Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/36/821/563514/
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 13:57:21
Document Index: 246955462

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 844', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 5861', '§ 2', '§ 5861', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 844', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 844', '§ 1111']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Glen Mathews, Defendant-appellant, 36 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1994 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Glen Mathews, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Glen Mathews, Defendant-appellant, 36 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1994)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 36 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1994) Argued and Submitted April 5, 1994. Decided Sept. 13, 1994
After a jury trial, Mathews was found guilty of Count 1, conspiracy with Webb to bomb property in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 844(i); of Count 2 of bombing property in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i); of Count 3, using and carrying a firearm (the bomb) during and in relation to the crime of violence charged in Count 2, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) (1) and (2); of Count 5, being a felon in possession of a firearm (the bomb) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) (1) and 924(e) (1); of Count 6, unlawfully manufacturing the bomb in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(f), 5871, and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and of Count 7, being in unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm (the bomb) in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He was sentenced to 15 years and 8 months imprisonment on Count 2 and to 30 years imprisonment, consecutive to Count 2, on Count 3, and to terms concurrent with his Count 2 conviction as to the other counts, his total sentence being 45 years and 8 months.
Mathews vigorously contends that sentencing on Counts 2 and 3 constitutes double jeopardy and double punishment for the same conduct. He concedes that Congress may impose multiple punishments for the same conduct without violating the Constitution, Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1145, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981), but observes that there is still a requirement that there actually be "two offenses" and the test "is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id., (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932)).
In the case of bank robbery committed with a firearm, Congress intended both to punish the bank robbery effected with the weapons (which is a crime distinct from unarmed bank robbery) and to add a mandatory penalty for the use of the gun in connection with the robbery as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991, 108 S. Ct. 1298, 99 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1988). The bank robbery case is the appropriate analogy here. Congress intended to punish both the crime of violence effected by the use of the bomb under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and, cumulatively, to add the punishment for carrying the bomb in relation to this crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) and (2). Mathews's action in transporting Webb and the bomb to the alley where it was placed is the fact which makes him liable under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). It is a fact distinct from the use of the bomb which makes him liable under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K1.4(c) (1).
Having correctly determined that the cross-reference applied, the district court went on to conclude that the most analogous guideline was that for attempted murder, Sec. 2A2.1. Under that section, the base offense level is 28 if the object of the offense would have constituted murder in the first degree, otherwise it is 22. The district court settled on the base offense level of 28, and then increased by four levels, as permitted under Sec. 2A2.1(b) (1), because "the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury." U.S.S.G. Sec. 2A2.1(b) (1).
While the district court finds facts for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 1564, 118 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1992), this court reviews the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Notrangelo, 909 F.2d 363, 364 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carvajal, 905 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Christman, 894 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1990).
In this case the question is whether Mathews had the intent required for first degree murder, so as to be liable to sentencing under the guideline for attempted murder, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2A2.1(a) (1). Application note 2 to that guideline refers one to the following definition of first degree murder.
18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). The specific intent required for attempted murder is not, of course, described by the two clauses describing felony murder and transferred intent. Therefore, the appropriate question is whether the district court clearly erred by finding that Mathews, with premeditation, wilfully, deliberately and maliciously attempted to kill someone.1 The majority, however, inverts the inquiry on review by insisting that the fact found be at least "clear by a preponderance of the evidence ...," opinion at 823, before it survives review.
An expert witness testified at trial that " [t]he purpose of additional shrapnel to [sic] the interior of the device is--is for anti-personnel purposes. Add more shrapnel and fragmentation to your device, increase your chance of killing or injuring personnel."