Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/895/810/47001/
Timestamp: 2019-07-16 22:16:06
Document Index: 109830497

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 3142', '§ 3147', '§ 3148', '§ 3145', '§ 3142', '§ 3731', '§ 3142', '§ 3142', '§ 3145']

United States, Appellant, v. Edward O'brien, Defendant, Appellee, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1990 › United States, Appellant, v. Edward O'brien, Defendant, Appellee
United States, Appellant, v. Edward O'brien, Defendant, Appellee, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990)
Heard Dec. 6, 1989. Decided Feb. 5, 1990
Defendant Edward O'Brien was a high-ranking federal drug agent for 18 years. He was arrested on August 14, 1989 in a government "sting" operation, and indicted for trafficking in cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The day after his arrest, O'Brien appeared before a magistrate and the government moved for his pretrial detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1) and (2).1 The magistrate ordered him detained because of a serious risk of flight. After further hearings, however, the magistrate ordered O'Brien released on the conditions that he wear an electronic monitoring bracelet2 and that he post as security the Virginia home in which he lived. The district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, but added two further conditions: O'Brien would report daily by telephone to the pretrial services office and random unannounced visits would be made to his home by pretrial services officers. Believing the defendant still posed an unacceptable risk of flight, the government appealed the district court's decision to this court. We affirm.
We first consider our scope of review. The issue has been touched upon but never clearly decided in this circuit since the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was enacted. Prior to that time, Congress specifically had provided that in pretrial detention decisions an order "shall be affirmed if it is supported by the proceedings below." 18 U.S.C. § 3147(b) (2) (repealed). No standard was articulated in the earlier act for decisions concerning release after conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (repealed), and courts typically applied an independent review. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1979). After 1984, however, all detention decisions have been governed by the same statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), which provides no standard of review.
In a decision following closely on the heels of the Act, this court indicated in passing that the standard for review was whether the order on appeal was "supported by the proceedings below." United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 387-388 (1st Cir. 1985). The court relied on cases citing the earlier statute and did not refer to or analyze the new statute. In United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 520 (1st Cir. 1985), we held that post-conviction detention decisions should be given an independent review with deference to the findings of the district court. We noted in dictum in Bayko, 774 F.2d at 518 n. 3, that it was no longer clearly appropriate to apply a different standard of review to pretrial detention decisions, but we made no such holding. We now address the question not reached in Bayko, and find that the standard of review for pretrial detentions is the same.
The circuits have split concerning the standard of review for detention decisions under Sec. 3145(c). Some courts have held that the district court's decision must be reviewed under the clearly erroneous or other highly deferential standard. See United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985) (supported by the proceedings below); United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985) (clearly erroneous); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 1985) (clearly erroneous). Most circuits, however, have applied an independent review with some deference to the district court's determination.
Two distinct formulations of the independent standard have been used. Some courts have determined that the appellate court should give an independent review to questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law, but a clearly erroneous review to the factual findings of the district court. See United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1470-1472 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1487 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985). Others, including this court in Bayko, 774 F.2d at 520, have held that review under Sec. 3145(c) should be independent but should give deference to the district court's determination. See also United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1399-1400 (3d Cir. 1985).
We have reviewed the decisions of those courts that have held that the standard is clear error, and we are not persuaded that they adequately address the responsibilities of this court. In Fortna, 769 F.2d at 250, the Fifth Circuit provided little analysis, but relied heavily on our dicta in Jessup, the continuing vitality of which is at issue here. In addition, the Fortna court had recent precedent, United States v. Golding, 742 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 1984), which it was reluctant to abandon. Moreover, in ruling that detention decisions were subject to a narrow review, the court expressly held that the standard should be the same for both pretrial and post-conviction decisions, a conclusion with which we concur. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, however, we have clear precedent that post-conviction decisions are subject to an independent review. The Fortna decision, therefore, provides little help to us. The other two circuits that apply the clearly erroneous standard do so without analysis. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d at 405; Williams, 753 F.2d at 333.
Despite this lack of analytical support, we recognize that there are good reasons for giving deference to a district court's determinations in this situation. Pretrial detention decisions are made after hearings specifically authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), and the district court's decision should therefore be a considered one. We think it would unduly intrude on the ability of district courts to render these decisions on a day to day basis if they were subjected to cavalier treatment by an appellate court with little experience or opportunity to develop expertise. In addition, the requirement that district courts "state in writing the reasons for the action taken," Fed. R. App. P. 9(a), "suggests that the courts of appeals are not free to ignore a trial judge's supporting statement of reasons for his or her actions." Delker, 757 F.2d at 1400.
In addition, at the same time it changed the review provisions, Congress added a new section allowing the government to appeal district court detention determinations, 18 U.S.C. § 3731. The legislative history of that provision indicates that it was designed to "vindicate the 'clear public interest in permitting review of release orders which may be insufficient to prevent a defendant from fleeing or committing further crimes.' " Bayko, 774 F.2d at 519 (quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 30 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3213). This additional purpose lends some force to the idea that Congress meant to unify both pre- and post-conviction review under a single independent standard when it eliminated the statutorily provided standard for pretrial decisions.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), Congress has established a rebuttable presumption that no conditions or combination of conditions exist that will reasonably assure a defendant's appearance where there is probable cause to believe that "the person committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.)." As this court previously has held, the presumption serves to shift the burden of production and to require that the defendant introduce "some evidence" to the contrary. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1985). The government retains the burden of proving that no conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance. Id. The presumption, however, does not cease to have effect once the defendant has come forward with some evidence. Instead, it continues to operate as one factor to be considered by the court in determining whether the defendant must be detained. Jessup, 757 F.2d at 383.
The government's claim that it is entitled to a hearing rests on the case of United States v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). Nebbia concerned a defendant who repeatedly had claimed to be unable to post bail of $100,000. Only a few hours after the last denial of his motion to reduce bail, the defendant presented a cashier's check in the full amount. The government requested a hearing concerning the sudden availability of this surety. The district court found that, as a matter of law, it was precluded from conducting a hearing once the set condition had been met. In Nebbia, the Second Circuit held that "the mere deposit of cash bail is not sufficient to deprive the court of the right to inquire into other factors which might bear on the question of the adequacy of the bail and stress the importance placed upon the ability of the surety to produce the defendant." 357 F.2d at 304. The court remanded to the district court to "take such action as in his discretion he may find to be justified." Id. at 305.
Thus, Nebbia, while authorizing a hearing if the trial court determines one is appropriate, does not support the government's contention that it was entitled to such a hearing. Courts have continued to hold hearings as necessary. See, e.g., United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 898 (1st Cir. 1987). But the government provides no authority for its claim to a hearing as a matter of right.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1) and (2).
The precise language in both rules is that the determinations shall be made "upon such papers, affidavits, and portions of the record as the parties shall present." Fed. R. App. P. 9(a) and 9(b). The Third Circuit held in United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1979), that this language enabled an appellate court to consider evidence not before the district court
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) provides: