Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105916/garrett-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-05-24 10:15:36
Document Index: 783984928

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 812', '§ 952', '§ 848', '§ 848']

Garrett Vs United States - Citation 105916 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Garrett Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105916
Case Number 471 U.S. 773
Appellant Garrett
garrett v. united states - 471 u.s. 773 (1985) u.s. supreme court garrett v. united states, 471 u.s. 773 (1985) garrett v. united states no. 83-1842 argued january 16, 1985 decided june 3, 1985 471 u.s. 773 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit syllabus in march, 1981, petitioner was charged in a multicount indictment in the western district of washington for his role in the off-loading and landing of marihuana from a "mother ship" at a washington location on specified days in october, 1979, and august, 1980. he pleaded guilty to one count of importation of marihuana and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and a $15,000 fine. the remaining counts were dismissed without.....
Garrett v. United States - 471 U.S. 773 (1985)
U.S. Supreme Court Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985)
1. The language, structure, and legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 show that Congress intended the CCE offense to be a separate offense that is punishable in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the predicate offenses. It would be illogical for Congress to intend that a choice be made between the predicate offenses and the CCE offense in pursuing major drug dealers. Pp. 471 U. S. 777 -786.
2. It did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause to prosecute the CCE offense after the prior conviction for one of the predicate offenses. The CCE offense is not the "same" offense as one or more of its predicate offenses within the meaning of that Clause. Nor was the Washington offense a "lesser included" offense of the CCE offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 , distinguished. The conduct with which petitioner was charged in Florida, when compared with that with which he was charged in Washington, does not lend itself to the simple analogy of a single course of conduct comprising a lesser included misdemeanor within a felony. The CCE was alleged to have spanned more than five years, whereas the acts charged in Washington were alleged to have occurred on single days in 1979 and 1980. But even assuming that the Washington offense was a lesser included offense, petitioner's double jeopardy claim is not sustainable. The CCE charge in Florida had not been completed at the time the Washington indictment was returned, and evidence of the importation in Washington could be used to show one of the predicate offenses. Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442 . Pp. 471 U. S. 786 -793.
3. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the cumulative punishments. The presumption when Congress creates two distinct defenses, as it did here, is that it intended to permit cumulative sentences. To disallow cumulative sentences would have the anomalous effect in many cases of converting into ceilings the large fines provided by 21 U.S.C. § 848 to deprive big-time drug dealers of their enormous profits. Logic, as well as the legislative history, supports the conclusion that Congress intended separate punishments for the underlying substantive predicate offenses and for the CCE offense. Pp. 471 U. S. 793 -795.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 471 U. S. 795 . STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 471 U. S. 799 . POWELL, J., took no part in the decision of the case.
This case presents two of the three aspects of the Double Jeopardy Clause identified in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 , 395 U. S. 717 (1969): protection against a second prosecution for the Washington importation conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for that conviction. Garrett focuses primarily on the former protection, which we address first.
Thus, CCE is not distinct from its underlying predicates in the way that conspiracy is a distinct offense from the completed object of the conspiracy. Cf. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 , 328 U. S. 643 (1946). Second, applying the test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932), each of the predicate offenses is the "same" for double jeopardy purposes as the CCE offense, because the predicate offense does not require proof of any fact not necessary to the CCE offense. Because the latter requires proof of additional facts, including concerted activity with five other persons, a supervisory role, and substantial income, the predicates are lesser included offenses of the CCE provision. The relationship is the same, Garrett argues, as the relationship between the joyriding and auto theft statutes involved in Brown v. Ohio, supra, and thus a subsequent prosecution for the greater CCE offense is barred by the earlier conviction of the lesser marihuana importation offense.
Where the same conduct violates two statutory provisions, the first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to determine whether the legislature -- in this case Congress -- intended that each violation be a separate offense. If Congress intended that there be only one offense -- that is, a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for a single act, but not under both -- there would be no statutory authorization for a subsequent prosecution after conviction of one of the two provisions, and that would end the double jeopardy analysis. Cf. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1 , 273 U. S. 11 (1927).
