Source: http://book.wolterskluwer.pl/x_C_I__PT_40110400__LL_0__PZTA_0E__UPT_40484303.html
Timestamp: 2020-06-02 15:29:29+00:00
Document Index: 27806777

Matched Legal Cases: ['de lege ferenda', 'art. 33', 'art. 5', 'SK 32/14 ', 'art. 64', 'SK 33/10 ', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 5', 'Art. 33', 'Art. 33', 'Art. 26', 'Art. 33', 'SK 32/14 ', 'Art. 64', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 12', 'Art. 12', 'de lege ferenda']

Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace z Prawa Własności Intelektualnej - Zeszyt 136
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Mem internetowy a definicja utworu w prawie autorskim. Próba analizy
Wolność panoramy w perspektywie porównawczej - Polska, Niemcy i Francja
System zatwierdzania tabel wynagrodzeń za korzystanie z utworów lub przedmiotów praw pokrewnych - wybrane postulaty de lege ferenda
Anna Chorążewska, Tomasz Bielesz
Konstytucyjna zasada państwa prawa a Prawo autorskie z 1952 r. (studium przypadku)
Liberatarianizm wobec prawa własności intelektualnej
Jedną z manifestacji działalności aktywnych internautów jest tworzenie memów internetowych. Choć zwykło traktować się je jako formę obrazkowego żartu, niejednokrotnie są jednak czymś więcej - prostą, lecz uniwersalną formą komunikacji, przekazywania idei lub opinii. Specyficzny sposób tworzenia memów (wykorzystanie różnych, przeważnie cudzych, materiałów) oraz ich rozpowszechniania (niekontrolowane kopiowanie i przesyłanie lub wstawianie na kolejnych witrynach przez innych użytkowników sieci), a także próby wykorzystywania w kampaniach reklamowych rodzą zasadnicze pytanie o ochro nę prawnoautorską memów. Niezależnie bowiem od ambiwalentnego stosunku internautów do prawa autorskiego oraz woli (i świadomości) ich samych, mogą oni tworzyć memy, które zasługiwać będą na ochronę jako utwory. Ochronę, po którą wkrótce ktoś być może - zdecyduje się sięgnąć.
Niniejszy artykuł stanowi przegląd wybranych orzeczeń oraz analizę różnic pomiędzy systemami prawnymi w kontekście wolności panoramy, zwieńczoną krytyką harmonizacji prawa unijnego w tym zakresie. Opisane w nim zostały regulacje z Polski, Niemiec i Francji, a także istotne orzecznictwo dotyczące wskazanej tematyki. Prawo panoramy z art. 33 pkt 1 ustawy z 4.02.1994 r. o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych - dalej pr. aut. - zezwala na swobodne rozpowszechnianie m.in. zdjęć, obrazów czy grafik utworów wystawionych na stałe w miejscach publicznych i nie budzi w Polsce większych kontrowersji. Podobną regulację zawiera art. 5 ust. 3 lit. h dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2001/29/WE z 22.05.2001 r. w sprawie harmonizacji niektórych aspektów praw autorskich i pokrewnych w społeczeństwie informacyjnym - dalej dyrektywa info-soc lub dyrektywa internetowa - ze względu jednak na fakultatywną implementację jej przepisów nie wszystkie państwa członkowskie zdecydowały się na wprowadzenie tego wyjątku, co poddane zostało powszechnej krytyce. Wolność panoramy jest przykładem regulacji, która dzieli państwa i wprowadza chaos na wspólnym rynku unijnym.
