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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 1337', '§ 2011', '§ 2210', '§ 2012', '§ 2210', '§ 1337', '§ 1331', '§ 1337', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 2210', '§ 2210', '§ 210', '§ 2210', '§ 2210', '§ 2210', '§ 1331', '§ 2', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 2210', '§ 1491', '§ 1331', '§ 1337', '§ 1337', '§ 1331', '§ 3566', '§ 2210', '§ 2210', '§ 2210', '§ 1337', '§ 1337', '§ 1346', '§ 1331']

Duke Power Co Vs Carolina Env Study Group - Citation 104352 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Duke Power Co. Vs. Carolina Env. Study Group - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104352
Case Number 438 U.S. 59
Respondent Carolina Env. Study Group
duke power co. v. carolina env. study group - 438 u.s. 59 (1978) u.s. supreme court duke power co. v. carolina env. study group, 438 u.s. 59 (1978) duke power co. v. carolina environmental study group, inc. no. 77-262 argued march 20, 1978 decided june 26, 1978 * 438 u.s. 59 appeal from the united states district court for the western district of north carolina syllabus the price-anderson act (act), having the dual purpose of protecting the public and encouraging the development of the nuclear energy industry, imposes a $560 million limitation on liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation of federally licensed private nuclear power plants, requires those indemnified by the $560 million fund.....
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group - 438 U.S. 59 (1978)
U.S. Supreme Court Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978)
Decided June 26, 1978 *
1. The District Court had jurisdiction over appellees' complaint against the NRC under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976 ed.), rather than § 1337, the jurisdictional base pleaded. The complaint, fairly read, raised two basic challenges to the Act, both of which are derived from the Fifth Amendment. Appellees' cause of action against the NRC directly under the Constitution is sufficiently substantial to sustain jurisdiction; the further question of whether such a cause of action is to be generally recognized need not be decided on this record. Pp. 438 U. S. 68 -72.
2. Appellees have standing to challenge the Act's constitutionality. That several of the "immediate" adverse effects of construction of the plants were found to harm appellees is sufficient to satisfy the "injury in fact" prong of the constitutional requirement for standing. And the finding as to the "but for" causal connection between the Act and the construction of the plants satisfies the second prong of the constitutional test for standing, that the exercise of the court's remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries. Pp. 438 U. S. 72 -81.
3. The constitutional challenges to the Act are ripe for adjudication, since all parties would be adversely affected by a decision to defer definitive resolution of the constitutional validity vel non of the Act. To the extent that "issues of ripeness involve, at least in part, the existence of a live Case or Controversy,'" Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 , 419 U. S. 138 (1974), the fact that appellees will sustain immediate injury from the operation of the disputed power plants and that such injury would be redressed by the relief requested satisfies this requirement. Pp. 438 U. S. 81 -82.
4. The Act does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 438 U. S. 82 -94.
(a) The record supports the need for the imposition of a statutory limit on liability to encourage private industry participation, and hence bears a rational relationship to Congress' concern for stimulating private industry's involvement in the production of nuclear electric energy. P. 438 U. S. 84 .
to protect the, public from the consequences of" a disaster of such proportions, the congressional decision to fix a $560 million ceiling is within permissible limits, and not violative of due process. Pp. 438 U. S. 84 -87.
(c) The District Court's finding that the Act tends to encourage irresponsibility in matters of safety and environmental protection cannot withstand careful scrutiny, since nothing in the liability limitation provision undermines or alters the rigor and integrity of the process involved in the review of applications for a license to construct or operate a nuclear power plant, and since, in the event of a nuclear accident, the utility itself would probably suffer the largest damages. P. 438 U. S. 87 .
(d) The Act provides a reasonably just substitute for the common law or state tort law remedies it replaces, and nothing more is required by the Due Process Clause. The congressional assurance of a $560 million fund for recovery, accompanied by the statutory commitment to "take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of" a nuclear accident, is a fair and reasonable substitute for the uncertain recovery of damages of this magnitude from a utility or component manufacturer whose resources might well be exhausted at an early stage. And, at the minimum, the statutorily mandated waiver of defenses establishes at the threshold the right of injured parties to compensation without proof of fault, and eliminates the burden of delay and uncertainty that would follow from the need to litigate the question of liability after an accident. Pp. 438 U. S. 87 -93.
(e) There is no equal protection violation, since the general rationality of the Act's liability limitation, particularly with reference to the congressional purpose of encouraging private participation in the exploitation of nuclear energy, is ample justification for the difference in treatment between those injured in nuclear accidents and those whose injuries are derived from other causes. Pp. 438 U. S. 93 -94.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 438 U. S. 94 . REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 438 U. S. 95 . STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 438 U. S. 102 .
When Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, it contemplated that the development of nuclear power would be a Government monopoly. See Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755. Within a decade, however, Congress concluded that the national interest would be best served if the Government encouraged the private sector to become involved in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a program of federal regulation and licensing. See H.R.Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-11 (1954). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), implemented this policy decision, providing for licensing of private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear power reactors for energy production under strict supervision by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). [ Footnote 1 ] See Power Reactor Development Co. v. Electrical Workers, 367 U. S. 396 (1961), rev'g and remanding 108 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 280 F.2d 645 (1960).
Congress responded in 1957 by passing the Price-Anderson Act, 71 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The Act had the dual purpose of "protect[ing] the public and . . . encourag[ing] the development of the atomic energy industry." 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i). In its original form, the Act limited the aggregate liability for a single nuclear incident [ Footnote 2 ] to $500 million plus the amount of liability insurance
available on the private market -- some $60 million in 1957. The nuclear industry was required to purchase the maximum available amount of privately underwritten public liability insurance, and the Act provided that, if damages from a nuclear disaster exceeded the amount of that private insurance coverage, the Federal Government would indemnify the licensee and other "persons indemnified" [ Footnote 3 ] in an amount not to exceed $500 million. Thus, the actual ceiling on liability was the amount of private insurance coverage plus the Government's indemnification obligation, which totaled $560 million.
Since its enactment, the Act has been twice amended, the first occasion being on the eve of its expiration in 1966. [ Footnote 4 ] These amendments extended the basic liability limitation provisions for another 10 years, and added a provision which had the effect of requiring those indemnified under the Act to waive all legal defenses in the event of a substantial nuclear accident. [ Footnote 5 ] This provision was based on a congressional concern that state tort law dealing with liability for nuclear incidents was generally unsettled, and that some way of insuring a common standard of responsibility for all jurisdictions -- strict liability -- was needed. A waiver of defenses was thought to be the preferable approach, since it entailed less
interference with state tort law than would the enactment of a federal statute prescribing strict liability. [ Footnote 6 ] See S.Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-10 (1966).
In 1975, Congress again extended the Act's coverage until 1987, and continued the $560 million limitation on liability. However, a new provision was added requiring, in the event of a nuclear incident, each of the 60 or more reactor owners to contribute between $2 and $5 million toward the cost of compensating victims. [ Footnote 7 ] 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Since the liability ceiling remained at the same level, the effect of the "deferred premium" provision was to reduce the Federal Government's contribution to the liability pool. [ Footnote 8 ] In its amendments to the Act in 1975, Congress also explicitly provided that,
Under the Price-Anderson Act as it presently stands, liability in the event of a nuclear incident causing damages of $560 million or more would be spread as follows: $315 million would be paid from contributions by the licensees of the 63 private operating nuclear power plants; $140 million would come from private insurance (the maximum now available); the remainder of $105 million would be borne by the Federal Government. [ Footnote 9 ]
Appellant in No. 77-262, Duke Power Co., is an investor-owned public utility which is constructing one nuclear power plant in North Carolina and one in South Carolina. Duke Power, along with the NRC, was sued by appellees, two organizations -- Carolina Environmental Study Group and the Catawba Central Labor Union -- and 40 individuals who live within close proximity to the planned facilities. The action was commenced in 1973, and sought, among other relief, a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act is unconstitutional. [ Footnote 10 ]
We noted probable jurisdiction [ Footnote 11 ] in these appeals, 434 U.S. 937 (1977), and we now reverse.
As a threshold matter, we must address the question of whether the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over appellees' claims, despite the fact that none of the parties raised this issue, and the District Court did not consider it. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737 , 424 U. S. 740 (1976). Appellees' complaint alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 ed.), which provides for original jurisdiction in the district courts over
Our reading of the pleadings, [ Footnote 12 ] however, indicates that
appellees' claims do not "arise under" the Price-Anderson Act as that statutory language has been interpreted in prior decisions. See Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, 316 U. S. 350 , 316 U. S. 353 (142).
