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Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and Beyond, by David S. Kris | Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act | United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
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A Single British Soldier: On Extended Deterrence and Security Guarantees for America's Allies, by Josef Joffe
International Spillover Effects: The US Encryption Debate
in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
THE FAA AND BEYOND
DAVID S. KRIS
Aegis Paper Series No. 1601
It is a strange time for national security. Beginning in 2013, Edward Snowdens leaks caused
the US government to significantly reduce the scope, and increase the transparency, of its
foreign intelligence surveillance, while the president urged caution and restraint in response
to the extraordinary rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). At the same time,
US communications providers sought additional reforms and reduced their cooperation with
surveillance directives in important cases. Finally, anti-surveillance politicians, on the right
and left of the US political spectrum, prospered as part of a burgeoning populist movement.
In Western Europe, by contrast, ISILs rise spurred a significant and overt expansion of
surveillance authorities. European governments, particularly the United Kingdom, began
making increasingly strident demands for communications data from US providers. Andthe
European Union struck down the safe-harbor regime for trans-Atlantic data sharing on
the grounds that US surveillance laws do not adequately protect privacy. Despite increased
transparency, as of January 2016, the immense technical and legal complexity of US
surveillance law continues to challenge informed debate across all of these fronts.
In this highly charged and confused environment, Congress will soon take up the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act(FAA), which is set to expire at the
end of 2017. I make six predictions about the issues likely to dominate that legislative
process. Most of those issues concern incremental change, and a range of possible outcomes
well within existing legal and policy paradigms; many are explained in a 2014 report by
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). All of the following issues are
important: the upstream collection of communications about non-US persons located
abroad (less than 10percent of FAA collection, and probably unavoidable for technical
reasons); US person queries of FAA data (fewer than 200 conducted by NSA in 2013, more
by other agencies); statutorily required or forbidden sharing of raw FAA data with foreign
partners (now dealt with through FISA Court-approved minimization procedures); the
authorized purposes of FAA collection (likely not to affect existing collection very much);
andNSA compliance issues (already well publicized, dealt with by the court and congressional
This paper was completed and first submitted for prepublication review on December 8, 2015, and then
edited, resubmitted, and finally cleared in its present form on February 8, 2016. I am grateful to the
participants in the Hoover Institutions conference, The Next Wave of Surveillance Reform, for their helpful
oversight, and unlikely to result in significant FAA amendments, but perhaps significant for
the long run as the intelligence community moves data to the cloud). But they are unlikely to
have a revolutionary effect on security or privacy, except perhaps in the aggregate. The one
exception concerns surveillance under Executive Order 12333, which is very likely to arise in
connection with FAA renewal, but is difficult todiscuss at present because it is the subject of
a forthcoming report from the PCLOB.
I also make predictions about political and technological trends that I think will have the
biggest impact on surveillance in the longer run. These predictions are more speculative
thanthe ones discussed above. They include increasing pressure on FISAs technical
assistance provisions, partly due to challenges posed by widespread and varied encryption;
two gaps in US law resulting from outdated assumptions that providers will voluntarily
cooperate when surveillance requests are certified as lawful but compliance is not compelled;
a growing but so far unmet need for international agreements to resolve cross-border
data requests; the increasing indeterminacy of location on the Internet and the resulting
foundational threat to US surveillance law; the Internet of Things and fintech, which
promise to pose a host of practical, legal, and cultural challenges; and the increasing
availability of open source and social media, which creates significant problems and
opportunities for US intelligence and counter-intelligence. At present, I fear that most of
theseissues, with the possible exception of cross-border data requests, are not very well in
focus at the highest levels of the executive and legislative branches. But I believe that they
should be considered soon, either in connection with FAA renewal or in a separate process,
because they have the potential to cause significant change over the next several years.
Technological and political developments in the next few years will have a major
impact on US national security and the law that governs it, including surveillance
law. Part 1 of this paper provides historical background for the discussion of those
developments, beginning with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
Amendments Act(FAA) in 2008, but focused particularly on developments since mid2013. Part 2 presents six issues that I think are most likely to arise in connection with
a legislative extension ofthe FAA, which is otherwise set to expire at the end of 2017.
These issues are already well in focus, largely due to reports from the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board(PCLOB), and should persist absent major disruption, such
as a significant terrorist attack on the United States, or perhaps the result of our 2016
presidential election. With one possible exception, concerning Executive Order 12333,
these issues concern only incremental change and fit comfortably within existing
legal and policy paradigms; although important, they are unlikely to have a profound
effect on security or privacy. Part 3 of the paper looks further ahead. It discusses
six political andtechnological trends that I think will have the biggest impact on
surveillance in thelonger run, and explains why many of them should be considered
David S. Kris Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
now. These longer-term predictions are more speculative, but they concern issues that
are potentially far more significant than those addressed in part 2; I hope they will be
interesting even if ultimately proven wrong. Part 4 of the paper is a short conclusion.
The predictions discussed below make sense only when considered in historical context.
Issues likely to arise in connection with the FAAs renewal in 2017, discussed in part 2,
require an understanding of the statutes enactment in 2008 and the PCLOBs major
report on the law in 2014.1 The longer-term issues discussed in part 3 make sense only
against the turbulent backdrop of the last two or three years, beginning with the first
unauthorized disclosure from Edward Snowden in June 2013 and including the rise of
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
A. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008
The FISA Amendments Act (FAA) was enacted by Congress in 2008 to address both
political and technological changes from the preceding several years. Politically,
Congress passed the FAA in response to unauthorized disclosures about the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP) ordered by President George W. Bush shortly after the
September 11, 2001, attacks. Revealed by the New York Times in December 2005, the
TSP allowed the National Security Agency (NSA) to acquire the contents of international
communications, to or from the United States, when one communicant was suspected
of being linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. Although subject to FISA,
surveillance under the TSP did not comply with the statute and generated enormous
controversy, centered on the presidents power to disregard statutes under Article II
of the Constitution. Roughly speaking, the FAA amended FISA to authorize the TSP,
although it also reiterated that, as amended, FISA is the exclusive means by which
such surveillance can be conducted.2
Technologically, the FAA modernized FISA in response to changing conditions. In
particular, the rise of web-based e-mail and other developments made it more difficult
to determine the location of parties to an intercepted communication. With FISAs rules
so heavily dependent on knowledge of those locations, the statute became difficult to
administer; it also required a high level of legal protection for surveillance of e-mail
acquired from storage in the United States, even if both sender and recipient were nonUS persons, located abroad, with no other connection to this countrysomething
the drafters of FISA clearly did not contemplate in 1978. The FAAs central innovation,
in section702 of the law, was to reduce protections for surveillance targeting non-US
persons reasonably believed to be located abroad, regardless of the location of their
interlocutors. Section702 authorized such surveillance without the FISA Court making
any finding about the particular person or facility (e.g., an e-mail address) being
surveilled.3
The FAA profoundly affected the scope of US foreign intelligence surveillance, at least
under FISA. In 2014, 92,707 persons were targeted under section 702, up from 89,138 the
year before. This compares to 1,562 persons targeted in 2014 under traditional FISA and
FAA703 and 704, up from 1,144 the year before. FAA surveillance covers far more
persons than does traditional FISA surveillance.4
B. The Snowden Disclosures Lead the United States to Limit Surveillance
The Edward Snowden disclosures, and the governments response to them, had a major
effect on US politics and policy, igniting debates about secret law and surveillance
excesses and spurring resistance to governmental surveillance from communications
providers.5 The disclosures, which began in June2013 and continued with the assistance
of some very skilled journalists, were quite significant in their own right, showing that
the FISA Court had authorized NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
collect the records (but not the contents) of a huge number of telephone calls, including
domestic calls. The disclosures claimed to reveal many other things, as well, not all of
which have been confirmed by the US government.
The disclosures arrived at a time of post-9/11 fatigue. They were preceded, in
May2013,by a speech in which the president announced that while we were still
threatened by terrorism, [t]here have been no large-scale attacks on the United
States... our homeland is more secure and the threat has shifted and evolved from
the one that came to our shores on 9/11. He declared that this war, like all wars, must
end, that America was at a crossroads, and that the future of terrorism... [and]
the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11. The
president also stated in the May2013 speech that he was troubled by the possibility
that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government
accountable, and he had directed the attorney general to convene a group of media
organizations to hear their concerns as part of [a] review of Department of Justice (DOJ)
guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters.6 In short, the president
stated shortly before the Snowden disclosures, the terrorist threat was reduced and the
government should be less aggressive in response to leaks of classified information.
The presidents initial response to Snowden, in June 2013, was to dismiss him as a
twenty-nine-year-old hacker and publicly to prioritize relations with Russia and China
over demands for his extradition:
[W]eve got a whole lot of business that we do with China and Russia. And Im not going
to have one case of a suspect who were trying to extradite suddenly being elevated to the
point where Ive got to start doing wheeling and dealing and trading on a whole host of
other issues simply to get a guy extradited, so that he can face the Justice system here in
the United States.... And Im sure there will be a made-for-TV movie somewhere down
the line.... But one last thing... no, Im not going to be scrambling jets to get a twentynine-year-old hacker.7
By August 2013, the government had affirmatively embraced the demand for greater
scrutiny generated by the disclosures, with the president asserting that he had in fact
called for a thorough review of our surveillance operations before Mr. Snowden made
these leaks. The president explained that he had never made claims that all the
surveillance technologies that have developed since the time some of these laws had
been put in place somehow didnt require potentially some additional reforms. In
fact, he stated, Thats exactly what I called for in the May 2013 speech.8 And while
Mr.Snowdens leaks triggered a much more rapid and passionate response than would
have been the case if I had simply appointed [a] review board to go through, and I had
sat down with Congress and we had worked this thing through... I actually think
wewould have gotten to the sameplace.9
As those reviews were unfolding, US communications providers continued to push
for additional reforms. One of the most prominent and thoughtful advocates in that
area was Microsoft, which, through its then-General Counsel Brad Smith, identified a
technology trust deficit due to the Snowden disclosures and outlined the unfinished
business required to close it.10 In part, at least, Microsoft was understandably concerned
that, in the absence of visible reform, its European counterparts were enjoying a
competitive advantage in the form of perceived relative immunity from surveillance.
As Smith put it, people have real questions and concerns about how their data are
protected. These concerns have real implications for cloud adoption. After all, people
wont use technology they dont trust. We need to strike a better balance between
privacy and national security to restore trust and uphold our fundamental liberties.11
One of the key points, Smith explained, was limiting cross-border data requests: Were
concerned about governmental attempts to use search warrants to force companies to
turn over the contents of non-US customer communications that are stored exclusively
outside the United States.12 Microsoft ultimately chose to resist a directive issued under
the US Stored Communications Act by the DOJ to produce e-mail of a suspected drug
dealer on the grounds that the e-mail was stored in Ireland, rather than in the United
States.13 The introduction to its brief in the Second Circuit used informal language
capable of being understood by a broader audience than the three-judge panel hearing
the case.14
By the fall of 2013, the government had made a bold decision to decrease the scope,
and increase the transparency, of US foreign intelligence surveillance, recalibrating the
balance between security and privacy in favor of the latter. In October, Lisa Monaco,
thepresidents counterterrorism adviser, wrote in USA Today of the administrations
desire to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are appropriately protected, promised
even greater focus to ensuring that we are balancing our security needs with...
privacy concerns, and committed to ensure we are collecting information because
we need it and not just because we can.15 The editorial, which noted with approval
the ongoing review of the FAA by the PCLOB, was a powerful statement of the
administrations commitment to curtail perceived foreign intelligence surveillance
excesses and to emphasize privacyi.e.,to do less surveillance than legally permitted
based on policy preferences.
This approach found formal articulation in Presidential Policy Directive-28 (PPD-28)
and a speech given by President Obama at the Department of Justice in January 2014.
In essence, the government committed to (1)introduce outside advocates into the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which was later accomplished in the USA
Freedom Act of 2015, (2)adopt more stringent minimization procedures for US person
information incidentally collected under FAA702, and (3) end bulk collection of
telephony metadata, also accomplished in the USA Freedom Act.16
It also committed to take what the president termed the unprecedented step of
adding new protections for non-US persons, including requirements that intelligence
surveillance take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and
respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they may reside and recognize the
legitimate privacy and civil liberties concerns of... citizens of other nations. Under
PPD-28, [p]rivacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in the planning
of US signals intelligence activities, including for foreign persons. This makes a stark
contrast with the language of Executive Order(EO)12333, in force since the Reagan
administration, which focuses almost exclusively on the privacy interests of US
persons.17 Implementation of PPD-28 remains ongoing as of this writing, but many steps
have apparently been taken to limit surveillance and protect foreigners privacy rights
and dignity.18 One recent paper identified at least two dozen measures undertaken since
2013 to reform surveillance laws and programs.19 In the fall of 2015, the administration
also decided not to support legislation requiring providers to retain access to encrypted
communications that they transmit.20 There is no question but that President Obama
and his senior national security advisers have significantly reduced the scope, and
increased the transparency, of US foreign intelligence surveillance since mid-2013: it
may be their chief legacy in this area.21
While the White House was curtailing surveillance and providers were pushing for
even more curtailment, anti-surveillance political positions, tied to populism on both
the right and the left, were on the rise in the United States.22 The shift was especially
visible in the Republican Party, which witnessed the advent of the Tea Party soon after
President Obamas election23 and, at this writing, features Donald Trump as its leading
presidential candidate.24 Trump is trailed closely by Senator Ted Cruz, despite Cruzs
anti-surveillance positions,25 for which he has been criticized by other Republican
candidates.26 Few observers during the administration of the last Republican president,
George W. Bush, would have predicted this state of affairs. On the Democratic side,
Bernie Sanders continues at this writing to enjoy strong standing in his race with
Hillary Clinton, despite being one of only sixty-seven members of Congress to have
voted against the USA Patriot Act in 2001 (and again in 2011).27 Of course, it can be
difficult to separate the politics of surveillance from broader political trends, and
the range of US public opinion on surveillance surely derives in some part from the
recent positions of the executive branch, which is often the proponent of more rather
than less surveillance. Whatever the causes, however, there is no question but that
American politics has over the past few years shifted to embrace more anti-surveillance
positions (although the attacks in Paris and San Bernardino have provided some recent
counterweight to that shift).
