Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/558753/
Timestamp: 2019-06-26 11:51:31
Document Index: 761183935

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.  19', 'Art.   14', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 226', 'Art.\t14', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 14']

Citedby 207 docs - [View All]
S.H. Jiffri Kareem vs The Addl. Director, Enforcement ... on 25 October, 1991
State Of Punjab vs Baldev Singh on 21 July, 1999
Swastik Gear Ltd. And Ors. vs Income-Tax Officer And Ors. on 12 February, 1988
section 132 income tax act
132 income tax act
Equivalent citations: 1974 AIR 348, 1974 SCR (2) 704
Bench: Ray, A.N. (Cj), Palekar, D.G., Chandrachud, Y.V., Alagiriswami, A., Bhagwati, P.N.
POORAN MAL  ETC.
DIRECTOR  OF INSPECTION (INVESTIGATION) OF INCOME-TAX  MAYUR
DATE OF JUDGMENT14/12/1973
1974 AIR  348		  1974 SCR  (2) 704
1974 SCC  (1) 345
RF	    1975 SC  67	 (1)
R	    1976 SC 636	 (2,4,6)
F	    1985 SC 989	 (15,16)
F	    1987 SC1748	 (20)
Income	Tax  Act (1961)-Sections 132, 132A  and	 Rules	112,
112A-Search  and seizure-Whether violate Art.  19(1)(f)	 and
(g) of the Constitution.
Income Tax Act 1961, Sec. 132(5)-Seizure of money,  bullion,
etc.-Whether provision confiscatory.
Income	Tax  Act,  1961,  Sec.	132(1)	and  (5)-Search	 and
seizure-Whether	  provisions   hit  by	Art.   14   of	 the
Constitution  for  following  different	 procedure  for	 the
evaders	 of  tax, who are believed to be  in  possession  of
undisclosed  income or property and evaders against whom  no
such belief is entertained by the authorities.
Income Tax Act 1961, Sec. 132-Whether evidence gathered from
the  illegal seizure of documents is excluded at the  trial-
Whether	 a writ of prohibition to restrain the use  of	such
evidence can be granted.
Income	Tax Act 1961, sec. 132--"Reason to  believe"-Whether
Director  of Inspection can entertain reasonable  belief  as
not being directly connected with the assessment-Whether the
Director can entertain necessary belief for ordering  search
and seizure where the assessment was already completed.
Income	Tax  Act,  1961,  Sec.	132-Seizure  of	  irrelevant
documents-Whether renders the search invalid.
In  the	 proceedings before the Supreme Court  two  of	them
being  writ petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution	 and
two  others being appeals from the orders of the Delhi	High
Court in writ petitions under Art. 226-relief was claimed in
respect	 of  the search of certain premises and	 seizure  of
account books, documents, cash, jewelry and other  valuables
by  Income-tax authorities purporting to act u/s 132 of	 the
Income	 Tax   Act,  1961.   The   petitioners/	  appellants
challenged  the	 validity  of Sec. 132(1) and  (5)  of	Rule
112(A)	on  the ground that they violate  Art.	14,  Article
19(1)(f)  and (g) and 31 of the Constitution.  It  was	also
contended  that	 a  writ  of  prohibition  to  restrain	 the
authorities  from using the 'information gathered  from	 the
documents  seized should be issued.  In the writ  petitions,
the actual search and seizure were challenged on the  ground
that   they  were  carried  out	 in  contravention  of	 the
provisions of Sec. 132 and Rule 112-A.	The Court  negatived
all the contentions.
HELD:	  (1) When one has to consider the reasonableness of
the  restrictions or curbs placed on the freedoms  mentioned
in  Art. 19(i) (f) and (g), one cannot possibly	 ignore	 how
such  evasions eat into the vitals of the economic  life  of
the community.	Therefore, in the interest of the community,
it  is	only right that the fiscal authorities	should	have
sufficient  powers  to	prevent tax  evasion.	As  a  broad
proposition,  it can be stated that if the safeguards  while
'carrying out search and seizure are generally on the  lines
adopted	 by  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  they  would  be
regarded  as adequate and render the temporary	restrictions
imposed	 by  these  measures  as  reasonable.	On  detailed
examination of the provisions of Sec. 132, and Rule 112,  it
Safeguards  are adequate to render the provisions of  search
and  seizure as less onerous and restrictive as is  possible
under	the  circumstances.   The   provisions,	  therefore,
relating  to  search and seizure in Sec. 132  and  Rule	 112
cannot	be regarded as violative of Arts. 19(1)(f) and	(g).
[714F, 717C]
In the course of his duties, the Director of inspection	 has
ample  opportunities to follow the course  of  investigation
and assessment carried on by the income Tax Officers and  to
check  the  information received from his sources  with	 the
actual	 material  produced  or	 not  produced	before	 the
assessing  authorities.	  It is not, therefore,	 correct  to
argue  that the Director of Inspection could  not  entertain
honest	and  reasonable belief before  ordering	 search	 and
seizure	 under	Section 132(1)(a)(b) and  (c).	 The  second
proviso	 to  sub-section  (5) of Sec.  132  shows  that	 the
assessee  can get a release of all the assets seized  if  he
can  make satisfactory arrangements for the payment  of	 the
estimated   dues.   So	also,  the  excess   collection	  is
refundable  u/s	 132-A	with  interest	after  the   regular
enquiry.    The	 provisions  of	 Section  132(5)   are	 not
confiscatory in nature. [717F]
M.   P.	 Sharma	 v. Satish Chandra [1954]  S.C.R.  1077	 and
Commissioner  of  Commercial Taxes v. R. S.  Jhaver  [1968]1
S.C.R. 148 followed.
(II) The  provisions  of Section 132(1) and  (5)  cannot  be
challenged   on	  the	ground	 that	they   make   unjust
discrimination between two sets of tax evaders in  .ordering
search	and  seizure or retention of the seized	 wealth	 for
recovering the tax, in some cases and not ordering the	same
in  other  cases.   All evaders of taxes  can  be  proceeded
against	 u/s  132.  Only in some cases, the  search  may  be
useful	because	 of the information  about  the	 undisclosed
income	and  wealth.  Where there is  no  such	information,
search and seizure would be futile.  Therefore, there is  no
substance  in the contention that two  different  procedures
for assessment are adopted an hence there is  discrimination
under Art. 14. [720C]
C.   Venkata  Reddy  and  Another  v.  Income-tax   Officer,
(Central)  1, Bangalore, and others, 66 Income-tax  Reports,
212 and Ramjibhai Kalidas V.I. G. Desai, Income-tax Officer,
and others, 80 Income-tax Reports, 721, cited with approval.
(III)	  The Income-tax authorities can use as evidence any
information  gathered from the search of the  documents	 and
accounts  and  articles	 seized.  Neither  by  invoking	 the
spirit	of our Constitution nor by strained construction  of
the  fundamental  rights can we spell out the  exclusion  of
evidence obtained on an illegal search.	 U23F],
A.   K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88 and  M.
Courts in India and in England have consistently refused  to
exclude	 relevant evidence merely on the ground that  it  is
obtained  by  illegal search or seizure. Where the  test  of
admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is
an  express  or implied prohibition in the  Constitution  or
other law, evidence obtained  as a result of illegal  search
or seizure is not liable to be shut out.  [723G]
(IV) In writ petition No. 446171, on facts it was found that
the   allegations  of  mala  fide  and	oppressiveness	 and
highhandedness	in search and seizure were not	proved.	  On
examining the records, held that the petitioner was not	 co-
operating with the Director of Inspection.
