Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20060831_0001275.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-16 15:13:02
Document Index: 615059082

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 1291', '§ 2253', '§ 2254']

| Medina v. Diguglielmo
JOSE MEDINAv.DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, APPELLANTS
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-00128 (Honorable Anita B. Brody).
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, NYGAARD and ALARCÓN,*fn1 Circuit Judges.
David Diguglielmo, the District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia, and the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania ("the Commonwealth") appeal from the order granting habeas corpus relief to state prisoner Jose Medina pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) (1994).
The Commonwealth contends that the District Court "erred in concluding that every reasonable attorney would have challenged Marcos Toro's competency at trial."*fn2 It also maintains that Mr. Medina "was not prejudiced by counsel's decision not to challenge Marcos's competency." We will reverse the District Court's order because Mr. Medina has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object to Marcos Toro's competency.
Mr. Medina showed the boys a long-bladed "Rambo" knife. Hector testified that Mr. Medina "was drunk and he said 'Today I am going to kill somebody with this knife.'" The boys then left the "Chinese store" and went to their home, which was one block away. A short time later, Marcos Toro heard Mr. Medina shouting that he was owed forty dollars. Marcos Toro testified that he saw Mr. Medina stab William Bogan in the heart with the same knife he had seen earlier.
Q: Before we came in here today, the defendant's sister and mother came up to speak to you; right?"
Q: And they made you nervous, didn't they?
A: (Witness shakes head)
Q: Did you tell me they scared you?
Q: They are here in the courtroom and they are staring in your direction [from the] back row?
A: A-huh.
Q: Are [sic] do they make you nervous now that you are binding your hands?
Q: Now, is what you are telling the judge the truth?
Mr. Silverstein did not move for a competency hearing based on Marcos Toro's age, or his inconsistent responses to the questions posed during direct and cross-examination, nor did he object to Judge Margiotti's sua sponte finding that Marcos Toro was "precocious."*fn3 Judge Margiotti determined that the Commonwealth had presented a prima facie case. He ordered that Mr. Medina be held for trial.
Judge Stout asked Mr. Daly if he had seen Marcos Toro cry. Mr. Daly replied: "I saw the child cry this morning." Mr. Daly stated further that he had no objection to excluding Mr. Medina's family. He also noted that "they would be sequestered anyway" because they would be testifying during the trial.
Judge Stout granted the motion.
Q: You are in the fifth grade. Is that right?
Q: Do you know what it means to tell the truth?
Q: Let me ask it the other way. Do you know what it means to tell a lie?
Q: Do you know the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie?
Q: You just told the jury and the judge when you put your hand on the Bible you were going to tell the truth?
Q: What does the truth mean?
THE COURT: First of all, let's sit up straight and take your hand down. What happens to you if you tell a lie? (No response.)
THE COURT: What happens to you? Take your hand down and look at me. Tell me what will happen to you if you tell a lie? (No response.)
Q: Do you want to be here, Marcos? I said, do you want to be here?
MR. DALY: I object. THE COURT: Overruled. BY MS. SWEENEY:
THE COURT: Now, listen, take your hand down. MR. DALY: Your Honor will note my objection for the record.
THE COURT: Your objection is well noted.
Sit up straight: Pretend you are at home or at school, or someplace and talk to us just like you would talk to the teacher.
Now, let's start over again.
Tell me what will happen to you if you tell a lie? What would the teacher -- what would your mother do to you? What would your father do to you? What would happen to you[?] BY MS. SWEENEY:
Q: Marcos, you have to give an answer if you know the answer. What would happen to you if you tell a lie? Do you get rewarded?
Q: Do you get a prize for telling a lie?
Q: Do you get in trouble for telling a lie?
Q: What about when you tell the truth? If you tell the truth, is that a good thing to do?
THE COURT: It is not good to tell the truth? THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q: We want you to tell the truth about what you may have seen and heard about a year ago involving the white dude. Do you know what I am talking about?
You don't know what she is talking about? THE WITNESS: No.
