Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20171120_0002755.NIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-01-16 13:08:42
Document Index: 227425805

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

Curtis B. Woods, Defendants.
For the following reasons, defendant's motion to stay [20] is denied, and defendant's amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion [7] is dismissed as untimely. The court declines to grant a certificate of appealability. The case is closed.
On June 30, 2016, defendant Curtis Woods filed an amended motion challenging his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [7], after the Seventh Circuit allowed a successive appeal under 2244. See [1]. On August 1, 2016, the court stayed these matters pending the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017) [10], and lifted the stay on March 10, 2017, following the Beckles decision [12]. After the court ordered supplemental briefing regarding the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles, the government filed a response on June 2, 2017 [19] and rather than file a reply, defendant filed a motion to stay on June 27, 2017 [20]. This matter is now ripe for the court's review.
The government has challenged defendant's § 2255 motion on the grounds that: (1) defendant expressly waived his right to raise a § 2255 challenge to his sentence in his plea agreement; (2) regardless of the waiver, defendant's § 2255 motion is untimely; and (3) defendant's § 2255 motion has been procedurally defaulted. The court agrees with the government that defendant has waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence. The court also agrees that, notwithstanding the waiver, defendant's motion is untimely. As such, the court need not address the issue of procedural default.
A. Plea Agreement Waiver.
As the government points out, defendant entered into a written plea agreement with the government on December 28, 2001. See United States v. Woods, Case No. 01 CR 500045-1, Doc. #17 (N.D. Ill.), The plea agreement contained the provision that defendant waived his right “to challenge his sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, ” except for collateral attacks presenting “a claim of involuntariness, or ineffective assistance of counsel, which relate[d] directly to this waiver or its negotiation.” See id.
Notably, defendant filed his first § 2255 on February 13, 2004, in United States v. Woods, Case No. 04 CV 50094 (N.D. Ill.). This court dismissed the case, explicitly finding that defendant's plea waiver was valid and that defendant had not challenged its validity or voluntariness. See Id. at Doc. #20. Defendant did not appeal.
Here, the court comes to the same conclusion. As this court has pointed out to defendant before, “it is well-settled that waivers of direct and collateral review in plea agreements are generally enforceable.” See Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 964 (7th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly upheld waivers in circumstances similar to defendant's. See United States v. Lockwood, 416 F.3d 604, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2009). For the same reasons, defendant's motion must be dismissed.
The government next argues that, regardless of waiver, defendant's motion nonetheless is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The parties agree that the motion is not timely under § 2255(f)(1), because defendant's sentence became final over one year ago, but defendant argues that it is timely under § 2255(f)(3), which holds that a motion is timely if it is filed within one year of “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Defendant contends that the right he asserts was newly recognized by the Supreme Court in Johnson, decided within one year of defendant's motion.