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Final. U.S. Department of Defense. Application-level Firewall. Protection Profile. for. Basic Robustness Environments. Version PDF
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1 Final U.S. Department of Defense Application-level Firewall Protection Profile for Basic Robustness Environments Version 1.0 June 22, 2000
3 Protection Profile Title: U.S. Department of Defense Application-Level Firewall Protection Profile for Basic Robustness Environments. Criteria Version: This Protection Profile (PP) was developed using Version 2.1 of the Common Criteria (CC) [1]. Constraints: Authors: Acknowledgements: Targets of Evaluation (TOEs) developed to satisfy this Protection Profile shall conform to CC Part 2 and CC Part 3. This Protection Profile was prepared by: Wayne Jansen, National Institute of Standards and Technology Jack Walsh, National Security Agency Kathy V. Dolan, National Security Agency Patricia A. Wright, National Security Agency Rita R. Montequin, National Security Agency The authors would like to acknowledge Thomas Karygiannis from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Jandria Alexander and Mario Tinto from the Aerospace Corporation, and Kris Britton from the National Security Agency. i
4 Table of Contents Conventions and Terminology...iv Document Organization...vi Application-Level Firewall Protection Profile Protection Profile (PP) Introduction PP Identification PP Overview Related Protection Profiles: Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description TOE Security Environment Assumptions Threats Threats Addressed by the TOE Threat to be Addressed by Operating Environment Organizational Security Policies Security Objectives Information Technology (IT) Security Objectives Security Objectives For the Environment IT Security Requirements TOE Security Requirements TOE Security Requirements TOE Security Assurance Requirements Rationale Rationale For IT Security Objectives Rationale for Security Objectives for the Environment Rationale For Security Requirements Rationale For Assurance Requirements Rationale For Not Satisfying All Dependencies References Acronyms ii
5 List of Tables Table Functional Requirements Table Auditable Events Table Assurance Requirements: EAL Table Summary of Mappings Between Threats and IT Security Objectives Table Summary of Mappings Between Threats and Security Objectives for the Environment Table Summary of Mappings Between Threats and IT Security Objectives iii
6 Conventions and Terminology CONVENTIONS The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Protection Profile are largely consistent with those used in version 2 of the Common Criteria (CC). Selected presentation choices are discussed here to aid the Protection Profile user. The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph of Part 2 of the CC. Each of these operations is used in this Protection Profile. The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text. For an example, see FMT_SMR.1 in this Protection Profile. The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. Selections are denoted by underlined italicized text. For an example, see FDP_RIP.1 in this Protection Profile The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignment is indicated by showing the value in square brackets, [ assignment_value ]. For an example, see FIA_AFL.1 in this Protection Profile. The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is denoted by showing the iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier, (iteration_number). For example, see FDP_IFC in this Protection Profile. The security target writer operation is used to denote points in which the final determination of attributes is left to the security target writer. Security target writer operations are indicated by the words {determined by the security target writers} in braces. For example, see FIA_ATD.1 in this Protection Profile. As a vehicle for providing a further understanding of and context for functional requirements, Requirements Overview sections have been selectively added to this Protection Profile. When they appear in the text, these overviews precede either a component or set of components. They provide a discussion of the relationship between security requirements so that the Protection Profile user can see why a component or group of components was chosen and what effect it is expected to have as a group of related functions. As an example, see the Requirements Overview which precedes the ADV_RCR.1 assurance component. iv
7 Application Notes are provided to help the developer, either to clarify the intent of a requirement, identify implementation choices, or to define pass-fail criteria for a requirement. For those components where Application Notes are appropriate, the Application Notes will follow the requirement component. For an example, see the Application Note which follows FMT_MSA.3 in this Protection Profile. TERMINOLOGY In the Common Criteria, many terms are defined in Section 2.3 of Part 1. The following are a subset of those definitions. They are listed here to aid the user of the Protection Profile. User -- Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE. Human user -- Any person who interacts with the TOE. External IT entity -- Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside of the TOE that interacts with the TOE. Role -- A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and the TOE. Identity -- A representation (e.g. a string) uniquely identifying an authorized user, which can either be the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym. Authentication data -- Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user. From the above definitions given by the CC, the following terms can be derived: Authorized external IT entity Any IT product or system, outside the scope of the TOE that may administer the security parameters of the TOE. Such entities are not subject to any access control requirements once authenticated to the TOE and are therefore trusted to not compromise the security policy enforced by the TOE. Authorized Administrator A role which human users may be associated with to administer the security parameters of the TOE. Such users are not subject to any access control requirements once authenticated to the TOE and are therefore trusted to not compromise the security policy enforced by the TOE. v
8 Document Organization Section 1 is the introductory material for the Protection Profile. Section 2 provides a general definition for application-filter firewalls. Section 3 is a discussion of the expected environment for the firewall, in particular the assumptions that must be true about aspects such as physical, personnel, and connectivity conditions. This section then defines the set of threats that are to be addressed by either the technical countermeasures implemented in the firewall s hardware and software, or through the environmental controls. Section 4 defines the security objectives for both the firewall and the environment in which the firewall resides. Section 5 contains the functional and assurance requirements derived from the Common Criteria, Part 2 and Part 3, respectively, that must be satisfied by the firewall. Section 6 provides a rationale to explicitly demonstrate that the IT security objectives satisfy the threats. The section then explains how the set of requirements are complete relative to the objectives; that each security objective is addressed by one or more relevant component requirements. Appendix A provides a list of relevant vulnerabilities against which Protection Profile compliant products must be checked. References are provided as background material for further investigation by interested users of the Protection Profile. Acronyms are provided to facilitate comprehension of frequently used terms. vi
9 Application-Level Firewall Protection Profile 1 PROTECTION PROFILE (PP) INTRODUCTION 1.1 PP IDENTIFICATION 1 Title: U. S. Department of Defense Application-Level Firewall Protection Profile for Basic Robustness Environments 2 Sponsor: National Security Agency (NSA) 3 Authors: Wayne Jansen, NSA; Jack Walsh, NSA; Kathy V. Dolan, NSA; Patricia A. Wright, NSA; Rita R. Montequin, NSA 4 CC Version: CC Version Registration: <to be provided upon registration> 6 PP Version: Version 1.0, dated June Keywords: information flow control, firewall, network security, proxy server, application gateway, protection profile 1.2 PP OVERVIEW 8 This Application Level Firewall Protection Profile defines the minimum security requirements for firewalls used by U. S. Government organizations handling unclassified information in a low-risk environment. Firewalls may consist of one or more devices that act as part of an organization s overall security defense by isolating an organization s internal network from the Internet or other external networks. The Protection Profile defines the assumptions about the security aspects of the environment in which the firewall will be used, defines the threats that are to be addressed by the firewall, defines implementation-independent security objectives of the firewall and its environment, defines the functional and assurance requirements to meet those objectives, and provides a rationale demonstrating how the requirements meet the security objectives. 1.3 RELATED PROTECTION PROFILES 9 U.S. Government Traffic-Filter Firewall Protection Profile for Low-Risk Environments [2]. 1
10 2 TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE) DESCRIPTION 10 The purpose of a firewall is to provide controlled and audited access to services, both from inside and outside an organization s network, by allowing, denying, and/or redirecting the flow of data through the firewall. Although there are a number of firewall architectures and technologies, firewalls basically fall into two major categories: traffic-filter and application-level firewalls. This Protection Profile specifies the minimum-security requirements for TOEs composed of an application-level firewall. 11 The TOE mediates information flows between clients and servers located on internal and external networks governed by the TOE. TOEs must employ proxies to screen information flows. Proxy servers on the TOE, for services such as FTP and Telnet, require authentication at the TOE by client users before requests for such services can be authorized. Thus, only valid requests are relayed by the proxy server to the actual server on either an internal or external network. 12 TOEs meeting this Protection Profile additionally impose traffic-filtering controls on information flows mediated by the TOE. Information flows between clients and servers according to the site s security policy rules. By default, these security policy rules deny all inbound and outbound information flows. Only an authorized administrator has the authority to change the security policy rules. 13 Users of the TOE consist of human users and host-like entities, called external IT entities. Human users may or may not be associated with the single role on the TOE for authorized administrators. If the information flow security policy rules permit human users (who are not authorized administrators) on an internal or external network to send and receive information to FTP or Telnet servers on an external or internal network, respectively, such users will have to be identified and authenticated (using a single-use authentication mechanism) by the TOE before information is relayed by the proxy server on the TOE to the FTP or Telnet server. Of the human users, only authorized administrators may access the TOE through remote means from an internal or external network. If an authorized administrator accesses the TOE remotely, and after successful identification and authentication (using a single-use authentication mechanism), a channel using DES encryption with securely generated and distributed key values must be used. In addition to remote access, and after successful identification and authentication, authorized administrators may access the TOE through local means without encryption, such as through a console (that may be included as part of the TOE). Though not recommended, the human users who are not authorized administrators may identify and authenticate from a local console to use nonsecurity functions on the TOE. The only security functions available to human users who are not authorized administrators are the controlled usage of the identification and authentication functions. 2
