Source: https://sccourts.org/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3246
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 13:29:23
Document Index: 405927392

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1817', '§ 18', '§ 1', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 15', '§ 8']

3246 - Hadfield v. Gilchrist
Mark Hadfield, Respondent,
Sam Gilchrist, d/b/a Gilchrist's Service Center, and d/b/a Gilchrist Towing Company,
Heard September 12, 2000 - Filed October 2, 2000
ANDERSON, J.: Mark Hadfield filed this action against Sam Gilchrist, d/b/a Gilchrist's Service Center, and d/b/a Gilchrist Towing Company (Gilchrist) for damages sustained by Hadfield's vehicle while impounded on Gilchrist's lot. The magistrate awarded Hadfield $4,035.00. The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the magistrate. Gilchrist appeals. We affirm.
Hadfield, a medical student at MUSC, went to retrieve his 1988 Lincoln Continental from the parking spot where his wife parked the vehicle.(1) The parking spot, located near MUSC, was on private property owned by Allen Saffer. Hadfield's wife parked the vehicle on Saffer's property without Saffer's permission. The vehicle was not in the parking spot when Hadfield arrived as Saffer had called Gilchrist to have the vehicle removed.
In Burns v. Wannamaker, 281 S.C. 352, 315 S.E.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1984), this Court amplified:
As is readily apparent, Section 18-7-170 confers authority upon the Circuit Court to reverse a magistrate's findings of fact when exercising appellate jurisdiction in an appeal from a magistrate's judgment. See Dingle v. Northwestern R. Co., 112 S.C. 390, 99 S.E. 828 (1919); Redfearn v. Douglass, 35 S.C. 569, 15 S.E. 244 (1892); cf. Vacation Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc. v. Kiwi Corp., [280 S.C. 232], 312 S.E.2d 20 (Ct. App. 1984)(where the Circuit Court reversed a magistrate's findings of fact in an ejectment action).
[T]he Court of Appeals will presume that an affirmance by a Circuit Court of a magistrate's judgment was made upon the merits where the testimony is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the magistrate and there are no facts that show the affirmance was influenced by an error of law [Bagnal v. Southern Express Co., 106 S.C. 395, 400, 91 S.E. 334, 335-36 (1917); Stanford v. Cudd, 93 S.C. 367, 369-70, 76 S.E. 986, 986-87 (1913); see 5B C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1817 at 152-53 (1958) ] . . . .
Burns, 281 S.C. at 357, 315 S.E.2d at 182. Our Supreme Court, in Stanford v. Cudd, 93 S.C. 367, 76 S.E. 986 (1913), held that where the testimony is sufficient to sustain a judgment of the magistrate's court, and it is affirmed on appeal to the Circuit Court, this Court will assume the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment on the merits, in the absence of facts showing the affirmance was controlled or affected by errors of law. The Court enunciated:
The rule is articulated in Price v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 93 S.C. 576, 77 S.E. 703 (1913):
As the circuit court is required to give judgment, in such cases, according to the justice of the case, without regard to technical errors and defects, which do not affect the merits [S. C. Code Ann. § 18-7-170], and as the record does not disclose the grounds upon which the court rendered its judgment, we must assume that it was rested upon some sound and meritorious ground, and sustain it, if the record discloses any such ground.
Price, 93 S.C. at 578, 77 S.E. at 703.
Did the Circuit Court err in applying the law of bailments?
Did the Circuit Court err in finding Gilchrist was responsible for damages?
A bailment is created by the delivery of personal property by one person to another in trust for a specific purpose, pursuant to an express or implied contract to fulfill that trust. 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 1 (1997). See Home Indem. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 452, 460, 166 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1969)("Bailment has been defined as the delivery of a chattel for some express or particular purpose upon a contract, express or implied, that, after the purpose has been fulfilled, then the chattel shall be redelivered to the bailor, or otherwise dealt with according to his directions.").
"A gratuitous bailment is, by definition, one in which the transfer of possession or use of the bailed property is without compensation." 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 8 (1997). For instance, a gratuitous bailment arises if the bailment is undertaken as a personal favor or is involuntary. See United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1996)(gratuitous bailment arises if bailment is undertaken either involuntarily or as a personal favor). See also McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 188 S.C. 358, 199 S.E. 413 (1938)(finding that although the type of bailment created, where purchaser of new tires left old tires at vendor's place of business for between five and seven months after purchase, may have started as a bailment for mutual benefit, it ripened after time into a gratuitous bailment, solely for the benefit of the bailor); Clott v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 180 S.E.2d 102 (N.C. 1971)(gratuitous bailment effected where baggage came into hands of carrier through accident or mistake).
A gratuitous bailee acts without expectation of reward or compensation. See McLaughlin, supra. To show the bailment was for the sole benefit of the bailor, the bailee must establish that it was not expecting compensation. The Court, in Brunson & Boatwright v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 76 S.C. 9, 56 S.E. 538 (1907), illuminated:
The fact that it has the right as a warehouseman to collect storage charges makes it a bailee for hire and prevents it from claiming that it was merely a gratuitous bailee, at least before it gives notice that it will not insist upon such charges, and will not longer hold possession of the property as a warehouseman, which the testimony does not show was done in this case. Therefore the defendant was not a gratuitous bailee . . . .
