Source: https://casetext.com/case/cicippio-puleo-v-islamic-republic-of-iran
Timestamp: 2020-08-03 18:00:12
Document Index: 400854103

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1330', '§ 1605', '§ 101', '§ 589', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 2002', '§ 201', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605']

Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 | Casetext Search + Citator
Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Proceedings before Judge Facciola have gone forward. Several months after this Court filed its memorandum…
The District Court's judgment against Iraq rests solely on causes of action purportedly arising under the…
Full title:Elizabeth A. CICIPPIO-PULEO, et al., Appellants, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF…
Date published: Jan 16, 2004
353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
holding that § 1605 does not create a private right of action against a foreign state
Summary of this case from Estate of Botvin ex rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran
This case involves a lawsuit brought against the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran") under the terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000). The plaintiffs in the suit are the adult children and siblings of Joseph J. Cicippio, a victim of terrorist hostage-taking. Joseph Cicippio was abducted in 1986 by Hizbollah, an Islamic terrorist organization that receives material support from Iran. He was held hostage until 1991, confined in inhumane conditions and frequently beaten. In 1996, Joseph Cicippio and his wife sued Iran for the tortious injuries they sustained as a result of Mr. Cicippio's kidnaping, imprisonment, and torture. Iran failed to respond to the complaint and default was entered on November 13, 1997. The case was tried ex parte and, on August 27, 1998, the District Court entered judgment against Iran in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Cicippio in the amount of $30 million. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F.Supp.2d 62, 64, 70 (D.D.C. 1998). No appeal was taken.
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency . . .
Five months after the passage of AEDPA, Congress enacted a separate provision, titled Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, which created a private right of action against officials, employees, and agents of foreign states for the conduct described in § 1605(a)(7). See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, § 101(c) [Title V, § 589], 110 Stat. 3009-172 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note). This provision is known as the "Flatow Amendment," in recognition of the family of Alisa Flatow, a woman who died as the result of a terrorist bombing in Israel. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998). The Flatow Amendment provides:
Because Iran has never entered an appearance in this litigation, the court appointed the Georgetown University Law Center's Appellate Litigation Program as amicus curiae to present arguments in support of the District Court's judgment.
As they have done in the past, see Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 332 note* (D.C. Cir. 2003), the advocates from the Appellate Litigation Program responded admirably on very short notice in assisting the court with an outstanding brief and oral argument.
"`Whether the FSIA creates a federal cause of action for torture and hostage taking against foreign states,' or only against their `official[s], employee[s] or agent[s]' as specified in the [Flatow] Amendment," an issue raised but not decided in Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 02-7085 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2003) (order appointing amicus curiae).
Subsequently, the court granted the motion of Blake Kilburn et al. ("Kilburn amici"), plaintiffs in other lawsuits in the district court against foreign states, for leave to participate as amici curiae. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 02-7085 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 2003) (order granting motion for leave to participate as amici curiae).
The Flatow Amendment does not provide a cause of action against foreign nations or their governments. . . . Quite unambiguously, the statute provides a cause of action against individual "official[s], employee[s], or agent[s]" of foreign states for the acts of terrorism in which they have taken part, but not against foreign states themselves.
The United States' Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims at 20-21, Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002) (Civ. No. 00-3110 EGS). In a later submission in Roeder, the Government further submitted that,
Reply Memorandum in Support of the United States' Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims at 17, Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002) (Civ. No. 00-3110 EGS).
Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 02-7085, 2003 WL 22669558 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 5, 2003) (order requesting statement of United States).
In denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and in sua sponte dismissing their complaint pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6), the District Court assumed that plaintiffs' factual allegations were true. The standard of review covering both the denial of summary judgment and the dismissal for failure to state a claim is the same — de novo. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). And we may affirm a district court's sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief. See Baker v. Dir., United States Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Because we hold that the Flatow Amendment does not authorize a cause of action against foreign states, it is clear that plaintiffs can allege no facts in their lawsuit against Iran that would entitle them to relief under the Flatow Amendment. Therefore, we affirm the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under section 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment.
Id. at 87. Since Price, some district court opinions in this circuit have held or assumed that the Flatow Amendment creates a cause of action against foreign states. See Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F.Supp.2d 222, 231 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that the Flatow Amendment provides a cause of action against a foreign state). See also Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 87, 98-99 (D.D.C. 2003) (adopting Cronin's reasoning that there is a cause of action against foreign states under the Flatow Amendment); Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F.Supp.2d 24, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2003) (same).
This court, however, has never affirmed a judgment that the Flatow Amendment, either alone or in conjunction with section 1605(a)(7), provides a cause of action against a foreign state. The issue was raised in Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2003), but the appeal was resolved on other grounds. In Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the court noted that, "[i]n view of the Flatow amendment's failure to mention the liability of foreign states, it is `far from clear' that a plaintiff has a substantive claim against a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act," id. at 234 n. 3, but that appeal was also decided on other grounds.