(V)  Held  further,  that seizure of books  of	account	 and
other  documents  which	 were afterwards  found	 to  be	 not
relevant, along with the documents relevant for the enquiry,
does not make the search and seizure illegal.  It may at the
most  be  an irregularity.  On the material on	record,	 the
Director  of inspection had proper grounds for a belief	 for
ordering search and seizure under sub-clauses (b) and (c) of
sub-section (1) of Sec. 132.  Merely because the  assessment
for  the  relevant year was already completed, it  does	 not
mean  that  on	the information in  the	 possession  of	 the
Director of Inspection, he cannot
entertain  the necessary belief. On facts, in Writ  Petition
No.  86/72  held  the	search	and  seizure  were   neither
oppressive nor excessive.
N. D. Karkhanis, Balram Sanghai, A. T. M. Sampath, M. M. L Srivastava and E. C. Agarwala, for the petitioner (in	W.P. 86/72).
F. S.	Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India, B. B. Ahuja and	S. P. Nayar, for the respondents (in	both W.Ps.) M.C. Chagla, L. M. Singvi, S. Sadhu Singh, Jagmohan Khanna R. N.	Kapoor, Nirmala Gupta and Mohinder Kaur and Veena Dev Talwar, for the respondents (in appeals). F.S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General of India, S. T. Desai. B.B. Ahuja and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents.	(in appeals) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PALEKAR, J.-In these proceedings-two of them Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and two others which are appeal from orders passed by the Delhi High Court under Article	226relief is claimed in respect of action taken under section 132 of the Income-tax, Act, 1961	(hereinafter called	the Act) by way of search and	seizure	of certain premises on the ground that the authorisation for the search as also the search and seizure were illegal. The challenge was based on constitutional and non-constitutional grounds For the appreciation of the constitutional grounds it is not necessary to give here the detailed facts of the four cases. It is sufficient to state that in all these cases articles consisting of account books and documents and in the	Writ Petitions, also cash, jewelry and other valuables,	were seized by the Income-tax authorities purporting to act under the, authorisation for search and seizure issued under section 132 of the Act.	Broadly speaking the constitutional challenge is directed against sub-sections (1)	and,(5) of section	132 of the Act and incidentally also against	rule 112A on the ground that these provisions are violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)	(f)
(g) and 31 of the Constitution. The non-constitutional grounds	of challenge are based up on	allegations to	the effect	that the search and seizure were not in accordance with section 132 read with Rule 112. This challenge	will have to be considered in the background of the facts of	the individual cases.
Chapter XIII of the Act deals with Income,-tax	authorities. their	,powers	and jurisdictions.	The heirarchy	of authorities as given in section 116 shows that the class of authorities designated as Director of Inspection is shown below the Central Board of Direct Taxes and above the class of authorities	known as Commissioner of Income-tax.	The other authorities mentioned are Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax. Income-tax Officers, and Inspectors of Income- tax. Section 117 shows by whom these	various	authorities are to be appointed. Section 118 deals	with subordination and control.	Section	119 deals with the powers of	the higher	authorities to give instructions and directions to subordinate authorities. Under section 120 Directors of Inspection have to perform such functions of any other Income-tax authority as may be assigned to them by	the Board.	The Board, it is clear, might assign to the Director of Inspection the functions of any other authority under the Act.
We, may then turn to part 'C' of this Chapter	which deals with the powers. Section 131 says that the authorities from the Commissioner down to the Income-tax Officer shall	have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of several matters including	the enforcing of attendance of any person	or compelling	the production of books of account and other documents. Section 132 provides for search and seizure. It appears that under section 37(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 a limited Power of search	and seizure had been first given to the Income-tax authorities in 1966. The present Income-tax Act initially gave that power under section 132 on the same lines as	the old section 37(2). But there were further amendments in section 132 in 1964 and 1965. Under the amendment of 1965, two sections namely sections 132 and 132A were	substituted for the original section 132.	We are concerned with these sections and it will be therefore, necessary in the first instance to reproduce the same "132. (1) Where the Director of Inspection or the Commissioner. in	consequence	of information in his possession, has reason to believe that-
(a) any	person to whom a summon under	sub-
section (1) of section 37 of	the Indian Income-tax Act,	1922 (XI of 1922) or under sub-section (1) of section 131 of this Act, or a	notice under sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or under sub-section (1) of section 142 of this Act was issued to produce, or cause to be produced, any books of account or other documents	has omitted or failed to produce, or cause to be produced,	such books of account or other documents	as required by such	summons or notice, or
(b) any person to whom a "summons" or notice as aforesaid has been or might be issued	will not, or would 708 not, produce or cause to be produced,	any books of account or other.documents which will be useful for, or relevant to, any proceedings under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) or under this Act, or
(c) any	person	is in	possession of	any money, bullion jewelry	or other valuable article or thing and such money, bullion, jewelry or other valuable article or thing represents	either wholly or partly in come or property which has not been disclosed for	the purposes	of the Indian income-tax Act,	1922 (XI of 1922), or this Act (hereinafter in this section referred to as the undisclosed income or property).
he may authorise any Deputy Director. of Inspection,	Ins- pecting	Assistant Commissioner, Assistant Director of	Ins- pection	or Income-tax Officer (hereinafter referred to as the authorised officer) to-
(i) enter and search any building or place where he has reason to suspect that such books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewelry or other valuable article or things are kept;
(ii)	break	open the lock of any door, box, locker, safe, almirah or other receptacle for exercising the powers conferred by clause
(i), where the keys thereof are not available.
(2) The authorised officer may requisition the services of any police officer or of any	officer of the. Central Government, or of both, to assist him for all or any of	the purposes specified in sub-section (1) and it shall be	the duty of every such officer to comply with such requisition. (3) The authorised officer may, where it is not practicable to seize any	such books of	account, other document, money,,bullion, jewelry or other valuable article or thing, serve an order on the owner, or the person who is in imme- diate possession or control thereof	that he shall	not remove, part with or otherwise deal with it except with	the previous permission of such officer and such	officer	may take such steps as may be necessary for ensuring compliance with this sub-section,.
(4) The authorised officer may, during the course of	the search	or seizure, examine on oath any person who is found to be	in possession or control of any	books	of account, documents, money, bullion, jewelry or other valuable, article	or thing and any statement made by	such person during	such examination may thereafter be used in evidence in any proceedings under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), or under this Act.
(5) Where any money, bullion, jewelry or other article or thing (hereinafter in this section and section 132A referred to as	the assets) is seized under sub-section (1),	the Income tax Officer, after affording a reasonable opportunity to the	person concerned for being heard and	making	such enquiry	as may be prescribed, shall, within ninety days of the seizure, make an order, with the previous	approval of the Commissioner
(i) estimating	the undisclosed income (including the income from the	undisclosed property)	in a summary manner to the best of his judgment on the basis of such materials as are available with him;
Provided that if, after taking into account the materials available with him, the Income-tax Officer is of the	view that it is not possible to ascertain to which particular previous year	or years such income or any part thereof relates, he may calculate,the tax on such income or part, as the case may be, as if such income or part were the total income	chargeable to	tax at the rates in force in	the financial year in which the assets were seized; Provided further that	where a person	has paid or	made satisfactory arrangements for payment of all-	the amounts referred to in clause (ii) and (iii) or any part thereof, the Income-tax Officer may, with the previous	approval of the Commissioner, release the assets or such part thereof as he may deem fit in the circumstances of the case.
