Source: https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/BO/
Timestamp: 2018-08-14 06:30:17
Document Index: 594322448

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.18', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 25', 'Art. 50', 'arty 3', 'Art. 22']

Bolivia's political finance regime, due to recent reforms, does not include direct public funding for political parties or candidates. Political advertising is regulated by the electoral authority, which assures free, equitable access to public media advertising slots for all electoral competitors. Non-financial state resources are frequently abused in Bolivia, especially by MAS, the current ruling party. Very few legal restrictions on contribution and expenditure exist: spending during campaigns is not capped, while limits on individual and corporate donations apply only to contributions to parties. In consequence, parties and candidates are largely privately funded, though MAS avails itself of public resources, legally and illegally, on a regular basis. Reporting requirements mandate that parties submit detailed pre and post election reports on their finances, as well as annual reports. Candidates are under no such obligations. In practice, party reports are quite detailed, and include an itemized list of contributions and contributors. None of that information, however, is made available to the public in any format. As a result, the media does not use official political finance data in its reporting. The independent political activities of third party vehicles, such as social organizations and groups of public employees, are not regulated, despite their presence in the electoral landscape. The Bolivian oversight authority, the Electoral Court (TSE), has no explicit investigatory powers in law. Appointments to that body are supposed to be independent and merit-based, but the MPT evidence suggests that they are often, in practice, compromised. The TSE does not investigate potential violations of political finance laws, but it can and does penalize parties for failing to submit their financial reports in the prescribed format. Because the TSE is subordinated to MAS, enforcement is highly uneven.
The current laws (Constitution, Laws 018 and 026) do not provide public funding for electoral campaigns. The new Constitution (2009) cancelled the public funding for electoral campaigns that had previously been included in the Electoral Law of 1997, the Political Parties Law of 1999, and the amended Political Parties Law of 2005. In 2008 the new government headed by Evo Morales, the first indigenous president of Bolivia, decided to transfer resources previously provided as electoral funding to the Disabled Persons Association.
The electoral laws apply:
a) for all the elections in Bolivia: national, subnational and legislative elections.
b) for parties and their respective candidates (no individual could participate without a party, citizen group or indigenous population (it is useful to say that the Constitution promulgated in 1961 enabled just the political parties as the unique mechanism for compete in elections. In reality, the Decree, 04315, 1956, enabled this for the first time in the Article 156. This permission was consolidated in the 1961 Constitution, that in the article 45 says: "the representation will be executed through the political parties". Just the new Constitution promulgated in 2004 broke this representation monopoly, allowing the participation of citizen groups and indigenous populations in article 222.
Individual candidates must be members of a specific party, citizen group, or indigenous population to compete in campaigns. Nevertheless, the Constitution promulgated in 1994, enabled the election of diputados uninominales (deputies elected directly in specific territories. Half of the lower chamber deputies are elected this way, but always within a party) that could deploy their own electoral campaigns. Even the abrogated laws never provided state funding for individual candidates.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree - There is currently NO public funding of campaigns, since the 2009 Constitution and Laws 018 and 026. Bolivia is a centralized state (despite significant decentralization at various local levels). All elections adhere to a common schedule and under the national laws. So, for example, in 2010 all the countries municipalities and regions had elections on the same day. The only exceptions are infrequent "special" elections (such as the creation of new municipalities in 2012 or to replace Chuquisaca's deposed prefect in 2008).
Despite the end of the "monopoly" held by political parties (with introduction of "citizens organizations" and "indigenous communities"), the reality is still the same (all three categories function the same; the only difference is the threshold needed to gain legal recognition). Candidates can only run if nominated by an organization; there are no indepedent candidacies recognized in Bolivian law.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Regulation 0229, Electoral Advertising, 8 November 2012, http://aclo.org.bo/electoral/index.php/menu-types/normativas-legales/101-reglamento-difusion-de-propaganda-electoral 4) Constitution of Bolivia, 2009, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/bo/bo024es.pdf 5) Jorge Lazarte, "Regulación jurídica de los partidos políticos en Bolivia", in Daniel Zovatto (ed.), Regulación jurídica de los partidos políticos en América Latina, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídica Internacional, IDEA, México, 2006, pp. 243-7. http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/libro.htm?l=2144
Previous electoral laws (1997 and 1999) established a clear mechanism for the distribution of public funding: a) 2,5% of the whole national budget was distributed to eligible parties for national/presidential elections, b) 2% for parties participating in municipal elections, and, c) 0,5% for the rest of the years without elections.
Besides that, the intra-political organization distribution occurred proportionally according to the electoral results of the last election. Finally, those political organizations with less than 3% of all valid votes cast would lose the right to public funding. These regulations were abrogated with the new Constitution 2009 and no public funding is distributed any longer.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Constitution of Bolivia, 2009, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/bo/bo024es.pdf
Not applicable. There is no direct public funding in Bolivia, and no mechanism exists to determine direct public funding for electoral campaigns.
1) a) Regulation 0229, Advertising Regulation, November 2012, http://aclo.org.bo/electoral/index.php/menu-types/normativas-legales/101-reglamento-difusion-de-propaganda-electoral and b) Regulation Special Advertising Regulation for the Judicial Authorities and the Constitutional Court, June 2011, http://isaacavalos.wordpress.com/2011/07/05/reglamento-del-regimen-especial-de-propaganda-para-el/ 2) Carlos Ernesto Ichuta Nina, "Financiamiento a los partidos políticos", La Razón, 29 march 2013, http://www.la-razon.com/opinion/columnistas/Financiamiento-partidos-politicos01804619672.html. 3) Salvador Romero Ballivian, "Sobresaltada historia del financiamiento a partidos", en Suplemento "Animal Político" de La Razón, 16 February 2014, http://www.la-razon.com/suplementos/animalpolitico/Sobresaltada-historia-financiamiento-partidos0_1999000131.html.
Not applicable. There is no electoral public funding in Bolivia.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Salvador Romero Ballivian, "Sobresaltada historia del financiamiento a partidos", en Suplemento "Animal Político" de La Razón, 16 February 2014, http://www.la-razon.com/suplementos/animalpolitico/Sobresaltada-historia-financiamiento-partidos0_1999000131.html. 4) D. Zovatto, "Contenidos de una nueva ley de organizaciones políticas en Bolivia", en Programa de las Naciones Unidas/Unidad de Gobernabilidad Democrática, Workshop "Nueva Ley de Organizaciones Políticas en Bolivia", from 12 to 14 December 2012, La Paz. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PfZas7O2Y-U&list=UUAnJ6YDINNLw-VfDuuRSwvA&index=6&feature=plcp.
Articles 125 and 126 of Law 026/2010 prohibt the use of state goods, resources, and services in electoral campaigns, and mandate the public servants may not use public institutions or their resources for the purposes of electoral propaganda. No distinction is made between parties and candidates.
1) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf
There are several cases in which MAS, the governing party, has been accused of using state resources in its electoral campaigns. For example, Iván Arias states that, in the most recent election, MAS candidates, including the president Evo Morales, used public vehicles to campaign, and compelled state employees to both attend rallies and contribute 10-20% of their wages to the campaign. Further, the Democratic Unity Party has filed a complaint with the Electoral Court in which it argues that MAS used state resources in at least 13 discrete cases during the last campaign.
Jimena Costa argues that state resources are regular features of electoral campaigns, and that MAS and Morales frequently contravene the law in blatant ways, but that the Electoral Court refuses to impose meaningful sanctions or punish the party. One exception is the recent case in which MAS was fined for abusing public media for campaign purposes, while in another incident, a MAS candidate attended a campaign event during work hours.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. The TSE has been pretty fair in its oversight of the use of state resources during electoral campaigns. For example, it sanctioned Morales after he solicited votes while presenting a new public work in early August. Also in August, the TSE ordered state tv to remove an attack ad against an opposition candidate. However, because sanctions aren't heavy, candidates violated provisions against the use of state resources.
1) Interview with Jimena Costa, ex-polytical analyst, candidate to the National Congress for Democratic Unity, the main opposition party for the presidential election in october 2014, September 2014. 2) Beatriz Layme, "Unidad Demócrata presentó 13 denuncias por delito electoral contra el MAS", Page 7, 15 August 2014. http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/8/15/presento-denuncias-delitos-electorales-contra-29441.html 3) Interview with Iván Arias, electoral adviser for the ex-president Tuto Quiroga, former candidate to the presidency with the Christian Democratic Party. 4) "Tribunal Electoral sancional al MAS y a Bolivia Televisión con 130 mil a cada uno." Noticias, 26 August, 2014; http://www.noticias.com.bo/politica/tse-sanciona-al-mas-y-bolivia-tv-con-mas-de-bs130-mil-a-cada-uno/ 5) Portal Bolivia Decide, "Ministra Morales hace campaña en horas de trabajo", September 2014, http://boliviadecide.blogspot.com/2014/09/politica-ministra-morales-en-campana.html
Secondary source: 4) Academic essay published by Fernando Molina, "El MAS en el centro de la política boliviana", en Alberto García and Fernando García (coord.), Mutaciones del campo político en Bolivia, Programa de las Naciones Unidas, La Paz, 2010, pp. 241-302.
