Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/658/720/50828/
Timestamp: 2019-09-22 21:11:52
Document Index: 78133718

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 5', '§ 45', '§ 5', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15']

Ronald T. Dreisbach, Individually and Dba Dreisbachenterprises, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. John Murphy, et al., Defendants-appellees, 658 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1981 › Ronald T. Dreisbach, Individually and Dba Dreisbachenterprises, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-appellants,...
Ronald T. Dreisbach, Individually and Dba Dreisbachenterprises, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. John Murphy, et al., Defendants-appellees, 658 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1981)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 658 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1981) Argued and Submitted May 13, 1981. Decided Oct. 8, 1981
Carriers transport frozen meat in large containers from Australia and New Zealand to Pacific Coast ports in the United States. Carrier-owned containers have been likened to "detachable stowage compartments of the ship" wherein cargo is stowed "utilizing stevedoring practices and materials analogous to those employed in traditional on board stowage." Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S. S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894, 907 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
Dreisbach says referral is improper because he seeks only money damages for past conduct and an award would thus not interfere with any future action of the FMC, citing Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d 418, 423 (5th Cir. 1976), and Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 393 F.2d 441, 447-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846, 89 S. Ct. 131, 21 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968), and because "the FMC cannot immunize conduct whose sole aim is to destroy competition in markets unaffected by its regulatory control". Carriers say referral is not required because their conduct clearly is authorized as a matter of law.3
There is no fixed formula for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 59, 64, 77 S. Ct. 161, 165, 1 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1956). Reference to an administrative agency may be appropriate if an issue before the court "involves technical questions of fact uniquely within the expertise and experience of an agency," or if reference would facilitate uniformity of regulation, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 304, 96 S. Ct. 1978, 1987, 48 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1976), or if the agency's determination would materially aid the court's resolution of an issue, Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 302, 93 S. Ct. 573, 580, 34 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1973). There are here no questions of fact, technical or otherwise. There is no indication that uniformity of regulation, or any future FMC action, is in any manner implicated.
In Cargill, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 530 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868, 97 S. Ct. 179, 50 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1976), Pacific Westbound Conference v. Federal Maritime Commission, 440 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881, 92 S. Ct. 202, 30 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1971), and Port of New York Authority v. Federal Maritime Commission, 429 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909, 91 S. Ct. 867, 27 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1971), the courts considered FMC orders. In Cargill, and Port of New York, the courts affirmed an FMC holding that the assailed conduct fell within the scope of a § 15 Agreement. In Pacific Westbound, the court sustained an FMC holding that certain conduct was not within such scope, but went on to reverse a contrary FMC holding respecting other conduct in light of the court's construction of the "plain language" of the agreement. These cases establish that the touchstone lies in the scope of the § 15 Agreements under consideration, that courts will themselves decide the breadth of that scope and whether specific conduct comes within it, and that carriers need not seek approval of conduct falling within that scope, the court stating, for example, in Port of New York, "the overland/OCP rates in question and the practices involving the absorption of terminal charges were routine matters under the conference agreements, theretofore approved, and thus not required to be filed for § 15 approval." 429 F.2d at 667.4
In the present case, the district court necessarily proceeded on the premise that "when words of a written instrument are used in their ordinary meaning, their construction presents a question solely of law". Great Northern Railing Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291, 42 S. Ct. 477, 479, 66 L. Ed. 943 (1922). In so doing, it was in good company. See World Airways, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 349 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 984, 86 S. Ct. 561, 15 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1966); United States v. Open Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 465 F. Supp. 159, 165 (S.D. Ga. 1979); In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235, 1242, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). To the extent necessary, we proceed here on that same premise.
When FMC approved Agreement No. 10012, the carriers had been exclusively employing Murphy's devanning service for some time. When FMC approved Agreement No. 10252, they had been exclusively employing Murphy's devanning services for four years. As discussed below, we construe the scope of the approved § 15 Agreements as encompassing the Carriers' arrangement with Murphy. That arrangement is therefore authorized by those Agreements and is clearly lawful. It is not merely "arguably lawful", as was the conduct in Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 222-24, 86 S. Ct. 781, 787, 15 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1966) (appropriate disposition of an antitrust suit alleging conduct "arguably lawful under the Shipping Act" is a stay, pending final FMC action, not dismissal of the action).
Though Dreisbach would have us read the present § 15 Agreements narrowly, we are guided toward a broader view of "a statute that uses expansive language." Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 273, 88 S. Ct. 929, 936, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1968). As stated in Volkswagenwerk, 390 U.S. at 276, 88 S. Ct. at 937, "(n)othing in the legislative history suggests that Congress, in enacting § 15 of the Act, meant to do less than ... subject to the scrutiny of a specialized government agency the myriad of restrictive agreements in the maritime industry" (footnote omitted). The § 15 Agreements here were subjected to that scrutiny and were approved. The conduct here challenged, use of one devanner, and the consequent rejection of Dreisbach's offer, involved a routine matter falling within the scope and authorization of those approved Agreements.8
In Count 4 of his complaint, Dreisbach asserted, as a separate basis for recovery, that Carriers and Murphy violated § 5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1976): "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful".
This circuit has held that private litigants may not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal district courts by alleging that defendants engaged in business practices proscribed by § 5(a) (1). The Act rests initial remedial power solely in the Federal Trade Commission. Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973). Accordingly, Count 4 was properly dismissed by the district court.
In Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. United States, 287 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985, 82 S. Ct. 600, 7 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1962), Cargill, Inc., a large grainhandling company, had the exclusive right to operate a public grain elevator in the Greater Baton Rouge port area by virtue of an agreement with the Baton Rouge Port Commission. After Cargill amended the agreement, in an attempt to control all stevedoring business at the elevator, Cargill and the Port Commission filed both original and amendment with the Federal Maritime Board (predecessor of the FMC) for § 15 approval. The Board approved the original agreement, but disapproved the amendment. In contrast to the instant case, there was no issue presented on whether a particular practice of ocean carriers fell within the scope of the agreement-authorizing language in an original, approved § 15 Agreement
Dreisbach cites Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 93 S. Ct. 1773, 36 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1973), in which the Court held that FMC's jurisdiction did not encompass the approval of an agreement for one carrier to acquire all the assets of another and which creates no ongoing obligations. Though the Court there declined to read the expanse of § 15 broadly enough to cover that type of agreement, its holding does not affect the interpretation of the entirely different conference agreement involved in this case
Having properly dismissed Counts 1-4 of Dreisbach's amended complaint, the district court exercised sound discretion in dismissing the remaining pendent claims based on state law. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966); Wham-O-Mfg. Co. v. Paradise Mfg. Co., 327 F.2d 748, 752-54 (9th Cir. 1964)