Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/artiglio-v-corning-inc-31894
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 08:47:13
Document Index: 19903535

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 437', '§ 323', '§ 324', '§ 732', '§ 281', '§ 281', '§ 732', '§ 324', '§ 437', '§ 1714', '§ 2395', '§ 2727', '§ 1627', '§ 1317', '§ 1799', '§ 114180', '§ 50086', '§ 279']

Artiglio v. Corning Inc. - 18 Cal.4th 604 S057133 - Thu, 07/09/1998 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 18 Cal.4th 604
Artiglio v. Corning Inc.
Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 479; 957 P.2d 1313
As will be seen, California courts, including this court, have long recognized section 324A's negligent undertaking theory, the general viability of [18 Cal.4th 608] which is not at issue. We have limited our review in this matter to whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiffs' section 324A claims, which are based on allegations the defendant corporations negligently discharged an undertaking to provide silicone toxicology research to their subsidiary, a manufacturer, inter alia, of medical devices.
Dow Chemical and Dow Corning each performed further toxicological tests on silicone. In 1954, Dow Chemical and Dow Corning jointly commissioned a study of the toxicity of a silica dust Dow Corning was producing. [18 Cal.4th 609] This dust proved useful for coating certain types of paper and had potential applications in the pharmaceutical, cosmetic, paint, varnish, ink, rubber, plastic and adhesive industries. Saranac Lake Laboratories of New York performed the study. Published in 1957, the study concluded, generally, that exposing rats to high levels of silica dust severely damaged their breathing apparatus.
In 1959, Dow Chemical performed an experimental study for Dow Corning that demonstrated silicones may cause eye irritation. The study's author [18 Cal.4th 610] speculated that such irritation was not caused by chemical reaction to the silicone being tested, but by silicone's tendency to reduce the surface tension of the eyeball.
When in 1964 Dow Corning first began marketing breast implants, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did not regulate medical devices. In [18 Cal.4th 611] 1991, Dow Corning submitted to the FDA a 25,000-page application for approval of its silicone breast implants. Dow Corning's application referenced hundreds of tests, including toxicological tests Dow Chemical had performed.
Silicone breast implant actions filed in federal courts were consolidated in a multidistrict action in the Northern District of Alabama. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation (N.D.Ala. 1993) 837 F.Supp. 1128.) The federal district court initially dismissed claims against Dow Chemical and Corning, but subsequently reinstated claims against Dow Chemical. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation (N.D.Ala. 1995) 887 F.Supp. 1455, 1460-1461.)
We granted plaintiffs' petition for review. [18 Cal.4th 612]
[1] Dow Chemical's motion for summary judgment was properly granted "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that [Dow Chemical] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review the trial court's decision de novo, considering "all of the evidence set forth in the [supporting and opposition] papers, except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all [uncontradicted] inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence." (Ibid.) " 'To succeed, [Dow Chemical] must ... demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of a trial.' " (Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 279 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 885 P.2d 950], quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46]; see also Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 973, fn. 7 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903]; Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1000 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 685, 884 P.2d 142].)
The common law theory restated in section 324A is one of liability to third persons for physical harm caused when, under certain listed circumstances, one negligently performs an undertaking to another. In its entirety, section 324A reads: "One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third [18 Cal.4th 613] person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to [perform] fn. 4 his undertaking, if [¶] (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or [¶] (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or [¶] (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking."
Over 30 years ago, we described this negligent undertaking theory of liability-sometimes referred to as the "Good Samaritan" rule-as "[f]irmly rooted in the common law [of negligence]" (Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited (1967) 67 Cal.2d 232, 238 [60 Cal.Rptr. 510, 430 P.2d 68]) and cited section 324A as one of the authorities establishing its controlling principles (67 Cal.2d at p. 238, citing numerous authorities). Indeed, "[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to a duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." (Glanzer v. Shepard (1922) 233 N.Y. 236 [135 N.E. 275, 276, 23 A.L.R. 1425].) As "Dean Prosser says [and Dow Chemical concedes], '[I]f the defendant enters upon an affirmative course of conduct affecting the interests of another, he is regarded as assuming a duty to act, and will thereafter be liable for negligent acts or omissions[.]' " (Valdez v. Taylor Automobile Co. (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 817 [278 P.2d 91].)
