Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/520/1140/271798/
Timestamp: 2019-08-18 01:15:48
Document Index: 245382246

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5104', '§ 3561', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1988', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1361', '§ 1107', '§ 10', '§ 1', '§ 405', '§ 3', '§ 701', '§ 408', '§ 5004', '§ 214', '§ 7203', '§ 701', '§ 1361', '§ 701', '§ 1391']

Jake King, Appellant, v. Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior Ofthe United States, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1975 › Jake King, Appellant, v. Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior Ofthe United State...
Jake King, Appellant, v. Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior Ofthe United States, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
Argued Jan. 10, 1975. Decided Oct. 9, 1975
2. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to territories which were not incorporated into the Union. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, (42 S. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627) (1922).
King appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the High Court of American Samoa. On April 1, 1974 the Appellate Division issued its opinion upholding King's conviction. Relying on the "Insular cases "2 and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627 (1922), the court held that the right to jury trial guaranteed by the United States Constitution did not extend to persons tried in American Samoa and that the imposition of the Anglo-American jury system upon Samoa's legal structure "would be an arbitrary, illogical, and inappropriate foreign imposition". Government of American Samoa v. King, No. App. 63-73 (High Ct.Am.Samoa, App. Div., decided April 1, 1974). The decision of the Appellate Division of the High Court of American Samoa is final under Samoan law. 15 Am.Samoa Code § 5104 (1973).
Although King's action is a civil action arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, we cannot determine on the basis of the record before us whether the action involves a "matter in controversy (which) exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs." This amount-in-controversy requirement is a prerequisite for jurisdiction under section 1331(a), even in cases in which fundamental constitutional rights are at stake, however difficult the valuation of such rights may be. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547, 92 S. Ct. 1113, 31 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1972). As we have said in Gomez v. Wilson, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 252 n. 56, 477 F.2d 411, 421 n. 56 (1973):
The burden of establishing the amount in controversy is on the person claiming jurisdiction, and the district court may question at any time whether the jurisdictional amount has been shown. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936). See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3561 (1975).
Not only is a duty owed to the plaintiff necessary to give the district court jurisdiction under section 1361, but as this court has said, " The writ should be used only when the duty of the officer to act is clearly established and plainly defined and the obligation to act is peremptory." Hammond v. Hull, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303, 131 F.2d 23, 25 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777, 63 S. Ct. 830, 87 L. Ed. 1145 (1943) (footnote omitted). Thus, the writ is not available to King unless the Secretary of the Interior has a "clearly established", "plainly defined" and "peremptory" duty, in administering the government of America Samoa, to require that government to provide for trial by jury as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Whether the Secretary has such a duty is a jurisdictional question, which cannot be answered without inquiry into the merits of King's claim. That inquiry should be made in the first instance by the District Court. Accordingly remand for further proceedings is appropriate.
King's argument that he is entitled to a jury trial in American Samoa is a tidy syllogism. He admits that only "fundamental" constitutional rights apply to unincorporated territories such as American Samoa. Insular Tariff Cases, supra note 2; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S. Ct. 787, 47 L. Ed. 1016 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 808, 49 L. Ed. 128 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627 (1922). He also concedes that the Supreme Court has held that the right to trial by jury is not "fundamental". Hawaii v. Mankichi, Dorr v. United States, Balzac v. Porto Rico, supra. But, he says, the Supreme Court has reversed its position in those cases and held the right to trial by jury to be "fundamental". Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S. Ct. 1886, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970). So, he concludes, the right to trial by jury applies to American Samoa.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821). The simple words of the opinions King cites are not as important as the contexts in which those cases were decided. The Balzac, Dorr, Hawaii and the Insular Tariff cases all involved unincorporated territories similar to American Samoa, but at a time much earlier in our nation's history. Those cases have never been overruled; specifically, they have not been overruled by the Duncan and Baldwin cases, which dealt with the right to trial by jury in states rather than unincorporated territories. The decision in the present case does not depend on key words such as "fundamental" or "unincorporated territory" in those opinions, but can be reached only by applying the principles of the earlier cases, as controlled by their respective contexts, to the situation as it exists in American Samoa today. As Mr. Justice Harlan wrote in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1260, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result), "the particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant to a question of judgment, namely, whether jury trial should be deemed a necessary condition of the exercise of Congress' power to provide for the trial of Americans overseas."
