Source: http://www.articlethefirst.net/p/court-of-appeals-ruling.html
Timestamp: 2017-03-26 03:24:08
Document Index: 396886648

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2284', '§ 2', '§ 1291', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§\n2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

No. 12-1171
JOHN BRYSON, in his official capacity as the
of the United States Department of Commerce;
JOHN GROVER, in his official capacity as the
of the United States Census Bureau;
KAREN L. HAAS, in her official capacity as the
of the United States House of Representatives;
JOHN BOEHNER, in his official capacity as the
DANIEL INOUYE, in his official capacity as the
of the United States Senate;
JOSEPH BIDEN; in his official capacity as the
DAVID FERRIERO, in his official capacity as the Archivist
(No. 3-11-cv-07117)
Before: SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges,
and ROSENTHAL, District Judge*
The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States
(Filed: September 20, 2012) OPINION PER CURIAM
Eugene Martin LaVergne, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals an order of the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey denying his request to
convene a three-judge panel under 28U.S.C. § 2284 and dismissing his complaint.
We summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. I. LaVergne, a New Jersey citizen and registered
voter, alleges in this suit that the method of congressional apportionment
under 2U.S.C. § 2a is unconstitutional. LaVergne asserts that the method violates (1)
separation of powers, (2) the nondelegation doctrine, (3) the principle of
"one person, one vote," and (4) "Article the First," an
amendment to the United States Constitution proposed in 1789 that LaVergne
asserts was ratified and is part of the Constitution. LaVergne sought a
declaratory judgment and an injunction ordering the leaders of Congress to
enact an apportionment plan consistent with Article the First's ratio of one
member of Congress per 50,000 citizens and ordering the Vice-President of the 1
Although LaVergne is pro se, he received his license to practice law in New
Jersey in 1990. His license United States to count 15 electoral votes for New
Jersey in the 2012 presidential election. The relief LaVergne sought would
expand the House of Representatives from the 435-member size that has been
statutorily set since the 1910s to over 6,160 members. On December 16, 2011, the District Court on its
own denied LaVergne's application for a show-cause order and his request for a
three-judge panel, and dismissed the case. LaVergne timely appealed. In this
court, LaVergne moved for a preliminary injunction, an expedited appeal, and an
expedited initial en banc review or panel review. This court denied the
motions. II. We have jurisdiction under 28U.S.C. § 1291. Our
review of the District Court's order dismissing the complaint is plenary. Ill.
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 230 (3d
Cir. 2011). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). We may summarily
affirm if an appeal presents no substantial question. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir.
I.O.P. 10.6. III. This appeal presents two threshold issues:
standing and justiciability. The District Court concluded that LaVergne lacked
standing because, among other reasons, he did not suffer the injury he
complained about. The District Court concluded that, if there was an injury, it
was only to certain government officials, such as the governor of New Jersey,
who is responsible for implementing redistricting under § 2a; New Jersey
members of the House of Representatives, who could lose their congressional
seats as a result of redistricting; or certain presidential candidates, who
would want New Jersey to have a larger number of electoral votes. (See A5).
LaVergne disagrees with that conclusion, relying on Department of Commerce v.
U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999). In that case, the Supreme Court held that state
voters' "expected loss of a Representative to the United States
Congress" based on redistricting ordered under § 2a "undoubtedly
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing." Id. at
331. But in that case, statistical evidence showed that the plaintiffs' votes
would be diluted through the loss of a congressional seat to another state. See
id. at 331-34; see also Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878, 885 (10th Cir. 2001)
(interpreting House of Representatives). Here, by contrast, the relief LaVergne
seeks would result in every state, based on its population, gaining
congressional seats under Article the First. The result would be an increase
for each state in the same proportion as the present method produces. If there
will be "dilution" to LaVergne's vote when New Jersey is redistricted
using the § 2a apportionment method, LaVergne's proposed solution would neither
affect it nor change the size of New Jersey's congressional delegation relative
to the size of other states' delegations. In addition to this problem, LaVergne at most
alleges "a type of institutional injury"--an allegedly
unconstitutionally low number of representatives--"which necessarily
damages" all United States voters "equally." Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 821 (1997); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (explaining that the Supreme Court has
"consistently held that a plaintiff . . . seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large--does not state an
Article III case or controversy"). He "has not alleged a sufficiently
personal injury to establish standing[.]" Schaffer, 240 F.3d at 885 (citing
Raines, 521 U.S. at 821). Cf. also Clemons v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 131 S.
