Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170118_0000079.ETN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-02-24 20:13:47
Document Index: 499855646

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4']

UNDERWOOD MILES, Petitioner,
Before the Court is Petitioner's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 33].[1] The Petitioner relies on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was unconstitutionally vague [Id.]. The United States responded in opposition on July 5, 2016 [Doc. 35]; Petitioner replied in turn [Doc. 36]. For the reasons below, Petitioner's § 2255 motion [Doc. 33] will be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In 2013, local police officers saw Petitioner, a convicted felon, shooting a firearm [Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 4]. Petitioner later pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which subjected him to a statutory penalty range of up to ten years' imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) [Id. ¶¶ 2, 59]. Based on a 1998 Tennessee conviction for attempted second-degree murder, the United States Probation Office assigned Petitioner an enhanced base offense level under Section 2K2.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines [Id. ¶¶ 22, 32].[2] After a four-level enhancement for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony offense and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Petitioner received a total offense level of twenty-one [Id. ¶¶ 13, 19-21]. Given his criminal history category of II, the United States Probation Office assigned Petitioner an advisory Guidelines range was 41 to 51 months' imprisonment [Id. ¶¶ 36, 60]. The Court sentenced Petitioner to 44 months' imprisonment on April 29, 2014 [Doc. 29]. No direct appeal was taken and his conviction became final for purposes of § 2255(f)(1) on May 13, 2014. See Sanchez-Castellano v. United States, 358 F.3d 424, 428 (6th Cir. 2004) (an unappealed judgment of conviction becomes final when the fourteen-day period for filing a direct appeal has elapsed).
The United States Supreme Court issued the Johnson decision on June 26, 2015. Petitioner filed the instant petition less than one year later [Doc. 33 (challenging base offense level)].
Section 2255(f) places a one-year statute of limitations on all petitions for collateral relief under § 2255 running from either: (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Supreme Court precedent makes clear that Johnson's invalidation of the ACCA residual clause amounted to a new rule made retroactively applicable on collateral review. See Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265 (U.S. 2016) (“Johnson is . . . a substantive decision and so has retroactive effect . . . in cases on collateral review.”); In re Windy Watkins, 810 F.3d 375, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding Johnson constitutes a new substantive rule of constitutional law made retroactively applicable on collateral review and thus triggers § 2255(h)(2)'s requirement for certification of a second or successive petition). It is yet to be seen whether the same is true of the “new rule” that results from application of Johnson's reasoning in the Guideline context. See Pawlak v. United States, 822 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that Johnson's vagueness analysis applies equally to the Guidelines and, as a result, that the parallel residual provision contained in Section 4B1.2 was void for vagueness); but see In re Embry, No. 16-5447, 2016 WL 4056056, at *1 (6th Cir. July 29, 2016) (recognizing that “it is not clear whether to treat Pawlak as a new rule that the Supreme Court has not yet made retroactive [to cases on collateral review] or as a rule dictated by Johnson that the Supreme Court has made retroactive”). The issue need not be resolved here, however, because the Johnson decision has no impact on Petitioner's case.
Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the criminal proceedings, Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353 (1994); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993), and he likewise bears the burden of articulating sufficient facts to state a viable claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A § 2255 motion may be dismissed if it only makes vague conclusory statements without substantiating allegations of specific facts and thereby fails to state a claim cognizable under § 2255. Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972).
Petitioner articulates a single ground for relief, arguing that the Johnson decision removed second-degree murder from Section 4B1.2's definition of “crime of violence” and, without that offense, he lacks the predicate offense required for application of an enhanced base offense level.
Section 2K2.1 sets a general base offense level of fourteen for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). U.S. Sentencing Manual § 2K2.1(a)(6). For offenders with one prior conviction for either a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense, ” the base offense level increases to twenty. U.S. Sentencing Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4). “Controlled substance offense” is defined as any offense “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S. Sentencing Manual § 4B1.2(b). “Crime of violence” is defined in an almost ...