11 10 External IT entities sending information through the TOE do not have to be identified and authenticated, unless those functions are supported by the underlying service (e.g., FTP). However, external IT entities attempting to send information to the TOE must always be identified and authenticated. Those external IT entities that are successfully identified and authenticated (using a single-use authentication mechanism) are authorized external IT entities. This subset of the external IT entities are permitted to perform a limited number of security functions. They are authorized to violate the TSP in a well understood and permitted manner. A router sending routing table updates to the TOE, serves as an example of an authorized external IT entity. This router would identify itself to the TOE and then use a single-use authentication mechanism to authenticate. The TOE would then accept routing table updates from the authorized external IT entity. There are no requirements mandating authorized external IT entities. 11 Audit trail data is stamped with a dependable date and time when recorded. Audit events include modifications to the group of users associated with the authorized administrator role, all use of the identification and authentication mechanisms (including any attempted reuse of authentication data), all information flow control decisions made by the TOE according to the security policy rules, and the use of all security functions. If the audit trail becomes filled, then the only auditable events that may be performed are those performed by the authorized administrator. The TOE includes tools to perform searching and sorting on the collected audit trail data according to attributes of the data recorded and ranges of some of those attributes. 3
12 3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 12 Protection Profile-compliant TOEs are intended to be used either in environments in which, at most, sensitive but unclassified information is processed, or the sensitivity level of information in both the internal and external networks is equivalent. 13 For all Federal agencies, including Department of Defense agencies, for the use of cryptographic modules in the protection of sensitive but unclassified information, compliance with FIPS PUB is required 1. FIPS PUB defines security requirements for cryptographic modules. A cryptographic module is that part of a system or application that provides cryptographic services such as encryption, authentication, or electronic signature generation and verification. Products and systems compliant with this Protection Profile are expected to utilize cryptographic modules for remote administration compliant with this FIPS PUB. 3.1 ASSUMPTIONS 14 The following conditions are assumed to exist in the operational environment. A.PHYSEC A.LOWEXP A.GENPUR A.PUBLIC A.NOEVIL A.SINGEN A.DIRECT The TOE is physically secure. The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low. There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage repository capabilities on the TOE. The TOE does not host public data. Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error. Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE. Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting the TOE may attempt to access the TOE from some direct connection (e.g., a console port) if the connection is part of the TOE. 1. See FIPS-PUB for the schedule by which all cryptographic modules used by Federal agencies must meet the provisions of this standard. 4
13 A.NOREMO Human users who are not authorized administrators can not access the TOE remotely from the internal or external networks. A.REMACC Authorized administrators may access the TOE remotely from the internal and external networks. 3.2 THREATS 15 The following threats are addressed either by the TOE or the environment Threats Addressed by the TOE 16 The threats discussed below are addressed by Protection Profile-compliant TOEs. The threat agents are either unauthorized persons or external IT entities not authorized to use the TOE itself. T.NOAUTH T.REPEAT T.REPLAY T.ASPOOF T.MEDIAT T.OLDINF T.PROCOM T.AUDACC An unauthorized person may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE so as to access and use security functions and/or non-security functions provided by the TOE. An unauthorized person may repeatedly try to guess authentication data in order to use this information to launch attacks on the TOE. An unauthorized person may use valid identification and authentication data obtained to access functions provided by the TOE. An unauthorized person on an external network may attempt to by-pass the information flow control policy by disguising authentication data (e.g., spoofing the source address) and masquerading as a legitimate user or entity on an internal network. An unauthorized person may send impermissible information through the TOE which results in the exploitation of resources on the internal network. Because of a flaw in the TOE functioning, an unauthorized person may gather residual information from a previous information flow or internal TOE data by monitoring the padding of the information flows from the TOE. An unauthorized person or unauthorized external IT entity may be able to view, modify, and/or delete security related information that is sent between a remotely located authorized administrator and the TOE. Persons may not be accountable for the actions that they conduct because the audit records are not reviewed, thus allowing an attacker to escape detection. 5
