Source: https://iflyamerica.org/accidentinfo_c_c172.asp
Timestamp: 2020-08-03 08:33:38
Document Index: 480958365

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 121', 'art 91', 'art 91', 'art 91', 'art 91', 'art 91', 'art 91']

I Fly America:.Accident Info - Cessna to 172
Aircraft: Canadair CL-600
Phase of flight: Landing approach
A Canadair CL-600-2B19, operated by Comair as flight 5689, experienced an uncommanded roll while on approach to Kent County International Airport (GRR), Grand Rapids, Michigan. The certificated airline transport flight crew, 1 flight attendant, and 18 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the scheduled passenger flight that originated from the Greater Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky Regional Airport, Covington, Kentucky at 1105. Flight 5689 was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan under 14 CFR Part 121.
The Captain reported they were flying a visual approach to runway 35 and were following the localizer to intercept the glideslope. When flaps 45 degrees were selected, the airplane rolled right about 15 to 20 degrees. He applied left aileron to correct the roll. The Captain reported he received a "FLT SPOILER DEPLOYED" message on the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). He reported the flight control synoptic page showed everything normal except the right flight spoiler box was yellow and zero displacement was indicated. The Captain discontinued the approach, declared an emergency, and climbed to 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl).
In a written statement, the Captain reported the following:
'We ran the QRH [Quick Reference Handbook] checklist for the flight spoiler deployed caution message and verified that the handle was stowed. We orbited making left-hand turns while we tried to identify the problem and attempted to contact Comair maintenance control for assistance.
After consulting with maintenance and flight operations personnel, and conducting a visual inspection, we determined that we had some sort of failure of the right flight spoiler. We then ran the checklist for a flight spoiler failure without satisfactory results. By this time we had only 2000 lbs. of fuel remaining and we elected to land using the corrected airspeeds per the QRH. The approach and landing were uneventful with normal GLD [Ground Lift Dumping] deployment indicated on touchdown.
A post-flight inspection revealed the right flight spoiler was fully deployed, probably from the GLD on landing and the left spoiler lug had fractured and separated from its respective actuator. Whether the lug failure was the primary failure or a secondary failure is unknown at this time."
In subsequent correspondence, the pilot reported the following information about the indications and messages provided to the pilots during the incident from the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS):
'In our event, the primary EICAS message was 'Flight Spoiler Deploy' caution message instead of the 'FLT SPLR L(R)' caution message. We were forced to spend time reviewing the contents of the other checklists to see which one would be most applicable to our situation. In this case, both the FLT SPLR and FLAPS TWIST checklists could have been applicable. We were forced to conduct a visual inspection to eliminate the possibility of a flap failure. Furthermore, when we extended the flight spoilers per the QRH checklist the F/CTRL page indicated a symmetrical deployment of the flight spoilers, even though this was not the case.'
The EICAS system relies upon the sensor mounted to the actuator to indicate flight control displacement, and it does not sense the actual displacement of the flight controls.
A review of the maintenance records indicated the right flight spoiler had acquired a total of 3987.9 cycles and 4064 landings.
The right flight spoiler assembly was sent to the National Transportation Safety Board's Materials Laboratory for examination. The inspection of the fractured aluminum lug revealed that one fracture surface contained features indicative of fatigue cracking. Fatigue cracking was on two planes of the lug separated by a large ratchet mark. 'Cracking on one side to the ratchet mark emanated from the inside diameter,' but the exact origin area could not be determined due to mechanical damage to the fracture surface. The report stated, 'The width of the fatigue crack region was approximately 0.2 inch, and the crack extended through approximately 75% of the wall thickness.'
The report stated, 'The inside diameter surface of the lug contained wear damage that was noted completely around the circumference of the lug, but that appeared more extensive in the area of the fatigue crack. The inside diameter surface also contained a circumferential mark' that extended completely around the circumference of the lug. Portions of the mark exhibited metal flow and steps, consistent with one edge of the bearing outer race moving laterally with respect to the lug.'
The airplane's manufacturer had issued a Service Bulletin (SB) A601R-57-027 that specified non-destructive inspections of the aluminum spoiler lugs. The manufacturer also started producing spoilers with steel lugs that could replace the original spoilers with aluminum lugs that would terminate the inspection requirement. The accident airplane did not have the maintenance performed on it that would have complied with the Service Bulletin since a Service Bulletin is advisory in nature.
Transport Canada issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) CF-2000-15 that directed that the aluminum flight spoiler lug be inspected by non-destructive means at a threshold of 7,000 cycles since new. The AD also stipulated that the installation of redesigned flight spoiler which utilized steel lugs provided terminating action to the inspection requirements.
Transport Canada issued AD CF-2000-15R1 that lowered the inspection threshold of the aluminum flight spoiler lugs to 3,000 cycles, and at intervals not to exceed 500 cycles. The AD also stipulated that the installation of redesigned flight spoiler which utilized steel lugs provided terminating action to the inspection requirements.
The Federal Aviation Administration issued AD 2001-12-24 that lowered the inspection threshold of the aluminum flight spoiler lugs to 3,000 cycles, and at intervals not to exceed 500 cycles. The AD also stipulated that the installation of redesigned flight spoiler which utilized steel lugs provided terminating action to the inspection requirements.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows: The uncommanded deployment of the right flight spoiler due to the fatigue fracture of the spoiler lug.
At 1715 eastern standard time, a Cessna and operated by a private individual as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, experienced total loss of engine power, and made a forced landing in the vicinity of Rome, Georgia. The airplane received substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The airline transport-rated pilot and private-rated passenger reported no injuries. The flight originated from the Richard B. Russell Airport, Rome Georgia, on February 1, 2006, at 1615.
The pilot stated while in cruise flight she looked at the fuel gauges and the right fuel tank was empty and the left fuel tank was approximately a quarter full. The primer was stuck in the out position. She and the passenger attempted to push the primer in with negative results. She then decided to fly back towards the departure airport and while en-route, the engine quit. The pilot stated that the airplane was approximately 1000 feet above the ground and she elected not to attempt an engine restart. She made a 180 degree turn and initiated a forced landing to an open field. The airplane landed half way down the field. She attempted to stop the airplane, but the airplane skidded through a barb wire fence, the left wing clipped a tree, and the airplane spun around 180-degrees. The airplane came to rest facing north.
Examination of the airplane after the accident by an FAA inspector showed the airplane contained no usable fuel and the primer handle was unlocked. A review of the primer's design drawings found that there are two check valves within the primers system which prevent fuel from entering the engine even with the primer in the out position. Fuel can only enter the engine through the action of closing the primer.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's improper fuel management resulting in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
At 2030 hours Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 150J experienced a loss of engine power and made a forced landing in a vineyard approximately 2 miles northwest of the Sonoma Skypark Airport, Sonoma, California. The airplane was operated by the student pilot/owner under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91, and sustained substantial damage. The pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the night cross-country flight, and no flight plan had been filed. The airplane had departed the Calaveras County-Maury Rasmussen Field Airport, San Andreas, California, about 1930, and was scheduled to terminate at the Sonoma Skypark Airport.
The student pilot stated that he had refueled at Sonoma Skypark the morning of the previous day. He flew to the Calaveras County airport and spent the next 2 days working in San Andreas. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical anomalies noted with the flight to Calaveras County. On the night of the second day, he conducted a preflight; however, he did not refuel the airplane prior to leaving Calaveras County.
The pilot indicated that he had flight following during his flight back to Sonoma, but that he had not filed a flight plan. During the return flight he was in radio contact with the Sacramento and Stockton air traffic controllers, and Oakland Center. While in contact with Oakland Center, he requested an altitude change near Sonoma from 4,500 feet to 3,000 feet. He stated that he was over the airport, but could not see the airport. As the airplane reached an altitude of 3,500 feet, the engine lost power.
The pilot reported he made several unsuccessful attempts to restart the engine. He declared an emergency with Oakland Center. The pilot stated that Oakland Center attempted to give him directions to the airport; however, the airplane was losing altitude and he decided to land the airplane. He picked a road to land on; at the last minute he saw power lines and maneuvered to avoid them. The airplane came to rest on its nose in a vineyard.
The pilot stated that the engine was sputtering and then quit. During the attempts to restart the engine, he stated that the primer was in and locked. He further stated that he did not see the oil pressure gauge indicating anything abnormal.
A Sonoma County Sheriff's deputy who responded to the accident site reported that fuel was present in the fuel tanks, but he could not tell what the quantity was.
A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, who conducted the on-scene inspection, stated that 3 1/2 gallons of fuel were drained from the left tank and 1 gallon of fuel was drained from the right tank. He further indicated that a few drops of fuel were collected from the fuel bowl.
The inspector conducted an engine inspection and ground-run. During the engine inspection he noted that the ignition switch was defective.
The inspector interviewed the pilot, who was present for the engine inspection. The pilot stated that there was a "trick" to starting the airplane. Pressure had to be applied to the instrument panel in order to allow the ignition switch to positively ground to the system for start up. The pilot further stated to the inspector that he knew the switch was defective prior to the accident flight, and it had been that way for some time. No further discrepancies were noted with the engine ground run.
According to the airplane manufacturer, the fuel system is a gravity fed system. Total fuel on board the airplane was 26 gallons; usable fuel for all flight conditions was 22.5 gallons, with 3.5 gallons unusable fuel.
The closest aviation weather reporting station was the Napa, California, airport, which is located about 6 miles east of the accident site. The 2054 METAR report for Napa noted in part that the temperature was 60 degrees Fahrenheit and the dew point was 55 degrees. Review of a carburetor icing probability chart disclosed that this temperature and dew point falls in an area of the graph annotated "Serious Icing Climb or Cruise Power."
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: Fuel exhaustion due to the pilot's inadequate preflight fuel consumption calculations and failure to ensure that adequate fuel was onboard the airplane prior to departure. A factor in the accident was the pilot's continued use of the airplane with known mechanical deficiencies.
A Cessna 150K experienced a total loss of engine power during cruise flight. The pilot made a forced landing in a park on the Island of Oahu, and during rollout the airplane collided with a tree. The airplane was operated by Oahu Aviation Flight School, Inc., Honolulu, Hawaii, and it was substantially damaged. The private pilot received a minor injury; the passenger was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed during the dusk flight, and no flight plan was filed.
The round-robin flight originated from the Honolulu International Airport on Oahu about 1530. The pilot reported that he believed the airplane's fuel tanks were full, but he may have 'misjudged" their actual quantity. After takeoff, the pilot flew to the Island of Lanai, and arrived there about 1620. While on Lanai, the pilot did not check the amount of fuel in the tanks. The pilot departed Lanai about 1650 and planned to return to Honolulu. The pilot reported that while en route the engine lost power. At the time, the fuel tank gauges registered slightly less than 1/2 full.
Unable to reach his destination, the pilot made a forced landing in the Waialae Iki Park (about 8 miles east of the Honolulu International Airport). During rollout, the airplane collided with a mango tree.
According to the operator, the pilot had been scheduled to rent the airplane between 1400 and 1600, but he had been delayed for undetermined reasons. The airplane's fuel tanks were not full upon the pilot's departure from Honolulu. The total time registered on the engine's tachometer (from Honolulu to Lanai to impact) was approximately 1.9 hours.
The operator reported that after the accident the airplane was examined. The undamaged right wing fuel tank was found containing several drops of fuel. The damaged (but not breached) left wing fuel tank contained about 1 quart of fuel. The operator also stated that the airplane's engine burns approximately 6 gallons per hour.
According to the Cessna Aircraft Company, the airplane's fuel tank capacity is 26 gallons. The total usable fuel in all flight conditions is 22.5 gallons.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: Fuel exhaustion due to the pilot's inadequate preflight inspection and improper in-flight decision and planning.
Where: Levelland, TX
Multiple witnesses located in the vicinity of the accident site provided statements to the NTSB investigator-in-charge. The first witness, who is a certificated flight instructor (CFI) and was employed by the flight school, stated that he had just flown the airplane before the accident flight. He added that the airplane had flown two previous flights; approximately 1.5 and 1.2 hours in duration. During the CFI's last flight, he stated that he took his wallet and keys and placed them in the airplane. Shortly after the accident pilot and student took the airplane, he realized that his keys and wallet were still in the airplane. The CFI stated that he took a car and drove out onto an intersection taxiway, hoping to get the accident pilot's attention. The CFI said the airplane's takeoff was "abrupt and nose high." The CFI then stated the airplane continued its takeoff run, before a slight "leveling off" and then the airplane climbed to 50-100 feet before making a steep, left banked turn. He then observed the airplane descend to about 50 feet while on the downwind leg, before climbing back to 100-200 feet. The CFI then left the taxi area to go back to the flight school and said he didn't see anything else relating to the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed resulting in an inadvertent stall. Contributing factors were low altitude and the gusting wind.
