Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/53479514/Telesaurus-Petition-for-Cert-US-Supreme-Court-Re-Preemption-of-Entry-Under-47-USC-332
Timestamp: 2017-02-24 09:43:20
Document Index: 264714918

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 332', '§414', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§206', '§ 332', '§ 1254', '§ 4306', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 202', '§ 206', '§ 207', '§ 208', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 414', '§ 41713', '§ 332', '§ 80', '§332', '§ 332', '§414', '§1254', '§ 332', '§ 414', '§80', '§ 206', '§206', '§332', '§ 206', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§332', '§ 332', '§332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§332', '§ 332', '§332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§332', '§332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§332', '§ 332', '§ 4306', '§ 332', '§ 41713', '§ 332', '§332', '§206', '§207', '§208', '§332', '§206', '§ 332', '§206', '§332', '§ 414', '§332', '§ 414', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 414', '§414', '§ 201', '§332', '§201', '§201', '§201', '§206', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§206']

Telesaurus Petition for Cert, US Supreme Court, Re Preemption of "Entry"Under 47 USC 332
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Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Randy Power, Patricia A. Power and Radiolink Corporation On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Tamir Damari (Counsel of Record) Patrick Richard Nossaman, LLP 50 California Street, 34th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 438-7278 tdamari@nossaman.com
ii Counsel for Telesaurus
i QUESTIONS PRESENTED The parties are FCC licensees regulated under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (the “FCA”) and Arizona state law. Telesaurus VPC, LLC (“Telesaurus”) alleges that Respondents Randy Power, Patricia A. Power and Radiolink Corporation (collectively “Radiolink”) competed unfairly by fraudulently procuring and using for profit common-carrier radio frequencies from the FCC that they knew had already been licensed exclusively by the FCC to Telesaurus, which had already outbid Radiolink for these frequencies at auction. After recognizing this error years later, the FCC “deleted” the frequencies from the Radiolink license on the ground that “the frequencies were not available” for licensing, Thereupon, Telesaurus sued Radiolink alleging state-law damage claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The Ninth Circuit found that all of Telesaurus’s state-law claims are preempted by the FCA’s preemption clause, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), which provides that: no State or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services. The Ninth Circuit further held that Telesaurus’s state-law claims are not saved by the FCA’s “savings clause,” contained at 47 U.S.C. §414.
ii The questions presented are: 1. Are Telesaurus’s state-law damages claims for fraud, tortious interference with contractual relations and conversion, state “regulation” of rates and market entry, and, thus preempted under U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)? 2. Are Telesaurus’s state-law damages claims for fraud, tortious interference with contractual relations and conversion against Radiolink, for procuring and using Telesaurus’s exclusive FCC-licensed frequencies, preempted under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), even though, at the time suit was initiated, the relevant licensed frequencies to Radiolink had been revoked by the FCC and recognized by the FCC as having been invalidlygranted in the first instance? 3. Are Telesaurus’s state-law damages claims for fraud, tortious interference with contractual relations and conversion against Radiolink (brought in federal court on diversity grounds) state regulation of “rates” or “market entry” under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)? 4. What is the extent of recourse that a plaintiff has under state law against a defendant-FCC licensee, where a dispute exists between the parties as to whether the defendant is a common-carrier subject to liability under federal law pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §206-207?
iii CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT There is no parent corporation of Telesaurus. No publically-held company owns more than 10% or any of the stock of Telesaurus.
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......................................... i CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............... iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ v INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1 OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 2 JURISDICTION ........................................................ 2 STATUTES INVOLVED............................................. 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................... 4 A. Facts Giving Rise To The Dispute ............................................................ 4 B. Proceedings Below .................................... 6 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..................... 9 1. There Is A Split In Authority Regarding The Preemptive Scope Of § 332(c)(3)(A) ........................................... 9 a) Introduction .................................... 9 b) Review Should Be Granted To Establish Uniformity ..................................... 10 2. The Court Should Grant Review To Settle An Important Question Of Law. ................... 14 CONCLUSION ........................................................ 28
v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) F EDERAL C ASES Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)............................................14 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008)........................10, 14, 19, 20 Aubrey v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15918 (E.D. Mich. June 17, 2002)....................................................11 Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Services, 205 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2000) .......................10, 13 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)......................................23, 27 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 US 431 (2005)..............................................15 Beckett v. Mellon Investor Servs. LLC, 329 Fed. Appx. 721 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................15 BriteSmile, Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30855 (N.D. Ca. November 18, 2005) ...........................................25 Cellular Telecom Indus. v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1999)..........................10 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992)................................14, 15, 18 Cooperative Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 867 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Utah 1994).....................26 Dimension One Spas, Inc. v. Coverplay, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69526 (S.D. Ca. September 5, 2008) ............................................25
Farina v. Nokia, 578 F. Supp. 2d. 740 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d 625 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 2010).................................11 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)............................................26 Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. 550 U.S. 45 (2007)..............................................27 GMP Technologies, LLC v. Zicam, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115523 (N.D. Ill. December 9, 2009) .............................................25 GTE Mobilnet Ohio v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 1997) .............................12 In re Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 14 FCC Rcd 13786 (1999) ..................................27 In re NOS Communications, Inc., 18 FCC Rcd 6952 22 (2003) ...............................27 In re: Silv Communication, Inc., 25 FCC Rcd 5178 13 (2010) ...............................27 In Re: Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 14 FCC Rcd 19898 (1999) ..................................16 In Re: Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd 17021 (2000) ..............................1, 16 Landmark Graphics Corp. v. Seismic Micro Technology, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 2d. 757 (S.D. Tex. 2007)...............25 Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)................................15, 23, 27 Pinney v. Nokia, 402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2005) ...........12, 13, 20, 26
