Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/509/43
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 245', '§ 1255', '§ 245', '§ 1255', '§ 245', '§ 245', '§ 1105', '§ 1255', '§ 103', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 245', '§ 245', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 103']

Janet RENO, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners v. CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews Janet RENO, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners v. CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., et al.
509 U.S. 43 (113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38)
(a) The Reform Act's exclusive review schemewhich applies to "determinations respecting an application for adjustment of status," 8 U.S.C. 1255a(f)(1), and specifies that "a denial" of such adjustment may be judicially scrutinized "only in the . . . review of an order of deportation" in the Courts of Appeals, § 1255a(f)(4)(A)does not preclude district court jurisdiction over an action which, in challenging the legality of an INS regulation, does not refer to or rely on the denial of any individual application. The statutory language delimiting the jurisdictional bar refers only to review of such an individual denial. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494, 111 S.Ct. 888, 897, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005. Pp. ____.
(c) Nevertheless, the INS's "front-desking" policywhich directs employees to reject applications at a Legalization Office's front desk if the applicant is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of statusmay well have left some of the plaintiffs with ripe claims that are outside the scope of § 1255a(f). A front-desked class member whose application was rejected because one of the regulations at issue rendered him ineligible for legalization would have felt the regulation's effects in a particularly concrete manner, for his application would have been blocked then and there; his challenge to the regulation should not fail for lack of ripeness. Front-desking would also have the untoward consequence for jurisdictional purposes of effectively excluding such an applicant from access even to the Reform Act's limited administrative and judicial review procedures, since he would have no formal denial to appeal administratively nor any opportunity to build an administrative record on which judicial review might be based. Absent clear and convincing evidence of a congressional intent to preclude judicial review entirely, it must be presumed that front-desked applicants may obtain district court review of the regulations in these circumstances. See McNary, supra, 498 U.S., at 496-497, 111 S.Ct., at 898-899. However, as there is also no evidence that particular class members were actually subjected to front-desking, the jurisdictional issue cannot be resolved on the records below. Because, as the cases have been presented to this Court, only those class members (if any) who were front-desked have ripe claims over which the District Courts should exercise jurisdiction, the cases must be remanded for new jurisdictional determinations and, if appropriate, remedial orders. Pp. ____.
* On November 6, 1986, the President signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, Title II of which established a scheme under which certain aliens unlawfully present in the United States could apply, first, for the status of a temporary resident and then, after a one-year wait, for permission to reside permanently.
An applicant for temporary resident status must have resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since at least January 1, 1982, 8 U.S.C. 1255a(a)(2)(A); must have been physically present in the United States continuously since November 6, 1986, the date the Reform Act was enacted, § 1255a(a)(3)(A); and must have been otherwise admissible as an immigrant. § 1255a(a)(4). The applicant must also have applied during the 12-month period beginning on May 5, 1987. § 1255a(a)(1).
The two separate suits joined before us challenge regulations addressing, respectively, the first two of these four requirements. The first, Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. (CSS) et al. focuses on an INS interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1255a(a)(3), the Reform Act's requirement that applicants for temporary residence prove "continuous physical presence" in the United States since November 6, 1986. To mitigate this requirement, the Reform Act provides that "brief, casual, and innocent absences from the United States" will not break the required continuity. § 1255a(a)(3)(B). In a telex sent to its regional offices on November 14, 1986, however, the INS treated the exception narrowly, stating that it would consider an absence "brief, casual and innocent" only if the alien had obtained INS permission, known as "advance parole," before leaving the United States; aliens who left without it would be "ineligible for legalization." App. 186. The INS later softened this limitation somewhat by regulations issued on May 1, 1987, forgiving a failure to get advance parole for absences between November 6, 1986 and May 1, 1987. But the later regulation confirmed that any absences without advance parole on or after May 1, 1987 would not be considered "brief, casual, and innocent" and would therefore be taken to have broken the required continuity. See 8 CFR § 245a.1(g) (1992) ("Brief, casual, and innocent means a departure authorized by the INS (advance parole) subsequent to May 1, 1987 of not more than thirty (30) days for legitimate emergency or humanitarian purposes").
The CSS plaintiffs challenged the advance parole regulation as an impermissible construction of the Reform Act. After certifying the case as a class action, the District Court eventually defined a class comprising "persons prima facie eligible for legalization under 8 U.S.C. 1255a who departed and reentered the United States without INS authorization (i.e. 'advance parole') after the enactment of the Reform Act following what they assert to have been a brief, casual and innocent absence from the United States."