Po niemal siedmiu latach od wprowadzenia systemu obowiązkowego zatwierdzania tabel wynagrodzeń na wskazanych polach eksploatacji zasadne jest dokonanie analizy podsumowującej, w jakim stopniu system ten sprawdza się w praktyce oraz czy realizuje cele i założenia określone w uzasadnieniu wyroku TK z 24.01.2006 r., SK 40/04. Warunkiem koniecznym rzetelnej oceny systemu jest nie tylko odniesienie się do orzecznictwa sądów powszechnych, ale także ustalenie, czy ustawa nowelizująca z 8.07.2010 r. wprowadziła zmiany niezbędne dla przywrócenia stanu zgodności prawa z Konstytucją Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2.04.1997 r. - dalej Konstytucja RP. Weryfikacja istniejącego systemu zatwierdzania tabel jest niezbędna także wobec konieczności implementacji dyrektywy 2014/26/UE5, mającej zapewnić ujednolicenie i poprawę standardów w zakresie funkcjonowania i przejrzystości działania organizacji zbiorowego zarządzania - dalej OZZ - w państwach UE. Przedstawione rozważania prowadzą do sformułowania dwóch alternatywnych propozycji zmian w celu usprawnienia zatwierdzania tabel wynagrodzeń i wyeliminowania mankamentów obowiązującego unormowania. Wariant I zakłada przyspieszenie procedury zatwierdzania tabel z wykorzystaniem instytucji milczącej zgody organu administracji; wariant II natomiast - określenie stawek wynagrodzeń rozporządzeniem Ministra Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego - dalej MKiDN - po zasięgnięciu opinii Komisji Prawa Autorskiego - dalej KPA.
Trybunał Konstytucyjny w wyroku z 23.06.2015 r. w sprawie SK 32/14 uznał prawa autorskie za element chronionych na podstawie art. 64 ust. 1 i ust. 2 Konstytucji RP innych praw majątkowych, dokonując swoistej konstytucjonalizacji ustawowych standardów ochrony autorskich praw majątkowych, w tym sankcjonując zasadę zapewnienia równej ochrony autorskimi prawom majątkowym. Tymczasem w judykaturze, w odniesieniu do oceny konsekwencji rozporządzenia wkładem twórczym do utworu kinematograficznego pod rządem poprzednio obowiązującej ustawy o prawie autorskim, zostały wyrażone dwa, wydawać by się mogło, wzajemnie wykluczające się zapatrywania prawne Sądu Najwyższego w sprawach I CSK 33/10 oraz V CKN 693/00. Opracowanie niniejsze próbuje wykazać, że każde z wyżej wymienionych rozstrzygnięć zachowało swą aktualność, a konflikt zawartych w nich zapatrywań prawnych jest jedynie pozorny, jeśli uwzględni się specyfikę stanu faktycznego będącego przedmiotem subsumpcji w każdej z przywołanych spraw.
Libertarianizm wobec prawa własności intelektualnej
Współczesny libertarianizm jawi się jako doktryna bogata i różnorodna. Chociaż wszystkie jego odłamy łączy przekonanie o prymacie wolności jednostki, to mogą one być klasyfikowane pod względem stosunku do państwa, teorii ekonomicznych czy koncepcji etycznych. Wydaje się, że najczytelniejszą spośród dystynkcji jest spojrzenie na status własności prywatnej. To właśnie to kryterium decyduje o kategoryzacji poszczególnych nurtów jako "lewicowych" bądź "prawicowych". W tym kontekście szczególnie interesujące wydają się libertariańskie teorie prawa własności intelektualnej, jako że adherenci omawianej doktryny rozpatrują prawa majątkowe na dobrach niematerialnych właśnie z perspektywy propertarianistycznej. Artykuł omawia zatem główne teorie legitymizacji i delegitymizacji instytucji autorskich praw majątkowych i patentów w libertariańskiej filozofii prawa.
Internet memes and the definition of work in copyright law. An attempt at an analysis
Freedom of panorama in comparative perspective - Poland, Germany and France
The system of approving tables of remuneration for use of works and objects of related rights - selected postulated legal amendments
The constitutional principles of a state ruled by law and the Copyright Act of 1952 (case study)
Libertarian theories of intellectual property law
The development of the Internet, especially in its Web 2.0 form, filled mainly with UGC (user-generated content), makes one wonder if the current copyright rules are ready for the new challenges and needs. Internet memes make up a signifi cant part of the abovementioned UGC. The concept of a meme as a unit of cultural selection was introduced first by Richard Dawkins as an analogy to the genes in the theory of evolution. The similarities to the mechanism of evolution, displayed by the way internet memes spread (in which 'mutations' also take place when they are modified by other users, the determining factor being catchiness and ease of assimilation) are quite striking. The main aim of a meme is to communicate ideas and opinions - often in a witty way. Hence the paramount importance of the context, which in the case of more popular memes is usually bound to the images, which happens through ongoing practice. The majority of them are also based on somebody else's materials; some memes contain the same, popular picture used over and over again by different creators ('common' internet memes). Moreover, memes are copied and spread without the authors' consent. The whole process can possibly involve an obstacle - copyright rules. Therefore it is important, yet questionable, if a meme itself can be considered a protected work (Art. 1(1) of the Polish Copyright Law).
