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Colorado Court of Appeals: Maintenance Payor’s Good Faith Decision to Retire Does Not Automatically Require Grant of Motion to Modify
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Thorstad on Thursday, January 24, 2019.
Post-Dissolution Action—C.R.S. § 14-10-122(2)—Modification of Maintenance upon Retirement—Rebuttable Presumption—C.R.S. § 14-10-114.
The parties were divorced in 2002. They had a separation agreement that required husband to pay wife maintenance and reserved jurisdiction for the court to modify maintenance. Husband retired from his job, in part due to health problems. He requested termination of his maintenance obligation based on C.R.S. § 14-10-122(2)(a), (b), and (c), which establish a rebuttable presumption that a decision to retire was made in good faith when certain conditions are met. These subsections did not exist in their present form when the parties entered into their separation agreement. The magistrate granted the request. Wife sought review in the district court, which denied her petition.
On appeal, wife argued that the trial court erred when it relied on C.R.S. § 14-10-122 instead of C.R.S. § 14-10-114 when granting husband’s motion. C.R.S. § 14-10-122 was the correct statute for the trial court to use. However, if a payor satisfies the retirement provisions in subsections -122(2)(b) and (c) that the decision to retire was made in good faith, the payor’s good faith retirement becomes one of the factors for the court to consider in analyzing whether under subsection -122(1)(a) the payor can show a substantial and continuing change of circumstances that makes the existing maintenance order unfair. In doing so, the court must also consider the factors listed in the 2001 version of C.R.S. § 14-10-114(3) and (4) (the new version of C.R.S. § 14-10-114 is applicable to petitions filed on or after January 1, 2014). Here, the trial court erred because it treated husband’s good faith decision to retire as conclusive in resolving his motion; the order failed to address whether husband’s retirement and declining health were continuing and changed circumstances that rendered his obligation unfair; and the trial court did not consider husband’s and wife’s needs and abilities as required by the 2001 version of C.R.S. § 14-10-114(3) and (4). Further, the separation agreement did not reserve jurisdiction over the question of what effect husband’s retirement would have on his maintenance obligation. Thus, the separation agreement did not require the trial court to use C.R.S. § 14-10-114 to resolve husband’s motion instead of C.R.S. § 14-10-122(1)(a), (2)(a), (2)(b), and (2)(c).
The order was reversed and the case was remanded for the court to (1) determine whether husband’s circumstances have changed in such a substantial and continuing way as to make the existing terms of the maintenance obligation unfair, and (2) consider wife’s request for appellate attorney fees under C.R.S. § 14-10-119.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: Colorado Court of Appeals, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, maintenance
Colorado Supreme Court: Balancing Test Appropriate when Deciding Competing Interests of Potential Parents in IVF Divorce Case
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Rooks on Monday, October 29, 2018.
Divorce—Assisted Reproduction—Embryos.
In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, the supreme court reviewed how courts should resolve disagreements over the disposition of a couple’s cryogenically preserved pre-embryos when that couple divorces. The court held that because the underlying interests at stake are the equivalently important, yet competing, right to procreate and right to avoid procreation, courts should strive, where possible, to honor both parties’ interests in procreational autonomy. Thus, courts should look first to any existing agreement expressing the spouses’ intent regarding disposition of the couple’s remaining pre-embryos in the event of divorce. In the absence of such an agreement, courts should seek to balance the parties’ respective interests in receipt of the pre-embryos. In balancing those interests, courts should consider the intended use of the party seeking to preserve the pre-embryos; a party’s demonstrated ability, or inability, to become a genetic parent through means other than use of the disputed pre-embryos; the parties’ reasons for undertaking in vitro fertilization in the first place; the emotional, financial, or logistical hardship for the person seeking to avoid becoming a genetic parent; any demonstrated bad faith or attempt to use the pre-embryos as unfair leverage in the divorce process; and other considerations relevant to the parties’ specific situation. However, courts should not consider whether the party seeking to become a genetic parent using the pre-embryos can afford a child. Nor shall the sheer number of a party’s existing children, standing alone, be a reason to preclude preservation or use of the pre-embryos. Finally, courts should not consider whether the party seeking to become a genetic parent using the pre-embryos could instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological children. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case with directions to return the matter to the trial court to apply the announced balancing framework.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: assisted reproductive technology, Colorado Supreme Court, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, health law
Colorado Court of Appeals: C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) and “Plausibility” Standard Do Not Apply to C.R.C.P. 16.2 Motions
October 1, 2018 By CBA-CLE Staff Leave a Comment
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Durie on Thursday, September 20, 2018.
