Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/682/377/278342/
Timestamp: 2020-04-08 22:07:16
Document Index: 801239112

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 183', '§ 213', '§ 323', '§ 1292', '§ 188', '§ 323']

Cti-container Leasing Corporation, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Oceanic Operations Corporation, Defendant-appellant, 682 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1982) :: Justia
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Cti-container Leasing Corporation, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Oceanic Operations Corporation, Defendant-appellant, 682 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1982)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 682 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1982) Argued March 17, 1982. Decided June 28, 1982
The precise categorization of the contracts that warrant invocation of the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction has proven particularly elusive. "The boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts-as opposed to torts or crimes-being conceptual rather than spatial, have always been difficult to draw." Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S. Ct. 886, 890, 6 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1961). If the contract is a "maritime contract," it is within the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction. See id. Traditional texts have defined a "maritime" contract as one that, for example, "relat(es) to a ship in its use as such, or to commerce or to navigation on navigable waters, or to transportation by sea or to maritime employment," 1 E. Benedict, Benedict on Admiralty § 183, 11-6 (7th ed. 1981), or as one "for the furnishing of services, supplies or facilities to vessels ... in maritime commerce or navigation." 7A J. Moore Federal Practice P .230(3), at 2773 (2d ed. 1948) (emphasis omitted). See also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., supra, 365 U.S. at 736, 81 S. Ct. at 890 (" 'The only question is whether the transaction relates to ships and vessels, masters and mariners, as the agents of commerce....' ") (quoting 1 E. Benedict, The Law of American Admiralty 131 (6th ed. 1940)).
The definitions have proved easier to state than to apply, as seemingly incompatible results abound.4 In general we seek guidance from rulings in like or analogous situations in order to arrive at a reasoned decision in the circumstances at hand. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., supra, 365 U.S. at 735, 81 S. Ct. at 890 ("Precedent and usage are helpful insofar as they exclude or include certain common types of contract....").
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 270, 97 S. Ct. 2348, 2360, 53 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1977) (footnote omitted). Consequently, in a variety of contexts, the container has been characterized as "a modern substitute for the hold of the vessel," id., and as " 'functionally a part of the ship,' " Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 443, 99 S. Ct. 1813, 1818, 60 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1979) (quoting Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 815 (2d Cir. 1971)).5
Given the function of the container and the growing dependence of the maritime industry on containerization, a shipowner's lease of containers has been held a maritime contract, Integrated Container Service, Inc. v. Starlines Container Shipping, Ltd., 476 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), much as other agreements for the acquisition of ship equipment have been viewed as maritime contracts, e.g., Radiomarine Corp. v. Gulf Northern Co., 394 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (radio and radar systems); Houston-New Orleans, Inc. v. Page Engineering Co., 353 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. La. 1972) (control panel for crane mounted on ship). We concur in the view that a lease of cargo containers for use on a ship is a maritime contract.
Finally, we note that Oceanic has sought to escape liability in this action on the ground that it disclosed in the lease negotiations that the real lessee of the containers was to be Oceanic's principal, Ocean Transport, a commercial shipowner. While any such oral disclosures by Oceanic are not admissible to relieve it from liability on the lease, see part B, infra, we are not required to close our eyes to the light shed by Oceanic's statements on the nature of the contract. Oceanic correctly concedes that a lease of the containers directly to Ocean Transport would have been a maritime contract. See Integrated Container Service, Inc. v. Starlines Container Shipping, Ltd., supra. We see no basis in logic to conclude that the present lease was not a maritime contract merely because Ocean Transport chose to acquire the containers through an agent. Accord, Maryland Port Administration v. SS American Legend, 453 F. Supp. 584, 589-90 (D. Md. 1978).
The general rule is that the terms of an unambiguous, integrated contract may not be varied by parol evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1979). As this principle is applied to the question whether a person who has signed a contract may escape liability for its breach on the ground that he was acting solely as an agent, the general corollary is that "(i)f the fact of agency does not appear in an integrated contract, an agent who appears as a party thereto can not introduce extrinsic evidence to show that he is not a party...."7 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 323(3) (1957). New York law, which the lease specified was to be controlling, conforms to these general rules.8 See, e.g., Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 161, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (1957) ("The parol evidence rule forbids proof of extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument...."); Meyer v. Redmond, 205 N.Y. 478, 98 N.E. 906, 908 (1912) ("Even where (the agent) discloses the name of his principal, if he signs a written contract in his own name merely, which contract does not upon its face show that he was acting as the agent of another, ... he will be personally bound thereby.") (quoting, with emphasis, Magee v. Atkinson, 2 Mees. & Wels. R. 440); see also John Minder & Son v. L. D. Schreiber Co., 73 F. Supp. 477, 480-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (discussing New York law).
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (3) (1976) permits appellate review of interlocutory orders that determine the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty suits in which appeals from final decrees are allowed
For example, it is well established that a contract to build a ship is not maritime, The People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393, 15 L. Ed. 961 (1857), while a contract to repair a ship is, New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96, 42 S. Ct. 243, 66 L. Ed. 482 (1922); 1 E. Benedict, supra, §§ 188, 189, 11-34-11-40. A "general agency" agreement is outside admiralty jurisdiction, P. D. Marchessini & Co. v. Pacific Marine Corp., 227 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), while a contract for managing a ship is within it, Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1961). A contract to procure a policy of marine insurance is nonmaritime, F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. W.E. Hedger Co., 48 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 858, 51 S. Ct. 651, 75 L. Ed. 1464 (1931), while a contract for marine insurance is maritime. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 348 U.S. 310, 75 S. Ct. 368, 99 L. Ed. 337 (1955). A contract to purchase a vessel is outside admiralty jurisdiction, Economou v. Bates, 222 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), while a contract to charter or hire a vessel is within it, Fisser v. International Bank, 175 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
There are limited exceptions to the general rule that are not applicable here. See id. §§ 323(3) (a), (b)