Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=1092
Timestamp: 2020-07-16 17:18:14
Document Index: 193388228

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art, 286', 'Art. 286', 'Art. 286', 'Art.286', 'Art. 32', 'Art.\n286', 'Art. 286', 'Art. 286', 'Art. 286']

J. versus GOKAL & CO. (PRIVATE) LTD. versus THE ASSISTANT COLLECTOR, OF SALES-TAX (INSPECTION) & ORS
1960 AIR 595	1960 SCR (2) 852
J. V. GOKAL & CO. (PRIVATE) LTD. V. THE ASSISTANT COLLECTOR, OF SALES-TAX (INSPECTION) & ORS [1960] RD-SC 12 (25 January 1960)
CITATION: 1960 AIR 595	1960 SCR (2) 852
Sales Tax-Sale in the course of import-Goods on high seas- Transfer	of shipping documents against Payment	- Whether amounts to delivery of goods-Whether transaction exempt from tax Constitution of India, Art, 286(1)(b).
The petitioner who entered	into contracts	with	the Government of India for the supply of certain quantities of sugar of foreign origin, placed orders with	dealers in foreign countries and made arrangements for transporting the goods to Bombay by engaging steamers.	When the goods	were on the high seas and before the vessels arrived at Bombay harbour, the petitioner delivered to	the Government	the shipping documents- including the bill of lading pertaining to the	goods	and received the price. After the goods reached	the port, they were taken delivery	of by	the Government of	India after paying the requisite customs duties to the authorities concerned For the assessment	year 1954-55, the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax held	that sales tax was payable by the petitioner in respect of	the transaction relating to the sugar sold to the	Government.
The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the sales had taken place in the course of import and therefore they were	not liable to sales tax under Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. But it was contended for the	Sales	Tax Authorities that the sales were not in the course of import and that, in any case, under the terms of the contracts	the intention of the parties was that	notwithstanding	the delivery of the bills of lading against payment the property in the goods should not pass to the Government till actual delivery was made.
Held:	(1) that under Art. 286(1)(b) of the	Constitution of India the course of the import of the goods starts at a point when the goods cross the customs barrier of	the foreign country and ends at a point in the importing country after the goods cross the customs barrier;
(2) that an importer	can, if he receives the shipping documents, transfer the property in the goods when they, are on the high seas to a third party by	delivering to	him shipping documents against payment and such a sale is	one made in the course of import;
(3) that the delivery of a bill of lading while the goods are afloat is	equivalent to the delivery of the goods themselves;
Sanders	Brothers v. Maclcan & Co., (1883) 11 Q. B. D.	327, relied on.
(4) that on a true	construction of the contracts in question the property in the goods passed to the Government of India 853 when the shipping documents were delivered to them against payment; and (5) that the sales in question took place in the course of.
import	into India and were exempted from sales tax under Art.286(1)(b) of the constitution.
ORIGINAL	JURISDICTION: Petition No. 38 of 1959. Petition under article 32 of the Constitution ofIndia for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Purshottam Tricumdas,	and 1. N.	Shroff,	for	the Petitioner.A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathi Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
C. K.	Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and T.M. Sen, for intervener No. 4 Attorney-General for India).
1960. January 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, T.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of	the Constitution for quashing the order of the first	respondent dated February	9, 1959, setting aside the order of	the second respondent allowing a deduction of an amount of	Rs.
1,86,42,730-15-0 from the Petitioners sales tax turnover	on the ground that the said amount was not liable to tax by virtue of s. 46 of the bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (Act	III of 1953), (hereinafter called the Act).
The material facts are not in dispute	and they may	be briefly	stated The petitioner is a private company within the meaning of	the Companies	Act, 1956 and has	its registered office at Kasturi Buildings, Bombay -1	on March 24, 1954 and April 15, 1954, into two contracts with the Government	of India for selling to the	latter	two consignements of sugar-one of 9500 Long Tons of sugar	of Peruvian orgin and the other of 25000 metrice Tons of sugar of continental	origin. To fulfil the terms of	the contracts, the	petitioner placed order with	dealers	in foreign	countries. The following are the	particulars relating to the first contract dated 854 March 24, 1954, for the supply of 9500 Long Tons of sugar:
(i) 3rd April	Letter of Credit opened by the petitioner.