C. ISILs Rise Leads Europe to Increase Surveillance
During this same period, while the United States was restricting its foreign intelligence
surveillance, European governments were expanding their surveillance authorities, in
response to growing concerns about ISIL and other terrorist groups. During 2013 and
2014, ISIL rose to power, taking credit for attacks killing eighty-eight people in Iraq in
January2013,28 announcing its merger with the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra group in April,29
orchestrating a large prison break in Iraq in July,30 and capturing Syrian oil fields in
November.31 In 2014, ISIL took Fallujah in January,32 directed or inspired an attack
on a Jewish museum in Belgium in May,33 took Mosul and announced a caliphate in
June,34 and released video of the execution of two US journalists in early September35
and of a UK humanitarian worker later that month.36 Although the president in early
2014 seemed to dismiss ISIL as unimportant,37 by later in the year he made clear that
ISIL was a significant threat, at least in the Middle East,38 and focused, at least initially,
on regional containment.39 By late 2015, ISIL had probably recruited at least 4,500
Westerners to its cause, many of them with European passports, and some of whom
returned to Europe to conduct attacks.40
At the same time, global instability was rising, and failed states like Yemen and Libya
created more safe havens for terrorists. From 20132015, al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula(AQAP) took advantage of instability and proxy fighting between Iran and
Saudi Arabia in Yemen. In December 2013, for example, AQAP attacked the Yemeni
Ministry of Defense, killing fifty-six people; in September 2014, Houthi rebels took
control of Sanaa; in March2015, President Hadi was forced to flee the country (and
later returned); and by April2015, AQAP had seized the fifth-largest Yemeni city
(andemptied its bank and prison), an oil terminal, a military base, and an airport
in southern Yemen.41 AQAP also claimed credit for the January2015 attack on Charlie
Hebdo in Paris.42 During this period, Libya also essentially fell into civil war; the United
Nations withdrew in July of that year. By 2015, ISIL had a well-established presence and
was reportedly using Libya as a gateway toEurope.43
Witnessing these developments in 2014 and 2015, in contrast to the United States,
European countries developed new and expanded surveillance authorities.44 The
Council of Europes Commissioner for Human Rights aptly summarized the situation in
October2015, recounting efforts to expand surveillance authority in France, Germany,
Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland (and probably having in mind similar efforts in
the United Kingdom and Canada):
When Edward Snowden disclosed details of Americas huge surveillance program two
years ago, many in Europe thought that the response would be increased transparency and
stronger oversight of security services. European countries, however, are moving in the
opposite direction. Instead of more public scrutiny, we are getting more snooping.45
Further expansions of European surveillance are likelysuch as the UKs remarkable
draft Investigatory Powers bill, discussed below.46
At this writing, in the aftermath of the Paris and San Bernardino attacks in late 2015,
further attacks in the West from ISIL and other terrorist groups seem almost inevitable.47
Indeed, ISILs ascendancy represents a significant change in paradigm due to several
factors, chief among them that an international terrorist group has now become
essentially a state actor, with control of significant territory, large sums of money and
income (measured in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars), and a worldwide
strategy that includes a growing focus on external operations and an expanding cadre
of geographically dispersed affiliates and allies.48 As such, particularly due to its oil
revenue and thousands of Western recruits, ISIL clearly has far greater resources in
materiel and personnel than groups like al Qaeda.49 Even if ISIL loses control of much
of its territory, it is quite unlike any recent international terrorist group (and even if
ultimately degraded or defeated, it will leave the Middle East more unstable).50 It is not
hard to imagine ISIL and the West moving into a kind of relatively limited war, with
the West bombing but not sending significant numbers of ground troops to ISIL-held
territory, and ISIL directing, sponsoring, or inspiring terrorist attacks against the West,
at or above the scale seen in Paris and San Bernardino.51 The wild card in that state of
affairs, however, will be whether ISIL is willing and able to engage in strategic terrorism,
perhaps involving attacks with weapons of mass destruction.52
2. Predictions Concerning Renewal of the FAA
As noted above, the FAA will expire, unless extended, in December2017. Between now
and then, Congress will very likely renew the statute, but only after extensive legislative
debate. Many of the issues likely to arise in that debate derive from the PCLOBs report
on FAA 702. The report generally found the section 702 surveillance program to
bevaluable, lawful, and appropriate:
Overall, the Board has found that the information the program collects has been
valuable and effective in protecting the nations security and producing useful foreign
intelligence. The program has operated under a statute that was publicly debated,
and the text of the statute outlines the basic structure of the program. Operation of
the Section702 program has been subject to judicial oversight and extensive internal
supervision, and the Board has found no evidence of intentional abuse.53
Based in part on this assessment, and the support for the statute from members
of Congress in both political parties, there is very little doubt that the FAA will be
renewed, rather than allowed to sunset, when the time comes at the end of 2017.
However, the PCLOB report also recommended several reforms based on its view that
certain aspects of the Section 702 program push the program close to the line of
constitutional reasonableness. Such aspects include the unknown and potentially large
scope of the incidental collection of US persons communications, the use of about
collection to acquire Internet communications that are neither to nor from the target
of surveillance, and the use of queries to search for the communications of specific US
persons within the information that has been collected.54 Between now and the end
of 2017, I think the following issues will arise in connection with the FAAs renewal,
many of them based on the PCLOBs recommendations.55 These predictions are not
necessarilynormative.
A. Upstream and About Collection
The first question likely to arise in connection with FAA renewal concerns upstream
collection under section 702, including collection of communications about, rather
than to or from, a surveillance target. As I have explained elsewhere, collection under
section 702 occurs not only directly from Internet service providers (ISPs), but also
at certain upstream locations, like international switches or other backbone facilities,
as communications transit through them.56 In other words, section 702 surveillance
comes in two varieties: upstream collection at the Internet backbone facilities and
downstream or PRISM collection from ISPs or other communications providers.
Approximately 90percent of NSAs FAA702Internet collection is downstream/PRISM
collection; less than 10percent involves upstream.57
The upstream facilities involved in section 702 surveillance carry huge numbers of
communications, including some domestic communications, the metadata and contents
of which are scanned to determine whether they contain a targeted selector, such as an
e-mail address. That is, NSA collects upstream not only the messages sent to and from
a targets e-mail address, like BadGuy@ISP.com, but also messages sent between nontargets that mention BadGuy@ISP.com (the e-mail address, not merely the name).58
Indeed, [b]ecause of the manner in which the NSA conducts upstream collection,
and the limits of its current technology, the NSA cannot completely eliminate about
communications from its collection without also eliminating a significant portion of
the to/from communications that it seeks.59
As an unavoidable byproduct of to/from collection at the upstream locations, about
collection can be defended under two publicly available FISA Court decisions from
2011. In those decisions, the court addressed another unavoidable aspect of upstream
collectionNSAs acquisition of entire Internet transactions, which may contain
multiple communications, including some communications that are outside the
scope of section702, but which have been bundled together by ISPs or other privatesector companies for business reasons. If an e-mail to or from a lawful surveillance
target is bundled in a single transaction with other, unrelated communications, from
other individuals, NSA may not be able to avoid acquiring all of the communications
in the transaction, including the unrelated ones. The FISA Court initially struck
down NSAs minimization procedures governing that inevitable over-collection, but
later upheld modified procedures that imposed more stringent limits on retention
of the unrelated content.60 The court reached that result despite the large scale of
the over-collection:NSA annually acquires tens of thousands of wholly domestic
communications, and tens of thousands of non-target communications of persons
who have little or no relationship to the target but who are protected under the Fourth
Amendment.61 The PCLOB likewise found about collection tolerable, based primarily
on its inevitability as part of to/from upstream collection.62
In connection with FAA renewal, I expect additional focus on the inevitability, legality,
and desirability of about collection. The first questions likely to arise will be whether
NSA now has the technical ability to parse about collection and to/from collection,
and if not, whether the agency is trying to develop such an ability. (A related question
will be whether NSA has developed, or is trying to develop, the ability to separate one
individual communication from another within an Internet transaction.) This will be a
very technical conversation, and may need to be conducted in closed session. It seems
unlikely that NSA has developed such an ability since 2014, in part because one of the
main challenges to doing so is the constantly changing nature of commercial Internet
protocols, but the questions will need to be asked and answered.63 Given the state of
confusion about the mechanics and other details of upstream collection that persist, it
also may be helpful if the legislative debates can further illuminate how the collection
works, without compromising national security.
Either way, and especially if about collection is no longer inevitable, I expect
Congress to consider whether it should be permitted or forbidden by statute (perhaps
against a Fourth Amendment backdrop). Much of the prior focus on about collection
has concerned retention of the inevitably over-collected data. In connection with
FAA renewal, however, I think that Congress may focus more intensively on the
collection itselfi.e., on the fact that NSAs machines scan the contents of all of
the communications passing through the collection point, and the presence of the
selector... that justifies the collection is not known until after the scanning is
complete.64 This purely legal issue, arguably involving the result of a search being
usedto justify the search, is both interesting and challenging.
Finally, if about collection is retained in the statute, Congress may ask whether it
should be expanded or restricted. One possibility for expansion might be to permit
about collection both upstream and downstreame.g., allowing the government to
direct ISPs to scan their servers for any stored e-mail mentioning BadGuy@ISP.com, as
well as e-mails to or from that e-mail address. Even if it were technically feasible, this
seems most unlikely. As discussed in greater detail in part 1, the Obama administration
since 2013 has consistently supported less surveillance, rather than more, and I doubt
that it will push for an expansion here.65 Nor is the new president likely to push for this
after January 2017at least absent a disruptive event of the sort described in the first
paragraph of this paper. Without support from the executive branch, increased about
collection seems very unlikely, especially given the legal questions it raises. As to further
restrictions, there are always a variety of incremental changes Congress could try to
legislate, particularly in the area of minimizatione.g., a one-year retention period,
rather than the two-year period approved by the FISA Court in 2011.
A second question likely to arise in connection with FAA renewal is the governments
authority to query un-minimized FAA702 data with US person identifiers, or in other
ways designed to return information about US persons.66 Attentive members of the news
media have already identified querying as one of the most likely issues to be addressed.67
To provide a sense of scale, according to the PCLOB, in 2013, NSA approved 198 US
person identifiers to be used as content query terms in queries of FAA702 data.68
Querying raises concerns primarily when US persons are not surveillance targets but
have their communications acquired incidentally, during collection targeting others.
Roughly speaking, US persons communications could be collected incidentally under
section 702 in any of three ways, two of which apply only to upstream collection:the
US person could be the interlocutor of a target, which is inherent in any formof
surveillance (including law-enforcement surveillance) that captures both sides of an
intercepted conversation; the US persons communication could be acquired upstream
as part of about collection concerning a targeted selector; or the US persons
communication could be acquired upstream as part of the same Internet transaction
as a targeted communication.
Given these three possibilities, querying upstream (rather than downstream) data
with US person identifiers is plainly more controversial. But NSAs 2014 minimization
procedures do not permit it, and neither the FBI nor the CIA has access to
un-minimized upstream data.69 Legislative intervention to address a hypothetical
concern seems relatively unlikely, unless it is in connection with broader changes to
upstream collection. But it would be possible if Congress does not want to leave the
matter to the other two branches of government.
With respect to downstream(PRISM) data, the PCLOB recommended that NSA and CIA
minimization procedures permit the agencies to query collected section 702 data for
foreign intelligence purposes using US person identifiers only if the query is based upon
a statement of facts showing that it is reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence
information as defined in FISA. The PCLOB recommended that the NSA and CIA
should develop written guidance for agents and analysts as to what information and
documentation is needed to meet this standard, including specific examples.70 It
appears that the NSA and CIA have implemented this recommendation with the FISA
Courts approval,71 and it is not clear that Congress will demand more by statute.
Two members of the PCLOB recommended in addition that [e]ach US person identifier
should be submitted to the FISA court for approval before the identifier may be used to
query data collected under section 702, for a foreign intelligence purpose, other than
in exigent circumstances or where otherwise required by law.72 It appears that this
recommendation has not been implemented, so it likely will be discussed. It has an
analog of sorts in the USA Freedom Act of 2015, which modified the prior program of
bulk collection of telephony metadata in several ways, including by requiring the FISCs
approval of selectors used for searches of providers call detail records.73 One possible
compromise would be to require FISC approval only for queries of upstream data, which
has the highest risk of involving unrelated US person communications, although that
would be an expansion of existing upstream querying authority.
A related question concerns the FBIs ability to query un-minimized FAA702 data
for evidence of a crime, particularly a crime not related to foreign intelligence.74 The
government reported in 2015 that consistent with the recommendation of the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, information acquired under section702 about
a US person will not be introduced as evidence against that person in anycriminal
proceeding except (1)with the approval of the Attorney General, and (2)in
criminalcases with national security implications or certain other serious crimes.
This change will ensure that, if the Department of Justice decides to use information
acquired under section702 about a US person in a criminal case, it will do so only for
national security purposes or in prosecuting the most serious crimes.75 The FBI has
reported that it is extremely unlikely that an agent or analyst who is conducting an
assessment of a non-national security crime would get a responsive result from the
query against the section 702acquired data.76 Two PCLOB members stated that they
were unaware of any instance in which a database query in an investigation of a nonforeign intelligence crime resulted in a hit on 702 information, much less a situation
in which such information was used to further such an investigation or prosecution.77
Recent reporting on ISIL recruits in Europe suggests this may not always be the case,
however, so the issue may be worth exploring further.78
Underlying this debate is an interesting, although somewhat technical, question of
whether querying should be seen as a separate, stand-alone Fourth Amendment event,
such that it must satisfy constitutional requirements on its own, or whether it is instead
best seen as part of the overall Fourth Amendment event described by the FAA, which
includes but is not limited to acquisition, retention, querying, and dissemination of
information. The former seems to have some support in the historical position of the
government going back to the 1980s,79 but the latter is at least arguably more consistent
with more recent authority, particularly in the context of FAA702.80 It seems unlikely
that Congress will tackle this technical, constitutional question in a focused manner.
