Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/99209632/Forest-Park-Pictures-et-al-v-Universal-Television-Network-11-CV-2011-2012-U-S-App-LEXIS-13068-2d-Cir-June-26-2012
Timestamp: 2015-10-06 19:56:15
Document Index: 227343363

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 106', '§ 19', '§ 1', '§ 106', '§ 19', '§ 1']

Forest Park Pictures et al. v. Universal Television Network, 11-CV-2011, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 13068 (2d Cir. June 26, 2012)
P. 1Forest Park Pictures et al. v. Universal Television Network, 11-CV-2011, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 13068 (2d Cir. June 26, 2012)Forest Park Pictures et al. v. Universal Television Network, 11-CV-2011, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 13068 (2d Cir. June 26, 2012)Ratings: (0)|Views: 25|Likes: 0Published by Charles Colman Law, PLLCExcerpt: "In this case, the issue is whether a particular breach of contract claim survives preemption. More specifically, Forest Park alleges that it entered into an implied-in-fact agreement with USA Network that required USA Network to pay Forest Park for the use of its idea. See Complaint ¶¶ 24-26. There are several qualitative differences between such a contract claim and a copyright violation claim. First, the Copyright Act does not provide an express right for the copyright owner to receive payment for the use of a work. It simply gives the copyright owner the right to prevent distribution, copying, or the creation of derivative works (though, of course, the copyright owner may cede or all part of these rights for payment). See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Second, a plaintiff suing for failure to pay under a contract must prove extra elements beyond use or copying, including mutual assent and valid consideration. Third, a breach of contract claim asserts rights only against the contractual counterparty, not the public at large. As the Seventh Circuit explained in ProCD, "A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights.'" 86 F.3d at 1454.A number of our sister circuits have accordingly concluded that at least some contract claims involving the subject matter of copyright do not contest rights that are the equivalent of rights under the Copyright Act, and thus are not preempted. See Montz, 649 F.3d at 980-81 (implied-in-fact contract); Utopia Provider Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Med Clinical Sys., L.L.C., 596 F.3d 1313, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2010) (express contract); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying First Circuit law to an express contract in a software license); Wrench, 256 F.3d at 456 (implied-in-fact contract); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454-55 (express contract in a software license); Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (express licensing agreement); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1490, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990) (express contract); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (express contract); see also 4 Nimmer § 19D.03[C][2] ("As a general rule, contract claims require proof of a significant 'extra element': the existence of an actual agreement between plaintiff and defendant involving a promise to pay for use of disclosed ideas. That conclusion is the same, regardless of whether the particular claim at issue is labeled express contract [or] implied-in-fact contract . . . ." (footnotes omitted)). Of course, preemption cannot be avoided simply by labeling a claim "breach of contract." A plaintiff must actually allege the elements of an enforceable contract (whether express or implied-in-fact), including offer, acceptance, and consideration, in addition to adequately alleging the defendant's breach of the contract.As long as the elements of a contract are properly pleaded, there is no difference for preemption purposes between an express contract and an implied-in-fact contract. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (under New York law, proof of an implied-in-fact contract requires proof of the same elements as an express contract); Warner Bros. Int'l Television Distribution v. Golden Channels & Co., 522 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) (same under California law). There is, however, a significant difference for preemption purposes between contracts implied-in-fact and contracts implied-in-law. Theories of implied-in-law contract, quasi-contract, or unjust enrichment differ significantly from breach of contract because the plaintiff need not allege the existence of an actual agreement between the parties. See 1-1 Corbin on Contracts § 1.20 ("A contract 'implied in law' is a fictitious contract. . . . A contract Excerpt: "In this case, the issue is whether a particular breach of contract claim survives preemption. More specifically, Forest Park alleges that it entered into an implied-in-fact agreement with USA Network that required USA Network to pay Forest Park for the use of its idea. See Complaint ¶¶ 24-26. There are several qualitative differences between such a contract claim and a copyright violation claim. First, the Copyright Act does not provide an express right for the copyright owner to receive payment for the use of a work. It simply gives the copyright owner the right to prevent distribution, copying, or the creation of derivative works (though, of course, the copyright owner may cede or all part of these rights for payment). See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Second, a plaintiff suing for failure to pay under a contract must prove extra elements beyond use or copying, including mutual assent and valid consideration. Third, a breach of contract claim asserts rights only against the contractual counterparty, not the public at large. As the Seventh Circuit explained in ProCD, "A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights.'" 86 F.3d at 1454.A number of our sister circuits have accordingly concluded that at least some contract claims involving the subject matter of copyright do not contest rights that are the equivalent of rights under the Copyright Act, and thus are not preempted. See Montz, 649 F.3d at 980-81 (implied-in-fact contract); Utopia Provider Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Med Clinical Sys., L.L.C., 596 F.3d 1313, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2010) (express contract); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying First Circuit law to an express contract in a software license); Wrench, 256 F.3d at 456 (implied-in-fact contract); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454-55 (express contract in a software license); Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (express licensing agreement); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1490, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990) (express contract); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (express contract); see also 4 Nimmer § 19D.03[C][2] ("As a general rule, contract claims require proof of a significant 'extra element': the existence of an actual agreement between plaintiff and defendant involving a promise to pay for use of disclosed ideas. That conclusion is the same, regardless of whether the particular claim at issue is labeled express contract [or] implied-in-fact contract . . . ." (footnotes omitted)). Of course, preemption cannot be avoided simply by labeling a claim "breach of contract." A plaintiff must actually allege the elements of an enforceable contract (whether express or implied-in-fact), including offer, acceptance, and consideration, in addition to adequately alleging the defendant's breach of the contract.As long as the elements of a contract are properly pleaded, there is no difference for preemption purposes between an express contract and an implied-in-fact contract. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (under New York law, proof of an implied-in-fact contract requires proof of the same elements as an express contract); Warner Bros. Int'l Television Distribution v. Golden Channels & Co., 522 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) (same under California law). There is, however, a significant difference for preemption purposes between contracts implied-in-fact and contracts implied-in-law. Theories of implied-in-law contract, quasi-contract, or unjust enrichment differ significantly from breach of contract because the plaintiff need not allege the existence of an actual agreement between the parties. See 1-1 Corbin on Contracts § 1.20 ("A contract 'implied in law' is a fictitious contract. . . . A contract More info:Categories:Types, Business/Law, Court FilingsPublished by: Charles Colman Law, PLLC on Jul 05, 2012Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee moreSee lesshttps://www.scribd.com/doc/99209632/Forest-Park-Pictures-et-al-v-Universal-Television-Network-11-CV-2011-2012-U-S-App-LEXIS-13068-2d-Cir-June-26-201207/05/2012pdftextoriginal 4
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