Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/434/335/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-01-18 03:21:58
Document Index: 95502993

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 301', '§ 8', '§ 8']

NLBR V. IRON WORKERS, 434 U. S. 335 (1978) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 434 > NLBR V. IRON WORKERS, 434 U. S. 335 (1978)
NLBR V. IRON WORKERS, 434 U. S. 335 (1978)
Subscribe to Cases that cite 434 U. S. 335
Held: Respondent's picketing was for recognitional purposes, and constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(7)(C). An uncertified union like respondent, which does not represent a majority of the employees, may not under that provision engage in picketing in an effort to enforce a prehire agreement with the employer. Pp. 434 U. S. 341-352. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 434 U. S. 352. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sections 8(b)(7) and 8(f) were added to the National Labor Relations Act in 1959. [Footnote 1] Section 8(f), permitting so-called chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"prehire" agreements in the construction industry, provides that it shall not be an unfair labor practice to enter into such an agreement with a union that has not attained majority status prior to the execution of the agreement. Under § 8(b)(7)(C), a union that is not the certified representative of the employees in the relevant unit commits an unfair labor practice if it pickets an employer with "an object" of "forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees" and if it does not within 30 days file a petition for an election under § 9(c). The National Labor Relations Board (Board) held that it is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8(b)(7)(C) for an uncertified union not representing a majority of the employees to engage in extended picketing in an effort to enforce a prehire agreement with the employer. [Footnote 2] The issue here is whether this is a misapplication of the section, as the Court of Appeals held in this case. [Footnote 3] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On March 6, 1974, Higdon Contracting Co. filed a charge with the Regional Director of the Board, alleging that Local 103 was violating § 8(b)(7) of the Labor Act. The Administrative Law Judge found that Higdon Contracting Co. and Higdon Construction Co. were legally indistinct for purposes of the proceedings. In an opinion issued August 23, 1974, he concluded that Local 103's picketing did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Higdon had entered into a lawful § 8(f) prehire contract with Local 103 by which it promised to abide by the multiemployer standard. The picketing was for purposes of obtaining compliance with an existing contract, rather than to obtain recognition or bargaining as an initial matter. Only the latter was a purpose forbidden by § 8(b)(7). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Board's subsequent petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari was granted. [Footnote 6] We reverse. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is undisputed that the union was not the certified representative of Higdon's employees, and that it did not file an election petition within 30 days of the onset of the picketing. The issue for the Board was whether, for the purposes of § 8(b)(7)(C), the union pickets carrying signs asserting that Higdon was violating an agreement with the union were picketing with the forbidden purpose of requiring Higdon to recognize or bargain with the union. Under the Board's view of § 8(f), a prehire agreement does not entitle a minority union to be treated as the majority representative of the employees until and unless it attains majority support in the relevant unit. Until that time, the prehire agreement is voidable, and does not have the same stature as a collective bargaining contract entered into with a union actually representing a majority of the employees and recognized as such by the employer. Accordingly, the Board holds, as it did here, that picketing by a minority union to enforce a prehire agreement that the employer refuses to honor, effectively has the object of attaining recognition as the bargaining representative with majority support among the employees, and is consequently violative of § 8(b)(7)(C). The Board and the Court of Appeals thus differ principally on the legal questions of how § 8(f) is to be construed and of what consequences the execution of a prehire agreement has on the enforcement of other sections of the Act, primarily §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(7)(C). We have concluded that the Board's construction of the Act, although perhaps not the only tenable one, is an acceptable reading of the statutory language and a reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant statutory sections. [Footnote 7] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although, on its face, § 8(b)(7)() would apply to any extended picketing by an uncertified union where recognition or bargaining is an object, the section has at been literally chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As the present case demonstrates, however, the Sullivan Electric rule does not protect picketing to enforce a contract chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
than to grant "exclusive bargaining status to an agency selected by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the nonconsenting majority." Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 731, 366 U. S. 737 (1961). This is true even though the employer and the union believe in good faith, but mistakenly, that the union chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The proviso exposing unions with prehire agreements to inquiry into their majority standing by elections under § 9(c) led the Board to its decision in R. J. Smith: An employer does not commit an unfair practice under § 8(a)(5) when he refuses to honor the contract and bargain with the union and the union fails to establish in the unfair labor practice proceeding that it has ever had majority support. As viewed by the Board, a "prehire agreement is merely a preliminary step that contemplates further action for the development of a full bargaining relationship." Ruttmann Construction Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971). The employer's duty to bargain and honor the contract is contingent on the union's attaining majority support at the various construction sites. In NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265 (CA3 1973), for example, the prehire contract was deemed binding on those projects at which the union had secured a majority, but not with respect to those chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congressional concern about coerced designations of bargaining agents did not evaporate as the focus turned to the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Board's position does not, as respondents claim, render § 8(f) meaningless. [Footnote 11] Except for § 8(f), neither the employer nor the union could execute prehire agreements without committing unfair labor practices. Neither has the Board challenged the voluntary observance of otherwise valid § 8(f) contracts, which is the normal course of events. It is also chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The union suggests that the Board's construction of § 8(f) deserves little or no deference, because it is merely an application in the § 8(b)(7) context of the decision in R. J. Smith Construction Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), which itself was inconsistent with a prior decision, Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1963). It is not at all clear from the latter case, however, that the union involved there had never had majority status. The issue received only passing attention at the time, and the case was distinguished by the Board chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The union argues that the Board's position permitting an employer to repudiate a prehire agreement until the union attains majority support renders the contract, for all practical purposes, unenforceable, assertedly contrary to this Court's decision in Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U. S. 17 (1962). There, the Court's opinion recognized that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to entertain suits on contracts between an employer and a minority union, as well as those with majority-designated collective bargaining agents. Section 8(f) contracts were noted as being in this category. The Court was nevertheless speaking to an issue of jurisdiction. That a court has jurisdiction to consider a suit on a particular contract does not suggest that the contract is enforceable. It would not be inconsistent with Lion Dry Goods for a court to hold that the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
An employer in the construction industry, like any other employer, is under no obligation to bargain with a labor organization that does not represent a majority of his employees. [Footnote 2/1] See NLRB v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 298 F.2d 176, 179 (CA2). But unlike other employers, he is free to do so, and may, under § 8(f), sign a contract with a union whose majority status has not been established without risking liability under chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Peaceful primary picketing in pursuit of lawful objectives, even by a minority union, is not forbidden by the National Labor Relations Act unless it falls within an express statutory prohibition. NLRB v. Teamsters, 362 U. S. 274, 362 U. S. 282. The chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
However one may view the relationship established by a § 8(f) agreement, it is established when the agreement is signed. Only by the most strained interpretation of the terms can picketing to enforce the agreement be said to be for the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary