Source: https://it.b-ok.org/book/2921356/e41e99
Timestamp: 2019-11-22 07:58:07
Document Index: 320423118

Matched Legal Cases: ['cjeu ', 'CJEU ', 'EWCA ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'art 2', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'art 3', 'art 2', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ']

Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the European Union and the Right to a Fair Trial | Monique Hazelhorst (auth.) | download
Pagina principale Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the European Union and the Right to a Fair Trial
Monique Hazelhorst (auth.)
Editore: T.M.C. Asser Press
ISBN 13: 978-94-6265-162-3
enforcement1399
ecthr954
regulation918
echr684
judgments654
cjeu633
refusal586
brussels580
proceedings388
para378
convention359
procedural335
courts308
appl283
exequatur262
violation254
bis regulation221
ii bis211
brussels ii208
brussels ii bis202
regulations197
recognition and enforcement193
civil judgments192
jurisdiction174
eeo172
eop158
bosphorus156
abolition156
refusal grounds151
brussels i bis147
escp145
eu cfr139
cjeu case138
debtor138
remedy136
grounds for refusal120
recognition or enforcement120
ii bis regulation118
ruling116
eu legislation116
refusal of enforcement109
enforcement of judgments100
manifest98
cooperation93
remedies92
submitted89
movement of judgments86
Jeremy B. Bierbach (auth.)
Leanne O'Leary (auth.)
Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the European
Union and the Right to a Fair Trial
Free Movement of Civil
Judgments in the European
Union and the Right
Judicial Assistant at the Supreme Court
This research was made possible with the support of the Netherlands Organisation for
Scientific Research (NWO). It is part of the project ‘Securing Quality in Cross-Border
Enforcement: Towards European Principles of Civil Procedure?’ (2011–2016) led by Prof. X.E.
Kramer at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
ISBN 978-94-6265-162-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-6265-162-3
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016956173
First and foremost, I thank my supervisors, Prof. Xandra Kramer and Prof. Kristin
Henrard, at Erasmus School of Law, for their support and comments on earlier
versions of the chapters for this book. This book is part of the research project
‘Securing Quality in Cross-Border Enforcement: Towards European Principles of
Civil Procedure?’, based on a VIDI grant by the Dutch Organization for Scientific
Research, and led by Prof. Kramer. I am very grateful to Prof. Kramer for introducing me to the rich field of European civil procedure.
Next, I would like to thank for their invaluable comments Prof. Fabian
Amtenbrink at Erasmus School of Law; Prof. Rick Lawson at Leiden University;
and Prof. Marta Requejo Isidro, professor at the University of Santiago de
Compostela and senior research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Procedural
Law in Luxembourg.
In Luxembourg, I would like to thank Prof. Hess for the opportunity to spend
two months as a guest researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Procedural
Law. The institute provided an inspiring work environment. Its research fellows made me feel very welcome: I would like to name Katharina Raffelsieper
in particular, though all became good friends in the short time I was there. I also
thank International Officer Christiane Göbel for her practical help in getting settled. During my time in Luxembourg, Prof. Gilles Cuniberti at the University of
Luxembourg agreed to meet me and discuss my work, for which I am thankful.
In Rotterdam, I would like to thank Prof. Wibren van der Burg, Prof. Sanne
Taekema and Prof. Elaine Mak for valuable help and comments on earlier versions
of some of the chapters of this book. Dr. Karin van Wingerde provided essential
practical advice during the final stages of this research. My fellow Ph.D. candidates not only provided support but were also prepared to discuss my ideas with
me; I mention in particular Stefan Philipsen, Thomas Riesthuis and Anna Sting.
I am also grateful to Prof. Roel de Lange and Prof. Janneke Gerards (at Utrecht
University) for letting me participate in their reading group on fundamental rights,
where I had the opportunity to explore this rich and ever-changing topic in more
I also wish to thank my fellow (ex-)PhDs from the department of private international law, Laura, Alina, Ekaterina, Piotr, Erlis, and Marta: the latter two deserve
special thanks for putting up with me as their office-mate in the stressful final
Ryan Gauthier took on the tremendous task of correcting the manuscript, which
he did superbly, despite being on a different continent.
In Utrecht, I would like to thank those who gave me the opportunity to start,
and complete, the Master’s Programme in Legal Research, which proved an invaluable springboard: Prof. Leonard Besselink, Prof. Ewoud Hondius and Dr. Ton
van den Brink, my tutor during the Programme, who was always good at making me put things into perspective. I would also very much like to thank Dr. Tony
Marguery for being prepared to review earlier versions of my work.
My friends from the LRM Programme also deserve thanks for being there for
me. Melissa, Frank, Marja-Liisa, Eduardo, Jurriën: I could not have done it without you. A special word of thanks goes out to Nik de Boer, who not only reviewed
some of my work, but also organized highly inspiring reading groups on EU law
I am grateful to my colleagues at Denkkracht Utrecht; participating in its activities gave me the opportunity to use my legal knowledge for different purposes than
my research every once in a while, which proved very refreshing. In particular, I
would like to thank Marije Louisse for always being prepared to listen to my lectures on my topic: I hope to be able to do the same for you.
Last but not least, my family and friends gave me the confidence I needed
to start the project in the first place. So I thank my mother Francisca, my father
Willem-Otto, and my sister Leonie, and especially my grandmother, Mariëtte
Louise Hoogendijk-van Holst Pellekaan, who practiced law in the 50s and from
whom I inherited the ‘legal gene’. I thank my parents-, brothers- and sisters-in-law
for welcoming me into their family and for always being interested. My friends
Sophie and Sjoerd were always there when I needed them, even if they were not
geographically close. Finally, dear Wouter, you helped me immensely, not just by
being there for me, but also by understanding so well why I wanted to do this.
The fact that it is now finished to me proves we can do anything as long as we are
1.1 Introduction: The Case of Maronier v. Larmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Background: Free Movement of Judgments
in the European Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 Relevance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4 Aims of This Book. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.5 Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.6 Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Part I Evolution of Free Movement of Civil Judgments
in Europe and the Role of Fair Trial
2 The Evolution of Free Movement of Civil Judgments
in the European Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the EU: Historical
and Political Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.1 Free Movement of Judgments and the Internal Market. . . . .
2.2.2 The Introduction of Mutual Recognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.3 The Role of Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust. . . . . . . .
2.2.4 Practical Arguments for Increased Free Movement. . . . . . . .
2.2.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Recognition and Enforcement Under Current EU Legislation . . . . .
2.3.1 Features of Recognition and Enforcement in EU
Civil Justice Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Grounds for Refusal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.3 The Brussels I bis Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.4 Complete Free Movement of Judgments:
The Maintenance Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.5 Automatic Enforcement with Minimum Standards
Under the Brussels II bis Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.6 Automatic Enforcement with Minimum Standards
Under the European Enforcement Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.7 Automatic Enforcement on the Basis of Common
Rules in the Uniform Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.8 Interim Conclusion: The Significance of the Reforms
for Fundamental Rights Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 Protection of Fundamental Rights by EU Instruments
on Free Movement of Civil Judgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 The Role of the Public Policy Exception in the Protection
of Fundamental Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.1 The Concept of Public Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.2 Public Policy and the European Convention
on Human Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.3 The Inclusion of a Public Policy Exception
in Instruments of EU Civil Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.4 Substantive and Procedural Public Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.5 Interpretation by the Court of Justice
of the European Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.6 Application of the Public Policy Exception
in European Union Instruments by Member State Courts. . .
3.2.7 Conclusion: The Value of the Public Policy Exception. . . . .
3.3 The Role of Other Grounds for Refusal in the Protection
3.3.1 The Protection of the Defendant in Default Proceedings. . . .
3.3.2 Special Jurisdiction (Article 35 Brussels I, 45(1)(e)
Brussels I bis). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.3 Hearing of the Child (23(b) Brussels II bis)
or Other Interested Person (23(d) Brussels II bis). . . . . . . . .
3.4 The Protective Function of Control by the Member
State Addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.1 The Value of a Cross-Border Check. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.2 Replacement of Refusal Grounds with Minimum
Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.3 Alternative Remedies: Appeal to the European
Court of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.4 Interim Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5 Fundamental Rights Protection in the Absence of Refusal
Grounds: The Zarraga Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Part II The Framework for the Protection of the Right
to a Fair Trial in Europe
4 The Right to a Fair Trial in Civil Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 The Right to a Fair Civil Trial in the European Treaties . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.1 Article 6(1) of the European Convention
4.2.2 EU Law and Article 47 of the EU Charter
on Fundamental Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.3 Relationship and Interplay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.4 Structure, Internal Connections, and Interpretation. . . . . . . .
