Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/102/1120/637386/
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 09:25:56
Document Index: 501801661

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 1962', '§ 841', '§ 1962', '§ 841', '§ 924', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 5', '§ 462', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2']

46 Fed. R. Evid. Ser v. 240, 10 Fla. L. Weeklyfed. C 621united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ralph E. Brazel, Jr., Charles Hubbard, Norman L. Burgess,defendants-appellants.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Sharvonne Mckinnon, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Levine Justice Archer, A.k.a. Jamaican Joe, A.k.a. Joe,willie Jefferson, Marlon Mcnealy, A.k.a. Man,defendants-appellants, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 1997 › 46 Fed. R. Evid. Ser v. 240, 10 Fla. L. Weeklyfed. C 621united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee...
46 Fed. R. Evid. Ser v. 240, 10 Fla. L. Weeklyfed. C 621united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ralph E. Brazel, Jr., Charles Hubbard, Norman L. Burgess,defendants-appellants.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Sharvonne Mckinnon, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Levine Justice Archer, A.k.a. Jamaican Joe, A.k.a. Joe,willie Jefferson, Marlon Mcnealy, A.k.a. Man,defendants-appellants, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1997)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1997) Jan. 6, 1997
Defendants' trial was lengthy, beginning on February 4, 1993 and consuming approximately three months.1 On May 7, the jury found all seven defendants-appellants guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Archer and McNealy were also found guilty of conspiracy to commit racketeering activities and participation in racketeering activities, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) & (c), and two and three counts, respectively, of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Jefferson was convicted of conspiracy to commit racketeering activities, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Brazel was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Burgess was convicted of use of a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Sentencing proceedings were held in August and September 1993. All the defendants received at least one life sentence. These appeals followed.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo to determine whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that the evidence established the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and make all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the government's favor. See United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 262, 133 L. Ed. 2d 185, and --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 350, 133 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1995).
To sustain a conviction for conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant knew of it, and that the defendant, with knowledge, voluntarily joined the conspiracy. United States v. Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d 438, 440 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Here, the government had to show that an agreement existed between two or more individuals illegally to distribute cocaine base, and that each defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined or participated in the conspiracy. See Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1201. Proof could be by direct or circumstantial evidence; if circumstantial, "reasonable inferences, and not mere speculation, must support the jury's verdict." Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d at 440 (citation omitted).
"Mere presence, guilty knowledge, even sympathetic observation" and close association with a coconspirator are insufficient, without more, to support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute drugs. Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1201; see also Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d at 441 (citing cases). Yet such factors may raise a permissible inference of participation in a conspiracy, which the jury may consider as a "material and probative factor ... in reaching its decision." United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 858, 111 S. Ct. 159, 112 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1990). A defendant may be culpable even if he or she played a minor role in the conspiracy, since a conspirator need not know the details of each act making up the conspiracy. See United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104, 111 S. Ct. 1005, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1088 (1991).
The evidence also showed that around midnight on October 31, 1991, McKinnon's brother, Tucker, Tory Gamage, and defendant Hubbard went at Mathis's request to McKinnon's apartment2 to cut up crack cocaine. Tucker testified that they arrived at about 1:00 a.m., McKinnon answered the door in nightclothes, and when they came in she went into the back bedroom with her infant and closed the door. Tucker, Gamage, and Hubbard cut up crack cocaine with razor blades and bagged it in 50-packs. At about 6:00 a.m., there was a knock on the front door and McKinnon went to answer it. Tucker testified that she looked through the peephole, and without opening the door, said, " [O]h my god, the police are out there." Tucker testified that he, Hubbard, and Gamage then put the crack cocaine and razor blades into bags, climbed out the window of the second-floor apartment, and ran. Tucker further testified that McKinnon had not observed or participated in the drug activities. Police searched the apartment later that day and did not find narcotics.
From the evidence as related above, we are satisfied that a reasonable jury could find that a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base existed and that McKinnon knowingly and voluntarily participated in it. The evidence shows more than McKinnon's mere presence at the scene or her close association with Mathis without more. Her understanding of the illegal purposes of the Mathis organization could be reasonably inferred from her attendance at the meeting on December 24, 1990 at which Mathis discussed how operations would be run, and her statement, in support of his, that "we" will not be as "flashy, ... showing that we got lots of money" as another drug operation in the city had been. Her knowledge of the organization's drug distribution objectives, and her knowing and voluntary participation in these, could reasonably be inferred from the substantial evidence showing that she performed various drug-related tasks for the organization at different times. At least two witnesses testified that she counted rocks of crack cocaine during Mathis's drug operations on the north and south side. A crack cocaine supplier and a shift worker both testified that McKinnon accepted plastic or paper bags of crack cocaine from them to pass on to Mathis. A taped telephone conversation revealed that she notified Mathis when a worker needed more crack to sell on his shift. At least three times when a worker had not shown up, she was seen counting drug proceeds delivered by workers whose shift ended at 8:00 a.m., and on those occasions she followed the organization's practice of binding together $450 per 50-pack after taking out $50 for the workers. McKinnon acted, moreover, as a lookout occasionally in 1991, expressly warning others of the approach of the green team by shouting, using a walkie-talkie, or calling on a cellular phone. When police arrived on the scene--whether it was the incident involving Bibery Ladson, Ricky Hill, or another time when a cellular phone Mathis had purchased had been taken by police--the evidence showed that she promptly contacted Mathis. Taped conversations strongly suggested that she knew the purposes of the organization, knew some of its daily activities, and willingly helped to achieve its goals of distributing cocaine base for profit while avoiding detection by law enforcement authorities. This record, from the jury's perspective, plausibly showed more than mere presence during drug activities or close association with persons dealing in drugs. Cf. United States v. Villegas, 911 F.2d 623, 629-631 (11th Cir. 1990) (reviewing mere presence/close association cases and reversing conviction where evidence only showed that defendant was coconspirator's brother and was present near drug transactions), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977, 111 S. Ct. 1625, 113 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1991).3
The above evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, established much more than a simple buyer-seller relationship between Mathis and Hubbard. "Where the buyer's purpose is merely to buy, and the seller's purpose is merely to sell, and no prior or contemporaneous understanding exists between the two beyond the sales agreement, no conspiracy has been shown." United States v. Beasley, 2 F.3d 1551, 1560 & n. 27 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Burroughs, 830 F.2d 1574, 1581 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969, 108 S. Ct. 1243, 99 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1988)), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1240, 114 S. Ct. 2751, 129 L. Ed. 2d 869 (1994). Here, the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that Hubbard understood that the large amounts of crack cocaine he was supplying to Mathis were to be distributed by others in the organization, and knowingly and voluntarily participated in that venture. Several witnesses testified that Hubbard, alone or with McNealy and/or Jefferson, repeatedly delivered hundreds of 50-packs of crack cocaine to Mathis at his house, to a shift overseer at his house for storage in his safe, or to another Mathis associate to bring to Mathis. On some such occasions he was seen carrying a gun, and the evidence showed that an overseer for Mathis's operations had purchased one that was then given to Hubbard. Hubbard picked up thousands of dollars in payment from Mathis and an overseer after the 50-packs had been sold on shifts, and on at least one occasion was accompanied to the car by one of Mathis's armed guards. See id.; Burroughs, 830 F.2d at 1581 (evidence showed "continuing course of conduct ... designed to result in the distribution of heroin," including fronting drugs to buyers and receiving payment after their distribution).
