Source: https://m.openjurist.org/664/f2d/946
Timestamp: 2020-07-15 23:12:16
Document Index: 730472353

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 55', '§ 59', '§ 192']

664 F2d 946 West India Industries Inc v. Tradex Tradex Petroleum Services | OpenJurist
664 F. 2d 946 - West India Industries Inc v. Tradex Tradex Petroleum Services
664 F2d 946 West India Industries Inc v. Tradex Tradex Petroleum Services
664 F.2d 946
WEST INDIA INDUSTRIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
TRADEX, TRADEX PETROLEUM SERVICES, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 80-1896.
A bill of lading is an acknowledgment by a carrier that it has received goods for shipment. G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 3-1, at 93 (2d ed. 1975); 1 T. Parsons, A Treatise on the Law of Shipping and the Law and Practice of Admiralty 190 (Boston 1869). The bill of lading is also a contract of carriage. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra, § 3-1, at 93; 1 T. Parsons, supra, at 190; see Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Delta S. S. Lines, Inc., 562 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1977), modified per curiam on other grounds, 571 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1978); Cabot Corp. v. S. S. Mormascan, 441 F.2d 476, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 855, 92 S.Ct. 104, 30 L.Ed.2d 96 (1971). It serves this function whether negotiable or not. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra, § 3-1, at 93. In addition, "if the bill is negotiable (as, for all practical purposes, all ocean bills are) it controls possession of the goods and is one of the indispensable documents in financing the movement of commodities and merchandise throughout the world." Id. (footnote omitted).
We need not expatiate on the effect of the October letter between Colburn and Howell. Even if, as West India argues, it was a contract,3 it was nevertheless superseded by the bill of lading. Universal Am. Corp. v. S.S. Hoegh Drake, 264 F.Supp. 747, 751-52 (S.D.N.Y.1966); Armour & Co. v. Leopold Walford (London), Ltd., (1921) 3 K.B. 473, 474, 475-76; H. Longley, Common Carriage of Cargo § 3.04(3), at 23 (1967).
West India seems to argue that, if the October 26 letter was a contract, it was thereafter immutable. To state this proposition baldly is to expose its error. Be a contract ever so binding, it is but a meeting of the minds, and those who enter into a contract may by mutual agreement rescind or alter it.4 Parties may, therefore, after they have formed a contract for carriage, assent to different terms contained in a bill of lading, and "thereby ma(k)e a new and different contract." Northern Pac. Ry. v. American Trading Co., 195 U.S. 439, 463, 25 S.Ct. 84, 92, 49 L.Ed. 269, 279 (1904).5
There is no greater merit to West India's contention that its agents lacked authority to change the letter agreement of October 26, 1978. The evidence supports the district court's finding that both Taurel and its employee Brisino were authorized to prepare and issue bills of lading on behalf of West India, and that the bills of lading at issue in this case were prepared and executed in accordance with that authority. Cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. American Trading Co., 195 U.S. at 463, 25 S.Ct. at 92, 49 L.Ed. at 279 ("the mere reception of (a) bill of lading by a clerk ... without evidence of any authority in him to consent to a modification of the contract already made by his employer"). West India, therefore, is bound by the contract embodied in the bill of lading. E. g., Sun Oil Co. v. Behring Properties, Inc., 480 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039, 94 S.Ct. 539, 38 L.Ed.2d 329 (1973); W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency §§ 55-56 (1964).
In one of the parts of his deposition that were read into evidence, David Howell said that "the so-called agreement with West India"-that is, the October letter-"was tentative." Our disposition of this case, however, makes it unnecessary for us to elaborate on the possibility that the October letter between Colburn and Howell was "a preliminary memorandum only, and not a final and definite statement of all the terms of the agreement between the parties." The Caledonia, 43 F. 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1890), aff'd, 157 U.S. 124, 137, 15 S.Ct. 537, 543, 39 L.Ed. 644, 648 (1895); accord, The Henry S. Grove, 292 F. 502 (D.Wash.1923)
Toyo Kisen Kaisha v. W. R. Grace & Co., 53 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1931); see Nichimen Co. v. M. V. Farland, 462 F.2d 319, 328 n.4 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing and quoting cases); Transmarine Corp. v. Charles H. Levitt & Co., 25 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1928) (L. Hand, J.); Equi Valley Marble Co. v. Becker, 165 F. 437, 438 (2d Cir. 1908), aff'g 153 F. 378, 380 (S.D.N.Y.1907); American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 81 F.Supp. 438, 447-48 (S.D.N.Y.1948), modified and aff'd, 194 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978, 72 S.Ct. 1076, 96 L.Ed. 1370 (1952); United States v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 295 F. 691, 692-93 (W.D.Wash.1924); The Chadwicke, 29 F. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y.1887); Armour & Co. v. Leopold Walford (London), Ltd., (1921) 3 K.B. at 477; W. Poor, American Law of Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading § 59 (5th ed. 1968).
1A A. Corbin, supra, § 192, at 180 (1963); accord, id. at 182 ("the giving of something different from what was previously due, even though of slight value"); see American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Naviera Andes Peruana, S. A., 208 F.Supp. 164, 169 (N.D.Cal.1962) (shipping company made concessions for which other party "ha(d) given no new consideration"), aff'd, 327 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964); cf. Missouri, Kan., & Tex. Ry. v. Ward, 244 U.S. 383, 386, 37 S.Ct. 617, 619, 61 L.Ed. 1213, 1215 (1917) (Brandeis, J.) ("As appellants were already bound (by statute) to transport the (goods) at the rate and upon the terms named in the original bill of lading, the acceptance by the shipper of the second bill was without consideration and was void.").
Courts construe a bill of lading strictly against the party that drafted it. The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124, 137, 15 S.Ct. 537, 543, 39 L.Ed. 644, 648 (1895) ("As the exceptions (in the bill of lading) were introduced by the shipowners themselves in their own favor, they are to be construed most strongly against them ...."); Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 807, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1981) ("ocean bills of lading are contracts of adhesion ambiguities in which must be resolved against the carrier"); Toyo Kisen Kaisha v. W. R. Grace & Co., 53 F.2d at 744 ("a bill of lading is to be construed strictly against the carrier"); E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1931) (L. Hand, J.) ("the language of a bill of lading must be taken against the carrier"); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Doyle, 142 F. 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1906) ("Any reasonable doubt as to the proper interpretation of the contract should be resolved against the (carrier). It chose the language incorporated in the printed portions of the bill of lading."); see Tessler Bros. (B. C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438, 444-45 (9th Cir. 1974); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. SS Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 15 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964, 90 S.Ct. 998, 25 L.Ed.2d 255 (1970); cf. United States v. Strickland Transp. Co., 200 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1952) ("if it could be considered that there is an ambiguity in the tariff and it is not made clear under which rating the articles shipped come, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the shipper")