(6) The assets retained under sub-section (5) may be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of section 132A. (7) If the Income-tax Officer is satisfied that the seized assets	or any part thereof were held by such person for or on behalf of any other person, the Income-tax	Officer	may proceed under sub-section (5) against such other person	and all the provisions of this section shall apply accordingly. (8) The books of account or other documents seized under sub-section (1) shall not be retained	by the authorised officer	for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty	days from the date	of the seizure unless the	reasons	for retaining the same are recorded by him in writing and	the approval of the Commissioner for such retention is obtained :
(13) The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,	1898 (V of 1898), relating to searches and seizure shall apply, so far as may be, to searches and seizure under	sub-section (1).
Explanation 1.-In computing the period of ninety days	for the purposes of sub-section (5), any period during which any proceeding under this	section is stayed by an order or injunction of any Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2.-In this section, the word "proceeding" means any proceeding	in respect of any year, whether under	the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922 (XI of 1922) or this Act, which may be pending on the date on which a search is authorised under this section or which may have been completed on or before	such date and includes also all proceedings under this Act which may be commenced after such date in respect of any year.
(1) The	assets retained under	sub-section (5) of' section 132 may be dealt with in	the following manner, namely
(i) The	amount	of the	existing liability referred	to in clause (iii) of the said	sub- section and the	amount	of the liability determined on completion of the regular assessment or reassessment for all	the assessment years	relevant to the previous years to	which	the income referred to in clause (i) of that sub-section relates, and in respect of which he is in default or is deemed to be in default may be recovered out of such assets'
(ii) If	the assets consist solely of money, or partly of money and Partly of other assets, the income-tax Officer may apply such money in the discharge of the liabilities referred to in clause (i) and the	assessee shall be discharged of such liability to the extent of the money so applied.
(iii)	The assets other than money	may also be applied for the discharge of any	such liability referred to in clause (i) as remains undischarged and for this purpose such 'assets shall be deemed to be under dist-
raint as if such distraint was effected by the Income-tax, Officer under authorisation	from the Commissioner	under	sub-section (5) of section 226 and the Income-tax	Officer	may recover the amount of such liabilities by	the sale of	such assets and such sale shall be effected in the manner laid down in the Third Schedule.
(3) Any	assets	or proceeds thereof which remain after the liabilities referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (1) are discharged shall- be forthwith made, over or paid to	the persons	from whose custody the assets	were seized.
(4) (a)	The Central Government shall	pay simple interest at the rate of nine per	cent per annum on the amount	by which	the aggregate of money retained under section	132 and of the Proceeds, if any, of	the assets sold towards the discharge of the existing liability referred to in clause (iii) of	sub- section (5) of	that section exceeds	the aggregate of the amounts required to meet	the liabilities referred to in clause (i) of	sub- section (1) of this section.
Rule 112	A which is also challenged as it prescribes the procedure for the enquiry under section 132(5) is as follows "112A.	Inquiry under	section 132(1) where	any money, bullion, jewelry or	other valuable	article or thing (hereinafter referred to as assets) are seized, the Income- tax Officer shall within fifteen days of the seizure issue to the person in respect of whom enquiry under subsection (5) of section 132 is to be made requiring him on the	date to be,	specified therein (not being earlier than fifteen days from the date of service of such	notice) either to attend at the office of the Income-tax Officer to explain or to produce or cause to be there produced evidence on which such person may rely for explaining	the nature of	the possession and the source of the acquisition of the assets. (2) The Income-tax Officer may issue a notice to the person referred to in sub-rule (1)	requiring him	on a	date specified therein to produce or cause to be produced at such time and at such place as the Income-tax Officer may specify such accounts	or documents or evidence as the Income-tax Officer may require and may from time to time issue further notices	requiring production of such further	accounts or documents or other evidence as he may require.
(3) The, income,-tax Officer may examine on oath any other person or make such other inquiry as he may deem fit. (4) Before any material gathered in the course of	the examination or	inquiry under sub-rule (3) is used by	the Income-tax Officer against the person referred to in	sub- rule (1) the Income-tax Officer shall	give a reasonable notice to that person to show cause why such material should be used against, him.
It will be seen in the first place that the power to direct a search and seizure is given to the Director of Inspection or the Commissioner. Secondly, the authorisation for	such search	and seizure must be in favour of officers not below the grade of an Income-tax Officer. Thirdly the power to authorise search and seizure can be exercised only when	the Director of Inspection or the Commissioner has reason to believe	(1) that in spite of the requisitions under	the relevant provisions mentioned in section 132(1) (a)	the required books	and documents have not been produced;	(2) that any person, whether requisition under	the above provisions is made or not, will not, or would not, produce or cause, to be produced, any books of account and other documents. which will be useful for, or relevant to,	any proceeding under the Income-tax Act; or (3) that any person is in possession of any money, bullion, jewelry or any other valuable article or thing representing either wholly or partly	undisclosed income	or property.	When	the authorisation is given by the Director of Inspection or	the Commissioner, as the case may be, it must be limited to	the five, purposes mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of	sub- section	(1). Sub-section (14) provides for the making of rules in relation to any search or seizure.	Accordingly, rule 112 has	been framed which says that the powers of search	and seizure under section 132 shall be exercised in accordance with sub-rules (2) to (14) under rule 112. These are detailed rules setting out the procedure for making	the search	and seizure and for the custody of what has	been seized.
Sub-section (5) of section 132 deals with the special cases where,	on search, money, bullion,	jewelry	and other valuables believed to be undisclosed income or property	are seize d. What is seized cannot be kept by the departmental authorities with them indefinitely.	Sub-section	(5) requires that a summary enquiry must be made by Income-tax Officer	with a view to ascertain how much of	the seized valuable should be retained against unpaid tax	dues.	The balance	must be forthwith released. the second	proviso to sub-section (5) further shows that the money and valuables may not also be retained by the Income-tax Officer if	the person, concerned has paid or made satisfactory arrangements for payment of all the income-tax dues which are summarily estimated under sub-section (5). The summary enquiry under sub-section (5) must	be finished within 90 days of	the seizure and the order which is made thereunder is subject to the previous approval	of the	Commissioner.	Under	sub- section	(6) of section 132 the assets retained 'under	sub- section	(5) are to be dealt with in accordance with	the provi sions of section 132-A 714 which	clearly	goes to show that the	Income-tax Officer shall proceed with the regular assessment or	reassessment of the tax payable by the person concerned and	after	such assessment the	amount	of tax :so held payable is to be recouped from	the assets retained under subsection 5 of section	132. The balance, if any, is to be returned	with interest at the rate of 9% if the assessment	and reassessment is not completed within six months of the	date of the retention order made under sub-section (5) of section
132. Even in	regard to the books of	account and other documents which are seized the authorised officer is	not entitled to retain the same for. a period exceeding 180 days unless	he records his reasons in writing for retaining	the same and the Commissioner approves of the retention.	The person	from whose custody the books of account and other documents are seized, is, however, entitled to receive copies or take extracts therefrom. Any person aggrieved by the retention	of the	documents is entitled	to make a representation	to the Board which is also the authority to which a representation could be made under sub-section	(11) by any	person	objecting to the order	passed	under	sub- section (5) retaining the assets.	Broadly it will be seen that section 132 and rules 112 and 112A	deal.	with search and seizure and the disposal of articles seized after search.	The challenge under Articles 19 and 14 is directed against	sub-sections (1) and (5) of section 132 and	rule 112A.
Dealing first with the challenge under article 19(1)(f)	and
(g) ,of the Constitution it is to be noted that the impugned provisions are evidently directed against persons who	are believed on good grounds to	have illegally	evaded	the payment	of tax on their income and property.: Therefore, drastic	measures to get at such income and property with a view to recover the government dues would stand justified in themselves. When one has to consider the reasonableness of the restrictions or curbs placed on the freedoms mentioned in article 19(f) and (g), one cannot possibly	ignore	how such evasions eat into the vitals of,the economic life	of the community.	It is a well-known fact of our economic life that huge sums of unaccounted money	are in	circulation endangering its very fabric. In a country which has adopted high rates, of taxation a major portion of the	unaccounted money should normally fill the Government coffers. Instead of doing so it distorts the economy.	Therefore, in	the interest of the community it is only right that the fiscal authorities should have sufficient Powers to prevent	tax evasion.
