Source: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/ctapun/9708/22.htm
Timestamp: 2018-06-24 01:19:51
Document Index: 461380054

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 169', '§ 171', '§ 171', '§ 169', '§ 171', '§ 171', '§ 169', '§ 169', '§ 171', '§ 169']

Michael Harold Romnes, petitioner, Appellant, vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent. C7-97-22, Court of Appeals Unpublished, August 26, 1997.
C7-97-22
Michael Harold Romnes, petitioner,
Filed August 26, 1997
File No. C3-96-9055
Daniel C. Guerrero, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., 1616 Park Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55404 (for Appellant)
Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and Peterson, Judge.
Appellant Michael Harold Romnes challenges the district court's dismissal of his petition to reinstate his driver's license. We affirm.
In 1986, following a series of alcohol-related driving violations, appellant Michael Harold Romnes's driving privileges were canceled and denied as inimical to public safety until he demonstrated his rehabilitation in accordance with the standards set by the commissioner of public safety. After Romnes met those standards in 1987, his driving privileges were reinstated with the restriction that he remain totally abstinent from alcohol and controlled substances. Romnes violated his restriction and resumed the use of alcohol, leading to an implied consent test on April 22, 1992, and a conviction for misdemeanor careless driving. Romnes's driving privileges were accordingly canceled and denied as inimical to public safety until such time as he completed the requirements for a second rehabilitation. On April 24, 1995, Romnes regained driving privileges for a second time with the restriction that he remain totally abstinent from alcohol and controlled substances.
On November 28, 1995, Romnes was arrested for DWI. As a result of Romnes's arrest and subsequent refusal to submit to alcohol concentration testing, the commissioner of public safety revoked Romnes's driver's license pursuant to the implied consent law.
Romnes initially sought judicial review of the commissioner's revocation of his license under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1996), the implied consent law. Romnes, however, subsequently waived the implied consent petition. He then sought judicial review of the revocation pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.19 (1996), license reinstatement. After the hearing, the district court concluded that Romnes may not pursue a cause of action under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 because the statute prohibits license reinstatement hearings in which appellant's license is revoked under Minn. Stat. § 169.123. The district court, therefore, denied Romnes's petition for license reinstatement.
Minn. Stat. § 171.19 (1996) provides in pertinent part:
Any person whose driver's license has been refused, revoked, suspended, or canceled by the commissioner, except where the license is revoked under section 169.123, may file a petition for a hearing in the matter * * *.
The supreme court explained that the 1982 legislative amendment to Minn. Stat. § 171.19 reflected "a legislative intention to foreclose" petitions from drivers whose licenses have been revoked under the implied consent statute. Willems v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 333 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Minn. 1983); see also State v. Hanson, 356 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Minn. 1984) (holding that failure to seek judicial review of the implied consent revocation results in "forfeiture" of driver's right to judicial revocation hearing). Statutory law and case law demonstrate that Romnes's petition was not properly before the district court.
At trial, Romnes suggested that he was somehow coerced into waiving his petition by opposing counsel. There is, however, no testimony regarding the alleged conversation between counsel. Furthermore, the commissioner does not concede that any such conversation took place. Romnes's counsel admitted to the district court that he (the attorney) did make the ultimate decision regarding the best course of action to take and that he had an obligation to "research and develop the law."
If Romnes's counsel felt that he was coerced into waiving his hearing under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1996), then the proper action was to seek to reopen the implied consent hearing. If Romnes had judicial economy in mind (as stated in his brief), he could have filed both petitions (under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 and Minn. Stat. § 171.19) and moved to consolidate. By withdrawing his petition under Minn. Stat. § 169.123, Romnes forfeited his right to judicial review of the implied consent revocation.