4.3 The Right to a Fair Civil Trial in the Case Law
of the European Courts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Elements of the Right to a Fair Civil Trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 The Right to a Fair Hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.3 Right to a Public Trial and Public Pronouncement
of the Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.4 The Right to Adjudication by an Impartial
and Independent Tribunal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.5 The Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time. . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.6 The Right to Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.7 Consequences of a Failure to Observe the Right
to a Fair Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Theoretical Foundations for the Right to a Fair Trial
in Civil Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.1 Introduction: The Need to Delve Further
into the Right to a Fair Trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.2 The Fair Civil Trial as a Means to an End. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.3 The Fair Civil Trial as an End in Itself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.4 Is It Possible to Distinguish a ‘Core’ and
a ‘Periphery’ Within Article 6(1)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 Free Movement of Judgments and the European Convention
on Human Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 The Scope of Application of Pellegrini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.1 Application of Pellegrini to Situations Where
Both States are Party to the ECHR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2 Application of Pellegrini to Situations Governed
by EU Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3 A Different Frame of Reference for Intra-European
Union Situations: The Bosphorus Test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3.1 Review by the ECtHR of Matters Relating
to EU Law Prior to Bosphorus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3.2 Bosphorus: Facts and Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3.3 Bosphorus: Impact and Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4 Applying Bosphorus to Free Movement of Civil Judgments:
The Povse Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.1 Povse: Background to the Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.2 General Comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.3 The Presumption of Equivalent Protection: Abstract
or Concrete?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.4 Equivalent Protection: The Importance
of the Preliminary Ruling Mechanism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.5 The Matter of Discretion and the Applicability
of Povse to Regulations Which Contain Grounds
for Refusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.6 A Manifest Deficiency?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5 The Bosphorus Doctrine After European Union Accession
to the European Convention on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6.1 Conclusions for Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6.2 Conclusions for Enforcing Courts or Authorities. . . . . . . . . .
5.6.3 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6 Free Movement of Civil Judgments and European Union
Fundamental Rights Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2 Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European
Union Legal Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2.1 The Position of Fundamental Rights in EU Law. . . . . . . . . .
6.2.2 The Member States Courts’ Task in the Protection
of EU CFR Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2.3 The Role of the CJEU in the Protection
of EU Fundamental Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2.4 Conclusion: The System of Fundamental Rights
Protection in the EU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3 ‘Systemic Deficiencies’ in Fundamental Rights Protection:
N.S. and M.E. and Others. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.1 The Rule: Mutual Recognition Entails a Presumption
that Fundamental Rights Are Protected. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.2 The Exception: Presumption Can Be Rebutted
in Case of Systemic Deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.3 Can This Exception Be Applied in the Field
of Civil Procedure?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Court of Justice of the European Union’s Melloni Judgment:
Member State Fundamental Rights and Mutual Recognition . . . . . .
6.4.1 The CJEU’s Judgment in Melloni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4.2 Application of the Melloni Doctrine to EU
Civil Procedure Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.5 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Part III How to Effectively Protect Fair Trial in the Context
of Free Movement of Civil Judgments
7 Towards an ‘Emergency Brake’ in EU Instruments
7.1 Introduction: The Need for an Emergency Brake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2 The Nature of the Emergency Brake: Procedural Public
Policy or Fair Trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2.2 The Right to a Fair Trial as a Fundamental Principle. . . . . . .
7.2.3 The Suitability of the Right to a Fair Trial
as a Yardstick for Refusing Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2.4 Are Procedural Public Policy and Fair Trial
Identical in Scope?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2.5 Substantive Public Policy and Fundamental Rights
Other Than Fair Trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2.6 Interim Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3 The Conflict Between Debtor’s and Creditor’s Rights. . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.1 Guidance of the ECtHR for Solving Conflicts. . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.2 Methods for Resolving Conflicts Between
Fundamental Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.3 Whether the Exercise of the Right Is Made
Utterly Impossible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.4 Whether Other Rights Are Also Implicated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.5 Cumulative Effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.6 Other Factors to Consider. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.7 Application to Conflicts Between Specific Elements
of Fair Trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.8 Conclusion: The Threshold for Refusing Recognition
or Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.4 Protection of the Defaulting Defendant and the Special
Jurisdiction Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.5 The Need for an ‘Emergency Brake’ for Return
and Access Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.5.1 Refusal of Enforcement of Return Orders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.5.2 Automatic Enforcement of Judgments Granting
Rights of Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.6 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8 Facilitating Enforcement of Civil Judgments Across European
Union Member States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2 How to Organize Judgment Import in European
Union Regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.1 Requirements That Can Be Derived from ECtHR
Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.2 Implications for the Design of the Procedure
for Obtaining Permission for Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.3 Other Recommendations for the Design
of an Effective Enforcement Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.4 Assessment: How Should Judgment Import
or Export Be Organized?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.5 Conclusion on Judgment Export in Brussels I bis. . . . . . . . .
8.3 The Maintenance Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4 The European Enforcement Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4.1 Service of the Document Instituting the Proceedings . . . . . .
8.4.2 Impartiality of the Judge Who Issues the EEO Certificate. . .
8.4.3 Right to a Fair Hearing Before a Judgment
Is Declared Enforceable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4.4 The Right to Appeal (Non-)Certification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4.5 Conclusion on the European Enforcement Order. . . . . . . . . .
8.5 The Uniform European Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.5.1 The European Order for Payment Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.5.2 The European Small Claims Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.5.3 The Uniform Procedures and the Need for Grounds
8.6 Enforcement of Return Orders and Access Rights Under
Brussels II bis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.6.1 Introduction: The 1980 Hague Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.6.2 Reforms Achieved by the Brussels II bis Regulation
and Controversy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.6.3 How Should Enforcement of Return Orders
Be Organized? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.6.4 Conclusion: Cross-Border Enforcement of Return
Order and Access Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.7 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.2 The Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.2.1 Summary of the Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.2.2 Limitations of the Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3 Implications of the Findings and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3.1 Implications for Academic and Political Debate. . . . . . . . . .
9.3.2 Implications for Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.4 Avenues for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.4.1 Convergence of Civil Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.4.2 Best Practices in the Application of EU
9.5 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  429
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  445
ECHR	European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
EU CFR European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights
FD EAW Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant
Procédure préjudicielle d’urgence
Abstract Effective mechanisms for the cross-border recognition and enforcement
of civil judgments has long been a priority for the European Union, since judicial
cooperation is a prerequisite for the functioning of the internal market. For a long
time, EU legislation balanced judgment creditors’ with judgment debtors’ rights
by combining a harmonized procedure for requesting a declaration of enforceability in the Member State of enforcement (exequatur) with limited grounds for
refusal of recognition and enforcement. Since the introduction of the principle of
mutual recognition in 1999, the EU legislature’s focus has shifted towards simplification or even abolition of this procedure. This move towards simplification has
resulted in the removal of formal requirements for enforcement in another Member
State of judgments falling within the scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation, which
is to say most civil and commercial judgments. For some categories of judgments,
it has also, more controversially, resulted in the abolition of the grounds of refusal
of enforcement and recognition that were previously available. This book examines
these developments for their conformity with European fundamental rights law, specifically the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the EU Charter
on Fundamental Rights (EU CFR). This is an important and timely issue, since the
European Union increasingly presents itself as a fundamental rights organisation.
The topic of mutual recognition of judgments also raises profound questions about
the nature of European integration and the role of fundamental rights in that respect.
Keywords Recognition and enforcement · Exequatur · Mutual recognition ·
1.1 Introduction: The Case of Maronier v. Larmer....................................................................
1.2 Background: Free Movement of Judgments in the European Union...................................
1.3 Relevance.............................................................................................................................
1.4 Aims of This Book...............................................................................................................
1.5 Structure...............................................................................................................................
1.6 Case Law..............................................................................................................................
M. Hazelhorst, Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the European Union
and the Right to a Fair Trial, DOI 10.1007/978-94-6265-162-3_1
1.1 Introduction: The Case of Maronier v. Larmer
Mr. Larmer was a dentist practicing in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. In 1984, one
of his clients, Mr. Maronier, claimed damages of EUR 26,800 from Mr. Larmer, in
respect of the treatment he had received from him. After an exchange of pleadings
and statements, in 1986 the proceedings were stayed for a period of 12 years.