(ii) 3rd May, 1954 S.	S. Alba sails from Salaverry (Peru) carrying 9782.01688 Long Tons of sugar.
(iii) 26th May, 1954 The petitioner delivered to its Bankers, the Central Bank ofIndia	Limited, Bombay, along with the invoice for	Rs.
50,35, 405-11-0	the Documents of Title (viz. the Bills	of Lading duly endorsed	in favour of	the Government of India., Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Agriculture) to	the above goods)	together with	other	papers	(such as Certificates) and instructed	the said Bankers	to present	the same to the Government of India, and to collect the said amount of Rs.	50,35,405-11-0 from	the Deputy	Accountant General (Food &	Rehabilitation),New Delhi.............
(iv) 7th June 1954 Payment	made to petitioner's Bankers	by the	Government ofIndia against delivery of Invoice and	Bills of Lading.
(v) 26 th June 1954 Date of arrival of S. S. Alba at	Bombay harbour.
The corresponding details -pertaining to the second contract are as follows Vessel	Vessel	vassel S. S. Eleni	S. S.	S. S. Inger Stathatos	Giovanni	Marie Amendola I.	II.	III.	IV.
(1) 9910-858 9919-7158	4464-3I5	Total	24292 - 8888 Tons Tons.	Tons.	Tons (ii) 5/6th 5/6th	15/6th	Letter of Credit opened June, 954. June, 1954.	June, 1954 by petitioner.
(iii) 10th	31st July,	31st July, Date of Sailing of vessel July, 954.	1954. 1954, 855 Vessel	Vessel	Vessel S. S. Eleni	S. S.	S. S. Inger Stathatos	Giovanni	Marie Amendola (1V) 22nd 12th August,16th August,July, 1954.	1954- 1954.
The	petitioner delivered to its Bankers, the Bank	of Baroda Limited,	Bombay, along with its invoices for Rs.- 50,43,5o1-8-o, Rs. 22, 69,800-13-0, Rs. 50,38, 997-14-o respectively the Documents of Title (viz. the Bills of Lacling) duly endorsed in favour of the Government of India, Ministry	of Food & Agriculture (Agriculture) to	the above goods together with other papers (such as Certificates)	and instructed the	said Bankers to present the same to	the Government of India and collect the said amounts of	Rs.
(V)26th	18th	August,	19th August, Payment	made to the July, 1954. 1954.	1954. petitioner's Bankers by .the Government of India against delivery	of Invoices and Bills of Lading.
The foregoing particulars disclose that some weeks before the vessel arrived at the Bombay harbour, i.e., when the vessels	were on the high seas, the Government of India received the documents of title, including bills of lading, pertaining to the sugar purchased by them and paid the price to the petitioner. Indeed after the goods reached the port, they were unloaded, taken delivery of, and cleared by	the Government of 109 856 India after paying the requisite customs duties to	the authorities concerned.
For the assessment year	1954-55 i.e., April 1, 1954	to March 31, 1955, the petitioner was assessed	to sales tax by the Sales Tax	Officer, Licence Circle, Division	1, Bombay. In calculating the turn-over of	the petitioner, the Sales Tax Officer deducted the price of the said two sales from the petitioner's turn-over.	On January 31, 1958, the first respondent, the Assistant Collector	of Sales Tax, issued a notice to the petitioner under s. 31	of the Act proposing to review the said assessment order passed by the	Sales Tax Officer. In due course the	petitioner filed objections and	made his representations.	The petitioner contended before the first respondent that	the notice should have been issued, if at all, under s. 15	and not under s. 31 of the Act inasmuch as the sales had been disclosed to the Sales Tax Officer and the deduction of	the same had been allowed by him. it was also pleaded that in any event the sales had taken place in the course of import and therefore they were not liable to sales tax.	The first respondent rejected both the contentions and held that sales tax was payable in respect of the said two transactions.	He reassessed the petitioner to a total amount of sales tax and general	tax of Rs.10,22,850-12-0 less Rs. 315-3-0 already paid by the petitioner, i.e., a sum of Rs. 10,22,535-9-0 and directed	the second respondent, the Sales Tax Officer,	to issue a notice of demand for the said amount. Pursuant	to that order, the second respondent issued a notice dated February	14, 1959. The petitioner has filed the present petition	for the issue of a writ of certiorari	cancelling the demand notice issued by the second respondent.
