Source: https://casetext.com/case/cutrera-v-board-of-suprs-of-la-state-univ
Timestamp: 2019-02-18 14:41:42
Document Index: 283317255

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 12102', '§ 1630', '§ 12112', '§ 1630', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Cutrera v. Board of Sup&apos;rs of La. State Univ, 429 F.3d 108 | Casetext
Cutrera v. Board of Sup&apos;rs of La. State Univ
429 F.3d 108 (5th Cir. 2005)
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No. 04-31100.
Mary Lenore Feeney (argued), Taylor, Porter, Brooks Phillips, Baton Rouge, LA, for Bd. of Supervisors and Caillier.
William Lee Schuette, Jr. (argued), Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere Denegre, Baton Rouge, LA, for La. State Univ. Foundation.
Appellant Barbara Cutrera was originally hired by LSU as a coordinator/research associate in the LSU Law Library in 1989. In 1993, Cutrera began experiencing difficulty tracking moving objects and driving at night, as well as numbness in her eyelids when reading from a computer screen. After consultation with several doctors, Cutrera was diagnosed with Stargardt's disease, a form of macular degeneration. Cutrera's vision has steadily deteriorated, and she now has virtually no central vision in her left eye, and little in her right. Cutrera retains some limited peripheral vision primarily in her right eye. There is no known cure or treatment for Stargardt's disease, and the vision impairment cannot be corrected with eyeglasses, contact lenses, or surgery.
Stargardt's disease (also known as fundus flavimaculatus and Stargardt's macular dystrophy) is the most common form of inherited juvenile macular degeneration. It causes a progressive loss of central vision and, in the early stages patients may have good visual acuity, but may experience difficulty with reading and seeing in dim lighting. The progression of vision loss is variable and can start with a visual acuity of 20/40 and decrease rapidly to 20/200 (legal blindness). There is no effective treatment for Stargardt's disease.
On August 2, 1999, Cutrera filed suit in Louisiana state court, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA, deprivation of her liberty interest in violation of § 1983, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of state tort law. After removal, the District Court granted summary judgment for Appellees on the grounds that (1) Cutrera is not disabled for purposes of the ADA, (2) Cutrera failed to make out a retaliation claim under the ADA, (3) Cutrera failed to make out a claim under § 1983, and (4) Cutrera failed to make out a state law tort claim. This appeal followed.
We review the district court's court's summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., Inc., 297 F.3d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 2002). The Court may grant summary judgment where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). A "dispute about a material fact is `genuine' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Mason v. United Air Lines, 274 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2001). Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmovant fails to establish facts supporting an essential element of her prima facie claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Mason, 274 F.3d at 316. In making the determination of whether summary judgment was proper, the Court reviews the facts, and all inferences drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1990). We will not, however, "weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. . . ." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Mason, 274 F.3d at 316.
Cutrera argues first that the district court erred in concluding that she is not disabled for purposes of the ADA, as required to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. The term "disability" under the ADA means: "(A) a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The EEOC's regulations state that the term "major life activities" includes "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . the hiring . . . or discharge of employees." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case for discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must be a qualified individual with a disability. Mason, 274 F.3d at 316 (5th Cir. 2001).
Our inquiry into whether Cutrera's impairment substantially limits her ability to see is guided by Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999) and Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). In Kirkingburg, the Supreme Court held that the ADA "requires monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act's protection, to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial." Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 568, 119 S.Ct. 2162. However, the Court also noted that monocular individuals do not have an "onerous burden" and that "people with monocular vision `ordinarily' will meet the Act's definition of disability." Id. In Sutton, the Supreme Court held that mitigating measures must be taken into account in judging whether an individual has a disability. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (holding that claimants with 20/200 vision or worse in both eyes who failed to meet the airline's minimum vision requirement of uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because their vision was 20/20 or better corrected).
Appellees offer as an alternate basis for affirming the summary judgment the argument that Cutrera failed to request an accommodation from the LSU Foundation. "In general . . . it is the responsibility of the individual with the disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9, App. (1995). Once such a request has been made, "[t]he appropriate reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer and the qualified individual with a disability." Id. Thus, the employee's initial request for an accommodation triggers the employer's obligation to participate in the interactive process. Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1029, 117 S.Ct. 586, 136 L.Ed.2d 515 (1996). However, when an employer's unwillingness to engage in a good faith interactive process leads to a failure to reasonably accommodate an employee, the employer violates the ADA. See Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 165 (3d Cir. 1999); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Appellant argues next that the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment on her ADA retaliation claim. The District Court found that appellant failed to prove any causal connection between the protected activity asserted in Appellants retaliation claim — requesting an accommodation from the LSU Law Library in 1997 and applying for new positions following her termination in 1998 — and the adverse employment action. Appellant now argues that the District Court failed to consider her request for accommodations at the LSU Foundation in 1998 as a basis for the alleged retaliation. However, Appellant's new factual theory was not raised in her complaint, nor raised in her opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment. We decline to consider Appellant's new arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 2004). The District Court correctly dismissed the retaliation claims.
Appellant argues next that the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment on her § 1983 claim, arguing that the District Court ignored her First Amendment retaliation claim. Appellant's First Amendment retaliation claim, however, was not raised in her complaint, and instead was raised for the first time in response to Appellee's motion for summary judgment. A claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court. Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th Cir. 1990).
The district court properly considered only Appellant's § 1983 claims based on the equal protection and due process grounds raised in the complaint and correctly granted summary judgment on the claims as pled. Appellant has not briefed the equal protection or due process issues on appeal, and has therefore waived those claims. See Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 921 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that where a claim is not briefed on appeal, it is abandoned). Because Appellant failed to properly raise the First Amendment claim, and has abandoned her equal protection and due process arguments, we conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Appellees on the § 1983 claims.