Source: https://nysappeals.com/author/rrosborough4/
Timestamp: 2019-07-19 01:22:17
Document Index: 691421078

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 225', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 1400', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 470', '§ 1245', 'art 2019', '§ 421', '§ 26']

Rob Rosborough – New York Appeals
Author: Rob Rosborough
What kind of world do we live in, the Plaintiffs in White v Cuomo want to know in their constitutional challenge to New York’s Interactive Fantasy Sports Law that authorized and regulated daily fantasy sports games in New York for the first time. “[A] Shakespearean world inhabited by Romeo and Juliet where substance trumps form, and a rose is, in fact, a rose; or . . . in a parallel universe of alternative facts, like the one inhabited by Humpty Dumpty—and now by the New York State Legislature—where ‘gambling’ is not ‘gambling’ simply because the Legislature has decided to call it something else” (Plaintiffs’ App Div Brf, at 2). To the Plaintiffs, a rose is still a rose, and DFS is wagering money on real life athletes in real life games over which the bettors have no control. That’s gambling, they argue, and barred by Article I, § 9 of the New York Constitution.
In the Plaintiffs’ opening brief to the Appellate Division, Third Department, they make four principal arguments in support of Justice Connolly’s decision declaring the IFS Law unconstitutional: (1) DFS falls within the Penal Law’s definition of prohibited gambling, and the Legislature’s rationale for an opposite finding ignores the realities that DFS is a game involving a material degree of chance and are wagers on future contingent events; (2) the New York Attorney General admitted that DFS is prohibited gambling when it prosecuted DraftKings and FanDuel before the IFS Law was adopted; (3) DFS looks like gambling and is regulated like gambling, so it must be gambling; and (4) the Legislature was not free to define gambling to exclude DFS because it had applied the constitutional gambling ban to all forms of sports wagering over more than 100 years. Let’s take a closer look at each of the arguments.
DFS is Gambling Under the Penal Law Because it Involves a Material Degree of Chance and Wagers on Future Contingent Events
The Plaintiffs start with the Penal Law definition of gambling. Under Penal Law § 225.00(2), “[a] person engages in gambling when he stakes or risks something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent event not under his control or influence, upon an agreement or understanding that he will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome.” According to Plaintiffs, that means “[t]he key elements, therefore, of gambling are (1) whether a contestant stakes or risks something of value, (2) upon a contest of chance or a future contingent event not under his control or influence, (3) with the understanding he will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome” (Plaintiffs’ App Div Brf, at 32).
DFS fits all three, they argue. DFS players pay an entry fee to the companies to participate—that’s something of value. The players have absolutely no control over how the athletes they select for their fantasy teams perform in the real life games—that’s a wager on a future contingent event not under their control. And if their fantasy team outperforms others, they win a prize—that’s receiving something of value in the event of a winning outcome. So, the Plaintiffs contend, DFS is gambling as the Legislature has defined it in the Penal Law.
The Legislature’s opposite conclusion in the IFS Law, they argue, lacks a rational basis and shouldn’t be accorded the presumption of constitutionality on which the State strongly relies. Attacking the Legislature’s rationale, the Plaintiffs first argue that DFS is a game of chance. There is no real distinction between the fantasy DFS game and betting on a real sports contest, the Plaintiffs contend, because the performances on which DFS is based are real life athletes in real games on any given night over whom the DFS players have absolutely no control. An athlete they choose for their DFS team could get hurt in the first inning, or have an off night shooting the ball, or could miraculously score the game winning goal in the Miracle on Ice, but in the end, the DFS player’s performance is all based on things well outside of his or her control. There’s unquestionably a material degree of chance involved, they contend. And just like poker, the mere fact that the players use their skill to play their hands, or for DFS to assemble their teams, doesn’t eliminate that material degree of chance.
But even if DFS didn’t involve a material degree of chance, as the Legislature found and the State contends on this appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that DFS is nevertheless a wager on future contingent events over which the DFS players have no control, and so it is prohibited gambling. As the Plaintiffs put it, “it is indisputable that the outcome of any IFS contest must inevitably be based upon a future contingent event—the performance of real-life athletes in real-life games. It is equally indisputable that an IFS contestant has absolutely no control over how those athletes will perform in those games, as the State itself has stipulated” (Plaintiffs’ App Div Brf, at 47). Indeed, the Plaintiffs argue, the mere fact that those real life players are being used in a fantasy game doesn’t magically transform the bets on their performances from gambling to not gambling. Supreme Court, therefore, properly declared the IFS Law unconstitutional, the Plaintiffs assert.
The New York Attorney General’s Prior Admissions
Unsurprisingly, the Plaintiffs support much of their argument with citations to the New York Attorney General’s position and public statements that DFS is gambling prohibited by the New York Constitution in People v DraftKings. Back before the adoption of the IFS Law, the Attorney General commenced criminal proceedings against DraftKings and FanDuel for what the Attorney General claimed was illegally offering DFS games that constituted prohibited sports betting. In particular, the Attorney General told the New York Daily News:
Daily fantasy sports is much closer to online poker than it is to traditional fantasy sports … FanDuel and DraftKings take a bite out of every bet. That is what bookies do, and it is illegal in New York … In fact, as our court papers lay out, these companies are based on business models that are identical to other forms of gambling . . . Consider the final moments of a football game where the outcome has been decided and the winning quarterback takes a knee to run out the clock and assure victory. Let’s say it’s Eli Manning, and the Giants are defeating the Eagles or the Cowboys. Statistically, this play would cost the quarterback one yard – a yard that could make the difference between someone on DraftKings or FanDuel winning or losing tens of thousands of dollars. What did that have to do with the bettor’s skill? It’s the classic risk involved in sports betting. Games of choice involve some amount of skill; this does not make them legal. Good poker players often beat novices. But poker is still gambling, and running a poker room – or online casino – is illegal in New York (Plaintiffs’ App Div Brf, at 50).
Throughout the criminal proceedings, the Attorney General took a strong position that DFS was prohibited gambling, for many of the same reasons that Judge Connolly invalidated the IFS Law. The Plaintiffs now use the Attorney General’s own arguments as evidence that DFS remains the same kind of banned gambling that it was then. Indeed, quoting from a former Attorney General’s opinion, the Plaintiffs attempt to equate DFS to straight sports betting, which the Attorney General has long held needed a constitutional amendment to be authorized.
If DFS Looks Like Gambling and is Regulated Like Gambling, It Must be Gambling
What do they say about ducks? If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it’s a duck. Well, that’s how the Plaintiffs frame their third argument for why DFS is gambling banned by the New York Constitution.
Listing off a number of factors that make DFS look like gambling, the Plaintiffs cite to the bets on real life athletes in real life games over whom the DFS players have no control, that the DFS operators rake a piece of the prize pool, that the Legislature put the IFS within the Racing, Pari Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law where other forms of gambling are regulated, and that the law offers protections for “compulsive” players, aka problem gamblers. Although the Legislature excluded “registered” DFS operators from the criminal prohibition, the mere fact of registration does not change the underlying nature of the DFS game. DFS is still DFS whether or not the operator is register, and it’s still gambling, the Plaintiffs argue.
The Legislature Was Not Free to Exclude DFS From the Definition of Gambling
Even though the term “gambling” is not defined in Article I, § 9 of the New York Constitution, that does not grant the Legislature unlimited license to define the term in any manner it wishes, the Plaintiff argue. Words must be construed to have their ordinary meanings, and thus “the Legislature [could not] ignore certain kinds of gambling, let alone pass laws to enable rather than to prevent it, as it has done here . . . Otherwise, as Supreme Court pointed out in this case, the prohibition against gambling, a protection embodied in the Bill of Rights in Article I of the New York Constitution, would exist only at the sufferance of the Legislature” (Plaintiffs’ App Div Brf, at 61-62).
From the 1894 addition of the constitutional ban on gambling, the Legislature and the Attorney General have always understood that sports betting is illegal gambling. DFS is no different than sport betting, because the bets are still placed on real life performances over which the DFS players have no control. Thus, it too is illegal gambling, and the Legislature wasn’t free to ignore over 100 years of history to find otherwise. Indeed, the Plaintiffs argue,
Courts are not required to stand by helplessly while the Legislature interprets the Constitution any way it wants. The difference between what Plaintiffs and the State cite as precedent turns on the distinction between the “interpretation” versus the “implementation” of a constitutional mandate. It is the Judiciary’s sole prerogative to interpret “gambling”; it falls to the Legislature to implement laws to prevent it. Thus, the determination on whether daily fantasy sports falls within the definition of “gambling” is for the Judiciary, not the Legislature, to decide. Supreme Court properly interpreted the term (Plaintiffs’ App Div Brf, at 68).
