Source: https://casetext.com/case/state-v-brandt-9
Timestamp: 2020-05-27 22:46:10
Document Index: 292642745

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 741', '§ 795', '§ 795', '§ 402', '§ 975', '§ 273', '§ 973', '§ 769']

State v. Brandt, 253 N.W.2d 253 | Casetext Search + Citator
In such cases criminal rule 25(2)(a) authorizes the court to proceed with the trial during the defendant's…
State v. Hoegh
See Seaton v. Polk County, 59 Iowa 626, 628, 13 N.W. 725, 726 (1882) (no inherent power to appoint…
Full title:STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Doug BRANDT, Appellee
253 N.W.2d 253 (Iowa 1977)
In State v. Brandt, 253 N.W.2d 253 (Iowa 1977), we recognized that a defendant could not bootstrap a right to be absent from his trial from a statute which merely gave the trial court the discretion to try him in absentia.
Summary of this case from State v. Randle
APPEAL FROM EMMET DISTRICT COURT, CAMERON B. ARNOLD, JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., William F. Raisch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
The county attorney asserted a conflict of interest because he represented defendant and members of his immediate family in certain civil matters. The district court appointed William F. Raisch, an assistant attorney general, as special assistant county attorney. The latter filed three county attorney informations, each based on acceptance of one of the above-alleged gifts on a different date, and each asserting a violation of § 741.1, The Code, 1973 (accepting gifts, bonuses or gratuities).
I. There is no dispute defendant was not brought to trial within the § 795.2 60-day period, or that the burden is on the State to show good cause for delay. State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1975). It might be argued the inexplicable malfunction in the clerk's office which resulted in the warrants not issuing constitutes good cause. State v. LaPlant, 244 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 1976) ("But good cause may be shown by the State without establishing fault on the part of defendant or his counsel").
"Section 775.2 of the Code allows the defendant to appear at his arraignment by an attorney. Section 777.19 of the code provides that a defendant may be tried in his absence, again, if he appears by an attorney. The Court concludes that the absence of the Defendant as set forth in the Affidavits of the State and the inability of law enforcement officers to locate him does not preclude his arraignment and trial since the State's prosecuting attorney was aware that the Defendant had an attorney in Estherville available to appear on his behalf during the period from April 28, 1975, to June 27, 1975.
The Defendant's absence, however, in these misdemeanor proceedings does not have the result of prohibiting the arraignment or trial of the Defendant from being held when the State knows the identity of the Defendant's attorney. If Mr. Fitzgibbons had been notified of the June 24 Order, the burden would have been upon him to either appear for the Defendant or request additional time. He was not, however, so notified."
Mr. Raisch, the assistant county attorney, on the witness stand being examined by Mr. Fitzgibbons, testified the magistrate had informed him by telephone "That the basis of his conversations with you [defense counsel] was that you would not represent — you did not represent, formally represent Mr. Brandt until he had been formally arraigned — or arrested."
The magistrate's recollection of his conversation with defense counsel, dictated into the record, is illuminating. Having been advised by Mr. Raisch that Mr. Fitzgibbons was defendant's lawyer, the magistrate placed a call to the latter on November 22, 1975, apparently to discuss the future proceedings. He recollected "Mr. Fitzgibbons advised me that Mr. Brandt had been in to see him about the matter some time ago, I gathered in May or something of that sort, and that at that point no retainer had been paid. He further advised me Mr. Brandt had not been arrested or had not been ordered in for arraignment." In a later telephone conversation with Raisch "I recited briefly the substance of my telephone call to Mr. Fitzgibbons." There is no intimation in the magistrate's colloquy that defense counsel was then purporting to represent defendant or that he had any authority or inclination to proceed with arraignment or trial or appear for defendant prior to defendant's arrest.
"A. * * * [Y]ou shook my hand, introduced yourself and said you did represent Mr. Brant [sic] and said there would be no trouble bringing him in for arraignment.
