Source: http://dutchcivillaw.com/caselaw/brusregone015.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:51:49
Document Index: 251245196

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 15', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 15', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 16', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 18', 'art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2']

CASE LAW BRUSSELS I REGULATION
Case law Brussels I Regulation (44/2001)
Article 15 - 17 of the Brussels I Regulation
(Art. 15 - 17 BR I = Art. 13 - 15 BC 1968)
ECJ 20 January 2005 ‘Johann Gruber v Bay Wa AG’ (Case C-464/01, ECR 2005 p. I-00439)
A person who concludes a contract for goods intended for purposes which are in part within and in part outside his trade or profession may not rely on the special rules of jurisdiction laid down in Articles 13 to 15 of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Articles 15 - 17 of the Brussels I Regulation], unless the trade or professional purpose is so limited as to be negligible in the overall context of the supply, the fact that the private element is predominant being irrelevant in that respect.
It is for the court seised to decide whether the contract at issue was concluded in order to satisfy, to a non-negligible extent, needs of the business of the person concerned or whether, on the contrary, the trade or professional purpose was negligible. To that end, that court must take account of all the relevant factual evidence objectively contained in the file. On the other hand, it must not take account of facts or circumstances of which the other party to the contract may have been aware when the contract was concluded, unless the person who claims the capacity of consumer behaved in such a way as to give the other party to the contract the legitimate impression that he was acting for the purposes of his business.
ECJ 3 July 1997 ‘Benincasa v Dentalkit’ (Case C-269/95, ECR 1997 p. I-03767)
In the context of the specific regime established by Article 13 et seq. of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 15 et seq. of the Brussels I Regulation], only contracts concluded for the purpose of satisfying an individual's own needs in terms of private consumption come under the provisions designed to protect the consumer as the party deemed to be the weaker party economically. On the other hand, the specific protection sought to be afforded by those provisions is unwarranted in the case of contracts for the purpose of trade or professional activity, even if that activity is only planned for the future, since the fact that an activity is in the nature of a future activity does not divest it in any way of its trade or professional character. It follows that the regime in question applies solely to contracts concluded outside and independently of any trade or professional activity or purpose, whether present or future, so that a plaintiff who has concluded a contract with a view to pursuing a trade or profession, not at the present time, but in the future may not be regarded as a consumer within the meaning of paragraph 1, point 1 of Article 13 and the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Convention [Article 15(1), point 1, and Article 16(1) of the Brussels I Regulation].
ECJ 19 January 1993 ‘Shearson Lehmann Hutton Inc.’ (Case C-89/91, ECR 1993 p. I-00139)
The special system established by Article 13 et seq of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 15 et seq. of the Brussels I Regulation] is inspired by the concern to protect the consumer, as the party deemed to be economically weaker and less experienced in legal matters than the other party to the contract, so that the consumer must not be discouraged from suing by being compelled to bring his action before the courts in the Contracting State [Member State] in which the other party to the contract is domiciled. Those provisions affect only a private final consumer, not engaged in trade or professional activities, who is bound by one of the contracts listed in Article 13 [Article 15 Regulation] and who is a party to the action, in accordance with Article 14 [Article 16 Regulation]. It follows that Article 13 of the Convention [Article 15 of the Regulation] is to be interpreted as meaning that a plaintiff who is acting in pursuance of his trade or professional activity, and who is not, therefore, himself a consumer party to one of the contracts listed in the first paragraph of that provision, may not enjoy the benefit of the rules of special jurisdiction laid down by the Convention [Regulation] concerning consumer contracts.
Article 15 of the Brussels I Regulation
(Art. 15 BR I = Art. 13 BC 1968)
Jurisdiction over consumer contracts [Article 15- 17]
Consumer and consumer contracts [Article 15(1)]
Other consumer contracts [Article 15(1) point 3]
Professional party with a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Contracting States [Article 15(2)]
Jurisdicition regarding proceedings brought by or against a consumer [Article 16]
ECJ 1 October 2002 ‘Konsumenteninformation v Henkel’ (Case C-167/00, ECR 2002 p. I-08111)
The rules on jurisdiction laid down in the 1968 Brussels Convention [Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that a preventive action brought by a consumer protection organisation for the purpose of preventing a trader from using terms considered to be unfair in contracts with private individuals is a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict within the meaning of Article 5, point (3), of that Convention [Article 5, point (3) BR I] (see para. 50, operative part).
