Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/14-6166
Timestamp: 2020-08-04 18:39:21
Document Index: 688088461

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1951', '§1951', '§1951', '§1951', '§1951', '§1951', '§1951', '§8', '§8', '§3', '§8', '§8', '§3', '§8', '§1951', '§1951', '§1951']

TAYLOR v. UNITED STATES | Supreme Court | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
(a) The language of the Hobbs Act is unmistakably broad and reaches any obstruction, delay, or other effect on commerce, 18 U. S. C. §1951(a), “over which the United States has jurisdiction,” §1951(b)(3). See United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 373. Pp. 4–5.
(b) Under its commerce power, this Court has held, Congress may regulate, among other things, activities that have a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125. This includes “purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 17, so long as those activities are economic in nature. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 613. One such “class of activities” is the production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances. 545 U. S., at 22. Grafting the holding in Raich onto the Hobbs Act’s commerce element, it follows that a robber who affects even the intrastate sale of marijuana affects commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction. Pp. 5–6.
DAVID ANTHONY TAYLOR, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
The answer to this question is straightforward and dictated by our precedent. We held in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1 (2005), that the Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to regulate the national market for marijuana, including the authority to proscribe the purely intrastate production, possession, and sale of this controlled substance. Because Congress may regulate these intrastate activities based on their aggregate effect on interstate commerce, it follows that Congress may also regulate intrastate drug theft. And since the Hobbs Act criminalizes robberies and attempted robberies that affect any commerce “over which the United States has jurisdiction,” §1951(b)(3), the prosecution in a Hobbs Act robbery case satisfies the Act’s commerce element if it shows that the defendant robbed or attempted to rob a drug dealer of drugs or drug proceeds. By targeting a drug dealer in this way, a robber necessarily affects or attempts to affect commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
The first attempted drug robbery for which Taylor was convicted occurred in August 2009. Id., at 220. Taylor and others targeted the home of Josh Whorley, having obtained information that Whorley dealt “exotic and high grade” marijuana. Ibid. “The robbers expected to find both drugs and money” in Whorley’s home. Ibid. Taylor and the others broke into the home, searched it, and assaulted Whorley and his girlfriend. They demanded to be told the location of money and drugs but, not locating any, left with only jewelry, $40, two cell phones, and a mariju ana cigarette. Ibid.
“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery . . . or attempts or conspires so to do . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.” 18 U. S. C. §1951(a).
To determine how far this commerce element extends—and what the Government must prove to meet it—we look to our Commerce Clause cases. We have said that there are three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities”; and (3) “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i. e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 558–559 (1995). We have held that activities in this third category—those that “substantially affect” commerce—may be regulated so long as they substantially affect interstate commerce in the aggregate, even if their individual impact on interstate commerce is minimal. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942) (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”).
While this final category is broad, “thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 613 (2000).
The case now before us requires no more than that we graft our holding in Raich onto the commerce element of the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act criminalizes robberies affecting “commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.” §1951(b)(3). Under Raich, the market for marijuana, including its intrastate aspects, is “commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.” It therefore follows as a simple matter of logic that a robber who affects or attempts to affect even the intrastate sale of marijuana grown within the State affects or attempts to affect commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
In making it a federal crime to commit a robbery that “affects commerce,” §1951(a), the Hobbs Act invokes the full reach of Congress’ commerce power: The Act defines “commerce” to embrace “all . . . commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.” §1951(b)(3). To determine the Hobbs Act’s reach, I start by examining the limitations on Congress’ authority to punish robbery under its commerce power. In light of those limitations and in accordance with the Hobbs Act’s text, I would hold that the Government in a Hobbs Act case may obtain a conviction for robbery only if it proves, beyond a reason- able doubt, that the defendant’s robbery itself affected interstate commerce. The Government may not obtain a conviction by proving only that the defendant’s robbery affected intrastate commerce or other intrastate activity.
Congress possesses only limited authority to prohibit and punish robbery. “The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 552 (1995); see Art. I, §8; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C. J.) (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written”). As with its powers generally, Congress has only limited authority over crime. The Government possesses broad general authority in territories and fed- eral enclaves. See Art. I, §8, cl. 17 (conferring power of “exclusive Legislation” over the District of Columbia); Art. IV, §3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”). But its power over crimes committed in the States is very different. The Constitution expressly delegates to Congress authority over only four specific crimes: counterfeiting securities and coin of the United States, Art. I, §8, cl. 6; piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, Art. I, §8, cl. 10; offenses against the law of nations, ibid.; and treason, Art. III, §3, cl. 2. Given these limited grants of federal power, it is “clea[r] that Congress cannot punish felonies generally.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 428 (1821) (Marshall, C. J.). Congress has “no general right to punish murder committed within any of the States,” for example, and no general right to punish the many crimes that fall outside of Congress’ express grants of criminal authority. Id., at 426. “The Constitution,” in short, “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power.” Lopez, supra, at 566; see Art. I, §8; Amdt. 10.
That is true even under our modern precedents. Even those precedents emphasize that “[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 617–618 (2000); see Lopez, 514 U. S., at 567–568. The substantial-effects approach is at war with that principle. To avoid giving Congress a general police power, there must be some limit to what Congress can regulate. But the substantial-effects approach’s aggregation principle “has no stopping point.” Id., at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring). “[O]ne always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce.” Ibid. Under the substantial-effects approach, Congress could, under its commerce power, regulate any robbery: In the aggregate, any type of robbery could be deemed to substantially affect interstate commerce.
Applying the substantial-effects approach is especially unsound here because it effectively relieves the Government of its central burden in a criminal case—the burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt—and because the Court’s holding does not follow from even our broad precedents. The Court reasons that, under Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1—a case that rests on substantial-effects reasoning, see id., at 17–22—“the market for marijuana, including its intrastate aspects, is ‘commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.’ ” Ante, at 6 (quoting §1951(b)(3)). Therefore, “a robber who affects or attempts to affect even the intrastate sale of marijuana grown within the State affects or attempts to affect commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.” Ante, at 6. As the Court later states, “[W]here the target of a robbery is a drug dealer, proof that the defendant’s conduct in and of itself affected or threatened commerce is not needed. All that is needed is proof that the defendant’s conduct fell within a category of conduct that, in the aggregate, had the requisite effect.” Ante, at 8.
But even if Raich established that the intrastate aspects of the marijuana market are “commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction,” §1951(b)(3), Raich still would not establish the further point that the Court needs for its conclusion. Specifically, Raich would not establish that a robbery affecting a drug dealer establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the robber actually “obstructs, delays, or affects” the marijuana market. §1951(a). Raich did not hold that any activity relating to the marijuana market in fact affects commerce. Raich instead disclaimed the need to “determine whether” activities relating to the marijuana market—even “taken in the aggregate”—“substantially affect interstate commerce in fact.” 545 U. S., at 22. Raich decided only that Congress had a rational basis—a merely “ ‘conceivable’ ” basis, FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 315 (1993)—for thinking that it needed to regulate that activity as part of an effective regulatory regime. 545 U. S., at 22. That is far from a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a particular robbery relating to marijuana is an activity that affects interstate commerce. Grafting Raich’s “holding . . . onto the commerce element of the Hobbs Act” thus does not lead to the conclusion that “a robber who affects or attempts to affect . . . the intrastate sale of marijuana grown within [a] State affects or attempts to affect”—beyond a reasonable doubt—“commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.” Ante, at 6.
Finally, today’s decision weakens longstanding protections for criminal defendants. The criminal law imposes especially high burdens on the Government in order to protect the rights of the accused. The Government may obtain a conviction only “upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the accused] is charged.” Winship, 397 U. S., at 364. Those elements must be proved to a jury. Amdt. 6; see Alleyne, 570 U. S., at ___ (opinion of Thomas, J.) (slip op., at 3). Given the harshness of criminal penalties on “the rights of individuals,” the Court has long recognized that penal laws “are to be construed strictly” to ensure that Congress has indeed decided to make the conduct at issue criminal. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C. J.). Thus, “before a man can be punished as a criminal under the federal law his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some statute.” United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 485 (1917) (internal quotation marks omitted). When courts construe criminal statutes, then, they must be especially careful. And when a broad reading of a criminal statute would upset federalism, courts must be more careful still. “[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly,” we do not deem it “to have significantly changed the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes.” Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 858 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The substantial-effects test is in tension with these principles. That test—and the deferential, rational-basis review to which it is subjected, see Raich, supra, at 22—puts virtually no burdens on the Government. That should not come as a surprise because the substantial-effects test gained momentum not in the criminal context, but instead in the context in which courts most defer to the Government: the regulatory arena. E.g., Wickard, 317 U. S., at 113, 122–125, 128–129 (relying on substantial-effects reasoning to uphold regulatory restrictions on wheat under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938). Without adequate reflection, the Court later extended this approach to the criminal context. In Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146 (1971), for example, the Court applied the substantial-effects approach to a criminal statute, holding that Congress could criminally punish loansharking under its commerce power because “[e]xtortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce” when judged as a “class of activities.” Id., at 154 (emphasis deleted); see id., at 151–154, 156–157.
Even in extending the substantial-effects approach, however, the Court still tried to impose some of the recognized limits on the Government in the criminal context. Just a year before it decided Perez, for example, the Court held that the Government must prove each charged element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship, supra, at 364. And the Court shortly thereafter gave a potentially broad federal statute a narrow reading—a reading that required a prohibited act to have a “demonstrated nexus with interstate commerce,” rather than a lesser showing—based on lenity and federalism. United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971); see id., at 339, 347–350. Indeed, the Court soon again invoked those same principles in rejecting a broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act itself. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U. S. 396, 410–412 (1973) (invoking principles of lenity and federalism in construing the Hobbs Act not to reach the use of violence to achieve legitimate union objectives).