Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/363/685
Timestamp: 2018-12-13 23:22:53
Document Index: 471921559

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 46', '§ 1735', '§ 1735', '§ 745', '§ 371', '§ 43', '§ 294', '§ 371', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 7460', '§ 7460', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 455', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 371', '§ 46', '§ 46']

UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN-FOREIGN STEAMSHIP CORP. et al. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN-FOREIGN STEAMSHIP CORP. et al.
363 U.S. 685 (80 S.Ct. 1336, 4 L.Ed.2d 1491)
Argued: April 25, 1960.
dissent, HARLAN, FRANKFURTER, BRENNAN [HTML]
The question to be decided here is a narrow one. The Judicial Code provides that in the United States Courts of Appeals '(c)ases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in active service.' It further provides that '(a) court in banc shall consist of all active circuit judges of the circuit.' 28 U.S.C. 46(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c). The sole issue presented is whether a circuit judge who has retired is eligible under this statute to participate in the decision of a case on rehearing en banc. We have concluded that he is not.
This litigation arose when the respondents, who had chartered ships from the Government under the Merchant Ship Sales Act, 50 U.S.C.Appendix, § 1735 et seq., 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1735 et seq., sued the Government in the District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover amounts of allegedly excessive charter hire which had been assessed by the Maritime Commission. The Government moved to dismiss the libels on the ground that the claims were barred by the two-year limitation period prescribed by the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. 745, 46 U.S.C.A. § 745. The libels were dismissed in the District Court on the authority of the Second Circuit decisions in Sword Line, Inc., v. United States, 2 Cir., 228 F.2d 344; 2 Cir., 230 F.2d 75, affirmed as to admiralty jurisdiction 351 U.S. 976, 76 S.Ct. 1047, 100 L.Ed. 1493, and American Eastern Corp. v. United States, 2 Cir., 231 F.2d 664. 1
Thereafter, on December 19, 1957, the Court of Appeals granted the libellants' petition for rehearing en banc and ordered that argument thereon be confined to written briefs to be submitted within twenty days. On March 1, 1958, Judge Medina retired pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 371(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 371(b). 2 Almost five months later, on July 28, 1958, the court issued its en banc decision. Circuit Judges Hincks and Moore and retired Circuit Judge Medina joined an opinion ordering the earlier three-judge decision withdrawn and remanding the causes to the District Court, 265 F.2d 136, 144. Judges Clark and Waterman dissented. 3 In his dissenting opinion Judge Clark expressed doubt as to a retired judge's eligibility to participate in an en banc decision. 265 F.2d 136, 153.
As a preliminary to decision of the precise question before us it is important to make clear that this case in no way involves the eligibility of a retired judge to participate in the hearing, rehearing or determination of a case as a member of a conventional three-judge Court of Appeals. Such participation is governed by different statutory provisions. The Judicial Code explicitly provides that 'judges designated or assigned' shall be 'competent to sit as judges' of such a court. 28 U.S.C. 43(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 43(b). Other provisions of the Code spell out in detail the system under which designations and assignments of retired judges are to be made. 28 U.S.C. 294, 295, 296, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 294296. 4
Moreover, there is not involved here any issue as to the procedure to be followed by a Court of Appeals in determining whether a hearing or rehearing en banc is to be ordered. In the Western Pacific Railroad Case, Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed. 986, it was held that this question is largely to be left to intramural determination by each of the Courts of Appeals. 'The court is left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a majority may order such a hearing.' 345 U.S., at page 250, 73 S.Ct. at page 658. 5
Here we are concerned only with the specific provision of the Judicial Code which ordains that en banc proceedings shall be 'heard and determined' by a court consisting of all the 'active circuit judges' of the circuit involved. The literal meaning of the words seems plain enough. An 'active' judge is a judge who has not retired 'from regular active service.' 28 U.S.C. 371(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 371(b). A case or controversy is 'determined' when it is decided.
