Source: https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2014/05/
Timestamp: 2018-06-23 06:09:55
Document Index: 656995091

Matched Legal Cases: ['§17', '§17', '§17', '§19', '§18', '§209', '§209', '§209', '§75', '§740', '§740', '§740', '§740', '§740', '§740', '§18', '§17', '§167', '§167', '§25', '§167']

2014 NY Slip Op 03904, Appellate Division, Third Department
A member [Member] of the NYS Employees' Retirement System sought to "buy back" member service credit based on his service as a hearing examiner with the City of New York. The Comptroller determined that Member was not an employee of the City and thus was ineligible to purchase service credit for that work.
In an earlier action* Member contended that he served as an “officer” of the City of New York and the matter was remanded to the Comptroller to address that claim. The Comptroller rejected Member’s claim that he was a public officer by reason of his so serving as a hearing examiner and Member appealed that determination as well.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Comptroller’s decision, explaining that the Comptroller "is charged with the responsibility of determining service credits for retirement purposes and his determination will be upheld if rational and supported by substantial evidence.” Further, said the court, Member had the burden of establishing his entitlement to the additional service credit.
The service credit question's result was dependent on whether Member had been engaged in "previous service with a public employer” that would have been creditable in one of the public retirement systems of the State, in this instance the New York City Employees' Retirement System. In other words, Member would have had to have been eligible for membership in NYCERS based on his work as a hearing examiner being deemed service as an officer of the City.
The City of New York Law Department, however, had taken the position that hearing examiners were neither city officers nor employees and NYCERS had determined that hearing examiners were not city officers such as to render them eligible for membership. The Comptroller relied upon these determinations in formulating his decision.
The court commented that even if the Comptroller had not relied on the views of the City’s Law Department and NYCERS in this regard, substantial evidence nevertheless supported the Comptroller's finding that Member was not a city officer entitled to claim prior service credit. Member, said the court, did not demonstrate that he served as a public officer in that he failed to show that he had been appointed for any specific length of time, was "a manager or policy maker," had filed a financial disclosure statement and that he had taken or filed an oath of office.
Although evidence in the record could support a different result, the Appellate Division concluded that there was sufficient substantial evidence in the record to support the Comptroller's determination that Member was not entitled to “prior service credit.”
* See 81 AD3d 1156.
2014 NY Slip Op 03765, Appellate Division, First Department
A second-year probationary teacher took over the class in the second week of November. The principal gave her Unsatisfactory Performance Rating [U-rating] at the end of the school year based on facts indicating a lack of progress toward implementing suggestions to improve the teaching and learning environment in the classroom, together with the principal’s view that the teacher had inherited a well-managed class without instructional and disciplinary concerns which deteriorated under the probationary teacher's leadership.
The teacher filed an Article 78 petition seeking a court order annulling her U-rating for the school year. Supreme Court granted her petition and remanding the matter to the New York City Board of Education for a new determination of the teacher’s performance rating for that year.
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court ruling “on the law,” explaining that on the records presented the teacher failed to demonstrate that the U-rating was arbitrary and capricious, or made in bad faith.
The court said that the record showed a rational basis for the conclusion that the teacher’s performance was unsatisfactory as evidenced by the three formal classroom observation reports describing her performance in class management and engagement of students. While the teacher asserted that she did not receive any mandatory pre-observation conferences before any of her classroom observations, she has not established that the U-rating was made in violation of a lawful procedure or substantial right
The teacher also alleged that she was never provided a curriculum or a professional development plan, that the school's administration did not help her manage the class's continued disciplinary problems and that no member of the administration modeled lesson plans for her. However, said the court, the record established that she had received professional support and that she had not sufficiently progressed during the year.
As examples, the Appellate Divisions noted that the teacher had been observed in the classroom three times and had received unsatisfactory ratings for the last two observations. Further, each observation was followed a report indicating areas for improvement and which set out specific recommendations for addressing observed the deficiencies.
Another factor considered by the court: the record indicated that the teacher was provided with professional development sessions after receiving her first unsatisfactory report but the same instructional deficiencies continued to appear in the next observation report, indicating that the teacher “had not implemented the recommendations for improvement.”
