Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-west-virginia
Timestamp: 2018-12-11 19:05:19
Document Index: 238350180

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 274', '§ 23', '§ 791', '§ 9', '§ 401', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 9']

United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463 | Casetext
295 U.S. 463•55 S. Ct. 789•
John P. Agnew Co. v. Hoage
…There is furthermore no allegation that the appellee has made any claim that his opinion is being disregarded…
ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE BILL OF COMPLAINT.
Argued May 2, 1935. Decided May 20, 1935.
1. The original jurisdiction of this Court over suits brought by the United States against a State is only of those cases which are within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution. P. 470. 2. The original jurisdiction of this Court does not include suits by the United States against persons or corporations alone. Id. 3. To sustain jurisdiction over a suit brought in this Court by the United States against a State, the bill must present a "case" or "controversy" to which the State is a party and which is within the judicial power of the United States. Id. 4. In a suit by the United States against a State and private corporations, to enjoin the construction by the latter of a dam forming part of a hydro-electric project, the bill alleged the stream in question to be a navigable water of the United States, and that the dam would be an unlawful obstruction, since it had not been authorized under the Act of March 3, 1899, nor had any license for the project been granted by the Federal Power Commission under the Federal Water Power Act. As grounds for joining the State, it was alleged that the State had licensed the project and, through its officials, was denying the navigability of the stream and claiming that the power to permit and control its use for the projected purposes resided in the State and not in the United States, and claiming that in so far as the Federal Water Power Act purports to confer upon the Federal Power Commission authority in the premises, the Act is an invasion of the sovereign rights of the State and a violation of the Federal Constitution. The bill did not assert any title of the United States in the bed of the stream, which might afford a basis for a suit to remove a cloud on title; nor allege any interference by the State, actual or threatened, with any other property of the United States, or with the navigable capacity of the waters in question or with the exercise of the power claimed by the United States or in behalf of the Federal Power Commission; nor any actual or threatened participation by the State in the construction of the dam, other than the granting of a permit, nor that it had issued any permit incompatible with the Federal Water Power Act, or intended to grant licenses in the future. Held that, against the State, the bill presented no question justiciable by a federal court. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, distinguished. Pp. 471, 474. 5. It does not appear in this case that the State has done more than issue such a license as the Federal Water Power Act makes prerequisite to a license from the Federal Power Commission. P. 473. 6. The Declaratory Judgment Act of June 14, 1934, c. 512, 48 Stat. 955, is applicable only "in cases of actual controversy." It does not purport to alter the character of the controversies which are the subject of the judicial power under the Constitution. P. 475. Bill dismissed.
On motions to dismiss a bill brought in this Court by the United States against the State of West Virginia and three private corporations, to enjoin the construction of a dam, part of a hydro-electric plant, in a river alleged to be navigable; and for a declaration of the rights of the United States to control the use of the stream, etc.
Mr. Homer A. Holt, Attorney General of West Virginia, for the State of West Virginia, defendant, in support of its motion to dismiss.
There is a justiciable controversy between plaintiff and the defendant State of West Virginia, and between plaintiff and the corporate defendants. The controversy includes the question of whether the New and the Kanawha Rivers are navigable waters of the United States and whether the State of West Virginia has the exclusive right to the control of these rivers for the purpose of producing hydro-electric power therefrom or licensing others to do so and excluding the United States from licensing others to create hydro-electric power on these streams.
A justiciable controversy between plaintiff and the corporate defendants is conceded.
The State is an indispensable party. All the rights of the corporate defendants flow from permits issued by the State. The rights of the State and the corporate defendants dovetail and are integrated but are not in any way in conflict. A decree supporting the prayer of the petition with respect to the State alone would strike down many of the defenses of the corporate defendants but would not compel them or any one of them to take out a license from the Federal Power Commission without another court proceeding. They are, therefore, necessary parties, not in conflict with the State or each other, but adverse to plaintiff. Thus, there is no misjoinder of parties.
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not exclude the corporate defendants under the exceptions in the Judiciary Act of 1789. No limitation has been put upon the type of parties defendant if the United States should bring a suit under the original jurisdiction of this Court.
This Court has entertained original jurisdiction in controversies between a State and the Federal Government where private parties were joined. It has taken jurisdiction in controversies between States where the United States intervened or was made a party and there were private parties.
