record his statement on video tape. Ford stated that he would like to confer with an attorney before making any recorded statements. Nicholson asked him “if he wanted to talk to an attorney before continuing on and he said he wished to continue the interview, but he didn't want to make any recorded statements until he talked with an attorney.” If an accused asserts his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, he “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Ford argues that his requests for counsel were not honored and that his rights under Edwards v. Arizona, supra, were violated. We do not agree.
Not only was his question about calling an attorney not a clear invocation of his right to counsel, compare Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984), the defendant “himself” initiated further conversation with the police. At this point, his interrogator was justified in stopping him and determining whether he wanted to call his attorney or to continue the interview. See Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267, 336 S.E.2d 812 (1985).
Ford's later invocation of his right to counsel with regard to a video taped statement was an invocation of a limited right only, which the police were required to honor to no greater extent than the express limits of his reservation. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987). The trial court did not err by finding that Ford's statements were voluntary and that the defendant's rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and Edwards v. Arizona, supra, were not violated.
7. The evidence supports Ford's conviction on two counts of malice murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Contrary to Ford's contention, evidence was presented that Oliver Chapman owned the convenience store where his sister Martha Matich worked, and that Ford took $579.80 from the store. The evidence supports the defendant's conviction for armed robbery and burglary. See OCGA §§ 16-7-1 and 16-8-41. The court did not err by refusing to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the evidence supports the conviction for this offense. See OCGA § 16-11-106; Miller v. State, 250 Ga. 436, 298 S.E.2d 509 (1983).
8. The evidence supports the jury's findings with regard to the § b(2) aggravating circumstance. See Division 1 of this opinion. OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(2). We do not find that the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor. OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(1). The sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(3). The similar cases listed in the appendix support the death penalty in this case. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Background: Following affirmance of his convictions for malice murder and felony murder, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and burglary, as well as his death sentence, 360 S.E.2d 258, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, No. 01-02595-CV-TWT, Thomas W. Thrash, J., denied petition, 488 F.Supp.2d 1258, as well as motion to alter or amend judgment and granted petitioner Certificate of Appealability (COA) on three issues.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Dubina, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) State did not violate petitioner's constitutional rights by its failure to disclose alleged deal with State's key witness; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective at sentencing; and (3) petitioner's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not violated during his police interrogation. Affirmed.
Petitioner, Melbert Ray Ford, a death row inmate, appeals from the district court's order denying him habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's judgment.
A. Facts We recite the facts from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia on direct appeal from Ford's conviction and death sentence.
Ford and Turner were arrested the next day. Turner confessed first and was brought into Ford's interrogation room to state to Ford that he had told the truth. Ford told him not to worry, that Turner was not involved in the murders. Afterwards, Ford told his interrogators that the shooting began after Martha Matich pushed the alarm button. He stated that, had he worn a mask, it would not have happened. Ford claimed at trial that he was too drunk to know what was happening, and that it was Turner who entered the store and killed the victims. Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461, 461-62, 360 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1987).
Ford filed a second state habeas petition in September 2001. Ford argued that his constitutional rights were violated because the jury returned a verdict that did not contain any finding of aggravating circumstances, and that his constitutional rights were violated because the State suppressed favorable information about Roger Turner's drug use on the night of the offense. In a footnote in his petition, Ford claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to obtain and effectively utilize the exculpatory evidence. The state superior court dismissed the petition as successive under O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51 (2006). On March 12, 2002, the Supreme Court of Georgia denied Ford's application for probable cause to appeal.
1. Whether the district court erred in finding that the State did not violate Ford's constitutional rights by its failure to disclose an alleged deal with Roger Turner, the State's key witness.
2. Whether the district court properly determined that the state court's resolution of Ford's claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing was reasonable.
3. Whether the district court properly determined that the state court's resolution of Ford's Fifth Amendment claim was reasonable.
This court reviews de novo mixed questions of law and fact and legal questions, while it reviews the district court's fact findings for clear error. See Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (11th Cir.1999). This court is precluded from granting habeas relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law [or] resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2) (2008). We presume that factual findings by the state court are correct, but the findings can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. See id.
FN1. Ford raised this specific claim for the first time in federal district court. The district court found that Ford's habeas counsel was diligent in investigating this claim and learned for the first time during discovery in the federal habeas action that the prosecutor at Ford's trial wrote a letter on behalf of Roger Turner to the state parole board. The prosecutor stated that his letter was not a part of any deal with Turner to testify at Ford's trial, but Turner's attorney stated in an affidavit that he remembered a discussion about a parole letter when making an agreement with the prosecutor about Turner's testimony. Based on this information, the district court determined that Ford met the burden enunciated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (stating that a district court can hold an evidentiary hearing on a new claim if the petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate of the claim through the exercise of due diligence). We will not review the district court's decision that Ford was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in light of our disposition of this claim. In reviewing this claim, we will consider not only the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, but also, the evidence already in the record.
