Source: https://www.oaic.gov.au/freedom-of-information/foi-archive/foi-guidelines-archive/part-6-conditional-exemptions-v1-2
Timestamp: 2019-05-21 14:49:29
Document Index: 248556976

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 6', 'art 6', 'art 5', 'art 5', 'art 5', 'art 5', 'art 3', 'art 5', 'art 5', 'art 3', 'art 5']

Part 6 — Conditional exemptions (v1.2)| Office of the Australian Information Commissioner - OAIC
Part 6 — Conditional exemptions (v1.2)
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Commonwealth-State relations (s 33A) Commonwealth-State relations (s 47B)
internal working documents (s 36) deliberative processes (s 47C)
documents affecting financial or property interests of the Commonwealth (s 39) financial and property interests of the Commonwealth or Norfolk Island (s 47D)
documents concerning certain operations of agencies (s 40) documents concerning certain operations of agencies (s 47E)
documents affecting the national economy (s 44) the economy (s 47J)
- personal privacy (s 47F)
- business (s 47G)
- research (s 47H)
contribute to the administration of justice generally, including procedural fairness[7]
could reasonably be expected to prejudice the conduct of investigations, audits or reviews by the Ombudsman or Auditor-General[8]
could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effectiveness of testing or auditing procedures.
6.32 The decision maker must determine whether access to a conditionally exempt document is, at the time of the decision, contrary to the public interest, taking into account the factors for and against disclosure. The timing is important: it is possible that certain factors may be relevant when the decision is made, but would not be relevant if the request were to be reconsidered some time later. In such circumstances a new and different decision could be made.[9]
6.36 The 2010 reforms did not substantially change this exemption (formerly in s 33A), apart from redrafting to insert terminology that is consistent with the new public interest test in s 11A(5). Another change removed an agency’s option to respond to a request for access to documents affecting Commonwealth-State relations by neither confirming nor denying the existence or non-existence of such a document under s 25.[10]
6.38 A decision maker may consider that disclosure would, or could reasonably be expected to damage the working relations of the Commonwealth and one or more States (s 47B(a)). ‘Working relations’ encompass all interactions of the Commonwealth and the States,[11] from formal Commonwealth-State consultation processes such as the Council of Australian Governments through to any working arrangements between agencies undertaken as part of their day to day functions.
interrupting or creating difficulty in negotiations or discussions that are underway, including in the development of joint or parallel policy[12]
substantially impairing (but not merely modifying) Commonwealth-State programs[13]
adversely affecting the continued level of trust or co-operation in existing inter-office relationships[14]
impairing or prejudicing the flow of information to and from the Commonwealth.[15]
6.41 The potential damage need not be quantified,[16] but the effect on relations arising from the disclosure must be adverse. A potentially positive effect on Commonwealth-State relations would not fall within the conditional exemption.
6.42 The term ‘could be reasonably expected’ is explained in greater detail in Part 5 of these Guidelines. There must be real and substantial grounds for expecting the damage to occur which can be supported by evidence or reasoning.[17] There cannot be merely an assumption or allegation that damage may occur if the document were released. When consulting a State agency or authority as required under s 26A, the agency should ask the agency or authority for its reasons for expecting damage, as an unsubstantiated concern would not satisfy the s 47B(a) threshold.
6.43 Section 47B(b) conditionally exempts ‘information communicated in confidence’ to the Commonwealth Government or an agency by a State or an authority of a State. It is not necessary for the decision maker to find that disclosure may found an action for breach of confidence for this element to apply.[18]
whether the communication was ad hoc, routine or required[19]
whether there were any existing, implied or assumed arrangements or understandings between the Commonwealth and State concerning the exchange or supply of information[20]
how the information was subsequently handled, disclosed or otherwise published.[21]
6.47 An ‘authority of a State’ is an entity that has been established by the State for a public purpose, given the power to direct or control the affairs of others on the State’s behalf, reports to and is under some control of the State.[22]Where there is doubt as to whether an entity is an ‘authority of a State’, the agency should consult the entity. The entity can confirm whether it is a State authority, or a business, contractor or private organisation (in which case an agency may need to consider whether an exemption under s 47G (business affairs) applies). The view of the State Government or the entity as to its status would be an influential but not decisive factor.
6.57 Deliberative matter does not include operational information or purely factual material (s 47C(2)).‘Operational information’ is defined in s 8A and is information that an agency must publish under the Information Publication Scheme.[23]
The action of deliberating, in common understanding, involves the weighing up or evaluation of the competing arguments or considerations that may have a bearing upon one's course of action. In short, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency are its thinking processes – the processes of reflection, for example, upon the wisdom and expediency of a proposal, a particular decision or a course of action.[24]
6.63 The deliberative process must relate to the functions of an agency, minister or the government of the Commonwealth. The functions of an agency are usually found in the Administrative Arrangements Orders or the instrument or Act that established the agency. For the purposes of the FOI Act, the functions include both policy making and the processes undertaken in administering or implementing a policy. The functions also extend to the development of policies in respect of matters that arise in the course of administering a program. The non-policy decision making processes required when carrying out agency, ministerial or governmental functions, such as code of conduct investigations, may also be deliberative processes.[25]
a collection of facts or opinions, including the pattern of facts or opinions considered[26]
6.66 The agency must assess all the material to decide if it is deliberative matter that relates to, or is in the nature of, the deliberative processes of the agency or minister.[27]
incidental administrative content[28]
procedural or day to day content[29]
the decision or conclusion reached at the end of the deliberative process[30]
6.69 Where material was gathered as a basis for intended deliberations, it may be deliberative matter.[31] However, if the material was obtained before there was a known requirement that the material would be considered during a deliberative process, that material would not be deliberative matter.[32]
6.70 A consultation undertaken for the purposes of, or in the course of, a deliberative process includes any discussion between the agency, minister or government and another person in relation to the decision that is the object of the deliberative process.[33]
6.73 Where a decision maker finds it difficult to separate the purely factual material from the deliberative matter, both the elements may be exempt.[34] If the two elements can be separated, the decision maker should consider giving the applicant a copy with deletions under s 22 to provide access to the purely factual material.[35]
6.75 The sciences include the natural sciences of physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology (such as botany, zoology and medicine[36]) and the earth sciences (which include geology, geophysics, hydrology, meteorology, physical geography, oceanography, and soil science).Technical matters involve the application of science, and include engineering.[37]
6.76 The social sciences, or the study of an aspect of human society, are not scientific for the purposes of this exception (for example, anthropology, archaeology, economics,[38] geography, history, linguistics, political science, sociology and psychology).
