Source: http://nomokanon.de/urteile/eughmr120925.htm
Timestamp: 2018-03-20 09:29:33
Document Index: 680446395

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 37', '§ 3', '§ 33', '§ 34', '§ 104', '§ 62', '§ 39', '§ 29', '§ 92', '§ 99', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 30', '§ 129', '§ 2', '§ 2']

CASE OF JEHOVAS ZEUGEN in Österreich v. AUSTRIA
In the case of Jehovas Zeugen in Österreich v. Austria,
Nina Vajić, President, Peer Lorenzen, Elisabeth Steiner, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Julia Laffranque, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Erik Møse, judges, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
1. The case originated in an application (no. 27540/05) against the Republic of Austria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Jehovas Zeugen, a religious community established in Austria under the Religious Communities Act 1998 (“the applicant community”), on 20 July 2005.
2. The applicant community was represented by Mr R. Kohlhofer, a lawyer practising in Vienna. The Austrian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ambassador H. Tichy, Head of the International Law Department at the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs.
4. On 19 January 2009 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
6. In 2002 the applicant community wished to employ a couple, G.V. and V.T., who were both ministers belonging to the Religious Order of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Orden der Sondervollzeitdiener der Zeugen Jehovas) and who were Tagalog speaking citizens of the Philippines, for the benefit of its Tagalog speaking members in Austria.
7. In order to obtain a residence permit (Aufenthaltsgenehmigung) or a settlement permit (Niederlassungsbewilligung), the couple had to have a work permit or be able to show that they were not subject to the provisions of the Employment of Aliens Act (“the EA Act”). On 16 April 2002 the applicant community therefore applied to the Währinger Gürtel Labour Market Service (Arbeitsmarktservice) in Vienna for a declaratory decision that the pastoral work the couple would exercise was exempt from the provisions of the EA Act. It submitted that, since the entry into force of the Religious Communities Act 1998, section 1(2) of the EA Act had to be understood as referring to all persons doing pastoral work for religious communities and not only as referring to ministers of recognised churches and religious societies. In any event, it submitted that the tasks which would be assigned to G.V. and V.T. would not constitute employment within the terms of the EA Act.
11. The Constitutional Court held that even though the pastoral work of ministers clearly fell within the scope of protection of Article 9, which also comprised the conclusion of employment contracts by a religious group with persons engaging in such activities, and even though labour-market regulations, in particular the employment of aliens, might constitute an interference with the rights protected by Article 9, such interference was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 9. The difference between the employment of foreigners as ministers performing pastoral work by a religious society and employment by a registered religious community made by the EA Act was in conformity with the Federal Constitution. Through recognition as a religious society, that religious group acquired a legal status, more closely defined in the relevant Act, which would allow it to participate in the shaping of public life in the State (an der Gestaltung des staatlichen öffentlichen Lebens teilzunehmen). As this status could, and indeed had to, be granted to all churches and religious societies provided the conditions established by law were met, the distinction between recognised religious societies and other communities did not give rise to doubts as to its constitutionality.
12. On 15 December 2004 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint, which had been transferred to it. The applicant community argued that section 1(1) of the EA Act was discriminatory. However, the Administrative Court found that this matter had been exhaustively examined by the Constitutional Court in its above decision. This decision was served on the applicant community’s lawyer on 20 January 2005.
On 2 May 2001 the Vienna Tax Office for Fees and Transaction Taxes (Finanzamt für Gebühren und Verkehrssteuern) ordered the applicant community to pay inheritance and gift tax in the amount of 14% on the sum received. It found that the applicant community could not rely on section 15(1)(14) of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act 1955 (“the 1955 Act”), which provided an exemption from tax liability for certain donations to religious institutions, because this tax privilege was reserved to churches and religious societies recognised by law.
15. On 25 January 2005 the Independent Finance Panel (Unabhängiger Finanzsenat) dismissed the appeal. It noted that section 15(1)(14) of the 1955 Act clearly referred to religious societies and there was no doubt that this did not mean a registered religious community. Referring to the case‑law of the Constitutional Court, in particular its decision of 10 October 2003 (see above), it found that the difference in treatment between religious societies and religious communities was in accordance with the Federal Constitution. Further, none of the other exemption clauses under this provision applied to the applicant community.