Division of Marital Property—C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) —Post-Dissolution Proceeding—C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).
Three years after a decree was entered incorporating a separation agreement dividing the parties’ marital property, wife moved under C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(10) to reallocate proceeds from husband’s post-decree sale of business assets. She alleged that husband had failed to disclose facts that materially impacted the value of the parties’ business assets. In response, husband filed a motion to dismiss wife’s motion. The district court applied the plausibility standard in Warne and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–56 (2007), and granted husband’s motion to dismiss. Wife moved for attorney fees, but the district court did not rule on her request.
On appeal, wife contended that the district court erred in dismissing her motion. After briefing, but before argument, a division of the court of appeals decided In re Marriage of Runge, 415 P.3d 884 (Colo.App. 2018), concluding that Rule 12(b)(5) and the Warne plausibility standard do not apply to a Rule 16.2(e)(10) motion. The court agreed with Runge and concluded that the district court erred in dismissing wife’s motion under that standard.
The court also rejected husband’s argument that C.R.C.P. 9(b), which requires that pleadings asserting fraud or mistake must allege the circumstances with particularity, applied in this context. Rule 16(e)(10) does not refer to fraud, but to misstatements or omissions. While some claims not denominated as fraud may be subject to the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements, the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement does not apply to Rule 16.2(e)(10) motions.
The parties also disagreed as to whether a movant under Rule 16.2(e)(10) can make allegations based on information and belief. The court concluded that Rule 8(e)(1) allows allegations based on information and belief in the context of a Rule 16.2(e)(10) motion, and wife properly included allegations based on information and belief in her motion.
However, wife’s allegations here did not enable the district court to conclude that her motion was sufficient on its face. The court instructed that (1) given Rule 16.2(e)(10)’s lack of applicable standard for determining a motion under the rule, a preponderance of the evidence standard should apply and the moving party bears the burden of proof; and (2) wife is entitled to undertake discovery in support of her motion.
The court further concluded that wife is entitled to seek attorney fees under C.R.S. § 14-10-119 on remand, but is not entitled to attorney fees under C.R.S. § 13-17-102. The district court may also award wife appellate attorney fees in its discretion under C.R.S. § 14-10-119.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: attorney fees, Colorado Court of Appeals, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, post-decree proceeding
August 15, 2018 By CBA-CLE Staff Leave a Comment
Dissolution of Marriage—Relocation—Parenting Time.
In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, mother notified the magistrate well before the permanent orders hearing that she wished to move with the children to California. She sought orders that would name her the children’s primary residential parent and decision-maker. Dr. Albert was appointed as an expert to conduct a parental responsibilities evaluation (PRE). He recommended that the children be allowed to relocate to California with mother and that she should have sole decision-making responsibility. At father’s request, the magistrate appointed Lieberman to perform a supplemental PRE. Lieberman recommended that the children remain in Colorado with father with shared decision-making responsibilities with mother. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the magistrate ordered the children to remain in Colorado, finding that their best interests would be served if the parents exercised equal parenting time with mutual decision-making responsibilities.
On appeal, mother contended that the magistrate erred by entering a parenting time order requiring her to remain in Colorado. When, as here, a parent indicates before permanent orders that she intends to move, a district court has no statutory authority to order her to live in a specific location. Mother’s admission that she would not “abandon” her children and move without them did not relieve the magistrate of his obligation to make the difficult decision to allocate parenting time with mother in California and father in Colorado.
Mother also contended that the magistrate erred in ordering mutual decision-making responsibilities over her objection and in the absence of credible evidence that the parents could work together. However, the magistrate reviewed the evidence and did not abuse his discretion in finding that the parties could make joint decisions and in ordering joint decision making.
The part of the judgment allocating parenting time was reversed and the case was remanded with directions. The judgment was otherwise affirmed.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: allocation of parental responsibilities, Colorado Court of Appeals, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, parenting time
Dissolution of Marriage—Post-Decree—Parenting Time—18 Years of Age.
In this post-dissolution of marriage action father moved to have the parenting plan terminated to allow the parties’ 16–year-old child to determine her own parenting time schedule. A district court magistrate denied father’s request, and while the appeal was pending, the child turned 18 years of age. On father’s petition for review to the district court, the court adopted the order.
Father filed his opening brief the day before the child turned 18. Mother moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that because the child is now an adult, the parenting time issues father raises on appeal cannot be resolved. Once the parties’ child turned 18, she attained the right to make her own decisions, including whether to visit her parents, rendering the issues father raises on appeal moot.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: Colorado Court of Appeals, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, emancipation, family law, parenting time
Colorado Supreme Court: Attorneys’ Charging Liens May Attach to Spousal Maintenance Awards
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Stoorman & Associates, P.C. v. Dixon on Monday, May 15, 2017.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: attorney fees, Colorado Supreme Court, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, litigation
Colorado Court of Appeals: Court Overrides Presumption of Fit Parent by Specifying Methods to be Used for Punishment
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Dean and Cook on Thursday, April 20, 2017.
Parenting Time—Contempt—Evidence—Transcripts—Magistrate—Exceeding Authority—Hearing—Attorney Fees—Reasonableness.
Dean (mother) and Cook (father) divorced in 2006. Father filed a contempt motion on the basis that mother denied his parenting time. On May 19, 2014, the court set the contempt hearing over and ordered mother to engage in therapy. On November 3, 2014, the court found mother in contempt of court, ordered that she could purge the contempt by allowing father to have the children during their 2014 Thanksgiving break, and ordered her to pay father’s attorney fees. Sentencing occurred on January 8, 2015, at which time the court ordered mother to pay father’s attorney fees.
On appeal, mother first contended that the magistrate improperly reconsidered the May 19 order when, on November 3, she changed the nature of the sanctions imposed. On May 19, the magistrate simply adopted the parties’ stipulation for mother to engage in therapy; the order was not imposed to force mother to comply with the parenting time stipulation. No sanctions were imposed until November 3, when the magistrate found mother guilty of remedial contempt.
Mother also challenged the evidence presented at the contempt and sentencing hearings, the weight the magistrate placed on that evidence, and the findings and inferences the magistrate made in her orders. Mother failed to provide a copy of the transcripts from the contempt and sentencing hearings to the district court when she sought review of the magistrate’s orders under C.R.M. 7(a). Therefore, it is presumed that the record supports the magistrate’s orders that mother failed to comply with the parties’ stipulation and was thus in remedial contempt.
Mother also contended that the magistrate exceeded her authority when she ordered mother to restrict the children’s privileges if they did not comply with her instructions to go to father’s home for parenting time. By specifying the methods mother must employ to obtain the children’s compliance, the magistrate’s order improperly disregards the presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Therefore, that portion of the order was stricken.
Mother further argued that the magistrate demonstrated bias against her and should have been disqualified. Mother’s allegations were based only on the magistrate’s legal rulings and the resolution of conflicting evidence, which are not bases for disqualification. Further, mother did not seek to have the magistrate disqualified under C.R.C.P. 97.
Lastly, mother argued that the magistrate should have held a hearing on the reasonableness of father’s attorney fee affidavit. Mother objected to father’s fee affidavit on the basis that it was ambiguous and lacked clarity, and she requested a hearing on the issue of reasonableness. Once she raised these assertions, the magistrate should have held a hearing on this issue.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: Colorado Court of Appeals, Colorado Rules for Magistrates, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, parenting time
Colorado Supreme Court: District Court Must Take Active Role in Managing Discovery Request of Non-Party in Dissolution Proceeding
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Gromicko on Monday, January 9, 2017.
In 2015, Lisa Dawn Gromicko (Wife) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, naming Nickifor Nicholas Gromicko (Husband) as respondent. The petition requested equitable division of marital assets and debts. In order to evaluate Husband’s income, Wife requested records from Husband’s employer, InterNACHI, a nonprofit organized as a § 501(c)(6) trade association. Although Husband initially stated he would not object to the production of certain records, he did not provide them, and Wife requested a status conference. Husband’s counsel, who was also InterNACHI’s general counsel, filed a motion in response to Wife’s discovery request, arguing (1) the only InterNACHI relevant to the divorce proceeding were those reflecting Husband’s compensation and expense reimbursements; (2) the court could not consider InterNACHI a marital asset because Wife did not allege grounds in her dissolution petition to pierce the corporate veil; and (3) the court could authorize Wife to serve a subpoena duces tecum on InterNACHI to produce the relevant documents. The court held the status conference but did not rule on the discovery issues.
