Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104112/califano-vs-jobst
Timestamp: 2016-10-25 05:36:35
Document Index: 759796826

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 402', '§ 1252', '§ 1381', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402']

Califano Vs Jobst - Citation 104112 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Califano Vs. Jobst - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/104112CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-08-1977Case Number434 U.S. 47AppellantCalifanoRespondentJobstExcerpt:.....relevant test of probable dependency, the general rule which obtained before 1958, terminating all child's benefits when the beneficiary married, satisfied the constitutional test normally applied in cases like this.
see mathews v. de castro,
and cases cited at
-770. that general rule is not rendered invalid simply because some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were burdened thereby. [
] for the marriage rule cannot be criticized as merely an unthinking response to stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally disadvantaged group, [
] or as an attempt to interfere with the individual's.....Judgment:
Califano v. Jobst - 434 U.S. 47 (1977)
Provisions of the Social Security Act specifying that secondary benefits under the Act received by a disabled dependent child of a covered wage earner shall terminate when the child marries an individual who is not entitled to benefits under the Act, even though that individual is permanently disabled, held not to violate the principle of equality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp.
434 U. S. 50
(a) The general rule that entitlement to a child's statutory benefits terminates upon marriage is rational. Congress, in lieu of requiring individualized proof of dependency on a case-by-case basis, could assume that marital status is a relevant test of probable dependency, a married person being less likely than an unmarried person to be dependent on his parents for support. Pp.
434 U. S. 52
(b) The exception provided for disabled children who marry individuals entitled to benefits under the Act to the general rule that marriage terminates a child's statutory benefits is likewise rational. That exception, which is a reliable indicator of probable hardship, requires no individualized inquiry into degrees of need or periodic review to determine continued entitlement. Moreover, Congress could reasonably take one step to eliminate hardship caused by the general marriage rule without at the same time accomplishing its entire objective.
The question presented is whether Congress has the power to require that a dependent child's social security benefits terminate upon marriage even though his spouse is permanently disabled. Answering that question in the negative, the District Court held that 42 U. S. C. § 402(d)(1)(D) and 402(d)(5) deprive appellee of property without due process of law.
Jobst v. Richardson,
368 F. Supp. 909. We reverse.
Mr. Jobst has been disabled by cerebral palsy since his birth in 1932. He qualified for child's insurance benefits in 1957, several months after his father died. In 1970, he married another cerebral palsy victim. Since his wife was not entitled to benefits under the federal Act, [
] the statute required the Secretary to terminate his benefits. [
Mr. Jobst brought this suit to review the Secretary's action. [
] The District Court held that the statute violated the equality principle applicable to the Federal Government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment,
, because all child's insurance beneficiaries are not treated alike when they marry disabled persons. Beneficiaries who marry other social security beneficiaries continue to receive benefits whereas those who marry nonbeneficiaries lose their benefits permanently. The court held this distinction irrational. 368 F.Supp. at 913.
The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Noting that Mr. Jobst and his wife had become entitled to benefits under a newly enacted statute authorizing supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and disabled, [
] this Court remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of that program.
Weinberger v. Jobst,
419 U.S. 811.
The District Court reviewed the new program, concluded that it had no relevance to the issues presented by this case, and reinstated its original judgment. The Secretary again appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction.
429 U. S. 189
As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act authorized a monthly benefit for qualified wage earners at least 65 years old and a death benefit payable to the estate of a wage earner who died at an earlier age. 49 Stat. 622-624. In 1939 Congress created secondary benefits for wives, children, widows, and parents of wage earners.
53 Stat. 1362, 1364-1366. The benefits were intended to provide persons dependent on the wage earner with protection against the economic hardship occasioned by loss of the wage earner's support.
In 1956, Congress enlarged the class of persons entitled to a child's benefit to include those who, like Mr. Jobst, were under a disability which began before age 18. [
] For such a person, the benefit continued beyond the age of 18, but, as with other secondary benefits, it terminated upon marriage.
In 1958, Congress adopted the amendment that created the basis for Mr. Jobst's constitutional attack. The amendment provided that marriage would not terminate a child's disability benefit if the child married a person who was also entitled to benefits under the Act.
72 Stat. 1030-1031. A similar dispensation was granted to widows, widowers, divorced wives, and parents. [
] In each case, the secondary benefit survives a marriage to another beneficiary, but any other marriage -- even to a disabled person unable to provide the beneficiary with support -- is a terminating event unaffected by the 1958 amendment.
The provision challenged in this case is part of a complex statutory scheme designed to administer a trust fund financed, in large part, by taxes levied on the wage earners who are the primary beneficiaries of the fund. The entitlement of any secondary beneficiary is predicated on his or her relationship to a contributing wage earner. If the statutory requirements for eligibility are met, the amount of the benefit is unrelated to the actual need of the beneficiary.
