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Baldwin Vs Alabama - Citation 105897 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
BaldwIn Vs. Alabama - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105897
Case Number 472 U.S. 372
baldwin v. alabama - 472 u.s. 372 (1985) u.s. supreme court baldwin v. alabama, 472 u.s. 372 (1985) baldwin v. alabama no. 84-5743 argued march 27, 1985 decided june 17, 1985 472 u.s. 372 certiorari to the supreme court of alabama syllabus alabama's 1975 death penalty act (later repealed) required a jury that convicted a defendant of any one of a number of specified aggravated crimes to "fix the punishment at death." however, the "sentence" fixed by the jury was not dispositive, because the act provided that, "[n]otwithstanding the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances" brought out at a required sentencing hearing, could refuse to.....
Baldwin v. Alabama - 472 U.S. 372 (1985)
U.S. Supreme Court Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985)
Held: Alabama's requirement that the jury return a "sentence" of death along with its guilty verdict did not render unconstitutional the death sentence the trial judge imposed after independently considering petitioner's background and character and the circumstances of his crime. Pp. 472 U. S. 379 -389.
it was clear that the sentencing judge here did not interpret the statute as requiring him to consider the jury's "sentence," because he never described the "sentence" as a factor in his deliberations. Pp. 472 U. S. 382 -386.
(b) Nor is there merit to the contention that a trial judge's decision to impose the death penalty must have been swayed by the fact that the jury returned a "sentence" of death. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 , distinguished. The judge knew that determination of the appropriate sentence was not within the jury's province, and that the jury did not consider evidence in mitigation in arriving at its "sentence." Pp. 472 U. S. 386 -389.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 472 U. S. 390 . BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 472 U. S. 392 . STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 472 U. S. 393 .
Between 1976 and 1981, an Alabama statute required a jury that convicted a defendant of any one of a number of specified crimes "with aggravation" to "fix the punishment at death." Ala.Code § 13-11-2(a) (1975). [ Footnote 1 ] The "sentence"
This case concerns the constitutionality of the peculiar and unusual requirement of the 1975 Alabama Act that the jury "shall fix the punishment at death," even though the trial judge is the actual sentencing authority. [ Footnote 2 ] The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the scheme was facially unconstitutional. Ritter v. Smith, 726 F.2d 1505, 1515-1517, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 869 (1984). Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court of Alabama, with two dissenting votes, ruled to the contrary in the present case. Ex parte Baldwin, 456 So.2d 129, 138-139 (1984). We granted certiorari to resolve this significant conflict. 469 U.S. 1085 (1984).
The judge stated that, "having considered the evidence presented at the trial and at said sentence hearing," id. at 17-18, the court found the following aggravating circumstances: the capital offense was committed while petitioner was under a sentence of imprisonment in the State of North Carolina from which he had escaped; petitioner previously had pleaded guilty to a felony involving the use of violence to the person; the capital offense was committed while petitioner was committing a robbery or in flight after the robbery; and the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. [ Footnote 3 ] The judge found that petitioner's age -- 18 at the
The Supreme Court of Alabama eventually affirmed the conviction and sentence. 456 So.2d 129 (194). [ Footnote 4 ] In his argument to that court, petitioner contended that the 1975 Act was facially invalid. Tracking the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Ritter v. Smith, 726 F.2d at 1516-1517, he argued that the jury's mandatory sentence was unconstitutional because it was unguided, standardless, and reflected no consideration of the particular defendant or crime, and that the judge's sentence was unconstitutional because it was based in part upon consideration of the impermissible jury sentence, and was infected by it. The court rejected petitioner's arguments,
holding that even though the jury had no discretion regarding the "sentence" it would impose, the sentencing procedure was saved by the fact that it was the trial judge who was the true sentencing authority, and he considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing sentence. 456 So.2d at 139. [ Footnote 5 ]
also Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977). In Woodson, the Court held that North Carolina's sentencing scheme, which imposed a mandatory death sentence for a broad category of homicidal offenses, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in three respects. First, such mandatory schemes offend contemporary standards of decency, as evidenced by the frequency with which jurors avoid the imposition of mandatory death sentences by disregarding their oaths and refusing to convict, and by the consistent movement of the States and Congress away from such schemes. 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 288 -301. Second, by refusing to convict defendants who the jurors think do not deserve the death penalty, juries exercise unguided and unchecked discretion regarding who will be sentenced to death. Id. at 428 U. S. 302 -303. Third, such mandatory schemes fail to allow particularized consideration of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense. Id. at 428 U. S. 303 -305. Alabama's requirement that the jury impose a mandatory sentence for a wide range of homicides, standing alone, would suffer each of those defects.
