Source: http://openjurist.org/520/us/43
Timestamp: 2013-12-19 23:56:07
Document Index: 396147516

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1983', '§2403', '§2403', '§3', '§3', '§4', '§1983', '§3', '§2000', '§2403', '§2403', '§2403', '§2403']

520 US 43 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona | OpenJurist
520 U.S. 43 - Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona	Home520 us 43 arizonans for official english v. arizona
520 US 43 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona 520 U.S. 43117 S.Ct. 1055137 L.Ed.2d 170
ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH and Robert D. Park, Petitionersv.ARIZONA et al.
Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee at the time, sued the State and its Governor, Attorney General, and Director of the Department of Administration under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that State Constitution Article XXVIII-key provisions of which declare English "the official language of the State,'' require the State to "act in English and in no other language,'' and authorize state residents and businesses "to bring [state-court] suit[s] to enforce th[e] Article''-violated, inter alia, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Yniguez used both English and Spanish in her work and feared that Article XXVIII, if read broadly, would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the State. She requested injunctive and declaratory relief, counsel fees, and "all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.'' During the early phases of the suit, the State Attorney General released an Opinion expressing his view that Article XXVIII is constitutional in that, although it requires the expression of "official acts'' in English, it allows government employees to use other languages to facilitate the delivery of governmental services. The Federal District Court heard testimony and, among its rulings, determined that only the Governor, in her official capacity, was a proper defendant. The court, at the same time, dismissed the State because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State Attorney General because he had no authority to enforce Article XXVIII against state employees, and the Director because there was no showing that she had undertaken or threatened any action adverse to Yniguez; rejected the Attorney General's interpretation of the Article on the ground that it conflicted with the measure's plain language; declared the Article fatally overbroad after reading it to impose a sweeping ban on the use of any language other than English by all of Arizona officialdom; and declined to allow the Arizona courts the initial opportunity to determine the scope of Article XXVIII. Following the Governor's announcement that she would not appeal, the District Court denied the State Attorney General's request to certify the pivotal state-law question-the Article's correct construction-to the Arizona Supreme Court. The District Court also denied the State Attorney General's motion to intervene on behalf of the State, under 28 U.S.C. §2403(b), to contest on appeal the court's holding that the Article is unconstitutional. In addition, the court denied the motion of newcomers Arizonans for Official English Committee (AOE) and its Chairman Park, sponsors of the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII, to intervene to support the Article's constitutionality. The day after AOE, Park, and the State Attorney General filed their notices of appeal, Yniguez resigned from state employment to accept a job in the private sector. The Ninth Circuit then concluded that AOE and Park met standing requirements under Article III of the Federal Constitution and could proceed as party appellants, and that the Attorney General, having successfully obtained dismissal below, could not reenter as a party, but could present an argument, pursuant to §2403(b), regarding the constitutionality of Article XXVIII. Thereafter, the State Attorney General informed the Ninth Circuit of Yniguez's resignation and suggested that, for lack of a viable plaintiff, the case was moot. The court disagreed, holding that a plea for nominal damages could be read into the complaint's "all other relief'' clause to save the case. The en banc Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that Article XXVIII was unconstitutional, and announced that Yniguez was entitled to nominal damages from the State. Finding the Article's "plain language'' dispositive, and noting that the State Attorney General had never conceded that the Article would be unconstitutional if construed as Yniguez asserted it should be, the Court of Appeals also rejected the Attorney General's limiting construction of the Article and declined to certify the matter to the State Supreme Court. Finally, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged a state-court challenge to Article XXVIII's constitutionality, Ruiz v. State, but found that litigation no cause to stay the federal proceedings.
(d) Taking into account the novelty of the question of Article XXVIII's meaning, its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona's business, the State Attorney General's views on the subject, and the at-least-partial agreement with those views by the Article's sponsors, more respectful consideration should have been given to the Attorney General's requests to seek, through certification, an authoritative construction of the Article from the State Supreme Court. When anticipatory relief is sought in federal court against a state statute, respect for the place of the States in our federal system calls for close consideration of the question whether conflict is avoidable. Federal courts are not well-equipped to rule on a state statute's constitutionality without a controlling interpretation of the statute's meaning and effect by the state courts. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 526, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1767-1768 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Certification saves time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism. See e.g., Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 1744. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's suggestion, this Court's decisions do not require as a condition precedent to certification a concession by the Attorney General that Article XXVIII would be unconstitutional if construed as Yniguez contended it should be. Moreover, that court improperly blended abstention with certification when it found that "unique circumstances,'' rather than simply a novel or unsettled state-law question, are necessary before federal courts may employ certification. The Arizona Supreme Court has before it, in Ruiz v. State, the question: What does Article XXVIII mean? Once that court has spoken, adjudication of any remaining federal constitutional question may be "greatly simplifie[d].'' See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 2868. Pp. ____-____.