After this period Mr. Maronier instructed his lawyers to pursue the case. In the
meantime, however, Mr. Larmer had moved to England, leaving his address with
the Rotterdam City Hall and the Dutch Association of Dentists. His lawyer, who
had not been informed of the new address, stated that he had not been in contact
with Mr. Larmer for a number of years and that according to his information Mr.
Larmer was living in England. Whether the lawyer explicitly withdrew from the
case is unclear.
Despite recognizing that Mr. Larmer was not represented in law, and recording
Mr. Larmer as living in Rotterdam, the Rotterdam District Court nevertheless
delivered judgment on 31 December 1999 and awarded Mr. Maronier damages to
the sum of EUR 33,000.1 Not having been served with any of the documents, Mr.
Larmer only found out about the reactivation of the procedure when enforcement
measures were taken against him in England. At that point, there was no way for
him to appeal the judgment. Given that he had submitted a statement before the
proceedings were stayed, the judgment was not a default judgment, and he was
therefore not able to invoke the remedy of opposition (or verzet under Dutch law).
The only option open to him was therefore to oppose enforcement of the judgment
in England.2
The case of Maronier v. Larmer shows the conflict inherent in cross-border
enforcement of civil judgments. In an integrated European Union (EU), as people
and businesses move across borders, many legal relationships involve cross-border
elements. Economic activity within the internal market is only possible when
businesses and consumers are able to rely on the effective functioning of the civil
justice system to resolve any disputes resulting from that activity.3 Cooperation
between Member States in the field of civil justice, and in particular rules facilitating the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments, are essential in
At the same time, the case of Maronier v. Larmer illustrates the difficulty of
effectively safeguarding the defendant’s right to be heard in a cross-border case.
Such difficulty can be caused by differences in the procedural law of Member
States, a lack of information such as to the defendant’s where abouts, or simple
mistakes in the application of the law. The question is whether, and how, EU
legislation on cross-border recognition and enforcement of civil judgments should
Not published; Kramer (2003) p. 16.
Court of Appeal, Maronier v. Larmer [2002] EWCA Civ 774. See Beaumont and Johnston
(2010) p. 255.
3 Jenard (1979) p. 3.
Introduction: The Case of Maronier v. Larmer
effectively safeguard the parties’ rights to a fair trial. This question involves a
balancing between, on one hand, a judgment creditor’s right to enforcement of a
civil judgment, and on the other hand, protection of the judgment debtor’s right to
a fair trial, including his right to be heard.
1.2 Background: Free Movement of Judgments in the
Since the inception of the EU, the European legislature has strived to achieve
effective mechanisms for recognition and enforcement of civil judgments between
Member States. The 1957 Treaty establishing a European Economic Community
(EEC) already required Member States to enter into negotiations in order to
simplify the formalities attached to the recognition and enforcement of civil
judgments.4 Prior to, and apart from, the European integration process, states
already made provisions in national law for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments from other states, and concluded treaties. The European integration
process gave great impetus to the development of rules on this matter. For a long
time, EU legislation balanced judgment creditors’ with judgment debtors’ rights by
combining a harmonized procedure for requesting a declaration of enforceability in
the Member State of enforcement (exequatur) with limited grounds for refusal of
recognition and enforcement.5 These grounds for refusal included the public policy
exception,6 which enabled a court in the Member State of enforcement to refuse
recognition or enforcement if that would be contrary to, inter alia, that Member
State’s public policy, and a ground for protecting the defaulting defendant.7
With the inclusion in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam of a legal basis for EU
legislative action in the field of judicial cooperation in civil cases,8 EU law on
recognition and enforcement, and civil justice cooperation as a whole, underwent
what may be termed a paradigm shift. Whereas historically states saw the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments as an exercise of state sovereignty and an act
Article 220, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 1957, OJ 25
5 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,
done at Lugano on 16 September 1988; Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Brussels.
6 Article 34(1) Brussels I Regulation.
7 Article 34(2) Brussels I Regulation.
8 Article 65, Treaty Establishing the European Community (Amsterdam consolidated version)
OJ C340/173, 1997. Under the current Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
judicial cooperation in civil matters is based on Title V (Articles 67–89) of Part III. With the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the European Union has replaced and succeeded the
of comity towards the other state,9 in the EU it has become increasingly automatic
and governed by harmonized European rules.
What spurred on this development is the goal, expressed at the 1999 the
European Council of Tampere, of creating a ‘European Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice’.10 The conclusions from this meeting, the ‘Tampere Conclusions’,
proposed a number of far-reaching measures to achieve this goal, many of which
affected civil justice, but also criminal justice and asylum and migration law.
The most influential idea arising from the Tampere Conclusions was the
introduction of the principle of mutual recognition as a cornerstone for cooperation
in these areas of law. Mutual recognition is a legislative concept, originally
developed in the context of free movement of goods,11 which requires Member
States to recognize or otherwise give effect to judicial decisions, official
documents, and other ‘products’ from fellow Member States. The underlying notion
is that of mutual trust of Member States in each other’s legal systems. Though there
is no uniformly accepted definition of mutual trust, it seems to require Member
States to presume that, because those decisions and other documents emanate from
a fellow EU Member State, they comply with norms and principles (such as
fundamental rights) that are common to all Member States. Those common
standards, which are laid down in primary or secondary EU legislation, thus obviate
the need for grounds for refusal of recognition such as public policy.
Mutual recognition thus presupposes mutual trust, though whether this trust
indeed exists or whether the European legislature merely assumes it exists is a
matter of debate. In any case, where mutual recognition has been implemented,
the absence of mutual trust in a concrete case is no legitimate reason for Member
States to refuse recognition. Mutual trust should therefore be seen as an objectified
form of trust. It has proved controversial: the fact that all EU Member States are
signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not justify
the conclusion that fundamental rights are therefore at all times respected.12 It has
consequently been argued that mutual trust should only give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that this is always the case.13
Not all authors agree that this paradigm is no longer valid in the EU framework: Lopez de
Tejada argues that abolition of exequatur is unwise mainly because it would remove Member
States’ control powers to check whether judgments conform to domestic standards. Lopez de
Tejada (2013) pp. 115–117.
10 Tampere European Council, 15–16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions.
11 CJEU Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein,
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, para 14; also known as Cassis de Dijon.
12 Statistical data show that, in the period 1959–2011, the ECtHR delivered a total of 3672 judgments in which a violation of Article 6 was found (still excluding complaints about the length
of proceedings) making it the most violated provision of the ECHR. See Table of Violations
1959–2011 at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Statistics/
Statistical+data/.
13 Kramer (2011) p. 217.
Background: Free Movement of Judgments in the European Union
The European Council of Tampere’s adoption of mutual recognition as the
cornerstone of justice cooperation proved fruitful. The 2004 the Hague
Programme,14 the 2010 Stockholm Programme,15 and the Civil Justice Agenda for
2020,16 all proposed measures for the implementation of this concept.
For the field of civil justice, the introduction of mutual recognition launched a
legislative effort with the aim of simplifying or altogether abolishing the existing
procedures for cross-border recognition and enforcement.17 This move towards
simplification has resulted in the removal of formal requirements for enforcement
in another Member State (exequatur) of judgments falling within the scope of the
Brussels I bis Regulation, which is to say most civil and commercial judgments.18
For some categories of judgments, it has also, more controversially,19 resulted in
the abolition of the grounds of refusal of enforcement and recognition that were
previously available. In this category, the European Enforcement Order Regulation
allows the court that handed down the judgment to provide a certificate, which
renders the judgment automatically enforceable throughout the Union, without any
possibility of opposing its enforcement.20 The European Small Claims Regulation21
and the European Order for Payment Procedure22 are uniform European procedures
that yield decisions that are likewise automatically enforceable throughout the
Union. The Maintenance Regulation has abolished prerequisites for enforcement
altogether.23 Finally, the Brussels II bis Regulation on family matters has abolished
any possibility for Member States to refuse enforcement of judgments from other
14 European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in
the European Union, 2005, OJ C 53/01.
15 European Council, The Stockholm Programme—an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ C/115/10, 2010.
16 European Commission, The EU Justice Agenda for 2020. Strengthening Trust, Mobility and
Growth within the Union, COM (2014) 144 final, 2014.
