Source: https://patents.google.com/patent/US10122741B2/en
Timestamp: 2020-01-25 22:39:49
Document Index: 200448067

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 400', 'art 500', 'art 600', 'Application No. 2016234999', 'Application No. 2017200969', 'Application No. 2013272215', 'Application No. 201380026239', 'application No. 2015', 'Application No. 2017200969', 'application No. 2013272211', 'Application No. 2016234999', 'Application No. 2', 'application No. 2', 'Application No. 2017']

US10122741B2 - Non-harmful insertion of data mimicking computer network attacks - Google Patents
Non-harmful insertion of data mimicking computer network attacks Download PDF
US10122741B2
US10122741B2 US15/165,036 US201615165036A US10122741B2 US 10122741 B2 US10122741 B2 US 10122741B2 US 201615165036 A US201615165036 A US 201615165036A US 10122741 B2 US10122741 B2 US 10122741B2
US15/165,036
US20160277433A1 (en
Curtis Hash, JR.
2012-03-22 Priority to US201261614148P priority Critical
2013-03-14 Priority to US13/826,736 priority patent/US9374380B2/en
2016-05-26 Application filed by Los Alamos National Security LLC filed Critical Los Alamos National Security LLC
2016-05-26 Priority to US15/165,036 priority patent/US10122741B2/en
2016-05-26 Assigned to LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC reassignment LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: HASH, CURTIS, JR., MR., KENT, ALEXANDER, MR., NEIL, JOSHUA, MR.
2016-09-22 Publication of US20160277433A1 publication Critical patent/US20160277433A1/en
2016-12-05 Assigned to LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC reassignment LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: FISK, MICHAEL, MR., BRUGH, ALEXANDER, MR., STORLIE, CURTIS, MR., UPHOFF, BENJAMIN, MR.
2018-11-06 Publication of US10122741B2 publication Critical patent/US10122741B2/en
230000002547 anomalous Effects 0 abstract claims description 20
This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/826,736 filed Mar. 14, 2013, which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 61/614,148 filed Mar. 22, 2012. The subject matter of these earlier filed applications is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
The present invention generally relates to mimicking network attacks, and, more particularly, to non-harmful insertion of data mimicking computer network attacks.
Conventional approaches to anomaly detection may use validation data in two forms. First, researchers have used real attack data to attempt to validate their approaches. This may be the best approach when such data is available, but typically, network operators have very little or no real attack data for their networks. Real attacks tend to be very rare. If such data is available, the generation of attack data may allow researchers to vary the parameters of the generation scheme and to test their methods on a variety of attacks. As such, researchers can usually only make substantiated claims about the specific attacks for which they have data.
Second, researchers have simulated both non-attack data and attack data. Many of these simulations are generated from models whose parameters are estimated from real networks. This has the advantage of allowing flexibility in the distributions of both nominal and attack data, which allows researchers to test methods against a variety of different scenarios. This method, however, suffers from the assumptions of the models generating the data. In short, researchers are not using real data, and many differences exist between real data and simulated data. Accordingly, an improved method to simulate attacks may be beneficial.
Certain embodiments of the present invention may provide solutions to the problems and needs in the art that have not yet been fully identified, appreciated, or solved by current attack mimicking technologies. For example, some embodiments of the present invention insert non-harmful data that mimics computer network attacks.
In one embodiment, a computer-implemented method includes generating, by a plurality of computing systems, anomalous real network connections between the plurality of computing systems in a network. The computer-implemented method also includes generating, by the plurality of computing systems, data mimicking an attack. The computer-implemented method further includes transmitting, by the plurality of computing systems, the generated data between the plurality of computing systems using the real network connections.
In another embodiment, a computer program is embodied on a non-transitory computer-readable medium. The computer program is configured to cause at least one processor to determine, based on historical data, which network connections to generate between a plurality of computing systems to create an anomaly. The computer program is also configured to cause the at least one processor to generate the network connections to create the anomaly and verify that a data collection mechanism for the network actually measured data pertaining to the connections. The computer program is further configured to cause the at least one processor to provide output of results indicating success or failure of each of the previous steps.
In yet another embodiment, a computer-implemented method includes inserting, by a plurality of computing systems, traffic in a path in a network including computing systems that do not normally communicate. The computer-implemented method also includes detecting the inserted path, by a computing system, as anomalous.
