Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-amparo-3
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 14:43:25
Document Index: 100523965

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 952', '§ 5', '§ 5', 'In fine', '§ 5', '§ 5']

U.S. v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288 | Casetext
961 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, First CircuitApr 8, 1992
Before BREYER, Chief Judge, FEINBERG, Senior Circuit Judge, and SELYA, Circuit Judge.
All three suspects were charged with aiding and abetting the importation of cocaine, possessing the drug with intent to distribute it, and related offenses. Jimenez pled guilty. Davis moved successfully for severance; he was tried separately and convicted. The appellant was tried last. The jury found her guilty on all counts. After imposition of sentence, this appeal ensued.
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally —
It shall be unlawful for any person to bring or possess on board any . . . aircraft . . . arriving in or departing from the United States . . . a controlled substance . . . unless such substance or drug is part of the cargo entered in the manifest . . . of the . . . aircraft. . . .
It shall be unlawful to import into the customs territory of the United States from any place outside thereof . . . any controlled substance . . . or any narcotic drug [with exceptions not germane to this case].
21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1982 Supp. V 1987).
Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, . . . or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
On the merits, appellant presents this court with what is essentially a claim that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to convict. She preserved the point, moving for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case in chief and at the close of all the evidence. The district court denied the motions. While appellant challenges both rulings, we need only address the second. A defendant who elects to adduce evidence in her defense after the district court has denied a Rule 29 motion made at the close of the government's case is deemed to have abandoned the earlier motion and waived any objection to its denial. See United States v. Clotida, 892 F.2d 1098, 1102 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Lopez, 576 F.2d 840, 842 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Belgrave, 484 F.2d 915, 916 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1973).
In this case, the rule makes no practical difference. The evidence, whether limited to that presented in the government's case in chief or viewed as a whole, easily passes Rule 29 muster.
The standard of review is a familiar one. We must survey the totality of the evidence, scrutinizing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Maraj, 947 F.2d 520, 522-23 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 86-87 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2053, 114 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991). So long as the record, read in this fashion, would have allowed a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the offenses charged, we must affirm a denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.
To maintain the defense of duress, a defendant must offer evidence sufficient to show three things: (1) that she acted under an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death, (2) that she had a well grounded belief that the threat would be carried out, and (3) that she had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise to frustrate the threat. See United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 249 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 592, 116 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991); United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1319, 113 L.Ed.2d 252 (1991); United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wells, 773 F.2d 230, 231 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The defendant has a burden of producing enough evidence to support a finding of duress. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415-16, 100 S.Ct. 624, 637-38, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) (where the defendant's evidence, even if believed, fails to establish all the elements of a duress defense, the trial court need not submit the issue to the jury); United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 346 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931, 103 S.Ct. 2095, 77 L.Ed.2d 304 (1983).
If the defendant succeeds in satisfying this entry-level burden, and the charged crime requires mens rea, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's criminal acts were not in fact the product of duress. See Santos, 932 F.2d at 249; United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 1989); cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 814-15 (1st Cir. 1988) (while defendant must shoulder an entry-level burden before an entrapment defense reaches the jury, "the defendant's burden of production does not shift the historic burden of proof"). The government can overcome this obstacle if it proves that the defendant's evidence is bogus in some material respect, say, by showing that no threat occurred, or that the defendant's fear was unreasonable, or that the defendant had an opportunity to escape but did not exercise it. See, e.g., Santos, 932 F.2d at 249; Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d at 1214.
Following Amparo's conviction, the district court sentenced her to sixty-three months in prison. Appellant challenges the sentence on three grounds.
The sentence, which included a four-year term of supervised release, was within the guideline sentencing range.
Appellant's flagship argument is that the lower court erred in failing to depart downward on the ground of duress under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12. We agree with appellant that the jury verdict did not foreclose this possibility. As the very language of the guideline indicates, the type and kind of evidence necessary to support a downward departure premised on duress is somewhat less than that necessary to support a defense of duress at trial. Hence, a jury's rejection of a duress defense does not necessarily preclude a sentencing court's downward departure under section 5K1.12. See Johnson, 956 F.2d at 898, United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 1989); cf. United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 862-63. (8th Cir. 1992)
If the defendant committed the offense because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a complete defense, the court may decrease the sentence below the applicable guideline range. . . . Ordinarily coercion will be sufficiently serious to warrant departure only when it involves a threat of physical injury, substantial damage to property or similar injury resulting from the unlawful action of a third party. . . .
