Source: https://id.scribd.com/document/394719855/Mount-Lemmon
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 21:42:30
Document Index: 431254687

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 1491', '§ 2680', '§ 11', '§ 630', '§ 621', '§ 630', '§ 621', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 28', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 2000', '§ 630', '§ 2', '§ 2000', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630', '§ 630']

Mount Lemmon | Undang-Undang Hak Sipil 1964 | Aturan Arti Biasa
Diunggah oleh Andrew Reath
simpanSimpan Mount Lemmon Untuk Nanti
G. Kevin Jones v. Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, 52 F.3d 279, 10th Cir. (1995)
Dr. Kathleen Johnson Wu, Dr. Hsiu-Kwang Wu v. Joab Thomas, University of Alabama Board of Trustees, a Body Corporate, Roger E. Sayers, Individually and in His Official Capacity as President of the University of Alabama, Dr. Richard Peck, Individually, Max Hocutt, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Alabama, Dr. John Formby, Individually, Dr. James Yarbrough, in His Official Capacity as Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Alabama, Dr. James G. Taaffe, in His Official Capacity as Academic Vice President of the University of Alabama, Dr. Billy Helms, in His Official Capacity as Head of the Department of Finance, Economics and Legal Studies of the University of Alabama, John Bickley, Michael Putnam, Movants, 996 F.2d 271, 11th Cir. (1993)
10 Fair empl.prac.cas. 435, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,035 Communications Workers of America, Afl-Cio, Esther Skipper, Individually and on Behalf of All Similarly Situated Non-Supervisory Female Employees of American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Long Lines Department v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Long Lines Department, 513 F.2d 1024, 2d Cir. (1975)
Lewis v. Milwaukee Brewers - Document No. 22
1168 859 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
fact that Plaintiffs are not the taxpayers at clude that the Government is wrong on
issue and are innocent third parties. We this record.
cannot, however, distinguish this case on
that ground without doing damage to the
statute’s text, see § 2680(c) (‘‘The provi-
sions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall not apply to TTT (c) Any
claim arising in respect of the assessment
or collection of any taxTTTT’’ (emphasis
added)), or creating an overt circuit split,
see, e.g., Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A., 769
F.2d at 307 (‘‘[Section 2680(c) ] gives no
indication whatsoever that the exemption
is limited to claims TTT brought by taxpay- John GUIDO; Dennis Rankin,
ers as opposed to third parties.’’). That Plaintiffs-Appellants,
said, I think that our case law fairly gives
Plaintiffs a chance to show that the IRS v.
investigation was purely criminal. But I
MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DISTRICT,
can’t agree with the majority’s conclusion
that IRS investigations into the validity of
a claimed refund fall outside the scope of No. 15-15030
§ 2680(c).
Finally, it is worth emphasizing what Ninth Circuit.
Plaintiffs are not alleging in this lawsuit.
They are not alleging that the IRS breach- Argued and Submitted December 15,
ed an express or implied contract to make 2016, San Francisco, California
Plaintiffs whole. Nor are they alleging that
the failure to repay Plaintiffs constituted a
government taking. These claims would Background: Firefighter captains who
fall under the Tucker Act, which specifical- were the two oldest full-time employees at
ly waives immunity for breach of contract fire district when their employment was
and takings claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). terminated at ages 46 and 54 filed suit
Plaintiffs have raised these claims before against the district, a subdivision of the
the Court of Federal Claims. Without State of Arizona, alleging violations of Age
passing on the merits of that lawsuit, Discrimination in Employment Act
breach of contract and takings would seem (ADEA). The United States District Court
to be the more natural way of styling for the District of Arizona, James Alan
Plaintiffs’ claims. Here, however, Plaintiffs’ Soto, J., granted summary judgment for
tort claims arose during the course of an fire district. Captains appealed.
IRS investigation. Further discovery may
Holding: The Court of Appeals, O’Scann-
confirm the Government’s argument that
lain, Circuit Judge, held that fire district,
Plaintiffs’ claims arose ‘‘in respect of the
as subdivision of the State of Arizona, was
assessment or collection of any tax’’ and
an ‘‘employer’’ within the meaning of
are thus barred by § 2680(c), but the
Plaintiffs should get the opportunity to
show otherwise. I don’t think we can con- Reversed and remanded.
