Source: http://www.flra.gov/decisions/v53/53-042.html
Timestamp: 2015-05-28 14:02:35
Document Index: 292703622

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7116', '§ 7116', '§7116', '§ 7114', '§ 7116', '§\n7116', '§ 7114', '§ 7116']

53:0312(42)CA - - Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Standiford Air Traffic Control Tower, Louisville, KY and National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Local SDF - - 1997 FLRAdec CA - - v53 p312 | FLRA.GOV
Authority Chairman and Members Find Types of Cases, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Office of the General Counsel Regional Offices, Guidances, Policies, Manuals, ULP Process, Forms, Representation, ADR Services, and Training.Federal Service Impasses Panel Find Jurisdiction, Statute, Work Schedules Act, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Solicitor, Administrative Law Judges, IG & Others Find General Information about these Offices and Contact Information.training & alternative dispute resolutionFind FLRA Training Information and ADR Services. 53:0312(42)CA - - Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Standiford Air Traffic Control Tower, Louisville, KY and National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Local SDF - - 1997 FLRAdec CA - - v53 p312 [ v53 p312 ] 53:0312(42)CA
The decision of the Authority follows: 53 FLRA No. 42 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION STANDIFORD AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY (Respondent) and NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
ASSOCIATION MEBA/NMU, (AFL-CIO) LOCAL SDF (Charging Party/Union) CH-CA-50496 CH-CA-50497 _____ DECISION AND ORDER August 29, 1997 _____ Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair; and Donald S.
Wasserman, Member. I. Statement of the Case This consolidated unfair labor practice case is before the Authority on
exceptions to the attached decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed by
the General Counsel. The Respondent did not file an opposition to the General
Counsel's exceptions. The consolidated complaint alleges, as relevant here, that the
Labor-Managment Relations Statute (the Statute) by refusing to sign and
implement an agreement with the Union concerning the design and layout of a
planned new facility at the Standiford Air Traffic Control Tower, Louisville,
Kentucky (Tower). The Judge recommended dismissal of the complaint. Upon consideration of the Judge's decision and the entire record, we
herewith. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that the Respondent
violated the Statute. II. Background and Judge's Decision This case concerns whether a substantive agreement on the design
and layout of a new facility resulted from "collective bargaining" within the
meaning of section 7103(a)(12) of the Statute.(1) The Judge found that the agreement did not
result from collective bargaining, and the General Counsel takes exception to
that finding. The facts are fully set forth in the Judge's decision and are
summarized below. The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) represents a
nationwide unit of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) employees, including
the employees assigned to the Tower. A. Events before April 1994 After the FAA authorized construction of a new facility at the Tower,
the Union President sought on several occasions to negotiate with the Tower's
Air Traffic Manager (the Manager) about the design and layout of the facility,
including the establishment of a multipurpose room at the facility. The Manager
declined to negotiate on the basis that he did not have the authority to enter
into an agreement with the Union on this matter. The Union President filed an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge with
the FLRA's Atlanta Region concerning the Respondent's alleged refusal to
negotiate. Subsequently, the Union President received a letter from the FAA on
the subject of the pending ULP charge, stating that the Manager was prepared to
negotiate with the Union concerning the new facility. However, when the Union
President approached the Manager in another attempt to begin negotiations, the
Manager again told the Union President that he did not have the authority to
negotiate. Thereafter, the Manager proposed to the Union President the formation
of a planning committee, consisting of two unit members and two management
representatives, to take over all planning for the facility. Under the
Manager's proposal, the committee "would have the authority to make decisions
on all matters concerning the new facility . . . ." Judge's Decision at 5. The
Union responded that, due to the pending ULP charge, it was inappropriate for
anyone other than the Manager and the Union President to handle the issues.
In January 1994, the FLRA's Atlanta Regional Director issued a
complaint on the ULP charge, with a hearing scheduled for April 1994. In March
1994, after having begun attending planning sessions a month earlier, the Union
President asked that the Manager either begin negotiations as management's
authorized representative or provide the name of someone who had the authority
to negotiate. The FAA assured the Union President that the Manager was ready to
meet with him and "resolve the issues in a partnership environment." Id.
at 6. B. Events during and after April 1994 On April 10, 1994, the Union withdrew its ULP charge based on the FAA's
assurances that the Manager was ready to meet with the Union President and
resolve the issues in a partnership environment and "on the condition that FAA
was willing to negotiate over the new facility and send an authorized
representative to the bargaining table." Id. Subsequently, on numerous occasions over an 8-month period, the Union
President met with the Manager and the other participants at the sessions to
discuss the facility's design and layout.(2) At these sessions, the Union President
submitted proposals for the Union. When the subject of the multipurpose room
arose, the Manager supported the inclusion of a multipurpose room in the
plans. On January 18, 1995, the Union President met with the Manager and the
other participants at the sessions to discuss the plans. At management's
request, the Union President drafted a blueprint that included the multipurpose
room. The following day, the participants agreed on that blueprint. On February 8, 1995, the Union President requested the Manager to
execute a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) incorporating the parties'
agreement on the layout and design of the facility. The Manager refused to sign
the MOU because "the size of the facility was being questioned by FAA
Headquarters" and "he did not have authority to commit FAA to a specific
building size through any local agreement." Id. at 8-9. After the Manager refused to sign the MOU, and on learning that the FAA
planned to eliminate the multipurpose room for budgetary reasons, the Union
filed the ULP charges that led to the consolidated complaint. C. Judge's Decision The Judge recommended dismissal of the consolidated complaint. He
determined that the Respondent did not violate the Statute when it refused to
sign and implement the result of the planning sessions.(3) He found that the sessions "were not
negotiations in the collective bargaining sense and that no agreement was
reached, in the collective bargaining sense." Id. at 13. According to
the Judge, "there was a fundamental confusion and disconnect" because the
Manager thought he was engaging [the Union] in more meaningful and
cooperative partnership discussions aimed at reaching a plan agreeable to all
participants that could then be submitted to FAA headquarters for approval.
[The Union President] apparently thought these planning sessions were converted
to negotiations and that any resulting agreement would be binding on both NATCA
and FAA. Id. at 14. The Judge concluded that there was no meeting of the minds with respect to the fundamental
nature of the planning sessions and their result and, thus, there was no
negotiated agreement as to the layout of the new [facility], in the collective
bargaining sense. Therefore[,] there is no agreement with respect to the layout
of the new facility that FAA was obligated to sign or implement . . .
