Source: http://propertylegalblog.co.uk/tag/judicial-review/page/2/
Timestamp: 2018-08-20 14:48:06
Document Index: 111749750

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 54', 'art 54', 'art 3', 'art 54', 'art 3', 'art 3']

Judicial Review | Phil Taylor's Law Blog | Page 2
Community donation immaterial consideration invalidating planning permission
The High Court case of Wright, R (on the application of) v Forest of Dean District Council & Anor [2016] concerned whether or not a local community donation, based on turnover generated by a wind turbine, amounted to a material consideration which it was lawful for the council to take into account when granting planning permission for the wind turbine.
The Environmental Report accompanying the planning application had offered benefits including:
“Annual community donations will also be made based typically on 4% of turnover (estimated at an average of around £15k to £20k each year for 25 years of operation – up to £500k to help address current and future community needs)…..”
The main ground of challenge to the permission was that this was not a material consideration that the council could lawfully have taken into account.
“Simply being a contribution for community benefit related to a local strategy for health, social or cultural wellbeing does not make that contribution in and of itself material to a planning determination. It must pass the Newbury test and be for a planning purpose and be fairly and reasonably related to the development proposed. It is difficult to see how the provision of waterproof clothing for a play group or lunches for senior citizens has any proper bearing on the issues relevant to the regulation of land use and control of development which are at stake when considering whether or not to grant planning permission for a wind turbine. The opportunity to make provision for them from the turnover of the scheme is not a planning purpose and is not fairly and reasonably related to the development.”
The council was not entitled to take into account the offer of the local community donation as a material consideration in their planning decision. As a consequence the decision was unlawful.
The court “was not prepared to accept that there would have been no substantial difference to the outcome of the members’ decision-making process had they appreciated that they could not take account of the community donation in determining whether consent should be granted.”
The council’s decision should be quashed.
This entry was posted in Development, Judicial Review, Local Government, Planning Law, Wind Farms and tagged Development, Judicial Review, Local Government, Planning, Renewable Energy, Renewables, Wind Farms, wind turbines on June 19, 2016 by admin.
CPR Part 54.5(5) provided with effect from 1 July 2013:
“Where the application for judicial review relates to a decision made by the Secretary of State or a local planning authority under the planning acts, the claim form must be filed not later than six weeks after the grounds to make the claim first arose.”
In Gerber, R (on the application of) v Wiltshire Council & Ors [2016], at the time the Council took its decision to grant planning permission the CPR Part 54.5(1) applied also to such applications and provided:
“The claim form must be filed –
The court had a discretion under CPR Part 3.1(2)(a) to extend time for compliance with this rule.
Section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides that the court “may” refuse to grant relief where “the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person” or where it “would be detrimental to good administration.”
The Court of Appeal said where a judge at first instance has interpreted the law correctly and has had regard to relevant considerations the court would not overturn his exercise of discretion under section 31(6) unless the ultimate conclusion reached was clearly wrong and outside the range of legitimate choices which might be made in the circumstances.
The Council had posted notices of the planning application at prominent places in the vicinity of the site in accordance with article 13 of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) Order 2010, including at the end of the lane leading to Mr Gerber’s Hall but he had not noticed them. Notice of the application was also given in the local newspaper, and on the Council’s website, but Mr Gerber did not know about the application until he noticed development work being carried out on the site on 19 March 2014, when he discovered that an application for planning permission had been made and had been granted.
On 20 March 2014 he wrote an email to the Council to object to the development on the grounds of the detrimental impact it had on the setting of his Hall. Eventually Mr Gerber commenced this claim for judicial review.
On 20 October 2014 Dove J granted permission for the application for judicial review to be brought.
The judge granted Mr Gerber an extension of time for bringing his claim. The judge found that the four substantive grounds of challenge were made out. The Court of Appeal agreed with three of them.
But the Court of Appeal said Mr Gerber had no proper grounds for delaying commencing legal proceedings as he did after 19 March 2014. The High Court judge had been wrong to extend time under CPR Part 54.5 for Mr Gerber to bring his judicial review claim.
As regards the exercise of the court’s discretion not to quash the planning permission, there was no need to rule on this further point but had the Court of Appeal allowed the extension of time and needed to substitute it’s own discretion, it would have said Mr Gerber had a fair opportunity to bring proceedings to challenge the planning permission in proper time but there was unjustified delay and the extent of the prejudice to the developers from quashing the planning permission militated decisively against this.
This entry was posted in Development, Judicial Review, Local Government, Planning Law and tagged Development, Judicial Review, Local Government, Planning on February 27, 2016 by admin.
Part 3, Class A of Schedule 2 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 2015 (the GPDO) permits development consisting of a change of use of a building from a use falling within Class A4 (drinking establishment) to a use falling within Class A1 (shops).
Noquet & Anor v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor [2016] concerned a former public house last used as a mixed use of A1 (sale of wood burning stoves etc) and residential use. That mixed use was unauthorised under the planning rules.
The claimant’s case was that the rights under Part 3 operated so as to grant planning permission for change of use from A4 to A1 as the claimants were entitled to resume the A4 use of the property under section 57 (4) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
The High Court said the claimant could not rely on the GPDO to grant deemed planning consent to a retail use. The fact that there had been actual A4 use in the past was irrelevant.
What had to be compared was the present use and the proposed use.
The court was not concerned to consider a notional A4 use which could be exercised without the need for further permission, as would be the position here should the claimants revert to use of the property as a public house, for which no planning permission would be required.
This entry was posted in Judicial Review, Local Government, Planning Law and tagged change of use, deemed planning consent, deemed planning permission, general development order, Judicial Review, Local Government, Planning on February 21, 2016 by admin.