Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/51318711/MoBarCLE-Evidence-Deskbook-Sample-Chapter
Timestamp: 2017-04-24 10:36:46
Document Index: 247059532

Matched Legal Cases: ['§13', '§ 490', '§13', '§13', '§13', '§13', '§13', '§13', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490', '§ 490']

ScribdBrowseInterestsPolitics & Current AffairsCareer & MoneyPersonal GrowthFictionHealth & FitnessLifestyleEntertainmentBiographies & HistoryScience & TechBrowse byBooksAudiobooksNews & MagazinesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoinMoBarCLE Evidence Deskbook - Sample ChapterUploaded by MoBarCLETrial CourtPlaintiffTrialsPunitive DamagesDamages0.0 (0)DownloadEmbedDescription: A sample chapter from MoBarCLE's Evidence Deskbook. Get more information at www.mobarcle.orgView MoreA sample chapter from MoBarCLE's Evidence Deskbook. Get more information at www.mobarcle.orgCopyright: © All Rights ReservedDownload as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentEric G.Jensen*
2010 Supplement to
ADMISSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES, INSURANCE COVERAGE, SETTLEMENTS, PLEA BARGAINS, AND COLLATERAL PAYMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES
Supplemented: §§13.8 13.10A (New Section) Motive and Intent Concerning Punitive Damages 13.15 13.18A (New Section) Cases Interpreting § 490.715, RSMo
B. Exceptions to General Rule 5. (§13.8) Impeachment or Rebuttal of Statements by Witness In Rader Family Limited Partnership, L.L.L.P. v. City of Columbia, 307 S.W.3d 243 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010), the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a city’s subsequent remedial measures in a nuisance and inverse condemnation lawsuit were
*Mr. Jensen’s biographical information appears on page 13–1 of the original chapter. 2010
13 Supp.–1
§13.10A
ADMISSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES, ETC.
not admissible. The court applied the same rationale as it would in negligence cases, holding that the city will be unlikely to adopt measures that will protect the public if subsequent remedial measures could be used against the city in these types of cases. The court did note that city employees who testified at trial and made comments that could be construed as controverting the feasibility of certain remedial measures could be challenged in cross-examination and impeached with city statements and policies, even if those policies were adopted after the incident involved in the lawsuit. 8. (§13.10A) Motive and Intent Concerning Punitive Damages (New Section) In Boshears v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 272 S.W.3d 215, 226 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008), the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s ruling under an abuse of discretion standard when counsel asked Calmar’s witnesses what Calmar would do differently in the future to avoid injuries to the plaintiff or others and “whether [Calmar] had learned its lesson.” The trial court allowed these questions. On appeal, the defendant contended that these questions amounted to improper testimony about subsequent remedial measures. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that subsequent acts may be relevant and admissible as to the issue of exemplary damages. If the actions are so connected with the particular acts as tending to show the defendant’s disposition, intention, or motive in the commission of the particular acts for which damages are claimed, they may be admitted. Thus, the court affirmed that postevent conduct may be deemed relevant to mitigate punitive damages or could be relevant to punitive damages and the conscious disregard of others’ rights.
(§13.15) Settlements and Offers to Compromise
In Ullrich v. CADCO, Inc., 244 S.W.3d 772 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008), the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s ruling allowing an attorney’s letter into evidence when the letter outlined four alternative methods of resolving the dispute between the parties. The defendant’s counsel introduced the letter into evidence; the plaintiff objected to it as being an inadmissible offer of settlement. The trial court ruled that the letter was admissible 13 Supp.–2
§13.18A
because it was relevant on the issue of punitive damages and whether the defendant ever intended to perform the parties’ original agreement. The Eastern District affirmed the trial court’s ruling and adopted the rationale that, when the settlement offer was independently relevant to show the defendant’s intent to perform its obligations, it would be admissible.