. Id. The Judge stated that if he had found that "there had been a
meeting of the minds and a negotiated agreement as to the layout of the new
facility had been reached," then he would have found that the Respondent
violated the Statute when it refused to sign and abide by the agreement.
Id. at n.6. The Judge also rejected the General Counsel's contention that the
Respondent violated the Statute by failing to send a fully authorized
representative to the bargaining table to negotiate about the new facility. The
Judge found that the Manager "had full authority to bargain about the new
layout and planning of the new facility." Id. at 15.(4) III. General Counsel's Exceptions The General Counsel contends that the Judge's conclusion--that the
parties' agreement to include a multipurpose room at the facility was not an
agreement in the "collective bargaining sense"--has no basis in fact or law and
is inconsistent with his own findings. Exceptions at 8. According to the
General Counsel, the record demonstrates that the agreement reached by the
parties was arrived at through "collective bargaining," as defined in section
7103(a)(12) of the Statute. In this regard, the General Counsel argues that the Judge erred in
finding that the nature of the discussions after April 1994 did not differ from
the nature of the earlier discussions. According to the General Counsel, there
were the following "dramatic" changes: (1) a complaint had issued
from the Atlanta Region and "litigation loomed" (id. at 14) over
the Manager's refusal to bargain with the Union President; (2) in
settlement of the complaint, management agreed that the Manager would meet with
the Union President and resolve the matter; and (3) in view of the FAA's
willingness to negotiate and resolve this matter, the Union withdrew the ULP
charge and spent the next 8 months working closely with the Respondent on
the design and layout of the facility. Additionally, the General Counsel contends that the Judge erred by
improperly taking into account the fact that the agreement "was reached in a
labor-management partnership environment[.]" Id. at 12. The General
Counsel also asserts that the Respondent never told the Union President that
any agreements reached during the sessions were subject to higher-level
approval. Therefore, according to the General Counsel, it was reasonable for
the Union President to assume that the parties were negotiating and that, as
the Judge found, the Manager had authority to resolve the issue. The General Counsel requests that the Authority order the Respondent
to: (1) sign the MOU and implement and abide by its terms, including the
provision for a multipurpose room at the new facility; and (2) post an
appropriate notice signed by the FAA Administrator. IV. Analysis and Conclusions A. The Respondent Committed an Unfair Labor Practice By Refusing to
Sign and Implement the MOU Section 7114(a)(4) of the Statute requires agencies and exclusive
representatives, "through appropriate representatives, [to] meet and negotiate
in good faith for the purpose of arriving at a collective bargaining
agreement." Section 7103(a)(8) defines "collective bargaining agreement" as "an
agreement entered into as a result of collective bargaining . . . ."
"Collective bargaining" is defined in section 7103(a)(12), as set forth above
at note 1. Under section 7114(b), the duty of an agency and an exclusive
representative includes the obligation to negotiate "with a sincere resolve to
reach a collective bargaining agreement[.]" If an agreement is reached, the
parties are obligated, on the request of any party to the negotiations, to
execute a written document embodying the agreed terms. U.S. Department of
the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing and International Plate
Printers, Die Stampers and Engravers Union, Washington Plate Printers Union,
Local 2, 44 FLRA 926, 938 (1992); U.S. Department of the Navy,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 44 FLRA 205, 206
(1992); Internal Revenue Service, Philadelphia District Office,
22 FLRA 245, 255 (1986)). An agreement, for purposes
of section 7114(b)(5) of the Statute, is one in which authorized
which they have been bargaining. International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots and Panama Canal Commission, 36 FLRA 555, 560 (1990). In
determining whether a party has fulfilled its bargaining obligation, the
Authority considers the totality of the circumstances in a given case.
E.g., Army and Air Force Exchange Service, 52 FLRA 290, 304
(1996); U.S. Department of the Air Force Headquarters, Air Force Logistics
Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 36 FLRA 524, 531 (1990).(5)	In this case, the sole issue in dispute is whether
the substantive agreement on the design and layout of the new facility resulted
from "collective bargaining" within the meaning of section 7103(a)(12) of the
Statute.(6) For the following reasons, we
conclude that it did. The record demonstrates, and it is undisputed,
that: (1) the complaint issued in January 1994, shortly before the scheduled
hearing in April 1994, alleging that the Respondent was refusing to negotiate
with the Union on the design and layout of the facility; (2) management
assured the Union President in April 1994 that the Manager was ready to
meet with him and resolve the issues concerning the facility; (3) the
Union's agreement in April 1994 to withdraw the complaint was based on the
FAA's assurances that the Manager would meet with the Union President and
resolve the issues; (4) the Respondent was aware that this was the reason for
the withdrawal of the complaint; and (5) the Union President spent the next
8 months working closely with the Respondent on the design and layout of
the facility and presenting proposals on behalf of the Union. These circumstances demonstrate that, whatever the
nature of the discussions was prior to April 1994, the discussions from April
1994 through January 1995 involved substantial joint involvement of the Union
President and representatives of the Respondent in an attempt to reach
agreement on the design and layout of the facility. Over the 8-month period,
there were five meetings at the Regional Airport Authority office conference
room (Tr. 54-55, 107-08). The meetings involved discussions about the exterior
and interior of the facility (Tr. 55-56; 108). The Union President was "quite a
bit more" involved than in the meetings before April 1994 (Tr. 56). The
Union President did not discuss ground rules for negotiations because the Union
was "trying to work within the partnership environment." Id. In attempting to resolve issues through
partnership, the Union President testified that such an approach did not mean
"ignor[ing] the [S]tatute." Tr. 122. According to the Union President, he and
the Manager "were just trying to figure out a better way to do business than to
fight each other." Tr. 123. Proposals were presented by "both sides" (Tr.
57); the plans that were drafted during these sessions were partially based on
Union proposals (Tr. 60) and included a multi-purpose room (Tr. 66). Agreement
was reached at the last session, and employees were told about the
agreement, including the multi-purpose room, by the Union and management (Tr.
70-71). The fact that the sessions were conducted in a
partnership atmosphere, as opposed to "traditional" collective bargaining, does
not preclude a conclusion that the sessions constituted collective bargaining
within the meaning of the Statute. The definition of collective
bargaining set forth in section 7103(a)(12) does not prescribe any
particular method in which collective bargaining must occur. It is well-recognized that collective bargaining may occur in a
variety of ways, including the use of collaborative or partnership methods.