GUIDO v. MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. 1169
Cite as 859 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017)
1. Statutes O1091 Appeal from the United States District
Court interpreting a statute begins its Court for the District of Arizona, James
analysis with the plain language of the Alan Soto, District Judge, Presiding. D.C.
statute. No. 4:13-cv-00216-JAS.
2. Statutes O1111 Shannon Giles (argued) and Don Awer-
If statutory text is plain and unambig- kamp, Awerkamp & Bonilla P.L.C., Tuc-
uous, court interpreting a statute must son, Arizona, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
apply the statute according to its terms. Jeffrey C. Matura (argued) and Amanda
3. Statutes O1242 J. Taylor, Graif Barrett & Matura P.C.,
Only when a statute is ambiguous may Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellee.
court interpreting the statute look to legis- Anne Noel Occhialino (argued), Attor-
lative history. ney; Jennifer S. Goldstein, Associate Gen-
4. Civil Rights O1116(1) eral Counsel; P. David Lopez, General
Twenty-employee requirement in first Counsel; Office of General Counsel, Equal
sentence of ADEA’s definition of ‘‘employ- Employment Opportunity Commission,
er’’ does not apply to public agencies or Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae
instrumentalities mentioned in second sen- Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
tence; second sentence means that, in addi- sion.
tion to those employers who meet defini-
tion of employer in first sentence, state or Before: DIARMUID F.
political subdivisions of state, and any O’SCANNLAIN, RONALD M. GOULD,
agencies or instrumentalities of a state or and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit
political subdivision of states are also ‘‘em- Judges.
ployers,’’ regardless of how many employ-
ee they have. Age Discrimination in Em- OPINION
ployment Act of 1967 § 11, 29 U.S.C.A. O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
§ 630(b). We must decide whether the Age Dis-
See publication Words and Phrases crimination in Employment Act of 1967
for other judicial constructions and
definitions. applies to a political subdivision of Arizona.
5. Statutes O1102 I
A statute must be susceptible to more
John Guido and Dennis Rankin were
than one reasonable interpretation to be
both hired in 2000 by Mount Lemmon Fire
District, a political subdivision of the State
6. Constitutional Law O2488 of Arizona. Guido and Rankin served as
Statutes O1138 full-time firefighter Captains. They were
Court should rarely depart from a the two oldest full-time employees at the
statute’s clear meaning because it risks Fire District when they were terminated
creating a perception that they are insert- on June 15, 2009, Guido at forty-six years
ing their own policy preferences into a law. of age and Rankin at fifty-four.
7. Constitutional Law O2488 Guido and Rankin subsequently filed
It is not court’s role to choose what it charges of age discrimination against the
thinks is the best policy outcome and to Fire District with the Equal Employment
override the plain meaning of a statute, Opportunity Commission (‘‘EEOC’’), which
apparent anomalies or not. issued separate favorable rulings for each,
1170 859 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
finding reasonable cause to believe the labor organizations, corporations, busi-
Fire District violated the Age Discrimina- ness trusts, legal representatives, or any
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. organized groups of persons.
§§ 621–34 (‘‘ADEA’’). They then filed this
The parties agree that the twenty-em-
suit for age discrimination against the Fire
ployee minimum applies to ‘‘a person en-
District in April 2013.
gaged in an industry affecting commerce’’
The district court granted the Fire Dis- and that the term ‘‘person’’ does not in-
trict’s motion for summary judgment, con- clude a political subdivision of a State.
cluding that it was not an ‘‘employer’’ with- However, they dispute whether the twen-
in the meaning of the ADEA. ty-employee minimum also applies to a
Guido and Rankin timely appealed. ‘‘political subdivision of a State.’’ § 630(b).
Guido and Rankin challenge the district
[1–3] Congress passed the ADEA to
court’s conclusion that the Fire District
protect older workers from ‘‘arbitrary age
was not an ‘‘employer’’ within the meaning
discrimination in employment.’’1 29 U.S.C.
of the ADEA.