This question of legislative intent arose in Blockburger in the context of multiple punishments imposed in a single prosecution. Based on one drug sale, Blockburger was convicted of both selling a drug not in the original stamped package and selling it not in pursuance of a written order of the purchaser. The sale violated two separate statutory provisions, and the question was whether "the accused committed two offenses or only one." 284 U.S. at 284 U. S. 303 -304. The rule stated in Blockburger was applied as a rule of statutory construction to
help determine legislative intent. Significantly, after setting out the rule, the Court cited a paragraph in Albrecht, supra, at 273 U. S. 11 , which included the following statement:
"There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction which it has power to prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction. "
(Emphasis added.) We have recently indicated that the Blockburger rule is not controlling when the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359 , 459 U. S. 368 (1983); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U. S. 333 , 450 U. S. 340 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684 , 445 U. S. 691 -692 (1980). Indeed, it would be difficult to contend otherwise without converting what is essentially a factual inquiry as to legislative intent into a conclusive presumption of law.
The language of 21 U.S.C. § 848, which is set out in full in the margin, [ Footnote 1 ]affirmatively states an offense for which punishment will be imposed. It begins:
§ 848(a)(1). At this point, there is no reference to other statutory offenses, and a separate penalty is set out, rather than a multiplier of the penalty established for some other offense. This same paragraph then incorporates its own recidivist provision, providing for twice the penalty for repeat violators of this section. Significantly the language expressly refers to "one or more prior convictions . . . under this section. " Next, subparagraph (2), which sets out various forfeiture provisions, also refers to any person "who is convicted under paragraph (1) of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise," again suggesting that § 848 is a distinct offense for which one is separately convicted.
Were we to sustain Garrett's claim, the Government would have been able to proceed against him in either one of only two ways. It would have to have withheld the Washington charges, alleging crimes committed in October, 1979, and August, 1980, from the grand jury which indicted Garrett in March, 1981, until it was prepared to present to a grand jury the CCE charge which was alleged to have been, and found by a jury to be, continuing on each of those dates; or it would have to have submitted the CCE charge to the Washington grand jury in March, 1981, even though the indictment ultimately returned against Garrett on that charge alleged that the enterprise had continued until July, 1981. [ Footnote 2 ] We do not
Id. at 223 U. S. 448 -449.
It may well be, as JUSTICE STEVENS suggests in his dissenting opinion, that the Florida indictment did not, by its terms, indicate that the Neah Bay importation would be used as evidence to support it, post at 471 U. S. 804 -805, and therefore, at the time the pretrial motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was made, the District Court in Florida could not have rendered an informed decision on petitioner's motion. But there can be no doubt that, by the time the evidence had all been presented in the Florida trial, and the jury was charged, only one reasonable conclusion could be drawn by the District Court: the Government's evidence with respect to the CCE charge included acts which took place after March, 1981, the date of the Washington indictment, and up to and including July, 1981. Therefore, the continuing criminal enterprise charged by the Government had not been completed at the time the Washington indictment was returned, and, under the Diaz rule, evidence of the Neah
Bay importation might be used to show one of the predicate offenses. [ Footnote 3 ]
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 366 ; Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 344 . As discussed above, Congress intended to create a separate offense. The presumption when Congress creates two distinct offenses is that it intends to permit cumulative sentences, and legislative silence on this specific issue does not establish an ambiguity or rebut this presumption:
Id. at 450 U. S. 341 -342. Here, of course, Congress was not silent as to its intent to create separate offenses notwithstanding Blockburger, and we can assume it was aware that doing so would authorize cumulative punishments absent some indication of contrary intent.
In Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 156 -157, a plurality of this Court stated that § 848
The Government, and not the courts, is responsible for initiating a criminal prosecution, and, subject to applicable constitutional limitations, it is entitled to choose those offenses for which it wishes to indict and the evidence upon which it wishes to base the prosecution. Whether or not JUSTICE STEVENS is correct in asserting that the Neah Bay charge was not necessary to establish one of the three predicate offenses for a CCE charge, the Government obviously viewed the matter differently. We think that, for the reasons stated in the text at 471 U. S. 786 -793, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require the Government to dispense with the use of the Neah Bay operation as a predicate offense in the CCE prosecution in Florida.
I agree that, on the facts of this case, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar prosecution and sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 848 for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise even though Garrett pleaded guilty to one of the predicate offenses in an earlier prosecution. This conclusion is admittedly in tension with certain language in prior opinions of the Court. E.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 , 432 U. S. 166 (1977). I write separately to explain why I believe that today's holding comports with the fundamental purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and with the method of analysis used in our more recent decisions.
The Double Jeopardy Clause declares: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." U.S.Const., Amdt. 5. This constitutional proscription serves primarily to preserve the finality of judgments in criminal prosecutions and to protect the defendant from prosecutorial overreaching. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 493 , 467 U. S. 498 -499 (1984); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117 , 449 U. S. 128 , 449 U. S. 136 (1980). In Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957), the Court explained:
Id. at 355 U. S. 187 -188.