Reviewer's sources: "Tribunal investiga la campana de dos candidatos," La Razon, 16 August 2014. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Elecciones-Tribunal-investiga-campana-candidatos02108189194.html
"El TSE instruye el retiro del spot sobre el 50-50," La Razon, 20 August 2014. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Elecciones-TSE-instruye-retiro-spot-50-5002110588962.html
"Evo presenta candidatos ‘aunque sea sancionado," La razon, 23 August 2014. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Elecciones-Evo-presenta-candidatos-sancionado02112388786.html
Article 19 of Regulation 0229 says that state media must grant free and equal air time with the same schedule to all political organizations and alliances in all electoral processes. Further, in the 45 days preceding election day, the TSE must draft and publish a strict schedule in which free, equitable access to public media is granted to all political organizations, and political alliances (and to civil society organizations during recall campaigns and referenda).
It is necessary to say that this right was already included in the Law 1983. See Art.18, VI: "a recognized right for all the parties or alliances of parties, is the right to access to equitable air time for electoral campaigns."
Finally, in accordance with the Regulation 0229, no single candidate has the right to do an electoral campaign, but the Plurinational Electoral Court gives to the population, through the public media, the whole information about the personal backrounds and professional achievements of the candidates.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Regulation 0229, Electoral Advertising, November 2012, Art. 19. See the web page http://www.oep.org.bo/index.php/marco-normativo/reglamentos for downloading the following archive: "Reglamento difusión de propaganda electoral" 4) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf
According to Andrés Gómez, a former supporter of Evo Morales who now criticizes the government in his regular column in the newspaper Página 7, indigenous radios display a clear bias in their broadcasting of electoral propoganda in favor of the current president. Further, The National Media Observation Unit (ONADEM) warns that public media is regularly abused in Bolivian elections, including the 2005, 2009, and 2013 elections. Finally, Ayo and Massi show that the government exercises excessive control of public and private media, something that Peñaranda also documents in his recent book, and in the New Chronicle article below.
Nonetheless, is necessary to say that at the beginning of the current "revolutionary" process in 2005, Evo Morales´ party ran a "poor campaign", almost without resources (Sivak 2008). At this time, MAS was in charge of just some local governments in Cochabamba. That means that the electoral competition was unequal (in this case, against Evo Morales), including the access to air time (interview with Vania Sandóval, november 2012). Anyway, since 2005, Bolivia has had at least one election each year, and in some of them (for example the Constituent Assembly or the Departamental Autonomies Referendum, both in 2006), the competition was, to some degree, fair.
As Iván Arias said "mainly in presidential elections, the competition is clearly uneven". During his first administration, Evo Morales did not have the control of the Senate. It was only once he won both chambers that MAS was able to initiate a "hyperpresidential" stage (interview with Erica Brockmann, August 2013, La Paz), "invading all public spaces". The worst moment of this gradual rising process of taking control of those public spheres, was the last presidential election, in which MAS received more than equal access to advertising in public media, according to interview sources. In sum, then, for the most part, MAS and its candidates have been allocated more air time for electoral advertising than opposition parties. This has occurred in contravention of the law.
Peer reviewer comment: Disagree. Suggests a score of 75. In principle, the research is correct, since state media tends to back the government. However, the law in question (Item #7) refers to specific "spots" made available to all candidates. In practice, this was carried out. The law required that each party have access to a 30 second spot, shown 6 time a day, during the 20 day period that lasted up to 72 hours before the election (when all campaigning must cease). The TSE regulation also required that three of those spots be shown on Bolivia's equivalent of prime time. Also, each party was allowed a 12-page insert in the state newspaper, Cambio.
However, the law only provides access to the spots; it doesn't provide funds to create campaign materials. In particular, the Green Party did not have resources and opted for relying on grafiti and other "on the ground" activities.
In addition, the TSE imposed regulations on private media access for campaigns. Each party was limited to 12 pages per week in newspaper solicitations and 12 minutes of television, with no spot to exceed 35 seconds.
1) Interview with Andrés Gómez Vela, director of ERBOL (one of the theree biggest radios in Bolivia), 2 September 2014, La Paz. 2) Interview with Vania Sandóval, ONADEM media expert, 20 September 2014. 3) Interview with Iván Arias, 24 September 2014. 4) Interview with Erika Brockmann, ex Senator, 22 August 2014. 5) ONADEM/UNIR (National Media Observatory/Fundation UNIR). See Bernardo Poma, "Perfil de la Programación Oficial boliviana", en Medios a la vista 3, Fundación Unir, La Paz, 2014. For a summary http://onadembolivia.blogspot.com/. 6) Diego Massi y Diego Ayo, "Más control remoto. El uso y el abuso gubernamental de la publicidad" (article not published), August, 2014. 7) Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno, "¿Hay un control estatal de los medios?", en Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno, No. 142, La Paz, April 2014; http://institutoprisma.org/joomla/images/NC/nueva%20cronica%20142.pdf 8) Raúl Peñaranda, Control remoto, no edition, La Paz, 2014. For a summary, see: http://www.raulpenaranda.net/
Reviewer's sources: "La propaganda gratuita comienza con Quiroga," La Razon, September 19, 2014. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Elecciones-propaganda-gratuita-comienza-Quiroga02128587162.html
"MAS, MSM, PDC y UD llegan a medios;?el PVB opta por las calles" La Razon, September 13, 2014. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Elecciones-MAS-MSM-PDC-UD-medios-PVB-calles02124987546.html
"Reglamento de Difusion de Propoganda Electoral," TSE Regulation. 2012. http://tse.oep.org.bo/index.php/marco-normativo/reglamentos?download=179:reglamento-de-difusion-de-propaganda-electoral
Law 1983 on Political Parties (1999), Art. 25, IV and and also the Project Law of Political Parties and Political Organizations, Art. 50, 1 (a draft law that has yet to be passed), authorize personal donations and contributions without any other explanation.
It is important to say that the project law was discussed for almost 2 years, but the government has decided not to promulgate it. Further, current laws do not restrict cash contributions.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf 4) Project of Law of the new Political Parties and Organizations, UNDP Bolivia, 2012. http://www.bo.undp.org/content/dam/bolivia/docs/prodocs/PRODOC72408P.POLITICOS.pdf
Article 51 of Law 1983 on Political Parties bans anonymous contributions to parties. However, that same article states that anonymous contributions made through public collections are permitted.
Salvador Romero Ballivian, the former president of the TSE, confirms that all provisions of Law 1983, with the exception of those that deal with public funding, remain in effect.
Further, Juan Carlos Pinto, a former member of the TSE, confirms that anonymous contributions are permitted because public collections allow anonymous contributions to occur.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf 4) Interview with Salvador Romero Ballivian, former president of the TSE, 10 December, 2014. 5) Interview with Juan Carlos Pinto, chief of the Intercultural Service for Strengthening the Democracy/Plurinational Electoral Court, 3 September 2014, in a flight from La Paz to Cochabamba.
The current laws, including Law 026, 018, and 1983, do not mandate that in kind donations must be reported.
Law 1983 stipulates that the party assets are the following: a) party members' contributions, b) the properties of the party (houses, cars, etc.), c) own money collections and d) public funding. Nothing was said about in-kind contributions.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf
No law mandates that loans must be reported.
Article 51 of Law 1983 on Political Parties limits individual contributions to less than 10% of a party's annual budget. Current laws do not restrict contributions to candidates, though article 46 of Law 026 states that, in order to be eligibile for an elected post, candidates must be members of "a political organization, or when applicable, a nation, or indigenous community."
1) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 2) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf
Article 51 of Law 1983 clearly states that no single donation from any source can exceed 10% of the party's annual budget. This prohibition applies to corporations, though they're not specifically mentioned. Limits on donations to candidates are not mentioned.
Article 51 of Law 1983 states that parties may not receive contributions from foreign governments or foreign legal entitites (in this latter case, "technical assistance" may be accepted). However, contributions from foreign individuals are not mentioned. Contributions to candidates are not regulated.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. Article 51 bans foreign donations, although the phrasing seems to cover only state entities and legal persons (so donations from citizens of foreign states is allowed, from my reading).
Current laws do not mention third party actors. It is necessary to mention that the new law in discussion (the new project of law of political parties and political organizations), addresses this topic. In Article 59 of the draft law, many prohibitions are included: "the political organizations could not receive a) contributions that were given by any foreign government or NGsO, b) foreign people, c) illegal donations, d) donations from religious organizations, e) contributions from subnational governments, f) contributions from enterprises that worked for any government in any terrotorial level, g) and contributions from unions, public employees or owning casinos.
That means that the political class is perfectly conscious of the holes in existing regulation in these fields, but no legislation has yet been passed to fill these holes. The main reason for this, according to Iván Arias, is that the current government "won't give even a dollar for any opposite organization, party, media, NGOs, or whatever" (interview with Iván Arias, 12 August 2014).
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf 4) Project of Law of the new Political Parties and Organizations, UNDP Bolivia, 2012. http://www.bo.undp.org/content/dam/bolivia/docs/prodocs/PRODOC72408P.POLITICOS.pdf 5) Interview with Iván Arias, 24 September 2014, La Paz.
Laws currently in effect do not mention any campaign spending limits.
Salvador Romero Ballivián, ex president of the National Electoral Court, and the most prestigious professor in Bolivia in this field, stated "maybe some articles of the law 1983 are valid, but now that is not important. What is important is what the government says is valid." In any case, campaign expenditures are not limited.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. There was never any limit on campaign spending. Parties can spend as much of their money (and state money, previously) as they want.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 3) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf 4) Interview with Salvador Romero Ballivian, former president of the TSE, 10 December, 2014.
The Constitution, in article 208, says that the institution in charge of all electoral processes is the Plurinational Electoral Court. In addition, in chapter 8, which details the distribution of responsibilities to the subnational level, article 298 says that the central government is exclusively responsible for all electoral events (this exclusive responsibility allows the central government to delegate the regulation and management of to other units of government in one case only: if the central government wants to delegate.)
Article 299, however, says that the responsibility for electoral processes is shared between the central and subnational governments, as subnational units have the right to legislate or co-legislate what the National Assembly has promulgated as a law. The right to develop the applicable legislation is based on the national "umbrella" law. In sum, this means that the subnational governments could, should they so choose, design their own "constitutions"--via Departmental Statues (at the department level) and Organic Charters (at the municipal level), which may include details about authorizing and using public/private funds in election campaings. Willian Bascopé, an expert in constitutional law, confirms, stating, "Of course subnational levels could allow the organization of electoral processes, including the right to contribute to specific political organizations."
Peer reviewer comment: Agree - The national laws regulate all election levels. Law 018 also suggests that departmental electoral courts could have some autonomy, but only to implement the appropriate norms and statutes. However, they remain subordinate to the national TSE.
Theoretically, departments (or even municipalities) could allow for public financing of political organizations within their territories. In practice, that seems unlikely (such laws would likely be struck down by the national government). But even if they were allowed, this would still be limited to only local-level public financing. At present, I know of no such examples.
1) Interview with Willian Bascopé, legal analyst, 6 September 2014, La Paz.
2) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 3) Constitution of Bolivia, 2009, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/bo/bo024es.pdf
The predominant sources of campaign funding for opposition parties and candidates are their own private resources, though everyone takes advantage of all the public tools available, including public media, subnational resources disguised as social or productive investments, etc. Indeed, the political advisors of the Democratic Unity and Christian Democratic Party admitted that the main source of their funding is not just private money/party-owned enterprises, but the personal finances of their candidates. This is especially obvious in the case of Samuel Doria Media, a cement magnate who is one of the richest individuals in Bolivia. Conversely, according to Iván Arias, Tuto Quiroga, an ex President, claims that, "he has no money, everything is because of the generosity of the people."
MAS, the governing party, however, takes advantage of all public resources available, both legal and illegal. For example, the National Electoral Court fined the Minister of Productive Development, Teresa Morales, because she used public cars in campaign events. The use of public resources by MAS was further confirmed by a release of an audio tape from a Senatorial candidate from the Movement Without Fear, which showed that, the President had authorized enormous expenses for the organization of the G77 Summit in order to suppress the population of Santa Cruz, a hotbed of anti-administration sentiment in Bolivia.
It is important to note that abuse of public resources is not limited to MAS. Parties and candidates who are elected figures at the local level have also been accused of (and sanctioned for) using public resources in campaigns. The reality, of course, is that MAS controls more public resources (the national government and the lion's share of department and municipal governments), and so engages in more frequent abuses.
1) Interview with Tommy Durán, political adviser of the presidential candidate for Democratic Unity, 3 September, 2014, La Paz 2) Interview with Iván Arias, political adviser of the presidential candidate for the Christian Democratic Party, Tuto Quiroga, 3 September, 2014, La Paz. 3) Interview with Juan Carlos Pinto, chief of the Intercultural Service for Strengthening the Democracy/Plurinational Electoral Court, 3 September 2014, in a flight from La Paz to Cochabamba. 4) The Plurinational Electoral Report that gives the MAS a financial punishment, Noticias, 26 August, 2014. "Tribunal Electoral sancional al MAS y a Bolivia Televisión con 130 mil a cada uno." http://www.noticias.com.bo/politica/tse-sanciona-al-mas-y-bolivia-tv-con-mas-de-bs130-mil-a-cada-uno/ 5) The audio of Evo Morales, Página Siete, 29 August, 2014. "Un supuesto audio de Evo: "la G77 es la mejor campaña del MAS." http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/8/29/supuesto-audio-evo-mejor-campana-30786.html
There are no expenditure limits in Bolivia. However, violations of other political finance laws are frequent. In accordance with the interpretation of Tuto Quiroga, ex president of Bolivia and current candidate "for one sanction imposed on the MAS, there are at least one hundred infractions not even registered by this bought Court." For example, the president is traveling around the country with the public airplane, participating in public inaugurations; two, MAS ministers are doing the same with their official cars; three, the bolivian ambassadors abroad are working for the re-election of Morales with the whole bolivian migrant-population", (see Tuto Quiroga en Bolivia Tv (source 8)).
The Plurinational Court's recent decision to sanction MAS because of their use of public resources in campaign events further demonstrates that, in contravention of the law, the governing party uses state resources during campaigns.
Finally the Plurinational Electoral Court's promuglation of Resolution 347 (which prohibits the use of images of the candidates one month earlier that the electoral day "because those images have been us, against the law, to discredit the rivals"), which was made in response to MAS's abuse of public media in campaigns.
1) Interview with Tommy Durán, political adviser of the presidential candidate for Democratic Unity, 3 September, 2014, La Paz 2) Interview with Iván Arias, political adviser of the presidential candidate for the Christian Democratic Party, Tuto Quiroga, 3 September, 2014, La Paz. 3) Interview with Juan Carlos Pinto, chief of the Intercultural Service for Strengthening the Democracy/Plurinational Electoral Court, 3 September 2014, in a flight from La Paz to Cochabamba. 4) Interview with Yerco Ilich, member of the Movement without Fear and polical analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz 5) Interview with Marcelo Silva, political analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz 6) The Plurinational Electoral Report that gives the MAS a financial punishment, Noticias, 26 August, 2014. "Tribunal Electoral sancional al MAS y a Bolivia Televisión con 130 mil a cada uno."
http://www.noticias.com.bo/politica/tse-sanciona-al-mas-y-bolivia-tv-con-mas-de-bs130-mil-a-cada-uno/ 7) The audio of Evo Morales, Página Siete, 29 August, 2014. "Un supuesto audio de Evo: "la G77 es la mejor campaña del MAS." http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/8/29/supuesto-audio-evo-mejor-campana-30786.html 8) BTV report on Tuto Quiroga, 11 August, 2014. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GsOYgTsFaw8 9) Elisa Medrano, "No se puede usar imágenes de candidatos", October 2013. http://www.unidad-nacional.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1345:al-menos-50-observadores-de-la-oea-llegaran-al-pais-para-el-12-de-octubre&catid=19:noticias&Itemid=116
Parties must submit pre and post election reports in which they account for contributions and expenditures.
Article 85 of Law 018/2010 gives the TSE the authority to regulate and monitor the economic resources of political organizations. Article 265 of Law 026/201 mandates that political organizations must, upon registering their participation in electoral campaigns, present their balance sheets, including sources of financing, to the TSE; by the same article, they must present a new balance sheet with detailed information on their electoral expenditures upon the conclusion of campaigns.
Further, by article 266 of the same law, within 60 days of the end of an election, all political organizations, civil society alliances, and indigenous groups that spent on electoral propaganda are obligated to present a detailed account of their income and expenditures on electoral propaganda during the campaign.