No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., May 3, 1988) (App. 50). On April 22, 1988, 12 days before the end of the legalization program's 12-month application period, the District Court granted partial summary judgment invalidating the regulation and declaring that "brief, casual, and innocent" absences did not require prior INS approval. No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., Apr. 22, 1988) (Record, Doc. No. 161); see Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F.Supp. 1149 (ED Cal.1988) (explaining the basis of the April 22 order). No appeal was taken by the INS (by which initials we will refer to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Attorney General collectively), and after further briefing on remedial issues the District Court issued an order on June 10, 1988 requiring the INS to extend the application period to November 30, 1988
for class members who "knew of the INS's unlawful regulation and thereby concluded that they were ineligible for legalization and by reason of that conclusion did not file an application."
No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., June 10, 1988) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a). Two further remedial orders issued on August 11, 1988 provided, respectively, an alternative remedy if the extension of the application period should be invalidated on appeal, and further specific relief for any class members who had been detained or apprehended by the INS or who were in deportation proceedings.
No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal.) (Record, Doc. No. 187, 189). The INS appealed all three of the remedial orders.
The second of the two lawsuits, styled INS v. League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) et al., goes to the INS's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1255a(a)(2)(A), the Reform Act's "continuous unlawful residence" requirement. The Act provides that certain brief trips abroad will not break an alien's continuous unlawful residence (just as certain brief absences from the United States would not violate the "continuous physical presence" requirement). See § 1255a(g)(2)(A). Under an INS regulation, however, an alien would fail the "continuous unlawful residence" requirement if he had gone abroad and reentered the United States by presenting "facially valid" documentation to immigration authorities. 8 CFR § 245a.2(b)(8) (1992).
On the INS's reasoning, an alien's use of such documentation made his subsequent presence "lawful" for purposes of § 1255a(a)(2)(A), thereby breaking the continuity of his unlawful residence. Thus, an alien who had originally entered the United States under a valid nonimmigrant visa, but had become an unlawful resident by violating the terms of that visa in a way known to the Government before January 1, 1982, was eligible for relief under the Reform Act. If, however, the same alien left the United States briefly and then used the same visa to get back in (a facially valid visa that had in fact become invalid after his earlier violation of its terms), he rendered himself ineligible.
In July 1987, the LULAC plaintiffs brought suit challenging the reentry regulation as inconsistent both with the Act and the equal protection limitation derived from Fifth Amendment due process. With this suit still pending, on November 17, 1987, some seven months into the Reform Act's 12-month application period, the INS modified its reentry policy by issuing two new regulations.
The first, codified at 8 CFR § 245a.2(b)(9) (1992), specifically acknowledged the eligibility of an alien who "reentered the United States as a nonimmigrant . . . in order to return to an unrelinquished unlawful residence," so long as he "would be otherwise eligible for legalization and . . . was present in the United States in an unlawful status prior to January 1, 1982." 52 Fed.Reg. 43845 (1987). The second, codified at 8 CFR § 245a.2(b)(10) (1992), qualified this expansion of eligibility by obliging such an alien to obtain a waiver of a statutory provision requiring exclusion of aliens who enter the United States by fraud. Ibid.
"all persons who qualify for legalization but who were deemed ineligible for legalization under the original reentry policy, who learned of their ineligibility following promulgation of the policy and who, relying upon information that they were ineligible, did not apply for legalization before the May 4, 1988 deadline."
No. 87-4757-WDK (JRx) (CD Cal. July 15, 1988) (App. 216).
The Ninth Circuit eventually consolidated the two appeals. After holding them pending this Court's disposition of McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991), it rendered a decision in February 1992, affirming the District Courts.
Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (1992). We were prompted to grant certiorari, 505 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2990, 120 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), by the importance of the issues, and by a conflict between circuits on the jurisdictional issue, see Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 292 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 156-162, 948 F.2d 742, 748-754 (1991) (holding that the Reform Act precluded district court jurisdiction over a claim that INS regulations were inconsistent with the Act), cert. pending, No. 91-1924. We now vacate and remand.
The Reform Act not only sets the qualifications for obtaining temporary resident status, but provides an exclusive scheme for administrative and judicial review of "determinations respecting . . . applications for adjustment of status" under the Title II legalization program. 8 U.S.C. 1255a(f)(1). Section 1255a(f)(3)(A) directs the Attorney General to "establish an appellate authority to provide for a single level of administrative appellate review" of such determinations. Section 1255a(f)(4)(A) provides that a denial of adjustment of status is subject to review by a court "only in the judicial review of an order of deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1105a"; under § 1105a, this review takes place in the Courts of Appeals. Section 1255a(f)(1) closes the circle by explicitly rendering the scheme exclusive: "There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection."