Payment of Medical and Other Expenses by Collateral Sources
C. (§13.18A) Cases Interpreting § 490.715, RSMo (New Section) Section 490.715, now RSMo Supp. 2010, was amended effective August 28, 2005. Missouri courts have struggled with portions of the revised statute concerning the value of medical treatment in injury cases. The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed § 490.715 in Deck v. Teasley, No. SC 90628, 2010 WL 4232835 (Mo. banc Oct. 26, 2010). In Deck, the Supreme Court held that, under § 490.715, the trial court erred in using the dollar amount necessary to satisfy the obligation to the plaintiff's health care providers (the amount paid by Medicare) rather than allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of the amount of the medical services actually billed. The Court held that the trial court’s failure to admit the testimony of witnesses who testified that the amount of the medical services billed by the providers, rather than the amount actually paid by Medicare, reflected the true value of the medical services was reversible error. The Court held that the presumption set out in § 490.715 was a rebuttable presumption and that the plaintiff properly rebutted the presumption with testimony that the amount billed, rather than the amount paid, reflected the true value of the services. The Court also noted that § 490.715 precludes any mention of any collateral source payment in front of the jury. In Berra v. Danter, 299 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009), the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court could consider the amount of medical cost “incurred” as set forth in billing statements, even though it was not the amount actually paid. The court noted that, before trial, both the plaintiff and defendant had filed a motion to determine the value of medical treatment under § 490.715.5(2). The plaintiff had attached to his motion copies of the medical bills in the amount of $90,062.52, healthcare and provider affidavits attesting to the reasonableness of
13 Supp.–3
these charges, and a Medicare medical payment summary. The summary showed that the plaintiff was billed $118,015.61 but had only paid $28,734.37. The plaintiff requested that the trial court find that either the amount of the bills reflected in the original billing statements ($90,062.52) or the amount reflected in the Medicare summary ($118,015.61) constituted the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s medical treatment. The trial court found that the amounts reflected in the billing statements were the reasonable value of the medical services and allowed that amount, $90,062.52, to be presented to the jury. The defendant argued that the presumption set forth in § 490.715.5(2) had not been rebutted and that the plaintiff should only be allowed to put into evidence the amount actually paid to satisfy the medical bills. The Eastern District held that the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption and that the trial court had the power under the statute to determine the value of the medical treatment based on additional evidence, including, but not limited to, the medical bills incurred by a party. The Eastern District ultimately stated that the trial court properly considered the amount reflected in the plaintiff’s billing statements in determining the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s medical treatment. In Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 316 S.W.3d 428 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010), the Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s submitted affidavits were insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption under § 490.715.5(2). The plaintiff argued that, under § 490.525.2, RSMo Supp. 2010, his affidavits as to the reasonableness of medical charges compelled the trial court to accept those charges and no lower figure as the medical treatment’s “value” under § 490.715.5(2). The Southern District rejected this argument, stating that some of the plaintiff’s affidavits made no mention of the charges or their reasonableness and that § 490.525 permits, but does not require, the trial court or jury to find in accordance with the affidavit. The court simply stated that the plaintiff’s attempt to blend §§ 490.525 and 490.715.5 failed as a concept. The affidavits are just one factor for the court to consider. In Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, 311 S.W.3d 752 (Mo. banc 2010), the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s ruling under § 490.715.5(2) concerning the difference between the amount billed and the amount the insurance paid on the plaintiffs’ medical bills. The plaintiffs provided evidence that they had signed agreements with two providers, stating that they were responsible for the 13 Supp.–4
amounts charged regardless of what insurance paid. The trial court found that the plaintiffs had rebutted the presumption with regard to the medical bills, which had a reduced amount paid, because they presented expert testimony that the bills were reasonable, they were still subject to liens for unpaid bills, and the medical providers had not provided any release of obligation to the plaintiffs for any amounts charged, but not received, by the medical provider. The Supreme Court stated that the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony about the full amount charged for the medical bills. The Supreme Court relied on two things: 1. The plaintiffs provided expert testimony that the full amounts of the bills were fair and reasonable charges. 2. The plaintiffs continued to have liens concerning the medical bills. The bills were reasonable in their entirety, regardless of the amount paid.
13 Supp.–5
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