ECJ 27 April 1999 ‘Hans-Hermann Mietz v Intership Yachting Sneek BV’ (Case C-99/96, ECR 1999 p. I-02277)
In the area of consumer contracts, Article 13, paragaph 1, point 1, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 15(1), point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] must be construed as not applying to a contract between two parties having the following characteristics, that is to say, a contract:
That provision is intended to protect the purchaser only where the vendor has granted him credit, that is to say, where the vendor has transferred to the purchaser possession of the goods in question before the purchaser has paid the full price. A contract having the characteristics mentioned above is, however, to be classified as a contract for the supply of services or of goods within the meaning of Article 13, first paragraph, point 3, of the Convention [Article 15(1), point 3, of the Brussels I Regulation].
In the context of the specific regime established by Article 13 et seq. of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 15 et seq. of the Brussels I Regulation] , only contracts concluded for the purpose of satisfying an individual's own needs in terms of private consumption come under the provisions designed to protect the consumer as the party deemed to be the weaker party economically. On the other hand, the specific protection sought to be afforded by those provisions is unwarranted in the case of contracts for the purpose of trade or professional activity, even if that activity is only planned for the future, since the fact that an activity is in the nature of a future activity does not divest it in any way of its trade or professional character. It follows that the regime in question applies solely to contracts concluded outside and independently of any trade or professional activity or purpose, whether present or future, so that a plaintiff who has concluded a contract with a view to pursuing a trade or profession, not at the present time, but in the future may not be regarded as a consumer within the meaning of paragraph 1, point 1 of Article 13 and the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Convention [Article 15(1) point 1, and Article 16 of the Regulation].
ECJ 21 June 1978 'Bertrand v Paul Ott KG' (Case 150/77, ECR 1978 Page 01431)
Since the concept of a contract of sale on installment credit terms varies from one member state to another, in accordance with the objectives pursued by their respective laws , it is necessary, in the context of the 1968 Brussels Convention [the Brussels I Regulation], to consider that concept as being independent and therefore to give it a uniform substantive content allied to the community order.
According to the principles common to the laws of the Member States, the sale of goods on installment credit terms is to be understood as a transaction in which the price is discharged by way of several payments or which is linked to a financing contract. However, a restrictive interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 14 of the Convention [Article 16(2) of the Regulation], in conformity with the objectives pursued by Section 4, entails the restriction of the jurisdictional advantage for which provision is made by that Article to buyers who are in need of protection, their economic position being one of weakness in comparison with sellers by reason of the fact that they are private final consumers and are not engaged, when buying the product acquired on installment credit terms, in trade or professional activities.
ECJ 14 May 2009 ‘Ilsinger v Dreschers’ (Case C-180/06)
In a situation in which a consumer seeks, in accordance with the legislation of the Member State in which he is domiciled and before the court for the place in which he resides, an order requiring a mail-order company established in another Member State to pay a prize which that consumer has apparently won, and
the rules on jurisdiction laid down by Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as follows:
The wording of Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001, which is essentially identical to that of Article 13 of the Brussels Convention, requires a contract to have been concluded by a consumer with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities. For a contract to exist within the meaning of that provision, it is necessary that the professional vendor should assume a legal obligation by submitting a firm offer which is sufficiently clear and precise with regard to its object and scope as to give rise to a link of a contractual nature, that is to say by declaring itself to be unconditionally willing to pay the prize at issue to consumers who so request. In the absence of such a legal commitment, Article 15(1) applies only on condition that the misleading prize notification was followed by the conclusion of a contract by the consumer with the mail-order company evidenced by an order placed with the latter (see paras 53-55, 59-60, operative part).
ECJ 16 March 2006 ‘Kapferer v Schlank & Schick’ (Case C-234/04, ECR 2006 p. I-02585)
The principle of cooperation under Article 10 EC does not require a national court to disapply its internal rules of procedure in order to review and set aside a final judicial decision if that decision should be contrary to Community law. In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question (see para. 20, operative part).
ECJ 20 January 2005 ‘Petra Engler v Janus Versand GmbH’ (Case C-27/02, ECR 2005 p. I-00481)
1. As regards Article 13, first paragraph, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 15(1) of the Brussels I Regulation], relating to jurisdiction over consumer contracts, point 3 of that provision is applicable only in so far as, first, the claimant is a private final consumer not engaged in trade or professional activities, second, the legal proceedings relate to a contract between that consumer and the professional vendor for the sale of goods or services which has given rise to reciprocal and interdependent obligations between the two parties and, third, that the two conditions specifically set out in Article 13, first paragraph, point 3(a) and (b) [Article 15(1), point 3(a) and (b), of the Regulation] are fulfilled.
