Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=12119
Timestamp: 2020-07-15 04:18:23
Document Index: 589600630

Matched Legal Cases: ['application No.2560', 'application No.2561', 'sui generis', 'sui generis', 'Art. 142', 'Art.32', 'Art.142', 'Art. 142', 'Art. 142', 'Art.\t32', 'Art.142', 'Art. 16', 'Art142', 'Art.32', 'Art.142', 'Art. 142']

IN RE: VINAY CHANDRA MISHRA
1995 AIR 2348	1995 SCC (2) 584 JT 1995 (2) 587	1995 SCALE (2)200
IN RE: VINAY CHANDRA MISHRA [1995] RD-SC 180 (10 March 1995)
KULDIP SINGH (J) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
CITATION: 1995 AIR 2348	1995 SCC (2) 584 JT 1995 (2) 587	1995 SCALE (2)200
1. On	10th March, 1994, Justice S.K. Keshote of	the Allahabad High Court addressed a letter to the Acting Chief Justice of that Court as follows - "No.SKK/ALL/8/94	10.3.94 Dear brother Actg. Chief Justice, Though	on 9.3.94 itself I orally narrated about	the misbehaviour of Sh. B.C. Misra with me in the Court but I thought it advisable to give you same in writing also.
On 9.3.94 1 was sitting with Justice Anshuman Singh in Court No.38.	In the list of fresh Cases of 9.3.94 at Sr.	No.5 'U.P.F.Corp. filed by	Smt. S.V. Misra was listed.	Sh.
B.C. Misra appeared in this case when the case was called.
Brief facts of that case M/s. Bansal Forgings Ltd. took loan from U.P. Financial Corporation and it made default in payment of instalment of the same. Corporation proceeded against the Company u/s 29 of the U.P. Financial Corporation Act.	The Company filed a 596 Civil Suit against the.Corporation and it has also filed an application for grant of temporary injunction.	Counsel for the Corporation suo moto put appearance in the matter before Trial Court and prayed for time for filing of	reply.	The learned trial court passed an order on the said date	that the Corporation will not scize the factory of the Company.
The Company shall pay the amount of instalment and it	will furnish	also security for the disputed amount.	The court directed to furnish security on 31.1.94 and case was fixed on 15.3.94.
Against	said order of the trial court this appeal has	been filed and arguments have been advanced that Court has no jurisdiction to pass the order for payment of instalment of loan and further no security could have been ordered.
I put a question to Shri Misra under which provision	this order has been passed.	On putting of question he started to shout and said that no question could have been put to	him.
He will get me transferred or see that impeachment motion is brought	against me in Parliament. He further said that he has turned up many Judges. He created a good scene in	the court.	He asked me to follow the practice of this Court. in sum and substance it is a matter where except to abuse me of mother	and sister he insulted me like any thing. what he wanted to convey to me was that admission is as a course and no arguments are heard, at this stage.
It is	not the question of insulting of a Judge of	this institution but it is a matter of institution as a whole.
In case dignity of Judiciary is not being maintained	then where this institution will	stand.	In case a senior Advocate, President of Bar and Chairman of Bar	Council of India behaves in Court in such manner what will happen to other advocates.
Since the day I have come here I am deciding the cases on merits.	In case a case has merits it is admitted but not as a matter of course. in this court probably advocates do	not like the consideration of cases on their merits at the stage of admission. In case dignity of Judiciary is not restored then it is very difficult for the judges to discharge their Judicial function without fear and favour.
I am submitting this matter to you in writing to bring	this mishappening in the Court with the hope that you will do something for restoration of dignity of Judiciary.
Yours sincerely, Sd/- (Jus. S.K. keshote)."
2. The Acting Chief Justice Shri V.K. Khanna forwarded the said letter to the then Chief Justice of India by his letter of 5th April, 1994. The learned Chief Justice of India constituted this Bench to hear the matter on	15th April, 1994.
3. On	15th April, 1994, this Court took the view	that there was a prima facie case of criminal contempt of court committed by Shri Vinay Chandra Mishra [hereinafter referred to as the "contemner"] and issued a notice against him to show cause why contempt proceedings be not initiated against him. By the	same order, Shri D.P.	Gupta,	the learned Solicitor General of India was requested to assist the Court in the matter.	Pursuant to the notice, the contemner filed his reply by affidavit dated 10th May, 1994 and also an application seeking discharge of show 597 cause notice, and in the alternative for an inquiry to be held into the incident referred to by Justice Keshote in his letter which had given rise to the contempt proceedings. It is necessary at this stage to refer to the material portions of both the affidavit and the application filed by	the contemner. After referring to his status as a Senior Advocate of the Allahabad High Court and his	connections with the various law organisations in different capacities to impress upon the Court that he had a deep involvement in the purity, integrity and solemnity of judicial process, he has submitted	in the	affidavit that	but for his	deep commitments to the norms of judicial processes as evidenced by his said status and connections, he would have adopted the usual expedient of submitting his unconditional regrets.
But the facts and circumstances of this case were such which induced him to "state the facts and seek the verdict of	the Court" whether	he had committed the alleged	contempt or whether it could be "a judge committing contempt of his	own court".	He has then stated the facts which according to him form the "genesis" of the present controversy.	They are as follows:- "A. A Private Ltd. Co. had taken an instalment loan	from U.P. Financial Corporation,	which provides	under	its constituent Act (Sec. 29) for some sort of self help in case of default of instalments.
B. A	controversy arose between the said Financial Corporation and the borrower as a result of	which,	the borrower had to file a civil suit seeking an injunction against the Corporation for not opting for the	non-judicial sale of their assets.
D. Being aggrieved	by the	condition of	furnishing security, which in law would be tantamount to	directing a mortgagee to furnish security for payment of mortgage	loan even when he satisfies the Court that a stay is called for - the property mortgaged being a pre-existing security for its payment.
E.The Company filed an FAFO being No. 229793/94 against	the portion of the order directing furnishing of security.
F.The said FAFO came for preliminary came hearing before Hon'ble	Justice Anshuman Singh and the Applicant of	this petition on 9th March, 1994, in which I argued for	the debtor Company.
G. When the matter was called on Board, the Applicant took charge of the court proceedings and virtually foreclosed at- tempts made by the senior Judge to intervene. The Applicant Judge inquired	from me as to under what law the unpugned order was passed to which I replied	that it was under various	rules of Order 39, CPC. That	Applicant therefore conveyed to me that he was going to set aside	the entire order,	against	a portion of which I had come	in appeal, because	in his view the Lower Court was not competent to pass such an order as Order 39 did not apply to the facts.
H. I politely brought to the notice of the Applicant Judge that being the appellant I' had the dominion over the	case and it could not be made worse, just because I had come to High Court.
J. Being upset over, what I felt was an 598 arbitrary approach to judicial process 1 got	emotionally perturbed and my professional and institutional	sensitivity got deeply wounded and I told the Applicant Judge that it was not the practice in this Court to dismiss cases without hearing	or to upset judgments or portions of judgments, which have not been appealed against.	Unfortunately the Applicant judge took it unsportingly and apparently lost his temper and directed the stenographer to take down the order for setting aside of the whole order.
K. At this juncture, the Hon'ble Senior Judge	intervened, whispered something to the Applicant Judge and directed	the case to be listed before some other Bench. It was duly done and by an order of the other Court dated 18th	March,	1994 Hon'ble Justices B.M. Lal and S.K. Verma, the points raised by me before the Applicant Judge were accepted. A copy of the said order is reproduced as Annexure	1 to	this affidavit.
L. I	find it necessary to mention that the exchange	that took place between me and the Applicant Judge got a little heated	up. In the moment of heat the Applicant Judge	made the following observations:- "I am from the Bar and if need be I can	take to goondaism.
Adding in English - "I never opted for Allahabad. I had opted for Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh. I do not know why the Chief Justice of India disregarded my options and transferred me to	this place, which I never liked." Provoked	by this I asked him whether he	was creating	a scene to create conditions	for getting himself	transferred as	also talked earlier."
4. After narrating the above incident, the contemner	has gone on to deny that he had referred to any	impeachment, though	according to him he did mention that "a judge	got himself	transferred earlier on account of his inability to command	the goodwill	of the Bar due	to lack of mutual reverence
5. The contemner has further denied the allegations	made by Justice Keshote that as soon as the case was called	out, he [i.e., Justice Keshotel asked him the pro vision under which the impugned order was passed and that he had replied that the Court had no jurisdiction to ask the same	and should	admit and grant the stay order.	According to	him, such a reply could only be attributed to one who is "	mad" and that considering his practice, of thirty five years at the Bar and his responsible status as a member of the	Bar, it is unbelievable that he would reply in such	a "foolish manner". The	contemner has further denied that he	had abused the learned judge since according to him he had never indulged in abusing anybody.	With regard to the said allegations against him, the contemner has stated that	the same are vague and.	therefore, "nothing definite	is warranted to reply".
6. He	has further contended in his affidavit that if	the learned	Judge was to be believed that he had committed	the contempt, the	senior	Judge who was to direct the court proceedings would have initiated proceedings under "Article 129 of the Constitution" for committing contempt in facie curiae.	He has also stated that the learned Judge himself did not direct such proceedings against him which he could have. lie has found fault that instead of doing so,	the learned Judge hat: "deferred 599 the matter for the next day and adopted a devious way of writing	to the Acting Chief Justice for doing something about it". He has then expressed his "uncomprehension" with the learned Judge should have come to the Supreme Court when he had ample and sufficient legal and constitutional powers to arraign him at the Bar for what was attributed to him.
