Source: http://echr.dk/leyla-sahin-mod-tyrkiet-sagsnummer-4477498-storkammeret/
Timestamp: 2018-09-25 14:55:26
Document Index: 554291295

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 9', '§ 64', '§ 93', '§ 46', '§ 47', '§ 29', 'in fine', '§ 43', '§ 47', '§ 78', '§ 91', '§ 57', '§ 53', '§ 63', '§ 112', '§ 45', '§ 99', '§ 113', '§ 84', '§ 58', '§ 50', '§ 57', '§ 67', '§ 73', '§ 78', '§ 67', '§ 27', '§ 39', 'in fine', '§ 37', '§ 95', '§ 124', '§ 32', '§ 51', '§ 46', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 52', '§ 27', '§ 5', '§ 38', '§ 65', '§ 36', 'in fine', '§ 95', '§ 2', '§ 92', '§ 65', '§ 90', '§ 80']

Portal om Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention | Leyla Sahin mod Tyrkiet, sagsnummer 44774/98, storkammeret
Klager, Leyla Sahin (S), læste medicin ved Istanbul Universitet, da universitetet udstedte bestemmelse om, at studerende med skæg eller tørklæde ville blive forment adgang til undervisningen. S blev kort efter blandt andet forment adgang til en skriftlig eksamen og kursustilmelding på universitetet, idet S bar tørklæde. S blev yderligere suspenderet fra universitetet i ét semester. Klager påstod blandt andet, at hendes ret til at tænke frit, til samvittigheds- og religionsfrihed – beskyttet af EMRK art. 9 – var blevet krænket.
Domstolen udtalte, at bestemmelsen, som var udstedt af universitetet, udgjorde et indgreb i S’s ret til at manifestere sin religion. Indgrebet havde ifølge Domstolen endvidere hjemmel i tyrkisk lov – blandt andet på baggrund af en ældre afgørelse vedrørende spørgsmålet om hovedbeklædning fra Den Tyrkiske Højesteret – hvorfor Domstolen fandt, at S måtte have været vidende om forbuddet, inden hun startede sin uddannelse. Domstolen mente endvidere, at loven havde det saglige formål at sikre orden på universitetet. Domstolen fandt slutteligt, at indgrebet kunne forsvares som nødvendigt for at bevare den tyrkiske stats principper om sekularisering og lighed og derved nødvendigt for at beskytte det demokratiske system i Tyrkiet og kampen mod ekstreme religiøse grupperinger i landet. På denne baggrund og henset til staternes skønsmargin fandt Domstolen, at EMRK artikel 9 ikke var blevet krænket i den konkrete sag.
_____________Dommen (engelsk)_____________
Education, teaching, research, and study are the only activities that may be pursued in educational and teaching institutions. These activities shall not be impeded in any way…”
“Secularism is the civil organiser of political, social and cultural life, based on national sovereignty, democracy, freedom and science. Secularism is the principle which offers the individual the possibility to affirm his or her own personality through freedom of thought and which, by the distinction it makes between politics and religious beliefs, renders freedom of conscience and religion effective. In societies based on religion, which function with religious thought and religious rules, political organisation is religious in character. In a secular regime, religion is shielded from a political role. It is not a tool of the authorities and remains in its respectable place, to be determined by the conscience of each and everyone …”
“… the expression ‘laws in force’ refers first and foremost to the Constitution … In institutions of higher education, it is contrary to the principles of secularism and equality for the neck and hair to be covered with a veil or headscarf on grounds of religious conviction. In these circumstances, the freedom of dress which the impugned provision permits in institutions of higher education ‘does not concern dress of a religious nature or the act of covering one’s neck and hair with a veil and headscarf’ … The freedom afforded by this provision [transitional section 17] is conditional on its not being contrary to ‘the laws in force’. The judgment [of 7 March 1989] of the Constitutional Court establishes that covering one’s neck and hair with the headscarf is first and foremost contrary to the Constitution. Consequently, the condition set out in the aforementioned section requiring [choice of] dress not to contravene the laws in force removes from the scope of freedom of dress the act of ‘covering one’s neck and hair with the headscarf’ …”
“The ban prohibiting students enrolled on the midwifery course from wearing the headscarf during tutorials is not intended to infringe their freedom of conscience and religion, but to comply with the laws and regulations in force. When doing their work, midwives and nurses wear a uniform. That uniform is described in and identified by regulations issued by the Ministry of Health … Students who wish to join the profession are aware of this. Imagine a student of midwifery trying to put a baby in or remove it from an incubator, or assisting a doctor in an operating theatre or maternity unit while wearing a long-sleeved coat.”
