Source: http://openjurist.org/94/f3d/648/holt-v-s-chater
Timestamp: 2016-05-05 10:42:41
Document Index: 127815122

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 404', '§ 28', '§ 28']

94 F3d 648 Holt v. S Chater | OpenJurist
94 F. 3d 648 - Holt v. S Chater Home
94 F3d 648 Holt v. S Chater 94 F.3d 648
Karla Ann HOLT, o/b/o Billy D. Gipson, Appellant,v.Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social SecurityAdministration, Appellee.
No. 95-3479.
Submitted: July 25, 1996.Filed: August 7, 1996.
Holt filed an application for surviving child's benefits on behalf of Billy on the record of the deceased worker, Charles B. Darter, Jr., who she alleged was Billy's father. Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, on the ground that she had not established that Darter was Billy's father under either Arkansas law or the Social Security Act (the Act). After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that paternity could be adjudicated before an ALJ, citing Zahradnik v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 355, 356 (8th Cir.1992). Based on Holt's testimony and blood test results showing a 96.32% probability that Darter was Billy's father, the ALJ concluded that substantial evidence existed that Billy was Darter's son and was entitled to benefits.
We review the Commissioner's decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Robinson v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 665, 668 (8th Cir.1994); Walker v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam).
As relevant to this case, Holt could prove paternity either by showing that Billy was entitled to take Darter's intestate personal property under Arkansas law, see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), or by demonstrating "by evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner" that Darter was Billy's father and "was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died," see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a) & (d) (1995).
We agree with the Commissioner that the ALJ was not competent to adjudicate paternity under Arkansas law, because Arkansas does not have a statute corresponding to the Oregon law which allowed the ALJ to adjudicate paternity in Zahradnik. The relevant Arkansas statute states in part that an illegitimate child may inherit property from his father provided that "a court of competent jurisdiction has established the paternity of the child." Ark.Code Ann. § 28-9-209(d)(1) (Michie 1987). Arkansas Chancery Court was the court of competent jurisdiction in which Holt should have brought a paternity action after Darter's death. See In re Estate of F.C., 900 S.W.2d 200, 200-01 (Ark.1995). Holt has not established paternity in Arkansas court or otherwise shown that Billy is entitled to inherit Darter's personal property under Arkansas law.
Finally, we decline to reach Holt's due process and equal protection challenge to Ark.Code Ann. § 28-9-209(d), because the issue was not sufficiently raised below. See Clarke v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir.1988).