Under this scheme, an alien denied adjustment of status by the INS in the first instance may appeal to the Associate Commissioner for Examinations, the "appellate authority" designated by the Attorney General pursuant to § 1255a(f)(3)(A). See 8 CFR §§ 103.1(f)(1)(xxvii), 245a.2(p) (1992). Although the Associate Commissioner's decision is the final agency action on the application, an adverse decision does not trigger deportation proceedings. On the contrary, because the Reform Act generally allows the INS to use information in a legalization application only to make a determination on the application, see 8 U.S.C. 1255a(c)(5),
We call the right to judicial review "latent" because § 1255a(f)(4)(A) allows judicial review of a denial of adjustment of status only on appeal of "an order of deportation." Hence, the alien must first either surrender to the INS for deportation
The INS takes these provisions to preclude the District Courts from exercising jurisdiction over the claims in both the CSS and LULAC cases, reasoning that the regulations it adopted to elaborate the qualifications for temporary resident status are "determinations respecting an application for adjustment of status" within the meaning of § 1255a(f)(1); because the claims in CSS and LULAC attack the validity of those regulations, they are subject to the limitations contained in § 1255a(f), foreclosing all jurisdiction in the district courts, and granting it to the Courts of Appeals only on review of a deportation order. The INS recognizes, however, that this reasoning is out of line with our decision in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991), where we construed a virtually identical set of provisions governing judicial review within a separate legalization program for agricultural workers created by Title III of the Reform Act.
There, as here, the critical language was "a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status." We said that "the reference to 'a determination' describes a single act rather than a group of decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making decisions." Id., at 492, 111 S.Ct., at 896. We noted that the provision permitting judicial review only in the context of a deportation proceeding also defined its scope by reference to a single act: " 'judicial review of such a denial.' " Ibid. (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 1160(e)(3)); see § 1255a(f)(4)(A) (using identical language). We therefore decided that the language setting the limits of the jurisdictional bar "describes the denial of an individual application," 498 U.S., at 492, and thus "applies only to review of denials of individual . . . applications." Id., at 494, 111 S.Ct., at 897. The INS gives us no reason to reverse course, and we reject its argument that § 1255a(f)(1) precludes district court jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality of a regulation without referring to or relying on the denial of any individual application.
Section 1255a(f)(1), however, is not the only jurisdictional hurdle in the way of the CSS and LULAC plaintiffs, whose claims still must satisfy the jurisdictional and justiciability requirements that apply in the absence of a specific Congressional directive. To be sure, a statutory source of jurisdiction is not lacking, since 28 U.S.C. 1331, generally granting federal question jurisdiction, "confers jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action." Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S.Ct. 980, 984, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Neither is it fatal that the Reform Act is silent about the type of judicial review those plaintiffs seek. We customarily refuse to treat such silence "as a denial of authority to an aggrieved person to seek appropriate relief in the federal courts," Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309, 64 S.Ct. 559, 571, 88 L.Ed. 733 (1944), and this custom has been "reinforced by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, which embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one 'suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.' " Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 702).
As we said in Abbott Laboratories, however, the presumption of available judicial review is subject to an implicit limitation: "injunctive and declaratory judgment remedies," what the respondents seek here, "are discretionary, and courts traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to administrative determinations unless these arise in the context of a controversy 'ripe' for judicial resolution,"
387 U.S., at 148, 87 S.Ct., at 1515, that is to say, unless the effects of the administrative action challenged have been "felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Id., at 148-149, 87 S.Ct., at 1515. In some cases, the promulgation of a regulation will itself affect parties concretely enough to satisfy this requirement, as it did in Abbott Laboratories itself. There, for example, as well as in Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U.S. 167, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967), the promulgation of the challenged regulations presented plaintiffs with the immediate dilemma to choose between complying with newly imposed, disadvantageous restrictions and risking serious penalties for violation. Abbott Laboratories, supra, 387 U.S., at 152-153, 87 S.Ct., at 1517-1518; Gardner, supra, 387 U.S., at 171-172, 87 S.Ct., at 1528-1529. But that will not be so in every case. In Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967), for example, we held that a challenge to another regulation, the impact of which could not "be said to be felt immediately by those subject to it in conducting their day-to-day affairs," id., at 164, 87 S.Ct., at 1524, would not be ripe before the regulation's application to the plaintiffs in some more acute fashion, since "no irremediably adverse consequences flowed from requiring a later challenge." Ibid.; see Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3190, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (a controversy concerning a regulation is not ordinarily ripe for review under the Administrative Procedure Act until the regulation has been applied to the claimant's situation by some concrete action).
It delegates to the INS the task of determining on a case-by-case basis whether each applicant has met all of the Act's conditions, not merely those interpreted by the regulations in question. In these circumstances, the promulgation of the challenged regulations did not itself give each CSS and LULAC class member a ripe claim; a class member's claim would ripen only once he took the affirmative steps that he could take before the INS blocked his path by applying the regulation to him.