7.The contemner has then gone on to	complain that	the "language used" by the learned Judge "in the Court extending a threat to resort to goondaism is acting in a way which is professionally	perverse and approximating to	creating an unfavourable public opinion	about the awesomeness	of judicial process, lowering or tending to lower the authority of any Court" which amounted to contempt by a Judge punish- able under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197 1.
He has	then gone on to submit "under	compulsion of"	his "institutional	and professional conscience" and	for upholding professional standards expected of both the Bench and the Bar of this court" that this Court may order a thorough investigation into the incident in question to find out whether a contempt has been committed by him punishable under "Article	215" of the Constitution or by the Judge under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
8. He has further stated that the entire Bar at Allahabad knows that he was unjustly "roughed" by the Judge and	was being punished for taking a "fearless and non-servile stand" and that he is being prosecuted for asserting the right of audience and using "the liberty to express his views" when a Judge takes a course "which in the opinion of the Bar is ir- regular". He has also contended that any Punishment meted out to the "outspoken lawyer" will completely emasculate the freedom	of the profession and make the Bar "a	subservient tail wagging appendage to the judicial branch, which is an anathema to a healthy democratic judicial system".
9.He has made a complaint that he was feeling handicapped in not being provided with the copy of the letter/report of the Acting Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court and he	has also been unable to gauge the "rationale of the applicant in not having initiated proceedings"' against	him either immediately or a day following, when he chose to address a letter	to the Acting Chief Justice. He has then contended that he wanted to make it clear that he was seeking a formal inquiry not for any vindication of any personal hurt but to make things safe for profession which in a small way by a quirk of destiny come to his keeping also. He has also stated	that he would be untrue and faithless to his office if he subordinated the larger interests of the profession and dignity of the judicial process for a small thing of seeking	his little safety. The contemner goes on to state that he did not opt for filing a contempt	against	the learned	Judge as in normal course of arguments, sometimes, altercations take place between a Judge and	the arguing advocate, which may technically be contempt on either	side but being no	intention, provisions of contempt are	not attracted. In support of his said case, he has reproduced an extract from Oswald's Contempt of Court, III Edition, by Robertson. The said extract is as follows:
"An advocate is at liberty, when addressing the Court in regular course, to	combat	and contest strongly any adverse views of	the Judge or Judges expressed on the 600 case during its argument, to object to	and protest aganist any course winch the Judge may take and winch the advocate thinks irregular or detrimental to the interests of his client, and to caution juries against any interference by the Judge with their functions, or with the Advocate when addressing them, or against	any strong view adverse to his client expressed by the presiding Judge upon the facts of a	case before the verdict of the jury thereon.	An advocate	ought to be allowed freedom	and latitude both in speech and in the conduct of his client's case. It is said that a Scotch advocate was arguing before a Court	in Scotland,	when one of the Judges, not liking his manner, said to him, "It seems to me,	Mr.
Blank, that you are endeavouring in every	way to show your contempt for the Court." "No," was the quick rejoinder, "I am endeavouring in every way to conceal it."
10. In the end, he has stated that he had utmost respect and regard for the courts and he never intended nor intends not to pay due respect to the courts which under the law they arc entitled to and it is for this reason that instead of defending himself through an advocate, he had left to the mercy of this court to judge and decide the right and wrong.
He has also stated that it is for this reason that he	had not relied upon the provisions of the	Constitution under Articles 129 and 215 and Section 16 of the	Contempt of Courts	Act and to save himself on the technicality	and jurisdictional competence.
11. Lastly, he has reiterated that he had always paid	due regard to the Courts and he was	paying the same and	will continue to pay	the	same and he "neither intended	not intends to commit contempt of any Court".
12. Along with the aforesaid affidavit was forwarded by the contemner, a petition stating therein that he had not	gone beyond	the legitimate	limits	of fearless,	honest	and independent obligations of an advocate and it	was Justice Keshote himself who had lost his temper and extended threats to him which was such as would be punishable under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as the "Act"]. He has prayed that the notice issued to him be discharged and if in any case, this Court does	not feel inclined to discharge the notice, he "seeks his right to inquiry and production of evidence directly or by affidavits" as this Court may direct. He has further stated in that petition that he is moving an	independent application for contempt proceedings to be drawn against the, learned Judge and it would be in the interests of justice and fairplay if the two are heard together. It	has to be noted that the contemner has throughout this affidavit as well as the petition referred to Justice Keshote as	"ap- plicant", although he knew	very well that contempt proceedings had been initiated suo moto by this Court on the basis of the letter written by Justice Keshote to the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court. His manner of reference to the learned Judge also reveals the respect in which he holds the learned Judge.
13. The contemner has also filed another petition on	the same day as stated in the aforesaid petition wherein he	has prayed	that on the facts stated in the reply affidavit to the show cause notice for contempt proceedings against	him this Court be pleased to draw proceedings under Section 16 of the Act against the learned for committing	contempt of his own court and hold an inquiry. In this petition, he him stated	that in his reply to the contempt notice, he	has brought the whole truth 601 before	this Court which according to him was witnessed by the senior Judge of the Bench, Justice Anshuman Singh and a large number of advocates. Once again referring to Justice Keshote	as the applicant, he has stated that	the learned Judge in open court conveyed to him [i.e., the contemner] that he can take to goondaism if need arises, that he	also talked disparagingly against the Chief Justice of India	for not -transferring him to the place for which he had opted and talked to the contemner scurrilously and in a manner un- worthy	of a Judge and also attempted to gag the contemner from discharging his duties as an advocate. The contemner has further contended	that as a common law principle relating to contempt	of courts, a Judge is	liable	for contempt of his own Court as much as any other person associated with judicial proceedings and outside, and	that the aforesaid principle has been given statutory recognition under Section 16 of the Act. He has further contended	that the behaviour	of the learned Judge so	unworthy that	the senior colleague on the Bench apart from "disregarding	with the desire of the applicant to dismiss the entire order" against	a part of which an appeal had been filed, released the case from the board and did not think of taking recourse to the	obvious and well-known procedure of initiating contempt proceedings against him for the alleged contempt committed in the face of the Court. He	has further contended that "the adoption of devious ways of reaching the Acting	Chief Justice by letter and reportedly coming to Delhi for meeting meaningful people"	is "itself seeking about the infirmity of the case" of the Judge.	He has in the end reiterated his prayer for an inquiry into	the behaviour of the learned Judge if the notice of contempt was not discharged against him in view of the denial by him of the conduct alleged against him.
14. This Court gave four weeks' time as desired by	the contemner to file an additional affidavit giving more facts and details. The Court also made clear that the cause title of the proceedings was misleading since Justice Keshote	had not initiated	the proceedings. The proceedings	were initiated suo moto by this Court. A direction was given to the Registry to correct the cause title.
15. On	30th	June,	1994, the contemner	filed	his supplementary/additional counter affidavit	in	this affidavit, he raised objections to the maintainability	"of initiating contempt proceedings" against him.	His first objection was	to the assumption of jurisdiction by	this Court to punish for an act of contempt committed in respect of another Court of record which is invested with identical and independent power for punishing for contempt of itself According to him, this Court can take cognisance only of contempt committed in respect of itself He has also demanded that in view of the point of law raised by him, the matter be placed before the Constitution Bench and that notice be issued to the Attorney General of India and all the Advocate Generals of the States. He has then gone on to deny	the statements made by the learned Judge in the letter written to the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court and in view of the said denial by him, he has asked for the presence of the learned Judge in the court for being cross-examined by	him, i.e., the contemner.	He has further stated that if	the contempt proceedings are taken against him, the statement of Justice Anshuman Singh who was the senior Judge on the 602 Bench before which the incident took place, would also be necessary. He has also taken exception to Justice Keshote's speaking in the Court except through the senior Judge on the Bench, which, according to him had been the practice in	the Allahabad High Court, and has alleged that the learned Judge did not follow the said convention. In the end, he	has reiterated that he has utmost respect and regard for	the courts and he has never intended nor intends not to pay	due regard to the Courts.
16. On 15th July, 1994, this Court passed an order wherein it is	recorded that on 15th April, 1994, the court	had issued	a notice to the contemner to show cause as to	why criminal contempt proceedings be not initiated against	him and notice was issued on its own motion. The	Court heard the. contemner	in person as well as his learned counsel.
The Court perused the counter affidavit and the additional affidavit of -the contemner and was of the view that it	was a fit case where criminal contempt proceedings be initiated against the contemner.	Accordingly, the Court directed that the proceedings be initiated against him. The contemner was given an opportunity to file any material in reply or in defence within another eight weeks. He was also allowed to file the affidavit of any other person apart from himself in support	of his defence. Shri Gupta, learned Solicitor General	was appointed	as the prosecutor to	conduct	the proceedings. The affidavits filed by the contemner were directed to be sent to Justice Keshote making it clear	that he might offer his comments regarding the factual averments in the- said affidavits.
17. In	view of the said order, the Court dismissed	the contemner's application No.2560/94 praying for discharge of the notice. The contemner thereafter desired	to withdraw his application No.2561/94 seeking initiation of proceedings against the learned Judge for contempt of his own Court, by stating	that he was doing so " at this stage reserving	his right to file a similar application at a later stage".	The Court without	any comment on the statement made by	the contemner, dismissed the said application as withdrawn.