17. On 26 September 2005 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the complaint for a lack of prospects of success, considering that insofar as the applicant community’s complaints concerned matters of constitutional law they had been sufficiently dealt with in its previous case‑law.
19. On 27 April 2006 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint as unfounded. It found that the applicant community was not a religious society and could not, therefore, rely on a privilege reserved to such an institution. Moreover, it was also not a charitable institution (gemeinnützige Körperschaft) within the meaning of the 1955 Act, as charitable goals were only those which consisted of promoting the interests of the general public (nur solche Zwecke sind durch deren Erfüllung die Allgemeinheit gefördert wird). As the applicant community, according to its constitutional documents, essentially addressed its activities to its members alone, it addressed itself to a more restricted group than the general public.
“The provisions of this federal act do not apply to:
(d) aliens in respect of pastoral work they exercise as part of a church or religious society recognised by law; ...”
“[The following] are also exempt from taxation:
- political parties.”
22. For a detailed description of the legal situation concerning religious societies and religious communities in Austria, see the case of Religions­gemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, no. 40825/98, §§ 37-55, 31 July 2008.
23. The applicant community complained under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention that the domestic authorities’ refusal to issue a declaratory decision under the Employment of Aliens Act (“the EA Act”) that the employment of G.V. and V.T. by the applicant community was exempt from the provisions of that Act on the grounds that the applicant community was not a recognised religious society had violated its rights under these provisions.
25. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
28. As the Court has consistently held, Article 14 of the Convention complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, as it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there can be no room for its application unless the facts in issue fall within the ambit of one or more of those provisions (see, among many other authorities, Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1997, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, and Camp and Bourimi v. the Netherlands, no. 28369/95, § 34, ECHR 2000-X).
29. Further, the freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 9 entails, inter alia, the freedom to hold religious beliefs and to practise a religion. While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies the freedom to manifest one’s religion, alone and in private, or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares. Article 9 lists the various forms which manifestation of one’s religion or belief may take, namely worship, teaching, practice and observance (see, as a recent authority, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 104-5, ECHR 2005-XI, with further references).
30. In the Court’s view, the privilege in issue – namely the exemption granted to religious societies from the provisions of the EA Act as regards the employment of aliens in respect of pastoral activities – shows the significance which the legislature attached to the specific function these representatives of religious groups fulfil within such groups. Observing that religious communities traditionally exist in the form of organised structures, the Court has repeatedly found that the autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is, thus, an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords (see Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 62, ECHR 2000-XI).
32. According to the Court’s case-law, a difference in treatment is discriminatory for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”: that is, if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised”. The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify different treatment (see, among other authorities, Willi v. United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, § 39, ECHR 2002-IV).
35. In the cases of Lang v. Austria (no. 28648/03, 12 March 2009), Gütl v. Austria (no. 49686/99, 12 March 2009) and Löffelman v. Austria (no. 42967/98, 12 March 2009) the Court had to examine whether the authorities’ refusal to exempt the applicants from alternative civilian service in lieu of compulsory military service was in breach of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 9. The applicants had complained that the difference in treatment between them as ministers of the Jehovas Witnesses, who therefore did not belong to a recognised religious society, and others who fulfilled a comparable function within a recognised religious society was unjustified. In the case of Lang (cited above, §§ 29‑31) the Court held as follows:
“29. The Court has to examine whether the difference in treatment between the applicant, who does not belong to a religious group which is a religious society within the meaning of the 1874 Recognition Act, and a person who belongs to such a group has an objective and reasonable justification.
30. In doing so the Court refers to the case of Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria (no. 40825/98, 31 July 2008), in which the first applicant, the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Austria, had been granted legal personality as a registered religious community, a private-law entity, but wished to become a religious society under the 1874 Recognition Act – that is, a public-law entity. The Court observed that under Austrian law, religious societies enjoyed privileged treatment in many areas, including, inter alia, exemption from military service and civilian service. Given the number of these privileges and their nature, the advantage obtained by religious societies was substantial. In view of these privileges accorded to religious societies, the obligation under Article 9 of the Convention incumbent on the State’s authorities to remain neutral in the exercise of their powers in this domain required therefore that if a State set up a framework for conferring legal personality on religious groups to which a specific status was linked, all religious groups which so wished must have a fair opportunity to apply for this status and the criteria established must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner (ibid., § 92). The Court found, however, that in the case of the Jehovah’s Witnesses one of the criteria for acceding to the privileged status of a religious society had been applied in an arbitrary manner and concluded that the difference in treatment was not based on any “objective and reasonable justification”. Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9 (ibid., § 99).
