Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/29/270/480188/
Timestamp: 2020-02-23 02:37:39
Document Index: 596635770

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3401', '§ 703', '§ 703', '§ 3402', '§ 482', '§ 482']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Debra Lynn Smith, Also Known As Debra Lynn Markarian,defendant-appellant, 29 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Debra Lynn Smith, Also Known As Debra Lynn Markarian,defendant-appellant, 29 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1994)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 29 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1994) Argued Feb. 17, 1994. Decided July 7, 1994
Shari Goggin-Ward, Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Lisle, IL (argued), for defendant-appellant.
In fact, the package was not lost. On July 8, 1991, federal agents x-rayed the package at the O'Hare Airport international mail facility in Chicago. Senior Customs Inspector Melvin Soto looked at the x-rays, noted the varying shades of dark and light on the x-ray, and directed National Guardsman Michael Lester to " [o]pen it. We don't got nothing to lose."
Smith never attempted her proposed macrame project. Instead, the government prosecuted her for a variety of offenses. With Smith's consent, the case was tried before a magistrate judge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401. A jury found Smith guilty of possessing bald eagle feathers in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), 16 U.S.C. § 703, and acquitted her of three related charges. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act makes it "unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to ... possess ... any migratory bird, any part ... or any product ... which consists, or is composed in whole or in part, of any such bird or any part ... thereof." 16 U.S.C. § 703. The bald eagle--our national symbol--is a migratory bird for purposes of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. 50 C.F.R. Sec. 10.13.
The magistrate judge sentenced Smith to probation and entered judgment on the conviction. Smith appealed her conviction directly to this court. We dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Smith failed to seek review in the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3402 and Rule 58(g) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Smith, 992 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1993). On appeal to the district court, the court affirmed Smith's conviction.
In this appeal, Smith argues that the MBTA, as interpreted by the district court, violates the Fifth Amendment guarantee that " [n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. Smith claims that she did not have the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of a crime and that her conviction therefore violates the Due Process Clause. Smith also contends that she lacked any knowledge as to the contents of the package.
Perhaps she means that she cannot be guilty if she did not know that she possessed eagle feathers. Smith accurately notes that scienter in some form is usually and traditionally a requirement of criminal responsibility. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 1117, 28 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1971). There are, however, many exceptions, especially in the regulation of activities involving public health, safety, and welfare. Id. Such regulatory offenses often do not and need not specify intent, particularly when the penalties for violations are small and do no grave harm to an offender's reputation. United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 531 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019, 107 S. Ct. 1900, 95 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1987). Conduct alone, without regard to intent, is often sufficient. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S. Ct. 240, 242-243, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1957).
The plain language of section 703 of the MBTA makes it unlawful to "possess" bald eagle feathers. There is no scienter requirement expressly written into the statute. A number of courts have held that the MBTA provides for strict liability and that the provision does not offend the requirements of due process.1 See, e.g., Engler, 806 F.2d at 436; United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1986) (" [I]t is not necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with specific intent or guilty knowledge."); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (6th Cir. 1984) (scienter not required for conviction pursuant to MBTA), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074, 105 S. Ct. 2153, 85 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1985); United States v. Ireland, 493 F.2d 1208, 1209 (4th Cir. 1973) (same).
Smith argues alternatively that her conviction amounts to punishment of wholly passive conduct, that the MBTA is vague or overbroad, and that for these reasons her conviction violates due process. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S. Ct. at 242-243; Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 1984). Smith's argument is unconvincing.
Smith raises one other claim--that the magistrate judge and the district court erred when they denied her motion to suppress the evidence of the eagle feathers which federal agents discovered when they searched the package at the airport. We review the denial of Smith's motion to suppress for clear error. United States v. Packer, 15 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1994).
The search at issue here, an airport search of a package sent from a foreign country into the United States, is the functional equivalent of an international border search. United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1290 (7th Cir. 1993). Federal agents are not restricted by Fourth Amendment standards when they conduct such routine searches. United States v. Carter, 592 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908, 99 S. Ct. 2001, 60 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1979); United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1978). Indeed, " [a]ny person or thing coming into the United States is subject to search by that fact alone, whether or not there be any suspicion of illegality directed to the particular person or thing to be searched." United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088, 95 S. Ct. 679, 42 L. Ed. 2d 680 (1974). Smith's constitutional argument fails.
Smith also claims that the agents who opened the package sent by Pickering violated statutory and regulatory standards. She points to 19 U.S.C. § 482, which authorizes certain federal agents, like those that opened her package, to "search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which [the agent] may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law." 19 U.S.C. § 482 (emphasis added). A variety of regulations implement, supplement, and explain section 482 and the "reasonable cause to suspect" standard. See, e.g. 19 C.F.R. Secs. 145.2, 145.3, & 162.7. The "reasonable cause to suspect" standard "is ultimately a matter of judgment for each Customs official, based on all relevant facts and circumstances." 19 C.F.R. Sec. 145 app. The regulations give several examples of cases where reasonable cause to suspect would exist, three of which are relevant to this case: (1) x-ray examination indicates the presence of merchandise or contraband; (2) the mail article is insured; and (3) the mail article is a box, carton, or wrapper other than a thin envelope. Examples 2, 5, & 6 to 19 C.F.R. Sec. 145 app. Any one of these alone is sufficient to establish "reasonable cause to suspect;" all three are present here.
The Honorable James B. Moran, Chief District Judge of the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation
The late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once pointed out the distinction between criminal and non-criminal intent: "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 n. 9, 72 S. Ct. 240, 244 n. 9, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952) (quoting Holmes, The Common Law) . In strict liability cases, like this one, both stumbling over and kicking a dog result in criminal liability