Source: https://openjurist.org/380/f3d/1277/tandy-v-city-of-wichita
Timestamp: 2019-10-14 17:55:18
Document Index: 16987108

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 804', '§ 3604', '§ 812', '§ 3612', '§ 3604', '§ 1982', '§ 804', '§ 804', '§ 12132', '§ 804', '§ 12133', '§ 794', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 37']

380 F3d 1277 Tandy v. City of Wichita | OpenJurist
380 F. 3d 1277 - Tandy v. City of Wichita
380 F3d 1277 Tandy v. City of Wichita
380 F.3d 1277
Sylvia TANDY; Naomi Passman; Jeff Farney; Betty Allen; Joel Goertz; Joann Donnell; Victor Beltz; Ron Garnett; Mike Goupil; Carolyn Jeffries, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
CITY OF WICHITA, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, John Thomas Marten, J. Kirk W. Lowry, Topeka Independent Living Resource Center, Inc., Topeka, KS, for Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
The appellants and cross-appellees produced evidence that, at the commencement of this action in April 2001, it was known Wichita Transit had a history of unreliable service to disabled riders. Furthermore, in the 1980s, Wichita Transit bolted shut the lifts on its buses because it did not want to maintain them. In the ten years prior to the commencement of this action, Wichita Transit received over $50 million from the Federal Transit Authority to buy and maintain handicap accessible buses, to operate its transit system, and to build accessible facilities. At the time this case was filed in April 2001, Wichita Transit still designated several of its fixed bus routes as inaccessible.6 In the pretrial order, Wichita Transit stipulated that "[i]t is and has been the policy of Wichita Transit to designate certain bus routes as not accessible.... This designation allows the City to utilize buses not equipped for handling disabled passengers for the full useful life of those vehicles." Prior to the commencement of this suit, Wichita Transit had ordered buses which were expected to make its fixed routes 100% accessible to mobility impaired riders.7 These buses were scheduled to be delivered by April 2002.
This court reviews issues of standing de novo. Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.2003). Article III of the Constitution of the United States restricts the federal courts to the adjudication of "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). The standing inquiry ensures that a plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in a dispute to ensure the existence of a live case or controversy which renders judicial resolution appropriate. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she has suffered an "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action10 of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by the relief requested. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding that to satisfy the traceability requirement, the injury must not result from the independent action of some third party not before the court).
The "injury in fact" requirement is satisfied differently depending on whether the plaintiff seeks prospective or retrospective relief. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). To seek prospective relief, the plaintiff must be suffering a continuing injury or be under a real and immediate threat of being injured in the future. Id. at 101-02, 107 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. Id. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660. The threatened injury must be "certainly impending" and not merely speculative. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693 (quotation omitted). A claimed injury that is contingent upon speculation or conjecture is beyond the bounds of a federal court's jurisdiction. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). A plaintiff seeking retrospective relief, on the other hand, satisfies the "injury in fact" requirement if she suffered a past injury that is concrete and particularized. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-11, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995).
Moreover, Allen's averred intent to use Wichita Transit's buses "several times per year" is not a mere "someday intention." Speculative, "someday" intentions do not support standing to seek prospective relief. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 500-01 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding that intent to undertake research at some unidentified future time is not sufficiently imminent to support standing to seek an injunction). Allen's testimony of an intent to use buses "several times per year" suggests a concrete, present plan to use Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses several times each year, including the year in which she made that statement. In contrast, the plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife, whom the Supreme Court held did not show an "injury in fact," had merely expressed a desire to someday visit places halfway around the world. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184, 120 S.Ct. 693 (discussing Defenders of Wildlife); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Unlike Allen, those plaintiffs had neither present concrete plans nor any specification of when"someday" would be. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Allen's intent to use Wichita Transit's buses "several times per year" cannot be equated with the Defenders of Wildlife plaintiffs' mere intent to return to foreign countries at "some indefinite future time."12 Id. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Thus, Allen has established an injury in fact that is sufficiently impending to support standing to seek prospective relief.
Finally, Allen's injury is redressable by the requested prospective relief. "It can scarcely be doubted that, for a plaintiff who is injured or faces the threat of future injury due to illegal conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a sanction that effectively abates that conduct and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185-86, 120 S.Ct. 693. Both injunctive and declaratory relief can effectively abate Wichita Transit's alleged injurious conduct and prevent its recurrence. It is therefore likely, and not merely speculative, that an injunction or a declaratory judgment would remedy Allen's injury in fact. Thus, Allen has standing to seek prospective relief.
The Supreme Court has held that the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") supports "`tester' standing." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374-75, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). In Havens Realty, the Supreme Court held that an African-American tester who was given misinformation about the availability of a rental property had alleged sufficient injury in fact to support standing to sue under the FHA. 455 U.S. at 374, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The Havens Realty tester never intended to rent the apartment. Id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The tester's sole purpose was, like the testers in this case, to determine whether defendant engaged in unlawful practices. Id.