The jury's mandatory "sentence," however, does not stand alone under the Alabama scheme. Instead, as has been described above, the trial judge thereafter conducts a separate hearing to receive evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and determines whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The judge's discretion is guided by the requirement that the death penalty be imposed only if the judge finds the aggravating circumstance that serves to define the capital crime -- in this case the fact that the homicide took place during the commission of a robbery -- and only if the judge finds that the definitional aggravating circumstance, plus any other specified aggravating circumstance, [ Footnote 6 ] outweighs
any statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. § 13-11-4. Petitioner accordingly does not argue that the judge's discretion under § 13-11-4 is not "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 , 428 U. S. 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). Nor is there any issue before this Court that the 1975 Act did not allow "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors" by the sentencing judge that has been held constitutionally indispensable in capital cases. [ Footnote 7 ] Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 , 438 U. S. 606 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also
would violate the Constitution. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 , 462 U. S. 885 (1983). Relying upon Zant, petitioner contends that, because the jury's mandatory "sentence" would be unconstitutional standing alone, it is an impermissible factor for the trial judge to consider, as the statute appears to require, in the sentencing process. That argument conceivably might have merit if the judge actually were required to consider the jury's "sentence" as a recommendation as to the sentence the jury believed would be appropriate, cf. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976), and if the judge were obligated to accord some deference to it. The jury's verdict is not considered in that fashion, however, as the Alabama appellate courts' construction of the Act, as well as the judge's statements regarding the process by which he arrived at the sentence, so definitely indicates.
-- does seem to authorize consideration of the jury's "sentence." It is not clear whether the second clause allows consideration of the jury's "sentence" only if the weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances authorized in the first clause has indicated that the "sentence" should not be rejected, or whether the second clause allows the judge to ignore the first clause and count the jury's "sentence" as a factor, similar to an aggravating circumstance, weighing in favor of the death penalty. We therefore look to the Alabama courts' construction of § 13-11-4. See Proffitt v. Florida, supra; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 , 462 U. S. 272 -273 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.).
"Let me say this: the jury has found you guilty of the crime of robbery with the aggravated circumstances of intentionally killing the victim . . . and set your punishment at death by electrocution, but the law of this state provides first that there will be an additional hearing in this case, at which time the Court will consider aggravating circumstances, extenuating and all other circumstances, concerning the commission of this particular offense. "
have thought that he owed any deference to the jury's "sentence" on the issue whether the death penalty was appropriate for petitioner. [ Footnote 8 ]
Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that a judge's decision to impose the death penalty must be swayed by the fact that the jury returned a "sentence" of death. He points to this Court's opinion in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 , 447 U. S. 645 (1980), which expressed some skepticism about the influence the jury's "sentence" would have on a judge. Beck held unconstitutional the provision of the 1975 Act that precluded the jury from considering lesser included noncapital offenses. The Court reasoned that the provision violated due process, because where the jury's only choices were to convict a defendant of the capital offense and "sentence" him to death, or to acquit him, but the evidence would have supported a lesser included offense verdict, the factfinding process was tainted with irrelevant considerations. On the one hand, the Court reasoned, the unavailability of the option of convicting on a lesser included offense may encourage the jury to convict the defendant of a capital crime because it believes that the defendant is guilty of some serious crime and should be punished. On the other hand, the apparently mandatory nature of the death penalty may encourage the jury to acquit because it believes the defendant does not deserve the death penalty. The unavailability of the lesser included offense option, when it is warranted by the evidence, thus "introduce[s] a level of uncertainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a capital case." Id. at 447 U. S. 642 -643.
