Source: http://www.hoeyfarina.com/straight-track/hoey-farina-defeats-norfolk-southern-association-american-railroads-rail-safety
Timestamp: 2019-02-23 06:09:45
Document Index: 397199330

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 51', '§ 10501', '§51', '§ 10501', '§ 10101', '§ 20101', '§ 4901', 'art 213', '§ 20106', '§ 10501']

Hoey & Farina Defeats Norfolk Southern & The Association Of American Railroads On Rail Safety Preemption Case | Train Injury Lawyer - Railroad Accident Attorney l Hoey & Farina
As reported in Straight Track - "FRA & Surface Transportation Board Join Forces With Hoey & Farina", Hoey & Farina had teamed up with the Federal Railroad Administration and the Surface Transportation Board against the Norfolk Southern Railroad and the Association of American Railroads in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Frederick Tyrrell vs. Norfolk Southern Railroad.
The case had the potential of impacting railroad safety in all 50 states. The specific issue was whether an Ohio minimum track clearance regulation, intended to protect railroad workers from approaching trains on parallel adjacent tracks, was pre-empted by the broad jurisdiction granted to the Surface Transportation Board by Congress in the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. The railroads argued that Congress intended for all authority over railroad safety to be vested in the Surface Transportation Board and that, therefore, the state of Ohio had no authority to enforce its own railroad track clearance standard. However, the critical point that the railroads attempted to ignore was that, since this STB itself had never promulgated railroad safety regulations of any kind, the railroads interpretation of the law would have nullified all FRA, state and local railroad safety laws and regulations only to effectively leave a complete regulatory void in their place.
The primary goal of the railroads was to defeat the meritorious claim of a student conductor who lost his lower right leg when he was struck by a passing tank car. The second goal of the railroad was to void all close clearance regulations, which had been enacted in most of the 50 states, so that the railroads could squeeze employees between parallel sets of tracks without worrying about compensating those who are injured, or the families of those who are killed, by hazardously close clearances.
To accomplish those goals the railroads were willing to tear down the entire safety regulatory scheme for railroads in the United States.
Fortunately, both the FRA and the STB realized the gravity of the attack on railroad safety and joined Hoey & Farina in the appeal.
On April 25, 2001 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit handed down its decision, ruling against the railroads and in favor of the injured employee, Fred Tyrrell. The Court agreed completely with the arguments submitted by Hoey & Farina and the affected government agencies. We promised at the conclusion of our original article on this matter to publish the Sixth Circuit’s final decision as soon as it was handed down. That successful result by Hoey & Farina, along with the appellate counsel James Genden and the attorneys for the STB and the FRA is presented here in its entirety.
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2001 FED App. 0136P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 01a0136p.06
Frederick W. Tyrrell,
No. 98-07690--David A. Katz, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: April 25, 2001
Before: NORRIS, SILER, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.(*)
ARGUED: James K. Genden, TORSHEN, SPREYER, GARMISA & SLOBIG, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant. James R. Knepp II, ROBISON, CURPHEY & O'CONNELL, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellee. Evelyn G. Kitay, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, Washington, D.C., Michael E. Robinson, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, APPELLATE SECTION, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae. ON BRIEF: James K. Genden, Steven P. Garmisa, TORSHEN, SPREYER, GARMISA & SLOBIG, Chicago, Illinois, Frank E. Van Bree, James L. Farina, HOEY, FARINA & DOWNES, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant. James R. Knepp II, Thomas J. Antonini, ROBISON, CURPHEY & O'CONNELL, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellee. Evelyn G. Kitay, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, Washington, D.C., Michael E. Robinson, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, APPELLATE SECTION, Washington, D.C., James Lacey O'Connell, LINDHORST & DREIDAME, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Amici Curiae.
SILER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Frederick W. Tyrrell appeals the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company. The lower court held that under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA"), the Surface Transportation Board's ("STB") exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over rail construction preempts the Ohio track clearance regulation upon which Tyrrell based his negligence per se claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"). Tyrrell argues that the district court erred as the Federal Railway Safety Act ("FRSA") is the proper statute for assessing whether the Ohio track requirement is preempted. We REVERSE the district court's decision and REMAND for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Tyrrell instituted an action against Norfolk Southern under the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., alleging that the railroad failed to provide him with a safe place to work by negligently and carelessly using an unreasonably dangerous track clearance in violation of state law. Norfolk Southern moved for partial summary judgment, contending that the Ohio track clearance regulation at issue was preempted under the ICCTA's jurisdiction provision for the STB, 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). The district court granted the railroad's motion.
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 86 F.3d 626, 627 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing City Mgmt. Corp. v. United States Chemical Co., 43 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994)). Summary judgment is appropriate "[i]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a matter of law, statutory construction issues are reviewed de novo on appeal. See United States v. Davis, 187 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
Ohio Admin. Code 4901:3-1-04 requires that any new construction or reconstruction of main lines, passing tracks, and yard tracks involved in rail switching must provide at least 14 feet of clearance between the centers of adjacent and parallel tracks. Constructed after the promulgation of this requirement, the Bellevue rail yard has a track clearance of 13 feet and 9 inches. FELA provides that common railroad carriers engaged in interstate commerce are liable for damages to employees who suffer injuries due to the negligence of a carrier's officers, agents, or employees or by reason of any defect or insufficiency in its cars, track, roadbed, or other equipment due to a carrier's negligence. See 45 U.S.C. §51. As Tyrrell's injuries arose from a workplace accident involving a track area that did not comply with Ohio Admin. Code 4901:3-1-04, he brought this FELA action.
