Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/315/15/case.php
Timestamp: 2018-06-21 17:51:57
Document Index: 508367513

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 210', '§ 47', '§ 238', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 205', '§ 1']

These cases are an appeal and a cross-appeal under § 210 (28 U.S.C. § 47a), and § 238 of the Judicial Code chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The findings of the Commission may be briefly summarized as follows: Fleming, on and since June 1, 1935, was engaged in bona fide operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle "in drive-away service of new automotive vehicles, finished and unfinished, and new automotive vehicle chassis." This drive-away or caravaning method of transportation is performed by individual driving of the vehicle under its own power, by driving one vehicle under its own power and towing a second vehicle attached to the first, or by driving under its own power a vehicle upon which another vehicle is partially or wholly mounted. Shipments by Fleming originated from the factories of automobile manufacturers in Detroit, Michigan, and were made to dealers and distributors in various states. Certain new cars were returned to Detroit in the same manner. Fleming commenced operations in 1933, and, between January 1, 1934, and June 1, 1935, transported shipments to one point each in Arkansas and Alabama; to two points each in California, New York, Pennsylvania and Tennessee; to three points each in Washington, Oregon, Kentucky, and North Carolina; to four points in Texas; to five points in South Carolina, and to seven points in Georgia. About 1,200 vehicles were transported in this period, and more than 2,100 from 1933 to July, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We are met at the outset with the question of the standing of the appellant railroad companies (seventy-one in number) to bring and maintain the suit in the District Court. All but a few intervened in the hearing before the Commission. Each is a common carrier and a competitor of Fleming in some portion of the territory which chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1(20) of Part I (49 U.S.C. § 1(20)), authorizes "any party in interest" to sue to enjoin any construction, operation or abandonment of a railroad made contrary to § 1 (18) or (19). Such suits may be maintained not only where the railroad proceeds without authorization of the Commission, but also where it proceeds under a certificate of the Commission whose validity is challenged. Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382. Hence, we conclude that § 205(h) has incorporated by reference the "party in interest" provision of § 1(20). We do not stop to inquire what effect, if any, the status of appellant railroad companies as intervenors before the Commission had on their right to bring and maintain this suit. Cf. Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, with Pittsburgh & West Virginia Ry. Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479. They clearly have a stake as carriers in the transportation situation which the order of the Commission affected. They are competitors of Fleming for automobile traffic in territory served by him. They are transportation agencies directly affected by competition with the motor transport industry -- competition which, prior to the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, had proved destructive. S.Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 13-27. They are members of the national transportation system which that Act was designed to coordinate. S.Rep. No. 482, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.Rep. No. 1645, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. Hence, they are parties in interest within chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"Territory" is not a word of art. The characteristics of the transportation service involved, as well as the geographical area serviced, are relevant to the territorial chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Commission took a somewhat similar approach to the problem presented in the instant case. It noted that Fleming was restricted to shipments at points where the manufacturers had established distribution facilities; that those facilities were limited in any given area; that Fleming's opportunity for service was therefore confined to a very few distribution points, and his operations were irregular; that less than an estimated seven percent of all new automobiles sold during 1935 in twenty-four western states were transported by the drive-away method; that distribution points in the automobile industry are constantly shifted; that allowance must be made for frequent changes in points served by a carrier who depends for his traffic entirely upon this one industry, and that Fleming's future opportunity for obtaining traffic will doubtless be as limited as in the past. In view of the scope of his holding out and the nature and characteristics of the highly specialized transportation service rendered, the Commission authorized continuance of his service to all points in the enumerated states. That is a judgment which we should respect. Certainly we cannot say that it was a wholly inappropriate method for creating that substantial parity between future operations and prior bona fide operations which the statute contemplates. The special characteristics of this roving transportation service make tenable the conclusion that Fleming's prior limited opportunity for service could not be preserved unless statewide areas, within the scope of his holding out and partially covered by his previous operations, were kept open chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellant railroad companies also insist that Fleming was not in "bona fide operation" in Oregon because, in January, 1936, he obtained in that state a contract carrier permit. The argument is that he could not obtain under the "grandfather clause" common carrier rights in Oregon in the face of his contract carrier status there. Cf. United States v. Maher, 307 U. S. 148. They further urge that Fleming's operations in Nebraska (one of the states through which his irregular routes were authorized) were conducted in violation of state law. In that connection, reliance is placed on his testimony that, in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is urged on the cross-appeal that the court below should not have set aside the Commission's inclusion of Arkansas in the certificate. The evidence was that Fleming had served only one locality in Arkansas -- the city of Texarkana. He had made three shipments there aggregating twenty-five vehicles. All of those shipments had been made prior to June 1, 1935, the latest being May 12, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary