Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/419/515/33474/
Timestamp: 2020-06-06 09:00:13
Document Index: 14418223

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 4208', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2255']

Louis Ray Jones and Billy Don Thompson, Appellants, v. United States of America, Appellee, 419 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1970) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1970 › Louis Ray Jones and Billy Don Thompson, Appellants, v. United States of America, Appellee
Louis Ray Jones and Billy Don Thompson, Appellants, v. United States of America, Appellee, 419 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1970)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 419 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1970) December 24, 1969
At arraignment each petitioner waived indictment and pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (b), robbery or larceny from a federally insured bank. Petitioners also pleaded guilty to several indictments outstanding against them in other districts but transferred to the Western District of Arkansas under Rule 20, Fed. R. Crim. P. Jones was charged with three separate offenses transferred under Rule 20 for crimes committed in Texas, Louisiana and Missouri; Thompson with two in Texas and Louisiana. They were each subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (b), and in addition each received several five-year terms in connection with the indictments transferred under Rule 20, which sentences were set to run concurrently with their 20-year sentences. However, both were sentenced under the indeterminate sentence procedure of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) (2), making them "eligible for parole at such time as the board of parole may determine."
1. Petitioners contend 18 U.S. C. § 2113(a) is unconstitutional because it makes a federal offense of "any larceny" committed in a federally protected bank and in so doing exceeds the constitutional powers of the United States Congress. Petitioners cite Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 63 S. Ct. 483, 87 L. Ed. 640 (1943) for this proposition. But Jerome is not in point. In Jerome the Court made no constitutional determinations, but rather construed the phrase "any felony" (committed in a federally protected bank), as it appeared in the statute, to mean only felonies already proscribed under federal law and affecting banks protected by the Act, on the ground that courts should not infer a congressional intent to incorporate state criminal law unless such an intent is clearly stated in the legislation. Thus, Jerome does not stand for the proposition that Congress is without power to prohibit "any felony" occurring within a federally protected bank. Jerome decided no constitutional issues nor considered any limitations on congressional power, but was concerned only with a statutory construction issue.
Congress is not without power to prohibit "any larceny" (a much more restrictive phrase than "any felony") occurring within a federally protected bank. This Court has upheld the constitutionality of § 2113(a) and (b) in Smith v. United States, 356 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 820, 87 S. Ct. 44, 17 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1966), and petitioners' contention is devoid of any merit. They admitted burglarizing the bank, taking money, coins, and money orders, and their acts fall within the clear purview of the statute.
The case of McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969) has laid down strict instructions requiring judges to follow Rule 11 carefully and to compile a record to show that Rule 11 was complied with. Although McCarthy is not applicable to this case since it does not apply retroactively, Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S. Ct. 1498, 23 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1969), we believe Judge Williams substantially complied with its commands.
3. Petitioners assert that their respective pleas of guilty are invalid, being the result of misinformation as to the maximum length of their sentences. It is true that the judge erred in indicating a 30-year sentence was possible under the original information, 20 years on count one under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and 10 years on count two under 18 U. S.C. § 2113(b). Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S. Ct. 403, 1 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1957) ruled that the maximum sentence possible under this statute is 20 years. However, this issue was broached by one of the attorneys at the time Judge Williams was discussing the penalties with the defendants and, though the matter was not settled at that moment, it is evident the petitioners were aware of the correct maximum sentences which they could receive under each count, and knew their counsel were contending that the lesser count was included in the greater.
5. Finally, petitioners contend that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to grant them a hearing on their § 2255 motion. The Supreme Court viewed this same issue in Hodges v. United States, 368 U.S. 139, 140, 82 S. Ct. 235 at 236, 7 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1961) holding, "that in any event this was a case where no hearing was required under the statute, because `the files and records of the case conclusively show' that the petitioner was entitled to no relief." We think the present case was a proper one for denial of a hearing. Several issues involved no disputed facts. As to the other issues, the record is clear that petitioners were deprived of no substantial rights.