Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/494/259
Timestamp: 2013-05-26 00:08:23
Document Index: 539455981

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1903', '§ 10', '§ 111', '§ 115', '§ 1114', '§ 1201', '§ 1114', '§ 1201', '§ 1203', '§ 1546', '§ 2331', '§ 1472']

UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Rene Martin VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Rene Martin VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ.
494 U.S. 259 (110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222)
Argued: Nov. 7, 1989.
[HTML] See 494 U.S. 1092, 110 S.Ct. 1839.
Syllabus After the Government obtained an arrest warrant for respondenta Mexican citizen and resident believed to be a leader of an organization that smuggles narcotics into this countryhe was apprehended by Mexican police and transported here, where he was arrested. Following his arrest, Drug Enforcement Administration agents, working with Mexican officials, searched his Mexican residences and seized certain documents. The District Court granted his motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the Fourth Amendmentwhich protects "the people" against unreasonable searches and seizuresapplied to the searches, and that the DEA agents had failed to justify searching the premises without a warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148which held that American citizens tried abroad by United States military officials were entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protectionsthe court concluded that the Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the Federal Government, even when it operates abroad. Relying on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778where a majority assumed that illegal aliens in the United States have Fourth Amendment rightsthe court observed that it would be odd to acknowledge that respondent was entitled to trial-related rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but not to Fourth Amendment protection.
(d) The view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the Government exercises its power is contrary to this Court's decisions in the Insular Cases, which held that not all constitutional provisions apply to governmental activity even in territories where the United States has sovereign power. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627. Indeed, the claim that extraterritorial aliens are entitled to rights under the Fifth Amendmentwhich speaks in the relatively universal term of "person"has been emphatically rejected. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784, 70 S.Ct. 936, 946, 94 L.Ed. 1255. Pp. 268-269.
(e) Respondent's reliance on Reid, supra, is misplaced, since that case stands only for the proposition that United States citizens stationed abroad could invoke the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Similarly, those cases in which aliens have been determined to enjoy certain constitutional rights establish only that aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed substantial connections with, this country. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2392, 72 L.Ed.2d 786. Respondent, however, is an alien with no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States, and his legal but involuntary presence here does not indicate any substantial connection with this country. The Court of Appeals' reliance on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, is also misplaced, since that case assumed that, but did not expressly address the question whether, the Fourth Amendment applies to illegal aliens in the United States. Even assuming such alienswho are in this country voluntarily and presumably have accepted some societal obligationswould be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation differs from that of respondent, who had no voluntary connection with this country that might place him among "the people." This Court's decisions expressly according differing protection to aliens than to citizens also undermine respondent's claim that treating aliens differently under the Fourth Amendment violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 269-273.
(f) The Court of Appeals' rule would have significant and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its borders. The rule would apply not only to law enforcement operations abroad, but also to other foreign operationssuch as Armed Forces actionswhich might result in "searches and seizures." Under the rule, aliens with no attachment to this country might bring actions for damages to remedy claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters, and Members of the Executive and Legislative Branches would be plunged into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad. Any restrictions on searches and seizures incident to American action abroad must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation. Pp. 273-275.
The District Court granted respondent's motion to suppress evidence seized during the searches, concluding that the Fourth Amendment applied to the searches and that the DEA agents had failed to justify searching respondent's premises without a warrant. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 856 F.2d 1214 (1988). It cited this Court's decision in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957), which held that American citizens tried by United States military authorities in a foreign country were entitled to the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and concluded that "the Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the federal government, even when it operates abroad." 856 F.2d, at 1218. Relying on our decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), where a majority of Justices assumed that illegal aliens in the United States have Fourth Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit majority found it "difficult to conclude that Verdugo-Urquidez lacks these same protections." 856 F.2d, at 1223. It also observed that persons in respondent's position enjoy certain trial-related rights, and reasoned that "it would be odd indeed to acknowledge that Verdugo-Urquidez is entitled to due process under the fifth amendment, and to a fair trial under the sixth amendment, . . . and deny him the protection from unreasonable searches and seizures afforded under the fourth amendment." Id., at 1224. Having concluded that the Fourth Amendment applied to the searches of respondent's properties, the court went on to decide that the searches violated the Constitution because the DEA agents failed to procure a search warrant. Although recognizing that "an American search warrant would be of no legal validity in Mexico," the majority deemed it sufficient that a warrant would have "substantial constitutional value in this country," because it would reflect a magistrate's determination that there existed probable cause to search and would define the scope of the search. Id., at 1230.
