Source: http://openjurist.org/371/f3d/732/united-states-v-stiger
Timestamp: 2016-05-04 02:29:30
Document Index: 607268902

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3161', '§ 1291', '§ 3161', '§ 851', '§ 851', '§ 851', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 84']

371 F3d 732 United States v. Stiger | OpenJurist
371 F. 3d 732 - United States v. Stiger HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series371 F.3d
371 F3d 732 United States v. Stiger 371 F.3d 732
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Kenneth Wayne STIGER, also known as Stacks, Defendant-Appellant.
A jury found Defendant-Appellant Kenneth Wayne Stiger guilty of numerous counts of conspiring to possess and distribute narcotics. On appeal, he alleges seven grounds for us to find reversible error: (1) use of defective verdict forms, (2) a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), (3) insufficiency of the evidence, (4) improper denial of his mistrial motion, (5) refusal to try him separately from his codefendants, (6) admission of summary testimony and exhibits, and (7) a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. We take jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND.
Mr. Stiger first argues that the verdict forms used at trial were defective. We review verdict forms under the same "abuse of discretion standard we apply to jury instructions." United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1285 (10th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033, 121 S.Ct. 621, 148 L.Ed.2d 531 (2000). "A district court does not abuse its discretion so long as the charge as a whole adequately states the law." United States v. Starnes, 109 F.3d 648, 651 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1128, 117 S.Ct. 2529, 138 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997). To make this latter determination, we review de novo whether the charge as a whole "accurately informed the jury of the governing law." United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir.1999).
Even if we find that the District Court erred, we must also determine whether the error is "harmless error." Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). The government bears the burden to show that a nonconstitutional error is harmless by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Wittgenstein, 163 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir.1998). An error "is harmless unless it had a `substantial influence' on the outcome or leaves one in `grave doubt' as to whether it had such effect." United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 910 (10th Cir.1994).
Although we harbor grave doubts about the propriety of the use of these verdict forms, we need not decide whether their use constitutes error or whether the jury instructions cured any possible error because, even if we found error, the use of the verdict forms did not substantially influence the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1318 (10th Cir.2001) ("Notwithstanding our doubts regarding the relevance of this testimony, we need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting it because we find that it was harmless error."); cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying harmless error to jury instructions).
B. Apprendi Rule
Mr. Stiger next argues that the District Court erred by not requiring the jury to make a specific finding as to the amount of drugs for which he was responsible. We review alleged Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), violations de novo. United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir.2003).
Although this is an issue of first impression for our court, at least five other circuits have addressed it. See United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138, 141-143 (3d Cir.2003); United States v. Knight, 342 F.3d 697, 709-712 (7th Cir.2003); United States v. Allen, 65 Fed. Appx. 476, 480-81 (4th Cir.2003) (Table); United States v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 722-23 (5th Cir.2003); Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 42-43 (1st Cir.2002). Without exception, these courts have found that Apprendi only requires the jury to make a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, as to the amount of drugs for which the entire conspiracy is liable. Today, we join those courts.
The reasoning of these courts, which we endorse, is simple. First, Apprendi holds that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Second, in the conspiracy context, a finding of drug amounts for the conspiracy as a whole sets the maximum sentence that each coconspirator could be given. Derman, 298 F.3d at 42. Because the subsequent attribution of drug amounts to individual coconspirators cannot increase their maximum sentence, "the judge lawfully may determine the drug quantity attributable to that defendant and sentence him accordingly (so long as the sentence falls within the statutory maximum made applicable by the jury's conspiracy-wide drug quantity determination)." Id. at 43.
Following the presentation of the government's case, Mr. Stiger moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, alleging insufficient evidence. "We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo." United States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231, 1249 (10th Cir.2002). In so doing, "we ask only whether taking the evidence — both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom — in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). "We rely on the jury, as the fact finder, to resolve conflicting testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw inferences from the facts presented." United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted).
Mr. Stiger moved for a mistrial below. In determining whether to grant a mistrial, a district judge must first determine whether an error has occurred and, if so, whether that error impaired the "defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial." United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir.2004). "We review a district court's refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion." Id. "In reviewing a court's determination for abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the determination absent a distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment." United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir.1997).
Two sources inform whether a district court should disqualify an attorney. "First, attorneys are bound by the local rules of the court in which they appear.... Second, because motions to disqualify counsel in federal proceedings are substantive motions affecting the rights of the parties, they are decided by applying standards developed under federal law." Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir.1994).
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma has adopted the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct.5 Here, Oklahoma Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 provides the relevant rule.6 Oklahoma Rule 1.9 tracks exactly the text of Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which "we believe reflect[s] the national standard to be used in ruling on disqualification motions." Cole, 43 F.3d at 1383.
Under Rule 1.9, a party seeking to disqualify opposing counsel must establish that "(1) an actual attorney-client relationship existed between the moving party and the opposing counsel; (2) the present litigation involves a matter that is `substantially related' to the subject of the movant's prior representation; and (3) the interests of the opposing counsel's present client are materially adverse to the movant."7 Cole, 43 F.3d at 1383 (citing ABA Model Rule 1.9(a) & (c)). If the movant establishes the first two prongs, an irrebuttable "presumption arises that a client has indeed revealed facts to the attorney that require his disqualification." Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir.1985).8
To show that an attorney-client relationship existed, Mr. Stiger need not show that "the parties ... executed a formal contract" or that he paid fees. Cole, 43 F.3d at 1384. Mr. Stiger need only "show that (1) [he] submitted confidential information to a lawyer and (2)[he] did so with the reasonable belief that the lawyer was acting as [his] attorney." Id. In Cole, we cited approvingly Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.1978), which held that an "implied professional relation" can exist in the context of the "preliminary consultation by a prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer," even though "actual employment does not result." Id. In addition, "the party moving for disqualification need not reveal the substance of its communication to the lawyer" and "[u]sually, a showing of the circumstances and subject of the consultation will be enough to demonstrate whether the information was confidential." Cole, 43 F.3d at 1384 n. 8.
Mr. Stiger next argues that the District Court erred in refusing to sever his trial from those of his alleged coconspirators because the government sought to introduce highly prejudicial evidence of codefendant Marlin Mack's alleged murdering of two people. In United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 676 (10th Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added), we held that:
Furthermore, Mr. Stiger must overcome the presumption that "in a conspiracy trial it is preferred that persons charged together be tried together." United States v. Scott, 37 F.3d 1564, 1579 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1100, 115 S.Ct. 773, 130 L.Ed.2d 669 (1995).
Mr. Stiger cannot establish reversible error. Even if he could show that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever, he cannot make "a strong showing of prejudice." Evans, 970 F.2d at 676. "Prejudice occurs when there is a serious risk that a joint trial will compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 434 (10th Cir.1995) (internal quotations omitted). As noted above, see supra p. 736, the government introduced extensive evidence at trial proving Mr. Stiger's involvement in the conspiracy. In light of this evidence, Mr. Stiger has failed to make a strong showing of prejudice, and we affirm the decision of the District Court.
Mr. Stiger next argues that the District Court erred in allowing Officer Harold Adair to present summary testimony and exhibits. "We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion." United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1067 (10th Cir.2003). "In reviewing a court's determination for abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the determination absent a distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment." United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir.1997). Even if we find that the District Court erred, we must also determine whether the error "affect[ed] substantial rights," i.e., whether it is "harmless error." Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a).9
As we noted in a companion case, United States v. Ray, 370 F.3d 1039, No. 02-5213, 2004 WL 1240855 (10th Cir.2004), a party may only admit summary testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 611(a) if the District Court previously admitted at trial the evidence that forms the basis of the summary. Because Officer Adair's own testimony indicates that he constructed the organizational chart from non-trial sources, the District Court could not have properly admitted it pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 611(a). We need not decide, however, whether it fell within the ambit of some other evidentiary rule because any possible error did not substantially influence the outcome of the trial. See Magleby, 241 F.3d at 1318; see also supra pp. 2-3.
Third, Officer Adair offered a chart of the total drug amounts testified to at trial. He testified that the chart was based exclusively on evidence admitted at trial. Mr. Stiger lodged an ambiguous objection against the chart. Reviewing the record evidence, we find that the District Court properly admitted the chart pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 611(a) because it was undoubtedly helpful to the jury in this particularly complex case, the District Court offered extensive limiting instructions, and the chart was based exclusively on previously admitted evidence. See United States v. Ray, 370 F.3d 1039, No. 02-5213, 2004 WL 1240855 (10th Cir.2004).
Finally, Officer Adair offered two other charts, one detailing the specific drug amounts attributable to each defendant and another illustrating the drug prices charged by the conspiracy in various transactions. He testified that both charts were based exclusively on previously admitted evidence. Mr. Stiger did not object to the introduction of either chart nor to the accompanying testimony at trial. "We review the district court's ruling admitting evidence ... if no objection is made, for plain error." United States v. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d 916, 931 (10th Cir.2002). Mr. Stiger cannot satisfy that standard. See United States v. Gonzalez Edeza, 359 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir.2004) (holding that when "overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted" evidence of guilt exists as to the charged or a closely linked crime, the plain error standard is not met); see also supra pp. 2-3.
Finally, Mr. Stiger argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., does not apply to an information filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). We review the District Court's interpretation of this statute de novo. United States v. Alahmad, 211 F.3d 538, 541 (10th Cir.2000).
On April 30, 2002, the government filed an information pursuant to § 851(a)(1), notifying Mr. Stiger of its intent to use his prior felony convictions to enhance any sentence resulting from the current prosecution. On July 11, 2002, Mr. Stiger filed a motion to dismiss this information, claiming that the Speedy Trial Act required the government to commence trial against him on the § 851(a)(1) information within seventy days of its filing. The District Court denied his motion, finding that the "plain language" of the "Speedy Trial Act only applies to informations and indictments which charge `the commission of an offense.'" For the reasons provided in a companion case, we affirm the District Court's Speedy Trial Act ruling. See United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d 1049, No. 02-5206, 2004 WL 1240830 (10th Cir.2004).
Count 1 — charges a drug conspiracy in violation of Title 21, United States Codes[s][sic], Section 846. We, the Jury, in the above styled and numbered case do upon our oaths, unanimously find the defendant Kenneth Wayne Stiger as to Count 1, as follows:
Object 1 — Knowingly and intentionally distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1):
______ Not Guilty        X    GuiltyObject 2 — Knowingly and intentionally distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1):
______ Not Guilty        X    GuiltyObject 3 — Knowingly and intentionally distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l):
______ Not Guilty        X    GuiltyVERDICT FORM — 6
Even though Mr. Burton represented one of Mr. Stiger's codefendants, and was thus not technically "opposing counsel," the prohibitions of Rule 1.9 apply equally when the alleged conflict involves a codefendantSee Model R. Prof'l Conduct R. 1.9 (not limiting the Rule to opposing counsel); Cf. Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir.2003) (noting that an impermissible conflict of interest can occur in the Sixth Amendment context "when an attorney representing a defendant has previously represented co-defendants."), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879, 124 S.Ct. 303, 157 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003).
Although we have subsequently modifiedSmith as it applies to imputing a conflict to an entire firm, see SLC Ltd. v. Bradford Group West, Inc., 999 F.2d 464, 467-68 (10th Cir.1993), we have not retreated from its holding as to individual lawyers.
Mr. Stiger, for the first time on appeal, also argues that the admission of the summary testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const.amend. VI. Because he never raised that objection before the District Court, we review it for plain errorUnited States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1009 (10th Cir.2001) ("Where a Confrontation Clause objection is not explicitly made below we will not address the constitutional issue in the absence of a conclusion that it was plain error for the district court to fail to raise the constitutional issue sua sponte.") (alteration and internal quotations marks omitted). Seeing that there is "overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted" evidence of his guilt as to the charged or a closely linked crime, see United States v. Gonzalez Edeza, 359 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir.2004), he cannot satisfy that standard.