Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/88808348/Prosecutor-s-Preliminary-Brief-Criminal-Trespass-and-Vandalism-75River
Timestamp: 2017-07-26 08:04:09
Document Index: 302455115

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 182', '§ 602', '§ 594', '§ 594', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', 'art 1']

Prosecutor's Preliminary Brief, Criminal Trespass and Vandalism- 75River | Aiding And Abetting | Conspiracy (Criminal)
Prosecutor's Preliminary Brief, Criminal Trespass and Vandalism- 75RiverUploaded by Auntie ImperialRelated InterestsAiding And AbettingConspiracy (Criminal)TrespassIntention (Criminal Law)Crime & JusticeRating and Stats0.0 (0)Document ActionsDownloadShare or Embed DocumentEmbedDescription: From: Rebekah Young Assistant District Attorney Santa Cruz County DA's Office (310) 562-1177 (cell) (831) 454-2557 (desk) rebekah.young@co.santa-cruz.ca.us
Nicole -- I'm so sorry for not call...View MoreFrom: Rebekah Young Assistant District Attorney Santa Cruz County DA's Office (310) 562-1177 (cell) (831) 454-2557 (desk) rebekah.young@co.santa-cruz.ca.us
Nicole -- I'm so sorry for not calling you back sooner. I will touch base with you as soon as possible. In the meantime, here's the pre-prelim brief I wrote in this case. It sets out the People's theory of liability in this case and the authority we're relying on. Thank you for your patience! To: Nicole E. Lambros Attorney at Law
Soquel, CA 95073Copyright: Public DomainDownload as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28BOB LEE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY REBEKAH W. YOUNG, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY STATE BAR NUMBER: 214859 COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ 701 OCEAN STREET, ROOM 200 SANTA CRUZ, CALIFORNIA 95060 TELEPHONE: (831) 454-2400 ATTORNEYS FOR THE PEOPLE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff, -vs-
PEOPLE'S PRELIMINARY HEARING POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Date: Time: Dept: Event: 3/13/12 9:00 a.m. 7 PRELIM HEARING
BECKY ANN JOHNSON et al., Defendants.
From November 28, 2011, to December 4, 2011, a self-declared "anonymous, autonomous group acting in solidarity with Occupy Santa Cruz," unlawfully entered and remained within a clearly closed and shuttered bank located at 75 River Street in Santa Cruz, California. See http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/localnews, last visited on February 22, 2012. Police officers attempted to disperse the group that day but were outnumbered. After nearly 72 hours and numerous negotiations with police, an estimated 20 or 30 individuals
eventually left the building.1 See id.
Defendant Johnson has noted in her eponymous blog that "taking over a long-empty bank building" was "technically illegal (trespass on private property)" and "likely to end with criminal charges." See http://beckyjohnsononewomantalking.blogspot.com (blog entry on February 19, 2012).
Currently, 11 defendants have been charged with several felony and misdemeanor offenses based on both the trespass onto private property and the approximately $30,000 in property damage that occurred after entry into the bank. In order to assist the Court with the probable cause determination it must make at the
defendants' upcoming preliminary hearing, the People respectfully submit the following points and authorities summarizing the charges and evidence against each defendant. In Count 1, the defendants have been charged with conspiring to commit both trespass and vandalism. In Count 2, the defendants have been charged with felony vandalism. The theory of liability
with respect to the vandalism charges in both Count 1 and Count 2 is that the vandalism was a natural and probable consequence of the initial trespass and that, as a result, the defendants are liable for the damage incurred inside the bank. In Count 3 and 4, the
defendants have been charged with two forms of criminal trespass. Each count is discussed in turn below. A. COUNT 1 -- JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND CASE LAW
Count 1 of the Complaint charges the defendants with Conspiracy to Commit a Crime, in violation of Penal Code § 182(a)(1), a felony. A conspiracy is an agreement entered into between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit a crime, and with the further specific intent to commit that crime, followed by an overt act by one or more of the parties for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement. See CALCRIM No. 415. While an overt act is an element of the crime of conspiracy in the sense that the prosecution must prove it to a unanimous jury's satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, the overt act element 2
"consists of an overt act, not a specific overt act." People v. Russ (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1134(emphasis in original). Furthermore, the overt act need not itself be criminal. Id. at 1135. Thus, a jury need only agree that any one overt act was committed, even if they disagree as to which particular overt act was committed. Id. Also, any one of the conspirators, not necessarily the charged defendant, may commit the overt act to consummate the conspiracy. Id. "Disagreement as to who the coconspirators were or who did an overt act, or exactly what that act was, does not invalidate a conspiracy conviction, as long as a unanimous jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspirator did commit some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. When two or more persons combine to commit a crime, the jury need not agree on exactly who did what as long as it is convinced a particular defendant committed the crime regardless of what that defendant's precise role may have been." Id. at 1135–1136.2