§ 621(b). The statute originally applied
A only to private-sector employers. See Spe-
cial Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, Im-
The ADEA applies only to an ‘‘employ-
er.’’ Under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b): proving the Age Discrimination Law 11
(1973) (the ‘‘Senate Age Discrimination
The term ‘‘employer’’ means a person
Report’’). Congress amended the ADEA in
engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has twenty or more employ- 1974 to extend coverage to States, political
ees for each working day in each of subdivisions of States, and other State-
twenty or more calendar weeks in the related entities by adding a second sen-
current or preceding calendar yearTTTT tence to § 630(b). Pub. L. No. 93-259,
The term also means (1) any agent of § 28, 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (the ‘‘1974 ADEA
such a person, and (2) a State or political Amendment’’).2
subdivision of a State and any agency or
instrumentality of a State or a political 1
subdivision of a State, and any interstate Guido and Rankin contend that § 630(b)
agency, but such term does not include is not ambiguous and applies to the Fire
the United States, or a corporation District. They assert that its plain meaning
wholly owned by the Government of the creates distinct categories of ‘‘employers’’
United States. and that the Fire District fits within one of
Under § 630(a): them. See Young v. Sedgwick County, 660
The term ‘‘person’’ means one or more F.Supp. 918, 924 (D. Kan. 1987); see also
individuals, partnerships, associations, EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 233, 103
1. We ‘‘begin [our analysis] with the plain lan- ambiguous may courts look to legislative his-
guage of the statute.’’ Negusie v. Holder, 555 tory.’’ In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d 1003, 1010
U.S. 511, 542, 129 S.Ct. 1159, 173 L.Ed.2d 20 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Nakano v. United
(2009). If the ‘‘statutory text is plain and States, 742 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2014)).
unambiguous[,]’’ we ‘‘must apply the statute
according to its terms.’’ Carcieri v. Salazar, 2. The 1974 ADEA Amendment also lowered
555 U.S. 379, 387, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 172 the employee minimum from twenty-five to
L.Ed.2d 791 (2009). ‘‘Only when statutes are twenty.
GUIDO v. MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. 1171
S.Ct. 1054, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983) (‘‘In 1974, previous definition of a term—it does not
Congress extended the substantive prohi- clarify the previous definition. See Hollo-
bitions of the [ADEA] to employers having way v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Town
at least 20 workers, and to the Federal of Vernon, 24 F.Supp.3d 1112, 1117 (N.D.
and State Governments.’’ (emphasis add- Ala. 2014) (concluding the twenty-employ-
ed)). Section 630(b), they argue, is decon- ee limitation should not be imported into
structed as follows: The term ‘‘employer’’ the definition of employer covering politi-
means [A—person] and also means (1) cal subdivisions of a state); see also John-
[B—agent of person] and (2) [C—State- son v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
affiliated entities]. 472 U.S. 353, 356, 105 S.Ct. 2717, 86
They note that each of the three ‘‘em- L.Ed.2d 286 (1985) (‘‘[I]n 1974 Congress
ployer’’ categories is then further defined. extended coverage to Federal, State, and
For example, the ‘‘person’’ category is local Governments, and to employers with
elaborated upon in § 630(a), which pro- at least 20 workers.’’ (emphasis added)).
vides multiple definitions of the term ‘‘per- For example, imagine someone saying:
son’’ and then narrows the category to ‘‘The password can be an even number.
those persons ‘‘engaged in an industry af- The password can also be an odd number
fecting commerce who has twenty or more greater than one hundred.’’4 These are two
employees for each working day.’’3 The separate definitions of what an acceptable
‘‘State-affiliated entities’’ category lists the password can be, and the clarifying lan-
various types of State-affiliated entities guage does not apply to both definitions. If
covered, such as a ‘‘political subdivision of the sentences are reversed,5 the ‘‘greater
a State,’’ and also contains clarifying lan- than one hundred’’ limiting language would
guage. still not carry over to the second sentence
discussing even numbers. See Holloway,
a 24 F.Supp.3d at 1117. This becomes more
[4] They argue that the ordinary obvious when it would be illogical to carry
meaning of ‘‘also’’ supports the notion that clarifying language over. If a statute said
there are three distinct categories. See ‘‘The word bank means ‘the rising ground
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & bordering a lake, river, or sea’ and the
Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 276, 129 S.Ct. word also means ‘a place where something
846, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009). We agree. is held available,’ ’’ the second definition
The word ‘‘also’’ is a term of enhancement; would not be describing a place that must
it means ‘‘in addition; besides’’ and ‘‘like- border a lake, river, or sea. Merriam-Web-
wise; too.’’ E.g., Webster’s New Collegiate ster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
Dictionary 34 (1973). As used in this con- dictionary/bank. The phrase ‘‘also means’’
text, ‘‘also’’ adds another definition to a indicates that a second, additional defini-
3. Agents of persons and political subdivisions bankruptcy trustee has the right to recover
are not defined as persons in § 630(a), thus but is silent regarding an administrative
explaining why they have to be included as claimant should be read as not giving such
separate definitions of employers in § 630(b). claimant the same right); Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpre-
4. If someone said ‘‘a password can be any tation of Legal Texts 107 (discussing the ex-
even number,’’ the ordinary meaning of this pressio unius est exclusio alterius canon)
sentence would be that an odd number can- (2012).
not be a password. See, e.g., Hartford Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 5. I.e., ‘‘The password can be an odd number
530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 greater than one hundred. It can also be an
(2000) (concluding that a statute that states a even number.’’