In original proceedings brought by a State against a State in the Supreme Court other defendants have been joined. The fact that this Court has assumed original jurisdiction in some cases between States where the Federal Government has intervened and the rights of private interests have been determined, without their being made parties, does not exclude the corporate defendants in this case.
The Court is not called upon to render a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff maintains that there is a justiciable question presented by the bill, and therefore the question of a declaratory judgment need not be considered. The language of the bill is broad enough, however, to include a declaratory judgment and, there being a controversy presented, the Court could, if it were necessary, grant a decree under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act (Act of June 14, 1934, c. 512, 48 Stat. 955; Jud. Code, § 274 — d). This Act is for the purpose of regulating procedure, and not of limiting the exercise of original jurisdiction.
Section 26 of the Federal Water Power Act, granting jurisdiction in the District Court in equity to pass upon violations of that Act, does not deprive the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction in this case.
The bill of complaint, filed January 14, 1935, contains allegations which, so far as now relevant, may be detailed as follows. The New River flows northwesterly across the State of West Virginia and near the center of the State joins the Gauley River to form the Kanawha River, which flows thence to the state boundary and into the Ohio River. The New and Kanawha Rivers are one continuous interstate stream, which throughout its course constitutes navigable waters of the United States. There are many locations for dam sites on the rivers; four dams have been constructed on the New River at points in Virginia and West Virginia, and a fifth at Hawks Nest, West Virginia, upon which the present litigation centers, is now approaching completion. The United States has constructed ten dams on the Kanawha River for the purpose of improving navigation and is now engaged in construction work on two additional dams on the Kanawha River immediately below the Hawks Nest project, and has in contemplation the construction of a large reservoir at Bluestone, West Virginia, on the New River above the Hawks Nest project, for purposes of flood control, production of power and in aid of navigation. It is alleged that the New and Kanawha Rivers throughout West Virginia constitute a continuous stream which was in its natural condition and still is susceptible of navigation, and is a highway capable of being improved and used for purposes of interstate and foreign commerce; that any obstructions to its navigability will be removed or overcome by improvements initiated by the United States and now in operation or in the course of construction; that the Hawks Nest project will seriously obstruct navigation in the New and Kanawha Rivers, by producing fluctuations in the flow of New River; and that, upon the filing by New-Kanawha Power Company of a declaration of intention to construct the dam, pursuant to § 23 of the Federal Water Power Act, c. 285, 41 Stat. 1063, 1075, 16 U.S.C. § 791, 817, the Federal Power Commission determined that the proposed Hawks Nest dam would affect the interests of interstate commerce and that under the Act the dam could not lawfully be built without a license from the Commission.
It is further alleged that the defendant, New-Kanawha Power Company, has obtained from the Public Service Commission of West Virginia a license or permit to construct the dam at Hawks Nest for power purposes. This permit was later transferred to the defendant, Electro Metallurgical Company; and the corporate defendants, acting under the state license, are now engaged in the construction of the dam. It is alleged that its construction is in violation of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1899, c. 425, § 9, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151; 33 U.S.C. § 401, and the Federal Water Power Act, in that the plans for the project have not received the consent of Congress or the approval of the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army and the Secretary of War, and the defendants have received no license for the project from the Federal Power Commission.
It prays an injunction restraining the corporate defendants from constructing or operating the Hawks Nest project without a license from the Federal Power Commission. It also asks an adjudication that the New River is navigable waters of the United States and that the United States has the right to construct and operate, and to license others to construct and operate, dams and connected hydro-electric plants on the New and Kanawha Rivers. We are asked to declare that any right of the State of West Virginia to license the construction and operation of dams upon the rivers, or to sell or to license others to sell power generated at such dams, is subject to the rights of the United States, and to enjoin the State from asserting any right, title or interest in any dam, or hydro-electric plant in connection with it, or in the production and sale of hydro-electric power on the New and Kanawha Rivers, superior or adverse to that of the United States, and from in any manner disturbing or interfering with the possession, use and enjoyment of such right by the United States.
