Source: http://case-summaries.wisconsinappeals.net/terminationOfParental.htm
Timestamp: 2020-02-28 00:21:21
Document Index: 617086048

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 37', '§ 806', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 801', '§ 802', '§ 802', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 48', '§ 972']

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, CHIPS, PATERNITIES Updated 1/27/10
TPR – Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) – Applicability: Not Limited to Physical Custody
For Luis R.: Devon M. Lee, SPD, Madison Appellate
TPR – Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) – “Qualified Expert Witnesses” Requirement
TPR – Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) – Burden of Proof
TPR – No Contest Plea, Withdrawal of – Prima Facie Showing re: Grounds
For Therese S.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
TPR – No Contest Plea, Withdrawal of – Prima Facie Showing re: Potential Disposition
¶8 Regarding the first alleged deficiency, it is undisputed that the circuit court never established on the record whether Therese understood she would be found unfit to parent as a result of her plea. Therese contends the circuit court was required to inform her of this direct consequence because Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) required the court to find Therese unfit.
Manitowoc County HSD v. Allen J., 2008 WI App 137
For Allen J.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate
¶1 Allen J. appeals from orders terminating his parental rights to his children, Brandon [1] and Stephanie J. He argues that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial because the court, rather than the jury, answered one of the verdict questions on an element of parental unfitness. Allen’s counsel had stipulated that the element was satisfied, but Allen argues that he did not personally agree to withdraw his jury demand on the element. We put this appeal on hold pending the supreme court’s resolution of Walworth County DHHS v. Andrea L.O., 2008 WI 46, __ Wis. 2d __, 749 N.W.2d 168. In that case, the supreme court held that the parties’ stipulation to one element of parental unfitness did not constitute a withdrawal of a jury trial demand because the jury, rather than the court, answered the verdict question and there was ample evidence to support the element. Id., ¶3. The court went on to hold that even if the stipulation had been a withdrawal of the jury trial demand on the element, it was not error for the circuit court not to hold a personal colloquy with the defendant where the defendant personally agreed to the stipulation in open court, the stipulation was to a single, undisputed, paper element, and there was ample uncontroverted evidence to support the stipulated element. Id., ¶4.
For Andrea L.O.: Suzanne Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate
¶6 There are four elements to this ground for termination. First, the child must have been placed out of the home for a cumulative total of more than six months pursuant to court orders containing the termination of parental rights notice. Second, the County Department of Social Services must have made a reasonable effort to provide services ordered by the court. Third, the parent must fail to meet the conditions established in the order for the safe return of the child to the parent's home. Fourth, there must be a substantial likelihood that the parent will not meet the conditions of safe return of the child within the 12-month period following the conclusion of the termination hearing. [3]
The court approvingly analogizes to State v. Charles J. Benoit, 229 Wis.2d 630, 600 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1999) (stipulation to burglary element of nonconsent didn't amount to waiver of right to jury determination of the element where jury instructed to accept any stipulation as conclusively proven, but also instructed that guilt required finding nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt).
¶34 Although N.E. and S.B. concern withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial, they are distinguishable from the facts presented here. In each of those cases, a party's attorney withdrew a prior demand for a jury trial while the defendant was not present. In N.E., the attorney did not consult with the juvenile before withdrawing the demand, and in S.B., the attorney withdrew the demand without S.B.'s knowledge or consent. Here, however, the stipulation between the parties took place in Andrea's presence. Moreover, Andrea's attorney asked her in open court whether she understood the issue and whether she was willing to stipulate that Junior was adjudged in need of protection or services and that he had been placed out of her home for six months or more. Andrea answered yes.
¶35 A second important difference between the present case and N.E. and S.B. is that this case does not involve a complete withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial. The parties agreed to stipulate to one element of the ground for termination, but the demand for a jury trial on the other three elements was unaffected. Importantly, Andrea's focus in the case was not on the first element. Her attorney admitted that the first element was "not seriously in dispute." Rather, he explained that the focus was on the fourth element, that is, whether there was a substantial likelihood that Andrea would not meet the conditions for return within a year. In contrast, N.E. and S.B. involved the withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial on all elements, rather than a stipulation regarding a single element that was not in dispute.
¶55 Nonetheless, while we do not require it, we urge that circuit courts in TPR proceedings consider personally engaging the parent in a colloquy explaining that a stipulation to an element withdraws that element from the jury's consideration and determining that the withdrawal of that element from the jury is knowing and voluntary. Although no personal colloquy is required here because Andrea received a jury trial, we have not addressed whether it would be required in other contexts.
¶56 Termination of parental rights proceedings are "among the most severe forms of state action" that involve the "'awesome authority of the State to destroy permanently all legal recognition.'" Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996). We have previously determined that such proceedings may "require heightened legal safeguards against erroneous decisions." Oneida County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, ¶32, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652 (quoting Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21)).
The court thus explicitly declines to address the “broad question posed by the court of appeals” in its certification request, which is as follows (¶¶27-28): <"Does the rationale and holding of N.E. v. DHSS, a juvenile case arising out of Wis. Stat. ch. 48 (2003-04), govern a termination of parental rights (TPR) case such that a parent must personally withdraw his or her prior demand for a jury trial?"
“Meaningful Participation” by Remote Webcam
Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16
For Teodoro E.: Ann T. Bowe; Leslie E. Schmerin
Parental Responsibility / Fitness, § 48.415(6) – Relevance of Father’s Conduct After Discovery He Is Child’s Father
State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, reversing summary order
¶5 For the reasons set forth, we hold that in determining whether a party seeking termination of parental rights has proven by clear and convincing evidence that a biological father has failed to assume parental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), a circuit court must consider the biological father's efforts undertaken after he discovers that he is the father but before the circuit court adjudicates the grounds of the termination proceeding. Thus the circuit court in the instant case proceeded under an erroneous interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, the facts were not fully developed; to the extent facts were developed, these facts and their import are in dispute. The parties disputed whether Bobby G. assumed parental responsibility after he learned of his paternity but before adjudication of the grounds for termination. Accordingly, with facts in dispute, the circuit court erred as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment. Moreover, Bobby G. requested a jury trial, which the circuit court denied because it erroneously found no material facts or inferences therefrom in dispute. Neither the circuit court nor this court can deprive Bobby G. of a jury trial by deciding the factual dispute. [6]
[6] A circuit court may direct a verdict in the grounds phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding. Door County DHFS v. Scott S., 230 Wis. 2d 460, 465, 602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999).
The opinion weighs in at 71 pages, ¶155¶¶, much of it consumed by lengthy recitation of the legislative history. In any event, if you provide TPR representation you’ll want to read the whole thing. If there’s a meta-message it might be: just because summary judgment is authorized doesn’t mean it’s favored.
¶90 Bobby G.'s responses to the State's interrogatories should have alerted the circuit court that Bobby G. was trying to establish a parental relationship with Marquette after he had reason to believe that he was Marquette's father. Summary judgment was inappropriate because material facts were presented disputing the State's claim that Bobby G. never assumed parental responsibility for Marquette.
And very much relatedly: “The legislature expressly intended to protect, whenever appropriate, the biological family unit,” ¶57. If there’s any doubt on these points, chew on the opening lines of the dissent:
¶111 Could a cocaine- pushing, woman-battering man, who does not even know about the existence of his child, have accepted and exercised "significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child"? Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (2003-04).
¶112 If that is too close of a call, consider the same question, only the person admitted he never exercised responsibility for the daily supervision of the child, never exercised responsibility for the education of the child, never paid child support, and never met the child. Plus, he has been incarcerated for the vast majority of the child's life.
¶113 The circuit court answered no. Such a person has not assumed parental responsibility pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6). The majority concludes the circuit court erred. "[T]he circuit court in the instant case proceeded under an erroneous interpretation of the statute" by failing to "consider the biological father's efforts undertaken after he discover[ed] that he is the father but before the circuit court adjudicate[d] the grounds of the termination proceeding." Majority op., ¶5.
¶114 The plain language of the Children's Code contradicts the majority's interpretation of § 48.415(6). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent
¶19 Dyanne acknowledges that the CHIPS order makes reference to “warnings” and contains the statutory language defining the possible grounds for termination. She also does not dispute that the order contains the conditions that were necessary for Artavia’s return. Dyanne’s argument is limited to an assertion that the order fails to sufficiently connect the warning language to the statutory language. She asserts: “what is missing is relevance of the statutory language at the end of the [CHIPS] dispositional order.” Dyanne states: “There is no bridging language to put the statutory language in context. There is nothing to tell the parent ‘If you fail to do this, your parental rights could be terminated.’”
¶21 Dyanne apparently reads M.P. to require an explanatory provision like the one quoted in M.P. Although such a provision may be helpful and advisable, we agree with the department that the CHIPS order in this case is sufficient under Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).
TPR -- Partial Summary Judgment (as to Fact-Finding Hearing) – Basis and Proof – Prior TPR, Grounds for
Oneida Co. DSS v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, affirming unpublished decision
For Nicole W.: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether partial summary judgment against Nicole was properly granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) (prior involuntary TPR within 3 years) when the prior termination order did not state the explicit § 48.415 ground relied on.