By contrast, a bailment for the mutual benefit of the parties arises when one party takes the personal property of another into his or her care or custody in exchange for payment or other benefit. 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 9 (1997). See Gilland v. Peter's Dry Cleaning Co., 195 S.C. 417, 11 S.E.2d 857 (1940)(finding a bailment for mutual benefit of the parties where plaintiff delivered a dinner coat to a cleaning company for cleaning and pressing, and company was to be paid a consideration for its services).
Although a bailment is ordinarily created by the agreement of the parties, the agreement of the parties may be implied or constructive, and the bailment may arise by operation of law. 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 15 (1988). Such a constructive bailment arises when one person has lawfully acquired possession of another's personal property, other than by virtue of a bailment contract, and holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes on the recipient of the property the obligation to keep it safely and redeliver it to the owner. Id. See also American Ambassador Cas. Co. v. City of Chicago, 563 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 328 (Ill. 1991)(police department was constructive bailee of automobile it impounded at time of driver's arrest and thus had duty to keep automobile safely and deliver it to its owner). A constructive bailment may occur even in the absence of the voluntary delivery and acceptance of the property which is usually necessary to create a bailment relationship.
Any abandoned motor vehicle may be removed to a storage area for safekeeping by or at the direction of the Police Department or such other person charged with enforcing the provisions hereof.
The owner of any removed vehicle, before obtaining possession thereof, shall pay to the city or, as appropriate, its agent storing said vehicle, all reasonable costs incidental to the removal and storage (of the vehicle) and locating of the owner.
Should such owner fail or refuse to pay the cost, or should the owner's identity or whereabouts be unknown and unascertainable after a diligent search and after notice as herein prescribed, the stored vehicle may be sold after twenty (20) days notice has been given to the department of motor vehicles before the date of sale, and after the vehicle has been held for not less than thirty (30) days.
Although contractual in nature, and involving the conveyance of personal property, an action for breach of the duty of care by a bailor sounds in tort. See Kurt Philip Autor, Note, Bailment Liability: Toward a Standard of Reasonable Care, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2117, 2124 (Sept. 1988)("Perhaps the most fundamental variance in bailment classification results from the different theories upon which an action in bailment might rest. Confusion is understandable considering the traditional adage that a bailment arises in contract, involves the conveyance of personal property, and is actionable sounding in tort."); Samuel Williston, Williston on Contracts § 8:1, at 12, 17 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1992)(bailment transaction is regarded as contractual but "it would perhaps have been better to treat these cases as falling within the domain of tort . . . . [T]he true nature of the liability is not contractual at all, for if it were, the only question would be what the defendant promised"; instead, bailee for mutual benefit is liable for ordinary negligence). Concomitantly, after finding a bailment for mutual benefit exists in this case, we must determine whether Hadfield is entitled to damages, relying on the application of tort principles rather than contract principles.
The degree of care required of a bailee for mutual benefit is defined as ordinary care, or due care, or the degree of care which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care in the protection of his own property. See Harris v. Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 199 S.E.2d 65 (1973)(bailment contract imposes upon bailee duty of care, breach of which constitutes a tort); Shoreland Freezers, Inc. v. Textile Ice & Fuel Co., 241 S.C. 537, 129 S.E.2d 424 (1963)(finding when food processor delivered goods to warehouse for storage, relationship of bailor and bailee arose for their mutual benefit and, although warehouse owner was not insurer of property left in its custody, it was required to exercise ordinary care, or degree of care which would be exercised by person of ordinary care and prudence in protection of his own property).
In a bailment action alleging a breach of the duty of care, the bailor is entitled to be compensated for all losses that are the natural consequence and proximate result of the bailee's negligence. Dixon v. Besco Eng'g, Inc., 320 S.C. 174, 463 S.E.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1995). "Damages are proximately caused if they are the foreseeable result of the defendant's tortious act." Id. at 180, 463 S.E.2d at 639 (citing Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978)). Proximate cause is a question for the finder of fact. Id.; Parr v. Gaines, 309 S.C. 477, 424 S.E.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1992). See also Childers v. Gas Lines, Inc., 248 S.C. 316, 149 S.E.2d 761 (1966)(questions of proximate cause are normally within province of jury); Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 477 S.E.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1996) (ordinarily, question of proximate cause is one of fact for jury and trial judge's sole function regarding the issue is to inquire whether particular conclusions are the only reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence). The Supreme Court, in Shoreland Freezers, supra, discussed a bailee's liability under a bailment for mutual benefit:
Under the decided cases in this State, liability of a bailee under a bailment for mutual benefit arises upon a showing that (1) the goods were delivered to the bailee in good condition, (2) they were lost or returned in a damaged condition, and (3) the loss or damage to the goods was due to the failure of the bailee to exercise ordinary care in the safekeeping of the property. The burden of proof in such cases, in the first instance, rests upon the bailor to make out a prima facie case. This has been done when the bailor proves that he delivered the goods to the bailee in good condition and their loss or return in a damaged condition. When the bailor has so proven, the burden is then shifted to the bailee to show that he has used ordinary care in the storage and safekeeping of the property. Fleischman, Morris & Co. v. Southern Railway, 76 S.C. 237, 56 S.E. 974, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 519; Marlow v. Conway Iron Works, 130 S.C. 256, 125 S.E. 569; Gilland v. Peter's Dry Cleaning Co., supra, 195 S.C. 417, 11 S.E.2d 857; Albergotti v. Dixie Produce Co., Inc., 202 S.C. 357, 25 S.E.2d 156; Kelley v. Capital Motors, Inc., supra, 204 S.C. 304, 28 S.E.2d 836; Arkwright Mills v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 217 S.C. 530, 61 S.E.2d 165.