18.Justice Keshote by	a letter of	20th August,	1994 forwarded his	comments on the counter	affidavit and	the supplementary/additional counter affidavit filed by	the contemner. The learned Judge denied that he took charge of the court proceedings and virtually foreclosed the attempts made by the senior Judge to intervene, as was alleged by the contemner. He stated that being a member of the Bench, he put a question to the contemner as to under which provision, the order under appeal had been passed by the trial court, and upon that the contemner started shouting and said	that he would get him transferred or see to it that	impeachment motion was brought against him in Parliament. According to the learned Judge, the contemner said many more things as already mentioned by him in his letter dated	10th March, 1994. He further stated that the contemner created a scene which made it difficult to continue the court	proceedings and ultimately	when it became difficult to hear all	the slogans, insulting words and threats, he requested	his learned	brother on the Bench to list that case	before	an- other Bench and to retire to the chamber. Accordingly,	the order was made by the other learned member of the Bench	and both of them retired to their chambers.
19. The learned judge also stated that the contemner	has made wrong statement when he states "that	applicant, therefore, conveyed to me that he was going to set aside the entire order, against portion of which I had come in appeal because, in his view, the lower court was not competent to pass such order as Order 39 did not apply to	the facts".
The learned Judge stated that he neither made any	such statement nor conveyed to the contemner as suggested by him.
He reiterates that except one sentence, viz.,	"that under which provision this order had been made by the trial court" nothing was said by him. According to the learned Judge, it was a	case where the contemner did not permit the court proceedings to be proceeded and both the Judges ultimately had to retire to the chambers.	The learned Judge alleges that the counter affidavit manufactures a defence. He	has denied	the contents of paragraph 6 [H] and	[1] of	the counter	affidavit by stating that nothing of the kind as alleged	therein had happened.	According to	the learned Judge, it was a case where the contemner lost his temper on the question being put to him by him,	i.e.,	the learned Judge.	He has stated that instead of losing his temper	and creating a scene and threatening and terrorising him,	the contemner should have argued the matter and encouraged	the new junior Judge. The learned Judge has further denied	the following averment, viz., "unfortunately, the applicant Judge took it unsportingly and apparently lost	his temper and directed the stenographer to take down the order	for setting aside of the whole order" made in paragraph 6 [J] of the counter affidavit, as wrong. He has pointed out that in the Division Bench, it is the senior member who dictates order/judgments. He	has also denied the	statements attributed to him in other paragraphs of the affidavit and in particular,	has stated	that he did not make the following observations: "I am from the Bar and if need be I can take to goondaism"	and has alleged that the said allegations are absolutely wrong.
He has	also denied that he ever made	'the statements as follows: "I never opted for Allahabad. I had opted	for Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh.	I do not know why the Chief justice	of India disregarded my options and transferred me to this place which I never liked". According to him,	the said allegations are manufactured with a view to create a defence. He has denied the allegations made against him in the additional/supplementary affidavits as wrong and	has stated	that what actually happened in the Court was stated in his letter of 10th March, 1994.
20. On 7th October, 1994, the contemner filed	his unconditional written apology in the following words:
"1. In deep and regretful realization of	the fact that a situation like the one which	has given rise to the present proceedings	and which in an ideal condition should never	have arisen, subjects	me to	deep anguish and remorse and a feeling of moral	guilt.	The feeling has been compounded by the fact of my modest association with the profession as	the senior advocate for some time and also being the President	of the	High	Court	Bar Association for multiple terms, (from which I have resigned a week or ten days	back),	and also being the Chairman of the Bar Council of India for the third five-year	term.	The latter two being posts convey with its holding an element of trust by my professional fraternity which expectations of setting up an example of an ideal advocate, which includes generating an	intra-professional culture between the Bar and the 604 Bench, under which the first looks upon	the second with respect and resignation,	the second upon the first	with courtesy	and consideration. It also calls for	cultivation of a professional attitude amongst the lawyers to learn to be good and sporting losers.
2. Guilty realizing my failure at approxi- mating these standards	resulting in	the present proceedings, nolo contendre 1 submit my humble and unconditional apologies for	the happenings in the Court of Justice	S.K.
Keshote at Allahabad High Court on March 9, 1994, and submit myself at the Hon. Courts sweet will.
3. I hereby withdraw from record all my applications, petitions, counter	affidavits, and prayers made to the court earlier to	the presented	[sic] of this statement. 1, also, withdraw	all submissions made	at the Bar earlier and rest my matter with	the present statement alone, and any submissions that	may be made in support of or in connection	with statement.
21. On that day, the matter was adjourned to 24th November, 1994 to enable the learned counsel for the parties to	make further submissions on the apology and to argue the case on all points, since the Court stated that it	may not be inclined to accept the apology as tendered.	The learned counsel	for all the parties including the contemner,	Bar Council of India and the State Bar Council of U.P. [who were allowed to intervene] were heard and the matter was reserved for judgment.
22. Thereafter, the	State Bar Council of	U.P.	also submitted its	written submissions on 26th November,	1994 along with an application for intervention. We have perused the said submissions.
23. We may first deal with the preliminary objection raised by the contender and the State Bar Council, viz., that	this Court cannot take cognisance of the contempt of the	High Courts.	The contention is based on two grounds. The first is that Article 129 vests this Court with the power to punish	only for the contempt of itself and not of the	High Courts.	Secondly, the High Court is also another court of record	vested	with identical	and independent power of punishing for contempt of itself.
24. The contention ignores that the Supreme Court is	not only the highest Court of record,	but under various provisions of	the Constitution, is also charged with	the duties	and responsibilities of correcting the lower courts and tribunals	and of protecting them from	those whose misconduct tends to prevent the due performance of their duties.	The latter functions and powers of this Court	are independent of	Article 129 of the Constitution. When, therefore, Article 129 vests this Court with the powers of the court of	record including the power to	punish	for contempt of itself, it vests such powers in this Court in its capacity as the highest court of record and also as a court charged with the appellate and superintending powers over the lower courts and tribunals as detailed in	the Constitution. To discharge its obligations as the custodian of the administration of justice in the country and as	the highest	court	imbued	with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over all the lower courts and tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted with the power to see that the stream of justice in the country remains pure, that its course is not hindered or obstructed in any manner, that, justice is delivered without fear or favour and	for that purpose all the courts and tribunals are protected while discharging their legitimate duties. To discharge this 605 obligation, this Court has to take	cognisance of	the deviation from the path of justice in the tribunals of	the land, and also of attempts to cause such deviations	and obstruct the course of justice. To hold otherwise would mean that although this Court is charged with the duties and responsibilities enumerated in the Constitution, it is	not equipped with the power to discharge them.
25. This subject has been dealt with elaborately by	this Court in All India Judicial Service Association, Tees Hazari Court, Delhi V. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(1991) 4 SCC 406].
We may do no better than quote from the said decision	the relevant extracts:
"18. 'Mere is therefore no room for any doubt that this Court has wide power to interfere and correct the judgment and orders passed by any court or tribunal in the country.	In addition to the appellate power, the Court has special residuary power to entertain appeal against any order of any court in the country .
The plenary jurisdiction of this Court to grant leave and hear appeals against any order of a court or tribunal, confers power of judicial	superintendence over all the courts and tribunals in the territory of India	in- cluding subordinate courts of Magistrate	and District	Judge.	This Court has, therefore, supervisory jurisdiction over' all courts in India.
19. Article 129 provides that	the Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt	of itself.
Article 215 contains similar provision in respect of High Court. Both the Supreme court as well as High Courts are courts of record having powers to punish for contempt including the power to punish for contempt of itself..
The Constitution	does not define "Court of Record".	This expression is well recognised in juridical world. In Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, "Court of record" is defined as :
"A court whereof the	acts and judicial proceedings are	enrolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony and which has power to fine and imprison for	contempt of	its authority." In Wharton's Law of Lexicon, Court of -record is defined as "Courts are either of record where their acts and judicial proceedingsare enrolled for	a perpetual memorialand testimony	and they havepower to fine and unpriced; or notof record being courts of inferior dignity,	and in a less proper sense the King's Courts-and these are not entrusted by law with any power to fine or imprison the subject of the realm unless by the express provision of some Act of Parliament. These proceedings are	not enrolled or recorded" In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition	Vol.
10 page 429) "Court of Record" is defined as under:
"Court of Record is a court where acts	and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial and testimony, which rolls are called the 'record' of	the court, and are	of such high	and	supereminent authority	that their truth is	not to be questioned." Halsbury's Laws	of England, 4th	Edn.,	Vol.
IO, para 709, page 3 19, states:
"Another manner of division is into courts of record and courts not of record. Certain courts are expressly 606 declared	by statute to be courts	of record.
In the case of courts not expressly declared to be courts of record, the answer to	the question whether a court is a court of record seems to depend in general upon whether it has power to	fine or imprison by	statute or otherwise, for contempt of itself or other substantive offences; if it has such power, it seems that it -is a court of record......	The proceedings of a court of record preserved in its archives are called records, and	are conclusive evidence of that which is recorded therein." x	x	x	x	x
23. The question whether in the absence of	any express provision a Court of Record has inherent power in respect of contempt of subordinate or inferior	courts, has	been considered by English and Indian courts.
x	x	x	x	x the High Court to deal with the contempt of inferior court was based not so much on its historical foundation but on the High Court's inherents jurisdiction being a court of record	having jurisdiction to correct the orders of those courts.