14 T.SELPRO T.AUDFUL An unauthorized person may read, modify, or destroy security critical TOE configuration data. An unauthorized person may cause audit records to be lost or prevent future records from being recorded by taking actions to exhaust audit storage capacity, thus masking an attackers actions. T. LOWEXP The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low Threat to be Addressed by Operating Environment 17 The threat possibility discussed below must be countered by procedural measures and/or administrative methods. T.TUSAGE The TOE may be inadvertently configured, used, and administered in an insecure manner by either authorized or unauthorized persons. 3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES 18 Federal agencies are required to protect sensitive but unclassified information with cryptography. Products and systems compliant with this Protection Profile are expected to utilize cryptographic modules for remote administration compliant with FIPS PUB (level 1). P.CRYPTO Triple DES encryption (as specified in FIPS 46-3 [3]) must be used to protect remote administration functions, and the associated cryptographic module must comply, at a minimum, with FIPS (level 1) [5]. 6
15 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 4.1 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) SECURITY OBJECTIVES 19 The following are the IT security objectives for the TOE: O.IDAUTH O.SINUSE O.MEDIAT O.SECSTA O.ENCRYP O.SELPRO O.AUDREC O.ACCOUN O.SECFUN O.LIMEXT O.EAL The TOE must uniquely identify and authenticate the claimed identity of all users, before granting a user access to TOE functions or, for certain specified services, to a connected network. The TOE must prevent the reuse of authentication data for users attempting to authenticate to the TOE from a connected network. The TOE must mediate the flow of all information between clients and servers located on internal and external networks governed by the TOE, and must ensure that residual information from a previous information flow is not transmitted in any way. Upon initial start-up of the TOE or recovery from an interruption in TOE service, the TOE must not compromise its resources or those of any connected network. The TOE must protect the confidentiality of its dialogue with an authorized administrator through encryption, if the TOE allows administration to occur remotely from a connected network. The TOE must protect itself against attempts by unauthorized users to bypass, deactivate, or tamper with TOE security functions. The TOE must provide a means to record a readable audit trail of security-related events, with accurate dates and times, and a means to search and sort the audit trail based on relevant attributes. The TOE must provide user accountability for information flows through the TOE and for authorized administrator use of security functions related to audit. The TOE must provide functionality that enables an authorized administrator to use the TOE security functions, and must ensure that only authorized administrators are able to access such functionality. The TOE must provide the means for an authorized administrator to control and limit access to TOE security functions by an authorized external IT entity. The TOE must be structurally tested and shown to be resistant to obvious vulnerabilities. 7
16 20 For a detailed mapping between threats and the IT security objectives listed above, see section 6.1 of the Rationale. 4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 21 All of the assumptions stated in section 3.1 are considered to be security objectives for the environment. The following are the Protection Profile non-it security objectives, which, in addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures. O.PHYSEC O.LOWEXP O.GENPUR O.PUBLIC O.NOEVIL O.SINGEN O.DIRECT The TOE is physically secure. The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low. There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage repository capabilities on the TOE. The TOE does not host public data. Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error. Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE. Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting the TOE may attempt to access the TOE from some direct connection (e.g., a console port) if the connection is part of the TOE. O.NOREMO Human users who are not authorized administrators can not access the TOE remotely from the internal or external networks. O.REMACC O.GUIDAN Authorized administrators may access the TOE remotely from the internal and external networks. The TOE must be delivered, installed, administered, and operated in a manner that maintains security. O.ADMTRA Authorized administrators are trained as to establishment and maintenance of security policies and practices. 22 For a detailed mapping between threats, assumptions, and the non-it security objectives listed above see section 6.2 of the Rationale. 8
17 5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 5.1 TOE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 23 This section provides functional and assurance requirements that must be satisfied by a Protection Profile-compliant TOE. These requirements consist of functional components from Part 2 of the CC and an Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) containing assurance components from Part 3 of the CC TOE Security Requirements 24 The functional security requirements for this Protection Profile consist of the following components from Part 2 of the CC, summarized in the following table. FMT_SMR.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_UID.2 FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.5 Functional Components Security roles User attribute definition User identification before any action Authentication failure handling Multiple authentication mechanisms FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (1) FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (2) FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (1) FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (2) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (1) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (2) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (3) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (4) FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data (1) FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data (2) FMT_MTD.2 FDP_RIP.1 FCS_COP.1 Management of limits on TSF data Subset residual information protection Cryptographic operation 9
