Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/1978/33135-1.html
Timestamp: 2019-06-24 13:15:04
Document Index: 779553018

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 26', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 27']

Spivey v. State :: 1978 :: Supreme Court of Georgia Decisions :: Georgia Case Law :: Georgia Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Georgia Case Law › Supreme Court of Georgia Decisions › 1978 › Spivey v. State
241 Ga. 477 (1978)
246 S.E.2d 288
The evidence introduced at trial showed that Spivey had gone to the Final Approach cocktail lounge in Columbus, Georgia, on December 28, 1976, where he consumed several drinks. Shortly before the lounge was to close, Spivey brandished a gun. He ordered the barmaid, Mary Davidson; a waitress, Lucy Weaver; and the only remaining patron in the bar, Burt Marten, to the back of the lounge. He then took $200 from the cash drawer and $50 from Mary Davidson's purse. The manager of the cocktail lounge across the street, Buddy Allen, and a security guard, Billy Watson, who were both lingering outside, became suspicious because the front doors of the bar had not been closed as usual at the closing hour. They entered the bar and proceeded toward the back area, where Spivey and his hostages were located. As they approached him he turned around suddenly and shot them both, killing Watson on the spot. He then ordered Davidson, Weaver, and Marten to leave the lounge with him. As they were leaving Allen moaned, and Spivey turned around and shot him again. Although Allen was severely injured, he was able to run for help to the cocktail lounge across the street, whereupon Spivey sent Weaver and Marten into the lounge to ensure that the police were not called. The police were summoned, and when Spivey *478 became aware of this he fired several shots into the lounge, hitting one of the patrons. He then abducted Mary Davidson and absconded with her to Alabama. He was apprehended by police in Alabama, and Mary Davidson was released.
The trial judge instructed the jury during the guilt determination stage of the trial in accordance with Code Ann. § 26-605 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1269), that the test for legal insanity is that if a man has reason sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong, in relation to the particular act about to be committed, he is criminally responsible. Spivey enumerates error upon the trial judge's further instructing the jury that the standard by which the acts of the accused were to be judged was the conduct of a reasonable man. He argues that this portion of the charge was misleading because it diverted the jury's attention away from his individualized conduct to the conduct of some mythical, reasonable man.
Looking at the insanity charge as a whole, we do not find it misleading. It conformed to that found in the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia (pp. 31-34). The jury were adequately instructed that in determining the issue of sanity, they should consider the acts and mental condition of the accused as revealed by the evidence before them, before and after the commission of the offense. They were *479 further instructed to consider the declarations, if any, of the accused made at the time of the offense, or reasonably close thereto, as proof of his mental condition at the time of the crime. The excerpt from the charge could not have misled the jury in the manner suggested, and this enumeration of error is without merit.
2. The trial judge instructed the jury that in reaching a determination of the penalty to be imposed, they were authorized to consider all of the evidence received in open court in both phases of the trial, and all of the facts and circumstances of the case. There was evidence introduced during the trial that would have authorized the jury to find that Spivey committed the murder while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct with the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. He argues here that these two factors constitute mitigating circumstances under Georgia's capital punishment statute (see Code Ann. § 27-2503), and that the court should have charged the jury specifically that these two factors constituted mitigating circumstances. The transcript shows that defense counsel strenuously argued to the jury the defendant's mental condition, and particularly his psychiatric history, as a reason for not imposing the death penalty.
Spivey's argument raises a point which has already been decided against him in Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393 (242 SE2d 1) (1978) and Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67 (243 SE2d 570) (1978). In both those cases we rejected the argument that the trial court must single out and name in the charge circumstances which defendant claims are mitigating. The reason behind that ruling was that Georgia law nowhere defines mitigating circumstances. "Mitigating circumstances" are referred to in Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b) and § 27-2503, but the statutes are wholly silent on what they shall be. Nothing in Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327 (240 SE2d 833) (1977) should be read to mean otherwise. The conclusion is inescapable that the legislature meant to empower the jury to consider as mitigating anything they found to be mitigating, without limitation or definition. This is a constitutionally valid *480 procedure.
In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (96 SC 2950)(1976) the United States Supreme Court approved the Texas capital penalty scheme because the jury were permitted to consider mitigating circumstances, even though the Texas jury never even heard the phrase "mitigating circumstances" and never received any definition thereof. Their statutory duty was (among others) to determine "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." 428 U.S. at 272. The Supreme Court approved the procedure because the questions asked of the jury were so constructed "that in considering whether to impose a death sentence the jury may be asked to consider whatever evidence of mitigating circumstances the defense can bring before it." Id. at 273.
The italicized phrase necessarily follows from this language of the Supreme Court in Jurek: "The Texas statute does not explicitly speak of mitigating circumstances; it directs only that the jury answer three questions. Thus, the constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated questions allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors." 428 U.S. at 272.
*481 The court held that they did.
In recent months, this court has reversed sentences of death in six cases for errors in the jury charge on the sentencing phase. Those cases are: Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142 (240 SE2d 37)(1977); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327 (240 SE2d 833)(1977); Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759 (243 SE2d 20)(1978); Davis v. State, 240 Ga. 763 (243 SE2d 12)(1978); Redd v. State, 240 Ga. 753 (243 SE2d 16)(1978); and Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10 (243 SE2d 59) (1978). Review of those cases shows that, in considering the adequacy of a jury charge on the sentencing phase of the trial, the ultimate test is whether a reasonable juror, considering the charge as a whole, would know that he should consider all the facts and circumstances of the case as presented during both phases of the trial (which necessarily include any mitigating and aggravating facts), and then, even though he might find one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances to exist, would know that he might recommend life imprisonment.
This test is substantive rather than formalistic and conforms with the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States that "a single instruction to the jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 147 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107 (1926). See also Pound, the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 ABA Rep. 395 (1906); Llewellyn, the Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals 36-37 (1960); Meador, Criminal Appeals, English Practice and American Reforms, 97, 107 (1973).
The charge given to Spivey's jury meets that test.
*482 Sentence Review
The death penalty imposed in this case must conform to the standards set forth in Code Ann. § 27-2534.1. This court must determine whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance; and, whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, as required by Code Ann. § 27-2537 (c) (1-3). We conclude that the sentence of death imposed on Ronald Spivey was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
The jury found as a statutory aggravating circumstance that the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of a capital felony, to wit: armed robbery. Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b) (2).
*483 Ronald Spivey's sentence to death for murder is not excessive or disproportionate considering the crime and the defendant.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hill and Marshall, JJ., who dissent.
The majority opinion approves a sentencing charge in which the jury was not told to consider mitigating circumstances. Our statute provides that ". . . the judge . . . shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances . . ." Code Ann. § 27-3534.1 (b). The majority opinion never mentions this requirement of our law.
As the majority opinion notes, in recent months this court has reversed sentences of death in six cases for errors in the jury charge on the sentencing phase. The *484 incoming tide of death penalty cases has worn away the court's resolve, first expressed less than a year ago in Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142 (240 SE2d 37) (1977), and Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327 (240 SE2d 833) (1978). In Fleming, supra, 240 Ga. at 146-147, we said that our system for imposing the death penalty requires the jury to consider two issues: first, aggravating circumstances, and second, after finding an aggravating circumstance ". . . the jury must then consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances relevant to the defendant and determine whether the death penalty is appropriate. . ." In Hawes, supra, 240 Ga. 334, we held that it was error for the trial court to fail ". . . to inform the jury that they were authorized to consider mitigating circumstances when there were mitigating circumstances authorized by law and warranted by the evidence. .."