See, e.g., E.O. 12871; Walton et al., Strategic
Negotiations (1994) at 31-33; Bluestone and Bluestone, Negotiating the
Future (1992) at 155-64.(7) Moreover, the Manager never informed the Union
President during this period that any agreement reached during the sessions was
merely tentative. This fact supports the conclusion that the agreement reached
was a binding one, subject only to approval by the agency head under section
7114(c)(1) of the Statute. See National Council of Social Security
Administration Field Operations Locals - Council 220, American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 21 FLRA 319, 320, 331-32 (1986) (SSA)
(where union negotiator possessed at least apparent authority to bind the
union, and the union failed to prove that the agency had prior knowledge that
any agreement reached by the negotiator was subject to approval of higher-level
union official, the union was required to sign a written memorandum of
understanding embodying the agreed-upon terms). Upon consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, and applying an objective standard to determine whether a
contract was formed, we conclude that, from April 1994 through January 1995,
the parties were engaged in collective bargaining and reached a collective
bargaining agreement within the meaning of the Statute.(8) Noting the Judge's undisputed finding
that the Manager "had full authority to bargain about the new layout and
planning" of the facility (Judge's Decision at 15) and the fact that there is
no dispute either as to the substance of the terms that resulted from the
sessions or as to the Respondent's refusal to sign the MOU, we also conclude
that the Respondent committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to sign and
implement the MOU. See Judge's Decision at 14 note 6 (stating that if
the Judge had found that the parties had reached a negotiated agreement, he
would have concluded that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and
(8) when it refused to sign and abide by the agreement). In reaching these conclusions, we encourage
parties to establish a common understanding at the outset of their discussions
as to what they intend such discussions to constitute. Clarity about ground
rules, such as whether the expected product of the discussions is a
recommendation or an agreement, may assist parties in avoiding disputes and the
unnecessary expenditure of resources on litigation. B. Remedy Where, as here, a respondent has committed an
unfair labor practice by failing to execute an agreement, the Authority
typically directs the respondent to implement the agreement. E.g.,
Veterans Administration Outpatient Clinic, Los Angeles, California,
22 FLRA 399, 400 (1986) (implement the agreement consonant with laws and
regulations governing the matters that are the subject of the agreement);
SSA, 21 FLRA at 322 (sign the agreement upon request of the
charging party); Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California and
FEMTC, AFL-CIO, 7 FLRA 102, 103 (1981) (take action in conformity with
agreement). Consistent with this precedent, we order the Respondent to
implement the agreement. Although the passage of time may have created
circumstances which would affect implementation, they have not been brought to
the Authority's attention. First, as the Respondent did not file an opposition
to the General Counsel's exceptions, it did not respond to the remedy sought by
the General Counsel or raise any concerns about implementing such a remedy at
this time. Second, the record does not establish the current status of the new
facility at the Tower. In these circumstances, rejection of the requested
remedy is not warranted. Cf. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Uintah &
Ouray Area Office, Ft. Duchesne, Utah, 52 FLRA 629, 642 (1996) (Chair
Segal dissenting as to other matters) (where the General Counsel's requested
remedy was rendered moot, the Authority concluded that it would not effectuate
the purposes and policies of the Statute to grant the requested remedy);
Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest Mountain Region, Renton,
Washington, 51 FLRA 35, 37 (1995) (FAA, Northwest Mountain Region)
(General Counsel requested the imposition of time limits on bargaining over
design features of airport facilities so that an agreement could be reached
before the projected opening of a new airport; the Authority denied the request
because the record showed that the new airport had opened and, therefore, the
expressed reason for the request no longer existed); Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, Washington, D.C., 44 FLRA 575, 587 (1992) (in view
of the impracticality and disruption to on-going construction that would be
caused by requiring the respondent to return to earlier parking arrangements,
the Authority concluded that a status quo ante remedy was
not appropriate). If issues arise concerning the effect of the
passage of time on the remedy, such issues may appropriately be considered
during compliance proceedings. Cf. FAA, Northwest Mountain
Region, 51 FLRA at 37 (any assertion that either party failed to meet its
duty to bargain would be appropriately raised at the compliance stage of the
proceeding); U.S. Geological Survey and Caribbean District Office, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, 50 FLRA 548, 552 (1995) (considerations affecting
reinstatement of discharged employees and computation of their backpay are
matters for consideration during compliance proceedings). Finally, we note that, as part of its remedial
orders, the Authority typically directs the posting of a notice signed by the
highest official of the activity responsible for the violation. E.g.,
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, D.C., 48 FLRA 1400,
1402 (1994). In its exceptions, the General Counsel requests that the notice be
signed by the FAA Administrator, whereas in its post-hearing brief to the
Judge, the General Counsel requested that the notice be signed by the Tower's
Air Traffic Manager. As no reason to depart from Authority's typical practice
has been alleged, it is appropriate that the notice be signed by the Tower's
Air Traffic Manager as the highest official of the activity responsible for the
violation. Accordingly, consistent with Authority precedent, we order the
Manager to sign the notice. V. Order Pursuant to section 2423.29 of our Regulations and
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Standiford
Air Traffic Control Tower, Louisville, Kentucky, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing and refusing to implement the
agreement with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, MEBA/NMU,
(AFL-CIO), Local SDF, the exclusive representative of bargaining unit
employees, concerning the design and layout of the planned new facility at the Standiford Air Traffic Control
Tower, Louisville, Kentucky, consonant with laws and regulations governing such
matters. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering
by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. 2. Take the following affirmative action in order
to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute: (a) Implement the agreement reached with the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, MEBA/NMU, (AFL-CIO), Local SDF, the exclusive representative of bargaining
unit employees, concerning the design and layout of the planned new facility at the Standiford Air Traffic Control
matters. (b) Post at its facilities copies of the attached
receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the Manager, Standiford Air Traffic Control Tower, Louisville,
Kentucky, and shall be posted and maintained for
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's
Regulations, notify the Regional Director of the Chicago Region, Federal Labor
Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days of the date of this Order, as
