Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19770705-713875
Timestamp: 2016-10-23 14:29:42+00:00
Document Index: 194152548

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 6131", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 14", "l'article 6", "l'article 14", "l'article 27", "l'article 285", "l'article 44", "l'article 27", "l'article 6", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7138/75Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1977-07-05;7138.75 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 9-1) LIBERTE DE RELIGIONParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : AUTRICHETexte : APPLICATIQN/REQUÃTE NÂ° 7138/7 5 X . v/AUSTRI A X . c/AUTRICH E DECISION of 5 July 1977 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 5 juillet 1977 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph 3 b) of the Convention : lf circumstances require that the defence has access to the file, it is sufficient for the lawyer to exercise this right . Article 6, paragraph 3 c) of the Convention : It ts for the competent authorities to decide wherher the accused defends himself in person or with the assistance of a lawyer, nominated by himself or designated ex officio . If he is represented by a lawyer, it is in principle through the latter that he has ro exercise his procedural rights . Article 6, paragraph I and Article 6, paragraph 3 c) of the Convention : Refusa/ by an appeal court dealing with a point of law to take into consideration argument submitted by rhe appellanr himself as well as argument submitted by his lawyer . Appellant not authorised to appear in person but represented by counsel in the hearing. No appearance of a violation . Article 14 of the Convention in connection with Article 6, paragraph 3 b) and c) of the Convention : The excfusion of the accused person from access to the file, on the ground that he is represented by a lawyer does not consriture discriminatory treatment .
Article 6, paragraphe 3, lettre b), de la Convention : Lorsque les circonstances exigent que la dÃ©fense ait accÃ©s au dossier, il suffit que l'avocat puisse le consulter. Article 6, paragraphe 3, lettre c), de la Convention : fl apparrient aux autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes de dÃ©cider si f'accusÃ© se dÃ©fendra lui-mÃªme ou avec l'assistance d'un avocat choisi par lui-mÃªme ou commis d'office . S'il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par un avocat, c'est en principe par l'inrermÃ©diaire de ce dernier qu'il doit exercer ses droits procÃ©duraux .
Article 6, paragraphe 1, et Article 6, paragraphe 3, lettre c) de la Convention : Refus par une juridiction de cassation de prendre en considÃ©ration les moyens dÃ©ve%ppÃ©s par le plaideur lur=mÃ¨me B cÃ´tÃ© de ceux prÃ©sentÃ©s par son avocat . Appelant non autorisÃ© Ã comparaÃ®tre lui-mÃªme mais reprÃ©sentÃ© par avocat A l'audience . Aucune apparence de violation . A rt icle 14 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec l'article 6, paragraphe 3, le ttres b) et c) de la Convention : ll n'y a pas discrimination Ã refuser l'accÃ©s personnel au dossier Ã un accusÃ© qui est reprÃ©sentÃ© par avocat .
I fran[â¢ais : voir p . 54 )
In 1974, the applicanr was brought to trial before the Regional Courr of Vienna sirring as a court of assizes, on a charge of frau d Two months before rhe opening of the trial, he was invited to nominate a lawyer or ask for legal aid. The applicant then asked to be allowed to consult the file . This was refused and he was given an ex officio counsel at his own cost . A furrher request to see the file was also refused . In November 1974, the applicant, found guilty without mitigating circumstances, was sentenced to five years qualified imprisonment . The apphcant lodged a plea of nulliry against the conviction and appealed against the senrence . For this purpose he prepared himself two draft pleadings, but his ex officio counsel prepared a texr of his own, to which he attached as annexes the drafts prepared by the applicant . In January 7975, the Supreme Court reiected in a closed meeting the nlea of nullity, partly as being manifesrly ill-founded anrf partly as hor being in thp reourred form .so far as it concerned the drafts prepared by the applicanr After a public heanng attended by rhe applicanr"s lawyer but not by the applicant himself, the Supreme Court rejecred the appeal in February 1975 and confirmed the refusal to find mitigaring circumsrances
THE LAW IExtract l The applicant has [finallyl complained that he was noi given full rights himself besides his lawyer, in particular that he was not granted access to his file In order to instruct his lawyer, that the Supreme Court refused to take into account the ground of nullity prepared by himself and that he was not allowed to appear in person before the Supreme Cour t al The Commission has first generally examined whether the alleged facts disclose a breach of the applicant's right under Art . 6 (3) Icl of the Convention t o
-5t -