Specifically, as we read the complaint, appellees are making two basic challenges to the Act -- both of which find their moorings in the Fifth Amendment. First, appellees contend that the Due Process Clause protects them against arbitrary governmental action adversely affecting their property rights, and that the Price-Anderson Act -- which both creates the source of the underlying injury and limits the recovery therefor -- constitutes such arbitrary action. And second, they are contending that, in the event of a nuclear accident, their property would be "taken" without any assurance of just compensation. The Price-Anderson Act is the instrument of the taking, since on this record, without it, there would be no power plants and no possibility of an accident. Implicit in the complaint is also the assumption that there exists a cause of action directly under the Constitution to vindicate appellees' federal rights through a suit against the NRC, the executive agency charged with enforcement and administration of the allegedly unconstitutional statute. [ Footnote 13 ] Appellees' right to relief
thus depends not on the interpretation or construction of the Price-Anderson Act itself, but instead "upon the construction or application of the Constitution," Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 10 , 255 U. S. 199 (1921). Hence, if there exists jurisdiction to hear appellees' claims at all, it must be derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976 ed.), the general federal question statute, rather than from § 1337 -- the jurisdictional base pleaded. [ Footnote 14 ]
For purposes of determining whether jurisdiction exists under § 1331(a) to resolve appellees' claims, it is not necessary to decide whether appellees' alleged cause of action against the NRC based directly on the Constitution is, in fact, a cause of action "on which [appellees] could actually recover." Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 , 327 U. S. 682 (1946). Instead, the test is whether " the cause of action alleged is so patently without merit as to justify . . . the court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction.'" Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 , 415 U. S. 542 -543 (1974), quoting Bell v. Hood, supra, at 327 U. S. 683 . (Emphasis added.) See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661 , 414 U. S. 666 (1974) (test is whether right claimed is "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this
Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy"). In light of prior decisions, for example, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), and Hagans v. Lavine, supra, as well as the general admonition that, "where federally protected rights have been invaded . . . , courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief," Bell v. Hood, supra at 327 U. S. 684 , we conclude that appellees' allegations are sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under § 1331(a). [ Footnote 15 ]
The further question of whether appellees' cause of action under the Constitution is one generally to be recognized need not be decided here. The question does not directly implicate our jurisdiction, see Bell v. Hood, supra, was not raised in the court below, was not briefed, and was not addressed during oral argument. As we noted last Term in a similar context, questions of this sort should not be resolved on such an inadequate record; leaving them unresolved is no bar to full consideration of the merits. See Mt. Healthy Cty Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 , 429 U. S. 278 -279 (1977). It is enough for present purposes that the claimed cause of action to vindicate appellees'
constitutional rights is sufficiently substantial and colorable to sustain jurisdiction under § 1331(a). [ Footnote 16 ]
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 (1962). As refined by subsequent reformulation, this requirement of a "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct and palpable injury," to the plaintiff, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 , 422 U. S. 501 (1975), but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 , 429 U. S. 261 (1977). See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26 , 426 U. S. 41 -42 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614 , 410 U. S. 617 (1973). Application of these constitutional standards to the factual findings of the District Court persuades us that the Art. III requisites for standing are satisfied by appellees. We turn first to consider the kinds of injuries the District Court found the appellees suffered. It discerned two categories of effects which resulted from the operation of nuclear
power plants in potentially dangerous proximity to appellees' living and working environment. The immediate effects included: (a) the production of small quantities of non-natural radiation which would invade the air and water; (b) a "sharp increase" in the temperature of two lakes presently used for recreational purposes resulting from the use of the lake waters to produce steam and to cool the reactor; (c) interference with the normal use of the waters of the Catawba River; (d) threatened reduction in property values of land neighboring the power plants; (e) "objectively reasonable" present fear and apprehension regarding the "effect of the increased radioactivity in air, land and water upon [appellees] and their property, and the genetic effects upon their descendants"; and (f) the continual threat of "an accident resulting in uncontrolled release of large or even small quantities of radioactive material" with no assurance of adequate compensation for the resultant damage. 431 F.Supp. 203, 209. Into a second category of potential effects were placed the damages "which may result from a core melt or other major accident in the operation of a reactor. . . ." Id. at 209. [ Footnote 17 ]
of harmful effect which has been deemed adequate in prior cases to satisfy the "injury in fact" standard. See United States v. SCRAP, supra. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 , 405 U. S. 734 (1972). [ Footnote 18 ] And the emission of non-natural radiation into appellees' environment would also seem a direct and present injury, given our generalized concern about exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the health and genetic consequences of even small emissions like those concededly emitted by nuclear power plants. [ Footnote 19 ]
The more difficult step in the standing inquiry is establishing that these injuries "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant," Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., supra at 426 U. S. 41 , or, put otherwise, that the exercise of the Court's remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries. 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 43 . The District Court discerned a "but for" causal connection between the Price-Anderson Act, which appellees challenged as unconstitutional, "and the construction of the nuclear plants which the [appellees] view as a threat to them." 431 F.Supp. at 219. Particularizing that causal link to the facts of the instant case, the District Court concluded that
These findings, which, if accepted, would likely satisfy the second prong of the constitutional test for standing as elaborated in Simon, [ Footnote 20 ] are challenged on two grounds. First, it is argued that the evidence presented at the hearing, contrary to the conclusion reached by the District Court, indicated that the McGuire and Catawba nuclear plants would be completed and operated without the Price-Anderson Act's limitation on liability. And second, it is contended that the Price-Anderson Act is not, in some essential sense, the "but for" cause of the disputed nuclear power plants and resultant adverse effects, since, if the Act had not been passed, Congress may well have chosen to pursue the nuclear program as a Government monopoly, as it had from 1946 until 1954. We reject both of these arguments.
