Source: http://fsmlaw.org/fsm/code/title12/T12_Ch02.htm
Timestamp: 2017-01-17 23:26:18
Document Index: 94244905

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 201', '§ 202', '§ 203', '§ 204', '§ 205', '§ 206', '§ 207', '§ 208', '§ 209', '§ 210', '§ 211', '§ 212', '§ 213', '§ 214', '§ 215', '§ 216', '§ 217', '§ 218', '§ 219', '§ 220', '§ 489', '§ 456', '§ 3', '§ 446', '§ 448', '§ 449', '§ 206', '§ 450', '§ 451', '§ 452', '§ 209', '§ 453', '§ 454', '§ 457', '§ 455', '§ 213', '§ 465', '§ 458', '§ 459', '§ 462', '§ 217', '§ 463', '§ 464', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 218', '§ 497', '§ 498', '§ 218', '§0']

Process - Warrants and Arrest FSMC, TITLE 12. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Chapter 2: Process - Warrants and Arrest
§ 201. Process obligatory upon police.
§ 202. Limitation of arrests without a warrant.
§ 203. Authority to issue a warrant of arrest.
§ 204. Warrant or penal summons upon complaint.
§ 205. Investigation of complaint in doubtful cases.
§ 206. Use of penal summons in lieu of warrant of arrest.
§ 207. Execution of warrants and service of penal summons.
§ 208. Return of service.
§ 209. Issuance of oral order in lieu of warrant or penal summons by community
§ 210. Issuance of warrant or penal summons on information.
§ 211. Authority to arrest without warrant.
§ 212. Use of citations.
§ 213. Complaints in cases of arrest without warrant.
§ 214. Arrested person to be informed of cause and authority of arrest.
§ 215. Use of force in making arrest.
§ 216. Disposition of persons arrested by private persons.
§ 217. Disposition of arrested persons by policeman.
§ 218. Rights of persons arrested.
§ 219. Effect of irregularities in issuance of warrant of arrest.
§ 220. Effect of violation of title.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 489; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 51; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 51.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 456; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 52; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 52.
Cross-reference: FSM Const., art. IV, § 3.
Case annotations: Suspicion of guilt can justify the extreme action of an arrest only when based upon reasonable grounds known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest so strong that a cautious man would "believe," that is, consider it more likely than not that the accused is guilty of the offense. Ludwig v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 27, 33 (App. 1985).
(4) any other person authorized in writing by the High Commissioner and a certified copy of whose authorization is filed with the clerk of courts for the district in which he acts.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 446; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 53; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 53.
Case annotations: Arrest and Custody No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraints or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. FSM v. Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79, 86 (Pon. 1983).
The law generally requires that a prisoner test the legality of his detention in a court of law rather than attempt to enforce his own claim to freedom. FSM v. Doone, 1 FSM Intrm. 365, 368 (Pon. 1983).
(3) Any official, other than a judge of a district court, may refuse to act if he deems that the public interest does not require action before the matter can reasonably be presented to a judge of a district court.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 448; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 54; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 54.
(1) If a judge of a district court before whom a complaint is made is doubtful whether sufficient grounds in fact exist for the issuance of a warrant or penal summons, he may, if the complainant consents, refer the complaint to the Micronesia police for investigation and report and withhold action for a reasonable time pending such report.
(2) If the complainant does not consent to such a reference or if the report of investigation is not received within a reasonable time, the judge shall proceed to examine under oath the complainant, any witnesses offered by the complainant and such other witnesses as the judge deems best and may, in his discretion, give the accused an opportunity to be present and to be heard.
(3) If the judge is satisfied from the investigation made by the Micronesia police or that made by him as directed in subsection (2) of this section that there is probable cause to believe or strongly suspect that the offense complained of has been committed and that the accused committed it, he shall issue a warrant or a penal summons as provided in this chapter.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 449; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 55; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 55.
§ 206. Use of penal summons in lien of warrant of arrest.
(1) In the case of all criminal offenses for which the lawful punishment does not exceed a fine of $100, or six months imprisonment, or both, a penal summons to appear before a court at a time and place fixed in the penal summons shall be issued instead of a warrant of arrest, unless it shall appear to the court or official issuing the process that the public interest requires the arrest of the accused.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 450; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 56; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 56.
A warrant of arrest shall be executed or the penal summons served by a policeman or by a person specifically authorized in the warrant or summons to execute or serve it. The warrant may be executed or the summons served at any place within the jurisdiction of the Trust Territory. The penal summons shall be served upon the accused by delivering a copy to him personally and orally explaining the substance thereof to him in a language generally understood in the locality and, if practicable, in one understood by the accused, or by leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of abode or of business with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing or employed therein and orally explaining the substance thereof.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 451; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 57; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 57.
(1) The person executing a warrant shall endorse thereon and sign a statement of the arrest showing the date and place of arrest and shall have such warrant delivered to the court or official before whom the accused is brought pursuant to section 217 of this chapter, or to the court named in the warrant if the accused is released on bail or personal recognizance before being brought before a court or official.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 452; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 58; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 58.
§ 209. Issuance of oral order in lieu of warrant or penal summons by community court.
(1) A community court or any judge thereof may, if the court or judge deems the public interest so requires, issue an oral order in place of either a warrant of arrest or a penal summons, which shall have the same force and effect within the territorial jurisdiction of that court as a warrant or penal summons.
(3) Any person making an arrest on such an oral order or serving such an order in place of a penal summons shall report all the essential facts to the court or official before whom the accused is brought or ordered to appear.
(4) Any person by going to trial before a community court without requesting a copy of the charges against him thereby waives his right to have a copy in advance of trial in that court, but he does not thereby waive his right to such copy before trial in a district court in the event of an appeal.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 453; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 59; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 59.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 454; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 60; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 60.
Case annotations: Information
Where language of an information is more specific than the language of the statute under which the offense is charged, the prosecution is required to establish those specific facts in addition to a violation of the statute. FSM v. Boaz (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 22, 24 (Pon. 1981).
An information which claims that the defendant entered a building for the purpose of "fighting" rather than "assaulting" a person within the building does not render the information inadequate for a conviction. A desire to fight carries with it a desire to commit an assault. FSM v. Boaz (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 22, 26 (Pon. 1981).
Government's failure to prove the assertion in its information that a dangerous weapon was used to cause the victim to submit to the sexual assault need not result in dismissal of the case. It merely prevents an application of the greater punishment available under 11 FSMC 914(3)(b). Buekea v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 487, 493-94 (App. 1984).
Allegations in the Information alleging a criminal violation must be proven in order to obtain a conviction. It is not sufficient that the evidence show a violation of the statute specified in the Information if the actual violation is different from the one alleged. Buekea v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 487, 493-94 (App. 1984).
At the discretion of the trial judge, the Information may be amended to conform to the evidence if it appears fair to do so. Buekea v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 487, 494 (App. 1984).
When an information sufficiently apprizes the defendant of the charges against which he must be prepared to defend and is sufficiently detailed to enable him to plead his case as a bar to future prosecutions for the same offense, it is generally sufficient that an information set forth the offense in words of the statute itself.Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 503, 516-17 (App. 1984).
The language of Rule 7(c) of FSM Supreme Court Rules of Criminal Procedure has been interpreted by other courts as permitting prosecution to charge commission of a single offense by different means, or by charging in conjunctive actions prohibited disjunctively in a statute. Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 503, 517 (App. 1984).
FSM Supreme Court Rules of Criminal Procedure were designed to avoid technicalities and gamesmanship in criminal pleading. They are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure. FSM Criminal Rule 2 convictions should not be reversed, nor information thrown out, because of minor, technical objections which do not prejudice the accused. Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 503, 518 (App. 1984).
11 FSMC 301 is one of a set of sections in Chapter 3 of the National Criminal Code specifying general principles of responsibility which apply implicitly to all substantive offenses but do not themselves enunciate substantive offenses. These are not subject to "violation" and are therefore not reached by Rule 7 of the FSM Rules of Criminal Procedure. These general principles are deemed applicable to all crimes, and mere failure to restate them in an Information is not a failure to inform or a violation of due process. Engichy v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 532, 542 (App. 1984).
Dropping one count from a criminal information does not prevent the prosecution from proving that count as an element of other pending charges. FSM v. Cheng Chia_W (I), 7 FSM Intrm. 124, 126 (Pon. 1995).
Where counts in an information other than the one count dismissed also charge illegal fishing violations the dismissal of two other counts for which illegal fishing is an element will be denied. FSM v. Cheng Chia-W (I), 7 FSM Intrm. 124, 126 (Pon. 1995).
Criminal defendant have the constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against them. This protection is implemented through Criminal Rule 7(c)(1), which requires that an information must "be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." An information should not be thrown out because of minor, technical objections which do not prejudice the accused. FSM v. Xu Rui Song, 7 FSM Intrm. 187, 189 (Chk. 1995).