2014 NY Slip Op 03623, Appellate Division, First Department
A New York Police Officer challenged her dismissal from her position as a police officer. The Appellate Division unanimously denied her petition, noting that “The penalty of dismissal does not shock the conscience in that petitioner was found to have engaged in serious misconduct, and admitted other less serious charges committed during her short career as a police officer”.
The court found that there was substantial evidence to support finding her guilty of certain disciplinary charges, including her admissions that she lied to federal agents conducting a drug trafficking investigation.
In Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969), the United States Supreme Court said: "Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government's right to ask questions - lying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood."
2014 NY Slip Op 03210, Appellate Division, First Department
A tenured schoolteacher [Teacher] was found guilty of a number of disciplinary charges alleging professional misconduct, neglect of duty, failure to follow procedures and carry out duties, and incompetent and inefficient service during two school years over a two-year period.
Teacher challenged the Department of Education’s decision to terminate her. Supreme Court vacated the termination and remanded the matter to the Department for its determination of a lesser penalty.
The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling, noting that the Hearing Officer upheld many of the charges and specifications lodged against Teacher, which findings were not challenged on appeal.
Furthermore, said the court, the evidence showed that notwithstanding Teacher's prior unblemished record of service, she continued to blame others and refused to accept responsibility for her failure to effectively manage her classroom and deliver effective instruction and was unwilling to implement any of the school administration's suggestions for improvement.
The Appellate Division held that under the circumstances the penalty of termination “does not shock one's sense of fairness,” applying the so-called Pell standard [Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222].
In the event an officer or an employee of the State as the employer is sued in connection some alleged act or omission in the performance of his or her official duties, he or she may seek representation by the State and indemnification in the event he or she is held liable for damages and fees under certain circumstances.*
§17 of the Public Officers Law applies with respect to civil proceedings and provides for the defense and indemnification of officers and employees as defined in Subdivision 1 of §17 in the event such an individual is in a civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or is alleged in the complaint to have occurred while the individual was acting within the scope of his or her public employment or duties; or which is brought to enforce a provision of 42 USC 1981 or 42 USC 1983 [Federal Civil Rights Acts]. This duty, however, does not arise where the civil action or proceeding is brought by or on behalf of the State.
The State’s duty to defend or indemnify and save harmless the individual is subject to the following conditions::
1. The individual’s delivery of the original or a copy of any summons, complaint, process, notice, demand or pleading within five days after he or she is served with such document to the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General at an office of the Department of Law in the State, and
2. The full cooperation of the individual in the defense of such action or proceeding and in defense of any action or proceeding against the State based upon the same act or omission, and in the prosecution of any appeal.
The timely delivery of such documents is deemed a request by the individual that the State provide for his or her defense and indemnification pursuant to §17.
§19 of the Public Officers Law applies in criminal actions and provides for the State to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses incurred by or on behalf of an officer or employee of the State as the employer in his or her defense of a criminal proceeding in a State or Federal court:
1. arising out of any act which the individual was acting within the scope of his or her public employment or duties upon his or her acquittal or upon the dismissal of the criminal charges against him or her or
2. incurred in connection with an appearance before a grand jury which returns no true bill against the individual where the individual's appearance was required as a result of any act which occurred while the individual was acting within the scope of his or her public employment or duties if such appearance did not occur in the normal course of the public employment or duties of the individual.
However, such reimbursement is also conditioned on (a) the individual’s timely delivery of a written request for such reimbursement of expenses together with, in the case of a criminal proceeding, the original or a copy of an accusatory instrument within ten days after he or she was arraigned pursuant to such instrument or, in the case of an appearance before a grand jury, written evidence of such an appearance. Such an item is to be delivered to the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General at an office of the Department of Law in the State.
In the event a request for reimbursement for reasonable attorneys' fees or litigation expenses or both made by, or on behalf of, the individual, the Attorney General is to investigate and review of the facts and circumstances involved and determine whether such reimbursement shall be paid. The Attorney General is to then notify the individual in writing of that determination.
Another condition to be met by the individual:seeking such reimbursement is his or her full cooperation in the defense of any action or proceeding against the State based upon the same act, and in the prosecution of any appeal.