6.77 There is considerable case law on the former exemption provision (formerly s 36) as to whether disclosure of an internal working document would be contrary to the public interest, and whether reasonable grounds exist for a conclusive certificate claim to that effect. Agencies should be cautious in applying those precedents in light of the changes to the FOI Act in 2009 and 2010. Many earlier decisions applied or referred to the AAT’s decision in Re Howard and the Treasurer ,[39] which listed five factors that could support a claim that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. Three of those factors are now declared to be irrelevant considerations by s 11B(4) of the Act (the high seniority of the author of the document in the agency to which the request for access to the document was made, misinterpretation or misunderstanding of a document, and confusion or unnecessary debate following disclosure). The other two Howard factors (disclosure of policy development, and inhibition of frankness and candour) are not, in those terms, consistent with the new objects clause of the FOI Act (s 3) and the list of public interest factors favouring access in s 11B(3). It is important that agencies now have regard to the more extensive range of public interest factors that may favour or be against disclosure (see paragraphs 6.23–6.29 above).
6.78 Section 47D conditionally exempts a document where disclosure would have a substantial adverse effect on the financial or property interests of the Commonwealth, Norfolk Island or an agency.[40]
6.80 The financial or property interests of the Commonwealth, Norfolk Island or an agency relate to both expenditure and revenue-generating activities. An agency’s property interests may be broader than merely buildings and land, such as intellectual property or the Crown’s interest in natural resources.[41]
6.81 The financial interests of the Commonwealth may encompass indirect effect. For example, where disclosure of documents would provide the criteria by which an agency is to assess tenders, the agency’s financial interest in seeking to obtain best value for money through a competitive tendering process may be compromised.[42]
6.82 For the conditional exemption to apply, the potential effect that would be expected to occur following disclosure must be both substantial[43]and adverse. This standard is discussed further in Part 5 of these Guidelines.
6.85 The effect must bear on the actual financial or property interest of the Commonwealth, Norfolk Island or agency. If the effect were, say, to reduce the amount of revenue that may be generated, the test would not be satisfied, particularly where the process for the collection is not affected, or required under legislation.[44]
6.88 The 2010 reforms repealed the provision relating to an agency’s ability to conduct industrial relations (former s 40(1)(e)), implementing a recommendation of the Open government report.[45] Where an agency is considering documents relating to its industrial relations activities, conditional exemptions such as s 47E(c) (management of personnel), s 47E(d) (effective operations of the agency) or s 47F (personal privacy) may be relevant.
6.91 In the context of this exemption, a prejudicial effect could be regarded as one which would cause a bias or change to the expected results leading to detrimental or disadvantageous outcomes. The expected change does not need to have an impact that is ‘substantial and adverse’, which is a stricter test.[46]
6.92 For the grounds in s 47E(a)–(d) to apply, the predicted effect needs to be reasonably expected to occur. The term ‘could reasonably be expected’ is explained in greater detail in Part 5 of these Guidelines. There must be more than merely an assumption or allegation that damage may occur if the document were to be released.
safety audits and testing regimes[47]
risk assessment matrices[48]
accident investigation techniques[49]
tests or examinations leading to qualifications[50]
potential fraud case assessment and analysis tools.[51]
facilitating cheating, fraudulent or deceptive conduct by those being tested or audited[52]
permitting pre-prepared responses which would compromise the integrity of the testing process.[53]
ensuring the selection of the most competent and best candidates for promotion[54]
allow for plagiarism or circulation of questions or examination papers that would lead to a breach of the integrity of the examination system[55]
allow for examiners to be inhibited in future marking by the threat of challenge to their marking[56]
allow scrutiny of past test results or questions for the pre-preparation of expected/acceptable responses, rather than honest or true responses, for example in psychometric testing to ascertain an applicant’s eligibility for a certain pension[57] or patent examiner examinations.[58]
the management of personnel – including the broader human resources policies and activities, recruitment,[59] promotion, compensation, discipline, harassment and occupational health and safety
6.106 The terms ‘would reasonably be expected’ and ‘substantial adverse’ have the same meanings as explained in Part 5 of these Guidelines. If the predicted effect would be substantial but not adverse or maybe even beneficial, the conditional exemption does not apply.[60] It would be unlikely for the potential embarrassment of an employee to be considered to be an effect on an agency.[61]
6.107 The predicted effect must arise from the disclosure of the documents that are being assessed.[62] The decision maker may also need to consider the context of the document and the integrity of a system that may require those documents, such as witness statements that are required to investigate a workplace complaint,[63] or referee reports to assess job applicants.[64]
6.109 An agency’s operations may not be substantially adversely affected if the disclosure would, or could reasonably be expected to lead to a change in the agency’s processes that would enable those processes to be more efficient.[65]
disclosure of the Australian Electoral Commission policies in relation to the accepted reasons for a person’s failure to vote in a Federal election would result in substantial changes to their procedures to avoid jeopardising the effectiveness of methods and procedures used by investigators[66]
disclosure of information provided by industry participants could prejudice the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s ability to investigate anti-competitive behaviour and its ability to perform its statutory functions[67]
disclosure of the Universal Resource Locators (URL) and Internet Protocols (IPs) of internet content that is either prohibited or potentially prohibited content under Schedule 5 to the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 could reasonably be expected to affect the Australian Broadcasting Authority’s ability to administer a statutory regulatory scheme for internet content to be displayed.[68]
6.111 The exemption may also apply to documents that relate to a complaint made to an investigative body. The disclosure of this type of information could reasonably affect the willingness of people to make complaints to the investigative body, which would have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the investigative body's operations.[69]
6.112 The predicted effect must bear on the agency’s ‘proper and efficient’ operations, that is, the agency is undertaking its expected activities in an expected manner. Where disclosure of the documents reveals unlawful activities or inefficiencies, this element of the conditional exemption will not be met and the public interest factors of accountability and transparency are further weighted towards disclosure.