Where: Coleman, TX
The 2,800-hour private pilot of the single-engine airplane experienced a partial loss of engine power on takeoff. A witness, who is also an airframe and powerplant (A&P) mechanic with inspection authorization (IA), stated that he heard the engine sputtering until the airplane was approximately 250 feet above the ground (AGL); then the engine stopped running. The A&P added that the pilot almost completed a 180-degree turn in an attempt to return to the airport; however, the airplane impacted the ground about 60 feet short of the airport. The A&P moved the airplane into a hangar, and reported to the FAA that the engine broke away from the airframe and the left wing was partially separated from the fuselage. The A&P also reported to the FAA that the fuel in the left fuel tank measured 0.75 of an inch, and the fuel in the right tank measured 0.25 of an inch. On the pilot's most recent FAA medical certificate dated April 11, 1989, the pilot reported his total flight time as 2,800 hours; however, he failed to complete a Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1) sent to him by the NTSB investigator-in-charge.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's failure to refuel the airplane, which resulted in fuel exhaustion. A contributing factor was the lack of suitable terrain available for the forced landing.
At approximately 1900 Mountain Standard Time, a Cessna 152, owned and operated by the pilot, crashed into a frozen lake near Spanish Fork, Utah. The private pilot was seriously injured and his pilot-rated passenger received minor injuries. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the personal flight being conducted under Title 14 CFR Part 91. The flight originated at Spanish Fork immediately prior to the accident.
According to the pilot's accident report and a subsequent written statement, he said the pilot-rated passenger was interested in purchasing his airplane and the flight was for demonstration purposes. The two pilots assessed the weather conditions, 'We had 5 miles visibility as we could see the lights in town and the moon above,' and 'we both determined it was safe to fly as we had five miles visibility.' The pilot wrote that shortly after departure, 'At 300 feet [above the runway] we lost visibility. I continued to climb on runway heading when the pilot-rated passenger grabbed the [control] yoke. I asked what he was doing. He said he felt we were turning. I then noticed we were going down.' In the ensuing struggle, the airplane crashed into a frozen Utah Lake, skidded about 300 feet, and then fell through the ice near Sandy Beach.
The pilot-rated passenger told rescuers, 'I don't know if we flew into a cloud or what. All of a sudden, we couldn't see the lights on the ground anymore. We were disoriented. [The pilot] thought we should descend a little. That's what we were doing when we hit the lake. We didn't really see it coming.'
In his written statement, the pilot-rated passenger said that during the initial climb, 'I remember looking out and seeing the lights on the ground. As I recall, we turned left crosswind and I could still see the ground. Shortly thereafter, probably on the downwind leg, I lost sight of the ground. I remember asking him what the airport elevation was and he said about 4,500 feet (4,529 feet). The last altimeter reading I recall was around 5,500 feet. We started to descend to get out of the fog but the situation was very disorienting as neither of us was instrument rated.'
The passenger assisted the seriously injured pilot out of the airplane. While the pilot clung to the airplane's wing, which remained above the water, the passenger walked across the lake's thin ice, then waded through water towards the rotating beacon at Provo, Utah, Municipal Airport, about 2 miles away. He arrived at the airport about 2030. The pilot was rescued approximately 2300. According to rescuers, the pilot was hypothermic, had fractured both ankles, and had sustained a serious head injury.
Provo airport personnel said the visibility was 'really low. . .about 2 miles' in fog. Neither pilot was instrument rated.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows: Improper weather evaluation by both the pilot and pilot/passenger, and the pilot's inadvertent VFR flight into IMC resulting in his spatial disorientation. Factors were the pilot-rated passenger's spatial disorientation, fog, and night conditions.
Where: Injuries: 1 Fatal
During low level cruise flight, within 2 minutes following takeoff, the Cessna 152 collided with terrain. The student pilot arrived at the airport during nighttime hours when the flight school was closed. He was not scheduled to fly that night and was not endorsed for night flight. He removed keys from the lockbox to an airplane of a type he had never before flown and for which he was not endorsed.
He entered the airplane without a preflight inspection, started the engine with difficulty, and then proceeded to the runway and took off without pausing for any pretakeoff checks. The airplane was observed to takeoff into the clear night, turn, and fly into a mountainside about 2 miles distant. The pilot's flight instructor and the owner of the flight school both found the pilot's behavior on the night of the accident completely out of character for him. A local law enforcement official said the pilot was the subject of a criminal investigation and that a search warrant had been served on his home earlier the same day while the pilot was not home. The pilot returned home to find that entry to his home had been forced and records and a computer were seized. The local coroner ruled the death a suicide.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's intentional flight of the airplane into terrain in an act of suicide.
On May 17, 2002, approximately 0238 mountain daylight time, a Cessna 170A, piloted by a non-instrument rated private pilot, was destroyed when it impacted terrain 15 nautical miles west-northwest of the Natrona County International Airport (CPR), Casper, Wyoming. Night visual meteorological conditions with observed dense fog prevailed at the time of the accident. The personal, cross-country flight was being conducted on a visual flight rules flight plan from CPR to Thermopolis, Wyoming. The pilot sustained fatal injuries. The flight originated at 0228.
The pilot's wife said that the pilot took off from Watkins, Colorado, for Thermopolis about 1900. She said she told him that they were experiencing bad weather, but it was moving rapidly to the east. The pilot's wife said she next spoke to the pilot about 2230. He told her that he was at Casper, Wyoming. He told her that he diverted around stormy weather and was going to wait until it cleared. The pilot's wife said he called her again at 0030 and told her the weather was still down and that he would be spending the night at Casper. He told her that he was going to stop at the Flight Service Station and see what they had to say. He told her that he would then sleep in the airplane until sunrise and not to expect him.
The pilot's wife said she received a call about 0400 from Flight Service asking if the pilot had gotten home and forgot to close his flight plan. She told them that he wasn't there, but would go up to the Thermopolis Airport to see if he was there. She said that Flight Service told her that the pilot waited at their office until 0230 when the weather began to clear up. He left after that.
At 0600, the pilot's wife said she spoke with Flight Service and informed them that there was no sign of her husband. Search and rescue was initiated. The airplane was located by Civil Air Patrol personnel and Natrona County Sheriff's deputies approximately 0730.
Civil Air Patrol personnel and Natrona County Sheriff's deputies, reported dense fog in the Casper area during the early morning hours.
The accident site was located in a pasture 2 miles south of U. S. Highway 20, and 15 miles west-northwest of the Natrona County International Airport. The site extended south along a 168-degree magnetic heading for approximately 373 feet.
