Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103308/butz-vs-glover-livestock-commission-co-inc
Timestamp: 2017-06-28 20:40:08
Document Index: 8535973

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 181', '§ 307', '§ 208', '§ 401', '§ 221', '§ 303', '§ 203', '§ 30', '§ 204', '§ 706']

Butz Vs Glover Livestock Commission Co Inc - Citation 103308 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Butz Vs. Glover Livestock Commission Co., Inc. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/103308CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-28-1973Case Number411 U.S. 182AppellantButzRespondentGlover Livestock Commission Co., Inc.Excerpt:.....in the magnificent mansion of the law. the
very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the law -- the law as it is found in the statute at hand, the statute book at large, the principles and conceptions of the 'common law,' and the ultimate guarantees associated with the constitution. [
the reversal today of a wholly defensible court of appeals judgment accomplishes two unfortunate results. first, the court moves administrative decisionmaking one step closer to unreviewability, an odd result at a time when serious concern is being expressed about the fairness of agency justice. [
] second, the..... Judgment:
Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., Inc. - 411 U.S. 182 (1973)
In setting aside the suspension order, the Court of Appeals exceeded the scope of proper judicial review of administrative sanctions, since the Secretary had full authority to make the suspension order as a deterrent to violations, whether intentional or negligent, and issuance of the order against respondent, who had ignored previous warnings against short-weighting, was not an abuse of administrative discretion. Pp. 185-189.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J., joined,
The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture, acting for the Secretary of Agriculture, found that respondent, a registrant under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U.S.C. § 181
willfully violated §§ 307(a) and 312(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 208(a) and 213(a), by incorrect weighing of livestock, and also breached § 401, 7 U.S.C. § 221, by entries of false weights. An order was entered directing that respondent cease and desist from the violations and keep correct accounts, and also suspending respondent as a registrant under the Act for 20 days. Upon review of the decision and order, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld, as supported by substantial evidence, the findings that respondent violated the Act by short-weighting cattle, and also sustained the cease and desist order and the order to keep correct accounts. The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the 20-day suspension. 454 F.2d 109 (1972). We granted certiorari to consider whether, in doing so, the Court of Appeals exceeded the scope of proper judicial review of administrative sanctions. 409 U.S. 947 (1972). We conclude that the setting aside of the suspension was an impermissible judicial intrusion into the administrative domain under the circumstances of this case, and reverse.
Respondent operates a stockyard in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. As a registered "market agency" under § 303 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 203, respondent is authorized to sell consigned livestock on commission, subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act and the Secretary's implementing regulations. [
] Investigations of respondent's operations
"intentionally weighed the livestock at less than their true weights, issued scale tickets and accountings to the consignors on the basis of the false weights, and paid the consignors on the basis of the false weights. [
454 F.2d at 115. The court nevertheless concluded that the suspension order was "unconscionable" under the circumstances of this case. The court gave two reasons. The first, relying on four previous suspension decisions, was that the Secretary's practice was not to impose suspensions for negligent or careless violations, but only for violations found to be "intentional and flagrant," and therefore that the suspension in respondent's case was contrary to a policy of "
achiev[ing] . . . uniformity of sanctions for similar violations.'" The second reason given was that
at 114, 115.
American Power Co. v. SEC,
(1946). Thus, the Secretary's choice of sanction was not to be overturned unless the Court of Appeals might find it "unwarranted
in law or . . . without justification in fact,. . . ."
Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC,
365 U. S. 413
-414 (1958);
387 U. S. 244
387 U. S. 250
(1967); 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 30.10, pp. 250-251 (1958). The Court of Appeals acknowledged this definition of the permissible scope of judicial review, [
] but apparently regarded respondent's suspension as "unwarranted in law" or "without justification in fact." We cannot agree that the Secretary's action can be faulted in either respect on this record. We read the Court of Appeals' opinion to suggest that the sanction was "unwarranted in law" because "uniformity of sanctions for similar violations" is somehow mandated by the Act. We search in vain for that requirement in the statute. [
] The Secretary may suspend
"for a reasonable specified period" any registrant who has violated any provision of the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 204. Nothing whatever in that provision confines its application to cases of "intentional and flagrant conduct" or denies its application in cases of negligent or careless violations. Rather, the breadth of the grant of authority to impose the sanction strongly implies a congressional purpose to permit the Secretary to impose it to deter repeated violations of the Act, whether intentional or negligent.