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)............................................14 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008)................................15, 23, 27 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)................................................17 Shryoer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 606 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2010).................7, 8, 11, 14 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002)........................................18, 19 Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12296 (D. Ariz. 2009) .................................................2, 5, 7, 11, 14 Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2010).............................2, 7 The Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998)....................23, 25 TPS Utilicom Servs. v. AT&T Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d. 1089 (C.D. Ca. 2002)..............22 WHW Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 753 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1985)..........................23 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)........................................14 S TATE C ASES Bryceland v. AT&T, 114 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App. 2002) ......................13 In re: Cellphone Fee Termination Cases, 193 Cal. App. 4th 298 (2011) ..............................12 Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009).............................11, 19
New-Par v. PUC of Ohio, 98 Ohio St. 3d. 277 (2002) .................................12 Pacific Bell Wireless, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission, 140 Cal. App. 4th 718 (2006) ........................12, 14 Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Services, 962 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1998) ..............12, 13, 19, 26 Union Ink, Co., Inc. v. AT&T Corp, 801 A.2d 361 (N.J. Super. 2002) .................13, 17 F EDERAL S TATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1254 ........................................................2 46 U.S.C. § 4306 ......................................................17 47 U.S.C. § 201 ..................................................26, 27 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)....................................................27 47 U.S.C. § 202 ........................................................27 47 U.S.C. § 206 .......................................i, 6, 7, 26, 27 47 U.S.C. § 207 ...............................i, 6, 20, 21, 26, 27 47 U.S.C. § 208 ..................................................20, 27 47 U.S.C. § 332 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 26 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)................................................27 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)......... ii,i, 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, ....................................................12, 13, 15, 19, 22 47 U.S.C. § 414 ..................................... ii, 1, 3, 25, 26 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) .........................................................19 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)? .................................................i R EGULATIONS 47 C.F.R. § 80.123 .....................................................4 O THER A UTHORITIES
ix Conference Report, Telecommunications Act of 1996, H.R. 104-458, at p. 1 (1996).......................9 Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., No. 97-288 ....................................................17, 18 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (the “FCA”) .......... ii
1 INTRODUCTION Telesaurus respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision that Telesaurus’ adds state-law claims are preempted by 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(3)(A). The principal question presented is whether Telesaurus’s state-law damages claims for fraud, tortious interference with contractual relations and conversion against Radiolink, for procuring and using Telesaurus’s exclusive FCC-licensed frequencies, are preempted under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), even though, at the time suit was initiated, the relevant licensed frequencies to Radiolink had been revoked by the FCC and recognized by the FCC as having been invalidly-granted in the first instance. There is a conflict among appellate courts regarding the extent to which such state-law claims are preempted. The better reasoned line of authority and the FCC have concluded that “[i]f ... providers are to conduct business in a competitive marketplace, and not in a regulated environment, then state contract and tort law claims should generally be enforceable . . .” In Re: Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd 17021, 17034 (2000). This approach also better effectuates the intent of the savings clause contained in 47 U.S.C. §414, which states that “[n]othing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.” This Court should grant review to resolve the conflict.
2 OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the trial court was reported at 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12296 (D. Ariz. February 5, 2009) and is reproduced at App. 29-44. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 623 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2010) and is reproduced at App. 1-28. The decision of the Ninth Circuit denying Telesaurus’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or in the Alternative Rehearing En Banc is unreported and is reproduced at App. 45-46. JURISDICTION The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was entered on October 8, 2010. On October 29, 2010, Telesaurus filed a timely Petition for Panel Rehearing, or, in the Alternative, Rehearing En Banc with the Ninth Circuit. On December 28, 2010, the Ninth Circuit denied this Petition. On March 18, 2011, Telesaurus timely filed an Application to this Court for an Extension of Time (up until April 11, 2011) to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. This Application was granted on March 23, 2011. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254. STATUTES INVOLVED 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), the FCA’s preemption provision, provides in relevant part: [N]o State or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from
3 regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services. 47 U.S.C. § 414 provides: Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.
4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Facts Giving Rise To The Dispute Telesaurus obtains FCC licenses to provide advanced wireless telecommunications services essential for Intelligent Transportation Systems App. 50 ITS is a unique, new wireless market in the United States. Id. Telesaurus uses its FCC licenses to serve the nation’s pubic safety, critical infrastructure, and large commercial vehicle fleet operations. In 1999, Warren Havens, Telesaurus’ predecessor in interest, competed against Radiolink in a public FCC auction to obtain a license for certain VHF public coast frequencies (the “VPC Frequencies”) in the Phoenix, Arizona area.1 App. 48-51. Mr. Havens outbid Radiolink to win the frequencies and was awarded a license for exclusive use of the VPC Frequencies (the “VPC License”).