to what steps have been taken to comply. NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
that the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration,
Standiford Air Traffic Control Tower, Louisville, Kentucky, violated the
and abide by this Notice. We hereby notify bargaining unit employees
that: WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to implement the
matters. WE WILL NOT in any like
or related manner, interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
Statute. WE WILL implement the agreement reached with the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, MEBA/NMU, (AFL-CIO), Local SDF,
the exclusive representative of bargaining unit employees, concerning the
design and layout of the planned new facility at the Standiford Air Traffic
Control Tower, Louisville, Kentucky, consonant with laws and regulations
governing such matters. _________________________________ (Agency) Dated:______________ By:
the Regional Director, Chicago Regional Office, whose address is: 55 West
Monroe, Suite 1150, Chicago, IL. 60603-9729, and whose telephone number is:
(312) 353-6306. UNITED STATES OF
20424-0001 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, STANDIFORD AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
TOWER, LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY Respondent and NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION, MEBA/NMU, (AFL-CIO) LOCAL SDF Charging Party Case Nos. CH-CA-50496 CH-CA-50497 Charles Oxford, Esq.For the
Respondent Gary J. Liebermann, Esq. For the General
Counsel of the FLRA Before: SAMUEL A. CHAITOVITZChief
Administrative Law judge DECISION Statement of the Case This case arose under the Federal Service
2411, et seq. Based upon unfair labor practice charges filed by
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO (NATCA), Local
SDF (NATCA Local SDF or Union), against U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration, Standiford Air Traffic Control Tower,
Louisville, Kentucky (FAA or Respondent), a Complaint and Notice of Hearing was
Director for the Chicago Region of the FLRA alleging that Respondent violated
§ 7116(a)(1),(5) and (8) of the Statute. Respondent filed an answer
denying the substantive allegations of the Complaint. A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky. All
parties were afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence. The GC of the FLRA and the
FAA filed briefs, which have been fully considered. Based upon the entire record(1), including my observation of the
conclusions and recommendations. Findings of Fact A. Background. NATCA is the certified exclusive representative of
a unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining at Respondent. NATCA
represents approximately 45 air traffic control specialists at Respondent's
Standiford Air Traffic Control Tower (Standiford Tower or Standiford facility)
as part of a nationwide bargaining unit. NATCA and FAA are parties to a
nationwide collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Standiford facility is located in the FAA's
Southern Region and is a terminal radar approach control whose mission is the
expeditious flow of air traffic, and to provide air traffic service to the
users of the air space. The current Standiford Tower was constructed in the
late 1960's, and is approximately 7500 square feet. The current facility
consists of an operations area, and a tower, that includes approxi-mately five
or six staff offices, management offices, a union
office, a break room, and a training room that is approximately 110 square
feet. The current Standiford facility does not have a conference room, and
staff meetings are generally held in the training room or off site at the
Regional Airport Authority, approximately a half mile away. Airways Facility, a component of the FAA that
maintains equipment for air traffic at the Standiford facility, is located in a
temporary office near the facility. Airways Facility employs approximately ten
to fifteen technicians, who are represented by another labor organization, the
Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS). B. FAA Authorized Construct of a New Standiford Air
Traffic Control Tower in 1991; NATCA Local SDF Submits a Request to
Negotiate. In 1991, shortly before Theodore J. Clark, Jr.
became Air Traffic Manager at Standiford Tower, FAA authorized construction of
a new Standiford Tower. The Standiford airport was being expanded, which
required the relocation of the current air traffic control tower to a new
location. Originally, the facility was authorized a base building of 14,500
square feet. It was anticipated that the new facility, which would include the
administrative offices of Airways Facilities, would be large enough to support
an additional 10 to 15 employees hired for air traffic control. 1. NATCA Local SDF Requests to Negotiate About
the New Facility. Mark Hood became the President of NATCA Local
SDF in June or July 1992. During his tenure as Union President, Hood has
negotiated with Clark, the Air Traffic Manager, on a variety of subjects
including sick leave, overtime, watch schedules, and facility orders. During
these negotiations Clark had the authority to resolve grievances, and execute
memorandums of understandings with Hood concerning working conditions. Clark is
the top management official at Standiford facility. Upon learning of FAA's plan to construct a new
control tower, Hood, as NATCA Local SDF President, discussed the details of the
plan with Clark. Clark informed Hood that he did not have the authority to
enter into any type of agreement with the Union, and that the decisions for the
new facility were going to be made at the Regional Office level. Nevertheless,
on August 31, 1992, Hood requested to negotiate by submitting proposals to
Clark, who then forwarded the proposals to Ike Grove on September 2, 1992.
Grove worked as a section supervisor in the Southern Regional Office in the
Facilities and Equipment (F & E) Division of the FAA, the section
responsible for the planning and construction of the new facilities.
The Union proposed that the new facility
should include a Union office, a smoking area in accordance with a Federal
Service Impasse Panel decision, a workout/recreational area, a basement for the
base building and covered parking. The proposal for the workout/recreational
room was to provide an area for weight lifting equipment, stationary bikes, and
space large enough for other recreational activities. NATCA Local SDF was to
provide the equipment. Hood wrote: As a general rule, air traffic controllers
have a high incidence of health problems, most of which can be directly related
to the high amount of stress incurred in the performance of our jobs, and the
lack of activity at the workplace. This area will not only provide a means to
dissipate stress, but will allow for the formulation and implementation of the
FAA Wellness program here at SDF. We feel that with the implementation of a
facility wellness program, there would be a substantial drop in sick leave
usage, and therefore a drop in overtime expenditures. NATCA Local SDF envisioned the workout room
(later termed the multipurpose room) as a benefit to both the bargaining unit
employees and the agency, by reducing the amount of stress inherent in the job
as an air traffic controller, and to meet the needs of the FAA Wellness
Program. The Union did not propose to negotiate the size of the overall
facility. 2. NATCA Local SDF Submitted Second Request to
Negotiate, and Filed Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), Case No.
AT-CA-30215. After Clark forwarded the Union's proposals to
Grove, Hood unsuccessfully attempted to call Grove on several occasions to
discuss the construction of the new facility and the Union's proposals. Hood
then did contact Grove who informed him that it was inappropriate for Hood to
contact him, and that he should be dealing with Clark on the subject.
