Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/709/1235/6853/
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 17:02:44
Document Index: 650195542

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 794', '§ 793', '§ 1983', '§ 1242', '§ 794', '§ 793', '§ 1983', '§ 793', '§ 1983']

Lee Meyerson, Plaintiff-appellant, v. the State of Arizona; Arizona Board of Regents; Ralph M.bilby; Rudy E. Campbell; Esther N. Capin; Earl H.carroll; Thomas Chandler; William G. Payne; William P.reilly; Tio A. Tachias; Renee Marler; John Schwada;paige E. Mulhollan; Karl H. Dannenfeldt; Joyce Foster;guido Weigand; Austin Jones; Leonard D. Goodstein; Peterkilleen; John Does I Thru V; and Jane Does I Thru V,defendants-appellees, 709 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1983 › Lee Meyerson, Plaintiff-appellant, v. the State of Arizona; Arizona Board of Regents; Ralph M.bilby;...
Lee Meyerson, Plaintiff-appellant, v. the State of Arizona; Arizona Board of Regents; Ralph M.bilby; Rudy E. Campbell; Esther N. Capin; Earl H.carroll; Thomas Chandler; William G. Payne; William P.reilly; Tio A. Tachias; Renee Marler; John Schwada;paige E. Mulhollan; Karl H. Dannenfeldt; Joyce Foster;guido Weigand; Austin Jones; Leonard D. Goodstein; Peterkilleen; John Does I Thru V; and Jane Does I Thru V,defendants-appellees, 709 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 709 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1983)
Argued and Submitted Dec. 14, 1982. Decided May 9, 1983
Meyerson, a handicapped psychology professor at Arizona State University (the University), charged the University with discrimination under four different statutory provisions: (1) section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794, (2) section 503 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793, (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (4) the Revenue Sharing Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1242, 1244(a). The district judge granted the University's motion for summary judgment on each statutory claim. Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1981); Meyerson v. Arizona, 526 F. Supp. 129 (D. Ariz. 1981). Meyerson appeals the entry of summary judgment only on his claims under section 503, section 504, and section 1983. We affirm.
Meyerson filed a complaint in district court asserting claims under sections 503 and 504 of the Act, section 1983, and section 1242 of the Revenue Sharing Act. The University moved for summary judgment on all four claims. The district court granted the University's motion on the section 503 claim and dismissed without prejudice Meyerson's claim under the Revenue Sharing Act for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 507 F. Supp. at 860-62, 864. The district judge also denied without prejudice the University's motion on the section 504 claim because of an inadequate record. Id. at 862-63. He also denied the University's motion on the section 1983 claim, pending the resolution of the section 504 issue. The district judge additionally held that Meyerson could not assert a section 1983 claim based on section 503. Id. at 864.
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district judge granted the University's motion on the section 504 and section 1983 claims. 526 F. Supp. at 129. On appeal, Meyerson has abandoned his claim under the Revenue Sharing Act and his section 1983 claim based on section 504. He appeals from the summary judgment entered on his sections 503 and 504 claims, and on his section 1983 claim based on section 503.
29 U.S.C. § 794. In a case decided after Meyerson filed this appeal, we stated that a private action under section 504 "cannot be maintained unless a primary objective of the federal financial assistance is to provide employment." Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital, 677 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (Scanlon) . Accord United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 620 F.2d 672, 674-75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892, 101 S. Ct. 249, 66 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947, 99 S. Ct. 2895, 61 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1979); contra Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 681 F.2d 1376, 1378-80 (11th Cir. 1982). The district court held that Meyerson failed to clear this initial hurdle.
Meyerson first requests that we reconsider our holding in Scanlon, contending that our analysis there conflicts with the Supreme Court's recent decision in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 72 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1982) (North Haven) (holding that employment discrimination comes within Title IX's prohibition). See Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1982) (Adams, J. & Weis, J., concurring) (rejecting the "primary objective" requirement as inconsistent with the Court's analysis in North Haven), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 1181, 75 L. Ed. 2d 429 (1983) (No. 82-862). North Haven, however, was issued one week prior to our filing of Scanlon and over four months before the panel's decision to deny the petition for rehearing. Thus, we must ascribe knowledge of North Haven to the panel in Scanlon. North Haven is not directly contrary to Scanlon. Since we are not permitted to reverse the decision of a panel of this court, absent a contrary intervening Supreme Court decision or a convening of our court en banc, we must adhere to our holding in Scanlon.