As noted on the FCC’s website ( http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/index.htm?job=ser vice_home&id=coast_stations): “Public coast stations . . . [permit] ships to send and receive [wireless] messages and to interconnect with the public switched telephone network. VHF public coast stations . . . generally provide short-range communications for vessels not more than 30 nautical miles from shore . . . [and] have obligations to monitor distress frequencies and to relay messages free of charge to search and rescue personnel . . .” These licenses may also be used for land services under 47 C.F.R. §80.123. ITS involves maritime and land operations.
5 App. 50-51. Only three months later, Randy Power submitted a sworn application to the FCC to obtain most of the VPC Frequencies contained in the VPC License, even though he knew the VPC License had been awarded to Mr. Havens. App. 51; see also Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12296, *4 (D. Ariz. 2009). In that application, Power falsely represented to the FCC that the VPC Frequencies were not already sold and licensed. App. 51. Specifically, Power did not disclose the fact that the VPC Frequencies were included in Telesaurus’ exclusive VPC License, but rather misrepresented to the FCC that the VPC Frequencies were available for licensing. App. 51. The FCC requires applicants to certify that all facts stated in licensing applications are true and correct, and it generally relies on these certifications. It therefore believed Power’s misrepresentations and issued to Power the VPC Frequencies that Mr. Havens had previously bought at auction. App. 51. Radiolink used Telesaurus’s VPC Frequencies for at least six years. App. 51 During that time, Telesaurus tried to find wireless communications companies to partner with using the VPC Frequencies. App. 52-53. Telesaurus subsequently learned from prospective business partners that the VPC Frequencies were already in use by Radiolink, blocking Telesaurus’s use thereof and thereby causing Telesaurus to lose out on valuable business opportunities. Id. After potential business partners informed Telesaurus that the VPC Frequencies were being
6 used by Radiolink, Telesaurus investigated and found this allegation to be true. App. 53. Telesaurus reported this fraudulent and invalid use to the FCC, and, in March 2004, the FCC issued a preliminary order in which it recognized that the “Radiolink application should not have been granted to the extent that it requested VPC frequencies.” App. 5, 83. The March 2004 Order was finalized in an Order issued on July 7, 2005, under which the VPC Frequencies were deleted from Radiolink’s license and restored to Telesaurus. App. 6, 84. In both the March 2004 and July 2005 Orders, the FCC noted that the VPC frequencies should not have been granted to Radiolink to the extent it requested the VPC frequencies; i.e., that the grant of these frequencies was, in effect, void ab initio. App. 5-6, 83-84. B. Proceedings Below Telesaurus filed its complaint on July 6, 2007, alleging that Radiolink willfully and wrongfully used Telesaurus’s spectrum and licenses for six years (the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), the operative pleading in this case, was filed on October 10, 2008 and is included in the Appendix at App. 47-56). Telesaurus alleged violations of the FCA (under 47 U.S.C. §§ 206-207), and state common-law causes of action for conversion, unjust enrichment, and interference with prospective economic advantage. App. 53-55. Radiolink moved to dismiss, contesting that it was not a common carrier subject to federal liability under 47 U.S.C. §§206-207 and that Telesaurus’s state-law claims were preempted under 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(3)(A). App. 57-73.
7 On February 5, 2009, the District Court dismissed Telesaurus’ FAC in its entirety, holding that “Telesaurus states no cause of action under federal law” for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 206, and that the “state [law] claims are preempted.” Telesaurus, supra, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12296, * 2. In connection with the latter determination, the District Court held that all of Telesaurus’ state-law claims are preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), which provides in part that states shall not “regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial” mobile service. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A). The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2010). With respect to the trial court’s dismissal of Telesaurus’ state-law claims, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all respects, holding that Telesaurus’s claims in effect challenged an FCC licensing determination and, as such, are preempted under §332(c)(3)(A)’s prohibition against state regulation of “market entry.” Id., at 1009-11. The Court noted that Shryoer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 606 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2010), a case involving preemption of state rate regulation, informed its preemption analysis. In particular, the Court held that: (i) “Licensing [is] the FCC's core tool in the regulation of market entry . . . [as it] directly involves agency determinations of public interest, safety, efficiency, and adequate competition, all inquiries specially within the expertise of the FCC;” and (ii) “§ 332(c)(3)(A) preempts state tort actions that require a court to substitute its judgment for the agency’s with regard
8 to a licensing decision.” Id., at 1008-09 (internal citations omitted). Applying the Shroyer standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Telesaurus’s state-law claims are preempted under §332. In the Court’s view, “Each of Telesaurus’s state-law claims requires adjudication of whether Radiolink’s use of the VPC Frequencies was improper [requiring] the court to substitute its judgment for the FCC's with regard to a licensing decision, a core determination regarding market entry.” Id., at 1010. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that “Telesaurus’s tort claims amount to a collateral challenge to the validity of the license initially granted to Radiolink by the FCC . . . Because an adjudication of [these] claims would be necessarily equivalent to second-guessing the FCC's issuance of a license, they are expressly preempted.” 2 Id. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the subject VPC Frequencies had been deleted from Radiolink’s license. Nevertheless, the Court failed to specifically how prosecution of a state-law claim arising out of the misuse of a license could have any practical effect upon (let alone constitute state regulation of) market entry, where the license had already been revoked by the licensing authority at the time the relevant complaint was filed.
