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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 1973', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 706', '§ 5']

MORRIS V. GRESSETTE, 432 U. S. 491 (1977) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 establishes two alternative methods by which States subject to the Act can obtain federal preclearance review of a change in their voting laws: (1) the State may file a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia and subsequently may implement such change if that court declares that the change has no racially discriminatory purpose or effect; or (2) the State may submit the change to the Attorney General and subsequently may enforce the change if the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within 60 days. A plan reapportioning the South Carolina Senate, enacted into law on May 6, 1972, and filed with the District Court for the District of South Carolina, which had invalidated a previous plan in a consolidated action challenging its constitutionality, was submitted to the Attorney General on May 12 for preclearance review under § 5. On May 23, the District Court found the new plan constitutional, and on June 30, the Attorney General notified South Carolina that he would interpose no objection, but would defer to the court's determination. Thereafter, another suit was brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the Attorney General's failure to object to the new plan, and, in response to that court's order of May 16, 1973, to make a reasoned determination as to the constitutionality of the new plan, the Attorney General stated that, in his view, it was unconstitutional, but that he still refused to interpose an objection in deference to the ruling of the District Court for the District of South Carolina. However, on July 19, 1973, the District Court for the District of Columbia directed the Attorney General to consider the new plan without regard to the other District Court's decision, and, the next day, the Attorney General interposed an objection to the plan. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that the Attorney General's initial failure to interpose an objection was reviewable, and that § 5 required him to make an independent determination on the merits of the § 5 issues. The present suit was then filed by appellant South Carolina voters in the District Court for the District of South Carolina, seeking to enjoin implementation chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
425 F.Supp. 331, affirmed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and STEWART, WHITE, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 432 U. S. 507. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 432 U. S. 517.
The events leading up to this litigation date back to November 11, 1971, when South Carolina enacted Act 932 reapportioning the State Senate. [Footnote 1] South Carolina promptly submitted Act 932 to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance review pursuant to § 5 of the Voting chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Rights Act. 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970 ed. Supp. V). [Footnote 2] That section forbids States subject to the Act to implement any change in "any voting qualification chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On March 6, 1972, the Attorney General interposed an objection to Act 932. [Footnote 4] Although the South Carolina District Court as aware of this objection -- an objection that, standing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On May 6, 1972, a new senate reapportionment plan was enacted into law as § 2 of Act 1205. [Footnote 6] This new plan was filed with the District Court, and it was submitted to the Attorney General on May 12 for preclearance review. On May 23, the District Court found the plan constitutional. [Footnote 7] By letter dated chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Not content with the Attorney General's decision to defer to the judicial determination of the three-judge District Court, several of the named plaintiffs in the consolidated Twiggs action commenced another suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on August 10, 1972, in which they challenged the Attorney General's failure to object to the new senate reapportionment plan. On May 16, 1973, that court ordered the Attorney General to make "a reasoned decision in accordance with his statutory responsibility." Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F.Supp. 742, 746 (1973). In chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Armed with the decision of the Court of Appeals and the belated objection interposed by the Attorney General, two South Carolina voters filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina as a class action under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 393 U. S. 557-563 (1969). The plaintiffs, appellants here, sought an injunction against implementation of § 2 of Act 1205 on the ground that the Attorney General had interposed an objection and the State had not chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The ultimate issue in this case concerns the implementation of South Carolina's reapportionment plan for the State Senate. Since that plan has not been declared by the District Court for the District of Columbia to be without racially discriminatory purpose or effect, it can be implemented only if the Attorney General "has not interposed an objection" to the plan within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. [Footnote 12] It chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
conceded that no objection was entered within the 60-day period. 425 F.Supp. at 333. But appellants insist that the Attorney General's nunc pro tunc objection of July 20, 1973, is effective under the Act, and thus bars implementation of the reapportionment plan. Since that objection was interposed pursuant to the District Court's order in Harper v. Kleindienst, its validity depends on whether the Harper court had jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review the Attorney General's failure to object. [Footnote 13] The Administrative Procedure Act stipulates that the provisions of that Act authorizing judicial review apply "except to the extent that --(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The nature of the § 5 remedy, which this Court has characterized as an "unusual" and "severe" procedure, Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 393 U. S. 556 (1969), strongly suggests that Congress did not intend the Attorney General's actions under that provision to be subject to judicial review. Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to delay implementation of validly enacted state legislation until federal authorities have had an opportunity to determine whether that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
According to the terms of § 5, a covered jurisdiction is in compliance pursuant to the latter alternative once it has (i) filed a complete submission with the Attorney General, and (ii) received no objection from that office within 60 days. This second method of compliance under § 5 is unlike the first in that implementation of changes in voting laws is not conditioned on an affirmative statement by the Attorney General that the change is without discriminatory purpose or effect. [Footnote 16] To the contrary, compliance with § 5 is measured solely by the absence, for whatever reason, of a timely objection on the part of the Attorney General. [Footnote 17] And this Court chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although there is no legislative history bearing directly on the issue of reviewability of the Attorney General's actions under § 5, the legislative materials do indicate a desire to provide a speedy alternative method of compliance to covered States. Section 8 of the original bill provided for preclearance review only by means of a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Hearings on S. 1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (hereafter Senate Hearings). Justified concerns arose that the time required to pursue such litigation would unduly delay the implementation of validly enacted, nondiscriminatory state legislation. Cognizant of the problem, Attorney General Katzenbach suggested that the declaratory judgment procedure "could be improved by applying it only to those laws which the Attorney General takes exception to within a given period of time." Senate Hearings 237. The legislation was changed to incorporate this suggestion. [Footnote 18] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In light of the potential severity of the § 5 remedy, the statutory language, and the legislative history, we think it clear that Congress intended to provide covered jurisdictions with an expeditious alternative to declaratory judgment actions. The congressional intent is plain: the extraordinary remedy of postponing the implementation of validly enacted state legislation was to come to an end when the Attorney General failed to interpose a timely objection based on a complete submission. [Footnote 19] Although there was to be no bar to subsequent constitutional challenges to the implemented legislation, there also was to be "no dragging out" of the extraordinary federal remedy beyond the period specified in the statute. Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 305. Since judicial review of the Attorney General's chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of the newly enacted legislation or voting regulation. Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 421 U. S. 569-570 (1975). It is true that it was the perceived inadequacy of private suits under the Fifteenth Amendment that prompted Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 556 n. 21; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 309. But it does not follow that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review of Attorney General actions under § 5. [Footnote 22] The initial alternative requirement of submission to the Attorney General substantially reduces the likelihood that a discriminatory enactment will escape detection by federal authorities. [Footnote 23] Where the discriminatory character chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 2 reapportioned the State's senatorial districts. It established two alternative reapportionments -- Plan A and Plan B -- and provided that, if Plan A did not meet the constitutional guidelines as set forth by the District Court, Plan B would be put into effect. Act 1205 retained the provisions of Act 932 calling for multimember districts, numbered posts, and a majority vote in primaries. See Harper v. Levi, 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 326, 520 F.2d 58.
While the Attorney General was considering Act 1205, South Carolina submitted for preclearance review Act 1204, which extended the numbered-post requirement to "all multi-member elective districts" in the State. See Harper v. Levi, supra at 326, 520 F.2d 58. On the same day that he declined to interpose an objection to § 2 of Act 1205, the Attorney General did interpose an objection to Act 1204 and to that portion of Act 1205 that required numbered posts for the State's House of Representatives. See n 6, supra. The District Court in Twiggs v. West had not considered any provisions relating to the House.
the court found it unnecessary to decide whether such findings and decisions would be reviewable. 171 U.S. App.D.C. at 335, 520 F.2d 67. See also n 24, infra.
Compliance by means of submission to the Attorney General was added to the bill, but neither the Committee Reports nor the debates discussed the addition. S.Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 711, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The legislative history is summarized in Harper v. Levi, 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 333, 520 F.2d 65.
The Court holds today that an Attorney General's failure to object within 60 days to the implementation of a voting law that has been submitted to him under § 5 of the Voting chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Common sense proclaims the error of this result. It is simply implausible that Congress, which devoted unusual attention to this Act in recognition of its stringency and importance, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 383 U. S. 308-309 (1966), intended to allow the Act's primary enforcement chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Voting Rights Act does not explicitly preclude review of the Attorney General's actions under § 5. The absence chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Not only is there nothing in § 5 precluding review, there is also, as the Court admits, "no legislative history bearing directly on the issue of reviewability of the Attorney General's actions under § 5." Ante at 432 U. S. 503. Thus, all the Court offers in support of its conclusion that the strengthened presumption of reviewability should be disregarded in this case is an inference that review must be foreclosed to serve the assertedly primary congressional purpose of limiting the time during which covered States are prevented from implementing new legislation. That inference is purportedly drawn from an inquiry into "the role played by the Attorney General within the context of the entire legislative scheme.'" Ante at 432 U. S. 501, quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra at 387 U. S. 141. In fact, however, the Court completely ignores the Attorney General; the majority's version of § 5 requires a covered State to submit its statutes to a mailing address at the Department of Justice and to wait for 60 days before implementing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"it is important to focus on the entire scheme of § 5. That portion of the Voting Rights Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the District Court for the District of Columbia holding that a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the Attorney General 'merely gives the covered State a rapid method of rendering a new state election law enforceable.' @ 393 U. S. 549."
411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 538 (emphasis added). Because the provision for submission to the Attorney General was meant only to ameliorate, and not to change, the "essential" burden of § 5, we upheld regulations that deferred the beginning of the 60-day review period created by the Act until a submission satisfied certain criteria. We noted that "[t]he judgment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult and complex one," 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 540 (emphasis added), and that, if he could not await complete information, "his only plausible response to an inadequate or incomplete submission would be simply to object to it." [Footnote 2/4] Ibid. We also upheld chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, both the statute and the regulation impose on the Attorney General a duty to review submitted statutes and disapprove them unless he is satisfied that they meet the standards established by the Act. It is undisputed in this case that the Attorney General, after reviewing the reapportionment legislation submitted by South Carolina, was unable to make that determination. [Footnote 2/6] It was, therefore, his duty to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The majority holds that this failure is insulated from judicial review under the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act expressly designed for such defaults, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), [Footnote 2/9] for one reason only: the statute contains a deadline within which the Attorney General must act. This holding that the existence of a deadline for the performance of an administrative duty is a "persuasive reason" to believe that failure to perform that duty cannot be reviewed is unique among our decisions. [Footnote 2/10] I trust it will remain unique. Nothing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court's conclusion is not only inconsistent with our description of § 5 in Georgia v. United States, it is also flatly inconsistent with our holding in that case. For in Georgia v. United States, we reviewed the standard by which the Attorney General determined to object to implementation of a submitted statute. The majority approved of the standard, and the dissenters objected to it, [Footnote 2/12] but the Court unanimously chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Perhaps out of justifiable embarrassment, the majority never mentions the effect of its ruling. That effect is easy to describe: the Court today upholds a system of choosing members of the South Carolina Senate that has prevented the election of any black senators, despite the fact that 25% of South Carolina's population is black. [Footnote 2/14] Thus, South Carolina, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Harper v. Levi, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 520 F.2d 53 (1975), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Attorney General's chanroblesvirtualawlibrary