18 FPT_RVM.1 FPT_SEP.1 FPT_STM.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.4 Functional Components Non-bypassability of the TSP TSF domain separation Reliable time stamps Audit data generation Audit review Selectable audit review Protected audit trail storage Prevention of audit data loss FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior (2) Table Functional Requirements 25 The statement of the TOE security requirements must include a minimum strength level for the TOE security functions realized by a probablistic or permutational mechanism. In the case of this protection profile, this minimum level shall be SOF-basic. For a rationale for this selected level, see section 6.3 of the rationale. 26 Specific strength of function metrics are defined for the following requirement: 27 FIA_UAU.5 - Strength of Function shall be demonstrated for the single-use and password authentication mechanism(s) by demonstrating compliance with the Statistical random number generator tests found in section of FIPS PUB [4] and the Continuous random number generator test found in section of FIPS PUB [4]. Strength of function shall be demonstrated for the password authentication mechanism such that the probability that authentication data can be guessed is no greater than one in two to the fortieth (2^40). The single-use and password authentication mechanisms must demonstrate SOF-basic, as defined in Part 1 of the CC. 28 The following paragraphs are intended to clarify why the functional components in this Protection Profile are presented in the order outlined in Table 5.1. FMT_SMR.1 is the first component because it defines the authorized administrator role, which appears in a number of the components that follow. 29 The class FIA components are listed after FMT_SMR.1. They describe the identification and authentication policy that all users, both human users and external IT entities, must abide by before being able to use other TOE functions. 30 The order of the class FIA components was chosen on the following basis. Since users are already defined in the Terminology section on page vi, the Protection Profile reader is introduced in component FIA_ATD.1 to their security attributes. 10
19 The next component, FIA_UID.2, forces users to identify themselves to the TOE using the user security attributes of component FIA_ATD.1 before further actions take place. Then, component FIA_AFL.1 describes what results if the user fails to authenticate after some settable number of attempts. Lastly, component FIA_UAU.5 discusses when authentication mechanisms must be used. 31 There are two information flow control SFPs, and they are defined after the class FIA components in FDP_IFC.1. Then the policy rules which must be enforced as well as the attributes of the entities defined in FDP_IFC.1 are written in FDP_IFF.1. Next, the management of the attributes in FDP_IFF.1 are specified in FMT_MSA.1(1), FMT_MSA.1(2), FMT_MSA.1(3) and FMT_MSA.1(4). Component FMT_MSA.3, which FDP_IFF.1 depends on, follows. As part of the installation and start-up of the TOE, FMT_MSA.3 mandates a default deny policy which permits no information to flow through the TOE. FMT_MTD.1(1), FMT_MTD.1(2), and FMT_MTD.2 define the management of TSF data. FDP_RIP.1 is listed next, ensuring that resources are cleared before being allocated to hold packets of information at the TOE. 32 Component FCS_COP.1 is a conditional requirement. If the developer allows administration from a remote location outside the physically protected TOE, then evaluation against this Protection Profile shall require the TOE to meet this component. FCS_COP.1 defines a cryptographic algorithm as well as the key size that must be used. The cryptographic module must be FIPS PUB compliant for the reasons stated in Section Components dealing with the protection of trusted security functions come next. These include components FPT_RVM.1 and FPT_SEP Since FAU_GEN.1 requires recording the time and date when audit events occur, it follows the FPT_STM.1 component that alerts developers that an accurate time and date must be maintained on the TOE. The class FAU requirements follow to define the audit security functions which must be supported by the TOE. FAU_GEN.1 is the first audit component listed because it depicts all the events that must be audited, including all the information which must be recorded in audit records. The remainder of the class FAU components ensure that the audit records can be read (component FAU_SAR.1), searched and sorted (component FAU_SAR.3), and protected from modification (FAU_STG.1). Lastly, FAU_STG.4 ensures that the TOE is capable of preventing auditable actions, not taken by an authorized administrator, from occurring in the event that the audit trail becomes full. 35 The last component in the profile is FMT_MOF.1. It appears last because it lists all the functions to be provided by the TOE for use only by the authorized administrator. Almost all of these functions are based on components which precede it. Thus it is listed last. 11
20 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 36 FMT_SMR The TSF shall maintain the role [authorized administrator]. 37 FMT_SMR The TSF shall be able to associate users with the authorized administrator role. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition 38 FIA_ATD The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: a) [identity; b) association of a human user with the authorized administrator role; c) any other user security attributes {to be determined by the Security Target writer(s)}]. FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action 39 FIA_UID The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling 40 FIA_AFL The TSF shall detect when [a non-zero number determined by the authorized administrator] of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [authorized TOE administrator access or authorized TOE IT entity access]. 41 FIA_AFL When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [prevent the offending user from successfully authenticating until an authorized administrator takes some action to make authentication possible for the user in question]. FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms 42 FIA_UAU The TSF shall provide [password and single-use authentication mechanisms] to support user authentication. 43 FIA_UAU The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [following multiple authentication mechanism rules: a) single-use authentication mechanism shall be used for authorized administrators to access the TOE remotely such that successful authentication must be achieved before allowing any other TSFmediated actions on behalf of that authorized administrator; 12