Although circumnavigating the Scylla of estoppel by verdict, appellant's argument is nonetheless engulfed in the Charybdis of appellate jurisdiction. It is an immutable verity that "absent extraordinary circumstances, a criminal defendant cannot ground an appeal on the district court's discretionary decision not to undertake a downward departure from the sentencing range indicated by the guidelines." United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508-09 (1st Cir. 1990); accord United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d 326, 330 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 450, 116 L.Ed.2d 468 (1991); United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1012 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1990).
To be sure, appellate jurisdiction will lie if the record supports an inference that the sentencing court's failure to depart did not represent an exercise of fact-finding or discretion, but was instead the product of the court's miscalculation about whether it possessed the authority to depart. See Lauzon, 938 F.2d at 330; Romolo, 937 F.2d at 22; United States v. Rushby, 936 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1991). In the case at hand, however, this exception has no bearing: Amparo does not theorize that the sentencing judge was unaware of his power to depart or misconceived the legal standard. Her brief, fairly read, merely argues that the court, in failing to soften the sentence because of the duress to which she had been subjected, was stupendously wrong. This sort of hyperbole amounts to nothing more than a challenge to the court's discretionary decision not to depart. It follows inexorably that we lack jurisdiction to review the assigned error.
At any rate, such a contention would be bootless. When Amparo was sentenced, the district judge clearly stated that he had reached an independent "determination that there was no duress," separate and apart from the jury's determination.
In her brief on appeal, Amparo grouped her two remaining claims of error. For ease of discussion, we will do likewise. These claims both involve U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, which allows — but does not require — a downward departure in return for a defendant's "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. . . ." Appellant contends that, by implicating Davis, she earned the right to such a congiary.
The guideline could not be more clear. It states that such a departure is available "[u]pon motion of the government. . . ." Id. As appellant acknowledges, we have squarely held that a sentencing court may not depart on the basis of substantial assistance except when the government so requests. See United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d at 23 ("We . . . hold that a district court may not depart pursuant to section 5K1.1 absent a government motion seeking such a departure."); see also United States v. Drown, 942 F.2d 55, 56 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir. 1990); La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1013-16. Even if the government acts arbitrarily in deciding not to request a substantial-assistance departure, it is settled in this circuit that the rule does not change. Romolo, 937 F.2d at 24; accord United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1065-66 (7th Cir. 1992).
Our holding conforms with the weight of existing authority. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1063-66 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 361 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 268, 116 L.Ed.2d 221 (1991); United States v. Chotas, 913 F.2d 897, 900 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1421, 113 L.Ed.2d 473 (1991); United States v. Bruno, 897 F.2d 691, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 712-13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 433, 112 L.Ed.2d 417 (1990); United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047, 110 S.Ct. 847, 107 L.Ed.2d 841 (1990). We note, as an aside, that the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case presenting the issues of whether a sentencing court may (1) depart under section 5K1.1 absent a government motion, and/or (2) inquire to determine whether the government, by withholding such a motion, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. See United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 635, 116 L.Ed.2d 653 (1991).
Amparo has one more string to her bow. She tells us that, given her sterling cooperation, the government's declination to file a section 5K1.1 motion was, at the very least, arbitrary; and that, therefore, we should await the Court's decision in Wade, discussed supra note 6, before upholding her sentence. We might well stay our hand in a closer case. But, Amparo's cooperation is more a matter of rodomontade than of substance. She did not testify against Davis or assist in his prosecution in any way. By the time she identified him as the ringleader, he had already been detained in the immigration area. At sentencing, the prosecutor explained convincingly why the United States regarded Amparo's assistance as insubstantial. The district court found, specifically and supportably, that the government's refusal to move for a downward departure on this basis was "not unreasonable. . . . not capricious and . . . not arbitrary."
Indeed, there was evidence that, during an interrogation occurring one day after her arrest, appellant changed her story so as to exonerate Davis and portray Jimenez as the ringleader.
In fine, even if arbitrariness on the government's part confers some leeway on the sentencing court under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 — and we continue to believe that it does not — appellant would not be benefitted. This is simply not the "egregious case . . . where the prosecution stubbornly refuses to file a motion [for a downward departure] despite overwhelming evidence that the accused's assistance has been [very] substantial. . . ." La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1017; see also United States v. Bannister, 924 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1991).
Appellant's due process claim does not require separate analysis. We, like other courts, have previously held that the procedure envisioned by U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 is not constitutionally infirm. See Bannister, 924 F.2d at 22; La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1017; see also Santos, 932 F.2d at 255-56; United States v. Francois, 889 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1085, 110 S.Ct. 1822, 108 L.Ed.2d 951 (1990).