Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US7948988?ie=ISO-8859-1&dq=5527183
Timestamp: 2014-03-13 07:09:18
Document Index: 68265085

Matched Legal Cases: ['application No. 07', 'application No. 07015003', 'application No. 05773540', 'application No. 07014575', 'application No. 05773501', 'application No. 05773501', 'application No. 2007']

Patent US7948988 - Device, system and method for analysis of fragments in a fragment train - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inAdvanced Patent SearchPatentsFragment trains in a communication network are analyzed. A fragment train includes fragments in the same fragment train and associated with the same target system. One or more fragment reassembly policies are identified out of several fragment reassembly policies, where the fragment reassembly policy...http://www.google.com/patents/US7948988?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US7948988 - Device, system and method for analysis of fragments in a fragment trainAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS7948988 B2Publication typeGrantApplication numberUS 11/493,934Publication dateMay 24, 2011Filing dateJul 27, 2006Priority dateJul 27, 2006Also published asCA2594646A1, EP1883200A1, US20080127342Publication number11493934, 493934, US 7948988 B2, US 7948988B2, US-B2-7948988, US7948988 B2, US7948988B2InventorsMartin Frederick Roesch, Judy Hollis Novak, Steven SturgesOriginal AssigneeSourcefire, Inc.Export CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (103), Non-Patent Citations (149), Classifications (6), Legal Events (1) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetDevice, system and method for analysis of fragments in a fragment trainUS 7948988 B2Abstract Fragment trains in a communication network are analyzed. A fragment train includes fragments in the same fragment train and associated with the same target system. One or more fragment reassembly policies are identified out of several fragment reassembly policies, where the fragment reassembly policy corresponds to a target system associated with fragments in a fragment train. The data in the fragments in the fragment train are provided in an order indicated by the fragment reassembly policy. The fragment reassembly policy can include determining the order responsive to an offset and a more fragments indication in the fragments, and/or indicating an order specific to overlapped fragments such as comprehensively overlapped fragments.
1. A method for analyzing fragment trains in a communication network, a fragment train including a plurality of fragments in the same fragment train and associated with a target system, comprising:
determining, in an intrusion detection/prevention system, which kind of host is associated with the target system identified in a header of the fragments in the fragment train;
reassembling, in the intrusion detection/prevention system, data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by a fragment reassembly policy selected from plural different fragment reassembly policies corresponding to different kinds of hosts based on the determined kind of host for the target system identified in the fragments in the fragment train,
the fragment reassembly policy indicating an order specific to the fragment offset field and the more fragments flag in the fragments,
when the fragment includes the more fragments flag indication, the order of the data indicated by the fragment reassembly policy is different from the order of the data when in fragments which do not include the more fragments flag indication,
the data in fragments which include the more fragments flag indication and a same fragment offset further being reassembled in a different order in the different fragment reassembly policies.
providing the reassembled fragments to the intrusion detection/prevention system.
3. The method according to claim 1, further comprising receiving the fragments in the fragment train, wherein the receiving is performed in accordance with an IP layer.
4. The method according to claim 1, the fragments being formatted according to an IP layer format, the target system identified in the header being a destination system IP address, the fragments having a same IP identification number in the header being handled as belong to the same fragment train.
a plurality of different target systems including the target system are provided, the different target systems being associated with different kinds of hosts, respective kinds of hosts being associated with respective fragment reassembly policies.
the fragment reassembly policies further indicating an order specific to comprehensively overlapped fragments,
when the data is in the comprehensively overlapped fragments, the order of the data indicated by the fragment reassembly policy is different from the order of the data when in fragments which are not comprehensively overlapped,
the data in comprehensively overlapped fragments further being reassembled in a different order in the different fragment reassembly policies.
7. A computer-readable non-transitory storage medium comprising instructions for execution by a computer, the instructions including a computer-implemented method for analyzing fragment trains in a communication network, a fragment train including a plurality of fragments in the same fragment train and associated with the same target system, where fragments can be non-overlapped, comprehensively overlapped, partially overlapped, or completely overlapped, the instructions for implementing:
determining which kind of host is associated with a target system identified in a header of the fragments in the fragment train in response to receiving the fragments; and
reassembling data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by a fragment reassembly policy selected from plural different fragment reassembly policies corresponding to different kinds of hosts based on the determined kind of host for the target system identified in the fragments in the fragment train,
the fragment reassembly policy indicating an order specific to comprehensively overlapped fragments,
8. The computer-readable storage medium according to claim 7, the instructions further comprising:
providing the reassembled fragments to an intrusion detection/prevention system.
9. The computer-readable storage medium according to claim 7, the instructions further comprising receiving the fragments in the fragment train, wherein
the receiving is performed in accordance with an IP layer.
10. The computer-readable storage medium according to claim 7, wherein
11. A computer system configured to execute all of the instructions of the computer-readable storage medium of claim 7.
12. A communication network comprising at least one computer system configured to execute all of the instructions of the computer-readable medium of claim 7.
13. A computer system for at least one of detecting and preventing intrusion, comprising: a unit configured to facilitate determining which kind of host is associated with a target system identified in a header of a plurality of fragments in a fragment train identified as belonging in a same IP packet, in response to all indication of the target system in fragments in the fragment train; a fragment reassembly unit configured to facilitate reassembling data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by a fragment reassembly policy selected from plural different fragment reassembly policies corresponding to different kinds of hosts based on the determined kind of host for the target system identified in the fragments in the fragment train, the data in the fragments belonging in the same IP packet being reassembled by the fragment reassembly unit in a different order in the different fragment reassembly policies; the fragment reassembly policies indicating an order specific to comprehensively overlapped fragments; when the data is in comprehensively overlapped fragments, the order of the data indicated by the fragment reassembly policy is different from the order of the data when in fragments which are not comprehensively overlapped, the data in comprehensively overlapped fragments further being reassembled in a different order in the different fragment reassembly policies.