It is a significant issue to establish which part of a meme has the feature of individual character, considering how (simply) the memes are created (they usually consist of only two elements: image and text). The proposed method is to apply the methods currently used to assess different types of creative output, such as texts or photographs/images (as the internet meme almost always is the combination of these two). The answer, however, to the frequently repeated question about the threshold of creativity required by the definition of work, also in relation to internet memes seems to be unclear and illusive. Even though the current requirements regarding recognition of the creations as works protected by copyright are quite low and liberal (as can be seen on the example of the Court of Justice judgment in case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening in relation to texts), many memes that can be described as 'common' seem to be still below the acceptable level. The cause for this problem is what appears to be the nature of memes - they are a new method of communicating ideas and the most essential for this purpose is the context, not the form in which they are expressed and which copyright rules require for it to be characterised as individual. That in turn leaves us with the problem of copyright not protecting the ideas, at least so far (some of the recent opinions in this matter, represented for example by prof. R. Markiewicz, can be crucial for changing this in the future). On the other hand, memes that are not considered as 'common' can achieve the required level of creativity (which has to be proven in every specific case) and for this reason they can be protected by copyright, of which fact their authors are often unaware.
This article is dedicated to the freedom of panorama - a provision that allows free dissemination of works that are permanently situated in the public space. It is mentioned in Art. 5(3)(h) of the InfoSoc Directive and because of its facultative character not all Member States have introduced a similar provision, deepening the divide between jurisdictions in the European Union. The author wants to emphasize the importance of the country of origin for understanding this exception. The Polish copyright law is compared with regulations implemented in Germany and France in order to present differences that often have a negative impact on the cross-border application of intellectual property law.
The main part of this paper focuses on Art. 33(1) of the Polish Copyright and Related Rights Act, which states that: It shall be allowed to disseminate the works permanently exhibited on commonly accessible public roads, streets, squares or gardens, although not for the same use'. This part presents scholars' opinions and commentaries, gives examples of use and mentions some Polish cases. The structure of the provision is divided into three main parts: 'permanent exhibition', 'commonly accessible places' and 'not the same use'. The author gathered materials that show the complexity of the provision, as well as variety of issues linked with the freedom of panorama.
The concept of permanent exhibition is described as an exhibition without specified time limits; it should not be understood as a technical solution - the object does not have to be fixed in one particular place. Sand, ice and clay are mentioned as examples of materials that cause controversies. In this part, the author explains also the idea of permanence in street art and the possibility of overlap between Art. 33(1) and Art. 26 of the Copyright Act.
Public roads, streets, squares or gardens are enumerated as commonly accessible places in regards to the freedom of panorama. This part of the article focuses on interpretations of their literal meaning and gives examples of different places that in the author-s view should also be included in the scope of Art. 33(1) e.g. cemeteries, railway station concourses.
The core topic of the article is a different use (application) of the given object. It is provided for in the part of the provision that effectively protects author of the primary work even though freedom of panorama constitutes permissible use of protected works. One can say that this element establishes the borders for unfair use and practices. Permanent exhibition of the object in a commonly accessible place is not enough if the user wants to create an identical thing. It has to have a different application, e.g. a sculpture may be reconstructed as an earring, but it cannot be replicated and exhibited as another sculpture.
Further sections of this article discuss the German and French regulations, briefly outlining their national approaches to the freedom of panorama, and give various examples of local cases. The comparison between three different jurisdictions allows the reader not only to spot inconsistencies in the harmonization of EU laws, but also to understand the attachment to national legal traditions.
The final part of the paper is a summary of the current trends in European copyright law and the author's personal opinion on the desirable provision concerning the given topic. In the author's view, the Polish regulation is broad and flexible, which makes it one of the most reasonable solutions concerning the freedom of panorama.