Search	and seizure are not a new weapon in the armory of those whose duty it is to maintain social security in	its broadest sense. The Process is widely recognised in	all civilized countries Our own 'Criminal Law accepted	its necessity and usefulness in sections 96 to 103 and section 165 of	the Criminal Procedure, Code.	In M. P. Sharma v. Satish	Chandra(.) the challenge to the power of issuing a search warrant under section 96 (1) as violative of Article 19 (1) (f) was repelled on the ground that a power of search and seizure is in (1) [1954] S.C.R. 1077.
any system of jurisprudence an over-riding power of	the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily	regulated by law. As pointed out in	that case a search by itself is not a restriction on the right to hold and enjoy property though a seizure is a restriction on the right of	possession and	enjoyment of the property seized.	That however, is only temporary and for the limited purpose of investigation. Then the Court proceeds to say "A search	and seizure is, therefore,	only a temporary interference with the right to hold the premises searched and the articles seized. Statutory	regulation in	this behalf	is necessary and reasonable restriction	cannot	per se. be considered to be unconstitutional. The	damage, if any, caused by such temporary interference if found to be in excess	of legal authority is a matter for redress in other proceedings. We are	unable to see how any	question of violation of article 19(1)(f) is involved in this case in respect	of the warrants in question which purport to be under the first alternative of section 96(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code-" p. 1081.
Similar	powers	entrusted to those whose duty	it was to enforce	taxation laws	were upheld by this Court in	The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and others v. R. S. Jhaver and others(1).	In that case section	41 of	the Madras General Sales Tax Act of 1969 was. under challenge. It	was held by this	Court that an	officer empowered by	the Government under sub-section (1) of section 41 was entitled to effect a search and seize goods and articles as provided in that section. Dealing with the question of	search	and seizure in a taxing statute the court observed at page 158 : "Now it has not been and cannot be disputed that the entries in the various Lists of the Seventh Schedule must be given the widest possible interpretation. It is also not in doubt that while making a law under any entry in the Schedule it is competent to the legislature to make all such incidental and ancillary provisions as may be necessary to effectuate the law; particularly it cannot be disputed that in the case of a taxing statute it is open to the legislature to enact provisions which would check evasion of tax. It is under this power to check evasion that provision for	search	and seizure is made in many taxing statutes. It must therefore be held that the legislature has power to provide for search and seizure in connection with taxation laws in order that evasion	may be checked." It is, now too late in the day to challenge the measure of search and seizure when it is	en- trusted	to income-tax authorities with a view	to prevent large sale tax evasion.
Indeed	the measure would be objectionable if its implement is not	accompanied by safeguards against its undue	and improper exercise. As a broad proposition	it is	now possible to state that if the safeguards are generally on the lines adopted by the , Criminal Procedure Code	they would be regarded as adequate and render the temporary restrictions imposed by the measure reasonable.	In the case just cited there was a proviso to sub-section (2) of section 41 (1) (19681 (1) S.C.R. 148 716 which prescribed that all searches under the subsection shall,	so far	as may be, made in accordance with	the provisions of	the Code of Criminal	Procedure. After pointing out that section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code would apply mutatis mutandis to searches made	under	sub- section	(2), this Court observed : "We are, therefore, of opinion	that safeguards provided in S. 165 also apply to searches made under sub-s. (2). These	safeguards are-(i) the empowered	officer	must have reasonable	grounds	for believing that	anything necessary for the	purpose	of recovery of tax may be found in any	place	within	his jurisdiction (ii) he must be of the opinion that such thing cannot	be otherwise got without undue delay, (iii) he	must record	in writing the grounds of his belief, and (iv) he must specify in such writing so far as possible the thing for which search is to be made,. After he has	done these things, he can make the search.	These safeguards, which in our opinion apply to searches under sub-s. (2) also clearly show that the	power to search under	sub-s.	(2) is	not arbitrary. In view of these safeguards and other safeguards provided in Chapter VII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also apply so far as may be to searches	made under sub-s.	(2), we can see no	reason	to hold that	the restriction, if any, on the right to hold property and to carry on trade, by the search provided in sub-s. (2) is	not a reasonable restriction keeping in view the object of	the search, namely, prevention of evasion of tax." We are, therefore, to see what are the inbuilt safeguards in section	132 of the Income-tax Act. In the first place, it must be noted that the power to order search and seizure is vested in the highest officers of the department. Secondly the exercise of this power can only follow a reasonable belief	entertained by such officer that any of the three conditions mentioned in section 132(1) (a), (b) and	(c), exists.	In this connection it may be further	pointed	out that under sub-rule (2) of rule 112, the	Director of Inspection or the Commissioner, as the case may be, has to record his reasons before the authorisation is issued to the officers mentioned in subsection (1). Thirdly,	the authorisation for the search cannot be in favour of	any officer below the rank of an Income-tax Officer. Fourthly, the authorisation is for specific purposes enumerated in (i) to (v) in sub-section (1) all of which are. strictly limited to the object of the search. Fifthly when money, bullion etc. is seized the Income-tax Officer is to make a summary enquiry with a view to determine how much of what is seized will be retained by him to cover the estimated tax liability and how much will have to be returned forthwith. The object of the enquiry under subsection (5) is to reduce the, incon- venience to the assessee as much as possible so that within a reasonable time what is estimated due to the Government may be retained and what should be returned to the assessee may be	immediately returned to him. Even with regard to the, books of account and documents seized, their return is guaranteed after a reasonable time. In the meantime	the person	from whose custody they are seized is permitted to make copies and take	extracts. Sixthly, where money, bullion etc. is seized, it can also be. immediately returned to the person concerned after he makes appropriate provision for the pay-
ment of the estimated tax dues under sub-section (5)	and lastly,	and this is most important, the provisions of	the Criminal Procedure Code relating to	search	and seizure apply,	as far as they may be, to all searches and seizures under section 132. Rule 112 provides for the actual search and seizure being made after observing normal decencies of behavior. The person in charge of the premises searched is immediately given a copy of the list of articles seized. One copy is forwarded to the authorising officer. Provision for the safe custody of the articles after seizure is	also made in rule	112. In our opinion,	the safeguards	are adequate to render the provisions of search and seizure as less onerous and restrictive as is possible under the	cir- cumstances. The provisions, therefore, relating to search and seizure in section 132 and rule 12 cannot be regarded as violative of articles 19(f) 'and (g).
A minor point was urged in support of the above contention that section 132 contains provisions which are likely to affect	even innocent	persons. For	example, it	was submitted, an innocent person who is merely in	custody of cash, bullion or other valuables etc. not knowing that it was concealed income is likely to be harassed by a raid	for the purposes of search and seizure. That cannot be helped. Since the object of the search is to get at concealed incomes, any person, who is in custody without enquiring about its true nature, exposes himself to search.	Sub- section	(4) of section 132 shows the way how such an innocent person can make the impact of the (search on	him bearable. All that he has to do is to tell the facts to the searching officer explaining on whose behalf he held the custody	of the valuables. It will be then for the Income- tax Officer to ascertain the person concerned	under	sub- section (5).
