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NLRB V. PLASTERS' LOCAL, 404 U. S. 116 (1971) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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When a charge is filed under § 8(b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the provision [Footnote 1] banning so-called jurisdictional disputes, the Board must, under § 10(k), "hear and determine the dispute out of which [the] unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless . . . the parties to such dispute" adjust or agree upon a method for the voluntary adjustment of the dispute. [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Before the Texas State picketing began, the Plasterers submitted their claim to the disputed work to the National Joint Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Joint Board), a body established by the Building Trades Department, AFL-CIO, and by certain employer groups. [Footnote 5] Both the Plasterers' and the Tile Setters' locals were bound by Joint Board decisions because their international unions were members of the AFL-CIO's Building Trades Department. Neither Texas State nor Martini had agreed to be bound by Joint Board procedures and decisions, however. The Joint Board found the work in dispute to be covered by an agreement of August, 1917, between the two international unions, and awarded the work to the Plasterers. [Footnote 6] When Texas State and the Tile chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Martini and Southwestern Construction Co., the general contractor that had hired Texas State, filed § 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice charges against the Plasterers, and the NLRB's Regional Director noticed a consolidated § 10(k) hearing to determine the dispute. [Footnote 7] Southwestern, Texas State, Martini, and the two unions participated in the hearing. A panel of the Board noted that the Tile Setters admitted being bound by Joint Board procedures, but deemed the Joint Board decision to lack controlling weight, [Footnote 8] and "after taking into account and balancing all relevant factors" awarded the work to the Tile Setters. [Footnote 9] When the Plasterers refused chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 8(b)(4)(D) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to strike or threaten or coerce an employer or other person in order to force or require an employer to assign particular work to one group of employees, rather than to another, unless the employer is refusing to honor a representation order of the Board. On its face, the section would appear to cover any union challenge to an employer work assignment where the prohibited means are employed. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, 364 U. S. 573, 364 U. S. 576 (161) (hereinafter CBS). As the charging or intervening party, the employer would normally be a party to any proceedings under that section. [Footnote 14] Section 8(b)(4)(D), however, must be read in light of § 10(k), with which it is interlocked. CBS, supra, at 364 U. S. 576. When a § 8(b)(4)(D) charge is filed and there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It may be that, in some cases, employers have no stake in how a jurisdictional dispute is settled, and are interested only in prompt settlement. Other employers, as shown by this cause, are not neutral, and have substantial economic interests in the outcome of the § 10(k) proceeding. A change in work assignment may result in different chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
terms or conditions of employment, a new union to bargain with, higher wages or costs, and lower efficiency or quality of work. In the construction industry, in particular, where employers frequently calculate bids on very narrow margins, small cost differences are likely to be extremely important. [Footnote 15] In the present cause, both employers had collective bargaining contracts with the Tile Setters specifically covering the work at issue; neither had contracts with the Plasterers, nor employed Plasterers regularly. Both employers determined it to be in their best interests to participate vigorously in the Board's § 10(k) proceeding. The employers contended it was more efficient and less costly to use the same craft for applying the last coat of plaster, putting on the bonding coat, and laying the tile, and that it was more consistent with industry practice to use the Tile Setters as they did. [Footnote 16] Both companies claimed that their costs would be substantially increased if the award went to the Plasterers, and that, without collective bargaining contracts with the Plasterers, they would lose 30%-40% of their work to plastering contractors. [Footnote 17] It is obvious, therefore, that both Texas State and Martini had substantial stakes in the outcome of the § 10(k) proceeding. The phrase "parties to the dispute" giving rise to the picketing must be given its common sense meaning corresponding to the actual interests involved here. Cf. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U. S. 205, 382 U. S. 220 (1965). Section 10(k) does not expressly or impliedly deny party status to an employer, and, since the section's adoption in 1947, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals rejected this construction of § 10(k). Its reasoning, which we find unpersuasive, was that because the employer is not bound by the § 10(k) decision, he should have no right to insist upon participation. But the § 10(k) decision standing alone, binds no one. No cease and desist order against either union or employer results from such a proceeding; the impact of the § 10(k) decision is felt in the § 8(b)(4)(D) hearing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We do not find that the legislative history of § 8(b)(4)(D) and § 10(k) requires a different conclusion. The Court of Appeals and the Plasterers rely upon various statements in the legislative history of the two sections, particularly the remarks of Senator Morse, referring to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