It is the vice-chancellor who shall have primary responsibility for taking safety measures and for supervising and monitoring the administrative and scientific aspects of the functioning of the university …”
The Act applies to all State schools and educational institutions, including post-baccalaureate courses (preparatory classes for entrance to the grandes écoles and vocational training courses). It does not apply to State universities. In addition, as a circular of 18 May 2004 makes clear, it only concerns “… signs, such as the Islamic headscarf, however named, the kippa or a cross that is manifestly oversized, which make the wearer’s religious affiliation immediately identifiable”.
“Conscious of the fact that the right to education is a human right, and that higher education, which is instrumental in the pursuit and advancement of knowledge, constitutes an exceptionally rich cultural and scientific asset for both individuals and society …”
“… higher education has a key role to play in the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the strengthening of pluralistic democracy and tolerance [and] … widening opportunities for members of all groups in society to participate in higher education can contribute to securing democracy and building confidence in situations of social tension …”
84. The Court reiterates its settled case-law that the expression “prescribed by law” requires firstly that the impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law. It also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail and to regulate their conduct (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 64, ECHR 2004‑I).
88. Further, as regards the words “in accordance with the law” and “prescribed by law” which appear in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Court observes that it has always understood the term “law” in its “substantive” sense, not its “formal” one; it has included both “written law”, encompassing enactments of lower ranking statutes (see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, pp. 45‑46, § 93) and regulatory measures taken by professional regulatory bodies under independent rule-making powers delegated to them by Parliament (see Barthold v. Germany, judgment of 25 March 1985, Series A no. 90, pp. 21-22, § 46), and unwritten law. “Law” must be understood to include both statutory law and judge-made “law” (see, among other authorities, The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 30, § 47; Kruslin, cited above, pp. 21-22, § 29 in fine; and Casado Coca v. Spain, judgment of 24 February 1994, Series A no. 285-A, p. 18, § 43). In sum, the “law” is the provision in force as the competent courts have interpreted it.
107. The Court has frequently emphasised the State’s role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. It also considers that the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed (see Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, judgment of 26 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1365, § 47; Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 78, ECHR 2000‑XI; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 91, ECHR 2003-II), and that it requires the State to ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January 1998, Reports 1998‑I, p. 27, § 57). Accordingly, the role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other (see Serif v. Greece, no. 38178/97, § 53, ECHR 1999‑IX).
108. Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic society”. Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position (see, mutatis mutandis, Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 25, § 63, and Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 112, ECHR 1999‑III). Pluralism and democracy must also be based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise necessarily entailing various concessions on the part of individuals or groups of individuals which are justified in order to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society (see, mutatis mutandis, the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, cited above, pp. 21‑22, § 45, and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, cited above § 99). Where these “rights and freedoms” are themselves among those guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, it must be accepted that the need to protect them may lead States to restrict other rights or freedoms likewise set forth in the Convention. It is precisely this constant search for a balance between the fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the foundation of a “democratic society” (see Chassagnou and Others, cited above, § 113).
109. Where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special importance (see, mutatis mutandis, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek, cited above, § 84, and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, pp. 1957-58, § 58). This will notably be the case when it comes to regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions, especially (as the comparative-law materials illustrate – see paragraphs 55-65 above) in view of the diversity of the approaches taken by national authorities on the issue. It is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society (see Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, judgment of 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295‑A, p. 19, § 50), and the meaning or impact of the public expression of a religious belief will differ according to time and context (see, among other authorities, Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001‑V). Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to another according to national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order (see, mutatis mutandis, Wingrove, cited above, p. 1957, § 57). Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it will depend on the specific domestic context (see, mutatis mutandis, Gorzelik and Others, cited above, § 67, and Murphy v. Ireland, no. 44179/98, § 73, ECHR 2003-IX).