Moreover, following Hubbard's arrest on October 24, the evidence showed that Mathis was concerned that his organization's drug supplies were running low and told Hubbard he would pay his bail and arrange for a lawyer to represent him. Hubbard was released from jail in the early evening of October 31, and several hours later left from Mathis's house with two Mathis associates recruited by Mathis to help Hubbard cut up crack cocaine and bag 50-packs. The evidence plainly sustains the jury's conviction of Hubbard for conspiracy. See Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1285-1286 (rejecting defendant's buyer-seller defense and finding his activities interdependent with the larger conspiracy where they "facilitated the endeavors of other alleged conspirators or facilitated the venture as a whole [ ]") (citation omitted).
Burgess asserts, without development, that the above evidence showed multiple conspiracies but that it did not show that he was a part of the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. We disagree. In determining whether the jury could have found a single conspiracy, we consider "(1) whether a common goal existed, (2) the nature of the scheme underlying the crimes charged, and (3) the overlap of participants." United States v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 633 (11th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 946, 115 S. Ct. 356, 130 L. Ed. 2d 310, and 513 U.S. 1006, 115 S. Ct. 525, 130 L. Ed. 2d 429 and 513 U.S. 1027, 115 S. Ct. 602, 130 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1994). Clearly, a common or similar goal existed: distributing crack cocaine for profit while avoiding authorities. See United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990). The nature of the distribution scheme was similar, in that three shifts of workers with assigned or functionally equivalent positions distributed crack cocaine delivered by suppliers to Mathis, and weapons were purchased and carried to protect Mathis and others in the operation. Lastly, there was an overlap of participants in the drug selling and supplying transactions. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to believe that a single conspiracy existed and Burgess knowingly and voluntarily participated in it.
The court's instruction correctly permitted the jury to convict McNealy of RICO conspiracy if it found that he agreed to conduct or to participate in the affairs of the Mathis enterprise either by agreeing personally to commit at least two predicate acts for the required pattern of racketeering activity, or by agreeing to the overall objective and knowing that others were conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. See Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1544 (citations omitted); United States v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 929 (11th Cir. 1988).
" [T]he predicate crimes of other conspirators can also serve as predicate acts for [a defendant's] RICO conviction." United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 860, 112 S. Ct. 178, 116 L. Ed. 2d 140 and 502 U.S. 827, 112 S. Ct. 96, 116 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1991). Accordingly, McNealy's RICO conspiracy conviction "can properly rest on any predicate acts the evidence to which sufficiently indicates that [he] agreed." Id. at 1546 n. 24.
McNealy argues that the district court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction on the buyer-seller theory of defense to a drug conspiracy charge. However, in United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d 1124 (11th Cir. 1986), we held that an instruction like the one given here was sufficient, stating that it "addressed the substance of the requested [buyer-seller] instruction: without a showing of knowledge, a single, isolated act by a defendant does not by itself constitute participation in a conspiracy." Id. at 1129. We add that the evidence against McNealy on the count charging a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base plainly showed much more than a buyer-seller relationship. Cf. Beasley, 2 F.3d at 1561 (failure to instruct jury on buyer-seller relationship theory was not plain error where evidence established a continuing course of conduct designed to result in the distribution of cocaine).
McNealy argues pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when Larry Thomas, who was being held in custody in the same prison wing as defendant Jefferson, was allowed to testify about statements Jefferson made to him that also inculpated McNealy. In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the admission of statements by a nontestifying codefendant that inculpated another defendant in a joint trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Even where the jury was instructed to consider the statements only against the nontestifying codefendant, a substantial risk remained that the jury looked to the extrajudicial incriminating statements to determine the other defendant's guilt. See id. at 126, 88 S. Ct. at 1622-23. No Bruton problem exists, however, where the statement "was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial." Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1987); United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1142 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 979, 113 S. Ct. 2979, 125 L. Ed. 2d 676 and 509 U.S. 932, 113 S. Ct. 3062, 125 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1993). Thus, " [f]or Bruton to apply, a codefendant's statement must be clearly inculpatory standing alone." Arias, 984 F.2d at 1142 (citation omitted).
