Source: https://m.openjurist.org/371/us/392
Timestamp: 2020-07-02 10:11:29
Document Index: 353428122

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 2', '§ 114', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 29', '§ 176', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', '§ 1343']

371 US 392 Cleary v. Bolger | OpenJurist
371 U.S. 392 - Cleary v. Bolger
371 US 392 Cleary v. Bolger
83 S.Ct. 385
9 L.Ed.2d 390
Michael CLEARY, Petitioner,
Edward BOLGER.
Argued Nov. 14 and 15, 1962.
Irving Malchman, New York City, for petitioner.
By this time the Waterfront Commission, a bi-state agency of New York and New Jersey1 which worked in close cooperation with the Customs Service in matters of law enforcement on the waterfront, had been informed of respondent's arrest, and two Commission detectives were present when the interrogation resumed. Petitioner Cleary was one of these detectives. After respondent had revealed that he maintained a tool room in the basement of an apartment house in New York, petitioner and a Customs officer accompanied respondent to this tool room, but nothing suspicious was discovered and they returned to Customs headquarters at 5:45 p.m.
After he had been told that he did not have to make a statement, respondent was sworn and interrogated by Customs officers in the presence of a Customs Service reporter, who recorded the questions and answers verbatim. Petitioner was present and could have participated in the questioning, though he did not do so.2 Respondent admitted that with the exception of a few items that he had purchased from crew members most of the articles seized at his home had been taken by him from piers where he worked. He also said that he had taken the Stenorette tape recorder from a lighter moored at one of the piers. At 7:30 p.m. respondent was released.
The District Court granted such relief, limited however, to the property seized at respondent's home, to the incriminatory statement made following his arrest, and to testimony respecting these matters.4 It held that the search and seizure at respondent's home violated Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.,5 in that it had been made without a search warrant, and that his incriminating statement had been procured in violation of Rule 5(a) of those Rules,6 in that respondent had not been taken before a United States Commissioner within a reasonable time after his arrest, and was also 'the result * * * of the illegal search and seizure.' In consequence of these illegalities an injunction against the federal officers was thought to follow. An injunction against petitioner was deemed necessary to make the injunction against the federal officials effective. D.C., 189 F.Supp. 237. The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 2 Cir., 293 F.2d 368. Since the use of federal equity power in the premises presented important questions touching upon federalstate relationships in the realm of state criminal prosecutions, we brought the case here. 368 U.S. 984, 82 S.Ct. 602, 7 L.Ed.2d 522.
Accepting for present purposes the holdings of the two lower courts with respect to the conduct and enjoinability of the federal officers, we nevertheless conclude that the injunction against this petitioner was improvidently issued.7
'(W)e would expose every State criminal prosecution to insupportable disruption. Every question of procedural due process of law—with its far-flung and undefined range—would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with review if need be to this Court, to determine the issue. Asserted unconstitutionality in the impaneling and selection of the grand and petit juries, in the failure to appoint counsel, in the admission of a confession, in the creation of an unfair trial atmosphere, in the misconduct of the trial court—all would provide ready opportunities, which conscientious counsel might be bound to employ, to subvert the orderly, effective prosecution of local crime in local courts. To suggest these difficulties is to recognize their solution.' 342 U.S., at 123—124, 72 S.Ct. at 121, 122.
