Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/342-u-s-308-606522302
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 04:11:00
Document Index: 285685307

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 9', '§ 39', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 1', '§ 9', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 9', '§ 39', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 32', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 32']

342 U.S. 308 (1952), 204, Guessefeldt v. McGrath - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 606522302
Docket Nº: No. 204
Citation: 342 U.S. 308, 72 S.Ct. 338, 96 L.Ed. 342
Party Name: Guessefeldt v. McGrath
72 S.Ct. 338, 96 L.Ed. 342
1. Petitioner was not "resident within" Germany within the meaning of the definition of "enemy" in § 2 and, therefore, was "not an enemy" within the meaning of § 9(a), authorizing a suit by any person "not an enemy" to recover property vested by the Alien Property Custodian. Pp. 311-312.
2. Properly construed in the light of its purposes, its legislative history, and the constitutional issues which otherwise would be raised, § 39, forbidding the return of property of any "national" of Germany or Japan vested in the Government at any time after December 17, 1941, applies only to those German and Japanese nationals otherwise ineligible to bring suit under § 9(a). Pp. 312-320.
The District Court dismissed petitioner's suit under § 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 1 et seq., to recover property vested by the Alien Property Custodian. 89 F.Supp. 344. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 88 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 191 F.2d 639. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 810. Reversed, p. 320.
This is a case brought under § 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, as amended,1 to recover property vested by the Alien Property Custodian. The [72 S.Ct. 340] District Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff,
62 Stat. 1240, 1246, 50 U.S.C.App. (Supp. IV, 1946) § 39,2 89 F.Supp. 344. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 88 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 191 F.2d 639. We brought the case here for clarification of the restrictions imposed by and the remedies open under the Trading with the Enemy Act. 342 U.S. 810.
Legislative history leaves the meaning shrouded. Some use of the term "domicile" as the touchstone of enemy status is to be found in the Congressional hearings and reports.3 But on the floor, Representative Montague, one of the managers of the bill, unequivocally stated under close questioning that the statutory language was intended [72 S.Ct. 341] to cover much more than those domiciled in enemy nations. Yet prisoners of war, expeditionary forces and
"sojourners" were not, he said, intended to be included. 55 Cong.Rec. 4922.4
argument runs, adopted a "policy of nonreturn,"5 and prohibited the restoration of vested property to a "national" of Germany. A citizen is a national, and Guessefeldt is a German citizen. Thus, even though he may, before the enactment of § 39, have been entitled to bring suit as a nonenemy under § 9(a), that privilege has since been cut off. To which Guessefeldt counters that § 39 must be construed harmoniously with § 9(a); the term "national" in the new section must accordingly be taken to mean only those German and Japanese citizens who could not theretofore have enforced the return of their property as of right. Section 39, in the context of its legislative history and in the light of the scheme and background of the statute, makes the Government's contention unpersuasive.
present purposes, it does not matter whether this action was taken simply to secure claims of American citizens against Germany or was regarded as the rightful withholding of spoils of war. In the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 254, 270, 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 9(b)(12), (13), (14), (16), 9(m), Congress provided for the return to admittedly enemy owners of 80% of their vested property. See Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft, 300 U.S. 115.6 Section 32 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 60 Stat. 50, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. (Supp. IV, 1946) § 32,
Section 39 was passed as part of a measure establishing a commission on the problem of compensating American prisoners of war, internees, and others who suffered personal injury or property damage at the hands of World War II enemies. Congressional attention was focused on the nature and extent of these claims and methods of adjudicating them. The issues involved in § 39 were of peripheral concern. Reading the legislative history in this light, it lends support to the view that § 39 was conceived as dealing with property not otherwise subject to return. Senate hearings opened with detailed testimony analyzing the value of assets which would be left after payments for administration and liquidation, returns under § 32, and disbursements in satisfaction of judgments...