A member of a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the crimes that he or she conspires to commit, no matter which member of the conspiracy commits the crime. CALCRIM No. 417. "Recognizing that criminal agency poses a greater threat to society than that
The defendants are charged with conspiring to commit one or more crimes -- trespass, in violation of Penal Code §§ 602(m) and (o), and/or vandalism, in violation of Penal Code §§ 594(b)(1) and (b)(2). Also alleged in the Complaint are 17 overt acts committed by the defendants and/or their uncharged co-conspirators in order to accomplish the object of the agreement. These acts include breaking into the lock box containing the keys to the building, entering the building, remaining inside the building after being given verbal and written warnings to leave, barricading the building's doors and windows, controlling access to the building, and painting slogans and writings within the building. 3
posed by an independent criminal actor, the law seeks to deter criminal combination by recognizing the act of one as the act of all." People v. Zielesch, (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 731, 739(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, a member of a conspiracy is also criminally responsible for any act of any member of the conspiracy if that act is done to further the conspiracy and that act is a natural and probable consequence of the common plan or design of the conspiracy. CALCRIM No. 417 (emphasis added)3. This rule applies even if the act was not intended as part of the original plan. Id. Under this rule, a defendant who is a member of the conspiracy does not need to be present at the time of the act. Id. See also People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416. In other words, "[i]n combining to plan a crime, each conspirator risks liability for conspiracy as well as the substantive offense; in 'planning poorly,' yet each risks additional foreseeable liability consequences for of the the
conspiratorial acts[.]" People v. Luparello (1986) 187 Cal.App.3rd 410, 438 (emphasis added). See also People v. Zacarias (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 652, 658 (noting that "conspiracy to commit a target offense makes it more likely that additional crimes related to the target offense will be committed"). Thus, "coconspirators, bound in criminal combination, are mutually bound to a punishment dictated by their conspiratorial efforts." Luparello, 187 Cal.App.3d at 437.
A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. Id. 4
Here, the defendants have not contended that the their trespass into the bank was anything other then a purposeful, planned act. Indeed, entering and occupying the bank was a clearly and publicly stated aim of the group.4 Thus, the only issue is whether the vandalism which took place after they entered the property was a natural and probable consequence of that trespass. Even if the defendants argue that while the initial trespass was intentional, the resulting vandalism was unplanned, they can still be held liable for this crime. Indeed, "[t]he law has been settled for more than a century that each member of a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the acts of fellow conspirators committed in furtherance of, and which follow as even a natural and probable were consequence not intended of, by the the
conspirators as a part of their common unlawful design." Zielesch, 179 Cal.App.4th at 739 (emphasis added).5 When determining if an unplanned crime was a natural and probable consequence of a conspiracy to commit the intended crime, the issue
is not whether the defendant "actually foresaw the
While each defendant entered the property, evidence of their entry will vary. For example, with respect to defendant Bradley Allen, photographs taken by Allen himself (and subsequently posted on public websites) ably documented his entry into and occupancy of the building. With respect to defendant Alex Darocy, law enforcement personally observed Darocy entering the building. However, as discussed in Section C. below, the Court should consider the concerted action of the group in addition to the individual conduct of a particular defendant. Thus, there are three possible ways a defendant could be held liable for the vandalism: (1) they personally committed an act of vandalism; (2) they engaged in a conspiracy to commit vandalism; or (3) they engaged in a conspiracy to commit trespass, and vandalism was a natural and probable consequence of the trespass. 5
additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, the unplanned crime was reasonably foreseeable." Id.(internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)(emphasis in original). "To be reasonably foreseeable the consequence need not have been a strong probability; a possible consequence which might reasonably have been contemplated is enough[.]" Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., People v. Kaufman (1907) 152 Cal. 331 (defendant who conspired to commit burglary necessarily conspired to protect other members of group from arrest or detection while going to and returning from scene of proposed burglary, and that shooting death of officer who encountered the group after abandoned burglary plot was natural and probable consequence of this unlawful enterprise). Here, the vandalism was reasonably foreseeable. The sheer number of group members who took over the property as well as the length of time those members remained within the building after the takeover made subsequent destruction of the property a reasonably possible, if not highly probable, consequence. Moreover, the
destruction in this case served a distinct purpose -- much like a street gang's graffiti, the vandalism in this case marked the group's territory; it allowed the organization to claim the building as their own, which was the ultimate point of the occupation.6 Furthermore, it is inconceivable that the group members personally responsible for the vandalism would have damaged the property unless they felt safe doing so; unless they felt that their fellow
According to defendant Becky Johnson, the goal of the occupation was to convert the building into a community center. See http://beckyjohnsononewomantalking.blogspot.com (blog entry from February 19, 2012). 6
trespassers would support their conduct. Indeed, it is axiomatic that those who commit crimes do not bring along for the ride innocent, unknowing witnesses; they do not allow others to view their crimes (or their aftermath) unless they believe the others are comfortable with, and supportive of, the enterprise and will protect their identities and nature of the offense from the police. Notably, a member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know the identity or roles of all the other members. See CALCRIM No. 415. Furthermore, the People do not have to prove that any of the members of the alleged conspiracy actually met or came to a detailed or formal agreement to commit one or more of the offenses. Instead, an agreement may be inferred from conduct if the members of the alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crimes. Id. See also People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 843
(circumstances from which a conspiratorial agreement may be inferred include "the conduct of defendants in mutually carrying out a common illegal purpose, the nature of the act done, the relationship of the parties, [and] the interests of the alleged conspirators"). Thus, it need not be shown the parties met and actually agreed to jointly undertake criminal action. Nor is it necessary to prove that all of its participants actually knew or directly associated with each other. Common design is the essence of conspiracy and the crime can be committed whether the parties comprehend its entire scope, whether they act in separate groups or together, by the same or different means known or unknown to some of them, if their actions are consistently leading to the same unlawful result. People v. Brown (1968)259 Cal.App.2d 663, 671-672.
Here, the common design was clearly, publicly and repeatedly stated -- to occupy a long-shuttered commercial building belonging to a private entity. The defendants all heeded the call and, in support of the message behind the occupation, knowingly trespassed into the building. It is immaterial whether they all knew one another -- they united for a common purpose. This is not in dispute. However, this joint undertaking is not without its consequences. In addition to being charged with trespass, they can, and have been charged with the damage caused by their illegal entry. The question is not whether the defendants actually foresaw the vandalism, but whether, judged objectively, the vandalism was reasonably
As discussed above, it clearly was.
California courts have aptly noted why crimes committed through the concerted action of a group, as is the case here, are more serious than those committed by an individual. "[T]o unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer. Collaboration magnifies the risk to society both by increasing the likelihood that a given quantum of harm will be successfully produced and by increasing the amount of harm that can be inflicted. Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path often, of if criminality. not Group association possible for the
attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish." People v. Williams (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 711, 721 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 8
It is for this very reason that co-conspirators are liable for the natural and probable consequences of their original goal. As Williams noted, the danger of a conspiratorial group is not limited to the particular end toward which it has embarked. "Combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise. Thus, wrongful conduct by such combination should be criminally punished even when the same acts would be excused or receive a lesser punishment when performed enhanced by an individual; and group criminal a conduct calls right for and
punishment, to
society at an
justifiable stage." Id.