Plaintiffs’ Cross Appeal
Finally, Plaintiffs argue on their cross appeal of Judge Connolly’s decision that he also should have declared the Legislature’s attempt to decriminalize DFS without substituting some other penalty unconstitutional. As the Plaintiffs view the constitutional commands, Article I, § 9 requires the State to pass laws to prevent gambling. The removal of the criminal sanction in the IFS Law is permitted, therefore, only if the Legislature substitutes some other penalty in its place. “It could, for example, have enacted a civil law prohibiting gambling and imposing civil fines to prevent any person or entity from operating IFS. Instead, it left a statutory and regulatory vacuum by decriminalizing gambling while not substituting something else in its place to prevent it” (Plaintiffs’ App Div Brf, at 70).
This legal limbo, where DFS has been decriminalized but still violates the constitutional ban, cannot withstand scrutiny, the Plaintiffs’ argue. Either the IFS law falls in its entirety, or it doesn’t. As an example, the Plaintiffs point out that DraftKings and FanDuel are still operating with impunity, and without any statute or regulation to stop them from continuing to violate the Constitution. “This is precisely why Chapter 237 should be struck down in its entirety, and not just partially, as Supreme Court did. The Legislature did not exclude IFS from the Penal Law definition of ‘gambling’ because it intended to substitute in its place some alternative measure to prevent it. Quite to the contrary, it inserted the exclusion for the obvious and sole purpose of enabling IFS to occur, so that the State could regulate and tax it. This is precisely why the exclusion is unconstitutional because it had the effect—an effect that was the Legislature’s deliberate objective—to enable that which is constitutionally prohibited” (Plaintiffs’ App Div Brf, at 72).
Next up in my run through the Appellate Division briefs, a not so surprising application for two DFS titans to participate in the appeal.
Court of Appeals Holds Commercial Contracts Can Waive Right to Seek Declaratory Judgment to Interpret the Terms of the Agreement and Yellowstone Relief
Contracts are often ambiguous. They are usually long, with many terms, and you never know how they will apply in circumstances that the parties never contemplated. That’s why the power to go to court to ask for an interpretation of the agreement and how it applies to the unique facts that the parties face has been so important in New York, the self-proclaimed commercial center of the world.
Not anymore, says the majority of the Court of Appeals in 159 MP Corp. v Redridge Bedford, LLC (No. 26). The right to freedom of contract trumps all. And sophisticated parties with counsel are allowed to agree to waive the right to seek a declaratory judgment to interpret the terms of a commercial contract if they do so in the agreement. Public policy can’t invalidate the express terms of the waiver, and a suit seeking to interpret the agreement and a stay of the period in which to cure any default while the court decides the issues—better known as a Yellowstone injunction—must be dismissed.
In 159 MP Corp., commercial tenants executed two 20-year commercial leases to occupy a building in Brooklyn and run a grocery store. The leases were typical boilerplate commercial agreements, but had been revised by handwritten additions and deletions, including this paragraph in the lease rider:
After the building owner sent notices of default to the tenants, the tenants commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that they hadn’t defaulted under the leases and a Yellowstone injunction to prohibit the owner from terminating the leases or bringing removal proceedings while the court decided the issues. The owner, however, moved to enforce the waiver clause, arguing that the action should be dismissed.
Supreme Court, Kings County denied the Yellowstone injunction and dismissed the complaint, holding that the clear terms of the waiver clause prohibited the declaratory judgment action. The Court held that the waiver didn’t prevent an action for damages or prohibit the tenants from raising any interpretation arguments in defense of a removal proceeding, but just precluded this action for declaratory relief.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed, with one Justice dissenting, on this issue of first impression in New York. Like Supreme Court, the Appellate Division agreed that the waiver should be enforced according to its terms, and noted that the tenants were not left without available relief. The lone dissenting Justice, however, argued that the waiver clause is void as against public policy because “the declaratory judgment action, together with the Yellowstone injunction, serve a valuable public policy role in relations between commercial landlords and tenants, providing a mechanism for a commercial tenant to protect its valuable property interest in the lease while challenging the landlord’s assessment of its rights” (159 MP Corp. v Redbridge Bedford, LLC, 160 AD3d 176, 204 [1st Dept 2018] [Connolly, J., dissenting]).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals majority too held that the waiver clause should be enforced according to its plain terms. In doing so, the majority rejected the tenants’ argument that the waiver clause violates New York public policy. The public policy, the majority emphasized, actually cuts the other way in favor of the freedom of contract: “In keeping with New York’s status as the preeminent commercial center in the United States, if not the world, our courts have long deemed the enforcement of commercial contracts according to the terms adopted by the parties to be a pillar of the common law” (Opn, at 6). Thus, the majority held, “because freedom of contract is itself a strong public policy interest in New York, we may void an agreement only after ‘balancing’ the public interests favoring invalidation of a term chosen by the parties against those served by enforcement of the clause and concluding that the interests favoring invalidation are stronger” (id. at 8). According to the majority, that balancing in most cases, including this one, weighs in favor of the freedom of contract.