14. The computer system according to claim 13, further comprising a reassembler to reassemble the fragments in the order indicated by the fragment reassembly policy.
15. The computer system according to claim 14, further comprising an intrusion detection/prevention unit to detect/prevent an intrusion in the reassembled fragments, wherein
the reassembler provides the reassembled fragments to the intrusion detection/prevention unit.
16. The computer system according to claim 13, further comprising a receiving unit configured to facilitate receiving fragments in the fragment train, wherein
the fragments are received in accordance with an IP layer.
17. The computer system according to claim 13, wherein the fragment reassembly unit further determines the order of the data in the fragments according to an IP layer format.
18. The computer system according to claim 13, wherein
a plurality of target systems including the target system are provided, the target system being associated with a kind of host, respective kinds of host corresponding to respective fragment reassembly policies, and
the fragment reassembly policy which is identified corresponds to the kind of host associated with the target system.
19. The computer system according to claim 13, the fragment reassembly policies indicating an order of the fragments specific to a more fragments flag and a fragment offset field in the header of the fragment,
20. The computer system according to claim 13,
the fragment reassembly policies indicating an order specific to comprehensively overlapped fragments, and specific to a more fragments flag and a fragment offset field in the header of the fragment,
when the data is in comprehensively overlapped fragments, the order of the data indicated by the fragment reassembly policy is different from the order of the data when in fragments which are not comprehensively overlapped,
the data in comprehensively overlapped fragments further being reassembled in a different order in the different fragment reassembly policies,
21. The computer readable medium according to claim 7, the fragment reassembly policies calling for honoring the fragment differently depending on whether or not the fragment is left-anchored,
when the fragment is left-anchored, the order of the data in the fragments as indicated by the fragment reassembly policy is different from the order of the data when in fragments which are not left-anchored,
the data in fragments which are left-anchored further being reassembled in a different order in the different fragment reassembly policies,
the fragment being deemed as left-anchored only when the fragment directly abuts a previous original fragment.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates in general to network traffic analysis, and more specifically to analyzing fragments in a fragment train, optionally in connection with intrusion detection/prevention.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION The Internet protocol (IP) layer protocol utilized in packet network communications allows an IP packet to be separated en route into smaller fragments which are ultimately sent to the destination, referred to herein as the target system. Each fragment still belongs to the original IP packet, and can be reassembled by the target system to re-create the original IP packet.
Different kinds of operating systems have unique methods of fragment reassembly. These methods of reassembling fragments can be exploited by attackers. In their landmark 1998 paper, �Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection,� Thomas Ptacek and Timothy Newsham exposed some weaknesses in intrusion detection systems (IDS). The authors revealed that an IDS cannot be effective and accurate because it does not necessarily process or even observe network traffic exactly as the destination host that receives the message does.
If an IDS utilizes a single reassembly method, it may not reassemble and process the packets in the same way that the destination system does. Consequently, an attack that successfully exploits these differences in fragment reassembly can cause the IDS to miss the malicious traffic.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Accordingly, one or more embodiments of the present invention provide methods, systems, and computer readable mediums for analyzing fragment trains in a communication network. A fragment train includes multiple fragments in the same fragment train which are associated with the same target system. The method includes identifying at least one fragment reassembly policy of plural fragment reassembly policies, the at least one fragment reassembly policy corresponding to a target system associated with fragments in a fragment train. The method also includes providing data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy, the at least one fragment reassembly policy including determining the order responsive to an offset and a more fragments indication in the fragments.
Another embodiment provides a computer-readable medium comprising instructions for execution by a computer. The instructions include a computer-implemented method for analyzing fragment trains in a communication network, a fragment train including multiple fragments in the same fragment train and associated with the same target system, where fragments can be non-overlapped, comprehensively overlapped, partially overlapped, or completely overlapped. The instructions implement identifying at least one fragment reassembly policy of plural fragment reassembly policies, the at least one fragment reassembly policy corresponding to a target system associated with fragments in a fragment train. The instructions also implement providing data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy, the at least one fragment reassembly policy indicating an order specific to at least comprehensively overlapped fragments.
Yet another embodiment provides a computer system for at least one of detecting and preventing intrusion. The computer system includes a unit configured to facilitate determining a kind of host associated with a target system, in response to an indication of the target system in fragments in a fragment train. Also included is a fragment reassembly unit configured to facilitate identifying at least one fragment reassembly policy of plural fragment reassembly policies, the at least one fragment reassembly policy corresponding to the kind of host associated with the fragments in the fragment train. The computer system also includes an order providing unit configured to facilitate providing data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The accompanying figures, where like reference numerals refer to identical or functionally similar elements and which together with the detailed description below are incorporated in and form part of the specification, serve to further illustrate various exemplary embodiments and to explain various principles and advantages in accordance with the present invention.
FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a simplified and representative environment associated with fragment train analysis;
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating non-overlapping fragments in a fragment train;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating overlapping fragments in a fragment train;
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating fragments with a more fragments indication, in a fragment train;
FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a first analysis of a sequence of fragments in the fragment train corresponding to FIG. 4;
FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a second analysis of the sequence of fragments in the fragment train corresponding to FIG. 4;
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a third analysis of the sequence of the fragments in the fragment train corresponding to FIG. 4;
FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating a prior art model for analyzing overlapping fragments;
FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating a model for analyzing overlapping fragments, including comprehensively overlapping fragments;
FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating portions of an exemplary computer system;
FIG. 11 is a block diagram illustrating IP layer processing;
FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating portions of a fragment;
FIG. 13 is a flow chart illustrating an exemplary procedure for analyzing fragment trains with a more fragments flag; and
FIG. 14 is a flow chart illustrating an exemplary procedure for analyzing fragment trains with overlapped fragments.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION In overview, the present disclosure concerns analysis of network traffic on communication networks, often referred to as packet switching networks, which support communication from wireless and/or wire line devices to a target system. Such communication networks may forward communication packets which have been broken into fragments. More particularly, various inventive concepts and principles are embodied in systems, devices, and methods therein for analyzing fragments, optionally in connection with intrusion detection/prevention systems.
Even though a problem with fragment analysis was identified by Ptacek and Newsham, many problems still exist in analyzing fragments. As further discussed herein, various inventive principles and combinations thereof are advantageously employed to improve analysis of fragments. The analysis of fragments can consider the operating system and applications on the target system, so that traffic sent to the target system can be analyzed in the same manner as the target system itself analyzes the traffic. This can reduce false positives about irrelevant alerts, such as an exploit specific to a WINDOWS operating system bound for a host running a UNIX operating system. Moreover, deliberately mangled packets are less likely to dupe the intrusion detection/prevention system.
Further in accordance with exemplary embodiments, the problems posed by overlapping fragments can be solved by reassembling overlapping fragments in the same manner as the target system happens to assemble fragments. Fragmentation reassembly policies can be provided, corresponding to target systems and/or the kinds of hosts associated with target systems. Thus, the fragment analysis can apply the appropriate one of the reassembly policies depending on the target system. The fragment analysis can handle all types of overlapping fragments, thereby reducing evasion attacks that use overlapping fragments. Moreover, the fragment analysis can interpret multiple fragments in a fragment train in the same manner as the target system, even when the multiple fragments are not properly indicated.
Referring to FIG. 1, a diagram illustrating a simplified and representative environment associated with fragment train analysis will be discussed and described. In the illustration, an intruder 101 (such as a computer system) transmits a communication including a packet to a target system 109. In this example, the packet is transmitted via a network 103, a router 105, and a firewall 107 to the target system 109. The communications to the target system 109 can be monitored with well known techniques by an intrusion detection/prevention system 111. Although this illustration provides a sensor behind the firewall 107, the sensor can be provided anywhere before the target system 109. Alternatively, the intrusion detection/prevention system 111 can be provided in-line with the target system 109, or can be incorporated into the target system 109.
A packet can be divided at the Internet protocol (�IP�) layer into fragments in accordance with known techniques, which are then sent to the target system 109, and the target system reassembles the fragments into the packet. The order in which the target system 109 reassembles fragments is a by-product of the fragment processing in the particular operating system on the target system 109. The method in which fragments are reassembled by a particular system can be exploited by the intruder 101. Note that although this illustration assumes an intruder 101 sending packets or fragments, fragments or packets that are analyzed can be sent from anywhere.
The process of creating fragments is discussed for example in connection with FIG. 2, and overlapping fragments are generally discussed in connection with FIG. 3. A detailed discussion of types of overlapping fragments is provided in connection with FIG. 8 and FIG. 9. In addition, the process of creating fragments utilizes a �more fragments� indication, to indicate whether or not there are additional fragments. FIG. 4-FIG. 7 discuss example issues related to the analysis of multiple no more fragments indications. Overlapping fragments and/or multiple no more fragments indications are handled differently by different kinds of hosts.
Referring to FIG. 2, a diagram illustrating non-overlapping fragments in a fragment train 201 will be discussed and described. Here, an IP packet created at the IP layer has been divided into fragments 203, 205, 207. Each fragment is provided with its own header including information identifying the original IP packet as well as the location of the fragment's data in the original IP packet. The fragments 203, 205, 207 belong in the same fragment train, which can be reassembled to recreate the data in the original IP packet.
In this illustration, the fragments 203, 205, 207 are received in sequence. The first fragment 203 includes bytes 0-7, the second fragment includes bytes 8-15 and the third fragment includes bytes 16-23. (Headers are omitted for clarity.) Thus, the reassembly of the fragments is straightforward and typically is handled properly.
Referring to FIG. 3, a diagram illustrating overlapping fragments in a fragment train 301 will be discussed and described. FIG. 3 illustrates the same original IP packet as in FIG. 2, which is divided into different fragments 303, 305, 307. In this example, the first fragment 303 includes bytes 0-7, and the second fragment includes bytes 8-23. The third fragment includes bytes 0-15, and overlaps both the first and second fragments. These packets are ostensibly in the same fragment train.
A WINDOWS system, for example, will reassemble the first fragment 303 and the second fragment 305, whereas a CISCO system will reassemble the third fragment 307 and bytes 16-23 from the second fragment 305. Suppose that an intruder intends to evade the intrusion detection/prevention system by sending overlapping fragments that different in content. In order for an intrusion detection/prevention system to detect/prevent the attack, it should analyze the fragments as they will be reassembled by the target system.
Although this is a simple illustration of overlapping fragments, fragment reassembly can be complicated by considerations such as the location of the overlap of the fragments, discussed in connection with FIG. 8 and FIG. 9.
A discussion of the complications presented by the use of the more fragments indication is provided in connection with FIG. 4-FIG. 7. FIG. 4 illustrates fragments in a fragment train where two or more fragments each purport to be the last fragment, and FIG. 5-FIG. 7 illustrate the reassembly of a particular sequence of the fragments of FIG. 4, according to a WINDOWS 2000 system, a CISCO system, and a SOLARIS 10 system, respectively.