As to Telesaurus’s federal claims, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court properly dismissed those claims, but erred in failing to grant Telesaurus leave to amend its complaint. Id., at 1003-06. The federal claim is not at issue in this petition.
9 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 1. There Is A Split In Authority Regarding The Preemptive Scope Of § 332(c)(3)(A) a) Introduction One the major purposes of the 3 telecommunications laws is to promote competition. As the telecommunications industry has expanded to wireless service, some industry participants have resorted to unfair business practices, engendering allegations of misrepresentations and failures to disclose, and sparking lawsuits from consumers and competitors in federal and state courts across the country. Courts have therefore had to address the preemptive scope of § 332(c)(3)(A). The law on §332 preemption varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As explained below, in the absence of a clear pronouncement from this Court, courts will continue to adjudicate claims of § 332 preemption ad hoc, exacerbating a patchwork of inconsistent results, stemming from differing theories of preemption.
Conference Report, Telecommunications Act of 1996, H.R. 104-458, at p. 1 (1996) (purpose of bill was “to provide for a pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced services and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition....”)
10 Preemptive intent may be expressly stated in the language of the statute or it “may be inferred if the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field, or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law.” Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008). Section 332 of the FCA poses particular challenges with respect to the preemption doctrine “because it leaves its key terms undefined. It never states what constitutes rate and entry regulation or what comprises other terms and conditions of wireless service.” Cellular Telecom Indus. v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As a result, courts are split regarding §332(c)(3)(A)’s preemptive scope. This split has manifested itself with respect to the question of which preemption category is applicable to state-law claims asserted against FCC licensees (that is, express, conflict, or field) and with respect to the types of substantive state-law claims that are preempted within a given category. b) Review Should Be Granted To Establish Uniformity As noted, there is a split in authority regarding the preemptive scope of § 332(c)(3)(A). On one end of the spectrum, the Seventh Circuit has held that § 332(c)(3)(A) establishes complete preemption. Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Services, 205 F.3d 983, 986-87 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Congress intended complete preemption” by passing § 332(c)(3)(A)) (emphasis added). Under this line of authority, virtually any state-law claim having any nexus to an
11 FCC licensee’s business activities is “federalized,” and, therefore, federal courts have exclusive federal question jurisdiction over such claims. Id. In other words, the Seventh Circuit not only holds that § 332(c)(3)(A) broadly preempts state law claims, but also that federal courts are the only tribunals empowered to assess the preemption issue. The Third , Ninth and D.C. Circuits, and numerous state appellate courts), have rejected complete preemption, but have nonetheless found claims preempted under § 332(c)(3)(A) under the rubrics of implied or conflict preemption. See, e.g., Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009) (customers’ suit against service providers alleging injury through cell phone use barred under implied preemption to the extent these customers sought to hold the defendants liable for injuries caused by cell phones that met FCC radio frequency radiation standards); Farina v. Nokia, 578 F. Supp. 2d. 740 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (state claims barred on an implied preemption theory, because, in order to prevail, the plaintiff necessarily would have to seek a determination by the trier of fact that FCC standards for RF emissions were inadequate), aff’d 625 F.3d 97, 120 (3rd Cir. 2010) (conflict preemption principles barred the plaintiff’s claims); Aubrey v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15918 (E.D. Mich. June 17, 2002). The Ninth Circuit’s decision below also seemed to rely on an implied conflict preemption theory. Telesaurus VPC, LLC, at 1010 (“there is an irreconcilable conflict between the FCC’s exclusive licensing authority . . . and Telesaurus’s allegations that
12 Radiolink ‘wrongfully’ or ‘unlawfully’ operated under its FCC license.”); see also, Shroyer (“Elements of Shroyer’s unfair competition claim, however, depend on the assessment of the public benefit of the merger. That determination has already been made by the FCC, and reexamination of that issue under state law is preempted either by § 332 or by the ordinary principles of conflict preemption.”). Finally, a third category of courts, including the Eighth, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, have taken a narrow view of §332 preemption, rejecting complete preemption and implied preemption as a rubric for evaluating §332, and instead holding that claims can be barred if at all only under § 332(c)(3)(A) on the basis of express preemption. Pinney v. Nokia, 402 F.3d 430, 450 (4th Cir. 2005) (“there is simply no evidence that Congress intended ... to preempt completely state law claims that are based on a wireless service provider’s sale and promotion of wireless telephones.”); GTE Mobilnet Ohio v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469, 479 (6th Cir. 1997) (The language of § 332(c)(3)(A) “does not compel the conclusion that ... the states may no longer adjudicate individual cases involving specific allegations of anti-competitive or discriminatory conduct.”). State appellate courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Services, 962 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1998) (customers’ claims that providers committed fraud by not disclosing a billing practice of rounding up calls to the next minute were not completely preempted); New-Par v. PUC of Ohio, 98 Ohio St. 3d. 277 (2002) (price discrimination claim by a reseller