The importance of the constitutional right at stake makes it essential that a decision in this case rest on a solid understanding of the present legal and cultural development of American Samoa. That understanding cannot be based on unsubstantiated opinion; it must be based on facts. Specifically, it must be determined whether the Samoan mores and matai culture with its strict societal distinctions will accommodate a jury system in which a defendant is tried before his peers; whether a jury in Samoa could fairly determine the facts of a case in accordance with the instructions of the court without being unduly influenced by customs and traditions of which the criminal law takes no notice; and whether the implementation of a jury system would be practicable. In short, the question is whether in American Samoa "circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and anomalous." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 75, 77 S. Ct. at 1260. That the Samoan system of criminal justice is in many respects similar to the Anglo-American system does not supply the answer to this specific and crucial question. Nor is the answer to be found in the failure of the Samoan Constitution, originated by the Samoan people, to provide for trial by jury in criminal cases.
2. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to territories which were not incorporated into the Union. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627 (1922).2
Without any further elaboration, the district judge simply dismissed this case for "lack of jurisdiction." The district court may have felt compelled to defer to the Samoan proceedings based upon the principles of equity, comity and federalism expressed by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971) though it was not jurisdictionally barred from hearing the case. However, regardless of the applicability of Younger to territorial court proceedings, Martinez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 343 F. Supp. 897, 902-04 (D.P.R. 1972); see Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383-84, 69 S. Ct. 606, 93 L. Ed. 741 (1949); Ackerman v. Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 187 F.2d 860, 868-69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859, 72 S. Ct. 85, 96 L. Ed. 646 (1951); Rodriguez Rivera v. Maiz, 331 F. Supp. 713, 715-17 (D.P.R. 1971), the prosecution of Mr. King in American Samoa has now run its full course,3 and federal judicial restraint, as the Government concedes, is no longer necessary on this basis. In absence of this bar, I am nevertheless obligated to inquire as to a proper basis for jurisdiction before reaching the merits.
In district court, appellant alleged jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1343 (civil rights), and 1361 (mandamus). At first blush, section 13314 is appealing; however, on this record, the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement raises a significant barrier, since the value of appellant's federal claim must exceed that amount. See Gomez v. Wilson, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 477 F.2d 411, 419-20 and n.56 (1973). The problem is not diminished by the mere fact that Mr. King faced a potential penalty of $20,000 in the Samoan prosecution at the time this action was initiated in the district court because, even if he were tried by a jury, his potential liability would remain constant. It is, nonetheless, conceivable that he could have made a showing in district court sufficient to sustain the requisite jurisdictional amount. Tatum v. Laird, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 444 F.2d 947, 951 and n.6 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 231, 33 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1972). See generally 1 Moore's Federal Practice PP 0.91, 0.95-0.96. In this regard, the record before us is incomplete and thus, jurisdiction cannot rest on 1331.
While my concern with 1331 could have been allayed in the district court, the problems raised concerning 28 U.S.C. § 1343,5 the jurisdictional complement to various civil rights statutes, are insurmountable. Quite plainly, the case sub judice is a suit against a federal official for equitable relief only; the Secretary of the Interior is the sole defendant, and appellant does not seek damages. As such, paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 1343, which by their plain terms concern actions "(t)o recover damages," are inapplicable here. Likewise, 1343(3) fails to sustain jurisdiction since it "applies only to alleged infringements of rights under 'color of . . . State law' . . . (and t)hus, . . . in suits against federal officials for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights, it is necessary to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction." Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547, 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1119, 31 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1972) (citations omitted). What remains is paragraph 4, which was added to section 1343 by the Civil Rights Act of 1957. 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1971). Although 1343(4) does not contain the "color of any State law" phraseology of 1343(3), neither its brief legislative history, H.R.Rep.No.291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1957), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1957, p. 1966, nor its subsequent judicial interpretation, e. g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n.1, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment), citing 409 F.2d 718, 720 n.1 (2d Cir. 1969); Ramirez v. Weinberger, 363 F. Supp. 105, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (three-judge court), aff'd without opinion, 415 U.S. 970, 94 S. Ct. 1553, 39 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1974), indicates that it was intended to encompass actions of federal officials. While 1343(4) has been successfully asserted as a basis for jurisdiction over actions of state officials, see, e. g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251, 92 S. Ct. 407, 30 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1971); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-57, 89 S. Ct. 817, 22 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1969), appellant has not cited, and I have not uncovered, so much as a single case, holding 1343(4) to be a proper jurisdictional basis over actions of federal officials. Moreover, even assuming the existence of such authority, appellant has not proffered "any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights," directed to federal officials, upon which 1343(4) jurisdiction could be asserted. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702-03, 93 S. Ct. 1785, 36 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973), wherein a similar deficiency befell plaintiffs relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). Thus, on the record herein, and in light of the considerations discussed above, I would be hard-pressed to find jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1343. However, there remains an alternative basis of jurisdiction which appellant alleged, and which I think properly vests jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1361.6
Section 1361 provides that "(t)he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Unquestionably, the purpose of this section was to provide jurisdiction in all federal district courts over actions which previously could have been brought only in the District Court for the District of Columbia. S.Rep.No.1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1962, p. 2784. See also Note on the Jurisdictional Amount Requirement in Suits Challenging the Validity of Federal Government Action, P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1160-61 (2d ed. 1973); 4 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1107, at 421 and n.68 (1969); Jacoby, The Effect of Recent Changes in the Law of "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review, 53 Geo. L.J. 19 (1964). Courts have subsequently held 1361 to be an independent grant of federal jurisdiction regardless of the amount in controversy. See, e. g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 492 F.2d 587, 592 (1974); Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 291, 427 F.2d 561, 564-65 (1970); Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213, 216 (9th Cir. 1970); Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 772-73 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941, 90 S. Ct. 953, 25 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1970); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 279 (1st Cir. 1965). Consequently, the only prerequisite to 1361 jurisdiction is that the complainant show that the defendant-official owes him a nondiscretionary duty to act. If, of course, the duty is not "clear and indisputable," that is, not "ministerial," then mandamus simply will not lie.
The issue was first presented to the Supreme Court in what are commonly known as the Insular Cases.8 The earliest of those cases, e. g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 S. Ct. 743, 45 L. Ed. 1041 (1901), concerning the lawfulness of import tariffs on goods brought into the United States from our then newly acquired territory of "Porto Rico," left the Court sorely divided on the underlying issues.9 One contemporaneous commentator opined that:
The "reasonable consistency and unanimity of opinion," lacking in the first cases, was shortly thereafter provided by the Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 808, 49 L. Ed. 128 (1904).
The question presented in Dorr was "whether, in the absence of a statute of Congress expressly conferring the right, trial by jury is a necessary incident of judicial procedure in the Philippine Islands, where demand for trial by that method has been made by the accused, and denied by the courts established in the islands." 195 U.S. at 139, 24 S. Ct. at 809. In the course of his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Day initially reiterated several elementary propositions: first, "that the Constitution of the United States is the only source of power authorizing action by any branch of the Federal government. 'The government of the United States was born of the Constitution, and all powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be either derived expressly or by implication from that instrument' "; second, that "the United States may acquire territory in the exercise of the treaty-making power . . .;" and third, that Congress is expressly granted by article IV, section 3 the power to govern such territory. Id. at 140, 24 S. Ct. at 809. Regarding the extent of Congress' power over the territories, the Court stated:
The limitations which are to be applied in any given case involving territorial government must depend upon the relation of the particular territory to the United States, concerning which Congress is exercising the power conferred by the Constitution. That the United States may have territory, which is not incorporated into the United States as a body politic, we think was recognized by the framers of the Constitution in enacting the article already considered, giving power over the territories, and is sanctioned by the opinions of the justices concurring in the judgment in Downes v. Bidwell, (182 U.S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088 (1901)).
Id. at 142-43, 24 S. Ct. at 810. The Court then determined that the applicable treaty had not "incorporated" the Philippines into the United States and in this context, turned to the question of whether the constitutional guarantees of jury trial would apply. Relying upon Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S. Ct. 787, 47 L. Ed. 1016 (1903), the Court held that those guarantees did not apply:
Dorr, 195 U.S. at 144-45, 24 S. Ct. at 811, quoting Mankichi, at 217-18. Notably, the Court also discussed the pragmatic considerations, i. e., "the uncivilized parts of the archipelago were wholly unfitted to exercise the right of trial by jury." Id. at 145, 24 S. Ct. at 811.
Aside from Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 25 S. Ct. 514, 49 L. Ed. 862 (1905), which held jury trial applicable to the territory of Alaska because it had been "incorporated" into the United States, the next and final major treatment of these issues was in the Court's unanimous opinion in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627 (1922). Beyond its ultimate holding that the constitutional provisions regarding jury trial did not apply to the unincorporated territory of "Porto Rico," the case is important for two other reasons. First, it delineated what should and should not be considered in determining whether a territory is "incorporated" into the Union. Simply put, it resolved that "incorporation is not to be assumed without express declaration, or an implication so strong as to exclude any other view." Id. at 306, 42 S. Ct. at 346. No longer could incorporation be implied from acts of Congress; anything short of an "express declaration" of Congressional intent to "incorporate" would not suffice. Second, while it is clear that the Court held, on authority of Dorr, that the right to jury trial was not "fundamental" and therefore not applicable in "Porto Rico," it is equally clear that this holding was made against the backdrop of the Court's perception of Puerto Rican society and culture in 1922. Id. at 309-11, 42 S. Ct. 343.
In sum, it can fairly be said that the Insular Cases stand for essentially two propositions: (1) for territories incorporated into the United States, the Constitution applies ex proprio vigore, and (2) for unincorporated territories, only "fundamental" constitutional rights apply.11 However, the analysis cannot end here, for the Insular Cases were subsequently severely criticized when their reasoning resurfaced in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957).
The question in Reid was whether the constitutional guarantees of jury trial were applicable in proceedings against civilian dependents of military personnel stationed in a foreign country. In his plurality opinion answering this question affirmatively, Mr. Justice Black addressed the Insular Cases, reiterated their basic holdings, as discussed above, id. at 12-13, 77 S. Ct. 1222, and proceeded to distinguish and disapprove them:
Id. at 14, 77 S. Ct. at 1229 (footnote omitted).
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan filed separate concurring opinions in which they expressed their view, inter alia, that Justice Black's opinion swept too broadly in regard to the Insular Cases. Justice Frankfurter opined that the cases were still valuable for their analysis: "The territorial cases, in the emphasis put by them on the necessity for considering the specific circumstances of each particular case, are thus relevant in that they provide an illustrative method for harmonizing constitutional provisions which appear, separately considered, to be conflicting." Id. at 54, 77 S. Ct. at 1250 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). Implicit in this thought is approval of the Insular Cases for their consideration of characteristics peculiar to the relevant territories. Id. at 51-53, 77 S. Ct. 1222. Justice Harlan clearly agreed with this interpretation:
(I)t seems to me that the basic teaching of Ross (In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 11 S. Ct. 897, 35 L. Ed. 581) and the Insular Cases is that there is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condition precedent to exercising power over Americans overseas, must exercise it subject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the conditions and considerations are that would make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous. To take but one example: Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, is not good authority for the proposition that jury trials need never be provided for American citizens tried by the United States abroad; but the case is good authority for the proposition that there is no rigid rule that jury trial must always be provided in the trial of an American overseas, if the circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and anomalous. In other words, what Ross and the Insular Cases hold is that the particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant to a question of judgment, namely, whether jury trial should be deemed a necessary condition of the exercise of Congress' power to provide for the trial of Americans overseas.
Id. at 74-75, 77 S. Ct. at 1261 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
To complete fully the relevant legal framework within which this appeal arises, I introduce, at this point, the case which lies at the very heart of appellant's constitutional claim Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968). All of the Insular Cases which concern the right to jury trial were decided at a period in our history when that right was not considered "fundamental." Obviously, Duncan has significantly undermined that premise. There can be no question that the right to a jury trial in serious criminal cases is now "fundamental" " 'basic in our system of jurisprudence,' " " 'essential to a fair trial,' " and "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." 391 U.S. at 149-50 and n.14, 88 S. Ct. at 1447. The relevance of Duncan in relation to jury trial in American Samoa will be addressed presently.
While I agree that the Balzac analysis is still viable, I am unable to accept the notion that its holding regarding jury trial is still good law. The Government argues that "the Court in Duncan was clearly referring to the Anglo-Saxon system of justice" and that we would be in error to conclude that " 'our system of justice' . . . is synonymous with the Samoan scheme of justice."13 I do not dispute that the Court in Duncan addressed the issue in terms of "Anglo-American" jurisprudence. I also concede that the majority opinion in Duncan did not directly carry the proposition beyond the "States," 391 U.S. at 149 n.14, 88 S. Ct. 1444, although I note that the dissent thought that it did and felt compelled to observe precisely that effect. 391 U.S. 185-86, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, I believe what Duncan conclusively resolved is that the "nature" of the right to jury trial as embodied in the Constitution is fundamental. Obviously the decision was in terms of Anglo-American jurisprudence, but the threshold proposition in Dorr and Balzac that jury trial was not fundamental was also in terms of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The point is that the nature of the right has always been determined in the first instance with reference to our own body of law. This was so in the Insular Cases concerning jury trial and grand jury indictment, and explains precisely why Justice Harlan opined that Duncan overturned the idea that "jury trial is not fundamental to ordered liberty." Id. Thus, at least to that extent, Dorr and Balzac are no longer valid.
Before turning to my final inquiry concerning the practical considerations of implementation of jury trial, I must comment upon the plethora of cases the Government has raised in support of its position that the Balzac holding is still good law. Two of the "recent decisions" cited to us as supportive of this proposition were decided before Reid and Duncan, and, in any event, are irrelevant. American Pacific Dairy Products, Inc. v. Siciliano, 235 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1956), was not even a criminal case; it concerned a civil action for damages for breach of a partnership agreement and, even as such, the jury trial issue was not exhaustively analyzed. Figueroa v. People of Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 615 (1st Cir. 1956), is equally inapposite; at most, it merely restated the holding of Balzac, which at the time was good law. Rivera v. Government of Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 988 (3rd Cir. 1967), and Government of Virgin Islands v. Rijos, 285 F. Supp. 126 (D.V.I. 1968), are also of no aid. While both were decided after Reid, they were still pre-Duncan.14 Moreover, their holdings concerned the right to grand jury indictment, which, unlike jury trial, has not been held "fundamental." See also Government of the Canal Zone v. Scott, 502 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1974). The Government also refers us to Government of Virgin Islands v. Bodle, 427 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1970), in which the Government says the court cited Rijos "with approval." Granted that Rijos was cited in Bodle, but only for the proposition that all aspects of the Constitution do not ex proprio vigore apply to unincorporated territories, and certainly not for the broad proposition asserted by the Government. Compare 427 F.2d at 533 n.1 with Gov't. Br. at 28-29. Further, the Bodle court's suggestion, in dictum, that "trial by a jury in all criminal prosecutions is deemed a remedial right which is not among the fundamental rights" and therefore not applicable to unincorporated territories, 427 F.2d at 553 n.1, citing Balzac, took no cognizance whatsoever of either Reid or Duncan and certainly cannot be controlling here. See also United States v. Dunn, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 459 F.2d 1115, 1122 (1972). Lastly, regardless of the once controlling weight of some of these cases, they have recently been subject to elaborate and critical analysis in view of Duncan, which I find to a large extent persuasive. See, e. g., Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332, 1335-42 (D.P.R. 1974); Torres v. Delgado, 391 F. Supp. 379 (D.P.R., filed July 3, 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1975).
The administration of local government is distributed among the district, county and village governing bodies. Am.Samoa Const. art. V, § 10; 4 Am.Samoa Code §§ 1 et seq. Notably, none of the local authorities is directly instrumental in the adjudicatory phases of the criminal justice process. Certainly they play a pivotal role in the functioning of Samoan society, but their position is clearly not akin to that of the courts. See, e. g., 4 Am.Samoa Code §§ 405, 406. At this level of Samoan society the matai, or chieftal, system in Samoa becomes most relevant, for it is here, close to the people, that a matai (chief) is most influential. As leaders of the extended families (aiga poto poto), that communally own virtually all Samoan land, the matais have authority over which family members work what family land and where the nuclear families within the extended family will live. At times, the matai also receives, when requested, "service" in terms of money or food from the family members.18 This has traditionally been fa'a Samoa, the Samoan way. Of course, the matais also exercise power through formalized channels as district governors, county chiefs and village mayors. 4 Am.Samoa Code §§ 3, 201, 401. Matai title controversies are now resolved pursuant to various statutory provisions, 1 Am.Samoa Code §§ 701-804, and a special judicial provision applies to these proceedings. 5 Am.Samoa Code § 408(e).
I have studiously examined the American Samoan government and culture, and see no reason why jury trial should not be applicable there. Contrary to the Government's argument, I do not think that jury trial in serious criminal cases would undermine any traditional cultural or societal aspects of Samoa. There is simply no indication that trial by jury, the matai system and Samoan culture generally are incompatible. Indeed, in view of the "supporting framework and the subsidiary procedures" presently in force throughout Samoa, I think that jury trial will merely complement the already existing criminal justice process. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14, 88 S. Ct. 1444. As juries serve to curb abuses of governmental power here, a like salutary effect will be served in Samoa. Id. at 155-56, 88 S. Ct. 1444. I also do not perceive insurmountable physical problems to empanelling a jury, see App. Item 2, nor are the problems of affinity, vis-a-vis the extended families, any greater in Samoa than similar problems encountered and surmounted in closely knit areas of the United States proper. Assuming that acts of atonement for crimes committed are prevalent in Samoan culture, and may have a significant effect, fa'a Samoa, on a jury's determination of guilt or innocence, see Gov't. Ex. 7 at 6, I fail to see how this could cut against the applicability of jury trial to Samoa. After all, in the final analysis, it is the populus of a given society to whom a miscreant is responsible; and, in any event, it is apparent that if acts of atonement were not considered by the jury, they would be considered by the judge in his sentencing decision. 15 Am.Samoa Code § 5004. Hence, I find none of the cultural differences or practical considerations which the Government poses in opposition to jury trial sufficient to warrant inapplicability of the right.21 Quite frankly, American Samoa in 1975 and "Porto Rico" in 1922 are simply not analogous.
