Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=9176
Timestamp: 2020-06-03 21:53:30
Document Index: 113939152

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 226', 'Art.\t226', 'Art.\n226', 'Art.\n226', 'Art. 12', 'Art. 226', 'Art.\n226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 12', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 162', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 73', 'Art. 226', 'Art.\t226']

J.R. RAGHUPATHY, versus STATE OF A.P. & ORS
1988 AIR 1681	1988 SCR Supl. (1) 694 1988 SCC (4) 364	JT 1988 (3)	313 1988 SCALE (2)218
J.R. RAGHUPATHY, V. STATE OF A.P. & ORS [1988] RD-SC 191 (28 July 1988)
CITATION: 1988 AIR 1681	1988 SCR Supl. (1) 694 1988 SCC (4) 364	JT 1988 (3)	313 1988 SCALE (2)218
RF	1992 SC 836	(7)
Andhra Pradesh Districts (Formation) Act, 1974-Whether location of Revenue Mandal Headquarters under	Sub-Section (5) of Section 3 of-Was amenable to Writ jurisdiction of High Court.
These appeals by Special	Leave and a petition	for Special leave arose out of different judgments of the High Court. The main issue	involved was whether the location of Revenue Mandal	Headquarters in	the State of Andhra Pradesh under S. 3(5) of the Andhra Pradesh District	(Formation) Act, 1974, was a purely governmental function, not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
Writ Petitions were filed in	the High Court by individuals and gram panchayats questioning the legality and propriety of the formation of certain	Revenue Mandals and location of certain	Mandal	Headquarters notified	in preliminary notification issued under sub-s. (5) of Section 3 of the Act.	In some	cases, the High Court	declined to interfere with	the location of Mandal Headquarters, holding that the government was the best judge of the situation, or on the	ground that there was	a breach of guidelines it directed the Government to reconsider the	question of location of the Mandal Headquarters. In some cases, the High Court quashed the final notification for location of	the Mandal Headquarters at a particular place, holding	that there was a breach of guidelines based on the system of marking and also on the ground that there were no reasons disclosed for deviating from the preliminary	notification for location of the Mandal Headquarters at another place.
Allowing Civil Appeal Nos. 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1987 of 1986 and all other appeals and Special Leave Petitions directed against the judgments	of the	High Court, whereby the High Court had interfered with the location of	the Mandal Headquarters, the Court, ^
HELD: It was difficult to sustain the interference by the High Court in some of cases with	the location of the Mandal	Headquarters and the	quashing of the impugned notification on	the ground that the Government had acted in breach of the guidelines in that one place or 695 the other was more centrally located or that location at the other place would promote general public convenience or that the Headquarters should be fixed at a particular place with a view	to developing the areas surrounded by	it or	that merely because	a particular person who was an influential Member of Legislative Assembly	belonging to the party in opposition had the right of representation but failed to avail of it. The location of Headquarters by the Government by the issue of the final notification under sub-s (5) of s.
3 of the Act was on a consideration	by the	Cabinet Sub- Committee of the proposals submitted	by the Collectors concerned and the objections and suggestions received from the local authorities like Gram Panchayats and the general public, keeping	in view the relevant factors. Even assuming that any breach of the guidelines for the location of the Mandal Headquarters was justiciable, the utmost that	the High Court could have	done was to	quash the impugned notification in	a particular case and direct the Government to reconsider the question. There was	no warrant for the High Court to have gone further and direct the shifting of the Mandal Headquarters at a particular place. [711B-E] The guidelines are merely in the nature of instructions issued by the State Government to the Collectors regulating the manner in which they should formulate their proposals for formation of a Revenue Mandal or for the location of its Headquarters keeping in view the broad guidelines laid down in Appendix I to the White Paper issued by the Government laying down the broad	guidelines. The	guidelines had no statutory force	and they had also not been published in the Official Gazette. They were mere departmental instructions for the Collectors.	The ultimate decision as to	the formation of	a Revenue Mandal or	location of	its Headquarters was with the Government. It was for that reason that the Government issued preliminary notification under sub-s (5) of section 3 of the Act.	Deviation from	the guidelines in some of the aspects was usually for reasons of administrative convenience keeping in	view the purpose and object of the Act i.e. to bring the administration nearer to the people. There was	nothing on record to show that the decision of the Government in any of these cases	was arbitrary or capricious or was one not reached in good faith or actuated with improper considerations or influenced by extraneous considerations. In a matter like this, conferment of discretion upon the Government in the matter of formation of a Revenue Mandal or location of its Headquarters in the nature of things necessarily leaves the Government with a choice in the use of the directions	conferred upon	it.
[713A-F] It was difficult to sustain the judgments of the High Court in the 696 cases where it had interfered with the location of Mandal Headquarters and quashed the impugned notifications on the ground that the Government had acted	in breach of	the guidelines in that one place or the other was more centrally located or that location at the other place would promote general public	convenience or	that the Headquarters should be fixed at a particular place with a view to developing the area surrounded by it.	The location of Headquarters by the Government by the issue of the final notification under sub- section (5) of Section 3 of the Act was on a consideration by the	Cabinet Sub-Committee of the proposals submitted by the Collectors	concerned and the objections and suggestions received from the local authorities like the gram panchayats and the	general public. Even assuming	that the Government while accepting	the recommendations of the Cabinet	Sub- Committee directed that the Mandal Headquarters should be at one place rather than at another place as recommended by the Collector concerned in a particular case, the High Court would not have issued	a writ	in the nature of mandamus to enforce	the guidelines which were	nothing more	than administrative instructions not having any statutory force, which did not give rise to any legal right in favour of the writ petitioners. The petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitutions before the High Court were dismissed.
[723G-H; 724A-D] Gram Panchayat, Chinna Madur & Orr. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, [1986] 1 Andhra Weekly Reporter 362; C.J.
Fernandez v. State of	Mysore & Ors., [1967] 3 S.C.R. 636;
Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries	& Food, LR 1968 AC	997; Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade, LR 1967 QB 643 at	705; Council of Civil	Service Unions	and Others v. Minister for	the Civil Service, [1984] 3 All ER 935 (RL); Secretary of	State for Education and Science v.
Tameside M.B.C., LR 1977 AC 1014; Breen v.	Amalgamated Engineering Union, LR 1971 2 QB 175 at 190; R.V. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, explain,	[1967] 2 QB 864 and Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] AC 40, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1979-85 of 1986 etc. etc.
From the Judgment	and	Order dated 12.2.1986/28.2.1986/49.1.1986 and 5.2.1986 of	the Andhra Pradesh High Court in	W.P. Nos.6063,	5379, 9908, 7836 and 5379 of 1985.
Seetaramaiah, A.S.	Nambyar, R.N.	Keshwani, T.V.S.N.
Chari, Ms. Vrinda Grover, S. Mudigonda, C.S. Vaidanathan, S.R.
697 Sethia, Vimal Dave, B. Rajeshwara Rao, Jitendra Sharma, G.N.
Rao, T.C. Gupta, B.P. Sarathi, A. Subba Rao and B. Kanta Rao for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J.	These appeals	by special leave and	the connected special leave petitions directed	against	the various judgments and orders of the Andhra Pradesh	High Court involve	a question of	principle, and relate to location of Mandal Headquarters in the State of Andhra Pradesh under s. 3(5)	of the Andhra Pradesh Districts (Formation) Act, 1974. The main issue	involved is whether location of Mandal Headquarters was a	purely governmental function and therefore not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the present cases we are concerned with the location of 12 Revenue Mandal Headquarters.