The availability of a Yellowstone injunction, the majority noted, is premised on having a valid action. Without one, the request for a stay is academic. But, the majority emphasized, a Yellowstone injunction isn’t necessary because a commercial tenant can’t be evicted from a property without first being able to defend its rights in a removal proceeding, where it will have the chance to argue about how the agreement should be interpreted and that it didn’t breach the lease. Thus, the majority reasoned, “there is no strong societal interest in the ability of commercial entities to seek such a remedy that would justify voiding an unambiguous declaratory judgment waiver negotiated at arm’s length, merely because this incidentally precluded access to Yellowstone relief” (Opn, at 16).
Judge Rowan Wilson, in dissent, would have voided the waiver clause on public policy grounds. As Judge Wilson put it,
Judge Wilson forecasts that the majority’s prioritization of the freedom of contract over access to the courts for interpretation of commercial agreements will incentivize building owners to “include a waiver of declaratory and Yellowstone relief in their leases as a matter of course. Those clauses will enable them to terminate the leases based on a tenant’s technical or dubious violation whenever rent values in the neighborhood have increased sufficiently to entice landlords to shirk their contractual obligations” (Dissenting Opn, at 2-3). Those dire consequences of the majority’s departure from the longstanding New York rule, he argues, are not worth the cost.
The game for the fate of daily fantasy sports in New York is on, and the State has scored first. Ok, ok. In appellate litigation, the losing party below always gets the ball first. And the State certainly lost below in this one. Judge Connolly of Supreme Court, Albany County held that daily fantasy sports were “gambling” prohibited by Article I, § 9 of the New York Constitution. But oftentimes the appellant’s opening brief leaves much to be desired, and much for the Court to decipher.
Not so here. The State has called on its stable of ready appellate lawyers, picked a great one—I know from personal experience because he’s beaten me in a case at the Court of Appeals before (still hurts now three years later)—and articulated a very strong argument for why the New York Legislature has the power to define what is and what is not gambling prohibited by the Constitution, how the Legislature exercised that power rationally here in deciding that the mixed skill and chance DFS games are not gambling, and how the courts should defer to that rationally supported legislative choice.
To recap quickly, back in 2016, there was a huge push to allow daily fantasy sports contests in New York, but the New York Attorney General said that the games violated New York’s constitutional ban on gambling. The DFS industry in response started a full court press to lobby for legislative authorization of the games. The industry didn’t want to wait the two-plus years it would have taken to amend the New York Constitution. The result: Chapter 237 of the Laws of 2016, known as the Interactive Fantasy Sports Law, which attempted to exempt “interactive fantasy sports” from the New York Constitution’s ban on gambling. Specifically, it provides:
A number of plaintiffs challenged the law as a violation of the constitutional gambling ban, and they won. At least in part. Judge Connolly held that DFS was gambling and struck down most of the IFS law, but held that the Legislature acted within its power to decriminalize the games. So, as we stand now, DFS is unconstitutional gambling, but if the games are offered in New York nevertheless, the operators can’t be brought up on criminal charges.
In the State’s opening brief challenging Judge Connolly’s holding that the IFS Law is unconstitutional, the State makes the case that because the Constitution leaves the term “gambling” undefined, and specifically authorizes the Legislature to implement the constitutional ban, it has to be up to the Legislature to fill the gap by defining what is and what isn’t prohibited gambling. Specifically, the State builds its case on traditional notions of judicial deference to rational legislative decision making. The State points out that the Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that where the Constitution provides broad and undefined powers to the Legislature to implement a constitutional provision, as here, the courts must defer to the Legislature’s factual findings and rational implementations of that power. The State’s constitutional duty to care for the “needy” and to provide a “sound, basic education” are two such examples. Neither constitutional provision actually spells out what standard the State is required to meet, and so that job is left to the Legislature to undertake.