C. International Data Sharing
At least two issues of international data sharing may arise in connection with FAA
renewal. First, especially in the wake of the November 2015 Paris attacks, there will
probably be some members of Congress who push for more sharing of un-minimized
data with foreign partners, including but perhaps not limited to Five Eyes (France is
not part of the Five Eyes). Un-minimized downstream (PRISM) data collected by NSA
under FAA702 is routinely shared with the CIA and FBI; the argument will be that it
should likewise be routinely shared with British, Canadian, or other allied intelligence
services, who may be able to identify foreign intelligence information that US analysts
would miss and who can be trusted to apply court-approved minimization procedures
after training by NSA or the Department of Justice (DOJ). Other members of Congress,
however, will raise concerns about such sharing with foreign partners, particularly
because it will include incidentally collected information about US persons. Under
section 8 of NSAs 2014 standard FAA 702 minimization procedures, the agency may
share un-minimized information only for technical or linguistic assistance, subject to
strict limits on analytic use by the foreign government.81 Of course, deviations from the
standard procedures, allowing for more sharing in particular cases or settings, may be
permitted if proposed by the government and approved on a case-by-case basis by the
Second, we may see discussion of data-sharing between the United States and the
European Union, including the Schrems decision striking down the Data Transfer Safe
Harbor, which was premised in part on European dissatisfaction with the FAA and
other US surveillance practices.82 The Safe Harbor issue will probably be resolved before
2017; but if it is not, it will surely figure in the debates over renewal of the FAA. One
interesting aspect of the Safe Harbor debates, and some related debates about crossborder data requests discussed in part 3, is the extent to which European surveillance
practices may be brought to light. There is certainly an argument that European
intelligence collection is conducted with far less oversight and far fewer restrictions
than US collection, and it is quite clear that data is legally safest from US governmental
snooping when stored here rather than abroad.83
D. Technical Issues and Compliance
A fourth issue that is likely to arise needs only brief mention, even though it could
be significant to the legislative debates: NSA compliance problems. These problems
have been well-documented in several areas and will likely be reviewed again in
connection with FAA renewal. As the PCLOB noted, [a] failure to implement the
acquisition in a manner that reasonably limits the collection to the authorized purpose
of the section702 certifications can, and has, led to incidents of noncompliance with
theminimization procedures that have been reported to the FISC and Congress.84
As itingests more and more data, the government will be more and more dependent
on data-tagging at (or just after) acquisition, in order to effectuate subsequent
controls governing access, use (e.g.,querying), purge, and dissemination rules and
requirements.85
The compliance regime will be even more complex to administer as the intelligence
community continues work on its Integrated Intelligence Enterprise (IC-ITE)referred
to by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as the largest IT
transformation in the history of the intelligence communitywhich would create
shared cloud-type servers for multiple agencies, each of which may have different access
rights and requirements.86 If the data-tagging efforts fail, the inter-agency compliance
regime that rests atop it will likewise fail. Congress will likely want to explore this
further in connection with FAA renewal because it is at the core of the governments
ability to comply with minimization procedures and other limits, and also critical
to its ability to limit access to information and mitigate the insider threat of further
E. Purpose of Collection
The FAA authorizes collection only when the government has at least a significant
purpose to acquire foreign intelligence information. That term is defined in two ways
in the statute. The first part of the definition concerns what is typically referred to as
protective foreign intelligence, including information necessary or relevant to the
ability of the United States to protect against attack, sabotage, espionage, international
terrorism, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power.
The second part defines affirmative foreign intelligence, including information
concerning non-US persons that relates to the national defense or security of the
United States or the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States, but only insofar
asthat information concerns a foreign power or foreign territory.87 The PCLOB reported
that the FISC has approved certifications authorizing collection under section702
for categories of information that satisfy the definition of foreign intelligence
information, including information concerning international terrorism and other
topics, such as the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Particularly in light of
PPD-28 and related statements from the Obama administration emphasizing the dignity
and privacy interests of non-US persons, Congress can be expected to debate whether
the FAA should continue to authorize collection of affirmative foreign intelligence
aswell as protective foreign intelligence.88
As of this writing, the PCLOB is working on a report on surveillance under Executive
Order 12333, the main presidential-level directive governing the US intelligence
community.89 Depending on the timing and nature of the report, legislative debate
over FAA renewal will almost surely address surveillance under EO 12333. It seems
all but inevitable that at least some members of the PCLOB will recommend a variety
of measures designed to constrain EO 12333 surveillance and to make it more like
surveillance under FAA702. Such changes might also include provisions akin to
those in FAA702 authorizing compelled assistance from communications providers
in connection with EO 12333 surveillance, although this might be opposed by US
providers on the ground that it would exacerbate the perceived disparity between them
and their foreign competitors in protecting privacy. Changes to the executive order in
light of PPD-28 may also be called for by the PCLOB, because the two documents are
significantly in tension with respect to their views concerning the privacy interests of
non-US persons. It seems very probable that the Obama administration will support
at least some of these measures; the next presidents views are less certain. Perhaps the
debate will go even further, and address whether Congress should enact comprehensive
legislation governing all intelligence surveillance, or even charter statutes for all
intelligence activities, as was considered in the 1970s.90 Of all the issues reviewed here
that might arise in connection with FAA renewal, this is the only one that I believe
hasthe potential to result in really profound change to the status quo.
3. Longer-Term Predictions
Although I expect the FAA debate to unfold roughly as described above (absent
a major disruption), it remains a very unsettled time for US national security in
general and foreign intelligence surveillance in particular. As discussed in part 1, the
Snowden disclosures and the US governments reaction to those disclosures, coupled
with increasing global instability and the rise of ISIL, have created a strange political
environment both here and abroad. In that environment, the increasing and varied
use of encryption, the growing fragmentation and indeterminacy of location in
communications networks, communications providers new reluctance to assist the
government with surveillance requests, the expanding Internet of Things, and
the explosion of open source and social media data all portend profound change. In this
part of the paper, I describe these emerging political and technological developments
and predict effects over the next several years. In general, the developments are
presented in order, beginning with those I perceive as most likely to have the most
significant, most identifiable impact in the nearest term.
A. Encryption and Technical Assistance
In the United States, at least, the November 2015 Paris attacks seemed to reopen a
debate that previously had closed, concerning whether the government should enjoy
exceptional access to encrypted communications and data so that it can effectuate
surveillance directives.91 There is a recent and well-developed literature on that topic,92
addressing both technical and policy issues, and no need to reproduce it here. But there
are two related points worth making, both of which directly concern FISA, the FAA,
andforeign intelligence surveillance in general.
First, if present trends continue, in the absence of a new statute dealing expressly
withencryption, there will be increasing pressure on the technical assistance
requirements in FISA (and the Wiretap Act). Under several provisions of FISA, including
the FAA,a telecommunications provider or other party may be directed to provide
technical assistance (or simply assistance) to the government in implementing the
authorized activity. For example, a traditional FISA order for electronic surveillance
shall direct that
upon the request of the applicant, a specified communication or other common carrier,
landlord, custodian, or other specified person... furnish the applicant forthwith all
information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic
surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum of
interference with the services that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person is
providing that target of electronic surveillance.93
The FAA has similar language in two of its three main provisions, although it
applies only to electronic communication service providers, not to custodians,
landlords or other persons.94 For section 702 surveillance, targeting non-US persons
reasonably believed to be abroad, the attorney general and the director of national
intelligence(DNI)
...may direct, in writing, an electronic communication service provider to...
immediately provide the Government with all information, facilities, or assistance
necessary to accomplish the acquisition in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the
acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such electronic
communication service provider is providing to the target of the acquisition.95
Indeed, section702 surveillance may only be conducted with the assistance of a
provider.96 Compelled assistance is also part of FAA703, which governs targeting
of US persons reasonably believed to be located abroad where the surveillance would
otherwise require a traditional FISA court order and is conducted in the United States.97
But there is no provision for compelled assistance in FAA704, which governs targeting
of US persons abroad when the surveillance would not otherwise require an order and is
conducted abroad: under section 704, the FISA Court does not even have jurisdiction
to review the means by which an acquisition under this section may be conducted, let
alone issue an assistance order.98 Section 704 is accomplished by the government acting
alone, or with voluntary cooperation from others.
The Supreme Court addressed technical assistance in 1977 in US v. New York
Tel.Co.,99 where it held that the All Writs Act, which allows federal courts to issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law,100 could be used to compel a telephone company to assist
with installation of a pen register. The pen register itself was authorized under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure41, but the court nonetheless noted the technical assistance
provision in the Wiretap Act, explaining that in light of the acts direct command
to federal courts to compel, upon request, any assistance necessary to accomplish an
electronic interception, it would be remarkable if Congress thought it beyond the power
of the federal courts to exercise, where required, a discretionary authority to order
telephone companies to assist in the installation and operation of pen registers, which
accomplish a far lesser invasion of privacy.101
As encryption becomes more common, both in transmission and in devices, the
government may seek more in the way of technical assistance from providers or others
to defeat that encryption.102 In the Eastern District of New York, the Department of
Justice and Apple are at this writing engaged in a dispute about whether Apple can
be compelled to unlock an iPhone for which there is a federal search warrant. The
government is relying on the All Writs Act and New York Tel. Co., and Apple is claiming
that the All Writs Act does not apply based on CALEA,103 a 1994 statute that requires
telecommunications providers to maintain their networks in certain ways that allow for
wiretapping but does not apply to stored data on a handset. Apples main argument is
that the All Writs Act cannot be used to compel what Congress declined to address in
CALEAi.e.,that CALEA occupies the field of compelled assistance.104
There is very little publicly available law on the limits of technical assistance in FISA.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the Wiretap Act could not be used to
compel assistance with a wiretap in ways that entirely disabled the communications
system for the particular customer involved in the surveillance. The majority concluded
that disabling the system was inconsistent with the statutory command that technical
assistance be provided in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a
minimum of interference with the services that such carrier... is providing that target
of electronic surveillance:
...the a minimum of interference requirement certainly allows for some level of
interference with customers service in the conducting of surveillance. We need not
decide precisely how much interference is permitted. A minimum of interference at least
precludes total incapacitation of a service while interception is in progress. Put another
way, eavesdropping is not performed with a minimum of interference if a service is
completely shut down as a result of the surveillance.105
The dissenting judge, Richard Tallman, concluded that the minimum of interference
standard governed the manner in which technical assistance must be provided, not
whether it must be provided. For Judge Tallman, it was enough that the Company
complied with the challenged order in the way least likely to interfere with its
subscribers services and that the only method of executing the intercept order in
this case was the one used, because even the complete shutdown of a service [for a
particular user] can represent the minimum interference, so long as no lesser amount of
interference could satisfy the intercept order.106 Judge Tallmans dissent is noteworthy,
in part because he is a member of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review,with a term of service expiring in 2021.107
In general, the technical assistance requirement admits of a balancing of the
providers costs and burdens on the one hand against governmental need and
alternatives on the other. It is therefore notable that in its case in New York, one
of the burdens described by Apple is the following:
...public sensitivity to issues regarding digital privacy and security is at an unprecedented
level. This is true not only with respect to illegal hacking by criminals but also in the area
of government accessboth disclosed and covert. Apple has taken a leadership role in the
protection of its customers personal data against any form of improper access. Forcing
Apple to extract data in this case, absent clear legal authority to do so, could threaten
thetrust between Apple and its customers and substantially tarnish the Apple brand. This
reputational harm could have a longer term economic impact beyond the mere cost of
performing the single extraction at issue.108
Taken to its logical conclusion, this might mean that a provider could create its own
undue burden by strongly and publicly opposing assistance with governmental
A second issue concerns the difference between providing technical assistance and
configuring communications networks to facilitate surveillance. As discussed above, the
former is required by FISA and the Wiretap Act, while the latter is required in limited
circumstances by CALEA. Absent an amendment to any of these laws, there will be at
least two critical questions where CALEA by its terms does not apply. First, as a legal
matter, what is the distinction between configuring equipment, facilities, or services
under CALEA and providing technical assistance under FISA and the Wiretap Act? For
example, is it technical assistance for a provider to push down to a users phone, with
or perhaps without the users knowledge, a software patch or program that facilitates
surveillance (e.g.,by covertly disabling encryption)? Does the answer change if the
software (code) is written by the government rather than the provider itself? These
issues may matter more today than they did in the era in which the Wiretap Act, FISA,
and CALEA were enacted, because in at least some settings, software has become more
important than hardware for facilitating surveillance. Second, to what extent can
uncooperative providers configure their equipment, facilities, or services to thwart
surveillance without depriving themselves of functionality desired by themselves or
their customers? For example, will providers be willing to eschew any capacity to add
an invisible third party to communications on their networks? If not, the capacity may
be available as technical assistance for governmental surveillance. There is enough
uncertainty on these issues that Congress may want to consider some clarification.
Other countries are tackling the issue now. In the United Kingdom, for example,
the November 2015 draft of a new Investigatory Powers Act is quite explicit. It deals
directly with what the British call equipment interference, which allows the security
and intelligence agencies, law enforcement and the armed forces to interfere with
electronic equipment such as computers and smartphones in order to obtain data,
such as communications from a device. Equipment interference encompasses a wide
range of activity from remote access to computers to downloading covertly the contents
of a mobile phone during a search. It is necessary to avoid the loss of intelligence
that may no longer be obtained through other techniques, such as interception, as a
resultofsophisticated encryption.109
In case the UK bill is not clear enough on its face, the Electronic Frontier Foundation(EFF)
asserts in public comments on the bill that the common term for equipment
interference is hacking: breaking into and remotely controlling devices. It permits third
parties to transform a general-purpose device such as a modern smartphone, laptop,
or desktop computer into a surveillance machine.110 Although the term equipment
interference carries with it the implication that the power is restricted to impeding
normal equipment operations, EFF asserts, it may also include adding unexpected
new functionality to a device, such as surveillance functionality.111 The EFF comments
further argue that under the UKs bill, third parties can be compelled to assist in hacking:
a warrant might be served on British Telecom, for example, to compel them to interfere
with a device they neither own nor legally control, such as a phone using their network
in order to access its voicemail.112 Indeed, EFF asserts, [u]nder the proposed law, a British
company could be compelled to distribute a [software] update in order to facilitate the
execution of an equipment interference warrant and ordered to refrain from notifying
their customers... Such an update could be targeted at an individual, an organisation,
or many organisations related to a single investigation.113 The draft IP bill also authorizes
bulk collection and (in certain circumstances) equipment interference in bulk.114 Whether
or not the EFF comments are completely accurate in their characterization of the UK
bill, they clearly illustrate the range of issues and conduct that might be authorized or
prohibited by new surveillance laws.
It would be worthwhile for Congress to consider the limits of technical assistance
inthe context of equipment interference and other techniques that might be used to
defeat at least some forms of encryption. This would include legal issues as well as
technical ones, depending on whether the interference action is to be accomplished
bythe government or the provider, and of course the relevant policy questions.
B. Provider Cooperation
Ironically, the governments increasing reliance on technical assistance from providers
will occur at a time when US providers are less inclined than they once were to cooperate
with surveillance requests.115 American law, however, still assumes that providers will
cooperate, at least in some cases, even when not required to do so. Coupled with the
increasing storage of data abroad,116 this creates at least two significant surveillance gaps
that Congress should examine.
First, whatever the merits of Microsofts argument in the case of the drug dealer
discussed above (part 1), there is no real doubt that it would prevail if the government
sought e-mail stored in Ireland under traditional FISA. That is because traditional
FISA searches may only occur in the United States, and traditional FISA electronic
surveillance applies to stored data only when the surveillance device is used in the
United States.117 Indeed, this was part of the assessment underlying the decision by
Congress to enact the FAA in 2008.118 When it comes to US persons, however, the
FAA is no help in reaching e-mail stored abroad. As discussed above, section702 does
not apply to US persons; section703 applies only when the surveillance is conducted
in theUnited States; and section704 has no technical assistance or compelled
production provisions at all. In short, unless the provider voluntarily repatriates the
USpersons stored e-mail, its production cannot be compelled under FISA.