The avowed	object and purpose of	the Andhra Pradesh District (Formation) Act, 1974, as amended by the Andhra Pradesh District (Formation)	Amendment Act, 1985	as reflected in the long title, was to bring about a change in the Revenue Administration with a view to	'bring	the administration nearer to the people and to make all public services easily	available to	them'. The change in	the Revenue Administration	was so	achieved by the creation of Revenue Mandals	in place of taluks and firkas. The purpose of the	legislation is	brought	out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, a relevant portion whereof is as under:
"On a careful review of	the socio-economic development of the State for the last 20 years the State Government felt it necessary to take	the administration nearer to the people. It was of the opinion that	the only method to be adopted by the Government for a better Revenue Administration and to serve the interests of the people in a more effective and suitable manner was by formation of the Mandals in place of taluks and firkas. It was of the view that a decentralisation of administration and reduction in its levels would be conducive to a more efficient implementation of administration which brings the involvement of the people, particularly	in the implementation of several welfare measures of	the Government, and especially to	uplift the conditions of the weaker sections of the society. It also felt that there was urgent necessity to review its 698 activities and services and welfare programmes and that they should be	extended to the interior regions and that the	creation of Mandals with a population ranging from 35,000 to 55,000 based upon density	of population would be an effective method for providing	better	facilities to	the people at lesser cost and greater convenience. The avowed object was	therefore to	'bring	the administration nearer	to the	people and to make all public services easily available to them'.
This was achieved by the creation	of Revenue Mandals in place of taluks and firkas." To implement the decision of the	Government, on 11th January, 1984 the Governor of Andhra	Pradesh	accordingly promulgated Ordinance No. 22 of 1984. This Ordinance	was later replaced	by Ordinance No. 5 of 1985 inasmuch as the earlier	Ordinance could not	be reintroduced due to dissolution of	the Legislative	Assembly. The Ordinance was later replaced	by Act	No. 14 of 1985. The change in administration was brought about by amending s. 3 of the Act by introducing	the word 'mandals' in	place of taluks and firkas. Pursuant to their powers under sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Districts (Formation) Act, as amended by Act 14	of 1985, the	State Government, by	notification published in the official gazette, after following	the procedure laid	down in	sub-s.(5) thereof divided the State for the	purpose of revenue administration into 23 Revenue District with such limits as specified therein. Each such district consisted of Revenue	Divisions and each Revenue Division consisted of Revenue Mandals. The 23 districts now comprise of 1104 Revenue Mandals.
As	many as 124	petitions under Art.	226 of	the Constitution were filed in the High Court by individuals and gram panchayat questioning the legality and propriety of the formation of certain	Revenue	Mandals, and	particularly location of Mandal Headquarters, abolition	of certain Mandals or shifting of	Mandal Headquarters, as notified in the preliminary	notification issued under sub-s. (5) of s.
3, deletion and addition of villages	to certain mandals.
Some of	the writ petitions were heard by one Division Bench and the	others by another, both the Benches being presided over by Reghuvir, J. who has	delivered all the judgments.
Incidentally, there is no statutory provision	relating to location of Mandal Headquarters and the matter is governed by GOMs dated 25th July, 1985 issued by the State Government laying down the broad	guidelines for the formation of Mandals and also for location of Mandal Headquarters. The learned Judges	upheld the validity of formation of Mandals as also the aforesaid GOMs and in some 699 cases they declined to interfere with the location of Mandal Headquarters holding that the Government was the best judge of the situation or on the ground that there was a breach of the guidelines,	and directed the Government to reconsider the question of location of Mandal Headquarters. However, in other cases the learned Judges have gone a step further and quashed	the final notification for	location of Mandal Headquarters at	a particular place holding that there was a breach of the guidelines based on the system of marking and also on	the ground that there were no reasons disclosed for deviating from	the preliminary	notification, and instead directed the Government to issue a fresh notification for location of Mandal Headquarters at another place. One of the arguments advanced before us in the cases where the High Court has declined to interfere is that both the High Court and the	State Government should have	applied a uniform standard in dealing with the question	and generally it is said that the State Government should	at any rate	have adhered to the guidelines in fixing the location of Mandal Headquarters without being	guided by	extraneous considerations.
Myriad are	the facts. It is not necessary for us to delve into the facts in any detail. It would suffice for our purposes to touch upon	the facts in some of the cases to present the rather confusing picture emerging as a result of conflicting directions made by	the High Court. It appears that Raghuvir,	J. relied upon the underlying principle emerging from his earlier decision delivered	on behalf of himself and Sriramulu, J. in the Gram Panchayat, Chinna Madur &	Ors. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, [1986] 1 Andhra Weekly Reporter 362 which he calls as the 'Chandur principle'. In	that case following the earlier decision of the High Court where a place called Chandur was not shown in the preliminary	notification for formation of a taluk, but was chosen to	be the	place	of location of the Taluk Headquarters in	the final notification, it was held that in such a	case publication of the final notification could not be sustained and it was for the Government to give reasons for such deviation. The decision proceeded on the principle that where guidelines are issued regulating the manner in which a discretionary power	is to	be exercised,	the Government is equally	bound by the	guidelines. If	the guidelines were violated, it was for the Government to offer explanation as	to why the guidelines were deviated from. We are afraid, there is no such	inflexible rule of universal application. The learned Judges failed to appreciate that the guidelines	issued	by the State	Government had no statutory force	and they were	merely	in the nature of executive instructions	for the	guidance of the Collectors.
On the basis of such guidelines the Collectors 700 were asked to forward	proposals for formation of Revenue Mandals	and for location of Mandal Headquarters.	The proposals so forwarded by the Collectors were processed in the Secretariat in the light of the suggestions	and objections received in response to the	preliminary notification issued under s. 3(5) of the Act and then placed before a Cabinet Sub Committee. The ultimate decision as to the place of location	of Mandal Headquarters was for the Government to take. It	cannot be said that in any of the cases the action of the Government for location of such Mandal Headquarters was mala fide or in bad faith or that it proceeded on extraneous consideration.	Nor can it be said that the impugned action would result	in arbitrariness or absence of fairplay or discrimination.
We must next refer to the facts in a few illustrative cases. In the Gram Panchayat, Chinna Madur's case, although in the preliminary notification issued under s. 3(5) of the Act for	formation of Devaruppalla Mandal, Chinna Madur was proposed as the Mandal Headquarters, the Revenue authorities in the	final notification declared Devaruppalla as	the Mandal Headquarters. In the writ petition, the High Court produced the records and it showed that both Devaruppalla and Chinna Madur provided	equal facilities as	to communication, transport, veterinary hospital, bank, school etc. and secured 15 marks each. The Government preferred Devaruppalla as Chinna Madur	was inaccessible in	some seasons as that village was divided by two rivers from rest of the	villages. Devaruppalla besides is	located on Hyderabad-Suryapet Highway which was considered to be a factor in its favour. After reiterating	the Chandur principle that	it is for the Government to give reasons for such deviation,	the learned Judges declined to interfere, observing:
"In the instant case, the record produced shows the authorities considered the comparative merits of Devaruppalla and Chinna	Madur.	The Revenue authorities applied	the correct	indicia	of accessibility in all seasons. Other facilities of the two villages were discussed at length in the record. Having regard to the overwhelming features in favour of Devaruppalla the village was declared as head quarters." We have referred to the facts of this case because it highlights the approach of the High Court and it has assumed to itself the function	of the	Government in	weighing the comparative merits and demerits in the matter of location of the Mandal Headquarters.