* §18 of the Public Officers Law authorizes a political subdivision of the State to adopt a law, by-law, rule, resolution or regulation providing for the defense and indemnification of the entity’s officers and employees.
2014 NY Slip Op 03521, Appellate Division, Second Department
The Board of Fire Commissioners expelled a member of the Fire Department. The member sued and Supreme Court annulled the Board’s determination and remitting the matter for a hearing and a new determination.* thereafter, and the petitioner cross-appeals from so much of the order as failed to grant the petition in its entirety.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that as the member was entitled to a hearing “upon due notice and upon stated charge” under General Municipal Law §209-l but was not afforded one, “the Supreme Court properly annulled the determination and remitted the matter for a hearing and a new determination thereafter.”
GML §209-l addresses the removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of volunteer fire departments and, in pertinent part, provides:
1. The authorities having control of fire departments of cities, towns, villages and fire districts may make regulations governing the removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of such departments and the companies thereof.
2. Such officers and members of such departments and companies shall not be removed from office, or membership, as the case may be, by such authorities or by any other officer or body, except for incompetence or misconduct.**
3. Removals on the ground of incompetence or misconduct, except for absenteeism at fires or meetings, shall be made only after a hearing upon due notice and upon stated charges and with the right to such officer or member to a review pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules. Such charges shall be in writing and may be made by any such authority. The burden of proving incompetency or misconduct shall be upon the person alleging the same.
* On a procedural note, in this instance, “on the Court's own motion,” the notice of appeal and the notice of cross appeal from the [Supreme Court’s] order was deemed to be applications for leave to appeal, and cross-appeal, respectively, and leave to appeal and cross-appeal is granted
** N.B. §209-l, however, further provides that “The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of members of any fire company to remove a volunteer officer or voluntary member of such company for failure to comply with the constitution and by-laws of such company.”
OATH Index No. 851/14
A computer aide was charged with discourtesy, refusal to obey orders, and inefficient performance.
OATH Administrative Law Judge Faye Lewis found that the aide was guilty of misconduct when she was rude and unhelpful to a day care provider who repeatedly called her for assistance and when she frequently failed to return that provider's telephone calls.
The ALJ also found the aide guilty of misconduct when she closed a door in a colleague's face after the colleague approached to say that a client was waiting to see her, and when she failed to obey orders to provide her supervisor with a case folder and to resubmit a form.
Judge Lewis, however, concluded that it was not misconduct for the aide to tell her colleagues she was on her lunch break and did not want to be bothered, as meal periods are not work time.
As the aide did not have any history of formal discipline, ALJ Lewis recommended that she be suspended without pay for 12 days.
Webb-Weber v Community Action for Human Servs., Inc., 2014 NY Slip Op 03428, Court of Appeals
Civil Service Law §75-b* and Labor Law §740(2)** are commonly referred to as "whistleblower statutes,” and prohibit the employer from taking retaliatory personnel action against an employee because the employee discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body, an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation.
In Webb-Weber the “narrow issue” before the Court of Appeals was whether a complaint asserting a claim under §740(2) must identify the specific "law, rule or regulation" allegedly violated by the employer.
The Court of Appeals concluded that there is no such requirement, holding that “[t]he reasonable interpretation is that, in order to recover under a §740 claim, a plaintiff must show that [he or] she reported or threatened to report the employer's "activity, policy or practice." Quoting Richard A. Givens’ statement in Practice Commentaries,*** the Court of Appeals said that “the practice --- not the legal basis for finding it to be a violation — appears to be what must be reported."
Thus, for pleading purposes, the court ruled that the complaint need not specify the actual law, rule or regulation violated, although it must identify the particular activities, policies or practices in which the employer allegedly engaged, so that the complaint provides the employer with notice of the alleged complained-of conduct.
The Court of Appeals observed that in order to recover under a Labor Law §740 theory, the plaintiff has the burden of proving [1] that an actual violation occurred, in contrast to merely establishing that the plaintiff possessed a reasonable belief that a violation occurred, citing Bordell v General Elec. Co., 88 NY2d 869, and [2] that the violation must be of the kind that "creates a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety," citing Remba v Federation Empl. & Guidance Serv., 76 NY2d 801.