According to Article 61 of Law 1983/1999, parties have to report their financial information annually.
Candidates are not required to report any financial information.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. The cited relevant laws do require annual audits of party finances, and that parties must supply accounting documentation. The level of detail for itemization is not specifically mentioned, but it would seem that at least some level of detail is implicitly required. Again, most parts of Ley 1983 are still in effect.
According to article 116 of Law 026/2010, campaign activities are permissible from 90 days prior to elections until 3 days before voting, and the broadcasting of electoral propaganda is permitted from 30 days before the elections until 3 days before voting. Articles 265 and 266 establish that parties must report their financial information before and after elections, or twice in the 90 day campaign period (equivalent to one report each 45 days, or less than monthly).
Individual candidates are not required to report their financial information at any time.
According to Article 61 of Law 1983, parties must submit annual reports to the TSE. No such requirement exists for candidates.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. Individual candidates do not report their finances, since they are candidates for parties (or "civic organizations" or "indigenous communities"). Parties report their financial information on a yearly basis (and more frequently prior during the 90 day election period).
Laws 018 and 026 compel the parties to present a report of financial information prior to and upon the conclusion of electoral campaigns. Law 026 mandates that such reports must be submitted within 60 days after the finalization of the elections. Nonetheless, in practice, parties rarely comply with these regulations. Indeed, according to Marcelo Silva, "political organizations do not deliver their reports until 6, 7, or 8 months prior to the next election, just because they need to do that in order of competing in the new election. They do that paying their respective fines."
However, José Luis Exeni, the first president of the Electoral Court, confirms that the final reports submitted by parties do typically include itemized contributions and expenditures.
1) Interview with Marcelo Silva, political analyst, September, 2014, La Paz 2) Interview with José Luis Exeni, the first president of the Electoral Court, 25 September 2014. 3) Jorge Lazarte en "Cinco vocales del Tribunal Electoral tienen antecedentes políticos", el Deber, 12 January 2014, http://www.eldeber.com.bo/septimo-dia/2014-01-12/ver.php?id=140111114653.
Despite the fact that no single political organization delivers its report in accordance with the legal schedule, submitted reports must be highly detailed in order for parties to participate in the next election. According to Veronica Palenque, "it is a nightmare to do that report. Although they (the employees of the Electoral Court) won't read the whole report, they need to see that the report includes different sections: contribution, in-kind contributions, money received, etc".
Jorge Lazarte confirmed that those reports included donors' names and addresses and also contributions are clearly itemized. "No single party could include any amount of money without specifying the source with all the basic information: names and adresses of donors, source of the resources, etc." But, as Lazarte says, in accordance to the abrogated Party Law, the current stituation is not as demanding as the previous law (Law 1983), which mandated clearly a retreat in the electoral history: that law required parties to submit an audited report (the audit should be done by a private firm) of all the expenses of the campaign.
Peer reviewer comment: The reports seem impossible to obtain, but all accounts suggest that parties and candidates DO file these reports. The reason is that failure to comply can result in losing "juridic personality" (the right to exist). However, the recent (2014) election is the first election without public funding, so it is unclear going forward whether parties will report all of their CAMPAIGN expenses. But prior to this election, they did.
1) Interview with Verónica Palenque, ex chief of the electoral campaign of CONDEPA and deputy of the National Legislative Assembly, 1 September 2014, La Paz.
Secondary source: Interview with Jorge Lazarte, June 2012, La Paz. Jorge Lazarte, "Regulación jurídica en Bolivia", en Daniel Zovatto (coord.), Regulación jurídica de los partidos políticos en América Latina, UNAM/IDEA Internationa, México, 2008, p. 262
Laws 026 and 341 mandate that the financial information of parties must be available to the public, but lack details on how that process should actually occur. Law 026, in its section on "Transitory First Disposition," says that a financial information needs to be available to the public, but that another law dealing specifically with "control and participation" will specify how. The 2013 law, law 341 on Social Participation and Control, in article 20, mandates the Electoral Tribunal to guarantee the delivery of all kinds of electoral information to the people. However, that same article states that exact detail on these requirements will be explained in another law. No such law, to date, has been passed.
Further, Law 1983, in article 63, states that the TSE will publish in the Official Gazette and in a national newspaper the approved resolutions on each party report (not the reports themselves). No further guidelines are available.
1) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 2) Law 341, Social Participation and Control, 5 February 2013, http://www.transparencia.gob.bo/data/botoneriaderecha/bt20131009_04.pdf 3) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf
The expert in the field, Raúl Maydana says that the both Law 026 and Law 341 are positive developments because they address some general aspects of transparency, control and participation, but that the stipulations of these laws have no relation with what actually happens in practice. Maydana says, "No, we have worked a lot getting consensus with the people in every single article. Mainly in the last law, all the social organizations participated in the elaboration of the final product. I was happy. I have to admit that the final draft was far from our intentions, but I also have to accept that this draft is the result of a big process of deliberation. Nonetheless, now those laws are resting in the libraries of Congress without any effect on people's lives. The reason is clear: the current government doesn't abide by the law, and hides every detail that could generate media scandals."
Financial information is not available online or digitally. But, as said by Marcelo Arequipa, a poitical researcher that worked in the National Electoral Court (2006-2008), the information is complete "if you get it". The problem is not with the quality of the information, but with the possibility of having access to that. You need to send a letter to the Electoral Court and they will decide if you get the information. Maybe you are going to wait some months and get it. That's your best scenario, in my experience. The worst is just to wait your whole life."
Fernanda Wanderley, a professor in Bolivia, says that: "there is no control. The government does not even want to deliver the Census (2012) information and other data that could damage its image. The information we used, for example, to analyze the health in Bolivia were delivered in 2010." Political information is even less available.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. Even as a researcher with a long trajectory working with the CNE (the predecesor of the OEP), obtaining information that is not available electronically is extremely difficult. The OEP library is closed for long periods of time, the archives are rarely open, and requesting any information requires a letter of requent directly to the OEP director. A persistent researcher CAN obtain information such information, but it's unlikely a for a "regular citizen."
This is actually the one area where the MAS government has clearly failed. Transparency has been a pet project of VP Garcia Linera, and there is much greater access to laws and other government statutes and regulations than ever before. However, this is not the case with political parties and election materials.
1) Interview with Raúl Maydana, expert in the filed of control and participacion, co-designer of both laws, 7 September, 2014, La Paz. 2) Interview with Marcelo Arequipa, Bolivian political expert, 24 September 2014, La Paz.
Secondary source: Interview with Fernanda Wanderley, professor in University San Andrés, Phd in Standford, February 2012, La Paz.
The three experts interviewed agree that there is no financial information published (much less in a standardized format). María Teresa Zegada, prestigious professor of University San Simón, concurs in her weekly column published in Página Siete.
1) Interview with Jimena Costa, ex-polytical analyst, candidate to the National Congress for Democratic Unity, the main opposition party for the presidential election in October, 2014. 2) Interview with Iván Arias, electoral adviser for the ex-president Tuto Quiroga, former candidate to the presidency with the Christian Democratic Party, 24 September, 2014. 3) Interview with Willian Bascopé, 6 September 2014, La Paz. 4) María Teresa Zegada, "Recursos para las elecciones", in Página 7, 20 February 2014, http://www.paginasiete.bo/opinion/2014/2/20/recursos-para-elecciones-14387.html
The three experts interviewed agree that there is no financial information published (much less in a standardized format). María Teresa Zegada, prestigious professor of University San Simón, concurs in her weekly column published in Página Siete. The National Media Observatory (ONADEM), over the past few years, has published three books about the work of the radios, television, internet in Bolivia during elections, but has never used official information in its analyses.
For example, in the book Seeing the Media 2, of the 25 articles published, only two are related to elections, and neither of those even tangentially addresses political finance issues. Besides that the first book published Seeing the Media 1 (2009) reported that the media devoted 85% of its coverage to sensationalism, political fights, and celebrities, with only a marginal focus on elections coverage, much less electoral finance issues.
1) Interview with Jimena Costa, ex-polytical analyst, candidate to the National Congress for Democratic Unity, the main opposition party for the presidential election in October, 2014. 2) Interview with Iván Arias, electoral adviser for the ex-president Tuto Quiroga, former candidate to the presidency with the Christian Democratic Party 3) Interview with Willian Bascopé, 6 September 2014, La Paz. 4) María Teresa Zegada, "Recursos para las elecciones", in Página 7, 20 February 2014, http://www.paginasiete.bo/opinion/2014/2/20/recursos-para-elecciones-14387.html
Secondary source: Fundación Unir/Observatorio Nacional de Medios; Medios a la vista 2, Fundación Unir, La Paz, 2011.http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br/download/674MON009.pdf
The two experts (Costa and Arias) said that there are few news reports or other documented incidents of violation or abuse of political finance laws. However, at least one news report (included as source 4), describes the MAS's use of public resources for electoral purposes, for which it was sanctioned by the Electoral Court, while another shows that a MAS candidate violated political finance laws (source 5).