13 against a service provider not completely preempted). In re: Cellphone Fee Termination Cases, 193 Cal. App. 4th 298 (2011); Pacific Bell Wireless, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission, 140 Cal. App. 4th 718, 735 (2006) (holding that “the doctrine of complete preemption is inapplicable in this case.”) Given these conflicting preemption theories, it is not surprising that courts assessing similar claims have reached divergent conclusions as to whether such claims are preempted. This split in authority is particularly pronounced with respect to state-law claims arising out of misrepresentations, such as those asserted by Telesaurus here. Compare Bastien (claim by wireless consumer that provider had committed fraud by misleading the plaintiff about the nature of service completely preempted by § 332) with Pinney (plaintiffs’ claims based on misrepresentations and failures to disclose regarding the level of radio frequency radiation emitted by cell phones were not preempted under express, conflict or field preemption) and Tenore, 962 P.2d at 345 (a claim by cellular customers that wireless providers had committed fraud by not disclosing a billing practice of rounding up calls to the next minute was not preempted under § 332(c)(3)(A)); see also Union Ink, Co., Inc. v. AT&T Corp, 801 A.2d 361, 369-78 (N.J. Super. 2002) (“We . . . determine ... the extent to which the statutory language expressly pre-empts a state court from awarding damages against providers of cellular telephone service based upon state statutes dealing with consumer fraud or under the state’s common law regarding fraud or negligent
14 misrepresentation ... [the trial court] erred in holding that plaintiffs’ state law ... fraud ... claims are pre-empted by federal law ... [in light of] this State’s public policies affording broad protection to consumers against deceptive commercial practices ... we conclude that plaintiffs’ State law claims ... are not barred by federal law.”) Bryceland v. AT&T, 114 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App. 2002). Indeed, even within the same geographic region (e.g., California), federal and state appellate courts have reached seemingly opposite conclusions on the appropriate preemption rubric. Compare Shroyer and Telesaurus VPC LLC (seemingly resolving claims, at least in part, on the basis of implied conflict preemption) with Pacific Bell Wireless, LLC (holding inter alia that “the doctrine of implied preemption is inapplicable in this case.”). Further clarity is needed. 2. The Court Should Grant Review To Settle An Important Question Of Law. Preemption is primarily a question of statutory construction, and, thus the Court should inquire into the objective or purpose of Congress in enacting the relevant statute. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. Moreover, several doctrines place limits on preemption. First, there is an “assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id., (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Second, because of this
15 “presumption against preemption,” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, Congress’ intent to preempt must be “clear and manifest” to preempt state law in a field traditionally occupied by the states. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009)(emphasis added); Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 543 (“[w]hen the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption’”), (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). Third, courts are required to assess complaints on a claim-by-claim basis to determine whether preemption applies. Cipillone, at 523; Beckett v. Mellon Investor Servs. LLC, 329 Fed. Appx. 721, 723 (9th Cir. 2009). Finally, violation of a federal statute may give rise to a state law cause of action without running afoul of preemption, where state law simply supplies a remedy not available under federal law. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 , 330 (2008) (“Thus [the Medical Device Amendments Act] does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal requirements.”);Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 US 431, 447 (2005); Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996). The question of the extent to which § 332(c)(3)(A) preempts claims associated with an FCC-issued license is an important one, because it potentially affects many FCC licensees and because it has been, and will continue to be, extensively litigated. If, as the Ninth Circuit suggested, § 332
16 preempts (under conflict preemption principles or otherwise) any claims arising out of a misuse of an FCC-issued license by a licensee (even when the license is essentially deemed void ab initio) any holder of an FCC license would be able to engage in unlawful and anti-competitive practices against competitors with impunity. This result would frustrate the states’ established right to regulate business activities within their jurisdictions. Simply put, an FCC-issued license should not be a carte blanche to commit state law torts. For several reasons, Petitioners submit that the line of case law taking a narrow view of § 332 preemption represents the better-reasoned line of authority. First, the FCC itself, which is entrusted with protecting the FCA’s regulatory scheme, takes the position that § 332 generally does not preempt state law tort claims. For example, in In Re Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd at 17026-34, the FCC held that (i) although § 332 preempts actual rate-setting by states, it does not preempt state contract or consumer fraud laws relating to the disclosure of rates and rate practices; (ii) § 332 generally does not preempt the award of monetary damages based on state tort or contract claims; (iii) state courts are not, as a general matter, prevented by § 332 from awarding damages to customers based on violations of state contract or consumer fraud laws; and (iv) tort and contract law have the function of compensating victims, which distinguishes them from the direct forms of regulation entrusted to the FCC. See also In Re: Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 14 FCC Rcd