The two courts below recognized the validity of these considerations but thought that injunctive relief was nonetheless required by Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct. 292, 100 L.Ed. 233. In that case the accused had been indicted in a federal court and had moved for an order under Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure suppressing the use in evidence of certain narcotics seized under a search warrant invalid on its face. The District Court granted the motion. Despite the order, however, one of the federal officers who had secured the search warrant caused the accused to be rearrested and charged, in a state court, with possession of the same narcotics in violation of a state statute, and threatened to make the State's case by his testimony based on the evidence seized under the illegal federal warrant. The accused then moved in the Federal District Court to enjoin the federal agent from testifying in the state proceeding. This Court, invoking its 'supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies' (id., at 216—217, 76 S.Ct. at 294), reversed the denial of an injunction and directed that the requested relief be granted in order to prevent frustration of the Federal Rules under which suppression had been ordered.8 Both lower courts in the present case evidently took Rea to mean that federal officers transgressing the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may always be enjoined from utilizing their ill-gotten gains in a state criminal prosecution against the victim or from directly or indirectly passing them along to state authorities for such use.9
We need not, however, determine in this instance the correctness of the lower courts' broad reading of the Rea case, cf. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 81 S.Ct. 632, 5 L.Ed.2d 620, on the basis of which the federal officers here were enjoined.10 For in any event Rea does not support the injunction against this petitioner, a state official. The Court in Rea was at special pains to point out that the federal courts were not there 'asked to enjoin state officials nor in any way to interfere with state agencies in enforcement of state law,' 350 U.S., at 216, 76 S.Ct. at 294, and further that '(n)o injunction is sought against a state official,' id., at 217, 76 S.Ct. at 294. The opinion is barren of any suggestion that any inroads on Stefanelli were intended.
Nor can the injunctive relief against this petitioner find justification in the rationale that it was required in order or make the injunction against the federal officers effective. Such relief as to him must stand on its own bottom. We need not decide whether petitioner's status as a state official might be ignored had it been shown that he had misconducted himself in this affair, that he had been utilized by the federal officials as a means of shielding their own alleged illegal conduct, or that he had received the evidence in direct violation of a federal court order. Here the District Court found that petitioner was not a factor in the federal investigation11 and that his presence there was simply 'the result of the commendable cooperation between the Customs Service and the Commission who were both concerned with law enforcement on the waterfront.' D.C., 189 F.Supp., at 255.12 On this record the upshot of the matter is that, insofar as this state official is concerned, nothing in Rea justifies disregard of the teachings of Stefanelli. Nor is the vitality of the principles on which the latter case rested sapped by this Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782, which had refused to extend to the States the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652. For in denying the injunctive relief there sought Stefanelli expressly laid to one side any possible impact of Wolf. 342 U.S., at 119 120, 72 S.Ct. at 120.
I concur in the result. I cannot, however, join the Court's opinion, because I do not find it necessary in the present circumstances to pass upon the question whether Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct. 292, 100 L.Ed. 233, may ever support an injunction against a state official who has received evidence illegally obtained by federal officers even though 'there is no evidence of a purpose to avoid federal requirements and the information has not been acquired by the state official in violation of a federal court order.' For me consideration of that question is obviated by the commendably broad reading which the New York Court of Appeals has given this Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081.1 Because I strongly adhere to the principle, stated with clarity in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120, 72 S.Ct. 118, 120, 96 L.Ed. 138, that the considerations governing whether a federal equity court should exercise its power here 'touch perhaps the most sensitive source of friction between States and Nation, namely, the active intrusion of the federal courts in the administration of the criminal law for the prosecution of crimes solely within the power of the States,' I would avoid granting of injunctive relief in cases such as this where, because there is a substantial likelihood that the state courts will exclude the evidence at issue, such relief is not essential to vindication of an overriding federal policy governing conduct of federal officers. The virtual certainty of exclusion in the New York criminal proceedings and the likelihood of exclusion in the state administrative proceedings satisfy me that denial of the injunction here will not encourage federal officers to engage in illegal conduct. Thus, deterrence of such illegality, the consideration which in substantial part underlay the decision in Rea, is not a determining factor here and there is no need to grant injunctive relief to effectuate that policy.
In stating my position I rely on the New York Court of Appeals' announced view that it regards Mapp as extending to the 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' a holding arrived at on facts similar to those involved here. People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 286, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357, 183 N.E.2d 651, 653— 654 (1962). It therefore appears that New York will exclude all the evidence here in question in the pending criminal proceedings. With reference to the Waterfront Commission hearing, I am well aware that the New York Court of Appeals has as yet taken no position on the applicability of Mapp in civil and administrative proceedings,2 and that, indeed, the effect of the Fourth Amendment in civil cases in the federal courts is not totally settled.3 However, in view of the encouragingly constructive approach of the New York courts to application of the Mapp decision, and of the 'quasi-criminal' character of the pending Waterfront Commission proceedings, I nevertheless take the view, based upon Stefanelli, that the orderly way to proceed in this case is for New York to pass upon respondent's claims first.