After hearing the testimony quoted above, Mr. Daly did not object on competency grounds. ADA Sweeney proceeded with her direct examination. Marcos Toro testified that he saw Mr. Medina in a "Chinese store." He stated he had known Mr. Medina since he was five years old. He had seen Mr. Medina every day in the neighborhood. When asked to tell the jury "[w]hat happened after Mr. Medina entered the store," Marcos Toro did not answer. ADA Sweeney then requested a sidebar conference, which was granted. She informed Judge Stout that ADA Ponterio had handled the preliminary hearing and knew the witness better than she did. ADA Sweeney requested that ADA Ponterio question Marcos Toro. Judge Stout replied: "If he testified at the [preliminary] hearing and you have the notes,*fn4 I think he can be declared an unavailable witness." Mr. Daly objected to permitting a second lawyer to continue the direct examination of Marcos Toro. ADA Sweeney then requested the Court's permission to seat ADA Ponterio at counsel table. Judge Stout inquired whether the prosecutor could put on another witness. ADA Sweeney replied: "He won't be any better tomorrow." Judge Stout permitted ADA Ponterio to sit at counsel table.
Q: Do you remember this question: "In fact, you didn't see Harry stab the guy. Did you? Do you remember that question?"
Q: Your answer: "My brother did." Do you remember that answer?"
Q: Do you remember this question: "Your brother did and you were only telling us what your brother told you is that right?"
And your answer: "Yes." The answer is "Huh-huh."
Q: Do you remember that question and that answer?
Q: Do you remember this question: "And you didn't eyewitness Harry do anything. Right? Am I correct? You have to say yes or no."
And your answer: "Yes."
Q: And you only assumed that because you saw the knife at the restaurant. Is that right?
Q: And you answered: "Uh-uh."
Q: And when [Mr. Silverstein] asked you that question, remember we went over here, when he asked you, "You only assumed that because you saw the knife in the restaurant. Is that right?"
Q: And when he asked you the question, "Everything you said about Harry stabbing the white dude is either something that your brother told you or you made up because you figured he did it because he had a knife. Right?
Q: When he asked you that question, you were telling the truth. Weren't you?
Q: And it is not your intention, never was, to tell a lie. Was it?
Q: And you believed at the time you were talking to the police that you were helping them?
Q: And what you told the defense attorney at the time was the truth. Wasn't it?
Q: You thought from seeing the knife earlier that Harry must have down [sic] it?
Q: As you told the defense attorney, in fact, you didn't see it. Did you?
Q: Did you make this up?
Q: Did you see this stabbing?
Q: Who stabbed the white dude?
On his direct appeal before the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Mr. Medina argued:
Commonwealth v. Medina, No. 3885, slip op. at 1 (PA: Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 1995). The Superior Court held the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Id. at 19. The Superior Court summarized the evidence as follows:
Well, I decided that the individual appeared to me to be competent, and based on the strategy that I wished to use, that is the fact that Michael Toro, in his preliminary hearing notes, seemed to flipflop, I wanted to have him on the stand to see whether or not he would do the same, which I believed that he, based on the notes testimony, that he would, and he flip-flopped in front of the jury at that time.
In Mr. Medina's second direct appeal, the Court of Common Pleas concluded: "[I]t cannot grant defendant relief simply because hindsight reveals that trial counsel's tactical decision that the witness was competent and that he would be able to discredit him through cross examination was in error." Commonwealth v. Medina, No. 1080, slip op. at 4 (Pa. Ct. of C.P. Feb. 7, 2000). The Superior Court affirmed that decision on February 16, 2001. Commonwealth v. Medina, No. 3132 EDA 1999, slip op. at 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2001) (holding that "[c]ounsel's strategy, while arguably the wrong one in hindsight, was not lacking in a reasonable basis designed to further appellant's interest.").
Mr. Medina filed for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act on December 11, 2001. His petition was dismissed by the trial court. The Superior Court affirmed that dismissal on September 17, 2003. Commonwealth v. Medina, 835 A.2d 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). On December 16, 2003, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Mr. Medina's Petition for Allowance of Appeal. He then initiated this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In his pro se brief for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), Mr. Medina raised six claims. Medina v. Diguglielmo, 373 F. Supp. 2d 526, 538 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2005). His first three claims alleged "ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to object to the competency of the Toro brothers." Id. at 538. His fourth claim alleged ineffectiveness of counsel for "failing to introduce medical evidence establishing that Medina was incapable of acting in the manner described at trial." Id. Mr. Medina alleged, in his fifth claim, that "the trial court rendered his trial counsel ineffective by admonishing counsel in front of the jury and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue." Id. In his sixth claim, Mr. Medina contended that "the prosecution made improper remarks in its closing argument by vouching for the Commonwealth's witnesses and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue." Id.
Id. at 538 n.6.
The District Court noted, however, that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("R&R") "disregards his pro se claim that the trial court violated his due process rights when it failed to conduct a sua sponte inquiry into the competency of the Toro brothers." Id. Because "[t]he parties did not object to the Magistrate Judge's characterization of Medina's claims in their objections, and Medina actually adopted [the Magistrate Judge's] characterization of his claims in his objections to the R&R," the District Court did not consider whether the failure of the trial court to conduct a sua sponte competency hearing violated due process. Id.
Pursuant to Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a district court is not required to determine de novo whether a magistrate judge erred in failing to consider a claim in his or her report and recommendation if no objection was made by a party on that ground. In his brief before this Court, Mr. Medina does not contend that his federal due process rights were violated by the failure of the trial court to conduct a sua sponte hearing regarding the competency of the Toro brothers. Furthermore, Mr. Medina did not file a protective cross-appeal challenging the failure of the District Court to consider his federal due process claims. See Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 877-79 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that "the failure of a party to object to a magistrate's legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo review" in the district court -- but not in the loss of the statutory right to appellate review). Accordingly, we conclude that this claim has been abandoned or forfeited.
The District Court entered a final order on June 2, 2005, granting Mr. Medina's petition for habeas corpus relief. It concluded that the state court's dismissal of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the competency of Marcos Toro was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Medina, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 549. The District Court also concluded that the failure of Mr. Medina's trial counsel to object on competency grounds was prejudicial because "[a]bsent Marcos's testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have a reasonable doubt regarding Medina's guilt." Id. at 552.
The Commonwealth has timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 (1993) and § 2253(c)(i)(A) (Supp. 2006).
The Commonwealth contends that the District Court erred in concluding that Mr. Daly's representation was ineffective for failing to challenge Marcos Toro's competency to testify.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. 2005).
The Supreme Court instructed in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) that [u]nder the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id. at 412-13. For the writ to issue, the state court's application of federal law must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated pursuant to the standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The standard has two components. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient." Id. at 687. "When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. "Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. Regarding prejudice, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.
"Of course, the state of the law is central to an evaluation of counsel's performance at trial. A reasonably competent attorney patently is required to know the state of the applicable law." Everett v. Beard,290 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds, Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394 (3d Cir. 2004). "[A] criminal defendant may demonstrate that his representation was constitutionally inadequate by proving . . . that his attorney's performance was deficient, i.e., unreasonable under prevailing professional standards . . . ." United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d Cir. 2005).
The law of Pennsylvania concerning the competency of a witness under fourteen years of age was clearly established long before the trial in this matter in Rosche v. McCoy, 156 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1959). See Everett, 290 F.3d at 510 (discussing status of state law at the time of trial, to evaluate competency of attorney). In Rosche, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "[c]ompetency is the rule and incompetency the exception. The burden to show incompetency lies upon the party who asserts it." Id. at 309 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Rosche, the Court set forth the rule that must be applied regarding "[t]he question of persons said to be mentally immature due to infancy." Id. at 310. "[C]ompetency is presumed where the child is more than 14 years of age. Under 14 there must be a judicial inquiry as to mental capacity, which must be more searching in proportion to chronological immaturity." Id.
Mr. Daly also justified his failure to object to Marcos Toro's competency based on his trial strategy of raising a reasonable doubt by demonstrating that Marcos Toro was not a credible witness because he "flip flopped" in his testimony at the preliminary hearing regarding whether he saw Mr. Medina stab the victim depending on which lawyer asked the question. Mr. Daly's alternative decision not to challenge Marcos Toro's competency because he wanted to discredit the child's testimony on cross-examination was also objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional performance standards in Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Mangini, 425 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1981), which was decided eleven years before the trial in this matter, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a defense counsel's performance under virtually identical circumstances was ineffective. Id. at 737. In Mangini, trial counsel failed to object to a witness's competency because he chose to discredit him through cross-examination. In concluding counsel's performance was ineffective, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
Mr. Medina's trial counsel's failure to object to Marcos Toro's competency, under these circumstances, as required by Rosche and Mangini, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386-387 (1986) (deficient performance of Strickland prong satisfied where counsel failed to file a suppression motion due to his ignorance of discovery rules); Everett, 290 F.3d at 500, 513-14, (counsel ineffective for failing to object to jury instruction due to lack of knowledge of applicable law).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court failed to cite Rosche or Mangini in holding that Mr. Daly's strategy "while arguably the wrong one in hindsight, was not lacking in a reasonable basis." Commonwealth v. Medina, No. 3132 EDA 1999, slip op. at 3 (Pa. Super. Ct., Feb. 16, 2001). This ruling was an objectively unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland because it failed to consider prevailing professional standards.
We next consider whether Mr. Medina has demonstrated that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The prosecution presented strong circumstantial evidence of Mr. Medina's guilt. Even without the testimony of Marcos Toro, there was more than sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Medina.
First, Hector Toro testified as follows. He was seven years old when he first met Mr. Medina. On October 18, 1991, Mr. Medina was carrying a "Rambo" knife that was about a total of thirteen inches long, with approximately a five-inch handle. He said: "Today I'm going to kill somebody with this knife." Hector Toro had seen Mr. Medina on almost a daily basis for several years. Thus, mistaken identity was not a viable defense. Hector Toro and his brother stayed in the "Chinese store" about fifteen minutes after encountering Mr. Medina. After they left to return home, Hector Toro heard a noise. He ran a half a block and saw a man lying on the ground.*fn5
When she returned to her home, she saw Mr. Medina bending over a car. He appeared to be looking for something under the car. A woman came up to Mr. Medina and held him down. He appeared to be mad. She tried to calm him. Ms. Caraballo saw Mr. Medina get "loose from the lady." She then heard a boy say they found a dead person at the corner. Ms. Carabello went to the corner and recognized Mr. Bogan as the man who ran past her.
The District Court concluded that "[w]ithout Marcos's testimony there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Medina. Marcos was the only witness at trial who testified to seeing the actual stabbing."Medina, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 551. In so ruling, the District Court overlooked the impact of the other witnesses' testimony. Hector Toro's testimony and the other circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth support a reasonable inference that Mr. Medina carried out his threat to kill someone that day with his "Rambo" knife.
Mr. Daly skillfully demonstrated to the jury through his cross-examination that Marcos Toro was not a credible witness because there were serious conflicts in his testimony. In his argument, Mr. Daly pointed out to the jury that "[t]he only testimony you heard stating that the defendant in this case stabbed him came from Marcos Toro, Michael Toro, the second young man that testified, and that, ladies and gentlemen is not to be believed." Mr. Daly pointed out to the jury that Marcos Toro's testimony went "[b]ack and forth." When the prosecutor questioned the witness, he testified: "I did see it." When cross-examined, however, Marcos Toro testified: "No, I didn't see it. Thus, Marcos Toro's testimony was clearly damaging to the prosecution's case because he admitted under oath that he did not see Mr. Medina stab the victim, and that his brother, and not he, had witnessed the crime.