Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/652/617/56730/
Timestamp: 2020-08-06 07:35:17
Document Index: 757825833

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 501', '§ 501', '§ 501', '§ 193']

Coleman A. Young, Individually and As Mayor, City Ofdetroit, and City of Detroit, a Municipalcorporation, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce of the Unitedstates, and Vincent P. Barabba, Director, Bureauof the Census, Defendants-appellants, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1981 › Coleman A. Young, Individually and As Mayor, City Ofdetroit, and City of Detroit, a Municipalcorpora...
Coleman A. Young, Individually and As Mayor, City Ofdetroit, and City of Detroit, a Municipalcorporation, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce of the Unitedstates, and Vincent P. Barabba, Director, Bureauof the Census, Defendants-appellants, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981) Argued Feb. 12, 1981. Decided June 15, 1981
Percent United States 1980 1970 Distribution 1980 1970 Total .............. 226,504,825 203,211,926 100.0 100.0 White ............... 188,340,790 177,748,975 83.2 87.5 Black ................ 26,488,218 22,580,289 11.7 11.1 American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut .... 1,418,195 827,268 0.6 0.4 Asian and Pacific Islander ............. 3,500,636 1,538,721 1.5 0.8 Other ................. 6,756,986 516,673 3.0 0.3 ------------------- Persons of Spanish Origin .............. 14,605,883 9,072,602 6.4 4.5 Persons not of Spanish Origin ..... 211,898,942 194,139,324 93.6 95.5
The issue of standing arises from the language in Article III that "(t)he judicial Power shall extend to ... Cases ... (and) Controversies...." U.S.Const. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court has held that restrictions upon standing are necessary to guarantee that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968), "so that federal courts will not be asked to decide 'ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues,' United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (67 S. Ct. 556, 564, 91 L. Ed. 754) (1947), or case(s) ... of 'a hypothetical or abstract character,' Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (57 S. Ct. 461, 463, 81 L. Ed. 617) (1937)." Id. at 100, 88 S. Ct. at 1952. See also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-39, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1923-24, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2204-2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 1147-48, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1973). In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154, 90 S. Ct. 827, 830, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970), the Supreme Court further characterized its doctrine of standing and reviewability as a "rule of self-restraint" "for its own governance." In addition to the minimum requirements imposed by Article III, courts have developed rules to limit their exercise of jurisdiction in particular cases when prudential considerations militate against invocation of the judicial process. See, e. g., Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 499-500, 95 S. Ct. at 2205, and cases cited therein.
In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-73, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 2629-2630, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1978), the Court stated that the standing rule requires "not only a 'distinct and palpable injury' to the plaintiff ... but also a 'fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct," "or put otherwise, that the exercise of the Court's remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries." Thus, when focusing on the question of a plaintiff's standing the relevant considerations are the existence of an injury, its cause, and the existence of a remedy for redress of the injury.
Contrary to the assertions by plaintiffs, the state legislature is not required by the Constitution to accept in all respects the census data supplied by the Bureau. Article 1, § 2 of the Constitution requires that "as nearly as is practicable" one person's vote is to be worth as much as another's vote in apportioning congressional representation. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 527-28, 89 S. Ct. 1225, 1227, 22 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1969), citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 84 S. Ct. 526, 529-530, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1964). To achieve this goal, limited population variances from district to district will be tolerated only if these variances are "unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or ... (if) justification is shown." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. at 531, 89 S. Ct. at 1229. Kirkpatrick rejected as a justification the claim that population variances were due to legislative attempts to take into account projected population shifts. The Court concluded that when the population changes over the ten year period between censuses, states that are redistricting may properly consider the population shifts. But "(f)indings as to population trends must be thoroughly documented and applied throughout the state in a systematic, not an ad hoc, manner." Id. at 535, 89 S. Ct. at 1231. It is evident that states may use adjusted population figures when redistricting between census years. There is no reason to believe that states would not be free to adjust census figures for redistricting in the census year, as long as the adjustment is "thoroughly documented" and applied in a "systematic" manner. See also Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 1296, 16 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1966) (in state legislative apportionment cases, the Constitution "does not require the States to use total population figures derived from the federal census as the standard" of measurement).
The goal in any redistricting is to assure that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is worth as much as another's." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 84 S. Ct. 526, 529-530, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1964). If the Census Bureau had erroneously undercounted the Detroit area by 25%, the Michigan legislature would not be precluded from adjusting the figures for purposes of congressional apportionment. Although the Constitution prohibits subterfuge in adjustment of census figures for purposes of redistricting, it does not constrain adjustment of census figures if thoroughly documented and applied in a systematic manner.
Plaintiffs also argue, however, that even if the state legislature is not constitutionally compelled to use the Bureau's census data, nonetheless it is very probable that the legislature will accept the data without adjustment. Thus the Michigan legislature is not an intervening independent actor, and the Bureau must still be considered the cause of plaintiff's injury. We disagree. Having found no legal compulsion that the state act in a certain way, we may not predict what decisions the state legislature will, in fact, make. The legislature may decide to conduct a recount or to adjust the state population to take the undercount into consideration for the purpose of apportioning Congressional seats. Thus we simply do not know whether plaintiffs will be harmed by the decision of the Bureau not to adjust its figures. The presence of an intervening actor casts doubt at least at the present time upon the existence of the injury felt by plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has stated, "(T)he 'case or controversy' limitation of Art. III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon, supra, 426 U.S. at 41-42, 96 S. Ct. at 1925-1926.8
Standing doctrine imposes constitutional limitations on federal courts' jurisdiction. Even when jurisdiction is technically present, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that " 'problems of prematurity and abstractness' ... may prevent adjudication in all but the exceptional case." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114, 96 S. Ct. 612, 680, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976), quoting Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588, 92 S. Ct. 1716, 1719, 32 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1972). Such questions of ripeness, the Court has held, are resolved through two inquiries. Courts must first "determine whether the issues tendered are appropriate for judicial resolution," and then "assess the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at that stage." Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162, 87 S. Ct. 1520, 1523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1967). Plaintiffs satisfy neither inquiry in this case.
The question whether tendered issues are appropriate for judicial resolution clearly "bears close affinity" to questions of standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 n.10, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975). The precise focus of ripeness doctrine is that it is "peculiarly a question of timing." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S. Ct. 335, 356, 42 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1974). As Justice Fortas has pointed out in the context of pre-enforcement attacks on administrative regulations, the reason for deferring consideration of abstract or premature claims is to allow governmental processes
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681; Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 87 S. Ct. 1520, 18 L. Ed. 2d 697; Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. 167, 200, 87 S. Ct. 1526, 1543, 18 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring and dissenting). Because the Michigan state legislature has not yet expressed its reaction to the census enumeration, the issue before this Court has not become as "specific" or as "particularized" as it will become after the legislature acts. Heightened public sensitivity to the problems of census undercounts makes past reliance on census figures an uncertain predictor of future legislative action. Even if the ultimate response of the legislature could be predicted with some confidence, however, the fact that it is a representative, deliberative organ of state government rather than a private party must make this Court hesitate to exercise its power so as to narrow the range of solutions it might consider. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, the reasons a governmental body might provide for its actions are important in review of those actions. Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 163, 87 S. Ct. at 1524.
Consideration of the "hardship to the parties" of a present denial of judicial relief also points toward a refusal to adjudicate plaintiffs' claim. The dilution of voting power on which they base their claim may not occur at all, and cannot occur until the Michigan legislature acts. That fact makes plaintiffs' claim unlike that in Duke Power Co., where the Court rejected a ripeness claim because the plaintiffs would sustain immediate injury were the Court not to act. 438 U.S. at 81, 98 S. Ct. at 2634.
I agree that the majority correctly outlines the modern law of standing. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S. Ct. 832, 25 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1970), the Supreme Court established the injury-in-fact requirement for constitutional standing. Subsequent decisions have made clear that in order to show injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must establish a "distinct and palpable injury" and a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271-73, 99 S. Ct. 1102, 1107-08, 59 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-3, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 2629-30, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1978). A plaintiff can satisfy the causation requirement by showing that there is a "substantial likelihood" that the relief requested of the court will redress the claimed injury. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, supra, at 75 n.20, 98 S. Ct. at 2631 n.20; J. Nowak, Handbook On Constitutional Law 73-9 (1978); id. 1978 Pocket Part at 7; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 92 (1978). Although the court correctly outlines the law of standing, it misapplies that law to the facts of this case.
