Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/836/1257/420039/
Timestamp: 2020-01-18 09:01:51
Document Index: 117589645

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2021', '§ 2024', '§ 2021', '§ 2024', '§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2024']

Charles A. Sawyer, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Swift & Company, Defendant-appellant, 836 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1988) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1988 › Charles A. Sawyer, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Swift & Company, Defendant-appellant
Charles A. Sawyer, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Swift & Company, Defendant-appellant, 836 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1988)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 836 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1988) Jan. 7, 1988. Rehearing Denied March 15, 1988
Swift & Company (Swift) appeals the Judgment and Order of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, finding that Swift violated 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b) (3) and 2024(d), the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act (Act), in its treatment of Charles A. Sawyer (Sawyer). Sawyer was an employee of Swift from December 8, 1980, until January 10, 1983, and a member of the Navy Reserves beginning for purposes of this case in October, 1982.
The District Court decided the case on the parties' joint motion for declaratory judgment based on stipulations of fact and deposition testimony. The court's Memorandum and Order appears at 610 F. Supp. 38 (D. Kan. 1985). The stipulations considered by the trial court are as follows:
The trial court found with respect to the first issue that because 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d) provides that a leave of absence from work "shall upon request be granted ... for the period required to perform ... inactive duty training," Swift was obligated to allow Sawyer to leave early on Fridays to attend training drills. Swift apparently does not dispute this finding. With respect to the other two issues, the trial court found that Sawyer gave adequate notice during the December 9, 1982, second-step grievance hearing that he would be absent the "first nonholiday weekend in January, 1983" for a make-up drill in Olathe, Kansas and that Sawyer was terminated in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (3)1 as a direct result of attending that drill. The court ordered reinstatement and back pay and ruled that the back pay could not be reduced by the unemployment compensation Sawyer collected after he was fired. Swift has appealed these three determinations.
Our standard of review is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a): "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." This standard may be problematic when the trial court bases its findings of fact upon deposition testimony and stipulations by the parties. Nevertheless, the clearly erroneous standard applies to all cases where the trial court makes findings of fact. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985). Anderson summarizes certain general principles that may be gleaned from the cases. The foremost of these is that " [a] finding is clearly erroneous 'when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Id. at 573, 105 S. Ct. at 1511. On the other hand, the reviewing court may not reverse the trier of fact merely because it might have decided the case differently, nor can it decide factual issues de novo. Id. Finally, where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at 1512. Bearing these standards in mind, we will discuss each issue raised by Swift.
First, we observe that legal authority on the subject of what constitutes proper notice to an employer under 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d)2 is sparse. In Blackmon v. Observer Trans. Co., 102 C.C.H. Labor Cases p 11, 450 at 23, 913 (W.D.N.C. 1982), the court was asked to decide whether mention of a reserve obligation by a driver at a drivers' meeting convened for general purposes constituted proper notice under the Act. The court sidestepped the issue by finding that because no one could corroborate the employee's contention, the employee had not in fact made the request. We can find no other cases that squarely address such an issue.
The trial court's finding that Sawyer was terminated in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (3) is premised on its conclusion that he gave adequate notice of his January 8 drill obligation. Because he was fired after attending this drill, the court found the conclusion inescapable that Sawyer was terminated because of his reserve status. The trial court did not discuss the role of Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 101 S. Ct. 2510, 69 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1981), except to dismiss it as inapplicable to the issue, not under appeal here, of whether Swift was required to give Sawyer travel time on Friday evenings.
In our view, Monroe cannot be ignored, despite its factual dissimilarity to the instant case. The issue in Monroe was whether an employer was required to make scheduling accommodations for employee-reservists. The Court held an employer did not have to make such accommodations because Sec. 2021(b) (3) was intended and enacted for the limited purpose of protecting reservists from discrimination based solely on their reserve status. If scheduling accommodations would not be made for employees without military obligations, they would not be made for employee-reservists. Monroe 's importance to the instant case is two-fold.
The second way Monroe is significant is that it suggests a much more stringent standard for cases brought under Sec. 2021(b) (3) than for those brought under other federal labor statutes, which apparently require a "but-for" test. At 452 U.S. 559, 101 S. Ct. at 2516, the Court states:
The legislative history thus indicates that Sec. 2021(b) (3) was enacted with a significant but limited purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge and demotion, motivated solely by reserve status (emphasis supplied).
Again at 559-60, 101 S. Ct. at 2516-17:
And yet again at 565, 101 S. Ct. at 2519:
The frequent absences from work of an employee-reservist may affect productivity and cause considerable inconvenience to an employer who must find alternative means to get necessary work done. Yet Congress has provided in Sec. 2021(b) (3) that employers may not rid themselves of such inconveniences and productivity losses by discharging or otherwise disadvantaging employee-reservists solely because of their military obligations (emphasis supplied).
In Clayton v. Blachowske Truck Lines, 640 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1986), the court applied the standard set forth in Monroe to a situation similar to the case at bar. Plaintiff was the safety director for a trucking firm whose duties included working on Saturdays. He informed his employers before accepting the position that he had Minnesota National Guard drills one weekend a month and was assured there would be no problem. After approximately four months, plaintiff was terminated for poor job performance. Among the specific reasons were plaintiff's frequent absences on Saturdays. Plaintiff asserted that this reason implicated his National Guard status, thereby violating Sec. 2021, and that it was a material issue of fact whether the other reasons were pretextual and thus precluded summary judgment. Citing Monroe, the court held:
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff the record before the court shows that plaintiff was not terminated solely because of his reserve status. It is undisputed that defendants knew when they hired plaintiff that he was in the National Guard and that they assured plaintiff that these obligations would be no problem. It is also undisputed that plaintiff was given several reasons for his termination. Three of the four reasons ... were unrelated to his guard duties and are supported by the evidence. Moreover, defendants have pointed to additional reasons for termination which are well supported by the sworn statements of a number of witnesses.... For these reasons, the court concludes as a matter of law that plaintiff was not terminated solely because of his National Guard obligations. 640 F. Supp. at 174.
On appeal, the the trial court was affirmed in Clayton v. Blachowske Truck Lines, 815 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987). We can find no other circuit court cases construing 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (3) and the language in Monroe within a similar factual context. In our view, the language in Monroe is plain and must be construed as in Clayton.
38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (3) provides:
28 U.S.C. § 2024(d) provides:
The phrase "upon request" has been interpreted to mean "after proper notice." Rodgers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 82 C.C.H. Labor Cases p 10, 222 at 16, 859 (E.D. Ill. 1977); Blackmon v. Observer Trans Co., 102 C.C.H. Labor Cases p 11, 450 at 23, 913 (W.D.N.C. 1982).