The Court's opinion states that 'To the extent that respondent's claims involve infractions merely of the Federal Criminal Rules, we need not decide whether an adverse state determination upon such claims would be reversible here.' I, like the Court, do not reach this issue, but I so conclude because of my stated belief that New York will, under Mapp, likely exclude all the evidence in question here, a possibility which for me, because of my firm belief in the principles of Stefanelli v. Minard, supra, is sufficient to make the granting of injunctive relief here an unwise exercise of federal power. Whether it would be similarly excludible in such state proceedings were respondent's claims premised solely upon federal officers' misbehavior in contravention of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a question which this Court has not decided.4 There is a strong interest, which many decisions of this Court reflect, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479, in ensuring compliance by federal officers with rules having the force of federal law, designed to safeguard the rights of citizens charged with criminal acts. Whether the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution compels state courts to enforce that interest by excluding evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the Federal Criminal Rules, including reverse 'silver platter' situations wherein illegally procured evidence has been handed over to state officers, will warrant serious consideration in an appropriate case. We need not and therefore do not decide that question here.
I think the Court of Appeals was correct in saying that 'the Rea case (is) ample authority for holding that the order appealed from is not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (28 U.S.C.A. § 2283) as an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court.' Id., at 370. The proceedings themselves are not enjoined. Enjoining a state agent from offering as a witness unlawfully obtained evidence has no different effect on the 'proceedings in a state court' than enjoining a federal officer. To be sure, in Rea there had been an earlier suppression order in a federal prosecution; and so it is now said that the injunction against testifying was necessary to protect or effectuate that suppression order. That answer proves too much, for it would enable federal agents themselves to violate the Federal Rules and, without fear of a federal injunction, produce all their illegally obtained evidence in a state prosecution.
Such an injunction should issue lest federal agents accomplish illegal results by boosting Oliver Twists through windows built too narrow by those Rules for their own ingress.* It is no answer to say that the state agent was merely a nonparticipating observer, or that Oliver Twist was an innocent child. The result produced, viz., the Oliver Twist method of obtaining evidence in violation of the Federal Rules, is illegal and should not go unchecked.
'Free and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement officers is to be commended and encouraged. Yet that kind of cooperation is hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal officers * * * (to violate the provisions of the Federal Rules). If, on the other hand, it is understood that the fruit of * * * unlawful * * * (conduct) by * * * (federal) agents will be inadmissible in a * * * (state) trial, there can be no inducement to subterfuge and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation'—to paraphrase an earlier opinion in a related area. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221—222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669. Unless a federal court can enjoin a state agent under the facts of this case, the provisions of the Federal Rules will be subverted and an unhealthy form of statefederal cooperation will be encouraged.
The Court concedes arguendo that it was proper to enjoin the federal officers from testifying in state proceedings against respondent as to the fruits of their violations of Rules 5 and 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. But having made this concession—compelled, I should think, by Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct. 2921—the Court then excludes petitioner from the injunction: 'injunctive relief against this petitioner (cannot) find justification in the rationale that it was required in order to make the injunction against the federal officers effective. Such relief as to him must stand on its own bottom.' The Court finds no 'bottom,' because petitioner did not himself violate the Federal Rules or otherwise misconduct himself. This reasoning, I submit, cannot withstand scrutiny.
In so refusing incidental relief against petitioner, surely the Court flouts settled principles of equity. Equity does not do justice by halves; its remedies are flexible. 'A writ of injunction may be said to be a process capable of more modifications than any other in the law; it is so malleable that it may be moulded to suit the various circumstances and occasions presented to a court of equity. It is an instrument in his hands capable of various applications for the purposes of dispensing complete justice between the parties.' Tucker v. Carpenter, 24 Fed.Cas.No.14217 (Cir.Ct.D.Ark. 1841); see 1 Joyce, Injunctions (1909), § 2; 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. Symons, 1941), § 114.2 'Complete justice' has not been done if the fruits of the violations of federal law by federal officers may nevertheless be used against respondent in state proceedings by a state officer who witnessed, indeed abetted, those violations.