6.113 Section 47F protects personal privacy by providing that a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under FOI would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information of any person (including a deceased person).
6.114 This exemption does not apply if the personal information is only about the applicant (s 47F(3)). Where the information is joint personal information, however, the exemption may apply. For more information about joint personal information see paragraph 6.136 below.
6.115 In some cases, providing indirect access to certain personal information via a qualified person may be appropriate (s 47F(5) – see paragraph 6.153 below).
6.116 Personal information means information or an opinion (including information forming part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion (s 4(1)). In other words, personal information:
relates to a natural person.[70]
6.117 Personal information can include a person’s name, address, telephone number,[71] date of birth, medical records, bank account details, taxation information[72] and signature.[73] For more information about personal information, see privacy material on the OAIC website at www.oaic.gov.au.
6.118 For information or opinion to be personal information, the individual’s identity needs to be apparent, or reasonably ascertainable. The question of whether the individual’s identity needs to be ascertainable by the applicant or the world at large has not been settled.
6.119 The issue has been considered by State jurisdictions, including the Victorian Court of Appeal in Victoria Police v Marke .[74] The Court of Appeal considered whether disclosure under FOI was disclosure to the world at large. The majority in that case held that disclosure under FOI was not necessarily disclosure to all the world. Weinberg JA held the Tribunal was ‘entitled to assume that once a document is made available, it has the potential to be disseminated widely’ and that this assumption would be true in most cases.[75] To require consideration of the likely extent of dissemination would be ‘a burdensome, and indeed pointless, exercise, which in the vast majority of cases will be of no relevance.’[76] However, where a person seeking access to information puts the issue of dissemination ‘squarely in issue’, the Tribunal is bound to consider the matter.[77]
6.120 In Re West Australian Newspapers Limited and Department of the Premier and Cabinet the Western Australian Information Commissioner took the broader view and stated that:
...if any person, even if only a person having some additional knowledge, could reasonably ascertain the identity of a particular individual from particular information about that individual, that information will be personal information for the purposes of the FOI Act.[78]
6.121 In the Commonwealth FOI jurisdiction, the Information Commissioner suggests that generally, the individual’s identity needs to be reasonably ascertainable by the applicant. The ability of an applicant to reasonably ascertain an individual’s identity will depend on the context and circumstances.[79]
6.122 In other words, it depends on whether it is practically possible for an applicant to link pieces of information to identify an individual. If the agency or minister is aware of relevant information that the applicant has (or could easily obtain) to ascertain the individual’s identity, this is to be taken into consideration. An agency or minister must not, however, seek information from the applicant about what other information they have or could obtain.
6.123 The Information Commissioner suggests that, where an agency or minister is unaware of the other information the applicant may have, the question to be asked is what other information a reasonable member of the public would be able to access.
6.124 In certain circumstances, however, it may be appropriate to consider whether the individual’s identity may be ascertainable by the world at large. This may be appropriate where the applicant is a journalist or interest group, for example. This issue is discussed further in relation to ‘unreasonableness’ in paragraph 6.127 below.
6.125 The information needs to convey or say something about a person, rather than just identify them. The mere mention of a person’s name or signature may, however, reveal personal information about them depending on the context.[80] For example, a person’s name may appear in a list of benefit recipients, and given that context, the information would be personal information.
6.126 An individual is a natural person and does not include a corporation, trust, body politic or incorporated association.[81] The FOI Act provides for the extension of the term ‘individual’ to include a deceased person. This differs from the Privacy Act definition, which does not include such an extension.
6.127 The personal privacy exemption is designed to prevent the unreasonable invasion of third parties’ privacy.[82] The test of ‘unreasonableness’ implies a need to balance the public interest in disclosure of government-held information and the private interest in the privacy of individuals. The test does not however amount to the public interest test of s 11A(5), which follows later in the decision making process. It is possible that the decision maker may need to consider one or more factors twice, once to determine if a projected effect is unreasonable and again when assessing the public interest balance.
6.128 An agency or minister must have regard to the following matters in determining whether disclosure of the document would involve an unreasonable disclosure of personal information:
the availability of the information from publicly accessible sources[83]
any other matters that the agency or minister considers relevant (s 47F(2)).[84]
6.129 These are the same matters that must be taken into account for the purposes of consulting an affected third party under s 27A(2).