Thereafter, on November 7, 1992, the Union made a formal written bargaining
request to Grove to discuss the construction of the new facility, and proposed
that the parties meet at an agreeable time and place to start the negotiation
process. After FAA did not respond to the Union's
demand to bargain, Hood filed an unfair labor practice (Case No. AT-CA-30215)
with the Atlanta Region of the FLRA on November 23, 1992. The ULP alleged that
FAA, by failing to reply to the Union's request to negotiate, bargained in bad
faith in violation of the Statute. C. NATCA Local SDF Pursued Bargaining and
Settlement while ULP (AT-CA-30215) was Pending. After the ULP was filed in November 1992, the
Union still pursued negotiations with Respondent over the new facility through
the submission of proposals, including ground rules. Clark responded again that
he did not have the authority to negotiate. Despite Clark's stated position,
Hood received a letter from Vance White, the FAA's Senior Labor Relations
Specialist for the Southern Region, which provided that Respondent was prepared to meet with NATCA to
negotiate. The letter provided in its entirety: In accordance with 5 USC Chapter 71, Section
7117, management recognizes its obligation to I & I bargain as appropriate
concerning the new tower at Standiford Field. The Manager at Standiford Tower
is ready to meet at your request. Upon receipt of the letter, Hood approached
Clark in another attempt to begin negotiations on the new tower. In spite of
White's assurances that Clark was the individual the Union should begin
negotiations with, Clark responded to Hood that he did not have the authority
to negotiate.(2) Following White's letter, on March 19, 1993,
Clark made a formal proposal to form a planning committee to take over all
planning for the new facility. Clark proposed: I envision the committee being made up of two
bargaining unit members and two staff members. The committee would have the
authority to make decisions on all matters concerning the new facility and the
responsibility to complete all future planning. The committee would also plan
and oversee the new procedures needed to move from the existing ATC to the new
facility. The Union responded that due to the pending
ULP, it was inappropriate for any other individuals to handle the issues other
than Clark and Hood. While the Union was attempting to initiate
negotiations, even after the ULP was filed, FAA continued to plan for the new
tower without Union input. Meetings were held in the Regional Airport Authority
conference room to discuss the design and construction of the facility, with
representatives from the Regional Airport Authority (the body that governs the
airport), architects, Clark, Joel Cole (a staff specialist at Respondent),
representatives from F & E (at least at some of the sessions), a
representative of Airways Facilities and Hood(3). At these meetings, the parties
discussed the design of the base building, which included the administrative
areas, the radar equipment, and the tower itself. Through the input of the
architect firm, the planners discussed a base building with a square footage of
17,500, to accommodate the amount of equipment required in the facility.
At one of the meetings, on July 21, 1993, Dirk
Bronson, from F & E, informed the parties that if it would not delay the
project if there was authorization to include a multi-purpose room in the new
facility, originally proposed by the Union. The consensus from the participants
was that the inclusion of the multipurpose room would not delay the project.
After this meeting, in August 1993, a new
nation- wide collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was executed. Article 76,
section 4 and 5 of the new CBA. New Facili-ties/Current Facility
Expansion, provides that NATCA, at the appropriate level, will be notified
when the FAA approved project implementation plans for new, expanded,
remodeled, or combined facilities, and: Any negotiations under this Article shall be
conducted in accordance with Article 7 of this Agreement. Nothing in this
Article shall be construed as a waiver of any Union or Employer
right. Article 7 of the CBA, addresses the procedures
for bargaining for changes in working conditions at the national and local
level. Article 13 of the CBA, entitled Union
Publications and Information and Use of Employer's Facilities, provides for
the use of bulletin boards and distribution of materials by the Union and for
the provision of a Union office and work space by the FAA. D. After the Issuance of Complaint in
AT-CA-30215, the ULP is Withdrawn by the Union. While planning of the new tower continued a
Complaint and Notice of Hearing was issued in Case No. AT-CA-30215 on January
18, 1994. A hearing date was scheduled for early April 1994. Concurrently,
NATCA and the FAA were implementing a partnership in an effort to improve the
relationship between the parties that had become adversarial. Discussions
ensued between NATCA Regional Representatives' Rodney Turner and Randy Schwitz
and the Respondent at the Regional level in an effort to resolve the ULP in a
partnership atmosphere. Prior to the withdrawal of the ULP, Hood submitted his
third written request to negotiate to Clark on March 2, 1994. Hood requested
that Clark either begin negotiations as FAA's authorized representative, or
provide the name of the individual who had the authority to
negotiate. The Union was given assurances that Clark was
ready to meet with Hood and resolve the issues in a partnership environment. On
April 10, 1994, the Union withdrew the ULP based on these assurances. The Union
withdrew the ULP on the condition that FAA was willing to negotiate over the
new facility and send an authorized representative to the bargaining table. At
no time after the Union withdrew the ULP in April 1994 did Clark, or another
management representative, inform the Union that they did not have the
authority to negotiate. Hood requested that FAA provide written
assurances. On May 9, 1994, one month after the ULP was withdrawn, Wayne
Goswick, Air Traffic Manager, Cincinnati HUB, assured the Union that, in the
spirit of cooperation and understanding, NATCA Local SDF would continue
to be included in the discussions over the new tower. The Union representative
was to be afforded an opportunity to attend all on site meetings concerning the
facility and would be able to provide recommendations concerning the internal
structure of the facility. Goswick's letter referenced Clark's March 19, 1993
letter, which was Clark's proposal to delegate complete authority on the
planning of the new facility to a committee. Goswick's letter also provided
that budgetary requirements would limit the inclusion of certain items, but was
silent with respect to higher level approval of any agreements reached.(4) Following the withdrawal of the ULP, and the
assurances from FAA, over an eight month span Hood met four or five times with
Clark, other FAA representatives from F & E, and the other participants at
the planning sessions outside of the facility, and had numerous informal
discussions, to discuss the design and layout of the new facility. The meetings
were attended by the same participants who were designing the layout of the
facility as before. Hood was introduced as the NATCA President and submitted
proposals on behalf of the Union. As the participants began these sessions, and
began discussing the blueprints for the interior design, Tom Malone, F & E
Specialist, was very specific that he could not approve a building larger than
the current size being discussed, 17,500 square feet. During the sessions, if
specific items arose, such as increasing the size of the building beyond 17,500
square feet by building a second story or a basement in the building, Malone
specifically stated that he needed FAA approval. When the subject of the multipurpose room
arose, Clark and Malone never indicated that a higher level of the FAA needed
to approve any agreements, and expressed their desires to include a
multipurpose room in the plans. During the session, the parties drafted
blueprints for both the base building and the tower. The plans that were
drafted were partially based on NATCA Local SDF proposals and included a
multipurpose room. By September 1994, the participants finalized
plans for the new facility and employees in the bargaining unit were notified
in the facility newsletter, at crew briefings, and by the Union that the new
facility would contain, among other items, a multipurpose room. On January 18, 1995, the day before the final
session, Hood met with Malone, the Airways Facility manager, and Clark to
discuss the plans and work out some minor changes to the plans. At Malone's
request, Hood drafted a blueprint of the base building reflecting these minor
changes that had been agreed to. The blueprint was for a 17,500 square foot
building as authorized by Malone, and included items that were agreed to at
previous meetings, a multipurpose room that was approximately 300 square feet
(adjacent to the mechanical room), a Union office, a smoking room and showers.