Referring to FIG. 4, a diagram illustrating fragments with a more fragments indication in a fragment train will be discussed and described. In this example, the content of the original IP packet is �AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDD�. The packet is divided into four fragments P1, P2, P3, P4 with the content of, respectively, �AAAAAA,� �BBBBBBBB,� �CCCCCCCC,� and �DDDDDDDD.�
Each of the fragments P1, P2, P3, P4 can include an indication that there are multiple fragments in the fragment train. Further, the last fragment in a fragment train can be indicated. Conventional techniques call for the fragments to set a �more fragments� flag for all but the last fragment. Here, the first and third fragments P1, P3 have the �more fragments� flag set, and the second and fourth fragments P2, P4 do not have the �more fragments� flag set. Hence, there is an error in the more fragments indication.
Different operating systems accept or reject particular fragments where there are multiple potential last fragments. In addition, different operating systems may accept different numbers of multiple last fragments.
FIG. 5-FIG. 7 examine how the fragment train is reassembled according to various systems. In each of these examples, the sequence of fragments from FIG. 4 is received in the order P2, P4, P1, P3.
Referring to FIG. 5, a diagram illustrating a first analysis of a sequence of fragments in the fragment train corresponding to FIG. 4 will be discussed and described. A WINDOWS 2000 system will reassemble each of the fragments in this sequence in the order, �AAAAAAAA,� �BBBBBBBB,� �CCCCCCCC,� �DDDDDDDD.� Therefore, the original IP packet will be recreated as �AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDD.�
Referring to FIG. 6, a diagram illustrating a second analysis of the sequence of fragments in the fragment train corresponding to FIG. 4 will be discussed and described. A CISCO system will reassemble the fragments in the order �AAAAAAAA,� �BBBBBBBB,� �CCCCCCCC,� and will drop the fourth fragment P4 with the content �DDDDDDDD.� Therefore, the content of the reassembled packet is �AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCC.� The CISCO system thus handled the multiple �more fragments� indications by dropping the last fragment in the fragment train.
Referring to FIG. 7, a diagram illustrating a third analysis of the sequence of the fragments in the fragment train corresponding to FIG. 4 will be discussed and described. A SOLARIS 10 system will reassemble the fragments in the order �AAAAAA,� �BBBBBBBB,� and �DDDDDDDD,� as bytes 0-7, 8-15 and 24-31, respectively. It will drop the third fragment P3 with the content �CCCCCCCC.� The content of the reassembled packet is �AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBDDDDDDDD.� The SOLARIS 10 system thus dealt with the multiple �more fragments� indications by dropping the last received fragment.
Consider the following additional examples of reassembly, where the sequence of fragments in the fragment train of FIG. 4 is received in the order P4-P2-P1-P3. The reassembled packet is �AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDD� for the FREEBSD 5.1 operating system, the SOLARIS 10 operating system, and the OPENBSD 3.6 operating system. For the CISCO operating system, the reassembled packet is �AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBCCCCCCCC.� the LINUX 2.2 operating system, LINUS 2.4 operating system, WINDOWS 2000 operating system AND the WINDOWS XP operating system do not honor the incoming fragments, perhaps recognizing that these fragments have errors.
According to one or more embodiments, a plurality of target systems including the target system are provided, the target system being associated with a kind of host, respective kinds of host being associated with respective fragment reassembly policies, and the at least one fragment reassembly policy which is identified is associated with the kind of host associated with the target system.
Fragment reassembly is complicated by the location of the overlap of the fragments, discussed in connection with FIG. 8 and FIG. 9. The discussion of FIG. 8 is an analysis by the inventors of the types of overlapping fragments recognized by Vern Paxson and Umesh Shankar (�Paxson/Shankar�); the discussion of FIG. 9 recognizes additional types of overlapping fragments. In both FIG. 8 and FIG. 9, the �original fragments� are the fragments that arrived first, and the �overlapping fragments� are the fragments that arrived after the original fragments. The offset indicates the byte displacement of the fragment. The offsets in FIG. 9 assume that it is a continuation of the fragments in FIG. 8.
Referring to FIG. 8, a diagram illustrating a prior art model for analyzing overlapping fragments will be discussed and described. In the paper titled �Active Mapping: Resisting NIDS Evasion Without Altering Traffic,� authors Vern Paxson and Umesh Shankar discuss fragmentation techniques as a means of evading intrusion detection systems. A test of the Paxson/Shankar model reveals five different fragment reassembly methods: (1) BSD operating system favors an original fragment with an offset that is less than or equal to a subsequent fragment; (2) BSD-right operating system favors a subsequent fragment when the original fragment has an offset that is less than or equal to the subsequent offset; (3) LINUX operating system favors an original fragment with an offset that is less than a subsequent fragment; (4) First favors the original fragment with a given offset; and (5) Last favors the subsequent fragment with a given offset.
Testing of the Paxson/Shankar model reveals that Paxson/Shankar considered some, but not all, types of overlapped fragments: (1) a fragment that is wholly overlapped by a subsequent fragment with an identical offset and length (�completely overlapped�); (2) a fragment that is partially overlapped by a subsequent fragment with an offset greater than the original (�partially overlapped�); and (3) a fragment that is partially overlapped by a subsequent fragment with an offset less than the original (�partially overlapped�).
In FIG. 8, there are six different fragments, with each illustrated box representing an 8-byte chunk of a fragment. Chunks 1A, 1B, 1C represent a first fragment; chunks 2A, 2B represent a second fragment; chunks 3A, 3B, 3C represent a third fragment, chunks 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D represent a fourth fragment; chunks 5A, 5B, 4C represent a fifth fragment; and chunks 6A, 6B, 6C represent a sixth fragment.
In FIG. 8, the fifth fragment 5A, 5B, 5C completely overlaps the third fragment 3A, 3B, 3C. They both start at the same offset, 48, and are the same length, 24 bytes long. Hence, the third and fifth fragments illustrate an overlap of the type referred to herein as a �completely overlapping fragment,� or a complete overlap.
The fourth fragment 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D partially overlaps the first fragment 1A, 1B, 1C. The offset of the fourth fragment starts after the first fragment and the length of the fourth fragment is such that it ends after the first fragment. The fourth fragment 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D also partially overlaps the second fragment 2A, 2B. The fourth fragment starts before the second fragment and ends before the second fragment. The fourth fragment illustrates overlaps of the type referred to herein as a �partially overlapping fragment,� or a �partial overlap.�
Also illustrated in FIG. 8 is a fragment of the type referred to herein as a �non-overlapping fragment,� or a �non-overlap.� The offset and length of the sixth fragment 6A, 6B, 6C are such that it does not have any overlap with any subsequent or previous fragment.
The model illustrated in FIG. 8, however, is incomplete since it does not provide for all different combinations of fragment placement. For example, it never considers a subsequent fragment with a starting offset greater than the original fragment and an ending offset less than the original fragment. WINDOWS and SOLARIS operating systems reassemble this particular example differently. Consequently, other types of overlapping fragments must be considered.
Referring to FIG. 9, a diagram illustrating a model for analyzing overlapping fragments including comprehensively overlapping fragments will be discussed and described. FIG. 9 provides an illustration of various comprehensively overlapped fragments. This model adds original fragment 3.1 (including chunk 3.1A), original fragment 3.2 (including chunks 3.2A, 3.2B), original fragment 3.3 (including chunks 3.3A, 3.3B, 3.3C), original fragment 3.4 (including chunks 3.4A, 3.4B), fragment 3.5 (including chunks 3.5A, 3.5B) and fragment 3.6, all of which immediately follow original fragments 1-3 illustrated in FIG. 8. This model also uses subsequent fragment 6 (including chunks 6A, 6B, 6C), fragment 7 (including chunks 7A, 7B, 7C), fragment 8, fragment 9, fragment 10, and fragment 11 (including chunks 11A, 11B), all of which follow subsequent fragments 4-6 illustrated in FIG. 8.
Fragments which are referred to herein as �comprehensively overlapping fragments,� or �comprehensive overlap,� include those where the offset and length of the data of one of the overlapped fragments is such that the data is comprehended (i.e., encompassed) by data of the other overlapped fragment; however, �comprehensive overlap� does not include the case where the offset and length are identical.
The �comprehensively overlapped fragments� include the following examples: the original fragment starts before the subsequent fragment and ends after the subsequent fragment (e.g., fragment 3.3 and fragment 8); the original fragment starts before the subsequent fragment and ends the same as the subsequent fragment (e.g., fragment 3.4 and fragment 9); the original fragment starts the same as the subsequent fragment and ends after the subsequent fragment (e.g., fragment 3.5 and fragment 10); the original fragment starts the same as the subsequent fragment and ends before the subsequent fragment (e.g., fragment 3.6 and fragment 11); the original fragment starts after the subsequent fragment and ends before the subsequent fragment (e.g., fragment 3.1 and fragment 6); and the original fragment starts after the subsequent fragment and ends the same as the subsequent fragment (e.g., fragment 3.2 and fragment 7).
Utilizing the model of FIG. 9, at least seven different fragment reassembly policies for example can be formulated: (1) BSD operating system favors an original fragment with an offset that is less than or equal to a subsequent fragment; (2) BSD-right operating system favors a subsequent fragment when the original fragment has an offset that is less than or equal to the subsequent offset, except when the original fragment ends at the same or greater offset than the subsequent fragment; in this case, BSD-right favors the original fragment; (3) LINUX operating system favors an original fragment with an offset that is less than a subsequent fragment; (4) First favors the original fragment with a given offset; (5) WINDOWS operating system favors the original fragment, except if a subsequent fragment offset begins before the original fragment and ends after the original fragment; in this case, WINDOWS operating system favors the subsequent fragment; (6) SOLARIS operating system favors the original fragment except if a subsequent fragment offset begins before the original fragment and ends at an offset equal to or greater than the original fragment; in this case, SOLARIS operating system favors the subsequent fragment; and (7) Last favors the subsequent fragment with a given offset. The �First� and �Last� reassembly policies are theoretical, since no available test system responded as expected.
Other reassembly policies can be formulated which take into consideration one or more of the comprehensively overlapped fragments. For example, a reassembly policy might call for ignoring comprehensively overlapping packets, which appears to be appropriate for current CISCO operating systems. As another example, a reassembly policy might call for honoring original or subsequent fragments differently when an original fragment starts after and ends before a subsequent fragment, depending on whether the original fragment does or does not directly abut a previous original fragment (left-anchored vs. non-left-anchored). In this case, WINDOWS honors a subsequent fragment over an original non-left-anchored fragment (i.e., fragments 6 and 3.1, respectively), but honors an original left-anchored fragment over a subsequent fragment (not illustrated). Various implementations can include a combination of any and/or all of the reassembly policies, where at least one of the policies has a different analysis for comprehensively overlapped fragments.
A reassembly policy utilized by a particular type of target system can be observed, for example, by using an ICMP echo request (or other echo back application) with a unique payload that, when reflected in the returned ICMP echo response, can determine the fragmentation reassembly policy. A specific reassembly policy can be validated through active or passive scanners.
Accordingly, one or more embodiments provide that the fragments can be one of non-overlapped, comprehensively overlapped, partially overlapped, and completely overlapped, and the at least one fragment reassembly policy indicates an order specific to at least comprehensively overlapped fragments.
Referring to FIG. 10, a block diagram illustrating portions of an exemplary computer system 1001 will be discussed and described. The computer system 1001 may include one or more controllers 1005, which can receive signals from a sensor 1003 which senses communications from a network 1035 in accordance with known techniques, where the communications are being sent to a target system (not illustrated). The controller 1005 can include a processor 1007, a memory 1013, an optional display 1009, and/or an optional user input device such as a keyboard 1011.
The processor 1007 may comprise one or more microprocessors and/or one or more digital signal processors. The memory 1013 may be coupled to the processor 1007 and may comprise a read-only memory (ROM), a random-access memory (RAM), a programmable ROM (PROM), and/or an electrically erasable read-only memory (EEPROM). The memory 1013 may include multiple memory locations for storing, among other things, an operating system, data and variables 1015 for programs executed by the processor 1007; computer programs for causing the processor to operate in connection with various functions such as receiving 1017 fragments in a fragment train, determining 1019 a kind of host associated with the target system, identifying 1021 the fragment reassembly policy corresponding to the kind of host, providing 1023 data in the fragments in the order indicated by the fragment reassembly policy, reassembling 1025 the fragments in the order, an intrusion detection/prevention unit 1027, and/or other processing; a fragment reassembly policy database 1029; a kind of host database 1031; and a database 1033 for other information used by the processor 1007. The computer programs may be stored, for example, in ROM or PROM and may direct the processor 1007 in controlling the operation of the computer system 1001.
The processor 1007 optionally may be programmed for receiving 1017 fragments in a fragment train. In the illustrated example, fragments are detected by the sensor 1003 connected to the computer system 1001 and are supplied to the computer system 1001 in accordance with known techniques.
The processor 1007 may be programmed for determining 1019 a kind of host associated with the target system. In the typical situation, the target system is identified in the fragment, for example as the destination IP address. A kind of host database or table can be maintained for known target systems, which indicates the kind of host associated with a particular target system. The kind of host database or table can be created, for example by manual configuration or by querying certain target systems. Thus, the kind of host database or table can be referenced based on the target system identification to determine the associated kind of host. Alternatively, the fragment can include an indication of the kind of host. The kind of host indicates an operating system/platform and optionally a version, for example, HP JetDirect, AIX 2, FreeBSD, HP-UX B10.20, IRIX 4.0, NCD Thin Clients, OpenBSD, Open VMS, OS/2, OSF1, SunOS 4.1.4, Tru64, LINUX 2.x, MAC OS, WINDOWS 2000, WINDOWS XP, CISCO IOS, etc. The kind of host is intended to distinguish between platforms and/or operating systems that reassemble fragments differently.
In addition, the processor 1007 may be programmed for identifying 1021 the fragment reassembly policy corresponding to the kind of host. Having determined the kind of host, an appropriate fragment reassembly policy can be determined. A particular fragment reassembly policy can be applied in connection with one or more kinds of host. Advantageously, a table or database can indicate one of several fragment reassembly policies to be applied for the particular kind of host. In the illustrated example, the fragment reassembly policy database 1029 includes two or more fragment reassembly policies, which can be indexed, for example by the kind of host.
Once the fragment reassembly policy is identified, the processor 1007 can provide 1023 data in the fragments in the order indicated by the fragment reassembly policy. The data can be provided, for example, by parsing the received fragments, by accumulating data from the fragments in storage in the order, or by data from the fragments being provided as input for another process (for example the intrusion detection/prevention unit 1027). For example, the processor 1007 can be programmed to handle the data in the fragments according to one or more of the policies and orders discussed in connection with FIG. 9, and/or FIG. 8.
Optionally, the processor 1007 may be programmed for specifically reassembling 1025 the fragments in the order. This can be done by storing the data from the fragments, in the order, in a storage location, to recreate the packet. The recreated packet can be provided for further processing, for example, to the intrusion detection/prevention unit 1027 The optional intrusion detection/prevention unit 1027 in the processor 1007 can be programmed in accordance with known techniques, to evaluate whether the fragments (in the proper order) suggest an attempted intrusion. The intrusion detection/prevention unit 1027 is illustrated as being incorporated into the computer system 1001; alternate embodiments can provide that some or all of the intrusion detection/prevention functions are in one or more different computer systems. Further, alternate embodiments provide that the intrusion detection/prevention unit 1027 is a host IDS or host IPS; thus the computer system can be the target system.
The processor 1007 may be programmed for a fragment reassembly policy database 1029. The fragment reassembly policy database 1029 can include two or more fragment reassembly policies. Alternatively, separate code can be provided for implementing the different fragment reassembly policies. The fragment reassembly policy database 1029 alternatively can be stored in a remote database and accessed as needed.
The processor 1007 may be programmed for a kind of host database 1031. The kind of host database 1031 can be maintained for known target systems, to indicate the kind of host associated with a particular target system. Optionally, the kind of host database 1031 can be maintained remotely, and relevant kind of host information can be downloaded as needed. Optionally, the kind of host can be indicated in a table rather than a database.
Accordingly one or more embodiments provide a computer system for at least one of detecting and preventing intrusion. The computer system can include (A) a unit configured to facilitate determining a kind of host associated with a target system, in response to an indication of the target system in fragments in a fragment train; (B) a fragment reassembly unit configured to facilitate identifying at least one fragment reassembly policy of plural fragment reassembly policies, the at least one fragment reassembly policy corresponding to the kind of host associated with the fragments in the fragment train; and (C) an order providing unit configured to facilitate providing data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy.