The learned Solicitor-General intervened on behalf of	the Union Government and	Mr. Palkbivala intervened for interveners 1 to 3, and both of them supported	the petitioner.
Mr. Purshottam	Tricumdas, appearing for the	petitioner, raised before us the following contentions: (1) Under Art.
286(1)(b) of the Constitution, as it	stood	before	the Constitution (Sixth Amendment)	Act, 1956, the sales in question were not liable to sales tax inasmuch as they took place in the course of import of the 857 goods into the territory of India; (2) the said sales were exempted	from sales tax by the Bombay State	under the explanation to Art. 286(1) of the Constitution, as the goods were delivered	for the purpose of consumption	in States other than Bombay; (3) the sales were effected outside	the State of Bombay i.e., New Delhi, and therefore they were also exempted under Art. 286(1)(a) of the Constitution;	and (4) the first respondent could have only interfered with the earlier	order of assessment under s. 15 of the	Act within three years from the end of the assessment year 1954-	55, i.e., March 31, 1955, and that the said period having elapsed,	he had no power to interfere in revision under	s.
The first point is the most substantial one in the case	and if the petitioner succeeds on that point, no other question would arise for consideration.
286(1)(b) of the Constitution before it was amended by	the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956. The said Article read;
" (1) No law of a State shall impose,	or authorise	the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- (b) in the course of the import of goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. "	Under this Article, if the sales by the petitioner to the Government of India took place in the course of the import. of the goods into the territory of India, the Bombay State would have	no power to impose sales tax on the said sales.
What does the phrase "in the course of the import of	the goods into the territory of India " convey ? The crucial words of the phrase are " import " and " in the course of'.
The term "import" signifies etymologically " to bring in	".
To import goods into the territory of India therefore means to bring into the territory of India goods from abroad. The words " course " means it progress from point to point	".
The course of import, therefore, starts from one point	and ends at another.	It starts when the goods cross the customs barrier	in foreign country and ends when they	cross	the customs 858 barrier in	the importing country. These	words were subject	of judicial scrutiny by this Court in State	of Travancore- Cochin v. Shunmugha Vilas Cashew Nut	Factory(1).
Construing these words, Patanjali Sastri C.J., observed	at p. 62:
The	word " course " etymologically denotes movement from one point to another, and the expression " in	the course of " not only implies a period of time during which the movement is in progress but postulates also a connected relation.
" It would seem, therefore, logical to hold that the course or the export out of, or of the import into the territory of India does not commence or terminate until the goods cross the customs barrier. " Das, J., as he then was, in his dissenting judgment practically agreed with Patanjali Sastri, C. J., on	the interpretation of the	said words. The learned Judge expressed his view at p. 92 thus:
"The word " course " conveys to my mind the	idea of a gradual	and continuous	flow, an advance, a	journey, a passage	or progress	from	one place to another.
Etymologically it means and implies	motion,	a forward movement. The	phrase	" in the course of " clearly	has reference to a period of time during which the movement	is in progress. Therefore, the words "in the course of the import of the goods into and the export of the goods out	of the territory of India " obviously cover the period of time during which the goods are on their import or export journey ".
We respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations of the learned	Judges.	The course of the import of the goods may be said to begin when the goods- enter their import journey, i.e., when they cross the customs barrier of the foreign country	and end when they cross the customs barrier of	the importing country.