1172 859 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
tion is being described. See § 630(b) (using trustees, trustees in cases under Title
the phrase ‘‘also means’’). 11, or receivers.
(b) The term ‘‘employer’’ means a per-
b son engaged in an industry affecting
The EEOC, as amicus curiae, expressing commerce who has fifteen or more em-
its views in support of Guido and Rankin, ployeesTTTT
contends that the English language provid- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (emphasis added). The
ed Congress many ways to apply clarifying EEOC argues that Congress knew how to
language across multiple definitions of a use language to ensure that an employee
term, had it wanted to. The EEOC cites minimum applied to political subdivisions
the 1972 amendment to Title VII of the when it wanted.6 Congress could have also
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as an example (the added the limiting language to each defini-
‘‘1972 Title VII Amendment’’). This tion discussed in § 630(b), or at least to
amendment extended Title VII protections the definition covering political subdivi-
to States and State-related entities, includ- sions, but it chose not to.7
ing political subdivisions of a State. Pub. L.
92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as 42 2
U.S.C. § 2000e). The EEOC emphasizes In the face of such a strong textual
that the 1972 Title VII Amendment used argument, the Fire District has a powerful
language making clear that the twenty- rebuttal: four other circuits have consid-
employee minimum applied to political ered this issue and all have declared
subdivisions, stating: § 630(b) to be ambiguous. Cink v. Grant
(a) The term ‘‘person’’ includes one or County, 635 Fed.Appx. 470, 474 n.5 (10th
more individuals, governments, govern- Cir. 2015); Palmer v. Ark. Council on
mental agencies, political subdivisions, Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir.
labor unions, partnerships, associations, 1998); E.E.O.C. v. Monclova Twp., 920
corporations, legal representatives, mu- F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1990); Kelly v.
tual companies, joint-stock companies, Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270
trusts, unincorporated organizations, (7th Cir. 1986).8 Cink, Palmer, and Mon-
6. Congress could have made the second sen- who has twenty or more employees for each
tence of § 630(b) the second sentence of working day in each of twenty or more
§ 630(a), not changed a word, and the twen- calendar weeks in the current or preceding
ty-employee minimum would clearly apply to calendar yearTTTT
political subdivisions. It would then have read
as follows: 7. Section 630(a)–(b) does such for private sec-
tor employers, defining ‘‘person’’ broadly—
(a) The term ‘‘person’’ means one or more including labor organizations, partnerships,
individuals, partnerships, associations, la- and business trusts—then defining the term
bor organization, corporations, business employer to mean a person with at least
trusts, legal representatives, or any orga- twenty employees. That structure ensures that
nized group of persons. The term also the twenty-employee minimum limitation ap-
means (1) any agent of such a person, and plies to all definitions of the term ‘‘person.’’
(2) a State or political subdivision of a State § 630(b).
and any agency or instrumentality of a State
or a political subdivision of a State, and any 8. Further, every circuit to consider the ques-
interstate agency, but such term does not tion of whether the twenty-employee mini-
include the United States, or a corporation mum applies to the ‘‘agent’’ category has con-
wholly owned by the Government of the cluded that § 630(b) is ambiguous. See Miller
United States. v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th
(b) The term ‘‘employer’’ means a person Cir. 1993) (concluding Congress just intended
engaged in an industry affecting commerce ‘‘to incorporate respondeat superior liability
GUIDO v. MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. 1173
clova Township all rely entirely on Kelly’s [5] A serious problem with the alterna-
reasoning regarding the statute’s ambigui- tive interpretation argument, however; is
ty.9 that the court in Kelly never explained
how it is a ‘‘fair and reasonable interpreta-
The Seventh Circuit in Kelly concluded
tion’’ of the statute’s actual language. A
the statute was ambiguous. While acknowl-
statute must be ‘‘susceptible to more than
edging that the categorical reading was a
one reasonable interpretation’’ to be am-
reasonable one, it concluded the plaintiff
biguous. Alaska Wilderness League v.
