Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/85379956/Schweiker-v-Gray-Panthers-453-US-34-1981-Statutory-Construction
Timestamp: 2013-12-22 10:30:02
Document Index: 408075079

Matched Legal Cases: ['§209', '§ 209', '§ 1902', '§1902', '§ 1902', '§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 1396', '§ 1396', '§ 1396', '§ 1396', '§ 1396']

Schweiker v Gray Panthers, 453 US 34 (1981) Statutory Construction
P. 1Schweiker v Gray Panthers, 453 US 34 (1981) Statutory ConstructionSchweiker v Gray Panthers, 453 US 34 (1981) Statutory ConstructionRatings: 0|Views: 139|Likes: 3Published by nolu chanSchweiker v Gray Panthers at 44: In view of this explicit delegation of substantive authority, the Secretary's definition of the term “available” is “entitled to more than mere deference or weight,” Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 426. Rather, the Secretary’s definition is entitled to “legislative effect” because, “[i]n a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term.” Id. at 432 U. S. 425. Although we do not abdicate review in these circumstances, our task is the limited one of ensuring that the Secretary did not “excee[d] his statutory authority,” and that the regulation is not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 432 U. S. 426.Schweiker v Gray Panthers at 44: In view of this explicit delegation of substantive authority, the Secretary's definition of the term “available” is “entitled to more than mere deference or weight,” Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 426. Rather, the Secretary’s definition is entitled to “legislative effect” because, “[i]n a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term.” Id. at 432 U. S. 425. Although we do not abdicate review in these circumstances, our task is the limited one of ensuring that the Secretary did not “excee[d] his statutory authority,” and that the regulation is not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 432 U. S. 426.More info:Categories:Types, Research, LawPublished by: nolu chan on Mar 14, 2012Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Free download as PDF, TXT or read online for free from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee MoreSee lesshttp://www.scribd.com/doc/85379956/Schweiker-v-Gray-Panthers-453-US-34-1981-Statutory-Construction06/26/2013pdftextoriginal U.S. Supreme Court
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,453 U.S. 34(1981)
No. 80 756Argued April 29, 1981Decided June 25, 1981453 U.S. 34
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Syllabus
The Medicaid program provides federal funds to States that pay for medical treatment for needy persons. Section 1902(a)(17)(D) of the Social Security Act provides that, in calculating benefits,state Medicaid plans must not“take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is such individual’s spouse”or minor, blind, or disabled child. Section 1902(a)(17)(B) requires participating States to grant benefits to eligible persons taking into account only such income and resources that are, “asdetermined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary [of Health and HumanServices], available to the applicant.” The Secretary promulgated regulations describing thecircumstances in which the income of one spouse may be “deemed” available to the other for purposes of determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits. In States participating in the programcalled Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI), whichsubstantially replaced the former state-run categorical need plans and enlarged eligibility for Medicaid benefits, the regulations provide that, when the applicant and his spouse live in thesame household, the spouse’s income and resources always must be considered in determiningeligibility whether or not they are actually contributed, and that, when the applicant and spousecease to share the same household, the spouse’s income will be disregarded the next monthunless both are eligible for assistance, in which case the income of both is considered for sixmonths. Greater “deeming” is authorized in States which have exercised the option under §209(b) of the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act of electing not to enlarge Medicaideligibility to SSI levels. Respondent, an organization dedicated to helping the elderly, filed suit inFederal District Court attacking the regulations applicable in the § 209(b) States on the groundthat “deeming” impermissibly employs an “arbitrary formula” to impute a spouse’s income to aninstitutionalized applicant, and thus is inconsistent with § 1902(a)(17)(B). Respondent claimed
that, before a State may take into account the spouse’s income in calculating an institutionalizedapplicant’s benefits, it must453 U. S. 35make a factual determination that the spouse’s income actually is contributed to that applicant.The District Court agreed, and declared the regulations invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the ground that the regulations were invalid because the Secretary, in promulgating them,had failed to consider the unfairness of treating separated spouses as a “single economic unit”and the disruption caused by the requirement of support from the applicant’s spouse.
The regulations at issue are consistent with the statutory scheme, and are reasonableexercises of the authority delegated to the Secretary. Pp. 453 U. S. 43-50.(a) In view of the explicit delegation of substantive authority to the Secretary in §1902(a)(17)(B), his definition of the term “available” is entitled to “legislative effect,” rather thanmere deference or weight. Pp. 453 U. S. 43-44.(b) The language of § 1902(a)(17)(D), which was enacted as part of the original Medicaid program, makes it clear that, from the beginning of the program, Congress authorized States to presume spousal support. And this provision’s legislative history is fully consistent with itslanguage. By enacting § 209(b), Congress in effect told States that wished to use the § 209(b)option that they could retain virtually all of the Medicaid eligibility limitations, including“deeming,” that were allowed under the original Act. Pp. 453 U. S. 44-47.(c) In treating spouses differently from most other relatives by explicitly authorizing state plans“to take into account the financial responsibility” of the spouse, Congress demonstrated that“deeming” is not antithetical to the general statutory requirement that Medicaid eligibility be based solely on resources “available” to the applicant. “Available” resources are different fromthose
The requirement of availability refers to resources left to a
after the spousehas deducted a sum on which to live, and does not require a State to consider only the resourcesactually paid by the spouse to the applicant. The administration of public assistance based on theuse of a formula is not inherently arbitrary. To require individual factual determinations of needwould dissipate, in factfinding, resources that could have been spent on the needy. Pp. 453 U. S.47-48.
203 U.S.App.D.C. 146, 629 F.2d 180, reversed and remanded.POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., andSTEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed adissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 453 U. S.50.
453 U. S. 36
The Medicaid program provides federal funds to States that pay for medical treatment for the poor. An individual’s entitlement to Medicaid benefits depends on the financial resources“available” to him. Some States determine eligibility by assuming — “deeming” — that a portionof the spouse’s income is “available” to the applicant. “Deeming” thus has the effect of reducing both the number of eligible individuals and the amount of assistance paid to those who qualify.The question in this case is whether the federal regulations that permit States to “deem” incomein this manner are arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful.
The Medicaid program, established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Act), 79Stat. 343, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), “provid[es] federalfinancial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.”
448 U. S. 297, 448 U. S. 301 (1980). Each participating Statedevelops a plan containing “reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extentof medical assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). An individual is entitled to Medicaid if hefulfills the criteria established by453 U. S. 37the State in which he lives. State Medicaid plans must comply with requirements imposed both by the Act itself and by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary).
§ 1396a(1976 ed. and Supp. III).AAs originally enacted, Medicaid required participating States to provide medical assistance to“categorically needy” individuals who received cash payments under one of four welfare programs established elsewhere in the Act. See § 1396a(a)(10) (1970 ed.). The categoricallyneedy were persons whom Congress considered especially deserving of public assistance becauseof family circumstances, age, or disability. [Footnote 1] States, if they wished, were permitted tooffer assistance also to the “medically needy” — persons lacking the ability to pay for medicalexpenses, but with incomes too large to qualify for categorical assistance. In either case, the Actrequired the States to base assessments of financial need only on“such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by theSecretary,
to the applicant or recipient.”§ 1396a(a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). Specifically, eligibility decisions could“not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or recipient
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