Source: http://openjurist.org/178/f3d/231
Timestamp: 2016-05-04 11:56:33
Document Index: 609828214

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

178 F. 3d 231 - Edwards v. City of Goldsboro HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series178 F.3d
Sergeant Edwards filed his second motion for leave to amend his complaint on October 7, 1997. The purpose of his second amended complaint was to add the additional facts allegedly showing that on August 25, 1997, Chief Hill, City Manager Slozak, and Major Szatkowski denied Sergeant Edwards' renewed application to teach the concealed handgun safety course. The Defendants contend the record clearly reflects two obvious reasons for the denial of Sergeant Edwards' motions to amend--delay and prejudice caused by the delay. With respect to prejudice, the Defendants argue that if the district court allowed the amendments, they would have been required to expend a tremendous amount of time and money through discovery and additional research in order to address Sergeant Edwards' new allegations. The Defendants do not contend Sergeant Edwards made the motions in bad faith or that the amendments would have been futile.
Rule 12(b) provides that "[a] motion making any [Rule 12(b) ]defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). However, Rule 12(h)(2) provides that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as set forth in Rule 12(b)(6) may be raised "by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits." Fed.R.Civ.P.12(h)(2); see 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 at 514-15 (2d ed.1990). Therefore, as a matter of motions practice, the Defendants' motion should be viewed as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings raising the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 182 (7th Cir.1986). However, viewing the Defendants' motion as a Rule 12(c) motion does not have a practical effect upon our review, because we review the district court's dismissal de novo and in doing so apply the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Frey v. Bank One, 91 F.3d 45, 46 (7th Cir.1996); Turbe v. Government of V.I., 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir.1991); Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11 (6th Cir.1987); Republic Steel Corp., 785 F.2d at 182; 5A Wright & Miller, supra, § 1367 at 515.
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint; "importantly, [a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4thCir.1992). Accordingly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should only be granted if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. See id. Furthermore, when as here, a Rule 12(b)(6)motion is testing the sufficiency of a civil rights complaint, "we must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged" and "must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged." Harrison v. United States Postal Serv., 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). We do note, however, that for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), we are not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint. See District 28, United Mine Workers of Am., Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083,1085 (4th Cir.1979).
Under Monell, municipalities are not liable pursuant to respondeat superior principles for all constitutional violations of their employees simply because of the employment relationship. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-94. Instead, municipal liability results only "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its law makers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury...." Id. at 694. While municipal policy is most easily found in municipal ordinances, "it may also be found in formal or informal ad hoc 'policy' choices or decisions of municipal officials authorized to make and implement municipal policy." Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir.1987); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) ("[M]unicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policy makers under appropriate circumstances.").9
"[A] § 1983 plaintiff seeking to impose municipal liability must satisfy only the usual requirements of notice pleading specified by the Federal Rules." Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir.1994). Thus, Sergeant Edwards was required under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 8(a)(2) to provide nothing more than a short and plain statement of his claims giving the City fair notice of what his claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See id. He is not required under Rule 8(a)(2) to "detail the facts underlying his claims," or "plead the multiple incidents of constitutional violations that may be necessary at later stages to establish the existence of an official policy or custom and causation." Jordan, 15 F.3d at 339.
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const.Amend.. I.10 While a public employee does not have a constitutional right to his job, a public employer "cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). It follows, therefore, that a public employer is prohibited from discharging or taking other adverse action against one of its employees on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987); see also id. at 384 ("Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees' speech."). Furthermore, of relevance in the present appeal, a public employer is prohibited from threatening to discharge a public employee in an effort to chill that employee's rights under the First Amendment. See id. at 384 (" '[T]he threat of dismissal from public employment is ... a potent means of inhibiting speech.' ") (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)); Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45.
However, in the public employment context, a public employer "may impose some restraints on job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large." United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),513 U.S. 454, 465, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995). This is because "[a]s an employer, the government is entitled to maintain discipline and ensure harmony as necessary to the operation and mission of its agencies." McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir.1998).
Whether speech involves a matter of public concern is a question of law to be determined de novo. See Arvinger, 862 F.2d at 77. Speech involves a matter of public concern if it affects the social, political, or general well-being of a community. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. "Personal grievances, complaints about conditions of employment, or expressions about other matters of personal interest do not constitute speech about matters of public concern that are protected by the First Amendment...." Stroman, 981 F.2d at 156. We have explained that the answer to the public concern inquiry rests on "whether the public or the community is likely to be truly concerned with or interested in the particular expression, or whether it is more properly viewed as essentially a private matter between employer and employee." Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir.1985)(internal quotation marks omitted). In performing the public concern inquiry, we must examine the content, context, and form of the employees's speech in light of the entire record. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
Here, the speech at issue is on a categorically public issue, the proper method of safely carrying a concealed handgun, knowledge of which is a prerequisite to obtaining a state permit to carry a concealed handgun. Because the speech at issue is on a categorically public issue, it occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (stating that the Supreme "Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection.") (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980)).
We next assess the time, place, and manner of the speech at issue,as well as the context in which the dispute arose. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. In this regard, relevant considerations are "whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise." Id.
