Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/462-f-2d-1205-595765850
Timestamp: 2019-12-06 01:41:05
Document Index: 744880529

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2514', '§ 1951', '§ 371', '§ 1952', '§ 1952', '§ 371', '§ 1952', '§ 1951', '§ 1951']

462 F.2d 1205 (3rd Cir. 1972), 71-1886, United States v. Kenny - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 595765850
462 F.2d 1205 (3rd Cir. 1972), 71-1886, United States v. Kenny
Docket Nº: 71-1886 to 71-1890.
Citation: 462 F.2d 1205
Party Name: UNITED STATES of America v. John V. KENNY et al. Appeal of William A. STERNKOPF, Jr., in No. 71-1886. Appeal of Fred J. KROPKE, in No. 71-1887. Appeal of Joseph B. STAPLETON, in No. 71-1888. Appeal of Philip W. KUNZ, in No. 71-1889. Appeal of Bernard MURPHY, in No. 71-1890.
462 F.2d 1205 (3rd Cir. 1972)
On November 16, 1970 a federal grand jury in Newark returned a thirty-four count indictment against John V. Kenny, Thomas Whelan, Thomas Flaherty, Walter Wolfe, John J. Kenny, William Sternkopf, Jr., Fred Kropke, Frank G. Manning, Joseph Stapleton, Philip Kunz, James R. Corrado and Bernard Murphy. Prior to trial the defendants Frank G. Manning, and John J. Kenny (no relation to John V. Kenny and called hereinafter J. J. Kenny) were severed and were granted immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2514. Corrado pleaded guilty to one count on May 21, 1971. During the trial, on June 11, 1971 John V. Kenny (hereinafter J. V. Kenny), because of physical inability to continue,
was severed. At the close of the Government's case five counts of the indictment were dismissed on the motion of the Government. On July 5, 1971, the jury returned verdicts of guilty against seven of the eight remaining defendants on all twenty-nine remaining counts and against defendant Kunz on seventeen of those counts. Sentences were imposed on August 10, 1971 1 and all defendants except Wolfe appealed. Thereafter the defendants Whelan and Flaherty withdrew their appeals. Thus of the twelve named in the indictment the appeals of five, Sternkopf, Kropke, Stapleton, Kunz and Murphy, are before us.
Count I of the indictment charges that each of the defendants, during the period from November 1, 1963 to the date of the indictment, conspired in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 2 to obstruct, delay, and affect interstate commerce by impeding construction undertaken on behalf of the City of Jersey City and the County of Hudson by contractors engaged in interstate commerce, in order to obtain the property of such contractors with their consent, which was induced both by the wrongful use of fear and under color of official right. Count II of the indictment charges that each of the defendants, during the period from November 1, 1963 to November 16, 1970, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 3 conspired to commit violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 4 by using the facilities of interstate
commerce to carry on an unlawful activity, that activity being the crimes of bribery and extortion in violation of the laws of the State of New Jersey. Thus the indictment charges violations of two separate federal conspiracy statutes; the specific prohibition in § 1952 against conspiracies to obstruct, delay or affect commerce (Count I) and the general prohibition in § 371 against conspiracies to commit an offense against the United States (Count II). The offense alleged against the United States in Count II is the substantive violation of § 1952-interstate travel to commit extortion or bribery in violation of state law. Section 1952, unlike § 1951, does not contain a specific prohibition against conspiracy. Section 1951 prohibits both substantive offenses and conspiracies. Counts III through XXXIV of the indictment each charges a separate substantive violation of § 1951 by the extortion of a specific sum of money from a specific contractor.
All defendants engaged in extensive pre-trial motion practice looking to discovery of the Government's case. That case was substantially documentary.
The court ordered the Government, on defendants' motion, to permit them to inspect all tangible evidence related in any way to the case, to furnish in advance copies of any records which the Government might use at the trial and to furnish a copy of the grand jury testimony of each defendant who had testified before the grand jury. As it turned out, there was a room full of documents. This room was kept open to the defendants six days a week prior to the trial and even on Sunday during the trial. Several of the defendants contend that the court's approach was so overly liberal that they never made any meaningful use of the vast volume of materials made available. This contention is without substance. The nature of the conspiracy was such that it generated a great deal of tangible evidence, including $50,090.00 in currency, all of which was available for inspection. The only evidence which was not, pursuant to the court's order, available for inspection prior to trial, was evidence of certain transactions which did not come to the Government's attention until the trial was under way. The court gave the defendants an adequate opportunity during trial to prepare to meet any such later discovered evidence.
Defendant Stapleton contends that the court erred in denying his motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a), for a copy of the statements of government witnesses setting forth conversations with him. We rejected the same contention in United States v. Fioravante, 412 F.2d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837, 90 S.Ct. 97, 24 L.Ed.2d 88...
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