Source: https://openjurist.org/121/f3d/537/thompson-v-holy-family-hospital
Timestamp: 2019-02-16 23:43:08
Document Index: 325609084

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12102', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 12102']

121 F3d 537 Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital | OpenJurist
121 F. 3d 537 - Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital
121 F.3d 537
7 A.D. Cases 308, 24 A.D.D. 833, 10
NDLR P 258,
97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6497,
97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,619
Cynthia THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
HOLY FAMILY HOSPITAL, a division of Dominican Health
Submitted Aug. 8, 1997.*
In order to lay claim to the protections of the ADA, Thompson must first demonstrate that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Disability is defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Thompson claims that her cervical injury substantially limits her ability to lift and to work; the ADA's implementing regulations include both lifting and working within the compass of "major life activities." See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(i) (1996) (lifting); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (working).
Thompson has not, however, put forth the requisite evidence that she is substantially limited with respect to these activities. In general, "substantially limited" refers to the inability to perform a major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population or a significant restriction "as to the condition, manner, or duration" under which an individual can perform the particular activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
In assessing whether Thompson is so limited, we are in territory well-charted by our colleagues in other circuits. A number of courts have held that lifting restrictions similar to Thompson's are not substantially limiting, and we agree. See Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.1996) (declaring, as a matter of law, that a 25-pound lifting limitation "does not constitute a significant restriction on one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity"), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1240, 117 S.Ct. 1844, 137 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1997). see also Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that a 25-pound lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir.1996) (concluding, where a plaintiff could lift and reach as long as he avoided heavy lifting, that he was not substantially impaired).
We further conclude that Thompson has not raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether her injury curtails her general ability to work. To establish a substantial limitation, Thompson must demonstrate that she is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). The inability to perform one particular job does not constitute such a limitation. Id.
Thompson points to no evidence that the restrictions on her ability to perform total patient care preclude her from engaging in an entire class of jobs. Nor does she offer the information relevant to this particularized determination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii); see also Bolton v. Scrivner, 36 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir.1994) (affirming summary judgment for the employer where the evidence did not address the plaintiff's "vocational training, the geographical area to which he has access, or the number and type of jobs demanding similar training from which [plaintiff] would also be disqualified"), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1152, 115 S.Ct. 1104, 130 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1995). The only evidence in the record addressing Thompson's experience and opportunities is the affidavit of a vocational rehabilitation counselor that was submitted by the hospital. After stating his belief that total patient care is not an appropriate assignment for an individual with a 25-pound exertional limitation, the counselor notes that Thompson would be qualified for a number of the positions available to registered nurses in the Spokane, Washington labor market. Thompson has not countered this suggestion with evidence of a significant decline in her ability to obtain employment. Indeed, while no longer performing total patient care, she currently is employed in the health care industry. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir.1995) (stating that the major life activity of working "does not mean working at a particular job of that person's choice"); Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 722 F.Supp. 633, 639 (D.Or.1989) ("[I]n order to come within the protection of the statute, the impairment must substantially limit an individual's employability generally, and not just with respect to one particular job."), aff'd and adopted, 915 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.1990). Compare Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that physical restrictions on lifting, pulling and pushing substantially limited the ability of a coal miner to work in a broad range of jobs including mining and construction.)
Recent decisions from other circuit courts support our view that Thompson's conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment. In McKay v. Toyota Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir.1997), the Sixth Circuit determined that a plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who was incapable of lifting over 20 pounds did not raise a genuine issue as to her disqualification from a broad range of jobs in various classes. The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723 (5th Cir.1995), in which it stated that "the inability to perform one aspect of a job while retaining the ability to perform the work in general does not amount to substantial limitation of the activity of working." Id. at 727; see also Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir.1989) (holding, under the Rehabilitation Act, that unsuitability to be a police officer is not a substantial limitation on working); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir.1986) (reasoning that a substantially limiting impairment under the Rehabilitation Act must pose a "general disadvantage in [the] search for satisfactory employment").
Furthermore, we reject Thompson's assertion that Holy Family "regarded" her as substantially limited in her ability to lift or work. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). "As with real impairments, ... a perceived impairment must be substantially limiting and significant." Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 913 (11th Cir.1996). Even if Holy Family believed that Thompson was incapable of lifting 25 pounds, it does not follow that the hospital regarded her as disabled. We noted previously that a 25-pound restriction does not amount to a substantial limitation on the ability to lift. See Williams, 101 F.3d at 349.
Thompson also points to affidavits by her supervisors noting her inability to perform the duties required in a position of total patient care. However, an employer's decision to terminate an employee "based upon the physical restrictions imposed by [her] doctor ... does not indicate that [the employer] regarded [her] as having a substantially limiting impairment." Wooten, 58 F.3d at 386. The evidence does not establish that the hospital viewed Thompson as precluded from performing a broad class of jobs.3 Indeed, Thompson was made aware of another job opportunity at the hospital, and Holy Family submitted a counselor's affidavit enumerating several possible jobs in the nursing industry. See Gordon, 100 F.3d at 913 (determining that, in the context of perceived disabilities, a significant impairment is one that the employer views as foreclosing the type of employment involved); Ray, 85 F.3d at 229-30 (although an employee was terminated because his medical condition prevented him from performing his job as a lift truck operator, there was no evidence that his employer regarded him as incapable of performing another job); Welsh v. City of Tulsa, Okl., 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir.1992) ("[A]n impairment that an employer perceives as limiting an individual's ability to perform only one job is not a handicap under the [Rehabilitation] Act.").
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Thompson cannot demonstrate a disability within the meaning of the ADA, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Holy Family.
In January 1992, an independent vocational counselor performed a job analysis of the registered nurse position in the Short Stay Unit where Thompson was employed and determined that a nurse in her position would have to lift 100 pounds two to three times per week, 50 to 100 pounds one to two times per week, 20 to 50 pounds rarely, 10 to 20 pounds occasionally, and 0 to 10 pounds frequently. He also concluded that the nursing position could not be modified to eliminate exertional requirements in excess of 25 pounds
Thompson has since agreed to the dismissal of her Title VII claim
In support of her claim, Thompson cites Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1162, 117 S.Ct. 1349, 137 L.Ed.2d 506 (1997), in which this court identified a genuine issue of fact as to whether an employer regarded a claimant as disabled where the claimant had exhibited abusive behavior toward his coworkers, and the employer had received reports diagnosing the employee with depression, anxiety, and stress. Id. However, in contrast to Thompson's exertional limitation, the perception that an employee suffers from a disabling psychiatric condition would disqualify the employee from a broad range of jobs