Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/486/995/287416/
Timestamp: 2019-06-21 00:21:34
Document Index: 628952264

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 167', '§ 4321', '§ 1331', '§ 4332', '§ 1346', '§ 4321', '§ 706']

National Helium Corporation, Plaintiff-appellee, Andphillips Petroleum Company and Cities Servicehelex, Inc., Intervenor-plaintiff-appellees, v. Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and Elburtf. Osborn, Director, Bureau of Mines, Departmentof the Interior, Defendants-appellants, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973) :: Justia
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National Helium Corporation, Plaintiff-appellee, Andphillips Petroleum Company and Cities Servicehelex, Inc., Intervenor-plaintiff-appellees, v. Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and Elburtf. Osborn, Director, Bureau of Mines, Departmentof the Interior, Defendants-appellants, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973)
This cause has been appealed on prior occasions. In National Helium Corporation v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), the district court, 326 F. Supp. 151, had ruled that helium purchase contracts entered into pursuant to the Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq. could not be terminated by the Secretary of the Interior without the filing by the Interior Department of an environmental impact statement in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. This court affirmed that decision, holding that the Department was required to comply with this provision of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Following the filing of an environmental impact statement by the Department, the Secretary again terminated the helium purchase contracts and once again plaintiffs-appellees filed an injunction suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The district court again enjoined the Secretary. On this occasion it was due to the dissatisfaction of the court with the impact statement. There have been two other appeal proceedings presented to us. One of these involved the scope of the retrial-whether it was to be an agency review or a de novo hearing. The other had to do with efforts of plaintiffs-appellees to discover government documents.
The district court, 361 F. Supp. 78, filed the decision leading to the instant appeal on June 11, 1973. It again enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from terminating three of the helium purchase contracts. Although the Department had filed an impact statement the court ruled that it had failed to comply with the mandate of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; that the impact statement, if not deficient in scope, was essentially lacking in depth. At present, then, the primary issue before the court is whether the Department's impact statement or report was in accordance with the statutory standards and in accordance with this court's mandate in the prior case.
First, it is contended that there was a lack of jurisdiction for the district court to even entertain the case in view of the Supreme Court's recent decision (rendered since our last decision) in United States v. Students Chal. Reg. Agcy. Pro. (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973).
First we consider the renewed challenge to jurisdiction. As above noted, this question was determined adversely to the government in the early appeal. See 455 F.2d at 653-654. The government now urges that the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, supra, has changed the applicable law and that this issue must be reexamined. In this recent case the Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the District of Columbia three-judge court which enjoined a proposed railroad rate increase of the Interstate Commerce Act. Under that Act a railroad is required to give at least 30 days notice for carrying out a proposed rate increase. During this period the Interstate Commerce Commission may, pursuant to Sec. 15(7) of the Act, suspend the operation of the proposed rate for a maximum of seven months pending an investigation and decision of the lawfulness of the new rates. The Interstate Commerce Commission refused to suspend the rate increase and the environmental issue arose from the fact that the increase involved a 2.5 percent surcharge on nearly all freight rates. Plaintiffs alleged that the modified rate structure would discourage the transportation of recyclable materials and promote the use of raw materials which compete with scrap material and would thereby affect the environment. The Court based its decision on Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern Railway Co., 372 U.S. 658, 83 S. Ct. 984, 10 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1963), which had held that Congress had in the ICC Act vested exclusive power in the ICC to suspend rates pending final decision and had deliberately extinguished judicial power to grant this relief; the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction.
The district court held that additional bases of jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), Sec. 1361 (action to compel a federal officer to perform his duty), and Secs. 2201 and 2202 (declaratory judgments). Jurisdiction on other than NEPA grounds becomes important only if we find compliance with NEPA. This argument is superfluous since NEPA furnishes a jurisdictional base, and the case being properly in federal court it is there for all purposes. Hence, we have no concern over jurisdiction outside the NEPA base.
We have fully considered the Supreme Court cases which prohibit injunctive relief against governmental officers on account of their upholding the rights of the government arising under a contract. Such a suit is distinguished by the Supreme Court from actions seeking compensations for an alleged wrong and are regarded as actions against the sovereign to which there has not been consent. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 U.S. 682, 69 S. Ct. 1457, 93 L. Ed. 1628 (1949).2
It is fundamental that the Tucker Act which contains a limited consent of the United States to be sued does not authorize an action in injunction. See Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 93 S. Ct. 629, 34 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1973) and United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S. Ct. 1501, 23 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1969).