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract [,] the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(7) of this title....
29 U.S.C. § 793(a). Subsequent to the district court's decision in this case, we decided Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 178, 74 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1982) (Fisher) . Employing the four-part test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975), we concluded that section 503 does not give rise to a private right of action. 663 F.2d at 863-67. Meyerson makes no attempt to distinguish Fisher, requesting only that we reconsider our earlier holding. Again, this argument is one that may be made properly in a suggestion for rehearing en banc, but not to us.
Meyerson contends that although Fisher forecloses a private cause of action based directly on section 503, he may still assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a violation of section 503.2 Although we were not confronted with this question in Fisher, our reading of that case and our own independent analysis of the statutory scheme of enforcement under section 503 compel the conclusion that Meyerson cannot circumvent the holding in Fisher by asserting his section 503 claim via section 1983.
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for a violation of a federal statute under color of state law. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980). A plaintiff's failure to prove that a private cause of action may be inferred from a statute does not necessarily preclude a remedy under section 1983 based on that statute. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 18-19, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2625, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981) (Middlesex) . However, the Supreme Court has identified two exceptions to the application of section 1983 to statutory violations: (1) where Congress has foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, and (2) where the statute does not create "enforceable rights." Id. at 19, 101 S. Ct. at 2626; Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981) (Pennhurst) . Our task is to determine if either of these exceptions applies to section 503.
The district court rejected Meyerson's section 1983 claim because it concluded that section 503 conferred no substantive rights upon handicapped persons. 507 F. Supp. at 864. Thus, the district court's dismissal fits within the second Middlesex exception, the "rights" exception. Meyerson argues that the district court's conclusion cannot be upheld due to our holding in Fisher, supra. Employing the first prong of the Cort v. Ash test, we inquired in Fisher whether Congress intended to confer federal rights on the beneficiaries of section 503. Fisher, supra, 663 F.2d at 863-64. Answering affirmatively, we concluded:
In applying this first exception, the Supreme Court has stated that, " [w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under Sec. 1983." Middlesex, supra, 453 U.S. at 20, 101 S. Ct. at 2626. The Act establishes the Department as the agency responsible for enforcing its provisions:
29 U.S.C. § 793(b).
With regard to the issue concerning section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, I do so only because Scanlon v. Atascadero Hospital, 677 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), compels that result. I am still of the opinion that Scanlon was incorrectly decided, as I was when I dissented in that case. 677 F.2d at 1272-77.
The district court apparently rejected Meyerson's claim both because he failed to establish a sufficient nexus between himself and the federal assistance received by the University, and because he failed to show that a primary objective of the federal assistance was to provide employment. Meyerson v. Arizona, 526 F. Supp. 129, 130-31 (D. Ariz. 1981). Since we conclude that Meyerson fails to establish that the research grants had a primary purpose to provide employment, we need not consider the nature of the nexus requirement or whether it was established by Meyerson
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 applies to violations of all federal statutes, not just civil rights statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980).
The most salient difference involves the allocation of the burden of proof. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that Congress intended to create a private cause of action when it enacted a particular statute. See Osborn v. American Association of Retired Persons, 660 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1981) (silent legislative history and lack of express statutory language are enough to defeat inference of a private cause of action). On the other hand, the burden is not on the plaintiff to demonstrate congressional intent to preserve section 1983 remedies. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 21 n. 31, 27-28 n. 11, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2626 n. 31, 2630 n. 11, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (majority opinion and opinion of Stevens, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, in this case both the express language and the reasoning of Fisher preclude us from permitting Meyerson to assert a claim under section 1983, regardless of who shoulders the burden of proof