The next question is, when can it be said that a sale takes place in the course of import journey ?	This Court in State of Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Co. Ltd. (2) held that a sale which occasioned (1) [1954] S.C.R. 53 (2) [1952] S.C.R. 1112 859 the export was	a sale that took place in the	course	of export of the goods. If A, a merchant in India, sells	his goods to a merchant in London and	puts through	the transaction by transporting the goods by a ship to London, the said sale which occasioned the export is exempted under Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution from the levy of sales tax. The same principle applies to a converse case of goods which occasioned the import of the goods into India. This Court again in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (1) extended the doctrine to a case	of sale, or a purchase of goods effected within the State by transfer	of shipping documents while the goods were in	the course of transit. The decision dealt with three types	of purchases, viz., (i) purchases made in the local market;
(ii) purchases	made in the. neighbouring districts of	an adjacent State; and (iii) imports from Africa. The imports from Africa consisted of two groups-one group consisted	of goods that were purchased when they were on the	high seas and shipped from the African ports to Cochin or Quilon :	we are not concerned with the other group.	In the said case some commission agents at Bombay arranged for the purchase on behalf of the assessee, got delivery of the shipping documents at Bombay through a bank which advanced money against	the shipping documents and collected the same from the assessees at destination. This Court, by a majority, held that, in respect of the purchases falling	under	the first group of imports, the commission agents acted merely as agents of the respondents therein and that the said purchases occasioned the import and therefore came within the exemption.	That was not a case where the	goods were sold by an importer in India to a third party when the goods were on	the high seas. It was a case where a party	in Cochin purchased goods which were on the high seas through his agent at Bombay and the agent paid the price through a bank against the shipping documents. But the learned Judge, Patanjali Sastri, C. J., expressing the majority view, considered the	scope of the exemption in all its aspects and, summarized the conclusions thus at p. 69:
860 " Our conclusions may be summed up as follows:- (1) Sales by export and purchases by import fall within the exemption under article 286(1)(b)	(2) Purchases in the State by the exporter for the	purpose	of export as well as sales in the State by the importer after the goods have crossed the customs barrier are	not within the exemption. (3) Sales in the State by the exporter	or importer	by transfer of shipping documents while the goods are beyond the customs barrier are within the	exemption, assuming	that the State power of taxation extends to such transactions. " Das, J., as he then was, in his dissenting judgment, agreed with Patanjali Sastri, C. J., on the third conclusion with which we are now concerned.' The learned Judge put forward his view at p. 94 thus:
" Such sales or purchases, by delivery of shipping documents while the goods are on the high seas on their import journey were and. are well recognized species of transactions done every day on a large scale in big commercial	towns like Bombay and Calcutta and are	indeed	the necessary	and concomitant incidents of foreign trade.	To hold that these sales or purchases do not take place " in the course of " import or export but are to be regarded as purely ordinary local or home transactions distinct from foreign trade,	is to ignore the	realities of	the situation. Such	a construction will permit the imposition of tax by a State over and above the customs duty or export duty	levied	by Parliament. Such double taxation on the same lot of goods will increase the price of the goods and, in the case	of export,	may prevent the exporters from	competing in	the world market and, in the case of import, will put a greater burden on the consumers. This will eventually	hamper	and prejudically affect our foreign trade and will bring about precisely that	calamity which it is	the intention	and purpose of our Constitution to prevent. " The learned Judge also in his judgment	elaborately considered the	great hardship that would be caused to an Indian importer if he was not permitted to sell	the goods which were on the high sear, by delivery of 861 shipping documents against payment. Though that case dealt with a	different situation, we agree	with the learned Judge's	observations that an importer can, if he receives the shipping documents, transfer the property in the goods when they are	on the	high seas to	a third party	by delivering to him shipping documents against payment	and such a sale is one made in the course of import.
The legal position vis-a-vis	the import. sale can	be summarized thus; (1) The course of import of goods starts at a point	when the goods cross the customs barrier of	the foreign country and ends at a point in the importing country after the goods cross the customs barrier; (2) the sale which occasions	the import is a sale	in the course	of import; (3) a purchase by an importer of goods when they are on the high seas by payment against shipping documents	is also a purchase in the course of import and (4) a sale by an importer of goods, after the property in the goods passed to him either after the receipt of the documents of title against payment or otherwise, to a third party by a similar process is also a sale in the course of import.
The next question is whether the sales by the petitioner	to the Government of India are sales in the course of import.