jurisdictional disputes as controversies between two labor unions, [Footnote 20] and a passage in the House Conference Report referring to § 10(k) as directing the Board to "hear and determine disputes between unions giving rise to unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(4)(D)." [Footnote 21] Nothing in these remarks or in the other relevant legislative documents indicates an affirmative intent to exclude an interested employer from participating in a § 10(k) proceeding. The usual focus of the legislative debates was on ways of protecting the employer from the economic havoc of jurisdictional strikes. [Footnote 22] But it does not follow from statements condemning the economically deleterious effects of inter-union strife that Congress intended an employer to have no say in a decision that may, practically, affect his business in a radical way. Congress did not expressly focus on the non-neutral employer, but there is nothing in the legislative history that negatives employer standing; [Footnote 23] and in referring to the "parties chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court has frequently cautioned that "[i]t is, at best, treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
adoption of a controlling rule of law." Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 328 U. S. 69 (1946); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U. S. 235, 398 U. S. 241 (1970). It is clear that Congress intended to protect employers and the public from the detrimental economic impact of "indefensible" [Footnote 25] jurisdictional strikes. It would therefore be myopic to transform a procedure that was meant to protect employer interests into a device that could injure them. In the absence of an "unmistakable directive," the Court has refused to construe legislation aimed to protect a certain class in a fashion that will run counter to the goals Congress clearly intended to effectuate. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 390 U. S. 349 (1968). We conclude, therefore, that these sections were enacted to protect employers who are partisan in a jurisdictional dispute as well as those who are neutral. Nothing in CBS, supra, mandates a different conclusion. Until that case, the Board's practice had been chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If employers must be considered parties to the dispute that the Board must decide under § 10(k), absent private agreement, they must also be deemed parties to the adjustment or agreement to settle that will abort the 10(k) proceedings. It is insisted that so holding will encourage employers to avoid private arbitration, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The difficulties with this argument are several. First of all, if union agreements to arbitrate are sufficient to terminate § 10(k) proceedings, there is no assurance that these private procedures will always be open to employer participation, that an employer will be afforded a meaningful chance to participate, or that all relevant factors will be properly considered. [Footnote 26] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Second, the argument for regarding the employer as a dispensable neutral is reminiscent of the position taken by the Board and rejected by the Court in the CBS case. There, the Board sought to justify a narrow view of its function and its failure to make affirmative awards as generating pressure to settle or arbitrate privately. As § 10(k) passed the Senate, it directed the Board to decide the dispute or to order arbitration, but the arbitration alternative was deleted in Conference, and the amended bill was passed by the Senate over the strenuous objections of Senator Morse and others. [Footnote 27] By this amendment, the Court in CBS held that Congress had expressed a clear preference for Board decision as compared with compelled arbitration, and that this policy preference must be respected. 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 581-582. Although this Court has frequently approved an expansive role for private arbitration in the settlement of labor disputes, this enforcement of arbitration agreements and settlements has been predicated on the view that the parties have voluntarily bound themselves to such a mechanism at the bargaining table. In both Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U. S. 261, 375 U. S. 262 (1964), and Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. at 398 U. S. 238, the employers had acceded to binding arbitration as the terminal step of the grievance procedure. This concession is not present in the instant case; the employers here did not even have a collective bargaining contract with the Plasterers. Section 10(k) contemplates only a voluntary agreement as a bar to a Board decision. As in CBS, we decline to narrow the Board's powers under § 10(k) so that employers are chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Concededly, an employer may be a third party to disputes over work assignments, but when chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If union settlement followed by disclaimer ends the § 10(k) case, some of the argument about the employer's party status becomes academic; for whether the employer is a party or not, the two unions alone can prevent a Board decision. But recognizing the employer's party status insures his right to participate when the unions do not agree and the Board must come to a decision. Further, the Board's Safeway rule applies only where the inter-union conflict is effectively settled and the employer no longer faces conflicting claims to the work. As this case demonstrates, the Board does not apply the Safeway rule to unimplemented agreements to arbitrate between the unions alone, and it does not consider it applicable where employees continue on the job after their international union loses an arbitration proceeding and renounces the work. [Footnote 31] These de facto disputes are real, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Our conclusion evinces no hostility to voluntary settlement of disputes and is wholly consistent with federal policy with respect to voluntary arbitration. In other contexts, where challenged conduct poses an arbitrable dispute under a collective bargaining contract, but is also an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the Board, the Board will, as a matter of policy, defer to the arbitral settlement, although it is not bound to do so chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ibid. at 152, 440 F.2d 180. Although the dispute at the Martini worksite had not been submitted to the Joint Board, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that, because the two unions had agreed to be bound by the procedures and decisions of the Joint Board, the NLRB was precluded from hearing and determining the Martini dispute under § 10(k).
Excluding the employer from participation as a party is inconsistent with the common law rule that "all persons materially interested in the result of a suit ought to be made parties, so that the court may . . . do complete justice.'" Vetterlein v. Barnes, 124 U. S. 169, 124 U. S. 170-171 (1888). @ 38 U. S. 375 (1839).