The dissenting judge argued that this Court's statement in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318, 57 S.Ct. 216, 220, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936), that "neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens," foreclosed any claim by respondent to Fourth Amendment rights. More broadly, he viewed the Constitution as a "compact" among the people of the United States, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment were expressly limited to "the people." We granted certiorari, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1741, 104 L.Ed.2d 178 (1989).
That text, by contrast with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, extends its reach only to "the people." Contrary to the suggestion of amici curiae that the Framers used this phrase "simply to avoid an awkward rhetorical redundancy," Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 12, n. 4, "the people" seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. The Preamble declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by "the People of the United States." The Second Amendment protects "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to "the people." See also U.S. Const., Amdt. 1 ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble") (emphasis added); Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States") (emphasis added). While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community. See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292, 24 S.Ct. 719, 723, 48 L.Ed. 979 (1904) (Excludable alien is not entitled to First Amendment rights, because "he does not become one of the people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by an attempt to enter forbidden by law"). The language of these Amendments contrasts with the words "person" and "accused" used in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating procedure in criminal cases.
The global view taken by the Court of Appeals of the application of the Constitution is also contrary to this Court's decisions in the Insular Cases, which held that not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States has sovereign power. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1922) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 34 S.Ct. 712, 58 L.Ed. 1231 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision inapplicable in Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S.Ct. 808, 49 L.Ed. 128 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S.Ct. 787, 47 L.Ed. 1016 (1903) (provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury trial inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901) (Revenue Clauses of Constitution inapplicable to Puerto Rico). In Dorr, we declared the general rule that in an unincorporated territoryone not clearly destined for statehoodCongress was not required to adopt "a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and that the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such right to territory so situated." 195 U.S., at 149, 24 S.Ct., at 813 (emphasis added). Only "fundamental" constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of those territories. Id., at 148, 24 S.Ct., at 812; Balzac, supra, 258 U.S., at 312-313, 42 S.Ct., at 348; see Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599, n. 30, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2280 n. 30, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976). If that is true with respect to territories ultimately governed by Congress, respondent's claim that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to aliens in foreign nations is even weaker. And certainly, it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases to endorse the view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United States Government exercises its power.
Indeed, we have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950), the Court held that enemy aliens arrested in China and imprisoned in Germany after World War II could not obtain writs of habeas corpus in our federal courts on the ground that their convictions for war crimes had violated the Fifth Amendment and other constitutional provisions. The Eisentrager opinion acknowledged that in some cases constitutional provisions extend beyond the citizenry; "the alien . . . has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society." Id., at 770, 70 S.Ct., at 940. But our rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was emphatic:
"Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court supports such a view. Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901) . None of the learned commentators on our Constitution has even hinted at it. The practice of every modern government is opposed to it." Id., at 784, 70 S.Ct., at 947.
To support his all-encompassing view of the Fourth Amendment, respondent points to language from the plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957). Reid involved an attempt by Congress to subject the wives of American servicemen to trial by military tribunals without the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Court held that it was unconstitutional to apply the Uniform Code of Military Justice to the trials of the American women for capital crimes. Four Justices "rejected the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights." Id., at 5, 77 S.Ct., at 1224 (emphasis added). The plurality went on to say:
Justice STEVENS' concurrence in the judgment takes the view that even though the search took place in Mexico, it is nonetheless governed by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment because respondent was "lawfully present in the United States . . . even though he was brought and held here against his will." Post, at 279. But this sort of presencelawful but involuntaryis not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country. The extent to which respondent might claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the United States were to be prolongedby a prison sentence, for examplewe need not decide. When the search of his house in Mexico took place, he had been present in the United States for only a matter of days. We do not think the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the search of premises in Mexico should turn on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the custodian of its nonresident alien owner had or had not transported him to the United States at the time the search was made.
