Source: https://m.openjurist.org/90/f3d/1363
Timestamp: 2020-02-16 23:20:24
Document Index: 442263736

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 1956', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500']

90 F3d 1363 United States v. Gonzales | OpenJurist
90 F. 3d 1363 - United States v. Gonzales
90 F3d 1363 United States v. Gonzales
90 F.3d 1363
45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 226
Martha Elena GONZALES, also known as Marta Gonzales, Appellant.
Jose Ramiro VALENZUELA-OBESO, also known as Tony, also known
as Ramiro Valenzuela, Appellant.
Juan Manuel VALENZUELA-OBESO, also known as Kiki, also known
as Miti, Appellant.
Patricia Camerina LOPEZ, Appellant.
Nos. 95-2940, 95-3261, 95-3263, 95-3370.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1996.
Defendants in this case were convicted of various counts of conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs, see 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession, and aiding and abetting possession, of illegal drugs with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and money laundering and conspiracy to launder money, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i). On appeal, they contend that the government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, by failing to turn over to the defense certain evidence. The defendants further challenge a host of evidentiary and other trial rulings made by the district court.1 We affirm.
Under Brady, supra, the government is required to disclose any evidence that is both "favorable to an accused" and is "material either to guilt or to punishment." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. In most circumstances, evidence favorable to the accused is material only " 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)).2 The defendant must demonstrate that he was denied a fair trial, by "showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1566.
Brady applies whether or not the accused has specifically requested the covered information, see Kyles, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1565 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383), and it applies to both exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence, see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3380. In analyzing a Brady claim, we do not consider the suppressed evidence item-by-item, but rather we must determine whether the suppressed evidence, viewed collectively, undermines confidence in the verdict. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1567.
There are several limitations to Brady. First, Brady does not require the government to disclose inculpatory evidence. See United States v. Roach, 28 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir.1994) (requested information must be exculpatory); United States v. Carper, 942 F.2d 1298, 1300 n. 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 993, 112 S.Ct. 614, 116 L.Ed.2d 636 (1991). Second, in this Circuit, the rule of Brady is limited only to the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense. See United States v. Manthei, 979 F.2d 124, 127 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting Nassar v. Sissel, 792 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir.1986)). Where the prosecution delays disclosure of evidence, but the evidence is nonetheless disclosed during trial, Brady is not violated. See United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 276 n. 6 (8th Cir.) (quoting Nassar, 792 F.2d at 121), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 888, 114 S.Ct. 241, 126 L.Ed.2d 195 (1993). Finally, the government need not disclose evidence available to the defense from other sources or evidence already possessed by the defendants. See United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1701, 131 L.Ed.2d 563 (1995).
The Jencks Act requires the government to produce any statements made by a government witness that are in the government's possession and relate to the subject matter of the witness's testimony after the witness has testified on direct appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b); Fed.R.Crim.P. 26.2. A witness's statements include all statements written or signed, or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness; verbatim transcriptions of the witness's oral statements; and the witness's grand jury testimony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e); Fed.R.Crim.P. 26.2.
Juan, Jose, and Lopez contend that the government's failure to disclose Bauer's prior oral declarations violated the Jencks Act. We disagree. When Bauer earlier implicated the defendants, he did so orally. He did not "adopt or approve" the declaration, nor was the declaration transcribed. Because oral, untranscribed, nonadopted assertions are not "statements" within the meaning of the Jencks Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e); United States v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832, 839 n. 2 (8th Cir.1979), the nondisclosure of the Bauer declaration did not violate the Jencks Act.4
Jose further contends that the delayed disclosure of the Zasada file violates the Jencks Act. Jose's brief fails, however, to go beyond this cursory and summary assertion. There is no specific assignment of error; indeed, there is no discussion whatsoever of why the delayed disclosure violated the Jencks Act. Rule 28(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant's brief to "contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(6). Failure to abide by this provision on an issue is deemed to be an abandonment of that issue. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740 (8th Cir.1985); see also Primary Care Inv., Seven, Inc. v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 986 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir.1993). Therefore, we do not consider this argument.
A. Western Union Documents
Gonzales and Lopez contend that the MTAs were hearsay and should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed only for abuse of discretion, and "absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, the district court's ruling will be affirmed." United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1498 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1098, 115 S.Ct. 768, 130 L.Ed.2d 664 (1995).
Under Rule 801(d)(2), certain statements are considered to be admissions by the party-opponent and thus do not constitute hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). Such statements include admissions made by the party herself and those made by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See id.
The MTAs can be broken down into two categories: (1) the MTAs for which the government presented handwriting evidence5 identifying the sender, and (2) all the other MTAs. The first category of MTAs presents a straightforward admission by the party-opponent. Because the government established an adequate foundation, see Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(1)-(3), upon which the jury could find that the documents were sent by one of the named defendants in this case, see id., the portion of the MTAs filled out by the defendants constitutes an admission by a party-opponent, and is not hearsay.
Although the government could not positively identify the senders of the MTAs in the second category, we conclude that these MTAs constitute admissions by party-opponents, because they were statements made by coconspirators.6 To take advantage of this provision, the government must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a conspiracy existed, that the defendants and the declarant were members of the conspiracy, and that the declaration was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306, 1312 (8th Cir.1985).7 The government submitted voluminous evidence tying all of these documents, even those sent by unidentified declarants, to the conspiracy, see Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Motion to Exclude Western Union Money Transfer "Send" Documents, reprinted in Appellee's Addendum, Ex. B, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these documents.
A willful blindness instruction "is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance." United States v. Duncan, 29 F.3d 448, 450 (8th Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted). In reviewing the district court's decision to give a willful blindness instruction, "we must review the evidence and any reasonable inference from that evidence in the light most favorable to the government." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The district court's decision to give a willful blindness instruction is reviewed only for clear error. See id.
The defendants' challenge to the district court's refusal to give a particularly-worded "theory of defense" instruction is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lynch, 58 F.3d 389, 391 (8th Cir.1995). A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction only if the instruction contains a correct statement of the law and the evidence supports the instruction. See United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 1304, 1306-07 (8th Cir.1987). In this case, the instruction requested by the defendants, see supra note 8, is not supported by the evidence at trial. The district court did not err in refusing to give this instruction.
Gonzales and Lopez contend that there was insufficient evidence to convict them of conspiracy to launder money. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, "we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept as established all reasonable inferences supporting the verdict." United States v. Barrett, 74 F.3d 167, 168 (8th Cir.1996). We then uphold the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. See id.
Where the prosecution knowingly uses perjured testimony, a standard of materiality more favorable to the accused applies. In such a situation, the conviction must be set aside if "there is any reasonable likelihood" that the false testimony affected the verdict. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at ---- n. 7, 115 S.Ct. at 1565 n. 7 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). In this case, there is no assertion that the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony, and so the "reasonable probability" standard applies
Although identifiability of the declarant would be helpful, it is not required. Where "the statement itself and the surrounding circumstances provide sufficient evidence of reliability, unidentifiability will not be particularly important." United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1081 n. 10 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039, 111 S.Ct. 709, 112 L.Ed.2d 698 (1991). The burden is on the government to prove that "the unknown declarant was more likely than not a coconspirator." United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306, 1313 (8th Cir.1985)