McNealy challenges two aspects of Thomas's testimony. First, Thomas testified that Jefferson told him "he [Jefferson] was getting rid of five birds a week with Romeo Mathis." Thomas understood from experience that "birds" meant " [k]ilos of cocaine." Contrary to McNealy's contention, nothing in this statement or the few statements that followed on the same subject, standing alone, directly inculpated him. See Arias, 984 F.2d at 1142-1143. The statement referred solely to Jefferson in connection with the Mathis operation. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury that this part of Thomas's testimony was to be considered solely against Jefferson. See Marsh, 481 U.S. at 210, 107 S. Ct. at 1708-09 (no Bruton problem where codefendant's confession was redacted to omit any reference to defendant and limiting instruction was given). We hold that the admission of this statement did not violate McNealy's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
The second statement presents a more troublesome question. Thomas testified that Jefferson said that "he [Jefferson] met a couple guys at a Burger King and made a deal with them for some drugs and the guys turned out to be police detectives," and that Jefferson said McNealy was with him at the deal. The event referenced was an undercover drug transaction on August 15, 1991, in which a confidential informant and FBI special agent arranged to meet McNealy at a local Burger King to purchase crack cocaine for $1,950. Jefferson did not testify at trial, and his alleged statement testified to by Thomas directly linked McNealy to the drug deal on August 15. McNealy's name was not redacted from the statement, nor was an instruction given directing the jury to consider the statement solely against Jefferson.7 The government concedes that this inculpatory statement creates a Bruton problem, violating McNealy's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that "the potentially inculpatory inference combined with the lack of a cautionary instruction constituted a violation of appellants' rights under Bruton and the confrontation clause," though the violation did not rise to the level of plain error).
McNealy did not, however, object at trial to the admission of Thomas's testimony nor did he ask the court to give a cautionary instruction. We, therefore, review the Confrontation Clause violation for plain error only. Plain error exists "when an error is so obvious that failure to notice it would result in a miscarriage of justice." Id. McNealy argues that the admission of Jefferson's statement directly linking him to the August 15th drug transaction substantially influenced the outcome of the trial. Viewing this statement in light of all the evidence presented at trial, however, id. at 1543, we think it added little if anything more to the government's case. The jury heard testimony about the August 15th transaction from the confidential informant and FBI special agent who conducted it undercover, and both identified McNealy as the one through whom all arrangements were made and carried out. The jury saw a videotape of this and other similarly conducted undercover drug transactions with McNealy. Because there was abundant properly admitted evidence linking McNealy to the drug transaction on August 15, we do not find plain error in the court's admission of the testimony about Jefferson's statement nor in the court's failure, unrequested, to instruct the jury to consider the statement only against Jefferson. See id. at 1543; cf. United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1501 (11th Cir. 1993) (Bruton violation was harmful error where, after the admission of certain evidence was reversed, "the properly admitted evidence of guilt is less than overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's statements is so significant in comparison"); United States v. Hemelryck, 945 F.2d 1493, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1991) (where admission of nontestifying defendant's statement was error, and government directly linked statement to defendant in its rebuttal closing, error was harmless in light of substantial independent evidence establishing defendant's role in cocaine transaction).
Jefferson contends that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial when the prosecution successfully moved, two days before the end of its case-in-chief, to dismiss counts two (RICO) and thirty-one (distribution of cocaine base) against him without his consent.8 The prosecution made the motion after it says it acquired a reasonable doubt about the validity of its charges against Jefferson that he took part in a drug deal at a Burger King on August 15, 1991. Jefferson argues, as he did in the district court, that the dismissal of the two counts without his consent violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a)9 and caused prejudice to him by impairing his ability to impeach the credibility of one witness, Thomas, who testified to his participation in that incident and the remaining crimes--RICO conspiracy and conspiracy to distribute cocaine base--of which he was found guilty. Moreover, since that witness cooperated with the government, Jefferson wished to use a more forceful impeachment of him to cast doubt on the veracity of all cooperating witnesses who testified against him on the remaining charges. This prejudice was compounded, he says, by the district court's refusal adequately to explain to the jury the reason for the sudden dismissal of counts two and thirty-one.
Conversations between the district court and counsel appearing in the record show that the court viewed its dismissal of these two counts as likely to be covered by Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), despite the requirements of Rule 48(a). Rule 29(a) authorizes a district court to grant a judgment of acquittal on its own motion or upon a defendant's request "after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses."
Before approving the dismissal, the court asked Jefferson's counsel whether he intended to move for a judgment of acquittal on all counts pursuant to Rule 29 at the conclusion of the government's case if the asked-for dismissal of the two counts were to be denied. Jefferson's counsel replied, "I'm sure I will," but pointed out that the court would have the problem "of having to, as a matter of law, judge the credibility of three eyewitnesses to the incident." In other words, Jefferson's counsel questioned whether the court could allow his motion for judgment of acquittal on the two counts, since, no matter how untrustworthy the government's witnesses, they had testified to Jefferson's involvement in the matters charged in those counts, raising jury issues of fact and credibility beyond the court's power to resolve as a matter of law on a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Brown, 587 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
This is not a case where the court entered a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal based on some improper ground such as the "interests of justice." See United States v. Varkonyi, 611 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945, 100 S. Ct. 2173, 64 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1980); Brown, 587 F.2d at 190-91 (trial judge lacks authority to enter a judgment of acquittal "simply because he thinks that course would be most consonant with the interests of justice [ ]") (citation omitted). Rather, the court correctly determined that, upon its allowance of the government's striking of all evidence against Jefferson on the two counts, there would be no evidence left in support of them. We are unwilling in these circumstances to construe Rule 48(a) as broadly preventing the government from paving the way for a Rule 29(a) dismissal by withdrawing in good faith unreliable evidence against a defendant with the court's consent. The situation might be different were a defendant unequivocally to insist on his right to secure the jury's verdict on the questionable charges, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a), advisory committee note 4. Here, however, Jefferson inconsistently indicated his own intention to move under Rule 29 at the close of the government's case-in-chief.
The refusal to give a requested instruction to the jury is reversible error only if "the rejected instruction was substantively correct, the actual charge to the jury did not substantially cover the proposed instruction, and the failure to give the request substantially impaired the defendant's ability to present an effective defense." United States v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The court may well have felt it both incorrect and unfair to the government to announce unequivocally that Jefferson had been misidentified at the Burger King, the government having conceded only that it was now uncertain about the identification. But even assuming for purposes of argument that the requested instruction on misidentification would have been correct, we do not believe the failure to give it substantially impaired Jefferson's defense on the remaining two counts. The district court's more cryptic reason for the dismissal--the good-faith professional representation of the government--was accurate as far as it went. The court ordered the jury not to concern itself with the reasons for the dismissal beyond what had been stated when evaluating the remaining charges against Jefferson or the other defendants, and not to consider the evidence against Jefferson on the two dismissed counts. We presume the jury followed the trial court's instructions, e.g. United States v. Brown, 983 F.2d 201, 202-03 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Jefferson maintains that the failure to instruct the jury that the dismissal was due to a misidentification prejudiced him, because he was unable to present witnesses thereafter to establish a misidentification defense. As noted, however, a codefendant's counsel secured Detective McConaughey's admission that he had misidentified Jefferson as being involved in the Burger King incident on August 15th and that Charles Scott, Detective Tapia, FBI Special Agent Bryant, and Larry Thomas had also testified--by inference, wrongly--about the same incident. Thereafter, Jefferson made much of the dismissal and misidentification issues at closing argument. It is most unlikely that, by analogy to the earlier, different situation involving a former codefendant who entered a plea during trial, the jury construed the dismissal of counts two and thirty-one to mean that Jefferson had pled guilty to them. Jefferson's situation was different from his former codefendant's, Jefferson having remained on trial and having argued, with support from McConaughey's concession, that the witnesses who testified to his involvement in the Burger King incident had misidentified him. We conclude that the court's refusal to give the instruction Jefferson requested was not reversible error.
A district court generally has broad discretion in ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, but this discretion "does not extend to the exclusion of crucial relevant evidence necessary to establish a valid defense." United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 671 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Here, the photographs were not allowed because of objections by codefendants Hubbard and McNealy and by the prosecution. The two codefendants objected that the surveillance photographs were highly prejudicial because they contained individuals who resembled themselves. The prosecutor added that if the photographs were introduced, they would open the door to showing criminal association of those codefendants at that time, and he would very likely make such an argument on rebuttal. The court sustained these objections, presumably on the grounds of Fed.R.Evid. 403, which allows the exclusion of evidence whose probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury...."
Jefferson argues that neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search. See United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1409 (11th Cir. 1988). The district court found probable cause, because the totality of circumstances known to Detectives Cooke and McConaughey at the time of the seizure indicated that the car was used to facilitate drug offenses and the purchaser (Gloria McNealy, said to be defendant McNealy's aunt) had no legitimate source of income to have acquired it with cash. The factual findings supporting the district court's denial of the motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, while the court's application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S. Ct. 3284, 111 L. Ed. 2d 792 (1990).
The district court also found that the potential mobility of the car satisfied the exigency requirement. Jefferson argues that this threat of mobility was nonexistent: he had one set of keys and was in custody at the time of the search; the officers obtained a second set of keys from his girlfriend at the private residence where the car was parked; and accordingly any exigency was created by law enforcement agents themselves. The government responds that the vehicle's inherent potential for mobility created an exigency justifying the warrantless search. E.g., Alexander, 835 F.2d at 1409 ("the ability of a vehicle to become mobile is sufficient to satisfy the exigency requirement," and " [t]he vehicle does not have to be moving at the moment when the police obtain probable cause to search [ ]") (citations omitted). We agree. No evidence was presented as to whether Jefferson's and his girlfriend's sets of keys were the only keys to the vehicle, or how many keys existed. Title to the Buick was in another person's name; Jefferson was not the only one to have been seen driving the vehicle; other codefendants were not yet in custody; and there was presumably a chance that someone (either coconspirators or his girlfriend) might remove incriminating evidence from the vehicle. See United States v. Forker, 928 F.2d 365, 369 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding exigent circumstances where all suspected coconspirators had not yet been apprehended, officers did not know how many sets of keys to the vehicle existed, and officers were uncertain about whether the vehicle would remain in the parking lot); Alexander, 835 F.2d at 1410 (finding exigency existed to search stationary vehicle where government argued that "because the car was not registered in [defendant's] name, the true owner could have driven it away, thus depriving the government of evidence," and that another friend or family member "might have ... sought to destroy evidence in the car if it was not searched immediately [ ]") (footnote omitted). The district court properly denied Jefferson's motion to suppress this evidence.
The government argues, as it did below, that Brazel lacks standing to challenge this search, because he has not carried his burden of showing a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the area searched. United States v. Baron-Mantilla, 743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1, 99 S. Ct. 421, 424 n. 1, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978)). The district court did not rule on this ground, instead deciding that the police officer had an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that the apartment was vacant at the time and that he had obtained valid consent from the landlord to search the area. We agree with the district court's ruling, although we also believe that Brazel lacked standing to challenge the search in any case.
To have standing, a defendant bears the burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, although the government has the burden of showing "abandonment" of the premises. United States v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir. 1994). Brazel cited no evidence in his motion to suppress and presented none at the hearing to show that he was the tenant or had an unrestricted right of occupancy or control in the apartment at the time of the search on November 4, 1991. The landlord/co-owner of the apartment building--an attorney who also had done some legal work in the past for Mathis--testified that the apartment was leased to Mathis on a month-to-month oral lease and that Mathis paid the rent. The landlord stated that the last rent was paid on October 7, and that he did not know whether that was for September or October, as he was not aware that any regular rent-payment schedule had been established. No rent was paid for November.
In addition to Brazel's lack of standing, further justification for the court's refusal to suppress lies in the fact that the officer seizing the evidence had an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that the premises were vacant and that he had obtained valid consent for the search from the landlord. While a landlord generally lacks common authority to consent to a search of a tenant's apartment, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961), a tenant who abandons the property loses any reasonable expectation of privacy he once had, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S. Ct. 683, 698, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1960). A third party's consent to search an area is valid if he has mutual use of it, with joint access to or control of the area for most purposes. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n. 7, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 n. 7, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974). And even if the consenting party does not, in fact, have the requisite relationship to the premises, there is no Fourth Amendment violation if an officer has an objectively reasonable, though mistaken, good-faith belief that the consent he has obtained valid consent to search the area. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990).