Green 486, 490-491. [ Footnote 21 ] By 1975, the tenor of the testimony had changed only slightly. While large utilities and producers were somewhat more equivocal about whether a failure to renew Price-Anderson would entail their leaving the industry, the smaller producers of component parts and architects and engineers -- all of whom are essential to the building of the reactors and generating plants -- considered renewal of the Act as the critical variable in determining their continued involvement with nuclear power. 431 F.Supp. at 216-217. Duke Power itself, in its letter to the Committee urging extension of the Act, cited recent experiences with suppliers and contractors who were requiring the inclusion of cancellation clauses in their contracts to take effect if the liability limitation provisions were eliminated. Id. at 217. And the Report of the JCAE, in discussing the need for renewal of the Act, stated:
simply echoed the views presented by Duke and others to Congress in 1975, that is, although some of the utilities themselves might be confident enough with respect to safety factors to proceed with nuclear power absent a liability limitation, the suppliers of critical parts and the utility shareholders could reasonably be expected to take a more cautious view. [ Footnote 22 ] Appellees presented expert testimony essentially to the same effect. Considering the documentary evidence and the testimony in the record, we cannot say we are left with "the definite and firm conviction that" the finding by the trial court of a substantial likelihood that the McGuire and Catawba nuclear power plants would be neither completed nor operated absent the Price-Anderson Act is clearly erroneous; and, hence, we are bound to accept it. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364 , 333 U. S. 395 (1948).
Id. at 392 U. S. 102 . See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 , 418 U. S. 174 -175 (1974). Since the environmental and health injuries claimed by appellees are not directly related to the constitutional attack on the Price-Anderson Act, such injuries, the argument continues, cannot supply a predicate for standing. [ Footnote 23 ] We decline to accept this argument.
outside the context of taxpayer suits where we have demanded this type of subject matter nexus between the right asserted and the injury alleged, and we are aware of none. [ Footnote 24 ] Instead, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 , 418 U. S. 225 n. 15 (1974), we explicitly rejected such a broad compass for the Flast nexus requirement:
"Looking 'to the substantive issues' which Flast stated to be both 'appropriate and necessary' in relation to taxpayer standing was for the express purpose of determining 'whether there is a logical nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.' 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 102 . This step is not appropriate on a claim of citizen standing, since the Flast nexus test is not applicable where the taxing and spending power is not challenged. . . ."
We continue to be of the same view, and cannot accept the contention that, outside the context of taxpayers' suits, a litigant must demonstrate something more than injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III. [ Footnote 25 ]
Our prior cases have, however, acknowledged "other limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers," Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 499 , which derive from general prudential concerns "about the proper -- and properly limited -- role of the courts in a democratic society." Id. at 422 U. S. 498 . See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, supra at 418 U. S. 221 -227. Thus, we have declined to grant standing where the harm asserted amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a substantially equal measure. See United States v. Richardson, supra. We have also narrowly limited the circumstances in which one party will be given standing to assert the legal rights of another.
Warth v. Seldin, supra at 422 U. S. 499 . See also United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 (1960). This limitation on third-party standing arguably suggests a connection between the claimed injury and the right asserted bearing some resemblance to the nexus requirement now urged upon us.
There are good and sufficient reasons for this prudential limitation on standing when rights of third parties are implicated -- the avoidance of the adjudication of rights which those not before the Court may not wish to assert, and the assurance that the most effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion them. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 , 428 U. S. 113 -114 (1976). We do not, however, find these reasons a satisfactory predicate for applying this limitation or a similar nexus requirement to all cases as a matter of course. Where a party champions his own rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one which will be
We conclude that appellees have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act. [ Footnote 26 ]
The question of the ripeness of the constitutional challenges raised by appellees need not long detain us. To the extent that "issues of ripeness involve, at least in part, the existence of a live Case or Controversy,'" Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 138 , our conclusion that appellees will sustain immediate injury from the operation of the disputed power plants and that such injury would be redressed by the relief requested would appear to satisfy this requirement.
subject, it would not, in our view, significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues presented, nor aid us in their resolution. However, delayed resolution of these issues would foreclose any relief from the present injury suffered by appellees -- relief that would be forthcoming if they were to prevail in their various challenges to the Act. Similarly, delayed resolution would frustrate one of the key purposes of the Price-Anderson Act -- the elimination of doubts concerning the scope of private liability in the event of major nuclear accident. In short, all parties would be adversely affected by a decision to defer definitive resolution of the constitutional validity vel non of the Price-Anderson Act. Since we are persuaded that "we will be in no better position later than we are now" to decide this question, Id. at 419 U. S. 143 -145, we hold that it is presently ripe for adjudication.
