Source: https://openjurist.org/136/f3d/631/united-states-v-doe
Timestamp: 2018-10-22 15:04:14
Document Index: 461637434

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 22', '§ 81', '§ 334', '§ 48', '§ 6', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 8', '§ 451', '§ 452', '§ 81']

136 F3d 631 United States v. Doe | OpenJurist
136 F. 3d 631 - United States v. Doe
136 F3d 631 United States v. Doe
98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1083
Jane DOE (R.S.W.), Defendant-Appellant.
No. 97-30042.
The question presented by this appeal is what mens rea is required to be proved to establish a violation of the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 81.1 The district court did not address the issue directly but its finding implies that it assumed knowledge that burning the building down was a likely result of the act was an element of the offense. We review the district court's construction or interpretation of a statute de novo. United States v. DeLaCorte, 113 F.3d 154, 155 (9th Cir.1997).
Section 81 makes it an offense to "willfully and maliciously set[ ] fire to or burn a building." Prior interpretations of "willfully" are not necessarily binding or helpful, for as the Supreme Court has noted, " '[w]illful,' ... is a 'word of many meanings,' and 'its construction [is] often ... influenced by its context.' " Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141, 114 S.Ct. 655, 659, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497, 63 S.Ct. 364, 367, 87 L.Ed. 418 (1943)). In analyzing the mens rea requirement of federal criminal statutes, courts "must follow Congress' intent as to the required level of mental culpability for any particular offense." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406, 100 S.Ct. 624, 632, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980).
The legislative history of § 81 is silent as to the intended meaning of "willfully and maliciously." In the absence of any indication to the contrary, we must assume that when Congress adopted the common law definition of the crime of arson-the willful and malicious burning of a building-it intended to adopt the meaning that common law gave that phrase.2 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 116-17, 111 S.Ct. 461, 469-70, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (where a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the term must generally be given that meaning); United States v. Loera, 923 F.2d 725, 727-28 (9th Cir.1991) ("[t]he common-law meaning of a common-law term used in a federal criminal statute provides a source from which statutory precision may be derived") (citation omitted); United States v. Juvenile Male, 930 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir.1991) ("Because 'assault' is not defined in the statute, we have construed it to be equivalent to common law assault."); United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 134, 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996) ("[I]f Congress uses a common-law term in a federal criminal statute without defining it, we must presume that Congress adopted the common-law definition of that term.").
At common law, "[a]rson is a crime of general, rather than specific intent and the requirement that the defendant act 'wilfully and maliciously' does not mean that the defendant must have an actual subjective purpose that the act he does intentionally shall produce either (1) setting a fire or burning of the structure or (2) damage to or destruction of said structure." Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 643 (Wyo.1983); State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 576 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1978); see also State v. O'Farrell, 355 A.2d 396, 398 (Me.1976); State v. Bell, 113 Ariz. 279, 551 P.2d 548, 550 (1976); United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1, 2 (C.M.A.1983); 6A C.J.S. Arson § 6, 223 (1975).3 "To be a willful act, the setting of the fire must be a conscious, intentional act done knowingly and according to a purpose, as distinguished from a fire that was started by accident or defendant's involuntary act." 5 Am.Jur.2d Arson and Related Offenses § 7 (1995); see also Isaac v. State, 645 So.2d 903, 908 (Miss.1994) (citing Curtis' Treatise on the Law of Arson); Dean, 668 P.2d at 642; Linehan v. State, 442 So.2d 244, 247 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983); Scott, 576 P.2d at 1385; State v. Nelson, 17 Wash.App. 66, 561 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1977). " '[M]aliciously' means that state of mind which actuates conduct injurious to others without lawful reason, cause or excuse." Dean, 668 P.2d at 643; Scott, 576 P.2d at 1385; see also 5 Am.Jur.2d Arson and Related Offenses § 7 (1995) (an act "done with a design to do an intentional wrongful act ... toward the public, without any legal justification, excuse or claim of right").4
We are aware of only one federal appellate decision that has addressed the mens rea requirement under § 81. In United States v. M.W., 890 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1989), the court affirmed a conviction, holding that a finding that the defendant was "consciously aware that his conduct would result in setting fire to or burning the school building ... established knowing conduct and was, therefore, sufficient to support [the conviction]" under § 81. Id. at 241.9 While we agree with the result reached by the court, we disagree with its reasoning. The court did not address the common law definition of the crime and instead made reference to the Model Penal Code analysis of mens rea. We respectfully reject its analysis which implies a higher mens rea requirement than exists at common law.10
We turn then to the facts. The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Kohli, 110 F.3d 1475, 1476 (9th Cir.1997). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Iriarte-Ortega, 113 F.3d 1022, 1024 n. 2 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)), modified, 127 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir.1997). The same test applies to both jury and bench trials. United States v. Mayberry, 913 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir.1990).