More frequent are a number of denunciations of the political opposition against the governmental party, the MAS. Such denunciations are also directed towards the Plurinational Electoral Court, which has been accused of supporting MAS illegally. Vania Sandoval, a journalist at the National Media Observatory, corroborated that, saying that the reports they pubished never include any kind of financial electoral information because the Court will not release such information to ONADEM. Indeed, Sandoval reports: "we asked for that in the Electoral Court but they never sent us what they have promised."
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. Most of the reports of violations refer to broader campaign violations, not particularly those related to financing. But the media did frequently report denunciations by opposition candidates of MAS abusing its incumbency advantage by using public resources (although there were also reports about abuses by other parties).
1) Interview with Jimena Costa, ex-polytical analyst, currently she is candidate to the National Congress for Democratic Unity, the main opposition party for the presidential election in October, 2014. 2) Interview with Iván Arias, electoral adviser for the ex-president Tuto Quiroga, former candidate to the presidency with the Christian Democratic Party, 3 September, 2014, La Paz. 3) Interview with Vania Sandóval, journalist who works for the National Media Observatory, January 2013, La Paz. 4) "Tribunal Electoral sancional al MAS y a Bolivia Televisión con 130 mil a cada uno." Noticias, 26 August, 2014; http://www.noticias.com.bo/politica/tse-sanciona-al-mas-y-bolivia-tv-con-mas-de-bs130-mil-a-cada-uno/ 5) Portal Bolivia Decide, "Ministra Morales hace campaña en horas de trabajo", September 2014, http://boliviadecide.blogspot.com/2014/09/politica-ministra-morales-en-campana.html
Reviewer's sources: "MAS y MSM vulneraron la ley municipal de propaganda," La Razon, September 6, 2014. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Elecciones-MAS-MSM-vulneraron-ley-municipal-propaganda02120787948.html
"TSE determina suspender spot de MSM en el que se ve al ex dictador Luis García Meza," La Razon, September 27, 2014. http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/TSE-MSM-Luis-Garcia-Meza02133386714.html
Tuto Quiroga filed a complaint with the Organization of American States (to Álvaro Colom, president of this institution), reporting that the current president, Evo Morales, was reelected unconstitutionally, that public funds were illegally used to support the Morales campaign, and that the Morales campaign engaged in widespread vote-buying. Quiroga was unable to provide firm evidence to support his accusations of vote buying, and though rumors are widespread, it's unclear whether firm evidence conclusively demonstrates that vote buying occurred during the most recent elections.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. There have always been accusations of vote buying (or even vote bullying, such as by organizations reminding their communities to vote unanimously). However, these are very difficult to prove. One related issue, however, is that MAS was "buying" opposition candidates and political operatives, often offering future appointments if they would defect. In the last month or so of the campaign, there were several very public defections to the party. Clear proof of vote buying, however, is not available.
"Bartolinas" en Potosí anuncian control para evitar voto cruzado en elecciones" , La Razon, 17 September 2014, http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Bartolinas-Potosi-control-cruzado-elecciones02127387351.html
"Abel Mamani dice “sí” a Evo y rompe su alianza con el MSM", Pagina, 31 July, 2014, http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/8/13/abel-mamani-dice-si-rompe-alianza-29257.html
"Candidata a senadora del MSM pasa a las filas del MAS", La Razon, 27 August 2014, http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Candidata-senadora-MSM-pasa-filas02114788598.html
1) Different private and public media reported the news about Tuto Quiroga´s denunciation to the Organization of American States; for example, Agencia Nacional Fides, "Tuto denuncia en OEA reelección de Evo", http://www.noticiasfides.com/g/politica/tuto-denuncia-la-re-reeleccion-de-evo-ante-mision-de-la-oea--27075/ 2) Interview with Iván Arias, electoral adviser for the ex-president Tuto Quiroga, former candidate to the presidency with the Christian Democratic Party, 24 September 2014, La Paz. 3) "Del Granado acusa al MAS de ‘comprar’ dirigentes opositores", La Razon, 23 September 2014, http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Elecciones-DelGranado-acusa-comprar-dirigentes-opositores0_2130986887.html
The conclusion among the experts is that no civil society organization works with officially published information, as no such information is in fact published.
1) Interview with Waldo Albarracín, ex Ombudsman, 4 September 2014, La Paz. 2) Interview with Ana Kudelka, Director of Gender in Swiss Help Organization, 6 September, La Paz, 2014. 3) Interview with Erika Brockmann, ex senator of Bolivia, expert in topics related to civil society, control and participation, 6 September 2014, La Paz.
In the past ten years, several laws have reformed political finance legislation in Bolivia. First, the 2009 Constitution abolished direct public funding for political parties, and Law 3925, passed in 2008, channeled public resources previously allocated to political parties to the Fund for Disabled Persons.
Laws 018 and 0126, both passed in 2010, reduced the reporting requirements for financial parties. A draft Project Law, which would have expanded the funding sources of political organizations, and helped opposition parties obtain more funding, was supported by the United Nations. The UN hosted many workshops on this potential draft law, and hired a number of consultants to come up with and finalize a draft version of the law, which would have significantly affected campaign finance rules in Bolivia. The Vice President publicly expressed his support for the initiative, but according to one of the consultants involved in developing the draft law, the VP, Álvaro García Linera, was clear, ordering that the opposition not be permitted to obtain any more funding, and that "the draft should disappear." Indeed, this anonymous source further reports that, despite a year of hard work on a draft, the government failed to bring any tenet of the draft law forward for official consideration. Carlos Camargo, the expert in charge of the UNDP effort, argued that a redesigned law was crucial in light of the new constitution, because "the current process allows not just representative democracy, but the communitarian/ethnic, direct/plebiscitarian and decentralized democracy. So, it is urgent to design a new law" to account for this new legal features of the system.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree - The current government is opposed to public financing for political organizations. The argument is that parties use these funds in order to "leach off of" the public. In addition to the UN, the Dutch Foundation for Multiparty Democracy (fBDM) has also worked on capacity -building for political parties, including teaching them to manage finances. A lot of the government's animosity towards public funding for parties comes from (a) a fundamental misunderstanding of the role political parties play in modern democracy and (b) resentment of the lack of funding MAS was given in its early days from the then-CNE because of legal hurdles.
Many public forums on political finance issues have been hosted by think tanks and relevant NGOs in Bolivia.
1) Law 3925, Creation of the Fund for Disabled Persons, 21 August 2008. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley3925.pdf 2) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 3) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 4) Project of Law of the new Political Parties and Organizations, UNDP Bolivia, 2012. http://www.bo.undp.org/content/dam/bolivia/docs/prodocs/PRODOC72408P.POLITICOS.pdf 5) Interview with Marcelo Arequipa, expert on Bolivian politics, 24 September, 2014, La Paz. 6) Interview with Carlos Camarga, head of UNDP Bolivia reform project, November 2012, Cochachamba.
Reviewer's sources: "Comineza el debate para la elaboración de una nueva Ley de Organizaciones Políticas en Bolivia," Governability.org, 2014. http://www.gobernabilidad.org.bo/noticias/2-noticias/1655-ley-de-organizaciones-politicas-en-bolivia
"TSE prepara Ley de Partidos Políticos", Hoy Bolivia, 14 May, 2013, http://www.hoybolivia.com/Noticia.php?IdNoticia=81478
"Ley de Organizaciones Políticas debe enlazar la complejidad democrática", La Razon, 19 August, 2012, http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/suplementos/animalpolitico/Ley-Organizaciones-Politicas-complejidad-democratica01671432902.html
No law requires third party actors to report financial information to the electoral oversight authority.
1) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 2) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Tribunal, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 3) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf
No third-party organizations report on campaign contributions and expenditures, much less to an oversight authority.
1) Interview with Juan Carlos Pinto, chief of the Intercultural Service for Strengthening the Democracy/Plurinational Electoral Court, 3 September 2014, in a flight from La Paz to Cochabamba. 2) Interview with Yerco Ilich, member of the Movement without Fear and polical analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz 3) interview with Marcelo Silva, political analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz
Sources concur that the financial information of third party actors is not available to the public in Boliva.