Whether or not correct, we believe that the officer's belief that the premises were vacant was "objectively reasonable" on the facts provided to him, which were consistent with his own knowledge about the case. See United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1981) (law enforcement agent had objectively reasonable good-faith belief that premises were abandoned when landlord, based on direct observation, told him that they were and this was consistent with agent's own observations and knowledge of the case); see also State v. Roberts, 160 Vt. 385, 391-92, 631 A.2d 835 (1993). Any mistake made by the detective as to whether the premises were vacant was, moreover, a mistake of fact, not one of law. Compare United States v. Elliott, 50 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1995) (since the question whether a given unit is unleased is one of fact, the officers' belief that an area was vacant and thus the owner could consent to a search was a factual error, if error at all), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 715, 133 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1996), with United States v. Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1041 (2d Cir. 1992) (warrantless entry of tenant's apartment was unconstitutional where officer made the mistaken legal conclusion that a landlord's authority to turn off electrical appliances or lights also validated the officers' search of the apartment).
Brazel argues that the district court's admission of critical evidence that, allegedly, was withheld from the defense in violation of the government's discovery obligations under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (1) (A), warrants the reversal of his convictions and a new trial.
The prosecution told the district court in response that it had inadvertently overlooked the guilty pleas until only the day before, when reviewing documents to prepare witnesses to the transactions. It then immediately obtained copies of the pleas and turned them over to the defense the next morning. The prosecution added that Brazel was on notice that his admission of guilt to the state charges would be at issue in the federal case, since one month before trial the government filed an information and notice of prior convictions referring specifically to the two state court convictions.18 The district court overruled Brazel's objection to the admission of evidence of the pleas. Without expressly determining whether the discovery obligations in Rule 16(a) (1) (A) had been violated, it ruled that Brazel's counsel knew or should have known that his admission of guilt to the state charges would be at issue.
We find no violation of Rule 16(a) (1) (A). The rule requires the government to disclose, upon a defendant's request, "any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government...." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (1) (A) (emphasis supplied). The government argues that the state court guilty pleas were not "within the possession, custody, or control of the government," for they remained with the state court clerk's office until the government obtained them during trial, at which time they were turned over to the defense. Binding precedent has construed the term "government" in Rule 16(a) (1) to refer to the "defendant's adversary, the prosecution," given the "repeated references to 'the attorney for the government' in 16(a) (1) (A), (B) and (D) and 16(a) (2)," and language in 16(a) (1) (C) referring to papers and documents "intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial." United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1271 (5th Cir. 1977). " [W]ithin the possession, custody, or control of the government" does not include possession of a federal court or probation officer under Rule 16(a) (1), id., and thus logically does not include that of a state court. Nor does possession of the "government" normally extend to that of local law enforcement offices. See Thor v. United States, 574 F.2d 215, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1978) (book containing witnesses' addresses was not discoverable under Rule 16(a) (1) (C) "because the book was not in the government's control, but in the control of the Oregon county police [ ]"); see also United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (in federal case initially investigated by local and state officers, Rule 16(a) (1) (C) did not require the prosecution to obtain items from state authorities relating to their acquisition of the defendant's financial records, for even if prosecution was aware of the documents, it did not have actual control or possession of them), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1204, 114 S. Ct. 1324, 127 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1994); United States v. Johnson, 679 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1982) (assignment of notes recorded in county was not shown to be in the "possession, custody, or control of the government" under Rule 16).19
Of course, a prosecutor may not "avoid disclosure of evidence by the simple expedient of leaving relevant evidence to repose in the hands of another agency while utilizing his access to it in preparing his case for trial; such evidence is plainly within his Rule 16 'control.' " Trevino, 556 F.2d at 1272. Nothing in this record, however, suggests that the prosecution deliberately left the state court guilty pleas with the state court offices to avoid its discovery obligations. When it realized that it did not have the pleas, it obtained them and immediately gave them to the defense counsel, or so the district court could believe.20 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing relief to Brazel under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (1) (A).
Neither did the district court commit plain error under Rule 404(b)23 when it declined to strike this evidence. Rule 404(b) permits the introduction of a prior or uncharged act if the government can show (1) that the evidence was introduced for a proper purpose and not to prove character, (2) that the defendant committed the act, and (3) that the probative value of introducing the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice. United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 1995). Here, the evidence relating to July 24, 1990 plausibly showed intent, plan, preparation, and/or identity, since other testimony suggested that Archer used the same scale found in the car on July 24 to weigh crack cocaine cookies on later occasions and that he used a rental car in Williams' name to make trips to Ft. Lauderdale to purchase cocaine base during the conspiracy period. The evidence about the July 24 incident was no doubt prejudicial, but we cannot say that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value or that it was plain error to have received the evidence. See id. at 1300 (no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of a defendant's prior marijuana dealings to support charges of possession and conspiracy to distribute cocaine "despite their differing nature and remoteness in time") (citations omitted); see also United States v. Hitsman, 604 F.2d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 1979).
Hubbard argues that the jury instruction unfairly created the impression of an obstruction of justice, when he in fact had complied with the government's first request for a handwriting sample. However, given that he stipulated to the fact that he refused to obey the court's order to give a second handwriting sample, did not object to the admissibility of the stipulation, and did not object to the jury instruction regarding this issue, we review for plain error only. Under applicable precedent, it is not error, let alone plain error, for a jury to hear evidence of a defendant's refusals to provide handwriting samples and to be instructed that it may consider such refusals as evidence of a guilty conscience. See United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833, 115 S. Ct. 111, 130 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1994); United States v. Knight, 607 F.2d 1172, 1177 (5th Cir. 1979). Here, the jury heard evidence of Hubbard's initial compliance as well as learning of his subsequent noncompliance. There was no error in the instruction given.
Hubbard objected to the admissibility of Culver's testimony on relevancy grounds at trial, but now for the first time asserts a violation of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Absent a timely, specific objection, his 404(b) claim may be reviewed for plain error only, see supra n. 28. Review is limited to correcting for errors that " 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,' and then only when a miscarriage of justice would result." United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985).
Rule 404(b) permits evidence of other wrongs to be introduced if the government can show that the evidence was introduced for a proper purpose and not to prove character, that the defendant committed the act, and that the probative value of introducing the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice. Lampley, 68 F.3d at 1299; supra Part II.H. The first part of this test is met, because evidence that a defendant threatened a witness is relevant to show consciousness of guilt, a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b). See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) (evidence of other wrongs is inadmissible to show character, but admissible to show, e.g., knowledge or intent); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 703 F.2d 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1983).
Hubbard also complains that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, because he could not cross-examine Culver about the specific circumstances surrounding the alleged threat without the jury's learning that Hubbard was being held in custody (as was Culver) before trial. But the fact that cross-examination is fraught with the peril of bringing out other facts detrimental to a defendant does not amount to a denial of that right. See United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 731 (10th Cir. 1982) (no violation of confrontation right where defendant declined to cross-examine his probation officer for tactical reasons). Hubbard's sole basis for arguing that he was deprived of an effective cross-examination of Culver was that the district court, in deference to the wishes of the prosecutor and defense attorneys, had warned against inquiry into the fact that Culver had been in custody. But Hubbard never told the court that he actually wanted to question Culver in such a way as to risk bringing out their incarceration together. Hubbard in fact moved for a mistrial when other defense attorneys unintentionally referred to this. The court's warnings would appear to have been an attempt to accommodate what it believed were Hubbard's own wishes, as well as to prevent the prejudicing of any defendant including Hubbard. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986) ("trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, ... prejudice"). We see no basis, in these circumstances, for Hubbard to argue that he was prevented from cross-examining Culver effectively.
Hubbard argues that he was prejudiced by the admission of numerous cordless and cellular telephone conversations that were illegally obtained by the government. The argument is entirely without merit. Hubbard did not move to suppress the recordings in the district court, and his argument that the recordings were excludable under state law is, in any event, without relevance here. " ' [I]t is well settled that federal law governs the admissibility of tape recordings in federal criminal cases,' and complaints that the evidence was obtained in violation of state law are of no effect." United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting that warrantless tape recordings should have been suppressed under Florida constitutional law because state and local officials were involved in the investigation) (quoting United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 253 (5th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108, 103 S. Ct. 735, 74 L. Ed. 2d 958 (1983); accord United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 695 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is not absolute and must, on occasion, give way to other rights and interests. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2214, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984). The purposes of the public-trial guarantee are to ensure that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors perform their functions responsibly; to encourage witnesses to come forward and discourage perjury; and to allow the public to see that a defendant is tried fairly. Id. at 46, 104 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (citations omitted). To further these interests, a party seeking total closure of a proceeding would have to show that the measures taken were necessary to serve an overriding interest, and the court would have to consider other alternatives and make findings adequate to support closure. Id. at 48, 104 S. Ct. at 2216-17 (stating standard in case where seven-day suppression hearing was closed to all but witnesses, court personnel, the parties, and counsel). Where proceedings are only partially closed, however, the test is less stringent; a "substantial" rather than a "compelling" reason is required where at least some access by the public is retained. Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S. Ct. 1170, 84 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1985). Defendants characterize this case as a "complete closure," because the identification procedure, once imposed, remained in effect throughout the remainder of the trial. We think, however, that if the identification procedure can be said to have imposed a closure at all, it was "partial," as all persons wishing to enter the courtroom were allowed to do so provided they identified themselves as required, and the required identification was not especially arduous. See id. at 532 ("partial closure" where press and family members of defendant, witness, and decedent were allowed to remain in courtroom during one witness's testimony); cf. Herring v. Meachum, 11 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1993) (trial court's decision to lock doors during jury charge "did not amount even to a partial closure," since all members of the public and press could attend if they arrived in time and space was available), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1059, 114 S. Ct. 1629, 128 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1994).
Assuming a partial closure, a "substantial reason" would be needed to justify it. The district judge (who was the chairperson of the security committee and also the administrative judge for the building) implemented the procedure sua sponte, noting that a previous trial that received much attention had done the same and she wanted to "keep tabs on the comings and goings of people in and out of the Courthouse." When defendants objected the next day, the judge noted that she had observed during the last week and into the present one that individuals were entering and "going into various positions in this courtroom and ... staring at the witnesses that were on the stand." The fixed stares were "making the witnesses uncomfortable, because I observed it." The court expressed concern with individuals "in any way attempt [ing] to influence or affect the testimony of any witness" or "affecting anybody who is a participant in this trial as a defendant, as a juror, as a witness, as a lawyer, as a party." The prosecution said that case agents had observed the same behavior (fixed stares at both witnesses and counsel at the government's table). Defendants objected that the identification procedure could have a chilling effect on the public, because some people might fear that if they identified themselves (by name, address, and birth date), a computer check might be run and they might be suspected of being a part of the drug conspiracy. Defendants proposed that to avoid infringing on their clients' rights to a public trial, a less restrictive measure be used, e.g., having the judge identify those individuals in the courtroom she thought were impeding a fair trial and then recessing to have the marshals identify them.
Defendants argue that they were deprived of their presumption of innocence and a fair trial when the district court required them to wear leg shackles for the last four weeks of trial. The Supreme Court has stated that "the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, [and] the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings," but in some situations, shackling "might possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way" to handle a contumacious defendant. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970). The Fifth Circuit similarly has stated:
United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir.) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898, 97 S. Ct. 262, 50 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1976). We hold that the district court's actions were within its discretion here.
Two months into trial, on April 12, 1993, the court held an in-chambers conference at which the prosecution and a U.S. Marshal raised concerns about security. The prosecution stated that: (1) the defendants' behavior has sometimes been disruptive and defiant to U.S. Marshals when exiting the courtroom, and in particular, defendant Hubbard "has made several direct derogatory comments to the Court, to the United States Marshal Service and the Marshals who have been in charge maintaining security in the Courtroom";29 (2) female U.S. Marshals had reported to the prosecution on numerous instances that defendants had challenged them verbally and physically with respect to their authority; (3) there was at least one outburst by codefendants Jefferson and Brazel; (4) three defendants (believed to be Brazel, Jefferson, and McNealy) were observed making threats to a witness on the stand by holding a finger up to their heads as if to shoot; (5) all defendants were facing life sentences; and (6) one afternoon after a recess of the trial, a small caliber projectile was shot at the front door of the courthouse, which may or may not have been related to this case. A U.S. Marshal added that the defendants' behavior had changed "dramatically" in the last week, and "they bec [a]me generally more defiant and more disruptive and kind of getting an I don't care attitude for whatever reason." The district judge expressed concern for the safety of everyone in the courtroom as the trial progressed into its final stages and noted the small size and layout of the courtroom. She indicated that the minimum security measures necessary should be implemented in a way that would not prejudice the defendants. After instructing defense counsel not to pass defendants anything (pens, etc.), she raised the possibility of shackling the defendants while placing cloths around the counsels' tables so that the jury did not see anything. The conference ended with the court allowing defense counsel an opportunity to speak to their clients before any decision was made.
