Source: http://www.banking.senate.gov/99_03hrg/032599/klein.htm
Timestamp: 2013-05-25 15:48:35
Document Index: 639044217

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 707', '§\n1637', '§ 209', '§ 727', '§ 523', '§ 341', '§ 707', '§ 151', '§ 157']

Prepared Testimony of Mr. Gary Klein
BALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of Committee, on behalf of our low-income clients,
the National Consumer Law Center(1) thanks you for inviting me to testify today regarding
financial services issues in pending consumer bankruptcy legislation.
Although the views I express to you today are mine, in the last several years, I have been joined
by a wide range of organizations, including those representing consumers, women and children,
working families, labor, the civil rights community, older Americans, and the guardians of the
system, bankruptcy judges. These groups oppose, as do I, the kind of one-sided, radical, and
unbalanced bankruptcy overhaul that was contained in last year's Conference Report, and which
has been re-introduced in this Congress. There is a great deal of misinformation circulating about the increase in bankruptcy filings and
purported abuses in the system. The reality is that more debtors use the bankruptcy system
because more debtors are having serious financial problems. American families increasingly face
foreclosure, repossession, utility shut-off, wage garnishment and extensive collection activity on
unsecured credit card debt. In short, more American families are using the bankruptcy system,
because more American families are having trouble paying their debts.
I. HIGH RATE CREDIT CARD AND HOME MORTGAGE LENDING IS A MAJOR
FACTOR AMONG THE MANY CONTRIBUTING CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCY. The fact that more bankruptcies are being filed is not evidence, in itself, that debtors are abusing
the system. The reality is that more cases are filed, because more American families are faced
with crushing debt. There is much more consumer credit outstanding than ever before. With the
additional extension of credit, comes additional risk.
The increase in bankruptcy filings is an unfortunate consequence of several significant structural
changes in the American economy. These changes have combined to create a rise not only in
bankruptcy, but also in foreclosures,(2) repossessions, utility disconnections, credit card defaults(3)
and visits to consumer credit counseling agencies.(4) Nevertheless banks continue to be very
profitable, reaching record profits of 62 billion in 1998.(5)
These are the factors which have contributed to the increase in filings:
Downsizing, economic dislocation, income disruptions, and underemployment. Families
are increasingly impacted by instability in employment income, particularly at the lower end of
the wage spectrum.(6) Although unemployment remains low, many workers file bankruptcy after
being forced to shift to lower paying jobs. A surprising statistic, based on data compiled by Visa
and MasterCard, is that no more than 29% of bankruptcies are caused by overspending. The
balance of filings are caused by other life events over which consumers have little or no
control.(7)
Rising debt to income ratios. More families have more debt. Part of the reason for this is
that the lending community has aggressively marketed credit card debt,(8) because it profits from
the very high interest rates. Another factor is the unprecedented increase in the cost of education
and the corresponding increase in student loan debt.(9) One family in six below $25,000 in
annual income, spends more than 40% of its income on debt service.(10) Reliance on two wage earners to make ends meet. This change in a fundamental condition
of the economy means that every family has double the risk. With two wage earners vulnerable
to income instability, any change for either one creates enormous pressure on the family budget. Child-bearing and time off to raise children mean that a family which was getting by on two
incomes is forced to rely on only one.
Rising divorce rates. A corollary of the latter factor is that when a family splits up, the
pressure of running a household with less total income is impossible. Bankruptcy debtors are
disproportionately single parents.(11)
Uninsured medical debt. At a time when a two day stay in the hospital to deliver a baby can
cost as much as $20,000, the uninsured have virtually no options to manage medical debts.(12) Bankruptcy has played an increasing role as the only way out.(13)
Aggressive Creditor Collection Action. Wage garnishments, debt collection by aggressive
telephone calling, and pursuit of legal remedies push many families into bankruptcy.(14) Few
debtors can afford to pay an attorney to defend against a debt collection or wage garnishment
action even when they have valid legal defenses.(15) Many bankruptcy filers report that their
attempts at non-bankruptcy payment arrangements were rebuffed.