The primary network of NGOs in Bolivia, the Network of Social Participation and Social Control (RPCS), is dedicated to promoting transparency and accountability throughout the country and among legal entities. However, even in its platform, the RPCS does not mention electoral resources. No prominent third party actors make their financial information available to the public.
For example, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which has done a great deal of research on electoral reform and civil society in Bolivia, concluded that the Electoral Court is not interested in supervising the activities of third party actors. According to Raul Maydana, third party actors make no financial information publicly available, saying, "That's a dream." As a result, no journalists have had the opportunity to investigate such issues. Ivan Arias states, "The worst thing is that no one is investigating [third party actors and their electoral activities]. Now, precisely now, during this campaign, we should have thousands of journalists doing that, but the reality is that no one cares.
1) Interview with Juan Carlos Pinto, chief of the Intercultural Service for Strengthening the Democracy/Plurinational Electoral Court, 3 September 2014, in a flight from La Paz to Cochabamba. 2) Interview with Yerco Ilich, member of the Movement without Fear and polical analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz 3) interview with Marcelo Silva, political analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz 4) Interview with Raul Maydana, 25 September, 2014, La Paz. 5) Interview with Iván Arias, 24 September 2014, La Paz.
Secondary sources: Alvaro García Linera, “El evismo: lo nacional popular en acción”, en Observatorio Social de América Latina, CLACSO, Buenos Aíres, 2006. Interview with Renata Hoffman, chief of the swiss cooperation, 20 February 2013, La Paz. Interview with H.C.F Mansilla, one of the mots prestigious professors of political science in Bolivia, 8 August 2013, La Paz.
There are three types of third-party actors that contribute to campaigns in an informal way:
1) the public employees, that "voluntarily" give a percentage of their salaries for the campaign. It is necessary to take into account that the public sector has become much bigger in the past decade. In 2005, before Evo Morales came to power, the public sector had 70.000 public employees, and now, just in 9 years it soared to 250.000. No single study analyzes that but the amount of money collected has also soared (see Silvia Escóbar for the data and for this hidden information, see Ayo). 2) the social organizations that receive a lot of money from the government through different institutional channels (for example the Indigenous Fund for Development);they have an implied pact: "we give you money if you are loyal, but you must campaign in your territorial domains, and prevent opposition parties from competing. This government repeats always that Evo Morales governs for and with the "social movements" (Interview with Iván Arias). 3) the biggest private corporation from the low lands that made a deal with the government: "we support your "left" government, including your electoral campaigns, and do not support anyone else, but we continue to export almost without paying taxes keeping our big properties ("latifundios") (Interview with Pablo Deheza).
All these actors are clearly not partisan actors but corporative actors with a lot of power in their respective regions (the social organization in the high lands and the private corporations in the low lands).
Peer reviewer comment: Agree - Organizations that are not NGOs or foreign entities are not barred from contributing to parties or campaigns. So unions (including public worker's unions) are allowed to contribute. This may be unethical (in the case of forced contributions), but it is not illegal. The researcher is correct that the government tends to use public development funds to reward loyal civil society organizations, but these are not immediately linked to electoral purposes (those organizations can't then fund parties). Article 50-51 of Ley 1983 put few limitations on contributions from individuals, corporations, or organizations (other than registered NGOs and foreign-based institutions), so there's very little to circumvent. Whatever resources organizations (like unions) spend on their own to back campaigns is not regulated or reported.
Silvia Escóbar (coord.), País sin industrias, país con empleos precarios, CEDIB, 2014, La Paz.
Diego Ayo (coord), Municipalismo de base estrecha. La difícil emergencia de nuevas élites, PIEB, La Paz, 2013.
Interview with Iván Arias, September 2014, La Paz.
Interview with Pablo Deheza, political analyst with close links to the government, 1 april 2014, Santa Cruz.
Reviewer's sources: Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf
Article 263 of Law 026/2010 authorizes the Plurinational Electoral Court to monitor everything related to financial elements of campaigns (assets of the parties and expenses in electoral campaigns). Article 6(9) of Law 018 also specifies the Electoral Court as the authority for political finance, stating that it is in charge of the regulation of political party finance; 6(10) states that the Court is responsible for overseeing electoral propaganda as well.
However, no investigatory or audit powers are explicitly granted.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree - The law does not explicitly state that the agency has audit or investigative powers. However, parties are required to submit fiscal information and can be sanctioned if the information is improper, which suggests audit powers.
Article 85 of Law 018 specifically creates a Unidad Tecnica de Fiscalizacion. It is regulated by internal regulations of the TSE. The TSE is formally a court, and it is the highest court (no appeals are possible) on electoral matters. Parties that violate norms can be stripped of their legal personality (which would prevent them from competing in elections; although they coud re-file as a new party, which is an arduous process).
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Institution, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 2) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf
In law, high level appointments to the Electoral Court must be public and merit-based, and appointees must be free of conflicts of interest. The National Assembly elects 6 members of the Court, and the 7th is appointed by the president. Article 13 of Law 018/2010 explains that a public convocation must be held during the appointment process: the National Assembly must publish regulations to govern the criteria, parameters, and procedures, as well as the method of evaluation and selection of appointees.
Article 14 of Law 018/2010 sets forth the requirements for appointees, including a professional degree with at least five years of experience and the ability to speak two national languages. Appointees cannot be party members, have been a candidate within five years, have any familial relation to high ranking public officials, and must renounce all positions and belongings that may incite other conflicts of interest.
However, it should be noted that these requirements may still be compatible with the possibility of political involvement, considering that the final decision for these appointments belong to the Plurinational Legislative Assembly and the President.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Institution, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf
Eduardo Leaño, an electoral analyst that worked for almost a decade in the Electoral Court, says that the current Electoral Court has a lot of problems, and the origin of these issues is that all appointments were made by Evo Morales and MAS, without following the merit-based appointment process stipulated in Law 018.
Jorge Lazarte, one of the most prestigious professors of political science in Bolivia and ex member of the National Electoral Court, said that almost all the members were selected on the basis of political considerations: "All of them belong to Evo Morales´party".
The politicized nature of the court is clear from an academic perspective as well. According to source 3, the Electoral Court has gone from being one of the most trusted institutions in the country to having the support of less than 10% of Bolivians since Evo Morales ascended to the presidency. The author postulates that this is due to the government's political interference in the court, including the appointment process.
The political links of the new electoral authorities appointed by the current government are easily demonstrated. For example, the one appointee selected by Morales previously worked as the political advisor of the Legislative Brigade of Cochabamba for MAS, and as legal advisor of the Departamental Government of Cochabamba, which was headed by MAS. Ramiro Paredes, another member, was advisor of the Federación de Cooperativas Mineras (Federation of Mining Cooperatives), one of the most loyal partners of the governing party, and also of the Corporación Minera Boliviana, COMIBOL (Bolivian Mining Corporation), a public Bolivian entreprise in charge of the whole mining business in the country that has historically allied itself with MAS; Irineo Zuna y Fanny Rivas, both indigenous citizens, belong to indigenous institutions that are closely linked to the government; Wilma Velasco, who since 16th August 2012 was designated as the new presidente of the Electoral Court, worked in 2010 for the Justice Ministry under the aegis of the Morales administration. Each of these appointees are clearly biased in favor of MAS and Morales. Indeed, of the members of the electoral court, only two, Dina Chuquimia, who worked for a decade in the Public University of El Alto (UPEA), and Marco Ayala, who worked in his own private business, have no clear links to MAS.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. It is important to understand that the vetting process is public, and there is vetting involved, but it is on a playing field that is uneven. MAS controls the legislature and the executive branch, and enjoys widespread support. That makes it unlikely that many TSE members will be opponents of the government and likely that they will be friendly. Morever, some of the new functions of the OEP (of which the TSE is a part) are closely aligned with MAS policy goals. For example, the new OEP is charged with promoting "intercultural" democracy, which fits the indigenous friendly policies of the MAS government.
However, the TSE remains a highly professional institution despite severe pressure on it by the government. One way to see this is to note that the previous TSE head (Wilfredo Ovando) was seen as very close to the MAS. But he was replaced a few months prior to the election by Wilma Velasco, who is known to be openly critical of MAS.
1) Eduardo Leaño, "El Tribunal Supremo Electoral y la calidad de la democracia", en La Razón/Animal Político, 7 September 2014; http://www.la-razon.com/suplementos/animalpolitico/TSE-calidad-democracia0_2120188126.html 2) Jorge Lazarte en "Cinco vocales del Tribunal Electoral tienen antecedentes políticos", el Deber, 12 january 2014, http://www.eldeber.com.bo/septimo-dia/2014-01-12/ver.php?id=140111114653. 3) Salvador Romero Ballivián, "Medio siglo de historia del organismo electoral en Boilivia", en América Latina Hoy, vol 51, abril 2009, Universidad of Salamanca, Spain, pp. 77-94; http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/308/30811731005.pdf 4) Iván Paredes, "Cinco vocales del Tribunal Electoral tienen antecedentes políticos", en el Deber, 12 January 2014, http://www.eldeber.com.bo/septimo-dia/2014-01-12/ver.php?id=140111114653+E132 5) Interview with Iván Arias, 24 September 2014, La Paz.