It was next argued that the power for directing a search is given to an authority like the Director of Inspection	who, it is submitted, is, in the very nature of things, incapable of forming any reasonable belief with regard to	the requirements of section 132(1) (a)	(b) &	(c).	The contention was	that the assessee has no contact in	the matter	of assessment with the Director and, therefore, he can hardly entertain any belief, reasonable or otherwise. It is conceded that the Income-tax Officer or his superiors in the direct line, like	the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner, may be in a	position to entertain the requisite belief on account of their having direct	and first hand knowledge	of the financial circumstances of the assessee, the defaults he has committed or is likely to commit, etc. But the Director of Inspection has no opportunity and is, therefore, thoroughly unable to form any opinion. This would only mean that	any belief entertained by him would be an arbitrary belief and legis- lation investing such an officer with the power to direct a search	is per se unreasonable. in our opinions there is no substance in this argument. The Director of Inspection, as already	seen in section 116 of the Income-tax Act, is an officer in the Income-tax Department next only in authority to the Board of Direct Taxes.	Section 118 shows that	all Inspecting Assistant Commissioners and Income-tax officers, besides	being	subordinate to the Commissioners, are	also subordinate to the Director of Inspection. Under section 119(2) 718 every income-tax officer employed in the execution of	the Act is required to observe and follow such instructions as May be	issued to him for, his guidance by the concerned Director of Inspection. Moreover under section 120	the Director of Inspection is required to perform such functions of any other income-tax authority, apparently, including the Income-tax Officers and his direct superiors, as may, be assigned to Mm by the Board. Under section 135 the Director of Inspection is competent to make any enquiry under the Act and for that purpose he is invested with all	the Powers that an income,-tax Officer has under the Act in relation to the making of enquiries. It would, therefore, follow	that in the course of his duties the Director of Inspection	has ample opportunities to follow the course of Investigation and assessment carried on by the Incometax Officers and to check the information received from his sources with	the actual	material produced or	not produced	before	the assessing authorities.	It is not, therefore,	correct to argue that the Director of Inspection could hardly be expected to entertain, honestly, any reasonable belief	for the purposes of scetion 132(1) (a) (b) &(c). A subsidiary	point relating	to the entertainment	of reasonable belief under section 132 was also raised by	Mr. Karkhanis. He submitted that it was possible to say	that the Director of Inspection or the Commissioner, as the	case may be, could, in conceivable cases, entertain reason to believe	the existence of conditions referred	to in	sub- clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (1).	For example, where the necessary requisition is made under sub-clause (a)	the authority concerned may from the record ascertain whether the person to whom the requisition is issued has omitted or failed	to produce or cause to be Produced the required documents. Similarly under sub-clause (c) if the authority, has received any secret information ,which, in its opinion, was reliable, it may be possible for it to have reason to believe	that any person is in possession 'of	any money, bullion, jewellery etc. which is undisclosed income or property and such property is secreted in some place.	But Mr. Karkhanis	submitted that so far as sub-clause (b) is concemed, it win be impossible for one to say that	the authority can	reasonably entertain the belief	that if a requisition is made the person concerned will not or would not produce or cause to be produced the required documents. In his submission, the authority, can entertain that belief only when a requisition is made and within reasonable	time given the document is not produced. That is provided for in sub-clause (a). But to say. that the authority can	also have reason to believe that if a requisition is made	the person concerned will not in future produce the document is, according to Mr. Karkhanis, a conclusion which is impossible to draw on any conceivable facts. We must say that if	Mr. Karkhanis really thinks that there is	substance in	this argument, than he must be blissfully unaware of the manner in which income-tax is evaded. It	is impossible	to enumerate all	the circumstances in which the necessary reasonable belief may be entertained under subclause	(b). As an illustration, however, we may point out a case which fans completely under sub-clause (b). An assessee may be 719 filing	his returns from year to year	regularly and	his Assessments may be also completed in due course over years. Ms books of account and documents have been duly checked from year to	year and the	assessing officer is	also completely satisfied that the returns are correct. But it might so happen that this apparently	honest	assessee-has invested large	funds	in properties and other financial deals, reliable information about which finds its way to the Director of Inspection.	In such a case no oracle is needed to tell the Director of Inspection that if a requisition is made on the assessee to produce his documents in connection with these financial deals and investments, the assessee will most certainly omit to produce or cause to be produced such documents.	On the other hand, there is danger that all these documents may be destroyed because the very fact	that a requisition is made with a view to investigate concealed deals would put the assessee, on his guard and the relevant documents may either disappear or be destroyed. . Indeed, it is possible that an assessee may, after knowing that	the game is up, produce the requisite documents.	But in	the nature	of things such an assessee would be	rare.	The question for us to consider is whether the authority under section	132(1) may entertain the reasonable belief that in such circumstances the assessee will	not or would	not produce the documents.	In our opinion though in a very rare case a	tax evader may comply with	a requisition,	the Director of Inspection who has reliable information that the assessee has consistently concealed his income derived	from certain financial deals may be justified in entertaining the reasonable belief that the assessee, if called upon to produce the necessary documents, will not produce the same. There is no substance, therefore, in the contention	that sub-clause (b) has over-reached itself.
The argument that section 132(5) is confiscatory in	its effect	has also no force. It must be remembered that	the object	of this provision is to expedite the return of	the seized	assets after retaining what is due by way of tax to Government and	has been illegally withheld by	the person concerned. The seizure of the assets has been made in	the belief, honestly held, that	the assets represents undisclosed income or property.	But the Income tax Officer cannot	merely rest on this belief. He must take a summary enquiry after notice to the person concerned and the latter has an opportunity to show that he bad duly disclosed	this income.	If he cannot do this the officer is	entitled to proceed	on the basis that it is undisclosed income and on the relevant material	make a broad estimate	of the	tax withheld The amount of such tax which truly	belongs to Government is	retained by the Income-tax Officer and	the balance	forthwith, released We do not see how this can be described as confiscation. In fact, the second proviso to sub-section (5) shows that the assessee can get a release of all the assets seized if he can make satisfactory arrange- ments for the payment of the estimated dues.	Moreover it must be noted that the enquiry under sub-section (5) is no substitute, for regular Assessment or	reassessment.	The Income-tax Officer, having jurisdiction, will proceed	with the assessment	in due course and determine	the correct amount of tax payable.	In the meantime the assets retained are only by way of sequestration to meet the tax dues 6-784 Sup Cl/74 720 found to be eventually payable. if by reason of the enquiry under section 132(5), which is admittedly a summary enquiry, an amount in excess of the dues is retained, the same is liable	to be returned with interest at 9 per	cent under section 132A.
It was	next argued that sections 132(1), and (5)	are violative of the fundamental right under Article 14 on	the ground	(1) that they make unjust discrimination between evaders of tax, distinguishing those who are believed to be, in possession of undisclosed income or property from those evaders of tax who are not believed to be in possession, and (2) that although all evaders are liable to be proceeded against under section 147 of the Act, yet only some of	them who are found	in possession	of undisclosed income or property are .liable to be subjected to the procedure under section 132(5).	We find no substance in this argument.	All evaders	of tax can be proceeded against under section	132. Only in some cases the, search may be useful; in others it may not be.	If the Director of Inspection	gets timely information about the undisclosed income. and its location, he can direct a search and seizure. Otherwise, it is futile to direct a search and seizure because the whole maneouvre will be fruitless. The provision for seizure	is designed with the object of getting at the 'income which has	been concealed illegally by the, assessee. Only	when he is honestly satisfied that some undisclosed income of a person is likely to come to his hands if a search is directed,	he, will be in a position to issue the necessary authorisation. He cannot, however, direct a search in respect	of an evader of tax who is astute, enough to spend all his income or otherwise make it impossible to be traced. For	the purposes of section 147 of the Act all evaders of tax	are subject	to the same	procedure for	assessment of	tax including those against whom action is taken under section
132. Assessees whose	assets	could	be seized for	the recovery of their tax liabilities do not	stand in a different class, as such, but stand in a different situation from those others against whom the	search	and seizure process, though available, is futile. The finding of undis- closed	income	in the form of cash, jewelry and the	like makes the provision of sub-section (5) imperative.	The taxing	authorities cannot keep the	valuables with = indefinitely without,trying to see how much of what is	now seized will go to the Government by way of tax.	Therefore, in fairness to the assessee,	sub-section (5) has	been deliberately introduced. In the nature of things such an enquiry	is impossible in the case of tax evaders from	whom nothing is or could be seized on a search.
