Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97277/pfister-vs-northern-illinois-finance-corp
Timestamp: 2016-10-28 03:34:49
Document Index: 174696695

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 3704', '§ 39', '§ 3705']

Pfister Vs Northern Illinois Finance Corp - Citation 97277 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Pfister Vs. Northern Illinois Finance Corp. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97277CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-16-1942Case Number317 U.S. 144AppellantPfisterRespondentNorthern Illinois Finance Corp.Excerpt:.....has run. p.
317 u. s. 152
4. in this case, the commissioner entertained out-of-time petitions to rehear orders fixing rental, granting stay, and directing sale, and denied the petitions upon the ground that they were inadequate to induce a reexamination of the merits of the orders they sought to reopen.
on the facts of this case, that the district court did not err in refusing an out-of-time review of the merits of the original orders. p.
317 u. s. 153
mr......Judgment:
Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corp. - 317 U.S. 144 (1942)
1. The time within which a petition may be filed to review an order of a conciliation commissioner fixing rental or granting stay or directing sale is governed by § 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, and is fixed at ten days after the entry of the order "or within such extended time as the court may for cause shown allow." P.
317 U. S. 147
2. The ten-day period for filing a petition to review a commissioner's order under § 39(c) is not extended by a petition for rehearing which is denied by the commissioner without reexamination of the basis of the original order. P.
317 U. S. 150
3. The ten-day period prescribed by § 39(c) is a limitation on the right of the aggrieved party to appeal, but not a limitation on the jurisdiction of the reviewing court to act. The District Court, in the exercise of sound discretion, can review orders on petitions to review filed after the ten-day period has run. P.
This certiorari, 315 U.S. 795, brings here certain rulings on the right of petitioner, a farmer debtor, to have reviewed the orders of a conciliation commissioner [
] under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. This section deals with Agricultural Compositions and Extensions. A conflict of circuits as to whether the ten-day period for filing a petition for review of a commissioner's order was a limitation on the power of the reviewing court to act or on the right of an aggrieved party to appeal [
] impelled us to grant our writ.
In re Pfister,
123 F.2d 543, 548;
Thummess v. Von Hoffman,
109 F.2d 291, and
In re Albert,
122 F.2d 393.
In addition to this point, numerous other questions as to the right to review are presented which may be fairly subsumed under petitioner's allegations of error below: (1) because the courts did not apply the limitation in the proviso of 75(s) [
] instead of that in 39(c); (2) because
rental, granting stay, and directing sale were filed with the Commissioner. The basis of these petitions and the reasons for their denial by the Commissioner are detailed in
I. The proviso of subsection 75(s),
is, we think, limited in its effect to steps before commissioners authorized by the provisions of Section 75(s), which precede the proviso. Congress evidently intended to allow adequate time for reflection and preparation before appeal by parties aggrieved by the basic and difficult finding of value. The provisions of Section 75(s), following the proviso authorize orders setting aside exemptions, leaving the appraised
property in the hands of the debtor and fixing rentals therefor, staying judicial proceedings, selling perishable property, directing reappraisals, and final sale of the estate. It is obvious that this proviso, couched in terms of appeal, could not have been intended to control the review of the manifold activities of a commissioner engaged in handling an estate through three or more years of bankruptcy. To hold the proviso generally applicable would leave unregulated reviews of orders entered more than four months after the commissioner approves the appraisal. The section applicable to these reviews is Section 39(c). [
II. The petitions for review of the Commissioner's orders of August 13, 1940, and September 7, 1940, which were filed November 28, 1940, and October 9, 1940, no extension having been granted, were out of time under Section 39(c) [
] unless, in accordance with the petitioner's contentions,
Where a petition for rehearing of a referee's order is permitted to be filed, after the expiration of the time for a petition for review and during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, as here, they may be acted on [
] -- that is, they may be granted -- "before rights have vested on the faith of its action," and the foundations of the original order may be reexamined.
] When such a petition for rehearing is granted and the issues of the original order are reexamined and an order is entered either denying or allowing a change in the original order, the time for review under 39(c) begins to tun from that entry.
Bowman v. Lopereno,
-138. The reason for taking the later date for beginning the running of the time for review is that the opening of the earlier order by the court puts the basis of that earlier order again in issue. A refusal to modify the original order, however, requires the appeal to be from the original order, even though the time is counted from the later order refusing to modify the original. An appeal does not lie from
the denial of a petition for rehearing.
Conboy v. First National Bank,
203 U. S. 145
Jones v. Thompson,
128 F.2d 888;
Missouri v. Todd,
122 F.2d 804.
On the other hand, where out of time petitions for rehearing are filed and the referee or court merely considers whether the petition sets out, and the facts, if any are offered, support grounds for opening the original order, and determines that no grounds for a reexamination of the original order are shown, the hearing upon or examination of the grounds for allowing a rehearing does not enlarge the time for review of the original order. This result follows from the well established rule that, where an untimely petition for rehearing is filed which is not entertained or considered on its merits, the time to appeal from the original order is not extended. [
Cf. Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,
-138. Whether time for appeal would be enlarged or not would depend upon what the order showed the court did.
