Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2005/10/04-3166a.htm
Timestamp: 2020-02-18 01:00:32
Document Index: 259514443

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§2', '§2', '§ 3742', '§2', '§4', '§4', '§ 922', '§2', '§ 922']

04-3166a -- U.S. v. Plakio -- 10/03/2005
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (40911 bytes) (33782 bytes)
Filed December 16, 2005
Appellant's motion to publish the order and judgment filed October 3, 2005, is granted. The published opinion is attached.
(D.C. No. 03-CR-40096-RDR)
Eric F. Melgren, United States Attorney and Nancy Landis Caplinger, Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender and Melody Evans, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant - Appellant.
Alonzo Plakio, Jr. pled guilty to being a felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).(*) Pursuant to USSG §2K2.1(a)(4)(A),(2) the district court calculated Plakio's base offense level as 20 based on a prior state felony drug conviction. Plakio objected, claiming his prior drug conviction did not constitute a felony offense under §2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because the maximum punishment for the offense for someone with his criminal history category was eleven months under the state sentencing guidelines. By his reasoning, the base offense level for the federal offense was 14, not 20. The district court disagreed and sentenced him to thirty months imprisonment. Plakio appeals pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). We exercise jurisdiction, REVERSE and REMAND for re-sentencing.
This approach best comports with the language of §2K2.1 cmt. n.5 and §4B1.2(b), which directs us to consider whether the crime and not the particular defendant is punishable by more than a year imprisonment. In addition, it furthers the general policy of the guidelines to promote uniform sentences, see Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996); Diaz-Bonilla, 65 F.3d at 877; United States v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117, 121 (10th Cir. 1990), by looking at defendants as a group rather than as individuals under state sentencing guidelines. This position is also in accord with the fourth circuit's recent opinion in Harp. There, under the plain error standard, it held that "to determine whether a conviction is for a crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one year [under §4B1.2(b)], . . . we consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history." Harp, 406 F.3d at 246. See also United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the same standard to § 922(g)(1)). I find the fourth circuit's reasoning persuasive. When considering state sentencing schemes under §2K2.1(a)(4)(A), we should ignore the individual defendant's criminal history category and look only to the maximum possible sentence allowed for any defendant convicted of the particular crime. This is a logical extension of our precedents in Norris, 319 F.3d at 1281-82,(1) and Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1148, which direct us to look at the maximum possible sentence and not the sentence actually imposed.
*.18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) provides:
1. While the majority is correct that the defendant in Norris raised the same arguments as Plakio, this Court's suggestion in Norris that "[h]ad Mr. Norris' state convictions become final after June 26, 2000, we would have before us a very different case," was dicta. 319 F.3d at 1283. We did not have to decide the issue in Norris because the defendant's conviction became final prior to the Apprendi decision and we are therefore not bound by the analysis suggested in Norris.
Updated: December 19, 2005.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2005/10/04-3166a.htm.