Ordinarily, of course, that barrier would appear when the INS formally denied the alien's application on the ground that the regulation rendered him ineligible for legalization. A plaintiff who sought to rely on the denial of his application to satisfy the ripeness requirement, however, would then still find himself at least temporarily barred by the Reform Act's exclusive review provisions, since he would be seeking "judicial review of a determination respecting an application." 8 U.S.C. 1255a(f)(1). The ripeness doctrine and the Reform Act's jurisdictional provisions would thus dovetail neatly, and not necessarily by mere coincidence. Congress may well have assumed that, in the ordinary case, the courts would not hear a challenge to regulations specifying limits to eligibility before those regulations were actually applied to an individual, whose challenge to the denial of an individual application would proceed within the Reform Act's limited scheme. The CSS and LULAC plaintiffs do not argue that this limited scheme would afford them inadequate review of a determination based on the regulations they challenge, presumably because they would be able to obtain such review on appeal from a deportation order, if they become subject to such an order; their situation is thus different from that of the "17 unsuccessful individual SAW applicants" in McNary, 498 U.S., at 487, 111 S.Ct., at 893, whose procedural objections, we concluded, could receive no practical judicial review within the scheme established by 8 U.S.C. 1160(e). Id., at 496-497, 111 S.Ct., at 898-899.
This is not the end of the matter, however, because the plaintiffs have called our attention to an INS policy that may well have placed some of them outside the scope of § 1255a(f)(1). The INS has issued a manual detailing procedures for its offices to follow in implementing the Reform Act's legalization programs and instructing INS employees called "Legalization Assistants" to review certain applications in the presence of the applicants before accepting them for filing. See Procedures Manual for the Legalization and Special Agricultural Worker Programs of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Legalization Manual).
According to the Manual, "minor correctable deficiencies such as incomplete responses or typographical errors may be corrected by the Legalization Assistant." Id., at IV-6. "If the applicant is statutorily ineligible," however, the Manual provides that "the application will be rejected by the Legalization Assistant." Ibid. (emphasis added). Because this prefiling rejection of applications occurs at the front desk of an INS office, it has come to be called "front-desking."
See n. 26, infra.
As respondents argue, see Brief for Respondents 17, n. 23, a class member whose application was "front-desked" would have felt the effects of the "advance parole" or "facially valid document" regulation in a particularly concrete manner, for his application for legalization would have been blocked then and there; his challenge to the regulation should not fail for lack of ripeness. Front- desking would also have a further, and untoward, consequence for jurisdictional purposes, for it would effectively exclude an applicant from access even to the limited administrative and judicial review procedures established by the Reform Act. He would have no formal denial to appeal to the Associate Commissioner for Examinations, nor would he have an opportunity to build an administrative record on which judicial review might be based.
Hence, to construe § 1255a(f)(1) to bar district court jurisdiction over his challenge, we would have to impute to Congress an intent to preclude judicial review of the legality of INS action entirely under those circumstances. As we stated recently in McNary, however, there is a "well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action," McNary, 498 U.S., at 496, 111 S.Ct., at 898; and we will accordingly find an intent to preclude such review only if presented with " 'clear and convincing evidence.' " Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S., at 141, 87 S.Ct., at 1511 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380, 82 S.Ct. 787, 794, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962)); see generally Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670-673, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 2136-2137, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (discussing the presumption in favor of judicial review).
There is no such clear and convincing evidence in the statute before us. Although the phrase "a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status" could conceivably encompass a Legalization Assistant's refusal to accept the application for filing at the front desk of a Legalization Office, nothing in the statute suggests, let alone demonstrates, that Congress was using "determination" in such an extended and informal sense. Indeed, at least one related statutory provision suggests just the opposite. Section 1255a(f)(3)(B) limits administrative appellate review to "the administrative record established at the time of the determination on the application"; because there obviously can be no administrative record in the case of a front-desked application, the term "determination" is best read to exclude front-desking. Thus, just as we avoided an interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1160(e) in McNary that would have amounted to "the practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review of generic constitutional and statutory claims," McNary, supra, 498 U.S., at 497, 111 S.Ct., at 899, so here we avoid an interpretation of § 1255a(f)(1) that would bar front-desked applicants from ever obtaining judicial review of the regulations that rendered them ineligible for legalization.
Unfortunately, however, neither the CSS record nor the LULAC record contains evidence that particular class members were actually subjected to front-desking. None of the named individual plaintiffs in either case alleges that he or she was front-desked,
and while a number of affidavits in the LULAC record contain the testimony of immigration attorneys and employees of interested organizations that the INS has "refused," "rejected," or "denied individuals the right to file" applications,
This lack of evidence precludes us from resolving the jurisdictional issue here, because, on the facts before us, the front-desking of a particular class member is not only sufficient to make his legal claims ripe, but necessary to do so. As the case has been presented to us, there seems to be no reliable way of determining whether a particular class member, had he applied at all (which, we assume, he did not), would have applied in a manner that would have subjected him to front-desking. As of October 16, 1987, the INS had certified 977 Qualified Designated Entities which could have aided class members in prepar ing applications that would not have been front-desked, see 52 Fed.Reg. 44812 (1987); n. 21, supra, and there is no prior history of application behavior on the basis of which we could predict who would have applied without Qualified Designated Entity assistance and therefore been front-desked. Hence, we cannot say that the mere existence of a front-desking policy involved a "concrete application" of the invalid regulations to those class members who were not actually front-desked.
