Source: http://ks.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190626_0000935.DKS.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 11:25:03
Document Index: 341842553

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1326', '§ 212', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1003', '§ 1229', '§ 1003', '§ 1229', '§ 1326']

FindACase™ | United States v. Herrera-Sandoval
United States v. Herrera-Sandoval
MANUEL HERRERA-SANDOVAL, Defendant.
The Indictment in this case charges Defendant Manuel Herrera-Sandoval with unlawful reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). Defendant seeks dismissal of the Indictment on two bases. First, he argues that his prior removal from the United States was invalid because the immigration court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the underlying removal order. Second, he argues that his prior removal order was invalid because the immigration judge who issued it was appointed in a manner that violates the Appointments Clause to the Constitution. For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant's motion.
Defendant was served a Notice to Appear (the “Notice”) on May 16, 2014, after being taken into ICE custody following his conviction in Clark County District Court in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Notice was prepared using Form I-862 (Rev. 08/01/07) and alleged that Defendant was not a United States citizen; that he was a citizen of Mexico; that he arrived in the United States at an unknown place and on an unkown time; and that he was not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. The Notice charged that Defendant was subject to removal from the United States pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The Notice ordered Defendant to appear before an immigration judge in Las Vegas, Nevada, “on a date to be set at a time to be set” to show why he should not be removed from the United States.
The Notice included a section titled “Request for Prompt Hearing, ” signed by Defendant, requesting an immediate hearing and waiving his right to a 10-day period before appearing before an immigration judge. In addition, the Notice contained a certificate of service that was signed by Defendant and the immigration enforcement agent. The certificate of service stated that that the Notice was personally served on Defendant on May 16, 2014, and that Defendant was provided oral notice in Spanish of the time and place of his or her hearing and of the consequences of failure to appear.
On May 21, 2014, Defendant was personally served with a Notice of Hearing on Removal Proceedings informing him of his hearing on June 18, 2014, at 8:00 a.m. in Las Vegas, Nevada. His hearing was held on June 18, and the immigration judge ordered him to be removed. Defendant waived his right to appeal the immigration order. On July 8, Defendant was removed from the United States.
At some point on or before January 29, 2019, Defendant reentered the United States. Defendant is now charged with reentry of a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). Specifically, the Indictment charges that Defendant is a citizen of Mexico and not a citizen and national of the United States, that he was previously deported, and that he was found in the United States after having voluntarily re-entered without the appropriate permission. Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Doc. 20) which is presently before the Court.
Here, Defendant challenges the validity of his prior removal as a defense to the § 1326 charge in the Indictment. In short, Defendant argues that the immigration court was never vested with subject matter jurisdiction because the 2014 Notice lacked a specific date and time for the initial removal hearing as required by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pereira v. Sessions.[6]Accordingly, Defendant argues that his due process rights were violated when he was deported from the United States.
Defendant also argues that the immigration judge who ordered his removal was not appointed to his position in a manner complying with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Defendant contends that this failure makes the removal order invalid and prevents the Government from meeting its burden of proof on the § 1326 charge at trial.
It is undisputed that Defendant's Notice was deficient under Pereira because it did not state the date and time of Defendant's initial removal proceeding. Defendant argues that this deficiency divested the immigration of subject matter jurisdiction thereby rendering his removal proceedings null and void. In support of this argument, Defendant relies on the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General interpreting the INA. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) states that “[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the [i]mmigration [c]ourt by the Service.” The regulations define a “charging document” as “the written instrument which initiates a proceeding before an [i]mmigration [j]udge. . . . these documents include a Notice to Appear, a Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge, and a Notice of Intention to Rescind and Request for Hearings by Alien.”[28] Accordingly, Defendant argues that because his Notice was defective under Pereira, a valid charging document was never filed in the immigration court and thus it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.[29]
The Tenth Circuit has yet to resolve the issue of whether a notice to appear that is defective under Pereira divests the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction.[30] This Court, however, concludes that it does not. Defendant seeks to expand Pereira's holding to encompass all notices to appear in all types of removal proceedings, not just those concerning the stop-time rule. He also seeks to extend its holding to circumstances where the alien later receives the missing information and actually attends the hearing. This expansive application conflicts with the plain language of the Supreme Court's decision, which explicitly stated that the question before it was a “narrow” one.[31] Indeed, when discussing the limitations of the notice to appear under § 1229(a), the Supreme Court limited its discussion to the context of the stop-time rule.[32] The word “jurisdiction” does not appear anywhere in the opinion. The Court presumes that if the Supreme Court intended for its holding to address the subject matter jurisdiction of the immigration courts as Defendant suggests, it would not have described the dispositive issue as a “narrow” one.
In sum, the immigration court had jurisdiction to order Defendant's removal. The 2014 Notice filed with the immigration court complied with the requirements set forth in the regulations. In addition, Defendant subsequently received a notice of hearing informing him of the date and time of his hearing in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15 and § 1229(a)(1).[79] Defendant's argument that the 2014 deportation order is void fails.[80]
Defendant argues that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the remedies are inadequate, inefficacious, or futile, . . . or where the administrative proceedings themselves are void.” But the Court has already rejected Defendant's argument that the underlying removal proceedings were void, and Defendant does not otherwise argue that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Defendant therefore fails to show an essential element of collateral review under § 1326(d). This failure precludes a collateral challenge to the 2014 removal order.
Defendant also argues that the Indictment must be dismissed because the removal order violates the Appointments Clause to the Constitution.[89] Defendant believes that the immigration judge who issue the order may not have been appointed by the Attorney General, although he has not been able to locate any facts regarding this judge's appointment. Regardless, the Court need not reach this question because Defendant did not raise this argument at any time prior to this motion. A challenge to the appointment of an administrative law judge must be made before the agency or it is waived.[90] Defendant has not shown that he challenged the appointment of the immigration judge who issued his deportation order during his immigration proceedings. Therefore, this argument has been waived.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ...