Source: http://openjurist.org/396/f3d/1303
Timestamp: 2013-05-24 07:15:35
Document Index: 669266091

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 6704', '§ 1958', '§ 1843', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1952', '§ 1952']

396 F3d 1303 United States v. M Drury Md | OpenJurist
396 F. 3d 1303 - United States v. M Drury Md	Home396 f3d 1303 united states v. m drury md
396 F3d 1303 United States v. M Drury Md 396 F.3d 1303
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Carl M. DRURY, Jr., M.D., Doctor, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-12924.
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and ALARCON*, Circuit Judges.
This case comes before us for a second time after this Court, sitting en banc, vacated an earlier opinion of this panel, United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir.2003), and granted rehearing en banc, see United States v. Drury, 358 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.2004), and then subsequently vacated the grant of en banc rehearing in light of a congressional amendment to the statute at issue in the case, remanding the matter to this panel for further consideration. See United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir.2005).
Drury placed a total of four calls to Agent Valoze's cellular phone. All four were made from pay phones in Brunswick, Georgia, and both Drury and Valoze were physically located within the state of Georgia at all times during the four telephone conversations. Drury first called Agent Valoze on August 7, 2001, and arranged to meet him at a local restaurant the next day. At that meeting, Drury formulated a plan with Valoze to procure the murder of Mary Drury. Valoze told Drury that he required a gun and a fee of $2,000. Drury provided Valoze with detailed information about his wife and her habits, including her place of employment, her work schedule, and the type of car she drove. Drury stressed that "[i]t just needs to be an accident." He told Valoze that he would call him again in a few days.
This panel initially affirmed Drury's convictions. United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir.2003). By a divided vote, the panel held that § 1958(a) creates federal jurisdiction only when a murder-for-hire scheme uses in interstate commerce a facility such as the telephone. Id. at 1104. Accordingly, the panel concluded that the district court erred in instructing the jury that pay phones and cellular phones are per se facilities in interstate commerce, but it found this error to be harmless, in light of the evidence that the cellular phone signal actually traveled from Georgia into Florida, before bouncing back into Georgia, each time Drury called Agent Valoze. Id. at 1106. The interstate path of the phone signals, the panel held, constituted sufficient evidence to satisfy § 1958(a)'s jurisdictional nexus, and thus to support Drury's conviction. Id. at 1104-05. The panel also unanimously held that the district court committed no reversible error in prohibiting Drury from introducing evidence of his character for truthfulness, id. at 1110; in refusing to admit testimony from Drury's son regarding a prior consistent statement made by Drury after his arrest, id. at 1108-09; or in denying Drury's request for certain jury instructions regarding witness credibility and law enforcement investigative techniques, id. at 1109-10.
On February 3, 2004, this Court vacated the panel opinion and directed that the case be heard en banc. United States v. Drury, 358 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc). We granted rehearing en banc to consider the important question of whether a purely intrastate use of a facility of interstate commerce (the telephone) satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of § 1958(a).
Notably, after the grant of en banc rehearing, Congress amended § 1958 to resolve precisely that question, which had been the subject of some interpretive disagreement among the courts of appeals. The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir.1999), interpreted the phrase "[w]hoever ... uses ... any facility in interstate... commerce" as requiring that the relevant facility actually be used in interstate commerce.2 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir.2001), interpreted that language as covering any use — intra- or interstate — of an interstate commerce facility. The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653 (7th Cir.2003), similarly read § 1958's jurisdictional language as "requir[ing] that the facility, and not its use, be in interstate or foreign commerce." Id. at 660.
The principal source of the courts' interpretive difficulty with § 1958 seemed to be the mismatch between the jurisdictional section's use of the phrase "facility in interstate... commerce," see § 1958(a), and the definitional section's use of the similar but not identical phrase "facility of interstate commerce," see § 1958(b)(2) (providing that "`facility of interstate commerce' includes means of transportation and communication"), coupled with the possibility of reading "in interstate ... commerce" as modifying the immediately preceding noun "facility" or the more remote verb "uses." See, e.g., Weathers, 169 F.3d at 340; Marek, 238 F.3d at 313.
(2) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting "or foreign" after "interstate".
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, § 6704, Pub.L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
Because this amendment obviates for all future convictions under § 1958 the precise question of statutory construction that we granted rehearing en banc to resolve, we determined that the case no longer merited en banc consideration. The full Court thus vacated the order granting rehearing en banc, and referred the case back to this panel for further consideration. United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir.2003).
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991, 993 (11th Cir.2001). "We will affirm a jury's verdict if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In determining a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the government's favor." United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1355 (11th Cir.2002) (citation omitted).