Deregulation. As rates and terms of credit have been deregulated, an increasing number of
American families have gotten credit on bad terms.(16) High rate home equity loans, credit card
interest rates exceeding 18%, and consumer fraud tied to credit are frequent contributing causes
of bankruptcy.(17) As some borrowers are increasingly pushed into "sub-prime" loans at high
rates, the bankruptcy system is at the fulcrum of a "chicken and egg" problem. Are high risks
justifying high rates, or are the high rates causing defaults which generate risk?(18)
More Credit Means More Bankruptcy. The clearest correlation of bankruptcy cause and
effect is between the increase in the amount of credit outstanding and the number of filings. The
number of bankruptcies and the total amount of consumer debt in our society have moved
upward together in lockstep.(19) It is not surprising that as more Americans borrow more money,
more families have financial troubles.
II. DOES THE LENDING INDUSTRY SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSUMER
FINANCIAL HARDSHIP AND THE INCREASE IN BANKRUPTCY FILINGS?
The reasons for the increase in bankruptcy filings are complex. Although banks and other
lenders are correct in pointing out that they are not entirely to blame, it is disingenuous of them
to assert that they should not bear some responsibility, at least to the extent of their own conduct.
Credit solicitations and other forms of marketing are designed to encourage consumers to rely on
credit. Much of the marketing is done to people who once would have been considered
unacceptably high risk. Due to high interest rates, the lending community has discovered that it
profits when people get in over their heads so that they cannot pay their balance in full each
month.(20) This generates remarkable profits for banks. However, it also makes consumers
vulnerable even to small life problems which can put them over the edge.
Every American family has a budget which represents a fixed pie. The 55 to 60 million
households that carry a credit card balance from month-to-month have an average balance of
$7,000 and pay more than $1,000 per year in interest and fees.(21) And, of course, the families
that wind up in bankruptcy are almost always on the high side of average in their debt-load and
the low side of average in income.(22)
Are consumers at fault for using the credit which is marketed to them? Of course not. Millions
of American families have not suddenly become irresponsible. They are simply using the credit
offered to them for the purposes for which it is offered. Families don't go out and borrow $7,000
on a credit card all at once. They make small purchases over a period of time, and make the
minimum payments which the lender requests. Few consumers understand that making only the
minimum payments means that their balance will grow and payments will take an ever larger
piece out of their monthly budget (at 16.9% interest or higher) for debt service.(23) (See attached
Congress should not enact legislation which undermines effective bankruptcy relief for struggling
families. Some reform is necessary, but that reform should be balanced and should include
financial services reforms which would help consumers avoid the credit problems which
contribute to bankruptcy.
We do not believe that creditors should be required to make less credit available to low and
moderate income consumers, but rather that consumers have the tools and information they need
to use credit wisely. Appropriate consumer protections designed to reinforce the lending
community's obligation to employ responsible credit practices include:
enhanced disclosure to consumers about the consequences of making minimum payments,(24) enhanced disclosures concerning teaser rates of interest,(25) protections against unilateral interest rate increases which are unrelated to a change in the
lender's cost of funds,(26) prohibition of unilateral credit limit increases,(27) prohibition of security interests based in credit card agreements,(28) protection against so called "cashed check loans" because they carry no "cooling-off"
period;(29) prohibition of credit card cash advance machines in casinos,(30) prohibition against making credit cards available to persons such as students who have no
present ability to make more than nominal payments,(31) and reregulation of interest rates by a floating cap -- above which it is simply unhealthy for
consumers to have credit.(32) With the exception of our last recommendation, these consumer protections are contained in one
or more of three pieces of legislation introduced this year: S. 480 "Credit Card Consumer
Protection Act of 1999" (Senator Schumer); S. 641 "Consumer Credit Act of 1999" (Senator
Sarbanes, Durbin, Dodd, Feingold); and H.R. 900 "Consumer Credit Card Protection
Amendment of 1999" (Congressman LaFalce and others).
If lenders choose to resist legislation to address these problems for consumers, they ought not be
heard to complain about the bankruptcies which are the inevitable result. Industry consultants
estimate that credit card companies could cut their bankruptcy losses by more than 50% if they
would institute minimal credit screening.(33)
III. ARE SUBSTANTIAL COSTS OF BANKRUPTCY PASSED ON TO NON-BANKRUPT CONSUMERS?
A. Is the system failing to recapture money which debtors can afford to pay?
Nobody likes to be owed a debt which is not paid back. Yet our society has a system of debt
forgiveness which has roots in the Bible.(34) Forgiveness and a fresh start have always been a part
of that system.(35)
A family's ability to repay its debts is limited by its income. Data shows that Americans in
bankruptcy are far poorer than their non-bankrupt counterparts. The median after-tax income of
a family in chapter 7 bankruptcy is under $20,000, or approximately half the national median.(36)
The credit industry has focused substantial resources on attempting to show that despite this
relative poverty, there are many families who are obtaining a bankruptcy fresh start even though
they can afford to pay. Based on this assumption, they would set up a system in which some
debtors are forced into payment plans.
Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence which shows that bankruptcy debtors can afford to
pay and quite a bit to the contrary. The credit industry's study released last year,(37) purporting to
show that bankruptcy debtors can afford some repayment has been severely criticized by the
General Accounting Office.(38) Once the credit industry study's results are adjusted to take
account of the GAO critique, it shows that only about 5% of debts could be repaid by debtors -- if
they undergo five year repayment plans.(39) This means that the creditor's own study ultimately
shows that bankruptcy debtors can afford to pay about a penny on the dollar per year. That result
was supported recently by a study funded by the American Bankruptcy Institute showing that
only 3% of chapter 7 debtors can afford to pay back their debts in a hypothetical chapter 13
plan.(40)
Outside bankruptcy, no reasonable creditor would spend more than a penny to collect a penny. Proposals to require five year payment plans for many more debtors have a heavy price tag,
including costs of administration and monitoring, costs to resolve disputes about capacity to
repay, and costs of collecting and distributing payments. Either the taxpayer would have to fund these costs, or if they are debtor funded, they will reduce
the receipts available to creditors in repayment plans. If taxpayer funded, every American would
be helping banks and other creditors collect their one cent per dollar per year. If debtor funded,
the one cent per dollar per year repayment capacity of debtors is even further reduced.
Finally, requiring five year repayment plans would have enormous social and human costs. People use the bankruptcy system for many legitimate reasons. If navigating the system is made
more difficult, and if a meaningful fresh start is denied when some cases inevitably fail,(41) more
debtors would be left with the burden of unmanageable debts.(42) Loss of homes, repossessions,
wage garnishments, utility shut-off and family stress associated with unmanageable debts would
be the inevitable result. While these social and human costs of denying chapter 7 relief to
debtors may be difficult to quantify, they nevertheless remain an important part of the relevant
B. Are losses associated with bankruptcy being passed on to other better off consumers in
the form of higher interest rates? The banking industry has claimed that it is losing 40 billion dollars each year to the bankruptcy
system and that it is passing those costs on to consumers at the rate of $400 per family.(43) These
numbers are ridiculous. Families may be discharging debt in bankruptcy, but the creditor's own
study, discussed above, shows that these are not debts which consumers can afford to pay. In reality, the lending community is scapegoating the bankruptcy system for losses associated
with bad loans. The vast majority of debts which are discharged in bankruptcy would have been
written off if no bankruptcy had intervened. The only impact of bankruptcy is that it gives
debtors a legally enforceable fresh start -- the same second chance which has been guaranteed
since Biblical times.
Equally important, there is no evidence that lenders would reduce rates on unsecured consumer
lending if they could avoid bankruptcy losses. Between 1980 and 1992, the federal funds rate at
which banks borrow fell from 13.4% to 3.5%. Nevertheless, credit card interest rates actually
rose.(44) How likely is it that other types of savings, if any could be realized, would be passed on
to consumers rather than investors?
To a large extent, the bankruptcy "problem" is nothing but a "bad loan" problem. It could be
fixed if lenders were more closely attentive to underwriting. For the most part, the lending
community has chosen not to take this step. The present interest rate environment has taught
lenders that substantial profits can be made from extending credit to risky borrowers, such as
college students. However, in exchange, the banking community must accept that it is reaching
some borrowers who cannot afford to pay.
IV. ARE THE AMENDMENTS CAPTURED LAST YEAR IN THE CONFERENCE
REPORT (H.R. 3150) AND REINTRODUCED THIS YEAR AS H.R. 833 FAIR AND
The bankruptcy system established in 1978 has been remarkably efficient. It provides critical
relief to financially troubled American families at a low cost to taxpayers. Over the years, many
open issues under the bankruptcy law have been resolved by court decisions and carefully crafted
Congressional amendments. To the extent the increase in the number of bankruptcies suggests that there are problems in the
consumer lending system, responsibility for fixing those problems must be shared between
consumers and lenders. Congressional reform, if any, should be balanced and narrowly targeted
at abuses by both debtors and creditors. It would be a mistake to enact reforms without addressing reckless lender conduct which pushes
people into bankruptcy. Offering additional credit, for example, to families already struggling to
pay their debts hurts not only borrowers, but also the borrowers' honest creditors if the new credit
pushes the family over the edge. Similarly, failure by one creditor to seriously consider payment
arrangements outside bankruptcy for families facing hardship may lead to a bankruptcy filing
which affects all creditors.
