Source: http://openjurist.org/324/f3d/190
Timestamp: 2016-02-12 14:26:21
Document Index: 327539806

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 1114', '§ 1125', '§ 1124', '§ 1331', '§ 1291']

324 F3d 190 Southco Inc v. Kanebridge Corporation | OpenJurist
324 F. 3d 190 - Southco Inc v. Kanebridge Corporation HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series324 F.3d
324 F3d 190 Southco Inc v. Kanebridge Corporation 324 F.3d 190
SOUTHCO, INC., Appellantv.KANEBRIDGE CORPORATION.
Rehearing Granted April 5, 2003.
James C. McConnon (Argued), Alex R. Sluzas, Paul & Paul, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
Stanley H. Cohen, Caesar, Rivise, Bernstein, Cohen & Pokotilow, Philadelphia, PA, Steven B. Pokotilow (Argued), Stroock, Stroock & Lavan, New York, NY, for Appellee.
On August 27, 1999, Southco filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and common law trademark infringement and trademark dilution in violation of 54 Pa.C.S.A. § 1124. The parties agreed to a temporary restraining order. They also agreed to enter a preliminary injunction on consent but were unable to agree on the scope of the injunction. Southco then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction based on its copyright cause of action. Following a one day hearing, the District Court granted the motion and enjoined Kanebridge from infringing Southco's copyright. Kanebridge appealed. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir.2001) ("Southco I").
The Southco I panel held that Southco had no likelihood of success on the merits because its product numbers failed to satisfy the originality requirement. Id. at 151. In reaching this conclusion, the panel distinguished between the numbering system and the actual part numbers. The panel found that, while Southco exercised creativity and choice in developing the numbering system, it did not claim that Kanebridge improperly used the numbering system and the "part numbers are completely devoid of originality and instead result from the mechanical application of the numbering system." Id. at 152. Consequently, the Southco I panel reversed the order of the District Court granting Southco's motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 156.
Turning to Group B, Bisbing stated that he used the first digit to designate whether the part was an assembly, subassembly, or a component because, due to the large number of values that the part numbers would have to express, he would need the second digit for other values. He assigned 1 to indicate assemblies with flare-in ferrules and 6 to indicate assemblies with press-in ferrules.2 Bisbing decided to use the second digit in Group B to indicate how far the screw projected beyond the outer panel surface. Bisbing then assigned the first digit in Group C to indicate thread size, and the second and third digit in Group C to designate the range of panel thickness to which the ferrule was adapted.3 Finally, for Group D, naturally finished aluminum was originally the only material or finish available. Thus, all enclosed retractable captive screws were assigned the number 10. However, Bisbing added other numbers as other finishes and materials became available. Bisbing concludes that he created these digits of the new product number "in accordance with the then existing Southco part numbering procedure," and that:
Despite the Bisbing declaration, the District Court granted Kanebridge's motion for summary judgment, rejecting Southco's argument that this new evidence, not before the Southco I panel, established the originality of the part numbers and their protectability. At argument on the motion for summary judgment, the District Judge expressed her strong disagreement with our ruling in Southco I. She went on to explain, however, that she was ruling against Southco on remand because the Southco I panel's ruling was "a decision on a matter of law." She concluded:
In the Order, granting summary judgment to Kanebridge, the court held that Southco's "argument ignores the plain mandate of the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff's submission does not provide evidence of additional creativity that would satisfy that court." The District Court entered final judgment on December 27, 2001.4 Plaintiff timely appealed.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as it constitutes a civil action arising under the laws of the United States. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We conclude that the District Court erred when it concluded that the Southco I panel's decision precluded the District Court from considering the Bisbing declaration. Under the law of the case doctrine, "one panel of an appellate court generally will not reconsider questions that another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case. The doctrine is designed to protect traditional ideals such as finality, judicial economy and jurisprudential integrity." In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717-18 (3d Cir.1998). The law of the case doctrine precludes review of only those legal issues that the prior panel actually decided, either expressly or by implication, so it does not apply to dictum. See id. at 718. Further, the doctrine does not restrict a court's power, but rather governs its exercise of discretion. See id. Therefore, the doctrine does not preclude reconsideration of previously decided issues in "extraordinary circumstances," such as where (1) new evidence is available; (2) a supervening new law has been announced; or (3) the earlier decision was clearly erroneous and would create manifest injustice. Id.
However, "while the law of the case doctrine bars courts from reconsidering matters actually decided, it does not prohibit courts from revisiting matters that are avowedly preliminary or tentative." Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir.1999) (quotation omitted). Preliminary injunctions are, by their nature, tentative and impermanent. See R.R. Yardmasters of Am. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 224 F.2d 226, 229 (3d Cir.1955). As the Supreme Court notes:
In this case, because the only issue before the panel in Southco I was whether Southco was entitled to a preliminary injunction, the District Court erred in concluding that it was bound by Southco I to grant Kanebridge's motion for summary judgment. While the Southco I panel reviewed the likelihood of success on the merits of the "originality" claim, the panel did not address the distinct issue of whether Southco is actually entitled to succeed on the merits of the claim. In both Council of Alternative Political Parties and ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 (3d Cir.1996) (en banc), a District Court denied a preliminary injunction, and we reversed, ordering that the District Court enter a preliminary injunction. As in the present case, the District Court in both Council of Alternative Political Parties and ACLU of New Jersey entered summary judgment on the merits on remand, finding that it was bound by our decision on preliminary relief. However, as we stated in ACLU of New Jersey:
The district court erred in concluding that it was so bound. The [prior] panel assessed the merits ... under the standard for the granting of a preliminary injunction - a standard which differs from the standard for granting a permanent injunction. Its decision to grant a preliminary injunction was based on an assessment of the likelihood that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits, and neither constitutes nor substitutes for an actual finding that plaintiffs have succeeded on the merits and are entitled to permanent relief.
The argument that an appellate decision regarding preliminary relief does not compel summary judgment on the merits is stronger in the present case than it was in ACLU of New Jersey. In ACLU of New Jersey, after we ordered the District Court to issue a preliminary injunction, the District Court entered a preliminary and a permanent injunction, finding that "[a]dditional hearings or new evidence might have put a different cast on the issues, but as the record has not been augmented since the motion for a preliminary injunction, we feel constrained to enter a final judgment in accordance with the Third Circuit's order...." 84 F.3d at 1476. On the other hand, in the present case, Southco augmented the record on remand with additional evidence, namely the Bisbing declaration. This declaration raises a genuine issue of material fact that assigning product numbers to the enclosed retractable captive screw involved creativity and choice about how the fastener should be characterized, and thus that the product numbers are not mechanically derived from the numbering system. See Southco I, 258 F.3d at 156.
Q. Now, when a new Captive screw is created by Southco, is it assigned an arbitrary, random part number?
A. No, not at all. The — the scheme — this coding scheme is utilized and, possibly, expanded, but the same basic system is applied to new products.
Captive screws are used to fasten panels together, as for instance in computers and telecommunications equipment. A captive screw consists of a screw, a ferrule, and a knob. The screw is mounted in one panel by means of the ferrule and the other panel contains an internally threaded insert that receives the screwSee Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 149 and fn. 1 (3d Cir.2001) ("Southco I").
Bisbing assigned several other numbers for internal manufacturing operations. Thus, 2 indicates a ferrule, 3 indicates a spring, 4 indicates a knob, and 5 indicates a screw
Only flared-in ferrules require this set of numbers. Thus, for press-in ferrules, where the first digit of group B is 6, the second and third digits of Group C are 01
The non-copyright claims were dismissed by stipulation of the parties