Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/552/573/169391/
Timestamp: 2019-05-26 11:17:04
Document Index: 681924212

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 921', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 127', '§ 125']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Francis A. Behenna, Appellant, 552 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1977 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Francis A. Behenna, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Francis A. Behenna, Appellant, 552 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 552 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977)
Submitted Oct. 13, 1976. Decided March 23, 1977
A jury convicted Francis A. Behenna of making a particularized false statement to two South Carolina licensed firearms dealers in connection with the purchase of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (6). He appeals, contending that the district court erred in refusing a request to instruct the jury that a defendant's honest and reasonable belief that he could legally purchase a firearm was a defense to the charged violation of the statute.
The general rule is that the prosecution does not have to show affirmative criminal intent on the part of the accused to establish a violation of section 922(a) (6). See, e.g., Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 38 (8 Cir. 1972). Nevertheless, the statute does require proof that the defendant knowingly made a false statement intended or likely to deceive the dealer with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale. This court has recognized that "(t)he word 'knowingly' in § 922(a) (6) incorporates scienter as an asserted element of the offense." United States v. Hedgecoe, 420 F.2d 458, 459 n. 1 (4 Cir. 1970); see also United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859 (2 Cir. 1971).
In United States v. Hedgecoe, supra, the defendant had certified on a federal gun purchase form that he was not prohibited by federal law from purchasing firearms. In fact, however, he was a convicted felon. Hedgecoe pleaded guilty to the charge of violating § 922(a) (6) in the purchase of a firearm but asserted that he did not know at the time of his purchase that he was barred from purchasing firearms. This court ordered Hedgecoe's guilty pleas stricken because "if he did not know of his disqualification, he acted without the required scienter in certifying that he was qualified." 420 F.2d at 460. Similarly, in the instant case, if defendant reasonably and honestly believed that he was entitled to purchase firearms in South Carolina, he acted without the scienter specifically charged in the indictment. He could not have "knowingly" misrepresented his eligibility to purchase firearms in regard to his residency if he reasonably and honestly believed that he was a South Carolina resident. Because the indictment specifically charged Behenna with knowingly misrepresenting that he was a South Carolina resident, the judge should have instructed the jury on that very narrow issue. The combination of the indictment as written and the court's instructions did not properly present the issue which had to be resolved by the jury in order to find Behenna guilty as charged.
Viewing the evidence and inferences from it in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. VanFossen, 460 F.2d 38, 40 (4th Cir. 1972), the jury could have fairly found that Behenna was an interstate gunrunner who pretended to be a South Carolina resident in order to buy handguns for his New York trade. The Congress has taken a dim view of the traffic and has extensively regulated it. 18 U.S.C. § 921, et seq. Behenna was indicted under the penalty section of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924, for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (6), which makes it an offense to knowingly make any false statement intended or likely to deceive the dealer with respect to any material fact going to the lawfulness of the sale. Because of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (5), the sales made to Behenna were unlawful if the dealer knew or had reasonable cause to believe Behenna resided in a state other than South Carolina. Therefore Behenna lied to the dealer. He gave as his "residence address" a large vacant lot on Highway 76 which he did not even own. Rabbits reside in fields. Persons do not. Since Behenna knew that he had to claim residence in South Carolina (the dealer had told him so), he obviously intended to falsely claim residence in South Carolina in a place fit for moles and birds but not for humans.
The indictment charged him with having falsely certified that he was a resident of South Carolina when, in truth and fact, as he well knew, he was not. To so certify violates the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (6).