It can no longer be doubted that the original jurisdiction given to this Court by § 2, Art. III of the Constitution, in cases "in which a State shall be a party," includes cases brought by the United States against a State. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621; United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379, 396; Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372; 258 U.S. 574, 581; United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 195; United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64; compare Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478, 494; United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211. But the original jurisdiction thus conferred is only of those cases within the judicial power of the United States which, under the first clause of § 2, Art. III of the Constitution, extends "to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and . . . to controversies to which the United States shall be a party . . ." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480-485; see Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289. Our original jurisdiction does not include suits of the United States against persons or corporations alone, see Ex parte Barry, 2 How. 65; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16; Baltimore Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 215 U.S. 216, 224; Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 581, nor is it enough to sustain the jurisdiction in such a case that a State has been made a party defendant. The bill of complaint must also present a "case" or "controversy" to which the State is a party, and which is within the judicial power granted by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution.
The only right or interest asserted in behalf of the United States is its authority under the Constitution to control navigable waters, and particularly the right to exercise that authority through the Federal Power Commission. Since that authority is predicated upon the single fact, fully alleged in the bill and admitted by the motions to dismiss, that the rivers are navigable waters of the United States, the power of the United States to control navigation, and to prevent interference with it by the construction of a dam except in conformity to the statutes of the United States, must be taken to be conceded. See New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 337. But the bill alleges no act or threat of interference by the State with the navigable capacity of the rivers, or with the exercise of the authority claimed by the United States or in behalf of the Federal Power Commission. It alleges only that the State has assented to the construction of the dam by its formal permit, under which the corporate defendants are acting. There is no allegation that the State is participating or aiding in any way in the construction of the dam or in any interference with navigation; or that it is exercising any control over the corporate defendants in the construction of the dam; or that it has directed the construction of the dam in an unlawful manner, or without a license from the Federal Power Commission; or has issued any permit which is incompatible with the Federal Water Power Act; or, indeed, that the State proposes to grant other licenses, or to take any other action in the future.
Section 28 of the Water Power Act of West Virginia, c. 17 of the Acts of 1915, which gives to the state Public Service Commission its authority, provides that "nothing contained in this act shall be construed to interfere with the exercise of the jurisdiction by the government of the United States over navigable streams." The bill seeks an injunction, against the corporate defendants, restraining only the construction of the dam without a license from the Federal Power Commission. But § 9(b) of the Federal Water Power Act requires that every applicant for a license shall present "satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing power. . . ." The mere grant of the state license, which the Federal Water Power Act makes prerequisite to the application for the federal license, cannot be said to involve any infringement of the federal authority. It does not appear that the State has done more.
But there is presented here, as respects the State, no case of an actual or threatened interference with the authority of the United States. At most, the bill states a difference of opinion between the officials of the two governments, whether the rivers are navigable and, consequently, whether there is power and authority in the federal government to control their navigation, and particularly to prevent or control the construction of the Hawks Nest dam, and hence whether a license of the Federal Power Commission is prerequisite to its construction. There is no support for the contention that the judicial power extends to the adjudication of such differences of opinion. Only when they become the subject of controversy in the constitutional sense are they susceptible of judicial determination. See Nashville, C. St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 259. Until the right asserted is threatened with invasion by acts of the State, which serve both to define the controversy and to establish its existence in the judicial sense, there is no question presented which is justiciable by a federal court. See Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129, 130; Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158, 162; Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra, 483-485; New Jersey v. Sargent, supra, 339, 340.
The Government places its chief reliance upon the decision in United States v. Utah, supra, in which this Court took original jurisdiction of a suit, brought by the United States against the State, to quiet title to the bed of the Colorado River. But the issue presented by adverse claims of title to identified land is a case or controversy traditionally within the jurisdiction of courts of equity. Such an issue does not want in definition. The public assertion of the adverse claim by a defendant out of possession is itself an invasion of the property interest asserted by the plaintiff, against which equity alone can afford protection. See United States v. Oregon, supra. A different issue, in point of definition of threatened injury and imminence of the controversy, is presented by rival claims of sovereign power made by the national and a state government. The sovereign rights of the United States to control navigation are not invaded or even threatened by mere assertions. It is, in this respect, in a position different from that of a property owner, who because of the adverse claims to ownership can neither sell his property nor be assured of continued possession. The control of navigation by the United States may be threatened by the imminent construction of the dam, but not by permission to construct it.
No effort is made by the Government to sustain the bill under the Declaratory Judgment Act of June 14, 1934, c. 512, 48 Stat. 955. It is enough that that act is applicable only "in cases of actual controversy." It does not purport to alter the character of the controversies which are the subject of the judicial power under the Constitution. See Nashville, C. St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, supra.