The same is true if the target of the surveillance or search is a non-US person located
in the United States: his e-mail in Ireland is beyond the reach of traditional FISA,
as discussed above, and his location in this country puts him outside the reach
of FAA702. In sum, then, when e-mail is stored abroad, neither traditional FISA
northeFAA can be used to compel provider assistance if the target is either a US person
(in any location) or a person (of any nationality) located in the United States. This is
a potentially significant shortfall in FISA, particularly as data become more and more
mobile, subject to being stored in any location, or even fragmented and stored in
severallocations at once.
A second possible gap concerns the situation in which all parties to a phone call or
e-mail are located abroad, but the communication transits a wire in the United States.
In that situation, it has long been the case that the US government generally cannot
get a FISA Court order to compel the assistance of the provider that owns the wire.119
Unless it has a valid target under FAA702i.e., a non-US person located abroadthe
most the government can do is assure the provider, in the form of a certification from
the attorney general, that it may lawfully cooperate, but not that it must do so.120 If a
provider refuses, the government has very little recourse. Today, with providers more
recalcitrant than they have been, based on their public statements, voluntary assistance
Congress should consider these questions. Some observers will instinctively approve
of any change that reduces collection opportunities, while others will instinctively
disapprove. But Congress should approach the matter more systematically. The
alternative is effectively to delegate authority to the communications providers, who
are focused on profit and other fiduciary duties to their shareholders, rather than the
public interest, and who are reacting to events largely controlled by others with no
accountability to US voters.
C. Cross-Border Data Requests
As Europe expands surveillance authorities and the United States contracts, and as
encryption proliferates in ways that challenge surveillance without providers technical
assistance, there will be more focus on cross-border data requestsi.e., situations in
which a government tries to compel the production of data located outside its national
borders. Today, major US providers face escalating pressure from European governments,
asserting their own laws to require production of data stored by the providers in the
United States, in ways that violate US law. At the same time, foreign governments
also are increasingly likely to enact laws forbidding production of locally held data in
response to US (and other) demands for its production, and also to enact laws requiring
certain data to be held locally, creating a form of reciprocal pressure. International
agreements could help reduce this dissonance and also rationalize surveillance rules to
promote international commerce, law enforcement, protection of civil liberties, and the
worldwide rule of law. Developing such international agreements will be challenging,
but the alternative is an increasingly chaotic and dysfunctional system for cross-border
data requests that benefits no one. There has been a good deal of recent scholarship on
this topic, and Congress should be sure to address itsoon.121
As discussed above, cheap, user-friendly data encryption seems to have reached, or
nearly reached, a tipping point, where it becomes the default instead of an esoteric
option for communications and stored data. Not far behind may be location-spoofing,
through technologies such as virtual private networks(VPNs). Of course, the
government has been dealing with anonymity and location spoofing for some time
due to TOR.122 But VPNs may be more significant because, among other things, they
are more user-friendly and might be more widely adopted. Companies offering VPN
service create an encrypted connection between the users device and their own servers,
and allow the user to connect to the Internet from those servers. In doing so, the users
apparent IP address corresponds to the VPN server, which may or may not be in the
same country as the user. Ordinary persons may use VPNs to protect their privacy or
their personal data from cybercrime, or perhaps to defeat geo-blocking, a location-based
limit on access to content on the Internet that relies on IP addresses to filter eligible
users.123 But VPNs or other technology that spoofs location to defeat geo-blocking
filters could also raise problems for administration of FAA702. As discussed above,
section702 permits surveillance only when the government has a reasonable belief
that the target is abroad, and NSA uses IP address as a means of determining location.124
Coupled with the continued growth of mobile communications at the expense of fixedpoint communications, and the increasing number of people who do in fact roam across
national borders, the widespread adoption of location-spoofing technology could create
It appears that ISIL has provided guidance to its members and affiliates on the use of
encryption;125 if it has not already done so, ISIL also could provide guidance on the
use of TOR, VPNs or similar services, or users could consult the Internet directly for
instructions. To be sure, NSA almost surely has other technical or human methods at its
disposal to help determine location, and it may also have lists of IP addresses associated
with known VPN providers that it might be able to persuade the FISA Court to ignore
as evidence of location in the court-approved targeting procedures or otherwise. But
NSAs current approach requires analysts to get to the bottom of conflicting information
about a targets location, rather than adopting a simple more-likely-than-not mechanical
test.What this means, in practical terms, is not only that conflicts must be resolved
before targeting can occur, but also that the emergence of new information about an
existing target may require immediate attention and de-tasking if the discrepancy
cannot be resolved. As the PCLOB explained in its report on FAA702:
Commentators have questioned the rigor of the agencys foreignness determinations,
particularly whether they rely on certain default assumptions where information about
a person is lacking. The notion also has arisen that the agency employs a 51percent
test in assessing the location and nationality of a potential targetin other words, that
analysts need only be slightly more than half confident that the person being targeted is
anon-US person located outside the United States.
These characterizations are not accurate. In keeping with representations the government
has made to the FISA court, NSA analysts consult multiple sources of information in
attempting to determine a proposed targets foreignness; they are obligated to exercise a
standard of due diligence in that effort, making their determinations based on the totality
of the circumstances. They also must document the information on which they based
their assessments, which must be reviewed and approved by two senior analysts prior to
targeting and which are subject to further review later.126
With respect to the foreignness determination, the NSA analyst is required to assess
whether the target of the acquisition is a non-US person reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States based upon the totality of the circumstances available. This
analysis begins with a review of the initial lead information, which must be examined to
determine whether it indicates either the location or the US person status of the potential
target. At times, the lead information itself will state where the target is assessed to be
located and their US person status. In other instances, this information may only enable
an analyst to infer location or US person status. In either case, the section 702 targeting
determination may not be made upon the lead information alone. Instead, the NSA
analyst must check multiple sources and make a determination based on the totality
ofthe circumstances available to the analyst.
The government has stated that in making this foreignness determination, the NSA
targeting procedures inherently impose a requirement that analysts conduct due
diligence in identifying these relevant circumstances. What constitutes due diligence
will vary depending on the target; tasking a new selector used by a foreign intelligence
target with whom the NSA is already quite familiar may not require deep research into
the targets (already known) US person status and current location, while a great deal
more effort may be required to target a previously unknown, and more elusive, individual.
As previously discussed above, a failure by an NSA analyst to conduct due diligence in
identifying relevant circumstances regarding the location and US person status of a
section 702 target is a reportable compliance incident to the FISC.
After conducting due diligence and reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the
NSA analyst is required to determine whether the information indicates that the
target is a non-US person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.
The government has stated, and the Boards review has confirmed, that this is not a
51percent to 49percent test. If there is conflicting information indicating whether
atarget is located in the United States or is a US person, that conflict must be resolved
and the user must be determined to be a non-US person reasonably believed to be
locatedoutside the United States prior to targeting.127
In sum, as NSAs director of civil liberties and privacy has explained, [i]f the analyst
discovers any information indicating the targeted person may be located in the
US or that the target may be a US person, such information must be considered. In
other words, if there is conflicting information about the location of the person or
the status of the person as a non-US person, that conflict must be resolved before
targeting can occur.128 Given this requirement to resolve conflicting information
about a targets location, and the scale of FAA702 collection (probably around
100,000 targets), location-spoofing does not need to work 100percent of the time, or
even 20percent of the time, to create significant administrative problems, delay, and
uncertainty in the application of the law and repeated de-tasking and re-tasking of
It may be that NSAs tools are so sophisticated that even a concerted effort by ISIL
or others to spoof IP addresses would have negligible impact.129 But Congress should
satisfy itself that this is the case in connection with FAA renewal, because if it is not,
the statute might require a major overhaul. To the extent that the true locations of
users of targeted selectors cannot be determined consistently, reliably, and quickly, the
FAA is to that extent in deep trouble. It is not clear to me that we have the technical
expertise, conceptual models, and political consensus necessary to write and enact
a next generation of surveillance laws that balance privacy and security effectively
andconstitutionally.130
Even in the absence of intentional efforts to spoof location, increasing fragmentation
of the Internet will also pressure the role of location in surveillance law. Compared to
just a few years ago, global communications networks are much bigger and faster, and
are likely to continue growing, whether measured by the number of users, number
of web pages, or amount of data available and transmitted.131 At the same time,
transmission facilities are proliferating, with more and more undersea cables being laid
and planned132 and fewer chokepoints for transiting communications of all kinds. For
example, Brazil is planning for an undersea cable connecting South America directly to
Europe, without transiting the United States, apparently motivated in part by desires to
avoid US surveillance133 (although such surveillance has been publicly known since at
least the 1970s).134
One result, not readily amenable to legal solution, is that the US home field advantage
in surveillance is receding. By one estimate, before 2001, 80percent of the worlds
communications traffic transited the United States, while now it is less than 20percent
(albeit of a much higher total number of communications).135 This estimate may or
may not be numerically accurate, but the trend is unmistakable. On the other hand,
the increase in the total amount of data also creates problems in the form of ever-larger
haystacks in which the government must find the needles.136
Another result of increasing fragmentation may be that there are fewer communications
facilities dedicated to carrying international rather than domestic traffic, meaning that
packets from domestic and international communications may increasingly be found
in the same locations. That seems to be part of what has challenged NSAs upstream
collection, as discussed above. To the extent that is the case, however, it challenges
another aspect of FISAs basic regulatory approach: the distinctions based on where data
is acquired, which were premised on the view that acquisition domestically deserved
more protection because of the higher incidence of domestic communications.137
That is still probably true, for at least some domestic facilities, to a great extent, but
it is becoming less true over time. For the long run, Congress may want to reconsider
distinctions between surveillance conducted in the United States and surveillance
conducted abroad.
E. Internet of Things and FinTech
It is commonplace today to acknowledge the expanding Internet of Things (IOT), in
which devices ranging from toasters to air conditioners to door locks are connected to
the Internet and to each other,138 and fintech, which involves the intersection of finance
and technology.139 There are many interesting business issues raised by the IOT and
fintech, and some very interesting operational issues relevant to national security (such
as the availability and durability of what may be a host of new network access points
for surveillance, and vulnerabilities for hacking, and new communications capabilities
embedded in financial transactions).140 There are also several legal issues related to
national security and surveillance. For example, the profusion of connected devices and
data types will challenge existing collection paradigms, and perhaps the distinction
between contents and metadata.141 The profusion of new providers may challenge
existing definitions in FISA and the FAA, both as to who may be compelled to provide
technical assistance and the nature of that assistance, and will certainly pose cultural
challengese.g., if and when a manufacturer of Internet-connected door locks receives
its first FISA order as part of an authorized physical search.142
F. Expanded Open Source Data, Social Media, and the Cloud
Finally, over time the government will need to address a series of issues arising from
the increasing number of digital footprints left by almost all users of the Internet,
especially users of social media. Among the issues are the following. First is the
question of governmental access to this data. One perspective is that if the data are
freely available on the Internet, the government also should be able to review them. A
competing perspective, of course, is that the government should not be reviewing my
Facebook posts without meeting some standard of suspicion. Second, of course, not all
open source data is freely available to everyonesome data may require elicitation by a
government agent or an agents undisclosed participation in a forum such as an online
chat room. Is data open source if a government agent needs to create a false online
identity (or otherwise violate a providers terms of service) to access it? Is it open source
if the agent uses her real online identity (and doesnt violate the terms of service)?
Third, there is the question of possible bulk collection of open source datae.g., how
would Americans feel about NSA ingesting public data on all real estate transactions
from Dearborn, Michigan, and then querying it selectively over time? To be sure,
there are guidelines that govern access to open source data, such as the FBIs Domestic
Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), DOD 5240.1-R, and DOD-I 3115.12, and
an inter-agency National Open Source Committee (NOSC) to consider policy issues.143
But it is not clear that the guidelines have kept up with recent changes. Fourth, the
increasing use of social media for terrorist propaganda only complicates matters and
introduces First Amendment issues as well.144
There is also a series of questions from the perspective of counter-intelligence. For
example, there have been concerns about the security of privately held open source
data. In other words, could Facebook be the next Office of Personnel Management?145
Although Internet and cloud providers may have better security than most individual
users, they are obviously attractive targets for hackers because they hold so much data.
For example, Google revealed in 2011 that unknown hackers likely originating from
central China tried to hack into the Gmail accounts of hundreds of users, including
senior US government officials, Chinese activists and journalists.146 The director of the
CIAs personal e-mail account was hacked in 2015.147 Today, with entire digital personae
available online, will terrorists and spies need to jettison their identities the way they
used to dispose of mobile telephones? Will future undercover agents or NOC operatives
need to do so? And if they take steps to avoid using the Internet during a period of
classified training, will that gap immediately expose them as government agents? These
and many related questions remain to be addressed by policymakers.
There is a significant contrast between the two analytical parts of this paper. With
the possible exception of modifications to Executive Order 12333, most of the issues
discussed in part 2 are interstitial and fit within our existing paradigms. Whether to
permit US person queries of upstream data, for example, is an important question, but
one on which reasonably educated policymakers can make a choice without fear of truly
revolutionary effects. The issues discussed in part 2 will be most significant when the
solutions are considered in the aggregate, rather than individually. Death by a thousand
cutsconsidered from the perspective of privacy or securityis the concern here.
The issues in part 3 of the paper, by contrast, strike me as substantially more significant,
and difficult. For example, if the government cannot use FISA to compel access to stored
e-mail of non-US persons located in the United States, it is a big deal; if encryption
makes all Western governments more reliant on provider technical assistance and
providers continue to resist, and if cross-border data requests cant be dealt with
efficiently, it is a very big deal; and if the basic location-based grammar of the FAA fails
because of increased location-spoofing or other developments, it is a huge deal. Debates
over renewal of the FAA in the next two years will very likely include the issues set out
in part 2 of this paper. I hope they will also include some of the issues set out in part3,
or that Congress and the executive branch will consider them carefully in a separate
process.148
1 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) describes itself as follows:
The PCLOB is an independent agency within the executive branch established by the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The bipartisan, five-member Board is
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. By statute, the Chairman serves full time,
but the four other Board members serve in their positions part-time. The PCLOBs mission is to
ensure that the federal governments efforts to prevent terrorism are balanced with the need to
protect privacy and civil liberties.
About the Board, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Bd., https://www.pclob.gov/about-us.html.
In July 2014, the PCLOB released a report on the FAA: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on
the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (2014)
[hereinafter PCLOB 702 Report], https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.