¶2 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(b) does not require proof of which § 48.415 ground was relied upon for a prior termination of parental rights because the phrase, "on one or more of the grounds specified in this section," in § 48.415(10)(b) refers to proving only that the prior termination was an involuntary termination. …
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(10)(b) does not require proof of which of the available 12 grounds set out in § 48.415 was the basis for the involuntary termination because the phrase, "on one or more of the grounds specified in this section," is meant as only a general directive that assures the termination of rights was involuntary. In regard to the sufficiency of a prior order that can be used as grounds under § 48.415(10), there is no need for the order to specify which ground was employed, as any of the grounds set out in § 48.415 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of paragraph (10)(b). [9] …
[9] Of course the issue may be different if the termination of Nicole's parental rights to Rockey were being appealed. In that case, the reviewing court could be asked to ascertain whether sufficient proof was admitted by the circuit court to support the court's determination that a specific ground was proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, an appeal of the termination of Nicole's parental rights to Rockey is not before us.
TPR -- Prior TPR as Grounds, Based on Default Judgment
Issue: Whether partial summary judgment against Nicole was properly granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) (prior involuntary TPR within 3 years) when the prior termination order was based on her default for failing to personally appear at the fact-finding hearing.
¶27 We agree with the court of appeals that to require more evidence than a prior involuntary termination order to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) would be tantamount to permitting a collateral attack on the prior order. A collateral attack on a judgment is "an attempt to avoid, evade, or deny the force and effect of a judgment in an indirect manner and not in a direct proceeding prescribed by law and instituted for the purpose of vacating, reviewing, or annulling it." Zrimsek, 8 Wis. 2d 1, 3 (citing 5 Callaghan's, Bryant, Wisconsin Pleading and Practice (3d ed.), p. 373, § 37.97). [12]
¶28 In general, "a judgment is binding on the parties and may not be attacked in a collateral action unless it was procured by fraud." State v. Madison, 120 Wis. 2d 150, 154, 353 N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1984) ….
¶33 … (W)e have applied Sixth Amendment concepts in the context of termination of parental rights proceedings, even though the proceedings are civil in nature and the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings.
¶34 When a claim of denial of the right of counsel is made, the claimant has the burden to make a prima facie showing of a violation of the right to counsel. …
¶35 However, we need not determine whether the prior Waukesha County termination of rights order may be collaterally attacked due to a violation of the right to counsel because Nicole made no prima facie showing that she was denied the right of counsel in the termination of rights proceeding regarding Rockey. …
TPR – Default as Sanction for Failure to Appear
Issue/Holding: ¶13 n. 3:
The circuit court did not order a default under Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5). Shirley E. had "appeared" at the hearing by her attorney. Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶17, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.
The circuit court found Shirley E. in default as a sanction for failing to comply with its order to attend a hearing in person. Before a circuit court may enter a default on the ground that a party failed to comply with a court order, the party's conduct must be egregious or in bad faith. Evelyn C.R., 2001 WI 110, ¶17, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768; Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 276, 470 N.W.2d 859, 878-79 (1991). The circuit court made no finding that Shirley E.'s conduct was egregious or in bad faith before finding her in default. The circuit court ordered the sanction of default on March 8, 2005 ——the first time Shirley E. failed to appear in person after being ordered to do so on February 14, 2004. Shirley E. ultimately failed to attend personally three other hearings in a five month period; her attorney attended all of them. The circuit court failed to consider Shirley E.'s attorney's explanations about why Shirley E. was not present in person, including difficulty of coming to Wisconsin from out of the state, her status as a parolee, and her lack of funds. A circuit court has discretion in imposing a sanction for noncompliance with an order but must make the appropriate findings to support a sanction of default.
Issue: “(W)hether a circuit court may deny a parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding the statutory right to counsel when the parent has appeared in the proceeding but failed to personally attend a hearing in contravention of a court order and is found in default as a sanction for disobeying the court order.” (¶2)
Good, concise prefatory discussion re: right to counsel, ¶¶31-38, as well in as in the succeeding ¶¶. For that matter, entire discussion suffused with necessity for adversarial input. Note, though, the 3-Justice concurrence (more accurately described as partial dissent) which agrees with need for reversal as to disposition but would uphold default as to grounds, ¶¶66-85. Shirley E. thus prevailed by the skin of her teeth, but more importantly the “concurrence” identifies the significance of the majority holding, close though the vote might have been:
¶83 The gist of the majority opinion is to reaffirm the decision in Evelyn C.R. that a circuit court has no inherent or statutory authority to enter a true default judgment as a sanction in a termination of parental rights case. It must always take evidence to support the judgment and make findings on the requisite burden of proof. But more important, the decision determines that the failure of a parent to appear in person may not be sanctioned to limit the role of the parent's attorney in the fact-finding proceedings. The attorney may challenge the state's evidence by motion, objection, or cross-examination, or present alternative evidence, and even demand a jury trial. [46] A parent's defiance or indifference, as reflected in the parent's consistent non-appearance in court, does not work any forfeiture of the parent's rights.
