Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/960/19/349758/
Timestamp: 2020-08-07 04:54:16
Document Index: 581054593

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2679', '§ 8116', '§ 2679', '§ 2679', '§ 8128', '§ 8128', '§ 2679']

Merrill Benton, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America and the United States Postalservice, Defendants-appellees, 960 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1992 › Merrill Benton, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America and the United States Postalservice...
Merrill Benton, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America and the United States Postalservice, Defendants-appellees, 960 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1992)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 960 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1992) Feb. 12, 1992
Merrill Benton appeals the district court's grant of the Government's motion to dismiss her complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) and (6). She contends that the district court erred in concluding that (1) the exclusive remedy provision of the Federal Employees Compensation Act barred her recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act for personal injuries, and (2) the exclusive remedy provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act barred her claim against the United States Postal Service. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the claim.
After exhausting her administrative remedies, Benton filed the complaint at issue on June 18, 1990, alleging that the stairwell that she fell on was negligently maintained, and seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for pain and suffering, future earnings, and general loss of enjoyment of life. She brought the action against the Postal Service, as both a co-employee and owner of the Postal Service Building, and against the United States as a substitute defendant for the Postal Service. In response, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the exclusive remedy provision of the FTCA barred her claim against the Postal Service, and the exclusive remedy provision of the FECA barred her personal injury claim against the United States. The district court agreed that the Postal Service was not a proper party to the suit, and that 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1) precluded her claim against the United States as substitute defendant for an unnamed co-employee. Consequently, the district court dismissed Benton's claims with prejudice.
We review a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) under the same standard used by the district court: a claim may not be dismissed unless it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). We employ the same standard in reviewing dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1). Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 742 n. 1, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 1851 n. 1, 48 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1976). So, taking Benton's factual allegations as true for the purposes of this appeal, we independently review her claims to determine whether the district court correctly dismissed it under Rule 12(b) (1) and (6).
5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). In Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822, 107 S. Ct. 89, 93 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1986), we held that this provision bars an individual who has received an award of compensation benefits under the FECA from suing the United States for that injury under the FTCA. Id. at 474. Moreover, we found that it also barred the claimant's daughter from recovering damages for loss of her mother's support and services. Id. at 475. The FECA benefits received by the claimant were not intended to compensate the daughter for any personal loss resulting from her mother's injuries.1 Nonetheless, we adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Woerth v. United States, 714 F.2d 648, 650 (6th Cir. 1983), that the proper inquiry is "whether the claim is 'with respect to the injury or death of an employee.' " 781 F.2d at 475; see also Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal of an FTCA claim based on negligent infliction of emotional distress not compensated under the FECA because it was "divorced from any claim of physical injury"). We agree with the district court that the exclusive remedy provision of the FECA bars Benton's claim for pain and suffering, future earnings, and general loss of enjoyment of life--injuries which derived from her physical injury for which she was already compensated under the FECA.
Second, Benton contends that the FECA exclusive remedy provision does not bar her suit against the United States in its capacity as substitute defendant for the negligence of the Postal Service, a co-employee. Benton relies on our holding in Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1962), to support this contention. In Allman, we held that absent specific statutory command, workers' compensation statutes are not construed to abrogate the common law rights of employees to bring negligence suits against their fellow employees. Id. at 563. Accordingly, we allowed the plaintiff's negligence action against a fellow government employee to proceed notwithstanding the FECA. As the district court observed, the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1), precludes Benton from obtaining the same result. This provision provides:
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1). Because this specific statutory command prohibits Benton's claim against the United States as substitute defendant for an unnamed co-employee,2 we agree with the district court that the claim should be dismissed.
It is well settled that "Congress has the power, through a 'clear command of the statute,' to preclude review of policy decisions...." Paluca v. Secretary of Labor, 813 F.2d 524, 527 (1st Cir.) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167, 90 S. Ct. 832, 838, 25 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1970)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943, 108 S. Ct. 328, 98 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1987); see also Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The structure of the FECA and the language of section 8128(b) convince us that Congress's intent was that the courts not be burdened by a flood of small claims challenging the merits of compensation decisions, ... and that the Secretary should be left free to make the policy choices associated with disability decisions.") (citations omitted). A statute may prohibit review of adjudications made in conformity with policy decisions, so long as it does not prohibit review of constitutional questions. See Paluca, 813 F.2d at 526, 527 (confirming validity of § 8128(b)'s bar of judicial review because it refers to statutory, and not constitutional, action) (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 1165, 39 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1974)). Because § 8128(b) prohibits review only of compensations decisions wholly within the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, we find that Benton's challenge lacks merit.
Benton also suggests that the exclusive remedy provision of the FECA deprives federal employees of their equal protection and due process rights because only federal employees are barred from suing under the FTCA when they are injured by negligent acts of the government. However, the FECA bar applies only to those claims arising out of injuries incurred in the scope of employment. The government has a legitimate reason for maintaining a federal worker's compensation program in this manner. In Gill v. United States, 641 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981), we observed that the FECA program is akin to state workers' compensation programs. In Gill, we recognized that " [t]he heart of the system is an implicit bargain: employees are granted surer and more immediate relief in return for foregoing more expensive rewards outside the system." Id. at 197. Benton's constitutional challenge provides no convincing reason for us to question the legitimacy of the purpose underlying the FECA program, as expressed in Gill. Therefore, we find this claim without merit.
Grijalva received disability compensation, reimbursement of medical expenses, and continuation of her salary during her disability. See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822, 107 S. Ct. 89, 93 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1986)
See Noga v. United States, 411 F.2d 943 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 841, 90 S. Ct. 104, 24 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1969) (dismissing FTCA suit in which United States was technical defendant in place of negligent federal driver because Federal Drivers Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)-(e) (1964), rendered government employee driver immune from suit)