Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/783/499/41709/
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 11:54:27
Document Index: 691995818

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. James Edward Eakes, Defendant-appellant, 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1986 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. James Edward Eakes, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. James Edward Eakes, Defendant-appellant, 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986)
On appeal of the denial of Nichols' motion to dismiss his indictments as violative of the double jeopardy clause, a panel of this court held that Nichols had "participated in a single conspiracy to commit multiple violations of the drug control law." United States v. Nichols, 741 F.2d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 1186, 84 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1985). The district court then granted Nichols' motion to consolidate the three indictments.
Eakes asserts that the delay of his trial until January 28, 1985, violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. That Act provides that a defendant's trial must begin "within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1). "Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary, the trial shall not commence less than thirty days from the date on which the defendant first appears through counsel or expressly waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (2). The Act also defines certain "periods of delay" which are not included "in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence." See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).
Relying on the language of the Act and its legislative history, the United States Supreme Court recently held that the Act does not mandate the commencement of a new thirty-day trial preparation period upon a defendant's arraignment on a superseding indictment. United States v. Rojas-Contreras, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 555, 556, 88 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1985), reversing 730 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1984). Due to a typographical error, the original indictment against that defendant mistated the date of a previous conviction on which the enhancement of the charged offense was based. The superseding indictment corrected that reference. The defendant claimed entitlement to a thirty-day continuance of his trial under Sec. 3161(c) (2) of the Speedy Trial Act. Id. at ---- - ----, 106 S. Ct. at 556-57.
In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court stated that "a defendant must [not] always be compelled to go to trial less than 30 days after the filing of such an indictment." Id. at ----, 106 S. Ct. at 558. The district judge still has a broad discretion to grant a continuance if "the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8)). The "ends of justice" provision authorizes a continuance in cases where a superseding indictment prejudices a defendant. Id. at ---- - ----, 106 S. Ct. at 558.
In Rojas-Contreras, and in all but one of the cases cited by Eakes in support of his main argument, it was the defendant who requested the thirty-day continuance after the return of a superseding indictment. The alleged error of the district court was the court's refusal to grant that request. See United States v. Adu, 770 F.2d 1511, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1985) (new thirty-day period not required where new indictment merely corrected a clerical error and did not change alleged facts or charges); United States v. Hawkins, 765 F.2d 1482, 1487 (11th Cir. 1985) (trial court has discretion to balance interests of government and defendant and grant or deny a continuance for trial preparation on a superseding indictment); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 510-11 (1st Cir. 1984) (new thirty-day period not required where superseding indictment named additional defendant even though original indictment was still outstanding), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 1355, 84 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1985); United States v. Horton, 676 F.2d 1165, 1170 (7th Cir. 1982) (new thirty-day period not required where new indictment charged same offense but reduced the number of counts), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201, 103 S. Ct. 1184, 75 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1983); United States v. Todisco, 667 F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1981) (new thirty-day period not required where charges in the superseding indictment were substantially the same as those in the original indictment, and where substantial discovery had taken place), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 906, 102 S. Ct. 1250, 71 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1982); see also United States v. Harris, 724 F.2d 1452, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1984) (new thirty-day period required because "section 3161(c) (2) ... guarantee [s] that the defendant is not forced to trial less than thirty days from the date on which the defendant first appears on the indictment on which the defendant ultimately goes to trial ") (emphasis in original).
In United States v. Dennis, the Eighth Circuit held that the trial court's grant of the government's motion for a continuance after the trial court dismissed a principal count of the indictment was not an abuse of discretion under the ends of justice provision or a violation of the appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. 625 F.2d 782, 793-94 (8th Cir. 1980).
Here, although the judge misinterpreted the Act, he granted the thirty-day delay because Eakes expressly refused to waive his assumed right to it. Eakes did not object to the delay at that time. Now, in an effort to turn the benefit he accepted into an error that would undo his conviction, he complains that the grant and his acceptance of extra preparation time violated his rights. The Speedy Trial Act entitles criminal defendants to adequate time for preparing a defense, but that right may not be used as a two-edged sword in this fashion. Cf. Rush, 738 F.2d at 508 (defendants may not "deliberately obtain an (h) (8) continuance for their own convenience in the face of speedy trial concerns articulated by the trial court and then later claim that the court abused its discretion in granting the requested continuance") (citations omitted).
Rojas-Contreras and the facts of this case also refute Eakes' alternative arguments. A district judge has the discretion to continue a trial under the ends of justice provision even though the Act does not require an additional thirty-days after arraignment on a superseding indictment. Rojas-Contreras, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 106 S. Ct. at 558-59. A judge's finding that a continuance would best serve the ends of justice is a factual determination subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.) ("we do not disturb factual findings underlying the district court's determination unless they are clearly erroneous"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918, 102 S. Ct. 1776, 72 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1982).
Eakes also implies, however, that his conviction cannot stand because the district judge did not comply with the Act's requirements for the grant of an ends of justice continuance. The Act provides that the court must "set [ ] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A). The Act also articulates permissible and impermissible considerations for making such a determination. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (B), (C). Eakes suggests that the district judge failed to sufficiently state his reasons for granting an ends of justice continuance.
Contrary to Eakes' suggestion, the basis for the judge's grant of an ends of justice continuance is apparent from the record. The judge granted the continuance "given the fact that both defendants ... have decided to exercise their right under 3161(c) (2) and the fact that both men were only arrainged [sic] today on the counts contained in the superceding indictment." The clear meaning of the exchange between the judge and the defense attorneys was that the judge was ready for trial that day and wanted to know whether the defense was also ready or whether it needed more time. The negative reply of Eakes' attorney when the judge asked for a waiver of rights under the Act indicated the defense was not ready for trial and did need more time.
We decline to apply a hypertechnical construction to the language of the Act in this case where the judge clearly granted the continuance for the benefit of and at the indirect request of the defendant who now complains of that grant. Cf. United States v. Richmond, 735 F.2d 208, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1984) (two-week postponement of trial after jury selection because defense counsel was not ready did not constitute attempt by trial judge to evade Speedy Trial Act requirements); United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d at 357-58 (portion of continuance necessitated by defense counsel's scheduling conflicts was excludable under ends of justice provision). The judge used the ends of justice provision in a reasonable manner under the circumstances. While the better practice would have been to articulate specific reasons, the record adequately defines the basis on which the court acted. Eakes has wholly failed to demonstrate the continuance until January 28, 1985, constituted reversible error.
Eakes also urges reversal on the ground that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance he imported was cocaine. In response to a charge that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. "We will reverse only if a reasonably minded jury must necessarily have entertained a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt." United States v. Galvan, 693 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Vergara, 687 F.2d 57, 60 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Eakes concedes that circumstantial evidence may establish the identity of a drug in a prosecution for violation of the narcotics laws, as long as it does so beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946, 96 S. Ct. 356, 46 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1975) (citations omitted). He claims, however, that the circumstantial evidence the government offered to prove the substance involved in this case was cocaine was insufficient. He relies on several cases in which courts held that particular circumstantial evidence not offered here was sufficient for an affirmance of both conspiracy and substantive drug convictions. See United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 978-79 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Identification based on past use coupled with present observation of the substance at hand will suffice to establish the illicit nature of a suspected substance."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 1392, 84 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1985); United States v. Haro-Espinosa, 619 F.2d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1979) (six tests conducted by an expert were sufficient to establish substance was cocaine); United States v. Crisp, 563 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1977) (testimony establishing defendants referred to substance as coke or cocaine, snorted it, cut it, weighed it, tested it over a flame and under a microscope, and sold it for large amounts of money was sufficient to prove identity of substance).
Other cases suggest, however, that various types of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to establish the identity of a controlled substance in a criminal prosecution. United States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1984), involved proof that a substance was cocaine very similar to the proof offered in the case at bar. The prosecution in Scott produced no samples of the substance in question, no chemical analysis, and no expert testimony. The government relied on the "lay testimony" of a cocaine user who stated that he bought some powder from the "same batch" as that purchased by the defendant, that he tested the substance by "snorting" it, and that he concluded it was cocaine. Id. at 44. The court defined the permissible types of circumstantial proof:
Id. at 45-46 (quoting United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976)). The court concluded that all these types of circumstantial proof were present in the case and confirmed the appellant's convictions for possession of cocaine. Id.
In United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919, 99 S. Ct. 2843, 61 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1979), the defendant was charged with fraudulently obtaining by means of false orders, and illegally distributing, diet pills manufactured by his employer. As in Scott and the case at bar, the government did not seize the drugs or have direct evidence that Hill ever possessed them. The government's evidence showed only "that the shipments were never returned to [the manufacturer] for credit, that Hill had volunteered to pick up the shipments and take care of the matter, [and] that Hill did go to the customers' offices and take the pills (although there were not always eyewitnesses)." Id. at 1349. The court held this evidence was sufficient to show possession. Id. The court further noted that "Hill's claim that none of the government witnesses could identify the contents of any of the specific shipments as Statobex-D [diet pills] does not defeat the reasonable inference of the evidence presented that the boxes did contain Statobex-D." Id. at 1350 (citation omitted).
United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004, 95 S. Ct. 1446, 43 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1975), involved a cocaine transaction. The court held that the following evidence identified the substance in question as cocaine sufficiently to support convictions for conspiracy and substantive crimes: the defendant's girlfriend and the purchaser testified the substance was a white powder; they also testified the defendant spoke of selling "cocaine"; the purchaser paid the defendant a substantial amount of cash for the white powder; and the transaction was carried out in secret. Id. at 439.
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court. We review those rulings only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Weempe v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 179, 88 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1985) (citation omitted); United States v. Cochran, 697 F.2d 600, 608 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
If the trial court grants a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment, and the government then reindicts the defendant on the same basic charges, the thirty-day preparation begins anew with regard to the new indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d) (1)