FIG. 1 illustrates an inserted path as a series of hops, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 illustrates an outstar inserted into a network, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 illustrates a caterpillar inserted into a network, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for generating non-harmful data mimicking a network attack and detecting the attack, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 5 is a flowchart of another method for generating non-harmful data mimicking a network attack and detecting the attack, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 6 is a flowchart of yet another method for generating non-harmful data mimicking a network attack and detecting the attack, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 7 is a block diagram of a computing system for detecting group attacks on a network, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Some embodiments of the present invention automatically create network data from within a deployed network for the purposes of validation and data collection. The type of data that is created may mimic that of an attacker acting maliciously on the network. Additionally, some embodiments may provide the opportunity to validate anomaly detection methods on the data.
In real anomaly detection implementations, it was recognized that users were not using the PathScan™ anomaly detection tool correctly on their data. Users were not measuring their network data well, even though they thought they were. In addition, since real attacks are very rare, it is beneficial to be able to convince customers that anomalies can be detected. By creating non-harmful data that mimics attacks, both goals can be accomplished. In other words, users can be trained to use anomaly detection tools correctly, and customers can be shown that anomalies can be detected.
In order to introduce data that realistically mimics an attack into a network data stream, a couple of validations should be made with respect to the generation code. First, it should be validated that the network operator is collecting data of sufficient quality to be used for anomaly detection. To this end, the validation code should check that the data inserted by the data generation code is indeed measured by the network collection mechanism. While this may sound trivial, it is the case that even at large, well-funded networks, this validation may not currently be performed, and some embodiments having such features present a significant advance in the art of network data collection. Second, it should be validated that the applied approach detects the type of attack introduced by the code.
Some embodiments of the present invention use real network data in generating the mimicked attacks. However, the data in some embodiments is not attack data from real events, which are rare and cannot be controlled. Rather, the data is obtained by generating real network connections in an anomalous way between computers controlled by network security personnel who monitor the network. What may constitute an anomalous way is described in more detail, for example, in priority U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/614,148.
The underlying mechanism by which the data is generated can vary, but it is generally important for the insertion process to be non-harmful to the network. One example is generating Domain Name Server (“DNS”) traffic using nslookup in a path consisting of machines that have never communicated before. nslookups are benign queries that resolve an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address from a given host name.
An inserted path may mimic the behavior of a malicious actor in the network, traversing from one host to the next in a sequence of hops. This is illustrated, for example, in path 100 of FIG. 1, where the fictitious “malicious actor” traverses across four hosts from left to right. Another example would be the insertion of an anomalous outstar, a shape which is created by a malicious actor using a central machine to examine and/or compromise its direct neighbors in the network. This is depicted, for example, in outstar 200 of FIG. 2. The gray host is compromised by the “malicious actor”, and the white hosts are direct neighbors that the gray host seeks to examine and/or compromise. Again, it is emphasized that the nslookup approach merely mimics the behavior of a malicious actor, without causing any hosts to actually be compromised.
A third example is that of a caterpillar, a shape which is created when a malicious actor creates a combination of outstars while traversing through a path. This is shown, for example, in caterpillar 300 of FIG. 3. The gray hosts and the edges between them are part of the core path. The white nodes and edges are part of outstars for respective gray nodes. nslookup is a network administration tool for querying DNS to obtain domain name or IP address mapping, or for any other specific DNS record. However, this is only a single example. One of ordinary skill in the art will understand based on the present disclosure that other non-harmful data generation mechanisms may be used, and the shape of the attack in the network may be configurable.
FIG. 4 is a flowchart 400 of a method for generating non-harmful data mimicking a network attack and detecting the attack, according to an embodiment of the present invention. In some embodiments, the method may be performed, for example, by computing systems such as computing system 700 of FIG. 7. The method begins with generating real network connections in an anomalous way between a plurality of computers in a network at 410. Next, data mimicking an attack is generated and sent between the plurality of computers using the real network connections at 420. For example, the generated data may be DNS traffic using nslookup in a path consisting of computers that have never communicated before. The generated data is then transmitted between the plurality of computers using the real network connections at 430.
A computer collects the generated data mimicking the attack at 440, and the collected data is analyzed at 450. The computer then determines whether an attack has occurred based on the collected data at 460. At 470, the computer verifies that the attack was correctly detected.
In some embodiments, software creating data mimicking attacks may require accounts on multiple networked computers. The software may also require data pertaining to historical connection patterns between the networked computers so that anomalous behavior may be effectively detected. An embodiment with this functionality is discussed with respect to FIG. 5 below.
FIG. 5 is a flowchart 500 of a method for generating non-harmful data mimicking a network attack and detecting the attack, according to an embodiment of the present invention. In some embodiments, the method may be performed, for example, by computing systems such as computing system 700 of FIG. 7. The method begins with determining, based on historical data, which network connections to generate between a plurality of computing systems to create an anomaly at 510. The network connections to insert the anomaly are then generated at 520. Next, a computing system configured to monitor for anomalies verifies that the data collection mechanism for the network actually measured the data pertaining to the connections at 530. Data collection mechanisms may include, but are not limited to, collection of DNS data, collection of NetFlow data, other centralized logging mechanisms, and host-based collection, such as via a Unified Host Collection Agent (“UHCA”). Output results are then provided at 540 indicating success or failure of each of the previous steps.
FIG. 6 flowchart 600 of a method for generating non-harmful data mimicking a network attack and detecting the attack, according to an embodiment of the present invention. In some embodiments, the method may be performed, for example, by computing systems such as computing system 700 of FIG. 7. The method begins with inserting traffic in a path in a network including computing systems that do not normally communicate at 610. The inserted path is then detected as anomalous at 620.
FIG. 7 is a block diagram of a computing system 700 for inserting non-harmful data mimicking an attack into a network, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Computing system 700 includes a bus 705 or other communication mechanism for communicating information, and processor(s) 710 coupled to bus 705 for processing information. Processor(s) 710 may be any type of general or specific purpose processor, including a central processing unit (“CPU”) or application specific integrated circuit (“ASIC”). Processor(s) 710 may also have multiple processing cores, and at least some of the cores may be configured to perform specific functions. Computing system 700 further includes a memory 715 for storing information and instructions to be executed by processor(s) 710. Memory 715 can be comprised of any combination of random access memory (“RAM”), read only memory (“ROM”), flash memory, cache, static storage such as a magnetic or optical disk, or any other types of non-transitory computer-readable media or combinations thereof. Additionally, computing system 700 includes a communication device 720, such as a transceiver, to wirelessly provide access to a communications network.
Processor(s) 710 are further coupled via bus 705 to a display 725, such as a Liquid Crystal Display (“LCD”), for displaying information to a user. A keyboard 730 and a cursor control device 735, such as a computer mouse, are further coupled to bus 705 to enable a user to interface with computing system 700. However, in certain embodiments such as those for mobile computing implementations, a physical keyboard and mouse may not be present, and the user may interact with the device solely through display 725 and/or a touchpad (not shown). Any type and combination of input devices may be used as a matter of design choice.
In one embodiment, memory 715 stores software modules that provide functionality when executed by processor(s) 710. The modules include an operating system 740 for computing system 700. The modules further include a data insertion module 745 that is configured to insert non-harmful data mimicking an attack using one or more embodiments of the present invention. Computing system 700 may include one or more additional functional modules 750 that include additional functionality.
The method steps performed in FIGS. 4-6 may be performed by a computer program, encoding instructions for the nonlinear adaptive processor to perform at least the methods described in FIGS. 4-6, in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. The computer program may be embodied on a non-transitory computer-readable medium. The computer-readable medium may be, but is not limited to, a hard disk drive, a flash device, a random access memory, a tape, or any other such medium used to store data. The computer program may include encoded instructions for controlling the nonlinear adaptive processor to implement the methods described in FIGS. 4-6, which may also be stored on the computer-readable medium.
determining based on historical data, by a computing system, which anomalous real network connections to generate between a plurality of computing systems in a network to create the anomalous real network connections based on stochastic models, the anomalous real network connections forming a k-path between the plurality of computing systems comprising a plurality of directed edges, each directed edge comprising associated data;
generating, by the plurality of computing systems, the determined anomalous real network connections between the plurality of computing systems in the network and data mimicking an attack; and
transmitting, by the plurality of computing systems, the generated data mimicking the attack between the plurality of computing systems using the determined anomalous real network connections forming respective k-paths, wherein
the k-path is a subgraph of size k that has diameter k, and
k is at least two.
2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the generated data comprises Domain Name Server (“DNS”) traffic that is transmitted in a path comprising computing systems that have never communicated before.
3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the data mimicking the attack is designed to mimic one or more specific types of attacks based on known types of real attacks.
building stochastic models, by the computing system, for each directed edge in k-paths of a plurality of the anomalous network connections; and
comparing historical parameters with current parameters in a time window, by the computing system, to determine a level of anomalousness of the k-paths of the plurality of the anomalous network connections.
5. The computer-implemented method of claim 4, wherein the historical data comprises historical connection patterns between the plurality of computing systems.
collecting, by the computing system, the generated data mimicking the attack;
analyzing, by the computing system, the collected data;
determining, by the computing system, whether an attack has occurred based on the collected data; and
verifying, by the computing system, that the attack was correctly detected.
providing output of results, by the computing system, indicating effectiveness of the verification.
8. A computer program embodied on a non-transitory computer-readable medium, the computer program configured to cause at least one processor to:
determine, based on historical data, which network connections to generate that form a k-path between a plurality of computing systems to create an anomaly by applying stochastic models for each edge in the k-path;
generate the determined network connections in the k-path and data mimicking an attack to create the anomaly; and
transmit the generated data mimicking the attack between the plurality of computing systems using the determined anomalous real network connections forming the k-path, wherein
9. The computer program of claim 8, the program further configured to cause the at least one processor to:
verify that a data collection mechanism for the network actually measured data pertaining to the generated connections; and
provide output of results indicating a degree of success or failure of the verification.
10. The computer program of claim 8, wherein the network anomaly is designed to mimic one or more specific types of attacks based on known types of real attacks.
11. The computer program of claim 8, wherein the generated data comprises Domain Name Server (“DNS”) traffic that is transmitted in a path comprising computing systems that have never communicated before.
12. The computer program of claim 8, the program further configured to cause the at least one processor to:
build stochastic models for each directed edge in the k-paths of a plurality of the determined network connections; and
compare historical parameters with current parameters in a time window to determine a level of anomalousness of the k-paths of the plurality of the determined network connections.
13. The computer program of claim 8, wherein the historical data comprises historical connection patterns between the plurality of computing systems.
inserting, by a plurality of computing systems, traffic in a k-path in a network comprising computing systems that do not normally communicate, the traffic deviating from stochastic models for each edge of the k-path;
detecting the inserted k-path as anomalous, by a computing system, based on analysis of the inserted traffic;
verifying, by the computing system, that an attack was correctly detected based on the detected inserted k-path; and
providing output of results, by the computing system, indicating a degree of success or failure of the verification, wherein
the k-path comprises a plurality of directed edges, each directed edge comprising associated data,
15. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein the inserted traffic is designed to mimic one or more specific types of attacks based on known types of real attacks.
building stochastic models, by the computing system, for each directed edge in the k-path; and
comparing historical parameters with current parameters in a time window, by the computing system, to determine a level of anomalousness of the k-path.
determining based on historical data, by the computing system, which traffic to insert between the computing systems to create an anomaly, wherein
the historical data comprises historical connection patterns between the plurality of computing systems.
18. A computer program embodied on a non-transitory computer-readable medium, the computer program configured to cause at least one processor to:
generate the determined network connections in the k-path to create the anomaly;
provide output of results indicating a degree of success or failure of the verification, wherein
19. The computer program of claim 18, wherein the network anomaly is designed to mimic one or more specific types of attacks based on known types of real attacks.
20. The computer program of claim 18, wherein the generated data comprises Domain Name Server (“DNS”) traffic that is transmitted in a path comprising computing systems that have never communicated before.
21. The computer program of claim 18, the program further configured to cause the at least one processor to:
22. The computer program of claim 18, wherein the historical data comprises historical connection patterns between the plurality of computing systems.
23. A computer program embodied on a non-transitory computer-readable medium, the computer program configured to cause at least one processor to:
build stochastic models for each directed edge in the k-paths of a plurality of the determined network connections;
compare historical parameters with current parameters in a time window to determine a level of anomalousness of the k-paths of the plurality of the determined network connections; and
generate the determined network connections in the k-path to create the anomaly, wherein
24. The computer program of claim 23, the program further configured to cause the at least one processor to:
25. The computer program of claim 23, wherein the network anomaly is designed to mimic one or more specific types of attacks based on known types of real attacks.
26. The computer program of claim 23, wherein the generated data comprises Domain Name Server (“DNS”) traffic that is transmitted in a path comprising computing systems that have never communicated before.
27. The computer program of claim 23, wherein the historical data comprises historical connection patterns between the plurality of computing systems.
comparing historical parameters with current parameters in a time window, by the computing system, to determine a level of anomalousness of the k-path; and
detecting the inserted k-path as anomalous, by a computing system, based on analysis of the inserted traffic, wherein
providing output of results, by the computing system, indicating a degree of success or failure of the verification.
30. The computer-implemented method of claim 28, wherein the inserted traffic is designed to mimic one or more specific types of attacks based on known types of real attacks.
determining based on historical data, by the computing system, which traffic to insert between the computing systems to create an anomaly;
the k-path is a subgraph of size k that has diameter k,
k is at least two, and
34. The computer-implemented method of claim 32, wherein the inserted traffic is designed to mimic one or more specific types of attacks based on known types of real attacks.
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