* A 1988 Arizona ballot initiative established English as the official language of the State. Passed on November 8, 1988, by a margin of one percentage point,1 the measure became effective on December 5 as Arizona State Constitution Article XXVIII. Among key provisions, the Article declares that, with specified exceptions, the State "shall act in English and in no other language.'' Ariz. Const., Art. XXVIII, §3(1)(a). The enumerated exceptions concern compliance with federal laws, participation in certain educational programs, protection of the rights of criminal defendants and crime victims, and protection of public health or safety. Id., §3(2). In a final provision, Article XXVIII grants standing to any person residing or doing business in the State "to bring suit to enforce th[e] Article'' in state court, under such "reasonable limitations'' as " [t]he Legislature may enact.'' Id., §4.2
Federal court litigation challenging the constitutionality of Article XXVIII commenced two days after the ballot initiative passed. On November 10, 1988, Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, then an insurance claims manager in the Arizona Department of Administration's Risk Management Division, sued the State of Arizona in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Yniguez invoked 42 U.S.C. §1983 as the basis for her suit.3 Soon after the lawsuit commenced, Yniguez added as defendants, in their individual and official capacities, Arizona Governor Rose Mofford, Arizona Attorney General Robert K. Corbin, and the Director of Arizona's Department of Administration, Catherine Eden. Yniguez brought suit as an individual and never sought designation as a class representative.
Fluent in English and Spanish, Yniguez was engaged primarily in handling medical malpractice claims against the State. In her daily service to the public, she spoke English to persons who spoke only that language, Spanish to persons who spoke only that language, and a combination of English and Spanish to persons able to communicate in both languages. Record, Doc. No. 62, &Par;8, 13 (Statement of Stipulated Facts, filed Feb. 9, 1989). Yniguez feared that Article XXVIII's instruction to "act in English,'' §3(1)(a), if read broadly, would govern her job performance "every time she [did] something.'' See Record, Doc. No. 62, ¶10. She believed she would lose her job or face other sanctions if she did not immediately refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the State. See App. 58, ¶19 (Second Amended Complaint). Yniguez asserted that Article XXVIII violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. §2000d. She requested injunctive and declaratory relief, counsel fees, and "all other relief that the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.'' App. 60.
All defendants named in Yniguez's complaint moved to dismiss all claims asserted against them.4 The State of Arizona asserted immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The individual defendants asserted the absence of a case or controversy because "none of [them] ha[d] threatened [Yniguez] concerning her use of Spanish in the performance of her job duties [or had] ever told her not to use Spanish [at work].'' Record, Doc. No. 30, p. 1. The defendants further urged that novel state-law questions concerning the meaning and application of Article XXVIII should be tendered first to the state courts. See id., at 2.5
Trial on the merits of Yniguez's complaint, the parties agreed, would be combined with the hearing on her motion for a preliminary injunction.6 Before the trial occurred, the State Attorney General, on January 24, 1989, released an opinion, No. I89-009, construing Article XXVIII and explaining why he found the measure constitutional. App. 61-76.
In Opinion No. I89-009, the Attorney General said it was his obligation to read Article XXVIII "as a whole,'' in line "with the other portions of the Arizona Constitution'' and "with the United States Constitution and federal laws.'' App. 61. While Article XXVIII requires the performance of "official acts of government'' in English, it was the Attorney General's view that government employees remained free to use other languages "to facilitate the delivery of governmental services.'' Id., at 62. Construction of the word "act,'' as used in Article XXVIII, to mean more than an "official ac[t] of government,'' the Attorney General asserted, "would raise serious questions'' of compatibility with federal and state equal protection guarantees and federal civil rights legislation. Id., at 65-66.7
On February 9, 1989, two weeks after release of the Attorney General's opinion, the parties filed a Statement of Stipulated Facts, which reported Governor Mofford's opposition to the ballot initiative, her intention nevertheless, "to comply with Article XXVIII,'' and her expectation that "State service employees [would] comply'' with the measure. See Record, Doc. No. 62, &Par;35, 36, 39. The stipulation confirmed the view of all parties that " [t]he efficient operation [and administration] of the State is enhanced by permitting State service employees to communicate with citizens of the State in languages other than English where the citizens are not proficient in English.'' Id., &Par;16, 17. In particular, the parties recognized that "Yniguez'[s] use of a language other than English in the course of her performing government business contributes to the efficient operation . . . and . . . administration of the State.'' Id., ¶15. The stipulation referred to the Attorney General's January 24, 1989 opinion, id., ¶46, and further recounted that since the passage of Article XXVIII, "none of [Yniguez's] supervisors ha[d] ever told her to change or cease her prior use of Spanish in the performance of her duties,'' id., ¶48.8
The District Court heard testimony on two days in February and April 1989, and disposed of the case in an opinion and judgment filed February 6, 1990. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F.Supp. 309. Prior to that final decision, the court had dismissed the State of Arizona as a defendant, accepting the State's plea of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id., at 311. Yniguez's Second Amended Complaint, filed February 23, 1989, accordingly named as defendants only the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Department of Administration. See App. 55.9
The Attorney General "ha[d] formally interpreted Article XXVIII as not imposing any restrictions on Yniguez's continued use of Spanish during the course of her official duties,'' id., at 312, and indeed all three named defendants-Mofford as well as Corbin and Eden, see supra, at __-"ha[d] stated on the record that Yniguez may continue to speak Spanish without fear of official retribution.'' 730 F.Supp., at 312. Governor Mofford therefore reiterated that Yniguez faced no actual or threatened injury attributable to any Arizona executive branch officer, and hence presented no genuine case or controversy. See ibid. But the District Court singled out the stipulations that "Governor Mofford intends to comply with Article XXVIII,'' and "expects State service employees to comply with Article XXVIII.'' Record, Doc. No. 62, &Par;35, 36; see 730 F.Supp., at 312. If Yniguez proved right and the Governor wrong about the breadth of Article XXVIII, the District Court concluded, then Yniguez would be vulnerable to the Governor's pledge to enforce compliance with the Article. See ibid.