To the extent there has been a focus on debtor misconduct, the burden of proof remains on the
credit industry. To date it has not been met. Simply saying that more people are using the
system, is not proof that people are misusing the system.
Some observers ignore the fact that the present system already has a variety of protections which
are designed to effectively root out abuses by debtors. These include: Rule 9011,(45) objections to
discharge,(46) complaints to determine dischargeability,(47) good faith requirements,(48) Rule 2004
examinations,(49) creditors' meetings,(50) dismissals for substantial abuse,(51) and criminal
sanctions.(52) Indeed, it is unclear why the creditor community does not believe that the small
number of cases where significant repayment appears possible are not resolvable under the
"substantial abuse" test of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).(53) Perhaps additional tightening of this
provision would make it work better.
An additional set of balanced reforms may be appropriate as long as they do no harm to the
majority of honest debtors who urgently need help. Provisions should be narrowly targeted to
address debtors who truly are abusing the system without affecting lower income debtors who
would be hurt by having to litigate additional issues. Creditors should not be allowed to obtain
leverage by forcing new litigation on consumers who cannot afford to pay the costs of defending.
Appropriate reforms should also create incentives for debtors to use a repayment plan option in
bankruptcy in order to repay their debts. Significant actions could be taken to make the costs of
those plans more manageable and to enhance outcomes for debtors who complete plans.(54) Provisions in H.R. 833 which limit stripdown related to automobiles and personal property and
which require debtors in chapter 13 to litigate many new dischargeability issues will undermine
chapter 13 rather than reinforce it.
Finally, the system should penalize dishonest creditors. These include creditors whose actions
push people into bankruptcy and those who take advantage of debtors after they file by coercing
inappropriate reaffirmation agreements. Honest and careful creditors should always be paid before abusive debt collectors, lenders that
encourage gambling in casinos, predatory second mortgage lenders, and lenders who are
unreasonable in refusing to accept non-bankruptcy payment plans. Lenders whose actions violate
the bankruptcy laws should be subjected to meaningful and straightforward penalties.
The lending community should not be allowed to scapegoat the bankruptcy system for lending
decisions which result in bad debt. The right to participate in the bankruptcy system should
require honesty not just on the part of debtors, but also by creditors. Balanced and fair
bankruptcy legislation would reform practices by lenders that contribute to bankruptcy.
Appendix -- Case Study
Mrs. M is a 39-year old mother of three children, two of whom are living at home. Her financial
problems started in 1994 when her husband lost his job in construction. Since that time, he has
been underemployed; his earnings have declined from an average of $52,000 annually between
1990 and 1993 to an average of $26,000 between 1994 and 1997. Starting in 1994, the family's
primary income has been $30,000 which Mrs. M earns as an administrative assistant at an
insurance company. Mr. and Mrs. M have struggled successfully to maintain payments on a
home they bought in 1987 since their financial problems began in 1994. Mr. and Mrs. M have also had significant credit card bills since the late 1980's. Despite their
financial problems, they avoided default on those debts by making minimum payments between
1994 and 1997. However, the total amount of their credit card debts increased from about
$11,000 in 1994 to about $29,000 in 1997, largely due to the accumulation of interest at an
average annual rate of 17.5%.
In 1997, Mrs. M's financial problems worsened, because Mr. M moved out of the family home. An additional strain was created because Mrs. M attempted to provide financial help to her oldest
daughter who began her first year of college. In family counseling, Mr. and Mrs. M
acknowledged that their marriage was breaking up largely because of the constant pressure of
financial problems and Mr. M's continuing inability to find steady work.
Mrs. M attempted to make payment arrangements with her credit card lenders so that she could
focus on her mortgage obligation. She was told that no payment arrangements were possible and
that she should "borrow money to pay off the debts." Mrs. M went to consumer credit counseling
where she was advised that her budget did not support any payments on credit cards. She was
advised to consider chapter 7 bankruptcy in order to eliminate the credit card debts so that she
could maintain her payments on the mortgage.