[2a] Thus, it is settled law that one "who, having no initial duty to do so, undertakes to come to the aid of another-the 'good Samaritan' "-has "a duty to exercise due care in performance and is liable if (a) his failure to exercise care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking." (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23 [192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137], citing Rest.2d Torts, § 323; see, e.g., Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 551, 557 [105 Cal.Rptr. 358, 503 P.2d 1366] [same]; see also BAJI No. 4.45 ["A person who is under no duty to care for or render service to another but who voluntarily assumes such a duty, is liable to the other for injury caused by a failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable care in the performance of that assumed duty."].) fn. 5
[3] As the traditional theory is articulated in the Restatement, a negligent undertaking claim of liability to third parties requires evidence that: (1) the [18 Cal.4th 614] actor (in this case, Dow Chemical) undertook, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another (Dow Corning); (2) the services rendered were of a kind the actor should have recognized as necessary for the protection of third persons (plaintiffs); (3) the actor failed to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its undertaking; (4) the failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in physical harm to the third persons; and (5) either (a) the actor's carelessness increased the risk of such harm, or (b) the undertaking was to perform a duty owed by the other to the third persons, or (c) the harm was suffered because of the reliance of the other or the third persons upon the undertaking. (See generally, FNS Mortgage Service Corp. v. Pacific General Group, Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1572 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 916]; Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 142, 151 [274 Cal.Rptr. 901]; see also Roberson v. United States (9th Cir. 1962) 382 F.2d 714, 721.) Recovery on section 324A's negligent undertaking theory thus requires proof of each of the well-known elements of any negligence cause of action, viz., duty, breach of duty, proximate cause and damages. (See generally, Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 238 [applying, inter alia, § 324A to ascertain duty element in negligence action]; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 732, pp. 60-62 [elements of negligence action]; Rest.2d Torts, § 281 [same].)
[4] "The threshold element of a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a duty to use due care toward an interest of another that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion. [Citations.] Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court." (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51, 834 P.2d 745, 48 A.L.R.5th 835], citing Rest.2d Torts, § 281, subd. (a); 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, §§ 732, 748, pp. 60, 83.) [5a] Plaintiffs contend Dow Chemical owed them a duty of care in the conduct and reporting of its silicone toxicology research for Dow Corning.
Plaintiffs' claim, as indicated, is grounded in the theory of "Good Samaritan" or negligent undertaking liability articulated in section 324A. [2b] "The foundational requirement of the good Samaritan rule is that in order for liability to be imposed upon the actor, he must specifically have undertaken to perform the task that he is charged with having performed negligently, for without the actual assumption of the undertaking there can be no correlative [18 Cal.4th 615] duty to perform that undertaking carefully." (Blessing v. United States (E.D.Pa. 1978) 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1188-1189.)
As noted, whether Dow Chemical's alleged actions, if proven, would constitute an "undertaking" sufficient, within the meaning of section 324A's negligent undertaking theory, to give rise to an actionable duty of care is a legal question for the court. In some cases, however, as Dow Chemical acknowledges, there may be fact questions "about precisely what it was that the defendant undertook to do." That is, while "[t]he 'precise nature and extent' of [an alleged section 324A] duty 'is a question of law ... 'it depends on the nature and extent of the act undertaken, a question of fact.' " (Smith v. State (Alaska 1996) 921 P.2d 632, 634 [921 P.2d 632], citation omitted.) Thus, if the record can support competing inferences (ibid.), or if the facts are not yet sufficiently developed (Mays v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (3d Cir. 1963) 323 F.2d 174, 175-176), " 'an ultimate finding on the existence of a duty cannot be made prior to a hearing on the merits' " (id. at p. 176), and summary judgment is precluded. (Accord, Pratt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (2d Cir. 1992) 952 F.2d 667, 670; Blessing v. United States, supra, 447 F.Supp. at pp. 1188-1189; Santillo v. Chambersburg Engineering Co. (E.D.Pa. 1985) 603 F.Supp. 211, 214; Hodge v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. (Ala. 1989) 539 So.2d 229, 230-231.)
