Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/877/895/270218/
Timestamp: 2019-11-14 15:58:13
Document Index: 559522097

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 960', '§ 960', '§ 960', '§ 960', '§ 960']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Armando Fuentes, Carmelo De La Rosa-ibarra, Diego Marzanjulio, Miguel Marquez-rodriguez, Juangarces-vasquez, Denis Joseblanquicet-guzman and Arielantonioarenas-arevalo,defendants-appellants, 877 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 1989 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Armando Fuentes, Carmelo De La Rosa-ibarra, Diego M...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Armando Fuentes, Carmelo De La Rosa-ibarra, Diego Marzanjulio, Miguel Marquez-rodriguez, Juangarces-vasquez, Denis Joseblanquicet-guzman and Arielantonioarenas-arevalo,defendants-appellants, 877 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1989)
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 877 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1989) July 19, 1989
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, and VANCE, Circuit Judge, and EVANS* , District Judge.
Defendants/Appellants are seven crew members of a vessel seized by the United States Coast Guard. They appeal their convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(a) and (j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Defendants were tried by a jury in the federal court for the Southern District of Florida. All were found guilty on both counts. As is required by 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(g), Defendants were sentenced under the penalty provisions of section 1010 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 960.2 Appellants Rosa-Ibarra, Blanquicet-Guzman, Marquez-Rodriguez and Fuentes each received concurrent ten year sentences. Ten years is the minimum sentence permitted by 21 U.S.C. § 960 for possession with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms of a mixture containing marijuana. Appellants Julio, Garces-Vasquez and Arenas-Arevalo received twenty years on each count, to run concurrently. Twenty years is the minimum sentence permitted by 21 U.S.C. § 960 for possession with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms of a mixture containing marijuana where the defendant has a prior drug conviction. Each of these defendants had a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute multi-ton quantities of marijuana.
The court correctly declined to utilize the special verdict form. Neither 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(a) nor Sec. 1903(j), the substantive offense statutes involved, mentions a particular quantity of marijuana. This Circuit has recently held that "the precise quantity of marijuana is not an element of the substantive offense defined in 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(a)." United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1529 (11th Cir. 1989). The holding in Mena applies equally to the language of Sec. 1903(j).
If Appellants' argument is that the court should have given an instruction with respect to the offense of simple possession, it is plain that such instruction was not warranted by the evidence. The only quantity referred to in the record which might arguably invoke such an instruction would be the several ounces of marijuana which the coastguardsmen swept from the ship's holds and which had been doused with diesel fuel, apparently as part of the clean up effort which occurred just before the guardsmen boarded the ship. No rational jury could have found that these scattered remnants constituted a separate lot of marijuana possessed for non-distribution purposes rather than being the remnants of a larger distribution quantity. Therefore, it was not error to fail to give a simple possession charge. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1973).
This argument is meritless. Because the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay does not have a federal district court, it is not a district within the meaning of 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(f).4 Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814, 83 S. Ct. 25, 9 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1962). Section 1903(f) generates venue only in places that have district courts. Otherwise venue is appropriate in the district into which a defendant is brought after his arrest on the high seas. See United States v. Ahumedo-Avendano, 872 F.2d 367, 372 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Crews, 605 F. Supp. 730, 735 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd sub nom, United States v. McGill, 800 F.2d 265 (11th Cir. 1986). The superseding indictment states that Dade County was the first place Defendants were brought in this country.
The exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate because vessels without nationality are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(c) (1) (A). For the purposes of Sec. 1903, a vessel without nationality includes "any vessel aboard which the master or person in charge fails, upon request of an officer of the United States empowered to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel." 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(c) (2) (B). A claim of registry or nationality may be made by showing documents evidencing the boat's nationality, by flying its ensign or flag or with a verbal claim of nationality by the master or person in charge. 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(c) (3). No one on the Black Sand made such a claim.
The standard of reviewing the verdict on sufficiency of the evidence grounds is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, proved Defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1046 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 465, 98 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1987). Conspiracy may be inferred when crewmen are on a vessel where the presence of contraband is obvious. United States v. Gonzalez, 810 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987). Where large quantities of contraband are on a small vessel "it is most unlikely that the person on board will be ignorant of its presence." United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049, 106 S. Ct. 1272, 89 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1986).
Appellants' argument that the wrong mandatory minimum sentencing standards were applied is also unfounded. The district court correctly applied 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(g) by employing the 1986 minimum mandatory sentencing provisions set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 960, rather than the out-of-date 1970 provisions.
(1) Any person who commits an offense defined in this section shall be punished in accordance with the penalties set forth in section 1010 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. § 960).