One or more embodiments can include a reassembler to reassemble the fragments in the order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy. Also, one or more embodiments can include an intrusion detection/prevention unit to detect/prevent an intrusion in the reassembled fragments, wherein the reassembler provides the reassembled fragments to the intrusion detection/prevention unit.
According to one or more embodiments, a receiving unit is configured to facilitate receiving fragments in the fragment train, wherein the fragments are received in accordance with an IP layer (discussed below). Moreover, according to one or more embodiments, the order providing unit further determines the order of the data in the fragments according to an IP layer format (discussed below). Furthermore, one or more embodiments can provide that the target system is indicated in a header of the fragments.
Also, accordingly to various embodiments, a plurality of target systems including the target system are provided, the target system being associated with a kind of host, respective kinds of host corresponding to respective fragment reassembly policies, and the at least one fragment reassembly policy which is identified corresponds to the kind of host associated with the target system.
It should be understood that various logical groupings of functions are described herein. Different realizations may omit one or more of these logical groupings. Likewise, in various realizations, functions may be grouped differently, combined, or augmented. Furthermore, functions including those identified as optional can be omitted from various realizations. Similarly, the present description may describe or suggest a database or collection of data and information. One or more embodiments can provide that the database or collection of data and information can be distributed, combined, or augmented, or provided locally (as illustrated) and/or remotely (not illustrated).
FIG. 11 and FIG. 12 illustrate relevant conventions associated with IP layer processing. FIG. 11 illustrates IP layer processing, and FIG. 12 illustrates relevant portions of a fragment in IP layer format.
Referring to FIG. 11, a block diagram illustrating IP layer processing will be discussed and described. This example illustrates a data link layer 1101, an IP layer 1103, a transport layer 1105, and an application layer 1107. A packet is received and processed in accordance with known means at the various layers. For example, an incoming packet is initially received at the data link layer; passed to the IP layer; and then sequentially passed to layers above for additional processing. Conventions associated with the data link layer 1101, the IP layer 1103, the transport layer 1105 and the application layer 1107, and the like are well known. In particular, conventions for formats of packets and of packet fragments in accordance with the IP layer are well known.
Referring to FIG. 12, a block diagram illustrating portions of a fragment will be discussed and described. The illustrated fragment is an IP fragment, that is, a fragment of a packet formatted according to the IP layer. The fragment includes a header 1211 and IP data 1209. The header 1211 includes an IP identification number 1201, a more fragments indication 1203, a fragment offset 1205, and an indication of the target system 1207.
When a packet is created in accordance with conventional IP layer processing, the packet is provided with the IP identification number 1201. When the IP packet is separated into fragments, each fragment still belongs to the original IP packet and conventionally includes the IP identification number 1201. A fragment train can be identified by fragments which have the same IP identification number.
The more fragments indication 1203 is inserted when the IP packet is split into fragments, in accordance with known techniques. If the more fragments indication 1203 is not set, that typically indicates that the fragment is the last fragment in the IP packet. The fragment offset 1205 is included in the packet to indicate the offset of the data in the original IP packet.
The target system 1207 uniquely identifies the destination for the IP packet. The target system 1207 conventionally is the destination system IP address.
Accordingly, one or more embodiments provide that the fragments are formatted according to an IP layer format. Moreover, one or more embodiments provide that the target system is indicated in a header of the fragments.
FIG. 13 and FIG. 14 are flow charts of procedures for analyzing fragment trains. FIG. 13 specifically handles the more fragments indication, and FIG. 14 specifically handles comprehensively overlapped fragments. Although these are illustrated as separate procedures, it will be appreciated that a procedure can handle both the more fragments indication and the comprehensively overlapped fragments. These procedures can advantageously be implemented on, for example, a processor of a controller, described in connection with FIG. 10 or other apparatus appropriately arranged. FIGS. 13 and 14 are discussed in more detail below.
Referring to FIG. 13, a flow chart illustrating an exemplary procedure 1301 for analyzing fragment trains with a more fragments flag will be discussed and described. In overview, the procedure 1301 includes receiving 1303 fragments in a fragment train, identifying 1305 a fragment reassembly policy corresponding to a target system associated with the fragment, providing data 1307 in the fragments in the order according to the fragment reassembly policy including handling the more fragments indication, and receiving 1311 fragments in the next fragment train. Optionally, the procedure 1301 can include reassembling 1309 the fragments in the order and providing to an intrusion detection/prevention system. These are described below, however, details which have previously been described are omitted.
The procedure includes receiving 1303 fragments in a fragment train. The fragments can be received in accordance with known techniques. In addition to receiving fragments within a fragment train out of order, it is possible that fragments for different fragment trains can be received out of order. Multiple fragment trains optionally can be stored while being received, according to conventional technology. Because fragments and fragment trains are not necessarily received in order, it will be appreciated that the reception of fragments and the process for providing the data in the fragments and/or reassembling the fragments can be handled asynchronously.
When a fragment train is received, the procedure provides for identifying 1305 a fragment reassembly policy corresponding to a target system associated with the fragment. For example, the target system can be determined from the fragment header, the kind of host associated with the target system can be determined (as described above), and the fragment reassembly policy for the kind of host can be determined (as described above). Alternatively, the target system can be determined from the fragment header, and the fragment reassembly policy for the target system can be determined (as described above). As another alternative, the IP header can indicate the fragment reassembly policy.
Then, the procedure can include providing the data 1307 in the fragments in the fragment train in the order according to the fragment reassembly policy, where the fragment reassembly policy includes determining the order based on the fragment offset and the more fragments indication in the fragments. This has been described above in detail.