So too here, the State argues. Article I, § 9 of the Constitution bans “gambling” but expressly delegates to the Legislature to pass laws that carry out that command. Because the Legislature has outlined what prohibited “gambling” looks like in the criminal statutes, and undertook an extensive fact finding process in enacting the IFS Law, the State argues that it’s not for the courts to undermine the Legislature’s rational conclusion that DFS games are not prohibited gambling. As the IFS Law specifically found, they are not games of pure chance, but are instead based on a player’s skill in assembling a roster of real life athletes to compete against everyone else’s chosen rosters. DFS games, therefore, are not predominately contingent upon games outside of the player’s control, but on his or her player selection and roster management abilities.
Notably, the State points out a number of examples of times when the Legislature has in the past declared that a certain activity is not prohibited gambling, including the selling of insurance and commodities trading. The strongest example, however, is that in 1995, the Legislature specifically exempted horse race handicapping tournaments from the constitutional ban:
As the State sees it, therefore, the IFS Law is just the Legislature’s latest exercise of its constitutional power to implement Article I, § 9 by defining what is and what is not prohibited gambling. That finding and policy judgment, which is based on extensive record evidence from the pre-enactment legislative hearings, is entitled to deference from the courts, the State argues.
The State also contends that Judge Connolly confused which constitutional standard should apply to evaluate whether DFS is a prohibited “game of chance.” From the adoption of the constitutional gambling ban, the State argues, the standard for deciding whether a game is prohibited has been whether skill or chance predominates while playing. Judge Connolly, however, used the “material degree” test that is derived from the statutory definitions of gambling under the Penal Law, not the dominating element standard required by the Constitution. Judge Connolly held that DFS was prohibited gambling because a material degree of chance was involved, notwithstanding that the players’ skill predominates. This was reversible error, the State contends. Because Judge Connolly accepted the Legislature’s factual finding that skill predominates over chance in DFS, that should have been the end of the Court’s inquiry and the IFS law should have been upheld.
For good measure, the State even argues that the law satisfies the statutory material degree standard, because the “Legislature heard a wealth of expert opinion, witness testimony, and statistical studies supporting the view that skill was such a dominant element in success at interactive fantasy sports contests that the role of chance was ‘overwhelmingly immaterial'” (State’s App Div Brf, at 34). The Legislature was entitled to credit that evidence, and the Court should defer to it as well, the State contends.
Next, the State argues that Judge Connolly’s conclusion that the DFS players exercise no control over the sporting events on which DFS is scored focuses on the wrong contest. It’s not the real world games that DFS players are playing in. They’re playing in separate contests over which they exercise substantial control. They choose which undervalued players to roster, which stacks to try to take advantage of, and which potential overvalued busts to avoid. In doing so, they meaningfully influence the outcome of the DFS games in which they play. Thus, the State argues, the Legislature rationally decided that DFS games “are not wagers on future contingent events not under the contestants’ control or influence,” which would be prohibited (State’s App Div Brf, at 35, quoting Racing Law § 1400 [l] [b]).
Finally, the State asserts that the Legislature rationally found that DFS is a bona fide contest for prizes where the players are required to pay an entrance fee to play and use their skill to influence the outcome. This, the State contends, is not gambling, and is just like when the owner of a horse pays an entrance fee to race the horse for the chance to win the purse. The Court of Appeals has held that that isn’t unconstitutional gambling, and thus neither is DFS, the State argues.
Coming into this appeal, I wasn’t very confident about the State’s chances to have Judge Connolly’s decision reversed. But the State’s reframing of the issues to ones focused on legislative policy making and the deference owed to those decisions by the court, so long as they are rational, has considerably strengthened their case. If the State succeeds in convincing the Appellate Division that this case is all about a legislative policy choice to allow DFS in New York, a decision with which the judiciary shouldn’t interfere, the State has a strong case to defend the IFS law and have Judge Connolly’s decision overturned. Indeed, given the very heavy burden that the plaintiffs face to show that the law is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, and the strong case for judicial deference that the State has made, this is turning out to be a much closer case than I had originally thought. I’ll be watching closely to see how the Plaintiffs now respond.
No Office, No Problem: Court of Appeals Holds that Violation of Judiciary Law § 470’s “Physical Office” Requirement Does Not Render Action a Nullity, But Could Subject Attorney to Discipline
In a unanimous decision authored by Judge Michael Garcia, the Court of Appeals today resolved an important issue of first impression implicating multi-state practice in New York—“whether an action, such as filing a complaint, taken by a lawyer duly admitted to the bar of this State but without the required New York office is a nullity.”
In Arrowhead Capital Finance, Ltd. v Cheyne Specialty Finance Fund L.P., the Court held that the failure of a nonresident attorney to comply with the physical office requirement in Judiciary Law § 470 at the time an action is commenced does not render the action a nullity. The opinion resolved a split between the First Department, which has held that any action taken by a nonresident attorney who fails to maintain a physical office in New York as required under Judiciary Law § 470 is a nullity, and the Second and Third Departments, which have permitted nonresident attorneys to cure a Judiciary Law § 470 violation by obtaining an attorney with a New York office or by application for admission pro hac vice by appropriate counsel.
The Court noted that the rule adopted by the Second and Third Departments stems from its prior decision in Dunn v Eickhoff (35 NY2d 698, 699 [1974]) where it held that “[t]he disbarment of a lawyer creates no ‘nullities,’ the person involved simply loses all license to practice law.” The Court held that “given [its] holding in Dunn, it would be incongruous to conclude that, unlike the acts of a disbarred attorney, actions taken by an attorney admitted to the New York bar who has not satisfied Judiciary Law § 470’s office requirement are a nullity.” Thus, the Court adopted the Second and Third Department rule and concluded that “the party can cure the section 470 violation with the appearance of compliant counsel or an application for admission pro hac vice by appropriate counsel.”
The Court, however, clarified that a Judiciary Law § 470 violation is not without consequences. The attorney who violates section 470 by practicing in the State without a physical office could face discipline. The court held that “[w]here further relief is warranted, the trial court has discretion to consider any resulting prejudice and fashion an appropriate remedy and the individual attorney may face disciplinary action for failure to comply with the statute.” “This approach,” the court concluded, “ensures that violations are appropriately addressed without disproportionately punishing an unwitting client for an attorney’s failure to comply with section 470.”
Important Practice Tip
Beyond clarifying the effect of a nonresident attorney’s violation of the physical office requirement in Judiciary Law § 470, the Court’s decision in Arrowhead includes a notable practice point that should not be overlooked.
In its motion for leave to appeal, Arrowhead limited its appeal “to the extent that the Appellate Division failed to reverse and remand the Order and Judgment of Supreme Court dismissing [its] Complaint as a ‘nullity’” for the Judiciary Law § 470 violation. The Judiciary Law § 470 dismissal, however, only related to the breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims that survived Defendant’s first motion to dismiss. By limiting its appeal to the distinct Judiciary Law § 470 issue, and not appealing the dismissal of its other claims, Arrowhead precluded the Court from reviewing the propriety of Defendant’s first motion to dismiss (see Quain v Buzzetta Constr. Corp, 69 NY2d 376, 380 [1987]). Thus, the Court granted defendant’s motion to strike the portion of Arrowhead’s brief addressed to defendant’s first motion to dismiss.
It is unclear whether Arrowhead’s decision to limit the appeal was strategic. Certainly, crystalizing an issue of first impression doesn’t hurt a party’s chances of having its motion for leave to appeal granted. But, by limiting the appeal, you give up other issues that could have otherwise been raised. Attorneys should be wary of the Court’s rule in Quain and only limit their appeals if they are willing to relinquish their rights to challenge other issues in the case.
And one more thing. The Court would do well to explain the practical impacts of its decisions to the parties and the bar in general in as plain of terms as possible. Here, the Court’s decretal paragraph reads:
To aid the parties and trial court, adding a clarifying clause to the decretal saying expressly that only the claims dismissed for the Judiciary Law § 470 violation remain to be litigated on remand would go a long way. Although this may appear straightforward in this case, many times the Court’s decisions on jurisdiction and reviewability leave parties scratching their heads about what to do next to fix the issues. The Court should try to help address those issues in its decisions to the best it can.
Everyone admits that the backlog of pending appeals in the Appellate Division, Second Department is a problem. As Presiding Justice Alan Scheinkman acknowledged in an op-ed in the NY Law Journal last fall, “it can take as long as 18 months for a civil appeal to obtain a place on the court’s day calendar and then more time for a decision to be rendered.” That’s 18 months after an appeal is fully briefed. And to get that far in the first place it could take up to a year from when the notice of appeal is served. So, in reality, the Second Department is often looking at appeals that are pending for almost three years before they are decided.
Recognizing this huge issue, Presiding Justice Alan Scheinkman of the Second Department announced a number of procedural reforms in September 2018 that were designed to decrease the Court’s backlog of appeals. First, the Court increased its oral argument calendars from 20 to 24 cases per day. That’s a good first start. Judge Scheinkman also noted that the Court would use specialized benches for an additional sitting in some long delayed matrimonial, Commercial Division, and land use and zoning appeals.
Third, Judge Scheinkman announced that he was reemphasizing the Court’s requirement of mandatory mediation for pre-perfected appeals through the Court’s Civil Appeals Management (CAMP) program. Judge Scheinkman’s hope is that early mediation will help new appeals, and long delayed ones, settle, which would help reduce the Court’s backlog. Finally, Judge Scheinkman also forecasted that the Second Department would be much less receptive to extensions than it had been in the past. Under the new Appellate Division Uniform Rules, parties can obtain two 30-day extension for their principal briefs by stipulation or letter agreement, but any further extension requires a formal motion “upon a showing of good cause.” The Court will not show much empathy for claims of a heavy workload or a pending reargument motion in the trial court. As Judge Scheinkman put it,
Extension motions should be confined, as the rule says, to limited circumstances where good cause exists, such as where an unexpected health issue or other unforeseeable event has occurred.
In addition to Presiding Justice Scheinkman’s reforms, a proposal was introduced in the Legislature last year to split the Second Department into two separate courts—a North division covering appeals from Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester counties and a South division covering appeals from Brooklyn, Queens, Nassau, and Suffolk counties.
That’s an interesting proposal, but there are two catches. First, the bill received little support last year and died in the Judiciary Committee of the NY Assembly, the only house in which the bill was introduced. Second, splitting the Second Department requires a constitutional amendment. The NY Constitution expressly provides that there shall be 4 departments of the Appellate Division, and specifies their boundaries.
And the constitutional amendment process is a long and troublesome one. The proposed amendment first has to pass in two successive legislatures, and then be approved by the people of this State at a general election. Normal people, however, aren’t generally thinking about how to fix the backlog of appeals in the Second Department and whether splitting it in two makes sense for the judiciary. So, finding the necessary support for a constitutional amendment may prove difficult.
But the Second Department doesn’t need the rigmarole of a constitutional amendment to fix its backlog of appeals. The New York Constitution already provides two solutions that I noticed. First, section 4(a) of the Judiciary article of the NY Constitution grants the Legislature the right to change the boundaries of the Appellate Division departments every ten years as long as it doesn’t change the total number of departments. Here’s how they’re currently divided:
The Second Department covers the 2nd, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 13th Judicial Districts, while the First Department covers the 1st and 12th, the Third Department covers the 3rd, 4th, and 6th, and the Fourth Department covers the rest.
So, how can the Legislature change the boundaries of the Second Department to reduce its backlog of appeals? Well, it’s all just moving pieces to a puzzle. The 9th Judicial District could become part of the Third Department. Or maybe just move Putnam, Dutchess, and Orange counties into the 3rd Judicial District, which would take them from the Second Department into the Third. Or to get all crazy with it, move Onondaga County into the 6th Judicial District, trade the 5th Judicial District from the Third Department to the Fourth in exchange for the 6th Judicial District, make the 9th Judicial District part of the Third Department, and send the 2nd Judicial District to the First Department. Oh, plus a player to be named later and cash considerations. The possibilities are endless. I’m fairly certain that it’s been more than ten years since the Legislature changed the boundaries of the Appellate Division, so this option is on the table.
If that’s too confusing for you, there’s a second way. Tucked away in the judiciary article is a never-mentioned provision giving the four Appellate Division Presiding Justices the right to call a meeting when one of the Departments is unable to complete its work within a reasonable time and transfer appeals to the other Departments. Who knew? Particularly, Article VI, section 4(g) of the Constitution provides:
So here, because the Second Department has been unable to decide all of its appeals within any reasonable period of time, it could be time for the four Appellate Division Presiding Justices to call a meeting of the families and transfer a bunch of Second Department appeals upstate. The Third and Fourth Departments decide fewer appeals after oral argument each year than the Second (1,579 in the Third Department and 1,444 in the Fourth Department compared to 3,815 in the Second Department in 2017).
Sure, this option would tax the Third and Fourth Department Justices with more work, but overall it should reduce the time that it takes to have appeals decided throughout the State. A little increase in the times from notice of appeal to decision in the Third and Fourth Departments should be more than offset by the significant reduction in the Second Department. And the caseload would be spread out across the four Appellate Division departments more equitably.