Q. [By Mr. Fitzgibbons] Mr. Raisch, I will go on record under oath or any way and say that I don't remember that conversation. A. If you are going to make that statement, I wish you would go under oath.
Q. I will be under oath, and I don't remember making that statement. I don't even remember being — A. Are you under oath?
Q. At the appropriate time I will be, but in the meantime I am cross-examining you."
"Q. Would you relate to the Court, the best you can remember, that conversation, Mr. Raisch, as completely and clearly as you can? A. Yes, I will. I began by stating that there has been no warrants issued for the arrest of Doug Brandt, that no arraignment had been had at that time, that I was there to ask the cooperation of you and your office.
Q. What do you mean by `cooperation'? A. That you would voluntarily bring your client in for arraignment, that I had arranged for a judicial magistrate to be present for an arraignment.
Q. When? A. That afternoon, if it was okay with you, and that I would call and confirm the time.
Q. What else did you say? A. Well, you accused me of ordering you into court, in for arraignment, which I denied numerous times to you.
Q. Didn't I ask you, `are you ordering me?' Wasn't that the way the question was phrased? A. No. Exactly what you said: `I am not going into court because the Attorney General orders me into court. I have lots of friends in Des Moines.'
Q. Oh? A. That's exactly what you said. I said, `I am not ordering you into court, I am asking for your cooperation and I would like to have you bring your client in voluntarily.
Q. What else did you say? A. Then you said basically there was no way you would do it that day. I said, `what about tomorrow?' You said, `well, we will have to talk about that tomorrow' and I said, `then you leave me no alternative, then, I will have to have warrants issued for Mr. Brandt's arrest and have him arrested,' and I said as I left, `I am glad we have reached an understanding.'
Q. And I am sure you got the impression that it might be difficult to get a jury in that following week, it was too late to work in the regular court schedule? A. I didn't through you, but I had no reason — it didn't leave an impression with me. The impression that was left with me, was that you believed such. I had no doubt in my mind that we could get a trial set.
Q. In other words, you weren't impressed by what I said? A. No, I was not.
Q. Next time I will make it stronger. * * *"
It is overwhelmingly apparent in the record Mr. Fitzgibbons was representing this defendant, as the magistrate found. He was representing him very well (although not in court) and he never entered a court appearance in these cases until after the 60-day period had expired. In view of the short interval prior to the § 795.2 deadline, he was understandably doing everything possible to avoid a court appearance. Absent an arrest, surrender, or a written appearance by counsel, it is also obvious trial court had no actual or constructive jurisdiction over the defendant. See State v. Kostura, 98 Ariz. 186, 188-189, 403 P.2d 283, 285 (1965); Tischhauser v. Jarvis, 95 Cal.App. 524, 273 P. 66 (1929).
(e) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant. A defendant should be considered absent whenever his whereabouts are unknown and in addition he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence."
See also United States v. Cartano, 420 F.2d 362 (1 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1054, 90 S.Ct. 1398, 25 L.Ed.2d 671 (1970); People v. Cronin, 9 Misc.2d 173, 169 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1957); 3 Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 402, at 145 (12th ed. 1975).
"So I think the question then becomes for the court — if you will look at the brief we have filed — I think the court would have no right to even command Mr. Brandt to appear for an arraignment in a misdemeanor, if there are attorneys who are ready and willing and able to appear for him.
Now if the defendant being charged with a misdemeanor does not have to appear at his own arraignment and his own trial, then what kind of absence could the State show for good cause? He could not show the absence of the defendant himself."
It should first be noted we are not concerned with a simple misdemeanor. The offense charged here is a white-collar crime which upon conviction could result in a year's imprisonment in the county jail. It is obvious such an imprisonment, imposed without defendant ever having been before the court, would pose grave constitutional issues. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); cf. State v. Hendricks, 240 N.W.2d 640 (Iowa 1976); State v. Welfort, 238 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 1976); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 975, at 903 (1961) ("it has also been held that where the offense is punishable by imprisonment waiver [of right to be present at trial] must be by accused personally.").
The basic flaw in defendant's reasoning is his attempt to bootstrap statutes which at the most give a trial court discretion to determine whether to proceed in absence of the accused into a statutory right not to be present in court when charged with an indictable misdemeanor. Defendant cites no authorities to support his theory. There are many decisions interpreting such statutes as not granting defendant a right to be absent. Many are collected and discussed in State v. Super, 281 Minn. 451, 161 N.W.2d 832. See United States v. Shelton, 6 F.2d 897 (E.D.La. 1925); Souther v. Reid, 101 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.Va. 1951); Warren v. State, 19 Ark. 214, 217-218 (1857); Barnett v. Russell, 299 Ky. 242, 185 S.W.2d 261 (1945); Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 638 (1959); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 273, at 308 ("But even where his [defendant's] right to be present can be waived, this does not amount to a right to be absent, since the prosecution has a right to require his presence for purposes of identification by its witnesses and of receiving punishment if found guilty."); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 973, at 889 ("A statute conferring authority on the court to try a misdemeanor charge in the absence of accused merely accords a privilege to the court and does not give accused a right to be absent.").
We hold trial court abused its limited discretion in finding the State did not meet its burden to show good cause for delay in this case. See State v. Albertsen, supra, 228 N.W.2d at 98.
"Two ready answers appear to the argument that the amended information was void because it was not approved and signed by the trial court. First, the question was not raised by a motion to set aside the information as required by Code Section 769.16 [now § 769.17], paragraph 5, I.C.A. A demurrer was filed, but it does not raise the point, nor was it the proper procedure in any event."
In reversing the trial court on this issue the majority states its conclusion in this fashion: "We hold trial court abused its limited discretion in finding the State did not meet its burden to show good cause for delay in this case. See State v. Albertsen, 228 N.W.2d [94] at 98 [(Iowa 1975)]."
When the motion to dismiss for want of speedy trial is grounded upon the constitutional guarantees provided in Amendments 6 and 14 of the federal constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, the four-factor balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, is involved. State v. Lee, 222 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 1974); Boyle v. Critelli, 230 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Iowa 1975). In Barker the Court held that a balancing test should be applied to each case, with consideration given the following factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial; (4) prejudice to him. State v. Steadham, 231 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1975).
"* * * Every limitation statute sets up an arbitrary date after which certain actions cannot be brought or certain rights cannot be enforced. One cannot escape the effect of such statutes by showing they were violated only a little bit." State v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 1974). See also State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Iowa 1975) and State v. Sassman, 226 N.W.2d at 809.
It is not necessary to reach the problem presented by section 777.19 which deals with a defendant's presence during trial. Cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the problem of defendant's presence at trial do not touch the problem presented by section 775.2 and are of no help in resolving the problem arising at the arraignment stage. See Barnett v. Russell, 299 Ky. 242, 185 S.W.2d 261; State v. Super, 281 Minn. 451, 161 N.W.2d 832; State v. Vincent, 222 N.C. 543, 23 S.E.2d 832, 833; People v. Winship, 309 N.Y. 311, 130 N.E.2d 634, 635; Souther v. Reid, 101 F. Supp. 806, 807 (E.D.Va. 1951).
This court has announced that the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss does not rest in the discretion of the trial court; it must be determined upon legal grounds and is subject to review by this court. See Newton v. City of Grundy Center, 246 Iowa 916, 919, 70 N.W.2d 162, 163-164; Ambrose v. Harrison Mutual Insurance Association, 206 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 1973); and Symmonds v. Chicago, M., St. P. P.R. Co., 242 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Iowa 1976).
interpreting Iowa Code section 336.3, the predecessor to section 331.754
Summary of this case from Polk County Conference Bd. v. Sarcone