Giglio error, a species of Brady error, occurs when ‘the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the prosecution's case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury.’ ” Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Ventura v. Att'y Gen., Fla., 419 F.3d 1269, 1276-77 (11th Cir.2005), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 3010, 168 L.Ed.2d 728 (2007)). To prevail on a Giglio claim, a petitioner must establish that “(1) the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony; and (2) such use was material i.e., that there is ‘any reasonable likelihood’ that the false testimony ‘could ... have affected the judgment.’ ” Id. at 1253 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766). This standard of materiality is equivalent to the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. at 3382 n. 9. The disclosure requirement ensures that “ ‘the jury knows the facts that might motivate a witness in giving testimony.’ ” Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1465 (11th Cir.1986) (quoting Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1467 (11th Cir.1983)). Accordingly, the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence of promises made to a witness in exchange for testimony. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S.Ct. at 766; Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 716 (11th Cir.1999).
At the federal evidentiary hearing, prosecutor John Ott testified that he entered into an agreement with Ford's co-defendant Turner wherein if Turner testified truthfully and in accordance with his statements to the police, the State would recommend that the trial court sentence Turner to 20 years' imprisonment based on his guilty plea to armed robbery, and that the State would drop the murder charges, which carried either a life term of imprisonment or the death penalty. Ott stated emphatically that the plea agreement did not include his promise to write a letter to the parole board on Turner's behalf, saying that he “know[s] with certainty that that was not part of the deal and that [he] would not have committed [him]self to writing a letter prior to the trial.” (District Ct. R. vol. 10, 48.) Ott stated that he would want to wait until after the witness testified before he agreed to write such a letter. Ott testified that he “would never want to put [him]self in a position of a defendant who got up on that stand and did not make a strong witness, did not testify well, and then after the trial came to [him] and said, well, now you got to write me a letter to the Parole Board.” ( Id. 36-37.) According to Ott, the decision to write a letter to the parole board occurred after Turner testified in an impressive manner at Ford's trial. ( Id. 39-40.) Ott's testimony is substantiated by the letter he wrote to the parole board in which he stated that after Turner testified, Ott told Turner that he (Ott) would do whatever he could to see that Turner was paroled when the time came.FN2 Additionally, Turner's testimony corroborated Ott's recollection of the plea agreement. Turner stated that although he and his counsel discussed trying to get Ott to help with the parole board, his plea agreement with the State did not include such a promise. ( Id. 55, 58.)
FN2. Ott's letter stated in part: At the time of trial, I was impressed with Mr. [Turner's] acceptance of his illegal acts and strong desire to do whatever he could to rectify his wrongs, accept his punishment and then continue with his life .... I told Mr. Turner, after he had testified, that I would do whatever I could to see that he was paroled when the time came. (District Ct. R., Pet'rs Ex. 5.)
B. Sentencing Counsel
In judging the adequacy of counsel's investigation of potential mitigating circumstances, we consider “ ‘counsel's perspective at the time’ investigative decisions are made” and give “ ‘a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.’ ” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2052). Counsel is not required to investigate and present all available mitigating evidence in order for counsel's investigation to be reasonable. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3126, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987). The court should “focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [petitioner's] background was itself reasonable. ” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. at 2536. Furthermore, in evaluating the reasonableness of the investigation, “a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Id. at 527, 123 S.Ct. at 2538.
Pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which governs this habeas action, an application for habeas relief can only be granted if the adjudication of the claim in state court resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly established federal law or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Williams, 529 U.S. at 376, 120 S.Ct. at 1504 (O'Connor, J.). A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if a state court applies a test that contradicts the governing one, or a state court reaches a different result on a substantially similar set of facts. Id. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. at 1519-20. “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. Because Ford only challenges the “unreasonable application” clause, we must determine whether the state court's resolution of this claim involved an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard.FN3
FN3. Ford contends that Wiggins and Rompilla set forth a new standard for effective assistance of counsel. We rejected a similar argument in Williams v. Allen, 458 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.2006). Williams, 458 F.3d at 1244 (“Although Williams urges us to apply Wiggins to his case, the controlling Supreme Court precedent with regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland.”), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1306, 127 S.Ct. 1874, 167 L.Ed.2d 365 (2007); see also In re Hutcherson, 468 F.3d 747, 749 (11th Cir.2006) (“The Court's decision in Rompilla was another interpretation of the Court's long-standing principles set forth in Strickland.”).
Specifically, Ford contends that his trial counsel, John Howell and Ben Hendricks,FN4 were deficient for failing to interview more family members, school teachers, and a minister and for failing to present mitigation evidence, such as medical, psychiatric, and school records. According to Ford, had trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation, they would have discovered the following important mitigation evidence: that Ford had a history of problems with alcohol and legal and illegal drugs; that Ford had periods of blinding headaches and blackouts; that Ford had a history of severe asthma, allergic reactions, and other physical problems; that Ford took medication that had the potential to cause numerous deleterious side effects; that Ford had a history of severe emotional problems; that Ford had received psychological treatment; that Ford's father had been addicted to alcohol and pain killers; that Ford's family was financially unstable; that Ford performed poorly in school; that in the weeks preceding the murders, Ford had been abusing drugs and alcohol; and that Ford had a caring personality.
