Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/955/990/448338/
Timestamp: 2019-07-22 20:19:23
Document Index: 307886583

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 1651', '§ 2255', '§ 3231']

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,553united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Irving M. Drobny, Defendant-appellant, 955 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1992 › Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,553united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Irving M. Drobny, Defenda...
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,553united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Irving M. Drobny, Defendant-appellant, 955 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1992)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 955 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1992)
Because the alleged scheme and the legal issues involve complicated questions under the securities law, we recite the facts in some detail. On collateral review, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1989). We draw the following background facts from our opinion on direct appeal, United States v. DeVeau, 734 F.2d 1023, 1024-26 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S. Ct. 906, 83 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1985). We also reiterate the procedural history carefully because a host of procedural complexities riddle this case.
Drobny raised two issues on appeal. He objected to the jury instruction on "willful blindness," and he contended that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that he knew that Jet funds would be used to cover his check. Both grounds for reversal were rejected. DeVeau, 734 F.2d at 1028-29. He did not complain of the omission of an "in connection with" instruction. See id. When he failed to gain relief from this Court, he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and he did raise the "in connection with" issue. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Drobny v. United States, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S. Ct. 906, 83 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1985).
Collateral review is fundamentally different from a direct appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982). As our Court, sitting en banc, recently said,
A defendant can challenge his conviction after it is presumed final only on issues of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 471, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962), and may not raise an issue for the first time on collateral review without showing both 'cause' for his procedural default, and 'actual prejudice' resulting from the error. Frady, 456 U.S. at 168, 102 S. Ct. at 1594.
United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 978, 117 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1992). If the alleged error is not constitutional or jurisdictional, "the defendant must show that the error could not have been raised on direct appeal, and if condoned, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice." Id. at 232 n. 7 (citing United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981)). If the defendant does not meet this burden of showing cause and prejudice, he is procedurally barred from attacking his conviction.
To invoke the procedural bar, however, the government must raise it in the district court. United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir. 1989). " 'As a general principle of appellate review, this Court will not consider a legal issue or theory not presented to the [federal district court].' " Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1368 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (State waived its cause-and-prejudice argument by not raising it in habeas corpus proceeding before the federal district court) (quoting Noritake v. M/V HELLENIC CHAMPION, 627 F.2d 724, 732 (5th Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949, 102 S. Ct. 2021, 72 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1982). The Supreme Court has affirmed one of our cases holding that the government waived the cause-and-prejudice standard. Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981).
Before we can decide the merits, though, we must determine what standards of review apply. Drobny filed his motion in the district court pursuant to § 2255, which applies only to those "in custody." At the time, Drobny was on parole. The Government concedes that one on parole is "in custody" within the meaning of § 2255. The Government instructs us that all issues raised by the § 2255 motion are accordingly addressed under a § 2255 standard of review, even though the Defendant is no longer on parole and thus no longer "in custody." Cf. United States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 864 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1988) (§ 2255 motion not necessarily moot after movant is released), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809, 110 S. Ct. 51, 107 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1989). We will follow the Government's instruction, without deciding which standard of review is appropriate for a § 2255 motion being reviewed after the movant's release.
Drobny now raises claims that were not included in his § 2255 motion. When a defendant is no longer in custody, a writ of error coram nobis is the appropriate procedural vehicle for attacking a conviction. The ancient coram nobis remedy survives under the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S. Ct. 247, 98 L. Ed. 248 (1954); Marcello, 876 F.2d at 1149 n. 1, 1154. A petitioner may obtain this writ only upon "demonstrat [ing] that he is suffering civil disabilities as a consequence of the criminal conviction and that the challenged error is of sufficient magnitude to justify the extraordinary relief". Marcello, 876 F.2d at 1154. This more stringent standard of review applies in the case at bar to the issues raised only after Drobny's release from parole (i.e., those issues not raised in his § 2255 motion).
We can easily dispose of the coram nobis claims. Drobny argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate for failing to object to a series of questions put to Drobny. Under Morgan, if Drobny could prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he would be entitled to relief even under the rigorous standards of coram nobis. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512, 74 S. Ct. at 252 (construing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938)).
We evaluate his attorney's performance with regard to prevailing professional norms, employing the two-prong test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). First, we determine whether the attorney's performance was deficient, giving "a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgment." Green v. Lynaugh, 868 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831, 110 S. Ct. 102, 107 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1989). Second, we determine whether even a deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
As discussed above, we generally do not address claims raised for the first time on appeal. Seldom can we fairly evaluate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without a factual record first being developed by the district court. In exceptional cases, however, when the record sufficiently details the allegations of ineffective counsel, we will address the claim on the merits. United States v. Kinsey, 917 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990).
First Drobny says that the Government did not prove the essential "in connection with" element and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction. This argument is simply wrong. District courts have jurisdiction over offenses against the laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. As the Supreme Court stated over three-quarters of a century ago, "nothing is clearer than that the district court, which has jurisdiction of all crimes cognizable under the authority of the United States, acts equally within its jurisdiction whether it decides a man to be guilty or innocent under the criminal law, and whether its decision is right or wrong." Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65, 36 S. Ct. 255, 256, 60 L. Ed. 526 (1916) (citation omitted). The indictment charged Drobny with an offense against the United States, and the district court had jurisdiction. What Drobny has actually raised by this argument, in the guise of a jurisdictional challenge, is a claim that the evidence was insufficient and that the jury was improperly charged.
We now turn to some of the case law interpreting Rule 10b-5 and its correlative statutes. Drobny relies on the Seventh Circuit rule that "misrepresentations made after an investor is legally committed to a sale or purchase [of securities] cannot form the basis for a Rule 10b-5 action." Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1237 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1988) (construing LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1988)). We do not disagree with this principle, which Drobny contends has been adopted by other circuits as well. Appellant's Br. at 9 (citing International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 151-52 (4th Cir. 1987); Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1986); Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Bollo, 560 F.2d 1089, 1091 (2d Cir. 1977); Raschio v. Sinclair, 486 F.2d 1029, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1973)). We do not believe that the principle furthers Drobny's claim, however.
We now address Drobny's argument that the jury was not properly instructed on the "in connection with" element. The trial judge read the jury both the securities fraud statute and the securities fraud rule. Both contain the "in connection with" language. The trial judge also told the jury that "in connection with" is an essential element of the crime charged. 16 Tr. 251-53. This jury instruction is sufficient; the jury was told at least three times that it had to find that Drobny perpetrated his fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. More than ample evidence at trial was adduced to prove this element. A rational trier of fact could conclude, from the evidence just recited, that the fraud was perpetrated in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. See United States v. DeVeau, 734 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S. Ct. 906, 83 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1985). The conviction is proper.