Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104525/perrin-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-09-22 16:59:46
Document Index: 172446646

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1952', '§ 1952', '§ 1952', '§ 371', '§ 1', '§ 509']

Perrin Vs United States - Citation 104525 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
PerrIn Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104525
Case Number 444 U.S. 37
Appellant Perrin
perrin v. united states - 444 u.s. 37 (1979) u.s. supreme court perrin v. united states, 444 u.s. 37 (1979) perrin v. united states no. 78-959 argued october 3, 1979 decided november 27, 1979 444 u.s. 37 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit syllabus petitioner, with others, was indicted for violating and conspiring to violate the travel act, 18 u.s.c. § 1952, which makes it a federal offense to travel or use a facility in interstate commerce to commit, inter alia, "bribery . . . in violation of the laws of the state in which committed." petitioner and his codefendants were charged with using facilities of interstate commerce to promote a commercial bribery scheme in violation.....
Perrin v. United States - 444 U.S. 37 (1979)
U.S. Supreme Court Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979)
Held: Bribery of private employees prohibited by state criminal statutes violates the Travel Act. Pp. 444 U. S. 41 -50.
(a) By 1961, when the Act was enacted as part of a legislative program directed against "organized crime," the common understanding of "bribery" had extended beyond its early common law definitions limiting it to bribery of public officials. In 42 States and in federal legislation, "bribery" included the bribery of individuals acting in a private capacity. Pp. 444 U. S. 41 -45.
(b) The generic definition of bribery, rather than a narrow common law definition limited to public officials, was intended by Congress. References in the legislative history to the purposes and scope of the Travel Act, as well as other bills included in the package of "organized crime" legislation aimed at supplementing state enforcement, indicate that Members, Committees, and draftsmen used "bribery" to include payments to private individuals to influence their actions. Congress recognized in 1961 that bribery of private persons was widely used in highly organized criminal efforts to infiltrate and gain control of legitimate businesses, an area of special concern of Congress in enacting the Travel Act. Cf. United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S. 286 . Pp. 444 U. S. 45 -49.
reflects a clear and deliberate intent on Congress' part to alter the federal-state balance in order to reinforce state law enforcement. Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808 , distinguished. Pp. 444 U. S. 49 -50.
We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict [ Footnote 1 ] on whether commercial bribery of private employees prohibited by a state criminal statute constitutes "bribery . . . in violation of the laws of the State in which committed" within the meaning of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
Petitioner Vincent Perrin and four codefendants [ Footnote 2 ] were indicted in the Eastern District of Louisiana for violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and for conspiring to violate the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 371. The Travel Act provides in part:
The indictment charged that Perrin and his codefendants used the facilities of interstate commerce for the purpose of promoting a commercial bribery scheme in violation of the laws of the State of Louisiana. [ Footnote 3 ]
In late July, 1975, Perrin met with Willis, LaFont, and Levy. Perrin directed Willis to call a firm in Richmond, Tex., to obtain gravity maps to aid him in his evaluation. [ Footnote 4 ] After the meeting, Willis contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation and disclosed the details of the scheme. Willis agreed to permit conversations between himself and the other participants to be recorded. Forty-seven tapes were made, a large number of which were played to the jury.
affirmed Perrin's conviction, rejecting his contention that Congress intended "bribery" in the Act to include only bribery of public officials. The court also rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the Louisiana commercial bribery statute, to the sufficiency of the interstate nexus to establish jurisdiction under the Travel Act, [ Footnote 5 ] and to the failure of the trial judge to sever petitioner's trial from that of his codefendants. [ Footnote 6 ] 580 F.2d 730.
Petitioner argues that Congress intended "bribery" in the Travel Act to be confined to its common law definition, r.g., bribery of a public official. He contends that, because commercial bribery was not an offense at common law, the indictment fails to charge a federal offense. [ Footnote 7 ]
We begin with the language of the Travel Act itself. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397 , 442 U. S. 405 (1979); TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 , 437 U. S. 173 (1978). A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U. S. 575 , 420 U. S. 580 -581 (1975). Therefore, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term "bribery" at the time Congress enacted the statute in 1961. In light of Perrin's contentions, we consider
In this country, by the time the Travel Act was enacted in 1961, federal and state statutes had extended the term bribery well beyond its common law meaning. Although Congress chose not to enact a general commercial bribery statute, it perceived abuses in the areas it found required particular legislation. Federal statutes specifically using "bribery" in the sense of payments to private persons to influence their actions are the Transportation Act of 1940, 49 U.S.C. § 1(17)(b) (prohibiting the "bribery" of agents or employees of common carriers), and the 1960 Amendments to the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 509(a)(2) (prohibiting the "bribery" of television game show contestants). [ Footnote 8 ]
A similar enlargement of the term beyond its common law definition manifested itself in the states prior to 1961. Fourteen States had statutes which outlawed commercial bribery generally. [ Footnote 9 ] An additional 28 had adopted more narrow statutes outlawing corrupt payments to influence private duties in particular fields, including bribery of agents, common carrier and telegraph company employees, labor officials, bank employees, and participants in sporting events. [ Footnote 10 ]
In sum, by 1961, the common understanding and meaning of "bribery" had extended beyond its early common law definitions. In 42 States and in federal legislation, "bribery" included the bribery of individuals acting in a private capacity. [ Footnote 11 ] It was against this background that the Travel Act was passed.
On a previous occasion, we took note of the sparse legislative history of the Travel Act. Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808 , 401 U. S. 811 (1971). The record of the hearings and floor debates discloses that Congress made no attempt to define the statutory term "bribery," but relied on the accepted contemporary meaning. There are ample references to the bribery of state and local officials, but there is no indication that Congress intended to so limit its meaning. Indeed, references in the legislative history to the purposes and scope of the Travel Act, as well as other bills under consideration by Congress as part of the package of "organized crime" legislation aimed at supplementing state enforcement, indicate that
Indeed, the McClellan Committee in 1960, like the Kefauver Committee in 1950-1951, documented numerous specific instances of the use of commercial bribery by these organized groups to control legitimate businesses. The McClellan Committee, for example, reported that a particular "shylocking" operation began in New York when persons were able to obtain a substantial unsecured line of credit at a New York bank "by making gifts to two of the bank officials." Id. at 772-773. The Kefauver Committee explored, among numerous others, the relationship between a high-ranking official of the Ford Motor Co. and persons believed to be members of organized illegal groups. Its evidence suggested that organized crime had exploited that relationship to obtain Ford dealerships and hauling contracts. Third Interim Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, S.Rep. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 75 (1951). See also id. at 160-161 (expressing concern about "corruption of college basketball players who could be talked into controlling the score of a game"). [ Footnote 12 ]
393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 29 . We are similarly persuaded that the generic definition of bribery, rather than a narrow common law definition, was intended by Congress. [ Footnote 13 ]
Petitioner also contends that a broad interpretation of the meaning of bribery will have serious federalism implications. He relies particularly on Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808 (1971). See also United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336 , 404 U. S. 349 -350 (1971). The factual setting in Rewis was very different from this case. There, we were confronted with a Travel Act prosecution of the proprietors of a gambling establishment located a few miles south of the Georgia-Florida state line. There was no evidence that Rewis had employed interstate facilities to conduct his numbers operation; moreover, he could not readily identify which customers had crossed state lines. The District Court had instructed the jury that, if it found that third persons traveled from Georgia
401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 812 .
Our analysis leads us to reject the application of the maxim of statutory construction that ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81 , 349 U. S. 83 (1955). Although Bell states the general rule in cases where the courts are faced with genuine ambiguity, the rule of lenity applies " when we are uncertain about the statute's meaning,'" and is "`not to be used in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.'" United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371 , 435 U. S. 379 (1978), quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563 , 431 U. S. 577 (1977). Nardello leaves little room for uncertainty about the statute's meaning.