Source: https://nclej.org/chapter-9-5
Timestamp: 2020-07-09 07:27:36
Document Index: 666103969

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1821', '§ 1962', '§ 1924', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1821', '§ 1828', '§ 1961', '§ 626']

9.5 Costs and Interest - National Center for Law and Economic Justice
Generally, a “prevailing party” for purposes of attorney fees is one for taxation of costs.4 There is no time period in the rule by which the prevailing party must move for costs. The deadline is generally set by local rule.5 In the absence of a local rule, the motion should be filed within a reasonable period of time after judgment is entered. The bill of costs must be verified.6 The clerk of court has the initial responsibility for taxing costs.7 The opposing party has fourteen days to oppose the motion, and the losing party has seven days to seek review by the court.8
Although Rule 54(d) and various federal statutes may provide for costs, the court has some discretion in imposing responsibility for payment.9 Specifically, most courts permit the consideration of the losing party’s indigence in taxing costs.10 The good faith of the losing party is not a reason to deny taxation of costs.11 Thus, a legal services client who loses a case and is faced with a costs bill should appeal to the court’s discretion, but such indigence does not automatically exempt a losing party from paying costs.12
Because ordinary costs are rather limited, counsel frequently look to fee-shifting statutes as a way to recover out-of-pocket expenses not covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Prior to 1991, courts often subscribed to the view that “out-of-pocket expenses incurred by an attorney which would normally be charged to a fee paying client are recoverable as attorneys’ fees.”18 In West Virginia University Hospital v. Casey, however, the Supreme Court imposed limitations on recoverable out-of-pocket expenses regarding expert fees by holding that “[Section] 1988 conveys no authority to shift expert fees. When experts appear at trial, they are of course eligible for the fee provided by § 1920 and § 1821.”19
1.In Marx v. General Revenue Corporation, 133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013), the Supreme Court ruled that the fees and costs provision in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1962k(a)(3), was not such a statute.
4.Dattner v. Conagra Foods, 458 F.3d 98, 100-02 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Incorporated v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)).
5.White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 453 (1982).
6.28 U.S.C. § 1924.
7.Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
9.Rule 54(d)(1) states that costs “should be” allowed, but there is a strong presumption to tax costs for the prevailing party.
10.See Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 631, 634-37 (7th Cir. 2006).
11.Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 793-95 (5th Cir. 2006).
12.Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (11th Cir. 2000).
13.28 U.S.C. § 1920; Crawford Fitting Company v. J.T. Gibbons, Incorporated, 482 U.S. 437, 441-45 (1987).
14.Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012) (costs associated with “compensation of interpreters” in Section 1920(6) are limited to those providing oral translations, not those translating written documents).
15.See, e.g., Sea Coast Foods, Incorporated v. Lu-Mar Lobster & Shrimp, Incorporated, 260 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2001); Stearns Airport Equipment Company v. FMC Corporation, 170 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1999); Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Systems, Incorporated, 135 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 1998); Callicrate v. Farmland Industries, Incorporated, 139 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1998); Soler v. Waite, 989 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1993).
16.Fogelman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1991).
17.28 U.S.C. §§ 1920; 1821. See, e.g., Pinkham v. Camex Incorporated, 84 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“[E]xpert fees in excess of the 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) $40 limit are not recoverable.”); Morrison v. Reichhold Chemicals, Incorporated, 97 F.3d 460, 463 (11th Cir. 1996); Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1257 (7th Cir. 1995).
18.Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1216 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986).
19.West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991). See also Crawford Fitting Company, 482 U.S. 437 (1987) (holding that authority to award expert witness fees as costs under Rule 54(d) was limited by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1828 and 1920).
21.28 U.S.C. § 1961. The statute states that interest is calculated from the date of judgment at “a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding.” The current Treasury-bill rate and how to apply it can be found at United States Courts, Post Judgment Interest Rates (n.d.).
22.See Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
23.29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
24.Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.), 214 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2000); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Incorporated, 41 F.3d 1132 (7th Cir. 1994). But see Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1996) (decision to award prejudgment interest is within sound discretion of district court).