Reviewer's sources: TSE website, Personnel page, http://tse.oep.org.bo/index.php/vocales-tse/246-dra-wilma-velasco-aguilar, accessed October, 2014.
High level appointees to the Electoral Court, in law, are independent. Article 206 of the Constitution establishes that members of the Court will be appointed for non-renewable six year term, and article 12 of Law 018/2010 reiterates this. Article 6 of Law 018/2010 grants the Electoral Court the power to review cases and issue decisions regarding all electoral processes, including the political finance of parties, and article 17 states that decisions and resolutions will be adopted by a majority vote. Article 21 states that members of the court will be removed if they're convicted of committing crimes during the exercise of their functions, of corruption offences, or of gross misconduct. Articles 87 and 88 establish due process in disciplinary and removal proceedings, explaining that disciplinary processes will be carried out by a 2/3 decision of the members of the plenary session of the Court, which includes its seven sitting members.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree - The TSE is the highest court with jurisdiction over electoral matters. Bolivia's legal system has different parallel systems (e.g. a special consitutional court and a special land court, both separate from the civil court system). TSE decisions are final, and there is no appeal.
The TSE also self-disciplines itself according to the law. Article 87 of Law 018 specifies that functonaries of the TSE can be sanctioned (and even removed) by 2/3 decision of members of the TSE itself. Articles 89-91 lay out the three degrees of "offenses."
1) Constitution of Bolivia, 2009, Article 206, III. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/bo/bo024es.pdf
2) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Institution, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf
As said by Jorge Lazarte and Salvador Romero, we can distinguish three stages in the history of the electoral court: the first stage lasted from the recovery of the democratic system to 1991. During this time electoral manipulation occurred regularly. The court was known by the following name: "the gang of four"; the second stage, from 1991-2005, was characterized by a political agreement among the main parties: MNR, ADN, MIR, UCS and CONDEPA, and appointments to the Court were made only with the agreement of 2/3 of the National Assembly. This was a great era in the institutionalization of representative democracy in Boliva. Unfortunately, the third stage, from 2005 to the present, has undone some of that progress, and the Electoral Court is characterized by the political control exerted on it from above.
Indeed, the fact that appointees to the court are often subject to fear and favor can be seen in their recent decision regarding the frequent use of public events in propaganda materials for the MAS, which is a violation of article 119 of Law 026. However, despite the government's clear contravention of the law, the Electoral Court recently ruled in its favor, stating that it's unclear that MAS and Morales have indeed violated legal principles.
Carlos Mesa, a former president, asserts that the independence of the Electoral Court is seriously compromised, and in the thrall of MAS, as the Court regularly refuses to punish members of MAS for failing to abide by the law.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. Lately (under Velasco), the court has been more willing to sanction MAS for violations. But that was not always the case. However, it is also important to note that the opposition often calls "foul" too often. The law states that candidate can't explicitly ask for votes when attending public functions, but says nothing about oblique references to policies or vague promises about the future. Some of the activies of MAS violate the letter of the law, but some are simply advantages of incumbency.
Morales did often try to "bully" unfriendly TSE members (and many resigned). But several TSE members (like Velasco, the curent president of the court) have been critical of MAS in many instances.
1) Eduardo Leaño, "El Tribunal Supremo Electoral y la calidad de la democracia", en La Razón/Animal Político del 7 de septiembre de 2014; http://www.la-razon.com/suplementos/animalpolitico/TSE-calidad-democracia0_2120188126.html 2) Jorge Lazarte en "Cinco vocales del Tribunal Electoral tienen antecedentes políticos", el Deber, 12 january 2014, http://www.eldeber.com.bo/septimo-dia/2014-01-12/ver.php?id=140111114653. 3) Salvador Romero Ballivián, "Medio siglo de historia del organismo electoral en Boilivia", en América Latina Hoy, vol 51, abril 2009, Universidad of Salamanca, Spain, pp. 77-94; http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/308/30811731005.pdf 4) Interview with Iván Arias, 24 September 2014, La Paz. 5) Carlos Mesa, "Neither Judges nor Just Rules," Blog post, 22 September 2014, http://carlosdmesa.com/2014/09/22/ni-arbitros-ni-reglas-justos/
Reviewer's sources: "Morales critica fallas en el TSE," La Prensa, 16 October, 2014. http://www.prensa.com/impreso/mundo/morales-critica-fallas-tse/408975
Ivan Paredes Tamayo, "Evo ve 'infiltrados' en TSE y oposicion critica los 2/3," El Deber, 2014. http://www.eldeber.com.bo/bolivia/evo-habla-infiltrados-tse-y.html
Law 018/2010 states in Article 17: "the Court will take its decisions with an absolute majority of its members." As such, in law, all decisions taken by the Court must be agreed upon by at least 4 of the 7 members. The Court regularly issues decisions regarding the use of electoral advertising during election campaigns, but is often criticized by members of the opposition for evincing bias in favor of MAS, the governing party in Bolivia. For example, Carlos Mesa, a former president, argues that the Court is in thrall to Morales and MAS, and refuses to punish the governing party or its members for breaking the law. Jimena Costa also claims that the Electoral Court ignores violations committed by the governing party, though in a recent case, the Court did impose a fine on MAS for violating electoral advertising rules.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree - Most TSE decisions occur behind closed doors (or at least with little media reporting; and to be fair most decisions are mundane). However, regarding politicized decision-making, an important case would be the recent election of Wilma Velasco. She was very outspoken (and gave frequent media interviews) prior to her reelection as president of the TSE, making clear that (a) she was making a play for the presidency and (b) she was going to be critical towards MAS and was worried Ovando (a MAS sympathizer) would be elected.
1) Carlos Mesa, "Neither Judges nor Just Rules," Blog post, 22 September 2014, http://carlosdmesa.com/2014/09/22/ni-arbitros-ni-reglas-justos/ 2) Interview with Jimena Costa, ex-polytical analyst, candidate to the National Congress for Democratic Unity, the main opposition party for the presidential election in october 2014, September 2014. 3) Tribunal Electoral sancional al MAS y a Bolivia Televisión con 130 mil a cada uno." Noticias, 26 August, 2014; http://www.noticias.com.bo/politica/tse-sanciona-al-mas-y-bolivia-tv-con-mas-de-bs130-mil-a-cada-uno/ 4) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Institution, 16 June 2010, http://www.cepal.org/oig/doc/bolley182010.pdf 5) Law 1983, 25 June 1999, Art. 22, http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-1984.xhtml 6) Law 026, Electoral Regime, final dispositions, second, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf
Reviewer's sources: "Personal “clave” se aleja del TSE por pugnas entre vocales," Pagina 7, 7 July, 2014. http://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2014/7/7/personal-clave-aleja-pugnas-entre-vocales-26116.html
"El TSE elige a su presidente en medio de cuestionamientos," Pagina 7, 15 August, 2014. http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/8/15/elige-presidente-medio-cuestionamientos-29450.html
"Tres de siete vocales quieren estar en la directiva del TSE," Pagina 7, 14 August, 2014. http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/8/14/tres-siete-vocales-quieren-estar-directiva-29352.html
"Dos grupos pugnan por la dirección del Órgano Electoral," Pagina 7, 12 August, 2014. http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/8/12/grupos-pugnan-direccion-organo-electoral-29161.html
The three experts have the same opinion: the National Electoral Court has insufficient capacity to monitor political finance regulations. Pinto said that "there is a lot of new employees without experience, they are people appointed by the social organizations that have a political pacto with Evo Morales," and these appointees lack the experience and skills necessarily to help the Court actually perform its primary functions. Iván Arias said that "not even in the last decade, prior to its politicization, did the prestigious Court have this capacity. And now MAS has interfered a lot in the daily work of the Court, which further impedes its abilities." Marcelo Silva added the following argument: "Even the departamental courts have been dominated by the MAS, without respect for the autonomy. The only purpose is to control the elections." By these accounts, the Court has very little capacity to exercise its essential functions.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree. The TSE lacks the capacity to be proactive (it is mostly reactive).
For the 2014 election, the TSE had Bs 170 million (about $21 million). However, this was less than the Bs 210 million (about $26 million) requested. The TSE is also frequently asking for additional resources.