In this case, the record establishes that Dow Chemical undertook to conduct and report the items of silicone toxicology research listed by the Court of Appeal. Obviously, toxicology research for a medical manufacturer, by its nature, at least theoretically implicates the well-being and protection of third parties; that is, to undertake such research broadly implicates the well-being and protection of potential patients who ultimately may receive treatment developed on its basis. (Cf. Santillo v. Chambersburg Engineering Co., supra, 603 F.Supp. at p. 214 [defendant provided safety inspections of an employer's physical plant; court noted "[s]afety concerns, by their nature involve consideration of the well-being and protection of third parties: the employees"].) Nevertheless, "[t]he duty of a 'good Samaritan' is limited. Once he has performed his voluntary act he is not required to continue to render aid indefinitely." (Baker v. City of Los Angeles (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 902, 907 [233 Cal.Rptr. 760] [policeman who took gun from intoxicated husband "did not become a guarantor of [wife's] future safety"]; see also Andrews v. Wells (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 533, 541 [251 Cal.Rptr. 344] [bartender who twice arranged ride for intoxicated patron had no continuing duty to make such arrangements].) Thus, "a Good Samaritan who has performed a series of voluntary acts in the past is not thereafter required indefinitely to continue performing such acts into the future." (City of Santee v. County of San Diego (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1012 [259 Cal.Rptr. [18 Cal.4th 616] 757] [county sheriff's past reporting of traffic light outages gave rise to no continuing duty to make such reports].)
In 1964, Dow Corning established its own medical products division to market breast implants and other medical devices using silicone technology. It was not until 1991 that Dow Corning was required to submit to the FDA an application for approval of its silicone breast implants. Plaintiffs acknowledge that, in the 1970's and 1980's, Dow Corning conducted silicone [18 Cal.4th 617] toxicity testing in its own facilities. As mentioned, plaintiffs also acknowledge Dow Chemical has never made or sold any silicone gel breast implants. fn. 7 Although plaintiffs assert Dow Corning continued occasionally to rely on Dow Chemical researchers and facilities, the record, as the Court of Appeal noted, establishes that, after 1964, Dow Corning's medical products division employed its own staff of scientists; Dow Chemical and Corning, moreover, conducted no tests with respect to the safety of the actual breast implants Dow Corning marketed.
Plaintiffs contend the evidence that Dow Chemical formally lent Dow Corning its tradenames and goodwill (retaining inspection rights) in 1975 agreements raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Dow Chemical undertook Good Samaritan liability toward them. (Cf. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 680, 684-685 [81 Cal.Rptr. 519, 39 A.L.R.3d 173] [public policy imposed duty on publisher to use ordinary care in issuance of its seal and certification of quality so that consumers who relied thereon would not be unreasonably exposed to risk of harm].) Dow Chemical insists the agreements conferred no right or practical ability on Dow Chemical to control Dow Corning's application of Dow Chemical's research.
[5b] In sum, the record before the trial court on summary judgment would not support a finding that Dow Chemical's was "an undertaking of such breadth and magnitude as to create a duty on the part of Dow Chemical to ensure the safety of all of Dow Corning's silicone products." (Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants, supra, 113 F.3d at p. 1495.) Moreover, many years elapsed between Dow Chemical's seminal toxicology research activities on behalf of Dow Corning and plaintiffs' alleged injuries. When [18 Cal.4th 618] that research was done, any possible consequence for plaintiffs-who years later allegedly received medical treatments traceable to its influence-was exceedingly attenuated and remote. We conclude that, at the times Dow Chemical allegedly conducted or reported for Dow Corning the toxicology research services on which plaintiffs premise their section 324A claim, it cannot reasonably be concluded that Dow Chemical "should [have] recognize[d]" those services were "necessary for the protection of" (§ 324A) plaintiffs. Accordingly, under the theory articulated in section 324A, no duty of care running to plaintiffs arose from Dow Chemical's undertaking.
