Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/604/215/7930/
Timestamp: 2019-07-20 15:45:29
Document Index: 369348431

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2253', '§ 2253', '§ 2241', '§ 1361', '§ 2241', '§ 2243', '§ 2254']

Thomas J. Roba, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 604 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1979 › Thomas J. Roba, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee
Thomas J. Roba, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 604 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 604 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979)
Argued July 16, 1979. Decided Aug. 27, 1979
After unsuccessful efforts to negotiate waiver of a removal hearing, the Government sought the issuance of a removal warrant pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 40 at a resumed hearing. The Government presented a certified copy of the California indictment and relied, for proof of identity, on Roba's own motion papers. Roba sought to have the removal hearing continued because of his ill health. The Government countered with the suggestion that the removal warrant should be issued and that execution of the warrant should be stayed for sufficient time to permit the California Court to rule on Roba's fitness to stand trial. In the Government's view, resolution of that issue would moot the question of Roba's competency to withstand the journey to California. The Magistrate agreed with the Government's position and recommended it to Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy.
We agree with appellant that § 2253 does not bar appellate jurisdiction because the proceeding before Judge Knapp was not a proceeding "to test the validity of a warrant to remove," but was an attack upon the lawfulness of the execution of the warrant in view of petitioner's medical condition. Congress enacted the prohibition against appeals in habeas corpus proceedings testing the validity of removal warrants out of an understandable concern with obstructive delays. See United States ex rel. Angelica v. Hammond, 99 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1938); United States v. Provoo, 16 F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The legislative history indicates, however, that the preclusion of appeals is properly to be limited to proceedings to test the " validity" of a removal warrant, and not extended, as the Government contends, to appeals from a proceeding challenging any aspect of removal. When the bill that became the second sentence of § 2253, H.R. 6178, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), was recommended to Congress, the Department of Justice urged its enactment with the assurance that "if any error is made in (the defendant's) removal it can be corrected on appeal from the final judgment of conviction." A. Holtzoff, Memorandum for the Attorney General re bill to abolish appeals in removal proceedings, reprinted in H.Rep.No. 1543, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1937). The manifest purpose of Congress was to prevent appellate consideration, in the circuit of the habeas court, of issues affecting the validity of the warrant, particularly probable cause and identity, the only issues available for litigation when a district court is asked to issue a removal warrant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 40(b) (3); see United States v. Woodring, 446 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Provoo, supra. Plainly the issue petitioner sought to litigate in the District Court whether execution of the warrant should be stayed because of a life-threatening medical condition would not be available for consideration upon appeal from a conviction. Of course, the petitioner could not defeat the Congressional objective by disguising an attack on probable cause or identity in the garb of a habeas corpus challenge to the execution of a warrant. But conversely, the Government cannot defeat appellate review of a challenge on medical grounds to the execution of a removal warrant by claiming it is in reality a precluded attack on the validity of the warrant.
Petitioner has a right not to be forceably transported by government officials while he is in a life-threatening condition. Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). If the removal warrant is executed, petitioner will be in custody, and while in custody, governmental power will allegedly be used to deny him that right. At that point petitioner's challenge to his transfer while seriously ill would be a challenge to the conditions of his confinement, for which habeas corpus relief under § 2241 would be available. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 498-500 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's reliance on § 1361 jurisdiction instead of available § 2241 jurisdiction); Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201, 1208 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Clinkenbeard, 542 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976).4 Petitioner need not wait until the marshals physically lay hands on him; he is entitled now to challenge the allegedly unlawful conditions of his imminent custody. Cf. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 93 S. Ct. 1571, 36 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1973); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S. Ct. 1549, 20 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1968); United States v. Consiglio, 391 F. Supp. 564, 566 n.2 (D. Conn. 1975). The habeas corpus court is obliged to adjudicate the merits of such a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.5 It does not have authority to delegate adjudication of the claim to some other court.6 Furthermore, even if the California Court, without petitioner's presence, could fairly determine his physical ability to be removed, it is by no means clear that that Court would have authority to stay the execution of a removal warrant issued by the Southern District of New York. In any event, the Southern District has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition for habeas corpus, and it may not decline to do so.
Those in state custody can present similar claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S. Ct. 407, 30 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969); Armstrong v. Cardwell, 457 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1972)