Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98191/hoiness-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-12-16 05:32:46
Document Index: 216812005

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 954', '§ 777', '§ 2', '§ 742', '§ 128', '§ 225', '§ 1291', '§ 230', '§ 954', '§ 777', '§ 2', '§ 688', '§ 2', '§ 782']

Hoiness Vs United States - Citation 98191 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Hoiness Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98191
Decided On Nov-08-1948
Case Number 335 U.S. 297
Appellant Hoiness
.....301 -302. 165 f.2d 504 reversed. a district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction a libel brought by a seaman against the united states and others under the suits in admiralty act. 75 f.supp. 289. the court of appeals dismissed an appeal. 165 f.2d 504. page 335 u. s. 298 this court granted certiorari. 333 u.s. 859. reversed, p. 335 u. s. 302 . mr. justice douglas delivered the opinion of the court. petitioner was a seaman on the s.s. escanaba victory, a vessel owned by the united states and operated under an agreement between the war shipping administration [ footnote 1 ] and the american-south african line, inc., the provisions of which are unnecessary to relate here. he was injured while the vessel was docked at the port of san.....
Hoiness v. United States - 335 U.S. 297 (1948)
U.S. Supreme Court Hoiness v. United States, 335 U.S. 297 (1948)
Held: it erred in doing so, since the defect resulting from a failure to refer to the first order was of such a technical nature that the Court of Appeals should have disregarded it in accordance with the policy expressed by Congress in R.S. § 954, 28 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 777. Pp. 335 U. S. 300 -301.
Held: It erred in doing so, since the provisions of § 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act directing where suits shall be brought relate not to jurisdiction, but to venue, which was waived by failure to object before pleading to the merits. Pp. 335 U. S. 301 -302.
This Court granted certiorari. 333 U.S. 859. Reversed, p. 335 U. S. 302 .
Petitioner was a seaman on the S.S. Escanaba Victory, a vessel owned by the United States and operated under an agreement between the War Shipping Administration [ Footnote 1 ] and the American-South African Line, Inc., the provisions of which are unnecessary to relate here. He was injured while the vessel was docked at the port of San Francisco, California, and brought this suit in admiralty against the United States [ Footnote 2 ] under the Suits in Admiralty Act. [ Footnote 3 ]
41 Stat. 525, 46 U.S.C. § 742. The libel alleged that the United States maintains offices and principal places of business in the Northern District of California, where the suit was brought, but it did not allege that petitioner was a resident of that district, [ Footnote 4 ] nor that the vessel was found there at the time suit was filed. The United States did not appear specially, but answered to the merits, leaving all questions of jurisdiction to the court. The District Court raised the question of jurisdiction sua sponte, and, being of opinion that jurisdiction was lacking, dismissed the libel. 75 F.Supp. 289.
I. We find it unnecessary to determine whether the order of August 5 or that of October 14, 1946, was the final decision [ Footnote 5 ] from which an appeal could be taken within the meaning of § 128 of the Judicial Code, 36 Stat. 1133, 28 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) § 225; 62 Stat. 929, 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The appeal was taken within three months of the earlier of the two, and was therefore timely. 43 Stat. 940, 28 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) § 230. And, although the petition for appeal referred solely to the second order, and not to the first, that defect was of such a technical nature that the Court of Appeals should have disregarded it in accordance with the policy expressed by Congress in R.S. § 954, 28 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) § 777. [ Footnote 6 ]
cause shall appear to it. It seems to us hypertechnical to say that the appeal papers did not bring the sole issue of the case fairly before the Court of Appeals. Thus, the assignments of error framed in the appeal attacked the basis of the first order, as well as the second. What appellant sought to have reviewed was plain. The failure to use the words August 5, 1946, if that be taken as the date of the final decision, was as insubstantial as a misspelling of the words would have been, since the words used identified the rulings which were challenged and in no way altered the scope of review. Cf. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Prudence Securities Advisory Group, 311 U. S. 579 , 311 U. S. 582 ; Georgia Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Compania De Navegacion Transmar, S.A., 323 U. S. 334 , 323 U. S. 336 .
II. The ruling of the District Court that the provisions of § 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act directing where suits shall be brought [ Footnote 7 ] were jurisdictional was, in our view, erroneous. Those provisions properly construed relate to venue.
the merits. United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1 , 237 U. S. 11 , 12; Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 1 9, 237 U. S. 24 . An analogous provision in the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, was construed the same way. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 , 264 U. S. 384 -385. And we recently indicated that that was the correct construction of comparable provisions of § 2 of the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, 46 U.S.C. § 782 ( Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U. S. 215 , 324 U. S. 224 ), an act which is similar in purpose and design to the present one. See American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446 , 330 U. S. 452 -453.
Congress, by describing the district where the suit was to be brought, was not investing the federal courts "with a general jurisdiction expressed in terms applicable alike to all of them." See Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra, p. 264 U. S. 384 . It was dealing with the convenience of the parties in suing or being sued at the designated places. The purpose of the Act was to grant seamen relief against the United States in its own courts. The concepts of residence and principal place of business obviously can have no relevance when applied to the United States. It is ubiquitous throughout the land, and, unlike private parties, is not centered at one particular place. The residence or principal place of business of the libelant and the place where the vessel or cargo is found may be the best measure of the convenience of the parties. But if the United States is willing to defend in a different place, we find nothing in the Act to prevent it.
This is the kind of problem which could be appropriately handled through the rulemaking authority of the Court of Appeals. Cf. Commissioner v. Bedford's Estate, 325 U. S. 283 , 325 U. S. 288 .