6.130 In considering what is unreasonable, the AAT in Re Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs stated that:
...whether a disclosure is ‘unreasonable’ requires … a consideration of all the circumstances, including the nature of the information that would be disclosed, the circumstances in which the information was obtained, the likelihood of the information being information that the person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent, and whether the information has any current relevance … it is also necessary in my view to take into consideration the public interest recognised by the Act in the disclosure of information … and to weigh that interest in the balance against the public interest in protection the personal privacy of a third party...[85]
6.131 The Federal Court affirmed the approach provided in Re Chandra and stated that there are four factors for determining whether disclosure is unreasonable in all the circumstances. The four factors are whether:
the author of the document is identifiable[86]
no public purpose would be achieved through release.[87]
6.132 Other factors considered to be relevant include:
the nature of the information, that is, whether it is common or disclosure would result in serious consequences[88]
how the information was obtained, that is, covertly, in confidence or using information gathering powers[89]
the current relevance or age of the information[90]
whether it would shed light on the workings of government.[91]
6.133 For example, in Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp , Heerey J considered that ‘...if the information disclosure were of no demonstrable relevance to the affairs of government and was likely to do no more than excite or satisfy the curiosity of people about the person whose personal affairs were disclosed...disclosure would be unreasonable’.[92]
6.134 Whether the motives and identity of the applicant are relevant when considering unreasonableness is not settled.[93] The FOI Act provides that a person’s right of access is not affected by any reasons they give for seeking access, or what beliefs the agency or minister have about the person’s reasons (s 11(2)). This leads to the position that an objective test of balancing public interests should be taken.
6.135 In the Victorian case of Re Lapidos and Office or Corrections, however, Fricke DP said that given the exemption turns on unreasonableness:
…one is driven to consider the purpose of the application. Disclosure to one applicant… might not be unreasonable, but it might be unreasonable vis-à-vis another applicant. The very words ‘unreasonable disclosure’ compel one to engage in a balancing exercise, weighing on the one hand, the strength of the applicant’s claim to access, and, on the other hand, the interests of other persons…[94]
6.136 Documents often contain personal information about more than one individual. Where possible, personal information should be dealt with separately under the exemption. An individual’s personal information may however be intertwined with another person’s personal information, for example, information provided for a joint loan application, or information about a relationship provided to Centrelink or the Child Support Agency.
6.137 Intertwined personal information should be separated where possible, without diminishing or impairing the quality or completeness of the applicant’s personal information.[95] Where it is not possible to separate an applicant’s personal information from a third party’s personal information, the exemption may be claimed if it is unreasonable to release the information.
6.138 Whether it is unreasonable to release the information will depend on the relationship between the individuals. Decisions about the release of joint personal information should only be made after consultation with the third party where such consultation is reasonably practical. For more information about consultation see paragraph 6.143 below.
6.139 Documents held by agencies or ministers often include personal information about public servants. For example, a document may include a public servant’s name, work email address, position or title, contact details, decisions or opinions.
6.140 Where public servants’ personal information is included in a document because of their usual duties or responsibilities, it would not be unreasonable to disclose unless special circumstances existed. This is because the information would reveal only that the public servant was performing their public duties.[96] Such information may often also be publicly available, such as on an agency website.
6.141 A document may, however, be exempt for another reason, for example, where disclosure would, or could reasonably be expected to, endanger the life or physical safety of any person (s 37(1)(c)). In addition, where an individual has a propensity to pursue matters obsessively and there is no need for them to contact a particular public servant in the future, disclosure of the public servant’s name may be unreasonable.[97]
6.142 There needs to be careful consideration of the exemption where the personal information does not relate to the public servant’s usual duties and responsibilities. For example, if a document included information about an individual’s disposition or private characteristics, disclosure is likely to be unreasonable.[98] This would generally include the reasons a public servant has applied for personal leave, information about their performance management or whether they were unsuccessful during a recruitment process.
6.143 Where a document includes personal information relating to a person who is not the applicant, an agency or minister should give that individual (the third party) a reasonable opportunity to make a submission that the document should be exempt from disclosure before making a decision to give access (s 27A). If the third party is deceased, their legal representative should be given this opportunity.
6.144 Such consultation should occur where:
6.145 Agencies and ministers should generally start from the position that a third party might reasonably wish to make a submission. This is because the third party may bring to the agency or minister’s attention sensitivities that may not have been otherwise apparent.
6.146 If there is a need to consult third parties under s 27A, the timeframe for making a decision is extended by 30 days (s 15(6)). Agencies should identify as soon as possible within the initial 30 day decision making period whether there is a need for consultation.
6.147 Where consultation occurs, a third party should be asked if they object to disclosure and invited to make submissions about whether:
6.148 To assist the third party to make a submission it may be necessary to give them a copy of the information. This could be done by providing an edited copy of the document, for example, by deleting any material that may be exempt under another provision. An agency should also take care not to breach any of its obligations under the Privacy Act during consultation, for example, by identifying the applicant without consent. For more information about an agency’s obligations regarding the disclosure of personal information, see the guidelines to Information Privacy Principle 11 at www.oaic.gov.au.
6.149 The letter to the third party may also include information about the obligation of agencies and ministers to provide the public with access to information that has been released in documents provided to an applicant (s 11C).
6.150 An agency or minister must have regard for any submissions made before deciding whether to give access to the document (ss 27A(3) and 27A(4)). The third party does not, however, have the right to veto access and agencies should take care that the third party is not under such a misapprehension.