defend himself in person . However, the Commission considers that this right as laid down in the Convention is in no way an absolute right . In this respect the Commission recalls its earlier jurisprudence according to which this provision guarantees to an accused person that the proceedings against him will not take place without an adequate representation of the case for the defence, but does not give an accused person the right to decide himself in what manner his defence should be assured . The decision as to which of the two alternatives mentioned in the provision, namely the applicant's right either to defend himself in person or to be represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, or, in certain circumstances, one appointed by the court, may lie with the competent authorities (cf . the Commission's decision on the admissibility of Applications Nos . 2676/65, Collection 23, pp . 31, 35 ; and 2645/65, Collection 28, pp . 43, 60) . It is implied by the above interpretation that where an accused person is represented by a lawyer he must generally exercise his procedural rights through this lawyer . It makes no difference in this respect whether the lawyer in question is a counsel of the party's own choice, or an ex officio or legal aid counsel . b) In the present case, the applicant's lawyer was given access to the file and facilities to discuss the case with the applicant . The lawyer himself apparently did not consider that the procedure chosen was inadequate and hampered his preparation of the defence . The applicant's request was made by him alone and not supported by the lawyer . The Commission considers that in these circumstances there is no appearance that the applicant's rights under Art . 6(3 ) Ic) of the Convention have been violated . The Commission has also examined this complaint under Art . 6 131 (b ) of the Convention which guarantees an accused person the right to be granted adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence . However, the Commission notes that the right of access to the file is not as such guaranteed, although it may be implied by the above provisions that under certain circumstances the person concerned or his lawyer must have reasonable access to the file . The Commission considers that in the circumstances of the present case it was not required to grant the applicant access to his file besides his lawyer . This complaint is therelore also manifestly ill-founded under Art . 6 (3) (b) of the Convention . The Commission has finatly examined whether the exclusion of the applicant from access to the file for the reason that he was represented by a lawyer constituted a discrimination in comparison to persons who are not represented and who, by virtue of Art . 45 12) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have personal access to the file . The Commission considers that this question ialls under the scope of Art . 14 which forbids dsicrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention on any ground including a person's status . In the present case there has been differential treatment with regard to the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Art . 6 (3) (b) and (c) of the Convention on account of the applicant's status, namely on the ground tha t
he was an accused person assisted by a lawyer . However, the Commission considers that this differential treatment was not arbitrary in that it had a reasonable justification with a view to securing the proper administration of justice . It follows that it did not amount to discrimination within the meaning of Art . 14 of the Convention, and that the applicant's complaint in this respect must equally be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art . 27 121 of the Convention . c) As regards the Supreme Court's refusal to take into account the grounds of nullity prepared by the applicant, n resulted from the application of a rule laid down in Section 285 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as constantly interpreted by the courts . The rule as such is in line with the above-mentioned general principle that represented parties must act through their lawyers . If the applicant in the present case failed to convince his lawyer that he should include certain arguments in the grounds of nullity, he was free to insist or change his lawyer as expressly provided by Seclion 44 121 of the Code of Criminal Procedure It cannot be maintained in these circumstances that by rejecting the applicant's own arguments which were not presented in due lorm the Court acted unfairly IAn . 6 111 of the Convention) or violated the applicant's right to defend himself in person IArI . 6 131 Icll . The applicant's complaints in this respect are manifestly i Ib founded within the meaning of Art . 27 121 of the Convention .
dl Finally as regards the applicant's exciusion from the hearing on his plea in mitigation, the Commission observes that the Convention does not, as such, guarantee an accused person's right to be present at the hearing of his appeal . As the Commission has already stated in its earlier case law, it is necessary to take into account the whole situation of the defence and not only the person of the accused when judging whether his rights under Art . 6, and in particular under paras . (1) and 131 Icl have been violated by his exclusion from an appeal hearing (cf . the Commission's decision on the admissibility of Application No . 2645/65, Collection 28, pp43, 59) . In the present case the issue before the Supreme Court was a purely legal question, namely whether the grounds of appeal put forward by the applicant in his written plea were sulfioient to justify the application of the right of extraordinary mitigation . This issue could well be decided without the court having obtained a personal impression of the applicant's personality . The applicant was in any case represented at this hearing through his lawyer These are circumstances which, according to the Commission's case law, have to be taken into account in such a situation (cf . the decision of admissibility of Application No 1169/61, Yearbook 6, p . 520) . It follows that the applicant's exclusion from the heaiing of his appeal against the sentence does neither amount to a breach of his right to a fair hearing (Art . 6 111) nor of his right to defend himself in person IArt . 6 131 (c)1 The applicant's complaints in this respect are therefore manifestly illfounded and must again be rejected under Art . 27 121 of the Convention .