17 Kramer (2011) p. 209.
18 Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 No
1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351/1. This Regulation is a recast of Regulation 44/2001 (the Brussels I
19 See among others Cuniberti and Rueda (2011); Van der Grinten (2006); Beaumont and
Johnston (2010); Oberhammer (2010); Fra˛ckowiak-Adamska (2015); Lopez de Tejada (2013);
Schack (2011); Timmer (2013).
20 Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April
2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, OJ L 134/15 (the ‘EEO
Regulation’), Article 5.
21 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007
establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199/1.
22 Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December
2006 creating a European Order for Payment Procedure, OJ L 399/1.
23 Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 of 18 December 2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L7/1.
Member States ordering the return of a child that was wrongly removed across
borders from his or her state of habitual residence.24 This same regime applies to
judgments concerning access rights.25
The simplification or abolition of procedural steps necessary to enforce or
recognize a judgment across borders has a profound impact on the protection of
fundamental rights. On one hand, simplification of the procedure for cross-border
enforcement improves parties’ confidence in the rule of law and allows the judgment creditor to exercise his right to enforcement, which both Article 6 of the
ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR) guarantee. On the other hand, safeguards, such as grounds for refusal of enforcement, are
necessary to protect the debtor’s right to a fair trial under those same provisions.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) supervises, within the limits of its
jurisdiction,26 the conformity of the application of EU legislation with the ECHR.
This book considers what consequences abolition of such safeguards has for the
protection of both parties’ rights to a fair trial, and how an EU regime for crossborder enforcement and recognition of civil judgments should be organized in
order to effectively protect those rights.
1.3 Relevance
The questions submitted above merit examination for three reasons: timeliness, the
controversial nature of the topic, and its relevance for EU law as a whole.
Firstly, as the previous section described, a great variety of mechanisms
for recognition and enforcement currently exists in European Regulations,
some of which, such as the European Enforcement Order (EEO), are entirely
unprecedented. Given that it has now been around 10 years since the entry into
force of these instruments, it is possible and necessary to evaluate whether they
have achieved their stated aims of simplifying cross-border enforcement while
respecting the rights of defendants.
Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, OJ L 338/1, Article 42.
25 Ibid., Article 41.
26 Since the European Union is as of yet not a member of the Council of Europe and not a signatory to the ECHR, the ECtHR considers it has no jurisdiction to review actions of the EU as an
organisation. The ECtHR however does entertain applications against the EU’s Member States,
such as in ECtHR Andreasen v. the United Kingdom and 26 other Member States of the European
Union (dec), appl. no. 28827/11, 31 March 2015; see 5.4.6. It also reviews actions of EU Member
States where they act in the implementation of their obligations under EU law, though this review
is limited where States have no discretion; see ECtHR Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret
Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, appl. no. 45036/98, 30 June 2005, ECHR 2005-VI, discussed in detail
Secondly, the reforms in this field have proved controversial. The idea of
abolishing exequatur and the accompanying refusal grounds, while being
presented as progress, was severely criticized by some.27 With the knowledge that
is currently available on the functioning of the various mechanisms, it is possible
to evaluate whether that criticism has proven to be justified.
Thirdly, the topic of free movement of judgments represents certain larger
developments in EU law. The EU increasingly presents itself as a fundamental
rights organization,28 the most important exponent being the adoption of the EU
CFR. In light of this development, careful analysis of EU legislation on its
conformity with fundamental rights such as the right to a fair trial becomes all the
more relevant.29 The EU’s responsibilities under the ECHR and the (lack of)
jurisdiction of the ECtHR to review the application of EU legislation is also highly
relevant in this regard.30 The operation of civil justice regulations provides a
unique perspective on this highly topical matter: the ECtHR’s approach to cases
involving mutual recognition of civil judgments highlights the difficulties with this
concept and with the relationship between the ECHR and EU law more generally.
The topic of mutual recognition of judgments also raises profound questions
about the nature of European integration and the role of fundamental rights in that
respect. Though mutual recognition can work in various ways, it often involves the
reduction or abolition of discretionary powers of the Member State where
enforcement of a judicial decision is requested. This has raised the question what
Member States should do when they believe the enforcement of a decision is
contrary to (national or European) standards of fundamental rights. This question
proved especially difficult in the field of European asylum law, where it led to the
much discussed M.S.S. judgment of the ECtHR,31 and the subsequent N.S. and
M.E. and Others judgment from the CJEU,32 in which the latter ruled that mutual
recognition should, under very strict circumstances, give way to fundamental
rights concerns. How legally and politically sensitive the relationship between
mutual recognition and fundamental rights has become is also demonstrated by the
fact that the CJEU saw accession of the EU to the ECHR as a potential threat to
the functioning of mutual recognition, and partly for this reason advised against
the 2014 Draft Accession Agreement.33 The question of whether fundamental
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union proclaims that ‘the Union is founded on the values
of respect to human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights’. Article 6(1) provides that the Charter shall have the same legal value of the Treaties,
whereas Article 6(3) provides that ‘fundamental rights […] shall constitute general principles of
the Union’s law’.
29 See Sanna (2011).
30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, OJ C 364/01.
31 European Court of Human Rights, Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, appl. no. 30696/09,
32 CJEU Joined Cases C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, N.S. and M.E. and others.
33 Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
rights may override mutual recognition has also arisen in relation to the European
Arrest Warrant.34 Whereas the problems associated with mutual recognition are
different in criminal law and in asylum law than in civil law, due to the difference
in subject matter, they stem from the same development. Since this book aims to
develop a principled view on the relationship between fundamental rights and
mutual recognition, it needs to take into account the problems associated with that
relationship in fields other than civil law, and consider whether similar solutions
may be useful for these fields. The proposed solutions are therefore of interest not
just for actors in the field of civil justice, but for those in other areas of law as well.
1.4 Aims of This Book
As stated above, this book takes as a starting point that there is a tension between
the EU concept of mutual trust on one hand, and ECHR-guaranteed fundamental
rights on the other.
The aim of this research can be described as defining the parameters arising out
of the case law and doctrine on the cross-border effect of the right to a fair trial
that need to be considered if a political decision is taken on how to further facilitate free movement of civil judgments within the EU.
This book focuses on the right to a fair trial as laid down in Article 6 ECHR
and Article 47 EU CFR. It does not focus on other fundamental rights. The reason
for this is that procedural fairness is the most important aspect of public policy, as
it is most often invoked. Procedural fairness has also been the subject of CJEU and
ECtHR case law, unlike substantive public policy. This focus does not preclude
acknowledging that other fundamental rights could also be of importance in this
context; it is simply not possible to include all potentially relevant fundamental
rights in this research project, though they are considered in the context of child
abduction cases. This book may therefore serve as a starting point for further discussion on whether standards could also be derived from other fundamental rights,
which are also relevant to the abolition of exequatur.
This book has as its explicit aim to discuss the cross-border recognition and
enforcement of civil judgments from the perspective of fundamental rights. It does
not explore whether free movement of civil judgments is feasible or desirable
politically or economically. Another limitation is that this research does not consider whether it is legitimately possible to weigh the protection of fundamental
rights against considerations of efficiency, such as the potential costs and benefits
of the abolition of certain safeguards, or against other considerations of societal
interest. This research has as its starting point that the right to a fair trial should be
protected effectively in all proceedings falling within its scope. Since both the EU
34 CJEU Case C‑399/11 Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107; CJEU Case
C‑396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39.
1.4 Aims of This Book
and its Member States have committed themselves to protecting fundamental
rights, limitations on that protection are only allowed in so far as the fundamental
rights framework allows for those limitations. Whereas, for example, the right to
privacy in Article 8(1) ECHR can be legitimately limited provided certain
conditions are fulfilled, the right to a fair trial does not contain an explicit
limitation clause.35 It is therefore not possible to legitimately discuss in what cases
interference with the right to a fair trial should be allowed. Whether such an
outcome is acceptable as ‘collateral damage’ of the abolition of safeguards that
may be seen as obstacles to enforcement is a political question; but this research
would maintain that even politically, such a trade-off could not legitimately be
considered, given that within the EU’s political framework, fundamental rights are
considered to be among its founding principles.