citations and quotation marks omitted). must be held accountable for the
Thus, the defendants here that naturally, and
predictably, resulted from the original object of the conspiracy. B. COUNT 2 -- JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND CASE LAW
Count 2 of the Complaint charges the defendants with Felony Vandalism, in violation of Penal Code § 594 (b)(1). Here, the People are proceeding under an aiding and abetting theory of liability.7 Aider and abettor liability comes in two forms. First, an aider and abettor is liable for the perpetrator's target crime when he acts with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with
To be a principal to a crime, the conspirator need only intend to agree or conspire and to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, People v. Horn (1974)12 Cal.3d 290, 296; while the aider and abettor must intend to commit the offense or to encourage or facilitate its commission. People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560. 9
the intent to have the target crime committed. People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259. Second, an aider and abettor is liable
for any other crimes committed by the perpetrator that were the natural and probable consequence of the target crime. Id. at 260 (emphasis added). See People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 181 (an aider and abettor "is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged"). A defendant's liability for any other crimes committed in addition to the target crime "is measured by whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have or should have known that the ... offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted." People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 ("The determination whether a particular criminal act was a natural and probable consequence of another criminal act aided and abetted by a defendant requires application of an objective rather than subjective test. This does not mean that the issue is to be considered in the abstract as a question of law. Rather, the issue is a factual question to be resolved by the jury in light of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident. Consequently, the issue ... depends upon whether, under all of the circumstances presented, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted by the defendant")(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 10
The standard of foreseeability is necessarily a low one, consistent with the bright line test that "any person concerned in the commission of a crime, however slight that concern may be, is liable as a principal in the crime." Id. (holding that forced sexual penetration with a foreign object could be a foreseeable consequence of tanning salon robbery). Foreseeable consequences need not be immediate, see, e.g., People v. Bringhurst (1923) 192 Cal. 748 (murder of police officer during traffic stop was natural and probable consequence of robbery committed three days earlier), or consented to. See, e.g., People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039 (aiding and abetting liability found where one member of professional "hitman" duo unpredictably killed a bystander, despite being told by his partner that there was a police officer nearby and that the bystander was not their intended target). In this case, the target crime was trespass. And the ensuing vandalism was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. Thus, as with the conspiracy charge discussed above, there are three possible ways a defendant could be held liable for the vandalism: (1) they personally committed an act of vandalism; (2) they aided and abetted the vandalism; or (3) they aided and abetted the trespass, and vandalism was a natural and probable consequence of the trespass. See also CALCRIM 402.
Generally, "an aider and abettor will 'share' the perpetrator's specific intent when he or she knows the full extent of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator's commission of the crime." People v. Beeman (1984)35 Cal.3d 547, 560 (citations omitted). However, under the natural and probable consequences 11
doctrine, an aider and abettor need only
facilitate the commission of the target crime. People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056 (emphasis added). If that hurdle is met, the critical issue becomes whether there was "a close connection between the target crime aided and abetted and the offense actually committed." Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th at 269. The natural and probable consequences doctrine is based on the recognition that those who aid and abet should be responsible for the harm they have naturally, probably, and foreseeably put in motion. Id. at 259. "It follows that a defendant whose liability
is predicated on his status as an aider and abettor need not have intended to encourage or facilitate the particular offense
ultimately committed by the perpetrator." People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12 fn.5. "His knowledge that an act which is criminal was intended, and his action taken with the intent that the act be encouraged or facilitated, are sufficient to impose liability on him for any reasonably foreseeable offense committed as a consequence by the perpetrator. It is the intent to encourage and bring about conduct that is criminal, not the specific intent of the target offense" which must be found by the jury. Id. "Among the factors which may be considered in determining aiding and abetting are presence at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense." In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 (citation omitted). However, a person who aids and abets the commission or attempted commission of a crime need not be present at the scene of the crime at all. See CALCRIM No. 401 ("Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends 12
to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator's commission of that crime. If all of
these requirements are met, the defendant does not need to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor.")8 See also CALCRIM No. 3400 (if defendant aided and abetted or conspired to commit charged offense, then defendant is guilty even if not present when crime was committed). In this case, the defendants aided and abetted the target offense (trespass) but will likely contend that they were not present when the natural and probable consequence of that offense (the vandalism) took place. Even if true, their absence should not exempt them from liability for this resulting crime. The defendants' support (whether at the scene or off site) assisted the cause and encouraged fellow trespassers to stay the course. And, as noted
above, those who aid and abet should be held responsible for the harm they naturally, probably, and foreseeably put in motion. Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th at 259. The trespass put the vandalism into motion. Indeed, it was part and parcel -- a natural extension --
of the target offense. If the medium is the message, then both crimes served the movement's purpose.
Conversely, a defendant may be convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine even if the target crime is not committed at all. See People v. Ayala (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1443. "An aider and abettor may be liable where he intentionally aids one criminal act but the perpetrator actually commits some other, more serious criminal act that is reasonably foreseeable." Id. (fatal shooting was a natural and probable consequence of a planned physical attack by multiple gang members upon perceived rival gang members even though the shooting occurred at the start of the confrontation and no assault with fists, baseball bats, knives, or other weapons preceded the shooting). 13
COUNTS 3 AND 4 -- JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND CASE LAW
Count 3 of the Complaint charges the defendants with Trespass by Entering and Occupying, in violation Penal Code § 602(m), and Trespass and Refusing to Leave Private Property, in violation of Penal Code § 602(o). In order to violate § 602(m) in this case, a defendant must willfully enter and occupy land or a building belonging to someone else without the consent of the owner, and must occupy some part of the land or building continuously until removed. See CALCRIM No. 2931. In order to violate § 602(o) in this case, a defendant must refuse or fail to leave land, real property, or structures belonging to another and not open to the general public, upon being requested to leave by a peace officer at the request of the owner, and upon being informed by the officer that he or she is acting at the request of the owner. See Cal. Pen. Code § 602(o). Here, the defendants entered the property at different times and remained for different durations. (For the purposes of this brief, only defendants Allen and Darocy will be discussed.) As noted above, photographs taken by Allen himself ably documented his occupancy of the building. With respect to defendant Alex Darocy,
law enforcement personally observed Darocy entering the building. Furthermore, on the first day of the group's occupancy, officers on the scene audibly announced that those entering and remaining inside the building were, in fact, trespassing and called for their exit. Officers also posted multiple signs clearly informing the building's occupants, and any future entrants, that they were trespassing and that the property owners had authorized law enforcement to take enforcement action for this violation. See Attachment A and B.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 // 24 25 26 27 28
The defendants may contend they personally made only a fleeting appearance at the location and thus cannot be held liable under 602(m). See In re R.N. (Jan. 3, 2012) 2012 WL 8178 at *3
(unpublished)(transient use of property insufficient under 602(m)). However, as discussed above, the defendants conspired to commit the trespass. Thus, the Court should consider the concerted action of the group in addition to the individual conduct of a particular defendant.9 A member of a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the crimes that he or she conspires to commit, no matter which member of the conspiracy commits the crime. CALCRIM No. 417. Given that one or more members of the organization occupied the building for three days straight, the occupation must be deemed continuous. Furthermore, one or more members of the organization failed to leave the building after being asked to do so by the owner (through the Santa Cruz Police Department). Thus, the elements of both § 602(m) and § 602(o) are met here. As the group's name clearly stated, the
goal of the enterprise was to take over the building for their own ends. There was no expiration date on this goal. The organization's signs did not declare "Fleeting Appearance Santa Cruz" or "Transient Use Santa Cruz." Their stated purpose was to "Occupy Santa Cruz" -in the form of 75 River Street. //
A defendant's individual conduct can be sufficient to infer an agreement between the conspirators as well as showing an overt act in furtherance of that agreement, even if that conduct does not precisely satisfy the elements of the charged offense. See People v. Powers-Monachello (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 400, 415. 15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dated: March 5, 2012
CONCLUSION The standard of proof at a preliminary hearing is not the substantial evidence required for conviction, but only such evidence required to establish a "rational ground for assuming the
possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it." Taylor v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578, 582, overruled on another ground in People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 92, fn. 12(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The People respectfully submit that this burden has been met here.
Respectfully submitted, BOB LEE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
REBEKAH W. YOUNG ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
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