Decisions by this Court have consistently recognized that the finality guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is not absolute, but instead must accommodate the societal interest in prosecuting and convicting those who violate the law. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U. S. 31 , 457 U. S. 40 (1982); United States v. Tateo, 377 U. S. 463 , 377 U. S. 466 (1964). The Court accordingly has held that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction generally is subject to retrial. Tibbs, supra, at 457 U. S. 40 . Similarly, double jeopardy poses no bar to another trial where a judge declares a mistrial because of "manifest necessity." Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458 (1973). Such decisions indicate that, absent "governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect," United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 , 437 U. S. 91 (1978), the compelling public interest in punishing crimes can outweigh the interest of the defendant in having his culpability conclusively resolved in one proceeding. Tibbs, supra, at 457 U. S. 41 -44.
Brown v. Ohio, supra, held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecution of a defendant for a greater offense when he has already been tried and acquitted or convicted on a lesser included offense. Id. at 457 U. S. 168 -169. The concerns for finality that support this conclusion, however, are no more absolute than those involved in other contexts. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137 , 432 U. S. 152 (1977) (plurality opinion). Instead, successive prosecution on a greater offense may be permitted where justified by the public interest in law enforcement and the absence of prosecutorial overreaching. For example, in Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442 , 223 U. S. 449 (1912), the Court found no double jeopardy bar to a prosecution for murder where the victim of an assault died after the defendant's trial for assault and battery. Diaz implies that prosecution for a lesser offense does not prevent subsequent prosecution for a greater offense where the latter
depends on facts occurring after the first trial. Dicta in Brown v. Ohio suggested that the same conclusion would apply where the later prosecution rests on facts that the government could not have discovered earlier through due diligence. 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 169 , n. 7. See also Jeffers v. United States, supra, at 432 U. S. 151 -152.
Application of the rule of Brown v. Ohio is also affected by the actions of the defendant himself. In Jeffers v. United States, supra, the plurality opinion rejected a claim of double jeopardy where prosecution for a greater offense followed a guilty verdict for a lesser offense, and the successive prosecution resulted from the defendant's opposition to consolidated trials. Id. at 432 U. S. 152 -154. Last Term, the Court relied on Jeffers to hold that, where a court accepts, over the prosecution's objection, a defendant's guilty plea to lesser included offenses, double jeopardy does not prevent further prosecution on remaining, greater offenses. Ohio v. Johnson, supra, at 467 U. S. 501 -502. After noting the State's interest in convicting those who have violated its laws and the absence of governmental overreaching, Johnson observed that the defendant
467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 502 .
Turning to the circumstances of this case, I conclude that Garrett cannot validly argue that the Government is prevented from using evidence relating to his May, 1981, conviction to prove his participation in a continuing criminal enterprise from January, 1976, through July, 1981. I am willing to assume, arguendo, that the 1981 conviction for importation of marihuana is a lesser included offense of the charges for violating 18 U.S.C. § 848. As noted ante at 471 U. S. 788 , 471 U. S. 791 -793, the Government both alleged and presented evidence that Garrett's violation of § 848 continued after the conviction on the lesser included offense. Although the Government alleged participation in the unlawful continuing enterprise through July, 1981, none of the events occurring after the date of the earlier prosecution were essential elements to
prove a violation of § 848. Thus, this case falls somewhere between Diaz and Brown v. Ohio. The dissent reads the latter decision as limiting application of Diaz to circumstances where the facts necessary to the greater offense occur or are discovered after the first prosecution. Post at 471 U. S. 806 -807. Although I find merit to this position, I reach a different conclusion upon balancing the interests protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The approach advocated by the dissent would effectively force the Government's hand with respect to prosecution under § 848. Under that approach, once the Government believes that facts sufficient to prove a continuing criminal enterprise exist, it can either bring charges under § 848 or seek conviction only for a predicate offense while forgoing its later use to prove a continuing violation of § 848. The decision to bring charges under § 848, however, will necessarily and appropriately depend on prosecutorial judgments concerning the adequacy of the evidence, the efficient allocation of enforcement resources, and the desirability of seeking the statute's severe sanctions. These considerations may be affected by events occurring after the last necessary predicate offense. Where the defendant continues unlawful conduct after the time the Government prosecutes him for a predicate offense, I do not think he can later contend that the Government is foreclosed from using that offense in another prosecution to prove the continuing violation of § 848. Cf. Jeffers, supra, at 432 U. S. 154 . As the Court noted in another context,
United States v. Scott, supra, at 437 U. S. 99 .