The Court of Appeals found some support for its holding in our decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), where a majority of Justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens in the United States. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for placing some reliance on the case, but our decision did not expressly address the proposition gleaned by the court below. The question presented for decision in Lopez-Mendoza was limited to whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should be extended to civil deportation proceedings; it did not encompass whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal aliens in this country. The Court often grants certiorari to decide particular legal issues while assuming without deciding the validity of antecedent propositions, compare, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980) (assuming State is a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983), with Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (State is not a "person"), and such assumptionseven on jurisdictional issuesare not binding in future cases that directly raise the questions. Id., at 63, n. 4, 109 S.Ct., at 2308, n. 4; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535, n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1377, n. 5, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). Our statements in Lopez-Mendoza are therefore not dispositive of how the Court would rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if such a claim were squarely before us. Even assuming such aliens would be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation is different from respondent's. The illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations; but respondent had no voluntary connection with this country that might place him among "the people" of the United States.
Not only are history and case law against respondent, but as pointed out in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950), the result of accepting his claim would have significant and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its boundaries. The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals would apply not only to law enforcement operations abroad, but also to other foreign policy operations which might result in "searches or seizures." The United States frequently employs Armed Forces outside this countryover 200 times in our historyfor the protection of American citizens or national security. Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1989 (E. Collier ed. 1989). Application of the Fourth Amendment to those circumstances could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest. Were respondent to prevail, aliens with no attachment to this country might well bring actions for damages to remedy claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Perhaps a Bivens action might be unavailable in some or all of these situations due to " 'special factors counselling hesitation,' " see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) (quoting Bivens, supra, 403 U.S., at 396, 91 S.Ct., at 2005), but the Government would still be faced with case-by-case adjudications concerning the availability of such an action. And even were Bivens deemed wholly inapplicable in cases of foreign activity, that would not obviate the problems attending the application of the Fourth Amendment abroad to aliens. The Members of the Executive and Legislative Branches are sworn to uphold the Constitution, and they presumably desire to follow its commands. But the Court of Appeals' global view of its applicability would plunge them into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad. Indeed, the Court of Appeals held that absent exigent circumstances, United States agents could not effect a "search or seizure" for law enforcement purposes in a foreign country without first obtaining a warrantwhich would be a dead letter outside the United Statesfrom a magistrate in this country. Even if no warrant were required, American agents would have to articulate specific facts giving them probable cause to undertake a search or seizure if they wished to comply with the Fourth Amendment as conceived by the Court of Appeals.
For better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which our Government must be able to "function effectively in the company of sovereign nations." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57, 78 S.Ct. 568, 575, 2 L.Ed.2d 603 (1958). Some who violate our laws may live outside our borders under a regime quite different from that which obtains in this country. Situations threatening to important American interests may arise half-way around the globe, situations which in the view of the political branches of our Government require an American response with armed force. If there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur incident to such American action, they must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.
* Particularly in the past decade, our Government has sought, successfully, to hold foreign nationals criminally liable under federal laws for conduct committed entirely beyond the territorial limits of the United States that nevertheless has effects in this country. Foreign nationals must now take care not to violate our drug laws,
The enormous expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction outside our Nation's boundaries has led one commentator to suggest that our country's three largest exports are now "rock music, blue jeans, and United States law." Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14 Int'l Law. 257, 257 (1980).
The Constitution is the source of Congress' authority to criminalize conduct, whether here or abroad, and of the Executive's authority to investigate and prosecute such conduct. But the same Constitution also prescribes limits on our Government's authority to investigate, prosecute, and punish criminal conduct, whether foreign or domestic. As a plurality of the Court noted in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1224-25, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957): "The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution." (Footnotes omitted.) See also ante, at 277 (KENNEDY, J., concurring) ("The Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic"). In particular, the Fourth Amendment provides:
and that the alien must have "accepted some societal obligations."
"It does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that, whilst they actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection. Aliens are no more parties to the laws than they are parties to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protection and advantage." Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 4 Elliot's Debates 556 (2d ed. 1836).
Finally, when United States agents conduct unreasonable searches, whether at home or abroad, they disregard our Nation's values. For over 200 years, our country has considered itself the world's foremost protector of liberties. The privacy and sanctity of the home have been primary tenets of our moral, philosophical, and judicial beliefs.
Our national interest is defined by those values and by the need to preserve our own just institutions. We take pride in our commitment to a Government that cannot, on mere whim, break down doors and invade the most personal of places. We exhort other nations to follow our example. How can we explain to othersand to ourselvesthat these long cherished ideals are suddenly of no consequence when the door being broken belongs to a foreigner?