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits pertinent s En 1974, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© traduit devant le tribunal rÃ©gional de Vienne, siÃ©geant en cour d'assises, comme accusÃ© d'escroquerie . Deux mois avant le dÃ©but du procÃ¨s, il a Ã©tÃ© invitÃ© Ã dÃ©signer un avocat ou Ã demander l'assistance judiciaire . En rÃ©ponse, le requÃ©rant demanda l'accÃ©s personnel au dossier. Cette demande fut rejetÃ©e et un avocat lui fut dÃ©signÃ© d'office, frais Ã sa charge. Une nouvelle demande d'accÃ¨s personnel au dossier fut repoussÃ©e . En novembre 1974, le requÃ©rant, reconnu coupable sans circonstances attÃ©nuantes, fut condamnÃ© Ã cinq ans de rÃ©clusion . Le requÃ©rant introduisit un pourvoi en cassation et un appel . l1 prÃ©para lui-mÃªme deux mÃ©moires mais son avocat d'office en prÃ©senta un autre, auquel il joignit en annexes ceux du requÃ©2nt . En janvier 1975, la Cour suprÃªme rejeta sans audience publique le pourvoi en cassation, en partie comme mal fondÃ© et en partie comme irrecevable, ceci en ce qui avait trait aux mÃ©moires rÃ©digÃ©s personnellement par le requÃ©rant . AprÃ©s une audience publique, Ã laquelle assrstait l'avocat du requÃ©rant mais non le requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme, la Cour suprÃªme, en fÃ©vrier 1975, rejeta l'appel en confirmant le refus des circonstances attÃ©nuantes .
I TRADUCTION I
EN DROIT (Extrait ) 3 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'outre son avocat, il n'a pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© lui-mÃªme de tous les droits de la dÃ©fense, notamment qu'il n'a pas pu consulter son dossier pour pouvoir donner ses instructions Ã son avocat, que la Cour suprÃªme a refusÃ© de prendre en considÃ©ration les moyens de cassation qu'il avait personnellement rÃ©digÃ©s et qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã comparaitre en personne devant la Cour suprÃªme . a . La Commission a d'abord examinÃ© d'une maniÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©rale si les faits allÃ©guÃ©s rÃ©vÃ©lent une violation du droit de se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃªme, que reconnait au requÃ©rant l'article 6131 (c) de la Convention . La Commission estime toutefois que ce droit, tel qu'il est Ã©noncÃ© dans la Convention, n'est pas un droit absolu . Elle rappelle Ã cet Ã©gard sa jurisprudence antÃ©rieure selon laquelle, si la disposition prÃ©citÃ©e garantit Ã toute personne accusÃ©e que la procÃ©dure engagÃ©e contre elle ne se dÃ©roulera pas sans que la dÃ©fense ait pu prÃ©senter ses arguments de faÃ§on adÃ©quate, elle n'accorde cependant pas Ã l'accusÃ© le droit de dÃ©cider lui-mÃªme comment sa dÃ©fense sera assurÃ©e . C'est en dÃ©finitive aux autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes qu'appartient la dÃ©cision quant aux choix entre les deux possibilitÃ©s Ã©voquÃ©es dans cet article, Ã savoir le droit du requÃ©rant de se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃªme ou d e
- 5q-
recourir Ã l'assistance d'un dÃ©fenseur de son choix ou, dans certaines circonstances, dÃ©signÃ© par le tribunal (cf dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªtes NÂ° 2676/65, Recueil 23, pp . 31, 35 et NÂ° 2645/65, Recueil 28, pp 43, 60) . L'interprÃ©tation ci-dessus implique que lorsqu'un accusÃ© est reprÃ©sentÃ© par un avocat, c'est gÃ©nÃ©ralement par l'intermÃ©diaire de cet avocat qu'il doit exercer ses droits procÃ©duraux . Il est Ã cet Ã©gard indiffÃ©rent que l'avocat en question ait Ã©tÃ© choisi par l'intÃ©ressÃ© ou commis d'office par le tribunal . b . En l'espÃ©ce, l'avocat du requÃ©rant a eu accÃ¨s au dossier et a pu discuter de l'affaire avec son client . D'ailleurs, l'avocat lui-mÃªme ne semble pas avoir trouvÃ© que la procÃ©dure choisie Ã©tait inadÃ©quate et l'avait empÃ©chÃ© de prÃ©parer la dÃ©fense de son client . Cette requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e par le seul requÃ©rant, sans Ãªtre appuyÃ©e par l'avocat . La Commission estime que, dans ces conditions, il n'y a pas apparence de violation des droits que l'article 6(3 ) Icl de la Convention reconnait au requÃ©rant . La Commission a Ã©galement examinÃ© ce grief sous l'angle de l'article 6(3 ) (b ) de la Convention qui garantit Ã l'accusÃ© les facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense . La Commission relÃ©ve toutefois que le droit d'accÃ¨s au dossier n'est pas, comme tel, garanti par la Convention, encore que la disposition prÃ©cÃ©dente puisse impliquer que, dans certaines circonstances, l'intÃ©ressÃ© ou son avocat pourront raisonnablement consulter le dossier La Commission estime que les circonstances de l'espÃ©ce n'exigeaient que fOt accordÃ© au requÃ©rant, en plus de l'avocat, le droit de consulter le dossier . Ce grief est donc lui aussi manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 