Because only those class members (if any) who were front-desked have ripe claims over which the District Courts should exercise jurisdiction, we must vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand with directions to remand to the respective District Courts for proceedings to determine which class members were front-desked.
The Court of Appeals did not consider the problem of ripeness, and the submissions to this Court have not discussed that problem except in passing. See Pet. for Cert. 11, n. 13; Brief for Petitioners 20; Brief for Respondents 17, n. 23. Rather, certiorari was granted on two questions, to which the parties rightly have adhered: first, whether the District Courts had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1255a(f), the judicial-review provision of Title II of the Reform Act; and second, whether the courts properly extended the application period. See Pet. for Cert. I. The Court finds the jurisdictional challenge meritless under McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991), see ante, at ____, as do I. But instead of proceeding to consider the second question presented, the Court sua sponte attempts to resolve the case on ripeness grounds. It reaches out to hold that "the promulgation of the challenged regulations did not itself give each CSS and LULAC class member a ripe claim; a class member's claim would ripen only once he took the affirmative steps that he could take before the INS blocked his path by applying the regulation to him." Ante, at ____. This is new and, in my view, incorrect law. Moreover, even if it is correct, the new ripeness doctrine propounded by the Court is irrelevant to the case at hand.
Yet I would not go so far as to state that a suit challenging a benefit-conferring rule is necessarily unripe simply because the plaintiff has not yet applied for the benefit. "Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143, 95 S.Ct. 335, 358, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974). If it is "inevitable" that the challenged rule will "operate" to the plaintiff's disadvantage if the court can make a firm prediction that the plaintiff will apply for the benefit, and that the agency will deny the application by virtue of the rulethen there may well be a justiciable controversy that the court may find prudent to resolve.
I do not mean to suggest that a simple anticipatory challenge to the INS regulations would be ripe under the approach I propose. Cf. ante, at ____, n. 19. That issue need not be decided because, as explained below, these cases are not a simple anticipatory challenge. See infra, at ____. My intent is rather to criticize the Court's reasoningits reliance on a categorical rule that would-be beneficiaries cannot challenge benefit-conferring regulations until they apply for benefits.
"In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956) , the Court held to be a final agency action . . . an FCC regulation announcing a Commission policy that it would not issue a television license to an applicant already owning five such licenses, even though no specific application was before the Commission." 387 U.S., at 151, 87 S.Ct., at 1516 (emphasis added).
More recently, in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U.S. 64, 101 S.Ct. 295, 66 L.Ed.2d 268 (1980), the Court held that a facial challenge to the variance provision of an EPA pollution-control regulation was ripe even "prior to application of the regulation to a particular company's request for a variance." Id., at 72, n. 12, 101 S.Ct., at 301, n. 12. And in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983), the Court permitted utilities to challenge a state law imposing a moratorium on the certification of nuclear power plants, even though the utilities had not yet applied for a certificate. See id., at 200-202, 103 S.Ct., at 1720-1721. To be sure, all of these decisions involved licenses, certificates, or variances, which exempt the bearer from otherwise-applicable duties; but the same is true of the instant cases. The benefit conferred by the Reform Actan adjustment in status to lawful temporary resident alien, see 8 U.S.C. 1255a(a)readily can be conceptualized as a "license" or "certificate" to remain in the United States, or a "variance" from the immigration laws.
"Absent explicit statutory authorization for immediate judicial review, a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action 'ripe' for judicial review under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately. Such agency action is 'ripe' for review at once, whether or not explicit statutory review apart from the APA is provided.)" Id., at 891-892, 110 S.Ct., at 3190 (citations omitted).
This language does not suggest that an anticipatory challenge to a benefit-conferring rule will of necessity be constitutionally unripe, for otherwise an "explicit statutory review" provision would not help cure the ripeness problem. Rather, Lujan points to the prudential considerations that weigh in the ripeness calculus: the need to "flesh out" the controversy and the burden on the plaintiff who must "adjust his conduct immediately." These are just the kinds of factors identified in the two-part, prudential test for ripeness that Abbott Laboratories articulated. "The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." 387 U.S., at 149, 87 S.Ct., at 1515. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581-582, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3333, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (relying upon Abbott Laboratories test); Pacific Gas, supra, 461 U.S., at 200-203, 103 S.Ct., at 1720-1721 (same); National Crushed Stone, supra, 449 U.S., at 72-73, n. 12, 101 S.Ct., at 301-302, n. 12 (same). At the very least, where the challenge to the benefit-conferring rule is purely legal, and where the plaintiff will suffer hardship if he cannot raise his challenge until later, a justiciable, anticipatory challenge to the rule may well be ripe in the prudential sense. Thus I cannot agree with the Court that ripeness will never obtain until the plaintiff actually applies for the benefit.