2 The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008), is scheduled to sunset on
December 31, 2017. See FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238, 126 Stat.
1631 (2012); Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144 n.2 (2013). For a detailed discussion of
the FAA, including events leading up to its enactment, an analysis of its political, legal and technological
aspects, and a description of how it functions, including its exclusivity provisions, see David S. Kris &
J.Douglas Wilson, National Security Investigations and Prosecutions, chs. 1517 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter
NSIP].
3 The FAA also increased protections for US persons located abroad. For a more complete discussion of
theFAA, see NSIP, supra note 2, at chs. 1617.
4 Office of the Dir. of Natl Intelligence, Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security
AuthoritiesAnnual Statistics for Calendar Year 2014 (Apr. 22, 2015), http://icontherecord.tumblr
.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2014; Office of the Dir. of Natl Intelligence, Statistical
Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security AuthoritiesAnnual Statistics for Calendar Year 2013
(June 26, 2014), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2013.
5 For a discussion of these debates, see, e.g., NSIP, supra note 2, 19:4.50 (Supp. 2015).
6 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
The president summarized his conclusions about terrorism as follows:
So thats the current threatlethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates; threats to diplomatic
facilities and businesses abroad; homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We have to
take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response,
we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced
In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our embassy in Beirut; at our Marine barracks in
Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; and on a Pan Am flightFlight 103over
Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center; at our military
facilities in Saudi Arabia; and at our embassy in Kenya. These attacks were all brutal; they were all
deadly; and we learned that left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and
proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11.
DOJ revised its media investigation guidelines in January 2014. See Kevin Johnson, DOJ Issues New
Guidelines for Dealing with Media, USA Today (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2015/01/14/doj-guidelines-media/21754099 (The Justice Department on Wednesday put
additional limitations on federal prosecutors investigating leaks of classified material in cases that
involvethe pursuit of information gathered by journalists.)
7 President Barack Obama and President Macky Sall, Remarks by President Obama and President Sall of
the Republic of Senegal at Joint Press Conference (June 27, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-office/2013/06/27/remarks-president-obama-and-president-sall-republic-senegal-joint-press-. These
remarks were widely understood as an effort to downplay the significance of Snowden. See, e.g., Nancy
Benac, Obama Recasts Edward Snowden As Hacker In Effort To Downplay Him, Huffington Post (June 28,
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/28/obama-edward-snowden-hacker_n_3515562.html;
Julie Pace, Obama: No Wheeling or Dealing to Extradite Snowden, Associated Press (June 27, 2013),
http://news.yahoo.com/obama-no-wheeling-dealing-extradite-142135715.html.
8 The president made two references to surveillance in his May 2013 speech. First, in describing the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, before he took office, he said: And so our nation went to war. We have now
been at war for well over a decade.... Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses.... Most of these changes
were sound.... But some, like expanded surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance that we
strike between our interests in security and our values of privacy. Later in the speech, the president said:
Thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because of our proud
commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home. Thats why, in the years to come, we
will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security
and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities
of law enforcement, so we can intercept new types of communication, but also build in privacy
protections to prevent abuse.
That means thateven after Bostonwe do not deport someone or throw somebody in prison in
the absence of evidence. That means putting careful constraints on the tools the government uses
to protect sensitive information, such as the state secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a
strong Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to review those issues where our counterterrorism efforts
and our values may come into tension.
Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, supra note 6.
9 All of the quotations in this paragraph are from President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President ina
Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks
-president-press-conference.
10 Brad Smith, Unfinished Business on Government Surveillance Reform, The Official Microsoft Blog
(June 4, 2014), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/06/04/unfinished-business-on-government
-surveillance-reform. Smith is currently the president and chief legal officer of Microsoft. See Paul
Barbagallo, Microsoft Appoints General Counsel Brad Smith as President, Bloomberg Business (Sept. 11,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-11/microsoft-appoints-brad-smith-as-president
-chief-legal-officer. Other companies were also pushing for reforms. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Tech
Giants Dont Want Obama to Give Police Access to Encrypted Phone Data, Wash. Post (May 19, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/19/tech-giants-dont-want-oba_n_7336642.html. Susan Molinari,
Congress Has Only A Few Weeks Left to Modernize Surveillance Laws, Google Pub. Poly Blog (April 29, 2015),
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2015/04/congress-has-only-few-weeks-left-to_29.html; USA
FREEDOM Act: Time for Meaningful Government Surveillance Reform, Yahoo: Global Pub. Poly (April28,
2015), http://yahoopolicy.tumblr.com/post/117638169643/usa-freedom-act-time-for-meaningful
11Smith, supra note 10.
12 See Brief for Appellant at 1012, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.eff.org/document
/microsofts-second-circuit-opening-brief.
13 See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation,
15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (appeal pending).
14 See Brief for Appellant at 12, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained
by Microsoft Corporation, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.eff.org/document/microsofts
-second-circuit-opening-brief. The Introduction to the brief begins as follows:
Imagine this scenario. Officers of the local Stadtpolizei investigating a suspected leak to the
press descend on Deutsche Bank headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany. They serve a warrant to
seize a bundle of private letters that a New York Times reporter is storing in a safe deposit box at
a Deutsche Bank USA branch in Manhattan. The bank complies by ordering the New York branch
manager to open the reporters box with a master key, rummage through it, and fax the private
letters to the Stadtpolizei.
The U.S. Secretary of State fumes: We are outraged by the decision to bypass existing formal
procedures that the European Union and the United States have agreed on for bilateral
cooperation, and to embark instead on extraterritorial law enforcement activity on American soil
in violation of international law and our own privacy laws. Germanys Foreign Minister responds:
We did not conduct an extraterritorial searchin fact we didnt search anything at all. No German
officer ever set foot in the United States. The Stadtpolizei merely ordered a German company to
produce its own business records, which were in its own possession, custody, and control. The
American reporters privacy interests were fully protected, because the Stadtpolizei secured a
warrant from a neutral magistrate.
No way would that response satisfy the U.S. Government. The letters the reporter placed in a safe
deposit box in Manhattan are her private correspondence, not the banks business records. The
seizure of that private correspondence pursuant to a warrant is a law enforcement seizure by a
foreign government, executed in the United States, even if it is effected by a private party whom the
government has conscripted to act on its behalf.
Microsofts position was somewhat challenged when the government of Ireland filed a brief conceding that
it is incumbent upon Ireland to acknowledge that its own Supreme Court has held that... there may be
circumstances in which an Irish court would order the production of records from an Irish entity on foreign
soil, perhaps even if execution of the order would violate the law of the foreign sovereign. Brief of Amicus
Curiae Ireland at 56, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft
Corporation, No. 14-2985-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2014) (italics in original) (citing Walsh v. National Irish Bank
[2013] 1ESC 2), http://digitalconstitution.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Ireland-Amicus-Brief.pdf.
15 Lisa Monaco, Obama Administration: Surveillance Policies Under Review, USA Today (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/10/24/nsa-foreign-leaders-president-obama-lisa-monaco
-editorials-debates/3183331.
16 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over
Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (USA FREEDOM Act). The amicus provisions of the
Freedom Act are codified at 50 U.S.C. 1803(i), and the provisions ending bulk collection are codified at
50U.S.C.1861(b)(2)(C).
17 For a more complete discussion of the presidents speech and PPD-28, see NSIP, supra note 2, 19:4.50
(Supp. 2015).
18 For example, in a February 2015 release, ODNI described some of the ways in which the intelligence
community has implemented PPD-28, noting that the directive reinforces current practices, establishes
new principles, and strengthens oversight, to ensure that in conducting signals intelligence (SIGINT)
activities, the United States takes into account not only the security needs of our nation and our allies,
but also the privacy of people around the world. Office of the Dir. of Natl Intelligence, Signals Intelligence
Reform 2015 Anniversary Report (2015), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-28/2015/privacy-civil
-liberties. In the same document, the DNI described himself as being pleased to report that, as required
by PPD-28, all Intelligence Community elements have reviewed and updated their existing policies and
procedures, or have issued new policies or procedures, to provide safeguards for personal information
collected through SIGINT, regardless of nationality and consistent with national security, our technical
capabilities, and operational needs. For a more complete discussion of PPD-28, see NSIP, supra note 2,
19:4.50 (Supp.2015).
19 Peter Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://fpf.org/wp
-content/uploads/2015/12/White-Paper-Swire-US-EU-Surveillance.pdf.
20 See Ellen Nakashima and Andrea Peterson, Obama Administration Opts Not to Force Firms to Decrypt
DataFor Now, Wash. Post (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/obama-administration-opts-not-to-force-firms-to-decrypt-data--for-now/2015/10/08/1d6a6012-6dca
-11e5-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html. By contrast, some of the 2016 presidential contenders, such as
Hillary Clinton, are keeping options open on encryption and urging providers and the government to work
together to find solutions. See Hillary Clinton on National Security and the Islamic State, Council on Foreign
Rel. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/radicalization-and-extremism/hillary-clinton-national-security
-islamic-state/p37266. In her CFR speech, Clinton said:
Another challenge is how to strike the right balance of protecting privacy and security.
Encryption of mobile communications presents a particularly tough problem. We should take the
concernsof law enforcement and counterterrorism professionals seriously. They have warned
that impenetrable encryption may prevent them from accessing terrorist communications and
preventing a future attack. On the other hand, we know there are legitimate concerns about
government intrusion, network security, and creating new vulnerabilities that bad actors can
and would exploit. So we need Silicon Valley not to view government as its adversary. We needto
challenge our best minds in the private sector to work with our best minds in the public sector
todevelop solutions that will both keep us safe and protect our privacy. Now is the time to solve
this problem, not after the next attack.
In a speech at the University of Minnesota in mid-December 2015, Clinton said this:
Now, encryption of mobile devices and communications does present a particularly tough problem
with important implications for security and civil liberties. Law enforcement and counterterrorism
professionals warn that impenetrable encryption may make it harder for them to investigate plots
and prevent future attacks. On the other hand, there are very legitimate worries about privacy,
network security, and creating new vulnerabilities that bad actors can exploit.
I know theres no magic fix to this dilemma that will satisfy all these concerns. But we cant just
throw up our hands. The tech community and the government have to stop seeing each other as
adversaries and start working together to keep us safe from terrorists. And even as we make sure
law enforcement officials get the tools they need to prevent attacks, its essential that we also
makesure jihadists dont get the tools they need to carry out attacks.
Hillary Clinton Lays Out Comprehensive Plan to Bolster Homeland Security (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www
.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/statements/2015/12/15/comprehensive-plan-to-bolster-homeland-security.
21 Of course, some observers presumably believe the Obama administration did not go far enough in
advancing reforms, while others may believe it went too far. An interesting question, which may be
answered during calendar year 2016, is the extent to which the US intelligence community will depart, in
public or in private, from the Obama administrations official positions on national security issues. There
are certainly at least pockets of resentment against the administration within the community, andserious
disagreement with some of its policies. See, e.g., Adam Entous & Danny Yadron, Some Senior U.S. Officials
Not Comfortable with Obamas Curbs on NSA Spying on Leaders, Wall Street Journal (Dec. 30, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/some-senior-u-s-officials-not-comfortable-with-obamas-curbs-on-nsa
-spying-on-leaders-1451506801. With respect to encryption, for example, FBI Director Comey called
publicly for legislation to address the issue in 2014, and then, after the administration decided not to seek
such legislation, the FBI in 2015 apparently continued to meet with congressional staff about the topic.
SeeJames Comey, Keynote Address at Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy and Public Safety on a Collision
Course?, Brookings Inst. (Oct. 16, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events
/2014/10/16%20going%20dark%20technology%20privacy%20comey%20fbi/20141016_fbi_comey
_transcript.pdf) at 14; David Perera, Terror Fears Dont Budge Obama on Encryption, Politico (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/obama-resists-calls-for-encryption-shift-216920 (After warning in
2014 that encryption was hamstringing the FBI, Comey launched a yearlong campaign to persuade
Congress to act. Even after being warned off earlier this year by the White House, FBI officials continued
meeting with lawmakers and congressional staffers.).
22 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. C.L. Union, ACLU & Tea Party Patriots Co-Sponsor TV Ads Calling for
Washington to Rein In Government Surveillance (May 19, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-tea
-party-patriots-co-sponsor-tv-ads-calling-washington-rein-government-surveillance.
23 Tom Cohen, 5 Years Later, Heres How the Tea Party Changed Politics, CNN (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/politics/tea-party-greatest-hits/index.html.
24 See, e.g., John Lapinski, Hannah Hartig & Stephanie Psyllos, Poll: Donald Trump Still Leads GOP Field,
NBC News (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/poll-donald-trump-still-leads
-gop-field-n490116; Jessica Schulberg, Rand Paul Ends Daylong NSA Filibuster, Huffington Post (May 20,
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/20/rand-paul-nsa-filibuster_n_7347722.html.
25 See Dan Roberts, Ted Cruz Rejects Demands to Revive NSA Surveillance after San Bernardino, The
Guardian (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/10/ted-cruz-nsa-surveillance
-san-bernardino.
26 See Nick Gass, After San Bernardino Massacre, Rubio Hits Cruz for Surveillance Vote, Politico (Dec. 4,
2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/marco-rubio-ted-cruz-surveillance-vote-216428 (In the
wake of Wednesdays massacre in San Bernardino, California, Florida Sen. Marco Rubio on Friday dinged
Ted Cruz and his other fellow senators and GOP presidential rivals for their votes to end the National
Security Agencys bulk collection of phone metadata.); Joel Aschbrenner, Christie Calls Out Cruz, Paul on
Surveillance, Des Moines Reg. (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/elections
/presidential/caucus/2015/12/04/christie-calls-out-cruz-paul-surveillance/76775374.
27 Press Release, Senator Bernie Sanders, Sanders Votes Against Patriot Act Extension (May 26, 2011),
(Ivoted against extending the Patriot Act today for the same reason I voted against enacting it in 2001:it
gives the government far too much power to spy on innocent United States citizens and provides for
very little oversight or disclosure.). For the votes cast on the 2001 Patriot Act, see On Passage of the Bill,
H.R.3162 (Oct. 25, 2001), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm
?congress=107&session=1&vote=00313; Final Vote Results for Roll Call, H.R. 3162 (Oct. 21, 2001),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll398.xml.
28 Qaeda Front Group Claims Wave of Iraq Attacks, The Times of Oman (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www
.timesofoman.com/article/7313/World/Qaeda-front-group-claims-wave-of-Iraq-attacks.
29 Bassem Mroue & Maamoun Youssef, Iraqi al-Qaeda and Syria Militants Announce Merger, USA Today
(Apr.9, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/09/qaeda-iraq-syria-merger/2066333.
