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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5861', '§ 5861', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 3162', '§ 3163', '§ 3162', '§ 3162', '§ 3174', '§ 701', '§ 713', '§ 5861', '§ 5871', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 3500']

| United States v. Kimberlin
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,v.BRETT C. KIMBERLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, No. IP 79-7-CR -- William E. Steckler, District Judge.
In Counts 1 through 8, each corresponding to one of the explosions, defendant was charged with possession of a firearm (destructive device) not registered to him, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). In Counts 9 through 16, he was charged with manufacture of a firearm in violation of Chapter 53 and § 5861(f) of 26 U.S.C. In three counts (17, 18, and 22), he was charged with maliciously damaging by explosive the property of an entity receiving federal financial assistance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), and in three counts (19, 20, and 21) with so damaging property at a business used in and affecting interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). In Count 22, it was also charged that personal injury resulted, augmenting the maximum penalty prescribed by § 844(f).*fn1
The first 22 counts were originally tried in September, 1980, with all other counts. At that first trial, the jury acquitted on Count 25, convicted on Counts 26 through 34, but could not agree on a verdict on Counts 1 through 24. The second trial (in May, 1981) was confined to Counts 23 and 24, and resulted in conviction. The convictions and sentences at these trials were, for the most part, affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F.2d 1247, 1249 (7th Cir. 1985).*fn2 The third trial, August 17 to October 15, 1981, was a retrial of the first 22 counts. This trial is the subject of Appeal No. 82-1025.
A motion to suppress the testimony of these witnesses was heard and denied before trial. There was testimony by the two hypnotists involved, by knowledge experts concerning the dangers of hypnosis, and by special agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) who had been involved in the process. Tape recordings of the hypnotic sessions were placed in evidence, along with transcripts thereof and statements of the witnesses, taken in two instances before the hypnotic session.
Judge Steckler decided to permit the jury to hear the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses, with cautionary instructions. The form of the instruction given each time a hypnotized witness testified, was agreed upon by counsel. It told the jury not to attach greater weight or significance to testimony of other witnesses, and that the jury may judge what effect, if any, the process of hypnosis had upon the witness' memory and ability to recall.
Defense counsel had stated: "We have selected two tapes that we would like for the Court to hear and one is a hypnotic session with Mr. Carr and the other is hypnotic session with Mr. Rogers and we would request these be heard as merely illustrative of what the hypnotic sessions were like." The judge listened to these two tapes.
While those guidelines [previously referred to as recommended by the Tenth Circuit] did not obtain in the case here at bar I feel there was not such an abuse by suggestive questions in the interrogation of the subjects under hypnosis that their recall would be so contaminated that a jury should be precluded from hearing their post hypnotic trance recall or testimony.
Later, during argument of counsel, he said:
Now, what I have heard leads me to conclude that there was no abusive suggested interrogation.
A leading case was Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949, 89 S. Ct. 2030, 23 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1969).*fn3 The weight of the evidence was a question for the trier of fact. This view retained vitality after 1981. See, e.g., Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 473 (Ind. 1982); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Wyo. 1982); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 575, 329 N.W.2d 386, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1304, 103 S. Ct. 2125 (1983); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983).
Attention had, however, been directed in academic writings to real dangers that the process of hypnosis may cause a witness to give testimony he believes to represent his true recollection, but in fact does not. In 1968 in response to the Harding decision, the United States Department of Justice instructed United States Attorneys "that before using hypnosis on any witness, the United States Attorney must obtain the written authorization of the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division." FBI employees were instructed to take no part in such interrogation without a specific grant of authority. By 1979, the FBI issued a memorandum not only requiring advance authorization, but stating "you should consider utilizing only a psychiatrist, psychologist, physician, or dentist who is qualified as a hypnotist. . . . It is important that you either audio or video tape the entire session. . . . Video tape, however, is the preferred method of recording these sessions." On December 14, 1979, ATF, after internal discussions over several years, adopted procedural guidelines. The requirements include: a licensed mental health professional as hypnotist, advance headquarters approval, tape or video recording, questions that are not leading, and precaution to avoid suggestive comments.
Several dangers are associated with hypnosis. One is hyper-suggestiveness. It makes hypnosis subjects susceptible to suggestion. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis as a Prospective Witness, 68 Cal. L. R. 313, 314, 316, 333 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Diamond). Suggestions may deliberately or unwittingly come from the hypnotist or his attitude, demeanor, expectations, tone of voice and body language as well as the context and purpose of the hypnotic sessions. Id. at 333. Th hypnotist cannot avoid implanting suggestions.
Another inherent danger is hyper-compliance. It creates two goals for hypnosis subjects, the desire to succeed in being hypnotized and to please the hypnotist. See e.g., Brave v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 83 (Fla. App. 1983); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860, 74 L. Ed. 2d 114, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
Confabulation is also a problem associated with hypnosis. Confabulation has been defined as "fill[ing] in those aspects which the individual cannot remember in an effort to comply with the suggestions of the hypnotist." Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 311, 319 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Orne). Confabulation causes occasional memory distortion, sheer fantasy and willful lies or a mixture of fact and fantasy. Orne at 317-319.
Two more problems arise after the hypnosis session and stem directly from the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony in court. Studies show that jurors tend to perceive hypnosis as an infallible method of discovering the truth, when it is not. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1977); Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 Va. L. R. 1203, 1208-09, 1222 (1977).
occurs when something learned under hypnosis is carried into the weakened state but the fact that the memory or thought was learned under hypnosis is forgotten. . . . A subject who has lost the memory of the source of his learned information will assume that the memory is spontaneous to his own experience. Such a belief can be unshakable, last a lifetime, and be immune to all cross-examination. It is especially prone to "freeze" it if is compatible with the subject's prior prejudices, beliefs, or desires.
a. In 1982 the Supreme Court of California held "the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the purpose of restoring his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible as to all matters relating to those events, from the time of the hypnotic session forward." People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804.
d. Courts in a fourth group decline a per se rule of inadmissibility and mandatory standards for the hypnotic sessions, but, after scrutiny of the circumstances, make a judgment concerning the reliability and impact of the testimony in question. E.g., Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046, 89 L. Ed. 2d 572, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986); Armstrong, supra; United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984). In Valdez, the Fifth Circuit applied, at least in part, the test of Rule 403, FED. R. EVID., whether probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and the test of Rule 103(a), whether the admission of challenged evidence has affected a substantial right of the party. 722 F.2d at 1203, 1204.