The majority looks to various constitutional provisions and suggests that " 'the people' seems to have been a term of art." Ante, at 265. But the majority admits that its "textual exegesis is by no means conclusive." Ibid.
One Member of the majority even states that he "cannot place any weight on the reference to 'the people' in the Fourth Amendment as a source of restricting its protections." Ante, at 276 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). The majority suggests a restrictive interpretation of those with "sufficient connection" to this country to be considered among "the people," but the term "the people" is better understood as a rhetorical counterpoint to "the Government," such that rights that were reserved to "the people" were to protect all those subject to "the Government." Cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335, 105 S.Ct. 733, 739, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) ("The Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment's strictures as restraints imposed upon 'governmental action' "). "The people" are "the governed."
Thus, the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to "create" rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Amdt. 9 ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"). The Fourth Amendment, for example, does not create a new right of security against unreasonable searches and seizures. It states that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." The focus of the Fourth Amendment is on what the Government can and cannot do, and how it may act, not on against whom these actions may be taken. Bestowing rights and delineating protected groups would have been inconsistent with the Drafters' fundamental conception of a Bill of Rights as a limitation on the Government's conduct with respect to all whom it seeks to govern. It is thus extremely unlikely that the Framers intended the narrow construction of the term "the people" presented today by the majority.
The drafting history of the Fourth Amendment also does not support the majority's interpretation of "the people." First, the Drafters chose not to limit the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in more specific ways. They could have limited the right to "citizens," "freemen," "residents," or "the American people." The conventions called to ratify the Constitution in New York and Virginia, for example, each recommended an amendment stating, "That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." W. Cuddihy, Search andSei zure in Great Britain and the American Colonies, pt. 2, p. 571, n. 129, 574, n. 134 (1974). But the Drafters of the Fourth Amendment rejected this limitation and instead provided broadly for "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." Second, historical materials contain no evidence that the Drafters intended to limit the availability of the right expressed in the Fourth Amendment.
The Amendment was introduced on the floor of Congress, considered by Committee, debated by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and submitted to the 13 States for approval. Throughout that entire process, no speaker or commentator, pro or con, referred to the term "the people" as a limitation.
The Court also relies on a series of cases dealing with the application of criminal procedural protections outside of the United States to conclude that "not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States has sovereign power." Ante, at 268. None of these cases, however, purports to read the phrase "the people" as limiting the protections of the Fourth Amendment to those with "sufficient connection" to the United States, and thus none gives content to the majority's analysis. The cases shed no light on the question whether respondenta citizen of a nonenemy nation being tried in a United States federal courtis one of "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The Insular Cases, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1922), Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 34 S.Ct. 712, 58 L.Ed. 1231 (1914), Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S.Ct. 808, 49 L.Ed. 128 (1904), and Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S.Ct. 787, 47 L.Ed. 1016 (1903), are likewise inapposite. The Insular Cases all concerned whether accused persons enjoyed the protections of certain rights in criminal prosecutions brought by territorial authorities in territorial courts. These cases were limited to their facts long ago, see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S., at 14, 77 S.Ct., at 1229 (plurality opinion) ("It is our judgment that neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion"), and they are of no analytical value when a criminal defendant seeks to invoke the Fourth Amendment in a prosecution by the Federal Government in a federal court.
The majority's rejection of respondent's claim to Fourth Amendment protection is apparently motivated by its fear that application of the Amendment to law enforcement searches against foreign nationals overseas "could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest." Ante, at 273-274. The majority's doomsday scenariothat American Armed Forces conducting a mission to protect our national security with no law enforcement objective "would have to articulate specific facts giving them probable cause to undertake a search or seizure," ante, at 274is fanciful. Verdugo-Urquidez is protected by the Fourth Amendment because our Government, by investigating and prosecuting him, has made him one of "the governed." See supra, at 284, 287. Accepting respondent as one of "the governed," however, hardly requires the Court to accept enemy aliens in wartime as among "the governed" entitled to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, supra.