Drury points to nothing in the statute, and we can find nothing that suggests the telephone's use in interstate commerce must be knowing or intentional. We see no reason that unintentional use in interstate commerce would not qualify as use in interstate commerce, and this Circuit's precedent suggests that there is none. In United States v. Davila, 592 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir.1979),4 the former Fifth Circuit held that the "purely incidental" interstate routing of a Western Union wire transfer satisfied the interstate commerce requirement of the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1843. In Davila, funds transferred between two banks located in the state of Texas were, unbeknownst to the defendant, routed through the state of Virginia. In spite of the fact that the interstate routing was wholly incidental to the wire fraud offenses with which the defendant was charged, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the interstate nexus was "too minimal and incidental" to satisfy the statute's jurisdictional element, reasoning that the wire transfers "were essential" to carrying out the offenses charged, "and they went of necessity on interstate facilities." Id. at 1264.
Drury next argues that, regardless of whether the government presented sufficient evidence to establish the requisite jurisdictional nexus, the district court erred in instructing the jury that "pay telephones and cellular telephones are `facilities in interstate commerce' under federal law." This instruction, Drury contends, violated his right to have a jury decide whether he "is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (citation omitted), by removing from the jury's consideration an essential element of a § 1958 violation: the interstate nexus.
The propriety of the trial court's jury instruction is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 908 (11th Cir.1998).
The jurisdictional requirement of § 1958(a) is a substantive element of the offense of murder-for-hire. See United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1105 (11th Cir.2002) (observing that the identically worded jurisdictional requirement of § 1958's predecessor statute, the Travel Act, "is a substantive element of Travel Act offenses that must be decided by a jury"). Drury, therefore, has a constitutional right to have a jury determine whether the requirement is satisfied. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23, 115 S.Ct. 2310 ("The Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is charged."); id. at 513, 115 S.Ct. 2310 (observing that there is a "historical and constitutionally guaranteed right of criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt or innocence on every issue, which includes application of the law to the facts").
However, we need not decide whether the trial judge's instruction that telephones are "facilities in interstate commerce" violated Drury's right to a jury determination of every element of the charged offense, since the instructions are subject to harmless error review. As the Supreme Court observed in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), "there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." Plainly, a jury instruction that omits an element of the charged offense — the error Drury alleges here — is subject to harmless error analysis. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) ("[A]n instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence."); Ross v. United States, 289 F.3d 677, 681 (11th Cir.2002). The appropriate inquiry is "whether it appears `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824).
Drury next challenges the district court's exclusion of evidence of his truthful character. Drury claims that the government attacked his credibility at trial, entitling him to introduce rehabilitative evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a)(2). Rule 608(a)(2) provides that "evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise."
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse of discretion. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1119. "The application of an abuse-of-discretion review recognizes the range of possible conclusions the trial judge may reach." United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc). "By definition ... under the abuse of discretion standard of review there will be occasions in which we affirm the district court even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call. That is how an abuse of discretion standard differs from a de novo standard of review. As we have stated previously, the abuse of discretion standard allows `a range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.'" Id. (quoting Rasbury v. I.R.S. (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir.1994))(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 971 (8th Cir.1984) ("The very concept of discretion presupposes a zone of choice within which the trial courts may go either way."). "Thus, when employing an abuse-of-discretion standard, we must affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard." Id.
Evidentiary errors "do not constitute grounds for reversal unless there is a reasonable likelihood that they affected the defendant's substantial rights; where an error had no substantial influence on the outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict, reversal is not warranted." United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir.1990). "The trial judge is given broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of character testimony." United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863, 874 (11th Cir.1982).
After careful review of the pertinent exchanges between the government's counsel and Drury, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony. As we have previously observed, under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a)(2), "evidence of a witness' truthful character is admissible only after [his] character for truthfulness has been attacked." United States v. Hilton, 772 F.2d 783, 786 (11th Cir.1985). An "attack" that consists only of "Government counsel pointing out inconsistencies in testimony and arguing that the accused's testimony is not credible does not constitute an attack on the accused's reputation for truthfulness within the meaning of Rule 608." United States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir.1982). However, that is precisely the sort of "attack" Drury claims the prosecution to have launched during its cross-examination. Because such an attack is insufficient to authorize rehabilitation under Rule 608, we have little trouble concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Drury's proffered reputation-for-truthfulness testimony.
Drury's next challenge is to the trial court's exclusion of testimony concerning a prior consistent statement Drury allegedly made to his son, Don. Drury's son would have testified that Drury told him immediately after his arrest that he had been participating in a role-playing exercise with Agent Valoze. Drury argues that his son's testimony was admissible on two grounds. First, he claims it was admissible to rehabilitate his credibility, which he says the prosecution impeached on cross-examination by insinuating that he had fabricated the role-playing story. Specifically, Drury cites the question, "Is that where you got the idea to claim that you believed this was all role playing?" as a prosecutorial attack on his credibility. Second, Drury argues that his son's testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), as a prior statement "consistent with the declarant's testimony and ... offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Both arguments are unavailing.6
As to Drury's first argument, we find again that his credibility was not attacked. Drury argues that "[a] prior consistent statement may be used for rehabilitation when the statement has a probative force bearing on credibility beyond merely showing repetition." United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir.1986). This may well be true, but it does not change the fact that Federal Rule of Evidence 608 permits rehabilitative evidence only when a witness's reputation for truthfulness has actually been attacked. See Fed.R.Evid. 608(a)(2). As we observed previously, the prosecution's questioning the veracity of the accused's testimony and calling attention to inconsistencies therein does not constitute an attack on the accused's reputation for truthfulness permitting rehabilitative testimony. See Danehy, 680 F.2d at 1314. Again, Drury has pointed to nothing but a few cross-examination questions to support his claim that the prosecution attacked his character for truthfulness.