17 19898 *26 (1999) (“We do not agree ... that state contract or consumer fraud laws relating to the disclosure of rates and rate practices have generally been preempted.... Such preemption . . . is not supported by its language or legislative history. [T]he legislative history of Section 332 clarifies that billing information, practices and disputes—all of which might be regulated by state contract or consumer fraud laws—fall within ‘other terms and conditions’ which states are allowed to regulate. Thus, state law claims stemming from state contract or consumer fraud laws governing disclosure of rates and rate practices are not generally preempted under Section 332.”). Notably, in these decisions, the FCC did not state or suggest that complete preemption or implied preemption frameworks are in any way applicable to §332. The FCC’s position is entitled to significant deference, since courts “should not sacrifice the public policies of the State to some ephemeral view of the federal interest which is at variance with the considered opinions of the administrative agency charged with overseeing the subject matter field, as well as those of most of the courts which have addressed the issues.” Union Ink, Co., Inc. at 375. Second, under the plain language of § 332, state governments are only denied “authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged . . . ” By using the term “regulate,” Congress preempted only the positive statutory and regulatory enactments of those governments, and not state-law claims for damages. Although a judicial decision is state action for some purposes, cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
18 (1948), that does not suggest that the ordinary meaning of "State government" includes judges and juries. In common parlance, one would not describe a civil jury -- whose principal functions are to assess liability and apply the law -- as a unit of a state or local government. Likewise, that description would be a very unusual way to refer to a judge. In fact, the U.S. Solicitor General argued as much in a 1997 Supreme Court brief filed in Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., No. 97-288. Lewis presented the question of whether the express preemption clause of the Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 4306 -- which was directed at the actions of a "State or political subdivision of a State" -- preempts common-law damages claims. In arguing for a no-preemption ruling in Lewis, the United States relied, among other things, on the fact that "a court in a common law damages action would not normally be thought of as a 'State or political subdivision of a State.'" Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Lewis, No. 97-288 (U.S. filed Dec. 1997), 1997 WL 799992, at *18. Likewise, this Court has also made clear that where a federal statute prohibits state “regulation,” it “most naturally refers to positive enactments by those [legislative or regulatory] bodies, not to common-law damages actions.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519. This Court made the same point in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002), where it held that the express preemption clause of the Federal Boat Safety Act pre-empted only positive enactments. If “law,” the Court noted, “were read broadly so as to include the common law,
19 it might also be interpreted to include regulations, which would render the express reference to ‘regulation’ in the pre-emption clause superfluous.” Id. at 63. This Court further explained that limiting the preemption clause to positive law (and thereby excluding state-law damages liability) “does not produce anomalous results. It would have been perfectly rational for Congress not to pre-empt common-law claims, which-unlike most administrative and legislative regulationsnecessarily perform an important remedial role in compensating … victims.” Id. at 64. (emphasis added). Under this definition of “regulation,” Telesaurus’s state-law claims are not preempted, because they do not involve a positive statutory or regulatory enactment by the State of Arizona. In this respect, § 332 stands in marked contrast to other preemption clauses. For example, the express preemption clause in the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), contains statutory language of “unusual breadth” because it prohibits states from enacting or enforcing any law “relating to rates, routes or services of any air carrier.” Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 548 (emphasis added). Unlike the Airline Deregulation Act, § 332 does not use the broad language of preemption of “any law relating to” commercial or private mobile carriers. Instead, this section preempts only those claims that “regulate the entry of or the rates charged by” mobile service providers. Indeed, as if to underscore this narrow approach, states are expressly authorized to regulate “the other terms and conditions of
20 commercial mobile services.” See also Tenore (citing to §332’s terms and conditions clause as grounds for rejecting preemption); Murray, 982 A.2d at 774 (same, noting that the trial court’s “conclusion cannot be reconciled with the second clause of section 332 (c)(3)(A), which expressly permits states to restrict ‘the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services’ without regard to whether such terms and conditions may create hurdles or burdens attendant to participating in the market.”). Third, the narrow approach best effectuates the well-settled “assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 543. This logic should hold particularly true where, as here, the defendant contends that it is not a common carrier subject to liability in a federal 4 court under 47 U.S.C. §§206-207 (or subject to FCC
In this regard, 47 U.S.C. §207 states that “Any person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter may either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this chapter, in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person shall not have the right to pursue both such remedies.”
21 regulation under 47 U.S.C. §208). Under such circumstances, state law remedies are absolutely vital, because they comprise the only bases under which a party such as Radiolink can be held to account for its actions. Pinney, 402 F.3d at n.4 (preemption inapplicable to telecommunicationsrelated claims because “[s]tates continue to have considerable authority in the wireless telecommunications area,” and because “[t]he presumption against preemption is even stronger against preemption of state remedies, like tort recoveries, when no federal remedy exists.”). The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion (finding Telesaurus’s state-law claims to be preempted under §332, while nevertheless leaving open the possibility that Radiolink is not a common carrier subject to federal liability under §§206-207), creates the very real potential of an anomalous and manifestly unjust result under which a party such as Telesaurus is left with no cause of action (under federal or state law) by which to remedy anticompetitive actions such as 6 those undertaken by Radiolink in the instant case.