The District Court held that the Price-Anderson Act contravened the Due Process Clause because "[t]he amount of recovery is not rationally related to the potential losses"; because "[t]he Act tends to encourage irresponsibility in matters of safety and environmental protection . . ."; and, finally, because "[t]here is no quid pro quo " for the liability limitations. 431 F.Supp. at 222-223. An equal protection violation was also found because the Act "places the cost of [nuclear power] on an arbitrarily chosen segment of society, those injured by nuclear catastrophe." Id. at 225. Application of the relevant constitutional principles forces the conclusion that these holdings of the District Court cannot be sustained.
accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality generally accorded economic regulations, and that it be upheld absent proof of arbitrariness or irrationality on the part of Congress. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 , 372 U. S. 731 -732 (1963); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 , 428 U. S. 15 (1976). Appellees, however, urge a more elevated standard of review on the ground that the interests jeopardized by the Price-Anderson Act "are far more important than those in the economic due process and business-oriented cases," where the traditional rationality standard has been invoked. Brief for Appellees 36. An intermediate standard like that applied in cases such as Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976) (equal protection challenge to statute requiring that males be older than females in order to purchase beer) or United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1 (1977) (Contract Clause challenge to repeal of statutory covenant providing security for bondholders) is thus recommended for our use here.
As we read the Act and its legislative history, it is clear that Congress' purpose was to remove the economic impediments in order to stimulate the private development of electric energy by nuclear power, while simultaneously providing the public compensation in the event of a catastrophic nuclear incident. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. ,6, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1957). The liability limitation provision thus emerges as a classic example of an economic regulation -- a legislative effort to structure and accommodate "the burdens and benefits of economic life." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., supra at 428 U. S. 15 .
more reason for this Court to defer to the congressional judgment unless it is demonstrably arbitrary or irrational. [ Footnote 27 ]
Assuming, arguendo, that the $560 million fund would not insure full recovery in all conceivable circumstances [ Footnote 28 ] -- and
the hard truth is that no one can ever know -- it does not by any means follow that the liability limitation is therefore irrational and violative of due process. The legislative history clearly indicates that the $560 million figure was not arrived at on the supposition that it alone would necessarily be sufficient to guarantee full compensation in the event of a nuclear incident. Instead, it was conceived of as a "starting point," or a working hypothesis. [ Footnote 29 ] The reasonableness of the statute's assumed ceiling on liability was predicated on two corollary considerations -- expert appraisals of the exceedingly small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of $560 million and the recognition that, in the event of such an incident, Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief provisions to provide additional relief, in accord with prior practice.
Given our conclusion that, in general, limiting liability is an acceptable method for Congress to utilize in encouraging the private development of electric energy by atomic power, candor requires acknowledgment that whatever ceiling figure is selected will, of necessity, be arbitrary in the sense that any choice of a figure based on imponderables like those at issue here can always be so characterized. This is not, however, the kind of arbitrariness which flaws otherwise constitutional action. When appraised in terms of both the extremely remote possibility of an accident where liability would exceed the limitation [ Footnote 30 ] and Congress' now statutory commitment to "take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of" any such disaster, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V), [ Footnote 31 ] we hold the
This District Court's further conclusion that the Price-Anderson Act "tends to encourage irresponsibility . . . on the part of builders and owners" of the nuclear power plants, 431 F.Supp. at 222, simply cannot withstand careful scrutiny. We recently outlined the multitude of detailed steps involved in the review of any application for a license to construct or to operate a nuclear power plant, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S. 519 , 435 U. S. 526 -527, and n. 5 (1978); nothing in the liability limitation provision undermines or alters in any respect the rigor and integrity of that process. Moreover, in the event of a nuclear accident, the utility itself would suffer perhaps the largest damages. While obviously not to be compared with the loss of human life and injury to health, the risk of financial loss and possible bankruptcy to the utility is, in itself, no small incentive to avoid the kind of irresponsible and cavalier conduct implicitly attributed to licensees by the District Court.