“… The Court … notes the emphasis placed in the Turkish constitutional system on the protection of the rights of women … Gender equality – recognised by the European Court as one of the key principles underlying the Convention and a goal to be achieved by member States of the Council of Europe (see, among other authorities, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, pp. 37-38, § 78; Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, pp. 21-22, § 67; Burgharz v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 February 1994, Series A no. 280-B, p. 29, § 27; Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, judgment of 21 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, p. 186, § 39 in fine; and Petrovic v. Austria, judgment of 27 March 1998, Reports 1998-II, p. 587, § 37) – was also found by the Turkish Constitutional Court to be a principle implicit in the values underlying the Constitution …
… In addition, like the Constitutional Court …, the Court considers that, when examining the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish context, it must be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, which is presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who choose not to wear it. As has already been noted (see Karaduman, decision cited above, and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, cited above, § 95), the issues at stake include the protection of the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ and the ‘maintenance of public order’ in a country in which the majority of the population, while professing a strong attachment to the rights of women and a secular way of life, adhere to the Islamic faith. Imposing limitations on freedom in this sphere may, therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing social need by seeking to achieve those two legitimate aims, especially since, as the Turkish courts stated …, this religious symbol has taken on political significance in Turkey in recent years.
… The Court does not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts … It has previously said that each Contracting State may, in accordance with the Convention provisions, take a stance against such political movements, based on its historical experience (see Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, cited above, § 124). The regulations concerned have to be viewed in that context and constitute a measure intended to achieve the legitimate aims referred to above and thereby to preserve pluralism in the university.”
121. In that connection, the Court does not accept the applicant’s submission that the fact that there were no disciplinary penalties for failing to comply with the dress code effectively meant that no rules existed (see paragraph 81 above). As to how compliance with the internal rules should have been secured, it is not for the Court to substitute its view for that of the university authorities. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the education community, the university authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions or the requirements of a particular course (see, mutatis mutandis, Valsamis v. Greece, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996‑VI, p. 2325, § 32). Besides, having found that the regulations pursued a legitimate aim, it is not open to the Court to apply the criterion of proportionality in a way that would make the notion of an institution’s “internal rules” devoid of purpose. Article 9 does not always guarantee the right to behave in a manner governed by a religious belief (see Pichon and Sajous v. France (dec.), no. 49853/99, ECHR 2001‑X) and does not confer on people who do so the right to disregard rules that have proved to be justified (see Valsamis, cited above, opinion of the Commission, p. 2337, § 51).
130. In conclusion, the Court will examine this complaint separately (see, mutatis mutandis, Göç v. Turkey [GC], no. 36590/97, § 46, ECHR 2002‑V).
135. As to the content of the right to education and the scope of the obligation it imposes, the Court notes that in the Case “relating to certain aspects of laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” (“the Belgian linguistic case” (merits), judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6, pp. 30-31, § 3), it stated: “The negative formulation indicates, as is confirmed by the ‘preparatory work’ …, that the Contracting Parties do not recognise such a right to education as would require them to establish at their own expense, or to subsidise, education of any particular type or at any particular level. However, it cannot be concluded from this that the State has no positive obligation to ensure respect for such a right as is protected by Article 2 of the Protocol. As a ‘right’ does exist, it is secured, by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, to everyone within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State.”
152. The right to education, as set out in the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, guarantees everyone within the jurisdiction of the Contracting States “a right of access to educational institutions existing at a given time”, but such access constitutes only a part of the right to education. For that right “to be effective, it is further necessary that, inter alia, the individual who is the beneficiary should have the possibility of drawing profit from the education received, that is to say, the right to obtain, in conformity with the rules in force in each State, and in one form or another, official recognition of the studies which he has completed” (see the Belgian linguistic case, cited above, pp. 30-32, §§ 3-5; see also Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 23, pp. 25-26, § 52). Similarly, implicit in the phrase “No person shall …” is the principle of equality of treatment of all citizens in the exercise of their right to education.
153. The fundamental right of everyone to education is a right guaranteed equally to pupils in State and independent schools, without distinction (see Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1993, Series A no. 247‑C, p. 58, § 27).
