Source: https://www.justice.gov/osg/brief/original-alaska-v-united-states-opposition
Timestamp: 2018-09-22 23:55:59
Document Index: 356677928

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 7', 'Art. 7', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 16', 'art 8102', 'art 17360', '§ 254', '§ 257', '§ 401', '§ 47', '§ 58', '§ 297', '§ 6', '§ 6']

Original: Alaska v. United States - Opposition | OSG | Department of Justice
Original: Alaska v. United States - Opposition
1.	Whether the Special Master correctly determined, in recommending that the Court grant the United States summary judgment on Count I of Alaska's amended complaint, that the straits and channels separating the islands of the Alexander Archipelago from each other and the mainland are not "historic inland waters." Alaska Exception 2.
2.	Whether the Special Master correctly determined, in recommending the Court grant the United States summary judgment on Count II of the amended complaint, that the straits and channels separating the islands of the Alexander Archipelago from each other and the mainland do not constitute one or more juridical bays. Alaska Exception 3.
3.	Whether the Special Master correctly determined, in recommending that the Court grant the United States summary judgment on Count IV of Alaska' amended complaint, that the United States reserved, and retained in federal ownership at the time of Alaska's statehood, the marine submerged lands within Glacier Bay National Monument (now Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve) to allow scientific study of tidewater glaciers, to preserve remnants of ancient inter-glacial forests, and to protect wildlife, including the brown bear. Alaska Exception 1.
o	reject Alaska's contention, in Count I of its amended complaint, that the State possesses title to pockets and enclaves of marine submerged lands within the Alexander Archipelago on the theory that the waters above those lands constitute "historic inland waters." Rep. 9-138.
o	reject Alaska's contention, in Count II of its amended complaint, that the State possesses title to pockets and enclaves of marine submerged lands within the Alexander Archipelago on the theory that the waters above those lands constitute heretofore-unnoticed juridical bays. Rep. 138-226.
o	reject Alaska's contention, in Count IV of its amended complaint, that Alaska possesses title to marine submerged lands within Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve (formerly Glacier Bay National Monument) on the theory that, when Congress set apart that area for federal use, it retained only the uplands and not the submerged lands therein. Rep. 227-276.
o	enter the United States' unopposed disclaimer of title, which makes clear, in response to Count III of Alaska's amended complaint, that the United States makes no claim that the creation of the Tongass National Forest, by itself, has resulted in federal retention of marine submerged lands within the Alexander Archipelago. Rep. 276-294.
1.	Alaska contends that it is entitled to pockets and enclaves of submerged lands more than 3 miles from shore on the theory that the whole of the Alexander Archipelago should be viewed as an "historic ba[y]." See Convention Art. 7(6), 15 U.S.T. 1609. Alaska acknowledges (Br. 22) that the Special Master identified the correct legal standard for assessing historic inland waters claims: Alaska must show that the United States exercised the power to exclude all foreign vessels from the area and did so continuously with the acquiescence of foreign nations. Rep. 13-14. The Master's exhaustive analysis of the historic record, Rep. 23-138, which specifically focused on the best evidence that Alaska could muster, Rep. 115-125, demonstrates that Alaska cannot satisfy that standard, Rep. 129-135, 137-138. Alaska challenges the Master's conclusion based on isolated incidents that have, at best, inconclusive historic significance. See AK Br. 22-37. The Master's report itself squarely answers each of Alaska's objections.
2.	Alaska alternatively contends (Br. 37-50) that it is entitled to pockets and enclaves of submerged lands more than 3 miles from shore on the theory that the whole of the Alexander Archipelago should be viewed as two huge-but heretofore unnoticed-juridical bays. See Convention Art. 7, 15 U.S.T. 1609. The Master correctly rejected Alaska's extraordinary contention. He demonstrated that Alaska wrongly seeks to characterize a series of discrete islands, separated by navigable channels, as extensions of the mainland. Rep. 138-198. The Master further concluded that, even if the islands were imagined to be mainland, they would not result in creation of anything that would qualify in law as a juridical bay. Rep. 198-226.
3.	Alaska also contends (Br. 10-21) that it is entitled to the submerged lands within Glacier Bay National Monument. The Master applied the controlling principles set forth in United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997), and correctly rejected Alaska's contention. The Master concluded, based on the Monument's boundary description and its purposes, that the United States had clearly reserved those submerged lands as part of the Monument. Rep. 227-264. He further concluded that Congress clearly expressed its intention, in Section 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act (ASA), 72 Stat. 340, to retain the submerged lands. Rep. 264-276. The Master explained that Section 6(e) retains federal reservations, including the submerged lands therein, that had been set aside for "the protection of wildlife" and that the Monument had been set aside for that purpose. Rep. 272-273. He specifically rejected, as inconsistent with Alaska, Alaska's contentions that application of Section 6(e) depends on which subdivision of the Interior Department manages the refuge or whether the reservation's "sole purpose" was wildlife conservation under certain federal statutes. Rep. 267-276.
I.	THE SPECIAL MASTER CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE WATERS OF THE ALEXANDER ARCHIPELAGO ARE NOT HISTORIC INLAND WATERS
A.	The Special Master's Analysis
B.	The United States' Reply To Alaska's Exception
1.	Alaska Has Failed To Show That Russia And The United States Exercised Sufficient Sovereign Authority Over The Archipelago Waters To Establish An Historic Inland Waters Claim. Since Russia first laid claim to Alaska, foreign nations have freely navigated the waters of the Alexander Archipelago. Alaska's claim that those waters should nevertheless be treated as historic inland waters depends on a handful of ambiguous statements and inconsequential events occurring over a period of more than 150 years. Alaska's evidence, whether viewed individually or taken as a whole, does not demonstrate that either Russia or the United States asserted "the power to exclude all foreign vessels and navigation." Rep. 14, 109 (quoting Alaska (Cook Inlet), 422 U.S. at 197).