The Court's ripeness analysis focuses on the wrong question: whether "the promulgation of the challenged regulations gave each CSS and LULAC class member a ripe claim." Ante, at ____ (emphasis added). But the question is not whether the class members' claims were ripe at the inception of these suits, when respondents were seeking simply to invalidate the INS regulations and the 12-month application period had not yet closed. Whatever the initial status of those claims, they became ripe once the period had in fact closed and respondents had amended their complaints to seek an extension. In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, this Court held that "since ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the District Court's decision that must govern." 419 U.S., at 140, 95 S.Ct., at 357. Accord, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114-118, 96 S.Ct. 612, 680-682, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). Similarly, in the cases before us, it is the situation now (and, as it happens, at the time of the District Courts' orders), rather than at the time of the initial complaints, that must govern.
The Court also suggests that respondents' claim to extend the application period may well be "flatly" barred by 8 U.S.C. 1255a(f)(2), which provides: "No denial of adjustment of status under Title II of the Reform Act based on a late filing of an application for such adjustment may be reviewed by any court. . . ." See ante, at ____, n. 20. I find it remarkable that the Court might construe § 1255a(f)(2) as barring any suit seeking to extend the application deadline set by the INS, while at the same time interpreting § 1255a(f)(1) not to bar respondents' substantive challenge to the INS regulations, see ante, at ____. As the INS itself observes, the preclusive language in § 1255a(f)(1) is "broader" than in § 1255a(f)(2), because the latter provision uses the word "denial" instead of "determination." See Brief for Petitioners 19. If Congress in the Reform Act had provided for an 18-month application period, and the INS had closed the period after only 12 months, I cannot believe that § 1255a(f)(2) would preclude a suit seeking to extend the period by 6 months. Nor do I think that § 1255a(f)(2) bars respondents' claim to extend the period, because that claim is predicated on their substantive challenge to the INS regulations, which in turn is permitted by § 1255a(f)(1). In any event, § 1255a(f)(2) concerns reviewability, not ripeness; whether or not that provision precludes the instant actions, the Court's ripeness analysis remains misguided.
Of course, the closing of the application period was not an unalloyed benefit for class members who had failed to apply. After May 4, 1988, those aliens had ripe claims, but they also became statutorily ineligible for legalization. The Reform Act authorizes the INS to adjust the status of an illegal alien only if he "applies for such adjustment during the 12-month period beginning on a date . . . designated by the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. 1255a(a)(1)(A). As the INS rightly argues, this provision precludes the legalization of an alien who waited to apply until after the 12-month period had ended. The District Courts' orders extending the application period were not unripe, either constitutionally or prudentially, but they were impermissible under the Reform Act. "A court is no more authorized to overlook the valid requirement that applications be submitted than it is to overlook any other valid requirement for the receipt of benefits." Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 790, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981) (per curiam).
Respondents assert that equity requires an extension of the time limit imposed by § 1255a(a)(1)(A). Whether that provision is seen as a limitations period subject to equitable tolling, see Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-458, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990), or as a substantive requirement subject perhaps to equitable estoppel, see Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419-424, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 2468-2471, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990), the District Courts needed some special reason to exercise that equitable power against the United States. The only reason respondents adduce is supposed "affirmative misconduct" by the INS. See Irwin, supra, 498 U.S., at 96, 111 S.Ct., at 457-458. ("We have allowed equitable tolling in situations . . . where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass"); Richmond, supra, 496 U.S., at 421, 110 S.Ct., at 2470 ("Our own opinions have continued to mention the possibility, in the course of rejecting estoppel arguments, that some type of 'affirmative misconduct' might give rise to estoppel against the Government"). Respondents argue that the INS engaged in "affirmative misconduct" by promulgating the invalid regulations, which deterred aliens who were ineligible under those regulations from applying for legalization. See Plaintiffs' Submission Re Availability of Remedies for the Plaintiff Class in CSS, pp. 6-15 (Record, Doc. No. 164), Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Remedies in LULAC (Record, Doc. No. 40). The District Courts essentially accepted the argument, ordering remedies coextensive with the INS' supposed "misconduct." The CSS court extended the application period for those class members who "knew of the INS' unlawful regulation and thereby concluded that they were ineligible for legalization and by reason of that conclusion did not file an application," App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a; the LULAC court provided an almost identical remedy, see id., at 59a.