6.151 Where an agency or minister decides to give the applicant access to documents, after a third party has provided a submission, they must give the third party written notice (s 27A(5)). Access to a document must not be given to the applicant until the third party’s opportunities for review have run out, or if review did occur, the decision still stands (s 27A(6)).
6.152 General information about consultation is provided in Part 3. That Part provides guidance about extended timeframes, notice of decision, review rights and when access to documents may be provided.
6.153 An agency or minister may provide a qualified person with access to a document that would otherwise be provided to an applicant where:
6.154 A broad approach should be taken in considering an applicant’s physical or mental health or wellbeing. The possibility of detriment must appear to be real or tangible.[99]
6.155 Where indirect access is to be provided, the applicant is to nominate a qualified person (s 47F(5)(b)). The nominated qualified person must carry on the same occupation as the qualified person who provided the document (s 47F(5)(a)). A qualified person means a person who carries on (and is entitled to carry on) an occupation that involves providing care for a person’s physical, mental health or wellbeing, including:
a counsellor[100]
6.156 Where access is provided to a qualified person, it is left to their discretion as to how they facilitate the applicant’s access to the document.
6.157 A document is conditionally exempt if it discloses information (business information) concerning a person in respect of his or her business or professional affairs, or concerning the business, commercial or financial affairs of an organisation or undertaking, where the disclosure of the information:
6.158 If a decision maker finds that the document is conditionally exempt, the decision maker must then apply the public interest test before concluding that the document is exempt from disclosure (see paragraphs 6.3–6.33 above).
6.159 If the business information concerns a person, organisation or undertaking other than the applicant, the decision maker may be required to consult that third party (see paragraphs 6.178–6.187 below).
6.160 The conditional exemption does not apply if the document contains only business information about the applicant (s 47G(3)). Where the business information concerns both the applicant and another business, the provision may operate to exempt the information of the applicant, but only if the applicant’s business information cannot be separated from the information of the other business or undertaking.
6.161 This conditional exemption does not apply to trade secrets or other information to which s 47 applies (s 47G(2)). In other words, a decision maker should seek an exemption under s 47 for documents containing such information if the circumstances call for it. This is a limited exception to the normal rule that more than one exemption can apply to the same information (see s 32).
6.162 The operation of the business information exemption depends on the effect of disclosure rather than the precise nature of the information itself. Nevertheless, the information in question must have some relevance to a person in respect of his or her business or professional affairs or to the business, commercial or financial affairs of an organisation or undertaking (s 47G(1)(a)). For the purposes of this conditional exemption, an undertaking includes an undertaking carried on by, or by an authority of, a Commonwealth, Norfolk Island or a state or territory government or an authority of such a government (s 47G(4)). However, it has been held that the business affairs exemption is not available to a person within a government agency or undertaking, nor to the agency or undertaking itself.[101] In other words, it is intended to protect the interests of third parties dealing with the government. The exemption has not materially changed since the Federal Court considered it in 1983. Therefore, decision makers should be aware that the application of this conditional exemption to an agency’s own business information is uncertain and should avoid relying on it, even if the agency is engaged in competitive business activities.[102] As an alternative, one of the specific exemptions for agencies in respect of particular documents in Part II of Schedule 2 may be available.
6.163 To be conditionally exempt, the disclosure of business information in a document must reasonably be expected to have either of the following outcomes:
6.164 This term is explained in Part 5 of these Guidelines’. As in other applications, it refers to an expectation that is based on reason. Mere assertion or speculative possibility is not enough.[103]
6.165 The presence of ‘unreasonably’ in s 47G(1) implies a need to balance public and private interests, but this does not amount to the public interest test of s 11A(5) which follows later in the decision process. It is possible that the decision maker may need to consider one or more factors twice, once to determine if a projected effect is unreasonable and again in assessing the public interest balance. This is inherent in the structure of the business information exemption.
6.166 The test of reasonableness applies not to the claim of harm but to the objective assessment of the expected adverse effect. For example, the disclosure of information that a business’s activities pose a threat to public safety may have a substantial adverse effect on that business but it may be reasonable in the circumstances to disclose it. Similarly, it would not be unreasonable to disclose information about a business that revealed serious criminality.[104] These considerations necessitate a weighing of a public interest (public safety) against a private interest (preserving the profitability of a business) but at this stage it bears only on the threshold question of whether the disclosure would be unreasonable.[105]
6.167 The AAT has distinguished between ‘truly government documents’ and other business information collected under statutory authority. The first category includes documents that have been created by the administration or that form part of a flow of correspondence and other documents between the administration and business. The AAT concluded that such documents inclined more to arguments favouring scrutiny of government activities when considering whether disclosure would be unreasonable.[106] By implication, the exemption is more likely to protect documents obtained from third party businesses.
6.168 Where disclosure would result in the release of facts already in the public domain, that disclosure would not amount to an unreasonable adverse effect on business affairs.[107]
6.169 The use of the term ‘business or professional affairs’ distinguishes an individual’s personal or private affairs and an organisation’s internal affairs. The term ‘business affairs’ has been interpreted to mean ‘the totality of the money-making affairs of an organisation or undertaking as distinct from its private or internal affairs’.[108]
6.170 In the absence of a definition in the FOI Act, ‘professional’ bears its usual meaning. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines ‘professional’ as relating to a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of learning is used in its application to the affairs of others, especially one of the three learned professions of divinity, law and medicine. For FOI purposes, ‘profession’ is not static and may extend beyond the occupations that have traditionally been recognised as professions, reflecting changes in community acceptance of these matters.[109] The word ‘profession’ is clearly intended to cover the work activities of a person who is admitted to a recognised profession and who ordinarily offers professional services to the public for a fee. In addition, s 47G(5) makes it clear that the conditional exemption does not apply merely because the information refers to a person’s professional status.