There is nothing in the history of the legislation to indicate that these words should be understood to mean anything else than what they say. As the Reviser's Note indicates, and as this Court pointed out in the Western Pacific Railroad Case, 345 U.S., at pages 250, 251, 73 S.Ct. at page 658, where the legislative history was fully reviewed, the statutory provision was added to the Judicial Code in 1948 simply as a 'legislative ratification of Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 1941, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249a decision which went no further than to sustain the power of a Court of Appeals to order a hearing en banc.' 6
When such circumstances appear, en banc determinations make 'for more effective judicial administration. Conflicts within a circuit will be avoided. Finality of decision in the circuit courts of appeal will be promoted. Those considerations are especially important in view of the fact that in our federal judicial system these courts are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases.' Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S., at pages 334335, 62 S.Ct. at pages 277, 278. 'The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in banc is to enable the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a majority of its judges always to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions, while enabling the court at the same time to follow the efficient and time-saving procedure of having panels of three judges hear and decide the vast majority of cases as to which no division exists within the court.' Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases in Banc, 1954, 14 F.R.D. 91, at page 96. As Judge Clark put it in the present case, the evident policy of the statute was to provide 'that the active circuit judges shall determine the major doctrinal trends of the future for their court * * *.' 265 F.2d, at page 155.
Persuasive arguments could be advanced that an exception should be made to permit a retired circuit judge to participate in en banc determination of cases where, as here, he took part in the original three-judge hearing, or where, as here, he had not yet retired when the en banc hearing was originally ordered. Indeed, the Judicial Conference of the United States has approved suggested legislative changes that would provide such an exception, and a bill to amend the statute has been introduced in the Congress. 7 But this only serves to emphasize that if the statute is to be changed, it is for Congress, not for us, to change it.
We conclude for these reasons that under existing legislation a retired circuit judge is without power to participate in an en banc Court of Appeals determination, and accordingly that the judgment must be set aside. American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W.R. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 387, 13 S.Ct. 758, 764, 37 L.Ed. 486; Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312, 316319, 58 S.Ct. 188, 191192, 82 L.Ed. 282. In reaching this conclusion we intimate no view as to the merits of the underlying litigation. The judgment is vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I can find nothing in 28 U.S.C. 46(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) which requires the decision the Court has made, and nothing in the decision which commends itself to considerations of sound judicial administration. For convenience I again quote § 46(c):
The 'heard and determined' clause on which the Court relies appears in a sentence whose purposes were simply to codify the doctrine that a Court of Appeals had power to sit en banc, Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249, while making clear that the usual procedure was to be decision by a three-judge panel. 1 It is not an unknown phenomenon in federal adjudication that a case, though heard by less than the entire tribunal, may be decided according to the majority vote of all. Cf. I.R.C., § 7460, 26 U.S.C.A. § 7460; see 2 Casey, Federal Tax Practice, 274280. The traditional term, 'heard and determined,' in my view was designed to do no more than reflect the obvious inappropriateness of such a procedure to the deliberations of the Court of Appeals. There is no necessity for finding in that term, in light of the context in which it appears, any Congressional direction regarding the constitution of an en banc court.
The requirements governing the composition of an en banc court are found in the last sentence of § 46(c). All it provides is that such a court shall not include retired circuit judges. The reason for such a provision is not hard to discern. Congress would hardly have required a retired circuit judge to return to the bench to attend at an en banc hearing and, as between leaving the matter to the discretion of the individual judge and limiting the court to active judges, it is not surprisingin view of the varying degrees of judicial activity of the retired judges, and the administrative undesirability of having, for these purposes, a court of unpredictable size and complementthat Congress should have chosen the latter course.