Our test for ripeness is two pronged, "requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). Whether an issue is fit for judicial review, in turn, often depends on "the degree and nature of a regulation's present effect on those seeking relief," Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1521, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967), or, put differently, on whether there has been some "concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him," Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3190, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). As Justice O'CONNOR notes, we have returned to this two-part test for ripeness time and again, see ante, at ____, and there is no question but that the Abbott Laboratories formulation should govern this case.
"The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Reform Act) constituted a major statutory response to the vast tide of illegal immigration that had produced a 'shadow population' of literally millions of undocumented aliens in the United States. . . . In recognition that a large segment of the shadow population played a useful and constructive role in the American economy, but continued to reside in perpetual fear, the Reform Act established two broad amnesty programs to allow existing undocumented aliens to emerge from the shadows." 498 U.S., at 481-483, 111 S.Ct., at 890-892 (footnotes omitted).
A major purpose of this ambitious effort was to eliminate the fear in which these immigrants lived, " 'afraid to seek help when their rights are violated, when they are victimized by criminals, employers or landlords or when they become ill.' " Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 292 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 168, 948 F.2d 742, 760 (1991) (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, p. 49 (1986). Indeed, in recognition of this fear of governmental authority, Congress established a special procedure through which "qualified designated entities," or "QDEs," would serve as a channel of communication between undocumented aliens and the INS, providing reasonable assurance that "emergence from the shadows" would result in amnesty and not deportation. 8 U.S.C. 1255a(c)(2); see Ayuda, 292 U.S.App.D.C., at 168, and n. 1, 948 F.2d, at 760, and n. 1.
Under these circumstances, official advice that specified aliens were ineligible for amnesty was certain to convince those aliens to retain their "shadow" status rather than come forward. At the moment that decision was madeat the moment respondents conformed their behavior to the invalid regulationsthose regulations concretely and directly affected respondents, consigning them to the shadow world from which the Reform Act was designed to deliver them, and threatening to deprive them of the statutory entitlement that would otherwise be theirs.
Cf. Lujan, 497 U.S., at 891, 110 S.Ct., at 3190 (concrete application threatening harm as basis for ripeness).
The majority concedes, of course, that class members whose applications were "front-desked" felt the effects of the invalid regulations concretely, because their applications were "blocked then and there." See ante, at ____. Why "then and there," as opposed to earlier and elsewhere, should be dispositive remains unclear to me; whether a potential application is thwarted by a front-desk Legalization Assistant, by advice from a QDE, by consultation with a private attorney, or even by word-of-mouth regarding INS policies, the effect on the potential applicant is equally concrete, and equally devastating. In my view, there is no relevant difference, for purposes of ripeness, between respondents who were "front-desked," and those who can demonstrate, like the LULAC class, that they " 'learned of their ineligibility following promulgation of the policy and who, relying upon information that they were ineligible, did not apply,' " ante, at ____, or, like the class granted relief in CSS, that they " 'knew of the INS' unlawful regulation and thereby concluded that they were ineligible for legalization and by reason of that conclusion did not file an application," ante, at ____. As Judge Wald explained in Ayuda, supra:
"The majority admits that if low level INS officials had refused outright to accept legalization applications for filing, the district court could hear the suit. Even if the plaintiffs' affidavits are read to allege active discouragement rather than outright refusal to accept, this is a subtle distinction indeed, and one undoubtedly lost on the illegal aliens involved, upon which to grant or deny jurisdiction to challenge the practice." 292 U.S.App.D.C., at 169, n. 3, 948 F.2d, at 761, n. 3 (Wald, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
The second Abbott Laboratories factor, which focuses on the cost to the parties of withholding judicial review, also weighs heavily in favor of ripeness in this case. Every day during which the invalid regulations were effective meant another day spent in the shadows for respondents, with the attendant costs of that way of life. See supra, at ____. Even more important, with each passing day, the clock on the application period continued to run, increasing the risk that review, when it came, would be meaningless because the application period had already expired. See Ayuda, 292 U.S.App.D.C., at 178, 948 F.2d, at 770 (Wald, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the dilemma respondents find themselves in today speaks volumes about the costs of deferring review in this situation. Cf. Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S., at 164, 87 S.Ct., at 1565 (challenge not ripe where "no irremediable adverse consequences flow from requiring a later challenge").
"When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The 'injury in fact' in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit." 508 U.S., at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2302-2303.
It is no doubt true that "when Congress passes a benefits statute that includes a time period, it has two goals." See ante, at ____. Here, Congress' two goals were finality in its one-time amnesty program, and the integration of productive aliens into the American mainstream. See Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F.2d 798, 813 (CA2 1992). To balance both ends, and to achieve each, Congress settled on a 12-month application period. Twelve months, Congress determined, would be long enough for frightened aliens to come to understand the program and to step forward with applications, especially when the full period was combined with the special outreach efforts mandated by the Reform Act. Ibid.; see 8 U.S.C. 1255a(i) (requiring broad dissemination of information about amnesty program); 8 U.S.C. 1255a(c)(2) (establishing QDEs). The generous 12-month period would also serve the goal of finality, by " 'ensuring true resolution of the problem and . . . that the program will be a one-time-only program.' " 967 F.2d, at 813 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-682, pt 1, p. 72 (1986).