We recognize that adherence to such standards would be prophylactic against the dangers of the use of hypnosis, and would aid the courts in making determinations concerning the reliability of the testimony of persons who had been under hypnosis. Investigating agencies may be well advised to follow them. We decline, however, to adopt them in this decision as standards which must universally be met before a witness who has been hypnotized can be accepted as competent.
There were eight explosions: Nos. 1, 2 and 3 occurred September 1, 1978 at 9:49 PM, 10:05 PM, and 10:35 PM,; No. 4 took place at 1:50 AM, September 2. Thus four occurred during the night of September 1-2. Number 5 occurred at 12:15 AM, September 3; No. 6 at 9:50 PM, September 3; No. 7 at 9:45 PM, September 5; and No. 8 at 8:15 PM, September 6.
Defendant had been engaged in construction on his land in rural Jackson County, Indiana, and engaged an architect for that work. Certain blasting was decided upon. On May 14, 1975, defendant was present when the architect purchased 86 sticks of Tovex 200 and 50 blasting caps with leg wires. Between 13 and 22 sticks of Tovex were used on defendant's project. Confer, one of defendant's business associates, testified that in July, August, or September, 1975 defendant warned Confer about two cardboard boxes of explosives in the trunk. He said these were some the architect had purchased for him and that the caps were in the cab. There was testimony by persons who worked on defendant's land that they observed no use of explosives on the property after the initial blasting.
There was testimony that monomethylamine nitrate (MMAN) is found in DuPont Tovex and Tovan, and those are the only products containing it. Trace of MMAN were found in swabbings taken from defendant's Mercedes automobile in December, 1978 and from a blue over white Chevrolet Impala searched September 21 and used by defendant from about September 13 to 20. Although it is possible for MMAN to exist in natural materials, there was expert testimony that its concentration would be too low from detection.
Patricia Strait is the sister of Sandra Barton, defendant's friend and one of his alibi witnesses. She lives a short distances from Austin, Texas. On March 10, 1979, Patricia was working in her yard and pulled out from under a tree three DuPont blasting caps and 14 sticks of Tovex 200. There was evidence that defendant had been in the general vicinity during the period from September to December, 1978. Although there had been an attempt to obliterate the date shift code on that Tovex, ATF analysts testified that it was the same as that on the Tovex purchased May 14, 1975.
Examination of the explosion sites also revealed a Mark Time timer of Nos. 6 and 8, and timer parts consistent with 60 minute Mark Time or Micronta timers at Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7. The Mark Time and Micronta timers are made by the same company and apparently differ only in name. Graham Electronics, a distributor of Mark Time timers, had three stores in Marion County where Speedway (as well as Indianapolis) is located. Records showed sales of 16 timers from May 3, 1978 through September 9, 1978. They showed a sale of six on August 23, which a customer had ordered August 21; three on September 2, and five on September 5.
We now turn to the testimony of the six who had been subjected to hypnosis.
My name is Tracy Carr; I am 21 years of age and reside at the above address. I am currently working for the Broad Ripple Sports Shop, 1015 E. Westfield Blvd., as a sales clerk and I have worked in this capacity for the past seven months. On or about August 10, 1978, to the best of my memory, I was working at the sport shop and did sell approximately twelve boxes of .445 caliber lead balls to one certain customer. These lead balls were packages in white rectangular cardboard boxes that were sealed by tape and bore the caliber size on the side of the box.
This transaction took place about 11:00 AM. The customer entered the store alone. He was about 5'5" or 5'6" tall and wore blue jeans and a light blue t-shirt with graffiti. This person had sparse hair on his cheeks as if he was starting to grow a beard. The hair on his chin was longer and appeared to be a goatee.
Mr. Palmer showed me a series of seven photographs bearing the picture of men with beards. I reviewed these pictures and chose #6 as being the person who I might've sold the lead balls to. I was then shown a black and white mug shot that I recognized as being the same person who was shown in picture #6, without the beard. After viewing the mug shot photo, I am satisfied that this person is the same customer to whom I sold the lead balls.
This transaction did strike me as being unusual at the time I made the sale due to the large quantity of lead balls he bought. On the day of this transaction the customer came in alone and went directly to the gun cabinet area. He asked me if I had any lead balls. I showed him a bag of .451 caliber and also the boxes of .445 caliber. He said the .451 caliber balls would not work.
Carr was the subject of hypnosis on October 21, 1978. Brooke Appleby, a detective with the Indiana State Police, was the hypnotist. He was familiar with Carr's September 26 statement and testified that he "didn't consider the session with Mr. Carr productive at all, there was nothing, no new information gained whatsoever." The transcript of the hypnotic identification of defendant's photograph preceded the hypnotic session.
At trial, Carr identified defendant as the person who bought the lead balls on August 10, 1978 and identified three boxes as part of that sale. These boxes had been found in the search of the trunk of the Impala September 21, and one of the boxes bore a tag with the price and the name of the sports shop on it. We are convinced that the experience of hypnosis did not impair the liability of Carr's testimony, and have no hesitancy in counting it as part of the strong circumstantial case made by the evidence already referred to.
On or about September 5, 1978, while so employed he had occasion to repair a vacuum line and perform normal maintenance on a 1976 Ivory colored Mercedes . . . owned by Brett Coleman Kimberlin.
While working in the trunk area Jones noticed 2 white boxes, approx. 3" x 4" x 2" containing ".445 cal Mini Balls." The white boxes had the above info which appeared to have been printed with blue or red ink and a hand stamp. Jones could not remember the store of manufacturers name.
In a hearing in the absence of the jury, Mrs. Jones related conversations with her husband. The evening after he had worked on defendant's car, he told her of working on it and finding "articles in the trunk that he found rather strange." The evening they saw a picture of defendant on TV, relating to his arrest, she testified that, "He told me that he had seen lead shot, a box of tools, a pamphlet discussing the use of explosives and some batteries in the trunk of Mr. Kimberlin's car. . . ." Both conversations preceded the hypnotic session.
Jones was the subject of hypnosis November 1, 1978. The transcript of the session shows his references to details not indicated in the report of the September 29 interview, or the conversation with his wife. Examples were: the dimensions of the battery, and that it was new, a Ray-O-Vac and had a $3.29 price tag on it; the name DuPont and some of the subject matter of the document on explosives; his spilling the lead balls and then picking them up; price tags on the boxes, with sixes and nines, and printing. He also described other contents which bear no apparent relevance to this case. Judge Steckler found "that the manner and method of conducting the hypnotic interview was not suggestive of the answers give by the witness." We have reviewed the transcript, and the finding was not clearly erroneous.
The other four witnesses who were subjected to hypnosis were employees at stores of Graham Electronics. Business records showed that Bruce Quillin took an order for six Mark Time timers from a Charles Martin on August 21, 1978; Peter Laux delivered the timers when Martin came in August 23; David Rogers sold three to a "Thomas" September 2; and Daniel Huffman sold five September 5. They were interviewed early in the investigation of the bombings, September 9 and 10. Each was placed under hypnosis September 11. Each gave a description of the customer in the transaction in which each case was involved. The descriptions were not identical, but generally similar. Quillin, Laux, and Rogers recalled a light, or new beard. Quillin recalled his customer asking whether the timer could be converted to complete rather than break a circuit, and Quillin showed him how this could be done. The witnesses made efforts to complete a sketch of the individual, but these are not in the record.
Bearing in mind the strength of the proof other than the testimony of these six hypnotized witnesses, the lack of any effect of hypnosis on Carr and the importance of his testimony, doubt that the recall of the Graham employees was significantly enhanced by hypnosis, the significant testimony given by Jones consistent with his pre-hypnosis statements, as well as the probability that the jury verdict would have been the same if Jones' testimony had been limited to his pre-hypnosis recall, and that of the Graham employees had been omitted, we are satisfied that the admission of the testimony of these six witnesses affected no substantial right of defendant. FED. R. EVID. 103(a).*fn4
In our opinion, the record and the voir dire do not reveal the kind of 'wave of public passion' that would have made a fair trial unlikely. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032-33, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984). See also United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954, 100 S. Ct. 2923, 64 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1980).
Before the first (1980) trial, a motion for change of venue had been denied. Conviction resulted on Counts 26-34, relating to unauthorized possession and use of an official insignia and impersonation of a federal officer or employee. In an unpublished order, this court affirmed, holding the denial of a change of venue was not error. United States v. Kimberlin, No. 80-2634, December 21, 1981, listed at 673 F.2d 1335.
At the second trial, beginning May 18, 1981, the court refused defendant's request for sequestration of the jury. Defendant was convicted of two counts of receipt of an explosive by a convicted felon. This court affirmed, again by unpublished order, holding the refusal to sequester was not an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kimberlin, No. 81-1993, October 20, 1982, listed at 692 F.2d 760.
A sufficient answer is that this proposition was not raised prior to trial as required by Rule 12(b)(2), FED. R. CRIM. P., and was thus waived, Rule 12(f).
Defendant alleges that he was not brought to trial within the time limits prescribed in the Speedy Trial Act, and seeks dismissal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Although the government asserts that the Speedy Trial Act excludes adequate segments of the delays which occurred, we need not perform the analysis. The indictment was returned February 28, 1979, and under § 3163(c), § 3162 does not apply to indictments filed before July 1, 1980. There is no claim of an earlier implementation of § 3162 in the Southern District of Indiana under 18 U.S.C. § 3174(c).
Defendant also asserts a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, measured under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972). That decision calls for "a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Id. at 533. Four factors were identified, though not an exhaustive list: "length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 530 (footnote omitted).
until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. [Footnote omitted.] To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
407 U.S. at 530-31. This court has found presumptive prejudice in a nineteen month delay (attempted bank robbery), United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911, 93 S. Ct. 974 35 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1973), and in a one year delay (assaulting a postal employee), United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 1976). Although those cases are distinguishable because they were far simpler than this one, we shall assume the nineteen month delay before the first trial and the ten month delay before the retrial are presumptively prejudicial, and weigh the other factors.
Defendant remained incarcerated in Texas because he was unable to post bond set in Indiana. He asserts prejudice in the discomforts and inconvenience of incarceration, and impairment of ability to contact his Indiana attorneys. He does not claim the loss of a witness or similar specific prejudice during the period before the first trial.
In summary, we conclude, balancing the factors described, that neither the delay occurring before the first trial, not the delay between trials, was a denial of defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights.
The witness had referred to a beard, terming it light, new, beginning, or sparse. They had observed their customer at various dates, from August 10 to September 2. The picture of defendant, taken after September 11, and before September 19, showed a beard, and the agents obtained pictures of six other young white men, with beards.
Defendant's picture had been taken with a telephoto lens, and enlarged. Although there was testimony that it appeared grainier than the others, our own examination shows little difference, except that an object in the background of the picture is not clear. Any difference does not appear to us to convey the suggestion that defendant's photograph must be of the person believed by the agents to be the customer. Cf. United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 198 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872, 54 L. Ed. 2d 151, 98 S. Ct. 217 (1977).
Although very little of the individual's clothing appeared on any picture, defendant's showed enough to indicate his shirt was a T-shirt. The other shirts appeared to have some type of attached collar. Witnesses Rogers, Quillin, and Carr had said the customer had worn a blue jean shirt or jacket.
We do not find the procedure so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972), adapting the standard expressed in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 88 S. Ct. 967 (1968).
Defendant challenges the validity of two search warrants authorizing search of the Impala. He had made pre-trial motions to suppress. He was arrested by an FBI agent the afternoon of September 20 for impersonating a federal officer and misuse of the seal of the President. On the morning of the 21st, FBI Agent Lucas obtained the first warrant. The magistrate found probable cause to believe that official badges, identification cards, and other insignia of the design prescribed by the Department of Defense and facsimilies of the Seal of the President, possessed and used in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 701 and § 713, were being concealed in an Impala. During the day the ATF agents who knew that defendant was a suspect in the bombings and the FBI agents involved in his arrest on the insignia charges became aware of each other's interest. ATF agents were present when the search was made. ATF Agent Donovan observed timers, lead shot, and a six-volt battery, among other things, in the trunk of the Impala. He then obtained the second warrant to search the car, and the search was made the evening of the 21st.
Concededly, Agent Lucas did not claim that anyone had observed badges, identification cards, insignia, or facsimilies within the Impala. The documents he had seen in defendant's possession had been in the print shop since the day before. Under the circumstances, however, it seems reasonable to believe that similar badges and documents and related items had been left inside the automobile. We think the magistrate could reasonably find probable cause.
"In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949), quoted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
In any event, the officers relied on the warrant, and if there be any gap between Agent Lucas' observations of defendant's possession of insignia and the like in the print shop, and the presence of similar items in the automobile, we think reliance was objectively reasonable. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
We think it clear that when an officer has probable cause to search a vehicle, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to prevent removal while obtaining a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 811, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984).
The facts of this case are substantially different. Here Judge Steckler found that "the first warrant was not obtained . . . on the pretext to conduct an unlawful search and seizure of the timers and other evidence that was ultimately obtained through issuance of the second search warrant." Although the offenses indicated in the first warrant were only misdemeanors, they were not trivial, and the FBI had a legitimate interest in pursuing them. The search did yield materials relevant to these offenses. Although the original arrest charges were soon dismissed, they were included in the indictment five months later.
He asserts that the evidence at the first trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict of guilty. Relying on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978), he contends that retrial resulted in second jeopardy and was therefore barred.
More recent decisions, distinguishing Burks, make it plain that "a trial court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy to which petitioner was subjected. . . . Regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at petitioner's first trial, he has no valid double jeopardy claim to prevent his retrial." Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S. Ct. 3081, 3086, 82 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1984), quoting at page 3085 Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 80 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1984) (footnote omitted).
Richardson established that retrial after a trial at which the jury could not agree was a continuation of original jeopardy, and we see no theory under which strenghthening the case at the second trial changes that proposition.
The government expected the jury to infer from defendant's possession of the car in Ohio and later in Indiana, the purchase of the ammunition in Ohio and its later presence in Indiana, that defendant, or someone acting for him, had drive the car from Ohio to Indiana, and that defendant knew the ammunition was in the car.
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970) the Supreme Court decided that the federal rule of collateral estoppel is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guaranty against double jeopardy. The Court defined the rule as "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. at 443.*fn5
Although the Court used the phrase "issue of ultimate fact" in its definition, it stated the test to be applied to the full record of the earlier case, as "whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration." It has been phrased elsewhere as whether the particular fact was necessarily determined against the government on the first trial. United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1961). See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 580, 92 L. Ed. 180, 68 S. Ct. 237 (1948) ("necessarily adjudicated"); United States v. Whitaker, 702 F.2d 901, 903 (11th Cir. 1983) ("necessarily established"); United States v. Mock, 604 F.2d 341, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 336, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356, 77 S. Ct. 1064 (1957) has said that the collateral estoppel doctrine "makes conclusive in subsequent estoppel doctrine "makes conclusive in subsequent proceedings only determinations of facts, and mixed fact and law, that were essential to the decision."
In speaking on this subject, this court has used the term "issue of ultimate fact." United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit has noted a division of opinion whether collateral estoppel bars only the relitigation of ultimate facts or evidentiary facts as well. United States v. Riley, 684 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111, 74 L. Ed. 2d 962, 103 S. Ct. 742 (1982). It seems to us that however the issue be classified, the critical question is whether it can be said with assurance that the fact was necessarily established by the judgment at the earlier trial.
Clearly defendant's possession or use of the automobile in Ohio or Indiana was not an "ultimate fact" in the ordinary sense at the trial of Count 25. It cannot be said, either, that the acquittal necessarily determined that he did not have possession in Ohio, or in Indiana, or have it from one to the other. The jury may simply have been unwilling to draw the inference that it was defendant who purchased the ammunition in Ohio, or obtained it from the buyer, or at least knew that the ammunition was in the car during the interstate trip.
Severance did not preclude the use of the purchase of explosives at the trial on Counts 1 through 22. We reject the argument that such proof was irrelevant on those counts, and that is probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Some of the arguments by both counsel have dealt with Rule 404(b), FED. R. EVID., "Other crimes, wrongs, or acts." Although that Rule prohibits use of other crimes evidence "to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith," the rule permits use for other purposes. The relevance of the evidence with which we are concerned (to prove defendant's access to the trunk) does not fit into any of the matters listed as other purposes, but the list is not exclusive, and the purpose for which the evidence was used here was entirely proper.
Coleman testified that no government agent had shown him a picture of defendant. He had seen defendant's picture on television at the time of his arrest and later. We do not agree that that type of observation triggers a due process right to judicial evaluation of the reliability of the in-court identification under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972).
Defendant now argues that the court should have given a greater portion of the instruction on identification recommended in United States v. Telfaire, 152 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This claim was waived by failure to object.
In a sense, it was fortuitous that the convictions on Counts 26 through 34 had occurred before the defendant testified concerning Counts 1 through 22 at retrial. Nevertheless we are aware of no principle which prevented their use as impeachment. Defendant cites only United States v. Burkhead, 646 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898, 70 L. Ed. 2d 214, 102 S. Ct. 399 (1981), but the circumstances were different, and the type of unfairness perceived by the court in that case did not exist in this one.
On cross-examination of defendant, the government inquired concerning his possession or involvement with a number of weapons. In part he admitted and explained and in part he denied possession or involvement. Insofar as credibility was the only consideration, defendant is correct in saying that his answers could not be disproved by extrinsic evidence. Rule 608, FED. R. EVID. On rebuttal, however, the government offered evidence concerning his possession of weapons.
Scott Bixler was a co-defendant with defendant Kimberlin in the Texas marijuana case. In rebuttal he testified that in the summer of 1978 he purchased seven AR-15 rifles at $300 each. Defendant Kimberlin supplied the money, and Bixler turned six of the rifles over to him. Days before, Bixler had purchased a shot gun for defendant Kimberlin. This testimony came in without objection. There was testimony that an AR-15 was found at the Patricia Strait residence in Texas, along with apparent bomb components, and that the serial number on the rifle was scratched through. This evidence came in without objection.
