Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/423/161/
Timestamp: 2020-01-23 04:41:27
Document Index: 695888086

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6851', '§ 7421', '§ 7421', '§ 2201', '§ 7421', '§ 6861', '§ 6851', '§ 6851', '§ 6861', '§ 6201', '§ 6851', '§ 6861', '§ 6861', '§ 6851', '§ 6851', '§ 6851']

Laing v. United States :: 423 U.S. 161 (1976) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 423 › Laing v. United States
Decided January 13, 1976423 U.S. 161ast|>*
The District Court, relying on its controlling court's decision in Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (CA2 1973), held that a notice of deficiency is not required when a taxable period is terminated pursuant to § 6851(a)(1), and dismissed the suit as prohibited by the Federal Anti-Injunction Act, § 7421(a) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), and as within the plain wording of the exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, for a controversy with respect to federal taxes. 364 F. Supp. 469 (1973).
Respondent Hall instituted suit on February 13 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, seeking injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. The court issued an order temporarily restraining the IRS from selling the automobile and from seizing any more of respondent's property. Thereafter, relying upon Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (Md.1969), the court held that the Federal Anti-Injunction Act, § 7421(a), was inapplicable because of the IRS's failure to follow the procedures of § 6861 et seq. The court ordered the return of respondent's automobile upon her posting a bond in the amount of its fair market value. [Footnote 11] It issued a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants (the United States, the Acting District Director, the Group Supervisor of Internal Revenue, and a lieutenant of the Kentucky State Police)
In the past, the Government has argued that § 6851 contained its own assessment authority, see Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (Md.1969), but it has since abandoned that position, see Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398, 401 (Ariz.1973), and it does not press the point here. Cf. n 17, infra.
The first is the inescapable fact that the assessment authority for an amount made "immediately due and payable" under § 6851(a) is not § 6861, but is the general authority granted by § 6201. Indeed, during the time the Revenue Act of 1918 was in effect, that is, until the Revenue Act of 1921 was adopted, only § 6851's predecessor was in existence; the predecessor of § 6861 had not yet appeared. Thus, I disagree with the suggestions contained in Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 121 (CA5 1974), in Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064 (CA6 1974), and in Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1273 (Md.1969), that the placement of § 6861 in the Code immediately following § 6851 served to establish a new procedure mandatory for a proceeding under § 6851. That approach is expressly
that this result would produce "significant constitutional problems." Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d at 1064-1065. See also Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. at 1281. This constitutional reservation has been prompted by the concern that, if a notice of deficiency is not required for a terminated taxable period, the taxpayer does not have the benefit of immediate access to the Tax Court.
See 423 U.S. 161fn2/10|>n. 10, infra.
The Government, on at least one occasion in the past, has contended that § 6851 did contain its own assessment authority. See Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1276 (Md.1969). In the present cases, however, the Government states that the statute does not go so far. Brief for United States 20.
Oral Reargument - October 15, 1975
Oral Argument - January 21, 1975
Opinion Announcement - January 13, 1976