6(3 ) Ibl de la Convention . La Commission a examinÃ© si le fait d'empÃ©cher le requÃ©rant de consulter son dossier pour le motlf qu'il Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© par un avocat constituait ou non une discrimination par rapport aux personnes qui ne sont pas reprÃ©sentÃ©es par un avocat et qui elles, en vertu de l'anicle 45 (2) du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, ont personnellement accÃ©s au dossier . La Commission estime que cette question relÃ©ve de l'article 14 qui interdit toute discrimination dans la jouissance des droits et libertÃ©s reconnus par la Convention, pour quelque motif que ce soit, y compris la situation d'un individu . En l'occurrence, il y a bien eu diffÃ©rence de traitement en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits que garantit l'article 6 (3) (b) et Icl de la Convention en raison de la situation du requÃ©rant, autrement dit en raison du fait qu'il Ã©tait un accusÃ© assistÃ© d'un avocat . La Commission estime toutefois que cette diffÃ©rence de traitement n'est pas arbitraire puisqu'elle repose sur une justification raisonnable, celle d'assurer la bonne administration de la justice . Il s'ensuit qu'elle ne constituait pas une discrimination, au sens de l'article 14 de la Convention, et que le grief formulÃ© par le requÃ©rant Ã cet Ã©gard doit, lui aussi, Ãªtre rejetÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27 121 de la Convention . c . Quant au refus opposÃ© par la Cour suprÃªme de prendre en considÃ©ration les moyens de cassation rÃ©digÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, il rÃ©sulte de l'application de la rÃ©gle prÃ©vue Ã l'article 285 (1 ) du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, telle que les tribunaux l'ont constamment interprÃ©tÃ©e . Comme telle, la rÃ©gle est conforme au princip e
gÃ©nÃ©ral susmentionnÃ©, selon lequel les parties reprÃ©sentÃ©es par un avocat doivent agir par l'intermÃ©diaire de cet avocat . Si, en l'occurrence, le requÃ©rant n'a pas convaincu son avocat d'inclure certains arguments dans les moyens de cassation, il lui Ã©tait loisible soit d'insister, soit de changer d'avocat, comme le prÃ©voit expressÃ©ment l'article 44 (2) du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . On ne saurait soutenir, dans ces conditions, qu'en rejetant les arguments du requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme parce qu'ils n'Ã©taient pas prÃ©sentÃ©s en bonne et due forme, la Cour ait agi de maniÃ©re inÃ©quitable (article 6 (1) de la Convention) ou violÃ© le droit du requÃ©rant Ã se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃ©me larticle 6 ( 3) (c) . Les griefs prÃ©sentÃ©s Ã cet Ã©gard par le requÃ©rant sont donc manifestement mal fondÃ©s au sens de l'article 27 (2) de la Convention . d. Enfin, en ce qui concerne la non-admission du requÃ©rant Ã l'audience sur sa demande d'attÃ©nuation de la peine, la Commission fait observer que la Convention ne garantit pas, comme tel, le droit d'un accusÃ© de comparaitre Ã l'audience portant sur son appel . Comme la Commission l'a dÃ©jA constatÃ© dans sa jurisprudence antÃ©rieure, il faut tenir compte de l'ensemble de la situation de la dÃ©fense et non seulement de celle de la personne de l'accusÃ©, pour juger si la non-admission Ã une audience en appel a violÃ© les droits que l'article 6, et notamment les paragraphes 1 et 3(c) reconnaissent Ã l'accusÃ© (cf . dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 2645/65, Recueil 28, pp . 43, 59) . En l'espÃ¨ce, la question posÃ©e Ã la Cour suprÃªme Ã©tait d'ordre purement juridique : les moyens d'appel formulÃ©s par le requÃ©rant dans son mÃ©moire Ã©crit Ã©taient-ils suffisants pour justifier que lui soit appliquÃ©e une attÃ©nuation extraordinaire de la peine Cette question pouvait fort bien Ãªtre tranchÃ©e sans que la Cour ait recueilli une impression directe de la personnalitÃ© du requÃ©rant . Au demeurant, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© Ã cette audience par son avocat . Selon la jurisprudence de la Commission, il est des circonstances dont il faut tenir compte en pareille situation (cf . dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 1169/61, Annuaire 6, p . 520) . II en dÃ©coule que la non-admission du requÃ©rant Ã l'audience d'appel portant sur la peine ne constitue ni une violation de son droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable (article 6 ( 1), ni son droit Ã se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃªme (article 6 ( 3) Icl . Les griefs formulÃ©s Ã cet Ã©gard par le requÃ©rant sont donc manifestement mal fondÃ©s et doivent, IA encore, Ãªtre rejetÃ©s conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27 (2) de la Convention .
- 56 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 05/07/1977Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page