Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/17/247/567091/
Timestamp: 2020-07-16 03:07:22
Document Index: 797483839

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1014', '§ 1014', '§ 1014', '§ 4', '§ 1014', '§ 1014', '§ 3664', '§ 1014']

Terry Kok, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 17 F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1994 › Terry Kok, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee
Terry Kok, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 17 F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1994)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 17 F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1994) Submitted Nov. 11, 1993. Decided Feb. 18, 1994
Terry Kok appeals the 27-month sentence of imprisonment and the order of restitution imposed by the district court following his plea of guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (making false statements to a federally insured financial institution). Appellant argues that the district court erred (1) in using amended versions of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) that were not in effect at the time of the offense; (2) by incorrectly calculating the amount of loss for purposes of U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1; (3) by improperly determining that it lacked authority to grant a downward departure from the guideline range; and (4) in ordering payment of restitution. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for resentencing.
Kok was charged by indictment with four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of a felony). He pleaded guilty to Count 4 of the indictment which charged him with making a false statement on March 14, 1989 pertaining to Component's financial condition for the years 1985 through 1988 for the purpose of influencing Western's actions with respect to Component's line of credit.
The version of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 that was in effect on the date of the offense provided for a maximum sentence of imprisonment of two years. An amendment to the statute which became effective on November 29, 1990 increased the maximum sentence of imprisonment to 20 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1992) (original at Pub. L. 101-647 (November 29, 1990)). At sentencing the district court applied the amended version of the statute and a revised version of the sentencing guidelines that was then in effect. As a result, the district court determined that the guideline range for imprisonment was 27 to 33 months. The government concedes, and we agree, that application of the amended version of Sec. 1014, resulting in punishment that was greater than that which existed at the time the offense was committed, violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S. Ct. 960, 963-64, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981). On remand, the district court should apply the pre-amendment version of Sec. 1014 such that the maximum sentence of imprisonment that Kok may receive is 24 months.
Appellant's second argument is that the sentencing court incorrectly applied the guidelines in determining the amount of the loss. We review a district court's finding regarding loss under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1 under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Earles, 955 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1992). The district court in this case determined that the amount of loss was $1,000,000, of which $800,000 was attributed to the amount of jeopardy to Western and the balance attributed to the bonuses paid by Component to Kok and three other employees.
Section 2F1.1 of the guidelines provides that the base offense level for an offense involving fraud or deceit is to be increased according to the amount of the loss. The amount of loss used to increase the offense level is either the actual loss resulting from the fraudulent conduct or the amount of loss the defendant intended to inflict, whichever is greater. United States v. Edgar, 971 F.2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1992). In the instant case, there was no evidence of actual loss with regard to the line of credit. All loans, plus interest, obtained during the period in question were repaid by Component to Western in a timely fashion. Therefore, the focus for purposes of sentencing should be on the amount of the possible loss that Kok attempted to inflict. United States v. Johnson, 908 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1990).1
Kok also challenges the district court's inclusion of the bonuses paid by Component in the loss computation. He argues that the bonuses should not have been included because Western was the only victim of the offense. For sentencing purposes the task of the district court is to determine the amount of loss that is attributable to the defendant's criminal conduct. United States v. Wilson, 980 F.2d 259, 261 (4th Cir. 1992). The guidelines do not define who may be considered a "victim" for the purpose of calculating the loss. Component's president testified at the sentencing hearing that based on the false financial statements Kok prepared the company paid $202,709.70 in bonuses to Kok and three other employees. As a result of the scheme perpetrated by Kok, Component suffered actual losses. When the offense involves a false statement, "the inquiry to determine loss must focus on the amount of loss related to the false statement." Id. (amount repaid to financial institution by guarantor could be included as a loss for purposes of calculating the sentence for making false statement to a financial institution). We believe the district court properly included Component's actual losses in determining the intended loss under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1.
Kok's third point is that the district court erroneously determined that it lacked authority to grant a downward departure. A district court's refusal to depart may be reversed if the refusal is based on the belief that the court lacked the power to depart. Johnson, 908 F.2d at 399. In this case the district court stated, " [I]n examining all of the evidence which has been submitted here this morning, I am of the--of the opinion and therefore, find that the Court will not provide for its--its discretion to depart downward." (Sentencing Transcript, p. 118). Thus, the district Court clearly recognized that it had authority to consider a downward departure, but determined that no departure was warranted. This aspect of the district court's determination is not subject to review. Johnson, 908 F.2d at 399.
Kok also argues that no restitution should have been awarded to Component because the company was not a victim of the offense of conviction. Restitution may only be awarded for the loss "caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction." Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413, 110 S. Ct. 1979, 1981, 109 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1990). The district court found that as a result of the offense to which Kok pleaded guilty, Component paid bonuses to him and three other employees. Although Western was the direct victim of the false statements, Kok also injured Component. See United States v. Farkas, 935 F.2d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 1991).
Alternatively, Kok requests that the restitution award be vacated because the district court failed to indicate on the record that it considered the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a).3 The presentence report that was submitted to the court contained detailed information regarding Kok's assets and liabilities. Kok was also furnished a copy of the report and had the opportunity to comment on the information it contained. See United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 106 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S. Ct. 202, 93 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1986).
In United States v. Owens, 901 F.2d 1457 (8th Cir. 1990), we encouraged sentencing courts to make specific findings of fact about the defendant's financial resources, financial needs, earning ability, and financial obligations to his dependents when ordering restitution. Id. at 1459-1460. On remand, the district court should make specific findings on the record concerning Kok's ability to pay restitution.
Appellant has cited a number of cases from other circuits for the proposition that the "loss" under Sec. 2.F1.1 should be equal to the "net loss" or the actual harm caused to the victim. However, this Court, acknowledging the split among the circuits, has held that the amount of "loss" does not hinge upon actual loss or "net loss." See United States v. Prendergast, 979 F.2d 1289, 1292 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1992)
The version of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 in effect at the time of the offense provided for a maximum fine of $5,000. The amended version provides for a maximum fine of $1 million