In response, Norfolk Southern argues that the district court's decision does not stand for the proposition that the ICCTA preempts FRSA or any other federal statute dealing with rail safety. Rather, it simply asserts the ICCTA's broad-based authority to preempt state construction regulations like Ohio Admin. Code 4901:3-4-04.(1) In addition, Norfolk Southern argues that the core preemption question is not what the stated purpose of the state rail law is, but whether its effect falls within the ICCTA's broad jurisdiction. For support, it cites CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 92 F. Supp. 2d 643 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (notice of appeal filed May 12, 2000) (hereinafter Plymouth II). In Plymouth II, the district court examined a Michigan train speed regulation under the ICCTA and the FRSA. While the district court ruled that FRSA preempted the state regulation to the extent it regulated rail safety factors like train speed, train length and air brake performance, it also held that § 10501(b)'s construction language preempted the state regulation as it required railroads to make substantial capital improvements. See Plymouth II, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 658-59. Norfolk Southern thus interprets Plymouth II to mean that the Ohio track clearance regulation is preempted because it affects rail construction and the ICCTA assigns the STB exclusive jurisdiction over rail construction.
Unfortunately in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the district court did not have the benefit of federal agency input regarding the jurisdictional relationship between the ICCTA and FRSA. As a result of this critical handicap, it did not achieve a "reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the [ICCTA] and its surrounding regulatory scheme" to affect FRSA and its regulations. Id. at 486. Rather, the district court's decision erroneously preempts state rail safety law that is saved under FRSA if it tangentially touches upon an economic area regulated under the ICCTA. As a result, this interpretation of the ICCTA implicitly repeals FRSA's first saving clause.
While the STB must adhere to federal policies encouraging "safe and suitable working conditions in the railroad industry," the ICCTA and its legislative history contain no evidence that Congress intended for the STB to supplant the FRA's authority over rail safety. 49 U.S.C. § 10101(11). Rather, the agencies' complementary exercise of their statutory authority accurately reflects Congress's intent for the ICCTA and FRSA to be construed in pari materia. For example, while recognizing their joint responsibility for promoting rail safety in their 1998 Safety Integration Plan rulemaking, the FRA exercised primary authority over rail safety matters under 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq., while the STB handled economic regulation and environmental impact assessment.(2)
While Ohio Admin. Code § 4901:3-1-04 references rail construction, its 14-foot track clearance requirement yields safety benefits for employees working along switching tracks. In addition, federal and state case law recognize that state track clearance provisions are designed to protect railroad workers by providing them with sufficient work space between tracks.(3) The Ohio Supreme Court also classifies this rail regulation as one dealing with rail safety. In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 102 N.E.2d 246, 247 (Ohio 1951), it upheld the Public Utility Commission of Ohio's ("PUCO") authority under state law to issue regulations and orders "relating to the protection and safety of railroad employees" working in rail yards. Under this authority, the PUCO developed an initial minimum track clearance standard that was succeeded by Ohio Admin. Code 4901:3-4-04. As the Ohio regulation has a connection with rail safety based on its terms, the safety benefits of compliance, and its legally recognized purpose, FRSA provides the applicable standard for assessing federal preemption.
The railroad's reliance on the FRA's 1986 letter fails to pass muster under Easterwood. The scope of FRSA preemption expressed in FRA's letter was rejected in Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Calif., 647 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). In that case, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit held that FRA could not rely on 43 C.F.R. Part 213's general structural requirements to preempt the California walkway rule, as these regulations do not cover track clearances. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 647 F. Supp. at 1224-27; 820 F.2d at 1111.
As the Supreme Court has reiterated, Easterwood controls the determination of whether the FRA has issued regulations "covering the subject matter" of Ohio's track clearance regulation. See Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 352 (2000), rev'g and remanding Shanklin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 173 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 1999). Currently, because no FRA regulation or action covers the subject matter of minimum track clearance, the Ohio regulation serves as a permissible gap filler in the federal rail safety scheme. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106.
Therefore, Norfolk Southern was not entitled to summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
We REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to the railroad and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
*The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 Citing City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1022 (1999) (finding that § 10501(b)(2) expresses Congress's broad intent to preempt state regulatory authority over railroad operations); Soo Line R.R. v. City of Minneapolis, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding the ICCTA preempts local regulation pertaining to the destruction of historic rail yard buildings); Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp. v. Anderson, 959 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Mont. 1997) (holding that the ICCTA preempts state law authorizing a state agency to exercise regulatory authority over railroad activities).
2 See Regulations on Safety Integration Plans Governing Railroad Consolidations, Mergers, Acquisitions of Control, and Start Up Operations; and Procedures for Surface Transportation Board Consideration of Safety Integration Plans in Cases Involving Railroad Consolidations, Mergers, and Acquisitions of Control, STB Ex Parte No. 574, FRA Docket No. SIP-1, Notice No. 1, 63 Fed. Reg. 72,225 (Dec. 31, 1998).
3 See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 647 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that a comparable California regulation was a safety provision based on its purpose); Brown v. Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Ry., 650 F.2d 159, 163 (8th Cir. 1981) (characterizing track clearance regulations as part of a safety code); United Transp.Union v. Dep't of Transp., 355 N.W. 2d 683, 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (ruling that Michigan's minimum railroad track clearance statute provided for railroad worker safety); Reading Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 146 A.2d 746, 748 (Pa. Super. Ct.1958) (stating that the duty to provide safe and reasonable facilities for rail workers included "adequate clearances between cars on parallel track, for the physical safety of employees whose duty took them there").