21 b) single-use authentication mechanism shall be used for authorized external IT entities accessing the TOE such that successful authentication must be achieved before allowing any other TSFmediated actions on behalf of that authorized external IT entity; c) single-use authentication mechanism shall be used for human users sending or receiving information through the TOE using FTP or Telnet such that successful authentication must be achieved before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that human user; d) reusable password mechanism shall be used for authorized administrators to access the TOE via a directly connected terminal such that successful authentication must be achieved before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that authorized administrator]. 44 Application Note: TOEs that do not provide capabilities for authorized administrators to access the TOE remotely from either an internal or external network (i.e., for remote administration), or for authorized external IT entities do not have to make such functionality available in order to satisfy this requirement. The intent of this requirement is not to require developers to provide all such capabilities and their associated authentication mechanisms. The requirement applies to those developers that do incorporate such functionality and intend for it to be evaluated. 45 Requirements Overview: This Protection Profile consists of multiple information flow control Security Function Policies (SFPs). The CC allows multiple policies to exist, each having a unique name. This is accomplished by iterating FDP_IFC.1 for each of the two named information flow control policies. The first policy identified is called the UNAUTHENTICATED SFP. The subjects under control of this policy are external IT entities on an internal or external network sending information through the TOE to other external IT entities. The second policy identified is called the AUTHENTICATED SFP. The subjects under control of this policy are human users on an internal or external network who must be authenticated to the TOE. The information flowing between subjects in both policies is traffic with attributes, defined in FDP_IFF.1.1, including source and destination addresses. The rules that define each information flow control SFP are found in FDP_IFF.1.2. Component FDP_IFF.1 is iterated twice to correspond to each of the two iterations of FDP_IFC.1. FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (1) 46 FDP_IFC The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED SFP] on: a) [subjects: unauthenticated external IT entities that send and receive information through the TOE to one another; 13
22 b) information: traffic sent through the TOE from one subject to another; c) operation: pass information]. 14
23 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (2) 47 FDP_IFC The TSF shall enforce the [AUTHENTICATED SFP] on: a) [subjects: a human user or external IT entity that sends and receives FTP and Telnet information through the TOE to one another, only after the human user initiating the information flow has authenticated at the TOE per FIA_UAU.5, b) information: FTP and Telnet traffic sent through the TOE from one subject to another; c) operation: initiate service and pass information]. FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (1) 2 48 FDP_IFF The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED SFP] based on at least the following types of subject and information security attributes: a) [subject security attributes: presumed address; other subject security attributes {to be determined by the Security Target writer(s)}; b) information security attributes: presumed address of source subject; presumed address of destination subject; transport layer protocol; TOE interface on which traffic arrives and departs; 2. The complete set of functional elements of a component must be selected for inclusion in a PP. However, since the following functional elements from the FDP_IFF.1 (1) component do not add anything significant to the PP, they have been moved here to allow for a clearer, smoother flowing presentation of FDP_IFF.1(1). FDP_IFF The TSF shall enforce the [none]. FDP_IFF The TSF shall provide the following [none]. FDP_IFF The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [none]. 15
24 service; other information security attributes {to be determined by the Security Target writer(s)}]. 49 FDP_IFF The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and another controlled subject via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: a) [Subjects on an internal network can cause information to flow through the TOE to another connected network if: all the information security attribute values are unambiguously permitted by the information flow security policy rules, where such rules may be composed from all possible combinations of the values of the information flow security attributes, created by the authorized administrator; the presumed address of the source subject, in the information, translates to an internal network address; and the presumed address of the destination subject, in the information, translates to an address on the other connected network. b) Subjects on the external network can cause information to flow through the TOE to another connected network if: all the information security attribute values are unambiguously permitted by the information flow security policy rules, where such rules may be composed from all possible combinations of the values of the information flow security attributes, created by the authorized administrator; the presumed address of the source subject, in the information, translates to an external network address; and the presumed address of the destination subject, in the information, translates to an address on the other connected network.] 50 FDP_IFF The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: a) [The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on an external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on an internal network; 16