The Havens Realty Court held that congressional intention cannot be overlooked in determining whether testers have standing to sue under a particular statutory scheme. Id. The Court reasoned that the actual or threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of a congressional "statute creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing." Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, the injury underlying tester standing stems from the denial of the tester's statutory rights. Id. at 374-75, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Critical to the Havens Realty Court's conclusion that the statutory provisions at bar supported tester standing was the language of those provisions. Id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. FHA § 804(d), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), which is enforceable through § 812, id. § 3612(a), makes it unlawful for a firm covered by the act to misrepresent the availability of a dwelling "to any person because of race." Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (emphasis in the original). The Court reasoned that this broad statutory language, alongside the FHA's purpose of eliminating racial discrimination in housing, evinced a congressional intent to confer standing "to the full limits of Article III," which includes tester standing. Id. at 372-74, 102 S.Ct. 1114.
Circuit courts have followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Havens Realty to hold that tester standing exists under other anti-discrimination statutory provisions. See, e.g., Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir.2004) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that disabled testers who sue under § 3604(f)(2) of the FHA and who have experienced the "dignitary harm" of observing discriminatory conditions have standing); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir.2000) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that employment discrimination testers who were discriminated against had standing to sue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Watts v. Boyd Props., Inc., 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.1985) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that fair housing testers had standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1982). Each of these circuits relied upon the statutory provision's broad language and anti-discriminatory purpose in concluding that testers had standing to sue. See Smith, 358 F.3d at 1103-04; Kyles, 222 F.3d at 297-99; Watts, 758 F.2d 1482, 1484-85.
Consistent with Havens Realty and other circuits' application of that holding to similarly broad language in other anti-discrimination statutes, this court holds that tester standing exists under Title II of the ADA. The Havens Realty Court emphasized FHA § 804(d)'s use of the phrase "any person" in concluding that this statutory language created legal rights, the invasion of which constitutes the actual or threatened injury required by Article III. 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The language of Title II of the ADA parallels in all important respects the language of FHA § 804(d). Title II of the ADA states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in... the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). The plain language of Title II evinces Congress' intent to confer upon a "qualified individual with a disability" a legal right not to be excluded from participation in the services of a public entity by reason of her or his disability. Title II's words "no" and "shall" function like § 804(d)'s phrase "any person" because, read in context, these words clearly proscribe discrimination against any person who is a "qualified individual with a disability."
The propriety of our construction of Title II's language is reinforced by Title II's enforcement provision. The enforcement provision extends the "remedies, procedures, and rights" under the statute to "any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of [Title II]." 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (emphasis added). Moreover, the ADA, like the FHA provisions at issue in Havens Realty, embodies a congressional intent to eradicate discrimination. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 ("The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities...."). Thus, the totality of Title II's plain language, the plain language of its enforcement provision, and the statutory scheme's anti-discriminatory purpose lead this court to conclude that Congress intended Title II to confer standing to the full limits of Article III. Cf. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372-74, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Therefore, we hold that testers have standing to sue under Title II of the ADA.
Likewise, tester standing exists under the Rehabilitation Act. The language of the Rehabilitation Act also evinces Congress' intent to confer standing to the outer limits of Article III. Like Title II of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act states that "[n]o ... qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from [] participation in ... or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance...." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (emphasis added). This language, which parallels the language of Title II of the ADA, shows Congress' intent to confer upon a "qualified individual with a disability" a legal right not to be excluded from participation in any program receiving federal funds. The Rehabilitation Act, like Title II of the ADA, uses the words "no" and "shall" to proscribe discrimination against any person who is a "qualified individual with a disability." This creates a "legal right, the invasion of which confers standing." Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Thus, tester standing exists under the Rehabilitation Act.14
Garnett has no standing to seek prospective relief. At the summary judgment stage of litigation, the elements of standing must be set forth by affidavit or other evidence. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Mere allegations do not suffice. Id. Unlike the other appellants, Garnett submitted no affidavit stating an intent to utilize Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses in the future. He merely alleged, in the complaint, that he "desires" to use Wichita Transit's fixed-route bus system. Because of this case's summary judgment posture, Garnett's mere allegation does not suffice to establish that he is under a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. Therefore, Garnett has no standing to seek prospective relief.