In addition, where the precise contours of a "reasonable" search and seizure are unclear, the Executive Branch will not be "plunged . . . into a sea of uncertainty," ante, at 274, that will impair materially its ability to conduct foreign affairs. Doctrines such as official immunity have long protected Government agents from any undue chill on the exercise of lawful discretion. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). Similarly, the Court has recognized that there may be certain situations in which the offensive use of constitutional rights should be limited. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (precluding suits for damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment where there are "special factors counselling hesitation"). In most cases implicating foreign policy concerns in which the reasonableness of an overseas search or seizure is unclear, application of the Fourth Amendment will not interfere with the Executive's traditional prerogative in foreign affairs because a court will have occasion to decide the constitutionality of such a search only if the Executive decides to bring a criminal prosecution and introduce evidence seized abroad. When the Executive decides to conduct a search as part of an ongoing criminal investigation, fails to get a warrant, and then seeks to introduce the fruits of that search at trial, however, the courts must enforce the Constitution.
I cannot agree with Justice BLACKMUN and Justice STEVENS that the Warrant Clause has no application to searches of noncitizens' homes in foreign jurisdictions because American magistrates lack the power to authorize such searches.
See post, at 297 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); ante, at 279 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). The Warrant Clause would serve the same primary functions abroad as it does domestically, and I see no reason to distinguish between foreign and domestic searches.
Federal drug enforcement statutes written broadly enough to permit extraterritorial application include laws proscribing the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute of controlled substances on board vessels, see 46 U.S.C.App. § 1903(h) (1982 ed., Supp. V) ("This section is intended to reach acts . . . committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States"), the possession, manufacture, or distribution of a controlled substance for purposes of unlawful importation, see 21 U.S.C. 959(c) (same), and conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws, see Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-1312 (CA9 1984) (applying 21 U.S.C. 846 and 963 to conduct by a Malaysian citizen in Malaysia), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031, 105 S.Ct. 1403, 84 L.Ed.2d 790 (1985).
The Sherman Act defines "person" to include foreign corporations, 15 U.S.C. 7, and has been applied to certain conduct beyond the territorial limits of the United States by foreign corporations and nationals for at least 45 years. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-444 (CA2 1945).
Foreign corporations may be liable under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), for transactions that occur outside the United States if the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange and the alleged conduct is "detrimental to the interests of American investors." Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (CA2), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (CA2 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906, 89 S.Ct. 1747, 23 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 32(b) (violence against an individual aboard or destruction of any "civil aircraft registered in a country other than the United States while such aircraft is in flight"); § 111 (assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees); § 115 (influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a federal official by threatening or injuring a family member); §§ 1114, 1117 (murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to murder certain federal officers and employees); § 1201(a)(5) (kidnaping of federal officers and employees listed in § 1114); § 1201(e) (kidnaping of "an internationally protected person," if the alleged offender is found in the United States, "irrespective of the place where the offense was committed or the nationality of the victim or the alleged offender"); § 1203 (hostage taking outside the United States, if the offender or the person seized is a United States national, if the offender is found in the United States, or if "the governmental organization sought to be compelled is the Government of the United States"); § 1546 (fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other immigration documents); § 2331 (terrorist acts abroad against United States nationals); 49 U.S.C.App. § 1472(n) (1982 ed. and Supp. V) (aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States, if the offender is found in the United States). Foreign nationals may also be criminally liable for numerous federal crimes falling within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," which includes "[a]ny place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States." 18 U.S.C. 7(7). Finally, broad construction of federal conspiracy statutes may permit prosecution of foreign nationals who have had no direct contact with anyone or anything in the United States. See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 619-620, 47 S.Ct. 531, 539-540, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927).
The United States Government has already recognized the importance of these constitutional requirements by adopting a warrant requirement for certain foreign searches. Department of the Army regulations state that the Army must seek a "judicial warrant" from a United States court whenever the Army seeks to intercept the wire or oral communications of a person not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice outside of the United States and its territories. Army Regulation 190-53 ¶ 2-2(b) (1986). Any request for a judicial warrant must be supported by sufficient facts to meet the probable-cause standard applied to interceptions of wire or oral communications in the United States, 18 U.S.C. 2518(3). Army Regulation 190-53 ¶ 2-2(b). If the foreign country in which the interception will occur has certain requirements that must be met before other nations can intercept wire or oral communications, an American judicial warrant will not alone authorize the interception under international law. Nevertheless, the Army has recognized that an order from a United States court is necessary under domestic law. By its own regulations, the United States Government has conceded that although an American warrant might be a "dead letter" in a foreign country, a warrant procedure in an American court plays a vital and indispensable role in circumscribing the discretion of agents of the Federal Government.