25 b) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on an internal TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on the external network; c) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on either an internal or external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on a broadcast network; d) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on either an internal or external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on the loopback network; e) The TOE shall reject requests in which the subject specifies the route in which information shall flow en route to the receiving subject; and f) For application protocols supported by the TOE (e.g., DNS, HTTP, SMTP, and POP3), the TOE shall deny any access or service requests that do not conform to its associated published protocol specification (e.g., RFC). This shall be accomplished through protocol filtering proxies that are designed for that purpose. 51 Application Note: Rule f) applies when an application-level proxy is provided for the following protocols: DNS, HTTP, SMTP, and POP3. FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (2) 3 52 FDP_IFF The TSF shall enforce the [AUTHENTICATED SFP] based on at least the following types of subject and information security attributes: a) [subject security attributes: presumed address; other subject security attributes {to be determined by the Security Target writer(s)}; 3. The complete set of functional elements of a component must be selected for inclusion in a PP. However, since the following functional elements from the FDP_IFF.1 (2) component do not add anything significant to the PP, they have been moved here to allow for a clearer, smoother flowing presentation of FDP_IFF.1 (2). FDP_IFF The TSF shall enforce the [none]. FDP_IFF The TSF shall provide the following [none]. FDP_IFF The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [none]. 17
26 b) information security attributes: user identity; presumed address of source subject; presumed address of destination subject; transport layer protocol; TOE interface on which traffic arrives and departs; service (i.e., FTP and Telnet); security-relevant service command; and other information security attributes {to be determined by the Security Target writer(s)}]. 53 FDP_IFF The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and another controlled subject via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: a) [Subjects on an internal network can cause information to flow through the TOE to another connected network if: the human user initiating the information flow authenticates according to FIA_UAU.5; all the information security attribute values are unambiguously permitted by the information flow security policy rules, where such rules may be composed from all possible combinations of the values of the information flow security attributes, created by the authorized administrator; the presumed address of the source subject, in the information, translates to an internal network address; and the presumed address of the destination subject, in the information, translates to an address on the other connected network. b) Subjects on the external network can cause information to flow through the TOE to another connected network if: the human user initiating the information flow authenticates according to FIA_UAU.5; 18
27 all the information security attribute values are unambiguously permitted by the information flow security policy rules, where such rules may be composed from all possible combinations of the values of the information flow security attributes, created by the authorized administrator; the presumed address of the source subject, in the information, translates to an external network address; and the presumed address of the destination subject, in the information, translates to an address on the other connected network.] 54 FDP_IFF The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: a) [The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on an external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on an internal network; b) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on an internal TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on the external network; c) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on either an internal or external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on a broadcast network; d) The TOE shall reject requests for access or services where the information arrives on either an internal or external TOE interface, and the presumed address of the source subject is an external IT entity on the loopback network; e) The TOE shall reject requests in which the subject specifies the route in which information shall flow en route to the receiving subject; and f) The TOE shall reject Telnet or FTP command requests that do not conform to generally accepted published protocol definitions (e.g., RFCs). This must be accomplished through protocol filtering proxies designed for that purpose. 55 Application Note: The TOE can make no claim as to the real address of any source or destination subject, therefore the TOE can only suppose that these addresses are accurate. Therefore, a presumed address is used to identify source and destination addresses. A service, listed in FDP_IFF.1.1(b), could be identified, for example, by a source port number and/or destination port number. A service command, also mentioned in FDP_IFF.1.1(b), could be identified, for 19