III. Since the petitions for rehearing, in our opinion, did not extend the time for review, we are brought to examine the question as to whether Section 39(c),
is a limitation on the power of the District Court to act
or on the right of a party to seek review. Courts of bankruptcy are courts of equity without terms. Commissioners, like referees, masters, and receivers, supervise estates under the eyes of the court, with their orders subject to its review. The entire process of rehabilitation, reorganization, or liquidation is open to reexamination out of time by the District Court, in its discretion, and subject to intervening rights.
Prior to the adoption of 39(c), General Order in Bankruptcy No. XXVII, [
] now abrogated, [
] governed review of referee's orders, but it prescribed no time limitations. It was held that petitions should be filed within a reasonable time. [
] Some local court rules, therefore, specified time limitations. Where such rules imposed definite limits on the time within which a petition for review could be filed, with extensions to be granted on cause shown, out of time petitions nevertheless were entertained and considered if cause was shown. [
Section 39(c) was intended to establish definitely and clearly the proceeding for review of a referee's order in the interest of certainty and uniformity, but the legislative history reveals no intention to change the preexisting rule as to power. [
] Indeed, the Chandler Act, by the amendment
to Section 2(10), [
] sought to conform the act to the prevailing practice as to the bankruptcy court's exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over referee's orders. [
] We do not think Section 39(c) was intended to be a limitation on the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court to permit the filing of petitions for review after the expiration of the period. The power in the bankruptcy court to review orders of the referee is unqualifiedly given in Section 2(10). The language quoted from Section 39(c) is, rather, a limitation on the "person aggrieved" to file such a petition as a matter of right. [
to dismiss because they were out of time. He thereupon heard and passed upon the petition's merits as bases for rehearings. His reasons for refusing to open the original orders complained of are adequate, and amply supported by the record. The appraisal was made, and the time of stay fixed, pursuant to the debtor's motion, he was represented by one or more counsel at each meeting, had opportunity to present evidence, and stipulated to the perishable character of the property ordered sold.
"Any farmer failing to obtain the acceptance of a majority in number and amount of all creditors whose claims are affected by a composition and/or extension proposal, or if he feels aggrieved by the composition and/or extension, may amend his petition or answer, asking to be adjudged a bankrupt. Such farmer may at the same time, or at the time of the first hearing, petition the court that all of his property, wherever located, whether pledged, encumbered, or unencumbered, be appraised, and that his unencumbered exemptions, and unencumbered interest or equity in his exemptions, as prescribed by State law, be set aside to him, and that he be allowed to retain possession, under the supervision and control of the court, of any part or parcel or all of the remainder of his property, including his encumbered exemptions, under the terms and conditions set forth in this section. Upon such a request's being made, the referee, under the jurisdiction of the court, shall designate and appoint appraisers, as provided for in this Act. Such appraisers shall appraise all of the property of the debtor, wherever located, at its then fair and reasonable market value. The appraisals shall be made in all other respects with rights of objections, exceptions, and appeals, in accordance with this Act:
That, in proceedings under this section, either party may file objections, exceptions, and take appeals within four months from the date that the referee approves the appraisal."
The legislative history of the proviso indicates the soundness of this conclusion. It appears first in the earlier subsection (s), 48 Stat. 1289, which was held unconstitutional in
. The preceding provisions were substantially the same as the present ones, but the proviso read
The specification of real estate, of course, excluded the proviso from any generality of scope. When the section was amended after the
case, the committee reports treated the paragraph of (s), as quoted in
separately from the succeeding numbered paragraphs, and the language connotes the idea that the proviso relates only to appeals from the appraisal. The comment is as follows:
Where a petition for rehearing is filed before the time for a petition for review has expired, it tolls the running of the time and limitation upon proceedings for review begins from the date of denial of the petition for rehearing.
United States v. Seminole Nation,
299 U. S. 417
Bernards v. Johnson,
314 U. S. 19
314 U. S. 31
Chapman v. Federal Land Bank,
117 F.2d 321, 324.
American Trust Co. v. W. S. Doig, Inc.,
23 F.2d 398;
Crim v. Woodford,
136 F. 34;
Bacon v. Roberts,
146 F. 729;
In re Grant,
143 F. 661;
In re Foss,
147 F. 790. 8 Remington on Bankruptcy (5th Ed.1941) § 3704.
In re Oakland & Belgrade Silver Fox Ranch Co.,
26 F.2d 748;
In re T. M. Lesher & Son,
176 F. 650;
Amick v. Hotz,
101 F.2d 311;
In re Wister,
232 F. 898,
237 F. 793;
see Roberts Auto & Radio Supply Co. v. Dattle,
44 F.2d 159.
H.Rep. No. 1409,
p. 19; S.Rep. No.1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 11,
Committee Print, H.R. 12889,
109 F.2d 291;
122 F.2d 393;
Boyum v. Johnson,
127 F.2d 491, 497,
see Biggs v. May,
125 F.2d 693, 696;
In re Loring,
30 F.Supp. 758, 759.
Contra, In re Pfister,
In re Parent,
30 F.Supp. 943.
2 Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed.1940, §§ 39.16, 39.20; 8 Remington on Bankruptcy,
§ 3705.