This court has stated, however, that "when the crime charged requires proof of specific intent, we have held that, because it is a material element to be proved by the government, it is necessarily in issue and the government may submit evidence of other acts in an attempt to establish the matter in its case-in-chief, assuming the other requirements of Rule 404(b) and 403 are satisfied." United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
For example, the defendant and other witnesses repeatedly described his regular and frequent periods of transcendental meditation. His alibi for one explosion starts out with his taking the teenage daughter and niece of friends on a shopping trip and to dinner. While at dinner there was an incident in which a young employee of the restaurant who had dropped a tray of dishes. Another alibi witness described the warmth of defendant's response to the witness' three-year-old daughter.
Although some of these instances were integral parts of alibi testimony, some were not. Taken together, they clearly suggest the inference that defendant was not likely to have the intent, general or specific, to carry out the bombings. In these circumstances, it seems fair that the government be able to rebut by proof that defendant possessed many firearms, including a pistol with a silencer. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735, 737 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907, 68 L. Ed. 2d 295, 101 S. Ct. 1974 (1981).
c. One prong of the defense was repeatedly to suggest the suspicion that Scott Bixler was really the bomber, and was responsible for the components found in the trunk of the Impala. The defense included testimony that defendant's deceased brother, Scott Kimberlin, and Scott Bixler were very close friends; that Scott Kimberlin had possession of the Tovex after May, 1975, and was "flaky" and "irresponsible"; that Scott Bixler had been overheard making a statement to Scott Kimberlin which sounded like an expression of regret for the personal injury which occurred in one of the explosions. Defendant testified that he had borrowed the Impala in Dayton about September 15th or 16th; he got it from a friend of Scott Kimberlin's, by arrangement with Scott and that he had turned it over to Scott Bixler about two days before defendant was arrested September 20.*fn6
During the government's case-in-chief, the defense, while cross-examining an ATF agent, had introduced documentary evidence showing that Bixler had purchased the seven AR-15 rifles. The defense also brought out that this rifle uses .223 caliber ammunition and that .233 ammunition had been found in the Impala. Bixler's testimony was an explanation of the transaction the defense had proved.
The appropriate test is whether "the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." (Citation omitted.) "To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87, 95 L. Ed. 1118, 71 S. Ct. 814 (1951); Ryan v. C.I.R., 568 F.2d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820, 58 L. Ed. 2d 111, 99 S. Ct. 84 (1978); United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1976).
In any event a defendant who testifies waives the privilege as to all matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examination. Neely v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1261, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1048, 79 L. Ed. 2d 184, 104 S. Ct. 723 (1984).
As already indicated he had testified to the trip to Texas in close connection with his trip to Dayton, which, if his testimony as to time en route were believed, would have made it impossible for him to have been present when the timer was set for explosion No. 8. He had also linked the trip to Texas with his explanation of borrowing the Impala from someone whose name he did not know. Getting possession of the Impala for the contents of its trunk was most important to his defense.
Defendant relies on the provision of Rule 608(b), FED. R. EVID., negating waiver when the witness is "examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility." As already noted, the testimony as to the Texas trip was closely related to such important substantive issues as an alibi, and avoiding linkage with very significant evidence of guilt.
Moreover, in rebuttal, the government called Francisco Gonzalez, one of the individuals inquired about, who testified that between sometime in September, 1978 and the beginning of December, he and defendant had traveled from Beeville, Texas to Austin, Texas. At defendant's direction, Gonzales drove him to a place in the general area of the Patricia Strait home, where apparent bomb components were later found. Defendant told Gonzales to drop him off and come back in about fifteen minutes. In final argument the prosecutor suggested that defendant's refusal to answer had avoided disclosure of the trip with Gonzales and the hiding of the bomb components at the Strait home.
In direct testimony defendant explained the purpose of some of the items found when the Impala was searched. Flares found there "were to be used for a clandestine airstrip to smuggle marijuana, bring an airplane in." He testified that he had purchased uniforms and insignia in Dayton September 14 or 15, "an they were to be used for an international marijuana smuggling operation." He had made the trip to Texas immediately before purchase of these items. It seems highly probable that they were purchased to carry out plans made in Texas a few days earlier, and his testimony waived the privilege as to any marijuana importing conspiracy formed or existing on September 7, whether or not the same conspiracy continued until February.
I then asked him why he needed these documents or what he would do with them and, since he had the appearance of being an official, what was he an official there fore, and he never gave me an answer to any of those questions.
No objection was interposed until, after Testimony III, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). His motion was based on Testimony II and III, and he expressly acknowledge that there was no cause for objection to Testimony I.
Doyle, United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 45 L. Ed. 2d 99, 95 S. Ct. 2133 (1975), and United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1985), involve more than testimony recounting that an accused, after being informed of his right to silence, remained silent. The facts of each case included affirmative use by the prosecutor of the accused's silence to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story. In this case there was no such use nor comment by the prosecutor.
Testimony III clearly related a statement by defendant that he had no interest in the car. That was not silence. Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1410-13 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Defendant's present claim rests entirely on a vague implication from the introductory clause that the agent asked defendant about the ownership of the car and defendant remained silent or orally refused to answer.
United States v. Williams, 665 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1981) held it was plain error to admit an agent's testimony that defendant had refused to answer specific questions about the price he paid for an item and its source. This court, pre- Doyle, held that where the prosecutor learned from one response that the agent would testify that defendant refused to answer a specific question, it resulted in prejudicial error for the prosecutor to go on eliciting similar answers. United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179, 183 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010, 95 S. Ct. 330, 42 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1974). We had previously reversed where an agent testified to two separate occasions where an accused responded that he did not have anything to say. United States v. Kroslack, 426 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1970). Those cases are readily distinguishable.
On rebuttal the government called a witness who had examined the room during 1979, and testified it was very easy to remove a piece of plasterboard at the ceiling of the room and the floor of the attic. Defendant also argues that the witness was called only for purpose of impeaching defendant, who had testified there was no access. This rebuttal evidence was not limited, however, to impeachment, since it also tended to rebut the alibi.