28 example, in the case of the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) service as an FTP STOR or FTP RETR. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (1) 56 FMT_MSA.1.1 (1) - The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED_SFP] to restrict the ability to [delete attributes from a rule, modify attributes in a rule, add attributes to a rule] the security attributes [listed in section FDP_IFF1.1(1)] to [the authorized administrator]. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (2) 57 FMT_MSA.1.1(2) - The TSF shall enforce the [AUTHENTICATED_SFP] to restrict the ability to [delete attributes from a rule, modify attributes in a rule, add attributes to a rule] the security attributes [listed in section FDP_IFF1.1(2)] to [the authorized administrator]. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (3) 58 FMT_MSA.1.1(3) - The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED_SFP] to restrict the ability to delete and [create] the security attributes [information flow rules described in FDP_IFF.1(1)] to [the authorized administrator]. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (4) 59 FMT_MSA.1.1(4) - The TSF shall enforce the [AUTHENTICATED_SFP] to restrict the ability to delete and [create] the security attributes [information flow rules described in FDP_IFF.1(2)] to [the authorized administrator]. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization 60 FMT_MSA The TSF shall enforce the [UNAUTHENTICATED_SFP and AUTHENTICATED_SFP] to provide restrictive default values for information flow security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. 61 FMT_MSA The TSF shall allow [the authorized administrator] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. 62 Application Note: The default values for the information flow control security attributes appearing in FDP_IFF.1 (1) and FDP_IFF.1 (2) are intended to be restrictive in the sense that both inbound and outbound information is denied by the TOE until the default values are modified by an authorized administrator. 20
29 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data (1) 63 FMT_MTD.1.1(1) - The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, modify, delete, [and assign] the [user attributes defined in FIA_ATD.1.1] to [the authorized administrator]. FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data (2) 64 FMT_MTD.1.1(2) - The TSF shall restrict the ability to [set] the [time and date used to form the timestamps in FPT_STM.1.1] to [the authorized administrator]. FMT_MTD.2 Management of limits on TSF data 65 FMT_MTD The TSF shall restrict the specification of the limits for [the number of authentication failures] to [the authorized administrator]. 66 FMT_MTD The TSF shall take the following actions, if the TSF data are at, or exceed, the indicated limits: [actions specified in FIA_AFL.1.2]. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection 67 FDP_RIP The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to [all objects]. 68 Application Note: If, for example, the TOE pads information with bits in order to properly prepare the information before sending it out an interface, these bits would be considered a resource. The intent of the requirement is that these bits shall not contain the remains of information that had previously passed through the TOE. The requirement is met by overwriting or clearing resources (e.g. packets) before making them available for use. FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation 69 FCS_COP The TSF shall perform [encryption of remote authorized administrator sessions] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: [Triple Data Encryption Standard (DES) as specified in FIPS PUB 46-3 and implementing any mode of operation specified in FIPS PUB 46-3 with Keying Option 1 (K1, K2, K3 are independent keys)] and cryptographic key sizes [that are 192 binary digits in length] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 46-3 with Keying Option 1 and FIPS PUB (Level 1)]. 70 Application Note: This requirement is applicable only if the TOE includes the capability for the authorized administrator to perform security functions remotely from a connected network. In this case, Triple DES encryption must protect the communications between the authorized administrator and the TOE, and the associated cryptographic module(s) must comply at a minimum with FIPS PUB Level 1. The intent of this requirement is not for the evaluator to perform a FIPS PUB evaluation; rather, the evaluator will check for a certificate, 21
30 verifying that the module did complete a FIPS PUB evaluation. FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP 71 FPT_RVM The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed. FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation 72 FPT_SEP The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. 73 FPT_SEP The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps 74 FPT_STM The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. 75 Application Note: The word reliable in the above requirement means that the order of the occurrence of auditable events is preserved. Reliable time stamps, which include both date and time, are especially important for TOEs comprised of greater than one component. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 76 FAU_GEN The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and c) [the events listed in Table 5.2]. 77 FAU_GEN The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [information specified in column three of Table 5.2]. 22
Security Target for. Astaro Security Gateway Software V6.300. CC Compliant Software EAL 2+
for Astaro Security Gateway Software V6.0 CC Compliant Software EAL 2+ September 04, 06 Version 2.08 Prepared by: Astaro AG, Amalienbadstraße 36 Bau 33a, 76227 Karlsruhe, Germany TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION...
Stonesoft Corporation StoneGate Firewall/VPN Version 4.2.2 Build 5708.cc3.1 COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY TARGET VERSION 1.3 19 February 2010 Stonesoft Corporation Itälahdenkatu 22 A, FIN-0210 Helsinki, Finland
Security Target for the Fortinet FortiGate -200B and 620B Unified Threat Management Solution and FortiOS 4.0 CC Compliant Firmware: EAL4+
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ISA Server 2006 SE/EE Common Criteria Evaluation Security Target Internet Security and Acceleration Server Team
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