30 Iraq: Hundreds Escape from Abu Ghraib Jail, The Guardian (July 22, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/jul/22/iraq-prison-attacks-kill-dozens; Adam Schreck, Abu Ghraib Prison Break: Al Qaeda In
Iraq Claims Responsibility For Raid, The World Post (July 23, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/07/23/abu-ghraib-prison-break-al-qaeda-iraq_n_3639101.html.
31 Erika Solomon, Islamist Rebels Capture Syrias Largest Oilfield: Activists, Reuters (Nov. 23, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/23/us-syria-crisis-oil-idUSBRE9AM03K20131123.
32 Liz Sly, Al-Qaeda Force Captures Fallujah Amid Rise in Violence in Iraq, Wash. Post (Jan. 3, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/al-qaeda-force-captures-fallujah-amid-rise-in-violence-in
-iraq/2014/01/03/8abaeb2a-74aa-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html.
33 Ingrid Melander & Adrian Croft, France Arrests Suspect in Brussels Jewish Museum Shooting,
Reuters (June 1, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/01/us-belgium-shooting-france
-idUSKBN0EC17P20140601.
34 Iraqi City of Mosul Falls to Jihadists, CBS News (June 10, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq
-city-of-mosul-falls-into-hands-of-isis-jihadists-after-police-army-abandon-posts; Paul D. Shinkman, ISIL
Declares Victory by Establishing Caliphate, US News and World Report (June 30, 2014), http://www.usnews
.com/news/articles/2014/06/30/isil-declares-victory-in-iraq-by-establishing-new-islamic-caliphate.
35 Matt Olsen, Dir., Natl Counterterrorism Ctr., Remarks (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.odni.gov/files
/documents/2014-09-03%20Remarks%20for%20the%20Brookings%20Institution.pdf.
36 Greg Bothelo, ISIS Executes British Aid Worker David Haines; Cameron Vows Justice, CNN (Sept. 14, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/13/world/meast/isis-haines-family-message/index.html.
37 David Remnick, Going the Distance, The New Yorker (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-david-remnick. The New Yorker article was the one in which
thepresident referred to ISIL as a jayvee group:
The analogy we use around here sometimes, and I think is accurate, is if a jayvee team puts
on Lakers uniforms that doesnt make them Kobe Bryant, Obama said, resorting to an
uncharacteristically flip analogy. I think there is a distinction between the capacity and reach of a
bin Laden and a network that is actively planning major terrorist plots against the homeland versus
jihadists who are engaged in various local power struggles and disputes, often sectarian.
In his May 2013 speech, the president gave a more nuanced assessment, without mentioning ISIL by name:
Unrest in the Arab world has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and
Syria. But here, too, there are differences from 9/11. In some cases, we continue to confront statesponsored networks like Hezbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Other
of these groups are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory.
And while we are vigilant for signs that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are
focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. And that means well face
more localized threats like what we saw in Benghazi, or the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local
operativesperhaps in loose affiliation with regional networkslaunch periodic attacks against
Western diplomats, companies, and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal
enterprises to fund their operations.
38 Meet the Press Transcript (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press
-transcript-september-7-2014-n197866 (ISIL poses a broader threat because of its territorial ambitions
inIraq and Syria).
39 Arlette Saenz, President Obama Vows to Completely Decapitate ISIS Operations, ABC News (Nov. 13,
2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-vows-completely-decapitate-isis-operations
/story?id=35173579 (From the start our goal has been first to contain, and we have contained them.).
40 See John McLaughlin, The Paris Attacks: Former CIA Chief Weighs In, Ozy (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.ozy
.com/pov/the-paris-attacks-former-cia-chief-weighs-in/66155.
41 Saeed Al-Batati & Kareem Fahim, War in Yemen is Allowing Qaeda Group to Expand, N.Y. Times (Apr. 16,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/middleeast/khaled-bahah-houthi-rebel-yemen-fighting
.html?_r=0; Yemen ProfileTimeline, BBC News (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle
-east-14704951; How Instability in Yemen Affects the U.S., CBS News (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.cbsnews
.com/news/how-instability-in-yemen-affects-the-us; Yara Bayoumy, Al Qaeda Thrives in Yemen amid Weak
Security, Stalled Dialogue, Reuters (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security
-idUSBRE9B702520131208.
42 Maggie Michael, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula Claims Responsibility for Paris Attack, US News and
World Report (Jan 14. 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/01/14/yemens-al-qaida
-claims-responsibility-for-paris-attack.
43 Libya ProfileTimeline, BBC News (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445;
Christopher Stephen, ISILs Rise in Libya, Politico (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine
/story/2015/01/isils-rise-in-libya-114742; Ruth Sherlock & Colin Freeman, Islamic State Planning to use
Libya as Gateway to Europe, The Telegraph (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/islamic-state/11418966/Islamic-State-planning-to-use-Libya-as-gateway-to-Europe.html.
44 See, e.g., Nils Muizniekse, Opinion, Europe Is Spying on You, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/opinion/europe-is-spying-on-you-mass-surveillance.html; Mark Scott, British
Court Rules in Favor of Electronic Surveillance, N.Y. Times (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/12/06/world/europe/british-court-says-governments-electronic-surveillance-is-legal.html; Justin
Ling, New Mass Surveillance Laws Come to Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, as the NSA May Have its
Wings Clipped, Vice News (May 12, 2015), https://news.vice.com/article/new-mass-surveillance-laws-come
-to-canada-france-and-the-united-kingdom-as-the-nsa-may-have-its-wings-clipped; Data Retention and
Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (Gr. Brit.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/27/contents/enacted.
45Muizniekse, supra note 44. See Tonda MacCharles, New Spy Bill Would let Canadian Agents Operate
Illegally Abroad, The Star (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/10/27/new_spy_bill
_would_let_canadian_agents_operate_illegally_abroad.html; Data Retention and Investigatory Powers
Act 2014 (Gr. Brit.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/27/contents/enacted.
46 The Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (Nov. 4, 2015) is available at https://www.gov.uk/government
/publications/draft-investigatory-powers-bill.
47 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Forever War is Entrenched, Lawfare (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www
.lawfareblog.com/forever-war-entrenched; Jack Goldsmith, President Obamas National Security Legacy
After Paris, Lawfare (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-obamas-national-security
-legacy-after-paris.
48 For a more complete and very thoughtful assessment of the challenges posed by ISIL, see Hearing:
Outside Views on the Strategy for Iraq and Syria Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong. (2015)
(statement of John McLaughlin), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20151118/104191/HHRG-114
-AS00-Wstate-McLaughlinJ-20151118.pdf. In December 2015, a senior Treasury Department official is
reported to have said that ISIL had taken between $500 million and $1 billion from banks in Syria and Iraq,
and had earned more than $500 million from black-market oil sales. Jonathan Saul & Guy Faulconbridge,
U.S. Says Islamic State has Made $1.5 Billion from Bank Looting, Oil Sales, Reuters (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa-idUSKBN0TT2IF20151210 (quoting Adam
Szubin, acting undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, US Department of the Treasury). For
a discussion of ISIL affiliates in places such as Libya, Nigeria, the Sinai Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Yemen, see, e.g., Eric Schmitt & David D. Kirkpatrick, Islamic State Sprouting Limbs Beyond Its
Base, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/world/middleeast/islamic-state
-sprouting-limbs-beyond-mideast.html; Islamic State Moves in on Al-Qaeda Turf, BBC News (June 26, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-31064300. For a discussion of ISILs current chief of external operations,
Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, see, e.g., Robert Windrem, Americas Most Wanted: The ISIS Leader at the Top
ofthe U.S. Kill List, NBC News (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/americas
-most-wanted-isis-leader-top-u-s-kill-list-n477946.
49 See, e.g., Luay Al-Khatteeb, The UN Strikes Back at ISILs Black Economy, Brookings Inst. (Aug. 23, 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/08/23-un-strikes-back-at-isil-black-economy.
50 Liz Sly, How the Battle Against the Islamic State is Redrawing the Map of the Middle East, Wash. Post
(Dec.30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/on-the-front-lines-of-the-war-against-the
-islamic-state-a-tangled-web/2015/12/30/d944925a-9244-11e5-befa-99ceebcbb272_story.html.
51 See McLaughlin, supra note 40.
52 See, e.g., Nathan Myhrvold, Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action, https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2
.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf. ISIL
has apparently used chemical weapons in Syria: see Raja Abdulrahim, Islamic State Accused of New Chemical
Weapons Attack in Syria, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 23, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state
-accused-of-using-chemical-weapons-in-syria-1440353562. I am not aware of any credible, public reporting
that ISIL has so far developed a meaningful capability in either biological or nuclear weapons.
53 PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 2.
54 Id. at 9.
55 See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Bd, Recommendations Assessment Report 1 (2015) [hereinafter
PCLOB 1-29-15 RAR], https://www.pclob.gov/library/Recommendations_Assessment-Report.pdf (The
Administration has accepted virtually all of the recommendations in the Boards Section 702 report and
hasbegun implementing many of them.).
56 NSIP, supra note 2, 17:5, (Supp. 2015). Section 702 of the FAA is codified at 50 U.S.C. 1881a.
57 See PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 3334, 84.
58 See id. at 37.
59 Id. at 10; see id. at 38 (There are technical reasons why about collection is necessary to acquire
even some communications that are to and from a tasked selector. In addition, some types of about
communications actually involve Internet activity of the targeted person. The NSA cannot, however,
distinguish in an automated fashion between about communications that involve the activity of the target
from communications that, for instance, merely contain an email address in the body of an email between
two non-targets. (footnotes omitted)).
60 For a detailed discussion of the two FISA Court decisions from 2011, see NSIP, supra note 2, 17:5
(Supp.2015).
61 Id. (quoting [REDACTED], 2011 WL 10945618, at *13 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011)).
62 See id. (citing PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 8486).
63 See PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 143145 (To build on current efforts to filter upstream
communications to avoid collection of purely domestic communications, the NSA and DOJ, in consultation
with affected telecommunications service providers, and as appropriate, with independent experts,
should periodically assess whether filtering techniques applied in upstream collection utilize the best
technology consistent with program needs to ensure government acquisition of only communications that
are authorized for collection and prevent the inadvertent collection of domestic communications.... The
NSA periodically should review the types of communications acquired through about collection under
Section702, and study the extent to which it would be technically feasible to limit, as appropriate, the
types of about collection.); PCLOB 1-29-15 RAR, supra note 55, at 2124.
64 NSIP, supra note 2, 17:5 (Supp. 2015). As the PCLOB explained in its report on FAA702,
In a still-classified September 2008 opinion, the FISC agreed with the governments conclusion
that the governments target when it acquires an about communication is not the sender or
recipients of the communication, regarding whom the government may know nothing, but instead
the targeted user of the Section 702tasked selector. The FISCs reasoning relied upon language in
a congressional report, later quoted by the FISA Court of Review, that the target of a traditional
FISA electronic surveillance is the individual or entity... about whom or from whom information
issought.
PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 2930. It is certainly true that the target of surveillance is the person
from or about whom the government is seeking information, as discussed in NSIP, supra note 2, 7:13,
8:1, 17:5. But that does not resolve the question whether the government can review the contents of an
unlimited number of e-mails from unrelated parties in its effort to find information about the target.
65 The Obama administration certainly has described itself as restricting surveillance in favor of privacy.
See, e.g., ODNI Signals Intelligence Reform 2015 Anniversary Report, http://icontherecord.tumblr.com
/ppd-28/2015/privacy-civil-liberties. For a more complete discussion of PPD-28, see NSIP, supra note 2,
19:4.50 (Supp. 2015).
66 Under current law, queries of FAA702 data are governed by minimization procedures approved by the
FISA Court. As explained in the PCLOBs report on Section 702:
Each agency that receives communications under Section 702 has its own minimization procedures,
approved by the FISA court, that govern the agencys use, retention, and disseminationof
Section702 data. Among other things, these procedures include rules on how the agencies may
query the collected data. The NSA, CIA, and FBI minimization procedures all include provisions
permitting these agencies to query data acquired through Section 702, using terms intended to
discover or retrieve communications content or metadata that meets the criteria specified in the
query. These queries may include terms that identify specific U.S. persons and can be used to
retrieve the already acquired communications of specific U.S. persons. Minimization procedures set
forth the standards for conducting queries. For example, the NSAs minimizationprocedures require
that queries of Section 702acquired information be designed sothat they are reasonably likely to
return foreign intelligence information.
PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 78 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the mechanics of querying,
see id. at 5560.
67 See Charlie Savage, New York Times, statement at The Second Annual Cato Surveillance Conference,
After FREEDOM: A Dialogue on NSA in the Post-Snowden Era (Oct. 21. 2015) (the FISA Amendments Act
come [sic] up for renewal in 2017, and... there is an effort already in Congress to require warrants before
the government can look at already-collected information that it gathered without a warrant for an
Americans identifier, which is something the intelligence community has been resisting. But well see
that, I imagine, is the next battle).
68 PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 57. With thanks to an attentive journalist for the reference, during
2013, CIA conducted fewer than 1900 queries of the data for U.S. person information (some of them
on behalf of other U.S. agencies), of which [a]pproximately 27percent... were duplicative or recurring
queries conducted at different times using the same identifiers, and FBI conducted a substantial but
unspecified number of queries during 2013. See Letter from Deirdre M. Walsh, Director, Office of Legislative
Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Ron Wyden (June 27, 2014), available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2095183-odni-letter-to-wyden-2014.html.
69 See Minimization Procedures used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions
of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Actof1978, as Amended, 3(b)(5) (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization
%20Procedures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in%20Connection%20with%20FISA%20SECT%20702.pdf;
PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 7 (Data from upstream collection is received only by the NSA: neither
the CIA nor the FBI has access to unminimized upstream data.); PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 35,
161n.571.
70 PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 12; see also id. at 137138.
71 In February 2015, ODNI reported that
FBI, CIA, and NSA each are instituting new requirements for using a U.S. person identifier to query
information acquired under Section 702. As recommended by the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, NSAs minimization procedures will require a written statement of facts showing
that a query is reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information. CIAs minimization
procedures will be similarly amended to require a statement of facts for queries of content. In
addition, FBIs minimization procedures will be updated to more clearly reflect the FBIs standard
for conducting U.S. person queries and to require additional supervisory approval to access query
results in certain circumstances.
ODNI Signals Intelligence Reform 2015 Anniversary Report, http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-28/2015
/privacy-civil-liberties; see also PCLOB 1-29-15 RAR at 1920. Other possibilities are set out in NSIP:
As to querying of downstream data, there are several options available in devising the new
restrictions. Substantively, the government could simply forbid querying altogether, or forbid
it when motivated by an affirmative (rather than protective) foreign intelligence purpose.
