Source: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/51501.99-en-20000125/view/
Timestamp: 2018-02-24 11:42:07
Document Index: 275446215

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application no. 51501', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 53', '§ 40', '§ 50']

CHEREPKOV v. RUSSIA
CHEREPKOV v. RUSSIA About Project
Application no. 51501/99
by Viktor CHEREPKOV
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) sitting on 25 January 2000 as a Chamber composed of
Having regard to the application introduced on 16 August 1999 by Viktor Cherepkov against Russia and registered on 1 October 1999 under file no. 51501/99;
The mandate of the previous Vladivostok Municipal Council (hereinafter referred to as the “VMC”) expired in 1993. From 1994 to 1996 elections to the VMC were fixed and postponed several times. The elections took place in 1996 and 1997, but were found invalid because of certain informalities, including insufficient participation by the electorate and a disputed outcome.
On 5 July 1998 the applicant’s mandate as the mayor of Vladivostok expired. On 26 September 1998 the Maritime Territory Electoral Registry refused to register him as a candidate in the next mayoral elections. The elections took place on 27 September 1998, but were found invalid due to various informalities. Upon the applicant’s appeal against the decision preventing his candidacy, on 5 October 1998 the Maritime Territory Regional Court upheld that decision. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. The applicant contends that the appeal is currently pending.
By a decree of 11 December 1998 the President of Russia authorised the Governor of the Maritime Territory to appoint an acting mayor of Vladivostok on the ground that the applicant’s mandate had expired. On 14 December 1998 the Governor appointed an acting mayor. The applicant applied to court, contesting the lawfulness of that appointment. He stated in particular that his term continued as long as his successor was not elected. On 19 January 1999 the Maritime Territory Regional Court confirmed the lawfulness of the Governor’s decision. On 4 February 1999 the Supreme Court rejected at first instance the applicant’s action whereby he had alleged that the presidential decree of 11 December 1998 had been null and void. On 15 April 1999 the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld that decision. On 14 May 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of 19 January 1999.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Constitution, the Russian Federation consists of “federal subjects” (субъекты федерации) which can have their own constitutions, statutes and legislation.
Under Article 11 § 1, “State authority” is exercised by the President of Russia, the Parliament, the Government and courts. Pursuant to Article 11 § 2, State authority which is vested in the federal subjects is also exercised by the competent authorities of those entities.
Federal subjects enjoy a number of autonomous rights, including inter alia the right to exercise, jointly with the competent federal authorities, legislative power in various political, economic, social and legal fields (Articles 72 and 76). Articles 73 and 76 of the Constitution entitle the federal subjects to exercise legislative power in those areas which do not relate to the exclusive competence of the Federation or the joint competence of the Federation and “federal subjects”.
The Maritime Territory is a “federal subject” of Russia (Article 65).
The status of the Maritime Territory is defined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Statute of the Maritime Territory. The Statute was passed by the Duma of the Maritime Territory (hereinafter referred to as the “DMT”) on 12 September 1995.
Under Article 11 of the Statute, the local authorities do not exercise “State authority” (i.e. legislative, executive or judicial powers).
The mandate, functions, powers and controls of the local authorities, including municipal councils and mayors, are defined in the Maritime Territory Local Government Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), which was adopted by the DMT on 26 December 1995. Municipal councils and mayors are elected by local residents (Articles 24 and 26 of the Act), and election procedures are specifically governed by special laws passed by the DMT. Pursuant to Article 29 of the Act, local authorities can adopt regulations and by-laws in the areas in which the Act confers such competence upon them.
The Court observes that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees the “choice of the legislature”. It is true that the word “legislature” does not necessarily mean the national parliament: it has to be interpreted in the light of the constitutional structure of the State in question. In the case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, the 1980 constitutional reform had vested in the Flemish Council sufficient competence and powers to make it, alongside the French Community Council and the Walloon Regional Council, a constituent part of the Belgian “legislature”, in addition to the House of Representatives and the Senate (see, the Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23, § 53; also see the Matthews v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 February 1999, to be published in Reports of Judgments and Decisions, § 40).
The Commission found that organs of local authority, such as the municipal councils in Belgium and the metropolitan county councils in the United Kingdom, do not form part of the “legislature” within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see, Eur. Comm. HR, no. 10650/83, Clerfayt, Legros v. Belgium, Dec. 17.5.1985, D.R. 42, p. 212; no. 11391/85, Booth-Clibborn v. the United Kingdom, Dec. 5.7.1985, D.R. 43, p. 236).
In Russia, legislative power is exercised by the Parliament (Article 94 of the Constitution). The Constitution also confers this power to the parliaments of its “federal subjects” (Articles 11, 72, 73 and 76). The Maritime Territory is a federal subject of Russia (Article 65). Pursuant to Article 46 of the Statute of the Maritime Territory, the DMT is the only legislative organ in the Maritime Territory.
The Court considers that the power to make regulations and by-laws which is conferred on the local authorities in many countries is to be distinguished from legislative power, which is referred to in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, even though legislative power may not be restricted to the national parliament alone (see the
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt and Matthews judgments cited above, loc. cit.).
As regards the complaint involving the mayoral candidacy proceedings, the Court notes that the applicant alleges that these proceedings appears still to be pending. Accordingly, the applicant cannot at this stage claim to be a “victim” of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article 34, and it would be premature for the Court to deal with this part of the application.
In any event, the Court notes that all the proceedings invoked by the applicant involved the determination of his rights to stand as a candidate or to choose his representatives in the local elections, or to occupy the post of mayor. The Court considers that the disputes in question determined the applicant’s political rights, not his “civil” rights within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention (see, in the context of parliamentary elections, the Pierre-Bloch v. France judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI, § 50, p. 2223).
51501/99 - -
- - 51501/99