That congressional intent is furthered, not frustrated, by the equitable relief granted here distinguishes this case from Pangilinan, supra, in which we held that a court lacked the authority to order naturalization for certain persons after expiration of a statutory deadline. 486 U.S., at 882-885, 108 S.Ct., at 2215-2217. In Pangilinan, we were faced with a "congressional command that could not be more manifest" specifically precluding the relief granted. Id., at 884, 108 S.Ct., at 2216. The Reform Act, on the other hand, contains no such explicit limitation.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. Section 201(a)(1) of the Reform Act created the alien legalization program at issue in this case by adding § 245A to the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. 1255a. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the sections of the Act as they have been codified.
The Reform Act requires the 12-month period to "begi[n] on a date (not later than 180 days after November 6, 1986) designated by the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. 1255a(a)(1)(A). The Attorney General set the period to begin on May 5, 1987, the latest date the Reform Act authorized him to designate. See 8 CFR § 245a.2(a)(1) (1992). A separate provision of the Act requires "[a]n alien who, at any time during the first 11 months of the 12-month period . . ., is the subject of an order to show cause [why he should not be deported]" to "make application . . . not later than the end of the 30-day period beginning either on the first day of such 12-month period or on the date of the issuance of such order, whichever is later." § 1255a(a)(1)(B); see § 1255a(e)(1) (providing further relief for certain aliens "apprehended before the beginning of the application period").
The CSS lawsuit originally challenged various aspects of the INS's administration of both the legalization program created by Title II of the Reform Act and the "Special Agricultural Workers" (SAW) legalization program created by Part A of Title III of the Reform Act (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1160). The challenge to the SAW program eventually took its own procedural course, and was resolved by a district court order that neither party appealed. No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., Aug. 11, 1988) (App. 3, Record, Doc. No. 188). With respect to the Title II challenge, the District Court originally certified a broad class comprising all persons believed by the Government to be deportable aliens who could establish a prima facie claim for adjustment of status to temporary resident under 8 U.S.C. 1255a. No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., Nov. 24, 1986) (App. 15). After further proceedings, the District Court narrowed the class definition to that set out in the text.
This description excludes the alien who was already in deportation proceedings before he applied for legalization under § 1255a. Once his application is denied, however, such an alien must also continue with deportation proceedings as if he had never applied, and may obtain further review of the denial of his application only upon review of a final order of deportation entered against him. See 8 U.S.C. 1255a(f)(4)(A). The Act's provisions regarding aliens who have been issued an order to show cause before applying are described at n. 2, supra; the provisions of the District Court orders regarding such aliens are described at nn. 6 and 12, supra.
The single difference between the two sets of provisions is the addition, in the provisions now before us, of a further specific jurisdictional bar: "No denial of adjustment of status under this section based on a late filing of an application for such adjustment may be reviewed by a court of the United States or of any State or reviewed in any administrative proceeding of the United States Government." 8 U.S.C. 1255a(f)(2). As the INS appears to concede, see Brief for Petitioners 19, the claims at issue in this case do not fall within the scope of this bar.
Under the Manual's procedures, only those applications that were not prepared with the assistance of a "Qualified Designated Entity" (the Reform Act's designation for private organizations that serve as intermediaries between applicants and the INS, see 8 U.S.C. 1255a(c)(1)) are subject to review by Legalization Assistants. The applications that were prepared with the help of Qualified Designated Entities skip this step. See Legalization Manual, at IV-5, IV-6. There is no evidence in the record indicating how many CSS and LULAC class members were assisted by Qualified Designated Entities in preparing their applications.
The Reform Act limits judicial review to "the administrative record established at the time of the review by the appellate authority." 8 U.S.C. 1255a(f)(4)(B). In addition, an INS regulation provides that a legalization application may not "be filed or reopened before an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals during exclusion or deportation proceedings." 8 CFR § 103.3(a)(3)(iii) (1992).
"Absent judicial action, the period for filing for IRCA legalization would have ended and thousands of persons would have lost their chance for amnesty. In purely human terms, it is difficultperhaps impossible for those of us fortunate enough to have been born in this country to appreciate fully the value of that lost opportunity. For undocumented aliens, IRCA offered a one-time chance to come out of hiding, to stop running, to 'belong' to America. The hardship of withholding judicial review is as severe as any that I have encountered in more than a decade of administrative review." 292 U.S.App.D.C., at 178, 948 F.2d, at 770 (Wald, J., dissenting).