701 The same infirmity unfortunately permeates through some of the	judgments where	the High Court has interfered. In some of	the cases the High Court has gone further and not only quashed the impugned notification for location of the Mandal Headquarters at a particular place but also directed the shifting to another place. In Civil Appeals Nos. 1980 and 1985 of 1986, in formation of Gollamamidada Mandal, Gollamamidada was shown as the proposed Headquarters in the priliminary notification, but Pedapudi was selected to be the place of	Headquarters in the	final notification.
Gollamamidada secured 23 marks	as compared to 18 marks secured by Pedapudi. The Collector relaxed the guideline because, it was stated, 12 out of 17	Panchayat opted for Pedapudi to be the	Headquarters	presumably because Gollamamidada was at one end of the Mandal and out of 17 villages comprised in the Mandal, 10	villages were at a distance of 7 to 14 kilometres and there were no proper travelling facilities and therefore it was beyond the reach of the	common man. Allowing the writ petition, the	High Court observed:	"On evaluation	of the sketch, we hold that neither of the two villages is centrally located". It went on to say that "the guidelines prescribed by the Government bind the Government and cannot be relaxed and there was no reason forthcoming for supersession of the claim of	the village Gollamamidada by Pedapudi." Although the Cabinet Sub Committee had directed the	variation on	grounds of administrative convenience and for the reason that 12 out of 17 Gram	Panchayats had resolved that Pedapudi should be the Headquarters, the High Court quashed the notification saying that the resolution of the Gram Panchayat might be relevant for consideration, but in law it was not decisive of the question. It further observed that there was no explanation as to why the	place	of location as specified in	the preliminary notification was varied and accordingly directed the shifting of Headquarters to Gollamamidada. We find it difficult to subscribe to this line of reasoning adopted by the High Court.
In Civil Appeals Nos. 1982 and	1987 of 1986,	the judgment of the High Court suffers from the same infirmity.
In the	preliminary as	well as final notification,	for formation of Kalher Revenue Mandal, Kalher was declared to the Mandal Headquarters. Kalher secured 14 marks as against Sirgapur which	secured 22 marks. The High Court quashed the notification for location of the Headquarters at kalher and directed the shifting of the Headquarters to Sirgapur on the basis of the Collector's note appended to the file which stated:
"As per the guidelines, the Mandal	Headquarters may have to be fixed at Sirgapur	and not at Kalher. Sirgapur has 702 scored 22 points whereas the score	of Kalher is only 14. Sirgapur is undoubtedly the zone of influence for	this Mandal. Moreover, Sirgapur is centrally located and has better road connections with the rest of the villages, besides having maximum infrastructural facilities." The High Court observed that no record was produced as to why	the Government did not act on the note placed on the file.
It will serve no useful purpose to delineate the facts in all	the cases which follow	more or less on the	same lines. We are of the opinion	that the High Court had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the decision of the State Government to locate the Mandal Headquarters at a particular place.	The decision to locate such	Headquarters at a particular village is dependent upon various	factors. The High Court obviously could not evaluate for	itself	the comparative merits of a particular place as	against	the other for location of	the Mandal Headquarters. In some of the cases the High Court declined to interfere saying that the Government	was the	best judge of the situation in the matter of location of Mandal Headquarters. However, in a few cases the High Court while quashing the impugned notifications for location of	Mandal	Headquarters issued under sub-s. (5) of s. 3 of the Act on the ground that there was a breach of the guidelines, directed the Government to reconsider the question after hearing the parties.
We have had the benefit of hearing learned counsel for the parties on various aspects of this	branch	of administrative law as	to the	nature	and scope of	the guidelines and whether their non-observance was justiciable.
The learned counsel with their usual industry placed before us a large number of authorities touching upon the subject.
On the	view that we take, it is not necessary for us to refer to them all.
Shri T.V.S.N. Chari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State Government followed by Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Shri U.R. Lalit and Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in cases where the High Court has interfered	have,	in substance, contended	that suitability as to the location of Mandal Headquarters is for the Government	to decide and not for the High Court. They contend that the High	Court failed to view the case from a proper perspective. According to them, the guidelines are executive instructions, pure	and simple, and have no statutory force. It was pointed out	that there is no statutory provision made either in the Act or the Rules framed there- 703 under laying down the	manner in which the location of the Headquarters of	a Revenue Mandal was to be made.	The Legislature has	left the matter of selection of a place to be the	Mandal Headquarters to the discretion of the State Government and	it was	purely a Governmental function based on administrative convenience. The Government	accordingly issued a White Paper laying down the broad guidelines as contained in Appendix I thereto. The Collector were required to forward their proposals for formation of Revenue Mandals indicating the	place	where the Headquarters should be located in accordance with the principles laid down in the guidelines based on a	system	of marking. Although	the Collectors were	required to propose the location of Mandal Headquarters at	a particular place on a system of marking, but that was not determinative of the question. If the marks were to be the sole criterion, then there was no question of inviting objections and suggestions. The ultimate decision therefore lay	with the Government	and in	making the selection the Government had the duty	to ensure that the place located for location of Mandal Headquarters promoted administrative convenience and further the	object	and purpose of the legislation in bringing about a change in the Revenue administration viz. (i) to bring the administration nearer to the people and (ii)	to make all public services easily available to them, the main criterion as laid down in the guidelines being suitability and accessibility. Further, the learned counsel contended	that the High Court	was clearly in error in substituting its	judgment for that of the State Government. Non-observance of the guidelines which were in the nature of executive instructions was	not justiciable. In	any event, the High Court could not have issued a direction requiring the Government to shift	the Headquarters of	a Revenue Mandal from a particular place to another place on its own evaluation	of the	comparative merits and demerits merely on the basis of marking.	The learned counsel	relied upon G.J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1967]	3 SCR 636 and other decisions taking the same view.
We had an equally persuasive reply to these arguments.
Shri Seetaramaiah, learned counsel	appearing for	the respondents in	cases where the High Court has interfered, advanced the main argument on the legal aspect with much learning and resource and placed all the authorities on this abstruse branch of administrative law, namely, the Courts have albeit the Governmental action which involves exercise of discretionary powers, control over the exercise of such Governmental power by implying	limits	of reasonableness, relevance and purpose. Judicial control over the executive, or over	an administrative authority, must be	maintained.
Such judicial control by necessary impli- 704 cation is reconciled with legislative intent, on the premise that the legislature never intended that the Government should have unfettered control over a certain area. He drew our attention to several recent English decisions which manifest a definite shift in the attitude of the Courts to increase their	control over discretion. According to	the learned counsel, the traditional position is	that Courts will control the existence and extent of prerogative power i.e. governmental power, but not the	manner	of exercise thereof. What degree or standard of control would then be exercised would	depend upon the type	of subject-matter in issue. He submits that	there is increasing willingness of the Courts to assert their power to scrutinise the factual bases upon which discretionary powers have been exercised.
It is said that the Court is not powerless to intervene where the decision of	the Government	is reached by taking into account factors that were legally irrelevant or by using its power in a way calculated to frustrate the policy of the	Act. It	follows that the nature and object of the status had to be considered to determine the area of power possesed. It is urged that the remedy of a writ of mandamus is available if a decision is reached by the Government on the basis of irrelevant considerations or improper purposes or for other misuse of power. Upon that premise, he does not accept that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders passed	by the	State	Government for	the location of the Headquarters of a Revenue Mandal under Art.
226 of the Constitution. Substantially, the argument is that the guidelines	framed	by the State	Government have a statutory force inasmuch as	the power to	issue	such administrative directions or instructions to the Collectors is conferred	by the	provisions of the	Act itself.
Alternatively, he says that even though a non-statutory rule, bye-law or instruction may be changed by the authority who made it without any formality and it cannot ordinarily be enforced through a	Court of law, the party aggrieved by its non-enforcement may nevertheless get relief under Art.
226 of the Constitution where the non-observance of the non- statutory rule	or practice would result in arbitrariness or absence of fairplay or	discrimination, particularly where the authority making such non-statutory rule-or the like- comes within the definition of 'State' under Art. 12. In substance, the contention is that the principle laid down in the classical decision of the House of Lords in Padfield v.
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, LR 1968 AC 997 that the Courts will control	the exercise of statutory powers by the Minister, still prevails over	exercise of discretionary powers by the Government. The general approach now is	for the	Courts to require that the Government must produce reasonable grounds for its action, even where the 705 jurisdictional fact is subjectively framed. He drew	our attention to the observations of Lord Denning M.R. in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade,	LR 1977 QB 643 at p.
705 to the effect:
"The	prerogative is a discretionary power exercisable by the executive	government for	the public good,	in certain spheres of	governmental activity for	which the law has made no provision, such as the war prerogative	(of requisitioning property for	the defence of the realm), or	the treaty prerogative	(of making treaties	with foreign powers). The law does not interfere with the proper exercise	of the	discretion by	the executive in	those situations: but	it can set limits by defining the bounds of the activity: and it can intervene if	the discretion	is exercised improperly or	mistakenly. That is a	fundamental principle of our constitution." *	*	*	* "Seeing that	the prerogative	is a discretionary power to be exercised for the public good, it follows that	its exercise can be examined by the courts just as any other discretionary power which is vested in the executive. At several times in our history,	the executive have claimed that a discretion given by the prerogative is unfettered:
just as they have claimed that a discretion given by statute	or by	regulation is	unfettered ......The two	outstanding cases are Padfield v.
Minister of	Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] AC 997 and Secertary of State for Education and Science	v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council, [1976] 3 WLR 641, where the House of Lords have shown that when discretionary powers are entrusted	to the	executive by statute,	the courts can examine the exercise of those powers to see that they are	used	properly, and	not impropertly or mistakely." In order to appreciate the contentions advanced, it is necessary to refer to	the relevant statutory provisions bearing on the questions involved. Sub-s. (1) of s. 3, as amended, is in these terms:
"3(1) The Government may, by notification,	from time	to time, for	the purposes	of revenue administration, divide the	State	into	such disticts with	such limits as may be specified therein; and each district shall consist of such 706 revenue divisions and each revenue division shall consist of such mandals and	each mandal shall consist of such villages as the Government may, by notification from time to time, specify in this behalf." Sub-s. (2) thereof provides that the Government may, in the interests of better administration and development of the areas, by notification from time to time on and with effect on and	from such date as may be specified therein, form a new district, revenue division	or mandal or increase or diminish or alter their name. Sub-s. (4) empowers the Board of Revenue in the interests of better administration and development of the areas and subject to such rules as may be prescribed, by notification, group or amalgamate, any two or more revenue villages or portions thereof so as to form a single new revenue village or divide	any revenue village into two or more revenue villages, or increase or diminish the area of any revenue village, or alter the boundaries or name of any revenue village. Sub-s. (5) provides that before issuing any notification under	the section, the Government or the	Board of Revenue, as the case may be, shall publish in such	manner as may be prescribed, the proposals inviting objections or suggestions thereon from the person residing within the district, revenue	division, taluk. firka or village who are likely	to be	affected thereby within such period as may be specified therein, and shall take	into consideration the objections	or suggestions, if	any, received. Sub-s. (1) of s. 4 enacts that the Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out all or any of the purposes of this Act. The rules so framed shall be laid before each House of the State Legislature, etc.
4 of the Act, the State Government framed the Andhra Pradesh District (Formation) Rules, 1984. The term	'Mandal' as defined in r. 2(iv) means a part of the district within a revenue division under the charge of a Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar. The expression 'revenue division' is defined in r. 2(v)	to mean a part of the district comprising of one or more mandals under the charge of a	Revenue Divisional officer/Sub Collector/Assistant Collector or any other officer placed	in charge of a division. The word 'village' in r.	2(vi)	means a settlement or locality or	area consisting of cluster of habitations and the land belonging to their proprietory inhabitants and includes, a town or city and a hamlet (Mazra). Rule 3 lays down the matters for consideration in formation of districts, etc. Rules 4 and 5 provide for the publication of the preliminary and final notifications in the official	gazette. Rule 3 insofar as material reads:
707 "3(1) Where any action is proposed to be taken by the Government under sub-s.	(1) or sub-s. (2) of s. 3	of the Act ..... the Government ...... shall take into consideration as far as	may be	the following matters and the views of the Collectors of the districts and of such other authorities as the Government may consider necessary:- (i) Area, population, demand under the land revenue and other revenues in respect of areas affected by the proposals;
(ii)Historical	association,	Geographical contiguity, Physical features common interests and problems, Cultural and Educational requirements, Infrastructural facilities and economic progress of the areas;
(iii)Development	of the area	or areas concerned, having	regard	to the various developments and welfare schemes undertaken or contemplated by the	Government in	relation to those areas;
(iv)Administrative convenience	and better administration; and (v)Interests of economy." "3(3). In matters concerning sub-s. (1) or sub-s.
(2) of s. 3 of the Act the Collector concerned shall forward to the	Government his	report with his views together with the record of enquiry	if any	for the consideration of the Government. If	after such consideration the Government so decides, a preliminary notification under sub-s. (5) of s. 3 of the	Act inviting	objections or	suggestions to	the proposals from	the persons residing in the area/areas which are likely to be affected thereby, shall be issued." Sub-r. (1) of r. 4 provides	for the manner of publication of	the preliminary	notification referred to in sub-rr.	(3) and (4)	of r.	3 inviting objections or suggestions. The notification has to be in Form I appended to the	Rules. R. 4(2) provides that any person affected by the proposal may within thirty days	from the date of publication of	the notification referred to in sub-r. (1), communicate his	objections or	suggestions thereto to	the Secretary to the Government in the 708 Revenue Department through the	Collector of the district concerned, who shall forward the same	with his remarks to the Government, etc. R. 5 provides that the Government shall having regard to the suggestions or objections referred to in r. 4 either confirm the preliminary notification or issue it with	such modification/modifications as may be necessary and publish it in Form II of the Gazette. A	preliminary notification under sub-s. (5)	of s. 3 of the Act which has to be in Form	I has to notify to all concerned that the Government in the interests of better	administration	and development of	the area concerned, proposed to form a new district/revenue division/mandal as set out in the schedule appended thereto. All objections and suggestions have to be addressed to the Collector within whose jurisdiction	the area or areas fall. Likewise, Form II prescribes the form of the final notification to the effect that the State Government having taken into consideration the objections and suggestions	received thereon, is pleased to notify that with effect from (date) the State shall consist of	the District/Revenue Division/Mandal specified in	Schedule I appended thereto. There are	no statutory provisions formulating the governing principles for formation of Revenue Mandals or for location of Mandal Headquarters.