Id. at 447 U. S. 645 -646 (footnote omitted). This Court's concern in Beck was that the judge would be inclined to accept the jury's factual finding that the defendant was guilty of a capital offense, not that the judge would be influenced by the jury's "sentence" of death. To "correct" an erroneous guilty verdict, the sentencing judge would have to determine that death was an inappropriate punishment, not because mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances, but because the defendant had not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Obviously, a judge will think hard about the jury's guilty verdict before basing a sentence on the belief that the defendant was not proved guilty of the capital offense. Indeed, the judge should think hard before rejecting the guilty verdict, because the determination of guilt is properly within the province of the jury, and the jury heard the same evidence regarding guilt as the judge.
Petitioner also argues that the requirement that the jury return a "sentence" of death "blurs" the issue of guilt with the issue whether death is the appropriate punishment, and may cause the jury arbitrarily to nullify the mandatory death penalty by acquitting a defendant who is proved guilty, but who the jury, without any guidance, finds undeserving of the death penalty. Petitioner's argument stems from Woodson, where the plurality opinion noted that American juries "persistently" have refused to convict "a significant portion" of those charged with first-degree murder in order to avoid mandatory death penalty statutes, and expressed concern that the unguided exercise of the power to nullify a mandatory sentence would lead to the same "wanton" and "arbitrary" imposition of the death penalty that troubled the Court in Furman. 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 302 -303. The Alabama scheme, however, has not resulted in such arbitrariness. Juries deliberating under the 1975 statute did not act to nullify the mandatory "sentence" by refusing to convict in a significant number of cases; indeed, only 2 of the first 50 defendants tried for capital crimes during the time the 1975 Act was in effect were acquitted. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 641 , n. 18. Thus, while the specter of a mandatory
The wisdom and phraseology of Alabama's curious 1975 statute surely are open to question, as Alabama's abandonment of the statutory scheme in 1981 perhaps indicates. [ Footnote 9 ] This Court has made clear, however, that "we are unwilling to say that there is any one right way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447 , 468 U. S. 464 (1984). See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 884 ; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 195 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). Alabama's requirement that the jury return a "sentence" of death along with its guilty verdict, while unusual, did not render unconstitutional the death sentence the trial judge imposed after independently considering petitioner's background and character and the circumstances of his crime.
It seems to me that the Court evades the constitutional issue presented, see ante at 472 U. S. 386 , n. 8, and resolves this case on the basis of a construction of state law (a) that is inconsistent with the relevant state statute, (b) that does not appear in the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court in this or any other case, and (c) that was not asserted by the State in its arguments before this Court.
" Notwithstanding the fixing of punishment at death by the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, may refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole, which shall be served without parole; or the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, may accordingly sentence the defendant to death."
Ala.Code § 13-11-4 (1975) (emphasis added). The statutory language, particularly the italicized portions, clearly contemplates that a trial judge sentencing a capital defendant is to consider the jury's "fixing of the punishment at death" along with the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. But according to the Court's opinion, the statute is ambiguous as to whether the judge must consider the jury's "sentence" in all cases or only in cases where he has decided that the death penalty may be appropriate. See ante at 472 U. S. 383 . Even if the Court is correct on this point, the ambiguity is irrelevant in every case, including this one, in which the trial judge does in fact impose the death sentence.
out its discussion of Alabama case law, however, the Court simply draws inferences from omissions. No Alabama decision holds affirmatively that the trial judge is not to consider the jury's "sentence." * The passages quoted by the Court, see ante at 472 U. S. 383 -385, establish only that the judge, not the jury, is the sentencing authority. This proposition is not inconsistent with the judge's having to consider the jury's "sentence" in the sentencing process.
* The same is true of the statements of the trial judge in this case. See ante at 472 U. S. 385 -386.
I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 , 428 U. S. 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and would therefore vacate the petitioner Brian Keith Baldwin's death sentence in any event. But even if I thought otherwise, I would vacate Baldwin's death sentence imposed pursuant to Ala.Code §§ 13-11-2(a) and 13-11-4 (1975) for the reasons set forth in JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, which I join.
In my dissenting opinion in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447 , 468 U. S. 467 (1984), I explained at some length why the jury, as the spokesman for the community, plays a critical role in the process of deciding whether to impose the death penalty on a defendant convicted of a capital offense. [ Footnote 2/1 ] It is my view that no death sentence is constitutionally valid unless it has the sanction of a jury. Even if I did not hold that view, however, I could not accept the Court's conclusion that a "misdescribed" jury sentence of death does not infect a judge's subsequent decision to "accept" that sentence. Ante at 472 U. S. 388 .