In September 1997, Mrs. M obtained advice from a bankruptcy lawyer and reluctantly filed
bankruptcy. She will discharge approximately $35,000 in unsecured debts. She will reaffirm
and continue to make payments on her mortgage and car loan -- totaling $1,320 monthly.
1. The National Consumer Law Center is a nonprofit organization specializing in consumer
credit issues on behalf of low-income people. We work with thousands of legal services,
government and private attorneys around the country, representing low-income and elderly
individuals who request our assistance with the analysis of credit transactions. The National
Consumer Law Center also serves as an advocate for low-income consumers on consumer
lending and bankruptcy. NCLC publishes materials for lawyers and consumers, including the
nationally acclaimed book Surviving Debt: A Guide for Consumers. NCLC has trained lawyers
and counselors nationwide on consumer protection issues relevant to low-income consumers.
My experience includes 14 years as an attorney representing clients in bankruptcy, as an advocate
for consumers on bankruptcy issues, as a teacher and trainer of other lawyers, and as an author of
books on bankruptcy and consumer debt. My work also focuses on helping homeowners with
financial problems avoid foreclosure. The bankruptcy system has always provided an important
means to that end. 2. Foreclosures have more than tripled since 1980. There were approximately half a million
foreclosures in 1998. 3. Ausubel, "Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and Bankruptcy", 71 Am. Bankr. L.J.
250 (1997); See Consumer Federation of America, "Recent Trends in Credit Card Marketing
and Indebtedness" (Report issued July, 1998) at p. 1.
4. The number of consumers who have visited consumer credit counseling for help in the last
20 years has increased at a faster rate than bankruptcy filings. More than two million families
sought such help in 1998.
5. See Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and Bankruptcy, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J.
250 (1997) for a discussion of the role of credit card profits in the current boom in banking.
6. Even MasterCard recognizes this trend. In its recent report on debt and bankruptcy, its economist states: "Stagnation in real wages during the last 20 years and the growing disparity in income and wealth, ... have almost certainly contributed to the rise in personal bankruptcies. Declines in income caused by job loss make it more difficult for those affected to service
previously accumulated debt." Chimerine, "Americans in Debt: The Reality", p.24 (MasterCard
International 1997).
7. Id. at p. 25. And even the 29% figure is acknowledged to overstate spending problems as a
contributing cause of bankruptcy. Id.
8. More than three billion credit card solicitations were sent out in 1997 and 1998.Consumer Federation of America, "Recent Trends in Credit Card Marketing and Indebtedness" (Report issued July, 1998) at Table 2 (citing industry sources). See Hays, "Banks Marketing Blitz Yields Rash of Defaults" Wall Street Journal, p. B1 (September 25, 1996). MBNA, one of the largest issuers, claims 30 million credit card solicitations each month in 1997 together with 6 million phone solicitations. Hansell, "A Banking Powerhouse of Cards", N.Y. Times, p. C1 (October 22,
9. See Chacon, "Debt Burden Soaring for U.S. Students" Boston Globe, p. 1 (October 23, 1997). According to the Nellie Mae study on which the article is based, an average student's debt increased from $8,200 in 1991 to $18,800 in 1997.
10. "Family Finances in the United States: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances" Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. 1, 21 at Table 14 (January, 1997). Overall, the rate is one family in nine.
11. See Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors, pp. 147-165 (Oxford University Press, 1989).
12. See Hildebrandt and Thomas, "The Rising Cost of Medical Care and Its Effect on Inflation",
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Econ. Rev. p. 47 (Sept./Oct. 1991).
13. Domowitz & Sartrain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, p. 25 (1997).
14. See Dugas, "Special Report: Going Broke, Wage Garnishments a Key Factor" USA Today, p. 1A (June 10, 1997); Hansell, "We Like You. We Care About You. Now Pay Up. Debt Collecting Gets a Perky Face and Longer Arms", NY Times, F.1 (Jan. 26, 1997).
15. Forrester, "Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing," 75 Ore. L.Rev. 1095 (Winter 1996); Sterling & Shrag, "Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?" 67 Denv. U. L. R. 357, 384 (1990).
16. See, e.g, Adding Insult to Injury: Credit on the Fringe, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Consumer Credit and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993). Rehm, In a First, FDIC Warns Banks About Dangers of Sub-Prime Lending, 162 Am.
Banker 2 (May 13, 1997).
17. 17. See Forrester, "Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal
Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing" 69 Tul. L. Rev. 373 (1994).