a.	The Dryad, Loriot, And Chichagoff Incidents (1834-1836). Alaska claims (AK Br. 29-31) that Russia asserted the power to exclude foreign vessels during the period, from 1821 to 1867, when Russia exercised sovereignty over the Alexander Archipelago as part of the Russian Possessions in North America. Alaska relies (Br. 29-31) on three incidents, arising between 1834 and 1836, relating to disputes over the interpretation of Russian-British and Russian-American treaties.3
b.	The Letter From Secretary Of State Thomas F. Bayard (1886). Alaska's exception does not put forward any affirmative evidence that the United States prevented innocent passage during the period of early American sovereignty (1867-1903). Rather, Alaska attempts only to overcome convincing affirmative evidence to the contrary. Secretary of State Bayard's 1886 letter to Secretary of the Treasury Manning (Exh. US-I-6) expressly states that the United States claims only a traditional 3-mile territorial sea along the coast of Alaska. See Rep. 45-49. The Master concluded that this document, which "unambiguously support[s]" the United States' position, is especially persuasive because it is an express contemporaneous statement from the Secretary of State himself articulating "the official position of the State Department" that foreign vessels could make "free transit" through the Alexander Archipelago. Rep. 45-47, 109-110. "Officials who held this belief could not, and evidently did not, claim that the United States could exclude innocent passage through the waters." Rep. 110.5
c.	The Proceedings Of The Alaska Boundary Tribunal (1903). Alaska predicates its historic inland water claim primarily on several statements that it has extracted from the 7-volume Proceedings of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal, S. Doc. No. 58-162 (1903-1904) (ABT Proc.). See AK Br. 22-24. The ABT convened to resolve a dispute between the United States and Britain over the land boundary between Alaska's southeastern panhandle and Canada. Rep. 58.6 Alaska contends that the United States' counsel made statements in those proceedings that support Alaska's historic inland waters claim. The Master interpreted the counsel's statements to express the view that the "political coast line" of Alaska runs along the outside edge of the Alexander Archipelago, Rep. 56-63, but the Master ultimately concluded that those statements are not a legally sufficient assertion of authority to establish an historic waters claim, Rep. 116-119.7
d.	Fisheries Enforcement And The Marguerite Incident (1924). Alaska challenges (Br. 25-29) the Master's rejection of its argument that the federal government's enforcement of fisheries regulations in the Alexander Archipelago, and in particular its seizure of a Canadian fishing vessel, the Marguerite, supports an historic inland water claim. The Master noted that "Alaska presents no definitive examples of actual enforcement of fishing regulations against foreign nationals within the [Archipelago's] pockets and enclaves." Rep. 119. In the only example that Alaska offered-the seizure of the Marguerite-the location of the seizure "remains unsettled." Ibid.; see Rep. 66-68. The Master correctly recognized that, in any event, the federal government's enforcement of fisheries regulations is immaterial because "even if Alaska could prove the factual premise of its argument- that the United States enforced fishing regulations in the pockets and enclaves at issue-this proof would not lead to the conclusion that the United States regarded the waters of the Archipelago as inland waters or territorial sea." Rep. 120-121. As this Court ruled in Alaska (Cook Inlet), the federal government's fisheries enforcement jurisdiction "frequently differs in geographic extent from the boundaries claimed as inland or even territorial waters." 422 U.S. at 198-199. See Rep. 120-121.9
e.	Post-Statehood Evidence (1959 to Present). Alaska makes mention (Br. 24, 27) of several post-statehood documents, including judicial proceedings culminating in Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961), government statements in a Supreme Court brief in United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965) (Exh. US-I-6 pp.130-131), and statements purporting to show government use of the so-called Pearcy charts for fisheries enforcement purposes (Exhs. AK-103 to AK-107). The Master correctly explained that those documents are inconsequential.
2.	Alaska Cannot Meet The Other Requirements For Establishing An Historic Inland Waters Claim. The Master found that, because Alaska cannot establish the requisite assertion of sovereign authority, it cannot establish a continuous exercise of that authority or foreign acquiescence. Rep. 129-133. He further noted Alaska cannot show that the United States' "vital interests" weigh in favor of Alaska's claim. Rep. 133-135. Alaska's contentions to the contrary are without merit.
a.	Continuity. This Court's decisions and past special masters' reports indicate that, to establish an historic waters claim, a nation must continuously assert that claim for at least a century. See Rep. 130; US-I Opp. 32-40. The Master correctly concluded that Alaska's claim that the United States continuously excluded innocent passage from 1903 to 1959, even if substantiated, was of insufficient duration. Rep. 130-131. Alaska now contends (Br. 31) that its evidence should be viewed a continuous assertion of sovereign authority during the period from 1903 to 1971. Even if Alaska's claim could be lengthened by 13 years, it still falls nearly one-third short of the century standard. Of course, the fact remains that Alaska has failed to show any sufficient assertion of sovereign authority-much less a single, consistent, and continuing theory for exclusion-on which to base its claim. To the contrary, the Inside Passage of the Archipelago is an international route of travel that, for much of its history, has been dominated by foreign vessels. See US-I Opp. 38-40.
b.	Foreign Acquiescence. The Master pointed out that, because "Russia and the United States did not sufficiently assert authority over the waters of the Alexander Archi-pelago, it follows that foreign nations could not acquiesce." Rep. 131. He went on to note the complete failure of Alaska's proof on this point. Rep. 131-133. Alaska simply repeats (Br. 34) the flawed evidence that the Master rejected, and his report is sufficient, by itself, to rebut Alaska's arguments. See Rep. 132-133. See also US-I Memo. 40-44; US-I Reply 19-20. As the Master observed, "Alaska has not produced any statement by the government of any nation confirming that it would acquiesce in exclusion of its vessels from the waters of the Alexender Archipelago," and "Alaska also has not presented any opinion from any expert in the law or policy of any foreign nation on the question whether the foreign nation would acquiesce." Rep. 132. See US-I Memo. 8-9.
c.	Vital National Interests. The Master correctly concluded that "recognizing the waters of the Alexander Archipelago as inland waters is not vital to the interests of the United States." Rep. 135. Alaska's contentions to the contrary (Br. 36) are without merit. As the Master explained, the United States does not stand to gain commercially or militarily from excluding foreign vessels from the Archipelago waters. Rep. 134-135. To the contrary, if the Court were to validate Alaska's plainly deficient historic inland waters claim, the Court would create a significant adverse international precedent restricting the freedom of the seas. Foreign nations might use that precedent to exclude United States vessels from strategically important offshore waters and correspondingly impair the United States' ability to protect its vital overseas interests. See US-I Memo. 9-10; US-I Opp. 27-29; US-I Reply 19-20.
II.	THE SPECIAL MASTER CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE WATERS OF THE ALEXANDER ARCHIPELAGO DO NOT CONSTITUTE TWO HERETOFORE-UNNOTICED JURIDICAL BAYS
1.	This Court's Decisions Preclude Alaska's Proposed Assimilations. This Court's decisions recognize that, in exceptional circumstances, islands may be treated as part of the mainland for purposes of applying the Convention's bay-delimitation principles. See Maine, 469 U.S. at 517-519 (approving assimilation of Long Island to New York); see also Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 61-65. As the Master explained, the Court has employed "a 'realistic' and 'common sense' approach," considering a variety of geographic, physical, and socio-economic factors that bear on the relationship between the islands and the mainland. Rep. 148-149 (quoting Lousiana, 394 U.S. at 63, 64), 151-152. The Master identified those factors (Rep. 153-177) and applied them to each of the islands that Alaska contends should be assimilated (Rep. 177-197). His report contains a chart (Appendix E), showing those islands and the intervening waters. Rep. 306 (Exh. US-II-10). The Master correctly concluded that Kuiu Island cannot be assimilated to Kupreanof Island (Rep. 177-181), Kupreanof Island cannot be assimilated to Mitkof Island (Rep. 181-185), and Dry Island cannot be assimilated to the mainland (Rep. 189-193).12
a.	Kuiu Island-Kupreanof Island (Keku Strait). The Master correctly concluded that Kuiu and Kupreanof Islands cannot be assimilated, primarily because the waterway that separates them-the generally deep and easily navigable 41-mile-long Keku Strait-is too substantial to be ignored. Rep. 177-181. Alaska does not challenge the Master's determination that Keku Strait, taken as a whole, would preclude assimilation. Instead, Alaska contends (Br. 43) that the Master erred because he did not limit his focus to the 18-mile portion of that channel called "Rocky Pass," which is generally narrower and shallower than the rest of Keku Strait.
b.	Kupreanof Island-Mitkof Island (Wrangell Narrows). The Master similarly concluded that Kupreanof and Mitkof Islands cannot be assimilated, primarily because the waterway that separates them-the heavily-used 15-mile-long Wrangell Narrows-is also too substantial to be ignored. Rep. 181-185. In the case of Wrangell Narrows, Alaska has abandoned its approach of identifying "pinched waters." Rep. 181. Rather, Alaska primarily takes issue (Br. 40-41) with the Master's determination that the waterway has "significant navigational utility" (Rep. 183).
c.	Dry Island-Alaska Mainland. If Kuiu Island cannot be assimilated to Kupreanof Island, and Kupreanof Island cannot be assimilated to Mitkof Island, then "North Bay" and "South Bay" do not exist, and it makes no difference whether Dry Island can be assimilated to the Alaska mainland. Rep. 193. In any event, that assimilation would be inappropriate. The Master correctly rejected Alaska's contention below that an island can "automatically become part of the mainland, for the purpose of creating a bay," merely because "the island may form part of the coast line." Rep. 191. Alaska does not renew that argument here. Alaska did not attempt to establish before the Master that Dry Island could be assimilated under the analysis set forth in Maine. See Rep. 192-193. The Court should accordingly reject Alaska's unsubstantiated (and forfeited) assertion (Br. 44-45) that those factors "all favor assimilation." Alaska's failure to provide a basis for assimilating Dry Island to the mainland is fatal, by itself, to Alaska's associated juridical bay claims.
2.	Even If Alaska's Proposed Assimilations Were Appropriate, Alaska's Proposed "North Bay" And "South Bay" Would Not Qualify As Juridical Bays. Alaska challenges (Br. 46-49) the Master's determination that, assimilation issues aside, neither "North Bay" nor "South Bay" would qualify as a "well-marked indentation" under Article 7 of the Convention (15 U.S.T. 1609). The Master reached the correct result in the case of each supposed bay on essentially the same rationale. He reasoned that an indentation is "well marked" if it possesses "physical features so that a mariner looking at charts that do not show bay closing lines may perceive the limits of the bay and avoid making illegal entry into inland waters." Rep. 215.17
3.	The Principles Governing The Recognition Of Juridical Bays Counsel Strongly Against Alaska's Proposed Bays. Alaska quotes (Br. 49) this Court's statement in Maine that "[t]he ultimate justification for treating a bay as internal waters, under the Convention and under international law, is that, due to its geographic configuration, its waters implicate the interests of the territorial sovereign to a more intimate and important extent than do the waters beyond an open coast." Maine, 469 U.S. at 519. That consideration weighs decisively in favor of the United States' position. Article 4 of the Convention recognizes that a "fringe of islands," like the Alexander Archipelago, presents a geographic configuration that is not the equivalent of a bay and does not necessarily implicate the interests of the territorial sovereign to the same extent; it accordingly gives the coastal nation the discretion to determine whether that configuration should be enclosed by straight baselines. 15 U.S.T. at 1608. The United States has declined to draw straight baselines, concluding on balance that the national interest is not well served by treating such areas as inland waters. See US-II Memo. 4-6, 14-17, 22-24. That self-restraint is essential if the United States is to avoid setting precedents that would inhibit this Nation's ability to navigate off foreign shores.
III.	THE SPECIAL MASTER CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES RESERVED AND RETAINED TITLE TO THE SUBMERGED LANDS WITHIN GLACIER BAY NATIONAL MONUMENT
1.	The United States Reserved The Submerged Lands Within The Exterior Boundaries Of Glacier Bay National Monument. The Master concluded that "Glacier Bay National Monument, as it existed at the time of statehood, clearly included the submerged lands within its boundaries." Rep. 263-264. Alaska states in a footnote (Br. 10 n.4) that it disagrees with the Master's conclusion that the Executive reservations establishing the Monument included submerged land, but Alaska has neither identified that issue as one of its exceptions nor developed the argument in its brief. Alaska has wisely refrained from excepting from the Master's conclusion that both the boundary descriptions and the purposes of the Monument indicated a clear intent to include the submerged lands.28
2.	Congress Retained Title To Glacier Bay National Monument, Including Its Submerged Lands, At the Time Of Alaska's Statehood. As the Court explained in Alaska, the ASA set forth the general rule that the United States retained title to all property it owned before Alaska's admission to the Union, while Alaska acquired title to all property held by the Territory or its subdivisions. 521 U.S. at 55. Section 6(e) sets out one of several exceptions to that general rule. Section 6(e) provides that Alaska shall receive federal property "used for the sole purpose of conservation and protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska, under the provisions of [three specific statutes addressing fish and game management]." Rep. 265. Section 6(e) additionally contains a proviso that clearly expresses the intent of Congress that the United States shall retain lands set apart for the protection of wildlife. That proviso states that
a.	The United States Set Apart Glacier Bay National Monument "For The Protection Of Wildlife." The Master concluded, for two reasons, that the Monument was "withdrawn or otherwise set apart as [a] refuge[] or reservation for the protection of wildlife." Rep. 273-276. First, since their inception, national parks and monuments have had, as a core purpose, the protection of wildlife. See US-IV Memo. 38. Congress codified that wildlife-protection purpose in the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, which directs the NPS to administer all national "parks, monuments, and reservations" in accordance with
b.	Congress Retained Title To Glacier Bay National Monument Without Regard To Whether The Wildlife Lands Therein Were Administered By The National Park Service Or The Fish And Wildlife Service. This Court has squarely ruled that Section 6(e) of the ASA demonstrates that "Congress clearly contemplated continued federal ownership of certain submerged lands-both inland submerged lands and submerged lands beneath the territorial sea-so long as those submerged lands were among those 'withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife.'" Alaska, 521 U.S. at 57. Alaska seeks to avoid that holding by arguing (Br. 14-17), without textual support, that Section 6(e)'s proviso applies only to lands that the FWS administers. That argument is inconsistent with Section 6(e), its history, and this Court's holding in Alaska. Rep. 274-276.
c.	Congress Retained Title To Glacier Bay National Monument Without Regard To Whether The Monument's "Sole Purpose" Was Wildlife Conservation Under Certain Federal Statutes. Alaska seeks to avoid, on yet another ground, this Court's unambiguous ruling that Section 6(e) expresses Congress's intention to retain federal ownership of lands, including submerged lands, that were "withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife." Alaska, 521 U.S. at 57. Alaska observes (Br. 11-13) that the main clause of Section 6(e) grants Alaska "real and personal property used for the sole purpose of [wildlife] conservation" under three particular fish and game laws applicable to Alaska. Alaska then argues that Section 6(e)'s proviso, which retains in federal ownership lands set apart "as refuges and reservations for the protection of wildlife," retains only those lands encompassed within Section 6(e)'s main clause. The Master correctly rejected that construction. Rep. 267-272.
1	The Special Master's report and the parties' briefs on motions for summary judgment are posted on the Master's Website: http://www.law. gwu.edu/facweb/gmaggs/128orig/docket.htm. In this brief, the United States abbreviates its memoranda in support of its motions for summary judgment as US-[Count No.] Memo.; its briefs in opposition to Alaska's motions for summary judgment as US-[Count No.] Opp.; its reply briefs in support of its motions for summary judgment as US-[Count No.] Reply, and its exhibits as Exh. US-[Count No.]-[Exhibit No.].
2	The Master noted that: (1) "on nearly every relevant point, the parties do not dispute the material historic facts," but instead "contest the significance or proper interpretation of undisputed facts" (Rep. 20); (2) "even on the few points as to which a factual dispute appears to exist, a closer look reveals that the problem is simply that the available historic evidence is less than complete and that the parties' dispute is still really over the interpretation of the available undisputed facts" (ibid.); and (3) the parties' voluminous record exhibits "appear to include all of the evidence that the parties have been able to compile with regard to count I" (Rep. 21). The Master concluded that, under the circumstances, conducting a trial, in which the same evidence would be submitted to the same decisionmaker, would serve no useful purpose and that a resolution through summary judgment is therefore appropriate. Rep. 21-22.
3	Alaska does not challenge the Master's conclusion that Czar Alexander I's Ukase of Sept. 4, 1821, which purported to exclude foreign vessels from approaching within 100 Italian miles of the Russian-American coast, does not provide a basis for an historic inland waters claim. See Rep. 24-25. As this Court has itself ruled, the ukase cannot support an historic inland waters claim because it "was unequivocally withdrawn in the face of vigorous protests from the United States and England." Rep. 24-25 (quoting Alaska (Cook Inlet), 422 U.S. at 191 n.11).
4	The Convention expresses the historical understanding that innocent passage "includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress." Art. 14(3), 15 U.S.T. 1610. It does not include passage that is "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State" or that violates the coastal nation's fisheries laws. Art. 14(4) and (5), 15 U.S.T. 1610. A nation is entitled to "take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which in not innocent." Art. 16(1), U.S.T. 1611. See US-I Opp. 4; 4 M. Whiteman, International Law 343-371 (1965) (discussing innocent passage).
5	Secretary Bayard's letter specifically underscores that the United States: (1) had consistently claimed a territorial sea of only 3 miles (Exh. US-1-6 pp.14a-16a); (2) measures the territorial sea from the shores of the mainland and the islands and not from lines connecting islands (id. at 16a); (3) recognizes the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea (id. at 18a); and (4) refused to recognize Russian jurisdiction beyond 3 miles of the shores of Alaska and cannot, therefore, "claim greater jurisdiction against other nations, of seas washing territories which we derived from Russia under the Alaska purchase" (ibid.). See Rep. 45-49.
6	As the Master noted (Rep. 56), the report of the special master in the Alaska litigation "provides a concise and accessible summary of [the ABT] proceedings." See Report, Alaska, No. 84 Orig., at 61-65 (Mar. 1996).
7	The United States disagrees with the Master's characterization of the counsel's statements as expressing an authoritative position of the United States. See Rep. 61. The counsel's statements, read in context, merely attempted to show that, if Britain's arguments in that case were accepted, they would lead to the absurd consequence that the Alexander Archipelago would have two political boundaries. See US-I Memo. 22-27; US-I Opp. 14-17; US-I Reply 10. The counsel did not purport to make a maritime claim, and his written brief was careful to point out, under the argument heading, "The Political Coast Line Not Involved In This Case," that "[t]he artificial coast line created by international law for purposes of jurisdiction only, which, following the general trend of the coast, cuts across bays and inlets is not involved in this case in any form." Exh. US-I-30, Pt. 1, at 17-18. See US-I Memo. 27; US-I Opp. 16; US-I Reply 10. Moreover, other government statements from that period contradict any suggestion that counsel may have made that the United States draws 10-mile closing lines around coastal archipelagos. US-I Memo. 15-16. This Court, however, need not resolve the proper characterization of the counsel's statements. As the Master concluded, those statements, even when interpreted as Alaska urges, are insufficient to establish an historic inland waters claim. Rep. 118-119.
8	Alaska notes (Br. 23) that Norwegian counsel discovered and cited the United States counsel's statements during a 1951 dispute with Britain over the scope of Norway's inland waters. But that was nearly 50 years later and, as the Master pointed out, the United States had made clear to Norway in 1949 that the United States did not claim the Archipelago waters as inland. Rep. 84-85; US-I Memo. 41-42. In any event, "[t]he ability of one foreign nation to discover the United States' argument when litigating a related issue * * * does not mean that foreign nations should have known of the United States' position." Rep. 118 n.34. Alaska has produced no evidence that those involved in actual navigation of the Archipelago waters knew of, or relied on, the counsel's statements.
9	For example, the United States currently maintains an Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 miles from the United States coast and prohibits foreign fishing, without permission, within that zone. 16 U.S.C. 1811 et seq. The federal government's enforcement of that prohibition cannot support an historic inland waters claim because the United States continues to allow passage through those waters. See note 4, supra.
10	Alaska is mistaken in characterizing Exh. AK-462 as a "contemporaneous map." The Coast Guard plotted the seizure on an edition of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Chart 8102 that was published in October 1925, at least 15 months after the Marguerite incident. See Exh. AK-461. (Exh. AK-462 is derived from Exh. AK-461, but does not include the chart's publication and issuance dates.) The Coast Guard apparently prepared the plot long after the incident took place, presumably in response to a British protest. See Rep. 67; Exh. AK-461. The British protest underscores that, even if the Marguerite were seized for fishing in a pocket or enclave, foreign nations did not acquiesce in any claim that the seizure was legitimate. Rep. 132. And of course, an isolated enforcement action would not satisfy the requirement of a continuous assertion of sovereignty for an extended period.
11	Alaska's quotation (Br. 29) from a United Nations study provides no support for its contention. That study merely indicates that a nation's continuous assertion of exclusive fishing rights might give rise to an historic fisheries claim, not an historic inland waters claim. Ibid. Alaska's reference to the Court's recounting of the Shelikoff Strait incident (Br. 28) in Alaska (Cook Inlet) also provides no support for its contention. The Court "scutini[zed]" Alaska's 1960 seizure of a Japanese vessel "more than three miles from shore" because the State's seizure in that case was evidence of Alaska's "assertion of sovereignty to exclude foreign vessels altogether." 422 U.S. at 201. The Court determined from the record that, at the time of the seizure, "Alaska clearly claimed the waters in question as inland waters," id. at 203, and Alaska justified the seizure on that basis, see 73-1888 App. 1186. But the Court concluded that Alaska's assertion of authority was insufficient to establish that the United States claimed those waters as inland waters because "the United States neither supported nor disclaimed the State's position." 422 U.S. at 203. The Court did not suggest that any seizure of a vessel beyond the 3-mile limit would necessarily constitute an inland waters claim. Rather, it specifically rejected that contention. See id. at 198-199.
12	The Master concluded that "assimilation is warranted between Dry Island and Mitkof Island and between Partofshikof Island and Kruzof Island." Rep. 197. The United States believes that the Master erred in concluding that Dry Island could be assimilated to Mitkof Island because he overlooked the most recent nautical chart (NOAA Chart 17360 (31st ed. Mar. 27, 1999)), which shows a channel at low-water between those islands. Compare Rep. 186, with US-II Reply 18-19. The Court need not reach that issue, however, because that assimilation would "not suffice" to create Alaska's proposed juridical bays. Rep. 197.
13	The Master explained that the United States' position provides certainty because it identifies the intervening waters through an accepted objective measure-the "45-degree test"-that the Court has used in other contexts. Rep. 154-158. By contrast, Alaska's position, which identifies the intervening waters through a subjective evaluation of where the waters are "pinched," would inevitably generate controversies over where the intervening waters begin and end. Rep. 155. Because Alaska relies on subjective criteria, its approach is "highly manipulable" and could lead foreign nations to "argu[e] for assimilation of islands that are not 'realistically' parts of other land forms." Rep. 158. And because "Alaska's approach would make assimilation substantially easier than the United States' approach," it would erode the understanding that assimilation is limited to the "'exceptional case.'" Ibid. (quoting Maine, 469 U.S. at 517).
14	In 1902 alone, "the 'large traffic' through Wrangell Narrows included 19,090 passengers and 124,681 tons of cargo." Rep. 183 (quoting Exh. AK-146 p.5). Two steamship companies made 187 transits through the Narrows in one year. Ibid. The historic documents show that Wrangell Narrows has long been the favored navigation route for national and international traffic from Seattle to Skagway. See Exh. US-II-31.
15	The Coast Guard reports that Wrangell Narrows is regularly used by Alaska state ferries of up to 410 feet in length with a 75-foot beam drawing 17 feet; tugs up to 120 feet long and 17 foot draft; barges up to 320 feet long and 22 foot draft with an average length of tow of 500 feet; cruise ships up to 407 feet long and 53 feet across with drafts of 16 feet; and fishing vessels up to 150 feet long drawing 15 feet. Exh. US-II-27 p.3; Exh. US-II-1 p.50.
16	Alaska's comparison of Wrangell Narrows to the New York's East River is unpersuasive. Wrangell Narrows, unlike the East River, "serves as the principal opening between two bodies of water" and is heavily used by foreign flag vessels, not as a destination, but rather as a route for international transit. Rep. 184-185.
17	The Master also concluded, correctly, that "South Bay" does not qualify as a juridical bay because its "depth of penetration" is insufficient. See Rep. 223-225. In doing so, the Master correctly rejected Alaska's flawed approach to measuring the mouth of a juridical bay. Compare Rep. 201-205, with AK Br. 47-49. Although the United States agrees with most of the Master's interpretations of Article 7, see US-II Opp. 31-45, it disagrees with his methodology for measuring the endpoint of penetration. See Rep. 207-208. The United States urged that the endpoint should not extend into waterways adjacent to an asserted bay (such as Lynn Canal in the case of "North Bay") that independently qualify as inland waters. US-II Opp. 42. The Master rejected that approach, despite its "logical appeal," based on his understanding of a pre-Convention decision of the International Court of Justice. Rep. 207-210. The United States suggests that resolution of that issue should await a case in which the answer affects the outcome. See Rep. 198 n.53.
18	For example, explorers consistently identified the Archipelago waters as "straits" and "passages" rather than "bays"; the State Department's renowned geographer S. Whitmore Boggs did not detect "North Bay" or "South Bay" in his extensive studies of the Archipelago waters; the United States' Coastline Committee did not detect them in preparing its 1971 charts of those waters; and Alaska itself did not detect them in objecting to the 1971 charts or even in its initial complaint in this case. Rep. 216-217. See US-II Memo. 16-22.
19	The Act creating Glacier Bay National Park provides that "[l]ands, waters and interests therein withdrawn or reserved for the former Katmai and Glacier Bay National Monuments are hereby incorporated within and made a part of the Katmai National Park or Glacier Bay National Park." 16 U.S.C. 410hh-2.
20	The Master's conclusion that Congress had notice of the reservation of submerged lands went beyond what is strictly necessary under the first part of this Court's test. The Court has examined whether Congress had notice of a reservation of submerged lands where the President had arguably exceeded his authority to reserve such lands, in order to determine whether Congress had ratified the executive action. See Alaska, 521 U.S. at 44. That inquiry is unnecessary in the case of the Antiquities Act because that Act clearly authorizes the President to include submerged lands within national monuments. United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 36 (1978). See US-IV Memo. 29 n.15. The unique characteristics of the Antiquities Act are also relevant to the second part of this Court's test-whether Congress intended to retain the submerged lands at statehood. Congress intended that national monuments would be permanent; they can be abolished only by Act of Congress. US-IV Memo. 39-40. Congress was aware of that rule and rejected attempts to reduce the Glacier Bay Monument, which indicates that Congress intended to retain those lands at statehood. See id. at 40-45.
21	Those boundary descriptions cannot be explained by a desire to include certain islands and exclude others. The boundary line runs through Excursion Inlet even though that inlet contains no islands on its western shore. Rep. 238. The line would not need to run 3 miles off the Pacific coast for the purpose of allocating islands because no islands lie more than 2 miles from the coast. Ibid.
22	Additionally, the United States demonstrated that National Park Service (NPS) officials who were responsible for preparing a report supporting the 1939 Proclamation and developing the expanded boundaries specifically stated that the 1925 Proclamation included the submerged lands and that the 1939 Proclamation would add submerged lands, calculating the specific acreage in each situation. See Exh. US-IV-9 pp.ii, 2, 3. One week after President Roosevelt issued the 1939 Proclamation, the Interior Department issued a press release noting the presence of whales, porpoises, and seals "in Glacier Bay and adjacent waters" and stating that the 1939 Proclamation extended the Monument "to the three-mile limit off the coast." Exh. US-IV-11. The United States also demonstrated that, since creation of the Monument, the NPS has consistently administered the Monument's submerged lands as part of the Monument. The NPS has regulated seal hunting and aircraft landings, included the submerged lands in management plans, conducted studies of wildlife and fish on or over the submerged lands, and built structures on submerged lands without seeking state tidelands leases. See US-IV Memo. 20-24.
23	The 1925 Proclamation identified, as a principal feature of Glacier Bay, "tidewater glaciers of first rank," which extend into the Bay. Rep. 245. Those glaciers, which rest on fjord bottoms but can advance or retreat more than a kilometer per year, have been subjects of scientific investigation for more than a century. Rep. 247-249. The Master recognized that Glacier Bay's "complete glacier system includes the mountain peaks as well as the ocean depths," and the Monument "would not be an effective area for the study of tidewater glaciers if the submerged lands were excluded." Rep. 247 (quoting Exh. US-IV-5 pp.6-7).
24	The 1925 Proclamation specifically identified those forests, which are the "remnants of ancient trees that had been buried underneath ice for millenia," as subjects of scientific study. Rep. 251.
25	Congress has decreed that a fundamental purpose of national monuments is the protection of the wildlife therein. 16 U.S.C. 1. The 1925 Proclamation identifies the study of the movements of flora and fauna as a purpose of the Monument, and the 1939 Proclamation expanded the Monument to extend those protections, especially with respect to the brown bear. The United States submitted expert evidence that brown bears make extensive use of marine submerged lands and have customarily been hunted from vessels. Exh. US-IV-6 pp.6-13. The expert confirmed that, to protect brown bears, it is necessary to "protect both the intertidal habitat and an adjacent zone of nearshore marine water." Id. at 19. Alaska submitted no contrary evidence. Rep. 255.
26	The Master considered and rejected Alaska's contrary contention. He concluded that, despite substantial discovery and ample time for preparation, Alaska had not presented any affidavit, expert report, or other evidence contradicting the United States' evidence. Rep. 249-250, 255. Moreover, at oral argument, the Master specifically asked what further evidence the State might present at trial. Rep. 250. Counsel for Alaska responded: "it is not that there are facts that the State needs to come forward with, but that there's been a failure of proof on the United States' part." Ibid. (Tr. 155 (Feb. 3, 2003)). The Master recognized that Rule 56(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires no defense if the movant fails to meet the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of fact, but he concluded that the United States had met its burden here. Rep. 250-251, 255.
27	Alaska actually goes even further, requesting (Br. 21) this Court to enter summary judgment in its favor, even though Alaska did not file a written motion for summary judgment before the Master. Alaska made an oral request for such relief at the Master's hearing on the United States' motion for summary judgment. See Rep. 228-229. The Master did not address Alaska's oral request (Rep. 1, 294), which apparently reflects his view that the request did not constitute a proper motion for summary judgment.
28	Alaska contends in its footnote (Br. 10-11 n.4) that "the Monument's borders were drawn partly through water to denote islands and other uplands to be included, not to clearly include the submerged lands" and that the "failure to reserve the entire seabed would not have defeated the United States' asserted purpose for the reservation." The Master correctly rejected Alaska's first contention because the water boundaries of the Monument traverse water bodies where there are no islands to allocate between those in and outside the Monument. Rep. 237-238. The Master rejected the second contention because the Court has never second-guessed the extent of the submerged lands reserved by the United States once the Court has determined that exclusion of all submerged lands would undermine a purpose of a reservation. Rep. 252 (citing Alaska, 521 U.S. at 40-41); see US-IV Reply 10-11.
29	The United States suggests that the Court should not ignore a judicial admission, such as the allegations of a complaint, when the party who made the admission has neither moved for nor received leave to amend the complaint. See Martinez v. Bally's La., Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2001); Solon v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 180 F.3d 844, 858 (7th Cir. 1999); Missouri Hous. Dev. Comm'n v. Brice, 919 F.2d 1306, 1314 (8th Cir. 1990); 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 254, at 138, § 257, at 142 (5th ed. 1999). The usual rule requiring amendment is particularly appropriate in cases such as this one, in which the admission goes to a crucial element of the case and the party has had ample time and opportunity to seek leave to amend.
30	That evidence shows that the Executive and Congress repeatedly discussed plans to expand the Monument to create a brown bear refuge. In 1931, the Special Senate Committee on Wildlife Conservation (Special Committee) recommended that the NPS study an expansion of the Monument "which would protect a certain number of large brown bears." Exh. US-IV-19 p.253. In 1932, the head of the Alaska Game Commission testified in support of a proposal to enlarge the Monument "as a bear sanctuary." Exh. US-IV-15 p.32. The Committee's chairman put on record that "this committee [has] made that specific recommendation that Mr. Terhune has just described." The chairman later wrote to the NPS director that he supported "an executive order to extend the confines of the Glacier Bay National Monument to include some of those coast forests and the further protection of the brown bear." Exh. US-IV-21. In 1937, the Administration reported to Congress on a ten-year program for Alaska, stating, in a section entitled "Refuges," that "wild animals and birds are especially protected by the [NPS] in * * * Glacier Bay National Monument." Exh. US-IV-19 p.147. The report, which provided an abbreviated description of the boundary of the proposed expansion running through water bodies, stated the proposed expansion had been urged since 1927 to "provid[e] a suitable wildlife refuge for the Alaska brown bear." Id. at 252-253. The report specifically stated that the "chief reasons" for expanding the Monument included "mak[ing] a suitable reserve for the brown bear." Id. at 260 n.73. In 1940, the Committee reported on the expansion using an acreage description that included submerged lands and stating that the expansion "gave much-needed protection to the giant brown bear and other subarctic species." Exh. US-IV-25 p.353. President Roosevelt himself took a personal interest in expanding the Monument to protect brown bears. When the President expressed shock that persons were shooting Alaskan brown bears from yachts, Secretary Ickes responded that the Interior Department planned to expand the Monument to protect the bears. Exh. US-IV-6 p.16. See Rep. 258-260.
31	Secretary Chapman stated, in explaining the language that became Section 6(e), that "the United States would retain administrative jurisdiction over the Pribilof Islands and over all other Federal lands and waters in Alaska which have been set aside as wildlife refuges or reservations pursuant to the fur seal and sea otter laws, the migratory bird laws or other Federal statutes of general application." Exh. US-IV-40 p.49 (emphasis added). The Antiquities Act plainly qualifies as such a statute. See Rep. 253, 261; see also US-I Memo. 37-38; US-I Reply 20-21. Furthermore, both at the time of the 1939 expansion and at the time that Secretary Chapman suggested the language of Section 6(e), NPS regulations provided that the "Parks and Monuments are sanctuaries for wildlife of every sort." 36 C.F.R. 2.8 (1939); 36 C.F.R. 1.9 (1949).
32	See Exh. US-IV-19 pp.252-253 (expansion of Glacier Bay National Monument proposed to provide "a suitable wildlife refuge for the Alaska brown bear"); 16 U.S.C. 694 (fish and game refuges within National Forests remain under Forest Service jurisdiction). Both before and after Alaska's statehood, revenue distribution schemes recognized that agencies other than the FWS also administered wildlife refuges. See Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, 1935, ch. 261, § 401, 49 Stat. 383; Act of Aug. 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-523, 78 Stat. 701; H.R. Rep. No. 88-1753, 14, 15-16 (1964) (explaining that receipts from wildlife refuges administered by agencies other than FWS would be distributed pursuant to other statutes). Moreover, the FWS's work and "valuable installations" in Alaska were likewise not limited to FWS-administered refuges, but extended to national monuments as well. See Exh. AK-452 p.32 (testimony of NPS director regarding FWS facility in Katmai National Monument).
33	Alaska overlooks the most salient features of those hearings. The Senate Committee requested representatives of each land-managing agency to provide information on the lands each administered in Alaska and on whether any reservations could be eliminated or reduced in size. Exh. AK-452 pp.23-24. The FWS witnesses primarily discussed only those lands that the FWS administered, and they objected to the elimination of most FWS-administered reservations. Id. at 55-84. The NPS director testified on Glacier Bay National Monument, which he described as a "water park" and as a "series of glaciers on a mountain range, with the Glacier Bay going up though the center." Id. at 46. He specifically urged that all of the Monument should remain in federal ownership. Id. at 54. Significantly, the Committee considered it irrelevant which Interior Department subdivision administered particular lands for wildlife protection. As Senator Cordon stated, "We are not too much interested in which division of the Department of the Interior does the work. I know you folks might be, but we are not." Id. at 66.
34	The FWS had applied for a refuge withdrawal, but that withdrawal was not made until after statehood. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 46. The regulations in effect at the time of application provided that an application for a withdrawal segregated the land, but that "[s]uch temporary segregation shall not affect the administrative jurisdiction over the segregated lands." 43 C.F.R. 295.10(a) (1954).
35	See McDonald v. United States, 279 U.S. 12, 20-22 (1929); Springer v. Government of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 207-208 (1928); United States v. G. Falk & Bros., 204 U.S. 143, 149 (1907); United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905); ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 37 (1904). See also 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.09, at 238 (6th ed. 2000); F. McCaffrey, Statutory Construction § 58, at 118-119 (1953); E. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes § 297, at 604-605 (1940); C. Jones, Statute Law Making in the United States 203 (1912).
36	Alaska does not contend that Section 6(e)'s main clause actually encompasses ANWR, stating that it "is immaterial to this case whether [the Court's] assumption was correct." Br. 18 n.7. Alaska apparently recognizes that the lands that would constitute ANWR were not, at the time of statehood, "specifically used for the sole purpose of conservation and protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska under [the specifically enumerated statutes]." ASA § 6(e). Furthermore, when ANWR was formally established, it was not created or managed pursuant to those statutes. See Pub. Land Order No. 2214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598 (1960).
37	The Court's holding that the Section 6(e) proviso is an independent retention clause is consistent with Secretary Chapman's explanation of that provision. He stated that the United States would retain "all other Federal lands and waters in Alaska which have been set aside as wildlife refuges or reservations pursuant to the fur seal and sea otter laws, the migratory bird laws or other Federal statutes of general application." Exh. US-IV-40 p.49. He noted that Section 6(e) was designed to "bring[] about a division of the fish and wildlife activities now conducted by the United States in Alaska, along lines of demarcation conforming to the recognized distinctions between Federal and State functions." Ibid. Under that division, the State would receive a varied assortment of "real and personal property" used solely for managing Alaska wildlife and fisheries under particular laws in accordance with typical state functions, while the United States would retain "lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart for the protection of wildlife [and] facilities utilized in connection therewith," ASA § 6(e), in accordance with the national interest in preserving wildlife reserves.
38	As noted, ANWR does not fall within Section 6(e)'s main clause. See note 36, supra. Of the 26 FWS-administered wildlife refuges in existence during Congress' deliberations on the ASA, Exh. AK-452 p.64, Alaska claims that two (the Kenai National Moose Range and Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge) qualify. The executive orders establishing those refuges, however, do not cite the specific statutes identified in Section 6(e)'s main clause. Both executive orders reference the Alaska Game Law of 1925 rather than the Alaska Game Law of 1943. Exec. Order No. 8857 (Kodiak), 6 Fed. Reg. 4287 (1941); Exec. Order No. 8979 (Kenai), 6 Fed. Reg. 6471 (1941). Moreover, the FWS director testified in the Statehood Act hearings that those refuges were used for purposes beyond game protection. See Exh. AK-452 p.67 (recreation areas in Kenai reserve), p.74 (industrial use zones in Kodiak reserve); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) (oil and gas leasing on Kenai reserve). Even if those difficulties with Alaska's theory were overlooked, the result would be that the United States retained submerged lands within only those two refuges. But the FWS director recommended, and Congress understood, that all the other refuges would be retained in federal ownership under the ASA, Exh. 452 p.71, and some of those refuges undisputedly include vitally important submerged lands. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 5858 (June 17, 1932) (creating the Semidi Islands Wild Life Refuge, which included "reefs and all lands under water appurtenant" to the Semidi Islands).
39	This Court's decisions make clear that the crucial question is whether the relevant statutory language, read as a whole in its historic context, expresses congressional intent to retain title. See Idaho, 533 U.S. at 273-281; Alaska, 521 U.S. at 41-46, 55-61. For example, the Court concluded in Idaho that Congress retained submerged lands within an Indian reservation because various pre-statehood congressional actions, viewed in historic context, demonstrated that intent. 533 U.S. at 276; see id. at 273-281. Similarly, the Court concluded in Alaska that Section 11(b) of the ASA retained submerged lands in the National Petroleum Reserve, even though that Section does not specifically discuss "United States' title to submerged lands," because the statutory language, read in context, expressed that intent. 521 U.S. at 41-42. Applying the same approach, the Court concluded that Section 6(e) similarly expressed Congress's overarching and "clearly contemplated" intent that the United States would retain submerged lands in "refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife." Id. at 57.
40	The record includes a video presentation, entitled Beneath the Reflections, that vividly portrays those treasures. Exh. US-IV-8 App. 6.
(a)	The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights.
(e)	If the United States disclaims all interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by order of the court, the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease unless it has jurisdiction of the civil action or suit on ground other than and independent of the authority conferred by section 1346(f) of this title.
(c)	The term "coast line" means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters;
(a)	* * * all lands expressly retained by or ceded to the United States when the State entered the Union (otherwise than by a general retention or cession of lands underlying the marginal sea);
1.	This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State.
2.	For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation.
3.	For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the water areas of the indentation.
4.	If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters.
5.	Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.
6.	The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied.
(e)	All real and personal property of the United States situated in the Territory of Alaska which is specifically used for the sole purpose of conservation and protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska, under the provisions of the Alaska game law of July 1, 1943 (57 Stat. 301; 48 U.S.C., sections 192-211), as amended, and under the provisions of the Alaska commercial fisheries laws of June 26, 1906 (34 Stat. 478; 48 U.S.C., sections 230-239 and 241-242), and June 6, 1924 (43 Stat. 465; 48 U.S.C., sections 221- 228), as supplemented and amended, shall be transferred and conveyed to the State of Alaska by the appropriate Federal agency: Provided, That the administration and management of the fish and wildlife resources of Alaska shall be retained by the Federal Government under existing laws until the first day of the first calendar year following the expiration of ninety legislative days after the Secretary of the Interior certifies to the Congress that the Alaska State Legislature has made adequate provision for the administration, management, and conservation of said resources in the broad national interest: Provided, That such transfer shall not include lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife nor facilities utilized in connection therewith, or in connection with general research activities relating to fisheries or wildlife. Sums of money that are available for apportionment or which the Secretary of the Interior shall have apportioned, as of the date the State of Alaska shall be deemed to be admitted into the Union, for wildlife restoration in the Territory of Alaska, pursuant to section 8 (a) of the Act of September 2, 1937, as amended (16 U.S.C., section 669g-1), and for fish restoration and management in the Territory of Alaska, pursuant to section 12 of the Act of August 9, 1950 (16 U.S.C., section 777k), shall continue to be available for the period, and under the terms and conditions in effect at the time, the apportionments are made. Commencing with the year during which Alaska is admitted into the Union, the Secretary of the Treasury, at the close of each fiscal year, shall pay to the State of Alaska 70 per centum of the net proceeds, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior, derived during such fiscal year from all sales of sealskins or sea otter skins made in accordance with the provisions of the Act of February 26, 1944 (58 Stat. 100; 16 U.S.C., sections 631a-631q), as supplemented and amended. In arriving at the net proceeds, there shall be deducted from the receipts from all sales all costs to the United States in carrying out the provisions of the Act of February 26, 1944, as supplemented and amended, including, but not limited to, the costs of handling and dressing the skins, the costs of making the sales, and all expenses incurred in the administration of the Pribilof Islands. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the rights of the United States under the provisions of the Act of February 26, 1944, as supplemented and amended, and the Act of June 28, 1937 (50 Stat. 325), as amended (16 U.S.C., section 772 et seq.).
(m)	The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (Public Law 31, Eighty-third Congress, first session; 67 Stat. 29) shall be applicable to the State of Alaska and the said State shall have the same rights as do existing States thereunder.
128.Original.pet.rep.pdf