‘‘weaken[ed] his argument that the statute
E.P.A., 727 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2013).
is unambiguous by arguing that we should But, declaring that multiple reasonable in-
look at ‘common sense’ and congressional terpretations exist does not make it so.
intent in deciding that the statute is unam- None of the cases cited by the Fire Dis-
biguous.’’ 801 F.2d at 270. It is not clear to trict elaborate on how and why this alter-
us why an appeal to ‘‘common sense’’ un- native interpretation is a reasonable one—
dermines this argument. Further, any ap- they simply declare it so.
peal to congressional intent is a non-sequi-
As a matter of plain meaning, the argu-
tur; it is not a factor that should affect the
ment that § 630(b) can be reasonably in-
determination of whether a statute’s plain
terpreted to include its second sentence
meaning is ambiguous. See Antonin Scalia
definitions within its first is underwhelm-
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The ing. If Congress had wanted to include the
Interpretation of Legal Texts 391 (2012). second sentence definitions of employer in
The Kelly opinion further supports its the first sentence, it could have used the
conclusion by stating that the defendant word ‘‘include’’ or utilized one of the other
presented a reasonable alternative con- alternative constructions described above.
struction: The word ‘‘also’’ is not used in common
speech to mean ‘‘includes.’’ Webster’s New
More significantly, the Park District
Collegiate Dictionary 34 (1973). As previ-
enunciates another fair and reasonable
ously described, the use of separate sen-
interpretation of section 630(b)—that
tences and the word ‘‘also’’ combine to
Congress, in amending section 630(b),
create distinct categories, in which clarify-
merely intended to make it clear that
ing language for one category does not
states and their political subdivisions are
apply to other categories. See United
to be included in the definition of ‘em-
States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th
ployer,’ as opposed to being a separate
Cir. 2015) (‘‘[U]ntil a clue emerges sug-
definition of employer. gesting otherwise, it’s not unreasonable to
Id. at 270–71. Since the alternative reading think that Congress used the English lan-
was also deemed reasonable, the court con- guage according to its conventions.’’). Even
cluded the statute was ambiguous. Id. at the Supreme Court defaults into the cate-
270. gorical approach when discussing the stat-
into the statute’’); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 biguous with one sentence of analysis, adopt-
F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996); Birkbeck v. ing the reasoning of Schaefer v. Transporta-
Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th tion Media, Inc., which itself had adopted the
Cir. 1994). reasoning of Kelly. 859 F.2d 1251, 1254 (7th
Cir. 1988) (citing Kelly, 801 F.2d 269). Mon-
9. Cink analyzes the entire interpretation ques- clova Township also adopts Kelly’s reasoning
tion in two sentences, adopting the reasoning about the provision being ambiguous without
of Kelly and the other circuits. 635 Fed.Appx. adding anything to the analysis. 920 F.2d at
at 474 n.5. Palmer concludes § 630(b) is am- 362–63.
1174 859 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES
ute. E.g., Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 233, 103 After concluding that the statute is am-
S.Ct. 1054; Johnson, 472 U.S. at 356, 105 biguous, Kelly relied on ‘‘the parallel
S.Ct. 2717. [1972] amendment of Title VII’’ and the
legislative history around the 1974 Amend-
3 ment to conclude ‘‘that Congress intended
[6] We are persuaded that the mean- section 630(b) to apply the same coverage
ing of § 630(b) is not ambiguous. The to both public and private employees.’’ 801
twenty-employee minimum does not apply F.2d at 271–72. Kelly’s focus on divining
to definitions in the second sentence and congressional intent, rather than determin-
there is no reason to depart from the ing the ordinary meaning of the text, led it
statute’s plain meaning. See Lamie v. U.S. astray. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 102, 128 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (‘‘It is well established 2395, 171 L.Ed.2d 283 (2008) (‘‘We have to
that when the statute’s language is plain, read [the ADEA] the way Congress wrote
the sole function of the courts—at least it.’’); Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The
where the disposition required by the text Interpretation of Legal Texts 391 (critiqu-
is not absurd—is to enforce it according to ing those who think ‘‘that the purpose of
its terms.’’). We are satisfied that our interpretation is to discover intent’’). We
reading comports with Lamie and certain- need not read minds to read text.
ly does not threaten to destroy the entire
Both parties argue that the 1972 Title
statutory scheme. See King v. Burwell, –––
VII Amendment supports their position.