On 25th July, 1985 the State Government published a White Paper on formation of Mandals.	It was	stated inter alia that the Revenue Mandals would be formed covering urban as well	as rural areas unlike Panchayat Mandals which would cover only rural areas. A Revenue Mandal would be demarcated for a population ranging from 35,000 to 55,000 in the case of rural mandals and was expected to cover one-third to one- fourth the size of the existing taluks in areas and in population. When a Municipality came within the area of a Revenue Mandal,	the urban population would be in addition.
The ushering	in of	rural	mandals	would	result	in introductions of a four-tier system by replacement of the then existing five-tier system. Such reduction in the levels of tiers of administration the Government felt would be more conducive to proper implementation of the policies	and programmes of the Government.	Greater decentralisation was expected to lead to more intensive	involvement of	the people, particularly in the implementation of programmes of economic development. According to the scheme contemplated, each Revenue Mandal would be headed by a Revenue Officer of the rank of a	Tahsildar or a Deputy	Tahsildar and it was stated that the intention of the Government was to vest in such Revenue Officers, all the powers	that were till then exercised by the Tahsildars and Taluk Magistrate. Appendix I to the	White Paper formulated the principles for formation of Revenue Mandals and also 709 laid down the	broad guidelines for	location of Mandal Headquarters. The Collectors	were accordingly asked to forward their proposals for creation of Revenue Mandals and also for location of Mandal Headquarters in conformity with the guidelines.	The proposals	were to	be duly notified by publication of	a preliminary notification under sub-s. (5) of s. 3 of the Act inviting objections and suggestions and the Government	after consideration of the objections	and suggestions so received would publish	the final notification. The broad guidelines for location of Mandal Headquarters are set out below:
(3) As a general principle,	the present Taluk Headquarters, Samithi Headquarters, Municipalities and Corporations will be retained as Headquarters of Revenue Mandals; if any exception is called for on grounds of compelling reasons detailed reasons will have to be given.
(4) Revenue Mandals whose headquarters will be the present	Taluk	Headquarters/Samithi Headquarters/Municipalities/Corporations, will generally have a	number	of much needed infrastructural facilities already	existing. A number of people from the neighbouring villages will therefore be visiting these headquarters for both	Governmental/non-Governmental business. In the case of Revenue Mandals to	be located exclusively within municipal	corporation areas, their requirements will be formulated according to their needs.
In cases	of Mandal Headquarters located in urban centres	which are not	municipalities	but with a population of	15,000 or above the total population of the	Mandal	would	be 55,000 irrespective of population density.
(6) In choosing the	Headquarters of	the Revenue Mandals in the rural areas, weightage may be given to the availability of the following facilities and the future growth of the place.
(i) Banking facility;
(ii) Communication facility-either Railway Station or Bus Stand;
(iii)PHC	or	Sub-Centre	or	any Dispensary/Indian Medicine;
710 (iv) Veterinary Dispensary;
(v) Police Station;
(vi) Post Office/Telephone Exchange;
(vii)High School.
(viii)Market Yard/Agricultural Godown;
(ix) Already a Firka Headquarters;
(x) Any other	special	qualification	like availability of office accommodation, residential quarters for the staff etc.
A centre having one or	more of the above characteristics and more accessible to most of the villages proposed for the Mandal in comparison to any other centre should be generally selected as Headquarters. If in any mandal there is more than one centre having equal accessibility/facilities then the centre which comes forward to donate land for office buildings	and to provide temporary office accommodation may be given preference.
(8) In the selection of villages for inclusion in the Mandal, the principal criterion shall be that the Mandal Headquarters is most accessiable to all the villages." It is quite obvious from the guidelines that	the location of the Headquarters of a Revenue Mandal is based on a system of	marking, the	principal criterion being 'accessibility' i.e. the place located must be accessible to all the	villages in the Revenue Mandal. In choosing	the Headquarters of	the Revenue Mandals in the rural areas, weightage had to be given to	the availability of certain facilities and	the future growth of the place as specified in items (i) to (x) of paragraph 6 of the guidelines. A centre or a place having one or more of the characteristics so set out and	more accessible to most of the villages proposed for the Mandal in comparison to any other place had to be generally selected as Mandal Headquarters. If in any Mandal	there	was more than one	place having equal accessibility/facilities then the place which came forward to donate land for office buildings and to provide temporary office accommodation had to be given preference. Location 711 of Mandal Headquarters was therefore based on a system of marking. Learned counsel for the parties have with infinite care taken us minutely	to the	facts of each case in an endeavour to support their respective contentions, viz., as to whether location of the Mandal Headquarters by	the Government at a particular place was	in breach of	the guidelines or not.
We find it rather difficult to sustain the interference by the	High Court in some of the cases with	location of Mandal	Headquarters	and quashing	of the impugned notification on	the ground that the Government acted in breach of the guidelines in that one place or the other was more centrally	located or that location at the other place would promote	general public convenience or that	the Headquarters should be fixed at a particular place with a view to	develop the areas surrounded	by it or that merely because a particular person who was an influential Member of Legislative Assembly belonging to the party in opposition had the	right of representation but failed to avail of it.
The location of Headquarters by the Government by the issue of the	final notification under sub-s. (5) of s. 3 of the Act was on a consideration by the Cabinet Sub Committee of the proposals submitted by the Collectors concerned and the objections and suggestions received	from	the local authorities like Gram Panchayat and the general public, keeping in view the relevant factors. Even assuming that any breach of the guidelines was justiciable, the utmost that the High Court could have done was to quash the impugned notification in	a particular case and direct the Government to reconsider the question. There was	no warrant for the High Court to have gone further and directed the shifting of the Mandal Headquarters at a particular place.
Broadly speeking, the contention on behalf of the State Government is that relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not available to enforce administrative rules, regulations or	instructions which have no statutory force, in the	absence of	exceptional circumstances. It is wellsettled that mandamus does not lie	to enforce departmental manuals	or instructions not	having	any statutory force, which do not give rise to any legal right in favour of the petitioner. The law on the	subject is succinctly stated in Durga Das Basu's	Administrative Law, 2nd edn. at p. 144:
"Administrative instructions,	rules	or manuals, which have no statutory force, are not enforceable in a	court of law. Though for breach of	such instructions,	the public servant may be	held liable by the State and disciplinary action may 712 be taken against him, a member of the public who is aggrieved	by the	breach of such instructions cannot seek any remedy in the courts. The reason is, that not having the force of law, they cannot confer any legal right upon any body, and cannot, therefore, be	enforced even	by writs under Art.
226." The learned author however rightly points out at p.