6.171 Any extension of the normal meaning of ‘profession’ will require evidence of community acceptance that the occupation in question should be regarded as a profession. For example, the absence of any evidence indicating community acceptance that the audit activities of officers of the Australian Taxation Office constituted ‘professional affairs’ led the AAT to refuse to extend the ordinary meaning of the expression in that case.[110]
6.172 The term ‘organisation or undertaking’ should be given a broad application, including Commonwealth, Norfolk Island or State undertakings (s 47G(4)). An organisation or undertaking need not be a legal person. However, a natural individual cannot be an organisation but may be the proprietor of an undertaking, for example, when the individual is a sole trader. The exemption may apply to information about an individual who is a sole trader to the extent that the information concerns the undertaking’s business, commercial or financial affairs.
6.173 A document that discloses the kind of information described in paragraph 6.157 above will be conditionally exempt if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth, Norfolk Island or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency (s 47G(1)(b)).
6.174 This limb of the conditional exemption comprises two parts:
the reduction will prejudice the operations of the agency.[111]
6.175 There must be a reasonable likelihood that disclosure would result in a reduction in both the quantity and quality of business information flowing to the government.[112] In some cases, disclosing the identity of the person providing the business information may be sufficient to prejudice the future supply of information.[113] Disclosure of the person’s identity may also be conditionally exempt under s 47F (personal privacy). In these cases, consideration should be given to whether the information may be disclosed without also disclosing the identity of the person supplying the information.
6.176 Where the business information in question can be obtained compulsorily, or is required for some benefit or grant, no claim of prejudice can be made. No prejudice will occur if the information in issue is routine or administrative (that is, generated as a matter of practice).[114]
6.177 Unlike the other limb of this conditional exemption, s 47G(1)(b) does not require that the prejudice to the future supply of business information be unreasonable. The unreasonableness of the prejudice may be considered in applying the public interest test under s 11A(5).
6.178 Where a document includes business information relating to a person, organisation or undertaking other than the applicant, an agency or minister should give that individual or organisation (the third party) a reasonable opportunity to make a submission that the document should be exempt from disclosure under s 47 (trade secrets) or conditionally exempt under s 47G and that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest, before making a decision to give access (s 27).
6.179 For the purposes of consulting a third party, business information means:
6.180 Because the requirement to consult covers a third party who may wish to contend that a document is exempt under s 47 as well as s 47G, business information includes information about trade secrets and any business information the value of which would be destroyed or diminished if disclosed. See Part 5 of these Guidelines for further guidance on the application of s 47.
6.181 Consultation should occur where:
6.182 Agencies and ministers should generally start from the position that a third party might reasonably wish to make a submission. This is because the third party may bring to the agency or minister’s attention sensitivities that may not otherwise have been apparent.
6.183 From a practical perspective, a decision maker should identify early any need to undertake consultation to benefit from the 30-day extension to the timeframe for making a decision (s 15(6)). This is because the extension only applies when consultation starts within the initial decision making period (that is, in the first 30 days).
6.184 Where consultation occurs, a third party should be asked if they object to disclosure and invited to make submissions about:
They should be asked to provide reasons and evidence for their submission. An affected third party who is consulted under s 27 cannot contend that exemptions other than ss 47 or 47G should apply.[115]
6.185 To assist the third party to make a submission it may be necessary to provide a copy of the information. This could be done by providing an edited copy of the document, for example, by deleting any material that may be exempt under another provision. An agency should also take care not to breach any obligation under the Privacy Act during consultation, for example, by identifying the applicant without their consent. If an edited copy of the document has been provided for consultation purposes, that copy should be clearly marked where material has been edited, and it should be stated that the copy has been provided for the purpose of consultation.
6.186 An agency or minister must have regard for any submissions made before deciding whether to give access to the document (ss 27(4) and 27(5)). The third party does not, however, have the right to veto access and agencies should take care that the third party is not under such a misapprehension.
6.187 General information about consultation is provided in Part 3. That Part provides guidance about extended timeframes, notice of decision, review rights and when access to documents may be provided.
6.188 A document is conditionally exempt under s 47H if it meets two criteria:
6.189 This provision is similar to the previous s 43A.There are no AAT or court decisions on the provision.
6.190 Under s 47J(1) a document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under the FOI Act would, or could reasonably be expected to, have a substantial adverse effect on Australia’s economy by:
6.191 The economy exemption reflects the need for the government to be able to maintain the confidentiality of certain information if it is to carry out its economic policy responsibilities, including the development and implementation of economic policy in a timely and effective manner. Section 47J differs significantly from its predecessor (the former s 44 of the FOI Act) by:
6.192 Section 47J(2) makes it clear that ‘substantial adverse effect on Australia’s economy’ includes a substantial adverse effect on a particular segment of the economy, or the economy of a particular region of Australia (s 47J(2)). For example, the disclosure of the results of information regarding the impacts of economic conditions or policies on particular sectors of the market may distort investment decisions within that sector and, in turn, adversely affect the Government’s ability to develop and implement economic policies more generally.
6.193 In this exemption, a ‘person’ includes a body corporate and a body politic (for example, the government of a State or Territory) ( Acts Interpretation Act 1901 , s 22).
6.194 The types of documents to which s 47J(1) applies includes documents containing matters related to any of the following:
6.195 The terms ‘substantial adverse effect’ and ‘reasonably be expected’are explained in greater detail in Part 5.There must be more than an assumption, allegation or possibility that the adverse effect would occur if the document were released.
