Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/131/222/514349/
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 09:44:50
Document Index: 673027534

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2302', '§ 658', '§ 185', '§ 1232', '§ 10902', '§ 10903', '§ 10903', '§ 10903', '§ 1983', '§ 181', '§ 1251']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Pedro Rivera, Defendant, Appellant, 131 F.3d 222 (1st Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1997 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Pedro Rivera, Defendant, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Pedro Rivera, Defendant, Appellant, 131 F.3d 222 (1st Cir. 1997)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 131 F.3d 222 (1st Cir. 1997)
Heard Sept. 9, 1997. Decided Dec. 2, 1997
We enter our analysis by noting that the interpretation of a statute presents a purely legal question, and thus our review is de novo. See Strickland v. Commissioner, 96 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1996).
(1) Plain Language or Beyond? The well established approach to statutory construction begins with the actual language of the provision, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2301, 85 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1985). When the "plain meaning" is clear on its face, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S. Ct. 192, 194, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917); United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 581 (1st Cir. 1995). From one vantage point, this is the beginning and the end of our analysis. On its face, there is nothing unclear about the meaning of section 10908. Its language does not limit its application to "a person" against whom Chapter 109 proceedings have been brought. Rather, it sets out three specific requirements for finding a person culpable: (1) knowingly sending a vessel to sea; (2) knowing that the vessel was in an unseaworthy condition; and (3) knowing that the unseaworthiness was such that it would likely endanger life. Straightforward application of the plain language rule leaves no place for the procedural prerequisites asserted by Rivera.
We have difficulty drawing so much from the context here. While cognizant of "the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole ..., since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context," Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1565, 123 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1993) (citations omitted), we gain no insight from the surrounding text in this instance. Indeed, the relevant "context" is subject to different interpretations. Rivera argues that the backdrop is a multi-part procedural scheme for making determinations of unseaworthiness based on claims brought primarily by seamen. The government takes a broader view, describing the context simply as a set of provisions concerning unseaworthiness, with the criminal prosecution serving as an appropriately harsh penalty for a limited category of individuals who knowingly put lives in jeopardy.
(2) The Role of Legislative History. Keeping in mind that resort to legislative history typically is inappropriate when the meaning of a statute is plainly discernible from its words, see Laracuente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1989), we engage in this discussion solely to reinforce our conclusion that this case is best resolved through reliance on the plain language rule. In a case such as this, where the "statute's text is encompassing, clear on its face, and productive of a plausible result," State of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 698 (1st Cir. 1994), our inquiry, at most, should be aimed at determining " 'whether there is a "clearly expressed legislative intention" contrary to [the statutory] language, which would require [the court] to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.' " Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-33 n. 12, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1213-14 n. 12, 94 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1987)).
The signals here are mixed. While the stated purpose of the legislation was simply to recodify in an organized fashion the then-existing law relating to the safety of vessels and protection of seamen8 --suggesting that no changes were intended--the accompanying House Report anticipated questions about substantive revisions:
Whatever the intended meaning of section 658, it seems to us that the recodification's affirmative separation of section 10908 from other provisions, and deletion of the word "such," reflect a deliberate decision that liability under the section is to be distinct from, and not dependent upon, compliance with Chapter 109's civil provisions. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 442-43, 107 S. Ct. at 1219 ("Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.") (citation omitted).
(3) An absurd result? It is a common occurrence in the law that black-and-white principles have an associated set of grey areas. Such is the case with the plain language rule. Though a solid anchor of statutory construction, it is not without exceptions, even in the absence of explicitly contrary legislative history. We have recognized that a "provision's plain meaning must govern its application, unless a palpably unreasonable outcome would result," Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 986 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Courts will only look behind statutory language in the rare case where a literal reading must be shunned because it would produce an absurd outcome, ... or when the legislature has otherwise blown an uncertain trumpet.") (citations omitted).
As for the logic of a civil prerequisite, it seems that an uneven enforcement of law would result. If the crew and officers of a vessel were intimidated or unknowing, they might not bring to light egregious circumstances of unseaworthiness that others might have discovered and reported. We think it irrational to posit that a prosecution for the dangerous conduct proscribed by section 10908 could be barred simply because a ship owner or other potential defendant was able to prevent a civil proceeding through deception or strong-arm tactics. The Third Circuit, faced with a similar question under the Clean Water Act, aptly observed that "we see no reason why the Government should be hampered by prerequisites to seeking criminal sanctions under the Act.... Although continued discharges after notification could be one way for the government to prove scienter, it is certainly not the only way to establish willful violations," United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1979).10
Nor does the novelty of this prosecution suggest to us that it is unfair or absurd. The prior lack of reported prosecutions under section 10908 or its predecessor may be a function of the fact that its coverage is narrow and that other provisions also reach aspects of the conduct that is actionable under it. Section 1115 of Title 18, for example, makes it a crime for any person employed on a vessel, or the owner or charterer of the vessel, to destroy "the life of any person" through misconduct, negligence, or inattention to duties. A person who operates a vessel in a grossly negligent manner "that endangers the life, limb, or property of a person" commits a misdemeanor under 46 U.S.C. § 2302(b). Prosecutors often have a range of statutory choices in bringing charges, and the historical neglect of section 10908 and its predecessor, section 658, may reflect only that it was less obvious than other overlapping statutes because of its placement at the end of a provision primarily concerned with administrative procedures. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S. Ct. 685, 139 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1997) (novel use of a statute is not alone a basis for reversing a conviction).