1.5 Structure
This book is structured as follows. Part I (Chaps. 1 and 2) outlines the history, legislative function and practical use of EU legislation on recognition and enforcement, up to and including the move towards reform. Next, it analyses the way in
which the exequatur has functioned as a means of protection against fundamental
rights violations in cross-border cases, and explains what consequences its abolition will likely have (or in some instances has already had) on fundamental rights
protection. This analysis uses case law, which was collected in the manner
described above under ‘Sources’. Empirical evidence on the functioning of the EU
Regulations is also a valuable source here, particularly the 2007 Heidelberg Report
on the functioning of the Brussels I Regulation,36 the 2011 Report on the
functioning of the public policy exception,37 and recent reports on the functioning
of other regulations. This research uses the empirical data gathered in these reports
throughout, in order to show what problems are encountered but also to show the
scale of those problems. Though it is not an explicit aim of this project, it does
take data on the functioning of the regulations into account, where possible, to see
how any proposed adaptations will affect the efficiency of the regulations’ functioning as a whole. Primarily, however, this research focuses on the positions of
the individual litigants as protected by the right to a fair trial. The conclusions
from this analysis are presented as a conclusion to Part I and used as guidelines for
Part 2 (Chaps. 4, 5, and 6) constructs a normative framework on the basis of
the ECHR and EU fundamental rights law. Chapter 4 discusses the requirements
that can be derived from the right to a fair trial (Article 6(1) ECHR, Article 47
See for a general overview of the topic Koch (2008).
Hess et al. (2007).
Hess and Pfeiffer (2011).
EU CFR). It discusses both ECtHR and CJEU case law to identify the existing
standard; it is after all possible that the CJEU has developed, in its application of
Article 47 EU CFR, more precise standards than those that can be derived from
the ECtHR’s case law. The Chapter also contains a discussion of the aims and
values that underlie the right to a fair trial; this analysis serves, partly, to determine
the relative weight of elements of the right to a fair trial in case of a conflict.
This discussion looks at the history of the right to a fair trial and its purpose and
function within the larger corpus of fundamental rights in Europe. Its conclusions
are supported by insights from legal philosophy.
Apart from this identification of norms, it is also necessary to establish how the
responsibility for protecting these norms is organized in the multi-level legal system of the EU. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse legislation, but particularly focus on case
law, to establish exactly how these responsibilities are divided between the EU as
an organization and its Member States, according to (respectively) the CJEU and
Part 3, Chaps. 7 and 8, contains a synthesis of the findings of Part 2. Its purpose
is to interpret the findings and to offer a perspective on how the findings apply to
the larger area of EU law of civil procedure. As stated above, the aim is to propose
amendments or adaptations that may help to protect fundamental rights effectively.
1.6 Case Law
Save for exceptional cases, case law and literature research was concluded on 1
February 2016. This means that the ECtHR Grand Chamber’s important judgment
in Avotins v. Latvia,38 which is very relevant to EU Member States’ obligations
under the ECHR, could not be taken into consideration. The Chamber judgment in
this case is discussed in Chap. 5. The reader should be aware that some of that
Chapter’s observations are affected by the Grand Chamber ruling.
Beaumont P, Johnston E (2010) Can exequatur be abolished in Brussels I whilst retaining a public policy defence? J Private Int Law 6:249–279
Cuniberti G, Rueda I (2011) Abolition of Exequatur: Addressing the Commission’s Concerns.
Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 75:286–316
Fra˛ckowiak-Adamska A (2015) Time for a European “Full Faith and Credit Clause”. Common
Mark Law Rev 52:1–28
Hess B, Pfeiffer T (2011) Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception as referred to in EU
Instruments of Private International and Procedural Law. Study for the European Parliament.
ECtHR Avotins v. Latvia [GC], appl. no. 17502/07, 23 May 2016.
Hess B, Pfeiffer T, Schlosser P (2007) Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the
Member States. Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, Heidelberg
Jenard P (1979) Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters (signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968), OJ C 59/1
Koch IE (2008) Human Rights: A conflict between positive individual and collective democratic
interests? Erasmus Law Lectures no. 12, Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague
Kramer XE (2003) Enforcement under the Brussels Convention: Procedural public policy and the
influence of Article 6 ECHR. Int’l Lis 2003:16–20
Kramer XE (2011) Cross-Border Enforcement in the EU: Mutual Trust versus Fair Trial?
Towards Principles of European Civil Procedure. Int J Proced Law 1:202–230
Lopez de Tejada M (2013) La disparation de l’exequatur dans l’ espace judiciaire europeen.
LGDJ/Lextenso Editions, Paris
Oberhammer P (2010) The abolition of exequatur. Praxis der Internationalen Privat- und
Verfahrenrechts (IPRax) 30:197–203
Sanna G (2011) Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Its Impact on Judicial
Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters. In: Di Federico G (ed) The EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights: from Declaration to Binding Instrument. Springer, Dordrecht/
Heidelberg/London/New York
Schack H (2011) The misguided abolition of exequatur proceedings in the European Union. In:
Gudowski J, Weitz K (eds) Festschrift für Tadeusz Erecinski. LexisNexis Polska, Warsaw
Timmer LJE (2013) Abolition of Exequatur under the Brussels I Regulation: Ill Conceived and
Premature? J Private Int Law 9:129–147
Van der Grinten P (2006) Abolishing Exequatur in the European Union: An Alternative. In:
Van der Grinten P, Heukels T (eds) Crossing Borders. Essays in European and Private
International Law, Nationality Law and Islamic Law in Honour of Frans van der Velden.
Kluwer, Deventer, pp 71–83
Evolution of Free Movement
of Civil Judgments in Europe
and the Role of Fair Trial
The Evolution of Free Movement of Civil
Judgments in the European Union
Abstract This chapter outlines the development of legislation on free movement
of civil judgments in the European Union. This legislation has evolved radically
over the past decades. The chapter shows that whereas legislation on civil justice
cooperation was originally motivated by the internal market rationale, aimed at
facilitating trade, the objective of creating a true European area of freedom, security, and justice, and the introduction of mutual recognition, meant that civil justice
cooperation became more ideologically motivated. Since the Tampere European
Council of 1999 made mutual recognition a principle of civil justice cooperation, the EU legislature made it a priority to simplify cross-border recognition and
enforcement as much as possible and to remove potential obstacles. The chapter
then goes on to discuss how recognition and enforcement are currently organized
under EU legislation in the field of civil justice. It considers how this mechanism
is laid down in a number of instruments: the Brussels I bis Regulation (the recast
Brussels I Regulation), the Brussels II bis Regulation, the Insolvency Regulation
and the Succession Regulation. It also discusses the two uniform European
Procedures, the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP) and the European
Order for Payment Procedure (EOP), as well as the European Enforcement Order
for uncontested claims (EEO).
Mutual trust · European Union civil justice cooperation · Area of Freedom ·
2.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................
2.2 Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the EU: Historical and Political Background.........
2.2.1 Free Movement of Judgments and the Internal Market.............................................
2.2.2 The Introduction of Mutual Recognition...................................................................
2.2.3 The Role of Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust...................................................
and the Right to a Fair Trial, DOI 10.1007/978-94-6265-162-3_2
2 The Evolution of Free Movement of Civil Judgments …
2.2.4 Practical Arguments for Increased Free Movement...................................................
2.2.5 Concluding Remarks..................................................................................................
2.3 Recognition and Enforcement Under Current EU Legislation............................................
2.3.1 Features of Recognition and Enforcement in EU Civil Justice Cooperation.............
2.3.2 Grounds for Refusal...................................................................................................
2.3.3 The Brussels I bis Regulation....................................................................................
2.3.4 Complete Free Movement of Judgments:
The Maintenance Regulation.....................................................................................
2.3.5 Automatic Enforcement with Minimum Standards Under the Brussels II bis
Regulation..................................................................................................................
2.3.6 Automatic Enforcement with Minimum Standards Under the European
Enforcement Order.....................................................................................................
2.3.7 Automatic Enforcement on the Basis of Common Rules in the Uniform
Procedures..................................................................................................................
2.3.8 Interim Conclusion: The Significance of the Reforms for Fundamental
Rights Protection........................................................................................................
2.4 Conclusion...........................................................................................................................