The fundamental purpose of the information is to inform the defendant of the charge so that he may prepare his defense, and the test for sufficiency is whether it is fair to defendant to require him to defend on the basis of the charge as stated in the particular information. Another purpose is to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. FSM v. Xu Rui Song, 7 FSM Intrm. 187, 189 (Chk. 1995).
An information that, as a practical matter, is not sufficiently certain and unambiguous so as to permit defendant to prepare a defense, or to inform the court of what alleged acts or omissions of this particular defendant result in criminal liability is defective, and may be dismissed without prejudice. FSM v. Xu Rui Song, 7 FSM Intrm. 187, 190 (Chk. 1995).
(4) Policemen, even in cases where it is not certain that a criminal offense has been committed, may, without a warrant, arrest and detain for examination, persons who may be found under such circumstances as justify a reasonable suspicion that they have committed or intend to commit a felony.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 457; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 61; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 61.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 455; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 62; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 62.
§ 213. Complaints in cases of arrest without warrant .
Source: TT Code 1966 § 465; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 63; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 63.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 458; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 64; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 64.
Editor's note: The 1970 and 1980 editions of the Trust Territory Code made extensive changes in the phraseology of the 1966 edition.
Case annotations: Where a municipal police officer intending to make an arrest to for unlawful drinking, informs the accused that he is going to "take him to a place" because he was drinking and where there are indications that the accused understands that the officer is seeking to effect an arrest, there is sufficient compliance with the requirement of 12 FSMC 214 that arresting officers "make every reasonable effort to advise the person arrested as to the cause and authority of the arrest." Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 569 (App. 1984).
One should be considered "arrested," for the purposes of the right to be advised of his rights to remain silent when one's freedom of movement is substantially restricted or controlled by a police officer exercising official authority based upon the officer's suspicion that the detained persons may be, or may have been, involved in commission of a crime. FSM v. Edward, 3 FSM Intrm. 224, 232 (Pon. 1987).
Source: TT Code 1966 § 459; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 65; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 65.
Case annotations: A police officer is entitled under 12 FSMC 215 to respond to physical resistance or attacks against him as he attempts to make an arrest and he may use whatever force is reasonably necessary to defend himself or others from harm. However, the police officer may not employ more force than he reasonably believes to be necessary, either to effect arrest or to defend himself. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 570 (App. 1984).
Where no Micronesian legislative body has addressed the rules concerning arrests and where no party suggests that the matter is influenced by customary law, the principles stated in the Restatements of Torts concerning use of deadly force may be considered in determining, for purposes of a criminal case, the scope of police officer's right to use force while making an arrest. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 570 (App. 1984).
The interest of society in the life of its members, even though they be felons or reasonably suspected of felony, is so great that the use of force involving serious danger to them is privileged only as a last resort when it reasonably appears that there is no other alternative except abandoning his attempts to make the arrest. In determining whether the use of such force is privileged, the actor has not the same latitude of discretion which is permitted to him in determining whether it is necessary to use force which is intended or likely to cause less serious consequences. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 570 (App. 1984).
Deadly force by a police officer attempting to effect an arrest, may be justified by evidence indicating the defendant reasonably believes that there is no alternative method of effecting the arrest and that deadly force is necessary as a last resort.Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 571-72 (App. 1984).
Reasonableness of a police officer's conduct in using deadly force while making an arrest must be assessed on the basis of the information the police officer had when he acted. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 571-72 (App. 1984).
It is quite reasonable for a police officer, who uses a deadly weapon in deadly fashion against a person armed with a knife, to obtain a weapon that will afford him a means of protecting himself against the knife and intimidating the person to be arrested. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 573 (App. 1984).
Where a police officer arms himself with a weapon to arrest a man armed with a knife, and then uses the weapon in a deadly fashion without first giving the person an opportunity to submit and without determining whether the person intends to use the knife to prevent arrest, this use of force cannot be viewed as a last resort necessary to the arrest not as reasonably necessary to protect the police officer from serious bodily injury. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 573 (App. 1984).
While a police officer may use force to effect an arrest and to protect himself and other citizens, he may not use force simply to punish people he dislikes or those he decides have done wrong. The principal functions of the police officer are to preserve peace and order and to apprehend lawbreakers so that they may be tried by the courts and handled justly. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 574_75 (App. 1984).
Punishment is no part of the police officer's assignment. A policeman who chooses to mete out punishment violates his office and does so at his own peril. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 575 (App. 1984).
It is not unreasonable for a trial court to conclude that a police officer, claiming to effect an arrest, who hits a person four times with a mangrove coconut husker and kills him was trying to kill him. Loch v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 566, 576 (App. 1984).