Alternatively, or in addition, it could adopt a procedural approach, requiring a finding of reasonable
articulable suspicion (RAS), or even probable cause, that the U.S. person is associated in some
way with an international terrorist group, or perhaps another foreign power. Such a finding could
be made either by the Executive Branch unilaterally, or be subject to approval by the FISA Court
(perhaps with an emergency exception), before querying may occur.
NSIP, supra note 2, 19:4.50 (Supp. 2015).
72 PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 14. For more detail on how querying works under Section 702, see id.
at 5560.
73 50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)(C).
74 See PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 137138.
75 ODNI Signals Intelligence Reform 2015 Anniversary Report, http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd
-28/2015/privacy-civil-liberties. In particular, according to Robert Litt, the General Counsel of ODNI:
Under the new policy, in addition to any other limitations imposed by applicable law, including
FISA, any communication to or from, or information about, a U.S. person acquired under
Section702 of FISA shall not be introduced as evidence against that U.S. person in any criminal
proceeding except (1) with the prior approval of the Attorney General and (2) in (A) criminal
proceedings related to national security (such as terrorism, proliferation, espionage, or
cybersecurity) or (B) other prosecutions of crimes involving (i) death; (ii) kidnapping; (iii) substantial
bodily harm; (iv) conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a
minor as defined in 42 USC 16911; (v) incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure as
defined in 42 USC 5195c(e); (vi) cybersecurity; (vii) transnational crimes; or (vii) human trafficking.
Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, ODNI, Prepared Remarks on Signals Intelligence Reform at the Brookings
Institute (Feb. 4, 2015), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/110632851413/odni-general-counsel-robert
-litts-as-prepared.
76 PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 97 n.438.
77 Id. at 162.
78 See Anthony Faiola & Souad Mekhennet, The Islamic State Creates a New Type of Jihadist: Part Terrorist,
Part Gangster, Wash. Post (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-islamic
-state-creates-a-new-type-of-jihadist-part-terrorist-part-gangster/2015/12/20/1a3d65da-9bae-11e5-aca6
-1ae3be6f06d2_story.html; Andrew Higgins & Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, An ISIS Militant From Belgium
Whose Own Family Wanted Him Dead, N.Y. Times (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18
/world/europe/paris-attacks-abdelhamid-abaaoud-an-isis-militant-from-belgium-whose-own-family
-wanted-him-dead.html (describing alleged petty crime, and drug dealing, by some of the Paris attackers);
cf. Lorenzo Vidino & Seamus Hughes, Program on Extremism, George Wash. Univ., ISIS in America: From
Retweets to Raqqa (2015), http://cchs.gwu.edu/isis-in-america.
79 See NSIP, supra note 2, 19:4.50 (Supp. 2015) and sources cited therein. Even if some querying of data
collected under EO 12333 were subject to a probable-cause or other requirement, it is not clear that the
same requirement would apply to data collected under FAA702 because of the higher standards and
requirements for collection under Section 702.
80 Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment
speaks not at all to the manner of executing a search warrant. The general touchstone of reasonableness
which governs Fourth Amendment analysis, governs the method of execution of the warrant. Excessive
or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment,
even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression. (citation
omitted)). In its decision upholding upstream collection, discussed above, the FISA Court relied in part
on strong minimization procedures to uphold very broad acquisition of information. See NSIP, supra note2,
17:5 (Supp. 2015); see also United States v. Mohamud, No. 10-475, 2014 WL 2866749, at *26 (D. Or. June 24,
2014) (Thus, subsequent querying of a 702 collection, even if U.S. person identifiers are used, is not a
separate search and does not make 702 surveillance unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.). The
analysis under the FAA may not be the same as earlier analysis governing EO 12333 surveillance, in part
because of the role of the FISA Court in the former.
81 See Minimization Procedures used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions
ofForeign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, as Amended, 8 (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization
see also NSIP, supra note 2, 9:8.50 (Supp. 2015). For a discussion of minimization in general, see NSIP,
supranote 2, ch. 9.
82 See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Commr, 11, 9498 (Oct. 6, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu
/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf.
83 Cf., e.g., David Anderson, A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review (2015),
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report
-Print-Version.pdf (discussing UK and European surveillance standards).
84 PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 52.
85 See id. at 5556 (The NSA... often stores data acquired from multiple legal authorities in a single data
repository. Instead of limiting access to whole databases, the NSA tags each acquired communication
with the legal authority under which it was acquired, and then has systems that prevent an analyst from
accessing or querying data acquired under a legal authority for which the analyst does not have the
requisite training).
86 What We Do, Off. Director of Natl Intelligence, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization
/chief-information-officer-what-we-do. The ODNI CIO reports:
The IC ITE [Intelligence Community Integrated Intelligence Enterprise] represents a strategic shift
from agency-centric information technology (IT) to a common enterprise platform where the IC
can easily and securely share technology, information, and capabilities across the Community.
To enable this change, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with the
applicable ICelement head, has designated IC elements as Service Providers, who assume the
responsibility for developing and maintaining IC ITE services of common concern. IC ITE Services
are the capabilities and shared solutions that are being delivered across the IC to help complete
the vision of IC ITE. These services currently include: a common desktop environment; a joint
cloud environment; an applications mail; an enterprise management capability; identification,
authentication, and authorization capabilities; network requirements and engineering services;
and a security coordination service.
Working with the IC under the IC ITE Strategy, the IC CIO is facilitating the development,
implementation, and adoption of seamless and secure enterprise solutions that promote trusted
collaborationconnecting people to people, people to data, and data to data. The strategy
enhances the ICs ability to securely discover, access, and share information across agencies and
ultimately enables greater mission success.
IC ITE Implementation is an evolving process of consolidating and adopting Community
capabilities. With the adoption of IC ITE Services, users will have broader and faster access to data
and an increased ability to collaborate on common systems across the IC in ways that enhance
mission integration and optimize mission success.
87 See 50 U.S.C. 1801(e)(1)(2), 1881a(a), 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v).
88 For a discussion of foreign intelligence information including both protective and affirmative
intelligence, see NSIP, supra note 2, 8:298:36. For a discussion of PPD-28, see NSIP, supra note 2,
89 See Press Release, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Bd., PCLOB Announces Its Short-Term Agenda
(Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.pclob.gov/newsroom/20140807.html (The Board will examine EO 12333 and
its implications for privacy and civil liberties.); see also PCLOB Examination of E.O. 12333 Activities in
2015, https://www.pclob.gov/library/20150408-EO12333_Project_Description.pdf (discussing plans for
public report on E.O. 12333). Executive Order 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), was issued on December 4, 1981.
It was amended on August 27, 2004 by Executive Order 13355, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2004). It was again amendedon
July30, 2008 by Executive Order 13470, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2009). For a discussion of EO 12333 and its impact
onthe U.S. Intelligence Community, including intelligence surveillance, see NSIP, supra note 2, chs. 1, 2, 17.
90 For a discussion of this possibility, and how it influenced the adoption of the first executive order
comprehensively regulating the Intelligence Community, an antecedent to EO 12333, see id. 1:4, 2:7.
Morerecently, in December 2014, in Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,
Pub. L. No. 113-293, 128 Stat. 3998 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 1813 (Supp. II 2014)), Congress required by statute
procedures governing retention of communications acquired under EO 12333. To my knowledge, this is the
first direct statutory regulation of such surveillance.
91 See David Perera, Terror Fears Dont Budge Obama on Encryption, Politico (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/obama-resists-calls-for-encryption-shift-216920; Ellen
Nakashima,After Terrorist Attacks, the Debate Over Encryption Gets New Life, Wash. Post (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/after-terrorist-attacks-the-debate-over
-encryption-gets-new-life/2015/12/09/3bb73f22-9e99-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html; Ellen
Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Obama Administration Opts Not to Force Firms to Decrypt DataFor
Now,Wash. Post (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama
-administration-opts-not-to-force-firms-to-decrypt-data--for-now/2015/10/08/1d6a6012-6dca-11e5
-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html.
92 Much of the most sophisticated and thoughtful material on encryption is available on or through
Lawfare, www.lawfareblog.com.
93 50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B); see also id. 1802(a)(4)(A), 1822(a)(4)(A)(i), 1842(d)(2)(B)(i); 50 U.S.C.A. 1861(c)
(2)(F)(vi). The language in FISA is very similar to that in a 1970 amendment to the Wiretap Act, which
provides that an
order authorizing the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter
shall, upon request of the applicant, direct that a provider of wire or electronic communication
service, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information,
facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and
with a minimum of interference with the services that such service provider, landlord, custodian,
orperson is according the person whose communications are to be intercepted.
18 U.S.C. 2518(4); see also id. 2511(2)(a)(ii).
94 The term is defined in 50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4) to include:
(A) a telecommunications carrier, as that term is defined in [section 3 of the Communications Act
of1934 (47 U.S.C. 153)];
(B) a provider of electronic communication service, as that term is defined in section 2510 of title
18, [United States Code];
(C) a provider of a remote computing service, as that term is defined in section 2711 of title 18,
[United States Code];
(D) any other communication service provider who has access to wire or electronic communications
either as such communications are transmitted or as such communications are stored; or
50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4).
95 Id. 1881a(h)(1)(A).
96 See id. 1881a(g)(2)(A)(vi).
97 See id. 1881b(a)(1). A Section 703 order shall direct... if applicable, an electronic communication
service provider to provide to the Government forthwith all information, facilities, or assistance necessary
to accomplish the acquisition authorized under such order in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the
acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such electronic communication
service provider is providing to the target of the acquisition. Id. 1881b(c)(5)(B).
98 See id. 1881c(c)(3)(A).
99 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
100 28 U.S.C. 1651.
101 New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 176177. The Supreme Court elaborated on this point in a footnote:
We reject the Court of Appeals suggestion that the fact that Congress amended Title III [the
Wiretap Act] to require that communication common carriers provide necessary assistance in
connection with electronic surveillance within the scope of Title III reveals a congressional doubt
that the courts possessed inherent power to issue such orders and therefore it seems reasonable
to conclude that similar authorization should be required in connection with pen register
orders.... The amendment was passed following the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Application
of United States, 427 F.2d 639 (1970), which held that absent specific statutory authority, a United
States District Court was without power to compel a telephone company to assist in a wiretap
conducted pursuant to Title III. The court refused to infer such authority in light of Congress silence
in a statute which constituted a comprehensive legislative treatment of wiretapping. We think
that Congress prompt action in amending the Act was not an acceptance of the Ninth Circuits
view but more in the nature of an overruling of that opinion. The meager legislative history of
the amendment indicates that Congress was only providing an unequivocal statement of its intent
under Title III. See 115 Cong. Rec. 37192 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). We decline to infer from
a congressional grant of authority under these circumstances that such authority was previously
Moreover, even if Congress action were viewed as indicating acceptance of the Ninth Circuits view
that there was no authority for the issuance of orders compelling telephone companies to provide
assistance in connection with wiretaps without an explicit statutory provision, it would not follow
that explicit congressional authorization was also needed to order telephone companies to assist
in the installation and operation of pen registers which, unlike wiretaps, are not regulated by a
comprehensive statutory scheme. In any event, by amending Title III Congress has now required
that at the Governments request telephone companies be directed to provide assistance in
connection with wire interceptions. It is plainly unlikely that Congress intended at the same time
toleave federal courts without authority to require assistance in connection with pen registers.
Id. at 177 n.25 (some citations omitted).
102 This is in one sense the continuation of a trend revealed publicly by the US government before the FAA.
See NSIP, supra note 2, 16:5 (quoting remarks by Ken Wainstein).
103 The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. 10011010. Under one
provision of CALEA, a telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the
governments ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the
encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt
thecommunication. Id. 1002(b)(3),
104 See Quinta Jurecic, DOJ and Apple File Briefs in EDNY Encryption Case, Lawfare (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/doj-and-apple-file-briefs-edny-encryption-case; see also H.R. Rep.
No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 15 (1994) (While the Supreme Court has read [18 U.S.C. 2518(4)] as requiring the
Federal courts to compel, upon request of the government, any assistance necessary to accomplish
an electronic interception, United States v. New York Telephone, 434 U.S. 159, 177 (1977), the question
of whether companies have any obligation to design their systems such that they do not impede law
enforcement interception has never been adjudicated).
105 In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of Oral Communications, 349 F.3d 1132, 1145
106 Id. at 114748 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
107 See Current MembershipForeign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/fiscr_membership.
108 Apple Inc.s Response to Courts October 9, 2015 Memorandum and Order at 4, In re Order Requiring
Apple Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this Court, No. 15 MISC 1902 (JO) (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/doj-and-apple-file-briefs-edny-encryption-case.
109 Draft Investigatory Powers Bill at 16 (Nov. 2015) (U.K.) (hereinafter UK Draft IP Bill), https://www.gov
.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473770/Draft_Investigatory_Powers
_Bill.pdf. This is distinct from equipment interference whose primary purpose is not collection of
information, but rather something like destruction of data. See id. at 236 (explanatory notes).
110 Written Evidence (IPB0119), Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment 3 (Dec. 21, 2015)
[hereinafter EFFUK Comments], http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence
.svc/evidencedocument/draft-investigatory-powers-bill-committee/draft-investigatory-powers
-bill/written/26370.html.
111 Id., Comment 27.
112 Id., Comment 24. This possibility raises an interesting question that Congress may want to consider
with respect to the technical assistance provisions of the FAA. As noted above, traditional FISA allows
compelled assistance from a specified communication or other common carrier, landlord, custodian, or
other specified person, while FAA702 applies only to an electronic communication service provider
(ECSP). The question is whether an ECSP is subject to the compelled assistance provisions of FAA702
where it is not directly involved in facilitating the communications to be monitorede.g., if Microsoft were
compelled to push down a Windows software update to facilitate surveillance of a person who was sending
encrypted emails on a Dell personal computer using a Comcast connection to the Internet and Gmail. For
a discussion of a more extreme scenario, in which a Verizon employee is compelled to assist in a physical
search under FAA702 by disabling a home alarm system, see NSIP, supra note 2, 17:8.
113 EFF UK Comments, supra note 109, Comment 33.
114 See UK Draft IP Bill, supra note 109, at 237 (explanatory notes). A law passed by China in late December
2015 apparently requires technical assistance, including with decryption. See Benjamin Bissell, What
Chinas Anti-Terrorism Legislation Actually Says, Lawfare (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/what-chinas-anti-terrorism-legislation-actually-says.