In an integrated legal order such as the European Union (EU), free movement of
civil judgments is essential to enabling cross-border trade and to ensuring legal
certainty. In order to achieve free movement, EU legislation long since facilitated
the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments delivered in one Member
State in another Member State. This legislation has evolved radically over the past
decades. Since the Tampere European Council of 1999 made mutual recognition
a principle of civil justice cooperation, the EU legislature made it a priority to
simplify cross-border recognition and enforcement as much as possible and to
remove potential obstacles. This chapter outlines the evolution within the EU of
the rules facilitating recognition and enforcement of civil judgments and shows the
changes that have an impact on the protection of both parties’ right to a fair trial.
This chapter starts by placing the development of mechanisms for recognition
and enforcement in the broader context of legislation in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters (Sect. 2.1). It shows that whereas legislation on civil justice
cooperation became more ideologically motivated. Justice has become increasingly
accessible to all types of litigants, and the recognition and enforcement of civil
judgments is now seen not simply as the fulfilment of a legal obligation but as an
expression of trust among Member States. This ideology led to the gradual abolition
of obstacles to complete free movement of civil judgments, as Sect. 2.1.3 explains.
Section 2.2 goes on to discuss how recognition and enforcement are currently
organized under EU legislation in the field of civil justice. It shows that the mechanism obtaining permission for enforcement is characterized by a strict separation
into what is called judgment import, the simplified and nearly automatic procedure
for obtaining a declaration of enforceability (exequatur), and what is called judgment inspection, the opportunity to challenge the recognition or enforcement on
appeal on the basis of a limited number of grounds for refusal. After these general
observations, the chapter considers how this mechanism is laid down in a number
of instruments: the Brussels I bis Regulation (the recast Brussels I Regulation), the
Brussels II bis Regulation, the Insolvency Regulation and the Succession Regulation.
It also discusses the two uniform European Procedures, the European Small Claims
Procedure (ESCP) and the European Order for Payment Procedure (EOP), as well as
the European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (EEO). It discusses to what
extent these instruments achieved complete free movement of judgments in their
respective fields. The discussion of the existing legislation provides a basis for Chap.
3, which examines the consequences of the abolition of obstacles to free movement
of civil judgments for the protection of the right to a fair trial.
2.2 Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the EU:
2.2.1 Free Movement of Judgments and the Internal Market
Free movement of civil judgments means that parties are able to invoke a judgment
in a civil case in a state other than the state where it was delivered. This requires
that recognition of the judgment is possible, and that enforcement of the judgment
is facilitated. Recognition of a foreign judgment means that its legal effects may be
relied on. An example of this may be where a judgment from one state establishes
that the seizure of goods was unlawful, and is invoked to claim damages for the
unlawful seizure in another state.1 Enforcement means that the judgment creditor
may take measures, assisted by an enforcement authority such as a bailiff if
necessary, to ensure that he indeed receives what the judgment awarded him: for
example by attaching a bank account. In this research, free movement of
judgments refers to the facilitation, to the greatest extent possible, of cross-border
recognition and enforcement, by EU legislation. Complete free movement means
that judgments are recognized and can be enforced across borders without the
interested parties needing to surmount any procedural obstacles.
Free movement of civil judgments across national borders is essential to
fostering international trade and to facilitating the free movement of persons
across borders. It is especially important in the EU, an internal market in which
goods, people and capital move freely across its Member States. Early on, it
was realized that international trade within the Union would be greatly aided if
the rights arising out of legal relationships concluded across borders could be
adequately recognized and enforced throughout the Union. If a judgment resulting
CJEU Case C-681/13 Diageo Brands v Simiramida-04 EOOD ECLI:EU:C:2015:471.
from a trade conflict could not be recognized or enforced over a debtor’s assets
in another Member State, this would greatly discourage parties from entering
into cross-border trade relationships. Effective mechanisms for cross-border
recognition and enforcement are therefore a prerequisite for international trade.
The benefits of securing cross-border recognition and enforcement are not limited
to the interests of the parties involved. As summed up by Michaels:
Parties are interested in transnational legal certainty and in avoiding repeated litigation
and conflicting decisions; the general public has an interest in avoiding resources spent on
re-litigation and in international decisional harmonies; and States have a common interest
in promoting inter-State transactions.2
Facilitating cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting
from civil and commercial cases has therefore long been on the European legislative agenda. The founding Treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC
Treaty) already contained a provision requiring the Member States to enter into
negotiations in order to “simplify formalities governing the reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.”3
In 1959 the Commission of the European Economic Community invited the
then six Member States to enter into such negotiations. In its letter, it stated that:
[A] true internal market between the six States will be achieved only if adequate legal protection can be secured. The economic life of the Community may be subject to disturbances and difficulties unless it is possible, where necessary by judicial means, to ensure
the recognition and enforcement of the various rights arising from the existence of a multiplicity of legal relationships. As jurisdiction in both civil and commercial matters is
derived from the sovereignty of Member States, and since the effect of judicial acts is
confined to each national territory, legal protection and, hence, legal certainty in the
common market are essentially dependent on the adoption by the Member States of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement of judgments.4
The Member States entered into such negotiations, which resulted in the first
EU instrument regulating jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement: the
Commercial Matters,5 or the ‘Brussels Convention’, signed by the then six
Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) on 27 September
1968.6 The Brussels Convention applied to most types of civil and commercial
matters, excepting family matters, insolvency proceedings, social security, and
Michaels (2009) para 1.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 1957, OJ 25 March 1957,
4 Jenard (1979) p. 3.
5 Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done at Brussels on 27 September 1968 (‘Brussels
6 The Lugano Convention extends the Brussels regime to three EFTA Member States:
Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters, done at Lugano on 16 September 1988.
Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the EU …
arbitration. The introduction of rules on jurisdiction is understandable considering
that jurisdiction of the court of origin is a common prerequisite for recognition and
enforcement in many national legal systems.7
One of the most important elements of the Convention was the introduction of a
common procedure for obtaining a declaration of enforceability (exequatur), in the
Member State where enforcement was sought, of the judgments falling within its
scope. The introduction of this procedure was important because it greatly reduced
the procedural steps interested parties would need to take in order to have their
judgments enforced in other EU Member States. Prior to the introduction of this
common procedure, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments was either
governed by national procedural law—and therefore different in each state—or
governed by bi-or multilateral treaties.8 In some states enforcement of foreign
judgments was very difficult, if not almost impossible, necessitating complicated
procedural steps. What was revolutionary about the newly introduced regime for
recognition and enforcement was that it guaranteed, to the furthest extent possible,
the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and created a simple and uniform
procedure for obtaining recognition. All judgments were recognized automatically,9
which meant that the effects of the judgment could be relied on in all EU Member
States without any procedural steps being necessary. As for enforcement, the
Convention provided for both ‘judgment import’ and ‘judgment inspection’. In
order to enforce a judgment from one Member State in another Member State a
declaration of enforceability had to be obtained: the exequatur.10 The exequatur
effectively imported the foreign judgment into the legal order of the Member State
where enforcement was sought.
The Brussels Convention balanced this simple procedure for cross-border
enforcement, which greatly benefited judgment creditors, with protection for judgment debtors: it allowed Member States to refuse recognition or enforcement if
one of a number of specific refusal grounds applied (judgment inspection). The
introduction of common refusal grounds became a standard feature of EU legislation in the field, as they provided protection of the debtor’s (and other interested
parties’) rights, while also being narrowly defined and thus providing clarity on
the grounds on which recognition or enforcement could be refused. The Brussels
Convention authorized Member States to refuse recognition or enforcement if such
recognition or enforcement would be ‘contrary to public policy in the State in
which recognition is sought’ (Article 27(1)). The concept of public policy or ordre
public, which is discussed in detail further on,11 encompasses principles that are
For example France (Rosner (2004) p. 233); Germany (Section 328(1) Zivilprozessordnung)
Switzerland (Article 26 Federal Statute on Private International Law).
8 Of course this is still the case for judgments falling outside the scope of European Union
legislation. See for an historical overview Berglund (2009).
9 Article 26, Brussels Convention.
10 Article 31, Brussels Convention.
11 Section 3.2.
deemed to be of fundamental importance in the legal order of the Member State
where enforcement is sought. As the next chapter shows, the public policy exception has proved instrumental in protecting the debtor’s right to a fair trial.
The debtor’s procedural rights were also protected by the another ground for
refusal, improper service in default proceedings. Recognition or enforcement
could be refused where the judgment was given in default of appearance, if the
defendant was not duly served with the document that instituted the proceedings,
or with an equivalent document, in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his
defence (Article 27(2)). Recognition or enforcement could also be refused for
judgments that were irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the
same parties in the State in which recognition was sought, or a judgment given in
a third state, provided it involved the same cause of action and the same parties
and fulfilled the conditions necessary for its recognition in the state addressed
(Articles 27(3) and (5)).12
The early Treaties on the European (Economic) Community did not give the
European Community (EC) the capacity to pass legislation on free movement of
judgments, which is why the first instrument within the context of the EU was a
convention concluded by its Member States. This changed with the 1993 Treaty of
Maastricht, which created the first legal basis for the European institutions to
legislate in this field under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. The 1997
Treaty of Amsterdam then moved this legal basis to Title IV of the EC Treaty.13
This enabled the EC to pass legislation on these matters if necessary to guarantee
free movement, and firmly entrenched judicial cooperation in the framework of the
internal market. It also meant that legislation on cooperation in the field of civil
justice could now take the form of EC regulations.
For the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments, this meant that
the Brussels Convention was replaced by a regulation. On 1 March 2002,
Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, or the ‘Brussels I Regulation’,
entered into force.14 This regulation simplified the procedure for obtaining an exe-
12 Article 27(4) is not discussed here because it was removed when the Convention became a
Regulation and therefore was not a factor in the discussion on the abolition of refusal grounds.
Article 27(4) allowed recognition or enforcement to be refused if the court of the State of origin,
in order to arrive at its judgment, has decided a preliminary question concerning the status or
legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship,
wills or succession in a way that conflicts with a rule of the private international law of the
State in which the recognition is sought, unless the same result would have been reached by the
application of the rules of private international law of that State.
13 Under the current Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) judicial cooperation in civil matters is based on Title V (Articles 67–89) of Part III (Consolidated version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 83/47). With the adoption of the Lisbon
Treaty in 2009 the European Union has replaced and succeeded the European Community.
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, OJ L 12/1 (the ‘Brussels I Regulation’).
2.2 Free Movement of Civil Judgments in the EU …
quatur: whereas under the Brussels Convention the court in the Member State
where enforcement was requested could review the grounds for refusal at the
judgment import stage, before it issued a declaration of enforceability, under the
Brussels I Regulation this review was no longer possible.15 This meant that a declaration of enforceability would be issued after a check of only formal requirements. The party against whom enforcement was sought would then have to take
the initiative to invoke the refusal grounds, in either an application for refusal of
the declaration of enforceability, or incidentally in another procedure.16 The
Brussels I Regulation thus clearly distinguished between a judgment import and a
judgment inspection stage.
Furthermore, two of the grounds for refusal were limited: the Brussels I
Regulation codified the limitation on public policy17 introduced by the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its case law.18 Recognition or enforcement could now only be refused in case of a ‘manifest’ incompatibility with public
policy. The Brussels I Regulation also limited the application of the ground for
refusal of undue service upon the defendant in case of a default judgment19 so that
it no longer applied in cases where the defendant did not lodge an appeal even
though he was able to do so. This increased legal certainty for the creditor.20
The creation of a Europe without internal borders did not just facilitate crossborder trade, but also the movement of individuals (such as workers and students),
families and property. This meant that the recognition of other legal claims across
borders became increasingly important. The harmonized procedure for recognition
and enforcement devised in the Brussels system was therefore transposed (with
some specifics) to a number of instruments in specific areas of civil justice. Most
of these are found in the area of family law. The mechanism for recognition
and enforcement of the Brussels system thus became a standard feature of EU
instruments on civil justice cooperation. However, the introduction of mutual
recognition in 1999 brought about radical reforms of this mechanism.
2.2.2 The Introduction of Mutual Recognition
The development of EU policies on judicial cooperation gathered momentum with
the introduction of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. Created by the
1992 Maastricht Treaty, this policy area encompasses police and judicial
Article 41, first sentence, Brussels I Regulation.
Article 43 Brussels I Regulation.
Article 34(1) Brussels I Regulation.
See in more detail Sect. 3.2.5.
Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention.
cooperation in criminal matters as well as judicial cooperation in civil matters. It
became more prominent after the Treaty of Amsterdam intensified cooperation in
criminal matters within the Third Pillar (Justice and Home Affairs), increasing
openness and accountability,21 while cooperation in civil matters was moved to the
Community pillar entirely. The area of freedom, security and justice was the topic
of the 1999 European Council in Tampere. In its Conclusions,22 the Presidency of
the European Council introduced the principle of mutual recognition as the cornerstone for cooperation in this area.23 The implementation of mutual recognition
meant that intermediate steps necessary for the enforcement of judgments across
borders would need to be reduced.24 The introduction of this principle therefore
led to a new policy goal: the abolition of the requirement for an exequatur and
reform of the grounds for refusal, for all types of civil cases.
The implementation of this plan started in 2004 with the adoption of the
EEO.25 The EEO regulation authorizes the court of origin of a judgment resulting
from an uncontested claim to certify the judgment as an EEO. This Order is then
enforceable throughout the EU without an exequatur being required and without
any possibility for refusing its recognition or enforcement. The regulation applies
only to uncontested claims and is intended to reduce the delay and expenses associated with the need for an exequatur.26
The EEO paved the way for two unprecedented uniform European procedures:
the European Order for Payment Procedure (EOP),27 and the European Small
Claims Procedure (ESCP).28 These instruments do not require an exequatur, but
result in decisions that are immediately enforceable throughout the EU. Instead of
refusal grounds, they contain minimum standards that are intended to safeguard
the procedural rights of the debtors. All three instruments are available only in
civil or commercial matters that have cross-border implications. Their purpose,
according to their recitals, is to increase speed and reduce costs in cross-border
Craig and De Bùrca (2015) p. 966.
Tampere European Council, 15–16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions (the ‘Tampere
Conclusions’).
23 Tampere Conclusions, para 33. See Storskrubb (2016). See in general on the topic of mutual
recognition Janssens (2013), Thunberg Schunke (2013), Ouwerkerk (2011), Thomas (2013).
24 See Sect. 2.1.3 of this chapter.
25 Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, OJ L 134/15 (the
‘EEO Regulation’).
26 Recital 9, EEO Regulation.
27 Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December
2006 creating a European Order for Payment Procedure, OJ L 399/1 (the ‘EOP Regulation’). See
Sect. 2.2.7.
28 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007
establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199/1 (the ‘ESCP Regulation’). See
Sect. 2.3.7.
litigation. While the EEO and EOP seek to facilitate commercial litigation, the
ESCP is primarily aimed at consumer cases.
Having achieved complete free movement of judgments in these three instruments, the European legislature pursued this goal for the Brussels I Regulation.
As opposed to the three instruments discussed above, which are optional and have
a limited scope, the Brussels I Regulation applies to most civil judgments and is
mandatory. The proposed abolition of exequatur and refusal grounds under this
instrument therefore met with more resistance than the introduction of the three
The proposal for reform of Brussels I was buttressed by the finding of the 2007
Heidelberg Report29 that the exequatur procedure of the Brussels I Regulation had
functioned quite efficiently, given that in 90 % of cases a declaration of enforceability
was granted and that it was seldom challenged successfully. The European
Commission, in its 2009 Green Paper on the Review of Brussels I,30 concluded on
the basis of these numbers that abolition of exequatur for all civil and commercial
matters would be feasible. In 2010 the Commission therefore submitted a proposal
for a recast31 of the Brussels I Regulation in which the exequatur was abolished. The
grounds for refusal would be narrowed, and their application redistributed among the
Member State of origin and the Member State of enforcement. The public policy
exception was to be replaced with a more narrow reference to ‘fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial’. The 2010 Proposal also entailed a redistribution of the authority to apply refusal grounds between the Member State of origin
and the Member State of enforcement: the ground for refusal of undue service upon
the defendant in case of a default judgment (Article 34(2) of Brussels I) would be
applicable only in the Member State of origin.32
The 2010 Commission Proposal provoked much discussion on the value of the
exequatur and the grounds for refusal. From the reactions to the 2009 Green Paper,
it was clear that abolition of the exequatur was generally supported, but that
reform or abolition of the refusal grounds was not.33 The recast Regulation
29 Hess et al. (2007) p. 221. The findings of this report are discussed in more detail in
Sect. 2.2.4.
