Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20200107_0000023.ETN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 15:14:23
Document Index: 311889012

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924']

JOSHUA MICHAEL YOUNG, Petitioner,
Before the Court is Petitioner Joshua Michael Young's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1, in No. 1:19-cv-343; Doc. 26, in No. 1:11-cr-66). Respondent, United States of America, opposes Petitioner's motion. (Doc. 4, in No. 1:19-cv-343.) For the following reasons, the Court will DENY Petitioner's § 2255 motion.
On November 8, 2011, Petitioner pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); robbery by means of actual and threatened force, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; and using, carrying, and/or brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence-the Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). (Docs. 14, 16, in No. 1:11-cr-66.) On February 16, 2012, United States District Judge Curtis L. Collier sentenced Petitioner to a total of 136 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. (Docs. 21, 22, in No. 1:11-cr-66.) Petitioner did not appeal. (Doc. 26, at 2, in No. 1:11-cr-66.)
On September 13, 2018, Petitioner mistakenly filed, with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a motion for leave to file a second or successive motion under § 2255. (See Doc. 24, in No. 1:11-cr-66.) On January 14, 2019, the Sixth Circuit denied Petitioner's motion as unnecessary, stating, “Young may file his § 2255 motion in the district court without our authorization.” (Doc. 25, at 3, in No. 1:11-cr-66.) On December 3, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 motion, asserting that his conviction under § 924(c) is unconstitutional in light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). (See Doc. 1, at 4, in No. 1:19-cv-343.) This motion is now ripe for the Court's review.
As a threshold matter, Petitioner's motion is timely under § 2255(f)(3). Petitioner's motion purports to rely exclusively on Dimaya, which the United States Supreme Court decided on April 17, 2018. If Petitioner actually relief solely upon Dimaya, his motion would be untimely because he filed the instant petition on December 3, 2019 (see Doc. 1, in No. 1:19-CV-343), several months after the one-year limitation period had lapsed. (Doc. 1.) However, as the Government notes (Doc. 4, at 2, in No. 1:19-cv-343), Petitioner's argument more appropriately relies upon United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), which the Supreme Court decided on June 24, 2019. The Court construes Petitioner's motion liberally, in light of his pro se status, and deems Petitioner's motion timely, as less than one year passed between the Supreme Court's decision in Davis and the filing of this petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
In Davis, the Supreme Court invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), known as the “residual clause” of this subsection, as unconstitutionally vague. 139 S.Ct. at 2324, 2336. But, as explained below, since Petitioner was convicted under § 924(c)(3)(A), Davis has no effect on his conviction.