Likewise, the portion of Donnell's injury in fact which stems from the driver's conduct is causally connected to the action which she seeks to have adjudicated. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). The relevant conduct which Donnell seeks to have adjudicated is Wichita Transit's failure to comply with 49 C.F.R. § 37.167, which interprets Title II of the ADA. The language of this section is mandatory, and states, in relevant part, that "the entity shall announce stops" and that "the entity shall ask ... persons to move in order to allow the individual with a disability to occupy [a] seat." 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(b), (j)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the conduct which Donnell seeks to have adjudicated is Wichita Transit's failure, as the "entity" in question, to comply with these provisions. Under these circumstances, Wichita Transit's policies of providing designated seats, calling out stops, and driver training, do not suffice to break the causal link between Donnell's injury in fact and the conduct which she seeks to have adjudicated. Because the conduct she seeks to have adjudicated is Wichita Transit's failure to comply with 49 C.F.R. § 37. 167(b) and (j)(1), Donnell's injury in fact does not merely result from "the independent action of some third party not before the court." Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quotation omitted). Therefore, the portion of Donnell's injury in fact which stems from the driver's conduct satisfies the traceability prong of the standing inquiry.
B. MOOTNESS15
In addition, the portion of appellants' claims that were based on the real and immediate threat of being denied a ride because of the driver-discretion policy17 are moot. The burden of establishing mootness by voluntary compliance is a heavy one. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189-90, 120 S.Ct. 693. A request for prospective relief can be mooted by a defendant's voluntary compliance if the defendant meets the "formidable burden" of demonstrating that it is "absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Id. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693. Such a burden will typically be met only by changes that are permanent in nature and that foreclose a reasonable chance of recurrence of the challenged conduct. See id. Wichita has met this burden with respect to the portion of appellants' injuries-in-fact which were based upon its driver-discretion policy. Wichita has submitted documents dated March 14 and 18, 2003, which establish that: (1) since the spring of 2002, all of Wichita Transit's fixed bus routes have been "equipped entirely with lift accessible buses"; (2) there are no remaining inaccessible bus routes; and (3) drivers are instructed to deploy lifts at all bus stops for disabled riders. This evidence establishes that both Wichita Transit's policy of designating routes as inaccessible and its driver-discretion policy have been discontinued. Nothing in the record suggests that Wichita Transit intends to resume its discontinued policies if this case is dismissed as moot. Under such circumstances, it is "absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Id.; see Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1223 (10th Cir.2001) (evidence that defendant intends to resume its wrongful conduct can preclude mootness by voluntary compliance).
Despite our conclusion that the claims for prospective relief against Wichita Transit's driver-discretion policy are now moot, we need not vacate the district court's grant of an injunction against that policy. When a portion of a case becomes moot while on appeal, this court generally vacates the relevant portion of the judgment below and remands with a direction to dismiss. See Boullioun Aircraft Holding Co. v. Smith Mgmt. (In re Western Pac. Airlines, Inc.), 181 F.3d 1191, 1197 (10th Cir.1999). "Vacatur, however, is an equitable remedy, and a key consideration in determining its appropriateness is whether the party seeking vacatur caused the mootness through voluntary action." Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that "it is far from clear that vacatur ... would be the appropriate response to a finding of mootness on appeal brought about by the voluntary conduct of the party that lost in the District Court." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 194 n. 6, 120 S.Ct. 693. Wichita has not presented any equitable consideration which would justify vacatur despite the fact that mootness was brought about by Wichita Transit's voluntary compliance. Therefore, this court declines to vacate the district court's injunction against Wichita Transit's driver-discretion policy.
The threshold standing inquiry in no way depends on the merits of a plaintiff's contention that the challenged conduct is illegalWhitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990).
This threshold standing inquiry in no way depends on the merits of the contention that Wichita Transit's lift malfunctions are illegalSee Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717.
Wichita Transit claims that it conducts regular lift maintenance. This assertion, which relates to the merits of Allen's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, is irrelevant to standingSee Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717. Allen's injury — inability to access the bus — is surely traceable to Wichita Transit's alleged failure to maintain the lifts in operable order.
Because Congress conferred standing under Title II of the ADA and under the Rehabilitation Act to the full limits of Article III, this court cannot employ prudential considerations to deprive the appellants-testers of standingSee Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982).
Although the parties do not argue Article III mootness on appeal, this court has an affirmative obligation to consider this questionsua sponte. See Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir.2004).
The district court should decide on remand whether Beltz's claims for retrospective relief survive his death. If Beltz's claims are non-surviving, his claim for damages would also be mootedSee Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 192, 120 S.Ct. 693.
Goertz, Passman, and Tandy all averred facts that would have supported initial standing to seek prospective relief based on a real and immediate threat of being denied a ride. For those reasons set outinfra, however, the appellants' and cross-appellees' claims relating to the driver-discretion policy are moot. Accordingly, the only justiciable claim presented by cross-appellees for prospective relief is the claim relating to Wichita Transit's failure to properly maintain bus lifts. See supra pp. 1283-1285.