The majority does not seriously dispute the fact that plaintiffs have established the requisite injury for standing purposes. The district court found below that the plaintiffs would lose a proportionate amount of political representation equal to the amount of differential undercounting in the federal census. There is little question that such a loss of political representation constitutes the kind of "distinct and palpable" injury necessary to establish constitutional standing. See, e. g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S. Ct. 1225, 22 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 526, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). But the majority concludes that the plaintiffs nevertheless lack standing because the second prong of the injury-in-fact requirement is not satisfied. It holds that the plaintiffs' loss of representation is not caused by the Census Bureau's differential undercounting of minorities, but is caused solely by the redistricting decisions of the Michigan state legislature. It bases this finding of intervening causation on the fact that the state legislature is not required by law to use the sub-state population totals supplied by the Bureau. If the state legislature chooses to use Bureau-supplied figures for state reapportionment, the majority holds that this decision would be an independent act breaking the chain of causation between the challenged actions of the Census Bureau and the injury to the plaintiffs. I cannot accept this conclusion because, in my view, it construes the causation component of the injury-in-fact requirement far too strictly.
In "but for" causation, a defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event if the event would have occurred without it. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts 238-9 (4th ed. 1971); Smith, Legal Causes in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103-9 (1911). Under this formula, if injury would not have occurred to the plaintiff but for defendant's conduct, the defendant is liable for the whole injury "regardless of its position in the string of acts leading to the injury though one or more of the other causes contributing to the result also involved wrongdoing on the part of other persons." F. Harper & F. James, 2 The Law of Torts 1121-22 (1956).4
The Census Bureau's differential undercounting is also the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. It is true that the undercount is not the direct cause of the state's malapportionment.6 However the Michigan legislature's redistricting decision is not an intervening cause since the legislature's use of the defective figures is not an unforeseeable consequence of the Bureau's actions. The parties do not dispute the fact that in its history Michigan has never failed to use federally supplied sub-state population figures. Moreover, the Bureau should know that in recent American history the states have almost invariably used federally-supplied figures for reapportionment.7 In addition, the Bureau should have been aware of the fact that if the state chooses not to use the federally-supplied figures it would have to use data at least as accurate as that supplied by the Bureau. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 16 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1966). Michigan has no already established bureaucracy to gather such data and perhaps has neither the financial nor technical capacity to do so. In fact, since 1959 state law has provided that the state and sub-state totals of the federal decennial census shall be used by the State of Michigan for all election purposes.8
Recent decisions support my view of the causation requirement's application here. In Duke Power Co. v. Environmental Study Group, supra, the district court discerned a "but for" causal connection between the existence of the Price Anderson Act, the construction of nuclear power plants in the country, and the adverse consequences alleged by the plaintiffs. The petitioners challenged this finding of causation on two grounds in the Supreme Court: (1) that the particular nuclear power plants in question would have been constructed by private companies without the Price Anderson Act's limitation on liability; and (2) that if Congress had not passed the Price Anderson Act it may well have chosen to pursue the nuclear program as a government monopoly as it had done from 1946 to 1954. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. It held that industry testimony at Congressional hearings on the passage of the Act indicated that the industry would not develop nuclear power facilities without a limitation on liability. In addition, it rejected the contention that the Price Anderson Act was not a "but for" cause of any adverse consequences to the plaintiffs since the government would have undertaken development of nuclear power on its own. It held that "(w)hatever the ultimate accuracy of this speculation, it is not a response to the simple proposition that private power companies now do in fact operate the nuclear-powered generating plants injuring the appellees, and that their participation would not have occurred but for the enactment and implementation of the Price Anderson Act." Id., 438 U.S. at 77-8, 98 S. Ct. at 2632-33. (emphasis added)
The Court in Duke Power did not specifically address the issue of intervening causation. But, it is clear that construction of nuclear plants and the resultant injury to the plaintiffs were foreseeable results of passage of the Price Anderson Act. This is evident because the Court did not find that the decision of the companies to construct nuclear power plants was an intervening cause that broke the chain of causation between the Price Anderson Act and the claimed injury. The company argued that in the absence of the Act, the government might have constructed such plants on its own or that private companies might have raised the necessary funding under an alternate scheme. However, the Court ruled that prior cases did not require "a party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction to negate the kind of speculative and hypothetical possibilities suggested in order to demonstrate the likely effectiveness of judicial relief." Id. at 78, 98 S. Ct. at 2633. The same analysis applies here. In order to demonstrate a traceable link from the Bureau's actions to their claimed injury, the plaintiffs should not be required to negate the "speculative and hypothetical possibilities" that Michigan might: (1) change its long standing law requiring the sole use of federal census totals; and either (2) develop the capacity to conduct an accurate state census or (3) develop the capacity to make accurate adjustments of federal census data. The decision of the Michigan legislature to use raw federally-supplied sub-state totals is a foreseeable consequence of the Bureau's supplying of those figures. Thus, as in Duke Power, there is no intervening causation present.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976). In that decision, the Supreme Court found that § 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code was not the cause of the plaintiffs' failure to receive free emergency medical treatment from the defendant hospital. The Court noted that: "It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'encouragement' or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications." Id. at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 1926. In other words, § 501(c) (3) was not a "but for" cause of the claimed injury and plaintiffs necessarily had no standing to bring the action. As previously discussed, that is not the case here; differential undercounting is a cause of the plaintiffs' injury.