1) Interview with Juan Carlos Pinto, chief of the Intercultural Service for Strengthening the Democracy/Plurinational Electoral Court, 3 September 2014, in a flight from La Paz to Cochabamba. 2) Interview with Iván Arias, political adviser of the presidential candidate for the Christian Democratic Party, Tuto Quiroga, 3 September, 2014, La Paz. 3) Interview with Marcelo Silva, political analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz
Reviewer sources: "TSE dispondre de Bs 170 milones para las elecciones generales en Bolivia," EJU! 4 September 2014, http://eju.tv/2014/04/tse-dispondr-de-bs-170-millones-para-las-elecciones-generales-en-bolivia/
"CON UN PRESUPUESTO DE Bs 210 MILLONES TRABAJA TSE PARA ELECCIONES EN BOLIVIA", El Boliviano, 10 February 2014, http://elbolivianoenvivo.com/con-un-presupuesto-de-bs-210-millones-trabaja-tse-para-elecciones-en-bolivia/
"TSE PIDE PRESUPUESTO ADICIONAL PARA COMICIOS", 7 September 2014, http://www.laprensa.com.bo/diario/actualidad/pol%C3%ADtica/20140709/tse-pide-presupuesto-adicional-para-comicios5882997027.html
Marcelo Silva said that the current situation is "reverse." Rather than the Electoral Court carrying out meaningful audits or investigations, opposition parties want to audit the Court due to its apparent lack of independence. Iván Arias said that the presidential candidates and mainly Tuto Quiroga asked the Organizations of American States to rigorously assess the integrity of both electoral processes and the electoral institution. Further, sources confirm that the Court did not conduct any investigations or audits in the last 20 years.
1) Interview with Marcelo Silva, political analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz 2) Interview with Iván Arias, political adviser of the presidential candidate for the Christian Democratic Party, Tuto Quiroga, 24 September, 2014, La Paz. 3) La Prensa, "La oposición boliviana protesta contra la censura del órgano electoral en las campañas", 23 August 2014, http://www.laprensasa.com/32america/2676640la-oposicion-boliviana-protesta-contra-la-censura-del-organo-electoral-en-las-campanas.html
Both experts, Arias and Silva said that no audits have been conducted, nor have any audit results been published; Rene Antonio Mayorga, a political scientist, that contributed to the design of the 1983 law (in the year 1999, Law of Political Parties) warned even in 1998 that the National Electoral Court could not audit the financial statements of political parties. Current legislation does not give the National Electoral Court audit powers.
1) Interview with Iván Arias, political adviser of the presidential candidate for the Christian Democratic Party, Tuto Quiroga, 3 September, 2014, La Paz. 2) Interview with Marcelo Silva, political analyst, 4 September 2014, La Paz
Secondary source: Rene Antonio Mayorga, "El Financiamiento de los Partidos Políticos en Bolivia", en Daniel Zovatto y María del Pilar del Castillo (eds.), La Financiación de los Partidos Políticos en Iberoamérica. San José: IIDH/CAPEL, 1998.
Law 1983, in articles 67, 68, 69 and 70, enumerates some sanctions for parties that fail to present the required financial information in a timely manner, saying that the failure to submit financial information could result in suspension from participating in elections. They can also be fined for failing to adhere to the law. Other laws do not define clear violations, nor are there defined sanctions.
1) Law 026, Electoral Regime, 20 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley26-2010.pdf 2) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Institution, 16 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley18.pdf 3) Law 1983, On Political Parties, 25 June 1999, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Bolivia/Leyes/Ley1983.pdf
Article 24(31) of Law 018/2010 grants the Electoral Court the power to impose sanctions and fines on political actors that violate the rules on the dissemination of electoral propaganda. By section 33 of the same article, the Court has the mandate to make known to the relevant authorities any electoral violations, and by section 34, to denounce electoral crimes before the competent authorities in cases of grave violations. Article 54 further permits the Electoral Court to sanction any electoral mistakes or omissions.
According to Articles 2, 26, and 39 of the same law, the TSE is also legally empowered to prosecute parties and individuals for offenses, and can unilaterally delist parties and candidates that violate electoral laws.
1) Law 018, Plurinational Electoral Institution, 16 June 2010, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Bolivia/Ley18.pdf
The Electoral Court rarely imposes sanctions. However, in the last election, the Court fined MAS for having broadcast electoral materials outside of the 30 day period prior to voting day, which is against the law. MAS complied and paid that fine immediately. The evidence suggests that, in the rare cases when sanctions are imposed, offenders usually do not comply, but some exceptions exist.
1) La Razón, "TSE multa al MAS y a Bolivia Tv con 130.625 por falta electoral", 27 August 2014, http://aclo.org.bo/electoral/index.php/noticias-electorales/316-tse-multa-al-mas%E2%80%88y-a-bolivia-tv-con-bs-130-625-por-falta-electoral. 2) Interview with Alvaro Blondel, Chief of Planification, 25 September, 2014, La Paz. 3) "El TSE inició el retiro de gigantografías electorales," La Razon, August 29, 2014.
http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?url=/animalelectoral/Elecciones-TSE-inicio-retiro-gigantografias-electorales02115988427.html
The main obstacle for having a more effective enforcement has to do with the subordination of the Court to the presidential party (the MAS). In this scenario, the possibility of enforcement is almost non-existent. What has been observed in the last election in Bolivia, is that the Court could not even fulfill the law on behalf of the prohibition to every single party to blend the electoral campaign to the daily inaugurations of governmental works (hospitals, schools, etc). In accordance to the law (article 119, law 026) any government (in different territorial levels) has the right to do electoral advertising, one month prior to the election, opening works of any kind. But, surprisingly, the Court said that there is no chance of enforcing this article and that it is no clear that they should fulfill that rule: "there is a lack of regulation on this topic", said the president of the Court.
Peer reviewer comment: Agree - In practice, the playing field is highly uneven. Partly, this is a product of MAS hegemony within institutions (particularly the executive bureaucracy). However, there is evidence that the TSE is regaining some of its independence. It is also clear that MAS victories are a product of populist appeal and charisma, not fraud or outright intimidation.
In my opinion, the most urgent reform would be to restore public financing to the parties. This would be particularly useful heading into the municipal elections, where hundreds of parties compete in local level elections. Public financing of parties at the municipal level would help strengthen political society, a critical link between the state and civil society. Reforms could also be made to require more transparency of financing (which is made easier if parties receive public resources). Another important area would be to expand access to media for parties. Currently, parties have access to media spots, but they may lack the resources to make and edit professional campaign materials.
1) María Teresa Zegada, "Recursos para las elecciones", in Página 7, 20 February 2014, http://www.paginasiete.bo/opinion/2014/2/20/recursos-para-elecciones-14387.html 2) Interview with Jimena Costa, ex-polytical analyst, candidate to the National Congress for Democratic Unity, the main opposition party for the presidential election in october 2014, September 2014. 3) Enlacesnet.bolivia, "Evo Morales desafía veto del tribunal y entregará obras", 12 September 2014, http://www.enlacesbolivia.net/sp/noticias_proc.asp?Seleccion=4912
Bolivia is a presidential republic with a bicameral legislature. The President is directly elected by the people if he/she obtains a majority of the votes cast in the first round or if he/she wins 40% of the vote and beats the nearest opponent by 10%. Otherwise, the top two candidates compete in a second round run-off election. Campaign funds are jointly managed by parties and candidates.
The Plurinational Legislative Assembly is composed of two houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies contains 130 seats: 63 members are elected in single-member districts in first-past-the-post voting, 60 seats are elected via closed-list proportional representation in nine departmental districts, and 7 members are elected in single-member districts in special ""indigenous"" constituencies. The deputies seats are awarded using the additional member system, which means that the list seats are awarded based on the total list (or presidential) vote, but after taking into account the seats won in the first-past-the-post voting. But that process does not include in the special indigenous seats, which stand apart.
The Senate has 36 members, 4 from each department, and all of whom are elected in a closed-list proportional representation system. Deputies and Senators serve five year terms. Legislative campaigns are managed at the party level. Candidates must run as representatives of a party ticket; candidates cannot run as independents and parties must contest all seats in the general election.
Presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently, and the list-proportional vote (for both chambers) is the presidential vote. The most recent elections occurred in 2009. In 2009, the incumbent Evo Morales won 64% of the vote and his MAS party elected 88 deputies and 26 senators. The now-defunct PPB party took 26% of the vote and elected 37 deputies and 10 senators. Two smaller parties, UN and AS, elected 3 and 2 deputies each, respectively. New elections were held in October of 2014.