The plans also included a 600 square foot conference room, and a training room
approximately 70 square feet larger than the training room in the current
facility. At the final session, on January 19, 1995,
Malone began the meeting by stating that the meeting was not going to end until
an agreement was reached. The participants agreed to make some minor changes to
Hood's blueprint, including the reduction of space in the multipurpose room by
the movement of a wall by two feet. The participants agreed upon the overall
blueprint of the base building drafted by Hood, which included a multipurpose
room. The participants also agreed upon the design and layout of the tower
shaft, including a quiet room, and a break room. At the conclusion of the
session, the architects discussed when they would finish the construction
drawings in order to begin construction on the building. There was no
discussion from either Clark or Malone that the plans needed higher level from
the FAA. No date was set for another session. E. FAA Refuses to Execute Written Agreement on
the Design and Layout of the New Tower, and the Plans are Changed. Following the agreement on the layout and
design of the facility, Clark informed Hood that the FAA planned to reduce the
size of the facility. On February 8, 1995, Hood requested that Clark, in
accordance with section 7114(b)(5) of the Statute, execute a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) recording alleged agreements reached by the parties. Clark
responded by letter dated February 15, 1995, refusing to sign the MOU because
the size of the facility was being questioned by FAA Headquarters, that the
facility was attempting to justify a facility of that size and that he did not
have authority to commit FAA to a specific building size through any local
agreement. The reason that the multipurpose room had been
eliminated from the design, was not because the inclusion of a multi-purpose
room in a facility would violate a law, or government wide rule or regulation,
but rather, because of purported budgetary constraints with respect to the size
of the overall building. Construction on the new facility has not
begun, and the latest plans for the new facility have not been finalized.
However, the latest plans drafted by the architects, exhibits a facility 14,500
square feet, without the multipurpose room. The latest blueprints also indicate
that Respondent is planning on constructing a 600 square foot conference room
in the new facility to be jointly used by the Air Traffic employees, and the
Airways Facilities employees, all employees of the FAA, and a training room
larger than the training room in the current facility. There was no evidence
adduced at hearing that FAA had an agreement with PASS over the design and
layout of the building. After Clark's refusal to sign the MOU, and
upon learning that FAA planned to eliminate the multipurpose room to
accommodate a smaller facility, the NATCA Local SDF filed the charges in the
two subject Unfair Labor Practice cases. Discussion and Conclusions of
Law The GC of the FLRA alleges that FAA violated
§ 7116(a) (1), (5), and (8) of the Statute by failing to sign a written
document embodying the agreed to terms concerning the new Standiford Tower; by
Clark stating in a February 15, 1995 letter, that he did not have authority to
enter into an agreement with NATCA; and by refusing to "abide and implement"
the agreement FAA had reached with NATCA. It is also alleged that FAA violated
§7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute by failing to be represented at
negotiations with NATCA concerning the new Standiford Tower by authorized
representatives as required by § 7114(b)(2) of the Statute. A. The Design and Layout of the Standiford
Tower and the Multipurpose Room. Once FAA made the decision to construct a new
air traffic control tower, it was obligated to negotiate the design and layout
of the facility. The Authority has held that the location in which the
employees perform their work, and other aspects of employees' office
environments are matters at the very heart of the traditional meaning of
conditions of employment. See Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest
Mountain Region, Renton, Washington, 51 FLRA 35 (1995); Department of
Health and Human Services, Region IV, Office of Civil
Rights, Atlanta, Georgia,
46 FLRA 396 (1992) (HHS). The FLRA has consistently held in
negotiability decisions that proposals concerning space allocation, and the
arrangement of space are negotiable unless an agency demonstrates that the
proposals are inconsistent with applicable law and regulation. See,
e.g., National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 83 and
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 35 FLRA 398, 413 (1990) (IRS); American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 12, AFL-CIO and
Department of Labor, 25 FLRA 979, 981
(1987). Cases concerning space allocation present an example of the tension
between the competing legitimate interests of employees and management,
interests that are not irreconcilable and ones that can be resolved through
collective bargaining. IRS, 35 FLRA at 414. An agency is obligated to bargain to the
extent it has discretion to bargain on otherwise negotiable matters.
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 7 FLRA 578 (1982), enf'd sub
nom. Library of Congress v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1983)(LOC). In LOC, the court affirmed the FLRA's findings
that the agency was obligated to bargain over changes in office design and
office environment.(5) The fact that
control over the construction of the new facility may ultimately rest with a
different organizational component of the FAA does not bar negotiations.
See, e.g., National Guard Bureau and Adjutant General,
State of Pennsylvania, 35 FLRA 48, 53
(1990). The record fails to establish the existence of any government wide
regulations (i.e., GSA regulations) controlling the design of facilities, and
FAA had full discretion in the design and layout of the facility. 1. The Multipurpose Room The test for whether a matter involves a
condition of employment is set forth in Antilles Consolidated
System, 22 FLRA 235
(1986)(Antilles). The FLRA considers (1) whether the matter
pertains to bargaining unit employees and (2) whether there is a direct
connection between the matter and the work situation of bargaining unit
employees. Id. at 237. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reviewed the Antilles test in American
Federation of Government Employees, Local
2761, AFL-CIO, 866 F.2d 1443, 1447, 1449
(D.C. Cir. 1989), and held that the second part of the test requires the FLRA
to determine whether there was a link or nexus between the matter and the
workers' employment. The Court also found that where a matter has "a direct
Id. at 1449. See also United States Department of
Region X, Seattle, Washington, 37
FLRA 880 (1990) (adopting the D.C. Circuit's application of Antilles).
