Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/101205/united-states-vs-seeger
Timestamp: 2017-12-11 09:49:14
Document Index: 746652833

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6']

United States Vs Seeger - Citation 101205 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Seeger - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/101205
Case Number 380 U.S. 163
Respondent Seeger
united states v. seeger - 380 u.s. 163 (1965) u.s. supreme court united states v. seeger, 380 u.s. 163 (1965) united states v. seeger no. 50 argued november 16-17, 1964 decided march 8, 1965 * 380 u.s. 163 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus these three cases involve the exemption claims under § 6(j) of the universal military training and service act of conscientious objectors who did not belong to an orthodox religious sect. section 6(j) excepts from combatant service in the armed forces those who are conscientiously opposed to participation in war by reason of their "religious training and belief," i.e., belief in an individual's relation to a supreme being.....
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
Decided March 8, 1965 *
1. The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. Pp. 380 U. S. 173 -180.
(a) The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief. P. 380 U. S. 173 .
(b) There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision does not deal with that question. Pp. 380 U. S. 173 -174.
(c) This test accords with long established legislative policy of equal treatment for those whose objection to military service is based on religious beliefs. Pp. 380 U. S. 177 -180.
doctrines, nor are they to reject beliefs because they are not comprehensible. Pp. 380 U. S. 184 -185.
3. Under the broad construction applicable to § 6(j), the applications involved in these cases, none of which was based on merely personal moral codes, qualified for exemption. Pp. 380 U. S. 185 -188.
Jakobson was originally classified 1-A in 1953, and intermittently enjoyed a student classification until 1956. It was not until April, 1958, that he made claim to noncombatant classification (1-A-O) as a conscientious objector. He stated on the Selective Service System form that he believed in a "Supreme Being" who was "Creator of Man" in the sense of being "ultimately responsible for the existence of" man, and who was "the Supreme Reality" of which "the existence of man is the result. " R. 44. (Emphasis in the original.) He explained that his religious
and social thinking had developed after much meditation and thought. He had concluded that man must be "partly spiritual," and, therefore, "partly akin to the Supreme Reality," and that his "most important religious law" was that "no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a means to any other end. . . ." R. 45-46. In December, 1958, he requested a 1-O classification, since he felt that participation in any form of military service would involve him in "too many situations and relationships that would be a strain on [his] conscience that [he felt he] must avoid." R. 70. He submitted a long memorandum of "notes on religion" in which he defined religion as the " sum and essence of one's basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of human existence, " R. 72 (emphasis in the original); he said that he believed in "Godness," which was "the Ultimate Cause for the fact of the Being of the Universe"; that to deny its existence would but deny the existence of the universe, because "anything that Is, has an Ultimate Cause for its Being." R. 73. There was a relationship to Godness, he stated, in two directions, i.e., "vertically, towards Godness directly," and "horizontally, towards Godness through Mankind and the World." R. 74. He accepted the latter one. The Board classified him 1-A-O, and Jakobson appealed. The hearing officer found that the claim was based upon a personal moral code, and that he was not sincere in his claim. The Appeal Board classified him 1-A. It did not indicate upon what ground it based its decision, i.e., insincerity or a conclusion that his belief was only a personal moral code. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim came within the requirements of § 6(j). Because it could not determine whether the Appeal Board had found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within the statutory definition, or whether it had concluded that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the indictment.
The Act required that all persons be inducted into the armed services, but allowed the conscientious objectors to perform noncombatant service in capacities designated by the President of the United States. Although the 1917 Act excused religious objectors only, in December, 1917, the Secretary of War instructed that "personal scruples against war" be considered as constituting "conscientious objection." Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection at 54-55 (1950). This Act, including its conscientious objector provisions, was upheld against constitutional attack in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 , 245 U. S. 389 -390 (1918).
Between 1940 and 1948, two courts of appeals [ Footnote 1 ] held that the phrase "religious training and belief" did not include philosophical, social or political policy. Then, in 1948, the Congress amended the language of the statute and declared that "religious training and belief" was to be defined as
"This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in subsection 5(g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious training and belief in his relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant military service. ( See United States v. Berman ( sic ), 156 F.2d 377, certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 795)."
I NTERPRETATION OF § 6(j)
or intimate any decision on that situation in these cases. Nor do the parties claim the monotheistic belief that there is but one God; what they claim (with the possible exception of Seeger, who bases his position here not on factual, but on purely constitutional, grounds) is that they adhere to theism, which is the "Belief in the existence of a god or gods; . . . Belief in superhuman powers or spiritual agencies in one or many gods," as opposed to atheism. [ Footnote 2 ] Our question, therefore, is the narrow one: does the term "Supreme Being," as used in § 6(j), mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, "to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent"? Webster's New International Dictionary (Second Edition). In considering this question, we resolve it solely in relation to the language of § 6(j), and not otherwise.
At 283 U. S. 633 -634. (Emphasis supplied.)
At 283 U. S. 634 .
is based on grounds that can fairly be said to be "religious." [ Footnote 3 ] To hold otherwise would not only fly in the face of Congress' entire action in the past; it would ignore the historic position of our country on this issue since its founding.
The Schema of the recent Ecumenical Council included a most significant declaration on religion: [ Footnote 4 ]
"Surely a scheme of life designed to obviate [man's inhumanity to man], and, by removing temptations and all the allurements of ambition and avarice, to nurture the virtues of unselfishness, patience, love, and service, ought not to be denounced as not pertaining to religion when its devotees regard it as an essential tenet of their religious faith. "
132 Iowa at 315, 109 N.W. at 898, cited in Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381. (Emphasis by the Court of Appeals.) The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question the existence of the registrant's "Supreme Being" or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government. As MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 , 322 U. S. 86 (1944):
But we hasten to emphasize that, while the "truth" of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is "truly held." This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact -- a prime consideration to the validity of every claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for assisting the Appeal Boards in making this determination, placing at their service the facilities of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and hearing officers. Finally, we would point out that, in Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 , (1946), this Court held that:
At 327 U. S. 122 -123.
If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties. For then those who embraced one religious faith, rather than another, would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we held in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 , would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It would also result in a denial of equal protection by preferring some religions over others -- an invidious discrimination that would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 .
The legislative history of this Act leaves much in the dark. But it is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe the words "Supreme Being" to include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so than other instances where we have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case than the present one, we said that the words of a statute may be strained "in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt." United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 , 345 U. S. 47 . [ Footnote 2/1 ]
in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled to exemption under the statute. None comes to us an avowedly irreligious person or as an atheist; [ Footnote 2/2 ] one as a sincere believer in "goodness and virtue for their own sakes." His questions and doubts on theological issues, and his wonder, are no more alien to the statutory standard than are the awe-inspired questions of a devout Buddhist.
And see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 , 285 U. S. 62 ; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422 , 350 U. S. 433 ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 341 , 297 U. S. 348 (concurring opinion).
If he was an atheist, quite different problems would be presented. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 .