154. In spite of its importance, this right is not, however, absolute, but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access “by its very nature calls for regulation by the State” (see the Belgian linguistic case, cited above, p. 32, § 5; see also, mutatis mutandis, Golder, cited above, pp. 18-19, § 38, and Fayed v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 September 1994, Series A no. 294‑B, pp. 49-50, § 65). Admittedly, the regulation of educational institutions may vary in time and in place, inter alia, according to the needs and resources of the community and the distinctive features of different levels of education. Consequently, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this sphere, although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court. In order to ensure that the restrictions that are imposed do not curtail the right in question to such an extent as to impair its very essence and deprive it of its effectiveness, the Court must satisfy itself that they are foreseeable for those concerned and pursue a legitimate aim. However, unlike the position with respect to Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, it is not bound by an exhaustive list of “legitimate aims” under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 36, ECHR 2002‑II). Furthermore, a limitation will only be compatible with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 if there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.
We agree with the majority that there has been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention in the present case. We have also voted for the finding that there was no violation of the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, mainly because the text of the judgment is drafted in such a way that it makes it difficult to divide these two findings. As stated in paragraph 157 of the judgment, the “analysis of the case by reference to the right to education cannot in this instance be divorced from the conclusion reached by the Court with respect to Article 9 …, as the considerations taken into account under that provision are clearly applicable to the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, which complaint consists of criticism of the regulation concerned that takes much the same form as that made with respect to Article 9”.
6. Under Article 9 of the Convention, the freedom with which this case is concerned is not freedom to have a religion (the internal conviction) but to manifest one’s religion (the expression of that conviction). If the Court has been very protective (perhaps overprotective) of religious sentiment (see Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, judgment of 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295-A, and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V), it has shown itself less willing to intervene in cases concerning religious practices (see Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek, cited above, and Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V), which only appear to receive a subsidiary form of protection (see paragraph 105 of the judgment). This is, in fact, an aspect of freedom of religion with which the Court has rarely been confronted up to now and on which it has not yet had an opportunity to form an opinion with regard to external symbols of religious practice, such as particular items of clothing, whose symbolic importance may vary greatly according to the faith concerned[2].
7. Referring to Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, ECHR 2003-II), the judgment states: “An attitude which fails to respect that principle [of secularism] will not necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest one’s religion” (see paragraph 114). The majority thus consider that wearing the headscarf contravenes the principle of secularism. In so doing, they take up position on an issue that has been the subject of much debate, namely the signification of wearing the headscarf and its relationship with the principle of secularism[3].
Unless the level of protection of the right to freedom of religion is reduced to take account of the context, the possible effect which wearing the headscarf, which is presented as a symbol, may have on those who do not wear it does not appear to me, in the light of the Court’s case-law, to satisfy the requirement of a pressing social need. Mutatis mutandis, in the sphere of freedom of expression (Article 10), the Court has never accepted that interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression can be justified by the fact that the ideas or views concerned are not shared by everyone and may even offend some people. Recently, in Gündüz v. Turkey (no. 35071/97, ECHR 2003-XI), the Court held that there had been a violation of freedom of expression where a Muslim religious leader had been convicted for violently criticising the secular regime in Turkey, calling for the introduction of the sharia and referring to children born of marriages celebrated solely before the secular authorities as “bastards”. Thus, manifesting one’s religion by peacefully wearing a headscarf may be prohibited whereas, in the same context, remarks which could be construed as incitement to religious hatred are covered by freedom of expression[4].
10. In fact, it is the threat posed by “extremist political movements” seeking to “impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts” which, in the Court’s view, serves to justify the regulations in issue, which constitute “a measure intended to … preserve pluralism in the university” (see paragraph 115 in fine of the judgment). The Court had already made this clear in Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others (cited above, § 95), when it stated: “In a country like Turkey, where the great majority of the population belong to a particular religion, measures taken in universities to prevent certain fundamentalist religious movements from exerting pressure on students who do not practise that religion or on those who belong to another religion may be justified under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.”
While everyone agrees on the need to prevent radical Islamism, a serious objection may nevertheless be made to such reasoning. Merely wearing the headscarf cannot be associated with fundamentalism and it is vital to distinguish between those who wear the headscarf and “extremists” who seek to impose the headscarf as they do other religious symbols. Not all women who wear the headscarf are fundamentalists and there is nothing to suggest that the applicant held fundamentalist views. She is a young adult woman and a university student, and might reasonably be expected to have a heightened capacity to resist pressure, it being noted in this connection that the judgment fails to provide any concrete example of the type of pressure concerned. The applicant’s personal interest in exercising the right to freedom of religion and to manifest her religion by an external symbol cannot be wholly absorbed by the public interest in fighting extremism[5].