The burden of proof in this case rests first upon the bailor, Hadfield, to prove a prima facie case. He must show: 1) the goods were delivered to the bailee in good condition; and 2) they were lost or returned in a damaged condition. See Shoreland Freezers, Inc. v. Textile Ice & Fuel Co., 241 S.C. 537, 129 S.E.2d 424 (1963). See also Fortner v. Carnes, 258 S.C. 455, 189 S.E.2d 24 (1972)(burden is upon bailee to prove due or ordinary care on his part, to jury's satisfaction, if he is to relieve himself of liability for goods not returned in accordance with bailment contract; whether bailee has exercised due care with regard to stored goods has to be determined with reference to all circumstances of particular case). When the bailor, Hadfield, has so proven, the burden is then shifted to the bailee, Gilchrist, to show that he has used ordinary care in the good's storage and safekeeping. See Shoreland, supra; Marlow v. Conway Iron Works, 130 S.C. 256, 125 S.E. 569 (1924).
In one of our most recent cases on this subject, the rule as to what constitutes a prima facie case is thus stated: "From a study of the decided cases in this State, it would appear that our Court has recognized that certain presumptions may arise in bailment cases, especially as to warehousemen, which overlap and shadow the oft repeated statement found in negligence cases, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not prevail in this State. In other words, in warehouse bailments, when the bailor shows that the bailee has not returned the property, the subject of the bailment, or that the property has been lost by theft or fire, or that it has been returned in a damaged condition, such bailor has made out a prima facie case, and the duty is then shifted to the bailee to show that he has used ordinary care in the storage and safekeeping of the property. From these facts, coupled with any testimony on the subject the bailor may introduce, it is for the jury to say whether the bailee has been negligent, that is failed to use ordinary care. Of course if upon all the testimony in the case the only reasonable inference that can be drawn there from is that the bailee used due care, it would then be the duty of the trial Judge to direct a verdict in the bailee's favor." Albergotti v. Dixie Produce Co., 202 S.C. 357, 25 S.E.2d 156, 158. The case of Fleischman, Morris & Co. v. Southern Railway Co., 76 S.C. 237, 56 S.E. 974, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 519, announces the same doctrine.
Hadfield testified before the magistrate regarding the "nice" condition of the vehicle prior to being towed, and the damage to his vehicle, and the other vehicles on the lot. In addition, he introduced photographs depicting the damage. Thus, Hadfield made out his prima facie case as required under Fortner v. Carnes, 258 S.C. 455, 189 S.E.2d 24 (1972). The burden then shifted to Gilchrist to show that he used ordinary care in protecting the vehicle while in his care.
Gilchrist impounded the cars in a storage lot surrounded by a chain link fence. There was an individual on the clock at all times. The person on duty spent time in the office and only visited the storage lot to check on it. The vandal cut a hole in the fence and broke into six to eight cars on the night in question. The fact the guard was not on duty at the impound lot and, considering the only other security for the vehicles was the chain link fence, the magistrate and Circuit Court judge could have concluded Gilchrist failed to exercise ordinary care. As explicated above, the decision of whether or not Gilchrist used ordinary care is a question of fact. Based on our standard of review, we must affirm the decision of the Circuit Court on the facts if it is supported by any evidence, and this Court finds no error of law. See Wright v. Ritz Theatre Co., 211 S.C. 161, 44 S.E.2d 308 (1947); Dingle v. Northwestern R.R., 112 S.C. 390, 99 S.E. 828 (1919). We find the facts support the finding that Gilchrist breached his duty as a bailee to Hadfield, and the Circuit Court was not controlled by any error of law.
Gilchrist asserts the magistrate and the Circuit Court judge erred in the finding of damages. Yet, Gilchrist's own counsel stated: "And all they have proved is damages. There's no question that the plaintiffs were damaged . . . ." Hadfield proffered the testimony of Rodney Smitz, an assistant manager at Rick Hendrick Collision Center, to explain the damages and the cost to repair the vehicle. Gilchrist's counsel did not cross examine Smitz regarding the estimates. We find no merit in Gilchrist's argument that there was no evidence for the Circuit Court to calculate damages.
1. The magistrate found Hadfield's wife parked the vehicle there earlier that day. Gilchrist presented evidence the vehicle was parked there for several days.