The accident site began with a 29-foot long, 10-inch wide, and 3-inch deep scrape in the ground running along a 172-degree heading. At the beginning of the scrape were pieces of red glass; blue and white paint chips, and a wing tip light frame. Along the scrape were numerous paint chips, pieces of clear Plexiglas, and pieces from the airplane's left wing.
At the end of the scrape was an impact crater. The crater was 11 feet long, 6 feet wide, and 28 inches at its deepest point near the center. Within the crater were pieces of broken Plexiglas, white paint chips, and a crushed cabin air vent. The ground at the south edge of the crater was pushed upward. A spray of dirt extended outward from the south edge of the crater for approximately 23 feet. Within the spray of dirt were broken pieces from the airplane's cowling and right wing. Additionally, there were broken pieces of Plexiglas, paint chips, and parts from the engine exhaust manifold.
A piece of the left doorframe was located 85 feet from the initial ground contact point. It was broken outward and crushed aft.
A piece of the instrument panel with the starter switch was located 90 feet from the initial ground contact point. The panel piece was broken and twisted. The switch was broken off.
The outboard section of the right aileron was located 123 feet from the initial ground contact point. It was broken off at the hinges, and was bent upward and twisted aft. The left wing fuel tank was located 130 feet from the initial ground contact point. The tank was broken open, and bent and crushed inward. The smell of aviation fuel was prevalent on the ground south of the fuel tank. The upper right cowling door was located at 137 feet. It was broken longitudinally along the hinges and was bent outward.
A 9-foot, 6-inch section of the airplane's left wing forward spar, the left wing strut, and the left main landing gear strut, were located 162 feet from the initial ground contact point. The spar section was broken out, twisted, and bent aft. The left strut was intact and remained attached by the mounting bolts to the wing strut and a piece of the bottom fuselage and left main landing gear strut. The left main landing gear strut was intact. The wheel, brake, and brake line were broken off. The fuselage piece with the landing gear strut was broken out, crushed and twisted. The smell of aviation fuel was prevalent on the spar section and on the ground around the spar and strut.
The right main cabin door was located 188 feet from the initial ground contact point. The door was broken at the hinges and crushed aft along the front edge of the door. The door window was broken out and fragmented.
The airplane's main wreckage was located 208 feet from the initial ground contact point. The wreckage consisted of the airplane's cabin, outboard portion of the left wing and aileron, the aft portion of the right wing, the right main landing gear, the aft fuselage, and the empennage.
The remaining right wing was bent aft and twisted forward at the wing root. The bottom aft wing skin, aft spar, and right flap were broken and twisted aft. The inboard portion of the right aileron was crushed aft. Flight control continuity to the right aileron was confirmed.
The airplane's aft fuselage was bent downward and twisted 45 degrees clockwise, aft of the rear cabin.
The airplane's empennage was bent right approximately 40 degrees just forward of the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer. The vertical stabilizer was bent left approximately 30 degrees beginning at the base. The top forward part of the vertical stabilizer was bent left 75 degrees. The airplane's rudder was broken free of the vertical stabilizer at the top and bottom hinges. The front edge of the rudder was crushed aft. The top 16 inches of the rudder was bent left and downward 45 degrees. The bottom of the rudder was crushed upward and aft. The tail wheel, tail wheel strut, and fuselage mount were undamaged. The fin leading to the vertical stabilizer was bent left and aft approximately 100 degrees.
A second debris field began at the south side of the airplane main wreckage and extended outward from the wreckage along a 168-degree magnetic heading for approximately 90 feet. The second debris field approximately 45 feet at its widest point. Within the debris field were seat belts, charts, tools, personal effects, wheel chocks, airport directory pages, a portable oxygen bottle, a fire extinguisher, engine parts, and engine instruments.
The airplane's left cabin door was located 258 feet south of the initial ground contact point. The top portion of the door, window frame, and window were broken off. The remainder of the door was broken and crushed aft. The cabin window frame was located at 281 feet. A venturi system filter marked the end of the debris field. It was located 302 feet from the initial ground contact point.
The airplane's engine marked the end of the accident site. It was located 374 feet from the initial ground contact point. The engine was broken free at the mounts. The front crankcase was broken open. The crankshaft was broken torsionally just outside the front of the crankcase.
An examination of the pilot was conducted by the Natrona County, Wyoming, Coroner at Casper, Wyoming. The results of FAA toxicology testing of specimens from the pilot were negative for all tests conducted.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's inadvertent flight into adverse weather conditions and his subsequent failure to maintain aircraft control. A factor contributing to this accident was the fog.
About 1640 Pacific Daylight Time, a Cessna 172S registered to a private individual and operated as a 14 CFR Part 91 solo instructional flight, was substantially damaged during landing at Boeing Field, Seattle, Washington. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was field for the local flight. The student pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured.
In a written statement, the student pilot reported that he took off on runway 13 left with the intent on staying in the pattern to practice touch-and-go landings. The student stated that while on downwind, he was cleared to land. The student reduced power and extended one notch of flaps. Base and final approach turns were made with additional power reduction and flap extension. The student pilot stated that when he turned to final approach, he realized that he was too high. The student lowered the nose of the aircraft, but did not reduce power. Airspeed began to increase and the student attempted to "slip to slow down." The student eventually got the aircraft on the VASI glide slope, but had an indicated airspeed of 75 knots. The student pilot then reduced power and continued to land with 70 to 75 knots airspeed. The aircraft touched down in a flat attitude with excessive airspeed and ballooned. The pilot pitched the nose down and the aircraft touched down on the nose gear and bounced. The student pitched the aircraft down and again the aircraft touched down on the nose gear and bounced. The aircraft finally settled to the runway and the pilot applied braking action and eventually pulled off the runway. The student pilot then taxied back to the fixed base operator to conclude the flight.
Representatives from the flying service reported that the firewall sustained substantial damage.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: Improper flare during the landing. Excessive airspeed and improper remedial action were factors.
Where: Eustis. ME
According to the pilot's written statement, upon arriving in the airport area he observed the windsock in the "down position," and entered the traffic pattern. After the pilot turned the airplane onto the final leg of the approach, he noticed that the airplane was "slightly" high, and compensated with "flaps and [a] slight slip."
The airplane touched down about 500 to 600 feet beyond the threshold of the 1,800-foot runway. The airplane "floated" down the runway for a time, then, the pilot elected to abort the landing. He turned off the carburetor heat, applied full power, accelerated the airplane to 60 mph, and "bled off" the flaps. As the airplane climbed through about 15 feet above ground level, the pilot banked the airplane to the right. The right wing contacted a bush about 60 feet beyond the end of the runway. The airplane pivoted 180 degrees, impacted the ground, and incurred substantial damage to the wings, engine mounts, and tail section.