This fact will prevent the Government from "treat[ing] the first trial as no more than a dry run for the second prosecution," id. at 397 U. S. 447 . Moreover, I note that we do not decide in this case whether a defendant would have a valid double jeopardy claim if the Government failed in a later prosecution to allege and to present evidence of a continuing violation of § 848 after an earlier conviction for a predicate offense. Certainly the defendant's interest in finality would be more compelling where there is no indication of continuing wrongdoing after the first prosecution.
On July 16, 1981, a grand jury in the Northern District of Florida returned an 11-count indictment against petitioner and five other defendants. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Petitioner was named as a defendant in seven counts, four of which refer to the use of a telephone on a specific date in 1978 or 1979. The three counts relevant to the present issue charged petitioner with conspiracy to import marihuana (Counts I and II) and with conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (Count XI) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
The contours of the prosecution's case are suggested by the 34 overt acts alleged in Count I as having been performed by the six defendants and five named coconspirators. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Each of the first 33 overt acts was alleged to have occurred in the period between December, 1976, and August, 1979; the 34th occurred on October 25, 1979. The three principal transactions involved (1) the unloading of about 30,000 pounds of marihuana from the vessel Buck Lee at Fourchan Landing,
Louisiana, in December, 1976; (2) the arrival of the vessel Mr. Frank with a multi-ton load of marihuana at a boatyard near Crown Point, Louisiana, in June, 1977; and (3) the voyage of the vessel Morning Star from Mobile, Alabama, to Santa Marta, Colombia, to pick up 28,145 pounds of marihuana in June, 1979. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Notably, although each of the three principal transactions would obviously have supported a substantive charge of importation in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 812 and § 952, no such charge was made against petitioner. Instead, Count XI charged that he had engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 "from in or about the month of January, 1976, and continuing thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment." [ Footnote 2/5 ]
On March 17, 1981, a grand jury in the Western District of Washington returned a four-count indictment against petitioner and three other defendants. [ Footnote 2/6 ] None of these codefendants was named as a defendant in the Florida indictment. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Count I alleged a conspiracy beginning in or about September, 1979, and continuing through August 26, 1980, to import 12,000 pounds of marihuana. The 15 alleged overt acts all occurred between September, 1979, and October, 1980, and all related to the unloading of 12,000 pounds of marihuana from a "mother ship" to fishing vessels in Neah Bay, Washington. [ Footnote 2/8 ] In addition to the conspiracy count, the
indictment also contained three substantive counts, but it did not make a CCE charge. [ Footnote 2/9 ]
There is some overlap between the Florida and the Washington indictments. The 34th overt act alleged in the Florida indictment was a meeting in Bellevue, Washington, on October 25, 1979, to discuss plans to import a shipload of marihuana. [ Footnote 2/10 ] The first three overt acts in the Washington indictment refer to activities in Bellevue, Washington, in September and October, 1979, which apparently related to the Neah Bay landing in August of the following year. [ Footnote 2/11 ] Moreover, the final allegation in Count XI of the Florida indictment refers to the yacht Sun Chaser III, which apparently was the "mother ship" in the Neah Bay incident. [ Footnote 2/12 ]
defendant for a greater offense after it has convicted him of a lesser included offense." [ Footnote 2/13 ] This rule applies to "complex statutory crimes." [ Footnote 2/14 ] The CCE offense proscribed by § 848 is clearly such a crime.