Nearly seven years after the system of mandatory approval of remuneration tables in the identified fields of use was introduced, it is desirable to analyse and sum up to what extent the system works well in practice and whether it delivers on the goals and assumptions specified in the statement of reasons for CT judgment of 24 January 2006 (SK 40/04). For a reliable assessment of the system, it is necessary not only to refer to the case law of general courts, but also determine whether the amending act of 8 July 2010 introduced the changes necessary to restore the law to a state of conformity to the Constitution. Verification of the existing system of approving tables is also necessary in view of the need to implement Directive 2014/26/EU, which aims to ensure uniformisation and improvement of standards in the field of functioning and transparency of operation of collective management organisations (CMOs) in EU states. The presented reflections lead to formulating two alternative proposals of amendments to improve the way remuneration tables are approved and eliminate the deficiencies of the existing norms. The first scenario assumes acceleration of the table approval procedure using the mechanism of tacit consent of the administration authority; the second scenario assumes fixing the rates of remuneration in a Regulation of the Minister of Culture and National Heritage [Polish abbreviation: MKiDN] after consultation with the Copyright Commission [Polish abbreviation: KPA].
The first scenario is a proposal for an evolutionary change of the system of approving tables using legal instruments that have already been tried and tested in the Polish legal system and are used to approve, e.g. price lists or rules of providing services in the Polish telecommunications law or postal law. The changes proposed in the first scenario do not remove the difficulties with explaining the quasi-normative nature of a decision approving the remuneration tables, but help make the proceedings less lengthy. In line with the proposal in the first scenario, in the course of the mandatory negotiations, drafts of remuneration tables would be developed and then submitted to the MKiDN for approval using the tacit consent mechanism. The mandatory negotiations should be attended by: 1) the applicant CMO; 2) CMOs which, under their permits, manage copyrights or related rights in the same categories of works or objects of related rights in the field of use the application concerns; 3) users' representatives; 4) mediators - KPA members, whose role should change compared to that resulting from the laws currently in force (cf. detailed comments in the article).
The second way to remove the defi ciencies of the currently applicable procedure, including the doubts connected with the character of KPA decisions, is to introduce a system where minimum rates are fixed by a regulation of the MKiDN. This proposal, too, relies on solutions which already exist in the Polish legal system. One of the aims of the proposed changes is to remove any doubts about the tables' binding force. The minimum rates fixed in a regulation of the MKiDN would have the character of universally applicable law. This system would be aligned with CT standpoint expressed in judgment SK 40/04, where it indicated similarities between approving remuneration tables and the mechanism of fixing official prices, with due regard for the importance of the stage of preparing draft tables outside the public authority (through mandatory negotiations between CMOs and users' representatives).
The article attempts also to define the 'economic value of the use of the rights in trade' and the 'economic value of the service provided by the CMO', which terms are used in Directive 2014/26/EU as criteria for determining the remuneration rates. The aforementioned criteria should be examined taking into account the positive economic effects of collective management for the users, in the form of signifi cant savings that users achieve by contracting directly with a CMO, rather than having to reach the author of each and every work on the playlist (cf. also opinion of Advocate General Verica Trstenjak in case C 52/07 Stim). The collective nature of copyright management by CMOs requires applying adequate tools to accommodate its particularities. We should bear in mind that the basis for the activity of those users that derive the greatest benefits from the improvements resulting from collective management, i.e. without limitation ratio and television broadcasters, operators of digital platforms, cable TV networks operators, is use of works for a profit (including mainly audiovisual works). The works are an object of multiple uses for a profit. Had the works not been created, the above entrepreneurs would not operate or earn profi ts in this area. When fixing the remuneration in copyright law it is permissible and reasonable to consider the price of the end product of the user's operations (e.g. a radio or television organisation), reflecting the 'economic value of the use of the rights in trade' and the 'economic value of the service provided by the CMO'. Therefore, remuneration rates in CMO tables should be reasonably proportionate to the benefits derived by users as beneficiaries of the system of collective copyright and related rights management; users' benefits should be assessed taking into account the revenue they earn by selling their products (e.g. revenue of a radio or TV organisations from broadcasting programmes).