Proceeding to the merits, the District Court found Article XXVIII fatally overbroad. The measure, as the District Court read it, was not merely a direction that all official acts be in English, as the Attorney General's opinion maintained; instead, according to the District Court, Article XXVIII imposed a sweeping ban on the use of any language other than English by all of Arizona officialdom, with only limited exceptions. Id., at 314. The District Court adverted to the Attorney General's confining construction, but found it unpersuasive. Opinion No. I89-009, the District Court observed, is "merely . . . advisory,'' not binding on any court. 730 F.Supp., at 315. "More importantly,'' the District Court concluded, "the Attorney General's interpretation . . . is simply at odds with Article XXVIII's plain language.'' Ibid.
The view that Article XXVIII's text left no room for a moderate and restrained interpretation led the District Court to decline "to allow the Arizona courts the initial opportunity to determine the scope of Article XXVIII.'' Id., at 316. The District Court ultimately dismissed all parties save Yniguez and Governor Mofford in her official capacity, then declared Article XXVIII unconstitutional as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but denied Yniguez's request for an injunction because "she ha[d] not established an enforcement threat sufficient to warrant [such] relief.'' Id., at 316-317.
Postjudgment motions followed, sparked by Governor Mofford's announcement that she would not pursue an appeal. See App. 98. The Attorney General renewed his request to certify the pivotal state-law question-the correct construction of Article XXVIII-to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Record, Doc. No. 82. He also moved to intervene on behalf of the State, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2403(b),10 in order to contest on appeal the District Court's declaration that a provision of Arizona's Constitution violated the Federal Constitution. Record, Doc. Nos. 92, 93.
Two newcomers also appeared in the District Court after judgment: the Arizonans for Official English Committee (AOE) and Robert D. Park, Chairman of AOE. Invoking Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, AOE and Park moved to intervene as defendants in order to urge on appeal the constitutionality of Article XXVIII. App. 94-102. AOE, an unincorporated association, was principal sponsor of the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII. AOE and Park alleged in support of their intervention motion the interest of AOE members in enforcement of Article XXVIII and Governor Mofford's unwillingness to defend the measure on appeal. Responding to the AOE/Park motion, Governor Mofford confirmed that she did not wish to appeal, but would have no objection to the Attorney General's intervention to pursue an appeal as the State's representative, or to the pursuit of an appeal by any other party. See Record, Doc. No. 94.
Yniguez expressed reservations about proceeding further. "She ha[d] won [her] suit against her employer'' and had "obtained her relief,'' her counsel noted. Record, Doc. No. 114, p. 18 (Transcript of Proceeding on Motion to Intervene and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, March 26, 1990). If the litigation "goes forward,'' Yniguez's counsel told the District Court, "I guess we do, too,'' but, counsel added, it might be in Yniguez's "best interest . . . if we stopped it right here.'' Ibid. The District Court agreed.
In an opinion filed April 3, 1990, the District Court denied all three postjudgment motions. Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F.R.D. 410. Certification was inappropriate, the District Court ruled, in light of the court's prior rejection of the Attorney General's narrow reading of Article XXVIII. See id., at 412. As to the Attorney General's intervention application, the District Court observed that §2403(b) addresses only actions ""to which the State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party.''' See id., at 413 (quoting §2403(b)). Yniguez's action did not fit the §2403(b) description, the District Court said, because the State and its officers were the very defendants-the sole defendants-Yniguez's complaint named. Governor Mofford remained a party throughout the District Court proceedings. If the State lost the opportunity to defend the constitutionality of Article XXVIII on appeal, the District Court reasoned, it was "only because Governor Mofford determine[d] that the state's sovereign interests would be best served by foregoing an appeal.'' Ibid.
Turning to the AOE/Park intervention motion, the District Court observed first that the movants had failed to file a pleading "setting forth the[ir] claim or defense,'' as required by Rule 24(c). Ibid. But that deficiency was not critical, the District Court said. Ibid. The insurmountable hurdle was Article III standing.