In its case in chief, the government called Attorney Keithley. Over objection, Keithley testified that he met with defendant on September 20, 1978; that thereafter he called an automobile dealer, told him the description and location of the Impala and "that my client had lost his keys; they'd have to have some keys made, and the motor wasn't working, there was something wrong with it, it would have to have some repair work, and would they tow it in, repair it and bill it to my client, Brett Kimberlin." By the time a towing vehicle reached the Impala, the FBI had decided to get a search warrant and would not permit removal.
Defendant asserts that the government's closing argument "was a mass of impropriety." One of his citations was characterizing MMAN as the "patented" ingredient of Tovex 200. Upon objection, government counsel withdrew the word "patented." We have addressed all other claims. We are satisfied that in the light of the evidence in the record the argument was within the bounds of fairness and that it is not necessary to discuss the details of each reference in this opinion.
12. Claims of "Other Misconduct"
Count 9 charged that on or about September 1, 1979, defendant "manufactured"*fn7 a firearm (destructive device) in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f) (and the penalty provision, § 5871). Counts 10 through 16 made the same charge on the date of the other explosions.
As evidence of violation, the government introduced a self-authenticating document (FED. R. EVID. 902), an ATF certification that a diligent search of the National Firearms Register and Transfer Record (NFRTR) failed to disclose evidence that any firearm had been registered or acquired by defendant, or that he had made application to make firearms, or paid the making tax. It has been held that such certification is admissible proof of lack of registration under Rule 803(10), FED. R. EVID., not admissible proof of failure to file an application or pay the tax, because filing occurs in advance of registration and payment of the tax is not directly reflected in NFRTR. United States v. Stout, 667 F.2d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Beason, 690 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1023, 103 S. Ct. 828 (1983).
Because a person must obtain the Secretary's approval before marking a firearm, and because such approval effects registration, we think the ATF certification that no registration was of record is sufficient evidence of this element of the offense.
We note that the Stout and Beason courts reversed the convictions of the unlawful making counts in those cases. Whether the indictments were different in form from the one before us, or not, those opinions appeared to treat the nonpayment of the tax as the critical element of the charge, not adequately proved. Stout, 667 F.2d at 1352-53; Beason, 690 F.2d at 441 n.1, 446.
Defendant contends there was no proof that the School Town received federal financial assistance within the meaning of § 844(f).
It has been held that federal funds need not be directly disbursed to an institution in order to constitute federal financial assistance under § 844(f). United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571-72 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 384 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich.), decision on motion affirmed although conviction reversed on other grounds, 557 F.2d 541, 559 (6th Cir. 1977). In interpreting a different statute, the Supreme Court decided that a college whose students financed their education with federal grants is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984).
A very thoughtful opinion by Judge Cornelia Kennedy in Brown, supra, analyzes the constitutional authority by which Congress could enact § 844(f). She found it in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, and concluded that "Congress must have the means to protect those institutions it is currently funding to carry out federal programs. . ." 384 F. Supp. at 1160. The "institution" need not be a part of government, but if it effectuates a national program with federal funds, it acts as an instrumentality of the federal government. 384 F. Supp. at 1159.
In United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969, 97 S. Ct. 1653, 52 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1977), this court considered the intended reach of § 844(i), making it an offense maliciously to damage property used "in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Upholding the application of the statute to use of explosives in an interstate activity having a de minimis effect on interstate commerce, we noted legislative history indicating that Congress intended to exercise "the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 200 (citation omitted).
Although the legislative history of § 844(f) spells out as its constitutional base only the power of the government to protect its own property, it clearly expresses outrage over bombings of university and other non-federal property, and urgency over supplying expanded federal investigative and prosecutive authority to meet the problem. "This section also protects real and personal property belonging to institutions and organizations receiving Federal financial assistance such as universities, hospitals, and police stations." See House Report No. 91-1549, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, pp. 4011, 4014. We have no doubt that Congress intended broad construction of the terms used, within constitutional limits.
The proof here was the the School Town of Speedway was one of ten school corporations entering into a Joint Agreement for Special Education Services, in the summer of 1970. One of them was to be the Servicing Corporation. It would provide joint programs for students with various types of exceptional problems. The joint program would be administered by the Servicing Corporation. The Agreement provided for a Board of Directors, composed of all the superintendents. One of the functions of the Board would be the development of the assessment formula for each Participating Corporation.
The Agreement recited that the parties intended that financing of the joint special education project can be obtained by each Participating Corporation through federal and state funding programs, but provided that each Participating Corporation shall be responsible to pay only its share computed on a formula based on enrollment from each. There was a provision for withdrawal, amendment, and renewal from year to year. There was a recitation of authority for the Agreement, including a state statute authorizing two or more local school corporations to engage in joint purchasing and employment programs.
In our view, however the "Co-op" seems not to be a separate entity, but a group of corporations acting jointly by agreement to carry on these specialized services. It seems reasonable and in keeping with Congressional intent to view each school corporation as performing the public and federally encouraged function of educating its students in need of special services, accomplishing that by collective action for the sake of efficiency, and receiving its proportionate share of federal money with which to do so. So viewed, Speedway was receiving federal financial assistance within the meaning of § 844(f).
We have already indicated our view that the evidence was "strong, albeit circumstantial, support for the guilty verdict." Supra, p. 15. Defendant's testimony and that of his witnesses supporting his alibi testimony did not, as claimed, produce a reasonable doubt as a matter of law.
1. On October 23, 1981, defendant filed a timely motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 33, FED. R. CRIM. P. The motion stated a belief the juror misconduct had occurred. No affidavits or record citations were supplied. The motion requested a hearing, and stated that defendant "is prepared to adduce evidence" of three instances of alleged misconduct. The motion was denied December 10, United States v. Kimberlin, 527 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
c. One juror commented in the presence of the others during trial that he or she had been hypnotized before and discussed the experience. Defendant stated belief that on voir dire this juror had denied lying hypnotized.
Judge Steckler's rejection of allegation b had not been challenged on appeal.
We recognize that these communications between jurors were allegedly made during the course of trial. Hence, they are not literally included in the prohibition of Rule 606(b) against testimony by a juror as to a statement during the course of the jury's deliberations. We note, also, as did Judge Steckler, that a juror's relating of a past personal experience may literally be "extraneous . . . information." We agree, however, with Judge Steckler that the Rule would not permit a juror to testify to the effect of the communication upon his mind or emotions, or concerning his mental processes in connection with the verdict. Thus, a hearing would be fruitless unless these statements, if made, would be presumed to be prejudicial.