See, e.g., Mathews v. De Castro, supra,
-186. The statute is designed to provide the wage earner and the dependent members of his family with protection against the hardship occasioned by his loss of earnings; it is not simply a welfare program generally benefiting needy persons.
430 U. S. 213
Nor has Congress made actual dependency on the wage earner either a sufficient or a necessary condition of eligibility in every case. [
] Instead of requiring individualized proof on a case-by-case basis, Congress has elected to use simple criteria, such as age and marital status, to determine probable dependency. [
] A child who is married or over 18 and neither
disabled nor a student is denied benefits because Congress has assumed that such a child is not normally dependent on his parents. There is no question about the power of Congress to legislate on the basis of such factual assumptions. General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases.
status is a relevant test of probable dependency, the general rule which obtained before 1958, terminating all child's benefits when the beneficiary married, satisfied the constitutional test normally applied in cases like this.
] or as an attempt to interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as important as marriage. [
Both the class of persons favored by the 1958 amendment and the class which remains subject to the burdens of the general marriage rule include persons who are not disabled. [
] The broad legislative classification must be judged by reference to characteristics typical of the affected classes, rather than by focusing on selected, atypical examples. When so judged, both the exception and its limits are valid.
The 1958 amendment reflects a legislative judgment that a marriage between two persons receiving benefits will not normally provide either spouse with protection against the economic hardship that would be occasioned by the termination of benefits. The Secretary submits, and we agree, that it was reasonable for Congress to ameliorate the severity of the earlier rule by protecting both spouses from the dual hardship which it effected. [
Mr. Jobst argues, however, that the reason for the amendment applies equally to his situation. He urges that his hardship is just as great as that which the amendment avoids when one beneficiary marries another, because his spouse is also disabled. He therefore attacks the exception as irrationally underinclusive. [
] We are persuaded, however, that, even if the benign purpose of the 1958 amendment encompasses this case, [
] legitimate reasons justify the limits that Congress placed on it.
. The exception, like the general rule itself, is simple to
administer. It requires no individualized inquiry into degrees of hardship or need. [
] It avoids any necessity for periodic review of the beneficiaries' continued entitlement. In the cases to which the exception does apply, it is a reliable indicator of probable hardship. Since the test is one that may be applied without introducing any new concepts into the administration of the trust fund, [
] Congress could reasonably take one firm step toward the goal of eliminating the hardship caused by the general marriage rule without accomplishing its entire objective in the same piece of legislation.
. Even if it might have been wiser to take a larger step, the step Congress did take
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended by the Social Security Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U.S.C. § 1381
The idea that marriage changes dependency is expressed throughout the Social Security Act. Most secondary beneficiaries are eligible only if they have not married or remarried.
42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(C) (divorced wives); § 402(e)(1)(A) (widows); § 402 (f)(1)(A) (widowers); § 402 (g)(1)(A) (surviving or divorced mothers); § 402 (h)(1)(C) (parents). With some limited exceptions, §§ 402(e)(4) and (f)(5), marriage or remarriage marks the end of secondary benefits. §§ 402(b)(1)(H) (1970 ed., Supp. V), 402(e)(1), 402(f)(1), 402(g)(1), and 402(h)(1). In each case, however, Congress has excepted marriages to some social security beneficiaries. §§ 402(b)(3), 402(e)(3), 402(f)(4), 402(g)(3), and 402(h)(4).
See Whalen v. Roe,
429 U. S. 603
. Congress adopted this rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of family life. This is not a case in which government seeks to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling by banning, or criminally prosecuting, nonconforming marriages.
See Loving v. Virginia, supra.
Congress has simply recognized that marriage traditionally brings changed responsibilities.
As we have seen, the burden of the general marriage rule is not limited to disabled beneficiaries; children, widowers, widows, divorced wives, and parents -- all are affected by the rule. And although the District Court singled out for analysis marriages to disabled nonbeneficiaries, Congress did not; Mr. Jobst would also have lost his benefits if he had married an able-bodied woman who was not receiving social security benefits. Finally, the protection extended by the 1958 amendment encompasses many more persons than those described by the District Court. Like the marriage rule itself, the amendment affects widows, widowers, parents, and divorced wives, as well as disabled children.
Even if we were to sustain his attack, and even though we recognize the unusual hardship that the general rule has inflicted upon him, it would not necessarily follow that Mr. Jobst is entitled to benefits.
Cf. Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U. S. 17
429 U. S. 501
. For the vice in the statute stems from the exception created by the 1958 amendment; that vice could be cured either by invalidating the entire exception or by enlarging it. Since the choice involves legislation having a nationwide impact, the equities of Mr. Jobst's case would not control.
Developments in the Law -- Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1136-1137 (1969). If we were to enlarge the exception, it would be necessary to fashion some new test of need, dependency, or disability. Although the District Court only granted relief for persons marrying a "totally disabled" spouse, its rationale would equally apply to any marriage of a secondary beneficiary to a needy nonbeneficiary.