TPR – Right to Counsel, Waiver
¶57 The State also argues that Shirley E., a parent over 18 years of age, has waived her right to counsel by not appearing personally. We can quickly dismiss this argument. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2) explicitly requires that any waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary. As we determined in M.W. v. Monroe County Department of Human Services, it is "the duty of the court to determine by careful questioning that the waiver of counsel[ ]. . . is knowledgeable and voluntary." [38] The circuit court conducted no such inquiry here.
Voluntariness of Plea to Grounds for Termination, Procedure for Challenging – Generally
Kenosha Co. DHS v. Jodi W. 2006 WI 93, reversing summary order
For Jodi W.: Joseph W. Voiland, Lewis W. Beilin, Rebecca E. Frihart (Pro Bono Project)
Issue/Holding: The circuit court must undertake a colloquy with the parent tracking § 48.422(7); the parent must know the rights being waived; and on a challenge to the plea the parent must make a prima facie showing that the colloquy was defective and also allege a lack of understanding of the omitted information, ¶¶25-26, citing State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) and Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607.
Typically, of course, where the plea is under review the parent filed a motion to withdraw plea but in this instance the case arrived at the appellate level via a no-merit report without a trial-level motion to withdraw plea. The court nonetheless perceives no procedural impediment to review, ¶¶27-28.
Voluntariness of Plea to Grounds for Termination – Apparent Confusion of Parent
Issue/Holding: The trial court failure to address numerous alterations made by the parent to the written plea questionnaire which created discrepancies with respect to the plea, and further failure to resolve the parent’s equivocations during the oral plea colloquy established that the parent’s no contest plea to grounds for TPR was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, ¶¶29-38.
Substantive Due Process – Grounds for Termination – Impossible to Meet Condition for Return
Issue: Whether finding of parental unfitness in a TPR, grounded on a condition for the child’s return that was impossible to meet when imposed (namely that the parent set up a suitable residence within 12 months even though she was incarcerated and would not be released before then), violates substantive due process.
¶49 Like the Nevada Supreme Court, we similarly conclude that a parent's incarceration does not, in itself, demonstrate that the individual is an unfit parent. See J.L.N., 55 P.3d at 956. We further conclude that a parent's failure to fulfill a condition of return due to his or her incarceration, standing alone, is not a constitutional ground for finding a parent unfit.Id. These conclusions are required by the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions, which preclude a state from terminating a parent's fundamental right without an individualized determination of unfitness. Stanley, 405 at 649.
Because the trial court relied for termination solely on Jodi’s incarceration, without considering other factors relevant to her circumstances, her right to substantive due process was violated, ¶¶52-56. In other words, both the court-ordered conditions for return and also the trial court’s evaluation of Jodi’s failure to meet those conditions, were not narrowly tailored to meet the State’s interest in protecting the child, ¶55.
For Susan P.S.: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate
The court also suggests strongly, if not holds outright, that standby counsel may offer an opinion as to the pro se litigant’s competence, and that a decision to rescind self-representation may be based on such an opinion, ¶53 n.6, and accompanying text. (“We are aware of no legal or logical support for the proposition that the right to self-representation is denied by the mere act of standby counsel opining that a pro se litigant is incompetent.” Ah, you may wonder: What about client confidentiality? What about State v. Jeffrey J. Meeks, 2003 WI 104? That case holds that with respect to a client’s competency during prior representation, “disclosure of even non-verbal communications … violates the attorney-client privilege," ¶36. Could be that the court doesn’t see standby counsel as bound by client confidentiality, but that seems too much of a stretch. (For one thing, the relationship may be hybridized but it is nonetheless an attorney-client relationship in some form. And, not to press the point, but for authority that standby counsel does have at least a limited effective-assistance obligation, see for example People v. Blair, 115 P.3d 1145 (Cal. 2005).) Could be that the court perceives Meeks as limited to disclosure of prior representation; and that with regard to a current case, State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986) (counsel ethically obligated to reveal doubts as to client’s competency) holds sway. But note that Meeks itself considered that possibility (¶46), and held that Johnson permits counsel to do no more than merely raise the issue of competency: “An attorney's duty under Johnson demands a very narrow and limited breach of the attorney-client privilege. The attorney is merely obligated to ‘raise the issue [of competency] with the trial court.’ Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 220. There is no requirement that the attorney testify about his or her reasons for raising the issue or the opinions, perceptions, or impressions that form the basis for his or her reason to doubt the client’s competence.” Most likely, then, the court of appeals simply didn’t consider the potential impact of Meeks. If it had, it would almost surely been bound to deem standby counsel’s opinion as to competency—which does more than merely raise the issue and is instead necessarily based on disclosure of verbal and non-verbal client communications—off-limits under Meeks. For that matter, ignoring Meeks is just about the only workable solution for one of the most ill-considered, sloppily thought out decisions in recent memory. General discussion, here.
Issue/Holding: Conducting part of a hearing in the absence of pro se respondent (who appeared before the hearing’s conclusion and conceded she had been late because she hadn’t been “ready in time”) did not deprive her of the right to self-representation, ¶¶55-62.
TPR: Right to "Meaningfully Participate" in Hearing
TPR: (Imprisoned) Parent's Telephonic Appearance and Right to "Meaningfully Participate" in Hearing
TPR – Appellate Procedure -- State’s Appeal, Commenced by GAL
TPR, Sufficiency of Evidence -- Jury Verdict That State Failed to Prove Grounds
Admissibility of Evidence -- Expert Opinion Testimony on TPR Parent’s Ability to Meet Condition for Child’s Return
¶41 Dr. Wellens could address Shannon R.'s abilities and her future behavior based not only on his training and review of her voluminous case history but also on his personal interview with and testing of Shannon R. and from listening to the opinions of others. …
¶42 The circuit court erred by not applying the proper legal standard. It failed to recognize that courts ordinarily allow psychologists to opine about the future behavior of an individual. …
¶43 … The circuit court seemed to be saying that only those experienced or trained in social work have the expertise to testify in termination of parental rights cases about the substantial likelihood of a parent's meeting the conditions for return of a child within the 12-month time period. Such a ruling is an error of law. Thus the circuit court erred as a matter of law in declaring that Dr. Wellens, a psychologist, would know so little about the subject that he should not be permitted to give his opinion. …
Concise summary is difficult. This is very much a fact-bound case; keep in mind that the county was allowed to ask its experts whether Shannon “would be able to meet” the conditions for return (the answer of course being, No); but that Shannon was denied the opportunity to ask her expert precisely the same question (the answer would have been, Yes).
Competency of Court and Time Limit, § 48.422(2) -- Continuance Beyond Time Limit for Fact-Finding Hearing – Factors
State v. Robert K., 2005 WI 152, affirming unpublished opinion
Issue: Whether a TPR court lost competency to proceed because the fact-finding hearing was held more than 45 days after the contested plea hearing, the time limit set by § 48.422(2).
Holding: A continuance of the fact-finding hearing beyond the 45-day limit may properly be granted under § 48.315(2), as to which good cause was established on this record, on the basis of lawyer and litigant scheduling problems.
Recent lost-competency cases distinguished, ¶32 n. 26: Sheboygan County DSS v. Matthew S., 2005 WI 84 (extension not granted on record in open court); State v. April O., 2000 WI App 70 (time limit extended by circuit court only after it expired); in this instance, the trial court granted the extension before the time limit expired, in open court and on the record. As to the exercise of discretion itself, the four factors applicable to evaluating good cause for continuance are “(1) good faith of the moving party; (2) prejudice to the opposing party; (3) prompt remedial action by the dilatory party; and (4) the best interest of the child,” ¶35. The court stresses the “sheer number of persons involved in the hearings,” along with the trial “cycles” in Milwaukee County, which limited available dates, ¶¶37-38. The court’s conclusion then, for these and other reasons, may be fairly said to be fact-specific. Indeed, the court “reiterate(s) the importance of complying with the statutorily mandated time period…. Therefore, it is incumbent upon a circuit court to minimize the uncertainty in a child's life and to protect constitutional rights by concluding a proceeding on termination of parental rights with dispatch.” ¶57. Too fact-specific, apparently, for the 3-Justice concurrence, which expressed “concern that the majority does not adequately recognize the problems of court congestion and that such congestion may, in appropriate instances such as this, constitute good cause for a continuance,” ¶60. Congestion alone, it may therefore be said in light of this express concern, isn’t enough. The court, incidentally, holds open “the issue upon which the circuit court ruled, that is, whether a guardian ad litem's acquiescence in the circuit court's setting the fact-finding hearing beyond the 45-day period fulfills the consent requirement of Wis. Stat. § 48.315(1)(b),” ¶4.
IssueWhether competency challenge to a TPR proceeding is waived under § 48.422(2) if not first raised in circuit court.
¶2 We conclude such a competency challenge based on the violation of the statutory time limitation of Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) cannot be waived, even though it was not raised in the circuit court. The court of appeals erred in extending the holding in Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, to violations of such a mandatory statutory time limitation under Wis. Stat. ch. 48. The circuit court did not hold the fact-finding hearing within the time limits established by § 48.422(2), and never granted a proper extension or continuance pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 48.315(1)(a) and (2), [2] and thus it lost competency to proceed before it ordered the termination of Rachel B.'s parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals, which had affirmed the order of the circuit court.
¶31 We also conclude that recent changes to the Children's Code do not affect our decision in this case, nor did the changes overrule B.J.N. and April O. sub silentio....
¶36 Because of the clear statutory language and legislative intent behind these statutes, we must emphasize the importance of strictly following the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 48. While we recognize the need for flexibility in the Children's Code, we believe the legislature addressed this problem with the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 48.315. In this case, for example, the court perhaps could have granted a continuance if it had recognized good cause for the delay in open court or during a telephone conference on the record. Without such action, however, there is no choice for us but to follow the plain language of the statutes, and to hold that the court lost competency to proceed before it ordered the termination of Rachel B.'s parental rights. …
[2] "The general requirements of § 48.315(2) control all extensions of time deadlines under the Children's Code." State v. April O., 2000 WI App 70, ¶5, 233 Wis. 2d 663, 607 N.W.2d 927.
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315(2) states: "A continuance shall be granted by the court only upon a showing of good cause in open court or during a telephone conference under s. 807.13 on the record and only for so long as is necessary, taking into account the request or consent of the district attorney or the parties and the interest of the public in the prompt disposition of cases."
Grounds -- Abandonment by Biological Parent, Occurring Prior to Adjudication as Parent, as Ground for Termination, §§ 48.02(13), 48.415(1)(a)3
Issue: Whether biological father's parental rights could be terminated on the ground of “abandonment” where he was not adjudicated as father until after alleged periods of abandonment.
¶15 We hold that an individual who is in fact the biological father of a nonmarital child satisfies the definition of "parent" in § 48.02(13), as he is a "biological parent," notwithstanding that he has not officially been adjudicated as the child's biological father. Because such an individual satisfies the definition of "parent," he may have his parental rights terminated based on periods of abandonment that occurred prior to his official adjudication as the child's biological father, assuming he has failed to establish a "good cause" affirmative defense to the ground of abandonment.
Grounds -- Denial of Physical Placement: § 48.356(2) Warnings in Underlying Order Unnecessary
Kimberly S.S. v. Sebastian X.L., 2004 WI App 83
For Kimberly: Richard J. Auerbach
For Sebastian: Jon C. Manzo
Issue: Whether § 48.415(4) requires proof that an underlying family court order denying physical placement contained the warnings required by § 48.356(2).
¶7. The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) requires proof that the notices in Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2) were provided only when the underlying order was issued in juvenile court. We agree with Kimberly that the first usage of "or" in § 48.415(4)(a) separates the paragraph into two self-contained clauses, one pertaining to family court orders and the other applicable to juvenile court orders. Thus, we read the notice requirement provision to be a part of the clause pertaining to juvenile court orders, and as inapplicable to the clause pertaining to family court orders. …
TPR – Substantive Due Process
Dane Co. DHS v. P.P., 2005 WI 32, affirming unpublished decision
For P.P.: Timothy A. Provis
Issue: Whether § 48.424(4) (2001-02) on its face violates substantive due process, in failing to require an individualized determination of unfitness as a precondition for termination of parental rights.
Holding: A parent has a fundamental liberty interest at stake in parenting his or her children, and thus the TPR scheme must be narrowly tailored to advance the State’s interest in interfering with that right, ¶20. In this instance, termination was based on the statutory ground in § 48.415(4) (one-year elapsed since order denying contact), but given that such an order was preceded by various proceedings which reflected on the parent’s fitness, the termination did not violate due process:
¶32. Only after all the above described steps took place, was P.P. faced with a fact-finding hearing on whether a ground for terminating his parental rights existed under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4). The findings that are required for a court to proceed against a parent at each of the steps prior to the final step under § 48.415(4) involve an evaluation of a parent's fitness. It is the cumulative effect of the determinations made at each of the previous steps that causes the finding made under § 48.415(4) to amount to unfitness. Looked at another way, this series of steps acts as a funnel, making smaller and smaller the group of parents whose relationships with their children are affected at each step, until only a very small number of parents would be affected by § 48.415(4). Accordingly, § 48.415(4) cannot be evaluated for a claimed constitutional infirmity in isolation. The full statutory scheme that precedes the implementation of § 48.415(4) must be evaluated as well. Therefore, it is with consideration of this statutory scheme underlying the ground stated in § 48.415(4), that we conclude that on its face § 48.415(4) is narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling interest of protecting children from unfit parents, including the temporal component in this interest that promotes children's welfare through stability and permanency in their lives. In our view, P.P. has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory scheme either shocks the conscience or interferes with a right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
The point of contention is whether or not these prior steps explicitly required a finding of unfitness; the majority says they did, the dissenters say no, ¶¶73, 79. The danger identified by the dissenters is that once a no-contact order has been entered, then a “mandatory irrebuttable presumption” of unfitness follows after the lapse of one year, ¶87. No doubt. But keep in mind that P.P. pleaded no contest, and that his challenge was therefore necessarily up-hill (if for no other reason than that he had to show the statutory scheme unconstitutional); the court thus stressed:
¶25 … We do not preclude an as-applied substantive due process challenge to the statutory scheme underlying § 48.415(4) so that the reasons for failing to modify the order denying visitation or physical placement may be explored, in a proper case. However, P.P. pled no contest to the ground asserted to terminate his parental rights, and in so doing, he relinquished his right to test the validity of the order that denied him visitation and periods of physical placement with his children. Accordingly, we do not reach the question of whether an as-applied challenge to the validity of a § 48.415(4) order will lie.6
--TPR – No-Contact, Occurring Prior to Adjudication as Parent, as Ground for Termination, §§ 48.02(13), 48.415(1)(a)3
State v. James P., 2004 WI App 124, PFR granted 10/5/04
¶3 WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.415(1)(a)3 provides that among the grounds “for the termination of parental rights” is that “[t]he child has been left by the parent with any person, the parent knows or could discover the whereabouts of the child and the parent has failed to visit or communicate with the child for a period of 6 months or longer.” James P. contends that although, as found by the trial court in its extensive and well-reasoned written decision, “[i]n early 2002, as a result of DNA testing, James P. was adjudicated the father of Chezron,” he was not Chezron’s “parent” as that term is used in § 48.415(1)(a)3 when he “failed to visit or communicate with” her. Thus, as noted, he argues that § 48.415(1)(a)3 does not apply.
¶4 As material here, WIS. STAT. § 48.02(13) defines “parent” for the purposes of WIS. STAT. ch. 48 as:
• “a biological parent” or
• “a husband who has consented to the artificial insemination of his wife” or
• “a parent by adoption” or
• “a person acknowledged under s. 767.62 (1) or a substantially similar law of another state” “[i]f the child is a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60” or
• a person “adjudicated to be the biological father” “[i]f the child is a nonmarital child who is not adopted or whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60.”
… We agree that the fact of biological parenthood does not turn on whether it is recognized, found, or adjudicated, any more than the fact that a tree has fallen in the forest depends on someone’s perception of the crashing sound, or, in another context, gravity’s existence depended on Sir Isaac Newton’s formulation of its principles.
¶5 … [A]s the trial court recognized, James P. was always Chezron’s biological father, even before he was formally adjudicated as such.
¶6 … Although James P. interposes law-school-question- type analyses in an attempt to eschew legal responsibility for the periods during which he had no contact with Chezron, he was in fact Chezron’s biological parent when she was born and he has never denied that. We affirm.
--TPR – Summary Judgment, Unfitness Phase
Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, affirming 2003 WI App 110, 263 Wis. 2d 241, 663 N.W.2d 817
For Kelly H.: Philip J. Brehm
¶5. We conclude that partial summary judgment in the unfitness phase of a TPR case is available where the requirements of the summary judgment statute and the applicable legal standards in Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415 and 48.31 have been met. An order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of parental unfitness where there are no facts in dispute and the applicable legal standards have been satisfied does not violate the parent's statutory right to a jury trial under Wis. Stat. §§ 48.422(4) and 48.31(2), or the parent's constitutional right to procedural due process. 6. Accordingly, partial summary judgment may be granted in the unfitness phase of a TPR case where the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding the asserted grounds for unfitness under Wis. Stat. § 48.415, and, taking into consideration the heightened burden of proof specified in Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1) and required by due process, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We overrule Walworth County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Elizabeth W., 189 Wis. 2d 432, 525 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1994), to the extent that it outright prohibited summary judgment in TPR proceedings. The circuit court's use of summary judgment procedure was not error.
¶31. The principles underlying the decision in Elizabeth W. were unquestionably sound and well-established; we conclude, however, that the court's holding was overbroad. Neither due process nor the TPR statutes require an absolute prohibition on summary judgment in the grounds or unfitness phase of a TPR proceeding. That a parent has contested the termination of his or her parental rights does not automatically mean there are material facts in dispute regarding the grounds for unfitness.
¶32. The code of civil procedure applies to "all civil actions and special proceedings" unless a "different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule." Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2). Parental rights termination proceedings under Chapter 48 are civil proceedings, and this general rule of civil procedure applicability has been cited in the context of TPR cases on numerous occasions….
¶33. There is nothing in the TPR statutes that explicitly or implicitly prohibits the use of summary judgment procedure under Wis. Stat. § 802.08 in the unfitness phase of a TPR case. Nor do the TPR statutes prescribe a procedure different from Wis. Stat. § 802.08 for TPR cases in which there is no genuine dispute of fact on the issue of unfitness under Wis. Stat. § 48.415. Kelley argues that a court order granting partial summary judgment on parental unfitness conflicts with the right to a jury trial at the fact-finding hearing, which she contends is an absolute right under the statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 48.422(3), (4), and 48.31(2), and as a matter of due process. We disagree.
(The court rejects a due process-based absolute right to jury trial on the grounds for termination. ¶¶40-44.)
--TPR – Right to Advice As To Right to Continuance To Consult With Counsel Regarding Judicial Substitution, § 48.422(5)
¶50. Parties to TPR proceedings may request a continuance of the initial hearing to consult with counsel about judicial substitution. Wis. Stat. § 48.422(5). However, the circuit court does not have an affirmative duty to advise parties of this right. Wis. Stat. § 48.422(1).
(Court withdraws language to contrary effect in M.W. and I.W. v. Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs., 116 Wis. 2d 432, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984). ¶¶51-52.)
-- TPR – Grounds, § 48.415(9) – Commission of Serious Felony Against Child – Effect of Pending Appeal of Conviction
Reynaldo F. v. Christal M., 2004 WI App 106, PFR filed 4/21/04
For Christal M.: Chris L. Hartley
¶7. Petersen argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed the termination ground based on Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9m). Christal responds that the trial court's interpretation of the statute was correct--that anytime a parent's direct appeal of a conviction is pending, there is no final judgment to form the basis for grounds to terminate under § 48.415(9m). Christal's argument was premised on the holding in Jennifer V., wherein this court interpreted the term "conviction" as used in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(5) to mean a conviction after the right of direct appeal had been exhausted. Jennifer V., 200 Wis. 2d at 681. The trial court agreed that this holding created a "bright line" rule, which prohibited a termination based on a conviction if the parent's direct appeal was still pending. Based on the reasoning that follows, we clarify the holding in Jennifer V. to prohibit termination based on a conviction when a direct appeal is still pending only if the pending appeal has raised issues challenging the parent's guilt. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for a new trial.
¶13. Here, it is undisputed that Christal was found guilty of serious battery of one of her children. A judgment of conviction was entered. She filed a direct appeal challenging solely the length of her sentence. There is no possibility that the appeal will result in an innocent parent losing rights to her child. Christal's guilt has been finally determined. Thus, Jennifer V. does not apply to this case. Jennifer V.'s holding is limited to appeals based on guilt or innocence. We hold that when a parent's pending appeal does not raise issues of guilt or innocence, the term "final judgment of conviction" used in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9m) means the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court, either after "a verdict of guilty by the jury, a finding of guilty by the court in cases where a jury is waived, or a plea of guilty or no contest." Wis. Stat. § 972.13(1).
-- TPR – Evidence – Death of Child’s Sibling During Same Incident for Which Termination of Rights Sought
¶15. Petersen also argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it excluded all evidence related to the existence of the life and death of Reynaldo's twin brother, Raymon. Christal responds that it was reasonable for the trial court to exclude this evidence. We conclude that the trial court's decision constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion.
¶19. We conclude that the story is incomplete without the evidence related to Raymon. Reynaldo was the second baby thrown. The facts demonstrate that Christal first threw Raymon and then buckled Raymon into his car seat. She then picked Reynaldo up and threw him toward his car seat. Because the trial court excluded all evidence of Raymon, Christal's counsel was able to present disingenuous arguments to the jury, including the argument that what occurred to Reynaldo was the result of a