Hyatt v. United States,
276 F.2d 308, 313 (CA10 1960);
G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States,
260 F.2d 286 (CA7 1958);
In re Silver,
21 Agri.Dec. 1438, 1452 (1962). [
] The employment of a sanction within the authority of an administrative agency is thus not rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases.
329 U. S. 227
-228 (1946);
, 251;
G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, supra,
at 296;
Hiller v. SEC,
429 F.2d 856, 858-859 (CA2 1970);
Dlugash v. SEC,
373 F.2d 107, 110 (CA2 1967);
Kent v. Hardin,
425 F.2d 1346, 1349 (CA5 1970).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals may have been in error in acting on the premise that the Secretary's practice was to impose suspensions only in cases of "intentional and flagrant conduct." [
] The Secretary's practice, rather, apparently is to employ that sanction as, in his judgment,
Nor can we perceive any basis on this record for a conclusion that the suspension of respondent was so "without justification in fact . . . as to constitute an abuse of [the Secretary's] discretion."
329 U. S. 11
347 U. S. 455
Secretary, not the court. The court may decide only whether, under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the Secretary made "an allowable judgment in [his] choice of the remedy."
The Court of Appeals cited a 1962 decision by the Secretary in which appears a reference to "uniformity of sanctions for similar violations."
21 Agri.Dec. 1438 (1962). That reference is no support for the Court of Appeals' decision, however, for the Secretary said expressly in that decision: "False and incorrect weighing of livestock by registrants under the act is a flagrant and serious violation thereof . . ." and,
"even if respondent did not give instructions for the false weighings,
his negligence in allowing the false weighings over an extended period brings such situation within the reach of the cited cases
[sustaining sanctions],
and we would still order the sanctions below.
at 1452 (emphasis added).
It is by no means clear that respondent's violations were merely negligent. The hearing examiner found that respondent had "intentionally" underweighed livestock, and the Judicial Officer stated: "We conclude then, as did the hearing examiner, that respondent
violated . . . the act." (Emphasis added.) "Wilfully" could refer to either intentional conduct or conduct that was merely careless or negligent. It seems clear, however, that the Judicial Officer sustained the hearing examiner's finding that the violations were "intentional."
See, e.g., In re Martella,
30 Agri.Dec. 1479 (1971);
In re Meggs,
30 Agri.Dec. 1314 (1971);
In re Producers Livestock Marketing Assn.,
30 Agri.Dec. 796 (1971);
In re Trimble,
29 Agri.Dec. 936 (1970);
In re Anson,
28 Agri.Dec. 1127 (1969);
In re Williamstown Stockyards,
27 Agri.Dec. 252 (1968);
In re Middle Georgia Livestock Sales Co.,
23 Agri.Dec. 1361 (1964). These cases involve suspension of registrants under the Packers and Stockyards Act for false weighing of producers' livestock, and in none was there a finding that the violation was intentional or flagrant. There are also many cases of suspension for diverse other violations without a finding that the conduct was intentional or flagrant.
See, e.g., In re Wallis,
29 Agri.Dec. 37 (1970).
Had the Court of Appeals used the talismanic language of the Administrative Procedure Act, and found the penalty to be either "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), I have no doubt that certiorari would have been denied. But the Court of Appeals made the mistake of using the wrong words, saying that the penalty was "unconscionable," because it was "unwarranted and without justification in fact." [
] Second, the Court serves notice upon the federal judiciary to be wary indeed of venturing to correct administrative arbitrariness.
The Court of Appeals borrowed this phrasing of the test from this Court's opinion in
K. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969), reviewed by Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 Yale L.J. 575.