Paragraphs numbered 4, 5, and 8 correspond to a, b, and c, included in the October motion denied by Judge Steckler, although somewhat differently stated. We are told that Ms. Irey was the source of the claim made in the October motion.
Defendant has already also argued on appeal that one of the jurors "repeatedly slept." This claim corresponded to Ms. Irey's paragraph 2. It was not raised in the October motion before Judge Steckler. In fact, the claim happens to have been reflected in the record, and to that extent we can consider whether there was plain error.
During the second day of trial, Judge Steckler, called counsel to a side bar conference and noted that a juror appeared to be nodding. Counsel said they had seen the juror sleeping. Defense counsel said he thought something should be done, but left how to do it up to the judge. Judge Steckler then addressed the jury, pointing out the need to be alert and pay careful attention. Six weeks later, one of defense counsel asked for a side bar conference. He said the same juror appears to be asleep again. It was the second time this week he had noticed, "and I don't know how the Court should handle it." The prosecutor agreed the juror was asleep. Defense counsel said:
The court might have considered whether a juror was unable to perform her duties. Upon such a finding, Rule 24(c), FED. R. CRIM. P., would authorize replacement with an alternate. United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1983). Neither side requested that or any less drastic action, except the recess, and the two excerpts from the record just referred to, do not demonstrate plain error.
At the colloquy before the conference defense counsel said he opposed replacing the juror with an alternate at that state and urged the court to discuss the matter with the juror.
MR. STANTON [Defense Counsel]: . . . for you Honor to do it in camera, either by yourself or with both parties present but not saying anything.
MR. STANTON: Either without or with the parties present, it makes no matter to us. Just to advise her that it is likely that she be required to stay on the jury and that she should make plans accordingly. And I think at that time then, if later she comes back and says, "Oh, I just can't do this," or something, then I think it can be rethought.
But we should urge the Court to say something, that she is probably going to be required to be on the jury beyond the date that her husband moves down there.
THE COURT: Well . . .
In Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267, 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983), the Supreme Court addressed a habeas corpus proceeding involving a state conviction. There had been unrecorded and undisclosed conferences between the judge and a juror over some concerns the juror had about facts which had come to the juror's attention.
Petitioners had conceded that the undisclosed ex parte communications established federal constitutional error. The Court assumed, without deciding, that defendant's constitutional rights to presence and counsel were implicated. Id. at 117 n.2. The Court disposed of the case, summarily, on the basis of error which was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appeal No. 83-2190 brings us the order of June 15, 1985, denying the motion for new trial on Counts 1 through 22, filed September 28, 1982.
Defendant claimed that government agents falsely stated at the suppression hearings that there were no Federal or Justice Department "guidelines" regarding hypnosis at the time that the witness in this case were hypnotized. The government responded that it had represented only that the ATF did not at the time of the investigation have guidelines pertaining to the use of hypnosis. Defendant has not cited anything in the record to show that any representation was made as to the FBI or the Department of Justice guidelines.
It has come to our attention that hypnosis has been used as an investigative aid. It is imperative that all future requests for the use of this technique be approved by this office. . . . Bureau Headquarters approval may be given after consultation and review to insure that the Department of Justice Guidelines and policies are adhered to. . . .
In any event, the September 15 instruction could have had no bearing on the hypnosis of four persons September 11. If the agents proceeded with the other two without the required approval, their violation of an internal policy directive or housekeeping rule did not render the hypnotized witnesses incompetent. See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173, 99 L. Ed. 210, 75 S. Ct. 182 (1954); Delay v. United States, 602 F.2d 173, 178 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012, 100 S. Ct. 660, 62 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1980); United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896, 58 L. Ed. 2d 243, 99 S. Ct. 257 (1978); United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 1978). Even where evidence is obtained in violation of an agency regulation, there is no exclusionary rule as a matter of course. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979).
Through FOIA, defendant obtained documents showing that a truck he had in Texas in February 1979 was checked for traces of Tovex and the finding was negative. Defendant was not informed. Judge Steckler found "defendant has not hinted at how such information would lead to a probable acquittal on retrial of the bombing counts." We deem the non-disclosure harmless under the standard of United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
Sandra Barton testified at trial that she was with defendant throughout the evening of September 1. She met him at his home at 6:00 or 6:30; they returned to defendant's house. She was with him until he retired and she did not observe him leave during the night.
We find no reason to reverse. We think Judge Steckler was correct in deciding that the government was under no duty to disclose the fact of hypnosis for which it was not responsible (and which did not produce the testimony given at trial). Failure to disclose the fact of hypnosis was the only claim made in district court. It is the argument made in the brief on appeal, except that there is, in addition, a slight hint at the argument that the government had on obligation to disclose a inconsistent statement, of which it had knowledge, whether under hypnosis or not. Although the reported prior statement, if made, would have impeached her testimony and her statement in her letter that she and her mother were together on September 1 for half an hour in Indianapolis, the statement would have put her and her mother together at dinner in Brown County on September 1.
Under the circumstances we consider the non-disclosure was not material, applying the test of United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
Ron Confer testified at the third trial that on an occasion in July, August, or September, 1975, he had seen defendant with boxes which defendant said contained explosives. Defendant asserts that the government did not provide the defense with any statement of Confer except it did provide Confer's grand jury testimony in which Confer said he had never seen defendant with explosives.*fn8 Defendant produced a portion of Confer's deposition taken by defendant in a civil action, December 3, 1981, after the trial.
A: Just talk back and forth, and then --
A: I think he wrote some notes and -- as he -- and then, I think I signed something -- you know, signed a statement. You know, I think we talked for a while and then he wrote it down and said, "Is this the way you recall it?" And I said, yes, and signed it.
Assuming that there was a statement as defined in the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e), failure to turn it over to the defense would not warrant a new trial in this case. The alleged discrepancies between Confer's testimony and the statement concerning the approximate date in 1975 of the occasion he saw the defendant with two boxes of explosives do not present an incongruity sufficient to raise a question of perjury. He stated on various occasions that the incident occurred in "late summer," "late August," "September," "between July and September." Since defendant repeatedly attacked Confer's credibility during cross-examination at trial, use of the purported statement for further impeachment purposes would have been merely cumulative. Furthermore, the Court cannot conclude the statement would have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Accordingly, no new trial is warranted as a result of the discovery of the statement. U.S. v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274, 281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947, 99 S. Ct. 2171, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1051.
Defendant seems to make two claims concerning the testimony of Coleman that he had seen defendant place a paper sack in the trash can at the site of explosion No. 1, after 9:00 PM September 1. Based on the depositions which defendant took of Coleman and his wife in December 1981, defendant claims that Coleman had given statements which were not given to the defense, and, generally, that the government knew Coleman was not credible.
Under FOIA defendant obtained from ATF an inter-office teletype received September 25, 1978, reporting on the first (FBI) search of the Impala on September 21. In part, it said that an Assistant United States Attorney (name obliterated) "who was present when search conducted desired materials used to manufacture bombs be left in the subjects car while he obtained a second search warrant for those items. AUSA (name obliterated) instructions were complied with. ATF will search car and obtain bombing materials."
The other citation in the brief is a colloquy between court and counsel during trial. Defense counsel was seeking to learn the names of individuals who participated in a different search, one of defendant's Jackson County real property. The judge was under the impression that the search of the vehicle was at issue the defense of all of the persons who participated in the search and seizure. . . ." Government counsel, in directing the court's attention back to the search of the real property prefaced by saying "Your Honor, if I may, I believe the Government has done that with the vehicle."
As to the claim that the evidence was planted, we can take judicial notice of the fact that there was an FBI agent named Charles Egger previously stationed at Indianapolis and dismissed June 26, 1978 for refusing to accept a transfer. See Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918, 78 L. Ed. 2d 262, 104 S. Ct. 284 (1983). There is no affidavit from Egger describing the statement he allegedly said was made to him by an unnamed agent. Defendant produced a copy of part of an article appearing in the February 25, 1983 issue of the Chicago Reader. The story reports:
Two points in the pro se motion filed November 1, 1982, not contained in the motion filed September 28, 1982, did or could related to the trial of Counts 1 through 22. These points do not appear to have been considered by Judge Steckler.
One point challenged the validity of the search warrants for the Impala because the affidavits included information from informants who had been hypnotized. Actually, this could only have referred to the statement in the affidavit for the second warrant that there had been interviews of employees of establishments selling timers, which disclosed that an individual fitting the description of defendant had purchased fourteen timers. In context, this information was of minimal significance and its omission could not reasonably have affected the magistrate's judgment in finding probable cause to search. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978).
The argument is derived from the holding in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978). There the Court decided that a defendant, within prescribed limits, has a right to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting the warrants. The standard which must be met is that of "deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 171. Here the claim rests upon an omission. Cf. United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980), where the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, "that the Franks rationale also permits an attack on search warrants obtained by affidavits marred by omissions of facts required to prevent technically true statements in the affidavit from being misleading."
The second point above referred to is a claim that defendant learned after trial that the government possessed photographs of defendant in his uniform, but not holding the FBI placard, and thus not appearing to be a mug shot, It is claimed, the mug shot picture of defendant in uniform was unnecessarily used, and must have been used in order to arouse prejudice. We deem the claim too insubstantial to warrant a hearing before the district court.
About the time of the second trial Joe Majko, a friend of Scott Kimberlin, informed defendant that he had helped Scott move explosives in the fall of the 1978 and that Scott had said the explosives were for excavating purposes on the Jackson County property.
We are satisfied that the description of the uniform as "non-regulation in nature" was not exculpatory.
D. [ARGUED AS POINT H.]
The only search of the Impala which yielded evidence relevant to Counts 29 through 34 was the first one. As already pointed out under Appeal No. 83-2090 there is no support for a claim that any information in the affidavit for that warrant came from a person who had been hypnotized.
The judgment appealed from in No. 82-1025 is AFFIRMED. The orders appealed from in Nos. 83-2190, 83-2191, and 83-2341 are AFFIRMED.*fn9
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, concurring. I write separately an the admissibility of the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses to emphasize why reliance on this evidence presents such difficult problems in this case and to suggest possibilities for avoiding some of these difficulties in the future. Although I think the question is exceedingly close and difficult, I agree with the majority that the admission of the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses does not require reversal. Nevertheless, the district court was presented with an unusually taxing problem, and I think we should take this occasion to propose standards that may be applied in determining whether to admit the testimony of witnesses who have been hypnotized before trial.
A persuasive case can be made for a rule of per se inadmissibility, and this is the route a number of states have taken. On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit has made the important point that a per se rule could be overly sweeping and might result in the exclusion of valuable and reliable evidence in some cases. See Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1122 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046, 106 S. Ct. 1263, 89 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1986). As a matter of fact, all of the federal court of appeals that have so far considered the issue have declined to adopt a rule of per se inadmissibility. See Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 492 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3310, 92 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1986); Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022, 106 S. Ct. 1212, 89 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1986); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S. Ct. 621, 58 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1978). But at the very least, we should follow generally the path of the Eighth Circuit and adopt a rule that requires the district court, in cases in which hypnosis has been used, to conduct pretrial hearings on the procedures followed during the hypnotic session in question. The district court should assess the effect of hypnosis upon the reliability of the testimony before deciding on admissibility. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1122. The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of persuading the district court that the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable and that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. at 1123. The district court must exercise great care to ensure that any statements made after hypnosis that are admitted into evidence are the product of the subject's own recollections, rather than confabulation or recall tainted by suggestions received while under hypnosis.*fn1 See United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1525 (9th Cir. 1985), United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200-04 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S. Ct. 621, 58 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1978). Unless a showing to this effect can be made, the statements must be excluded.
In making its determination of admissibility, the district court should at least consider: 1) the appropriateness of using hypnosis for the kind of memory loss involved; see Spryncznatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123; 2) the extent to which information concerning the events in question may be communicated intentionally or inadvertently to the subject; 3) whether there is any evidence to corroborate the hypnotically enhanced testimony, see Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123. Further, the district court should consider the extent to which the safeguards articulated in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 545-47, 432 A.2d 86, 96-97 (1981) and Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1122-23, were followed.*fn2