"Even though	a non-statutory rule,	bye-law or instruction may be changed by the authority who made it, without any formality and it cannot ordinarily be enforced through a Court of law, the party	aggrieved by	its non-enforcement may, nevertheless, get relief under Art. 226 of the Con stitution where the non-observance of the	non- statutory rule or	practice would result in arbitrariness	or	absence	of fairplay	or discrimination,-particularly where the authority making such non-statutory rule or the like comes within the definition of 'State' under Art. 12." In G.J. Fernandez's case, the petitioner submitting the lowest tender assailed the action of the Chief Engineer in addressing a communication to all the tenderers stating that even the lowest tender was unduly high and enquired whether they were prepared to	reduce their tenders. One of	them having reduced	the amount of his tender lower than	the lowest, the Chief Engineer made a report to the Technical Sub-Committee which made its recommendations to the Major Irrigation Projects Control Board, the final authority, which accepted	the tender so offered. The	High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that there was no breach of the conditions of tender contained	in the Public Works Department Code and further that there was no discrimination which attracted the application of Art. 14. The question that fell for consideration before this Court was whether the Code consisted of statutory rules or not. The so-called Rules contained	in the	Code were not framed under	any statutory enactment or the Constitution.	Wanchoo, CJ speaking for the Court held	that under Art. 162	the executive power of the State enables the Government to issue administrative instructions to its servants how to act in certain	circumstances,	but that would not make	such instructions statutory	rules	the breach of which is justiciable. It was further held that non-observance of such administrative instructions did not give any	right to a person like the appellant to come to Court for any relif on the alleged breach of	the instructions. That precisely is the position here. The guidelines 713 are merely in the nature of instructions issued by the State Government to the Collectors regulating the manner in which they should formulate their proposals for formation of a Revenue Mandal	or for	location of its Headquarters keeping in view	the broad guidelines laid down in Appendix I to the White Paper. It must be stated that the guidelines had no statutory force	and they had also not been published in the Official Gazette. The	guidelines were mere	departmental instructions meant for the Collectors. The ultimate decision as to formation of a Revenue Mandal or location of	its Headquarters was with the Government. It was for that reason that the Government issued the preliminary notification under sub-s. (5) of s. 3 of the Act inviting objections and suggestions. The objections	and suggestions were	duly processed in the Secretariat and submitted to the Cabinet Sub-Committee along with its comments. The note of	the Collector appended to the	proposal gave	reasons	for deviating from	the guidelines	in some of the aspects. Such deviation was	usually for	reasons	of administrative convenience keeping in view the purpose and object of the Act i.e. to bring the administration nearer to the people.
The Cabinet Sub-Committee after consideration of	the objections and	suggestions received from the Gram Panchayat and members of the public and other organisations as well as the comments of the	Secretariat and the note of	the Collector came	to a decision	applying the standards of reasonableness, relevance and purpose while keeping in view the object and purpose of the legislation, published a final notification under sub-s. (5)	of s. 3 of the Act. There is nothing on record to show that the decision	of the State Government in any of these cases was arbitrary or capricious or was	one not	reached in good faith or actuated with improper considerations or	influenced by	extraneous considerations.	In a	matter	like this, conferment of discretion upon the Government in the matter of formation of a Revenue Mandal or location of its Headquarters in	the nature of things necessarily leaves the Government with a choice in the use of the discretion conferred upon it.
It would be convenient at this stage to deal with the arguments of Shri Seetaramaiah that	the action of	the Government in the matter of location of Mandal Headquarters amounted to misuse of power for political ends and therefore amenable to the writ jurisdiction of	the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel mainly relied upon certain English decisions starting from Padfield v. Minister of Agricultural, Fisheries & Food, LR 1968 AC 997 down to Council of Civil	Service Unions and Others v.
Minister for the Civil	Service, [1984] 3 ALL. ER 935 (HL).
What we call 'purely governmen- 714 tal function',	it is said, is nothing but	exercise of 'discretion derived from the royal prerogative'. The learned counsel contends that	ever since the judgment of	Lord Denning in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade, LR 1977 QB 643, the myth of executive discretion in relation to prerogative power no longer exists. The learned counsel equated prerogative and statutory powers for this purpose, saying that in both cases alike the Courts will not review the proper exercise of	discretion but	will intervene to correct excess	or abuse. According to him, the prerogative powers of the Crown in England are akin to the executive functions of the Union and the States under Art. 73 and 162 of the	Constitution, on which refrain	from expressing any final opinion.	Prima	facie,	it seems to us that	the executive powers of the Union and the States under Arts. 73 and 162	are much wider than	the prerogative powers in England. We would refer to a	couple of English decisions from amongst those to	which we were referred to during the arguments.
At one time, the	traditional view in England was that the executive was not	answerable where its	action	was attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor De Smith in	his classical	work 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' 4th Edn., at pp. 285-287 states the law in	his own	terse	language. The	relevant principles formulated by the courts may	be broadly summarised as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any	particular manner. In	general, a discretion must	be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That	authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it	do what it has not	been authorised to do. It must act	in good faith, must	have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations,	must not seek	to promote purposes alien	to the	letter	or to	the spirit of	the legislation that gives it power to act, and	must not act arbitrarily or	capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis	of an	erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power.
The two	classes are not, however, mutually exclusiv. Thus, discretion may	be improperly fettered	because irrelevant considerations have been taken	into account;	and where an authority hands over its discretion to 715 another body it acts ultra vires. The learned author then deals with the question whether the	principles outlined above are applicable	to the alleged abuse of	wide discretionary powers vested in executive bodies and further states:
"We have already noted that the courts sometimes call	a discretionary power executive	or administrative when they are	unwilling to review the mode of its	exercise by reference to "judicial" standards.	Does this mean that such discretionary powers are legally absolute, totally immune from judicial	review? To this question there is no short answer.
(1) Parliament (or, to put the	matter	more realistically, the Government) may	purport to exclude judicial review by means	of special statutory formulae which, if construed literally, would deprive the courts of jurisdiction.
(2) No discretionary power is reviewable unless somebody has	locus standi in impugn the validity of its exercise.
(3) If it is	claimed that the authority for the exercise of discretion derives from the royal prerogative, the courts have traditionally limited reveiw to questions of vires in the narrowest sense of the term. They can determine whether the prerogative power exists, what is	its extent, whether it has been	exercised in the appropriate form	and how far it has	been superseded by statute; they	have not normally been prepared to examine the appropriateness or adequacy of	the grounds for exercising the power, or the fairness of the procedure followed before the power is exercised, and they will not allow bad faith to be attributed to the Crown." Although the weight of authority in England favours only narrow grounds for judicial review of the exercise of prerogative powers, there is not a total absence of support for the view that in some circumstances at least the Court may apply somewhat broader standards of review. See: De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th edn., pp. 285-287; H.W.R. Wade's Administrative Law, 5th edn. pp.
350 et.	seq.; Foulkes'	Administrative Law, 6th edn.,	pp.
213-215, 219-225; Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice by Grahame Aldous and John Alder, p. 105;	and D.C.M. Yardley's 716 Principles of Administrative Law, 2nd edn. pp. 65-67.