It follows that plaintiffs cannot establish the duty element of their section 324A cause of action against Dow Chemical, and that the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Dow Chemical therefore was correct (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10]). Accordingly, we need not address the other elements of plaintiffs' section 324A claim.
By way of background: Dow Chemical and Corning formed Dow Corning in 1943 to develop and produce silicones, and have owned it in equal shares ever since. Dow Chemical undertook to perform human toxicological research on silicones for biomedical applications on behalf of Dow Corning in 1948, and continued to do so until at least 1959. Dow Chemical's facilities were located adjacent to those of Dow Corning. Dow Corning designed, manufactured, and sold silicone breast implants in the period from 1961 to 1992. Plaintiffs were recipients of these or similar products, and allegedly suffered injury including physical harm as a result. Dow Corning filed a [18 Cal.4th 619] voluntary petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1995, and has since enjoyed the benefit of an automatic stay of the commencement or continuation of all actions or proceedings, including this one.
Under the law of negligence of California, Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), declares the general principle that "[e]very one is responsible ... for an[y] injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person ...." As to actors, it covers, in terms, "every one"-which embraces all those who perform human toxicological research on substances for biomedical applications, including entities such as Dow Chemical with regard to silicones on Dow Corning's behalf. As to victims, it covers, by implication, the general class of persons for whose protection the actor in question is required to exercise the demanded care or skill (see Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63 [271 P.2d 23]; see also Hosking v. San Pedro Marine, Inc. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 98, 106 [159 Cal.Rptr. 369] (conc. opn. of Hanson, J.) [reading Richards in light of Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a)])-which embraces all those who are subsequently exposed to any such substances, including plaintiffs who were recipients of Dow Corning silicone breast implants.
Restatement Second of Torts section 324A, which reflects California's law of negligence, declares a more specific principle, to the effect that "[o]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical [18 Cal.4th 620] harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect [sic: read, apparently, perform] his undertaking, if" "(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm," or "(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person," or "(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking." As to actors, it covers, in terms, anyone "who undertakes ... to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things"-which embraces all those who perform human toxicological research on substances for biomedical applications, including entities such as Dow Chemical with regard to silicones on Dow Corning's behalf. As to victims, it covers, in terms, the general class of persons for whose "protection" the actor in question should recognize his "services" are "necessary"-which embraces all those who are subsequently exposed to any such substances, including plaintiffs who were recipients of Dow Corning silicone breast implants.
In Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496], we stated: "Although it is true that some exceptions have been made to the general principle that a person is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances, it is clear that in the absence of statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by [Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a)], no such exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy." By parity of reasoning, the same is true of the more specific principle, which is set out in Restatement Second of Torts section 324A, that a person who undertakes to render services to another that he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things may be subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking.
Inasmuch as those who perform human toxicological research on substances for biomedical applications-including entities such as Dow Chemical with regard to silicones on Dow Corning's behalf-are not exempted by statutory law from the general principle of Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), or even from the more specific principle of Restatement Second of Torts section 324A, they should not be exempted from either one of them by decisional law, because such a result is not clearly supported by public policy. To be sure, any limitation of the "responsibility" or "liability" of such persons and entities under Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), or Restatement Second of Torts section 324A, respectively, might perhaps give an incentive to good work, through which many men and women could be helped. But it might also remove a deterrent against bad work, through [18 Cal.4th 621] which many men and women could be hurt. Before a court could reasonably consider any such limitation, it would have to have available for its scrutiny an empirically based cost-benefit analysis. An analysis of this sort, however, is apparently nonexistent.