nuclear accident with a satisfactory quid pro quo for the common law rights of recovery which the Act abrogates. Initially, it is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause, in fact, requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy. [ Footnote 32 ] However, we need not resolve this question here, since the Price-Anderson Act does, in our view, provide a reasonably just substitute for the common law or state tort law remedies it replaces. Cf. New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). [ Footnote 33 ]
Appellees, like the District Court, differ with this appraisal on several grounds. They argue, inter alia, that recovery under the Act would not be greater than without it, that the waiver of defenses required by the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1970 ed., Supp. V), is an idle gesture, since those involved in the development of nuclear energy would likely be held strictly liable under common law principles; [ Footnote 34 ] that the claim administration procedure under the Act delays, rather than expedites, individual recovery; and, finally, that recovery of even limited compensation is uncertain, since the liability ceiling does not vary with the number of persons injured or amount of property damaged. The extension of short state statutes of limitations and the provision of omnibus [ Footnote 35 ] coverage do not save the Act, in their view, since such provisions could equally well be included in a fairer plan which would assure greater compensation.
and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of" a nuclear accident, 42 U.S.C. § 210(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V), to be a fair and reasonable substitute for the uncertain recovery of damages of this magnitude from a utility or component manufacturer, whose resources might well be exhausted at an early stage. The record in this case raises serious questions about the ability of a utility or component manufacturer to satisfy a judgment approaching $560 million -- the amount guaranteed under the Price-Anderson Act. [ Footnote 36 ] Nor are we persuaded that the mandatory waiver of defenses required by the Act is of no benefit to potential claimants. Since there has never been, to our knowledge, a case arising out of a nuclear incident like those covered by the Price-Anderson Act, any discussion of the standard of liability that state courts will apply is necessarily speculative. At the minimum, the statutorily mandated waiver of defenses establishes at the threshold the right of injured parties to compensation without proof of fault, and eliminates the burden of delay and uncertainty which would follow from the need to litigate the question of liability after an accident. Further, even if strict liability were routinely applied, the common law doctrine is subject to exceptions for acts of God or of third parties [ Footnote 37 ] -- two of the very factors which appellees emphasized in the District Court in
Appellees' remaining objections can be briefly treated. The claim administration procedures under the Act provide that, in the event of an accident with potential liability exceeding the $560 million ceiling, no more than 15% of the limit can be distributed pending court approval of a plan of distribution taking into account the need to assure compensation for "possible latent injury claims which may not be discovered until a later time." 42 U.S.C. § 2210( o )(3) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Although some delay might follow from compliance with this statutory procedure, we doubt that it would approach that resulting from routine litigation of the large number of claims caused by a catastrophic accident. [ Footnote 38 ] Moreover, the statutory scheme insures the equitable distribution of benefits to all who suffer injury -- both immediate and latent; under the common law route, the proverbial race to the courthouse would, instead, determine who had "first crack" at the diminishing resources of the tortfeasor, and fairness could well be sacrificed in the process. The remaining contention that recovery is uncertain because of the aggregate, rather than individualized, nature of the liability ceiling is but a thinly disguised version of the contention that the $560 million figure is inadequate, which we have already rejected.
Workmen's Compensation Act in New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. at 243 U. S. 201 , the Court observed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated simply because an injured party would not be able to recover as much under the Act as before its enactment.
causes. Speculation regarding other arrangements that might be used to spread the risk of liability in ways different from the Price-Anderson Act is, of course, not pertinent to the equal protection analysis. See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 , 411 U. S. 378 (1973). [ Footnote 39 ]
The Act was also amended in 1966 to provide for the transfer of all claims arising out of a nuclear incident to a single federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2). If the court finds that liability may exceed the liability limitation of the Act, immediate payments to injured parties are limited to 15% of the liability limitation until the court approves a plan of distribution to insure equitable treatment of all parties. § 2210( o ) (1970 ed. and Supp. V).
Previously, § 1331(a) required a minimum amount in controversy in all suits, but a 1976 amendment eliminated the jurisdictional amount requirement in actions "brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." Pub.L. 94-574 § 2, 90 Stat. 2721. Thus, this action, at least as against the NRC, would seem clearly permitted by § 1331(a) without specification of an amount in controversy. See Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U. S. 604 , 436 U. S. 608 n. 6 (1978). Appellees' failure to assert § 1331(a) as a basis for jurisdiction in their complaint is not fatal, since the facts alleged are sufficient to support such jurisdiction. See 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 608 n. 6.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 734 .
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364 , 333 U. S. 395 (1948). Application of this standard to the factual findings of the District Court does not persuade us that they should not be accepted.
Our recent cases have required no more than a showing that there is a "substantial likelihood" that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed to satisfy the second prong of the constitutional standing requirement. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 , 429 U. S. 262 (1977), quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26 , 426 U. S. 38 (1976) ("MHDC has shown an injury to itself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision'"). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 , 422 U. S. 504 , 422 U. S. 506 -507 (1975).
