Source: https://openjurist.org/597/f2d/7/national-labor-relations-board-v-wells-fargo-armored-service-corporation-of-puerto-rico
Timestamp: 2017-10-22 08:47:18
Document Index: 563044594

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 151', '§ 158', '§ 152', '§ 7', '§ 157', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 158']

597 F2d 7 National Labor Relations Board v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation of Puerto Rico | OpenJurist
597 F. 2d 7 - National Labor Relations Board v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation of Puerto Rico
597 F2d 7 National Labor Relations Board v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation of Puerto Rico
597 F.2d 7
101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2209, 86 Lab.Cas. P 11,276
WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE CORPORATION OF PUERTO RICO, Respondent.
No. 78-1496.
As Amended May 9, 1979.
This is an application of the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 Et seq., for enforcement of its order issued against Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation of Puerto Rico for a violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).1
The parties see the basic issue differently. As posed by the Board, the question is whether the Board properly rejected, for failing to establish a legitimate and substantial business justification, the Company's reason for refusing to reinstate the four strikers. The Company denies that there was any 8(a)(3) violation on the basis that there was no proof of anti-union animus and that none could be inferred from its conduct.
The ALJ spent considerable time analyzing the misrepresentations made by the nine strikers, found that "a half-truth should be no less 'obvious' than no truth at all," and held that the refusal to rehire the four was not justified by legitimate and substantial business considerations. On this basis, a finding of a violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Act was issued. Although not explicitly stated, the ALJ's finding must have been predicated on the belief that the Company had a duty to rehire strikers in strict order of seniority.3
The Board cavalierly assumes that this case falls easily within the holdings and reasoning of N.L.R.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 88 S.Ct. 543, 19 L.Ed.2d 614 (1967), and the Laidlaw Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), Cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920, 90 S.Ct. 928, 25 L.Ed.2d 100 (1970). We do not agree that the case can be thus pigeonholed. In Fleetwood, the Company hired six new employees for jobs which the striker applicants were qualified to fill. It was on these facts that the court held:
Section 2(3) of the Act (61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)) provides that an individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of a labor dispute continues to be an employee if he has not obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment. If, after conclusion of the strike, the employer refuses to reinstate striking employees, the effect is to discourage employees from exercising their rights to organize and to strike guaranteed by §§ 7 and 13 of the Act (61 Stat. 140 and 151, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 163). Under §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) (29 U.S.C. §§ 158(1) and (3)) it is an unfair labor practice to interfere with the exercise of these rights. Accordingly, unless the employer who refuses to reinstate strikers can show that his action was due to "legitimate and substantial business justifications," he is guilty of an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (87 S.Ct. 1792, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027) (1967). The burden of proving justification is on the employer. Ibid.
Id. 389 U.S. at 378, 88 S.Ct. at 545-546. Laidlaw applied the rule of Fleetwood to a situation where not one striker who was replaced was recalled despite the fact that fifty new employees were hired. There was also a prevailing atmosphere of anti-unions animus. We do not quarrel with the holding of either Fleetwood or Laidlaw. They simply do not apply to this case. Here, there was no hiring of new workers in place of the four alleged discriminates. Nor, as in Laidlaw, was there any expressed hostility to the Union. And we do not think that this is the type of conduct giving rise to an inference of anti-union animus. See N.L.R.B. v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963); Teamsters Local v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667, 81 S.Ct. 835, 6 L.Ed.2d 11 (1961).
It is now well established that during a strike an employer can hire replacements for strikers and is under no duty to discharge them and rehire the strikers at the termination of the strike. N.L.R.B. v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381 (1938). After the strike was over, the Company here followed the teaching of Fleetwood and Laidlaw. It formulated a seniority list, Sua sponte, for the rehiring of strikers in the event job openings occurred. There is no suggestion that the Union precipitated or participated in the seniority listings. The words of the statute are specific. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act,29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment To encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization " (emphasis added). We fail to discern how this conduct in any way "encourag(ed) or discourag(ed) membership in any labor organization."
Radio Officers Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 42-43, 74 S.Ct. 323, 337, 98 L.Ed. 455 (1954).
It is accepted law that absent anti-union animus, an employee may be discharged for any reason. N.L.R.B. v. Sutphin Co.-Atlanta, Inc, 373 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1967). We have held in a series of cases that, in an 8(a)(1) discharge situation, "(t)he Board must find that anti-union animus was the dominant motive for the discharge and that it would not have taken place 'but for' such animus." Hubbard Regional Hospital v. N.L.R.B., 579 F.2d 1251, 1255 (1st Cir. 1978). See also Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. N.L.R.B., 592 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1979); N.L.R.B. v. Rich's of Plymouth, 578 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1978); Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977); Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 536 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976); N.L.R.B. v. Fibers International Corp., 439 F.2d 1311 (1st Cir. 1971). The same test should be applied to rehiring strikers. If an employer is free to decide on the basis of his business judgment whom he can discharge, he should have the same freedom in rehiring strikers.
We find that there was no 8(a)(3) violation. This finding makes it unnecessary to consider the scope of the cease and desist order.