"Normally a judgment will not be reversed where a proper result is reached on the basis of a wrong reason, provided that the defendant suffered no prejudice." United States v. Castillo-Felix, 539 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir.1976).11 Even if the district court applied a higher mens rea standard than required, R.S.W. suffered no prejudice from its application because the correct standard-general intent-is less stringent, and the lower standard is encompassed within the higher.12 Applying the correct standard, the district court's relevant findings of fact support R.S.W.'s conviction under § 81.
The majority affirms R.S.W.'s arson conviction under § 81 on a basis different from the one relied upon by the district court. See Majority at 634. The district court followed the interpretation of § 81's intent requirement of "willfully and maliciously" adopted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. M.W., 890 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1989).1 That case interprets the "willfully and maliciously" requirement in § 81 as "includ[ing] acts done with the knowledge that burning of a building is the practically certain result: a person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense [ ] ... if the element involves a result of his conduct [and] he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result." Id. at 240-41 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 22A.05 (Arson, 18 U.S.C. § 81) ("As used in these instructions, the term 'willfully and maliciously' means either to knowingly set fire to or burn a building, structure, vessel or machinery deliberately and intentionally ('on purpose'), or to act with the knowledge that burning a building, structure, vessel or machinery is practically certain to result."). The majority, by contrast, fashions its own novel construction, purportedly derived from the common law.2
At common law, arson "is the wilful and malicious burning of the dwelling place of another." Wharton's Criminal Law § 334 (15th ed.1995). As such, "[a]rson was one of the earliest felonies in which the mental element was stressed." John Poulos, The Metamorphosis of the Law of Arson, 51 Mo. L.Rev. 295, 319 (1986) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). The required intent "cannot be inferred from the mere act of burning," 5 Am.Jur.2d Arson and Related Offenses § 48 (1995), although it may be inferred from such facts as the defendant's removal of "most of the contents of the building shortly before the fire," "threats to destroy the property later burned," and "ill will, unfriendly relations and trouble between the defendant and the owner of the property burned," id. (citing numerous cases).
Inexplicably, the majority then concludes, without any citation to authority, that "[a]t common law, therefore, arson did not require proof of an intent to burn down a building, or of knowledge this would be the probable consequence of the defendant's act." Majority at 635. This conclusion directly contradicts the authority that the majority cites. It is basic hornbook law that "[t]o constitute arson, there must be an intent to burn a building or other structure, and [the] accused must be consciously aware that his conduct is of such a nature that fire would result." 6A C.J.S. Arson § 6 (1975); see also Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Bryce, Criminal Law 276-77 (3d ed. 1982) ("[T]he state of mind which constitutes guilt of common law arson ... is either an intent to burn the dwelling of another, or an act done under such circumstances that there is obviously a plain and strong likelihood of such a burning.").
Modern cases as well continue to follow this rule. See, e.g., Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz. 222, 564 P.2d 911, 913 (1977) (holding that intentionally setting a grass fire that spread out of control to burn a house was insufficient to satisfy the arson statute's intent requirement of "willfully and maliciously"); People v. Fabris, 31 Cal.App.4th 685, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667, 672 (1995) (explaining that, although arson is not a "specific intent" offense,3 conviction nevertheless "requires an intent to burn a structure when the burning is caused by the act of setting fire to a substance which is not itself the subject of the arson statute"); T.E. v. State, 701 So.2d 1237, 1237-38 (Fla.Ct.App.1997) (holding that the burning of a wooden shack caused by a boy who ignited a piece of paper at the end of a metal pipe was insufficient to meet arson statute's intent requirement of "willfully and maliciously"); People v. Lindsey, 83 Mich.App. 354, 268 N.W.2d 41, 42 (1978) (overturning arson conviction despite evidence that fire was started by human means with the use of paper because "an inference that the fire was negligently started ... appears equally as plausible as the prosecution's inference that the fire was wilfully and maliciously set by the defendant"); Isaac v. State, 645 So.2d 903, 907-09 (Miss.1994) (holding that the accidental burning of the door to an apartment by lighting a towel with a cigarette is not arson); see also, e.g., Walters v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 172 F.R.D. 165, 168 (D.Vi.1997) (construing arson as the malicious burning of "any building of another with the intent to destroy it"); Veverka v. Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1982) (explaining that common law arson requires a "general intent to burn a building"); Stokes v. State, 86 Okla.Crim. 21, 189 P.2d 424, 427 (1948) (construing arson as "wilful and malicious burning of a building with intent to destroy it"), as modified, 86 Okla.Crim. 21, 190 P.2d 838, overruled on other grounds by Parker v. State, 917 P.2d 980, 986 (Okla.Crim.App.1996); State v. Nelson, 17 Wash.App. 66, 561 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1977) (explaining that common law arson requires "a general malice or intent to burn some structure").