When we read the majority's assertion of the "unforeseeability" by Dow Chemical of "any risk of physical harm" to plaintiffs in its context, we find it to be of no consequence. For reading it thus, we discover that it goes to [18 Cal.4th 622] proximate cause rather than duty. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 617.) Proximate cause, of course, was not the basis of the superior court's granting of Dow Chemical's summary judgment motion, and hence was not the basis of the Court of Appeal's sustaining of that action. Even if it had been, it could not have survived scrutiny. For it is generally a question that is not amenable to determination on summary judgment. (See, e.g., Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 56 [192 Cal.Rptr. 857, 665 P.2d 947].) It is not otherwise here.
­FN 1. We previously granted plaintiffs' and defendants' joint request that review as to defendant Corning Incorporated (Corning), only, be dismissed as improvidently granted.
­FN 2. Our factual recitation parallels (and occasionally supplements) that of the Court of Appeal. No party petitioned for rehearing to suggest the Court of Appeal omitted or misstated any material fact. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(2).)
­FN 3. The quotation is from plaintiffs' "Separate Statement of Disputed Facts," dated March 16, 1994, and submitted to the trial court in opposition to Dow Chemical's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs now assert "Dow Chemical marketed and sold Dow Corning breast implants in Europe, Central and South America, and Australia through its majority owned (and later wholly owned subsidiary) LePetite," citing asserted "new evidence" outside the record. Prior to oral argument in this matter, we denied both plaintiffs' "Motion to Allow the Production of Additional Evidence on Appeal and Request for Judicial Notice" and Dow Chemical's "Request for Judicial Notice/Notice of Lodging."
­FN 4. The published text of section 324A uses "protect" rather than "perform." Such was apparently a typographical error. (Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (D.Md. 1982) 532 F.Supp. 1348, 1351, fn. 5, citing Hill v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (5th Cir. 1970) 428 F.2d 112, 115, fn. 5.)
­FN 5. Statutory exceptions to Good Samaritan liability include immunities under certain, primarily emergent, circumstances for medical licensees (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 2395-2398), nurses (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 2727.5, 2861.5), dentists (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 1627.5), rescue teams (Health & Saf. Code, § 1317), paramedics (Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.104), those acting to remove food from the throat of a person choking (Health & Saf. Code, § 114180) andfirst aid volunteers (Gov. Code, § 50086). None of these statutory exceptions apply to our inquiry. (See generally, 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, §§ 279, 281, pp. 361, 364.)
­FN 6. Plaintiffs point also to a 1992 trade magazine article quoting Dow Chemical's president and chief executive officer as finding Dow Corning's silicone breast implants "beyond reproach," but concede the speaker was a member of Dow Corning's board of directors.
­FN 7. But see footnote 3, ante, discussing plaintiffs' citation of asserted "new evidence" to the contrary.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a summary judgment in a civil action. This case contains an issue concerning the direct liability of an entity which negligently tests a component of a manufacturer's product to a third party who is injured by the product. Issues ordered limited to (1) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the theory in Restatement Second of Torts section 324a, and (2) whether the review court's refusal to grant continuance will effect future litigants.
Thu, 07/09/1998 18 Cal.4th 604 S057133 Review - Civil Appeal closed; remittitur issued
1 Artiglio, Eda (Appellant)
2 Artiglio, Eda (Appellant)
Represented by B. James Pantone
Pantone & Spangler
3 Breast Implant Case (Amicus curiae)
4 Product Liability Defendants (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Jack B. Mccowan
5 Corning, Inc. (Respondent)
Represented by Angela Christine Agrusa
6 Corning, Inc. (Respondent)
Represented by Peter W. James
7 Corning, Inc. (Respondent)
Represented by Cary W. Miller
8 Corning, Inc. (Respondent)
Represented by Richard R. Spirra
9 Dow Chemical (Respondent)
Represented by Anthony G. Brazil
10 Health Care Providers Tech. (Respondent)
11 Product Liability Advisory Council (Amicus curiae)
12 Washington Legal Foundation (Amicus curiae)
13 Medical Device Manufacturers (Respondent)
McKenna & Cuenio, LLP
1900 "K" Street, N.W.
14 Dow Chemical Company (Respondent)
Represented by Daniel G. Jarcho
1900 K Street, N. W.
15 Dow Chemical Company (Respondent)
Represented by Herbert L. Zarov
Michele Odorizzi, Esq.