Simon apparently provides the basis for the majority's invocation of intervening cause analysis in this case. In Simon, the Supreme Court did state that "Article III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court." 426 U.S. at 41-2, 96 S. Ct. at 1925-26. (emphasis added). However, since § 501(c) (3) was not even a "but for" cause of the plaintiff's alleged injury, the Court did not have to explain when for standing purposes an injury is caused by one precedent and not by another. It is extremely doubtful that the above language in Simon precludes concurrent causation in the law of standing.9
In fact, I think that the Michigan legislature is not the proper forum for the issues presented by this case. A proposal in the Michigan legislature to correct census figures would provoke a heated controversy, in which the citizens of Detroit and the citizens of other areas suffering high differential undercounting would be politically handicapped. Their strength and representation in the legislature is directly weakened by the very phenomenon at issue differential census undercounting. The net result of legislative consideration of this issue is likely to be a decision dictated by politics and not dictated by objective appraisal of the expert demographic testimony. It would probably be too much to expect state representatives from areas which have benefited politically from differential undercounting to in effect vote themselves out of office and increase the representation of the citizens of Detroit. The Supreme Court recognized this problem when it held in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962), that the protection of the Constitutional right of equal representation could not be left solely to the legislatures. Because the vindication of this most important of Constitutional rights is a responsibility of the courts, I think we cannot put off a decision on the merits here.
I think that the district court's formulation of the law governing this controversy is unassailable. Simply stated, the court held that the Secretary of Commerce and the Bureau of the Census are bound by the Constitution to conduct the decennial census as accurately as possible. This holding follows from the Supreme Court's recognition in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962), of the constitutional right of equal representation that one citizen's vote should not weigh any more or less heavily than another citizen's vote. Later, the Supreme Court went on to hold that equal representation requires that the apportionment of representation in the United States House of Representatives and in the state legislatures must be based "as nearly as is practicable" on precise mathematical equality. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 526, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1964) and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S. Ct. 1225, 22 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1969).
It goes without saying that unless the population base for reapportionment is accurately determined, there can be no such precise mathematical equality between voting districts. If an inaccurate enumeration takes place, then some voting districts by virtue of differential undercounting would contain more persons than others.11 In these circumstances, the deleterious effect on equality of representation might be as serious as any that would occur from gerrymandering. See Note, Demography and Distrust: Constitutional Issues and the Federal Census, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 841, 860 (1981).
In its recitation of the facts, the majority seems to accept the Bureau's analysis as true.21 However, the plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to rebut the Census Bureau's analysis since the plaintiffs' experts testified before the release of the preliminary 1980 census data. It is for this reason that I would remand this case to the district court for further fact-finding. If the plaintiffs can show that there are available methods to measure the differential undercounting of blacks and Hispanics, then the district court's conclusion is correct statistical adjustment to correct the differential undercounting is feasible. I think the plaintiffs should have this opportunity. They should be allowed to submit additional evidence on remand, particularly in view of the evidence introduced in Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) which indicates that there may be ways to accurately measure the 1980 undercount.22
A secondary standing consideration is related to the question of remedy. Although this relationship has never been well-defined, either before or after the changes in the standing doctrine defined in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970), see Vining, Legal Identity 26 (1978), standing does still depend on the existence of a situation where "the exercise of the Court's remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries." Duke Power Co., supra, 438 U.S. at 73, 98 S. Ct. at 2630. Obviously there are many unjust conditions and occurrences, natural and man-made, which federal courts do not have the strength, wisdom or power to remedy in a timely manner. When there is no realistic remedy available, there is no point in deciding the merits. In light of our disposition of the justiciability issue based on other considerations, we need not decide whether the only remedy available the synthetic method is so unrealistic that it defeats standing to litigate the case on the merits
F. Supp. at 1327-28
See Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 212 (1976); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 93 (1978). See also Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of Standing, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 433, 439 n.22 (1962) (relying upon standing doctrine "may lead to a shorter, more easily written opinion, but it will also lead to inadequate consideration of the real issue or conceal the actual thought process which produced the result.")
Causation analysis exists in areas of the law other than torts and standing. Although the analysis may be phrased in different ways when it appears in different areas of the law, upon closer examination causation can only be viewed in terms of either "but for" cause or proximate cause wherever it appears. For example, causation in the substantive criminal law and in criminal procedure takes the form of either "but for" or proximate cause depending on the circumstances. See 7 Wharton's Criminal Law § 193-211 (1974) (discussing the causal connection between offender and offense). See also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (cases applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" under the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule)
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this principle. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, supra, 438 U.S. at 75 n.20, 98 S. Ct. at 2631 n.20, the Court expressed the "but for" causation standard for standing purposes in the following terms: Whether "there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed." (citations omitted). In other words, if there is a "substantial likelihood" that an injury would not occur without the challenged conduct, standing causation exists. See id. at 74, 98 S. Ct. at 2630. This formulation is less strict than the tort "but for" cause standard. In torts, substantial likelihood will not suffice; a plaintiff must show that its injury absolutely would not occur "but for" the allegedly tortious conduct.
The direct cause or most "immediate cause" of the plaintiffs' claimed injury is concededly the decision of the Michigan legislature to use unadjusted federal census figures for state reapportionment. But this does not mean that the Bureau's actions are not also a cause of the injury. Although Lord Bacon stated that the common law "contenteth itself with the immediate cause; and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree", Smith Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 106 (1911) that has long ceased being the case. See Prosser, supra at 246
The government points out that Hawaii apparently does not use federally supplied sub-state totals for state reapportionment. See Reply Brief For the Appellants at 5 n.7 (citing Congressional Districts in the 1970's, Congressional Quarterly 1973 at 51). However, there is no question that this is a very unusual state practice. See Note, Demography and District: Constitutional Issues of the Federal Census, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 841, 861 (1981) ("in practice, most states will probably use unadjusted figures, if those are the data supplied by the Census Bureau."). It is so unusual that the Bureau must expect and be able to foresee that in almost every instance its sub-state totals will in fact be used by the states for reapportionment
See Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 209 n.31 ("The Court states that a federal court cannot act to 'redress ... injury that results from the independent action of some third party ...' To the extent that this implies that plaintiffs must prove that defendants' actions were the sole cause of plaintiffs' injury, it is certainly an incorrect view of causation as an element of a cause of action.") (citations omitted)
The situation here is analogous to that presented by a voluntary affirmative action plan. Before the Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 61 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1979), an employer faced an impossible dilemma if it considered an affirmative action plan to remedy its possible past discrimination. If it failed to remedy past discrimination, it might face lawsuits from minority employees who might have been discriminated against. However, if the company initiated an affirmative action plan, it might face lawsuits from white workers. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum Co., 563 F.2d 216, 227-39 (5th Cir. 1977). (Wisdom, J., dissenting). In order to help solve the employer's dilemma, the Supreme Court in Weber established a zone of reasonableness. See DPOA v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979) cert. pending
In addition, since "one man, one vote" is the law of the land, an accurate population base for reapportionment is necessary. The Census Bureau in virtually every case provides the data base for reapportionment. Thus, I believe that Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962), and its progeny provide additional direct support for the Bureau's duty to provide accurate census figures.