In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614 (1973), a nontaxpayer suit, reference was made to Flast's nexus requirement in the course of denying appellant's standing to challenge the nonenforcement of Texas' desertion and nonsupport statute. Upon careful reading, however, it is clear that standing was denied not because of the absence of a subject matter nexus between the injury asserted and the constitutional claim, but instead because of the unlikelihood that the relief requested would redress appellant's claimed injury. Id. at 410 U. S. 618 . This case thus provides no qualitative support for the broader application of Flast's principles which appellants appear to advocate. Cf. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court -- A Functional Analysis, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 645, 660-662 (1973).
Both at the time of its formulation, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 120 , 392 U. S. 130 -131 (Harlan J., dissenting), and more recently, see United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 , 418 U. S. 181 , 418 U. S. 196 n. 18 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring), there have been questions as to whether the nexus requirement, even in the context of taxpayers' suits, is constitutionally mandated, or is instead simply a prudential limitation.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST undertakes to sever the action of the NRC in executing indemnity agreements under the Act from the Act's alleged constitutional infirmities -- particularly the liability limitation provisions. Careful examination of the statutory mechanism indicates that such a separation simply cannot be sustained. The execution of the indemnification agreements by the NRC triggers the statutory ceiling on liability, which, in terms, applies only to "persons indemnified." See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Thus, absent the execution of such agreements between the NRC and the licensees, the liability limitation provisions of the Act, to which appellees object, would simply not come into play. This fact, coupled with the District Court's finding that "but for" the liability limitation provisions, there is a substantial likelihood that the contemplated plants would not be built or operated, is sufficient to establish the justiciability of appellees' claim against the Commission. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 44 -46.
"What we were thinking about was the magnitude of protection, and we set an arbitrary figure, because it seemed to be practical at that time and because we didn't think an accident would happen . . . , but yet we recognize that it could happen. We wanted to have a base to work from. "
Our cases have clearly established that "[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law." Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 50 (1912), quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 , 94 U. S. 134 (1877). The
Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117 , 280 U. S. 122 (1929), despite the fact that "otherwise settled expectations" may be upset thereby. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 , 428 U. S. 16 (1976). See also Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400 , 250 U. S. 419 -422 (1919). Indeed, statutes limiting liability are relatively commonplace, and have consistently been enforced by the courts. See, e.g., Silver v. Silver, supra, (automobile guest statute); Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578 (1883) (limitation of vessel owner's liability); Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F.Supp. 338 (SDNY 1944) (Warsaw Convention limitation on recovery for injuries suffered during international air travel). Cf. Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (CA3 1976) (Federal Driver's Act).
Appellees also contend that the Price-Anderson Act effects an unconstitutional "taking," because, in the event of a catastrophic nuclear accident, their property would be destroyed without any assurance of just compensation. We find it unnecessary to resolve the claim that such an accident would constitute a "taking" as that term has been construed in our precedents, since on our reading the Price-Anderson Act does not withdraw the existing Tucker Act remedy, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976 ed.). See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 125 -136. Appellees concede that, if the Tucker Act remedy would be available in the event of a nuclear disaster, then their constitutional challenge to the Price-Anderson Act under the Just Compensation Clause must fail. Brief for Appellees 71 n. 56. The further question of whether a taking claim could be established under the Fifth Amendment is a matter appropriately left for another day.
Surely a plaintiff does not have standing simply because his challenge, if successful, will remove the injury relied on for standing purposes only because it will put the defendant out of existence. Surely there must be some direct relationship between the plaintiff's federal claim and the injury relied on for standing. Cf. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 , 429 U. S. 261 ; United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669 , 412 U. S. 687 -690; Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614 , 410 U. S. 617 -618. An interest in the local water temperature does not, in short, give these appellees standing to bring a suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed.) to challenge the constitutionality of a law limiting liability in an unrelated and as-yet-to-occur major nuclear accident.
as carefully defined in our statutes and cases. Because I believe the preservation of these limitations is, in the long run, more important to this Court's jurisprudence than the resolution of any particular case or controversy, however important, I too would reverse the judgment of the District Court, but would do so with instructions to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction. Cf. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246 , 341 U. S. 249 -250 (1951). Giving the conclusory allegations of appellees' complaint the most liberal possible reading, they purport to establish only two grounds for the declaratory relief requested. First, they contend that the Price-Anderson Act deprives them of their property without due process of law in that it irrationally limits the tort recovery otherwise available in the North Carolina courts. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Second, they contend that the Act works an unconstitutional taking of their property for public use without just compensation. They purport to base District Court jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 ed.), which covers
It is apparent that appellees' first asserted basis for relief does not state a claim "arising under" the Price-Anderson Act. Their complaint alleges that the operation of the two power plants will cause immediate injury to property within their vicinity. App. 32, Ś 21. The District Court explicitly found that these injuries
Id. at 211 U. S. 152 .