The specific procedural requirements of NEPA are delineated in 42 U.S.C. § 4332. Section 4332(2) (A)-(H) imposes specific procedural duties on federal agencies, one of which is the duty of preparing a detailed impact statement to accompany any recommendation for a major federal action significantly affecting the environment. The requirements of this impact statement contained in Sec. 4332(2) (C) include five specific areas to be covered in the impact statement:
The trial court employed the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of Sec. 706 of the APA.4 This sets aside the action if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law. The trial court purportedly relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-414, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971). This case did not, however, involve the preparation of an environmental impact statement. This was a review of the decision of the Secretary of Transportation in respect to the building of a highway through a park. This was in truth "agency action." The decision of the Secretary in Overton Park was concerned with the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. In assessing the adequacy of the impact statement, we are not here reviewing, as we said above, agency action within the meaning of Sec. 706 of the APA. Rather, we are concerned with the NEPA requirement which is, to be sure, a prerequisite for agency action but is not agency action itself. The trial court's conclusion that it was required by Overton Park to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard was, in our view, erroneous.
Finally, the most recent decision of the D. C. Circuit, Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, D.C. Cir., 481 F.2d 1079, 1973, expounds the standards more clearly than earlier decisions:
The remaining issue and the crucial one in the case pertains to the adequacy of the Final Environmental Statement testing it by the five prescribed areas set forth in Sec. 4332(2) (C), supra.
As a preface, we note that there is some dispute as to whether the comments which were given by the various agencies and institutions to which the draft environmental statement were sent are to be regarded as a part of the Final Statement. The Department solicited, received and considered comments from many interested parties, including the plaintiffs-appellees. They contend that the various comments are not to be considered as a part of the Final Statement. However, we disagree. These were incorporated into the Final Statement and were available for consideration by all interested parties and are available for the information of the President, the Congress and the public. Those commenting included the various agencies within the Interior Department and ten other federal agencies, including the National Science Foundation, Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition, there were comments of three states, various scientific groups and a number of business and educational institutions. Moreover, the Final Environmental Statement shows that the comments were considered by the authors of the statement. The cases hold that the comments are to be regarded as an integral part of the statement. See Con. Council of N. Car. v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972), and Environmental D. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng. of United States Army, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark. W.D.1972).
Apart from the five categories, Sec. 4332(2) (C) requires that the Department "consult with and obtain the comments of" federal agencies having jurisdiction or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved in a contemplated action. The impact statement meets the standard prescribed by Sec. 4332(2) (C) in this regard, when viewed in light of the "rule of reason" we have here approved. The requirement should not be viewed as necessitating that the completion of an impact statement be unreasonably or interminably delayed in order to include all potential comments or the results of works in progress which might shed some additional light on the subject of the impact statement. Such a result would often inordinately delay or prevent any decision in environmental cases. The courts should look for adequacy and completeness in an impact statement, not perfection. E. D. F. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d at 297. In this particular case this court expressed the opinion that an ultimate resolution of the issues involved in this case was urgent and should be expedited. 455 F.2d at 657. The initial impact statement was not issued until May 16, 1972, and the Final Statement issued on November 13, 1972. To have delayed the statement any longer would have flown in the face of what we considered a reasonable time for preparation of the statement.
It is also contended by the parties (appellees) that the statement is defective because of failure to state the purpose of the contemplated action. Section 4332(2) (C) does not explicitly require that the purpose of the contemplated government action be spelled out. While in many types of governmental action the exact purpose of the action might be unclear and thus lead to confusion were it not stated, this is not such a case. The self-evident purpose of the proposed action here is to terminate the continued purchase of helium reserves which the Secretary regards as economically superfluous and beyond the goals set forth in the 1960 Amendments to the Helium Act.
The decision in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254, SCRAP, does not affect federal jurisdiction in the instant case because we have no concern with any federal statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction on an agency. The argument of the Government is that this case involves federal contracts and that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2) and 1491, is the only statute which gives federal courts jurisdiction over government contract cases. In the first place, this suit does not arise out of any contract. It is concerned with compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. In the second place the Tucker Act does not equate with the statute giving the Interstate Commerce Commission exclusive power to suspend rates.
The general standard of judicial review of agency actions is found in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A). The action is set aside if it is arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-414, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136. The key phrase in Sec. 706 is "agency action." NEPA directs that "to the fullest extent possible * * * all agencies of the Federal Government shall * * * include in every * * * major Federal action(s) significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official" covering stated subject areas. NEPA alters the decisionmaking process of the federal agencies and brings environmental factors to an equal footing with economic, technical, and other traditional considerations, all of which must be balanced by the decision-maker.
337 U.S. at 704, 69 S. Ct. at 1468. See also some of the numerous other cases which support the Larson holding: Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S. Ct. 999, 10 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1963); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S. Ct. 1009, 91 L. Ed. 1209 (1947); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058 (1941).
National Helium Company, et al. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78, filed June 11, 1972 (D.Kansas)