There are solutions to fix the huge backlog of undecided appeals in the Second Department. The courts just need to know where to look. Although Presiding Justice Scheinkman’s efforts are certainly laudable, and may well help reduce the problem to an extent, I think the time has come for more drastic action than adding 4 more cases to the daily argument calendar can provide. The time is here to look to our Constitution and use the powers that the Legislature and Judiciary have been granted to change the boundaries of the Appellate Division departments or transfer Second Department appeals to other departments. Indeed, three years for an appeal is just too long for any party to have to wait.
E-filing appeals in the Appellate Division has expanded again. This time to ring in the new year, the Fourth Department announced that it would expand its e-filing program to all civil appeals on a voluntary basis. Before, the Fourth Department had limited e-filed appeals to Commercial Division matters, Surrogate’s Court matters, and all matters that were e-filed in Supreme Court below. Now, all an appellant needs to do is e-file the appeal in the first instance and serve on the respondents a notice of e-filing, and the required Entry of Initial Information for Electronic Filing (22 NYCRR § 1245.3). That’s it.
Here’s the only catch. Because the Fourth Department hasn’t yet made e-filing mandatory, the other parties still can decide not to e-file the appeal. But why would you do that? Outside of unfamiliarity with the e-filing system, I can’t see any reason not to consent. Plus, the Court encourages e-filing in all matters in which it is allowed, and advises that the e-filing program will continue to expand as 2019 progresses. You wouldn’t want to shrug off the Court’s preference for e-filing, would you? I sure wouldn’t.
Finally, the Fourth Department advises that the e-filing program will continue to expand as 2019 proceeds, which can only mean a move to mandatory e-filing in all civil appeals. That’s where the Third Department is, and the First and Second are getting closer too. This is yet another positive step for e-filing in New York, and a great way to start 2019. Happy New Year!
The Appellate Division April, May, and June 2018 Leave Grants
The Appellate Division rounded out the 2017-18 term with only two more leave grants. That makes only 13 Appellate Division leave grants for the entire 2017-18 term, which is well off the mark of 38 grants during the 2016-17 term. So what explains the change? Could it be that Chief Judge DiFiore quietly told the Appellate Division Justices to stop granting leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals because the Court wants to control its own docket? I certainly hope not (and I have thoughts on that that are best left for a different time). But such a huge drop off in Appellate Division leave grants must have some explanation.
In total for the 2017-18 term, the Appellate Division granted leave in 6 cases from the Second Department, 5 from the First Department, 2 from the Fourth Department, and none from the Third Department. That mostly follows the pattern from last year that most Appellate Division leave grants come from the downstate departments, while the upstate departments are more stingy in sending cases directly to the Court of Appeals.
Here’s a quick look at the two new Appellate Division leave grants from April, May, and June 2018.
April Appellate Division Leave Grants
Kuzmich v 50 Murray Street Acquisition LLC, 157 AD3d 556 (1st Dept 2018)
Question presented: Whether the tenants’ apartments in a building receiving Real Property Tax Law § 421-g tax benefits are subject to rent stabilization or should have been deregulated under the luxury vacancy control provisions of Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 [Administrative Code of City of NY] § 26-504.2(a).
Supreme Court, New York County, among other things, denied the landlord’s motion for summary judgment, granted the tenants’ cross motion for partial summary judgment, declared that the tenants’ apartments are subject to rent stabilization, and ordered that a special referee be designated to hear and determine the amount of the rent overcharges and the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the tenants in litigating this action. The Appellate Division, First Department reversed, granted the landlord’s motion for summary judgment to the extent of declaring that the tenants’ apartments were properly deregulated and are not subject to rent stabilization, denied the tenants’ cross motion, vacated the orders regarding the special referee, and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
159 MP Corp., et al. v Redbridge Bedford, LLC, 160 AD3d 176 (2d Dept 2018)
Question presented: In an action for a judgment declaring that two commercial leases are in full force and effect and that the plaintiffs are not in violation of their obligations under the leases, and seeking a Yellowstone injunction to prevent landlord from terminating leases or commencing summary proceeding for eviction, whether written leases negotiated at arm’s length by commercial tenants may include a waiver of the right to declarative relief that is enforceable at law, or whether such a waiver is void and unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
Supreme Court, Kings County, denied plaintiffs’ motion for a Yellowstone injunction and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed.