Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/20/926/523336/
Timestamp: 2020-07-04 16:29:15
Document Index: 555392536

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 5005', '§ 924', '§ 5005', '§ 921']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Ronald Larry Miller, Also Known As Owen Whidby, Also Knownas Alex Martin, Also Known As James Pauly, Alsoknown As Danny Galt, Also Known Aswilliam Laslo, Appellant, 20 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1994 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Ronald Larry Miller, Also Known As Owen Whidby, Also Knownas...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Ronald Larry Miller, Also Known As Owen Whidby, Also Knownas Alex Martin, Also Known As James Pauly, Alsoknown As Danny Galt, Also Known Aswilliam Laslo, Appellant, 20 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 20 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994) Submitted Jan. 11, 1994. Decided April 6, 1994
The defendant, Ronald Larry Miller, after entering a conditional plea of guilty, was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which provides a fifteen-year-minimum sentence for a Sec. 922(g) violation when the defendant has three prior violent or drug-related felonies.
Miller, acting both through counsel and pro se, appeals his conviction and sentence on the basis of several theories; three of them deserve discussion. First, Miller claims that the weapon he is charged with possessing was discovered during an automobile search which violated the Fourth Amendment and that the gun should have been excluded from evidence. Second, he contends that his due-process rights were violated by a 27-month delay between his arrest and indictment on the Sec. 922(g) charge. Third, he asserts that, in enhancing his sentence, the District Court1 wrongly relied on certain bank-robbery convictions obtained in violation of the then-applicable Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq. (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, Sec. 218(a) (8), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984)). We affirm.
Whether a traffic stop is pretextual, thus requiring suppression of the resulting evidence, is a question of fact subject to review only for clear error. United States v. Richards, 967 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Portwood, 857 F.2d 1221, 1223 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069, 109 S. Ct. 2073, 104 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1989)). The stop is measured against a standard of "objective reasonableness." United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 428, 116 L. Ed. 2d 448, 449 (1991) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1978)). In this case, the magistrate judge credited Officer Drunert's version of the traffic stop over Miller's.4 Moreover, she observed that driving too slowly and impeding traffic violates Missouri law, despite the absence of a minimum speed limit. Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 304.011 (1992).
Miller also contends that Drunert lacked suspicion adequate to allow the traffic stop to evolve into an investigative stop. In order for such a stop to be reasonable, it must be based on specific, articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
At the suppression hearing, Drunert testified that he asked to see the contents of Miller's wallet after receiving Miller's paper identification (which included different names for the license and car registration), observing Miller's nervousness (including shaking hands), and watching Miller's apparent attempts to hide the contents of his wallet. Drunert also asserted that he saw what appeared to him to be additional plastic cards in the wallet--perhaps more driver's licenses. The cards turned out to be three false Oklahoma licenses, leading to further investigation. Nervousness alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion, United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1990), but the facts cited by Drunert, taken together as a whole, provided ample justification for the limited additional request to see the contents of Miller's wallet.
Miller also contends that he did not consent to Drunert's search of his car, and, that even if he did, his consent was invalid because he was detained. Turning first to the issue of consent, we note that police officers may search an area, even without probable cause or a warrant, if someone with adequate authority has consented to the search; prosecutors must demonstrate voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1990). In assessing voluntariness, courts look both to the characteristics of the accused and the details of the environment. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S. Ct. at 2047; Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 380-81 (listing relevant aspects of each). We review the District Court's consent determination under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Archer, 840 F.2d 567, 573 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941, 109 S. Ct. 364, 365, 102 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1988).
Miller argues that, because Drunert possessed his (bogus) identification, he justifiably believed that he was not free to leave, see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988) and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980), and that, therefore, his consent could not have been voluntary. However, this Court recently stated that "even persons who have been arrested and are in custody can voluntarily consent to a search...." Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 382, citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). Miller's invocation of this Court's decision in United States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990), is unavailing, because in that case evidence yielding articulable grounds for suspicion (a discrepancy between the driver's identification and a vehicle's car-rental contract) was not discovered until after an unreasonable seizure had occurred. Id. at 347. Here, we have already concluded that Drunert had sufficient grounds to stop Miller and ask to see the contents of the wallet. Once he found the additional licenses, it was reasonable to seek permission to search further. The District Court's finding that Miller's consent to the search was voluntary is not clearly erroneous.
In order to establish a Fifth Amendment due-process violation resulting from pre-indictment delay, this Court requires defendants to prove that the delay was unreasonable and that it actually and substantially prejudiced the presentation of their defense. United States v. Savage, 863 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082, 109 S. Ct. 2105, 104 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1989). Under this standard, a showing of actual prejudice must first be established; if it is, the court will then inquire into the reasons for the delay and balance those reasons against the demonstrated prejudice. Ibid.; United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1987). See also United States v. Bartlett, 794 F.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 934, 107 S. Ct. 409, 93 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1986).
To begin with, a significant portion of the 27-month delay was due to legitimate investigative needs.5 See United States v. Taylor, 603 F.2d 732, 735 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 982, 100 S. Ct. 487, 62 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1979) (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796, 97 S. Ct. at 2052, and United States v. Hood, 593 F.2d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1979)). At the end of such delay, in the normal course of events, many, if not most of the relevant materials would have been lost,6 and memories would already have considerably eroded. How much less Drunert remembered because of the additional delay is mere speculation.
Finally, the defendant challenges the enhancement of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Miller's enhancement was based on the presentence report (PSR), which indicated that he was convicted of multiple bank-robbery charges in the District of Utah in 1969 and of extortion in the Northern District of Oklahoma in 1980; the Utah convictions, obtained when the defendant was nineteen, covered a series of armed robberies committed throughout the West.
In essence, Miller attacks the validity of the 1969 bankrobbery convictions on two grounds. First, he claims his guilty plea was invalid because, during his plea hearing, he was not fully apprised of his rights with respect to possible alternative sentencing under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq., since repealed. Miller augments his own version of events with an affidavit from a relative. The District Court declined to credit either account. Miller also points to questions asked by the Utah judge at sentencing, which might be taken to indicate that penalties had not been discussed in the plea hearing.
We conclude that Miller's claim of an invalid plea is without merit. To begin with, we agree with the District Court that it makes no sense for Mr. Miller to contend that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known that it was possible he could receive a more lenient sentence. Second, the defendant bears the burden of proving the invalidity of a prior conviction based on a guilty plea. United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 982-83 (8th Cir. 1991). When the relevant record is missing or nonexistent, as is the case here, the presumption is that the actions of a court of competent jurisdiction are correct. Parke v. Raley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992). We agree that the defendant has failed to overcome this presumption.
Miller's second contention is that the sentence he received from the Utah court is invalid because that court did not explicitly consider alternative sentencing under the Youth Corrections Act, as required by Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S. Ct. 3042, 41 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1974). This decision was rendered after Miller was sentenced. While we have ruled that Dorszynski operates retroactively, the Tenth Circuit, where the bank-robbery convictions occurred, has concluded that it does not, Jackson v. United States, 510 F.2d 1335, 1337 (10th Cir. 1975), and its law prevails here. See United States v. Gipson, 985 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S. Ct. 81, 126 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1993) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (20)). This sort of omission, moreover, is hardly serious enough to subject a conviction to collateral attack. The District Court properly sentenced Mr. Miller under Sec. 924(e).