Source: https://casetext.com/case/oldwick-materials-inc-v-nlrb
Timestamp: 2019-02-21 18:20:26
Document Index: 723757580

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 160', '§ 158', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 10']

Oldwick Materials, Inc. v. N.L.R.B, 732 F.2d 339 | Casetext
Oldwick Materials, Inc. v. N.L.R.B
732 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1984)
Oldwick Materials, Inc.v.N.L.R.B
United States Court of Appeals, Third CircuitApr 19, 1984
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No. 83-3084.
Argued January 9, 1984.
Donald M. Lomurro (argued), Lomurro, Eastman Collins, Freehold, N.J., for petitioner.
Elliot Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, John D. Burgoyne, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Michael David Fox, Margaret Gaines Bezou (argued), N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., for respondent.
On September 24, 1980, Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO ("Union") filed an unfair labor practice charge against petitioner, Oldwick Materials, Inc. ("Oldwick"), a New Jersey corporation engaged in the processing and sale of crushed stone and related products. The Union's charge alleged that petitioner violated sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1, 3, 4), by terminating the employment of Michael Bylina and John Cregar because of their membership activities with the Union. On November 3, 1980, the Union filed a second charge, arising out of the same incident, which stated that petitioner refused to bargain collectively with the Union.
Although it is acknowledged that § 10(e) "governs the Board's right and mode of enforcing its unfair labor practices orders," with regard to petitions to review Board orders, subsection (f) states that the reviewing "court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e)." 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). It is thus recognized that the "extraordinary circumstances" rule applies to both enforcement and review proceedings. The Seventh Circuit took this position in Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983, 97 S.Ct. 499, 50 L.Ed.2d 593 and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022, 97 S.Ct. 639, 50 L.Ed.2d 623 (1976), wherein Judge Pell, writing for a unanimous court, stated: "We are of the opinion that there is jurisdictional equivalence between the two sections in view of the references in section 10(f) to conducting proceedings in the same manner and to making and entering decrees in a like manner." Id. at 1171-72.
Application of section 10(e) is mandatory, not discretionary. NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 322, 82 S.Ct. 344, 347, 7 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961). In the instant case, petitioner's failure to object or to urge "extraordinary circumstances" before both the Board and this court requires foreclosure of any judicial consideration of objections raised in the enforcement proceedings. We therefore cannot reach petitioner's contentions (1) that Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows this court to relieve a party or his legal representative from a final order for excusable neglect and (2) that the Board failed to sustain its burden of proof. See Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1978) (an aggrieved party was precluded from challenging the NLRB's jurisdiction for the first time in the enforcement proceedings before the appellate court); NLRB v. STR, Inc., 549 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1977) (employer's failure to object and subsequent failure to file objections under "extraordinary circumstances" provision of statute required court to accept Board's finding as established); NLRB v. Good Foods Manufacturing Process Corp., Chicago Lamb Packers, Inc. — Division, 492 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1974) (where there was no reason to excuse employer's failure to urge its objections before the NLRB, the Court of Appeals was precluded from considering employer's petition for review); and NLRB v. Rish Equipment Co., Eastern Division of Bluefield Supply Co., 401 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1968) (employer precluded under § 10(e) of the Act from raising for the first time its inadvertent failure to mail a request for extension of time to file exceptions to Board's order).
Moreover, a court of appeals has no power, sua sponte, to find objectionable a portion of an NLRB order, if no objection was raised before the Board and the failure to object was not excused by any "extraordinary circumstances" under § 10(e). NLRB v. United Mineworkers, 355 U.S. 453, 463-64, 78 S.Ct. 386, 392-93, 2 L.Ed.2d 401 (1958). The Supreme Court recently affirmed this rule in Woelke Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 2082, 72 L.Ed.2d 398 reh. denied, 459 U.S. 899, 103 S.Ct. 198, 74 L.Ed.2d 159 (1982). In Woelke, the Ninth Circuit had addressed an issue not raised during the proceedings before the Board. The Supreme Court vacated that portion of the circuit court opinion:
[T]he Court of Appeals . . . was without jurisdiction to consider that question. The issue was not raised during the proceedings before the Board, either by the General Counsel or by Woelke. Thus, judicial review is barred by § 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), which provides that "[n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances." (Citations omitted.)
The § 10(e) bar applies even though the Board held that the picketing was not banned by § 8(b)(4)(A). See Carpenters Local No. 944 [Woelke Romero Framing, Inc.], 239 N.L.R.B. [241, 251 (1978)]. Woelke could have objected to the Board's decision in a petition for reconsideration or rehearing. The failure to do so prevents consideration of the question by the courts. See Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., [ 420 U.S. 276,] 281, n. 3 [95 S.Ct. 972, 975, n. 3, 43 L.Ed.2d 189].
Id. at 665-6, 102 S.Ct. at 2083.
This court has long adhered to the jurisdictional principles espoused by the various authorities above. NLRB v. Marshall Maintenance Corp., 320 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1963), is one of the seminal cases where this court has stated with precision our construction of § 10(e). In Marshall, where the facts differed from those in the instant case, we denied enforcement of an NLRB order where the Board improperly determined that a premature mail pickup resulting in a one-day delay in filing of exceptions did not constitute a neglect which amounted to an extraordinary circumstance. Id. at 645.
Indeed, petitioner never filed any exceptions to the Board's order and never filed any petitions for reconsideration. Unlike Marshall, petitioner fits into that mold of cases cited by Judge Kalodner which were "inapposite" to the Marshall facts, and thus where there was an absence of extraordinary circumstances.
Although one member of the Board dissented from its decision and argued that default judgment was improper because petitioner's answer to the original complaint sufficiently answered the charge as to the employee Bylina, and the Board responded to the dissenter's argument in a footnote, this brief reference to the merits in the Board's decision does not excuse petitioner from its statutory obligation under § 10(e) to file exceptions presenting and preserving its argument to the Board.
No exceptions were ever filed, nor was there any excuse advanced to the Board or to the Court for the failure to do so, in National Labor Relations Board v. Perry, 244 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1957); National Labor Relations Board v. Pugh Barr, Inc., 194 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1952); National Labor Relations Board v. Noroian, 193 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1951), and National Labor Relations Board v. Auburn Curtain Co., Inc., 193 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1951). In each of these cases the Court specifically pointed to the fact that the respondent had neither filed exceptions with the Board nor presented to it any excuse or explanation for failure to do so, and held that, under the provisions of Section 10(e) of the Act as amended, each respondent was precluded from challenging the validity of the Board's order in summary enforcement proceedings.
NLRB v. Marshall Maintenance Corp., 320 F.2d at 643, (footnotes omitted).