The language and context, then, of § 46(c) are given full effect by holding, as I would, that the statute requires no more than that the members of an en banc court be in active status at the time the case is argued or submitted. Such a construction, for a court which decided the Textile Mills case, supra, should not be difficult to reach. The issue there was whether the predecessor of § 46(c), conferring appellate jurisdiction on circuit courts consisting of three judges, prevented adjudication by a circuit court composed of five judges, constituting all the active circuit judges of the particular circuit there involved. In holding that it did not, the Court, making a wise 'sacrifice of literalness for common sense,' 314 U.S. at page 334, 62 S.Ct. at page 277, found no difficulty in rising above the arithmetic of the predecessor of § 46(c) so as to achieve a sensible result. Still less should there be difficulty here in accommodating § 46(c) to the needs of sound judicial administration. So construed, the statute was complied with here. 2
But even were I to accept the Court's premisesa reading into the en banc procedure of a requirement that only active judges may participate in the 'determination' of such cases, and a view of § 46(c) as expressing a Congressional policy against participation by retired judges in decisions setting the 'major doctrinal trends' of a courtI could not agree that they justify this decision. Choice of the date of announcement of a decision as the date of 'determination' of the cause may provide a touchstone which a disappointed litigant searching for grounds for reversal can easily apply. However, it seems a singularly infelicitous construction of this particular legislative language. 3 '(L)aws are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy arising out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of particular ends.' Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col.L.Rev. 527, 533. The exact point of time when a case is 'determined' is, as all informed lawyers know, a question whose answer varies from case to case, and which is known in a particular instance only to the judges themselves. Certainly, if an opinionall argument, reflection, deliberation, and explication having been completed by a court composed of active judges onlyis filed with the clerk of the court on the morning following the retirement of one of its members, no policy remotely discernible in § 46(c) can justify a requirement that his vote in the case should not be counted. If any such policy can be thought to be reflected in the en banc statute, it should not be taken as requiring more than that a judge, whose retirement comes at a time when meaningful things in the process of adjudication still remain to be done, must withdraw from further participation. But where such is not the case, the statute should not be thought to require a precipitous termination of judicial affairs and the undoing of adjudications properly made. In the nature of things the effectuation of such a policy should be left with the various Courts of Appeals, if indeed not to the conscience and good taste of the particular circuit judge concerned, as in most instances of individual disqualification for other reasons. Cf. 28 U.S.C. 455, 28 U.S.C.A. § 455.
It is not a ground for objection that such a construction would provide no test which an outsider, whether litigant or reviewing court, could apply. 4 As this Court has observed: 'In our view, § 46(c) is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed to the Court of Appeals.' Western Pacific Railroad Case, 345 U.S. 247, 250, 73 S.Ct. 656, 657, 658, 97 L.Ed. 986. On its view of the statute the Court should not have hesitated to adopt that construction of the 'heard and determined' clause which most faithfully reflects its purpose merely because those with whom the statute is not concerned are thereby hampered in voicing their own objections.
Indeed, while I need express no definite view on the question, since I regard the claim of noncompliance with § 46(c) as untenable, I must say that the Court's opinion presents no substantial reason for permitting a litigant to overturn a judgment of the Court of Appeals through this sort of collateral attack on the competence of one of its members to sit. Had Judge Medina found in § 46(c), as the Court holds he should have found, a statutory direction to withdraw from further participation in this lawsuit, petitioner and not respondents would have prevailed on the appeal, since that would have resulted in the affirmance, by an equally divided Court of Appeals, of the District Court's judgment in favor of the Government. Of course, to a litigant, there is no greater injury than to lose a case, but I have difficulty understanding just what legal error has been committed against petitioner, such as to warrant vacation by this Court of the judgment below, thus giving the Government an opportunity to retrieve its original loss in the en banc Court of Appeals. Clearly, Judge Medina was not a mere interloper, or a usurper. He was, and is, a circuit judge of the United States, bearing a commission signed by the President. Abstractions about 'competence' only becloud the matter. All that has happened is that Judge Medina has exercised the right conferred by Congress ( 28 U.S.C. 371(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 371(b)) to retire from active service. Nothing in that action, or in what the Court has said concerning the scope of § 46(c), renders the judgment of the court below vulnerable to attack. The cases cited by the Court dealt with disqualifications based on policy grounds the effectuation of which called for a vacation of the judgments rendered there. 5 No reason has been given why that is so here.
At its Annual Meeting in September, 1959, the Judicial Conference of the United States received a joint report of its Committees on Court Administration and Revision of the Laws, stating their view that under the present law retired judges are not eligible to participate in en banc proceedings. 'However, the Committees thought it proper to permit a retired circuit judge to be a member of the court of appeals sitting in banc in the rehearing of a case in which he has sat, by assignment, in the panel of the court which heard the case originally.' The Conference agreed and approved a draft of a bill, presented by the Committees, which would add the following sentence to 28 U.S.C. 46(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c): 'A circuit judge of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also be competent to sit as a judge of the court in banc in the rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the court or division at the original hearing thereof.' Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States (1959), pp. 910. A bill to effect this change was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Celler on April 5, 1960, as H.R. 11567, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 Cong.Rec. 6865.
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