Sub-section (5) of section 132 does	not contemplate a different procedure in the matter of	regular	assessment. See section 132A which shows that those who are found in possession of undisclosed income on a seizure are liable to be regularly assessed or reassessed. Sub-section (5)	only contemplates a provisional summary enquiry 721 with a view to determine how much of the seized wealth	can be legitimately and reasonably retained to cover the	tax liability already incurred.	Regular	assessment follows under the law	in the same manner as in the case of	tax evaders who are not found in possession of concealed income. The utmost that can be said is that by reason of the seizure the Government	is in a position to secure its tax	dues before	the regular assessment is concluded. But that	does not introduce	any different	procedure for	the regular assessment of such an assessee's income which	remains	the same for all tax evaders. In one set of cases	the fiscal authorities make sure of recoveries, in the other, they	are unable to do so-not because the provisions of section 132 do not operate on them, but because action under that section by search and seizure is- futile. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that two different procedures for assessment are	adopted	and hence there is a discrimination under Article 14. The plea on behalf of	the assessees, in effect, only amounts to this "It is true	that we are tax evaders. But if other evaders successfully dodge the collection of the tax by causing their concealed income to disappear, why should we not get the same facility." Some points of lesser substance were mentioned in	the petition memos in support of the challenge under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g). They were,, however, not urged at the time of the hearing, as no the other grounds urged, it	was impossible to	hold that the	impugned provisions	were violative of either Articles 14, 19 or 31. We may however, mention in this context that these points had been raised in C. Venkata Reddy and Another v. Income-tax Officer (Central) 1, Bangalore, and others(1) and in Ramjibhai Kalidas v. I G. Desai,	Income-tax Officer, and others(2) where they	have been- quite adequately dealt with and rejected. Apart from the constitutional challenge there was also a further	challenge on the ground that the actual search	and seizure	in all these cases, being in contravention of	the requirements of section 132 and rule 112 was illegal. Several	allegations have been made of malafides, high- handedness, oppressive behavior and the like and we shall have to deal with them on the facts of each case. But so far as the two Civil Appeals are concerned, it appears to us that it is not necessary to enter into the question of	the alleged illegalities. The High Court has not done so.	The relief claimed in those petitions in the High Court was	for the, return of the account books and documents which	had been seized and it would appear from the record that before the High Court disposed of that matters, the account books and documents had been already returned. However, there was another	relief claimed in the petitions and that was for a Writ of Prohibition restraining the Income-tax Department from using as evidence any information gathered from	the search	of the articles seized. It would appear from	the record	that the High Court was prepared to assume for	the purposes of those cases that the search and	seizure	was illegal. Even	so the question remained whether these victims of illegal search (1) 66 Income-tax Reports, 212.
were-entitled to a Writ of Prohibition that the Income-tax authorities shall not use any information gathered from	the documents which had been seized. The High Court held	that they were not, and proceeded to pass the following identical order in the two cases.	It is as follows "In this	case all the documents seized in pursuance	of the search	warrant have	been returned	to the	petitioners and the	only question	is whether the information gathered as a result of such search and seizure could be used	in evidence if it be held that	the search and seizure was illegal.	In Balwant Singh and others v. Director of	Inspection (Civil Writ No. 750-D of 1966), announced today, we have held that such information	can be uses.	It is unnecessary, therefore, to pronounce upon the validity of the search	and seizure.	This petition, therefore, fails	and is ,dismissed with no order as to costs."
Balwant Singh's case referred to above is reported in 71 In- come-tax Reports, 550. We understand that an	appeal	had been filed to	this Court but was not prosecuted.	That decision not only upheld the constitutionality	of section 132 of	the Income-tax Act but also held that there	was nothing in Article 19 of the Constitution which forbids	the use of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search. Consistently with that view	the relief for	a Writ of Prohibition. was rejected and hence the two Civil Appeals before us.
Dr. Singhvi who appeared on behalf of the appellants in	the two appeals frankly conceded that there was	no specific Article	of the Constitution prohibiting the admission of evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure. But he submitted that to admit such evidence is against the spirit of the Constitution which has made our liberties inviolable. In this connection he referred to some American cases which seem to recognize the validity of his submission. As to	the argument	based	on "the spirit of	our Constitution",	we can	do no better than quote from	the judgment of Kania, C. J. in A. K.Gopalan v. The State of Madras(1). "There is considerable	authority for	the statement that the Courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words.	Where the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by necessary implication,	the general powers conferred upon the Legislature we	cannot	declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered something in the	spirit	of the Constitution	which is not	even mentioned in the instrument.	It is	difficult upon	any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial.interposition, except so	far as the	express words of a written Constitution give	that authority." Now, if the Evidence Act 1871 which is a	law 'Consolidating,	defining and amending the law of evidence, no provision of which is challenged as violating	the Constitu-
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88 at p. 120, 723 tion permits relevancy as the only test of admissibility of evidence (See section 5 of the Act) and, secondly, that	Act or any other similar law in force does not exclude relevant evidence, on the ground that it was	obtained under an illegal	search or seizure, it will be wrong to	invoke	the supposed spirit of our Constitution for excluding such	evi- dence.	Nor is it open to us to strain the language of	the Constitution, because some American Judges of the American Supreme	Court	have spelt out certain constitutional protections from the provisions	of the American Constitution.	In M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chander, already referred to, a search and seizure made under the Criminal Procedure Code was challenged as illegal on the ground of violation of the fundamental right under Article 20(3),	the argument being	that the evidence was no better	than illegally compelled evidence. In support of that contention reference was made to the Fourth and Fifth amendments of the American Constitution and also to some American cases which seemed to hold that the obtaining of incriminating evidence by illegal seizure and search tantamounts to the violation of the Fifth amendment.	The Fourth amendment does not place any embargo on. reasonable searches	and seizures.	It. provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. .Thus the privacy of a citizen's home	was specifically safeguarded	under	the- Constitution, although reasonable searches and seizures were not taboo. Repelling the submission,	this Court observed at page 1096.	"A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence in overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought	fit not to subject such regulation	to constitutional	limitations by recognition of a	fundamental right	to privacy,. analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we	have no justification to import it, into a totally	different fundamental right, by some	process of strained construction.	Nor is it legitimate to assume	that the constitutional protection under article 20(3) would be defeated by the statutory provisions	for searches."	It, therefore, follows that neither by invoking the spirit of our Constitution nor by a strained construction of any of the fundamental rights can we spell out the exclusion of evidence obtained on an illegal search.
