Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/94900/ex-parte-public-national-bank
Timestamp: 2018-03-19 03:20:12
Document Index: 761692937

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 266', '§ 266', '§ 266', '§ 266', '§ 266', '§ 266']

Ex Parte Public National Bank - Citation 94900 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Ex Parte Public National Bank - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/94900
Case Number 278 U.S. 101
Appellant Ex Parte Public National Bank
.....s. 104 of a court composed of three judges. the suit here involved the constitutionality of a state statute, but it was not brought to restrain "the action of any officer of such state in the enforcement" thereof. the persons sued are municipal officers, having no state functions to perform, but charged only with the duty of collecting and receiving taxes assessed by other city officials in no respect for the use of the state, but for and in behalf of the city alone. in effect, the contention for petitioner practically comes to this -- that the general purpose of § 266 being to safeguard state legislation assailed as unconstitutional from the improvident action of federal counts, the words, "by restraining the action of any officer of such state in the enforcement . . . of such.....
Ex Parte Public National Bank - 278 U.S. 101 (1928)
U.S. Supreme Court Ex Parte Public National Bank, 278 U.S. 101 (1928)
1. Section 266 of the Judicial Code, which provides that no injunction restraining the enforcement of any statute of a state by restraining the action "of any officer of such state" in the enforcement of such statute shall be granted upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute, except upon a hearing and determination by a court composed of three judges, does not apply where the action sought to be enjoined is that of a municipal officer in performance of local, as distinguished from state, functions. P. 278 U. S. 103 .
2. A case has not the force of a precedent on a question which, though existent in the record, was not raised or considered by the court. P. 278 U. S. 105 .
The statutory court held that § 266 did not apply, because neither of the defendants was an officer of the state and the suit involved only the action of city officials in the collection of taxes for the use of the city. In support of this ruling, Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565 , was relied upon. In that case, suit was brought to enjoin proceedings under a resolution of the city of Phoenix, Arizona, directing the paving of a street upon which petitioner was an abutting owner. The improvement was to be made pursuant to general statutes of the state, which were assailed as contravening the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Judge denied a request to call two judges to sit with him, upon the ground that the case did not come within § 266. This Court sustained the action of the District Judge, and held that the section did not apply, although the constitutionality of a statute was challenged, because the defendants were local officers and the suit concerned matters of interest only to the particular municipality involved. We need add little to what we there said.
Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112 , 101 U. S. 115 . We are unable to perceive any ground for departing from the rule in the case before us. It follows that, giving effect to the phrase in question, § 266 requires the concurrence of two things in order to give the three-judge court jurisdiction: (1) the suit must seek to have a state statute declared unconstitutional, or that, in effect, and (2) it must seek to restrain the action of an officer of the state in the enforcement of such statute. See Henrietta Mills Co. v. Rutherford County, 26 F.2d 799, 800; Connor v. Board of Comm'rs of Logan County,
Our attention is directed to several cases disposed of under § 266, where this Court passed on the merits although the suits were against local officers. We do not stop to inquire whether, at least in some of these cases, the so-called local officers in fact represented the state or exercised state functions in the matters involved and properly might be held to come within the provision of § 266 now under review. Compare, for example, People ex rel. Plancon v. Prendergast, 219 N.Y. 252, 258; State ex rel. Lopas v. Shagren, 91 Wash. 48, 52; Griffin v. Rhoton, 85 Ark. 89, 93, 94; Fellows v. Mayor, 8 Hun (N.Y.) 484, 485, 488; Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Lamb & Tyner, 28 Okl. 275. It is enough to say, as was said in the Collins case, that the propriety of the hearing before three judges was not considered in the cases to which we are referred, and they cannot be regarded as having decided the question. Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507 , 266 U. S. 511 ; United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9 , 271 U. S. 14 .