From the facts	narrated supra, it is seen	that	the petitioner, pursuant to the earlier contracts entered into with the Government of India, delivered the shipping documents, including the bill of lading to the Government against	payment when the goods were on the high	seas.	In view of the foregoing discussion, it should be held that the sales fall under the fourth principle and therefore they were sales that took place in the course of import of	the goods into India. A bill of lading is " a writing, signed on behalf of the owner of the ship in which	goods	are embarked, acknowledging	the receipt of the	goods,	and undertaking to deliver them at the end of the voyage subject to such	conditions as may be mentioned in the bill	of lading'.	It is well settled in commercial world that a bill of lading represents the goods and the transfer of	it operates	as a transfer of the goods. The legal	effect	of the transfer of a bill of 862 lading has been enunciated by Bowen, L.J., in Sanders Brothers v. Madan & Co. (1) thus at p. 341 "The law as to the indorsement of bills	of lading is as clear as in my opinion the practice of	all European merchants is thoroughly understood. A	cargo	at sea while in the hands of the carrier is	necessarily incapable of physical	delivery. During this	period	of transit	and voyage, the bill of lading by the law merchant is universally recognised as its symbol, and the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading operates as a	symbolical delivery	of cargo. Property in the goods passes by such indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading, whenever	it is the	intention of the parties that the property should pass just as under similar circumstances the property would pass by	an actual delivery of the goods. And for	the purpose of passing such property in the goods and completing the title of the indorsee to full possession thereof,	the bill of lading, until complete delivery of the	cargo has, been made on shore to some one rightfully claiming under it, remains	in force as a symbol, and carries with it not only the full ownership of the goods, but also all rights created by the	contract of carriage between the shipper and	the shipowner. It is a key which in the hands of a rightfull owner is intended to unlock the door	of the	warehouse, floating or fixed, in which the goods may chance to be.	" We have	quoted the passage in extenso as it clearly	and fully states the law on the subject. It is not disputed that the law in India is also similar to that in England.
The delivery of the bill of lading while the	goods	are afloat	is equivalent	to the	delivery of	the goods themselves. The learned counsel concedes that	ordinarily that will be so, but contends that in the present case, the contract clearly indicates that the intention of the parties was that till actual delivery was made the property in	the goods would not pass to the buyer. Both the contracts	are similar	in terms and they follow the standard terms pres- cribed by the Government. The main terms of the contracts may be summarized thus:
863 The first clause defines the term "sellers" to mean	the party selling the sugar and the term "the Government"	to mean the President of India.	Clause	2 prescribes that suitable	gunny	bags approved by the Government should	be used for importing sugar. Clause 3 provides for	inspection of quality, weight and packing of sugar by the Government at the time of shipment.	Clause 4 says that sugar shall	be shipped	to particular ports. Clause 5 compels the sellers to engage steamers on charter terms, empowers the Government to take delivery of the goods at the port of discharge from the ship's rail and imposes the burden on the	sellers	to meet the expenses of stevedoring,	lighterage where necessary, hiring of cranes, dock dues and pilotage. Clause 6 deals with the mode of payment for supplies made; under that clause the sellers are to submit	a bill for full payment	of cost and freight value to the Government in	the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, New Delhi, duly supported by a complete set of clean on board bills	of lading consisting of three negotiable	and three non-negotiable copies,	a certificate of origin of sugar, a certificate	of quality,	weight and packing, a certificate from	the ship- owners that the freight has been paid in full and that	the ship owners retain no lien whatsoever on the cargo on that account. Under	clause	6 (c) letter of credit shall	be opened by the sellers at their cost, and the Government	of India agree to arrange for the foreign exchange as necessary to the extent of the cost-and-freight-value of the quantity of sugar purchased on the production of an import licence which will be issued on application to the proper authority on their prescribed form. Clause 8 confers on	the Government a right, in the event of the sellers' failure to supply the sugar in accordance with	the terms of	the contract, to recover any sum as liquidated damages, and/or by way	of penalty upto a prescribed	amount.	Clause 9 authorizes the	Government, in the event of the sellers failing	to observe or	perform any provisions of	the contract, to terminate the contract forthwith. Clause	II under the heading "Force Majeure" confers on the Government, in case delivery in whole or in part is prevented or delayed directly 110 864 or indirectly by any cause of Force Majeure, war, strikes, rebellion, insurrection, political disturbances, civil commotion, fire	or flood, on account of plague or other epidemics, the	right to cancel the	contract for	the quantities so prevented or delayed.	After the sellers entered	into the contracts, they obtained the requisite licences	from the Government, opened letters	of credit, placed orders with foreign companies, engaged a steamer	on charter	terms, took delivery of the goods from the foreign firms and, when the goods were on the high seas, delivered the documents of title to the Central	Government against payment and the said Government, taking the licence from the sellers, cleared the goods at the Bombay harbour.
