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Timestamp: 2020-02-20 14:14:54
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12']

US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 443 > BELLOTTI V. BAIRD, 443 U. S. 622 (1979)
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1. There are three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional chanrobles.com-red
POWELL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,and STEWART and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. chanrobles.com-red
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions. They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976). chanrobles.com-red
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.Supp. 847, 850 (Mass.1975) (Baird I). Initially there was some confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in chanrobles.com-red
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued an opinion invalidating § 12S. Baird I, supra. The court rejected appellees' argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also are capable of giving informed consent chanrobles.com-red
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that § 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 428 U. S. 148 (1976) (Bellotti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning the meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing chanrobles.com-red
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to the Supreme Judicial Court. [Footnote 9] These were answered in an chanrobles.com-red
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parents' consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an emergency requiring immediate action.'" [Footnote 10] Id. at 750, 360 N.E.2d at 294. Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any judicial proceedings brought under § 12S. Id. at 755-756, 360 N.E.2d at 297. chanrobles.com-red
Id. at 1001. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in chanrobles.com-red
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair." Id. at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give chanrobles.com-red
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or property interests by the State. With respect to many of these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, supra. In particular, minors involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice, the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 430 U. S. 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of schoolchildren implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had violated a criminal statute). chanrobles.com-red
Second, the Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. [Footnote 13] chanrobles.com-red
id. at 390 U. S. 638, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 321 U. S. 170 (1944). [Footnote 14] The Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in question presented a danger against which they should be guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 390 U. S. 641. It therefore rejected the chanrobles.com-red
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual chanrobles.com-red
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S, Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to choose to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), with the special interest of the State in encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in making the important decision whether or not to bear a child. As noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132 (1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its provisions by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. We previously had held in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 428 U. S. 74. In chanrobles.com-red
Appellees and intervenors contend that, even as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts § 12S does unduly burden this right. They suggest, for example, that the mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden. As stated in 443 U. S. 91:
(Footnote omitted.) [Footnote 21] chanrobles.com-red
Yet an abortion may not be the best choice for the minor. The circumstances in which this issue arises will vary widely. In a given case, alternatives to abortion, such as marriage to the father of the child, arranging for its adoption, or assuming the responsibilities of motherhood with the assured support of chanrobles.com-red
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; [Footnote 23] or chanrobles.com-red
Attorney General, chanrobles.com-red
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was objectionable in the statute successfully challenged in Danforth, § 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects. We now consider these. chanrobles.com-red
Attorney General, supra at 750, 360 N.E.2d at 294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule, making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died or has deserted his or her family." [Footnote 26] The Supreme Judicial Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or statutory substitute) is available." 371 Mass. at 750, 360 N.E.2d at 294. The court also ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for an abortion. [Footnote 27] Id. at 755-756, 360 N.E.2d at 297. chanrobles.com-red
We conclude, therefore, that, under state regulation such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the opportunity -- if she so desires -- to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her chanrobles.com-red
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing about abortions . . . requires the minor's interest to be treated chanrobles.com-red
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n 23, supra. But we are concerned here with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character. See supra at 443 U. S. 642-643. As stated above, if the minor satisfies a court that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully informed decision, she then is entitled to make her abortion decision independently. We therefore agree with the District Court that § 12S cannot constitutionally permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the implications of the choice she has made. [Footnote 30] chanrobles.com-red
I join the opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL and the judgment of the Court. At such time as this Court is willing to chanrobles.com-red
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, the Court held that a woman's right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy is chanrobles.com-red
Whatever confusion or uncertainty might have existed as to how this statute was to operate, see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, has been eliminated by the authoritative construction of its provisions by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N E.2d 288 (1977). The statute was construed to require that every minor who wishes an abortion must first seek the consent of both parents, unless a parent is not available or unless the need for the abortion constitutes "an emergency requiring immediate action.'" Id. at 750, 360 N.E.2d at 294. Both parents, so long as they are available, must also receive notice of judicial proceedings brought under the statute by the minor. In those proceedings, the task of the judge is to determine whether the best interests of the minor will be served by an abortion. The decision is his to make, even if he finds "that the minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion." Id. at 748, 360 N.E.2d at 293. Thus, no minor in Massachusetts, no matter how mature and capable of informed decisionmaking, may receive an abortion without the consent chanrobles.com-red
Id. at 428 U. S. 74. These holdings, I think, equally apply to the Massachusetts statute. The differences between the two statutes are few. Unlike the Missouri statute, Massachusetts requires the consent of both of the woman's parents. It does, of course, provide an alternative in the form of a suit initiated by the woman in superior court. But in that proceeding, the judge is afforded an absolute veto over the minor's decisions, based on his judgment of her best interests. In Massachusetts, then, as in Missouri, the State has imposed an "absolute limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion," id. at 428 U. S. 90 (STEWART, J., concurring), applicable to every pregnant minor in the State who has not married. chanrobles.com-red
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 429 U. S. 599-600 (footnotes omitted). It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties. In Massachusetts, however, every minor who cannot secure the consent of both her parents -- which, under Danforth, cannot be an absolute prerequisite to an abortion -- is required to secure the consent of the sovereign. As a practical matter, I would suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of a parent. [Footnote 2/3] Moreover, once this burden is met, the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the best interest of the minor. That standard provides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the minor -- particularly when contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision -- is fundamentally at odds chanrobles.com-red
I was in dissent in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 428 U. S. 94 95 (1976), on the issue of the validity of requiring the consent of a parent when an unmarried woman under 18 years of age seeks an abortion. I continue to have the views I expressed there, and also agree with much of what MR. JUSTICE STEVENS said in dissent in that chanrobles.com-red