31. In the present case, the refusal of exemption from military and alternative civilian service was likewise based on the ground that the applicant was not a member of a religious society within the meaning of the 1874 Recognition Act. Given its above-mentioned findings in the case of Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others, the Court considers that in the present case the very same criterion – whether or not a person applying for exemption from military service is a member of a religious group which is constituted as a religious society – cannot be understood differently and its application must inevitably result in discrimination prohibited by the Convention.”
36. The Court considers that in the present case the refusal of the authorities to grant an exemption from the provisions of the EA Act was also based on the fact that the applicant community was not a recognised religious society. Given the Court’s findings in the cases of Lang (cited above, §§ 29-31), Gütl (cited above, §§ 29-31) and Löffelmann (cited above, §§ 29-31), based on the case of Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others, the same criterion identified in those cases – whether or not the applicant community was a recognised religious society – cannot be understood differently in the present case and its application inevitably resulted in discrimination prohibited by the Convention.
43. The Government submitted that the basic provisions of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act 1955 (the “1955 Act”) had been quashed by the Constitutional Court. As a result, the difference between religious societies and other religious communities had lost its practical significance, as inheritance and gift tax had ceased to be collected after 31 July 2008. In any event, the applicant community had been recognised as a religious society on 7 May 2009 and now enjoyed all of the privileges linked to that status.
46. As regards the applicability of Article 14 of the Convention to the inheritance and gift tax proceedings, the Court finds that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, second paragraph, establishes that the duty to pay tax falls within its field of application. Accordingly, Article 14 is also applicable (see, Darby v. Sweden, 23 October 1990, § 30, Series A no. 187).
48. The Court observes further that the refusal to grant an exemption from inheritance and gift tax was based on the grounds that the applicant community was not a recognised religious society. It finds that, also in this respect, the same criterion used in the previous cases examined by the Court cited in paragraph 35 above – whether or not the applicant community was a recognised religious society – cannot be understood differently in the present case and its application inevitably resulted in discrimination prohibited by the Convention.
51. The Court considers that – although admissible – in view of its findings under Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 Protocol No. 1, there is no need to also examine the complaint from the point of view of Article 9 read alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.
54. The Government considered that the finding of a violation in itself would constitute sufficient and appropriate redress in the present case. They submitted that in the case of Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others the Court had granted the applicants compensation in the amount of EUR 10,000 for damage resulting from the violation of their rights to the free exercise of their religion under Article 9 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (cited above, § 129). In any event, they submitted that the amount of non-pecuniary damage claimed was excessive and the sum claimed as pecuniary damage would in any event be refunded to the applicant community following a judgment of the Constitutional Court of 2 July 2009 (B 1397/08), in which it had found, in a subsequent case brought by the applicant community, that the levying of inheritance and gift tax on the applicant community was unconstitutional.
55. As regards the applicant community’s claim for pecuniary damage, the Court observes that the applicant community has not disputed the Government’s contention that, following the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 2 July 2009 – albeit relations to different proceedings – it is entitled to a refund of the inheritance and gift tax paid. The Court therefore considers that no award can be made under this head.
“129. As to non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that the violations it has found must undoubtedly have caused the applicants some prejudice under this head. In assessing the amount, the Court takes into account the fact that the applicants have not shown that at any instant they were actually hindered in pursuing their religious aims. Accordingly the Court awards, on an equitable basis, EUR 10,000 under this head.”
57. Given that the present case is narrower in scope than that of the above-quoted case, which involved a broader complaint under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention about discrimination in the State’s refusal to grant the status of a recognised religious society, the Court considers that in these circumstances the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient reparation in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered.
58. The applicant community also claimed EUR 7,682.40 plus value‑added tax (VAT) for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 5,152.05 plus VAT for those incurred before the Court. The claim for costs incurred at the domestic level related only to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court.
60. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers the amounts claimed by the applicant community reasonable and awards them in full, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant community on that amount.
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 12,834.45 (twelve thousand eight hundred and thirty-four Euros and forty-five cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant community, in respect of costs and expenses;
8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant community’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 September 2012, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.