It is also worth observing that Congress has taken pains to specify the conditions under which a federal court shall withhold injunctive relief in respect of a pending state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283. The Court nowhere mentions this provision, surely because its total inapplicability to the case at hand is plain: an injunction against this state officer would not stay the state proceedings against respondent but only preclude the use of certain evidence in them. Since Congress in § 2283 set out specific conditions for withholding federal equity relief, and these conditions have not been met in the case at bar, I submit that we are obligated to allow such relief to be granted in conformity with the accepted usages of equity procedure.
With all respect I cannot share the view of my Brother GOLDBERG that relief should be denied here because the probable exclusion of the challenged evidence, in whole or part, by the New York courts would sufficiently serve to deter lawless conduct by federal officers. My view is that equitable actions grounded in violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be governed by the accepted principles of equity. Among them is the principle that an adequate remedy at law bars equitable relief. This principle seems to me to be applicable even where the remedy is given by the state courts, so long as the source of the remedy is federal law. See Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U.S. 121, 126—127, 50 S.Ct. 270, 272, 74 L.Ed. 737. I further believe that one who has an adequate remedy by way of appeal, as well as one who has a more conventional adequate remedy at law, is thereby disbarred from equitable relief. 1 Joyce, supra, § 29. But for a remedy to be adequate, it must have more than a merely theoretical availability. If 'a court of law can do as complete justice to the matter in controversy * * * as could be done by a court of equity, equity will not interfere. * * * But in order that the general principle may apply, the sufficiency and completeness of the legal remedy must be certain; if it is doubtful, equity may take cognizance.' 1 Pomeroy, supra, § 176. How certain, complete, and sufficient is the remedy by way of appeal in the instant case? My Brother GOLDBERG concedes uncertainty as to whether the New York courts, though they have generally interpreted Mapp v. Ohio, supra, will exclude all the challenged evidence involved in this case, or whether Mapp or any other decision of this Court compels such exclusion. Nor is it certain that a State is obliged to exclude evidence which is the product of violations of the Federal Rules—no decision of this Court has yet so held and Rea was premised on a contrary assumption, see 350 U.S., at 217; Wilson v. Schnettler, supra, at 391, 81 S.Ct. at 638 (dissenting opinion) and finally, while petitioner herein was enjoined from testifying the state administrative proceeding against respondent, as well as in the criminal proceeding, it has not yet been settled whether Mapp applies to administrative proceedings. Thus, to remit respondent to his remedy by appeal in the state courts is to set him adrift on a sea of legal uncertainties, and very possibly to deprive him, in the end, of any remedy whatever. Since respondent's remedy by law is uncertain, conventional equity principles require that the injunction issue against this state officer, premised not on constitutional grounds but on violations of the Federal Rules by federal officers.3
It should be noted that respondent did not allege in his complaint that the matter in controversy exceeded the sum or value of $10,000, or that diversity of citizenship existed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332. Nor did he allege that the District Court had jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner incidental to its supervisory power over federal law enforcement agencies, cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217, 76 S.Ct. 292, 294, 100 L.Ed. 233, or that 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343, conferred jurisdiction. But, in view of our determination that equitable power should not have been exercised with respect to this petitioner, it is not necessary to resolve the questions whether the complaint stated a cause of action as to him or whether federal jurisdiction existed or was adequately invoked. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120, 72 S.Ct. 118, 120, 96 L.Ed. 138.
The Court's intimation, in note 7 of the opinion of doubt as to the existence of federal jurisdiction in the instant case seems to me totally unwarranted. The Court was unanimous in Rea as to the existence of federal jurisdiction; the only dispute was as to the propriety of exercising it. See 350 U.S., at 219, 81 S.Ct. at 295 (dissenting opinion). To predidicate federal jurisdiction in the instant case, we need not decide whether the Federal Rules are civil rights statutes within the intent of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(4), nor need we resort to any other jurisdictional statute. For the federal courts have the inherent authority to issue orders to protect their processes, here, as in Rea, governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 350 U.S., at 217, 81 S.Ct. at 294; Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556, 558, 31 S.Ct. 599, 600, 55 L.Ed. 581.