* Civil Service Law 75-b.2(a) provides as follows: A public employer shall not dismiss or take other disciplinary or other adverse personnel action against a public employee regarding the employee's employment because the employee discloses to a governmental body information: (i) regarding a violation of a law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (ii) which the employee reasonably believes to be true and reasonably believes constitutes an improper governmental action. "Improper governmental action" shall mean any action by a public employer or employee, or an agent of such employer or employee, which is undertaken in the performance of such agent's official duties, whether or not such action is within the scope of his employment, and which is in violation of any federal, state or local law, rule or regulation.
** Labor Law §740(2) provides as follows: Prohibitions. An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because such employee does any of the following: (a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety, or which constitutes health care fraud; (b) provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any such violation of a law, rule or regulation by such employer; or (c) objects to, or refuses to participate in any such activity, policy or practice in violation of a law, rule or regulation.
*** Givens, Practice Commentaries, McKinneys Cons Laws of NY, Book 30, Labor Law §740, at 549 [1988 ed].
2014 NY Slip Op 03265, Appellate Division, Second Department
MTA Bus Co. had a policy banning cell-phone use while operating a bus. After the bus driver allegedly violated the MTA’s cell-phone policy three separate occasions and, in accordance with that policy, he had been suspended from employment for a period of 10 days.
Following the bus driver's fourth violation MTA terminated his employment.
The bus driver’s union filed a grievance challenging the termination, and an arbitration hearing was conducted. After the hearing, the arbitrator concluded that the bus driver had committed a "cell phone violation," and that MTA's decision to terminate his employment was proper. The bus driver filed and Article 75 petition seeking a court order vacating the arbitration award.
Supreme Court denied the petition, in effect confirming the award and the bus driver appealed, contending that the arbitration award was irrational.
The Appellate Division, noting that "Judicial review of an arbitrator's award is extremely limited" said a court may vacate an arbitration award pursuant to CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) "only if it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power." Further said the court, "Courts are bound by an arbitrator's . . . judgment concerning remedies [and] cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award and substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator simply because it believes its interpretation would be the better one." In addition the court commented that the fact “That the arbitrator may have treated the petitioner differently or less favorably than another similarly situated bus driver is not a ground to vacate the arbitration award.”
The Appellate Division held that the arbitrator's award was justified and, hence, rational as the record showed that the bus driver was aware of MTA’s cell-phone policy and had been previously suspended for 10 days for violating that policy. The court explained that violation of the MTA's cell-phone policy, which also violates New York law, constitutes appropriate grounds for termination of employment.
Local 342, Long Is. Pub. Serv. Employees v Huntington, 2014 NY Slip Op 03271, Appellate Division, Second Department
Public Officers Law §18*permits a political or civil subdivision of the State whose governing body has agreed by the adoption of local law, by-law, resolution, rule or regulation to “confer the benefits of the section” upon its employees, and (ii) to be held liable for the costs incurred under these provisions including the defense and indemnification its officers and employees, other than the sheriff of any county or an independent contractor.
This provision may be triggered in any civil action or proceeding, state or federal, arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or allegedly occurred while the officer or employee was acting within the scope of his or her public employment or duties.
However, this duty to provide for a defense does not arise where such civil action or proceeding is brought by or on behalf of the public entity employing such employee.
As the Local 342 decision demonstrates, a political or subdivision of the State may also obligate itself to be liable for such costs by including such an obligation in a collective bargaining agreement.
An arbitrator determined that the Town of Huntington had breached a provision in a collective bargaining agreement by failing to pay certain legal fees on behalf of an employee in the collective bargaining unit.
The Appellate Division said that Supreme Court properly concluded that the arbitrator's determination did not clearly violate a strong public policy, was not totally or completely irrational, and did not manifestly exceed a specific, enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power.
The court explained that although the payment of a public employee's legal fees "would constitute an impermissible donation from the public purse in instances where there is no prior legal obligation on the part of the State or a municipality to provide reimbursement, the reimbursement is proper and considered additional remuneration where there is a prior legal obligation" to do so.
