Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/4:2011cv00364/623074/17
Timestamp: 2018-06-19 05:04:06
Document Index: 486439587

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 13', '§ 2241', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§636']

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for High-Elk v. Ryan et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings
Justia Dockets & Filings Ninth Circuit Arizona Arizona District Court High-Elk v. Ryan et al Filing 17
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1). The motion to conduct discovery (Doc. 12) and motion for disclosure (Doc. 16) should be denied as moot. The motion to file a supplement to his reply brief should be granted in the interest of completeness (Doc. 15). Signed by Magistrate Judge Glenda E Edmonds on 1/31/12. (See atached PDF for complete information.) (KAH)
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Rodrick Wade High-Elk, Petitioner, 10 11 vs. 12 Charles L. Ryan; et al., 13 Respondents. 14 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CIV 11-364-TUC-FRZ (GEE) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 15 Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on June 15, 2011, 16 by Rodrick Wade High-Elk, an inmate confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex in 17 Florence, Arizona. (Doc. 1) 18 Also pending are the petitioner’s motions for discovery, disclosure, and leave to file an 19 amended reply. (Docs. 12, 15, 16) 20 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, this matter was referred to Magistrate 21 Judge Edmonds for report and recommendation. 22 The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the 23 record, enter an order dismissing the petition. It is time-barred. 24 25 Summary of the Case 26 High-Elk was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of aggravated assault with a 27 deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, two counts of aggravated driving under the influence 28 1 of liquor, and fleeing from a law enforcement vehicle. (Doc. 11-1) The trial court sentenced 2 High-Elk to concurrent sentences, the longest of which was 15.75 years’ imprisonment. Id. 3 On direct appeal, High-Elk argued he was denied a fair trial because prosecution 4 witnesses improperly testified to prior bad acts and because the evidence was insufficient to 5 support the assault convictions. (Doc. 11-2) The court of appeals affirmed his convictions and 6 sentences on August 29, 2007. (Doc. 11-1) The Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition for 7 review without comment on January 28, 2008. (Doc. 11-2) High-Elk did not file a petition for 8 certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. (Doc. 1, p. 4) 9 On March 19, 2008, High-Elk filed notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11-7) 10 Counsel filed a petition in which he conceded he could find no colorable issues for review. 11 (Doc. 11-3, pp. 6-9) He nevertheless urged the court to hold a hearing on the issue of executive 12 clemency because the sentence required by law was excessive. Id. On August 6, 2008, the trial 13 court dismissed the petition without a hearing. (Doc. 11-3, p. 48) High-Elk subsequently filed 14 two motions to extend the time for filing a pro se petition for review of the trial court’s denial. 15 (Doc. 11-3, pp. 50-52) The trial court granted the motions, but High Elk did not file a petition 16 for review. (Doc. 11-3, p. 54) 17 On December 1, 2008, High-Elk filed a second notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 18 11-4) He argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly evaluate the state’s plea 19 agreement. Id. Trial counsel believed High-Elk would be eligible for a minimum sentence of 20 10.5 years should he lose at trial and therefore concluded the plea agreement of 10.5 years 21 offered no advantage. 22 imprisonment, which was in fact the minimum sentence available by law. Id. Id. After trial however, High-Elk was sentenced to 15.75 years’ 23 The trial court denied the petition on March 4, 2009. (Doc. 11-5, p. 2) The court of 24 appeals granted review but denied relief on July 30, 2009. (Doc. 11-5, p. 27) High-Elk’s 25 petition for review before the Arizona Supreme Court was denied on June 15, 2010. (Doc. 11-5, 26 p. 67) 27 On June 20, 2011, High-Elk filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus 28 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1) He argues (1) he was denied a fair trial when -2- 1 prosecution witnesses gave prior bad-act testimony violating the pre-trial order, (2) trial counsel 2 was ineffective for giving incorrect advice causing the defendant to reject the state’s plea 3 agreement, (3) counsel failed to request that the trial court give him special permission to 4 petition the Board of Executive Clemency pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-603(L), and (4) the evidence 5 presented at trial was insufficient to prove intent. (Doc. 1) 6 On October 31, 2011, the respondents filed an answer arguing, among other things, that 7 the petition is time-barred. (Doc. 7) High-Elk filed a reply on December 2, 2011. (Doc. 13) 8 High-Elk also filed a motion for discovery (Doc. 12), a motion for disclosure (Doc. 16), 9 and a motion for leave to file an amended reply (Doc. 15). 