Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/23/395/482116/
Timestamp: 2020-08-06 07:53:21
Document Index: 638958213

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3142', '§ 2119', '§ 924', '§ 2119', '§ 924', '§ 3142', '§ 3142', '§ 3142']

Notice: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 States Unpublished Opinions May Be Cited Only in Related Cases.united States, Appellee, v. David Irizarry Cruz, Defendant, Appellant, 23 F.3d 395 (1st Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Notice: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 States Unpublished Opinions May Be Cited Only in Related Cases.united States, Appellee, v. David Irizarry Cruz, Defendant, Appellant, 23 F.3d 395 (1st Cir. 1994)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 23 F.3d 395 (1st Cir. 1994) May 6, 1994
This is an appeal from the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico ordering appellant David Irizarry-Cruz detained pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
Appellant was charged in a four-count indictment with (1) aiding and abetting, while in the possession of a firearm, the taking of a motor vehicle by force and violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) and Sec. 2; (2) aiding and abetting in the knowing use of a firearm during the carjacking-a crime of violence-in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) and Sec. 2; (3) aiding and abetting the carjacking while in the possession of a firearm by force and violence resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2) and Sec. 2; and (4) aiding and abetting, while in the possession of a firearm, a crime of violence in which defendants inflicted serious bodily injury to the victim, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) and Sec. 2.
Appellant was arrested on February 7, 1994, after an aborted attempt to steal a car the night before. On February 8, the government moved, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142, that appellant be detained pending trial. The next day an order of temporary detention was entered. On February 11, 1994-three days later-a magistrate judge held a detention hearing. He required the parties to proceed by proffer. Although the government submitted vaious documents, appellant did not submit any affidavits or other evidence. On February 18, 1994, the magistrate judge ordered the pre-trial detention of appellant, finding that no conditions would reasonably assure appellant's presence at trial and the safety of the community. On appellant's motion for reconsideration, the magistrate judge, in a written order, deleted risk of flight as a ground for detention. The trial judge then denied a second motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1994. This appeal ensued.
The grand jury indictment of March 3, 1994, gave the district court probable cause to believe that appellant had committed a crime of violence within the meaning of Sec. 3142(f) (1) (A).1 This, in turn, triggered the rebuttable presumption contained in Sec. 3142(e). See United States v. Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1416 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Thus, "[s]ubject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure ... the safety of the community...." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). The burden of persuasion remains on the government and the presumption still carries evidentiary weight where, as here, appellant has come forward with "some" refutatory evidence. See id.; see also United States v. Perez- Franco, 839 F.2d 867, 870 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Keeping the foregoing in mind, we turn to the evidence.
On appeal, appellant makes the further argument that the district court mistakenly equated the standard for finding probable cause that a crime of violence had been committed with the requirement that "a finding pursuant to subsection (e) that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of ... the community shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence." See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Appellant also maintains that the court did not make specific findings concerning what it believed to constitute clear and convincing evidence.