18.Home mortgage loans with high loan-to-value ratios, particularly so-called 125% loans, are the major component of the recent surge in home equity lending, both in the prime and subprime markets. Recent growth in the volume of 125% loans has been unprecedented: 1995--$1 billion; 1996--$4 billion; 1997--$10 billion; 1998--an estimated $20 billion. Although such loans are at least partially secured by the debtors' homes and can result in the loss of the home, they carry
interest rates much closer to those of credit cards, in the 13-15% range. See "A 125% Solution
to Card Debt Stirs Worry," Wall Street Journal, Nov. 17, 1997
19. Four neutral academic studies show this remarkable correlation. Moss and Johnson, "The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both" (Harvard Business School, Division of Research, Working Paper, October 17, 1998); Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and Bankruptcy, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 250 (1997); Bhandari & Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1 (1993); Statement of Kim
Kowalewski, Chief, Financial and General Macroeconomic Analysis Unit, Congressional Budget
Office, before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Courts, (April 11, 1997). These studies stand is sharp contrast to credit
industry funded studies which purport to show otherwise.
20. Borrowers who maintain balances pay interest at rates which typically range from 14.5 to 19.8%.
21. See Consumer Federation of America, "Recent Trends in Credit Card Marketing and Indebtedness" (Report issued July, 1998) at p. 1.
22. Research shows that the median after-tax income of debtors is under $20,000 annually. Id. $1,000 in annual debt service expenses can thus be a very meaningful proportion of a debtor's income.
23. Industry analysts estimate that, using a typical minimum monthly payment rate on a credit card, it would take 34 years to pay off a $2,500 loan, and total payments would exceed 300% of the original principal. George M. Salem and Aaron C. Clark, GKM Banking Industry Report,
Bank Credit Cards: Loan Loss Risks are Growing, p. 25 (June 11, 1996). Credit card statements,
unlike mortgage loans and car loans, do not disclose the amortization rates or the total interest
that will be paid if the cardholder makes only the minimum monthly payment See 11 U.S.C. §
1637. A provision which would require new Truth in Lending disclosures on these issues was
included in the bill passed by the Senate (§ 209), but deleted from the Conference Report.
24. Minimum payments on many credit cards will not amortize the loan, thus sucking people in over their heads. If minimum payment terms are offered which won't amortize the debt in two years, consumers should be told, in clear and conspicuous language, what they need to pay, if they make no further charges, in order to pay off the loan over a two year period. 25. Low initial rates are designed to encourage consumers to use credit in the first months after
credit is granted. Many consumers do not understand what the permanent rate will be or the
impact of the rate change on a large unpaid balance. 26. Some lenders raise rates arbitrarily after consumer balances reach a certain level. Interest rate changes should be tied to an actual change in the interest rate environment so that consumers are not caught unawares. See, Hershey, "Sales of Credit Card Accounts Are Hurting Many Consumers," NY Times, March 2, 1999, p.A1 (documenting the effect of unilateral interest rate changes."
27. When a lender extends a consumer's credit limit unilaterally, in some cases after a consumer
is already struggling with the existing balance, the message is that the lender believes that the
consumer can afford to take on more credit. Consumers would not be hurt by having to ask for
more credit, rather than having it offered unilaterally. Such a request should trigger at least
minimal underwriting requirements.
28. These hidden security interests in items of property which have no resale value to the creditor provide inappropriate leverage to lenders in the collection process even though there is no potential that the lender could make money in the event of repossession.
29. Consumers receive checks from several major lenders in the mail for as much as $5,000. Not everyone understands that cashing these checks can lead to acceptance of high rate credit
terms. In addition, providing preapproved credit through cashed checks eliminates the cooling
off period which more common credit application processes provide.
30. With credit card cash advance machines prevalent in casinos, is it surprising that some gamblers get overextended on credit and file bankruptcy based on those credit card debts?
31. Offering credit aggressively to college students who cannot afford to pay off their debts until they join the work force some years later is prevalent because interest mounts until the debt is paid. By lending aggressively to college students, at a time in life when money is scarce, our society runs the risk of saddling people early in life with an unmanageable problem which will later preclude more important uses of credit such as purchase of a home and car. See US PIRG,
"The Campus Credit Card Trap: Results of a PIRG Survey of College Student" (September 1998).
32 Competition in the market has not worked to keep rates at reasonable levels. On a procedural level, the Supreme Court has held that credit card lenders can rely on the law in the state where they are incorporated in setting the interest rate and many of the other terms of credit for consumers nationwide. This has led to a "race to the bottom". States deregulate in order to
create the best possible environment to encourage a credit card company to locate there in order
to export terms of credit across the country. This helps certain states create jobs. However, it
means that those other states that do want to regulate for the benefit of their citizens can no
longer do so. Either states should be freed to create and enforce meaningful regulations or the
federal government should step in with consumer protections.
33.George M. Salem and Aaron C. Clark, GKM Banking Industry Report, Bank Credit Cards: Loan Loss Risks are Growing, p. 25 (June 11, 1996).
34 Deuteronomy 15:1-2 ("At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release. And this is the manner of the release: every creditor shall release that which he has lent unto his neighbor and his brother, because the Lord's release hath been proclaimed".)
35. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). See Gross, Failure and Forgiveness, ch. 6
(Yale University Press 1997).
36. Consumer Federation of America, "Recent Trends in Credit Card Marketing and Indebtedness" (Report issued July, 1998) at p. 1; Warren, "The Bankruptcy Crisis" 73 Ind. L. J. 1081, 1102-1103 (Fall 1998); Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook, "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991", 68 Am Bankr. L. J. p. 121, 128 (1994).
37. Barron and Staten, "Personal Bankruptcy: A Report on Petitioners' Ability to Pay", Monograph 33, Georgetown U. Credit Research Center (1997). This report is reprinted as Appendix G-2.b to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report.
38. GAO Report, Personal Bankruptcy, The Credit Research Center Report on Debtors' Ability
to Pay, GAO/GGD-98-47, p. 6 (Feb, 9, 1998) The GAO concluded that the study's "fundamental
assumptions were not validated". In addition, the GAO review concluded that the credit
industry's study: failed to assess the accuracy of the data collected; failed to account for major
expenses which bankruptcy debtors have after filing including payments on non-housing secured
debt and reaffirmed or non-discharged non-priority debts; failed to evaluate potential differences
among the sites chosen for the study; and failed to use statistically valid research techniques.
39. Warren, "The Bankruptcy Crisis" 73 Ind. L. J. 1081 (Fall 1998); Klein, "Means Tested Bankruptcy: What Would it Mean?" 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 711 (Spring, 1998).
40. 40. Culhane and White, "Means Testing for Chapter 7 Debtors: Repayment Capacity Untapped?" (American Bankruptcy Institute, 1998).
41. 67% of repayment plan cases fail under current law. There is every reason to think that if economically marginal debtors are forced into involuntary repayment plans, the failure rate would be higher.
42. See D. Caplovitz, Consumers In Trouble: A Story of Debtors in Default pp. 280-285 (Free
43. 43.The unpublished credit industry-funded report which served as the basis for this claim has also been criticized by the GAO for lack of analytical rigor. GAO/GGD-98-116R "The
Financial Costs of Personal Bankruptcy" Letter from Associate Director Richard Stana to the
Honorable Martin T. Meehan.
44. Medoff and Harless, The Indebted Society, at pp. 12-13 (Little, Brown & Co. 1996).
45. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 727.
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
48. See, e.g., In re Barrett, 964 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that debtor's second chapter 13
filing, when he had insufficient income to support plan, was in bad faith but that third chapter 13
case, after circumstances had changed was not in bad faith); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir.
49. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004. It is hard to see why creditors concerned about abuses can't utilize
the examination process to uncover them. If it is not financially feasible for a creditor to pursue
an examination, why should taxpayers instead bear that burden for the creditor's benefit.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 341. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2003.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-157. Bankruptcy fraud is punishable by fine and imprisonment for up to
five years. 18 U.S.C. § 157.
53. That is the provision which Congress added to the Code in 1984 and which has functioned to
root out debtors who can afford to pay their creditors. See, e.g., In re Kelly, 841 B.R. 908 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Krohn, 886 F.3rd 123 (6th Cir. 1989) (substantial abuse found where debtors
could pay back their debts with "good, old fashioned belt tightening"). 54. For example, efforts should be made to provide improved credit reporting for people who complete chapter 13 payment plans. In addition, the discharge available in chapter 13 should be as broad as possible in order to serve as incentive to choose that chapter. Costs can be lowered by encouraging secured lenders to accept modifications to their mortgages in exchange for more favorable treatment.