In recent	years, the concept of	the rule of law in England has been undergoing a radical	change. The present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the	doctrine of immunity of prerogative powers	from judicial	review where purely governmental functions are directly attributable to the royal prerogative, such as whether a treaty should be concluded or the armed	forces deployed in a particular manner or Parliament dissolved	on one	day rather another, etc. The shift in approach to judicial interpretation that has taken place during the last few years is attributable in large part to the efforts of Lord Denning in Laker Airways' case. The attempt was to project the principles laid down in Padfield's case into the exercise of discretionary powers by the executive derived from the prerogative, and to equate prerogative and	statutory powers for purposes	of judicial review, subject	to just exceptions. Thus, the present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those class of cases which relate to deployment of troops, entering into international treaties, etc. The distinctive features of some of these recent cases signify the willingness of the Courts to assert their power to scrutinise the factual bases upon which discretionary powers have been exercised.
The decision of the House of Lords in Padfield's case is an important landmark in the current era	of judicial activism in this area	of administrative law. The Minister had refused to appoint	a committee, as he was statutorily empowered to	do when he thought fit, to	investigate complaints made	by members of the Milk Marketing Board that the majority of the Board had	fixed milk prices in a way that was unduly unfavourable	to the complainants.	The Minister's reason for refusing to accede to	the complainants' request inter alia was	that 'it would be politically embarrassing for him if	he decided not to implement the committee's recommendations'. The House of Lords held that the Minister's discretion was not unfettered and that the reasons that he	had given for	his refusal showed that he had acted ultra vires by taking into account factors that were legally irrelevant and by using his power in a way calculated to frustrate the policy of the Act. The view was also expressed by four of the Law Lords that even if the	Minister had given no	reasons for his decision, it would have been open to the Court to infer that the Minister had acted unlawfully if he had declined to	supply	any justification at all	for his decision: De Smith's Administrative Law, 4th edn.,	p. 294.	More recently, in Laker Airways case and	in Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside M.B.C., LR 1977 AC 1014 both the Court of Appeal and the 717 House of Lords have set aside as ultra vires the exercise of discretion that included a substantial subjective element.
In Padfield's case the scarcely veiled allusion to fear of parliamentary trouble was,	in particular,	a political reason which was quite	extraneous and	inadmissible.	Lord Reid during the course	of his	judgment emphatically	and unequivocally rejected the contention that the discretion of the Minister was absolute, in these words:
"Parliament must have conferred the discretion with the intention that it	should	be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act;	the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing	the Act as a whole and construction is always a matter of law for the	Court. In a matter of this kind	it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line, but if the Minister, by reason, so uses his discretion as to thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act, then our law would be	very defective	if persons aggrieved were not entitled	to the protection of the Court." Lord Upjohn said that the Minister's stated reasons showed a complete misapprehension of his duties, and were all bad	in law. Lord Denning in another case observed that the decision in Padfield marked the evolution of judicial opinion that the Court could	intervene if the Minister 'plainly misdirects himself	in fact or in law'.	The importance of	the decision of the	House of Lords in Padfield's case	was underlined	by Lord Denning in Breen v.
Amalgamated Engineering Union, LR 19712 QB 175 at p. 190, in these words:
"The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a	discretion which is to be exercised according to law.	That means at least this:	the statutory body	must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant. If its	decision is	influenced by	extraneous considerations which	it ought not to have taken into account,	then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith; nevertheless the decision will be set aside. That is established by Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, which is a landmark in modern administrative law." In	Laker	Airways' case,	the Court of	Appeal	was concerned with	the power of Minister to give directions to the Civil Aviation 718 authorities overiding specific provisions in the statute in time of	war, in the interests of national	security or international relations or protection of the environment. In his judgment, Lord Denning M.R. held that the review of the prerogative is	assimilated to	that of	statutory power, so that its exercise may be impugned for 'misdirection in fact or in law'. Lord Denning M.R.	discussed the nature of the prerogative and said;
"Seeing that	the prerogative	is a discretionary power to be exercised for the public good, it follows that	its exercise can be examined by the courts just as any other discretionary power which is vested in the executive." He then	went on to say that the prerogative powers were as much capable of abuse	as any	other power and therefore subject to judicial review and observed:
"Likewise it	seems to me that when discretionary powers are entrusted	to the executive by	the prerogative-in pursuance of the treaty-making power-the courts can examine the exercise of them so as	to see that they are not used improperly or mistakenly." This observation has given rise to considerable debate.
The majority, however, proceeded	on a narrower basis concluding that	the Civil Aviation Act, 1971 had impliedly superseded the	Crown's prerogative in foreign affairs, and that the holder of a licence under the statute could not be deprived of its commercial value by a decision on the part of the Secretary to State or revoke the licensee's status as a designated carrier under the Bermuda Agreement. In other respects, the majority accepted the orthodox position on the unreviewability of the exercise of the prerogative, per Roskill and Lawton, L. JJ, Lord Denning however went further and held that the Court could intervene if	a Minister 'plainly misdirects himself in fact or in law'.
Another important	case in this	context is R. V.
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board,	ex p. Lain, [1967] 2 QB 864.	The question in this case was whether payments made by the	Board to victims of crime were subject to judicial review. The difficulty was that Lord Reid's phrase 'power to make decisions affecting rights' in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] AC 40 was taken to refer to	legal rights,	whereas	the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme was not said to be by legislation but 719 just as	an administrative expedience by means of internal departmental circulars.	So payments made under the Scheme were not, strictly, a	matter of legal right	but were ex gratia. On the other hand, the criterion on which payments were made were laid down in some detail and were very much like any law rules for assessment of damages in tort. So the Board, like the Courts, was meant to be focussing on the individuals before it, in deciding whether to make an award and how	much to award. It was strenuously argued that the Board was not subject	to the	jurisdiction of	the Courts since it did not have what was described as legal authority in the	sense of statutory authority.	This argument	was emphatically and unanimously rejected. In his judgment Lord Parker, CJ. said:
"I can see no reason either	in principle or in authority why	a board, set up as this board were set up, should not be a body of persons amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. True the board are not set up by statute but the fact that they are set up by executive government,	i.e., under the prerogative, does not render their acts any the less lawful. Indeed, the writ of certiorari has been issued not	only to	courts	set up by statute but to courts whose authority was derived;
inter	alia,	from the prerogative. Once	the jurisdiction is extended, as it clearly has been, to tribunals	as opposed to courts,	there is no reason why the remedy by way of certiorari cannot be invoked to a body of persons set up under the prerogative.
"Moreover the	board,	though	set up under	the prerogative and not by statute, had	in fact the recognition of Parliament in debate and Parliament provided the money to satisfy the board's awards." See also the judgment of Lord Diplock, LJ.
The ratio	derived from Ex parte	Lain's decision	can best be stated in these words:
"Powers derived from the royal prerogative	are public law powers." It therefore follows that a non-statutory inferior authority like the Board albeit	constituted under the	prerogative powers, is just as well amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court as a statutory body. It is clear 720 that certiorari	will lie where a decision has de facto effect upon the individual and it is not necessary to show that the 'right' in question is legally enforceable.
In Council	of Civil Service Unions & Ors. v. Minister for the	Civil Service,	[1984] 3 All E.R. 935 the House of Lords reiterated broader standards of review of the exercise of prerogative	powers. The principles deducible are clearly brought out in the headnote extracted below:
"(1)	Powers	exercised directly	under	the prerogative are not by virtue of their prerogative source automatically immune from judicial review.