As noted above, Telesaurus contests this contention by Radiolink, and this issue is currently on remand before the District Court of Arizona. 6 Also, it should be noted that state-law causes of action allowing for relief of the sort Telesaurus has sought in the case sub judice are typically far better conceptually-developed and clear, and far better understood by courts, than the permissible scope of
22 When construing the scope of § 332 preemption, it is also important to define exactly what is meant by the term “market entry.” Telesaurus was not seeking to regulate market entry in this case. It did not, at any point, attempt to challenge the criteria under which FCC licenses were issued to Radiolink in the first instance, nor did it second-guess the FCC’s initial grant of the VPC Frequencies to Radiolink. Furthermore, Telesaurus’s claims neither sought to regulate the competitive auction bidding process nor sought to challenge eligibility requirements for obtaining FCC licenses. As noted, it was the FCC that ultimately determined in March 2004 that the “Radiolink application should not have been granted” to the extent that it requested the VPC Frequencies, thereby prompting the FCC to cancel Radiolink’ licenses with respect to those frequencies. The instant case was not filed until after this cancellation. As such, there was no likelihood that the adjudication of Telesaurus’ state-law claims would have impinged upon the FCC’s authority to issue licenses, among other reasons because, with respect to the VPC Frequencies, Radiolink was not an FCC licensee at the time Telesaurus filed suit. The principal issue here was whether Telesaurus’s claims sought to “second-guess” an FCC license determination. This is a practical assessment that examines whether these claims may impinge on or damages claims under 47 U.S.C. §§206-207, which is still being developed by courts.
23 contradict rights granted to an FCC licensee. The risk of such a conflict is non-existent where license rights have been revoked and the issuing agency has itself determined that the rights should not have been granted in the first place. Even those courts which have dismissed claims on §332(c)(3)(A) grounds have recognized this fact. See, e.g., TPS Utilicom Servs. v. AT&T Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d. 1089, 1109 n. 19 (C.D. Ca. 2002) (“If TPS brought the unfair practices and tortious interference claims . . . after a determination that a party had wrongfully participated in an FCC license auction, such claims might escape FCA preemption”). In short, vindication of the state law claims at issue in this case would have the effect of bolstering (rather than adding to or conflicting with) the FCA’s policies (including the FCC’s interest in ensuring that 7 licensees act with candor towards the Commission ). Riegel, at 330; Bates, at 447; Lohr, at 495. Telesaurus respectfully submits that however broad the scope of the FCC’s interest in regulating rates or market entry might be, this interest does not extend to effectively protecting a party’s ability to illegally use another party’s spectrum, via federal preemption. For similar reasons, the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in asserting that Telesaurus’s claims “collaterally challenge” a Radiolink license. Once the FCC determined that the VPC Frequencies should not have been licensed to Radiolink, there
See, e.g., WHW Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 753 F.2d 1132, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
24 was simply nothing left for Telesaurus to “challenge” before the FCC. Telesaurus’s claims, far from collaterally “challenging” an FCC determination, were actually based, in substantial part, on the FCC's determination that Radiolink had no right to the VPC Frequencies in the first place. A useful analogue can be drawn to patent cases. It is well-established that that a party can assert a state-law claim against a patent licensee arising out of the wrongful procurement of a patent, where it is alleged that the patent was procured by fraud or in bad faith. The seminal case on the issue is The Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998), in which the plaintiff (Dow) asserted state-law unfair competition claims against the defendant (Exxon), arising out of Exxon’s inequitable conduct in procuring patents from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The trial court concluded that Dow’s state-law claims were preempted by federal patent law. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding: [A] state law claim is not preempted by the federal patent law, even if it requires the state court to adjudicate a question of federal patent law, provided the . . . cause of action includes additional elements not found in the federal patent law cause of action. . . The state law cause of action at issue here does not present an obstacle to the execution and accomplishment of the patent laws. . . While it is true that . . . the state court would be required to
25 make a determination of an issue of patent law in reaching its judgment on the underlying tort, this determination would only be ancillary to its central purpose . . . The instant case. . . concerns an allegation of bad faith enforcement of a reputedly unenforceable patent. . .[thus] [t]he tort claim at issue here is not premised upon bad-faith misconduct in the PTO, but rather is premised upon bad-faith misconduct in the marketplace. . . A state has every right to protect its citizens and residents in their contractual relations from acts of wrongful interference . . . by any party, including a patentee . . . Any award of damages, then, would be based on local conduct that the state has a right to regulate; proof of acts before the PTO in such a trial are merely evidence of the patentee’s bad-faith. Id., at 1473-78. See also BriteSmile, Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30855 *16-17 (N.D. Ca. November 18, 2005); GMP Technologies, LLC v. Zicam, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115523 *10 (N.D. Ill. December 9, 2009); Dimension One Spas, Inc. v. Coverplay, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69526 *48-58 (S.D. Ca. September 5, 2008); Landmark Graphics Corp. v. Seismic Micro Technology, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 2d. 757, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (“SMT’s unfair competition counterclaim alleges that