FN4. At the time of Ford's trial, Howell had been practicing law for fourteen years and had participated in over two hundred felony trials, including two capital cases. The trial court appointed Hendricks to assist Howell. Hendricks had been a member of the state bar for approximately ten years and had been involved in several serious criminal cases prior to representing Ford. (State Trial R. 1074-75; State Habeas Proceedings, Ex. 3, Doc. 17, 85, 295.)
In rejecting this claim following an evidentiary hearing, the state habeas court held: Mitigation evidence from an independent psychiatrist and from the Petitioner's mother was presented. Petitioner cannot demonstrate any constitutional violation in his own failure to present other evidence. The Court finds that Petitioner agreed with counsel's decision not to present certain other witnesses that counsel and Petitioner had discussed. Petitioner cannot now be heard to complain about a strategic decision he and his attorney made.
Further, some, if not all, of the evidence Petitioner alleges should have been presented (other family members, a former school teacher, and a minister) would have been cumulative of some of the testimony and emotional pleas offered by the two mitigation witnesses. The habeas court cannot second guess the decision of a defendant and his counsel regarding when enough mitigation evidence has been presented. The fact is, the opportunity to present such evidence was given and there can be no constitutional violation when a defendant and his counsel decide that they have exercised that right to the fullest extent desirable. Demonstrating in the habeas proceeding that there were other witnesses who could have testified at trial does not, by itself, prove that counsel was ineffective for not presenting them at trial. (State Habeas Proceedings, Ex. 2, Doc. 16, 65-66 (record and case citations omitted)).
It appears that the only issues addressed in the affidavit testimony that were not presented during the sentencing phase concerned: (1) the Petitioner's history of headaches, allergies, and asthma; and (2) the Petitioner's father's addiction to pain killers and alcohol. The Petitioner also asserts that the witnesses could have testified to his caring personality. In order to establish prejudice, the Petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Here, the jury found three statutory aggravating circumstances with regard to the malice murder of Martha Matich, i.e., that the murder was committed during the commission of two capital felonies (armed robbery and murder) and during the commission of a burglary, and two statutory aggravating circumstances associated with the malice murder of Lisa Chapman, i.e., that the murder was committed during the commission of a capital felony (armed robbery) and during the commission of a burglary. In light of the weight of this and other aggravating evidence, including the fact that the Petitioner shot a child in the head at close range, the new evidence cited by the Petitioner is not compelling mitigation evidence, even when combined with the evidence presented at sentencing, such that there is a reasonable probability that had the jury heard this testimony the sentencing outcome would have been different. The Petitioner's claim of ineffectiveness based on a failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence is without merit. (District Court R. vol. 5, Doc. 69, 150-56 (internal citations omitted)).
C. Fifth Amendment Right
On direct review, the Supreme Court of Georgia found: Ford was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), as soon as he was taken into custody. He was transported to Newton County, re-advised of his Miranda rights, and then interrogated. After it was relayed to Ford that co-defendant Turner had admitted his involvement in the robbery and the murders, and one of the interrogators told Ford that he believed Ford to have been responsible for the victims' deaths, Ford asked if he could “call his attorney.” GBI agent Nicholson advised Ford that he could. Then Ford began questioning agent Nicholson about Turner's statement. Nicholson stopped Ford and told him that because he had asked for an attorney, they “could not continue the interview until he talked to one, unless he changed his mind and wanted to continue without it.” Ford responded that he would like to continue the interview without his attorney.
Later on, Nicholson offered the defendant a chance to record his statement on videotape. Ford stated that he would like to confer with an attorney before making any recorded statements. Nicholson asked him “if he wanted to talk to an attorney before continuing on and he said he wished to continue the interview, but he didn't want to make any recorded statements until he talked with an attorney.” If an accused asserts his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, he “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Ford argues that his requests for counsel were not honored and that his rights under Edwards v. Arizona, supra, were violated. We do not agree.
Ford's later invocation of his right to counsel with regard to a video taped statement was an invocation of a limited right only, which the police were required to honor to no greater extent than the express limits of his reservation. The trial court did not err by finding that Ford's statements were voluntary and that the defendant's rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and Edwards v. Arizona, supra, were not violated. Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461, 465-66, 360 S.E.2d 258, 262 (citations omitted).
As the district court correctly found, the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision on this issue was not an objectively unreasonable application of the clearly established Supreme Court precedent that existed at the time. The record supports the state court's finding that Ford's request for counsel was ambiguous. The state court's findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1251, 1253 (11th Cir.2002). Ford cannot rebut this presumption of correctness. Further, even if Ford's request was not equivocal, Ford himself initiated further conversation with the police. Any police questioning of Ford after he asked whether he could call an attorney was limited to clarifying whether Ford wanted to call an attorney or wanted to continue the interview. Following the attempts to clarify Ford's statement, Ford resumed discussions relating to the crimes by questioning GBI Agent Nicholson about Turner's statement to the police. Moreover, Ford's waiver of his right to counsel was voluntary. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the police coerced or pressured Ford into making his statements. Therefore, we conclude that the Supreme Court of Georgia did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law by holding that Ford waived the right to counsel by voluntarily initiating further discussions with the police. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this claim.