Let us now scrutinize the terms of the contract to ascertain whether	they disclose any intention of	the parties that notwithstanding	the delivery of the bill of lading against payment	the property in the goods should not pass to	the Government. The circumstances under which the contracts were entered into between the parties indicate that both the parties	were interested to see that property in	the goods passed in the ordinary way when the shipping documents were handed over to the Government against payment. The sellers had to meet their liability to the foreign companies with whom they opened letters of credit and the Government must have been anxious to get the title to the goods so that	the sellers	might not divert the goods towards their other commitments or	to other buyers for more tempting prices.
Under the contract every safeguard for securing the goods of agreed specifications was provided for in the earlier clauses and therefore there was no reason for postponing the passing	of the property in the goods to the buyer till the goods were actually delivered in the port. The sellers	on their side would have been anxious that the property should pass when the goods were on the high seas, for otherwise they would be	compelled to pay sales tax. Nor are	the clauses	of the contracts relied upon by the	respondents inconsistent with the	property in the	goods passing	in accordance with the mercantile usage. The	liability undertaken by the sellers to meet the expenses relating 865 to stevedorage,	lighterage where necessary,	hiring	of cranes, dock dues and pilotage, at the time of delivery	of the goods on which reliance is placed to indicate a contrary intention, in our view, has nothing to do with the question raised,	for that liability can rest with the sellers even after the property in the goods has passed to the buyers;
nor clauses 9 to 11 on which strong reliance is	placed	by the learned counsel are inconsistent with the property in the goods passing to the buyer; they could legitimately	be made applicable to a point of time when the property in	the goods has not passed to the buyer. If the sellers fail	to observe	the performance of any provisions of the contracts before the property in the goods passed to the buyer, under clause 9 of the contracts the buyer can cancel the contract.
So too,	under cl. II, if any	contemplated mishap takes place on the high seas by force majeure, the seller shall send a cablegram to that effect and the buyer is empowered to cancel the whole of the contract or a part of it. This also applies to a point of time before the property in	the goods has passed to the buyer.	If, on the other hand,	the seller delivers the shipping documents against payment	and thereafter if he does not deliver the goods at the port, the buyer may have other remedies for the recovery	of damages etc. But that right is not covered by either cl. (9) or el.
(II) of the contract. A scrutiny of all the terms of	the contract	does not indicate the intention that the property in the	goods shall not pass to the buyer notwithstanding delivery of shipping documents against payment.
Apart from the	terms of the contract,	reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the following circumstances: (i) the seller	himself chartered the ship; and (ii) the licence issued by the Government was made non-transferable.	We do not see how these	two facts indicate	the contrary intention. If the seller himself chartered a steamer. when the goods he purchased were loaded in the	ship, the property in the goods passed to him	and therefore he was in a position to sell the same to	the Government. The fact that the licence was non-transferable has no relation to the property in the goods passing 866 to	the Government.	The licence issued by the Govern- ment is	an exercise of the statutory power	under	the relevant Act. Whether the petitioner sold the goods to	the Government or to a third party, he had to obtain	a licence.	Indeed in the present case, the licence was given to the	seller with the express object	of fulfilling	the contracts with the Government and was issued several days after the contracts were executed, and indeed the Government took the licence from the seller and	cleared	the goods through their officer.
For all the foregoing reasons we hold that the property	in the goods passed to the Government of India when the shipping	documents were delivered to them against payment.
It follows that the sale of the goods by the petitioner	to the Government of India took place when the goods were on the high seas.
That being so, the sales in question must be held to have taken place in	the course of the import into	India and therefore they would be exempted from sales tax under Art.
In this view, no other question	would	arise	for consideration. ln the result the order	of the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax is set aside and that of	the Sales Tax Officer is restored.	The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioner.