Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/hardie-v-eu-30413
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 00:49:02
Document Index: 13188587

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 29214', '§ 29215', '§ 29216', '§ 29218', '§ 29221', '§ 29228', '§ 22']

Hardie v. Eu - 18 Cal.3d 371 - Mon, 11/29/1976 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 18 Cal.3d 371
Hardie v. Eu , 18 Cal.3d 371
(Opinion by Richardson, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court.) [18 Cal.3d 372]
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Iver E. Skjeie, Assistant Attorney General, Floyd D. Shimomura, Deputy Attorney General, Stanford D. [18 Cal.3d 374] Herlick, County Counsel (San Bernardino), Craig S. Jordan, Deputy County Counsel, William M. Siegel, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Robert T. Owens, Deputy County Counsel, Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel (Orange), Laurence M. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, John B. Clausen, County Counsel (Contra Costa), Peter J. Lucey, Deputy County Counsel, Donald L. Clark, County Counsel (San Diego), Bruce W. Beach, Deputy County Counsel, John B. Heinrich, County Counsel (Sacramento), Richard J. Moore, County Counsel (Alameda), James E. Jerreris, Assistant County Counsel, Daniel H. Lowenstein, Robert M. Stern, Kenneth H. Finney, Natalie E. West, Michael J. Baker and Howard, Prim, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady & Pollak for Respondents.
Government Code sections 85200-85202, the challenged statutes, were enacted as part of the Political Reform Act of 1974 (the Act). Section 85200 generally prohibits any "person" from incurring expenditures "in [18 Cal.3d 375] furtherance of ... circulation or qualification of a statewide petition ..." unless such expenditures are expressly authorized by the "proponent." Subdivisions (a) and (b) of the section contain an express exemption from application of the Act for those unreimbursed personal expenses "incidental" to "circulation" and "advertising, and speech" expenditures not "directly incidental" to "circulation."
Petitioners, however, direct a pointed challenge to these statutes, even as so limited, arguing that they constitute an impermissible infringement on petitioners' First Amendment rights and that they run afoul of the California Constitution as well. We issued our alternative writ of mandate and stayed the enforcement of sections 85200-85203 pending our resolution of the matter. Respondents Secretary of State and Fair Political Practices Commission have filed returns opposing the issuance of a peremptory writ. Respondents county registrars of voters (who have initial responsibility for filing and screening initiative petitioners) have disclaimed any active interest in this litigation and express a willingness to comply with any disposition of the case. [18 Cal.3d 376]
[1a] Our examination of the contentions of the respective parties is aided by the recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 96 S.Ct. 612]. In Buckley the high court struck down provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, which sharply limited expenditures by, or in behalf of the election of, a candidate for federal office. Finding that virtually every means of political communication in modern society requires or involves the expenditure of money, the high court concluded: "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." (Id., at p. 19 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 687].) Discerning no overriding governmental interest the high court held that such limitations infringed upon the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and association.
We subsequently recognized the applicability of Buckley to sections of the Act which imposed similar ceilings on expenditures for or against the passage of statewide ballot propositions. (Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 671, 675 [129 Cal.Rptr. 106, 547 P.2d 1386].) The principles expressed in Buckley and Citizens have equal application to the process by which citizens seek to qualify such propositions for submission to the voters.
[2] As defined by the Supreme Court, the purpose of the First Amendment is "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." (Roth v. United States (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 484 [1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1506-1507, 77 S.Ct. 1304]; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 269 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 700, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412].) [1b] Qualification of an initiative measure requires prior evidence of significant voter support in the form of petition signatures. It follows that the process of solicitation of these signatures, of necessity, involves discussion of the merits of the measure. The circulators themselves thus become unavoidably a principal means of advocacy of the proposal. Further, as the Commission implicitly concedes, limitations of the kind expressed in sections 85200-85202 may substantially hinder a proposal's initial access to the electoral process. Thus, a limitation on expenditures for the use of petition circulators, even though restricted to those who are compensated financially, directly and inevitably restricts "the amount of money a person or group can spend on political [18 Cal.3d 377] communication during a campaign ...." (Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, at p. 19 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, at p. 687].)
[3] We accordingly submit the challenged sections to that strict scrutiny appropriate to cases in which fundamental constitutional rights are affected. Using this test, we determine whether the restraints imposed are nonetheless justified as incidental to the promotion of a "substantial" or "compelling" governmental interest, unrelated to speech, and unattainable by means less intrusive upon First Amendment rights. (Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 44-45, 47-48 [46 L.Ed.2d at pp. 702-704]; N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 438, 444 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 421, 424-425, 83 S.Ct. 328]; Shelton v. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 488-490 [5 L.Ed.2d 231, 237-239, 81 S.Ct. 247].)
Moreover, the Commission advances no persuasive argument that the Legislature cannot deal effectively with corruption in the circulation process by laws more narrowly aimed at specific abuses. Several existing statutes proscribe a wide range of corrupt circulation practices. The Elections Code, for example, prohibits misrepresentation in circulation [18 Cal.3d 378] of a petition (§ 29214); filing (§ 29215) or circulating (§ 29216) petitions with false signatures; filing false affidavits concerning any petition (§ 29218); forgery of petition signatures (§ 29221); and withholding or obscuring the text or summary of a measure from a potential signatory's view (§§ 29228, 29229).
[4b] We think it significant that the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Commission as upholding broad regulation of paid petition circulators (State v. Campbell (1973) 265 Ore. 82 [506 P.2d 163, 166-170], app. dism. sub nom. Campbell v. Oregon (1973) 414 U.S. 803 [38 L.Ed.2d 39, 94 S.Ct. 132]; State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc. (1973) 82 Wn.2d 94 [508 P.2d 149, 153]) predate Buckley. Their authority is therefore suspect to the extent that they conflict with the Buckley rationale.
[6a] Petitioners also challenge on state constitutional grounds the provisions contained in Elections Code section 3507, which impose a 150-day limitation on the circulation of petitions. We are advised by respondent Secretary of State that, within the 150-day period allotted to it, the Greyhound Dog Racing Initiative obtained more than 110 percent of the necessary signatures and has, accordingly, qualified for the [18 Cal.3d 379] November 1976 ballot. The point is arguably moot. [7] However, appellate courts have on numerous occasions exercised their discretion to consider questions technically moot as to the parties where the issues are nonetheless of continuing public importance. (E.g., Diamond v. Bland (1970) 3 Cal.3d 653, 657 [91 Cal.Rptr. 501, 477 P.2d 733], cert. den. sub nom. Homart Development Co. v. Diamond (1971) 402 U.S. 988 [29 L.Ed.2d 153, 91 S.Ct. 1661], rehg. den. (1971) 404 U.S. 874 [30 L.Ed.2d 120, 92 S.Ct. 27], rehg. den. (1972) 405 U.S. 981 [31 L.Ed.2d 257, 92 S.Ct. l189], rehg. den. (1972) 409 U.S. 897 [34 L.Ed.2d 154, 93 S.Ct. 91] [initiative qualification]; DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Dept. of Employment (1961) 56 Cal.2d 54, 58 [13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362 P.2d 487]; People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 462, 467-468 [89 Cal.Rptr. 290].) We do so here.
We perceive no difficulty in harmonizing the relevant provisions. Under Elections Code section 3507, as authorized by article IV, section 24, subdivision (e), of the Constitution, a measure may "qualify" only by submission of supporting petitions, bearing the necessary signatures, within the requisite 150-day solicitation period. Once a measure has "qualified" it must then be presented to the next statewide election held at least 131 days thereafter "or at any special statewide election held prior to that general election." (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 22, subd. (c).) Such an interpretation is consistent with our analysis of a predecessor provision to Elections Code section 3507 in Gage v. Jordan (1944) 23 Cal.2d 794, 803-804 [147 P.2d 387].
We conclude, accordingly, that the 150-day limitation imposed by section 3507 is not invalid under article IV of the state Constitution. [18 Cal.3d 380]
Mon, 11/29/1976 18 Cal.3d 371 Review - Criminal Appeal Opinion issued
1 GEORGE GRAHAM HARDIE et al., Petitioners, v. MARCH FONG EU, as Secretary of State, etc., et al. (Respondent)
2 GEORGE GRAHAM HARDIE et al. (Petitioners)
3 MARCH FONG EU, as Secretary of State, etc., et al. (Respondent)
Nov 29 1976 Writ Issued
SCOCAL, Hardie v. Eu , 18 Cal.3d 371 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/hardie-v-eu-30413) (last visited Friday August 7, 2020).