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to allow the use of leg shackles in these circumstances. The court acted reasonably on the basis of the prosecution's and marshals' representations as to defendants' conduct, its own direct observation of the demeanor of the defendants and witnesses and of changes occurring in the previous week, the fact that defendants faced life sentences, and the potential for outbursts or escape attempts as the end of trial approached. See Allen v. Montgomery, 728 F.2d 1409, 1413 (11th Cir. 1984) (" [P]hysical restraints and added security precautions may be required to protect courtroom personnel, including the judge, the jury, and the lawyers, against threatened harm.") (citation omitted); Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1983) (no abuse of discretion in requiring defendant to wear leg shackles at trial where district court was aware of defendant's previous escape attempt and observed defendant at trial), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 941, 104 S. Ct. 1921, 80 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1984). The court's use of cloths to cover all counsels' tables so that the leg shackles were not visible significantly reduced the possibility of prejudice. Cf. Allen, 728 F.2d at 1413 (where jurors caught at most a brief glimpse of defendant in handcuffs, there was no abuse of discretion in imposing strict security measures where death threats had been made against the trial judge and a witness).
The defendants challenge the method that the government used, and the district court accepted, to calculate drug quantity. While rejecting most aspects of their challenge, we agree that one part of the calculations was insufficiently supported: the determination that 91 kilograms was supplied from May until November 1991. The government's initial calculation for that period, based on quantities that witnesses specifically saw or knew were delivered by the suppliers, totaled almost 32 kilograms (12 kilograms by the Jamaicans, 15.775 in identifiable quantities by McNealy, Jefferson, and/or Hubbard, and 4 kilograms by Hubbard). This figure was clearly based on adequate evidence. See United States v. Hansley, 54 F.3d 709, 714 & nn. 4 & 5 (11th Cir.) (basing calculations on specific number of attempted trips to purchase drugs and reliable determinations of quantity), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 539, 133 L. Ed. 2d 444 and --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 540, 133 L. Ed. 2d 444 and --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 575, 133 L. Ed. 2d 498 and --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 582, 133 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1995).
McKinnon was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. The sentencing court accepted the recommendations by the prosecution and in the PSR that she be held responsible for the entire amount of crack cocaine distributed from March 1990 until November 1, 1991, and, finding a total offense level of 4437 and criminal history category of I, sentenced her to life imprisonment. McKinnon argues that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, because the evidence at trial and sentencing did not show that she ever agreed to participate in a conspiracy to distribute drugs. She also faults the district court for failing to make specific findings as to the extent of drug activities undertaken by her and the specific quantities attributable to her. We find these arguments unpersuasive, for the district court made specific rulings as to McKinnon's role and the foreseeability of her coconspirators' acts, and we cannot say that its factual findings were clearly erroneous. See Hansley, 54 F.3d at 714; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1).
McKinnon testified at the sentencing hearing. Under oath, she stated that she was not involved in the conspiracy, that since trial a few cooperating witnesses had told her they lied at trial or had apologized for their testimony,38 that she was coerced into staying with Mathis because of an abusive relationship, that Mathis shared little of his "business dealings" with her, and that she did not profit from the activities of the conspiracy, as she had her own job driving a school bus from mid-1988 until February 1991, when she left after learning she had become pregnant. As detailed earlier, however, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for a reasonable jury to find that the government proved the conspiracy charge against McKinnon beyond a reasonable doubt. The record of the trial was incorporated at sentencing, and the sentencing court was required to make findings supported only by a preponderance of the evidence. The question before us, then, is not whether McKinnon agreed to become a part of the conspiracy, but whether the district court committed clear error in determining the scope of her agreement and the extent to which her coconspirators' acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were reasonably foreseeable to her. "A sentencing court may not speculate on the extent of a defendant's involvement in a conspiracy," United States v. Adams, 1 F.3d 1566, 1581 (11th Cir. 1993). A preponderance of the evidence must support its findings.
McKinnon argues that the district court erred in refusing to decrease her sentence by four levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) for being a minimal participant. This subsection applies to defendants "who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.... [T]he defendant's lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role as minimal participant." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 comment. (n. 1). We are constrained to review the district court's refusal to allow the downward adjustment for clear error only, and cannot say that this high standard was met here. The district court heard the witnesses' testimony at trial, and its findings at sentencing based on that evidence support its conclusion that McKinnon played more than a minimal role in the conspiracy. See United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 309-310 (11th Cir. 1992).
Brazel was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and two substantive distribution offenses on March 22 and 25, 1991. He was sentenced on all three counts to concurrent terms of life imprisonment.41 He argues on appeal that the district court erred in imposing a mandatory minimum life imprisonment term on the conspiracy count because he had committed the offense "after two or more prior convictions for a felony offense have become final." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A). Brazel argues that the two Florida convictions for selling crack cocaine on March 22 and 25, 1991 were not "prior" offenses because they occurred during the conspiracy, and further, they were not "final" within the meaning of the statute. The government concedes the latter point, so we need not address the former. This circuit has held that for purposes of enhanced sentencing under this statutory provision, a conviction is not final until "all avenues of direct attack have been exhausted." United States v. Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 467 (11th Cir. 1982) (construing finality requirement in § 841(b) (1) (B), which contains same pertinent language as § 841(b) (1) (A)); see also United States v. Lovell, 16 F.3d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1994) (collecting circuit cases). Brazel was convicted of the state counts on October 17, 1991 and was sentenced on November 18, 1991. While the record does not show whether he appealed, it is clear he would not have exhausted his appeal rights under state rules until after the conspiracy had ended. Thus, the provision for enhanced sentencing based on prior, final convictions was inapplicable. However, Brazel is not entitled to a remand, because life sentences on each count were required by his total offense level of 47 and criminal history category of III. See U.S.S.G. § 5A & comment. (n. 2) (Nov. 1992).