Our decision to let Sergeant Edwards' § 1983 claim alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech go forward past the initial pleading stage is fully supported by our Pickering analysis in Berger. In that case, we held on appeal from a bench trial that the Baltimore Police Department could not condition the continued employment of one of its officers upon his cessation of off-duty public entertainment performances in blackface that members of Baltimore's black community found offensive. See Berger, 779 F.2d at 1002. In reaching this holding, we concluded that the police officer's artistic expression constituted a matter of public concern. See id. at 999-1000. On the balancing portion of the Pickering test, we held that the police department's perceived threat of disruption to its external operations and relationships by threatened reaction to the artistic expression by offended members of the public could not serve as justification for disciplinary action directed at that artistic expression. See id. at 1001. The present case is analogous to Berger in two critical respects. First, in both cases the speech and/or expressive conduct was performed off-duty by a police officer at a location unconnected to the police department. Second, in neither case was there any indicia of disruption or likely disruption of the internal operations of the police department.
Sergeant Edwards' freedom of association claim parallels his free speech claim. Indeed, we have recognized "[t]he right to associate in order to express one's views is 'inseparable' from the right to speak freely" Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1331 (4th Cir.1996) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945)). As the Supreme Court explained in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462(1984):
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const.Amend. XIV. In part, Sergeant Edwards' equal protection claim is best characterized as a mere rewording of his First Amendment retaliation claim, which we have already held survives the Defendants' motion to dismiss. "A pure or generic retaliation claim, however, simply does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause." Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344,1354 (11th Cir.1997).
Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages in a § 1983 action "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc ). In analyzing the applicability of a qualified immunity defense, we must first identify the specific right that the plaintiff asserts was infringed by the challenged conduct at a high level of particularity. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987);Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir.1996). We must then consider whether at the time of the claimed violation that right was clearly established. See id. For a right to have been clearly established, "the 'contours of the right' must have been so conclusively drawn as to leave no doubt that the challenged action was unconstitutional." Swanson v. Powers, 937 F.2d 965, 969 (4th Cir.1991) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). In determining whether a right was clearly established at the time of the claimed violation, "courts in this circuit [ordinarily] need not look beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court of appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the case arose...." Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 709 (4th Cir.1998) (en banc ). "[I]f a right is recognized in some other circuit, but not in this one, an official will ordinarily retain the immunity defense." Id. Notably, however, the nonexistence of a case holding the defendant's identical conduct to be unlawful does not prevent the denial of qualified immunity. See id. at 708. In analyzing the applicability of the qualified immunity defense, we lastly consider whether a reasonable person in the official's position would have known that his conduct would violate that right. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639;Taylor, 81 F.3d at 433.
The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well regulated Militia,being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend.II. The district court properly dismissed Sergeant Edwards' claim that the Defendants violated the Second Amendment by denying him per-mission to teach the concealed handgun safety course while he was off-duty and by punishing him for doing so without permission, because the law is settled in our circuit that the Second Amendment does not apply to the States. See Love v. Pepersack, Sr., 47 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir.1995) (holding that Second Amendment does not apply to the States, and therefore affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim against State of Maryland and several Maryland state police officers, alleging that such parties violated her Second Amendment right to "keep and bear" a handgun by denying her a permit to carry a handgun).
In presenting the facts, we accept all well-pleaded allegations in Sergeant Edwards' complaint as true and draw all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in his favor. See infra Part IV
Hereinafter, we will refer to this course as the concealed handgun safety course
The City delegated authority to Chief Hill and City Manager Slozak to formulate, develop and administer final official employment and personnel policies and practices of the City
Chief Hill believed the North Carolina Concealed Handgun Statute was a " 'bad law.' " (J.A. 108). Indeed, Chief Hill had personally lobbied against the statute prior to its enactment
With respect to these § 1983 claims, Sergeant Edwards sued Chief Hill and City Manager Slozak in their individual as well as their official capacities
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(A) requires that the argument section of an appellant's opening brief must contain the "appellant's contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies...." Id. Failure to comply with the specific dictates of this rule with respect to a particular claim triggers abandonment of that claim on appeal. See 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 58 F.3d 988, 993 n. 7(4th Cir.1995) (en banc ) (involving predecessor to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(A))
Given our reversal of the district court's denial of Sergeant Edwards' motions to amend his complaint, from now on we will consider Sergeant Edwards' second amended complaint as the complaint dismissed by the district court
Sergeant Edwards' claims against Chief Hill and City Manager Slozak must be treated as claims against the City. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ("Official-capacity suits ... generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent ....") (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, for purposes of this issue, we only refer to the City as the defendant
Pembaur concerned a decision by a county prosecutor, acting as the county's final decision maker to direct county deputies to forcibly enter the petitioner's place of business to serve capiases upon third parties. See 475 U.S. at 485. The Supreme Court held that the county could be liable under § 1983, holding that a final decision maker's adoption of a course of action "tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations" may, in some circumstances, give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481; see also Board of County Com'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405-06, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)(affirming this reading of Pembaur ). Elaborating, the Court stated:
This prohibition is made applicable to the States and local levels of government by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir.1997) (en banc )
We note that Sergeant Edwards alleges a separate claim that the Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. Sergeant Edwards' substantive due process claim fully overlaps his free speech claim. Because the First Amendment "provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against" the particular sort of government behavior of which he complains in his substantive due process claim, the First Amendment, "not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing" his claim. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Sergeant Edwards' separate substantive due process claim
Sergeant Edwards raises two other claims grounded in procedural due process. First, he argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of his liberty interest in pursuing secondary employment of his own choosing without being afforded procedural due process. Second, Sergeant Edwards argues that the district court erred when it dismissed a similar claim made pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution. We have reviewed these claims and find them to be without merit