Source: http://openjurist.org/237/f3d/1368/william-allen-v-anthony-j-principi
Timestamp: 2015-07-07 07:06:56
Document Index: 122070634

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1110', '§ 8052', '§ 1110', '§ 1110', '§ 1110', '§ 1110', '§ 1110', '§ 3510', '§ 1110', '§ 1110', '§ 1110', '§ 7292', '§ 1154']

237 F3d 1368 William Allen v. Anthony J Principi | OpenJurist
237 F. 3d 1368 - William Allen v. Anthony J Principi	Home237 f3d 1368 william allen v. anthony j principi
237 F3d 1368 William Allen v. Anthony J Principi 237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
WILLIAM F. ALLEN, Claimant-Appellant,v.ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.
Judge Jonathan R. Steinberg Ronald L. Smith, Disabled American Veterans, of Washington, DC, argued for claimant-appellant. With him on the brief was Stephen L. Purcell.
William F. Allen appeals the order of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("Veterans Court") vacating a November 26, 1997 Board of Veterans' Appeals ("Board" or "BVA") decision which denied increased disability compensation and remanded the case for further proceedings. In its one-judge order, the Veterans Court instructed the Board that its interpretation in Barela v. West, 11 Vet. App. 280 (1998), of 38 U.S.C. § 1110, as amended by § 8052(a)(2) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 ("OBRA"), Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-91, was "binding precedent" and barred recovery to the extent that Allen sought increased compensation for his alcohol abuse disability, either as secondarily service-connected or as evidence of the increased severity of his service-connected Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). We hold that we have jurisdiction over this remand order because the Veterans Court's interpretation of the statute will affect the remand proceeding, and our future review may be evaded. We further hold that § 1110, when read in light of its legislative history, does not preclude a veteran from receiving compensation for alcohol or drug-related disabilities arising secondarily from a service-connected disability, or from using alcohol or drug-related disabilities as evidence of the increased severity of a service-connected disability. Therefore, we reject the Veterans Court's statutory interpretation of § 1110 and to that extent reverse the court's order, and remand for proceedings in accordance with the interpretation of § 1110 as set forth herein. The part of the order remanding to the Board for proper application of the rating criteria is affirmed.
Allen appealed the denial of a rating higher than 50 percent to the Board. On November 26, 1997, the Board upheld the RO and denied a higher rating. The Board said that "alcohol abuse may not be service[-]connected, on either a direct or secondary basis, and impairment from non-service- connected substance abuse may not be considered when evaluating the severity of the service-connected PTSD." In order to receive a 70 percent rating, the next available step above 50 percent, the Board required Allen to demonstrate both occupational impairment and social impairment. In considering all of the evidence, the Board found that "the record . . . demonstrates that the veteran's employability has been seriously undermined by his history of alcohol abuse and dependence," but that Allen's PTSD was "not the only factor influencing his industrial [occupational] impairment." The Board also found that Allen failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate social impairment. On March 25, 1998, Allen filed a timely appeal to the Veterans Court.
On July 12, 1999, the Veterans Court vacated the Board's decision and remanded for a further evidentiary hearing. Both Allen and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs ("the Secretary") agreed that a remand was required in light of the Veterans Court's opinion in Barela, which had been issued subsequent to the Board's November 26, 1997 decision. Barela held that § 1110 precludes a veteran from receiving compensation for disabilities due to alcohol or drug abuse. Barela, 11 Vet. App. at 283. The Barela court, however, added that § 1110 does not bar an award of service-connection for alcohol or drug abuse. Id. An award of service-connection would entitle a veteran to benefits such as educational assistance to a veteran's dependents, or housing loan benefits for the veteran. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 3510, 3501(a)(1), 3702(a)(1), 3702(2)(b) (1994). It would not entitle the veteran to any increase in disability compensation.
In Allen's case, the Veterans Court remanded in order for the Board to apply the court's interpretation of § 1110 as set forth in Barela. Allen had argued that Barela was "wrongly decided to the extent that it held that the law prohibits the payment by VA of compensation for alcohol abuse either on a secondary-service-connection basis or as evidence of an increase in the severity of a service-connected disability." The Veterans Court, however, rejected Allen's interpretation of § 1110 and stated that Barela was "binding precedent" to the extent that Allen "seeks compensation based either on alcohol abuse secondary to service-connected PTSD or `an increase in his rating for service-connected PTSD based on manifestations of PTSD symptomatology, i.e., alcohol or drug abuse.'" If, on remand, the Board found service-connection, Allen or his relatives could still receive educational or housing benefits under title 38. Allen could not, on remand, under the Veterans Court's interpretation of § 1110 in Allen's case and in Barela, recover additional disability compensation pursuant to an increase in his schedular rating due to his alcohol abuse disability secondary to his PTSD, or as evidence of the increased severity of his PTSD.
The Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, Div. A, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988), grants this court jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Veterans Court. The Act was codified in title 38 of the United States Code. Section 7292(a) states in pertinent part that "[a]fter a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is entered in a case, any party to the case may obtain a review of the decision with respect to the validity of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof." 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (1994). Under our case law, however, our jurisdiction is limited to the review of final decisions of the Veterans Court, which usually does not include remands. See Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244, 1247-49 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Dambach v. Gober, 223 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This so-called "final judgment rule" ordinarily limits our jurisdiction to appeals from a decision or order that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981) (internal citation omitted). There are, however, exceptions to the final judgment rule. Thus, the critical issue raised by this appeal is whether such an exception applies in this case.
Our precedents have broadly stated that our jurisdiction over a veteran's case is proper "when the remand disposes of an important legal issue that would be effectively unreviewable at a later stage of the litigation." Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Travelstead, 978 F.2d at 1247-49. In Travelstead, the Secretary, not the veteran, appealed a Veterans Court's decision, remanding to the Board for a "proper adjudication of [Travelstead]'s entitlement to a release of liability." Id. at 1246. This court held that despite the final judgment rule, our jurisdiction was proper, noting that the Veterans Court "rendered a `decision' interpreting a statute . . . and compel[led] action of the Secretary, on remand, contrary to the Secretary's prior ruling." Id. at 1248. The court said that the Veterans Court's remand order "was unquestionably a `judgment,' as it terminated the civil action challenging the Secretary's final determination . . . set aside that determination and finally decided that the Secretary could not follow his own regulations in considering the disability issue." Id. The court added that there would be "grave doubt" as to whether the Secretary could appeal his own order if on remand the Secretary undertook "the inquiry mandated by the [Veterans Court]." Id.; see also Jones v. West, 136 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that this court had jurisdiction over the Secretary's appeal of a statutory interpretation in a remand order).
In Dambach, this court applied Travelstead to find jurisdiction when a veteran appealed the Veterans Court's interpretation of a statute in a remand order. Dambach, 223 F.3d at 1379. The veteran in Dambach argued that 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) was applicable to his case. See id. Section 1154(b) requires the VA to accept "satisfactory lay or other evidence" as sufficient proof of service-connection for any illness or injury alleged to have incurred in combat, when official service medical records proving such incurrence do not exist. The Vete