6.196 A decision maker must focus on the expected effect on Australia’s economy if a document is disclosed. The types of circumstances that would, or could reasonably be expected to, lead to a substantial adverse effect could include:
disclosure of information could distort the Australian economy by influencing investment decisions or giving particular individuals or businesses a competitive advantage.[116]
[6] See also Carver and Fair Work Ombudsman [2011] AICmr 5.
[7] This refers to administration of justice in a more general sense. Access to documents through FOI is not intended to replace the discovery process in particular proceedings in courts and tribunals, which supervise the provision of documents to parties in matters before them: 'Q' and Department of Human Services [2012] AICmr 30, [17].
[8] See Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Commonmwealth Ombudsman [2012] AICmr 11.
[9] See Washington and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2011] AICmr 11.
[10] As recommended in Australian Law Reform Commission and Administrative Review Council, Open government: A review of the federal Freedom of Information Act 1982 , Report No 77, 1995.
11] See Arnold (on behalf of Australians for Animals) v Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607.
[12] See Arnold (on behalf of Australians for Animals) v Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607.
[13] See Re Cosco Holdings Pty Limited and Department of Treasury [1998] AATA 124.
[14] See Arnold (on behalf of Australians for Animals) v Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607.
[15] See Re Shopping Centre Council and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2004] AATA 119.
[16] See Re Jeffrey Samuel Angel and the Department of Arts, Heritage and Environment; HC Sleigh Resources Ltd and Tasmania [1985] AATA 314.
[17] See Attorney-General’s Department and Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180.
[18] See Re Mann and Australian Tax Office [1985] AATA 144.
[19] See Re Maher and Attorney-General’s Department [1986] AATA 16.
[20] See Re Maher and Attorney-General’s Department [1986] AATA 16 for agreements and Re Queensland and Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service (Australians for Animals, party joined) [1986] AATA 224 for assumed arrangements.
[21] See James Edward McGarvin and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [1998] AATA 585.
[22] See General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125, Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v Delegate of the Australian Postal Commission (1980) 144 CLR 577.
[23] Note that s 8A came into effect on 1 May 2011.
[24] See Re JE Waterford and Department of Treasury (No 2) [1984] AATA 67. See British American Tobacco Australia Ltd and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] AICmr 19, [15]–[22]. See also Carver and Fair Work Ombudsman [2011] AICmr 5 in relation to code of conduct investigations.
[25] See Re Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation [1984] AATA 249 , Re Reith and Attorney-General’s Department [1986] AATA 437, Re Zacek and Australian Postal Corporation [2002] AATA 473.
[26] See Chapman and Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs [1996] AATA 210.
[28] See Re VXF and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1989] AATA 107.
[29] See Subramanian and Refugee Review Tribunal [1997] AATA 31.
[30] See Thomas Lincoln Chapman and Wendy Jennifer Chapman and Minister of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs [1996] AATA 210; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] AICmr 19; Briggs and the Department of the Treasury (No. 3) [2012] AICmr 22.
[31] See Secretary, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business and Staff Development Centre (2001) 114 FCR 301.
[32] See Re Susic and Australian Institute of Marine Science No Q89/580 AAT [6189], Re Booker and Department of Social Security No Q89/193 AAT NO 6189.
[33] James Edward McGarvin and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [1998] AATA 585.
[34] See Eccleston and Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs , unreported decision of the Queensland Information Commissioner, Decision No 93002, 30 June 1993; Chapman and Minister of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs [1996] AATA 210.
[35] See Re Jennifer May Mcdonald Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Keith Cameron Mackriell and Michael H Cosby (1983) 78 FLR 236.
[36] See Re Eleanor S Wertheim and the Department of Health [1984] AATA 537.
[37] See Re Jennifer May Mcdonald Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Keith Cameron Mackriell and Michael H Cosby (1983) 78 FLR 236 per Beaumont J.
[38] See Re John Edward O'Brien Waterford and the Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia [1985] AATA 114.
[39] Re Howard and the Treasurer [1985] AATA 100.
[40] For an example of the application of this exemption see Briggs and the Department of the Treasury (No. 3) [2012] AICmr 22.
[41] See Re Connolly and Department of Finance [1994] AATA 167, in which the Commonwealth property was the uranium stockpile.
[42] See The Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd and Secretary, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (2001) 114 FCR 301.
[43] See Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1983) 78 FLR 236.
[44] See Re Hart and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2002] AATA 1190.
[45] Australian Law Reform Commission and Administrative Review Council, Open government: A review of the federal Freedom of Information Act 1982 , Report No 77, 1995.
[47] See Vasta and McKinnon and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2010] AATA 499.
[48] See Lobo and Secretary, Department of Education, Science and Training [2007] AATA 1891.
[49] See Vasta and McKinnon and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2010] AATA 499.
[50] See James and Australian National University [1984] AATA 18.
[51] See Splann and Centrelink [2009] AATA 320.
[54] See Ascic and Australian Federal Police [1986] AATA 108.
[55] See Ascic and Australian Federal Police [1986] AATA 108.
[56] See Ascic and Australian Federal Police [1986] AATA 108.
[57] See Re Crawley and Centrelink [2006] AATA 572.
[58] See Re Watermark and Australian Industrial Property Organisation (1995) 70 FOIR 61.
[59] See Re Dyrenfurth and Department of Social Security [1987] AATA 140.
[60] See Albanese and CEO Australian Customs Service [2006] AATA 900.
[61] See Wilson and Australian Postal Corporation [1994] AATA 189.