24. In	India	prior to the enactment of the	Contempt of Courts	Act, 1926, High Court's jurisdiction in	respect of contempt of subordinate and inferior courts was regulated by the principles of Common Law of England. The High Courts in the absence of statutory provision	exercised power of contempt to protect the subordinate courts on the premise of inherent power of a Court of record." 26.The	English and the Indian authorities are based on	the basic foundation of inherent power of a Court	of Record, having	jurisdiction to correct the	judicial orders of subordinate courts. The King's Bench in England and	High Courts	in India being superior Courts of Record and having judicial power	to correct orders of	subordinate courts enjoyed	the inherent	power of contempt to	protect	the subordinate courts. The Supreme, Court being a Court of Record	under Article 129 and having wide power of judicial supervision over all the courts in the country, must possess and exercise similar jurisdiction and power as the	High courts had prior to contempt Legislation in 1926. Inherent powers	of a	superior Court	of Record have remained unaffected even after codification of Contempt Law." x x x x x x 28....The Parliament's power to legislate in relation to law of contempt relating to Supreme Court is limited therefore the Act does not impinge upon this Court's power with regard to the contempt of subordinate courts under Article 129 of the Constitution." 29.Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a court of record and it further provides that the Supreme Court	shall	have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.	The expression used in Article	129 is not restrictive instead it is extensive in	nature.	If the Framers of the Constitution intended that	the Supreme Court shall have power to punish for	contempt of itself only, there was no necessity of inserting the expression "including the power to punish for contempt of itself".	The Article	confers power on the supreme Court to	punish	for contempt of itself and in addition, it confers	some additional power relating to contempt as would appear	from the expression "including". The expres- 607 ion "including" has been interpreted by courts, to extend and widen the scope of power. The plain language of Article 129 Clearly indicates that this Court as a court of record has power to	punish	for contempt of itself and	also something else which could fall within the inherent juris- diction	of a	court	of record. In interpreting	the constitution, it is not permissible to adopt a	construction which would render any expression superfluous or redundant.
The courts ought not to accept any such construction. While construing Article 129, it is not permissible to ignore	the significance and impact of the inclusive power conferred on the Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court is designed by the Constitution as a court of record and as the Founding Fathers	were aware that a superior court of	record	has inherent power to indict a person for the contempt of itself as well as of courts inferior to	it, the expression "including" was deliberately	inserted in the article.
Article 129 recognised the existing in her power of a court of record in	its full plenitude including the power to punish for the contempt of inferior courts. If Article	129 is susceptible to two interpretations, we would prefer to accept the interpretation which would preserve the inherent jurisdiction of this	Court being the	superior court of record, to safeguard and protect the subordinate judiciary, which forms the very backbone of administration of justice.
The subordinate courts administer justice at the grassroot level,	their protection is necessary to preserve	the confidence of people in the efficacy of courts and to ensure unsullied flow of justice at its base level.
x x	x	x	x	x 3 1. We have already discussed a number of decisions holding that the High Court being a court of record has inherent power in respect of contempt of itself as well as of	its subordinate courts even in the absence of any express provision in any Act. A fortiori the Supreme court being the Apex Court of the country and supe- rior court of	record should	possess	the same inherent jurisdiction and power for taking action for	contempt of itself	as well as for the contempt of subordinate	and inferior courts. It was contended that since High Court has power of superintendence over the subordinate courts under Article	227 of the Constitution, therefore, High Court	has power to punish for the contempt of	subordinate courts.
Since the Supreme Court has no supervisory jurisdiction over the High Court or other subordinate courts, it does	not possess powers	which High Courts have under Article	215.
This submission is misconceived. Article 227	confers	su- pervisory jurisdiction on the High Court and in exercise of that power High Court may correct	judicial orders of subordinate courts, in addition to that, the High Court	has administrative control over the subordinate courts. Supreme Court's power to correct judicial orders of the	subordinate courts	under Article 136 is much wider and more effective than that contained	under Article	227.	Absence	of administrative power of superintendence over the High court and subordinate court does not affect	this Court's	wide power of judicial superintendence of all courts in India.
Once there is power of judicial superintendence, all	the courts whose orders are amenable to correction by this Court would be subordinate courts and therefore this	Court	also possesses similar inherent power as the High Court has under Article	215 with regard to the contempt of	subordinate courts.	The jurisdiction and power of a superior Court of Record	to punish contempt of subordinate courts was	not founded	on	the Court's	administrative	power	of superintendence, instead the	inherent jurisdiction	was conceded to superior Court of Record on the premise of	its judicial power to correct the errors of subordinate courts.
608 x x	x	x	x	x 36.Advent of freedom, and promulgation of Constitution	have made drastic changes	in the	administration of justice necessitating new judicial approach. The Constitution	has assigned a new role to the Constitutional Courts to ensure rule of law in the country. These changes have brought	new perceptions. In interpreting the Constitution, we must have regard to the social, economic and political changes,	need of the	community and the independence of judiciary.	The court cannot be a helpless spectator, bound by precedents of colonial days which have lost relevance. Time has come to have a fresh look at the old precedents and to lay down	law with the changed perceptions keeping in view the provisions of the	Constitution.	"Law", to use	the words of	Lord Coleridge, "grows; and though the principles of law remain unchanged, yet their application is to be changed with	the changing circumstances	of the time".	The considerations which weighed	with the Federal Court in rendering	its decision in Gauba and Jaitly case are no more	relevant in the context of the constitutional provisions.
37.Since this Court has power of judicial superintendence and control over all the courts and tribunals functioning in the entire territory of the country, it has a corresponding duty to protect and safeguard the interest	of inferior courts	to ensure the flow of the stream of justice in	the courts without any interference or attack from any quarter.
The subordinate and inferior courts do not have adequate power under the law to protect themselves, therefore, it is necessary that this court should protect them.	Under	the constitutional scheme this court has a special role, in	the administration	of justice and the powers conferred on it under Articles	32, 136, 141 and 142 form part of basic structure of the Constitution. The amplitude of the power of this Court	under these articles of the	Constitution cannot	be curtailed by law	made by Central or State legislature. If the contention raised on behalf of	the contemners is accepted, the courts all over India will	have no protection from this Court.	No doubt High	Courts	have power to persist for the contempt of subordinate courts	but that does not affect or abridge the inherent power of	this Court under Article 129. The Supreme Court and the	High Court both exercise concurrent jurisdiction	under	the constitutional	scheme	in matters relating to	fundamental rights	under Articles 32 and	226 of the Constitution, therefore this Court's jurisdiction and power to take action for contempt of subordinate courts would not be inconsistent to any constitutional scheme.	'Mere may be occasions	when attack	on Judges and Magistrates of subordinate courts	may have wide repercussions throughout the country, in	that situation it may not be possible for a High Court to contain the same, as a result of which the administration of justice in the country may be paralysed, in that situation the	Apex Court must intervene to ensure smooth functioning of courts.
The Apex Court is duty bound to take effective steps within the constitutional provisions to ensure a free and fair	ad- ministration of justice throughout the country, for	that purpose it must wield the requisite power to take action for contempt of subordinate courts. Ordinarily the High Court would protect the subordinate court from any onslaught on their independence, but in exceptional cases, extraordinary situation may prevail affecting the administration of public justice	or where the entire judiciary	is affected, this Court	may directly	take cognisance of contempt	of subordinate courts. We would like to strike	a note of caution that this Court will sparingly exercise its inherent power in taking cognisance of the contempt of	subordinate courts, as ordinarily matters relating to contempt of 609 subordinate courts must be dealt with by the High Courts.
The instant case is of exceptional nature, as the incident created	a situation where functioning of the	subordinate courts all over the country was adversely affected and	the administration	of justice was paralysed, therefore,	this Court took cognisance of the matter.
38....It is true that courts constituted under a law enacted by the	Parliament or the State legislature have limited jurisdiction and they	cannot	assume	jurisdiction in a matter,	not expressly assigned to them, but that is not so in the case of a superior court of record constituted by the Constitution.	Such a	court	does not have	a limited jurisdiction instead it has power to	determine its	own jurisdiction.	No matter is beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court of record unless it is expressly shown to be so, under the	provisions of	the Constitution. In	the absence	of any express provision in the Constitution the Apex Court being a court of record has jurisdiction in every matter	and if there be any doubt, the Court has power to determine its jurisdiction. If such determination is	made by High Court, the same would be subject to appeal to	this Court,	but if the jurisdiction is determined by this Court it would be final.
x x	x	x	x	x Court and a superior court of record has power to determine its jurisdiction under Article 129 of the Constitution	and as discussed earlier it has jurisdiction to	initiate or entertain proceedings for contempt of	subordinate courts.
This view does not run counter to any provision of	the Constitution.
26.The	propositions of law laid down and the	observations made in this decision conclusively negate the contention that this Court cannot take cognisance of the contempt committed of the High Court.
27.The contemner has also contended that notwithstanding the decision in Delhi Judicial Service Association Case [supra], the matter should be referred to a larger Bench because according to him, the decision does not lay down the correct proposition of law when it gives this Court the jurisdiction under Article 129 of the Constitution to take cognisance of the contempt of the High Court. Neither the contemner	nor the learned counsel appearing on his behalf has pointed	out to us any specific infirmity in the said decision. We	are not only in complete agreement with the law laid down on the point in the said decision but are also unable to see	how the legal position to the contrary will be consistent	with this Court's wide ranging jurisdiction and its	duties	and responsibilities as the highest Court of the land as pointed out above. Hence we reject the said request.
28.The	contemner has	further contended that	it will be necessary to hold an inquiry into the allegations made by the learned Judge by	summoning the	learned Judge	for examination to verify the version of the incident given by him as against that given by the contemner. According to him, in view of the conflicting versions of the incident given by him and the learned Judge, it would be necessary for him to cross-examine the learned Judge. As the facts reveal,	the contempt alleged is in the face of	the Court.
The teamed Judge or the Bench could have itself taken action for the offence on the spot.	Instead, the learned Judge probably thought that	it would not be proper to be a prosecutor, a witness and the Judge himself in the 610 matter	and decided to report the incident to	the learned Acting Chief Justice of his Court. There is nothing unusual in the	course	the learned Judge adopted, although	the procedure adopted by the learned Judge has resulted in	some delay in taking action for the contempt [see Balogh v. Crown Court at St. Albans [(1975) QB 73, (1974) 3 All ER 283].
The criminal contempt of court undoubtedly amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence for	such offence, the procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute law even	in this country has	always	been summary. However, the fact that the process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity of	meeting the charge,	is denied to	the contemner. The degree of precision with which	the charge may be stated depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allegations	is made clear or otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is	not always necessary to formulate the charge in a specific allegation.	The consensus of opinion among	the judiciary and	the jurists alike is	that despite	the objection that the Judge deals with the contempt himself and the contemner	has little opportunity	to defend himself, there is a residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish on the spot but it is the only realistic way of dealing	with certain offenders. This procedure does	not offend against the principle of natural justice, viz.,	Nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration	of justice.	The threat of immediate punishment is	the most effective deterrent against	mis- conduct. The	Judge has to remain in full control of	the hearing	of the case and he must be able to take steps to restore	order	as early and quickly as possible, The	time factor	is crucial. Dragging out the contempt	proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralyses the court for a time and indirectly	impedes	the speed and efficiency with which justice is administered.
Instant justice can never be completely satisfactory yet it does provide	the simplest,	most effective	and least unsatisfactory method of dealing with disruptive conduct in Court.	So long as the contemner's interests arc adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the case of contempt in the face of the Court is commended and not faulted.
29.In the present case, although the contempt is in the face of the court, the procedure adopted is not only not summary but has adequately safeguarded the contemner's interests.
The contemner	was issued a	notice	intimating him	the specific allegations	against	him.	He was	given	an opportunity to counter the allegations by filing his counter affidavit and additional counter/supplementary affidavit as per his request, and he has filed the same. He was	also given an opportunity	to file an affidavit of any other person that he chose or to produce any other material in his defence, which he has not done. However, in the affidavit which he has filed, he has requested for an examination of the learned Judge. We have at length dealt with the nature of in	facie curiae contempt	and the justification for adopting summary procedure and punishing the offender on the spot.	In such procedure, there is no scope for examining the Judge, or Judges of the court before whom the contempt is committed.	To give such a right to the contemner is to destroy not only the raison 611 d'etre for taking action for contempt committed in the	face of the court but also to destroy the very jurisdiction of the Court to adopt proceedings for such conduct. It is	for these reasons that neither the common law nor	the statute law countenances the claim of the offender for	examination of the	Judge	or Judges before whom the contempt	is committed. Section 14 of our Act, i.e., the	Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with the procedure when the action is taken for the contempt in the face of the Supreme Court	and the High Court. Subsection [3] of the said Section deals with a situation where in facie curiae contempt is tried by a Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed.	The provision in specific terms and for obvious reasons, states that in such cases it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in	whose presence or hearing the	offence is alleged	to have been committed, to appear as a witness	and the statement	placed	before the Chief Justice shall be treated	as the evidence in the case. The statement of	the learned	Judge has already been furnished to the contemner and he	has replied to the same. We have, therefore, to proceed	by treating the statement of the learned Judge	and the affidavits filed by the contemner and the reply given by the teamed Judge to the said affidavits, as evidence in	the case.
30. We may now refer to the matters in dispute	to examine whether	the contemner is guilty of the contempt of court.
Under the common law definition, "contempt of court" is defined	as an act or omission calculated to interfere	with the due administration of justice. This covers criminal contempt [that is, acts which so threaten the administration of justice that they require punishment] and civil contempt [disobedience of an order made in a civil cause]. Section 2 [a] [b] and [c] of the Act defines the contempt of court as follows:
"2.Definitions. - In this Act,	unless	the context otherwise requires, - [a] "contempt of court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt;
[b] "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;
[c] "criminal contempt" the	publication [whether	by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations,	or otherwise] of any matter or the doing of	any other act whatsoever which - [i] scandalises or tends to or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or [ii] prejudices,	or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings, or [iii] interferes or tends to	with,	or obstructs	or tends to obstruct,	the administration	of justice in any other manner"
31. From the facts which have been narrated above, it is clear that the allegations against the contemner, if true, would amount to criminal contempt as defined under Section 2 [c] of the Act. It is in the light of this definition of the "criminal contempt" that we have to examine the facts on record.
32. The essence of the contents of Justice Keshote's letter is that when he put a 612 question to the contemner as to under which provision	the order was passed by the lower court, the contemner "started to shout and said that no question could have been put to him".	The contemner further said that he would get	the learned Judge transferred or see that impeachment motion was brought against him in Parliament. He also said that he had "turned	up many judges". He also created a scene in	the Court. The learned Judge has further stated in his letter that in sum and substance it was a matter where "except to abuse him of mother and sister", he	insulted him "like anything". The contemner, according to the learned Judge, wanted	to convey to him that admission was a matter of course and no arguments were to be heard at that stage.	The learned	Judge has given his reaction to the entire episode by pointing out that this is not a question of insulting a Judge but the institution as a whole.	In case the dignity of the judiciary was not maintained then he "did not	know where	the institution would	stand,	particularly	when contemner who is a senior advocate, President of the Bar and Chairman of the Bar Council of India behaved in the court in such manner which will have its effect on other advocates as well".	He has further stated that in case the	dignity of the judiciary is not restored, it would be very difficult for the Judges to discharge the judicial function without fear or favour. At the end of his letter, he has appealed to the	learned Acting Chief Justice for "restoration of dignity of the judiciary' 33.The	contemner, as	pointed	out above, by filing an affidavit has denied the version of the episode given by the learned Judge and has stated that when the matter was called on, the learned Judge [he has referred to	him as	the 'applicant'] took charge of the court proceedings and virtu- ally foreclosed the attempts made by the senior Judge to intervene. The learned Judge enquired from the contemner as to under which law the impugned order was passed to which the latter replied that it was under various rules of Order 39, CPC. The learned Judge then conveyed to the contemner that he was going to set aside the entire order although against a portion of	it only he had come	in appeal.
According to the contemner, he them politely brought to	the notice of the learned Judge that being the appellant, he had the dominion over the case and it could -not be made worse just because he had come to High Court. According to	the contemner, the learned Judge then apparently lost his temper and told him	that he would set aside the order in	toto disregarding what he had said.	The contemner has then	pro- ceeded to state that "being upset over what" he felt was an arbitrary approach to judicial process he "got emotionally perturbed" and "his	professional	and institutional sensitivity got deeply wounded" and he told the applicant- Judge that "it was not the practice"	of that Court to dismiss	case without	hearing or to	upset judgments or portions of judgments which have not been appealed against.
According to the contemner, "unfortunately the applicant Judge took it unsportingly and apparently lost	his temper and directed the Stenographer to take down the order	for setting	aside of the whole order. The contemner has	then stated	that he "found it necessary to mention that	the exchange that took place between him and the applicant-Judge got a	little	heated	up". In the moment of heat	the applicant-Judge made the following observations: "I am	from the Bar and if need be I can take to goondaism.
613 never opted for Allahabad. I had opted for	Gujarat	and Himachal Pradesh. I do not know why the Chief	Justice of India disregarded my options and transferred	me to	this place, which I never liked". According to the contemner, he was "provoked by this" and asked the learned Judge "whether he was	creating a scene to create conditions	for getting himself transferred as also talked earlier". The contemner has denied that he had referred to any impeachment although according to him, he did say that "a	Judge	got himself transferred earlier on account of his inability to command the goodwill of the Bar due to lack of	mutual reverence".
He has also denied that when the learned Judge asked him as to under which provision the order was passed, he	had replied that the Court had no jurisdiction to ask the	same and should admit and grant the stay order. He has added that such a reply could only be attributed to one who is mad and it	is unbelievable that "he would reply	in such a foolish manner". He has also denied that he had abused	the learned	Judge and the allegations made against him in	that behalf	were vague. According to the contemner, if he	had committed the contempt, the senior member of the Bench would have initiated	proceedings under "Article 129" of	the Constitution for committing contempt in facie	curiae.	He has also stated that even the learned Judge himself could have done so but he did not do so and deferred	the matter for the next day and "adopted a devious way of	writing to the acting Chief Justice for doing something about it" which shows that the version of the episode was not correct.	The contemner has also then expressed his " uncomprehension" why the learned Judge should have come to this Court when he had ample and sufficient legal and constitutional powers to arraign	the contemner at the "Bar for what was	attributed" to him.
34.Before we refer to the other contentions raised by	the contemner, the question is which of the two versions has to be accepted as correct. The contemner has no	doubt asked for an inquiry and an opportunity to produce evidence.	For reasons	stated	earlier, we declined his request for	such inquiry, but gave him ample opportunity to produce whatever material he desired	to, including the affidavits	of whomsoever he desired.	Our order dated 15th July, 1994 is clear on the	subject. Pursuant to the said order,	the contemner has not filed his further affidavit or material or the affidavit of any other person. Instead he	tendered a written	apology dated	7th October, 1994 which will be considered at the proper place.	In his earlier counter	and additional counter, he has stated that it is not he who	had committed contempt but it is the learned Judge who	had committed contempt of his own court. According to him,	the learned Judge had gagged him from discharging his duties as an advocate and the statement of senior member of the Bench concerned was	necessary. He has taken exception to	the learned	Judge	speaking in the Court except	through	the senior	Judge of the Bench which according to him, had	been the practice in the said High Court and has also alleged that the learned Judge did not follow the said convention.
35.Normally, no Judge	takes action for in facie curiae contempt against the lawyer unless he is impelled to do	so.
It is	not the heat generated in the	arguments but	the language used,	the tone and the manner in which it is expressed and the 615 use disrespectful, derogatory or threatening	language or exhibit	temper	which	has the effect	of overbearing	the court.	Cases are won and lost in the court daily. One or the other side is bound to lose. The remedy of the losing lawyer	or the litigant is to prefer an appeal	against	the decision and not to indulge in a running battle of words with the court. That is the least that is expected of a lawyer.	Silence on some occasions is also an argument.	The lawyer	is not entitled to indulge in	unbecoming conduct either by showing his temper or using unbecoming language, 36.The incident had undoubtedly created a scene in the court since even according to the contemner, the exchange between the learned Judge and him was a little heated up" and	the contemner asked the learned Judge "whether he was creating scene to create conditions for getting himself	transferred as also talked earlier". He had also to remind the learned Judge that "a	Judge got himself transfeffed	earlier on account of his inability to command the goodwill of the	Bar due to lack of mutual reverence". He has further stated in his affidavit that "the entire Bar at Allahabad" knew	that he was	unjustly " roughed" by the Judge and was being punished for taking "a fearless and nonservile	stand"	and that he was being prosecuted for "asserting"	a right of audience and 'using the liberty to express his views when a Judge takes a course which in the opinion of	the Bar is irregular". He has also stated that any punishment meted out to the "outspoken" lawyer will completely emasculate the freedom	of the profession and make the Bar a	subservient tail wagging appendage to the judicial branch which is an anathema to a healthy democratic judicial system. He has further stated in his	petition for taking contempt	action	against	the learned	Judge that the incident was "witnessed by a large number of advocates".
37.We have reproduced the contents of the letter written by the teamed Judge and his reply to the affidavits filed by the contemner. The learned Judge's version is that when he put the question to	the contemner	as to	under which provision, the lower court had passed the order in question, the contemner	started shouting and said that	no question could have been put to him. The contemner also stated	that he would get him transferred or see that impeachment motion was brought against him in Parliament.	He further said that he had "turned up" many judges and created a good scene in the Court. The contemner further asked him to	follow	the practice of the Court.	The learned Judge has stated that in sum and substance, it was a matter where except "'to abuse of his	mother	and sister", he had	insulted him "like anything". The learned Judge has further stated that	the contemner wanted to convey to him that admission of every matter was as a matter of course and no arguments were heard at the admission stage.	He has reiterated the said version in his reply to the affidavits and in particular, has denied the allegations made against him by the contemner. He	has defended his asking the question to the contemner since he was a	member of the Bench. The learned judge	has stated that the contemner took exception to is asking the	said question as if he had committed some	wrong	and started shouting. He has further stated that he had asked only	the question referred to above and the contemner had created the scene on account of his putting the said question to him, 616 and made it difficult to continue the court's	proceedings.
Ultimately, when it became impossible to hear all	the slogans	and insulting words and threats, he requested	the senior learned member of the Bench to list that case before another Bench and to retire to the chamber. Accordingly, an order was made by the senior member of the Bench and both of them retired to the chamber. The learned Judge has denied that he had conveyed to the contemner that he was going to set aside the entire order against a portion of which	the contemner had come in appeal. He has stated that it was a case where the contemner did not	permit	the court proceedings to	be proceeded and both the members of	the Bench had ultimately to retire to the chambers.	The learned Judge has stated that the defence of the conduct of	the contemner in the counter affidavit "was a manufactured" one.
He has there dealt with each paragraph of the	contemner's counter	affidavit. He has also stated that there was no question of his having directed the stenographer to	take down the order for setting aside of the whole	order since that function	was performed by the senior member of	the Bench.	He has also stated that the	contemner has	made absolutely wrong allegations when he states that he had made the following remarks : "I am from the bar and if need be I can take to goondaism". He has also denied that he	had said: "I never opted for Allahabad. I had opted for Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh.	I do not know why the Chief Justice of India disregarded my options and transferred me to	this place,	which I never	liked". He has stated that	the contemner has made false allegations against him.
38.We have, by referring to the relevant portions of	the affidavit and the counter affidavit filed by the contemner, pointed out the various statements	made in the	said affidavits which clearly point to the veracity of	the version	given	by the	learned Judge	and the attempted rationalisation	of his conduct by the contemner. The	said averment& also lend force and truthfulness to the content of the learned	Judge's	letters. We	are, taking	into consideration all the circumstances on record, of the.	view that the version of the incident given by the learned Judge has to be accepted as against that of the contemner.
39.To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to	be disrespectful to him, to question his authority to ask	the questions, to shout at him, to threaten him with transfer and impeachment, to use -insulting language and abuse	him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to create scenes in the Court, to address him by losing temper, are all	acts calculated to	interfere with and obstruct the course of justice. Such	acts tend to over-awe	the court and to prevent	it from performing its duty to administer justice.
Such conduct brings the authority of the court and	the administration of justice into disrespect and disrepute	and undermines and erodes the very foundation of the judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people in the	ability of the court to deliver free and fair justice.
40.The	stance	taken by the	contemner is that he	was performing his duty as an outspoken and fearless member of the Bar. He	seems	to be	labouring under a grave misunderstanding. Brazenness	is not	outspokenness	and arrogance is not fearlessness. Use of intemperate language is not	assertion of right nor is a threat an argument.
Humility is not servility and cour- 617 tesy and politeness are not lack of dignity. Self-restraint and respectful attitude towards the Court presentation of correct	facts	and law with a balanced mind	and without overstatement, suppression, distortion or embellishment	are requisites of good advocacy. A lawyer has to be a gentleman first.	His most valuable asset is the respect and goodwill he enjoys among his colleagues and in the Court.
41. The rule of law is the foundation	of the democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of	law.
Hence judiciary is not only the third pillar, but	the central pillar of the democratic State.	In a democracy like ours, where there is a written Constitution which is above all individuals and institutions and where the power of judicial review is vested in	the superior	courts,	the judiciary has	a special and additional duty	to perform, viz., to oversee that all individuals and	institutions including the executive and the legislature act within	the framework of not only the law but also the fundamental	law of the	land.	This duty is apart from the	function of adjudicating the disputes between the parties which is essential to peaceful	and orderly development of	the society. If the judiciary is to perform its	duties	and functions effectively and true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted to it, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected and protected at all costs.
Otherwise, the very cornerstone of our constitutional scheme will give way and with it will disappear the rule of law and the civilized life in the society. It is for this purpose that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine their authority and bring them in disrepute and disrespect by	scandalising them and obstructing them from discharging their duties without	fear or favour. When the court exercises	this power, it does not do so to vindicate the dignity and honour of the	individual judge who	is personally	attacked or scandalised, but to uphold the majesty of the law and of the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice. When the founda- tion itself is shaken by acts which tend	to create disaffection and disrespect for the authority of the court by creating distrust in its working, the edifice of	the judicial system gets eroded.
42.It cannot be disputed and was not disputed before us that the acts indulged into by the contemner in the present	case as stated by the learned Judge per se amount	to criminal contempt of court. What was disputed, was their occurrence.
We have held above that we are satisfied that the contemner did indulge in the said acts.
43. As held by this Court in the matter of Mr. 'G, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court [(1955) 1 SCR 490]:
misconduct is not concerned with ordinary legal rights,but with the special and rigid rules of professional conduct expected of	and applied to a specially privileged class of persons	who because of their	privileged status, am subject to certain	disabilities which do no attach to other men and which do not attach even to them in a non-professional character........ He (a legal practitioner) is bound to conduct himself in a befitting the high and honourable profession 618 to whose	privileges he	has so long	been admitted	and if he departs from the	high standards	which that profession has set	for itself and demands of him in	professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary action".
44.In L.M. Das v. Advocate General, Orissa [(1957) SCR 167], this Court observed "A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a	duty to his client and must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably	be submitted on behalf of his client. He	may even submit that a particular order is	not correct and may	ask for a review of	that order. At the same time, a member of the	Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the court in which he is appearing. He	must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly overstepped the limits of propriety when he	made unputations of partiality	and unfairnesss against the Munsif in open Court.
In suggesting that the	Munsif	followed no principle	in his orders, the appellant	was adding insult to injury, because	the Munsif had merely upheld an order of his	predecessor on the preliminary point	ofjurisdiction and Court fees, which order had been upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalising	the Court in such manner is really polluting	the very fount of justice; such conduct as	the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial	service; it brought	into disrepute the whole administration of justice.
From that point of view, the conduct of	the appellant was highly reprehensible.
45.The	contemner has obviously misunderstood his function both as a lawyer representing the interests of	his client and as an officer of the court.	Indeed he has not tried to defend	the said acts in either of his capacities. On	the other hand, he has tried to deny them.	Hence, much need not be said on this subject to remind him of his duties in	both the capacities. It is, however, necessary to observe	that by indulging in the said acts, he has positively abused	his position both as a lawyer and as an officer of	the Court, and has done distinct disservice to the litigants in general and to	the profession of law and the administration of justice	in particular. It pains us	to note that	the contemner is not only a senior member of the legal profes- sion, but holds the high offices of the Chairman of the	Bar Council of India, Member of the Bar Council of U.P., Chair- man and Member, Executive Council and Academic	Council of the National Law School University of India at Bangalore and President of the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad.
Both as a senior member of the profession and as holder of the said high offices, special and additional	duties	were cast upon him	to conduct himself as a model	lawyer	and officer	of the court and to help strengthen the adminis- tration of justice by upholding the dignity and the majesty of the court. It was in fact expected of him to be zealous in maintaining	the rule of law and in strengthening	the people's confidence in the judicial institutions. To	our dismay,	we find that he has acted exactly contrary to	his obligations and has in reality set a bad example to others while at the same time contributing to weakening of	the confidence of the people in the courts.
46.The	contemner has no doubt	tendered an unconditional apology on 7th October, 1994 by withdrawing from record	all his applications, petitions, counter affidavits, prayers and submissions made 619 at the	Bar and to the court earlier.	We have reproduced that apology verbatim	earlier. In the apology he	has pleaded that he has deeply and regretfully realised that the situation, meaning thereby the incident, should never	have arisen	and the fact that it arose has subjected him to anguish	and remorse and a feeling of	moral guilt.	That feeling	has been compounded with the fact that he was a senior	advocate and was holding the elective posts of	the President of the High Court Bar Association and the Chairman of the Bar Council of India which by their nature show	that he was entrusted by his professional fraternity to set up an example of an ideal advocate. He has guiltily realised his failure	to approximate to this standard resulting in	the present	proceedings and he was, therefore, submitting	his unconditional apology for the incident in question. We have not accepted this apology, firstly because we find that	the apology is not a free and frank admission of the misdemeanor he indulged in the incident in question. Nor is there a sincere	regret for the disrespect he showed to the learned Judge and the Court, and for the harm that he has done to the judiciary.	On the other hand, the apology is couched in a sophisticated and garbed language	exhibiting more an attempt	to justify his conduct by reference to the cir- cumstances in which he had indulged in it and to exonerate himself	from the offence by pleading that the condition in which the "situation" had developed was not an ideal one and were it ideal, the "situation" should not have arisen.	It is a clever and disguised attempt to refurbish his image and get out of a tight situation by not only not exhibiting	the least sincere remorse for his conduct but by trying to blame the so-called circumstances which led to it. At the	same time, he has attempted to varnish and re-establish himself as a valiant defender of his "alleged duties" as a lawyer.
Secondly, from	the very inception his	attitude has	been defiant and belligerent. In his affidavits and application, not only he has not shown any respect for the learned Judge, but has made counterallegations against him and has asked for initiation of contempt proceedings against him. He	has even chosen to insinuate that the learned Judge by	not taking	contempt action on the spot and instead writing	the letter	to the Acting Chief Justice of the High	Court,	had adopted a devious way and that he had also come to Delhi to meet " meaningful" people. These allegations may themselves amount to contempt of court. Lastly, to accept any apology for a	conduct	of this kind	and to	condone it, would tantamount to a failure on the part of this Court to uphold the majesty of the law, the dignity of the court and to maintain the confidence of the people in the judiciary.	The Court	will be failing in its duty to protect	the administration	of justice from attempts to denigrate	and lower the authority of the judicial officers entrusted	with the sacred task of delivering justice. A failure on	the part of this Court to punish the offender on	an occasion such as this would thus be a failure to perform one of	its essential duties solemnly entrusted to it by	the Constitution and the people.	For all	these	reasons, we unhesitatingly reject the said so called apology tendered by the contemner.
47. The question now is what punishment should be meted out to the contemner.	We have already discussed	the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution.	That jurisdiction is	independent of	the statutory law of contempt enacted by the Parliament 620 under	Entry 77 of List I	of VII	Schedule of	the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 129 is sui generis. The jurisdiction to take cognisance of the contempt as we 11 as to award punishment for it being constitutional,	it cannot be controlled by any statute.
Neither, therefore, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 nor the Advocates Act, 1961 can be pressed into service to restrict the said jurisdiction. We had, during the course of	the proceedings indicated that if we convict the contemner of the offence, we may also suspend his licence to practise as a lawyer. The learned counsel for the contemner and	the interveners and also the learned Solicitor General appointed amicus curiae to assist the Court were requested to advance their arguments also on the said point.	Pursuant to it, it was sought to be contended on behalf of the contemner and the U.P. Bar Association and the U.P. Bar Council that	the Court cannot suspend the licence which is a power entrusted by the Advocates act, 1961 specially made for the purpose, to the disciplinary committees of the State Bar Councils and of the Bar Council of India. The argument was that even the constitutional	power	under Articles	129 and 142	was circumscribed by the said statutory provisions and hence in the exercise of our power under the said provisions,	the licence of an advocate was not liable either to be cancelled or suspended.	A reference was made in this connection to the provisions of Sections 35 and 36 of the Advocates	Act, which show that the power to punish the advocate is vested in the disciplinary committees of the State Bar Council	and the Bar Council of India. Under Section 37 of the Advocates Act, an appeal lies to the Bar Council of India, when	the order is passed by the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council. Under Section 38, the appeal lies to this Court when the order is made by the disciplinary committee of	the Bar Council of India, either under Section 36 or in appeal under Section 37. The power to punish includes the power to suspend	the Advocate from practice for such period as	the disciplinary committee concerned may deem fit under Section 35 [3] (c) and also to remove the name of the advocate	from the State roll of the Advocates under Section 35 [31	(d).
Relying on these provisions, it was contended that since the Act has vested the powers of suspending and removing	the advocate from	practice exclusively in the	disciplinary committees of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India,	as the case may be, the Supreme Court is denuded of its power to impose such punishment both under Articles	129 and 142 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the observations of the majority of this Court in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner,	UP., Allahabad [(1963) Supp. I S.C.R. 8851 relating to	the powers of this Court under Article 142 which are as follows:
.lm15 "In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out	that the wide powers which are given to this court for doing complete justice between the parties, can be used by	this court for instance, in adding parties to the	proceedings pending	before it, or in admitting additional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in allowing a new point to be taken for the first time. It is plain that in exercising these and similar other powers, this Court would not be bound by the	relevant provisions of procedure if it is satisfied that	a departure from the	said procedure is necessary to do complete justice between the parties.
That takes us to the second argument urged by the Solicitor- General that 621 Art. 142 and Art.32 should be reconciled by the adoption of the rule of harmonious construction. In this connection, we ought to bear in mind that though the powers conferred on this Court by Art.142(1) are very wide, and the same can be exercised for doing complete justice in any case, as we have already observed, this Court cannot even under .Art. 142(1) make an order plainly inconsistent	with the express statutory provisions of substantive law, much less,	in- consistent with any Constitutional provisions	There	can, therefore, be no conflict between Art. 142(1) and Art.	32.
In the case of KM. Nanavafi v. The State of Bombay f(1961)1 S.C.R.	497] on which the Solicitor-General relies, it	was conceded and rightly, that under Art.142(1) this Court	had the power to grant bail in cases brought before it, and	so, there was obviously a conflict between the power vested in this court under the said Article and that vested in	the Governor of the State under Art. 16 I., The possibility of a conflict between these powers necessitiated the	application of the rule of harmonious construction. The said rule	can have no application to the present case, because on a	fair construction of Art142(1), this Court has no power to circumscribe the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.32.
The existence of the said power is itself in dispute,and so, the present case is clearly distinguishable from the case of K.M. Nanavati."
48. Apart from the fact that these observations arc	made with reference to the powers of this Court under Article 142 which are in the nature of supplementary powers and not with reference to this Court"s power under Article 129, the	said observations have been explained by this Court in its latter decisions in Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of Gujarat	[supra] and Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India [(1991)4	SCC 584]. In paragraph 51 of	the former decision, it has been, with respect, rightly	pointed	out that the said observations were made with regard to	the extent	of this Court's power under Article 142 [1] in	the context	of fundamental rights.	Those observations have no bearing	on the present issue.	No doubt, it	was further observed there that those observations have no	bearing on the question in issue in that case as there was no provision in any substantive law restricting this Court's power to quash proceedings pending before subordinate courts. But it was also added there that this Court's power under Article 142 [1] to do complete justice was entirely of different level and of	a different quality.	Any prohibition or restriction contained	in ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional power of this Court.	Once this Court is in seisin of a matter before it, it has power to issue any order or direction to do complete justice in the matter. A reference was made in that connection to	the concurring opinion of Justice A.N. Sen in Harbans Singh v.
State of UP. [(1982) 2 SCC 101], where the learned Judge observed as follows:
"Very wide powers have been conferred on	this Court for due and proper administration of justice.	Apart from the jurisdiction	and powers conferred on this Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution I am of	the opinion that this Court retains and	must retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any extra-ordinary situation in the larger interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This power must necessarily be sparingly	used	only	in	exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of justice.
The Court has	then gone on	to observe there that no enactment made by Central 622 or State legislature can limit or restrict the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution,	though	the Court must take into consideration the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute. What -Would be the	need of complete justice in cause or matter, would	depend	upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
49. In	the latter case, i.e., the Union Carbide's	Case [supra], the Constitution Bench in paragraph 83 stated as follows:
"It is necessary to set at rest certain	mis- conceptions in the arguments touching the scop e of the powers of this Court under Art.142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of serious public importance. The proposition that a	provision in	any ordinary	law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founds operates to limit the powers of the apex Court under Art. 142(1) is unsound and erroneous. In both Garg as well as	Antulay cases the point was one of violation	of constitutional provisions	and constitutional rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency with statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis	turned on	the	breach	of constitutional rights.	We agree with	Shri Nariman that the power of the	Court under Article 142 insofar as quashing	of criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 Cr.P.C. or all of them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different	quality.	Prohibitions	or limitations or	provisions contained	in ordinary	laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations	on	the constitutional powers under Article 142.	Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature and status of the authority or the court on which conferment of powers - limited in sonic appropriate way	- is	contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on	any fundamental considerations of public policy.	Shri	Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to Garg Case, said that limitation on the powers under Article 142 arising from "inconsistency with express statutory provisions of substantive law"	must really mean and be understood as some express prohibition contained in any	substantive statutory	law.	He suggested that if	the expression 'prohibition' is read in place of 'provision' that would	haps	convey	the appropriate idea. But we think that	such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some	underlying fundamental	and general issues of public policy and	not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory	pro- visions override a constitutional provision.
Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of	" complete justice" of a cause or matter, the apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power	and discretion accordingly. The proposition	does not relate to the powers of the	Court under Article 142, but only to what is	or is	no t 'complete justice' of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of	the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise." 50.In view of these observations of the latter	Constitution Bench on the point, the observations made by the majority in Prem 623 Chand Garg's case [supra] are no longer a good law. This is also pointed out, by this Court in the case of Mohammed Anis v. Union of	India & Ors. [(1994) Supp. 1 SCC 1451 by referring to the decisions of Delhi Judicial	Services v.
Stale of Gujarat (supra) and Union Carbide Corporation v.
Union	of India (supra) by	observing that statutory provisions cannot override the constitutional provisions and Article	142 [1] being a constitutional power it cannot be limited	or conditioned by any	statutory provision.	The Court has then observed that it is, therefore,	clear	that the power of the Apex Court under Article 142 [1] of	the Constitution cannot be diluted by statutory provisions	and the said position in	law is	now well settled by	the Constitution Bench decision in Union Carbide's case [supra].
51. The consequence of accepting the said	contention advanced on behalf of the contemner and the other parties, will be two-fold. This Court while exercising its power under Article 142(1) would not even be entitled to reprimand the Advocate for his professional misconduct which includes exhibition of	disrespect to the Court as per	Rule 2 of Section	1 of Chapter 11 of Part VI of the Bar	Council of India Rules made under the Advocates Act, which is also a contempt of court, since the reprimand of the advocate is a punishment ,Which the disciplinary committees of the State Bar Council and of the Bar Council of India are authorised to administer under Section 35 of the Advocates Act.	Sec- ondly,	it would also mean that for any act of	contempt of court,	if it	also happens to be an act of	professional misconduct under the Bar Council of India Rules, the courts including this	Court, will have no power to	take action since the Advocates Act confers exclusive power for taking action	for such conduct on the disciplinary committees of the State, Bar Council and the Bar Council of India, as	the cue may be. Such a proposition of law on the	face of it deserves rejection for the	simple	reason that	the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar Council and	the Bar Council of India to take action for professional	mis- conduct is different from the jurisdiction of the courts to take action against the advocates for the contempt of court.
The said jurisdictions co-exist independently of each other.
The action taken under one jurisdiction does	not bar an action under the other jurisdiction.
52. The contention is also misplaced for yet	another	and equally, if not more, important reason. In the matter of disciplinary jurisdiction under the Advocates Act,	this Court is constituted as the final Appellate authority under Section	38 of the Act as pointed out earlier.	In that	ca- pacity this Court can impose any of the	punishments mentioned in Section 35 (3) of the Act including that, of removal of the name of the Advocate from the St-ate roll and of suspending him from practice. If that be so, there is no reason	why this Court while exercising its contempt jurisdiction, under Article 129 read with Article 142 cannot impose	any of	the said punishments.	The punishment so imposed	will not only be not against the provisions of	any statute, but in conformity with the substantive provisions of the Advocates Act and for conduct which is both a	pro- fessional misconduct as well as the contempt of court.	The argument has, therefore, to be rejected.
53. What is further, the jurisdiction and powers of	this Court under Article 142 624 which are supplementary in nature and are provided to do complete justice in any matter, are	independent of	the jurisdiction and powers of this Court	under Article	129 which cannot be trammeled in any way by any statutory provision including the provisions of the Advocates Act or the Contempt of Courts Act. As pointed out earlier,	the Advocates Act	has nothing to do with the contempt jurisdiction of the court including of this Court and	the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 being a statute cannot denude, restrict or limit the powers of this Court to	take action for contempt under Article 129. It is not disputed	that suspension of	the advocate from practice and	his removal from the State roll of advocates are both	punishments.
There is no restriction or limitation on the nature of punishment that this Court may award while exercising	its contempt jurisdiction and the said punishments can be	the punishments the Court may impose while exercising the	said jurisdiction.
54. Shri P.P. Rao, learned counsel appearing	for	the High Court Bar Association of Allahabad	contended	that Articles 19 [1] (a) and 19 [2], and 19 [1] (g) and 19	[6] have to be read together and thus read the power to suspend a member of the legal profession from practice or to remove him from the roll of the State Bar Council is not available to this Court under Article 129. We have been unable to appreciate this contention. Article 19 [1] (a) guarantees freedom	of speech and expression which is subject to	the provisions of Article 19 [2] and, therefore, to the law in relation to the contempt of court as well. Article 19	[1] (g) guarantees the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business and is subject to the provisions of Article 19 [6] which empowers the State to make a	law imposing reasonable restrictions,	in the	in- terests of general public, on the exercise of the said right and, in particular, is subject to	a law	prescribing technical or professional qualifications necessary for prac- tising	the profession or carrying on the occupation, trade or business.	On our part we are unable to see how these provisions of	Article 19 can be pressed into	service to limit the power of this Court to take	cognisance of	and punish for the contempt of court under Article 129.	The contention that the power of this Court under Article 129 is subject to the provisions of Articles 19 [1] (a) and 19	[1] (g), is unexceptional.	However, it is not pointed out to us as to	how the action taken under Article 129 would be violative of the said provisions, since the said provisions are subject to the law of contempt and the law laying	down technical and	professional qualifications necessary	for practising any	profession, which includes the	legal pro- fession. The	freedom of speech and expression cannot be used for committing contempt of court nor can the legal profession be practised by committing the contempt of court.
The right to continue to practise, is subject to the law of contempt. The law does not mean merely the statute law	but also the constitutional provisions. The right, therefore, is subject to the restrictions placed by the law of contempt as contained in the statute - in the	present case,	the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as well as to the	jurisdiction of this Court and of the High Court to take action under Article	129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively.	We, therefore, do not see any conflict between the provisions of Articles 129 and 215, and Article 19 [1] (a) and Article 19 [1] (g) read with Articles 19 [2] and 19 [6] respectively.
625 55.When the Constitution vests this Court with a special and specific power	to take action for contempt not only of itself but of the lower courts and tribunals,	for discharging its constitutional obligations as	the highest custodian ofjustice in the land, that power is obviously coupled	with a duty	to protect all	the limbs of	the administration	of justice from those whose actions create interference with or obstruction to the course of justice.
Failure to exercise the power on such occasions, when it is invested specifically	for the purpose, is a	failure to discharge the duty. In this connection, we may refer to the following extract from the decision of this Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd. [(1950) SCR 536]:
.lm15 public	authority there may be circumstances which couple with the power a duty to exercise it.	To use the language of Lord Cairns in the case of Julius v. Bishop	of Oxford;
'There may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or	persons	for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so'." 56.For	the reasons discussed above, we find the contemner, Shri Vinay Chandra Mishra, guilty of the offence of	the criminal contempt of the Court for having interfered	with and obstructed the course of of in the above terms. justice by trying to threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and threatening language, and convict	him of the said offence. Since the contemner is a senior	member of the Bar and also adorns the high offices such as those of the Chairman of the Bar Council of India, the President	of the U.P. High Court Bar	Association, Allahabad and	others, his conduct is bound to	infect	the members of the Bar all over the country. We are, therefore, of the view that an exemplary punishment has to be meted out to him.
57.The	facts and circumstances of the present case justify our invoking the power under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution to	award to the	contemner a suspended sentence of imprisonment together with suspension of his	practice as an advocate in the manner directed herein.	We accordingly sentence the	contemner for	his conviction for the offence of criminal contempt as under:
[a] The	contemner Vinay	Chandra Mishra is hereby sentenced to undergo	simple	im- prisonment for	a period of	six weeks.
However, in the circumstances of the case, the sentence will remain suspended for a period of four years and may be activated in case	the contemner	is convicted for any other offence of contempt of court within the said period, and [b] the contemner shall stand suspended	from practising as an advocate for a period of three years from today with the	consequence that all elective and nominated offices/posts at present held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall vacated by him forthwith.
58. The contempt petition is disposed of in the above terms.