Ct. 821 (2010) (summarily ordering voters' constitutional challenge to § 2a
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). LaVergne's claims also fail on other grounds,
including lack of justiciability. LaVergne's constitutional challenge to § 2a is
primarily based on his argument that the apportionment method violates Article
the First. He alleges that this proposed constitutional amendment was ratified
by the states in November 1791 or June 1792. Putting aside the considerable
factual and historical problems with his argument, "[t]he issue of whether
a constitutional amendment has been properly ratified is a political
question." United States v. McDonald, 919 F.2d 146, 1990 WL 186103
(table), at *3 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 450 (1939)). In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that "the question of
the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures . . . should be regarded as
a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate
authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation
of the adoption of the amendment." 307 U.S. at 450. See also Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39 (1849) (holding that "the
political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or
amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial
power has followed its decision"); United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457,
463 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the issue of "the validity of an
amendment's ratification [is] a non-justiciable political question" and
citing, among other cases, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922), and
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450). LaVergne also argues that the § 2a apportionment
method violates the nondelegation doctrine and separation of powers. To the
extent that these arguments present justiciable questions, 2 they fail on the
merits. As to the first 2 See U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442,
456-59 (1992) (rejecting the government's contention that a constitutional
challenge to § 2a presented a nonjusticiable question because the challenge was
to whether "specific congressional action"--the enactment of §
2a--violated constitutional principles); but cf. Clemons, 131 S. Ct. 821
(summarily ordering that voters' constitutional challenge to § 2a--which the
three-judge district court had determined was justiciable--be dismissed for
lack of argument, the Supreme Court has recognized that "in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives." United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564,
575 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989)). Congress may "endow a coordinate branch of government with a
measure of discretion" if the delegation includes "'an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated
authority] is directed to conform.'" Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Section 2a clearly contains an intelligible
principle to guide the exercise of delegated authority: "the method of
equal proportions," which is automatic in character and which provides
"procedural and substantive rules that are consistently applied year after
year[.]" Montana, 503 U.S. at 465. LaVergne's nondelegation argument is
meritless. LaVergne's separation-of-powers argument similarly
fails. The Supreme Court's "separation-of-powers jurisprudence generally
focuses on the danger of one branch's aggrandizing its power at the expense of
another branch." Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991). Congress acted
within its authority by delegating the ministerial tasks of implementing the
method of equal proportions, for redistricting, to the Department of Commerce
and its employees. Cf. also jurisdiction). Montana, 503 U.S. at 465 (holding, with regard to
§ 2a, that there is "no constitutional obstacle preventing Congress from
adopting such a sensible procedure"). Finally, LaVergne's appeal of the District Court's
order denying his request to convene a three-judge panel is limited to passing
references to that issue. (See Opening Br. at 5, 6 n.1, 9, 29-30). Such cursory
presentation waives the issue on appeal. See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2004) ("We have held on numerous occasions
that an issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for
those purposes a passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that
issue before this court." (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted)); John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int'l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076
n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J.) ("[A]rguments raised in passing (such as,
in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived."). Moreover, LaVergne does not seek reversal on this
basis, or remand, but rather states that this three-judge panel's review of his
claims suffices. (Opening Br. at 30). IV. This appeal does not raise a substantial question.
We summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. was temporarily suspended in January 2011and
indefinitely suspended by the New Jersey Supreme Court in July 2011. In re
LaVergne, 21 A.3d 1181 (N.J. 2011).