We review the district court's factual findings on this matter for clear error, and its application of the enhancement de novo. See United States v. Taylor, 88 F.3d 938, 942 (11th Cir. 1996). The district court found that Jefferson made a decision to defy authority rather than provide exemplars which the government was seeking in order to compare his writing to that on drug tally sheets. Having examined the record, we are satisfied that the two-level enhancement was appropriate. Id. at 944.
See also United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1284-1287 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding conspiracy conviction where defendant claimed he had no specific task within the conspiracy but was shown to have facilitated the venture as a whole); United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1991) (sustaining conspiracy conviction of leading drug distributor's girlfriend where evidence showed that he occasionally stayed at her apartment and stored a suitcase of cocaine in a closet there, both were arrested there while awaiting a large delivery of cocaine, and expert witness gave uncontroverted testimony that drug dealers do not discuss or deliver large quantities of drugs in presence of innocent bystanders), aff'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 534, 113 S. Ct. 933, 122 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1993)
Rule 48(a) covers the dismissal of counts of an indictment as well as the whole. See, e.g., United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d 36, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1994) (analyzing dismissal of one count after defendant pled guilty to three), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 2286, 132 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1995); Woodring v. United States, 311 F.2d 417, 424 (8th Cir.) (allowing dismissal of one count before case was submitted to the jury), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913, 83 S. Ct. 1304, 10 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1963)
Cf. United States v. Del Vecchio, 707 F.2d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (absence of defendant's consent did not violate Rule 48(a) where trial had not yet commenced); accord United States v. Arzate, 545 F.2d 481, 481 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
Courts have in rare instances allowed judgments of acquittal before the close of the government's evidence in the interests of fairness to the defendant and judicial efficiency, notwithstanding the plain language of the rule. See United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 413-414 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing cases); 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 462 at 639 & n. 2 (1982)
Although Brazel failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress, the district court ruled on the merits of his motion at trial, and that ruling is now reviewable. See United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S. Ct. 576, 83 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1984)
The state court convictions were formally entered on October 17, 1991. The government's filing listed the two convictions and quoted 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1) (A) as follows: "If any person commits a violation of this subchapter ... after two or more convictions for a felony drug offense have become final, such persons shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release and fined in accordance with the preceding sentence."
While it is possible that the term "government" in Rule 16(a) (1) may include investigative agencies aligned with the prosecution and to which the prosecution has ready access, that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Trevino, 556 F.2d at 1272; cf. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 649-50 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (tape recording of undercover drug deal with defendant, taken by agents of Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, was discoverable under Rule 16(a) (1), because "government" may include both the prosecution and an aligned investigative agency)
See United States v. Cannington, 729 F.2d 702, 711-12 (11th Cir. 1984) (where defendant's entire defense was misidentification and the prosecution introduced a rental agreement with his signature on it which had not been disclosed before trial, Rule 16(a) (1) (A) was not violated because the prosecution did not possess the evidence until a witness produced it during trial; the document was immediately given to the defense, and the trial court was within its discretion in finding that the prosecution acted in good faith and could not have produced what it did not have)
See United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Evidentiary errors that are not specifically objected to at trial are reviewed for plain error. We correct only for errors that are particularly egregious and that 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,' and then only when a miscarriage of justice would result.") (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029, 1042 (11th Cir. 1986) (where objection at trial to admissibility of evidence was based on relevancy and hearsay and not on ground urged on appeal, review was for plain error only), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1037, 107 S. Ct. 1973, 95 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1987); accord United States v. Carrillo-Figueroa, 34 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 1994) ("since appellant failed to state a specific objection based on Rule 404(b), and no such basis of objection could be considered clear from the context," review was for plain error only)
See also Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 1995) (trial judge's prevention of ingress and egress to courtroom during witness testimony did not violate public-trial right where "trial judge was merely maintaining order in his courtroom and ensuring a non-disruptive atmosphere" for participants, press, and public; no one was ordered to leave; no portion of trial was completely closed to public; and "record does not reveal that anyone interested in the case was excluded from the courtroom [ ]"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 2533, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1056 (1996); Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1992) (trial court's exclusion of defendant's family members from courtroom during testimony of government witness did not violate public-trial right, where family members had approached witness outside courtroom and made her apprehensive about testifying)
See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 41 F.3d 1435, 1447 (11th Cir.) (review of the record did not reveal "sufficient circumstantial or direct evidence that January 17 was a reliable proxy for all of the other days in the conspiracy [ ]"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 1987, 131 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1995); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1199 (1st Cir. 1993) ("the gap in proof is not satisfied by showing ... that more trips and larger amounts are consistent with the general scale of the [drug leader's] enterprise [ ]"), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1223, 114 S. Ct. 2714, 129 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1994); United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1509 (10th Cir. 1993) (averages used to arrive at drug quantity findings must be "more than a guess")
See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c), 5A (Nov. 1, 1992). For the conspiracy to distribute drugs count on which all defendants were convicted, the mandatory term was ten years to life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A)
She received a base offense level of 42 corresponding to an amount of crack cocaine in excess of 15 kilograms, and a two-level increase for possession of a firearm during the drug conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1); United States v. Otero, 890 F.2d 366, 367 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (discussing conditions for attributing to one conspirator a coconspirator's possession of a firearm)
Defendant O knows about her boyfriend's ongoing drug-trafficking activity, but agrees to participate on only one occasion by making a delivery for him at his request when he was ill. Defendant O is accountable under subsection (a) (1) (A) for the drug quantity on that one occasion. Defendant O is not accountable for the other drug sales made by her boyfriend because those sales were not in furtherance of her jointly undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the one delivery).
See United States v. Lee, 68 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 1995) (where district court's decision on quantity of drugs attributable to conspirator was based on testimony at trial which it conducted, "we give great deference to the district court's assessment of the credibility and evidentiary content of [the witnesses'] testimony [ ]")
This section provides for a two-level increase " [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense."