Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100066/garment-workers-vs-labor-board
Timestamp: 2018-03-24 00:25:10
Document Index: 267415095

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 8']

Garment Workers Vs Labor Board - Citation 100066 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Garment Workers Vs. Labor Board - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/100066
Case Number 366 U.S. 731
Appellant Garment Workers
garment workers v. labor board - 366 u.s. 731 (1961) u.s. supreme court garment workers v. labor board, 366 u.s. 731 (1961) international ladies' garment workers' union, afl-cio v. national labor relations board no. 284 argued april 17, 1961 decided june 5, 1961 366 u.s. 731 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit syllabus in the bona fide but mistaken belief that a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit had authorized petitioner union to represent their interests, the union and the employer entered into an agreement under which the employer recognized the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain of its employees,.....
Garment Workers v. Labor Board - 366 U.S. 731 (1961)
U.S. Supreme Court Garment Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U.S. 731 (1961)
Held: the Board and the Court of Appeals correctly held that such extension and acceptance of recognition constituted unfair labor practices; the remedy provided was appropriate; and the judgment is affirmed. Pp. 366 U. S. 732 -740.
(a) A different conclusion is not required by the fact that the union subsequently obtained authorization from a majority of the employees to represent their interests, since the earlier recognition of the minority union was a fait accompli depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to choose their own representative. P. 366 U. S. 736 .
(b) The agreement was void in its entirety, and it cannot be held valid and enforcible as to those employees who consented to it. Pp. 366 U. S. 736 -737.
the nonconsenting majority, the employer violated both § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(2). Pp. 366 U. S. 737 -738.
(d) The employer's bona fide belief in the majority status of the union is no defense. Pp. 366 U. S. 738 -739.
(e) The remedy provided by the Board's order was proper. Pp. 366 U. S. 739 -740.
We are asked to decide in this case whether it was an unfair labor practice for both an employer and a union to enter into an agreement under which the employer recognized the union as exclusive bargaining representative of certain of his employees although, in fact, only a minority of those employees had authorized the union to represent their interests. The Board found [ Footnote 1 ] that, by extending such recognition, even though done in the good faith belief that the union had the consent of a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, the employer interfered with the organizational rights of his employees in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, and that such recognition also constituted unlawful support to a labor organization in violation
of § 8(a)(2). [ Footnote 2 ] In addition, the Board found that the union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) [ Footnote 3 ] by its acceptance of exclusive bargaining authority at a time when, in fact, it did not have the support of a majority of the employees, and this in spite of its bona fide belief that it did. Accordingly, the Board ordered the unfair labor practices discontinued and directed the holding of a representation election. The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, granted enforcement, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 280 F.2d 616. We granted certiorari. 364 U.S. 811. We agree with the Board and the Court of Appeals that such extension and acceptance of recognition constitute unfair labor practices, and that the remedy provided was appropriate.
striking employees had signed authorization cards solicited by the union during its drive, and, while the strike was in progress, the union entered upon a course of negotiations with the employer. As a result of those negotiations, held in New York City where the home offices of both were located, on August 30, 1957, the employer and union signed a "memorandum of understanding." In that memorandum, the company recognized the union as exclusive bargaining representative of "all production and shipping employees." The union representative asserted that the union's comparison of the employee authorization cards in its possession with the number of eligible employees representatives of the company furnished it indicated that the union had in fact secured such cards from a majority of employees in the unit. Neither employer nor union made any effort at that time to check the cards in the union's possession against the employee roll, or otherwise, to ascertain with any degree of certainty that the union's assertion, later found by the Board to be erroneous, [ Footnote 4 ] was founded on fact, rather than upon good faith assumption. The agreement, containing no union security provisions, called for the ending of the strike and for certain improved wages and conditions of employment. It also provided that a "formal agreement containing these terms" would "be promptly drafted . . . and signed by both parties within the next two weeks."
although more specific, conformed to that contained in the prior memorandum. It is not disputed that, as of execution of the formal contract, the union in fact represented a clear majority of employees in the appropriate unit. [ Footnote 5 ] In upholding the complaints filed against the employer and union by the General Counsel, the Board decided [ Footnote 6 ] that the employer's good faith belief that the union in fact represented a majority of employees in the unit on the critical date of the memorandum of understanding was not a defense, "particularly where, as here, the Company made no effort to check the authorization cards against its payroll records." 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292. Noting that the union was "actively seeking recognition at the time such recognition was granted," and that "the Union was [not] the passive recipient of an unsolicited gift bestowed by the Company," the Board found that the union's execution of the August 30 agreement was a "direct deprivation" of the nonconsenting majority employees' organizational and bargaining rights. At pp. 1292, 1293, note 9. Accordingly, the Board ordered the employer to withhold all recognition from the union and to cease giving effect to agreements entered into with the union; [ Footnote 7 ] the union was ordered to cease acting as bargaining representative of any of the employees until such time as a Board conducted election demonstrated its majority status, and to refrain from seeking to enforce the agreements previously entered.
The Court of Appeals found it difficult to "conceive of a clearer restraint on the employees' right of self-organization than for their employer to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a minority of the employees." 280 F.2d at 619. The court distinguished our decision in Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union No. 639, 362 U. S. 274 , on the ground that there was involved here neither recognitional nor organizational picketing. The court held that the bona fides of the parties was irrelevant except to the extent that it "was arrived at through an adequate effort to determine the true facts of the situation." 280 F.2d at 622.
vice in the agreement, and discussion of "collective bargaining," as distinguished from "exclusive recognition," is pointless. [ Footnote 8 ] Moreover, the insistence that we hold the agreement valid and enforceable as to those employees who consented to it must be rejected. On the facts shown, the agreement must fail in its entirety. It was obtained under the erroneous claim of majority representation. Perhaps the employer would not have entered into it if he had known the facts. Quite apart from other conceivable situations, the unlawful genesis of this agreement precludes its partial validity.
In their selection of a bargaining representative, § 9(a) of the Wagner Act guarantees employees freedom of choice and majority rule. J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332 , 321 U. S. 339 . In short, as we said in Brooks v. Labor Board, 348 U. S. 96 , 348 U. S. 103 , the Act placed "a nonconsenting minority under the bargaining responsibility of an agency selected by a majority of the workers." Here, however, the reverse has been shown to be the case. Bernhard-Altmann granted exclusive bargaining status to an agency selected by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the nonconsenting majority. There could be no clearer abridgment of § 7 of the Act, assuring employees the right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing" or "to refrain from" such activity. [ Footnote 9 ] It follows, without need
of further demonstration, that the employer activity found present here violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act, which prohibits employer interference with, and restraint of, employee exercise of § 7 rights. Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "contribute . . . support" to a labor organization. The law has long been settled that a grant of exclusive recognition to a minority union constitutes unlawful support in violation of that section, because the union so favored is given "a marked advantage over any other in securing the adherence of employees," Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261 , 303 U. S. 267 . In the Taft-Hartley Law, Congress added § 8(b)(1)(A) to the Wagner Act, prohibiting, as the Court of Appeals held, "unions from invading the rights of employees under § 7 in a fashion comparable to the activities of employers prohibited under § 8(a)(1)." 280 F.2d at 620. It was the intent of Congress to impose upon unions the same restrictions which the Wagner Act imposed on employers with respect to violations of employee rights. [ Footnote 10 ]
the Act -- that its prohibitions will go far to assure freedom of choice and majority rule in employee selection of representatives. [ Footnote 11 ] We find nothing in the statutory language prescribing scienter as an element of the unfair labor practices are involved. The act made unlawful by § 8(a)(2) is employer support of a minority union. Here, that support is an accomplished fact. More need not be shown, for, even if mistakenly, the employees' rights have been invaded. It follows that prohibited conduct cannot be excused by a showing of good faith. [ Footnote 12 ]
authorization cards. Individual and collective employee rights may not be trampled upon merely because it is inconvenient to avoid doing so. Moreover, no penalty is attached to the violation. Assuming that an employer in good faith accepts or rejects a union claim of majority status, the validity of his decision may be tested in an unfair labor practice proceeding. [ Footnote 13 ] If he is found to have erred in extending or withholding recognition, he is subject only to a remedial order requiring him to conform his conduct to the norms set out in the Act, as was the case here. No further penalty results. We believe the Board's remedial order is the proper one in such cases. Labor Board v. District 50, U.M.W, 355 U. S. 453 .
I agree that, under the statutory scheme, a minority union does not have the standing to bargain for all employees. That principle of representative government extends only to the majority. But where there is no majority union, I see no reason why the minority union should be disabled from bargaining for the minority of the members who have joined it. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Yet the order of the Board, now approved, enjoins petitioner union from acting as the exclusive bargaining representative "of any of the employees, and it enjoins the employer from recognizing
We have indicated over and again that, absent an exclusive agency for bargaining created by a majority of workers, a minority union has standing to bargain for its members. In Virginian R. Co. v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515 , 300 U. S. 549 , note 6, the Court quoted with approval a concession that,
That case was under the Railway Labor Act. But it has been followed under the National Labor Relations Act. In Edison v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197 , a union, the Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, was allowed to act as a bargaining representative for the employees who were its members, even though they were a minority. The Court said,
Id., 305 U. S. 237 . Maintenance of the status of a minority union, until an election was held, might well serve the purpose of protecting commerce "from interruptions and obstructions caused by industrial strife." Id., 305 U. S. 237 . A decree requiring the employer to cease recognizing the Brotherhood as the exclusive representative of its members was modified:
Id., 305 U. S. 239 .
It was in that tradition that we recently sustained the right of a minority union to picket peacefully to compel recognition. Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274 . There, a minority union sought to compel exclusive representation rights. To be sure, this Court recognized in that case that "tension exists between . . . [the] right to form, join or assist labor organizations and [the] right to refrain from doing so." Id., 362 U. S. 280 . But when a minority union seeks only to represent its own, what provision of the Act deprives it of its right to represent them, where a majority have not selected another union to represent them?
In that case, a minority union was recognized as having standing in a grievance proceeding outside the collective bargaining agreement, even where a majority had chosen another union. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 .
Honoring a minority union -- where no majority union exists or even where the activities of the minority union do not collide with a bargaining agreement -- is being respectful of history. Long before the Wagner Act, employers and employees had the right to discuss their problems. In the early days, the unions were representatives of a minority of workers. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The aim -- at least the hope --
of the legislation was that majority unions would emerge and provide stabilizing influences. Yet I have found nothing in the history of the successive measures, starting with the Wagner Act, that indicates any purpose on the part of Congress to deny a minority union the right to bargain for its members when a majority have not in fact chosen a bargaining representative. [ Footnote 2/3 ]
Second, the result of today's decision is to enjoin the employer from dealing with the union as the representative of its own members in any manner, whether in relation to grievances or otherwise, until it is certified as a majority union. A case for complete disestablishment of the union cannot be sustained under our decisions. While the power of the Board is broad, it is "not limitless." Labor Board v. Mine Workers, 355 U. S. 453 , 355 U. S. 458 . Thus, a distinction has been taken between remedies in situations where a union has been dominated by the employer and where unions have been assisted, but not dominated. Id., 355 U. S. 458 -459.