Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/538-u-s-510-605708522
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 04:25:55
Document Index: 540511271

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1231', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 3', '§ 2241', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226']

538 U.S. 510 (2003), 01-1491, Demore v. Kim - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 605708522
Docket Nº: No. 01-1491.
Citation: 538 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724, 71 U.S.L.W. 4315
Party Name: DEMORE, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO DISTRICT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ET AL. v. KIM
538 U.S. 510 (2003)
123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724, 71 U.S.L.W. 4315
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), "[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who" is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, including an "aggravated felony." After respondent, a lawful permanent resident alien, was convicted in state court of first-degree burglary and, later, of "petty theft with priors," the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged him with being deportable from the United States in light of these convictions, and detained him pending his removal hearing. Without disputing the validity of his convictions or the INS' conclusion that he is deportable and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), respondent filed a habeas corpus action challenging § 1226(c) on the ground that his detention thereunder violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. The District Court agreed and granted respondent's petition subject to the INS' prompt undertaking of an individualized bond hearing, after which respondent was released on bond. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that § 1226(c) violates substantive due process as applied to respondent because he is a lawful permanent resident, the most favored category of aliens. The court rejected the Government's two principal justifications for mandatory detention under § 1226(c), discounting the first ensuring the presence of criminal aliens at their removal proceedings upon finding that not all aliens detained pursuant to § 1226(c) would ultimately be deported, and discounting the secondprotecting the public from dangerous criminal alienson the grounds that the aggravated felony classification triggering respondent's detention included crimes (such as respondent's) that the court did not consider "egregious" or otherwise sufficiently dangerous to the public to necessitate mandatory detention. Relying on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, the court concluded that the INS had not provided a justification for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a permanent resident alien's liberty interest.
1. Section 1226(e)which states that "[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review" and that "[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien"does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to aliens challenging their detention under § 1226(c). Respondent does not challenge a "discretionary judgment" by the Attorney General or a "decision" that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release. Rather, respondent challenges the statutory framework that permits his detention without bail. Where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear. E. g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603. And, where a provision precluding review is claimed to bar habeas review, the Court requires a particularly clear statement that such is Congress' intent. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308-309, 298, 327. Section 1226(e) contains no explicit provision barring habeas review. Pp. 516-517.
2. Congress, justifiably concerned with evidence that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings. In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80. Although the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process in deportation proceedings, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, detention during such proceedings is a constitutionally valid aspect of the process, e. g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235, even where, as here, aliens challenge their detention on the grounds that there has been no finding that they are unlikely to appear for their deportation proceedings, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538. The INS detention of respondent, a criminal alien who has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited period of his removal proceedings, is governed by these cases. Respondent argues unpersuasively that the § 1226(c) detention policy violates due process under Zadvydas, 533 U.S., at 699, in which the Court held that § 1231 (a)(6) authorizes continued detention of an alien subject to a final removal order beyond that section's 90-day removal period for only such time as is reasonably necessary to secure the removal. Zadvydas is materially different from the present case in two respects. First, the aliens there challenging their detention following final deportation orders were ones for whom removal was "no longer practically attainable," such that their detention
did not serve its purported immigration purpose. Id., at 690. In contrast, because the statutory provision at issue in this case governs detention of deportable criminal aliens pending their removal proceedings, the detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing the aliens from fleeing prior to or during such proceedings. Second, while the period of detention at issue in Zadvydas was "indefinite" and "potentially permanent," id., at 690-691, the record shows that § 1226(c) detention not only has a definite termination point, but lasts, in the majority of cases, for less than the 90 days the Court considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas. Pp. 517-531.
Judy Rabinovitz argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Lucas Guttentag, Lee Gelernt, Steven R. Shapiro, A. Stephen Hut, Jr., Christopher J Meade, Liliana M. Garces, and Jayashri Srikantiah[*]
Rehnquist, Chief Justice
Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 200, as amended, 110 Stat. 3009-585, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who" is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes. Respondent is a citizen of the Republic of South Korea. He entered the United States in 1984, at the age of six, and became a lawful permanent resident of the United States two years later. In July 1996, he was convicted of first-degree burglary in state court in California and, in April 1997, he was convicted of a second crime, "petty theft with priors." The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged respondent with being deportable from the United States in light of these convictions, and detained him pending his removal hearing.[1] We hold that Congress, justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.
Respondent does not dispute the validity of his prior convictions, which were obtained following the full procedural protections our criminal justice system offers. Respondent also did not dispute the INS' conclusion that he is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1226(c). See Brief in Opposition 1-2; App. 8-9.[2] In conceding that he was deportable, respondent forwent a hearing at which he would have been entitled to raise any non frivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not properly included in a mandatory detention category. See 8 CFR § 3.19(h)(2)(ii) (2002); Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).[3] Respondent instead filed a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California challenging the constitutionality of § 1226(c) itself. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. He argued that his detention under § 1226(c) violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. Id., at 31a, 33a.
The District Court agreed with respondent that § 1226(c)'s requirement of mandatory detention for certain criminal aliens was unconstitutional. Kim v. Schiltgen, No. C 99-2257
SI (Aug. 11, 1999), App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a-51a. The District Court therefore granted respondent's petition subject to the INS' prompt...