U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2495, 192
But, critically, Congress used different lan-
L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) (preventing the de-
guage than it used in the 1974 ADEA
struction of the statutory scheme may jus-
Amendment, which changes the ADEA’s
tify departing from ‘‘the most natural
meaning relative to Title VII, and such
reading of the pertinent statutory
Congressional choice must be respected.
phrase’’). Courts should rarely depart from
See Univ. of Tex. SW Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
a statute’s clear meaning because it risks
––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528–29, 186
creating a perception that they are insert-
L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). If Congress had want-
ing their own policy preferences into a law.
ed the 1974 ADEA Amendment to achieve
See id. at 2495–96 (citing Palmer v. Mas-
the same result as the 1972 Title VII
sachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83, 60 S.Ct. 34, 84
Amendment, it could have used the same
L.Ed. 93 (1939)). Here, there is no valid
justification to depart from the plain mean-
ing of the language and to adopt another Nor does the legislative history Kelly
interpretation. relies on address the specific question be-
fore us. Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271–72. It refer-
C ences a Senate report written a year be-
Even if we agreed with the Fire District fore the bill was passed discussing how the
and concluded that the statute is ambigu- same set of rules should apply to the pri-
ous—which we do not—the outcome would vate sector and the government. Id. (citing
not change. The best reading of the stat- Senate Age Discrimination Report at 17).
ute would be that the twenty-employee The Senate report never states that the
minimum does not apply to a political sub- twenty-employee minimum should apply to
division of a State. We reject the Fire Dis- political subdivisions, but it does ‘‘urge
trict’s contention that considering the leg- that the law be extended TTT to include (1)
islative history Kelly reviewed should lead Federal, State, and local governmental em-
us to an alternative interpretation. ployees, and (2) employers with 20 or
U.S. v. CERVANTES 1175
Cite as 859 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2017)
more employees.’’ Senate Age Discrimina-
tion Report at 18 (emphasis added). It also UNITED STATES of America,
cites a House report containing the same Plaintiff-Appellee,
vague language about ensuring the same
rules apply and two floor statements by v.
Senator Bentsen, one of which occurred in
Steven CERVANTES, Defendant-
1972, arguing that the amendment is need-
ed so that government employees receive
the ‘‘same protection.’’ Id. (citing H.R. No. 15-50459
Rep. No. 93-913 (1974); 118 Cong. Rec.
15,895 (1972); 120 Cong. Rec. 8768 (1974)). United States Court of Appeals,
[7] Eventually, the Kelly court resort- Ninth Circuit.
ed to arguing that given its perception of
Argued and Submitted January 13,
Congressional intent, Congress could not
2017, Pasadena, California
have intended what it said. 801 F.2d at 273
(‘‘We also believe that applying the ADEA Filed June 19, 2017
to government employers with less than
twenty employees would lead to some ano- Background: Defendant was convicted,
malous results which we do not believe following a stipulated-facts bench trial, in
Congress would have intended.’’). Howev- the United States District Court for the
er, there are plenty of perfectly valid rea- Central District of California, No. 8:15-cr-
sons why Congress could have structured 00006-DOC-1, David O. Carter, J., for un-
the statute the way it did.10 In any event, it lawfully possessing counterfeit currency
is not our role to choose what we think is and images of counterfeit currency. Defen-
the best policy outcome and to override dant appealed.
the plain meaning of a statute, apparent
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Paul J.
anomalies or not. See Michigan v. Bay
Watford, Circuit Judge, held that:
Mills Indian Cmty., ––– U.S. ––––, 134
S.Ct. 2024, 2033, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). (1) police officers’ warrantless search of
defendant’s hotel room was reasonable
III under the Fourth Amendment;
that the twenty-employee minimum applies (2) defendant’s hotel room was not his res-
to political subdivisions; it does not. There- idence;
fore, the order granting summary judg- (3) defendant’s hotel room constituted
ment is reversed and the case is remanded premises;
for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. (4) police officers had probable cause to
believe that hotel room was under de-
fendant’s control;
, (5) officers did not violate California’s pro-
hibition against arbitrary, capricious,
or harassing searches; and
10. One can imagine policy reasons for all of lawsuits than small private-sector busi-
these choices. Perhaps Congress thinks that nesses or that government should be a model
government agencies, even very small ones of non-discrimination.
like the Fire District, can better bear the costs
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