Optionally, the procedure 1301 can include reassembling 1309 the fragments in the order and providing to an intrusion detection/prevention system. Each of these is described above in detail.
Having handled a fragment train, the procedure can provide for receiving 1311 fragments in the next fragment train.
Accordingly, one or more embodiments provides a method for analyzing fragment trains in a communication network, a fragment train including a plurality of fragments in the same fragment train and associated with the same target system, comprising: (A) identifying at least one fragment reassembly policy of plural fragment reassembly policies, the at least one fragment reassembly policy corresponding to a target system associated with fragments in a fragment train; and (B) providing data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy, the at least one fragment reassembly policy including determining the order responsive to an offset and a more fragments indication in the fragments.
Accordingly, one or more embodiments includes reassembling the fragments in the order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy; and providing the reassembled fragments to an intrusion detection/prevention system.
Moreover, one or more embodiments provides for receiving the fragments in the fragment train, wherein the receiving is performed in accordance with an IP layer.
Referring to FIG. 14, a flow chart illustrating an exemplary procedure 1401 for analyzing fragment trains with overlapped fragments will be discussed and described. In overview, the procedure 1401 includes receiving 1403 fragments in a fragment train, identifying 1405 a fragment reassembly policy corresponding to a target system associated with the fragment, providing data 1407 in the fragments in the order according to the fragment reassembly policy including handling comprehensively overlapped fragments, and receiving 1411 fragments in the next fragment train. Optionally, the procedure 1401 can include reassembling 1409 the fragments in the order and providing them to an intrusion detection/prevention system. Details which have previously been described are omitted. Furthermore, much of FIG. 14 is similar to FIG. 13; to avoid repetition, reference is made back to FIG. 13 where appropriate.
The procedure includes receiving 1403 fragments in a fragment train, as described in connection with FIG. 13. When a fragment train is received, the procedure provides for identifying 1405 a fragment reassembly policy corresponding to a target system associated with the fragment, also as described in FIG. 13.
Then, the procedure can include providing the data 1407 in the fragments in the fragment train in the order according to the fragment reassembly policy, where the order is specific to comprehensively overlapped fragments. Optionally, the order can handle partially overlapped fragments and/or completely overlapped fragments. This has been described above in detail.
Optionally, the procedure 1401 can include reassembling 1409 the fragments in the order, and/or providing to an intrusion detection/prevention system. Each of these is described above in detail. Having handled a fragment train, the procedure can provide for receiving 1411 fragments in the next fragment train.
Accordingly, one or more embodiments provides for a computer-readable medium comprising instructions for execution by a computer, the instructions including a computer-implemented method for analyzing fragment trains in a communication network, a fragment train including a plurality of fragments in the same fragment train and associated with the same target system, where fragments can be non-overlapped, comprehensively overlapped, partially overlapped, or completely overlapped. The instructions are for implementing (A) identifying at least one fragment reassembly policy of plural fragment reassembly policies, the at least one fragment reassembly policy corresponding to a target system associated with fragments in a fragment train; and (B) providing data in the fragments in the fragment train in an order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy, the at least one fragment reassembly policy indicating an order specific to at least comprehensively overlapped fragments. One or more embodiments further includes instructions for reassembling the fragments in the order indicated by the at least one fragment reassembly policy; and providing the reassembled fragments to an intrusion detection/prevention system. Furthermore, one or more embodiments includes instructions for receiving the fragments in the fragment train, wherein the receiving is performed in accordance with an IP layer, and the providing data in the fragments includes applying an IP layer format to the fragments. Optionally, one or more embodiments provides a plurality of target systems including the target system, the target system being associated with a kind of host, respective kinds of host being associated with respective fragment reassembly policies, and the at least one fragment reassembly policy which is identified is associated with the kind of host associated with the target system.
Moreover, embodiments include a computer system configured with the foregoing computer-readable medium and/or method(s); and/or a communication network comprising at least one computer system configured with the foregoing computer-readable medium and/or method(s).
It should be noted that the communication networks of interest include those that transmit information in packets which can be formed into fragments, for example, those known as packet switching networks that transmit data in the form of packets, where data can be divided into packets before transmission, the packets are transmitted, and the packets are routed over network infrastructure devices which can fragment the packets, which are sent to a destination where the fragments are reassembled into the packets. Such networks include, by way of example, the Internet, intranets, local area networks (LAN), wireless LANs (WLAN), wide area networks (WAN), and others. Protocols supporting communication networks that utilize packets include one or more of various networking protocols having any link layers that support IP, or any application or transport that rides over IP, for example TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol), and other wireless application protocols or wireline application protocols and/or other protocol structures, and variants and evolutions thereof. Such networks can provide wireless communications capability and/or utilize wireline connections such as cable and/or a connector, or similar.
Furthermore, the designation �intrusion detection/prevention system� is used herein to denote a device or software that passively or actively analyzes network traffic for intrusion. Examples of such devices or software are sometimes referred to as �intrusion detection system� (IDS), �intrusion prevention system� (IPS), �network intrusion detection system� (NIDS), �network intrusion protection system� (NIPS�), and the like, and variants or evolutions thereof. An intrusion detection/prevention system may be host-based, or may monitor traffic to a target system using, for example, sensors, anywhere between the target system and the intruder, typically after a final router or firewall. The designation �intrusion detection/prevention� is used herein to indicate the analysis of network traffic with respect to intrusion, whether the analysis is used passively (commonly referred to as �intrusion detection�) or actively (commonly referred to as �intrusion prevention�). Likewise, the designation �detect/prevent� is utilized to indicate either passive or active handling of intrusion, which may occur for example in an IDS, an IPS, or other software or device which incorporates an IDS or IPS function.
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