The Constitutional Tribunal in case no. SK 32/14 recognized author's economic rights as the individual's other property rights that enjoy the protection provided for in Art. 64 of the Constitution. The constitutionalisation of the standard of protection of author's economic rights made a contribution towards refl ections on what appeared to be competing lines of judgments as regards assessing the consequences of the creator's transfer of author's economic rights in a creative contribution to a film shot in times of the Polish People's Republic. The system of values of the Polish Constitution of 1997 recognises the principles of: equal protection of author's economic rights (Art. 32), disallowing the expropriation of individuals without just compensation (Art. 21(2)), and rejection of the value system from the Polish People's Republic period. With respect to transfer of author's economic rights, these principles are now expressed in the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act of 1994. The issue we are dealing with was regulated differently in the People's Republic of Poland under the previous Copyright Act of 1952. In general, it is not disputed in the literature that under Art. 13 of 1952 Copyright Act, state enterprises which were producers of films originally acquired rights in the entire cinematographic work. This did not, however, mean that they acquired author's economic rights in creative contributions which made up the film. During the process of film creation, author's economic rights were acquired independently in respect of the film work as a whole, understood as a sum of component works, on one hand, and in respect of the individual creative contributions, on the other hand. The state enterprise had to conclude copyright transfer agreements with creators of independent component works to acquire these rights. These agreements could differ in character and scope. However, the acquisition of a wider range of rights in a creative contribution than what would result from its cinematographic use as part of an audio-visual work always required detailed provisions in the agreement with film co-creator expressly indicating the acquisition of a wider range of author's economic rights than that indicated above. There was no doubt that state enterprise by virtue of law could acquire all the rights in the contributed work when it was created on the basis of Art. 12(1)(3) of the 1952 Copyright Act for the purposes of advertising or economic propaganda, just as it is in the current state of law the case with the so-called employee creative work under Art. 12 of the 1994 Copyright Act. However, the condition for acquiring the rights was that the employment contract not only had to require the employee to be in 'creative readiness', but it also had to precisely define the characteristics of the creative contribution to be made in its performance. In other cases, the scope of the acquired rights in the component work was defined by an agreement with the creator, which could take the form of an agreement for creating a component work or an agreement transferring author's economic rights in an existing work. Usually, these agreements were imprecise and vague, often with a general clause transferring all author's economic rights in a creative contribution, in violation of the principles of the applicable law: the ban on transferring rights to non-existent (unknown) fields of exploitation or the requirement of precise exemplification of fields of exploitation to which the right in the creative contribution is transferred.
Consequently, the subject of the analysis had to be the legal views expressed in two judgments of the Supreme Court: of 2 December 2010 in case no. I CS 33/10 and of 8 November 2000 in case no. V CKN 693/00. The authors' analysis leads them to conclude that these judgments are not mutually exclusive. Each of the judgments ensured protection of the right to remuneration due to the author of the component work, while taking into account the producer's right to properly exploit the cinematographic work under the changed conditions of recording, reproduction and performance technologies. However, in case no. V CKN 693/00 the Supreme Court pointed out the need to burden both parties to the agreement with the consequences of new fields or ways of exploitation, previously unknown and unpredictable, coming into existence many years after the conclusion of the agreement transferring author's economic rights in the component work. This need occurred especially when, after a period of time, there was a signifi cant increase in the economic value of the component work, which was impossible to predict and even estimate at the time when the creator transferred copyright. The remuneration paid to the creator could not cover this newly created field or way of exploitation of the component work, which in case no. V CKN 693/00, contrary to case no. I CSK 33/10, was capable of existing and being exploited independently of the cinematographic work as a whole. The cartoon characters of Bolek and Lolek can be used in the changed economic environment in other ways than cinematographic exploitation, e.g. in computer games, smartphone applications, books or toys. Today, the creator can effectively protect his/her rights under civil law as well as under industrial property law, obtaining rights in a registered graphic trademark or industrial design. Undoubtedly, the parties to the agreement which transferred the right to use the component work to the film production enterprise did not intend the agreement to cover the right to use it in the abovementioned way, since it was not justified by the requirement to ensure proper exploitation by the producer of the cinematographic work as a sum of the component works.
This article discusses the leading theories of legitimisation and delegitimisation of copyright and patents in the libertarian philosophy of law. According to propertarianism, which is currently the dominant vein among adherents to the doctrine in question, in order to maintain harmonious interpersonal relationships it is necessary to establish and clearly delineate private property. This right would enjoy priority among other rights and would fit in with the conception of negative freedom. But among propertarians there is no unanimity as to the character and source of ownership, as well as the kind of goods in which exclusive property rights may be established. Consequently, one can distinguish three libertarian viewpoints on the issue of legitimising intellectual property: affi rmation, voluntarism and abolitionism.
Representatives of the first viewpoint refer to natural rights of man or the connection between the creator-inventor and the product of intellectual effort and on this basis justify property rights in intellectual goods. In case of Robert Nozick, who drew on Locke's theory of ownership, we can speak of formulating a 'labour' conception: the title to a patent or work is derived from human effort and is an emanation of the individual's moral right to the product of their own effort. This is a legal right, which is universal and exclusive, as well as a natural right - pre-political and complementary to human autonomy. According to the author of 'Anarchy, State and Utopia', copyright is yet another right that a person has and no person or group can violate. Similar views were expressed by Ayn Rand. In this philosopher's creationist theory there is no difference between appropriating tangible and intangible goods. In either case a specific object is created and - by virtue of the right to live - a rationally operating creator is entitled to it. The difference between 'producing' a work or its copy would lie exclusively in that the former act of creation takes place ex nihilo. As a rule, intellectual property rights would be treated in the same way as ownership sensu proprio and would have a natural character: enactments would only sanction the established title.
In a different vein, representatives of the abolitionist view (including N. Stephen Kinsella, Wendy E. McElroy, Boudewijn Bouckaert) stress that introducing the possibility of 'appropriating' works or inventions (the main areas of criticism) lead the propertarianist theory to become internally contradictory. Private ownership is the consequence of scarcity of goods. Meanwhile intangible goods are neither rivalrous nor excludable. Nor can they be ascribed any attribute of the classical Roman ownership triad. Possessing, using, deriving benefits and using up, finally also disposing can only take place in the physical space. It is impossible to take possession (direct and exclusive control) of abstract creations. Ownership of intangible goods is thus impossible on the plane of natural law. Moreover, supporters of deontological theories submitted also that there was no need to introduce 'artificial scarcity' and fiduciary intellectual property on conventionalist underpinnings. In this context it was submitted that intellectual property was not 'property', though not in the way this distinction is made by legal academics, but by virtue of the fact that it is a privilege, sanctioned by the state apparatus of coercion, for certain groups of infl uence, hence an infringement of the principle of non-aggression.
Finally, voluntarists try to reconcile criticism of the fiduciary character of titles to works and inventions with the need to secure just interests of creators and inventors. In the vein of such postulates, Murray N. Rothbard tried to present his own vision of contractual copyright: acquirers of copies of works would undertake to respect the copyright determined by parties under freedom of contract. Although one can doubt in the success of this project, both the voluntarist theory and the abolitionist one complement the foundations of 'right-wing' libertarian thought. Theories which affirm intellectual property lack this attribute. It seems that approval for IP among some propertarians indeed results in an insurmountable internal contradiction between the ethical and economic theories they advocate.
Consequently, even though libertarianism failed to develop a single theory of intellectual property law, the dispute conducted within this doctrine merits attention, also from dogmatic sciences. The abolitionist theory, currently the dominant one among propertarians, may be a source of important arguments de lege ferenda, to support liberalising the mandatory legislation and to revise the model of copyright construction in the Polish copyright law system. From this perspective, it is the radical libertarians' comments that seem particularly interesting: they refer to the fact that recognising title to intangible goods invariably leads to an overlap of claims and to confl icts among rightholders. Rights in works and inventions are neither parallel to nor identical with possessing their corpus mechanicum.
Most likely, the regime of intellectual property law cannot be justified with any deontological theory that accepts the strong status of ownership and links ownership with freedom. Such attempts may be made at most within other, distributive, conceptions of justice, or consequentialism.
ISSN: 1689-7080 , Format: B5 , 156
Kod: KAM-6003:201702 Miejsce wydania: Warszawa