In sum, we cannot say that punishing a responsible person for knowingly sending a vessel to sea in such a condition as to endanger life is so "palpably unreasonable," Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d at 986, "difficult to fathom," United States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627, 629 (1st Cir. 1996) (citation omitted), or "absurd," Sullivan, 992 F.2d at 1252, as to trump the unvarnished language of section 10908.11 B. Matters for Congressional Attention.
The second question certified for en banc review is whether the government produced sufficient evidence to support the verdict that Rivera "knowingly" sent the Emily S. to sea in an "unseaworthy" condition "likely to endanger the life of an individual."12 When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, " 'we review the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, taken as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant[ ][was] guilty as charged.' " United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 747 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1031 (1st Cir. 1993)).
As the majority acknowledges, ante at 224, precedent from both the United States Supreme Court and this Circuit establishes that the "plain language" rule requires the examination of a statute's textual context. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1564-65, 123 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1993) (the "cardinal rule [is] that a statute is to be read as a whole ..., since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context"); Skidgel v. Maine Dept. of Human Services, 994 F.2d 930 (1st Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, my brethren "find no aid to construction in the provisions surrounding section 10908" because in this case "the relevant 'context' is subject to different interpretations." Ante at 225. Thus, "[t]aking section 10908 at face value, without limitations, avoids any uncertainty." Ante at 225.
An examination of section 10908's predecessor statute, 46 U.S.C.A. § 658 (1958), establishes even more clearly that the civil procedures of Chapter 109 must be initiated before section 10908 may be invoked. In 1983, Congress recodified much of the law as to seamen, and in doing so split section 658 into sections 10901, 10906, and 10908. Pub. L. No. 98-89 (1983). Section 658 established the penalties that would attach if court-appointed inspectors were to find a vessel unseaworthy in some respect. The inclusion of both civil and criminal penalties within the same section was a clear indicator that the criminal penalties were the ultimate sanction for violations discovered pursuant to the civil complaint procedures.
The "plain meaning" rule does not govern recodification statutes such as Pub. L. No. 98-89. As the Report correctly points out, in the usual kind of amendatory legislation, "a change of language is intended to change substance. In a codification statute, however, the courts uphold the contrary presumption: no change in law is intended unless clearly expressed." Id. at 118-119 (Add. at 11-12). The Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that:
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227, 77 S. Ct. 787, 790-91, 1 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1957) (citing United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740, 4 S. Ct. 196, 201, 28 L. Ed. 308 (1884)); see Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553-55, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2009-10, 104 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1989); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 467-74, 95 S. Ct. 2178, 2185-89, 45 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1975); Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162, 93 S. Ct. 408, 415, 34 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1972); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 198-99, 32 S. Ct. 626, 630, 56 L. Ed. 1047 (1912). Since the House Report does not even discuss the purported change in the law urged by the government, let alone clearly express an intent to enact such a change, one may safely conclude that no substantive change in this section was ever intended.
Furthermore, we should be guided by our own precedent that counsels examination of statutes as a whole, and that due weight be given "to design, structure and purpose as well as to aggregate language." O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); United States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1982). Falvey involved a prosecution for possession of counterfeit foreign coins under a statutory scheme first enacted in 1877 but extensively rephrased in 1965. 18 U.S.C. § 185. Until 1965, the statute's scope had been limited, to foreign coins in actual use and circulation as money within the United States. However, because the 1965 version of the law simply made it a felony to counterfeit silver coins, the government sought to apply the statute to counterfeit foreign currency that was not either in actual use or circulation in the United States.
Finally, the fact that the interpretations of section 10908 proposed by Rivera and the government are "both ... consistent with what [the majority] see[s] as the overall purpose of the legislation," ante at 225, should at the very least suffice to trigger the operation of the rule of lenity, which "commands that genuine ambiguities affecting a criminal statute's scope be resolved in the defendant's favor," ante at 227 n. 9 (quoting United States v. Bowen, Nos. 96-2289, 90, slip. op. at 15 (1st Cir. Sept. 5, 1997)). The majority refuses to apply the rule because "[t]he plain language of section 10908 is not ambiguous." Ante at 227 n. 9 (emphasis added). However, in applying the rule of lenity the inquiry is not whether the language of the statute is plain, but rather whether its meaning is clear. See United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 301 n. 10 (1st Cir. 1993) (the rule is applicable when "at the end of a thorough inquiry, the meaning of a criminal statute remains obscure") (emphasis added). The meaning and scope of section 10908 can hardly be described as unambiguous when, as the majority admits and this concurrence has shown, it remains subject to two reasonable but competing interpretations. Thus, if Congress accepts the majority's invitation to look into this matter, ante at 228, I also suggest that it define unambiguously the nature of the relationship between Chapter 109's civil and criminal provisions.Appendix: A Comparison of Provisions
The jury also convicted Rivera for knowingly violating a Coast Guard regulation, see 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b) (1), but the district court later granted Rivera's motion for acquittal on that count
Chapter 109 was enacted in 1983 as Public Law 98-89. It provides for the filing of a complaint with the master of a vessel by the "chief and second mates or a majority of the crew," before a voyage takes place, if the vessel appears unfit to the seaman, 46 U.S.C. § 10902(a) (1). A master receiving such a complaint is then required to apply to a district court of the United States for the appointment of "3 experienced and skilled marine surveyors to examine the vessel for the defects or insufficiencies complained of." Id.; id. at § 10903(a). After their investigation, the surveyors must make a report stating whether the vessel is fit and, if not, must make appropriate recommendations as to how to render the vessel seaworthy. Id. at § 10903(a). The district court then passes upon the report and renders its judgment, which must be complied with by the master and crew of the vessel. Id. at § 10903(b). The remaining sections of Chapter 109 detail further consequences: section 10905 provides for the filing of complaints in foreign ports; section 10906 provides for the discharge of the crew upon a finding of the vessel's unsuitability; section 10907 prohibits a master from interfering with a seaman's right to file a complaint under this chapter. Finally, section 10908, the provision at issue here, provides for criminal sanctions
Context plays a larger role when a literal reading of the language at issue would do violence to the overall scheme. See United States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871, 875 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[C]ourts are not bound to read a statute literally in a manner entirely at odds with its history and apparent intent.") Construing section 10908 as a stand-alone provision not only supports Chapter 109's overall purpose of protecting seamen but also promotes Congress's apparent intent to increase responsibility for life-threatening accidents. See infra at 226
This is not unlike the conflict between Justices Brennan and Powell in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980). Justice Brennan's majority opinion held that the phrase "and laws" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 encompassed violations of all federal statutory as well as constitutional laws, while Justice Powell in dissent asserted that the context clearly confined coverage of the provision to, at most, statutes providing specifically for equality of rights. As did the majority there, we think the better approach, in the absence of clear guidance to the contrary, is to accept the provision as written, without reading in unstated limitations
We briefly note two other arguments made in support of Rivera's position. First, Rivera asserts that the competing interpretations of section 10908 warrant resort to the rule of lenity, which "commands that genuine ambiguities affecting a criminal statute's scope be resolved in the defendant's favor," United States v. Bowen, Nos. 96-2289, 90, slip op. at 15 (1st Cir. Sept. 5, 1997). The rule is triggered only when, " 'at the end of a thorough inquiry, the meaning of a criminal statute remains obscure,' " Id. (quoting United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 301 n. 10 (1st Cir. 1993)). As we have discussed, this is not such a case. The plain language of section 10908 is not ambiguous, and the rule of lenity is therefore inapplicable
Second, the Maritime Law Association of the United States contends in its amicus brief that the government's interpretation of section 10908 must be wrong because it will adversely affect the long-standing right of vessel owners to utilize the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189. Under the Act, damages claims against a vessel owner following an accident may be limited to the value of the vessel and freight on board if the mishap occurred without the privity or knowledge of the owner. See generally Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Florida, 768 F.2d 1558, 1563-64 (11th Cir. 1985).
We find some support for our judgment that criminal liability in this context is rational in the court's reference to section 10908 in Seymore v. Lake Tahoe Cruises, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1029, 1035 (E.D. Cal. 1995). The court there recognized a wrongful termination cause of action in favor of a captain terminated for refusing to pilot a vessel he believed was unseaworthy, posing an unreasonable risk to passengers and crew. In endorsing the pilot's claim, the court pointed to section 10908 as evidence of the strong public policy at issue. That court, at least, did not view criminal responsibility for such life-threatening conduct to be "absurd."
The term "unseaworthy" is not defined within the statute, and the question was raised at oral argument whether it should be given a more limited meaning within this criminal context than in the maritime setting, where it is "essentially a species of liability without fault," Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94, 66 S. Ct. 872, 877, 90 L. Ed. 1099 (1946). Because we believe the mens rea requirement ("knowingly") and the "likely to endanger the life of an individual" element serve to sharply limit prosecutions under the provision, we see no reason to depart from the common usage of the term. We therefore understand an "unseaworthy" vessel to be one not properly outfitted or safe for a voyage at sea. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1728 (2d ed. unabridged 1987)
The warranty of seaworthiness provides that the owner of a vessel owes an absolute duty to seamen to provide a ship's hull, gear, appliances, ways, and appurtenances which are reasonably fit for their intended purpose, Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S. Ct. 926, 4 L. Ed. 2d 941 (1960), as well as to appoint a competent master and a crew adequate in their number and competent for their duty, Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 91 S. Ct. 514, 27 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1971)
The case relied upon by the majority, United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), is inapposite. The Third Circuit was there faced with the task of interpreting the Clean Water Act. That statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq., which is of relatively recent vintage (1972), contains neither procedures similar to those in Chapter 109, nor is it the result of a recodification scheme