the provisions	prescribed by the Code, I hold that	what would otherwise be relevant does not become irrelevant because it was discovered in the course of a search in which those provisions were disregarded. As Jimutavahana with his shrewd	common-sense observes-"a tact cannot be	altered by 100 texts," and as his commentator quaintly remarks : "If a Brahmana be slain, the precept 'slay not a Branmana'	does not annul the murder." But the absence of the	precautions designed. by the legislature lends support to the argument that the alleged discovery should be carefully-scrutinized." In Emperor v. Allahdad Khan(1) the Superintendent of Police and a Sub-Inspector searched the house of a person suspected of being in illicit possession of excisable articles	and such articles were found in the house searched.	It was held that the conviction of the owner of the house under section 63 of	the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, was	not rendered invalid by the fact that no warrant had been issued for the search, although it was presumably the intention of the legislature that in a case under section 63, where it was necessary to search a house, a search warrant should be obtained beforehand. In Kuruma v. The Queen(2) where	the Privy Council had to consider the English Law of Evidence in its application to	Eastern	Africa, their Lordships propounded the rule thus : "The test to be applied, both in civil and in criminal cases, in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the	matters in issue.	If it is, it is admissible and the court is	not concerned with	how it was obtained." Some American cases were also cited before the Privy Council. Their Lordships observed at p. 204 thus "Certain decisions of	the Supreme Court of the United States of America were also cited in argument. Their Lordships do not think it necessary to examine	them in detail. Suffice it	to say	that there appears	to be considerable difference of opinion among	the judges both in the State and Federal courts as to whether or not the rejection of evidence obtained by illegal means depends	on certain articles in the American Constitution. At any	rate, in Olmstead v. United State (1828) 277	U.S. 438, the majority of the Supreme Court were	clearly of opinion that the common law did not reject relevant evidence on that ground." In Kuruma's case, Kuruma was	searched by two Police Officers who were not authorised under the law to carry out a search and, in the search, some ammunition	was found in the unlawful possession of Kuruma. The question was whether the evidence with regard to the finding of	the ammunition on the person of Kuruma could be shut out on	the ground	that the evidence had been obtained by	an unlawful search.	It was held it could not be so shut out because the finding of ammunition was a relevant piece of evidence on a charge for unlawful possession.	In a later case before	the Privy Council in Herman King v. The Queen(3) which came on appeal	from a Court of Appeal of Jamaica, the law as	laid down in Kuruma's case was applied although the Jamaican Constitution guaranteed the constitutional right against (1) 35 Allahabad, 358.
search and seizure in the following provision of the Jamalca (Constitution)	Order in Council 1962, Sch. 2, s. 19	"(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others	on his premises. "(2) Nothing contained in or	done under the authority of any	law shall be	held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent	that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably required .... for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. . . ." In other words, search and seizure for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime reasonably enforced was not inconsistent with	the constitutional guarantee against search and seizure.	It was held in	that case that the search of the appellant by a Police Officer was not justified by the warrant nor was it open to	the Officer to search the person of the appellant without taking him before a Justice of the Peace. Nevertheless it was held that the Court had a discretion to	admit the evidence obtained as a	result	of the illegal search and	the constitutional	protection against search of	person	or property without consent did not take away the discretion of the court. Following Kuruma v. The Queen the	court	held that it was open to the court not to	admit the evidence against	the accused if the court was of the view that	the evidence had been obtained by conduct of which	the prose- cution ought not to take advantage. But that was not a rule of evidence but a rule of prudence and fair play. It would thus be seen that in India, as in England, where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or	necessarily implied prohibition in	the Constitution or other law evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. In that view, even assuming, as was done by the High Court, that the search and seizure were in contravention of	the provisions of section 132 of the Income Tax Act, still	the material seized was liable to be used subject to law before the Income-tax	authorities against the person	from whose custody it was seized and, therefore, no Writ of Prohibition in restraint of such use could be granted.	It must be therefore, held that the High Court was right 'in dismissing the two Writ Petitions.	The appeals must also fail and	are dismissed with costs.
Writ Petition No. 446 of 1971 The petitioner Pooran Mal is a partner in a number of firms- some of them doing business in Bombay and some in Delhi. His permanent	residence is 12A Kamla	Nagar,	Delhi.	His business premises in Delhi are A.14/16 Jamuna Bhavan,	Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi. It would appear that on	an authorisation issued by the Director	of Inspection,	his residence and business premises in Delhi were	searched on 15th and 16th October, 1971. On the 15th his 726 premises in Bombay were also searched and at that time it appears. the petitioner was present in Bombay. When	his residence was searched on 15th and 16th, there were in	his house the petitioners wife, two or three adult sons and	his father	who is said to have been ailing. It was alleged on behalf of the petitioner that the search in the	residential premises was malafide, oppressive, excessive, indiscriminate and vexatious.	The grounds for making these	allegations ,seem to be (1) that the search and seizure, in the house took place in spite of the wife's request to postpone	the search;	(2) it was Dhanteras day which is a festival	day; (3) petitioner's wife was not informed that there was	any authorisation;	(4) her father-in-law	was suffering	from paralysis; (5) even children's small boxes containing their pocket money were seized; (6) jewelry including that of	the mother-in-law of the petitioner,, Kailashbai, who had	died six years earlier was seized; (7) the panchas who helped in the search were unknown to the petitioner or the members of his family; (8) the search went on from 8.00 A.M. on 15.10 till the early hours of 16.10 and the search was again resumed	on the evening of 16.10. The grounds on which	the wild allegations of malafides, oppression etc. had been made do not	appear to be of any substance.	It is	undoubtedly true that search and seizure is a drastic process and is bound to be associated with some amount of unsavory	and inconvenient results.	A sudden search and	seizure	may unnerve	the inmates of the place where the search is made. But this is to be expected. When oppression and malafides are alleged, we should have, more substantial grounds	than these.	On the other hand, the allegations	of highhandedness,	malafides,etc.	are wholly denied in	the affidavit filed on behalf of the Department. That it was a Dhanteras day is denied. But assuming it was there is no law which says that a search and seizure cannot take place on that day. It may be that the wife had requested that the search	may be	postponed till her husband's-	return	but obviously the	officers concerned could not agree to	this request	because the whole purpose of the search would	have been defeated.	It is denied that the inmates were	not informed of the authorisation, , In fact it is alleged	that the petitioner's wife	Smt. Sharda Devi was shown	the authorisation and in token of the same, she had put	her signature thereon. That the petitioner's	father	was suffering from paralysis might be unfortunate but it	does not appear that the officers concerned caused him the least inconvenience.	All throughout the search, it	is alleged, Sharda Devi and her two educated sons Dinesh and Vinod, were present	at the time of the search. It is not	denied	that considerable jewelry was seized. The jewelry seized in	the house was worth Rs. 37,043/- and though it is the	case of,the petitioner that part of it belonged to his mother-in- law, Smt. Kailashbai, who is now dead, it is stated on oath on behalf of the Department that in the statements recorded on 15th and 16th October, 1971 Smt. Sharda Devi had claimed the whole of the jewelry as her own, though in the	last Wealth Tax Return she had valued her jewelry at Rs. 5,0001- only.	So, far as the Panchas are concerned, 'it is denied that they were not known to the inmates of the	house.	In fact, it is alleged by the Department that Pancha Mathuradas was a resident in the same house and had been called 727 at the suggestion of Sharda Devi. it is not denied that' the search went on for a long time because a number of documents and account books were seized in the course of	the search and so also a lot of jewelry and cash, The allegation	that the small boxes of the children containing their pocket money was seized is denied. We may say, therefore,, on	the whole that there is nothing in the petition inducing us to take the view	that the search in the house	was either malafide, oppressive or excessive etc. etc. The search in the business premises was made when a number of persons who usually worked there were present. Books of account, documents, some jewelry and a large amount of	cash amounting to about Rs. 61,000/- were seized. On 16.10 there was a search in the Branch Offices of Laxmi Commercial Bank and the Punjab National Bank. 84 Silver bars were seized from Laxmi Commercial Bank and 30	silver	bars were seized from the Punjab National Bank. The value of these silver bars comes to nearly 18 lakhs. It is the	case of the petitioner that these bars belongs to M/s Pooran	mal and Sons of Bombay who sent the same	to the Motor	and General Finance Company of which the petitioner is a partner and this Finance Company, it is alleged, kept	these	bars with the two banks. 84 bars were kept in the account of	M/s Udey Chand Pooranmal for an alleged overdraft	limit while the 30	silver bars were pledged with the Punjab National Bank in the account of the Finance Company. In all these aforesaid firms the petitioner is a partner and it is	the Department's case that all these bars are the	undisclosed assets	of the petitioner. It appears that the Income-tax Officer made a summary enquiry as required by section 132(5) after issuing notice to the petitioner and his order dated 12-1-1972 shows, of course prima facie, that all the assets which had been seized in the house, the business premises and the banks, except for the value of the ornaments declared by Mrs. Sharda Devi in her Wealth Tax Return,	had to be retained for being appropriated against tax dues	from 1969 onwards which amounted to nearly 42 lakhs.	Indeed this prima facie liability was subject to regular assessment	and reassessment.