11. Turning to equality, the majority focus on the protection of women’s rights and the principle of sexual equality (see paragraphs 115 and 116 of the judgment). Wearing the headscarf is considered on the contrary to be synonymous with the alienation of women. The ban on wearing the headscarf is therefore seen as promoting equality between men and women. However, what, in fact, is the connection between the ban and sexual equality? The judgment does not say. Indeed, what is the signification of wearing the headscarf? As the German Constitutional Court noted in its judgment of 24 September 2003[6], wearing the headscarf has no single meaning; it is a practice that is engaged in for a variety of reasons. It does not necessarily symbolise the submission of women to men and there are those who maintain that, in certain cases, it can even be a means of emancipating women. What is lacking in this debate is the opinion of women, both those who wear the headscarf and those who choose not to.
It is not the Court’s role to make an appraisal of this type – in this instance a unilateral and negative one – of a religion or religious practice, just as it is not its role to determine in a general and abstract way the signification of wearing the headscarf or to impose its viewpoint on the applicant. The applicant, a young adult university student, said – and there is nothing to suggest that she was not telling the truth – that she wore the headscarf of her own free will. In this connection, I fail to see how the principle of sexual equality can justify prohibiting a woman from following a practice which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, she must be taken to have freely adopted. Equality and non-discrimination are subjective rights which must remain under the control of those who are entitled to benefit from them. “Paternalism” of this sort runs counter to the case-law of the Court, which has developed a real right to personal autonomy on the basis of Article 8 (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, § 92, ECHR 2001-III; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, §§ 65-67, ECHR 2002-III; and Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 90, ECHR 2002-VI)[7]. Finally, if wearing the headscarf really was contrary to the principle of equality between men and women in any event, the State would have a positive obligation to prohibit it in all places, whether public or private[8].
I would begin by noting that before refusing the applicant access to lectures and examinations, the authorities should have used other means either to encourage her (through mediation, for example) to remove her headscarf and pursue her studies, or to ensure that public order was maintained on the university premises if it was genuinely at risk[9]. The fact of the matter is that no attempt was made to try measures that would have had a less drastic effect on the applicant’s right to education in the instant case. My second point is that it is common ground that by making the applicant’s pursuit of her studies conditional on removing the headscarf and by refusing her access to the university if she failed to comply with this requirement, the authorities forced the applicant to leave the country and complete her studies at Vienna University. She was thus left with no alternative. However, in Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek (cited above, §§ 80 and 81) the existence of alternative solutions was one of the factors the Court took into account in holding that there had been no violation of the Convention. Lastly, the Grand Chamber does not weigh up the competing interests, namely, on the one hand, the damage sustained by the applicant – who was deprived of any possibility of completing her studies in Turkey because of her religious convictions and also maintained that it was unlikely that she would be able to return to her country to practise her profession owing to the difficulties that existed there in obtaining recognition for foreign diplomas – and, on the other, the benefit to be gained by Turkish society from prohibiting the applicant from wearing the headscarf on the university premises.
[1]. See S. Van Drooghenbroeck, La proportionnalité dans le droit de la Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme. Prendre l’idée simple au sérieux, Brussels, Bruylant, 2001.
[2]. See E. Brems, “The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to religion”, in Th. Marauhn (ed.), Die Rechtsstellung des Menschen im Völkerrecht. Entwicklungen und Perspektiven, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2003, pp. 1 et seq.
[3]. See E. Bribosia and I. Rorive, “Le voile à l’école : une Europe divisée”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2004, p. 958.
[4]. See S. Van Drooghenbroeck, “Strasbourg et le voile”, Journal du juriste, 2004, no. 34, p. 10.
[5]. See E. Bribosia and I. Rorive, “Le voile à l’école : une Europe divisée”, op. cit., p. 960.
[6]. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, judgment of the Second Division of 24 September 2003, 2BvR 1436/042.
[7]. See S. Van Drooghenbroeck, “Strasbourg et le voile”, op. cit.
[8]. See E. Bribosia and I. Rorive, “Le voile à l’école : une Europe divisée”, op. cit., p. 962.
[9]. See O. De Schutter and J. Ringelheim, “La renonciation aux droits fondamentaux. La libre disposition du soi et le règne de l’échange”, CRIDHO Working paper series 1/2005.
[10]. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, “Annual report on ECRI’s activities covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2004”, doc. CRI (2005)36, Strasbourg, June 2005.