115 See Public FilingsU.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, available at http://www.fisc
.uscourts.gov/public-filings. According to Google, it provided at least some data in response to 76percent
of all worldwide government law enforcement requests for information in the six-month period ending
December 31, 2010, as compared to 63percent of such requests in the six-month period ending June 30,
2015, a reduction of 13percent. Google assures users that it review[s] each request to make sure that it
complies with both the spirit and the letter of the law and that it may refuse to produce information or
tryto narrow the request in some cases. Google Transparency Report, https://www.google.com
/transparencyreport/userdatarequests. Other companies report data on their compliance over a
shorter period, making identification of trends more difficult. Apples transparency report is available
at http://images.apple.com/privacy/docs/government-information-requests-20150914.pdf, Facebooks
transparency report is available at https://govtrequests.facebook.com, Yahoo!s transparency report
is available at https://transparency.yahoo.com/government-data-requests/index.htm, and Twitters
transparency report is available at https://transparency.twitter.com/information-requests/2015/jan-jun.
In describing their compliance qualitatively, however, these providers are often quite explicit in their efforts
to provide as little data as possible to the government, and only when compelled to do so. Apple reports its
approach to compliance as follows:
Any government agency demanding customer content from Apple must get a search warrant.
When we receive such a demand, our legal team carefully reviews it. If theres a question about the
legitimacy or scope of the request we challenge it, as we have done as recently as this year. We only
comply with information requests once we are satisfied that the request is valid and appropriate,
and then we deliver the narrowest possible set of information.
Facebook describes itself as follows:
We have strict processes in place to handle these government requests. Every request we receive is
checked for legal sufficiency. We require officials to provide a detailed description of the legal and
factual basis for their request, and we push back when we find legal deficiencies or overly broad or
vague demands for information. We frequently share only basic subscriber information.
Yahoo! uses similar language to describe its approach:
We carefully scrutinize each request to make sure that it complies with the law, and we push
backon those requests that dont satisfy our rigorous standards. When we are compelled to
disclose data, consistent with our Global Principles for Responding to Government Requests,
wedisclose only as much data as is necessary to comply with the request.
Yahoo! also highlights on its transparency web site a quote from its general counsel: We fight any requests
that we deem unclear, improper, overbroad, or unlawful.
Finally, Twitter reports this:
We do not comply with requests that fail to identify a Tweet or Twitter account.
In other cases, users may have challenged the requests after weve notified them.
On the other hand, it is reasonably clear from these reports that the providers have not decided to resist
government directives wholesale or to engage in broad civil disobedience of court orders. According to
their latest published data, Google, Apple, Facebook, Yahoo! and Twitter all currently provide at least some
information in response to approximately 80percent of US government law enforcement requests. The
companies do not appear to publish data on their compliance with US national security requests, although
50 U.S.C. 1874 as amended by the USA Freedom Act has expanded reporting options.
116 See Microsofts Objections to the Magistrates Order Denying Microsofts Motion to Vacate In Part a
Search Warrant Seeking Customer Information Located Outside the United States at 56, In re a Warrant
toSearch a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, No. 13-MAG-2814;
M9-150 (S.D.N.Y., June 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/06
/10/National-Security/Graphics/SDNY%20MSFT%20Brief.pdf. Here is Microsofts explanation for why it
stores some users e-mail in Ireland (citations omitted):
In September 2010, Microsoft began to store data for certain web-based email accounts in a
datacenter in Dublin, Ireland, which is leased and operated by Microsofts wholly owned Irish
subsidiary. The addition of the Dublin datacenter boosted the quality of service to numerous users
because it reduces network latencyi.e., the inverse ratio between quality of service and the
distance between a user and the datacenter where that users account is hosted. Maximizing quality
of service by minimizing network latency is critical to Microsofts business. The Dublin datacenter
allows Microsoft to reduce network latency and improve the quality of service for users located
closer to Ireland than to the United States. For Outlook.com accounts stored in Dublin, the users
content resides on a specific server in the Dublin datacenter. It does not exist in any form insidethe
United States. Certain non-content information and address book data, in contrast, is stored in
For its part, the government says that [a]ccording to Microsoft, it stores email content in a foreign
datacenter when a subscriber claims to be physically present in an overseas location, but it takes no
steps to confirm whether the subscriber is, in fact, logging in from a foreign location. Governments
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Microsofts Motion to Vacate Email Account Warrant at 2, In re
aWarrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation,
No. 13-MAG-2814; M9-150 (S.D.N.Y., April 20, 2014), http://digitalconstitution.com/wp-content/uploads
/2014/11/government-warrant.pdf
117 For a more complete discussion of these points, see NSIP, supra note 2, at 7:12, 7:16, 7:18.
118 See NSIP, supra note 2, 16:5 (quoting remarks by Ken Wainstein).
119 See NSIP, supra note 2, 7:29. As a former assistant attorney general for national security (Ken
Wainstein) explained in 2008 in a slightly different context, We rely on the communications providers to
do our intelligence surveillances. We cant do [the surveillances] without them because... we... dont
own the communications systems. We need to rely on their assistance. Cited in NSIP, supra note 2, 16:5.
The full quotation from Wainstein reflects the fact that in some cases (but not in all), the government can
obtaina FISA Court order.
120 See 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(ii).
121 A good deal of high-quality scholarship, and also a short piece that I wrote on the subject, can be found
on Lawfare, https://lawfareblog.com/search/node/cross-border%20data%20requests.
122 See Tor Project, https://www.torproject.org; Dune Lawrence, The Inside Story of Tor, the Best Internet
Anonymity Tool the Government Ever Built, Bloomberg Business (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg
.com/bw/articles/2014-01-23/tor-anonymity-software-vs-dot-the-national-security-agency.
123 For a discussion of the efforts of Netflix and Hulu to defeat VPN-spoofed IP addresses, see, e.g., Thorin
Klosowski, Get Around Location Restrictions on Netflix or Hulu with a Private VPN IP Address, Lifehacker
(Jan.20, 2016), http://lifehacker.com/get-around-location-restrictions-on-netflix-or-hulu-wit-1754043343.
124 See PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 38 (NSA is required to use other technical means, such as
Internet protocol (IP) filters, to help ensure that at least one end of an acquired Internet transaction is
located outside the United States.), 120 (In part to compensate for this problem, the NSA takes additional
measures with its upstream collection to ensure that no communications are acquired that are entirely
between people located in the United States. These measures can include, for instance, employing Internet
protocol filters to acquire only communications that appear to have at least one end outside the United
States.); 132 n.544 (NSA masks U.S. person identities in its FAA702 reporting in certain circumstances,
and unmasking can include IP addresses as well as names). See also NSA Director of Civil Liberties and
Privacy Office Report, NSAs Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702, at 5-6
(April16, 2014) (For example, in certain circumstances NSAs procedures require that it employ an Internet
Protocol filter to ensure that the target is located overseas), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents
/0421/702%20Unclassified%20Document.pdf.
125 Margaret Coker, Sam Schechner and Alexis Flynn, How Islamic State Teaches Tech Savvy to Evade
Detection, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 16, 2015) (Islamic State, for its part, has built a tech-savvy division
of commanders who issue tutorials to sympathizers about the most secure and least expensive ways of
communicating), http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-teaches-tech-savvy-1447720824.
126 PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 117-118 (footnotes omitted).
127 PCLOB 702 Report, supra note 1, at 43-44 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
128 NSA Director of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office Report, NSAs Implementation of Foreign
IntelligenceSurveillance Act Section 702 at 4 (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents
129 According to one study from June 2015, VPNs are used by approximately 20percent of European
Internet users, but 11 out of 14 VPN providers studied leaked information about users because of the
IPv6 leakage. See Science Daily, Most Internet Anonymity Software Leaks Users Details (June 29, 2015),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/06/150629210621.htm.
130 See David Kris, Thoughts on a Blue Sky Overhaul of Surveillance Laws, Lawfare (May 2013),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-blue-sky-overhaul-surveillance-laws-introduction.
131 The Internet can be measured by number of users, amount of data, or number of web sites, among
other things. Precise measurements can be difficult, but the trends are unmistakable. See, e.g., Internet
World Stats, Internet Growth Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm; Internet Live
Stats, Internet Users, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users.
132Telegeography, Global Bandwidth Research Service, https://www.telegeography.com/research
-services/global-bandwidth-research-service/index.html.
133 Robin Emmott, Brazil, Europe Plan Undersea Cable to Skirt U.S. Spying, Reuters (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-eu-brazil-idUSBREA1N0PL20140224.
134 See NSIP, supra note 2, 16:12; Church Report Book III at 741.
135 Marc Ambinder, How the U.S. Lost its Home Field Advantage, The Atlantic (Feb. 6, 2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/02/how-the-us-lost-its-home-field-surveillance
-advantage/35495.
136 See David Kris, Whats the Big Secret, Slate (Aug. 29, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/life
/the_breakfast_table/features/2007/whats_the_big_secret/searching_the_haystacks.html.
137 See NSIP, supra note 1, Chapters 7, 16, 17.
138 For an overview of the Internet of Things, see, e.g., Internet of Things, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Internet_of_Things.
139 For an overview of FinTech, see Financial Technology, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Financial_technology. For a thoughtful article on the future of FinTech, see The Fintech Revolultion,
TheEconomist (May 9, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21650546-wave-startups
-changing-financefor-better-fintech-revolution.
140 See, e.g., Danny Yadron, Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013, Wall Street Journal
(Dec,20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013
-1450662559; Robert OHarrow, Jr, Cyber Search Engine Shodan Exposes Industrial Control Systems to
NewRisks, Wash. Post (June 3, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/cyber-search
-engine-exposes-vulnerabilities/2012/06/03/gJQAIK9KCV_story.html.
141 See, e.g., Susan Hennessey, The Problems CISA Solves: ECPA Reform in Disguise, Lawfare (Dec. 23,
2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/problems-cisa-solves-ecpa-reform-disguise; Paul Rosenzweig, The
Cybsersecurity Act of 2015, Lawfare (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-act-2015.
142 See, e.g., the reference to common carrier in 50 U.S.C. 1801(l), 1802(a)(4), and 1805(c)(2)(B), and
thedefinition and reference to electronic communication service provider in 50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4)
and,e.g., 50 U.S.C. 1881a(g)(2)(A)(vi).
143 See, e.g., Ben Bain, Committee Sets Goals for Open-Source Info, FCW (Sept. 11, 2008), https://fcw.com
/articles/2008/09/11/committee-sets-goals-for-opensource-info.aspx.
144 In a November 2015 speech, for example, Hillary Clinton said: Radicalization and recruitment also is
happening online. Theres no doubt we have to do a better job contesting online space, including websites
and chat rooms, where jihadists communicate with followers. We must deny them virtual territory just as
we deny them actual territory.... Social media companies can also do their part by swiftly shutting down
terrorist accounts so theyre not used to plan, provoke, or celebrate violence. Hillary Clinton on National
Security and the Islamic State, Council on Foreign Relations (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.cfr.org
/radicalization-and-extremism/hillary-clinton-national-security-islamic-state/p37266. President Obama
addressed the nation from the Oval Office in early December 2015. According to an article in Politico, a
senior administration official speaking ahead of Obamas speech Sunday told reporters the presidents
speech would include a discussion about encryption and the social media fight, but the president left that
out of the version of the speech that he delivered. (The White House said Monday that the efforts to address
this issue are underway.) Edward-Isaac Dovere, This Time, Clintons Closer to the Public Mood than Obama,
Politico (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/hillary-clinton-obama-national
-security-216523. See also Nicole Perloth & Mike Isaac, Terrorists Mock Bids to End Use of Social Media, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 7, 2015) (As soon as Twitter suspends one account, a new one is created. After the groups
99th account was suspended, it taunted Twitter by creating @IslamicState100, posting images of birthday
candles, cake, trophies and fireworks), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/technology/terrorists-mock
-bids-to-end-use-of-social-media.html; Scott Shane, Matt Apuzzo & Eric Schmitt, Americans Attracted to
ISIS Find an Echo Chamber on Social Media, N.Y. Times (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09
/us/americans-attracted-to-isis-find-an-echo-chamber-on-social-media.html; Scott Shane, Internet Firms
Urged to Limit Work of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19
/us/politics/internet-firms-urged-to-limit-work-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html; Simon Cottee, The Challenge
ofJihadi Cool, The Atlantic (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/isis
-jihadi-cool/421776; C.J. Chivers, Behind the Black Flag: The Recruitment of an ISIS Killer, N.Y. Times (Dec.20,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/world/middleeast/isis-recruitment-killer-hassan-aboud
.html?login=email&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=photo-spot
-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
145 The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was hacked in 2014, and data on several current and
former government employees was taken. See Fred Barbash and Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Hackers May
Have Breached the Federal Governments Personnel Office, U.S. Officials Say, Wash. Post (July 13, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/09/report-chinese-hacked-into-the
-federal-governments-personnel-office.
146Reuters, Google: Gmail Hack Likely From China Cyberattackers, Huffington Post (June 1, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/01/google-gmail-hack-china_n_869995.html.
147 See, e.g., Evan Perez, Tal Kopan and Shimon Prokupecz, U.S. Investigating Report Email Account
Linkedto CIA Director Hacked, CNN (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/19/politics/cia-fbi
-alleged-hacking-report/index.html.
148 The question whether the issues discussed in part 3 should be considered as part of FAA renewal, or
separately, is one that may depend on legislative tactics and other considerations. I am largely indifferent
as to whether these issues are addressed as part of FAA renewal or in a separate process.
Copyright 2016 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
The preferred citation for this publication is:
David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and Beyond, Hoover Working Group
onNational Security, Technology, and Law, Series Paper No. 1601 (February 24, 2016), available at http://www.scribd
.com/doc/300422389 and at https://www.lawfareblog.com/trends-and-predictions-foreign-intelligence-surveillance
-faa-and-beyond.
Jean Perkins Foundation Working Group
on National Security, Technology, and Law
David S. Kris is general counsel
of Intellectual Ventures. From
2009 to 2011, he was assistant
attorney general for national
security at the US Department
of Justice. From 2003 to 2009
he held various positions at
Time Warner, including deputy
From 1992 to 2003, he was an
attorney and then associate
deputy attorney general at the
the author of several papers on
national security and coauthor
of the treatise National Security
law and how governments can use that technology to
defend themselves, consistent with constitutional values
and the ruleof law.
surveillance to counterterrorism to the dramatic impact
that rapid technological changedigitalization,
computerization, miniaturization, and automaticity
arehaving on national security and national security
law.Topics include cybersecurity, the rise of drones and
autonomous weapons systems, and the need for
anddangers ofstate surveillance. The working groups
output, which includes the Aegis Paper Series, is also
published on the Lawfare blog channel, Aegis: Security
Policy in Depth, in partnership with the Hoover
Jack Goldsmith and Benjamin Wittes are the cochairs of
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For more information about this Hoover Institution Working
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