Mr. Karkhanis submitted that the petitioner bad been	very cooperative with the department before and, therefore,	the Director of Inspection could have no possible	reason	to. believe	that if any requisition for documents	and account books were made the same would not.	be produced.	This allegation about cooperation is denied by the Department and in this connection the Department has produced a chart at Annexure RI showing how the petitioner has been throughout noncooperative.	Assessment for the year 1967-68 is still pending and no return has been filed for the year 1968-69 or for later years. We are not at all satisfied that	the petitioner was cooperative, and, therefore, the Director of, Inspection would have no possible ground for entertaining a reasonable: belief as required by sub-clauses (a) (b) &	(c) of subsection (1) 'of section 132. To satisfy ourselves we called for 728 the grounds	recorded by the Director	before	the authorisation was issued and we are quite satisfied	that there were grounds for him to entertain reasonable belief as required under the sub-clauses.	As already pointed out	the summary	enquiry made under sub-clause (5) of	section	132 discloses that	the assets seized were for the most	part undisclosed income and property. Indeed the accident	that undisclosed property is found on a search may not be a justification for the authorisation of a search if, in	fact there had been no grounds for entertaining reasonable belief.	But finding of assets as expected by the Director of Inspection on, the information received by him would at least support	the view that the authority concerned	bad reliable information on which he could entertain	the necessary belief.
Writ Petition No. 96 of 1972 The position in this Writ Petition is not different.	The petitioner Ganeriwala is a businessman.	His residence is 1, Raj Narain Road, Civil Lines, Delhi and he runs a family business in Automobile parts in the	name of Ganeriwala Trading	Company. The business is at no. 1 Krishna Motor Market,	Kashimiri Gate, Delhi. The family seems to be a partner	in the firm	of M/s	Bisheshwar Lal	Bijr Natin Barielly, and	is. supposed to have income from ancestral agricultural lands in Haryana State. It is alleged by	the, petitioner that his assessment of income had been completed upto the year 1970-71 and of Wealth Tax upto 1969-1970.	The Return for 1970-71 was also filed. Even so, it is alleged, on 8-101971 his residential house and	also the business premises were searched and documents and books	of account were seized.	The search was started	at 8.00 A.M.	and continued till	the evening and, thereafter, the business premises were searched. The petitioner stated that though the raiding party made a very detailed search, they did. not come across any concealed incomemash of bullion, ornaments or jewelry. General allegations regarding the search being oppressive and	excessive are	made.	But there is	no substance in them. Objection was taken to the search on the ground	that the authorities	had deliberately selected Panchas	who were inimical to	the petitioner. This is denied.	It is stated in the affidavit on behalf of	the Department that one of the pancha witnesses namely Lt.	Col. Raj Behari Lal was actually sitting in the house of	the petitioner even before the	search	party entered	the premises. It	is also stated that both the	panchas	are responsible persons of the locality	and the immediate neighbors of the petitioner-one of them being a	responsible officer	in the Army. The petitioner says that he had	told the authorities that he.had been on inimical	terms	with these panchas.	But that is denied. There is, therefore, no reason to think that respectable panchas were not taken	for the search. Another objection was made that two cash books relating to the years 1970-71 and 1971-72 were	removed by the Income-tax authorities but they were not duly entered in the inventory.	This allegation also is denied, In para 21 of the counter-affidavit the Assistant Director	of Inspection has	stated	that during the course of	the petitioners 729 examination and the recording of his statement on October 8, 1971 the petitioner had stated that his Roker-Bahis for	the accounting year 1970-71 and 1971-72 did not	contain	any entries regarding the expenditure on the construction of the godown,	and as such those Roker-Bahis were not seized	from the custody of the petitioner.	The other reason was	that the petitioner had requested that they may not be seized as otherwise the petitioner would face difficulties in carrying on his business. It must be remembered that the search	and seizure had been ordered because the petitioner had recently constructed a huge godown near his residential premises with the floor area of approximately 6700 sq.. ft. on which a large investment was estimated to have been made from income which had not	been disclosed in the books	of account produced or returns filed by the petitioner.	Since	the petitioner himself told the authorities that the Roker-Bahis for the two years did not contain any entries regarding	the expenditure on the construction, the authorities inspected the Roker-Bahis for the year 1971-72 and finding that it did not contain ,any entries for the past 30 days it	was considered by the authorities not proper to take Possession of the same. We are inclined to think that this objection by the petitioner is an afterthought with a view to malign the departmental authorities.	It is not denied that	the petitioner had	been given a copy of the inventory of	the documents seized from his custody on that very day. He, did not raise the objection regarding the account	books	till November 5, 1971 i.e. nearly after one month.	The petitioner is a businessman. He could not have been unaware that his Roker-Bahis for the current year and the previous year were missing for such a long time.
It was next alleged that a very large number of documents were seized which were really irrelevant. The authorised officer	has to seize books of account and other documents which will be useful for and relevant	to any proceeding under the Income-tax Act. When in the course of a search voluminous documents and books of account are to be examined with a	view to judge whether they would be	relevant a certain amount of latitude must be permitted to the authori- ties. It is true that when particularly documents are asked to be seized unnecessary examination of other documents	may conceivably make the	search-excessive. But when	the documents, pieces of paper, exercise books, account books, small memos etc. have all to be examined with a view to	see how far they are relevant for the proceeding under the	Act, an error of judgment is not unlikely.	At the most	this would be an irregularity not an illegality. Nor can it be a valid objection to the search that it continued for about 16 hours.	By their very nature the search and seizure as shown above, would consume a lot of time.
In this petition also it was alleged that the	Director of Inspection could possibly have no reason to	believe	the existence of circumstances required by sub-clauses (b) & (c) of sub-section (1) 'of' section 132 because the petitioner's assessment for the year 1970-71 had been already completed and so also the Wealth Tax assessment for the year 1969-70. But this does not mean that on the information, 730 in the possession of the Director of Inspection he cannot entertain the necessary belief. The grounds for the belief recorded by	the Director	of Inspectionbefore	the authorisation were shown to us and we do not the that on the material the authority could not have entertained	the belief.	A big godown has been newly	constructed by	the petitioner but	his books of account did not	reflect	the expenditure on account of this construction. It is alleged on behalf of	the Department	that,	on search, certain documents in the nature of maps etc.	were seized which showed	that the petitioner had constructed the building in the month preceding the date of search and the	money	with which the said building was constructed was	unaccounted money.	There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the incometax authorities could	not have possibly entertained the required belief. The search and seizure, therefore, impugned in this Writ Petition cannot be regarded as illegal.