In making an otherwise lawful arrest, a police officer may use whatever force is reasonably necessary to effect the arrest, and no more; he must avoid using unnecessary violence. Meitou v. Uwera, 5 FSM Intrm. 139, 143 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1991).
Any private person making an arrest shall deliver the arrested person to a policeman or an official authorized to issue a warrant without unnecessary delay and shall explain the cause of the arrest. Except where transportation difficulties are involved, or neither a policeman nor an official authorized to issue a warrant can be located promptly, such delay should not extend beyond a few hours during the daytime or early evening nor beyond 10 o'clock on the following morning in the case of persons arrested during the night time.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 462; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 66; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 66.
§ 217. Disposition of arrested persons by policeman .
Persons arrested by a policeman, except under subsection (4), section 211 of this chapter, or delivered to him after arrest by a private person, shall be brought without unnecessary delay before a court competent to try the offender for the criminal offense charged, subject to the following:
(2) If it appears that it will not be practicable to bring the arrested person promptly before a court competent to try him for the offense charged, and he has not been released on bail or personal recognizance, he shall be brought before an official authorized to issue a warrant without unnecessary delay. This official shall commit the arrested person, discharge him, or release him on bail or personal recognizance as provided in this title. Whenever a judge of a district court is available, the arrested person shall be brought before such a judge in preference to any other official authorized to issue a warrant.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 463; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 67; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 67.
In any case of arrest, or arrest for examination, as provided in subsection (4) of section 211 of this chapter, it shall be unlawful to:
(1) deny to counsel, whether such counsel is retained by the arrested person or a member of his family or is a Public Defender not yet appointed by the Court, the right to see the arrested person once, at any time, for a reasonable period of time at the place of detention, and thereafter at reasonable intervals and for reasonable periods of time; or
(2) deny to the arrested person the right to see at reasonable intervals, and for reasonable periods of time at the place of his detention, counsel, or members of his family, or his employer, or a representative of his employer; or
(3) refuse or fail to make a reasonable effort to send a message by telephone, cable, wireless, messenger, or other expeditious means to any person mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, provided the arrested person so requests and such message can be sent without expense to the Government or the arrested person prepays any expense there may be to the Government; or
(4) fail either to release or charge such arrested person with a criminal offense within a reasonable time, which under no circumstances shall exceed 24 hours; or
(5) fail to either release the accused or to bring him before a court, judge, or judicial officer for a bail hearing within a reasonable time, which under no circumstances shall exceed 24 hours after his arrest, unless the location of the nearest court makes such appearance impossible. When the location of the court makes such appearance impossible, the municipal or community court judge for the area where the person was arrested shall be immediately notified by the arresting person or officer and shall set any conditions for the release of the person that the judge believes will protect the public and will insure the presence of the person when transportation to the nearest court becomes possible. The person arrested shall be transported to the nearest court without unnecessary delay.
(6) further, it shall be unlawful for those having custody of one arrested, before questioning him about his participation in any crime, to fail to inform him of his rights and their obligations under subsections (1) through (5) of this section.
(7) In addition, any person arrested shall be advised as follows:
(c) that the services of the Public Defender, when in the vicinity or of his local representative, are available for these purposes without charge.
Source: TT Code 1966 § 464; COM PL 4-5 § 1; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 68; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 68: PL 1-74 § 1.
Case annotations: Under FSM law, courts will rarely be required to look to the Constitution to determine the scope of any right a person in custody may have to be advised of rights before questioning because national statute establishes the rights of persons accused of national crimes. 12 FSMC §§ 218, 220. FSM v. Edward, 3 FSM Intrm. 224, 230 (Pon. 1987).
Source: TT Code 1966 § 497; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 69; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 69.
No violation of the provisions of this title shall in and of itself entitle an accused to an acquittal, but no evidence obtained as a result of such violation shall be admissible against the accused; provided, that any person detained in custody in violation of any provision of this title may, upon motion by any person in his behalf, and after such notice as the court may order, be released from custody by the court named in the warrant, or before which he has been held to answer. The release shall be upon such terms as the court may deem law and justice require. The relief authorized by this section shall be in addition to, and shall not bar, all forms of relief to which the arrested person may be entitled by law.
Source: TT Code 1966 §§ 498, 499; TT Code 1970, 12 TTC 70; TT Code 1980, 12 TTC 70.
Case annotations: Under FSM law, courts will rarely be required to look to Constitution to determine scope of any right a person in custody may have to be advised of rights before questioning because national statute establishes rights of persons accused of nat'l crimes. 12 FSMC §§ 218, 220. FSM v. Edward, 3 FSM Intrm. 224, 230 (Pon. 1987).