As the Court demonstrates, it would be patently unconstitutional to uphold the death sentence in this case if the jury's mandatory capital verdict were dispositive. Ante at 472 U. S. 379 -380. In my view, it is also unconstitutional to present an elected trial judge, who might otherwise regard the arguments for and against a death sentence as equally balanced, with the burden of rejecting a jury verdict of this kind before he can impose a sentence of life.
One reason that we have condemned mandatory jury death sentences in the past is that they are unintelligible. When a jury that convicts a defendant of the crime charged must impose a sentence of death, there is no assurance that its sentence represents the jury's belief that death is the "just and appropriate sentence." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 , 428 U. S. 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). For when the jury has followed proper instructions, conviction should mean nothing more than that the jury believed the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; unless the jury is willing to violate a sworn oath and nullify the evidence, the death sentence is automatic. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 , 447 U. S. 642 , 447 U. S. 644 (1980). Of course, even though the verdict is automatic, the jury might believe that the defendant should die. [ Footnote 2/2 ] But even if the jury did
intend the consequent death sentence in some sense, it did so with "no guidance whatsoever," id. at 447 U. S. 640 , and without the "particularized consideration" of relevant factors that the Constitution requires in capital cases. Woodson, supra, at 428 U. S. 303 ; see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 , 428 U. S. 333 -336 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). Thus, a mandatory jury death sentence cannot be said to represent the sort of considered community judgment the Court has approved in the past. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 , 428 U. S. 271 -275 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 , 391 U. S. 519 (1968). [ Footnote 2/3 ] Instead, such a mandatory sentence is so "uncertai[n] and unreliab[le]" that it "cannot be tolerated in a capital case." Beck, supra, at 447 U. S. 643 .
judgment of the community based on consideration of all relevant information concerning the particular offense and defendant at bar, such a sentence represents, at best, the jury's unguided and arbitrary judgment regarding the proper sentence, and, at worst, merely an unwillingness to set a violent criminal free even though the jury would not have imposed death had it had any discretion. Because the sentencing judge cannot possibly know what meaning, if any, a mandatory jury death sentence conveys, such a sentence is "totally irrelevant to the sentencing process." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 , 462 U. S. 885 (1983). In my view, due process of law requires that any death sentence based even in part on such a factor be set aside. Ibid.
The record in this case plainly indicates that the jury's sentence was, in fact, on the mind of the judge that sentenced Baldwin in 1977. [ Footnote 2/4 ] When the judge scheduled Baldwin's sentencing hearing, he noted that "the jury has . . . set your punishment at death by electrocution, but . . . first " he would hold a hearing to consider "all . . . circumstances." 2 Record 249 (emphasis added). His subsequent decision to sentence Baldwin to death was delivered not without reference to the jury's sentence, but rather in terms of "accept[ing]" the death penalty "as fixed by the jury." App. 18. Theoretical speculation regarding what the judge "logically" should have concluded regarding the jury's sentence, ante at 472 U. S. 385 , is insufficient to overcome the obvious consideration demonstrated by the judge's repeated references to the jury's sentence. We do not know how the sentence weighed in the judge's deliberations, but not even the most careful parsing of words can support a conclusion that he did not "conside[r]" it at all. Ibid.
in 1980, seven Justices agreed that "it is manifest that the jury's verdict must have a tendency to motivate the judge to impose the same sentence that the jury did." Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 645 . Today, three Justices have changed their view, and the Court now maintains that "[i]t defies logic to assume that a judge will be swayed to impose the death penalty" by a jury sentence of death that was mandatory. Ante at 472 U. S. 388 . I cannot so easily change my appraisal of human nature. Judges in Alabama, as in many States, are elected. Ala.Const., Amdt. No. 328, § 6.13. They are not insulated from community pressure; indeed, responsiveness and accountability to the community provide the justification for an elected judiciary. [ Footnote 2/5 ] Although a judge may understand that a mandatory jury sentence of death is, in some sense, meaningless ( but see n. 2, supra ), the community probably does not. A jury sentence of death is likely to be reported and understood as a real sentence of death, as it was in this case. [ Footnote 2/6 ]
Whether it "logically" need be so or not, ante at 472 U. S. 385 , 472 U. S. 388 , the plain fact is that a judge who later decides to sentence to life in such circumstances is publicly perceived to have rejected the jury's sentence; indeed, the terms of the statute itself embody that perception. The pressures on a judge that inevitably result should not be ignored. [ Footnote 2/7 ] In my view,
Baldwin's argument is not that a capital sentencing judge may never consider the views of a jury as to the appropriate sentence. The Court has approved a capital sentencing system in which a judge ultimately determines the appropriate punishment after receiving an advisory sentence from a fully informed and properly instructed jury. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (197). But when the jury's sentence is mandatory -- as it is here -- it does not represent the jury's view of an "appropriate" sentence based on full information and the exercise of guided discretion. Rather than providing a sentencing judge with some arguably helpful information about the community's view, such a sentence is either misleading or, at best, irrelevant to the capital sentencing decision. [ Footnote 2/8 ]
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349 , 430 U. S. 358 (1977) (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880 , 463 U. S. 938 (1983) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). A mandatory jury death sentence serves only to mislead the public and to complicate the task of the sentencing judge with confusing signals and irrelevant pressures. Because I believe the Constitution prohibits such influences in capital cases, I respectfully dissent.
"Because it is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally understand such rules, but rather is ultimately understood only as an expression of the community's outrage -- its sense that an individual has lost his moral entitlement to live -- I am convinced that the danger of an excessive response can only be avoided if the decision to impose the death penalty is made by a jury, rather than by a single governmental official. This conviction is consistent with the judgment of history and the current consensus of opinion that juries are better equipped than judges to make capital sentencing decisions. The basic explanation for that consensus lies in the fact that the question whether a sentence of death is excessive in the particular circumstances of any case is one that must be answered by the decisionmaker that is best able to 'express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 , 391 U. S. 519 (1968) (footnote omitted)."
468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 468 -470 (footnotes omitted).
"[M]ost, if not all, jurors at this point in our history perhaps equally abhor setting free a defendant where the evidence establishes his guilt of a serious crime. We have no way of knowing. . . ." Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 642 , quoting Jacobs v. State, 361 So.2d 640, 652 (Ala.1978) (Shores, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979). In this case, Baldwin's jury was told that death was the mandatory sentence upon conviction. 1 Record 20 ("This is a capital crime under the law of this state, and the punishment upon conviction is death by electrocution. There are no lesser included offenses"). The jury was not informed that the judge could later refuse its death sentence. See 2 id. at 237-247, 298-303; Beck, supra, at 447 U. S. 639 , n. 15. The jury's subsequent verdict stated: "We, the Jury, find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, and fix his punishment at death by electrocution." App. 4. Given these facts, I cannot agree with the Court's view that the jury's sentence necessarily "conveys nothing more than the verdict of guilty." Ante at 472 U. S. 388 . It may or it may not. The unavoidable uncertainty of the message is one reason such a sentence creates constitutional difficulties.
Cf. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 , 455 U. S. 112 -114 (1982) (considering record evidence of judge's actual application of Oklahoma capital sentencing law).
We approvingly quoted Justice Jones of the Supreme Court of Alabama to this effect in Beck, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 645 , n. 22, after noting that "it is fair to infer that the jury verdict will ordinarily be followed by the judge," id. at 447 U. S. 645 .
See also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 475 , n. 14 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("if the jury recommends death, an elected Florida judge sensitive to community sentiment would have an additional reason to follow that recommendation"); Ritter v. Smith, 568 F.Supp. 1499, 1521 (SD Ala.1983) (the identical claim to Baldwin's "appears to be substantial. The automatic death penalty, combined with the inclusion of that penalty in the actual sentencing formula and the sentencing judge's position with respect to the public, might in some circumstances prejudice a defendant where the sentencing decision presented a close case").
In any case, such a purpose would not save this scheme from invalidation, given the arbitrariness inherent in the means. Because every jury in this situation knows that death is the mandatory sentence and has the option of acquittal, the legislature's message will be conveyed only at the whim of any particular jury. Thus, whether or not such a legislative message would be constitutional standing alone, the constitutional procedural flaw of "unguided and unchecked jury discretion" condemned in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 , 428 U. S. 302 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), is not removed by the State's theory.