The majority appears to acknowledge as much, but then in retreat suggests that even if the district court erred in its finding, "[g]iven that common law arson is a general intent crime, that finding is surplusage." Majority at 636. The majority is wrong as to the law.
While it is true that common law arson is not a "specific intent" crime, it does not follow that an arson conviction requires nothing more than the lowest form of "general intent." The phrase "general intent" encompasses many forms of the mental state requirement not designated by "specific intent," or "purpose." See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5(b), (e) (1986); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405, 100 S.Ct. 624, 632, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) ("In a general sense, 'purpose' corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent.").
The term of art, "intentional," on the other hand, as used to describe the common law offense of arson, has traditionally been defined to include both purpose and knowledge, "and thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows that those consequences are substantially certain to result from his acts." LaFave & Scott § 3.5. Only with this understanding then does it become clear why, as applied to arson, "[m]alice is the deliberate and intentional firing of a building, or other defined structure, as contrasted with an accidental or unintentional ignition thereof." 6A C.J.S. Arson § 8 (1975).
Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont, the Virgin Islands, and West Virginia all have statutes employing the terms "willfully and maliciously." California has arson statutes with two different mens rea: "willfully and maliciously" and recklessly. Although a minority of California Courts of Appeal have concluded that the legislature intended to change the common law mens rea of "willfully and maliciously" to specific intent by criminalizing "reckless arson" as a lesser offense, the majority view supports maintaining the common law's general intent mens rea for the higher offense. Compare In re Stonewall F., 208 Cal.App.3d 1054, 256 Cal.Rptr. 578, 580 (1989), with People v. Bolden, 44 Cal.App.4th 707, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 490-91 (1996); compare Cal.Penal Code § 451 (West Supp.1998) (willfully and maliciously), with Cal.Penal Code § 452 (West 1988) (recklessly). Thus, certain California cases applying these arson statutes, such as the dissent's only cited case authority, People v. Fabris, 31 Cal.App.4th 685, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667, 672 (1995), are inapposite to our determination of the common law meaning of "willful and malicious."
See Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1994) (in reviewing denial of habeas petition, "[w]e may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if it differs from the reasoning of the district court"); United States v. Lehman, 792 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.1986) (appellate panel "may affirm ... on any ground supported by record"); United States v. Click, 807 F.2d 847, 850 n. 5 (9th Cir.1986) ("It is proper for an appellate court to affirm a correct decision of a lower court even when that decision is based on an inappropriate ground."); see also Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245-47, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) ("In the review of judicial proceedings the rule is settled that, if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.")
This is not a case where as the result of the trial court's application of the wrong standard, the conviction was not supported by evidence required under the correct standard. Reference to the wrong standard here merely led the court to make surplus findings, in addition to those required for the conviction. Cf. Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d 312, 324-25 (9th Cir.1958) (reversing conviction at bench trial when district judge applied erroneous standard of law and correct standard would require findings not made by the district court)
It is worth noting as a threshold matter that the majority skims over both textual analysis and review of legislative history in its haste to reach the conclusion that Congress encoded the common law in § 81. Only one sentence is devoted to textual analysis, in which the majority completely ignores the term "maliciously" and selectively quotes a Supreme Court case to support the proposition that interpretations of "willfully" are not binding or helpful. Majority at 634 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141, 114 S.Ct. 655, 659, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994)). In fact, the Supreme Court in Ratzlaf warned that judges should hesitate to treat statutory terms "as surplusage," and that "resistance should be heightened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense." 510 U.S. at 140-41, 114 S.Ct. at 659; see also, e.g., State v. Long, 243 N.C. 393, 90 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1956) ("It is an essential element of the common law crime of arson that the burning was done or caused maliciously.")
Contrary to the majority's puzzling assertion, Majority at 635 n. 6, the California Court of Appeals in People v. Fabris held that its arson statute codified a "general intent" crime. See 37 Cal.Rptr.2d at 675 ("[A]rson can be categorized as a general intent crime."); see also id. at 672 ("Stonewall F. [208 Cal.App.3d 1054, 256 Cal.Rptr. 578 (1989),] does not characterize arson as specific intent crime.")