In U.S. Department of the
Army Aviation Systems Command, St. Louis,
Missouri, 36 FLRA 418, 422-23
(1990) (U.S. Department of the Army Aviation Systems
Command), the Authority found that the
existence and availability of physical fitness facilities directly affected the
work situation and employment relationship of bargaining unit employees, and
therefore, was a condition of employment. In reaching that conclusion, the
Authority found that a link or nexus was established because of Army
regulations that emphasized physical fitness. Compare, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, Local
F-116 and Department of the Air Force, Vandenberg Air Force
Base, California, 7 FLRA 123
(1981). FAA contends that it has no obligation to
bargain about a multipurpose room in the new facility because it is not a
condition of employment. I conclude that inclusion of a multipurpose
room in the new facility is a condition of employment under section 7103(a)(14)
of the Statute. In the Union's original proposal Hood explained that the
multipurpose room, which was to be furnished by the Union with exercise
equipment, was designed to reduce the amount of stress experienced by
bargaining unit employees in the position of air traffic controller. Also, the
multipurpose room would hopefully reduce the amount of sick leave and overtime
expenditures, and be used in conjunction with the FAA's Wellness Program. The
evidence established that there is a link, or nexus, between the multipurpose
room and the workers' employment as it was proposed in conjunction with the
Agency's Wellness Program and reduction of stress among air traffic
controllers. Thus the record establishes, and I conclude,
that the multipurpose room has a direct effect on the employees' work
relationship and is a condition of employment. Moreover, there are no
government wide rules, laws or regulations that prohibit a multipurpose room in
a facility. 2. FAA's "Covered By" Argument. FAA's contends that it had no obligation to
bargain with the Union concerning the construction of the new facility because
the matter was "covered by" the parties negotiated agreement. I reject FAA's
contention in light of the Authority's decisions addressing whether a contract
provision covers a matter in dispute. In U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Baltimore,
Maryland, 47 FLRA 1004 (1993)
(SSA) the Authority established a test to determine when a matter is
contained in or is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The Authority
ruled that, upon execution of an agreement, an agency should be free from a
requirement to continue negotiations over terms and conditions of employment
already resolved by the previous bargaining. SSA, 47 FLRA at
1018. SSA is premised on an agency's refusal to bargain, or the
implementation of a change that is covered by the parties'
agreement. In the subject case Article 13 of the CBA
deals with FAA's obligation to provide the Union with space and facilities to
communicate with the unit members and to conduct union business. It in no way
deals with the lay out of employee space and the planning of towers for the
benefit of the employees or the provision of a multipurpose room for employee
use. Article 76 of the CBA provides for notice to
the Union at the national level when certain decisions are made regarding a new
facility, it provides for the Union at the local level to be part of and
participate in a transition committee or work group to plan the new facility.
FAA correctly points out that this provides for a participation in a procedure
that is less than negotiations. However, Article 76 of the CBA also provides
for notice at the local levels and for bargaining under Article 7 of the CBA
and it further, specifically provides that nothing in the agreement shall be
construed as a waiver by the Union of any right. I conclude the CBA not only
does not preclude bargaining over the provision of a multipurpose room and does
not cover the subject of plans and layout of the tower so as to prevent
bargaining, but, rather, specifically provides for such bargaining by providing
for notice at the local level and for bargaining and by stating that the Union
was not waiving its rights. The CBA contemplates further negotiations, at the
local level, on the construction of new facilities. See Internal Revenue
Service, 47 FLRA 1091 (1993). B. The Planning Sessions Section 7103(a)(12) of the Statute defines
collective bargaining as the: performance of the mutual obligation of the
representative of an agency and the exclusive representative of employees in an
appropriate unit in the agency to meet at reasonable times and to consult and
bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the
conditions of employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested
by either party, a written document incorporating any collective bargaining
agreement reached. . . Section 7114(b)(5) of the Statute provides
that the duty to negotiate in good faith includes, if an agreement is reached,
the obligation to execute upon request a written document embodying the agreed
upon terms and to take necessary steps to implement the agreement.
Internal Revenue Service, Philadelphia District
Office, 22 FLRA 245 (1986). The GC of the FLRA contends that after
settling the ULP case (Case No. AT-CA-30215) NATCA Local SDF and FAA engaged in
negotiations over the new Standiford Control Tower and reached agreement and
that FAA was obligated to execute and implement the agreement. The GC of the
FLRA argues that the planning sessions, after the withdrawal of the ULP charge
in Case No. AT-CA-30215 constituted negotiations and that the Union and FAA, in
these sessions, reached agreement on the layout of the new tower. I conclude that these meetings were not
reached, in the collective bargaining sense. The record does establish that NATCA Local SDF
on a number of occasions requested, indeed demanded, to negotiate concerning
the layout of the new Standiford Facility. FAA reassured Hood that Clark would
try to resolve the issue in the spirit of partnership. Hood had been participating in the planning
sessions long before the withdrawal of Case No. AT-CA-30215. When he first
attended these sessions he apparently recognized that they were not negotiation
sessions between the Union and management. The May 9, 1994 memorandum from the
FAA reassured Hood that in the spirit of cooperation and understanding FAA
would continue to include the Union in the discussions concerning the
establishment of the new facility and that the Union representative would be
afforded an opportunity to attend all on site meetings and to provide
recommendations concerning the internal structure of the
facility. After receipt of this reassurance Hood
continued to attend and participate in these planning sessions. These meetings
were fundamentally conducted in the same way as before the reassurance and
nothing changed to convert them to collective bargaining meetings or to
negotiations. At these planning sessions the Union, as well as all the other
participants, made suggestions and tried to reach consensus, which they did.
The participants at these sessions, in addition to the Union, Malone and Clark,
were representatives of the Regional Airport Authority, of the architects, of F
& E and of Airways Facilities. These planning sessions, which the GC of the
FLRA contends metamorphosed to negotiations after the withdrawal of Case No.