Consequently, in a situation where a professional vendor made contact with a consumer by sending her a personalised letter containing a prize notification together with a catalogue and an order form for the sale of its goods in the Contracting State [Member State]where she resides in order to induce her to take up the vendor’s offer, but where the vendor’s initiative was not followed by the conclusion of a contract between the consumer and the vendor for one of the purposes referred to in Article 13, first paragraph, point 3, of the Convention [Article 15(1), point 3, of the Regulation] and in the course of which the parties assumed reciprocal obligations, the action brought by the consumer for the payment of the prize cannot be regarded as being contractual in nature for the purposes of that provision (see paras 34, 36, 38).
2. Legal proceedings by which a consumer seeks an order, under the law of the Contracting State [Member State] in which he is domiciled, that a mail order company established in another Contracting State [Member State] award a prize ostensibly won by him is contractual in nature for the purpose of Article 5, point 1, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation], provided that, first, that company, with the intention of inducing the consumer to enter a contract, addresses to him in person a letter of such a kind as to give the impression that a prize will be awarded to him if he returns the ‘payment notice’ attached to the letter and, second, he accepts the conditions laid down by the vendor and does in fact claim payment of the prize announced. On the other hand, even though the letter also contains a catalogue advertising goods for that company and a request for a ‘trial without obligation’, the fact that the award of the prize does not depend on an order for goods and that the consumer has not, in fact, placed such an order has no bearing on that interpretation. (see para. 61, operative part).
ECJ 11 July 2002 ‘Rudolf Gabriel’ (Case C-96/00, ECR 2002 p. I-06367)
The jurisdiction rules set out in the 1968 Brussels Convention [the Brussels I Regulation] are to be construed as meaning that judicial proceedings by which a consumer seeks an order, in the Contracting State [Member State] in which he is domiciled and pursuant to that State's legislation, requiring a mail-order company established in another Contracting State [Member State] to pay him a financial benefit in circumstances where that company had sent to that consumer in person a letter likely to create the impression that a prize would be awarded to him on condition that he ordered goods to a specified amount, and where that consumer actually placed such an order in the State of his domicile without, however, obtaining payment of that financial benefit, are contractual in nature in the sense contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 1, point 3, of that Convention [Article 15(1), point 3, of that Regulation] (see para. 60, operative part).
ECJ 15 September 1994 ‘ Brenner and Noller v Reynolds Inc.’ (Case C-318/93, ECR 1994 p. I-04275)
Articles 13 and 14 [Articles 15 and 16 of the Brussels I Regulation] form part of the Section on 'jurisdiction over consumer contracts'. In addition, the first subparagraph of Article 13 [of Article 15 of the regulation] expressly states that that Section, as a whole, applies `without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 and 5, point 5 [Article 4 and 5, point 5, of the Regulation]. According to the first paragraph of Article 4 [Article 4(1) Regulation], 'if the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State [Member State], the jurisdiction of the courts of each Contracting State [Member State] shall, subject to the provisions of Article 16 [Article 22 Regulation], be determined by the law of that State'. Article 16 [Article 22 Regulation] lays down rules for exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons, the validity of entries in public registers, the registration or validity of patents, trademarks, designs or other similar rights, and in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments.
It follows that, subject to those cases of exclusive jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of courts in proceedings where the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State [Member State] is governed not by the Brussels Convention [the Brussels I Regulation], but by the law of the Contracting State [Member State] of the court in which proceedings are brought. With respect to consumer contracts, the only exception to the rule in Article 4 [Article 4 Regulation] is introduced by the second paragraph of Article 13 [Article 15(2) Regulation], which applies where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in a Contracting State [Member State], but has a branch, agency or other establishment there and the dispute arises out of its operations. Where in a specific case no branch, agency or other establishment within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 13 [Article 15(2) Regulation] acted as an intermediary in the conclusion or performance of the contract, the exception does noes not apply. Accordingly, the courts of the State in which the consumer is domiciled have jurisdiction in proceedings under the second alternative in the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Brussels Convention [Article 16(1) of the Brussels I Regulation] if the other party to the contract is domiciled in a Contracting State [Member State] or is deemed under the second paragraph of Article 13 of that Convention [Article 15 of that Regulation] to be so domiciled.
Article 16 of the Brussels I Regulation
(Art. 16 BR I = Art. 14 BC 1968)
ECJ 15 September 1994 ‘Brenner and Noller v Reynolds Inc.’ (Case C-318/93, ECR 1994 p. I-04275)
It follows that, subject to those cases of exclusive jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of courts in proceedings where the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State [Member State] is governed not by the Brussels Convention [the Brussels I Regulation], but by the law of the Contracting State [Member State] of the court in which proceedings are brought. With respect to consumer contracts, the only exception to the rule in Article 4 [Article 4 Regulation] is introduced by the second paragraph of Article 13 [Article 15(2) Regulation], which applies where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in a Contracting State [Member State], but has a branch, agency or other establishment there and the dispute arises out of its operations. Where in a specific case no branch, agency or other establishment within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 13 [Article 15(2) Regulation] acted as an intermediary in the conclusion or performance of the contract, the exception does noes not apply. Accordingly, the courts of the State in which the consumer is domiciled have jurisdiction in proceedings under the second alternative in the first paragraph of Article 14 of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 16(1) of the Brussels I Regulation] if the other party to the contract is domiciled in a Contracting State [Member State] or is deemed under the second paragraph of Article 13 of that Convention [Article 15(2) of that Regulation] to be so domiciled.
In the context of the specific regime established by Article 13 et seq. of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 15 et seq. of the Brussels I Regulation], only contracts concluded for the purpose of satisfying an individual's own needs in terms of private consumption come under the provisions designed to protect the consumer as the party deemed to be the weaker party economically. On the other hand, the specific protection sought to be afforded by those provisions is unwarranted in the case of contracts for the purpose of trade or professional activity, even if that activity is only planned for the future, since the fact that an activity is in the nature of a future activity does not divest it in any way of its trade or professional character. It follows that the regime in question applies solely to contracts concluded outside and independently of any trade or professional activity or purpose, whether present or future, so that a plaintiff who has concluded a contract with a view to pursuing a trade or profession, not at the present time, but in the future may not be regarded as a consumer within the meaning of paragraph 1, point 1 of Article 13 and the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Convention [Article 15(1), point 1, and Article 16 of the Regulation].
Article 18 of the Brussels I Regulation
(Art. 18 BR I = No equivalent in BC 1968)
ECJ 22 May 2008 ‘Glaxosmithkline v Rouard’ (Case C-462/06, ECR 2008 Page I-03965)
The rule of special jurisdiction provided for in Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation cannot be applied to a dispute falling under Section 5 of Chapter II of that Regulation concerning the jurisdiction rules applicable to individual contracts of employment.
As regards the possibility that only an employee may rely on Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, that would run counter to the wording of both that provision and Section 5 of Chapter II of that Regulation. The transformation by the Community courts of the rules of special jurisdiction, aimed at facilitating sound administration of justice, into rules of unilateral jurisdiction protecting the party deemed to be weaker would go beyond the balance of interests which the Community legislature has established in the law as it currently stands. Furthermore, such an interpretation would be difficult to reconcile with the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the regulation and which requires, in particular, that rules of jurisdiction be interpreted in such a way as to be highly predictable (see paras 19-24, 32-33, 35, operative part).
ECJ 10 April 2003 ‘Pugliese v Finmeccanica’ (Case C-437/00, ECR 2003 p. I-03573)
Article 5, point 1, of the Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that, in a dispute between an employee and a first employer, the place where the employee performs his obligations to a second employer can be regarded as the place where he habitually carries out his work when the first employer, with respect to whom the employee's contractual obligations are suspended, has, at the time of the conclusion of the second contract of employment, an interest in the performance of the service by the employee to the second employer. The existence of such an interest must be determined on a comprehensive basis, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case. When such an interest is lacking on the part of the first employer, Article 5, point 1, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that the place where the employee carries out his work is the only place of performance of an obligation which can be taken into consideration in order to determine which court has jurisdiction (see paras 26, 28, 30, operative part 1-2).
ECJ 27 February 2002 ‘Weber v Universal Ogden’ (Case C-37/00, ECR 2002 p. I-02013)
1. Work carried out by an employee on fixed or floating installations positioned on or above the part of the continental shelf adjacent to a Contracting State, in the context of the prospecting and/or exploitation of its natural resources, is to be regarded as work carried out in the territory of that State for the purposes of applying Article 5, point 1, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation](see para. 36, operative part 1 ).
2. Article 5, point 1, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that where an employee performs the obligations arising under his contract of employment in several Contracting States [Member States] the place where he habitually works, within the meaning of that provision, is the place where, or from which, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer.
In the case of a contract of employment under which an employee performs for his employer the same activities in more than one Contracting State [Member State], it is necessary, in principle, to take account of the whole of the duration of the employment relationship in order to identify the place where the employee habitually works, within the meaning of Article 5, point 1 [Article 54, point 1, Regulation]. Failing other criteria, that will be the place where the employee has worked the longest. It will only be otherwise if, in light of the facts of the case, the subject-matter of the dispute is more closely connected with a different place of work, which would, in that case, be the relevant place for the purposes of applying Article 5, point 1, of the Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Regulation].
In the event that the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice do not enable the national court to identify the habitual place of work, as referred to in Article 5, point 1, of the Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Regulation], the employee will have the choice of suing his employer either in the courts for the place where the business which engaged him is situated, or in the courts of the Contracting State in whose territory the employer is domiciled.
Moreover, national law applicable to the main dispute has no bearing on the interpretation of the concept of the place where an employee habitually works, within the meaning of Article 5, point 1, of the Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Regulation] (see paras 58, 62, operative part 2-3).
ECJ 9 January 1997 ‘Rutten v Cross Medical’ (Case C-383/95, ECR 1997 p. I-00057)
Article 5, point 1, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that where, in the performance of a contract of employment, an employee carries out his work in several Contracting States [Member States], the place where he habitually carries out his work, within the meaning of that provision, is the place where he has established the effective centre of his working activities. When identifying that place, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the employee spends most of his working time in one of the Contracting States [Member States] in which he has an office where he organizes his activities for his employer and to which he returns after each business trip abroad.
ECJ 13 July 1993 ‘Mulox v Hendrick Geels’ (Case C-125/92, ECR 1993 p. I-04075)
1. The terms used in the 1968 Brussels Convention [the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted autonomously. Only such an interpretation is capable of ensuring uniform application of the Convention [Regulation], the objectives of which include unification of the rules on jurisdiction of the Contracting States [Member States], so as to avoid as far as possible the multiplication of the bases of jurisdiction in relation to one and the same legal relationship and to reinforce the legal protection available to persons established in the Community by, at the same time, allowing the plaintiff easily to identify the court before which he may bring an action and the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he may be sued.
2. In view of the specific nature of contracts of employment, the place of performance of the obligation in question, for the purposes of applying Article 5, point 1, of the Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Regulation] must, in the case of such contracts, be determined by reference not to the applicable national law in accordance with the conflict rules of the court seised but, rather, to uniform criteria laid down by the Court of Justice on the basis of the scheme and the objectives of the Convention. The place of performance is the place where the employee actually carries out the work covered by the contract with his employer.
Where the employee performs his work in more than one Contracting State [Member State], the place of performance of the contractual obligation, within the meaning of that provision, must be defined as the place where or from which the employee discharges principally his obligations towards his employer.
ECJ 15 February 1989 ‘Six Constructions Ltd v Paul Humbert’ (Case 32/88, ECR 1989 p. 00341)
Article 5, point 1, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that, as regards contracts of employment, the obligation to be taken into consideration is the one which characterizes such contracts, in particular the obligation to carry out the agreed work. Where the obligation of the employee to carry out the agreed work was performed and had to be performed outside the territory of the Contracting States [Member States], Article 5(1) of the Convention [Article 5(1) of the Regulation] is not applicable; in such a case jurisdiction is to be determined on the basis of the place of the defendant' s domicile in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention [Article 2 of the Regulation].
ECJ 15 January 1987 'Hassan Shenavai v Klaus Kreischer' (Case 266/85, ECR1987 p. 00239)
Whereas in the case of an action based on an obligation under a contract of employment or another contract with the same particularities for work other than on a self-employed basis the relevant obligation for the purpose of determining the place of performance within the meaning of article 5, point 1, of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 5, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation] is the obligation which characterizes that contract, the position is different where no such particularities exist, as in the case of most contracts, where the general rule applies that the relevant obligation is that on which the plaintiff's action is based. In a dispute concerning proceedings for the recovery of fees commenced by an architect commissioned to draw up plans for the building of houses, therefore, the obligation to be taken into consideration is the contractual obligation which forms the actual basis of the legal proceedings.