26 Landmark has sought to enforce the 570 Patent against SMT with knowledge that the patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. This counterclaim does not rest entirely on actions before the PTO but alleges ‘marketplace misconduct.’. . .”). The logic of these cases applies with even greater force to this case. Unlike the patent cases, in which the courts were required to resolve “ancillary” issues of patent law, the District Court in this case need not have adjudicated any FCC licensing issues. The issue in this case, as in the above-cited authorities, is whether the putative tortfeasor asserted, in bad faith, a federally-conferred right that it knew it did not have. As in Dow Chemical, the allegations contained in Telesaurus’s complaint are premised on bad-faith misconduct in the marketplace and proof of acts before the FCC at trial would simply be evidence of Radiolink’s bad-faith. Finally, the approach proposed by Telesaurus best effectuates the intent of the § 414 savings clause which states that “[n]othing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.” The inclusion of the savings clause “assumes that there are some significant number of common-law liability cases to save,” and mandates a narrow reading of §332’s preemption provision. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000). Courts have specifically recognized the important interplay between § 414 and § 332, and have held that it “preserves causes of action for breaches of duties distinguishable from those created
27 under the [FCA].” Cooperative Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 867 F. Supp. 1511, 1516 (D. Utah 1994). In Pinney, the Fourth Circuit held that the “savings clauses counsel against any broad construction of the goals of § 332 . . . that would create an implicit conflict with state tort law.” Pinney, 402 F.3d at 450. And in Tenore, the Washington Supreme Court held that the existence of the § 414 precluded a finding that preemption barred claims by customers against providers alleging that providers committed fraud by not disclosing a practice of “rounding up”. Telesaurus respectfully asks: If the §414 savings clause does not save and protect claims against a party that is alleged to have wrongfully obtained and used another entity’s frequencies associated with a valid FCC license, then what does it in fact save? Finally, to the extent the state-law claims asserted by Telesaurus against Radiolink are parallel to federal-law claims that could be asserted by Telesaurus under 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 206-207 if 8 Radiolink were deemed to be a common carrier, logic dictates that these claims should not be preempted. See Riegel, at 330; Bates, at 447; Lohr, at 495. In other words, Telesaurus maintains that it would be anomalous for a party that has engaged in unjust and unreasonable practices that would
Under 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(1), common carriers cannot be exempted from sections 201, 202 or 208 of the FCA. As such, all common carriers are potentially liable for unjust and unreasonable practices under 47 U.S.C. §201.
28 typically be actionable under both the FCA and state common-law, to escape all liability, simply on account of the fact that it claims not to be a common carrier. Fraudulent and misleading practices have been deemed by the FCC to be per se unjust and unreasonable practices under §201. See, e.g., In re: Silv Communication, Inc., 25 FCC Rcd 5178 13 (2010); In re NOS Communications, Inc., 18 FCC Rcd 6952 22 (2003); In re Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 9 14 FCC Rcd 13786, 13802 (1999). As discussed, Radiolink is alleged to have engaged in false and misleading practices by fraudulently obtaining the VPC Frequencies from the FCC. Accordingly, Telesaurus should have been permitted to proceed with state-law claims arising out of Radiolink’s false and misleading practices. For each of these reasons, the conflict of authority with respect to the scope of FCA preemption should be resolved in favor of a narrow view of preemption. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, this petition should be granted.
Furthermore, this Court has held that actions deemed to be “unjust and unreasonable” practices under §201(b) of the FCA may give rise to a cause of action under §206-07. See Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. 550 U.S. 45 (2007).
29 Respectfully submitted, /s/Tamir Damari Tamir Damari (Counsel of Record) Patrick Richard Nossaman, LLP 50 California Street 34th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 438-7278 tdamari@nossaman.com Counsel for Telesaurus
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Sign up to vote on this titleUsefulNot usefulTelesaurus Petition for Cert, US Supreme Court, Re Preemption of "Entry"Under 47 USC 332 by Skybridge Spectrum Foundation0.0 (0)EmbedDownloadDescriptionTelesaurus v. Power, Telesaurus petition for cert filed April 2011. This case is important since the US Supreme Court should correct the the US 9th Circuit (in this case) and other courts that err ...Telesaurus v. Power, Telesaurus petition for cert filed April 2011. This case is important since the US Supreme Court should correct the the US 9th Circuit (in this case) and other courts that err in finding (with a split as to courts that find otherwise) that wireless competitors and consumers cannot protect themselves, and fair competition, by suing under state-law torts and to protect contract rights, a FCC-licensed wireless operator, based on the preemption clause under section 332 of the Communications Act (47 USC § 332(c)(3)(A)) that preempts "state regulation" of "rates" and "entry" into the wireless market. The questions the petition presents are: 1. Are Telesaurus’s state-law damages claims for fraud, tortious interference with contractual relations and conversion, state “regulation” of rates and market entry, and, thus preempted under U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)? 2. Are Telesaurus’s state-law damages claims for fraud, tortious interference with contractual relations and conversion against Radiolink, for procuring and using Telesaurus’s exclusive FCC-licensed frequencies, preempted under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), even though, at the time suit was initiated, the relevant licensed frequencies to Radiolink had been revoked by the FCC and recognized by the FCC as having been invalidly- granted in the first instance? 3. Are Telesaurus’s state-law damages claims for fraud, tortious interference with contractual relations and conversion against Radiolink (brought in federal court on diversity grounds) state regulation of “rates” or “market entry” under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)? 4. What is the extent of recourse that a plaintiff has under state law against a defendant-FCC licensee, where a dispute exists between the parties as to whether the defendant is a common-carrier subject to liability under federal law pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §206-207? Interests: Types, Government & PoliticsRead on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Copyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)Download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentShow moreShow less
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