The district judge fairly and correctly charged the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "that the defendant knowingly made a false or fictitious statement . . . in connection with the firearm, which was likely or intended to deceive the dealer with respect to any material fact." Appendix at 101. The judge defined the meaning of residence, and if he erred, it was in favor of the defendant. After correctly telling the jury that "it is possible for a person to have more than one place of residence," Appendix at 110, giving as an example one who resides in South Carolina permanently but who has a summer home in Florida or in the North Carolina mountains, he then framed a question for the jury highly favorable to the defendant's contention: "Did the defendant really intend to become a resident of South Carolina when he obtained his voter registration and when he purchased the firearm in question?" That instruction was more than the defendant was entitled to. It put into the case the defendant's subjective intent which relates to domicile, not residence. Behenna's intention with respect to establishing a residence in South Carolina would become important if domicile were the question, but, even then, only if there was some evidence suggesting that he had done something toward making South Carolina his home or one of his homes, e.g., renting a room, or buying a house, or taking household effects or clothing and leaving them in a place of habitation to which he expected to return. See Wehrle v. Brooks, 269 F. Supp. 785 (W.D.N.C. 1966). Here, there was not one scintilla of evidence that Behenna had done any such thing other than to register to vote, and I would judicially notice there is no residency requirement to get a voter registration certificate in the State of South Carolina, i.e., one does not have to be there any particular length of time in order to get such a certificate.
The indictment and the district judge's charge, read together, made Behenna's state of mind his knowledge of the falsity of his statement as to residence a defense. I would not go further and hold, as does the panel, that he was entitled to an instruction on these facts that if he honestly and reasonably believed that he could legally purchase the guns the jury should acquit. To so charge puts into a regulatory measure enacted in the interest of public safety an idea of mens rea, or evil intent, that properly belongs in other areas of the criminal law. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 44 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1975); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 28 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1971); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S. Ct. 134, 88 L. Ed. 48 (1943). It suffices under this statute and this indictment that Behenna lied about his place of residence falsely claiming it to be an open field in South Carolina.
It is unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 922(b) (3) for any dealer to sell a firearm to "any person who the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in . . . the State in which licensee's place of business is located . . . ."
The Eighth Circuit in Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 38 (8 Cir. 1972), recognized that the question to be resolved by the jury in a case involving the violation of section 922(a) (6) is whether the defendant "understood the facts, not the law." The jurors in the present case were never presented with the ultimate factual issue whether Behenna knew he was not a resident of South Carolina but instead were instructed only on the technical, legal definition of what constitutes residency. The jury should have been permitted to determine whether Behenna reasonably and honestly believed that he was a resident at the time he purchased the firearms. Behenna may very well have thought that he had met the technical requirements of becoming a South Carolina resident by obtaining a voter's registration card because the clerk at the sporting goods store had suggested to him that a South Carolina voter registration card or a driver's license would be sufficient identification of a resident to entitle him to purchase a firearm
The phrase "as the defendant then and there well knew, he was not a resident of the State of South Carolina" in the indictment cannot be treated as surplusage. Professor Wright states, "Words descriptive of what is legally essential to the charge in the indictment cannot be stricken as surplusage." 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 127, at 278 (3d ed. 1969). In the instant case the above-quoted phrase from the indictment is descriptive of the requirement of scienter, a necessary element to prove a violation of section 922(a) (6). United States v. Hedgecoe, supra at 459 n. 1
If the indictment was limited to merely the statutory language necessary to state a violation of section 922(a) (6), this "bare bones" indictment might be sufficient, but it would not have informed the defendant in what specific manner he allegedly violated the statute. Section 922(a) (6) is written in very broad and general terms ( . . . knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any false, fictitious or misrepresented identification, intended or likely to deceive such . . . dealer . . . with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale . . . (Emphasis added)) and a wide range of actions could constitute a violation of the statute. Professor Wright states: "(i)f the statute is couched in general terms, the indictment must particularize the offense sufficiently to inform the defendant of the accusation he must meet." 1 C. Wright § 125, at 238. If the indictment had been limited merely to the statutory language, the defendant would probably have requested a bill of particulars under Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to ascertain the specific accusation which he would have to meet. But because the indictment in the instant case specifically informed Behenna of the actions that the government contended were a violation of the statute, it was only logical that he would undertake to defend against the specific charge in the indictment.