The Appellate Division cited as "Insular Cases " De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 S. Ct. 743, 45 L. Ed. 1041 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 21 S. Ct. 742, 45 L. Ed. 1065 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 21 S. Ct. 762, 45 L. Ed. 1074 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 21 S. Ct. 827, 45 L. Ed. 1086 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088 (1901); and Huus v. New York and Porto Rico Steamship Company, 182 U.S. 392, 21 S. Ct. 827, 45 L. Ed. 1146 (1901). These cases, properly referred to collectively as the Insular Tariff Cases, also include, in addition to the foregoing, Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 22 S. Ct. 62, 46 L. Ed. 128 (1901), and Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 22 S. Ct. 59, 46 L. Ed. 138 (1901)
App. Item 10. The Government of American Samoa has adopted, with relatively minor alteration, the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 18.0405 of the Revised Code of American Samoa, enacted in 1963, Am.Samoa Pub. L. No. 8-1, now codified at 34 Am.Samoa Code § 214 (1973), makes "a criminal offense under chapter 75 of subtitle F(A) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954 . . . an offense against American Samoa . . . ." Id. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 provides:
At the eleventh hour, appellant has raised in this court two additional jurisdictional allegations habeas corpus and section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06. There is a serious question whether Mr. King was in sufficient custody at the time of the filing of this action to maintain it as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S. Ct. 1556, 20 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1968). Absent more elaborate briefing of the issue by the parties and in view of my decision regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1361, I think it best to defer these questions. Neither do I see any reason to resolve appellant's APA claim, which, at best, is dubious. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1) (C), which states that the term "agency" does not include "the governments of the territories."
I note in passing that process was served on the defendant Secretary of the Interior and, that venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970)
For definitional purposes, the term "Insular Cases" as used in this opinion refers to those cases decided by the Court in its 1900 and 1901 terms concerning tariffs applied to goods entering the United States from our then recently acquired territories of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 S. Ct. 743, 45 L. Ed. 1041 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 21 S. Ct. 742, 45 L. Ed. 1065 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 21 S. Ct. 762, 45 L. Ed. 1074 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 21 S. Ct. 827, 45 L. Ed. 1086 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088 (1901); Huus v. New York and Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392, 21 S. Ct. 827, 45 L. Ed. 1146 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 22 S. Ct. 62, 46 L. Ed. 128 (1901); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 22 S. Ct. 59, 46 L. Ed. 138 (1901), plus Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S. Ct. 787, 47 L. Ed. 1016 (1903); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 808, 49 L. Ed. 128 (1904); and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627 (1922). While this may not be technically correct, De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 2, 21 S. Ct. 743; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. at 135, 24 S. Ct. 808, the Court itself has subsequently utilized this characterization in reference to all of the above cases. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12-13 and n.22, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148; 354 U.S. at 65 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
Some of the issues the Court faced in the earliest Insular Cases were foreshadowed in Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 291 (1898); Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, id. at 365 (1899); Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, id. at 393 (1899); Thayer, Our New Possessions, id. at 464 (1899)
Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 169, 170 (1901). See also The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court, id. at 164 (1901); The Results in the Insular Cases, id. at 395 (1902)
For an excellent analysis of the Insular Cases see Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 823 (1926). See also P. Kauper, Constitutional Law 517-18 (3d ed. 1966); Note, Inventive Statesmanship vs. The Territorial Clause: The Constitutionality of Agreements Limiting Territorial Powers, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1041 (1974)
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that defendants convicted without benefit of a jury trial have been wronged. See DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S. Ct. 2093, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1308 (1968)
This holding would not require that every aspect of the federal jury system be engrafted onto the Samoan criminal justice process. The standard is that only fundamental rights be accorded. The Supreme Court has held that neither a twelve-person nor unanimous jury is fundamental. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970). Thus, for example, neither aspect would necessarily have to be implemented in Samoa. Beyond that, I express no opinion as to the specific type of jury trial required; that is properly an issue to be resolved in the first instance between the Secretary and the Samoan Government
I also stress that this holding would apply only to criminal prosecutions for "serious offenses." See, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S. Ct. 1886, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970). There can be no question that Mr. King was prosecuted for such an offense. Id. at 69, 90 S. Ct. 1886.