Source: https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/el-salvador-supreme-court-judgment-unconstitutionality-amnesty-law
Timestamp: 2018-10-16 10:43:41
Document Index: 788980050

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 3', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 4', 'Arts 4', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 4']

El Salvador, Supreme Court Judgment on the Unconstitutionality of the Amnesty Law | How does law protect in war? - Online casebook
[Source: Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Incostitucionalidad 44-2013/145-2013, San Salvador, 13 July 2016, available at: http://www.jurisprudencia.gob.sv/VisorMLX/PDF/44-2013AC.PDF (unofficial translation, footnotes omitted)]
1. (Paras [10], [20]) How would you classify the conflict between the FMLN and the armed forces of El Salvador? What was the applicable law? Once Protocol II applies, is it necessary to verify its applicability throughout the conflict? Might it stop applying at some point? (GC I-IV, Art. 3; P II, Art. 1; See also Switzerland, Qualification of the Conflict in El Salvador)
2.a. What is an amnesty? What are the consequences of granting amnesty? Does P II, Art. 6 (5) deal with amnesty? According to the Court, what is the purpose of the amnesty in the context of P II, Art. 6 (5)? (P II, Art. 6 (5); P II, Art. 6, Commentary, 1987, para. 4617)
2.b.How does the Supreme Court interpret the phrase “the broadest possible amnesty” as it appears in P II, Art. 6 (5)? How does the Supreme Court reconcile the requirements of P II, Art. 6 (5) with the conflicting obligations upon El Salvador arising from other rules of international law or its Constitution?
2.c. Do you agree with the Supreme Court’s decision, set forth in para. [18]: “the amnesty will continue to apply to and must continue to protect only those persons who have not participated in acts constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes constituting serious violations of IHL”? May war crimes be the object of an amnesty? Would this be compatible with Customary IHL Rules 158 and 159? Why? Why not? (CIHL Rules 158 and 159; See also Colombia, Constitutional Conformity of Protocol II, paras 41 – 42)
2.d. Is the amnesty envisaged in P II, Art. 6 (5) only intended to cover participation in hostilities? Is there a similar provision in Protocol I? Why? Why not? In your opinion, does rewarding respect for IHL by granting amnesty represent an effective strategy to encourage armed groups to comply with International Humanitarian Law? In a NIAC, can members of armed groups be punished for mere direct participation in hostilities, including for killing enemy fighters? Under the IHL of IACs, can combatants be punished for mere direct participation in hostilities, including for killing enemy combatants? (P II, Art. 6 (5))
3.a. How does the Supreme Court interpret the prohibition set forth in P II, Art. 4 (2)? How, according to the Court, does it influence the interpretation and application of P II, Art. 6 (5)? Do you agree with the Supreme Court’s statement in para. [12], that acts listed in P II, Art. 4(2) which are “widespread or systematic must be considered to be […] crime[s] against humanity or […] war crime[s] constituting serious violations of IHL”? Why? (P II, Arts 4 (2) and 6 (5))
3.b.Do you agree with the Supreme Court’s holding that the phrase “shall be prohibited at any time” appearing in P II, Art. 4 (2) implies that statutes of limitation are inapplicable to crimes against humanity and war crimes? Does the Supreme Court consider this a peremptory norm of international law? (P II, Art. 4 (2))