16 Medical Device Manufacturers (Respondent)
Represented by Stanley W. Landfair
18 California Manufacturers Association (Amicus curiae)
980 Ninth St #2200
333 South Grand Ave #3400
Jul 9 1998 Opinion: Affirmed
By Counsel for Aplts Eda Artiglio, Et Al. two Doghouses w/Petn.
Nov 18 1996 Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice filed
Application of Herbert L. Zarov and Michele L. Odorizzi for Admission Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Resp the Dow Chemical Company
Nov 19 1996 Received:
C/A Record D021243 two Doghouses (2 of 4)
Nov 22 1996 Answer to petition for review filed
Respondent Corning Incorporation
Nov 26 1996 Answer to petition for review filed
Resp the Dow Chemical Company, 40n
Dec 12 1996 Telephone conversation with:
Ca4/1 (Jill) -- requested for Record Vols.#3 & #4
Dec 13 1996 Received:
CA Record in D021243 - Vols. 3 and 4 (2 Doghouses)
Review to 1/31/97
Jan 15 1997 Petition for Review Granted (civil case)
Votes: George,CJ, Mosk, Kennard, Werdegar,JJ.
Feb 14 1997 Opening brief on the merits filed
By Aplts. with one Vol of Exhibits.
Feb 18 1997 Motion filed (in non-AA proceeding)
Motion by appellants Eda Artiglio et Al., to allow the production of additional evidence along with three declarations.
Feb 19 1997 Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice granted
Herbert L. Zarov, Esq. and Michele L. Odorizzi, Esq to on behalf of defendant/respondent The Dow Chemical Company.
Resp the Down Chemical Company answer brief/merits (asking to 4/15/97)
Feb 26 1997 Issues ordered limited
Did trial court err in granting summary judgment on theory in Restatement Second of Torts sec 324a (petition, issues 4 & 5)? Will not review court's refusal to grant continuance or effect of judgment on future litigants (petition, issues 1, 2 & 3). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.2) Chin, J. did not participate
Feb 26 1997 Extension of time granted
Respondent Dow Chemical Company's answer brief on the merits to & including 4/15/97.
Mar 3 1997 Opposition filed
Respondent the Dow Chemical Company's Opposition to Appellant's motion to Allow Additional Evidence and request for Judicial Notice.
Answer Brf/merits to 4-15-97 Respondent Corning Incorporated...Nat Ok to Grant. Order Being Prepared.
Mar 7 1997 Filed document entitled:
Supplemental Declaration of Angela C. Agrusa Re Application for Ext.of time to Serve and file Corning Inc's answer brief on the merits.
To & Including April 15, 1997 To Serve & file Resp's (Corning Inc.) answer brief on the merits.
Mar 31 1997 Filed letter from:
Counsel for Resp Dow
Letter from Baker and Hostetler dated April 11th Seeking Withdrawl of Petn as to Corning Inc. Only.
Apr 15 1997 Request for Judicial Notice filed
/Notice of Lodging Respondent the Dow Chemical Company
Apr 15 1997 Answer brief on the merits filed
Respondent Corning Incorporated
Respondent the Dow Chemical Company
May 5 1997 Motion filed (in non-AA proceeding)
Motion by appellant Artiglio requesting preference on court calendar pursuant to California Rules of Court 19.3 & 41.
May 5 1997 Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
By Applts Artiglio Et Al
Aplts' motion for Calendar Preference Is denied.
May 23 1997 Received letter from:
Joseph L. Dunn, Plaintiff's Liaison Counsel, Re Court's letter of 5-9-97 and Authority to Act.