In this instance, said the Appellate Division, the relevant collective bargaining agreement expressly created a prior legal obligation on the part of the Town to pay the subject legal fees incurred by the individual.**
* Public Officers Law §17, provides for the defense and indemnification of officers and employees of the State as the employer by the State. .
Santer v Board of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 2014 NY Slip Op 03189, Court of Appeals
Members of a teachers' union picketing on a public street in front of a district school) displayed picketing signs from their cars parked where parents were dropping their children off at school district’s Woodland School. East Meadow Union Free School District brought disciplinary charges for misconduct against certain teachers, alleging that the teachers had created a health and safety risk by parking their cars so that students had to be dropped off in the middle of the street instead of at curbside.
After their respective hearings, the arbitrators found the teachers guilty of the misconduct charge and imposed a fine as the penalty. The arbitrators, acknowledging that the parking demonstration was conducted on public property while teachers were off-duty, and that their cars were legally parked, nonetheless concluded that teachers "intended to (and did) disrupt the student drop off and that the parked cars created a health and safety risk to children who had to be dropped off in the middle of a busy street in the rain." The Court of Appeals noted that although it was "fortunate" that no child was injured, the arbitrators determined that fact was irrelevant to their findings that teachers’ intentional conduct posed a potential threat to student safety.
The teachers than sued, seeking to vacate the arbitration awards in which they were found guilty of misconduct, contending that the disciplinary proceedings commenced against them, and the discipline ultimately imposed them, a fine, violated their right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Supreme Court denied the petitions but the Appellate Division reversed in each case. Applying the two-part balancing test from Pickering v Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will County Ill, 391 US 563,* the. Appellate Division decided that the teachers’ speech addressed a matter of public concern and, second, that the District failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that teachers' exercise of their free speech rights "so threatened the school's effective operation as to justify the imposition of discipline."
Although the Court of Appeals said it agreed with the Appellate Division with respect to the picketing demonstration, a form of "speech" protected by the First Amendment, addressed a matter of public concern, it disagreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusions with respect to the second step of the Pickering test and reversed the lower courts’ rulings.
The Court of Appeals said that viewing the record evidence in light of established federal precedent, it concluded that “the teachers' interests in engaging in constitutionally protected speech in the particular manner that was employed on the day in question were outweighed by the District's interests in safeguarding students and maintaining effective operations at Woodland.”
The school district, said the court, also satisfied its burden of proving that the discipline imposed here was justified because the teachers created a potential yet substantial risk to student safety and an actual disruption to school operations.
Addressing the Free Speech argument advanced by the teachers, the Court of Appeals said that “It is well settled that a public employer may not discharge or retaliate against an employee based on that employee's exercise of the right of free speech” but “Equally well settled, however, is that ‘the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general,’" citing Pickering,
Accordingly, said the court, public employers "may impose restraints on the First Amendment activities of its employees that are job-related even when such restraints would be unconstitutional if applied to the public at large." Thus, although "public employees like . . . teacher[s] do not leave their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse door, . . . it is plain that those rights are somewhat diminished in public employment." Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, holding that the teachers’ demonstration constituted "speech" subject to First Amendment strictures, considered “that speech” in the context of the Pickeringbalancing test.
On the record, said the court, the teachers’ speech was on a matter of public concern and entitled to First Amendment protection. It then moved on the the “second test,” weighing the employee's First Amendment rights against the public employee's interest " in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees'.
The interests the District asserted: “ensuring the safety of its students and maintaining orderly operations at Woodland” are legitimate said the court. As the evidence at the hearings showed that the parking demonstration created dangerous traffic conditions in front of the school that could have injured a student and that caused actual disruption to the school's operations, the school district contented that this was sufficient to justify its discipline of the teachers and that it was not required to prove that a student was actually injured for the Pickering balance to tip in the District's favor.
The majority of the Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the Appellate Division’s ruling, with costs and confirmed the arbitration award.
N.B. Justice Smith concurred but “only in the result, because [he did] not agree with the majority's view that the conduct of these teachers was speech or expression protected by the First Amendment,” stating that he was “troubled by the implication that intentionally disruptive and dangerous conduct can, if it is designed for the purpose of calling attention to the actor's message, qualify for First Amendment protection.” In contrast, Justice Rivera dissented, stating that “I dissent from the majority's decision because I can find no legal or factual error in the Appellate Division's application of the Pickering balancing test to the facts of these cases. I would affirm the Appellate Division's orders and its conclusion that the District violated the teachers' free speech rights.”
* A summary of Pickering, “Essentials of the "Pickering Balancing Test” was posted earlier on NYPPL at http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/01/essentials-of-pickering-balancing-test.html
Bransten v State of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 03214, Appellate Division, First Department
Sitting and retired members of the New York State Judiciary challenged the State’s recent decrease in its employer contribution to the cost of the judges' health insurance premiums, contending that it violated the Compensation Clause of the New York State Constitution which provides "compensation [of a judge] shall be established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of office for which he or she was elected or appointed."*
The Appellate Division agreed, finding that the reduced contribution, which in turn increased the amounts withheld from judicial salaries as employee contribution towards health insurance premiums, constitutes an unconstitutional diminution of judicial compensation.
The court explained that the reduction in the State’s employer contribution for health insurance premiums occurred in 2011 when the State, faced with a serious budget shortfall, threatened to lay off thousands of workers unless employees in State's several collective bargaining units made wage and benefit concessions that included bearing more of the cost of their health insurance premium.
The State Legislature in August 2011 amended Civil Service Law §167.8 to provide that “The president [of the Civil Service Commission], with the approval of the director of the budget, may extend the modified state cost of premium or subscription charges for employees or retirees** not subject to an agreement referenced above and shall promulgate the necessary rules or regulations to implement this provision.”
The President, with the State Budget Director's approval, then adopted a Regulation that reduced the State's contribution for health insurance premiums not only for employees in State’s several negotiating units that had agreed to the reductions through collective bargaining, but also for some “nonunionized employees” and retirees of the State as the employer.
In accordance with these new Regulations, in September 2011 the State notified judges that it would reduce its contribution to sitting judges' health insurance premiums by 6% and reduce its contributions to retired judges' health insurance premiums by 2%.
The State argued that the Compensation Clause does not prohibit the State from decreasing its contributions to the health insurance premiums because any reduction to judicial compensation was "indirect" and nondiscriminatory.
Supreme Court, however, found that the State's reduced contribution amounted to a direct diminution of judicial compensation because it increased the amount withheld from judicial salaries.
On appeal, the State did not contend that reducing its contribution for health insurance premiums did not directly diminish judges' compensation but rather that its contribution to judges' health insurance premiums is not "compensation" within the meaning of the Compensation Clause.
The Appellate Division rejected that argument, explaining “it is settled law that employees' compensation includes all things of value received from their employers, including wages, bonuses, and benefits” and the Appellate Division, Second Department has expressly found that “health insurance benefits are a component of a judge's compensation,” citing Roe v Board of Trustees of the Village of Bellport, 65 AD3d 1211.
In contrast to State employees who either consented to the State's reduced contribution in exchange for immunity from layoffs or were otherwise compensated by the State's promise of job security, the decision points out that judges were forced to make increased contributions to their health care insurance premiums without receiving any benefits in exchange. The Appellate Division noted that the judiciary “had no power to negotiate with the State with respect to the decrease in compensation,” and they “received no benefit from the no-layoffs promise because their terms of office were either statutorily or constitutionally mandated.”
Thus, said the court, “§167.8 uniquely discriminates against judges because it imposes a financial burden on them for which they received no compensatory benefit.”***
Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, the State’s motion to dismiss was properly denied by Supreme Court.
* New York State Constitution, Article VI, §25[a].
** With respect to retirees, prior to the 2011 amendment to Civil Service Law §167.8 it provided that employer contribution for health insurance premiums may be increased pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement but that such increase “shall not be applied during retirement.”
*** Much the same argument would apply to retirees of the State as the employer, including retired judges, who retired prior to the effective date of the President’s Regulation as such retirees are not employees within the meaning of the Taylor Law nor did they receive any benefit with respect to job security as, like sitting judges, retirees cannot be “laid off.”
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