In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (1977), after making a full statement of the general rule, [ Footnote 2/15 ] we noted the exception that may preserve the government's right to prosecute for a greater offense after a prosecution for a lesser offense. We stated:
not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442 , 223 U. S. 448 -449 (1912); Ashe v. Swenson, [397 U.S.] at 397 U. S. 453 n. 7 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). [ Footnote 2/16 ]"
The fact that the general rule and the exception may be easily stated does not mean that either may be easily applied to this case. The problem may, however, be clarified by a somewhat oversimplified statement of the elements of the CCE offense. It, of course, requires that the defendant be a manager, organizer, or supervisor of the enterprise, that he act in concert with at least five other persons, and that he obtain substantial income from it. [ Footnote 2/17 ] The most important requirement for present purposes, however, is that he must commit a felony as "a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter. . . ." [ Footnote 2/18 ] I assume that the words "continuing series" contemplate at least three successive felony violations, but of course the series could involve more. [ Footnote 2/19 ]
Thus, if we view the entire course of petitioner's conduct as alleged in both indictments, it would appear that the Government could have alleged that all four importations constituted proof of a single CCE. Moreover, even though the prosecutor was clearly aware of the fourth importation when the Florida indictment was returned, I see no reason why he could not properly establish a CCE violation based on only the first three importations. [ Footnote 2/20 ] As written, the Florida indictment
"can only be considered by you in your deliberations concerning Count 11 of the indictment, which is the so-called continuing criminal enterprise count, that's the allegation that Jonathan Garrett was engaged in, a continuing criminal enterprise. [ Footnote 2/21 ]"
the instructions on the CCE count did not inform the jury that the Neah Bay incident could not constitute a predicate felony to the CCE charge. [ Footnote 2/22 ]
It is also clear that the exception identified in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (1977), is not applicable to this case. All of the facts necessary to sustain the CCE charge in the Florida indictment occurred before the Washington indictment was returned. Moreover, the Government has not claimed that the evidence necessary to sustain the CCE charge in the Florida indictment was not discovered until after the Washington conviction. [ Footnote 2/23 ] Indeed, if one compares the indictments, and if one assumes that the Government was prepared to prove what it alleged in the Florida indictment, the Neah Bay evidence was not needed in order to sustain the
CCE charge. [ Footnote 2/24 ] The record discloses no basis for applying the exception identified in Brown to this case.
The Court's reasons for not applying the general rule to this case are somewhat unclear. It seems to place its entire reliance on the fact that the CCE charge alleges that the enterprise continued to the date of the Florida indictment on July 16, 1981, together with the fact that, when petitioner was arrested a week later, he made some damaging admissions. [ Footnote 2/25 ] Neither of these considerations has any constitutional significance that I can discern. Further, although I did not subscribe to the analysis in the plurality opinion in Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137 (1977), I had thought every Member of the Court endorsed this proposition:
"What lies at the heart of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the prohibition against multiple prosecutions for the 'the same offense.' See United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332 , 420 U. S. 343 (1975). [ Footnote 2/26 ]"
In my opinion, it is far more important to vindicate that constitutional principle than to create a new doctrine in order to avoid the risk that a retrial may result in freeing this petitioner after only 19 years of imprisonment. [ Footnote 2/27 ]
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137 , 432 U. S. 150 (1977) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.).
Id. at 432 U. S. 151 .
"131 U.S. at 188. Although in this formulation the conviction of the greater precedes the conviction of the lesser, the opinion makes it clear that the sequence is immaterial. Thus, the Court treated the formulation as just one application of the rule that two offenses are the same unless each requires proof that the other does not. Id. at 131 U. S. 188 , 131 U. S. 190 , citing Morey v. Commonwealth, [108 Mass.] at 434. And as another application of the same rule, the Court cited, 131 U.S. at 131 U. S. 190 , with approval the decision of State v. Cooper, 13 N.J. L. 361 (1833), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a conviction for arson barred a subsequent felony murder indictment based on the death of a man killed in the fire. Cf. Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387 , 397 U. S. 390 (1970). Whatever the sequence may be, the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense."
432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 168 -169 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 432 U. S. 169 , n. 7.
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 141 -142.
See ante at 471 U. S. 780 , n. 1.
"Petitioner does not dispute that the CCE prosecution could be maintained if predicated on a series of Title 21 violations for which he had not previously been prosecuted, and the proof at trial showed many such violations. The Washington offense was therefore by no means indispensable to establishment of the CCE offense. . . . "
"Your Honor, the investigation by the grand jury in this district and the investigation which is being coordinated from the Narcotics Section in Washington, D.C. indicates that, between 1977 and 1980, Mr. Garrett was involved in about four or five mother boat operations. The Department of Justice had originally authorized this district to present a continuing criminal enterprise count to the grand jury. "
" I can represent as an officer of the court that I think there was probable cause to believe he had been responsible for a continuing criminal enterprise and the grand jury would have returned an indictment. "
See ante at 471 U. S. 791 -792.
432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 150 .
As the Court points out, ante at 471 U. S. 775 , 471 U. S. 777 , the petitioner's 40-year sentence on the CCE count was concurrent to the consecutive sentences of 5 years for the Washington conviction and 14 years for the three Florida convictions.