AT-CA-30215, are the crux of this case. Thus FAA's representatives were
communicating to the Union that FAA was prepared to accomplish the planning of
the new facility in the spirit of partnership and to join with the Union and
the other participants of the planning sessions in arriving at plans to be
submitted for approval. In this regard it must be noted that among the other
participants making suggestions were representatives of the Regional Airport
Authority, a non FAA entity, and Airways Facilities, an FAA operation at the
Standiford Facility that does not employ any members of the unit represented by
NATCA. The Union on the other hand was demanding to
negotiate about the new facility as Hood continued to attend and participate in
these planning sessions. Accordingly, I conclude that there was a fundamental
confusion and disconnect between Clark and Hood. Clark thought he was engaging
NATCA Local SDF in more meaningful and cooperative partnership discussions
aimed at reaching a plan agreeable to all participants that could then be
submitted to FAA headquarters for approval. Hood apparently thought these
planning sessions were converted to negotiations and that any resulting
agreement would be binding on both NATCA and FAA. I conclude that there was no meeting of the
minds with respect to the fundamental nature of the planning sessions and their
result and, thus, there was no negotiated agreement as to the layout of the new
Standiford Tower, in the collective bargaining sense. Therefore there is no
agreement with respect to the layout of the new facility that FAA was obligated
to sign or implement and FAA did not violate § 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of
the Statute when it refused to sign and implement the result of the planning
sessions.(6) In concluding that the planning sessions were
not negotiation sessions, at least not in the view of FAA, I am not indicating
that the Union waived its right to negotiate by participating in the spirit of
partnership, in the planning sessions. Rather, the Union could have insisted on
negotiating with FAA concerning the new facility and exercised this right by
not participating in the planning sessions, by engaging in negotiation meetings
at different times than the planning sessions, or by insisting that FAA
recognize the planning sessions were being converted to
negotiations. C. FAA's
Representative. GC of the FLRA argues alternatively that, if
it is found Clark did not authority to bind FAA, FAA violated §
7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute because § 7114(b) (2) of the
Statute obligates parties to send fully authorized representatives to the
negotiation table. U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 44 FLRA 205 (1992). The record, herein, establishes that, although
at first Clark stated he did not have authority, both FAA and Clark did
acknowledge that Clark had full authority to bargain about the new layout and
planning of the new facility.(7)
Accordingly, I must reject the contention of the GC o the FLRA that FAA
violated the Statute by failing to send an authorized representative to the
bargaining table.(8) Accordingly, having concluded that FAA did not
violate § 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute, it is recommended that
the Authority adopt the following: Order The Complaint in Case Nos. CH-CA-50496 and
CH-CA-50497 are hereby DISMISSED. Issued, Washington, DC, February 12,
1996 ___________________________ SAMUEL A.
CHAITOVITZ Chief Administrative Law Judge FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) Authority's Footnotes Follow: 1. Section 7103(a)(12) defines "collective bargaining" as
the performance of the mutual obligation of the representative of an
agency and the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit in
the agency to meet at reasonable times and to consult and bargain in a
employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested by either
party, a written document incorporating any collective bargaining agreement
reached, but the obligation referred to in this paragraph does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or to make a concession[.]
2. The other participants at the sessions were architects
and FAA officials. Transcript (Tr.) at 35, 39, 53. 3. The Judge also found that "inclusion of a multipurpose
of the Statute[,]" (Judge's Decision at 11) and he rejected the
Respondent's argument that it had no obligation to bargain with the Union over
the facility on the ground that the matter was covered by the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. No exceptions were filed to these conclusions.
4. The General Counsel "does not contest this finding as
the record fully supports it." Exceptions at 8. 5. Similar standards apply in the private sector. "A
meeting of the minds of the parties must occur before a labor contract is
created." Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers
Union, 835 F.2d 1164, 1168 (6th Cir. 1987). "Whether a collective
bargaining agreement exists is a question of fact; [the] technical rules of
contract law are not strictly binding." Id. (citation omitted). The
surrounding circumstances and the intentions of the parties may be considered
to determine if a collective bargaining agreement exists; however, an objective
standard applies to the formation of a contract, regardless of a meeting of the
minds in a subjective sense. Warehousemen's Union Local No. 206 v.
Continental Can Co., 821 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1987). 6. It is clear that the Union President was authorized to
negotiate on behalf of the Union. The Judge found that the Manager was
authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Respondent, and no exception was taken
to his finding. There is also no dispute as to the substantive terms that were
agreed to at the end of the sessions. 7. In American Federation of Government Employees, Local
3529 and U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Central
Region, Dallas, Texas, 52 FLRA 1313 (1997), the Authority denied a union's
exception contending that the arbitrator erred in finding that the parties'
partnership agreement was not an addendum to the parties' collective bargaining
agreement. The Authority noted that the union did not claim that the
partnership agreement itself either constituted a collective bargaining
agreement under the Statute or resulted from collective bargaining. Id.
at 1317 n.4. 8. As our conclusion is based on the totality of the
circumstances in this case, it is not intended, and should not be construed, as
a general pronouncement that all discussions of the sort in this case
constitute collective bargaining within the meaning of the Statute. ALJ's Footnotes Follow: 1. The GC of the FLRA filed a motion to correct the
transcript in this matter (Attached hereto as "Attachment A"). No opposition to
this motion has been filed. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED
and the corrections set forth in "Attachment A" are hereby made. 2. Prior to the settlement and withdrawal of Case
No. AT-CA-30215 Clark informed Hood on numerous
occasions that he did not have the authority to negotiate. However, NATCA
withdrew the ULP on assurances from FAA that Clark was the individual NATCA
should be dealing with to resolve the issue. 3. Hood started attending these planning sessions in
approximately February 1993. 4. Once the ULP was withdrawn FAA never informed Hood
that his negotiations with Clark were subject to approval by the FAA, or that
Clark did not have the authority to negotiate. 5. Although the Union in this case never proposed the
expansion of the facility, the Authority has found negotiable a union's
proposal that an agency expand existing office space to accommodate a break
room. U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, Tucson,
Arizona, 46 FLRA 930 (1992). 6. If it had been found that there had been a meeting of
the minds and a negotiated agreement as to the layout of the new facility had
been reached, then I would have concluded that FAA would have violated sections
7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute when it refused to sign and abide by the
agreement. U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 44 FLRA 205
(1992). 7. Clark and other FAA representatives stated that Clark
could not bargain over the size of the new Standiford Facility, presumably
because of budgetary considerations. I need not reach the issue of whether
Clark did have authority to bargain over the size of the new facility or if not
having this authority would violate the Statute, because the Union was not
attempting or asking to bargain over the size of the facility. There is no
allegation or contention by the GC of the FLRA that any such lack of authority
violated the Statute. 8. In so concluding I need not decide whether FAA
violated the Statute by engaging in a course of conduct which constituted
refusing to meet with the Union and bargain about the layout of the new
facility, because neither the complaint herein nor the GC of the FLRA makes
such an allegation. Therefore, such a possible violation was not before me.
See United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States
Border patrol, Del Rio, Texas, 51 FLRA No. 68 (1996), at 6.