Moreover, and perhaps more significant, prior consistent statements are treated as admissible non-hearsay only if they are offered to rebut a specific allegation of recent fabrication, not to rehabilitate credibility that has been generally called into question. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) ("The Rules do not accord this weighty, nonhearsay status to all prior consistent statements. To the contrary, admissibility under the Rules is confined to those statements offered to rebut a charge of `recent fabrication or improper influence or motive'....")(quoting Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)). The Supreme Court has made perfectly clear that "[p]rior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited." Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling Don Drury's testimony inadmissible to rehabilitate Appellant Drury's credibility.
As to Drury's second argument, we find that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in declining to admit Don Drury's testimony as a prior consistent statement. "A district court is granted broad discretion in determining the admissibility of a prior consistent statement under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion." United States v. Prieto, 232 F.3d 816, 819 (11th Cir.2000). Of particular importance here, "whether a witness had a motive to fabricate when a prior consistent statement was made is a factual question properly decided by the district court and subject to reversal only for a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 822.
A prior consistent statement is admissible only if it was "made before the alleged influence, or motive to fabricate, arose." Tome, 513 U.S. at 158, 115 S.Ct. 696. Drury, however, claims that the district court abused its discretion by applying a "temporal litmus test," under which the fact that Drury's statement to his son was made post-arrest rendered it inadmissible, on the theory that his arrest gave Drury a motive to fabricate. In United States v. Prieto, this Court declined to adopt a "bright line rule that motive to fabricate necessarily and automatically attaches upon arrest." Prieto, 232 F.3d at 822. However, the record does not show that the trial court applied such a rule in this case. In fact, the trial judge excluded the statement because he found that "the conditions established by [Tome v. United States] of admissibility of such a statement have not been established here." Although more specific findings on this subject would have eased our inquiry, the record provides ample support for the trial court's determination that Drury, subsequent to his arrest, had motive and opportunity to fabricate the story he told his son. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the statement inadmissible.
"Our review of a trial court's jury instructions is limited; if the instructions accurately reflect the law, the trial judge is given wide discretion as to the style and wording employed in the instruction. Under this standard, `we examine whether the jury charges, considered as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so that the jurors understood the issues and were not misled.'" United States v. Fulford, 267 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir.2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1005 (11th Cir.1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 819 (11th Cir.1984) ("[T]he district court has broad discretion in formulating its charge so long as the charge accurately reflects the law and the facts."). "The district court's refusal to give the requested instruction is reversible only if (1) the instruction is substantially correct, (2) the instruction was not addressed in the charge actually given, and (3) the failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present an effective defense." United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1298 (11th Cir.2001).
Drury argues that he needed that instruction because Whatley, the witness Drury characterizes as the crux of the government's case, was shown at trial to have a bad reputation for truthfulness in the community. Indeed, the trial court permitted Drury to vigorously argue as much to the jury, through direct examination of two character witnesses, cross-examination of Whatley, and closing argument. These opportunities to impugn Whatley's character for truthfulness, coupled with the trial court's general instructions on witness credibility, persuade us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Drury's proposed pattern jury charge. Cf. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir.2002) ("In light of the opportunities afforded the jury to consider Ryan's entrapment defense, we find that the failure to include specific instructions on the issue did not seriously impair presentation of the defense."); United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089, 1101 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that failure to instruct did not impair a defendant's ability to argue that he did not intend to steal cocaine as charged, but rather money, in light of the defendant's opportunities to elicit supporting testimony and to make closing arguments on the issue).
The original Travel Act, entitled "Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering offenses," established penalties for anyone who "travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or (2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1961). The statute provided that "[a]s used in this section `unlawful activity' means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extortion or bribery in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States." Id. § 1952(b).
It bears noting, however, that the Sixth Circuit subsequently disavowed the reasoning ofWeathers and limited its holding to the facts of that case, adopting instead the Fifth Circuit's construction of the statute in Marek. See United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 771 (6th Cir.2002).
Drury makes the additional claim that the trial court improperly ruled that Federal Rule of Evidence 613 barred Don Drury's testimony. However, Drury has taken the trial court's reference to Rule 613 completely out of context. Rule 613(b) governs admissibility of priorin consistent statements, see Fed.R.Evid. 613(b), and accordingly the trial court applied it in determining the admissibility of alleged prior inconsistent statements by Mr. Whatley, who served as a trial witness. The trial court did not, however, cite Rule 613 as a ground for excluding Don Drury's testimony, and thus we do not address Appellant Drury's argument that the trial court erroneously applied that rule.
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