If the subject matter of a	prerogative power is justiciable then the exercise of the power is open to judicial review in the same way as a statutory power. However (per	Lord Roskill),	prerogative powers such as those	relating to the making of treaties, the defence of	the	realm,	the prerogative of mercy, the grant of	honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of ministers are	not justiciable or reviewable. (2) Administrative action	is subject to	control by judicial review under three heads: (i) illegality, where	the decision-making	authority has	been guilty of an error of law, e.g. by purporting to exercise a	power it does	not possess;	(ii) irrationality, where the decision-making authority has acted so unreasonably	that no reasonable authority would have	made the decision; (iii) procedural impropriety, where the decision-making authority has failed in its duty to act fairly." Lord Diplock in his speech found no	reason	why simply because the decision-making power is derived from a common law and not a statutory source, it should for that reason be immune judicial review, and observed:
"Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality',	the second 'irrationality' and	the	third	'procedural impropriety'." 721 We should also refer to the illuminating judgment of Lord Roskill who found no logical reason to see why the fact that the source of the power is the prerogative and not statute, should today deprive the citizen of that right of challenge to the	manner of its exercise	which he would possess were the source of the power statutory. In either case, the act in question is the act of the executive. The learned Judge agreed with the conclusions reached by Lord Scarman and Lord Diplock and observed: "To talk of that act as the act of the sovereign savours of the archaism of past centuries." We may with advantage	quote	the following passage from	his judgment;
"Dicey's classic statement	in Law of	the Constitution (10th edn., 1959) p. 424 that	the prerogative is 'the residue	of discretionary or arbitrary authority,	which at any given time is legally left	in the	hands of the Crown, has the weight behind	it not	only of the author's	own authority but	also of the majority of this House in Burmah Oil Co. (Burma Trading) Ltd. v.	Lord Advocate, [1964] 2 All ER 348 at 353, per Lord Reid. But as Lord Reid himself pointed out, this definition 'does not take us very far'. On	the other hand the attempt by Lord Denning, MR in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Dept. of Trade, [1977] 2 All ER 182 at 192, (obiter) since the other members of the Court of Appeal did not take so broad a view) to asert that the	prerogative 'if ........
exercised improperly or mistakenly' was reviewable is, with great respect, far too wide. Lord Denning MR sought to support his view by a quotation from Blackstone's Commentaries (1 B1 Com	(15th	edn) 252). But unfortunately and no doubt inadvertently he omitted the opening words of the paragraph:
"In the exercise therefore	of those prerogatives, which the law has given	him, the King is irresistible and absolute, according to the forms	of the constitution.
And yet,	if the consequence of that exertion be manifestly to the grievance or dishonour of the kingdom, the parliament will call his advisers to a just and severe account." In short	the orthodox view was at that time that the remedy for	abuse of the prerogative lay in the political and not in the judicial field.
722 But, fascinating	as it	is to explore	this mainstream of	our legal history, to do so in connection with the present	appeal has an air of reality. To	speak today of the acts of	the sovereign as	'irresistible	and absolute' when modern constitutional convention requires that all such acts are done by the sovereign on the advice of and will be carried out	by the	sovereign's ministers currently in power	is surely to hamper the continual	development of	our administrative law by harking back	to what Lord	Atkin	once called, albeit in	a different context,	the clanking of medieval chains	of the ghosts of the past." The effect	of all	these decisions is admirably summed up by Grahame Aldous and John	Alder in their Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice thus:
"There is a general	presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, so that statutory provisions which purport to exclude judicial review are construed	restrictively.	There	are, however, certain areas of governmental activity, national security being the	paradigm, which	the courts regard themselves as incompetent	to investigate, beyond an initial decision as to whether the government's claim is bona fide. In this kind of non-justiciable area judicial review is not entirely excluded, but very limited. It has also been said that powers conferred by the Royal Prerogative are inherently unreviewable but since the speeches	of the	House of Lords in Council of Civil Service	Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, this	is doubtful. Lords Diplock, Scarman and Roskill appeared to agree that	there is no general distinction between	powers,	based	upon whether their	source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial review can be limited by	the subject matter of a particular power, in that case national security. Many prerogative powers are in fact	concerned with	sensitive, non-justiciable areas, for example foreign affairs, but some are reviewable	in principle, including	the prerogatives relating	to the	civil service where national security is not involved. Another	non- justiciable power is the	Attorney General's prerogative to decide whether to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest." Much of the above	discussion is of little or academic interest as 723 the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant an appropriate writ, direction	or order under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not	subject to	the archaic constraints on which prerogative writs were issued in England. Most of the cases in which the English courts had earlier enunciated their limited power to pass on the legality of the exercise of the prerogative were decided at a time when the Courts took a generally rather circumscribed view of their	ability to review Ministerial statutory discretion. The decision of the House of Lords in Padfield's case marks the emergence of the interventionist judicial attitude that has characterized many recent judgments. In view of the recent decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions, it would be premature to conclude that in no circumstances would the Court be prepared to apply to the exercise by the Crown of some non-statutory powers the	same criterion for review as would be applicable	were the discretion conferred by statute. In the ultimate analysis, the present trend of judicial opinion in England on the question as to whether a 'prerogative' power is reviewable or not depends on whether its subject-matter is suitable	for judicial control.	All that we	need is to end this	part of the	judgment by extracting the	cautionary note administered by H.W.R. Wade in his	Administrative Law, 5th edn. at p. 352 in these words:
"On the one hand, where Parliament confers power upon some minister or other authority to be used in discretion, it is	obvious that the discretion ought to be that of the designated authority and not that of the court. Whether the discretion is exercised prudently	or	imprudently,	the authority's word is to be law and the remedy is to be political	only. On the other hand, Parliament cannot be supposed to have intended that the power should be open to serious abuse. It must have assumed that	the designated	authority would	act properly and	responsibly, with a view to doing what was best in the public	interest and	most consistent with the policy of the statute. It is from this presumption that the courts take their warrant to impose legal bounds on even the most extensive discretion." We find it rather difficult to sustain the judgment of the High Court in some of the cases where it has interfered with the location of Mandal Headquarters and quashed the impugned notifications	on the	ground that the Government acted in breach of the guidelines in that one place or the other was more centrally located or that location at the other place would promote general public convenience, or that the 724 headquarters should be fixed at a particular place with a view to	develop the area surrounded by it. The location of headquarters by	the Government	by the	issue of the final notification under sub-s. (5)	of s. 3 of the Act was on a consideration by the Cabinet Sub-Committee of the proposals submitted by the Collectors concerned and the objections and suggestions received from the local authorities like	the gram panchayats	and the general public. Even assuming that the Government	while accepting	the recommendations of the Cabinet Sub Committee directed that the Mandal Headquarters should be at place 'X' rather than place 'Y' as recommended by the	Collector concerned in a particular case, the High Court would not have issued a writ in the nature of mandamus to enforce the guidelines which were	nothing more	than administrative instructions not having any statutory force, which did not give rise to any legal right in favour of the writ petitioners.
The result	therefore is that Civil Appeals Nos. 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1987 of 1986 and all	other	appeals	and special leave petitions directed against the judgment of the High Court where it has interfered with the location of the Mandal Headquarters, must succeed and are allowed.	The petition filed	by the	appellants under Art.	226 of	the Constitution before the High Court are	accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.