10 11 Discussion 12 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the 13 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A one-year limitation 14 period applies to persons in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 15 The statute reads in pertinent part as follows: 17 A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-- 18 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 16 (1) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 28 -3- judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 1 2 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 3 The limitation period for High-Elk’s claims was triggered on “the date on which the 4 judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 5 seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The court of appeals affirmed his 6 convictions and sentences on August 29, 2007. (Doc. 11-1) The Arizona Supreme Court 7 denied his petition for review without comment on January 28, 2008. (Doc. 11-2) High-Elk 8 then had 90 days to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for review. Sup. Ct. R. 13. When he did 9 10 not do so, his judgment became final on April 28, 2008.1 See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 11 The one-year limitation period did not begin to run immediately because High-Elk’s first 12 post-conviction relief petition was pending at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Tolling 13 pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) continued until August 6, 2008, when the trial court dismissed the 14 petition without a hearing. (Doc. 11-3, p. 48) The limitation period began to run the next day 15 and ran for 117 days until December 1, 2008, when High-Elk filed a second notice of post16 conviction relief and statutory tolling resumed. (Doc. 11-4) 17 Tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) continued until his petition for review was denied by 18 the Arizona Supreme Court on June 15, 2010. (Doc. 11-5, p. 67) The limitation period resumed 19 the next day and expired 248 days later on February 18, 2011. High-Elk filed his petition in this 20 court on June 15, 2011.2 It is time-barred. 21 22 23 24 1 25 The 90th day, April 27, 2008, is a Sunday. See Sup. Ct. R. 30. 2 26 High-Elk put his petition in the prison mailing system on this day. (Doc. 1, p. 19); See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the “prison mailbox rule”). 27 28 -4- 1 High-Elk argues his petition is timely because the limitation period did not begin until 2 his second petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on June 3 15, 2010. (Doc. 13, p. 6) He is incorrect. 4 The limitation period began to run when the trial court denied his first post-conviction 5 relief petition because, at that time, he had no petition for post-conviction relief “pending.” See 6 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Banjo v. Acers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[P]eriods between 7 different rounds of collateral attack are not tolled.”), cert. Denied, 131 S.Ct. 3023 (2011); 8 Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2007) (The limitations period was not 9 tolled between the dismissal of the petitioner’s first PCR notice and the filing of his second PCR 10 notice.), cert. Denied, 555 U.S. 829 (2008). High-Elk’s limitation period ran for 117 days until 11 he filed his second notice of post-conviction relief. Tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) resumed 12 and continued until June 15, 2010, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition for 13 review. (Doc. 11-5, p. 67) The limitation period resumed the next day and expired 248 days 14 later on February 18, 2011. High-Elk filed his petition in this court on June 15, 2011. It is time- 15 barred. 16 17 Outstanding Motions 18 On December 2, 2011, High-Elk filed a motion to conduct discovery. (Doc. 12) High- 19 Elk would like information about the current state of the law on the issue of ineffective 20 assistance of counsel. Id. He also requests access to certain trial exhibits, which would 21 establish that he suffered K-9 bites when he was arrested. Id. 22 23 24 25 26 27 In light of this court’s conclusion that the petition is time-barred, High-Elk’s motion to conduct discovery on the merits should be denied as moot. (Doc. 12) On December 23, 2011, High-Elk filed a motion for disclosure. (Doc. 16) High-Elk seeks access to certain trial exhibits and to the police files related to his arrest. Id. In light of this court’s conclusion that the petition is time-barred, High-Elk’s motion for disclosure on the merits should be denied as moot. (Doc. 16) 28 -5- 1 Also on December 23, 2011, High-Elk filed a motion to file a supplement to his reply 2 brief. (Doc. 15) In his supplement, High-Elk offers additional argument related to his 3 evidentiary claim and his sufficiency of the evidence claim. In the interest of completeness, the 4 motion should be granted. (Doc. 15) 5 6 RECOMMENDATION 7 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review 8 of the record, enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1) 9 It is time-barred. 10 High-Elk’s motion to conduct discovery should be denied as moot. (Doc. 12) 11 High-Elk’s motion for disclosure should be denied as moot. (Doc. 16) 12 High-Elk’s motion to file a supplement to his reply brief should be granted in the interest 13 of completeness. (Doc. 15) 14 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within 15 14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not 16 timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 17 18 The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this report and recommendation to the petitioner and the respondents. 19 20 DATED this 31st day of January, 2012. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -6-