Just as the underlying claim in Mottley arose under Kentucky contract law, the underlying claim in this case arises under North Carolina tort law. This Court has construed the "arising under" language of 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 ed.) just as it has the similar language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed.). Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 316 U. S. 350 , 316 U. S. 353 (1942).
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667 , 339 U. S. 673 (1950). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U. S. 125 (1974); C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3566, pp. 43738 (1975). [ Footnote 2/2 ]
Duke, and that it will enter into an agreement "to indemnify Duke for any nuclear incident exceeding the amount of $125,000,000 subject to a maximum liability of $560,000,000." App. 31, Ś 13. Neither of these actions is alleged to be unconstitutional. The gist of the complaint is the asserted unconstitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V), which limits Duke's liability. But this limitation of liability is separate and apart from the indemnity agreement which the Commission is authorized to execute under 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d) (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Commission has nothing whatever to do with the administration of the limitation of liability; whatever administration of that statute there is to be is left in the hands of the District Court. 42 U.S.C. § 2210( o ) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court, of course, is not a party to this suit. [ Footnote 2/3 ]
It simply cannot be said that these allegations make out an actual controversy against the Commission. While the Commission may be quite interested in the constitutionality of the statute, that is hardly sufficient to establish a justiciable controversy. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 , 219 U. S. 361 -362 (1911). While appellees may have been damaged by Duke's decision to construct these plants, there is no "challenged action of the defendant" Commission to which their damage "fairly can be traced." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 436 U. S. 26 , 436 U. S. 41 (1976). If Duke decided to proceed with construction despite a declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality, there would be nothing that the Commission could do to aid appellees. Where the prospect of effective relief against a defendant depends on the actions of a third party, no justiciable controversy exists against that defendant. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 , 422 U. S. 505 (1975). In short, appellees' only conceivable controversy is with Duke, over whom the District Court had no jurisdiction.
Brief for Appellees 62. This statement makes clear that appellees' claim arises not under the Price-Anderson Act, but under the Fifth Amendment itself. Jurisdiction under § 1337 extends only to actions vindicating rights created by an Act of Congress. Compare Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 , 320 U. S. 300 (1943), with General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 320 U. S. 323 , 320 U. S. 337 (1943). Since it cannot be maintained that the Price-Anderson Act created appellees' asserted right to be free from takings for public use without just compensation, it follows that District Court jurisdiction may not be predicated upon § 1337.
The District Court does have jurisdiction to consider claims of taking under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976 ed.), where the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000. [ Footnote 2/4 ]
Richardson v. Morris, 409 U. S. 464 , 409 U. S. 464 -465 (1973). It is incontrovertibly established that neither the Court of Claims nor the district courts have jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to issue the sort of declaratory relief granted here. Compare ibid. with United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1 (1969). Thus, the record does not establish any jurisdictional basis upon which the District Court could grant declaratory relief on appellees' taking claim.
Appellees have explicitly abandoned their claim based upon the so-called equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, "since, in this case, any equal protection arguments would be largely duplicative of appellees' due process arguments." Brief for Appellees 21 Ś 26.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 , 415 U. S. 535 n. 5 (1974). In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, this Court's opinion did not even cite the statutory basis for jurisdiction, much less consider its validity. To conclude that § 1331 embraces a "taking" claim makes the Tucker Act largely superfluous, cf. United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392 , 424 U. S. 404 (1976), and will permit the district courts to consider claims of over $10,000 which previously could only be litigated in the Court of Claims. Richardson v. Morris, 409 U. S. 464 (1973). Such a significant expansion of the jurisdiction of the district courts should not be accomplished without the benefit of arguments and briefing.
that may possibly occur at some uncertain time in the future, and may possibly injure the appellees in a way that has no significant connection with any present injury. It is remarkable that such a series of speculations is considered sufficient either to make this litigation ripe for decision or to establish appellees' standing; * it is even more remarkable that this occurs in a case in which, as MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST demonstrates, there is no federal jurisdiction in the first place.
* With respect to whether appellees' claim of present injury is sufficient to establish standing, it should be noted that some sort of financing is essential to almost all projects, public or private. Statutes that facilitate and may be essential to the financing abound -- from tax statutes to statutes prohibiting fraudulent securities transactions. One would not assume, however, that mere neighbors have standing to litigate the legality of a utility's financing. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 .