30 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2009) 175
31 Recasting is a legislative technique that involves bringing together in a single new act a legislative act and all the amendments made to it. The new act passes through the full legislative
process and repeals all the acts being recast. Apart from codification, recasting involves new substantive changes, as amendments are made to the original act during preparation of the recast
text. See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/recasting_en.htm, last visited 06 March 2016.
32 See Zilinsky (2011) para 2.3.
33 Oberhammer (2010); see the contributions to the consultation on the 2009 Green Paper on the
review of Regulation 44/2001, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/
news_consulting_0002_en.htm, from Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Denmark; Finland; Germany;
less clearly, Greece; Latvia; Lithuania; Malta; Slovenia; and the UK.
1215/2012,34 which entered into force on 10 January 2015,35 indeed abolished the
exequatur as it existed under Brussels I. All that is needed for enforcement today is
a certificate issued by the court of origin, but this only serves to provide
information to the enforcement authorities and does not as such constitute an
enforceable title. The grounds for refusal however remain intact.36
The introduction of mutual recognition also had a profound impact in the field
of family law. Regulation 2201/2003 (the Brussels II bis Regulation),37 which facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and
matters of parental responsibility, allowed for complete free movement of judgments ordering the return of a child in order to simplify and speed up the return of
a child in cases of abduction.38 An exequatur is still required for custody orders.39
A 2014 report by the European Commission expressed a clear intention to pursue
the further abolition of exequatur for judgments in the field of family law.40
The 2009 Maintenance Regulation also abolished exequatur and refusal grounds
for maintenance orders.41 According to the proposal for the regulation, the reasons for
proposing abolition of exequatur were (1) simplifying the citizen’s life, (2) strengthening legal certainty, and (3) ensuring effectiveness and continuity of recovery.42
34 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
Commercial Matters (recast) OJ L 351/1 (the ‘Brussels I bis Regulation’).
35 In accordance with its decision to implement it Regulation 1215/2012 will also be applicable
in Denmark. Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on
OJ L 79/4, 31 March 2013.
36 See under 2.3.3.
37 Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, OJ L 338/1 (the ‘Brussels II bis Regulation’. This instrument replaced Regulation 1347/2000,
or the Brussels II Regulation, which was the first piece of EC legislation in the field of private
international law in family matters (other than maintenance) and was therefore considered a
landmark (see (Stone 2006) p. 384); Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in
matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses, OJ L 160/19.
38 Regulation 2201/2003, Recital 17. See also Jänterä-Jareborg (2003) p. 205; see on the free
movement of judgments in these matters Sect. 2.2.5.
39 Regulation 2201/2003, Articles 21–52.
40 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European
Economic and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial
matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000,
COM (2014) 225 final, pp. 10–11.
41 Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 of 18 December 2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L7/1 (the ‘Maintenance Regulation’).
42 See Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, COM
(2005) 649 final, pp. 4–6.
The recast Insolvency Regulation43 allows for enforcement of judgments opening
insolvency proceedings by incorporating the mechanism of the Brussels I bis
Regulation.44 Exequatur has therefore been abolished for these types of judgments.
The recast Insolvency Regulation includes one refusal ground (the public policy
exception).45
The 2012 Regulation on Wills and Succession46 still contains an exequatur procedure for decisions in matters relating to succession (Chapter IV); as do two proposals47 for regulations on matrimonial property48 and property consequences of
registered partnerships.49 In the text of these proposals, the Commission points out
that an exequatur procedure is deemed necessary because the proposals are a first
step in the harmonization of property regimes resulting from marriage or registered partnerships,50 but that abolition will become an option once these instruments have been evaluated.51
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, OJ L 160/1.
Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2015/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) 2012/0360 (COD) LEX 1607, PE-CONS 31/15
(not yet published in the Official Journal) (‘recast Insolvency Regulation’).
45 Article 33 of the recast Insolvency Regulation.
46 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and
Certificate of Succession.
47 These two Proposals were not adopted after a failure to reach political agreement. Instead, in
March 2016 the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Council decision authorising
enhanced cooperation on these topics. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision
authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition
and enforcement of decisions on the property regimes of international couples, covering both
matters of matrimonial property regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM (2016) 108 final.
48 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement
of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM (2011) 126 final.
49 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM (2011)
127 final.
50 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM (2011) 126 final, para 5.4;
Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of
decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM (2011) 127 final,
para 5.4.
51 The European Parliament was of the opinion that the exequatur procedure should indeed
be retained for these procedures given their complexity. (European Parliament, Report on
the proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and
enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes (COM(2011)0126—
C7-0093/2011—2011/0059(CNS)) Committee on Legal Affairs, rapporteur: Alexandra Thein,
The latest instrument based on mutual recognition is the European Account
Preservation Order (EAPO).52 It is an instrument that allows creditors to preserve
the amount owed in a debtor’s bank account. The EAPO exists as an alternative to
national procedures for cross-border cases. It is an ex parte procedure, which
means the debtor is not notified of the application for the EAPO. The EAPO can
be requested from a court in the Member State that has jurisdiction over the substance of the matter (Article 6(1)) or, where a judgment has already been obtained,
from the court in the Member State that issued the judgment (Article 6(3)). This
court shall issue the EAPO when the creditor has submitted sufficient evidence to
satisfy the court that there is an urgent need for a protective measure in the form of
a preservation order because there is a real risk that, without such a measure, the
subsequent enforcement of the creditor’s claim against the debtor will be impeded
or made substantially more difficult (Article 7(1)). When the EAPO has been
issued, it is recognized and enforceable in all other Member States without the
need for a declaration of enforceability (Article 22). There are no grounds for
refusal of recognition or enforcement in the Member State addressed, though the
debtor may apply to the court of origin of the EAPO, which may revoke or modify
it when the conditions set out in the regulation are not met; for instance, where the
Order was not served on him within 14 days of the preservation of his account or
accounts (Article 33(1)).
The EAPO facilitates cross-border debt recovery by offering a uniform instrument for account preservation. However, the EAPO is not a (final) judgment, but
rather a protective measure that is issued ex parte, without the defendant being
summoned to appear. Under Brussels I bis, such measures are already excluded
from the scope of the regime for recognition and enforcement, and therefore also
from the scope of the refusal grounds.53 The innovation of the EAPO is therefore
primarily that it provides a uniform and automatically enforceable provisional
measure, not that it contains no refusal grounds. Since it does not facilitate the
recognition and enforcement of judgments, it is outside the scope of this research.
The EAPO is however another example of the simplification of cross-border litigation in civil cases pursued by the European legislature and therefore worth
To conclude, considering the amount of legislation that has recently been
adopted in this field, it seems safe to say that the simplification of the regime for
cross-border recognition and enforcement of civil judgments in the EU will remain
a legislative priority for the future.
52 Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt
recovery in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 189/59.
53 Article 2(a) Brussels I bis Regulation. See CJEU Case 125/79 Denilauler v SNC Couchet
Frères, ECLI:EU:C:1980:130; see further under 2.3.1.1.
2.2.3 The Role of Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust
Under current legislation on civil justice cooperation within the EU, free movement of judgments is based on the principle of mutual recognition, which in turn
presupposes mutual trust. In order to understand how these principles function, it
is necessary to define them and explain how they have shaped the development of
legislation in the field of civil justice.
There is no widely accepted definition of mutual trust as of yet,54 but it generally refers to the confidence Member States have, or should have, in the functioning of each other’s legal systems. It is a matter for discussion whether mutual trust
in fact exists between the Member States, or whether it is assumed to exist in order
for EU legislation to function effectively. It is also a matter for discussion whether
mutual trust implies a blanket presumption that a fellow Member State’s legal system functions adequately or whether Member States are entitled to review, in specific cases, whether that trust is justified. These questions were the subject of a
number of highly important CJEU and ECtHR judgments, that are discussed in
Part II of this book.55
Mutual recognition can be seen as the practical application of mutual trust: if
one Member State trusts another, then it should recognize judicial decisions and
other acts of the other Member State without second-guessing whether it conforms
to its own national standards. Mutual recognition presupposes and is based on
mutual trust. Mutual recognition is a well-established mode of cooperation within
the European Union,56 and was first introduced by the CJEU in its seminal judgment Cassis de Dijon.57 In this judgment, which concerned the free movement of
goods between Member States, the CJEU ruled that goods lawfully marketed in
one Member State should, in