May 30 1997 Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., supporting Respondents"Dow Chemical" (App & Brf Under Same Cover)
Jun 4 1997 Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
By Washington Legal Foundation in support of Respondent Dow Chemical (brief Under Same Cover)
And brief of Medical Device Manufacturers Assn in support of Resp the Dow Chemical Company. [brief Separate]
California Chamber of Commerce & California Manufacturers Association [Respondent Dow Chemical]
By California Medical Association in support of Respondents (brief Under Same Cover) received in LA Office on June 4, 1997
Jun 9 1997 Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
By Washington Legal Foundation in support of Respondent Dow Chemical
Jun 9 1997 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Washington Legal Foundation in support of Resp Dow Chemical. answer Due June 30, 1997
By Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc, in support of Resps
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., in support of Respondents. answer Due June 30, 1997
Medical Device Manufacturers in support of Respondent Dow Chemical Company
Medical Device Manufacturers in support of Resp Dow Checmical Company
Jun 12 1997 Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
California Medical Association in support of Resps answer Due 20 Days of filing brief [7-2-97]
Jun 12 1997 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
California Medical Association in support of Resps
By California Chamber of Commerce and California Manufacturers Association in support of Resp. Dow Chemical
Calif. Chamber of Commerce and Calif. Manufactur- Ers Assoc. in support of Resp. Dow Chemical answer Due July 2, 1997
Jun 16 1997 Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
And brief of the Assn for Calif Tort Reform in support of Resps [Late 12 Days]
Jun 26 1997 Application to file Amicus Brief Denied
The Associatioin of California Tort Reform in support of Resps Is denied as Untimely. [Original returned to Counsel - letter Sent]
Jul 1 1997 Letter sent to:
Aty B. James Pantone asking whether as Sole Pltfs Rep appearing on Petn/Rev Concur w/joint Reqst for Dismissal of Review as to Corning, Inc., Only.>>>> Response to Court's Inquiry should be Addressed to the Clerk of the Court, by Lettr, on or before July 17, 1997. (See Rossi's Ltr)
Jul 17 1997 Received letter from:
Pantone and Spangler Re Court's letter of July 1st
Jul 30 1997 Order filed
The joint request of plaintiffs/petitioners Eda Artiglio et al. and defendant/respondent Corning Inc. to dismiss review as improvidently granted as to defendant/respondent Corning only is granted. The Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1 is directed to issue a partial remttitur consistent with this order. Chin, J. did not participate. Votes: George C.J., Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar & Brown JJ.
Dec 23 1997 Change of Address filed for:
Counsel for Appellants Eda Artiglio Law Firm of Robinson, Phillips & Calcagnie
Tuesday, May 5, 1998 @ 1:30pm
Apr 23 1998 Request for judicial notice denied
Appellant's motion to allow the production of additional evidence on appeal & request for judicial notice is denied. Respondent Dow Chemical's request for judicial notice/notice of lodging is denied.
Apr 24 1998 Received document entitled:
Supplemental brief of Respondent the Dow Chemical Company [Citing New Authority]
May 4 1998 Change of Address filed for:
Attorney B. James Pantone
Jul 9 1998 Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
Majority Opinion by Werdegar, J. -- joined by George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Brown & Callahan (assigned) JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Mosk, J
Aug 11 1998 Remittitur Issued
Certified copies to Dca4/1
Receipt for Remittitur Signed by D. Schonenberg, Deputy Clerk, Ca4/1.
B. James Pantone (Pantone & Spangler)
Carrie-Lee Coke (980 Ninth St #2200)
Curtis A. Cole (Thelen Marrin Et Al)
Peter W. James (Baker & Hostetler)
Cary W. Miller (Luce Forward Hamilton & Scripps)
Angela Christine Agrusa (Baker & Hostetler LLP)
Richard R. Spirra (Luce Forward Hamilton et al)
Anthony G. Brazil (Morris Polich & Purdy)
Daniel G. Jarcho (Mckenna & Cuneo, L.L.P.)
Herbert L. Zarov (Mayer, Brown & Platt)
Stanley W. Landfair (Mckenna & Cuneo, Llp)
Jack B. Mccowan (Gordon & Rees)
Susan W. Liebeler (P. O. Box 4362)
SCOCAL, Artiglio v. Corning Inc. , 18 Cal.4th 604 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/artiglio-v-corning-inc-31894) (last visited Wednesday August 5, 2020).