Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190213_0000930.SGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-02-26 05:07:56
Document Index: 550095123

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 51', 'art, 811', '§ 1983']

Plaintiff, an inmate at Wilcox State Prison in Abbeyville, Georgia, is proceeding pro se in this case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding events alleged to have occurred at Johnson State Prison (“JSP”) in Wrightsville, Georgia. Plaintiff initiated this case in the Superior Court of Johnson County, Georgia, and, on August 10, 2018, Defendants removed the case to this Court and paid the filing fee. (Doc. no. 1.) Notwithstanding the payment of the filing fee, the case or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See Leal v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Accordingly, the Court screens Plaintiff's amended complaint herein and REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Jackson, Smith, Hurst, Scott, Emmons, and Martin be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and Defendants Jackson, Smith, Hurst, Scott, Emmons, and Martin be DISMISSED from this case.
Also before the Court is Defendants Emmons, Jackson, Granison, Caldwell, and Martin's motion to dismiss, (doc. no. 83), which should be DENIED AS MOOT as to Defendants Emmons, Jackson, and Martin in light of the Court's screening of the amended complaint, and GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Defendants Caldwell and Granison. In a companion Order, the Court allows to proceed Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Warden Caldwell and Plaintiff's First Amendment free exercise, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Defendant Granison. Finally, the Court recommends Plaintiff's motions to amend, motion regarding service, and motions for sanctions, default judgment, and summary judgment be DENIED, (doc. nos. 69, 99, 98, 106, 107, 109), and the remaining pending motions be DENIED AS MOOT.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants: (1) Ms. Granison, Kitchen Manager of JSP; (2) Tarra Jackson, Chief Counselor of JSP; (3) Lakeisha Smith, CERT Officer JSP; (4) Lt. Jason Hurst, JSP; (5) Officer Scott, JSP; (6) Shawn Emmons, former warden of JSP; (7) Antoine Caldwell, Warden of JSP; and (8) Officer Jan Martin, JSP. (Doc. no. 41, pp. 3-5.) Taking all of Plaintiff's allegations as true, as the Court must for purposes of the present screening, the facts are as follows.
On March 21, 2017, Plaintiff was transferred from Hayes State Prison (“HSP”) to JSP. (Id. at 7.) Prior to the transfer, several HSP inmates asked officials to give Plaintiff store goods because Plaintiff did not have food. (Id.) The officers allowed inmates to give Plaintiff approximately $178 in store goods and hygiene products and gave Plaintiff property sheets for the items. (Id.) Plaintiff arrived at JSP with sixteen other inmates. (Id.) Defendants Hurst, Smith, and Scott and an unknown CERT officer took the inmates to a gymnasium for orientation and to inventory their belongings. (Id.) Many inmates had a substantial number of belongings, but the officers singled out Plaintiff, cursing at him and asking him what island he was from because he looked different and had an accent. (Id.) Plaintiff informed the officers he is from Haiti. (Id.)
The officers separated Plaintiff and asked him to provide receipts for his store goods. (Id.) Plaintiff gave them the property sheets, but the officers told him property sheets are not receipts and accused Plaintiff of stealing the goods. (Id.) The officers made Plaintiff “go back and forth” while the other inmates watched. (Id.) Officers returned some of the goods to Plaintiff but kept the rest for themselves without providing Plaintiff with a receipt. (Id.) Plaintiff attempted to explain he obtained the goods from other inmates at HSP, but the officers mocked him for being Haitian and not speaking English, cursed at him, threatened to write a disciplinary report against him for stealing the goods, and threatened to put him in an administrative segregation isolation holding cell. (Id.) Officer Smith pointed a stun gun at Plaintiff, threatened to shoot him, told him not to touch her food, and threatened to “lock him up.” (Id.)
The same day, Plaintiff wrote a grievance against the officers concerning the misconduct. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff attempted to submit the grievance to Defendant Jackson, but she refused to sign the grievance for retaliatory purposes. (Id.) Defendant Jackson threatened to write a disciplinary report for the stolen goods and put Plaintiff in isolation if he submitted the grievance against the officers. (Id.) Defendant Jackson called the officers into the room, and they cursed at and insulted Plaintiff and threatened to take him to the hold and beat him to death if he filed the grievance. (Id.) After they left, another counselor accepted the grievance from Plaintiff and explained Defendant Jackson should have accepted the grievance and did not do so because it related to two of the officers. (Id. at 8-9.) Defendant Jackson was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's health and safety and failed to protect him like similarly situated prisoners based on retaliation. (Id. at 11.)
From March 27, 2017, through April 8, 2017, Defendant Granison intentionally denied Plaintiff “diet religious vegeteri[an] trays” containing no meat, fish, or eggs. (Id. at 9, 11.) Another officer instructed Defendant Granison to provide Plaintiff with meals without meat because he does not eat meat, fish, or eggs. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff starved for thirteen days. (Id.) Defendant Granison insulted and harassed Plaintiff every time he was in the kitchen, cursed him, and questioned his dietary restrictions. (Id.) On April 9, 2017, a JSP captain was in the kitchen with the sergeant, who oversees the kitchen. (Id.) The sergeant explained Defendant Granison's actions toward Plaintiff to the captain, and the captain called the warden, who immediately came to the kitchen, told Defendant Granison she was wrong, and instructed her to give Plaintiff a meal tray without meat, fish, and eggs for every meal because Plaintiff is vegetarian. (Id.) Defendant Granison was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's health and safety, failed to protect him like similarly situated prisoners, and acted out of retaliation and racial discrimination. (Id. at 11.)
On April 5, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred back to JSP for a court date on April 10, 2018. (Id. at 9.) Warden Caldwell threatened to punish Plaintiff for the grievances and lawsuit filed against the other Defendants. (Id.) Warden Caldwell had officers place Plaintiff in a holding cell for administrative segregation isolation for twenty-one days with a Blood gang member, who had recently stabbed another inmate, as a means for Plaintiff to be injured. (Id.) Plaintiff did not receive a blanket, sheet, pillow, or change of clothes, and slept on a dirty mattress. (Id.) Warden Caldwell instructed Defendant Granison not to provide vegetarian trays to Plaintiff. (Id.) Some days, Plaintiff did not receive a meal and occasionally went three to four days without a shower. (Id.) The cell was unsanitary because the bathroom would overflow and not drain for days, leaving feces on the floor. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff starved for twenty-one days in retribution for his grievances and lawsuit. (Id.) Warden Caldwell also retaliated by intentionally withholding Plaintiff's application for clemency or commutation and never sent it to the state parole board. (Id.) The board would have granted him pardon, clemency, or commutation early if they received the application. (Id.) Warden Caldwell was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's health and safety and failed to protect him like similarly situated prisoners. (Id. at 12.)
The amended complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
2. Plaintiff Fails to State a Due Process Claim Against Defendants Smith, Hurst, and Scott for Deprivation of Property
Plaintiff argues Defendant Smith, Hurst, and Scott violated his constitutional rights by taking his store goods during the intake process. The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations of property, only against deprivations that occur “without due process of law.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). Georgia has created a civil cause of action for the wrongful deprivation of personal property. O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1. This statutory provision covers the unauthorized deprivation of an inmate's property by prison officials. Grant v. Newsome, 411 S.E.2d 796, 799 (Ga.App. 1991). The statutory cause of action constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy under Parratt. See Byrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at State law, and he fails to state a valid § 1983 due process claim based on the deprivation of his property.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff does not raise any state law claims based on Defendants' alleged actions. (See doc. no. 41.) Indeed, in his February 4, 2019 objections, Plaintiff asks the Court to remand the entire case to state court to consider any possible state claims. However, Plaintiff's request to remand is procedurally improper. See § IV, infra. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring state law claims based on these allegations, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims if these Defendants are dismissed from this lawsuit, as the Court recommends herein. Accordingly, Plaintiff may, if he chooses, pursue any state law remedies based on the alleged deprivation of property in state court.
3. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Based on Allegations of Insults and Threats by Defendants
Plaintiff attempts to bring Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Smith, Hurst, Scott, Foreman, Jackson, Granison, and Caldwell for using insulting and threatening language against him based on his race and nationality. (Doc. no. 41, pp. 7-9.) However, mere “allegations of verbal abuse and threats by prison officers” are not sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Hernandez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 281 Fed.Appx. 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissing plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim because “verbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a constitutional claim”) (citing Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.3d 1271, 1274 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989)). Additionally, “derogatory, demeaning, profane, threatening, or abusive comments made by an officer to an inmate, no matter how repugnant or professional, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Leonard v. Scott, No. 17-14248-CIV-ROSENBERG, 2017 WL 8772149, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2017). Accordingly, fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against these Defendants for their insulting and threatening language.
4. Plaintiff Fails to State an Equal Protection Claim against Defendants
“To establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must demonstrate (1) he is similarly situated with other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally protected interest such as race.” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate challenged action was motivated by intent to discriminate in order to establish equal protection violation). A “class of one” exists where a plaintiff has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated without justification. Thorne v. Chairperson Fla. Parole Comm'n, 427 F App'x 765, 771 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). “To be ‘similarly situated,' the comparators must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010)). Furthermore, a plaintiff must “describe the comparator's characteristics ‘that would be relevant to an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker'” in detail. Alvarez v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr, 646 Fed.Appx. 858, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1207 (11th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff does not establish an equal protection claim against Defendants Smith, Hurst, and Scott based on their actions during the intake process. Plaintiff alleges he informed the officers he did not have receipts for the store goods because he received them from other inmates at HSP. (Doc. no. 41, p. 7.) While Plaintiff alleges some other inmates also had numerous store goods and did not have receipts for them, he does not allege they received the goods from other inmates instead of purchasing the goods themselves. (Id.) Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any facts concerning from where the other inmates received their goods. This characteristic would have been relevant to an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker, as it casts doubt on whether Plaintiff was in proper possession of the store goods. In fact, Plaintiff alleges the officers determined the store goods were stolen based on their discussion with Plaintiff and his explanation of receiving the goods from other inmates rather than purchasing them himself. (Id. at 7, 10-11.) The connection between Plaintiff's statements about the origin of the store goods and the officers' conclusion the goods were stolen is strengthened by the fact Plaintiff did not allege the officers suspected any of the other inmates' store goods to have been stolen. Thus, Plaintiff does not establish the other prisoners were similarly situated because he failed to describe relevant characteristics of comparators; namely, whether they also received their store goods from other inmates instead of the inmate store. In short, Plaintiff's allegations fail to establish he was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals and fails to state an equal protection claim against Defendants Smith, Hurst, and Scott.
As to Plaintiff's allegations regarding: (1) Warden Emmons's alleged failure to remedy the officers' actions; (2) Defendant Granison's alleged failure to give Plaintiff vegetarian meals, and (3) Defendant Jackson's alleged refusal to sign Plaintiff's grievance form, Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting there were any comparators whatsoever, let alone any that were similarly situated to Plaintiff and received more favorable treatment. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting Defendants Emmons and Jackson's behavior was discriminatory based on any protected class. In fact, Plaintiff indicates Defendant Jackson's actions were caused by her relationship with the intake officers, not based on a discriminatory motive. (Doc. no. 41, pp. 8-9.) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an equal protection claim against Defendants Emmons, Granison, and Jackson.
5. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants Smith, Hurst, Scott, Jackson, and Granison for Their Alleged Retaliatory Threats
Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim against Defendants Smith, Hurst, Scott, and Jackson for threatening him with bodily harm or death if Plaintiff filed a grievance based on Defendants Smith, Hurst, and Scott's actions during the intake process. (Doc. no. 41, p. 8.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Granison retaliated against him for filing grievances by denying him vegetarian meals. (Id. at 11.)
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim based on a threat, a plaintiff must allege “‘(1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) [he] suffered adverse action such that the administrator's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected speech.'” Hoever v. Hampton, No. 4:14cv273-WS/CAS, 2016 WL 3647596, at *3 (N.D. Fla. May 19, 2016) (quoting Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008)). However, “threats that are not carried out and that do not deter a plaintiff from engaging in speech are not actionable as retaliation.” Bishop v. McLaughlin, No. 5:11-CV-107(MTT), 2012 WL 1029507, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2012), adopted in part by 2012 WL 1029499, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2012) (citing Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1292 n.13 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Here, Plaintiff clearly determined Defendants Smith, Hurst, Scott, and Jackson's alleged threats were not legitimate, because Plaintiff alleges he filed the grievance with another counselor immediately thereafter. (Doc. no. 41, pp. 8-9.) Because of Plaintiff's immediate filing, the Court may infer Defendants' threats were not enough to deter a person of ordinary firmness from filing the grievance. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege these Defendants attempted to carry out the alleged threats after he filed the grievance. Finally, Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting Defendant Granison was aware of any grievances or lawsuits filed by Plaintiff. (Id. at 9.) Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish a causal connection between Plaintiff filing grievances and Defendant Granison's actions. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state either a First Amendment claim against Defendants based on their alleged retaliatory threats.
6. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Based on an Alleged Violation of Prison Regulations
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hurst, Smith, and Scott's failure to provide Plaintiff a receipt for the store goods they retained violated Georgia Department of Corrections polices. (Doc. no. 41, p. 10.) An allegation of non-compliance with a prison regulation by prison officials is not, in itself, sufficient to give rise to a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (noting many prison regulations are “primarily designed to guide correctional officers in the administration of a prison” and “such regulations are not designed to confer rights on inmates); Taylor v. White, Civ. No. 11-0377-CG-N, 2012 WL 404588, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2012) (“A claim based on a prison official's failure to follow prison regulations or state regulations, without more, simply does not state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right.”), adopted by, 2012 WL 403849 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2012). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a separate claim upon which relief may be granted based on any alleged violation of Georgia Department of Corrections policies.
7. Plaintiff Fails to State an Eighth Amendment Use of Force Claim Against Defendant Smith
Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment use of force claim based on his allegations Defendant Smith pointed a taser at him and threatened to shoot him if he touched the store goods the officers had taken from him. “[T]he use of force in a prison setting is legitimate when it is applied in good faith to maintain discipline and is not applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Ledlow v. Givens, 500 Fed.Appx. 910, 912 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). “The Supreme Court has outlined four factors in determining whether the application of force by a jail official was malicious or sadistic: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by responsible officials; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Id. at 912-913 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).
Plaintiff does not allege actual force, but instead merely a threat of force to ensure Plaintiff's compliance with the officers' directives. While the Eleventh Circuit has indicated an excessive force claim based on an “immediate, malicious threat of electric shock . . . would not be indisputably meritless, ” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001), Defendant Smith's alleged threat was not malicious but a good faith attempt to maintain discipline. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, the four officers were apparently alone in a room with sixteen inmates, who had just arrived from another prison and were in possession of items the officers had not yet inventoried, and Plaintiff continued to dispute ownership of the goods despite the officer's decision. (Doc. no. 41, p. 7.) Indeed, Plaintiff alleges he continued to argue with the officers about how he came into possession of the store goods after the officer returned some of the store goods and retained the remainder under suspicion they were stolen. (Id.) In this situation, it would not have unreasonable for Defendant Smith to draw her taser and threaten its use in order to prevent Plaintiff from attempting to recover the goods from the officers. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state an excessive force claim based on Defendant Smith's alleged threat because it was made in good faith to maintain discipline during the intake process. Ledlow, 500 Fed.Appx. at 912.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;8. Plaintiff Fails to State a Valid Claim ...