Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/895/615/46878/
Timestamp: 2019-10-17 23:07:37
Document Index: 290493915

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 3551', '§ 991', '§ 994', '§ 2113', '§ 994']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Bradley Scott Summers, Defendant-appellant, 895 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1990 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Bradley Scott Summers, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Bradley Scott Summers, Defendant-appellant, 895 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1990)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 895 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1990) Submitted Nov. 2, 1989. *Decided Feb. 5, 1990
Bradley Scott Summers appeals from an order sentencing him to 210 months imprisonment, with a three year term of supervised release, for bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Summers contends that the district court erred in refusing to apply the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility to career offenders. He also advances various constitutional challenges to the federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") that were promulgated pursuant to The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3625, 3673, 3742, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998. We uphold the constitutionality of the Guidelines and affirm the court's refusal to apply the reduction.
Chief Judge Panner, with the concurrence of the entire court, transferred all of the cases involving constitutional challenges to the Guidelines to Judge Burns. Oral argument was held on June 15, 1988. Judge Burns found the constitutional challenges invalid in an opinion issued June 30, 1988, United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Or. 1988).
Summers attacks the Guidelines on grounds that the function of the probation officer under the Guidelines is violative of separation of powers and denies due process. He similarly attacks the Temporary Order issued by the District Court for the District of Oregon on December 15, 1987. He also claims that the Guidelines violate due process by unduly restricting probation. These issues are identical to those raised by the defendant in United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1990), a companion case also decided by this court. For reasons stated in this court's opinion in Belgard, we reject Summers' constitutional challenges to the Guidelines and affirm the district court's decision.
Summers claims that the district court erred when it decided that career offenders are not entitled to a two point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. He, therefore, attacks the district court's construction of the Guidelines. Issues of statutory construction are questions of law that we review de novo. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S. Ct. 101, 83 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1984). That standard of review will be applied to construction of the Guidelines.
The circuit courts that have addressed this question disagree with the defendant. These courts have found that the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility does not apply to the career offender section. See United States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495, 498 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 713 (3d Cir. 1989). We agree with those circuits' interpretation of the Guidelines.
A proper construction of the Guidelines supports that interpretation. The instructions for the application of U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1 indicate that the trial judge's first task in imposing a sentence is to determine the offense level for that sentence. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1(a) and (b). This is done by examining the statute of conviction for the crime committed and comparing it to the table set out in the Guidelines. This level is then adjusted according to several factors, including the acceptance of responsibility reduction. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1(c). Thereafter, the court determines the defendant's criminal history category. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1(f). If the defendant, however, comes within the career offender provision of U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.1, then a new offense level is set and the criminal history category is VI. If the offense level under the career offender provision is greater than the offense level initially computed, then the offense level calculated under the career offender section controls. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.1. This helps to carry out the Congressional mandate stated in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) that the Commission should draft the Guidelines to ensure that career offenders receive at or near the maximum term authorized by statute. See United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 559 (9th Cir. 1989).2
Because we have held that the special assessment is an unconstitutional taxing device, we find that Summers is not required to pay the $50.00 assessment. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 48, 107 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1989).
Bank robbery carries a maximum sentence of 20 years. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)
Of course, before the amendment became effective it had to be presented to Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p)