Wife then served a subpoena duces tecum on InterNACHI requesting (1) Husband’s employment and compensation; (2) the employment by InterNACHI of any person related to Husband; (3) InterNACHI’s bookkeeping, accounting, and tax return or Form 990 preparation; and (4) InterNACHI’s conflict-of-interest policy. InterNACHI moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that many of the requested documents were privileged, confidential, and irrelevant to the dissolution proceeding. InterNACHI also renewed its motion that Wife did not allege any grounds sufficient to claim that InterNACHI was Husband’s alter ego and pierce the corporate veil. The court denied InterNACHI’s motion to quash, and it filed a C.A.R. 21 interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, InterNACHI argued that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to quash or modify Wife’s subpoena because (1) Wife was required to, but did not, plead in her dissolution petition a claim for piercing InterNACHI’s corporate veil and (2) certain of Wife’s discovery requests were irrelevant to her veil-piercing claim and thus were outside the scope of discovery permitted by C.R.C.P. 26. The court first analyzed the discovery requirements in domestic relations cases, which are governed by C.R.C.P. 16.2, and found that Wife was not required to plead in her dissolution petition a claim seeking to pierce InterNACHI’s corporate veil. However, the supreme court concluded the district court did not use the correct standard in evaluating InterNACHI’s objection to the requested discovery.
The court compared C.R.C.P. 16.2 to the discovery requirements in civil cases, governed by C.R.C.P. 26. The court found the two rules analogous. The court found that its holding in DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 2013 CO 36, applied in this case and required the district court to take an active role in managing discovery. The supreme court found that the district court should initially have granted Wife only such discovery as would reasonably have been necessary to allow her to attempt to establish the existence of the alter ego relationship that she claimed. The supreme court noted that if, after receiving limited discovery, Wife could prove that InterNACHI was Husband’s alter ego, she may then be entitled to receive the information in her initial request, but the court must actively monitor discovery pursuant to DCP Midstream.
The supreme court made its rule to show cause absolute and returned the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: business law, Colorado Supreme Court, discovery, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, litigation
Colorado Court of Appeals: Posting Bond is Necessary but Insufficient Condition to Stay Dissolution Proceedings
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Finn on Thursday, December 30, 2016.
Post-Dissolution Marriage Proceeding—Request for Stay—Romero v. City of Fountain.
Husband and wife had entered into a marital agreement. Wife later filed for dissolution of the marriage, and the trial court subsequently issued a detailed order directing husband to make certain payments to wife within 20 days. Husband filed a motion for post-trial relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59 and 60, which was denied. Husband appealed and also filed a motion for stay with the trial court and requested approval of his supersedeas bond; both requests were denied.
Pursuant to C.A.R. 8, husband sought a stay of the trial court’s orders requiring him to pay wife certain sums of money and to return her artwork and other personal property. Husband presented a redacted copy of a cashier’s check in the amount necessary for a supersedeas bond and represented that his counsel would deposit the check if his motion were granted.
Stays pending appeal are controlled by C.A.R. 8(a). Romero v. City of Fountain adopted a four-part test for determining whether a stay should be issued under CAR 8: (1) whether the moving party has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits, (2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted, (3) whether other interested parties would be harmed by granting the stay, and (4) whether the public interest will be harmed by granting the stay. Romero involved a motion to stay an order denying an injunction. Husband argued that Romero does not apply here.
A stay is an exercise of judicial discretion and not a matter of right. The Colorado Court of Appeals first concluded that posting a supersedeas bond alone is insufficient to mandate a stay in a family law case. As to both the monetary and nonmonetary orders, the court then determined that a court considering a stay of that part of a judgment involving marital and separate property must consider the first three Romero factors; the fourth factor, harm to the public interest, is ordinarily not relevant in the context of a dissolution of marriage. The court found that (1) husband had not made even a cursory showing as to why his appeal was likely to succeed on the merits; (2) husband’s contention that he faces “clear” irreparable harm if a stay is not granted was unpersuasive; and (3) wife would be harmed by the issuance of a stay, because she would be denied benefits she negotiated in the marital agreement.
The motion for stay was denied.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: appellate laws, bond, Colorado Court of Appeals, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, stay
Colorado Supreme Court: Laches Can Apply as Defense to Child Support Claim
September 30, 2016 By CBA-CLE Staff Leave a Comment
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Johnson on Monday, September 26, 2016.
Interest on Child Support Debt—Laches.
The Supreme Court considered whether a father may rely on the doctrine of laches to defend against a mother’s claim for the interest on his child support debt. The Court concluded that laches may be asserted as a defense to a claim for interest on child support arrearages. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which had concluded otherwise, and remanded this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Filed Under: Case Law Tagged With: child support, Colorado Supreme Court, dissolution of marriage, domestic relations law, family law, laches