The pilot did not report any mechanical anomalies with the airplane.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from a bush during the aborted landing.
At 1115 eastern daylight time, a Cessna R172K was substantially damaged while landing at the Warrenton-Fauquier Airport (W66), Warrenton, Virginia. The certificated private pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
The pilot stated that he was performing practice go-around's to runway 32, a 4,103-foot-long, 60-foot-wide, asphalt runway. On his third approach, as the right wheel touched down, and the left one began to settle, the airplane began to veer left. The pilot immediately added full throttle to attempt a go-around, but the airplane was almost instantly in the tall grass at the edge of the runway. The pilot retarded the throttle and applied the brakes, but the airplane continued into a ditch, coming to rest inverted.
The pilot added that the accident could have been prevented if he had paid more attention to the airplane's alignment while landing, and the sudden changes in wind direction.
The pilot stated that he did not experience any mechanical malfunction with the airframe or engine.
Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector revealed substantial damage to both wings, and the vertical stabilizer. The inspector did not observe any anomalies with the flight controls.
The weather observation at the Manassas Regional Airport (HEF), located approximately 12 miles northeast of W66, at 1055, included winds from 310 degrees at 10 knots with 14 knots of gust, visibility 10 statute miles, sky condition clear, temperature 71 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point temperature 52 degrees Fahrenheit, altimeter setting 30.05 inches of Hg., and a wind shift was reported 6 minutes past the hour.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause of this accident as follows: The pilot's inadequate compensation for the shifting wind conditions, and his failure to maintain direction.
Where: Martinsville, Indiana
A Cessna 172K, piloted by a private pilot was destroyed on impact with trees and terrain near Martinsville, Indiana. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight was not on a flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The pilot and passenger received fatal injuries. The flight originated from the Sky King Airport (3I3), Terre Haute, Indiana, at about 2240 and was en route to the Greenwood Municipal Airport (HFY), Greenwood, Indiana.
The pilot had been in communication with air traffic control prior to the accident. At 2300:44, the pilot was given the weather conditions at the Indianapolis International Airport (IND), Indianapolis, Indiana. The air traffic controller said, ''the Indy altimeter three zero two seven, we're showing visibility one quarter with freezing fog, the scattered ceiling is at one hundred feet and broken at seven hundred feet our RVRs are all below eight hundred for the runways. I'm not sure you want to come this direction.' The destination airport, HFY, is located 11 nm and 119 degrees from IND.
Radar data for the time period beginning 2250 EST to 2330 EST was plotted on an aeronautical navigation chart. The plotted data shows the aircraft ground track from a position about 8.7 nautical miles (nm) and 90 degrees magnetic from 3I3 to the accident site. The data show the aircraft on an east-northeast heading until about 2302 EST when the aircraft turned to a southeast and ultimately an easterly heading. The last recorded radar position was recorded at 2318:08.147 EST. The last recorded radar position places the aircraft about 0.3 nm and 220 degrees from the accident site.
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land rating. The pilot did not have an instrument rating. According to a family member, the pilot had accumulated about 300 hours of pilot flight time. No pilot flight records were recovered. The pilot also held a third class aviation medical certificate. The medical certificate listed as a restriction that the pilot must wear corrective lenses.
The airplane was a Cessna model 172K, powered by a Lycoming O-320-E2D engine that was rated at 160 horsepower. A relative of the pilot reported that the aircraft had received an annual inspection and had accumulated a total of 2,699 hours at the time of the inspection. The aircraft logbooks were not recovered.
The Indianapolis International Airport weather reporting station recorded the weather at 2255 EST as:
Wind - 020 degrees at 4 knots
Weather condition - freezing fog
Sky condition - 100 foot indefinite ceiling
Temperature - minus 02 degrees Celsius
Dew point - minus 02 degrees Celsius
Altimeter setting 30.27 inches of mercury
The Indianapolis International Airport weather reporting station recorded the weather at 2321 EST as:
Wind - 010 degrees at 4 knots
Visibility - 1/8 mile
Witnesses in the area of the accident site reported foggy conditions on the night of the accident.
The following is a synopsis of the communications between the aircraft and the Terre Haute, Indiana, Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT):
2248 - The pilot reported on approach frequency 125.45
2249 - Terre Haute approach responded.
2249 - The pilot told approach he was VFR off of Sky King (3I3) to Greenwood (HFY).
2249 - Approach had the aircraft ident on 1200 code.
2249 - Approach radar identified the aircraft and asked at what altitude he would be cruising.
2250 - The pilot responded 2200 feet.
2250 - Approach gave the pilot the altimeter setting and told him to maintain VFR, standby for squawk code.
2250 - The pilot acknowledged.
2250 - Approach issued code 4561.
2259 - Approach instructed the pilot to contact Indianapolis Approach on frequency 119.05
2300 - The pilot acknowledged frequency change to Indianapolis.
The following communications were recorded between the aircraft and the Indianapolis, Indiana, ATCT Approach Control position (DRE):
2300:32 - The pilot contacted Indianapolis approach.
2300:35 - DRE acknowledged.
2300:38 - The pilot stated, 'We're about thirty five miles to the west we're inbound for hotel foxtrot Yankee.'
2300:44 - DRE advised that 'Indy altimeter three zero two seven we're showing visibility one quarter with freezing fog the scattered ceiling is at one hundred feet and broken at seven hundred feet our RVRs are all ah below eight hundred for the runways. I'm not sure you want to come this direction.'
2301:13 - The pilot responded he would deviate to an alternate airport.
2301:17 - DRE stated, 'If it helps at all, Greencastle airport's about eleven or twelve o'clock and six miles.'
2301:26 - The pilot responded, 'Okay, thanks a lot have a good day.'
No further transmissions were received from the aircraft.
A post accident examination of the wreckage was conducted. The cockpit section was destroyed by fire. The remainder of the wreckage was fragmented and distributed along the wreckage path. The wreckage was oriented on an approximately 150-degree magnetic heading. All flight control surfaces were identified. Control system continuity could not be verified due to the amount of damage to the aircraft. All identified control cable breaks exhibited signatures consistent with overload. No anomalies were found with respect to the airframe that could be associated with a preexisting condition.
Several downed trees were found in the immediate area of the accident site. Several branches were found with diagonal cuts. A tree about 16 inches in diameter was found with a diagonal cut that penetrated about 4 inches deep into the center of the hollow trunk.
The engine was removed from the accident site and transported to a location where an examination could be made. The engine could be rotated by turning the propeller. Crankshaft and valve train continuity were established. Accessory gear continuity was established. Thumb compression was established on all cylinders. Both magneto cases were broken. The upper set of spark plugs was removed and no anomalies were noted. The carburetor was broken loose from its mount. The carburetor throttle arm was moved and a fluid consistent in odor to gasoline was sprayed from the accelerator pump nozzle. The carburetor was disassembled and a fluid was noted in the float bowl. No anomalies were found with respect to the engine or engine accessories that could be associated with a preexisting condition.
A forensic toxicology report was negative for all tests performed.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows: The pilot's decision not to fly to the alternate airport, his decision to continue the flight in known adverse weather conditions, spatial disorientation by the pilot, and his failure to maintain aircraft control. Factors were the low ceilings, the dark night, the fog, and the trees.
Where: Decatur, WA
Witnesses to the accident reported that shortly after departing from the northbound runway, the pilot initiated a 360-degree turn to the right (east). Shortly before completing the turn, the aircraft banked sharply to the left, pitched down, and collided with trees in a nose-low attitude. Witnesses reported that the aircraft's engine sounded normal during takeoff and the initial climb.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate with an airplane multiengine land rating. He also held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating and instrument rating. According to company training records, the pilot's most recent proficiency check was completed in a Piper PA-31-350.
According to FAA records, the pilot's medical certificate carried no limitations or waivers. On the application for the medical certificate, the pilot indicated that he had accumulated approximately 3,100 total flight hours, including 140 hours in the six months preceding the application date.
The airplane, a 1977 Cessna 172N, was powered by a naturally aspirated Lycoming O-320 series engine rated at 160 horsepower. Maintenance records indicated that the airplane's last inspection, a 100-hour inspection, was completed on September 10, 2001. The airplane had accumulated approximately 48 hours from the time of the inspection to the time of the accident.
According to the aircraft's flight manual, the maximum gross takeoff weight for the airplane is 2,300 pounds. Weight and balance records for the airplane listed the airplanes empty weight as 1,426.2 pounds. The estimated gross weight of the airplane at takeoff was 2,361 pounds. The weights used to determine the airplane's gross weight at takeoff were based on the most current weight and balance records, the actual weights of the occupants, the baggage and personal items (153 pounds) and the airplane's fuel load (102.6 pounds) at takeoff.
The 1353 Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) at Friday Harbor, Washington (FHR), approximately 9 miles west of the accident location, reported winds from 348 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; clear skies; temperature 16 degrees Celsius; dew point 8 degrees Celsius and altimeter setting 30.20 inches.
Personnel from the NTSB, FAA, and Textron Lycoming accessed the aircraft wreckage. The wreckage was located in a heavily wooded area approximately 1/4 mile beyond the departure end of runway 33. The wreckage field encompassed an area approximately 195 feet long, from north to south. A grouping of large trees, with fresh scarring, was noted at the north end of the wreckage track. The magnetic bearing from the trees to the wreckage was approximately 170 degrees. The main wreckage was located at the southern most end of the wreckage distribution track. The remains of the fuselage were found inverted, oriented on a magnetic heading of 208 degrees. Evidence of a small post-crash fire was noted, with thermal damage and soot in the area of the carburetor.
All aircraft components were located at the crash site. The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, empennage, right wing assembly and engine. A section of the left inboard wing and left flap was located approximately 18 feet north of the main wreckage. The remaining (outboard) section of the left wing and left aileron were located at the base of a large tree 100 feet north of the main wreckage. The still-standing tree measured approximately 10 feet in diameter and was approximately 150 feet tall. Fresh scarring, approximately 70 feet up from the base of the tree, was noted. The left main landing gear assembly was located 196 feet north of the main wreckage. The left main landing gear assembly was found at the northern end of the wreckage distribution track.
Extensive impact damage and fragmentation was noted to the cockpit controls and instrumentation panel. The throttle control was full forward, the mixture control was in the full rich position and the carburetor heat control was in the cold (forward) position. The fuel selector was in the 'both' position.
All fixed and movable empennage control surfaces remained attached in their respective positions. Rearward crushing and deformation was noted to the outboard section of the left horizontal stabilizer and left elevator. The right horizontal stabilizer was bent aft; however, the right elevator was intact and no deformation was noted. The vertical stabilizer and rudder sustained minimal impact damage. Control cable continuity was established from the empennage control surfaces to the cockpit.
The partially attached right wing was located with the main wreckage. The right flap and aileron were attached to the wing, and the flap was in the up position. Leading edge deformation, increasing toward the tip, was noted. An undetermined amount of fuel, blue in color, was noted in the right fuel tank.
The left wing was found separated into two sections. The inboard section of the wing sustained extensive impact damage and had separated from the fuselage at the wing attach points. The wing flap had separated from the wing, and was located in the area of the inboard section of wing. A large section of the leading edge was crushed rearward to the trailing edge of the wing, exposing the wing fuel tank. Leading edge rearward crushing and bending was noted to the outboard section of the wing. The left aileron was still attached to the outboard wing assembly.
The propeller assembly was found as a unit attached to the crankshaft flange. Rearward crushing was noted to the propeller spinner. Aft bending and chordwise scratching was noted to propeller blade 'A'. Propeller blade 'B' was bent aft and chordwise scratching was noted.
The engine was found attached to the engine mount assembly and firewall. Minimal impact damage was noted to the frontal, lower and accessory area of the engine. Rocker arm, valve train and accessory gear continuity was established by rotating the engine's crankshaft by hand. All four cylinders developed pressure when the crankshaft was manually rotated. Internal examination of the piston cylinders, utilizing a lighted bore scope, revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction. The single drive magneto assembly and ignition harnesses sustained thermal damage, however, produced spark when the drive shaft was manually rotated. The spark plugs were removed and normal operating wear patterns were noted.
According to the autopsy report, the pilot's cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head and chest. The manner of death was listed as accidental.
The FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, conducted toxicology testing on the pilot. According to the postmortem toxicology report, results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and ethanol, legal and illegal drugs.
Representatives from the NTSB, Cessna Aircraft and Textron Lycoming conducted an engine examination and teardown at the operator's hangar facility in Anacortes, Washington.
Disassembly and examination of the engine revealed no evidence of pre-impact malfunction or failure. The rocker arms and valve assemblies were intact and in their normal position. The crankshaft main bearings exhibited no evidence of bearing shift or scoring. The connecting rods moved freely on their respective journals. No lifter spalling, pitting or abnormal camshaft wear was noted. The engine oil pump gears were intact and in their normal position. The oil pump cavity was clear and the oil screens were free of contaminants.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows: The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed during a low altitude turn, resulting in a stall. The pilot exceeding the aircraft's maximum gross takeoff weight was a factor.
Where: Albuquerque NM
At approximately 1140 mountain daylight time, a Cessna R172E, was substantially damaged when the left wing struck the asphalt taxiway following an encounter with a jet blast from an MD-80 while taxiing for takeoff at Albuquerque International Airport (ABQ), Albuquerque, New Mexico. The student pilot, the sole occupant on board, was not injured. The United States Air Force, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, was operating the airplane. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country training flight that was originating at the time of the accident.
According to the student pilot, he had just finished opening his flight plan with Albuquerque Flight Service Station. He called ABQ Ground Control for taxi clearance and was instructed to taxi to Runway 8 and to follow an Air Tractor. The student pilot reported that after he crossed runway 35 and was approaching the taxiway intersection "A3," the airplane "began getting pushed to the left." The student pilot said he applied right aileron. The airplane continued to veer to the left. The student pilot stated he "applied additional right aileron" and "brakes." The airplane continued to roll, "resting momentarily on the left wingtip with the propeller striking the taxiway." An examination of the airplane revealed the left wing spar was bent aft. No other anomalies were found.
After the event, the student pilot noticed an American Airlines MD-80, flight 1712, to his right that had just pushed back from its gate, B1, and was beginning to taxi.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The student pilot's inadvertent encounter with the jet blast and the subsequent inability to maintain aircraft control.
Approximately 1711 central daylight time, a Cessna 172L single-engine airplane was destroyed when it impacted terrain following a loss of control during takeoff from the New Braunfels Municipal Airport (BAZ), near New Braunfels, Texas. The private pilot and one passenger sustained fatal injuries and one passenger sustained serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Par 91 personal flight. The cross-country flight was originating at the time of the accident and was destined for Killeen, Texas.
According to local authorities, the three occupants of the airplane were in Laredo, Texas, the night before the accident on a reported weekend hunting trip. Three ticket stubs from the Greyhound Lines, Inc., found in one of the occupants clothing, indicated the three individuals departed from Laredo approximately 0300 on a bus, destined for San Antonio. Local authorities reported that the three individuals arrived at a family member's residence in San Antonio, approximately 0630. The pilot reportedly slept until 1330, and approximately 1400, he called Southern Wings Flight Training Center, at BAZ, and reserved the accident airplane for the rest of the day. Approximately 1700, the three occupants arrived at BAZ for the flight.
Prior to the accident flight, a company representative from the Southern Wings Flight Training Center spoke with the pilot. The pilot informed the company representative that he was intending to fly to Killeen, Texas, drop his friends off and return. The company representative asked the pilot if he needed any more fuel and if he worked a weight and balance. The company representative informed the pilot that there was approximately 2.2 hours of fuel onboard the aircraft. During the conversation, the pilot stated that his two passengers weighed 185 pounds each, and would use the self-serve fuel pump himself to refuel the airplane.
Fuel records from the self-serve fuel pump at BAZ indicated that 12.8 gallons of 100 low lead aviation fuel was purchased for the accident aircraft.
A local airshow had been scheduled at the airport. The airshow activities were concluding for the day at the time of the accident. Airshow personnel reported that runway 35 was the active runway throughout the day for the airshow.
Multiple witnesses observed the airplane taxi to runway 17 at the end of the airshow. The Safety Board obtained statements from witnesses located on the east ramp at BAZ where the airshow event was being conducted.
The first witness observed the airplane depart from runway 17, and the airplane appeared to be "kind of tippy." The airplane started a turn to the left, "not very high off the ground with the wings dipping back and forth." As the airplane started turning out over the field, it "did a complete 360-degree barrel roll."
A second witness observed the airplane takeoff at an approximate angle of 70 degrees. The witness stated "[the] pilot appeared to attempt a recovery, but seemed to overcorrect and pull up too fast." The airplane "pitched downward towards the left and entered a spin towards the right."
A third witness located in an ultralight holding short of runway 35, observed the airplane liftoff "into an extremely steep climb." There never "appeared to be any attempt of a recovery from the stall. The [air]plane did a left roll and went down." The witness also stated it "looked like the left wingtip and nose hit at about the same time."
The pilot was issued a private pilot's certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating and an instrument airplane rating. The pilot was issued a second-class medical certificate with the limitation of "MUST WEAR CORRECTIVE LENSES." The private pilot's total flight time was reported to the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) to be approximately 200 hours. The pilot's logbook was not located.
The passenger in the front right seat applied for a student pilot's certificate but was denied due to medical reasons. The passenger in the back seat of the airplane held a student pilot's certificate and second-class medial certificate.
During a telephone interview conducted by the IIC, the passenger, who was sitting in the back seat, stated that the accident flight was his first flight with the pilot. The passenger also stated that he "had heard the pilot was a very safe pilot."
The 1971-model Cessna 172L airplane was configured to carry a maximum of four occupants. The airplane was powered by a normally aspirated, direct drive, air-cooled, horizontally opposed, carbureted, four-cylinder Lycoming O-320-E2D engine, rated at 150 horsepower. The engine was equipped with a two-bladed fixed pitch McCauley propeller. The airplane was equipped with shoulder harnesses and lap belt restraints for both front seats. The rear seat was equipped with lap belt restraints.
According to the aircraft logbooks, the airplane's most recent annual inspection showed a total airframe time of 3,557.0 hours. The most recent 100-hour inspection showed an airframe total time of 3,751.1 hours, and an engine total time of 1,212.1 hours since major overhaul. The airplane had accumulated 72.24 hours since the 100-hour inspection. No open maintenance discrepancies were noted within the aircraft logbooks.
At 1651, the BAZ automated surface observing system (ASOS), reported the wind from 050 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 statue miles, few clouds at 7,000 feet agl, temperature 91 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 61 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting of 29.95 inches of Mercury.
BAZ is located four miles east of New Braunfels, Texas, with a field elevation of 651 feet msl. The non-towered airport features two asphalt runways: runway 17/35 and runway 13/31. Runway 17/35 is a 5,364-foot long by 100-foot wide asphalt runway, and runway 13/31 is a 5,352-foot long by 100-foot wide asphalt runway.
The accident site was located near the departure end of the runway 17, approximately 499 feet left of the runway centerline. The Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates recorded at the accident site using a hand held GPS unit were 29 degrees 91.687' minutes north latitude and 098 degrees 02.528' minutes west longitude, at an elevation of 651 feet msl. The airplane impacted soft terrain on a magnetic heading of 060 degrees, and came to rest upright on a heading of 040 degrees, approximately 25 feet to the right of the point of impact. The wreckage debris distribution area remained within an 85-foot radius to the main wreckage.
The initial ground scar measured approximately 14 feet in length and contained portions of white and red paint chips and plastic. A red navigational light lens was located adjacent to the ground scar. A crater, 2-1/2 feet wide by 2 feet long was located 8 feet from the end of the initial ground scar. A second ground scar, parallel to the left wing measured approximately 12 feet in length.
Examination of the wreckage revealed that the left wing was partially separated from the fuselage. The inboard half of the left wing was buckled and deformed from the leading edge aft to the aileron. The outboard half of the left wing was destroyed, and the left wingtip fairing was separated. A one-foot section of the aileron was separated and was located adjacent to the main wreckage. The left flap was observed to be in the up position. The vented fuel cap was secure, and the seals were found in good condition. The stall warning system was field tested at the wing and found to be operational.
The right wing remained attached to the fuselage; however, it was buckled from the leading edge to the aileron throughout the length of the wing. The area of wing skin common to the fuel tank was deformed. A 1-foot section of the aileron was partially separated. The right flap was observed to be in the up position. The vented fuel cap was secure, and the seals were found in good condition. Flight control continuity was established from the cockpit control column to the left and right wing control surfaces.
The fuselage section forward of the baggage door was deformed upward. The undercarriage of the fuselage, behind the right main landing gear attach point was bent upward. The left and right main landing gear remained attached to the fuselage. The left main landing gear was bent upwards. The nose wheel was curled aft underneath the forward part of the fuselage.
The empennage remained intact. The horizontal and vertical stabilizers remained intact, and respective flight control surfaces and cables remained attached. The elevator trim tab was measured to be in the 5-degree tab up position. Control continuity was established to the rudder and elevator trim. Elevator control continuity was established from the flight control surface to the elevator control shaft. The elevator control shaft, located between the yoke control assembly and the forward elevator bellcrank, was found fractured at the yoke control assembly attach point. The fracture surfaces were consistent with overload.
The cockpit was destroyed with crushing and component separation. The instrument panel, including surrounding structure was separated from the cockpit doorposts. The tachometer displayed 2,040 rpm and 3,289.14 hours. The magneto switch was observed in the left position. The throttle and mixture controls were found in the full forward position. Continuity was established throughout the pitot system.
Both side bases of the front left seat were separated. The outboard rear roller was still attached to the seat. The seat-locking pin was bent aft. The seat back was intact and straight. A rag and flight control lock was found under the seat. A gouge was observed on the outboard seat rail, approximately 9 1/4 inches from the front end of the rail on the outboard side. Both side bases of the front right seat were separated. The back of the seat was bent and slightly twisted. The seat-locking pin was bent aft. The outboard seat rail displayed a "mark" on the outboard side, approximately 13 inches from the front end of the rail. Safety blocks for both the left and right front seats were found installed on both the outboard seat rails.
The engine was displaced aft and curled underneath the cabin with its mounts intact. The propeller remained attached to the engine, and engine continuity was established by rotating the propeller by hand. The carburetor was separated from its attach point. Fuel was expelled when the carburetor accelerator arm was actuated. No fuel was observed in the carburetor bowl. The oil suction screen was removed and found free of contaminants. When compared to the Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug Wear Guide (Part Number AV-27), all spark plugs displayed signatures consistent to normal operation. Both magnetos remained intact to their respective mounting pads and produced spark at all outlet towers when rotated by hand. A borescope inspection revealed no mechanical deformation on the valves, cylinder walls, or internal cylinder head.
The propeller spinner was displaced and crushed downward. One propeller blade displayed an "S" bend approximately 12 inches inboard from the tip. No leading edge damage was observed. The other propeller blade displayed a leading edge gouge approximately 12 inches from the tip, as well as chordwise scratching.
No radio headsets, charts, flight gear, or logbooks were located within the aircraft wreckage.
There was no post-impact or pre-impact fire.
The pilot succumbed to his injuries. An autopsy was not performed on the pilot. Toxicological tests were not obtained for the pilot. According to the local law enforcement, the pilot's blood test at the hospital at the time of the accident was negative for alcohol.
The IIC and a representative from the airplane manufacturer conducted an examination of the aircraft's seat tracks on October 28, 2003, at the facilities of Air Salvage of Dallas, near Lancaster, Texas.
The outboard seat track for the left seat (part number MC0511240-11) was bent upward approximately 90 degrees, 6 inches aft of the front of the track. Holes #1, #2, #3, and #4, were cracked and deformed. The cotter pin installed in hole #1 was not damaged. Hole #5 was elongated and deformed forward and outboard. A gouge was observed in the bottom of hole #5. The seat rail track was separated into two pieces at hole #10.
The inboard seat track for the left seat (part number MC0511240-15) remained intact. A "SAF-T-STOP" (part number 8701-04) was installed approximately 4 inches forward of the aft end of the track and was found secure.
The outboard seat track for the right seat (part number MC0511240-12) remained intact. A "SAF-T-STOP" (part number 8701-04) was installed approximately 1 3/8 inches forward of the aft end of the track and was found secure.
The inboard seat track for the left seat (part number MC0511240-14) remained intact. A seat stop was installed in hole #1 and was secure. Hole #7 was deformed with a gouge on the top of the T section of the seat track that extended forward to hole #6.
On March 17, 2004, the aircraft's seat tracks were sent to Materials Analysis Inc., of Dallas, Texas, and examined under the supervision of the IIC. The metallurgy report obtained from Materials Analysis Inc., indicated that both the left and right front seat locking pins were engaged. The fractures of the seat cast frame were consistent with overload.
An NTSB metallurgist reviewed the Material Analysis, Inc. report. The NTSB metallurgist found that the documentation supports that both the left and right seat pins were engaged at the time of the accident.
The airplane manufacturer calculated the weight and balance of the airplane at the time of departure using the reported weights of the occupants, estimated fuel weights, and the weight of the luggage removed from the accident site. The weight and balance was found to be within limits at the time of departure.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed sufficient for flight resulting in an inadvertent stall/spin during takeoff.