[62] See Re Dyrenfurth and Department of Social Security [1987] AATA 140.
[63] See Albanese and CEO Australian Customs Service [2006] AATA 900, Wilson and Australian Postal Corporation [1994] AATA 189.
[64] See Re Department of Social Security v Eric Bernard Dyrenfurth (1988) 8 AAR 544.
[65] For example, in Re Scholes and Australian Federal Police [1996] AATA 347, the AAT found that the disclosure of particular documents could enhance the efficiency of the Australian Federal Police as it could lead to an improvement of its investigation process.
[66] Re Murphy and Australian Electoral Commission [1994] AATA 149.
[67] Re Telstra Australia Limited and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2000] AATA 71.
[68] Re Electronic Frontiers Australia and the Australian Broadcasting Authority [2002] AATA 449.
[69] For examples of the application of the exemption to complaints processes see Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Commonwealth Ombudsman [2012] AICmr 11; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] AICmr 19.
[70] See s 4 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and s 6 of the Privacy Act1988 .
[71] See Re Green and Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation [1992] AATA 252.
[72] See Re Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation [1984] AATA 249 and Re Jones and Commissioner of Taxation [2008] AATA 834.
[73] See Re Corkin and Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 448.
[74] Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218.
[75] Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218 at 68.
[76] Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218 at 69.
[77] Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218 at 85.See also XYZ v Victoria Police [2010] VCAT 255 at 181.
[78] Re West Australian Newspapers Limited and Department of the Premier and Cabinet [2006] WAICmr 23.
[79] See Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice , Report 108, 2008, paragraph 6.54. See also Autism Aspergers Advocacy Australia and Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AICmr 28.
[80] See Re Veale and Town of Bassendean [1994] WAICmr 4.
[81] See s 22 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 .
[82] See Re Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437; Parnell and Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet [2012] AICmr 31; ‘R' and Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AICmr 32.
[83] See Re Jones and Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2008] AATA 413; 'Q' and Department of Human Services [2012] AICmr 30.
[84] For example, where a ‘care leaver’ requests access to third party personal information, decision makers should note that it is government policy that a care leaver have such access. A ‘care leaver’ is a child in Australia in the 20th century who was brought up ’in care’ as a state ward, foster child, or in an orphanage. See the government response to recommendation 12 of the report of the Senate Community Affairs References Committee (2009) Lost innocents and Forgotten Australians revisited report on the progress with the implementation of the recommendations of the Lost Innocents and Forgotten Australians reports , Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.
[85] See Re Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437 at 259.
[86] Note: s 11B(4)(c) provides that when the public interest test is considered, the fact that the author of the document was (or is) of high seniority in the agency is not to be taken into account (see paragraph 6.31).
[87] Re McCallin and Department of Immigration [2008] AATA 477.
[88] See Re Timmins and National Media Liaison Service [1986] AATA 23, Re Z and Australian Taxation Office [1984] AATA 458.
[89] See Re Timmins and National Media Liaison Service [1986] AATA 23, Re Lianos and Department of Social Security [1985] AATA 38.
[90] See Re Wiseman and Defence Service Homes Corp [1987] AATA 895, Haneef and Australian Federal Police and Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] AATA 514.
[91] See Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 29 FCR 429.
[92] Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 29 FCR 429.
[93] See Re Carter and Department of Health (ACT) [1995] AAT 101, Re Williams and Registrar of Federal Court of Australia [1985] AATA 226.
[94] Re Lapidos and Office of Corrections (Vic) [No 3] (1990) 4 VAR 150 at 154.
[95] Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police [1986] AATA 79 and Re McKinnon and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1995] AATA 364.
[96] See Commissioner of Police v District Court of NSW (1993) 31 NSWLR 606.
[97] Re Bartucciotto and Commonwealth Ombudsman [2005] AATA 1109.
[98] Re Toomer & Department of Primary Industries and Energy [1990] AATA 85 and Re Dyki & Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 12 AAR 554.
[99] Re K and Director-General of Social Security [1984] AATA 252.
[100] The Freedom of Information (Amendment) Reform Act 2010 replaced the previous reference to ‘marriage guidance counsellor’ with a reference to ‘counsellor’.
[101] Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1983) 78 FLR 236.
[102] In Secretary, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business v The Staff Development and Training Centre (2001) 114 FCR 301 the Full Federal Court seemed to accept (without referring to the Harris case) that a government agency could claim this conditional exemption, although it did not decide the case on this point. The question therefore remains uncertain.
[103] Re Actors’ Equity Association (Aust) and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2) [1985] AATA 69.
[104] Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre and Department of Community Services and Health (1992) 108 ALR 163.
[105] In relation to the test of reasonableness, see 'E' and National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority [2012] AICmr 3.
[106] Re Actors’ Equity Association (Aust) and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2) [1985] AATA 69.
[107] Re Daws and Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry [2008] AATA 1075.
[108] Re Mangan and The Treasury [2005] AATA 898.
[109] Re Fogarty and Chief Executive Officer, Cultural Facilities Corporation [2005] ACTAAT 14.
[110] Re Dyki and Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 12 AAR 554.
[111] Re Angel and the Department of the Arts, Heritage and the Environment [1985] AATA 314.
[112] Re Maher and the Attorney-General’s Department [1986] AATA 16, Re Telstra and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2000] AATA 71.
[113] Re Caruth and Department of Health, Housing, Local Government and Community Services (1993) 53 FOIR 65.
[114] Re Kobelke and Minister for Planning [1994] WAICmr 5.
[115] See 'E' and National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority [2012] AICmr 3.
[116] See Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 21–22. For an example of the application of this exemption see Washington and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2011] AICmr 11.