The first inquiry is whether there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity. If there has been such a waiver, as in this case, the second inquiry comes into play — that is, whether the source of substantive law upon which the claimant relies provides an avenue for relief.
The Supreme Court has also made it clear that the federal courts should be loathe to "imply" a cause of action from a jurisdictional provision that "creates no cause of action of its own force and effect . . . [and] imposes no liabilities." See Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). "The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Id. at 578, 99 S.Ct. 2479. In adhering to this view, the Supreme Court has declined to construe statutes to imply a cause of action where Congress has not expressly provided one. See, e.g., Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (recognizing the Court's retreat from its previous willingness to imply a cause of action where Congress has not provided one); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) ("Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.").
The language of section 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment — the only provisions upon which plaintiffs rely — is clear. In declaring that "[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States . . .," 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) merely abrogates the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of the courts in lawsuits for damages for certain enumerated acts of terrorism. It does not impose liability or mention a cause of action. The statute thus confers subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts over such lawsuits, but does not create a private right of action.
As the Supreme Court repeatedly has explained, an official-capacity claim against a government official is in substance a claim against the government itself. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). . . . By definition, a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit is enforceable against the state itself (and only against the state). See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099 . . .; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). . . . Thus, to construe the Flatow Amendment as permitting official-capacity claims would eviscerate the recognized distinction between suits against governments and suits against individual government officials. . . . [T]he text of the the Flatow Amendment and Section 1605(a)(7), as well as all relevant background interpretive principles . . . foreclose any such construction.
Subsequent enactments by Congress providing for the payment or enforcement of judgments entered against foreign states in cases brought under § 1605(a)(7) fail to establish that Congress created a cause of action against foreign states. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1541-43; Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337-39. As we explained in Roeder, these statutes merely provide for payment " if an individual has a judgment against Iran," but they do not address or resolve the anterior question "whether plaintiffs are legally entitled to such a judgment." 333 F.3d at 239 (emphasis added). It is entirely plausible for Congress to direct the United States to compensate victims of terrorism without purporting to establish or support a cause of action against foreign state sponsors of terrorism.
holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1605 merely removes a foreign state's immunity from jurisdiction in federal courts, and does not affirmatively create a cause of action
Summary of this case from Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran
holding in light of evolving state of law that "[w]e will therefore remand the case to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to state a cause of action under some other source of law including state law . . ."
Summary of this case from HARTFORD INS. v. SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB
holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1605, the terrorism exception, is a jurisdictional provision
holding that neither section 1605 of the FSIA nor the Flatow Amendment, either alone or in tandem, creates a cause of action against foreign terrorist states
holding in light of evolving state of law that "[w]e will therefore remand the case to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to state a cause of action under some other source of law, including state law, as the Kilburn amici have suggested"
Summary of this case from Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran
upholding the district court's sua sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b) of plaintiffs' complaint where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief"
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affirming the district court's dismissal based on its consideration, sua sponte, of the applicability of FSIA and its exceptions
rejecting conclusion in Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 231 (D.D.C. 2002) that a foreign state could be sued under the Flatow Amendment and FSIA on the theory of respondeat superior
Summary of this case from Fisher v. Jamahiriya
rejecting Judge Lamberth's interpretation of the Flatow Amendment and noting that "neither 28 U.S.C. § 1605 nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government"
noting appointment of amicus curiae "to present arguments in support of the District Court's judgment" when district court dismissed case sua sponte and defendants never appeared
Summary of this case from Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates
In Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, we held that hostage-taking for profit did not fall within the commercial activity exception.
Summary of this case from Mwani v. bin Laden
In Cicippio, the D.C. Circuit held that "neither 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government."
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considering an issue not raised by the parties after giving them an opportunity to submit supplemental briefing
Summary of this case from U.S. ex Rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.
In Cicippio, this court definitively ruled that "neither 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government."
In Cicippio, we held that neither § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered together, supplies a cause of action against foreign states.
In Cicippio, we held that neither § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two together, creates a cause of action against foreign states themselves.
In Cicippio, we permitted such a remand because the state of the law at the time of that appeal "may have... misled" the plaintiffs in that case into assuming that the Flatow Amendment afforded a cause of action against the foreign state defendant.
noting that the fact that 1605 did not provide a cause of action against foreign states "takes nothing away from § 1605" because what that section "does is to make it clear that designated foreign state sponsors of terrorism will be amenable to suits in United States courts for acts of terrorism in cases in which there is a viable cause of action"
declining to imply cause of action against foreign government where "the liability imposed by [28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) ] is precisely limited to ‘an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism’ "
Summary of this case from Doe v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth.
In Cicippio-Puleo, the D.C. Circuit held that the "Flatow Amendment only provides a private right of action against officials, employees, and agents of a foreign state, not against the foreign state itself."
Summary of this case from Kumar v. Republic of Sudan
noting that satisfying the requirements of § 1605 and the Flatow Amendment serves only to establish jurisdiction
Summary of this case from Estate of Botvin ex rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic
discussing claims for solatium damages
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